AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
Ex.912-922. Japanese Navy. Japanese foreign relations (14 items) See also Oversize Folder No .2
application/pdf
* " и ? / Doc. Ho. 1210 В & С Pate 1 "Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations" VI. А Ж Ш С З Ж К Т ОБ1 THE BOARD OF 1КЮЕКШ02? CCHICSSSIIJQ- ТЕЗ COiCLU{5lUh OF THE JAPAIJESE-GEHMAH AMD JAPANESE- ITALIAH A&BEEMENTS ОТ ECONOMIC January 21, 194-3. Yesterday, January 20th, at the C-eneral Headquarters of the German Fuehrer, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General Hirochi Oshima, and the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Joachim von Ribbentrop, signed an agreement between Japan a.rd Germany concerning economic co- operation and on the same day at Home the Japanese Charge d1Affaires, Mr. Shunichi KaseP and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galleano Ciano, signed an agreement on economic co-operation between Japan and Italy. These agreements possess the same period of validity as the Tripartite Pact, the purpose of which they are to substantiate in the field of economy. In this respect they may be considered as the extension and re-inforcement of the Tripartite Pact. Japan, Germany and Italy have constantly been strengthening their political co-operation established by the Tripartite Pact and new, by concluding these agreements, they intend tc provocate war against their common enemy through the formulation of a grand economic plan and by employing the total combined strength of the two great economic spheres of Greater East Asia and Earope and, at the same time, to lay the foundation for permanent economic co-cperation between thece spheres after the г?аг. The agreements provide for the acceleration of extensive exchange of various kinds of economic goods and servicen and . also for co-opera.tion regarding all matters pertaining to economy and finance. i Doc. No. 1210 В & С Page 2 VII. • STATEMENT OP ТЕЗ SPOKESMAN OF THE ВО.йШ OP IKPOHMATION CONCEBNING THE CONCLUSION OP TEE JAPAlOSE-GEBbiN JAPANESE-ITALIAN ii.G3EEi'it5NTS ON ECONOMIC С О-0P3BATION January 21, 1943.. by concluding the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy, recognizing and respecting the leader- ship of Japan in Greater East Asia end that of Germany and Italy in Europe in the establishment of a new order, pledged among themselves to stand Ъу and со-oporate with one another. The treaty is the propelling force of an epochal nature for the construction of a new world order which is primarily aimed at establishing permanent peace. Yfoerever this force has exercised its dynamic influence the work of constructing а пег; order in Greater East Asia and Europe has steadily produced concrete results. The economic agreements which have just been concluded are agreements which give concrete expression to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact in the field of economy. The fact that these agreements have Ъоеп concluded is in itself a demonstration that the construction of the new order i3 being further substantiated and that economic collaboration among the throe Powers will henceforth be rendered increasingly closer. In addition, these agreements bring to an end an emlfiitative economic system with which the United States and Britain have endeavoured to dominate the world under their monopolistic control and have opened the way for the direct settlement of accounte between Japan and Germany and Japan and Italy, another fact which is of very great significance. It is my firm conviction that the co-opera.tion among these three Powers in both the spiritual and material spheres will thereby be further enhanced in strength and that it will not only contribute powerfully toward the prosecution of the war but also to the completion after the war of the grand undertaking of establishing the new world truly based on fairness and righteousness. Page 1 "THE НЕТ HOD AND МВТ POINTS CF ENLIGHTENING PUBLIC OPINION ON TEE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATION RE 1935 NAVAL LIMITATIONS CONFERENCE" Decided on 12 October 1934 The enlightenment and guidance of public opinion on the preUrinary negotiation re 1935 Naval Limitations Conference shall be done based upon the following according to general principles: ACCOUNT I. MATTERS OF E3LJGHTENKENT (1) It is the national right of every country to hold sufficient military forces in order to stabilize her own national defense; at the same time for our Empire, it is a necessary duty in order to secure the peace of East Asia. (2) Our Empire's claim is not the expansion of armaments but the reduction of armaments; namely, it means to plan the armament reduction of all nations to the utmost based upon the spirit of disarmament and to contrive to lighten the national burden as much as possible in the future. Moreover, it means the promotion of friendship among nations. (3) In order to establish the principle of no-threats and no-aggression, it is necessary to carry out limitation of armament by abolishing or by re- ducing offensive force, and by replenishing defensive force. (Л) Our Empire denounces the Washington Treaty, but she hopes to conclude a just and appropriate treaty as a substitute. (5) In case aft agreement is not effected, the Empire has a counter-plan which will make the best of the situation from the standpoint of national defense. However, the Empire will persistently maintain an attitude of just peace and, of course, try willingly not to aggravate peaceful relations with the interested countries. II. THE WAY OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1) Internal enlightenment a^d propaganda shall be performed through journalists and correspondents. addition, the interested authorities will dispatch" lecturers in"case of necessity; or it shall be done by contributions to newspapers, "Бу broadcasts, by films, ly distribution of pamphlets and so on. (2) All interested officials shall guide internal newspaper and magazine writers and correspondents. Even though they will avoid as much as possible M > О I * Бос. Mo, l6l8 А gt talcing measures such as banning publication of anything except currently- banned matters, each ministry shall exert itself and shall attempt to prevent publication of speeches which might destroy a policy already decided* by the Empire, which make special mention of opposition of ministry to ministry, of disunity of internal public opinion, or the publishing of articles which would tend unnecessarily to stimulate internal and external public opinion. Each ministry should try to prevent it, (3) As the newspaper articles containing announcements for internal en- lightenment are promptly translated by foreign journalists in Japan and are telegraphed _ outside Japgji,""тШеп the aforesaid announcements are made, we must jjive ample consideration to the foreign reaction. We should carry on propaganda for foreign enlightenment according to item (5) in addition to carrying it on through foreign correspondents in Japan and Japanese correspondents. 'To shall direct organizations abroad such as our foreign, companies and non-official groups, and Jgganese residents abroad to cooperate with the policy of enlightenment of tlio"Government, .Special consideration shall be given to the indirect effectiveness of internal Lightenment, (5) The enlightenment in foreign countries shall be conducted with foreign diplomatic establishments as centers. Concerning this, the central government shell consider and take measures for close liaison with military and naval attaches in diplomatic establishments abroad, (6) The guidance and the enlightenment of foreign correspondents should be done with the Foreign Office as a center. (7) As censorship of the communications of foreign correspondents is not 'established as a system, we make it a rule not to limit them especially, except in the case of an extreme communication; instead the guidance of cor- respondence is emphasized. - We should make a separate study concerning refutation and counter- propaganda in response to the propaganda from foreign countries. (9) We should make a separate study concerning tho_prevention of the bribing of internal newspapers and magazines by others, and the buying; of foreign newspapers and magazines. * " ~—" (10) We should make a separa з stud;/ concerning the oppositions and the artificialities, etc., in the p-\ ic opinion of eountrids"ТИШЯГ"partiсipatcd in the Conference, especially those of Britain and America. (11) The controlled and firm attitude of the authorities is a basic con- dition of enlightenment and guidance, and at the same time, it is the best protective wall for stopping propaganda from foreign countries. Accordingly officials in chargc"of each Iftterested ministry should maintain the necessary liaison. The End "ос. No. 1618 А Page 3 ^ REFERENCE (Confidential) 25 Navy METHOD OF EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA I. The policy of Japan is always to maintain poacc in the East. (1) The maintenance of por.ee in the East is not only one of tho greatest pillars for tho Peace System of the world, but also it is the important element of existence for Japan without which self-supply and self-support arc impossible and the importing and exporting of goods are necessary. (2) Therefore, the maintenance of peaco in the East and the Japanese national defense arc closely conncctod raid indivisible, (3) History testifies that Japan protected, at the risk of her national fortune, the poacc of the East ovory time it xrr>.s in danger. In fact, Japan has never taken up arms except in the above instance. (4.) For other powers also, the maintenance of poacc in the East is the guarantee of their trade in the East. (5) When the powers look dispassionately at the actual situation in the East, they trill discover Japan. as the only defender of the peaco of the.. East and -ill be unable to help thanking her and respecting her, II. The attitude of Japan is always on a basis of justice and duty, and at tho Naval Conference of 1935, Japan is to take the same attitude, (1) Tho intention of Japan based on the spirit of tho reduction of armament, is to abolish increases in armament and to reduce armament. In this case, tho powers with the greatest armament should take the lead in making reductions, (2) It is absolutely nocossary to maintain national existence. Therefore every country has an equal right to foel at oaso about her defense; so each nation has an equal right to provide tho armament necessary for national defon (3) As naval strength is very easily moved, all powers concerned can be at ease as regards national defer?o when the treaty based on the principle "NOT TO THREATEN OTHERS" is cor/ :.ied, (Л) This discriminating ratio of naval strength is a violation of the principle of no-threats and no-aggression and should bo rejected, (5) In order not to menace one another, we should abolish or drastically reduce our offensive force, and assert our defensive armament. Бос. Но. 161S А Pago Л А III. The abrogation cf the existing treaty is a natural stage in concluding a now inpa.rtj.ail treaty, (1) Ton years h.i-70 passed since the conclusion of tho Washington Treaty- raid this treaty has lc\?i ±-r. validity due to the development cf sciences and due to The changes in tho infc omatiorsxl situation"."" ratio gives Japan especially а. с distant menace and makes hor azu-exous about tne safety of her nation.1.J. defense. This stimulates stiJl пего the idea of opposing powers, and is not tho measure for maintaining the international peace; we must abrogate this as soon as possible» (2) The Washington Treaty itself anticipates the loss of its validity owing to the passing of time, and provides for tho abrogation of the treaty. Therefore, according to the stipulation of the troaty, ft rill bo natural for Japan to announce the abrogation of tho treaty; this is based on hor con- structive hope for concluding a now treaty, impartial and saleable for the pr ft&eat., ̂situation . (3) The London ..T̂ oaiy.--is originally. temporary and it is natural that т/о abrogate it according to its provision and substitute a new agreement. (Л;" It is the traditional spirit of the Japanese that they got along with good neighbors and help their neighbors, making nothing of their own lives in the maintenance of justice. No ono can terrorize hor by putting on a demon's mask. :MU, COMMITTEE VERBAL, MOTE (to be distributed at the 4-th Joint Disarmament Information Commission, 5 October 193Л) All the Ministries cannot carry out tho concrete details of propaganda, and it3 diffusion in tho same way for they all axe in different situations, and it nay be advantageous for each Ministry to take a different attitude in attain- ing the object, The principle should bo that all have a close, connection beneath the surface. Under separate cover is contained the elementary methods of propa- gan3a'diffusion now being used by the Navy. We shall be pleased if you make "a suitable selection and use it. Doc. No. 161C Л Pago 5 * CONFIDENTIAL - RE8ERE1TCE 25 Navy EIEMENT3 0? EffETlHfiL PROPAGANDA I. 77c should be suro to make the people believe that mintrilling the national defense power permanently is absolutely essential to the arnanent reduction treaty. (1) Generally spoaldrg, it is absolutely necessary that an independent country has the right to amaments necessary to safeguard herself,» (2) Without the safety of national defense, we positively cannot expect to build the international peace system,, the stability of the national life, nor the future prosperity of the country. (3) Therefore, a just raid impartial treaty of armament reduction should contain the permanent maintenance of the national defense as its essence. II. The following iters should be emphasized for the conclusion of a just and valid now treaty for armament reduction» (1) We cannot accept any treaty which threatens the independence of the national defense of Japan and by which the permanence of the national defense of Japan cannot be anticipated. (2) To insure the principle of no-threats and no-aggrcssion, we abolish the gradation and ratio„ Moreover, wo should limit our armament on the basis of drastically reducing military strength and replenishing military strength. (3) All nations should plan to drastically lower their amounts in accord with the spirit of reducing armament. Ill, Wo explain the following concerning the abrogation of the existing treaty. (1) As ten-odd years have passed since the conclusion of the Washington Treaty, it is not suited to the present situation due to scientific progress and changes in the international situation in the meantime. The treaty itself anticipates its own abrogation, end it is the proper end just preparatory measure for concluding a new and just armament reduction treaty. Therefore, it is not simply as a use of a right proper from the standpoint of the treaty, but as a step in the direction of a fair agreement that we announce the abrogation of the treaty. (2) The London Treaty is a temporary agreement in force until the end of 1936, and after the term is итог it will naturally become invalidated. Doc. Wo. 1613 A Pa.ge 6 ''' IV". Japan who resigned fron the League of Nations -1th regard to the Mr.nchuria Incident experienced the fajt that a just clain is not necessarily always recognized in ал international conference. Even if our clain should unfortuna.tely not be accepted, and the agreement sheuld not be concluded, we need not necessarily expect the opening of a ship construction race consider- ing the national situation m the various countries. If such competition should appear, the authorities arc confident of maintaining the national de- fense by independent measures. Therefore, we should strongly advocate that the people should not be afraid of it, V. Due to the situation of the empire, the defense of the empire is con- nected with East Asiatic peaco and indivisibility, and as the maintenance of naval force by Japan is the basis cf tho peace of East Asia, they should be made to recognise emphatically that the future of Japan depends on the vicissitudes of her Navy, VI. As the negotiation for the armament reduction reaches its climax, foreign propaganda may bccor.o violent, lo must spread the warning ahead of tine not to bo taken in by foreign tricks» I.P.S. Ио. 1618 А С К R T T F I C A T E St-dbgaenb .of Sour OR and, Authenticity I, Tat 5":JO TSIMJDO hereby certify that I am official.у connected with the Japanese Government in the follow- ing capacity: J.c-mbcr _cf and Documents -Section. Second D emob il i. 7,at ion ):' av e au and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 Volume , dated gept. and Oct». 193A, and described as follows: "Guidance of Public Opinion Reг 1935 London Naval Limitations Conference." I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Navy Ministry Signed at Tclave on this 3rd day of Oct. . 194-6. TATSUP TSPKUDO Signature of Official (SEAL) Witness: _ _R, ЪШШРА (SEAL) Member of Archives and Documents Section, 2nd Bemobll. Bureau Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement T, 2d Lt. ERIC W. FL^ISHER 0-935000 hereby certify that I am associated with the General"Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tolrvo on this 3rd day of October , 19A6 ERIC "T. TL̂ ZT-T-R M E Witness: IfT̂ 'I 5НГЭДЛЫА Investigation Division, IPS Official Capacity ^ f j Z Doc. Ho. 2453 С И Г Page 1 (Excerpt from Asahi Shlmbon, Tokyo, December 12, 1941) Victory is Undoubted (A talk of Premier TOJO) Yith the news of the declaration of war by Ш М Ш and ITALY against the United States of America, Premier TOJO gave the following statement at 11:00 p. m., on the Ilth. "Today, both (ШШАЗГ? end ITALY declared war against the United States of America* Furthermore, it made clear that JAPAN, G3RMAFY and ITALY renew their alliance and would firmly carry out the war until final victory has 'been gained against our common foe, the United States of America and BRITAIN, and that we would not conclude treaties of armistice and peace without mutual understanding. "The world is now divided into two groups; one that vainly struggles to maintain the status quo, and the о'..her, who earnestly strives_to establish the rightful new order; and they are fighting the greatest battle that has ever occurred in history. With just cause and substantial power, I believe without doubt victory is ours. I now offer my hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries in becoming stronger than ever, and herewith express my firm belief in our glorious future. « Dec. No. 2462 Page 1. C B S T I P I C a T E Yoshiji N1 SHI JIM (Seal) I certify the following: That the reduced-size edition of the December, 1941, issues (including the December 12 issue) of the ASAPH SHIMSUN, kept within the Investiga.t ion Department of the Main Office of the ASAEI SHIMSUN in Tokyo, was presented to International Prosecution Section on May 1С, 1946, upon their request. Yoshiji NISEI JIMA. (Seal) Head, Investigation Dept. Tokyo Office, Asahi Shimbun Document Nc« 2461-A Excerpt from "Tokyo ASAHI" of April 16. 1944 Page I "War for Indian Emancipation towards Achieving Common Objective- Premier's Address Lands Brave Fight Put Up by Germany and Italy РБЕШЖ TOJO'S ADDRESS On this event in the opening meeting of the Mixed Specialists' Committee today which is being based on tha Tri Partite Pact, I deem it an extreme pleasure to have the opportunity be address you. Taking a general view of the war situation, we find that the Angle-Americans who were defeat ей in each and every consecutive battle in the early part of this war have, since laf i- year, begun proclaiming counter-offense. They have mobilized their £411 force and are now pressing the borders of the Axis territories •• in the East and the Vfest. Despite their efforts our strong and solid camp has not even shown the slightest stir. The firm, conviction of ultimate victory and the unciefeatable positions of Japan, Germany and Italy have been all the more strengthened. I am always paying my respects to the brave and courageous fight put up by the Germans and Italians in Europe; especially, I am unable to withhold my joy upon receiving the report that- German troops have complete- ly smashed the enemy advance on the Italian front; the carrying on of at- tack on a large scale against London; and besides, that Italy has arrayed new battle formations and is about to join the front lines of this Co- operative War. Impatience being increased through such state affairs, our enemy, the Anglo- Anericans, have recently declared the construction of the Second Front in Europe, It is rather for such rash acts that Germany awaits, and I firmly believe that Germany will not merely drive them back, but will deal them deadly blows and thereby hurry the time of winning the ultimate victory for Japan, Germany and Italy. In Greater East Asia, our Empire is ensuring the key point of the Southern areas, and smashing the enemies' aggressive attempts in the continents and the Pacific areas. Through the complete cooperation given in war efforts by the countries and nations within the Greater East Asia Sphere, and the utilization of the abundant important resources for arma- ments, our position of ultimate victory is being strengthened day by day. Cur Empire will maintain this position to the last, and resolutely deal blows to the enemies and thereby fight through this war to the end. As you are ail aware, the Japanese forces, with the great help received from Burma, have recently marched abreast with the Free Indian Nationalist, Army and have already crossed the Indian-Burmese border into Indian territory, gaining victories, after victories. Especially the Free Indian Nationalist Army/"their tlhief, Chandra Bose, is fighting for the emancipation of their country with the hearty cooperation accorded by Burma, and the other Asiatic nations; and, it is most joyful to note Document So. 2461-A Page 2 the fact that the surging tendency for Indian emancipation is now -pre- vailing all over India, which proves the steady achievements of our common objective - that is{ the emancipation for the oppressed nations. It it- needless to repeat that this current war was fought by the Axis powers which stood up to fight for self-existance and self-defense and for the construction of a world peace, based upon righteousness against the greedy ambit...on of world domination of the Asg'io-Americans who un- ashamedly гасг-i.ficed others for the jт own prosperity. Especially the am- bition of the two countries has lately become all the more clear and to this we shall further determine our resolution never to put down our arms but fjght until we sma-jh exhaustively the insolent ambition of the Anglo- Americans. Even I hough 'battle fields may be apart, to the east and the west, the necessity arises for us, the Axis nations, bo cooperate and con- cert much more closely and ко increase our fight against our common enemies, America and Britain. To neat this situation. Japan must carry on connections with the countries of Germany, Italy and the other Axis nations in Europe on a closer basis, and smash all A^gly .American plots_to,segregate -Japan .from the other АаДр uavlons, ''ve will then be able to advance together toward the achievement of common objective and. thus, with the collaboration of Europe and As'Ja, gain the ultimate victory. 