AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
30 items
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<Jt Document Fo. 532-B Page 1. Record of the Conversation Between the Fuehrer and the Japanese ioreign Minister HATSUOKA in the Presence of the German Foreign Minister and State Finister № ISSUER in Berlin on 4 April JL 2.41, * * * * Then F.ITSUOKA reported on his conversations î itn Puce and the Pope^. v t h Риге he had had a general conversation on the state of Europe and the war and on the relations between Italy and Germany, as well as on the future development of the world. * * * * Finally the Italian Chief of State talked about Soviet RUSSIA, and America. It was necessary to clearly understand the strength of one's adversaries. America was Enemy No, 1, with Soviet RUSSIA ranking next. " * * * * He OlATSUOKA) agreed with these thoughts. * * * * FATSUOKA then also expressed the request that the FUEHRER in- struct the proper authorities in Germany tp meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. * * * * Berlin, 4 April 1941 Signed: SCJF'IDT. l y O Dcc. No. 15551 Page 1 Excerpt from "TOKYO GAZETTE", Vol. V, No. February, 1942 THE 73TII SESSION CF THE IIVTEPIAL DIET -Iidnistenal Addresses of December 16, 1941- ADDHESS BY THE FRI'i-iE MINISTER, GENERAL HI DEE I TO JO I have been profoundly impressed with the Gracious, Message from th.-; Throne £.r.;ntgd today at tho opening— ceremony of у.1ш "Imperial liet. In respectful response to the Imperial Wishes^ ТТГПГ my intention to overcome '"his difficult situation, unprecedented in history, by devoting myself heart and soul to service to State, and thereby to put His Majesty's mind at rest. At the previous 77th session of the Diet I asked for your cooperation, by frankly laying before you the Govern- ment's convictions with regard to the execution of national policies с Since then, the Government had continued their negotiations with the United States of America. As already explained on that occasion, the negotiations were conducted for preventing third Powers from interfering with the suc- cessful conclusion of the China Affair which Japan has in view, for making various Fowars surrounding Japan not only to refrain from giving direct military menace to Japan but also to remove such hostile measures as an economic blockad against Japan and to restore normal economic relations with us, and also for preventing the European war from spreading to East Asia. Bearing the unbearable and enduring the unendurable, the Government redoubled their efforts to attain the said purpose through diplomatic negotiations. The United States, however, took Japan's patience and prudence for a sign of weakness. She not only refused to listen to Japan's just contentions but furthermore withdrew her original proposals, and in collusion with Britain she submitted her new arrogant proposal to Japan. Details of the American proposal have already been made public by the Government. Three points of the American proposal which Japan could by" ndTneans accept were as follows: 1) Withdrawal of all Japanese military, naval, air and police forces from China and French Indo-China. 2) Withholding of support - military, political and economic - from any government or regime in China other than the Chungking regime. Doc. No. 15551 Page 2 3) Agreement that ro agreement, already concluded with any third Power, shall be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout The Pacific area. In other words, the United States demanded Japan to withdraw all her armed forces from China and French Indo- China, to repudiate the Nanking Government, and to renounce the Three-Power Pact. It became clear that the intention of the Unitsci States was to challenge Japan with a rapture of economic relations and military Intimidation, and there- by to bring Japan to her кпелз. Had Japan accepted the American demands, not on]у the strenuous efforts of Japan for long years in the stabilization of Greater East Asia would have been brought to naught, but also^ Japan's very existence would have been jeopardized and Japan's honour would have been lost by being compelled to break her pledge given to her allies for cooperation in restoring world peace. Such a thing could never be borne by Japan under any cir- cumstances. Vuhen things came to such a passv Japan, though ardent in her desire for peace, had no course left to her but to rise up with arms to safeguard her prestige and existence. This is the reason why the imperial Rescript was issued on the eighth of this month, declaring war upon the United States of America and the British Empire. I am overwhelmed with emotion and inspired by the Imperial Will and Vision, Once-hostilities were opened at the Imperial Command, tin gallant officers and men of our fighting ser- vices have speedily broken through the enemy kev positirtrtg within less than ten davs. The bulk of the American fleet, ?vbich TT-nfl tta "5a se in_Hn.waii. is destroyed' the main body of the British Far EasterrL-f-leet is crushed- the encircling front against Japan, whose strength the enemy has exaggerated and given wide publicity in an attempt to intimidate Japan, is shattered at various places. The Anti-Japanese encircling front is already on the fair way to collapse. These great military achievements have become a wonder of the world, enhancing cur Empire's prestige both at home and abroad. This is "entirely due trr~the August Virtue of His "Imperial majesty tile" Emperor, "whictf is the source of my profound inspiration с T7e owe the officers and men of the Army and Navy debts of heartfelt gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they have been silently going through hard training in preparation for this day. Once war starts, they go to the front, with no thought of returning alive, for the cause of the State. Doc. No. 15551 Page 3 At the same time I feel keenly that the Government and people on the home front are shouldering increasingly heavy responsibilities. On the outcome of this war depends the destiny of the Japanese Empire. History clearly shows that the Japanese people, when confronted with a grest national crisis, get united li're one man and successfully overcome all difficulties, by giving full play to their self-sacrificing spirit for the cause of the State, thereby enhancing national fortune. The secret of winning a war lies in an abiding faith in sure victory, I am firmly convinced that the entire nation, in keeping with national polity and recalling the glorious history of the Empire, which has never been sullied with a single defeat in war during its twenty-six centuries' existence, will endure whatever hardships and" privations they may have to undergo with unshaken faith in sure victory, and will bring the pres- ent war to a glorious termination by performing their duties in their respective functions. However, our enemies are the United States and the British Empire who boast of extensive territories and abun- dant re purees and by those means are intent on realizing their ambition of holding th3 world hegemony. It is the task of Japan to settle the disturbances in Greater East Asia and to defeat these powerful opponents. We are pre- pared that the war will be a long or.p, We must, therefore, definitely bear in mind that our country will hereafter meet many difficulties, and endeavour to exploit the brilliant successes won at the beginning of the war by increased efforts for the annihilation of enemy forces, and at the same time undertake a grand construction work in all fields embracing various regions of the South which will newly participate in the task, and thereby speedily perfect a. structure capable of' withstanding such a long- term war. The war remains rather to be fought hereafter. We people should not be intoxicated with individual vic- tories- nor should we worry about any individual phenomena; we must all the more invigorate the inherent spirit of Japan, and help one another in guarding against negligence at home and preventing the infiltration of evil thought from the outside, and thus with a dirm faith in out **. story, exert ourselves resolutely to attain the objective of the war with the thought of giving ourselves tc the cuasc of our Empire. I wish here to express our profound gratitude to our Allies, Fanchukuo and China, with which Japan's inseparable relations are evermore cordial, and which have, since the opening of the war, been rendering to us cooperation in Doc. No. 15551 Page 4 every possible way. It is also gratifying that Japan has previously concluded the joint defence agreement with French Indo-China and has also reached an agreement of views with Thailand concerning the conclusion of an offensive-defensive alliance with that country, and that these two countries are going forward together with us toward the construction of the New Order by further strengthening their collaboration. That Japan has boon obliged to take action at this time i£L_the regions of the South is for no other purpose than to bring to an end the tyrannical policies of the United States and the British Empire and enable all regions of Greater East Asia to restore and develop their inherent character as well as to undertake construction wane on a grand scale. It is earnestly hoped that several hundred millions of people of Greater East Asia will understand the real intentions of Japan and, without needless opposition, will participate rather as our partners in the consecrated task of constructing the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. It is very deplorable that the Chungking regime is at present still continuing its resistance. If it persists in offering resistance hereafter, Japan will not in the least relax her pressure upon it. As a matter of fact, however, the fountain-head of its power of resistance is now on the verge of complete collapse, л settlement of the disturbances in China is, I believe, forthcoming before very long. It is a source of mutual gratification at tnis time that our allies, Germany and Italy, have joined the war immediately after Japan's declaration of war and have, together with us, pledged themselves with an inflexible determination to take all forceful moans and never to ley down arms until a victory is won against the common enemies of world peace. They have also agreed ri lh Japan net to conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States or the British Empire without a complete mutual understanding among the three countries and to cooperate more and more closely in future for the realization of a now order characterized by justice and equality. This agreement has resulted in a further consoli- dation of the bond of alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. I desire nere. to exprcas. the firm determination of the Japanese Empire never to sheathe the sword until the United States and the British Empire are brought to submission.. I also wish to take this opportunity го express cur Heartfelt appreciation of the enthusiastic display of patriotic spirit of our nation since the outset of hostilities. The budgetary and legislative measures submitted at this session are all confined to matters of urgent nature for the prosecution of the war. I earnestly hope that you will speedily deliberate and give your approval upon them. Doc. No. 1170 Page 1 The Investigation Committee on the Conclusion of a Treaty Between Japan and. Thailand Concerning Thai Territory in Malaya and Shan Агеаз. Held in Room 3, East, in the Palace on the 18th August, 1943 (Wed. Those Present: President KARA Chief of the Committee, Vice President SUZUKI COMMITTEE МЕМБШ$ Councillor ARIMA KUBOTA SHIMIZU Ml KAMI (Hiroshi) KARA SUGAWAEA MATSUUKA USSIO HAYASHI ИЖА1 FJTAGAKI OB AT A TAKEGOSHI MITSUCHI IKEDA MIKAMI (Jiro) MOTOJI KIEAO ABSENTEES Councillor и n n n I SHI I MATSUI маю OSHIMA IZAWA STATE MINISTERS Prim« Minister and War Minister TOJO Greater East Asia Minister AOKI Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Doc. Но. 1170 Page 2 EXPOSITORS Director of the bureau of Legislation MORIYAMA Secretary of thcBureau of Legislation SATO " " » MIYAUCHI Director of the Bureau of Administration, Foreign Ministi Ш Ш Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry ANDO Secretary Foreign Ministry SONE » 11 " MATSUDAIRA " " » SUYAMA Director of the Bureau of inilitary Affairs, War Ministry SATO Chief of the Military Affairs Section, Bureau of Military Affairs SAKAKIBARA Director of the Navy Affairs Bureau OKA Director of General Affairs Bureau, Greater Eant Asia Min' TAKEUCEI Director of the Bureau of Southern Affairs, Greater East Asia Ministry MIZOTO Secretary; of the Greater East Asia Ministry " " " HAGIWARA " " " YAMADA MIYAKE Chief Secretary of the Privy Council HORIE Secretary of the Privy Council 11 " » MOROHASHI " " " TAKATSUJI (OPENED AT 9 A.M.) SUZUKI, Chief of the Committee, called the meeting to order. Premier TOJO explained the circumstances that led to the conclusion of this treaty while Foreign Minister SHIGEKITSU explained the contents of this draft. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU then reported the recent inter- national situation centering upon Italy. KUBOTA, а те;.Ъег of the committee, raided a question concerning the exchange document referred to in the draft, and AOKI, Greater East Asia Minister, made the reply. SHIMIZU, a member, asked whether there was an- dissatisfaction on the part of Burma due to Japanese approval of the annexation of the two Shan states by Thailand, and whether there was any request on the part of Thailand for the re-acquisition of Penang Island and the State of Wellesley, both of which she had lost in Malaya but had not been included in the present annexation plan. In reply to this ques- tion, Premier TOJO related the circumstances when he had made the propose Doc. No. 1170 Page 3 in his interviews with BA MAW at Singapore and. Phibun at Bangkok during his trip Scath. He stated that although Ba Maw had shown no sign of di. satisfaction regarding Thailand's annexation of the two Shan States, uneasiness might Ъз entertained by the natives, and that therefore noth should Ъе left to Ъе desired in Japan's future policies. He further ex plained that because only a few years had passed since Thailand's cessi of the territories which she wan about to reacquire, her desires had Ъе very strong. He explained that it wan for this reason that Japan was trying to recognize Thailand's reacquisition of these territories, and that the present measures taken toward the four Malay states seemed to a surprise to Thailand, Phibun's face was full' of joy. either SHIMIZU further asked which would Ъе the^authorized text in case a difference of interpretation should arise in/the Thai and Japanese textt АЖЮ, Director of the Treaty Bureau, replied that though it would Ъе de- cided through diplomatic negotiations, in reality it should Ъе decided according to the Japanese text. Then MIHAMI, a member of the committee, inquired what meaning such an action would have Ъу International Law. МОРЛУАМА, Director of the Bureau of Legislation, replied that it was the popular opinion according to International Law that occupying nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas, and therefore such treaties for territorial cession in the occupied arua should not Ъе concluded. However, on the other har as an occupying nation was conducting the administration for occupied areas, in other words, military administration, and as there was no spec regulation stipulating that we should continue this condition forever, it should Ъе perfectly all right to agree that there would Ъе no objec- tions to our abolishing the military administration in the occupied are' and letting a third power annex such territories. He explained that the treaty between Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit. A reply was made by Premier TOJO to the effect that the Japanese Army al- ready firmly believed that this was Japan's territory and that the measure for this draft should be taken according to this firm convictioj Minami further questioned why the Government had not asked the Emperor for consultation at this Council on the Exchange Document refer? to in this draft. In reply to this question, AOZI, Greater East Asia Minister, said that aw it was agreed in detail in Article V of the Treaty, there was no need to t-чке such a proceeding. USHIO, a member 01 the committee, questioned t?hy the date of enforcement, date of sealing, and the date of signature were separately stipulated in Articles III, IV and VI, respectively, in this treaty. A2TD0, Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry, replied that though the three different dates would be the same in the end, they had just observed the conventional phraseology used in international treaties. Бос. No. 1170 Page 4 HAIASHI. а member of the committee, asked whether the Government intended to consider such measures provided in the Treaty as not being contrary to International Law. Premier TOJO answered that International Law should Ъе observed so long as the enemy observed it; hut that Inter- national Lav; should Ъе interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our own opinions, and that he considered the present measure as being perfectly justified Ъу International Law. 3FUKAI, a member of the committee, asked a question as to the Excha- Document referred to in this draft. AOKI, Greater East Asia minister, made the reply. FUTAGAMI, a member of the committee, stated that the expressions in Article I and II would be very weak if the Government wa& to cede the occupied areas to Thailand by considering these areas as pal of Japanese territory, and he demanded the Government's opinion on it. Premier TOJO answered that the Government had used such expressions to avoid needless friction. MITSUCKI, a member of the committee, incjuired about the Exchange Document referred to in the draft and Premier TOJO made the explanation, MOTOJI, a member of the committee, questioned as to the relation betwee the proposition formerly made by the Premier to Thailand and the conclu- sion of this Treaty, Premier TOJO answered that it was the cardinal point in politics rot to lose an opportunity and therefore ha had ob- tained the Emperor ь sanction beforehand for making a proposal to Thaila Ke said that a draft treaty had been prepared as a promise between tne t countries and that the Emperor was being consulted at this Privy Council He replied that the proceedings taken in the meantime wore believed to be lawful. After this, 'The Chairman of the Committee, SUZUKI, considering that all interoellations had been concluded, reauested the withdrawal of the Ministers and Expositors. (Ministers and Expositors withdrew) Then, after deliberations among the members of the committee, this draft was decided on as it was and approved unanimously. The preparatio of the investigation report was left to the Chairman. Chairman SUZUKI declared the meeting adjourned. Adjourned at 11:26 A.M.). Document No. 4062G Pa/-e 1 Item 11 Telegram (Open) To Ъе к try ft in locked file. Special Train EUROPA 5 July 1941 0.17 hours Arrival 5 July 1941 1.10 hours No. 598 1.) Code Bureau 2.) German Embassy Tokyo (Tf.iegram Cipher, secret cinher process) Remark: Sent to Tokyo under No, 981, Tel. Ktr. , 5.7.41. At the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, I wish to rectify below for your ото orientation" what HATSUOEThas told you at the time concerning my conference, with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression or Neutrality. As you4reported in your telegram No. 685 of May 1941, MATSUOKA told you at that; time that after his departure from Berlin, he did not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Ja-nanese- Russipn Treaty of Neutrality. He said he had even brought this up in his conversation with me merely stating his willingness to accett in case Russia was willing to conclude such a T>pct„ By talking to you in this way, MATSUOKA obviously wanted to say that I would have had to reckon with the conclusion of the Treaty after the conversations at Berlin. After agreement had been feached cn the conclusion of the treaty and immediately before it was formerly signed, MATSUOKA also informed Count SCHULENBURG- in Moscow in a similar vein. At this occasion Mr. MATSUOKA described his conversations with me at Berlin as follows: He had told me that while at Moscow he would probably not be able to avoid touching upon the long -rending question of a Japanese- Russian treaty of neutrality or non-aggression. He would, of course, show no empressement whatever, butshould the Russians comply "1th Japan' wishes, he would be obliged to do something. I had consented to this trend of thought. Neither the description made to you nor that made to Count SCHOLESBURC- corresponds to the facta, ;The subject of a Japanese- Soviet Treaty of Non--Aggression or Neutrality has been touched upon by MATSUOKA and myself in our conversation of 28 March 1941, in the foTlowing "wayi acc rding to the memorandum made immediately after the conversation by Minister SCHMIDT:^ Document No. 4062 G Page 1 Document Но. 4052 G Page 2 a Pollоving/remark on the conclusion of a Jaoaneso-Russipn long-term trade agreement, MATSUOKA asked me directly whether during his return trip he should stop over in Moscow somewhat longer, in order to negotiate a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact. He stressed that the Japanese people would not allow a direct admittance of Russia into the Tri-Partite Pact, which, would cause one cry of indignation all over Jar» an. I replied to MATS tJCKA that the adherence of Russian to the Pact was out of the question and recommended that hs not "broach the previously mentioned qu-stion, i.e., the question of a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact with the Russians in Moscow, since this would not fit into the frame of the present situation.~0n MATSUOKA's further remark that the conclusion of a trade and fishery agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no objections against the conclusions of such purely commercial treaties. Hence, what I said to MATSUOKA at the time unnietakeably revealed that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact to be suitable. The news of the conclusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I refrained at the time from making this known to MATSUOKA. Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to MATSUOKA the incorrectness of the statement which he made to you at the time as veil as to point to the fact that with the concluding of the Pact, he has surprised the German Government with a fait accompli. I am neverthe- less informing you of the actual course of events because during your future political conversation?1., there may arise the chance to rectify thi3 point to MATSUOKA in a suitable way. should it be deemed useful. In the same way t there may be an occasion in the further course of events-to remind MATSUOKA that during the sane conversation in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Treaty with you, he made the following noteworthy statement; "Should Germany come to blows wit h jthe-jLoyiet—Ilni on. no Japan-s e Premier "or Foreign Minister vould ' ever be able to keep Jman neutral, In this case Japan would be driven by the force~oi necessity to attack Rgssia G-ртпятту. No NsutfaiiTTy Pact could alter any of thie.:: i ' Should you deem it advisable occasionally to draw attention to both of the points, please do it in a very gentle manner so that MATSUOKA will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to task on these matters. RIB3ENTR0P Document No. 4052 G Page 2 Document No. 4052 G- Certificate:- I, Ulrich Straus. