AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
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Doc. No. 2672 International Kilitary Tribunal Far East The United States of America and Others, versus ARAKI Sadao and Others. ffidavit I am 'HATSUliURA Tomokatsu, formerly Major-General of the Japanese Army, ard Was born in the 32nd year of lieiji /1899/. I state here as follows I served in the Japanese Army General Staff Office in various capacities in and after the 4th year of SHOWA /1З.29/. In October of the l6th year of SHOWA /1941/, I became chief of the 5th section (Soviet Russian Intelligence) of the 2nd dept. (Intelligence) in the Army General Staff Office. In August of l8th year of SHOWA /19 А 3/, I was transferred from that post to that of the chief of the 1st section (operations) of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, In March of 20th year of 'SIIOM /1045/ 1 was appointed Vice-Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, remaining in that post until the surrender. I testify as follovi's the facts I knew in relation to my duties during the period mentioned abovet- 1) Having arrived at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in the igtb У ряг nr rho'TA a s t h e Chief of the Strategy Section, was first of all informed of the operations plan kept by the Headquarters. At this time I was informed of the directives of the Army General Staff concerning the operations plan against Soviet Russia for the lZth_year of"SHOWA /1942f and the operations plan itself of the Kwantung Army Headquarters basod upon the said directives. The directives of the Army General Staff instructed \ the Kwantung Arm^rTTeadguartar^ to fora'pr. operations plan against Soviet Russia with the occupation of the Haritime Provinces of Soviet Russia and the destruction of the air- bases in the Maritime Province as the general objectives, and also to focus the principal attack upon Voroshilov. It was also written in the directives that the Kwantung Army should make preparations for further operations after occupation of the Maritime Provinces. The operations plan made by the Kwantung Army Head- quarters according to the above directives in 17th year- of SHOWA /1942/ contained the following items: - Doc. No. 2672 Page 2 1) The general tasks of the Kwantung Army. 2) Distribution of military strength. 3) The tasks of the different fronts and armies. The tasks as set forth in the afore-mentioned directive of the Army General Staff were indicated as the general tasks of the Kwantung Army. In the item of the distribution of military strength, it was planned that the First Fronc,, the Second Front and the Sixth Army should participate in the operation against Soviet Russia. The First Front comprised 4 armies (the 2nd, 3rd, 20th. 5th Army), consisting of 15 infantry divisions, and 2 tank divisions. Furthermore, besides the First Front Armies, one independent infantry division was stationed at CHIAKUSU in order to protect the left wing of the First Area Army. The Second Front was planned to comprise two Armies (the Fourth Army and a certain other Army) consisting of seven divisions? and the Sixth Army consisting of four divisions. Besides these there were three infantry divisions as the general reserve of the Kwantung Army and the Second Air Force Army consisting of four air divisions were under diroct control of the Kwantung Army. In the item concerning the tasks of the different fronts and armies, the task of the First Front was indicated as follows? that the Second Army should attack from CHIENTAO Area toward the &:>utho?n GSSURI Area- that the Third Army should attack from T'lJ!IGHrJG Area toward VOROSEILOVr that the Twentieth Army should attack from the area to the w e s t of Lake IChanka toward VOROSEILOVj and that the Fifth лгшу should attack from HUTOW Area toward IIAN Area and thereby cut off the enemy's communica tions extending from south to north and later have one part of the force cover the north and have another part advance southward to facilitate the attack of the main force on VCRCSII1L0V. Although it is not expressly indicated in the plan_, ic can be presumed that the occupation of VLADIVOSTOK was to follow that of VORGSHILOV The tasks of the Second Front were indicated as follows: that the Fourth Army and a certain other Army should be stationed in the SDI'1-Ш.Т and EEI-HO Areas respectively, where they were to check the Soviet Army in the ALUR River Area. Doc. По. 2672 Page 4 We used to deliver intelligence to the l6th Section (in charge of German affairs about once a month. The above was written by my owr. hand and the contents are true. (Signed) lOLTSULXTRA, Tomckatsu Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named I/ATSUIURA, Tomokatsu, at the Soviet Embassy Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of September, 19<6. /signed/ Roland J. Schwartz Roland J. Schwartz Captain Т.О. Summary Courts I artial C E R T I F I C A T E I, 2d Lt. John D. Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English language and that this day, the said Matsumura,- Tomokatsu, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence? and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanes into English and English into Japanese and fully under- stood and. comprehended by said Affiant. Dated this 27th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan. /signed 7 John D. Hattori JOHN D. HATTORI 2d Lt. Central Interrogation Section. Doc. No. 2672 Page 3 The task of defensive in the Soviet Army from operation of the the Sixth Army was to stand on the KSINGAK mountain-range against the ZA3AIKALYE and cover"the offensive First" Front. The operations plan against Soviet Russia for SHQWA 17./1942/ was signed by General U1IEZU, Commander of the Kwantimg Army, Hieutenant-General EASAHAHA*, Chief of Staff, and Colonel TAI.URA, Chief of the Operations Section. It was not clear to SovietTnion would be с related to operations. iinst '•war against only of know the matters "oT war ag? me whether г ried on Г T attors concerning the political Soviet Russia were under the authoritу of the government, and I know nothing about them. л c -iS for operations plan against Soviet Russia for SIICV7A 18 /1943/ the Army General Staff gave us no now directives the general practice /1942' was followed whatever. Therefore, according to in the Army, the plan for SHCWA 17 in SHOWA 18 7 19< 3 / as well. 1941 Immediately as Chief of after my assumption of office in October the 5th gfvQt-i on CSovie.t-r elations) of ftVtM < the 2nd Department, Lieutenant General 1 1 ut^rT the Chief of the 2nd department. ' office to deliver 4- ' Soviet OrAI .OTC, _Seifuku, order in his gave me an the intelligence relating to the Union collected by the 5th Section to the l6th 1Г J S Section (GERI.AF RELATIONS) of the 2nd Department. On this occasion, Lt.-General OICAb ОТО explained to me that the intelligence was wanted by T'RETSCEi'AR, • German military attache. Thenceforth, in accordance with the orders given by Lt.-General OfAhCTC, Seifuku, Chief of the 2nd Department, and his successor Lt.-General ARISUE, Seizo, I systematically forwarded to the l6th Section (GERI'/AN RELATIONS) for Colonel KEETSCHNSR the intelligence regarding Soviet military forces, their disposition in the Far East, war potential of the Soviet Union, movement of Soviet divisions to the west-from the Far East, internal movements of Soviet strength, and reconstruction of the withdrawn Soviet industries. These ,intelligences were based upon materials reported to the General Staff Office from Japanese military g.ttecb^s in MOSCOW and various other intelligence sources. They 'were arranged by officers of my section and after my examination were delivered directly to the l6th Section. Sometimes important ones were delivered to the l6th Section after I had examined tbem and after Chief of the 2nd Department had gone over them. if Ur-tfi_ / /br^-ii*^ л** ^ /г 0-4.. л M . ^JUajsM-L J \ • v. Ке^ ^Ш ; •• v - • П • .Л Doc. ITo. 1981 9 Witness Interrogation Affidavit At Khabarovsk March 28, 1946 I, Col. of Justice Ivanof, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo, interrogated through the interpreter officer, Lt. Petrof, the following person as a witness, having previously warned him of the responsibility he should take upon hinself in case of false statements, according to Article 95 of the Criminal Law of the TJ.S.S.R. 1. Наше: Kaztuna OTSIJbO 2. Age: 51 3. Official Position: Chief of Staff of the Third front of the Kwantung Army 4. Political Affiliations: None 5. Present Location: Khabarovsk A. certificate concerning the responsibility of the witness for false statement and also the interpreter-officer's for false interpreta- tion are attached to this affidavit. Kazuma OTSUBO From when have you been in the service of the Japanese Army? What kind of military education have you received? In what position have you served? A. I entered the active service in 1918. I graduated from the Military Academy in the same year, and" from the Army Staff College in 1930. Then I became a Company Commander of the Third Mountain Artillery Regiment. From 1931 to 1936, I served in the Military Affairs Sec- tion of the War Ministry and from 1936 to 1937, in the Field Artil- lery School as an instructor in tactics. In 1937, I was transferred to the Artillery Section of the Department of Military Education. Prom 1937 to 1939, I served as a staff-officer of the Middle China Expeditionary Army, and from 1939 to 1940, I served again in the Artillery Section of the Department of Military Education. From 1941 to 1942, I became commander of an artillery regiment in Horth China. From 1941 to 1942, I served in the Artillery Section of the Departmen" of Military Education, ^rom 1ЭЛЗ to 19.4^, I was Chief of the Heavy Artiliery School. In 194o, Г о-г-ап̂ Chief of Staff of the Third front, the post of which i hold as my last duty in the Army. Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 Q. From when and. to what time have you been in service in Manchuria? A. Prom March to August, 1945, until I was interned Ъу the Soviet Army. 4. Have you never been in service in Manchuria before that? A. I was the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Division under the command of the Sixth Army, Kailar, for eleven months in 1942-43. The then Commanders of the Sixth Army were Lt.-Gens. KITA and ISEIG-ШЮ. Q,. When and where was the Second front Headquarters established? A. In 1942, at Chichihaerh. Q,. Of what armies did the Second front consist? A. It consisted of the 4th and the Sixth armies. 4. In what direction were these Armies? A. Tlie 4th Army stationed in the direction of Blagoveshchensk and 6th Army stationed in the direction of 3ozzia-Danria. Q,. When were the First front Headquarters established in Manchuria? A. The First front Headquarters were established at the same time with those of the Second front, in May or June, 1942. Q,. For what reason were these two fronts composed in Manchuria in 1942r The Japanese were preparing war against Soviet, weren't they? A. I heard that, as the military strength of the Kwantung Army had beer increased owing to the realization of the "Kan-Tolcu-Sn" plan, fronts were newly organized in order to make the commander ship easy, and the Kwantung Army Headquarters too£ the command of these fronts. Q,. How much was the military strength of the Kwantung Army in 1942? A. The Kwantung Army had the military forces of about fifteen division? Q. Were there any other army formations, for example, brigades or general reservists corps, etc.? A. There were, besides eight Frontier-Guards detachments the front in which I served had three Frontier-Guards detachments, but there wer« eight in all in the Kwantung Army. There were no brigades at the time of "Kan-Toku-En", but just before the war was opened, the Frontier-Guaras were reorganized into brigades and thus ten brigade? were formed. Doc. No. 1981 Page 3 Q,. When and. from whom did you near about the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? A. In July, 1941, when I wa? in service of the Artillery Jection of the Department of Military Education. I saw the name of the plan on the documents which were sent to there from the War Ministry. Q. What measures was the Department of Military Education compelled to take by the plan of the "Kan-Toku-En"? A. The special purpose of the "Kan-Toku-En" plan was the speedy train- ing of troops for the emergency of war. It was difficult to prac- tice the training in the Japanese homeland. Q,. Were these the troops prepared for the war against Soviet according to the plan of the "Kan-Toku-En" in 1941-42? A. These were the troops to be used, for example, in the wars against Soviet, the United States, or Britain, according to the changes in international situation. Q,. Against what country was Manchuria a basis for war? A. Manchuria was the basis for war against Soviet and China. It was important for war against U.S. too. Q. Was it prearranged, in the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, to (complete the con- struction of railways as well as of warehouses necessary for the supply of munitions and foods to the Kwantung Army? A . Though I don't know much about the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, I think such matters were prearranged. As the measures prearranged in the plan were kept in secrecy, I don't know them exactly. Q. Was the designation, "Kan-Toku-En", a cipher for the measure for the increase and strengthening of the Kwantung Arm;.-? A. The meaning of this designation is the special manoeuvre of the Kwantung Army. The men wi:c were sent to Manchuria from home in 1941, according to thi^ plan, were told that they were going to have a special manoeuvre. Q,. Then, were the conuenbratioi and the strategic deployment of military forces in Manchuria kept f.r. пе̂ге̂у even to the Japanese enlisted men transported tc i'r"u irar 4 a"' A. The increase of the К-'ал ип̂ A-my ъа" t t— the enlisted men. Q,. How much was the Kwantrng A^ry increased by the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 A . In 1941, the military formations of the Kwantung Army were put into the wartime organization,the deployment of the troops was a strategic one. The increased strength was some 300,000 men and the total num- bered about 600,000. Q. Was each division of the Kwantung Army mainly arranged to the quarters in strategic directions most important in the war against Soviet? A. Yes, all divisions were stationed at the places mainly strategic important in the war against Soviet. Q. Can you come to the conclusion that the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army made the strategic deployment of the Kwantung Army in 1941, for the war against Soviet? A. Yes; according to my private opinion, this strategic deployment was made for the war against Soviet. Q,. Were the Headquarters of the First and the Second fronts established in conjunction with these circumstances? A . Yes; I think the Headquarters of the First and the Second fronts of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria were organized in connection with the strategic deployment of the troops. 0,. Where was the "Kan-Toku-En" plan made? A. In the Japanese Army General Staff. ft. Who was the Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff at the time of the making of the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? A . The Chief of the Army General Staff was Gen. SUGIYAMA. The Chief of the Army General Staffs Military Operations Department was Major- Gen. ТАКАКЛ Shinichi. The War Minister of the Konoe Cabinet, the then Cabinet, was General T0J0. Q. Was there, at that time, any agreement that Japan should enter the War on the side of Germany and Italy? A. I have heard of the military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy, but I don't know the substance. Q,. Was the Anti-Commintern Pact which was concluded aiaong Japan, Germany and Italy in 1936 an anti-Soviet pact? A. I think it was anti-Soviet. Q. When were the Third front Headquarters established? Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 A. The Third front Headquarters were organized in September, 1943, at ChiChihar, in place of the Second front which had gone to the South. Q,. Did the Armies and Divisions of the Second front remain in Manchuria? A. All the Armiee and Divisions of the former Second front remained in Manchuria in 1943, and came under the command of the Third front staff Q,. Prom where did the orders about the organization of the First, Second and Third fronts come? Prom the Army General Staff Office or the War Ministry? A. According to my opinion, it came from the Army General Staff. Q,. Who made the replenishment? Was it the Army General Staff or the War Ministry? A. The replenishment plan was made by the Army General Staff. The War Ministry guided its practice. Q. Was it the War Ministry that put the "Kan-Toku-En" plan made by the Arnty- General Staff into operation? A. I think so. Q,. What do you know about the surprise attack plans made by the Japanese Army against Soviet in 1943 and 1943? A the first stage of the war against Soviet, the First front was to ovtack and occupy the Soviet Maritime Province. The Fourth Army of the Second front, by engaging in the diversional movement in the Blagoveshchensk District, was to cut off the Trans-Siberia Main Line, give a blow to this supply line, and facilitate the action of the First front which was in charge of the most important duty. The duty of the Sixth Army was to hold the Red Army from invading into Man- churia from Zabaikalye ana engage in the defensive action. Q. Were these plane of the Kwantung Army offensive plans? A. Yes, in the eastern district, the plans of operations against Soviet were offensive. Q,. Were these plans effective till the spring of 1944? A. Yes, these plans were effective till the spring of 1944. Q,. What was the plan of hostile operations against Soviet made by the Sixth Army and the Second front in 1942 and 1943? Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 A. In August, 1943, a conference concerning the military operations against the U.S.S.R. was held, at the Headquarters of the 6th Army, Hailar. it that time, I attended, the conference as the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Division. The chairman of the conference was Maj.-General IG3TA, the then Chief of Staff of the 6th Army. 4,. Were you the only person attended the conference as the divisional Chief of Staff? A . Yes, I was the only person. Q. For what reason? A. At that time, there was only one division in the 6th Army. Besides that, there were frontier-guards detachments. Q. Speak more minutely about the conference. A. As the Kwantung Army was to take the offensive in the areas of the Maritime Province during the first step of the war against the U.S.S.I the 6th Army was to go on the defensive in its area. Therefore, through the first two days of the conference, the plan of defence in the area of the 6th Army was discussed. It was the scheme of the commander that we were to fight to death against the enemy in the Zabaikalye Area until new divisions would arrive to the Second front. On the third day of the conference, the offensive operation was studied. The operation was to Ъе executed Ъу the Front and the Army, reinforced Ъу new formations. In this occasion, the 2nd front was to attack in the direction of •"'•hit a. The commander's plan was, after concentrating the main body in the area of Hailar, to make an attack from the southern district of Lake Dalainoor Ъу an encirclement move- ment, behind the right wing of the Zabaikalye front and advance to Borsis. Area, destroying the enemy forces and cutting off their retrea.'' Q. Were there sufficient military forces in the Area Army for attaining the purpose of operations in 1942-43? A. At least twenty divisions were required in order to achieve the ob- jective of attack in the area of Chita. However, our strength in this area was sufficient just to make a strong resistance. Therefore in order to attack, reinforcement of between fifteen and twenty divi- sions from other areas was necessary. The regrouping of the Kwantung Army could be done only after the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province and the accomplishment of the initial stage of Y T ar. I wish that the map drawn by me showing the defensive operation?- of the 6th Army, belonging to the second front, at the first stage of the war against Soviet in 1943 and alr-o the map showing the offensive operations of the Second front at the second stage of the war against Soviet, after the occupation of the Maritime Province was attained successfully, and the military forces of between ten and twenty divi- sions were transferred to the direction of Chita, were attached to this brief interrogation affidavit. Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 Q. When did Lieut.-Gen. KITA command the 6th Army? A. I do not remember exactly, but I think he commanded the Army from 1941 to 1942. It was Lieut.-Gen. ISHIGUBO who succeeded Libut.-Gen. KITA. Q. What was the plan of operations of the 3rd front when you were the Chief of Staff of that front in 1945? A. In 1945, the duty of the 3rd front was to interrupt the advance of the Soviet Army in the vicinity of Chaonan, Wuchakow, ana Tungliao in Manchuria. According to the plan of operations in 1945, the main forces of the third front should take up positions in the districts of Mukden, Ssupingchieh, and Ksinking, and if the enemies would come to attack, should destroy them in these districts. The fundamental principles of the plan of operations for the war against Soviet in 1945 were as follows: 1. In case the main forces of the Soviet Army would attack the 44th Army in the vicinity of Mukden, the Japanese Army was to give a blow to the enemy's left wing with the largest possible military strength. For this purpose, the 30th Army from the Hsinking dis- trict and the 39th Division and the 9th Tank Brigade from the Ssupingchieh district were to attack the Red Armies with the pur- pose of annihilating them in short time. 2. In case the enemy would attack the 30th Army in Hsinking with its main forces, the blow to the enemy's wing was to be dealt by the 44th Army, the 39th Division and the 9th Tank Brigade. 3. In case the main forces of the Soviet Army would attack Ssupingchieh, the Japanese Army was to give an enveloping attack to both wings of the enemy. In this case, by the attack of the 30th Army from Hsinking and that of the 44th Army from Mukden, we should promptly annihilate the Soviet troops in the battlefield in short time. 4. If we could drive back the Bed Army units in the district of the Dairen-Hsinking Railway Line, the Japanese Army was to attempt with one part of its military forces, to pursue the enemy promptly along the Hartin-Haiiar Railway, to at sack along the Chaonaa- Khalonarshan Railway with, its main forces, then to advance through Choi Colsan to the vicinity of Olovyamaya and Karymskaya in the Soviet territory, and to destroy the enemy by interrupting the enemy's retreat. 5. If we should be driven back by she confronting enemy, the Third froat; wat 1 "to i*<**reat, with its main forces to the vicinity of the litb u£ Liuho, Kfingking and Huanohshen, to prevent the enemy's advance and for* a plan for holdi-ig out with the titmost effort. Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 Q. Who was the Inspector-General of Military Education of the Japanese Army in 1941? A. General YAMADA. Q,. Under whose command was Gen. YAMADA as the Inspector-general of Military Education? A. He was under direct control of H.I.M. the Emperor. Q,. Did he have the same power as the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff? A. Yes, he had the same power and occupied the same leading position in the army as they did. Q,. What was the duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education? A. The principle duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education was the guidance and supervision of the Japanese military education. The Inspector-general issued orders concerning the military educa- tion, and the Army Infantry School, the Army Artillery School and the Military Academy, etc., were under his control. The Army Pay- master 1 s School and the Military Medical College were under the command of the War Minister, while the Army Staff College was under th at of the Chief of the General Staff. Q,. What measures did Gen. YAMADA take as the Inspector-general of Military Education according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? A. Gen. YAMADA assumed leadership only in the military education of ordinary times. The education and guidance of the Kwantung Army according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was the plan of the front line, was made directly Ъу the Chief of the General Staff. Accord- ingly, Gen. YAMADA supplied the Army General Staff only with the materials regarding education. G. What propositions did Gen. YAMADA make concerning the education of the Kwantung Army units? A. Gen. YAMADA furnished only the materials necessary for the sh-ort course education to the Chief of the General Staff. The Inspector- general of Military Education assumed leadership in the military education of the units of peace organization footing. The units in Manchuria were educated as the units on a war footing, and according- ly, the guidance of education of the Kwantung Army in 1941 was made Ъу the Аллу General Staff. Concretely speaking, what materials did Gen. YAMADA offer? Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 Q,. Who was the Inspector-General of Military Education of the Japanese Army in 1941? A . General YAMADA. Q. Under whose command was Gen. YAMADA as the Inspector-general of Military Education? A. He was under direct control of H.I.M. the Emperor. Q. Did he have the same power as the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff? A . Yes, he had the same power and occupied the same leading position in the army as they did. Q,. What was the duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education? A. The principle duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education was the guidance and supervision of the Japanese military education. The Inspector-general issued orders concerning the military educa- tion, and the Army Infantry School, the Army Artillery School and the Military Academy, etc., were under his control. The Army Pay- master's School and the Military Medical College were -under the command of the War Minister, while the Army Staff College was under th at of the Chief of the General Staff. Q,. What measures did Gen. YAKADA take as the Inspector-general of Military Education according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? A. Gen. YAMADA assumed leadership only in the military education of ordinary times. The education and guidance of the Kwantung Army according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was the plan of the front line, was made directly by the Chief of the General Staff. Accord- ingly, Gen. YAMADA supplied the Army General Staff only with the materials regarding education. ft. What propositions did Gen. YAMADA make concerning the education of the Kwantung Army units? A . Gen. YAMADA furnished only the materials necessary for the short course education to the Chief of the Genar?l Staff. The Inspector- general of Military Education assumed leadership in the military educati on of the units of peace organization footing. The "units in Manchuria were educated as the units on a war footing, ana according- ly, the guidance of education of the Kwantung Army in 1941 was made Ъу the Army General Staff. Q- Concretely speaking, what materials did Gen. YAMADA offer? Doc. No. 1981 Page 9 A. They were the general materials for education. Q. How were the recruited men which, as you said before, were increased by about 300,000 in the Kwantung Army in 1941 organized? A. In 1941, the levy concerning the "Kan-Toka-En" plan was made in the homeland of Japan, and the recruited men vrere transported from Japan to Manchuria. Q. This levy was made during June and July, 1941. Was it a secret mobilization? At that time, it was a secret mobilization under the name of an educational_lev£. Were the men mobilized and ordered to serve in the Ewantung Army those who had undergone military education or had they been in military service? A. Most of them were those who had undergone military education and had been in military service. Q,. What order did General YAMADA issue concerning the training of the special attack corps (the deatTTband)? A. Gen. YAMADA did not issue any order concerning the special attack corps (the death band). I think nobody gave any special order cor^ cerning them. Sometimes wartime death bands were organized, but these units did not receive any special training. Q. In what way were the Japanese soldiers trained for the purpose of war of aggression? What order did Gen. YAMADA give when he was the Inspector-general of Military Education? A. The.fundamental object of education lies in training soldiers so that they can engage in any war without thinking of the character- istic of that war^ The materials for spiritual education were pro- pared by a special section in the Department of Military Education. This section distributed to the troops the pamphlets in which be- haviours of model soldiers were written. Q. Was it Gen. YAMADA who instructed the fundamental principles of education of officers, non-commissioned oificers and enlisted men? A. Yes, Gen. YAMADA instructed the fundamental principles of military education as the Inspector General of Military Education. He often instructed about the spiritual education, too. But as regards the education of the units on a war footing, Gen. YAMADA, as the Chief of Military Education, sent to the Army General Staff only the materials. Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 Q. What were the fundamental principles of spiritual education of soldiers concerning-the war against China, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? A . Political education was not conducted, hut spiritual education was given, in which soldiers were taught that they should оЪеу orders of superior officers and that they should become model soldiers. Q,. What propaganda was made regarding the right of Japan to take over China? A. Towards China, it was propagated that this war had been waged for the purpose of constructing a new order in the Greater East Asia. Q,. Who had suggssted such an education? A. The fundamental principles of such education were instructed by the War Minister. Q,. Who, among the War Ministers, had issued orders of such spiritual education that Japan should be the ruler of the Greater East Asia? A. War Minister T0J0 spoke about these affairs at the assembly of Chiefs of Staffs in about 1941 and 1942. ft. Who, among Japanese statesmen and soldiers, had propagated the war against Soviet? A , I think GeneralJTAHAXAj who had become the Vice-chief of the General Staff. The War Minister and the P r e m i e r с . , had such thought. Lieut.-General МГОА0КА, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantur. Army just before the Manchurian Incident had such thought that Japan must solve' her population problem by seizing the natural resources ir I Manchuria. By my signature, I hereby certify that the above answers are of my own writing. Eazuma 0TSU30 Interrogator: Col. of Justice, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo. Ivanof. Interpreter-Officer: Lt. Petrof. The Witness: Maj.Gen. Kazuma 0TSUB0 Col. of Justice, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the Inter- national Military Tribunal, Tokyo, Ivanof. Interpreter-officer: Lt. Petrof. Secretary-stenographer Doc. So. 1981 Page 10 In this document, rewritings, insertions, and erasures are made as follows: 1. page 3. The word "army" is inserted in two places. 2. page 6. Four letters of a Japanese word for English "mainly" are inserted. 3. page 7. Two letters of a Japanese word for English "yes" are in- serted. 4. page 18. Two letters of a Japanese word for English "spirit" are inserted. 5. page 20. One letter of a Japanese word for English "house" is re- written. The Witness: Assistant Prosecutor: Interpreter-officer: Maj. Gen. Kazuma 0TSUB0 Ivanof Petrof. D O C . 1 9 8 1 p. 12 Шр showing the offensive operations of the Second front at the second stage of the war against Soviet, after the occupation of the Maritime Province was attained successfully, and the military forces of between faj 0 г>епо Kazuma Otsubo, Chief of Staff of the Third Area ,гшу (Ь-arch 28, 1946) DOG e 1981 To 13 Гар showing the defensive operations of the 6th Army, belonging to the Second front, at the first stage of the war against Soviet in 1943» Doc. Но. 1981 с Acknowledgment Date & Place I, the undersigned, Maj. Gen. ICazuma OTSTJBO, Chief of Staff of the Third front, delivered this acknowledgement to Col. of Justice Ivanof, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the Inter- national Military Tribunal, Tokyo, after having sworn that I, as a witness, would make only true statement concerning major war criminals. I was previously warned of the responsibility I should take upon myself in case of false statements, according to Article 95 of the criminal law of the USSR. Maj. Gen. Xazuma OTSUBO Recipient of this acknowledgement Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal Tokyo Ivanof. f .Doc. No. 1982 Page 1 Affidavit of a Witness March 25, 194-6 at Khabarovsk I, Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, interrogated the undermentioned person^ through an interpreter 2nd Lt. PETROV, as a witness after warning him that he would be responsible under Art. Ко. 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S'.F.S.R. if he made any false statements. 1. Nane: _KISA3A, Tatsum! 2. Age: TSofh xY? "5Я years 3. Official position" Ex-Cс Maunder of the Continental p .2 ^ 1 тг я у " ~ ~~~ 4. Political Party: nil 5. Present address: Khabarovsk Attached certificate of the respor.sibility of a witness regarding false statement and also a certificate of the official interpreter regarding false interpretation with this interrogatory of a witness. This interrogation has been made in the Japanese language through the interpretation of 2nd Lt. PETROV. p.3 Q. When, and by whom were you appointed to the Commander of the Continental Railway? A. At the date of December l6th, 1944, I was appointed л the commander of the Continental Railway by His rf.Ъ**^ Majesty. * Q. Have you ever participated in the Manchuria Railway? A. Yes, after-the ManchurLar Incident, I have participated in it as the head of the Sixth Section of the Third Division of the General Staff Office (the head of the Section of Railway), from the 6th year of Showa /1931/ to the 8th year of Showa /1933/. In the 6th year of Showa /1931/ the head of the Third Division was, Major- General OKI and in the 7th year of Showa /1932/ Major General OBATA. Q. When did you have relation to the leadership of the Manchurian Railways? A. From 10th year of Showa /1935/ to 12th year of Showa /1937/ I had connection with the leading of the Squth. Manсhuгian Railway as an adviser attached to the South Manchurian Railway and belonging .Doc. No. 1982 Page 2 to the staff of tbe KWANTUNG Arnv. And I took the charge of tho connection between the KWANTUNG Army, t y c government of Manchuria end the heed office of the South Lanc v urian Railway Company. At that tine I took t v e position in the general Bur ecu of the "South Unnchurian Railway Company in Пикаen. Zt" tret.tine tre Commander of the KWANTUNG A m y was General MINAI1 Jiro, and t^e L M_ef of t b e staff of t M s army was Lieutenant- General NISFIO Juzo. n. 4 Q From end tc v/>rt time were you on activc service? 700' Tc * A I was on active scrvice from 1908 tc 1944 rnd on December, 1st, 1944, I was ordered to go into reserve. Q W v at kind of military education did you get? A In 1915 I bad graduated from the staff college. Q From w v at year did you specialize in tbe railway relations? From 1916. Q Before the Iwrnic^urian occupation, that is to say before 1931? v e.s the government of Japan ever carried out the construction of strategic railways in I anc v uria? A . Yes, it v a s . Q Before the IIanc v urian occupation in 19^1, v ad- any strategic railways been constructed in Ilanchuria on Japanese funds? p. 5 А Г Ye,? 4 f'c.i e was* T>'c railway between Ssupln£kaj. - \ Tacnen -- A n s r n g c h i was built in 1V2V* anc"~its length was 500 kilometres long. Where is tbe strategic point of this railway? Tell me. T^is rrilwry can transport promptly the Japanese forces staying on Irnchurirn Railway Main Line to the direction of Tafcsihar and cut off the East C M n a Railway, and besides it is convenient to transport the troops in f-e direction of outer licngorir via Solun from Taonan. In 1931? at the, time of "tre Lane^urian incident t v is railway was utilized far t.Vr trrngpoitpticnof t v e Japanese forces, .Doc. No. 1982 Page 3 Q. Before 1931, was there any other railways built in Manchuria? A. In 1928, Changchun-Xirin-Tunkua Railway was built" by the South Manchiirian Railway Company. It was constructed as the first step of Kirin- •'Hxeining Railway which is one of the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia, and it is convenient for making the Japanese troops in Korea advance promptly in the direction of Knabin. At the time p. 6 of the Manchurian incident this railway was utilized for transportation of Japanese forcer-. Q. What are the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia and their strategic meanings? A. They are as follows:-- 1. Ssupingkei-Taonan Railway 2. Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway 3. Kirin-Hweining Railway 4. Tsits"Jiar-Talai Railway 5c Chanchun-Talai Japan got the concession to lay these railways in the 21 Items Treaty of Japan against China in 1915» I already explained the strategic meanings of 1,2,3. Tsitsihar-Iieiho Railway is convenient for carrying troops which could cut off Heilung Railway. Changchun-Talai Railway p. 7 is convenient for making advance the Japanese troops in Korea promptly to the direction of Tsitsihar via the established Changchun-Kirin Railway and Kirin-Hweining Line. Q. Before 1931 '"'hat railways were built besides them? A. In 1929, Mukden-Hailung-Kirin Railway was completed by Chinese North-East government. Q. Did it do good for Japan? A. It brought the benefit to Japan from the strategic point of view. Japan utilized it for carrying her troons at the time of the Mr.nchurian incident. Q. Don't you think that the suggis^tion of constructing this railway was made by Japanese General Staff? A. I don't know whether Japanese General Staff p. 8 participated in it or not, though it was a benefit to Japan, In 1926 Kinchou-Fitzuro Railway was built on Japanese private companies fuyifls, but it has__no strategic meaning. In 1930, Hulutao- Koupangtze-T'ahuskan-Tung 1 iaо Railway was constructed .Doc. No. 1982 Page 4 by Chinese North-East government, and the length of this railway is about 400 Kilometres and it had strategic importance for Japan after the Manchurian iTncTdSTTt. : ~ Q. What do you think of the reason why the activities of some M a n c h u r i a n prominent men on the construction of this railway were in to the Japanese advantage? A. At the time of the construction of the railway they were of anti-Japanese attitude. Q. What did you hear of the TANAKA plan? A. I have heard that TANAKA wanted to accomplish the Japanese continental advance policy, basing on " Manchuria fei Mongolia. 