AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
16 items
application/pdf
'JUZ OUTLINE OF THE PLAIT FOR THE JSPAN5I0N OF FIiCDUCTIV'3 POWER By OUTLINE OF THE PLAN FOR TTIE EXPANSION OF PRODUCTIVE POWER In view of the present situation at home and abroad, this plan aims at the repletion and strengthening of the national power — � of our country ?/hi々H3 force of East Asia f and for the establishment of a comprehensive productive power expansion plan for Japan, Manchoulcuo and China, which will bring about the realiza- tion of the necessary goal in regard to important national defense and basic industries by 1941• in order to be prepared for the epochal development of our c o u n t r y ^ destiny in the future, and the realization of tuis is expected at all cost. !• Basic Policy. (1) The scope of this plan chiefly aims at the perfection of the foundation of national defense and is restricted to major industries requiring rapid expansion under a unified plan* (2) This plan is for the establishment of a plan for the expansion of the productive power o f the major in- dustries of our country based on the policy for establishment of a con^prehensive plan for Japan f Manchoukuo and 'China through close contact and co- ordination among Japan, Manchoukuo and China« (3)ラ This plan aims at the establishment of self- sufficiency in regard to ingjortant resources within the sphere of our influence and thereby avoid dependency on the resources of a third power as far as possible in time of an emergency. 2. Aim. The types of planned industries, the production goal to be achieved in 1941 by this plan and the yearly production estimates are as follows: Yearly Sstiraates KE3D OF MATERIAL UNIT GOAL 193& 1939 1940 1,000 Kilo tons Steel Material Ordinary Steel .260 ,615 ,(>30 6,280 , 2 6 0 Special Steel & Cast Steel 1,000 520 670 820 1, ,000 Steel Ingots 9,950 6,310 7,753 8,799 9 , 9 5 0 Pig Iron 6,362 3,300 4,000- 5.293 , 3 6 2 Iron Ore. 5.700 2,250 3 , 2 0 0 4.400 5, , 7 0 0 COAL 1,000 78,182 58,3^3 6 5 , 8 0 3 71,725 78, , 1 8 2 Kilo tons Light Metals Kilo tons JU.uminum, 126,^00 Magnesiuia 11,000 Non-Ferrous Ifetai Kilo tons Copper 179.000 Lead 35,55。 Zinc 95,000 Tin 3.500 Nickel 5.000 Petroleum & its 1,000 Subsititutes Kilo-litres Gas. for Aircrafta 240 Gas. for lifto to rears 1,250 (nat.) Gas. for Ifotorcars. 290 (art.) Heary Oil (nat.) 850 -Heavy Oil (art.) 246 Lubricating Oil for Aircrafts 20 1 9 , 0 0 0 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 9 , 1 0 0 1 2 6 , 4 0 0 1 . 1 2 3 2,780 6,650 1 1 , 0 0 0 9 7 , 4 0 6 128,183 149,477 179»000 18,744 26,785 33,625 3 5 . 5 5 0 5 5 , 8 0 0 70,100 88,000 9 5 . 0 0 0 1 , 8 0 4 2,650 2 , 8 5 0 3,500 1 5 0 2,150 3,980 5 , 0 0 0 45 74 145 2 4 0 965 1,228 1,417 1 , 2 5 0 1 0 26 76 2 9 0 6 1 0 756 8 8 6 8 5 0 2 8 48 83 2 4 6 10 20 . 一 Yearly estimates KBTD OF MATERIAL Unit Goal 1938 1939 1940 IflJI Absolute alcohol 2 7 0 2 0 9 0 1 7 0 2 7 0 SODA. & INDQSTPIAL SALT 1 , 0 0 0 Kilo tons Soda Ash 9 0 8 7 3 6 6 6 ? 757 9 0 8 Caustic Soda 574 4 0 8 396 471 574 industrial Salt 325 5 0 71 157 325 JUaoonia Sulphate 1,000 2, Kilo tons ,。39 1^510 1.760 1.936 2 , 0 3 9 KJIP 1 , 0 0 0 Long tons 3br Paper 1, ,037 875 901 989 1,037 Itor Bayon 3 0 7 95 194 253 307 GOLD Kilogram 106, ,53k 51,669 76,025 91,909 106,534 M A C H T S TOOLS ROLLING STOCK 1,000 Yen Cars 200, ,000 7 6 , 0 0 0 118,500 1 7 2 , 5 0 0 200,000 Locomotives 1, , 1 0 0 877 9 8 0 1 . 0 5 0 1,100 Passenger cars 2, , 0 0 0 1,161 1 , 6 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 2,000 Freight cars 2 1 • 0 0 0 14,111 20,000 2 1 , 0 0 0 21,000 SKIPS Ton 650 , 0 0 0 402,000 550,000 600,000 650,000 M0T0R0APS 1 , 0 0 0 Cars 8 0 157 45 65 8 0 ？TOOL Bale 9 ,166 2,722 3 , 9 0 2 4 , 1 0 3 9.166 Electric Power K . W . Hydro, .2. ,693 , 7 0 0 4 1 5 . 0 0 0 5 2 8 , 0 0 0 6 5 8 , 7 0 0 : 1,092,000 Coal 1 ,000 ,000 2 9 5 . 0 0 0 2 4 5 , 0 0 0 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 230,000 U , B . The yearly figures for electric powers denote the Estimated increase during the year and the figures given in the Goal Column represent the aggregates. 3 . Method of execution. This plan is to be realized in accordance with the real object of its planning, with the government and the people united as one, and with the entire strength of the nation backed by -3- perfeot cooperation and firm, determination directed toward it f Accordingly f in executing this plan, the government should take every possible measures for its accoiiplishment, so that there could occur no setback in its execution. For this purpose, the government should endeavor to make a proper and effective use o f the various systems and facilities for the promotion of industries executed heretofore, and in view o f the fact that this plan aims at a rapid and intensive expansion o f the productive power, the government sh«Lll devise special msasures in regard to the control and encouragement of enterprises, the supplying o f technicians and laborers, the accommodation of frnds a n d the supplying of necessary materials according to i^ie condition of the various industries for accelerating and securing the execution of the plan* Pursuant to the above policy, the government is to take such measures f if necessary f as to enact la界3 and to enforce the National Mobilization Law* (Reference Material) PLAN3 ？OP SXPA BIOr了 OF PRODUCTIVE POWER OF 證 C H O U K U O & NORTH CHINA In r.ancho-.iloio t a 5-Year Plan tor industrial exploitation has been f i n e d aiming at 1941 (8th Year of EDtoku) as a goal and is in course of its execution, while in ？-brth China, a plan for expansion of productive power during a period of 1939-1942 was also undertaken and is at present under vigorous preparation• In the above two plans, those factors corresponding to our expansion program of productive power may be outlined in the following tables. Furthermore f these plans may^ subject to further re- adjustments £rom the point of view of an expansion plan for synthetic productive power of Japan, Manchoukuo asd when our plan is finally decided• ⑴ 5 - Y m i PLAN FOR INDUSIBIAL SgLOITATIOW OF MAMDHOOKPO ITEMS IRON & STEEL UNITS -1221 2 m . ie-Thousand Kilo tons Steel Materials 335 395 557 1.038 Steel Ingot 620 655 1 . 039 2.027 Pig Iron 910 1，76o 2’ 350 3,325 Iron Ore 3.286 5 . 315 7,295 11,200 Light Metals AlunLlnum Magnesium NON-FERROUS METAL3 Copper Lsad ae-Thousand Kilo tons Kilo ton 17,185 21,450 26,ijl0 1^500 Eilo ton 2 390 ,993 4.500 10 1.765 1 2 . 3 9 5 8, 丨 5 0 0 400 ふ 1 6 0 27.487 Automobile SHESP'S WOOL Select Breed Ordinary Breed ELECTRIC _P0*ER Kilo ton 116 ,171 3,346 316 .548 K . W . 31.910 15.000 1,000 3.971 46,152 Zinc n • 2, .575 14,3X9 31.850 50.525 LIQUID FUEL Gasoline ( 3ne-Thousand Kilo-litres 135 U 3 191 Heanry Oil C )ne-Tfaousand Kilo-tons 95 91 186 186 SODA & 5AI2 1 KLlo-ton Soda Ash • • 54, ,000 72,000 7a,000 72,000 Caustic Soda • a 200 3.100 9,655 12,255 Salt • _ 391, ,180 509.190 679,400 910,1^0 SUIPHATE OF AMMONIA • • 270, ,670 308,162 382,420 393.990 PULP ( -Thousand Kilo tons 54 65 193 270 GOLD Kilograms 5丨 10,065 20,568 33,277 ENGINEEFING ISACHEffiRY Mo. 120 250 500 500 30•ooo 3 603,730 8迅 0 1 0 1,394.210 2 t o66 529 ,757 ,010 合 N . B .丄 . T h i s Table shows the estimated amount of production in and after the 2d year, of the same articles enumerated in the expansion plan of productive power of Japan. 2 * Respecting Sheep's Wool, plan on Japanese side ha3 been provisionally adopted, - 6 - of gold (Vide attached Table Nb # 3). To remove the holdings of the Kanchurian Central Bank to the Bank of Japan and to export necessary gold, (d) To create 8 lone term credit abroad araDunting ap- proximately to 500 f 000 f 000 yen for five years # the III. Policy : As the execution of this program, it i3 presumed that the price level within the period of this program may rise by 10% more or less per year# Consequently f it becomes an urgent problem to make pertinent the measures for price and wages to ensure uninterrupted execu- tion of this program and to prevent probable decline of export-, trade which would followerise of production costs and also to avoid the confusion of people 1 3 livelihood, Ibr this purpose t the following measures are deemed necessary. A*. To speedily increase the production of iron and o ther important materials. To an^)lify the supply of articles by all means and to facilitate their distribution. B . To intensify the price control f if conditions so require, not only on the standard of price of general merchandise but also on the individual price• C . To make all possible efforts to avoid stimulating the doiuestic market resulting from an excessive restriction of in?)orta t namely, holding back of commodities t big increase of speculative .inports and the resultant boosting of market price abroad• • 9 - proposed countries being U.S.A.• Britain, and Germany• for i^rices of Goods* result of increase of demand for goods, following the Especially «s regards the projected inaustries, eacport industriea f and industries producing the principal necessaries of life t to operate the priority import system and to examine the import priced according to the standard price to be determined from ticB to time. To intensify the Mti-Piofiteering Ordinance and to control all attempts for limiting supplies and unreasonable profiteer- ing, imposing heavy penalties on the offenders• To institute Price Inspectors (Bakaku-Ean) with function of inspecting prices in pursuance of the provisions of Anti- Profiteering Ordinance, Uapcrtant Industries Control Law and Inportaat Fertilizer Industry Control Law e To mke it necessary to obtain governoent permission in order to raise the price of any important merchandise (to be enforced insraediately) • To designate the cartels or associations of coal and other iiqportant home product materials and machineries (i.e. Engineering Industry Association, Commercial Association! Iferine Products Association, Industrial Association, etc.) as the controlling bodies and iaake them exercise control on production» sales allocation of distribution, and on prices• To have the merchants submit nonthly reports of ajnount in i ^tock, anjDunt under contract, and amount qf. production to the coirp^tent minister through the con5)etent pref8etural offices • To prevent increase of freight costs and to undertake importa- tion of about 650 f 000 tons old ships f if found necessary, for the purpose o f stocking scrap iron. T}o control use of iron and other inportant merchandises and also papers• This may be effected by way of building permission for iron materials and for papers by restricting the number of pages VS newspapers and nagazines. T- J^ To take measures for preventing rise in general cost of living (1)* To require permission of the competent authorities for raising house-rent f and to make it a fundamental principle not to grant such permission throughout the period of this program. This rule shall also apply to the case of beanpaste (miso) f sauce (shoyu) f ^aeats f electric lights, gas, snd water-supply• (2) • To effect reduction or exemption of sugar consumption tax within Japan. (3)• To adopt regulation uniforms for civil service employees causing the private companies and banks to follow this 一 _ “ —•—“ example, and thus undertake 飞o siinplify general clothings IV# Policy for Control of Industries. Although this policy may only be quickly achieved by people close union brought about through collaboration of the Government and people labour and capital under stern and confidence- inspiring guidance by the Government, the virtually lias in the nDst efficient utilization of the existing economic organizations• Btom this point of view, the existing economic organizations and useful persons engaged in their^ianagement shall ziK)bilized in a roost logical and efficient way so as to make the execution of this policy. Accordingly, in respect to the problem of forms of enterprises, it is planned to strengthen state administration where necessary with a view t6 attaining the nation's objectives by independent control of private enterprises without placing thorn under ； state ip ̂ or_state mftnagement. called for in the meantime in pursuance The urgent of the foregoing principle shall be as u n d e m o t e d To extend the ^ndustry Control Bureau as follows: (a) To strengthen the existing organization o f the Industry Control Bureau, (b) To institute a comnittee composed of representa- tives of production, distribution and consutoptijon to ensure pertinence and smoothness in applying the relative laws* B« The important industries shall be subject to control in accordance with the following princiolesi (a) To intensify the policy of aiding industries and, if (b) To enact a special law for each proposed industry• (c) Aa to munitions industries, to make it compulsory to obtain the Government permission concerning the following items• (1) The reduction arid disuse of producing facilities (2) The important niatters relating to production, sale, labour t and general trade, (3) Disposal of profit or loss. (d) Ceilings o n unit prices shall be exercised in case ©specially necessary# The disposal of profit shall be directed from the point of view o f state policy when necessary. The fundamental industries shall be expanded in accordance with the following principle. and guarantee of profit to those national policy enterprises• - 1 2 - Iron and Steel Industries. (a) To aia import and custody of material ores and to suppress importation of scrap iron, if required (b) To urge disposition of the poor mines. (c) To stimulate use of iron sand. � To foster the spread of special ten?pering method. (e) To accelerate improvement of quality and increased production of special steel. (f) To unify control of inportation and distribution of iron and steel ffoia the standpoint of state policy• (g) To unify and rationalize the distributing and purchas- ing system of steel material throughout Japan and Ivianchuria. Petroleum, (a) To enforce a decisive subsidizing policy for synthetic petroleum and exploitation of oil-fields in order to ensure self-su3tainiiig o f fuel oil supplies. (b) To establish special juridical person Imperial I\iel Industiy Erorcoting Con^any in order to ensure an ample supply of funds for the petroleuia industry, and also to let them put into effect synthetic petroleum industry, w h i c h is necessary. (c) To control and utilize the domestic manufacturing capacity of machinery (including tnose under govern- al ment/management) and to contrive for quick equipment of synthetic petroleum^plants• Provided that in its early state, the equipping shall be aijned at approxi- mately one million metric, tons per year as the goal and to import German equipments as the national policy. (d) Haviitg the above in view, to establish special juridical person National Policy Machinery Manufacturing Company making synthetic petroleum manufacturing plants for the 腿 k i n s of machineries o f high precision and im- portance • For this purpose, 1 0 f 0 0 0 metric ton forcing press and other enginearing roachineries essential for their equipping shall be expeditiously iuiported pre- ferably from Germany a3 the national policy. (e) The manufacturing irethod of synthetic petroleum and the form of enterprise shall not be subject to any particular restriction. HDwever f ea^hasis shall be laid on production ，f gasoline of superior quality for aircraft use and of Diesel Oil. (f) In development of artificial fuel oil industry for war use stress shall be laid on the continent, especially in the rational utilization of Limchiirian coal. (g) In addition to acceleration of the prospecting of the existing oil-fields t to exert exploitation o f hidden oil-fields by extensive and drastic investigation of oil veins running through the Empire and丨 the neighboring countries under national management. (h) To stimulate research and utilization o f substitute fuels. Coal Industry• (a) In the exploitation o f coal-fields emphasis shall b e laid on the continent. (b) To make unified control over the price and distribution throughout Japan and Manchuria and specially u to promote the importation of Manchnrian coal* (c) To unify and liquidate thos^ inferior enterprises in order to rationali2e this industry # Electric BDwer. (a) To put the generation and transmission of electric power under private ownership and govermaental manage- m e n t , contriving the abolishment of double equipping, rationalization of equipments and thorough exploitation and utilization of hidden re sources • ibr the above purpose, to create a special juridical person f The Japan Electric Power Equipment G o m p a n y an*d let it administrate and manage these mat七 (b) To exercise necessary control over the price, equip- ment etc*« in connection with the distribution of electric power• (c) The jurisdiction shall be with the Ministry of Commerce and industry and importance attached to the promotion of industries• Particularly, to practice the general low rate system and f moreover, to apply the specific low r a t e system to the specially designated industries for quickening the promotion of the inportant national defense industries• (d) To place ai$)hasis on water power exploitation and maintain the principle of *water power prior to fire power.• Aluminium and Magnesium. (gt) To provide abundant and cheap electric power supplies so as to reduce the production cost to the lowest possible degree• (b) To cultivate positively their uses by dent of the national policy tod extend the scope o f their general demand • (o) To strive to utilize the contin抑tal resources as far as possible- To amend the Ingx^rtant -industries Conlfrol Law as follows i To discontinue the designating system of industries and eir^loy a genera] cartel law. 仍 make the efficient use of the provisions controlling the establishment and extension of enterprises with a view to inducing new investments, ^o strengthen public benefit regulations, ensuring specially their prompt and appropriate application. intensify the penalty provisions, adopting the corporal punishment system and inposing deprivation of the trade right according to the circuiastances. (E) In order to unofficially guide and control the execution of this policy throughout Japan and Manchuria, to create in the capital an orgen for unified guidance and control• (F) Particularly in Manchuria, to designate iron, coal and petroleum industries as war industries and urge their expeditious development by xjieans of military aid in addition to ordinary aid. (G) Beside the above to take measures for uniformity o f research, assistance t and encourasement of inventions as regard essential industries and spur research in and eacploitation of requisite resources• Plans for Technicians and Labourers• Consequent to the rise of productive capacity and in general industries and the increase of traffic following the execution of tnis progranif the demand for technicians t skilled workmen and ordinary labourers in the manufacturing, mining and transport industries around 1941 is expected to be so increased as shown hereunder. (ロnit ： One .*Hjous«nd Men) — じ上ass 1936 1 9 W Number of Proportion of • Increase Increase Technicians 1 137 1 232 1 95 t 1.7% Skilled iTorlanen * らブh、 t 1,339 1 6 6 5 1 Ordinary Labourers t 6,090 1 8,027 » 1,937 t 1,3% Of the foregoing, the portion to be supplied by natural increase is anticipated to be 78,000 technicians, 559*000 skilled workmen said 6 1 975*000 ordinary labourers. In addition to this, it is calculated \ that 9»780 technicians are to be raised in .their status from the lower • \ grade as well as supplied ftram the graduates, therefore, the ultimate number of m e n needed for special replenishment training will be 6,700 technicians, 96,000 skilled workmen and 1,052,000 ordinary labourers. / For this purpose the following steps should be taken by th# Government. ゴ (1) P l a n s for Technicians• To plan the increaae of graduates from the industrial sections of government t public and private universities t and flrora the industrial technical colleges creation of industrial sections in private universities, raising of status of the industrial technical colleges and A-claas industrial schools and also attacning of the technical colleges to government f public 1 • and private universities. (2) Plans for skilled workmeru Tto establish or extend the training institutes for skilled Tjorkmen in the metropolitan and local prefectures and al30 I M o 尺 in large factories, (3) Plans for ordinary labourers. Uo contrive absorption chiefly from the agricultural and canmerclal t»uulation and strengthen the organization o f otqploymBnt a«enoy office in order to ensure smooth progress o f the absorption. Also, to make efforts in dispersing industries into the provinces. - 1 7 - (4) Necessary expenses* The expense required for training tdohnioians and skilled warloiien is sstljaated at 87*600,000 x!sn(«D include equip- ment, expenses and working budget for five years)of which 58,300,000 yen will be disbursed by the Government, V I . Plans for Mechanical Xadustries. From the present status of our productive capacity, it is quite impossible to self-supply immediately all the neoessary machineries for this program, so that, it becooies inperatlve fbr satisfying the BDst urgent demand of the least amount to hare recourse to in^ortation. The ioport is roughly eetimated as here* usdeir* ； (Unit 鼙‘ One Million Yen) CUIBS Total Aoount imount to Required be ^ p o r t e d Needed for this Program Machinery needed for Other General Indiis tries "General Macbinary Engineering Machinery 2,900 500 10,500 950 All b«aed 250 on tion. ,050 TOTAL 13.900 2 •？泸 Even though we estimate the export araoiiat of our home made machinery for five years at l t 7 0 0 f 0 0 0 f 0 0 0 Y e n , the balance will result in a considerable excess of icports. Kbwever f such a phenomenon is quite unavoidable for a country in the courwe of building up her hearry industries and we have to iaake up with all despat^i fqrjair~4?oks by- adopting the equipment and techniques of otKers" so A3 to quickly ^ 一 一 . ^ secure the means of independence and self-support, aiming at advanc- z ing into the international market before long» Ibr this purpose, the following steps are' necessarily to be taken. ⑴ To create a special juridical person, National Ibiicy t'lachinery-manufac taring Coup any and charge it with the • manufacture of machineries of limited demand, engineering machinery of hi^h precision, coal liquefying machinery and the like which are considered to be too difficult for tho existing enterprises from the technical and economical point of view. (2) To expedite inporta to under take/aad. installation under the national policy. These iK^xzi^xzz shall be principally conducted by the National Iblicy Trading Comr)an±es which will execute control of orders abroad, investigation of order accepting capacity abroad, suppression of inporting price and financing export funds, etc. (3) To plan quick promotion of productive capacity by standard- ization of various gauges of manufactures, rationalization of giving orders at home and control in the descriptions of manufactures• (4) To make efforts in ccntrollins subcontractors to prcauote their qualities and capability. V I I • Traffic R)licy. • Tfce Goyerraaent is to contrive complete equipping of railways f harbors and road^ 9 over-all rationalization of the firei^ht rates and cancellation of non-urgent transportations with a view to meeting the increased amount of freight following this plan. Apart from the above, the Government is to«frajne a resolute protective and fostering policy towards the civil air transporta- tion in order to guarantee its epoch-malcing development. The principal itejas psrtaini:^ to the above problem will bei (1) Railways • (a) To adopt the principle of •freight first •； passengers second so as to assure the smooth working of freight traffic in spite of all difficulties. - 1 9 - (b) To expedite realization of the straiどht一line plan of principal niain lines of Manchurian-Korean Railways to promate thair transporting capacity. (c) To adopt specific Iotj freight rates system for tho constructive materials of Important industries and their essential commodities -and particularly in Manchuria and Korea, to practice lon£>distsnce diminishing freight rates. (d) To undertake construction and in?)rovement of railways in the important industrial zones in RMnohuria and Korea in accordance with therequiremeiits• (2) Marine Transportation. (a) To firmly establish ''Home cargo on home ship* principle• For this end, to execute irgjort of old vessels, if it is found inevitably (as stated before). (b) To stimulate increase in building of superior vessels• ^o; lb accomiDdate special carriers for coal, steel material, iron ore and petroleum, (d) To improve harbour accoirsnodations in the iirportaxit industrial zones # (3) Land 'Kransportation. (a) To take up h^me made motor-vehicle principle with one accord of the Government and people, provided that during the period of this program* use of cheap •Ford* and •Chevrolet* within the limits of necessity is to be exempted. (b) To urge propagation of large size mo tor-trucks of superior home manufacture to supplement the deficiency of railway transportation. (0) Other measures to be taken are: 1 . Equipment of roads to afford facilities to motorcar transportation• 2 # Standardization of mDtor-vehicles for business - 2 0 - purposes and restrictions on the use of the cars of inferior quality. 