1 have the firm conviction that both Germany and Italy possess the same determination as we possess. At this time of emergency, as Soday, it is most opportune that this meeting has been held, and I heartily pray for its success^" Doc. Но. 2461 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel ТАЕШАЖО G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a file of the Japanese Newspapers "Tokyo Asahi" for April 1544 with TOJO's speech of April 15. 1944 was taken from the Imperial Library in Tokyo on or about Jul.v 10. I94 , and that the original of the said document may be found in I do further certify /s/ Lt Col Taranenko (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, July 11 , 1945. doс. Ко. 2ij.6l C E R T I F I C A T E I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:- The book, Titles "Tokyo Asahi Sb.imbun1s miniature Edition of April, 1944" (including issue of the l6th of April); Publisher» Tokyo -sahi ̂ himbun Co. Year of publication: 1944 No. Of T o l u m e S 1 Сдэ Bookshelf No; .iiscellany 54/200 owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 13, 194&» xJated the 28th day of September, 1946. i Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal) and the General Aspect of National Defense Related to the Navy CUT (January, 193.7) Japan Diplomatic Association Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 2 Tills is the gist of the speech delivered cry- Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry TCIOEA at a secret neeting of the Third Special Committee of our association (concerning diplomacy and the Navy). It has been recorded by the secretary of this association. Consequently, vre have not obtained the speaker's consent nor his perusal of this speech. Naturally, this associa- tion bears entire responsibility for this copy. Investigation Bureau Japan Diplomatic Association December, 193\6 Further, it is requested that special attention be directed so as not to permit these pamphlets to be read by people other than the members of the Special Committee of this association. г Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 3 Outline of Naval Budget for the Next Fiscal Year and General Aspect of National Defense as Related to the Navy Dslivered by Mr. T0Y0DA, Soemu, Vice Admiral, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry It is an honor for me to have the opportunity to focus my talk on the naval budget for the next fiscal year and to speak on wliat the Navy is thinking about. Аз I have made hasty preparations for'this speech, I am afraid you v;ill find it hard, to listen to. You are cordially requested to ask me questions and to give comments later on. The order of яу speech will be as follows: The present international situation and the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy; recent conditions of the тт. .q. nrvifir. end thass oT other Powers; what the future armament policy of the Imperial Navy should be on the basis of tht recent international situation and the rccent naval conditions of the various Powers; then the out- line and the key points of the naval budget for the next fiscal year drawn up on the basis of the aforesaid policy of armament; and the future of the ship construction competition about which so much is being said. I should like to give my personal opinions on these questions first, and then, taking into consideration the aforesaid future situation, tc speak on what the Imperial Navy's budget ought to be in years to come. 1. Determination to cope with the non-treaty era. Though our _delcgat.es attended the disarmament conference held in London from the end of last year to the beginning o:C this year, with the claim that externally we would promote a feeling of national safety and internally reduce the burden on the neo^le "by reducing our naval armament as much as possible by cutting down on aggressive armament and by intensifying the defensive power according to the fundamental policy of non-threat and non-invasion, the Powers Doc. No. 903 -V? Pago 4 did not rocognizc our just and rational claim; and the Empire was obliged to toitffiraw from the conference. Within ten days we entered a naval non-treaty era as far as Japan was concerned, but we do not intend to encourage a ship- building competition nor a threat to other Powers, as vrc, as the Japanese Government or as the Imperial Navy, have taken every opporhmity to declare both before and after the Disarmament Conference and up to the present. We have a firm intention to push our naval armaments in the future with this conviction. Eut although wo would not encourage ship-building competition, we cannot remain a spectator, leaving the armaments to take care of them- selves if we look at the present international situation and consider the fact that naval armament has an important relation to the execution of the national policy. There is no denying that there is an urgent need to observe the situation closely and to set up a plan to cope with it. Since the present international situation as it concerns Japan is one of the subjects which it is tho duty of this association to study, your Excellencies are well aware of the said situation and as it is I who will have to ask for your instructions, I shell not go into details. When I think of tho diplomatic developments up to now from tho time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and from the time of our withdrawal from the League of Nations two years ago, I feel that importance and difficulty arc being added day by dry to Japan's national defense. During the interim, there have been ups and dovms, and I cannot say that when we look at the future the present stcto of affairs is reassuring. 2. Britain, U, S., Soviet Russia and China as the central consideration, I believe that Britain, U. S,, Soviet Russia and China will become the core of Japan's external relations to which we shall have to give our closest attention. Though our navy has no direct relation with Soviet Russia, we have, of course, several indirect relationships. However, our navy is not so much concerned with Russia as with Britain and the U. S. Although I shall refrain from speaking in игхх aotail here, we are well aware of the fact that the array will have to replenish its armament as preparation against Soviet Russia. The greatest obstacle to the execution of Japan's foreign policy can never be limited to Soviet Russia alone. I feel that we must concern ourselves especially with Britain raid tho U.S.A. Even now we сад draw such conclusion, judging iron the naval armament of these two countries. England has important rights and interests in China, not to mention India, and^ of course, she must have., enough power to secure such rights and interests; on the other hand, the U. S. does not have such big interests in China nor in other Oriental countries. Sho^bas few overseas investments and little trade as compared with Japan, Nevertheless, the U, S. in the past few years, especially since the Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 5 putbraaL. of the Manchurian Incident, Las been l.-aking a great effort to complete the Gcy.innent of her Navy. If we consider this fact and thc_ attitude which her N g E L , we shall clearly understand what the N. S. has in jî adt. Sono Americans, and even some Japanese, often say that the U, S. does not have such big interests in the Orient and that for this reason common sense tells us that the U. S. will absolutely not attack Japan. On the contrary, I feel that reality indicates -that the U. 3. has a special concern to suppress Jap£n* There are warn in the absolute sense, and wars in the relative sense. If Japan and tho U. S. should fight one mother in tho future the war will be • a,osoIute~"£fficT a question of life and doath. to Japan; but not to the U. S, That is, to the TJ. S, it will be a war for her prosperity, while it will bo a question of life or death to Japan, Therefore, viewed from a common sense standpoint, it is absurd to say that the N. S, will spend so much money and make various large scale gestures to put pressure on Japan, But actually she is doing so. The U. 3, naval installations of recent years and the question of stationing the Pacific fleet permanently in tho East, of which I will speak more fully later, '%vo no other object than to chock and oppress Japan, In short, both the N. S, and Eritain do not like Japan's development in the East. It is their basic idea to wish to check it in some way and to riin'it in the bud; consequently, various questions which accidentally occur in the international relation, are always based on the aforesaid idea, though the situations may differ. We must, therefore, keep this in mind all the time, end to say that the U. 3. has relaxed her pressure or has tightened it by looking at her superficial behavior must be avoided so that we may not mistake the main issue, jifter all, the Imperial Navy has not the least intention of attacking the TJ, S,, at least at the present time, but we rust be prepared at any cost with an invincible attitude. I believe that it is only by this attitude that Japan's foreign policy will be .guaranteed. 3. Comparison of Japanese, British and U, 3. Naval Expenditures, I shall speak on the latest situation of British and U, 3. navies. In comparing the British, U. S, and Japanese naval expenditures, as shown in Table I, we find that tho..Manchurian Incident -vhich broke out in 1931, and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, have made it necessary for Japan to make a supplementary budget, etc., raising the amount to ¥300,000,000. Since then the amount has increased yearly. The measures which Japan was obliged to take to cope -,1th the tenseness in the international situation appear in tho budget. Likewise, the budgets of the British and U. 3. navies have also rapidly in- creased during the past three years. Doc. No. 903 -V? Pago 6 TAELE I II/VAT' EXPENDITURE (Unit - one million 1 . . . 1 г 1 - ; 1930 {1931 il932 1933 193A j 1935 1936 • " 1 | i UNITED STATES (dollars) J 383 j ЗбО j 329 • A06 i Л55 j /Х2 527 ! ! ! ! BRITAIN (pounds)-Navy j 52,61 51сб| 50,^ 53.6 58.8 1 67.8 8А». » » -Air Force i 17.9! 1-д! 17,4 17,4 20 30,8 55.* 1 1 1 ' " J/.P/1I (yen) 1 263 1 211 1 307 | Л0А /,.89 530 550 Л. U. S. Ship-Gilding Program and its Present Condition. Tho latest, ship-building pro£ran of the U. S. and its present state of progress aro shown in Table II. Almost In the sar э way as the Japanese Na.vy, the U. S. Navy draws up a comprehensive ship-building program to be effected within a limited number of years, but the budget is not in the form of con- tinuous expenditures like that of Japan, but the necessary budget is appropriated yearly. Consequently, it often happens that even if a program has been decided on the ship building does not go according to the program, depending on the financial situation at the tint. The biggest plan now existing is the.Vinson plan which was set ut> in 193Л, involving" 102 ship.-, abort 200,000 tons, at a cost of $600,000,000, which is ejected to bo completed for 1939. so it will be finished in 1940. In addition to the above, in the preceding year, sho was building,Д2 ships., about 120,000 tons, with a budget of $23£'>000,000, derived from the money from tho Sangyo Fukkohi (Reconstruction Finance } as an cnorgencjr project. Another is the Navy Completion Plan .rhich wa.s supplemented successively from 1916 to 1929. This, however, tt.s not corplotod by 1929, аз expected, and in 1933", the building of 11 ships of. about 3%P00 tons, costing approximately $120^000,000, was loft undone. This program is also undorwey at present. Cf the above programs, about 6". р'-пря arc not yet laid down for con- struction; about 63 ships, 223,000 tons, are under construction; while the rest have already been completed." The expenditures for building these ships do not cover the •.•hole of the naval budget. Construction expenditures were 03?,000.000 in 1931, which increased yearly, and finally amounted to mere than $200,000,000 in 1935. The estimate for 1936 is $168,000,000. These plans aim at the completion of Treat;/ navy of which the U. S. so often spoahs, i.e., a plan to prepare- the amount of chips stipulated both in the Washington and tho Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 7 London Treaties. Accordingly, if those plans go smoothly, in 19-40 the U. S. navy will come to possess the naval force provided for in the two treaties. This includes not only replenishment for the lack of new ships, but also the construction of ships to replace the out-of-date ones. Besides this, though the official report has not yet reached us, it seems that a new plan is under way which r. a inly provides for the building of 2 battleships and 12 Class-B cruisers. There are, in addition, ships and boats which do not come under the limitations, or special service ships. In the bndget for the current fiscal year, а ISO fCOO-ton building plan was presented, but was not adonted by Congress because it could not get through the discussion stage. •3.10,00c' At any rate, it may be perceived Jbhat the U, S, will come to possess the number of ships stipulated botli" in the "Washington and .the London Treaties, Tt is" not certain t̂icthcrr ttnr lT, S. has any intention of expanding her navy "T5yoM~thls p3 an, but, according to what g s declared by the responsible people of the U. S. Government 5л Gongress, or on various other occasions, she will respcct the past two Treaties to the utmost and has no intention of ЗлсгоавШ? ЙОГ naval plan. This, however, cannot bo fully relied upon (as it may change) according to the development of the situation in the future. Generally specking, it would not be a great mistake to believe that the U. S. will effect the completion of naval armaments based on the tonnage of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties in the coming four or five years. TABLE II U. S. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM A'D ITS PRESENT STATE OF PROGRESS Vinson Flan 102 ships, about 200,000 -&ons From the Sangyo Fukkohi (RFC Funds J 32 shirs,..about 12СДХХ) tons 193U Program 1,000,000 lto_bo_finished Ъг 1939) 1933 Program $236,000,000 The reminder of tho plan for 1916 and 1929 (construction to be commenced after 1933). 11 ships, about 35,000 tons - about f0.20,000,000 Of the above-mentioned plans: Not yet began about 68 ships 115,000 tons (a part of the Vinson Plan) Under construction about 63 ships 233,000 tons IUU ITI И СJ. U AII UAUY UVA . BUILDING EXPENDITURES Year L 1930 1931 1932 193A 1935 1 1936 Unit - One million do3.la.rc .. 62,9 20,0 _ 182,2 . 216J. J.. L68_TS Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 23 5. U. S, Establishments for naval operations in the Pacific. Next., I shall speak on the U. S. establishments for naval operations in the Pacific. It is an obvious fact that the U. S. has been laying great stress on land and water establishments in the Pacific area of recent years. After the Washington Treaty the lT. S._.ast. to-, -work -сп.а.20 year plan with a budget of .$150,000,000 for the improvement of land and water establishments in the Pacific area, but that program has not made much progress since then ^ owing to the policy of financial retrenchment and so on. She took much in- . terest in the equipment of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but, besides f'is, there was no other notable phenomenon.. As soon as the Hanchnrian Incident broke outf however, the U. S^, suddenly changed bar attitude. She Increased her naval budget and besides she began to lay much stress on the Pacific area by means of Sangyo Fukkohi (RFC funds). The establishment on which the greatest importance was laid was Pearl Harbor, Hawaii*_The detailed figures of the sum of money spent here are not at hand now, but to cite the latest example, 1936, $15,000,000 out of §36,000,000 appropriated as expenditures for land and water equipment was allocated to this port, and we hear that almost CO or 90 per cent of the work is finished and the whole is nearing completion. Actually when the grand naval maneuver was held last year in the Pacific area, the whole fleet entered Pearl Harbor at the same time for supplies and rest. Hereafter, also, she will take more interest in that harbor; for instance, she has a plan to build two floating docks which will be made with pointed bows so that they can be towed and can sail under their own power. I cannot say for certain, but, at any rate, it seems that she lias a plan for building such things and defraying therefor the amount of $10,000,000 to this harbor. This material is evidence to show how earnest the U. S. is about operations in the Pacific area. In addition to the above, along the western coast of the continent, starting from the north, at Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Pedro and Panama, sh9 is taking steps to increase equipment so as to perfect these ports for repair, supply and recuperation purposes, Since the outbreak of the Ilanchurinn Incident, the U. S. fleet has_contimfid-.to...bс stationed in the Pacific area, and the American people as well as ourselves at the outset anxious that'lGT it •'ere to be stationed there for a long time it wauld. be 1 .possible for the U. 0. he maintain the fleet on the Pacific Coast, but the fact is that she has managed to maintain them on the western coast by means of prompt inc":: ,-:o ox l.nd and water installations. Only those ships requiring great scale reconstruction sail to the eastern coast, and dally repairs, docking, repainting of the ships' bottoms and such other works arc all arranged for somehow or other on the western 1 coast. Last year when the major part of the U. S. fleet sailed to the eastern coast, ws_..hcard that no workmen went to the fleet from the New lor?,: Navy lard, which fact is almost unbelievable to us of. the Japanадn ilavy. But this is .i Doc. No. 903 -V? Pago 9 strong evidcnco to show on one hand tha^ U, S. shins havo perfect mechanical equipment and that they arc quite self -sufficient. On the other hand, it shows land and water equipment on tho Pacific Coast is so complete that there is nothing lacking for the maintenance and repair of a big fleet. Besides these, the U. S. has been making groat efforts recently to complete air bases and to investigate the weather conditions around Alaska and the Aleutians in the north. It is also said that some army air forces arc stationed in Alaska and that they are being trained. At any rate, the U. S. is making strenuous efforts for the defense of the north" the completion and investigation of the important strategic"points, and such others. Thus the amount of money defrayed recently for land and water equipment, as shown in Table III, while it was only about A,000,000 in 1925, "has exceeded ^10,000,000 each з̂ еаг in recent years. In 1936 it amounted to $3-8,000,000. ¥0 can perceive the general situation from these facts. 6. The Strength cf tho U. S. Naval Air Force Next, I shall speak on the U. S. naval air force. Like Japan, the U. S. does not havo an Independent air force; the Army and the Navy each equip and maintain their own air forces. The effort which the U. S. Navy puts into tho air forces is groat, and from what we hear, the U. S. Navy says that she will complete her air forces attached to tho fleet aid fight decisive battles with control of the air. This preparation policy has changed with the years and has, of course, become larger scale. The latest scale of the plan is said to be to complete about 2200 naval planes with the object of replenishing the naval air forces, but fearing these 2200 could not bo finished by 1939, the terminal year of the Vinson Plan, it was first reduced to 1650, and later a plan was set up to build 1900 planes in five years. At present she has about 1500 planes and I think the 2200 planes of the first plan will also be completed by the time the Vinson Plan has boon completed. In addition to the above, the U. S. Army is showing an extraordinary zeal for tho air forces, which, it seems, intend to cooperate with the navy by participating not only in army operations but also in naval operations. TABLE III OUTLINE OF APPROPRIATION OF ESPI:.DIT!FJr,S A.D. 1 9 — ' 2 5 ' 2 6 ' 2 7 ' 2 8 «29 '30 ' 3 1 ' 3 2 T33 ' 3 4 ' 3 5 ' 3 6 Unit - million dollars A . o 2.7 i 2 . 7 4 . 7 5 . 4 5 . 2 1 1 . 1 1 2 . 2 1 2 . 5 2 3 , 5 1 6 . 8 3 8 . 1 Note: Out of 3-- million dollars, 15 million was devoted to Pearl Harbor in 1 0 3 6 . Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 10 7. Importance attached to the East by the British Navy-» The British Nzy. a little different from that of tho N. S. or Japan, | doosjnot customarily make public comprehensive building programs covering a certain number of years. As she adds or supplements necessary plans each i year to the original it is "difficult for us to see through to tho future, but . generally spcabin;,, around the time when the London Treaty was concluded, she was not activo in buildinr; ships. She was at that "time building only about three cruisers, nine destroyers and three submarines yearly. The past two or 'three years, however, it was suddenly increased and according to the government announcement of last spring, the construction of two capital ships will be started next year and one airplane carrier, five cruisers, over 12 destroyers, some submarines and several non-limitation ships arc to bo built. As for tho budget, only tho estimates for 1936 and 1937 are presented, and how many years are needed after that for tho fulfillment of the plan is not made known. At any rate, it can be clearly perceived that her ship- building in the last two or three years has become very active as compared with that of several -oars preceding. The increase of expenditures is shown in Table ЗУ. TABLE IV BUILDING EXPENDITURES OF TITS BRITISH NAVY Year 1 1 9 3 1 1 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 3 1 9 3 A j 1 9 3 5 1 9 3 6 1 9 3 7 In million pounds 1 I 6 . 2 | 6 . 0 I 7.7 i 9 . 7 1 1 . 5 1 1 . 9 1 6 . 2 To touch a little on Britain's intention in regard to hor war operations jn tho Oriental area, is, hor naval forces in the Orient and hor installa- tions at the important strategic points in the area, in recant jrears Britain seems to be laying special emphasis on naval strength in the Orient. After the Fusro-Japanese 'Jar, following the downfall of the Russian Navy, the revision ArigTn—Тяррпого Л llano с, tho rise of the Germrm Npvy In Europe and so on, Britain gradually rcduced hor naval forces in the Orient. A long time ago, she had a powerful пал-' in the Orient, but it was extremely reduced at one time, and needless to say, during the World War her naval power in the Orient was but a small one, for she relied for the most part on tho Japanese Navy. After the World War, however, sho gradually augmented the strength and in recent years in the Orient sho holds one airplane carrier, 7 cruisers (10,000 ton cruisers of the latest type) - sho only has 15 in all, but out ox hor total of 15 cruisers, 7 are allotted to the Orient - as wel? as 15 Class-B cruisers. Destroyers and submarines have boon attached to this nucleus, not including the gunboats for tho use on tho Yangtze. •.ip?.. г Тс. 9 Щ - А fags 11 TaZdtng all these into consideration, it is obvious that the strength is far more full and strong than in the past. And, moreover, the ships are new, and it seers that in many cases cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or whatever ships they may bo, when newly built, are first sent to the Orient, Besides the naval forces, she lays much stress on the solidification and strengthening of strategic points, making a chain from Gibraltar-Malta-Suez Canal in the West, and Adcn-Colombo-Singaporc-Kongkong and so on in the East, furnishing fuel oil tanks and other installations in the ports. jlmong these ports, the one on which the biggest importance is laid is Singapore. The plan was at the outset a considerably big one, but at the time "of the Labor Cabinet it seemed as though it was temporarily stormed, but late**, especially after the.outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the plan was resumed with some additions. It is said that Britain has been making strenuous efforts for its realization in recent years. I hear that the money already poured into Singapore is about Ы5,ООО,000, but she is still carrying out, stop by step, her plan and the construction of her installations; moreover, it is said the work is nearing completion, the drydock being already finished, and 1,000,000 ton fuel-supply facilities, repair shops, armouries, fort barracks, and so on, which have been planned hitherto, to be completed around the end of this year. And it is supposed that additions will bo made to the plan in the future. It is reported that despite the fact that Hongkong is situated within the defense restriction зоне, it is being considerably strengthened. C. British Air Force Rapidly Growing. The British air force grow rapidly during the Great War. At one time later, however, it showed signs of decline, compared with those of France, Italy, and others. But recently Britain has begun to put great efforts into the air force. According to the announcement made by the government at the end of last year, Britain aims to have a strength of 1750 planes, and actually her -'hole air force around the end of last year was reportedly about 1300 pianos already. We can see the. recent rapid increase in her budget by looking at her air force expenditures shown_in Tablo^I. Far Eastern Navy of Soviet Russia ,./ Besides the above, there are problems concerning the state of the navies of Franco, Italy, Germany and of Soviet Russia, with which we have an important relationship in the Far East. If I enter into those problems, my talk will become too detailed, and, considering the fact that if our navy manages to cope with the British and U. S, navies, those of the other Powers can bo taken care of, I should like to refrain from speaking on those navies today. Yet we cannot entirely ignore the fact that Soviet Russia has begun to increase her naval installations rapidly in recent years and, therefore, we have a great concern for the Russian Navy. Doc. Но. 903 -A Pago 12 At proscat, Russia has about 50 submarines in tho Orient. Russia apparently has about 120 submarines in all, of. which about 50 arc assigned to the Pet East. I'orr.over, sho has 6 destroyers, which are not rmrth mc,nt:'.c..r \ awd гот so-с .11. d high speed torpedo boat:;, which arc of a vt&y small ̂ p o o i several +.c is c:" tons, probably used as submarine chasers on some occasions and as torpedo boats on others. She has about 100 of theno high speed torpedo boa.ts in all at Vladivostok and there is no denying that these trill have a considerable power of restraint upon the Japanese navy in case RiT3"ia takes the defensive. Eowevor, the newer of a naw or the command of sea is not CCL-V' itu.t d by submarines or torpedo boats alone. It can't be maintained without a well balanced navy with big ships as its center. The torpedo boats and submarines may have value as defensive forces, but, as far as the command of tho sea in the OriGnt is concerned, those ships have, I believe, no chance of victory over tho Japanese navy. 10. Japanese Naval Armament Policy Taking into consideration tho aforesaid International situation and the actual statue of the navies of other Powers, what policy should our navy take for its armament? I trill speak a little on this matter. As J have stated above, Japan, for her part, has no intention whatever to incltc a shipbuilding competition even if a no-treaty org should set in;" she ?ims at possessing the minimr.; invincible force. At the recent naval reduction confercnce, Japan claincd tho maximum equal ratio, which other Powers opposed, saying that Japan does not hove the strength enough to possess ал equal ratio with Britain and tho U. S. and that each Power has its particular geographical condition. In other -ord.s, it has specific seaknaas in the so- called national defene-, but Japan has little доакаса» in this point, while Britain, and the U, G. have many . weaknesses. To have cqua.1 military force, ignoring such difference in we-hness, cannot be said to be non-threatening nor non-aggressive. It will only lead to inequality in the feeling of safety. For those reasons, the Powers opposed the Japanese claims, but wo of the navy firmly believe oven now that wo were not wrong in making such claims. 11. Invulnerablu Defense Lines in the Теstern Pacific, It is too officious to say that it would be a lurrury for Japan to have the degree of argents a- Britain ак1 the U. S. without having enough national „•power. The." ma" say so privately, but to discuss in such a way at an inter- national gathering is not permissablo. Furthermore, although wo cannot say that there is absolutely no weakness in our national defense, r^y-ness Thinly arises In case of ag vrcssion. In other words, we can say that .weakness will be consId:rably decreased if only we maintain the defvwive attitude, If each Power adnita the principle of safeguarding herself and of non-aggression, I believe that each Power can openly and squarely cla.im the right to possess an Doc, Mo, 903 Page 13 equal number of armaments wherever it ma** he, I believe it absurd for the first class Powers to say that SO or 70 per cent of their quote, will be enough for us because the*' will not attach us, not--ithstanding the fact that they aid we are on equal footing. It would be quite another matter if they forced it on us, but they mot coiv-ider the difference of Japan's national strength, her national situation and also of her international situation from the time of the former Washington and London Treaty Conferences and the time of the present naval reduction conference held from last year to this year. We we re not under any circumatance to be forced to accept their unreasonable demands, and if we ox a to adhere to our assertion of non-tnreat and non-aggression from the standpoint that the navy holds an important role, especially as the stabilising power of the Orient and as the power for assisting the carrying out of Japan's national policy, we cannot but claim that the right of armament of the Powers should be equal. Although Jâ rvi demanded eruality of military power at the Disarmament Conference, it decs not necessarily roan that Japan will immediately build up fa military •power' equal to those of Britain and the U. 3. as her future armament plan. Japan has no intention at all to invade otherj?.oun±2dts, Japan has no intention eg attJcliniv westcgh ccact of the N.' S. or с/ invading Singapore and £ _ : g; .!ng Jidda in the near .-'.tvtuvo, It -ufficos that Japan complete her rational e'efense. Concrctei" Japan will be satisfied, to have an actual fighting peer that is invulnerable in the Test Pacific as compared w5.th that of an-' naval Poorer. > To have equal fighting po *or does not necessarily wean to have ships of the same type, of the same tonnage and in the золе numbers. If a country makes aggressive operations it will, of course, be at a disadvantage. Whereas, if ... Japan strategically- firhts и. defepp^y? she will be able to паке full use oT' ftsr "ffS^^apMcai advantage, and if Japan will fight with her particular geographical conditions, with particular installations added thereto, and the strategy of "a.raiting the enemy's fatigus after coming a long distance," she will bo able to preserve the security or national defense even without a naval, strength (morns concrete $ava! strength) equal to that of the opposing country. 12. New Armament Program of the Japanese ilavy. Such being the case, the nocossary nilitary power for national defense has been unofficially decided in our naval armament plan for the future after the various relations have been considered and in accordance with tho new situa- tion, I have no liberty to refer to it here, but the program, is aimed at replenishing tho naval forces by the new replenishing scheme based on the above unofficial decision. The amount of forces which will form, the basis of our naval armament as shown in the budget for the newt fiscal yoar is not necessarily to realise immediately the -..hole of the strength estimated to be necessary for national defense itself. Doc. No. 903 Since tho outbreak of the Tanchurian Incident, Japan hac been quite busy externally. She !ias to complete national defense on one hand, and on the other hand to provide security for the people. All these together with other natters in various fields require enormous national expense. The Array especial- ly re'u.ir a a pro- ~ replenishment of armaments. On the other hand., as the revenue of the treasury will not allow unlimited expenditures, the minimum tolerable amount has been appropriated a.s naval expenditures for the budget of the next fiscal "ear. Consequently because of financial reason?:, matters of considerable importance, not only from the strength necessary for the national defense power as a standard, but also in the light of this immediate urgent necessity cannot be realized promptly, would have to bo put off to some future fiscal years. I feci that wo can but wait for some measures to be taken in the future to tide us over these difficulties in accordance with the national finance or tho international situation, etc. Next cones tho question of -hat degree of equipment should be made according to the new armament plan. I regret to say, we cannot give you the concrete figures today, as we must consider the new London Treaty concluded between Britain, tho N. 3, and Prance, the special armament reduction agreement concluded at the Anglo-Russian Meeting, as well as the An^o-Gprman naval agreement which Goraanr concluded with Britain last rear, all ox wS'icb wx.il naturally have relation to the new armament reduction of this year, I believe. In addition to the above, Britain is making vigorous efforts to induce all Ba.7 :"ic border states to cone under her control and is trying to restrict their naval armament. Therefore, in the near future the new armament reduction treaty concluded this year will have the effect of restricting the European countries ar.d the N. S. at least. 13. Significance of Agreement on Notification of Shipbuilding. In short, the now London armament reduction treaty concluded this year conelets oi twe parts, i.e., substantial reduction and notification of ship- building. Speaking in detail, although there may be some difference in substantial reduction as compared with the former Washington and London Treaties, we will not bo greatly mistaken if we nay it has been concluded for the most part after the spirit of these treaties. But tho shipbuilding notification is considerably different in method from that stipulated in the former treaties, that is, the main part consists in mutual secret notification of shipbuilding among the nations concerned. Consequently, it is so constituted that non-treaty Powers cannot !cnow tho shipbuilding policies or programs of the treaty Powers. As for the method •f notification, tho Powers arc to notify secretly tho countries concerned bet-con January end April of the shipbuilding program planned to bo put into Doc. Но. 903 "A Page 15 practice during the current calendar year, the items of notification to include the types, number, and the -aximum calibre of cannon to be installed on the ship. Just before construction work is begun further details are to be made 'mown, these items being the type, important measurements, horse power, and speed of the ship and the armaments to be installed on the ship. The most precise notification is required in regard to the last item, i.e., the number of cannon, torpedoes, machine guns, planes, catapults, and search lights. And the building work cannot be begun until four months after the notification to the countries concerned. If any changes should be made in the principal items during the construction, the work on the changes cannot be begun until four months after the arrival of notifications thereof to the countries concerned as in the above. The provisions are strict to this extent.- 1Л. Reasons why it camot be made Public. This is, in short, the device of Britain and the U. S. to check the weak naval Powers, and by means of this device the two countries intend to watch an opponent country so that it will not get ahead of them. The provisions have been made as а кеапз for the strong naval Powers to suppress the weaker naval Powers. At any rate, as Japan has not participated in the Treaty, she has no idea of what shipbuilding plans the U.S. and Britain have, nor of course the contents thereof. Under such circumstances if Japan follows her customary way of making public too early what types of ships will be constructed and in what numbers, the total number, the total tonnage and total expenditures, and so on, according to the new replenishment plan, it paid be nothing but showing our hand to others without seeing the other's hand. Such foolishness can absolutely not bo tolerated. In demanding a considerably larger amount of expenditure of the Diet and its approval thereof, the Imperial Navy almost gobbles up the budget with- out making any full explanation, end without acquiring the understanding of either the Diet or the people at. large. This is indeed regrettable and, of course, against our principles, but, the situation of the Powers being such at present, please understand that we unfortunately c a n n o t make public the con- tents of our plan at this time. However, once a ship is completed, one can know the approximate size of the ship, or of the cannon on the ship, though the details may not be known. The main reason for not making them public is that it is unprofitable for us to let the other Powers know too early the future shipbuilding policy of our navy, whose armaments and materials are malcing rapid progress from day to day. 15. Analysis of Naval Budget for 1937. The total amount appropriated for the next fiscal year in the naval budget is a little over ¥631,000,000, a total increase of about ¥120,000,000 compared with that of the working budget of last year, which was ¥551,000,000. To select the important items from among the increased expenditures, among the ordinary expenditures there is a maintenance expense for new ships totalling Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 16 ¥9,/Д),000. Tliis is a customary one and covers the expense of maintaining the ships to be completed during the fiscal year of 1936, i.e., till the end of March, 1937, and all these ships are included in the secondary replenishment program. Then comes the air force units maintenance expense totalling ¥9,630,000, which is for the increase of air units in accordance with the secondary supplement program and will he completed in the next fiscal year. With these, the secondary supplement program will be completed for the most part, and a small part will be left over for the following fiscal year, which will appear in the 193S budget as a normal increase. Next cone the expenditures to maintain aircraft weapons, a little more than ¥2,270,000. In the navy the so-called air units are those on the land, and the maintenance expenses for aircraft carried on board aircraft carriers and other ships are appropriated separately. Last comes the expenditure for the testing of shipbuilding and armaments, which amount to ¥7., 500,000. It is the ease, I believe, with not only the navy but in all fields throughout Japan that techniques arc always following and running after those of other Powers and it is to be regretted that there has been much imitation and that fundamental re- search has been lacking. As fundamental experiment and research has been lacking hitherto in the Navy also, the various methods tried usually ended in failure or did not ret good results. Therefore, a considerable amount of expenditures has been demanded in the budget for the next fiscal year for experiment and research on all kinds of facilities. In the extraordinary ex- penditures there is shipbuilding errpenditure totalling ¥60,000,000, in which is included the first year allotment of the new supplementary program amounting to about ¥4o,000,006, the balance of ¥12,000,000" being the additional expenses arising from the change in the first and second supplement programs. In addition to this, the allotment for the last year of the supplement program is a little over ¥150,000,000 in the 1937 budget. Together with the newly requested ¥50,000,000, it totals ¥210,000,000 which constitutes the ship- building expenses for 1937. Next comes the expenditure needed for the installations of the Mcchanical Enginoering Board. As the docks and the various arsenals are of the old type and are inefficient, ¥33,950,000 has been appropriated as miscellaneous improve- ment expenditures, while ¥9,000,000 has been set aside as necessar" for the equipment of Munitions Department, the biggest expense of which is for the additional building of heavy oil storages. The navy has up to now stored liquid fuel as an emergency measure, and has a considerable amount stored today, but it is in no way sufficient to meet the demand of war operations. From the beginning of this year the fuel question has become very grave. Officials and citizens of all fields connected with this problem are deliberating the question and will work according to the national fuel policy. Therefore a considerable amount has been appropriated in the budget of the Commerce and Industry Ministry for the coming year as e:;penditure for the national fuel policy, but the sub- stitute fuel industry cannot realize in two or three years even the annual No. 903 'A Page 17 production of only 2,000,000 tons, and I think that vigorous efforts rail he needed to increase production to 2,000,000 tons in six years as planned. And even if two mill.ion tons are produced according to plans, when viewed from the demand aid supply of the past years, that amount only corresponds to the normal amoimt of increases in that number of years, and therefore tho amount to be imported from abroad will not show any remarkable decrease as compared with the present, it is ospoctod. Consequently, tho navy cannot stop immediately storing oil even if the national liquid fuel policy is set up, and will have to continue its policy of storage for the time being. Next, the expenditures for the air units' equipment, ¥26,670,000, is for the equipment of 5 air units to be started in the next fiscal year in connection with tho supplementary program for tho next fiscal year. The ex- penditures for the overhauling of ships are ¥36,070,000. Though the over- hauling o£ the capital -hips has boon for the most part completed by 1936, that of aircraft carriers and other auxiliary ships still remains to be done, and the above expenditure is for these. Lastly, the expenditure of ¥1';,950,000 is for the completion of munitions, including ams, ammunitions, fuels,and so on, but the majority of it is for tho purchase and storage of liquid fuel. Besides the above, ex- penditures for tho Kanchurian Incident and for the grand maneuver and others are to bo found in the budget, but I shr.ll omit them for they arc not worth explaining. 