9 Q. From whom have з̂ои heard of it? A. I knew it through newspapers and\from my friends. Q. Did this plan intend to occupy Manchuria? A. Yes, it did. . Q. During the term from 1927 to 1931 who of the Japanese politicians participated most actively in the strategic policy which was carried on in Manchuria? A. The TANAKA cabinet. At the time of the TANAKA cabinet the special service agency were organized V and set in Mukden. Q. Is the intelligence service agency regarded to have been set for the preparation of the Manchurian occupation? A. The special service agency was necessary for the collection of Manchurian information and for the observation of the schemes of Chinese North-East Government. p.10 Q. r ' r hat part did those railways• which were constructed in Manchuria from 1927 to 1929 by Japan, perform at the time of Manchurian incident? A. They performed an important part in transporting Japanese troops against Manchuria in the time of 1931» YJho~of the Japanese prominent persons do you think is responsible for these policies of Manchurian occupation Doc. 1982 Page 5 A. General HONJO, Shigeru, the commander of the KWANTUNG Army at that time is responsible for the happening of Manchurian incident. At that time, his headquarters was in Luchun. Manchurian incident was operated following the plan made by HONJO, Shigeru. Q. What kind of part did the commander of the Japanese Korean Array take and by whose direction was he put in motion*? A. The commander of the Korean Army, General HAYASHI, Senjuro made the 2.0th Division cross the border p. 11 on his own responsibility, The leading of the battle in the actual place was operated by Lieutenant General TAMON, Jiro, the commander of the Second Division under the KWANTUNG Army. Q. Who was the Prirw 1С.lister at that time? A. WAMSIIKI, Reijiro vas Prime Minister of Foreign Affair was SriDI, TT ..RA Kijuro, and" t v e Minister of War was MINuiil Jiro and t^c Chief of the General Staff was KANAYA PanzOr Q. What attitude did they take towards the Manchurian incident? A. They wanted the activities of Japanese troops to be limited only to the self-defence of railway lines. But both General MINAMI Jiro and the Chief of the General Staff, KANAYA Eanzo wanted the Manchurian occupation. Q. Kow can you know that MINAMI Jiro took the leading part regarding the Manchurian occupation? p.12 A, He did not emphasis^ the stoppage of the Japanese forces' activities of hostilities. On the contrary he required the increase of forces in Manchuria and supported the advance of Japanese forces into various places in Manchuria. Q. To whom did he emphasis? A. He reported with the Chief of the general staff to His Majesty on the increase of Japanese troops against Manchuria and th r spreading of the war zone» Q. Could MINAMI, Jiro carry on that policy and complete the Manchurian occupation? Doc. No. 1982 Pc.se 6 A Sinco I'anchuria was ooer.pated practically, the plan cf the War I Minister was completely carried on. The Minister cf :/ar, I'.IiTAУ.1 Jiro carried on this plan with the co-eperation with KANAYA Hanzo, fj£. T^^ Q "LizX sort of recognition could those people got from His Hajesty as to the activities of Manchurian occu- 3J nation and among then who received the gratitude and were decorated? p. 13 А The Linis ter of ,'ar and the Chief of the General Staff received the gratitude fron His La3сsty and received the special lavours of being decorated. Q Tell nc the activities and the carts ISKIHAhA, Kanji, and ITaCAI-I Seishiro played in planning and carrying on the liancharian occupation? A ITAGAKI took the part of loading on the planning and carrying en the ilan hurien occupation as a high staff officcr. ISHIHAVIA ftooV the part in drawing up operation- orders as the head of the operation section and of leading the Settle at the tine of the outbreak of the Kanchurion incident. DOIHARa co-operated with then in the construction of independent ^anchuria as theT head of the special service agency in liikcTon. Did the latter instigate this incident directly? A I don't know wall : bat I suppose he Ttlght have been connected with this event directly as he_was the ncad_ of the specirl service agency. p.14 Cj ?or what purpose was the i-iaachurian occupation carried out by Japan? A Politically, its purpose was to obtain right for Japan of a leading uonopo}ization in Manchuria о Q Only in Jianchuria? ^ к At that tine it was only in llanchiiria• And after that tine? A After that, the idea occurred to them that it would be convenient to make an invasion into the territories of China and the U.S.S.H. through Lanchuria as a stra- tegic point. Doc. No. 1982 Prgc 7 Q W^o agreed witl: this opinion? А ТАШЛСА Giichi ? iilLS?.df.o, TOJOJ- T ideki, XT А Гг АКТ Seishiro, LATSUOKA. Vesuke, SUGAYAMA Geu T FAYASFI Sen jure, KONOE Far.1ir1p.ro. OS КБ A_. Fiyoshi, H I N M p. 15 Jiro, and nanr^^hers, end their activities were conccntrr.t^? i ffl44P^^king the territories of the U.S.F.R., Chine., end the Republic cf Outer Mongclir., end they also urged t^e occupation of t^c South Sea islrnds by Japanese forces. According to newspaper accounts- rnd ny friends' gossip ARAKI Sadao rnd ЩАК1 Issei nr.de a plan to turn the Japan Sea as an inlrnd sea of Japan, that is to say ? they were planning to occupy the Maritime Province, w w ic v is the territory cf the U.S.S.R. T v ey also urged Japanese political predominance all over East Asia as positive policy. These people (pointed out that the Urrl Mountains would be the limit cf Japanese predominance. " Q Have ycu net Mr. IATSUOKA? A Yes, w M l e I was an adviser of the South BJanchurian Railway Company,_hc was t b e President of_fc2:c company. This was from 193b to 1937. p. 16 Q W v at ideas does LATSUOKA hold in regard to the occupation of territory in the U.S.S.R.? A / Mr. I ATSUOKA often used to sing: 'Let the fire, ( of Rising Sun wave over the Ural Mount?ins 1 at the V banquets he attended. I aTso rave oecn present at banquets given by the South Manchurian Railway Company. Q What railway was constructed in Manchuria after the Manchurian occupation? A In 1933 Kirin-Fwoining lino, in 1934 the Line from Rashin to Tun en to I uta.nkiang were built. Kirin- Fwcining Line is convenient to carry the Japanese forces w^c arc to be sent from the interior of Japan to continent, to the direction of Harbin promptly. And RASFIN-Tmen-Mutankiang Line is convenient to transport t v e forces promptly to the border of t^c U.S.S.R. and Lanchuria. Since t*e military utilization of the established railways were paid the great attention and from about 1936 the w^olc attention was paid to the construction of the strategic railway. - У- Page 8« Haven't the railway towards the shore of Лгсиг River established in 1956 any direct strategic meaning? At the tine of the Manchurian incident, the construc- tion cf railways were chiefly carried out in the riddle Manchurian zone, and cfter taere, in the North and east Manchurian zong For example. bJutankiang -Linkon Eutou Line—this railway has the important strategic meaning,, The plan of this railway was made before 1934» In 1932-1933 the Lafe-Harbin-Peian-Keihe Line, and the Peian-Tsitsihar Line—these railways are con- venient to carry promptly the forces to the north, so that they have the important strategic meaning• The Paichiengtzu-Solun-Kalonarshan Lino was planned in 1933 and was built in four year. The strategic meaning of this railway is clear from the fact that lead to the border of Manchuria and Mongolia* The construction of the Changchun-Paichiengtza line was began in 1933 and the construction cf the Linkou-Chiamus su-Suihua lino in 1935 and in the same year, the Suiyang-Tung- ning~V*angchins line .was also begun to be constructed. The latter railway pointed cut to the direction of Vovoshilov, and has the important strategic meaning. The direction of Vovoshilov is the direction of the important point of attacking, In 1939 and 1940, the Бsiaclii engtzu-Lishuchen-Chining-Mishan Line was con- structed. It has a great strategic meaning аз the connecting line cf the railway for Vovoshilov and the railway for Iman. In 1941 the Tangpichen branch line from Tungan to Turi-kog was constructed. In 1940, the IIunchun-Tunentzu lino was constructed. This rail- way has a great strategic meaning as it points out the direction of Barabash and Vladivostok. These above mentioned railways were all constructed till 1941» In 1943 5 rz.ll.ic.ys for Blagoveshchensk were constructed. From 1935 to 1940 three main lines from Korea to Manchuria were constructed. One is the Kanko Sci-sin Turien-Mutankiang-Linkou-Tungan line and other is the He i j о -Kanko -Manpu chcn-Tunghua -3 sup ing ka i line and the rest is the established Fuchan-Antung-Mukden line. Those three main linos were convenient to carry promptly the forces for any way in Manchuria from south Korea. If one of them became useless, it does not ef- fect to the others and can change the forces into other lines, and the most valuable line which could carry on this changing is the Heijo-Genzan Line. Doc. No. 1982 Page 9 Q Fere the fcanchurian milwpys, which provide Jppan with her military case in that country, bpsed on the plnns made by t*e General Ftaff Headquarters of the Japanese Ату? 20 A Yes, they are based on the plans drawn up by Japanese General Staff. •Q Were the plans of Japanese General Staff made by the Strategic Transportation Section? A The plans were conceived in the Operations Depart- ment, and their technical details were the responsi- bility of No. 3 Department. The Operations Depart- ment has neither the personnel nor materials necessary to draw up such pirns, but o n l y presented drafts to No. 3 Department, which then made practicpl plans and introduced them to the f f ?r Ministry as the opihion of the General Staff. The War Ministry negotiated with the Cabinet, pnd with their approval, passed the plan on 10 the Kwmtung Army. The Kwantung Army made out a practical scheme on the spot and passed it on to the South Manchuri^n Railway Co., who put it into execution. Q Do you think the network of railways in Manchuria was sufficient for the attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941? A Yes, it was, especially the dense strategic network at the eastern front. The" railway could secure p. 21 the force in the central p^rt of Manchuria =>nd it was possible to transfer it quickly and whenever it was necessary, to places in trouble in the front area of Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. /nd we were able to transfer the forces from one pl^ce to another promptly by this network in time of war. f Q Was it at t v e request of t v e Operptions Department of the General Staff? A Yes, it was at the request of t b e Operations Depart- ment in the General Staff. Q What kinds of Operations Plan against the U*F.S.R. were made by the General Staff and the Staff of the Kwpntung Army before 1941? .Doc. No. 1982 Page 10 / The General Staff P nd the Staff of the Kwantung Army carried out all the preparations of war against the U.S.S.R. and had the plans of war. Q Were they offensive pirns? A Yes, they were, p. 22 Q Tell mc what you know about tbe "Kan-Toku-En" plan. A It provided for the increase of our military strength in Manchuria" in connection with the outbreak of t v e Russo-Gerrian War in 1941, rnd by this plan some three hundred thousand forie were transfered to Manchuria* The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was only the name to camouflage our plan'of operations against the U.S.S.R. Q What \irs the order which had relation to the construction of railway based 0:1 the "Kan-Toku-En" plan? A I don't know, but I t^ink there was no order concerning the construction of railway. Q So was it the a p p r o v a l of the completion of the preparation against the U.S e S.R. concerning the construction of the railway th<=t caused t b e pirn? A Yes, it was. Q Few many kilometres long were the Manchuripn Railways in 1931? p. 23 A They were 4,450 kilometers at that time. Q And in 1941? A They were ^bout 11,000 kilometers long. Q Whpt field of operation had the sufficient network for t r, o war against the U.S.S.R.? A The strategic network in t^e field of operations in the Maritime Province was sufficient for the operation against t b e U.S.S.R. Q Fow many lines led to the Maritime Provinces border of the U.S.S.R.? .Doc. No. 1982 Page 11 A There" sre eight lines, which stprt"fronr Yuki (Korcn), Tsumeutzu, Suifeuho, Tungan, Panchei ho", Futow »nd Trn Pichen. As the Fsi? Chientzu-Kichan- Futow line runs->long"t b e borders, the forces сan detrain at any pl^ce where operations pre required• Q Fow" about the lines for Blagoveshchensk pnd Zabaikalye? p. 24 A the Harbin-Peian-Feiho lino, and"'1 ~ - - - - - - - l y have also two lines, they pre thc""old"~East Chinp Line', pnd the Paichcngtze-*"^loru^rshpn-Haiidagai Lino. These lines pre suitable for cprrying troops promptly for operption in the neighbourhood of Chit-> ~nd the outer Mongolian Republics. Q The witness knows that" t v e r a i l w a y must secure the transportation capacity of troops which were going to cprry"'out operation in the Chitp "district, toward Chichihperh district, foreseeing t V t t^e plan of the offensive operation against the U.S.S.R. must be*"chrnged pt; for the disposition of the troops after the attack of the Mprtime district. Then did the network secure the transportation cpppclty of the troops wM.ch wore'necess^ry for the cprrying out of tl с socond stage operation rgpinst the UoScS.R.? p. 25' A Yes , the transportation of the troops might be done promptly. The condition of r->ilw«y mpde the ** troops possible to concentrate promptly to Tsitsihpr district from those districts in Manchuria and China, but advance towards the" further westwards, that is to s^y. Hoi] perk ^nd ^ardagai", was late bocruse of the condition of the railway. The imperfection of the railway in the western district was caused chiefly by the lying of the zone of Tahingan Mountains. If there is no such ь cause the lailway in this some district mig v t have been developed more grc-tly. Q How m=ny days were necessary to transfer the No. 2 and 5 army from L>itime Province direction to Tsitsihar district? The number of divisions of"the 2 pnd 5 'rr у is 10" divisions (about 400" trains -re necessary to transport) and for the attached artillery divisions Doc. Ко. 1982 Prge 12 pnd tpnk brigades ~nd troops in" repr (nbout 400 trpins)—for t^esc, 800 trains pre necessary in nil. And' so fie concentration nepr Tsitsibpr would be nccomplisbed for twenty~"dpys using tbe following lines mixed 40 trains p dry. LINE Numbers of Trpins i n ^ d n y Old E-st Cbinp line 20 Tbe Fut ow-Tug n-Rinkou- Cb i pmussu-Suibur -Ре ip n- Tsitsibpr line " 8 Tung ning-Tumen-Kir in-Cbг ng с bun- Pricbcngtzu line 12 4 Wrs t'-e network completed to" tr-nsport~~tbe forces which were decided by tbe pl^n of wpr pgninst tbe U.S.S.R. to M'-ncburin promptly froirrNortb Cbinp just before or in t^e time of tbe wpr ngpinst tbe U.S.S.R.? A For this trpnsportntion vir tbe Tientsin-Cbinbsien line, twentytrains p d^y pnd vip tbe Poipin- ^bong t e-Ybbpn isb oii-T' ь s ien-Fsinlitun-Tungl in о 1 ine, 5 trnins" p dpy migbt be" used nnd p с cording to circumstances if necesspry 6 trains n dpy from Peipin to Kolgpn or its west cpn be used to tbe tr-nsportrtion of troops. 0 Fow mnny dpys it tnkes to transport 5 divisions to nepr Tsitsibpr »nd t^e spme divisions to nepr Cbungcbun from CMnr? p. 27 /- To csrryfive divisions to Cbungcbun from Nortb СМпр vin Tientsin-Cbinbsien-Lukdcn line, nbout 200 trains pre necesspry,">nd to enrry five divisions to nepr Tsitsibpr vip Tientsin-Cbinbsien- Mukden-Ssupiengkpi-Ppicbengtzu from Nortb Cbinp, pbout 200 trains ь-го necessary. So 400 t m i n s ore" necesspry in nil." T^e" nbove two lines trpnsport cpprcity is twenty trpins p dpy. Using tbe Peipin-C v Tngte'-Ye v ppisbou-Ibsicn*-Fsinlitun-Tunglipo- C> r. ng с b i p tun -P~ icbengtzu-Ts it s ibp r line""pnd tbe Сe ng с b i p t ш -S s u p i ngk p i - С b p ng"c bull line pf tbe snme time n.nd using* 5 tr-ins » dny, we cm" conclude to transport 400 transport trpins for 16 dnys. Q Fow Bin ny dnys does it tnke to transfer tbe mnin forces of tbe 2nd / rmy Group from Blpgovesbcbensk to nenr Tsitsibpr? Doc. Ко. 1982 Page 13. A It would, take 15 days to transfer completely the main forces of the 2nd Army Group, that is five divi- sions (200 trains), and the attached artilleries, p. 28 tank corps, correspondence corps and rear-guards and so on (100 trains)", using totally 300 trains, that is 15 trains a day via Keiho-Peian-Tsitsihar line and Heiho-Peian-Harbin-Tsitsihar line, and 5 trains a day via Liishen-Siianshenfu-Huolungmen-Nunkiang-Tsitsihar line at the sane time, namely using 20 trains a day. Q Was there any railway construction going on during the period of 1941 to 45? A Yes, the work for doubling the tracks was in progress. Q What railways? A The work for doubling the tracks of those lines were carried out; the Earbin-Eutankiang-Suiyang line, Iautankiang-Linkou-Tunagn line, the Changchun-Harbin line, the IIukden-Antung line and the Kukden-Chinhsien- Shanhaikwan line. p. 29 q Was the Huolungaen-Heiho line constructed? A Yes, it was opened to traffic from liuo-lungmen to Liishen, in 1943. Q Was the said railway in concert with the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43? A Yes, I think the construction of the railway was car- ried out basing on the nlan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43. Q From and to what time were you the commander of the Kwantung defending army? A From November 1941 to 26th December 1942. It was for one year and one month. Q How did you want to deploy the Kwantung defending army by the plan of operations in 1941 and 42? A The Kwantung defending Army took the part of the rear defence while the First Army Group and next the Second or Third Army Groiros were delivering an attack against the U.S.S.R. .Doc. No. 1982 Page 14 p. 30 Q From what time to what tine were you the commander cf the Fourth .army? A It was from December 1942 to February 1944. It was for one year and two months. Q To what Army Group was the Fourth Army attached? A Till November 1943, it was attached to the Second A m y Group and after that it was attached to the third Army Group. The headquarters of the Second .Army Group (it was changed to the Third Army Group afterwards) was in Tsitsihar. ч Q Who is the commander of the Second Army Group? A The commander of the Second Army Group, .is General AMAIiI Korechika, and the Chief cf Staff is major General './АТлКАВ":. Q Ног/ was the Second A m y Group organized? A It was organized by the Fourth and Sixth armies. vj Was there any time when the headquarters of three Army Groups, that is, the headquarters of the First, Second and Third A m y Group, were in Kanchuria at the same time? If there was*, when? p. 31 A Noj there was no time when they were in L'anchuria at the same time. When the headquarters of the Second Army Group v/as diverted to'the south battle front, the Third Army Group was organized. Q who was the commander of/ the Third A m y Group? a The commander of the Third m y Group was General 0KA32 Naosaburo till August 1944, and after that it was General -USHIRGKU лшь - - Q How was the organization and the.', position-of the Fourth Army in the first half part ef- /1 A The headquarters cf the FourtVAr^y v;as in Sunwu. On the First Division, its Comtandej^ was Lieutenant-Genera: HaXaZA'vA and. its headquarters was» in Sunwu'. On the Fifty-seventh Division* its •'cp^'nander was Li'eutenant- General ULITJRA and its headquarters was in Shanslienfu. The headquarters cf the First .Artillery and the Ar- tillery Intelligence Regiment were in Sunwu, the First- Regiment of the Heavy Field Artillery was in Shenwutim, and the Independent Heavy Artillery Regiment was in * Peian. The* tank Dcc. No. 1982 Page Ц corps was ±n Sunwu." The headquarters of the" second p. 32 engineer was"in""Furalki. Frontier guard units were directly £uЪрг о"f fay/cl c". to the commander of the Fourth / rmy. 0 Wit 1 " v, ow many divisions was the Fourth /.rmy organized in war time*? T v e scheduled plan was that in war time the Fourth /rmy should be doubled than in peace time. "That is it was" to be extended to four divisions -nd one t-nk brigade. Q Did you know the plan of operations of the Second / m y Group and the Fourth .Army? A Yes, I did, rnd it was the offensive plan. Q Tell me -bout, the contents of t v c pl-n of operations of the Fecond Army Group and t v e Fourth A m y from 1941 to 1944? A According to tVe pirn of 1941, reported -nd explained Ъу t v r Chief of the Staff of t. v e Fourth ATmyt.-jor General K B IFTRt , the e-rly concentrated attack of the war; -gainst t v e U.S.S.R. was to be carried out by the First ."rmy Group in the Ivaritime Frovince, . -nd during this time the Second /.rmy Group was to cover t> e flank of" t v e First".'•ray Group and to prep-re for the p]-n of oper-tions in the^districts of Z-vlt-y- ond Kuibyshevka. In preliminary st-go of - war, the N "f'rmy and airfc-rccs w v ich had operated before in the K-ritime Province were to be transfered to the 2nd /.rmy Group. According to the pl^n of operations of the authorities, the Second /rmy Group was to let the Fourth /rmy (four divisions) cross t v e TT eilungkian River from the- place between Shengwuton -nd ,'igun тй to let the N"/.rny (two" divisions) cross it from the pl<-ce near Ch±ke, -nd let t'"ose"tt7o"Armies crrry out the att.-ck ag-inst the 2avit-ya -nd Imibyshovka, cut off the Feilungkiang R-il?>y, destroy the^/rmy cf the U.S.S.R., occupy the"import-ht"points of BlagtJvSshfchensk, KU.ibysV CVka , Z-Vitaya nnd Siro.^novskaya ,*-and then adv-nce to the direction of K v -barovsk -nd Ruk v lovo. p. 34 In September, 1942, t v e commander of"the Second Army Group, General- JN/LI ICorecMkp -mtnded this plan. *'¥- jоr-Genora 1 KIl I TT IR/ particip-ted in this sub-plan of operations. According to this sub-pirn, the Second / m y Group was to let the Fourth /rmy (four divisions) cross the Feilungkirn River from Doc. No. 1982 P-ge 16 the froht"of T-yinshan -nd S-ntaoka, cut off the Feilungkiah R-ilWayy occupy Svofcodny -nd Kuibyshevka and advance to Khabarovsk." During t M s tine t v e Eighth Army (one *nd"a h*lf"division) w-s to cross the r.i.vtr from Fur:'-, -nd adv-nce to Ruk v lovo along the railroad and occupy it. Those plans of operations of t^e Second Army Group**w«s in force from 1945: to the spring of 1944, that is p. 35 the time when I was t v e commander of the Fourth T r y , t M s pl*n was in force. I don't know ot % er plans of operations of the Second Zrmy Group. T v e headquarters of**the*"Third Army Group w v ic v took the place of t v e headquarters of the Second"Army Group did not change t v e -hove mentioned pl-n of operations in 1943» Q Do you know about t b e offensive moveinent*"in the district of Chita at the next stage of war? A No, I don't know. ' . С /53y*-whom was the offensive plan of operations j J ag-inst the U.S.S.R. in 1941-42 -nd -43 decided? A It WPS decidcd by the Chief of t b e Gener-1 Staff &UGIY/MA Gen*,* t^e Minister of W*r TOJO tT ideki -nd the Commander of the Kw-ntrng Army UFEZU 1 Joshijiro. Q WhKt kind of the*"preparation wvs cairied out ih Blagoveshchensk ~nd Kuibyshevka to make the plan of operations in 1941-42 and -43 succeed? p. 36 / In 1943, Sunwu-SVnshenfu-Fum- military road"was completed. T v e military road between Sunwu -nd C v ike was completed in 1941 *a"nd Jap-n brgan to construct the roads w^ich lead to the m>"in points of the passage*"of a river," Only the road bed" construction was operated -nd"in 1943, t v e road bed between Sunwu and Sun ho <--bout"50 kilometers l o n g ) and the one between Su-nghsia ^nd Tuanlich (about 50 kilometers long) tre re T!orstructed. Those military roads were camouflaged -g-inst t v c territory of the U.S.S.R.- in the other shore, -nd among the m-in points of a prssage of a river*,- the road construction of t^ose parts which can be seen frorn the other shore was not operated. Q v > s there any preparation of the line of communica- tion for li-ison? Doc. No, 1982 Pnge 17 A Yes, the Fourt v Army bed t v e military telegraphs nnd telephones." Telephone wire w^s constructed In 1942 ^nd"43 nnd secured tbe li«son to Fvrbin nnd Tsltsi v -r. nnd nt the snine tine telegraph wire wn3 constructed» Q Were f-ere nny preparations for t^e stornge of food nnd ammunition? p. 37 / Tbe stornge of tbe .-nmunition nnd"food for tbe operntion of the first st-^ge of w^r were finished on the w v ole. Q Wt>t"wKs TOJO's n nd"Uf :EZU's position in t v e prepnrntion of Wnr pgninst the U.S.S.R.? A /TOJO, 53 t s e minister of wnr, suggested -nd Lnde " / the "Krn-Toku-En" Dlnn with tbe 7 -C v ief of t v e Gener^b- ( Sstnff SUGIY^LLJScn pnd the Commnnder of t*e Kwnntung JrnY UI.F2U Kos'-ijiro. T v ey developed t v eir prtppra- tion to t'-e"condition of being -ble for t b e Kwnntnng Army to «dvnnce to the territory of t h e U.SvSvR. in 1941 5 -nd *s the m*in supporter of t^e J-p-nese- Germ-ny Militnry Alliance -gninst t v e"U.S.S.R., drvoted nil t 1 eir power to the preparation of w~r. I don 1 t'lmow whether they pinned the oceupn- tion"of the Kniitime Province in the"first st-ge of"wnr or not, nnd nt t^e snme time nbout tbeir p l n n of next stnge. p. 38 It Is testified t v -t t^e ntlswers in t v is interrogntion were written in J-p-nese by tbe witness himself, Lieut en? nt-Gen гт-Л KTT.q/FA . Trtsumi. I.J./, interrogator: Colonei Г/ANOV," Assistrnt Prosebutor for the U.S.S.R. nt Intern-tionnl Military Tribun-1 in Tokyo. Interpreter: Second Lieutenant PETROV. Doc. Ко. 1982 P-ge 1 3 The Military Sketc* of tht vAdo'ossory programme for t v e Offensive pirn of operations of tYe Second Army Group in 1942 and 43» Skovolodino I \ с кг N v ' •>/ _ S ima no v s ka у a t\ ^Santaoka - V-olsako '('A N \Saregesvka (' Kuibystievka A* Tayirielian / i I 0 Suanghsia Heilungkian R » V t////j >л ) Doc. No. 1982 P-ge I9 A nil it <»ry sketch of t b e • Chief / progr-rme for the Offensive Pl-n of Oper-tions of the Second A m y Group in 1941, 42, and 43 0 Kum.a w m . ! * 7,abitaya 1 Suanghsia v'. / r j Shengwutq^g. \ Чс'Го Khabarovs \ Sunwu \ Chika 'IftVd Д)ои No. 1932 Page 20 C E R T I F I C A T E The tlnderhentlotted Lieutenant-General KUS'BA Trtstiri Sw>* e to moke true statements -bout, t^e main w«r criminals t0 the witness to Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at t^e International Military Tribun-1 in^Tokyo, Colonel of JUstiOe IV.'NOV, and gave t v is certificate to them. He was warned""that he would be responsible under"/rt."No. 95 of"t v e Criminal Code of the R.S.S.R. if he made any f-lse statements. KUSABA tetsuni The receiver of this 'acknowledgement. /Ssist-nt Prosecutor of th e U.S.F.R. -t the International ?br Tribunal, Tokyo. Doc. No. 219P (11) Page 1 Br. Ex. 2? THIS SECRETARY CF STATE TO THE LIN I ST ER IN CHINA (JOHNSON) Washington, December 11, 19^1 11 a.m. 4 u4 j. On December 10 the Secretary of State issued a statement to the press as follows? "The Government of the United States is gratified at the unanimous adoption by the Council of the League of Nations of the Resolution of December 10. This represents a definite step of progress in a long and difficult negotiation which I . Briand and his associates have conducted with great patience. The Council of thj League of Nations was in session on September 1° when the present situation in hanchuria first developed. China at once appealed to the Council under Article 11 of the League Covenant. The Council took immediate cognizance of this appeal, and China and Japan participated in the discussions before it in accordance with their obligations as parties to the covenant. This Government has from the beginning endeavored to cooperate with and support these efforts of the Council by representations through the diplo- matic channels to both Japan and China, rot only are the American paople interested in the same ob.iectiya_s.o.ught by the League of preventing a di-sastrous war and securing a peaceful solutior of the hanchurion controversy, but as a fellow signa- tory ith Japan and China in the Kellogg-Briand JEact and in the so-callad Nine-rower Treaty of . February 6, 1922, this government has a direct interest ""in and obligation under the undertakings of those treaties. The prssent Resolution prcvidos for the iffi-odiate cessation cf hostilities. It reaffirms the solemn pledge of Japan to'vithdraw her troops within the railway zc-rio as speedily as possible. It provides for "the appointment of a commission of five members to study on the spot and report to the Council on any circumstances which disturbs the peace or affects the good understandings between China and Japan. Such a provision for a neutral commission is in itself an important and. t Doc. ко. ?19P (11) Page 2 Br. Ex. ?7 constructive stop towards an ultimate and fair solution of the intricate problem presented in Manchuria. It moans the application with the consent of both China and Japan of modern and enli; ht med methods of conciliation to the solution of this problem. The principle which underlies it exists in many treaties of con- cilation to which the Unitod States is a party and which havo played in recent years a prominent part in ti constructive peace machinery of the world. The operation of such a commission gives time for the heat of controversy to subside and makes possible a careful study of the underlying problem These are the essential principles for which the United St-tes and the nations represented on the Council have been strivinr and it is in itself a signal accomplishment that there.) has been arrayed behind these principles ir. a harmonious cooperation such a solid alignmort of the nations of the world. Foreign Relations I, pp. 60-61 Doc, Noс 219? (4) Br. Ex. 20 T E I E G R \ M THE SECRETARY O F ^ A T F . n "0 АЫВ tSSA.D0R IF J.V^.N (FORBES) Washington, January 7, 1°32—noon. 7* Please deliver to the Foreign Office on behalf of vonr Government as s°"n as possible the following note; "With the_rggent. m ; 11 t-aт oper-nt< ens about Ch-' nchow, the last r-£jE3 * л * n? !v"> -' nistngt"* ve authority V е the Govern- ment o r thp HMngsc Renrb? 1c in South ?-?a'churla. ̂ s it existed prior tcSoptercber l*tfr, 1931 ? has been IdesTi-oyed. The American Govei"tfWfll ц/yit/hl)es c^Fident that the work o c thf neutral coTiss'on recently authorized by the Gounc" 1 ' 1 of the League o T " Nations will fac'litite an ultimate solutior of the difficulties now existing brt.wpp^ China .Тяпаг. But in view of the present situ- + ion and of its own rights and obligations th«r r in, the American Government deems it to be 1 чое-tjâ -••both—the InnerjUtlL- Дздаайё&в--Ge-vern- rg^tr"lTn?~~The Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor~~ 'pes it intend to reeogftl26 anv treaty or agreement irto between those Governments k or agents the T, °of, v, hich may impair the t r e a t y rights or the unTted States or its citizens in Clv'na, including those wba'ch relate to the sovereignty, the Independence, or the territorial and ad- r* nis H rative integrity of the Republic o^ China, or to the international policy relative te Chir.a, commonly known as the open door policy; and th^t It does net intend to rec^gri? any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about. b' r means contrary te the covenants 3nd obi 1 ея t -5 ons of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 192^, to which Treaty both Ch"па and Japan, as well as the United States, »re parties»" State that an identical note is be 1 n? sent to the Chinese government, STIMSON Foreign Relations I, p, 76 Doc. No. 219P (13) Br. Ex. 31 Fage 1 TELEGRAM THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (FORBES) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE T © F Y n ^ n m r y 16, . (Received January I67—6:03 a.m.) Department's telegram No. 7, January 7, noon, t receive^ETie reply of the Japanese uovernmenf") "The Оо^атnmsnt сf -Japan were well aware that the Government от' the United States coald always be relied on to rto everything in their po.ver to support Japan's "iffort.s to secure the full and complete fulfilln-jAt in every detail of the treaties of Washington and the Mellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War. They are glad to reccive this additional aSSTIrance of the fact. As regards the question which Your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-call 'open door, ' t're Japanese Government, as has so often boeft Stated; I'Hgb.rd L'i5t as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East, and only regrets that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail - throughout China. Insofar аз they can secure it, the p o l i c y of the open door will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China proper. While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yot ; as Tour Excellency knows, the welfare ard safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of t?TO deepest mCsrost and of ППГУ importance. tQ the Japanese people. FORBES Foreign Relations I, pp. 76-77 D o c . Ко. 219? (14) " Br. Ex. 32 TELEGRAF THE SECRET ,RY OA STATE TC THE CONSUL GENERAL AT SHANGHAI (CUNNINGHAM) Washington, February 24, 1932 - 2 p.та. 50. For the Minister. Reference your ToTiruary 9, 9 а.г., from Nanking, paragraph ?, and Nanking's 14, January 24, A p.p., paragraph 5, and Shanghai's 72, F :bruary 1' , 6 p.rn., paragraph f. 1. There is row b ing released to the pr• • g s here t.hi4—fĉ xt of a. le tter from the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions of the Senate". You should comeunicato to the Foreign Office and make available to the press, at once, the text, as follows: "You have askod my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently sv^Aested, present conditions in China hr-.v-j in any way indicated that the so-called Eine Power Treaty has bee000 inapplicable or ineffective or rijvhtly in need of modification, and if so, what 1 considered should bo the policy of this Government. This Tr:?.aty, as you of course know, forms thalegal basis upon - hlch now rests the 'Open Pooг * policy towards China. That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1"J99, brought to an end the struggUTluioH" various' powers for so-, celled "sphoi'es of iMLjr.'Lit In China which was •.threatening the ciismomfrorpjerst of that empire. To acconrlish this : r. May invoked two principles (ll^c.-uelity or С0Т£У;ГС1а1 opportunity among all nations in deallnr with пнп, (-У) я?, п̂ г̂ я̂ту to that equality pr.:^ -rvit.inn rf China's territorial and admlnistr-.-tivc integrity. These ЛТ̂ТгиМ p] ад |.Qt. S.'QW If t.h,-• Tor-algn p O I 1 P.V O f America^ They had be;-n the principles upon which it rested i y - its dealings ••*ith other nations for many years. In the case of China theу were in- voked to save a situation ich not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also thr-̂ atei.v.«d to create dangerous end constantly increasing rivalries between the ether r\.tions of the world. War had No. 219? (14) Ex. 32 P a g o 2 already taken taken place between Japan and China. At the close of that war throe other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some ofthe results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the powers at Peking. 'Thile the attack on those legations was in progress, Lr. Kay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion. He said •The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international laar, and safagusrd for the world the principle of eciual and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 1 He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced. In taking these steps l ; r. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to I/r. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British_JPrlao i.-'lnl stnr expressed himself 'most emphatically as concurring in^tho policy of the Unitod States. ' For twenty years thereafter the Open Door policy rested upon the informal commitments thus mode by the various powers. But In the winter of 1921 to 1922 f at a conference participated In by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was cry stall zed, into the.so-called Nine Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that Treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed 1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and \ administrative integrity of China. Doc. No. 219P (14) Br. Ex. 32 Pq <r -j 2. To provide tho fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effec- tive and stable government. 3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations Throughout the tоrrit"o'ry"jQTjJhiпаГ. 4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to tho security of such states. This Treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties thoir rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other band, to assure to the people of China tho fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened, standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the ti?-o this Treaty was signed, it was known that China /as engaged in an attempt to dove lop the free institutions of a self-governing republic aft-.r her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government5 that she would require many years of both uconoiric and political effort to that end* and that her progress would necessarily bo slow., Tho Treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed—and. tho whole history of the development of the 'Open Door' policy reveals that faith—that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only if China Dut of all nations .vhich have intercourse with her best bTe gnryodT ' ' " In its report to the President announcing this Treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Kr. Charles E. Hughes, said Doc. No. 219P (14) Page 4 Br. Ex. 32 'It is believed, that through this .-• . t • • h e n Door' in China has at la?t beer mad'? a fact. ' During the course of the discussions which resulted in the Treaty, the Chairman of the British delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that 'The British Empire delegation understood that there "'as no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of interest" was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government was concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation. ' At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron__Shi.dahara, announced the position of his "goverHmert as follows: 'No one denies to China her sacred jright to govern herself. No- <me stands" In the. ••• чу of China ta -югк out her own great ifationaJ . ' The Treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. Sub- sequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark and Mexico. Germany has signed it but her Parliament has not yet ratified it. It must bo remembered also that this Treaty was ore of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the Various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregard >d without distrubing the general under- standing and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not onl r through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the worJd, particularly in the Far East. These Doc. Wo. 219Г (14) Br. Ex. 32 Page 5 problems were all interrelated.. The willingness of the American io^ernrent to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Fine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of eoual opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot dismiss the possibility of modi- fying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent. Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg- Briand Pact. These two treaties represent inde- pendent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly develop- ment by the law of nations including the settle- ment of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nino Potfer Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China. The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which have beer begun in ianchuria have latterly been extended to Snangnai," far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the . No. 219P (14) Page 6 Ex. 3? covenants therein to all of the nations interested in ths Far East. It-is_jiot necessary in that с one e с t i or. to_inqutro~ int о tho с uses or the con- troversy or attempt. to~~apportTon the blare between tile two nations which are unhappily invftl7£di for" regardless or cause or responsibility, it is cleSF beyond peradventuro that a situation has developed tfhich cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with tho obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faith- fully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine. Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Eriand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for «.edifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value cf the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have boon subjected in Shanghai. That i s tho view of this Government. ¥e see no reason for abandoning tho enlightened principles which re embodied in these treaties. TFE beiievo that this situation would have been avoided had those covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to Indicate that a due cot.pli-.ncc with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and t hei r na t iona1s. On January 7th last, upon tho instruetion of the ^rosTdjni. Llils •мчаь.лИ formally notified Japan and China that it would nop recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered - into by 'tho5a govornaauLb In violation of tha cuvenaiiLS'" of the5: treaties, ehich Jiffacted the rights of qur Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by tho other governments of the world, £• caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar tho legality hereafter of any title or right sought to bo obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and v'hich, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to tho restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived. . No. 219? (14) . Ex. 32 Page 7 In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate succoss in dealing with then, of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual goodwill. Wo appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, wore foreseen by Lessrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet. We concur with those statemen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future. Very sincerely yours, (Signed) Henry L. Stimson" 2. Repeat the whole of the above in clear at once Tokyo. ST II. .SON Foreign Relations I, pp. 83-87 Doc. No. 219? (12) Page 1 Br. Sx. 30 TEL ED-RAM THE SECRETARY 0? STATE TO TIE MINISTER IN S'.VITZERLJtTO (WILSON) Excerpt. Washington, February 25, 1933—6 ?° m « 78. Your 125, February 24, 7 p.m. Communicate to Erummond (Secre- tary General of the League) as a letter from me under today's date the following! •There has been communicated to me the text of your letter of February 24, 1933b transmitting to me a copy of the report of the Committee of Nineteen as adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on this day. I note your request that I communicate to you as soon as possible the reply of the Government of the United States. In response to that request I have the honor to state the views of the American Government as follows; In the situation which has developed out of the controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of the United States has coincided in general with that of the League of Nations, the common objective being maintenance of peace and settlement of international disputes by pacific means» In pursuance of that objective^ while the League of Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a con- troversy between two of its members, the Government of the u nited States has endeavored to give support, reserving to itself in- dependence of judgnent with regard to method and scope, to the efforts of the League on behalf of peace. The findings of fact arrived at by the League and the under- standing of the facts derived by the American 'Government from re- ports made to it by its own representatives are in substantial accord. In the light of its findings of fact, the Assembly of the League has formulated a measured statement of conclusions» "frith those conclusions the American Government is in general accord. In their affirmations respectively of the principle of non-recognition and their attitude in regard thereto the League and the u nited States ^ are on common ground. ,J -'he League has reconmended principles or settle- ment. in so far as appropriate under the treaties to which it is a party, the American Government expresses its general endorsement of the principles thus recommended. STIM5QN Foreign Relations I, pp. 115-116. Doc„ Nop 219P (15) „ . . THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) m 0 THE E r ' e ' * SECRETARY OF STATE No о Ю52 TOKYO, November 14, 1934 • (Received December !«,) Excerpt„ While it may be argued that the Japanese Government never specifically guaranteed the maintenance of the principles o^ the open door and eqral opportunity in Manchuria after the government of "Manchukuo" was organized, the Japanese recognition and endorse- ment of the new regime was largely predicated unon the maintenance of those policies, as is evidenced by the speech of Count UCHIDA, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the M e t on August 193? > and the Japanese Government r s'pyblic statement of September 15 ? 