AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
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X № ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ от СОЮЗА ССР в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио DOC N0 U.S.S.R. N0 150-2 REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF BARRACK CAPACITY IN KOREA IN THE PERIOD FROM 1931 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH THREE MAPS IN TWO COPIES. I CO REPORT on the Increase of the Barrack facilities in Korea from 1931 to 194-5. By the time of the occupation of Manchuria the total billeting capacity of the barrack facilities of the Japanese troops in Korea was for two infantry divisions with support units. The barracks and the military settlements were as a rule situated in big towns of the country: Seul, Kheijo, Ranan, and Tsinkai. After Manchuria had been occupied by Japan, a rapid increase of the barrack facilities in Korea began to show itself, and barracks and even whole military settlements were built as a rule in Northern Korea, mainly on the areas bordering with the U.S.S.R. From 1931 to 1941 the barrack facilities in Korea increased more than three times with capacity of seven infantry division could have been billeted there, five of which could ha-e been billeted in Northern Korea. From 1941 to 1945 the Japanese continued to build barracks and military settlements all over the country. During this period the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Korea was increased for receiveng about twelve divisions together with support units. Thus, the construction of a great number of military barracks in Korea, especially in its northern part, shows that the "apanese Command planned to transform Korea into a military base for attacking the Soviet ^rimorye. Appendix: 1. Map. "Barracks Facilities in Korea in 1931-1932". 2. lfiap. "Barracks facilites in Korea in 1941-1942". 3. Map. "Barracks facilities in Korea in 1945'.'. DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY Colonel /Tsigichko/ January "30", 1946. CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, V. I. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Documen, Signature: / JCv&jur^/ » м> m * « • < * * • г ' О ЦХАЛИИ ^fegri^iicks in Яч., Г С in •4. У «ь. - ЭЬ^аньге обозначения.- • Военные ;маэармы > Wl« K; V - - V Общая емкость ннори TU totol ViUetin̂ , et^b^tu o-i tl o^ К о н а - 14<И)00 ni«n L<4 < V u V V - % M W - V ^ \ / o- ' v. 4 . л / • ' j r O m W * - V »V ' НвчерЬник бот^т ffHU/табв faacqou Йрмии \ подпсуйкАник . v л* \ ^THeXRed Ar ' Chie Я> g-tk DeparTmfcnl LiVu&anl- col 0 n« L \ ^okoLoV. »l mart borraclfj <7 \ Масштаб 1:2500000 9 и и i t « .its а г г а е тения (эя емкость казэрмен? >нда Кореи- 250.000 чел 6 отрелв Генштаба кРвснои . \ . J v . General Staff Масштаб 1 : 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 Л»: Letiniy kt berrotltS 250.000 men. i C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARAHEKKO G. I., a member of the mili- tary forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##: 2073 2236 2130 1379 2151 2134 2148 1377 1831 2133 1385 2120 2172 a 31 "Table of the increr.se of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945." "Report, Organization of Division of Kwantung г-rrv " i.l J. .J о "Table of the r.rowth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and ir. the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945." "Report concerning Puppet Troops created by the Japanese, in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia." "Table 1гегз-лse of Sungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945." "Report or. the growth of the network of rail- roads and automobile re ds in I/anchuria from 1931 to 1945." IIT? .. port or; the increase of the airfield svstem in Manchuria froiv. 1931 to 1945," "Report construction of fortified districts in, i schuria from 1934 to 1945'," "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. " "Report or: the increase of the barrack facili- ties in Lanchuria from 1931 to 1945." "Report Concerning Jap̂ nes*? military settlements in Lanchuria." "Report or. the growth 0$ Searorts of Korea and. ia-nchuri-. from 1931 to 1945." "Table or the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the aeriod 1931- 1945." "Report on th^ increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Koren from 1931 to 1945," "Report on the increase of the airfield net- work in Korer free.; 1931 to 1945." "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945. - 1 - t 2127 "Ret)ort on construction of military dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945." 2150 "Reaort on the increase of the barrack faci- lities in lities in Korea from 1931 to 1945." was deliver 2d to :;;'; by the Rod Army General Gt~ff in Moscow, on or about January 3^? 194-6, LT. COL. T ARArENKO CHIEF OF THE USSR DOCL: U'T SECTION. /7 \i w . ^ DOC. NO. 2364 ^ f T " Page 1 A F F I D A V I T of RODZASVSKY Konstantin Vladimirovich of April 11, 1946 K.V. RODZAEVSKY, born in 1907 in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Russian, higher legal education. The former head of the whiteguard organization, "the Russian Fascist Union", in Manchuria. Q Living in Manchuria you carried on intense anti-Soviet activities directed against the Soviet Union. Tell us about them. A Having escaped from the Soviet Union to Manchuria in 1925 I created the whiteguard organization "The Russian Fascist Union" (R.F.S.) there. "The Russian Fascist Union", the aim of which was to overthrow the Soviet power In the USSR, counted on Japan which was preparing a military attack against the Soviet Union. I and other leaders of the Russian Fascist Union were closely connected with a number of Japanese military and statesmen, and also with the Japanese intelligence service in Manchuria, under whose direction we carried on our active sabotage work against the USSR. Following the task set by the Japanese intelligence service the "Russian Fascist Union", directed by me, trained agents out of the whiteguard emigrants, these agents being smuggled into the Soviet Union for intellience work for creating fascist underground organizations, for the preparation of an armed revolt and the organization of terroristic acts a- gainst the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolshevics) and of the Soviet Government. At the same time the "Russian Fascist Union" carried anti- Soviet propaganda among the whiteguard emigrants on a large scale and also published anti-Soviet literature for distri- bution on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Q When did you establish contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service? A I established contact with the Japanese Intelligence Serviee with the aim of joint struggle against the USSR in 1931? through the Japanese secret service a^ent Osawa, who published in Kharbin the newspaper "Kharbinskoye Vremya" in the Russian 'DOC, NO. 2364 Page 2 * language. In 1932 after the occupation of Manchuria by- Japan, I got in touch with the chief Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, which up to 1945 directed and controlled all the activities of "the Russian Fascist Union" and of other anti-Soviet whiteguard organizations existing in Man- churia as well. Having obtained control of all the Manchurian white emigrants, the Japanese Intelligence Service represented by the chief Military Mission In Kharbin' and Missions in other towns of Manchvria did everything for employing the whiteeuards against the Soviet Union, and in the first place, for training them for an attack against the Soviet Union. I knew of the war which Japan prepared against the Soviet Union, and of the aims she set before herself in this war, from personal talks with representatives of the Japanese military circles. Q When and with whom had you such talks? A General HIGUCHI, the chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, in a heart to heart talk with me at his private residence in March, 193?, said that Jap£n^ij^ivad.Jio turn the Soviet Far East into a bn^pr-^.ai-e. bpt,woan a^d the t'.b He called th.fi" state Far Eastern Russia and demanded that "ttle "Russian Fascist Union" consider its sole aim the struggle for creation of such a state under the guidance of J anan. General HATA, who had succeeded HIGUCHI at the post of the chief of the Japanese Military Mission and who recently was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, also spoke about the preparation of an attack of Janan on the Soviet Union. Approximately in September, 1939, HATA, in his directive speech addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants" Affairs Bureau in the Manchurian Empire" created by the Japanese, said that the Kwantung Army would help the white- guard emigrants to realize their anti-Soviet hopes. Statements to the same effect were made in the directive speeches addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau" delivered by the succeeding chiefs of the Japanese military Mission in Kharbin: General YNANGITA in 1940-1942, and General DOI in 1943. Some leaders of the Jap- anese military planned to create by their military forces a united "national Russia" which would be under Japan's influence. г •ЬОС. NO. 2364 Page 3 * Those plans were inspired by General ARAKI, former Japanese War Minister. In March 1934 during my visit to Tokyo in connection with the affairs of the "Russian Fascist Union" I visited General ARAKI in his flat and forwarded to him a secret letter from Major Akmusa, Assistant Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission. Tli" contents of this letter, as Akikusa told me, was concerned with the acitivities of secret Japanese organization "The Union of Young Officers" with which both of them were connected. During my talk with ARAKI I told him of the anti-Soviet activities of "The Russian Fascist Union" of which he fully approved and pro- mised to help us. Then ARAKI made a statement that Japan - would by all means fight against the USSR to establish, as he put it, "National Russia", which would serve the interests of Japan. ARAKI allowed me to publish this talk in a somewhat milder form, as an interview In the newspaper of the "Russian Fascist Union", "Nash Put" (Our Way), and it was done. During my second visit to Tokyo in March, 1939 for the purpose of establishing connection with the representatives of governmental circles of Japan as regards "The Russian Fascist Union", I again met ARAKI who at that time was Minister of Education. Being at my request received by him in the premises of the Ministry of Education I informed ARAKI in brief about the work of the "Russian Fascist Union" and told him about the prospects of this work. ARAKI promised to help us as before, and wrote in my album his autograph: "An eternal friend of Russia, but not of the Soviets" as a token of his intention to fight to the end for the creation of "National Russia" where Japan would have unlimited influence. General KOISO, the Japanese Minister of Colonies, who from 1933 to 1935 was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarter also told me about the aggressive plans of Japan concern- ing the USSR. I met KOISO twice during my visits to Tokyo. When I first met him in the Ministry of Colonies in karch, 1939 KOISO promised me his support of the anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union". DOC. NO, 2364 Page 4 I met him for the second time in October 1939 when I came to Tokyo on an excursion organized by the Kharbin Military Mission. KOISO received me in his flat and in our conver- sation concerning the relations of Jaoan with the USSR said that Japan strove to drive Soviet Russia from the Pacific Ocean. After the outbreak of the war between Germany and the USSR, the Japanese were talking not only about the plans of attack- ing the USSR but about the time of their attack as well. When discussing with me in October 1941 my proposal to inten- sify the anti-Soviet propaganda carried on by the "R.F.S,", Lieutenant Colonel NIUMURA, chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharhin, stated that Japan had her own plans and that our untimely activity might only dis- close these plans. (Japan, NIUMURA went on, would .start war against the Soviet Union after the German troops had taken Moscow., Then he added tftst—the alto of"Japan WcTŜ to cut off the Far East from the Soviet Union and to create a new state on Its territory under the protectorate of Japan. Japan postponed the opening of hostilities against the USSR exclusively because the Red Army routed the German troops at Moscow and Stalingrad. Japan, however, did not give up her former plans of territorial ?ains at the expense of the USSR until recently. In December, 1942, the same Lt. Col. NIUMURA, speaking of the conditions at the Soviet-German front said that the most urgent task of J?pan was the straightening of the Manchurian-Soviet frontier'line along the Amur river, i.e. the annexation of the So\iet Primorye, Q. Tell us what you know about the practical measures taken by Japan with the aim of preparing for war against the USSR, A The occupation of Manchuria carried out by the Japanese Kwan- tung Army in 1931-32 was a decisive step towards the preparation of Гаp"n for an attack on the Soviet Union. The editor of the newspaper "Kharbinskoya Vremya" Osawa, who was Japanese secret agent, told me during the offensive of the Kwantung Army troops on Kharbin that if the Soviet administra- tion of the Chinese Eastern Railroad put obstacles in the way of the Japanese offensive, Japan would immediately start a war against the USSR, in case there were no such obstacles, Japan would attack the Soviet Union some time later. г DOC. NO, 2364 Page 5 'The Japanese had worked out the nlan of occupation of Man- churia beforehand, and it was corroborated by their own statements made during their talks with me. While in Kh-.rbin, I repeatedly met the Japanese NAGAOKA who was personal friend and advisor of General ITAGAKI, the former chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. NAGAOKA's permanent residence was in Dairen, and he came to Kharbin rather frequently. Almost every time when he came there he called on me in my residence and inquired about the activities of the "Russian Fascist Union", which he supported in every way. In the winter of 1938, during one of his regular visits to Kharbin, NAGAOKA ceme'io my place and on behalf of General ITAGAKI inquired as to my considerations concerning the question of the future reorganization of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau". When talking with me, in reply to my complaints concerning the difficulties which we came across in our anti-Soviet activities, NAGAOKA spoke in the following way: "We, Japanese, for 25 years were preparing to create the "Man- churian State", and, as you can see, have created such a state. Likewise, you, the leaders of the "Russian Fascist Union", should act gradually and follow the plan set beforehand: at first, with the help of Japan, to create your own state ex- tending as far as ibe Baikal Lake, and then up to the Urals", NAGAOKA told me during the same conversation that the "Union of Young Officers" existing in Japan at that tine had played a great part in the preparation and carrying out of the occu- pation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops, I had previously been informed of the same by the aforementioned OSAWA. Q Tell us in detail^, how the Japanese prepared for the occupa- tion of Manchuria? A At the beginning of 1932 when talking to me in his flat, Osawa said that he was a member of the Japanese Fascist organization, the "Union of Young Officers", on the initiative of which the invasion of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was organized, and that General MINAMI, the War Minister of Janan, was well aware of the plan of this invasion. Further OSAWA told, me that the head of this organization, Colonel HASHI''ЮTO, personally had participated in the clash between the Japanese and the Chinese troops in Mukden area Which he, HASHIMOTO, had provoked. Doc. No. 2364 Page The occupation of the town of Kharbint which had been held by the Chinese troops till February 1932 also was provoked by the Japanese. As there were many foreign consulates and settlements in Kharbin, it was of importance for the Japanese to create a formal pretext for the occupation of the town. V/ith this aim in view ООА.ЪЧ got in touch with me, as the head of the "Russian Fascist Union" and with the whiteguard General ̂ osmin, w.io was the head of one of the sections of the anti-Soviet terroristic organization "The Brotherhood of Russian Truth" and set us the task of creating a sembj-ance of jdi^gj^rinJ^arbin. As Kosmin told me in October I93I, he, folTowiig"(3bA-̂ Ars instructions, had laid several grenades in the premises of the Japanese Mili- tary mission, the Japanese Consulate, the Japanese Military Civilians' Society and of one mare Japanese office in Kharbin. This had been carried out through members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth* Society. '/hen the grenades vferc discovered, the Japanese published in the newspapers,and through diplomatic channels protested against the alleged attempts of the part of the Chinese to blow up the Japanese officers. In December of the same year, KO£MIN informed me that 0SA7/A had instructed him that he open disorderly fire in the cen- tral streets of Kharbin at night with the help of the white- guards» In the connection with this he asked me to place at his disposal two members of the "R.F.S." to be used for carrying out this task, to which I consented and commissioned "'EREEHOV and Ш В Ш 2 Ш ) , members of the Kharbin affiliation of the "R.F.S." to E03.1IN. The provocation carried out, the Japanese newspapers reported that complete anarchy was reigning in Kharbin, and that Chinese policemen went unpunished firing in the streets and plundering the civilian population. The Japanese Consulate in Kharbin made a protest to the Chinese authorities concerning the same matter. At the beginning of January, I932, a fight between a Russian customer aad Chinese salesmen took place in one of the Chinese shops in Kharbin. To aggravate the situation I50SMEN, by order of ОЗЛ'.'/А, sent sever:al members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" Society to the said shop who made a pogrom there, which caused a mass clash between Russians and Chinese. As the result of this pro- vocation several men were killed. To further aggravate this incident OSAV/A sent the Japanese newspapermen NAKAI.ITRA and myself in a car with the Japanese Flag to the place of the incident. •Doc о No о 2364 Page 7 Doing so he warned me that fire would be opened at our car. Near the place of fighting same strangers actually fired at us, and the Japanese made another protest to the Chinese authorities and to the Corps of the Foreign Consuls to the effect that the Chinese policemen were allegedly firing at the car bearing the Japanese flag, and in particular, had made an attempt on NAKALXJRA and me. Ensuing these provocations!, the units of the Kwantung Array captured -Kharbin on February 5c 1932 and commenced the occu- pation of Northern Manchuria,, As soon as the occupation of ail Manchurd.a was completed;, the "7apanese directly started preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union0 (i "'/hat military preparations were made by Japan in Manchuria for an attack on the Soviet union? A First of all, the greater part of the Kwantung Array was drawn up to the ̂ anchurian-Soviet border, in the Haiiar area, in particulars a whole 5apanese division was stationed, another division was at the town of Tsitsikar. The commanding personnel and the Headquarters of the units stationed along the frontier consisted, as a rule, of former participants of the Japanese intervention in Siberia in 1918-1922 who spoke Russian well о As far back as 1933 Japanese Military Missions were established in most of the Manchurian towns in. the frontier area for the purpose of carrying on reconnaissance work against the USSR« The personnel of these missions also consisted mostly of the participants of the Japanese intervention in the ^iberia0 Simultaneously Intensive construction of fortifications and airfields was carried out along the frontier of the Soviet Union» Powerful fortifications were constructed in the dis- trict of the town of Haiiar, the Hingan Station and the Po- granichnaya S ation» The population were strictly forbidden to come into these districts. Military airfields were constructed in the border towns of Manchuria8- Haiiar, Saghalin=Ula„ Tsiamusy, Lahasusu, Pogran- ichnaya, Mudantsian» Along with this in 1932; an intense construction of new rail- roads of strategic importance was started0 Among these rail- roads there were8 Lafa-Kirin RRS which enabled the Japanese to transfer their troops from Southern Manchuria and Korea to Northern Manchuria« to the USSR frontier» The railroad DOC. NO. 2364 Page 8 Kharbin-Saghalin-Ula in the direction cf Blagoveshchensk; • the railroad line Tsitsikar-Peiang, which made it possible to transfer troops from Tsitsikar in the direction of Sakhalin-Ula. ' The so-called top secret railroad leading from the town of Taonan to Halun-Arshan, which made it possible to transfer troops from Southern Manchuria to the Mongolian People's Republic border. A net of new railroads leading from Southern Manchuria to the Soviet Primcrya was also built. The building of military constructions of various kinds and of railroads of strategic importance, was going on during the whole period following the creation of Manchukuo and be- came especially intensified during the war of Germany agains t the Soviet Union. Thus even in 194? an intense construction of a railroad leading from Nansa Station (of the Kharbin-Tsiamysinskaya BR) to the North in the direction of the Amur River was being carried on. During the same period the garrisons in the areas bordering with the Soviet Union were considerably reinforced. That up to the recent time Japan was preparing for war against the USSR is confirmed by the fact that at the beginning of 1943 General YAMASHITA, who was regarded in Japan as a "blitskrieg specialist" and who, prior to this was in command of the troops which captured Singapore, was in the area of the northern border between Manchuria and the Soviet Union. MATSUGA, one of the leaders of the Japanese state organization the "Kyo-Wa-Kai", in March 1943 spoke"to me confidentially about YAMASHITA1s stay in Manchuria. The preparation for a war against the' USSR was carried out in the sphere of ideological propaganda among the Manchurian population. In order to establish among the population faith in Japan and hatred toward the Soviet Union, the Japanese immediately after the occupation of Manchuria created the state political organisation ''Kyo-Wa-Kai" (Commonwealth of Nations) which propagated the idea of creating the Greater East Asia and of establishing in this sphere the JaDanese "new order". The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society carried out intense anti-Soviet, propaganda among the Chinese population and then began to spread it over among the Russian whiteguards. The document Nc. 23i4 Page 9 "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Intentely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meeting* and in press. The activities were directed Ъу the Japanese Central Head- quarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, headed in recent years Ъу MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of the occupation of Manchuria. Beside the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization, the anti-Soviet pro- paganda was carried on Ъу the Japanese military Missions in the towns of Manchuria, through their agents. Q,» What part was assigned to the Russian whiteguards in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union? A. The Japanese had great faith in the whiteguards, who lived in Manchuria, in connection with the preparation for an attack against the U.S.S.R. and therefore tried to activize the anti-Soviet activities of the white- guards. It was planned that during the war against the Soviet Union, the whiteguards would Ъе used as armed force, and after the end of the war successful for Japan, they were to carry out Japanese policy in the areas amexed from the U.S.S.R. The direction of the Anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards organizations was carried out Ъу the Japanese military missions, which in their turn were directed Ъу the chief Japanese military mission in Kharbin. Besides the whiteguard organizations were supported from Japan itself. General ARAKI and General KOISO personally promised me to render any help in activieing the anti-soviet work of the "Russian Fascist Union." . The "R.F.3." was also supported Ъу the Japanese organization "The Black . Dragon" headed Ъу Mitsuru TOOYAMA. In 1935, the Japanese TCMITA, TOOYAMA'e representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that TOOYAMA sympathized with the anti-Soviet ac4- tivitios-o'f "the Russian Fascists" and wished us success in the struggle against the U.S.S.R. In 1939 being in Tokyo I, with the help ofJTOMITO* visited TOtYAMA who repeated his wish that we might succeed and had his picture taken with me. His assistant, SUENAGA, in an interview, stated that "through the elimina- tion of communism the ancient Rus (Russia) will emerge in new nimbus." This interview was published in the "R.F.S." magazine, "Natsia" (Nation}.' Since the meeting with TOOYAMA I always felt the support of the "Black Dragon" society in my antl-Soviot activities. г document No. 23«4 Page 9 "Kyo-Wa-Kai" intensely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meetluge . and in press. The activities were directed Ъу the Japanese Central Head- quarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, headed in recent years Ъу MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of the occupation of Manchuria. Beside the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization, the anti-Soviet pro- paganda was carried on Ъу the Japanese military Missions in the towns of Manchuria, through their agents. Q,. What part was assigned to the Russian whiteguarde in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union? A. The Japanese had great faith in the whiteguards, who lived in Manchuria, in connection with the preparation for an attack against the U.S.S.H. and therefore tried to activize the anti-Soviet activities of the white- guards. It was planned that during the war against the Soviet Union, the whiteguarde would Ъе used as armed force, and after the end of the war successful for Japan, they were to carry out Japanese policy in the areas amexei from the U.S.S.H. The direction of the Anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguarde organizations was carried out Ъу the Japanese military missions, which in their turn were directed. Ъу the chief Japanese military mission in Kharbin. Besides the whiteguard organizations were supported from Japan iteelf. General ARAKI and General KOISO personally promised me to render any help in activising the anti-soviet work of the "Russian Fascist Union." The "H.F.S." was also supported Ъу the Japanese organization "The Black Dragon" headed Ъу Miteuru TOOYAMA. In 1935, the Japanese TCMITA, TOOYAMA.1 s representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that TOOYAMA. sympathized with the anti-Soviet ac*- tiTities-o'f lfthe Russian Fascists" and wished us success in the struggle against the U.S.S.H. In 1939 being in Tokyo I, with the help of Т0М1ТЭ, visited TOOYAMA. who repeated his wish that we might succeed and had his picture taken with me. His assistant, SUEHAGA, in an interview, stated that "through the elimina- tion of communism the ancient Hus (Russia) will emerge in new nimbus." This interview was published in the "R.F.S." magazine, "Natsia" (Uation-).' Since the meeting with TOOYAMA. I always felt the support of the "Black Dragon" society in my anti-Soviet activities. Document No. 2364 PageIf You can judge of the role for which the Japanese prepared the white- guards Ъу the statements made Ъу the chief of the Kharbin Military mission, General DOI, in the talk which took place in December 1943 in the train going from Kharbin to the Sungari 2 station, to which we went in connection with the so-called Sungari Russian Military detachment being formed there, told me that "Bureau of the Russian Emigrant's Affairs" created by the Japanese must consider itself to be a future Russian Government. In several talks which I had in 1934 with Major AKIKUSA, assistant chief of the Japanese Military mission, he told me that Japan was preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. and in connection with this recommended to me to consolidate contact with SEMENCV, a white- guard ataman, whom the Japanese considered chief of whiteguard emi- grants, and whom they proposed as a leader of future "Ifetional Goveriment of Russia." Q. What was the concrete way of the Japanese military missions in dir- ecting the anti-Soviet activities of the white emigrants' organization? A. Immediately following the occupation of Manchuria the Japanese Mili- tary Mission in Kharbin established control over all anti-Soviet white emigrants' organizations acting in Manchuria, and among them the "Russian Fascist Union" headed Ъу me. At first counsellors were appointed to each white emigrants' organi- zation from among the employees of the Japanese Military Mission. Major AKIKUSA acted counsellor to the "Russian Fascist Union." The white emigrants organizations: "The Russian Fascist Union," The Monarchist Association," "The Legitimists," "The Far Eastern Union •f the Military," and the "Kossaks Union," under the leadership of the Japanese Military Mission spread among the emigrants large anti- Soviet propaganda and smuggled their agents into the Soviet Union with the taSk of conducting intelligence work and creation of an anti-Soviet underground organization. In 1934 the Japanese military mission in Kharbin docided to unite all whiteguard organizations for the purpose of establishing centralized guidance of their activities against the U.S.S.H. In the same year the Bureau of RursIan Emigrants Affairs in the Manchuria Empire was created as a united body of all those organizatiors. It was sub- ordinated to the Japanese Military Mission in Knarbin. Through "BBEM" in Kharbin and its branches in other towns in Manchuria, the Japanese Military missions rccrui-crd whiteguard for the purpose of sabotage activities on the territories of the Soviet Union. A special detachment was recruited in 1936 from the members of the "Russian Fascist Union" according to the proposal made by SUZUKI, a Japanese intelligence officer of the Khartin Mission. This Detach- ment was placed under the command of MATVEY PLATONCVICH MASLAKJV, a Document No. 2364 Page 11 whiteguard, my aide. This detachment armed and equipped Ъу the Japanese was in the Autumn of the same year smuggled across the Amur River onto the Soviet Union Territory for the purpose of terrorist and sabotage activities and also for the establishment of fascist underground organizations. The snruggling was carried out by SUZUKI and by MOZUKA, a member of the Japanese military mission in Kharbin. In the same year, i.e. 1936, and in the following years many other agents trained in the Japanese Military Mission were smuggled into the Soviet Union. In 1937 the so-called secret schools were organized at the "Russian Fascist Union" and "Monarchist Union" in accordance with the order of Major CNCUCHI, chief of the 3rd Department of the Japanese Mili- tary mission in Kharbin. These schools trained future organizers of sabotage activities in the U.S.S.H. rear. I was appointed director of the school at the "Russian Fascist Union". SUZUKI was my assistant. Those who graduated from the schools were sent to work in the Japanese Military Missions. In 1938 instead of secret schools the Kharbin Military Mission es- tablished a special school at the mission training agents for re- connaissance work directed against the U.S.S.H. In this school were trained the organizers of anti-Soviet propaganda who later on would work in Japanese missions in the frontier area. Whiteguard youth were students of the school. This school existed till the surrender of Japan and it especially extended its work when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In 1943 special detachments were formed out of the students of this school; those detachments sent agents to the U.S.S.H. for the purpose of gathering intelligence information, fhe said detach- ments were at Shitouheazy station, Imyanpo Station and in the Haiiar area. Along with the smuggling of agents into the Soviet Union, the Japanese military mission in Kharbin carried out a great work of organization of antl -Soviet oropaganda among the white emigrants and of training of detachments consisting of white emigrants for a war against the U.S.S.H. Q. What anti-Soviet armed detachments were formed by the Japanese of the Russian whiteguarde in Manchuria? A. The Japanese started forming the whiteguard armed detachments in 1932. Document No. 24.60A Page 12 In the middle of 1932. General KOMATSUBARA, the cirf-̂ r 0f the Japanese Military mission in Мггаггпм, оп-Ьгчлс-ьоЛ the whixt guard General KOSMIN with the task of forming armed detach- ments out of whiteguards, these detachments were the nucleus which were to be developed into a whiteguard army in Manchuria» Kosmin told me that according to KOMATSUBARA, this army was intended to be used in the war of Japan against the U.S.S.R. Fulfilling the task set by KOMATSUBARA, KOSMIN immediately formed two such detachments which performed guard duties on the Mukden-Shanghai-Guan RR and the Lafa-Kirin RR, then under construction. Beginning from 1933 the Japanese, following the order of the same KOMATSUBARA, began forming Russian police guard detachments, which carried on struggle against the Manchu- rian guerillas. Such detachments were subsequently formed at the Mulin coal mines, near the Hailin Station, at the Handaohedzy station, near the Yablonia station and at other points of Eastern Manchuria.