16. Equilibrium in the Drafting of tho Naval Armament Program. In connection with tho supplement program, I have a while ago stated a general idea that Japan has no intention of inciting shipbuilding competition and now I should like to speak on it in figures. In the new armament program we have at present already rid ourselves of the notion of ratio on which many discussions were hold in connection with tho Washington and London Treaties. Although there is no other way of comparing a completed strength than by percentage, such as the percentage of a certain type of ship out of tho total tonnage of ships, we do not fix a percentage first and then fill up the content thereof in order to decide on our own military power. It is, of course, necessary to take into consideration the appro:m.mate strength of tve Powerз in question, since the problem is relative. Now, considering the relations with the U. S., with our eyes fixed on 19AO, the year in which the Vinson Plan and other supplementary plans relating thereto will be completed, we find that the navy of the U. S. is a so-called treaty navy, and will possess tho strength stipulated in the Washington and the London Treaties. If Japan had retained the treaty, she would have only built ships to replace her former ones, and the strength would have naturally been fixed. But now, as Japan is not restricted by the treaty, she can decide Doc. No. 903 -V? Pago 33 on. the strength needed, which can be decided naturally by comparing the «-•.илоте str- gtL of America end Japan, and consider the organization and the unit of all of"the forces from a strategic point of view, instead of thinking that our main s^ins -.j.̂-Ь be 70 per cent of America's, that we must have such and such a peroov.tago cf cruisers, etc. In our new armament plan we neither soy nor think today that wo must have such and such percentage of the armament of the United States. The navy aims at successively adding such units as would build up а палу corresponding to our national strength, from the standpoint of actual war operations. There should be some difference in the results between building up a treaty navy and execution of the new armament policy, which I have just stated. As a matter of fact, they happen to coincide with each other, without the amounts having been equalized intentionally. 17. Investigation of the tonnage of Japanese, British and U. S. Shipbuilding. Table V does not include the new program, and it is divided in three groups: Japanese, British and U. S. The lino рп-j on tho left shows the average annual tonnage cf ships for tho next ton years that would have to bo replaced by each Power in the following year in order to maintain the military power, assuming that the past Washington and London Treaties were in existence. According to this table, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons yearly, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 70,000. The line to the right of the above shows the tonnage of ships to be built in the course of 1936i Japan, about 30,000 tens, Britain, about Д0,000, and the U. S., about 36,000. Furthermore, the black line Щ to tho extreme right shows the average annual tonnage in the five year period of 1931-193"; Japan, about 22,000, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 43,000. The latter two lines are added only for reference, and as the lines on the left show, even if the past two treaties had continued to exist, Japan "'ould have to build about 53,000 tons, Britain, about 33,000, and tho U. S. about 70,000. Keeping in mind the amount of 53,000 tons as shorn in this graph, let us see the average annual tonnage in tho programs of five consecutive years as given in Japan's new supplementary program and we will find that it comes far below 53,000 tons. This, i am suro, is statistical proof that Japan has no intention of encouraging a shipbuilding competition even in a naval non-treaty era. Thus, it is clear that the tonnage of ships to be built according to the new program is actually not more than that it would be if the two treaties were still in effect. Then there probably will arise the question of why the total sum of expenditures in the budget has been increased. This will explain itself if the middle and left lines are compared, that is, the building of capital ships has become a very heavy burden. It is true that the former Washington and London Treaties restricted the whole scale of the navy and, for instance, the building of replacements for capital ships was postponed by prolonging the lives of the ships, and that they would have been effective in temporarily checking the increase of national expenditures at that time. But it is not an 1 Doc. Но, 903 Pago 19 absolute problem; so, owing to the suspension of building capital ships, the naval building expenditures would have to be increased the following year. This increase is not in the least the result of withdrawal from the naval reduction treaty nor of having entered into a non-treaty era. TABLE V C0I2PARI3CN OF ТЕЗ TONNAGES TO BE BUILT BY JAPAN, BRITAIN, AND THE U. S. in thousands _ ol_ tons , 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Japan Ш 53.366 v> 'i! H Щ V about 22 Щ SKI ^ M Shi. fcif I ;5M Britain 83,550 kS К; • i у about 40 4N, „К about United States about 86 "T about 69,604 3 Щ « Чч. № % Si $ ч ' si !> i Shows the replacement tonnage to be built after 1937 if Washington and London Treaties were valid (average annual tonrage for next ten year period) Tonnage built in 1935 Average annual tonnage built from 1931 to 1935 i about 48 1 Iftfj f+i чП P i l l Г ос, Но. 903 - А Page 20 18, Spiritual gains obtained by withdrawal from Armament Reduction. With reference to the armament treaty, although we are about to enter into a non-treaty era beginning next year-, we have no intention whatever to applaud it merely as a matter of sentiment, I believe that armament reduction is surely effective if it is really done impartially with mutual understanding. But, sad to say, the two treaties of the past were not in the least impartial; they were extremely unfavorable, especially to Japan. Among such unfavorable points, there were, of course, material disadvantages, but there were also extreme spiritual disadvantages. This is not a question of national dignity, but is a question pertaining to the navy itself; it is my personal opinion that undesirable ideas have been implanted in the naval officers for more than ten years, that is, whenever the Disarmament Conference was broadcast, or dis- cussed in magazines and newspapers. We have been told for more than ten years that in order to attack many with little, Japan which has been allowed only a low ratio, should do this, etc. When the senior officers taught the juniors they always encouraged the latter to do their utmost because Japan had limited strength. This has, I fear, unconsciously planted in the heads of officers, especially of the younger ones, the idea that fighting is impossible with an inferior ratio. Besides, various demands are made by the young men of the fleet with reason that the strength is inferior. This produces a very undesirable effect on the psychology of war. I am of the belief that, to foster a soldier's spiri it is absolutely necessary to give them discipline so as to have an idea of in- fallible victory even with an inferior strength and to go ahead with a firm determination in that direction. But as we hear always about the reports, dis- cussions of the Disarmament Conference, etc., we compare the strength of both sides and are apt to think that we have no chance of winning because our streng- is inferior. I fear this is the most undesirable idea implanted in us soldiers by the Disarmament Conference. From now on, after our withdrawal from the reduction treaty, we shall not speak of our strength as being only 60 or 70 per cent of that of the U, S., and so on. Of course, if we make comparison, we may say that she has the advan' age and that we arc inferior, but there is no need to say such a thing now, and the sourco of discussions comparing each other's strength lias for the most part disappeared. Is this not a valuable spiritual gain obtained 1vj our withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, which in turn has released us from the fetters of the reduction treaty? I also feci that we will have to guide properly the young officers, after taking the above fact into consideration. 19. Lack of Encouragement for Shipbuilding Competition. Next, I shall speak on the problem of shipbuilding competition. It is difficult to foretell the future on this natter, but in the Pacific the U. S, asserts that she will limit herself -'GO tho tonnage stipulated, in the two treat! Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 21 of tho past and will also stick to tho spirit of the treaties. Therefore, we may Ъо justified to think that the U. S, rill not begin ship-building competition unices she is stimulated by others. Japan, as the rival of the U. S., has no intention whatever of making armament plans which might threaten the U. S. and incite a shipbuilding competition. As we are of the idea that we will be satisfied with the minimum, with that minimum necessary for the security of Japan*s national defense on the sea in the West Pacific, we may be able to say there will be no chance for the rise of a shipbuilding compe- tition between the two states; but, putting aside Japan's idea, how will the IT. S. public regard Japan's new an lament program? If they conclude from the new program that Japan has begun shipbuilding competition against the spirit of the Disarmament Treaty, and begin the same under the above pretext that is another matter. If their real purport is the preparation of a treaty navy, they may not enter into a competition. But, as I first said, if the fundamental idea of the U. S. is that she does not like Japan's development in the Orient and wants to nip her in the bud as soon as possible, the loss said, the better. 20. Probable Start of Competition in Europe. I cannot make a definite conclusion, lout I think, if аду shipbuilding competition should arise, that it might bo in Europe instead of in the Orient. In Europe a conference was succosggrllr.ho^d,^j}wg.,^Britain and Germany last year. This conference was motivated by the fact that Germany, after declaring Л1 P'earmament policy, began to proceed steadily in that direction, and Britain, foreseeing the:двюЬямаваа«д£ the situation :],р. efl я n Омттапду яЬш?"М be left to" Igice nor о" •' shyi, %r> пр-пгояя famw. On the nth or hand, .as... Germany wou'.a not be able to tropes о Brit.-,in p-jrn,ly fpr the next ten pear г., or at least :оог some time, she wanted f though r r l n r t r r r h l v^ -t-^ m hnnd j r ; r r i t h .RHt.ti-TTij and thus oh 07 came го nold tho confer once. I believe. Taking advantage of this iiOik'ur. I.UU, ЛЪТЯШ! ®teH"To~hoid the Disarmament Conference of last year, and also direct the reduction treaty of this year in the lino of the Anglo- Gorman conference, but she was balked in her designs. Since the Disarmament Conference, Britain has negotiated with Soviot Russia, Poland, Sweden, and other countries. Now Soviet Russia has stood up again. However, Germany, above all, was so exhausted during the Groat War end immediately after tho war also, that she could not spend money for navy equipment. In recent years, together with France and Italy she has come to make efforts to replenish her navy, thereby driving Britain into a very tough situation. Such being the care, Britain is striving hard to preserve the stand on which she can always remain invincible against any combination of at least two navies, by controlling tho various naval countries in Europe. You are well aware of the recent situation in Europe. I fear it would become serious should complications arise, brought forth by the Spanish problem. Then any country like Soviet Russia or Germany or Franco may go into a ship- building competition, and a stone thrown by one country will dircctly or In- directly stir tho other Powers. Then Britain will not be able to remain a Doc. Но. 903 - A Page 22 spectator in the impending emergency, especially as Britain has received no restriction of amount whatever hy the new reduction treaty, she can build ships whenever she wants to. Britain and the IT. S. arc tacitly carrying out things in a sort of parity between themselves, and so if Britain increases her strength it is only natural that the J, S. will do so also, I may bo a little mistaken, but I am of the opinion that if shipbuilding competition should arise in the future, tho origin wi l l be in Europe instead of in the Orient. And I also feel that it will be caused by none other than the inter- national situation in Europe, 21. Standard for Naval Budget in the Future, As for cur naval budget for the future, if all the Powers enter into shipbuilding competition from the outbreak of some abnormal situation, I can say nothing for certain now; but, otherwise, the navy, though she is not fully satisfied with the strength estimated and required in the new supplement program, will not need an enormous increase in the future budget, which, if we set up a plan by looking into the near future, will be based on the standard of 1937 budget. We also hope to follow it as much as possible. This is con- fidential between ourselves. The budget which the navy has demanded of the Finance Ministry is not the same as that which has been recognised, and much has been deleted. As some items of considerable importance were eliminated or postponed for future years, it cannot be said that the budget for future years will be the same as that of 1937. It is a matter of course that items of importance will have to be accomplished early, and consequently tho budget of later years will have to be somewhat increased, but, generally speaking, I think that you may understand that the estimated expenditures for the navy for the noxt few years will be based on the standard of tho budget for 1937 with some inevitable addition, and this will suffice us for the next several years. Wo, on our part, also wish to sake it suffice as far as circumstances permit. I shall end my speech hero and shall answer your questions if you have any. I thank you very much for your courteous attention. * % C E R T I F I C A T E I.P.S. No. 903 - A Sf-;:.tcv=ont_of Source адcl /urthentlcity I, ODO, NaaaJ-iaru hereby cert if:,- that I am officially con- nected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: . Aseistqut Chief. Archives Section, — - Foreign. Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 57 pages, dated Jan. , 193.7, and described as follows: "Outline of Naval Budget for Fiscal Year 1937 and the... General Aspect of National Defense Related to the Navy", a lecture bw Adn. So emu TOYPDA, Chic.:', '.'Tr.val Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry. I further certify that the.attached record and document is en official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if anv, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or .files): Archives Section t Foreign Office --- , Signed at To'r.'o on this 1st, day of Oct,> , 1946. bTAGAIIÂ U 0D0 Signature of Official SEAL Witness: T. SATO Ass't. Chief. Archives Section. Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, 2d Lt. EP.IC I'LhlSHSR. 0-935000 hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for tho Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by mo from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Sijnod at TQV.-Q on this 1 day of Oct. . 1946 EfIC - n~'TSb!S3. 2d Lt. NAME Witness: Н Г П о Н Ш С Л А Investigator. I.P.S. Official Capacity IPS Document No. 62 b/ List of the totU increase in Imperial JzpfneTZ ( ^ A / е t б о rrn ti) both endstcJ 3.77J comwisstioyed from 31 December ПЗЧ- until /5 August /14-5. {/93^ -/2-3/ £<) /9VS-8-/5 2 rntbtri / ' or. 31 Pecember) Щ- 'А 112-31 Officers Evii st e J men [ 014. t 1 ncreq-sc T ) ( T ± f -A ) ( it) ( tf *>) / 939 6. 9 // 8 3.0? 8 9 5009 — ~ / 13 5 " 9 0. S35' 9 9. 923 2. 7 / ^ / 936 1.0 39 9 9ЛП /0 LI3 9 г 2/¥ 7 737 1. 9 У 2 / 2.5.3 0 5 1 /33. m 2 U / 0 7 T5J 5/14 ) 95 521 / s 9-. if 5 2 0 9 ¥f / 939 / 0.6 5? / b 3.01-1 /7 S.J 05 2^0/0 / /гли 2 ! 5.205 227. Ub a J? 9 / 7 1 « / /99/ "1 / S O69 2.9 6. 2?0 311 359 9 3 7 tf ] 1/ —X I ' / 9 72. 2 3. (>ЗУ 4 0 5: 7 ЗУ У 2 9.3 U //Яо 09 j 7 9 УЗ ^ ¥/• 0 55 (,•6 7./ 0 4 q oi 15е/ 17 8.71/ I / 9 77 Ь¥.720 /23 0. tj. OS /295125 586 166 / 9755 5- /с, I. 024 .. / Ы7. /99 4 6 93.223 3 9S.09S Го1.*{ Increo.se ( t f t/o ft) Г9 1 П 1531Ю/ ,— 0 -> iii 9 5 Jb.t-it /59S.2./9- V Г> C W f А / / О / / i. ; J^uocu went tvo. fa ц? / CERT IF ICATE I hereby ortifjthitl я.тп officilCCy connected With "the Japanese Lrover'n тпе-nt ~<zS ffember of Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, 2nd ihzt in such official capacity Ih zve prepared the, foregoing tubte from official records of the. Tzpznese Grove rrnnent. I further certify thzt the tzb£e is true and Zccurzte , Me-mb er of Research Dj vision -2nd Demobitiz^,tion Bureau. Signed loKjo, Tzpzn, On this / Лгу of OcXcrUl J / 7 Ц- to . .d&nvibce, -2net ТЗшЫяМ. /fc. m - щ " T fa 1t ft t it •л p e f xXi r- jfi >,i. v i * far- £kx a Ж ' А К iLfiiO.') t -ft 3 L I & 2 . l i t P it it-fc.rg. fjL-7i.jfe.fb3 i LI Ш г Щ ? 3. % Mr _ В -ъ W ^ % < ^ 1k- О 'Docо Nc„ 2528 Page 1 " Excerpts from Article Appearing in Dec» 12, 1944 Issue of the Nippon Tines о • UNITY .TILL ilFIN VICTORY8 AVEBS FOREIGN MINISTER High Tribute Paid Axis Efforts By Shigemitsu in Exchange Broadcast •There cannot be the slightest doubt about final Axis victory so long as Ja- pan, Germany, Italy and their Allies remain firmly united together," declared For- eign Minister Maiaoru Shigemitsu» in his exchange broadcast with German Foreign Mi- nister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Italian Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister Benito Mussolini delivered Monday evening in commemoration of the third anniversary of the Axis Military Pact, Paying high tribute to the Geiman people8s heroic struggle under the leader- ship of their Fuhrer, Mr, Shigemitsu said, "we are firmly convinced that Europe will, after all, be saved by Hitler and Mussoliniо" Mr. Shigemitsu® s radio message follows.0 •Today, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Geimany and Italy0 it is a great pleasure for me to be able to exchange greetings over the radio with His Excellencies the Foreign Ministers of Geimany and Italy0 •I recall that in 1939 when the war broke out with Britain's declaration of war on Geimany, J apan, in accordance Tyith her traditional policy, exerted every possible effort in order to check the expansion of the war disaster. In her sincere desire to maintain peace in East Asia, Japan exerted her best possible efforts in her negotiations with the United States until the last minute, but as it increasing- ly transpired that the United States was attempting to deny the existence of the Japanese Empire as a great JPower in order to attain her sinister designs of domina- ting the world, Japan was forced to rise resolutely in arms for her self-existence and selfprotection. That Germany and Italy, abiding faithfu. ly by the Tripartite Alliance, immediately declared war on the United States, following in the footsteps Japan0 was greatly appreciated by Japan. I also recall that on December 11, 1941» the three nations, concluding a new treaty* firmly pledged themselves to fight out the common war until final victory and simultaneously clarified again to the world their camion ideal of establishing a new world order and also realizing true inter- national justice. "For three years since then, the A^med Forces of the three nations have achi- eved numerous brilliant war results in the various battlefields of the east and west. On the other hand, we the Japanese people have made steady efforts and are for> ging ahead toward the realization of our war objective-—international justice—-by overcoming all sorts of difficulties,. Brilliant Results Achieved Doc о Noe Page 2 Despite the fact that two or three minor nations in Europe have recently, becoming unable.ito bear the heavy pressure of the war, fallen out of the Axis camp, Geimany, together with Italy, is still carrying on her gallant fight in order to defend the fatherland» In fact, the German National Army, for the self-protection of the Ger- man race, is showing a strong determination of not letting the enemy stain even an inch of her soil by repeating its death-defying struggle. The figures of the German people under the leadership of their Fuehrer are undoubtedly the figures of heroes. We firmly believe that after all Europe will be save by Hitler and Mussolini. •The war situation in Greater East Asia as everyone knows, has today entered the decisive stage. Confident of final victory both on the first line and on the home front, we are fighting this decisive war to a finish. The fighting on Leyte has become»truly violent. America, depending on material superiority, has mobilized her material strength and brought this to bear in her Leyte operations. However, it is my belief that our Special Attack Units and the Kamikaze Corps will unfail- ingly shatter the American forces» Furthermore, the attacking spirit of the Kami- kaze Corps also the spirit of the entire nationals of Japan, both at the front, and at home, and is the propelling force that will lead to the attainment of the ultima t< victory. "The attainment of our aim of international justice must be realized no matter what difficulties confront us or how great the Sacrifices. Nay, our lofty ideas of the liberation of Asia and the resurrection of East Asia are today rapidly seeing realization. It is indeed with great joy and pride that hand in hand with the nations and peoples already liberated in East Asia we throw our full strength in this war of righteousness. "As the war bedome a prolonged one the enemy has come to disclose in inc- reasingly stark nakedness his inordinate ambitions of world domination. Spurred on by blind hatred against Japan, Germany and Italy, the enemy leaders seek to efface the three nations of Japan, Germany and Italy from the face of the earth and to rule and police the world by themselves, depriving the various peoples of their right of free development. It is clear to all that such is an inhuman policy that attempts to reverse the flow of history. Their policy is a freak phenomena which in the present time prepa,res for the next war. With the war sacrif- ies mounting increasingly it is but natural that the grave question of why the war is being waged should arise in the minds of the nationals of the enemy countries. Enemy Seen Frantic "Thus, the enemy who has fatal weakness within his country, in spite of material superiority, is eager to end the war as soon as possible by means of des- perately moving into the offensive. In order to terminate the war at the earliest possible date, the enemy has been mustering all available military forces and resor- ting to underhand maneuvers when closing in on the Japanese, German and Italian positions. Thanks to the united efforts of Japan, Geiman0 Italy and other Axis na- tions, the enemy has not achieved any of his strategic Schemes in spite of his enor- mous attrition and sacrifices and his irritation over the progress of the war has become greatly aggravated. Undoubtedly the decisive war is progressing in our favor. Doc. N 0 0 2528 Page 3 "We harbor unwavering faith in the fact that the struggle for justice will emeige victorious in the end» As long as, Japan, Germany, Italy and other Axis nations are solidly united, we need entertain no doubt as to the successful outcome of the ware It~Ts of deep significance that we pledge afresh to further tighten our cooperation and forge ahead for final victory ever faithful to our ideal, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Three Power Military Allien* ce between Japan, Germany and Italy® "In closing I should like to pay highest tribute to the struggle now being wa- fed by Germany and Italy and at the same time, pray for the best of health of the eaders and Foreign Ministers of those countries." Doc о No о 2528 Page C E R T I F I C A T E I о Et„ Colonel Taranenkoo „ a member of the military forces of the UoSoS.R», do hereby certify that This photostat is a true eoov of the article appearing in Peg» 12ч 19kk issue of the Nippon Time?, was delivered to me bv Library of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, ?ar East on or about July 26 19^ 6„ and that the original of the said document may be found in Document Division of International Pro- secution Sec-Maa* I do further certify ; /s/ Lto Colo Taranenko (Signature and ranko) Tokyo„ Japan, Ъос. Ко. 2528 О S ii i l l i c A T Б I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.