AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
20 items, various Doc. numbers
application/pdf
Doc. No. 11a(6) Berlin, iNJovember 17, 19-4-1 Telegram Code - Sender To the Foreign minister of the Reich Via "bli3 Office of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. In accordance vith instructions I conferred today with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the possibility of Japanese action in a northern or a Southern direction. General Oshima remarked that he h-d no information what- ever concerning the intentions and deliberations of his Government and therefore could givu oniy his personal opinion: he is of the opinion that in view of tne time of year, military operations against the Soviet TJiiiou could taxes place only on a li lited scale. It prooably would not prove too difficult to occupy tna northern (Eussian) part of the island of Sakhalin. In vie-.*- of the severe losses which the Soviet troops have suffered at the hands of the German troops, they could also probably be driven away from the border, however, any attack on Vladivostok, or even any advance toward Laite i3aikal at this time of year was scarcely possible and v/ould under present circumstances have to be vost... oned till spring. In view of the grievous economic losses which Japan had suffered in the long war with China, as '-cell us in view of the economic boycott of the Anglo-Saxon powers, an advance by Japan toward the South Was in the opinion of the .-embassador unavoidable, especially because of the. pressing need for petroleum. To my cuostion as to what in particular was to be understood by an advance toward the South, lir. oshi.ua made the following reply: For the securing of petroleum, tne seizure oi tne island of Borneo was above all necessary. Japan gets her petroleum principally from the ports ot Tarakan and Balki-Papan in Dutch Borneo. According to his knowledge there were aloO petroleum resources in British Borneo. .»e deter-jined on the .lap that Borneo was 100 kilometers distant from the part of Indo-China occupied >• Japanese troops. It was or cours© L Doc. No. 11a(6) theoretically possible Tor Japan to take possession only of Dutch. Borneo arid leave British Borneo clone. It .was, howeve probably, though ,mt o.-.r-f.̂i n ; that t h c w ^ I i ~'fr'-U" the sa.ie way to a Japanese attach on the Jtfetherland-Indies as they would to an atcaci-c on Lnglisn territory. The Ambassador is of the opinion tnat an attach on -ongkong is unnecessary ana is not be in,, considered. ..m attaciv on Borneo would be easiest; an .atta'e.v on Singapore would oe uo'st"effective.. In ^is opinion, in connection with an advance on Borneo, in view of the close proximity of the island to the Philippine.a, it would be desirable to declare tlx at it was thft rl p. s i nn the part of the Japanese to respect ] American possessions in .oast 33ia*I er oourse, tjr£~a~c1rion I "would have to be prepared for in advance, so thui~in Case~of need, should there be a corresponding ..̂ lerican attitude, one | could "proceed a3,jInst yrrH-ippin.:& -^.ruItaniequgJLy. Jit would scfiTvTnTY' hfi pnssi hi f. for the ^ e n c a n s to dQfeala tfosai • effectively. TIu distance fron lor^osa to -lanila is only 800 kilometers. According to OsLiraa's opinion, the united States gets principally tin fra\ Sumatra and rubber fro..a the 15a lay ; archipelago as well as ±nao-China. .American deliveries rro-n Indo-Cnina are now blocked. Upon being questioned further, tne embassador remarked that the .Anglo-Saxon powers .light perhaps just ...ut up with a Jaraneseinvasion of xhall^nd. Such an invasion should if possible be undertaken after prior agree.rent vitu the Thailand government. In order to' prepare fo,. tnis the Japanese government in its efforts at .lediation in the conrlict between Indo-China and Thdiland nad decided in favor of the latter. Of course there was very active Bn lisn and -•̂ .xericdn propaganda In Bangkok,. 30 thai: the attitude of the G-overnment" there has beco ue irresolute. In wis opinion the Japanese troops in South Indo-Onina should oe still further increased before an invasion of Thailand can be ..The only purpose of such an invasion would oe to secure Thailand "as~a sprmgoolrd" f or Singapore. It was not very likely that ling3rl̂ h:'ijl~'trnrb cas^JvouTd invade South Thailand, since they would then expose themselves there as well as on tne narrow Malayan fehinsula to a Japanese flank attack with, land- ing maneuvers northwest of Singapore, i is was admittedly not easy since dense jungle would h&ve to be sur-ount there. Doc. No. 11a(6) Page 3 Only txie immediate ares eround Singapore was fortified, especially strongly fortified is the area facing tne sea. Strong naval forces which could match their strength with the Japanese fleet were not present tnere. Several battleships as well as the English aircraft carrier Sa^le had left Singapc after tne outbreak of the war. The Dutch fleet was very weak. Of American naval forces there were in oingaporo at the host only light cruisers and several destroyers. The unlikely possibility that the Americans would send stronger naval unit:, would only bo desirable for Japan, since ^ucn forces would then have to operate far from their bases and be exposed to Japanese air attacks, .ambassador Oshima is assuming that the three Japanese infantry divisions on the island of Hainan are being trained for Landing operations and co.abat in tropical regions. He is of the opinion that a Japanese advance agains+ Singapore is to considered in conjunction with a German advance in the .liddie 3ast. The speeches_of Tojo and Togo in Parliament were Known to the embassador. He 5oes not expect any decision concerning the Tapollese attitude to be hade until it has become apparent what sucfiiiussi is attained by the special mission of ^^abassador Kurusu. The strength of the Japanese army units in South China as well as th^ir distribution in the different areas is made knov/n by the report of the German -lilitary attache in Tokyo, transmitted together with the telegraphic report of the ambassador in Tokyo, No. 2-̂ 30 of November 13. according to that report, there are four infantry divisions in xNlorth Indo- China and a aotoriaed brigade, which would have to furnish the protection against a flank attack oy Chiang Sal Chek through the province of Tunan in the event of a Japanese advance being undertaken against Thailand. In South Indo- China there are up to now thr-e Japanese infantry divisions. Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Keich Hrdm.jnnsdorff Doc. No. 11jx(6) Page 4 Certificate:- I, Ulricii Straus , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and Sn^lisn Ian vuLiges, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English t^xts, I have established that this is a true and correct tran3lation of International Prosecution Document No. 11k (6) . 1 3 / Doc. No. 406 5k Page 1 TELEGRAM (Code Clerk) / V / PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs. Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941 Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, fca Pol 6075 gill Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubbery Japan/U.S.A. Negotiations have been conducted with the French dele- gation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER ex- pressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China.to release the 5*000 tons which the Japanese nad requested f o r September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5?000 tons to the U.S.A. c * Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer t®'.a question from the German side, that in payment of_the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold. French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on be- half of his government that it appreciated the German atti- tude and would take the German point of view into considera- tion during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A. The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. Pie suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5?000 tons,as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured» T.7e are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on 1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours it. HEM!'IE N Doc. No. 4065B Page 1 Doc. No. 4065B Page 2 TELEGRAM (Open) PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045 Arrival,6 October 1941 - 2330 No. 3031 of 6 October 1941 State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treatyfs military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and r.ore„ At the tine, Darlan had,in the Vichy Cabinet, personal] and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pre- text for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact. Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China. doubts have been expressed, within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right5 furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared. I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin5s informa- tion, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in T okyo j ABSTZ Doc, No. 4065B Page 2 Doc. No. 4065S Page 3 Secret State natter - to be kept in locked file. TELFGRAM (Secret Cipher Process) TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours Arrival," " " 1520 « No. 2095 of 14 October Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II Observations here confirn the description of condi- tions as reported to Berlin fror Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neunann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction, I heard fron the For.eign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseninated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on. The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops. The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administra- tion through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November. I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance__of_ a defense alliance and, furthermore, is arraTd of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial adminis- tration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota,amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained Doc. No. 4065B DOG. NO. 4065B Page 4 owing to better prospects for the harvest. The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission con- cerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon. OTT CERTIFICATE I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Docu- ment No. 4065B. /s/ ULRICH STRAUS Doc. No. 4065B Page 4 7 33 Doc. No. 4025E(10) , 7 Telegram (Secret Cipher process) SAIGON, 12 October 1941 1350 hours Arrival 12 October 1941 2145 hours No. 10 of 11 October 1941 Secret documents which have fallen into the hands of the French police throw light on activity of the Pan-Asiati< League as a tool of Jrpanese expansionist policy in Indo- china, According to this, the League's branch offices in Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon were ordered towards the end of J une: 1. To train instructors, teachers and propagandists for agitating for the Annamite independence movement. 2. To train a squad of native agitators who are to propagate anti-French uprisings at the proper time. 3* To form special units among the Japanese occupa- tion troops who are to foster a pro-Japanese sentiment through blameless behavior„ 4. To pis ce suitable observers at all important centers of production and communications by making use of the provisions of the trade agreement between Indo-China and Japan. Their task would be: a) To report on all French troop movements. b) To locate the storage places and the quan- tity of all raw materials important for Japan, including foodstuffs. Such information is termed necessary for the prepara- tion of uprisings. According to the intentions of Imperial General Headquarters the most suitable time for striking will be the end of this year or next spring. For this purpose contingents of Annamites trained in Japan will soon be incorporated into the Japanese occupation army as liaison men and interpreters. According to Japanese source there are nine Annamite fighting units in Saigon and over twenty rather large Annamite fighting units in Hanoi. The French say that the leaders and a great part of the members are previously con- victed criminals. It is significant that as early as 1935 Prince CIJONG DE presided over the Pan-asiatic Congress. The prince is a descendant of Emperor GIALONG and has been recognized as the sole lawful successor to the throne by Annamite Page 1 Doc. No. 4025E(10) Page 2 legitimists| he had fled to Japan at the beginning of this century. — — — /S/ NEUMANN Identical telegram to Tokyo Certificate I5 Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established, that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(10). /S/ ULRICH STRAUS / > L Doc, No. 785-F Pago 1 I Local Lilitary Agreement between the- French Authorities rnd t'-e Japanese Army concerning the Joint Defense (1) TVesFrenc1" authorities shall collaborate wit"1" all their resources wit^ the Japanese Army in the defense of French Indo-China in conformity with agreements drawn up between France and Japan, (2) For the duration of tve operations carried out by t^c Japanese Army, the Indo-China Authorities svell ensure public order in all Indo-China territories in sucv a way to secure tsc rear of the Japanese Army. TT~e Japanese troops shall be able eventually to cooperate to t'1 is effect with tve Frencv Indo-China authorities. (3) TVe Indo-Cvina authorities sh-iJl grant to the Japanese Army on Indo-C'-ina soil, all facilities for its movement, subsistence and for the installation of its military e s tablisvmcnts. (4) TVc defense will, in principle, be divided up tvus: Japanese Army - Southern Indo-China. and eventually other regions v/̂ cre it takes up positions Indo-China Army - Northern Indo-Cvina rnd of-cr regions V^ere indo- or ina troops are stationed. In instances where both Japanese and Indo-C1 ina troops might be stationed at the san. point a spccial agreement would govern t*e details of the joint defense at tvis point* (5) Separate agreements shall govern tvc collaboration as far as it concerns Anti-aircraft defense Coastal defense Sea and air navigation Utilization of means of transport Communications f edical Service Employment of material and labour Anti-Espionage Control of Information of French Indo-China-, General Principles Doc. No. 7S5-F Pago 2. Fanoi 9 December 1941 Squadron Vice-Admiral Jean Decoux Governor-General of Indo-Cvina Signeds Jean Decoux Navy Captain ^0RIUCTTI Representing the Supreme Commander of the Jrpanose Navy,, Major General TYO representing the Supreme Commander of tve Japanese Army. Loc^l Military Agreement between t^c Frcnc1" Authorities and the Japanese Army regarding t^e joint defense of_ French Indo-Cvina Detailed Provisions (1) Air Defense. The air defense of Indo-Cv.ina territories is guaranteed by t^c French authorities who hold themselves, in t^is respect, in close liaison with the corresponding authorities of the Japanese Army. Tvc latter can require the French authorities to put into action t^eir means of defense, it being understood tvat tvcse will be employed primarily in the defense of Indo-Cvina civil and military installations. (2) The measures for air defense svall come into force immediately.. (3) Orders relative to air alerts (including ligvt control) shall be given in eac^ locality by the Japanese and Indo-China commanders on their own respective initiative under t>e stipulation tvat ea.c1- svall warn tve otver without delay. (4) The extinguishing or lighting up of lightvouses5 boacon lights, etc., svall be carried out on the demand of tve Japanese authorities. Doc. No. 11a(6) Page 3 (5) For air look-out and communications between tve Japanese and French anti-aircraft defenses.the existing network sVall be used primarily. Other networds shall be established according to necessity and materials available. II Coast." Defense (1) In eases where war or merchant svips or planes belonging to countries at war witv Japan approach t^e coasts of Indo- china, the Frcnc^ authorities shall inform the Japanese Army of it immediately and shall make all dispositions to repulse t1 eir attacks. (2) The defense of tvc coasts of Indo-China (including laying of mines or t^c higV seas) shall be secured in agreement with the Japanese. Authorities. (3) The moment at which this defence shall come, into force shall be fixed by understanding between the French and Japanese authorities. (4) Liaison personnel may be stationed by the Japanese Army with the command of the fortified zones of CAMKANF BAY, DOSON and CARS SAINT JACQULS and other coast batteries. III.Ship Movements (1) The Japanese Navy shall be consulted before any movement by Frcnch war or merchant ships. (2) A'cccss to CAMRANF BAY is not allowed without the permissio of the Japanese Authorities. (3) In exceptional and urgent cases Japanese warsMps and tran ports may be relieved of the necessity of taking on and Indo- china pilot. IV. Movement of Planes. (1) F r e n c h military aviation shall concentrate all its units in the North of Indo-China. (2) French military aviation shall effect preliminary coordinr tion with the Japanese Army for the anticipated modifications o: its disposition. These modifications may always be carried out without preliminary consultation in case of necessity for air defence, on condition that the Japanese Authorities be informed of them without delay. Doc. N0.785-F Page 4 (3) The installations guaranteeing the safety of air navi- gation shall operate equally for the benefit of the Japanese Army. (4) The service "AIR FRANCE" shall be suspended in the mean- time . (5) Tve Japanese Army may use, in case of urgent need, all aerodrome and sea plane bases (including places suitable for aviation) under the reservation that French aviation is free to make use of areas v&i cv it is actually occupying and which arc indispensable to it. In case of joint-occupation, local agreements will be made guaranteeing the use of the landing ground to French planes. (6) The air forces of the two armies stationed, in Nortv Indo China shall mutually exchange liaison officers if the need to do so makes itself felt. V. Traffic and Transport. (1) The French Indo-China authorities svall satisfy, as far as possible, demands made necessaiy by the operations of the Japanese Army as regards the carrying out of transportation, In regard to demands which envisage the use of transport in- stallations, tverc must be a specific request in each parti- cular case and such demands.will be completely met as far as the safety of traffic and the carrying out of the transporta- tion permit. (2) Where military operations might involve transportation over the Cambodia railway, such transportation will be made, as a general rule, by special through trains. (3) If, in the course of Japanese military operations there is any risk that the transportation required by the Japanese Army may be subjected to delays and difficulties, tve Japanese Army, after giving sufficient notice, may, for tve time being, assume control of the use of railways. (4) All matters relating to the use of the railways by the Japanese Army must be kept strictly secret. (5) T^e total indemnity arising from, the relevant clause of the present agreement will be finally settled after calcula- tion. (6) In cases of destruction of railroads, roads, bridges, etc., repairs s>all be rapidly carried out by tvc personnel normally responsible for such repairs. The Japanese Army svall have the power to take part in sucv repairs with the ob- ject of speeding up their completion. Doc. No. 785 L Page 5 (7) When operations make it necessary, the Japanese I: rry she?,11 have the power, after giving notice to the Ir.c'o-C" ina authorities, to^limit or forbid, land, sea or river traffic within the bounds of Japanese military installations and in certain zones reserved for military operations. In each case, an agreement wit1"- the French authorities ŝ -aii specify the modifications to be applied to the propose measures in order to guarantee the needs of the Administrati and of the existence of the population. 71. C onwan i a a t i o ns. (1) In case of pressing need of operations and after It has been demanded by the Japanese Army, the Indo-China Authoriti will have certain radio sendings and certain international communications by cable, stopped. (2) Messages relating to air defence shall r̂.ve priority over all others. (3) In case of necessity, the Japanese and Indo-China armic shall have the power to attach liaison agents to their radio stations. (4) The Indo-China. Authorities shell give, to the Japanese Army the use of the installations mentioned below. The Japa esc Army in using these installations must take into account the rightful needs of the Indo-China Authorities, giving priority to Indo-China official telegrams. (a) Transmission by wire (actual lines) 1. The Sector SAIGON-I^'NOM-PENF-PUESAT Telegraph -- 2 lints Telephone — 1 line 2o Sector SAIGON - Cape Saint Jacuqes " Tele.graph - 1 line ' 5 , (b) Wireless and Badio Transmission 1. Radio Sending Station of FT® ITO (Compen.io Generale of Wireless Transmission) One (12 KW) short wave sending set Two (3 KW) short wave sending sets One (3 KW) broadcasting set. An agreement shall be made on the spot for the sv?ring and use of the sending stations mentioned above, sending sta tions corresponding to these senders, installations assigned to the operation of these sets and microphone rooms. Doc. No. 11a(6) Page 6 It s^all "be the sarac for the following stations. 2. Station PTU TFO (radio service) 1 (5 KW) wireless set 3. Station POT QUOC 1 (5 KW) wireless set 4. Station FANOI Agreement to be made for the use of the one sender, of 5 KW, in existence there. 5. T^e use of the broadcasting station (12 KV7) of PFU TTT0 (Companie Generale of wireless tran mission) shall be the object of a special agreement. 6. The electricity centres of SAIGON and FANOI shall satisfy to the limits of their power, the needs of the Japanese ..rmy, whicv shall Vavc t^e power, if the necessity makes itself felt, of attaching liaison agents to them. 7. If events make it necessary, the Japanese /'.rmy may be compelled to present fresv demands rela tive to t^c control of radio-electric waves. VII Medical Service (1) The Indo-China Government shall afford to the Japanese Army all possible facilities for the hospitalization and treatment of sick and wounded. In the last resource and on demand, establishments, medical instruments and appliances and medicines, not in- dispensable to the needs of the population, may be lent to the Japanese Army. A total of 6,000 beds divided among the establishments of the regions, SAIGON - C/KB SAINT JACQUES, TOUEANE, DALAT, etc., s^all be reserved from now on, for the use of'the Japanese Army. In addition to the 6,000 mentioned above, the Indo-Chir authorities shall make every effort to accommodate a number of wounded as nearly as possible up to a total of 19,000 until the Japanese Army can construct field hospitals. Doc. No. 785 L Page 7 (2) The Indo-China Government svall grant to tvc Japanese Arrny all facilities for its studies in tropical hygiene. VIII. Use of Latcrials and labour (1) The Indo- CI"ina Authorities svall comply as far as it is possible with the requisition of war materials and the locruitment of labour demanded by the Japanese Army. (2) They shall lend their aid for the repair of sMps, vehicles, and other Japanese military material. (3) T^ey shall satisfy as far as possible the demands whicl the Japanese Army may present to them in the way of workshop arsenals, magazines, cold storage, etc. IX. Counter-Espionage Measures. (1) The Indo-China Authorities shall collaborate with the Japanese Army in its efforts against espionage and activitic liable to endanger its security on Indo-China soil and will lend it their support in the matter of counter espionage. They shall, without delay, exchange with the Japanese Authorities all information which they may be ^ble to procur on t> is subject. (2) Tv'G competent Indo-China Authorities shall take the necessary steps against foreigners of every nationality, whose activities might endanger the security of the Japanese forces. (3) The Indo- China. Authorities must recognize how very important secrecy is in the operations undertaken for tve joint-defence of Indo-China. With e view to preserving this secrecy, the Japanese Army will place a liaison agent in each of the Indo-China control commissions of telegrams, telephone conversations, and with the censorship of reviews, newspapers and postal delivery. X. Control of Information (1) The Indo-China, Authorities shall jointly decide upon measures which might be necessitated by the exigencies of the joint-defence of Indo-China, for control of Indo-China information both outward and inward. (2) The Japanese Army will proceed to the establishment and utilisation of Japanese organizations for radio broadcasting to foreign countries after having informed tT*e Government of Indo-China of. its intentions. Doc. No. 11a(6) Page 8 (3) If events make it necessary, the Japanese Arry shall >ave the power eventually to attach liaison agents to Indo- Cvin- broadcasting organizations. Xi. r.iscellanoous (1) The air services of Indo-China and Japan shall acquaint each other of the identification marks of their respective planes. (2) The Indo-China Authorities shall procure geographical ancl vydrographical maps and charts for the Japanese Army. (3) The present agreement shell come into force counting from the day it is signed. i.ade at the Government General of Indo-China at HANOI on 9 Dec. 1941. Squadron Vice-Admiral J. DECOUX Governor- General of Indo-China Signed Sh ip-Capta in FORIUCFI Representing tve Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Squadron. Signed. Major-General TYO Representing the Commander-in-Chief of tvc Japanese Army Signed. APPENDIX Squadron Vice Admiral JEAN DECOUX, Grand Officer of the Legion of f-Toncr Governor-General of Indo-Cvina TO T>o General Head of the Japanese Mission HANOI Dear General, I have the honour to send to you vcrewit'~ the text of the Agreement established between the French Authorities and the Japanese Army with a view to settling tve joint-defence of Indo-China. Doc. No. 785-F Pa ee 5 As I stated to you tvis morning, it is the intention of the Government-General to do nothing which can harm in any way the operations of the Japanese Array, In order to confirm this immediately as you h?ve asked me, I Vave put my signature at the foot of this Agreement. It goes without saying that the French Authorities will give to the Japanese Authorities the facilities for t V con- duct of the operations which the latter may ask. It must, however, be understood tvr>t in any eventuality the sovereign! of France over Indo-China shall be respected and tve operatic of the Government Services assured. I have not always been able to effect direct contact witv the French Government and tve latter r.ay Vr-ve already entered into engagements with the Japanese Government in the name of Indo-China, which I am ignorant of. If I should receive instructions from my Government, I migvt be prevailed upon to jmpa.rt them to you witv a view to eventual new discussions. Signed: J. DSCOUX f / n * Doc. Ho. 772 Intervention "by Britain, and America as regarls She question of the occu:atign._of ^orthprn Indochina "by the Imeerial Force a After the out "break of the Ghina Incident, the French Indochina Government firmly eromisei us in October 1937 to orohibit the trans..or- tat ion of nras to China vis Indochina. Sit, in s.vit»; of the ?ror.i3«t the transoortat ion of the arms suit to aid C tiang via French Indochina was really continued after th°t, so the Iioerial Gov - rnment had to earnestly continue the n^otiationa in order to ut a sto;o to it. The French authorities, however, were so lacking in sincerity as to Insist that there vas no fact of such transportation, and therefore, we were obliged to resort to such self-protection leasurea as the jvj bombing of the Junnaii Sailv^y. But. u...or. the surrender of France proper to Germany on 17 Q'une, 1340., a proposal was male to us to susoend the transportation of the aforementioned materials, and we sent the personnel re. uired for superintending this to the olace in question. However, from the viewpoint of the necessity of opr oos^ations a.'