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the G-ргпап and English languages, and as a result of the conrnarison between the Gerr.an and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Docunant Ho. 4062 &, /s/ ... Uliich A. Straus AFFIDAVIT I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department, of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and -as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, 'T have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture 'were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15} 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office dociwient which was captured from said German Foreign Office files- and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control In the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a'photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming W. P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) Doc. No. 2521 Page 1 \) THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE ARMY Period . Division Brigade Total Strength Jan. 1930 17 4 250.000 " 1931 17 4 2500000 " 1932 17 4 ЗООоООО " 1933 17 5 33O0OOO " 1934 17 5 35О0ООО " 1935 17 5 38О0ООО » 1936 17 5 4000000 " 1937 17 5 450.000 " 1938 26 5 950 о000 " 1939 35 15 1130.000 " 1940 43 16 12400000 " 1941 53 24 1350.000 " 1942 56 25 2100.000 " 1943 68 25 2400.000 " 1944 80 41 2900 с000 Note 1. The number of division shows the total of infantry divisions, tank divisions, flying division groups, flying divisions and flying training divisions. 2. The number of brigades shows the total of independent mixed brigades, independent infantry brigades, cavalry brigades, artillery brigades, independent tank corps, task brigades on sea and the Karafuto Mixed Brigade. 3« "Total Strength" shows the permanent establishment, so the number is roughly estimated. г Doc. No. 2521 Page 2. 4. The necessary materials to the estimation of the above numbers were lost on account of burning up and so on at the termination of the war. So, this is the best record that the 1st Demobili- zation Bureau can offer at present (July 16, 1946) through various remaining records (and a part of them was collected from memories). July 16, 1946 C E R T I F I C A T E Haruyoshi Saito certifies as follows: (A) I, as an official of the Japanese Government who has the qualification of Demobilization secretary, have the power of making this certificate. (&) I, as the Government official, has the right of keeping a part of the records and documents concerning the strength of the Army. And the larger parts of them was lost at the termination of the war by burning up and so on. (C) The annexed papers concerning the strength of the Army were compiled by making the best use of the above remaining records and documents which could be available.(And some of them were collected from memories). /s/ Haruyoshi Saito Haruyoshi Saito Secretary of 1st Demobilization Bureau * ? г о Doc о No. 1886 Page 1 EXTRACT FROL THE DIARY OF K. A. SMETANIN, THE'USSR AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN cf June 1941 I asked Mat?u:>ka the bas ic. с,иез oioa._cr,nc.evning the attitude, of Japan towards the war; I asked hiri whether Japan would remain neutral, the sane way as the USSR was, in accordance with the neutrality pare between the USSR and Japan cf April 13 cf the current year» I.!atsuoka_ evaded e direct answer _to this question and said that his attitudcTTo this problem had already been expressed (on April 22 of the current year; in his statement made by hin upon his return from Europe, At the same tine he emphasized that the Tripartite Fact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the present war and the neutrality pact happened to be at variance with that basis end with the Tripartite Pact, the neutrality pact "will not continue in force." The copy is correct: N.I. Generalov, Chief of the Second Far Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF TFE EXERFTS OF TITB ABOVE DOCUMENT I, V, KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation cf the indicated excerpts cf the above Document. V. KAPLAN Doc. Но. 1886 page 1 с ;•.' 1-, i j i с a 2 z I, Lt. Colonel ИАШШГ.0 C-.I. , a member of tho military forces of the U-S.S.S., d:> hereby certify that the attached document — "An extract from the diary of Smetanin the Soviet Ambassadоr to Japan Vbcuc tho talk with Matauoka.. the Japanese Foreign Minister, of June 191-1, in .Tokyo., was delivered to та Ъу tho S'yje'u Foreign Мз'п? s::ry. on or aboui gQ Apr?1 , 1945, and that the original of the t said document may be found in the Certral Archives of the 'U.S.S.B. in Moscow. I do further certify 1 / s/ Lt. Col. Targnenko (Signature and rank.) ЧГ 4 I i Tokyo, Japan, i'ia.y 30 , 1946 Document No. 17564.̂ Page 1 EXCERPT FROM " JAPAN YEAR BOOK 1941-42" CHAPTER XLIII SOUTH SEA ISLANDS UNDER JEAN'S MANDATE Geographical Features The South Sea Islands mandated to Japan, numbering over 1,400, with an aggregate area of 2Д48.80 square kilometers, are the Mariana, Marshall and Caroline groups, between 131° 10' and 172° 10! of east longitude and between 1° 15' and 20° 52' of north latitude. The Hawaiian Islands are to the east; the Philippines and Celebes to the vrestj the Bonin Islands to the north, and New Guinea to the south. Only- one island among then, i.e. Guam, belongs to the United States. The Mariana archipelago starts close to ths southern end of the Bonin Islands, stretching toward the equator, and the Marshall and Caroline groups extend to the east and west along the equator, forming an inverted letter "T" with the Marianas. About 740 miles south of the Bonin Islands lies Saipan, the largest of the Marianas, and about 180 miles farther south is Truk, one of the largest of the Carolines, which marking the crossing point of the inverted "T", is the center of the mandated territory. The line of 148° east longitude divides the Carolines into the Test Carolines, with Palau and Yap, and the East Carolines, with Truk and Ponape. Because of the distances between the islands and the extensive area covered by them, communications are difficult. The fact that each group of isles uses different words peculiar to itself sufficiently demonstrates the degree to which they are separated. г * / Doc. Но. 4052-Н Page 1 Item 5 Telegram (Secret Cipher Frocess) To be kept in locked file. Tokyo 15 July 1041 1230 hours Arrival 16 July 1941 8,23 " Ко. 1248 of 15 July Lost urgent.' Director European Section informed n:e that the Soviet Ambassador, on Saturday, announced himself to LATSUOKA for an urgent conversation in order to ask, in the name of his government, "whether the neutrality pact Y/ould be applied, on the part of ' to the prasent German -Russian war. PATSCOKA replied that the neutrality pact could not be applied to the German-Russian war. it was concluded at a time when the German-Russian relations war о ess orrtia liy different Russian Ambassador, who had expected a statement that^ouid. set~hls mind at ease,, v;as much taken aback, by th±s_j|eclaxa-tio£u— OTT. Aprpinal Note0 Sent on to Special Train without number Tel. Ktr. 16 July 1941. Certificate 1 - tj Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the nritaд and enplish languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the enplish texts; I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document I-fo. /iO-2H, /s' Ulrich A, Straus AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cunning, "being first duly sworn on oath, de-oose and say: 1. That I an an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U-S-), Tnat in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ny por'-session, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives- 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by niliterу forccs under the command of the Supreme Coriander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture wore firs с as*enb2ed by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved. by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on august 15, 1945, and sa.id captured. German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in r.y possession and custody and under my control, 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was capturcd from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into ny possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a. photostatic copy, is being held and reta.ined by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a. photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. /s; W, P. Cur.r-.ipg V. P. CUMkING Subscribed and sworn to before me this £3rd day of April 1946. /в/ G. E. Garde G. h. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE CF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOE GERMANY (U.S.) y f C S ^ " ^ Doc. No. 4033D Page 1 Telegram (To be kept in locked file) (Secret Cipher Process) Токуб, 23 June 1941 1235 M Arrived^22 " » 2215 hours No. 1012 of 22 June Most urgent! In answer to telegraphic instruction Multex No. 401 of 21 June, For the Reich Foreign Minister Today at 1900 Japanese time,'after -receiving the tele- gram instruction mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minis- ter MATSUOKA. I explained to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Fuehrer. The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation appre- ciatively and told me that Ambassador OSHIMA had been _ informed by the Reich Foreign Minister after 0400 German- time, corresponding to 1100 Japanese time, that war with the Soviet Union had begunj. He thereupon requested me for information whether there had been a formal declaration of_war. I answered in the negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where mention is made of the removal of a threat riade against the German Reich. MATSUOKA described my explanation as valuable, but requested me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the Japanese Government. However he requested precise information on the German point of view. MATSUOKA remarked further: 1. A meeting of the Control Committee of the cabinet, consisting of the Prime-Minister, Foreign Minister, the Дrmy Hhiflf Яг)гЗ tha FinannP Minister Will take place to- morrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to be able to inform the German Government expedi- tiously of the opinion of the Japanese Government. 2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich. Doc. No. 4033D Pago 2 \J t> v C 3. For. the United himself he could once_ again assert that not be in a position to deliver Slates would military s ujniHes^^ —the__P а с if i с le «apancse cabinet л; arid certainly of the same opinion, 4. Fe had requested all departments to refrain from giving their own views ou the situation through spokesmen; the Japanese press was recommended to be reticent by the Bureau of Information. MA&STi'OKA then asked re for information whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime, as he had for some о pen able to see danger in it only through an external war? nhen I answered that the German considerations wore not known by me in detail he requested information fr^m MATSUOKA. continued that he had gained the impression from the report of Ambassador OSHIMA, that the Fuehrer and the Foreign Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the Soviet Union on the basis of the Tri-Partite Pact. He personally was of the same opinion /as beforethat in̂ the long run Japan could not remain neutral in thlo оэпПгП, 111 the event Qf the entry of I the United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo-C-erman war, he personally considered that the Tri-Partite Pact would apply to Japan. Towards the end of the interview MATSUOKA received another telegram from OSHIMA wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called attention to art-allayed Russian withdrawal. .of-Jbroops from the. Wp^tf MATSUOKA pxplained spon- taneously that he-would immediately propose counter measures MATSUOKA was thoroughly positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied emphatically that the existence of the cabinet was in danger, and he repeatedly expressed his confidence that a quick success would be the lot of the German proceedings. With regard to the current economic negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily. Reouest telegraphic answer to the question brought up by MATSUOKA. OTT AFFIDAVIT I, V/. P. Cunning, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I an an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I an a. representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in ny capacity as above set forth, I have in ny possession, custody and control a.t the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin. Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files rxic archives.- 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forccs under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture wore first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, German}', on August 15, 1945, an<? said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I WE.s stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in ny possession and custody and under ny control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files a.nd archives, and which cane into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. /s/ W, P. Cummipg W. P. CUMMIPG Subscribed a.nd sworn to before me this «-3rd day of April 1946. /в/ G. II. Garde G. E. GA3DE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVEEHMEITT FOS GEEMAifY (U.S.) f Doc. No. 6022 __ Page 1 Г ' \ Date .16 March 1946. I, Hanuel Blanco , I.D. Ко. 14492 , Labor No. do hereby make the following statementjto the Legal Officer, giaittasSsimxKsxt freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me. — frjL V I, hanuel Blanco, was born on Saipan on 13 November 1906. I worked for the N.K.K. as a blacksmith from 1934- to 1944. During this period, the Japanese Navy's most important mili- tary construction projects were the buildings of A3LIT0 Naval Air Base commenced in 1932 and it was never completed. At the beginning of 1940 anti-aircraft,, coastal batteries, and other type of ordnance were installed at the A3LIT0 Air field. I saw at that time the NKK train bring plane parts and guns, bombs, etc., from the pier to the Aslito Naval Air Base. 1 helped to build a bomb shelter at Aslito Field in 1938. The hangars as well as other installations were camouflaged with grass, trees, and plants beginning in the later part of 1938. i The Japanese used forced labor in a very small degree before August 1939 but from that time on forced native labor was used extensively. The native forced laborers гeсeived" 80"sen a day and this was not adequate. In my opinion -1tlfe -J apane s e Govt, used forced labor without suffi- cient remuneration. I have had all the foregoing material on this page inter- preted to me by Vincente de Leon Guerrero, in the Ohamorro language, which I understand. "I have" made this statement" voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the state- ment on this page5 finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or Doc. N0» 6022 Page 1 Doc. 13о. О02Г' Page 2 pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. / s / M a n u e l Blanco I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same. /s/__ Vincente de Leon Guerrero WITNESS:s/Charles D. Cook Ens. D(L) USNR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March , 1946. Theodore K. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I. Doc. No. 6022 Page 2 \ DOCUMENT КО. 4062 Е Page 1 Item 8 Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) To Ъе kept in locked file Tokyo 3 July 1S41 3:55 m Arri-v̂ l 3 July 1941 6.30 hours No. 1109 of 2 July 1941 Most Urgent'. For the German Foreign Minister Re Telegram of the 1st, No. 942 (Foreign Minister) Immediately upon receipt of the above telegraphic order I have called on MATSUOKA, personally, transmitting the message of the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA stated that he had already received from Ambassador OSEIMA the announcement of the message already before today's Cabinet Session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut decision. He was thankful for the message with which he would tomorrow iimnediatelŷ gggrarlrit the 'Army- jTayŷ " айаДД яя fnp. Emperor. He was personally in full agreement" with the trend of thought set forth by the German Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not prevailed for the moment. During the Cabinet Session he had warningly pointed out to Premier KONOYE and other Cabinet members that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government action against the S0VIE!FUilI0W7'"•Antagohisfic forces, who now are in the foreground, win in the long run be unable to carry their point. He requests to assure the GermanlForeign Minister that he will adhere to the previous way /an alter Linie Festhalten/. I brought to MATSUOKA's attention that the resolution of the Cabinet will certainly not be understood by the people, trho will in the future heavily blame the governr.:- nt for the missing /their opportunity/. ((Matsuoka, said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement I to the SOVIET Ambassador was the necessity"to deceive the Russians or _ J at least to keep thorn in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments J still bni.n.? -incomplete" At -present SMETANIN was not aware of speedy^ I preparations being made against the SQVIE"1 UNION as is hinted at in the / government resolution transmitted to_us_.) ) He has furthermore informed SMETANIN that, as far as was known to Japan the USA had not promised armed assistance /Waffenhilfe/ nor had the SOVIET UNION asked for it. He wished to give the earnest advice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind since, at tho request of her Allies_^_Japan f would not tolerate shipments. I told MATSUOKA that JAPAN's attitude could not satisfy us. MATSUOKA replied that he had expected this, personally regretted the Cabinet resolution, but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness would DOCUMENT HO. 40622 Page 2 would Ъе eliminated as fast as possible, and that the army was preparing for all eventualities. OTT Remark: Transmitted to Special Train under No, 2129 Tel. Ktr. 3 July 1S41 Certificate!- I, Ulrich Straus , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document So. 4062E /s/ Ulrich A. Straus AFFIDAVIT I, V. V. Cu""lnfc, -first duly sworn on oath, denese and say: 3. TVat I an an Attache of the United States Depart-eat of ~tr-te on the Staff it the United States T-olitic»?. Adviser an Geraan Affaire, and rs such I а-з a representative of the Office of Military Government for 'hiг any (U.S.). '2h.pt in r::y capacity es above cet forth, I have la -neesael^r., custody, control at the Berlin Documents Center, Яег in, Geruany, the ori-lna? captured Oeroaa F*reij,r Office filer and archive: . ?hat p.iid origins." Forei .n Office files and archies were c-raturcd and obtained Ъу irilit-sry forces under the ca"?.aad of the Sua re -e Covr,-ander, Allied Expeditionary Farces, arid upon their seizure and caoture »rro fi/st aereu'hled "cy said tii? itnr:-- forces at a Ailitnxy Do с «eat Center at Aarhur0, Germany, arid were later r.oved Ъу authorized personnel of t-aid Allied forces to said central docu-oents center, above referred t;, and toio^n as the -Berlin Jocur.ents Center. o. That I i-аз assisted ta said aocurent crater at Marburz, Ger.an-., an t 3 5, 3S42} one sni<" caotured German Forei^r Office fil®8 and archives first сглс into ~y oeeeeaei>n and control wrile I »'f8 stationed at t^orhur^, Gs''r.?_'.y, and that thereafter the eatre have continued in лу possession one custody and under _-y control. That the document to whi ch tvis affidavit is attac'-ed is r-. true tad correct ohotost?tie .'coy ;f an uri;. ir.nl Geroan Pareij.n Office d̂ c.-r.ent «-hich «-as caotuiod fro.: said German Foreign Office files and tre'ives, and which с.зл.е into -y osssession end cut steady and under ray control iu the meaner г "cove set forth. 2. That said ori .In?, docacent, of which the attached i? a >h.otostatxe cooy, in beip...- held an-? rstaineo hy ~.e in order that it .~ay he crr.r. inr.d end inspected Ъу various interested a...eoc*ea, and a >h•;tostrtic со v of said -.ri_.inal is hereby furnished rr.d certified to because r-" the Wavailahil'iVy гЛ" said original for the reasons above ;-et forth. в! 'J. f. Ctvrr.iru. ?. (XkTbG Subscribed end sworn to before re this 23rd day of A-aril 1945. \ s/ G. i- • G-'ODS Lt. Colonel, AG 3 Acting Adjutant General 0F/IC*S OF liHIT^T GOV̂ ILhl̂ T FOh СаЛ..AIvY (b. ) t Document Ho. 6024 I I, vfakamatsu Makotо, I. D. ITo. 9804, Labor Ho. F-272, do hereby make the following statement] to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the" full realization that ev.ch statement made may be used as evidence against me. t с. ; V" Г I, Wakamatsu M a k o t a t Pita Ken, KjT3ehu_J^jaP, on 13 June 1907. I first came to Saipan in.1S35T6 wcrk an a Chemical engineer for the H.K.K. ftJj I "observed varioug д ш Ц д installations in the vicinity cf the Aslito flnici on ^^ cr.mmp-ir-.pr; iî 1923ч,- Two years before the outbreak cf the war, the Japanese military a series of ccaciete trenches and shelters around the Aslito Air Field*, which were designated to serve as means of protection in case of air raids. In 1940, I happened to see some Japanese Navy'Men storing a huge amount of ammunition in some warehouses in Aslito Air Field. These warehouses were situated in a forested section and were camouflaged to look like trees. They were coastal guns located on Ш 1 Ж Point and Н Ш Я Point. I heard after fx cm Ш . officials that there was an anti-submarine net in Tanarag Harbor placed there just before December u I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me Dy Ens. Charles D. Sheldon in the Japanese language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it tc be a full and complete statement of the circum- stances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. /я/ Wakamatsu Makotо I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and tiie Japanese language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Japanese language to the person who signed same. WITNESS: /э/ Charles D. Cook Ens. D (L) USSR /s/ Charles D. Sheldon, Ens., S (1), USSR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March, 1946. (Seal) /s/ Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (J.G.) US1IR Legal Officer, U. S. Hav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M. I. Document No. 6019 Date March 16, 194-6 ' I, Ignacio Benavente, Farmer and Village Chief Assistant, I.D. No. 20220j Labor No. В 728, dc hereby make the following statementJ to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me. i As far as I can remember the ASLITO Airfield was built in 1935. I .saw a wireless station and gasoline tanks at the same airfield before I left for Yap in 1937 and another military wireless station north of Susupe, site of present Signal Supply. I heard: at that time that an ammunition dump was being built and also a large tank in 1935 rrear the harbor, i When I came to lap in 1937 I heard that Mr. Price and his wife had been there sometime in 1935, but they were not denied any equal rights. They were watched everywhere they went. During my stay in Yap I did not see any Americans there except after the surrendering of the Japanese. I have written £.11 the material on this page. /Signed/ IGNACIO BENAVENTE WITNESS: CHARLES D. COOK /а/ Ens. D(L) USNR Subscribed and sworn to before me this l6th day of March . 