AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
22 items
application/pdf
Doc. 114. 833 Page .1 RADIO ADDRESS BY MR. YOSUKS MATSU02A, MINISTER FOE P0REIGN AFPAIRS September 27, 1940, 10:00 p Today on the occasion of the conclusion of the Three Power Pact between Japan, Germany end. Italy, an Imperial Rescript—I an profoundly moved to say—has been issued to the nation. What we, His Majesty1s subjects, should do has been plainly indicated by~the "Prime Minister in his message. I sincerely "believe that it is incumbent upon all of us to lpy to hear^the-^ag^iaV^warljr-^^UT: Sovereign and put forth our best ef- forts in order to surmount the current emergency. Our country is now faced with a most difficult situation, unparal- leled in its historj7. What step we should take at this moment is a grave problem upon which hangs the fate of our nation. The Government, keenly conscious of the gravity of its responsibilities, is seeing to it that nothing shall cone amiss. The objective of Japan's foreign policy is no other than to dispose of the China, Affair, to construct a sphere of common prosperity in Greater East Asia and to contribute thereby to the establishment of true peace for the entire world. But vhen we look at the actual international sitUcv- tion, we find that this intention of Japan is not yet fully understood. There arecountries which have the mistaken idea that peace meana__the^sei^ maintenance of the old order* or those which, while realizing the inevita- bility of change, are reluctant to part with the old order. Moreover, there are countries *hich attempt to obstruct directly or indirectly, our construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, and even those who resort to all sorts of stratagem in order to block the path of Japan's advance toward the fulfillment of her great historic mission—that of establishing world pea.ee. The Japanese Government has assiduously striven to remedy this regrettable state of affairs. Nevertheless, I regret to sa.y that the situs,tion has not only fa,iled to improve, but it has even shown, signs of aggravation in certain quarters. Circumstances have now brought Japan to the point where she can no longer permit the international situation to drift as it will. At this juncture, there is only one course for Japan to take. That is to say, internally we should stand resolutely together—one hundred million people as one—by establishing app.flrijly the new state structure for na— tiona.1 defense; and externally, we should first unite with Germany and" Italy which have the same aspirations and policy as ours and later with those Powers who can cooperate with us. We should thus go fearlessly forward to carry out our conviction, calling at the same time upon those Powers t u s to reconsider their attitude. In such manner, the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yanato race— namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia, Doc. No, 823 Page 2 Accordingly, we have conducted, negotiation with the representatives of Germany and Italy, which have resulted in the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, made public just a short while age* The establishment of this histcric relationship of alliance between the three countries, is, of course, due to tlie wisdom of our gracious Sover- eign, At the same time it owes much to the judgment and decision of the eminent lenders c.f Germany and Italy—Chancellor Hitler and Premier Musso- lini. Again, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop, has earnestly made efforts fcr German-Japanese cooperation from the very day he assumed his present post, while the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, having been once stationed in East Asia, and understanding fully Japan's position in East Asia, has ceaseless"y laboured for the promotion of Italo-Japanese friendship. Heedless to say, these two foreign ministers have played im- portant roles in the conclusion of the present pacts The pact provides that Japan, Germany and Italy shall cooperate freely with one another toward the construction of a new order, respectively in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, in which these Powers are at present engaged. It also provides, that if any one of the Contracting Parties should be attacked by an outside Power, at present not involved in the European War or in the China Affair, the three Contracting Powers shall render mutual assistance with all possible means, political, economic and military. Accordingly, it does not mean that because of this pact Japan is to enter the European War at present, nor that she 5.ntends to challenge any Power without provocation It may be added also that the present treaty will not affect in any way the existing political status between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other. The treaty also provides that Germany and Italy recognize Japan's position of leadership in regard to the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia. We in turn recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European regions where they are now engaged in the establish- ment of a new rrder, staking even their national existence in the under- taking. And thus the Three Powers are to join forces and help one another to the utmost. With the conclusion cf this treaty, Japan's responsibilities as leader of the new order in Greater East Asia becomes even greater than before. Although it is the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfill these responsibilities always by peaceful means, there is no telling whether there might not arise occasions and circumstances calling for a momentous deci- sion on the part cf our nation® Cur future is beset with countless obsta- cles and difficulties, which, it must be fully realized, no ordinary effort will be sufficient to surmount- Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be pre- pared to endure nil hardship and all sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as t conform to the august will of our Sovereign* J ^-C. No. 823 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. Statement of Course and Authenticity I, _HAYASEI_ Kaoru hereby certify that I an officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of_tho_Archives Section, Ja£aneso_For£i£n_Office and that ~s such official I h~ve custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated , 1540. and described as follows: "Foreign_0ffice Announcements" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following- named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or ?.ny other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); Foreign Office Signed at Tokyo on this Hth dav of Sc£tenb^, lc<6. /s/ R. Heyashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: /s 7 N-jyaharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, 2d Lt Eric W. Floisher. hereby certify that I an associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of iry official business. Signed at Tokyo on this nth day of S 1 C A 6 's' Eric \'J. Floisher 2d Lt AUS NALIE Witness s /s7 Richard K. Larsh Investirator IPS Official Capacity Doc. No» 1372/. Page 1 Secret State I attor Memorandum of the Conference between the German Foreign Finistcr and Ambassador OSTTII. A on 24 June 1942 in Berlin. I t tbe beginning Ambassador OSTTII<<]A said it hrd been bis desire to inform the German Foreign Minister before the be- ginning of tbe great German offensive sometving about tbe future military plans of Tokyo. Forever, to bis great regret be bad up to no1'' received almost no concrete account from bis Govern- ment about f-eir military plans. There was, however, no doubt that tbe Japanese armed forces were making similar preparations for action of great scope in line with t^e German operations, Whether tbe direction of suc> action would be directed against Australia, India, or Russia was not clear; be guessed it would be directed to tbe South, against Australia. Ambassador OSFIMA then banded tbe German Foreign Minister a sbort note (as attached) according to_wbicb no war material ._ .red Russia via Vladivostok since Japan'Tntered tbe war During tbe further course of t^e conversation tbe German Foreign Minister in general stressed tve importance of tbe year 19^2 for our conduct of tbe war; be believes, as heretofore, tvat this year should be fully utilized by all means by adopt- ing as daring a strategy as can be conceived. T"hc Japanese Navy probably still has such important tasks to solve as the strengthening of the Japanese position in Aus- tralia, thc^push " to tre rndi?1 n •Cccr.o, securing tbe position facingT or in, Fawaii, as well" as jn_the Aleutians. If new 't-eavy blows could be administered to the Vimericans' and English there, this would be of great importance to the joint prosecu- tion of tve war. It would be of especial importance if we hands somewhere in tve Indian 0qagn In tjf nnt t.no dista.nt "futureThe German Jvorn 1 gn m 1 rvl .qt.r.r_wa TLĉ yP—. Japan's plans in tvis regard^ At any rate, it is, however, Important not to lose sigbt of tbe Russian question. If in view of the reorganization of shipping routes and of tvc consolida- tion of the positions thus far captured in the various seas, further maritime operations would perhaps be contemplated only at a later time. Then he was of t^e opinion that at any case Doc„ No. 1372.1 Page 2 Russia should be tackled and the Russian enemy finally jointly disposed "or~lrrttis year. It was the strength of tve Tri- partite pui'.'trs t^at they had proceeded on the offensive from tie outset5 never waging a defensive v-ar as England has done thus far. Ambassador OSFIIIA stated tVr.t he agreed t^ what the German Foreign Minister had said iii_tiV£j:y_xespect and askcd_ hin to "be convinced' that m-j^K"!" h^-nrr hi p •̂"•r-.-pnnr.Tnf. - be- lieved in conducting tve vjar defensively but that victory ^ coultt only be secure!—th-gouch furth-e^-etta-eks. Fe had no doubt ~hpt tVpTlhi s .Top^nrgr ^ o r c e s were at this time preparing further operations according to a doflnitu plan and would at- tack a^i'gt cia appropriate tine, ' The German Foreign Hinister replied that the victories of Colonel General Rommel as well as tve first attacks in the Last and the raids of cur submarines prove that this year Germany would go on attacking and he was convinced that Japan would do likewise. Ft added that also in future a daring strategy would be the shortest road to a victorious end of the war. /s/ Gottfriedsen (Fanded to the German Foreign Minister by Ambassador OSrIHA during the conference of 24 June.) 1. Since Japan entered the war 9 20 Russian merc^antmcn ^ totalling_JL02.n0Q- tons. wit,h-r_ naxinum—lQadinfr capacity of 11^11P4 frrms V-ave entered the harbor of Vladivostok^ During their voyage., tresc ships were searched by units of t^e Japanese Navy. TVe searc^ revealed t^at tve freight consisted mainly of foodstuffs, flour, sugar, vegetable oil, etc. and contained no armaments cr'Tnuniiioris. 2. ,'pparcntlyP t^c transport of these goods to Vladivos- tok was carried cut in most cases after reloading in t>e harbor ? of PntrnpavlovslLa. The occupation of tve western Aleutian Islands by Japanese fighting forces will make this method very difficult / in t1ne future o Certificate; I? Ulric^ Straus, hereby 'certify that I am thoroughly conversant witv the G err an* and languages and as a re- sult cf the comparison between trc yerman and the English texts, I have established tT-at this is.a true .̂ nd correct translation cf International Prosecution Document No0 1372/ . /s/ Ulrich A. Straus Lk>C, NO. 48§C Page 1 SJe Inevitability of tbe Renovation by FAllPirOTO (p. 139, paragraph 4) / 1 A Leap Towards Armament There must be established an absolute armament to subjugate under any occasion, any nation with doctrines dis-similar to ours that may hinder the execution of the expansion of the Imperial undertaking. The main stress in t^e armament must be in the establishment of an air force, taking away from the people the idea that the air- craft belongs to ^.flmy-and jmbiiing that the aircraft belongs to the nation and t^e people, similar to the faith that our people had in the Japanese sword in olden times. Doc. No. 488 C Pag< C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. Statement of Source and Authenticity I, ShjbataT Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially Connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity? Second Cl-iss- Administrative Officer of Investiga-:jcn Bureau of Pome Lair is try in charge of Feme Ministry J J trsrx* - and that ar. such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated , 19 > and described as follows: Book, entitled "The Inevitability of Renovation", by FASHIMOTO. Kingoro. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of tve Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also t^e file number or citation, if any, or any other official designa- tion of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Pome Ministry Signed at Tokyo on tvis 7th day of August . 1946 /_s/_ Signature of Official SEAL Witness:, /s/ P. C. Nortory Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Edwar P. Monaghan , hereby certify that I am associated with the General headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of" August , 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan NAME Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Document No. 1652 Page 2 Page 1 Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American Negotiations adopted through the conferences in~"tne imperial presence. 1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2ry 1941_- 2. Through the lepe^ial conference on September 6, 1941. 3. Through the Istper4-ai conference on November 5* 4S4!• Proposition (A) Proposition (B) 4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941. (Tavenner's Exc erpt) 1., RESOLUTION"adopted through the Imperial conferences on ^July 2, 1941. ) A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes in the situation. I PRINCIPLE. a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace, b. Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for' herself a basis for self-existence and self-defence. The Nor- thern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations. c. Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose. II SUMMARY. a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, fur- ther pressure will be strengthened to "̂ he changes in the situa- tions, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chunking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy con- cessions in China, b. For the sake of her self-existence and self-defeace Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations _for a war with Britain and tne~TJhTted Statep. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo- Chi^ar-and Thailand following the "PrincTpIe Policy toward French Indo-cmna and Tnalland,11 and "Matters concerning the Promotion Document No. 1652 Page 1A of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance„ In order to achieve the above-men- tioned purpose, Japan will be ready for a war with Britain and the United Statesa Document No. 1652 Page 2 £ Though, the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, "but take voluntary measures Tjv secretly preparing arms aa&lnst the Soviet U&tona Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the ncrtnerh problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions„ d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of erocytioii of arms* must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Brit ain and the Uniter1 St aces. g We shall do cur utmost in preventing the United States participa- tion in the Mar through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged pro- grammes, and every other -cocsible war/, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Ttipr-ruite Fact*, However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently. f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense. £ As to the definite jseacures we shall decidc separatelyv (End Tavennor's excerpt) 2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept.6,1941. Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy. In viow of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Hussia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will cxecuto her Southern advance policy, related in the "?rincî Ie__of_ Japan* s Policy According to the Change of SituatloniT"1 as~TolTows: a In order to secure self-existence and self-defence, Japan, with determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Nether- lanc1 s), will have completed her preparations by the"errrd"of'""October, b. Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the ful- fillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States anri Britain. The minimum natters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's nego- tiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet. J Document Ho. 1652 Page 3 £ Ifi through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment "by the 'beginning of October, we shall immediately deter- mine to w-ge war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands,) ^ All measures, save for those concerned with the Scuth, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Eusso-American com- bined front efcainst Japan, ATTACHED DOCUMENT. Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), rand the limit Japan is able to come to an agree- ment in this connection. Sect, I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain). (l) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT, The United States and Britain 'rill neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident. a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Inci- dent in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan- Manchoukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration. b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will cive Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support. RUMARK — The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the now arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity. Following the settlensatof the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident. It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any •ictions on American or British interests in China, provided that will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly. rcsti they Document No, 1552 j 2 f * Page 4 (") I's Itev-.' c - ; "iijp* I ho eecvrity of Japan's national defence. The United State:- .-x-d Britain --ill net take such action in the Par East as to threaten Japan*s national doxence. a P.ocognitir.n of the special relations existing between Japan rnd Prance based on the Japan-French Agrees*;-".. b They will not eutablish any military interacts in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory, c. T will not further strengthen, their present armaments in the Par East, (3) Matters concerning Japan' n obtaining necessary meCterl&la... The United States and Britain will coop rate with Japan in obtaining her neceuaary resources. u They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the fouth-Westorn Pacific, with resources indispensable for hter self-existence. b They will :1aMy collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and Pranch Indo-China, Sect,II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement, Tf the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I; (1) Japan, with French Indo- China an a hase, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent ai-ae o.rccpt China. (2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo- China after an impartial peace will have been eetablitihsod in the Par East, (3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines, (NOTE) a In case cf an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance- it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's exeevbien of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, oichsr our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States towarfl the European War. b In case of an interrogation an to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Buss la, it will be replied that Japan will not tnJre the initiative for military action as long as f'.cvleb Base la v/lil respect the Eusao- Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria. Document No. 1652 Page 2 SUMMARY OP TEE NEGOTIATION WITH BRITAIN CONCERNING THAILAND. (Memorandum) Adopter! in the liaison Conference "between the Imperial Headquarters and the Ministry, on August 16,1941 Referring to the British Ambassador's private plans, chiefly on the problems of Thailand, at the conference with our Foreign Minister on August 11th, Japan's policy will "be altered as follows: (1) Japan's demands to Britain, a Britain will respect the neutrality of Thailand and will not execute military measures there. Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with all re- sources necessary for her self-existence from Burma, Malay, British- Borneo, India, Australia, New Zealand, and other areas in the South- western Pacific under British influence; and will devise the most favourable measures to normalize commercial tradings with those respec- tive areas. ic, Prom the Dutch East Indies and Thailand, Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with resources necessary for her self-existence; and in normalizing Japan's commercial trades with these nations, Britain will not take any obatractive measures and abandon her present actions that are proving a menanoe. 'd Britain will bar her aid to Chiang Kai-shek (including the closure of tho 3urma R̂ utef), (2) Matters that may bo agreed upon according to the attitude of the British. a We shall respect the neutrality of Thailand. b Wo ahall not make any military proposals to, nor military advances into Thailand. £ We shall not make any military advance not only in Thailand but also in all areas adjacent to French Indo-China (excluding China). (3) Our principles in the negotiations. a This negotiation will bo the continuation of the daily contacts between our Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador; and each matter will be discussed in turn in the form of a reply to the Ambassador's private proposals. At the beginning, the problems of dis- cussions will bo localized to the utmost, and we shall strive to minimize the sphere of British proposals. We acknowledge it to be the best policy to start the discussions on the following matters: Document Ho,, 1652 (a) Respect of T&ailand's neutrality. (b) lita/y advance will net be made into Thailand. (cj Parma Route till be closed. (d) Resources will bo supplied to Japan smoothly. b Such problems aas Abandoning of Britain's aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Japan's not making military advances into Thailand and all other areas adjacent to French Indo-China, and problemB of Dutch East- Indies, will be discussed after looking over the situation of the nego- tiations. c, In ".he courr.fr. of this negotiation, attention must be paid less we shall li?vo nothing to profit, our future freedor. cf action will be restricted, find cur present privileged standing will be obstructed, (REMARL) The Imperial Government will promptly settle by mutual concessions the conference being held with Thailand in winding up the affairs of the frozen ascete$ and according to the situation, she will continue to negotiate on the general economic cooperation. In this negotiation, special importance will be stressed on Japan's obtaining of her neccsaary rescurcese Page 6 3, PROPOSITIONS (A) -nd (3), adopted through the Imperial Conference on ITovmber 5, 1941, PROPOSITION (A) (1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination,, In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will bo revised, "If the principle of indiscri- mination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China," (2) Problems of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall farther make it clear that we haĵ e no intentions, with- out good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of solf-defense; and that at the same time, we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite pact. We shall reply that wo feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States, (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops. This problem will be eased as follows: £ Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China, Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the CJaisese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a cer- tain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence Document No. 1652 Page 2 to withdraw the rest according to 4. separate agreement between. Japan and- China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two yearsP (Note) If the United Staten should make an inouiry as to the necossary tera, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years. b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China, Japanese government will respect Frcnch Indo-China* c sovereignty upon hor land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French. Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East, Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States, (both under?landings and other statements,) FROiC3ITI0N (B) (l) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China, (3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch Ear.t-Indies. (3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets. The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum. (4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan* s efforts for a peace with China, (REMARKS) (1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be pro- mised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan end China, or after an impartial peace will have bean established in the Pacific area, (2) If necossjiry, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation .->nd execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in proposition A, may be additionally inserted. Document Ho. 1552 Page 8 4. EISOX.fJTTOH adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941, Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5. have finally failed, Japan will iter.iare- war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. Doc, No. 4043 £ page 1 TOP SECiffiT'. Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) Tokyo, 23 March 1939 19 o'clock Arrival, 23 March 1939 18.10 « No. 121 of March 23 Secret» For the State Secretary I hear from well informed Japanese press source that the Japanese conference of the five ministers under the presidency of the Prime Minister had decided at two o'clock tonight after a discussion for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers. The same was demanded by the Italian Government. The Navy had recommended limitation on Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed to have delivered the inquiry of the German Government, whether Japan would be willing to conclude the military treaty. Ostensibly, Germany is supposed to be content with merely anti-Russian tact and has requested an answer by April 3. The government here does not wish to break off the bridge to America and England despite the treaty and is for this purpose supposed to be considering concessions in China. The newspaper Ai&HI also mentions in today's morning edition a secret minister's conference and announc ,3 that 'an important question of Japanese foreign policy would be decided upon in a few days.' A35900/ w 9 DAVIT Wi P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: I. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control -it the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germanv, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives, ?. That said original Foreign Office files and archives •/ere captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were f J tv t assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above.referred to, ana known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1 was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, cn ;iugust 15? 194;?; anc id captured German Foreign Office f. les arid arc.iv c first came into my possession and con- trol while I \Yas stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true anc correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my.possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested'agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ IV. P. CUBING P. CUMMIKG Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G.n. H. Garde • _ G". H. "GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) 7 ' - M t w t̂ri.c Doc. No. 2548 Page THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and OTHERS ) ) _ AGAINST . , ) A V j' I D ) AR&KIfl SADAO and OTHERS f̂t ) / J I, HORIBAs KAZ.Ur/0 do swear on my conscience, that the following 3b t 1 . I an officially connected with the Japanese Government as the ry of the "i'irst Demobolization Bureau. " 2. THE document, hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit A" which has , i ned by me is a list of Members of the Institute for the research into t.' The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit AAH which has also signed by me is a translation of Exhibit A which I handed to the Intematior. • -ose- cution Section. , 3. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit B" which has • Igned by me is a list of research student members of the Institute for the rch into total war for the first, second and third periods from April 10 to March 1944" The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit; BB" whi. also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit 3 which I handed t~ \o International Prosecution Section. 4« THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit C" which has I dgned ly me is a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute o e document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit CC" which has also been by me is a translation of Exhibit C which I handed to the International cation Section. 5» THIS said documents narked "Exhibit A", "Exhibit B" and "ExhibS ' have been compiled by me from memory and from enquiries made by me, the oi 1 records having been burnt or destroyed, and I cannot claim that the;. " .plet 6. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit D" which has led by me is a list of the subjects and practices of education and trair first term students of the Institute in 1941 showing the names of le: a ,. id the number of lectures on each subject and other particulars. The hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit DD" which has also been signed I translation of Exhibit D which I have procured and handed to the Ini '.o >.1 Prosecution Section. * « Doc. No. 2548 Page 2 7. IN my official capacity,. I have examined the twentysix documents, parti- culars of which are contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked "Ex- hibit E", the said documents being now in the custody of the International Prosecution Section. The said documents have been compiled by the Total far Research Institute as material for research' and training in the Institute, or are collections of the results of the work of the research students and were obtained by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Po- wers from Japanese Government Offices. 8., IIMQRAt J 0 ivho formerly held the rank of Lieutenant -General in the Japanese Army held the post of Director of the Total War Research Institute from January I94I to>"0ctober 1941® Prior to his holding that post he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and on ceasing to hold that post he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria and subsequently he was appointed Director of the Military War College. _/§Zj|oriba Kazqyro Sworn and subscribed to before the" under- signed Officer by the abcvenamed HDRIBA,, XAZCTtfO at War Ministry Bldg.„ Tokyo s Japan this 5th day of August 194^° /s/ Roland Schwarts„ Cant. TC Summary Courts Martial C E R T I F I C A T E . I. A. Ro Joyce hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I did, this day. read the foregoing Affidavit to the abovenamed H Q R K ^ KJ&J7/0 in Japanese and in so doing did tnie- ly and correctly translate the contents thereof from English into Japanese:* And I further certify that I did at the same time show to him the Japanese translation of the said affidavit which is annexed hereto and that he did read the same and thereafter did sign the said affidavit and the said trans- lation in my presence0 having previously duly sworn on oath that the contents of both the said documents were understood by him and were true. And I alao certify that all proceedings incidental to the administration of the said oath and the signing of the said documents were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and from English into Japanese and were to the best of my knowledge and belief fully understood by him® Dated this 5th day of August, 194& at War Ministry, Tokyo, Japan. /s/ A. R. Joyce Doc. No. 2548 EXHIBIT "AA LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR Page 3 Official post Name Fomer post (Rank) ^eturn to Original post Period in Item in charge charge President In charge of > President General Secretary President President Jo Iimura Shin Oka Kiichi Endo Keisaku Murakami Kanji Ogawa President General Secretary General Secretary Kunio Kawamoto In charge of President General Secretary Taro Wada In charge of President General Secretary Ryosuke ̂ ujimuro Member Member Member Member Chiaki Matsuda tfataru Watanabe Shoichi Terada Seitaro Okamatsu Lieut. General Vice-Admiral Major-Admiral Lieut. General Vice-Admiral Secretary of Great East Asia Ministry Secretary of Commerce and Industry Ministry Major-General Captain Colonel Secretary of Agricul- Conmander of 5th Army From Jan.1941 to Oct.1941 Naval attache in From Dec.194° Shanghai to Nov.1941 Oomrrander in Chief of the 1st Despatched Fleet to China Commander of Army From Nov.1941 to Mar.1943 From Mar.1943 to Dec. I94.3 Naval attache to Japa- From Dec.1942 nese Unbassy in China t,o Jan.1945 Secretary of Home ^rom Dec. 1943 Ministry to Apr.1945 Anmunition official of From Mar.1944 the ammunition Ministry to Apr.1945 die(Aug. 14th I942) Front Front 1rom to From to From to F rom Chief of the Marine ture & Forestry Ministry Production Bureau, to Agriculture & Forestry Ministry Secretary of Commerce Chief of Mining From & Industry Ministry Supervision Bureau to Oct.1941 Aug.1942 Oct.1940 Sep.1941 Oct.1940 Oct.1941 Oct.1940 Feb.1942 0ct.l940 Mar.1943 Control Assistant to President Control Control Control Economy Economy Military affairs Military affairs Military affairs Economy Economy Doc. No. 2548 page 4 Official post Name Former post Return to Original post Period in Item in charge chnrgfi Member Hiroo Oshima Secretary of Home Chief of the Business From Oct.1940 Thought Ministry Bureau, Military Aid to Jul.I943 Board Member Katsumi Maeda Secretary of Ministry Secretary of Ministry From Oct.1940 Economy of Finance of Finance to Jun.1942 Member Katsuzo Okumura Secretary of Foreign Second Rank ̂ Secretary From Oct.1940 Diplomacy Office of Embassy to Nov.1940 Member Tooru Hagihara Secretary of foreign Secretary of Foreign From Dec.1940 Diplomacy Office Office to Feb.1942 Member Masaru Nishiuchi Professor of Army Professor of Army From Mar.1941 Thought to Jan.1944 Member Kazuo Iloriba Colonel Front From Jul. 1941 Militar, to Aug01942 affairs Member Tetsutoki Tsuda Secretary of Conmuni- Secretary of Communi- Frcm Jul.1941 Economy v cation Ministry cation Ministry to Dec.1941 Member Hideo Hosoi Secretary of Taiwan- Secretary of Taiwan- From Aug<>1941 Thought government government to Sep.1942 Member Shigeo Honda Senior staff of South To South M.R.Co.Ltd. From 0cto19iA Economy M.H.Co.Ltd. to Mar.1943 Member Kaoru Takeuchi Captain Ministry of Navy From Nov.1941 Military to Jul.1942 affairs Member Totaro Sasaki Member of Mitsuj. To Mitsui Bussan From Dec.l941 Economy Bussan Co .Ltd. Co.Ltd. to Dec.1942 Member Yuichi Hori Secretary of Conmuni- Secretary of Conmni- From Dec.1941 Economy cation Control Office cation Control Office to Sep.1943 Member Tsuru Kuwahara Secretary of Legation Secretary of Foreign From Feb. 1942 Diplomacy • Office to Jan. 1943 Doc. No. 2548 page 5 Official post Name Former post Return to Original post Period in Item in chnrgft flhnrgfi Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Kikuro Higuchi Tadao Annaka Toshio Mano Kumao Nishimura Risaku Yamazoe Jiro Oba Taro Iwase .a Mikio Suzuki Genpu Nakayama Den Harada Seiichi Arafune Kenkichi Yoshida Minoru Machida Railway Investigation Division Secretary of Insurance Board Lieut. Colonel Secretary of Foveign Office Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry Senior official of Monopoly Bureau, Mini- stry of Finance Member of Yokohama Specie B a n k — Secretary of Home Ministry Colonel Secretary of Agricul- ture Forestry of Ministry Secretary of Conmuni- cation Control Bureau Secretary of Foreign Office Secretary of Home Ministry Secretary of Railway Ministry Secretary of Ministry of Well fare Lieut. Colonel Senior official of Embassy Chief of the Forestry Administration Bureau Secretary of Ministry of Finance Headquarters of Inves- tigation and Research Mobilization Chief of Section Metropolitan Police Station Front Secretary of Combined Board From Feb. 1942 to Dec.1943 From Oct.1941 to Jul.1943 Frcm Mar. 1942 to DeCo1943 Frcm Mar. 1942 to Deco1943 Frctn Mar. 194-2 to Feb01944 From Jul. 1942 to Dec.1943 From Mar.1943 to Mar.1944 From Jul .1943 to Aug.1944 From Aug. 1942 to Aug.1944 From Dec. 1943 to Apr.1945 Secretary of Communi- From Sep. 1943 cation Board Secretary of Foreign Office Secretary of Home Ministry to Mar.1945 From Dec. 1943 to Apr.1945 From Aug.1944 to Apr.1945 Economy' Economy Military affairs Diplomacy Economy Economy Economy Thought Military affairs Economy Economy Diplomacy Thought Doc. No. 2548 Page 6 EXHIBIT "BB" LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSriTliTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR (Notes Those whom no explanations are given returned to former posts.) First period students (From April 1, 1941 to March 2, 1942) Former place of service Ministry of Railway Domei-tsushin-sha Ministry of Overseas Development Ministry of Finance Intendance Bureau of War Ministry Secretariat of House of Re pre sent at ive s Home Ministry Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Member of central Bank of industrial association Tokyo girls' Higher Normal School Ministry of Finance Member of Nippon Bank Ministry of Navy '.Tar Ministry Ministry of Commerce and Industry Return to original post Name Osamu Akutagawa Takeo Akiba Takashi Ishii Kenkan Imaizumi Shun Okamura Shiro Oka be Shojiro Kawaguchi Tadashi Kiyoi Kakuichi Kubota Go Kurazawa Toshihiko Sakai Tadashi Sasaki Tadashi Shimura Masatoki Shirai Keizo Tamagi Remarks Doc. N0o 2548 Page 25 Navy Ministry Foreign Office Nippon Steel Manufacturing Ministry of Education Tokyo Prefectural Office North china Area A m y Ministry of Commerce and Industry Foreign Office Tokyo Higher School Chosen Government Horae Ministry Mitsubishi Mining Co. Ltd. N.Y.K. J udge Ministry of Welfare < Daido-Gakuin Ministry of Communication Ministry df Agriculture and Forestry Military Staff College I lone Ministry Recruited in course of study Intelligence Bureau of Cabinet Ministry of Education Judicial Research Institute Yokohama Marine Affairs Bureau to proceed to front before graduation Yoshio Takechi Hiroshi Chiba Yukio Chiba Takashi Choji Hisao Nakanishi Kanichi Narita Tsutamu Nomiyama Kaoru Hayashi Taneyuki Hara Hiroo Higasa Kiyoshi Fukuda Reiichi Hoshina Katsuji Maeda Kantaro Mibuchi Katsixmi Mibuchi Jiro M: -azawa Iwao Mori Gaisei Yano Toshihisa Yamaguchi Keiichi Yoshioka Doc. N0o 2548 Second • t Former place of service Domei-tsashinsha Judge Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry Rural Rehabilitation Association Sumitomo chemical industry Co. Ltd. Yokohama Specie Barik Yamashita Shipping SoTltd. Home Ministry Ministry of Communication North China Area Army Ministry of Railway War Ministry Ministry of Education Intendence Bureau of War Ministry Imperial agricultural Association Tokyo Higher Normal School Local Office Page 8 period students (From 1st April 1942. to March 1943) Return to origi- Name Remarks nal post Nori Akutagawa - Tokyo district Masanori Asano ( dead in June»l Civil Court Yoshihiko Ito Katsuhide Inoue Yasuhiko Ihochi Taro Iwase Juichi Urushino Toshio Eguchi Shigeru Otsuka Teiken Oda Gaku -Kanematsu Kiyoyasu Kawakami Fujimaro Kubota Takuji Kumagai Kenichi Koike Nobuaki Kobayashi Ministry of welfare Shinjiro Koyama Doc. No. 2548 War Ministry Ministry of Commerce & Industry Ministry of Over Seas Development Nippon Oil Go. Ltd. Foreign Office jggji. I. Co. Ltd. Home Ministry Ministry of Navy Ministry of Finance General Affairs Bureau. Manchukuo Government Chosen Government General Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government Ministry of Welfare Nippon Steel^Manuf actur- wnr Taiwan Government tf Ministry of inance The 4th Higher School Ministry of Commerce & Industry Foreign Office Ministry of Navy .. Nippon Electric Distribution Co. Ministry of Great East Asia Front Home Ministry Ministry of Finance Ministry of Commerce & Industry page 9 Masatsugu Sakakibara Kyo Sakuna (dead in June 1944) Hideo Sue Eiji Suzuki Akira Sono Fumio Takaoka Katsuji Tamakoshi Taizo D 0i Yasuo Nakanishi Tadao Natsume Masayuki Hashimoto Yoshinori Fujimaki Yoshifumi Futagawa Kishiro Hoshino Isao Mizuno Seiji Minoyatoa (dead in March 1943) Hajime Murakami Hiroshi Morikawa Hachiro Yamaji Zene Yamatsu Katsuro Yamamoto Ichiro Watanabe * Doc-o No. 2548 Page 10 Third period Students (From April 1,1943 to Dec. 15,1943) Former place of service Judge Home Ministry- Ministry of Navy Nippon Manure Co. Army Surgeon School •ministry of finance Mainichi-Shinbun-sha Government Deposit Bureau Ministry of Commerce and Industry Toledo Shibaura Electricity Co. i^ar Home Ministry Chosen Government Nippon Nitrogen Manure Nippon Coal Co. Ltd. Dai Nippon Air Navigation Co< Daido-Gakuin Mitaai^ Shipping Co. Ministry of Railway War Ministry foreign Office Yokohama Higher Commercial School Return to original post Tcskyo 5'istrict Criminal Court Tokyo Prefecture Office Ministry of Araauni tion General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government Ministry of Communication Name Gizin Aoki Masaaki Adachi ^eizaburo Ara Yo shiro Arai Katsuhiko Inagaki Ryoichi Iida Masahiro Imaizumi Hiroshi Imai Akira Irie Tsugio Iwata Toshio Ueda Kiyokazu Okubo Tadashi Kakegawa Yoshiro Kanazaka TatsuL-ko Kawabuchi Haruo Kitazawa Shuichi Kumano Hirotsugu Kb bun Yoshio Kouda Tasaku Kojima Shinzaburo Koshimura Remarks (dead) Doc. N0. 2548 Government Monopoly Bureau Ministry of Finance Manchukuo Government Local Office Ministry of Ammunition North China Area Army Ministry of Education Tokyo Prefecture Tokyo Prefectural Office Army Ministry Military Aid Board Ministry of Great Bast Asia Foreign Office Ministry of Navy Ministry of Agriculture and forestry Koehi Higher School Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Mining Control Association Taiwan Government Nippon Bank Mainichi-Shinbunsha Page 11 Masakatsu Mit suede Asaumi Sato Tadao Soto Seihei ̂ awabe Sakuo Teranaka Kosaku Nakamura Masaro Nalamura Isao Nerio Takehiko Hi sat alee Seizo Hiuga Ichiro Fujihara Mori Masuda Toshihiko Miyata Shigeru Murata Toyozo Murata Saburo Morimoto Asataro Yamamoto Ko Ycshizawa Nobu Yoshitake Doc. No. 25̂ 8 Page 12 EXHIBIT »CC • LIST OF THE CONTENTS OF LECTURES AT THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TOTAL WARFARE Name of lecturer Social position of lecturer Jyo limura Kiichi Endo Keisuke Murakami Kanji Ogawa the Head of the Institute' Subject of lecture Foundamental principles of National Total Warfare Arata °ka Wataru Watanabe Kazuo Horiba Chiaki Matsuda Genpu Nakayama Seitaro Okamatsu Shuzo Canada Taro Oda Yoji Minobe Shoji Suganami Shoichi Terada Einosuke Ishii Risaku Yamazoe Den Harada Mototake Yugawa Ko Kurakami Kanji Kato Tadaatsu Ishiguro Tetsutoki Tsuda Yuichi Hori Shizuo Yoneta the Director of the Insti- tute Member of the Institute the Planning Board Director the Planning Board Chief of Steel Section in the Ministry of Commerce & Industry Member of the Institute Director of Provision Bureau Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Member of the Institute Member of the Institute ) Director of Marine trans-) portation Bureau ) Merits and demerits of Iapanese On China Incident General Principles of Total warfare Concerning the material mobilization Chief of Agricultual Administ-) ration Bureau in the Ministry ) of Agriculture and Forestry Member of the Institute Steel General conception of food question; food question; the condition of the marine products. General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products. General conception of communicat ion Marine transportation Doc. N0o 2548 Page 13 ^ikuo Higucki Sonosoke Nagasaki Katsumi Maeda Uichi N0da Hisatsune Sakamizu Juichi Tsushima Tsuneji Taniguchi Hideo Matsukuma Tadao Annaka Takeo Mori Tooru Hagihara ^atsuzo Okumura Tsuru ̂ uwatara Kumao Nishimura Kenkichi Yoshida Hikamatsu Kamikawa Hidemi Ozaki Kumataro Honda Member of the Institute Director of Transportation Bureau in the Railway Bureau Member of the Institute Secrete y of Finance 0 Vice President of Bank of Japan Director of Accountant's Bureau in the Ministry of Finance Director of Revenue Bureau in the Ministry of Finance Member of the Institute Intendant Maj. Gen. Member of the Institute ) ) ) . - ) ) Doctor of Law the Asahi (newspaper) Ambassador Shigeharu Matsumoto Ddmei News Agency Satu.ro Ota Yoshio Nakano Buryo Isomura Minister Sakamoto Ambassador Hongo Hisao Tani Kbji Sakai Tsunamasa Shidei Ryosuke Fujimuro Tetsuzo Nakajima Takeji Teramoto Masami Ishii Wataru Watanabe ^azuo Horiba Genpu Nakayama Secretary of Foreign Affairs - V Colonel Colonel Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Lt. General Lt. General ) Maj.General ) Maj.General Lt. General Rear Admiral Colonel Member of the Institute ) ) ) Land traffic Railroad transportation General conception of finance Control of foreign exchange Finance control Theory on financial matter Present state of Japanese Finance System of Japanese taxes General conception of service Economic histry State of things in foreign policy History, of diplomacy State of affairs in China State of affairs in China Gossip on China State of affairs in the United States of America State of affairs in Great Britain State of , ffairs in the Near East » State of things in Europe State of affairs in Soviet Russia History of Russo-Japanese War History of World War I 3- History of China Incident Change of Military Power Warfare Essence of leadership Real condition of battle Outline of Military tactics Doc. No. 2548 page 14 Chiaki Matsuda Kaoru Takeuchi Yozo Miyama ^lsumu Nishiura Kikusaburo Ofcada Chiaki Matsuda Sum! Hiraizumi Takeo Yamada Hiroo Oshima Hideo Hosoi Misao Suzuki Minoru Machida J Goro Murata Sotaro Ishiwata Seizo ̂ obayashi Hideoto Mori Member of the Institute a Colonel Colcafel Member of the Institute Doctor of Literature Outline of Naval tactics Maseru Nishiuchi Member of the Institute ,• ) Organization of the Army ) ' Military munition mobili- zation Organization of the Navy Japanese History "Rojiki* (ancient chronicle) Original meaning of J a panose Nationality I — Director of Peace Section in the Ministry of Home Affairs Trend of the thought in the country Secretary-General of the assi- Regarding to the Imperial stance of the Imperial Rule association Admiral Secretary of the Planning Board Rule Assistance Association State of affairs in Formosa Poly-geography of th#Ec.st Asia Note* As above-mentioned has been made retracing my memory, it is not yet perfect. /s/ The 22.May 19^6. 71 IjfflUTfl Doc. No. 2548 page 15 Subjects and practices of educations and trainings for 1st tenn students in 1941* Basic principle of National Constitution • 22 NiSHnJCHI, stan Member. 18 YAMADA, President of Jingu Kogakukan College. 2 HIRAIZUMI, Professor. 2 Totalized War 412 (118) Principle and rules of totalized war. 5® Director of Institute. 10 Superintendent of Institute. 15 TERADA, Staff Member. 2 MAXSOIIA, staff Member. 11 WATANAEE, staff Member. 6 BDRIBA, Staff Member. 3 SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Section. 2 FUJIMURO, staff Member with an additional post. 6 - Leadership. Captain TERAM0T0o 6 State of things in foreign Countries. 34 Extra lecture Latest international situations. HAGIWARA, staff Member. " 1 Gennany and Italy. Major General CKJMOTO. l Politics in China. OTA, Chief of 1st of Far 1 East Bureau. Navy. MATSUDA, staff Member. 1 Politics in Europe. SAKAMOTO„ Chief of Europe 1 and America Bureau. Military affairs in Colonel ISCMJRA. 1 U.S.SoRo Problems in the South Seas, Captain HORIUCHI. 2 Extra lecture. Ambassadore HONDA. 1 1941 Apr. 5. Apr.14• Apr.28. Apr. 30 May 2o May 15. May 20. June 5» Doc. N0o 2548 Page 34 June 18. Navies in Europe. Captain KOJIMA 2 June 19. Economics in China. MORI, Secretary of Board of 1 Planning. June 3°. Powers politics toward China. SAITO, Yoshie. 1 July l.)Polic!r i n C h i n g u OZAKI.Hidemi. 2 2. July 2. Economics in the South Seas. YAMADA.Fumio 1 July 4. Navy of tf«S.A. Captain OGAJtA 2 July 4. Europe and the South Seas HAGIWARA, staff member 1 July 8. Political policy of U.S.A. UKI,Chief of 1st Section of Ame- rican Bureau. 2 July 8. Foreign Policy of U.S.A. ONO, Chief of 2nd Section of American Bureau. 1 July 9. Foreign Policies in- the - South Seas, TOKO, Chief of 2nd Section of the South Seas Bureau. 1 July 14. Natives in the South Seas. ITAGAKI, Proffessor of College of Commerce. 1 July 25. Foreign policy of Germany. Secretary FUHOUCHI. 1 Aug. 5. Military affairs of China. H0RI3A, Staff member. 1 Sept.10. Extra lecture. IMAI, 1st Secretary of Japanese Ambassadore in UoS.S.R. 1 Oct. 21.)Affairs inu.SoS.R. Lieutenant Colonel HAYASEH. 2 23. Oct. 28. Problems in the South Regions. HAGIWARA.Staff member. 1 Nov. 18. British Colonial Policy. OTA, Chief of 3rd Section of Europian Bureau. Nov. 29. Economics in Germany. TACHIo Investigation Official of Bank of Japan. 1 Jan. 24« Observation of the Great War from British point 1942 of view. Lieutenant Colonel NAKANO. 2 History of Totalized War. 28 Lieutenant General TANI 13 • SAKAI 5 Vice-Admiral NAKAJIMA. 10 Practical exercises in room, investigations and trainings. 