̂ inst China, ae well as the promotion of the disposal of the China. Incident, it was considered imperative, on the occasion of sudden change in the inter- national status of French Indochina, not only to orohiTbit the transporta- tion of the materials for aiding Chiang, "tut also to establish our military, political and economical supremacy over French Indochina, oo, we started preliminary negotiations in July at the place in question, and on 1 August we began formal negotiations in Tokyo with the French Ambassador there. The negotiations - ere extremely difficult a.s the .French Government took a stiff attitude toward the above roauest of the Imperial Government, "but "by dint of our efforts at •.•••rsuasion an ajreement between the -oartiea was at last reached on 30 August. Based uoon th« above, in French Indochina, talks ". ere "begun between the Japanese ani French military authorities on practical matters, "but they were too reluctant to acceet our re'iuests, inventing various reasons. ,, On 4 September. how'Vt.r, the military •vreeroent was concluded, end ' • 1/ detailed negotiations were made as to its enforcement. Meanwhile, due to mutual misunderstanding, some localc/batties were engaged between the two armies, and the Japanese residents ere repatriated, for a time causing the threat of * rupture in negotiations. But .after many conrolications on 22 September the detailed arrangements were at length concluded at the olace in question, enabling our forces to peacefully occupy northern French Indochina from the 33rd on. The negotiations as above with French Indochina attracted the atten- tion of Britain and America, and in the ccur e of the negotiations, the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo officially expressed the concern of their respective governments as listed below. And each time we refuted them. But the French Indochina authorities, on the other hand, were contriving to bring about American Intervention while the Chungking Governmert took such stees as inciting Britain and America, and concentrated a big force on the French Indochina border, and making oronUganda to the effect that the"- would take counter-measures, doing their utmost to prevent the conclusion a the negotiations. Me, on our oart, endeavored to settle the negotiations quickly so as to forestall a cons.iracy of the oow ers. Doc. So. 772 c List America 7 August 1940 - Talk "between Minister MATSUOKA and TJ. S. Ambassador GR3'.', 4 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OEASPII and U. A„ Ambassador GHJ'j.I' , 14 September 1940 - Talk "between Vice-Minister OHASHI and U. S. Ambassador G3E.< , (our answer to America) 20 September 1940 - Talk "between Minister MATSUOKA and U, S. Ambassador . 22 September 1940 - Talk between our Ambassador to America HORIUCHI and Vice-Secretary "/3LL.3S. Britain 10 August 1940 - A letter to Vice-Minister MATSUMIYA from 3ritish Councillor DODDS 4 September 1940 - Talk "between Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CHAIGISi 16 September 1940 - Talk bet': eon Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador CRAIGIS 18 September 1940 - Talk betwssn Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CHAIG-I3 27 September 1940 - Talk between Vice Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador C3AIGI3 Gist of Talk concerning the French Indochina problem between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GSETJ on 7 August 1940 (from 5:00 P.M. to 5:30 P.M.) The U. S. Ambassador, by way of introduction said, 151 should like to relay an oral message to you, the minister, on instructions from the U. S. Government, as regards the various reports and press news concerning the Japanese Government's secret demanis toward French Indochina," read the attached document and handed over it and its attached papers, the copies of statements by the Secretary of State on 17 April and 11 May 1940. In answer to this, Minister MATSUOKA said in introduction, "I will reserve comment and observation upon this proposal of the U. S. Government, but I shall tell you the following/' anl continued, "I know that American newspapers contain various accounts about this matter, but some of them are exaggerated and some others are unfounded, ifext, as for our demarche in this matter, though this minister is today not as yet in the oesition to soeak a word about its nature, I shall say for the strictly confidential information of the U. S. Government that the demarche, was already approved and agreed on by the French Government on :rindole." The minister insisted that he wished this last r>oiiit to be kept in absolute secrecy so as not to leak out. /Memorandum pertaining to the Frrnbh Indochina question given by the American Ambassador in Tokyo to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 7, 1940./ Doc. I.e. 772 Page 2 Hews Agencies are carrying various reports in effect tha.t the Jao»nese Government has mt forward to the French authorities secret demanis concerning French Indochina. It is reported that the demands under reference include, among others, the right for Japanese military- forces to make use of air bases at certain places in French Indochina, and the right for Japanese armed forces to "be transported through French Indochina. There was set forth in the statements issued "by the Secretary of State on Aoril 17 and May 11 the "belief held "by the United States Govern- ment that any intervention in the internal affairs of the Netherlands Indi;- or the change of their status nuo except "by peaceful processes would rejudice the cause of peace, security rnd stability in the entire Pacific area as well as in that of the Netherlands Indies. The observation of the JiDierican Government "'as likewise set forth that this belief had its "basis in a doctrine which possesses universal validity and in supeort of which the United States stanis -onequivocally. The foregoing belief and obser- vation have thus a natural application also to French Indochina. The demarche reported to have been made by the Government of Japan to the French authorities has, under these circumstances, seriously oerturbed the Government of the United States. August 7, 194©. I Jamn's Heoly to America concerning the French Iniochina question. (Reply made orally to Ambassador G b y Vice-Mini ster 0H.̂ o>II at 6:00 ?.!!., September 14, 1940 / In the course ofsths conversation I had with Your Sxcellency on .august 7, 1340, Your Sxcellency stated, referring to n newspaper report that the Japanese Government has oresented certain demands .to France con- cerning French Indochina, that the United States Government could not note the report without concern. Necessitated by the ta.sk of establishing p. new order in Sast Asia., the Japanese Government has formerly -ntered into negotiations with the French Government with r e;̂ ard to French Indochina. The discussions have since been going on with the authorities on the spot and are making satis- factory progress. Japan, while bent on the settling of the China Affairs and determined to secure for herself a minimum sphere of existence, has no intention to resort to conquest and exploitation in order to attain these ends, taking care to regulate her action by considerations of mutual -orosoerity and brotherly love among the peoples of the regions concerned. She lias exerted and is exerting her utmost efforts to avoid any unfortunate change in the status quo of these r -gions in so far as such policy does not render impossible the realization of the above ob.jccts. In face, however, of the present world situation which is changing hour by hour, it is obvious that mere observance of old criteria, which may become inapplicable to the actual state of affairs, is not the way to safeguard world oeace. It is mainly for that reason that Japan has hither- to strictly refrained from exoressing her opinion vis-a-vis the epochr- making changes which are actually taking rjlace in the Western Hemisphere. TV.'.?, J'lo. 772 Page 4 I may "be permitted to coint out that any action by th3 United States Government which may "be interpreted as an un^ue interference in matters pertaining to a region so far away from America like the present matter is tound to have undesirable repercussion uoon the sentiments of the Japanese •peo'ole exactly in the some manner as a similar attitude on the part of a third uo-rer would affect the public opinion of America were such third power to take an interfering attitude toward an American policy pertaining to the territories of a third power in the western Hemisphere. He: Protests filed by American and British Ambassadors to Vice-Minister G-IASHI, regarding the French Indochina question. 1* On the 4th (inst.) the American Ambassador visited Vice-Minister OxLiSliI and stated that the home a-ov ̂ rnment had ordered him to inciuir'i into the reasons •;hy this county had made various military demands on and delivered an ultirutum to French Indochina. Accordingly, the Vico-Mini-;ter answered that no ultimatum was sent so far, but negotiations ith regard to Trench Indochina seemed to be under way. Then the Ambassador questioned whether such actions did not go counter to the Japanese declaration relating to the STATJo JJO in the Far 3ast. The Vice-Minister answered that although he, being uninformed of the state- ment, had no knowledge of it, he considered the present problems temporary ones; and asked that whether the fact that the U. S, Government rut stress upon the matters, could be construed that the U. S. Government was going take some action if occasion renuires. The Ambassador said that the U. S. Government has no such intention, but that it is concerned for the situation of French Indochina where the U.S.A. had interests in various senses of the vord; and that he, therefore, would likB to know hew negotiations between Japan and French Indochina were going on as much as possible. Then he left. 2. The British .imbassador also visited Vice-Minister Ohashi on the same day and asked the <;ame kind of a question. The Vice-Minister refused to answer, saying that there might be something to it but not to ask him because he was an uninformed person. British Ambassador was said to have retired v/ithout making any further iuestion. (iTo. 3. Section of the -lurope and .est Asiatic 3ureau, 20 September 19-10)/ le: The Visit o,f the American Ambassador to Foreign Minister i-iATSUOKA anl the filing of a protest regarding the French Indochina problems. American Ambassador residing in Tokyo, at 5:00 P.M. 20 September., visited Foreign Minister MAT3U0ICA. He r^ad the annexed note ".-J1 to Foreign Minister MaTSUCKA and said that he would be very happy if he could get an assurance that the report concerning the imoortant demands on the nart of the Japanese Government to French Indochina was groundless and did represent neither the int ->ntion of the Japanese Military Authority in iianoi nor that of Japanese Government. Boc. Ho. 772 After an introductory remark to the effect that the presented note would he oarofully studied hy the concerned officials, he stated that Japan and France had reached an agreement and that talks relating to a detailed agreement were "begun on the spot for the purpose of the execution of the contents of the above, and that they had progressed to the point where the military authorities of both countries vrere on the verge of signing the agreement on the 6th of this month. But that the Governor-General of French Indochina for some reason had assumed the attitude of postponing the conclusion of the agreement as long as possible and of trying to nullify it. Thus Japan was compelled to deliver a final note to both France and to French Indochina, the contents of which were almost the same with that note which the Ambassador had just read. The Governor-General of French Indochina should assume the responsi- bility for all these, for Japan had no alternative but to resort to these measures on account of the insincere procrastinative policy of French Indochina. Japan, pressed by the urgent necessity of her military oper- ation against China which could not be postponed any more, had taken the above mentioned steps. The Governor-General of French Indochina was said to have boasted to a certain foreign consul that he was checking the fulfillment of the demands of Japan. This country thought 3uch an attitude of the Governor- General unjustifiable and felt that it would be due to the fact that Vichy Government had no control over him. .<e, therefore,, filed a protest to Vichy Government to ascertain the fact. But Vichy ansv§red that the rumor concerning the Governor-General was not true and he was undar its control. Hence the minister (i) couli not but understand that all was due to a third .power which olayed an active part in the background. Ho further problems in connection with the lodging of the "ITqte" was made and the talk continued. . . -(•• ... •! By way of introduction the Minister said that he would like to talk to the Ambassador in extreme secrecy about our fair intentions for the purpose of removing unnecessary misunderstanding on the part of the U. S. Government. Then he stated that the true aim of the present Japanese demands to France was only to obtain military facilities in French Indochina Accessary for the furtherance of our military operations against China, ".'e, therefore, had made it clear that utilization of the military facilities there was of a temporary nature. Furthermore we gave assurance to France in compliance with the latter1s desire to have freedom from care that we would respect the territorial integrity and French sovereignty in French Indochina. Under these circumstances, it was beyond our comprehension why the U. S. Government should find fault with this French Indochina question. The Foreign Minister said that he had confided our secret to the U.S.A., and that if their talk should leak to France or any other power, the complete agreement between France and Japan would be nullified. So, 3hould such a thing happen, he said, he would call the U. S.Government "a liar." The Minister added that our protest against French Indochina had been presented with the great objects of accelerating,the settlement of the China incident and of bringing peace between Japan and China; and bo they % Doc. So. 772 6 wor? thinking that the U.S.A. should help us so as to adtws-iŝ the conclusion of the French-Japanese agreement instead of complaining, if she does not want to hinder peace "between China and Japan, because to bring peace to all Sast Asia was a contribution to the world peace. Lastly the Minister said that Japan would never take a policy of subjugation or exploitation, bub would adhere to friendly mutual under- standing to the last in our attempt to solve an international problem. Prince KGiCO and the Minister are a minority, but that they would uphold to this policy even at the risk of their lives. Thus the Foreign Minister concluded his explanation. Ambassador Grew filed "Jote" 3 as his reply to 7ice-Minister OEaSIII'S answer made a few days ago. To this the Minister said that he thought that his answer would cover the above and closed their conversa- tion. /Oral Statement- of the American Ambassador on his visit at 5r00 P.M., September 20, 1540/ My Government has received from an authoritative source information to the effect that the Governor General of French Indochina has been presented by General Hishihara at Hanoi with demands that Jaoanese military forces occuoy Hanoi. Haiphong, and five airports. My Government is further informed by the same source that General Uishihara has stipulated that Japanese armed forces intend to invade Indochina on September 22 unless the Jacanese demands are accented.. I am instructed by my Government to convey this report to you. The American Government is greatly surprised that the Japanese military authorities in French Indochina should have taken action giving rise to this report in the light of all circumstances, a.s well as the voluntary Japanese pledge, previously expressed, to preserve and keep the status quo, in the Pacific area. My Government assumes that this report, provided it is based on facts, reflects action taken locally and in excess of instructions from the Japanese Government, as was reportedly true when a previous ultimatum was presented by the Japanese military authorities. The Government of the Unite! States would appreciate receiving assurances from the Japanese Government that this report is not warranted and that it does not represent the intentions of the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi nor the intentions of the Japanese Government. September 20, 19i|0 /Statement given by the American Ambassador on his visit at 5:00 P.M., September 20, 1940, as the reoly to Vice-Minister OHASH]/ My Government has instructed me to make the following observations in reply to the oral statement which was handed to me by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14: It is the opinion of my Government that the status quo, of a third country is seriously affected when one of two countries which is engaged in hostilities with another insists, in order to attack the other, upon the right of the use of airdromes and the right of oassage for troops through the third country. In the light of the Japanese Government's announced desire that the status quo. be maintained in the Pacific area. Doc. No. 772 Page 7 there appears to be an inconsistency in connection with the stipulations of this nature which are being made uoon the authorities in Indochina by the Japanese Government. The American Government urges uoon all governments the employment of peaceful means only in their relations with all other governments and with all other regions. The attituie of my Government toward the unwarranted use of pressure in international relations is global, Septerfter 19; 1940. Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on May 11, 1940 I have no full report about the matter referred to in the press despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks n number of governments, in- cluding Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands 3ast Indies. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government assumes that each of the Governments .Jirhich has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments,. On Aoril 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said: "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the IT therlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful .rocesses (Mould be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.1' In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of interest to respect the status quo of the Netherlands 3ast Indies cannot be too often reiterated. Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on April 17, 1940 I have noted -ith interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indi ;s would directly affect the interests of many countries. The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean, The islands themselves extend for a: distance of approximately 3,2C0- miles east and west astride of the equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They also are an important factor in the commerce of the whole world. They produce considerable portions of the world's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities. Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. Doc. No. 772 Page 27 This cGtj.cl̂ îQn, based a ioqtrlne which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan — as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean — sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1932, in which each of those governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular :ossessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, amon^ which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations anl non-intervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and .just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty oledges, with modification thereof, when needful, by orderly processes. It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States —. as it is no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments — that the attitudes and policies of all -overnments \ ill be based upon these principles and that there principles ill be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world. 1940, No. 23831/cipher/ Sent from WASEL..GTOE on the morning of September 21, Received by FOREIGN MINISTRY on the night of Sept. 31. TO FOREIGN MI^ISTRR MATSUOKA FROM AMBASSADOR HCRIUCHI No. 1513-1 (urgent) (Secret) On the 22nd I had a talk with Assistant-Secretary WSLLdS on the problem concerning American rights and interests in C'̂ INA. After that the Assistant-Secretary, in a solemn attitude, said that it was very regrettable that he had to talk with me on an important subject in spite of the fact that I w.s to leave here in a few days. With this as an introductory remark, ho said that it was really a problem relating to Fruil.;CH IaDOCHI^A but that since this spring, the Japanese Government, as I well knew, had given statements on the maintenance of the status quo of the N S T I.DIio. Then he r->ad aloud the summaries of the statements that had been made by our Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of the Intelligence Board since the last cabinet, and read out the notes that had been ta,ken of the conversation between the Secretary of State and myself. He then said that although the U. S. Government had been placing full confidence in these words of the Japanese Government, Foreign Minister MATSUOXA told Ambassador GRiW in Tokyo on the previous night that Japan had sent an ultimatum to the Government of French Indochina. The items of the Japanese demands, it was reported, contained man;'- important items such as the occupation of the City of Hanoi and of the airfield by the Japanese military forces, and that the occupation would be carried out on and after the 33rd. The American Government, he Doc. I.e. 772 Page 9 &aid, was greatly surprised, and that in the sight of the American Govern- ment it was none oth r than an invasion of French Indochina. This matter, he said must he considered the climax of the many problems which had risen between America and Japan for the past three ye'rs and more. Should that fact become known to the American people, public sentiment would surely turn worse against Japan. The American Government, which was obliged to respect public opinion in deciding its policy, would be force! to consider some sort of necessary measures for the present situation, (continued) 1940. So. 28834 (cipher) Dispatched from .S-iL GTO.,:, Sept. 21, A.M. Received by FORiilGi- .,1. I.y II, Sept. 21, night TO FOiSIGr , H iaTSUOKA FROM aMBASSA'OR EQRIUOHI No. 1513-2 (urgent) (too secret) He told oe that I mu=>t be well aware of the American government's pro- British policy, and that Germany's aggression on Britain was not one directed against Britain but was none other than an infringement on the peace of the whole world, and on the international morals and international principles in vhich we *AMr±cans) believe. Therefore the American Govern- ment found it necessary to give every a.id to Britain, who ha.s resisted this. In the case of French Indochina also, should French Indochina try to resist such Japanese demands, the American oeoole would feel obliged to rssist that country also. Thus, he said, the American- Japanese relations might make the most unfortunate turn and %hat he waB extremely sorry over the matter especially as he had connection with Japan whore he had remained on duty for more than three years, doing his utmost up to the present day to , djust American-Japanese relations. I then told him that as I was not yet informed of anything about the conversation held in Tokyo on the previous night, I was not in the position to discuss the contents of the talk. But I saii in return that what I wanted to know first concerning his present auTcrsation with me was on what grounds America's int roat waa-Jbased. The Under-Secretary answered that the American government, as we must bo aware and as it had repeatedly declared before, had great interest in maintaining the status quo of the Pacific. Whereby I told him that, as far as I knew, Japan made demands of Dutch Bast-Indies solely in connection with economic problems such as the exoort of certain kinds of material and the alleviation cf restriction on entrance and enberorises of the Japanese. As he wa.s aware, the Japanese Commerce and Industry Minister and other economic envoys were now negotiating with the authorities of the Netherlands Fast Indies about this. With French Indochina, an agreement had already been reached between France and Japan with regard to the banning of importation of commodities for China, and the supervision of the enforce- ment of this, (continued) 1940, No. 288S0 (cipher) Dispatched from .A3HINGT0N, Sept. 21, A.M. Received by F0R3IGN MT^oTRY, Sept. 21, night N*. 