3* Propagation and fostering of Diesel cars* “ Reduction and exemption of various taxation on motorcars. Aviation, ^a; To create speedily the Central Air Technical Research Institute to encourage epoch-making advancement of air techniques. (b; To rationalize regular air-transport service rates and extend as niich as possible its use for civil purposes. (c) To spur working an bloc of railway and air transport and to stimulate progress of air-transport through the iaedium of the railways • # (d) To extend further the protection and fostering with a view to founding regular international air routes over the continent and ocean areas, (e) Furtiierujore, to carry into effect the following progressive and protective policies• 1« Creation of duty of keeping aircrafts at the large coir^anies and factories. 2. Encouragement of research and trial manufacture of special bodies or motor engines• Aid to private purchase of home made aircrafts, 4. Stimulation and aid to export of hone ronde aircrafts. 5. Encouragement of searching fish-shoals by aircraft. 6. Siicourageraent of various air work (photography, survey, etc•)• 7 . Establishment of air navigation insurance system. 8. Guarantee of upkeep of aircraft manufacturing equipment, etc# - 2 1 - 獲 POLICY FOR ASSURING STABILITY OF PEOPLE'S SUB3TSTE.NCR. The development recorded by our industries in the recent years is worthy of special mention. However, owing to its recent origin, vre caa not deny the fact that in comparison with other powers^with national wealth and people f s income, we have a remarkably lower . ： — standard. The prime object of tnis program of course lies in the unified organization of the nation 1 s strength, so that, by the execu- tion of this program, various industries no评 being expanded can make big advancement and it is assumed that through the increase in production the people 1 s earnings will rise from the present^ - 一 ^ - 一 一 一 一 “ — ： ^ “ 一 20 f 000,.000 f 000 yen to"over 30• 000,000• 000 yen by about I^IaJ-How- ever, special caution is called for at this moment on the question of how this expanded national wealth and people's income can be disposed among the various classes of people .with appropriateness and fairness since expanded wealth is the basis of stability of the people 1 s subsistence^ From the above point of vie^r, the follov7ing practical measures should be adopted pertaining^to promotion of agricultural districts, in^rovement of the living conditions of urban workers and the relief of medium and minor industries. (1) Pronption of agricultural districts. With a vie讨 to avoiding the evil of preponderance of cities which is liable to result in course of execution of this program, to exert the pro- — . ’ . 一 . . . — . 一 motion of econoiay of farui-Tillages by meaiis of dispersal of industries into prpvinces and simultaneously to lessen the burden of farmers and iiiQ)rov«e their condition of living. (1) Reduction of burden of taxation. Total yen 21o f 000 f 000 f of which Total atolislment of HDusehold Rate 50% reduction of Special Land-Tax and fts Additional Tax 140 Million Yen - 2 2 - 5^% Reduction of Miscellaneous Tax •fe. (2) and its Additional Tax 50 Million Yen Transfer of that portion of expenses of Tovm and Village Offices belons- ing to the Governiueat business. 19 Million Yen Re-adjustment of the farmer's debts. To clear off about 1,500 f 000,000 yen out of those hi^tv ザ n V — I れ̂r&h i 如,ハh i \ \ e 1 3 interest and unsecured debts caused by operating and living expends borne by the middle and small class farmer^ and con- stituting an ixapediment to agricultural production. The Government is to indemnify o^ 十 l o a n Association with the limitation of 10,000,000 yen per year^ (3) Creation of the Health Association System* To create the Health Association in tovms and villages and inako it obligatory for the inhabitants to join it. Medical eocpenses an3Dunting approximately to 175,000,000 yen a year (for 7,000,000 houses at 25 yen per house、will be divided equally and borne by the health instalment of the inhabitants, Government subsidy, payment by the patients, etc. (4) New establishrasnt of condensation system for the natural disaster to agriculture. To establish insurance association with several villages as a unit to undertake crop insurance business on the staple farm products• This shall be re-insured by the national insurance at an assumed amount o? approximately 60 million yen which is to be paid by the Government. (2^ promotion of subsistence of urban workers• (1) To contrive to the best of our ability, means fbr alleviating intensity of labor resulting ffom expansion of industries and decline of living level resulting from rise of prices and to work for the cultivation of people'3 laboring strength and forcingint.pnarnof industrial peace. - 2 3 - (2) To revise Factory Ordinance a M especially to undertake alleviation of excessive labor and relief for the sick and wounded^ (3) To plan enlargement of various labor insurances. (4) Ho prcxnot© welfare institutions for working class in general. (3) Protection of zniddle^and minor^lasguinanufacturers # In view of the importance of the position occupied by the medium and minor industries in our industrial organization, to adopt the following measures for their revival and succor. (1)/ Readjustment of debts of the middle and minor class 1 irianufae tur ers • (2) /Readjustment of banking organs for medium and minor industries (3) Qfiexooval of pressure by big enterprises^^) (4) RationaTl^a tluu uf maixageifient and systexnati2ation of organization. IX # Financial' Policy. The success or failure of this program is doubtless solely dependent upon the Government 1 s consistent and firm guidance under the national policy• The Government should support various industries with all possible means from the standpoint of strengthening the natioiPs power and it is especially of vital necessity that measures for financial aid should be taken by our Government* The assumed suK>unt requisite for the financial aid to be executed by the Qoverraaent for achievement of this program is as follows (Aa to outline of the items of account, vide attached table Nb# 4パ - 2 し Hepresents the requisite amount as the secondary additional estimate for 1937 following execution of this program and is included in 2,945 million yen. The counter-plan for the above purposes nill be; 1 # Sstimates for the annual revenue corresponding to the above quoted expenditure shall be dealt with in the following manner* NOTE i (Unit r One Million Y^n) 1937 1938 19.39 19iiP ISki T o m Amount of Subsidy for t Construction of Projected industries t 30 1 1^6 t 261 » 278 t 1 289 t ：1,004 t I • Amount of Subsidy Jioidental to Execution i of this Erogram 27 » 82 i 59 « 55 « 49 5 272 TOTALS 4 t 228 1 320 ‘323 « 338 » 1.276 The estimate of the future annual expenditure of our Ec^pire for the purpose of realization of repletion of the n a t i o n ^ strength and completion of the national defense (i.e # azoount of the future annual e^roenditure having as an object the execution of this program) is approximately as in the chart below and the foregoing subsidies are to be included in the amount of annual ©jcpenditure # . (Unit ニ On© Million Yen〉 Classification 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 TOTAL Itotal imount or 2,945 i 3#571 i 3.900 t 11,200 ik.300 i 18,843 Estimated Annual Erpenditure (Assumed) I I i : t Increase as against 1937 (a)- 72 t 626 t 955 » 1.255 ：1»355 » 4,263 • 25 - CLASSIFICATION Fundamental Revenue 1.600‘ » l.6oo » 1,$00 t 1,600 t 1,600 t 8.000 Natural Increase & Increased or New Taxes iiDO » 784 i 903 » 1.073 « 1.^11 : i . 3 7 1 Increase Itansferred from Specific Account 50 : 6o » 72 » 86 « 99 » 二68 National loan Bond 895 « 1.127i « i . U l 1 1,390 ： 6 . 1 7 7 TOTAL 2 •他-5 » 3.571. 2 t ? o o J 4 . 200 » 4.300 » 18,916 t Amount of Increase ( 7 2 ) 6261 « ‘ 1 怨 ‘^.2 6 3 K 2 . It is necessary for the Government f not only to carry out all possible synthetic measures to improve the financial situation regarding cir- culation of moneyt consumption and all the matters concerned with the people's subsistence, but also to take the following Important steps for the purpose of successful accon^lishmeilt of the above financial policy. (1) Ito intensify the control of budget* To concentrate the annual e^enditure on fostering and achievement of the execution of this program and to thoroughly cut down non-urgent and non- inportant' e^cpenditures. (2) XQ conjunction with the advancement of producing capacity and increase of the people's income, to contrive fundamental rationalization of the taxation system, e t c” in order to increase the running revenue of the nation參 (3) To strive all the more fbr drawing the raili"tory expenditure into industrial branches• (4) To stimulate the profits of heayx^iB^sl^i?? to be participated in .iy-JJie^ftgricultural and fishing districts. (5) To firmly establish the national loan bond policy in conjunction with the financial policy. (6) TO enforce administrative and financial re-adjustment with e view to prouDting efficiency of the Govermnent and public officials. # - 2 6 - REFORMATION OF ADIFFIJISIPATIVE QRGATVLZATION X . m the course of execution of this program, it is inperative to firmly astablish a powerful administrative organization and to maintain it as. a systematic and immovable national policv t and for this purpose funda- mental reformation of the present cabinet system, such as formation of the Board of National Affairs and severance of the heads of all ministrial departments from the ministers of national affairs, etc., and also re- investigation on the whole administrative organization, becomes in- evitably necessary• However, due to the difficulty of rapid realiza- tion of the above objects, the following emergency measures at least, ought to be adopted for the present to avoid any impediment in carrying out the national policy for execution of this program. (1) Formation of the Board of General Affairs as the central directive and controlling organ for the execution of this program. (2) Hew establishment of the Ibreign Trade ISinistry for adjust- ing and handling foreign trade• (3) New establishment of the Air-transport Ministry for realization of unprecedented advancement of our civil air-transportation. (k) New establishment of the Ministry of Health for the pro- motion of people f s physique and cultivation of their labor strength • (5) Pevision of the Civil Service Appointment Ordinance with a view to selecting and appointing capable civilian personnels to let them undertake fresh and active industrial administra- tion. (6) As to personal affairs of the special juridical person, to make it a basic principle not to appoint any Government official in view of the evils in the past. - 2 7 - ESTIMATES OE DIRECT & INDIHS3T SUBSIDIES CF I&P如ISE GOVERi:ュIEKT FOR IJ3DTETRIES PROJECTED BY THIS PROGRAM Attached Table No» 4 - 1 (Unit __ One Thousand Yen) ITBvS 1 2 2 2 . 1̂ 33 1 鄉 1%0 1 ? U T O W , Liaintenance & Guarantee of Factory Equip- ments of Aircraft Manufacturing Company Amount to be appropriated cut of Army Air 23,199 Expenditure for Aircraft Industr；' (Based on Assumption) Aid for equipment in accordance with Iron and Steel Self-sufficient Policy 26C Subsidy to Petroleum Prospecting 6 f ;2 (Decided) Subsidy to Ezploltatioa of North Sakhalin Petroleum Resources (Ditto) 2,172 Prospecting Expenses of Navy Reserve 710 Oil Fields (Ditto) Subsidy for Prospecting Oil Fif?3da - (fcvernment Investment in Imperial Fuel Joint Stock Company 1,000 Subsidy for Artificial Fuel Oil ISanufacture 1,792 Security Honey for National Policy Shipbuild- ing Companies - •Government Investment tc National Policy Vechinery Ooinpany 一 367k 31.3S3 32,793 42,153 46.713 2,10c 3 ,ICC 2 , 6co - 715 715 715 715 2,44c 1.SS5 710 - S64 ,000 327 24 ,000 ,772 5,000 34.327 640 1.2C0 S76 5 , o d o 5,000 5,00c S64 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 3,000 46,265 ISO 3.574 176,256 3,'CoC 3.552 7.550 l.i.20 24,COO 25, 115. 000 093 2.976 15,000 OTHERS 1CTAI. Government Subscription to Tlinir^ and Industrial ^ecticn of 為nchuris:. Railway ^onpany Government Investment in Cther Enterprises in Uanchuris TCE&L - 51,000 2c,S25 116,320 - 10.00C 150.000 150,000 150,000 230,553 24?,5/L$ 250,26s 1C.0C0 10,000 -9,657 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 29,637 501,00c 663,511 39.6S7 80,00c 119,63? ふGGR3G&T2 29.G25 146,320 2Co,553 277,545 235,955 1 . 003,153 KOIZs Thic ^ b l e ir a p r o v i s i o n a l c alexia tier, f o r tiie purpose of ottaining basis of ^ecuis ite Funds. Attached Table Mo. 1. TABLE SIIOWIVG PROPORTION CF EXPAIEION T OF PROJECTED INTDUSTRTES 1,000 Metric ton) 10,000 K.W.) 1,257 1,117 1,000 No.) 1 0 0 9 0 1,000 No.) 50 45 10,000 Metric ton) 1,300 900 Magnesium ( Electric Power( Shipbuilding ( Ordinary ( Automobile Engineering ( Machinery Steel Material( Petroleum ( Coal ( Aluminum ( 1,000 Metric ton) 100 70 10 5 4 0 0 2ko 2,800 30 3 1 4 0 7 37 13 485 36.4 5,556 21 0.5 721 50 37 13 440 21 ,200 21 0.5 675 50 45 15.1 46 2.7 3.8 1,356 2 . 0 1 . ' 1.9 2.4 3.5 2.7 2.0 15.6 15.5 1.7 •3 18.0 12.0 1.' 1.1 8 . 9 I5.6 2.8 3.0 Comparison of Production Strength in 1941 of principal projected industries with that of lgpfe shows approximately the following results rrsass I A } FRODUCTIOIJ GOAL (B) PRBSENT CAPACITY MJLTIPLS HATJO OF (A) to (b)_ Total Japan Manchuria Total japan Manchuria Total Japan Manchuria NOTESJ 1 . Ths expansion ratio of gensral machineries is approximately 18. 2. The expa-ision ratio of Petroleum shows exclusively that of hone produced gasoline and heavy oil. In case the producing capacity ( 1 9 3 6 ) based on imporced crude oil is taken as stand3rd, the multiple ratio becomes little less than 10. 86 ,0,000 ton 93 on) 325 ton) ,200 t丨 trie 10,000 565 trie Me M8 0,000 1,000 Attached Table M o . 2 A S S m S D A1.T0UNT OF PEOPLE」S SAVINGS Inres trcent Paid-up Internal Insurance Reserve Fund Mutual yinancin^ Yearly Reserve Fund — マ Increase Indus- • by Industrial Capital Company 饰tional Local Indus trial insurance Govern- _ or Companies trial Assn. Asen. of Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Companies ment Insur- Association Bank Decrease, Ccmpanies ance ? u p d Deposits 1 9 2 6 14 1 9 2 7 • 6 1 5 1 9 2 8 1 2 9 1 9 2 9 92 1 1 的 3 0 (-)42 1 0 193ユ (-)78 7 1932 Sh 5 1933 316 6 1934 ぬs 3 1935 x 433 x S 21 18 18 17 12 6 Postal. •^tevings & Postal Transfer Savings x 578 2 0 5 158 2 6 2 13? 92 ( - ) 1 363 25 539 427 2 4 2 101 13 114 147 • 104 3ら9 4 6 2 466 垆0 169 2 136 137 5 257 224 659 2 3 8 239 137 6 151 131 10 318 299 295 66 48 17 113 133 8 ( - ) 3 4 3 296 273 136 204 145 m 123 127 8 ( • ) 263 2 6 4 147 746 145 18 142 172 1 369 &5 6 3 2 (-)164 1.109 262 5 157 2 4 0 巧 598 109 330 96 1 . 0 4 1 359 ハ J 0 2 1 7 2 3 2 18 707 157 999 151 878 U 4 2 241 x 232 14 934 1 6 0 Serines • Speolflo Oaah Held by Truat Deposit* In Depoeita in IHdlviduala & TOEAL DepMlta Oâ gaas belong- Depoelt Industrial i ine to fodus t r ia l S«otiQD GoqpeniM •v- Ufait * One Milllo. YatO Pan«d by Banks, Ina« ..TXUFLTT llatual F1O«BO« >l8a» Otivezraient, Looal m a s . Sop osi tat Seourlties^ Sepoaita & Caah Owned _ _ _ _ _ _ by Industrial Seouritioa Canpanies TOZAL B People'• Sarings U - B ) 蚴坳177115725^2179393 9071617202239 刃91以和汾56723582| 2,029 2•玷2 2.928 2.526 756 645 2,297 3.890 4.966 k^OO ‘I bk 16 264 9k 122 307 110 313 48 382 990 1.359 504 291 403 1.091 1.7巧 1«5鸠 1.238 172 129 11 14 5 113 278 309 余 k33 .131 .267 727 180 110 ,206 .141 ,668 •(69 lt596 1.521 1,661 1,801 576 535 1.091 1.749 X Represents unknown and figures for previous year prorisicPally adopted. Bepz-esenta that 也ioh includes figures adopted as abenre ESTIMA.T3S OF SUBSIDIES OF JAPANSSS GOVERNMENT FOR COLLATERAL U7TSHPRIS53 FOR EXECUTION OF THIS PROGRAM Attached Table Nt>. j U n i t • One Thousand Yen)_ ITEI® 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 Total Promotion & Subsidy to Civil Air-Transportation Government X n ve3tment in The Industrial Bank of Japan Government Investment in The National Policy Trade Company Expenditure Cultivating Overseas Farai Products Markets Training Expenses for Technicians & Skilled Workmen Aid to Exploitation of Special Iron Resources TOTAL Government lavestment for 6theft Industrial Enterprise^, than the IV&nchurian Railway Expenses of National Policy of Immigration to Jfenchuria TOTAL GPAKD TOTAL - 1 2 , 9 9 8 1 4 , 1 6 8 1な,1 5 8 3 , o o o 3 . o o o 3,000 3 , o o o 5 , 0 0 0 300 ,000 200 300 1 4 , 4 0 3 5 5 , 7 2 7 3 , 0 0 0 1 5 , 0 0 0 5 , 0 0 0 - 1 5 , 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 1 5 , 0 0 0 17,418 13,950 15,155 5,950 5,950 58,323 1 , 0 0 4 2,148 1,165 1 , 2 0 0 700 6 , 2 1 7 2 6 , 7 2 2 3 7 , 2 9 6 3 3 , 7 8 8 2 9 , 6 0 8 2 4 , 3 5 3 1 5 1 . 7 6 7 • 3 0 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 2 4 , 1 0 5 1 0 4 , 1 0 5 1 5 , 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 1 6 , 0 0 0 4 5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 5 0 0 2 4 , 6 0 5 1 2 0 , 1 0 5 2 6 , 7 2 2 82,296 5 8 , 7 8 8 5 5 . 1 0 8 4 8 , 9 5 8 271,872 REMARKS* 1 . The Ascunts Shown in this Table are not inoluded in the Annnnts of Government Investment described in the text of Financial Policy. 2, This Table has been provisionally prepared for the purpose of calculating basis of requisite funds. ATTACHE? TABLE K O . 3 ESTIMATED >\:<jiari CF AAOUNT-JIAL BE NEWLY S&TENCLEQ 'RLQJ xisi .U1SITL FUi必 rol. E X T i ^ I C W gun OF IMPCRCta/T INDUSTRIES CF JAPaX< & 胸 C H U R 1 4 ( CLASSIFICATia^ UNIT Total Aircraft Ordinary Motorcar General Machinery Engineering Machinery Iron Ma'nufecture Steel Pig iron Ore Petroleign Oil-Field Artificial Fuel Oil Total Alcohol Total Coal Alunlnium Magnesium Electric Power Shipbuilding Vehicle locomotive Frei^xt Car Soda Dyestuffs Pulp Gold lUning OTHERS lO-Hiousarxl 11 10-Thousand Yen 12_5»000 • 13,700 10.Thousand kilo 735 tone • 1,207 • 151 400 29 580 6 l.Ihousar*d Kilo 5 tons 10-Thousand K . W . 5 3 6 10-lbousa^d tons 43 N o . 10-Thouaand kilo ton 22 • 2 “ 26 10-Tbouaand Yen 2^,141 kilo tons 5 7 Japan Manchuria Total Japan Jf&nchuxia 10 i.17,000 10,700 360 474 477 8,000 3,00a 355 365 730 151 - Liquid 149 165 Shale 86 375 153 6 2 5 137 1.001 98 97 100 1.325 86 1»512 765 141 14 2,477 129 28 24 33 98 186 . - 641 (3UKD TOCAL OF REQjUISITE 9.536 25 341 ,400 442 36 235 4 239 2 M 2 2 94 88(691) ,000(7620)‘ 19 2 23 H.175 kO 5 6,966 17 302 146 S85 107 504 mm 38 100 5 9 8 75 773 476 79 7 2,210 108 73 7 40 30 497 98 5 8 Liquid 621 Shale 107 728 739 293 62 7 2 6 7 21 28 19 33 .81 144 481 6.092 18 42 160 2 . M 4 HIMAPKS： This Tlable has been specie 11 y studied and composed for th& purpose of estimating total arcount of construction funds required for execution of this program and consecusmially does not cotiplGtely coincide in basic figures with Table of ReC'uisite T te m r " and Attached Table No. 1 . However, this Table hse been inserted for refereJice as shaving basis of calculetion of such' fund" / / 又 又 SECPST •PARTICUUfflS IN FRAMING A PROGPJLI： FCP EXTENSION OF IMPORTANT INDCJSTRlJiS i • Reproduced by Document Number Beam Number Reproduced Copies made Tox;a丄 War Research Institute Materials ゼ2 25 September 1941 100 Disposition Keep within the Institute INDEX TO CONTEOTS I . Sunmary of 5_iear Program of Important Industries Prepared by War Ministry, dated 29 Hay 1937• II. Resume-of Policy Relating to Execution of Essentials of 5-Year Program of Important Industries. Trial Draft Prepared by Army f dated 10. JUne 1937 III. Summary of Program for Extension oft Productive Capacity* Prepared by Planning Board, dated January 1939. ESS5NTIAL3 OF 5-YE£R PROGRAM OF IMPOPTANT mUSTRTBS WAR LONigiRY, 29 May 19?7 I PRZXJIPLE I* plan systematically to prooote the activity of im- portant industries generally bj, 1941 f so that, if anything happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying the important materisls in Japan, l^anchuria and Worth China and alao to realize long-stride advancement of the nation's strength in peace time, ensuring the actual power of leader- ship in East Asia # II OOTLIMS This program, having in view five years jft-om 1937 to 1941 as its first period f is to strictly select the classes and goals of important industries for the national defense and to control and encourage the realization production• Although five years has been set as a general period f the extent and time of achiefrement of the advancaioent and expansion shall be adjusted in conformity with the degree of demand for the variou3 materials According to»the degree of progress of the first period t necessary plans shall be prearranged for the second period事 2. Although our Eraplre is made the subject in the proujotion of in?)ortant industries for national defense, the requisite inSlustries (for national defense； should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according： to the principle of right work in the rignt place with Japan and Manchuria as a single sphere and in consideration of their necessity in our national defense. and f furthercr>re f observing the farsighted future policy of our Empire, we should pick out the most Important resources. The proraotion of the Munitions and Aircraft Industries should be in accordance with the plan separately framed by the Army, but f elements such as funds f machinery materials, labour, fuel t motive power, etc. f which should be dealt with and arranged in parallel with the promotion of general important industries f are included in this program. 5» Based on the foregoing principles, ths general goal for the promotion of important industries and their arrangement in Japan and Ivanchuria are roughly shown in the attached table• should ingeniously take the initiative in econo^iw exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources• 3« In carrying out this program, it is considered advisable to avoid causing an abrupt cnange in our present system of capitalism However, proper and timely m ^ a u r e a should be takan in connection with the control of circulation of 2no&ey 9 finance, prices of goods trade, settlement of aocounts with fbreign coiibtries, transporta- tion, distribution (of oonsaodities) f labour and non-Important production and consumption so as to ensure the ufaolesale and \ satisfactory progress of the program* m the promotion of toportaBt industries• those elements 一 such as teohnigue t capital t raw materials, e t c” should be coordinated, and perceiving the mutual relationship of the various industries, we should eltcoiziate any discord among them. How«rer t we zaust distinguish the degree of Ixzportance and urgency and pick out in the first place sost inportant and urgent ones and encourage their achievement* With the aibore in view 9 the important items to be taken up with priority in our first period program are listed as follows： 1« Munitions industry 2. Aircraft industry 3« Automobile industry 4 . Engineering machinery industry Iron and steel industry 6. Liquid fuel industry 7 . Coal industry 8 . General machinery industry • • 9 . Aluminium industry 10 • blagnesium industry 11• Shipbuilding industry 12 # Electric-power industry 13 Railway car industry GENERAL GOAL FOR PROMOTION CF E-IPOTCCAKT U DDSTRXBS ITEMS UNITS GOAL FCR TOTfeX PROMOTION CF JAPAN PR0DUCTICN M&I'XJKDHIA CtO&L F O R T O M EXPANSION CF JAPAN HOIDIfJG CAPACITY MiMCHDRIA REt^RKS Aircraft No. ( ) ( ) ( ) Civil Use 2,000 Goal for promotion of production is net shown in order to keep secrecy. Automobiles 10,000 ^ars 10 9 1 30 26 k 1. Sn»ll size automobiles & tractors are not included. 2 . Proportion of passenger automobiles & trucks to be generally equal. Engineering L&TOHINER3 R 1 0 , 0 0 C life chines 5 0 45 5 Iron Steel Materials 1,000 (1,300) 700 ( 9 0 0 ) 300 (400) Deficiency in Japan to be supplemented f.c’an Manchuria. & Steel Pig Iron 10,000 Metric tons 1 . 150 (1 .550) 750 (1,000) 400 (550) .、ソ Iron Ore 2,250 1.050 1,200 一. Ore in Stock 800 800 ' ' - Deficiency of about 4,500,000 k . t, in Jepan to be supplemented from Central & South China, South Seas & Australia. Besides t efforts shall, be made to utilize Resources of North China to curtail the above imports. Liquid Gasoline 330 190 140 Compulsory Oil Storage as per present rule Ccanpulscry Oil Compulsory Oil Storages as per Storage as per present rule present rule. Fuel Alcohol 1 0 , 0 0 0 Kilo litres 50 45 5 To be mixed with u asoline Benzol 20 14 6 Benzol to be exclusively for peace time 235 135 100 l t000,000 Kilo-litre from Ifenchuria is Shale Oil Coal 10,000 Metric tons 1 1 , 0 0 0 7,200 3,800 10,000,000 k.g.to be imported to Japan from Ifenchuria• Aluminum 1 0 , 0 0 0 Metric tens 5 1 0 7 3 Magnesium 1 , 0 0 0 Metric tens 9 6 r\ Vessels 1.0,COO tons ( 9 3 ) (86) ( 7 ) 700 660 20 Vessels under 1,000 tons & above 25 years of age are not Included. Electrlft Power 1 0 , 0 0 0 k . w . Railway Cars No. • L 2,200 w 52,700 L 1,000 w 30,000 L 1,200 1. ¥ 22,700 2. 