19Д6 /s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON, Lt. (J.G.) USNR Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Gov't. Saipan, M. I. {SEAL) Doc. Mo. 40б2-H Item 13 Page 1 Secret State latter Pel I L 2107 g.Hs. Berlin, 6 July 1941 Six copies were made This is No. 1 Ref. : LR. ERALARZ CRAKDUi (Tho Army High Command has informed us on 6 July: "Colonel YAi Ai СТО, assistant of tho Japanese Military Attache, in Berlin called on Colonel von LAHCUS3I-, Chief of Counter Intelligence Section II, on 4 July 1941, accompanied by Major HIGUChI, and sal3_thfi_Xoll0vjin£.: "Tho Japanese General Staff has commissioned him to communicate 7to us/ that the Japanese General Staff if ready to carry out sabotage attacks against SOVIET RUSSIA in the Far East, especially from b.CFGOLIA and iIANCEUH70 and, primarily against the area adioing Lake BAII'AL." • RAi "ARZ.) Doc. Ко. 4062-Е Page 2 Certificates- I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and enplish languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the enrlish texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document Ко. 4062H. /s/ Ulrich A. Straus AFFIDAVIT I, V/. P. Curbing, being first duly sworn on oath, deoose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of St^te on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German .affpirs, and гs such I am a. representative of the Office of Militrry Government for Germany (U.S.)' That in my capacity as rbove set forth, I have in my oofsession, custody "nd control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files .and archives- 2. That said originrl Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Coriander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and uoon their seizure pnd capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Mr.rburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said ctntrel documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. That I was assigned to said document center a.t Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first сгme into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany» and that thereafter the same have continued in my aosoession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of a.n original German Foreign Office document which vrs captured from, said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to bccpuse of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. /s/ W, P. Cumr-ipjE: W. P. CUMtelli'G Subscribed and s'-crn to before me this 23rd dry of April 1546. / s / G. E. Gp.rc'.e G. E. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY" (U.S.) Ж * - ! v i a Document Ко. 6020 1 Date МягсН 16. 1946 ! I, Elias P. Sablan, I. В. Ко. 1899, Labor No. C-850, do hereby make the following statement] to the Legal Officer freely and voluntarily, without;-coercion, with the full realization that such statement made m£iy be used as evidence against me. \ I, Eliss Sablen, was born on the 8 of November 1899, on Saipan, К. I. I '-forked as foreman loading and unloading cargo,ее. Ibis work "as carried on at Tana-pag harbor in 1951. Aslito Field in 1935 was started. In 1939 3anadero construction began. The Japanese brought in about 10-inch guns stored them in warehouses. This "occurred around 1937. They -"ere set no in 1939 and 1940. The forced labor started in 1939 and they took Saipan chamorros up to a reef to fortify it. Keening forced labor there for S months. These people "ere paid two yens a day. Early 1931 the Japs started bringing in cement, lumber, many airplanes. In the summer of 1941, they started to bring in fighters, bombers, and many drums of gae. Forced labor used to help to fortify Saipan "as used by the Japanese. About 18 November 1941 ten young Chamorros 21-1» who could speak English were picked forcibly and another groun one which later were told they were to help the Emperor and Japan. ®n 6 December they were sent to Guam in unknown mission. Second graip was sent to Guam on 8 December 1941-. They were used to search the island for gun positions , to help the Japanese but after being turned loose to watch they hid in the jungles^j I have had all the foregoing material on this page typewritten after I had written it in English. /а/ ЕТ^.я P._5аЬ1дп WITNESS: Charles D. Cook Ens. D (L) U5NR Subscribed and sworn to before me this l§th day ef March J.946. TheoAore И. Adelson, Lt. (JG) TJSKR Legal Officer, U. S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, К. I Domnsent Ho. 6030 Page 1 2 t b Doc. No. 4062C Page 1 Item 22 Telegram (Secret cipher process) Tokyo, 12 July 1941 1025 hours Arrival 13 July 1941 1.00 " No. 1200 of 12 July For High Comrand of Armed Forces. A. I believe the following individual measures for Japanese preparations for war seem to have been taken: 1) Numerous officers called to new jobs. 2) Reserves of 24 years to 27 years allegedly called, up. 3) Additional car drivers called up. 4) Requisition of tractors in Manchuria. 5) Students not allowed to travel far. 6) Russian speaking persons called up. B. Allegedly only three divisions are kept in readi- ness for the occupation of Snigon which is expected on 17 July according to rumors. C. Replenishment of the Kwantung Army for г war against Soviet Russia which is not yet imminent, evidently vie Shanghai and Tientsin where reservists (cf.A2) and. to begin with, about two Japanese divisions including the 16th, are being sent. D. In China major Japanese operations are unlikely at present. Kretschmer OTT Note: Sent on to the code clerk of the Armed Forces High Command via the teletype office. Tel. Ktr. 13.7. Doc. No. 4062C Page 2 Certificate I, ULPiICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I an thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062C. /S/ TJLRICH STRAUS AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Ctaaning, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose »nd say: 1, That I an an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I an a. representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in ny capacity a.s above set forth, I have in ny рогsession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured ard obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3* That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first cane into ny possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and unc'.er my control. 4. That tho document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. /s / W- P- Cummiii£ W. P. CUMMIhG Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. /s/ G. H. Garde G. fi. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GGVEEITME2TT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) Doc. No. 602.3 Page 1 Date 16 March 194-6 15 , l~aria.no Pangellnan , I.D. No. 1 , Labor No. 849 ч do hereby make the following statement^to the Legal Officer freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realisation that such statement made may be used as evidence against me. I, Kariano Pangellnan; was born on November 1880 in Guam and came to Saipan in' 1901. From 190.3 to 1S.45 I served as district chief" of Dis criet .#2, 'Under the Japanese I x̂ as a labor foreman, j In such capacity I had an opportunity to observe the conditions under whloh native labor worked. The Japanese government definitely used forced native labor. If a man did not work, ho.was beaten or thrown into jail. "Even children of saver years were forced to work. Adults were poorly paid, nstive children were not paid at all. These youngsters carried baskets of sand, bricks and building materials and worked in road construc- tion. The only thing that they obtained was food, and that was insufficient to sustain them. In my opinion the Japanese definitely forced laborers to work for them with- out remuneration., The Japanese were very careful to hide from the native population all military installations and fortifications, but I saw many signs of Japanese rearmaraent in Saipan before 194].. This rearmament started gradually around 1935 with the building of the Aslito air field on the present site of Is.lev Field" and made rapid headway by 1940» I noticed during this period the construction of ammunition dumps, military barracks, and other military installations.. I have had all the foregoing material on this page inter- preted to me by Ignacio Benavente in the Chamorro language, which I understand, I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the state- ment on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attach- ment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a Doc, 6023 Page 1 Doc., No, 6023 Page 2 complete and true statement of facts, and that no com- pulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. /s/ Mariano Pangeiinan I swear that I am familiar with both the English, language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read заге in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same. 13/ lo Benavente 'rITNE8S i/s/ Charles D, Cook Ens, РПЛ USNR Subscribed and sworn to before me th.is 16th day of March , 1946. /s/ Theodore IE. Adelscn, Lt. (HG) USNR Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. fe.il, Govt. Saipan, M.I. (Seal) Doc0 6023 Page 2 ос• No. 4025D с —) iT fjf / Page 1 Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) Tokyo, 1 August 1941 Arrival, 2 August 1941 Ho. 1415 of 1 August 11:05 S 1:00 o'clock Most Urgent Minister Secretary YAIIAMOTO commissioned with the affairs of the Vice Foreign Minister, gave me the following information about t^e situation at our initial talk today. Upon the announcement of the agreement, concluded between the Japanese and the Frencv Government concerning Indo-C^ina, the English Government had defended itself in a sharp protest against the argument, wbich was delivered to the former, that Indo-C^ina's security is threatened by Great Britain, and declared that a further advance of Japan in t^e Southwest Pacific would necessarily lead to serious consequences. Tve Government of the United States of America delivered the same declaration. YAMAMOTO did not contradict my remark that both govern- ments obviously put up with t^e Japanese measures under protest and warning and limited tbemselves, at present, to economic reprisals; He strongly underlined trat Japan made the Anglo- Saxon powers very uneasy by her newly won position of power and that she has strengthened her pressure a great deal in favor of the Axis powers. Th£ mobilization works in the same way, ŵ -ich is being с a rjdjsiOhrrmgh wit* the d e s t roytrtg the Rus s i an military forces in the Far East0 The Soviet Government is officially reserved",ПэиЛГ according to reliable informations, is watching the mobilization with increasing anxiety and will hardly decide to move more troops to the West. When I, because of rumors, which SFIRATORI,. whom I visited again during the past days in M s place of convalescence, had pointed out to me as being serious, anticipatedly ask§d_whether Japan intended to_ start hex actiye-ada:£nce_with demands on "the ̂ dviet^Goverp- jjierjt, the Vice Minister /Remark of" T^e translator":" Apparently a mistake, should be MINISTRY SECRETARY/ marked t^is way as the best method of finding a defensive excuse for a Russo- Japanese attack in face of tse neutrality agreement. Fe is pnr^nngiiy f/Hfrying ^f 'ip.nppd? of such sharpnc££_jLha±--th£L Snviftt- Ciov^™^"!^-^"!л nnt pnoc-fKiy fro able to accept them, whereby he sgemed to hays territorial cessions in mind.. In regard to my remark that t^e Soviet Government might t̂ c-n delay Japan's entry into v/ar by delaying negotiations and in coopere 4 • i Doc* No о 4025D Page 2 tion witb the progressive pressure of the Anglo-Saxons, until the beginning of winter and thereby perhaps prevent it entirely, YAi.IiJJOTO asserted that ^e personally believed that a quick entry into war would be the rigvt tbing«, OTT /147741/ AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Gumming, "being first duly sworn on oath., deuose end say; 1, That I am an Attache of the United States Department of Gt̂ .te on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German .affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)- That in my capacity as г "hove set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured end obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Co:.:.ander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3< That I v.as assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, anc1 said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my oossession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of a.n original German Foreign Office document which vvs captured from sa.id German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That sa.id original document, of which the attached is a. photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavaliability of said original for the reasons above set- forth. /s / W. P. Cummin V. P. C'JMKILG Subscribed and s'-om to before ...e this 23rd day of April 1946. /s/ G. E. Garde G. К. &АЕШЕ Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE CF MILITARY GOVEEIJMEilT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) X г Doc. Ко. 6025 Page 1 Date 15 JCf rch 1946 f I, Antonio Angailen, IЛ), NO, 3133 Labor No, C-851, do hereby make the following statenenr//to the Legal Officer ) free-'I у and Voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realisation :-hat such statement made may be used as evidence against me, I was born on .-Sa'in̂ r 24 November 1889- 1 was elected Dlstrlos СЬ;еГ if Carolina43 in 191.2 while under the rulo ~bi 555 • A': present I hold the same job, feie JanaripTn- •-ŷ -.---' + e foT̂ ii-j the яг г.-a î ;-,! tion. Jin 1935 а Шуе.", /tlx- Base at laiiata? was startad, in j937 'AsliTu'TTsToy;'"aTTTIeld was built, Inu^-O ГариTcse empia^Fldotowe? a vat he? Children and adults ware fuiTaa. So ie-ve; Т-ПУ^ or̂ iy у ounces to out.^ I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted со шэ by Elias Sablan in the Carolinian language, winch I understand, I have made this state- ment voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page*, finding it to bo a full and com- plete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this esse, I hereby certify that the above is a complete ani true statement of facts, and. that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whaсsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement, /s/ ANTONIO A.NGAILJN I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Carolinian language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Carolinian language to the person who signed same, /в/ ELIAS D. SABLAN /в/ WITNESS: / Chailes D, Cook Ens- D(L) U3HK Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16bh day of March 1946. (SEAL) /s/ THEODORE M, ADELSON Lt.(jg) USNRj Legal Officer US Nav.Mil,Govt * Saipan, M»i. ^ - , - , Page i v-tem 4) I Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) TOKYO 4 September "1941 1050 S Arrival 5 September 1941 505 hours ь No. 1713 of 4 September 1941» Most urgentо ; The attest of Prince ТШОЧЕ to avoid., by a direct message to T̂ffR1' . a clash witn the A'ECf) Coalition, and possibly the SOVIET Union, resulted from the following situation. f^on after йкТч̂ ЦОТ'̂ : a dismissal» The Third Д Ш Щ В Cabinet was set to undertake a fjfeSa ng r'QQiI:i?ation as a rofu.lt of th» НРС^ПП гГГ~ 2 July which -.таз adopted in the pvesonce of The Emperor; by its very ngture this m o h i " 1 i -gainst the SCVIET Union. Accordingly, KONOYE considerably strengthened ret/.ng elements of the new Cabinet, and, to a great extent, placcd the гзпрoneability up^n The biavy. Thus a cover of the rear to tho North WES КГENTLy IMPEDED;. As reported, the Army Command in recent inquiries has become more reserved as to a clash with the SOVIET Union, It is being argued that the Japanese Anцу, tied up and weakened in the war against CHINA, was not in a position to start on a winter campaign a.-ain̂ t tns 507ГТГ Unioji. I:i view of t he resistance put up by the Russian Arijy against an army such as the Cernan, the Japanese General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving a decisive success against лиалА before Winter sets ia. ^ioreover, it is probably- maided by the thought of NOiCQNIiaN. still vivid in the memory, notaDly~~of t̂ e.ikLtiliTILiG- The exaggerated conception of Russian strength is partly based ou the misleading argument that even in view of the collapse of the UUii.Ii IE front the Soviet union still disposed of sufficient fight in forces for taking the offensive against PERSIA on the nearby CAUCASUS front. view of this appraisal of the situation, the KY'ANTUNG л nay allegedly pressed for a decision of tb 2 Imperial Headquarters. I learned from a usually reliable source that the Imperial Headquarters in the last, days cane to itm ai on i;n pofltpone action aaainst the S0VI5T Union. A new decision was conte.;qplated. to be taken as soon ''.s clear sjgna ^ + V m — decomposition or tiie b'ar eastern Army appear or when a great numerical superiority of the Japanese arqy is established,» | While consequently the -«ч'щу, for the time being, adopts an attitude of readiness in the Uogjifo» the activistic elements of the A"avy have_ again come to the fore to a greater extent.? qcmanGing a southern advance„ /Гя ~t.r> tile plans existing m these circles (occupation of SI.J-,1, ensuing blockade of SINGaJPOKE, attack on BORNEO, elimination of МЛН11А) I have already Jreported. The younger Navy officers corps are entertaining hopes that recent shifts in the -'avv С-одцдпи. notably the fact that activist VIVIAN I КШ.РО, until now Chief of the '•'"avy General Staff, has taken over an important field commune and was replaced by ̂ ear-Admiral ITO, likewise an activist, will be beneficial to these plans. »<eighty reasons are brought forth by Doc. No. k)80A Page 2 this group for an early advance in the South, '^я lin-uy still has oil stores for two years. The imports from The Netherlands Indies have ceased and there is no hope that they will Ьз resumed, These stores groups missing*) lies ("'handwritten on bottom of page) must be used up if JAPAN does not wish to submit helplessly to the dictates of Anglo-Saxons. The Navy activists are convinced that the Unit 3d states will probably resist an attack 011 ВОШВО immediately and win certainly not allow a peaceful jgpanese exploitation. ^ny attoaipt то aivide гае United Ctates and England is doomed to failure from' the outset, -"fter the outbreak of the German- Russian War the surrounding countries were welded into a psychological uait against isolated JAPAN, The press chicf of the Imperial Headquarters, Colonel ivABUCHI (cf „ Ш В lio. 212 to 2l6, 1 September) and admiral KDITDO have expressed themselves to the same effect. The result is that in case Japan must clash with the coalition, she must fight the United States directly. The impossibility of maintaiaing the present state of tension with the United otanes psv chofogicallyand" fiat er ialiy": without reaching a clash, ha3 induced the circles influencing to make" the primitive attempt o7~aljprjachiiî . ГШ' directlyI am tola by a reliable source that at first AOITOYE wanted to carry on the negotiations secretly. V«hen, however, the fact of. ПОШЛА* з visit to BOOS^VЕЛ was published by the American press on the very same day. 2ШЗУ2 hurriedly convoked the Cabinet for an extraordinary meeting and had to admit, whether hs liked it ЗГ. not, that JAPAN had initiated the talks despite American provocations. As I could gather from unanimous opinions during the last days, it has been suggested to the Navy and the ether activistic circles that the KONOYE message constitutes a last, not even seriously meant step to convince the Japanese people of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement. It is, however, obvious that this is not the intention of the circles surrounding IvONQYE, but that, at least for the time being, a modus vivendi is sought with the United States. I am of the opinion that in view of the very real and far-reaching conflicting interests, this attempt to briag about a detente that is not merely temporary, also cannot be successful. The inner political situation has become even more tense during the last weeks, so that the outbreak of a crisis mist be reckoned with at any time. ..s I reported, the Third nOI-JOYS Cabinet did not know how to provide the Japanese people with unequivocal leadership in race or tae grave inaer political aad" foreign political questions which are awaiting a solution. The Cabinet rather tends to avoid any c'ecision and to paralyze the aptivistic a roups by pi eying them off against each nthйг, The attempt on the life of AIR.J/IUi.IA,_the demonstrations of nationalist organisations and the resignation of Admiral SUDl'slfGU, welJ/̂ Tcnown nationalist loader, fromtho presidency of_ The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, sponsored by KQL-TOiE, must be regarded as symptoms of crisis. The negotiations with the United States could possibly drag on for some time, but a compromise, which can be had only by maximum concessions on the part of J-J-AI-I, would at once result in grave inner convulsions. This is confirmed to me by all circles which the '̂ •bbassy is constantly influencing in accordance with telegraphic order of 25 august, -o. 1383. 1 OTT^J AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I an an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German .affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Gerry ny (U- S 1, Taat in my capacity as гhove set forth, I have in my possession. с a,; tody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files "no. archives- 2. Trafc said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained "by military forces under the command of the Supreme Cor....finder. Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture wore first; assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel ?f inid All led forces to said гч-пс-гя! documents center, above referrec to, and known as the Berlin Dccucentis Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on august 1.5. 