294 Doc. No. 2548 page 17 Military 7/arfare. Essence, strategy and tactics of Military Warfare. 4° WATANABE, staff Member. 1 HORIRAt staff Member. 7 Lieutenant General NAKAJm. 13 Major General SHITEI 4 ISHII, Staff Member with an additional post. 8 MATSODA, Staff Member. 1 NAOI, Staff Member with an additional post. o Military Organizat ion. 22 WATANABE, staff Member. 3 Colonel NAKAZAMA. 2 1 SANADA. 1 « OKADA. 2 Lieutenant Colonel OSAKA. 2 MATSODA:, Staff Member. 4 Captain TAKADA. 1 ISHIKAVJA, staff Member with an additional post. 1 Captain YANAGIMOTO. 3 * NAGATANI. 2 HASHIMOTO, Staff Member with an additional post. 2 Ships, aims and military materials. 20 WATANABE, Staff Member. 1 MAX30DA, staff Member. 19 Political Warfare. (Diplomatic) Essence, basic principle, rules and applications of political warfare 1 0 HAGIWARA, Staff Member. 1° History of political warfare. 8 —Professor ICfiMEKAWA. 8 1 Economical Warfare. Principle and rules of economical warfare. 9 TERADA, Staff Member. 4 CKAMATSJ0 staff Member. 3 MAEDA, " _ 2 r History of economical warfare. 0 Major General9 Intendance MORI. 6 } . I « \ I • * "" "* Doc. No. 2548 \ i = * Fage 18 Economics in War times. Nil. J Important Materials. 1941 Apr. 22. Food situation. ISHII, Chief of Bureau. -•* May. 1. Genera plan for material mobilization. SUZUKI, staff member with an additional post. May 7' General plan for development of production. YAMADA, staff member with an additional post. May 10. Iron. SQGANAMI, Secretary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry. May 13. Coal. TSCJDA, Chief of Coal Bureau. May I4. Fuel oil. A2EMA, President of Fuel Bureau. June 3O. Fertilizer. SHIGEL.ASA, Chief of Bureau. July 24. Withdrawal of substitute materials. H I R A I , Chief of Section. Oct. 23. Non-iron Metals. WATANABE, Chief of Section. Oct. 28. Control of silk thread. YOoHEDA, Seiji. Oct. 31. Forestry products.IDEYAMA, chief of Forestry Bureau. NOT. On reorganization of economy. KANDA, Staff Member with an additional post. » Dec. 2. Substitute fuel. BAN, Chief of Fuel Investigation Institute. Dec. 9 . Agriculture in General. TERADA, Staff Member. 16 2 I - 1 1 1 2 1 i 1 1 1 1 •t-• V, f - p <Y 19iA Money market and others Apr.l^. Finance. Apr.21. Apr.22. Apr.24*1 30/ Apr.28. May 1. ) 2. May 27. Jul.e 12. July 5. July 10. TANIGUCHI, chief of Intendance Bureau. 1 Taxes. MATSCJHJMI, Chief of Rt "enue Bureau. 1 Control of Money Market. SEKOMIZU, Chief of Planning Section. 1 Inflation ARAl»7ice Governor of Kogyo Bank, 2 Affairs of Money Market .TSUSHIMA, Vice Governor of Bank of. Japan. 1 Money order. N0DA„ staff Member with an addi- tional post. • 2 Railroad transportation. NAGASAKI, chief of Transportation Bureau. 2 Ships. YONEDA„ Chief of Section. 2 Electricity. TAGURA, Chief of 1st Bureau of Eledtricity Board. 2 Services, Saiki0 Chief of Section. 2 .' r v •• ; ' • • H ... V <V * •• .. ' • A • *. Doc. N0. 2548 Page 19 July l6o Commerce. MIZUNO, Chief of Bureau of Commercial Affairs. 2 July 21 . Latest state of affairs in China. TSODA, Staff Member. 1 Sept.11. Aviation. OKDBO, Chief of International Aviation Section. 1 Sept . 1 2 . Communication. TJSJDA, Staff Member. 1 Oct. 31. Prices. HOMJO, Chief of 2nd Bureau of Price Board. Nov. 18. EmigrantSo IMAYOSHI, Chief of Takuhoku Board. 1J Inspection. Inspection of establishments in Tokyo Metropolis. 3 Thought Warfare. 19 Principle and rules of thought warfare. 12 OSHIMA, staff Member. 8 HOSOI, « 2 CKA„ Masao. 2 History of thought warfare. Nil. Educational questions. 4 Colonel NAKAGAWA. 2 HORIIKE, Chief of Planning Bureau of Education Board. 2 Domestic thought questions. MLTRATA„ Chief of Peace Section. 3 Lectures on Science and others. 10 Apr. 7. On observation of secrecy. OSHIMA, Staff Member. 1 Apr. 24. KOBAYASHI, ex-Governor General of Formosa. 1 May 12 . H0SKIN0, c --President of Plan- ning Board. 1 May 19. ISfHWATARI, President of General Affairs Bureau of Imperial Rule Assistance Association. 1 May 22. Inspection of examination of conscription. WATANABE, staff Member. 1 June 17. S0RB1ACHE, Eiichi. 1 Sept. 4. SAKURAZAJIA, Joichi. 1 Sept.11. MATSUMOTO, Chief of Editorial Office of Domei News Agency. 1 1 Doc. No. 2548 Page 20 Nov. 17. Inspection of the expeditionary- session of the Diet. 1. Inspection tour. 6l days May 8-9o Inspection of Military Cadets School. 2 • May 30-June 3. Inspection of the establishments in Niigata and T0yama Prefectures. 5 * June 21-28. Visit to the Great Shrine of Ise. Inspections of *Vval Manouvre, and ecomomical establishnents of Kyushu and Chugoku, Districts. 8 • July 19-20. Visit to the Kashima shrine. 2 " » Sept. 1-2. Practice of purification ceremony. 2 " Sept.14-°ct.19« Foreign tour. 3^ • " Nov.12-14. Inspection of Military Manouvre. 3 " Nov.20-22. Inspection of Agricultural Coumunities in Ibaraki Prefecture. 3 * Doc.. N0.2548 Page 21 EXHIBIT "2* SCHEDULE OF CCLiPIL ,TIOi^ OF THE TOTAL flfAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE. Top oS • Dog.No.^ 1543 (1) 1544 (2) 1548 (3) 1355 (4) 1367 (5) 1368 (6) 1471 (7) Sf *rp it 1472 (8) 1473 ( 9). TITLE. "Special Plan of Export and Import under War Conditions." (Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese- Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute in April 1938. "Plan for Replenishing Technicians8 3killed Laborers and General Laborers for Expand- ing Productive Power". (Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese- Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute on 17th June 1937. "Data pertaining to natural Petroleum" • "Reports on 1942 Total Research". (Marked Secret). •Daily Log of Training Affairs". (Marked Confidential). Estimates of the Domestic and Foreign situation in the early part of 1941 from the Total Ifar viewpoint". (Marked Top Secret). "Data in Jstimating the future of East Asia from an Economic Standpoint". (Markted Top Secret). This publication was compiled by the Japanese- Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute. "Anticipation of Economic Warfare". (Marked Secret). Date of compilation by Total War Research institute 27 October 1941 18th October 1941 June 1943 30th March 1943 July 1942 1941 5th Ocfober 1941 19th December 1941 "Study on Total War pertaining to the National March 1944 strength of Imperial Japan and Foreign Powers". (Top Secret). Doc. No. 2548 page 22 SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - FLRMT/I. I.P.S. Pnr.Ufu 1507 1521 1524 1669 1594 1605 1621 1660 1341 2228 14O1 T I T L E „ (10) "Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance". (Marked Top Secret). This document was compiled by the Japanese- Manchurian Economic and Financial Instit- ute in January 1939« (11) "Table Discussion pertaining to completion Remaining Business". (Marked ^ecret). "Suggestions for Implementing the Directions for the table discussion". (Marked Top Secret). (12) "Summary on Total War" - Volume I. (Marked Secret). (13)"Documents pertaining to Second Stage Exercises table discussion in the Planning of Total War". (Marked Secret). (14)"Discussion from the Standpoint of Total War regarding present situation of Japan". (Marked T 0p Secret). (15)"Documents pertaining to 1942 Exercises in the planning of Total War". (Marked Secret). (16)"Draft of Establishment of Greater East Asia- First P.iase in the Total War Plan". (Marked Military Top Secret). (17)"Opinions on Research Items". (Marked T 0p Secret). (18)"Asiatic Affairs". (19)"Records of Progress of the First Stage Exercise in table discussion of Total War". (Marked Top Secret). (2*2) "Report of Basic Research of War Time Industry". Date of Compilation by Total War Research institute. 25th October 1941 1941 1941 1 1 July 1941 1943 10th January 1943 1943 18th February 1942 1941 14th December I941 August 1941 March 1943 Doc.No. 2548 \ Page 23 SCHEDULE O F C O M P I L A T I O N S OF T H E T O T A L WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE _ Contd. I.P.S. DPC. NQ» 1343 1342 1331 1566 1549 1795 TITLE. (21) Basic ^esear Materials for 1942. (22) Table Top Manoeuvres for 1942. (Military "Top Secret") (23) Anticipation of Diplomatic War in the Total War. ("Top Secret"). (24) "The Study of the System of National Organ- ization for the Total War of the Empire". (25) Revision of educational system of Total War Institute. (26) Imperial Ordinance No.648 establishing "Control of Total War Research Institute". Date of Compilation by Total War Research Iflgtitutg. 1941-42 1942 24 January 1942 3rd February 1941 September 1943 30 September 1940. Doc. No. 4050B Ppge 1 COPY Japanese Embassy Berlin The Japanese Embassy 'has the honor to inform the Foreign Office, by order of the Japanese government, of the views of the latter in regard to the recently concluded pact of non-aggression and consultation between tre German govern- ment and the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, as followss "The Japanese Government regards the pact of non- eggrussion and consultation recently concluded between the German Government and tve Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as running counter to the secret appended agreement to the Agreement against the Com unist International. Berlin, 26 August 1939 To the Foreign Office Doc. No. 4050B Page 2 Certificate: - I? Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I an tvoroughly conversant with the'German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that f'is is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4050B,<>/ /s/ Ulrich A. Streus AFFIDAVIT I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Iolitical Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ray possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while i was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. 5/ W. P. Cumming W. P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt, Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) IPS D'OC NO. r> r> 1356-A X ) u EXCERPTS FROM IPS DOCUMENT NO, 1356 ENTITLED "FIRST TABLE TOP TOTAL WAR IA NEWERS - No. 1" (Outside Cover) Secret Number 1 First Table Top Total War Maneuvers Situation of tre Maneuvers from tbe Third to t^e Nint^ Terms The Problem and the Disposition of t*e Maneuvers Superintendent's Department of the Table Top Maneuvers IPS DOC. NOc 1356-A Page 1 SOKIEN NO. 7 Part I No. 5 of 120 copies in all Appointed Distributor MATSUDA Member of State Keeping secret Secret to all except those par- ticipating in maneuvers CONFIDENTIAL Management IJeJt August 6, SFOWA 16 (0830 delivered) Shall be re- turned after the end of maneuvers. Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers - IB.IUFA, Jo. Situation and, Exercises,„of__th_e_ Third Period Maneuvers' of"~the"First Total 'War Table "Top Maneuvers. (I) Situation at t>e beginning and middle of August,,- SFOWA 16* 1. International Situations (1) The DX War is gradually developing advantageously for X, and tvere are signs tvat X's offensive against B is becoming more and more positive. (2) D is on a strict guard against N's attitude and is once more requesting the new cabinet of the Blue State to explain her attitude, Pt. I, p. 1 2e Situations of the Supreme Command and Army. (1) The Supreme Command of the Blue State desires the repletion of armament and the preparation for war to meet a sudden change in the situation, and requests the acquisition (repletion) of strategic points in tv,e district of T (F). It wisves, however, to avoid absolutely the occurrence of serious troubles with a tvird power, especially a twa-sided operation against D and A (B)« % sjc >jc >jc jc IPS DOC. NO. -13 56-A Page 2 (2) In order to prepare for war against D and A, (B, E) the Blue State is mobilizing calling up since the first decade of July, 300,000 new military personnel and 300,000 tons of new ships. (Quantity given orally). 3. Home Situation, (1) The new mobilization and requisition of ships, carriages and cattle, have had some influence on all the fields of labor power, communication power, agriculture, mining, industry, etc* in the country. Decrease of produc- tion as well as considerable obstacles are expected as the situation grows more and more serious0 (2) As regards railroads and electrical communica- tions, they are not smoothly functioning on account of the increase of military transport and communication, and decrease in the number of employeeso (3) The raising of funds for industry is not satis- factory especially the issue of debentures Pt I, p. 4 for the various enterprises for increase of production is becoming more and more difficult, with the result that 35 percent of raised debentures remain unsold and the situation cannot be neglected. Short term funds are sufficienta The stock market is not active. (4) Owing to bad weather the rice crop all over the country will obviously be poor, and agricultural crops in general are also very poor, A shortage of fuel and the requisition of fishing botes have considerable influence on the haul of fish. (5) As a result of leakage of a part of the negotiation between N and A, various rumors are arising among the people, but the situation is not yet noteworthy. As the situation grows more and more serious, the people in general are desiring the powerful leadership of the Government. Pt. I, p. 5 * ĴC jjc Questions II 1„ Submit a report concerning the steps wvich the various organs of maneuvers of the Blue State will adopt by the 20th of August, (Deadlines 13.00 on 7th of August) and a report concerning the steps to be adopted by the end IPS DOC. NO, 13 56-A Page 3 of August. (Deadlines O83O on 8th of August). However, the general policy to he taker. b;r the Blue State Government must he shown privately to t^e Leading Section by 0900 on 7th of August. 2. The Blue with the Supreme potency of tre Blu occasion of entering •State Government shall effect communications Command, and investigate concretely the com- L i»a ̂ e war in the against situations and submit the report will be indicated afterwards. execution of war on the A, B and E from the present at an appointed time which l̂C Ĵ̂ Pt. I, 8 SOKIEN Part II of No. ̂ CONFIDENTIAL No. 5 of 120 copies in all Appointed distributor Keeping Secret Management MATSUDA, Member of Staff Secret to all except to those who are con- cerned with the mane- uvers . Should be returned after the maneuvers are over0 August 7, SFOWA 16 (afternoon) Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers - IIMURA, Jo Supplementary Situation of the Third Period Maneuvers of the First Total War Table Top Maneuvers 1. On and after t^e 1st of August, meetings of the Liaison Conference between t^e Blue State Government and the Supreme Command were held several times, and the following items were decided on; (1) The original plan of the private draft for the Total War policy, (2) To submit to the Tyrone to open a meeting in the Emperor's presence concerning the Total War policy and the preparation for war which requires Immediate attention. (3) The draft provided for the above mentioned meeting in the Emperor's presence. (The draft should consist of the fundamental items of the Total War policy and the items concerning the action for the preparation for war wMch requires immediate attention, and shall be provided with explanatory items which include judgement on the Total War policy Ft II, p. 1 and the scale of the present war). V IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 4 * 2. On 10th of August a meeting was held in the Emperor's presence and after questions on the fundamental problem by the Emperor, the prepared policy was concluded as the decision of the meeting in the Emperor's presence. 3, t* regards the Government s plan for mobilizing resources and goods in the preparation for war against A, B and E- r.he Government and the Supreme Command negotiated with each other, with the result that they reached an a .̂ -eemant on the P.Ota of August after modifying a pert of th« final pl.tr. of the Government. During the proceedings of the meeting: (1) Roper ted negotiations between the authorities of administr tiv-?. affairs resulted in no settlement while the situation:-- dicv,' t permit delay, So by the political settlement between the leaders of' both parties, they c ripronised in that they should provide 100,000 tons of steel in addition to 1,900,000 tons for munitions reserve, and that they should perform supplementary operations for each of the other deficient materials. (2) The Supreme Command demanded in the meeting the following items: (a) That they should accelerate, most urgently, the- technical investigation for the increase of "octane" value of aircraft gasoline. (b) That they should supplement as ctuickly as possible the deficient materials. ?t. II, p. 2 (Supplementary Order) In the course of the maneuvers, try to make investiga- tions on the minimum limit for securing civilian demand, especially the limit of ordinary gasoline, to such extent as is possible. ?t. II, p. 3 2>jC 5|c 5jc 5jc • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 5* SOKIEN Part III of No. 7 CONFIDENTIAL Management Papers of the 3rd Period Maneuvers - No. 1 Time to be preser*«*! (Supposition) Middle of Aug. 1941 Authorities to be presented to General Policy of the Blue State Government concerning the Third Period Problems (Project for Private Showing) 1. Against A To the proposal of A, we shall neither give our word clearly concerning the position of the Blue State, nor expect an ultimate peaceful settlement with A, but adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, depleting war preparations in the meantime. 2. Against D We shall give .to D the reply that $he Blue State will" nc$ attack D a^sitively, as long as D would faithfully observe"" ttje fulfilment spf the Neutral Trea'ty-"be%5{ee.B N and D. P|. m , P. 2 3. Against X We shall proceed along th® policy of tho maintenance of the status .quo, and make then satisfied with the* effect of the Tripartite Pact between N, and X2, restraining A's participation in way against X. Real da e) 7 Aug. 9:00 a.m Superintendent's Head- quarters, the heads of the sections for: Military Force 5 Diplo- matic War, Ideological i:rar; Economic War; Judgment. Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer) Prime Minister of the Blue State Government IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A 4. Against F and '! Against F, we shall proceed with the Total War policy previously decided upon- Against T, ?re shall endeavor to enforce the political and military coalition, and take positive steps in order to conclude a military alliance (Secret, if necessary). 5. Against E We shall continue econonic negotiations so that the rela- tion between N and E will not grow worse than at present. Pt. Ill, p. 3 CONFIDENTIAL The Management Papers of the Third Period Maneuvers No. 3 Authorities to be presented to Superintendent's Head- quarters r"ar of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Thoughts; War of Economy; Judgment Section Time to be presented Supposition - Middle of August, 1941 Real Date 1 p.m. 7th of August State Minister Presenter Prime Minister of (Occupation the Blue State and name of Government maneuvering officer) I intend to finish consultation at the Liaison Conference with the Supreme Command concerning the necessary matters in the draft of General Policy of the Blue State Government on the problem of the Third Period Maneuvers, decided in the cabinet meeting on the morning of the 7th of August, and then I will submit it to the Throne to obtain Imperial sanction. Pt. Ill, p. 4 sfc ajc ijc 5je ajc >|c % Authorities to be retorted to SOKIEN Part IV Management Papers of the Third Period Maneuvers No. 2 To be presented Real date - 7th i/.. August, a.m. Authorities to The Superintendent's Presenter be presented to Headauarters (Occupation and name Authorities to of maneuver- be reported to Government ing officer) or informed Foreign Minis- ter, CHIBA, Hiroshi • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 7* Measures cf Foreign Minister to meet the situation at the beginning and middle cf August,. Til conformity with the General Policy derided upon is. !V Five Minister's Meeting on of August, [ ain, c.s .-.n imminent question at prevent- ing the relation he <m N, A a ad B from, getting worse than they are at pres?;it and at the -onpletion of the Blue State !s intention of advancing .southward into T and F, and I will adopt the following st°pss Against A I will get -he Ambassador in A to open negotiations with the A Government concerning the proposal of August 10 from A and get him to sound out A:s r3a] intention and possibili- ties cf her granting concessions without speaking our mind concerning our situation and without expecting a .final peace- ful settlement. And I will prevent the relations between N and A frcm getting worse than they are. In the meantime, replete cur war preparations and go on Bt. i.iiy.ŷ f-4-Q ^^Lmpressing ^ with cur firm resolution to fulfill our duties of - the N, Xj, and X2 Alliance, and to endeavor to restr ain A's participation in war against X]_. (Further details v/ill be stated in the accompanying document in the telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador in A). Against F We shall superintend F's attitude so that she will not disturb our actions in the stationing of troops, establish- ment of military equipments, etc., in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement. When necessary, we shall adopt coercive measures jigiLiiTBt-'F'. Against T Though aiming at the enforcement of an economic, military and political coalition with T, and ultimately the conclusion of a military alliance, we shall endeavor for the time being to obtain staple commodities, and to conclude an agreement needed for the financial and monetary coalition between N and T. Should this be difficult, we shall endeavor to push the negotiations concerning the agreement, by resorting to oppressive measures such as military pressure, repatriation of residents, etc. In case we cannot find any other measures except the use cf armed force which will cause military conflict with A and B Pt. IY, p. 11 we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoid- ing unnecessary instigation,, Concerning the political and military coalition with T, we shall sound the intention of T's authorities, and endeavor to promote the coalition. But if we find it difficult to attain this object without roscr-ting to pressure, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations.. • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 8* Against E By continuing economic negotiations with E, authorities through the resign", organs, we shall endeavor to prevent the relation between N and E from getting worse and to reduce the influence of uhe freezing of funds, If Ers attitude is uncompromising and it becomes difficult to accomplish this, we shall wait unci! the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary stimulation. Moreover, we will supple- mentally propose to A and B the necessity of supplying N with E's goods a -id get them to advise E to mitigate her attitude. Against D Concerning the rumor of the military alliance with A, B and C2 against N, we shall request D to make her attitude clear and inform iiei that car country has grave concern Pt IV, p. 12 for the performance of the Neutrality Treaty, and indicate that we are prepared to take revenge for a violation of the Treaty. And at the same time, we shall inform D that though our policy is centered on the N, X^ and X2 Alliance as did that of the previous government, we have no intention of attacking as long as D maintains a friendly attitude towards us. Running parallel with the said proceedings, we shall pro- pose to D the conclusion of a new agreement concerning trade and fishery and the offer of the rights of the Karafuto netroleum. If D will not agree to our proposal, we shall threaten her with military demonstration, denouncement of the Neutrality Treaty, et^., but avoiding the conflict of arms. Concerning this economic request against D, we shall obtain beforehand the understanding of X]_, and be prepared for D's alienating propaganda. Against Xi We shall make X-̂ be satisfied with the restraint of A and D and concerning their inquiry on negotiations with A, we shall ex$ain our real intention of securing the final victory of the Axis Powers by the above negotiations. Pt IV, p. 1 3 • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 9* Against C If there is fear of doubt arising about negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention, and ask for her understanding. Against B Though we shall not positively request to negotiate with her; if we find an opportunity, we shall sound her intentions on the adjustment of diplomatic relations betv/een N and 3 according to the same purport as in the negotiations with A. Pt. IV, p. 14 jC 3fc 2jc sjc jc SOKIEN NO. 7 Part 23 Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 2 Authorities to Superintendent's Head- Time to be presented be presented to Quarters; War of Arms, War of Diplomacy; War of Ideological; War of Economic; Judgment Section Supposition First part of November, SHOWA 16 Real date August 14 5 p.m. Authorities to be reported to or informed Prime Minister Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer) SKIRAI, Masatatsu, War Minister Foreign Policy (to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting). I. Policy 1. Keeping its intention secret, the Blue State will carry out.a surprise advance against E in the middle of November. II. Measures. 