1 Q 32, issued on the occasion of the recognition o! "ManchUkUg*^ which reads in. part, is follows; "As regards the economic activities of foreigners, the Manchukuo Government m?de clear in thei"" communication of March 10 above alluded to that they would observe the principle of the Open Door. What Japan desires in Manchuria is to do away with all anti-foreign policies there so that the region may become a'safel3Iace r>r ahndp 4 'nr ngti'vps and foreigners alike, at the same time, guaranteeing her legitimate rights and interests the^-p; qn^ therp^ore^ It is hardly necessary to "repeat the as srranсё that Japan sincerely hopes that all the peoples о г the worl" >"'11 Pursue "heir economic activities in Manchuria on a footing of eaual OP- pprxunity qn,- 1 will thereby contribute ^o t.ne development" and_^prosperity of that region." — The Protocol between Japan and "Manchukuo" of September 15, 1°?2, itself is predicated UPon the observance by "Manchukuo" of. inter- national obligations applying te that territory, as is shown by the second paragraph o f + he preamble of the Protocol: "Whereas Manchukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all. international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchukuo." It is difficult to see how the Japanese Government can ignore these definite declarations, but •'hat it has done so is not only shown by the excerpt quoted above, etc,. Foreign Relations I, p„ 135 at 137. ь Doc. No. 219.P (23) Br. Ex.. 42 Fag a 1 THE TELEGRAM b^SSADC^lN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATS Excerpt. (Paraphrase) TQK£XLl April (Received пк i > < This norning I had an interview -ith the Foreign linister. r. Hirota referred. on his own initiative, to the supiect of the Ar.au statement г сrding the attitude of Japan toward foreign assistance to China, and. said that tie wishedto clarify that state- ment to i.'.e in He told me that under questioning by newspaper men, Arau had given cut the S'ta.teafen€ without • his knowledge or approval, and that the «у or Id had received a wholly fp'1 s" irnpros?ion of Japanese policy. €hat Japan ^jTftrtnrT 1 Г ,г.̂у.г.1. г г •̂"•••«•IPg special priv ilerc-.b in China, of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona fide trade of other countries with China. Various foreign activities have tended to disturb, v-'ieeefyl -conditions \a China, an* Japan. is naturally very much interested in those peaceful condivjons owing to. her nearness to China. But that does not moan Ша.% there is any intention or desire on the part of japan i с claim a prl'? legsd pesiti л г In derogation of tho ft*£ .lifci*» to -whic^ fcta* of the Nine-Power Treaty are entitled. The policy of Japan is complete observance and support of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty in every respect. Foreign Relations I, p. 227 Doc. No. 219? (24) Ра?.; о 1 Br. Fx. 4.3 I "EI OBANDUIil BY THE SECRETARY OF -STATE ( 1 : ASIJINGTO№y lUy 19, 1934. The Japanese Ambassador celled атз4-prompt,Ly-grew out f:n elaborate telegram, which he said war, from Foreign ."inist r Hirota in Tokyo to him. Ho first reoarkoa ъг.аъ ETrota desired to extend his appreciation of the friendly spirit in which I sent the statement to him on April 2j}j 1934, and which was delivered by United States AnETsCBsSdor Crew. He added that Ambassador Grew had stated to .Minister Hirota at the time that the United States Governsoht did not expect eny reply. The Japanes . Ambassador then proceeded practically to read the tele re;,, although appearing core or less to be speaking orally. He retained the telegram which was in. his language. At its conclusion, I inquired if it was virtue lly a rest a teror.it of the statement durine the latter part of Aj.:ril oC his Government to Sir John Simon in the London Foreign Office. He replied that it was. I then stated that I had kept perfectly auiat while Japanese officials all the way from Tokyo to Geneva on April 17th, and for many days following, were reported as giving out to the press the views and policies of' the Japanese Government touching certain international phases relating to the Orient? that at the conclusion of these different statements I felt, in order not to be misunderstood hero or anywhere, that I should in a respectful and friendly sprit, offer /а succinct but comprehensive restatement of rights, •' interests, and obligations as they related to my country primarily and as they related to all countries signatory tc the Nine-Pow r Treaty, the Kellogg Fact, and international law as the same applied to the Orient. I then inquired whether the Japanese Government differed with any of the fundamental phases of the statement J sent to the Jananeso Foreign Minister on the 2f'th day of April, 1934? Thgjfoha яsnЛor replied that it did not differ, that his Government did agree to the fundamentals of my note or statement, but that his Government did feel that it had a special interest in preserving peace .ind order in China. Ho then repeated the sane formula that hia government had boon putting out for some-'vYeeks about the superior duty or function of his jovernment to preserve peace and" of its special interest in the peace situation i n — t o quote his - -оШ—"festern Asia" . I remarked that, as Hirota Doc. Wo. 219P (24) B R . E X . 43 Рале 2 wrote me, I saw no reason whatever why our two countries should not, in the most friendly and satisfactory way to each, solve every question or condition that existed now or that might arise in the future. I then said that, in my opinion, his country could conduct its affairs in such a way that it would live by itself during the coming generations, or th. t it right conduct its affairs oven того profitably and at the Same time retain the perfect understanding and the friendship of all civilized nations in particular that my hope and prayer was that all the civilized nations cf the world, including Japan, should work together and in a perfectly friendly and understand- ing way so as to promote to the fullest extent the welfare of their respective peoples and at the same time meet their duties to civilisation and to H o 1 ore backward populations of the world- and that li> Government would always be ready and desirous of moating his Government fully half-way in pursuing these latter objectives. I then rem-rked that I would be entirely frank by saying that just now there was considerable inquiry everywhere as to just why his government singled out the clause or formula about Japan's claiming superior and special interests, in jEo' peaae- situation in "Ka.qf.prn ftcjiw'-L and herc"su perToг rights^or duties'in connection with the preservation of peace there: and that /«any wrere ider ing wim llnrr -this, phrase or formuaiA had ulterior or ultimata implications, '.partaking of the nature оГ~а.'Ц of the Orlerr^or a definite purpose to secure preferential trade rights as rapidly as possible in the Orient or "Eastern Asia"—to use the Japanese expression. The Ambassador commenced protesting that this was not the manning contemplated or intended. I "sale.!, it would be much simpler and easier if when the national of any other government engaged in some act in the Orient which Japan might reasonably feel would affect her unsatisfactorily, to bring up the individual circumstance to tho proper government, instead of issuing a blanket formula which would cause nations everywhere to inquire or surmise whether it did not ссr.tami>.\ate an overlordshin of the Orient, nnd an nt.toF.pt at trade /_ preferences as soon as possible. The Ambassador again STaid that this so-called formula -..bout the superior interests of Japan in preserving peace, etc., did not contemplate the interference or domination or overlord- ship such as I had referred to. Doc. ho. 219? (24) Br. Ex. 43 I < statod that today there was universal talk and plans about" armaments. on a steadily increasing - scale and that Japan and Cermany were the two countries consTfTered chiei'lv re^BOhglbl'J fur lhaL 1мH > 1.пят., of course, if the world understood the absence of any overlordship intentions or other unwarranted inter- ference by his government, as the Ambassador stated them to mo, his country would not bo the occasion for armament discussion in so many parts of the world; and that this illustrated what I had said at the beginning of our conversation that nations should make it a special point to understand each other, and the statesmen of each country should be ready at all times to correct or explain ary trouble-making rumors or irresponsible or inaccuratc statements calculated to breed distrust and misunderstanding and lukewarmness between nations. I went on to say that it was nevar ' so important for the few existing civilized countries of the world to work whole-heartedly torethnr.; and that tHTs~action of course would, more fully than any other, promote the welfare of the people of each and. also would best preserve civilization. I emphasized again that it would bo the height of felly for any of the civilized nations to pursue any line of utterances of professed policies that would engender a feeling of unfairness or treaty violation or other unsatisfactory reaction in the important nations who might have both rights and obligations in a given part cf the world such as the Orient. I said that in this awful crisis through which^ ^ t.ho wnrld wn<! passing, debtors everywnore were not hVmeping faith with creditors in many instances;_that I sanctity of treaties, in Western m r o p o especially/" jwas being ignored and violated; tnat tnis was peculiarly d time when ou.r civilized countries should be especially vigilant to- observe and preserve both legal and. moral obligations' and that шу country especially felt that ••my, not only on its own account but for the sake of preserving the bettor and the higher standards of both individual and national conduct оуегуЖтё'. I remarled that my Government, apart from its general treat£jgbHgiltlong f was only interested in the equality of trade rights in the Orient as in every part of the world and also its obligations and rights under the law of nations; that what little trade we had in the Orient we naturally desired to conduct on this basis of Doc. No. 215? (24) Br. Ex. 43 Page 4 equality, oven though it might be less in the future than now. Then I remarked that if these treaties which imposed special obligations on my government in the Orient were not in existence that., while interested in peace in all parts of the world; my government would also bo interested in equality of trade rights. I inquired whether his government had any disposi- tion to denounce and got rid of these* treaties in whoio tor in part^. and said than, "со ignore or violate them would be ambarrassihg to шу government, ana that this would relieve la cf any possibilities of such embarrass- ment. I said that I was not remotely suggesting in the matter. lie rep .led that his government was not disposed to denounce and abrogate these treaties. He said that ~ they felt obliged to get out of the League <">f N^t-i rmg огГассоипт; of certain considerations which their member- ship created. "I then inouti ed of him whether his government .abandoned membership on. account of difficulties arising from the fact that Japan was a member of the League or whether it was due to Japan being a signatory to the Versailles Treaty." I did not got a complete answer to this. The Ambassador then stated that in any preliminary naval conversations that might soon take place, his government would he opposed to discussing any Far Eastern political or similar questions or conditions and that only the purely naval side should bo taken up. Ho said that political and all other phases of the subject were discussed at the Washington Conference and his government was opposed tc a repetition cf this. I offered no с omment. С(ORDELL) H(ULL) Foreign Relations I, pp.233-236 Doc г No с 219P (l p ) BR. EX. 37 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AIDE-MEMOIRE Excerpt With particular reference to 4 he Foreign Office memorandum of November 5 the A m e r i c a n Government f-'nds unconvincing the statement as contained therein that the nronosed control of the oil industry in Manchuria is not with 5 n the knowledge or concern the Japanese Government,. The American Government must of necessity assume that a project of such major importance to all concerned and one with regard to which Japanese nt.cres J s in- cluding a quasi-official organization apparently are taking so active a^d so p^om^'nent a part- can not «escape either the knowled- ge or the concern of the Japanese Go TT er~ment. Likewise for obvious reasons the American Government can nc + accept t^e implied disclaimer of responsibility on the part of Japan in relation to the industrial policy in Manchuria of which this prohibition (project?) is a manifestation. The American Government dees not wish nor dors V believe that the Japanese Government would wish to enter into contro- versy over the deta J ls of the project under discussion. The A m e r i c a n Government feels however that it must call to the at- tention of + he Japanese Government for that Government's most careful consideration certain facts and conclusions to wh'ch the American Government attaches great importance namely that there is proposed the s e t t i n g no in Manchuria of a control of the petroleum industry which by whatsoever ^ a n s a" tailed and whatever called would in fact constitute a monopoly of the sale and distr ; bution of oil in that irea; that the creation 6£ such a monopoly would impinge UPon treaty rights which rights the authorities in Manchuria have affirmed to the world they would respect and maintain, an affirmation -"hich the Japanese G o v e r n - ment accented and adopted in the protocol into which it entered with those authorities: that an oil monopoly and in fact 'any monopoly would in addition constitute a violation of Article III of the Nine Power Treaty *o which both Jaaan and the United States are co-signatories. The creation of such a monopoly world adverselv affect legitimate American interests long es- tablished in tha + region. Perseverance in this project by its promoters and indifference bv the Japanese Government to that development and its consequences would tend to Place at naught the emphatic and unconditional assurances ren-'-atedly made by the Japanese Government of Its devotion to the maintenance in Man- churia of the princ'ple of tbe open door. TOKYO, November 30, 1^34 Foreign Relations I, PP. 14-3-144 у V Doc. No. 219? (25) Br. Ex. 44 -/ П/ Page 1 * STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE 10 In reply to inquiries by п-res-s -corresp-ond-ents in regard to the ^autonomy movement" in North China, Chinese and Japanese activities in relation thereto, and the American Government's attitude, the Secretary of State said: There is going on in and with reg rd to North China a political struggle which is unusual in character and which may have far-reaching effects. The persons mentioned in reports of it are many; the action is rapid and covers a large area5 opinions with regard to it vary; what may come of it no one could safel3r undertake to say; hut, whatever the origin, whoever the agents, be what they may the methods, the fact stands out that an effort is being made—and is being resisted—to bring about a substantial change in the political status and condition of several of China's northern provinces. Unusual developments in any part of China are right- fully and necessarily of concern not alone to the Government and people of China but to all of the many powers which have interests in China. For, in relations with China, and in China, the treaty rights and the treaty obligations of the "treaty powers" are in general identical. The United States is one of those powers. In the area under reference the interests of the United States are similar to tbose of other powers. In that •rea there are located, and our rights and obligations appertain to, a considerable^number of American nationals, some American property, and"'substantial American commercial and cultural activities. The American Government is there- fore closely observing, what .Is happening there. Political disturbances and pressures give rise to uncertainty and misgiving and tend to produce economic and social dislocations. They make difficult the enjoyment of treaty rights and the fulfillment of treaty obligations. The views of the American Government with regard to such matters not alone in relation to China but in relation to the whole world are well known. As I have stated on many occasions, it seems to this Government most important in this period of world-wide political unrest and economic instability that governments and peoples keep faith in Doc. No. 219? (25) Page 2 * principles and pledges. In international relations there must he agreements and respect for agreements in order that there may be the confidence and stability and sense of security which are essential to orderly life and progress. This country has abiding faith in the fundamental principles of its traditional policy. This Government adheres to the provisions of the treaties to which it is a party and continues to bespeak respect bjr all nations for the provisions of treaties solemnly entered into for the purpose of facilitating and regulating, to reciprocal and common advantage, the contacts between and among the countries signatory. Foreign Relations I, pp. 240-241. Footnote: Issued as a press release December 5, 1935> for publication in the morning newspapers of December 6, 1935.) Doc P No» 219P (16) THE CONSUL AT MUKDEN (LANGDON) TO THE ВН. EX. 35 AMBASSADOR IN CHINA (JOHNSON) Excernts. Mukden, October 30, 1937. No. 158 с Г » # { • # ! > Г For Kr- Ohashi's ready reference Mr. Langdon cited sore of the n>any declarations made b T ' Hsinking promising to maintain the Open Door in. Manchuria, namely: The passage dealing with foreign policies in the Proclamation on the establishment of the State, March 1, 1932; The telegram o-" Foreign Minister Hsieh to the Secretary of State of the United States, March 12. 1932, in Particular paragraph 7. r<=ad"ng as follows: "With re?a r d to economic activities of peoples of foremen nations within the state of Manchuria, the principle of the» Open Door shall be observed"; The statement of Foreign Minister Hsieh on the occasion of the sipn'ns; of the Manchukuo-Japan Protocol of September 15, 1932;' The telegram of congratulation of November 12. 1 Q 32, by Foreign Minister Hsieh on the occasion of the election of President Roosevelt; Statement given to United Press representatives in "okvo by the Manchukuo Foreign Office (see Витаи of In- , r format-"on and Publicity, Denart^e^t of Foreign Affairs, \ Bulletin No, 60, May 4,'l933); Statement for foreign countries issued March 1, 1934, by Foreign Minister Hsieh on the Occasion of the enthronement of the Emperor, reaffirming the undertaking to maintain the Open Door announced March 1, 1932, on the occasion of the establishment of the State, Mr- Langdon expressed to Mr. Ohashi his deep -"-egret tbat the statutes of Manchukuo now Placed discriminatory restrict"ons on the commercial relations of his country with Manchuria and re- invested that Mr. Ohashi communicate to the nroper authorities the unfavorable impress'on which svch restrictions were r a k i n g in the United States, which treats the trade of all countries, in- cluding Manchuria, alike. Foreign Relations I, P, 151 at p, 153- Document No. 219P (26) / ^ ^ Page i Br. Ex. 45 THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (SAITO) TO THE SECFETARY OF STATE No. 250 WASHINGTON, December 29, 1934, SIR: I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to communicate to you the following:- In accordance with Article XXIII of the Treaty concerning the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, the Government of Japan hereby give notice to the Government of the United States of America of their in- tention to terminate the said Treaty, which will accordingly cease to be in force after the 31st December, 1936. Accept (etc.) SAITO Foreign Relations I, p. 274. <j0 Document No. 219P (27) Page 1. Br. Ex. 46 T E L E G R A H THE CHAIRA'AN OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION (DAVIS) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE LONDON, January 15, 1 9 3 6 — 2 p.m. Excerpt. (Received January 15—11:27 a.m.) The United States has been most desirous of reaching a new agreement fcr a reduction and limitation of r.aval armaments to supersede the existing treaties that are to expire at the end of this year. T "'e have, therefore, been willing to discuss any proposals and to explore every possibility of agreement. irr e have been willing to consider any evidence that might have been presented to the effect that the present relative strengths are not fair and equitable and do not provide for equal securit}'. v: e have accordingly listened with the most careful atten- tion to all the explanations given by the Japanese delegation of their proposal for a common upper level with a view to deter- mining whether апл' - new facts or considerations might be developed which would justify the United States in modifying its belief that the principles of the common upper limit would not be a practicable basis for the limitation and reduction of naval armament. While we greatly appreciate the clear exposition of the Japanese point of view presented by Admiral Nagano, the discussion has if anything served to strengthen our conviction that the principle of a common upner limit would not serve as a basis for negotiation and agreement. Foreign Relations I, pp. 294-295 Cftfi Doc. No, 219P (20) Br, Ex, 39 THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) r 0 THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HIROTA) No, Я2 р TOKYO, December 1, 1937. EXCEI LFNCY: Acting under the instruct - ' ons o f my Government I have the honor to refer to reports that on November 1 (5?) a treaty was signed with Japan ending Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchuria and that on this account there- was Issued a manifesto in regard to the extraterritorial rights o f foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. It has also been brought to the attention of my Gover ment that tbe branch at Harbin of the National City Bank of New York, an American concern, has received a letter f r o m the Department of Economics at Hsinking stat^nar that = recently promulgated "law concerning foreign juridical persons" "naturajly" applies to all foreign firms and requesting that preparation be made to v gister and to appoint a represen- tative in. accordance with the law. The extraterritorial rights of nationals of the United States in Manchuria are granted bv treaties between "he United States and China and my Government considers that the law under reference which apparently contem- plates tbe assertion by the authorities J n Manchuria of juris- diction over American juridical persons is inapplicable to American nationals and firms. My Government therefore is impelled to register emphatic objection to any a t e m p t by the authorities of Manchuria, to-exercise jurisdiction over American nationals and to make full reservation in regard to the treaty rights of the United. States and its citizens» I am. directed by my Government to address the Japanese Government on this matter in view of the rela*-' onsbio between the Japanese Government and the authorities In Manchuria. I avail"myself, (etc,) JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, P. 154. Document No. 219 е (28) Br. Fx,. 4-7 Page i THE СНА.ТВ IAN OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION (NAGANO) TO THE CI-LiTPJ'AN OF THE CONFEJ ENCE (MONSELL) (LONDON,) January 15, 1936. MY LORD, I '.'Tv: zlie honour he rj i-.o notify Your Lordship that as it has Ьег-.овчз juf:r1 eiently cl s г today's session of the First Committee that the basic prie.c:. ">les embodied in our pro- posal for a compranensive limits-ion .reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general sup-ort, oar Delegation have now come to the conclusion that we can no longer usefully continue our participation in the deliberations of the present Conference. We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limita- tion submitted by the other Delegations. I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been go 3d enough to conduct the Conference 5 at the same time, X should like to tender- o^r deepest thanks on behalf of our Dele- gation, for the hearty co-oneration of all cne Delegations to this Conference. I have (etc.) OSA T,T I NAGANO Foreign Relations I, p. 2 е "?. Document No. 21QP (29) Br. Ex. 48 "age I, T E L E G R A M THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY 01 STATE TOKYO, June 18, 1937--4 p.m. (Received June 18—9?05 P.m.) While the limits^ on cf the g ! -n ca- tbre fcr capital ships constitutes ore itrporrant aspect "f qua J itative limitation, the Japanese Government, in elucidating at the las с Iendon Naval Conference their basic attitude concerning the means calculated to bring about just and fair state of naval disarmament, made it clear that they could not subscribe to qualitative limita- tions alone, if not accompanied by a simultaneous restriction in quantity. The Japanese Government still hold the same conviction as regards the matter of qualitative limitations. Stated briefly, it is their belief that a mare limitation in quality alone will only induce a tendency to make up for the deficiency caused through such limitation, by resorting to quantitative augmentation, thus ultimately leading to a competi- tion in naval armament in quantity. The Japanese Government, therefore, are not, at this juncture, in a position to adopt, apart from quantitative restrictions., a mere limitation of the gun calibre for cap'bal ships ; a matter which properly belongs to the most important phase of qualitative limitation and hope that the United States Government will understand the above- mentioned position of uhc Japanese Government. It may be added for the info:* tie hi on o 1 " the United States Government that this position of the Japanese Government as re- gards qualitative limitation was communicated towards the end of 4arch to the British Government, v»hen the Japanese Government responded to the British proposal of January this year regarding the limitation to fourteen inches of the maximum calibre of guns for capital ships. June 18, 19?7. GREW Foreign Relations I, 301-^02 * Doc. 219? (31) Br. Ex. 50 STATSbUDNT BY THE SSGtOTIOT OF STITi: 11 I have bean receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the тогId. Utiquestionabjy there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which a m o d hostilities are in progress or are threatened is i situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities any- where in the w r l d which rill not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country, I therefore feel warranted in making--in fact, I feel it a duty to m a k e — a statement of this Govern- ment's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern. This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of 5 peace* I7e advocate national and international self-restraint. 'Те advo- cate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations, 'Те advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement, 'Те advocate faithful observance of intern itional agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor crises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. 'Те believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. Tfe stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. T'e advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. '.7e advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. 'Те seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment, "c believe in Imitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. '.Те avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practi- cable means in support of the principles, hereinbefore stated. Foreign Relations I, pp. 325-326. Footnote: ( U Issued as a press release on July l6, 1937; reprinted from Department of State, Iress Releases, July 17, 1937 (vol. ГГС1, No. 407), p. 41.) 4 Document No. 219P (30) Page 1 Br. Ex. 49 I^ 1 OEANDUM BY r iT830' .! •• ' .. X .. N . (WASHINGTON,) June 12, 1936. Excerpt, In reply, I told Mr, Yoshida that I would speak frankly but in the friendliest possible spirit and say that the impression among many persons in this country was that Japan sought absolute economic domination, first of eastern Asia, and then, of other portions as she might see fit; that this would mean political as well as military domination in the end; that the upshot of the entire movement would be to exclude countries like the United States from trading with all of those portions of China thus brought under the domination or controlling influence so-called of Japan?, that this presented a serious question to first-class countries with commercial interests in every part of the world, for the reason that, for instance, my country stood unqualifiedly for the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and industrial right alike in every part of the world; and that it would be strange and impracticable for my country to stand for this doctrine with the announcement always that it qualified same by applying it to only one-half of the world and one-half of the world's population. I remarked that I could say in all candor that this Government had never by the slightest word or intimation suggested to the people or officials of the 20 Latin American countries as to what amount of trade they should conduct with Germany, or Great Britain, or Japan, or any other country. I continued with the statement that there was no reason, in my judgment, why countries like Japan, the United States and England, could not in the most amicable spirit, and with perfect justice and fairness to each, agree to assert and abide by the worldwide principle of equality in all commercial and industrial affairs, and each country solemnly agree that it would not resort to force in connection with the operation of this rule of equality and why Governments like the three mentioned could not sit down together and in a spirit of fair dealing and fair play confer and collaborate and not cease until they had found a way for amicable and reasonable adjustments or settlements. I said that this would wipe out and eliminate 90% of all the occasions for friction between the nations. C(OBDELL) H(ULL) Foreign Relations I, pp. 241 at 242-243 Doc. No, 219P (32) Pago 1 Br с. Ex. 51 MEi'IORANDFM BY "HE SECRETARY OF STATE Ecerots (WASHINGTON) July 21, 1°37 The Ambassador of Jan an celled th 4 s morning at my request. After b r ief proline'n.arie s, I verv seriously addressed tbe Am- bassador and said that, of course, he rust be fully aware that when two nations comprising 5^0 million people are engaged i" a controversy in wh'ch danger of general hostilities а i r -шИn e a t this country cannot help bat be g r e a t l y interested and concerned; that it is in the light of t M s situation and of the intense de- sire of this country for peace everywhere that I have been under- taking to confer with the ambassadors from both Japan and China from time to tl?.-<?. regarding developments, present and prospective, in the danger zone: that T have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of paace and to the avoidance cf hostilities n 'n the Far East; that, 1+" 'he Ambassador did not mind, I would be gl a d to reemnhasize the chief points I had referred in our РГ?v'ous convorsat 4 ons on this gen r ral subiос* and situation; that these included a most earnest appeal to each government, from every oossibl! standpoint, for peace, as well as an e a T , n n st express'on of tee oPin 4 on that a war woul d result 1n irreparable bnrm to all governments involved and would prove utterly disastrous, in + he present chaotic state о"" world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress . » , I + Ьеп said to the Ambassador 4 hat T might repeat '"hat. I had also said to him at the beg 4 "n1ng~that this government is r«ady a'-̂ d will be most gl^d a + any * ime + o say or do anything, short o^ mediation -rb.lch оf course r crir^s the qgreer-ont of Ьо + ь par- ti's in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute to- wards composing the present matters of controversy between Janan and China; that this was, of course, said to the Ambassador for his Government; am 1 I added + hat I desired to repeat, with emphasis the present, continued attitude of + h1s government of thus be-'ng readv and des 4 reus of sav 4 п» or doing anything th* t the govern- ment or governments concerned might suggest which would be f a i r and impartial towards all concerned and at the s»me J 4 m e calculate to be helpful in restoring thoroughly peaceful relations in the Far Eastо I said to the Ambassador 4 "hat th c re was another phase of the matter I would like to put before him, I explained that I was anxious that, my point of view be completely understood and for this reason I would like to inform the American Ambassadors Doc„ Ко. 219Р (32) D aste 2 In Jinan and in China of the conversations held her» and w^uld like to hive those Ambassadors report what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I soоке here would report, to the Japanese a^d Chinese Governments, At one stage I ashed the Ambassador what the latest develop- ments wer° f He replied that he knew very little in addition to what had been reported to me bv the Japanese Counselor during the past three or four davs, except a report about a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only and declined to use infantry. He said t^eir purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still has hones thit this result n y he accomplished: + hat they are not brirel^g down troops from Japan eroper. The Ambassador said little throughout the conversation, but sought +o ma>e h'mself agreeable. I emphasized to him that if we did not feal genuinely friendly and impartial towards his country and all concerned I would not be say' ̂ g some of the things I was saying. During the course of the conversation, I remarked that I desired to refer specially to an incident of the past two '"ays in which two American women, ne-r their embassy in Peking, were assaulted by Japanese guards, I said that I had r «walked to the press, off the record, on vestarday that I had only received newspaper information about this attack unon the American w~men and I could not comment unon it with accuracy until official in- formation came to re; that in the ^eantire I assrmed and honed that our Embassy in Peking would take the matter UP with the Japanese Government and a settlement, or a<?iust"ent. or act 4 on satisfactory to all concerned would be brought about. The Am- bassador expressed his favorable interest in such action and also his belief that srch would be the case, Dr, H o m b e c k , who was present, remarked to the Ambassador that similar incidents re- lating fo our nationals or 'he nationals of other governments have occurred during the past five y<=ars and that it woul^ be very helpful to the renutat 4 on of the Japanese Gover nment to see + o it' that their guards would deport and. derean themselves in a way to avoid such occurrences. The Ambassador expressed his approval. С(ORDELL) H(ULL) F O R E I G N R E L A T I O N S I , P P . 3 3 0 - 3 3 3 \ Doc. No. 219P (33) Br. Ex. 52 РРМОВДМОЦМ BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JA^.N (GREW) (TOKYO) August 10, 1937 Excerpt American Offer of С-с-об Offices. 2, I then referred to the statement which I h^d rede to the M'nis + er cur last сonversat'ens as on my own initiative and responsibility, that I hoped he would let me know if he evor saw w'vs in which 1 ceuld be helpful in the Present situation. I said that my Government had no™ authorized re to present this as a definite offer of good offices and that I was doing so in an in- formal, confidential and exploratory way, first because it seemed to me important to avoid Publicity, °nd second because we wished to avoid any semblance of interference and were only anxious to be as helpful as possible. I repeated and emphasized this aspect of my remarks so .that there could be no "oubt in the Minister's r'nd as te our precise atti+ude and intentions, I then ST : d that it had occurred to us that either now or later it might be helpful for us to arrange s^me neutral ground for a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations and perhaps to be helpful if difficulties In those negotiations should arise. J(OSEPH) C. G(REW) Foreign Relations I, n r 339 at 340, V. Doc, 219 p (36) 1 Br- Ex- 56 T 7T ~ SFCR T '?.Y OF - rr; 4; m jT' -0 THE a T S c r ^ R IF S T T*Z' rr :iI. 1 r '"D (H \R!'TSON) (Substance) ExcTtitSr W SHING?0\ T , September 1937 10 1+ is desirable, however, i^asruch *s the T>it?d States Government associates i"' self with J he Leaser's ded iber • t 4 ens through author 4 zing the II 4 nister to s 4 1 with the Assembly Id- visor v Ccrmitt.ee the subcommittee, th" t the *f nister know of and understand the Imoric -r Government»s thought in connec- tion with his possible contributions toward enabling his asso- ciates at Geneva to reach decisions vh'ch may have some "bene- ficial practical effect r'g-rding objectives w M c h -re co^-on to the United States +o + ho League's ^-rberse When Jap-n orbrkod 1-st July up on F 4 1 4 1 - > c - -wtlos 4 n Chin-, the United S t ^ c s Go^ f .mnent, wh 4 ch took full account of evidence pr" son ted -1 th~t f ire ^vr'n? the- n^st 4 nr io.-tive of Japanese political objectives ? on July 16 r->de nubile a state- ment of h-sic principles "*h 4 ch -т, felt should und'rlie normal peaceful i^t^rn - - + i о"a 1 ' r 1 - J 4 o"shins, Government The United States/miter•ted г-о̂е spec 4 fic-lly on Iverst 23 in a statement, witn especial reference to t^e ar^ed conflict between Japan and China, certain of the principles comprised in the s^tt ront of July 16, an: 1 th'- viow r s emphasized that 4 hose principles VVD! 4 '-d as -'ell to H "hr Pacific r 0 4 , as elsewhere,- Attention w s called, inter - F a , exnr~sslv to "-Ho^g- Briand D act and the N'пе- Р о тг: т r rp-tv. Exception was thus defi- nitely t ken to + ba coims r ollowed by Japan, Iюгeovcr, several definite s + eps h* ve V o n t-Ven in. "amort of th" 4narican Pos 4 tion: (1) Direct a^po-als +c Ja'-an and Ch 4 r i a to desist or refrain from hcstilit 4 as* (2) repeated statements to both sides regarding the availability to th^r of good offices should they make any suggest 4 ons for resort to concil 4 -t 4 on pro- cesses ; (3) r rP a ted protests to 4 he Japanese G o ^ r mont. ~g ~ 4 n*t aerial bombing of noncombatants and publication in one instance of an An-- rican note to the Japanese Government" in ob.iaction to and condemnation of such bombing and in -ano+hor ins^-nco iss 1 nco of a state о' n t today on that sub 4 ret- г Docr No. ?19P(36) * Japan's military oper-tions trve Incr^scd i^ intensi у ^ d in extent - f ith the unfolding situation. Ch rges of Janan's violation of trrity provisions anr 9 intern-'tione 1 law h"»vc been amplified• by +he Chinese Government., ^ d a ^ llin^n^ss to resort, to conciliation uroccss"? h 0< ? been n-r-F*-pr'd bv f-r Chin se- The j-sp^riese h^ve "enounced, ho v "°v'r, t h M r i^f-tion to destroy the Chinese '"ill and capacity to * sist act.-; ?lly te over- throw the r.x ! s*'*r>(r Chines " Government, By d^chn 1 " 1 -!? the Leasee Assembly Advisory C c rittee's imH.t J he Jan-nose hav- re- fused even te consult 1,1 other gov-^rT^n 4 s *"ith ~ v 4 ow to nd- justin.g their гМ.̂-'ей ' i's W th The Secret.-rv expresses th" feeling th't Sino-JT'n-es* s i. tu" 4 * on J of ; ni J ely concerns the world as a whole. longer do th' quest 4 ens involved relate m-relv to snec'^ic promts'ens c r p^rt'cul'r treaties boirc --•» elated; thev lues* 4 n s pf i^tor- n 1 1 cn n 1 1 -or, of principles of hum T i t " , of v-r peace, N - tu r"" ly t i s tj»-ue "h" 4 the quest 4 o^s i'-^'olve violating ~gree- v c nts p'-rticul arlv H he Le-.-n-" of N't 4 ens C c ^ e ^ ^ t , the F 4 -e- ?c r - 7 er T-a~tv ? m d th." F"ello"' CT -Brl -md °~ct, But ^"С 1 '! 0 " s of verld economy, world hrm~ni + v ? -^d ••'ô l'* - ' security л 1 с о ^ ^ 'n- volved, HULL Foreign R-l't'ens I, pn> 375-? 7 ? Doc. Но. 853-A Vfig/Ь 1* Exhibit Ho. IPS Document 853, taken from Japanese Foreign Ministry АЖОШСЕМЖТ OF THE JAPANESE GOVEEHMEINT RELATING TO THE CEI1IA INCIDENT ( V 0 L - December 1937 Announcement by Foreign Ministry on invitation to Attend the ITine Power Treaty Meeting BELGIAN EMBASSY His Excellency, the Belgian Ambassador, baron de 3 P ssompierre, paid an official call on Mr. Eoki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 21st, at 10 г 30 A.M. and handed him the following Note Verbale. NOTE VERBALE In compliance with the reouest of the Government of Great Britain, made with the approbation of the Government of the United States of America, the Royal Government propose to the Signatory States of the Treaty of February 5, 1922, to convene at Brussels on the 30th of this month, with the view of examining in accordance with Article 7 of that Treaty, the situation in the Far East and of studying the amicable means of hastening the end of the unfortunate conflict existing there. Tokyo, October 20th, 1S37 Doc. Ко. 853 Page 1 C I 1 5 I 2 I C A T E ¥ . D. С. Но. ' I. P. S. Го. 8511 Statement of Зотгсе and Authent-ici by I, Паузаhi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Crovern^enl in the following capacity: Chief of the Arrhi~es Section, Офшбв Foreign Office and that as such official I have cu.'.fcciy of the document hereto attached consisting of 14-3 pages, dated Oct-lTov-Lec- , 19bV, and described aa fellows: Announcementa of the Japanese Government Belaticg to the China Incident. (Vcl« 2), I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the оарагеье Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (opacifying alao the file numoeror citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document- in the archives or files): Foreign Office. Signed at Tokyo on fchic 23rd day of Sept., 19^6 /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official ST1AL Chiof. Archives_Sect Official Capacity Witness: /в/ Fagaharu Odo Statement of Official Procurement I, John A . Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated vrith tho General Headquarters of tho Supreme Commander for the Allied Povere, end that thr above described ftocrcmont was obtained by me from the a>ovr signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my officia.l business. Signed at Tohyo on this 23 day of Sent. , 1946 h i J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. I ь ill ill Witness: /д./ Pichtrd H. Larsh Investigator Official Capacity. Doc. No. 6908 RESTRICTED - For releaaj^o^iy after delivery begins before tKeTriounal. o l d ^ p r f i c k z s ^ U n i i / l/J RELATIONS ЕРШЕН THE UNITED STATES AND 01 ДАТ BRITAIN ON THE ONE; HAND AND JAPAN ON THE OTHER OPENING STATEMENT Carlisle W. Higgins Y Joseph B. Keenan Grover C. Hardin Chief of Counsel John W . Fihelly A. Comyns Carr Frederick A. Mignone T. Humphreys G. Menon Pedro Lopez Eugene D. Williams OF COUNSEL Doc. No. 6908 Page 1 Mr. President and Members of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Our schedule now requires the presentation of that part of the prosecution's case which deals with the relations between the United States and the British Commonwealth on the one hand and Japan on the other. In order that various events, diplomatic conversations and exchanges may appear in their true perspective, a short review of the treaty rights and obligations of the parties to each other and to the Republic of China, we think, will be helpful to the Tribunal. The pertinent treaties were introduced in the early days of the trial as basic documents. They deal in the main with three subjects: (1) Agree- ments designed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; (2) Agreements defining relations between Japan and the other countries* (3) Agreements dealing especially with China. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter- national-Disputes signed at The Hague 29 July 1899 marks the first worldwide attempt by convention to prevent the Doc. No. 6908 Page 79 outbreak of hostilities. (Items 1 to 4, Appendix В to the Indictment, and Exhibit No. 12 in the case.) All countries here concerned are parties to the Convention. The two pertinent articles are; "Article I. With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations between the states, the signatory powers agree to use their best efforts to insure t r e pacific settlement of international differences," "Article II. In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, the signatory powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers„" The second treaty in group one is The Hague Con- vention Number III of 18 October 1907, (Item 5 of Appen- dix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 14 in the case) the pertinent article of which providess "The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war." Doc. No. 6908 Page 3 The Covenant of the League of Nations, dated 29 June 1919 (Items 11 to 14 inclusive of Appendix В to the Indictment, and Exhibit No. 23 in the case), pr r vides: "Article 10. The Members • f the League undertake tc respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political inde- pendence of all Members cf the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shr-,11 advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." "Article 12. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any disnute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council." The United States was never a member of the League. Japan seceded in 1935» The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 2? August 1928 to which all the countries are parties (Items 33 and 34 of Appen- dix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 33 in the case) provides: Doc. No. 6908 Page 4 I. "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they con- demn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies., ana renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another -" 1Г. "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them., shall never be sought except by pacific means." Under group two the first pertinent agreement is that of 30 November 1908, entered into between the United States and Japan, declaring their policy in the Far East (Items 6 to 9 inclusive of Appendix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 22 in the case) which provides: "2. The policy of botb Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the mainte- nance of the existing status quo in the region above- mentioned and to the defense of the principle of eoual opportunity for commerce and industry in China." "3- They are accordingly firrly resolved recipro- cally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region." Doc. No. 6908 Pago 5 Tho next pertinent treaty, dated 13 December 1921, to which the British Commonwealth, France, Japan and the United States were original parties and The Netherlands and Portugal became parties on A and 6 February 1922 rasnec tively, (Items 19 to 21 inclusive of Appendix В to'tic- In- dictment and Exhibit No. 24 in tho caso) provides; "The High Contracting Parties agree as between them- selves to respect their rights in relation to their in- sular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.' 1 "If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said, rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happilv subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contract- ing Parties to join a Conference to vfhich the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." Japan agreed, under the mandate of the League of Nations, that islands covered by the mandate should not be fortified. (Item 18 of Appendix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 23 in the case.) Article IV provides: Doc. No. 6908 Page 6 "The military training of natives otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defense of the territory shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifi- cations erected in the territory." The United States, not being a member of the League, obtained the benefits of Article IV by entering into a treaty with Japan on 11 February 1922 (Item 31 of Appen- dix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 29 in the case). Article II provides: "The United States and its nationals shall receive all the benefits of the engagements of Japan as defined in Articles 3? 4 and 5 of the aforesaid Mandate, not- withstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations." Under the third classification, it may be stated that a number of treaties contain provisions relative to the territorial integrity of China and the policy of the "open door,," However, the Nine Power Treaty dated 6 February 1922, to which the United States of America, the British Commonwealth, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal are parties, contains the essential obligations of Japan and the other con- Doc. No. 6908 Page 7 tracting Powers with respect to China. (Items 22 to 30 inclusive of Appendix В to the Indictment and Exhibit No. 28 in the case.) The prosecution considers it to be cf sufficient importance to this case to justify quoting the first four articles: "Article _I. "The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government; (3) To use their influence for the purpose of ef- fectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges J which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States." Article II "The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with Doc. No. 6908 Page 8 any Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I." Article III "With a view to applying more effectually the prin- ciples of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Con- tracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in sfceking (a) Any arrangement which might purport to estab- lish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic develop- ment in any designated region of China; (b) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of under- taking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category or public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calciilated to frustrate the practical applica- tion of the principle of equal opportunity. "It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be Doc. No. 6908 Page 9 necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, in- dustrial, or financial undertaking, or to the encourage- ment of invention and research. "China undertakes to he guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from the Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present Treaty or not." Article IV "The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territor3 r ." Under the foregoing and other pertinent treaty pro- visions, omitted here in the interest of time, the con- tracting Powers had certain well defined duties and obligations in China, not only to China but to each other. These treaties had as their ultimate objective the pre- servation of peace. Their faithful observance, therefore, was a matter of grave concern to all nations interested in peace. Doc. No. 6908 Page 9 a The four cardinal points in Article I of the Nine Power Treaty % r e but declaratory of the foreign policy of the United States not only toward China but toward all nations. From the date of the treaty, which is without time limitation, the other powers had a right to assume that these provisions constituted the foreign policy of Japan toward China" and that Japan in simple terms was committed (1) tc respect the sovereignty of China, (2) to permit. China to settle her internal problems without interference, (3) to promote ecuality of commercial oppor- tunity in China, (4) to refrain from taking advantage of con- ditions in China to seek special privileges. The evidence to be offered will show that from, the date of the treaty until September 1931 Japanese pledges were reasonably observed. After September 1931 pronouncements of Japanese foreign policy became more and more irreconcilable with the commitments in the Nine Power Treaty. Each declaration of policy was designed to meet the exigencies of the moment. It was a policy of opportunity not of principle. The declared policy was designed to assist and make easier of accomplishment the actual policy, which will be Doc. No. 6908 Page II shown to be a policy of force and conquest. Under pertinent treaty provisions each of the countries enjoyed, equally with others certain extra- territorial rights in China. Japan had well defined but limited rights to maintain railway guards, not more than fifteen par mile, along the right of way of the South Manchuria Railroad. In addition, she had rights to station troops in certain areas of Forth China under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and to land and station troops in international settlements at Shanghai and Kulangsu, and in any exclusive Japanese concession. Mo right existed to station troops outside the foregoing well defined limits. The aggressions initiated at hukden and the failure of Japan to confine and localize the incident in accor- dance with her promises, brought immediate, sincere and earnest protests from the Government of the United States. Specifically, Japan's conduct was declared to be of grave concern not only to the United States but the rest of the world. The objections were raised on moral, legal and political grounds. They involved violations both of the Nine Po~er Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Thus arose the first conflict of policies between the United States and Japan, D o c . N o . 6908 Page II From the beginning of the Manchurian aggression, Japan stated in her coi unications with the United States and the British Commonwealth that she had no territorial designs in Manchuria and expressed her sensibility of the friendly concern and fairness of views with which the American Government had observed the recent course of events in Manchuria. As the Mukden Incident expanded into aggressive military domination of the whole of Manchuria, both, the United States and the British Commonwealth followed an announced policy of neace and of adherence to treaty obligations. Diligent efforts were made to have Japan follow a like course. The United States, although not a member of the League of Nations, integrated its efforts to this end with those of the League. Notwithstanding Japan's professed desire for friendly relations with China, her military operations continued until Manchuria was conquered» The punpet government of Manchukuo was set up. Both the United States and Great Britain refused to recognize this nuppet. government. As has been shown, the League of Nations condemned Japan's aggressions in Manchuria. It will be shown that the United States L o c . Ко. 690З Page 12 Secretary of State announced that the United States was in substantial accord with the findings and conclusions of the League. The League of Nations set up, and the United States endorsed, principles for the settlement of the contro- versy between Japan and China. Japan talked much of settlement but never settled. The relations between Japan and the United States were disturbed of course by the aggressions in China. In February 1934 the accused HIROTA, Japan's Foreign Minister, expressed to Secretary Hull a desire for peaceful diplomatic relations, stating that there was no question between the nations "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." Secretary Hull responded cofdially. Not?,rithstanding this gesture, however, in less than one month AIvIAU, Chief of the Information Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, proclaimed the "hands off China" policy, setting up Japan as the politi- cal guardian and economic entrepreneur of China. Other powers were warned against any undertaking prejudicial to Japanese interests. By this declaration the Japanese arrogated to themselves a position in China for which there was no basis under existing treaties. The British Doc. No. 6908 Page lj Commonwealth and the United States made earnest though not violent objections. However, both gave more credit to Japanese reassurances at the time than later develop- ments justified. In 1934 Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty. In 1935 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. Thereafter her conquests extended beyond Manchuria by an invasion and complete occupation of Jehol Province and Eastern Inner Mongolia and by an advance into Hopei Province south of the Great Wall. Even before Japan withdrew from the Washington Naval Treaty, her naval experts had come to recognize the aircraft carrier as a fighting unit of the most advanced offensive type. Admiral YAMAMOTO, on 29 October 1934, stated that Japan should not be sus- pected of aggressive designs in the Far East. He cited as proof Japan's willingness to give up the building of carriers which he characterized as the best type of weapons for expansion and aggression. On 15 January 1936 the accused Admiral NAGANO stated that the aircraft carrier is the principle type of aggressive Doc. No. 6908 Page II naval arms. I ouote: "In order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate . . . abolition of aircraft carriers . . .." Statistics of naval construction are difficult to obtain. But it anpears probable that between the date of that statement and 7 December 1941, Japanese carrier con- struction exceeded that of the rest of the world. By withdrawing from the London Conference, Japan thereby severed her last connection with the Naval Agreement of the Western Powers. Although France, Great Britain and the United States entered into an agreement with reference to naval strength, Japan doclined to adhere to that treaty and proceeded with feverish haste to increase her armaments. At the same time, she refused to divulge to the other powers facts concerning her naval construction. By the evidence which we shall produce it will be made apparent that the withdrawal both from the League of Nations and from the Five Power Naval Treaty were steps in the preparations for large- scale, aggressive warfare. It is difficult to reconcile such preparations with a peaceful intent. Throughout the period from the Mukden Incident in September 1931 to the outbreak of the more extensive D o c . N o . 6908 Page iy operations in China in July 1937? the attitude of the United States and the British Commonwealth toward Janan had been restrained, tolerant and peaceful. While in- sisting that Japan was acting in violation of existing treaties and protesting injuries to their nationals, these countries made no move or suggestion of warlike intent or of anything except a sincere desire that a peaceful settlement might be reached. Meantime, Japan, having gained the military domination of Manchuria, had consolidated and developed her political and economic position in that territory. She practically monopolized its economic resources. In so far as the British Commonwealth and the United States were concerned, the door to Manchuria was closed. The United States at the time of the expansion of the China War in July 1937 at first attempted to con- centrate on the protection of its own nationals and property and legal rights. On 16 July 1937 Mr. Hull, the United States Secretary of State, announced the position of the United States to be that it constantly and consistently advocated maintenance of peace; that it advocated abstinence by all nations from the use of force and from interference with the internal affairs of Doc. No. 6903 Page 16 4 \ other nations; and that it advocated the adjustment of problems in international relations by a process of peaceful negotiation and the observance of international agreements. The United States Government attempted to point out to Japan the irreparable harm done to all Governments concerned by the situation which existed in China. Nevertheless, Japan continued to advance. The fighting spread to Shanghai. The first American lives were taken and property damaged in that area. On 5 October 1937 in his speech at Chicago, Presi- dent Roosevelt proclaimed to the world the intention of the United States to do all within its power to preserve peace and by every practicable measure to avoid involve- ment in war. The United States and the British Common- wealth adhered to that policy. They still refused to charge that the conquest of a country by military force was taking nlace in China. On 6 October 1937 the League of Nations adopted a resolution declaring that Japan's actions were not justified on the basis of se3.f-defense and were in contravention of treaty obligations. On the same date Loc. No. 6'>Go Page i; the United States Secretary of State directed attention to the fact that tho action of Japan in China was in- consistent with the principles which should govern the relationship between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg- Briand Pact. On 27 October 1937 Japan refused the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference convened for the purpose of studying amicable means of hastening the end of the unfortunate conflict in the Far East. The treaty of 13 December 1921 and the Nine Power Treaty called for such a conference. Meanwhile, Japan's armies continued their advances in China. British and American citizens were shot, many of them killed, their homes and properties bombed, shelled, burned and destroyed. On 12 December 1937 the American gunboat PANAY, while assisting in the evacuation of American Embassy officials from Nanking, was bombed and destroyed, together with three United States merchant vessels on the Yangtze Fviver. Japanese fliers from the fleet air arm, bombed and machine- gunned the crews and passengers. American lives were lost in these attacks. On the same day, the Japanese Doc. No. 6908 Page II armies shelled the British gunboat LADYBIRD, causing extensive damage. British lives were lost in this attack. The ships were engaged in peaceful missions. They were where they had a right to be. During the latter half of 1937 and all of 1933, the Japanese conquest of China continued. The burning of properties of citizens of the United States and Great Britain and attacks on these citizens continued. Several hundred complaints were made and claims for reparations were filed by the United States. Five hundred such claims were made by Great Britain alone. During 1939-1940 the attacks 011 American and British nationals continued. Lives were lost. Much property was damaged and destroyed. The incidents mounted into the hundreds. Protests were made and claims were filed by both Governments. Japan sometimes evaded, sometimes ignored, sometimes attempted to ex- plain, but the attacks continued. Attacks were made on hospitals and missionary establishments, plainly marked by the United States or British flags. Japan was furnished with maps showing the locations of British and American owned properties, and, in par- Doc. No. 6908 Page II ticular, hospitals and missionary establishments. No attention whatever was paid to these efforts to prevent attacks. A number of such institutions were attacked several times; one on sixteen separate occasions. These attacks were so freouent, so obviously not accidental, and made under such circumstances as to indicate that they were a part of a systematic nlan, not only to con- quer and rule China, but to drive all whites, in partic- ular all Americans and British, out of China. The damage done in any one of these hundreds of attacks was much in excess of that claimed by Japan to have occurred at the time of the Mukden Incident. The lives and property of American and British citizens forfeited to these attacks far transcended in import the claim of the Japanese of the loss of a single soldier, which was used as the excuse for Marco Polo Bridge. Yet, neither the United States nor Great Britain took any military or naval action. They made neither demonstrations nor threats to do so. Over and over again they expressed so great an interest in a neaceful settlement of the war between Japan and China and of the recognition of treaty rights in China that they were willing to mini- mize the sufferings and loss of lives and property, Doc. No. 6908 Page 20 On 3 November 1938 Japan boldly proclaimed "А Пет/ Order in East Asia." She refused to permit continuance of 'freedom of trade" which had existed pursuant to the policy of the "open door." She asserted preferential rights in China. This was in violation of existing treaties. The squeeze was on. The lot of non-Asiatics was to become more and more difficult. During this period it'will be shown that Japanese air forces without provocation or excuse attacked the automobile in which the British Ambassador was riding. Japanese armed forces without provocation assaulted the American .. Consul at banking о Laws were passed and regulations adopted by Japanese authorities and Japanese sponsored regimes in China which prevented American and British nationals from continuing to engage in their long- established occupations. Japan continued her aggressions and refused to respond to the remonstrances and appeals of the United States and Great Britain. Because of this, the relations of these two countries with Japan grew progressively worse. It became apparent that something more con- crete than mere protests was required. Therefore, on 26 July 1939 the Government of the United States gave Doc. No. 6908 Page II a six months' notice to Japan as provided by the commer- cial treaty of 21 February 1911 announcing her intention to terminate that treaty. The aggressions of Japan in China, coupled with declarations of a "New Order in East Asia" were finally viewed by the American and British Governments _as part of a plan of Japan politically to dominate the Pacific area, economically to exploit China for Japan's benefit to the exclusion of the interests of other countries, and socially to effect the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors. All of this was in violation of solemn treaties. Yet the United States and Great Britain made no threats, adopted no warlike attitudes, endeavored to negotiate for peaceful solutions. Japan sent troops of considerable strength into Indochina, occupied Hanoi and Haiphong. She gave false explanations in attempting to justify these moves. It finally became apparent that Japanese ambitions seemed to expand with each additional acquisition of territory. That the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Borneo were soon to be objectives was strongly D o c . N o . 6908 Page II indicated. These further military moves posed a direct and critical threat to the security of both the United States and the British Commonwealth. Neither threats nor hostile moves were made by either Government. Both attempted to reason with Japan and to persuade her to abandon her schemes of conquest. They would have realized how vain was this hope had they known that the occupation currency for the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Borneo was then concealed in vaults of the Bank of Japan. This invasion currency was processed under the top-secret orders of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, and Finance Ministry, approved 24 January 1941. The first delivery actually went into the vaults of the Bank of Japan in May 1941 to be with- drawn under orders of the War and Navy Departments to finance war e x p e n d i t u r e s . That Japan was not greatly Interested in the preser- vation of peace is further indicated by her secret plotting with Germany in the spring of 1941 to attack the British at Singapore and to seize the Philippine Islands. At the same time, protracted conversations, initiated by Japan, were proceeding with the United States. These conversations on their face were designed Doc. No. 6908 Page II to explore both the differences arising out of the war in China and the possibilities for a peaceful settle- ment of Pacific and Asiatic problems. At the very beginning of the conversations, 16 April 1941, Mr. Hull informed the Japanese Ambassador that the purpose of the discussions should be to explore the question of improving the relations between the United States and Japan. Mr. Hull stated that the United States had been proclaiming and practicing certain principles on which relations between nations should rest. I quote: "1. Respect: for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 3. Support of the principle of equality, includ- ing equality of commercial opportunity. 4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means." The Secretary made it perfectly plain that the conver- sations should relate to matters within the framework of these principles. Doc. No. 6908 Page II Looking backward in the light of subsequent events it is not unreasonable to conclude that Japan in fact either sought to obtain from the United States recog- nition of her right to occupy and to conquer at her own caprice or to lull the United States and Great Britain into a sense of security while she made secret preparations and determined upon the most advantageous time to make further aggressive moves. It must have been obvious to these accused that there was no possibility that either the United States or the British Commonwealth would enter into any agreement which would recognize, ratify, or assent to Japan's right to retain the spoils of her aggression and to proceed further with her conquests. The evidence is plenary that Japan, acting through these accused and others of like purpose, never intended to s t o p or to turn back. It should be noted, as the Tribunal gives considera tion to these conversations, that each position assumed by the United States and every demand made was, not only an effort to get Japan simply to recognize and comply with her solemn treaty obligations, but was in accor- dance with the rights and obligations of the United States and the British Commonwealth under those treaties Doc. No. 6908 Page II With great respect we call the Tribunal's attention to what we think the evidence will show to be the funda- mental differences in the viewpoints of the countries involved. The United States and the British Commonwealth took the position that all problems of conseouence could be solved by simply observing the existing treaty provi- sions. These countries Insisted that Japan's claim to the rights conferred under the treaties carried an obli- gation equally strong to perform the duties required. Japan, on the other hand, claimed rights greatly in excess of those conferred and refused utterly to recog- nize the duties imposed. There was no claim in the conversations that the United States or Great Britain were not living UP to their treaty commitments. Japan's purpose seems to have been to explore the question of how fast and. how far she could go in her aggressive moves. This brings us to the middle cf the fateful year 194-1 and to an acceleration of Japan's plans for war. By 1 June 1941, the conquest and occupation of France was complete. Tbe German submarine blockade was near the peak of its effectiveness. The tonnage of ships being sunk in the Atlantic was increasing under Doc. No. 6908 Page II the intensification of Germany's submarine blockade. The United States was known to be unprepared for war. On the 22nd of that month Germany attacked Russia. The struggle was desperate, the question, whether Russia could survive. With this factual background, liaison conferences were held daily in Tokyo, beginning on 23 June and ending 30 June. These conferences determined future Japanese national policy. On 2 July 1941, following these liaison conferences, an Imperial Conference was called at the request of War Minister TOJO. It was there decided that the Japanese national policy, in view of the "changing situation" would be based on three main noints: (1) That Japan would continue its endeavor to dispose of the China Incidents (2) That Japan would establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, regard- less of how the world situation might change; (3) That measures would be taken by Japan to advance southward. Doc. No. 6908 Page II It was determined that Japan would attain these ends, even if it meant war with the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands. General preparations were made for war with these nations. The military prepara- tions in ouestion proceeded on a large scale and inclu- ded the calling up of more than one million reservists and conscripts. he surviving accused present at the preliminary liaison conferences, where the real decision was made, were HIRANUMA, TOJO, NAGANO, MJTO and OKA. The same persons, with the substitution of SUZUKI for MJTO, attended the Imperial Conference„ There were some, including MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, SEIRATORI and others, who were in favor of Japan's immediately joining in the war against Russia on the German side, either before or simultaneously with any advance to the South. But for the time being and in spite of repeated renewals of the proposal and assurances to Germany that such a plan would be carried out, the preference for southward expansion prevailed and continued to prevail. , T ing to differences of opinion between Doc. No. 6908 Page II KONOYE and MATSUOKA, the exact cause of which is obscure, the second KONOYE Cabinet (in power since July 1940) and thi~third was constituted with TOYODA as nister in place of MATSUOKA. HIRANUMA remained in the Cabinet, but as Minister of State without Port- folio instead of Home Minister. TOJO continued as War Minister with KIMURA as Vice Minister and SUZUKI remained Mini ster of State and President of the Planning Board. From some date, at least as early as 18 June, we now know negotiations were in progress by which German aid was sought and obtained to compel the Vichy Govern- ment to admit Japanese troops into Southern Indochina. Troons had been stationed in Northern Indochina for several months. Japan's intention was to occupy the country by force df Vichy did not agree. This policy was initiated by the second KONOYE Cabinet and ultimately came to fruition under the third. This, in spite of warning by NOMURA as to the disastrous effect it would have upon the Japanese-American conversations in Washington. During July the American Government received reports that the movement of a large number of troops into Doc. No. 6908 Pago 2 у Southern Indochina was imminent. This military move- ment brought into the open tbe threat to the Philippine Islands, British and Dutch possessions in the Western Pacific area, as well as vital trade routes essential to the industrial life of the United States, the British Commonwealth and The Netherlands. These reports were immediately brought to the atten- tion of the Japanese Ambassador. The inconsistency was pointed out between such a movement and the conversations which were then proceeding in Washington. Information was requested as to the reported facts. At first the reports were flatly denied. But on 23 July the Japanese Ambassador, by way of further reply, stated that Japan needed to secure an uninterrupted source of supplies and. raw materials and that i'o was also necessary to insure against the military encirclement of Japan. Japanese documents, to be tendered in evidence, however, will prove conclusively that the intention was to provide a base for fur theг ope ra t i0n s, pa r t i с u- larly against Singapore and Siam. Acting Secretary of State Welles replied and pointed out the fallacy of the explanation offered. Doc. No. 6908 Page II He said that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as proceeding from a policy of expan- sion and conquest in the.region of the South Seas. Also, on behalf cf the Secretary of State, he told the Japanese Ambassador that under these circumstances, the Secretary cculd not see any basis for pursuing further the pending conversations. Accordingly, the conversa- tions were temporarily suspended. On 27 July President Roosevelt made a proposal to the Japanese Government that Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. Obviously, this would assure Japan of"a source of food supplies and other raw materials. The Japanese Government refused to accept the President's proposal. Large Japanese forces moved into Southern Indochina. This military movement was but a follow-up of the plan begun at Mukden, extended northward through Man- churia, then southward to Nanning on the mainland and Hainan Island, leaving Chinese territory for a distance of 2400 miles in the military, political and economic control of Japan. The evidence already in and to be presented discloses that treat"' obligations were com- Doc. No. 6908 Page II pletely disregarded. Protests almost without number were useless. Japan was mobilizing all forces at her command for the purpose of extending, by force of arms, her dominions throughout the Pacific area. Finally, in order that the resources under the control of the United States might not be used by Japan for these aggressive purposes, the President on 26 July issued an order freezing assets of China and Japan. Britain and The Netherlands immediately took similar steps. As a result, there was a virtual cessation of trade between Japan and the other countries named, including exports of oil, on which an embargo was shortly afterwards placed. It is important to observe that these measures by the United States, the British Commonwealth and The Netherlands did not precede the aggressive action of Japan in Indochina, but followed as a consequence. Japanese apologists afterwards endeavored to treat these measures as in the nature of hostile acts and as forming a justification for the ultimate treacherous attacks by Japan. So it is vital to get them in their proper perspective. Doc. No. 6908 Page II On 8 August, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, inquired as to whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet for the purpose of discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views. On 28 August the President was given a message from the Japanese Premier, Prince KONOYE, urging that a meeting of the heads of the two Governments be arranged to discuss all important problems covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying this message was a state- ment containing assurances, and I ouote: "Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia. "Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories." The statement contains this further assurance, and I quote 2 "It is also stated by the United States Government Doc. No. 6908 Pago 33 that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or J-.pan would be considered except as these might be in con- formity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. -The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point. "Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such г program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself." 'Then these assurances were given, the Japanese Foreign Office knew that the United States had not changed its foreign policy. Prince KONOYE knew that the four points stated by Mr. Hull in April constituted the cornerstones of that policy. The President, in his reply on 3 September, sugges- Doc. No. 6908 Pago 34 ted that there take place immediately in advance of the proposed meeting and as a necessary step precedent there- to, preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought. On 6 September the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals which contained much narrower assurances than those given in the statement communica- ted to the President on 28 August. Japan, in this statement,offered to agree and I quotes "That Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any if its.adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan," and further in the seme statement, and I quote: "That the economic activities of tbe United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis"; and in the same statement, the United States was asked to agree, and I quote: "That the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area," and a final provision calling for rescision of the freezing order. The practical effect of these requirements would be: Doc о No, 6908 Page 35 (1) That Japan retain its military control ever the whole of Indochina with no limi- tation whatever on the number of troops stationed there; (2) That Japan would be the judge as to whether there was justifiable reason for military action against the regions lying south of Japan ; (3) That Japan would determine whether economic activities of the United States were carried on in China on an equitable basis; (4) That the United States should abandon all efforts to strengthen its defenses in the Philippines and other places in the Far East. But the words used, and I quote, "suspend any military measures" could easily be con- strued to prevent the supplying of bases already established in the Far East and might require their actual abandonment on that account; (5) That the United States would cease all military aid to the Republic of China; (6) That the rescision of the embargo and freezing Doc. No. 6908 Page II orders would permit Japan to obtain iron and aviation gasoline in order to intensify its military preparations. On this same date,\6 September, ,:r ar Minister T0J0_ and a military group desirous of waging immediate war on the United States,/Great Britain and The Netherlands, / W U M M M M N N U M / caused another Imperial Conference to be called. At ~ ~ " """ this Imperial Conference it was decided that the mili- tary group would ygo forward with preparations for war — -t г " and if the pending conversations had not terminated in a manner satisfactory to Japan by the middle of October, that Japan would attack. The accused present were TOJO, NAGANO, ШЛс/ OKA and SUZUKI. The attention of the Tribunal is called to the fact that the United States never sought to make time the essence of the conversations 5 never fixed any dead- line. But as the hours of peace ran out, it was Japan that kept watching the clock. The Japanese diplomatic cloth was being cut to the pattern of a military uniform, On 25 September the Japanese Government presented J to Ambassador Grew a complete new draft of proposals and urged that an early reply be made thereto. Among Doc. No. 6908 Page II the commitments the United States was asked to make was the following, and I quote: "In case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of inter- pretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation." Thus, the United States was asked to endorse and approve the right of Japan to make war on the United States accord- ing as Janan might determine her obligations to be under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact. An additional proposal that looked innocent enpugh by itself unless understood in relation to other facts was the following, and I quote: "Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, dis- continue immediately the measures Of freezing assets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of then." From the evidence already in and to be presented, it is apparent that Japan was only waiting for a sufficient backlog of military supplies, Doc. No. 6908 Page II especially steal and aviation gasoline, prior to launching her attack on the United States and the British Commonwealth. Agreement to the provision above ouoted would have required the United States to furnish these materials because t!" ev were available in the United States. On 2 October the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining the attitude of the United States towards various points in the Japanese proposals which did not appear to be consistent with the principles to which the United States was, and had been committed. The four cardinal points which formed the foundation of the American Government's relations with other nations were again listed as follows: 1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 3. Support of the principle of eciuality, includ- ing equality of commercial opportunity. Doc. No. 6908 Page II 4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo nay be altered by peaceful means. It nay be observed that this was but an exact repetition of the statement made by the President to Ambassador NOMURA on 3 September 1941. It will be further observed that these same four identical points were given to Ambassador NOMURA by Secretary Hull on 16 April 1941 as forming the basis of preliminary conversations looking toward a reconciliation of views with respect to the settlement of Pacific questions. As the middle of October approached, some of those (including KONOYE), who had been parties to the decision of the Imperial Conference of 6 September, became alarmed and after a bitter quarrel (the details and. parts played by personalities will be; shown in the evidence) the third KONOYE Cabinet resigned. As had, by this time, become the custom, KIDO as lord Keeper of the Privy Seal sum- moned a conference of Senior Statesmen with whom he consulted as to the advice which he should give the Emperor on the choice of a siiccessor. The Lord Keeper with the active support of HIRCTA, recommended TOJO. No one seems to have opposed. KIDO laid down two funda- Doc. No. 6908 Page II mental points: First, that the deadline of the middle of October set in the resolution of 6 September should г ; — ~ be extended and the conversations continued meanwhile; and second, that a quarrel which had__de_veloped between the Army and Navy (really as to the chance of success of war against the United States and Britain) should -fotoQj be resolved. TOJO took office as Premier on the con- ditions specified by HIDO. The first was dealt with by extending the deadline from 15 October to 25 November К 1 O O Q and afterwards to 29 November; the second by appointment of the accused SHIliADA as Navy Minister in place of OIIvAWA who had disagreed with TOJO. NAGANO who, at NfitC At N & fif) — —— - ^ an earlier stage, had been pessimistic about the chances of war with the United States, seems to have changed his opinion. At all events he remained as Chief of the Naval General Staff. SUZUKI retained office in the Cabinet and as President of the Planning Board, and К J W f t k - U HIMORA as Vice Minister of Far. The following accused .joined the Cabinet as new members: TOGO as Foreign "ГЭб-о a) and Overseas Minister and KAYA as Finance Minister; K A Y * Cs) л ' HOSHINO became chief Secretary of the Cabinet and a t+OStilHfy Minister of State. Doc. No e 6908 Page 41 The Japanese Government then became ever more insistent in urging a quick decision on the Japanese proposals but still showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position. With TOJO heading the Japanese Government as Premier, events moved rapidly towards war. On 5 November an Imperial Conference was held and the Japanes^na^^nalpolicy^tov/ard the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands ".-as reexamined]. It was decided to begin hostilities as soon after 25 November as preparations could bo completed. The /^uTo accused taking part in this decision vie re TOGO, TOJO, KAYA, SUZUKI, SHI MAD A, NAGANO, KIMJRA, ШТО ajid OKA. Apparently, on the day of the Conference, Com- bined Fleet Top-Secret Operation Order No. l w a s issued providing for the Pearl Harbor attack and for combined fleet operations against the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands. Two days later, Combined Fleet Тор-Secret Order Ко. 2 was issued designating 8 December as Y-Day - the tentative day fixed for the attack. X-Day was to be fixed later as the actual day of the attack. Doc о No. 6908 Page 42 This Pearl Harbor attack plan, known as the "YAr.AI' CTO Plan," the evidence will show, was formu- lated in the spring of 1Q41. It was used in the summer naval maneuvers of that year. The Japanese planes practiced coming in low over mountains similar to those at Pearl Harbor. Likewise, a shallow-water torpedo suitable for use in the waters of Fearl Harbor was perfected and used in the maneuvers. Final work was done on the Fearl Harbor attack plans in war games which were held, at the Japanese Naval WE Г College in September 1941 and which were presided over by NAGANO as umpire. On 10 November the order was given for all Japanese ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November and for a powerful Japanese task force to rendezvous at Tankan Bay in th Earl' on 26 November, the order was given, and I ruote, "Attack Pearl Harbor." At 6 o'clock that morn- ing the task force steamed east and then south to ~ ту out that order. Despite these various plans which were made to attack the United States, Great Britain and The Nether- Dec. e 6908 Page 43 lands, the conversations which had been carried on between Japan and the United States since the spring of 194.I contirued. In fact, as we will show, there cane a tine, certainly in the months of November and December, when the conversations were obviousljr used as a screen to hide the Japanese plan to attack. On 20 November the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. KURUSUj who had been sent to aid him as a result of the Imperial Conference held on 5 November, presented another proposal to the Secretary of State. This pro- posal was of such an extreme nature that acceptance by the United States would constitute abandonment of its entire foreign policy and approval of Japan's many acts of conquest and aggression. On 26 November the Secretary of State made a reply to the Japanese representatives in the form of two docu- ments; the first, an outline in a tentative form of a proposed basis of agreement between the United States and Japan, and, second, an bxplanatory statement in regard to it. The document proposed that if Japan were really interested in a settlement of all Pacific questions, it could be done by accepting the four points given by Mr. Hull on 16 April as a basis for exploratory conver- Doc. No. 6908 Pago 44 sations, repeated on 3 September and 2 October, and suggestions for the implementation of these four points. Although it later appeared that the Japanese Government, lacking other excuses, treated this 26 November proposal as preventing any peaceful settle- ment of the Questions involved in the conversations,. specific instructions were given by Foreign Minister TOGO to their emissaries to be certain to have the conversations continue. In fact, Japanese represen- tatives kept up the appearance of carrying on the conversations until after the attack began. Between 28 November and 1 December inclusive, meetings were held at which the final plans for war with the United States, the British Commonwealth and The Netherlands were again reviewed. There was a liaison conference on 28 or 29 November attended by the following accused: TOGO, TOJO, KAYA, SUZjJKfT SHIMADA, NAGANO, HOSHINO, ШТО and OKA. 0n[30 NovemberI the accused NAGANO and SHIMADA assured the Emperor of the Navy's readiness for war and of their confidence in success. Thus the Array and Navy seemed to have reconciled their differences of opinion. Both were ready to take the final plunge. On 1 December the D o c . No. 6908 Page II final Imperial Conference and Cabinet Moating were • - " <• — held. At the former the following accused were present: TOGO TOJO, SI'IMADA, ,KAYA, SUZUKI, NAGANO, HOSHINO, MUTO, OKA; and at the Cabinet Meeting, TOGO, TOJO, SEIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI and HOSHINO. There seems to have been no dissent in either of these meetings from the de- cision for war. X-Day was fixed for 8 December, Tokyo time, 7 December, Pearl Harbor time, In these circumstances, it became extremely im- portant to decide what notice, if any, should be given of the approaching attack. The controlling purpose was to have the initial assault a complete surprise. The Cabinet discussed the type of message to be sent. NAGANO and SHIMADA wanted to attack without any message. All were anxious to achieve the results of a surprise attack. The Hague Convention III reouiring a declara- tion or an ultimatum seems to have been without friends at the meeting. Prima facie the duty of drafting the document and directing the time of its delivery was !£0G0's. The document delivered speaks for itself. It is not a declaration of war. It is not an ultimatum. It was not delivered until an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor began. As to a'hich of these accused knew D..г,о, 6908 Page 46 of these facts in advance or were directly responsible for them, we have their own statements, which are ex- tremely conflicting. w e shall place them before you and leave you to judge from these statements and other testimony where the truth lies. Meanwhile, from a date as early as 18 November, discussions had been in progress with Germany and later with Italy seeking agreement of these three countries that no separate peace would be negotiated. The agreements were m&de. Both Germany and Italy gave promise of military support in the struggle Japan was about to begin. r On 2 December the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. KJJRUSU in regard to the reason for continued Japanese troop movements and reinforcement in Indochina. On 5 December the reply was presented to Under Secretary of State Welles that the Japanese reinforcements had been sent as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory. This reply was presen- ted on instructions from TOGO, although NOMURA had pointed out its utter inadequacy - one of many warnings which he gave to his superiors in Tokyo. D o c . No. 219P (125) Page 1 On 6 December TOGO dispatched to NOMURA the Japanese message, a lengthy document, with instruc- tions that it was to be decoded and prepared with the utmost secrecy, but not to be presented until a separate order was received as to the time. On 7 December (Tokyo time - 6 in Washington), followed the instructions to deliver it at 1 P.M. on the 7th (Washington time). Before this document was delivered, namely, in the evening of 6 December, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan asking that the tragic possibilities in the situation be avoided. At the time of the strike, both Britain and the United States were at peace with Japan. Between the United States and Japan, diplomatic conversations were in progress. There were no conversations between Japan and the British Commonwealth, The latter were indeed in close touch with the United States but Japan had no right to assume that the requirements of The Hague Convention III and other t r e a t y provisions as to open- ing of hostilities could be omitted. The exact sequence of events around the Pacific Basin at this fateful time is extremely important. For the convenience of the Tribunal and all taking part in Doc. 1:0. С у Об Page 48 the Trial the sequence has been reduced to the form of a Time Chart. The basic time for the Chart is the time at Tokyo, from which center the duplicity in Washington and the actual attacks in the Pacific were planned and controlled. while the Time Chart itself will be presented for the convenience of all concerned, the items upon it, however, have been numbered, and will be proved in accordance with that numbering. It will be seen from the Chart that on the evening of 6 December, the Press was told in Washington at 7-4-0 P.M. about the proposed telegram from the President of tho United States to the Emperor of Japan, and that at 8:00 Mr. Hull sent a telegram to Mr. Grew, American Ambassador in Tokyo, advising him that such a message v/as on the way. At 9:00 P.M. the actual telegraphic message which, had it been delivered to tho Emperor at once might have changed the course of history, was sent from" Washington to Tokyo marked "Triple Priority," and, at the President's own request, in a code which could be easily deciphered. Doc. No. 219P (49) Page 1 An hour later this telegram reached Tokyo, where jit was then 12 noon on 7 December. Yet before it was delivered into the hands of Mr. Grew no less than ten and a half hours of precious time had elapsed. Evi- dence will be called, to prove that such a delay was a result of deliberate orders to the postal authorities to delay the delivery of all such telegrams by a period of five to ten hours. Further evidence will be called to prove that the contents of the telegram were being freely communicated, among the staffs of Government Departments by 6:00 P.M. that day, and probably for several hours earlier. Yet, as already stated, the telegram itself"was"not handed to Mr. Grew, who alone could effectively use it until 10:30 P.M. that night, a period of exactly ten hours over the normal time of delivery. Obviously, however, the Japanese Government could have acted upon it, if they had wished, as soon as they had decoded it. Fur- thermore, it will be proved that the Japanese Govern- ment had public as well as secret knowledge of the arrival of the telegram. At 3-00 P.M. that afternoon, the American Radio announced to the world that such a message was on the way. It is reasonable to suppose Doc . he . by08 Page 50 the facts were known long before as a result of the Press announcement in Washington a l r e a d y mentioned. At 9J00 P.M. that night, Mr. Grew received a telegram, also marked "Triple Priority," warning him that the President's message was on the way. He was therefore waiting for the message itself to be delivered when it arrived at. 10;30 P..J/L On receiving it, and while it was being decoded, he immediately telephoned the Japanese Foreign Minister TOGO, asking for an urgent appointment. A cuarter of an hour after mid- night he saw Foreign Minister TOGO, read the President"' s message to him, and gave him a copy which the Foreign Minister promised to place before the Emperor without delay. At 12;45 A.M. on 8 December (Tokyo time) Japanese armed forces in strength occupied the Shanghai Bund, the -ater front which is in the British part of the International Settlement. Less than an hour later, at 1:40 A.M. on the 8th December (Tokyo time), the Japanese invasion forces opened fire from the sea on the British beach defenses at Xota Bharu, on the northeast corner of British Malaya, inflicting substantial casualties. Doc. No. 219P (51) Page 1 While this invasion jras proceeding, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was asking Mr. Hull for an appointment at 1:00 P.M. (Washington time) but before that interview could talie._pla.ce, Japanese forces had landed at Kota Bharu and wiped cut on the spot the whole of the small British force opposing them. T "hen 1:00 P.M. arrived in Washington, Ambassador NOMURA, instead of calling on Mr. Hull, asked for a postponement of the meeting to 1-45, which at Pearl Harbor was 8:15 on Sunday morning, 7 December. The attack on Pearl Harbor had begun at 7'55 A.M., 1:20 P.M. Washington, twenty-five minutes earlier than the suggested meeting. The attacks at Shanghai and Kota Bharu were unknown in Washington and Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor was in execution of Combined Fleet Top-Secret Operation Orders 1 and 2 by the task force which left Tankan Bay on 26 November It was carried out by 360 carrier-borne torpedo, dive and horizontal bombing and strafing planes launched from six fast carriers at a point about 230 mil p s north of Pearl Harbor. The carriers were escorted by two cf the most powerful battleships afloat, a number Doc. No. 219P (52) Page 1 of cruisers, destroye] This task fo.?ce was probably the most powerful ever assembled up to that time. So great was the temprrary success achieved by the attack without declaration and without WE. ning that four battleships of the American fleet wer sunk; four, severely damaged; three cruisers, heavily 'araged; three destroyers, heavily damaged; two о the;.* naval vessels, sunk and. two badly damaged. The United States Navy lost 1999 officers and men killed, among them Admiral Kidd. The Marine Corps lost 109 killed. The Army lost 234 killed. The civilians killed in the attack numbered54° The United States lost 188 planes, most of them on the ground. The wounded were numerous. The damage to shore installations was heavy. As against this the attacking force, which, under equal conditions, usually nays the severer penalty, lost 28 planes and. 5 midget suicide submarines, which were never expected to get back to their mother shin. The Japanese killed and wounded all told were fewer than one hundred, all from the submarines and the attac w ^ D o c . No. 219P (53) Page 1 At five minutes past two in Washington, the Japanese Ambassador arrived at the office of the Sec- retary of State and at 2:20 P.M. entered his room. The attack on Pearl Harbor bad been under way for one hour, The Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State the document already described. Not even a copy of this document was handed to the Foreign Sec- retary in London. By 5 ; 20 A.M., Tokyo time, the Japanese forces had completed the occupation of the water front in Shangha Heavy howitzers were dragged into position and began shelling ships in the harbor. About 5-25 A.M., Tokyo time, t h e y opened fire on a British gunboat, which scon went down with many casualties. ,:r hile tbis shelling was in progress at Shanghai, Japanese troops forced their way into Siam from Indo- china. The demand for permission to enter with an ultimatum attached was not delivered to the Siamese Government until several hours after the invasion began. At 6:10 A.M. there was an air raid on Singapore. Еос. Ко. 6908 Page 54 At 7"00 A.M., although these violent hostilities had been in progress since midnight, the Japanese radio in Tokyo made the first public announcement that hostilities had in fact begun. At the same time, Mr, Grew was awakened by a telephone call from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, asking him to call there at once. He arrived at 7:30 A.M. Foreign Minister TOGO claimed that he had seen the Emperor at about 3:00 A.M. He then handed v., . . . " to Mr. Grew a copy of the document delivered to Mr. Hull in Washington three hours before. He stated to Mr. Grew that the document was the Emperor's reply to the Resident's message. This was not true, however, as the purported reply had been sent to the Japanese representatives in Washington two hours before the President's message to the Emperor left Washington and at least twelve hours before it was delivered to Mr. Grew in Tokyo. Half an hour later, at 8:00 A.M., Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and was there handed a copy of the same document which the Foreign Minister had delivered to Mr. Grew. Doc. Ко. 6908 Page 55 It is to be noted that neither Mr. Grew nor Sir Robert Craigie knew of the Japanese radio announcement of the opening of hostilities made at 7 : 00 o'clock that morning until after their visit to Foreign Minister TOGO. The Japanese Foreign Minister did not disclose r— 1 that their respective countries were actually at war. While Sir Robert Craigie was receiving a cony of this document, the Japanese were making an air attack on Guam, and an hour later another on Hong Kong, where plainly marked Russian vessels in the harbor were attacked. At about noon, twelve hours after the Japanese had commenced hostilities an Imperial Rescript was issued to the effect that a state of war then existed between Japan, the United States of America and the British Commonwealth of Nations. In a speech made on the same day as the procla- mation of the Imperial Rescript, Prime Minister TOJO excelled himself in reversing the facts. According to him, Japan had only attacked the Allied Nations in self-defense, after making every possible effort to avoid war. The Allied Nations, according to him, D o c . No. 6908 Page had made intolerable demands on Japan and had refused to make the slightest concession in favor of her most reasonable requirements. This speech was in line with the propaganda through the controlled press releases and radio broadcasts which had become a part of war preparations. Facts were concealed and dis- torted and much false information given in order to prepare the public mind for war. Such was the mental and emotional attitude of the Japanese people at the outbreak of hostilities. Their homes by the hundred thousands and their lives by the millions were soon to be offered up to the gods of war to satisfy the ambitions of these accused in the hey-day of their power. The records of the Privy Council of 10 December show the decision of the Government to ally Japan still more closely with the totalitarian bloc in Europe. On the following day the announcement of the new Tripartite Agreement, already in evidence as Exhibit 51, was made. The Agreement stipulated that neither of the three Powers should make a separate peace until the joint war against the United States and the British Commonwealth was successfully concluded. D o c , Ко , 6908 Page 5'? It is interesting to observe that the question of a breach of The Hague Convention III soon began to trouble some of the accused who were members of the Japanese Government at that time and p a r t i c u l a r l y TOGO, the Foreign Minister, T 7e find in the Japanese Foreign Office a report on this subject compiled by the Second Section of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry with the aid of certain Japanese lawyers. As this particular report bears the date 26 December 194-1 the inquiry must have been ordered immediately after the outbreak of war. This document, we shall put in evidence. It would tend to amuse, were the subject less tragic. The Committee came to the conclusion that it was difficult to regard as a declaration of war the docu- ment handed to the United States Secretary of State because it included no preliminary notice of taking independent action or of opening hostilities. This would appear to conclude the matter, but they solemnly discuss the practicability of contending that the question is to be governed, not by the real time at which the attacks and the subsequent real declaration of war took place, but by the nominal time, that is, Doc. No. 219P (136) Page 1 ignoring the fact that actual time varies according to longitude. They abandoned this argument as being too difficult to justify. The next suggestion is that they might contend that the А, В, C, D Powers had themselves started hostilities by a rupture of economic relations in July, but decided that this contention is practically absurd - a conclusion from which we need not differ. They then fall back on the argument which they describe as not unnlausible, that, as the Treaty names no time which is to elapse between the delivery of the declaration and the opening of hos- tilities and specifies no place for delivery, it can not in any case achieve its object and may, therefore, be entirely ignored. However, on further examination they do not appear willing to rely on this argument. Finally, they conclude that the best line of justifi- cation is to say that the existence of Japan was endangered, she was acting in self-defense, and was entitled to ignore this and all other treaties. Thereafter, the tide of Japanese conquest flowed west and south, until it was halted at the gates of India and Australia. The course of this movement, as well as the vast expanse of territory engulfed by it, Doc. No. 219P (59) Page 1 has already been shown to the Tribunal with the aid of the enlarged maps on the wall cf this Temple, shown in the early days of this Trial. In particular, those for the period 1943-1945 show more graphically than any words the aggressive purpose of Japan and the extent of the territory over which she planned domination. That the plan existed and the means of its partial consummation were boldly set forth in speeches by the accused TOGO, TOJO and SUZUKI in the Diet on 29 January 1942. The speeches were made at a time when the speakers were unhampered by diplomatic negotia- tions. There were then no inducements to deceive. These speeches were considered so important that they were summarized by the German Ambassador in Tokyo to his Government on the same day. The speeches themselves as well as the summary will be offered in evidence, The German Ambassador points out that these declara- tions are especially noteworthy because of their systematic character and the stago of success which had then been reached b> Japan in the initial opera- tions of the war. East Asia was to be built up of Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking, China, which were to form the core of the new organization. Thailand and Doc. No. 69О8 Poge 60 Indochina, if they cooperated, might also be included. The remaining lands of Greater East Asia were to fall into three categories. The first, consisting of Hong Kong and the fcalay Peninsula, were to come under the complete control of Japan. The second consisted of areas to which independence would be granted if they cooperated, namely, the Philippines and Burma. Their independence was te be on the pattern of Manchukuo. Additional evidence as to how much independence that amounted to will be shown by telegrams from the Foreign Office immediately before Pearl Harbor. In these TOGO gave precise instructions, contradicting those he had given a few days previously, as to the action Lianchukuo was to take on the outbreak of war with the United States and the British Commonwealth. In the third category were areas which were to be placed under military rule if they showed themselves to be hostile, namely, the East Indies, Australia and Chungking, China. The German Ambassador further reported that there was some difficulty about India as Japan could not conquer Australia and India at the same time and the Indian Congress appeared to be hostile. With regard D o c . No. 219P (61) Page 1 to Russia, he reported that while the accused TOGO had emphasized in his speech that relations with her were unchanged, according to strictly confidential informa- tion, military preparations against Russia were under way and hostilities were to start after the conquest of Port Darwin. Such was the plan, and if not all of it was carried out, that was due to circumstances over whioh these accused had no control. The success achieved in the beginning resulted from long and careful planning. The resources cf the nation were mobilized and expended with a lavish hand for the success of the plan. Ф In previous phases of this case Japan's aggres- sions ixP Manchuria and in other parts of China have been shown. Open declarations of the purposes and aims of those aggressions by several of the accused made from time tc time beginning even before 1931 have been offered in evidence. The open announcement of Japanese ambitions for the formation of the so-called ^ ̂ — Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has been shown. Documents showing negotiations resulting in ihttf'Anti- / 4 Гос. No. 6906 Page 62 Com!tern and Tripartite Pacts whereby Japan acquired ' Я • in 1111-1 in, __ _ ,.„<<>— active rnd like-minded allies are in evidence. The evidence now to he presented, together with that airead Tr in, will show that events which led to war between Japan on the one hand, and the United States and Great Britain on the other, were but the foreseeable ard natural consequences and culmination of the nlots and plans in which the accused, some from the beginning, and others from various later dates, were engaged. The rapid conquest of Manchuria, the exploitation of her natural resources, the push into and exploitation of North China, and the attempt to conquer all of China, were studied and calculate! moves on the part of these accuse!. The preparations of naval bases on and fortifications of the Mandated Islands, the occupation of French Indochina, the armed invasion of Slam, were but milestones along their pathway of war. Pearl Harbor and Singapore were but tactical objectives. Grand strategy called for all of China, the Philippines, East Indies, Australia, Nev /onland and India, у / /Ь- jjf'Wv '' -J ̂ / | / I / . ч V / } / / W j . { .4 • • .4. У- /Jf i "A/- vs Д ч «у! (,, . . .^A-tV Г* & > v' I 'I**4** f^^'^^bs^' ^ У*»- у — •• » - • 1 Г . 1 r r t V \ [Jj M \ Ц ^ Ш Ш ^ * Ф - V S • » / F # V ; л . о 'v V * ***** - ^ ^ • v ^ ' - , \ • V f У Qi f-v ': ft >f ' ' rYW" 4 "' .1 ' - ы ^ > v ; # - , - ( U u -г. ^ # в I <.F . .XJT : Я • ГПИ , , __ ) о?-*- ^ с 61 — '<*'• j ' — ( -v Л-Г ' % ^tH/ Av^ —j /Q-З o- • s v-^ • л. .. ^t c I ft-< j 0 cA 4 Doc о No„ 219P (46) ' ?age .1 Br. Ex. 74 TIE AMERICAN AI.IBASSADQR IN JAPAN (GRE.7) TO TIE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HI ROTA) No. 796 TOI7YO, Sspterr.ber 17» 1937» EXCELLENCYj I have the honor, by direction of my Government, to address to Your Excellency the following notes "Since the beginning of the present fighting in China the American Government has received reports of attacks by Japanese armed forces in c hina upon American nationals and their property, in- cluding attacks upon American hums nit aria., and philanthropic es- tablishments and upon the persons and property of non-combatants generally. The American Government desires in particular to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government a recent attack on September 12 by Japanese planes on an American missionary hospital in South China» located at '.Taichow, Kw .ngtung Province. Information in the possession of the American Government indicates that three Japanese planes flew low three times over the mission compound where two large American flags were flying; that each time the planes dropped bombs all of which exploded seriously injuring personnel of the hospital as well as damaging the hospital and the residence, that there were no anti-aircraft guns at taichow, and that the mission itself is two miles distant from any c hinese military encampment. Attack upon non-combatants is prohibited both by long accepted principles and by established rules of international law. Also c attack upon humanitarian establishments!, especially those which are law- fully under the flags of countries in no way party to military opera- tions, have no warrant in any system of law or of humane conduct. The American Governments therefore, is impelled t in fulfillment of its obligations toward its nationals and on behalf of those funda- mental principles of law and of morality which relate to the immunity of non-combatants and humanitarian establishments„ emphatically to voice objection to such attacks and to urge upon the Japanese Govern- ment, "which the American Government cannot believe approves of such disregard of principles, that effective steps be taken toward averting any further such attacks»" I avail myself (etc.) JOSEPH C, GRE'iT Foreign Relations I, pp. 498-499 Doc. No. 219P (47) Page 1 Br. Ex. 75 THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO TRE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HIROTA) No. 780 TOKYO, September 22, 1 9 3 7 c Excerpts. Tbe American Government objects both to such jeopardizing of lives of its nationals and of non-combatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals now residing m and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities® In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of Government in Chine and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of t^e American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of w 1 ich the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards. In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and non-combatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the Powers at Ninking, the American Government cannot believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of t v e Japanese Government. • • • • о о JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, pp. 504-505 Doc. No. 219 P (48) Page 1 Br с Ex. 76 MEMORANDUM BY TFE CHIEF OF TFE DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (HAMILTON) OF A CONVERSATION WITH TFL COUNSELOR OF TFE JAPANESE EMBASSY (SUMA) Excerpts (WASHINGTON.,) September 25, 193r I referred to tbe recent Japanese bombing operations at Canton whore, according to the reports, some 2,000 non- combatants had been killed. I said that I had noticed a statement in some newspaper to the effect that the Japanese military were very much surprised that reports were being sent from China to the effect that Japanese military opera- tions wore resulting in the death of non-combatants, I said that f~is killing of non-combatants at Canton, at Hankow, at Nanking and at various other places in C^ina could not but create t^e most deplorable impression in tT~is country and in other countries» . . e I said again that t^is w v ole matter of bombing non-combatants was deplorable and ?/as creating a most unfortunate impressions H(AXWELL) M . H(AMILTON) Foreign Relations I, pp. 505-506 / Doc. No. 219P (49) Page 1 Br. Ex. 77 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY TEE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADVISORY 00ЖITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1937 Tie Advisory Committee, Taking into urgent consideration tie question of tie aerial bombardment of open towns in China, by Japanese aircraft, Expresses its profound distress at the loss of life caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of women and children, as a result of such bombardments. Declares that no excuse can be made for such acts wKich have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world, And solemnly condemns them. Foreign Relations I, p. 506 Doc» No, 219P (50) j Br. Ex. 78 Page 1 PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY TFE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON SEPTil BER 28, 1937 The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of t v <e text of the resolu- tion unanimously adopted on September 27 by the Advisory Committee of t>e League of Nations on the subject of aerial bombardment by Japanese air forces of open towns in C v ina. Tht American Government, as has been set fort v to t v e Japanese Government repeatedly, and especially in this Government's note of September 22, holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. Foreign Relations I, p. 506 Doc. No, 219P (51) Page 1 Br. Ex. 79 PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON JANUARY 31, 1938 Excerpt. The Department of State on the evening of January 28, 1938, instructed the American Embassy at Tokyo to make oral representations to the Japanese Foreign Office with reference to the incident Involving the slapping by a Japanese soldier of Mr. John M. № .11 son, t'"ird secretary of t v e American Embassy at Nanking, on January 21 * The Department instructed the Embassy at Tokyo orally to communicate the substance of Mr. Allison's telegrams of January 27 and 28 to a hig^ officer of the Japanese Foreign Office and that in so doing there be emphasized that in weighing the gravity of the incident this Government takes into account the fact that the whole incident, including the slapping by a Japanese soldier of a diplomatic representative of the Government, is not an isolated case, but represents but one of and cannot be dissociated from a series of cases of irregular entry of American property rffd disreg-id ~6f , American rights by Japanese sold-;lcrs e Foreign Relations I, p. 574- Doc, No, 219P (37) p ^ge 1 ЕГг Ту с 57 1DDBESH DELIVERED BY SI DENT ROOS r VF,LT IT CHICAGO 0? T OCTOBER 1937 Exсоrot - Г С с * 9 С с The political situation in the " T orld, wh 4 ch o f l->te his boon grс 7- ' ng arogress 4 v r h r "'csc., is such ^s to c u s e grave concern т; тх 1 ' oty to ill the pennies and na t 4 ons т_т Ьо " т4 sh to live in pc ico ard ar 4 ty with their neighbors. Some 15 ye'-rs ago the hopes of r^nkind for ° confnuing eri of intern Moral poi.ee wor.- r ised. to g r t heights T vhen ro^e th "• n 60 n"t 4 ons solemnly pledged tb" rcr 'h rr "? no 4 ' to r* 7 sort to • r^s in fpnth' - т»r-.сё of their net*on* 1 ! JTS ^^d policies, The high e s p 4 1 ' ons expressed in the Briand-Kel 1 ogg Peace D act ->nd the hones for p e c o thus raised hive o p late fi'.vf way +o a haunting fe^r of calamity. The ^rase^t тр-'̂п of tатог and in- ^erno+'ion '1 lawlessness b' g^n n ^p™ ^ s "-ко. It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of o t V r n-ti ons or the 4 nv - si on of alien territory in violation of tr^'ties and h~s no'"' reached i stige "'here the ^ery foundations o" ci vilization arc serinvslv threatened , "he l~nd- трarks and traditions " T hich h^ve imrkod th" progress of civiliza- tion toward a condition of la*", crdo - ", and justice -e 4 ^g wiped away, Without a deel ration of ^ar and without ng or ^u^* 4 - fiction of any kind, civilians, including wo^en a-d ch'ldren, are >oing ruthlessly nurd'red. with botrbs from the i 4 r r In times of sc-clled peace shi.ps are be 4 ng attacked ^nd sun v by sub- г-ri.nes without cause on notice. Nations л ге fomenting and taking sides in. civil '"irf"rG in. n t 4 o n s that have «ever done them ->ny H - R F , Nations clilring frondOP for T H E M S E L V E S deny i + to oth' rs - Innocent peoples and nations are hoing cruellv sacrificed to a greed for no" ,T °r чип~срасу ch is devoid of al 3 sense of iu?'' ice ?„nd hum" ne co"»sidanat' on- To э --r a phrase -• recent author. "perhaps wo foresee a tire '•*hen men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will so ho + ly over th- ,:T orld tha + c-very a" r c ! m i s ^b.ing ™?"'11 b r in danger, even book and Picture and harmony, е тг егу x reasv-rr garnered through t--.ro millenniums, the snail, the de3 4 с"- 1 e, the defenseless* all '"ill be lost or wrecked or tr *erlv destroyed. " Doc r No. 219? (-7) ^-«e 2 If those + h"nes c^rc tr n-'ss in other m r t s of fh^ world le 4 " no от. t r "" , "ine th n t \rerica w i n -sc n r)o, thrt it r- rr exp~ct гтсу, th-t this ; est r "^n He^i "^h" 1 "" wi 11 no 4 hr a* tac v cd, 'nd t>-t it viii continue trnn"-jilly ~nc? n^icr-fully to с * ту о" the e t ^ c s the --rts o* civ^l 4 z^tion. If J hcs" d~>ys core "th^-rr w Ц r̂- no safety bv arr-g no ^ele fror au + hori + y» no answer in science. r he s t e m '"ill till every flo""r of с ltu.ro is tr'rnled a^d "11 h w ^ n be'nag leveled "'n 1 v~st etios," If those: "avg -r r ' not to co^c +o n^ss — if we to hav r a world in whict we e n breath- freol" T d live in ->rtth without fear--thc peace-loving n " 1 o*" 1 s rust a c^-c rtod e r r o r t to uphold 1 " r s it a i-ninc f nlf s o M which "'lone n~ n ce can rest secure. The peace-loving n" 4 v~ns r,v u s t m" v e а с on с т t e d effort in onposit-'on to those violations of treaties a "d those if»norin?s of humane instincts " 7 hlch todav с'""а + ' , п.т a st~t- c 4 " inter- national anarchy •••nd inst-b 4 .i itv fror '"M.ch th' ~ э is no escape through г от».*» isolation о" n.eutr "li ty r Those who cherish their freedor and recognize and respect the equal rirht of their nei c f h v ors to he free ,r, d liv** in r>o?ce, rust work top'othc- fon the 4 riuroh of lew ^ d ron->l ^ ^ c ' l h s in..order th^t pence, justice, confidence r v prevail in the worldP There rus 4 be a r" J irn to -» belief in 4 ho nie^ged word., in the value cf a signed, treaty. Th r rc r Tst he T C O g n i M o n of the fact th n t national r e a l i t y is as vi t*l °s р - "!"* te roraJ i*y# ,« . A bishop wrote we 4 he oth'r day: "It soc-rs to that, some- thing greatly needs to be sa-> d in ordinary hur^nity aga' n? t the P T s e n 4 Pr°ctice of c r w i n p thr horror? of w-.r to helpless civHinn?, esnrci'lly "or^n --d children. It r->v be that such a protest right bo r c g T d e d by r-nv. w^o cla'r to he f r '.lists, is *Ytiir, but ray it not ho that ho-^t of - ->nMnd is sr filled wi+h horror ~>.t the present n.eadless s 1 ffor'ng that that force coi">ld he robilized in sufficient v l u r r to l-'ss^n such cruelty tn + he •-''ays hvon though it may t ke twenty v«a -rs which God forbid, for civilization to r H effective i 4 s corporate protest against this trrb'.risr. s v t I v strong voices r w hasten th© ^ v , " r here is a solid -ri у " , п ,я interdepnrvde^ce -"bcu 4 thr modern world, both technically ro"""»lly, " r h c h r°kes it irncss'ble for any -^Ttion corple" .~ly 4 о isolate its'lf fro 1 " rccTric and political upheavals in the r - st of 4 he w orl--". especially when such upheavals м to b'~ &тг-">г'* г \<? °nd not. decl.-'nine„ Th^re с an ho no stability or peace either -'thin n' 4 ic n s o^ between nations except under l-»ws and roral standards adhered to by all. Internitional -narchy destroys everv foundation for peace. It Doc г No, 210° (37) Page 3 .jeopardizes eith'r the imredi-te or 4 he firure socuri + v of e v r y nation, 1 rge or small, I+" is, + he T, rfo->e, л m"tto-r of v1t-l irt~r'st ana concern to the P" ор1 г c* the United States 4 h-t the sanctity of int-^r» ation-il treaties and the p?a 4 nton"nce of i >t rT '- r " 11 c^ a 1 ror ° 1 i ty be r*-stored. The overwhelm 4 ng ma.iorv'y o 4 x he peoples arc 1 n - t- 4 ons of +hc T •orlc tod-y • ijvc +o live in peace» They soek the ov-^1 of harriers again^l trade» Theу "r n+ to exert thc-pelves In indvs+гу in agriculture, In bus 4 ness, th -1 they ray irc -•-•so their wealth throrgh th? prediction cf ,r e--i.i + h-nroduc 4 ng goods r ther th-• n striving to pnoduco militar - " - a l ^ r s and herbs m d machine guns "nd c-nnon for the destruction of hum?n li^es and useful property» In those n" 1 1 4 OPs of the world w V c h sner to be Piling arra- rent. en arrar^nt for pur noses of aggression, a-d those othor nations which * v acts of aggression ^gai^st ther -nd t^oir security, •> v - - h i g h proportion of their n ^ i n -1 4 ncore is ^e' n g spent di octlv for ^r.trents, It runs fro r 3C to "S high as 50 percept» Tho proportion that we in the United States sn-nd is far less—11 or 12 percent» Row h^ppy we -re that the circumstances of thr- rrr-ent permit us to put our rone у in+e bridges any boulevards, dars "n- 4 re- forestation, tho conservation of our soil, and rany other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing -rri'-s '""d vast supplies о r ' implements of w r , I a"- corpolled " -d you are cornolled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The pea.ee, the freedom, and the s^cvr 4 *y of °0 percent of + ho population cf the w OT .]_ f i -j_ s b^ine 4 ooP"rdi.zod by the re- raining 1С Percent, who are x hre-toning - br"i v do^n of "11 inter- national order and l-v/„ Surely th* 00 rj^cr^t who want to live in peace under 1 aw tn accordance -*1.th monal standards th 1 »t. h-vo received a l m o s t universal ^ccopt-nee through the centuries, can ".nd rust f 4 nd son'- "pv to гак" their will prevail. The situation is definitely of universal concern. The ques- tions involved r-"l-tr net r ^ - l y t n violations of sa ci'tc pro- visions of papticul"r treaties; thov -re questions of w-> r o^d of peace, of intern-tirn"l law, "nd especially of principles ef humanity. It 1s true th-t. thav in^ol^a def'nite violat'cns of agroerents, and especially of the Covenant of the L _ "gua of Nit 4 ons the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Po^er ^-eatv. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security, ^nd world humanity. ё Doc. 219Р (З 7 ) Page 4 It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same tune it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanotity of treaties, of respecting the rights and iibani c.V others, and of putting an end to acts of internet!onaI a g дr s a i on It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading» When a n о p 5 d e л 1 с о f nh у si eel disease starts to screed, the community app-cves and -aire in a quarantine of the patients in order to p r e ? c t h e health of the community against the spread cf the disease. It is my determination to pursue a policy of рояce aid to adopt every n~.-5.jt j C ao Le -a^aaure t о a^oid. involvement in wa r . It ought to be 1 ncenooi T â b.Ie '•> ь t in thia modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could he s" foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of . .Landing the whole world into war by invading and violating in с onera cention of solemn ureaties the territory of other nations that h a v e done- them. n. • reel bar a and which are too weak to protect themselves aae.'i'uc.cely* Tat the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation is today >eing threatened by that very thing. • No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences aid by exorcising great patience with and consideration for tie rights of other nations. War is p contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It cen engulf states end peoples remote from the original scene cf hostilities, "'u are determined ho keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves •• geinec the disa_>r,rous effects of war and the dangers of involvement;, -Уз are adopting such measures as will minimize опт risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete pro- tection an a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down. If civilization is to survive the nrincirles of the r rince of Peace must bo restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived. Fost important of all, + he will for peace on the part, of peace-loving nations must, express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will des:ST from such a cause. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. /me r ica hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively enrages in the search for pcace. Foreign Relations, I, pp.380-3 (Beginning 379 ) Document No. 219P (80) Page 1 Br. Ex. 114 THE AMERICAN A Tr !3AS3ADOB IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN APIAIRS (HIROTA) No. 874 TOKYO, January 31, 1938 (Excerpt) The American Government has recently received information from its representatives in China to the effect that a provi- sional regime in Peiping _has_ caused a revision _to be made of Chinese custoi^s^ rates on certain articles entering~ihto~t'he foreign—expert and import trade OF North China". Ty~G6vernmentj_ regarding the Government of China as the only authority which can legally cause a revision to be made in the Chinese customs tariff, is constrained to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to this arbitrary and illegal assumption of authority by the provisional regime in Peiping and to point out that the action of the provisional regime may have a seriously adverse effect upon the integrity of the Chinese customs, v/ith regard both to administration and to revenues, and that the revision of rates does violence to the principle of a uniform Chinese tariff at all ports. The Japanese Government shares with the American Government and with other Governments a long established and well recognized interest in the integrity of the Chinese customs administration, and the American Government has expressed its confident belief that the Japanese Government reciprocates the earnest desire of the American Government that the integrity of the Chinese cus- toms be respected. The action of the provisional regime 'at Peiping in revising rates of duty seriously threatens the integrity of the customs. Tor the creation and the acts of the provisional regime the Japanese Government has an inescapable responsibility; and when those acts are of a character, as in the case of the revision of the rates of duty, which affect the interests of foreign Governments, it is to the Japanese Govern- ment that those Governments must address their representations. Foreign Relations I, pp. 738-739 Doc» No, 219P (52) j Br. Ex. 78 Page 1 TH: AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO ТШ". JAPANISE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FIROTA) No. 872о TOKYO, February 4, 1938. EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to ny note no 0 866, of January 17, 1938, and, under instructions from ny Government, to inform Your Excellency that numerous complaints are being received by the American Government of the utter disregard shown by Japanese armed forces in China for American property» Among such cases arc-: S00С тт Ш: According to American missionaries who visited Soochow a number of times between November 21 and December 21, on November 24 they found that property of the Baptist Mission had been broken into and thoroughly looted, and they observed Japanese soldiers looting the ladies' home and school buildings 6 On the same day these missionaries inspected the American Presbyterian Mission Fospital, saw one building burning, and found that the administration building had been looted» They inspected the Methodist Episcopal Mission Fospital, and ' found that the lower floor of t v e doctor's residence had been looted, and saw Japanese soldiers engaged in looting the upper floor 0 On November 26 they inspected property of the American Church Mission in company with Japanese offisors detailed by military headquarters, and they saw three Japanese snldiers on t v e premises engaged in looting 0 They inspected Soochow Academy property and found the principal's and treasurer's offices thoroughly looted, and all .safes and filing cabinets broken open» They found also that one foreign residence had been thoroughly looted, and t v at the C h u r c h had been broken into and vestments looted or strewn about in great disorder. On December 1 they found Japanese soldiers in the treasurer's office in the Yates Academy, trying to break open the safe. On visiting the office the following day they found that the safe had been broken open. They also saw soldiers loading loot from Baptist residences and school buildings о According to Bishop Arthur J 3 Moore, in charge of the missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in China, who had visited Soochow. where the Mission has large holdings, including Soochow University and Laura Faygood School for Girls, call the buildings had been looted, four buildings had been bombed, and Japanese Doc. No. 219P (52) Page 2 Br. Ex. 80 were occupying other buildings, using the new chapel of Laura Haygood School for Girls as a stable. FANGСHOW: Reports from missionaries at Fengсhow indicate that on December 26 Japanese soldiers entered three American residences s on which American flags were flying and on which American consular proclamations and notices issued by the Japanese military police bad been posted, and stole money, jewelry, and other articles. On December 27 Japanese soldiers again entered the same residences and stole property 3 JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, p. 578 ?7t Doc. Ко. 219? (81) Pago 1 Br. Ex. 11^ THE AI-ERICAN E3 BASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE 1INISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AlDE-Iv.EI.OIRE Excerpt. I'oro than throo months have elapsed since the occupation of Nanking by Japanese military forces. The areas of hostilities have in that interval moved to substantial distances from that city, and there is at this time no conceivable danger which would of itself make it unwise for Americans to reside there. Notwithstanding these facts the Japanese military authorities continue to impose restrictions which in effect prevent Am rican missionaries and business men, with important interests in Nanking, from returning to that city. TOKYO, April 4, 1938. Foreign Relations I, pp. 76I-762 Doc. No. 219? (53) Br. Ex. 81 Page 1 THE AI. EE I CAN El BASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AIDE-MEHOIRE The American Embassy had the honor, in its note No. 892 of harch 12, 1938, to invite the serious attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the continued occupation by Japanese forces of certain American mission property in Shanghai. The occupation of American property by Japanese military forces is not confined to the cases cited in that note but is a condition which obtains extensively in areas in Central China under occupation by Japanese military forces. American missionaries have been denied access to mission property and during their enforced absence nearly all buildings have been looted and damaged and some have been destroyed by fire. American mission property at the following named places is occupied at the present time by Japanese troops: Changshu, Changchow, Chinkiang, Liuho, Nanking, Nansiang, Quinsan, Shanghai, Soochow, Sirgkiang, Yangchow, and Wusih in the Province of Kiangsu, and Huchow and Kashing in Chekiang Province. Tokyo, Larch 26, 1938. Foreign Relations I, p. 588. *t BP. EX. 65 (SAGA 1 )--I?3 Doc. 85A-J STATEMENT BY тнз PRIMS мшхзтза, PREJCE шти&о ICONOE. Lecember 22, 1938. The Japanese Government are resolved, as has boon clearly sot forth in thoir two previous statements .iaauad. t M a . year r to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuamintong Government. and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new ord^r in .East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in our ideals and aspirations. The spirit cf renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting over higher.. The Japanese Government cbsire to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations between Japan and China, in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood both nnfl abroad. Japan, China, and Manchoukuo rill be united by the common aim of es- tablishing the new order in "Jest Asia and of realizing a relationship of neighbourly amity, ссхаиоа defence against Communism, and economic coopera- tion. For that purpose it is necessary first of all that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced vior<s belonging to the past and do away with the lolly of ant i-Jap an ism, and resentment regarding Manchoukuo. In other rords, jqpan frankly desires China to enter of her own will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchoukuo. The existence of the* Comintern influence in East Asia can not be tol- erated. Japan therefore considers it an usauntiHt condition of the adjust- ment of the Sino-Japanese relations that there should be concluded an anti- Comintorn agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern .tgreemont between Japan, Germany and Italy. And in order to ensure the full accomplishment of her purpose, Japan demands, in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in China, that Japanese troops bo stationed, аз an anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the said agreement is in force, and also that the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist area. Аз regards economic relations between the two countries, Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China, nor does she intend to demand of China to limit the interests of those third Powers, who grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly. Japan only seeks to render effective the cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. That is to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, should recognise the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, with a view to promot.ing the economic interests of both peoples; and that, in the light of the historical and economic relations be- tween the two nations, China should extend to Japan facilities for the de- velopment of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of Worth China and Inner Mongolia. ч- Br. ТЬс. 65 (Page 2)-- 3F3 Doc. 854 - J The above gives the genera], linos of what Japan demands of China. If the true object of Japan in conducting the present vast military cam- paign be fully understood, it will be plain that what she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the costs of military operations. Japan de- mands only the minimum guarantee needed for the execution by China of hor function as a participant in the establishment of the now order. Japan not оп1з г respects the sovereignty of China, but she is prepared to ^ive positive consideration to the questions of the abolitition of extra-territoriality and of the randition of concessions and settlements— matters which are necessary for the full independence of China, Г/о cut»-ant r 0 . 85 4-J •••е 3. .г-. : т о. • о о . ' О • . - — ^ Т . _ . .t.".t3;-;~rt о:', ош_с.е_ .а гт Vut hз r t i сi tv T , ' '• v \ >' heraby certify that I z.r- off icinl" 1 у con- nected ith the Jo t :n9 че ;>ovoin*-ent In tho folio*.Tins c e c i t y ? Chief of the ' r chives Section, Jao-ne^e ' orsign Office, in" that as such of" ic'.sl I ' л Уе custody o:' t'. з do^r ^ent hereto ?.tt?.chad consisting of 177 ^ •ет, d'ted Jm.-Рзс., 101 , o.c described. -. s follows nnouncЭ' \nts of t a J?. ->"• rose Government hoisting ':o the China T ncidont ( o h . T further certify that the ?. tt" с lied, re•-* ore and Cocv ent is .in f icial docu-ent of the J-mneia ' ovem'-'ont, л ту that it is part of tie official archives and files of the following пл уз с r in 1 ', "try o: c'oTjirtwent ( ci- fying also the ile number or cit tion, if r.ny, or ?.nv other of'ioia.1 designation o:' the regulo loc tion of the document in the a j'cl ivз s or files): I ore ign inis try '"•i пег at Tokyo on this 23 со.-"- of "e-»t., 1946. (.si : n M l J C ? 2 S M . с igro. ture of Cf - icial" T'.L "itnas".;_. ."Î finhorv. M o .(..Sih n e.d)__ Chief of : the " rc ! ives Section Official r n oacity ct : -..te::y3nt of. Pi/ScJL-X ^icurar;ent T, John '-.. Curtis ? hereby c e r t i f y that X от as oeir.ted with the Oeneril • -nCqrertors of tha пгз'--з Co-' and or for tha Mlied lowers, and that the a 1 -ova dssc*'ibed document "ns obtained by r«e from the ->bove signed officio.! of the J ; onese Government in the aonduct of my official business. ' * ned. at Tokyo on this ?3 O y от Sept., 1945. (^i'.ned) J.. .JU ftigtis,. %d Lt. Document 854-A AN"TOUNCE 1 '"EFTS 0Г THE JAP^ESE GOVERN? T3NT EEL A TING TO THE CHINA. INCIDENT (v Q l. 3). (Excerots) ATEI'TENT OF IMPERIAL GOVSRTOWT January 16, 1938 Even after the capture of Nanking, the Japanese Government have till now continued to be oatient with a view to affording a final opportunity to tha Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. Eowever, the Chinese Govern- ment, --vithout appreciating the true intentions of Japan, blindly persist in their oonos 5 ti on against Japan, with no consideration either internally for the people in their miserable plight or ex- ternally for the peace and tranquility of all East Asia. Accord- ingly, the Japanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establish- ment and growth of a new Chinese regime, harmonious ro-ordinatton with which can really be counted upon. 7 7ith such a regime they will fully co-ooerate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese rela- tions and"for the building up of a rejuvenated China. Needless to state, this involves no change in the policy adopted by the Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China as veil as the rights and interests of oth?r Powers in China. Japan's responsibilities for the peace of East k^ia are now even heavier than ever before. It is the fervent hope of the Government that the people will put forth still greater efforts toward, the accomplishment of this important task Incumbent on the nation. •"Document No. 854-A Page 2 ^ М Ш | П 1 1 1 W.P.C. No. _ T.P.S. No. 854-A 1 Statement of Source and Authenticity T, H m S H I , HAORU hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the \rchives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows; Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Goveri rrent, and that it is part of the. official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designatioi of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); foreign "inistry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. K. Hayashl (signed) Signature of Official SF Шtnessс Fagaharu Odo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. c igned at Tokyo on this 23 day of-Seat., 1946 J. A. Curtis. 2d Lt. (sign: HAIIE Witne s s: Fa сhard H. Larsh /s/ _ Investigator Official Capacity t 9 7 ^ Document No. 854-B Page 1 ^ STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN ОП ICE SPOKESMAN CONCERNING THE ALLISON CASE January 31, 1938 Concerning the ca c 8 of Mr. John lllTson, American Consul at Nanking, the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Гг. Joseph C. Grew, called on Mr. Konsuke Horinouchi, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 6:30 o'clock last Saturday evening, January 29th. The American Embassador made to the Vice-Minister, an oral representation based mainly on the reports from Mr. Allison; and the Ambassador further informed the Vice-Minister that the Ameri- can Government expect to receive a suitable expression of regret by the Japanese Government and an assurance that the Japanese Government will take adequate measures for the punishment of those responsible. As a reply to the American Ambassador's oral representation of the evening of the 29th, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained the following three points to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, at 10 o'clock yesterday evening. 1. Under whatever circumstances the incident might have taken place, the slapping by a Japanese soldier of the American Consul at Nanking, Гг. John Allison, was an extremely unfortunate occurrence. Major Honge, staff officer of the Japanese forces in Nanking, went to the American Embassy and tender3d, in the name of the Commander, expressions of regret and apologies which, it has been reported, were accepted on the part of Mr. \llison. The Japanese Government, on their part also, wish to express their profound regret for this happening. 2. In view of the serious character of the incident, the Japanese Government wish to give assurances that, on the comple- tion of the strict investigations, steps will be taken for the adequate punishment of those responsible for the act. 3. In consideration of the possibility of there existing considerable discrepancies as to the circumstances leading to the occurrence in a case of this kind between assertions of those involved in the case; just so, in this case also, there exist considerable differences between the vsrsion given in the American complaint regarding the circumstances leading up to the slapping of the American Consul by a Japanese soldiar; and as the real facts will be brought to light only after careful and thoroughgoing in- vestigations to be conducted, the carrying out cf the investiga- tions will, of necessity, have to be reserved to later date. Document Го. 854-B Page 2 F.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 854-B •Statement of Source and Authenticity I, HAYASHT, KAORU, hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives—Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official T~~hav3 custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Govern- ment, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following namad ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. (signed) K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section Off i с ia 1 Ca pa с i'ty SJ^ltemgnt. of Official Procurement I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated, with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Comrrander for the Allied Powars, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. .Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. (signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. NAFF Witness: Richard H. Larsh (signed) Investigator Official Capacity Doc. Ее. 854-С P p ge 1 ** Collection if Official Announcements Concerning China Incident ( H o . 3 ) Information Department, Foreign Ministry December 1938 September 22, 1933 Mr. Avanol Secretary General of the League cf Hations Geneva I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 19th September 1938, transmitting the invitation based on the first paragraph of Article 17 of the Covenant, and addressed to the Imperial Government by the Council of the League of Nations. The Imperial Government hold to the firm belief that the method c.s envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations can not bring a.bout a. just and adequate solution of the present conflict between Japan and China and their, attitude in this regard has repeatedly been mrde clear in the ppst. I have the honour cf bringing to your knowledge that, for this rea.son, the Imperial Government regret that they are not able to a.ccept the invitation cf the Council. X. Ugaki Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Document Го. 854-C Page 2. C E R T I F I C A T E 0D0C0 i о• I.P.S. Го. 854-е St.atoopnt of Source and authenticity I, HAY ASF I, HAOETJ, hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives "action, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have cue cod.7 of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan,-Dec,, 1933, and. described as follows: Announcements cf the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3), I further certify that the attached record, and. document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of tne official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. (signed) J_. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: Fagaharu Odo (signed) Chipf o: the Archives Section Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, John A. Curtis-j hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and. that the above desc ibec. document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my offici"l business. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. (signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. Wi tne s s: Richard II. Larsh _(_sj_ Document No. 854-D Page 1 у I , V STATELET СЕ TEE FOBS IGF ОГ Г ICE SPOKESMAN October 12, 1938. The operations just undertaken in South China by the Imperial Japanese forces are purely military operations for the purpose of intercepting t u e principal route farms and munitions supply to the Chinese forces and destroying the important points of hostile machinations against Japan. The policy hitherto pursued by the Japanese Government of respecting the rights and interests of third Powers remains un- changed. Mthough the best efforts will therefore be exerted for the prevention of any damage to them in the present opera- tions, it is earnestly hoped that the third Powers will undar- stand the real intentions of Japan and extend cooperation to the efforts of the Japanese forces and thereby preclude the occur- rence of any untoward incidents, Document No. 854-D Page 3. * C E R T I F I C A T E r ".D.C. No. I.P.S. No. Ж4-Р.; Statement of Source and Authenticity I, HAYASHI, KAORU, hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol, 3). I further certify that the attached record and. document is an of:•'ici n l document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946 (signed) K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed) Chief of the \rehives Section Official Capacity statement of Official Procurement I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokvo on this 23 day of Sent., 1946. (signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d. Lt. !Ш® Witness: Richard H. Larsh /з/ Investigator Official Capacity 7 7 0 ж Etc. Ex. 65 (Pagel )—ИЗ Doc. 854-E Ct. Ex. The Foreign Office made public at 10 o'clock p.m., November 18, the following text of the Japanese Government's reply to the Note of October 6th of the Government of the unit'eH States. concerning American rights and inter-sbr ir. China, which was delivered to the American Ambassador Mr. Joseph Grew in the evening of the same day. EXCELLENCY, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note, No. 10?"6, dated October 6th, addressed to the thai Minister for Fore-inn Affairs lYirco "Korqye, concerning the rights and interests of the United States in China." In the Note are cited various instances based on information in the possession of the Government of the United States that the Japanese author- ities are subjecting American citizens in China to discriminatory treat- ment and violating the rights and interests of the United States. I have now the honour to state hereunder the opinions of the Japanese Government with regard to these instances. 1. The circumstances which led to the adoption of the present measures concerning export exchange in Tsingtao and the present situa- tion being, so far as the Japanese Government are aware, as set forth below, they consider that those measures can not be construed as con- stituting any discrimination against American citizens. A short time ago the Federal Reserve Bank of China was established in North China whose notes with an exchange value fixed at one shilling and two pence against one yuan, have been issued thus far to the anount of more than one hundred million yuan, and are widely circulated. These bank notes being the compulsory currency cf the Provisional Government, the maintenance of their value and their smooth circulation is regarded as an indispensable basis for the conduct and the development of economic activities in North China. Consequently the Japanese Government have taken a co-operative attitude; and oil Japanese subjects are using the said notes, and in their export trade are exchanging them at the rate of one shilling and two pence. On the other hand, the old fa-pi still cir- culating in these areas has depreciated in exchange value to about eight pence per yuan. Consequently those who are engaged in export trade and are using this currency are enjoying illegitimate profits, as com- pared with those who use the Federal Reserve notes and carry on legiti- mate transactions at the legitimate rate of exchanges that is to say, Japanese subjects who use the Federal Reserve notes have been suffering unreasonable disadvantages as compared with persons who while residing and carrying on their business in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of North China, use nevertheless, the old fa-pi exclusively. V Sr. Ей. 65 (Page 2 ) — I P S Dcc. -E ' Furthermore, the existence of the beforementioned disparity in exchange value between the new notes and the old fa-pi, which the Federal Reserve Bank has been exchanging at a rate not very much below oar, is bound to exert an unfavourable? effect upon the exchange value of the new notes, and eventually upon the exchange value of the Japanese yen. The Japanese Government feel that it is incumbent upon the- not to remain indifferent to such a situation. The export exchange measures adopted in Tsingtao are calculated to place the users of old Chinese currency who have been obtaining unfair profits, on equal footing with those who are using the Federal Reserve notes. These measures are also intended to protect the ex- change value of the Federal Reserve Bank notes. Inasmuch as the appli- cation of the measures makes no differentiation according to nationality they cannot be considered as discriminatory measures. As a matter of fact, it is through these measures that those users of the Federal He- serve notes who had in a sense been discriminated against, have been placed on an equal footing with the others, and thus enabled to compete on a fair basis. 2. In North and Central China the new Chinese regimes some time ago effected revisions of the Customs tariff in an attempt to secure a rational modification of the former tariff enforced by the Kuomintang Government, which was unduly high and ill-calculated to promote the economic recovery and general welfare of the Chinese people. However, the schedule actually adopted for the time being is the one that was approved by the Powers in 1931» s ° that no complaint has been heard from foreign residents of any nationality on the spot. The Japanese Government are of course in favour of the purpose of the said revision, believing that it will serve to promote effectively the trade of all countries with China. 3», Аз for the organization of certain promotion companies in China, the restoration and development of China's economic, financial and indus- trial life after the present Affair is a matter of urgent necessity for the welfare of the Chinese. Moreover, the Japanese Governnent are deeply solicitous for the early inauguration and progress of тогк having for its object this restoration and development, for the sake of the realization of a new order in East Asia, and are doing all in their power in that direction. The North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company were established with a view to giving China the necessary assistance toward the said restoration and also with the aim of contributing toward the ievelooment of China's natural resources. It is far from the thoughts 4f the Japanese Government to impair the rights and interests of American citizens in China or to discriminate against their enterprises. The Japanese Governirant therefore do not oppose, but welcome heartily, the participation of t lird Bowers on the basis of the new situation that has arisen. Lr. Ex. 65 (Page 3 ) —IPS Doc. 854-E The telecommunication companies in Worth and. Central China and of the inland navi~ation steamship с'бгарайу at Shanghai and the whor^n company at Tsir.-bao hare alec teen rsto" lie'ic-d to ? :> 5 need of an early restoration of со . imun i с с t i one, transport ' ' ̂ , harbor facilities. With the exception of the telecommunications enter- prise, which, because of its obvious relation to the maintenance of peace_ and jrder and to the national defense, as well as because cf its public character, has been placed in the hands of special companies, all these enterprises re turned over to cncerns that are ordinary Chinese or Japanese jurr-Tical persons, without any intention of allowing them to reap _ nuanporistTc" prof its by discriminating against America or any other Power. Аз regards the wool trade, while the control of purchasing agencies was enforced for a time in the Mongolian region, it has since "been discontinued. There is no plan at present of any sort for es- tablishing a monopoly in tobacco. 4 . Concerning the return of American citizens to the occupied агеаз. Your Excellency is aware that in North C-ina there is no restriction, excepting in very special cases where the personal safety of those who return would be endangered, while in the Yangtse Valley large numbers of .Americans have already returned. The reason why permission to return has not yet been made general is, as has been repeatedly communicated to Your- Excellency, due to the danger that persists because of the imperfect restoration of order and also to the impossibility of admitting nationals of third Powers on account of strategic necessities such as the preser- vation cf military secrets. Again, the various restrictions enforced in 'llib Occupied areas concerning the resident?, travel, enterprise and trade cf American citizens, constitute the minimum regulations possible consist ently with military necessities and the local conditions of peace and order. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to restore the situation to normal as soon as circumstances permit. • 5* The Japanese Government are surprised at the allegation that there exists a fundamental difference between the treatment accorded to Japanese In ЖэгТса and the treatment accorded to Americans in Japan, ffhile it is true that in these days of emergency Americans residing in this country are subject to various economic restrictions, yet these are, needless to say, restrictions imposed not upon Americans alone but also o: all foreigners of all nationalities as well as upon the subjects of Japan I beg to reserve for another occasion a statement of the views of the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of Japanese subjects in American territory, referred to in Your Excellency«s note. As has been explained above, the Japanese Government, with every intention of fully respecting American rights and interests in China, have been doing all that could possibly be done in that behalf. However, since there are in progress at present in China military operations on scale unprecedented in our history, it may well be recognized by the Government of the United States that it is unavoidable that these mili- W - n г.' ' ' т : pcp-sc .л* .- .-с- ; : - тг. '•'{.': : з- v. j.o ' с* * и ;• •• _ . V\r • j; • . - • • .: : ; . . . . . gx. -от'-. . ;„<: щ. -J •• .7Э o~J Q ,:-. Еьтз®» ••- гор' f-' C.im jfs opAjc•№ т.••jVi'r'ci: to b-titi&terbGb ?>" С 3ti'cj0 "f jc :.г он £jr« ifrlrfc' v.r, .. :-: ' а J . - Y Br. Ex. 65 (Page 4)--IPS Doc. 85j~3 tar у operations should occasionally present ctstac"' s + c ' r' • effect to cur intention of respecting the righto aad >jv.. с2' American с i t iz ens. Japan at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a now .order baaed 011 genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of v&ich end is not only an indispensable condition "of the very existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia. It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in Saat Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions cf today and tauorx-ow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute tovvard the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues. However, as long as these points are understood, Japan has not the slightest inclination to oppose the participation of the United States and other Powers in the £jreat work of reconstructing East Asia along all lines of industry and trade; and I believe that the new regimes now being formed in China are prepared to welcome such foreign participation. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. 1 Document No. 854-S " > i С E R ш I С Ш r- I!P!S! NO! Z Z H - Z Z Statement of Source and Authenticity I, H'lYiSHT, '-AOPU, hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity; Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and tha" as such official I have custody of the document hereto -attached consisting of 177 pages, datad Jan.-Dec., 19.38, and described as follows: Announcements of the Jap nose Government Relating to the C h i n a incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record, and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of tha official archiv and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official design*tion of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. (signc-d) . K. I-Iayashi __ Signature of Official"" SEAL Wi tn ss: Fag a ha ru 0d_o_ /s/__ _ Chief of tha Archives Section Official Capacity Stat err ..:nt of Official Procurement I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquartars of the Supreme Commander for the Allie Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 19-46 (signed) J. h. Curtis. 2d Lt. NAT\S h r i tn e s s: Г: i с hard. Larsh J Invest i gat or Official Capacity lOJY0* (I Г; 4 ( W ' •f „ • v-^- - / Br. Ex, 65 (Page l ) — I P S Doc. 854-G ADDRESS О ? тнз P R B E MINISTER , PRINCE рщзшло KONOE T \ ; ( BEFORE THE 73RD SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET January 22, 1938. The New Year is with us amid the storm and stress of the China Affair Today- at this session of the Imperial Diot which faces a momentous crisis of our nation, I have the honour to wish with you a long life to our Sovereign and prosperity and happiness to the Imperial House, before stating to you the views of the Government. I have been moved beyond words by the Imperial Message that was graciously granted at the opening session and by the deep concern shown by His Majesty over the present situation. It is scarcely necessary for mo to say that Japan's immutable national; policy aims at building the edifice of permanent peace for East .Asia on the unshakable foundation of closc co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and to contribute thereby to the cause of TJorld peace. The adoption some time ago of our determined policy not to deal rath the obdurate Kuomintang Government of China, and the exertion of coascloss efforts towards the cultivation of friendly relations with the Powers, have been both dictated by this policy of the Government. We all rejoice for the sake of world peace that the tripartite Anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy was completed through the participation o f T t a l y T a s t "fall. It is now more than half a year since the commencement of the present conflict. The fields of hostilities have been extended from North China to Central and South China. The valorous and daring operations of the Imperial forces have brought us victory after victory. Nanking, the Chinese Capital, quickly fell into our hands. The situation is developing most favourably far Japan. While this is, of course, due to the August Virtue of our Sovereign, I am profoundly grateful for the loyalty and courage of the officers and men of the Imperial forces at front end for the ardour and enthusiasm of all our people at home. Now the Government look forward to the emergence of a new Chinese regime which may really be counted upon to co-operate with Japan, and with such a regime they intend to adjust the Sino-Japanese relations and lend their hands in the rehabilitation of China, and in laying firmly thereby the foundation for a permanent peace of East Asia. Needless to say, there will bo no change in Japan's policy to respect the sovereignty and terri- torial integrity of China and the legitimate rights and interests of Third Powers in China. The mission of Japan as the stabilizing force of East Asia is greater •and her obligations have grown heavier than ever. In order to fulfil this mission, and to discharge these obligations of ours, we must certainly be prepared to make hereafter still greater sacrifices than we have made Br. Ex. 65 (Pago 2 ) ~ U 6 Doc. 854-G * hcrotoforo. But unluss re resolve -co do this v re only lay in store mis- fortunes for the future. x believe that to bear such sacrifices is a noble duty that vo of the present generation ore to posterity. It is under a conviction such as this that our Government are striving with all their might rc rea.l with tho China Affair and to A O b i e y e t h a end they have m view. And for that they are working for the completion of f.Tvs plans for the national mobilization both material and spiritual, and the ozootttioL of the various necessary measures. Hidcr this policy, the Government realize the first necessity of replen- ishing armament a and filjln? tho rat ionnl "trens ury. and accordingly, emphasis has been placed on th?."- релг.т. in regulating country's economy and finances .• e re,V'rcL£ ; badges for tho joining fiscal year, it has been so о окр ilea at. to йсл-̂гь mooey and material as possible to tho fulfilment" of iai.iltaty re^c-ircagonts, m o to curtail as for as possible the general coneune t ion of the <госйз and funds having to do n t h military supplies. In the field of industry, the basic principle of the Government rill be laid in the increase o+' our nation 1 3 productive power under the one comprehensive scheme covering Japan. Manchoukuo and China, and efforts are to be exerted toward supplying the articles needed for national defer.ee, promoting all the important industries-, and expanding our export trade. As for our work at the hone front, not only everything will be of course done in order to кос? our officers and men at front free from all anxieties for those at home, but suitable and effective measures will be taken to provide for the relief of the families of those killed, wounded, or taken ill. Jar distant stiIt. is tho end ai the conflict, ~e should expect that it will "00 о long time before a settlement is reached. Curs is indeed a momentous task unparalleled in history- "Jo shall njvor succeed in oc- complishingtho task unless ail of u-з show the dauntless spirit of gladly and courageously offering ourselves to our country. Let me assure you that the Government with patience and perseverance and a resolute will, expect to reach a settlement of the Affair. In accordance with these views, the necessary bills together with the budget are being presented to you, on which I earnestly hope that you, appreciating the intentions of the Government, will give your approval. Document Го. 854-G Page 3 * C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. _ Statement of Source and I.P.S. Го. 854-G * Authenticity I, FAY AS HI, KAORU. hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows; Announcements'of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Govern ment, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designa- tion of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)? Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946, (signed) K. Kayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section Of f ic ia 1 ~Ca pa с i ty Statement, pf Off icial Procurement I, John . Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946 (signed) J. A. Curtis. 2d Lt. Witness: Pichard K. Larsh /s/ Br. Ex. 65 (Page ' D--IP5 Doc. 854-H JL 77* ADDRESS OF MR П H3R0TA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE SSTUNT2»THIRD SESSION OF THE BIPERI-i DIET, DELIVERED .'NUARY 22, 1938. At the last session of the Diot I had the honc"r to speak on the policy of the Japanese Gove mine nt regarding the China Affair. Today I desire to address you on the subsequent developments ishich have occurred in the Chine so situation as sell as on our foreign relations in general. The attitude of the Japanese Government towards the present Affair has been clearly set forth in their statements made public from time to time in the past. Japan has no territorial ambitions i ̂ Chi г л L n o r has she any intention of separating North China from the rest of tie country. All she wants is that China, taking а broad vie" of tho situation, rill collaborate with Japan iov.ard the fulfilment of tho ideal of Sino- Japanese со-operation for' the Somen prosperity and "ell-being of the tiro countries'. According?^ even after the outbreak of the present Af- fair, we eagerly looked forward to joining forces with China for the purpose of securing peace in East Asia as soon as the Nationalist Govern- ment should have discarded their policy of opposition to Japan and Manchoukuo and evinced a sincere desire to work together for this idea of Japan. However, the Nationalist Government failed to understand our true intentions, and they were caught, so to speak, in the trap set by themselves, being bound by their commitments to the anti-Japanism that they had fostered for such long years. Unable to act wisely and well with a calm judgment, but relying upon third Powers, or allying themselves with Communists, they are oven now calling for a prolonged resistance, ro^ gardless of the plight of the A00 million people of China whoa [they have \ plunged into the depth of suffering and misery. Now the heroic operations of our loyal and valiant forces in the north and in the south, have forced the Nationalist Government to abandon Nanking, their capital, and to flee fer up the Yangtze River. Still unrepentant, they persist in their desperate opposition. It is a most lamentable thing for the sake of East Asia as a whole as well as for the people of China. Some time ago when the Japanese Government received a proffer of good offices by the German Government to act as an intermediary for bring- ing about direct negotiations between Japan and China, they proposed, with a view to affording the Nationalist Government a last opportunity for re- consideration, the following four points as tho basic conditions for the solution of the Affair: 1. China to abandon her pre-Communist and anti-Japanese and anti- Manchoulcuo policies to collaborate with Japan and Manchoukuo in their anti-Comintern policy. 