2945 • anc said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my x>soessior. and custody and under my control. 4. That tho document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a. photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a. photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to bccause of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above sot forth. /s/ W, P. Cumnirg W. P- CUMING Subscribed and sworn to bsfore me this £3rd day of April 1946. /s/. G- II.- Garde G„ И- &й ?DE Lto Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOE GEEMaNY (U.S.) Doc. No, 6026 Page 1 Date 16 March 1946, Г i ' I, Juan ГЯ= Ada, IrD„ No® 2665. La cor No. j do hereby make the /сIlowing statement^ to tho Legal Officer, "" freely and voluntarily, without coercion,, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evi- dence against me, I was born in Gi-.â or. October 24. , and came to / finlnan vn in 1 V*as sleeted head Chief of _ Vi.; :ngeT ill afrBillU У hi dlliia UlU V1114^a i was foiled to takp оч̂ г""- Trp T" . ilnH I Japanese Ъоигг-,;, up the area of Тапаоая: Village „and building, a Naval Air Base,j From 1939 to 124S-Jche Japanese t'crabS all the ОТ&деоrro were able-bodied to work at about &'/ sen nor day when the average wage a'e 3 2 yen per day for others«_. la 1943 in order to build the Susupe Air Field tho Japanese forced all Chamorros from ll.tt.lo school boys and school girls to old men and old v;omen to work for no wages.,, giving them only 7k ounces of rice for adults and naif of that for a child per day, I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Ellas Sablan in the Chamorrc language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter road the statement on this pagei finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that, no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. isL . . JUAN K. ADA I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and mat before the above statement was signed I read same in the dhamorro language to the person who signed same. /3/ ELI AS Г.. SABLAN WITNESS' /2/ CHARLES D. COOK_ Ens. D(L) ,USLR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946, (SEAL) /s/ THEODORE M.^\pSLS0N___ Lt s(jg) i'SNR* Legal Officer, US Nav о Mil,Govt.,Saipan,M.I. SS<7 Doc. По. 2593-Dr21 Page 1 (Item No. 2"0 SECRET From; Tokyo To; Berlin Your Honor, th.rcfore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROt and confidentially comuinicato to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that Lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Jaay that t h e „ i n t o v arious \ ple.cos in East ^sia and that we will inevitably have to counter • у also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that the re—is -_extrviirt о dancer that war may suddenly break out_h.-t'.'Joan the Anglo^Saxor nations and .Тпряп through~~sbme clasFT of arms and add t)lat the timo of the brerrklne out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. a - Part 2 net available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #2*553. b - Hot available, с - Sea S.I.S. and 25555 SECRET 25552 JD 6943 Trans. 12-1-41 (ГШ) Doc. Ко. 2593-D-21 Pago 2 (Item No. 23) SECRET From: Tokyo To: Berlin November 30, 1941. Purple. (0П it98^. (Part 3 cf 3) 4 . If, who fit you toll tho-'i: this, the; Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Stfifiot", say that wo have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. that by our present moves southward ыо. do not moan to relax our pre3sure against the Soviet and that if Russia 4ДЩЁ t-i-hto-p n th Sn^innd япД the United States" and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with с11 our might• however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being .70 would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. This message is important from a strategic pnirit rif vi.MW nngf 14:71V-. Г д П he held it: the most absolute socjuaay. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is. 6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier HISSCLINI and Foreign minister CJANCL As soon :.s a date is set for a con- ference with the Germans and Italians, please lot me know. Vill you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message. 255^3 Trans. 12-1-^1 (N10 A TRUE COTY: /s/ 'villiam J. 'alsh, Jr. Uilliam J. Welsh, Jr. C:pt';in, Inf. SECRET Doc„ Noо 2593 (Certificate) WAR DbP'RmMFNT WAR DE° "'•RT/TNT G"NER-VL -ST4FF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WASFINGTCN, 25, D,C, 24- July 19^6 I h»rpbv certify tint. the attached Photostats of Japanese геяээ.рея hive been intercepted by electric or ohysicnl reons, decrypted, and tr-a-slated by traced personnel of the y'?? an/.' Navy Departments, and arc a^cura+e authentic to rhe best o^ ry. knowledge belief insofar -is it i's humbly noss'ble for an occidental accurately tc translate Jaoa^ese scrint, » /s/ Carter Clarke C AREER W. .CLnRKE Colonel, G-C,C, у s Doc. Ко. 6021 Page 1 \ 15 Coneepcion Blanco I Date , I,D. No. I.7283 16 March 1946. 3 Labor No. B-311 1 do hereby make the following statement)to the 1 Legal Officer. gnilssj^E^astEKXs freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me. 1У, S M г I CONCEPCION BLANCO age 27 was born on Saipan on 13 December I 9 I 0 . I worked as a clerk and telephone operator in the Japanese Naval Construction department at- Tanapag Harbor Saipan from 1938 to 1944. In this capacity I had the opportunity to observe the construction of Japanese mili- tary fortifications and installations before December 1941. Six underground tanks were constructed in 1937» I saw fuel installations at the seaplane uase. There were five barracks housing about 3QQO military and naval personnel. The construction of these began in 1938. There were two radio stations constructed in 1938. There were five signal stations operated by Kasuga butai at Garapan, Sh&bata butai at Garapan.. Nafuten, Agr-annan, Tanapag, Iuagac-ienne Bay. A Navy Rear Admiral was in charge of all these signal stations. I The natives were forced to work before 194.1 by the NKK but not extensively. They were generally used at the pier. They were paid 80 sen a day. The average single laborer needed 120 sen a day. In my opinion the Japanese used forced labor and did not pay them the amount needed to live on. I have had all the foregoing material on this page inter- preted to me by Vineente De Leon Guerrero... in the Chamorro language,"~which"~I understand- Г have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read Doc. 6021 Page 1 Doc. No. 6021 Page 2 the statement on this page; finding it to he a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. /s/ Сoneend on Blanco I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the ,_.0Ьатеит;о _ language and that before the above statement "was signed 1' read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same. /s/ Vincents de.Leon Guerrero WITNESS: _ Charles D. Cook Ens. D(L) JJSNR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 th day of I larch , 1946. Theodore H. Ad elson, Lt .(JG) USIQ Legal Officer~U'»S."Nav. Щ.1"Govt. Saipan, M.I. Doc. 6021 Page 2 Doc-о No о 15F (3) page 1 Excerpt from. "Eaaxl-HachoEi, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and Tter.ftmhftr Я. 1 pp . If - l6 (Secret) From i Tokyo To s Berlin» 15 August 1941 #739 (Separate message) At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day0 I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests_Jjâ JJorthegn pn and also the removal_of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since thens we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German- Russian war..5 to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia^ that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact0 and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future„ but0 thaA whether o r n°t we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory'"Ln East Asia should be ceded„ sold9 or leased to a third power-, or offered as military bases„ (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia0 or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation. To this the Soviet Ambassador replieds that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality paet0 and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future0 I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United LStates will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok? land Ittet~trthis^3hould be Шге-ц Japan would have 10 lake's serious view of 'itT as IT would involve the three power pact relations. IP. regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German- Russian war0 I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign polieys which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact0 even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had com- municated to the Soviet Government 2 Juiy9 and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.» 21175 JD-l2 4637 (F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-NH) 9 V Document Ко. 6017 Page 1 (Dale I I (I» Vineer.ite de Leon Г-доггсг«. I. D. He,J2fiSa__i Labor Ко. 0-884 . do hereby make the following statementbo the freely and voluntarily, without coercion, wibh the full realisation that such statement; made may "be used as evidence sgaiasb ice. 1 <T was Ъогп on the "<th October 1B93 in Gar ap an, Saipan,, Since tho age of 7 " enters! the Public German School up to the age of 16, when I was graduated in April 1913. On December 1913? I was seeded to Yap to tjh.? German Duceh. "«hie "« Co. to work at the station as a During August 1914; the World War I broke out, end met. then in Yap, The landings of the_0'apenese Пату in October ?', 1914e 2 miss шу Job as a Operat-ra vr* fo ""SIS» ТЙпсе'^Йёп'Т work a t m y ! at her s farm in helping ny father supporting us, up to the time vhen / got married ab the age cf £50 My Job is still a farmers whan in 193?' I was chooaed as a foreman by order of the Chamorran Adnirdstretiej"., to go with a party of £0 natives to work at the underground tavkn installation* at Tanapag Harbor for 3 month-, There were 6 underground barks (4 big onao and 2 mall), Each tank of the big size are approximate'Ly 1300 i-'eMs round. if?o are informed by the authority that we chamorros bo have to сагху some jobs; be cou.se a war might happen in the very near future, and these installations must be done before too late, those tanks when completed are to be filled with oil and gasoline, for the ships that have to come in В alp an. We are informed to kqp% the words very secret., Anybody who tel'la such things must be punished by the authorit у c -he deepness cf ouch cf euoh tanks age 50 feet, The concrete around each tank are о feet thick and iron pl/anas-" are riveted in concrete. Iron planks and concrete were иьео. for roofing0 Ir. the inside of such tanks there were iron posts constructed to bold the vco*. Many pipelines were constructed in connection of all the tanks* A big pipeline ware crossing from the tanks to the »ji.ee* Plants and trees wore used as camou- flage. The location of such task* are between what ir. now Hot Plant Ко. 3 and Pipe Plante At the beginning of the year 1933, the Chamorran Ad~ini». stmt ion are informed from the authority to cons с rips labor to send tc Kainan to "(Marcus Is.) for another installation for r plane base, The laborers have to Ъп sended over there for a tin ее month periode Another bench of laborers vera чended at the beginning of 1940<. The wages are Si, 50 per day end is under the Japanese Kaval Operations. Document Ко. 6017 Page 1 Socument No. 6017 Page 2 There were installed gun inplacements in 1939 here in S&ipsn (AAA Battery behind the Japanese Naval Her depart ers in Garapan» several costal defenses pons in Lariian, Kaftan Point} Agingsn Point and Mirchot Point). On the Island in front of Tanapag Harbor were also installed a gun inplacanent (Ifaniagasab In every gnnrteplacrnent were Navy personnel attached' (Units of the Shikato Butai) о J '•» WIWUII ̂ WHIUWWHK JUJ^JU I t have written all the foregoing material on this page. /s/ Vincent о de Loon Guerrero I swear that I аи familiar with both the English language and the language and that before the above statement was signed I read sane in the language to the person who signed same. WITNESS fs/ Charles D. Cook D (L) usm Subscribed and sworn to before ne this 16th day of March , 1946. Theodore M. Adelson, Lt„ (JO) UBS?. Legal Officer, U. S„ Naval Military Government, Saipan, M„ Ie Doc:0. No о 15F (4) page 1 Excerpt from * Pearl Harbor-, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by the Japanese Government between Inly 1 and nprtpmhar 8, "i Q/il * p. l6 Fromз Tokyo To s Berlin 15 August 1941 #740 (Secret) On the l^th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially,, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassa- dor along the lines of my separate message $739*» Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that accord- ing to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German- Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital,, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future0 the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied thatj in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-men- tioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Governmmt, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures,jfc.1iet are h c tq^qn against Russia.~ that this is merely a temporary arrangement„ in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed." To this jTreplleO in" "the affirmative Г Please relay to Rome together with the separate iiassagec *ID,„ig 4637 S»- I» ^21175о Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality p^rt i a _,..belBg_3trictly observed; Japan warns against third, powerBs acquiring Russian territory, in East Asia;, extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok. 21219 JD-13 4656 (?) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR) Doc. No, 602y 5 ? Pa,"О i Date 16 March 1946 _ f t ' I, Francisco de Bcrje, I.D. No» 20764. Labor No. do hereby inaivQ the- lolloping statement^'to the Legal Officer, freely and. voIuht'Srlly„ without coercion, with the full realization that each statement made nay be used as evidence against me. |Г" I was born on Atril jrd 1687 on C-uam, I came to Saipan in 1&99 went oo Anr^au_in the Pelelu Island group and returned to SairarTln Feb > 1946. I worked as fore- man for 800 workers in the Phosphorus Company there, first for the Germans then the Japanese, .1 knew of the building of an airfield ur. Pelilieu in .» On Angau people from the surrounding' islands were forced to dig phosphorous for the company for 50 sen plus 3 meals of rice per day. When I was in Yap in 1940 I knew of no Americans (civilians) there. I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement "voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement. /s/ FRANCISCO de BORJE I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same. / V ELIAS P. SABLAN WITNESS; /s/ CHARLES D. COOK Ens. D(l) USNR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th dav of March 1946. (SEAL) /s/ THEODORE M. ADEI.S0N Lt. (jg) USNR Legal Officer, US Nav„rtl,Govt., Saipan, М Л . ? f Doc. Ко. 25^3-D-37 (Item No. 40) From: Tokyo To? Berlin РесеаЬаг^б, 1941 Purple (CAj tUr?ent) Page 1 SECRET ? 9 #1003 Re 2 of your ^1418C 1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my we would like to avoid bringing about any situa- tion likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it: and so get the German Government to understand this position cf ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present thoy would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question. In doing this, explain to them at con- siderable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high auality nor of large quantity,, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Flease endeavor to come to an understanding on this line. 2. However, should Foreign Minister RIE3EKTRGP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a statement to the effect that т*?е would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia, via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly. 3- In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 and 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against I making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone . the conclusion_jof such a treaty. This point is intended I for you to bear in mind. 25925 .Y SECRET Doc. Ho. 2593-D-37 Page 2 (Item Ко. 40) SECRET 4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later. a - Not available. b - Parts 1 and 3, S.I.S. Nos. 2^52, 3* Part 2 not available. \ Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war С suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia .joins hands with England and the United States against har, Japan will turn upon her with all her might. / 2 59?5 ARLY Trans. 12'9'41 (ГШ) SECRET Doc. No» 2593 (Certificate) M R Dh?'RmMENT WAR DE° ̂RT.-TNT G "FERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WASHINGTON, 25, D,C, 24 July 1946 I h^rpby certify thit the attached Photostats of Japanese messages have been Intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, ar.d tra "slated by trained personnel of the vTar arr. Navy Departments, and are accurate authentic to rho best о г my knowledge a^d belief insofar as it. is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese scriptr * /s/ Carter ,r. Clarke C'R~ER VI. CLARKE Colonel, G»C,C» 4 Doc, No, 2593 (Certificate) W ..R DE° 'RT-ITNT vmp DFP"'RT"?FT C<~p' R\L STAFF I?-TTF LIGBNC5- DIVISION WSR"NGTCM, D.f . ч.» 24 July 1°46 I h' r,"b"t'T certify th""!" • Ъл я" tacked nhoJ'CS*?ts cf J a r c s s ^ f o s h~ve tee1" erce^tod bv ^l^ctric cr physical ri'i^s, decrypted , viJ translated by tra'^cd n^-rsonnel of 1,Jar N^vy De^-rt' er>ts, ?rd q f*r accurate r^d v '.t f j с 1 о tbo best o r my i-r.T4<»f •'.neofar •• ? 'H is hurarlу noFS-'tle f c â- occidr-i+al accurately -r tra^sl^to -:'a 'a-ese script. /s/ Carter W, ClorVe С Rr~ER CIHR^E Colonel , G. S * С. O Q J Document 11A(7) Page 1 TELEGRAM о . у ( (Secret Cipher Process) Tokyo, 7;00 A.M. Beceived, n 29, 1042 - 10?15 P.M. Ho. 245 of January 27. Secret i Debates in the Diet last week brought out soveral basic declarations by leading Japanese ST, ate omen f especially by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, about Japanese political and war aims, the texts of which are known there. The declarations arc especially noteworthy because of their programmatic character and the time at which they were made, namely, shortly before the attack upon the..-forAruiaa_of Singapore, after the successful begin- ning of the attack onJBurma in ohe direction of Rangoon, the start of the operations against the Netherland Indies, the progressive occupation of the Philip-pines and the first actions against the outer defenses of Australia, the Bismarck Jrchipelagq, New Guinea and Torres Strajjo, ~~Acbor 3ing to confidential information, Prime Minister General Tojo himself desired the programmatic determination of Japanese politics~and put it through against opposition. This emphasis, resulting from his ovm initiative, shows Tojo as a leading statesman^ politically,. у»ho is advancing beyond the stature of an exponeno of the army. His aim was obviously to lay down Japanese wax policy along a line which. :'.s removed both from the limited wishes of the circles which fcimorly hoped for an under- standing with the Anglo-Saxons and on the other hand from the very extensive tendency toward expansion on the part of certain radical group s. Prom the explanations of To .jo and Togo can be seen, firstly, the outline of the future building cf Greater Asia, under Japanese leadership end, secondly, the program of the government for future policies and conduct of the war. I.) The Building of East Asia. 1,) The inner core of the new organization is formed by Japan, Manchokuo and Nanking-China, to which are added Thailand and Indo-China, which are -voluntarily cooperating with Japan. Around this core the other regions of tho new empire Grossraum are to crystalline under varioua sovereignties., The active support of allied Thailand was especially cordially mentioned by tho Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, its requests for revision not mentioned, however. Document 11A(7) Page 2 2.) The remaining countries of Greater East Asia are divided into three categories. a.) Previous bastions of British imperialism which served to oppress and dominate East Asia, namely, Hongkong and the Malayan Peninsula. This region will have to be changed into a bastion for the defense of Greater East Asia and therefore placed under the direct contrel of Japan. This principle was given practical application in the appointment, reported elsewhere, of General Isogai as Governor General of Hongkong. b.) Hegior.s to which independence is to be granted, if they cooperate loyally with Japan: the Philippines ana Burma. As the Military Attache he?rs confidentially from the army, their independence is to be patterned after that of Manchukuo. c.) Regions which are to be militarily overcome if they continue opposition to Japan: the Dutch East Indies, Australia and Chungking-China. Declarations of Tojo and Togo showed that the original hope fcr the yielding of the Dutch East Indies without resistance no longer exists, and military action is considered as indispensable. Both speeches contained an insistent appeal, addressed to Chungking,"to turn away from the Anglo-Saxons and come to an understanding with Japan, which was also especially emphasized by the declaration, already reported, of the Prime Minister before the Budget Commission on January 23. 3.) General principles for the future Organization of Greater East Asia. In this respect the speeches of Tojo and Togo as well as the declarations of Taja and the President of the Planning Bureau, General Suzuki, before the Budget Commission on January 23. contain some interesting statements. The program is decidedly moderate. Hew regions were not to be exploited after the destruction of An^lp-fiamn rule. Instead of that, economic cooperation, no racial strife. Freedom of religion, no economic exclusivism, but direction and regulation of production, in certain cases also limitation of certain branches of production (sugar and rubber were mentioned in confidential conversation) according to the needs of the co-prosperity sphere directed by Japan. The aim cf the present measures is the securing of the raw materials necessary for waging war and the foundation later of the autarchic co- prosperity sphere. The present program: a.) Securing important sources cf raw materials. b.) Stopping the flow cf raw materials from the South Sea regions to the enemy powers. Document 11A(7) Page 3 c.) Assuring the self-sufficiency of the army in the theaters of operations. cL) Cooperation with Japan of the existing enter- prises in the occupied, regions. II. Farther Policies and Conduct of the War. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister strongly emphasized the inseparability of the Tripartite Pact Powers and the close inner cooperation of Japan with Germany, Italy and its other European Friends. Attack toward the south appeared as the military aim: Dutch East Indies and Australia. According to confidential military information, Port Dai-win is to he taken first of all in Australia. For the present the Japanese war leaders can Ъе contented with the possession of this base in Аа^^яНя. This emphasis in the direction of the south explains the failure to mention India, toward which great restraint can be obserred here. The govern- ment and the army hold the viewpoint that Japan cannot attack_ Australia and India at the same time but, rather, must halt after the fall of Singapore and Burma, since the push toward the south is more important and mere useful* According to a confidential remark of the Director of the European Division of the Foreign Ministry, the Indian Congress is inimical to Japan. Indian nationalism, even in the case of a successful revolution^ would not be capable of building up an independent, orderly state. The control of such an immense region, containing 40C million inhabitants, would be scarcely possible for Japan along with its other numerous difficult talks. Under, these circumstances, there would be danger that India would become a victim of Bolshevism. Toward Soviet P-ussia the Foreign Minister emphasized that relations are unchanged and are still determined by the neutrality pact. In the Biidget Commission, Togo reported that the yearly renewal bf the Japanese-Russian fishing' agreement is imminent. According to very confidential information, however, military preparations against Russia are underway- in Mancimrla- Influential circles here are of the opinion that after the conquest оfJPort Darwin Japan, must turn against Russia and selze-.YIs.divostok, the coastal province and Uorth Sakhalin in order definitively to make itself also secure in the north. I have reported separately about the Japanese attitude toward South America and the Rio Conference. Document 11A(7) Page 4 Certificate:- I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German a.nd the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document Ho. 11A(7). /S/ Ulrich A. Straus Doc. Ко. 6018 Pago 1 Date. 15" March 1946 I, Jose S. Pangelinan, I.D, No. 2902, Labor No. C-900, do hereby maize tve following statement to the freely and voluntarily, without coercion, witг the full realiza- tion that suet statement made may be used as evidence against me. I was born on Saipan, 27 March 19045 I was 10 years old in 1914 on October when tve Japanese took tbis Island (Saipan) from t^e Germans, I entered the Japanese School, and at the same time, they gave me a job as Messenger in the Japanese Milt. Govt. Fead offices In 1916 they change my job and put me as an Interpreter in Japanese & Chamorro: In 1919 I quit work and went to Japan (to school) "study music and business course, until 1923 when the big earthquake destroyed Tokyo, I ̂ returned and- work with my Father at the farm (after I'returned кЫЯ 0 from Japan never had a chance to get a Job): In 1926 I N ™ ' ,,,,, went to Guam trying to get permission from tie Governor ' of Guam to reside on the Island, but I failed; I married a Guam girl and returned to Saipan the same year (I was > h'" ' in Guam for 3 months) and running my 50 acre sugar planta- tion using Okinawans tenants, about 11 farmers, until 1934- when the Japanese Government took my plantation away from me and gave it to V e IT.K.K, (5outv Sea Development Co.) tVe reason they said is "NO NATIVE AtJTFOKTZEir TO USE A JAPANESE. AS T E N A N T S I know v.dat . they mean, and I gave u p . I n 1935? I went to Ponape, started my owrt busifiess (using native laborers) as a copra trader, and sea transportation also. In 1940 they took my motor boat and sampan to use for transporting materials from mainland to the small islands around Ponape for installation; I returned again to Saipan early in 1940 and on I ay t^e same year I found my job at the seaplane base, using a bull cart, as a material transporter from the Navy Ware. Fouses to the contractors that working at the Seaplane Base. I worked till September t^e same year, and during this time, I noticed t^at there was 2 hangars, ware houses containing a big quantity of food, lumbers, nails, wires of all kinds and construction materials, small air planes, big air planes, etc: 1 Big overground heavy builded concrete shelter containing all kinds of explosives, bullets, bombs etc.: 2 or 3 repair svop for servicing airplanes; about 8 or 10 Big Barracks that can hold about 350 to 500 men each. During this time (my working time) I became very acquainted witb many of the Navy Boys and they told me openly that all of t*is work is for t^e military purposes. Doc. No. 6018 Page 2 I did not working direct to the Navy, but for tho con- tractors, and my working hours is from ОбОО to 1700 with one 30 minutes during the morning and another 30 minutes in the evening, i|- hour at noon recess time<. They feed me 3 times a day and paid me ¥ 5-00 (five yens) p.d. I noticed too that there was always 15 up to 25 Big 4 propellers Seaplane and some fighting and scouting plane. When they stopped me working at the Seaplane Base, I helped my father who was a chief of Section #2 in Garapan, issued Laborers for the Air Strip at Aslito and also for the load and unloading of Ships at Tanapag, Chalan Kanoa & Teniani All laborers that went out to work to the Air Strip was by force and every cble man must go. At 0400 they blew their buggle to wake up the 'workers, at 0500 they got their breakfast, and then March out in line to thoir working place. Around 1100 or 1130 they get their lunch and a rest for about 40 minutes then started to work untill evening; No one alouded to go to his home except on day off at every days for hours day off, We had many, many claims from the workers about foods and clothing, that they did not get enough and sometimes they slipped out from their quarters, aid went to their family to get clothes and food. This was the most worse situation we ever had; Our Chiefs and their helpers explained the matter to the peoples; We gave cut all we could do to help them; Bananas, bread- fruits, Yams, potatoes and many other things that produced on our own farms, or sometimes we bought it from the Japanese Store and send it up to the Airfield once a week, so they can get more food. The pay rate for the workers at this time was 80 cents Japanese p.d. I have written all the foregoing material on this page. /s/ JOSH S. PANGELINAN WITNESS: Charles D. Cook, Ens. D(L) USNR Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day cf March 1946. (SEAL) /3/ THEODORE M. ADELSON Lt.(jg) USNR Legal Officer, US Nav. Milt,Govt, Saipan, M.I. Document Г.о. 6013 Page 1 1455 (010)-gel HEADQUARTERS, OCCUPATION FORCES, TRUK AHD CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS. Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimony construction of fortifications and * of Alfred Milo, assistant military installations in the Truk * chief, Мэеп Island. Atoll prior to December 1941, use * of forced native labor without * adequate remuneration, and denial * of equal rights to Americans on Yap. * * * ** Я * к* я* * ft* ял* * Л a ** * *** * Г Taken at: Date: In the presence of: Reporter: Interpreter: Questions by: t Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation. ! A. Alfred Milo, assistant chief, Moen Island. How long have you lived on the island of Moen? A. Forty-five years. 1 Q,. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll? A. Forty-five years. Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Moen Island prior to December 1941? A. Yes. Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines. February 25, 1946. Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve. George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve. Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island. r' Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corpos Reserve. Document Г.о. 6013 Page 2 Q,. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations? A. During the latter part of 1938 the Japanese started constructing a lighthouse on the eastern tip of Moen, Prior to the construc- tion of the Hothouse a lock was built along the eastern tip and then a road from the dock to where the lighthouae was to be erected. It required approximately one year to complete the dock» road, дтИ lighthouse. Upon completion of the aforementioned project the Japanese commenced building caves, gun emplacements, and a searchlight platform, Six gun emplacements were built. The guns appeared to me to have an eight or nine inch bore. Theee installation's wore all in the Immediate vicinity of the li.gh'ohoufv-r I>,\ri:i/ ITjyr.̂ ter of 1939 on che mountain cf Uitibiun the Japanese dug .-onorate emplacement similar to a hut in which they installed rada- and erected two gun emplacements for the installation cf five or s.'.x inch guns and two smaller ones for anti-aircraft, In the ?агле section two platforms were constructed and searchlights placed thereon. Two caves were dug into the mountain and ammunition stored therein. Upon the completion of this project in 1940 further development thereabouts was unknown to us because it was then made a prohibited area. On the eastern end of the island a radio station was installled during 1939. This building was constructed of concrete. In 1940 on the northwest tip of the island the 0'apanese commenced building an airstrip. This strip was completed after December 1941. On the southwestern tip of the island at the same time another airstrip г/as under construction and completed after December 1941. In 1940 on the northwestern tip of the island on the side of the mountain close to the airfield two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed there. They appeared to me4- - to have eight or nine inch bores, also a platform and searchlight was installed there. Q,. Were any revetments built along the airstrip prior to December 1941? A. On the airfield on the southwestern tip one was built before . December 1941. Q,. When were all the pill boxes along tho shore of Moen Island constructed! A. After December 1941. Q,. I notice on the mountain of Uitibiun many big guns, machine gunB, range finder, ca.vo housed flat trajectory guns, and anti-aircraft guns; other then the ones already mentioned by you, when were these CCLC.cruotei^ A, After December 1941. T believe for \re were not allowed to go there after the initial construction in 1939 and 1940. Document >Jo- СУ13 Page 3. V I notice on the southern tip, slightly in rear of the airfield, anti-aircraft guns, cave housed guns, and machine guns, when were these placed there? A. After December 1941. Q, I notice throughout the island quite a few barracks to. house the army and navy, when were they constructed? A. After December 1941. Q, How many Japanese troops were here before December 1941? A. A great number of Japanese personnel were here on the island, and they had some barracks here at that time, also, most were built after 1 December 1041. Q. Do you know of any installations built on any islands in the immediate vicinity of Moen? A. Yes. Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about those installations. A. On the island of Мог during 1940 a concrete reinforced dock was built. Two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed thereon, appearing to be about three inches in diameter. Also buildings were built for the men and one searchlight was installed there. Telephone communication was installed between that island and Moen. The island has flat terrain and in one section a lookout tower vas built. Q. Were there any Other installations built on this island? A. No. Q. On what other islands you know of installations being placed? A. On the island of Pisemeu-during 1940. The exact construction was made there as took place on Мог. 3. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated? A. Yes. Q. Sta.te what you know of your own knowledge about these cases. A. From January 1942 until the end of the war I was forced to furnish the Japanese commander on Moen Island one hundred fifty women and two hundred men per day. One day per month we were forced to furnish .labor without pay. The day without pay occurred, on the eight of each month. Are there any other cases where forced labor was used without adequate remuneration? Document Г.о. 6013 Page 4 A. At different times when the Japanese were in need of more help they would come to the village and call for any number they wished and refused to pay for the work performed. We did not кедр a record of tho number of times this occurred or the dates. Q,. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equa,l rights to Americans on lap? A. So, sir, Q. Is there any other information relative to the subjects on which you have been questioned that you wish to report? А. Ко, sir. '&/ Alfred Mailo Alfred Mailo, assistant chief, Moen Island. Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Alfred Mailo, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have road tho foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. /я/ Alfred Mailo Alfred Mailo Subscribed and sworn to mo this 4th day of March 1946. /s/ T. Santamaria T. SiixiTAMARIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. Document Г.о. 6013 Page 5 Moon Island Truk and Control Carolines I, Artie Moses, of lawful ago, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated tho foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thoroupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto. /s/ Artie Moses Artie Moses Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946» /s/ T. Santama ria T. SAIITAMARIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. I, f. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.H., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Alfred Milo, and gave the foregoing ansvors to the several questions sot forth; that after his testimonv had been transcribed, the said Alfred Milo read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence. Place: Headquarters Military Government, /s/ Т.. Santamaria Truk and Central Caroline T. SASTAMAIBA, Islands. 1st Lt., USMCR,, Ishad Command, Truk. Dato: March 4. 1946 Doce No. 1230 г П Page 1 TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.) From Berlin Me у 15th 2:20 P;Iie To Tokyo May 15thc Tokyo Embassy No. 1197/9 of May 14th, To be kept under lock and. seal For the Ambassador personallyо Re: Telegram of the 6th, Noc 14-12. With respect to tic question dealt wit^ in your „ tclc_gran on Jajganesf-"Ц^с^ап rr.latlonsj t^e following should be taken under consideration; without doubt the opportunity to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Viadivоstok, so__ vit9.Hy_iiecessary to Japanese security, will never be as faviQrable as at present when Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European frontэ In this situa-tion the following exists: 1) If Japanese estimates of Russian forces 1n SijieПя яге яп^Ггяг.р^, and she is able to overcr'iri<' RuFgiar> qt.pnp-f̂ in Vladivostok and penetrate intoSiberia in the direction of Lake В:.ака^> tv4.r such an undertaking would be very significant to tre subsequent development of the war. Jepa-n-can_not__ evade the thxoat to Ver rear from Russian coastal provinces, it would therefore be best if she would arrive at a decision to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest. There is no ques tion that tv-is intervening time is used by the Russians in cooperation with the Americans for the sole purpose of fortifying the Siberian Coastal areas in order to provide air bases wrlrtb w i l l r n n s t . i t . n t . p я hVreaf to__sLapaxto Therefore, the earlier the push against Vladivostok takes place the less progress will have been made in these proparations0 however, this is all based on the premise that Japan is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature and will not have to free other forces wvich would weaken her position against England and America, as for example, in Burma 2) If Japan lacks the necessary strength to successfully undertake such an operation then it would naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations with Soviet Russia0 ^ vis also eases our burden since in any event Russia must maintaJji_tre~ops m last й1Ьег-?я in «nt/Mpatf.oa of g Г Jfapanesl^^Russian conflict» Abovc all any Japanese assurance to the Russians must bo avoided, By maintenance of neutrality, •'Doc. No. 1230 Page 2 the risk of a long drawn out war wit! insufficient forces and particularly with danger of air attacks against the Japanese Home Islands will be avoided о In tvis respect, Japan must „undertake the offensive in scne other direction,_ as for example-, India or Australia, in order to contribute effectively to the joint conduct or tve warл In summing up. the following is to be said from the German standpoint: a sudden and successful attack against Soviet-Russia might prove a great boon for t^c further conduct of the war to the Tripartite Powers, but tbis should only be undertaken if success can be assured», I request that you stress tW following considera- . tions and perhaps put less copra sis on the advantages wMch may accrue from a Japanese attach on Soviet Russia to the United States as it appears in your telegram-. The most important point whic^ should to constantly brought to the attention of the Japanese are г 1») t^at the situation was never as favorable as it is now. 2«) the longer one waits all the more airfields will be built in Siberia and- 3») the .Americans will be able to render the Russians more effective: support oncc these installations are completed than is possible todayo. With reference to III•. 4? of your telegram in w'rich you mention that a Russian-Japanese war would be welcomed by America since it л would weaken Russia. I.jfiiUl_tO note tvat t> ls argument is somewhat devious since at the p-p..rant. noment the Americans are actually strr.ngt.hr-rnng Vvc.g-u. by the delivery of war (materials,, etc» in order to strengthen her as much as possible, and. by no means think; of weakening Russia, On tie other hand, l agree with your views expressed in II., 3 that the Americans in the- light of coming presidential election will try everything to bring about a Soviet Russian Japanese War as a solution and so it must be reckoned that tie Japanese will try to avoid such a conflict. All in all our tactics must be such as to make Japan aware of these points of view without directly forcing the issue, RIBBENTROPo DOCUMENT NO. 6001 Page 1. EXHIBIT I. | A witness, JOSEB UBRBELAU„ called by ths investigi.vc.ing officer encered, was informed of the subject matter of v'ie investigation, duly sworn and declared through the inter- preter, ? IAS AO MO TO OKA, as follows! Examined by the investigating officers 1. 0. -rrhat is your name? A. JOSEB UERBELAU. 2. Q, What is your date of birth? A. 1908, I do not know the day. 3. Q. Where were you born? A. NGEFBECIIED, KOROR ISLAND, PAL AIT 4. Q. ?That is your present home address? . A. N GERE MID, KOROR ISLAND, PAL AIT.. 5. Q. 177hat is your occupation? A. I am the native Chief of Police for military government on KOROR ISLAND J 6. Q. Prior to the occupation of thin area t>y the Americans what was your civil occupation? A. I worked for ~he JAPANESE government and jvas in charge ofMjhreeT hundred (' ̂ QpT п.Г.;:1 •• ̂ at II>.LIIK Village* en 7. Q. Did you bear military arp.?? A. No, I did not. 8. Q. How long did you do this work? A. From February. 194-5 to August, 194-5» 9. Q. Do you know of construction of fortifications or military installations prior to December, 1941? Dx о i G s» 10. Q. Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned? A. I know cf a gun emplacement constructed at NGEREIILENGUI, BABELTHUAP, in 1939^ 11. Q. Did you witness this construction? v^ - DOCU?TENT No, 6001 ¥ Page 2, 12. Q. Did you work on it? A. No. 13. Q. Did you see the gun in the finished emplacement? A. No, the area was restricted by the JA^NESE after its com- pletion. 14. Q. Was forced native labor used on the gun emplacement on BiBELTHUAP? .1. Yes. 15. Q. How do you know this was a gun emplacement? A. I saw the gun being brought from a boat at NGERETtLENGUI Harbor to the area of the gun emplacement. 16. Q. Do you have knowledge of construction work before 1941 other than that mentioned? k. No^j 17. Do you know of other cases of use by the JlPiPESE of forced native labor? 1. Yes. 18. Q. Did they force you to work? A. Yes. 19. Q. Who forced you to work? L. The South Seas Government officer, KIJISHIMA. 20. Q. Is KAJISHIMA a JAPANESE civilian or a member of the military? A. I do not know. 21. Q. What did thej?- make з̂ ои do? A. They made me work on the airstrip at AIRAI, BABELTEUAP. 22. Q. ,:"hat are the inclusive dates of your work on the air- strip? A. From March 3, 1944, to August 5, 1944. 23. Q. What did they pay you for this work? A. One (1) yen per day. 24. Q. How long was your working day? A. From 6 a.m. until 5 p.m. with a 30 minute rest pariod at 10 a.m., 1 hour for lunch, from 12 a.m. to 1 p.m., and another 30 minute rest period at 3 p.m. 25. Q. Did the Japanese provide you with food? A. Yes. DOCUMENT No. 6001 Page 3.. 26. Q. Did you pay for this food? г A. No, it was provided free of cost. 27. Q. Did the JAP\NESE provide a place for you to live? A. Yes. 28. Q. Did you have to pay for it? A. No. 29. Q. During this period of work on the airfield did you have any days off? A. No, we worked every day. 30. Q. Could you take a day of:r if you wanted to? A. No, we were put in jail if we did, 31. Q. ,,Tere you ever put in jail for taking a day off? A. No, I never took a day off and was never put in jail. 32. Q. Did you ever see anyone out in jail for taking a day off? A. No, I did not. 33. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide you with clothing? A. No, they did not. 34-. 0. Did you buy your clothing from the JAPANESE? A. Yes. 35. Q. What did they charge you for clothing? A. The prices varied. I paid from 5 yon to 30 yon for a pair of pants. 36. 0. While you were doing this work were you treated well by the JAPANESE? A. Yes, I was well treated. 37. Q. Were all the natives working on this project treated well"by the JAPANESE? A. No, some were mistreated. 38. Q. What mistreatment did you see the JAPANESE inflict upon the natives? A. They were beaten with sticks. 39. 0. Who beat them? A. A JAPANESE NavyGonzoku known as KAWAHARA. DOCUI'ENT No. 6001 Page 4. 40. Q. Can yon describe this man? A. He weighed about 18 kahn and was about 5 feet 8 inches tall, 41. Q. What means did they employ to make you work on the airstrip? A. I received a written order. 42. Q. Do you still have the order? A. No. 43. Q. To the best of your knowledge what did the order say? A. It read, "Tomorrow morning at 8 a.m. report to the South Seas government building, KOROE. Those failing to report will be punished." 44. 