3. Figures of this column represent required. amount of increase. Lfenchoukuo column includes Korea. L . Represents locomotive & Represents Freight wagons • . N O T E S：し Yearly production of General Machinery of approximately 2,700,000,000 is the gcel. 2 . With the progress of researches distribution between Japan & Manchuria, although pre-arranged as shown in this table, is to be subject to-re-ad justaent in accordance with the principle of "right work in righ.t place . 3 . Those figures in parentheses in "Goal for Promotion of Production" column represent Cepacity of Equipment. 4 . Munitions are not included in this Table. 5 . Substantial investigation is urged in connection with the construction of Cross-I'orean ^harj-el ^ailway. RESUME Og POLICY RELATIMG TO EXECUTION OF SIT.T.^Ry OF 5-YSAR PRCGRAM o r IMPORTANT B R O A S M R S (Draft) Tentative Draft by Army, 10 June 1937 INDEX TO CONTENTS No# Principle Nc>« 2 . Plans Financial policy (for raising funds) 2參 Foreign trade and exchange policy 3 . Policy on Comoodity Prices 4 . R l i c y for Controlling Industry 5* 、Policy for Technicians & Labourers 6 . Policy for Machine Industry 7 . Transportation Policy 8 . Policy for Assuring Stability of People's Subsistence (National)Financial Policy 10« Reformation of Administrative Organizations Tables Attachedi • 1« Table showing proportion of expansion of projected industries Kb* 2. T a ble showing assumed amount of p e o p l e s a v i n s s Nb # 3 # Table shoving approximate amount of necds3ary funds under Japanese-Manchurian Industrial Extension Rx>gram 4* Estimates of subsidy by Japanese Government to the projected industries \ Outline of Plan for ^ p a n s i o n of Productive Power. In view of the present situation at home and abroad, this plan aims at the repletion and strengthening of the power of our nation, which is the stabilizing force of East Asia t and at the establishment of a cocgjrehensive productive power emails ion plan for Japan, I^anchoukuo and China 9 which 冒ill bring about the realization of the necessary goal in regard to important national defense and basic industries by 1941t in order to be prepared for the epochal development of our country's destiny in the future; to be attained in spite of all difficulties• I* Basic R>licy. A* The scope of this plaa chiefly aims at the per- fection- of the foundation of national defense, and is essential particularly restricted to/industries requiring rapid expansion under a unified plan. B* Tliis plan is for the establishment of a plan for the expansion of the productive pot7sr of the major in- dustries of our country based on the policy for the establishment of a coiaprehensive plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China through close contact and coordination ajsong Japan• Manchoukuo• and China• C# This plan aims at the establishment of self- sufficiency in regard to important resources within the sphere of our influence and thereby avoid depending on � • the resources of a third power a3 far as possible even in time of an emergency, The prospective distribution of the shares of capital eacpeniitures necessary for the enfercemsiit of this plan is generally as follows: ぶUnit : Yen 000^000 Years Japanese Government Manchukuo Government Civilians Total NOTES 1957 i 30 ： 4 1 700 : 734 Estimates of 1938 X 146 : 90 1,866 ； 2,102 i necessary funds for 1939 • 261 : 130 1.866 j 2,257 :the respective 1940 • 278 : 130 l f 866 : 2.274 1 industries are 1941 i i 289 : i 125 755 ： t ,1,169 xshovm in attached :Table Ifo. 3 TOTAL I i L f 004 1 t 479 7,053 i s 8,536 Estimates of 1 investments by the To be included t Principally : (Japanese Govern- • Remarkst in increased ； amount of : consists of 1 private in- t :ment are snown in :attached Table Government ； vestment of 1 :Nb. 4* i I s Expenditure i i ： Japanese t nationals t 1 : 1 X And it is assumed that the people's savings f which must provide the required fund amounting approximately to 17 t 000 f 000 f 000 Yen as shown above, will reach about 17 f OOO f OOO f OOO Yen within the period of this plan (Refer attached Table No# 2). Ifewever, in addition to the foregoing, there will be demand for funds of about a billion and several hundred million yen including local / bonds and foreign investiasnt during these five years• Consequently, al- though it is thought nftedless to be extremely pessimistic over the raising of ftxads, it is not difficult to presume that m control will be necessary to quite an extent* Ibr the above purpose, our nation should exert itself for a smooth progress of this plan with a complete collaboration amDiig all officials and people • Herewith, several financial policies essential for carrying out this plan, are set forth. A« In order to facilitate supply of funds essential to the construction to accocpany the fulfilment of this plan f the basic principle for guiding finance shall be carried out smoothly by the positive and voluntary cooperation of the existing banking organs* However, iriMi a view to avoiding various obstructions liable to be met with in the money market 9 necessary and appropriate control is to be exercised. The prime object of this control may be summarized as followsi To faoilitate raising of necessary funds for this plan. To contrive to increase positively new savings 9 which are the sources for the supply of funds • To adjust the investment of capitals and to prevent double investment. To firmly maintain the proper and relevant policy in respect to rate of interest. C# Several concrete measures essential for the above purposes may be stated as followsi (1) Measures for facilitating raising of funds, (a) To amend the Bank of Japan Act and have the bank administrate the finance of the basic industries (b) To grant this bonk the controlling and supervisory po??sr3 over various banking organs • (c) To amend the Industrial Sank of J apan Act and extend the legal limit of issuance of debentures by IS tiiTios the present system. For this end f necessary increase of capital shall be mode by means of Government investment, (d) To grant this bank monopoly power over issue and trust of public bonds arid debentures and to have it exercise control over the loan market* fe) To revise the system of real rights granted by way of security. (f) To extend the financing of industries by the funds of Deposit Section / of Finance Ministry/ and Post Offtiee Insurance* ifeasures for increasing savings• (a) To open a national movement for practicing economy of consumption and thrift and saving* (b) TO lower the minimum limit of postal s w i n g s (from 10 sen to 5 sen). (c) To start house-to-house collection system of postal savings (similar to post office insurance) • treasures for adjusting investment of capital. (a) TO suppress ftresh investment in non-urgent and non- essential enterprises. (b) lb have the Bank of Japan supervise and guide the en5)loyment of capital by the various banking organs. (c) To restrain double investment. Measure for interest rate. (a) To firaily maintain the general low roongy rate policy. (b) To exercise control over the rate of interest of public bonds and debentures by unified acceptance .、__of public bonds and debentures by the Tn^nqt-rj Bank of Japan» (c) To make ar adjustment of lon^-term interest and of interest on public loan bonds• (d) To regulate employment of funds of the Deposit Section, for the purpose of suppressing sudden rise of money rates• (e) To accelerate the amalgamation and rationalization of the various banking organs with a view to lowering the cost of raising funds to the utmost• 0« To carry out a sound currency policy and to manage the money market properly and opportunelj'" under the control of tne Central II. Foreign Ttade and Exchange R)licy# Upon estimating the international receipts and payments accompanying the execution of this plan, Japan and L3anchuria consi-dei^ed as one unit, the deficiency in international payments ms shown in the following table exceedyl,000 t 000 f 000 yen for the years 1937 and 1938, and tnis cannot be paid up with that year's gold export alone• However f , m repletion of productive power f it is anticipated that this decline will be checked and that the international balance will improve fl*om 1940 on B3TB1A.TES OF INTERNATIONAL RECEIPTS &_PAiaiEOTS t JAPAN & CQ?jSIDERED/T3NIT^ ACCOMPANYING EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN _(Unit ,ooo«poo� J22L 1228 1940 19 与1 Total Average •total l-^jorts 4»085 Total Imports 4*699 Excess of Exports or Imp6rts ( - ) 614 Receipts & Payments outside of Foreign 230 Trade International Receipts & Payments (-) ( - ) 384 Export of Gold 154 Excess or Deficiency of ( - ) 230 Payment 5,420 »5.917 »24.887 » 4.977 5,458 5,470 126,417 « 5,283 ：-)38 « 447 01.530 <-) 306 230 » 230 i 1.150 t 230 192 i t 677 <-) 380 76 Aixd as 曲ether or not the balance would improve depends on proper foreign, trade and exchange measures of the government, it is deemed necessary to consider the following policies. L. Measure for foreign Trade. (1) Conprebens ive Trade Control Plan. (a) To enact "%_trade control laで，regulating uniformly the done3ゼic and foreign territories and institute "Trade Ckiild Law" with a view to promoting autonDmous control and coijnon interest of the traders• (b) To establish U Ibreign Trade Ministry" witn a view to. proper adjustment and management of .foreign trade. (e) To establish a National Policy Foreign Trade ConiDrjiy, Ltd. terielsr 'or to undertake the export and import of those manufactiares important for national defense*. (2) Positive measures for accelerating exports The emphasis In ma exportation shall be laid on the munitions industry and A f< product ion • Provided that f in order to maintain balance of the international receipts and payments f the exoort of textile goods and consumable materials shall be encouraged as heretofo (Vide attached Table No. 3). (a) To strengthen the Export ^eoociation and enforce com- pulsory participation of all 欲 porters• The asaociatio^ shall also be matie to exercise independent control in respect to qualities f quantities and prices. ㈨ \y c / V � To undertake complete organization of export banking organs for the smooth functioning of ©acport finance• To intensify the existing Escort Compensation I^m and to jLroaote overseas exportation by meニns of export compensation and credit condensation• Itxr the purpo se of propagandizing Japanese and Mancharr an goods and speedy collection of trad-e"intelligence from various sources f to institute Traae Offices in the principal cities of the world and 9 in addition, tc station trade intelligence officials in the necessary points. (3) Negative measures for suppressing import. (a) To keep in force the present iiaport-bill permit, system, if found necessary, and to apply proper and timely control over the importation of non- expedient and non-essential articles• (b) To vest the Trade Minister with the controlling power over customs duties. To auBnd the Customs Law, laying Qng)hasis on international receipts and payments, and adopt the Japan-Manchurtan Proferential Tariff System, which aims at the abolisiicient of double ヽ duty and customs duties, (c) To demand會 under the indeimiification principle^ the promotion of exportation or the suppression of im- portation to those ov©r-iD5)ort countries such as U.S•人"Australia, Germany, Canada書 Indian and, on the cx>ntrary t to adopt the scattered purchase system according to the import compensation system, in response to the demand for indenaification of those cnrer-export countries such as Central America and the Ifear East, (4) Ing>rovement of receipts and payments outside of overseas trade (a) To encourage the es^ansion of our shipping business and increase the income from overseas freight• fb、 To endeavour to attract the foreign tourists and simultaneously to curtail expenditures abroad of Jap&nese and Manchurian nationals• Exchange Plan* (a) To maintain^ aa far as posaible t the exchange rate o la 2d against Britain for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value. (b) Tb intensify the IbreigQ fixchange Control Law and completely stop the flight abroad and speculative investment abroad of our capitals• (c) To fix appropriate and opportune purchasing value of gold in order to encourage an epochmakin^ production i2) SXFANSICN P1AN OF PPO.TICTIVE K W E R OF 1TOPTH C H m ITE3S UNTi'S 1939 1940 1941 1942 IRON & STEEL STEEL I./ATSRIAI5 Pig Iron Iron Ore COAL LIQUID FJ5L Gasoline Keavy Oil SODA fi： SALT Soda Ash Caustic Soda Salt SH2SP'S' WOOL Select Breed Ordinary Dresd ELECTRIC P0.V2T One-Tnousand Kilo-tons One-Thousand Kilo-tons One-Thousand Kilo-tons 45 2 9 0 1 4 , 2 0 0 One-Thousand Kilo-tons 42 076 s, 633 84, 000 U i 6 2 2 17,900 55 1,266 30 9,108 84,000 2 1 0 1 , 2 6 0 2 2 , 7 0 0 25 125 18 1.532 7k 5.609 229,000 1 3 0 571 1. 6^9 22, 300 2 io, 269, 125 215 820 554 036 ooo N • i • 1. This Table shows the estimated an^ant of production of the sane articles taken up in tne expanaion plan of productive power of Japan. 2. Regarding Sheep's Wool, amount anticipate：! by Japan has been adopted. 3. Regarding Electric Itower, figures planned in I-toneotian- Sing Kiang Districts are not included. ctunent No. 1 5 - 2 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. Wo. 1522 Statement of Source and A.uthenticity m imm i n • 一 • __• — • t f a w k *‘ - 1 i ^mmtmam* mm^mmtmmmma^mfmm^mm^a^ • immmmtM^m^rnm I, T ^ H A - S n i , Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: ^ecrstary of Cabinet, and thr.t as such official I h v e custody of the document hereto attached con- sisting of 66 pages, dated , 1941, and described as follows: Eook, "Progress for Map Ding Out e. Program for Important Industry Extension. I further certify that the attached record and document is an offIcial document of the Japanese Government, and thnt it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or depart- ment (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of \ the document in the archives or files): Cabinet. Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of August, 194-6. M . Takahashi (signed) •Signature of Official Witness: R . Kuri^ama (.signed). 一 S e c r e t a r y of Cabinet Official Csparity. SEAL Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H . Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was ob- tained by me from the above signed off icial of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of /lug., 194-6 Richard H . Larsh (signed) m m Witness: Edward P. Fonoghan (signed) Investigator. IPS Official Capacity / へ す 1 ^ ^ •— — . 1 —— 产'，- Page 1 Extracts from the Japanese AmDa3sad.o.r-_iii^Mosccw Heco rd of the Talk with M も..:、hi gem! t su.. ノ July 2Q, 1-938 M SHIGBMITSU: On July 11 ? •しhe Soviet troops unexpect^iiy occupied the Chaiig--gliu-reng dis-cricl west of Lake Ghang-Ghi and "began to fortify it. In view of 七 his Charge d 1 Affaires M s hi made a protest to Mr. Stozit- onyakov and demanded that an immediate evacuation of the Soriet troops from that district "be effected. Stomonyakov declared the protest grouni— less and declined it on the "basis of the Khunchun agreement and the maps attached to it. Cn having studied the cjuestion the Imperial Government wired me and instructed th state the following； According to tlie data founded on the agreements "between China and Hussia, the border is established in this region and likewise according to the data oi the iarist regime wfiich are at the disposal of the Man— churian Government Ierrtt'ory "belongs to Manchukao. Besides, in the TQluiicliuii agreement "inentioned； ̂ y IVJT. btomonyakov, it is said, that from letter "T M the frontier line runs north-west, follows the line of "uhe mountains on the v/estern side of Lake IQiassan, and reaches the northern end of the sandy ridge, etc. Therefore it is clear that the western coast of Lake Chang -Chi forms the "border. ^he fact- —that—the Manchurian population have their religious rites on this mountain is another proof of this area ̂ eing Manchoukuo -possession^ It follows from the a"bove that there is no dou"bt whatsoever that the territory belongs to Manchoukao and the Japanese army in virtue of its ,) obligations to Manchoukao might take measures ensuing from these o"bligationb X LITVimy： During his conversation with NI3HI, STOMONYAKOV presented q^iite official document a, i.e., the Khunchini Agreement and the maps attached to The frontier on those maps is defined q_uite clearly, and tho maps are signed "by the Chinese representatives. ？n this nap the frontier runs vest of lake Khassan, which you call Chang-Chi. It seens to ne that the D0CUME1W 2241 Pag4 2 presentation of these docunents should have put an end to all sorts of talk on 七he subject, and エ was glad to learn fron the Ambassador that the Japanese-Manchurj an party had studied all the doctinents and I ex- pected to learn f^^r f h n f f • T n r " " ' n f i n ^ ^ to the sane, i.e. 5 the only possible conclusion,_that the lake and the ad— jacen^Tiills "belong to the Soviet Union-. Unfortunately, the -Japanese ggT^ih—ei上し iliyj.hi しb uuun 1 し{=} pti^s - n r ^ ^ p W i i l i p i J J g ^ l B I P i B l l B B S g ^ i o r has r.entioned certain data, yet lie did not s'ay wiiat J^PP^e-ije neant "by hin^ He has nentio.^ed ceirbaija religious rites vfelch cannot be upon "by any'bodjr- Wg know ^nd ha.ve ̂ alv/avs ̂ considered the hi 11 n n q-^ to_"be on the Soviet side of the frontier^ Our "border guards always diss— ch^r^ed t.Vi.QTr H”~hipg "Therefore we rust categorically decline every protest and demand, "because we are dealing with the Soviet lerxiiprjj-jaad no c l a m s on it of another power axe acceptalDle^ X rr The An"bassador has nentioned certain data, that are at the disposal of "both parties. ¥e presented our data 七o the Japanese Er;."bassy repre- sented "by NISnl. エ a二 ready to present zher:. also 七つ七]ae Arr^bassador. “ If the Japanese party produce their data, we b.re willing to study then, "but sr far we have only heard unfcunded statements and groundless demands• •V ハ. SHISBiyilTSU: My opinion is that the Japanese governr.ent will not "be satisfied with your reply. Firstlyジ you are speaking a/boii七七!^ r:-ap as一 serving as "a ""legal basis of tlie argur.ent f "but the iriap, which Mr. Sto ニ onya— kcor showed to jJiSHX- had never "been published^ and； to ny r.ind, at this critical nonent speaking of sor.e nap is unreasonalDlec. This will only complicate natters. 一 一 一 X LITYIiTOV: I rmst say I ̂ ar. greatly surprised at hearing you, an old and experienced dipxonat, spfi^kiriff gp gi-ightly a,T7n-p.t official naps and calling then 1 some naps^a, You nur•七 know _七hat p p s are the only r.eans of estat丄：Lsnin与 rrontiers. SHI£5MITSU; !t 。• • Jaでan_has the rights ani obligations to Manchoukuo to use force anl nake the Soviet_ troops evacuate fror. the territory or kan- choukao, unlawfully occupied "by then. LIT7ILTQ7 ； The An"basF?ador has not said anything new. The only new thing was that he threatened us with the use of force. The AnTDaosador DOCUM&HT 2241 Page 3 , , evidently considers the tactics of,jLhrfintiR a siuad. diploratic neans. Unfortunately, there is quite a mxz'ber of countries that are susceptible tc "being frightened, and threatened., iDut the A^oas_saiax_~ust this neans cannot "be successfully used in Moscow- U / ^ T ^ i e i f L1T11 1TVII0T The copy is correct; _ Director of the State Central Historic Record Office of the US9E. Professor V.Maksakov. CEETIFICjffiB OF THAHSLATIOK OF EXCE2PTS 0? THS ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, IQPLAS V,, hereby certify that I ar:. thoroughly conversant with, the Russian and English languages ； and the a"bove is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the atove docunent. Signature： /s/ Y. .Ka-qlan Y.KAPIAU へ h 巨 も e S h f i / ^ V , 3 (一 フ か ー ザ — （ ^-crvr- ル fo Doc, No. 2241 P r g c 1 C E R T I F I C ム T £ I, L t . Colontl し.7.KK0 G, I. a nt'nbcr of the military fcrccs of t"hc U,S»S,R., do hereby certify that cxtvect fron tVc rccord of tl-c trlk of Litvinov and Sl-i系cuitsu on Julj 20, lg^B in I oscow concerning t v c Khassrn Lake incident, on 10 sheets was delivered to mc by th; Centrrl State Fistorlcrl Rocords Office of tYc U,S 3 3.>RO on or ebout__13,.March, 1946, rnd thst the original of the srid document be found in the Central State 7igtorlc?l rccord_3 of . t. v c USSR in Moscow,, . I do further ccrtify_ /s/ T/vIANENKO Ljto, Col. T A I X N E N K O — (Signature end rsnic.j Tokyo«, Jappn June 24一 / 9 V J r n ^ ^ 丨 ③ ^ • -ふ ^ i m \ , /IX^M-^I (rf ^r>、、t^t~) ゾ ， ” 丨 j U ^ y l ^ t V P M 卜 ル 丨 ( ゼ : み し べ ド へ 、 1 M / わ ハ ？ . y U r 3 (TO-O Documm so. 1992 Affidavit of vdtndss ChGrnopvatko, the Zhassan Lake of Pebruai-y 26 A F F I D A V I T "D an eya-mtness of 1946 • % 0? THS WlTMgS INTEHEOC-ATIOH Moscow, reoraary 26, 1946^ I, military interrogator for the U i S . S i n the International Military Tribunal in lolcyo, Colonel Doliteky exsmin&d and warned of the responnilDility for false testimony under article 95 of the R.S.F.S.H. Criminal Code, the witness mentioned below, who testified: Chernopyatko Ivan Davidovitch, torn in 1914, in Voroshilovgradsky District, Kaganovitch region; rank-major, Hero of the Soviet Union, address：- Moscow, 5 Jamskoye Polye street; 19/21, flat 356. The certificate of the witness duly warnsd of the responsitility for false testimony is attached. In 1938 I was a platoon comoEnder of the 59th frontier detachment* Irom the 29-th of July to the 31-st July, took part in the "battles against the Japanese troops who attacked the Soviet frontier patrol on the Hill Zaozernaya. Some time "before the 29th of July 1938 Hot two weeks the Japanese troops seen from the Hill Zaozsrnaya to "be concentrating in this area, occupying the commanding hills where the artillery was "being mounted and other fire nests were "being "built • To my calculation by the 29th of July the Japanese had drawn up at out an infantry regiment strengthened "by artillery and mortars. There were 2 artil- lery divisions. We» Soviet frontier troops on the Soviet part of the Hill Zaozernaya, were atout 30 men* One night we heard noise and screams of women and children coining from the village Khamoki situated at the foot of the Hill Zaozemaya on the Manchurian territory^ In the morning it turned out that there were no ,暴ocal inhabitants f and the village was occupied "by the Japanese soldiers• I ず ， The Japanese carefully watched the Zaozcrnaya Hill and sent single scouts our territory. I I In the area of the Zaozernaya hill during the 18-th through the 20th of； 1938 at different times our frontier outpost guards captured two local I ? DOCUMEHT 110. 1992 Page 2 civilians vath letters from the chief of the Japanese detachment at Khunchun addressed to the Chief of the 59th frontier detachment demanding to clear all the territory of the Zaozernaya Hill including Lake Hassan, otherwise threaten- ing to occupy this Soviet territory "by force. Wa did not answer and went on guarding the state frontier, running atop the Zaozernaya Hill, staying all the time on the Soviet territory. On the 29th of July 1938 at 16,30 hours th^ Japanese troops, 100-120 men strong made a surprise attack under the cover of fog on the adjacent Soviet frontier patrol, concisting of 11 frontier guar Is. W4 heard rifle and m c h i n o - gun fire and watchad the developiLent of figlvbing. Some advance movement of the Japanese on the Soviet territory on the hill Belymyannaya, "became noticatle. The frontier guards retreated into the depth of our territory. Our rein- forcement four men strong were sent out under i;he comnand of the section comman- der Batarshin, stopped the Japanese and after that the latter retreated "beyond the State Frontier, Shortly afterwards, 5 killed and 6 wounded soldiers of the Soviet frontier guards were "brought from the hill Bezymyannaya to the place where iry patrol and I were stationed^ All of them were cut with satres and had "bullet wounds• On the night of the 31st of July 1938 I was sent on a reconnaissance party into the depth of our territory for guarding the flank and rear of our disposi- tion. Atout 12 o ! clock at night I heard noise in the grass and Japanese speech. This was on the Soviet territory 200 meters daep of the State frontier. The Japanese also caught sight of us and opened fire. In a few minutes the Japanese "batteries from the adjacent hills opened hurticane artillery and mortar fire on the Zaozernaya Hill. After a short artillery preparation the Japanese troops simultaneously "began attacking Zaozernaya Hill from all sides going deep into the Soviet territory everywhere• In the "battle, at a"bout 6 o ! clock in the morning I was "badly wounded and carried away from the "battlefield, and then evacuated to the hospital. I may testify that during the whole time of my service in the 59th frontier detachment there was not a single case of "breach of the State Soviet-fenchurian frontier "by the frontier guards of our detachment, in spite of a num"ber of pro- vocations on the part of the Japanese-Manchurian troops. Of the participants in the defence of the Kill Zaozernaya "besides Batar- shin I remember the chief of the outpost Peter Fedorovich Tereshkin from Moscow now in the rank of Lt.