• In 1937, Major ONOUCHI, the chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, concentrated the supervision over all previously formed whiteguard detachment by subordinating them to the Handaohedzy station branch of the Kharbin Military mission. A police school was opened at this branch, where the members of the detachments re- ceived military training and were educated in the anti- Soviet spirit. In 1938, the Kharbin Military mission established at the Sungari Station 2 a secret "RUSSIAN DETACHMENT ASANO" in which the white guard youth were trained for a war against the USSR. This detachment was considered by the Japanese as a model ©f all anti-Soviet formations. General HATA, chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin while inspecting this detachment said to its members that they formed the backbone of the future Russian Army. I, personally, several times visited the "ASANC DETACHMENT" to give anti-Soviet lectures.. In 1939, several men of the detachment participated in the Japanese provocation in the Nomangan area. Document No. 2364- Page 12A In 194-3 the "Asano detachment" was enlarged and transformed into "Russian detachments of the Manchurian Army", in view of this three detachments were formed; cavalry detacnr.en'j • at the Sungari station, infantry detachment at the Ha^ac- hed zy station and a cossack detachment at trie town of Hailar The strength of these detachments amounted approximately to 1500 men. To ensure military training for all whiteguard youth, obli- gatory military training was introduced in 1942 In all secon dary and higher schools for the Russians by order of Lt. Colonel NIUMURA, the chief of the 3d department of the Khar- bin Military Mission, Document Ко. 2364 Page 13 Beaid.es the military training the whiteguard organizations directed Ъу the Japanese Military Mission carried on active anti-Soviet propa- ganda and published newspapers and magazines. In 1941 a special propaganda section was established in the Kharbin Military Mission with the aim of intensification of anti-Soviet activities. It had white emigrant newspapermen on its staff. Besides directing the anti-Soviet propaganda among the Manchurian population this section began preparing anti-Soviet leaflets and booklets in 1941 vrhich wore to be distributed after Japan attacked the Soviet Union. I, myself, following the instructions of the Japanese, wrote such leaflets. Thus, during a number of years and up to recent days, the Japanese Government and the General Staff, carrying out their aggressive plans of seizure of the Soviet territory, turned Manchuria into military base for an attack on the U.S.S.Е»,constructed fortifications, a net of railroads and highways there, increased the strength of the Kwantung Arm у and prepared the population of Manchuria, and among them the whiteguards, for war. But the rapid advance of the Bed Army deprived the Japanese of the opportunity of bringing their plans into life. The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me. Signed: Bodzaeveky. Interrogated: Counter Intelligence Officer Major Putintsev CERTIFICATE The City of Moscow April 11, 1946 I, Bodzaevsky, Konstantin Vladimirovich, sign this certificate to the effect thai I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the case of the main Japanese war criminals. I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the P.S.F.S.B. Signed: Bodzaevsky This certificate is taken by the Counter-intelligence Officer Major Putintsev. Document No. 2364 Page 14 CERT I PI CATS OP TRANSLATION OP THE ABOVE DOCUMENT I, Gildenblat, M., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document. Signature: /в/ M. Glldenblat p / r -toe. No. 2329 N Page 1 EXTRACTS FM,. TFi всо:: " G R E A T И A N С F U R I A N E M P I R E " PU3LI34-D ON А СООШТ OF TFI. 'J.TN-U-AГ. ЛТТОЕЗ BY TFE STATE ORGANIZATION KYO-WA-KAI AND TFE OUTEF EUEIAU CF TtFL RUSSIAN EL I GRANTS AFFAIRS OF TFE tiANCFURIAN EMPIfiE # IN KFARBIN 1 2 4 2 At present the great ideal of the foundation of Manchou- kuo spreads all over East Asia and even he4 its reflection in Europe. The political system of our Ally Germany is undoubted- ly influenced by tie ideas of the bast. Our ideal was a reality but not a phantasy, and when there is an ideal, wten there Is confidence and integrity, there shall be victory. One can say t^at the creation of Manchoukuo, as it were, brought about spiritual renovation to mankind» (pg, 6l) In April, 1932 (PHa-Ttn 1st Year) in Гикаen a special committee for t" e Icunuation ci the Kyo-Wa-Kai was formed. The Committee was composed of: Colonel Ite.gaki, Captain Iiatakura and Mr. Sheh, later first Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo, Mr. Yui, Mr. Wen, also Messrs. Wada, Koyame. and Yamaguti. The committee fulfilled their responsible mission with exceptional zeal and successfully accomplished it by elaborat- ing the basic instrument of the Kyo-Wa-Kai and the plan of its activities, (pg. 170) The supreme Ruler _ Fis Fajecty Emperor, now prosperously reigning, accepted tve'posc of Бгтргетз fresident of t>~e Society and tve post of Supreme Adviser was accented by General ronjo, Commanding General of tve Kwantung Armyb (pg, 171) In 1933 (Dha-Tun 2nd Year) the basic principles of the Kyo-Wa-Kai were promulgated» •Doc. No. 2329 Page 2 TTT. STATE MISSION JP KYO-WA-KAI According to tvese basic principles, the main tasks of the Kyo-Wa-Kai's activities are as follows: The ultimate purpose of I anchoukuo being a ctate, in the existing international situation, is t^e creation of a founda- tion so as to successfully subserve tVe allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle against tbe Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against tbe Comintern aggression. In tvis boly struggle all tbe. peoples of bast Asia must join to form tve united front of t^e common fig^t with tbe oppressors, (pg. 172). Thus tbe Kyo-Wa-Kai, as is clear from tbe above stated, bas a special mission of great importance to spread tbe spirit and tve ideology of t^e State not only among tbe entire population of Mancboukuo but throughout tbe world. For tbe purpose of attaining tbis great aim tbe Kyo-Wa-Kai must carry on a perma- nent ideological struggle for tbe embodiment of its ideal both inside and outside tbe state. Tbe Kyo-Wa-Kai is tbe ideological Centre of tbis struggle.»..." (pg. 172) To establish and consolidate closer bonds witb tbe Nippon state, the Kyo-Wa-Kai Bureau started functioning in Tokyo. It is necessary to say, that in certain circles of tbe pop- ulation there existed tbe opinion that the Kyo-Wa-Kai was by nature a temporary organization* To dispel tbis wrong opinion General Minami, General Nisbio and a number of other represen- tatives of higher -ut'-oj ities issued special directives concern- ing the intrinsic nature of the Kyo-Wa-Kai, (pg. 176) Imperial Rule 'ssistance Association in Nippon, the Renova- tion of Asia Union, the Conmi.tv.ee of Mobilization of Spirit in Korea, the Society of МоЪэ ligation of Spirit on Formosa, the Renovation of /.sia Asso ciation in the Kwantung Region, Associa- tion for Assisting tve Throne on the South Islands, the Ortho- dox Kuo-Ming-Dan in the Renovated China, Shin-I ing-Khoi, the Last Asia people's Union, tbe I'.yo-Wa-Kal of tbe l:ancvurirn Em- pire—These constirace the powerful ideological front, which wins illustrious victories on boundless land and sea stretches. It must be said t^at the Kyo-Wa Kai is righteously a pioneer of the ideological front of the creation of the New Order and the Renovation of the Great East Asiae (pg„ 182-133) •Do c . No. 2329 Page 3 7th ALL-MANCFURIAN CONGRESS OF TPE KZQ-WA~KAI " (pg. 204) 1940 (KFAN-DFE 7th YEAR) Fis Majesty and the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army honored with their presence the ceremony of the opening session of tl̂ e 7t'h Congress. (pg. 204) 8th AIL-MANCFURTAN CONGRESS OF TFE M H i k l M i 1941 (KFAN -DFE 8th YEAR) The 8th All-Manehurian Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai held its session in the Central Headquarters Building in Shinjin from October 10 to October 17. (pg. 205) Fis Majesty, the Emperor accompanied by the Commanding Gen- eral of the Kwantung Arc у honored the opening ceremony with Fis presence. (pg. 205) Four delegates of the Russian emigration participated in the 8th Congress for t^e first time» The twofold reasons for their having been absent at the previous Congresses are as fol- lows : Firstly, one of a technical nature—language diffi- culties,, Secondly? at some places there were no special Rus- sian Sections'of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. In the course of time these obstacles had been removed and several Russian dele- gates specially invited for the occasion were able to take an active part in the proceedings of the 8th Congress. (pg« 205) All -hiANCTURIAN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF TFE IQO-WA -FA I On February 8, 1942, an All Manchurlan Extraordinary Con- gress of t^e Kyo-Wa-Kai was called by the Central Feadquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. The session was opened in the premises of the Kyo-Wa-ICaikan in Shinjin. The Congress was called in connec- tion with the promulgation of Fis Majesty, the Emperor's mani- <л>с. No о 2329 Page 4 festo on tbe collaboration witb tbe allied Nippon Empire in ber Foly-War for the Great East Asia„ Tbe session was beld two days. (pg. 206) Ensuing Fis Majesty, tbe Emperor's departure General Umedzu, tbe Nippon Iinperial En/ey arid Corrn&ndirig General of tbe Kwan- tung Army, aic-ressod de'i sgatea cf the Congress witb a directive'writ * contained anwng other things tbe following: "Fis Majesty Ter.oo Granted Ki-s Manifesto on tbe Declara- tion of War. c-n tbo same day Fis I'&iasty, tbe Emperor5 s mani- festo was promulgatedj All -ibis filled our 'hearts with a special happy feelings "Tbe aim of tve Great East Asiatic War is to liberate East Asia from tbe h.: lefu! inTitience of England and tbe U»S,A. and by jcint efforts of tbe East Asiatic nations r.o establish the New Order audi prrTide еле possibilities for tbe states of East Asia to bring into life the "Kbakko Itiu" idea and their General prosperityf "By tbis day tbe Nippon Imperial Army and Navy have won a series of brilliant victories in the Pacific Ocean and in compliance wit"0 Fis Majesty Tontioo* s Gracious Decree, annihilated a number of military bases of tbe e n i n » st Asia, thus makinr a gigantic stride towards the organization oi the New Order. "however, to ensure the complete realization of tbe pur- poses of the war and to secure the prosperity of East Asia, we must go a long w?.ya At such an extraordinary historical moment the present Congress is extremely opportune, Tbe delegates to the Congress must first cf all pay their attention to the general: situation aJL; over the world,, and per о Giving the grave signifi- cance of tro tarnations! situation and tasks facing Mancboakuo t1 ey must take tro lead in the mo/ement of raising tbe spirit of tbe fcondition of the state, for promotion in every way tbe idea of sacrifice* for elucidating tbe masses as to tro great cause of f-e Foiy War,, for raising trie spirit of tbe masses, in tbis way helping increase the national production and raise t^e might of tbe state, "On the other band, basing themselves on the principles of tbeir common struggle and durable relations between Manchou- kuo and Nippon tbe delegates must contribute to the cause of national defense so that Nippon might br sure so far as the rear is concerned. "Thus you must fulfill what you are assigned and at the •Doc. No. 2329 Page 5 same time you will enjoy His Majesty, the Emperor's great benevolence." (pg. 206) The following principles of work of tie Central Headquar- ters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai for t^e present time were given in t^e speech of General Miake, Chief of the Headquarters: (a) To popularize among the masses the significance of the war for the Great East Asia» (b) To act wit1'1 confidence in tv,e coming victory bea ing in mind that wherever tvere is justice there is vic- tory с (c) The population of Manchoukuo must feel grateful to the life of today, (d) Each and everyone should live inspired by the sentiment of the foundation of t^e New Order in East Asia. CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF TFE ABOVE DOCUMENT. I, V, A. Kaplan, hereby ccrtify that I am thoroughly con- versant wit*- tbe Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated exccrpts of the above Document® Signature: /s/ V. A. Kaplan •Doc. No. 2329 P a g e 6 S e i zur e_ of.. Do с umcnts. The Town of Kharbin. September 10, 5. I, Lieutenant-Colonel Danshin, Victor Vasilievich, the military prosecutor of the army unit i:-3<2°9, "ert *6n this day to building N-l6 on Tsitsikars'raya Street, which had previously belonged to tbe Intelligence Department of the Fwantimg Army, for examination anc"! seizure of literature which mi-ht be used as evidence against the war criminals in Japan. Cn arriving there I examined the library which had belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Fwantung Army. During the examination I discovered a book published in the Russian language in Fharbin, in 19<2, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of : anchoukuo. The title of this book was as follows? "The Great Tanchurian Empire." The book contained. A16 pages of various articles and photos showing the activities of the Russian Emigrants' Bureau, the Command of the /wantung Amy, the political organization "I'yo-"a-';ai" and of number of other public and political societies in I anchuria which had been organized by the Japanese, Taking into consideration the fact that this book might be used as evidence revealing that the Japanese Government had been preparing the • anchurian rilitary base for a war against the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, and the fact that this book might be needed, as evidence by the International rilitary Tribunal, I, under authority, of art. 17*> and l'°3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R. RULED - To seize the above-mentioned book for forwarding it as evidence to the International Trilitary Tribunal. . ilitary Prosecu.tor of the \rry TTnit <.т-35?р9» Lieutenant-Colonel anshin. C3RTIFIC' ТЕ C'F TR^'SLATTf-H IF TEE 7' "E ЖТ- I Г. Gild.enblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly • conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document. Signature• fst : . Cildenblat Doc. No. 2329 . page 7 CAPTIONS FROM THE BOOK, "GPSAT lANOFURIAN EMPIRE" F. 26 4. General I INAJII. 6. General UMEZU. P. 38 General ITAGAKI, former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headcuarters. P. 39 General DCEHARA. P. 66 General TOJO, Prime I inister of Japan and Marshal Tsar-Tsin-Kui, Prime Linister of I anchckuo. P. 140 General UMEZU, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army and Special Envoy of Japan reads his address before His Majesty the Emperor, on the account of the 10th Jubilee of Manchukuo. P. 142 Parade of 65.000 members of mobilization rally of the Kyowa-Kai youth in Shintsin. P. 168 His Majesty the Emperor and General UiEZU at the opening ceremony of the All-Manchurian Kyowa-Kai congress. P. 203 (left) General UMEZU, Special Envoy of Nippon and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army makes a directing speech to the participants of the Congress. P. 203 (right) L. NEIRONE, Italian Envoy greets the delegates of the Congress. P. 204 The address of welcome of Dr. W. WAGNER, German Envoy. P. 224 The Harbin High Courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth at the parade. p. 21? The Parade of Public Voluntary Detachments-of the Kiowa and the High courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth, P. 217 (left) Cavalry General V.. A. KISLITSIN, Chief of Staff of the Lain Detachment of Public Voluntary '"•roups of the Kiowa pisses by the ranks. P. 217 (right) General YANAGITA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission inspects the training groups, of Public Voluntary Detachments of the Kiowa. Ataman I.U. SEMENOV visits a camp of Russian "Seinendanovites" in Kakagashi. Right — R. KATO — Left — P. I. GRIBAKOVSIY. The 193? Slogans of the "Anti-Corainter Day." "Moscow Brings Destruction — Tokyo brings Rennovation" "Communism is the Worst Enemy of Humanity" "If you Want to Regain Russia Join the Ranks of Anti- Comintern" . "Communism Shall Die, Russia Shall Live." "Long Live the Anti-Comintern". Doc . -По. 2329 Page 9 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARAFEI-TO G.I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Book "Greater Manchurian. Empire", published by the "Kio-Wa-Kai" and Chief Bureau of Russian Emj grants in I anchu.ria in 1942 was delivered to me by the - ilitary Prosecutor of the Zabaikalyo-Amur Military district on or about hay . 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the document is attached herewith. I do further certify 7s' Lt. Col. Taranenko (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, ..June.. 28 , 1946_. Doc. No. 2658 Page 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST. The United States of America, et al ) ) vs. : Aifldavl ) Sadao ARAKI, et al ) 15 Lt. General Yukio KASAHARA, state under oath as ' f ollov/s: I was the Chief of Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau of the Japanese General Staff in 1928. I certify that I obtained knowledge of the following natters during the/said, period, through ny duties. •1 'eft'' \ Tn 19?8f Mai or Mnsatane. KANDA was on special duty with 1 the HnrMn Rpfm'pi Mi",qinn . He served in the Russian Sec- It 1огГНТГ"ТКё~1?ШЖ Bureau) of tne Japanese [General Staff Office a little previously. In the photostat copies of the Japanese document consisting of 50 pages, en- titled "Military Materials for the operations against U.S.S.R.' which were shown to me I saw the following three items. 1. Outline of sabotage activities against U.S.S.R. 2. Important sabotage activities matters that would be carried out east of Siberia. 3. Facilities to be stationed for the sabotage purposes east of Siberia and their operations. I saw the documents containing these three items 18 years ago. In other words, I saw that part of the document beginning from the 1st to the 16th page. That document was drawn up by Major Masatane KANDA who was on duty in the said Harbin Specirl Mlssion"T.icnt 1 QnSd above. I saw the aforementioned part of that document, during the period when I was the Chief of the Russian Sent.inn of thp Pnrj Bureau of the - General Staff Offices in other words, in 1928, In order to certify the above mentioned matter, I put my own signature and date in my handwriting on the backs of the photostatic copies of the portion of the said document which I saw in 1928. Doc. Noe 2658 Page 2 This affidavit is signed by ne in ry ovm handwriting and it is true and accurate, Yukio KA SAHARA Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above named Yukio KASAHARA at the v/r.r Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 6th day of September, 1946 /s/ John Fc Hummel John F. Hummel, Major J.A.G.D, Certificate I, 2nd Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, rnd that this day, the said Yukio KASAHARA was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence, and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affida- vit were truly and correctly translated fror; Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said affiant. Dated this 6th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan* James Murakami 2nd It. Central Interrogation Sectior: C^f <Л h' Fape 1 л р ^ Uoionel КАнАШТи . , *** Attached to Net? Port Arthurr (i ̂ tfi^j^ / H u ^ 0 ^ л У * Кпйл-Tung Arny FeadquartSrj^V Document No. 2Л6СА Dear Major KASAHARA; I wish to p.sl: you +.0 please emd me a rec&fpt for this lettera This will cor \>.ые o\xs r^^f^L "<-'neer^^4naterials for military op eration agEins o ooviev,' Ifes&taue KANDA Ко, Ю З Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin Telephone No* 4-822 Dear Colonel КАШЮТО г v I wish to ask you to please send :ae a receipt for this lettere This will conclude our research0 ' * * j q f? 7М-Ш. М а з а Й ^ ^ ^ " " - - * " - ^ • No -. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin Telephone No, Д822 Tf Г, General outline of sabotage activities against Soviet Russia0 II, Principal matters of sabotage activities planned to be executed in the east of Siberia,, III, Organizations to be established for the purpose of sabotage activities in the areas Sfest of Siberia and their tasks0 . IV» Sabotage activities in connection with the line of transpor- tation in North Manchuria,, V» Sabotage activities in connection with the collection of goods in North Manchuria,, VI, Collection of reference nafcerialso Document No. 24.60A Page 2 Additional explanation: Feace time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our sabotage work against Soviet Russia» G2HERAL OUTLINE OF S*D3TiOE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA The position of sabotage activities in future wars is very im- portant, Particularly when we are unable to bring about the final decision in our operation-- agsiiu-t Russia by force of arms, most part of the war, from beginning to end, shall be a war of sabotage„ The affairs included in our sabotage activities against Russia are many and their activities will extend throughout the whole world„ Now, I shall mention the general outline of affairs to be executed, as follows: 1; In the light of trie present situation in the Soviet Union, various strifes concerning race, thought, and social classes shall be aggravated, especially the internal strifes among the Communist Partieg shall be invigorated in the hope of destructing the national structure0 Above all, it is necessary to unite the states of Asiatic races in the Union in opposition to European Russla* 2.. In relation to the preceding article, anti-war spirit will be instilled among the Russian Army, especially among troops of foreignJraocs., so that the Russians will commit errors in their "plans of operations in the Far Easts 3, Threatening the Sovie'o Union by inducing the neighboring countries in the West and the South, we shall make it impossible for her to move large troops to the Far East, Through economic blockade the import of goods, especially of war materials, will be checkedo U* By destroying the transportation system we shall delay the mobilization ard assembling of troops: and by creating distur- bances in munition plants we shall obstruct tJneir manufacture of war materials о The Siberian Railway is the most important point? 5« We shall isolate the Soviet Union by destroying the communication facilities and through wireless competitions.,. Special attention should be paid to the Far East arease 6, Should, any regime connected with the Soviet Union exist in China, it shall be destroyed. Document Wo. 24.60A Page 3 II. PRINCIPAL MATTERS OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES PLANNED TO BE EXECUTED IN THE EAST OF SIBERIA Russian territories east of Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia v;ill be the zones of military operations or form the background areas for both armies, so there are very many matters for sabotage activities in these areas? I shall now outline the important matters as follows: 1, Propaganda activities and instigation wj.ll be executed in Russian territories east of Siberia to instill anti-Communist and anti-Jewish spirits amoag r.he in.isLatants and troops, and anti-war movements sftaut be pre voire-j, 2.- As the situation becomes acute, the principal railways cast of Siberia will bs destroyed, and r'trikes will be instigated in coal mines in Siberia and the Maritime Province to bring hardships in "railway transportations, Farmers will be made to oppose to the collection of grainsj 3. Anti-Communist organisations will be set up in South Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien. and will be made to advance into North Manchuria and Far-East Russian territories at favorable op- portunities tc hamper operational activities of Russian troops, In connection with the development of the general war situation, an anti-communist regime will ba established within the Russian terri^ tory, and we shall contemplate the overthrow of the Communist Government both in the Siberia ana Caucasus areas«_ A, We shall hope to make Outer Mongolia anti~Soviet. 5 г Should ar-iyjpro-Soviot regime .exist-in South China, ж shall scheme to~destroy It., A^oveta3l7~"reshall Ъе careful not to let Shanghai become the base for Communist intrigues» It is also necessary to break up the troops of Feng Ya-Hsiangts factions 0 Should any pro-Soviet government bs established in North Manchuria, we shall first of all scheme to overthrow it» 6, Regarding the stealing and interrupting of telephone and wireless communications 5 The vdreless connunication post at Hubarovsk shall be destroyed,, 7. Especially in North Manchuria, the protection or destruc tion of the transportation systenj collection cf materials? or preventing the enemy from utilising them etc», all must be executed by maintaining close relations with military operation, Document No. 2Д60А Page Л III, ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR TEE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS EAST OF SIBERIA AND THEIR TASKS 4s the sphere of sabotage activities against Russia extends throughout the worlds its organization should also cover both conti- nents,, We shall her з speak how the organizations will be established, and how they will carry out their activities in the Russian terri- tories east cf Siberia and in Manchuriaг 1, Siberian Organ-! -vM-on Far before the од-'Лгеак of hostilities (it -will be desirable to arrange from peace tine) a military- officer disguised as а member ofJ±e consulate at jjovos:i3irsk_shull paatad to st-tldy the condi~ tions of the people arct the mill tar у situation in Siberia and to frame up anti-communist movements,» Fcr this purpcs e, scveral officers with funds disguised as merchants havinn business relations with the farming classes will be attached to him.