* The book, Title» "Nippon Times" of Nov. and Dec. 1944 Year of Publication» 1944 No. of Volumes» Оде owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on May 24, 1946. Dated the 28th day of September, 1946. -Рос. No. 590 Page 1 Official Gazette (extra) Proceedings in the 86th Irmerial Diet ' Published Jan. 22, 1945. Speech by Prine Minister XOISO Kuniaki (Addressed on Jan. 21, 194-5) P. 12 The present situation of the war is far frorj reassuring but I firmly believe that now it is the best opportunity for us to gam a"1 vie Lory, ior the enemy's long way of"supply is exposed as our attacking target. P. 14- The enemies are discussing at random about the post-war international structure, calling for our non- conditional surrender and thus planning to strike out Japan. Of course^ it is a mere drear, of fools. Their Anglo-American's greedy ambition to control the world has been disclosed to the sun. In the district of their occupation they already are quarreling on the share., of~4̂ ie3xJtii£__sane_. On the contrary the countries in the East Asia are, under the joint ideal of reconstructing East Asia, exerting their utmost to protect it and to fight it out with their total powers. The ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity in the joint declaration of the Greater Ei.st Asia could not be compared with their cunning object of the aggressive war. I believe that only the country which would endure any hardship to come, would stand in the way of critical situation and would fight it out with firm resolution of victory, should win in the end. Speech by Foreign Minister SKIGEMTSU Mamoru ("Addressed on Jan. 21, lV-^) P. 14 The world war has reached a white-heat point. And the enemy which has weak points i1. its country is making a headlong rush being impatient to finish the war in a hurry. P. 15 They call themselves as peace loving countries but their war aim lies not in the protection and respect of"freedom of the lesser powers but lies in^reconstruction of the world_ system under the dictatorship of "Hie big powers with U.S.A. md Britain as leaders. The truthjLs that the Greater East Asia _War_ was broken out because U.S.A. and Britain tried to remove" the Japanese power which will be an obstacle to such enterprises. Doc. No. 590 Page 2 Depriving E:.st Asians of their countries they want to make them thair eternal colonies and паке use of ,£hera as a base to control" the worTcn If we lose the uar once, all the nations in the Erst Asia wiXT"be exploited_and^j3pprAsge>ri fnrgypr. Britain's policy oi" fishing In troubled waters, urging the internal strife among Asians, was succeeded by U._S_.A. as it is. And it is clearly seen in'Chins^ She has driven China into anti- Japanese front with honeyed words and threat. Our army's aim in the South China is at U. S. Army and its base in order to drive out the U. S.'s disturbing forces in China, to return China to Chinese and to make them contribute to reconstruction of the East Asia in cooperation with Japan. ?•-. 16 In brief, Japan's intention lies in constructing the world of non-threat and non-aggression. Doc. No. 590 Page 3 The Official Gazette. The extra number on the 22nd of January, in the 20th year of Showa. Q.945) ' The third number of the shorthand records of the proceedings in the House of Peers. (The 86th session of the Imperial Diet.) (Mamoru SHIGEMITSU, the Minister of States, goes up on the platform.) The Minister of State (Mamoru SHIGEMITSU) The combination between our empire and the other allied countries is becoming firmer and firmer, and we are convinced of carrying out the current war successfully to the last together with our allied countries at any cos£~̂ I am convinced that it is our most sacred mission to exert ourselves to carry out, together with our allied countries both in the E.-st and West, the severe battles destined to exploit the future of mankind in order to accomplish the common war aim of making clear international justice in the war of self-existence and self-defence. / г 1 Doc. Ко. 590 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. So. I.P.S. So. 590 Statement of Source and Authenticity. I, lAiCAiLiSil _K_ich.it о ah i hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following1 capacity: Secretary. of_Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated 28 Jan. . 1Э 45. and described, aa follows: OffIс 1 al_Ge_3 e tt e I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of tiie Japanese Government, and 'chat it is part of the official a).chives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also 'che file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); _Cabinet3cr e t_ar iat Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September. 1S4S. /а/ H. Takashi Signature of Official SEAL witness: E. Euriyama, /s/ Secretary of Cabinet Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, ..Richard H-_Iiar r;h , hereby certify that I am associated vi*h the Сеаеднл. Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powerc, глй tiir.t the above described document was obtained by mo from 1Ы above signed official of the Japanese Government in tho conduct of хзу official business. Signed at Tokyo on this ,..17th. day of Sept , ±945 /в/ Richard. E Larsh •&ДМВ ..itness: wn С. ?rout Investigator, IPS Official Capacity /I nt Ыс Ь M A T O R С О М б Л Т А / м г V E S S E L S O F T A P / A N I S 3 I — 1 9 4 - 5 O N H A N D А N Р U N D E R СО N S T R ( J С Т I О N / i з, ф 75 Ж /чЧ- S ЗЁ ̂ 3 в ^ Щ Ш * j f r О fclA N - P f/o. / / J С 5 / Ос< )! Bu-tГ/е Ships i A,rcratL £<>•>•/€>'s Нем Ж J у Cro'SepS & Ё И . LiQht C>v>ters D c u W / e M Sub^a. >/AA f J С !2$ 31*У\ А/ о ff ^ TO ns NO [.ЛЖ Tons . 4Й1 %% Tons tk Ш. N О itM. Тс n.S L /С/U v c? t.a Ttns „̂ ..gfct.. £ 4 * i) c / 1 3 / | / 0 3 г {,8.440 17 -/A i55 /2-з.т 6'7 7/ /7̂ ! 2/7 7/2537 —f /0 ЗОШО ь/,2Щ /2 /07,Zoo / 7 /0/ - r . .. 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No. 4052-$) Page 1 TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process) Tokyo, 25 July 1941 6.20 Arrived, 25 July 1941 21.30 hours No. 1355 of 25 July Host Urgent Simultaneously for the Supreme Headouarters of the rfehrmacht and Supreme Army Headouarters. 1) The draft of reserves slowly beginning in Japan and Manchukuo ^ 1 ̂ July. and the following days, suddenly reached a large and no longer concealable extent, es- pecially in the 1st, 4tb,_JZthj_ 12th and^Tgtli dTvision? and continued until today in decreased strength. Until the middle of August supposedly about 900,000 (nine hundred thou я and) reservist s " a^jtojbc draTted, that is the 24__to 45 year jjlcls; among the eldest", however, only specTalists like drivers, technicians, people able to speak Russian, etc. ""After that, "another 500,000 (five hundred thousand) reservists, are supposedly available. 2) Together with the drafting of the reservists on.10 July^ /orders cane for/ a draft of horses, motor vehicles, etc., and a little later, Instructions to firms to pro- vide military goods of consumption, like food staffs, candles, and others till the end of September at the latest. 3) On 11 (12) July limitation of the use of foreign languages in the teletype and telephone communications." In addition, starting 20 July mail censorship on foreigners1 letters, also within Japan. 4) Since т.? -ТтЛу ̂ nbihiting of travel by railway, ship,», and airplane T^r fn?pignprs on~~gracLuaiiy~all along~^ distance lines within Japan and to Korea, Ghina^.TZprmqsa. Japanese are also prohibited from entering Sachalin. Japanese Ья-̂ е to remain in the vicinity of their_ residence. 5) Since about 10 July transporting of troops, beginning with Quartermaster troops, technician troops and artillery of the l6th and 1st division and transport of reservists from Japan. Goal; Seishin and ffashin for troops and reservists, Tientsin and Shanghai only for reservists. Doc. No. 4052-A Page 1 Doc. No. 4052-A Page 2 6) Since the middle of July preparation in Manchuria for billeting and the arrival of troop transports. In addition increased transport of military goods, which may be interpreted as the establishing of supply bases. 7) My impression: a) Besides the increase of Japanese troops in Manchuria and probably also in North China, a new army group is being formed in Korea. b) According to conversations with officers of the General Staff, besides the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea apparently also parts of the North China Агглу are to Ье_ияаД for action against the Soviet Union. "No clarity regarding the Japanese operations plan. But it is probable that it will not be limited onl v to anattack on the VIadivngtnV area and in a northerly~direction, but will also simultaneously start in the direction of Lake Baikal, along the Manchurian Railroad, through CMia^ and from the area of Kalgan through Outer Mongolia. cj Time of start /of operations/ unknown. One fact 7/hich might bear this out is that, in my opinion, the deployment of troops will take until about the .middle of AugusTT, and that General 0КАМ0Т0 several times mentioned in his conversations that Japan w o p l d n n l v . q t . q r t w h a n t h p famin n m ' t . q the Volga. 'KRSTSCKMAR OTT Forwarded through the teletype office to the code- clerk of the Headquarters of the 17EHRMACHT Tel. Ktr. 26 July 1941. rC A. Note ft Doc. No. 4052-A Page 2 AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, deoose »nd say: I™ That I am an Attache of the United States Depp.rtr.ient of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German affairs, and as such I an a representative of the Office of Military Government for Gerr.ir.ny (U.S.)» That in ny capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forccs under the command of the Supreme Com.ander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known PS the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center p.t Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I wa.s stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my oosoession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which vrs captured from sa.id German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of sa.id original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above sot forth. /s/ W, P. Cummin P. CUMilliG Subscribed and svorn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. /s/ G. E. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE CF MILITARY О О Т Ш Ш Ш FOB GEBMASY (U.S.) с?/Я Во с о Mo. 2;59') A Page 1 GEHFIF ЮЛТЕ С Aug« 7, 1946 с The undв signed does hereby certify th it is impossible to submit you the foliovi.:. documents, a:1-: they are r t • -r possession now. the f.. os of I t id nd Depart;,oat.: с Japanese General 'Jtaff bearing upon the planning of war against the JSUFU (Otsu and Kan-'foku- En ens). 2.) ̂ The correspondence of the General Staff and the Tfar Ministry of Japan v/ith the Headquarters if Kwantung and Korean Amies on the question of military preparation of Japan for a war against the Soviet U|iion. /А/ XO JO IUIYPMA Yo~o h'iyama ^hirf of -тг сfeponence on. 1st i'Ov:..::Л.1 Л -/;. ;; iv.". J'J: f / f A Doc. ВГо. 197-3 The Matter pertaining to. Supplementary Education of the Interpreters of the Kwangtung Army Staff H. Q,. Directive l~o, 2, Hotice Kb. 14-03 To the Entire Army under the H0 Q,, The students of foreign language schools in Japan and Harbin College (Harbin Gakuin) who have beer omployd as Army interpreters on Russian language since the opening of the"Kan teku en" should Ъе given supplementary education, in accordance with the "Outline of Supplementary Education for Kwangtung Army Interpreters", as explained in the separate booklet. Sept. 16, 1941 Commander, Eungtung Army, Т.ТТЛТйЧГГТ 7V,i*hT rft UMhZV YolhiilYb i Iroc. No. 1973 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARAHENKO. G, I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photostatic copy of tie Kwantung Army readquartprs direc- tive under the title; "Tve,Matter^Pertaining to Supplementary Education of t^e Interpreters of tve ICwantung ^rmv". was de- livered to me by the Red Army Chief I.ilitary Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about Marcv 22 , 194-6, and that the original of tYe said document may be found in the Records office of the said department. I do further certify Lt. Col. TARANENKO (Signature and rank) Tokyo, Japan, September 26 . 1946. Doo. "To, U M ? / Г Page 1 H (title) Basic Principles for Rapid Conclusion o£ War Against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, NETHERLANDS, and the CHUNGKING Regime The Fifth of Five Copies State TOP Secret LIAISON CONFERENCE DECISION PLAN 11 November 194-1 Policy I, We shall endeavor to overthrow quickly the American, British, and Dutch bases in the FAR EAST, establish our self-sufficiency, and at * the same time hasten the surrender of the CHUNGKING Regime. Further, we shall endeavor to cooperate with GERMANY and ITALY in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first, and then to deprive AMERICA of her will to continue war. II. We shall do our utmost to avoid making more enemies. /TN: can be translated: We shall do our utmost to prevent the expansion of enemy powers./ Principal Points I. .JAPAN will execute a swift war by force of arms and will overthrow the American, British, and Dutch "bases in EAST ASIA and in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby ensuring*herself a strategically dominant position. At the same tine she will secure areas of vital natural resources and principal communication lines, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency of long duration, We shall exhaust every effort to lure out at an opportune time the main navel force of the UNITED STATES and destroy it. ГГ. The three countries, JAPAN, GEFFANY, and ITALY, will cooperate in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first. (1) JAPAN will adopt the following plans: (a) In regard to AUSTRALIA and INDIA, she will use such methods as political warfare 'S^STsruotion of commerce to cut their ties mill the Ш ' Ш з XElGDflET and so scheme to alienate them. (b) She will promote the independence of BURMA. (2) JAPAN will endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt the following plans: Doc. No. 1UUU . x Page 2 Л (a) Carry out military operations in the NE.1R EAST, NORTH AFRICA, and in SUEZ, and at the sane tine take measures with regard to ЕЮ LI. (b) Strengthen the blockade against ENGLAND, (c) Carry out landing operations against ENGLAND, when the situation permits. (3) The three countries trill cooperate in the adoption of the following plans: (a) Strive for liaison and simultaneous action among the throe countries via the INDIAN ССШГ. (b) Intensify warfare for the disruption of commerce. (c) Put an end tc..K"GL.'AlD 's receiving natural resources from occupied territory, ГП, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will endeavor to deprive AKERICA of her -/ill to fight and at the same time carry out measures against BRITAIN, (l) JAPAN will adopt tho following plans: (a) A. Alienate the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS from the U.S.A. and give them independence.** B. Take into consideration that the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS must be so handled that they contribute to the rapid conclusion of war. С&ъ* C. Leave Infemul -pulle-iea-^g the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS alone. (b) Intensify warfare for the destruction of Л xT.ICA's commerce. (c) Put an end to AMERICA!s receiving natural resources from СНД& and the SOUTH PACIFIC. (d) Intensify propaganda raid conspiracies against AIJEBIflL. Ley emphasis on luring the main naval force of the UNITED STATES into the FAR EAST, on causing her to reconsider her Far Eastern policy, and on pointing out the senselessness of a Japanese-American war. Induce AMERICA to develop public opinion against war. Л I Г (с) Plan for the alienation of relations between AMERICA and Doc. No. 1ЦЛ Page 3 (2) Endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt tho following plans: (a) Intensi ?y on-tho-soa aggression against AMERICA in the ATLANTIC. (b) Intensify military, economic, and political aggression against CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA. IV, JAPAN, in hor relations with CHINA, will use to her own advantage the war against tho UNITED STATES 'and the NETHERLANDS, especially tho successful outcome of the military operations. She will plan to stop aid to CHIANG-KAI--SH2X, thereby reducing his power to fight, and, by positive political and military measures, ensure the downfall of tho CHUNGKING Regime, V, While JAPAN is engaged in military operations against southern areas, she will do all in her power to avoid provoking, a war .with, tho U.S.S.R. Sho will take into consideration*that if,GERÎ 'JX and the U.S.S.R, are. so inclined, they may be brought to make peace and the N.S.S.R. enticed into the Axis camp, VI, While constantly keeping watch on and examining the international situation, trends of enemy public opinion, and developments in the war situation, JAPAN shail~ende£Vor to maico use of the following opportunities to end tho war; A, An important oa.usc in military operations against the southern gisssГ ' B, An important pause, in military operations against СНЖ1, particularly the downfall of the CHIANG regime. C. A favorable change in the European War situation, especially, tho downfall of ENGLAND, termination of "the Russo-Gcrman War, or succoss of the"programme against DID LI. To achievo these ends, JAPAN will immediately intensify hor program of diplomacy and promgqnda toward the countries of SOUTH AHStICA, & Щ Ш , PORTUGAL, and tho VATICfl*. time of ENGLAND Vs. surrender, the throe countries, and ITALY will ncrT^mmodiatclv conclude peace with h.or, but will strive to have ENGLAND induce AMERIGи /to make. noncff/. W.D.C. No. C E R T I F I C A T E I.P.7. No. 1 Щ . Statement of Source and Authenticity I, QDO Nagaharu hereby certify that I on officially connected with the Japanese Government in the follovjing capacity: Assistant, Chief Archives .Section, Japanese foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated .11 Nov. , 19^1, and described as follows: Liaison Conference Decision .Plan,, 11 Nov ember 194-1, entitled "Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of far against the United States. England, Netherlands .and Chtir.gking Regime." I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specify- ing also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files) Foreign Ministry Signed at To?.cyo on this 22nd day of Oct. . 194-6. Nagalia.ru CDO Signature of Official SEAL Witness: S. КРУПА Assistant Chief Archives Section Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, JOHN A. CURTIS , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my officia.l business. Signed at Tokyo on this 22 day of Oct. . 