-Col. D O C U M M T m . 1992 Pag© 3 I have nothing els© to testify. My testimony has "been written down and read to me, to which I sign my name The Investigator of the Prosecutor at the International Military Tritunal in Tokyo• Colonel Dolitsky. CEHIIFIGATE OF IHANSLATION OF THS ABOVE DOCUMEHT: I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Bussian and English languages: and the s/bove is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. Signature：. 8/ Menshova Document No. 2149 Page 1. AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS B/ITARSHIN, .\N EYE- WITNESS OF THE KHASSAN LAKE INCIDENT OF FSBPUARY 2 6、 1946^ I, military investigator for the U.S.S.R. at the Inter- national Military Tribunal in Tokyo colonel of the Judicial Corps, Dolitski having duly warned of the responsibility for giving false evidence under art. 95 of the Criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R. examined the following witness, who stated; Batarshin-Gilfan ifctibikerovitsh born in 1914, in the Donez Basin at the Golobovski mine. Military rank-major, hero of the Soviet Union. Address: Moscow, Bolshaya Kalujskaya ulitsa 28 flat 47. k signed paper of the witness being warned of responsibil- ity for giving false evidence, is attached to the minutes of the examination. In the period 1936-38 inclusive I served as section commander of 59 frontier detachment, that guarded the section of the Manchurian Soviet state frontier which in- cluded the Lake Hassan area. From July 29 till August 12， 1938, I took part in military operations to defend the'Soviet territory against Japanese armed forces, that unexpectedly attacked the Soviet frontier patrol on hills Zaozernaya and Bezjimjannaya. Earlier on July 15, 1938， while being in the frontier patrol directly on the hill Zaozernaya I personally observed the Japanese troops concentrating in the vicinity of the Hill Zaozernaya. In the course of 10-12 days troops and guns were brought up in trucks toward the state frontier in front of hill Zaozernaya. In my estimate in this section there were con- centrated by the Japanese about 600-700 soldiers5 two Japanese Batteries were mounted on each of the two hills. To these hills shells were carried daily by soldiars; the shells were passed from hand to hand as the hills did not allow any motor transportation. At that time there were only 30 frontier guards on hill Zaozernaya. There were no other Soviet troops stationed even in the vicinity. The concentration of Japanese forces in the area of hill Zaozernaya persued the object of attacking the Soviet terri- tory 5 not only was the concentration of troops and mounting of artillery by the Japanese itself a proof of it, but the Document No. 2149 Page 2. direct declarations of the Japanese command, made through their emissaries, ？.s well. Twice during this period local Manchurians were sent to our frontier guard detachment by the Japanese command and they brought letters from the commander of the Japanese detaclirpent in which an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet frontier guards from the hill Zaozernaya was demanded. In the letters it was pointed out that hill Zaozernaya v/as to be occupied by the Japanese troops, k threat to start mili- tary operations against the Soviet troops in case they did not withdraw from hill Zaozernaya was added to it. The Soviet frontier guards did not give any reply to the demands of the Japanese Command and remained on hill Zaozernaya on their territory. On July 29, 1938, at 16 hrs. the Japanese troops suddenly- attacked a neighbouring frontier guard patrol 11 men strong. T'lsr^ were about 100 Japanese soldiers armed with rifles, raedi'um and light machine guns. Having attacked the frontier guards, the Japanese opened fire. The battle was taking place at a distance of 700 metres from u s . The commander of our outpost watched the battle and sent me with four frontier guards to help. Having taken a light machine gun, I approached the place of the battle and saw the following scene. /Ill the Soviet frontier guards were lying wounded, unable to put up resistance; whereas the Japanese, with blades drawn, slashed the wounded and tried to drag some of them away on to their territory, I immediately opened fire after which the Japanese started running towards their territory, leaving on their way corpses and wotmded frontier guards. On the battlefield I found five corpses of our frontier guards whose bodies were slashed with blades from head to foot. The other six frontier guards were badly wounded and all of them had slashed wounds. < On the night of July 31st 1938 approximately at midnight large Japanese forces attacked hill Zc.ozernaya that was guarded by our frontier guard patrol. The Soviet frontier guards had given no reasons for an armed conflict either in the abovamentioned Japanese attack against hill Bezimiannaya or in this case. Document No. 2149 Page 3. In general I don't know of a single case of trespassing the state frontier by the Soviet frontier guards during the entire period of my service in tha 59 frontier guard detachment. According to my observations the hill Zaozernaya was attacked by approxijia 'zely one infantry regimont of the Japanese forces v/ith a siraolcaneous use of art^.llery and mortar fire. At the moment of ih? sttack of the Japanese forces there were about 30 frontlcT ) l^^s^'des there was a p丄stoon of field, forces also 30 r.en strong. Until dawn ws held hill Zaozernaya. During this time we suffered losses 5 15-20 men killed and the rest wounded I per- sonally, was slightly wcuiided and remained on duty "until our •units arrived. rT e left the hill Zaozernaya at 6 o f c l o c k in the morning. A.t that time エ rrareh^d the Japanese soldiers come onto the crest of ths hill and ^ava blades. In the following daj^s the Japanese soldiers wero bv.ilding fortifications on our territory: barbed wire entanglement, artillery and machine gun defended Dosts trenches, a net of firing trenches. From .lugust 6th 1938 our units laimched an offensive and by A/ugnst 12, 1938 had driyen che Japanese off our territory and stopped on the former ntate frontisr. Of the frontier guards, who together with ms dafonded hill Zaozernaya, I remember Ivan Chernopjatko a major at present, living in Moscow and Peter Tareshkin, former chief of the frontier guard outpost, wiiose section included hill Zaozernaya. He also lives in Moscow nnd, as I have heard, has the rank of lia-utenant-colonel. I want to ac'd that in the period during which the Japanese concentrated their fci'ces tc^-a^d the hill Zaozernaya I observed that ths Jr.panose turned ths iiinafcitants out of the village of Hamoka which is situated at t'oa foot of hill Zaozernaya on the territory of Manchuria and stationed their troops in it. It was approximately between July 2 0 - 2 1 9 3 8 . I have nothing olss to st?.ts. Document No. 2149 Page 4. lly tostir.cny has oecn srittan do.-. : n r.nd read to 2ie, to v;liich I sign ny naws • G. BATnRSFIH. Military Investigator of the- Prosecution for tho U.S.S.R. at tho Intsrnc.tionc.1 Hilitary Tribunal in Tokyo • Colonel of the Judicial Corps Dolitzki C E R T I F I C A T E Moscow. February 26，194-6. I iindorGignod Eatarshin, Ghilfc.il aTdli'oukcrovlch pledge to tell the truth in ny testimony in the case of War Criminals• I an duly warned of responsibility for giving false tcsti- raony providod for 'cy Article 95 of tho Griiainal Code of the H 5 F 3 R . This certificstc is signed by me in tlio presence of Colonol of Justice Dolitzki. G . BATAR3HIS. The certificate is takon by: Colonel of Justice DOLIT^KY, liilitary Attorney for ths T Jo3H in tho Interna.tionr.l Military rri"bunal in Tokyo • I, KAPTAM, V.A., hereby certify that I an thoroushly con- versant v;ith ths liussian and Enslish languages: and tiie abovo is a ccrrsct and true translation cf tlic indicated Document. S i g n a t u r o / s / V • K a p l a n Document Ho. 2235 /i Page U.S.S.R. Uo, 185 Extract from a ^ci;.rnal of "battle actions of the S.ed Army G-enera?. Staff concerriing the incident in the Lake Hassan area in 1938. "....On July 24, 1938 at 00,25 hours the Military Council of the front reported the situation c'.n t-Le fronbier as it was on July 23, 1938 at 19,00 hours (see entry 48^/325 cf July 26, 1938) ” On July 22 a i^trnber of violations of the frontier occurred. At 08.30 hours 10 Japanese and Mancbxr-iaxis armed with a light machine-gun violated the frontier 1 kni. south of Hozrダa七waxiii; at 12.50 houru on July 22 4 men in civilian clothes violated the frontier, penetrating 50 meters deep into our territory l/2 km. nor^hweet of Diasheli Zaozernaya. Besides, the Japanese 270 men strong ^ere digging 七:renches 4 km. southeast of Tansinachan, and a group 40 men strong deployed 600 metres west of the Zaozernaya hill. In some places the population of ceri-ain inhabited points was transferred to the points deep in the territory. In the area 1 km, south of Kemurukahi (west- of a tenrporary stable arrangement for 1 0 0 horses was discovered at 18.00 hcrar钐 on July 2 2 . In the area 2 km. east of Hatuhesa a letter was fo'u l :ad demanding the with- drawal from the Zaozernaya hill and threatening wiuh serious ccraplications if the demand is not fulfilled. On July 23, during the second half of the day the Japanese concentrated in the F.efun Area nearly an infantry regiment. According to the report of the Pcs7et frontier guard de-bachmexit the Japanese during July 23 and night of July 24 concentrated on the front Zaozernaya, Kenfun, Kemurukuiii more than 3,000 Japanese troops with artillery and tanks. On July 24 at 23.10 hours the Military Council of the Far Eastern Jront reported under N 12/002881 the reccnnaissauce information on the concentration of the Japanese troops. According to the military observation "by the frontier guards on the front of Zaxechye, on the Zaozernaya hill, on the Korean and Manchoukuo territory there were about 3,800 men. The Japanese moved the popu- lation out of Homoka and Tariton. They held meetings among the population calling upon them to seize the Zaozernaya hill. A iniit of the 19th Infantry division arrived and detrained in Sisoevo at the station Zahve (Sikai) of the Uki-Ttunen railroad, July 25，1938. On July 25 at 14.25 hours the Military council of the front under N 5991 reported on a ntimber of violations of the frontier "by tjae Japanese planes in different places and at different height;. The Japanesa planes pene— tratea 丄ー 丄/2 km. deep into our territory (in the Hovo-A1ekseevka area heading toward Grodekovo) 6 km, deep (in the area 2406). Heights ニ 4， 5, 6 metres; and at 12.50 hours a plane appeared over the town of Medvezhya at the height of 9,000 metres. 33ocujnent ilo. 22Z5 Page 2 Pat a of the Uvert B in the Zaczcmaya Area.— At 3.12 July 3上，the shooting "began, grer:udes are going off on the southern slopes of Zaoserna7£'- hill: 4。〇0 hrs. ';.he battle is going on. A company of the 118th rifle reminent «vlth tanks attached thrown into an attack from the direction of PodgC'i'nrv'a. The "be.t'ialiens and a tank company of the 119th rifle regiment are concentra^ed at hill 68。8 4,20. A group stationed "between Zaozernaya and Bezyn^anrLa/a Iiilis commanded "by F-atiiic has entered, into action. Hei; Oroi^ir^^ cf CcncentratIn^； Ja^aneae。 First—一from the d:..sbrici/ of Ahopiislcanry in the direction of frontier niark 115 一一 a'"ba*btalliつn strong a:.id 10 一 12 tatiko for the purpose cf occupying hill 80.7. Second 一 一 just as rM ctig a.ppearing on the frontier "between frontier marks E7 and K8 are constructing defenses on the hills -... Situation on July ？ 2 4 , 0 0 heirs and 1, 15^3, 2.03 hours. 1. The enemy supported "by heavy artillery fire moving from the area Chisinnut 一 Seo七sin, Homoka, hill 653， 4 town of Simini at 20.00 hours seized the hills 68.S; 86^8; 64.8 (all of them northeast of the Haesan lake). 3. Hearly one enemy division is concentrated in the area of the Bezirnannaya hill, Homoka. 4. Nearly one infantry "battalion with artillery is corxcentrated in the area of the town of Sirumi, Kcnrarulmki. 5. Nearly an infantry "battalion with artillery in the area of Malaya Savelovka, south slope of the Malaya ITovaya hill. 6 . In the area of Panzan, frontier mark N2一一nearly an infantry "battalion. Arrival of the enemy infan'bry and artillery was observed at the stations of Agotch; and Sikai. Enemy armcrored trairxS kept heavy artillery fire from the area of Sikai. According to the reconnaissance information of July 31； (a) 2 i n f a n t ^ columns came out of the Pogranichnaya station on July 31， at 12.00 hours. Pro"balDly these are the units of the 8七]! infantry division, which are transferred to Dunniru (a) Infantry with artillery and tanks detrained at the stations of Sikai (Sahve) and Aodi (Agochi), strength unknown presumably new units， arriving to the north Korean ports or the units of 120th infantry divisioニ， tr'ansferred to the north, (c) m the actions the following urxits may take part on the side of the enemy; Unknown part of the 19th infanti^y division, stationed in -'ohe area of Sun-Chun, the 120th infaJitry division and new units almost a division strong, arriving from the Eorth to the Korean Dorts. Document No. 2235 Tot^J. n-omte: about 3 Battle report Army Headquarters I • infantry divisions. li II/I Yoroshilov 22.30 hours Map 11100,000 1. The enemy aooui- an i ̂ l^ntry divisions at 20.00 hour a la-it-hed an seized the hills: £4, 5; So v 8； 65,3. Received 19,30 hours A-igixal：. 1， 1938 August 8, 1938 regiment ピ trong cfi'ensxve ana at irappcri:ed ty two artillery SJeCO hours J'aly 31, 1938 Map. 1:100,000 .Battle Report of the Army Headquarters of the 1st las Sastern Fron七 at, 16. 00 hears. Lxiga^t 2, 1933. Eo. 1 the General Staff IS. 15 h. Augus b 2， 1938. The enemy more than infantry regiment (with artillery) strong stuVoornly defends the Zaozernsya hill, ano. created strong flanking artillery and machine- gun fire, in this way holdir.g up the offensive of our troops, The enemy pro*baoly plans strong defense cf the Sac^iernaya hi 13.. The enemy acts in a beguiling way not patting iuto action its entire fire power. Reconnaisance Reports M cf Yoroshilov. and 2 of the Array Headquarters Town 3y 2.00 liours, August 8，‘ 1938 and "by 20.00 hours Map 100,000 A'agust 4, 1933 Received at 11.20-11,50 houis and at 15.00 hours August 4, 1938 seen that: On uuiy infaaitry arrived to 1. According t-o the reconn8.issance 7でports it may be 30 — 31 about 800 cavalrymen and 200 uapanoae and Kanelririan Zhaohe from the area of Euiin v apparen.:;上y the^e were units of the 28th. infantry division of the S2d ca-valry regiment cf the ManciiorJcao troops. Earlier the transferring of the 8th 4th infantry regime.nts iia-d. teen observed. On A-agas J o 3 the 4 cavalry r^givAents of the 4'oh cavalry division arrived at the frontier in the area of ra:..bichzen Daalnchi . The garrison of Urnanshan consists of the t2d separata "oattalion and an art.しllery division of 3 AP. Military ctservation found that 350 infantr^en wsre deployed m Dan- "biciizhan. 500 men of the Japanese infarrbry arrived there from Mishan and deployed 300 metres from the frontier. 2. On August 2 the arrival of an infantry oattalicn, an artillery division ani 80 tracks to 3antzen wa3 obcerved. Military observatj on fcrund that a column of infantry, almost regiment strong and two cavalry squaii*ons came out oi IHinnin and marched in the soathern direction, at 16.00 hours the head of the coiumn was entering "fanoabotzi. One cavalry regiment and one infantry regiment were in Hanchuru Alnost an infantry regiment and an armoured motor detachment were in Satatxe. An infantry "battalion in Malaya Savielovka, Almost an infaritry regiment with, artillery in Kenhin Kenurukihi. A"bout two infantry regiments and an Docnunent ITo. 2235 Page 4 artillery regiment in H^xtokiisan-Zac：/ierr-^a, Hoto-sci. Tte arrival of 7 echelons with Japanese trocps a/; the station of Saiioi wâ cijc-eivei. Ad out thirty transport sfcips with military cargoes \fler© o"oserved to arrive to the Korean ports Yuki-Kashin-Seighin-G-eiizari.しcme artillery in the area of the lake "Bezimyannoe , : , southvreat of Man-- ckroisan, the Chaochi lake aiil Eomokxi. 3. rrom July 22 to July the S•しix infantry division concenorated in the area of Pogranichna^-a, Sv^o?-^!: f Silinao. The，ユ11丄七& of the knl icfantry division were otcer-Teil t d o^nceutrate in tha area Madantzin-Minan, the units of the 12th. infantry- aivibi-'n r.oiiceritrated In Duntili, a netつ：r regimsnt of the &untzulin motor l:rtgav«e a r m . o i t-here. (This inforiration rsquires verifica- tion) . Au^ast 丄七上ie. ca'xivai of 5,000 Japanese troops is c"bserved in Eannin, On AagiiGt 2, at 10.45 ho^rs tl:e movement cf 40 "banks is observed from n 7erhnya Pad caimaya" i n vh3 c.irec-', Ion of the Suifun^ka hill. 13 transport ships taking troope on boari were observed in the Ataru port. Several "transport ships sail a.t- 12,00 hour s 4 . 44 carriages arrived at the Vantsche area； 96 trucks were observed; the materials were oeing brought "b:, tracks. (p.8-10) Correct： CHIEF MILITARY PROSECUTION SEC'flOK OF THE EED ARMT CHIEF OF TEE SECR3TJSIA1 MAJOR OP JUDICIAL C0EPS. 、 /BoDovsky/ CERTIFICATE OF TRAHSLATI01； OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE D0CUM31TT: I，V. TAKKHOV, hereoy certify tha" Russian and English languages; and the of the indicated excerpts of the a'oove .I am thoroughly conversant v/ith the aoove is a correct arid true -oranslation Dc^iuiient. Signature ： / W V. ？ a r l d i o v Doc. No. 2235 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt, Col, G, I. a member of tho iiilitary forces oT the I.T.S»S,R., do ho re by certify that cxtract frori a .journal of battle s.ctions_._of, General Staff concornlng the_J.n_clc-.ont j r n. J_hc_ lako Hassan area in 1938, on 13 sheets was delivered to rao by the_ Cjiiof Military Proeocution Departnont cf the ;tGd on or about _JL3. Jlarcli, 1^46. and that the original of the said, docimont may bo found in the Chief I ；i 1 itr.rYL.i?IL9sjlcuti_on Dept, of the Ked Arni^. ェ do further cortify ^J/t^Col.. l^RAIp：M0___ J_s/_ Signaturo and rank Tok/o, Japan Juno 14 I94•会。 Doc. No. 2243 Page 1 U.S.3.R. No. 189 Extract from the record of the talk between Litvinov and Siiigenitsu cn august 7, 1938 From M. 1,1. Litvinov's Diary An Extract froii tiie Jecord of tiie Tall-c v/itli Siiigeraitsu of August 7， 1933. As エ pointed out last tine, we do not object to the redenarkation of tiiis sector. But エ call your attention to the fact, that we do not iiean tlie establisiiaierit• of a new frontier, but the rodemarlcaticn of the frontier, established by the Khunchun agreement, Tiierefore it will be useless to coriiiience this v/ork unless the recognition of the •Aliuncliun agreeraent witii the :aap and tiis protocols attached, is set as principle of it. The Copy is correct: Director of tiie State Central Historic Record Office of tiie U.3.S-R,，Professor V. ilaicsakov. C3HTIFIC“T3 OF T+.し•.了GÎ TION OF EXCSRx'TS JOCII.IENT: I, (Kaplan, V)， hereby certify that エ aバl thoroughly conversant witii the Russian and L'n^liEL IcJi^u^cs ；に d tac id a. corroct =,nd true tr^a：-lation of..the i^dic^t^d 」xcvi;î ts or t^e above docuraent a •よ Signature Kaplan V Doc. No. 2243 Page 2 From M, M, Litvinov' s Di.ary •an Extract fro,i the Kecord of tlie Palk ^ith Shigemitsu of August 7， 1938. エ point out to 3iiigeaitsu that, v/iien we speak of tiie frontier, we iaean tiie existing frontier establisiied by tlie Ktiuncliun and other a.srse.,ients and. it is tiie only frontier we can speak of, Shigeraitsu's reply is, that according to their inter- pretation of the KliunCiiun sgreenent, the Japanese party considers that the frontier before July 11 should be the one between llanchukuo and the U. S, S, H, It ;,ieans that tlie Chd.nkiiUiing iiill is a iianchurian territory. Therefore, it is desirable tiiat tiie Soviet party siiould not attack tiie Japanese troops even if CiianiciiUfing were now in tiie iiancls of the Japanese， I saj to Shigenitsu, I a.a afraid there is no use of conversing dnj, longer and we liad better discontinue the talk. •ie have siiovm ths frontier on the ^aap, Tlie 3eziruya.iinaya and Ciiankhufing M i l s are on tiie Soviet territory. '、e slia.ll defend tiie.n at any cost cind -.ve s^iall not yield an inch. If the ^uiibassador does not agres witii ue, m liad better discon- tinue the conversation. Tils copy is correct： Director of" tlie State Central historic decord Office ox the U . S . P r o f e s s o r V. lialcsalcov. C E I i T I F I U S 0 ? T:Ui::i“TI0N 0 ? JiXGLHPTS O F T E 3 „ 3 0 V S D0GU. E,i\ T T: ェ，（Kaplen，マ.、，hereby certify that I aa tiiorou^nly conversant with, tlie itussian and Sn^lisii languages ； £.nd tlie above is a correct and true translation of tiie indicated excerpts of the above docu;aent. Signature Kaplan V Doc. No. 22/ + 3 ffroia II. M. Litvinov's Diary Ail Extract froa ths Hecord of _uugust 7， Page 3 of tiie Talk with Siiigerditsu 193S. エ said to Siiigeiaitsu that エ wanted to take advantage of liis visit in order to express ..iy surprise at tiie fact that tiie •Japanese troops continued their attacks and artillery fire after he liad proposed the cessation of hostilities and エ liad replied that we would cease hostilities if tiie Japanese troops ceased their attacks and fire fro.r.i the ilancliurian side of the frontier. I said tiiat we were iTorced to counteract and even bring our aircraft into operation. ^ltJaou^li the Japanese attacks were repulsed, tils Japanese Government マ/as responsible for tiie casualties, The copy is correct: Director of the otate Central Kistoric Hecord Office of the U c o.S.R. Professor V. LLJCSAKOV. CERTIFICATE OF TrLJSLパTION OF SZGERPTS OF IEE ^BOVE DOCIMIT： I, (Kaplan, V)，hereby certify tiiat I am tiioroughly conversant with, tiie Russian and English, languages ； cind tiie above is d correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document;. Signature Kaplan V Doc # No. 223C Ta-^e From the diary of comrade M # M. Lxtvlnov Extract from the Record of the Talk with OITT r'HOiT Au し SHIGilttTSU stated that thジJapanese party has no objections to setting the treatles ccncluded by tho roprGsentauives of China and Russia as principle of tho 7/ork^ but the Japanese party understands that addi- tional documents mr.y bo subinltted to tho conmittQG, and rhey will bo con- siderod by the comnifcteo, to make its work novo succo?sxi'l, SHIGiMIT3 T J s\id that on tho wholo ho had no objoctions to leaving point 4 in the ̂ or^xon of tho Soviet party. But as to the additional docunonts, of v/hich ho spoke ̂ ho thought there were no objoctions to using thon # I strossod this only as an arguaont# Whothor tho cojnmittoo woula accept them or net, is for tho conritteo to docido. SPIIUii-ilITSU ̂ c-poated. that he has no objections to leaving the contents of tho point 4 in iti present version, but spoaking of the subnission of tho additional- docu- monts ho ropoated that ho mo ant what エ said to him last tino and that-' which results from tho contents of today's talk 0 Thus ho^ SH丄LiSk̂ iSU, thought that both parties understand this point in tho saniG way© I replied to this: n Let us hope that both parties undor3tand this point in the srune way. M Here I added that to mako it cloaror I would make this point more procise. The Hunchun a^roorient and othor docunents signed by tho ropro-^ sefitativos of ftissia anci CMna should be necesrarily considered by the conwltte^~The Japanese" and ^jnchurian party cannot say : tr Vh cannot"̂ aoc^lTTMs cr' that treaty .J 1 As to the other documents submitted by one of the parties, tho opposite party may say that she dcos not accept this or th.it document. In this lies the differ one 0 between tho nature of the agreements signed by tho raprosentatives of Russia and China and othor docunonts^ エ think エ mndo myself clear and tho Ambassador probably under- stood ne. ^HIGSMITSU answered that ho understood it in the following way： Ihe treaties and ac^eonents concluded botwoon Russia and China are set up as principlo of the corrjnittGo work^ and othor adddticnal docunents are taken into considoration—this is for the comnittco to decide in what mannor to take thain into consideration. Considering all that he stated that we had no difforoncos* The extract is correct 2 Chief of tho State Centred Historic Record Offico of tho USSR Professor i&ksakov Doc. No. 2 230 Page 1. C E R ェ F ェ C A T IS I, Lt。Coloru-1 Taranonkp^ _(]；••. .1.，. , a member of the military forcos of tha U . S . d » H . , do hereby cortify that cx^ract from Jbho rccord of the tclk betwcei'i Litvinov_ and 一 ， Slii£omitsu on Aujrust 1938 i:i Iloscov/ on 2 sheets was dGlivorod to mc by Jbho. C^ntijil. Stetglj^feoriciiA ii^cprd OfLficG on or about March 13, 1946, and that the original of the said docuncnt may ，oe found in tho CjDnt_ral State- Ilistorica 1 Hqcqi"ds O f f i c o inJ,Ioscow. ェ dc further ccrtify _ . U _ 。 