1513-3 (secret) (urgent) The Japanese Government, I told him, had lately made some demands Doc. I.e. 772 Page 10 accessary for its military activities in the Southwest China area, ragarrling which some "basic understanding had already "been reached between Japan *nd France together with French Indochina. Only, negotiations were being made on the spot with regard to the details. However, because of the recent standstill (in this negotiation,) the Japanese authorities seem to have been forced to take the present step. I considered, I told him, that the Japanese Government had not yet given u hope of reaching some sort of agreement. In short, the Japanese Government had no other intention than to settle the China Incident as soon as possible and pre- pare against the disadvantageous effect on last Asia that would be caused in the future by the European War• To this statement './ETLES answered that, though he ardently hoped, of course, to see some understanding reached between Japan and France and & crisis avoided, he could not but recognize it as aggression In case Jap°n should on the contrary send military forces into French Indochina against the latter's will. Then I told him that Japan had to take suit- able measures to cope properly with the effect of the European War which might be brought uoon East Asia just as much as America would, if necessary, take measures such as military supervision over the possessions of European countries in the Caribbean Sea. He said that as America was not yet being menaced by any aggression, it had not taken such an action, and that America would proceed to protect common interest through consulta- tion with other countries concerned, which step, he said, could not be regarded in the same light as that of Japan which was going to take an independent action against French Indochina. At any rate, he said, hs had frankly expressed his point of view in anxiety over the diffi- culties that stood in the way of American-Japanese relations. This co y has been forwarded to Washington. Please forward from Washington to Britain, France, Germany and Italy. /Memorandum regarding the French Indochina problem delivered to Vica-Minlster MATSUMIYA by the Councillor of the British Embassy, DODD, on August 10, 1940 / He.orts have come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that demands have been made uoon the Government of Indochina by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government will recall that on April 26th the Parliamentary Under Secretary exoes3ed to the Japanese Ambassador His Majesty's Government's full agreement with the Japanese Government a,s to the meintena ce of the status quo in the Netherlands 3ast Indies. His Majesty's Government attach similar importance to the maintenance of the status nuo of Iniochina and other countries in the Far East. Summary of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador C'UIGIE in Tokyo (l6 September 1940. Second Section of the European and ./est Asiatic Affairs Bureau) l.The problem of the arrest of Britishers. Ambassador CHAIGI3 after having exoressed his desire for the release of the two Britishers, Captein JA 3S and WOOLLEY, who had been arrested about the end of July, Doc. Ho. 772 Fage 11 as per annexed caper A, stated that the above-said had been transferred and were now in the hands of the public procurators, and that, though the following remark of his was only for the Minister's personal reference, there was a rumor that the Snglishmen were observed to be acquitted soon because theirs was slight offense against the military police. He then asked the Minister to make efforts to release them. In this regard, the Minister immediately telephoned to the Justice Minist r for the information thereof and though he received a report a little later from the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Justice Ministry, he told the Ambassador that he would answer one way or the other at a later date. 2. The French Indo Cl.ina Problem.. The Ambassador presented an oral statement as per attached paper B, instead of an oral explanation and stated that the British Government was very anxious about this matter. To the above the Minister responded that an agreement had already been reached between Japan and France, the content of which he s?id he was not in the position to disclosp, that Japan had been going ahead with everything under the frinndly understanding with France, and, that therefore, there was no reason for a third Power to have anything to say about it. Ambassador CBAIGI3 stated that Britain feared lest her interests should bo damaged and also lest this matter should entail, for example, 5hin8a4. invasion of French. Indochina. Whereupon the Minister stated that it was for the very purpose of preventing such ̂ situation frcra arising that Japan desired that a detailed agreement between the authori- ties on the spot would be speedily concluded. Nevertheless, the French authorities there were not only aisob3dient to the instructions of the mother country and in opposition to the will of the Vichy Government, but al so through the officials of the British, American and Chunking Govern- ment-. expected aid from these governments and wore striving to put off the solution of the situation as long as possible, that such an attitude of the French Indochina authorities was aggravating the situation and also that the Japanese side had not changed in the least the original desire to solve the ouestion amicably under mutual understanding between the governments of both states. Then, Ambassador CHaI&IE denied the alleged fact that the third Power officials ere striving to oostpone the solution of the situation in conspiracy with the French Indochina authorities. To this denial the Minister stated that he had grounds to confirm such facts and further emphasized that he was not of such temperament as to talk of a non-existent matter as though it existed. When the Ambassador hinted at the passing oft-iroopo through Fr.nch Ijjdochina as being an infringement of the sovereignty of French Indo- china, the Minister contradicted that there was no such reason; assuming that an Anglo-Japanese agreement had been reached regarding the passage of troops through India or 3urma, and if some third Power protested it as violation of British sovereignty, "would this be considered reasonable?" 3. The Bombing of the "impress of Asia" Incident.. The embassador presented the annexed paper 0, .-oncernieg the above incident with the premise that he wa.s not going to make any protest or-representation, requesting that, as the conditions would possibly give rise to a doubt that the bombing had been done purposely, he desired to be given some Doc. I.e. 772 Page 31 written document which, describing the situation in detail, would specifically enable him to fully realize that the alleged action had not been done punosely, which request the Minister promised that he would consider. 4. The Hongkong and 3urma. ones'1-ion. Ambassador CHAIGDJ, after a remark that the fo 11 owing was a.ccording to the instruction from the home government, stpted that the British Government had accepted with fore- bearance, despite various unfavorable discussions within the country,the agreement concerning the catting off of thp Hongkong and. Burma Transport Routes, and he nsked the Minister if Japan had lost hope of restoring peace, Japan's endeavor for which was specified in the stipulation of the agreement. Whereupon the Minister r^s^onled the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to restore peace; that the treaty negotiations then in progress vith the '/AUG Government at xiA-iKIliG were solely for th»t purpose. The Minister continued that it was true that Japan had some ho6a in regard to CHIANG'S Government too, though he could not tell about the terms for peace and that the Jaoane^e Government of course would strive for peace, athe ardent desire of the Japanese people. Then, CRAIGIS asked if the negotiation with the :>ANG Government would not become the cause of breaking peace with the Chunking Government. The Minister explained some people argued in this way, but he had long been in China and on good terms with '..'ANG C-IING-Wei, and, further, that he was on such terms with CHIANG KAI SH5K as to have held a six hour consulta.- tion with him on one occasion a.t Nanchen; therefore, he believed that there was a possibility. CRalGI?] then proceeded to ask the Minister if Japan did not wish the mediation of Britain for peace restoration with CHIANG, to which the latter answered that he found no necessity of the British good offices as he knew CHIANG so well, and CHIANG also knew the Minister was a man who wou" d nev r make unreasonable demands nor use tactics and as he had assumed the post of Foreign Minister recently he thought that Then, Ambassador Craigie asked the Minister if he had any idea as to what should be done with regard to the Hongkong-Burma Tjr obi em after the • xoiration of tomrs of tiv> agreement, after which everything was to be left to the free decision of Britain. The Minister answered to the effect that this question would be left at the disposal of the British Government and that he might at some later date have occasion to talk about it when necessary. Telegram sent on September 20, Showa 15, 1940, to Ambassador 3-IG-i-ilTSt" in England by Foreign Minister MATSUCKA He interview with Ambasaador Craigie by the Minister and Vice Minister with regard to the problems about French Indochina and Burma. Coded No. 757 1. Ambassador Craigie called on this Minister on the 16th inst. and requested an answer which would satisfy the British Government re the oroblem about French Indochina, saying that he could not help feeling as if the Imperial Government, taking advantage of the plight of France Doc. Ho. 772 Fage 32 and French Indochina,were trying to coerce problems of political and strategical importance uoon the various powers which are interested in Far East, lot alone French Indochina and China. To the above, this Minister replied that the third powers should have no cause for comolaint as the whole matter is carried on with friendly understandings on the basis of the treaty concluded between the Governments of Japan and France, and confuted that it is regrettable to see that the representatives of Britain, U.S.A. and the Ghungking Govern- ment are delaying the settlement of the issue by instigating the French Indochina authorities against the will of the French Government. 2. Ambassador Craigie in the above interview asked a.s to tha intention of the Imperial Government about one of the stipulations concluded between Ja.oa.n and Britain in regard to the susoension of traffic via the Burma Houte, which clearly states Japan should endeavor to arrange peace with China. This Minister answered that the Japanese Gov rnment is endeavoring to bring about peace between Jaoa„n and China. When questioned further by the Anbassador whether Japan desired British intermediation to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government, this Minister answered that Japan did not so desire. 3. Then, on the 13th inst. Anbassador Craigie called on the Vice-Minister OHAbHI saying that aft r the above-stated interview with this Minister he had received a telegram from his Government as to its views. Ambassador Craigie said that the demands by Japan upon French Indochina would mean to facilitate an attack uoon China from a new direction, and that the demand would be contrary to the spirit of the .agreement concerning Burma which stipulated the efforts of Japan to restore peace. When the Vice-Minister asked if this protest meant that Britain would reopen the Burma. Houte in case Jaoan should execute her plan upon French Inlochina, the Ambassador replied that it did not necessarily so mean but was intendedtto urge Jaoan to reconsider the affair as it was considered to be contrary to the spirit of our hitherto mutual understandings. Re protests cf Britain and U.S.A. against the occupation of Southern French Indochina by the Imperial Forces The relations between our Empire and French Inlochina had been gradually improved since the conclusion of the MATSUOKA-H'-QLiRI Agreement on August 30 Showa. 15 (1S40) and furthermore it seemed as if the amelioration was spurred by the successes of the economic negotiations between Japan end French Indochina and of the arbitration conference for the dispute betw ;en Thailand and French Indochina in regard to their boundary which were both held in Tokyo in the Spring of Showa 16 (lS4l), but the situation is as yet not satisfactory. On the other hand the then attempted siege of Japan by Britain and the U.S.A. in Bast Asia was gradually turning into a military cooperation between Britain, U.S.A., the loth rlands and the ChungkingGov-ernments; moreover, the situation in French Indochina, especially in its southern Doc„ So, 772 Page 14 area, caused grave anxieties on the part of our Umpire. As it would "be a serious matter for our Smoire if French Indochina should consequently secede from its mother country of Japan in compliance with the siege by Britain and America, it b cam'? imperative for the existence and self- protection of our Smoire to prev mt such a turn and safeguard French Indochina from encroachment by third cowers, perfecting the cooperation between Japan and French Indochina. Thereupon the Imperial Government decided to demand of the French Government the co-defense of French Indochina and permission for the stationing of our forces and the use of the naval and air bases in its southern area. Considering that there would be a leak in the secrets, a delay in negotiations or some other obstacle if we held the talk in Tokyo, on July 12th we instructed KAT0; the Ambassador to France, to make the proposal at Vichy. The negotiations were mostly conducted with Vice-Premier Darlan and the official documents veri formally exchanged on July 22. Consequently on the 23ri ayletailed agreement on practical matters was concludcd between the authoriti -s of Japan and French Indochina at the actual place, and more army and naval forces vere sent in French Indochina beginning July 29. As it was anticipated that the British and American Gov rnments would protest against us in regard to this issue, wo instiucted HOMURA, Ambassador to Amrica, to make an offer as per separate paper at the same time as the occupation; while in Tokyo Foreign Minister TOYODA explained the true intention of the Imperial Government to the Ambassadors of Britain and United States separately. •«'e contradicted a protest presented by Britain at that time, but we simply ignored the arrogant proposal made later by the U.S.A. as to the actions of our occupation forces, and did not reply. c J R T I F .I 0 A T E Wo Da Co I JO 5 I.P.So No, ?72 Statement of Source and ..uthonticitv I, Hs'XJSEI Saoruj hereby certify that I am officially connectec with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody cf the document hereto attached consisting of 34 pages dated «4ig, Sept.,, igAQ? aud d^sjribod as follows i Anglo-iimerican Intervention at time of lmperrsJ advance into northern French Indo- China, a booklet - I furthor certify that the atuaci.ed'record and document is an officio' document of the Japanese Go rommer-t, and that it is part of the official archives and files of tho following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citationj, if any5 or any ether official designation cf the regular location of tho document in tho archives or files)? Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo ';n thi.3 27th day of Sopt - ,/itnossj N.'.G.'JL*RTJ GDO ĥjp:c'r .Prehives Section... Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Tohn .'.» Curt is j hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the .11 lied Powers, •and that the above certifies;;: on war, obtained by mo from tho above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business,. Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of Sept., 1946 J^l CIP.TX3 2nd Lt. ifiis H-NCSHI Signature cf Official witness T/2j. T.TOGUCIII .Tnvoet i gat or Official Capacity Doc. No. 785 L 4 0 ' Page 1 Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan "and Indo-China. Signed in Tokyo Kay 6, 1941 Ratifications exchanged in Tokyo July 19^1 In Force from the same day. Promulgated July lr41 (Gazetted July 10, 1941) Having consulted the councillors of the Privy Council, we ratify and hereby promulgate the Franco-Japanese accord concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China. signed and sealed in Tokyo by the Japanese delegate together vith the French delegate on Lay 6, 1941. The Imperial Seal July 9, K 4 1 Prime Minister Prince KCNCYE, Fumimaro Foreign Minister iATSUCKA, Yosuke Treaty #13 Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China. The Japanese Government and the French Government, desiring to obtain a closer economic relation between Japan and Indo-China, to assure the eoual development of trade between the two countries, and to facilitate the payrent for it, have agreed on the following provisions: Article 1 All natural products or manufactured goods, produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries shall receive on their importation into the territories of the other country, most favoured nation treatment on all matters concerning tares, fees or other assessments, and regulations and formalities pertaining to importation. All natural products or manufactured £oods produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries, shall receive on their exportation to the other country, the treatment accorded to similar goods destined to the most favoured nation for all matters concerning taxes, fees, or other assessments, and the regulations and formalities pertaining to exportation. Doc. No. 785 L Page 2 Article 2 Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article the import duties applicable in Indo-China to the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from Japan, shall be those of the lowest tariff. Furthermore, the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Japan enumerated in Table A attached to the present A-jeerd, shall enjoy, on their importation into Indo-China, the reduced rates on the duties cf the lowest tariff or the exemption of duties, listed in that table. Article 3 Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1 the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Indo-China, enumerated in Table B attached to the present Accord, shall enjoy, on their importation into Japan, reduced rates on the duties of the national tariff or exemption of the duties listed in that chart. Article 4 When one of the two countries finds it necessary to raise, for any one cf the products enumerated in Table A and B, the customs duties applicable to tho date of signature of the present Accord, it shall notify tho other party its intention in writing at least two months before putting the new customs duties into effect. In order to indemnify in friendly fashion the disadvantages which may accrue to the other country by this raising of tariff, a conference may be held, at the recuost of the other party. Fo raise in the customs duties applicable to tho products enumerated in Tables A and B shall be made before the expiration cf one year from tho date of enforcement of this present Accord. Article 5 The advantages prescribed in the preceding articles shall remain as acauired advantages, regardless of any change that may be made in the list of articles or the classification of customs duties. Doc. N0„ 785 L Page 3 Article 6 The enjoyment of the tariff advantages prescribed in this Accord is subject to the dual condition of direct shipment and certification of origin. However, notwithstanding the regulation of direct shipment, the products enumerated in Table A and B attached to this Accord, when transhipped in the ports of Honkong, I.'anila, Shanghai, or Canton, shall enjoy the tariff advantages prescribed in the above Ch*rts, under the following conditions? 1) The shipment should receive a through bill of lading from the country of origin to the port of destination. 2) The bill of lading should be endorsed by the consular authorities of the country of destination at the port of transhipment, who will attest that the transhipped merchandise h?s not undergone at the port of transhipment any transformation or manipulation of this nature as to lose its indentity. 3) The transportation between the port of tran- shipment and the port of destination prescribed in the bill of lading shall be made by Japanese or French vessels. Article 7 The certificate of origin shall be issued either by the customs authorities of the country of origin, or by nualified organizations of the country of origin which have been approved by the country of destination. In the former case, vises by the consular officials shall be exempted . Shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air-mail shall be exempted from certificate of origin. When one of the two Governments notifies the other that fraudulent acts were committed in the issuance of the certificate of origin, the Government which received the notification shall immediately begin the investiga- tion of the contravention end communicate the results t1"'--1• 1 - cor.ipl' in.ir. Co, v r-r- :n%.nd, if necessary, take every possible step for preventing the continuance of such fraudulent acts. Doc. No. 785 L Page 4 Article 8 For the application of valorem, duties at the time of importation, the customs declaration should be accompanied by an invoice certified by the consular authorities of tho country of destination or by the customs authorities of the country of origin. However, for shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air mail, and also for all shipments the value of which does not exceed one hundred yen or its ecuivalent piastres, no certified invoices are raouired. A single deed (mixed document) may be produced in place of a certificate of origin and a certified invoice. This single deed must satisfy the conditions imposed on each of the documents for which it is a substitute. Article 9 The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries shall be exempted, in the territories of the other, from all taxes and fees for transit, transhipment, storage in bonded warehouses, warehouse entry, temporary duty-free importation and re-exportation. They shall receive for all regulations and formalities pertaining to these operations the most-favoured-nation treatment. Article 10 The natural products or manufactured good produced originally in and coming froir one of the two countries and imported into the territories of the other country shall not be subject to finished product tax, city admittance tax, or consumption tax collected for the account of the state province, towns, villages, or public or private authorities, higher than those which are being levied or may be levied on similar good pro- duced at home, or if there are no such products, on similar products of the most favoured nation. The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries and. imported into the territories of the other for the purpose of being stored in bonded warehouses or of transit, shall not be subjected to any internal tax whatever. Doc. Eo. 785 L Article 11 J )c. No. 785 L Page 5 The prohibitions or restrictions on the importation or exportation which ..re being enforced or may be enforced in the territories of one of the two countries for what- ever reason it may be. shall be applied to the trade of the other country only in the case where these prohibi- tions or restrictions are applied to all foreign countries* fiey shall be applied in such a manner as will not result in any arbitrary discrimination to the detriment of the other country. Article 12 The engagements stipulated in the preceding article shall not constitute an obstacle to the measures of prohibition or restriction which one or the other of the two countries might be led to take, provided that these prohibitions or restrictions ar.j at the same time applicable to all countries coming under the same con- ditions and provided that they are justified by any one of the following reasons; 1) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning public security 2) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning trans- actions in arms, ammunition, and war materials, or in exceptional circumstances, all other war supplies? 3) Prohibitions or restrictions enacted in order to protect public health or morality, or to insure the protection of animals and plants against disease, vermin and harmful parasites; 4) Prohibitions or restrictions on the exportation cf national, artistic, historical, or archaeological property for the purpose of protecting such property 5) Prohibitions or restrictions which have as their object the e.rtention to foreign products the system established for the country concerning the production, selling, transportation, and consumption of similar home products* 6) Prohibitions or restrictions applied to products which are or may become the objects of state monopolies or monopolies exercised under state control within the country in respect to their production or sale. Doc. No. 785 L Page 6 Article 13 The two Governments agree that, in all matter con- cerning commei'ce, all privileges, favors, or immunities which one of the two countries has accorded or may accord to a third country> shall be extended immediately and without condition to the other country, their in- tention being that the most-favoured-nation treatment will be assured, in all relations, to the other country. Article 14 The stipulation of the present Accord concerning the most-favoured-nation treatment shall not be applicable to the following matters: 1) Special advantages vhich are accorded or may be accorded to Lanchukuo by Japan? 2) Special advantages based on Customs Union? 3) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to adjoining countries in order to facilitate border trade* 4) Special advantageswhich ara accorded or may be accorded to domestic fishing industry and to fishing industry similar to domestic fishing industry. Article 15 The competent authorities of the two Governments shall decide upon mutual agreement, each year for the following year the list of the products of Indo-Chinese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Japan, and on the other hand, the list of the products of Japanese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Indo-China, and also the allotment to be given to Japan for the products which are subject to allotment in their importation into Indo-China. In the same way they shrll decide, by mutual agreement, the conditions of application of the foregoing provisions. Article 16 The Japanese Government shall permit the importation into Japan of the products of Indo-China origin prescribed in Article 15 in the ouantities agreed upon in accordance with the same Article. Dec. No. 785 L Page 7 The French Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Japan. The two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Japan and the exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin prescribed in Article 15 in quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Japan and exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15. Article 17 The French Government rliall permit the importation into Indo- China of the produces of Japanese origin prescribed in Article 15 in the quantities agreed upon in accordance with the said Article. The Japanese Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Indo-China. In cauc the system of allotment of imports into Indo-China is extended during the course of the year to products other than those which are subject to this system of allotment at the time of the grant of the allotted quantities prescribed by Article 15, the allotment granted to Japan for these products shall be, fixed by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the two Governments. In case the total allotment of the products subject to the system of allotment for importation into Indo-China is increased during the course of the year, the French Government shall consider favourably the grant to Japan of additional allotments, In the sarr.e way, the two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Int.o--Chi.na and tho exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese oxigin prescribed in Article 15 5n quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Indo- China and the exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15. Article 18 The place of origin cf" the products ehall be evidenced by the pre- sentation of the certificate of origin drawn up in accordance with .Article 7 of the present. Accords i. i i Doc. No. 785 L Page 8 Article 19 The competent authoritative officials of the two Governments shall communicate to each other every month a list of the import licenses issued by each of the two countries for the products originating and coming from the other and also statistics of imports and exports between the two countries. Article 20 With the exception of the products for which exceptions have been specially agreed upon between the two Governments, the amounts due to creditor in Indo-China in payment for the imports into Japan of the products of Indo- Chinese origin shall be paid in Indo-Chinese piastres, and the amounts due to xjreditors in Japan in payment for the imports into Indo-China of the pror ducts of Japanese origin shall be paid in Japanese yen. The provisions of the preceding article shall be applied to the payment of freight, insurance and various other charges connected with the trade between Japan and Indo-China. The Japanese yen and Indo-Chinese piastres prescribed in the two preceding articles shall be acquirable respectively at the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine. Article 21 The Banque de l'Indochine shall place at the disposal of tne Yokohama Specie Bank,-as the counterpart of their equivalent in yen, Indo-Chinese piastres necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article. The Yokohama Specie Bank shall place at the disposal of the Banque de l'Indochine, as the counterpart of their equivalent in Indo-Chinese piastres, yen necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article. The exchange rate between the yen and piastres to be applied to the operations prescribed in the present article shall be determined by mutual agreement between the two Banks on the basis of the gold value of the two monies, such as result from the quotations by the said Banks for these .uonies in the same foreign money convertible into gold. Article 22 The yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article, shall be paid into two special yen accounts, which will be opened in the books of the Yokohama -jpscie Bank in tho name of the Banque de l'Indochine; these accounts shall be designated in the present Accord under the names of Account A and .account B, Doc. No. 785 L Page 9 To the credit of Account A shall be carried the yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine as the counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payments made by applica- tion of the present Accord, with the exception of those prescribed in the following paragraph. To the credit of Account B shall be carried the total in 1941. 70% in 1942, and 55% in 1943 of the yen acquired by the Banque of l'Indochine as a counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payment of the white rice purchases made by Japan in Indo-China. Account B ph.all bear interest at the rate to be fixed by mutual agreement between the two Banks. The Piastres acquired by the Yokohama Specie Bank in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article shall be paid into a special Piastre account to be opened on the books of the Banque de l'Indochine in the name of the Yokohama Specie Bank; this account is designated in the present Accord under the name of Account C. The Piastres and Yen respectively possessed by the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Banque de l'Indochine at the time of the enforcement of the present Accord shall be carried to credit of Accounts A end C, Article 2J The funds in Accounts A and C shall be appropriated exclusively to the following: 1.) The payment of the products traded between Japan and Indo-China. 2.) The payment of freight, insurance and other incidental charges related to this trade. The funds in Account B shall not be used directly for any payment. The sums which will have been carried to the credit of this account in the course of one month shall be transferred to Account A at the end of the corresponding month of the following year. Article 24 Accounts A and B shall be settled at the end of each month after effecting the operation of transfer prescribed in the preceding article. When a comparison of the two accounts shows in favor of oneof the Bantcs a credit balance in excess of 5»000,000 ypn or its equivalent in piastres, the amount in excessof the 5»C00,000 yen or its equivalent in piastres shall be paid, upon demand by the creditor Bank, in gold or foreign currencies convertible into goide However, if a credit balance exists in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the payment prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be mace only •for that part of the balance, evaluated in yen, which exceeds the balance Doc. No. 785 L Page 10 of '"'ccount B a3 of the same date after the addition of 5«000,000 yen. Article 2j On the expiration of the present Accord, Accounts A and C shall be settled and offset against each other. If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold; Account B shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord. If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Yokohama Specie Bank; it shall be offset against the balance of Account 3. If the credit balance resulting from this second offsetting is in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments, be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convert- ible into gold. If the balance is in favor of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord. Article 2o In case of an alteration of the gold value of yen or of piastres as fixed in Article 21, a revaluation of the balances of Accounts A, 3, and C shall be made, by mutual agreement, on the basis of the new gold value of the two monies. Article 2? The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine shall decide between themselves the technical methods necessary for the enforcement of the present Accord. Article 28 In the application j>f the present •'•ccord, the following terms shall be understood: 1.) The terms "the two countries", "each of the two countries" shall b understood as Japan and Indo-China; the terms "either of the two countries", "the other country" shall be understood as Japan or Indo-China. 2.) The terra "State", when applied to France, shall be understood as the French Government, or the Government-General of Indo-China. J )c. No. 785 L Page 11 3.) The terms "the products of domestic production," "domestic products," when applied to Indo-China, shall be understood as products of Indo-Chinese origin. Article 29 The provisions of the present Accord shall be applicable to all the territories or possessions belonging to or under the jurisdiction of Japan and in all tne territories constituting the Government-General of Indo-China, However, the provisions of Articles 15 to 27 shall not be applicable in the Kwantung Leased Territory. Article 30 If during the duration of the present •"•ccord, one of the two Govern- ments finds it impossible to perform any of the provisions owing to unforseen incidents, the two Governments shall enter into a negotiation for the solution of the difficulties thus arisen. Article 31 The present accord shall be ratified and the instruments of ratificatioi shall be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible. However, the French Government, in case of unavoidable circumstaces, may substitute for this instrument of ratification a written notice-of ratification, in which case the French Government shall forward to the Japanese Government the instru- ment of ratification as soon as possible. The present Accord shall come into forco from the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall be effective until December 31> 1943* -̂"t shall be extended by tacit renewal year by y;ar unless one of the two Governments notifies the other six months before the expiration of the -"ecord of its intention of ending the -».ccord. The present -accord replaces the commercial agreement dated May 13, 1932 entered into between Japan and France, which temporarily fixes the provisions of trade between Japan and Indo- China, and the documents attached thereto. In witness thereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their res- pective Governments, have signed and sealed the present Accord. Qrawn up in Japanese and French, in Tokyo, on the 6th of May, in the loth year of Showa corresponding to May 6, I94I, /s/ Yosulce i-lATSUOKA Jq'J Jun MAT3UMIYA /s/ Charles Arsene Henry /s/ Rene Hobin Doc. No. 735 L TABLE A Page 12 Japanese -products which on their im^ort^tj on into Indo-China en .joy the advantages of. reduction or exemption ,3f ouscoms-uutiss prescribed in Article 2 and also the advantages of fixed tariff in accordance with the conditions prescribed in Article L. Number of the Tariff of Indo- China The Name of Merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the Lowest Tariff Ex 17-eX 17t 2 19 27 < H, am 31 35 to 35,5 nf 37 38 45A and B # V7 48 j Canned meat t j Cocoon, silk for spinning • Silk refuse ( j Cieo-margarine and margarine 1 | i Milk, cream, condensed milk, 1 and powdered milk > j Cheese Butter, fresh or melted 1 }• • ; Salted j Honey j Fresh, •(refrigerated) or j frozen Fish I 1 Dried, salted or smoked fish Fish conserved naturally, i pickled or processed by ( other methods 1 i Oysters * Exempted jExempted 33*33% 3J »33% 33*33% 3J »33% i Exempted y 49(1 to 3) i Shells, fresh or Kept' in a j fresh Condition' ; • * A i 49(4 to 6) ! Molluscs, conserved naturally or; • processed, dried shrimps, ! dried trepang and dried shark fit Exempted 50 ; Sea mussels and other muiluscs i in shells or dried Applic- Unit of able Levy Tariff ad valorem I lowest lowest duty-fr duty-fr lowest 1055 f r a t o.oa-j 10% lowest lowest 1C% 1 t X //O duty-frc lowest duty-fre Doc. N0„ 785 L Page 13 dumber of the Tariff of Indo- China The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms duties of the -he i'â i of Merchandise Newest Tariff Applic- Unit of able Low Tariff 57 75,5 77 80-80,2 83 8kk and B Pearls Fancy biscuits or high grade biscuits without sugar Kneaded noodles and Italiaa noodles the so-called Chinese noodles Dried vegetables and powder of dried vegetables Irish Potatoes Fresh table fruits and other kinds of fruits I (l to 5) jCitrus fruits (6) (7 and 8) (9) (10) (11 and 12) Almonds Pineapples and bananas Cherries Dates Figs and strawberries (13 to 18)(Persimmons, letchis, mangosteen, I mangoes, betel nuts and coconuts (19 to 22) (23) 85 86a, B and C 93,2 Peaches, apricots, apples, pears, plums and grapes Other kinds of fresh table fruits not specified above Dried or crushed and dried table or other kinds of fruits • 33*33% -exempted Exempted Exempted Exempted Exempted Exempted Exempted Pickled or conserved table or other kinds of fruits Confectionaries, bonbonsA etc. 33*33% 25% PL 10? lowest duty-fr duty-fr lowest duty-fr lowest duty-fr lowest duty-fr lov»est duty-fre duty-fr lowest lowest 50% Doc. No. 785 L Page 14 •dumber of the Tariff of Indo- China 94 95 The --•arqe of merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Mitie3 of the Unit of 98 9 8 , 2 103 109 110-110,2 1 1 1 . 2 AffiB 1 1 1 . 3 112 ( 1 - 2 ) (3 to 6) ( 7 ) (9> (10 to 12) ( 1 3 ) ( 1 4 ) 122,2 113 114 113 126(1) 126(2) ' sugared biscuits Jams, jelly, marmalade, etc. containing su^ar or honey ! Brick, bar or other forms of ; chocolate ; Confectioneries containing ' cocoa, cocoa butter or chocolate Tobacco, tobacco leaves llanufacturod tobacco Fat oils' pure, boiled, oxidised or perfumed Sdibla vegetable oils Sulphurated oil Benzine or essences Rose, geranium-rosat and ylang- ylang Citron, orange, bergemot, mandarine, citronella, eucalytus, caiaphor Peppermint and safrol oil, de-turpentined oil Menthol crystals Thymol, Suntaloi, ̂ nethol Safrol Resinoides, sugenol, isafrol, turpentined carbidc Artificial aroma, vanilla and its derivation or substitutes Vegetable wax Vegetable t ar Camphor The roots of ginseng Foots other than those of ginseng lowest Tar-;ff 1+0% Levy_ 40/i k.0% 33.3^ 4<> 40^ kc/%- Exempted Exempted exempted 50%' applic- able Tariff 15% 15% lowest 3o;1 45^ lowest 20% lowest lowest lowest lowest 15% 15% lowest 15% lowest 15% lowest lowest duty-free duty-free duty-free 25% lowest J )c. No. 785 L Page 15 '•aber of 'is Tariff Iado- 'jJLoa The Name of Merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Aitias of the LgWPSt Tariff Applic- Unit of Able Levy Tariff 127,2 1.58k-D 170,2(l) 170 ,2 (2 ) 172.3 173,2 174.4 135 189 190 203k 205B 205C-206 207 207,2 207,3-5 203 209-209, 23 Vermifuge chrysanthemum (rinds, flowers, leaves, stems, and roots) Vegetables, fresh, salted, pickled, conserved or dried Edible sea-weeds Vegetable products or refuse not mentioned hare Be or Japanese liquor Natural mineral water Cement, white others 3u.lph.ur Coal Ordinary pig iron for casting Hematite pig iron (phosphous not excessing 0.15>') Spiegel pi^ iron, ferro-alloy, and iron or steel ingots Iron or steal rolled into bars, blooms or billets Iron jr steel rolled into bars less than 3 millimetres Tempered steel for implements, special steel and oar3 of smelted special steel Iron or steel Hoop iron or hoop steal rolled by heating or cooling Exempted -xempted Exempted Reserved (Note l) •-xempted Exempted 40)2 Exempted Exempted 4C$ 40/2 40% k0% 40* duty-fre * i t j lowest ! j duty-fre 1 t j duty-fre 1 ! Roserved (Note l) duty-fre. duty-fret 15% lowest duty-fre duty-fre r-t O/o 1 owes t 6% lowest i ro% ; lowest oZ OC. IMO. 735 L I Number of the Tariff of Indo- Cliin? The • • nme of ̂ merchandise Page 16 The Reduction Rate of the Cus- Applic- toms Duties of the Tj'nit of able Lowest Tariff Lew, Tariff 210 -212 I 212,2-217 011-012 j i I 044-045 I 046,2 048 0o2,2 073 076 081 087 0110 0114 0115,2 0123 0124 and 0131 0.165,5 0l66 0175 0173 0180,2 Thin plite3 of iron or steel, broad iron plates, tin plated, copper plated, lead plated or zinc plated iron and iron or copper wires Iron or steel waste, rails, wheels and axles Potassium nitrate, natural or I transformed 5 Hydrochloric acid5 ordinary or j coeuercially pure f otassium chlorate | 1 Bleaching powder Red phosphorus Sulphuric acid Sodium Bisulphite Sodium sulphide aluminium Sulphate -dlicated calcium Potassium Chrauri.de and Potassium' Dichroifliae Chromic alum Copper sulphate Copper sulphate of iron and sulphate of iron Bicarbonate of soda Sodium sulphate Zinc oxide hi th op one Naphthalene,(l) coarse (2) Powder, lump or plate 40^ - xemptcd Exempted Exempted •̂ xei-pted Exempted Exempted 40/:= 30% Exempted 50^ Exempted 40^ Exempted B-xe.ipted 40/o 43^ x̂ejjpted ko% & lowest duty-frc | duty-fre I 1 duty-fr.. duty-fr. duty-fr? duty-fr (3% 7% | duty-frc ! 5? I/O ! duty-frc ! duty-frc duty-fre duty-frc % J )c. No. 785 L Page 17 dumber of the Tariff of Indo- Pluna The --emo of Merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- Applic- toms Duties of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff Lew Tariff 0 200 i i 0379 0380 j i 0331,3 ! 01 to 0392 29 4»,B and 0 I 298 I 293,3 I I 299 299*2 (1-2) (3) (4-5) 300 301 3C8 308,2-3 310 311 312 314 316 Acetone Phosphatic manure nitre-lime Insecticides made from materials ! other than copper i t j t Chemical products not mentioned •.; above 1 1 Dyes made from coal-tar 1 Varnish and other similar paints i | I Liquid polish for metals Ink for writing or drafting Printing Ink Black Coloured ink which, contains more than 3% of pigments b ed f om; coal-tar Other coloured ink Black cosmetics Pencils, pencil lead, and pastels Cosmetics, knead3d with oil Colours Cosmetics not mentioned here Perfumes Soap other than perfumed soap Seasonings Compounded medicine not mentioned here 403 Exempted Exempted Exempted 6o£ 30^ Exempted 60% 30% 9/i duty-fr duty-fz duty-fr lowest lowest lowest 1owest 10% system of the concern pigment 17.5* duty-fr 10% lowest lowest lowest lowest 2k.5% lowest lowest J )c. No. 785 L Page 18 •umber of the Tariff of Indo- yliiaa.... The Naiiie of ivierciiandise 3 2 1 330(lJ?) 331-332 336-337 338-341 All 2 343-344 345-346,3 347A-B and 547,4 3 4 7 , 2 i-B 343 >48,2-5 343,6 349-34?14 350 351 <51,2-4 352-354 355-356 | All kinds of candles 1 Wax, cream, paint or paste for shoei 1+0% i Fireproof bricks and other fireproof} | products i Other pottery made of ordinary clay ; The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the lowest Tariff Applic- Unit of able Levy Tariff Pottery made of grit Ceramics or grit pottery for sanitary use Tiles pf 140: i I 133*33% Ceramics made of ordinary potter's ; clay or of clay containing tin i33*33% 1 High-grade ceramics and majolica ceramics, high-grade clay potteriesj earthenwares and imitation porcelai460/i » Porcelain, tea and coffee sets j60% of porcelain, porcelain wares j Electrical wares made of pottery, i porcelain, grit pottery or glass Plate glass Fronted glass, opa-jue glass, coloured glass, etc. Mirrors Cast rough glass Glasswares Window glass Stained glass, triplex glass and safety glass Glass for clocks and watches Glass for spectacles i 60% ! ! 4Q£ i | f 40% 50% lowest 15% lowest lowest 9% 13% 10% 10% 10% 10% lqg 15* 15% 15% lowest 15% O/O lowest lowest lowest oc 765 L Page ±<y Number of the Tariff of Indo- Qfrj-fla ... , The Name of Merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- Applic- toms Duties of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff Levy Tariff 357 ; I 358 j 359-359.21 to 5 359.6 | 361 | 361,2 361,3 368-373 372-375 379,380, 381 381,2- and B 385-335,2 404-406,3 407(l-4) 407(5-]7) to 10,2 Optical glass &aall glass articles Bottles Vacuum flasks and other vessels for keeping water hot Incandescent electric bulbs ^ther electric implements (lamps, vacuum tubes) Dry plate for photography Pure or mixed cotton yarns' Yarns not arranged for retail sale Arranged f or retail sal e or for embroidery Pure or mixed woolen yams 3ilk or spun silk yarns, refuse of silk threads Rayon yarns, refuse rayon and fibre Oil cloth and linoleum ^urecotton cloth (raw, refined, bleached, dyed or mercerized, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics, fabrics for bandage, and rubber cloth Printed cotton handkerchiefs, comforters, mufflers, scarfs ana shawls •Pure cotton cloth (printed, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics - coloured lining cloth for binding books-colored cloth-velvet-tulle) bofo 4Q?i Wo Exempted Exempted 23S 28& lowest 15% { lowest j 15* j 12* | 15% I lowest i 1 i i 18.21 15% duty-fre duty-fret 15^ j 18£ \ 25.25S 1852 J )c. No. 785 L Page 20 umber of v,e Tariff " Tndo- - -iua 411A-S The Name of merchandise The Reduction Rate of the Cus- Applic toms Mities of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff Lew Tariff H- 411F-J 411,2 to 418 Pure or mixed plain, twilled or ! drilled cotton cloth woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns Pure or mixed figured cotton satin or figured cotton textures woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns i • Pure cotton cloth (crepe for sani- • tary use."figured satin, or figured® texture-(curled texture) wanaori ! or texture woven in Jacquard styled 419A-D 420 420 ,2 pique or pique bl:nikets-damask- tulle bobbinots-blankets Cotton hosiery machine knitted cotton lace Handiaade cotton lace 420,3,421,2! Pure cotton texture (Braided to 422(l-2^)t exture-ribbons, ribbons dyed ' with ink or dyes, plain tulle 422(23) Pure cotton texture (embroidered tc 426 itulle,woven embroideries, inter- • laced weavings-curtains, of muslin ! or fancy tulle,-embroidered cur- ;tains, embroidered muslin f 427-431 -Pure cotton (without special • tariff) wick for lamps and .braided wick for candles-incan- ' descent mantel soko of twisted 'thread for textile use oilcloth 432-433 .Mixed woven cotton cloth in which (l to 3) cotton weighs the heaviest (velvet, plush and sealskin) tex- tures excepting crepe for sanitary use 433(2) (Mixed woven cotton (crepe for sanitary use) 23? 232 | 28* | 232 232 232 28£ 232 2852 Idfi 185? i 1852 25.2£ 36(2 722 1655 3&? lfiK 1S5» 18/2 r Doc. No. 785 L Page 21 Number of the Tariff of Indo- Silns 434 435 436 The Name of Merchandise The ̂ eduction Rate cf the Cus- tom Duties of the lowest Tariff Appl ic- Unit of able Levy Tariff wax3d woven ribbons in which cottol weighs the greater part (1) iaixed with silk, spun silk or; rayon (2) Others Nixed braided cotton in which cotton weighs the heaviest (l) iviixed with silk, spun silk or ii (2^-(12) Others Other mixed cotton cloth in which cotton weighs the heaviest lyon 28̂ 437 Fishing net 1 •Exempted 438-441.3 Pure woolen cloth, woolen cloth, padding, muslin, dyed plain wool) i 40* 442^-B Pure woolen cloth (carpets) Pure woolen cloth (hosiery) i Wo i 4.44-447 Pure woolen cloth (braided wool, ribbons, berets, Turkish hats, tapestries and shawls) t j i kr>% 1 J 448-449 Pure woolen lace and not laco I 450-451 Woolen nets and blankets k0% t t [ 452 Woolen slippers with trimmings and the so-called 3trausburg slippers i 453 Prills of woolen texture ! Exempted 1 1 i 453,2- 454(9) Woolen velvets for upholstery, mixed woolen cloth (Berry, Serge) wool 40% system 0 • tax no,ij I or J a cording circurn- stances» ; tax of • pure cotton ribbons system o J tax 'number 45' 1. , . 13"> • tax of pure cotton ac cording to speaies • Duty-fre. I 15^ lowest 21& ; 21/» I tax of cotijon lace ah net dace ! 15^ 1 system of tax no. 482, 2 according to its (kind 1 duty-free 1 15? J )c. No. 7 8 5 L •' iber of Tariff ' Indo- 'aa .4(10) The Namo of ̂ crchanaisc 54(11) ,54(l2) 54(l3) 6<P "dxed woolen carpets ^ixod woolen hosiery x'-ixod woolen texture (crops for sanitary use) Other mixed woolen textures Page 22 The Reduction rate of the Cus- Applic- toms Mi ties of the Unit of able lowest Tariff Levy Tariff system o pure woo carpets 40% 40% ! :-i-6) •3-15.17 ! 3.26-26 | I I 24) 7,12,l6, } 5.19.22,24 )) ^ i 20,21) ,9C Special silk cloth of ̂ sia Pure or mixed silk or spun silk without metallic admixture in which silk weighs the heaviest ^repe (figured or unprinted) braided thread, plain serge velvet and plush (not figured) net cloth (not figured) , plain, gauze, thick cloth (unrefined) Thick texture, light silk and othez kind of texture not mentioned here weighing over 100 groin per 100 square metres (refined, bleached or dyed). Orepe (figured or printed)velvet ,or plush (figured) net cloth (figured or printed) heavy texture weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and un- refined) below 100 grams (figured or printed) Thick texture Poulard, etc. weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and refined, bleached, dyed or printed) 20% 33.33% 33.33% 38.7&S j 42.86% la ce Waste of pure or mixed silk 46.66% 60% 21% t tax of pure woolen texture according tb its kind 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% system of spun silk Doc. N0. 735 L / I'age Number of the Tariff of Indo- Qhim _ Th0 i'-'amo of 1;icrchandiso The Reduction rata of the Cus- Applic- toms Duties of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff Levy Tariff 459 ,D, Sl.Jte.F 45 9G 45911!. 32, I. J, E 459.M | 459^- j 460-460,61 i 1 461 461.02 461.3 46I,4A-B 462* 462 ,B 462,0 • 462 ,2 463 463,2 464 •̂ ure or mixed silk, spun silk, waste of spun silk, rayon texture with metallic admixture •Pure or mixed rayon in whirh reyonj weighs the heaviest without metal- lic admixture Silk, spun silk, rayon mixed with other fibres (wool, horsehair, animal hair, cotton, etc.) and in ; which the mixed fibres neigh the heaviest and without metallic admixture Silk, spun silk or rayon carpets j or gauze carpct Hosiery Garments and other ready made articles ' Paper (excepting 46l,G) Machine made paper weighing over ' 35Qrans per 1 square metre 1 Special paper called chemical \ paper ; i. { ' Pap 5T for photographing and films I i Rough cardboard and glossy' paper j ceLledthe "press pan" So-called "Fancy board" Processed cardboard and artificial felt, cardboard cut in sizes Out or processed cardboard Talcunized fibre Cardboard boxes 46? Crr ] '•r' ii.CC-j SO;! 