2. We will continue diplomatic negotiations with E as long as possible until the disembarkation is executed, . without issuing an ultimatum. • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 10* 3. T,fe will first land our advance troops then the main forces by surprise on E on X day attempting, if possible on this occasion to conauer E at one stroke. 4. In case A and B take up the gauntlet after our military advance into E Dt. 23, p. 3 we will lose no time in advancing, overcoming these obstacles, but in case they open hostilities against us before the event takes place, we will begin an attack on P and Q first of all, and later seize the opportunity and advance against E. 5. We will take no measures against A and B for the time being, and with the landing on E, propose the following items s (1) That N's advance into E is indispensable for the self-existence of the Blue State and peace in the Pacific. (2) That we are prepared for a challenge from A and B at any time but we are ready to supply them with the neces- sary materials if they understand cur real intention. 6. Against X we will request without delay that as we shall advance into E first of all to assist X against A and B; X shall not change her military operations against D into a defense attitude throughout and shall carry out positively her war of economy and thoughts against D Pt. 23 p. 4 \ and moreover shall wage war positively against A and B. Pt. 23, P. 5 Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 8 Authorities Superintendent's to be Headquarters; War presented to of Arms; War of Diplomacy; Judgment Section Time to be presented Supposition - Latter part of November SH0'"rA, 16 August 15, 3 p.m. Heal date Authorities Prime to be reported Minister to or informed Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuver- ing officer) SHIRAI, Masatatsu, rrar Minister • IPS DOC. NO. 1356-A Page 1* Opinions to be presented, to the Cabinet Meeting Foreign Policy Based on Supplementary Circumstances 1. Decision 1. Tbe Blue State shall decide to initiate war against A and B and every possible measure should be taken to see that the internal and external situations at tbe time of tbe outbreak of war be extremely favorablee 2. The date of the opening of war shall probably be after the middle of December. II, Measures 1, Against E Besides waging a war of arms, we shall develop a strong war of thought Pt. 23, p. 10 and expect E's complete surrender in a short time. Further, we s>all endeavor to send back ships and materials taking into consideration the temporary isolation of our troops wMch have advanced into E after tV'e outbreak of the war against A and B, and to send beforehand the required munitions. 4, Against L and B We svall endeavor to keep our intention of opening a war secret by means of a compromising and concessive diplomatic policy and endeavor to seize an advantageous situa- tion at the outbreak of the war, gainst X We will inform X that the time of our opening a war against A and B is at hand, and present our demand indicated in the items of SOKIEN, Total War Table Top Maneuvers No. 9> Part 4, 6, Against D We will open negotiations on request. Though we will adopt a delaying policy, we shall maintain the premeditated plan of granting Items 1, 2 and 4. Pt. 23, p. 11 ^ / DOCUMENT NO. 4005B TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp) Page No © RECORD OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER Record of Minister MATSU0K4. in Berlin The Reich Foreign Mix aster welcomed MATS UP KA with cordial words as a man who has shown by word and deed that he has the sameattitude toward cne crcslcms of his country as the Fuehrer arid his 'Co-wJrkers must have for Germanya and who made possible thS tsonulusluu ijf the"pact wi~h Japan au the responsible Foreign Minister of his countrye The Tri-Partite Pact is a very impor-tant instrument for the future of the three countries, and rep- resents the foundation on which the future of the three nations can be assured in a manner that has always been imagined by Ger- man and Japanese patriotsn In this connection- the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the situation as it appears from Germany's view* In reference to the military situation, he pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase of her fight against Englandc During the past winter. the Fuehrer prepared every-thing" further so that Germany stands today completely ready for deployment in order to meet England everywhere she can be reachedo The En eh-tp r has at this moment at his disposal perhaps the strong- est military might which has ever existed in the worldr Germany has ready to strike 240 divisions186 of which are first-class attack divisions of young soldiers* Twenty-four (24) of them are armored divisions to which must be added more motorized brigades«, If one calculates the sum total of the military situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion that the Axis is practi- cally master of the situation in all of continental Europe in the military fieldt A gigantic army is at the disposal of Germany which is practically unemployed and can be committed at any time at any place where the Fuehrer deemed it necessary© The political situation is characterized by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change of government arrived from Belgrade this morning, however all details are lacking so far* Also, the poli- tical situation in Europe and in the whole world has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-Partite powers * Germany continues to strive to win over this or that state which still stands out- side of the pact, to the cause of the three powers. He (Reich Foreign Minister; can inform MTSUOKA ^confidentially that Spain at least in_!=ip-'Tr>J't. in t.hp T-p^-Payti to Pact? Df the two or * three remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interesting,. He can tell MTSUOKA confidentially that here too, attempts would be made to win these countries for the Tri-partite Pact. Certain feelers have already been aimed at TurkeyP Even if this country formally has an alliance with England, it is at least not entirely impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact. * * * * * W i i v o Germany has concluded her well kno-"m "treaties with Russiae Ambassador OSKIMA knows these treaties were r.^, Germany had at that time the_desire t<- conclude a oact with Jap^. j^g to the situation in Japan it haa ^ t been possible to carry this desire0 On the other hand, the storm clouds of the war ap peared more and mere threatening in Europe and since the pact, Italy-Japan-Germany v?as unfortunately not possible at that time for the signing of which the Raich Foreign Minister had been, as Ambassador OSEIMA knows ready for six months on or-der of the Fuehrer, Germany had -co decide upon the pact with Russia in view of the approaching war0 Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA that present'relations toward Russia are correct but not very friendly, s[c * * j|e * The German armies in the East are available at any time0 Should Russia one day take up an attitude which could be in- terpreted as a threat against Germany, the Fuehrer would dash Russia to pieces, One is positive in Germany that such a campaign against Russia would end in a complete victory for German arms and the absolute destruction of the Russian Army and the Russian State The T̂oVvrgr i ̂ that in case of an_advg.nce against the Soviet Union a few months later a power (gropmacht) Russia would ncTTonger exist. The Tri-Pertlte Pact has followed ma_inly the aim of ̂ frightening'America rrcm continuing "on the course taken,_and_is keep her out of warP This goal is absolutely clear and approp-riate, Furthermore, the Iri-partite Pact is to serve to secure the cooperation of the signatories in the new order, in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and in case of Japan in East Asia, for the futureo * * * * * Germany believes that for instance a rapid attack against Singapore would be a very decisive factor for a ranid overthrow of Englandc Doc. No. 2007-E • a Q W^A , 3 / 3 S|bJJC \ ̂ * . ^TS FROH TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY 0E..STATEL DLLZriVEM BEFORE TTT? .TNTWT R.OATTTP F.S ? J PI, • AM rriTT̂ • : NATION OF THE ^AKl, 1 HARBOR ATTACK J pp c 1076 to 10^3 I* BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS The Japanese proposal'for conversations was directed towarc the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of internation- al aggression, her record of duplicity in international deal- ings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United Statese A, Japan's Record of Aggression: The ^resident and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far ^ast* Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been p u r * * - a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, e^sot during certain brief periods when forces of moderation apn^ared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation. In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and triad unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Ilanchuria. In 1905j after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South. Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin, In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue. In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands. Doc, Noc 20C7-B Pap? 2 At the end of the first world war Jinan participated in thf Washington Conference of 1921-22 and becare a party to the treaties concluded there. Arong those treaties was the Nine Dower Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China, That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designee to provide the fullest and most unembarrased opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and sta- ble government,. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self- restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested. In 192p, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently estab- lished there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke cornletely away from the policy o*P coopera- tion agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties, I recalled how early in 1^34 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr, Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no "question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundarent- ally incapable of amicable solution"* In ry reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Governments belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes,. Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose o^ aggression consistent- ly adhered to by Powerful policy-making elements in Japan, On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman pave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purnose to corpel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to hive relations with China only as Japan allowed. On December 29, lp34 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1°36 from the Naval Limita- tion Treaty signed at Washington on February 6? 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded, energetically to increase her armarents, preparatory to launching her invasion in China, About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1Q36, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1°37 Docr No, 2007-B Page 3 Italy adhered- While the Pact was ostensibly for self-nro- tection against cosaranismi actually it was a preparatory rove for subseauent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis". In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a mine incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near ^eiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like ove" great areas, including industrial and other key centers- Thes' armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of law- less acts,. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nankin/ following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937. On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U,S,S« panay in the Yangtze River. To gain public support in Japan for its program of military_expansion, slogans Were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"r The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development. In August and September 1°40 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina* In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite ^act with Germany and Italyr That alliance was aimed directly at the United States* It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until bot" Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States the? standing aloner On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press a statement on the Tripartite Pact has having said in part; "If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ,,those powers will be forced to go to war, Japan is now endeavor ing to adjust Russo-Japanese Political and economic rela- tions and will make every effort to reduce friction betwee Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manouvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang reg'me. B„ Japan's Record of Duplicity? Docr No, 2007-B Page 4 The ^resident and I also gave thought to the fact that Janan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given. In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and terri- torial integrityr In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. In IQQflj, Japan pledged with the United States to support the ifSTependence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there,, In 191 !f, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands." In l^lP, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which mighi be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops. In the Nine Power Treaty•Q£JL2£2y Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and adminis- trative integrity, Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there, Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges. On November 21, ,1932/Mr, .Matsuoka, then Japanese delegat. to the League of Nations-," said: "We.. ..no more territory," By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied "Tfie ̂ moTS' ST Manchuria and in subsequent years they roved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China, On July 27, 1937? prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, sa_ "In 'sending troo"ps to North China, of course, the Government h' âalfiJKer purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, thr to preserve Llim U'.'aic uf Bas"CAb'lfy;" In order to "preserve th< peace oil iilasi Asl-j," JdU.miwsfc! furl!?? for four years" had carried ,,Tarfare and suffering over the greater part of China* On.. October 2 P, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looTf.' un^" phinese people as an enemy...," Japan sh6W6l' Its 'Flendiy reeling for dhina by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty. Docr No, 2007-B Page 5 On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, TaY<T the "Japanese Government, cannot but be deeply concerned over any ..development „. „ tha.t-wa^a^t^e^-^^ status QUO of the Netherlands East Indies". (Following the ocrc 45 at ion of the Netherlands bv Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have rp̂ nnpri tho Indies practically to a Japanese colony. After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against Chin1 ir̂ Jifly 1QP7. Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected,. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assur- 3.TIC 0 S c o r pp. 10*4- to 10«8 Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respectedr Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of Ameri can property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put, into effect in Japanese occup- ied areas. Trade monopolies T"'ere set UP, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities. C- Divergence between Japanese and American Policies: The ^resident and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policiesc We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies. We recalled that Japan's action in 19^1 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had. ushered in an ever widening conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace,- Our Gov ernment's opposition to Japan's course in Wanchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 19 and in a further communication of February 25, 1935» to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. On January 17, 1933 the president-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, ma< clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international Docr No, 2007-B Page 6 treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a state- ment as follows: "I am ... wholly willing tc make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest." In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would. dedicate this nation to the policy rf the good nei-hb r—"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others— the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes. On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Salt., ~ne 0f nany conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in fallowing policies of peace. Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had boon putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear Implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlord ship over neighboring nations and territories. On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I t'Id the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first f̂ eastern «sia and then of ^ther areas such as it might select, and that this vruld ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged unrn the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program. Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles ' f international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support :-f peaceful processes. Docr No, 2007-B Page 7 In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues,in that situation, rf concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of tho protection cf American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part cf tho world were of concern t~ all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities. \ On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which sh- uld govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening tho end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was hold in accordance with a prevision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeatbd refusals cf the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On N'vomber 24 the conference suspended its sittings. pp. 1089. On'April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially tho Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance cf that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies 0r any alteration of their status quo by -thor than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the causa cf stability, peace, and security, n't only in the region of tho Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I uroed that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world. Doc. No. 2007-B Page 8 p. 1090 During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind—and I was explaining to nerabers of Congress and other Americans with whon I can in contact— that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting cn a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to erne in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves. I was saying to these Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to apprrr.ch the Japanese and prevail on then to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future fr^n the standpoint of political, econonic, and social aspects. p.- 1092 The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous tine has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the narch threatening other natirns, great and snail. P. 1093 On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Laase Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Hruso cf Representatives, I said: "It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing hor-s-elf in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arris and thus to make themselves master of an area containing alnost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a cmsequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region." Dcc. No. 2007-B Page 9 I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and inplacahle movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding notions "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere". pp. 1103 to 1109 II. C ONYEESATI ON S AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941. On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned. Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations. On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused, over the German and Japanese movements to take charoe of the seas and of the ether con- tinents f r their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims. On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The -resident agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries c-uld be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would he removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. ,,rith the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking lmdly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion. On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was con- cerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt f^ur principles which cur Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows: (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty rf each and all nations; (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Support of the principle of equality, including eouality of commercial opportunity; (4) Non-disturbance "f the status quo in the Doc. No. 2'̂ OV-B Page 10 Pacific except as the status quo nay he altered by peaceful neons. I tcld the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as wuld be consistent with those principles. On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the Unite 1 States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources—such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel— in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of Independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe. The proposal also contained an affirmation cf Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted. The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipula- tions disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, pro- fessedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia. Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility cf working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this c untry stood. On I,lay 14, Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Konoe and he were determined, that Japan's southward, advance should be carried out only by peaceful moans, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible." DCC. NO. 2007-B r-.rr ; In reply to the Ambassador' s inquiry as to \;hac circumstances he had in nind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that th^se measures were regarded as provocative by tho Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act. On May 27, 19^1, President Ecosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radi~ address on the sane day ho declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our cwn security. He warned, of the conditions which vruld exist should Hitler be victorious. The President and I were sure that the proclamation w.uld be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords. Cn May 28 I t'ld the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in tho proposals. During the next few weeks there were a number of con- versations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas -f difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points—the necessity of Japan's making clear its relaticn tc the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application -f the principle of nc n-interference in the internal affairs cf another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of n.n-discrinination in commercial relations in China and -"ther areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent In the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seekin ; was a comprehensive agreement which w-"uld sneak f-T itself as an instrument of peace. The Japanese pressed for a complete reply their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft 'f their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed t~ take action against tho United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made tr work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the ques- tion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would disc ntinue aid tc the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarifi- cati'n r f r the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles. Doc. No. 1418—A Page 1. •tttry Co-jjit 01.