i . — T A i y i l p M O / s / Signature r.nd rank Tokyo, Japan Juno 24, 1946. Doc. No. 2627 A Page 1 Er.csrpt from.. "Japan 's Hissior. in the Show a. Era y Sadao 》Var Minister Fublished by the Social Sdncation Association Next v/8 must think of a country far way, iiongoli?.. '/hat kind of a region those do.yn is Longolia 0 Is it a Ohinose territory a Russian territory or ？.n independent country 9 Perhr-.ps no one in the world cnn give a definite answer. Neither can China herself make any affirination. If pesce in East A s i a is to be an important problem th.3 v;ill of Iv-ongolia must, first of 11, be clarified. ^lapan does not v/ant such an ambig"uous ？.r̂ a as _Monpolia to exist next to her sphore of inf丄nonce ¥ongolia, Dy ^江 means, should be Llongolia of the East, a.nd she should be given indsp9nd9r.ee, peace and tranquillity. It would be out- rageous to leave her to be preyed upon by other countries. Tho ambigviousness of I ongolia 's position will be the source of troubles of the whole East. The problem of kongolic may become a f?.r greater obstacle to the proclamation of the Imperial '''ay than the Manchurian problem. Therefore, it will ba necessary to make it clear at this point, that ws have a resolute dotermination to crush any country that turns against the Imperial ''-fay Doc. No. 2627 A Page 2 C 3 R T I F I C A T 3 I, Lt.Colonal _ ^ . ， a member of the military forces of the U.S.S-R, do here- by certify that the. book ^l^ellanepus__PGpple. Literature^ ！'linao r „Bunko»_ . No.„ 5.1.6-. 1933. with Araki. Sadao'_s_ . _ article under th_e.. title of "Japan's Mission, of. Sh.owa 3ra,ll__ was taken,,from, the IlPQ.rla.L.Library,, in..,Toky_o^——— on or r.bout August 2 0 ， 194 6, and that the original of the said document raay be found in I do further certify _. . — — . .. . _ fs ' It Col Taranenko 、 TSifnntiire and rank.) Tokyo, Jspan, 2 1 August. „, . 、、ぐ.. ハし ^ ター レ ^ T ^ M ^ v ^ W ザ ^ ^ ^ ^ き 千 U S , 一 ^ M ^ H ノ 上 机 ; ^ c A d U ^ ^ f n 〜 . ^ n r ^ u J ^ w ^jUi^ J e ^ v VJL^/ t>- V o 芒 v ’ ネ y ト t & f - X .<JJ( ノ 'I 、 ' 〜 “ 一 U ^ j c ^ 了 叫 、 タ Doc. So. 2627 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, iolciclii I:S:.I3UH0, G::ief of 3ectioa 2 of t.-ie Imperial Librarj do iiereb^ certify as follows: That tl:e book described as, Title: "i.liusiiu Bunko 1 ' /Popular Library/ fro ； Volu.ie No. 56 to Volume No. 71 ^utlior and .： u'olis^sr, "S.'idlĉ i iCyoilcu I5roicai" /Social Lducation -association/ Ddts oi" ... ublicaticn, rroa uct 1931 to Jdii 1933 oi' Volu.ies: One じニse-u....elf ニiscellaニeous 57 belongs to possession of Tiie Imperial Library, ニlid ti:Qt tlxe book was loaxisa out to tx.e International I-roseoution oection, of t.xQ Headqudrters of the iupra ie Co.i.ander of the allied Powers, at tiie requsst oi" 'u: e said Iiiternatio.ial Prose cuti on o e c t i o n , 0:1 t L e 19tli o ^ y o f ^ u g a t t , 2 1 s t Y e a r o f / 1 9 4 6 / . Signed and sealed on tuis 20tl: dajr of oepteiubei', 21st Tear of SZ0^,A /19厶6/， by ooivic^ii I s n i j u r o DOCpffiNT No. 9027-A Page 1. ,: The Tokyo Mchi-Nichi" 11 March 1942 N o‘23， 5 8 8 /V SPEECH 3Y KEiNRYO SilTO CHIEF OF THS I'TLITABY AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE WAR MINISTRY。 Hot Pursuit of America and Britain, No七 to be Relaxed.-^ Internal Structure Must be Reinforced。 Major General Kenry.o Sato, Chief of the Military Af- fairs Section, War Ministry。 delivered the following speech at the Army Day commemoration lecture meeting, held from 6s30 10^ 七he Thirty-Seventh A.rmy Day, at Hibiya Public Hail, Tokyos "Recalling the Riisso - Japanese War on this anniversary of the Mukden Battle, which, together with the Battle of the Japan Sea, brought about an end to the Russo-Japanese War, I wish to express my views on ths direction of the Greater East /Vsia War and our firm belief in gaining •ultimate victory. The Time of Starting the p-jisso-Japanese War and the Initial Battie. "Generally speaking, there are two points that are most important in a war. One is to select the right time for starting war and to obtain substantial results in the initial battle. The other is to gain a complete victory in the ultimate battle which truly determines vj.ctory or defeat. irr hat required our country 7 s deepest consideration in select- ing the 'time fc?r—star ting；" the Rus so-Japanese Far was to start the war before the construction of the Siberian Rail- way was completed and befora its great transportation capa- cltjr was developed. We seized our opportunity to start the war, though we had many troublesome internal difficulties. This selection of the right tine for battle and the result- ing surprise attack against Port Arthur, the crossing of the Yalu River, the surprise landing on the Liao-tung PeninstLla and other brilliant war results, brought to nothing the Russians' operational plan to mass their army between Haicheng and Kiao-yang and to defeat one by one with a determined offensive our forces which were marching north- ward from the direction of the Korean Peninsula on the one hand and frora the Liao-tung Peninsula on the other. DOCpffiNT No. 9027-A Page 2. Opening of the Greatsr isia War, The Time and the Initial Battle. "The points which required consideration in the selection of the time for opening the Greater East Asia War were the amount of reserve war materials and the various tactical factors Tor ttie landing operations against Malaya. If there w a s n o w a y o f b r e a k i n g t h e d e a d l o c k i n the J a p a n e s e - A m e r i c a n n e g o t i a t i o n s , t.he t i m e f o r o p e n i n g t h e ？/ar w o u l d s u r e l y d e c i d e t h e f a t e o f o u r countrv., T h a t i s 5 w i t h t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e w a r , r e s e r v e w a r m a t s r i a l s w o u l d b e f a s t c o n s u m e d a n d , unless the graph of consuMption of war materials could be completely adjusted with the graph of the new production w h i c h c o u l d b e n e w l y a n d s t e a d i l y a c q u i r e d b y o p e r a t i o n s , t h e continuance of the war irould become impossible. " I f o u r c o u n t r y \reve d r a g g e d a l o n g b y A m e r i c a ' s p o l i c y of procrastination, we would have grown poorer ancl poorer and the adjustment of the consumption graph and the new production graph rendered impossible 3 thereby crippling the country, be- cause we consumed annually hundreds of thousands of tons of oil, even if the Greater East Asia マar had not been started. The other matter which was the subject of the greatest anxiety to the Hvmy and Navy in tlie initial battle was the l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t M a l a y a , I ^ n d i n g _ o p e r a t i o n s a r e seriously affected by the moon, the tide, and the monsoon. Because of these factors, December 8 was.the last opportune moment. The decision of our Ei^nire to start the Greater East XsTa'"War by seizing the opportunity in the direction of our national policy was a fsat that finds its place in the most illustrious moments of history. The Cardinal Principle of Directing the Greater 2ast A.sia V/ar. "Secondly, what will be the greatest decisive battle in the Greater East Asia War which will be comparable with the Mukden Battle and the Battle of the Japan Sea? Our Entire has already captured Singapore, the greatest of the British strategic bases in East Asia, taken possession of all the strategic bases in ths South Seas, and is now completing the occupation of Burma, whereby our military power will control the Indian Ocean. The loss of Singapore, which, together witii the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, both of which will perhaps be. occupied later by the German and the Italian Armies, forms Britain's three great key points in ths world from the standpoint of strategy and trade, is not only a serious loss to the existence of the British Empire, but places under OV.T complete control areas with important DOCpffiNT No. 9027-A Page 3. resources in China and the South Seas。 Furthermore, it will ,not be long before India and Australia fall out of the British Empire. Thus, even if the British Empire fails to collapse altogether, it will be nothing but a tributary of America. "Thus, while bringing about the collapse of the British Empire, we shall be securing and consolidating strategic bases in the Pacific against America, Meanwhile, Germany and I t a l y while pressing hard on the British rear guard line, will secure and consolidate strategic points in the Atlantic. F i n a l l y , Japan, Germany and Italy, in perfect cooperation, will employ both political and miiitary tactics to defeat Britain and ！Imerica by carrying out active operations in b o t h the Pacific and the Atlantic. What A.re the Enemies 1 Measures? "What measures will the enemies take against us? _Ajierica and Britain are placing great expectations on the Soviet- German War. They also ap'oear to be planning to consolidate tneir contacts with Soviet Russia via Africa, the Near East and the Caucasus, and also their contacts with India and China via the Near East, yath a view to smashing German and Italian spearheads, while checking cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, Then they hope to take the offensive against Japan, From what direction will this offensive come? First, they may force the Soviet Union to attack the Japanese mainland from the north, using the Maritime Provinces as their base. But it should be more than clear what the fate of Soviet territory in East へsia will be if the Soviet Union should attack Japan in cooperation with America. When t-x-Foreign Minister Hatsuoka visited Stalin in IIoscow, their conversation happened to touch on the problem of the Maritime Provinces. It is said that Stalin, holding a stick under his chin as if he were hanging himself, stressed that to lose the Maritime Provinces was to Soviet Russia like hanging herself. However, since it is always the cardinal principle of war to rely on one's own preparations, v/e have already fully prepared ourselves for any emergency. '13!he_5Sjii2nc__course _is for the enemies to attack us from the Southwestern Pariffc Tn^^arr gradually tak- m g bac'̂ T̂ Etiose s t r a t e g T c bases that have already fallen into nTrp-trnrrfltj or will be mji.-U'jifaid l>v ~ U n d e r present conditions, however, "Aug丄o—American offensive opera- 七:Ions against Japan are a very, very hard task，uril^ess— great7"commaricTer m a k e s s o c e v e r y "worTaerfui ' v e d o no.t know froirrwhere the fritHĉ r̂ atrfarclCT̂ rrnrcyr̂ さ，frGir the north or from the south, but we imist anticipate that America and DOCpffiNT No. 9027-A Page 4. Britain will seek a decisive battle with Japan in one, two, or three years after America has completed the expansion of her armaments. The Lesson of the Rurso-Japanese irT ar c " I n t h e Russo-Japanese W a r , our army g a i n e d conseci.itive victories from the beginning, Tns Russian General Kropatkin, upon being defeated at the Battle of Liaoyang' ; decided to give up Mukden and to retreat as far back as Tiehlfng, Herein lies a great lesson. If cur army had possessed a rallying force and had hbtly pursued the Russian troops after the Battle of Liaoyang, further battles would net have been fought and the war would have ended then and. there, Alas, however, the Japanese Army at that time possessed no such, rallying force and hence could not make any chase worthy of the name。 That is to say, up to the Battle of Mukden ? Japan could not com- pete with Russia in concentrating or expanding fighting power. In the light of this lessen, the best way to win the present war is to forestall and frustrate the intentions of the enemies, anc" cause their submission without fighting another Battle of Mukden or another Battle of the Japan Sea. Anglo-American Contradictions and Miscalculations k. Contradictions in American T .Var Aims "Here I wish to point out the enemies 1 contradictions an miscalculations. First, the contradictions in American war aims. Ever since the time when the Chinese Incident broke out the European Tr ar occurred and the Greater East Asia War was started, the United States, always v,ith the object of pro- tecting democracy, has been trying to fight Japan' ？5 expan- sionist policy, Hitlerism and Fascism. And yet America is now associated with the Soviet Unioru Isn't rommunism the most formidable enemy of democracy? A.side from this incon- sistency, America has adopted the defense policy of making London, Moscow and Chunking the firsセ line of her national defense and assigning to herself the role of an arsenal for supporting Britain-, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union, whereby to achieve her national policy, by offering goods in- stead of blcod, Moreovei’, uセilizing to advantage her neutral position, she is obtaining as much as she pleases of rubber, tin, tungstin and other important products from the various parts of the world, especially from East Asia, and she is making strenuous efforts to expand her armaments, in the hope of gaining the greatest vcice, nay, the highest power of command in the world when the belligerents have been finally exhausted. However, the outbreak of the Greater East へsia War 、DOCUMENT No. 9027-A Page 5. has radically upset America's defense policy. Government is being reduced to a local regime while Japan has inflicted great damage to the cut off America from the treasure islands of the South Seas j deprived her of almost all strategic points in the Pacific, and inflicted heavy losses to the American Navy. The Chungking in the interior. Allied Powers, "Thus, A.merica ? which might have gained victory by- sacrificing only materials, has no prospect of victory, nay, she will be a loser, even if she made sacrifices both in materials and human blood. The chief cause of this sad plight of America 1 s can be traced back to the question of stationing Japanese troops in special districts of China for a certain specified period of time, which was the last point in the Japanese-American negotiations„ America opposed the stationing of Japanese troops, because she was deceived by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda. Roosevelt had a great mind to please the Chinese and win their applause, Chiang Kai- Shek himself neither thought it possible to secure the com- plete evacuation of Japanese troops, nor considered it would be impossible to make peace with Japan unless complete evacu- ation was effected, ks a matter of fact, the Chungking side once intimated to Japan through a certain channel thatlit had the intention of recognizing the stationing of Japanese troops in certain specified districts of China. It follows that we must not overlook the fact that behind the greatest cause of the rupture of the Japanese-American negotiations was this stupid ambition of Roosevelt 1 s, who had been influenced by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda. B. Miscalculation of Japan's Fighting Power. "The fundamental cause of the commission of such a serious blxiridsr by American leaders may be traced, back to the fact that Japan's excessive humility toward America in her past foreign policy and othei* ma七tsrs" i n v i t e d for herself American contempt. Especially since the outbreak of the China Affair, America thought Japan had completely exhausted her national strength. "In 1936 our army formulated a national defense plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments anc 1 productive power in order to secure and develope the results of the Manchurian Incident,. As the expansion of armaments and rearmament by the European Powers were to be completed by 194-1 or 1942, we anticipated an international rrisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it neces- sary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period 1937 to 194-2, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941. In 1937, the first year of ^DOCUlENi No. 9027-A Page 6. this plan, the Lukonchiao Incident broke out. ^hat worried us m o s t was the fear that this incident might cause the break-down of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five—Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident woult* not end in a war of a11ritiorLJiQ__aiir_. sjL4e. Accordingly, ̂ ensrally ^peaking / we^ spent 40^ of_our_ budget on the Chinese Incident and もQ% OP. armam'^t In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20% on the Chinese Incident and 80艿 on the expansion of armaments, ks a result, the air force and mechanized units have been greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese .Irmy has been increased to more than three tines what it was before the China Incident. I believs that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China Affair must have perfected and expanded its fighting power. Of course, productive power of the munition industry has been expanded 70 to 80% at a rough estimate. "Besides the above-said armaments and productive power, we have separately defeated each anti-Japanese force in China and occupied the greater part of the important portions of China, and the iron ore, coal, cotton and other important defense resources obtained from these areas are now contribut- ing greatly to our fighting power. Fe have completed our estabiishinent of strategic points on the continent, in particular our troops have marched into French-Indo-China, which gave us powerful footing for the present Greater East Asia War. Furthermore, through four and a half years of the China Affair we have gained real training in actual fighting. Their intangible results are now being developed before our eyes. Sword and Abacus "According to what I heard recently frcm certain people who had been on friendly terms with American leaders, the latter seem to think that Japan's expansionist policy cannot be checked at all, that if Japanese troops once narch south- ward, it cannot be helped if the Philippines, Ifelaya and the Netherlands Indies fall into Japanese hands for a time; but that after breaking the brunt of the German attack, the Allied Powers will be able to subdue Japan very soon if they face Japan cooperatively and apply the great economic power of Britain and America, because Japan will exhaust her national strsngth more and more owing to her military advance into the Southern areas. British leaders seem to think the same. DOCpffiNT No. 9027-A Page 7. "It is very comic that they think too much of economic power. They are committing again the same mistake that they did in mistakenly j u d g i n g that Japan wou?_d be ruined economic- ally by the China A.f'fair, If a cartoonist is allowed to depict this, he will perhaps draw a picture in which 1'Iiya.moto- Musashi ,/a famous fencer of the Tolmgawa Era./ is brandishing his swor'd while underneath a clerk cf a big shop tries to check the blow with an abacus. The enemies probably realized the difference of power between a sv/ord and an abacus from the initial battles of the present war, but they must be shown by facts that their abacus is getting out of order. "The .American Navy will probably regain in two or three years what it lost in the initial battle of the war and build, in addition, more powerful warships. Aircraft, tanks and army units also will be enormously increased. However, the military training necessary for operating these arms cannot be carried out in a short time. Moreover, we have a tremendous advan- tage over America in respect to strategic positions. Analysis of Causes of the Greater East A.sia War "The wost important problem for directing the war i3 the expansion of productive power. This cannot be unrelated to the stabilization and maintenance of the people's life. We can neither fight nor produce with an empty stomach. Hence we do not ask people to work without food。 Therefore, the Army pays the greatest attention to the rice-problem and does not grudge closest rooperation in bringing back rice from the South, even though it causes much inconvenience to military operations. May, the Army thinks it a part of military opera- tions to acquire and transport rice, and is firmly determined that there shall be no dearth and unrest over the total amount of our nation's chief diet. "A.s I have already said, the enemy makes it his war aim to protect democracy, and has declared war against Japan's ideology of the coprosperity sphere, ant? against the Hitlerism of Germany. The war has taken the pattern of a purely ideo- logical war. Jit goes without saying how dangerous It is in t he^prosggut i on ofjwar country's t many adirlrers of liberalism, which is the mono"pbly "oT ！Qie enemjj, A•セ the time of the Russo-Japanese , t h e outcome of war was一 decided simply by armed force. There was no such thing as ideological war then. I'or the prosecution of war poisonous remnants of western civilization must be speedily rooted out. If we analyze the causes of the Greater East Asia War, we have thfi following domestic pfohlernS a p a r t £i-om a r m e d nlaahos: •DOCUMENT No. 9027-A Page 8. Attrition of Aircraft and Ships -- Expansion of Produc- tive Power and Snsurance of People's Life -- Exclusion of Liberalism and other Poisonous Remnants of Western Civilization. Invincible Conviction. "Since the secret of winning the Greater East Asia War lies in the solution of internal problems, we ought to pay great interest to the renovation and strengthening of our internal structure. I don't wish to touch much on internal problems here, but at the time of the crucial point in Japanese-/'i.merican negotiations last year, I felt there was no clear manifestation of a truly united national opinion, and a truly organized people's strength. Of course, I heard the voice of our people and there was no doubt about the existence of the strength of our great nation, but I felt that I could not believe in any realistic sense that this voice and strength was so united and organized as to truly propel and assist the Government and to put it into practice. In order to gain final victory and successfully build up the Greater East A.sia Coprosperity Sphere, we must conquer many difficulties. Since most of them are internal problems in the final analysis, it is most important for us to establish a national organization fully imbued with the spirit of assisting Imperial Pule by performance of our duties as subjects in order to tide over these difficulties. •A ,；Loo. Uo. 9027"- エ hereby certify that tho following copy in ^apanese is :dontical ith the article appearing in our press； ̂ o , 23538 of THE TOKIO :1エふ1エ；了;EC.HI JHL.i3U::(レited II ュっ.r. 1942 /ぬ0““ 1ア/ ふ . 丄 J T O , Ohiof of the Section of 上.丄ilitary affairs of the "ar ム‘丄 inistry, ainpaasizss tho secrets of sure victory J "«»e iiiust not relax our efforts to AOily pursue HRIT“IH and •̂ ！丄し只エレム and v^ should strengthen our interrial structure •“ I U H : 15 Oct. 19/16 /di、ふ“ 21/ /J/ director of the ゾcita I>epartraent of ^ ivUIUICHI ŜluffiXE.了 iiia‘3Hi T • 丄 m / DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 1 SECRET Hecord of the Meeting of Privy Council Held oii 3 July, 1935. Ee: A) The conclusion of an agreement "between Japan and Manchoukuo on the establishment of a Joint Scon- omic Coiiimittee, 5) The changes to "be made in the organization of the Ministry of Commrniications, The meeting of the Priry Council \va3 opened on 3 July 1335 in the preserxCG cf H l s Majesty the Ei^peroro Others present were as follows: Chairman ICHI2I Tice-Chairman FSRkiTUlU Menfbers of the Caoinet: Premisr OE/UOA Heine Minister GOTO _ STa\ r y Minister GSUMI I'ore ign rl EISOTA War n EAB.SHI Communication Miru T O 难 皿 Commerce & Indus H ii'j MA.CHIDA- Ijgi'iculii-ars & 5;OJ restry .YLM!IGaEI Overseas Min. KODAMA' Councillors: • KIIBOTA ISHII ISEIZUKA TGMII ASTMA SAKAMOTO KU10DA b:aea ISHIWA'JA SAEUIL/II EJBOTA SKIMIZU A3AI M0T0D.A. FiJJISAWA S A M I SUZUSI (Soroku) BATSSHI SUZUZI (Kantaro) The absentees: Impe r p. «1 F f え nc e s ' » Prirics XiSUEI^O Priiice ITGIIINI.IO Prince ZOTOHITO D0CUMS1® 875i Page 2 Ministersi Minister o f Finance " Ju.Sti.C9 TAJT.IFASEI omaTA K'u'SUDA UCH]:EA " E d n n a t i on 1 丨 Sailways ^KSCRl C N 'A /1 Ti-1 nfi /V 11 -J //几"TV n K!S "v /\ I CcuncillorB: KAIIE-KO. ISHIGUR0 5 IS5IEAHA, XaRIUO. /KcimeG of ctlier minor mem"bors will "b3 omitted here/ Chairman ICHIZI: The mseting will now "be opened. Our SUTDject wi]l "be the conclusion of an agreement cn the estaT,- lishmeiit of a Joint Economic Cciimiittee "between Japan ani Mancharia, We shall have the first reading, and omitting ths:. reoita"Bons we shall imme- diately hear the report of the chairman of the Investigation Committee. Esporter iRtl: Having t»een appointed jneirilDers of the Investigation Committee to study on tha subject which was referred to the Privy Council "by His Majesty the Smperor for deliberation, we held a committee meeting on the 27th of this mc-rxth, and after inquiring the Minister of State and other authorities connected v/ith the suoject t we have completed its in- vestigation® The Empire* g "basic policy toward Manchnkao is, as it has oeen declared in the Eoscrlp七 of March 1S33, cn the withdrawal 5rom the League of Hat ions and In tlie Japanese. Manchx?乞an-Agreement concluded in Sep5_. 