- With the development of situations, anti-Coaaopist and anti-war movements shall be instigated chiefly among the farming classes in coordination with the Far Eastern, ^tiro-Russian, and the_ South Russian 'districts'.) Strikes will'be started in the Kusnotzk and Chernorvskyi coal mines and the feraers shall be incited not to sell their cro?gj> After instructing the destruction of the Siberia Railway, they will gradually withdraw to the Eoste The_existence of Japanese merchants who purcnasc wheat butter, and live~stocks and sgj! miscellaneous goods and farm imple- ment3__in the Siberian area is not nseessarily illogical. If they are properly instructed, they should be able to bring about great resultss Therefore, if we..advise somatMng-Iike-an export union toward Russia and have them extend their пмппргНпЛ fin I г! Дп these areasthe execution of cur intrigue will become very convenient, 2. Chita Organization Chiefly coordinating with the ITorth Manchurian organization, this organization shall be a guiding and liaison organ for the anti- Communist movements in the Gabaikalis areasл In addition, it shall have connections with the Siberian organization, and with the purpose cf spying on military situations in the Zabaikalie areas, an organi- zation consisting of Russians, (itwill be best if we can get members o f V ' ^-7 w-.th p-.̂ tiio opinions against the present government. Otherwise they shall be merchants tfco do not belong to any party) •• shall be stationed. It is desirable that this organization, too, be arranged from peace time» Document No. 24.60A Page 5 3. Blagoveschensk Organisation and Heiho Organization In accordance with the outline for the Siberian Organisation, a disguised military officer shall be stationed at the consulate in the respective areas. He shall stay at Heihn and shall cooperate with a military officer disguised as a merchant engaged in smuggling in Russian territory, in planning for anti-Communist movements mainly among the farming classes in Heiluugehou. Furthermore, he shall make connections with the anti -Revolutionary Army, (t'iiall relate later), which will pene- trate along the Amgun valley from the district of Nikolaevska The Heiho Organization shall be left in the hands of bandits maneuvering in the Northern part of North Manchuria, Um Habarovsk Organization Disguised military officers (including one naval officer) will be posted at the consulate in Habarovsk, and in offices of other representatives of pur fishery and forestry rightsa if such representa- tives" areTto be stationed^ They will take chrrge of liaison and supervision business for the anti*-Communlst movements by the farming claas in the areas of the Maritime Province and Heilung Province, They also shall cooperate with the Blagoveschensk Organization to destroy and disturb rail and water transportations,^ and to cut off the communication linesEspecially, they shall plan to destroy the wireless station in Habarovgk, They shall contact with the bandits to be employed in the lower regions of the Sungari River» 5. Vladivostok Organization Several military officers disguised as members of the Vladivostok Consulate, merchants, or persons concerned with fishery J and forestry businesses, shall be postede They shall plan to supervise the anti-revolutionary movement in the southern regions of the Maritime Province and to appease or annihilate the rebellious Korean organiza- tions. The; shall also instigate strikes.in the Sucheng coal mines» They shall take measures to contact with the anti-revolutionary organi- zations that will advance from the Northern Korea regions. In view of the geographical situations, all the organizations in the Maritime and Heilung Frovinces shall strive to instill the anti-war spirit among the Russian troops and to make them join the anti-revolutionary organizations с 6. Saghalien Organisation With its base either in Southern Saghalien or Hokkaido, this organization will instigate the petroleum mine-workers_ in Northern Saghalien and lead them into anti-revolutionary movements. Simultaneously > Document No. 24.60A Page 6 with the outbreak of war, they shall occupy Northern Saghalien in col- laboration with the anti-revolutionary array to be organized in Japan proper. They shall continue to proceed to Nikolaevsk, then to Habarovsk regions along the Heilung Riverг Another group shall advance along the Amgun River to the Heilungchow regions and check the Russian Army. Even before the outbreak of war this organization shall make connections with the_gold_mines in Keilungchcw Province, and shall plan routes for importation of explosives to be used in destroying railways. 7. The North Korean Organisation >/ An organization shall be established at Lonan, and this will organize a Russian Army of anti-revolutionary faction; which, in cooperation ttftlh IjgRdlts, wi 1.1 maneuver in~the regions of Chientao and Southern Ussuri, annihilating rebellious Korean organizations and destroying the railways. Then, with the development of the situation, they shall advance into Southern Maritime Province, and in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army advancing southward from Northern Saghalien, they shall try to induce the people in that region to give up communistic ideals. <?. The North Manchurian Organization J Resides adding the Heiho Organization to the present organi- zation, a formal military official or a disguised military official shall be stationed in Tsitsikar, Several milit ry officials shall be stationed in Hailer disguised as merchants and shall engage in fur trades and Outer-Mongolia commerce. They sha3.1 corner all furs and live-stocksj and shall disturb the independence movement in Hulunpeierh, (planned by the Soviets), and shall support the movements to break away from Communism in Outer-Mongolia, Letting fur traders engage in business in Heilar from peace time will have greater probabilities than there are in Siberia. The sabotage activities of the North Manchurian Organization based in Hab"argvbT: is complicated and divergent, I shall state the important matters as follows: a. To completely sieze the Chinese political power. If a pro-Soviet government shall be established, it shall, first of all, be overthrown. b. To get rid of all members of the Soviet managing staff from the Chinese_ Sxg.t£rn Ĵ ailwiiyJ, thereby repuking all red influence from North Manchuria. Document No. 24.60A Page 7 c. Manipulation of anti-revolutionary Russians and bandits, and destruction of rebellious Korean organizations, d. Protection and destruction of communication lines. e. Collection of materials and preventing their utilization by enemies. f. Intercepting, disturbing, and protecting communications. g. Obstructing the activities of Russian intelligence organiza- tions . 9, Taonan Organization Formal military officials will be stationed, to hold in command the Chinese Army in this area. They shall also organize and control bandit organizations and Russian Army» They shall maneuver in the districts of Solun and Tuchiian with the purpose to cope with the enemy's irregular army end. shall strive to make connections with the Hulunpeierh regions,, Protection of the Taonan-Anganch railways, especially that cf the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway shall be important duty. IV. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINE OF TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA If the lines of transportation in North Manchuria can be utilized effectively by our army, it will be an important matter having very close relations with military operations which is part of our sabotagê activities against Russia, Furthermore, there will be a difference in this intrigue according to the international relations among Japan, China, and Russia at the time of the outbreak of war. For instance, if the relation between Japan and China is good and is in a situation where these two countries are able to mutually cooperate in coping with the Russian Army, the various transportation systems in North Manchuria should be protected for our use, and the main point is to prevent the enemy's destructive activities. If, on the contrary, the relation between Russia and China is close, and these two countries shall mutually coordinate in opposition to Japan, we shall take measures to destroy the transportation systems to check the rapid advancement of Russian troops into Northern Manchuria, At the same time it will be necessary to strive to maintain, at all cost, the portions of the railways necessary for the advancement of our troops. In the former case, the mission will be accomplished relatively without Document No. 2Д60А Paige 8 difficulty as we can have the Chinese as collaborators, but in the latter case we shall encounter great difficulties. Therefore, consid- ering the present- changing Chinese political situation, we must bo prepared that future wars will inevitably be started under such conditions. So, as a study; importance will be placed in the latter case. Thus, as it is no other than the East China Railway that forms the main transportation system in North Manchuria, I shall here make the most concrete description of this railway, A, Sabotage activity on the Eastern China . Railway 1. Destruction of the railway In case the Russian Army should advance into the plains of North Manchuria before us, we shall take measures to destroy the East China Railway to interrupt them, Following is an outline for such measures. a, Western Line Points to be destroyed (only important points will bo mentioned)e Nontsian bridge 305 Sajeng in length 13 in width Chalantun station and the train depot, Buhedu station and the train depot» Hsingan-ling tunnel 1ДА2.25 sajeng in length Petorya station and the curved railways near-by, b. Methods of destruction 1. The troops of Rxissians and bandits organized at Taonan shall guard important places at Tuchiian, Solon and Hsingan-ling; and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers will be employed under their protection? With the Hsingan Mountainous regions South of the East China Railway as their base, they shall make frecuont attacks along the rail- way lines and destroy them,, The employees of Dzaimien Company and Japanese residents in Bukedu will be utilized in scouting on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be carried from the district of Mukden. 2. If, necessary, men will bs secretly sent from Harbin_scparat©ly-£or -the -destruction of the Nontsian jbridgfu Document No. 24.60A Page 9 i 3, The Harbin and. Manchuli organizations shall bribe and instigate fibitc Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize the trains. Eastern Lino a. Placos to be destroyed (only important places shall be stated)il I MatangblarAg Iron Bridge, 195 sajeng in length and 13 sajeng I in widthо Three irnrnols betwoor Na:orni arid 'ror.nclnaya, 75 sajeng, 35 sajerg.. atV' 195 ~>ajeng in length respectively, bo Methods of destruction 1. Troops of Russian soldiers and bandits organized and amred in Northern Korea shall~be~ made to maneuver ih_ the mountainous regions east of Mutanchiang and Homeng, and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers under their_ protection, snail make frequent attacks on the railroads and destroy them, Japanese residents in Pogravichiraya and Japanese employees of the Moiling Sino-Japanese Lumber Company shall be utilized to spy on enemy situa- tions, Necessary tools and explosives shall be supplied from North Koreaс 2. The Pogravichiraya and the Harbin organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize trains; II. Protection of the Railway Southern Lines Every effort shall bo made to protoct this line for the purpose to collect goods and to bring them southward, and to allow our troops to assemble in Harbin by utilizing the materials transported by the East China Railway. a. Points to be protected No. 2 Sungari Iron Bridge 2A5 sajeng in length and 17 sajeng in width, .... • Linho Iron Bridge (TN*illegible) 125 sajeng in length and 8 sajeng in width» Imaho Iron Bridge 135 sajeng in length and 9 sajeng in width. Document No. 24.60A Page 10 Yaomen Station and train depot. Kuanchengtzu Station and train depot, b. Measures for protection In relation to the establishment of the Pro-Japanese Chinese government in North Manr-huria, we_ghaiX bri.bg and appease the military authorities on the Southern Lines to collaborate with us in the protec- tion of railways. 2. Disguised Japanese soldiers will be made to join the troops of Russian soldiers organised in Ifevisn, and they .shall maneuver in the regions of the Southern Linos, iher. in case txie Sino-Japanese coalition mentioned in clause i she-aid со compacted, a part of them will supervise the Chinese Army in the pr« vocation c.t important areas, and the rest will manouver outside of those areas t-.-. cope with the Russian irregular army. In case our plans for coalition 7/ith the Chinese Army should fail, at least the No. 2 Sungari Bridge and the railroad south of it shall be protected by force in the vicinity of Harbin, In case the Sine-Japanese coalition {should be completed, the Chinese Army and the Chinese Police Forces shall be utilized for the strict protection of Harbin Station and its factory and the Sungari Bridge. Also, all employees of communist faction shall be dismissed. III. Collection and destruction of' rolling stocks. It is most desirable that we collect as much rolling stocks from the East China Railway as possible to facilitate our army's future operations, and to prevent the Russian army from utilising them. For this purpose: 1. Funds shall be supplied to the Internationa.1 Transportation / Company and Japanese merchants in jts connection, and they / fibnJWvTpprng^.qe or compete with the Chinese оffiсial mer-^ / chants a. They shall plan to comer all the special products of North Manchuria and transport them to tho south. Therefore, all rolling stocks available shall be assembled on the Southern Line,. 2. Vilion the situation allows us ho cooperate with the Chinese Army, the rolling stucics in Harbin and chief stations along the railway shall be guarded and prevent them from being stolen or destroyedс 3. By proper destruction of the tunnels east of Hsingan-ling and Mutanchiang, we shall prevent the rolling stocks from being stolen and taken outside of the border» Document No. 24.60A Page 11 Л. In case our cooperation wx~0 the Chinese army is impossible, we shall immediately despatch a regular army to Harbin, and it shall be necessary at least to confiscate all the materials south of Hai-bin. In ease of military operation in North Manchuria by the Japanese army, a rough estimate of necessary rolling stock is as follows: (a) Twenty trains will be necessary each day to operate on the East-West Line and the Southern Line, both east of Ts its Hear» The particular lr- as follows* Locono J-.V3E - Freight Cars (b) Ton trains will be necessary each day to operate between Tsitsikar and Manchuli; Тгле particular is as follows:: Locomotives 82 Freight Cars 2,00C Total (a) and (b) Locomotives 354 Freight Cars 8,600 Presuming that we shall have been able to confiscate all rolling stocks between Anta, Harbin and Kuanchengtan, the estimated number of cars (cars in good condition) will be as follows: Locomotives 260 Freight Cars 3,300 It is to be understood that the collection of rolling stocks, as mentioned above, will have important effect on our execution of future military operations. If the advancement of our troops should be delayed and the Russian Army should bo in a position to Titilize the rolling stocks at their will, we shall attempt to destroy and burn the materials everywhere by using employees and secret agents, and at the sane time, prevent the enemy from removing them into Russian territories by destroying the railways as mentioned before. B. Sabotage activity ten the Taonan-Anganch and Huhai Lines I. Taonan-Anganch Line We shall employ the Chinese regular army, bandits, and troops of Russian soldiers, all under the power of our organization in Taonan to executc the following: Do curt Grit No. 24.6OA Pago 12 1. If the Russian Amy should try to advance southward to the vicinity of Taonan before our aniy gets there, we shall delay their advance by destroying the Khalkhingol railway bridge and at the sane tine nake their maneuvers difficult by disturbing them fron the side and the rearc 2. The rolling stocks shall be collected to the south of Taonan prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to make it impossible for the Russian Array to utilize the/a,. 3. In view of the difficulty of water supply in that area, water facilities at sta+ions shall not be destroyed by our own hands л out they shall be protected to the best of our abilities» 4-. If the situation allows our army to advance to the north of Taonan before the Russian army does, we shall maneuver with the purpose to at least maintain the railway south of Tailai, 5. In the regions of the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway, the Liao-Ho Bridge and water facilities at stations north of this bridge shall bo protected under cooperation with our railway garrison troops and by supervising the Chinese regular army, II. The Huhai Railway The Huhai Railway shall be extended to Hailun in the near future. Then it will be of great importance to our military operations in the districts of Heiho, However, if the Russian Army should advance to the vicinity of Harbin before our troops get there, the railway will inevitably be destroyed. However, this railway was built with funds invested bvjbhe Chinese a£f-; pi n"1 гт.Ч nivilinnR of Heilungkiang Province so^they have~far greater devotion to it than the East China Railway»_ By takingiiH-imnt.ngrp nf t.M.c; fpRUng nf the Chinese, we may be able to teach and instigate them to protect the railway with their own hands. Needless to say, our troops will guard this railxmy immediately, should they advan-ле into Harbin. 3. Sabotage activities on the waterways 1. The Sungari River For the purpose of disturbing the entry of the Russian Heilungkiang fleet into Sungari River and collect materials in North Manchuria by waterways, we shall bribe nnd infitiĝ tq -frfr? captains of Chinese steamers, who are mostly former Russian skippers, to explode Document No. 24.60A Page 13 and sink their own steamers in shoals like Sanchan, Sanksing, Fuchin, and Tangyuan, thereby blockading the waterways. V. SABOTAGE АСТШНЙШCONNECTION TEETH THE COLLECTION OF GOODS IN NORTH MANCHURIA Collecting of materials or disturbing the enemy from utilizing them in North Manchuria, the treasure land nf grains ̂ iŝ an important matter of intrigue to be executed crior to the таг« Let us now study the Russian Army's policies on this mat,~Gor» 1, If the Russian Army will be in a situation where they can con- centrate their main force in the vicinity of Harbin, they will spare the railway transportation power and procure their provisions from goods on the spot. Therefora, at least, thsy will strive to collect the grains and livestocks in the regions north of the West Railway lines and all the grains available in Hulunpeierh for the use of their own army. 2. If the main force of the Russian Army should be retreated and concentrated at Zabaikalie and only the vanguards arc made to maneuver in North Manchuria, the materials to support the main force may be pro- cured from Siberia. Therefore, if a part of the materials in North Manchuria can be transported east to supply the army in the regions of Maritime Province, the rest will be transported tc the regions of Zabaikalie. The main propose of the Russians will be to strive to prevent the Japanese Army from collecting them. If the main force of the Japanese Army is to concentrate in North Manchuria it will be just as necessary to depend on local materials for supplies as in the case of the Russian Army. As a measure against both cases of the Russian Amy, mentioned above, we shall have to corner all materials for our use and prevent the enemy's utilization. Now I shall state some studies I have made into this subject. 1. Necessary rations for the Russian Army when they gather their main force in North Manchuria;, In case the Russian Army should concentrate a largo -troop in North Manchuria with the 39tk Infantry Divisions and "Й5Б /+tk Cavalry Divisions as the main force, an annual quantity of rations necessary will be 28,000,000 pounds for 780,000 men and ДО,000,000 pounds for Л00,000 horses, 2. Surplus grains in the regions west and north of Harbin: According to investigations in 1924 by the East China Railway, the surplus grains in the regions of Harbin, Anta, Chichihaerh, and the lower regions of the Sungari River showg^ total of 87,900,000 poinds, (including an estimated 2„5.00 pounds of wheat). 3. The ratio- of grains in North Manchuria sent to the East and to the west: Document No. 2460A Page 14- Out of the total produce of 120.000,000 pounds of grains in North Manchuria, the ratio transported to Vladivostok (for use by the Russian Army), via the Eastern Railway and those transported to South Manchuria via the Southern Railway have become equal, as the amount going east has had a gradual rise in recent years. When we study the figures above, the conclusion will be that: 1, If the Russian Агпзг should make a perfect collection of grains in the regions to the west and to the north of Harbin- and if the men and horses should be satisfied with a mixture of variou'J grains, additional transports of staple foodstuffs will no: bo necessary, 2, However, the amount bought by xh.e Soviet during peace- tine is only about 60;000,000 pounds, and it will be necessary to buy about 20,000,000 pounds more in order to neet their plans to collect the necessary amount prior to the outbreak of war. 0 Accordingly, if the time for the outbreak of war is forecasted, it will give rise to competition in the purchase of materials far before that tine between Japan and Russia, Therefore, the nost influential members, recently in the field of gPf|£iflL-PrPHnrtPj n-ro thn ••mt.hnT'it.-jof Chinese official merchants. v and it is said that they have cornered eighty per cont of the total product. They have purchased the special products of North Manchuria with the almost valueless inconvertible paper currency, and are selling thorn- fftrTslien and Vladivostok The Chinese authorities will never forget the profits in trading Japanese goods to other countries* As > this tendency is expected to continue indefinitely in the future, our policy Oil cullциLing grains will be as follows: 1, 2. 3, Prior to the outbreak of war, the freight rate of the South_ Manchurian Railway shall be specially reduced so that the "amount"going to the south will inevitably be -„increased. Funds will be supplied to the International Transportation Company in a plan to corner the grains and to send them south. The rise in prices through cornering "ill naturally nake Russian competition difficult, The Chinese official merchants, especially the Kwangsin Conpany having power in the Heilungkiang Province, shall _be appeased to send their purchased grains to Dairen. (While the present governor of Heilung Frovince is in. office, bribery will be comparatively easy .J Document No. 2Л60А Pago 15 As the tine for the outbreak of war draws near we shall nako it impossible for the outflow of grains by destroying the Eastern Railway, And we shall dispatch secret agents to burn the grains collected at Anta, Mankou and Chichihaerh. To provide against the destruction of the Southern Railway and also to collcct local transportation vehicles, coach transportation between Changchun - Harbin, Changchun - Fotur.a, and Changchun - Wuchang shall be commenced or increased. For the protection of this transportation, an irregular any, organised either in Changchun or Mukden, shall be accompanied, if necessary. Therefore, such a policy of cornering grains and transporting then southward will naturally concentrate the East China Railway's rolling stocks on the Southern Railway, The Taonan-Anganch Railway has not shown any effect as yet in collecting goods, but by competing in the same manner, it shall specially prevent the grain crops in the regions along the railway from being removed to the north. • VI. A COLLECTION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS ^ 1. White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the important personages. The organization of White Russians in North Manchuria are centered around Harbin. At present, though they have not been oppressed by the Chinese officials like the Red organisations, it is a long time since they had fled from their country and their funds and members have been so scattered, there is no organisation vrorthy of demonstrating its powers. However, the spirit of unity is comparatively active among young men, so they are being regarded as worthy of being considered as characters to bo utilized by us. Following are the nain organizations: 1. Refugее's League (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii. At the time '.Then Japanese soldiers wore despatched, he was the governor of a garrison at Nckolaevsk* (b) Number of members - about 8,000. However, this number is a little doubtful. This organization is not strongly united. 2. Ex-officer's League (The Tsarist Army Officers' League) (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii. (b) Number of members - about 800. Doсилont No. 2Д60А. Pago 16 3. Young Men's League. It is divided into the following organizations CO The Holy Cross Organization (2) The' I3th Party_ (3) Motor-car Driver's League (Л) White Saglo League. (5) Russian Students'League President - General Osipov. Number of members total, about 2,700. Members are"further expcecod to increase. Besides these, there is the East China Railway!s Chinese Employees1 Cooperative Society, the chief purpose of which is to cope with the Rod. Labor Union. It is said that about 1,500 Russian employees have partici- pated in this society. This organization shall need much attention in the future. 2. The names of important characters in North Manchuria are: Gondachi Puresikov Ho z watt Bzojilovskii Gondachi no long er retains his former influence and popularity because of his cunning; and Puresikov and Hozwatt are men of the past and WO С ?J"1 NCI vo no hope in them. Bzojilovskii is presently the representative of the Refugees' League and the Ex-officors' League and he is a character who may bo con- siderably valuable to us, but he shall never be able to control all the White Russians. In our future utilizing of White Russians, it will bo advantageous to pay our attention to the younger genera- tions as has been stated abovo, so I think it proper that their leaders also should be selected from among them. 3. The connection between the White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and tho Far Eastern Russian Territories is in a very difficult situation. However, the ex-soldiers in the region of the Maritime Province seem to bo comparatively maintaining contact with the Ussuri Кооsacks. So, if we wish to organize anti-revolutionary organizations within the Russian territories, it will be best to contact chiefly with White Russians if it is in the Maritime Province, and chicfly with tho farming class if it is in the regions of Heilung and Labaikaln. The connection in tho latter case can be made through tho Habarovsk Organization, Manchuli Organization and tho Heiho Organization. (They shall be established before the outbreak of war.) 2. Kunghutze in the region on the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and tho connection with them. Document No. 2Л60А Pago 17 1. Bandit activities these days are not confined to a single area. They can evade pursuits by government authorities and are able to move to any area, so their investigation is made very difficult, However, the bandix organisations in the regions of the eastern lines of the Eastern China Railway in about November 1926 are as follows: Names of Leaders Nur.iber of Members Arms The Seat of . Loaders Meng Chang-Chun H O 110 Nearby Yapuli-Ta.shukwe Tien I 60 50 Nearby Shahotzc Poi Zung Л0 35 Nearby Washaho Tien Pong 130 100 Nearby Tsungsha Nang Yang 30 20 Nearby Ghow-kia-yuan Kung Ping 50 30 Nearby Erh-chen-shun-T Erh Tei-Hao 70 50 Wuchang, shachengtzo Tai Tung 80 Shihtouhotsu, Total 600 AA5 Hengtaokotzu 2. Bandit organizations in the vicinity of the Sino-Russian border that havj not yet completely been bribed by the Russians are as follows: Names of Leaders Tai Lin Wulung Shuanglung Shuangyang Lulin Yuanwang Total Number of Members Arms The Seat of Loaders 300 700 1,000 270 Paiskoakon, North of Hunchun A 50 Southern East of Mishan nearby Hinglungkou 720 3. Japanese nationals who have full knowledge of the bandits described above and who may bo called upon to lead the bandits in tine of emergency are as follows: (1) Persons who have connection with tho Hunghutze on the China Eastern Railway; - Seisuke NAKANO, 7 Donchi- Gai Futo-ku, Harbin. This nan originally has had connections with the Jingigun Munghutze in Kitir.