194-6 J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt. NAME Witness: RICHARD H. LARSH Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc„ No. 219? (1) BR. EX. 17 у 7 / 'age 1 -EMOR;\NDriff BY THE SECRETARY STATE • 22 September 1?31 (Wasb'ngtonj) Spnterrber 22, 1931 J opened the conversaton w* + h +be Japanese Ambassador bv re.ferr-'n? to our last talk on September 17th ™hen we had bo^h expressed our feeling tha4" the relations of cur two countries were in such a satisfactory condition,. J sa'd I had been profoundly surprised concerned by what was taking Place '̂n Manchuria and fhat I had sent Dr. Hornbeck to see the ^mbassado1 on Saturday an'® now as the matter had developed I wished to see him myself,. He said yes, that he hid seen Dr. Hornbeck and he had told him of ho*" surprised he (the Ambassador^ had been and ho*" concerned he was чпг1 how impossible it was for him. to understand the causes of what had taken Place. I explained, that &s he well knew, I had the utm.os.t_ confidence in Baron Shidehara and his desire for peace a- corn international relations, I told him that I had learned from Dr, Hornbeck's report of what Debuchi had said Sunday—that there was a sharp cleavage between Shidehara and some of Jhe rrlit^istic elements of his government. He said that that was so, I said that what I "'as now doing was seeking to strengthen Baron Shidehara1s hand and ^ot to weaken it. The Ambassador said he understood that" perfectly, I then took the ^emor-ndum. which had been prepared (a copy of which is annexed) and read i very slowly to the Ambassador, paraphrasing the language into more simple words wherever it seemed at all necessary in order that he should fully understand it. He repeated, many of the sentences, showing that he did understand. When I had finished I said that tV.s was not to be taken as a formal note or an official action on the part of my government, but as the memor- andum of a verbal statement given to the Ambassador for 4te purpose of enabling him to understand and report to hi.s gover^ir' ho1" I, with my background of friendship towards Japan, felt towards this situation, I said that the Ambassador was at liberty to send ia to Shidehara or not, as he saw fit. He said he understood perfectly and thai the memorandum did not represe an official note but that if the si/uatdon was not remedied he understood that it might be followed by official act/'on on our part later. He said he would communicate its contents to his government that evening, I then told him that there was one thing however +hat I would like to ask of him and Jhat was that be nostpone bis Document No, 21?? (1) ля 2 departure for Japan un4il ^he situation was in better shape, I told him I felt confidence ir him from our long relations to- gether tl''it it ••ic, ][d be eas ier to handle th«? tv*t*on 'f he was berr. He expressed hirself аз very much torched by tb's and said that he was glad to be able to say +hqt this morn'ng he had, aftev' having purchased his tickets a^d made all his plans, decided to postpone his departure a'-d had •'-old Madame Debuchi and his -'avgnter to that effect, and had telegraphed out to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to cancel the a p p o i n t - ments he had made, I spent quite a little time after reading the memorandum in pointi^? out what a ser4 ov.s impress* on iJ' world p'ake in this country if thr situation of Manchuria isjTot_££s±ored~te- the status quo, IT<r-S"ThM^-dVliy ind^hstdodthat a^d he had beer-r-surprtseg" at moderate on of our American ^ress thus far and attributed thaT~to 'he с ••re"~which I h^d~Ta'ren in trrerwegg " .c.rnfRrprifpg!f He begged me that if the irne should ever core "гь*еп I did wish to act officially in this ma'ter I world first inform him. I said I would try to do so« Il(enry) L, S(tirason) Foreign Relations I, pp. Doc. Но. 2153 (complete translation) Page 1 Witness Interrogation Affidavit May 18th, 1946 At Khabarovsk Captain of Justice Sekolov interrogated the following person as witness, warning that the said witness id responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the E.S.F.S.B. for any false statement made. A certificate is appended in which the witness and the interpreter acknowledge that they are responsible for any false testimony or inter- pretation made. Q. What languages have you learned? A. Japanese and some Chinese. Q,. In what language do you wish to state? A. I wish to state in Japanese. Q. State abcttt your official positions in Japanese Army. A. In 1935, I entered the Military Academy in Tokyo, and graduated at it in the beginning of 1939. I was appointed Sub-lieutenant immediately on graduation, I was assigned to the First Company, Reservist Corps, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, Miyakonojo City. In August, 1939, I was appointed instructor of the Cadets' Com- pany (Training Company) of the same Gor-рэ. In March, 1940, I was promoted to Lieutenant, assigned to the 23rd Infantry Regi- ment, the Sixth Division, the Eleventh Army of the Middle China Expeditionary Forces, and appointed section commander of the First Machine Gun Company of the same Regiment. From August 15, 1940, to October 15 of the same year, I was given a lesson in cryptography at the General Headquarters of the China Expedition- ary Forces at Nanking, and after completing it, I returned to the previous position in the previous Regiment. On November 15, 1940, I was .despatiched to the Army Сommurdcations School as a student in cryptography. After having graduated at that school on 1. Name: 2. Year of birth: 3. Official position: Japanese Major MATSUUBA, Kusuo l&l?. Chief of Cipher Section, General Headquarters of the Kwantung Array. 4. Membership in political parties: None,. 5. Present addresss: The town of Khabarovsk. Doc» ITo. 2153 Page 2 January 15, 1941, I returned to the previous Regiment and was ap- pointed cipher officer in the Headquarters of the £3rd Infantry Regiment. In March, 1941, I was appointed Chief of the Cipher Section in the Headquarters of the Mongolia Stationary .Army. The Mongolia j Stationary Army Headquarters were stationed in the town of Kalgan, Inner Mongolia. I served in the above mentioned place until August, 1943. In March, 1942, I was promoted to the rank of Captain. In August. 1943, I was assigned to the Cipher Section of the J Kwantung Army Her̂ ii'inr-torn > In August, 1944, 1 wa3 promoted to the rank of Major and ordered j Chief cf the Cipher Section. I served in this capacity until the surrender of the Japanese Army on August 19, 1945. Q,. In what sort of work ai d you engage as Chief of the Cipher Section? A. I engaged in teaching cryptography to the units of the Kwan- tung Army as well as in the practical ciphering in the Kwantung Army Headquarters. I took in charge all the ciphcr commanications con- cerning military operations and various informations which were ex- changed between the Kwantung Army and the Army General Staff Office, the War Ministry, the Headquarters of the Tokyo Defence Army and other Defence Armies in homeland, the China Expeditionary Forces and the South Sea Army. In the service, I was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. Morio TOMUEA. senior signal staff-officer, who himself was placed under the command of Colonel MAISUMUBA Tymokats.ru, Chief of the Pirst Section. Colonel MAT ST/MORA was after-wards appointed Vice-Chief of Staff, and concurrently Chief _.of. the- Pi^t-Section^ When I was the Chief cf the Cipher Section in the Mongolia Sta- tionary Army prior to August 1943, I took charge of almost the same work as I did as f'e Chief of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army Gensral Headquarters. Q. What do you know about the Japanese Army1s plan regarding the preparations for offensive against the Soviet Union? A. Towards the end cf June, 1941. when I was perusing the orders concerning the cipher work at the Staff Department of the Mongolia Stationary Army, I found among many orders, an order, o f _ С о пглап d e г - in-Chief of the Horth China. Area. -Army, who was" the direct superior commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. It was an order issued in June, 1941, but I do not reaomber its order number. I remember in it was-written the'order to the Commander of the Mongolia Army that the preparations for military actions should be completed as soon a„s possi- ble according to the Appendix, nthe Principles of the preparations for military actions". I^think it was a document ordering the commence- ment of putting into practice the war preparation plan against the <j с. :To. ̂ j. 5 о Page 3 Q. For what reason do you. witness think that the said order had some connection with the Japanese Army's preparations in Inner Mongolia for offensive against the Soviet Union? A. I was led to the conclusion by the following facts: { After the beginning of the German-Soviet War, about June 23-24, 1941, Gen. OKAMUEA, Commander of the North China Area Army, calledTby cipher telegram Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU. Commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army, and Col. Masataka, senior staff officer in charge of military operations, to the North China Area Агтпу Headquarters in Peking. The jabnyg. -Urn 1 aft for_Pak:.ng about June 24, 1941. On returning from Peking, abcuv July 5, 1941, Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU Tatarо called all commanders of tiie forces under his command for an assembly. It appeared that directives concerning preparations of war against the Soviet Union ware given at this 'meeting. Regarding the military operations against the Soviet Union, Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia had to act in concert with the Kwantung Array.j I was told about this matter by Lieut.-Col. IT5HIKI Masao, senior signal staff officer, who had attended the assembly. Lieut.-Col. Maeao I_TSHIXl_-a.sked me whether the code book to tbe used after the outbreak of the war against Soviet and to be clistribu- jtecTby thelmperial Headqua,rtpra Ия d bqgn fully prepared. j Г reported that the said code-book had„been fully prepared -and У well learned. \ It was prearranged that, after the opening of hostilities,̂ the \ additive tables and the^emergency indicator tables to be used in com- .bination with the army code-bcok No._3 ghmiia Ьи c.harigad affording to the instructiong of the Army General Staff Office. These additive tables and indicator tables had been already received from the Army General Staff Office, At the same time, the Commander of the 26th Division who had ^ been in charge of suppressing Chinese guerilla army received orders to ' prepare for military operations against Outer Mongolia in the Feisuan- taiku desert district. Early in Sept., 1941, Lieut.-Col. EOTANI, General Staff Officer ^ arrived by airplane from the Kwantung Army Headquarters. As regards his arrival, a cipher telegram had been previously received informing that Staff-Officer KOTANi would be dispatched from the Kwantung Army General Headquarters for liaison purpose. He had an interview with the commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. I do not know what had passed between them at the interview. ———• Since June, 1941, the discharge from military service upon ex- piration of the term was suspended, and the increase of troops was en- forced by newly conscripted strength. For example, over 5,000 appear to have arrived between June and Dec., 1941. By 1943, the Army forces had been increased to about 70,000 from about 40,000. About Aug., 1943, the 3rd Tank Division was organized, with the cavalry group as a cadre unit. , , , v. . . , 3-tjw^ К - - /fvi-ч/ 0 ir^t^^l — / f у v Doc. ITo. 2153 Page 4 I cannot help hut say that the problem of an offensive against the Soviet Par East was openly discussed by Japanese officers. Daring a conversation with Captain KANI Ichiro, an officer attached to the Army Intelligence Section, he stated that the offensive of the Japanese army against Outer Mongolia was to he directed against Ulahbator- Zabaikalye, the object which lay in making military trar.sporta.tion to the Far East difficult by cutting off the Trans-Siberian Railroad. - In May, 1943, five expeditionary parties were organized, each party being composed of about one company. Among them, three parties were dispatched from the 26th Division, and other two from the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade. Major AOSHI MA Ryoichiro, senior army in- telligence staff-officer commanded the parties. The object of the expeditionary parties lay in the actual exploration of the Feisuan- taiku desert district. After about one month's exploration, it was found out that the Feisuantaiku desert district was passable by tanks, and that water could be obtained by a small digging. I heard this from Captain Tsuboi, company commander of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, who had joined the expeditionary parties. In the beginning of August, 1943, I was transferred to the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Array. Q,. What do you know about the plan of operations of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters against the Soviet Union? A. On August 5, 1943, I arrived at the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. I immediately reported my arrival to Major KOBAYASHI, Chief of the Cipher Section, and after having rsceived directions for an officer attached to the Cipher Section, I asked him the explanation of organization and general conditions of the Kwantung Army. Because these were en^ential problems for fulfilment of my dutieo. Major KOBAYASHI explained by means of a map which waa hanged on the wall of the officers' room, and stated that there had been in the Kwantung Army an offensive plan of operations against the Soviet Union called "the Kan-Toku-En/ Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvre 1941. Accord- ing to the said "Kan-Toku-En" plan, two area armies had been newly organized under the command of the Kwantung Army. The 1st Area Army consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and the 20th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Mutanchiang. The object of the Army lay in the hostile operations against the Red Army in the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province. The 2nd Area Army consisted of the 4th and the 6th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Chichihaerh. The object of the Army lay in the defensive operations towards the west, with the object of covering the offensive of the 1st Area Army. According to this plan of operations, large-scale manoeuvres were put into practice in Manchuria by the Kwantung Army since August, 1941. It was so also with the Eorea Army in Korea. It can bo said that these manoeuvres meant the completion of preparations for the offensive of the Kwantung Army against Soviet. The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was effective during 1942 and 1943. Doc. Fo. 2163 Page 5 During this period, the military strength of the ICwantung Army was over increased Ъу the supplementary forces conscripted in Japan proper (.md Manchuria. Ex-soldier government officials and officials of the special com- panies of importance in national defence were subject to special edu- cation and training while they were off duty. Iii December 1943 I attended the assembly of officers attached to cipher sections held at the Army General Staff Office, in Tokyo, in order to receive directives concerning the compilation of the code- book,-for tho year 1944. During a conversation with Captain HATTORI, who had been in the service of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters in 1941, and was then an officer attached to the Cipher Section of the Army General Staff, he told me that the offensive plan of operations, for the year 1941, of the Xwantung Army against Soviet had been maked with the secret designation "ICan-Toku-En". According to the above-mentioned plan, two stages were pre- arranged in the military action against Soviet. In the first stage, the 1st Area Army was to occupy the Soviet Maritime Province; end in the second stage, it was previously arranged that the military strength of the 1st Area Army, which would have finished the object of its operations in the first stage, should be transferred for the purpose of increasing the military strength of the 2nd Area Army, with the object of developing the offensive Operations Ahaiftet tho-Soviet Zabp.il3.lye district. At the same time, it was pre-arranged, too, that the Mongoli Stationary Army should begin the advance into the Zabaikal district through the Republic of Outer Mongolia. Q,. What do you know, besides what you have already stated, about the documents concerning cipher business which were intended for use after the commencement of advance of the Japanese Army into the Soviet territory? A. According to the instructions of the Japanese Imperial Head- quarters, the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters completed the compilation of an appendix dictionary to be used in con>- binetion with the Army code-book Fo. 3, which was then used. In this appendix dictionary, the names of the inhabited places in the Soviet Maritime Provinco and the Zabaikal Province were con- tained in form of cipher. That cipher form was four figure type. Eor instance, Vladivostok, Voroshilov, Grodekowo, Sovgavani, Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Maritime Province; Chita, Borzya, Blagoveshchenski in the Zabaikal Province, together with other towns and villages were recorded in the document. The. appendix dictionaries were about 100 pages each, published as separate volumes and distributed to the headquarters of divisions, a,rmies and area armies to be used in the occupation of Soviet terri- tories. The like appendix dictionaries were also made by the Mongolia Stationary Headquarters, which enntained the pla.ee names of the Re- public of Outer Mongolia and the Zabaikal Province. Each one copy was sent to the Im-erical Headquarters in Tokyo for reference and has heen kept there from 1941 to thp time of the surrender of the Japanese Army. г ,:t / Doc. lib. ?15? Page 5 What do you know about the tine of the opening of hostilities by tho Japanese Arny against Soviet? A. I do not know precisely about the tine of the opening of hos- tilities against Soviet, but judging frcn the progress of preparations nadc by the Kwantung Army and the Mongolia Stationary Arny according to the "Kan-Toku-En!; plan, it can be concludod that the preparations for the surprise attack had "keen completed Ъу the end of 1941. Г In Aug. 1943, Li-Jit.-Col. TOMURA, Morio, Senior staff liaison officer of the Kwantung Arny Headouarters warned M&j. KC3AYASEI and myself that preparations must be nade so that v/e night change the ciphers speedily when military operations against the Soviet Union were opened. Lieut.-Col. ТОШНА told no that, according to the directives of the Imperial Headquarters, tho Kwantung Army would open surprise operations against tho Hed Arny so as tc overwhelm it by taking the initiative j against its superior force. * ' When I asked Lieut.-Col. ТОМСКА about the tine of advance into Soviet, he replied he did not know. ^ It was rumoured at that tine among the young officers of the General \ Headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the opening of war against the Soviet Union would be about the beginning of winter of 1943. Por example, Captain Tadao iTAKAJIMA, attached to the Intelligence Section of the Second Department, drew this inference fron the fact that, in wixiter, rivers would be frozen over and military novenent would be facilitated. Д. What sort of spiritual education were the Japanese troops and ( people given regarding the offensive against Soviet? A. Tjae Japanese public propaganda organs acted so that they night impress deeply on the nind of the people, as early as fron tho age of school pupils, that the Soviet Union wa* the perpetual eneny against Japan and that there was a constant danger for Japan of being__atiacked by Soviet. They further propagated the inevitability of the war against Soviet under the conception that it was a natter affecting the destinies of the nation, as the problem of national defence or national aarf.stance for Japan, whether she could occupy Saghalien and tne'Maritime Province, which wore at present possessed by the Soviet Union and which were so near to Japan and accordingly would bocone the base of military offensive against Japan. The like propaganda was nade through newspapers, magazines and radio broadcastings. It was at the tine of the conclusion of the Anti-Connintorn Pact and the Triple Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy when the anti-Soviet propaganda was specially strengthened. At the tine of the German, advance into the Soviet Union, all Japanese newspapers reported the situation cf war favorable to Germany and foretold the victory won by Germany in the near future. As for the official propa- ganda for the Manchurian occupation, they expounded that Manchukuo was the child of Japan, that tho country was necessary for the Japanese people who were the parents of Manchukuo, and that the Soviet Union was a perpetual menace to the security of Manchuria. Doc. No. 2153 Page 7 According to the order of Major-General TAXAKASKI, Chief of Staff of the Mongolia Stationary Army, Major AOSHIMA, senior staff-officer in charge of intelligence, gave lectures on current problems to officers, at the dining room, almost every day at the beginning of the German- ' Soviet War. In these lectures, the Major sometimes referred, concerning the inevitability of the War against Soviet, to matters of Anti-Soviet nature. For example, he stated his opinion that the proper time for opening the offensive against Soviet was the period from July to Decem- ber, 1941, in view of the reduction of military forces of the Soviet Army in the Far East on account of the outburst of the German-Soviet War. Q,. What units were belonging to the Mongolia Stationery Army? And give the names of the commanders of these units. A. The Mongolia Stationary Army was composed of the 26th Division, (The Division Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Kaneshiro SHIBAYAMA),a Cavalry Group consisted of three regiments, (The Group Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Masao BABA. This Group was reorganized in Augufct, 1942, to the 3rd Tank Division, Lieut.-Gen. Issaku NISHIHARA being appointed by the Emporor as the Division Commander), the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade (the Brigade Commander was Major-Gen. Goro MANO), the 56th Anti-aircraft Gunnery Regiment, the 23rd Automobile Regiment, and the 11th Telegraph Regiment. (I do not remember the regiment commanders1names). The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Lieut.