0. "'hat work were you forced to do on the airstrip? A. I broke stones. Natives did all types of manual labor. 45. Q. Who supervised the work? A. Navy Gonzokus. 46. Q. While you were working on \IRAI airfield did any air raids occur? A. Yes, there were air raids. 47. Q. During these air raids were you allowed to take shelter? A. Yes, I was permitted to take shelter. 48. 0. Do you as an individual consider the pay given you as adequate remuneration? A. No, it was not adequate. 49. Q. Before you were forced to work on the AIRAI airfield, where did you work and what pay did you receive? A. I worked at the lumber yard at MADALAI, KOROR. I received 1 yen 70 sen per day. \50. Q. Do you have knowledge of other incidents of forced native labor and if so relate same? A. The gun emplacement at NGREI'DIU, URUKTHAPSL was constructed with forced native labor. 51. P. ̂ hen did this take place? A. In February, 1941.- 52. 0. Previously you said the construction of the gun em- placement on BABELTHUAP was the only fortification or mili- tary installation t&at you yourself knew was built before December, 1941. Is the date February, 1941, correct? A. Yes, it is correct. When I answered before I did not know what you meant. DOCUMENT No. 6001 Page 5.. 53. Q. Did you work there? A, Yes. 54. Q. Who ordered you to work there? A. The PA.LA.UA.bT Government, a branch of an subordinate organi- zation of the South Seas Government. 55. Q. What are the inclusive dates of this period of labor? A. February, 1941 to July, 1941.J 56. Q. T77hat did they pay you? л. 1 yen 50 sen per day. 57. Q. What was the length of your working day? л. The length of the working clay on this project depended entirely on the individual laborer and the effort he put forth. The average working day was from 5 a.m. until 2 p.m. 58. 0. Did the JAPANESE provide shelter? A. Yes, tents. 59. Q. Did you pay for shelter? A. No. 60. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide food? A. No, they did not provide food. 61. Q. During this period of work were you allowed any days of rest? A. One day a month was allowed. 62. Q. Did the JAPiHBSE treat you well while working on this project? A. No, I was mistreated. I was not whipped but I was not permitted to leave the area and return to my village. 63. 0. Did you see any natives •istreated by the JAPANESE on this project? A. No. 64. 0. Where did you work prior to this period of forced labor and what paTr did you receive? A. I worked for the PdLAU.lN Government as a small boat operator. The pay was 1 yen 40 sen per day. 65. q. Did you see them place the gun in the emplacement you worked on? A.. Yes, I saw then and helped the Navy Gonzokus put the gun in place. The gun moved around and up and down while I sat on it.;: DOCUMENT No. 6001 Page 6.. 66. Do you have any knowledge of YAP ISLAND? A. No. The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. The witness was duly warned and withdrew. Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages. DOCUMENT No. 6001 Page 7.. Verification by witness: I, Joseb Uerbelau, having previously testified, was called in by the investigating officer, informed that my oath formerly taken was still binding, and having my testimony read to me in the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct. Joseb Uerbelan (signed) Verification by interpreter: I, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being duly sworn depose and say: That after being duly sworn I translated the ques- tions propounded by the investigating officer to Joseb Uerbelau in the Japanese language, and that I translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanes language, into the English language. That I have read the foregoing transcript of testi- mony to said Joseb Uerbelau and declare that it contains all the information I received from said Joseb Uerbelau. Masao Motooka (signed) Verification Ьзг reporter: I, Corp Richard L. Koll, USNCR, reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being duly sworn, hereby certify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and transcribed by me and I delcare the same is true and correct. Richard L. Koll (sianed) We, Joseb Uerbelau, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Tear, Western Pacific Ba~e Command, USA, and Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly sworn and subscribed our names to the foregoing transcript this 26th day of February, 194-6. Subscribed and sworn to before me. Emery M. Perry (signed) Emery M. Perry, First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer, at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau Islands. DOCUMENT NO. 6001 Page 8.. Tho testimony of this witness was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness, inter- preter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read to the witness by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, as well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter. Emery !r., Parry (signed) Emery M. Perry, First Lieutenant, TJ. S. Marine Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer, at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau Islands. Doc. No. 2593D-2 (Item No. 3) SECRET From $ Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31 1941 У v Purple (CA) #433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires O U T Я .QGJ QF.grTnp~.nnv' T H A I I — S H E is at W A R witf~~Kussia. After э conference with tve military, at tve risk of a certain amount of repetition w1 ich may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government:s policy and views, Fereaftei, will you please act accordingly» 1 о In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of july 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn» You were informed of it by Circular #1300? Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materializa- tion of tvat policy^ 2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation fa^p^jn^ f-rnn t>p. nnrtVi anri г-rgr. the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teet> for all-out war, a - Not available. NOTE; The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office, It used the CA code transposed according to J-19 keys and the resulting transposed code was then enciphered in the purple machine, This is the first solution of such a system that has been effected® ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/4/41 (NR Doc. No. 2593D-2 (Item N0. 3) SECRET Page 2 From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple CCA) #433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well® The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear tvat their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position. 3, Commercial and economic relations between Japan third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the -South Seas, Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep, T*at is why we decidcd to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory. Tvat step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese- American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil roadг Tbis shows what a blow it has been to the United States в heedless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question^ ~~rmd it is—e—fact _that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be ea sily understood о If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action, 5, I know t>~at t^e Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into ARMY SECRET Trans с 8/4/41 (NR: Doc, No. 2593D-2 Page 3 (Item Nn. 3) From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) To: Washington July 31, 1941 Purple (CL #433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) the war, and wc -'.shed to settle tve Chinese incident» We were working toward those objcct-i/oso bet him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the bnitoa States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany. It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germanyэ Fogr_that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia beceuse~~or~Tcr own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now wo have not only to settle the"Chinese 'incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite incon- venient о We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germanyс She knows it and ought to understand our actions с 6c Well , t*"e formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of tic Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conducts What I mean to say Is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action,, In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgmentc Thus, all measures wvich our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pacte That this is a fact is proven by Jbhe promulgation of_an Imperial rescript. . We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives and no?; during this dire emergency is certainly no time tt engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action» Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/4/41 (NR) Doc с Noo 2593 (Certificate) WAR DIP'RTMFNT WAR DE° \RT>T№T GENERAL STAFF • INTF.LT,IGr">CE DIVISION WASHINGTON, 25, D,C, 24 July 1946 I certify that. the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, â -d tra-slated by trad^ed personnel of the "'ar ar:~ Naw Deo^rt'-e^ts, and are a^cura+e a"- authentic о rhe bast o-0 ry knowledge and belief insofar as it ^s humanly poss'ble for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese seriate /s/ Carter Clarke CAREER V". CLARKE Colonel, G,C,C, Doc. No. 6002 Page 1 EXHIBIT II Л witness, А1ЖЗГ R1UMD, caU sd by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation, duly sworn and declared through the interpreter, MASAO MOTOQKA, as follows: Examined by the investigating officer» 1. Q, iVhat is your name? Л, AUKLT HIUMD. 2, ч» '«That is your date of Id rin't A. March 2b, 1913. he:. At I'̂i' К 1 'Шл on ВШйЛ?ША? I slant 4. ft. ̂ hat is your present home address? A. NGEEMUD Village, ГОЛ0П Inland/ Pal an. I 5. ft. V/hat is your present- occupation A. I am a native policeman for Military Government on KOROH Island. 6. ft. Prior to the occupation of this area by the Americans, what was your civil occupation? A. I was a policeman for the south Seas Government at И Л Е Ы Ж Village on ВАЗИ.ТШАР. 7. ft. Did you bear arms? A. No. 8» ft. How long_did you do this work? A. From December 10 1944o to December 2, 1945» 9« ft» Do you know of the construction of fortifications or military installations by the JAPANESB prior to December, 1941? A, Yea. 10, ft, Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned? А. I know of a gun emplacement constructed at OIGUL Village, 3A3EL- ТШАР, in 1939. 11, ft. Did you work on it? A, No, I did not work on the emplacement. I was a supervisor of native labor called in to do the manual labor. The natives were ordered to do the work. Doc. No. 6002 Page 2 12» ft. ifho ordered this work? A. A vice-admiral of the JAPANESE Navy, not Admiral ITO. 13* 0.» tfes this a written order? A. Yes, the written order was brought to the village chief by a navy man and the chief in turn ordered the natives to work. ft. Did this order state there would be punishment for those who did not comply with it? A. Yes, the order said the gun emplacement was to be finished by a certain date and we want so many natives. Those failing to re- port will be punished. 15* ft. Did you see this order? A. Yes, the village chief showed the order to me. 16. ft. Do you have the order? A. No, the Navy man took it away with him aftep the chief and X had seen it. ! 17. ft. Can you describe the vice-admiral who issued this order? A. I cannot describe him. I know that he left these islands in 1939* 18. ft. Did you supervise the entire construction of this gun emplacement? A. No, I supervised the natives who carried boxes to the gun emplacement. 19* ft* Did forced native labor build the gun emplacement? A. No, the Navy Gonzokus built it, 20. ft. Did.you see the contents of any of the boxes the natives carried to the gun emplacement? A. No, I did not seejthe contents. The natives carried the supplies to the site of the gun emplacement which had not' been built at that time. 21. ft. Did you see the completed gun emplacement? A. Yes, but the gun was not in it yet. 22. ft. Do you remember what date this was? Л. No, only that it was 1939. 23» ft* Did you see the gun placed in this fortification? A, No, I did not see a gun placed there but later in March, 1944*! I saw a gun there. 24* ft* *or the forced native labor which hauled the supplies prior to the completion of the gun emplacement, what was the daily individual wage? A, <Te received no pay. Doc. No. (A02 Page 3 25. ft. Did the JAPANESE provide the natives т/ith food? A. Yes, breakfast and supper. 26, ft. Did the JAPANESE provide you with shelter? A. No, we lived at our village of OICRJL, on BASLTIIJAP. 27» ft. "ere JAPANESE guards present to force you to do thia work? A, Yes, there were Navy guards who carried r i f l e s . 28. ft. *hat was the length of the vrorking day* A, From 5 a.m. to 6 p.m. We had 1 hour for lunch from H13O a.m. to 12»3<> p.m. We took lunch with us or went to our hemes to eat. 29» ft. Can yoU give the inclusive dates of thip labor* A, No, but we worked for about three (3) weeks. % • ft. Did you receive any days of rest during this period? ' A. Yes, we asked for and received one half day of rest during this period. \ 31. Did the JAPANESE mistreat you? i A, Yes, they mistreated me once. 32* ft. that mistreatment did you reoeive? A. I was slapped on the face three times by a Navy guard because I was late for work. 33» ft. Was this the only case of mistreatment you know oft A* No, two natives told me the guards had hit them with their f i s t s . 34» ft. Do you know the names, rank, and organization of the JAPANESE who hit you and the natives? A. Their names were Leading Seaman ТАКШ1ЙД and another Nary man Лове name was SHTNOIiARA.. They were both members of a SASAKI Unit. 35. ft. For this forced native labor was the vi l lage chief given any remuneration? •f A* No, the guard just thanked the chief upon completion of the work. 36, Q, Besides the above mentioned gun emplacement, do you know of other fortif ications constructed prior to December» 1941? A, Yes, I worked on the PKf.KI.TU Airfield from January, 1936 to March, 1936. "" - 37» ft. Were you forced to do this work? A, Yes, I was ordered by the South Seas Government Offioer, КШЗНША, to take the place of a man who became sick. Doc. No. 6002 Page 4 38* ft* Was thi3 a written order? A. Yes. 39• ft* Do you still have this order? A. No, I returned it when I reported for work. » 4°. ft. What did the order say? A. It read, "On (date) you, 1ШЛД), report and bring this order to the South Seas Government Officer, KAJI£HILIA. If you f a i l to do so, you will be punished. 41. ft. Can you describe this man KAJlSIffilA? A. He was a civilian who worked for the South Seas Government. 42* ft* What type of work did you do during this period? A. I carried stones and dug holes to place the dynamite in. ft. What was the length of your working day? A. Frcni 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. We were given a 15 minute rest period at Ю a.m. and 1 hour for lunch at 12 a.m. We were given another 15 minute rest period at 3 p.m. 44* ft* What was the daily wage received? A. 1 yen 5° sen per day, 75 sen of which was deducted by the JAPANESE for food and shelter which they provided. 45• ft» Were you mistreated during this period of labor ty the JAPANESE? A. No. 46. ft. Did you see anyone mistreated? A, Yes, I saw a Navy Gonzoku beat a native on the baek with a stick about three and one half (3^) feet long and about one half (i) inch in thickness. 47* ft* Were there JAPANESE guards present to force you to work? A. Yes, there were Navy Gonzoku supervisors who carried pistols. 48. ft. Were there any airplanes in the area at that time? A. No, the airfield wasn't finished. 49* ft* Were there any guns or fortifications around this area? A. No. 50. ft. What work were you doing prior to this period of labor and what pay did you receive? A. I was working as a department store clerk on К0РШ Island and re- ceived 1 yen 3O sen per day. Doc. No. 6002 Page 5 51» Besides the above mentioned information, do you'know of any other fortifications or military installations constructed prior to December, 1941? A. I have heard of others but these were the only ones I worked on. 52, Q. Do you have any knowledge of YAP Island? A. No. The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. The witness was duly warned and withdrew. Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages. Doc. No. 6002 Verification by ...J Page 6 I, Aukst Riumd, ha- • : r,.eu0 was called in by the investigating officer, .nfor ---л:- у taken was still binding, and having my testimony read 1 the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct. t. д / AUKST HUM) Verification by interpreter. < I, T-5 llasao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being d u i • - p.ud sax' That after being duly .-j.ns.ated the questions propounded by the investigating officer to Auks* flii.jnd :.л the Japanese language, and that 1 translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanese language,, into the English language. That 1 have read the foregoing transcript of testimony to said Aukst Riumd ana declare that it contains all the information I received from said Aukst Riumd. /о/ Mfiзао Motooka . Verificat ion by reporters 10 Corp Richard L„ К USKGR0 reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being" 7. . ,ж , пгьЬу cerfify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and. v an- ..bea by me and I declare the same is true and correct. /д/ Ricnard L, Koll 7te0 Aukst Riumd, T..5 ASasao Mot-ouKa9 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA., е.л~ Sc-i,;, H;! hard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly swt>r-- ant subscribed our names го the foregoing transcript this 27th day of Peeimvy'o Subscribed and swb:;m to before ms. /a,' Emerv M, Perrv . Hnery I'. Perry0 , i .rar, Lieutenant, U, S, Marine Сс rps Reserve, Investigating Officer, at Island Goniaand, Peleliu, Palau Islands, The testimony of this vi тгэза was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness 0 •interpreter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read tr г-b- -vitiess by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, аз well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter, Emery M, Perry, First Lieutenant, U.S.Marine Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer, at Island Cornraand, Peleliu, Palau Islands. V ! i V F 9 & Doc. No. 1621E Page 1 Excerpt from; "Establishment of East Asia," a symposium of the Institute of Total War 2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing-, if necessary, pressure to bear at a jperiod when the war situation is favorable to tier many" I. '-hen the war situation is favorable to Germany. (1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting it a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to (suspend hoyitlXLttes". (2) In this case we will obrain from the Soviet Union a promise that she-would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise. II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany Wken the warjgituation is_unfavjirab2 e_to Germany, it shall be~~^S~general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be. prepared to exert great pressure on the Sovlot-Union- in caseof unavoidable necessity, and to_ expect a pea ce which may not be necessarily satisfactory. Doc. No. 1621B Page 2 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 1621B__ Statement of Source, and Authenticity; I, Та]-ehashij_ ?Iichitcs_hi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:„Secretary, of_ Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of "the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general, mobilization war for the es- tablishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached"document was issued by the Total VTar Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the recuest of the prescribed Institute. Signed at Tokyo on this IJZik-day of September, 1946 Witness: /s/ R. Ivuriyama /s/ M. Takehashi ~Signature of Official SEAL Secretary cf Cabinet "Official Capacity Stater lent cf Official Procurement I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters,of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me fr> m the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 12th dav of September, 1946 /s/ Richard K. Larsh FAME Document Жо. 6012 Я ? Page 1 1455 (OlO)-gc] Ш Ш 5 CHARTERS, OCOUPASIOS F0RC3S, TRU2 AIID CSSTEAL САВОЪШВ ISLANDS, * chief, Uman Island. Information relative to the date of construction of fortifications and military installations in the Truk Atoll prior to December 1941, use of forced native labor without adequate remuneration, and denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap» * * Perpetration of testimony * of Ichiro Moses, assistant E Taken at: Date: * n в In the presence of. Reporter: Interpreter: Questions by: Moen Island,, Truk and Central Carolines, February 23, 1946, Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, S: Marine Corps Reserve. George C„ Liehka, corporal, U« S. Marine Corps Reserve. Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island, Thomas Santamaria., first lieutenant; U. S„ Marine Corps НезеГ70„ 1 • Г: ч* State your name, permanent home address, and occupation. • A. Ichiro Moses, assistant chief, Uman Ifcland, 0. How long have you lived on the island of Uman? A, Forty-five years0 Q. How long have you been living in t A. Forty-five years. Q,. Have you any knowledge ef fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Uman Island pricr to December 1941? A. Yes. Document Но. 6012. Page 2» Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations. A. In 1939 on the southern section of Urnan Island the Japanese commenced building roads and fortifications. Houses were built to billet troops, a searchlight was installe?, raplac.monts for big guns built, and two big suns and four sr.all ont-.3, ineta: led, They lug a cave, reinforced it with concrete, ar.d stored irar.mi .ion tierein This construction was under the direction of the navy. The officer in charge of the troops billeted there was Taicho. Seconi in command was Buntaisi. During 1940, prior to December of that year, or the island of Otta, eight miles south if Urnan, the Japs-аэse Navy его?ted a wharf, houses, installed a search light, two ;unc- with tores of about two or three inches in diameter, and sevsr-ii machine guns were installed» During 1941, prior to December of that year, on the island of Salat, eight miles east of Шаг, -one Japanese Navy constructed a wharf, houses, \ installed a e загс} light, two »uns with bores appearing to be about V three inches in diameter, глЗ erectcd a radio station. "Tnir r ililMMIfiiWYrnTri—НП '"i --T-—- Г -•- • /.;...