^0 Diary September 19. 1940 I O J U ^ J A r r i v a l of B i b b e n t r o p . He i s i n a good humour and v e r y p l e a s e d w i t h t h e welcome g i v e n him by the ' 'applause squad" which was w e l l coached by the Questura. In c a r he immedi- a t e l y speaks of tho s u r p r i s e he has i n h i s p o r t f o l i o - t h i s i s the Japanese m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e which i s to be s igned i n a. few days in B e r l i n . Tile Russ ian dream v a n i s h e d f o r e v e r i n the halln nf the. I.plvp.dere a t Vienna a f t e r the g u a r a n t e e s _to Rumania were made. He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s s t r o k e w i l l have a double edge" A g a i n s t R u s s i a and a g a i n s t America. The t h r e a t of the Japanese f l e e t w i l l keep the l a t t e r from making any move. I e x p r e s s a d i f f e r e n t o p i n i o n : The a n t i - R u s s i a n g u a r a n t e e s a r e a l l r i g h t ; the a n t i - A m e r i c a n note which w i l l induce Washington to i n c r e a s e her~~cominitiaent s to B r i t a i n i s not so good. 4s f a r as Great B r i t a i n i s concerned, Ribbentrop says t h a t the weather has been extremely bad and t h a t c l o u d format ionSj, r a t h e r than the RAF, have p r e v e n t e d the f i n a l s u c c e s s of the a i r a3j5iSsS»r However, he says t h a t the a t t a c k w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l ps soon as the weather c l e a r s f o r a few d a y s . The l a n d i n g } 'preparat ions a r e complete and a. l a n d i n g i s p o s s i b l e , B r i t i s h J t e r r i t o r i a l d.eioiiSOS ai 'e-rrothing t o worry about,. I t w i l l only V take one German d i v i s i o n to break up the e n t i r e d.efense system. DoCo Ho. 627 A l r e a d y V i c e - m i n i s t e r Approved by P a r l i a m e n t a r y Wot y e t C o u n c i l l o r Page 1 Sections; General, military Service, Accountant, Connected jTransjortatioit, Lae'sinerf, I%tei*ials Term t o be Icept: Perma- n e n t l y R e c e i p t Nos ' deceived Army-China- | j.Var Confidential- 11512 1 ISSUJ sd fays I&mltions S e c t i o n of {Ministry Receiot-No. f Ordinance Btiream D e c i s i o n d i r e c t e d byi D i r e c t o r o f the Bureau A c t i o n d i r e c t e d bv; IEA'.VA} IARAS Concerning? D e l i v e r y o f a r i a s M i n i s t e r s appointed by person i n charge | P a r l i a m e n t a r y ' V i c e J - ' i n i s t e r i P a r l i a m e n t a r y C o u n c i l l o r s S e c r e t a r y : V i c e - M i n i s t e r : appointed by person i n charge S e n i o r A d i u t a n t : CKA.T.VIIAĴ i A d j u t a n t i n charge? "̂'JH&IEA | CoEEissicner of S e c r e t a r i a t e Accountant : D i r e c t o r o f Bureau i n charge 2 fSOGA } C h i e f o f S e c t i o n i n c h a r g e : i ITO 1 S e c t i o n Ejaciber i n charges I SI®JI 1 Copyisst ( o f t h i s n o t e ) At Bureau i n charge At M i n i s t - e r ' s S e c r e - t a r i a t e Nos China- Conf i d . Received om Submitted on? Nov. 1 1 . SH0.7A l£ Received on on: , Nov. 1 1 F i n i s h e d on? Nov. I 3 Connected? Director of Bureau-: Chiaf flf Sftetinn Hilit .LCIT .-- : Aceonntaiit f~ I AiaCHI 1 M a c h i n e r y 1 CIXIX ~f g e n e r a l , . l ^ o c > Trains port f HIRCI^a. I Materials I laSCDA \ C i r c u l a t i o n a f t e r ex- e c u t i o n ( d e c i s i o n ) % 3 i r e c t o r o f Bureau: C h i e f o f ion* Doc. No. 627 Page 2 Army - China - Confidential Instruction from the adjutant to the Vice-Director of the Army Ord- nance Headquarters. 3y order I inform you that you are directed to have the prepared arms, stated in the "Army-China-Confid.-No. 3898, dated Nov.7," delivered to all troops at each place in accordance with the attached table. P.S. Its expenditure is to be paid out of the extraordinary mili- tary budget account. Army-China-Confid.-No.2(004 Nov. 11, SHOtfc 16. /1941/ Army - China - Confid. Instructions from the Adjutant to the Chiefs of the Staffs of the l6th, 55th, and 56th Divisions. By order I inform you that arms stated in the attached lists No. 1 and 2 are to be delivered as diown in the attached table. 1 Army-China-Confid.-No.4004 Nov. 11, SHOWA 16. /1941/ (Sig.) Army-China-Confid.-No. 10578 received by the '.tar Ministry Top Secret. Army Department in Imperial Headquarters. (Army) No. 409. Part 3. The notification to keep in secrecy the identification of the officers dispatched to French Indo-China. 15 October 1941. The Chief Secretary of General Affairs of the Army Staff of Imperial Headquarters. Tadaichi takamatsu (sig.) To the Adjutant of the Army Ministry. Nawoichi Kawahara. The notification. To keep in secrecy the general plan for "Operation 'Ah'", I request your deep consideration to keep in secrecy at present,, by wearing civilian clothes etc., the identification of the officers and the essential members of the staff of the Army Ministry who are to be dispatched to French Indo-China. This notification to be sent to the following offices, i.e, Army Ministry; Aviation Section of Army Ministry; Sea transportation Headquarters of Army Ministry. ! 'Doc, (p 1 fi- J O lUvpJjli-rxJsnX yxJiu^ti o-J the & o . <7?uil£co>-vs6 " >-<ifj. ' 1 0 ' i tJu /^jLesiesieuucuui . Q Jiuz / 6> 7J, Cf S S K ^jt'V-on^ n. J%A S l u iA'-^rnAj (Qsi/tOn cun. £Ji / ^ i i ^ i i a ^ ^ 1 JitttAtjUtX-ttf>i</ oj' i.b oLi^J^lLiritXCrt- * { yniisniJ^jtrri* 4)<Jj. tJU flvrru c/. to i » ' JjUY- • Tits 5 3 ti. II >/ B o - 1 1 I 1 ft t/ »/ * W e /3d %- s. // ' ' • > . _ /f J JL.I /Stl %n~. il'jj J.) ti. tQjs-f-iuxoi 1 1 1 (rL&t i /rrl Tins 1 1 ! i rfe. Z XA i j : - •t* £ O '7 * r ' « / , ' " T > i v - — " r. y " J ? / /' 1 „ 1 " " Tel" ' H J M " - j i- t*T i.1 IS 3 'kA - ! ! " . " N clA,' .i i.. i'A | - H ! 1 L. ^ ! J i ' o t ! 7/ J** -<• • 9 z 1 / ? -Aju^^fu \ -> • — > : j f/ t-1 1 | / > fiZy'it- i ">H f&M- . , /. su.tPO *?l£>,00<> 4^2/ tO 1 ZtSjfiOi ^ i f t - ' - - " ^ c A- ° V-00 0 J * - - : J ? o | / 3 a /f^ I i y 1 1 V-o y'-iT ĉO | 21 d u t f ? Sj/ri-o | /S~P ; i . . . . _ . . ! / ,- . . I - ' J_ l m / Oto.S 7L LJL d tvUic&A OyruL d czsntL C'/rvwriMS! liturtv* Ac Jrt cLUjUvU^-oi o**- ^u^A^ W * t<ki" " T^ " j TtrfaJZ- " A . «* U/HitL * e " CLk> ! Gut ic QJJL.'*^ uXW* • *, H s , » [ /ft. i "3C 'He'' 'Ua | - v s y - - - / 0 (X JUAXJL CfjittJjL 4i.ll' t ttif n,'^ /oyteyLcMl. tt.tooo 1 i 370, QSO^OO.trrC 1 1 t<>ti,t>(rO ff&e+e 2.-V-C* /$.<?TO /i~4 errs CeAM.tXiC i.'S*- nJUy^ t-JZlf asl^- fjt.tnri It. trri Sj.CtrO /Jt. <hrc f crt> / <?<"> 97 U^Il L. - 0 . Itli-- c^iL^iM*- JL% a^njLfi+tA-c***- &J&T3 i HOytrtc iVîl- IjUk cJUf .nJUL Socorro n n JJL i jtro-o tp'ffV 3.* /6 £0 j Srfco 70 '3o UiL-^Lidjf n o fiUl - c^UMi j) ̂ j / (rtro A CO fyuJL- WJJAA j U l ' i ^ . ^ j 1 /) //' j/)//* J^O c> /jO 60 \ i 1 //O 4 2>cc . t j ) / - 4-- { -IrJi! Cc^Utdfri ! — »-' ———j i I H | t ! fu aZ-^JLv S-AjrIP- CO "XrJcL^J) /c-tns, I . 1 (A/jo tXlrJ: ij.ot^t. i, A! ! i r-sU S-UP-. -A&uoii 7f ^ 1 i - — — ~ t ScUJfy** Owl -J&off Co-'utv-, otp > » ' /4<ntP" ; r • I s /c /c-sXvXeo' l A^t/UC^JL /S.mt> —< ro /.JVV i 2 " I -po^Ji'-bvirJU | • /C-^-^tj tfi po ^yyyt^ks" yvHjinjcJZer l/L OV era /<rc /o-» /rv /oro L U^<KXSLA JnvurKs Jcrv /<r* J"* J~D ftro J"® J-b /£T%- J>/i (TW ! 'TV-V lf.o-0 y in? /.Jro /arc / m /crv ^crv r A6 6 Uo /o \ A A A f t ! 7" " / £TU /Cn> J-0 j yP (TO r~o j / ^ I t iZASL J -'•'n. < Ci t • <*• •H • -V. . \ \35T~":—'•••^JT J.4 , • >•„ -r, A ro fCtd- enx V. < , trn. v i / K J ' J . • "vd* * e J i A' o \ / • J -I liW.I j f l i r _ j . ! i? ,_L_ , j 91* Wl^ff^^i. rift t / o z A T i c v <0 j i t i / i * y ^ t s f i M 'OH-* • * < • L- r / ) , TV , 9 * / 4 1 S~trO f e e 2 orft 9 ! j a X p f l i -wiofĉt e & a . r f h ^ ^ f 2 0 f 2 a Z $ A j j h f l * * * - // i " • f s J y & t M f A < ™ r ; ? a X J s M j U c t r x ^ J i e . * - / O - < h M * U j x r J a . t t A * e - • , J % x t A % . l % ' . u p u J * * > 0 ' . / Z d h q r i f L f r ? t A I A % 1 t i l y J M % I V I-I- : — yd. 6 iQ^ayiZ^ j^v fleS 'to" tie*. IfliT* if X ~ •C^-t C/.ynsHth fatty fU. 1 M&. frfl^pJUcy (JtA**"^ frrfiuniX&t / s/jjfiMffH tl frs 1 tiib-Uiim a u, i f* K ' . ti ajK*u>vt fc^tllundi Cj&Hf***/ Z*JL Utsa 1, 000 1 -ooo I* DOO l-SOO 2.00 fct loo .zoo 0 Sjjr^-le^JA/ tri^yy^v St) €0 5V xo So 10 20 10 ID I iVV 7 LsC C {' <.• i 'J (ItTm-:.-.:. f /.-t-y H • jjA : ' - ^ !j8t . 17 j f M t A J l i&ltL : : /jUw; j fr , ,7 > , si , I j • ! 'J • !»• J i L: l _ i " A i > 7* £ y ̂ Ji - \Mu Jf ' / 1 | f+siSo id.-j.JL- L.jkrrif... 2 ir : , -c V j "slA, 55C '7 • I » 'ytiMsruX^oyiA Xc oCL&fo.jJnAX&Ms "SIN" "TBI" • ^f/l&AJk j, ~ f^jjiinvud^k OX'JIN "{lA " (UJLo+is .vuJufts "aJJ' 3i> qZJU. /v'MJU -OuCt^fy. J qcj,^ P0C? 1 <jcj (jzjUs (JkeML - fgtooP • Jljw-y SYY^aM^US 9z t^1^*™* 9 A, fituJte^ M W ^ H A - - > 9 V ff M^Jh' C. j s J t ^ J ^ A - JA^ ^ / ^ W J J Z U t i , c X u ^ A^OAJJLL 4-0 c? 1 ... ^ VttL 6 <2-1 if} tfyU | " 3. oco [ 1 1 ^LwmteH 3* 'iXft* f^JU ) " fflJtgJL Ho.l f o j f b cyn&Ms*. Osyit*' - aASlMO-ift ^OMt/Hel 'r 2 ,(rt"9 f7 Jtylh ^uOlajl yxMtn* d- / ^ J . ( P ^ J J . t J 1 ff sMtpudfy - f j ceM&f^Mz WIHIB: ffwS Jir^V , /jLnJXeJlM jo (Mtunui 1 cSjp 30 dyuj^^i j i i ' 6 J y - • r . J ' o ^ U ^ TZJ- 'j} .MxcjU p/ 3 ^jyi j c > / f.- J Q C s/l̂ M ̂ l^rrfa^cjl AMmJbJt"if A* w* 1 ^ e>, <2° i-S'-t̂ s <3;A 1V OJib - ^ A I/O ^ — E H . / 0 Q 0 -/o f /{TO. U C w . 6Z1 / Pri^tjXJ^ s U /O fl&f^ cfJsMjk' P/^fA^Zilzs b V v 1 , S JO / o 3 0 9Si tf^JL, <2jd^yy^ i • / o S' JO ; v o S-P f Doc. 627 C E R T I F I C A T E .< •• jJ 1 0 0 i'To • I . P . S . Ho. ...627 frtatgjagnt of I, Laneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity" Corresponding Secretary 1st J^emobilizati n Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting-Of 15 pages, dated ^ctv Nov, 194l» described as follows' ^emorandum pertaining to concealment of identity of military officers going to -French Indo Onina and memo and charts pertaining to distributions of munitions, etc. I further certify that the attached record and documant is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archi- ves and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War ulinistrv. Signed at Tokyo*, on tais 16 aay of October, 1946. /s/ feaneo ̂ shibashi Signature of Official '•>itnesss /3/ Tjrakichi ̂ "alcamura (SE.iL) Corrasrionainfi Secretary Official Capacity Statenenl_of '->£facial Procurement I, 2d Lt. Eric Fleisher, 0-935-00, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the -Hied lowers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 16 day of 0ctobert 1946 Witnesss /s/ ̂ ou..;las L , "aldorf 1st Lt., Inf. Chief, Inv. IPS /-./ r i c "L i ' l e i s h e r . 2d M . . -TJ3 HUM. I n v e s t i g a t o r . IPQ Official Capacity Doc. No. 1298 Page 1 CODE TELEGRAM HO. 39430 Berlin Saptember 26, 1940, A.M. Received: Foreign Office September 26, 1940, P.M. Tos Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador KURUSU No. 1251, (urgent), Ambassador's Special Code Book Ambassador Schulenberg is on his way back to Germany to confor on Gcrmrr. relations with Soviet Russia in the event of the Japan-Germany-Italy Treaty boing concluded. The German Govornmont plans to guide the German press to lay particular emphasis on tho fact that the treaty does not moan anticipation of war with Russia. But on the other hand, Germany is concentrating troops in the Eastern regions as a check on Russia. i" Doc. No. 1298 (' C d ^ t / Page 1 / C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No._l2.9jL. Statement of Source andAuthenticity Hayashi. hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have*custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated Sept.T 1940? and described as follows: Strictly confidential documents of the Foreign Office concerning the Tripartite Pact. I further certify that the atc&cned record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the fol- lov/ing named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office. Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of August,1946. /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witne s s: Nagaharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement Richard H. Larsh? hereby certify that I am assoc-iated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Aug.. 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh N A M Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis £nd Lt., MI Investigator T IPS Official Capacity •>oc. A , • 4 0 ' y "age 1 Telegram SECRET (Various seals, etc.) Despatched from NAEKIVO 9 - Despatched at 1128 ' Y j W - Received at 1330 Addressed to the Vice-Hinister of War Vice-Chief of the General Staff. Despatched hy the Chief of the Third Air Group. Telegram-- The Third Air Group Tel # 2704. 1. The Chief of the Aerial Group will leave NANKING early tomorrow morning —the 15th— with the staff officers required for the south part of Indo-ChTna and lish a command post in Saigon on and after the!l6th. 2. The Chief of the Staff and the staff officers required shall remain in NANKING to carry cut the con- centration of aerial forces and measures with regard to shipping and transport. 4 C S R T I F I C A T S W.D.C. No. IPS No. 630-A §iaiemen.t_ of. Source, and Authenticitv I, Kaneo ishibashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capp.cJt̂ v: Corresponding Secretary - 1st Demobilization and that as svch official I have custody of the document hereto attached consist- in? of 1 pages dated Nov. 14, 1?41 and described as follows: Telegram re?ardin? troop movement I further certify that the attached record and docvment is an official docvment of the Japanese Government, and that it is part, of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or anv other official designation of the regular location, of the docvment in the archives or files): 1st Demobilization Bureau, (former ;,'ar Finistry) Signed at. Tokvo on this 22 day of An?, 1946 s/ Faneo Ishlbashi "S-^nature of Official Witness: s/ Sh3na.i-1< Kobavashi SEAL Correspond! ng_ Secretary Official Capacity S__atement of Official Procurement I, Richard K.- Larsh hereby certifv that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct cf my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this s/ Richard H. Larsh 22 day of Aug, 1946 Name Investi^ato r Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis, 2d Lt. ¥1 'Official Capacity ( I / / * Doctonent Ho. 1285 A 5 E H I A 1 . R e c o g n i t i o n o f P r o t o c o l c o n c e r n i n g e n t r a n c e o f Hungary i n t o Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and I t a l y . 2 . R e c o g n i t i o n o f P r o t o c o l c o n c e r n i n g e n t r a n c e o f Romania i n t o Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and I t a l y . 3. R e c o g n i t i o n of P r o t o c o l c o n c e r n i n g e n t r a n c e o f S l o v a k i a i n t o Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and I t a l y . 4 . R e v i s i o n o f t h e Ceremonial Law. 5 . S p e c i a l appointment of c e n s o r s of t h e Home M i n i s t r y . Document Ho. 1285 Page 5 RECORD OF TH3 MEETING OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL Meet ing opens a t 10820 A . M . , Wednesday, December 1 0 , 1940 " j His I m p e r i a l M a j e s t y E n t e r s Present M i n i s t e r s : C o u n c i l l o r s ! - P r e s i d e n t HAFA T i c e - ? r e s i d e n t SULTj/TI, Prime Mini s t er~ZONOtlg- W e l f a r e M i n i s t e r EAN3MISSU O v e r s e a s M i n i s t e r AKI1A Jjfar Minister I-ajft'' __ F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t e i T l O S H i r A Commerce & I n d u s t r y M i n i s t e r KOBAYASHI F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r KA.¥jiDA Home M i n i s t e r YASTJI J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r KAJAM Communications M i n i s t e r MU3ATA A g r i c u l t u r e & F o r e s t r y M i n i s t e r ISEIGTJRO Navy M i n i s t e r 0I2A¥A R a i l w a y s M i n i s t e r CGAKA C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r C o u n c i l l o r EAWAI ISEII ARIMA EU30TA ISHIZUKA SHIMIZU M I M I HARA ARAKI MftTSUI SUGAl'JARA MATSUURA USHIO HA GAS EI FUZAI FuTAGAMI MANO OSHIMA OBATA TAEEKASHI MITSUCHI (No. 5 ) (No. 6) (No. 7 ) (No. 8) (No. 9) (No. 10) (No. 1 1 ) (No. 1 2 ) (N0. 1 3 ) (No. 1 4 ) (No. 1 5 ) (No. 1 6 ) (No. 1 7 ) (No. 1 8 ) (No. 2 1 ) (No. 22) (no. 2-3) (No. 24) ( n o . 25) (No. 26) (No. 27) (No. 23) (No. 29) (No. 30) (no. 31) (no. 32) (No. 33) (no. 34) ( n o . 35) (No. 36) (no. 37) CNo. 38) (no. 39) (No. 40) (NS. 4 1 ) Document No. 1285 Page 1 Document Ho. 1285 Page 2 Absent Imperial Princes:- Prince YASUEITO ' (Ho. l) Prince H03IHIT0 (Ho. 2) Prince TAXAHITO (Ho. 3) Prince KOTOHITO (Ho. 4) Councillors:- Councillor EAHEKO (Ho. 20) Delegates (Government Delegates) Director of the Legislation Bureau MUBASE Councillor of the Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA (The above two concerning each item on the Agenda) Director of the Eurooe & Asia Bureau (Foreign Ministry) SAHAMOTO Director of the Treaty Bureau (Foreign Ministry) MATSTJMOTO The above two concerning Items 1, 2 and 3 President of the Board of Decorations SEKO Secretary of the Board of Decorations MURATA (The above t™o concerning Item 4) Director of the Polia Bureau (Home Ministry) FUJIWARA (The above concerning Item 5) Reporting member.- Chief Secretary HOME Secretaries 5- S e c r e t a r y MOROEASHI S e c r e t a r y TAEATSTJJI President (EARA) The meeting is called to order. I submit the following three items together as the subject for discussion:- 1) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Hungary into Ihree Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy. 2) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Romania into Ihree Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy. Document Ho. 1285 Page 2 Document No. 1285 Page 3 3) R e c o g n i t i o n o f P r o t o c o l c o n c e r n i n g e n t r a n c e o f S l o v a k i a i n t o Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and. I t a l y . A c c o r d i n g t o p r e c e d e n t , we s h a l l d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e R e a d i n g s , r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s t o t h e main p o i n t s c f t h e " b i l l , omit the r e a d i n g and i m m e d i a t e l y c a l l f o r the r e p o r t o f the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . R e p o r t i n g Member (EORIE) R e s p e c t f u l l y i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e s e t h r e e i t e m s , I b e g t o s t a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g : - Soon a f t e r t h e s i g n i n g of the Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and I t a l y , on September 27bh of t h i s y e a r a t B e r l i n , t h e German Government conveyed to t h e I m p e r i a l Japanese Government t h e i r d e s i r e t h a t Hungary be a l l o w e d to e n t e r the above-mentioned Three Power P a c t , and asked f o r our o p i n i o n . T h e r e f o r e , the I m p e r i a l Japanese Government r e p l i e d t h a t i t had. no o b j e c t i o n s , F o l l o w i n g t h i s , t h e German Government showed te t h e d r a f t o f the P r o t o c o l c o n c e r n i n g Hungary ' s e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e above-mentioned t r e a t y , and moreover t o l d us on t h i s o c c a s i o n t h a t i t d e s i r e d t h e e a r l y r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s b e c a u s e of t h e European s i t u a t i o n . Next t h e German Government t o l d us i t d e s i r e d t h e e n t r a n c e of Romania and S l o v a k i a i n t o the above-mentioned t r e a t y , t h a t i t h o p e d f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s as soon a s p o s s i b l e , and as b e f o r e a s k e d f o r our c o n s e n t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e I m p e r i a l Japanese Government t r a n s m i t t e d i t s consent to the d r a f t o f t h e P r o t o c o l , and at t h e same t i m e , g r a n t e d the d e s i r e of t h e German Government t and under the c o n d i t i o n of r e c e i v i n g t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e Government, caused our p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s t o s i g n the P r o t o c o l f o r Hungary on November 20th a t V ienna, f o r Romania on November 23rd and f o r S l o v a k i a on November 2 4 t h , b o t h at B e r l i n . The form and c o n t e n t s of t h e t h r e e P r o t o c c l s a r e c o m p l e t e l y i d e n t i c a l . They a r e composed of t h r e e a r t i c l e s . Japan, Germany and I t a l y are the c o n t r a c t i n g powers on one s i d e w h i l e on t h e o t h e r s i d e t h e c o n t r a c t i n g powers a r e Hungary* Romania, and S l o v a k i a as the c a s e may b e . Between t h e s e two c o n t r a c t i n g p o w e r s , t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s a r e a g r e e d upon! l ) Eungary, Romania and S l o v a k i a a r e t o j o i n t h e Three Power T r e a t y between Jgoan, Germany and I t a l y s i g n e d at B e r l i n on September 2 7 , 1940. Hungary, Romania and S l o v a k i a may c a u s e t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the mixed commissions p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t i c l e 4 of t h e above-mentioned t r e a t y whenever problems c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s a r e d i s c u s s e d by t h e Commissions. The main body o f the above-mentioned t r e a t y i s t o be appended to the P r o t o c o l as a Supplement. The P r o t o c o l w i l l be d r a r a up i n J a p a n e s e , German and I t a l i a n and Hungarian, Romanian and S l o v a k i a n as the c a s e may b e . E a c h of t h e s e t e x t s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d o f f i c i a l . Document No. 2185 Page 3 Document Ho. 1285 Page 2 By the conclusion of this treaty Hungary, Romania and Slovakia recognize the leading position of Germp^y It.nly in Europe and the lead- ing position of Japan l"n"~SrsateriFiqat Asia* and will also cooperete with Japan, G-ermany and Italy in making efforts for tlB constraction of a new world order. The six countries of Jap an v Germany. Italy, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia have pledged each other that if any one of them is attackad~by a country not"at present involved^ in either the European war or the Sjno- Japanese hostilities, the six wit* «n pnflsiVlfi means, and that these points vdll have no influence on the existing political situation "between each of these countries and the Soviet Union. We "believe that the three items under eonsideration are in accord- ance with principles of the preamble, of the 'Three Power Treaty previously concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy* that in order that Hungary, Romania, aid Slovakia might .join the treaty the interested countries have decided to conclude an agreement in the form of a protocol, and that this will be of service in strengthening the Jspaa-'Garmany-Italy Ast* and in realizing the final purpose of the Three Pc'er Treaty. For these reasons the conclusion of this agreement may be called an. opportxme step_, and its articles may also be recognized as presenting no difficulties. Thus we coiL&idar that each of these three items shoald be passed as they stand. The abcva is a respectful report on the res-alts of the investigation. No. 36 (EUTAEAMI) The protocols under consideration wj.ll expand the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, and are a very serious natter because circumstances may arise in which our country will bear the uuty of giving military aid to Sungsry, Romania, and Slovakia and of going to war for themZ Therefore, I wish to ask two or three questions^ firsts in whet position are these three countries to enter the Three Power Treaty? That is, what is the meaning of the word entrance in these protocols? As there are no special stipulations concerning the Three Power -raaty other than the article regarding the Mixed Technical Commission in the protocols, we may consider the above-mentioned three countries have the same rights and duties as Japan, Germany and Italy as I'M an the other articles of the treaty are concerned. In that case, regarding the second article of the treaty, G-ermany, Italy, Hungary and the other two countries in Europe? Since the chief object of the-Three Power Treaty is to establish the two great co-prosperity spheres of Europe and Greater 3-ast Asia, is it net right to understand it in the above- mentioned manner? Delegate (MATSUMQTO) The Honorable Councillors theorty concerning Article 2 of the Three Power Treaty is correct, but as to Article 1; our country does not recognize the position of Germany. Italy» Hungary and the other two countries in Europe; our country and Hungary and the other two countries recognize the Document Ho. 1285 Page 4 Document Ho. 1285 Page 5 the l e a d i n g p o s i t i o n of Germany and I t a l y i n Europe , I n o t h e r words , we u n d e r - stand t h a t Hungary and the o t h e r two c o u n t r i e s recognise the l e n d i n g p o s i t i o n of Germany and I t a l y , and of Japan, i n Europe and G r e a t e r E a s t A s i a , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Ho. 36 (POxAKAMl) Such an e x p l a n a t i o n would "be c o n v e n i e n t f o r Germany and I t a l y ? but_ would not be c o n v e n i e n t f o r Hungary and t h e o t h e r two c o u n t r i e s . 