-Gen. Jutoro AMAKASU in 1941, Lieut.-Gen. Ichiro SHICHM in 1942, Lieut.-Gen. Yoshio KOZUKI in 1943. The Chief of Staff of the Army was Major-Gen. Mosuke TAKAEASHI in 1941, Major-Gen. Toyojiro IHAMURA in 1942, Major-Gen. Masao YANO in 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of military operations was Col. Masataka KABURAGI in 1941, Col. Tomomichi YAZATO in 1942 and 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of intelligence was Major Ryoichiro AOSHIMA from 1941 to August 1942, Major Masujiro NAICAJSISHI from August 1942. I hereby testify that the above statement was made by myself and that it was true. Witness Japanese Major Interrogator Officer of Justice Interpreter Private Stonographer Kusuo MATSUURA Captain Sokolov Tsvilov Chemofeev Doc. Но. 2153 lUviiЪллчЛ'аК karch 33, 1946 I, under si--rani! r.r.j or ̂ aESUiBu, ли?иэ Ilod-To that heinp a 'itnoss in the с ns cf tho nriu vrr crininrls I «hrll testify truly л no. correctly. I rr earned of the rapoonr.ioility I oe^r for -ivintc frlse testi- mony orovirled for in rrticln 95 of the Crininr.1 Code of tho RbJoH. This certificate is -ubaittoc* to the Kilitnry interrogator Or.ot-in SOAJLUV, ter-ci frvlovich, /s/ k^aJlHa, Xusuo The certific-tc i?- nubnittod tj: the Military Snterro^ptcr, Captain SQii.0 LCV. /я/ oJKuiiOV. CAEIIi'ICijiLii Oi" T.LvoJj.'i.iTOi.-; J? ii-л дЬ-J/.. ;QGu"..— T: I, V. л, i U r , hereby certify th-t I ar. thoroughly converssnt v itfc the Низ pirn rr.d. -inglieh 1т.-,иг£се,- г»; the n'oove r correct end true tr^nr.l^ticn of the inc'icrtoi document. j p j Ч iu-jpi^n.21 "Document No. 2673 Page 1 IFT3BMTI0ITAL T'ILITAKY TFIBUHAL FOE TEE FAR EAST The United states of America, etc. vs, U АКТ. Sadno °nd others AFX ID WIT. I, SEJF'A, Buizo, зх-Lieutenant-Colonel of the Japanese Army, horn in 1911 (T"Tei,ii 44) state as follows; I graduated from, the Trilit^ry Academy in 1932 (shown 7) and from the Military College in 1938 (Shown 13). In January 194C (Shown 15) I \jrs attached to the Army General Staff Office; then in December 1941 (Showa 16), I was appointed member of the 1st Department (Military Operations Department) of the Army General Staff Office, where I actually"worked till August 1944 (Shown 19). I take oath and testify as follows to the facts I had been able to learn in tho execution of my duties while working with the Arm.v Gensr.nl Staff.Of* ice from January 1940 (Shown 15) to August 1944 (Shown 19)• I. During this period I worked continuously in Section II / Ш Ш Т К к 1 / 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office. This section, called the Military Operations Bootion, took charge of duties regarding plms for military operations. From January 1940 (Shown 15) to December 1941 (Shown 16), I attended to matters of genornl business which included safe-keeping of secret documents and incineration of documents for which the custody period had expired. During the period that I was a member of Section II, I had charge of matters regarding employ- ment of military forces, and during the latter part, I also participated in the drawing up of operational plans, some of which I drew up myself. In about spring of 1941 (Shown. 16), I incinerated the documents concerning the Plans for the 1939 (Shown 14) military operations which had bean kept in the document safe. In the Army General Staff Office, the period of custody for operational plans was generally two years. Before incinerating these documents , Docurient Гто. 2673 Pago 2 . I took a glance through then, and found arong than tho plnns ror the 1939 (Shown 14) operations against the U.S.S.R. It was thus that I learned about these plan's and can still recollect their outline. According to this plan, the chief strategical scheme of Japan's Supreme Command, in case of a Russo-Japanese war, was to concentrate our main forces in Eastern Hanchuria and take the offensive "against Far East Russia, In this case, the Kwantung Army was to occupy VOR ПЯТИ VOW, VLADIVOSTOK, IITAN and then KHABAROVSK, BEA.G0VESHCHENSK and IOJI'VSHEVSKA. After I became a member of ̂ Section II, 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, I wqs'able to'learn in far more detai] the contents of the operational^ plans as ny duties were related t.qjbhe employment of military forces. It was be- cause I had to consider operational plans for the various areas concerned, in the employment of military forces. Accordingly, I h"ve been able to learn the plans for operations against Russia for the years 1941 (Showa 16) and 1942 (Showa 17). According to the operational plan for the year 1941 (Showa 16) the Kwantung Army was to concentrate its rain forces in the direction of the T ' ^ r i p a r t of its forces in the direction of ВГА00VESHCH3KSK and XUIVSHEVSKV and another part in the neighbourhood of HAILAR while the reserve was to be concentrated in HARBIN in trie event of a Russo-Japanese war. The offensive was to be taken from the SUI-REH HO district towards and from the HE I-IIP district towards the BRAGOVES HCHENSK and KUIVSHSVSKA districts, Plans were made for the forces in the neighbourhood of HAILAR to take a defensive position in order to protect offensive operations in other areas. The aim of the offensive operations in the liaritine Provinces was to occupy that area, while the offensive in the 3RAG0VESKCISIISK and KUIVSНЕТ7VSIvA districts was meant to cut the railway, to make re- inforcanerrfTand supply from the west impossible. In the first chase of the war, they expected to occupy VOROSHLOV, VLADIVOSTOK, BRAGOVESHCHENSK, I'M, KUIVSHEVSKA and RULOVO, while in the second phase, they expected as far as the situation permitted, to occupy TInrth SAKHALIN, Port PETROPAVIOVSK of KA?TCHATKAT NIKOIAYEVSK of the Amur River, KOTOS'TObISK and SORGATTANI. Beside the Army's plan cf operation worked out at the Army General Staff Office, there were as a part of the opera- tional plans, the plans for joint, operations to be carried out in close cooperation by the Army and together. Out of Document Но. 2673 Page 3 . these plans, those concerning Naval operations were worked out at the Naval General Staff Office and forwarded to the Army General Staff Office where they were inserted as part of the operational plans. Accordingly, I looked through some of the plans for Naval operations also, For instance, the Naval operations for 1941 (Shows 16) had the three following objects; (1) to protect the landings on Port PETFOPAVIOVSK of KAMCHATKA and NORTH SAKHALIN; (2) to attack the Russian Pacific Fleet and blockade VLADIVOSTOK from the sea fronf;— (3) to protect the communication line connecting Japan Proper, Korea and '"gnchuria by guarding the 1 5 Ш Е Ш channel." In 1942 (Shown 17), the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office had worked out a new plan for operations against the U.S.S.R., which was adhered to until the spring of 1944 (Showa 19). Having seen this plan many tiroes, I can still recollect its outline. Like all the previous operational plans, this plan for .he year 1942, (Showa 17) was an offensive, plan j.nd the operation was scheduled to commence with a surprise attack. According to the above plan, about thirty divisions, were scheduled to be concentrated in ГАПCHLIEIA with the main force in Eastern ISCHURIA, and concentrations of sone of the forces in the SUN-WIT and HAILAR districts respectively_. The First Front which was to take the offensive against VOROSHLOV consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and. 20th armies. The forces of the four armies were to advance in parallel so that they could fight a decisive battle in the vicinity of VOROSHLOV. The 2nd Front consisted of the 4th and 8th armies and its object was to take the offensive in the SWOVODONUI and KUI3YSHEVKA districts to annihilate the Russian forces in those areas, and cut the railway. Diversional operations were scheduled to be undertaken by the 6th Army in the Western areas. In the first phase of the war, the Japanese Army was scheduled to occupy the Russian cities in the Maritime Province and BRAGOVESHCHENSK, S'WODONUK and KUIBYSBEVSKA. The forces in HOKKAIDO were to OCCUPV North SAKHALIN, and a division in Japan Proper was to occupy Port PETEOPAVLOVSX of KAMCHATKA. Document No. 2673 Page 4. Tho plans for Naval operations for the year 1942. (Shows 17) was in general the same as that of 3.941 (Showa 16). The op-rational plans against the U.S.S.R. for 1943 (Showa 18) also followed the above plans for 1942 (Showa 17). It had never been explained to гэ whether there was to be a war against Russia or not, A. 11 I knew were the military matters concerning operational plans as гш officer of the 1st Department of the A m y General Staff Office, and I have no knowledge concerning political relations. ; и^ъ f^ •( r H * J " ' IT, In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), after the German attack on Russia, I came to learn the following facts in connection with the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army. A. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, the text of the Imperial Command (handwritten) for despatching two new divisions to the Kwantung Army. 3. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, a military order (printed) reorganization in connection with the fifteen divisions of the Kwantung Army on a semi-war-time basis, which was distributed to each sec- tion of the department. C. Through the documents I saw at the Army General Staff Office, in other words, through the telegrams reporting the progress of mobilization in all districts, I knew that a mobilization was underway in Japan in the summer of 1941 (Showa 16) to reinforce the Kwantung Army. The number of mobilized men was about 300,000, and I came to learn about it through calculation of "the strength of the Kwantung Army in 1942 (Showa 17). The mobilization w s secretly carried out, and the usual elaborate send-offs for the conscripts were prohibited. In Tokyo, I often saw mobilized troops passing through or leaving from the stations in pro- found silence. The above was written by my own hand and the con- tents are true. (signed) Sejima, Ruizо О 4 -Л" И Н ^ ^ . ^.-(A'VM/r I H H С £\ v А /' «У-г. А ^ А ( У < Л ; j С f • v. * <3 * i, - f $1 rU i ), а : J v f 'tytfi Ь л ' • • 1 -С/к, f <( '/ I - ©V <( I/ U- d M n ЯЯДЗ» 'V ?, . 3 o O ^ ' " c r p ^ £• YY I* it* •• ( >t Щ л tU rA'^c. . (Л ' , . . ГХ.А̂ -'С Ш ^ diH С Ъ м \ « та л A,* i J*t Document Fo. 2673 Page 5» Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named ЗЕЫША, Rulzo, at the Soviet Embassy Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of September, 1946. /signed/ [.'•'•land J. Schwartz Roland J. "chwartz, Capt. T.C. Summary Courts Martial C E R T I F I C A T E I, 2nd Lt. John D. Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that' this day, the said SEIJIMA, Ru.izo, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath In my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and. correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant. Dated this 27th day of September, 194-6, at Tokyo, Japan. /signal/ John D. Hattori JOHN D. HATTORI 2nd Lt. Central Interrogation Section. ICC, lit.г 219? (з) Рзее 1 BR. EX. 19 Т S L F: G P A M ТРГ SECRETARY OF ST'TE TO Til'7. CHAEG13) IN JA°*N (NEVILLE) Wash1ngton, September 24, 1931-- 4 T3.Fr 16?,, Please deliver to the ^'nis^er for Fo^ira Affairs immediately as a note, the identical text of "'h-' ch ^п! 1 be com- municated by +he American Minister to China to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following! "The Government and people of fhe United States have observed with regret and with great concern everts o f the aas'r f^w da^s in Manchuria. In view of the s'^cere desire of tne people o7* ffii's country that ->rlnc-'nles and methods of тээасе shell c m i l in international r°lat'ons, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions cf which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies be- tween nations without resort +o use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese anri the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause tv'оiг rrlitarv forces to rffra-'n from any further hostilities will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and inter- national agreements, a^d will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences." ST IMS ON Foreign Relations I, P. 9 Document Fo. 2467 Page 1. AUIOGP-AfH TESTIMONY P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army of the Kwant'-ng Army. General KITA, Seiichi. 7-om April 20 to April 33, l'J46. I, former Commander cf the first Area Army cf Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seiiohi shall state about the preparation for sei-uxe cf Manchuria and the attack against U.S. S.H. oy Japan. At the beginning cf Showa era i.e., jr. 193fi, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused Ъу the anti-northern expedition carried out Ъу Sun-Bun and CHI /;"TG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China.. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area w.-uld be contradicted. The Japanese govern- ment, therefore, recidet? the following measures: 1. That the civil war of China shg.ll net be allowed to extend over Manchuria. 2. That the influence of Sun-Pun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria. 3. That the government of CEA17G Tsuc-lin in Manchuria shall be supported tc the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penet ating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself. These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Favy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TAFAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1?37. The then *"ar Minister was General TTGAXI. In May 1923, the nationalist forces in Forth China smashed the resistance of CKA17G Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Hanking Ъу the order of the Chief о" the General Staff, General KAFAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-Gen-ral SATC, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and cuctoms of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the impor- tant persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHEFKIAFG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Fanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Fanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Fanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEF XIAFG with the Document Но. 3467 Page 2. object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expo- sition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HC Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HO Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. ?erides this person, I was on good terns with the vise-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Hanking Government, CEEJ-Yi, Inspector-C-en-ral of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHO Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HTAHG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt.General YAHG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the ""mbassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Hanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KAITAYA: 1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Hanking Government. 2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria. To form friends among the military circles of the Hanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties. I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General ЗАТО in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Hanking, to pay attention to the situation of mili- tary administration of the Hanking Government. After my arrival in Hanking, I established contact wit'- the above-mentioned military authorities of the Hanking Goverr_ment and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Hanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelli- gence work — the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confronta- tion of the Chinese military cliauss, the existence of anti-governn-ent elements and so or. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelli- gence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better rela- tionship with the military authorities of the Hanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents, Hot long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was HAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSIHGAH LIHG near Solon. Captain HASAMLTiA -as one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood o^ ESIHG AIT LIHG. After my arrival as Chief 'of the second section of the Eeadouarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Ewantung Army that the said HAKAMUBA was dispatched with the object o~' investigating the roads in HSIHG AH LIHG and I an convinced of the statements being true. Document '.'о. 3467 Pare 3 I think I can safely say concern:ng the Japanese preparation for the oc cuo at ion of Manchuria that the fact, that Japan haa long "been covetous of Manchuria could he testified hy the condition "before the Manchurian Incident and Ъу various other situations there, Japan wanted to have military "bases in Manchuria for the execution of regressive plane against Soviet Russia. The ccnatruction of strategic railway lines in Korea such a.> the Seoul-Fumen line, the Kanan line, and the Рауэл-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realise thib cherished plan some proper historical time had to "be choceiw The year of 1931 afforded a pood opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Sussia were absorved in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions' to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five--year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the fi?.peditiona.ry forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in tne occupation of the whole of Manchuria- Follovingthe о ecu-nation, Ja.pan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo, There were two opinions-—one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese adviser: in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Msnchukuo, and to keep the real power of tho country in the hands of Japan, The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. I SKI'АЗА and Col. ITAGAICI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung лгяу, and was supported by Gen. ASbSI In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of •"'ice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in v-rioua Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung лгту made it their primary ta.sk to annihilate all the ax.ti-Japanese elements either by subjudgating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive e:tp edit ions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chine how, end in the vicinity of TU1TG PI HT TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chart-shar and LI—Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive caroaigne. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAK3 and Lt. Gen. KOI 30 ahen C-enerals Hon jo ;r.d Muto were commanders' of the Kwantung i.w,E.leSe punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to "bankruptcy. "e cannot but definitely admit that such sperations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember veil the amount and scone of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headouarters of the Kwantung .̂rmy as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headnuarfcera of t'ne Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. Г7ЛХ). Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows: 1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRI1T the 10th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. HIHOSl) 2, The vicinity of Chinchcw and Jehol the 8th Divis on (Commander, Lt. Gen. KISHI). • Document No, 2467 Я-ge 4 3. The province of Н Е П Д Г Ш Ш И and the vicinity of CHICHJHAERH the li[th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MATSOKI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku. 4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt.Gten. SAKAMOTO) Mixed brigade (Commander, № j. Go* HATTORI) A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jeohol m s directly commanded by the coramamer of Kwantung Army General MLJTO and I also participated in the Jehcl operations, I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chi^f of staff of Kwantung Army tho data of intelligence concerning both tho doings and movements of ihe anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on щу reports, Jn the spring of 1934 a large scale militaxy operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SLIAN, south of CHIA MJ SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the bfenchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Mmchurian possessed land by the bbnehurian Development Company of japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. 3Ji order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, tho Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their ov.n regimental Commander Ool. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the bbnehurian residents. This fighting таз directed by the chief of staff Col. Ш Л О of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen.HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Array in bjanchuria during the period from I93I to I936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army—Generals H0NJ0, ШГ0, HISHIKARI, Ш Ж Щ ' and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese mstern 1&Ишу. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations wore chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, №j. Gen. KOIvIu T3UBARA» the Representative of the South Ivhnchuria Rly. Company in Harbin. Director USAMI and othsr agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters, I cannot flatly dony the fact that Japan maao use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel tho influence of Soviet Russia from l&nchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway adminis- tration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Mincauria were disturbed by bandits, in 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to soil the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, After that Jhpan gradually enlarged hor preparation for military bases in Шпсhuria for war against Soviet Russia, Along with it, the building of^fortrosses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes, p ..