•-•• - ( Q. On the map which I have before me of Uman I notice a northeast battery, consisting of one Armstrong type forty caliber fifteen centimeter gun, tvo twenty-fiy.e mi'iir.eier dual mouit machine cannons, and a northwest battery, consisting of ens Armstrong typeforty caJ.iber fifteen centimeter gar, could you tell me when these were installed? A. In 1942, Q. In the center of the ifland I notice one quadruple thirteen milimeter machine gun, do you knew when that was installed? A. In 1042. Q, When was the radar station in the center of the island constructed? A. In 1942. I Q. Were all the gune in the southern part of Uman installed in 1939, I 1940, and prior to December 1941? A. Yes. Q. In the construction of the-be.tidings what material did they use? A. Tor the buildings they used concrete foundation and the rest was lumber. The cave was concrete reinforced and all emplacements were concrete based. I Q, How many caves die they build before the war? | A. Only one, I. Q, Did you see ammunition stored in the cave before the war? A. Yes. Q, Did they have a great quantity cf ammunition there? A. Y e s . Document Но. 6013 Page 3 Q. What was the size of the cave? A. Twenty-four fees long, twelve feet wide, and nine feet high, and this cave was full of ammunition and provisions, mostly ammunition* Q,. Before December 1S41 did the Japanese ever practice shooting their big guns? A. Only to test them, Q,. Was the searchlight buj.lt into a cpve? A. It was built on a platform and covered over with canvas» Q,. Did they have any other equipment close :o the searchlight? A. They had a range finder. Q,. On the island of Obta what did they have there beside guns and searchlights? A. They had a warehouse there in which they kept ammunition and provisions. Q,. Did you see the provisions and ammunition? A. Yes. Q,. What did they have on the island of Sala; beside the searchlight and guns? A. A warehouse for ammunition and provisions» Q,. Was all this construction on Otta and SaLat prior to December 1941? At. Yes. Q,. During 1939, 1940s and 1941 s prior to the war, did tho Japanese ever mention waging a war against the Uniled States? A. Yes. Q,., What did they say? A. We are going to install fortifications and military installations before we start the war against the United States. i mm- Q,. Do you know of any native г лгло were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated? A. Yes. Q,<, State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases, A, In 1939 when they were installing guns and the military installa- tions on the southern part of Urnan we were forced to furnish fifty men per day of eight hours, six days a week for about a year and a half. The wages at this time were eighty sen per day. Daring Document So. 6012 Page 4 194-2 we were forced to furnish the Japanese one hundred natives a day for two months for construction of a road, Fone of these men were paid any salary. However, when we were through they gave us twenty hags of rice of one hundred pounds each, ten hags of harley of one hundred pounde each., one hundred loin cloths, one hundred towels, twelve bottles cf saki each holding about three quarts. We were forced to furnish fifty men per day for the con- struction of barracks and a radar station for approximately five months. They paid us eighty sen per day and furnished our people with three meals per day. We furnished twenty-five men per d.̂ y to work on the northern tip of Uman constructing a dock, wireless station, and houses. Thi3 continued for six months and the wages received was eighty sen per day. In 1944 the Japanese Army came to Uman. They took our houses for themselves and paid us half of what they were worth. After the war the houses were returned to us but they were all in very poor condition- Commencing in January 1944 we furnished the Japanese Army one hundred women and one hundred fifty men p^r day. Prom January to the end of the war we were forced to furnish this number every day. The workers we furnished ranged In age from thirteen to fifty. The men received one yen and twenty sen per day» The women were paid eighty sen per day. One day each month we were forced to work without pay„ Q,. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Otta? A. We were forced to furnish thirty men during 1939 for the construc- tion on Otta for approximately five months. These men were paid eighty sen per day. Q,. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Salat? A. We were forced to furnish thirty men per day for construction of installation on the island of Salat for approximately six months. The men received eighty sen per day» Q. Are there any further details you wish to report? А. Ко, sir. Q. Aro you aware of any circumstances concerning the denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap? A.. Ho, sir. jp.j Ichiro Moses Ichiro Moses, assistant chief, Uman Island, Document Но. 6012 Page 5 Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Ichiro Mosos, of lawful age, being duly swcrn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of ray interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. /з/ Ichiro Moses Ichiro Moses Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of March 1946. /s/ T. Spntamaria SAiiTAMAEIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing _4_ pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto. is! Artie Moses Artie Moses Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th dry of March 1945. /а/ Т. Santamaria Т. SMTAMARIA, 1st Lt.. U3MC3., Legal Officer, I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.S., certify that cn February 23, 1946, personally appeared before me Ichiro Moses, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ichiro Moses read the seme and affixed his signature thereto in my presence. Place: Headquarters Military Government, /з/ T. Santamaria Truk and Central Caroline T. SAixTMAEIA, Islands. 1st Lt., U3MCH., Island Command, Truk. Date: March 11. 1946 ОС. ..-J с Page i С ч̂ "Г / Affidavit of .the Witness Nohara Komak:'chl HQgcog.y. February 15? 194-6 о Nohara KomakicM, born in 1899, a native of Yokohama Г Japan)„ A Japanese subject, mr^nemoerjf Family? Wife and son? School ЕпГГ%ПГ7ето'j.ty education received in Europe, graduated, from the faculty of philosophy at t-hv. university in Basle and Berlin® Frog 4->22 till 1939 he lived in Europe; the Dm.ted States of America", South America and Japa'.f̂ I-Ie was a journalist^ Has never been tried. From the 1st of September 1939 till the 21st of ApriX 1945 he was an assistant of a press- agent of the Japanese Embassy. In Benin- At present he is in the U,SeS,Hfi as an internee, I have been warned of the responsibility for false testi monyo I am informed of the contents of Chapter 25 of R,T,F, ScRt Criminal Code» The examination is being conducted in the Japanese Language, with translation into Russian by the interpreter Rosenbaum EP Ge The interpreter Rosenbaum E, 6, is warced of the responsibility for the correctness of the translation, according to Chapter 98 of the ReT,F,S6R. Criminal Codec Question: When and where were you detained by the units of the Red Army? Answer: I was detained by the units of the Red Army 011 the 21st of April 194-5 in the suburb of Berlin, in Shtrausberg, 4-0 kilometres to tlie East of Berlin, Question; Why were you in the area of military operations and not at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin on the 21st of April, 1Q45? Answer; It happened, because I always lived in Shtrausberg, where my family was^ I didn't want to part with them in such troublesome time0 Last time I worked at the Japanese Embassy on t.hp "|bi-.h April., 1945-. later on I was not able to go to Berlin, because the railway between Berlin and Shtrausberg was destroyed* Doc, ATo, 2074- Page 1 07 I-АВЗ Question: Explain -che origin and nature of the present Cfernua and Engl: i-h documents, which were found ahcu*- you by the Red Army officer at the time of your arrest and explain why those documents were on you * I Answer; The present documents on four sheets of paper which were actually found on me, belonged in the, past to "the Japanese Embassy in Berlin,- As I was a convinced antifascist 1 Wag * \ against the war of Jacan and Germany,against the Scv:vt Union \ and her alllc-sT I1,deliberately kept these documents and in» \tended to use them ""In the interest or tiie allies , as I was~ sure Ithair-the day would come wnen these documents would, to a certain jexteiit exnose the Japanese v.'nr n>ininaiq; whn imri py_nvnVr>ri the |уяг against the peace-loving countries and brought their country and their people to a catastrophe^ Therefore, I kept those documents and made 110 attempt to hide or destroy theiu When Jon the 21st of April 1245.1 was taken in Shtrausberg I handed them over to the Soviet officerH The greater part of these documents were secret. Though it was not my immediate duty, as a press-agent, to deal with documents of that kind* yet I was made to be concerned with secret work by the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara Siru Ну duty was to work at the docu- ments of military and other secret information. The work was considered to be top secret and nobody but Ambassador 0shima, the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara and me ¥/ere initiated in it, The greater part of the present documents which were .found about me are copies of memorandums, containing secret information about the number and disposition of the units of the Red, its. equipment and supplies, the state of the war industry of the Soviet Union and its production; planes, tanks and also man-power of the TJrS~SeR- The Japanese Embassy in Berlin received ndJLitary information of similar nature about the Soviet Union from Japanese Ambassadors in Moscow Tatekava~and 'S"atro In the form of ciphered telegrams.* at which the counselor Kavahara,and me worked afterwards and translated into German. Afterwards the Japanese Embassy in Berlin passed that information to the German Ministry for Foroign Affairs с .Question; You are being snown the document of the 15th of January 1945» headed "War potential of the Soviet Russia", in which figures of_planes? tanks, oil, c-tc^ produced in the Soviet Union; are omitted. By whom and when was the document drawn up and what does the omission of the figures mean? Doc . No г г074 Page 2 Doc. Noe 2074- Page 3 Answer: This document was drawn up by the Counselor Kavahara and ne in January., 1945, on the ground of the information, received from Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow* The omission of the figures is made by the Counselor Kavahara5 he wrote them in hand in the 1st copy and handed the copy as it wasj to the Germanse This information Kavahara considered top secret. .Questions Among the documents found about you, there is a document under the title of "On the strength or the Red Amy", There is a mark, made in your hand on this document, stating that on the 21st of January? 1942, the military attache in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, through us, handed the follow- ing information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs* Under the document it is written in your hand that Mon the 22nd of January, 1942, that information was in the hands of the German Commander-in~Chie.fM . Explain what those marks on that docu- ment mean. Answer: This document is a record of secret information received by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin from the Japanese attache in Moscow on the 21st of January,, 7 Q4?„- That's how the origin of this information was explained to me orally by the Counsel of the Embassy Kavahara0 The record is repro- duced by me in this document 011 the ground of draft copies. The next day, on the 22nd cf Januarjr5 after Kavahara and me had worked up this document, the Counselor Kavahara. personally handed it to the Gorman Foreign Office. As to the delivery of secret information a^out the Allies to the Germans Ту the Japanese Embassy.in Berlin, I want to say in addition that from J. 939 till 1945 the Japanese Embassy handed, as far as I remember, about 40 communiques tothe Germans ̂ whenever they were coming from Moscow, London "and Tokyo„ The contents of those materials, mainly; refer to war-economic power of the , ПпР-Д-ГС- Alii Part of the materials were summaries of certain investigations concerning different problems, other materials were results of personal observations of the Japanese "who passed through the Soviet Union in war-time, ĵ ies_tion г Was anything known to you about tho agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941? Doc, No* 2074 Pago 3 Doc,- No * 2074 Page 4 Answer5 Yes, I, as well as the rest of the Japanese Embassy staff in Berlin; knew of the existence of such an agreement, Question; By whoso orders did the Japanese Embassy in Berlin pass the secret information about the U.SeS.R. to the Germans? Answer % By the order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador OshinalT Question; In this case, how will you characterize the actions of the Japanese authorities ana their representative Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin? Answer; Since there was an agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, the delivery to Germany of secret military and other information about the U*SoS,R3 helped to a certain extent Germany in her war against the Soviet Union and, consequently, was a breach of the agreement of neutrality. Ambassador Oshima,^as a representative of the Japanese Government did not" want to consider and. fulfill the agreement of neutrality between Japan arid the Soviet Union, In his practical activity he was guided by the id_coj.ogical alliance, the so-called ahti-kOmintcrn pact", a military •union between Germany, Japan and Italy. Oshima being an active partisan and conductor of the Japanese Governments anti- Soviet policy, in this respect his activity directly contributed to the latter. Question; Characterize the activity of Oshima Hirosi? as Ambassador of Japan in Berlin. Answer; The а с t i yl ty.. of -Q s hi as w.sll as his political facej have been sufficiently described by me above. Г only want to add the following; Qshima Hirosi is a convinced,, partisan of fn.40i.qn of the German typo and'an'Trreconcilable enemy of the U«SaS»IL>, England and tne и .Soil. He contributed to a large extent to conclusion or a military agreement between Germany. Japan and Italy, being the Japanese military attache in Berlin. During the celebration of the anniversary of the Mukden battle (the victory of the Japanese In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905), Oshima said at a banquet injBerliru *4 am drinking Russian vodka and think that I am drinkingJ^gsjLi!!,) тпе complete Oshima • s confidence in power oflJermany was well-known not only at the Embassy but Doc г No0 2074 Page 4 Due» Ко с» • 2 О'74- Page 5 to the Germans as vol notorious leaders of Oshima to banquets cJ у there. Goering "was i/G. /^Hf- .1 • Goering<. Ко 1 tel. Himmler » " ' ' " " , I I and о ь I I Й1" Germany were •i" the Embassy __ _____v_o]uota.nt of visiting ^ ^ / not c o n c e a l u n f r i n n n ипи.^ rewards m e Japanese, out \ Hibnler and-other leaders 'ten invited by Ambassador Hitlpr was once present the Embassv e a lid of «SoS»" J?.'OG'L!en.tly called Oshima and in their turn invited him to then, Oshima the German Language quite we'll and therefore he never an interpreter along while visiting the Germans. In way his talks with the Hitlerites wore held in their topics are unknown to ne* With гл.- help on know? took his L.o.a travelled showed him " and his assistants Germans trusting Oshima with their assistance that Oshima., Japanese military attache in 194-2 the Soviet-German front Kanensk in Go '.A T V privacy and of Kimmler -my a lot aril the :-\c Compaq ТГё' •r 1943 Ч5Б J."C J 2 3 L "W o. 3 the .so ma ae a Ukraina", trip to or The" . cLO 1 was in tne. K aina I think in _____ that he was an Ambas sador""" Of Japan, which had an agreement of neutrality with the UoSeS«Re, did not embarvass him in the least. He thought it quite appropriate to stay on the Soviet territory, occupied by the Germans. Oshima has always been an advocate of a joint military attack of Japan and Germany on the UjS^ScRo In this respect the following episode is characteristics Immediately after the attack of Germany against the Soviet Union on the 22 - 23rd of June 194-1, a ciphered telegram was received in Tokyo, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the meaning of which was approximately the followings "In con- nection with the present situation Japan would guard the Pacific Ocean in the spirits cf anti-komintern pact," Oshima summoned the counselor Kavahara and me and asked for our opinion. Kavahara and I declared that, according to the meaning of the telegram Japan-will not attack the U,S»ScRe Oshima tried to prove the opposite, pointing out that "the guard of the Pacific Ocean" meant war of Japan against the U,S.S.R. Oshima, infuriated by vagueness of the telegram, form lat- ns ordered the telegram to be sent to the Germans in the it was received, without paraphrasing tho text and tran ing it from English into German. The reply of the Germ J_s unknown to me* Oshima completely shared the so-cajt 11 tll̂ ory11 n-F -pnn-- -•-' ri r,n-i -,-.i nn д exposed in^ rtitl er1 s 'book "Mein Kampf"„ W^en_other Japanese made hints to"Oshima that rTit-lor p̂r.tre ̂ bnii-r t h n . b ^ Q P я g wnll я я of 1П1'СГ10Т_ creatures« Oshima that ho would я як it was Hitler's mistake and author to introduce r.n-pppqpon-lpm: answered that 1Ш corrections in the book a<Avw< От. , facts that were Л N o u 2074 -Eago 5 1 [ u t c ^ ^ crt^jt^tr Doc Ко» 2074 Page 6 cocoon knowledge about the Hitlerites f atrocities within tneir own country and on the occupied territory„olL±2ie Soviet union0 He considered" these to" bo" false, saying that they were only lies and enemy propaganda * As a natter of fact, obligingness and servility of Oshina towards' the Germans were boundless., The case of a Japanese professor Sakinura nay serve as an example of it,. Being sent on con~ piss ion _by_a_ -Тя^лр^ T^-hp^iurgical concern-to- йагшпу Sakinura in 1943 or 1944 left for Sweden, where in an interview given to an English correspondent declared that Germany would lose the war tiirough shortage of iron and сд the, whole" he denounced Germn fascism^ In connection with the protests of the Germans there wad' an exchange of notes between Oshina and tho Germans three timesj In his last note Oshina infnmVi tho Germans that he did not object to the delivery of Saki-Mur to_tho Gestapo» This is an indisputable fact, as l nysolf^put the technical touches to the notco This action of Oshina caused great indignation even among pro-fascist Japanese, I don't know what has" become of Sakinura, as he did not live in the Embassy and I lost sight of him. Military attaches generals Eanzai and Konatsu and navy attaches Iokoi and Kodzina were the most intimate people, with whom Oshina had close connections. He constantly kept company with then as all of then culti- vated profascist sentiments„ Finally, the 1ast stagr of—— (lshina'a enrr-m- 7 r\ Germany was also connected with Oshina's соцрletо confidence in~strength ana posslbillty'lpf the-- - гГг>-ггп̂ пдт Hî on * -л April 1945 the" situation bocane alarcjng in Berlin, Oshina accepted the Gernans1 offer to novo""to~~ the South of Germany as ho pelloyed the Germans that_they would be able to continue a Jasti.ng~resistance jnTthe South, On the 14th of April 1945 Oshina with the Enbassy went to Bad Gashtein. to the south of Salzburg in motor cars. Since then I haven-t heard anything new about Oshina, In Berlin, the Counselor Kavahara. a diplomatic attache, the Japanese consiil and two or three officials were left in Berlin to contact with separate members of the German Cabinet. I stayed because of the pointed out at the beginningc- The testimony is written from ny words correctly and is trans- lated into Japanese tu no» Nohara Doc. Ко, 2974 Page 6 Docо No, 2074 Page 7 ч The examination began at 5 o'clock The examination ended at 9 о!clock. Examined2 Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov» The interpreter Rosenbaum Hepebeus Kejobs CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT I5 Ma GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly con versant with the Russian and English languagesг and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document, Signature j, _ Docо No с 2074 Page 7 (final) t \ hoc. Го. 2074 Page 1 / 19 January 1945 Corfidential WAF- POTENTIAL OF SCVIST RUSSIA Favorable development of the military status of Soviet Russia and the reconouering of her lost regions has resulted not only in the moral but also in the material strengthening of the war potential of Soviet Russia. The production of aircraft, tanks, vessels, coal, oil iron, steel, and other war materials has increased though the basic industries have not yet reached the pre-war production level, Rebuilding in reconquered regions has already begun, but still Soviet Russia, in restoring her war industry, relies on the aid from abroad to a large extent. As far ss food-stuffs are concerned, restoration in the reconquered territories is comparatively rapid and therefore in view of last year's good harvest, the breakdown of the Russian war potential due to the lack of food-stuffs is unthinkable. Russian armed, fо®ces_ ard^workers ояп mafrrtain their former e ff iciency-r-̂ The patriotic—movement in Russia, the friendly attitude of the gnv̂ rriTr̂ nt trvyqrris roiigion, as well as a number of economic measures have led to the revival оf^thg~T!ational spirit^ On" the whole, it can be con- firmed that the war potential of Soviet Russia has notably increased. PRODUCTION СГ ': AR ".ATTi'IALS • AIRCRAFT Production par month in December 1944 Number of aircraft received from abroad until April 1944 (Average monthly delivery0 - Number of aircraft in disposition on the first front against Germany Number of aircraft in use in the eastern regions of the USSR TANKS Production per month in December I°44 Doc. Го. 2074 Page 2 Number of tanks imported from abroad until April 1944 (Average monthly delivery- ) Number of tanks on the fronts: Against Germany In eastern regions of the USSR УESSEhp Number of vessels built in 1044 : 10 with the total tonnage of 120,000 tons. С GAL The restoration of coal mines in the Donetz Basin has not made any noticeable progress. At the end of 1944 the daily output of the Easin amounted to from 75,000 to 100,000 tors. However, there are possi- bilities of increasing the output in the Alaganda and Uzbekistan regions. The output of coal in Soviet Russia in 1944 amounted to 130,000,000 tons. GIL The production of oil in 1944, including the Rumanian and the Polish oil fields amounted to 38,000,000 tons. The amount of aviation petrol imported from abroad before April 1544 r (Average delivery per month!4 ) IRON and STEEL Iron industry of the Donotz Basin has not been restored in full measure, though there are possibilities of inc r ea sing production in the Urals and in Uzbekistan. The production cf steel ir 1944 amounted to 11,500,000 tons. alt: и м и Production in 1944 - from 100,000 to 120,000 tons. Importation from abroad before April 1944 (Average amount per month ) COFFER Production in 194 4 - 200,000 tons. Importation of cooper and copper wares from abroad before April 1944 - 24 0,000 tons. Doc. Но. 2074 Page 3 AUTCk03TLES Production in 1044 - 200,000. Importation from abroad before April 1944 - 220,000. NAI'TFO'vER Number of mobilized forces men. Total losses since the beginning of th3 war - 11,000,000 Reserves able tc bo mobilized" from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 men. Manpower in use on the Soviet-German frr.nt men. In eastern regions of the USSR , men. Number of workers engaged in war work — 71,600,000 Among them; 28,200,000 men 4 3,400,000 women Reserves of labor power from 3,000,000 to 3,500,000 FOCI) SITUATION Cereal Production in 1944 - 46,800,000 tons etc. etc. Пос. Но. 2074 Page 4 (Written in handwriting) Cn 21 January 1942, the Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow let the following report go through us to the German Foreign OTfice: Confidential The Strength of the Soviet Russian Armed ForceS According to information received by the Rumanian General Sta 'f the aspect of the strength of the Red Army at the beginning of December 1941 is as follows0 Strongth of Russian troops before the beginning of the Russian-German war; European Russia г Infantry 146 divisions Cavalry" 27 " Armored forces 3.5 " Total" 208 far East: Infantry 25 divisions Cavalry 20 " Armored Forces • . . . . ^ '_! Total . . 