-sheng. He had once headed those Hunghutze by request, of tho Governer- Genorol of Korea and at present he is connected with a representative of the Governor-General of Korea in Harbin. He also has intimate relations with members of the' "Black Dragon Society". Presently, ho has a vocation of repairing arns in Harbin. At present he is employed by the Sino-Japanese Wood Company at Hailin Document No. 24.60A Page 18 and he is пот; out to manage some Chinese at Linyang. He is not well off. Concerning his relations with the army, he does not voluntarily try to coma in close contact because cf his natural character, but his relation is not bad, Yoshihara KONDO, President of the Russian Correspondence Company in Harbin, Major IIMORA, formerly stationed at Pogranichraya, and Lieutenant Commander OKANO, formerly attached to the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff and present Captain of the warship Hozu, anchored at Changking, all have special connections with him j {2) People having connections with Hunghutze in the regions of the border; - Bunroku NOGUCHI - stationed at Sanchakow, This man had been a sheep merchant for a long time at Sanchakow and was a spv for tho Special Service Agency at Nikolaevsk at the time of the Siberian intervention. Since then he is still keeping contact with the Pogranichraya Japanese Agency. He is of an inflexible nature and has many acquaintances among bandits and he is a person that we may use with confidence» However, he is dissatisfied with the army's careless ways of using people, and he especially has ill-feelings towards staff officers who indulge in impracticable arguments, so much care will be necessary in managing him., Major IIMURA who formerly served at Pogranichraya has special relations with him. Other people who have connections with Hunghutze in other regions and in the Russian territories are? - Yasaburo FJKUDA; Masuo OYA (Alias - Tadayuki YAMANAKA, a reserve cavalry sergeant). Their residences are uncertain, but we can contact with them through NAKANO, who has been mentioned before. EUKUDA knows Major General MATSUI of Mukden and Major IIMURA. Additional descriptions: - Peace-time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our intrigue against Soviet Russia. The sabotage activities against Soviet Russia must depend on research establishments from peace-time. Therefore, from tho stand- point of sabotage activities, the various present establishments are very insufficient. I shall state the main reasons as follows: 1. Not having any intelligence organization in Siberia and within the Far East Russian territories. Document No. 24.60A Page 19 For this reason, the real conditions of the people and the military nocessary for supervising our intrigues are entirely unknown, If it is impossible to establish formal organizations, men should be made to enter Russian territories as diplomats. If this measure is also impossible, disguised officers should be made to enter Russia. Of course, it will be difficult for them to get the full results but it will be far bettor than having nothing accomplished. Likewise, it will bo greatly necessary to lot them make often trips in these regions. 2. Lack of institutions for retaining and training anti-revolutionary elements and lack of anti-revolutionary propaganda establishments. In supervising our intrigue against Russia, the most important duties must not bo entrusted upon anti-revolutionary Russians. Therefore, due to the present lack of institutions for retaining those old elements and for training the younger generations for anti-revolutionary organizations, their attitudes towards Japan are gradually getting colder. And if this should continue as it is, we shall find great difficulty in utilizing them in the future. To organize and maintain Russian troops in our Mukden Army will be greatly advantageous for us in using them. Furthermore, execution of anti-revolutionary propaganda activities in Russian territories should be made an important matter for the peace-time institutions for our intrigues. Of course, several of these matters are presently under consideration and are being es- tablished but greatly to our regret, t1 ey arc being financed by partial expenditures of small funds. So, no matter how hard we strive we shall never be able to compote with Russia, England or the United States. This is why I hereby wish to havo this reconstructed. As I described at the beginning, our war of intrigue will be specially important in a Russo-Japanese war, so those peace- time establishments as preparations for war, must be con- sidered with the same importance as arms and munitions. Moreover, Soviet Russia, having unified her diplomatic, military and commercial organizations, is sotting up her intelligence systems to perfection in all important cities in China and Japan to say nothing of North Manchuria which is expected to become the main battlegrounds. (Lashevich, Vice President of the Eastern Railway is an ex-Army and Navy Vice Minister and Kokor, President of the same railway is an ox-military attache at the Consulate in Peking.) Russia is also supervising an intense thought-warfare in the above areas. To cope with Document No. 2/.60A Pago 20 this present situation it will be all the того urgent to organize our establishments promptly. Besides this, it v;ill also bo necessary to establish research organisations or intermediate organizations for trade with Siberia and Outer-Mongolia by inspiring the leading govern- ment and. private organisations at the influences of the military. The advantages that will be brought about by these establishments upon our operations against Russia can never be neglected. Doc. 24.60 rage 1 ••• c e r t i f i c a t e I, Lt. Colonel TARAHENKO G. I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R, do hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Material? N for Military Operations against the USSR" was delivered to ne by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department. Moscow. on or about March 22. 194.6. and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department. I do further ccrtify /s/ IIRAFENKO Lt. Col. T&RAHESKO (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan May 17. I946 Doc. 24.60 Pago 2 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Colonel Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.~\S., hereby certify/ that on September Д, 194.6, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I.~.S., I presented to Kasahara, Yukio, former It-Gcncral of the Japanese Army, a pnotocopy of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 F£-gcs under the titles "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", and the said Kasahara, Yukio, put his signature and date at the back of each of the first 16 pages and made the following inscription at the back of page 1 in r.iy presence: "I, Kasahara, Yukio, Lt-Gencral of the Japanese Arny testify the following: I saw 3 chapters of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", photocopies of which were presented to no this day. These chapters arc: 1. General outline of sabotage activities against Russia. 2. Chief matters cf sabotage activities on the territory Bast of Siberia. Doc. 2ДбО ?ago 3 3. Organizations to bo established for carrying on sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberiaj__and their tasks. In other word.R̂ I saw the first 16 pages of this docu- ment. It was drawn up by Major Kanda, Masatano, who at that time worked at the Kharbin Special Scrvico Agency I saw, the said part of the document at the time when I was Chief of the Russian Section of the Section of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, i.e. in 1928. To cortify tho said fact, I have nut my signature and date at the back of tho photocopy of the part document which I saw in 1928. KaSahara Yukio, September 4., 194-6". This was done in the presence of interpreter A.M. Rojetskin who translated th- contents of the, inscription from Jananosc into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith. Colonel MOROSOV, Investigator of the Soviet Division of the т т. с J- * . v- . September 4. 194.6 Tokyo, Japan CERTIFICATE OF TR'^SLATICT CF TT E '•.IC-VE P< CVT-"E"T* 1,1'. GILnE?TBL\T, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated doevt'ont. Doc. 24.60 ?agc 4 C E R T I F I C A T E I, the undersigned, Alexander Kichailovich Rojetskin, hereby certify to Colonel *laton Dnitrievich Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I."Vе.., that I an conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate corrcct]у the inscription made by the witness Kasaharn, Yukio, on tho photostate copy of the docuncnt, entitled: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", which has been presented to him. I have been duly warned of tho responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of tho R.S.F.S.R. /Б/ A. ROJETSKIN A. M. ROJETSKIN Subscribed, to before Colonel D. MOROSOV Investigator of the Foviet Division of tho I.~.S. The City of Tokyo, September 4, 1946. CERT IF 1С "'.ТЕ CF TE.V'SLATIOr CF Tr'E -BCVS XCDASNT- I, I,. GIL^T'ELAT. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and. English languages" and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. 'Signature0 Г. Gildenblat f Г Ч Document No. 24.60A Page 1 EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OP INTERROGATION OP THE ACCUSE? MATSUI TOKYO. 25 April 1946. I, military r.nterrogatcr froir cts Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lics in the International И'-Hoary Tribunal for the Ear East Senior Counsellor of Justice Б AAI3£3F, in Lis p -ьззисо of Senior Counsellor of Justice P.D. M0I.GZCV. wr':h "he participation of interpreter Junior Lieutenant B, A, PETROV, and secretary-stenographer L. A. MAMLINA, interrogated the чссолге* r-u.ned bsicw, who gave the- following evidence: 1, Name - MATSi i 1. .tvilE, 2. Age - Born in 1873 ^ М,л,, Г о ffirtHCf 3. Occupation up to Lhe time of arrest - President of the League of the Revival of Greater East Asia. 4. Political party affiliation - Belonged to a series of Pan- Asiatic organizations, 5. Address - Tokyo. Sugamo Prison. Q,. What decisions were accepted in the conference of the Japanese military attaches in Europe, called in Berlin in 1929. A. In 1929 I, in my capacity of director of the[second/department_of the General Staff, was in America and ЕигореГ During my stay in Berlin, I called a conference of all the military attaches of Japan in European countries. At the conference we considered various current problems. We didn't touch on any political pro- blems at the conference. Q. A. Did Ш Щ Щ Е р participate in the deliberations of that conference? Yes, HASHIMOTO, being at that time military attache in Turkey, participated in the deliberations of that conference. Document ЕГо. 4107 Page 2 q. A document is being shown to you which is a photon-copy of notes concerning the work of the conference of military attaches in Berlin in 1929 0 Were questions given in the document considered at the conference? (A photo-copy of the said document is being shown.) A, Having read tho document shown to me, I have come to the conclusion that the notes were made by one of the persons who were present at the conference and apparently reflect correctly the contents of some of the cuertions which were considered at the conference. CERTIFICATE I, A. V. Ш.ЛШТ, hereby c rtify that I am fully conversant with English and Ku3sian languages, and the above is a true and correct translation. Doc. No. 1989 Page (The Special Secret Report from Turkey Ho. 5) 15 Nov. 1929 /Sender:// Artillery Major HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Military Attache to the Jimperial Japanese Embassy in Turkey /То/ The Assistant-Chief of the Army General Staff OEAMOTO, P.en-ichiro TITLE: SITUATION Ш THE CAUCASIA AND ITS STRATEGIC USB FOR TEE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES Я 2/ The Caucasus area, various in race and religion, is affected little Ъу Russian civilization, being located far from the center of Soviet Russia. Considering this, the Caucasus is surely an important area from the stand- point of strategems against Russia. However, because of the fact that the various races in the area are antagonistic to each other and сел not cooperate in doing anything, we cannot deny that it will be very difficult to unite the whole Caucasus in rising against Russia unless by the force of military occupation. ) /Р. 5/ 6. It would also be a good scheme to make all races in the Caucasus confront each other and consequently to bring about confusion in the area, by instigating either the idea of Greater Armenia, or the independent inclination of Georgia, or the Mussulman Movement, or the Partizan Movement of the mountaineers"etc. The idea of Greater Armenia is the most promising one as a fuse to give rise to such a situation regardless of its succcss. In case that this idea is advocated, there would break out a great confusion becauso of opposition on the part of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and, needless to say, of Turkey. ' ¥ Document No. 1989 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., 60 hereby certify that the "Utiliza- tion of conditions in the Caucasus for purposes of sabotage activities" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 21, 194-6, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department, Moscow. I do further certify Lt " " ~ ' ' ' Ш&1 Tokyo, Japan, May 17. 1946, A 1 Doc. No. 1682 ' Page 1 e f A f~ltems Concerning tiie U.S.S.R. Presented at the Conference of Japanese military attaches in EUROPE \ I. Re: Investigation of situations. 1. Appraisal of conditions in and future of the U.b.o.R. by conparison of foreign with Soviet views of the U.S.S.R. 2. !i/hat policy should JAP.iN adopt if any future change takes place in U.S.S.R.? ' 3. study of sabotage measures to be taken by various European countries in case of war with the U.S.S.R.^ J i. a. survey of the conditions of white Russians in foreign countries and estimate of their future activities. v 5. Views on the effect on Soviet-European relations, if in the future JlaPi-jlT should end friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. II. Miscellaneous Items. 1. Opinion based upon past experience as GO whether Japanese military attach:s in Poland should take additional duties as military attaches in Baltic States. Opinions on intelligence work against the U.S.S.R. conduc- ted by Japanese military attaches stationed outside the U.S.S.R. r (The attaches are of the opinion that ENGL.J® is spending huge sums in EUROPE for intelligence work against the U.S.S.R. Opinion as to whether the Conference of Japanese military attaches stationed in different countries should be continued or not. N. E. Under the above-mentioned headings detailed mention has been made, but some of it is illegible beyond с onp reliens ion. 10./ Reliance on foreign newspaper, in particular on white - Russian is misleading ал it abounds with propaganda. It should be guarded against. (SUZUKI). according to (T.N. illegible), newspapers published in Russia are, after all reliable. Doc. No. 1682 Page 2 11. (intelligence from Constantinople is jiostly British Vropagonda. (SUZUKI) 12. /Latvian policy is always directed by Poland and Britain, I and is subject to change fro,a time to tine, but it is I worthy of utilising (KU.^TSUB^JLi) 13. Liaison of intelligence from the various attaches in Eastern Europe is important; to verify each intelligence report. Hope the Central Depart.lent will watch it more carefully. (KOll.TSUB-Elb.) 14. /TROTSKY now has arrived in TURKEY, and 60 of his subordinates are to be driven out of the country, it is ^reported. They may be used for our espionage. (ihJSEBIOTC 15. whenever a good spy is found in a country, would it not be profitable for us to buy reports from him by collect- ing money from all attaches? (Ih-JBHlmOTO) 16. Question of sharing important points of espionage intelligence on Russia"from TURKEY, rOIu-iND _Ж> VIENNA among the respective (attaches) is now being studied, it seems. (SUZUKI) (T.N. Paragraph 1? illegible) 18. Much of the espionage intelligence 011 Russia from Austria is unreliable. It should be guarded against. (KOI LlTSUZxu'/A) 19. There shall at least be one conference of attaches of the respective countries in each calendar year, and it is also important that an influential man be sent from the Central (office), and it is preferable that it take place in May or June and be prearranged. (..ill attaches concord in this opinion). Doc. Wo. 1682 Page I. CERTIFICATE I, Lt. Colonel ТАЕШШК0, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the document in Jappnese Items Concerning the U.S.S.R., discussed at the Conference of Japanese Military Attaches in European countries held in Berlin in April 1929 (on 4 sheets) was delivered to ae by the records iffico of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecuticn Department, Mescow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the Red Army Military Prosecution Department, Moscow. I do further certify Lt. Col. ТАНА1ДЖ0 /s/ Signature and rank Tokyo, Japan October 7, 1946,- / с -т Numerous facts of intolerable sm^L-Soviet activities . / ' of the Japanese military authorities of Manchuria which are / absolutely contradictory to article 5 of the Peking Convention concluded between the USSR and Japan on January 20, 1925, have repeatedly been brought to the notice of the Japanese Imperial 2)oK. government. Below are given new facts which show that these activities have lately been carried on on a larger scale and -Z3°7 that intense sabotage work in the USSR has been organized on the territory of Manchuria. The Japanese military authorities often make use of the Russian whiteguard emigrants living in Kanchuria for their anti-Soviet activities, using then directly or indirectly for committing terroristic and sabotage acts on the USSR territory, smuggling then for this purpose to the USSR, etc. One of the methods of training men for sabotage and terroristic work is that of forming armed military and police detachments of Russian white guards by the Japanese military authorities in Kanchuria, which are on the allowance of the Japanese and Manchurian governmental offices. So, there is a special composite detachment of Russian policcmen, consisting of about 50 men and receiving systematical training. At the Pogranichnaya Station, on June 24, 1935 a special group.of 32 Russian whiteguards was formed in the body of the "special police detachment for repressing banditry" at the Police Department of the Bitsian province; there is a guard detachnent of 50 Russian emigrants on the territory of the Japanese subject Kondo'a wood concession which runs along the Eastern line of the North Manchurian Railroad, etc. Finally, the Union of Military Emigrants having at its disposal schools for training the commanding personnel of the Russian white emigrants, military camps, etc., was created in Kharbin with the knowledge and permission of the Japanese-Manchurian authorities. The systematic anti-Soviet propaganda carried on in the Russian language in the Manchurian newspapers and through the radio stations of Tientsin and Kharbin, calling to commit terroristic and sabotage acts against the legitimate authori- ties of the USSR, serves the same task of training men for sabotage and terroristic work. As there is the strictest censorship of press and radio in Manchuria, this propaganda may be carried on only with the knowledge and approval of the proper Japanese and Japanese-Hanchurian authorities. Doc. No. 2307 Doc. No. 2307 2 Further on, the material of investigation and sentence® pronounced by various Soviet courts establish beyond doubt the direct and leading participation of the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria in the organization of sabotage and terroristic acts on the territory of the USSR. The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan can make reference to following facts: 1. The Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in session held in Irkutsk on August 31 and September 1, 1935? established by the investigation of the court following (below an'extract from the sentence is given): "In 1935 the White Guards I. V. Kobylkin and E. L. Pereladov, having secretly penetrated into the Soviet Union territory through Manchuria with the aim of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts, were held up at various dates in the East Siberian Region, having arms, incendiary cartridges and counter-revolutionary literature on them. "Later, at the end of May, 1935, Victor Oleinikov was held up in Zabaikalye while crossing the frontier. He, too, had secretly penetrated into the Soviet territory together with two other terrorists: Michail Oleinikov and ICustov shot when attacking a border guard post. Revolvers, poisons, and • counter revolutionary literature were found on the shot men and on Victor Oleinikov as well. "It is established by the documents of the case and by the confession of the defendants that Kobylkin and Pereladov who turned out to be a white guard colonel and a white guard sub-lieutenant, respectively, living in emigration in Northern Manchuria since the rout of the white bands in the Soviet Far East in .1922 till 1935, and being members of various white guard counter-revolutionary organizations took an active part in their activities in preparing an armed attack on the Soviet Union with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet Power and of restoration of capitalism with the help of foreign intervention. "Having counter-revolutionary convictions and pursuing those aims of his own free will as one of the chiefs of the Eastern Department of the 'Russian General Military Union1, he also received and obeyed instructions of the Secret Service offices of a certain foreign power, being its secret agent. Doc. No. 2307 Doc. No. 2307 3 Besides, Kobylkin holding an official position in police, helped and personally organized the snuggling of armed bands, weapons and individual agents from Manchuria to the Soviet territory to carry out espionage, and sabotage and terrorist acts. "So, during the time when Kobylkin worked as & police supervisor at the st ation of Djalamor, five armed bands were smuggled from Manchuria to the Soviet territory. "In January, 1935? Kobylkin, following instructions of the secretary of the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin, with the knowledge of the head of the military mission of the same power in the town of Manchuria, smuggled to the Soviet Union territory white guard Pereladov with the task of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts. "Pursuing the same counter-revolutionary aims and following the instructions of the already mentioned secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, Kobylkin himself, with the help of the head of the military mission in the town of Jlanchuria, crossed the Soviet frontier line with weapons on •/him in March, 1935? hut was held up. There were on him two у "Mauser" and one "Astra" pistols, incendiary cartridges to \be used for setting on fire stores and constructions of mili- tary importance, and a large quantity of counter-revolutionary literature» "In organization of the transfer of agents of the secret service of a certain power and of representatives of counter- ' revolutionary organizations into the Soviet territory, and in transportation of weapons and receiving espionage information, Kobylkin was assisted by Victor Oleinikov who, since 1933 maintained through General Shilnikov close contact with the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin. When General Shilnikov who being chief of the Eastern Department of the Russian General Military Union had simultaneously been a secret agent of the said military mission in Kharbin, died in 1934, the direction of the activities of the white guard organization of the "Russian General Military Union" passed on to_KobvlkinT and Vlctor~Oie.lnikov recel'/ea nis Instructions, both from Kobylkin and from the secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, directly, and from the heads of the mili- tary missions in the towns of Manchuria and Hailar. Doc. No. 2307 Doc. NO. 2307 69 "With the help of Victor Oleinikov, who had repeatedly- crossed the frontier hinself and snuggled Pereladov, Kustov, Hichail Oleinikov and oven Kobylkin hinself, the latter trans-^ ferred onto the Soviet territory 12 pistols with a large supply of rounds for connitting terrorist acts, ten incendiary cartridges for sabotage acts, a canera with filns for espionage work and poisons: strychnine and atropine, for sane terrorist acts. "Kobylkin, as it is stated in his confession and in Pereladov's and Oleinikov1 s evi-steseĉ ., got all these things, intended for fulfilling espionage, sabotage and terrorist tasks on the Soviet Union territory, fron official representa- tives of the Military Mission of a certain power in the towns of Kharbin and Manchuria directly or through the head of the editorial office of the newspaper "Kharbin Tine", Osawa. "The sane persons gave Kobylkin noney for carrying on counter-rcvclutionary sabotage work." On considering the abovesaid the Assizes cf the Military Collegium of the Suprene Court cf the USSR found I. V. Kobylkin E. L. Pereladov and V. V. Oleinikov guilty and sentenced then to be shot. At the closed session of the Assizes the defendants gave following evidence. Kobylkin said: "The power to which I and all other defendants have referred to as a 'certain1 Power is Japan. I received instructions fron the secretary of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, fron the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Manchuria, Sakurai, and also fron the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Hailar Saito and fron the head of the editorial office of the newspaper 'Kharbin Tine' Osawa." Pereladov said: "When I, giving testimony during the investigation in the court, spoke about the dependence of the counter-revolu- tionary organizations on the nilitary missions of a certain Pov/er, I neant Japan. "Whenever a band was being formed to be snuggled to the USSR, official representatives of the Japanese nilitary nission Doc. No. 2307 Doc. NO. 2307 5 participated in and sanctioned the snuggling. It is confirned by the fact that when I expressed ny wish to cross the frontier and Kobylkin consented to snuggle ne, I had to communicate on this question with the secretary of the Japan- ese Mission, whon I had to promise to carry cut a special task of sabotage — terroristic and espionage nature set by the Japanese Military Mission, and only then ny crossing was sanctioned by the mission in the town of Manchuria represented by Sakurai and by the mission in Kharbin represented by Tsiida." Oloinikov said: "Being abroad I was connected with the secretary of the Japanese Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, with the Head of the Military Mission in the town of Manchuria Sakurai, with the supervisor of the Department of Police, Tinofeev, who was concurrently secret agent of the Japanese Military Mission, and with the supervisor of the Crin.inal-Detective Departnont, Kulikov. — С 1 —* "I passed information to and received instructions from Tsuda and Sakurai who paid me money for it. The 'Mauzer' pistol I got also from Tsuda." 2. On Octobor 26, 1935 an armed group of 6 Koreans who had penetrated onto the territory of the USSR from Manchuria ran across sin outpost guard of Soviet border guards on duty in the area of Northwest of the village Pcltavka. Trying to put up resistance to the border guards who wanted to hold them up, the bandits opened fire, and as a result of firing two of the bandits were killed and two wounded. The remaining two bandits had managed to disappear during the .firing, but were net by another border-guards outpost on duty in the sane area. Being discovered, they again opened fire, and when the out- post opened retaliatory fire one of then was mortally wounded, but the other managed to run away. The following things were found on the killed and wounded Koreans: a pile of counter- revolutionary literature, two "Brauning" and two "Mauzer" pistols, two wrenches for unscrewing joints of rails and a small crowbar for pulling out spikes fastening, the rails to the sleepers. The held-up wounded saboteurs, who called them- selves Kiniseb and Pakenkha, testified that their band had been formed by a spocial Japanese military organ in Sanchagon which had sent then onto the territory of the USSR with the task of destroying railroads and organizing' of railroad accidents. According to testimony given by the sane persons this military organ had forned a second band of 7-8 men, which was supposed to be smuggled onto the Soviet territory 5-6 days after the return of the first band. Doc, No. 2307 Doc. No. 2307 6 3. The Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Amy, in the session held in the town of Khabarovsk on January 20-25, 1936, heard the case cf 21 defendants, and among them of the Russian emigrant, whiteguard Georgy Ser.en, Koreans Lin Shen-do, Kin I-seb, Рак En-kha, Tiu Hva-sun, 0 Gui-khen, Li En-gyn, Lin Son-khak and others. The Military Tribunal established that nost of the defendants were nenbers of the espionage-sabotage groups, snuggled onto the territory of the USSR frc-n Manchuria in August, September and October, 1935. These groups crossed the border with the ain of carry- ing on espionage, of planting secret agents in the Ussuri and Prinorye districts of the. Far Eastern region, and cf connitting sabotage acts. According to the testimony given by the defendants, the Japanese Military Fission in the town of Sanchagon, and an enployee cf this mission, Midzuno, in parti- cular, supplied these groups with weapons, neans for carrying out sabotage activities, a canera for taking pictures of military constructions, etc. The defendants Kim I-seb and Рак En-kha, fcr instance, who had twice crossed the Soviet frontier in October, 1935? together with a group of saboteurs, had the task cf destroying the railroad track in the important points cf the Ussuri Railroad. All the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern A m y to various punishments. Appendise to the note of the Enbassy of the USSR to Japan of May 4, 1936. Correct: Director of the State Central Historical Record Office Professor V. Haksakov CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, Ы. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Dccunent. Signature: /s/ II, Gildenblat Doc. No. 2307 Doc. Ко. 1Э&9 Page 1. С E It T I P I С A 1' E I, Lt„ Colonel ТАЕЖЫАЖО, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S-S.R., do herety certify that the attached ohotostat of the document in Japanese "A report of the Japanese military attg.che in Turkey, major Hashimoto concerning the "Situation in the Caucasus end its strategic use for the purpose of sabotage activities on 2Z pages, was delivered to me by the Sea .irmy Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March P,2. 1046., and that the original of the said document may со f und in the record office of the Red -ins:/ Chief Military Pr osecut ion Department. I do further certify • /8/ Lt. Col. ТАВЕЫАЖО. G. I. (signature and rank) Tokyo, Japan, October 5, 1945. ч Doc. No. 1968 P~ge 1 Februory 16 th, 1940 (The Sixth C3>use of Inquiry Items) Revision of the Anti- Soviet Sobctoge activities -nd of guidance of White Russians in keeping with the revisions. 1." Reform of the onti-f-oviet sobotoge Activities. The ideo Vre h~ve hitherto hod regarding the"onti-Soviet sobotoge activities wns to use the individual" sobotoge ** units under the direct leodOrship of the J«ponese military authorities. Fowever,; to moke this more^effective in future, it is odvontrgeous to establish о F^r Eost /nti- Comintern Self-government simultaneously with the commencement of hostilities, to unite various kinds of sobotoge activities by tMs, ond to odd political meanings to this. Nomely, for the White Russians resiaing^in M*nchuri« ond Chinr /-the obove mentioned consists in raising their spirit of autonomous, positive co-opcrwtion with the J^p^nese Army by showing tbe'most distinct object ot the commencement of hostilities ond olso, for tue population on the Soviet territory, it consists in giving them opportunity to join voluntarily the Jnti-Comintern Self- government under t4e hope of establishing о liberal ond peaceful independent stote, 4.*. ЛХ For this purpose, it is indispensable, Ks prepr.rotions in peoce time, to strengthen whot bos been Corried out hitherto, to complete individually every element to he United to the self-government"when estoblisMng it, m d " ot the some"time on the one h~nd to give the White Russians themselves odministi-otivc^troitiing, ottd so to give the White Russians entirely sotisfrctory obility"beforehond to execute proctic-1 business v:hen they ore opplied to every orgon"of the government, ond locol self-governing bodies ~ttd oil kinds of economic systems /"especially, ttven opplied os responsible persons of the deportments contacting With the people on the occrssion of the establishment of о self-government. 2," Plon of guid-ncc-'-cf the White RuSsions in connection with chorges'-of sobotoge activities. Regording t*e former port of the obove-mentioned ргерог-tions in pe-ce time, it will suffice to'-follow^the plon token hitherto, however, regarding the letter port it is recognized necessary, to Army SpOcipl Service Org-hizг tion (T0КШШС1К/ N) »t Forbin. Doc. Ко. 1968 Fr g-o _ rdd sore change to t^e «.dministr*tive org-nism of M~ncbukuo present. TVr-t is to s^y, for г- пег&иге of ndministr=tive discipline for the White Russians /"it is now possible to consider dividing it into two categories. .. j.- j-- P-rt I—is to appoint White Russians in important posts of"the present odtiinistr*tive rnd economic systems ond to moke t^em undertake pr^ctic^l business. "Considering these proctic-1 businesses*; it is necessary to appoint them on responsible posts *nd not to confine them to such robot-like beings cs former Bliss* n public officials or •company employees in M-nchurio0 For t M s purpose, special appointments must be opened for them to some extent. The celitr-l government rec^ntly^enumer^ted where the White RusSi-ns eould be used: «t le*st, every Iticrl vdministr^tlve"-^nd**self-governing^system's, military authorities, r^ilw-y, other special Companies etcV, under tve province5"*^nd it is required to assign neces^ry " personnel to P11 P^rts ,""'-nd to engr-ge therein pr^ctic^l businesses of military pff^irs, police "ff^irs, economy, industry, tr-ffic, correspondence, propagation, judicature, etc. P-rt II--is*"tc try to m^ke use of the"*White Russian Emigrant Eure^u ^nd execute ^11 the civil rdministr-tive pffnirs'-of t^e White Russians through the office, N-ttely, registration? distribution of d^ilymeceesities, social* work, education, ŝ nlto'tlcn*; physical training, cultural*" enlightenment,""military pff-^irs, commercial ~nd industrial relation etc. rre tKe «beve-mentioned, However -ccording to the necessity of e.~bct-=g<r- rctivities the existence of tie White Russian Emigr-nt Bureau is**import-nt *nd it is indispensable not to dissolve this Bure-u immediately jnto loc^l ^dministrotive systems or self-governing systems, but to^keep it existing'vs ~*uxilir>ry system, to utilize it, -nd to execute prvctic-l pctivities of White Russians' through ite Mso practicing themotivity of the KyoWr-TOi (M-nchtikuo Fsich-ho-hui) towards the White Rusei-ne without f ̂il'*throtigh tve White Russi-n Emigr-nt Bureau, rnd it is not rdvis-ble to divide the forces into two p^rtso No. 1968 С E R T I F I С I T E I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I., P member of tbe military forces of tbe U.S.S.R., do hereby certify — - th -1 "Tbe confercnce of chiefs of Army organs in Northern M-nchurir."--"Revision of the plot "gainst the U.S.S.R. -nd the -pl-n of guid-ncc of WMte Russians in keening with the revision". (Febru-ry 1940) w»s delivered to me by the Eed Army Chief Military Prosecution Deprrtnent. Moscow. on or -bout M^ret l j . 194 6 . end tbot the origin-1 of tbe s-id document mr-y be found in Tbe archives of the s-\id. department in Moscow. I do further certify TfTignrture r-nd r-nk.T /s/ Т^ггпепко Lt. Col, TAEANENKO Tokyo, J-p-n 194.6^ Doc. N0e 1962 Extremely Secret Instructions pertaining to the Sabotage Activities Education and Training for the Year of Showa (1943) (Takeaka) (Shimoyama) (Nakamori) V (The 2nd Intelligence Conference of 1943» Distribution N0.7 extra No.l (Murazawa) June 16, 1943. ^wantung Army Intelligence Dept. _ The Sabotage Activities Education and training for the 18th year of SHD7A (1943) should be based on this direction. (SHYO'ffA 18-6-16 (June/6/1943) Chief of the Intelligence Dept., Ewantung Army, DOI, Akio I. General Rule. This direction is based on the Kwantung Airay Headquarters Educational directions of the 18th year of SHOW,», (1943) for the special Corps with consideration of the results obtained from the previous trainings. IT. Purpose. The principal purpose of this is to develop and strengthen the fighting spirit, the cog -a tic unity, and also to perfect osmosis of the general training subjects; ana to teach special training-subjects in a way not to disclose the real object, which will meet the condition of enemy, geography, duties (services applied in wartime), and especially to strengthen officer's education. III. Methods 1. The period from Showa 18-4-1 to Showa 19-3-31 (Apr. 1, 1943-March 31,1944) is the Showa 18 year to be the education period of the 18th year of Showa for this' education and is divided into four periods of three months each. 2. The curriculum will be divided into two, the one being the general training and the other the special training for enemy condition, geography, etc, and the former shall be repeatedly trained while the latter diall be enforced in a care- ful manner so as not to have the object disclosed. 3« The subjects which need completeness as shown in the attached Chart No.l of the fundamental points of the enforcement of general common training are as follow^j a. /"Spiritual training. b. I Disguise, camouflage, tricks c. ) Information collecting. ~~ d. \ Destruction of transportation especially communication, eо \ Propaganda and jagitat ional 1"Guerilla" system of fighting, go I"Sure-hit" shooting. Document No. 1957 Page 77". 4. Special training is as shown in Chart 2. 5. In "both, cases special stress shall Ъе placed upon staff training so as to give them thorough knowledge and capacity together with the system of division of work such аз information collecting, political intrigue, destructive training, communication, etc. and laying stress on team working. 6. In education and training, besides teaching them the fundamentals repeatedly, train them actually, and, to do this, have a short period field camp training frequently, and give them one week or a month's long dated field camp training at least once in each period. 7. At each branch, mobilization training shall be carried on at least for two weeks in each period and s'jaff-training shall be carried on separately for 10 days* Status of each branch, however, shall be taken into consideration and the time and duration cf such braining may be manipulated ac- cordingly. 8. Education and training especially the out-door training shall be carefully carried on so that the real object of it shall not be noticed. 9. Powder and bullets, explosives, and arms for the training are as shown in "hart 3. IV. Report. 1. Each brarch corps shall make a plan in accordance with this dir- ection and report five copies of it by July 15th. 2. The principal function concerning education such as examinations, inspections, long period campings shall be planned and reported ten days before carrying it out and. its result shall also Ъе reported as soon as it is over — also in five copies» 1962 Page 1, СЕР. T Ш С i 1 S I, Lt. Colonel SAKMEIIKO, G. I., a master of the military forces of the U.S.S.H., do hereby certify that "The 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section" - "Instructions pertaining to armed diversionary activities for the year 1943" was delivered t"> me Ъу the Hed Army Chief Military Prosecnfcion Department, Moscow on cr about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department. I do further certify _. Lt. Col. TAEAIVi"SMt. G. I. /s/ (signature and rank) Tokyo, Jacan IV fey, 1946. / DOC. NO. 1956 V «- / 7 Г ? - I ' \ ^ . dLj. Л.-^ х У ^ N o Second Intelligence Conference, 1943 Document for Distribution, No. 6 The directions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians, June, 1943 KWANTUNG Army, Intelligence CONTENTS No. 1 Concerning general principle. No. 2 Extent of those who should be treated as Vhite Russians. No. 3 Concerning guiding principle. No. 4 Concerning cultivation o" the indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit. No. 5 Concerning reward and punishment No. 6 Concerning intensification of anti-espionaee arrangements, No. 7 Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys. No. 8 Concerning encouragepent of national defense physical training. No. 9 Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese Language education. No.10 Concerning encouragement of return to farm of the city residents. No. 11 Concerning dispersed residents' gathering together. No. 12 Preparatory matters for the future reform of the organ to guide the Whice Russians. No. 13 Other matters for instruction Separate volume No. 1 Gist for the intensification of the training for the whlte—Russiarix young men and boys. (draft) No. 2 Gist for the ildance of the T"hite Russians' national defense physical training, (draft) No. 3 Gist for the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language among the "rhite Russians. No. I - Concerning general principle. 1. Whether they are_men or women o^ whether they wish lt or not, the White Russians shall be used powerfully and to the maximum degree jCnc-the war with tFre-±LQvlet_J[nion, especially for the secret war with the Soviet Union. ЬОС. NO. 1956 Page 2 2. Belief to be willing to join the anti-comintern c-t-rifo witb ine-. to share i—y-'ss and^sulfering, or life and death with J?.na--i; .-^Н^ЛЛ—roughly established. StiorTs shall also be made for ihe cultivation of a violent indomitable fighting spirit. 3. Those who are available shaJULiie„allowed to retaip t heiiL,raciral-e ha г а с b r i з t-î -o and they shall be protected better^ thanjbefoie. As to those who are rot available, we should not only deny racial consideration, but we must take rreasvres for anti-espionage against them. Bad elements shall be strictly dis- posed of.. Fo. II - The limit of those who should be treated as White Russians Those who can be used directly or indirectly for the war with the Soviet Union shall be treated as White Russians, con- sidering their racial characteristics. They shall be divided as follows: (1) Those who are beins? used, at present, directly or in- directly for the secret war with the Soviet Union by the Intelli- gence or by the other army authorities: those whom we are train- ing and mooring with the .Intention to make use of in future, and their families (A). (2) Those who can possibly be used directly for the war with the Soviet Union now or in future and their families (B). (3) Those who cannot be used directly now and In future, but who may possibly become loyal to both Japan and MA5CHUKU0 and who can contribute directly to the war with the Soviet. Mo. Ill - Concerning the guiding principle. Out of the necessity of attaining the special object of the army, we should let the Vhite "Russians retain their racial characteristics and lead them to cultivate anti-comintern thought. Though we admit_J^eii^wish to return to their, homeland we should- expect them to perform their "dut7~as~~the nation of MANCHTJKUO. At the same ti^e, we should lead them especially to lay to heart the ideal of the establishment of the Greater List Asia based upon the spirit of universal peace and bar irony, and tp_msh -toward. the ̂ destruction of the communist repine with an indom^^bleflght- ingI«aS4tM._5harinr happiness and suffering and life~~ana death-: with us яп^ wi fihing~Tnr[ t.h101̂ т»яг»1ят -prosperity in tne cc-p~foŝ _ perity sphere controlled by Japan. Fo. IV - Concerning cultivation of indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit. In view of the fact that there are some among the White C I T 1 DOC. NO. 1956 . Page з Russians, especially amor- the ci^y residents who are ant to for- get__the original—ri,1 ИЗ 5a Ш — r ' ^ Ry.:--'av|,--;T and wish only for I/С| the quiet life to no purpose, wither.-, really understanding the situation and not changing their old way- in their daily life and !in other things, we zre 1 by ev - opportunity, try to convince them our guiding princi jle. le s hould especially guide their to cultivate the indomitable fighting spirit to be willing to join _ the anti-comintern strife, excluding their relative attitude. 's/e \sfacyuld l^ad thfiip̂ to guard agajx^tjrriv^^ gayety and ?e practical insTeadfT~gna strengthen a sound ana healthy spirit. No. V - Concerning reward and punishment. Each person shall be -riven a different treatment in pro- portion to his available value. Pad elements shall be properly suppressed or disposed of. Reward and punishment shall be given justly. 1. The following arrangm-nt, for a good treatment shall be made for those coming under 2 of Article No, II (A) (1) Increase, in ̂ rations, (2) Reduction of taxes Tto be enforced within the limit of the law, keeping in contact with the authorities in the actual place.) (3) Convenience for children's educstion (priority for the use of the dormitory and support in tuition). (4) Gratis for rewriting the foreign residential cer- tificate. (5) Priority in business у empHoyrent^the use of charity and relief facilities. 2. Towards the superior ores among the students and pupils, members of the Young Геп' s Corp/-:-embers of the Volvnteer Corps and the Japanese Language to.'ool students cf 2 of Article No. II proper measures shall be taken into consideration for their good treatment with the object of giving them encotragement. 3. To 3 of Article II, a special go id treatment shall not be given, although racial consideration гhall be given. 4. Towards the ones who will not fo. low our guidance and towards bad ones and their families, resulute steps shall be +aken .when necessary, in addition to the reduction or suspension of nation and other measures of suppression. No. VI - Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrange -ents. It is needless to say that tha r>.it-> Ensslans_who are the saae_ race_as—the -Red—ones and who live among them should De more DOC. NO. 1956 Page 4 prudent than the FA?TC-FRIANS, FOFEANS or MONGOLIANS. They should further refrain absolutely from having contact with the Red Rugs- ians_ on their own accord and keep aloof from the company of bad MAFpHTOIANS. In everything they must not act in such a way as to be observed with sufcicion. "re rust lead them to intensify the system of their mutual watch and joint resDonsibility, while, on the other hand, strengthening inspection and secret espionage toward them ana thus making assurance doubly sure for anti-es- pionage. Prevention, of their having.touch with the Red Russians R-IIG^i qhall ЪР ЧАРД to try t:> nheck themselves- from"getting in touch with the Red ones, this step must be taken carefully and in a clever manner so as not to excite the Soviet side uselessly. (1) Strict investigation shall be made to see whether there is any Red one mixing Into various arrungments and organi- zations of the 'rhite Russians, and necessary measures shall be adopted, especially as to the ratter? which ™ay effect the Soviet side, they shall be submitted to the Fead 0 fice beforehand, giving the details. (a) (b) gather.together. Ration system and ration station. Schools and placeз where young men and women Temples and charity and relief arrangements. Trade union, enterprises, and employment. Neighbors* Society (TOFAPIGFKI) Residents association. - — (2) It is our principle that the 'V'hite Russians who keep company with the Red Russians shall be strictly punished by oral instructions It shall be made thoroughly known that this shall be strictly observed thoroughly and the ones who will not stop shall be punished properly. (3) The hite Russians who happen to live next to the- Red ones shall be removed to some other suitable ulaces. bility. Intensification of mutual watch and joint responsi- (1) The neighborrs society shall be led strongly. The leaders and assistant lei Зё r s s hall Jhs._£alke ted carefully. They shall point out harmful elements by mutual inspection, and esta- blish the system of joint responsibility in each section. DOC. NO. 1956 Page 5 (a) The- Interior Inspecti n__shall _he.-intРПs 1 f 1 fed-Jjpr__ each residents association and other kinds of associations. Their leaders^gRall he absolutely resnrv-HMfi fnr the conduct of their Inferiors or the membersT" Eacl~ society or group shall establish- he' sуst e nr~of" QIpit reao'nslbili tr. 3. Intensification of general inspection and secret es- pionage and encouragement of early examination. Inspection and espionage by the gendarmerie and police authorities, not to speak of the special mission shall be strengthened. Suspected persons shall be inspected at an early stage. No. VII - Concerning intensification of the training of young men ard-boys. Concerning Intensification of the training of young men and boys, we have made a representation of oar opinion to the authorities, based û c-n the separate volume No. 1 "Gist of -Strength- ening of the training of the White Russian Toung Fen and Boys (Draft)." Regarding the application of the labor Service Ordinance of MANCHUKUO in order to carry out a long term camping, we must put it into operation after a decision is •-ade by the authorities but as to the other matters, the training which are being given now shall be more strengthened and renovated. No. VIII - Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training. Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the "Gist of the Enforcement of the Na- tional Defence Physical Training for the White Russians. (Draft)" We are told that it is impossible to carry out this plan as a whole this fiscal year, because of the expenses, materials and other reasons. As for the Intelligence however, it has been de- cided that the following plan shall be put in operation in each actual place. 1„ Measures shall be taken to spread and. intensify all the more the training for gliders already in one-ration. 2. Measures shall be taken to spread and encourage all the more the making and competition of model planes which is being undertaken in some places. 3. Concerning the construction of г parachute tower, we should try to bring about the atmosphere for it, calling to the influential groups or persons in the actual places. 4. From the point of view of anti-espionage, it shall be clearly understood that the above training measures shall not be given to the White Russians only, but to general Japanese, MAFCHURIANS and MONGOLIANS. No. IX - Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education, Concerning the diffusion and .p̂ 2̂ tratioa.j3£-4;hj Ja^.n^ns. Ianguag£_j2iiucaticn, we have made a representation cf our opinion -tcTthe authorities, in accordance with the separate volume No, Я "Gist of the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanc.se la? guigo fs (Draft)" Regarding the matters, depending upon the arrangements (of the М С Н Ш М Teleuhcpr-i and Telegraph Company and the South- / MAFCHURlAJV kallwayJIornpf^. they shall be enforced after they have ( / been-decided upon by theauthoribies. As to tho following matters efforts shall be made to intensify and promote them in the actual places. 1, Concerning the Japanese language School already in operation, it shall be intensified all tne more. 2. ТЬр Wb-'tp-Frisian residents association and the cultu- ral societies shall quickly undertake c.r.e aii'fus.Lon~g^the^ Jjr̂ anes language according~~tEr the principle of the Japanese language Schoo 3. Necessary propagation shall be put in practice in order to promote the interest of the general public for learning Japanese, 4. For the stvdsnts cf superior ability, good treatment shall be given concerning employment and allowances, 5. TJie-iap̂ ê e-iafiiguafie column shall be established in ;he Russianpapers and magazinesо Jo. X - Concerning tho city residents' return to farming. According to tho following principle, the return to farm- ing s h a l l _ o r d e r to lead the T7hlte Russians to contribute to food -production r as well as to cultivate a scvnd \ andnieaTthy "spirit and heighten a suitable character for the per- sonnel required fortfoe secret warfare. 1, ThIs shall be carried out for each race in order to facilitate the guidance of th- racial movement, based upon poli- tical espionage standpoint. 2. This shall be carried out voluntarily, apart from the special emigrants, according to the following principle, (1) This Plan shall be based uoon the city pcpu.latJ.on dispersal plan which is being carried out by tho КАКСШТСГО Govern- ment. It shall be guided in a positive manner by the colordzatior organs in provinces and "HSIEN" ("district). *ЬОС. КО, 19^6 Ра-е 7 (2) In order to facilitate the enforcement of the above plan, attention shall be paid to the following details. (c) Places shall be selected, as beat as possible, where building mifcenais can be obtained without difficulty. (a) Concerning the attainment of seeds, proper steps shall be quickly taken by the adjustment committee through the relative organs cf the province of "Esien." (e) The pi! see shall be chosen taking into'consideration the guidance cf the Ynite Russians and transport facilities. The residents shall be gathered together as best as possible. No. XI - Concerning the gathering together of the disnersed resi- dents. In order to facilitate the guidance and training and also inspection and anti-espionage we must try to gather together those ̂ aiJfiL-Esassjbaee whs 11 у ersed in various places as best as possible. Т.,Is shall be carried o.vc following the preceding "Article NoT'X. No. XII - Preparatory matters for the future reform of the '7hite Russians guiding organ (given orally). No. XIII - Other matters for instruction. Concerning the enforceunent of collective education of the military training instructors. 1, It is scheduled that a collective ca-ping education shall be given by the -ead Office for five days from 1 July with the object of convincing the "liite Russian military training in- structors in various places of the guiding principle and instruct them the method of guidance of practical courses. Each branch office shall select the participants as follows, and report to the Head Office by 25 June. (1) HAILAR pranch Office HAIIAR 2 MANC:iURI 1 YAKOSEIE 1 SAFHO 2 (2) • Т1АЖ1ЛГG brarc'i Office ETTAPKIAFG 2 FFLUNG 1 H MT2,A0H0TZ~ 1 (3) CHIAJTGSU Pranch Office CHIn?RTS3F I DOC« NO. 19е)6 (4) HEIHO Branch Office. HEIHO 1 (5) MUKUDEN Franch Office MUKUDEN 1 HS INKING 1 (6) DAIFEN Branch Office DAIREN 1 (7) Head Office HARBIN 3 TSIT3IHAR 1 Page 8 APULONI (2) Concerning the transfer of the jurisdiction of the guidance of the "hite Russians in the HSINKING Special City to the HARBIN Special Mission. It is scheduled that the guidance of the White Russians in HSINKING Special City shall he placed under the direct control of the Head Office from 1 July. Regard- ing the details, instructions shall he given separately. The MUKUDEN branch office shall take charge, as before, of the guid- ance of the '"hite Russians in various places in KIRIN Province, and in view of the status quo of KIRIN and the district around the "dam", investigation shall be irade so as to have the instruc- tors reside permanently for the guidance of the T"rhite Russians around these places. The concrete plan shall be handed in by the end of June. 3. Concerning the tour of inspection to Janan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA. The, tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHFRIA which used to be undertaken by the Japanese Language School, the Concordia (HSEH-HO) Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc. shall not be given this fiscal year. There will be no ob- jection, however, tc the Concordia Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc., making use of the HARP'IN Exhibition which is to be held from 1 August to 20 September. 4. Concerning the control on the removal of residence of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO. In view of the fact that the ration system is getting complicated and also of the prin- ciple of intensifying the city population dispersal plan and anti-espionage arrangements, the change of rbode of the White Russians in MANCFUKUO shall be controlled as follows: 1. Removal from, farming villages to cities shall be \ checked. 2. Though the return to farming and the gathering to- gether shall be much encouraged in moving the '"/hite Russians into the district belonging to the other secret mission control organ, report shall be made mutually between fch? organs concerned. г Doc. N0. 1956 Page 1 с а н т I F I G A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.S.G.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Amy Information Section."