'I'o cause a c o u n t r y t o j o i n a t r e a t y i n o r d e r t o res^gni If l f tdlng p o s i t i o n o f another c o u n t r y , and r e t t o have one*8 own c o r j i t j y - s p o s i t i o n recognized. - thfet i s a v e r y ayfcward e x p l a n a t i o n . , If t h e meaning ( o f the p r o t o c o l s ) i s i n - deed as t h e h o n o r a b l e d e l e g a t e has answered, i t would have been s u f f i c i e n t s imply t o have s a i d t h a t (Bungary and. t h e o t h e r two c o u n t r i e s ) r e c o g n i z e t h e s t i p u l a t i o n s of A r t i c l e s I and 2 o f t h e t r e a t y » N e x t , r e g a r d i n g t h e e x - p l a n a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g mutual a i d among t h e s i g c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t Japan, Germany and I t a l y , and the t h r e e c o u n t r i e s who a r e p a r t i e s t o each of t h e p r o t o c o l s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e a r t h e o b l i g a t i o n of mutual m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . What a r e not c l e a r p r e the o b l i g a t i o n s t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s o f Hungary, Romania and S l o v a k i a w i l l b e a r between each o t h e r . Prom t h e form of t h e s e p r o t o c o l s i t does not appear t h e r e i s any p r o v i s i o n f o r mutual a s s i s t a n c e between t h e s e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s . I a s k f o r a r e p l y . D e l e g a t e (MATSUMOTO) The h o n o r a b l e C o u n c i l l o r ' s t h e o r y i s c o r r e c t and t h e r e i s some doubt about t h e wording of t h e protoco!s_. But i n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , s i n c e t h r e e new c o u n t r i e s have j o i n e d t h e Three Power T r e a t y between Japan, Germany and I t a l y and s i n c e t h e s e s i x c o u n t r i e s have e n t e r e d i n t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p of a l l i a n c e my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t when t h e s i t u a t i o n s t i p u l a t e d i n A r t i c l e 3 a r i s e s , t h e s e t h r e e n e w l y - j o i n e d c o u n t r i e s a l s o b e a r t h e o b l i g a t i o n of a s s i s t i n g one a n o t h e r . No. 36 (FUTAEAMI) I f t h e r e were an a r t i c l e p r o v i d i n g f o r a d m i s s i o n s i n the Three Power T r e a t y , t h e r e would b e no q u e s t i o n , but s i n c e t h e r e i s none, Hungary and t h e o t h e r two c o u n t r i e s became one of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s i n the r e s p e c t i v e p r o t o c o l s , but t h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r t h e a r i s i n g of any r e - l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s . I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r t h o s e who a r e not p a r t i e s t o a t r e a t y assuming o b l i g a t i o n s . What i s t h e Government's o p i n i o n ? No. 9 (MATSUOEA) As to the f i r s t p o i n t o f t h e h o n o r a b l e C o u n c i l l o r ' s q u e s t i o n , i t goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s newly j o i n i n g t h e t r e a t y r e - c o g n i z e d t h e p o s i t i o n o f Japan, Germany and I t a l y when s i g n i n g t h e p r o t o c o l . Regarding t h i s p o i n t , I b e l i e v e t h a t a s i d e from t h e t h e o r y of t r e a t i e s , as a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , t h e r e i s no room f o r d o u b t , and as f o r t h e second p o i n t , t h e r e can a l s o be no d o u b t . S i n c e t h e fundamental s p i r i t o f t h e s u b j e c t under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h a t t h e c o u n t r i e s p a r t y t o t h i s t r e a t y a c t as one i n Document No. 1285 Page 5 Document Ho. 1285 Page 5 assisting each other, although there may he doubts on this point as a legal theory, no doubt can arise on it as an actual political problem„ Nd. 36 (FUTAEAMl) Since the honorable minister declares himself of the same^opinion . as far as the interpretation of the treaty goes I hope he will satisfactorily deal with the matter politically0 In conclusion I have a question to ask regarding the form of concluding international treaties, Recently, when the Three Power Treaty between Japan,Germany and Italy wcs submitted to this Council for deliberation only the Japanese text was placed before this Council as the official text of the treaty, and the German and Italian texts were not submitted. Today for the first time I have become aware of its contents when these protocols were placed before us for deliberation. Since I am fully aware of the circumstances of the times I have no intentio of disputing about this, but in future I desire that all official texts be submitted to this Council for _cQnsid.Rrw.tinn before asking for the Imperial approval. Among the official texts of the protocols submitted to this Council for consideration are Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian. These languages, unlike German and Italian, are comprehended by few persons in this country. Y^iat^methods have the authorIti£S-_gffipi nyf»<TTio~see that these texts agree withthe official Japanese text? To give an example, a few years ago there was a plan to conclude a treaty between our country gncT Ethiopa. Whgn the Imperial approval was almost about to be asked for,_lt. was found «n engaging a scholar of the Imperial University to interpret^ the official text in Ethiopian that there were two or three points on which it differed from the official text in our language. Finally» the draft was dis- carded and a new treaty drawn up in which French was the official language. While I believe that in all probability much care was taken in comparing the official texts of these protocols, I would like to know how this was done. Delegate (MATSUMOTO) As regards the matter pointed out by the honorable Councillor, in view of the precedent concerning the Ethiopian language we have taken due care. There axe competent specialists in our country regarding Hungarian and Romanian while Slovakian is a dialect of Bussian and there were specialists in the Russian language who comprehended that language. Therefore, we have carefully scrutinized the text, and have also inquired of the German and Italian Embassies concerning this. Thus we have taken every care so that there might be no discrepancy between these texts and the official Japanese text. No. 26 (SHIMIZU) When will Germany and Italy recognize the Nanking Government as the Government ̂ representing the Republic of China? Also, what attitude will the three countries newly adhering to the Three Power Treaty take regarding the recognition of this Government. Document No. 1285 Page 6 Document No. 1285 t Page 7 No. 9 (MATSUOEA) The I m p e r i a l Japanese Government had already d i s c u s s e d t h e r e - c o g n i t i o n of t h e Nanking Government Kitli German and I t a l y b e f o r e our r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s Government. Italy is prepared to recognize t h i s Government immediately and I e:spect that following this, Germany and t h e o t h e r t h r e e c o u n t r i e s corxsrned in the protocols under c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l extend r e c o g n i t i o n also* However, in regard to the I t a l i a n Government,gs i t , i s d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e Inperial Japanese Ambassador be t h e d o y e r of t h e i i p l o p a j l c oorps accredited to the new C-iorernmsnt,. we asI%drTSe~ItgLian Government t o extend recognition after car aflbpssador had "presented h i s c r e d e n t ! a l s " a n d obtained their understanding regarding'this» A l s o , as f o r the time t h e German Government will ysctocd recognition, t a e r e i s a. d e l i c a t e problem. That i s to say. J ;ba jgpfrj.r'.a.l rjcxsje Government has not y e t g i v e n up i t s hope of realizing an all-out paae-e" in China. Per t h i s , l t " I ¥ ~ a t T ^ I e c o r e n e c e s s a r y t o ask for German assistance on the side lines. But i f t h e - German Govermer.t should recognize the r.eur Ccrrerrssent it yill n a t u r a l l y mean the s e v e r a n c e of ties with. the Chunking Government and w i l l o n l y bring about inconveniences, , However, I a s confident that t h e German Government w i l l r e c o g n i z e t h e New Government any tim e our Government r e q u i r e s . / No. 35 (FUKAl) R e c e n t l y a war has broken out between I t a l y and Greece . Concerning t h i s have t h e r e been any n e g o t i a t i o n s between our Government and the I t a l i a n Government r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Three Power T r e a t y ? No. 9 (MATSUOEA) To d a t e t h e r e have been no n e g o t i a t i o n s between Japan and I t a l y r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of A r t i c l e 3 of the Three Power T r e a t y . I c o n s i d e r t h a t even i n f u t u r e n e i t h e r Germany nor I t a l y w i l l demand a c t i o n by Japan under the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t t h e y have been a t t a c k e d by Greece . No. 22 (ISEII) A c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the F o r e i g n O f f i c e a u t h o r i t i e s , Hungary commenced n e g o t i a t i o n s with Germany h e r s e l f b e c a u s e she d e s i r e d to j o i n t h e Japans-Germany-Italy Three Power T r e a t y , and our c o u n t r y a g r e e d to t h i s through t h e good o f f i c e s of Germany. 3 u t as"regards Romania, and S l o v a k i a , Germany urged t h e i r adherence and opened n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e Imperia l Japanese Government. Moreover, the German Government d e s i r e d a speedy r e a l i z a t i o n of this, so t h a t th£—Imperial Japanese Government " a s unable to take t h e p r o p e r s t e p s and f i n a l l y concluded the p r o t o c o l s now under d i s - c u s s i o n by an ad referendum,, To b e g i n w i t h , the Three Power T r e a t y was conc luded - by tlie~ t h r e e Great Powers of the w o r l d , as as f a r as t h e I m p e r i a l Japanese GovernHentTs'~c6~ncerned, t h e r e should be no r e a s o n f o r such undue^ h a s t e i n c a u s i n g t h e s e second rate -powers t o foin t h e T r e a t y ^ Furthermore, each of the t r e a t i e s now under c o n s i d e r a t i o n are t r e a t i e s whose c o n c l u s i o n con- t a i n s t h e danger e f s t a k i n g our n a t i o n a l f a t e . T h e r e f o r e , I c o n s i d e r t h a t Document 1285 Pago ?• Document Ho. 12S5 Page G these t r e a t i e s are not g g s h as should b e welc-oscd by otir government. i s for Bomania, she has a d i s p u t e of many y e a r s s t a n d i n g w i t h "Russia over Pessaralia. Should i n c i d e n t s a r i s e from t h i s , t h e r e i s f e a r t h a t , depending on developments, our c o u n t r y nay b e a r t h e o b l i g a t i o n of going to war for that country. Moreover our country has no hope of r e c e i v i n g any a s s i s t a n c e from Romania. Germany a l s o , because of her r e l a t i o n s h i p to the S o v i e t Union will be in the p o s i t i o n o f l p o k i n g on_with f o l d e d arms<> In r e g a r d to this, there is something • would l i k e t o know. Why did Germany drag along these small weak covntr ies and what i s the reason for having been in such haste that the Imperial »"apg.nese Government was even unable to take the proper steps i n s i g n i n g the p r o t o c o l a w i t h t h e s e c o u n t r i e s ? Also, what led the Government to a g r e e t o bVe t r e a t i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n vhich_ an occasion will a r i s e wheri in Gexr.rr.y v 111 not bear any obligations but_our country will. Ho. 9 (MATSUOFA) Ho diplomatic relations i n Europe at the present moment are so complicated and so d e l i c a t e as those between s e v e r a l powers such as Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, Great Britian and others i n the Balkan Peninsula. GERMANY and ITALY are endeavoring bo strengthen their position in the-said peninsula to the greatest possible extent for convenience of carrying out their vrar with GREAT BRITLAN and from tho necessity of maintaining friendly- relations with, and at the sane time, rendering a menace to SOVIET RUSSIA^ In taking necessary steps for the purpose the German authorities concerned are most fearful of the divulgence of the secret. I f these protocols should leak out before sealing, the object in view could never be attained, which circumstances explain their hasce in concluding the agreements. How in view of the circumstances that have led to the conclusion of the Three Power Alliance, and of the existing international situation, this Empire ought to agree to the enhancement to any extent of GERMANY* s position in the Balkan Peninsula. forgone of the ol^eCtlvea of Lhe^S^Power Alliance lies in taking advantage of the alliance in order to' adjust Bus so- Japanese relations, While it is necessary to intensify the close relations between GERMANY and SOVIET RUSSIA based on the interests of the two powers. I deem it a good policy J& aggrandize the German menance. to SOVIET RUSSIA availing ourselves of the situation to regulate our r e l a t i o n s wi th SOVIET RUSSIA, g^lng that SOVIET RUSSIA does not f i n d any menance i n JA7AN end is i n c l i n e d to r e j e c t the adjustment of Russo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s From t h i s p o i n t of view the Goveramaat has agreed to the p r o p o s a l i n question from a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t it will be favorable to our diplr-macf t I t seems t h a t GERMANY i n t e n d s t o include ITALY as well as the BALKAN s t a t e s w i t K i n her sphere of i n f l u e n c e » and to besiege TURKEY diplomatically '.n order to take u l t i m a t e contraL of" her, thereby obviating the danger of h e r e n t r y i n t o J . h e . war„ It is not wi thout reason that GERMANY should request JAPAN her/"C'oJ"S'% quick i n taking action in connection with the matter , Considering i t necessary f o r the improvement of our international p o s i t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y i n Bus so--J apanese relations, we have taken the said exceptional a c t i o n . I hope j'ou w i l l understand these circumstances. Document Ho, 1285 Page 8 Document Ho. 1285 Page 9 President (KARA.) As there are no otner opinion?.- expressed, we shall immediately vote jn the matter. All those in favor of the items under consideration, please rise. (JCL1 arise) President (HARA) The items have he en passed "by a unanimous vote. (Nine pages omitted) (Translator's Notes The discussion of Items 4 & 5, Revision of the Ceramonial law and*Special Appointment. of Censer? of the Home M5~niUtry.7ar e omitted as they are purely a matter of form and have no hearing on the present case.) President (EARA) The meeting stands adjourned. His Imperial Majesty Leases. Meeting Closed at IIS50 A.M. President: loshimchi EARA (Signature) Chief of Secretary? Sueo >'vri"i it Secret ari es: Yuzuru M0EDE4SHT n I las ami TAKATSUGI « Document No* 1285 Page 9 Doc. Ho. 1285 C E R T I F I C A T E W. D. C. Fo. „ I. P. S. ITo. 1285 Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Shuzo Jinbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated 18 Dec. 1940, and described as follows: Privy Council Proceedings "Recognition of Protocol in Entrance of Hungary Roumania, and Slavokia in Tri-Partite Pact". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Sove^nmpnt, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following ministry or depart- ment (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground. Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of September, 1946 /s/ Shuzo Jimbo Signature of Official Witness: Kiichi, Chosofe.be SEAL Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this /s/ Edward ?. Monaghan 4th dav of Sept, 1946 HAME Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. M. I. Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc. No. 6 2 8 A Page 1 Top Military Secret Proj. No. 105 S. A. No. 15072 Sack No. Item No. 372 Title; Monthly Wartime Report (KO) No. 4 of the HA Corps Date: Nov. 1941 | — , Headquarters of the; HA Corps i Content: I. General Condition cf the Corps. II. Preparation for the Attack on Hongkong. III. Operations and Garrison Duty. IV. The State of Public Peace. V. xne investigation of Topographical Data. VI. The State of Traffic and Communications. VII. Outline of the Rear Conditions. VIII. The Condition of the Army of the New Regime. I. General Condition cf the Corps. 1. The Corps is preparing whole heartodly for military operations agairst Hongkong, and also intensifying tbe blockade against the enemy. 1. Preparations to attack Hongkong are progressing smoothly, and are expected to be completed e a r i n December. 2. Fortifications under construction for the defense of CANTON and its surrounding strategic points were completed during the latter part of November. 3. The 13th Division, the 21st Heavy Field Artillery Battalion, the 4th and 15th Independent Engineer Regiments, the 8th and 11th Epidemic Prevention and Water- Supplying Sections, and the 10th River Crossing Materials Company left the command of the Corps at their respective positions at 00.00, ,15th inst. 4. The 45th Air" Regiment, the main force of the 10th Independent Air Unit, a part of the 18th Independent Souadron, and the direct co—opera tion unit of the 44th Air Regiment were assigned to tbe corps at end of this month. 62 c-A Page 2 As the IIAI Branch Unit in HAINAN had returned to their original units the 21ATSU0 Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 1 Infantry Battalion) T,vas organized and despatched to above place from Shantou. 6. The units of the SANG Corps in ClIUNGM districts wore relieved of guard duty in the middle of this month by the newly organized BANJO! S Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 2 Infantry Battalions) Preparation for the attack on Hongkong. Upon receiving ur.offj.cia 1 iris truetions to attack Hongkong., the corps ^holoheartedly prepared and began concentrated movements of the QUIIs to attack at tho end of this month. 1. Gathering cf Information Gathering of information was started from the middle of Showa 15 /194Q/, In August of tnis_ year the focus of the gathering of information was directed toward Hongkong .and endeavored, to grasp all aspects of Hongkong by air reconnaissance, reading air photographs, 'CAT'I'yIflg ouc inves^igatleSrTs in actual piat'.gg, tf d *jv.i li Tilrg nil r.vpQg nr ~ ijl'v-eJligercê moreover,, the units to execute the Attack j&sr0 ordered to gaur,er "cEe information. 2. Training The SAHO Corps, as well as being appointed to guard ./duty/ since the end of Showa 15 /1940/ commenced training for the attack /on Hongkong/, and especially executed training of thp> s'Cv.if in attacks, building ry° fnr-.' r-i <- -irun..̂. attacking fortifications of a spooiai tv^a. prui the usage of mate- rir.is in irur'̂ t o* thi 3 vf^rT nrn rigid training to -hcut a 1000 of^-cers undjnen ffho are to the. O-T ivni t.g attacking five position:^ ' Jurthermore, in m o Doginning"~oi Cevber. when the KOIXDA Corps were relieved of guarding the guard area excluding the intermediate district, units were concentrated and executed regular training. Since the XITAJIKA branch unit was stationed near the British-Chinese frontier, the branch unit devoted themselves to training for the attack on Hongkong. Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 3 3. The Repair of the Transportation Road in the Rear Since the end of September repairs Of the rnn-i-nf-T-nn̂ h«f.-.-.7Ann qui Kfc nnri PAGAN, which is the main transportation rpr.ri in the rearT were commenced and completed on the 8th Oct. as prearranged. 4. Commencement of /Troop/ Lavements. In the last part of this month SANO Corps units stationed in CHUKGIIEN were concentrated in HULEN. The main force of the SANO Corps concentrated in FUSHAN and units under direct army command in the CMITON area Have commenced movements pradually to the HULEN, TUNGICUN, and SHEKLDNG areas, secretly by the C ANT ON - S ALSHUI and'CANTON KOWLCON lines. rj. Thus, the Corps has ordered, on thp 30th inst,, preparations for the attack oh Hongkong and endeavoring to Keep the plah SSCF51 '\flQ awaiting the opportunity t6 open Hostilities. III. Operations and Garrison Duty 1. f XI _CorPs A "part of the forces were stationed at HSIKAN as mThTjo p,-..̂rv-> nrdor nn the right bank of CHUKIANG had become worse, the remainder being engaged ir, guarding in their previous disposition. 2. . I ^ Q E O p r p O As a result of the enlargement of the guard area, importance was attached to the FATSEIN district, arid cleared the district of the enemy. Furthermore, in the middle of November, the Northern SANSHIJI and Southern TSTNCTA districts wore cleared. 3. IftlTAJILA Branch Unit! Other than preparing for the campaign against Hongkong, a part of the unit annihilated "the comr i?ni at -bandits in H/iNGSHHPAI. n^NGTOC AND TZUPATIEN .districts in the beginning of November. 4. itelAY.ll Branch Unit " ?he disposition of a part of the force was changed, and together with enforcing guarding more rigidly endeavored to reconnoiter the offensive plan of the enemy. Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 4 5.\ KATSUI Corps ''in the latter part of October a punitive expedition was conducted in. the northern part of CEAOYANG, the enemy bases being annihilated. 6. (fp,NJG?.̂ .r and I'ATSPO feranfth Units No change. 7. aiAmJUn.it Svs"well as executing air-defenses in the vicinity of CANTON, secretly reconnoitered the HONGKONG distrfct, The summary -cable of main battles in November and the summary maps are shown in the attached chart Ho. 1 and inserted maps No. 2 respectively. Total war results are as per attached chart No. 2. -iic uj-jKLuJod oar rear somewhat actively Jji attaching the forry-steamars in £he south or uAfJ'iur; in r.|ia mic'cie of November, and fre- quontly. buses in the latter cart pf rnt.nh»r - However, as a result of the activity of the Military Police fTHIT'TFT) these mixed units vpartisans) were capt.urr^, and peace conditions in general arc satisfactory. The chart of the conditions of peace are as per attached sheet of inserted maps No. 3. Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 5 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Okikatsuv Arao hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity? Chief of General Affairs Divisions and. that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated November , 1941„ and described as follows0 "HA"Corps Monthly Report. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of tho Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archivos or files)' First Demobilization_Bure?.u Signed at Tokyo on this 5 day of July, 194 6 /s/ Okikatsu. Arao Signature of Official Witness; /s/ laneo Ishibash.i SEAL Official Capacity Statement of Official Frocurement _ William C._?rout , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headouarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that tbe above described, document was obtained by m3 from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this "5th day of L.July, 1946 7s/ William C. Prout NAIffi Witness 1 /s / Edward P. I onophan_ Investigator Official Capacity I.P.S. Doc.. No. 654 Page 1 / Top secret telegran from C. TSUKADA, Chief of Staff of Southern Amy to EIM'JRA, H,, Assistant Linister of War. K E,4 Nov. 22, 1941 / Top Secret "Forward movement cf Southern Army" Addressed to Assist. Minister of War /H. Kimura/ From General Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada, "The HQ of the Southern Army will advance as follows. Special secrecy is requested. I After that the HQ will bo located at TaihoVa until about D e c . T h e staff officers will be alSut 5" and others will be stationed at Saigon,, Nov. 25 to leave Tokyo Nov., 2o embark from Ujina by Suwa Maru .Nov. 29 landing at AOclung. \ C E R T I F I C A T E " , 9 , 0 , IPS No. 654-A UflPFer.t. of Source and, Authenticity I SHI I. M"sayoshi hereby certify that I am officially corrected with the Jananes- Government in the following capa- city: In charge of military History and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 22 Nov, 1941, and described as follows: Top Secret Telegram 0, Tsrkada, Chief of Staff to Vice Minister of War. I frrther certify that th«=» attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives a^d files of the following named ministry or department (specifying alsc the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files: Military Affairs Section - ,,rar Minis+ ry Signed at Tokvo on this 27th day of June, 1946 s/ M. Ishii Signature of Official Witness: SEAL Official Capacity Statement of Official,.Procurement I, Villi^m C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Cormander for the Allied Powers, and that the abc-e described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Jananese Government in the corduct of my official business. Signed at ^okyo on this 2?th day of June, 1946 s/ •Villiam C. Prout Name Witness: s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator Official"Capacity IPS i Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 1 TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file. MOST URGENT Tokyo, 4 October 1941 2,57 H. rrival: ̂ ^4J)ctober 19,^1^ 1325 hours No. 1974, of 4 October. For the German Foreign Minister* Re: Telegraphic report of 2 Ootobor, No. I960 with Pol. VIII NOTE: Sent on to Special Train under No, 335l» Tel. Ktr. 4 October 1941„ As report, the Japanese United American States I have stated in my la negotiations seem to be w11aaut-rosuit-, unless the fundamentally changes" her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do* However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, t lie re remains in JAPAN, a ecrtain_ sense of un^^rtai^^-y _to_jvh<^tpolicy should Jbe~adop ted in JAPAN." " For the first time IrHaer His Lory JAPAN i'eels litsl'SeUT physically isolated and surrounded by anemias. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her fornns-on militarily inferior CHINAL now she is under the impression, despite bril- ITant Individual qnp.r.fis.qps,_sliat she cannot succesJTully\te£r this minate iilitury_mc,ao.s. Even more than the long drawn out S feeling prevailing within the country, vice behind the frost /Efappendienst/ _ Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices,, One cannot help feeTtHjpthat thd mobilization, bf>gur, in Jnly, hp <3 ̂ n^nced the md material is by bringing to deficiencies. light the numerous economic the goals In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and se ^ of JAPAN will not hp fnrtherari.. nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army leaders (Minister for War, Chief of GeneralJlfcaff,-Haqd of the Political SectT5ir~gMI5iUihe Section fnr Fni-pi rn Armies^ the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at. (The inherent about a new Far East by ov aim of the (TTstri rpoworing Tripartite Pact is to bring _the British Empire. Keeping Doc. No. 4065A Pago 2 1 AFRICA at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could \ only be mere means to this end.) Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and hascarried it throughjnilitarily succesful to a great extent the important thing is to'lFe'eslaDlish the connection oT Llie powers oT~the Tripartite Pact th-rrvn gh ̂ SIBERIA as soon as possi- ble , and to concentrate the__entire energy on TigTiting ETfGfcAND -̂-yrrrd Ear_Kast_aF7welJ. a s on the BrTfci —" Operation^-_lir BnTUpean RUSSIA._hadr-de!5onstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION bavs gnffered^deTeat but that the_pu±xti£aT" collapse of the regime-does nrvh f.ntnmntira1]y fnlTjTyjt~TfTr7Tjinn»«r" waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered _ | as being- in fighting_t rim, is noc feasible before next spring. lunlessa moral collapse of the ^pgimp nnmp^ ahojit̂ The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not • even by a J apan^se' at tack in AugiiAtIx^-S5gtembeF7could_ the~ route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after, the occupation of~LIPKC0Y/t to induce the remainder of 'RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this, JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and ea<j?tr d"1"1*"̂ rig for whiclT~JAFIN~~ wguld then..be in -a-position/ta-dn t.hi the CHINA,conflict on her handrS» In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time. .— — Military actions l3y_JAPAN againgiL the Anglo-Saxon position in the South of "lihe ti.n̂ of year! it is tcPbe \ endeavored tolink /them/ upwiJjX3 G°T*an d^vo against t.hp Anglo-Saxon yusiliun liT~the~ECTdl^Sast, although there is no absolute" necessity to waiT~7fo"r However ," victory over the British Empixe_aQuid_bi~comp1eta only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Tppinn"pogTtion. With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly shew the atti- tude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the'plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 3 too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military attaches m tne impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, tho calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does ngt^guarga^eus^th^juccess of a southward r>ush beyond ini- tial conquests^. Ini'rencn...) one group garbled).. .only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the linos of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic__l£sdGrship deprives the Japanese fighting rorces or the assurance which is essential to success. It iŝ thoi'̂ foi' lu be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive* The activation of JAPAN in the sense of^he-JIrlparti.^g---- Pact can most easily De Drought about fcy demonstrating to her technically anil politicalilTT^^ operations hav- h'lp oQKfflOn goal (passage- t.hrmiffh RTTSFglk or a com- bined attack in the MlddloF&sT or thr t?rv F,ast,U ATIcmg^dis- tance nifUit rrom tne KiisqifTn from to MjJjGHIILIas soon as this is technically possible, would pronablv mnkea deep impresslun " here. Consl~dering''the rormalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are other- wise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem® In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no men- tion vtas made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find outTTKat-In military considerations they were al- most completely setting aside or ignoring the possible inter- vention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy0 Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting en- tangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen,. The Japanese Government /Staats- fvenng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the charac- ter of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Arti- cle Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through Doc. No. 4065A Pago 4 common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAEMER as negotiations chairman and myself. The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged, I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regula- tion /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. How- ever, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders * I shall next report on the attitude of the political cir- cles . OTT Certificate: I? Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No0 4065Ao /s/ Til rich A a Straus AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ray possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1' was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and •under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files.and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/W. P. Cumming W. P. CUMMING" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G^_H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE CF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) DOCUMENT 1412A Page 1 ,T MILITARY ADMINIGTRATI7E MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN TEE EVENT OP JAPAN5S PARTICIPATION IN WAS",—12 Nov. 1941 SECRET In d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s c o p y , e s p e c i a l c a r e must he t a k e n i n r e g a r d s t o out? i d e r s . 12 November 1 9 4 1 Concerning measures t o he t a k e n i n t h e event of J a p a n ' s p a r - t i c i p a t i o n i n -via::-, (Supplement No. l ) ( P r e c e d e n t s of m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n o c c u p i e d a r e a s . ) The Second Department of t h e T r e a t y B u r e a u . CONTENTS Page ( 1 ) The S i n o - J a p a n e s e War 1 (2) The Russo-Jaoanese War 1 5 (A) MANCHURIA and KWAN TUNG Leased T e r r i t o r y 1 5 (B) SAGHALI3N 4 1 (3) The F i r s t World War (CHIAOCHOU BAY) 45 C , (4) The S i b e r i a n E x p e d i t i o n 52 » / C S R ^ I F I C A 1 I W.D.C, Mo. IPS. NO. 14.12-A State^n4- of Source -nd Authenticity I, HAYASHI Kaoru herehv certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capa- city: Chief- of .Arcl'lves. SectionJapanese Foreign Office, and that as" such official I have orstody of the docvment hereto attached consisting of. 6;)_pagos, da+ed Nov. 12, 1941 and described as follows: Military Administration Measures to "be taken in the Event of Japan's Participation in War I furthr-r cer-cify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if anv, or ar.y other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Ministry Signed at ^okvo on this 22nd day of August, 1946 s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official Witness: s/ Na7g.bg.ru,, Odo __ SEAL Archives Chief Official Capacity statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H. Larsh, herehv certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described docvment was obtained by rre fror the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct, of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on. this 22 day of Aug, 1946. s/ Richard tT, Larsh Name Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis. 2nd Lt} MI Inves ti'-ator Official Capacity JĴ jf HJU, yy^J-t- t^f+^L 0 ^ H ^ Doc. No, 527 Rsge 1 Report RAM 19/41 REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941. * * * * * * Tho largest part of the German amy was anyway on tho Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any tine.-, Ho (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter in'co a conflict; with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few monthse In this case. Japan would havc~r~of course, log stress on to be afraid f s'nc wanted to .aslzan&fc on -Singapore0 " Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia0 * * * * * * He (the RAM} wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility3 In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossiblo0 On tho contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it wore not probable, would have to be considered possible, * * * * * * The RAM declared that it was quite possible that the above-mentioned circumstances should very soon lead to a conflict between Germany and Russia, If Germany felt herself in danger, she would immediately strike end finish- off bolshevism» * * * * * * Japan had, however, to bear in mind thrt, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Rcich was fighting against tre British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet, Japan, on the ether handj was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russiafs main weight lay on the European side* These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge. Metsuoka finally- agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort„ (Berlin. 31 March 1941.) Doc0 No, 527 Page 2 O F F I C E O F U.S. C F I E F JO F C O U N S E L A P 0 124A U,Se A R I; Y 28 M?rch 1946 TVis is to certify tvat the photostatic copies listed below arc true copics of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander a.ad are now in the custody of the UeSe Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality: 1877-PS Memorandum about t1nc conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, at Berlin on 29 March 19410 2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and tic Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at FuscKU I834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56A, Extractaof a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941, 2954-PS Memorandum about tve conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943» 2897-PS Telegram, Tokj^o, dated 14 July 19410 #1217 2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097 1881-PS Memorandum shout a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister. Matsuoka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister cf tVe Reich and Minister Meissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941. 2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941, C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan Fuehrer Headquarters, Dated 5 March 1941. GERARD SCFAEFER 1st Lt0 Inf. C^icf, Documentation Division Bepno: ? 7 Doc. No. 1448 Page 1 DETAILS OF THE EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES /To. l$cf forty V'hmei f Decisions by the liaison conference between / — „ the Tnir.ftrĵ l 'Tpadgna.'tnT'g and the Government »#.«#/ t r o f J a p E n o n N o v e n b e r — " ? 1. General Policy. For ocausisu..areas, a military administration is to be ternpnrarl 1 y enforced for the purpose of restoring public / peace and order, for the i.-".edtato accuisition of resources i vital for our national defense, \ self-sufficiency of our operational forces. and for maintaining the The final reversion of the territories we have occu- pied and their future disposal are to be decided later. r 1 I r 2. Details 1 • In the execution of militar/ administration, such administrative organs as still exist will be made as much use of as possible and all obtaining social and racial customs •••-'ill be respected. 2. As far as operations allow, our Occupation Forces will take measures -to obtain all resources vital for our national defense and to expedite their development. Rfi&Qnrces vital for our national defense which are developed or obtained iri the occupied areas will form an integral part of the I.'iaterials-?^bilization Plan of the Central Executive and everything needed by our operational forces for local self-sufficiency will, as a rule, be assigned to them locally in accordance with the Executive's distribution plans. 3* The transportation of resources to Japan will be a pi si fitrn-j jn.^very way possible by the Navy and Army alike, pho will do their best to make full use of the ships they have requisitioned. 4. The Occupation Forces will keep control of railways, shipping, harbours, aviation, communications and the post. Doc. No. 1448 Page 1 'who IN C1-AKG.E. Doc. No. 1448 Page 2/OF !3AN6/i0k / O F F / C £ f 5. The Occupation Forces will control trade and exchange and in particular will prevent any leakage to the enemy o T X s ' gfisrturees of special, inipnrtflnc.e,. such as petroleum oil, — rubber, tin, tungsten, quinine, etc. 6. Existing local currencies will, as a rule, be utilized and circulated as far as possible", "but in unavoidable cases military notes of foreign denomination will be used. rv ~ — 7. Natives will have to reconcile themselves to such pressure as is unavoidably involved for thorn in our acquisi- tion of resources""vital for cur national defense and Lire local self-sufficiency of our Occupation Forces. Demands for their pacification will not be tolerated if they LLllitat.fi P gn T nqt frfrftpf*~ Qh j ectlVOS.' 8. American, British and Dutch nationals wijLl be directed to cooperate *'dth our military administration. For the recalcitrant., deportation or oth^r appropriate measures will be devised. The existing rights and interests of the Axis Powers will be respected but any future extension of will be restricted as far as possible. Chinese emigrants will be made to renounce allegiance to the Chiang Government and to sympathize and cooperate ••ith our measures. v Native- inhabitants will be directed so as.to promote their feelings of dependence on the Imperial Army. "7e must avoid giving rise to any premature independence movement. 9. Japanese will be strictly examined as to their fitnejss^^ before "tnev can make their first trip into eaeisy laad after the start of operations; preferential consideration will be - v~ given, t.c the return .journeys of those who we re once resident in these areas, but who have returned to Japan. t 10. The following measures are to be taken in connection with the execution of military administration: (a)All important matters concerning our local military administration shall be decided by means of liaison conferences between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government. Local troops will be notified of decisions of the Central Executive by the Navy and Army respectively. Doc. No. 1448 Page 2 Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 3 (b) Schemes and regulations for the acquisition and development of resources will for the present be made by the Central Executive organization, under the leadership of the Planning Board. The latter's decisions shall be carried out in . accordance -"ith (a). JrfMiWih. ( c) In the case of F.I.C. and 34am, our pre-arranged policies will be adhered to and no military ad- ministration will be enforced. Measures will be decided later in the event of any sudden change in their status. Notes:— 1. The military administration machinery will be gradually amalgamated, readjusted or taken over by the new organiza- tion which the Government ?/ill set up, depending on the " progress of the Imperial policies toward the Occupied Territories. (The End) Doc. No. 1448 Page 3 m Doc. No. 1340 'Page 1 i t O r i g . ) Record TRANSLATION 0? 1TCJR1EBERG DOCUMENT' OPTICS or j.s. CSIBP oT CJUJ^l rue/No. 13/14 of t h e c o n f e r e n c e between the "Tuehrer" and the Japanese T o r e i g n M i n i s t e r MATSUOKA i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e German T o r e i g n M i n i s t e r a s w e l l a s Ambassadors OTT end OSHIMA on 27 March 1 9 4 1 . A f t e r a fev; words of welcome t h e Fuehrer i n q u i r e d f i r s t how MAT SUOKA had stood t h e l o r g end t i r i n g t r i p from Japan t o Germany. MATSUOKA r e p l i e d t h a t t h e t r i p a g r e e d w i t h him v e r y vrel l e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e on h i s t r i p through S i b e r i a he WFS e n t i r e l y c u t - o f f from t h e o u t s i d e wor ld and o n l y from time t o t ime g o t t o see a s m a l l S i b e r i a n c o u n t r y paper i n which p r a c t i c a l l y no a c c u a l news was r e c o r d e d . Ee t h e r e f o r e had f e l t a s i f on a v a c a t i o n t r i p . Page 2 >f O r i g . ) A f t e r t h a t t h e Tuehrer gave a s u r v e y of t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n . (He s a i d ) The war was f o r c e d uoon Germany. However, she had not been s u r p r i s e d by the war; b e c a u s e she had had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o f o l l o w ut> t h e campaign of i n c i t e m e n t o f c e r t a i n B r i t i s h , Trench and American c i r c l e s f o r y e a r s and t h e r e f o r e p r e p a r e d h e r s e l f f o r e v e r y t h i n g . In s-oite of t h e s e thorough p r e p a r a t i o n s the o u t b r e a k o f the war was however not a p o l i t i c a l aim. Germany had p o l i t i c a l demands, but hoped t o be a b l e t o s a t i s f y same by rea.son. In 1939 t h e p r o c e d u r e o f a p e a c e f u l r e v i s i o n of i m p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s which had worked u n t i l then w i t h s u c c e s s was i n t e r r u p t e d t h r o u g h P o l a n d ' s p u s h i n g f o r w a r d and t h e r e s u l t a n t c o n c e q u e n c e s . Page 3 )f O r i g . ) C o n s i d e r i n g t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n s o b e r l y and w i t h o u t i m a g i n a t i o n one would have t o s t a t e t h a t a t the o u t b r e a k of t h e war i n 1939 t h e r e were on t h e o p p o s i t e s i d e 60 P o l i s h , 6 Norwegian, 18 Dutch, 22 B e l g i a n and 138 Trench d i v i s i o n s . In a d d i t i o n ther f t were 1 2 - 1 3 B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n s on t h e c o n t i n e n t . Now i t was p o s s i b l e , i n b a r e l y lis- y e a r s , t o e l i m i n a t e 60 P o l i s h d i v i s i o n s v i t h t&e o c c u p a t i o n of P o l a n d , 6 Norwegian d i v i s i o n s w i t h t h e o c c u p a t i o n of Norway, 18 Dutch d i v i s i o n s w i t h the o c c u p a t i o n of H o l l a n d , and 22 B e l g i a n d i v i s i o n s v i t h t h e o c c u p a t i o n of Be lg ium, and out o f 128 Trench d i v i s i o n s o n l y 8 weak b r i g a d e s a r e s t i l l i n e x i s t e n c e . A l l B r i t i s h t r o o p s were d i s p e r s e d and c h a s e d away. These a r e l o s s e s which cannot be r e p l a c e d , and B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n cannot be saved any more. By t h i s t h e war was d e c i d e d , t h e A x i s powers have become the c o n t r o l l i n g c o m b i n a t i o n . R e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i r w i l l i s i m p o s s i b l e . Doc. ITo. 1340 Page 2 Page 4 f Orig.) As MATSUOKA knows, at the "beginning of,the war Germany was just on the point of "building a navy. In s.:>ite of this fact any military operations in the course of which seaways had to "be used, especially in Horway, were completed, and the British were not in a position to prevent these operations. The German submarines as well as the surface vessels (auxiliary cruisers and battle ships) together with the Luftwaffe caused the British tonnage losses amounting to almost 3/4 of British and Allied losses of World War I. Por, at first, very few submarines were put into active service by Germany. By far the greatest number had been used to train new crews for the numerous units manufactured by mass production. The real sub- marine warfare would only begin in the present and next month. Britain would be weakened to a considerably greater extent than her present losses and would not be in a position to threaten German shores and means of communications anymore. Besides, Germany is tyingup in increasing percentage of the British fleet in the Horth Sea and the Atlantic. The same is being done by the Italian fleet and the German Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean. Page 5 f Orig.) Germany has absolute control of the air in spite of all British, explanations about alleged successes. MATSUOKA would be able to check this statement while looking around in Berlin and comparing present Berlin with present London. Blows of the Luftwaffe would still be increased considerably in the next few months. Britain would suffer from increasingly heavy losses of ship space, and the effectiveness of the German blockade is being shown by the fact that rationing in Britain has to be much stricter than in Germany. The war, meanwhile, would be continued as preparation for the final blow against Britain. The "Fuehrer" then discussed the situation in the Mediterranean and , explained the Italy had been unfortunate in ITorth Africa because she \ lacked the necessary antitank defense against the British Tank army. I How, however, the danger has been eliminated with the arrival of the first armored division in Tripolitania which will soon be followed by a second division. A farther British advance is now out of question, to the contrary, the Axis will in a short time begin a counter-attack Page 6 f Orig.) The Italian undertaking in the Balkans was hindered by severe weather conditions. However, in the next few days all difficulties in this theater will be eliminated by a combined advance of Germany and Italy There is no military problem because Germany has 240 divisions "unemployed" at her disposal out of which 186 divisions are first class assault troops. The losses in personnel and material were very slight in the years of 1939 and 1940 so that in spite of the previous campaigns Germany is stronger in every respect than she was in 1939. Doc. Ho. 1340 Page 3 The Fuehrer than expressed, his conviction that Britain already has lost the war. It is only a matter of insight whether she wants to lidmit this. Consequently this will then result in the collapse of the people and of the regime which is responsible for the insane policy of Britain. Page 7 if Orig.) In her present critical situation Britain is clinging to any blade of straw. She especially relies on two hopes: First, for American help. Germany has figured on this help from the beginning. It will, however, assume moie palpable proportion only in the year of 1S42, but e^en then the extent of this help would be in no proportion to Germany's increased productivity: Britain's second hope is Butsia. The British Empire as well as the United States of America hoped that they would succeed, in spite of everything, in getting Russia on. Britain's side. They expected to reach this goal if not this year then perhaps next year in order to bring about a new balance of power in Europe. Page 8 >f Orig.) On_this it should be noted that Germany has made the known treaties with ItilBBla, trgt still more important than this is the fact that Germany has 160 to 130 divisions at her disposal in case of emergency, for her protection against Russia. In case of this eventuality she (Germany) has therefore not the slightest fear and would not hesitate for a second to draw the consequences at once in case of danger. He (the Fuehrer) however does not think that this danger will oscur. | About the objectives of the German warfare in Europe the Fuehrer said that the British hegemony, under all circumstances,would be broken, the British influence in Europe eliminated and every attempt at American interference in Europe would be excluded. Furthermore, the new order of the European continent would as the most essential element, establish the limitation of the rights and duties of those who lived on the continent, and would exclude all the countries which only wanted to interfere from the outside, that is especially Britain and America. 