40% Wo 40>" 10% added to tax of the texture heav- iest in weigl (Note 2) I not wo ight ; 1 Kg. 1 ad i valorem 10 franc (Note 3- 70.2^ 70.2% 70.2% lowest lowest 17.53 lowest lowest 15% 153 lowest 1% Doc. No. 735 L Number of is Tariff of Indo- Oliing... The Name of Merchandise Page 24 The Reduction rate of the Cus- Applic- toms Duties of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff Levy Tariff 464.2 464.3 465-465,2 465.3 465.4 465,5- 466,466-2 468 469 469,2(1) Bobbins and tubes of cardboard Superior cardboard products, boxes and others Typed or lacquered cardboard or fibro products Cardboard or fibre products ornamented with pictures or damascene mounts for photographs Notebooks, memorandum books, small pockotbooks, account books 3ooks newspapers, periodicals, old newspapers Colour prints, semi-coloured photo prints, lithographs Photographs of artistic or record keeping value 40£ l\.0% 40% 40;o' 40/2 Exempted Exempted 40^ Exempted 469,2(2) | Other photographs 469.3 469.4 469.5 469.6 470 431-433 liQl.2-3 jPhotograph type-founding and other 1 similar articles Films for motion pictures j Tronscopiod pictures and j printed matter i I Post cards : All kinds of printed matter j specified above » ! Footgear made of leather, cloth, j etc. ' Products of morocco leather • -Mourns and album covers 40/2 40/2 kC/a kCZ 40/2 1 ' 19% i 15? 21% 15% ! ' lowest ! ; duty-fre 1 ; j 1 I ; I duty-frc I i » 1 , 1 1552 t ! duty-frc i | I system ! i of i litho- A graph i • 1 system of litho graph^ - .. . ; » t ! lowost » I I ; ^ | | 152 ! | ! : 1 lowest 30^ 21% J )c. No. 785 L •fiber of '* /.io Tariff ° Tndo- - d m Page 25 The Name of Merchandise The Reduction rate of the Cus- toras Duties of the 1 Tariff Applic- Unit of able . Levy Tariff Bags, satchels, handbags, etc. 4 92,5 I Leather belts 492,6-7 Leather products not mentioned 497-503,2, Small clocks 5 0 5 - 5 0 5 , 2 t 5 0 4 - 5 0 4 . 4 5 0 6 - 5 0 9 , 2 5 1 0 - 5 3 6 , 4 5 5 5 568D 5 7 4 5 7 6 , 4 5 3 7 - 5 7 9 . 2 5 3 3 584 5 8 5 , 2 538 . 603,4B 604-605 604(5 2-56): j 609 614 614(2) 1 - 4 , 614(2) 5 - 1 7 Gauge for rotations, electrcity, isater, gas,etc., electric gauge Large clocks, besides gauges Machinery Enamel bathtubs made of moulded iron 4052 40% 4O£ 3 3 - 3 3 2 lowest k&'o Enamel bathtubs of thin steel plat0 Lamps and tin products Batteries -••̂etal wares not mentioned above Gunpowder lynamite Detonators for mines Fuse for mines Wo I : 49% 1 f * 1 ; 33.33% ; Exempted { ( I Exempted f Exempted Wooden boxes for coffee packing,20^ Musical instruments excepting gramophones Gramophones and similar articles ' 30% Fancy mattings ' Vehicles ' * Bicycles, autocycles, tricycles 50% ft t Accessories and parts of b icycles • j . 21% j lowest 10JS lowest 15% 15% 152 153 1owest • duty-fr duty-fi duty-fi : 20A i | lowest : 24*5% 1 i lowest ! lowest 1 I ! 25̂ 1 i lowest r Doc. No. 735 L Number of the Tariff of Indo- Chir.a P -5 ov- O. x agb The Name of Merchandise The Reduction rate of the Ous- Applic- torns -uties of the Dait of able . LT7es-b Tariff Lew . Tar:.ff 614, - 3 - 6-11, 13-16 1-5,6-11, 12,13-16 614,3,B 614,3,C 620 ,A-G 620,1 620 J 620 ,H-J b20 ,H-J 620 ,K-M 620 NII automobiles Chassis for buses and sightseeing- cars. Trucks with oquipmant for gas generation Motor cars for r iding, trucks excepting- those with gas gener- ating equipment accessories and parts of auto- mobiles He a dl i Jit s, lant ems, etc. Rubber sheets, gum sulphide threads, elastic cloth, gum sulphide, rubber cloth, ready made goods of rubber cloth,ebonite Solid tyros for wheels Tubes and tyres for motor cars Tubas and tyres for jinrikishas Tubes and tyres for bicycles,etc. Soft rubber products, special rubber for combing machines, hot water bottles of rubber or of rubber cloth Rubber f ootgear 20% 20% 20% 40: 2 8 . 5 7 23,57% 620,0—R Rubber products for sanitary use, 1 rubber belts, and other rubber j goods 626-627 i Felt hats 1 623,^-0 t Hats, hat materials, berets & caps f 630,4^-B j Burners and parts of acetylene burners 40/ 40% I 635,2" 635 ,23 63̂ .3 Cameras and their appliances Bobbins for rolling films Medical instruments 43% _ML t 20? : 40% > 32% i lowest j lowest i ; lowest 15' j 25% I lowest f ' 25% ! lowest 15% i 15̂ c 1 lowest 20% 21% r. , No. 785 L Pago 27 i_x.be r of re Tariff •* Tado- L.na The Reduction rate of the Cus- -pplic- toms duties of the ^nit of able 'he Name of merchandise Lowest Tarjff Lev\ Tariff j 636A&D Fountain p a n s , sharp pencils r— i ! lowest 6 3 7 : Spectacles 50/" • 17.5% 641,2 I Fancy g o o d s m a d e from materials other t h a n ivory, mother of pearl, tortoise s h e l l , amber and ambroid 20% i 28% 642 1 Fines, p i p e s for cigars, etc. 20% , 28* 644(4-8) ; N i g h - g r a d e brushes 60% 10% 644(1-3) I Ordinary brushes, writing 33.33% 10% 644.2 1 Brushes and other brush products i 1 645(1-13)! China or porcelain buttons Ordinary metal buttons 40% > 15% 645(1-36) Buttons made of pressed cardboard, wood, ivory or hemp palm ! lowest 646-646(2; Beereation implements and parts ; 4c% j 21% 646,3 Intestinal or artificial intestinal ; strings, tread3 and plaited cord ' 21% ) ' 20% o48,2..-C Lighters t * L i lowest 652 Umbrellas, parasols, etc. 1 ( 1 J ; lowest Misc. 1 | Crown stoppers t ! J Exempted duty-fr -»ote (l) The import duty on beer shall be fixed by mutual agreement in case a quota is granted to foreign countries. Note (2) For the application of the provisions of Tables 459^ "to 459^ ^ ^ Note 2 of Table S of the customs tariff of Indo-China, the duty applicable to rayon cloth is fixed at 70.2% ad valorem after making 46 per cent reduction on the duty of the lowest tariff. Nets (3) The enjoyment of the benefit of a specific duty of ten francs per kilo- gram net is permitted under the conditions that the control of the price of rayon cloth, established according to the methods fixed by the competent authorities of the two Governments, shall secure between the import price of rayon cloth and the import price of rayon yarns a difference which corresponds to the manufacturing costs of the handicraft of Indo-China less the above duties. Doc. NO. 785 L ^ge 28 Nate (,/|,) The ready-made goods, except for the exceptions enumerated in the tariff, shall carry, besides the duty on cloth, a ten percent manufacturing surtax. Note (O The price of the packings (external and internal) shall be included in the assessment value of the contents, however, the declarant has the right to demand that the packings bo taxed the duty provided for the tariff position to which they belong® IA3IZ, 3 The products of Indo-China which on their importation into Japan enjoy the percentages of reduction or exemptions of customs duties proscribed in —rticle 3 and also the consolidation of duties according to the conditions prescribed in Article Number in P'ercentag e of the Japanese reducti on on Taxa- Applic- Tariff Name of merchandise duties of nat- tion able ional Tariff Unit Tariff 19 Indian Corn Exempted duty-fre* 26,3 Castor Beans . exempted duty-fre 37 Pepper Seeds 20$ every 100 kn.Y7.88 66,2 Salt "."xempted duty-fre 128 Sp ice Ex empted duty-fre 256 Lacquer 507? every 100 kn. Y4.59 402 Silica, excepting coloured ones Exempted duty-fre 429 Coal Exempted duty-fre 458 Iron ore 458 -"anganese "xempted duty-fre 453 Tungsten Exempted duty-fre 458 Tin ore Exempted duty-fre 458 2inc ore Exempted duty-fre 458 Antimony ore Exempted duty-fre 609 Rattan (unsplit) Exempted duty-fre 612(1,c) Teak Exempted duty-free 4- M c ^ - r « J^v •— *" —cits • Document No. 2664 A Pago 1. THE SUBREME WAR-LEADERSHIP COUNCIL DECISION No. 16, HE MEASURES TOifriRES FRENCH LIDO-CHINA TO 13EEP THE SUDD3J CIL'JTGE IN THE SITUATION. . 9 • O . 9 February 1, 1945® Principle. lo In view of the change in the war situation and the attitude of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, based on tho absolute need of self-existence and self-defence, shall rosort to timely indepoa military action® The time for rosorting to military measures shall be dot separately, 2. Our plans are to be kept in strict socrocy until tho time of launching military measures. II. Essential FfcintSo 1. Prior to the exercising of military force, wo shall first of all have our Ambassador, with a time limit, demand the following points of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, in order that the diplomatic procedure may be completed as quickly as possible. ITEMS. In view of the general situation® especially of tho fact and tendency of exercising of military power by the American forces against the territory of French Indochina, tho Japanese Snpire, in order to perfect the defence of Indo-China, shall request the Governor-General of French Indo-China to agree to the following as the materialization of hit definite resolution to collaborate with the Japanese Empire against the exercising of military action by tho UsS.--. and Britain towards Indo-Chii and do their utmost to defend Indo-China, on the basis of the fundament;: spirit of the joint defence of Japan and French Lido-China. a) So long as the present situation continues, the Military and armed police forces of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army, and shall act, one and all, according to the orders of'the Japaafise Army in regard to organisation, allotment and movement etc., of units, arms and materials, and such organs as railways Document No. 2664 A Bige 2. shipping, canmuni cat ions etc „ £ which ore of strategic necessity shall be placed under the control of our Army. b) Immediate orders shall be given to all organs in French Indo- China to co-operate fully end loyally in accordance with the requests of the Japanese Empire, c) The aforesaid two items shall be acccpted in toto within 6 hour£ Upon the lapse of the aforementioned time limit, the Imperial Forces shall by considering the French Indo-China Governor General as lacking in sincerity as regards joint defence, resort to necessary measures0 2. Even in the event of French Indo-China accepting our demands in toto, the French Indo-Chinese Military and armed police forces shall 1 reorganized,, 3. Should French Indo-China refuse to accept our demands, the Japanese Empire shall deal with French Indo-Chinu with military force and place some for the present, under military control. 4. The measures towards Annam etc., shall be as follows a) The Japanese forces on the spot 3hall elevate and support the independent positions of Annum etc., as they deem fit, and devise plai so as to make them co-operate with us activoly. b) Tne independence of Annam etc0f shall be recognized after taldn^ the general situation into consideration. As regard the time and manner etc., of recognizing independence,; same shall be determined separately. 5* Along with the Military disposition^ the Imperial Government shall issue a ccruauiiique at an opportune moment. 6. The Japanese Government alic-110 depending upon the necessity, explain its truo intentions - especially its non-aggressive intentions to Soviet Russiao 7• The Japanese Government shall report to Germany its true intentions as regards the disposition of French Indo-China and make •her follow on along the same course as Japan. 8. The Fronch Military forces etc, in the Kwangchow-V/an leased Document No. 2664 A Territory and other crocs are to Indo-China* Note s Pago 3. bo dealt with similarly to French The righto and interests of the Frcnch people in general shall be treated as leniently as possible,* DOC. NO. 1956 No. 1 TOP S~":CR3CY The Second Intelligence Conference, 1943 Document for Distribution, No. 6 The directions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians. June. 194-3 KWANTUNG Army, Intelligence CONTENTS No. 1 Concerning general principle. No. 2 Extent of those wno should be treated as White Russians. No. 3 Concerning guiding principle. No. 4 Concerning coltivation of the indomitable fighting morale and the sound a'..d healthy spirit. No. 5 Concerning reward and punishment No. 6 Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements. No. 7 Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys. No. 8 Concerning encouragement of national defense physical training. No. 9 Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese Language education. No.10 Concerning encouragement of return to farm of the city residents. No. 11 Concerning dispersed residents' gathering together. No. 12 Preparatory matters for the future reform of the organ to guide tlie White Russians. No, 13 Other matters for instruction Separate volume No. 1 Gist for tbe intensification of the training for the white Russians yo ng men and boys, (draft) No. 2 Gist for the guioance of the T:'hite Russians' national defense physical training, (draft) No. 3 Gist for the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language among the ";hite Russians. No. I - Concerning general principle. 1. Whether they are men or w r e n or whether they wish it or not, the White Bvssians snail be useci powerfully and to the maximum degree for the war with the Soviet Union, especially for the secret war with the Soviet Union. DOC. NO. 1956 Page 2 2. Belief to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife with the idea to share hanpiness and suffering, or life and death with Japan, shall he thoroughly established. Efforts shall also be made for the cultivation of a violent indomitable fighting spirit. 3. Those who are available shall be allowed to retain their racial characteristics and they shall be protected better than before. As to those who are rot available, we should not only deny racial consideration, but we must take treasures for anti-espionage against them. Bad elements shall be strictly dis- posed of. No. II - The limit of those who should be treated as 1Frhite Russians. Those who can be used directly or indirectly for the war with the Soviet Union shall be treated as White Russians, con- sidering their racial characteristics. They shall be divided as follows: (1) Those who are beins used, at present, directly or in- directly for the secret war with the Soviet Union by the Intelli- gence or by the other army authorities: those whom we are train- ing and mooring with the intention to make use of in future, and their families (A). (2) Those who can possibly be used directly for the war with the Soviet Union now or in future and their families (B). (3) Those who cannot be used directly now and in future, but who may possibly become loyal to both Japan and MAvCHUKUO and who can contribute directly to the war with the Soviet. Mo. Ill - Concerning the guiding principle. Out of the necessity of attaining the special object of the army, we should let che 7hite Russians retain their racial characteristics and lead them to cultivate anti-comintern thought. Though we admit their wish to return to their homeland we should expect them to perform their duty as the nation of MANCHTJKUO. At the same ti^e, we should lead them especially to lay to heart the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia based upon the spirit of universal ceace and harirony, and to rush toward the destruction of the communist regime with an indomitable fight- ing spirit, sharing happiness and suffering and life and death with us and wishing for their racial prosperity in the co-pros- perity sphere controlled by Japan. No. IV - Concerning cultivation of indomitable fighting morale and the sound and. healthy spirit. In view of the fact that there are some among the White DT)C. NO. 1956 Page 3 Russians, especially amonf the city residents who are ant to for- get the original mission of the *a'hj te Russians, and wish only for the qviet life to no purpose, without, really understanding the situation and not changing che:lr -..Id ways in their daily life and in other things, we : uc t, by ev opport unity} try to convince them our guiding principle. We should especially guide them to cultivate the indomitable fighting soirit to be willing to join _ the anti-comintern strife, excluding their relative attitude. We should lead them to guard against frivolity; discard gayety and be practical instead, and strengthen a sound ana healthy spirit. No. V - Concerning reward and punishment. Each person shall be eiven a different treatment in pro- portion to his available value. Pad elements shall be properly suppressed or disposed of. Reward and punishment shall be given justly. 1. The following arrangment, for a geod treatment shall be made for those coming under 2 of Article No. II (A) (1) Increase in rations. (2) Reduction of taxes (to be enforced within the limit of the law, keeping in contact witb the authorities in the actual place.) (3) Convenience for children's education (priority for the use of the dormieory and support in tuition). (4) Gratis for rewriting the foreign residential cer- tificate. (5) Priority in business, employment, the use of charity and relief facilities. 2. Towards the superior ones a^ong the students and pvpils members of the Young !'enls Corpr., members of the Volmteer Corps and the Japanese Language School students of 2 of Article No. II proper measures shall be taken into consideration for their good treatment with the object of giving them encouragement, 3. To 3 of Article II, a special go->d treatment shall not be given, although racial consideration .hall be given. 4. Towards the ones who will not follow our guidance and towards bad ones and their families, resulute steps shall be 4aken when necessary, in addition to the reduction or suspension of ration and other measures of suppression. No. VI - Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements. It is needless to say that the T"hite Russians who are the same race as the Red ones and who live among them should be more DOC. NO. 1956 Page 4 'prudent than the MANCHTOIANS, KOREANS or T'ONGOIIANS. They should further refrain absolutely from having contact with the Red Russ- ians on their own accord ana keep aloof from the company of bad MANCHURIANS. In everything they must not act in such a way as to be observed with suspicion. T"e must lead them to intensify the system of their mutual watch and joint responsibility, while, on the other hand, strengthening inspection and secret espionage toward them and thus making assurance doubly sure for anti-es- pionage. 1. Prevention of their having touch with the Red Russians. Though the White Russians shall be lead to brv to check themselves from getting in touch with the Red ones, this step must be taken carefully and in a clever manner so as not to excite the Soviet side uselessly. (1) Strict investigation shall be made to see whether there is any Red one mixing Into various arrangments and organi-' zations of the Thite Russians, and necessary measures shall be adopted, especially as to the ratterr which ray effect the Soviet side, they shall be submitted to the Head Office beforehand, giving the details. (a) Rati'n system and ration station. (b) Schools and pieces where young men and women gather.together. (c) Temples and charity and relief arrangements. (d) Trade union, enterprises and employment. (e) Neighbors* Society (TONARIO'.^I) (f) Residents association. (2) It is our principle that the White Russians who keep company with the Red Russians shall be strictly punished by oral instructions It shall be made thoroughly known that this shall be strictly observed thoroughly and the ones who will not stop shall be punished properly. (3) The "hite Russians who happen to 1̂ 've next to the' Red ones shall be removed to some other suitable places. 2, Intensification of mutual watch and joint responsi- bility. (1) The neighbor's society shall be led strongly. The leaders and assistant leaders shall be selected carefully. They shall point out harmful elements by mutual inspection, and esta- blish the system of joint responsibility in eech section. DOC. NO. 1956 Page 5 (a) The interior inspection shall be intensified for each residents association and ether kinds of associations. Their leaders shall be absolutely responsible for the conduct of their Inferiors or the members. Each society or group shall establish the system of joint reponslbility. 3. Intensification of general inspection and secret es- pionage and encouragement of early examination. Inspection and eseionage by the gendarmerie and police authorities, not to speak of the special mission shall be strengthened. Suspected persons shall be inspected at an early stage. No. VII - Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys. Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the separate volume No. 1 "Gist of Strength- ening of the training of the White Russian Young Men and Boys (Draft)." Regarding the application of the Labor Service Ordinance of MANCHUKUO in order to carry out a long term carping, we must put it into operation after a decision is made by the authorities but as to the other matters, the training which are being given now shall be more strengthened and renovated. No. VIII - Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training. Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the "Gist of the Enforcement of the Na- tional Defence Physical Training for the White Russians. (Draft)" We are told that it is impossible to carry out this plan as a whole this fiscal yoar, because of the expenses, materials and other reasons. As for the Intelligence however, it has been de- cided that the following plan shall be put in operation in each actual place. 1. Measures shall be taken to spread and intensify all the more the training for gliders already in operation. 2, Measures shall be taken to spread and encourage all the more the making and competition of model planes which is being undertaken in some places, 3, Concerning the construction of a parachute tower, we should try to bring about the atmosphere for it, calling to the influential groups or persons in the actual places. 4. From the point of view of anti-espionage, it shall be clearly understood that the above tra:' aing measures shall not be given to the White Russians -•vi.'v, but <-ereral Japanese, MANCHURIANS and MONGG ."u.iMS. DOC. NO. 19^6 Page 6 Concerning the diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education, we have made a representation '"f <'>'•'•" <>\••• ' to the authorities,, in rccordanee with r.>.o ;:"o ,?r "Gist of the enforcement of the diffusion of the ^ap^n. .1 (Draft)" Regarding the matters, depending upon the arrangements of the FANCRTRIAN Telephone and Teleeraph Company and the"South MANCKURIAN Railway Company, they shall be enforced after they have been decided upon by thr author!bias. As to the following matters efforts shall be made to intensify and promote thee in the actual places. 1, Concerning the Japanese language School already in operation, it shall' be intensified all the more. 2. The White Russian residents association and the cultu- ral societies shall quickly undertake the diffusion of the Japanes language according to the principle of the Japanese Language Schoo 3•> Necessarv propagation shall be put in practice in- order to promote the interest of the general public for learning Japanese, 4, For the stvdents of superior ability, good treatment shall be given concerning employment and allowances, 5. The Japanese language column shall be established in the Russian papers and magazines. No. X - Concerning the city residents* return to farming. According to the following principle, the return to farm- ing shall be encouraged in order to lead the White Russians to contribute to food productioni as well as to cultivate a sound and healthy spirit and heighten a suitable character for the per- sonnel required for the secret warfare. 1, T'"is shall be carried out for each race in order to facilitate the guidance of th- racial movement, based upon poli- tical espionage standpoint. 2. This shall be carried out voluntarily, apart from the special emigrants, according to the following principle, (1) This Plan shall be based uoon the city population dispersal plan which is being carried out by the ITANCHTKUO Govern- ment, It shall be guided in a positive manner by the colonization organs in provinces and "HSIEN" (district). DOC. NO. 1956 Page 7 (2) In order to facilitate the .enforcement of the above plan, attention shall be paid to the following details. (a) These who have experience in farming and who have financial influence shal"1 be leaders and the '"rhite Russian pro- letarians shall work under them. (b) Feehanicul farming shall be preferred, but it shall absolutely adopt the system using substitute fuel, (e) Places shall be selected, as beat as possible, where building materials can be obtained without difficulty. (d) CeiK.eruij.'g the obtainment of seeds, proper steps shall be quickly taken by the adjustment committee through the relative organs cf the province of "Ksien." (e) The pi'see shall be chosen taking into'consideration the guidance of the White Russians and transport facilities. The residents shall be eathered together as best as possible. No. XI - Concerning the gathering together of the disnersed resi- dents „ In order to facilitate the guidance and training and also inspection and anti-espionage we must try to gather together those T"hite Russians who live dispersed in various places as best as possible.. T.,is shall be carried out following the preceding Article No. X. No. XII - Preparatory matters for the future reform of the White Russians guiding organ (given orally),, No. XIII - Other matters for instruction. Concerning the enforcement of collective education of the military training instructors. 