— The Direct» ions in relation to the guidance of the TThitg Russians" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Militav Prosecution Department. I.IgSCOW. on or about March 21 194 6 . and that the original of the said docu- ment may be found in the archives of the said department. I-toscow. I do further certify /а/ Lt. Col. ТАЙД1ДЖР (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, 17 Mav 194-i. 0» / , Document No. 1971 Top secret PLAN FOR CARRYING OUT TKS TRAINING OF WHITS RUSSIAN YOUTHS IN THE SPECIAL IMMIGRATION SETTLE?"ENTS 5 KHARBIN SPECIAL 1. Object 2. System of Instruction 3. Training Instructors 4. Personnel in charge of local training 5. Term of Training 6. Outline of types and programs of Training 7. Trainees 8. Funds necessary for Training 9. Outline of Education 10. Methods of Assistance. SERVICE AGENCj CONTENTS -1- DOCО1971 \ Д. с OBJECT о Training of white Russian youths in the special iauiiigratlen settlements taking into consideration their characteristics шаг involve appreciation of the spirit of the foundation of the iianchurian Effipir-e and a heighterdng of their feeling of reliance on Japan and ManchukuOc At the same time wa most promote their anti-communist, anti-Soviet feelings ana confirm their enthusiasm for the restoration of their fatherland as a means of cultivating personnel for espionage work against the Soviet, threat in case of emergency,-, 2, SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION The commander of the fiAMilN Special Duties Organization shall be responsible for the uriiorm training nt the whits Russian youths in the immigration settlements о The commander of the HARBIN SPECIAL Duties Organization shall appoint Japanese officers as training instructors for instruction of local training. These instructors will take charge of all planning end leadership after they have fully conferred with group leaders Iincluding all general "пТАМАЙ" and oelowj and the head of the loCcu. office0 Training in ТлШЭДаМ immigration settlement and its execution idll be tatle the responsibility of the commander of the CKIAMUSSU Special Duties Organization 3« TRAINING INSTRUCTORS Training instructors will take charge oi military training and civic education and at the same time will be responsible for anti-espionage controlo He will also help with the duties of the local office and will submit reports at the appropriate times on their supervision and leaderships Training instructors will consist of Japanese officers vdth Japanese non-commissioned officers attached to thaa0 ла assistant officers., the Russian officers and non-commissioned officers from the Special ASaEO ВЦТл1 will be despatched,, Training instructors will draw up a training program for the new term before it begins, and have it sanctioned by the commander of the HARBEJ Special Duties Organization» 4, TK3 PERSGHNEL IN CHARGE OF LOCAL TRAINING. The training school headquarters shall be established in the office of the immigration settlement and the group leader will be in charge of the training» The group leader shall appoint two white Russians from within the immigration settlement as his assistants in military training and civic education and also shall appoint a number of White Russian leaders in every village for the same purpose0 The assistants and leaders appointed for this military training shall be selected from the personnel discharged from the AS^KO Unit and the assistants aid leaders appointed for civic education shall be selected from leading members of the local Russian coamunityc Occasionally the HAEBIN Snecial Duties Organization will send out Japanese and white Russian lecturerse nil personnel stationed at the local office will assist the group leader in civic edueation0 e2e5 we, 1971 5о TERM OF TRAINING. The term of training will extend from 1 April to 33. March the next year. The standard training period shall be 300 hours a year for «nilitary twining and citric sducati on, 6, OUTLINE OF TYPES AND PROGRAMS, Training will be divided into two typos,,,,..-training by individual communities and collective trainings (1) Training by individual communities,. From 1 April to ths end of February + h? rnxt year, except for the faming eeason of sewing, reaping end harvesting, the standard period for military training shall b* 90 hours г year and for civic education 30 hours. The leaders will be responsible for th? exscution of the military training &rd civic education of ratrh community c The personnel in charge of the training shall not only go around to each community to give hie personal leadership, but will also post assistant trainer appropriate in each community to give direct instruction, This can be done by combining two or acre village" into oca according to clr- cy/astences „ In connect ion with this education, the students vrill have to do appropriate labor service to assist in cultivating thoir spirit of cooperation,, As far &e civic education is conccmcd. rc aiz "to contribute by its Keens to the enlightenment o.f the general public as long as there is no interference with the education of the students themselves» (2) COLLECT'УР, TRAJEING In Harch, the last month of the training term, collective training will be carried out for about a month (a period totaling 130 hours). For military training squads and sections will be organized on a village basis for the performance of ceremonial drill, battle drill ond field service with the discharged Berbers of A&ANO Unit as the staff. The students' aggressive spirit and will to cooperate rv.ot bo cultivated by drills and battle maneuvers, night actions, field duty, indoor duty liia, cooking;, ganaes and huntingj leadership and training must be o«ch as will prepare their, agsinet bandits attacks and enemy xaneisvcrs frop the exterior£ The students' closing ceraxory will be held on 31 March (the great Cossack festival day in the Far East) on which occasion the group leader shall publicly honour all those of outstanding meritо School children and all othar kinds of corporate bodies will be asked to Join and there will be all kinds of sports and games. дасг i97i 7 о TRtJSEES These comprise young ircmj,grants of 18 to 30 and physically fit9 who агз divided as follows: lo Trainees discharged from the army who are keeping in practicej 20 Preparatory trainees not yet enlisted (18-23 years eld)„ 3o Untrained students (24 to 30 years old)c 3. FUUQ5 KEGESSART F03 TRAINIHG. As a rule the funds for subsidizing special settlers and for training will be used to meet the expenses for personnel,, equipment, training materials and other sundry expenses; ^пи»n^nf-. nf frf-p идррта Рр^-;»^ Duties Organization will be responsible for checking_and apportioning the ex- vVirft nf thnafl fimds^ Other measures in addition to this budget may" be taken with the permission of the commandant when recognized as being especially necessary0 9c OUTLIKE OF EDUCATION» (1) Spiritual education*. The spiritual education imparted by means of military training and civic education shall promote an intensive cultivation of their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo and their anti-communist urge for the restoration of their motherland Its main ®bjcct will also be to accompany the specific military training in cultivating a spirit of fierce aggression and disposition to stand up to hardships and privations,, The training items are as given in Appendix Koolc (2) Military Training. As given In Appendix No020 (3) Civic Education-...is to give them an understanding of the history nf Japap and Manchukuo and of Japan's mission and to_cu3.tlvata their feeling of reliance on Japan a^Janchukud^ At the~~sama time, their anti-Soviet urge for the restoration of their motherland will be cultivated by teachin^fchenTgiB- hiatory of the Russian people""ana ths actual conditions in the Soviet; and by exalting their consciousness of their mission as young men who bear the whole burden of the white Russians and tfceiy-'faEgo They shall also be given a general knowledge and education in such things as Manchurian laws, economy and geography to пг-кз thes the backbone and nucleus of the settlement. The training items are as given in Appendix No020 -4= DOC о 1971 10, METHODS OF aSSIST^NCS Outstanding sti?d«mts will be allwrnd to participate ia the КХОЙ'АХ&Х Japanese language groups' visit to Japan while outstanding stadenta who arc fall-grow? and of enliotossnt ego shall receive special сonaid«ration in thaf.r troatawat after they havo joined ASANC Unit. Thess and similar measures of encouragemmt will be taken to promote the &civanceaent and improvement of this education» А Р Р Э Ш Д 1C SPIRITUAL EDUCATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION С CLASSIFICATION SPIRITUAL EDUCATION -aBB 1 о — . 2. _ 3, ^ 4c - 5- — 6o Greek Orthodoxy. The traditions and virtues of the Cossacko The mission of the white Russian Youth. The Japanese spirit о The true meaning of the establishment of the Japanese army0 The aggressive spirit and military disciplineо (The most important element of a powerful array)„ Exsciplary and inspiring tales of bravery and loyalty in Japanese and Russian history -5- DOC, 1971 CLASSIFICATION С Ш С EDUCATION Russian history The new worlc order and Japan's imperial mission Outline of Japanese hiatory0 The history of the establishment of Manchukuo and the Empire-building spirit Outline of the laws and economy of Manchukuoо Their duty to llanchukuo as its nationals . Facts about the Soviet, Interna tional сonditicne. Miscellaneous civic morals„ REMARKS 1§ Military education, spiritual education and civic education shall b© separated and in view of the special characteristics of the Russians, spiritual education should rouse their racial ardor„ 2) Civic education should augment their quality as citizens of Manchukuo0 STaMDiiRD P.- ВВдЦДВуиДЙЕЗ Т ш " /, ffifc - HI У&ДИИОо TIPS OF TRAINING TRAINING MkTERIALS INDIVIDUAL DRILL FOR PREPARATORX TRAINEES BEFORE THEIR ENLISTMENT 1„ They will perfect themselves in, .all the basic routine performed by soldiers in battle 0 TROOP DRILL FIELD DUTY TTBE OF TRAINING TRAINING MATERIALS INDIVIDUAL DRILL TROOP DRILL They 'Till thoroughly familiarise themselves with all close-order movementa„ Tfcey will perfect themselves in all the movements of a squad warfare and will learn the rudiments of troop drillo i« They will perfect themselves in the movements and technique of patrols, sentries and liaison-men» 2, They will be trained to Cirry out route without failing» 3» They will acquire the rudimenta of camping out с TRAINEES DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY гЯЮ ARB KEEPING IN PRACTICE. They will review all basic battle movements and at the same tim®, they will be enabled to perform the function of assistant instructors,, 10 They will revise all close-order and battle Stovemer tse 2» They will be taught the movements of a squad uoraaander in detail and those of a platooi commander in outlines, FIELD DUTY 10 They will review all the movements of liaison,_earching,pclicing,marching, and camping cut and at the заше time they will be enabled to perform the function of class teachers» • 1Ш11 III 'Ill 'frr— — I -. i . i i . p . . - . . . . - ^ .м . п - . . , » <||MI.I " i n . . П И 1 Щ Ш «111 III Ю* ЯГ1Ч11 I » — И Г И 1 1 1 — — — H I * III • f 11 » I W 1 Щ И • -7. DOC,1971 TRAINING FOR UHTRalEBD STUDENTS INDIVIDUAL DRILL TROOPS DRILL FIELD DUT" lo They will perfect tre:;;. lws in al:. {.fcs basic routines performed 'эу soldiers i: battleо They will familiarize therjBvuliаз r- tr all close order battle movement a be enabled to perform ths function of ?qu.3d leaders о 1, 3. They will perfect theaaelvee in t * •.-c?e- merts and techniques of pr-.tr.xls, з ntries and lifeiton menо They will be trained to carry out ..-i t:' marches without failing. They will acquire the rudir->:r.is o>' camping out. о ТУРЕ OF TRAINING TR*I№G MATERIALS FOR «LL THREE TYPES CF TRAIMEE MILII-JRY LECTURES They will be taught an outline cf all-. -sea • ial matters, concerning the functions of cfe branch of the service, and the regulations and manuals rtf nf И ЛП.О i уахчЪ- INDOOR DUTY Tftult! I«G GYLL.: ДА The custom of emphasizing discipline and courtesy, and especially that of stressing obsdienoe aud harmonious cooperation w.il! he cultivated and taeir good qualities of leadership developed -.О + ̂ К • /TLRNUT. « 9 A — ' — _ .«raw. — , , . . w . ... . И » ; Efforts will be made to dewrlo oh strength and energy or tc impart an outline of hers and also to train s vigorous personality,, -3. I The unenllsted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type and additional training end ra^si^r she!1?, be given both to discharged veterans and tc- these vdt-hnut any training at all. The unenlisted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type0 Their aoliities Tor every type or leadership Will De cultivated In each type of training emphasis will be laid on action ?t night о -9» Doc. N0. 1971 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARAIjlLNKO G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that «the 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Anny Information Section"—The plan to onrrv out the education of White Russian Youths in the special emmigrant .district" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department. Kpggow, on or about ^arch 21. 19A 6 . and that the griginal of the said docum- ent may be found in the archives of the said department. Moscow. I do further certify /в/ Lt. Col. TARAIEIIKO (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, 17 19-Ul.. / . Document Fo. 1957 ff О / P - J ?-yL Page 1 ? > 7 The Principles of the Japanese Propar ganca Campaign against Outer Mongolia Separate paper Fo. 3 of distribution document Fo. 8 related to the secon. conference of Intelligence Section _in 1943._ Published the Intelligence Sec- tion of Kwantung Army June 16 th 19̂ -3. Contents, I, Preface II, Propaganda Measures Towards Outer Mongolia III, Chief Itesas of Propaganda IV, Explanation of Chief Propaganda items and general methods of execution. I. Preface 1. In accordance with the point of view of treating the Soviet Russia and Mongolia as one unit, Propaganda in Outer Mongolia should in its .fundamental idea conform with the propaganda principles against the Soviet Union5 but In actual propaganda the special characteristics of Outer Mongolia oust be taken into consideration. This guide will point out only these special points and give necessary explanation thereof. Propa- ganda towards Outer Mongolia., therefore, shall in general rules follow the propaganda principle towards the Soviet Union and in its expression follow this guide, 2, In executing propaganda according to this guide, contents and methods of propaganda shall be judiciously selected and adjusted within the prese;ibed limits, according to the exist- ing circumstances. II. Propaganda Measures 1gainst Outer Mongolia The same measures shall be taken as t6wards the Soviet Unio? except the following unique pointss jy/p /V//у - к//̂ W ' 7/VjCxe Document No, 1957 1. Tha_jiltimte_ ob jective of propaganda -In Outer' Mongolia. Js positively to induce the Outer Mongolians to become anti-Soviet, ? ge 2. that is,, to cooperate with Japan, objective the the following and in attaining this final propaganda work shall go through something like steps: Stages Object I Probable Phenomena Frustration of public 1st Stage confidence in the present government Opposition of the 2nd Stage military and the popu- lace against the present government. Estrangement from and 1 resistance against 3rd Stage j the Soviet Union, i.e. 1 cooperation with 1. Wholesale clean- 1 up - 2. Cattle slaughter by the people (Delivery evasion) 2. -t—- 1 о 2. ; Japan, f 3. Out-break of riots and re- volts. Oppression by the Red A.rny Numerous riots & revolts о Birth of an auton- omous government under the leader- ship of the Japanese Army. War against Russia Out- break» of a Eusso- Japanes war at certain time. In each stage of the propaganda work, attempts shall be made, with a view to the ultimate, as well as the immediate objective, at the attraction of the Outer Mongolians, especially soldiers, towards our camps, that is to say, at the obtention of pro-Jananese and cooperative elements. 2. The Outer Mongolians possess peculiar manners and customs, while the standard of their civilization is generally low, being exceedingly inferior to the Soviet Russians though slightly more advanced than the Inner Mongolians. In our propa- ganda work, therefore, we must jiave recourse not only to such_ expressions and instances as approximate~to the actual circum- stances jrut also to novel expressions in order to arouse their curiosItyT" Document No. 1957 Page 3". 3. Since Outer Mongolia is a country of a small and weak race, situated in addition between two great powers, Japan and Russia, the inhabitants have a tendency of worshipping the powerful. Mith vie / also to their uncivilized conditions, we should as occasion calls, attempt to show off (plainly display or suggest) our might In conne^jLioiL-With our propaganda worZ7 4. For the sake of' propaganda effects, the racial similarity^ between t he Л а p an ess, я rirl t \ .R Mar go "I sha.ll be utilized to — direct the Mongolians to harbor racial hatred and hostility against the Russians. ~~ - 5. The Mongolian race has .for all ages been emotionally hos- tile to -che гчса.—Therefore, m our propaganda work no mention shall be made as to the relations between these two countries. 6. Heed shall be given to the fact that although there is not much difference between the Inner and the_0in;er Mongolia so~far as~written language is connorned, tnere is" a great deal of cTTfference in the matter of spoken language. IIIс Chief Items of Propaganda 1. The* Outer Mongolians1 deep attachment, to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated. 2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure_flownfall-of the Outer Mongolla shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti- Soviet atmosphere, 3. A.n anti-Choibarsm atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians. (4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand-, and "be military, the government quar- ters, and che general' yuolio on the o^her shall be intensified; in particular, an armed revolt by trie Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated, 5. The racial ccns.;icu.s:isss shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union. 6. Me should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both ill Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy, Document No. 1957 Page 4". protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas, in such a way hinting an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrange- ment between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union. 7. Влг propagandizing the feebleness cf the Soviet Union- we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer' Mongolians. Гг- Explanation of Chief Fropaganda Items and General Methods of Execution. 1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated. (Corresponding to No. 1 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union») / (a) Explanation. The Government of the people's revolu- I tionary party is a general term comprising the party | government, communism in Outer Mongolia and the socialistic \ system. The communism in Outer Mongolia has been imported in its entirety direct from the Soviet Union, and with no great thought foundation, it is nothing more than an incidental by-product of the people's sympathy with the overthrow of the old feudalism. So. there is no sealous devotees of the thought itself, while the majority of the people show no understanding, no interests. Again, the socialistic system is not necessarily very attractive to the general public. Only the younger genera- tion knows no other system. Is for those middle-aged or aged, the attraction of the system does not go beyond the realization that it is slightly better than feudalism; or rather, it may be admitted that they are infernally annoyed at the rapid strides of science ever since the socialis tic revolution. ''On the other hand, the so-called leaders of the "Choi- barsun" Party, which is now in power, are not only exceed- ing^ anxious to keep up their enormous might and influ- ence, but also are well aware that once they lose power they will be immediately and inevitably massacred. Sub- mitting tamely to the command of the Soviet Union, there- fore, they are continuing with their desperate efforts, Document No. 1957 Page 5". by fair means or foul, for the maintenance of their power| in the past they completely subdued all the up- risings that broke out in several occasions and now they have instali3d their followers In all the important posi- tions, 3o, their party is most anxious to maintain the status quo, while at present there is scarcely any other power to offer resistance. But since the post-revolution history of Outer Mongolia testifies that racial opposition would inevitably arise within the party or the army, the foremost emphasis should Ьз laid on the propaganda among party members and army personnel» (b) General Methods of Execution, ilmost identical wit! the corresponding item in the principles of propaganda — towards the Soviet Union, 2, The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be incillcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti- Soviet atmosphere. (Corresponding to No, 2 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.) (a) Explanation,. Strong in racial consciousness and exclusive, the Outer Mongolians have never liked sub- mission to the Soviet Union; but as a result of their habits for several hundred years, they are prepossessed by the idea cf absolute obedience to the powerful (or to the feudal lords, in olden days). If we should enlighten these people in this respect, while at the same time carrying cut Nos, 5 and 7 of the Items of Propaganda, we should surely succeed in fostering an anti-Soviet tendency. (b) General Methods of Execution. Giving familiar examples such as shortage cf commodities^ conscription of men and live stock, increase in imposition, and so "On we should make the Cuter Mongolians realize firstly that all these ware the result of their cooperation with the_ 'SazieJt. Uniciu. Secondly, unlimited mobilization of men and materials from the unproductive Outer Mongolian land not only for domestic use out even for the defense and existence of the enormous Soviet Russia or even for send- ing far WOst to hf^r thr* hr-m r. ̂f d eventually parish Outer Mongolia altogether. Document No. 1957 Page 6". Thirdly, the United States and Great Britain are at present allied with the Soviet Union solely for the purpose of defeating Germany, ar̂ d ones Garmajiy collapses •«j;aey would he sure t.-. wiii^s -̂Tth the Soviet Union, fn ether veede, Outer Mongolia, so long as she remains sub- . missive *cd the Soviet "union, will be subject to Soviet exploitation. These foregoing ideas shall be propagated. As for party members and younger generation, our propa- ganda work shall dwell persistently and with novel word- ings on the proposition of whether it was the objective of the Puts r_llcngc Usa -̂ evojrUtion- to cause, rne rum or Outer Mongc'J io through cooperation with the Soviet Union. 3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians. (Corresponding to No. 3 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.) Explanation and General Methods of Execution. This part should read exactly the same as the corresponding part of the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union. In particular, among the intelligent Outer Mongolians in- cluding those who have studied in the Soviet Union, there appears to be a tendency of thinking highly of Stalin and comparatively Ignoring Choioarsun. It is necessary for us to take advantage of this trend. 4, The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, government quarters, an* the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular an s r ^ ^ ' i t by т.Ья т^дп'Ирп ^рту shall be instigated." '(.Corresponding to No. 4 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, m the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.) (a) Explanation. The party government in Outer Mon- golia, it is observed, is an exact copy of that in the Soviet Union, that is, the actual power is in the hands of the party itself although the outward execution is committed to government organs and the like. In the Mongolian society, however, the power of ostensible organs such as the government, the military, and so on has been so сve rwheImingly strong since olden days that every momentous question has had to be decided in the form of a joint conference of responsible representatives of such organs. " Document No. 1957 Page 7. Also In the Mongolian society there has been traditional oneness of military and administrative affairs and ordi- narily military leaders possess great voting rights is a proof' of thin, we have tho cases cf military leaders play- ing an active part in the frequent civil wars cf Outer Mongolia. Furthermore, the manpower mobilization in Outer Mongolia is growing more and more extensive so that there remain at present only a very small number of men that are purely civilians. Therefore, in order to bring about internal disturbances we must needs approach the army and instigate them to armed revolt (or to semi-bandit activi- ties, to begin with;, (b) General Methods of Execution. As long as the party government continues to exist, bloody clean-ups will never come to an end and ir> would be impossible to shake off the Soviet fetters. r"ith this theory, side by side with excitement of racial consciousness (Item No, 5)> we should instigate chiefly military commanders to armed re- volt. 5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union. (Corresponding to No, 6 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.) Explanation and General Methods of Execution. Under this item no special explanation is necessary. Among the items of plotting and propaganda for Outer Mongolia, the one that has the largest scope of application is the excite- ment of racial consciousness With view especially to the extreme stubbornness of tbe Mongolians1 racial conscious- ness, we should tactfully weave this subject into all the other items of propaganda, for that would invariably awake a responsive cord in the hearts of the Outer Mongolians. In this connection, however, care should be taken to direct their racial strife only against the Russians, and under no circumstances whatsoever against the Japanese, the " Document No. 1957 Page 8. 6. We should exaggera-ta _the_.prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia. w,h"'oh in imr'er Japan1 s protection^ and— in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy, pr.-r teotion of -fSlisii-'/S. and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas in such a way hinting an eventual complete independ- ence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, Note: This item hardly requires a special explanation. 7. By propagandising the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mon- golians . Explanation,, Utter failure of several rebellions in the past and hesitation thereafter to plot another in spite of the general public's unwillingness to remain submissive to the Soviet Union and to the party now in power, have been due solely to the belief that the Soviet Union is great and invincibleс So, once we ha^e succeeded, with the help of examples, _£n, convincing the"Fongolians of the vulnerability, of the Soviet. UnTonreoojjjjTrT^",-,fter_rebellloris would inevitably occur in utter turmoil, and herein Ties the necessity of the item. The fact, it is apparent, that both traffic and communica- tions between the Soviet proper and Outer Mongolia is extre^eljr difficult suits our purpose beautifully. " Document No. 1957 Page 1. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TA.R1NEFK0 G.T., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meet- ing of the Kwantung Army Information Section,'1 — "The Principles of Japanese Propaganda campaigns in relation to Outer Mongolia" was delivered to me by the Red A.rmy Chief Prosecution Department, Moscow cn or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document majr be found in the archives of the said department in Moscow. I do further certify Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed) "(Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, 17 May 1946. I \ V — —у < L c L j ^Лхи^ Y ^ G ) ^ д о a • — . . . _ ^ -^T—jMz/ - . " у У ^ " J / / ' ) / « J «V. y<STrlj ^v'^vvv^' _—. I 1 ( f Doc. No. 2661 I Page 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR TEE FAR EAST United States of America, and others, VS adao ARAKI, and others ss AFFIDAVIT I, Torashiro KAWABE (age 56) hereby state under oath as follows г 1. I served as a military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from Januarjr 1932 to March 1934. 2. I admit that the five sheets of documents which were shown to me represent photographic copies of the original of the report which was written in my own handwriting and sent to the General Staff Office at Tokyo from Moscow on 14th July, 1932. I affixed my signature on the back of each photographic copy which I recognized. I admit that the date of dispatch of these docu- ments coincides with the date of "the photographic copy of the envelope. 3. I admit that the other four photographic copies which were shown to me are the copies of the original of the record which Lt. Colonel KASAHARA of the General Staff Office_had Lt. Colonel itAM) A transmit to me in Moscow on 16th July,^193^ The TirsT page of the said four is a copy of my own handwriting, but 1 think the other three are probably copies of the record written by YAMOEA who was my assistant. Torashiro KAWABE To certify the foregoing, I affixed my signature of my recognition on the back of the first sheet of the photographic copies of the documents. Torashiro KAWABE Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kawabe, Torashiro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 3rd day of September, 1946. ~ ARTHUR." A SAWUSKY Captain, J.A.G.D. C E R T I F I С A T E I, 2d Lt. John Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kawabe Torashiro, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japa- nese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant. Dated this 3rd day Of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan. — •L. "~2d" LtT' John"*Hattori~ Doc. Mo, 2660 Page 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR TEE FAR EAST UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. ) ) vs. ) SS AFFIDAVIT ) ARAKI, Sr.dao, et al. ) I, Torashiro KAY/ABE (56 years old), state, under oath, as foilov.rs :- 1. I, Lieutenant-General Torashiro KAWABE, was the Deputy Chief of General Staff from. April 1945 till October of the same year. At that time the Chief of General Staff was General Yoshijiro UM3DZU. 2. The decision concerning the surrender was made by His Majesty the Emperor on August 13, 1945. On August 14, 1945, the decision concerning the surrender was communicated to the Allied Powers by radio. The formal signature of surrender was made by Japanese repre- sentatives on September 2, 1945. 