152^3 to recogni ls airl respect MarxChukuo‘ 1 s independence and help its progress and developjuent 07 maintaining an inseparable re- lationship "between the two co-antries. It has "been the constant wxsh of the Japanese Government to adhere to this principle in taking any form of measures and to secure a strong connection with Ma-iclralruor Taerbfcy^ 'based on the article 011 the united front in the JapaDe^e--KancL'j.rian agreement, Japan has esta"b- lished the rig.it to ga/.rでison Japanese troops periiiariently in Manchukuo ancl has also f crmai military agreements with li ; jr,*. In the d-'ploma-uio field 5 it was concluded in the official docu- ments exchanged at the time of the es balDiirhruent of ths Ifenchurian Empire last March ? 七hat ？4anc?iuy,ia should submit; ? "beforehand, ail diplo- matic and military niatters to the Japanese government for thorough and unreserved deliberation, Eoworer, in coLiparjson to the military dip- lomacy, no system liae "bean established, as yei: 5 for cooperative measures in the economic field -which, playa a close and vital role in uniting the two countries. Therefore, the Japanese Government has no foraial voice D0CUKE3T 875A Page 3 in the management of the economic problems of Manchuria which have important relations with tLat of Japan, especially in the supervision of the Japanese-Manchurian joint concern having its o"bject in the im- portant industries of country; and Japan, at present, is btligei to leave i七 up to 七！xe discretion of ths Mancliurian G-overnment. This is ixo v/ay to hold an irri9*oa'ra"ble tie "betwsen the two coun- tries, nor is it Q u i t dou."bt； the way tc strengthen the economic inter- dependent relation^ of on:-: co'untries 0 As long as it is related 七o the unity of "both counorie?j 9 〕•七 is necesrsary that Japan should gain formal voice in the econoinic f:i eld an well as in the military and diplomatic fields through the of cooperative measures 'based upon an 0rgani2atj.cn， To meet this neceyBity Japan has found it well to conclude a pac*^ iA/it;h view vo osta^lishing a joint:' liistniment "be- tv/een the two corurier,, and has "been a"bio to draft concrete plans for this purpose liaving- a Japanese diploma七 in Mancii.r>ia. negotiate with that governniento The agreement of the programme is a dccument entitled; agreement "bet we an Japan /Mid Mancbolcao .on the the establishment of a Joint Economic Conunit uee if , with an f: anaei? ! giving the precise details of "ohe agreement and is a matter cf imdb：?s'jaMing concerning the con- clusion of a pact for tha establishment of a joint committee, agreed upon "by representatives p 1 enip01en0iary of "toth countries J 1 The •Tunda- mental principles of each d-apartment are as fol-lows: I • The Agreement • (1) A Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo will Tdo estaLIisheJ. permanently in Hsinking P Manchoukuo• (2) The commjt-tee yill dolj.terats on and s.nsver all questions submitted "by the Japanese and Manchurian governments on a•ニ上 irqporbant njatiers concerning the scor.'5r̂ 5.C->tie of the tvd cou-oti-las and the supei'v^i on cf laC'inoss of 土 h e tJapanesり‘-Kanclivurian Joinu special corporaision. The two goT3min : -;xvtf3 cannot setiJ e any of the ahove matters until they ha、 T e "been submit13d to the ccmm£ti;ee for deliberation. (3) If neces^aT'y-j, the committee may make "proposals to the of Japan and Manchukuo on any mabier concern- ing the rational economic uni'ficatiorx df the two countries. (4) The organisation and operation of the committee will "be prescrioed in the -annex> DOCUMENT 87 5A Page 4 (5) The agreement will go into effect on the date of signa- ture. Both Japanese anci Chinese will be the official language； and in case of a difference in the interpre- tation of the two texts, i七"will be settled according to 七 h e Japanese text. II. Annex- The fuiidatnental principle of the organization and opera- tion of ths cOiiini七‘tse vjIII be prescribed in the annex. (l) The coiru:uttee shall cons is 七 of eigli 七 members, four from each country, wnr.ch shall report 七o each other. In case of absence of any member, a proxy wil!!.?be appointed through 七 h e conference of the Japanese plenipotentiary in Manchukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo• If necessary, the two governments may appoint the same number of temporary member after a consul七a七ioru (2) The chairman 0? the coramittee will be elected by- mutual vote among the members. (He will be elected a七 every meeting.) (3) The same number of secretaries will be appointed by the tvvo governments froia among the staff members to take care of the general affairs of the coramittee. ( 4 ) All ma七七e:rs of the coramittee will be decided by a majority. The chairman has the right 七0 vote as a member ; and in case of a tie he has the right to make the decision. (5) The rulas for the proceedings in the committee will be set by the committee after abtaining approval of the two governments • エエエ• Understood matters. More*definite rules on the organization and power of the Joint ^Economic Committee will be given here in details (1) Japan's permanent members of th© coramittee shall con- sist of 七he Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, the Chief Councillor in full service at the Japanese Em- bassy in lianchulcuo, Chief cf the Kwangtung Bureau, and one member specially appointed by the government. DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 5 The Manchukuo members shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affair, Commerce and Industry, and Finance, and Head of General State Affairs• (2) The important matters to be deliberated hy 七he cornni七七ee, and are connected vrith the economies of the two govern- ments are$ the eてpor七：，impor七 and tariff problems; the development and contrc丄 of the important industries; 七he e n c i . c十 a n d . anendraent of lav/s concerning the es七a"b- lishi^ant c^ a r/pociai Jap an e s e -1'ianc hur i an Joint Corpora- tion; invê triior;'; i and other important problems ccncern- ing the eaononic connection of the two governments and are "within the power of the Manchurian Government. Those natters importれnt to the eccnomic ties of both governments but are rithi:i Japan 7 s pov/er will no七"be taken up by this conmi*t七eeu Because they will not be deliberated by the cornraittee they iTill be made into uni- lateral contracts binding only the Manchurian Government• (3) The important matters to be deliberated by the coranii:七ee concerning 七he supervision of business of the special Japanese-I.IanchurIan Joint concern include i the important amendments in xi'ie regulations of corporations, the pur- pose of which is to materialize importan七 industries con- cerned with e c o n o m c unity of both governments, and ivhich have been established according 七o 七he laws of one of two countries and more than half of whose capital has been raised "by the government, citizens, or juridical persons of the opposite gov-ernment: the disposition of 七he profit of saia corpora-uion and the recognition of the decision "to ama 1 p;ama"Ge or clisso丄ve。 As there is as ye七 no corpora•七ion established according to the Japanese law ？rith more than half of Ifeinchurian investment, the agree- ment in reality binds only the Mしnchurian ^OTeriment in this point also. Due to the existonce in the documenx of such one sided articles binding only Manchukuo, the au:しhcrities have declared, after an agreement brought forth by the ir-vc governraents^ to have this point Gep七 secret• The point is that tlie agreement aims at the' realiza七ion of a rational unification of the ocon.oin.ies of 七he two coun七rios by a full and close cooperation to strengthen porrnanently 七he economic relations according to the principles of the Ja pan -Man chulruo Agreemerit, For the purpose 七he Japanese-lfe.nchu.rian Joint Economic Conmittee has been formed, ffhenevor important econcF.ic question relating to the two countries arise, the comniittee，/vill deliberate on it and settle it* In view of the special relationship of the tv;o countries and the DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 6 assistance the comriittee will accord Japan in accomplishing her ilanchur- ian policy, the said agreement is approvable in its general principle with little or no disapproving, points in the articles. It is needless to say, such special provisions without proper application will never attain expected results^ so the authorities must give their fullest attention in enforcing the agreements. The agreement has been approved unanimously by the Investigating Cominittee with hopes that the authori- ties vrill no七 err in their enforcement and would render the best results• MOTODAt According 七o "bliis agreement, matters concerning Japan- ese -Manchurian joint concerns with more than half of capital invested by opposite party must b© deliberated by the committee. Is it proper to set th© invostnierits of both countries on an equal basis? Furthermore, the committee shall consist of , members from each country, from among whom the president is appointed by mutual election. The chairman no七 only has a right to vote but has the power of decision, acquiring for herself a tremendous power• His term, moreover, has not been set. According 七o "the inves七iga七ion report the chairman is elected at every mooting, but such matters require more definite rules or it will give rise to doubts. エ think it proper to set this rule in the agreeFient and also in the proceedings regulations. At any rate, with only the rules of agreement the question brought to the conmiii:七ee for deliberation are apt to be decidod. by the chairman alone. The agree- ment, I feel is not compls七ed on this point. May エ hear the opinions of the authorities regarding this matter? HIROTA: BY his question, I take conns el lor MOTODA. to mean that should the coinmittee consist of four members from each country Japan might be at a disadTantage in case a na七七er is decided by tho chairman. エ ask him to consider the fact that three out of the four from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one is tho Chief of General State Affairs who is, and will be, a "Jb.panese forever, I am confidents Although he is an official of Manchurian, he is 七he central organ assuming the leadership of that country. Therefore, in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries, it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan. The chairman may make the final decision at times, but we feIt it improper for him to have a permanent position, so we have adopted the system of electing the chairman a七 avery raBetinr, according to the nature of the matter to be deliberated® This point, however, may need full reconsideration when regulations for the proceedings aro enacted in the future• The result of the investigation has been reported as above• DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 7 In shorty the set up of the committee may apparently seem equal on the part of both countries^ but in reality it is no七• Such bo ing the case^ we should liko to have 七 h e agreement stand as it is despite some points "tha七 may be difTicu丄て七o iirberpre"fc« MOTODA： エ do no七 think that there, is any neod of enforcing treaty rights between the two countries t.odaj。 but not to form any agree- ment for this reason should bo a lack of prudence, If agreements are to be formed, it shou]け"be made ao as to be applicable to the nation's plans for a hiuidred years, It has been stated in the Invostigo/bion Report that the fullest at七©irfcion should be paid in enforcing the agreement., that no error should be made,, etc» I hope that the authorities v̂ rill give their full consideration to this point, which エ think comprises many- meanings • S A K A M O T O :エ agree: with the opinion of Councillor MOTODA. Aocordin^ 七o the Foreign Ministg-rTs reply 5 a Japanese is aDpoiri七ed as Chief of General State Affairs, and as he will do his duty as a Japan- ese, he v/ill no七 act against Japan Ts interest. Should ho act in favor of Japan in case of an opposition of the two countries 1 interest, he will incur the ill-feeling of the Manchukuo people• As long as he is an official of l&nchukuG^ we muct not be too sure that ne will not act against Japan T s interest. エ should like to ask the authorities ! opin- ions on this point. Furthermore^thore is no case in our country where a chairman is elected at every mec^ting« Can the authorities tell mo of such a case, if it should exist? HIROTA； エ take the question to mean that evon if he is a Japanese, tho Chief of General State Affairs must do his duty as a loyal official of Manchukuo^ and that therefore, it will be impossible for him to decide in favor of Japan Y s in七eres.t® The Chief of General S七c/bo Affairs, who is the genoral manager of the Ja^anes© officials there, is employed by the fenchoukuo Government to guide it<, He i-s an official of Manchoukuo and simu丄••匕こneously a leading instrument dis- patched by Japrtii。 therefore, must porforra both duties, and it is his primary duty to soe 七ha七 there will not b© any opposition be- tween Japan and Manchoukuo. In case the Manchoukuo nembGrs of the Comnittee should purposely scheme to act agains七 JapciriTs interest after the committee is formod P the chief of Goneral State Affairs will take proper measures after giving due consideration to the interests of both courfGries^ It will bo his duty to lead Manchukuo in sush a way that °uch fear would be unnecessary. KURITAM/L (member of Irrvesisigation Committee)s There ivas a ques- tion as to the existence of such a system of legislation in which the DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 92 chairman is elected by mutual vote from among the members. The chair- man of the Board of Directors of the League of Nations is generally elected by mutual vote at each meeting from among the members, and he acts as the temporary chairnan until the now chairman is elected. The election of 七he chairman of the Joint Economic Committee v/ill function almost in the sane manner, We are th5.nking of establishing detailed prescriptions on this point in the procedure regulations that will be set up in the noEir future. As the mcrnbors of this connnittee are formally Japan and Manchoukuo on an equal basis, we have taken this form of elec七ioxu SAKAMOTO; I feel that this coranittee is different from that of the‘League of Nations^ but エ shall not relate on that at present. The idea seems to be that there will be no mistakes because the Chief of Genoral State Affairs occupying the important position of 'lead- 1 • ing Manchuria is an official of Japaneso descent。 However, we cannot be too positive 七 h a t the present relations between Japan and Manchuria will never change forever, so I hope the authorities will put their fullest efforts in fulfilling the points stressed in the Foreign Minister T s reply. Chairman ェ C I I B ^ h As there are no more discussions, we shall omit the second reading s.nd pass on to the vote. Those in favor of this plan will plee.se stand up. (Every member stands up.) Chairman ICHIKI: The whole council has decided in favor of it. Chairman ICHIKIj； v«c shall now proceed 七o "fche changes to be made in the organization of the ！linistrv of Communication• ffo shall have the first readings and omit七ing the rocita七ion, we shall immediately hear 七 h e investigation report. Reporter WRiaUu-11 i Upon investigating the matter cf making changes in the organ:.zation of 七he Ministry of Communica七ion, which has been reforred to the Privy Council by His Majesty the Enperor for deliberation, we deem it; necessary to make the following changes• To coTnpleta the establishment; for supervising wireless electric facilities such as tolesraph, wireless telephone, and others, which havo shovrn a rorriarkable pro grass, a secretary, an engine ar- two clerks and two assistant-engineers will bo nowly appointed. To have a more strict control over the electric wire，electric equipments, and the laborers in the； engineering works^ one adninistrativG official, throe clerks, and three assistant engineers- will be added. DOCUMCOT S?5A Page 9 To take charge of 七he business affairs connected with the main- tenance of the newly ostablishod ad r route between FUKUOKh. and TAIHOKU, 0110 aviation official and two assistant engineers will be appointed. Two clerks and one assisi;a.nt ongin&er will be added as the business affairs for the purcha-'sir.g and rationing cf necessary supplies have increased wi*fch 七he progress of the coriirjnica七ion business 0 ふ clerk will be added 七o superAriRe and take charge of tho business affairs concerned with 七h3 plan of inoreasirig the non-col丄ec七:Lng and non- deliverinpr third ciasc post offices in every district® As the ordincirjr mails have greatljr increased in mimber r an engineer^ six clerks rjid two assistdnt-engitieGrs will be appointed to supervise and ma.kG plans fc: setting up nachinerdes and other estab- lishmeri七s, Ĵ 'our clerks will be appointed to intensify th© censorship of foreign mails i0 which is necessary in controlling dangerous ideologies • Nine clerks and five assistant engineers will also be added to take charge of the business ccnoernod vrith 七he maintenance of the expanding telephone business, We hereby wish, to make 七he above changes in the present organiza- tion of tho Ministry of Coramunica七ior^ The number of employees will be increased by one socretary v .one adnini, s t r at ive official- and one officer in charge of aviation,-, two engineers, twenty•—seven clerks 3 and fifteen assistant engineers,. Considering the fact that this draft for the imperial Ordinance has been drawn to make necessary increase in the employees to cope with tho increasing business affairs in the Ministry of Coirnnunicct七ion, and as we see no poin七s 七o bo con.匕：radiotod^ we believe it quite permissIblG to pass the plan as it is.， My report on our investigation is. as above• Chairman IGHI:[Ii ks there is no proposal, vre shall omit the second reading and tho rest and immediately proceoa with 七)ae vote» "those in favor of the plan please stand up? (All stand up,) Chair nan JX;iIIlI丄，. Tho whole council has decided in favor of it< The meeting wllIL-b^ adjourned for today« 、 -*—̂ (Time of adjournment-j 11:05 a^ru) Signed5 Chairaanj ICHIKI Chief Secretary^ Secretariess Kitokuro lUUPAia^I, Kyoichi. H02.1E, Suec. MUTCし Morio, DOCUMEffl? 875A Page 10 Aj;reemori七 on the Establishment of a Joint Economic Committee between Japan and Manchuria. ” •. Hoping to realize a rational unifioation of the econonies of Japan and Manchoukuo in order to strengthen permanently the economic relations now existing between the two countries 5 and deeming it; nee— cessary to have a full and close cooperation on all economic problems essential to 七 h e relationship of both countries y according to the prin- ciples of the Japan-Manchoul<:uo Agreement signed on 15 September 1932, (lb Sep七ember of ths Is七 yee.r cf Ta•七ung) the two governments have decided tc establish a Joint Econcmic Commi七"tee。 The agreement on the establishment of the said committee is as follows? Article I. A Joirt Economic Committee "between Japan and Man- choukuo will be established in Hsinking, Manchoukuo« Article II, The comnittee will deliberate on and give opinion on all questions, submitted by the Japanese and Manchurian governments^ concerning the economic tie of the two countries and 七 h e supervision of business of the Japanese-Manchurian joint special corporation. Article III- The two governments shall execute any of the above matters only after having si^mixted them to 七 h e committee for deliberation Articis IV-, If necessary, the committee may make proposals to the governmen七s of Japan and Manchoukuo on any matter concerning "uhe rational economic unification of the two countries d Article V。 The organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the annex# Article VI„ The agreement will 50 into effect on the date of signature. Both Japanese and Chinese will be the official language, and in case of a difference in the interpretation of the two 七eatts, it be settled according to th© Japanese text, Tho following have signed 七o "the agreement as proof to the above with proper authorization from their respective governments. A M E X 1 # The committee shall consist of eight members。 The govern- ments of Japan and Manchoukuo each will appoint four members and report to each other. In case of absence of a?iy member 5 a proxy may be appointed through the conference between the Japanese plenipotentiary in Manchoukuo and 七he Prime Minister of Manchoukuo• The proxy will perform his duties DOCUMENT 875A Pace 11 as a meinber. Beside the above； the two governments may appoint, if necessary, the same number of temporary members after consul七atioru 2. The chairman of the coramittee will be elected by mutual vote from among the xneniberG^ 3. Secretaries will be placed in the comnittee 七o take care of the general affairs,, The ^ame number will be appointed by the two governments from among the staff members• 4c All matters of the corrimit七ee will be decided by a majority» In case of a tie the chairman wii-1 make the decision. The chairman may join in the vote as a member. 5, The coTmittec will decide on its rulos for procedure af七or obtaining approval of the two governments o Imperial Ordinance Ncu The following changes shall be made in the organization of the Ministry of Ooinnunication "Seventeen secretaries" in Article II slmll be changed to "eighteen secretaries" "Sixteen full-time administrative officials of the Ministry of Communication 1 ' in Article Vエエ shall be changed to "seven七een full time administration officials of the Ministry of Comiminicai:ion T i "Eleven full-time officials in charge of aviation" in (2) of Article VII shall be changed to ""twelve full-time officials in charge of aviationつ n Sixty-seven engineers” in Article VIII shall be changed to "sixty-nine engineers’し "Three hundred eighteen full-time clerks" in Article IX shall be changed to t? Three hundred fcrtj^-fi^e full-time clerksバ’ "One hundred twenty-nine as sis 七 an 七一 engineers.' in Article X shall ba changed to u One hundred forty-four assistant engineers二 Supplement: This ordinance shall go into effect on and after the day of promulgation. Doc. 3Jo, 875 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. llô I.P.S, ITO. 875 Stateinerrb of Source and Authenticity I, Shuzo Jimoo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese G-overnment in tho following capacity： Private Secretary to the PresidGivb of tha Privy. t CoiyxCil w3r and that as such official I have custody of tho doeum^nu hereto attached consisting of pages, dated . Jn.ly Srd • 19 35, ani described as follows： Consideration of X.sta"blisininミ Joint Jai3anese-Manchurian Committee oil yinancia'i. Afiaira, 丄 turtiier certify that the attached record and document is an official document of tho Japanese &overnment, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following najned ministry or aepartmont (specifying also tiie file rrairfber or ciliation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Councils at tho Iirroerial Palace Ground • Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July • 1946. /s/ Shuzo Jimbo Signature of Official Private secretary to the SEAL Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe Preside it of t.io, '^riv：' Go^icll Official Capacity Statemont of Official Procurement I, Edward ？. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated witii the Gen。ral Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied ゼowerづ，and that th.3 above described documeni} was obtained "by me from the above fligned official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official "business. Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July • 1945. /s/ F.DWA3D P. MOEAOEAg HAMS Witness： /s/ William C. Prout Investigator I.P.S. Official Capacity P が Doc. Fo. 1466, Pa^e 1 rt 2. m m C T 3!R0M c o w AMBA5SAD03 AEITA ^GAKI SSISIHO WITH 1936 SHE PROBLEM OF OUTEE MONGOLIA Cuter Mongolia is a secret zone. The Czarist Regime had already stretched out its evil hand and had made this secret zone a protectorate. Silica the revolution tho Government of Soviet Hussia, has adopted th© same policy and succeeded in winning over this country. As is quite evident if we look p.t the map of Bast Asia, Outer Mongolia, is of importance from the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today "because it is the flank dcfence of the Siberian Bailroad which is a, connecting line between Soviet territory in the Far Bast and in Europe• If Outer Mongolia "bo combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition, and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed almost without fighting. Therefore, the A r i ^ aims to extend Japanese-Manehiirien power into Outer Mongolia by all n§s.ns at iianci and as its first step, to est alii ish normal. -and_conip le t c dipiomaiic relationsJbetwcen ManchukiiQ and Outer Mongolia regarding the latter as independent country, without considering Soviet Enssian will. They are furthering their work against Western Inner Mongolia, to "be e3cplaincd next, to conciliate the Outer Mongolian r a d But if Outer Mongolia should set it at nrught our moderate intentions as stated above and should invade Manchukuo with Soviet Rassia, the Irperial Army is ready to hold fast to each foot and inch of territory with firm resolution in light of the spirit of the protocol "between Japan and Manchukuo. Western Inner Mongolia(Chahar and SuiTuen Province) and the zono to the west of these are of great value for executing the continental policy- Should the said zone "be placed in the sphere of Japanese a.nd Manchurian influonce, it means that will "be a base for pacification of their "brothers of the same race in Oather Mongolia, moreover that the influence of Soviet Hussia wiiich conies rrom iiSIWci-ZIAlIG, as well as a land link "between Soviet Russia and China, will both "be blocked, fundamentally frustrating the plan of the Third Internatiohal movement against China* In a passive sense the said zono will be the shield against Coramunization of the establishment of peace and order in Manchukao. THE PROBLEM OP I F S R MOFGOLIA Part 3. of Japan. Doc* l T o, 14S6 Page 2 - ンハ ̂ rid 2o;io should net "be placed in the spliore of Jenpanese and Manchnripjx influence, "but left to np/bura.1 tendencies, it is o"bviou3 thr.t Bolshcvizr.tion will inmediatoly close in on the western frontier of Manchukao through Outer Mongolia and oinkiang district. From the above stanApoiu 七 the? Imp er ial a>rr,;y IIP.S "btson farthering ibs work with regard to ¥ostern Z.nn^v Mongolia for scleral year^• The con- ditions in the past and at pros en b are dss crimed in a sepai-to sheet. The Inpcri^l Arrny is rosolvod to further its >rork ovorcomine- all sorts of olDstacles, Document No. 14-66 Page 1 . C S R T I F I C i T E W.D.C. No. I.PoS. No. . 