1. It is scheduled, that a collective ca-ping education shall be given by tre "ead Office for five days from 1 Julv with the object of convincing the White Russian military training in- structors in various places of the guiding principle and instruct them the method of guidance of practical courses. Each branch office shall select the participants as follows, and report to the Head Office by 25 June. (1) HAILAR P-aneh Office HAILAR 2 MNC'IURI 1 VAKOSEIH 1 SANHO 2 (?) : WTAMIAr G branch Office FFTANXIAFC- 2 I 'FLUNG 1 HENZTAOHOTZF 1 (3) CHIAIUSSU Pranch Office CZIA15US3U 1 9 ' o c . NO. 1 9 5 6 Page 8 (4) HEIHO French Office. HEIHO 1 (5) MUKUDEN Branch Office MCKTOEN 1 HSINKING 1 (6) DAIREN Branch Office DAIREN 1 (7) Head Office HARBIN 3 TSIT3IHAR 1 APULONI 1 (2) Concerning; the transfer of xhe jurisdiction of the guidance of the mite Russians in the HSINKING Special City to the HARBIN Special Mission. It Is scheduled that the guidance of the White Russians in HSINKING Special City shall he placed under the direct control of the Head Office from 1 July. Regard- ing the details, instructions shall be given separately, "̂ he MUKUDEN branch office shall trke charge, as before, of the guid- ance of the 1"bite Russians in various places in KIRIN Province, and in view of the status quo of KIRIN and the district around the "dam", investigation shall bo made so as to have the instruc- tors reside permanently for the guidance of the ;"rhite Russians around these places. The concrete plan shall be handed in by the end of June. 3. Concerning the tour of inspection to Janan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA. The, tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA which used to be undertaken by the Japanese L'nguage School, the Concordia (IISEH-HO) Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc. shall not be given this fiscal year. There will be no ob- jection, however, te the Concordia Youths' end Boys' Corps, etc., making use of the HARFIN Exhibition which is to be held from 1 August to 20 September. 4. Concerning the control on the removal of residence of the Trdte Russians in MANCHUKTO. In view of the fact that the ration system is getting complicated and slso of the prin- ciple of intensifying the city population dispersal plan and anti-espionaee arrangements, the change of abode of the "%ite Russians in MÂ C-.'IJKTTO shall be controlled as follows: 1. Removal from farming villages to cities shall be checked. 2. Though the return to farming and the fathering to- gether shall be much encouraged in moving the White Russians into the district belonging to the other secret mission control organ, report shall be made mutually between th organs concerned. Doc. N0. 1956 Page 1 C i i H I I f l C A l E t I, Lt. Colonel TAHANBNKD G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.5.S.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Araiy Information Section."— The Direct- ions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians" 1 "« was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Militav Prosecution Department. Moscow. on or about IJarch 21 1Q4 6 . and that the original of the said docu- ment may be found in the archives of the said department. I-toscow. I do further certify /a/ Lt. Col. TARAHEHHD (Signature and rank.) Tokyo, Japan, 17 May . 194JL» 7 0 D0C0MS3T NO. 2363 PAGE 1 THE AFFIDAVIT 11/ OF Srir:o:T-7, GRIGORI MIKRA.II07ICK C^ ASRIIHL946 . SEWYONOY, G. M. "born in 1890 in the Cossack village Durulgaevskaya of the Zabaikalye Hncion; Russian, a non-country citizen. Former Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Frontier Area; a whiteguard arm;'- general. QUESTION During the Civil War in Russia and later on, during your stay abroad, yon actively fought acainst the Soviet Power. Who supported you financially and directed your anti-Soviet activities? ANSWER: During the p riod of l?l~-lr?Q. I r;c:iy--d pre-.iary sub- aidie8. weapons and equipment from the Japanese Government. The main role in intensifying my anti-Soviet activities was played by the then Japanese Prime-Minister, Count TERAUCHI• and War Minister Baron TATAEA. I was personally connected with SATQ. the Japanese Consul- General in Fharbin: Colonel Kurasawa^ Chief of the Kharbin Kilrtary Mission; ana Major XUftQgiTrepreamtative of the Japanese Arm;?- General Staff. From them I learned about the decision of the Japanese Government to support me in every way; they also informed mr that both Count TERAUCHI in the cn.TV.city of the Premier of the JpwnnHB QyMr"* and Baron TATCATTA «« War Minister, persistently strived with the help of Japan to secure by force the outcome of the 1918-1920 events in my favor. QUESTION: Why were the Japanese Government, and TERAUCHI and TANAKA in particular, interested in the initiating of the hostilities in the Far East? ANSWER: I was informed of the Japanese plans providing for the seizure of the territory of the Soviet Far East. In 1912, 12 Jagane.se divisions encroached into the Russian" terri- tory and completely occupied the Frimorye and the Eastern JD0CUME2E? iTO. 2563 PAGE 2 part of the Amur Region. Concurrently,- the Japanese started negotiations with.KOLCHAK and vith myself promising thft support of their expeditionary "rnTny. „ The aim of Japan was to achievc the annex of .the Primorye .by cutting it from Russia at ac.y cost and to incorporate it vith. Japan. This was disclosed to me by the Japanese themselves. In autumn of 1919 in Chita 1 met F.A.T0, Envoy plenipotentiary of the Japanese Governmentt who 7&ter cn hscene Ifice-Foroign Minister of Japan. KATO was enrcute t.c dr.-.*.•<> LX1CKAS and to hand in the proposal of "the Japanese Gory insert concerning Joint actions against the Red Army. KAITO informed re that tho Jr.pa;.;:-.3e Gov arm ".ant vas desirous to come to termo wi territory of Siberia iro of the rear of the KOLCEAE Army; in cxr.b consent to recognise the right of the o apanetie to colonize the Soviet Prinjorye. In the beginning of 1020 the Japanese Government endeavored to create "a~ puppet Government "in. Primorye under its control. They reckoned that under the disguise of the supposed independence of that Government Japan would, make the Soviet Primorye serve her interests. On November 20, 1920s when I, and my Staff were at the Station of Manchuria/Ocloncl ISOf-ifT, representative of the Japanese General Staff, came from Vladivostok and informed ne, that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government in the Primorye and was ready to support mo as a candiints for the post of the head of thi3 Government. With the view of continuing the negotiations on the subject, I arrived at Vladivostok at the end of ITovember, 1S20. where 1 met Ma .j or-General JTAgA L'di A "1chi.e£_of_jj;ha Seadcpiar bers of the Japanese Expeditionary Foreen in Siberia. On behalf of the Japanese Government, TAEAYASSTAGI assured me that ISOME had correctly prepented the Japanese view point on the destiny oi tne Pfmoryo, ancTI gave my consent to become the head of the future government in tho Frimorye. After that, to define more accurately and fully the conditions offered by Japan, I met <rijjh/General TAOHlIiAtTA, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, w.oo was scon appointed" to the post of the Commanding General of the -Japanese Occupational Forces in Siberia. I also net his successor, General fJA'AI, the future Chief of the General Staff; I vac similarly elucidated by them as to the desire of Japan to see me at the head of tile Primorye Government. The final condition'? propoeed by the Japanese Government on the Primorye issue was forwarded to me by Count MAT SI? HAIR A, the Head of the Japanese_Hi, ss-inn T-i t^e ^ ^ ra.r Er^t]_jmp_idier on, prior to the " surrender of Japan, was Inpe-riJL. Household Minister, / Question: On DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 3. QUESTION: ANSWER: QUESTION: ANSWER: On what conditions did you settle the question of capturing the Soviet Primorye with the. Japanese? ... ... The Japanese conditions were as follows: Japan took upon herself to place at my disposal the necessary loan in cash, weaoons, and ammunitions. I, on my part, had to cio away with "all so-called frontier formalities "between the Primorye and tho territory under the Governor-General of Korea, as soon as I became the head of the Par Eastern Government. In other words, according to this condition set forth by MATSUDAIRA, I agreed to the annex of the Primorye by Japan. I also agreed to take all decisions pertaining to the questions connected with the possible extension of the territory under the Primorye Government, only together with the Japanese representative. Along with that I wa3 obliged to make a statement to the effect that I agreed to leave Japan the right to freely carry on the immigration of the Japanese and Koreans to the terri- tories of the Soviet Ear laBfaYTdThe Soviet"" Sakhalin. Was it only tho Soviet Prinorye and Northern Sakhalin that the Japanese territorial claims were limited to? No. The seizure of Northern Sakhalin and the Soviet Primorye was only part of the Japanese plans, which provided for far wider territorial gains at the expense of Russia; Japan planned. (jT^) to seize the whole of EnsWrn-Rus-sia-as-faj-as. the .Baikal— In 1920 I conducted negotiations on this issue with General TOCHIBAHA, who at that time was promoted to the post of the Commanding General of the Japanese Occupational Forces in the Far East, and with Colonel UEDA who later on was in the rank of General and commanded the Kwantung Army. TOCHEBANA and UEDA invited me to come to Vladivostok and informed me that the Japanese Command was preparing an offensive into the depth of the Russian territory from the Khabarovsk district in the direction of the E.C.R.R, As a result of tho offensive, TOCHIBAKA told me, the Japanese troops would carry out the full occupation of the Soviet territory up to the Baikal. TOCHIBMA and UEM also informed me that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government under me in the Zabaikalye and to completely annex the Primorye. Japan failed to carry out the plan of seizing the Zabaikalye and the Primorye, yet she kept her forces on the Soviet territory until 1922, reckoning that she would succeed somehow to annex the Primorye from the Soviet Russia by force. /Question: What DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 4. QUESTION: What was the Japanese's attitude towards the population of the Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia during the intervention? ANSWER: Throughout the period of the Japanese occupation in the Par East, the Japanese troops treated the local population nost inhumanly, The regime established by them in the Prinorye and Siberia va9 a combination of plunder, coercion and unheard of atrocities. Upon entering Khabarovsk the Japanese troops went looting throughout the town. They broke into the houses, stole valuables, raped women, and there were cases when earrings . were torn off the ears of Russian Women. I also know that by personal order of the Japanese General 001 all cattle and horses were talien away from the population of the town of Iman, A great amount of railroad equipment, captured by the Japanese in the stores of the Ussuri Railroad was shipped to Japan. At the Ease time threatening the local population of the Primorye with repressive measures, the Japanese took away their land allotments and settled colonists from Korea and Japan on them, . As a result of tho Japanese policy of colonization, the Russian population of the Primorye and Eastern Siberia was placed in an exceedingly hard situation. As far as I know the Japanese went on preparing for attacks on the Soviet Union, pursuing the same aim of territorial seizure even after the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East was over, ifcJESTION: What do you know about the Japanese preparations for military aggression against the Soviet Union? ANSWER: Upon the failure of the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East, they started working out new aggressive plans in Japan, In. 1S27 the^so-callod "TANAKA MEMORANDUM" was publlpV"^ ^ the world praaiul fhe~Japanese tried to refute the existence of that document through their press, but I was personally in- fo rnedby TANAK^ ~~Tn It'25 when it became known in Japan that the" "GENRO COUNCIL" took the decision to offer TANAKA to form a new Japanese Government, tho M^nReitn pm»t.y of having" alleged^J^i^hlLjloj-..himsolf-_kig_ leadership in the Selyukal party for 20 million yenT which funds had been_assIgnoA^by"the Diet for the expenditures on the military operations during^ the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East and were ' entrusted to TASAKA, who was War Minister fit that time. This question was investigated by Frosecutor-General of the Tokyo prefecture, and in December 1926 I was summoned by him to bear witness in the case. / At \ PAGE 5 At the Tokyo Station I was met by Gene red YAMANASHI, TANAZA1 s closest friend, who took me to TANAKA's private residence^ ' TS®KA welcomed me and speaking fluent Russian told me that he knew" 1 was summoned by~ the Prosecutor; he also told me about the alleged crimes he was being accused of and asked me to speak in hia favor before the Prosecutor, when giving my testimony concerning the 1918-1922 events. TANAKA recommended that I ground tho expenditure of the 20 million yen by per.suad.lng the Propeau.tor that the War Ministrysupported financially not only myself but the white- guard generals KHCK7AT, KGLMYXOV" and KUSUBTSOV as well. At that time TANAXA corroborated the information of the MGE1IR0 COUNCIL's" decision to entrust him with the formation of n new Japanese Cabinet, TAKAKA said that when ho became the Premier he would direct the Japanese Government to carry out his plan of the annex of East Siberia from the U.S.S.R., that pirn having been elaborated by him long before, and he said he would carry out the creation of a limitrophe state on that territory. During the conversation TMiJCA promised that I should be appointed the head of the Par-Eastern State to be. TANAZA went on developing his ideas and stated that the realization of, the ..plan would be effected in a somewhat different way, as compared with that of the period of the intervention in Liberia. ~As TAISAKA"put it, his plan was as follows: Japan would seize Manchuria and proclaim the creation of a separate state on the Manchurian territory, and then she would attack the U.S.8.3. and seize Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal, TANAZA proposed to create a government which would please the Japanese on the annexed Soviet territory, and then to declare the independence of the annexed Soviet Par East. The next day I called on the Prosecutor-General and in accordance with EAXAEA's request testified that the 20 million yen had positively boon spent on the military needs connected with the intervention. Ensuing my calling on the Prosecutor I was invited by TAiTAKA to dinner with himself, General YAMMASHI and SEOODJD, the_interpreter. At, dinner I asked TANAKA what Japan was going to do with Manchuria in caso Cnina;: pro tested against turning it into a separate state. TANAEiA replied that ho was speaking quite frankly with me and then told me that the creation of a separate stato in Manchuria would be just tho first step which would be immediately followed by another, to-wit, the complete incor- poration of Manchuria with Japan and the subjugation of the former to the purpose of Japan. / I DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 6. QUESTION: I asked TANAKA whether Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. if the plan of the seizure of Manchuria failed due to some or other cause. YAMANA5HI answered this question saying that following TANAKA's coning to power, he, YAMANASHI would he appointed Governor of Korea and, if the realization of the plan of attacking the U.StS.R, through Manchuria failed, the Korean territory would he used as a military "base for the attack on the Soviet Primorye, TANAKA corroborated YAMANASHI's statement and said that when a final scheme of attack against tho U.S„S.E. was chosen, the advantage cf using the Russian whiteguard emigrants, residing in the sphere of the Japanese influence would be taken into consideration. , TANAKA recommended that I should intensify the preparation y'y-^ of whiteguard emigrants for war against.the U. S.S.R. so that cu they night play a definite role in it. Towards the end of our conversation it was decided that I should maintain a close contact with YAMANASHI and TANAKA's claspst associate - TANAKA SEASEIN, one of the leaders_of thejgLACK DRAGON" snooty. _. v In 1928 when the "TANATA MEMORANDUM" became known and the Japanese refuted the existence of that document, 1 still had an opportunity to convince myself that the Japanese were In 1928 I met TANAKA SHASHIN ia Tokyo and"asked" him to. elucidate me as to Baron TANAKA'a future plarig. TANAKA SHASHIN told me that Baron TANAKA's plans were not changed and to confirm this he showed mo a scheme of the railroad construction in Manchuria, provided the occupation of Manchuria were effected by the Japanese troops. Tho existence of TANAKA's plan became quite indisputable when the incident of 1931 took place and when the Japanese occupied Manchuria as was set forth in the plan. Did you participate in the seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese? ANSWER: Yes I did. I personally took an active part in the preparation for the occupation of Manchuria. As far back as 1928, in Tyantsin, I established a personal contact with PU-YI through my old acquaintance, the Chinaman LO-DZU-YUI. who was PU-YI's tutor. At that time PU-YI lived on the territory of the Japanese concession in Tyantsin. Pirst LO-DZU-YUI and then PU-YI himself intimated to me that negotiations had been started between PU-YI and the Japanese on the restoration of PU-YI's claims on the Imperial Throne in Peking. The Japanese had promised PU-YI their support but delayed the solution of the question. / PU-YI DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 7. PU-YI asked me to assist him in his negotiations with the ' J ^Mftj Japanese. I gave my consent, and arriving in Tokyo met with M i l ^ o q Count OrJDAIEA and TOYAMO MIISURA who was at that time a well known politician, i aaked'Ucth of them to use their influence and assist in the quick solution of this question. After that, during the period from 1929 to 1930 I several times entered into negotiations with the representatives of the Japanese ComEiand on "behalf of FTJ-TI» and in March, 1931 I succeeded in h?.r " b -C-•.r,.g 1'ZSOIC.'lL, then Deputy Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, state that PU-YI would he rendered a sub3;antdal assistance "by the Japanese. General ITUIOKIYA asl'ed me t-j forward his request to PU-YI to send hie representative from among tno Chinese. I got connected with LO-D'-TIJ-YUT., and FU-Yt-'s private secretary LU arrived in Tokyo., General L'XITOMIYA received him and informed him of the firm decision oi' the Japanese Government to assist PU-YI in the restoration of his Imperial prerogatives. Presently the Japanese staged the Chinese General WALT' a aggression against the Japanese which served as a pretext for the opening of hostilities which ended in the occupation of Manchuria hy the Japanese. Then a government was formed in Chanchung which would please the Japanese, and PU-YI was placed at the head of the Government» ( f o > y , i ^ QUESTION: Who of the Japanese military leaders played the nost active role in the eeiaure of Manchuria. ANSWER: General H0NJ0y the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army directed the operations of the seizure of Manchuria. Besides, an active role in initiating war in the Per East was played hy the group of the so-called young officers. Among them there were Colonel 1TAGAECI who occupied the post of deputy Chief of the"l£wantung Army 'Headquarters, Coloriol DCIRARA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. ColnntUZSSlMAMQTGU- Chief of the Mukden garrison, and Maj3 Genu__HA£HIMOTp, .Chief of the Japanese gendarmery in Manchuria. As a pretext for attacking Manchuria, the Japanese staged the notorious "Mukden Incident!' f the preparation for which had "been conducted since Ji,:,!y " 97,1 At the time I was In Mukden. I met ITAGAKI, DOIHAEA, SHIMAMOI'O and HASHIMOTO there, and was aware of the provocation that was "being brewed by them, I was beforehand personally informed by SHIMAMQiO of the plan of the Japanese in which the objectives that were to be taken first were shown, as well as artillory positions for opening fire at the Chinese barracks were tcepared. M . . / . M DOCUMENT NO. 2363 V^JrA s^ r PAGE 8 At the same tine another division of the Japanese troops was brought into Mukden in smaller units, Later on this division participated in disarming the Chinese garrison. At that time DOIHABA was conducting an active political preparation selecting V q amenta—from among the Chinese who further on constituted the backbone of the administrative body created by the Japanese in Manchuria, Among tho Chinese selected by DOIIIAHA for the collaboration with the Japanese there were TDT17, the first Premier of Manchoukuo , CHLIILFQ--DILIT-ICLTL. the second Premier of Manchoukuo, 10kDaj_yul Chairman of the Kar.ohoukuo Senate, end many others. On September 17. 1SS1 under thy supervision of SHIMAMOTO ) and 201KASA a railroad brieve of no significance near MukdonVy, was blown up by tho Japanese. Tho Japanese press published ' a report cf the Chinese soldiers having allegedly blown up the bridge, ensuing which the Japanese opened hostilities which resulted in tho attaining of their aim - the seizure of Manchuria. Having accomplished this part of their aggressive plan Japan started intensive preparations of the Manchurian military base for their attack on the U4S.S„R. In their plans the Japanese emphasized the significant role that the whiteguard emigrantu were to play. QUESTION: What role wore the Russian whiteguard emigrants to play according to the Japanese military plans? ANSWER: Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, in 1931, I was called to Colonel ISHIMJPJL Chief of the Second Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters to confer on the question concerning tho Russian emigrants. ISHIMURA informed me that the Japanese Government in virtue of its benevolent attitude towards the whiteguard emigrants, was desirous to help us realize our long cherished dream—to return to the Fatherland. When I askod him to explain what he meant by saying it, he replied that the Japanese General Staff was working out a plan of invasion of the Japanese army into the territory of the Soviet Union with tho whituguards playing an important role in that qperatioa. Then ISHlMUlcA suggested that 1 start preparing armed for cos compor-ed of whit-eguards and said that I should report to him about the measures taken, as soon as possible. "When we nest net 1 reported to ISHlMuEA my proposal as to the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants in China Japan and hanohnria 5nto one organization giving it the name of the Rus o ian Whi t opt.. d Emier ant s Ai f aij'sB oard_under the Ministry^or~the" Trit.pr i.-ir- ^nnr^-TwTTr; !3StoUilA~agraed with me and said that I should bo at the head only of that nart of 7 the DOCUMENT FO. 3363 PAGE 9 the Russian, emigrants Xivyd on tho "Inn^hoterritory, as to the ether emigraafcs1 settlements, they would he super- vised respectively "by the headquarters of the Japanese Army in the areas of which they resided. In IS34 as a resc.it of negotiations between me and t-fav-r Ch:'lef of the Japanese Military Mission, the ĉ ucstion of the creation of the whiteguard emigrants' organization in Mrochuria, was finally decided. When in 1934 iSDO and I met in the "Nagoya Hotel" in Makdeu we ccmoosei a draft of the white guard emigrants organization to "be in Manchuria, and came to an agreement as to xhc norni-ieea for the leading postn in tho organization. In the same year, 1SJ4, tho organization of the Russian emigrants in Maaolroria was created and 'by suggestion of tho Kwantung Army Headquarters was called tho sRussian Emigrants Affairs Bureau", abbreviated: i:33Sm". • "J mr.!it Sc.y here that the creation of the "Russian Emlgrenbd Affairs Bureau'' muse by no moans be considered as an expression of the Japanese's care for the Russian emigrants„ Although they needed the whifceguard emigrants as an instrument for carrying on work hostile to the Soviet Union, chwy did not at all ca.ro to give them any rights whatsoever* Oo.ite the contrary, the Japanese encouraged ail sort a cf manifestation of ill-will against Russians as- the representatives oi" the white race. General F.CI50 was tho ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination, as-vol1 as religious persecution policy! !Te~~was cnXef of the Zwantung Army Headquarters from 1933 to 1935 and later on Prime--Minister of Japan. """gn hUlou-s urgent request an instruction of the_Japp.neso Mini i try of Education found its applies don the Japanese f schools, that Instruction preacribin^jLlie-tcaahars as a matter cf obligation to inculcate in tho Japanese children hatrea_Towards Rues iar.a^Am^icgaB.^joL^c:1 *• thaa with the iaea cx"~the Japanese be^y; r, Mfihar race in comoaiision -with tho other ng.t:_oii,?"*r .Also it was en EC'130's m i dative that in 1940 in Manchuria was published PU~YI;3 manifesto which prescribed the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of the loligxoue convictions of these or those national groups, to worship the Ĵ vv̂ -̂ ftp. goddess Amatorase. The persecution of Russians became still worse following the beginning of Japan's war arainst the U. S. A., and Great Brittain, when one could see Russians beaten openly by the Japanese in the streets of Eharbia and Dairen. These facts prove that Japan needed the ^BREm" only in view of her war against the U. S. S, R. /Question: T'̂hat I' chr^ DOCUMENT 110. 2353 QUESTION! ANSWER: What hs.sic task3 were given the ''Russian Emigrants Affairs / / a^^0^- Bureau8 in Manchuria by the Japanese? By the creation of vote pursued the aims of the consolidation cf the anti-Scviet ideology among the emigrants and of the preparation of them for war against the Soviet Union on the side of Japan, The work of the was carried on in accordance with those tasks. The sChief Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" was in Sharein. At the beginning General RYCSE07_wa3 at the head of it. Major. General VZAJZE70:.