3. All of the secret and top-secret documents and records of tho General Staff had been burned in Tokyo during the time from August 13, 1945 until the day we received from the Allied Powers the orders prohibiting the burning of documents. Among the documents burned were documents of mobili- zation plans, military operation plans, and the documents referring to the guidance of the war, as well as records of Supreme War Council. At that time the burning of secret and top-secret documents was done by persons whose ranks were lower than those of the chiefs of sections of the Army General Staff. Doc. Ко. 2660 Page 2 When the documents were burned. General UMEDZU, Chief of Army General Staff, was in Tokyo. I do not know whether or not any written or oral orders were issued concerning the destruction of all documents of the Army General Staff Office. Furthermore, I do not know whether or not any documents of Japanese General Staff have been concealed. (Signed) Torashiro KAWABE Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kacrabe, Torashiro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 5th day of September 1946. ARTHUR A." SANDUSKY Captain, J.A.G.D. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Raymond K. Nimura, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the J clpciriOSG ol nd English languages, and that this day, tho said Kawabe, Torashiro was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affi- davit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully under- stood and comprehended by said Affiant, Dated this 5th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan. Ч (Signed by) Raymond K. Nimura 2d Lt. AUS Г Documepi: Mo , v / К - J r r l - - -"л F F I P A 7 c' -.rags 1 Name: A.ge: Citizenship: Education: Rank: Last occupation: Shun л EDIT SA 51 Japanese College graduate Ma j or-general j Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army. Interrogation was done in Moscow on the 22nd of February, 194-5. The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S.J., Assis- tant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Mili- tary Tribunal in Tokyo. Q. Enumerate posts you have occupied in the Japanese Army. A. T was graduated from the Military Academy and appointed Second Lieutenant in 1914. Being Second and afterwards First Lieutenant, I served as officer attached to a com- pany in the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in 1918-1923, and I worked as interpreter during the Inter- vention of Japan against Russia in 1919? being despatched to the Third Division stationed in Chita at that time. In 1923 I was promoted to Captain and appointed Company Commander, at which post I served for two years till 1925. In 1925 I entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, studied Russian for one year, and afterwards was ordered to Harbin for one year in order to practice the Russian language, as a trainee of the Far Ministry. Then I re- turned to the First Imperi-1 Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo, After serving as extra-staff officer of head- quarters of the regiment for one or two months, I was despatched to the General Staff Office. I took the post of officer-interpreter there for two years, and for two years more served there in the General Affairs Section of the Second Department. Document No. Г.9̂ 3 In 1932 I was promoted to Major and appointed teacher of the Russian language in the M:ilitary Academy in Tokyo and taught the language for one year and then was trans- ferred to the Harbin. Tokumu-Kikan (the Harbin Special Service Agency), where I assisted the chief of the agency for three years; then I returned to Tokyo, worked in the General Staff Office as officer attached to the JRnssian Section of the Second Department for one year. Q. Where did you serve since that time? A. Since then I served in the war Ministry as Chief of the Administrative Office of the Military Affairs Bureau. Q. Xt-Ĵ s..not —true-,—Cnti] 1937-you served in the Second ( 1 1 g e n e e ) Department of the General Staff, and then were transferred to the •Jar Ministry, served there for three years, and again returned to the General ?taff. If so there seems to have been the interval of three yeaxs-dur-ing-- wh-ic-h period yniT.sErBZ"bot in. the.. pos ition of intelligence officer, but such a case cannot occur usually. "What were"you doing in the War Ministry for those three years? You were engaged in your speciality, weren't vou? A. Yes., I "was a teacher in a school in those three years where reconnaissance officers of the War Ministry were trained. 0. *::hen were you promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel? A. In 1936 when I began to serve in the General Staff Office I was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. Q. '".'hen were you promoted to Colonel? A. While I was chief of the Reconnaissance Officers' Train- ing Srhool. Q. In 1940_vou were transferred to the. Second Department of. the General Staff Office. r'hrt was your duty and how long did you serve there? A. At the rank of Colonel I served for two years as Extra Staff Officer in the General Staff. In reality, however, I was ordered abroad those two years. And after return- Trig t£L-T.n̂ yn j^JLB^ T w^s appointed Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison in Huton, Manchuria, which is situated opposite to the city pi1* Iman and stayed there for more than two years. Document' No. l$8j> Fagc 3, 9. "'hen ware you promoted to Majo:-:~Gsneral? A. Xa 1943 while I wis Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison I was promoted to Maj^r-Geneга1. Q. When were you appointed C.biof of the Harbin Special Ser- vice Agency (Chief of the Intelligence DepartmentTof the Kwantun g A rmy) ? v k. It was in February, 19451. and I remained in that post until the surrender of Japan. Q. Did you participate directly in the occupation of Manchuria in 1931? — A. No, I didn't participate in it. Q. What do you know about the transformation of Manchuria into a military base of' attack on the Soviet Union? A. The Japanese Government increased the Japanese troops in Manchuria and newly constructed railways, roads, air- fields, various kinds of storehouses and other military equipments for the purpose of turning Manchuria into a military base against the Soviet Union. I saw these facts in person while I was an assistant officer of the Harbin Special Service Agency. Q. How many airfields were there in Manchuria in 1936? A. There were 9-10 airfields in 1936. In 1942 the number of them increased a little more, but I cannot tell you exactly how many there were. Q. How many railways were there in 1933? A. In 1933 there were two railways. Q. And in 1936? A. Before 1936 the third railway was newly constructed and in 1942. the number of the trunk railway lines increased 5-6 times as many as before. Q. For what purpose were these equipments in Manchuria con- structed? For the purpose of starting aggressive operation against the Soviet Union. Doeunept No. 1963 Page 4. Q. You served for three years in the 'rjar Ministry as a teache of the school where reconnaissance officers were trained. Tell me what lessons were taught there. k. The Foreign states, art of collecting and arranging re- ports and investigation of foreign languages were the basic lessons. Q. What were the supplementary lessons besides these? A. The supplementary lessons given to the reconnaissance officers were to learn specially the fiiture intalligence jaim and prjictice "adlo business, and to.study how to keep s~ecrets. Q. 'are sabotage activities taught? < — » A. In these two or three years theyjaave been taught.^ Q. Do you know the names of the officers who taught sabotage activities? A. I don't know their names. Q. What did you. teach yourself? A. I taught the art of intelligence. Q. where was your school? A. Our school was situated in one part of a building at Kudan, Tokyo, under the administration of the "rar Ministry anc1. the school was a small two-storied building. Q. By what name die1 the military call your school for the people near it? Had the school any number? A. The school was called the Коho Kimrmiч Yoin Kenkyusho. (The Be sea rnh Tn.qti tr»t<n for the Hear Service ?/• r 3 onne 1) for the people. Q. What did the ordinary people take the school for? A. The ordinary people thought that it was a part of the TJTar Ministry. Document No. 1983 Page 5. Q. What do you know about the military operations at Changkufeng? A. I know that there occurred hostilities near Changkufeng in 1938 and its aim was to reconnoitre in force the real might of the Red Array by fighting. In the encounter parti- cipated a Japanese division of the Korean Army and it ended in the defeat of Japanese trooos. Two more divi- sions from the Kwantung Army were dispatched to the place of the encounter, but as the battles ended before their arrival, these two divisions of the Kwantung Army couldn't participate in the encounter. Q. 3y which side was the encounter at Changkufeng started? A. The Japanese Government reported that at first firing was opened by the Red Army, but afterwards I could reach the I conclusion that the encounter was started by the Japanese I Army._ Q. Do you recognize that the encounter was an aggressive one and was commenced by the initiative of Japan? A. Yes, I recognize it. Q. Tell me what you know concerning the encounter at Noraonhan. A. The incident occurred in„153£ and I think that this encounter was the same as that at Changkufeng. In the encounter participated a division of the Kwantung Army and. several other independent forces and the commander of these forces was Lieutenant-General Michitaro J^O^TSTTBAPft, the former chief of the Harbin Special Ser-_ чНрр \ p-nnny—pnr the former m-j ] i tnту n t/F> rhe to t,he__ Japanese Embassy in ''ORPOW, and for the purpose of re- lieving tnese Japanese forces a division of the Kwantung Army was newly despatched, but as the Japanese Army was defeated before its arrival, it couldn't participate in the battles. 0. /By which side's initiative was the encounter started and I what was its cause? Document No. 1983 Page 6. A. I think that the encounter was started to reconnoitre I the jrealJj^jfot And the encounter at « Nomonhan was sTarfed .by the initiative of Jnnqn^ but the Japanese Government, as it did in the case of the Chang - kufeng Incident, gsyea^false conception to the Japanese oeople that the Nomonhan Incident-also was started by the Mongolians and that Japan was only obliged to defend its own territory. Q. Who do you think are responsible for the encounters at Changkufeng and Nomonhan? A. I think that the General_Sia£l^ the .Kwantung...Агщу .and the Japanese Korean Army ar^ responsible for the Emperor 1 and the nation. Q. r?ho was the chief of the General Staff then? the General Staff was His Imperial Highness Q. Wha,t do you know concerning the plan of gan-toku-en (A special grand maneuver of the Kwantung Army)? A. From the conversations with Colonel Saburo HAYASHI. Chief of_the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff and other officers, I learned that the plan of the Kan-toku-en was quickly drawn UP after the start of attack on the Soviet Union by Germany in 194. and its contents were the plan" of preparation of mili- tary operations for the purpose of taking military aggression against the Soviet Union by Japan. And in connection with my duties I was personally aware of some measures with regard to the "Kan-Toku-En11 plan. Q. When did Colonel Saburo HiMISHI speak to you concerning the plan of the Kan-toku-en? A. In autumn, 1942. Q. Where? A. /This conversation took place in an office room of the /Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff. Document No. 1983 Page 7. Q. Who drew up this plan personally? A.. The chief of the First Section of the Kwantung Army Head- quarters drew it up. Q. Was the plan investigated in the General Staff? A. Yes, the plan was revised and. authorized by the General Staff. Q. A. Q. A., Q. rho were in reality engaged in the clan in the General Staff? The chief of the First Department of the General Staff revised it, but his name I forgot, and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the General StaffT authorized it. And was TOJO connected with the plan? As General TOJO was then the War J^inisjtgr, without his consent this plan rrmld not be drawn up, he was con- cerned in the plan, of course. Do you know yourself anything about the contents of this plan? A. t n 4 ' A, I could form the general idea concerning the contents of this plan with the aid of several data investigaged by me while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison. That in 194-2 by the Fifth Army, one part of the Kwantung Army - enforced a war game as a means of preparing the realization of the Kan-toku-en plan. One of the designs of the war game was as follows: The Fifth Army was to give ч blow t.n F^d Army frm.i the east side of Lake Hanto, interrupt railways and in this way Isolate Maritime Province and the south corps of the Кос Armv from the central part of the Soviet Union. Did you see any documents stamped "Kan-toku-en"? Yes, in 1943 I saw such documents concerning a financial account of the expenditure which was pa id. out of the Kan-toku-en budget. These documents also testify the active- preparations for the realization of the plan. Document No. 1983 Page 8. Q. How do you happen to know about the increase of the number of soldiers in Manchuria, the construction of new roads, etc., responding to the Kan-toku-en plan? A. I learned about these facts by my own inspection when I arrived at my now post as Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison. 0. You told that you were abroad from 1940 till 1942. Tell me the import of your duty in this period. A. Twas ordered by the General Staff to Europe in order to investigate the administrative organization of the coun- tries occupied by Germany. The object of the investiga- tion was t о ma ke my ins ре с t i ons a vaJJLable to the solution vof problems concerning the administrative organization of \ tha areas whic.n wouio. be occupy red hy .Тярпп iri -НЬР war v/i jgh G£jjrfc_Brit?in, _China_̂ _America. arid in on ̂ of a war against ,. 11 hilsoviiit-t i n i nxur Q. How long did you stay in Europe? A. I went to Europe in 1940 and stayed there for about two years. Q. Accordingly you returned to Japan in 1942. What countries did you visit? A. Yes, T returned to Japan in 1942 after visiting Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden,. Switzerland, ЯряТпand~ Pnrtriga-U. 'ma I visited Spain, Portugal, Sweden,, •Switzerland and other countries only for the purpose of making an ordinary journey. My duty was done chiefly in Berlin. Q. Did you send any report from Berlin to Tokyo concerning your duty? A. Yes, having learned from the attache that the Kwantung Army was preparing for aggression against the Soviet Union, I Q. ""'hat did you say in that telegram of yours? A. I wrote in the telegram the datn T collected and when I returned to Japan I wrote a report. Document No. 1983 Page 9. Q. From where did you obtain the data for the purpose of investigating the order and administration for the occupied territories by Japan? A. For the purpose of investigating the administrative organi- zation I availed myself of the data obtained from news- papers and magazines and reports from the Japanese officers and civilians in Germany and other countries. Q. Did you know that Germany mobilized working power of the occupied territories and directed it to its industries? А. I didn't know about it. Q. Iknd do you know the fact that Germany used P.O.W.'s in its (munition industries? A. One of the Japanese nationals saw P.O.W.'s used in the coal-mines in Ruhr when he ?/ent there. Q. And did you hear many foreign people were massacred in its occupational territories? A. I heard that Jewish people were massacred. 0. When you returned to Japan, did you propose in your report that such order as Germany held in its occupational areas be applied in Japanese occupational districts? A. Only within the bounds of general matters, I concluded my argument that investigation of this problem theoretically be further made in view of the necessity of the investiga- tion of nationalities in the occupied territories and. the : esults of the type of German administration in its occupational countries. It was merely a theoretical con- clusion, not touching any actual detail. For I couldn't relate any actual detail on account of the scarcity of my knowledge about it. Q. Were you ever connected with White Russian emigrants during your service in the Ilarbin Special Service Agency? A. / We used white Russian emigrants as spies and propagandists. / the data for the propaganda used, by them were printed in \ the Press "Harbinskol ureneya". Q. Did you inspect the publication of the data? A. Yes. Document No. 1983 Page 10. Q. Do you know the ASANO detachment? A. Yes. Q. What was that detachment? A.. As far as I remember, the detachment was organized from / White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station in f 1938. Q. ?rhat was the number of the persons of the detachment? A. There were 200-300 men I11 the ASANO detachment. Q. What was the aim of tho detachment? A. The detachment was enlisted into the Manchurian Army and was to be controlled by a commander of the Japanese Army in case of war with the Soviet Union. Q. /6°n you firmly recognize the fact that Japan availed her- / self of "'hite Russian emigrants in espionage and sabotage I activities on a large scale? A. ^es, т can firmly recognise it. 0. TChat do you know about the fact that the Russian emigrants were used in the above-mentioned purposes? A. The Japanese side used the Trrhite Russian emigrants as spies, propagandist^ and saboteurs, and in order to create disturbance in th^ Soviet Union territory. Japan organized three detachments of the "liiuc Russian emigrants at the Second Sungair Station, Haiiar and Hengtaohotsu. Q. "rho was the commander of the Sungari Party? A. It was Colonel ЗгИгппу.- I don't remember exactly who were the commanders of the Haiiar and Hengtaohotsu detachments. The commander of one of the two parties was Peshkov, but I don't remember which detachment he commanded. Q. Do you know yourself Smirnov? A, Yes, I know, Q. How were you connected with Russian emigrants while you were an assistant of the Harbin Special Service Agency? Document No. 1983 Page 11. A. 0. I participated in establishing "the Russian Emigrants Bureau" in Manchoukuo. How many Rus ian emigrants were there in Manchuria? A. / I think there were approximately 70,000 White Russian emlgr-pnt.g In Hanr»hivr1r> than. - 0. What was the purpose of "the Brem" (the Russian Emigrants Bureau) in itself? * A. It consisted in bringing together 'hite Russian Emigrants around Japan for tho purpose of widely enforcing anti- Soviet movement. Q. Did "the Brem" work und^r the control of Japan in such a way? A. x Yes, "the Brem" existed completely under the control of ^•stspan. Q. /In Harbin there was a school for saboteurs. Who was the ^director of this school? A. Yes, in Harbin existed such a school, and Major MUF.ATA was the director. Q. When was this school established? A. This school was established in about 194-3, and in 1945 still existed. Q. What kind of parsons were allowed to enter the school as students? A. They were officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Japanese Army. Q. Tell me in detail concerning the White Russian Emigrants Fascist Party. A. /Such a party existed in reality, of which leaders were f Rozaevoky, Matkovaky and Dolov. 0. What was the purpose of this party? A. /The purpose of the party was to make anti-Soviet and anti-Jews activities. Document No. 1983 P-ge 12. Q. What was the rolo of the Intelligence organs concerning the establishment of the Fascist Party? A. "'hen I went to my new post in Manchuria in 1933, the Fascist Party (the Russian Fascist Alliance) already existed. While I was staying in Manchuria, the Alliance was given financial assistance by Japan and used in anti- Soviet propaganda. I know well Rozaovsky and Matкоvsky, the leaders of the Alliance. A general Kosmin partici- pated temporarily in the Alliance, but afterwards quarreled with the other .leaders of the Alliance and left the Allianc Q. What kind of assistance was given to "the Brem" in Harbin by Japan? A. /While I was an assistant of the Harbin from 1933 till [l936, "the Brem" did not receive any financial aid from I Japan because it had its own funds, but from about 1937 Jit began to receive financial aid from the Japanese^ Л budget. When "the Brem" was transferred to the Manchoukuo j Government in 1944, the monthly sum of financial aid from I Japan in Harbin city alone must have been more than ten V thousand yen. Q. /Tell me about "the Intelligence Detachment", which be- \longed to that Special Service Agency. A. The duty of what was called "the Special Detachment" that belonged to the Harbin Tokumu-K1kan, conslsl^d in r̂i-i q-t-n-i-h-ing p̂ ri Armv in the rear in case of war with the Soviet Union. 0. How many members were there in this "Special Detachment"? A. Approximately 200. Q. Was this detachment composed in consideration of its members' duality? A. Half o:; the detachment were Japanese soldiers in active service and another half Japanese nationals subject to the compulsory military service. Q. Wore there any 1 Thite Russian emigrants in this detachment? 'Document No. 1983 Page 13. Г о. but Lussian emigrant^ were united into other sabotage detachments (guerilla warfare) at the Second Sungari Sta- tion, in Hailar and Ilengtachotsu. q. Did the Russian emigrant detachments and your "Special Detachment" work positively in 1945? A. Y.Tith regard to what was called "the Special Detachment" of the Japanese Army, which belonged to the Harbin Special Service Agency, in conformity with the order received from the Headquarters of the TCwantung Army. on the 10th of August, 1 9 j I ordered Colonel M\KIN0^ coromander of that detachment, to prepare for its activity. Colonel MAKTNO divided the detachment into three and posted them to the eastern region of Harbin, but as I received the report of the surrender of the Japanese Army on the 15th of August, I don't know anything about the further move- ment of that detachment. As for the Russian emigrant disturbance detachments, I don't know anything. Q. 1,Tere there any sabotage detachments of this kind which belonged to the other Special Service Agency in Manchuria? A. Colonel 0М0Ж, an officer attached to the Senond Section •of!."the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, who had some experience about such a matter gained from his former office in north China by the directions of the Head- quarters of the Kwantung Army drafted a plan of the organization of a Peace Maintaining Troop (the Special guerilla detachment) in order to disturb the Red Army in the rear, composed of four kinds of members, that is, of the personnel of the Special Service Agency (its branch alone, with the exception of Mukden), the police, the military police and the Japanese regular forces. But in consequence of the refusal" of the police to participate in this Peace Maintaining Troop on the 1st of August 1945? the troop was composed of three kinds of members (the personnel of the above-mentioned Special Service Agency*, military police and Japanese regular forces). This Peace Maintaining Troop was to have the duty of positively taking security precautions against spies in time of peace, and to disturb the Red Army in the rear in time of war as I already mentioned. Such troops were organized in Chichihaerh, Mukden and Mutanchiang. Each troop had. several peace maintaining battalions; the 'Document No. 1983 Page 14. A.. (continued) Mukden Troop had 8-9 battalions; the Chichihaerh and Tlutanchiang Troops had 5-6 battalions; that is, there were 20 battalions of this kind in all. The Commander of the Mukden Troop was a general officer ranking with the commander of a division, whereas the commanders of the other two troops were officers ranking with the commander of a brigade. Q. Tell me if there were special units in each battalion. A. In each battalion there was one intelligence company. Q. Were'there any special units of saboteurs in each battalion A. The two companies of each battalion were called peace main- taining companies and it was planned that each battalion should have a detachment for sabotage activities which was to be composed of the native Manchurian people and Russian emigrants. The organization of such a detach- ment was already started v/hen I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Agency, that is, in February and ended/at the end of .June, 1945. The above-mentioned Peace Maintaining Troops hid no connec- tion at all with "the Special Detachment" of the Karbin Special Service A:;ency. The latter had only the duty of carrying out battles in the rear of the Red Army, while the principal duty of the Peace Maintaining Troop was to take"positive security precautions against spies to keep order and to suppress riots in the time of peace and to execute sabotage activities in the rear of the Red Army as a secondary duty in the time of war. The answers to the questions were written by me and I affix my signature hereto. Shun 1KIKUSA (Signature) The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S. J., Assis- tant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.H. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. S. Rozenblit (Signature) The military Interpreter - First Lieutenant Tastenko. A. Tastenko (Signature) Doc. 1983 T;age 1 C E R T I F I C A T E MOSCOW. February 22, 1946. I, the undersigned, Senior Lieutenant- Dr.: i try Ivanovich LASTENKO, military interpreter, hereby cortify to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, that I an thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate oral speech into Russian and that I promise to translate correctly testi- mony of AKIFJSA, Shun. I have been duly warned that as an interpreter I boar criminal responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. Signed: LASTENKO Subscribed to before Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant "rosocutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Signed: ROSENBLIT. CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF TEE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, M. GILDENBLA.T, hereby certify that I am thoroughly con- versant with the Russian and English languages: and tho above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. Signed: II. GILDENBLAT / Doc. No. 1383 Page 1. OATH Z, -<•_-UTS.:, Shun, Major-General of the Japanese Army, hereby premise to testify only the truth on the case of near criminals of Jappn, included in the first list. • I give this ocrth to Colonel S0S3K3LIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, I have been duly warned that for giving false testimony I should bear crim nr»l responsibility under the Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the P., S.P.S.R. Signed: AXIZUSA, Shun February 1946 MOSCOW Sworn and subscribed to Colonel SOSELBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. /в/ Colonel R0SES5LIT Military Interpreter: Lt. LaSTEliKO Doc. Fo. 2369 Page 1. ;M. M. LITYIF07'S DIARY. Talk ifith Yoshisawa, Japanese Foreign Minister over a cup of coffee on December 1531. ] Mr. Y. thanked for the courtesy and attention paid to him during travelling and for "breakfast arranged for him. I told him that we learnt with satisfaction of his having Ъесп appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ее had signed the Peking agreement end in such a way had personally participated in laying the foundation of our present relations, and therefore we wore glad that the preservation of those relations was then in his hands. The preservation of peaceful and friendly relations with all our neighbors including Japan is a foundation of our foreign policy. Mr. Y. replied that ho was proud of the role he had played in establishing relations with us. After his appointment he was not in contact with his Government and therefore could not speak on its behalf, but he personally was in- favor of preserving and improving relations with us and therefore he was glad to hoar from mo of similar intentions on our part. I concurred with Yoshisawa, that prior to the exchange of opinions with his colleagues in the Government he could not make any official statements on behalf of the Government, but that his personal views of relations between our countries were also valuable. I also concur with Y's supposition of the possibility and desirability of improving these |relations, and think that it could be achieved by some new act. We are rinndiirsting negotiations with Poland, are starting negotiations with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Rounania with the aim of concluding pacts \ot non-aggression and neutrality. We have concluded such pacts with ; Germany. Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The pact with France has beciTTnitialled. When these negotiations are completed and the pacts signedT,"ve shall bo bound by the pacts of non-agression with vall our neighbors with the exception of Japan. We consider that this gap should be filled, otherwise there will be a queer situation that Japan will be our only neighbor who has no pact of non-aggression with us. Such a pact expresses the peaceful policy and intentions of the Governments, and it will be well-timed especially now when the future of the Japanose-Sussian relations is the subject of speculations in Wflptnin Europe and America. The conclusion of this pact would put an end to these speculations. I therefore decided to make use of the opportunity of forwarding through Yoshisawa a proposal, to the Japanese Government to. open negotiations concerning the conclusion of the non-aggression pa.ct. This proposal took Yoshisawa, just as well as Eirota who attended the talk, obviously by surprise. Having inquired in deta.il about the progress of negotiations with other countries mentioned by me in Doc. Но. 2369 Page 2. the course of our talk, Yoehizawa again repeated that he had Ъееп suddenly called from Paris to Tokyo and had, therefore, no time to make the policy of the new cabinet clear to himself, but that he certainly would not forget to forward our proposal to the Government. Ее asked whether that proposal had been made by us before, through Eirota, or comrade Troyanovsky. Comrade Karahan made it clear to him that in Tokyo in 1928 and even in 1У30 there were conversations on the subject. I added that, of course, v;e did not expect to receive an official reply from Yoshisaws., 'which ге would be forwarded through comrai Troyanovsky, or Eirota, but I was intoro^bod to know Mr. Yoshisawa's personal opinion. Y. refrained from further talk or. that subject and asked me whether I wanted to forward anything to Tokyo. The copy is correct„ diPLECToh of tee state сЕытадь RECOPJD OFFICE OF TEE U. S. S. li0 Professor Msksakov CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF TEE A507E ХЮСШЕНТ: I, A. Y. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages! and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document. Signaturс r /s/ A,., Eunin Doc. JTo. 2369 / I Doc. No. 2369 Page 1. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I. . a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a copy of К. M. Litvinov's diary-record of his talk with Oshlsawa, _ ... Japanese j'oreign Minister of Do с ember 31. 1931 on 3 sheets _ was delivered to ne by( the Central State Historical Record Office of the U.S.S.R^on or about June 7 , 1946, and that the original of the said document nay bo found iri the Central State Historical Record Office of the USSR in Moscow^ I do further certify Lt. Col. TARANSNKO _/s/ Signature and rank Tokyo, Japan 2 July, 1946. DOCUMENT 2371 V jv/ page 1 U.S.S.R. NO«. 2ЯС-1 Copy from the copy of the translation* Verbal Note Delivered by ushida to iroyanovsky on December 13, 19.32 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL VERBAL NOTE It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan .and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupu- lously respect the sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each other1s border. Different opih- ions may be maintained, however, concerning the proper time and methods of bringing these satisfactory relations to the formal conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. ' Some people are of the opinion that in view of the fact of the existence of different problems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by meansof a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement. On the other hand the opposite opinion is adhered to by those who believe that first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement. To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations on the subject between the two governments in this case seemsto be untimely-- Perhaps at present it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations; as to the nego- tiations which теге referred to, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created. For the time being it will be of avail if both governments mil confer together on peaceful methods of preventing and solving locally all sorts of difficulties that may accidentally arise due to the fact that the Japanese and Soviet troops are stationed so close to one another. The creation of a Japano-Soviet-Manchurian committee to prevent border incidents may become one of such nEans. The note was delivered to Troyanovsky by Uchida December 1Я, 1932, The copy is correct. Director of the State Central Record Office of the U.S.S.R. May 21, 1946 professor Maksakov. CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF TIE ABOVE DOCUMENTt I, Kaplan, Б.А., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages;, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document. Signature V. Kaplan Doc. No. 2371 Pago 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel Taranenko, G. I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the text of the verbal note delivered ,bv_ UCHIDA to..TROYANOVSKY on December 13? 1932, on 2 shoots. was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Records Office of .the USSR. on or about fttay 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found im the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR. I do further certify Lt. Col. TARANBNKO /s/ ^Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan Document Mo. 2372 The note is delivered by- Troyanovsky to Uchida of January Д, 1933 about the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of non-aggression, on three sheets. Document No. 2372 Pa-••о 2 The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became acquainted with the contents of the verbal note of the Japanese Foreign Office of December 13 of this year in which the Japanese Government declined for the present the proposal of the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanр-я ̂ nnri- aggression pact, made on December 31, 1931 in Moscow by Litvinov, People's Commissar for"Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Yoshizawa who was returning to his country to occupy the post of Foreign Minister. In the above verbal note is recognized the existence of the opinion in Japan to the effect that "in view of the existence of different prpblems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by means of a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement," This argument reflects the similar viewpoint of the Soviet Government and it was the point of departure in its proposal of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that this opinion is shared by the Japanese circles. Unfortunately, we must state, that the Japanese Government did not find it possible to follow this point of view and adhered to the opposite opinion cited in the verbal note in the following vein: "first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement," The consistent development of this argument will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and the refusal of all nations to use таг as an instrument of settling controversies, the latter being the essential element of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agree- ments is pertinent only between two states which have no controversies. Under the conditions of the present economic and political interdependence between nations such state of affairs is hardly existing, nor is it possible, especially between two states which are more or less close neighbors, Tho solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out now ones in the future, particularly if the policj7- of the state develops along the line of aggression and extension of its sphere of influence. It is noteworthy that the states, whether close neighbors or no neighbors at all with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which con- cluded non-aggression pacts with it, by no means admitted the absence of any mutual claims or controversies. Particularly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics quite recently gave Its consent to the conclusion of a non- aggression pact with a neighboring state, with which it has a disputable border and to which it has well grounded territorial claims. Document No. 2372 Page 3 The substance of non-aggression pacts, as well as the substance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact lies in the principle that the states involved, taking into consideration the existence of controversies between them at present, or the possibility of new controversies in the future, refuse to settle them Ъу the use of force. The Soviet Government on its part in no way considers that between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan there are controversies which cannot be settled, or which the Soviet Government refuses to settle by peaceful means. The negation of this would be contradictor;/ to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan are signatories. Proposing a non- aggression pact with Japan, the Soviet Government has in no way ignored that international instrument, but meant to consolidate it by means of bilateral agreement to amplify it and to adapt it to the peculiarities of the relations between both nations. The proposal of the Soviet Government was not called forth by the considerations of the moment, but resulted from all its peaceful policy, end therefore continues in force for the future. On the other hand, it is permissible to doubt that the refusal of one party to conclude the non-aggressions pact would contribute to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the solution of all controversies and the settling of all misunderstandings ..." Delivered to Trojranovsky by Uchida January 4, 1933. The Copy is correct: Director of tho State Central Record office of the U.S.S.R. Professor Maksakov. May 21, 1946 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF TIE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, Kaplan, B.A,, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document: Signature: V. KAPLAN Doc a No*2?/?2 Pago 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO Gc I, а member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby ccrtify tbat tbe text of tvc note is delivered by TROYANOVSKY to UCFIDA of January 4» 19.1.1 about the conclusion of t H Soviet- J?panose Pact cf non-ag.?:cession, c.i 1 sheets was delivered to no by/the C/ntral, "tatс Historical. Records Office of tbe USSR ) on or about May 21 194-6, and that the original of the said document nay be found in the Central Fistoriorl Records Office of the USSR I £o further certify Lt, Col, TARANEKKO /s/ (Signature and rankc) Tokyo, Japan J. NO, 2373 Page 1 SvS;&.B. No. 230-3 Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by Sugesida by the order of TJehida Foreign Ministry tc the Plenipotentiary The note delivered on January 4 to the Foreign minister by the Soviet ambassador in reply to the verbal note of December 13 last year presented Ъу the Foreign Minister to the ambassa- dor on the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the USSR, which was proposed by the Soviet Government, contains an argument 'based on the misinterpretation of the viewpoint of the Japanese Government; besides, it con- tains expressions hardly desirable in view of the interests of the friendly relations between both countries. In the course of conversation between the Vice-Foreign Minister and His Ex- cellency which took place after that the former brought this fact to the attention of the Ambassador and recommended that the Soviet Government should pay its serious attention to it. The Japanese government feels it ncessary to take the advan- tage of this new opportunity to propose that the Soviet Govern- ment further deliberate this problem. In the note of the Soviet government dated January 4 it is stated that, "the consistent development of this argument, will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and those contained in the Kellog-Briand pact," and that "the Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agreements is pertinent only between the two states which have no controversies." To refute this idea the Japanese government can only insist upon the Soviet Government's thorough deliberation of the statement contained in the verbal note of the Japanese Government which reads; "To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations between the two governments in this case seems to be untimely," and "it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations: as to the negotiations mentioned above, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created." The statement contained in the Soviet note to the effect that "the Solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out new ones in the future, particularly if the policy of the state develops along the line of aggression and extention of its sphere of influence," attracted most serious attention of the Japanese Government. NO. 2373 Page 2 The Japanese Government accepts the explanation of the Soviet embassador to the effect that the phrase "the country" did not imply Japan, Need it be said that following the dictates of her constant feeling of justice, Japan has no designs of armed aggression. Indeed, we must'say that in the above verbal note the Japanese Government maintained that "It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupulously respect the Sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each others herder." It is necessary to add that the Soviet Government published the details of tne negotiation prior to having received an ac- quiescence of the Japanese Government. As a matter of principle the Japanese Government had no objections to this being pub- lished since the Government of the USSR would consider it nec- essary to do so, as vice-Foreign Minister made clear to the Soviet Ambassador. But the fact is that the Soviet Government unexpectedly did it though no definite agreement of the opinions of both governments had been effected as to the time and methods of publishing. This step on the part of the Soviet Government, contradictory to the international custom, took the Japanese Government un- awares and it must confess, that it finds it difficult to under- stand what considerations made the Soviet Government do so. Delivered February 13, 1933 by Sugeshida, Director of the First Section of the European-American Department p. proc. Foreign Minister Uchida to Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy Spilvanek to be forwarded to the Ambassador. The copy is correct: Director of the State Central Record office of the USSR. Professor Maksakov. May 21/1946 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, Kaplan, E.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conver- sant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document Signature s/ V. Kaplan Document No. 23'73 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. Colonel TAPANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U. 3. S. R., do hereby certify that copy of the translated text of the Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by Sugesida by the order of Uchida Foreign Ministry to the counsellor of the Embassy for delivery to the Plenipo- tentiary, on 3 sheets was delivered to me by the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. on or about June 7, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the State Central Record Office in Moscow. I do further certify (signed) Lt. Col. Taranenko " (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, July 2, 194-6. Document Wo. 20?! Page 1 The CONTENTS 0? THE NOTE OF THE DEPUTY GENERAL CONSUL OF THE USSR IN KHARBIN OCTOBER 1934, CONCERNING UNLAWFUL [ARRESTS OF THE SOVIET EMPLOYEES. ' To: Mr. Si-Lui—Ben, Special Agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North Мапс^цтИ -No. 011/39 of (^October 23, 1 9 3 * ^ Mr. Special Agent, In his numerous talks with you Consul-General Mr. Slavutsky repeatedly called your attention on his own behalf as well as officially on behalf of the Soviet Government, to the condition of guarding the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and requested that you should take measures to ensure the guard- ing of the line. I would like to remind you of Mr. Slavutsky's statement made on behalf of the Soviet Government as far back as December 15 of last year in which he indicated that "the Functioning of the Chinese Erstern Railroad has lately been carried on in conditions of incessant violations of exploitation rules, attacks on trains, I destruction 01 Ll'SCkS, murders of h&liroad agents, COrmlLting (Violences against them, seizure of railroad, property and the Idestruction~of~Tt7irtrnfortuna£ely? the Mancnurian authorities pot only have not taken and are j3Q±_.t aking_ suff ici ent_.npa sures f.ô assist the Chinese Eastern Railroad and guard, it, but hsAc@_iiiX£ctl^ participated and are participating in the activities detrimental to the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railroad as well as detrimental to the USSR rights thereto." Unfortunately, parallelly with the growth of attacks on the Eastern line of the railroad, the guarding of the line, has not improved, but even has gradually assumed a catastrophic character. It came to that, that the Guard Troops Headquarters considered it possible to officially inform in their letter of May .19 that the guard troops had been removed from freight trains -fee- the Eastern line. 0?*- In connection with the foregoing situation and these new measures of the guard troops Headquarters. Mr. Slavutsky made s protest to Mr. Shimomura acting for з̂ ои, insisting that urgent Document No. 2071 Page 1 'Document No. 1983 Page 2. measures be taken by the high Manchurian authorities. However, I am obliged to state that neither Mr. Slavutsky's protest, nor repeated and almost daily presentations of Mr. Bendura, deputy assistant Chairman of the Board, and later on the presentations of Mr. Kushetsov, assistant chairman of the Board, who came from Tokyo, made to Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, chairman J of the Board, gave no results0 -I pan't_but point out that all these acts just coinciding _with the actualbreakdown of Tokyo negotiations on the sale of the Chinese Elgstem Railroader, the breakdown arranged by the Japanese-Manchurian party, are considered by the Soviet Government as disorganizing the functioning of the Chinese Eastern RAILROAD AND AS a grave violation of the treaty rights of the USSR to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and reflect the aspirations of ^regressive elements trying_ to seriously darken япг) р̂ грп nn^t thjx r^1J£rtiaas_between the two countries which was repeatedly brought to your notice by Mr. Slavulsky in his "talks with you. I am authorized to make a protest against the said acts of local authorities, and I believe. Mr. Special Agent, that you will take measures to set free Soviet citizens, railroad em- ployees, who were illegally arrested? and to restore normal functioning of tho railroad in compliance with existing treaties pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Awaiting your prompt reply, I beg you to accept, Mr. Special Agent, the expression of my profound respect. N. Raivid, Correct: Maksakov, Consul-General of the USSR in Harbin. Director of State Central Record Office of the USSR. CERTIFICATE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, A. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. Signature: /s/ A. Kunin [ i Doc. No. 2071 Page 1. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt, Colonel ТАДШШЖ0. G. I. a member of the military forces of the U. S. S. R., do hereby certify that the text of t ~o official statement of the superintendent pf_ Consulate-General in Kharbin of, Octojbor 19Я4. was delivered to me by Chief of State Central Historical Records Office of the. .USSR on 4 jp_ag.es_._ on or about April 28 , 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR. I do further certify — Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/ Signature and rank. Tokyo, Japan June 14^ _15_46. Doc. Но. 2146 Page 1 Но. 359 December 15, 1934 TO : Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, Chairman of the Board of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Dear Sir, The Director of the railroad in his protest of November 20, 1934 Ho. Ill, 9/1009 states that the seizure of offices and premises be- longing to the railroad by various institutions in Harbin as well as along the line, has become widespread, especially of late. It may be seen from the Director1я protest that in the period from 1930 to October 7, 1934, 101,230 square meters of railroad buildings (29.353 square meters in Harbin and 71.927 square meters along the line) were illegally occupied by the following institutions: The Japanese military command occupied 299 premises with a total floor space 79.867,36 square meters, guard troops - 132 premises, 9,237,79 S. M., Hailroad Police - 19 premises, 1.112,3ft a.m., Commander-in-Chief's office - 15 premises, 991,48 a.m., Harbin Post Office - 9 premises, 489, 07 a.m., Ministry of Transportation - 1 premise, 115,30 a.m., Police Department - 4 premises, 143,45 a.m., Tillage Police - 16 premises, 693,67 a.m., Frontier Police and Police Guard Detachment - 21 premises, 4.932,67 a.m., the Great Harbin Administration - 4 prbmises, 2.446,86 s.m., Department of Education S premises, 986 a.m., Telephone Network - 3 premisea, 120, 56 s.m., private people - 2 premises, 173,99 a.m. on the whole 534 premises with a total floor space 10},280,54 s.m. were illegally occupied. Illegal seizures are distributed as follows: 1930 - 1.687, 99 Square metera. 1931 - 95, 49 1932 - 57.187, 72 1933 - 31.236, 25 и .1 it n II П before October 1, 1934 11.073, 09 s.m. It may be aeen from these figures that almost all aeizures took place in the period of 1932 - 1934. Further the Director of the railroad points out that appeala to the Railroad Police are to no purpose as the officials of the Railroad Police illegally seize the premises themselves. Smashing locks anddoors, .opening doors with skeleton keys or with specially selected keys was their usual method of penetration into the railroad flat s due to the inactivity of the Railroad Police (the details see in the said protest of the Director of the railroad). Doc. Ко. 2146 Page 2 But even after October 1, 1934 the said illegal acts have not ceased, but even increased which is conformed by a number of protests and telephone messages of the Director of the railroad during November and December of this year. Not only temporarily vacant premises of the railroad are occupied, but often are occupied the premises in which live the employees of the railroad who are forcibly moved into other people's flats or thrown out bag and baggage into the street. All sorts of institutions participate in these illegal seizures of railroad premises. Most of the seizures have been effected by the Japanese military, but not less active in that res- pect were the institutions which are specially called upon to maintain law and order, and in particular to protect railroad property, viz., guard troops, railroad and general police, etc. Even the institutions of the Ministry of Transportation arid of the Ministry of Education had a hand in this, and, finally, some private offices and people. All this is detrimental to the interests of the rail- road and its personnel and stands in the way of its smooth running. I have already called your attention to the illegal seizures of railroad premises and in particular to the illegal seizures of the living quarters of its personnel, but nothing ha3 been done to protect the rights and interests of the railroad and the seizures are going on and even in- creasing. I categorically protest against such illegal acts and insist upon effective measures being taken to clear off the premises which were il- legally seized and protect the railroad personnel from the outrages. Sincerely yours, Signed: Bandura "The Copy is correct : Director of the State Central Record Office of the U.S.S.R. (MAKSAKOV) CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT I, Kunin, A.V., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document. Signature /a/ A. KUNIN Doc. No. 2146 Page 1. С il В I I F I С A I E I, Lt. Colonel TAANSNKO, G. I. , a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.h., do hereby certify that .copy M.Shk. letter of the Vice-President of the Chinese Eastern Ea.i_lroad_ Boar_d. of Dec ember 11.93.4 .No. 359 about the occupation of tho С.Е.Уи pr_eii.is.qs by the..Japanese fore с s on p. sheets was delivered to De by the Director of tho Central. State Historical Records. .Office _o_f t ho. USSR _ on or about 12 May, 1946, and that the original of the said document may bo found in „the Central .State, .Historical Ji^cords Office of the USSR in Moscow. I do further certify Lt. Col. TARANENKO, /s/ Signature and rank. Tokyo, Japan Juno 19 1946. I No. 520 Г P?ge 1 xj-..ocrpt from: Kotos on the conversation between tve Reich Foreign Minister' and Ambassador OSFILA at Fuschl on l8 April Ш . ' Tie Reich Foreign Minister then once more emphasized that if Japan felt strong enough and bad sufficient anti-tank weapons, the current year was without doubt the best opportunity for attacking Russia, which would certainly never again be as weak as she is now. We bad reliable information according to which the Russians are newly constructing a large number of airfields in the East from wMch they themselves as well as the Americans would one day certainly attack the Japanese Island Empire with their bomber squadrons. The Japanese estimate of the strength of the Russians as 800,000 men in Siberia is, in our opinion, however, over-estimatedc Our estimate is only 250,000 men, who, in addition, are second-class soldiers, since all the Siberian Divisions had already been battered by the German armies last winter. If, however, Japan was not in t*e position to beat the Russians quickly and decisively, it would be better for her not to attack. However, she would then under all circumstances have to launch a new attack in some place against the British or tve Americans. Ambassador Oshima explained that he did not know V~c views of his Government but understood that for tve last 20 years all plans of the General Staff had been worked out for an attack on Russia and were still directed towards such an attack. If success in that direction could in any way be expected, they would cortainl; attack. If, however, Japan did not do so now, she would certainly shortly launch an attack against the Anglo-Americans. The risk on this side was becoming ever greater through the constant increase of their Air Force, wKich, therefore, Vad to be beaten ever anew. The Japanese Air Force had for a long time been inferior at the fronts, now, however, it had again caught up with tT-is advantage and was on its part superior to the enemy. Fundamentally, he could, however, say that Japan throughout t*e whole of its history had never yet remained on tve defensive in war. Doc, !Io, 520 Page 2 Certificate:- I-. K£ictJit£an§. hereby certify that I an tborougbl conversant witf "th с ' and English languages-, and as a result of tvc с onpa г is on"" bctw e en the С-огдап and the Bngj.isn texts, I have established that t>i.s Is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No, jfeO. /s/ Ulrich A, Straus Doc a No. 520 Page 3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL TFE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TPE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TRE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND TFE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS -against- FERMAN WILFELM GOERING ct al Dof ends, nt So CERTIFICATE. The undersigned 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAI,. L. MITCEEL hereby certifies That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of tve records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause. T'bat tbe document tc which this certificate is attached is a true and correct copy of tbe photostatic document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 159, T^at s^id photostatic document so admitted in evidene as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by t'̂ e undersigned<, That the undersitned has issued t^c herein certificate ard caused the same to be attached to said copy of said photostatic document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish t'-e fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid. D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany this 16th day of April 1946o /s/ William L, Mitchell WILLIAM L. MITCHELL General Secretary International Military Tribunal 5 crfeju1Л. L^-^jh . A ^ _ C ^ v w V ) — . A № - ^ ^ h' _ P V' ^ ^ ^ - /^v) • f Ц ^ T ^ f # -У) 4 Ay?. No. 1953 Page 1 '39 VIOLATIOIB OF T -oi'ATE FRONTIER OF TIE U.S.S.R. BY T1IE JAPANESE FROM 19Я2 TO IQ^. Incidents "1932 1933.' 1934 193^ 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 194е; V Total 1 Frontier violations by the Japanese militar f 62 69 136 36 (by units, groups of, single nnaymen) 15 45 130 124 387 59 229 4L4 144 Before 1937-321 cases From 1938 to 1945- 2 Violations of the U.S.S.R. territorial wate PS - 1529 men by Japanese vessels 25 48 105 87 215 210 203 120 19 64 123 92 19 1350 3 From among those vessels were held up 11 - - - 79 22 9 18 7 36 39 23 19 263 4 Violations of the U.S.S.R. Frontier by 56 61 Japanese aircraft 6 32 62 31 43 40 83 82 119 . 171 3 789 5 Smuggling of spies over to the U.S.S.R. 146 territory (total of the held up) 10 125 108 69 208 1754 217 241 302 222 140 124/ 3666 men ) 6 Smuggling of counter-revolutionary liter- 176 61 ature over to the U.S.S.R. territory - - 22 19 37 222 55 150 129 113 - Before.I94O-43I coses From 1941 to 1944- 453 pieces 7 Captivity of Soviet citizens - - - - - 1 2 - - 1 - - — 4 8 Transfer of bands on to the territory • 68 0f U.S.S.R. 14 - - 1 1 4 19 14 4 2 - 2 5 2 9 Seizure of the Soviet territories - - - - - 3 2 - - - - - - 5 LO Opening fire at Soviet territory citi- 61 65 zens, borders detachments, vessels, etc.- 19 51 46 36 51 104 24 24 24 39 7 551 LI Our losses: (Killed ( 7 - 1 4 10 6 40 12 - 1 2 - - - 83 (bounded ( 3 - 2 1 18 - 58 25 - 11 - 1 l - 120 L2 Taking photos of our territories - - — - — 26 36 10 - — — — — 72 Note.t Under 1 the number of cases but not of individuals in indicated up to 1937. Beginning from 1938 to 1945 the number of individuals that violated the state frontier is indicated. February 2ОД946 Peoples Comnissariat for Home Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Chief of the Frontier corps Lieutenant-General Stakhanov.
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Ex.816-839. Japanese military training of non-Communist Russians in Manchuria (22 items, Doc.1956 to Doc. 2460)
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