1466 Statement _of Source, and .luthentlcity I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connscte with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and tliat as such official I have custody of the dccunent hereto attached con- sisting of _ pa^es, dated 1935-193^, and described as follows? Manchurian Incident 一一 Reference I,Taterial and Protocol on the North China Problem rl. I further certify that the attached record and docurrient is an official docu- w e n t of tha J a p a n e s e Government, and. t h a t it is pa t of the official archives and. files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other ofi icial designation of the regular location of the docv.ment in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of August，1946. (siァnedj HaYashi 3 igna'ture of Official itnsss: Wagaharu Odo (signed) SEAL_ O f f i c i a l C a p a c i t y •Sta.te^ent .of Officiel .ProcTarerrent I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by ne from the above signed official of the Japanese Govsrnment in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Aug., 194-6 Richard L^ Larsh ^si^ned) N'il-IE Witness: J. A. Curtis (.signed.) Investj^ator._ IPS 2d Lt. M.I. “ Official Capacity D0C.751-C (P 40 of origiri&l Doc) m n 額 G AT^rr, i^chot^JO Staff Headquari 24 January, 1938 Gen. SUQIYM-iA, \'ar Miuiatei- Kenkichi IHSA, 3oran ia nda:it IT,;AITTU1T& AEMY Staff Hdiitrs, Ilv/aiituiig； Ai-iiiir, Maaciiokuo) Subject J Representation of Opinion concerning ^statlishirient of a Hew China In accordance to th.e new situation, wo here"by 3ulDiiiit to you, as per attached sheet, our opinion ir* regard tot he estatlishnent of a Uew China as seen from the standiDOint of our Army. H2C3IYZD: (Mancliukao-War Ministry Secret ： Jile Ko. 101 (27 January 1938, War Minister Secretariate STAMFSD: ( Military Affairs Section, War Ministry Perused： Y03HIDA, SHIBATA, MIYAMOTO, ELViAHIGASHI Perused tjr： Vice War Minister, U1CSZU ODAJIMA. KAVJMU3A. DOC. 751 C STHICTLY C01FIDE1OTIAI (Cover) NO.5 of 20 copies OUTLIE- 0? TIE POLICY for the H3ta"blishment of a ilew China IDAD-JJAHTIHS 0? THE ir^IITUlIG AHMY JAlT.i32, 1938 30CI3MSET 751-C OUTLILILE 0 ? T H E P O L I C Y ？OR THS E S T A B L I S H M E N T OP A 1I3DW C H I U A ( I M M A L P O L I C Y 1 # ITow that a nev/ starting point for our attitude tov/ard the National Govern— nent has "been formed "by resolution of the Cabinet Council, a definite aim has already "been given generally. Prom this point of view, we hold the uniiication of Japan and Manchukuo to "be the fundamental policy of our Bmpire, and, further- more, by cooperating~wiTh"a ziev; China v/e shall maintain the principle of progreSvS- ing towards stabilization of East Asia. At the same time, v;e must not "be stopped merely "by forms and arrangements as "belong to a centralized and unified govern- merit, but, as a first step t we must try to strengthen and connect the imluen- tial regimes existing in the various localities^ Thus, "by achieving unification through so-called adniiaistration of the local governments, w© save the Chinese people from maladininietration of a country split by factions, and from disaster of Bolshevization,—We make it a fundamental policy to carry out an adminiatration as will realize the co-prosperity of Japan and Manchukuo， especial] the strengthening of the national defence power in time of emergoncy. Ve especially must dispel any doubt as to our moral spirit of anti- coimnuiiisn aad relief af the people v/hich are desired "by our Empire. We shall acquire the friendship and. trust of the 400,000,000 Chinese people at home, and clear up suspicions and correct misconceptions held 'by the great pov/ers atooad. At the sane tine we try to destroy the National Government completely "by taking various measures. G13[ERAL OuTLTUS 07 ADMIIJISTaATION A Guide to the Eatatlishnent of a Sevr China. Although the establishnent of a new China lies ultimately in organizing a central government in Horth China, we shall respect the wishes and conven- tions of the native people exclusively and make them contribute to the pre- paration for th© fast aporoaching war with Soviet Hussia. At the saiae we shall nake then concentrate on post — war adjustment made necessary "by the Incident. Thus, it is our aain purpose to "build an ideal self-governing "body of the united provinces which will be fit for the present state of affairs endsaitatle for the demands of national defence, peace and order, and the political situation of various provinces. Especially, we shall avoid hurrying the establishment of a centralized government as a formal so-called modern nation^^dherent; to the manner of Europe and Anerica, so that we na^ not unnecessarily irritate the local r e ^ m s u We shall accomplish unifica- tion through the Bo-called administration of local governnents and endeavor to achieve our purpose. 2 . GSIFFLHAL O U T L I U E ？ O R G U I D I N G T H S ADMILTISTRATIOIT OF L O C A L OOVUSMZNTS • (a) adopt ing a positive policy, accompanied "by the military action of- the Imperial Army, we shall cause the establishment in the various provinces 〕f self-governing regimes, and at the Banc time we plan to strengthen thorough- ly each powerful regime already "born in Mongoliansiankiang etc. and to in- vigorate the Central China regine now coning into existence. Thus, we let every regime em"body national prosperity, acquiring its confidence in the I Empire tranquilly, and consequently v/e conduct the operation so as to have the 400,000,000 Chinese people cone under their own regines gladly. (*b) Although the various local regimes shall unify their course of administration according to the policy established by the central govermneirt • the SUTDstance of it shall "be limited to the mere outline. We shall have the various local regimes adopt in their administration the principle that the natives shall "be given first consideration, which is appropriate to the actual conditions of the specific localities, and. thus the extreme formalities shall "be avoided in leading th© regimes. Especially, administration with the Japanese at its nucleus is extremely inadvisable. c. The following articles shall be the comnon aim throughout the various local regimes in order to establish nev/ China and shall "be adninistered uniformly "by the proper management t according to circumstances and relative importance• 1. 3. 4. policies, 5. The establishment of national defence and public order. Stabilization of popular sentiment. Ir^roマement of national life. Adoption of anti-conmtmisitic policies and pro—Japan-ManchoJoian Intellectual movement for the exaltation of Oriental moral©• d. To each of the following articles special attention shall "be paid, in view of the extraordinary situation of the local regimes, Mongolia—Siankiang Districts As a base for invading Oater Mongolia and as a mutual "bulwark "between Japan, Manchukuo and Mongolia against comnunisin in Hingsia and its western parts, this district shall satisfy it曰 demands for national defence. At the same time we will not let this district fail to secure the resources for national defence while we have them (the people of this district) promote the esta^lishnent of new China in accordance with the development of Manchukuo• 2. UOHTH CHIHA. DISTRICT Geographically and economically, this district shall oe a "bond which unites Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time, as a stabilizing zone at Manchulaio 1 s back door, it shall specially satisfy the denanda for its national defence and public order. ^or the tine "being, we will try to find our market there in order to make it contri"bute to the expansion of the -productive power of JAFAiT and MAIレ CHUKUO, TDeaicLes we expect to secure the ？esourcesof national defence for the future. 3. C^iTR&L CHIilA. The unreasonatl© ？ J a r o p e a n and American influence, ceiiterei at Shanghai and the Yangtze River, Bhall "be driven out and vre will carry out our policy so as to try to establish the political and economic power of our Empire there• l : or the present, first consider at ion shall "be given to post-war recovery and to winning the hearts of the people• 4 . South CHIIiA. The first principle is friendship "between Japan and China and economically let it coordinate with the advance of the great powers. 3) OEGMIZATIOH 0? THS MS¥ HS-IiG. a. The new central regime shall hold sovereignty over China and "by representing China centrally undertake negotiations with foreign countries. Besides, its system shall "be something like a general united committee of China consisting of the representatives of the various local regimes, and, especially with regard to trance, economic, communication, etc. f it shall adjust the interests of the various local regimes and be responsible for the control and guidance of theiru DOG 751-C Every regime shall "be managed so that the organs concerned with the Japanese Army nay "be able adequately to lead it internally. The duty of the Japanese navy is restricted to the sea exclusively and thus in leading tho new regime we may adopt a single policy. c. In order to make tho above nentioned central control easier and more advantageous, the political system of each local regime shall have freedom in tlie management of official "bufiiness and in the adjuatnerrb of the interests among the various local regimes. Also•ケ it shall "be appropriate to the actual conditions of tho various localities^ One instance of its plan is as follov/BJ MOIGOLIJUSIA1®IMS BBGIMS. We will strengthen it on the basis of the present dttiation and extend it to Hingsia and farther west. NORTH CHIKA HBGIMS, This governs principally the inner parts of the Great Wall ani further south, the provincea of Shansi, Shantung and Hopei, respectively, Tho Literal City of Shanghai. Besides establishing a Shanghai in the north district of Chap, we shall sat up r. neutral area generally along the line of Taiiiu and its east to Chinshan and lead it under the power of the Umpire• レ CSNTRA1 CHIKA. Ono regime shall Tdo estalDliAhed along the banks of the Chongko33g # With regard to the leading of policy and economics, we shall try to achieve the purpose "by employing Japanese advisors who have a lofty- character and a wise view and fit for settling a matter properly. Also, persons of moral influence and of pro-Japanese leanings, or young men of pro-Japanese leanings ani with new ideas shall "be selected and used in each regime. The former military clique and politicians shall "b© cleared qxisq/- at one stroke and shall not "be made use of • 4 . 7IKA1JCI&L POLICY 07 THE 蘭/ SSGIMS. The financial policy of the new regime depends upon the principle of unification through the local goverments and in eyery influential local regime (Mongclia^Siankiang, UorthCHIHA, Central CHIxlA. otc) we shall establish a bank of issue with an independent system and control it properly through the central regime• 5. IOTSLLSCTUAL POLICY IH THS ITW EB&IMS. a. Inte丄丄ectual policy shall "be reduced, for instance, to such _ a unified idea as tha new ̂ principle of_ .royalty (the essential parts of its .'ut-sf,ance"~consis"t ol pro-Japanese and Manchukaan ideas, the spirit of .anti^ Bolshevism, exaltation of eastern moral's, etc. Thus, the new regime shall not fail to hold govern ^EeTHearts cf the people• d* Tho systeiLi of ulie operation of the thought policy shall be for the present, localized according speftial conditions of *the respective pro vinco of each local regime and wo unify it according to intellectual conteixt # Plasty formal unification through societies like the Hew People 1 s Society, (SHIMMDUKAl) etc. shall be strictly avoided. 6. Policy of the Kew Regime Towards Putlie Order. The new refine does not organize a systematic army under centralized control, but, a3 a principle, each local re'‘irne keeps the least numter of peace preservation units necessary for securing public peace. • But the Inner Mongolian Army shall "be strengthened as army. an expeditionary D P C . 751-C The Japanese Army sta/fcions at the spots necessary for taking counter- measures to the National Ooveriinent and for securing x»u"blic peace, and for- tification shall "be set up# 7. Policy T'ov;ards the Katicual Government. We are prepared for a thoroughly prolonged war against the ifetional Government, and wo shall speed up the various policies, while at the sane tiine w© plan the utter destruction of th© ITational Government "by taking all meas- ures such as ；politic, diplomatic, economic and so on. However> concerning the eispansion of the area of nilitary operations we carefully consider zhe n^ctoTc 8 . P O L I C Y TOWAT0S T H S 厕 C H I M Jap^m and Manchukao will support the establishment of new China ana 丄©t her assume a definite attitude. Thus in the first place we foster regimes in various localities and, Id. trying to adjust relations "between them, we promote the grov/th. of the nev/ central regime and gradually we shall come to recognize it formally. -6- *Doc. NO. 18^8 C E R T I F I C A T E I ， L t . C o l o n e l T A H A N E M O . G . I . ， a m e m b e r of tトe m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f t ^ e U . S . S . R . , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t r a t " T h e M a p of M o n g o l i a f r o m t h e C h i n e s e P o s t a l A l b u m " . o n 2 s r e e t s w a s d e l i v e r e d t o m e b y t h e L;：'.rector of t h e Moscc? 7 L e n ^ n L i - _ _ b r a r Y o n o r a b o u t Marcレ 2 0 ? 194-6, a n d tトat t r e o r i - g i n a l of t're s a i d d o c u m e n t m a y b e f o u n d i n t h e Iuoscow L e n i n L i b r a r y « I d o f u r W e r c e r t i f y I s / T A F A N E N K Q ^ S i g n a t u r e a n d r a n k ) T o k y o , J a p a n , M a r 2 2 _ . ， 1 9 4 6 C S R T ェ I _ G A T E I , L t . C o l o n e l 一 レ:於。 ニ へ ゼ . a m e m b e r o f the military forces o f the U . S . S . R . , d o h e r e - by certify that 卞は瓜“ ： : > 令 パ ン 久 メ ^ 一 二 私 し ム ^ ^ n c ^ " ハ " .’へ‘ “ < frv 一\ • レ 4>/ was delivered to me by 一 /'C ；" / i \ •： ふ J 、 位 .ア； J パ * し > ィ-•ド糾V • i n 1 on or about / , . 从 牧 . t 19L • and txiat t h e o r i g i n a l of the said docuijent -aay be found i n / / 、：',’ , 、 し “ 一-. ノ 这：ン， I do further c e r t i f y / . 办々 • z ^ t rネ^ ^— T S i ^ n a t u r e and" rank. Tokyo, Japan, _ 忽 级 ザ 多 ム 1 9 4 フ - J I I £ • 一 文*令 三 i 三 十 - 一 ， T 三 ， 5 } 三真 三 三 文 f ル 四+ 四十一 四 ナ ニ 0 + S四 + 五 « + 六 J ) 輿 i B t 郵華中 路郵各暨所局務郵省各明列 目 緦 阖 輿 I!?：；：：：：：：：：-—- 年八國民莘中 行印局總政_部通交 直鎿雀 a l k部 ttle雀拽郎 陝西雀あ邹 键黐省 托郜 螃袠省象n郎 甘 糸 ^ ? 郃 斩疆省西郎 斩钂雀束郢 東三布西南郜 朱三省塞部 朱王雀れ邹 山 束 ^ 1 6 郎 山朿省朿邰 四川渴西讣卸 四 川 ^ 朿 讣 郎 四川省西ぁ邰 ' 笨 m ' f t t f 廣 廂 廣 摩 f 古 古 古 州 南 而 而 禹 》 曲 州 柬 氽 あ 农 西 名 布 省 省 省 省 省 府 i 省 祁 邰 郎 朿 西 束 西 朿 西 本 束 s あ 南 》 バ 郎 郎 邹 邰 却 C H I N A POSTAL ALBUM sNaaWIM. IM» P O S T A L ESTABLISHMENTS A N D POSTAL ROUTES IN E A C H P R O V I N C E 書四十三 Doc, Ho. 9022 Re； Military Currency, 1941. (Connnunicrtion 1, p. 1) (1) TOP ^CiLDT Kei-ohu-Er.t su 14 ダ % To Shinhei T^K3aJCHI, Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance. Page 1. 19-7-46 16 Jrnupry 1S41 Connnunicrtioxi referring to preunrrtion of Plates for Military Currencies e v/r.nt you to urgently prepare the original pln.tes of military currencies to "be used in "certain unspecified r.reas". • "e hereby mpke this inquiry. P. S. ~ Regr.rding paxticulrrs of the preparrtions, I vould like to add for caution 1 s s-^ke that direct commxinicptions vrill be m M e v r ith your "bureau "by the officials in charge. Chief of Intendriice lure^u, Ministry. Ko. 9022 Page 2 (Communication 2, p. 1) (2) (Top Secret) Drafted 17 Januarj." 1941 Sarctionod 2ん January 194.1 From Chief of tho Head of the Head of the Financial Bureau, (TAKTUCH3)* Troasiiry Division, (YOSEIDA)* Foreign Affairs Division (SmL)** To Minister, (KAフAD/L)* Vicc-y:inist r ; (KIRCSニ)* Hoad of th.:. Archives Sz Document Division, (UJIIF)* Foad of tho ニcccuntant Division, (UI.F.KITA)* ( U H ) * Investigation (FUJITA)* Chief of tho Intondancc Buvocm. (TANIGUGHI)* (KUROGAN̂ * Sub t ioct Ccnc.;rnir]!?- Proraraticns for Printinr of Military C m T c n c y Kotos With rof^rcnco to preparations for printing of Military Curroncy No^t^s vtLich nay bo us〕d in "cortain unspocifiod a r e a s i n the futuro, TO rcccivad. on inquiiy from the Chief of the Irtondancc Bureau, T7ar Ministry, as per ？.ttachod. Sincc FC ara of the opinion that tho samo is "an:ivoidable under th:； circumstanccs, i/ould it be alright to roply to tho「ar Ministry with Craft No^ 1 and to tho Cabinet Printing Puroau Yrf/th Prrift No. 2 roquosting preparation of the original platos, following，a decision to proparo for thoir issuance0 Wc request yoisr approval, Draft No, 1 Date To C^icf of tho Intondancc Bureau, Ministry (Confidential) エ acknoulしdgc rocoipt cf roior inquiry Koi-Shu-Hc.tsu No. 14 dn.tcd 16 J v i t h rof jrcncc： tc propr.rations cf tho original plc.t:s for military currcncy notos, contents of which hcive been fully noted. Chief of the Financial EUTGCIU, Ministry cf Finrmco • * Indiccitod on original by "Han" (seal) • 躲 MHantJ net Io?iblo # Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication 2, p . 2) Tl^"：' Noo 2 Date To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau, (Confidential) In viow of tho nocoasity for the preparation of printing military currency notes, you arc requested to iiimodiately make preparations for the original plates of コ-tarjr crurrcncy notes in accordance with the design herewith attached - P.S. -- You aro also requestod to advise us as soon as the original plates aro ready and wc woiild like to add that top secrecy be maintained in regard to this subject, particularly. Chief of tho Financial Bureau. Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication 3 - p# 1) TOP SECRET Drafted 15 March 19厶1 Sanctioned 29 March 194ユ From Chief cf tho Financial Buroau, (TAK^CHI)* Head of tho Treasury r i n s i o n , (YGSHID^)* Head cf the Foreign Affairs Division. (S^AL)** Investigation (FUJI7A)* To Minister Vicc-Mir.istor (FIHCSi；) * I Head of the Archives & DocumGnt Division, (YUJI)*了 (UZK®)* Head of tho Accountant Division, (UM1KITA)* (fSFIDA)* Chief of tho Intonclancc Buroau. (TMIGUCHI)* (HAXASHI)* S u b l e t conccr^ine- ^rintinf of n Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notog, Pursuant to the docision of the ministrial confcrcnce held on 24 Januc-iy last, wo mado application to tho Cabinet Printing Bureau for the preparation of tho original plates of military curroncj^ notes which may be losod In "ccrtc.in imspocificd areas" in tho future•• 7v r o now have rcc jivod an inquiry from the Chief of tho Intcndancc Bureau, ワar Ministry, concorning the printing of the said military, notes as onclosod heroin, and ？inco wg arc of tho opinion that this is unavoid- able under tho cirWinstarcos,てマould it be alright, folioワing tha docision tc print thom, to reply to tbc Far Ministry with Drr.ft No. 1 and to request tho Gj.^inot Printing Bureau with Draft No« Tic roaaost yov.r approval ¥ Draft 如 • 1 1 April To Chief of the Intondanco Bureau, T?ar Ministry^ エ cicknowlodgG rccoipt of your inquiry Koi-Shu-Hatsu pertaining to tho manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni ft series of curroncy notos and duly noted the contonts. Chief of tho Financial Ministry of Finance• (Marrinal Note； P # S . — U p o n approval, wo would liku to send thorn dated C:S of April 1 for budgetary reasons.) * Indicated on original by w HrJi" (seal) # ** "Kan" not legible. 1941 Bureau Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication 3 - p . 2) Draft No. 2 1 April 19々1 To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau, You are requested to manufacture immediately "Ha" and "Mi" series of military currency, as follows: SSRIES Denomination "HA 5，Severs "ir.i.n Sfirios 50 Sen Note i'hou-aiicl Yen 1,000 — Thousand Zen 1,000 1 Yon Note 1,500 1,500 5 Yen Note 7,000 7,000 10 Yen Note 10；000 10,000 TOTAL 19,500 19,500 Document No. 9022 Pag-e 6 (Coimntmication U p 1 0 ) Kei-Shu-Fatsu No. 107 Communication cn Subject Conccrnirぶ？!wjfactAire of n Ha ? ? Series Ivlilitar; r Curroncv 斤ブ.os。 11 Iferch 1941 To Shinhei TAK^JGHI, Chiof of the Pinニnrial Bureau， Ministry of Finance d エ have to rccraost that you will mannfactiiTG, for tho time being, "Ha" series military* ci:rr-nc; r notes as follows: Kotos i ヽ \ Denomination rfin Dutch Language i/{ln lig丄ish Language 丨 Total Period Required ノ，へ ‘ ‘ • t/ 10、5Sieusafidr"Ten : 10 Thotts^^^YtjiT' 10,000 ？ 50 Son Note 100 : 100 200 1 Yen Note 150 : 150 300 ^Darly in 5 Yen Note 700 ！ 700 1，仰 April 1 9 a 10 Yen Note 1,000 : 1,000 2,000 TOTAL. 1,950 ； 1,950 3,900 Furthermore, roparding the ；particulars, I would like to ada that I will have the official in charge of my bureau gat into direct contact with yours to make the arrangemontsr Yasumasa KUKEHASHI, Chiof of tho Intendance Bureau, i"ar Ministryo Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication う，p, 1) TOP S ^ R U Draftsd 19 April 1941 Sanctioned 23 April 1941 (TAKEUCHI)* (•TC'SHim；)* (SATAKE)* (HCRI)* Chief of the Intondanco B'orcau， Head of the Treasury Division. Investigation (MJJITA)* Subicct ConCG.rrJ.n? No"f ifcation to C rbi^t._PrintIng Pm-ca-q for the Manufacture of ド.cur.pi.>-,。广''Ha-1 acid Scries Military Curroncy Notes, • Draft Date To Chief of tho Cabinet Printing Bureau, You arc roouostcd to arrange for tho manufacture of samples cf "Ha" and "Ki" scries military currency notes, as foliows;- Tho samplos ahova rofqrred to arc to be ordered for manufacturo simultaneously with military curroncy notes previously ordered ? Notes : Denomination " T ic. ,? Series "Ni» Series : : 5 0 Sen Note Sheets 150 Shoots : 150 j : 1 Yen Note 150 150 : : 5 Yen Note 150 150 : : 1 0 Yen Note 150 150 : : TOTAL 600 600 : CHITF CF TH3 FINANCIAL- BUREAU. * Indicated on original by "Han" (seal). Document No. 9022 Pag-e 8 (Communication 6， p» 1) MILITARY S1LBYCY Kei-Shu-Hatsu No,ん8ぅ Communication on Subject Concerning Manufacture of uEo“ Series and Increase of Bfanufacture of "Ro n 9 !y Ha n and n Ni” Ser^ec ？.ailtar^ Currency Notes, 13 September 1941 To Shinhei TAKTUCHI, Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance. You are requested to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of w Ho" series military currency not^s, preparations for which were requested Dreviously and tiie additional manufactiire of "Ro", "Ha", and "Ni n series military currency notes, as follows: P . -一In this connection, kindly note that you are at .Liberty to postpone in the meantime, the manufacture of lf I n series military currency notes now in progress and we "would liko to add that we wi丄 1 have our official in charge get in touch w5 こh yours in regard to the particulars。 1 # Re "Ho n series military currency 1* Denomination, cfaantity and value : Donomination Sheets • Pesos : ： 10 Pesos Note 2,000,000 20,000,000 : : 5 Pesos Note 1,900,000 9,500,000 : : 1 Pesos Note ム , 0 0 0 ， C O G 厶 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 : : 50 Centavos Note 5,000,000 2,500,000 : s 10 Contavos Note ]0,000,000 1,000,000 : ； 5 Centavos Note 3, coo,000 150,000 : : 1 Centavos Note 5,000,000 50,000 : : TOTAL 30,900,000 37,200,000 : 2 e Date of completion 20 October 3. Samples 300 Sheets of each denomination® Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication 6, p . 2) 2 . Re "Ni" series military currency 1 . Additdoral mamifacture of currency according to denomination, quantity -?,nd value. ： \： Units of 10 s Units of 10 : : Denomination : Thousand Sheets ； Thousand Dollars .: : 10 Dollar Note ： 2^0 ； 2,4.00 : ！ 5 Dollar Note ： ；, 220 s 1,100 : : 1 Dollar Note s 500 : 500 i : 50 Cents Note : 600 : 300 : : 10 Cents Note : 2,^00 : 24.0 : : 5 Cents Note s 600 : 30 : : 1 Cent Note : 1,600 : 16 : ： TOTAL , , 6,160 ； ^ A . 586 b,OOP i 2 . Date of Completion About one-half 30 October Remainder 10 December 3 . Samples 500 sheets of each denomination, 3 . He "Ha n series military currency. 