'Page 9 f Orig.) In the present struggle the Axis powers were spiritually, morally and partially materially, supported by Japan. The Tripartite Pact, for instance, through the cooperation with Japan made it possible to supply German auxiliary cruisers in East Asia. Above all it caused America to hesitate to enter the war officially. On the other hand it has contributed to the Japanese partner a great deal towards her own future by means of the work and battles of Germany. Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 4 There are few situations which offer greater facilitation and. a greater probabil:t,> of success in the realization of the Japanese aim than the present one. Britain is completely checked, on the sea, in the air and on land. In the Mediterranean ever stronger British power is heing tied up. Likewise she has to use in- creasingly stronger units for convoys. Often, cruisers and destroyers are not longer sufficient since these convoys would he attacked on Germany's part hy 'battleships. Por in contrast to World War I, Germany owns today on the lorg front from Narvik to the Spanish-Trench border numerous bases from which she could advance with her naval forces against Britain and her supply lines. Britain, therefore, is nailed down in Europe, the aim is the destruction of the British Empire. . (Page 1C of Orig.)America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war some place else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone opposed to the powers of the Tripartite Pact. But in no case could America wage a war some place else. Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint action of the Tripartite power than the one established today will in all human possibility never again arise. On the other hand it is clear to him that with e.v.ery historical act a risk has to be taken into consideration. Barely in history, however, has the risk been lesfcs than at present while war is being waged in Europe, Britain is tied up there, America is still at the beginning of her armament, Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Westerg,border. Such a~ffioment will never occur again, it is unique in historgj No (the Tuehrer) admits that there is a certain risk involvecLT^but it is an exceptionally small one at a time when Russia and Eritain are eliminated and America is not yet prepared. If this favorrable moment would pass by and the European conflict would possibly end in a compromise, Trance and Britain would recover in a few years. Anerica would join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner or later be faced with the task after all of defending the security of her living space (Lebersraun) in a battle against these three nations. of Orig.) Militarily, too, there has not been since the memory of man a situâ - tion relatively as favourable as now, although the military difficulties resulting from action should not be underestimated. Especially favorable is the fact that there exist no conflicts of interests between Japan and her Allies. Germany, which would satisfy , her colonial demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe. (Page 11 of Orig.) \ (Page 12 > 1 Doc. Ho. 1340 Page 5 On tho other hand the cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons nover meant a real coalition hut always only a playing off of one against the other. Just as much as jfritain does not put up with the hegemony of ono nation in Burope, she would in Hast Asia play off Japan, China and Hussia against each other to promote tho interests of her own Page 13 ompire. Tho_ United States would act just like Britain, she would f Orig.)inherit tho empire and replace British imperialism with American 1 imperialism. / A better situation for joint action would hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He .(The Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, tho German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody also in her previous history. He has the necessary power of resolution in critical situations and, finally, Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of successes which is also unique in the world but need not be repeated. In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the year 1941. Ho has always been for coopera- tion with this country«_ Ambassador OSHIMA. knows that he (the Puchrcr) has worked firmly toward this goal for many years. He is determined Page 14 in tho future novor again to deviate from this line. As already f Orig.)mentioned, especially favorable for cooperation is tho fact that there are no conflicts in interest between Ja.pan and Germany. _ For interests in the long run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will of a Fuehrer; therefore they always endanger anew tho cooperation between nations if they aro turned in opposite directions. In the caso of Japan and Germany, therefore, one can plan for tho longest time on account of the non-existance of such conflicts. This has boon his firm conviction since oarliost youth.. Tho Japanese, German, and Italian nations would be highly successful if they would draw the consequences from this present unique situation. MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank statements which made the wholo situation very clear to him. Although he already has occupied himself thoroughly with tho arguments advanced by HITLER, ho would once again consider most thoroughly tho arguments mentioned. Page 15 On the whole ho agrees with the views mentioned by the Fuehrer. EB- f Orig. Specially he is also of the opinion that any resolute action involves a certain risk. MATSUOKA doclarod with reference to the roport of Ambassador OTT and the German Poreign Minister through which the Fuehrer will probably bo accurately informed about tho present situation in Japan, that ho wants to present tho situation personally and very frankly. There aro in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which can be kept in check only by a strong man. This is the type which although he would like to have the cubs of tho tigross, is, , however, not prepared to go into tho cave to snatch them away from their mother. Those trends of thought, wero presented by him using Doc. No. 62 8-A Page 6 tho samo picture at a conforcnce at headquarters in the presence of two princes of royal "blood. It is regrettable that Japan has not 'Page 16 yot rid horself of those circles, indeed that some of these people )f Orig.)are even in influential positions. Confidentially, however, he can say that, aftor a violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at tho conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that decisively, when she has the fooling that sho would otherwise lose a chance which might only roturn after a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless of tho condition of her preparations, "because there would always "be some people who would consider the preparation insufficient. This point he, MATSUOKA, carriod successfully also against "both the princes. Tho timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate and would act partly "because of a sympathetic pro-British or pro-American attitude. MATSUOKA thon pointed out that he had advocated tho allianco already long "before tho outbreak of tho European war. He greatly oxortod himself at that time on "bohalf of its conclusion, "but regrettably had had no success. After the outbreak of tho European war ho personally held the viow that Japan first should attack Singapore and put an ond to British influonco in this district, and only thon should conclude tho Tripartite Pact, because tho thought of Japan joining tho allianco without simultaneously making a contribution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to him. Bocauso, while Germany has already wagod a gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at tho timo of tho conclusion of the pact, had not yet contributed anything. Thoreforo, ho had very strongly insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not push it through and then, by forco of circum- stances roversod his program and put joining of the pact in first place. Ho did not havo the least doubt that the South Sea problem could not bo solved without the capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only 'Pago 18 to intrude into the cave of tho tigress and take out tho cubs by force, jf Orig.) It is only a matter of time until Japan will attack. According to his opinion the attack should ensuo as soon as possible. Unfortunately ho does not govern Japan but has to convert the rulors to his opinion. Ho will surely also succeed in this some day. But at the present moment ho cannot, under these circumstances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese nation. Upon his roturn. ho would give thoso matters his mostsorious attontion after his conference with tho Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having porsonally examined tho situation in Europe. He could not promise anything definite but promises that he will person- ally advocate to tho utmost tho goals indicated. MATSUOKA thon also urgently requosted the statements just presented by him to be held strictly confidential because upon their bocoming known in Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion would 'Page 19 probably turn pale and try to got him out of his office, jf Orig.) Doc. Ho. 1340 Page 7 While endeavoring to "bring about tho pact, he had also kept strictest silence until the very last moment and frequently and purposely created the impression of a pro-American or a pro-British attitude for the deception of his adversaries. Shortly before conclusion of the pact it v,ras reported to him that the British Ambassador made strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite pact. Tho American Ambassador also expressed himself similarly. A few days after conclusion of tho pact he asked tho American Ambassador whether the reports abof.t the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador Pago 20 admitted everything aril, mcr^ovor, stated that every Japanese he had met f Orig.)since publication of the conclusion of tho pact, had exprossod tho opinion that G-ermany would win the war. This, according to the opinion of the American Ambassador, is untrue, G-ermany has no chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact porhaps with the assumption of a G-erman victory. MATSUOKA doclared further that ho had thereupon roplied to tho American Ambassador that only G-od knows who would win the war in tho long run. But ho (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the basis of the victory of this or that power, but based on his vision of the now order. He . had listened with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer about the Page 21 new order and was fully and entirely convinced by them. If he would f Orig.)for once, assume purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would turn at a given moment against G-ermany, ho must state to tho American Ambassador that Japan would then immediately come to tho assistance of her ally. His visions of the new order were laid down by him in the preamble of tho Tripartite Pact. That is an idoal which has been transmitted from one generation to another since time immemorial. For him, personally, the realization of this ideal is his life objective to which ho has devoted all his labor up to now, in order to make a small contribution on his part toward its realization. This Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Bom- Tokyo, is also a contribution toward this realization. The execution of those trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further, stands moreover with tho motto: "Ho conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." This was not yet understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan Pago 22 should ovor deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA) would be the first to ? Orig.)fight against it. In this connection MATSUOKA also remindedof tho other principle of the preamble to tho Tripartito Pact according to which every nation was to tax® the place due it. Although Japan, too, will proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the new order, and although she sometimes would have to lead with a strong hand the nations affectod by this new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously quoted motto constantly before her eyes: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation. Doc. No. 1340 Pago 8 During the further course of the conversation MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an explanation about it to the German Foreign Minister and would havo given it at the morning conferencc if the German Foreign Minister had. not been called away prematurely. Now he intends to givo this information to tho loader. Page 23 First of all ho intended to pay a complimentary visit to Molotov on f Orig.) his trip through Moscow. Aftor some reflection however, ho decided to ask tho Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild way from the Soviet government whether there exists any interest in a conference between Stalin and him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could follow his instructions with tho Soviet government, the proposal was made by the Russian government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsuoka. Ho spoke with Molotov for about 30 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that duo to the necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes vith Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin. He had explained to Stalin that tho Japanese are morally communists. This ideal had been passed on from the fathers to tho sons Bince time immemorial. But at the same time he stated that he does not Page 24 believe in political and economic communism and rather assumed that of Orig.)his Japaneso ancestors had already early givon up every attempt in this direction and had dovoted themselves to moral communism. For that which he called moral communism, MATSUOKA then quoted somo examplos from his own family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism and egoism introduced from tho West. At present the situation in Japan in this respect is extromoly confusod. However, there is a minority which is strong enough to fight successfully for tho resurrection of the "old ego" of tho Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan is oxtremoly bitter. But those who fight for the restoration of the old ideal are convinced of thoir final victory. Page 25 The Anglo-Saxons are basically responsible for the penetration of f Orig.) the above-mentioned prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the old traditional Japanese ideal Japan is compelled, therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just as well as in China she is fighting not against the Chinese but only against Groat-Britain in China and capitalism in China. MATSUOKA stated further that ho had explained to Stalin his ideas about tho new order and thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this ordor and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight against them. He explained to Stalin that the Soviets also on their part are advo- cating something new and that he believes to be able to settlo tho difficulties between Japan and Russia after the collapso of the British empire. Ho pictured the Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviot Russia's common enemy. Doc. No. 1340 Pago 9 Page 26 S t a l i n h e l d out t h e p e r s p e c t of en answer when ho would t r a v e l )f O r i g . ) t h r o u g h Moscow on h i s r e t u r n to Japan, hut i m m e d i a t e l y added a f t e r some d e l i b e r a t i o n t h a t S o v i e t R u s s i a n e v e r was f r i e n d l y w i t h B r i t a i n , nor o v e r w i l l h e . MATSUOKA, i n t h e f u r t h e r c o u r s e of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n , made some remarks about t h o n a t u r e of t h e TENiiO. The TENiTO i s t h o B t a t e , and t h o l i f o a s w e l l a s p r o p e r t y of each Japanese b e l o n g s t o t h e TJEHNO, t h a t i s tho s t a t e . T h i s i s so t o speak t h e Japanese v e r s i o n of a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e s t r u c t u r e . In c o n c l u s i o n MATSUOKA spoke a d m i r i n g l y about t h e way i n which t h o F u e h r e r i s l o a d i n g the German nation, which s t a n d s b e h i n d him i n complete u n i t y , with d e t e r m i n a t i o n and power through t h i s g r e a t t ime of r e v o l u t i o n u n e q u a l l e d i n h i s t o r y . Each n a t i o n h a s such a "age 27 l o a d e r but once i n a thousand years. The Japanese n a t i o n has n o t J O r i g . ) y e t found i t s F u e h r e r . But ho wculd s u r e l y a p p e a r i n t h e hour of need and t a k e over t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h o n a t i o n w i t h d o t o r m i n a t i o n . B e r l i n , 1 A p r i l 1 9 4 1 s i g n e d : SCHMIDT Ambassador 3 May 1946 I , WA22DA S. TISSZEN, C i v . , X 046255, h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I am t h o r o u g h l y c o n v e r s a n t w i t h tho E n g l i s h and Gorman l a n g u a g e s ; and t h a t t h o abovo i s a t r u e and c o r r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of Document 1878-PS. WANDA S. TI3SZ3N C i v . , X 0452S5 Doc.. No. 654 Page 1 Measures to bo taken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for tho execution of National Policies, which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor held on November j . . , I,ia?lson Conference Decision I November 13th, 1941, Policy Towards Germany and Italy. When the present negotiations with the United States of America break down and a war with her becomes unavoidable (presumed to be after November 25 ch), the Japanese Government shall notify Germany (and Italy), without delay, of our intention to start war against tho United States of America and Britain as soon as our war preparations are ready, and shall open neces- sary negotiations-with them in connection with the following matters, telling them tnat chose are a part of our war preparations: 1. Participation of Germany (and Italy) in the war against the United States cf America. 2. No separate peace. Remarks: If we are requested by Germany to join in the war against the Soviet Ur.ion3 we shall reply that we will not enter it for the tine being. It cannot be helped if, as a result of it, Germany's participation in the war against the United States of America is delayed thereby. Policy towards Britain. Prompt measures shall be taken directly or through tho medium of the United States of America to make Britain accept, and positively cooperate with us in, the matters included in the understandings reached in the negotiations between Japan and the United States of America. In order to conceal our intentions, no other special diplomatic measures shall be taken. Doc* No* 1/jJil page 2 Policy towards the Dutch East Indies In order to help conceal and disguise our in- tentions, we shall open as soon as possible a series of diplomatic negotiations /with the Dutch East Indies/, in tho form of continuation of previous negotiations, with the chief object of obtaining commodities needed by our country. Policy towards the Soviet Union Diplomatic negotiations /with the Soviet Union/, shall be continued in conformity with Item I of the Outline of Diplomatic Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which was decided at the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and tho Government held on August 4th, 1941. Policy towards Thailand. 1. JusJL before COBEIO-ROing the. advance into /Thailand/, tho following demands shall be made and thoir immediate compliance obtained: Our troops shall advance /into Thailand/, as prearranged, even if our demands are rejected by Thailand. However, efforts shall be made to localize as much as possible military collision between Japan and Thailand. {'.; (a) Right, of jns?=;ago nf Japanese, troops through her territory and the grant of various facilities incidental thereto. (b) Immediate enforcement of measures to avoid possible collisions between the troops of Japan and Thailand, owing to the passage of Japanese troops. (c) Conclusion of a joint defence agreement, if Thailand desires it. Note: No special change in our attitude towards Thailand shall be made before the commence- ment nf t.ha- negotiations,. In particularr great care shall b3 taken to conceal our plan of opening war. 2. After the penetration of our troops, we shall immediately open negotiations with the Government of Thailand for concrete arrangements on the following matters: Doc. Ho. 1340 Page 3 (a) Matters concerning the passage and station- ing of Japanese troops. (b) Provision, construction and enlargement of military establishments. (c) Provision of necessary traffic and communi- cation facilities as well as factory facilities. (d) Matters concerning billeting and sustenance for the Japanese troops passing through or stationed in Thailand. (e) Loans to defray necessary military expendi- ture . Remarks: In the negotiations on Items 1 and 2, we shall definitely promise to respect her sovereignty and territorial Integrity In conformity .with the Outline" of" Policies towards French Indo-China and Thailand, which was decided at tar rialsen Conference of Imperial Headquarters and the Government faeltl repruary 1st. IV41. " Moreover, depending on the attitude cf Thailand, we" shall try to turn the negotia- tions to our advantage, by suggesting that Wo will indenture consider "the cession.of a part of Burma :>r Malay to Thailand. Policy towards China. The following measures shall be taken, bearing in mind tho necessity of preserving our all-round fighting power to cope with a protracted world war by avoiding military attrition in China as far as possible, and also bearing in mind the probable decrease of our military strength in the future: 1. To drive out the military forces of the United States of America and Britain in China. 2. To place under cur actual control enemy con- cessions in China (including the Legation Quarter in Poking) and important enemy Interests (such as the maritime customs and mines), but care shall be taken to lighten as far as possible our burden in respoct to manpower and materials. Doc. no. 3/41 Page 4 Note; Though tho International Sottlenents and the Legation Quarter in Peking shall he brought under our actual control after driving out the enemy's military forces, these areas shall not be completely taken over since th -y also include interests of countries friendly to us. 3. The ahovemcntionoc" plans shall be carried cut only after the declaration of war against the. United States of America and Britain, lest our inten- tions be revealed * 4. Our right of belligerency against the Chungking Regime shall not be obtained by a declara- tion or other formalities, but the actual effect cf belligerency will be obtained by a declaration cf war against tho United States of America and Britain. 5. Among the enemy interests In China, even those interests connected with the National Government shall, if necessary, bo brought under cur control for the time being, and adjustment made separately. 6. The activities of influential Chinese in the occupied aroa shall be one->uragod and fostered as far as possible, so as to win the people's mind to Sina-Japanese cooperation"and ̂ thereby gradually establish localized peace the croas whore this is possible. 7. In our economic relations with China, we shall lay special strong uncn che acquisition of goods. For this purpose reasonable"adjustments shall bo made in the various existing restrictions. Doc. No. 1441 Page 1 R T I F I C A T £ j W.D.C . No. I.P.S. No. 1441 .Statement of Source and Authenticity I, _ Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: _Chief__of Archives_Section_of Foreign Office_„>._ nd that -ars "such official I have custody, of the document hereto attached consisting of 7, pages, dated I? Nov.. 1941. and described as follows :jFundamental Foreign Tenets Concerning_the_Execution_of the National_Policies Decided by_ the Imperial_Conference of_November Dated 13-November 1941. T further 'Certify tKat "tfie attached record ?;nd document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also tho file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)0 Forei£n_Office Signed at Tokyo on this 17 day of Sept. 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Vi/itness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H._Larsh , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headouarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day cf Sept. 1946 ^/Richard H. Larsh NAME Witness: T/4 P. Toguchi Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Image provided for research and reference use only. Permission to publish, copy, or otherwise use these images must be obtained from Rare Books and Special Collections http://rbsc.library.ubc.ca
University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections
Ex.865-878. Japanese foreign relations, 1940 - 1941
Text