50 " The strength of Russian troops increased by mobiliza- tion since the beginning of the war 2 Total strength - 340-350 divisions Losses during the war; (until the beginning of December 1941) Infa ntry • • » • • . ш • » 2 X 5-220 divisions Cavalry 15-20 " Armored Forces 20-22 " (Translator's note corrected by hand; originally types' "10-20") etc. (Written by hand under the printed text on lower margin of the document) "On January 22, 1942 this information was in the hands of the German commander-in-chief." DOCUMENT No. 6014 CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 4 1455 (OlO)-gftl HE AD QUARTERS , OCCUPATION FORCES, ТГОК AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS. * * * * * * * * * * * * * ifc it * * * Л * * * * * * * sjc * * * * if. * * * * * * Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimon construction of fortifications and * of Bona Lion"-kit, As sis tan-, military installations in the Truk * Chief, Toi Island, Atoll prior to December 191-1, use * of forced nalise labor without * adequate renu ieration, and denial * of equal rights to Americans on Yap,* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I Taken at: Date: In the presence of: Reporter: Interpreter: Questions by: Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation. A. Sona Monukit, assistant chief, Toi Island» Q. How long have you lived on the island of Toi? A, Forty-eight years. Q, How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll? A. Forty-eight years. Q, Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military instal- lations constructed by the Japanese on the island of Toi prior to December 1941? A. Yes. Q, State what you know of your own knowledge about these instal- lations . A. During 1939 on the southwest section cf South Toi a road was built from the dock to the top of the hill. Around the edges of the top of the hill three gun emplacements were installed and three guns appearing to be about eight inches in diameter in- stalled there. A platform was erected and a searchlight affixed thereon. A reinforced concrete cave in which ammunition was stored was dug in the side of the bill. Two barracks were built for the Japanese soldiers. During 1949 on the northern tip of North Toi a concrete wharf was construe tod and a road from the wharf to the top of the mountain. At the top of the mountain one barrack and two warehouses were buixt. A concrete platform Page 1. Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines. February 25, """"" Thomas Santemaria, first lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve„ George C. Lishka, corporal, U, S. Marine Corps Reserve. Artie Hoses, chief of Uman Island. Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S„ Marine Corps Reserve. DOCUMENT No. 6014 Page 1. was built and a searchlight placed thereon. Two gun emplace- ments were constructed and guns installed appearing to be about four or five inches in diameter and a radio station built. 0. On the western section of North Tol I notice on this map be- fore me a cave housed gun and some barracks, when were these constructed? A. These were built after December 1941. Q. On the eastern section of North Tol there are quite a few barracks, when were bese constructed? A. After December 1941. Q. Did the Japanese place more guns and more installations on the northern section of North Tol after December 1941? A. Yes. Q. Were there any airfields built on either North or South Tol? A. No. Q. On the southeast section of South Tol we have a cave housed flat trajectory gun, generators, and searchlight, when were these put in? A. After December 1941. Q. On the eastern section of South Tol I notice a hospital, when was that built? A. After December 1941. Q. On the map of South Tol there are numerous buildings used as ammunition storage and barracks, when were these built? A, After December 1941. Q. Are there any other installations or fortifications on North or South Tol that you know of? A. No. Q. Do you know of any military installations or fortifications built on islands near Tol? A. No. Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated? A. Yes. 0. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases. A. During 1942 and 1943 we were forced to furnish three hundred men per day to the Japanese forces for labor. These men receiv eighty sen per day. Four days each month we worked with no pay. During 1944 and 1945 we were forced to furnish five hun- dred persons per day to work for the Japanese. The men were paid one yen and twenty sen per day and the women received eighty sen per day. During this period we were forced to work four days per month without pay. Q. Do you know the names of the Japanese in charge here at any- time the construction was in progress prior to December 1941? A. The second in command of Tol Island at that time was Hansai of the Japanese Navy and Michuno v;as in command of the army troops. I do not know the names of anyone else at that time. Q. Do you know the names of any Japanese in command when they were securing from you personnel for forced labor? A. Matsuta and Nakashima were the army commanders during 1942 when we were forced to furnish personnel for labor purposes. DOCUMENT No. 6014 Page 1. Q. Do you know any other names? A. No. Q. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equal rights to any Americans on Yap? A, No. Q. Is there any information you wish to add to that already given relative to the subjects under question? A. No. (signed) Sona Monukit Sena Monukit, assistant chiaf, Toi Island. Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Sona Monukit, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. (signed) Sona Monukit Sona Monukit Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946. (signed)_ Santamaria T. SANTAMiRIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing . 3 pages, to the witness; that the wintess thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto. (signed) Artie Moses Artie Moses Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946. (signed) T. Santamaria T. SANTAMARIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Sona DO CUT.® NT No, 6014 Page 4- Monukit, and gave the foregoing answers to the several ques- tions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Sona Monuklt read the same and afl.ixed his signature thereto in my presence. (si^r^d) T, S ant armaria ^ д . Ж Ш ^ Х А , j.. 31 -u и с 5 US г iCI\ о j Island Command, Truk. Place; Headquarters Military Government, Mcen "Island, Truk and Central Carolines. Dates February ГР. 1946 CONFIDENTIAL. Doc. 2ю. 2313 Page 1. 0 c , q 7 НВУЛЕАЗГООМ On the Discussion ci' the G> rm-nn Foreign Minister with Ax: F I '.ado:' v̂ SHIITA on Г, March 1943 Ambass: '.dor CJKCAA declared с ha 5 he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he : s to -̂jpr-rc to tn-j Germm Foreign Minister, Ъу order of his government, the following; Tho suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the susjecb ox a r.dtug.1 сcaiorence "between the Japanese Government апсГ imperial neacquai" cers, m wni.cn the question was exhaustively disdUsSCd T.nd •A.inv.l.jly-̂ .-obel The result was the" following: The Japanese GovornLient thoroughly recognizes the danger which i threatens frcm Bussia and ii?s full under standing for the desire of I its German elly, that Japan, too, enters into tho war against 1 Russia. It is not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. It is rp.ther of the conviction that it is in the common interest, not to start the 1 :ar pg-inst Зш air now. Or. the other hand, the Japanese Government will never disregard the Russian question. ) The. Jaornore Government has the intention to once againin С the future, tpke the offensive on the other fronts. In the dcclpration of the Ambassador, the German Foreign Minister asked how one conceived,in Tokyo, the future waging of the-war. At present, Germany is to a great extent waging war agp.inst the сommon enemies, ~lln£lahd ftftfl firmQ| rfapan is taking ^a rather defensive stanQj. However, it would Ъе more in order if all__the po\tfer-s—ammii-ĥ . t.Vip Triparti^e Pact joined all their foreos to jointly defeat not only England and .America, hut_Russia as well. It_jg nnt. when one part must fight, alnn?. One ""should not overstrain the German people's strength. In secret he is сoncernod that forces could he at work in Tokyo, who arc of the opinion — and who also propagate — that Germany wculd conclude tho fight victoriously anyway, and Japan should therefore further consoll idato herself before it would make further and "supremO effort; s, The U.S A. and England were pursuing the strategy that the Allies should at first turn all their strength against Germany and Italy alone, and had also expressed this ir. CASABLAHCA completely openly as their program. Actuality has confirmed this until now. Unfortunately, Ambassador SATO in KUIBYSHEV has apparently delivered to the "Russians ir this matter the assurance of the absolute neutrality '4 Doc. Но. 2312 Page 2. of Japan. However, we had. to undergo the experience that on the Eastern Front — especially in STALIH&BAD also — fresh Siberian division had fought. \ie would nevertheless attackRussians again and again. The situation "on tnc a,stern ifront had stabilized itself and a str.blo German Front had been establi hed except for a small, still existing, gap. however, at the same time we have to fight against England and America more or less by ourselves in Africa, in the air and on all the oceans as well. Compared with this, Japan's share w s small. Even the battle area in BUK-IA wa.s small in comparison. Tokyo must therefore understand it when Germany raises the question of .whether in the spirit of waging the joint war,'it is the correct strategy for Japan not to make full use of her people's strength, while German."1 s is strained to_tne limit;. He would like to emphasize again that if Germany would ever become weak, Japan would find herself facing a world coalltlun which wauld consist hat onl.v~bf CSn̂ lar.d, America and Hussia, but_t>'fi ppnpln'g /УПТ..ЧК7?йТГту nf |>n tTw BflliBtriM on earth, as~well as that of a bolshevized Europe. The question was therefore raised whether at this time" so"exceedingly decisive for the outcome of the • ar, the strength of the allies was properly distributed and was really being used in the spirit of a joint, total conduct of the war. Ambassador OSHIMA answered that what ..decided the issue for Japan was whether she had sufficient forces and whether her armament capacity was sufficient in order to attack and defeat the Hur.sians, in addition to the em-.mies Japan already has, without e naang a ring"her operations on the other fronts. Tokyo is afraid of splitting its forces. On the other hand Japan's attitude was in no way purely defensive and just waiting, but a new attack against the U.b.A. and the Eritish will surely take place. Even though he has no detailed reports concerning this, he personally believes that this attack will come in the direction of the Indian Ocean. In any case, however, the belief in an inseparable mutual victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion for Tokyo. * * * * * The C-erman Foreign Minister commented at this point that an infraction of mutual trust vras naturally completely out of the question, since this was unshakeable between Germany and Japan. In the matter of the inauiry which wa.s brought up, it vras solely a auestion of the joint conduct of the war, the strategy which is to be jointly carried out, that is, the proper use of the common strength. Germany entirely understands that Japan must first finish constructing her newly won bases and positions and must consolidate her forces. Japan had done this for a year and now Doc. No. 2312 Page 3. when Germany is hearing the brunt of the struggle, Japan should Ъе in a rositicn to he able to apply a new decisive blow against the common enemy. It was in no way a. question of mutual trust, but he sometimes is concerned that Japan has the intention of consolidating he- forces for yet another year and only later starting a new autack- Upon this the Ambassador replied that he did not think so. The intentions of the military leaders in his fatherland were unknown to him; nevertheless, he knew that for a long time Japan had the inteaM-c-n cf-fra^njag ainst Russia^ But for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one withdrew the front in the South and abandoned several islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the North, this could be possible. This would, however, mean a heavy defeat the South- Both an advance _to the South, and at the same time to the North was impossible for Japan. * * * * * * The German Forcgn Minister then once more brought up the question of a (Japanese attack on Russia,- by stating that the struggle on the Surma Front a.s well as in the South was more of a maritime problem and that actually only a fevr land troops were being employed "on all' frontа̂ _е:-:сeot inc China» The .attack on Russia was therefore in the first place a matter for the Army and the consideration "as whether the necessary forces were nevertheless ready for this. OCHIMA replied that the bulk of the Japanese Amy was bound-in China and on the Burma Front the forces were by no m ar.s insignificant either. If .Japan- should want to attack Russia.: she would, have to bring almost all the troops from the South into Manchuria. In any case, one did not have enough troops in order to be able to attack Russia with the firm prospect in an early victory. In ca.se the Russians are the attackers, cne is naturally armed. But" for ал attack on them, insufficient forces were ready. At_the end of March or early April of this yea.r, a few officers, cloaked as couriers and Embassy Secretaries, will come here from Tokyo in order to deliver particulars concerning the situation and Japan1 s military forces and plans._ Ее will be able to draw a better picture/of matters/ there when these hs.ve arrived. The ambassador emphasized again that Japan was unwilling to take up a defensive attitude. * * * * * * Concerning the division of strength on the Russo-Japanese front, the_Amba.ssa.dor remarked that the Japanese fighting forces were- gr-eatly inferior to those of the Russians. The Japanese General Staff has a very exact view over the state of the Red Doc. No. 2313 Page 4. «Per Bagtem Army, on the hap is of a carefully expanded jt spy net on the Russian side у.here many Koreans were jrnrkin̂ for them as spieiT One has an. exact idea of the position of the hunkers, thickness of the hunkers, etc. The general strength of the Russian Arm' amounts to BOO.000 men. It ш quite natural that the Russians left so many tmopг at the frontier, as in the course of their history they had aLvayз until now made extremely unpleasant experiences with surprise attacks on the part of Japan. Concerning our report;g on Russia's imoorts from the U.S.A. via VLADIVOSTOK, OSIU tnoucht t.h? >, Japan allowed the Russians only one seaway, and cIt-id on tr.-? re^vay all ships are searched for arms end, ammunition. The Japanese Go1 ernmant lias no particulars concerning -i^anIslberv of yiar malerials oyer this way. However, it was known to him that the Americans were maintaining an airline from Alaska to Siberia. This goefe fro3" FAlRBAITS.S; ilTADYR, JilZUTSK to KEjASITOJiSSK p.nd some material, of value to tne Russians, vrould certainly "be delivered over it. * Ж * * * * In that tho German Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Japan will soon he acle to conduct an effective shipping war from her far advanced "bases against tho enemy lines of supply, and after Ambassador OSEIMA once again expressed his thanks for the German willingness in the name of his Government, the German Foreign Minister hid goodhye to the Ambassador Berlin, 9 March 1943 GOTTFRIEDSEN Document Ко. 6015 s CCFTIРОЦ-ТТIAL Page 1 1455 (010)-gel EEADCpASTIIRS, OCCUPATION FORCES, ТНПК: AND СЗЖЕАЬ ОАРСЫМЗ ISLAilDS. Information relative to the date cf construction of fortifications and military installations in the Truk Atoll prior to December 1341, use of forced native labor without adequate remuneration,, and denial of equal rights -co Americano on Yapt * * * * $ Perpetuation of testimony of Ater Era, chief, Fefan IБlandu \ Taken at: Date : —"J In the presence оi Reporter! Interpreter; Questions by: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines. February 25s 1946. Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve» George C„ Lishka, corporal, U, S, Marine Corps Reserve, Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island. Thomas Santamaria., first lieutenant, U. S. Mar m o Сог"оз So serve . Q,„ State your name, permanent home address, and occupation. A, Ater Era, chief, Fefan Island. Q. Eow long have you lived on the island of Fefan? A. Forty-nine years, Qp Eow long have you been living in the Truk Atoll? A„ Forty-nine years. Q,, Eave you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese en Fefan Island prior to December 1941? A, Yes. CONFIDENTIAL Document Но. 6015 оошпетш. Page 2 Q,. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations. A. On the island of Eefan during the year of 1940 the Japanese con- structed a road from the dock or. the east side of the island to the top cf the mcuntair.„ Emplacements for two guns were built and guns appearing to have bores cf about five inches were installed. A searchlight was placed there on a platform and a generator placed inside a snail buildingr Three large buildings were erected, one used as a barracks and two for warehouses* Q,o On the north side of lefcn there is a caved housed flat trajectory gun, a machine gun,, and two twenty-five miiimeter twin mounts, when were these installed? A. After December 1941. Q,. On the south tip they have a cave housed flat trajectory gun and a machine gun_, when were these installed? A. After December 1941. Q,. All over the island I notice numerous buildings, a hospital, barracks, warehouses, and guns, when were these installed? A. After December 1341* Q. Do you know of any military installations and fortifications placed on other islands thereabouts? A. Iess on the island of Ealeu. Q,« 'Oiat was built on this island? A. After December 1941 they dug cave3, built buildings, and installed guns there. Q,. When was the seaplane base built on the island of Tsis? Ae During 1943„ Q,» When was the airfield built on Faram? А» Construction was started in 1943.., Do you know the names of any of the persons in command or in charge While the building was going on prior to December 1941? Iwair Japanese ITevy, was one of the officers in charge during that period. m u q. Do ycu know of any natives who were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated? A. Yes, Q,» State what you know of your own. knowledge about these cases. Ac Erem January 1942 until cessation of hostilities we were forced to furnish four hundred men and three hundred women to the Japanese for сотэтатш. Document iTo. 6015 о о т ш и ш Page 3 employment purposes. The Pay received was eighty sen for the men, sixty sen for women per day- Daring '1943 and 1943 we were forced to work one day a a eh month without pay. Por the year 1944 we were frrcod ir *for.r fa: о !R«ct :hs wii-hart рг:.г ЕЛ4 during 1345 three months wliiiou;, xvvr. r.g "•944 and 191-5 the men received one yen and twenty sen ani the women eighty sen par day, Q,. What method о id the Japanese use in forcing you to supply labor? A. We were told to furnlfh certain amounts, Q.> Supposing yen ла»1 a5 b furnished this labor what would have happened? A, We had to furnish a list and if the. person did not make an appearance or didn't report for work they were whipped, Because we would be punished if vrs didn't supply the request for personnel by the Japanese forces we never disobeyed orders. Q. Do you know the name of anyone in command forcing you to furnish labor? A. The name of the military police m?„ster during 1942 and 1943 on Fefan was Sate, and during J944 and 1945 the name of the polico master was AK-i » I-iy people reporting for work had to report to these officials, 0_ Do you know of any circumstances of denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap? A. Ho. Q,. Is there anything you would like to add to the testimony already given? A. Ho. Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I. Ater Bra9 of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. /g/ Ater Bra Ater Era, chief, Ifefan Island /s/ Ater Bra /s/ Т. Santamaria T, SAiffiAMARIA, 1st Lt., USMCH,, СОН? 1D"HT IA1 Legal Officer Document No. 6015 Page 4 COirEIDEFTIAL Moen Island Truk and Central Carolines I, Artie Ыосез, cf lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after heing transcribed., I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing „3 pages, -co the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto /s/ Artie Moses Artie Moses Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946. /s/ T. Santaraaria T. SAIM'TAMARIA, 1st Lt., USMCR., Legal Officer. I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 0Б2989, U.S.M.C.E., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Ater Era, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ater Era read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence. Place: Headquarters Military Government, /s/ T, Santam-aria Truk"and Central Caroline T. SAHTAMARIA, Islands 1st Lt., USMCR,, Island Command, Truk. Date: March 4, 1945 COFFIDMTIAL
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Ex.878-899. Japanese foreign relations, 1941 - 1943. Japanese actions in Saipan, Truk, and Caroline Islands
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