1 . Additional manufacture of currency according to denomination, quantity and value. Document No. 9022 Pag-e 10 (Communication 6, p. 2a) 10 10 Guilders Note 5 Guilders Note 1 Guilder Note 1/2 Guilder Note 10 Cents Note 5 Cents Note 1 Cent Note T Q ^ a Units of Units of Thousand Sheets 10 Thousand Guilders 24.0 2,4-OC 220 1,100 500 500 60。 300 2,400 ZA0 600 30 1,600 16 6,160 2. Date of Completion Abotit one-half 20 November Remainder 30 December 3. Samples 500 Sheets of each denomination. k‘ Re "Ro" series military currencj^. l t Additional mamtifacture of currency according to denomination, quantity and value. Units of Units of 10 Thousand Sheets 10 Thousand Yen 10 Yen Note 55 550 5 Yen Note • 50 250 1 Yen Note 110 11.0 50 Sen Note 180 90 TOTAL 395 1,0CC 2. Date of Completion 20 November 三.Samples 500 shsets of each denomination. Yasumasa KURIKムSFI, Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War lianxstry^ Document No t 9022 Page 11 (Communication 7, p* 1) ^ , w a^mm- m • • • • . 秒 , m m - m>"mm jmm i • __ Drafted l£ September 19ノユ Sanctioned 16 September 1941 From Chief of the Financial lureau, (TAK^lC?a)* Head of the Treasury Division, (ICSFIDA.)* Head of the Foreign Affairs Division. (SAKOfflZU)* Investi£ation (i:ISI J IFARA) * (SATAK^) * (TANIGUCHI) * (KU.^iOGANE) * To Minister Vice Mrdstsr^ Head of Archives & Dc cum ants Division- ( l A M A G m ) * cpncorning^ mmf^txjre.。殳？且？：&如—“逊二圣乡过进—迎旦—^^^ S ^ i e s ^ o itaix^urr 0]；!. cv^ Notes • In regard to the manufacture cf n Ho M (new manufacture) and "Ro", ,T Ka n and "Ni li series (additional manufacture) of military currency notes which may be used in certain unspecified areas in the future, we roceivad an inouiry from the Chief of the Intendancc Pureau, r ar Ministry, as enclosed herein• Since vjo are cf the opinion that this is unavoidable under the circumstances, wouldn't it be alright to reply to tho War Ministry with Draft No, 1 m d make a request for the manufacture of these to tbe Cabinet Printing Bureau with Draft No. 2. request your approval• p m i Date: To Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War Ministry < Q acknov/J.ed)&.o receipt of voit inauiry Koi-Shu-Hatsu No.厶S5, dated 13 Se; temhor concerning the manufacture of "Fo", M R o " H a " and rf Ni 1f series military currency notes and have fully noted its contents• Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry, of Finance * Indicated on original by f 'Han M (seal) • Document Wo. 9022 Page 12 (Communication 7, p# 2) DRAFT NO . 2 Dato # Tc C 1 ief of the Cabinet Printinp Ĵ ioroau lour are requostod to manufacture ijnm。di?.tely military currency notes as per particulars in the attached sheets. In this connection, Ke would like to add that you handle it with top socrocy # Chief of tho Finnncial Bureau Document Wo. 9022 Page 13 o c c o o o c o o o o 090(00009 ， , ， ， ， ， , ， 21450 3 50 1 3 Yen Note Yen Note Yen Note Sor Note Son Note Son Nots Sen Noto TOTAL "Ni" Series 10 Ion Moto 5 Yon Note 1 Yen Noto 50 Son Noto 10 Son Note 5 Sen Note 1 Son Koto TGTAI, (Communication 7, p . 3) (Unit • One Thousand Sheets) One Thousand Yen ) I T ^ S LIST ^ ^ ^ ： Q L NGTIiS TC BE L!k?IUF^CTURED Apoiint^ Ifeinufacture s Recuirod ^guantity <?： Date ...M^Jife yalue ^20 Oct ^nd Get 20 Nov 10, Doc End, (It has ].'9Gn decidod to call the " K c s o r i o s Notes to be ncv/ly manufactured by the C fJ .binet Printing Buroau as "No, 3 Notes") 00000000 ひ 5CV5 o 1 2 , , ， 9 , ， o 9 A - 2 1 7 2 3 000 90c 000 00c occ 000 000 900 2, 1 , Uy 5, 10, 3， 5, 30, 00000000 ( y o c o ム ？ 5 タ，*\ ラ ? . 1 ooocoooo 42^00006 , ， , ， e \ , ， ， 2 2 5 6 A - c 6 1 2 1 6 0 5 1 c o 5 1 1 5 o c o o o o o o o b c o o 21500008 ， ， ， ， ， c\，， 1 1 2 ? - 2 38 o 1 3 o o o o c o o c o c o 2150000s 1 1 2 3 2 rtc o 1 3 nR c M Series 10 Yen Note 5 Yen Note 1 Yen Note 50 Son Note Note Note Note Noto Note Note Note . • I . o c o o o o o o 5 5 18 1 1 TOTiiL 3,950 10,0C0 3,950 TOTAL 61,600 4.5,860 - - 30,800 • 30,800 Document Kc f 9022 Page l/ f (Communication 7, p« U) "Ha" Series o o OQ 0000 5 5 1 Q ^ , ， , 5 2 1 0000 50 0 5 5 18 ， 1 1 200 c o o o o o .00 o o o c 15 0 0 1 1 2 0 - 2 3 8 1 1,200 1,100 2,500 3,00C 12,000 3,000 S，000 00C 000 oco 000 400 ?on 160 11 5 3 2 0000000 o ^ c o o o o 42000 ， ， ， ， ， 0 \ 2 2 5 6 / 4 6 f 2 1 10 Yen 5 Yon 1 Yen 50 Sen 10 Sen 5 Sen 1 Son GRAND TOTAL 158,050 138,920 30,900 30,800 34., 750 30,?00 30,800 Document No. 9022 Pag-e 15 Currency (Japanese coin (Communication 8, p . 1) MILITARY S^Ca^T (OZAWA)* (ARMY)* Koi-Shu-Hatsu No. 54-7 INQUIRY P«RTAINING TO K}R^?.DING CF fflllTAP.Y CURRENCY 15 October 1941 To Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministrj. of Finance Please be advis ad that jou aro rooucstod to forward, for the time being, tho following of tho military currencies which havo previously bean ordered for manufacture, As to particulars of transportation, we would liko to add that we will have our officials in charge contact you. I . Series and donorainations of Militarv,GtfrrGnciGS< 1 , "Ni" Series Military Currency 10 Dollars Note 5 Dollars Woto 1 Dollar Noto 50 Cents Noto Total 2,100,000 Dollars 1,050,000 Dollars 4-50,000 Dollars 500,00C Dollars ^,100,0CC Dollars II. Destination The Bank of Japan, Shanghai Agency. III. Time to arrive By 22 October Chief of the Intcndancc Bureau War Ministry * Indicated on original by "Run" (seal). al Auxiliary 10 Son 5 Son 1 Son Tot 2 000 Yen 500 Yen 800 Yen 300 Yon 9 . ， 2 1 1 U ， r^c 3, .ut ”o,、r‘022 Page 16 (Cへ‘iinrujdc. t.5_oi•丄 9，p., 1) TOP ST^Rマ Drafted 22 Ccxoljcr 19.41 Sanctioned 31 October 1.941 From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKEUCHI)* Head of the Treasury Division, (YDSHIDA)* Acting Head cf the Foreign Affairs Division (AI)* Investigation (NI3KIMKA)* To I/iinistur, (TAWICUCI-D )-：：- Vice-BIinistsr, Head of the Archives &. Documents Division, (IAMGIWA)* Head of the Accountant Division, (OTSUKA)* Chief of the Financial Eureau (KIITCHI)* (KUBOGANE)* Chief of tbo Earning Eureau (AT.DA)* (AEKI)* (HAYASKI)* Chief of the なcahnge Bureau (HARi^GUCHl)* (S^AL)** (NAKAI1QRA)* Supariutendant-Qf the Bank of Japan (KISBI)* (WODA)* (HARA)* Prime ffinistor, iTOJO)* ) War Minister, (4oJG)* I Vice-Ministor/ (KII-HJILl)* Acting Chief cf the. Military Affairs Pureau (SANADA)* C ノHead of tho Military Affairs Section, ( S A M M ) * \ ノ Acting Chief of the Intendance Bureau^ (；細)* Head of the エntend&nce Section, (tNCO；* (KURIBASHI)* Navy Minister, (SHIM/IDA)* Vice Minister, (SA'^KTO)* Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, (OKAK^E)* Head of the 1st Section (TAKADA, TCSHITAi'IE)* Chief of the Intendance Bureau (S狐)** Head of the 1st Section (FUKUOKA)* * Indicated on original by "Han" (saal) ** "Han" not legible. Document No. 14-66 Page 1. (Communication 9, p . 2} Chief of the Intendance Bureau Head of the No. 1 Division SUBJECT P TO JSim CF ？江 L I U C U R卿 C Y NOTES IN Considerinp' the oventrality of carrying out a military operation in the sc”t,h rrn it is deomed necessary to issue military currencjT- notes in foreign concminations for the purpose cf affording the convenience to_defrav the war_expenditures o土 i e forces• I _ It is, therefore, desired tc carry into effect the issuance of militaiy currency notes as enclosed "by the Prime Minister, the Ministar of Finance ? the the Minister. We request your approval• OI^T.INS F3R THE ISSUil恥を O F H I ? ^ CURR^ TCY NOTES 1 . Military currency not 丨s in foreign donominations are to "be issued for the purpose of affording the convGnionces to defray war expenditures in consideration cf tho eventuality of carrying out a military operation in the southern regions 0 2 . The mi?ite.ry currency notes are to be exchangeable with Japanese ) currcncy, v^here necessary 6 the outJ-ine for herein upon approval War Minister and ?>, The mode of at a corforencG Navy Minister。 procedures of the preceding Articles shall be determined of the r'inistor of Finance, the War Minister and the Document F©, Pa^e IS (Conmunication 10, p. 1) TOF SiXTで DFAFT^D 22 October 1941 SAKCTIO ド;® ？1 October 19 ん 1- From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKSQCKI)* Head of the Treasurer Division, (3DSEIM)* Acting Head of the Foreign Affairs Division, (AI)* Investigation, (FISFIH^RA)* To Minister 7ice-Ministor, (TANIGtTCI了I)* Head of the Archives & Document Division, (YAMilGm)* Head of the Accountant Division, (GTSUKA)* (KURDGANE)* Chief of the Financial Btireau, (KIUCHl)* ( U ^ ) * Chief of the Banking Bureau, “IDA)* Chief of tho T iccbanee Fiu-eau, (FARAGUGHl)* Superintondant of the Bank of Japan, (KIPHI)* (NAKAJfJHA)* (HA^ASHI)* (HAPJk)* Minister, (TOJO)* Vice-Ministar, (KIMUilA)* Acting Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, (SANAM)* Head of tho Military Affairs Section, (SANAm)* Chief of the Intendanco Bureau, (/WDO)* (KUHIBASHI)* Head of the Intondance Section, ( ^ 1 0 ) * N a v y Minister, ( S F I E ^ D A ) * Vice-Minister ( S A V ^ n O T O ) * / Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, (OKAOI)* / Head of the 1st Section, (TAKA.m TOSKIT^I^)* Chief of tho Intendance Bureau, (S”AL)** Head of the 1st Section, (INAOKJ.)* SUBJECT F STAINING TO INSTITUTION OF FOR HANDLING M3XITARY CUHP.^ICY N O T ^ IN P Q R ^ G N r^ICBaFATXCNS FOR THマ S O U T H S RTTIONS. In consideration of tho eventuality of carrying out operations in the Sonth Seas area, tb.3 policy in regard to the -vatter of issuing mx.litarv ciurency notes of foroign denominations for the purpose of affording the convenience of defraying the military oxcenditures of the said forces is to have the outline for the issuance of military I - currency notes decided hマ tha PrimA M-in-i st-ar. the Finance Minister, '"ar Minister and tho Wavv Minister and have it carried out, Dut woulc? it ho alright to establish a procedure for the handlirg of military currcncy notes of foreign denominations for th.e southern areas, as onclosod herein, after tho above has been decided. Further- more, it is desired that this matter bo substitutad at the conference with the 7"ar Minis tor and the Navy Minister as stipulr.tod in Articlo 3 of the outline for the issuance of military currency notes, After the abovo has been docidcd, would it be alright to notify tha rospGCtive runrtcrs concerned v:ith the following plan? fJe apain seek for your approval. * Indicated on original by "Han" (saal). ** "Han" net legible. Document Wo. 9022 Page 19 (Comrau-nication 10, p # 2) PSDGZDU?^ FCR I^ANiXIFr； MILITAa：： C U H R ^ C Y NOT^S IN F O R H G N E'HOrarMTICNS K R SCUT”RN RT:I0NS. ARTICLE 1 . iiRTlCL^ 2 . Fcr tho purpose of affording the convenienco of defraying tho war expenditures in tho areas of military operations in the South, tho government shall issue m i l i t a r y currency notes in fcroign doncmin^ticns within the scopc cf tho budget• The military currency nctos mantionod in tho precoding article shall bo callod Military Curroncy Notes of 1941 (hereinafter briefly callcd Foreign Currency Military Notes) and thoir donomirations shall be as follows: Guidon Military Notes 3 Dollar Mi/itary Notqs, Peso Military Notos, 7 denominations - 10 Guldens, 5 Guldens, 1 Guidon, 1/2 Guidon, 10 Cents, 5 Cents & 1 cont. 7 denominations - 10 Dollars, 5 Dollars, 1 Dcll-r, 50 Cents, 10 Conts, 5 Cents & 1 Cent. 7 denominations - 10 Poses, 5 Pesos, 1 Feso, 50 Centavos, 10 Gontavcs, 5 Contavcs & 1 Centavo, ARTICIT. The Chief cf the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance, with tho approval of tho approval of tho Minister of Financc, shall at any time when nccessary dotermine the denomination , amount and Deriod of manufactura of foreign curroncy military notes and shall advise the Cabinet Printing Bureau of the same. ARTICL"? “ Tho Cabinet Prirting Bureau, following、completion of the monufacturG of foreign crurroncy military notes, shall inform to Chief of tho Financial Bureau, Ministry cf Financo, thoir denominations and amount• ARTICL'" 5# Tho Chief cf the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance> upon recoipt of tho advice mentioned in the preceding article from tho Cabinet Printing Bureau, shall diroct the said bureau to deliver the foreign curroncy military notes to. the Bank of Japan and shall also take steps to instruct tfic said Bank to rocoivc tho samc» Docimcnt No. 9022 Page 20 (Comuiiiaicc.tion lu, p . 3} ARTICLE 6. The Bank cf Japan, upon receipt of the foreign currcncy militiiiy notos in ccccrdanco with tho provisions of the procoding 1 Articlo, shall accopt the same as specific deposits and shall dispose cf them under tho category amount of military notes issued in the general lodger of Gcvommont funds• However, thq amount acccptod for the said specific deposits shall bo as indicated in the at- tached tabic # 、. ARTICL”’ 7» ’Sion tho War Ministir _or Navy Ministry desiros t tc have parents of forcTgn currency military nctos, she；Jshall give previous notico tc tho Ministry of finance in regard to their amount, denomination, quantity and date. Tho I' T inistry of Financs upon rcccipt cf the notica of tho prccoding provision from tho War Ministry or tho Nっvy Ministry, shall immcdiatoly advise the Bank of Japan to that offcct» ARTICI.ア 8 # When delivGr:ゾ of foreign currency military notes are necessary to advance funds to tho funds advancing official, tho disbursing official of tho War or Nこvy Ministry shall attach to the choquo ho issue, a statomont of items showing the denominations and quantity of the foreign curroncy military notes• However, the amount to bo issued shall depend on tho retained value of the specific deposits• Tho fcrogoing provision shall also apply tc eases whore tho fund advancing official of the War or Nnvy Ministry, desiring to draw out its dopositcd funds, requires tho delivory of foreign currency military notes• AIiTICL r 9 . The Bank of Jap-an shall prepare a 1941 account book for Military Currency Notes and shall report the amount of receipts and disbursoncnts to the Ministry of Finance each time such transaction is made® The Bank of Japan shall report to the Ministry cf Finance tho balances of foreign currency military notos according to th:ir denominations at tho ond of oach month• ARTICLE 10. The procodurcs of payment find oxchango cf foreign cuiTcncy military notes shall be provided for separately® Doon.nent :To« 9022 Page 21 Series 10 Guldens M 5 Guldsns ?i 1 Gulden 1/2 Gulden »t 10 Cents 5 Cents 1 C^nt Series 10 Dollars n 5 Dollars « 1 Dollar t» 50 Cents tt 10 Cents 5 Cents 1 Can七 Series 10 Pesos 5 Pesos ” 1 Peso ti 50 Cen七avos it 10 C 3n七avos ,t 5 Centavos tt 1 Cen七aTO (CoTnmunication 10, p . 4) Attached chart. AH0J1 T T OF 'nX.ITARY CURRENCY TO 3E DEPOSITED BI TQS SPEC IFIC DEPOSITS FOR 1941 Distinction as pe：" Ssiiso Denomination in Foreign Accepting Value Ourrencv 10 Yen 5 Yen 1 Yen 50 Sen 10 Sen 5 Sen 1 Sen 10 Yen 5 Yen 1 Yen 50 Sen 10 Sen 5 Sen 1 Sen 10 Yen 5 Yen 1 Yan 50 Sen 10 Sen 5 Sen 1 Sen Ooquttb^ No. 9022 Page 22 (Coramunication 10, p. 5) DRAFT NO, J. Date To War Minister,) Navy Minister,)' Respectively エ hereby would like to inform you that procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions have been instituted as enclosed herein• Minister of Finance DRAFT NO, 2 Date To The Bank of Japan, Since procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations have now been prescribed, your attention is invited there七〇• Minister of Finance Doci^ont No。 9022 Page 23 (Cormaunica七ion 10, p # 6) DRAFT NO, 3 Data To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau- I, acting on orders, am hereby informing you that the Froceduros for handling i/Iilitarj" Curroncy Notes in Foreign Denominations for Sou七hern Regions Y.ave been instituted as enclossd heroin„ Chief of Financial Bureau DRAFT NO. 4 1 November 1941 To financial Gcmmissioncr at Shanghai ) 七."！ “ 3/iIiilTA, Secretary at Kwan^tung ) しム"‘ ^ エ con hereby inforaing you 七ha七 the "Outline for the Issuance of Military Currency Notes" and the "Procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions” have now been decided as enclosed herein• Chiof of Financial Bureau £々 .？t〕rueuて oi' ccurce and Authenticity I Sueo YA. J:rOUCRj； , hereby certify- that I am officially cor-nected with tlie Jspar.ese Government in the following ca^ccity: ‘ ‘ e^iber of Liaison Off i c.a, In^erial Finance ViristiT and thct as suc.h official エ have custody of the file of correspondence hereto atte.ched (being I.^.v 0 . Documerrt Ko & 9022A) corsistirg of ten co^vvMnicetiors, fritter between the dctes of 1 January 19^1 amd一31 October 19厶1 concerning the making of vlates for the ri^ntirg of r,Dlitarv currercy for use .̂n occupied territories and :r>strnctjor>.s reletirg to the use of such currency. I further certify th r : t the Tiers co可-rising this file h£、,e been extracted from the offj cia], les of the Finrnce of the Japanese Goverrmer.t and し r e ^art of the of r 5c?al archives erd files of thどt J;5nistry. Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of Oct, .19^6• .. /s/ Sueo Y.v - ；-I:CHI r ir nature of Official fEAL L-ember, Liaison Office witness: As/ Richard H Ltrsh F i i iこ n q ^ L i j ^ i l S l ™ „ Investigator, IPS Offfciai Capacity ‘ Stetenient of Official rroci?r^« v .eLit I, lichu rd H« Larsh 一 ) hereザ cai tify thr.t I am associated witli the Gererel Headqiiarters of the Supreme Ccr*H^:id3フ foi* the Allied ？orers, and 十上と,t the k bove described document res obteiued by n e fro'T. the rbove signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official bus:less. Signed こ,t Tokyo or this 10th dry of October 一 一 , 19A6 Is/ Richard H . Lar,sh - E Witness：_(s( J. I . Curtis Investjgしtor, I^S 秦 Official Gs^acity 昭和九年三月調製 2ADE iz MA73CH 一 . J o o iそ 關 東 廳 PART OF I 一：\w ト r A 1 A 60 S c u U I ： 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 ニ之分万十 i t百ニ尺縮 100 go 1 M A P OF MANCHURIA 昭和十年二月調製 M A D W ー 2 Dmc印2BTE为 3 3 の 關東局 O T U ^ f n A U O f T H E X W 5 T U 5 K - z o m . Doc. No, 175厶 1 C Z R T I j Z I C ^ T ^ I, SokicLi エ:iZIGUHC， Cnisf or Section II of the Imperial Librarjr, do ニereby certify as follows: Tna t tiie bo oil d e s c r i b e d as, Title： 'Map of Iluiiĉ iukuo" _ふut:二or and i ublisier, Govern- ient- G-.-^eral P u b l i s h e d in tiie 9t-ii Yeしr of。：::。、.ぬ /1934/ ^a iber of oiieets : Oae 672 Cdse-siiolf iio. ~6 9 baloii-jS to t‘丄 possession of Tlie Lipericil Library, . し,-'.and. .that" t!ae.'Ijoa.c v^.atloanarl^out .to t.ュ& ••.エニteâ iaticxual i-rosecution Section, of tiie General ±isaclquurters of tiie oupre^ie Coiiiander for the -allied rovrers, at tiie request or tLe' said International Prosecution J r jCtiO-i, 011 t L e 24tii d a y of H a y , 2 1 s t Y e a r of 励.,“ /1S46/. Signed and sealed on tlx is 20t し day of oc.tte.iber, 21st Year of SZO'L. /19U6/ b^ Sokiciii Isl.i^uro DOC 9016 Page 1 SECRETARIATE SECRET B !、p • 8I4I-3 1 November 1941 To the Baric of japan f The procedures in dealing with the military currency expressed in southern region fore ign currency have been prescribed as under and shall accordingly be pursued• Okinobu KA.YA Minister of Finance • M i n i s t e r • . Seal • procedures in dealing with the military currency expressed in southern region foreign currency. ARTICLE 1--The Government, for the convenience of defraying the m r expen- diture in the southern region under rar operations, shall issue the TOr-notes expressed in foreign currency within the scope of the budget• ARTICLE 2--The war-notes mentioned in the preceding Article shall be named military currency for 1941 (hereinafter briefly called Foreign Military currency) and be sorted as follows： Gulden War-notes Dollar 膽r-iptes peso War-notes 10 Guldens. 5 Guldens f 1 Gulden t 1/2 Gulden, 10 Cents, 5 Cents and 1 C e n t « 7 sorts• 10 Doliars• 5 Dollars t 1 Dollar, 5° Cents• 10 cents, 5 Cents, and 1 C e n t — 7 sorts• 10 pesos, 5 ！Pesos, 1 Peso, Oentavcs, 10 Centavos f 5 Centavos end 1 Centavc « 7 sorts. ARTICLE ^ — T h e president of Finencial Fsnagement Bureau of the Ministry of Finance through sanction of the Minister of Finance, shall at any time determine the sorts, number, and period of maroifacture of the foreign military currency and, shall advise the Cabinet print ing Bureau of the same. ARTICLE ^ T h e Cabinet Printing Bureau» following completion of manufacture of the foreign military currency, shall inform the President of Financial management Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of their sorts and number• DOC 9016 Page 2 jOTICLE 5--The president of Financial MBnagement Bureau of the Ministry cf Finance, upon receipt of the advice mentioned in the precediiig Article ftrom the Cabinet Printing Bureau* shall dircct the said bureau to deliver the foreign military currency to the Bank of japan and'shall also take procedures for instructing the said baiik for receiving the same. ARTICLE 6 — T h e Bank of Japan, upon receipt of the foreign military currency in pursuance of the provisions of the preceding Article t shall accept the same as a separate deposit and shall settle it under the item "amount of issuance of the war-notes" in the items of the combined ledger of the Treasury• provided that the acceptance value cf the said separate deposits shall be in accordance with the appended table. ARTICLE 2華-^en the Ministry of War or the Ministry of Navy intends to receive payment of the foreign icilitary currency, it shall give previous notice to the Ministry of Finance of their amount, sorts, number• end time. The Ministry of Finance, upon receipt from the Ministry of War or of NSavy of the notice of preceding provision, shall immedia- tely advise the Bank of Japan to the same effect. ARTICLE 8 — w h e n the disbursing official of the Ministry of War or of the N&vy must deliver military currency in case he wishes to advance funds to the fund-advancing official, he shall attach to the cheque he issues, a statement of it eras showing sorts and number of the foreign military currency, and the value so defrayed shall be in accordGiice with the velue of the balance in the special account• The foregoing provision shall also apply to the case where the funds-advancing official of the Ministry of ？fer or the Ministry of igavy intending to withdraw its deposit funds, requires de- livery of the foreign military currency. •ARTICLE -The Bank of japan shall prepare an account book of receipts and disbursements of military currency for 1941 and shall each time report to the Ministry of Finance the amount of receipts and disbursements. The Bank of Japan shall also report to the Minis- try of Finance the balances of the foreign currency m r - n c t e s in distinction of their sorts at the end of each month• ARTICLE 1 0 — T h e methods of making payment and epcchange of the foreign currency vi/ar-notes shsll be separately prescribed. DOC 9016 Page 3 i P F E K D K T/iBLE _ acceptina Value of Specific Deposits of yar-notes for 19hl Circulating Regions Distinction Value Expressed Acceptence a s per Jtorms in ibreign Value C ^ r e n c y Netherlands Bast India N o . EL ( 1 £ ) 10 Guldens 5 - 1 » 1/2 « 10 Oents 5 Cents 10 Yen 5 " 1 • 50 Sen 10 • 5 “ British 购 l a y , British Borneo & Hiailand N D . m (1=) 10 Dollars, n 5 » « 1 " . n 5 ° C5ents ン » 10 " n 5 “ 10 Ye n 5 " 1 « 50 Sen 1 0 “ 5 " Philippines N o . HO (1 i ) 10 pesos 10 Yen “ 5 « 5 » » 1 • 1 • " 50 Centavos 50 Sen » 10 » 10 • • 5 • 5 “ D0CUM5: T ro. 9016 . U^； C E R ? I ? I C A ? 3 ^ . D . C , i;o. 一 I-P.S. I:o. 9 0 1 3 W M Z of Source _8nd Authenticity I, Otoe Fuji! hereby certify that. I am officially connected rith the Bank of Japan in the follow:，.ng capacity: Chief of Treasury D e p 1 1 . and that ag such o:»?3?iaial I have cii?, fc' dy of tlie Accujaenfc hereto attaciied consisting of 6 "oa^es ? dated :: r ov. .1941. and desorioed e-o follows: "Proedures in connect,ion. \rith Military curren cy in Soutixern areasi ,? t "Topsecret," signed "by Mr。 Okinolru Kaya., Minister 01 finance # I further certify tliat the a^tachea record and ..iocumsnt is an official doeumeiifc, e,tid. that it is part of the official archives ani files of the Bank of Japan. Signed at Tokyo on this 24 iay of June, 1946. /s/ 0 . Pujii Signature of Official Witness： /s/ T. Kakajiina ( ) Cffioiai Capacity Statement of Of.floral ？i’c.ci::、sment I,冗iward Monogiian,, hereby certify that I an a-srociated with the General Haadquat'ters of the Cozuia^fer for tb.ろ.Allied Pov/ers, and that tlie a"bove desori'oed document- •ぶas o"l")taiii<rd lue irom the a'oove signed official of the Bank of Japan in tlie conduct of my official business # 〜 Signed at Tolcyo 011 this 24 day of June, 1945, /s/ Edward P。Monoghan FAf^i InYe^ti^ator Witness: /s/ A , H . Gcyce Official Capacity I.PcS. Doc- Ho. 1505 ！fOUYO GAZETIB A Monthly Seport of Curreat Policiss Official Statements end St».tietice Volume III !o。1 July, 1939 D«spu.tcdl B o r d e r A r e a NJVln&re Sowi&t J a p a n e s e troops ‘ clashed recent/グ fon<,w,nr いolatらn of the ManeKoulf«0 frontier by O^tcr-- Mongolian C o m m u n i s t troops s s/
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Image provided for research and reference use only. Permission to publish, copy, or otherwise use these images must be obtained from Rare Books and Special Collections http://rbsc.library.ubc.ca
University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections
Ex.842-854. Japanese actions in Manchuria and strategies for Mongolia
Text