2. Establishment of demilitarised zones in the necessary localities, and of a special regime for tho said localities. 3. Conclusion of an economic agreement between Japan, China and * Br. Ex. 65 (Page / 2) — I P S Doc. 8 ^ - H Manchoulcuo. 4 . China tc pay Japan the necessary indemnities. These items summarized the minimum requirements which were con- sidered absolutely indispensable by the Japanese Go V e r m o n t . It was my earnest hope that the Nationalist Government would sue for peace on the basis of these fundamental conditions. Hcrover, that Government, blind to the larger interests cf EastAsia, and ignoring both our magnanimity and Germany's friendly intention, exhibited no readiness to ask frankly for peace, but only souglrc to delay the matter and ultimately failed to send a reply that could be regarded in any way as sincere. The National- ist Government having thus wilfully thrown away the last chance placed at their disposal by the Japanese Government, it became clear that there would be 110 hope of ever arriving at a solution by waiting indefinitely for any reconsideration on the part of the Nationalist Government. It is because of these circumstances that the Japanese Government issued on the l6th of this month the statement that they would from thence forward ceaso to deal with the Nationalist Government Government, As is made plain in that statement our Government now look forward to the establish- ment and the growth of a new Chinese regime capable of genuine coopera- tion vith Japan, which it is their intention to assist in the building up of a new and rehabilitated China. I am fully convinced that this is the only way of realizing our ideal of securing the stability of East Asia through Sino-Japanese co-operation. I desire to avail myself of this occasion to say that in Europe and ijnorica there are some who are apt to entertain misgivings regarding" Japan's intentions as though she were trying to close the Chinese door, and expel the interests cf the Powers from China. Let me state explicit- ly that not only will Japan respect to the fullest extent the rights and interests of the Powers in the occupied areas, but she is prepared, for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Chinese people, to leave the door wide open to all Powers and to welcome their cultural and economic cooperation there. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Powers, by recognising the new conditions prevailing in China, and by appreciating the propriety of such Japanese demands for necessary and national adjust- ments as have been submitted, or may be submitted hereafter, in order to meet those conditions, will co-operate for the establishment of a now order in the Far East. As regards our relations with Manchoulcuo, it is the fundamental prin- ciple of our national policy to help that country to achieve a healthy progress as an independent state, maintaining all the while its intimate and inseparable relationship with our own. In accordance with this basic principle our Government decidod upon the abolition of the extraterri- toriality long enjoyed by Japan and transfer of her administrative rights in the South Manchuria Rail"..ay zone. And in the execution of that pro- Br. 2s. 65 (Page 3 ) ~ H S Doc. 854-H gramme the first treaty was concluded in June, 193&» 3 1 1 <1 t t i e second treaty in November last year, the operation of both of which hasproved exceedingly satisfactory. As for the international status of Manchoukuo, because of the various governmental reforms and improvements accomplished through her strenuous efforts exerted with the help of Japan for their materialization, the Powers have come to revise their appraisement of the new state. Italy, firs: of all, extended formal recognition towards Jhe end of November last, and the mutual extension of formal recognition with the Franco Government of Spain took place in the early days of the following December. Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union has always been guided by our conviction of the urgent need of placing the relations of the tvro countries upon a normal footing for the sake of the peace of East Asia. It is in accordance with this policy that we endeavored within the past year to solve the long pending issue of the revision of the Fishery Treaty* but unfortunately, owing to xhe attitude of the Soviet authorities, ж were obliged to conclude a modus vivendi at the year end as in the year before last. I should add, however, that since the Soviet Government are proceeding with the necessary internal preparations for the conclusion of an agreement providing for a revision of the treaty now in force, we are taking steps for the continuance of the negotiation and the signing of the new agreement at the earliest possible date. This Government attach great importance to a smooth operation of the Japanese concession enterprises in North Saghalien. Let me say that the Japanese Government will never allow these rights and interests de- rived from the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty to be nullified through un- reasonable pressure. Again, the relations between the Soviet Union and China are attracting the special attention of our nation. China con- cluded in August last a non-aggression pact with the .Soviet Union, while members of the Communist International have penetrated all classes *f the Chinese .destroying the social order of the country and endangering the stability of East Asia. Japan, ever solicitous for the civilization of East Asia and the welfare of its people, cannot but view the situation with the gravest concern. In conducting military operations in China, Japan has been exercis- ing special care lest the nationals and the rights and interest of third -Powers should suffer. But there have occurred, I regret to say, toward the end of last year the Panay Incident and the Ladybird Incident, in- volving Great Britain and the United States, flbile it is needless to say that their occurrence was entirely unintentional, it was feared for a time that these incidents might lead to an alienation of feeling between Japan and those two countries. I rejoice that thanks to the calm and fair-minded attitude taken by the Governments of both countries and the sincerity of our Government end people, the incidents have been brought in each case to an amicable settlement. Бг. Ex. 65 (Page *)--IPS Doc. 85A-H ' Since the outbreak of the present Affair, the United States has always maintained a fair and just attitude, acting on all occasions with such careful regard for the cause of Japanese-American friendship that, despite such mishaps as the Fancy Incident, the relations of the two countries, I am happy to say, have suffered no impairment. The importance to the conduct of our foreign affairs of American understanding needs scarcely to be mentioned. We shall continue to do our best towards the furtherance of Japanese-American amity and good will. As regards Groat Britain, there has been no change in the policy of the Japanese Government, which aims at the maintenance of the traditional friendship between the two countries, I hope that the British Government and people, grasping fully the importance of Anglo-Japanese relations, will endeavour to comprehend correctly Japan's position in East Asia and to co-operate with Japan for the furtherance of peace and good under- standing between the two nations. At the same time, I desire to urge upon our own people to stand solidly behind this policy of the Govern- ment, in view of the seriousness of the general situation. I am glad to say that Japan and Germany have been brought closer together than over through such auspicious events as the visit of E.I.H. Prince Chichibu who was pleased to make a tour of that country on his way home from England last year, and also the cruise of the H.I.M.S. Ashigara, which included a call at Kiel. Especially do this Government appreciate tlie friendly 'Sid most sympathetic attitude Germany has taken in consonance with the spirit of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agree- ment. We will strive to strengthen further the cooperation between the two countries. From tho beginning of the present /iffair, Italy, understanding our true motives, has collaborated with us along all lines. It is well known to you how consistently and how energetically the Italian Government supported our country in November last year at the Brussels Conference of the Signatory Powers to the Nine Power Treaty. In connection rath the question already mentioned of the settlement of the present /iffair, tho Italian Government again manifested their sympathetic concern. This Government are most grateful for these proofs of good will on the part of Italy, which had taken actually the same position as Japan in the matter of combatting the Comintern, joined in the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement in November last. It is a subject for congratulation from the standpoint of securing world peace that Japan, Germany and Italy have come to join forces under the Anti-Comintern banner. This Government will seek to extend further the effective operation of this agreement in concert with Germany and Italy. In Spain, the civil war which broke out in July 193& has developed steadily in favour of the regime under General Franco, which has now succeeded in bringing the greater part of the country under its control, and in consolidating its foundations. Moreover, the Franco Government is Br. Ex. 65 (Page f)--JP3 Doc. 854-H identified with tho Government of this country in the policy adopted against the Cumins or EL. In the Hgh'b of these facts wo have decided to recognise that Government, and the necessary steps to that end were taken early in December last уerr» A survey of our foreign trade shows that there has been in the past year a notable increase, as compared with the preceding year, of more than 35 per cent, in value as regards imports and 18 per cent, in value as regards exports—the total value of imports and exports together exceed- ing 7J270,000,0C0 yen, which.is an unprecedented sum in the history of our foreign commerce. Nevertheless, there still remain the economic barriers as heretofore, "(bile endeavouring on the one hand to eliminate these obstacles through diplomatic moans by dealing individually with the various countries accord- ing to their respective circumstances and the measures employed by them, this Government are exerting on the other hand unremitting efforts to promote our foreign trade bj r every means available. During the past year trade agreements have been concluded with British India, Burma, and Turkey. There were also signed in December a Treaty of Commerce with Siam and a supplementary agreement to the Italo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce relating to the Italian colonies. Negotiations are now in progress with other countries for the conclusion of the necessary trade agreements, covering both old and new markets. A boycott of Japanese goods has been initiated in certain countries owing, to misleading Chinese propaganda concerning the present Affair and to the machinations of the Chinese who reside there in large numbers e However, nowbere has it developed into any serious proportions, thanks to the united efforts of the Government and people and the fair attitude of the general public in the countries concerned. The Japanese Government believe it to be one ofthe necessary condi- tions of the peace and hrrmony and the prosperity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and consequently of tho entire world t to increase rationally the productive power cf those three countries, and to strengthen their economic ties, and at the same time to promote their trade with the rest of the world» For the realization of this purpose the Government are now carefully preparing appropriate plans at home and abroad. Finally I desire to say a few words 011 cultural work. In order to promote int-лгат.- tonal friendship and to bring about a real peace among mankind It necessary that nations should form intimate cultural bonds and cultivate a fall understanding of one another's ideals and aspirations, The present Affair- is traceable in no small degree to Chinese lack of understanding in this regard. If Japan and China are to build up а ^Lasting friendship, they should undersband each other's national condi- tions and characteristics, and cooperate culturally according to the fundamental spirit of the Orient. Taking this standpoint, the Government Br. Ex. 65 (Page 6 ) — I P S Doc. 854-H intend to carry cn in China more intensively than heretofore the cultural work which will serve as a foundation for the permanent peace and prosperity of the two nations. At the same time the Government will not relax their cultural work elsewhere since there is a special need, in the face of the present international situation, of making other peoples bet- ter acquainted with our unique culture and the national traits of our people who love justice and peace. I hope that from what I have now said you have been able to under- stand the views of the Government regarding the present China Affair and foreign questions in general. In brief, the underlying aim of the foreign policy of the Government is to eradicate the root of evil in East Asia, to make Enown throughout the world the justice of our cause, and to contribute toward laying the foundations of world peace» To that end the Government are doing their very utmost. And I trust that you will appreciate the intentions of the Government and will extend your co- operation for the attainment of the objectives of our foreign policy in dealing with the grave emergency that confronts the nation today. Document "о. Л 54-Н С Е К Т I F I С А Т Е •.Г.С. Ft. I.P.S. Fo. 854-Н Statement of Source end Authenticity T, KAY",SHX, KAOPF, hereby certify that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Of: ice, and that as such official I.have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Pec., 1938? and described as fellows: Announcements of the J-p nese Government ; -lating to the Chin- T n e M .nt (7ol. "0 * I further certify that the attache r-ror" and document is an official document of the Japanese - eve rent, ":nd t h t it is p-rt of the of ici"l -rehires and files of th - :• ol'o-in- named ; ini'-try or depart" ent (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other of'ici^l designa- tion of tie :> 'gular location of th a do cur ent in the archives or files): foreign ' inistry. fi^ne-" ~t ^okyo on this 23 day of Sept., 19-6. kzL r J&£j... Л^.'ГХА^. "ianatiire of Ofiсia 1 3 " AL tnesss ' T a -h/п Odo (signed) Qxief of Jbhe .rehires Section Off iVin^^C^a'city л t -tor ant of Off icial " > rocura' -nt T, John . Curtis, hereby certify tiv.t I a^ -s oci-ted with hri'r l -j-r p^-rt :rs of ti,e Jupre^e Co- nd r for the '.Iliad : o -era, I nd. t : ~t the a hove "d з sc: ibsd document was obtained Ъу me from the abo^e ..si ned of:- icial of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. ~i' i- ned at Tokvo on this 23 day of Sept., 19 '6 ,_(_si :ned). . J.. .. Curtis,. 2/: Lt.... * -' •• E itxies"" ' ichard. . Larsh /s/ __ "nv-зstiĵ rfeor . . й " Official Oa a"city l ос шлеп t No. Br. Ex. 116 219P (82) ORAL S T:\TE" ENT BY THE ДЩШС4Л AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GEE 1 !) TO THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (PRINCE KONOYE) OCTOBER 3, 1938 Excerpts I have had many conferences on this general subject with former Ministers, especially Mr. Hirota and General Ugaki, who have repeatedly given me precise and definite assurances that American interests in China would be respected and that the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity would be steadily maintained. The American Government to its regret is constrained to observe that violation of American rights and interests, includ- ing violation of the principle of the Open Door, has neverthe- less persisted. In the light of the situation which I am now reviewing, the President of the United States asks that the Japanese Government implement its assurances already given with regard to the maintenance of the Open Door and. to non-interference with American rights by taking prompt and effective measures to rec- tify the situation which I am about to explain. The American Government has already pointed out to the Japanese Government that alterations of the Chinese customs tariff by the regimes functioning in those portions of China occupied by the Japanese and for which the Japanese Government has formally assured its support are arbitrary and illegal assumptions of authority, the responsibilitjr for which the Japanese Government cannot escape. It is hardly necessary to ~tate that there can be no Open Door in China so "long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax, or prohibit trade is exercised, directly or indirectly, by the authorities of one "foreign" power in furtherance of the interests of that power. It would appear to be self-evident that a fundamental prerequisite of a condition of equality of opportunity or Open Door in China is the absence in the economic life of that country of preferences or monopolistic rights operating directly or in- directly in favor of any foreign country or its nationals. Foreign Relations I, 782-783. Doc . Ко. 219P (55 ) Br . Ex. 83 Page 1 THE A?'ERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Excerpts . No. 942 The American Embassy presents i t s compliments to the Japanese Min is t ry of Foreign A f f a i r s and has the honor to r a f e r to the damage to American mission property at Nantungchow on August 17, 1937, as a r e su l t of Japanese m i l i t a r y operat ions. According to information received from the American Consul General at Shanghai, Mr. C. A. Burch of the United Ch r i s t i an I i s s ionary Soc iety , who proceeded to Nantungchow to make an inves t iga t ion , stated in a sworn statement tha t , during an a i r ra id which occurred at t en - th i r t y on the morning of August 17, 1937, four two-winged hydroaeroplanes described by witnesses as bearing the "Red Sun" i n s ign i a on the wings f lew low over the mission property and dropped a number of bombs, one of which was bel ieved to be incendiary , on the hosp i t a l and other mission bui ld ings causing extensive damage. TOKYO, May 30, 1938. Foreign Relat ions I , pp. 590-591 Doc. No.. 219 P (56) Page 1 Br. Ex.. 84 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FCR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Excerpts. No. 946 The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the following message from Haichow has been received through the American Consul General at Shanghai; "American Presbyterian Chapel only a few feet from American Presbyterian Hospital and American Presbyterian Women's Bible School, in same yard with our residence, were bombed on May 24th by Japanese planes causing great damage; residences"only very slightly damaged. Chapel and school greatly damaged, in addition our chapel(s) inside the city and at Shaiho were bombed and greatly damaged. American flags were prominently displayed at each building. The American Consul General at Shanghai reports that a second message has been received stating that the Mission was again bombed on May 28, one bomb landing less than thirty-five yards from Mr. McLaughlin's residence, but that they were, however, fortunately unharmed. TOKYO, May 31, 193 я - Foreign Relations I, p. 593» Doc. No, 219P (57) Pago 1 Br. Ex. 85 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY EOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9P Excerpt. No. 955 The American E m b a s s y presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that according to information received through the American Consul General at Shanghai, the nurses' home and two residences on the compound of the Soochow Hospital, property belonging to the American Methodist Episcopal Mission South, were occupied by Japanese troops on May 3° last. The American Consul General at Shanghai has made repre- sentations to his Japanese colleague concerning this report of the recent occupaion of additional American property. TOKYO, June 10, 1938. Foreign Relations I, p. 597» Doc„ Ко. 219? (89) Pags 1 Br. Ex. 124 THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) Excerpt. No. 147̂ 1 TOKYO, February 6, 1940 EXCELLENCY: The Tax Bureau of the so-called Rehabilitation Commission at Swatow, China, which, as Your Excellency is no doubt aware, is sponsored by agencies of the Japanese Government, has since November of last year levied taxes on imports and exports at that port. This Commission has issued regulations announcing the collection, as of November 1, l c 39, of a five per cent ad valorem tax on local produce and a ten per cent ad valorem tax on imports not liable to the Consolidated Tax, and it has also commenced the collection of a forty per cent ad valorem tax on postal parcels entering Swatow. I am instructed by my Government to protest this illegal and unwar- ranted action of the Swatow Rehabilitation Commission. Foreign delations I, pp. 753-754 > Document No. 1634-1 / 7 7 •P" r r r "! The Basis of National Policy June 30, 1936 (3H0 T m 11) The r 'ar and Navy "inistries I. The fundamentals of administrating state af'airs lie in strengthening our national foundation at home and. bringing about the prosperity of our nation abroad so that, on the basis of the relations between sovereign and, subject, our Empire may se.cure the peace of the "Orient, and contribute to the weirare of manTsTnd as the real stabilizing power in East ASIA., thereby realizing the ideal underlying"the foundation of our nation. In / view of the internal and external situation of the Empire, her fundamental policies must consist in advancing and developing 1 in the southern Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the J East Oriental continent for the stabilization of our national defense. These fundamental, pnl 1 rias. are as follows: (1) v, e must strive to correct the great Powers' aggressive polic-i.ep and ahare hapniwac? arm тяуог wTtlL- others according to a real principle of give and take; /That is to say, our guiding principle must be,.t.Q real 1 че the spirit of the 'Imperial "ay* (KODO) by a consistent Л policy of overseas expansion. (2) '"e must complete our nati.ona 1 de fens e armament in order to maintain peace and tranquillity, to safeguard ,отт prosp_erity_an^ tn secure the position of' the Empire as the stabilizing power in East ASIA. in fact as well as in name. (3) ~ ,T e expect the sound development of .'IINCENXUO and hope by accomplishing this to stabilize Japan- T ianchukuo national defense; thus in order to promote our economic, development, we Intend to ^et rid~~of the "menace of" the i'.3..E. э while preparing against BFITIIN and the U. S. and bringing about close collaboration between JA.PA.N, ^iNCHThNO and CHINA.. This is the basis of our conti- nental policy in the execution of which we must also pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers. Document No. 1634-1 P P г? Г* Г A ( 5 _ (4) r e plan to promote our -actal and economic • development in the Southern Seas, especially in the Outer Aonf.hprn Saas, and without musing other powers to action, we must attempt to extend our strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of F.\? T CHtTK rT 0 in addition to the above, we may expect the full development of our national resources and the completion of our national defense. II. On the basis of the above fundamental national policies we expect to reform our government system so as to make it suit- able for the present external and internal situation, and to unify political, financial and economic policies both within and without the country. The essential points are as follows: (1) Defensive armament preparations. a) The aim of our military preparations is to enable us to C O P S with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilize in the Far East. Especially, our force in МЖШШЮ and KOREA, must be strengthened so that we may smash har Par Eastern force at one blow from the beginning. b) As for the navy, we must complete its arma- ment sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the IT. S. Налгу. (2) The first principle of our diplomatic policy lies in the smooth execution of our fundamental state policies as well as synthesizing and renewing them. The military will give undercover assistance without appear- ing on the surface so that the activities of our diplo- matic organs may progress advantageously and smoothly. (3) r 'e must reform and. improve our administrative system and establish an economic and financial policy by means of every facility available so as to strengthen our defensive strength and to promote our economic development vigorously. For this purpose, we will take suitable steps concerning the following matters. a) r 'e should direct and unify internal public oainion and make the resolution of the people steady to tide over the present emergency. Document No. 1634-1 Page 3. b) ;Te should appropriately improve our politi- cal and economic systems in o^der to develop the important trade and industries which are necessary for the execution of national policy and national defense. c) We should take approrpiate measures to stabilize the life of the people, promote their physical strength and lead their thoughts into sound channels. d) rr e should make appropriate arrangements for the rapid development of the aviation and shipping business. e) We should promote the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for resources and materials important for national defense and industry. f) We should reform our diplomatic organs and also draw up a system of information and propaganda in order to make our diplomatic function and the spread of our culture in the world more active. Matters Pertaining to Outline of the State Policy June 30, 1936 The War and Navy Ministries I. The vision of J^pan is to make clear the justice and cause of the country, to Pla^ thp rise of the country and to realize the peace of the Eastland contribute to the welfare of the human being, "In view of the Internal and external situations of the Empire, the fundamental policies of tb.e Empire must lie in advancing,,-arid developing into the Southern Seas as well as obtaining firm position in the Ea^t. Oriental con- tinent stabilizing the national defense." Ж Ж Ж лу о aliment Mo. 1634—1 C E R T J F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. wo. I634-I Statement of Source and. Authenticity I, IiAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capa- city? Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and de- scribe d. as foilows% Outline of the basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministers I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)s Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Seat., 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official Witness: /s/ Na_gaha.ru 0do__ SEAL Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard E. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the a^ove described document was ob- tained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 23' day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh m m Witness 2 /3/ J. A. Curtis. 2d L U Investigator, IPS Official Capacity DOCUKEiiT НО. 1534 К Page 2 "The fundamental principle of our national policy", (signed by the five Ministers - the Premier, War, Ilavy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers - "llAugust 1936). Fundamentals of our National Policy The fundamental principle of administering the state "based on righteous- ness lies in realizing the ideal of our national foundation Ъу strength- ening the foundation of our country internally and prospering externally, thereby making the Japanese "moire develop into the stabilization Power, nominal and virtual, in the East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the uep.ee and welfare ox mankind throughout the vrorld. In viev of the situation of the Empire, both home and abroad, to establish the fundamental national policy consists in securing a steady footing of our empire in the Bartern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense. The general basic principles are as follows: (1) To exclude the Military Pule Policy of the Powers and follow our policy to share nratual welfare by participating in co-existence and co-prosperity principle is the only way of realizing the ideal of our Imperial Poile of Justice. It should, therefore, be the immtable~les.ding spirit in all times in relation to our overseas development. (2) In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safe-guard its development so as to acauire the position of the real stabilizatio Power in the East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament. (3) We sbouid strive to eradicate the Sussian menace on the Sorth, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defense of both Japan and hanchuria. _¥e should also be prepared for BrjtR.in я.пг! '-maric-p, attempting at the same time an economic development by the close cooperation of Japan, China and Manchuria. The above should be our fundamente'd policy for the Continent. For the achievement of such an object we should always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers. (4)- For the furtherance of our plan to achieve the social and economic development of our Empire toward the South Seas r especially on the Outer South Sea Islands ,-ree A we should take л gradual and peaceful measure, always «voiding to stimulate other nations, and try to I fulfill our national strength correlative with the oorripletioa pi Mancnuria." ~ " ... J Making the above fundamental principle the pivotal point of our national policy, we expect thereby to unify all our policies, internal and external, and generrlly innovate the administration in accordance with the present situation of the Empire. The outline of our new policy is as follows: ЮЗПУШ? i 0. 1534 К Page 3 '1) T h e fulfillment of the^ ational Defense ArmamentT^ (a) A3 to the Army armaments, we should я fan to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish to employ in the ?ar T'i.jt; and. especially, so as to enable us to strike a hit at the very cnrc-set of the v*ar upon tile J'usaians, we should complete cur military force in Xorea and Manchuria. (b) Аз to the У aval Armaments, we shouicl attempt to fulfill its strength. to~ such an extent as to Ъе sufficient for securing the command of the sea on the Western "acific counter to the American I T avy. (2) Our diplomatsn pali.gy is solely to make it the first principle to try to prosecute the national schene in smooth and amicable manner, aad thereby to conduct an innovation rnd improvement in general. The military authorities on their part are required to assist the activities of the diplomatic organ from within in order to have it act fully and advantageously, evading all the time to act from without as far as possible, (3) In order to renovate and improve political and administrative organ, to establishfinancial and economic policies, and to manage other plans and schemes, according to our fundamental principle, the following measures should be taken properly: (a) Lead :-nd unify public opinion at hojje, and strengthen the will of the people- to tide over the extraordinary emergency of our country. (b) In order to advance and further our trade and industry essential to the prosecution of the n tional policy,an appropriate improve ment should be introduced to the administrative, and economic organs. (c) An adecuate measure should be taken concerning the stabilization of the people's livelihood, the development of their physical strength, and festering sound and healthy mini and idea. (d) A suitable measure should be taken in order to make a drastic progress in air аз well as sea transportation. (e) It is re uired to accelerate the establishment of a self- supporting and self-sufficient policy for the important resources and materials essential to national defense and industry. (f) By innovating diplomatic organs, as well as completing in- formation and publicity systems vre should strive to quicken our diplomatic function, and to enhance the natiоnal^Culture^ abroad. UU4...W-U.IX xiО. ID34 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. I.P.S. N o . l 6 U - K Statement of Source and Authenticity I, HAYAQHI, Laoru, hereby certify that ^ am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity; Chief of the Archives Section. Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 11 august. 1936. and described as follows: Fundamental principles of National policy sisned by tk_.Jlz-- minister:,via.,» Premier. War. Finance, and Forei. r /ji Ministers on 11, J-TiiS. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or uny other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Signed at Tokyo on this 21st day of Sept. 1946. V? i tn ess J /з/ T. o.uto /s/ K . Havashi (Signature of Official) (SEAL) (Official Capacity) St_;itemmit of Official Procurement I» Ricln.rd II. Larsh, hereby certify that I era associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by ms from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 2 d day of Scat.. 1946. /в/ Richard L a r s h rituiitit I'itnesss /в/ J. Curtis. 2d L t . gA^py. ̂ S Official Capacity Doc. No. 219P (86) Br. Ex. 120 Page 58 THE A!-ERICAN EMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (UGAKI) Excerpt. No. 975 TOKYO, June 28, 1938. EXCELLENCY ' Acting under instructions from my Gov or iiT: ant I have the honor formally to protest an unwarranted attack on June 15, 1938, by Japanese airplanes upon the American Southern Baptist Mission at Pingtu, Shantung, which resulted in placing the lives of two hundred school children and seven American missionaries in grave jeopardy and In wounding other noneombatants, and which inflicted extensive damage upon American property. JOSEPH G. GREW Foreign Relations I, 604 Doc. No. 219P (59) Page 1 Br. Ex. 87 THE AMERICAN AI В AS SAD CR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (UGAKI) Excorpt. TOKYO, August l6, 1938. No. 1026 I an directed to make comprehensive and emphatic representations to the appropriate Japanese authorities through Your Excellency, r calling succinctly the essential facts and circumstances of the attacks of these American mission properties at Wuchang, and to point out that notwithstanding the fact that the mission properties have been marked on maps delivered by the American Consul General at Shanghai to the Japanese authorities tho mission properties under reference have been bombed no less than seven tim.es since July 6 last, and particularly to emphasize the fact that in the course of these attacks American lives have been directly imperilled. JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, p. 619 \ Doc. No. 219? (60) Page 1 Br. Ex. 88 PI:ESS RELEASE ISSUED BY TI T E DSPARTEENT OF STATE OK JJGUST 26, 1938 Excerpt. EXCELLENCYi Acting under instructions, I have the honor on behalf of my Government to protest to Your Excellency against the unwarranted attack on August 24, 1938, near Lacao, by Japanese airplanes upon a comrcrc.ial airplane operated by the China National Aviation Corporation resulting in the total destruction of the commercial airplane, the loss of the lives of a number of norcombatant passengers, and the endangering of the life of the American pilot. (Sirned) JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, p. at p. 619 620 / Doc. No. 219? (83) Page 1 Br. Ex. 117 THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) Excorpt. No. 1111 TOKYO, November 7, 1938 YOUR EXCELLENCY: In the note No. Ю76 of October 6, 1938, which I had the honor to address to Your Excellency's distinguished predecessor, mention was made, among other points, of the ex- clusion from the lower reaches of the Yangtze River of American and other non-Japanese shipping although Japanese merchant vessels are carrying Japanese merchandise between Shanghai and Nanking, to the exclusion of merchandise of other countries. I pointed out to His Excellency Prince Konoye that this treatment of American shipping and commerce, as well as the treatment by Japanese authorities of other American interests in China, not only violates American rights but is in direct contra- vention of assurances repeatedly affirmed by the Japanese Government to the American Government that the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in China would be supported, by the Japanese Government. Foreign Relations I, p. 794 Doc . No. 219P (62 ) Pare 1 Br. Lx. 92 I . V ^ THE AFIRICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THC JAPANESE MINISTER EOK FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) F E Excerpts No. 1230 TOKYO, March 30, 1939. EXCELLF'NCY! Acting under instructions, I have the honor to inform Your Exc^llcncy that my Government formally end emphatically protests the continued disregard by the Japanese military forces of American lives end property in China. In this connection I am directed to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to the ever lengthening list of instances in w v ich, as a result of air re ids by the Japanese forces, American properties, although clearly marked and t>"e location thereof previously reported with accompanying maps to the J-p-ne.se authorities, have been damaged and in some cases destroyed» An outstanding example of the instances to which my Government refers is the recent bombing of the American Lutheran Mission at Tungpeb which resulted in death or grave injury to certain members of the Nyhus family. Twenty-eight of t^c attacks upon American property reported to the Japanese Government since the. beginning of t v is year include three bombings on November 13, 14-, and 18, 1938? of property of the Christian and Missionary Alliance at Tciping; bombing of the Peniel Missionary Feme at Sai Nam, Kwangtung, in June 1938 and again on October 22, 1938, bombing on October 3 and 5? 1938, of property of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company at Nmcbang; bombing on December 24- and again five deys later on December 29, 1938, of buildings of the Christian and Missionary Alliance at Kweilin, which resulted in the killing end wounding of members of the staff of t v e mission and refugees therein; the bombing on December 29, 1938, of the American Southern Baptist Mission hospital, also at Kweilin, and the bombing on December 29, 1938, of the American Southern Baptist Mission at S v iuchow. Further bombings occurred on January 10, 1939? which resulted in the demolition of and damage to buildings belonging to the Evangelical Lut v eran Mission at 3>asi, Fupeh; on November 13 and November 23? 1938, and again on January 12, 1939? w v ich resulted in the destruc- tion of hospital and residence buildings belonging to the American Presbyterian Mission, North, at Fcngyang, Funan; on Doc. No. 219P (86) Br. Ex. 120 Page 62 January 15, which resulted in serious damage to the property of the Sutob Girls' School of the American Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking; on January 23, wlich resulted in damage to the American Church Mission at Ruling; on February 4, w v ich resulted in damage to property belonging to the Werner G. Smith Company at Wanhsien; on February 22, which resulted in damage to the hospital of the Covenant Missionary Society at Kingmen; on February 25 which resulted in damage to the American Catholic Mission at Loting, and tVe serious wounding of Father Kennelly; on March 8, which resulted in damage to two compounds of the American Church Mission at Ichang, bombed in separate raids; and again on March 14, w v ich resulted in damage to the St. James School property of tic same mission at Ic v ang; on March 17, when the American Southern Baptist hospital at Clengchow was bombed twice, causing six casualties; again on March 19, when this same property was bombed for t v e seventh time since February 1938; on March 20, resulting in serious damage to property of tic Covenant Missionary Society rt Siangyang. Fupeh, and to t v e Santch Bibl<~ School premises of t^e Lu"C v eran United Mission at Fanchang, Fupeh. JOSEPH C. GREW Foreign Relations I, pp. 643-645 Г-сг -rrt Го. 219P (84) Ir. Ex. 118 Page 1. ORAL STATET'"ET T T BY THE AMERICAN A"!BASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREM) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOI FOREIGN AK AIRS (ARITA), FOVETBER 21, 1938. Excerpts. Your Excellency has discussed the question of the "exploi- tation" of China and. spheres of influence therein. I think Your Excellency will agree, with ire that the historical record shows clearly that the United States of A'perica has never attempted to "exploit" China or to acquire any "sphere of influence" what- ever in that country. Our desire always has been and is today to avoid spheres of influence and exploitation by or in any one country. Our interpretation of the Open Door is totally contrary to those prindoles. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity has been a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of the United States ever since our country came into existence. The treaties relating to the Far East to which the United States is a party and in which provisions relating to that principle appear ware in all instances concluded with a view to decreasing and avoiding frictions which had developed in or which might develop in international contacts in that area. There can be no doubt that owing to Japan's actions and policies in China there is good :• eason why both Your Excellency and I should be disturbed with regard to the developing situa- tion in Japanese-American relations. For my part I am more dis- turbed at present than I have been for a long time and it seems to me that whatever may result from our future conversations and negotiations Japan should now without further delay proceed to take the obvious steps to prevent those relations from steadily deteriorating. Another obvious step of prime importance on the part of the Japanese authorities would be forthwith to cease the bomb- ings of and other interference with American mission and other property in areas far removed from military or naval operations. Document Но. 219P (84) Br. Ex. 118 Page 2. Such unwarrantable acts are taking place constantly, the re- ports of vhich are daily pouring into our Embassy. The plea that these outrages are accidental is obviously untenable in view of tne volume and constancy of these depredations v/hich recently have involved not only the loss of American property but the loss of American life, and the desecration of our flag. Foreign Relations I, p. 898 at pp. 809-811 Doc. No. 219P (44) Er. Ex. 71 MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNSELOR Excerpt. Page 1 OF EMBASSY IN JAPAN (D00MAN) (TOKYO,) November 19, 1938* Mr* Arita went on to say that tlere prevails a widespread feeling tbat t b e Japanese Government bas now adopted a new policy-—one cf closing tho niirn dnnr There bad, in fact; been no change in policy, Fis several predecessors bad on several occasions given assurances to tbe American, British, and otner representatives in Tokyo that Japan would respect tbe principle of the open door. As a matter of fret, those assurances were not intended to be unconditional, for the reason that the time had passed when Japan could give an unqualified undertaking to respect the open door in C' H ina e Fc was not implying that his predecessors had given the assurances in bad faith; on tbe contrary, he felt certain that they were acting in the best of faith, but what they were attempting to do was to reconcile the principle of tbe open door with Japan's actual needs rnd objectives, rnd that could not be done. As he had previously 'explained, those objectives are to provide Japan with a market secure against any possible threat of economic sanctions and to acquire safe sources of necessary raw materials; but within those limits Japan was prepared to guarantee equality of opportunity. There would be given- full consideration to those enterprises conducted by foreigners other than Japanese which would in no way conflict with or obstruct the carrying out of these primary objectives, and with respect to those enterprises, whether industrial, commercial, or financial, the Japanese Government was fully prepared to give unqualified guarantees. But with regard to other undertakings w h i c h overlapped the Japanese economic defense plans, it was no longer possible for Japan to extend any such guarantee. When he came into offi ce, he decided that it would be mischievous as well as useless to attempt to reconcile t b c principle of the open door, as understood in the United States and elsewhere abroad, _witt the new situation which Japan was endeavoring to bring about, „не therefore declined to repeat those assurances in the note which was yesterday sent to t v e American Government. E (UGENE) F. D(OOMAN) Foreign Relations I, p. 801 at p p . 8 0 3 - 8 0 4 . Doc . No. 2 1 9 P ( 4 5 ) B r . Ex. 73 Pare 1 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AIDE-MEMOIRE The American Ambassador on August 23 brought orally to the attention of the Vice Minister ror Foreign Affairs the desire of the diplomatic representatives at Nanking of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy that Japanese bcmbing operations be excluded from an area in that city wherein they and some of their natiors reside and where foreign shipping is anchored. The American Government feels, however, that other aspects of the matter demand equal consideration. The extensive bombing of that city on the night of August 26 placed in danger the lives and property of noncombatants, both foreign and Chinese, and it has seamed to the American Government that the appropriate Japanese authori- ties, when this fact is brought to their attention, may desire to limit future -action in accordance with the restraints which considerations of humanity and of international comity usually impose on the bombing of the political capital of a country, especially when no state of war exists. Both before and after the earlier request for the protection of a defined area, thera occurred bombing operations over the city which extensively damaged the buildings and killed and injured several of the employees of the National Central University and also resulted in tho burning alive of numerous peaceful Chinese in one of the poorer quarters. These scones of destruction have been visited by foreign diplomatic officers. The Government and people cf the United States are in friendly relations with China as with Japan. Basing its appeal, therefore, cn these friendly relations and on the principle of ordinary humanity, the American Government requests the discontinuance of activities which, despite 'their military objectives, result actually in-the indiscriminate destruction of property used for educational and other non-military purposes and in the wounding and painful death of civilians. The American Government is also greatly concerned over the fact that there are Ame^j, qa" ^ f 1 гам.gt.in scattered t-hrou,; h* ut China who will have to use the railways and motor reads as their only means of leaving for places of comparative safety» In view, therefore, Doc. No. 219P (4 5) Pago 2 Br. Ex. 73 of the widespread bombing operations now being carried out by the Japanese military throughout Chinese territory the American Government feels that it may properly make representations to the Japanese Government with a view to persuading it to refrain from attacks upon defense- less cities, hospitals, trains and motor cars, et cetera. There is grave risk that sooner or later some incident will take place resulting in the death or injury to American citizens who are going about their legitimate occupations within the interior of China where such dangers should not exist. Japan declares that it is not at war with China and yet its planes are conducting raids far in the interior, dropping deadly missiles with consequent serious damage to the rights of other nations. The attention of the Japanese Government is invited to the situation described in the foregoing paragraphs in the hope that appropriate instructions may be issued to its military forces in the field. TOKYO, September 1, 1937 Foreign Relations I, pp. 494-495 Doc. No. 1573 SUMMARY OF JAPAN- AMERICAN NKGOTIATI0N3 DURING FOREIGN MINISTER AFtlTA'S TENURS CP OIFICE 1.FROM N07. I938 UNTIL JULY 1939) (September 2nd 19*! l) I. Prior to Minister ARITA аявшА v.g his duti 3 as Foreign Minister in. November 195Й Imbaeoi:dv. C.iii:/ remarked to Premier IICiIOYS (concurrently no л ding п.-т. post o f Foreign Minister) on October 3rd that xie wis ted • < IziJzwz oral iy regarding problems that the U. So Irebidont fext is possessing direct interests, and after seating I:hat, го* г!г?»•stae. in,^ that the respecting of American r i g h t s ьпЛ i v.'.er. cs n Qhina аз well as the Open- Door Poll.. ;> as well as Fx • д.;ip le of Equal Opportunity had been definitely guaranteed by t .e former Minister (T.N» Foreign Minister), he regretted to h?r - to d e c i d e that the infringing of Ameri с-in rights and ц п"егегхз had not ceased and that the Open Door Policy was still being ignored, and after citing some instances such as E.rchange Control and Trade Restrictions etc. in North China> he demanded thet prompt and effective measures be taken in order to carry out the guarantee that had been duly made» (Annexed Document No, l). To this Minister TCCNOYE replied that Japan's China Policy as well as foreign policy remained unchanged, and that Japan's assertion with regard to the respecting of foreign rights and interests relative to China as well as the maintenance of the Open Door Policy and the Principle of Equal Opportunity remained unchanged, adding that, although in poiht cf fact; there had been cases at times which were not settled satisfactorily due to military strategic necessity or other reasons, he w^s striving to settle matters as satisfactorily as possible upon the conditions returning to their normal state.. He also stated that, vith regard to commer- cial and tradal problems.- he wished to, aftar studying same, comply with the embassador : s request at the earliest possible opportunity. Ambassador Grew subsequently sent a note embodying the same con- tents as the foregoing paragraph. (Annexed Document Ne. 2). II. The manner of reply to the aforesaid American .Ambassador' з note p.2 was studied ever since the appointment of ARITA as Foreign Minister and although it had been decided to put off the said reply until conditions had becoiae settled for awhile as it happened to be just before the fall of Canton rith the capitul tion of Hankow being close at band, so that the state of affairs was changing rapidly, in view of this matter representing problems which- after all? possess an iveoxtant bearing to the Nine-Power Pact, after studying the draft of the r .ply based on the policy of: No. 1573 I'age 2 (a) Avoiding all phraseology whatsoever that vsould reaf- firm the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity- based on the Nine-А огдэг iact, (b) Maying them understand that, although the existing rights and interests of Third Powers will be respectой» this is not being done as a corollary of the Nine-lower iact. (c) Making them understand that the standard laws governing the future economic activities by Third Powers in New China shall be established in conformity with the new conditions, a reply was sent on November 18th to the following effect, in addition to giving explanations to each of the instances cited in the American note and clarifying the point that their claims regarding Infringement of Rights and Interests were unjustified, viz. t (1) It is hoped that, inasmuch as military activities are being conducted cn a unprecedented scale in East Asia, the United States will note the fact that there may be times when difficulties may occur in executing our intention regarding the respecting of American rights and interests, (2) The $apiro believes that it will not solve urgent problems of the moment or aid towards the establishing of permanent peace in East Asia by attempting to gauge the present and future state of affairs by ideas or principles in their original form that were applied to the pro-incident state of affairs, especially at this time when the Snpire is dashing ahead with the Establish* ment cf a New Order in East Asia and when new condi- tions are setting in in 3nst Asia. (3) Should any Third Power or lowers participate in the gigantic taslc cf Reconstruction of East Asia in the fields of enterprises and trade by appreciating the ofcr©-mentioned points, the Empire shall have no ob- jection whatso ever towards same. (Annexed Document No.3)• When Minister ARITA invited Councillor Doomon of the U. S. Embassy at Tokyo on November 19th and asked about the impressions regard- ing the recent Japanese Reply, Dooman replied that /jnbassador Crew's impression regarding the said Reply seemed to be that "It represented a wholesale denial of the American Demands," whereup- on Minister ARITA explained that it vnuld be excusable if the Open Door iolicy and the irinciplo of Equal Opportunity were ap- plied 'ее tho entire \7orld from the start, but it is extremely illogical tc apply same today to China only. ARITA then went on to say that his predosesscr gave his guarantee regarding the Doc. No. 219? (83) Page 1 respecting of the said principles by being of the belief that the actual prevailing conditions could be made to harmonise with the Open Door Policy and the Principle of Equal Opportunity, but that, in his or.n opinion, it was no longer possible to expect the said harmony, at the same time explaining the great p.5 pains taken by Japan in regard to the said reply, to which Dooman stated that it was extremely regrettable that there were over 300 cases recently remaining unsettled despite their having no connections with military actions and being extremely trivial matters, and that the recent official American note was the re- sult of the American commercial concerns in various parts of China exerting severe pressure on their Бэте Government, at the same time pointing out that the United States did not make any reference to the Nine-Power Pact. IV. On inviting Ambassador Grew to Tokyo subsequently on the 21st of the same month and conferring with him on the same principle as per tho foregoing paragraph, Grew declared as follows after making the introductory remark that viiat he would be saying today would not be in the nature of any reply whatsoever 'to the Japanese Note of tho 18th»- (1) The United States Government has never attempted to exploit China nor extend American influences in China. The United States Government's interpretation of "Open Door" is totally different from the foregoing. Th other words, tKe Principle of 'Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce has always been the actual basic principle of the United States. (2) All of the treaties concerning the Far Fast embodying the said irinciple, and to which the United States is a signatory, теге concluded for the purpose of preventing the occurrence or likely occurrence of international friction in the Far East, and the United States Government is intent up n checking the present day trend of international anarchy as well as contributing towards the adjustment of international rela- tions .as well as restoration of international order, and it is the advocacy of the Unit ad Statos that this object can be attained by peaceful negotiations and agreements as well as by faithful fulfillment of international agreements. p.6 (3) The Commercial Policy of tho United Statos lies in aim- ing at international concord by striving for the expansion of foreign trade by means of removing obstacles lying in the way cf the international distribution of commodities. I be- lieve that the frequent instances of other countries trying to gain most-favored footings do not contribute towards es- tablishing prosperity in the United Statos and the world. No. 1573 -0.30 4 (4) On November 3rd ireader K0N0Y3 statod that "Japan w i l l , cooporato with any Third lower t hat, nnnr с с i atea Japan's real intentions and adopts a policy th t conforms to the new state of a f f a i r s b u t what is tho concrete meaning of this statement? Surely he dec3 not mean tho kind of co- operation whereby, as is being generally rumored, Americans can not engage in trade in China without going through the hands of Japanese merchants. (5) Minister ARITA expressed his \7ish that the United States should allow Japan sufficient time to see what the results would be, but there is a limit to the patience of the American people. Considering it impossible to pacify public opinion, the Government has, to begin with, demanded the liberation of tho lower Yangtze region as well as the suspension of bombing of and other interference with churches and their properties situated at considerably far-off distances from the scene of military operations. (Annexed Document No. 4). To the foregoing Minister ARITA explained that, in regard to Item (4) of the foregoing paragraph, it is difficult, as was made plain in the last part of our Reply dated the 13th, it was im- possible for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of Equal Opportunity and Open Doer at the present day when the state of affairs in China has become changed, but that Japan possesses the desire to cooperate with Third lowers in the event cf the foregoing becoming understood, at the same time remarking in connection with the rumours as specified at the end of the said paragraph that such a thing таз totally impossible and could also not be put into practice, whereupon Grew stated that he felt relieved on hearing the fcregcing. Minister ARITA further explained that tho assertion that Japan's Open Door iolicy and xrinciple of Equal Opportunity might clash with the respecting of rights and interests of Third lowers im- plied that measures necessary for fostering the closer relation- ship of Japan and China as well as for ensuring Japan and China's rights of existence might at times necessitate eliminating the application of the aforesaid Principles to some extent, so that there was still considerable room left for economic activities of other countries. As Grew then asked as tc what was meant by the New Order, Minister ARITA replied that same implies the establishing cf co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China in regard to I clitics, Economy, and Culture, meaning, as for example, that iolitical Co-operation is-indispensable for exterminating the Anti-Japanese 1 < licy as well as Ire-Communistic 1'olicy that have so far been th; causes cf unrest in the Orient, whereas, furthermore, in regard to Economic Cooperation, it may beccme necessary, as mentioned above, to No. 1573 I ago 5 eliminate, tc scrse extent, tho application of the Open Door and Equal Сррс̂ г Ш̂117у :_ ГгТпс1р1еь. Fur the roo re, on Grew romar ing that he considered it necessary for Japan to make seme sort- of gesture in order to pacify tho excited feelings cf the general public in the I M t e d States, the Minister replied that., a:, though ho recognized the need of same on principle s he was not in a position to say any mere as the question cf Liberation cf гhe Yangtze River had already been replied to, Cn December 6th Hi nis J . а" ЛН1Т.'. invited Grow, and after having explained as f e l i n e regarding the .manssored points of tho foregoing Clause IT. handed :o him a written note embodying the said points (Annexed Lbiumont No. 5») (1) Referring tc tho views cf tho United States as per the former part cf Item 2 of the fcrogoing Clause IV, the application, in their original farm, of the various treaties which теге conduced at tho time for tho purp-se of pre- venting internat: oncl disputes in the Orient would, with the general change of conditions in tho world, as wo11 as the new state cf affairs that is developing in the Far East, rather hamper the bringing about of x"eaco and Universal xrosperity. (2) Equal Opportunity in regard to Co.amerce is what the Em- pire has been hitherto demanding of the world, and although we agree, cn principle, to the opinion rf the United States that Sc:ual Opportunity in regard to Commerce will bring about World 1'eaco» bat, as things are at present, good quality and low price 1 Japanese goc-ds aro meeting vlth dis- criminatory treatment ovp.t the world., As regards th© gaining of a most-favoured footing by one country in other countries as per It om (3) of the fere да in.a Clause IV". the Most-Fav : nrftft between the British % p i r e with her colonies as well as eo-mutuaily her colonies wore po-intnfl nut T at the same time asserting that ttie contention that in the case of the British Empiio it is unavoidable as it applies to a single political unit but that the es- tablishing of eccnomaс relatione botween Japan, Mancjcukuo, and China si-rilar to those та thin the British 2npito can not bo recognized in view of the said three countries not con- stituting & single political unit, can not bo tolerated. (3) Moreover, it wes reiterated that it шз Japan : s belief that it would by no means contribute towards stabilizing the world to let an econoaic uiit xiko that of Japan cxiet on one hand against such largo economic units of the British 3ipire, Doc. No. 1573 lage 6 tho United. States аг.Л tho Soviet Union on the ether, and that, as the relations of Japan, Manchoukuo and China in regard to ru.ti.al ect uanic cooperation emanated from the afore-mentioned idea, same would not conflict rath the prosperity of the «arid, This collaboration has for its object i- (a) In regard tc the field of enterprise, the guaran- teeing cf supply of products ihv-t are indispensable from the standpoint of nations I existence* Tc attain this object there may bo enterprises that require tho granting of special monopolist! ? rights in ordgr tc foster thei-r doVuIopmentt Ii> regard to such enterprises, Third rowers will be welcanfcd^ within the sphere oft he plans cf Japan, Manch.uk io, and China, to participate in regard to yapitalj, technics or resources, but the establishment of competitive enterprises shall not be recognized. (b) Fur tn errnore, in regard to the field cf foreign trade, it shall be the principle not to make any special dis- criminatory treatment by enforcing Customs tariffs or other export and import counter-measures. То this, Grew remarked that he believed it to be the stand of the United States Govornr.mt that it could not recognize any one-sided alterations to any treaties or other agreements until the necessary procedure regarding alteration of some be taken conjointly by the countries concerned, after which he stated that it would p.11 be desirable to prove by actual facts that Japan will not show discriminatory treatment» VI. On December 26th Grew was invited and told that it wis regrettable that, whereas it had already been made clear on repeated occasions that Japan entertained no intention of closing the Chinese Market, the editor in! tone- of сотое "f the American newspapers an? maga- zines went s*> show гшг. Ja, reai iute&cioo v«s no и tting understood, whereupon Grow 3tatod that, although the said news- papers and magazines were not neceG_.ar-.ily' expressing the views of the Government, it was nevertheless true that the American public in general were feeling greatly uneasy regarding Japan r s actions in C T .iaa, also adding xhat the use of restrictive phraseology, on the occasion of the previous interview such as having stated that it would be necessary to give protection to "certain 1, indus- tries and "special" enterprises is liable to create" uneasiness regarding Actual Treatment. To this the Minister replied that such restrictions should not bo interpreted in a broad senso, whereupon Grew again expressed his desire to have the foregoing demonstrated by actual facts. p.12 On that occasion Ambassador Grew remarked that it was regrettable 0m i/ 1 r w 1 Doc. No. 1573 Inge 7 to have issued a statement like that cf November 3rd regarding the Open Doer and Equal Opportunity in China notwithstanding that same had been guaranteed by Foreme Minister CHU as well as Minister KONOYE, whereupon the Minister repeated the seme explanation that he had made to Councillor Socman on November 15th, VII. On December 31 £ t Ambassador Grew visited the Vice-Minister (adding that, although he had visited tho Vice-Minister due tc Minister ARIT.'. being away on a trip, he wished it tc be understood that same would have the зале results as having visited the Minister) and handed him an official note expressing the views cf the Tjnited States in regard to Japan's Reply to the United States under date of November 18th, The "Vice-Minister asked for an explanation ef the main points of the said note, to which Grew explained that some expresses the views ofthe United States Government as follows:- (l) Hie so-called New State f Affairs in the Far East can not be created" only "by Japan's ox-part0 Declaration, but should be recognised only by means of a Conference. (2) It is true that the lowers including the United States possess special rights in China, and although the United States has always been advocating that such discriminatory special rights should be abolished and that China should be granted an equal (T»N« original says UNEQUAL) position, it is believed that such changes in the state of affairs should also be effected at a Ccnference cf the Powers, rnd also added that, as the United States possesses special interest in the state of affairs in the Far East, the United States would announce same at the first opportunity, (Annexed Document Nc. 6), VIII. Ever since then, the conversations between the Minister and Am- p.l3 bassador Grew became suspended, but on the occasion of Ambassador Grew's tenporarj- return to the United State3 (T*N, the original specifies KICK) implying return tc Japan, probably an error) in May 1939» Minister ARITA handed the said Ambassador a note аз per Annexed Document, and лranior НЖ.ЖТОА. also requested him tc con- vey a message addressed tc Secretary of State Hull. (Annexed Documents Nos. 7 and 8.) C E R T I F I C A T E I.r.S. Doc. N o . 1573 Statement of Source and Authcnticaticn I, 0D0 Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the f H e w i n g capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as auch official I have custody cf the document hereto attached consisting of 13 pages, dated 2 Sept. 1941, and described as follows: Summary of Japanese-American Negotiations During Foreign Minister ARITA's Term of Office (from Nov. 1938 until July 1939). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official do curie nt of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files cf the following named ministry or department (speci- fying alse the file number or citation, if any, or any.ether official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry. Signed at TOKYO on this (s) ИалгаЬаги Odo 31st day of October, 1946. (SEAL) Ass. Chief. Archives-Soсtion Witness: (sj M,„ Enure Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, RICHARD H . LARSH, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied j-owers, and that the above described document was obtained by mo from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at TOKYO on this (s) Richard H. Larsh 31 da., of October, 1946 NAME Witness: Eric Floishor, 2nd Lt. AUSnvostjeation Division, 113 Official Capacity <jrfd Document Mo. 219P (85) Br. Ex. 119 THE kmRICAN A.^A'SADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE ""IMI-TER TOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) Excerpt. No. 1126 TOKYO, November 24, 1938. It has recently baen brought to the attention of vy Govern- ment that the Chinese T : T aritlme Customs at Canton was taken over by the Japanese consular and military authorities on November 9» 1938, and that the acting deputy commissioner in charge was in- formed by those authorities that no customs funds then owing or there in banks >~ight be transferred to the Inspector General Customs without the permission of the Japanese authorities. Accordingly, acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor formally to protest against the taking over of the Chinese Maritime Customs House at Canton by the Japanese authorities. My Government is of the opinion that this reported action constitutes an infringement of the international status of the Chinese Maritime Customs. . . . Foreign Relations I, p. 746 at p. 747 99/ у Doc. No. 219F (86) Page Br. Ex. 120 f̂ A —' TEE AMERICAN ALBAS SAD OR ПЬчГ&РАК (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE LINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) Excerpts. K J ^ No. 1153 \ " TOKYO, December 30, 1938. In the light of facts and experience the Government of the United States is impelled to reaffirm its previously expressed opinion that imposition of restrictions upon the movements and activities of American nationals who are engaged in philanthropic, educational and commercial endeavors in China has placed and will, if continued, increasingly place Japanese interests in a. preferred position and is, therefore, unquestionably discriminatory in its effect against legitimate American interests. Further, with reference to such matters as exchange control, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision, and monopolistic promotion in certain areas of China the plans and practices cf the Japanese authorities imply an assumption on the part of those authorities that the Japanese Government or the regimes established and maintained in China by Japanese armed forces are antitled to act in China in a capacity such as flows from rights of sovereignty and further in so acting to disregard and even to declare nonexistent or abrogated the established rights and interests of other countries including the United States. The Government of the United States expresses its con- viction that the restrictions and measures under reference not only are unjust and unwarranted, but are counter to the provisions of several binding international agreements, voluntarily entered into, to which both Japan and the United States, and in some cases other countries, are parties. The Government of the United States in its note of October 6 requested, in view of the often reiterated assurances proffered by the Government of Japan of its intention to observe the principle of equality of opportunity in its relations with China and in vie 1 /; of Japan's treaty obli gations so to do, that the Government of Japan abide by these obligations and carry out these assurances in practice. Doc. No. 219P (86) Br. Ex. 120 Fage 2 Tho Japanese Government in its reply appears to affirm that it is its intention to make its observance of that principle ^ ^ i H p n n l прпл ЯП nn^prcibrfling hv t f hfl ДТДТ"'сяп ГТПУПТ"!1РСПЬ and by other governments of я "n^w situation" and a "new order" in the Far East as envisaged and fostered by Japanese authorities^. This country's adherence to and its advocacy of the principle of equality of opportunity do not flow solely from a desire to obtain the commercial benefits which naturally result from tho provisions of that principle. They flow from a firm conviction that observance of that principle leads to economic and political stability, which are conducive both to the internal well-being of nations and to mutually beneficial and peaceful relationships between and among nations; from a firm conviction that failure to observe that principle breeds international friction and ill-will, with consequences injurious to all countries, including in particular those countries which fail to observe it; and from an equally firm conviction that observance of that principle promotes the opening of trade channels thereby making available the markets, the raw materials and the manufactured products of the community of nations on a mutually and reciprocally beneficial basis. The principle of enuality of economic opportunity is, moreover, one to which over a long period and on many occasions the Japanese Government has giver definite approval. It is one to the observance of which the Japanese Government has committed itself in various inter- national agreements and understandings. It is one upon observance of which by other nations the Japanese Government has of its own accord and upon its own initiative frequently insisted. It is one to which the Japanese Government has repeatedly during recent months declared itself committed. The people and the Government of the United States could not assert to the establishment at the instance of and for the special purposes of any third country of a regime which would arbitrarily deprive them of the long established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs along with those of other nationals. Fundamental principles such as the principle of equality of opportunity which have long been regarded as inherently wise and just which have been widely adopted and adhered tc, and which are general in their are not subject to nullification by л л^^лХ^^ Doc. No. 219P (86) Br. Ex. 120 Page 3 In tho light of tha so facts, and with reference especially to the purpose and the character cf the treaty provisions from time to time solemnly agreed upon for the very definite purposes indicated, the Government cf the United States deprecates the fact that one of the parties to these agreements has chosen to embark—as indicated both by action of its agents and by official statements of its Authorities—upon a course directed toward the arbitrary creation by that power by methods of its own selection, regardless of treaty pledges and the established rights of other powers con- cerned, of a "now order" in the Far East. Whatever may be the changes which have taken place these matters are of no less interest and concern to the American Government than have been the situations which have prevailed there in the past, and such changes as may henceforth take place there, changes which may enter into the producing of a "new situation" and a "new order" are and will be of like concern to this Government. This Government is well aware that the situation has changed. This Government is also well aware that many of the chang have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Government does not admit, however, that there is nood or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and tho agent of destiny in regard thereto. The Government of tho United States has at all times regarded agreements as susceptible of alteration, but it has always insisted that alterations can rightfully be made only by orderly processes cf negotiation and agree- ment among tha parties thereto. The Japanese Government has upon numerous occasions expressed itself as holding similar views. The United States has in its international relations rights and obligations which derive from international law and rights and obligations which rest upon treaty provisions. Of those which rest on treaty provisions, its rights and obligations in and with regard to China Doc. No. 219P (87) Br. Ex. 121 1 THE Л1 ERIC AN Ai'BASSADCB IF JAPAN (GREW) TC THE JAPANESE J INISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) Excerpt. No. 1207 TOKYO, l arch 11, 1939- EXCELLENCY: The renewed attention of Your Excellency is invited to my note No. II78, dated February 6, 1939, relating to the imposition by the Japanese naval authorities at Chefoo of various restrictions on the shipment of merchandise, to the informal memorandum relating to unwarranted restrictions placed upon American personal and business interests in Tientsin which was left by the Counselor of the Embassy on (with) the Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office on February 6, 3-939, and to the aide morcoiro which was left at the Foreign Office on Larch 8, 1939) in which the hope was expressed that, in view of the continued imposition of such restrictions at Tientsin, necessary steps would immediately bo taken to alleviate those restrictions. From various sources the Government of the United States has received farther information to the effect that the Japanese .sponsored regime in North China, with the support of the Japanese authorities, has brought about the imposition of drastic trade restrictions, including the recuirement of export permits and con- trolled money exchange. The Government of the United States regards these export restrictions as the most comprehensive discrimina- tion against the United States and other foreign countries and in favor of Japan which has yet been established in North China by Japanese authorities and as a virtual nullification in that area of the principle of equal opportunity so far as import and export are concerned. Foreign Relations I, pp. 831-832 219P (86)- Br. Ex. 125 9P THE AMERICAN CHARGE IS JAP AS (DOOMAN) TO THE JAPANESE MI MIS TEE РОЕ FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ABE) Excerpts. Ho. 1366 TOKYO, September 1, 19 EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese mi 1 itary forces at Swatow have continued to occupy the premises of the Chinese Maritime Customs at that nort for a oeriod of more than two months. •v It is the view of my Government that the actions, as set forth above, of the Japanese authorities at Swatow constitute an effective seizure of the Chinese Maritime Customs at Swatоv. I am, accordingly, desired by my Government to protest against such s, izure and continued occupation of the customs house which prejudice the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs. My Government taices this occasion to reit rate and further to emphasize to the Japanese G vernm nt its very real interest in the preservation and integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and in the safeguarding of the customs revenues. I avail myself, (etc). Eugene E. Dooman Foreign Relations I, pp. 748-749 Doc. Ко. 713 Page 1 Г Г 04 Notification from tho U. S. Secretary of State Hull to the Japanese Ambassador to the U, S. HORINOUCHI in regard of the abolition of Japanese-American Commerical Treaty; . I take the liberty to inform ycu that, during the recent years the -Gcvori- ::ent of the United States has been examining the rreaticr. _of согаленаа-ajad • nasigaslon in..forcc between the United ssates andTother countries with a view to ctetemininfT/Iiat charges may'need be made toward better sagging the purposes for which such treaties wore c o n f l l - - In the course cf t is survey, the Government of the United States has coma to a cor.elusion that the Treaty of Commerce and navigation existing between the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contained provisions which, deserve new consideration. In order to find an adoouato method for such considera- tion, and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new developments nay require., the GuvernrienL uf~tnr> Unit.vi fit.-n-.n^ .or-Mr^ ^ record afire with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII cf tho said treaty, hereby wishes to яivo notice of it? desire- thrt. *ы q f.rnnty JkgTorminatea, and that having thus given notice, the United States expects the tr e.ty, together with its annexed protocol to expire after six mantes from this date. In concluding this letter, I beg to renew my respects to you. Respectfully yours, Document Mo. 713 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E T .P.S. No. 713 Sta tor-cnt of Source... and , A_u then tic i ty. I, HAYASKI Kaoru hereby certify thet I cm officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capa- city; Chief cf the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one page, dated 26 July, 1939* and de- scribed as follows: J1?ANESE-\'HTT0\N RELATIONS III REGARD TO TEE ABOLITION OF T-3) J A? A N E 3 E • • .1 '<E RIC AN COIP'ERCIAL TREATY ON 26 JULY 1939, being U«. S, notice to Japan of intention to abolish said Conrnarcial Treaty. I further ccrtify that the attached record, and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of tha official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry Sienad at Tokyo on this (s) It. E 19th ray of Sent., 1Q46. Signature of Official SEAL "'tn3ss;__(s) Naqahara Odo Official Capacity Sta ten ..nt of Official Procurement I, Fichard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Eaadqurrtors of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was ob- tained by mo from tho above signed oficial of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Serjt., 1Q46 JsJ Richard N. Larsh NA'3 Witnass° /з/ T/4 Tognchl Investigator? IPS. Official Capacity Doc. No. 219P (63) Page 1 Br. Ex. 93 ORAL STATEMENT BY TFE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO ТГЕ JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA) ON MAY 11, 1939 Excerpts. I have now been Instructed by ir;y Government to call on your Excellency and, primarily 011 humanitarian grounds, and in reiteration of the representations made on both occa- sions mentioned, emphatically to express the most serious concern at the recent indiscriminate bombings of the civilian popula- tions of Chungking, Swatow, Ningt>o, and Foochow. According to information reaching my Government, the destruction caused by these air raids by the Japanese forces was confined almost entirely to civilian lives and the property of civilians. Added to t b e humanitarian factor applying to non- combatants generally, there exists the emphatic objection of the American Government to the jeopardizing of the lives of its own nationals which must inevitably arise from such indiscriminate attacks. I need hardly remind Your Excellency of t^e repeated bombings of American property in China, of w v ich approximately 140 separate instances have come to my Government's attention during the present hostilities, in spite of t v e fact that these properties were clearly marked by American flags and t v eir positions notified to the Japanese military authorities. Loss of American life, wounds and serious property damage were crused. The fact that during г rccent period reports of t v ese attacks on American property dwindled, and for a time actually ceased, gave us the hope that effective steps were being taken to meet our representations. Foreign Relations I, pp. 547-648 Doc 0 No. 220 С (1) Ю page 1, Br. Ex. 132 THE АШАЯЯАПСВ TELEGRAM IN JAPAN (GEE'S) TO THE SECRETARY CF oTATE T QKY0, M ay 18, 1939—7 p.m. (Received May 18--1C;03 a.nu) Excerpt 80 The Minister on his own initiative then turned to the subject of the so-called "South Sea advance* and made to me the following confidential oral statement; "•̂ e understand that, since the military occupation of Hainan Island by Japan and the placing of the Sinnan Gunto 'Spratly Islands) .under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government General, rumors have spread, giving the impression as though Japan entertained some territorial designs toward the South Seas; that as a result certain interested countries are apprehensive„ and that even some Americans have a similar apprehension with regard to the Philippines. The Japanese Government consider it regrettable from the standpoint of Japanese-American friendship that such apprehension has been aroused. They are, therefore prepared, if "the United States Government should desire that some step be taken by the Japanese Governement for the purpose of dispelling such apprehension, to enter into conversation with the United States Government . и Cipher texts by mail to Shanghai, Chungking,, peiping. GREW Foreign Relations И, p. 1 at pp. 4-5 Doc. No. 219? (83) Page 1 B r . E x . 95 TFE SECRETARY OF STATE TO TFE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) (Pare phrase) Excerpts . WASFINGTON, Ju ly 6 , 1939--7 p.n I83. On Ju ly 5j and at Ms own request, the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suna) ca l led at the Depart- ment. . . . . . . An informal memorandum was then handed to the Counselor i n w v i c v was described the bombings of ce r t a in Protestant and Roman Catholic mission properties on June 23, 24 and 25, and the bombing of the Union Figh School, Foochow, on June 29. Telegram repeated to Chungking. FULL Foreign Relat ions I , p. 653 Doc. No. 219P (66) Br. Ex. 96 pe In MEMORANDUM BY TEE SECRETARY OF STATE Excerpt. (WASHINGTON) J u l y 1 0 , 1939 The Jopaneso Ambassador came in at my request. I tben proceeded, without particular preliminaries, to read bim the following: "On two occasions between midnight and. 2:00 a.m., July 6, two squadrons of Japanese pianos raided Chung- king. Bombs fell at random on both banks of the Yangtze River and in the city. One bomb fell within 400 feet of the residence of the Counselor of the American Embassy» Other bombs fell in the same general neighborhood, one landing about 300 yards from the residence of the American Ambassador. The Lewis Memorial Institutional C h u r c h at Chungking, an American institution, was badly damaged. "Another raid was made by Japanese planes on Chungking on July 7 commencing about 12:40 a.m., and lasting until about 2:10 a.m. On this occasion bombs , fell in various areas of the city and also on the south bank cf the Yangtze, one bomb falling within 50 yards of the quarters of the Counselor of the American Embassy and causing about 30 Chinese civilian casualties. "During those raids five bombs struck within 200 •yaijds of the U.S.S. Tutuila. . . С (ORDELL) F(TJLL) Foreign Relations I, p c 656
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Ex.923-999. Japanese-Soviet-U.S. relations, pre-War
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