-.aaont Яз. 2467 Page 5. tho construction cf railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction о: 'ТА£ЕШ harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the es- tablishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Jараповe Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry cut these planя, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself. 1. The fortification department to build fortresses. n — ' * I'ho sir f iree units to build air-fields. 3, The Manchurian oivil Engineering Bureau to build military roads. 4, The Мегзс-hurian Telegraph end Telephone Company to establish c.emr. г.:̂ ..'.са/.1опе. 5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Ely Company.. 6. Ihe Manchurian Kcavy Irdnntry Company shall be founded for tho establishment and management of munition factories. The Jap.' uaese authorities, either purchased at low prices by convulsion the land owned Ъу Manchuriапз or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among tho Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the freo laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Mcreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Mancimrian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSOfG A2T LIHG and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwan- tung Army, Lt. Gen» HAT4 and General L3.4IP.QKlJ explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell mo the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000. Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, IifUK&3\ KOHCE, and General TOJC;. Japanese War Ministers Generals AEASI, SVGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KAFAYA, Prince КАН-Ш, SU&IYAMk and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals Ш Ш О , Щ 8 Ё Ш В 1 , MIHAMI, U3DA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1Я34 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAF-IH, Deputy Chief, Lt, Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of tho 1st department, Maj. C-en. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Ma,j. Gon. JSOYA '.later Lt. Gen,), and chief of the 3rd department, Ma.j, Gen. USH1B.0-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of tho intelligence pertaining to Caina and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China, group (chief, Lt. Col, KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WA.CEI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work wa,s executed Document Fo. 2467 Page 6. Ъу studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the varous countries, с specially from the attache at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Poking, Tt-infj., r.nd Carton, together with those from the Налгу and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, hut nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forcos in Manchuria, was furthered a.nd in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Array со four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalion and four frontier garrisons, wr s realised. In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung лгту instructions per- taining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933. The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy: In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Hegotia.tioKs relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1S35 between the military attache to the Embassy in Germany, It. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attache OESHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure , but I, as well a,s other persons clcarly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature wa.s provocative to Soviet Eussia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist! politics of Soviet Russia, and that it wa.s necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual propa.ra.tion for war against Soviet Russia and also in the inter- ference in the internal administration of China. The days when I"was the Military Attache to the Embassy in China! In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Atta.che to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to bo solved by the Ambassador were as follows: 1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan. 2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall co- operate economically. Do с ument No . 246 7 Page 7 3. China shall r.ircr i-э i.v-,h in ant:l~Ĉ -dir':e-,n .. ;tivities. I remember that as the compensation Гэг the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 193&? Ambassador KAWAGQE began negotiations with the Nanking Governm'snt on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following anrwers as to the proposals offered by Japan. 1. China will not officially recognize Ivhnchukuo, but will connive the situation in Mmchuria, 2. China herself will resist Cbuimunism. Sfeterially speaking, China is fighting against the pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia* 3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti- Japanese movements in China by its о ш power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual, Tho Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese тааг in 1937» Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Enbassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows* "I shall collect intelligence regarding tho political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same tine co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relation.̂ between both countries." I tsent from time to time to Nanking and saw the Embassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937» Japanese troops stationed .in the suburbs of Peking on mneuver were fired upon by the Chinese, Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed, Japan later announced in the press end to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHIANG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai, This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War. The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board ( К О-А - Ш ) . In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese Vfar the North China Area Army m s established in Psking. At the same time, I таз appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I vas appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the fecial Service Section Document Ко. 2-167 Page 8 were to execute the work of Military pcb.iniotrp.tion, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied areain China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section. 1. General Affairs Bureau—in charge of political matters. 2. First Economic Bureau—in charge of finance and economy. 3. Second Economic Bureau—in charge of traffic and industries. 4. Culture Bureau-—in change of education and culture. Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a, plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in Forth China while I wao chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a. regime in Forth China with Wang Ko-min, a oro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese re- presentatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the adtisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIEAC Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigec. These three were not military men. The principle of the adviserr, wp.s to cexry out the policies of the Japanese , government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain)- I wp.s appointed Chief of the Forth China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Beard. I received this appointment from the cabinet, Н1НАНША was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier EIBAFUMA was the head end the pre- sident. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. G-ensral ITAGAKI, TEE Favy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister} and there were about sixty beard members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YAFAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could b-come board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chi&f of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia. Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jac—-IT. S. wpr when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such аз Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Acia Developm nt Воaid waj greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territores in Greater East Aub'ia, a larger and stronger organization based on the .й-sian Development Beard was required. Consequently, in the b eginning of 1 3 4 2 , the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater E?st Asia Ministry and the duty of theChief of the •Document Но. 3467 Page 9. Liaison Section of the Board wa.s transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extras-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria.,TAFI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation, ''/hilo I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in Forth China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our Forth China Army end to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria. In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the Forth Cnina Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (la/ter full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAF, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, wh^n the Mongolian Arm;'' was established its Commander was Lt. General HAS^TUMA, the Special Service Agency wa.s changcd into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In Fovembor 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Esinkiang government headed by Prince Те. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our objcct at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a. military baso there against Outer Mongolia. This measure wa.s carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The a-ssistance vfrich I offered to the measure for the tricing of Inner Mongolia wa.s in creating in Forth China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our Forth China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not "build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles a.t Cbang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Fomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of tho Japanese Army; and since the detail' and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here. In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunonuya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Eighness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihacrh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not nccessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against tho Soviet Russia. Document Fo. 2467 Page 10. When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to ho thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaerh, as tho division would he employed on the Hairaerh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should he carried out во ae to he chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Pussian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaerh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaoch twico in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates. After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against' Russia. This increase was executed in accordancc with a plan known as "Kan -Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by •5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the ̂ Kan-Toku-En11 consisted of: 13 divisions 195,000 men 2 tank divisions 30,000 men & 400 tanks Air forces 34,000 men ? 1,000 planes Border guards (38 battalions) 19,000 men Railway guards (5 units) 17,500 men Rear forccs 100,000 men Total. ..(men) 386,00 (horses) 40,000 It novr possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses duo to the increase made by the "Zan-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division undor my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered tha,t similar increases were made in other divisions. When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten prepp.rations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not road it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order exccpt an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Arms'- ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights oast of Hairaerh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All tho conditions in Kwantung Arny during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, aa a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to . Document Но. 2467 Page 11. say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or a g a i n s t America. The folllwing throe items were decided at an Imporial Council in Tokyo in June 1941: (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War. (2) To prepare for the operations in the South. (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders. But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia Ъу continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the ,,Kan-Taku-EnTr plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to tho Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General Limezu gave individually to each axmy commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time arnie3. I received tho following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hairaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to mo the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening tho war. I was only in- structed to maintain the positions-in'Eftiracrh for a long period of time. In accordance with the duty given mo, I reinforced the forti- fications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hairaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and fnod supplies for six months near Hairaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaorh, when the Second Area- Army, to which the 6th Army belonged was set up, its Commander Lt. General AHAMI Korechika explained to mo the object of establishing the Second Area. Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in tho Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by tho r.ncrei name * b r> plan "B" (Otsu11), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters . Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Array from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "Но. Б". Lt. General AFAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offenso at the third stage of the operations, I shoulc make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained tho strategic plan which should bo followed by main force of the Second Ar*» Army at the second stage. Tho details will be given le.ter. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carriec out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "В". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by tho for- mer Commander of the First Area Army General YAMA.SHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to mo. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army, in Mutanchiant Document Fo. 3467 Page 12 Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of tho First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army "cased on Plan "3" Undor this plan the following measures wore to be taken. Preparatory Measures Eeihe District:- In the pca.ce time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and IT Army were to be set up at Tsitsikar and Heiko respectively. ST Army seemed to be changcd to 8th Arm;?- later. This formation was to bo made by diverting four divisions from China, and Japan. Consequently tho Second Area, Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Hoiks and one division under the direct control of tho Area Army. Besides, tho 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of tho 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (ahout one division strong) should be increased by tho addition of another division after the out- break of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future. Maritime Province District:- Those stationed inpea.ee time in this district wore three divisions of the 5th Army, throe divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Kunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu—eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters wa.s established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from tho 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area T.rny Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of tho 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of tho 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under tho direct control of the First Area. Army. In addition there was one air force arm;* under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on tho Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B". Offensive Plan:- In accordance with the offensive Plan"B" we cxpoctod to seize tho entire Far East as far a,s Baikal in four successive steps. In the first stcrp the 4th and the IT Armies 'of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on tho Russian border near Sunwa, and Heiko, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. Fo actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army wa.s expected to be fettered within that area. Should tho Red Army start т. offensivo it must bo checked. ThelSth Army should maintain its positions at Sailor and Arhshan. Document Fo. 2467 Page 13. la case an attack was made by the Bed 4pmy from Chita via №nchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the l^ritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following planj- (a) The 5th Army shall advaice from Killing with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Iman, and, while securing Iman to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southv;ard to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov, (b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nunn District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in conaeft0t<to|0l0M& main force of the Area Army, (c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of lake Hsingkoi, (d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunknxing to г.г<"йсi*ovo and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This vas to end the first stage. Its chief object \ms to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of №nchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the i&ritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district, Secaid Stagej- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Arny was to advance North- ward toward Ha bar о vs 1га along the railroad, leaving part of the Arxry in the Maritime province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Lsninsk to jjrotect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Array and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchenc Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway, One part of the forces were to defend the West and the uain force was to move eastward along the railway line to Habarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a deoisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy од5ГЬаго$зк.' This was to com- plete the second stage. Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalyo. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions TJhich were to prepare to advance the attack, in the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army, The main force of the 3econd Area Army would turn Vfest after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway. Document no. 2467 11 Page T? A<3 ̂ ppq. us $he Second Area Army's main forpe reached Atogacha, th@ Army was immediately to start £he attack by breaking through the bordep near Sanho and Ifenchuria, And the 6th Arny was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Arab's main force and advance to C:.xt:i and its southern area» ДО. seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Ssoond Area Array was to secure important districts in the Vfeotj and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close. In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage. Operations Rogaraing Outer Mongolia1 - in the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Arnjr, the iiThshan Detachment (approximately one division) газ to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in hhnchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chic a from Arhshan via mmpsakbuJ ak, Baintumen and Ulan-< Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer hbngolia. Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the £nperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Щеп-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1245— Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia '«7ar, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature. General Kita Seiichi 3x-Commander of the First Area Arny Kwantung Army Interrogator; Lt, colonel Derevyankin Interpreter j Shehobenltov Doc. Но. 2467 page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel ТА1ШШК0 G. I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese • prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written Ъу him in Japanese on April 20-23 was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the U.S.S.R. on or about June 27. 1946 , and that the original of the said document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the Khabarovsk Region. I do further certify • Lt. Col. TARAKEMO (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan September 26 , 1946.
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Ex.912-922. Japanese Navy. Japanese foreign relations
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