£I, who" wa3 jater on appointed by fcSe Japanese to the post of the Chief of the "BEEm", was my personal representative in the Chief "BREm". There were five sections in the chief BREm: Is v—Propaganda; 2nd—-Military training of the whitoguard emigrants; 3rd—Intelligence ana counter-intelligence; 4th—--Economic; Eth— Charity. Besides, tho council of nationalities was organized in the EREm. It was composed of the chairmen of the national communities: Br, EAUliMAKN cf the Jewlsn Community. Professor KULYABKO—-EGRETSKY of the Ukrain1an 0omraunity, and also the representatives of the Turkic-Tartar and Armenian, groups. The council of nationalities periodically held conferences with the Chief of the and decided questions concerning contact of the national organisations with one another. Anti-Soviet propaganda was widely disseminated among the emigrants, Upon my approval RUB2AE7SKY who escaped from the Soviet Union in lc-'25 was appointed she Chief of the propaganda section. He started intensive anti-Soviet activities. On the initiative of AKiSu'SA, Deputy Chief of the Japanese Milicaxy Mission, a print-shop was equipped in Kharbin in 1954. R0DZAE7SKY supervised the publishing of the news- paper "Nash Put- (.SLUT "v'ay)_ and the Magazine '"'Natsia" (Nation), which were printed in thaVprint-shop. At that time was also started the printing of pamphlet* and leaflets which were widely spread in Manchuria, and part of those publications were printed on especially fine paper-to. facilitate «heir smuggling to and af-.r-tter ing thr̂ ighô *- the U.S.S.R. Fri or to the transfer cf the EaC,R,R, into the hands of the Japanese, ROPZAEYSKY told me that they managed to snuggle their pamphlets and leaflets into the UcS.S.R. with tho assistance of the railroad employees. In 1S41, when the XL S* S.R.—Japanese Pact was concluded, the Kwanc-ung Array Headquarters ordered that they should change the tone c © DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 11. tons of their publications with regard to the U.S.S„H., hut it pointed out that the antl- -Soviet propaganda should not "be checked altogether and that it should he conducted by publishing and spreading pamphlets and leaflets crnong the emi g.eanne „ The nevepaper "Nash Put" office was transferred to Shanghai, whereas the cover of the aNafcsia!l Magazine hegan \ , to bear an jniecrlptlon of allegedly bo-Siy. alsajmblished in Shanghai, thongc it was still-hein^ -published in_Kharhin. Along with all thrt the Japanese instructed that oral propaganda should he intensified through various literary and historic circles. The sole aim of such circles was conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. It was at that tine that bhe young emigrants hegan to he drawn into the created cy the Japanese !!Kyo-Wa-Kai" association (Commonwealth of Naticnc;), where they wore to familiarise themselves vlth the Japanese politics. The ;,'£yo-wTa-£al:' i«.as created in 1932, hy the Japanese pursuant tc Snperor P'J-11' a special manifesto. The ttEyo-Wa- Kai,; was an organization spread widely among all the strata of the Manchurian population including the white guard emigrants. The aim of that organization was to implant in the minds of the population the ideas requisite to the Japanese and justifying Japan's aggressive designs. The Ê-yo-Wtv-iiai1' also preached the idea of Japan" s domination over the other nations of East Asia. The Ewantung Army Headquarters supervised the activities of . the "EYO-Wfv-IIai" and its directives were obligatory for the leadership of the society. Men-Jhoukuo Prrme Minister CEIANG-CH1N-E7JI was the President of the "iCyo-afsw-Eal-5, hut its actual supervisors were the Japanese TAKE3A and MYAEI, former Chief of the , Ewantung Army Headquarters, The Central Office of the "Zyc-Wa-Eai" was in Changchun, and there were the local branch offices of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" in other towns, which cupcrvised the network of the primary _nuclei among the population. \ In 1938 1 published a bock under the title of "About Myself^ in which I described the progress of my struggle against the Soviet power during the Civil War, arid pointing out to the mistakes a?de by toe »hiteguardn army. I developed the idea ( of the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants with the ( view of overthrowing the Soviet power. I In 1942 I wrote another book following the suggestion of _&_enoral DPI. Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission,. The title of the book was "Thoughts on the New Era"; I handed the j manuscript to the Japanese. / / / In DOOJMSKT HO. 2363 PAGE 12 In this hook I advocated, the idea of Japan's being the leader of E "t; As ia, and suggested that an authoritative body be established in Japan Which would represent the block of the states of East Asia. I proposed that the whiteguard emigrants be given a separate territory in Inner Mongolia. In addition to those, on the order of Colonel HOI and Major--General E2MAT£TJ, the Chiefs of the Military Mission, I wrote articles directed against measures carried out in the Hed Army. In this way the ideological preparation of the whiteguard. emigrants for war against the TJ.S,3.It. was combined with military training carried out on a 'large scale. QUESTION: How was the military training of the whiteguard emigrants conducted? ANSWEH: 11 The Whiteguard Emigrants Affairs Bureau" included military training in the curricula of the emigrant schools, and begin- ning fron 1933 special military detachments were organized. One of these detachments, 500 men strong, was stationed at Hantachedsa, the second-500 men strong-at the railroad station Sungari 2„ Throughout the existence of both de- tachments 4.500 emigrants were given comj/lete training, and subsequently they were mustered every summer for additional training. In Zakhinganye Area (the area beyond the Khingan Mountain Hange), where the whiteguard emigrants were mainly occupied in agriculture, and it was not profitable for the Japanese to have them interrupt their work, the young emigrants were mustered for a three-week period of military training every year. Colonel P0STHYAGI1T' s detachment was stationed, in Ehailar and another, under the command of Cossack Captain PESHKOV, was stationed in Yaki&hi. Each of those detachments was 1,200 men strong, .During their musters the said detachments wore used for military operations against Chinese guerrilas. All those military detachments were trained to be ready for military operations together with the Japanese against the U.S.S.E. Question: . What was your particular role in the Japanese plans__of attack on the_Sev4r«- UiiiOnT Answer: Iji 193n, T was galled by Ma.^r-^rif-P1 &1CTyi. the Chief of the ̂ Japanese Intelligence Service in Manchuria who informed me that he wanteri to initiate me into the military plans of the / Japanese 2 . ^ - C ^ ^ c f ^ , J V j"7 - DOCUMENT HO. 2363 PAGE 13 Japanese j AETDO sta/ted that the Ja panese Government had planned for the nearest future to effect the invasion of the Japanese troops into the Soviet Primorye, where it was planned tc create a limitrophe state of Manchoukuo type, in which I should play the leading role. In the same year 193G, I met General OKAMURA, Chief of the Zwantung Army Headquarters"! I~~Te-arned from him, that accord- ing to the Japanese plan of invasion, the Ussuri region was to he incorporated into Manchoulcuo, and a buffer state was to "be created extending from, Lake Baikal to the East, with myself at the head cf the^Gcvernment. QUESTION: ANSWER: Tell the names of the Japanese politicians and military war lords, who initiated those aggressive plans. War Minister General ARAKI most strikingly expressed the — C D Japanese aggressive r.snirations at that period. We were friendly.. General AiAXl and myself, since the 1S18-1922_ Japanese intervention. It that time ARAKI was chief of the Japa_ne_se Military Mission in Kharbin._ When from 1931 ARAN! became War Minister and then a member of the Supremi- Military Council of Japan I repeatedly went to see him in Tokyo and had lon<; talks with him. In_1955 AR.AICI told me that Japan was striving at the creation of heavy industry in Manchuria, in as short time as possible, with the task of partial prevision of the Kwantung / V Army needs. Ensuing the creation of this industrial base Japan would /(/ /['A^A begin war against the Soviet Union. It was then that I . —-• Z learned for the first time from ARANI that AIKAWA, a repre-/ sentative of the industrial. circl.cs_ was appointed to supervise the creation of the Manebaidan industrial Tbsise for the amy. ARAZI characterisedA.IZAYAas one of the official industrial leaders— " At that time under the supervision of AIKAWA the intensive construction of an iron~and-steel plant was started in Southern Manchuria, as well as the reconstruction of the Anshan and Mukden works. When enlarging on the question of war against the U.S.S.R. AELAJCI tcld me that the Japanese plan at that time essentially was to effect the annexation cf Eastern Siberia and the Primorye from the U.S.S.R. by the use of force and to create a limitrophe state on that territory. Along with that ARAZI stated that only the seizure of the Primorye might be effected by Japan at first, which would in no way mean the cessation of the further advance into the core / of DOCUMHET JTO, 2363 PAGE 14 of the U.S.S.R., the ultimate aim of Japan, ARAKI concluded, for all times being tho territory immediately East of Lake Baikal , Towards the end o.f our conversation ARAKl suggested that I should maintain a close contact with the Kwantung Army Head- quarters, whose immediate task it was to carry the plan of the seizure of the Soviet Ear East into effect. When later on ABM.I and I met, he was always true to his word and confirmed his previous statements to the effect that the preparation for war against tho U.S,S.R. was the main purpose of his activities. In 1933 the Japanese General Staff decided to reconnoitre the power of the Red Army in the Ear East "by "battle, and opened hostilities In the Lake Hassan district- Major YAMAOKA, a General Staff Officer, came to Dairen from Tokyo to soe me, with a special task to inform ana have me prepared for the events which ware taking place. YAMAOKA. warned me that I with the whiteguard emigrant units had to be ready to participate in the operations 3S> provided the operations in the Lake Hassan district progressed successfully, large forces of the Japanese Army would be thrown into the Soviet Primorye, and the whiteguard emigrants units would be used for the consoli- dation of the occupied territory. When the Red Army liquidated the Japanese break-through into the Soviet territory in no time, and peace negotiations were started, the Japanese Command initiated the preparation for a new diversion in the direction of ths M.P.R. and the Soviet SLabaikalye. I was to take part in this operation, and, in case of a successful break-through, I, with the whiteguard emigrants units, had to begin an advance in Inner Mongolia through the M.P.R. into the Soviet Union. The Japanese pointed out that the main strategic direction of the Japanese blow was the Zabaikalyc which in the opinion of the Japanese was the narrow outlet thru which went tho supplies for the Soviet Primorye. Major-General AEDO in his talk with me said that the Japanese reckoned that in case they succeeded in intercepting the Red Army communications at Lake Baikal, the Soviet Far East would be annexed from the Soviet Union. Although tho ITomongan Incident ended in a defeat for the Japanese they wont on drawing plan3 of war against the U.S.S.E. and McP.R. I was included in this work as well. At the end of 1941. by order of Colonel UKAI, Chief of the Dairen Military Mission, I worked out a plan of the formation of Mongolian units, taking into consideration the modern technic and the oeculiarities of the Mongolian armed forces. / With DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 15. With the view of the utilization of the Mongols in the war against ths U.S.S.R. and the M.P.R., the Japanese were deciding the question of what particular type of units would he most suitable for them and sought my collaboration in the working out of this plan. I handed in my plan of the formation of Mongolian Units to Colonel UKAI in November, 1941, when the battles betwsen the German troops and the Red Army were raging on the approaches to Moscow. Cfiicnol UKAI, who had the right of direct contact with the Japanese General Staff and was always informed about the decisions, taken in the General Staff, told me that the time was approaching when Japan would enter into the war against the U.S.S.R. I reminded UKAI of the existing peace treat;/ between Japan and the U.S.S.R. To this UKAI replied that the Japanese General Staff JbacL already taken the daciaiaw to launch an attack on the Soviet Union and weald certainly realize it as soon as the fall of Moscow became known* "The Army General Staff1 s. attitude to the peace treaty between Japan and the U,S.S.R,f UKAI wont on, was as follows: If the Japanese are benefited by the observance of the treaty, it should bo observed; if, on the contrary, gains may be obtained by violating the treaty,—violated it must be by all means. The following fact is worth one1 s attention, though. Japan went through great military hardships in 1944-1945, the Japanese military circles did not give up their designs of attacking the U.S.S.R. In 1S44 I was called by Major-General AKIKUSA, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission, who informed me that tho Japanese units would possibly soon retreat from their positions in China, and if this was the case, the Army General Staff would not consider the possibility of Japan's war against the U.S.S.R. fully eliminated; therefore it was necessary to consolidate the Inner Mongolian military base by means of forming new Mongolian Military Units. I was commissioned by the Japanese Army General Staff to lead these formations. In connection with this decision, the Manchurian detachment formed by the Japanese under Lieutenant-General GARMAEV- UBZHIN and consisting of sir cavalry regiments and an artillery division, which were to constitute the backbone of the Mongolian Army to be, were transferred from Khailar to Khingan. / / In D0CUME3T NO. 2363 PAGE 16. In June 1945 I had a talk with Major-General KH30, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. Ee said that if Japan succeeded in coming to terms with China on the conclusion of peace, Japan would he able to transfer her troops now engaged in China to Manchuria, and then she would have her hands free to begin war against the Soviet Union. Saying this KUBO referred to the alleged decision of the Japanese Government on this question. Prom that conversation with KIJ50 I came to the conclusion that the Japanese Army General Staff had a specially worked out plan of an attack on the Soviet Union. I personally witnessed how throughout 1944—1945, in view of the realization of that plan, the Japanese actively consolidated the I'wantung Army and prepared for the invasion into the territory cf the U.S.-S.R. But the offensive oper- ations of the Soviet troops in Manchuria smashed all their military plans, The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me. Signed /SEMEillOV/ Interrogated: Counter—Intelligence Officer Lieutenant-Colonel / SOKOLOV/ DOCUMENT NO. 2363 PAGE 1? C E R T I F I C A T E The City of Moscow. April 11, 1946. I, Semyonov, Grigory Michailovich, sign this certi- ficate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the cast of the main Japanese War Crimi- nals . I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R, Signed: /SEMENOV/ The certificate is taken by the Counter-intelligence Officer Lieutenant-Colonel /S0K0L0V/ CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE AEOVE DOCUMENT: I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby curtify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Eussian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. Signature: V. Kaplan Doc. Ho. 2366 Page 1. ALLIED COUNCIL POF. JAPAN TOKYO OFFICE 0? THE MEMBER FOR T:^ UPTON 07 S0TI7T SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt-Colonel Kurkov, Chief of the Secretariat of the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Jaoan, hereby certify that the Map of the Soviet Tar East and Northern Manchuria has been prepared by tho Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan and for this purpose was used part of the Administrative Map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is an official publication of the Department of Topographical Survey and C a r t o g r a p h y under the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs of the IT. S. S. R. , of 1537. September 13, 1946 Allied Council for Japan Office of the Member for The Union of Soviet Socialist Republi Chief of Secretariat Kurkov CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCEEPTS 0.? THE AB077- DOCUMENT: I, V. A. KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document. September 13, 1946 TAwtvr*' V Kaplan Doc. No. 2367 " Page 1. Talks Between General ARAKI and ISHIWATA, Secretary General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. From the "Kokunin Shimbun" of August 14. 1941, - r ^ ' 1 7 ^ 7 jMMhuU.. f thf d m r Looking back at the Siberian Expedition, I feel that e plans were complete, but it seens there had been consider- able regret on account of the failure to make the expected last stroke. There is a proverb, 'History repeats itself,'- nd I believe this principle is still the sane today.J That will happen if we shall be satisfied by merely looking on with, folded arms without dispatching troops or doing anything? Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. Unqualifiedly, we simply call it the Siberian Expedition, but there were many very complicated circumstances lying in its background. Japan's present ambition to dominate the Continent may fully be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition. Unfortunately, however, I feel that, in the execution of this expedition, there had been lacking in contemporary internal situations, the courage and the determin- ation to strive for the calculated ends by deciding on a Cabinet resolution under a firm and resolute policy. With a very complicated and congested environment as its background, it had been very cl-verly planned. However, it is exceedingly regretful that we had met with various obstacles which had arisen at home and abroad »and that we had been unable to carry this plan to perfection. 1 .Minim*" )' lot I, The first foundation of the Siberia incident, thus ooking from all angles, has been justified as an impartial and proper measure. So_at that time if our country had held strict confidence, had'not hesitated to carry OUT: a natiohal etaliatory measure to return for the violation of internation-al— r. • - ji j-i- .— ..̂ _ _— -i— 1 suLagreement. lav;, under the guarantee of .real ability, ana nacT proceeded resolutely for the stability-o-f East Jigj^gj^gresentin; a common front with the countries with goodwill for us, such T̂flUveJ-ieiiL as l.>Tg—c-staKLlshnent of new order "whToh is also heaviest task up to the present would have bspn SRt phpiit icT mgde prop-r-q?̂ T Now I am thinking about it thus deep emotion.| Poo. No. 2367 C E R T I F I C A T E I, S. 35. DANLY, hereby certify: 1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G-. H. Q., S. C. A. P., and as such have possession custody and control of original or oopies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said section. 2. That. Document No. 2367 was delivered to me by the Russian Division of International Prosecution Section as being a file of the Japanese Newspaper ,;Kokumin Simbun" for 1941 including the issue of 14 August 1941, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery. 9 September 1946 /s/ E. E. Danly 3. S. DANLY Doc. No. 2367 CERTIFICATE I. SOKICFI ISFIGURO , Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library do hereby certify the following, vizj- The book Title: "KOKUMIN SFBiBUN" of July and August 194-]. (incl. issue No„ 17867 of Aug, 14). Publisher: KOKUMIN SFE BUN SFA Year of Publications 194-1 No. of Volumes: One Book-shelf No, ~~~J5T~ owned by the Imperial Library, was at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of t^e Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 12, 1946, Dated the 28th day of September, 1946. SOKICFI ISFIGURO (sign and seal) TO / U i m J Doc. Ho. 2457A Pago 1 EXCERPTS EROH THE BOOK K "Conference on the L.;citations of Arma- ments in 1922" (Baron Shidehara's statement). THE CEAIBMA1T (speaking in English); I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Ear Eastern Questions to report to the Conference that in the discussion cf matters relating to iIberia tho following statement was made to the Committee by Baron Shllehiu'a on behalf of the Japanese Govern- ment. The statement is as follows: "The military expedition of Jaioan to Siberia was originally under- taken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1518. It was primarily intended to render assistance tu the Ozecho-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect tho railway lircs which afforded the sole means of transportation cf the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia wore immense. "Jn January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. Por come time thereafter, Japanese trcops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, .and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks. "The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever singe then, Japan has been locking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her~t"roops from Siberia^ The maintenance of such trcops m a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless under- taking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacu- ated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Kikolsk. "It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there are a considerale number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guaranties of treaty established them- selves in Siberia long before the 'tolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9,71?, In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can h -.rdly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other auth- orities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated Doc. Ho. 2457A Page 2 in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have "boon obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. 'While tho hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have boon serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok, ?.n which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested. "There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province» Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security of tho Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those he?tile Koreans, joining hands with lawlcsi elements in ?.UDSIN, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Kunchun and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that nay present itself. "Having regard to those consideration?!, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exorcise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacua- tion of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without ade- quate provision for the future, they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question end of maintaining order and security in Korea. "It should bo made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in tho southern portion of that Province, but they have not cot up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confinod to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of these districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they wore formerly stationed. "Tho Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolehak, They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various politi- cal groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they rith-hcld ail assistance from General Rozanow against the revolu- tionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1320. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired. t j j Doc. No. 2457A Page S "In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it nay he useful to refer briefly to the past relations "between the Japanese authorities and Atanan Semenoff, which seen to have been a source of popular nisgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in iAusaia in the early part_J2f_ 1913 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might uc removed by the lolshcvifcs to European Russia, for the use 01 tne lie mans. Ataman Semenoff was Then" in Siberia, and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevist activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. Ib wis in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give suptort to the Cossack chiefT* After a ley nontns, gggg si"" port Py tno other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some tine their conncction with Ataman Werneroff. Tĵ ey hg.d, however, no___ intention '.•hatover of interfering in the domestic affairs cf Pussia, and when it war found that the assistance rendered to the Atanan was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberias they terminated all rela-_ tluns with him1 and no auujurl of an.V kind has since been extended to hin byjthe Japanese authority PP. "The Japanese Government arc now seriously considering plans which would justify then in carrying nut their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives end the agents of the Chita Government. "Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right cr advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust sone of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives rnd prop- erty of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guaranties for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda, over the Siberian border. Should adequate provi- sions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal cf Japanese troops from the Maritime Province. "The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incider.t cf 1920 at Nikolaicvsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognised Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respcct will possibly remain forbearing under such a. strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. T r. <rs/. Doc. Ho. 2457A Page 2 Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative hut to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction. "Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of tho present helpless condition of Russia for prose- cuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the 'jreat "far. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province ef Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, ar.d will naturally ccme to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of tho question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government. "In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity cf Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry ef all nations in every part of the Russian possessions." I, S. S. Danly, do hereby certify that the foregoing extract is a true and correct copy cf the statement cf Baron SKIDEBARA which appears on pages 340 to 346 of the volume ''Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922", published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., and is in my custody, /s/ E. E. DANLEY 13. S. DANLY Chief, Document Division, IPS DOCTF^NT No. 2239 Affidavit of the Fitness KHABAROVSK 26 March (SHOWA 21) 1946 I, Colonel of Justice BAGIKYAN, Military Interrogator for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, with Lieutenant Petrov as interpreter, interrogated, having warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 25 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness the below named, who testified: 1. Name - TAKE3E, Rokuzo 2. Age - 54 3. Name of Profession - Former Chief of General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Government. 4. Kind of Political Party - None. 5. Present Address - Khabarovsk, The certificates of the witness being warned of the respon- sibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit. Interrogation v/as clone in Japanese, )"1 Q. Mention the names of persons among the leaders of Japan with whom you had close relation. A. iy acquaintances or those whom I met are the followings GENERAL TOJO5 Former Prime Minister KOISO; Former Prime Minister SUZUKI $ Formei- Prime Minister ABE, Nobuyuki 5 Generals UI^SU and YAMADA5 Lieut-Gen. RATA5 Former Com- mander of the Kwantung Army U3DA 5 Former Commander of the Kwantung Army MINAMI; Former Minister of Greater East Asia Affairs AOXI, Kazuos MA'ISUOKA; and ODATE, Shigeo, Former Minister of Home Affa rs and Former Head of General Affairs Bureau during SHOWA 11-12 (1936-1937), and Chief of General Affairs just before my installation-, H0SE1N0, Naoki, and Former President of the South Manchurian Railway and Former Transportation Minister AOHIYAMA, Naotc. Q. What was the purpose of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria'.' A. The most important aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent. Q. Against what country was this base built? A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China. 0. Where did you find out that the aim of the Japanese occupa- tion of Manchuria was to make Manchuria a military base against the U.S.S.R. and China? A. This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and the Kwantung Army. I know that the problem of preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed at the head- quarters of the Kwantung Army. I heard about it from the Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals UFEZU, UEDA, MINAMI, and Lieutenant-General IKEDA. I have attended con- ferences held at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army when I held high positions of leader in Changchun. Q. What was the fundamental mission of the Kwantung Army? A. The Durpose of the Kwantung Army being stationed in Man- churia was for defense, and. it maintained an offensive •~s_t and_jtoat ta In this purpose. ̂ lirSHDvB~lTTL944) the GreatslFSast Asia War became very difficult and disadvan- DOCUMENT No. 2239 Page A. Q. A, tageous 5 attitude and at the same time the Kwantung Army changed its to a defensive one, Until the Nomonhan Incident^ :ne the Kwantung Army had tak-?r- an offensive stand towards E. . , bulTar "cer the aocve i attitude of aggress3ve_ became absolutely on the nrgyfen1j--l-t changed to an After SHOWA 19 (1944) it defensive, Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concern- in.cr t.hp -operation of the base of operation against the ng UcS he s p J-l o . within Manchuria? /The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret, | demanded the government to take up many kinds of I in political and economical administration. but it measures From whom and what kind cf orders did you receivo? First I received orders from the Kwantung Army concerning the first and second plans on developing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to develop industry, to supplement the demands of the Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads which can be useful in the case cf a war breaking cut against the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base* Q. A. The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an economical >.3 A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. \4. Q. A. base V for operations against the U.S.S.R., wasn't it? es, it was for an attack against the U.S,S Q. r7hen and from whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the first and second plans? I received documentary orders through the secretariat, and I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army to talk it over. Also, ^very year I went up to Tokyo to report and received orders concerning my future work. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concern- ing the preparation of the base for a war against the U.3o S.R? After all the political and economical demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the preparation for a war against the U,,S.S.R. I received orders "from the Com- mander (Generals of the Kwantung Army UMEZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieut, Generals KIMURA, YOSHIMOTO, KASAHARA, and HATA), Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieut. Generals HATA and IKEDA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels KUEOKAWA and OBI). Have you ever talked with the Japanese War Minister? Yes, I have. what kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister? I didn't receive anjr concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOJG by aero- plane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia, War Minister TOJO said only that it was necessary to re- inforce the Kwantung Army and didnEt explain the reason,, Trjhat was the reason for the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which began about the summer of SI-IOWA 16 (1941)? The" reinforcement of the Kwantung Army began just after the beginning of the Russo-German T"ar, and its purpose was to complete the preparation for the war against Soviet Russia. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What do you know about the measure by the "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre, the plan called "Kantokuen"? A. The "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre" was a name for keeping secret the actions of the Kwantung Irmy. Actually the Kwantung Army was reinforced by this plan. According to this plan there were orders concerning the delivery of food and other things, supplying laborers, and transporta- tion of goods. Q. ,3rhen and by-r whom were you made to know the existence of the "Kantokuen"? A. I heard about it at the beginning of July SHOWA 16 (1941) froJ KUROKAWA, Chief of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and also from UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army. Q, What kind of concrete things did UMEZU say concerning the "Kantokuen" plan? A. During his talk with me, UITSZU told me about the increase- ment of the troops of the Kwantung Army and demanded the delivery of food for these troops. Q. Under jrour command what measures should be taken by the Manchurian Government regarding the "Kantokuen" plan? A. First of all, the delivery of goods necessary for the re- inforced troops, transportation of these goods, the mobili- zation of laborers, and anything else necessary for the Army. Q. When were the measures of the Manchurian Government ac- cording to the Kantokuen plan to be realized? A. Its measures were to be realized within six months. Q. was food to be replenished with the crop cf SHOWA 16 (1941)? A. At the beginning feed was prepared with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940). Q. It proves that the measures had to be realized in a very short time, doesn't it? A. Yes, there was no time to wait for the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941), and we had to prepare it with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940). Q. What really did the head of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army inform you concerning the plan of the Kantokuen plan? A. He informed me of two things, One is that the troops of the Kwantung irmy would be greatly reinforced, and the other is the delivery of goods for the Army must be in- creased. Q. What kind of steps did you take towards the organs under you in the Manchurian Government to realize these measures A. Conferences which I attended were held many times. Q. To whom did you report about the demands concerning the Kantokuen plan? And in what way did the actual realiza- tion of the plan begin? A. I informed the Prime Minister of all the demands of the Kwantung Army, and also the vice-chief. I also held meet- ings of the vice-chiefs of each section. Q. Was the military mobilization cf the government officials to be prepared by the Kantckuen plan? A. Yes, I relieved the officials so that they might be mobilized by the army by the Kantokuen plan. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What do you think is characteristic of the political and military actions of TOJO? A. I think that TOJO should take the responsibility of pre- paring for the attack on Soviet Russia, and also of start- ing a war against America and England in the South. Q. What part did TOJO play in the war against China in SHOWA 12 (1937)? A. At that time TOJO was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Array, and I think he is responsible for leading the troops of the K*~antung Army into a certain district of China and also, after ne became War Minister and Prime Minister, for the whole management of the China Incident, Q. "ras the National Service Law of SHOWA 14 (1939) in Man- churia proposed by the Japanese? A. The National Service Law was proposed by the Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand cf UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army. Q. What was the reason for this demand? A. The reason was that it was necessary to have a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R. Q. By whom was the mobilization of laborers enforced in Man- churia? A. The mobilization of the laborers was enforced in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way, and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law. More than a million people were mobilized every year,, Q. How long was the term cf this mobilization? And in what way was it realised? A. The mobilization of the laborers was compulsory. They were mobilized for from 4 to 6 or S months„ By the Labor Ser- vice Lav/ youths of 21 to 23 years of age were mobilized and by executive order people were mobilized regardless of age. Q. By whose proposal was the mobilization carried out? A. It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU. Q. When was mobilization by the Labor Service Law enforced in Manchuria? And what was its purpose? A. The mobilization of laborers by the Labor Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in SHOWA 18 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of laborers in the military pro- duction factories, q. 1?rhat do you know about the KYOWA KAI? A. I myself was a member of this association, and also a mem- ber of the Central Headquarters Committee. The leader of ' the KYOWA KAI was Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader was Lieutenant-General MIYAKS, Chief of Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems con- cerning guidance of the Manchurian people were discussed. For instance, the problem of the mobilization of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the KYOWA KAI. ;OCUMSNI No. 2239 Q. By whose proposal was the KIOWA KAI organized? A. The KIOWA KAI was established by the proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO, former Commander of the Kwantung Army, In this association, the Japanese held the position of leaders and through this association the Japanese thoughts were made known, Q. How was the KIOWA KAI made use of for the preparation of the war against the U.8.S.R.? k. As mentioned before, the government received orders con- cerning this from the Kwantung Army, but the KIOWA KAI cooperated in making Manchuria a base for preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R. Q. Mention the facts cf the cooperation between the KIOWA KAI and the Japanese Government in preparing for the war against the U.S.S.R. A. The KIOWA KAI aid not cooperate directly with the Japanese Government but only through the Kwantung Army. Lieutenant- General MIIAKE, representative of the Kwantung irmy, appointed the leaders of the KIOWA KAI. Also, officers of the Kwantung Army often attended the conferences and took the lead in its actions. p.8 Q, How many members were there in the KIOWA KAI? A. There were more than 4,000,000. Q. what do you think is distinctive of the activities of AYUKAWA in Manchuria? Ho-played an important part in developing the heavy in- dustry in Manchuria according to the first 5-Year Plan. Almost all of his activities were concentrated upon the establishment of the munition industry. He directed the production of coal, iron, light metals, aeroplanes and motor cars, He established the Manchurian Heavy Industry Develop- ment Co*, Ltd., and directed it from December of SHOWA 12 (1937) to SHOWA 17 (1942). L\)if A. Q. Did AIUKAWA1S activities in Manchuria bring forth great profit? A. All the industries un.der AYUKAWA1 s direction showed a deficit. Q. Who supplemented the loss? A. The Manchurian Government granted a subsidy. From SHOWA 12 (1937) the total subsidy came to be about 500,000,000 yen. 0. Was the compulsory mobilization of the laborers mainly for AYUKAWA1s work? A. The laborers who were mobilized were, in the fxeld of.developing heavy industry, used for AYUIlAWA's w>rk. P*10 Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI's speeches? A. Hien I was the governor cf AKITA Prefecture around SHOWA 8 or 9 (1933, 1934), I heard ARAKI's speech at a meeting of prefectural governors. He was at that time the War Minister. AFAKI hung up a map of the U.S.S.R. and Man- churia, and explained the necessity of the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R"., Siberia and Zabaikalye (Phonetic) for Japan. SUZUKI, Teiichi also spoke on the same thing as ARAKI did. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What did you learn from OSHIMA, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany? A. I have never met OSHIMA. personally. But I have heard of him from MORISKIHA, Japanese Minister at Moscow. Accord- ing to MORISHIMA, OSKIMA trusted the ability of Germany anc! Hitler, and he always reported to the Japanese Govern- ment that Germany would surely win. Last year, when the Japanese residents cf Germany passed CHANGCHUN, I heard from them that OSKIMA had prohibited them from reporting to Japan the actual circumstances in Germany. (Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo I prove by my signature that the above answers are written in my own handwriting. (Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo Interrogator; Interpreter Military Interrogator for the U.S.L at the International Military Tri- bunal for the Far ^ast in Tokyo* Colonel erf Justice BAG IKY AN. Lt. Petrov Secretary-Stenographer Timoleeva Beginning of Interrogation lis 35 Close of Interrogation 17°-15 C E R T I F J C A T ,E. At Khadarovsk, 26 March 194b Swearing that I, former Chief of General Affairs of the Manchurian Government TAKEBE, Rokuzo, will, as a witness, make only true statements concerning the chief war criminals to Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Inter- rogator at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, I deliver this certificate. Doc. No. 2527 C E R T I F I C A T E Page 1 I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARANENKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that this photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in July 11; 1938 issue of "Japan Advertiser"5 was delivered to me by the library the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section on or about July 26, 1946, and thafc the original of the said document may be found in the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, the Far East. (Sgd) Lt.Col„ TARANENKO Tokyo, Japan. ARAKI CHIDES NATION FOR EXTREME ECONOMY: CAN'T GO WITHOUT SHOES FOR 20 YEARS5 HE SAYS. Government officials and the people at large are go- ing too fsr in their efforts to support the campaign in China, Education Minister General Baron Sadao ARAKI told members of the Politics and Economics Study Society in Osaka yesterday. Since Japan is determined to continue the war for 20 or 30 years if necessary, emergency measures and stringent savings cannot be continued indefinitely, he insisted. "In today*s economy, national attention is concentrat more 011 materials than on money, on men rather than materials and on thoughts instead of men'", the retired general pointed out, according to Dcmei. "Japan*s deter- mination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade. In spite of this circumstance, however, the nation. seems to be carrying its sacrifices to extremes. To me, seekin£ a quick victory seems too hasty, It is contrary to the Doc. No. 25'27 Page 2 real trend of events„ People are being encouraged to wear "geta" rather than shoes. If the war ends in a year lor two, this is ail right, as the public can go without leather footwear for a while, but we cannot be shoeless ifor 20 or 30 years. "I want to call to the attention cf both officials and citizens the need for re-examining their basic ways of thinking about the war* The Japanese have a habit of respecting the occupations handed down by their ancestors* However., the idea that unemployment can be solved merely by putting "he jobless to work on tasks for which they are net adapt sc. is a mistaken cne". J/c. 2527 C ^ H T I l I C i i T S I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of section II of tho Imperial library, do hereby cortify tho following, viz.» The book, Title: "The Japan iu^TZRTIa2Rn of July and .-ngust 1938 'fear of -ublioation; 1938 Ho. of Yolumos: One Bookshelf No.* Y/28 owned by the iiup .rial J-ibr^.y, was, at the request of tho Internationa Prosecution Section, 3upreiae Oo^iaund of the Jxlliod lowers, loaned out the said Action on U^y 24, 1946. Dated the 28th day of ^ptembor, 1946. y 3 (-T . ;e. 1341 Page 1 T ZjLjiiGR/ii '70 Ultra Secret Urgent o : Vice-V'ar I inister and Vice-Chief of General Staff rem: Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army 9 June 1937 1. Judging the present situation in China from the point of view f military preparations against Soviet Russia. I am convinced that if ur military" poster permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all tpon the Nanking regime to get rid cf the menace at our back. If our military power will not permit us to take such a step, think it proper that vc keep a strict watch on the Chinese govern- ont that they do not in} a single hand on our present undertakings in Jhina until our national defence system is completed. rre will thus ;ait for the Chinese government to reconsider. :e should not take the initiative to become friendly with the .anking government, which has no intension whatsoever of adjusting l.iplomatic relations with Japan, for, judging from their national characteristics, such a step will only aggravate their disdainful ittitude toward Japan. 2. us for Japan's policy toward China, as stated in the telegram rom Shanghai (No. 121) and hanking (fto. 159), we of the Kwantung '.vny re entirely of the same opinion. For further particulars, I shall oport to you myself when I go to Tokyo. But I hope for the present that a del:berate scrutiny will be dded to the practical plan toward China and the leading policy in orth China which were made public at the ti .3 the cabinet was changed ome time ago. X Doc. No. 184-1 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 1841 Statement of Source^ and Authenticity I> K. Eayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated , 193Z* a n d described as follows: file of telegrams. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the fol- lowing named Ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreiffn Ministry«. . Signed at Tokyo on this™ 30 th day of August, 1946. /s/ K« Kavashl Signature of Official Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo S E A L Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard E. Larsh, hereby certify that I am assoc- iated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of 1\ug. 1946. /s/ Richard E. Larsh NAME Witness: /s/ J3| A. Curtis 2nd Lt. M.I. " Investigator, IPS Official Capacity Doc. Ho. 2366 Page 1. iCE JAPANE SE- ENGLI Cli-CH HIE SE WJG by ZOKDO Shigeki Published by The He search Institute for Chinese Problems (Page 74, line 5-10) What is it that has been influencing Europe, which is a peninsula of Asiat and the whole world, if not the propellent force of Japan in the far distant liasb. Has not Japan been the actual, the only motivating power in modern world hietMyV Sino-Japanese War Bus so-Japanese War World War I Manchurian Incident The Nazi Regime in Germany The Annexation of Ethiopia The Spanish War The Occupation of the Rhineland The China Incident The Annexation of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Albania (Page 78, line S, 10) Thus, the fall of modem Europe will mean the rise of Asia, and great propaganda for the Imperial way in which all races will be -unified. Develop the European Incident into a world-wide incident I The Japanese—English-Chineas War All rights reserved Printed 21 October 14 Showa /1939/ Published 1 November 14 Showa ,/l939/ Price 40 sen Author: ZONDO Shigeki Publisher: 0GU2A Toraji. The Research Institute for Chinese Problems. 1 - Chone 4, Yurakucho, Kogimachi-ku, Tokyo-Shi Printer: NiKAUURA Hakuzo. 1- Chomc 14, Yurakucho, Kojinachi-ku, Tokyo-shi Printing Office; Daisansha Coy. Ltd. 1 - Chone 14, Yurakucho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo-shi Place of sale: Sekai Sozosha, inside Kikuchi Building. Chome 5, Ginza West 5, Kyobashi-ku, Tokyo-shi Telephone: Ginza (57) No-. 3546 Transfer accounts No. 116142 Tokyo Doc. No. 2368 I, Sokichi Tshiguro, Chief of Section II of the imperial library, do hereby certify the following, viz.: The book, Title: "Japanoso-British-ChiacsQ War" (Volume 1 cf the War Culture Series) Author: Shigeki Imafuji Publisher: Research Institute on Chinese Problems Year of Publication: 1939 Ho. of 7olumes» ^no Bookshelf Ho.* 751/255 owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied ̂ o-zers, loaned out to the said Section on ulay 24, 194'̂ • Dated the 23th day of September, 1946. Sokichi Ishiguro (Si^n. & Seal) Doc. No. 2524-A Page 1* C E R T I F I C A T E I.P.S. No.'2*24 Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Shibata, J:osaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police_Affairs„ Section --_in charge of, library of HomeJ'anistry __ and that""as such""official I have custpdy of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated lov-Pec, 1941. and described as follows0 Printed Journal ^KAIZO^ iRec6nstruction)J/ol^, 23_No._21 I further certify that the~attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home_I inistry Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sent., 1?46 (sirned) Kesaburo Shibata Sic nature of Official SEAL Witness: (signed) O.H.C. Norton Folice Affairs Section (illegible) of Hone Ministry Second Class Secretary Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H._Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headcuarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by mo fro;;' the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this day of Sept . 1946 's/ Richard E. Larsh HAUB Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d It. : .1. Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc. No. 2^24-A Page 2 * Excerpts from the magazine "KAIZO" (Reconstruction) Vol. 23, No. 21 of November, 1941 TANAKA's article "A NEW STAGE OP S CVIET-GERMAN WAR and. JAPAN" (pp. 206-211) (Page 206) (Title) "The New Development in the Busso-Gorman and Japan" by TANAPA, PANAS /Hlt.lp-p's speech on the night of Oct. 3 was a declaration of German victory OV'ST Russia, and thp' world soon came to 'mow this concretely." The Soviet-German front, for a long time stable, had turned active in the area of Vyazma east of Smolensk with a death struggle of 7 million men, and the last Timoshenko army 70 divisions was being encircled and annihilated. While Russia was proudly showing her tough power of resistance in the seige battles of Leningrad and Odessa, Moscow and Donetsk industrial zone have approached the crisis. Th3 attack on Moscow, which appeared impossible before the end of year, seems to have become an accomplished fact during these ten days. —>» Qf-wujvaJL Before the arrival of "German Winter" the firm resolution of the German army will make impossible the recurrence of "Napoleon's defeat" which the Anti- Axis countries are expecting. The faces of America and Britain, so long self- complacent, have assumed wry expressions. Here again has began another agony for Churchill and a worried look for Roosevelt. Thus we may say that the world- wide struggle between the Axis and the anti-Axis is gradually approaching its turning point. (Page_210) How should Japan move at this tim&2—-Jstpsn's standpoint is definite. Japan rejoices in and hopes for the victory of Germany, her confederate . Doc. No. 2^24-A Page 3* Needless to say Japan should make efficient use of the world situation created by the victory of Germany in order to achieve her primary great mission. However, this does, not mean that Japan depends upon German victory, nor should our attention be drawn to a single phase of battle or to one isolated diplomatic battle. What we should do is to plan to be ready for a ficht when opportunity knocks and to take what measures are necessary for the three principles which have been r jpeatedly advocated during these 5 years of the China Incident, that is, respect for the Tripartite Pact, the settlement of the China Incident, and the estab- lishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (Page 211) What does that mean on this occasion? It means to see into the essence of America, to resolve not to rely upon what can not be relied upon, and to give concrete form to what follows from the above. In disposing of the China Incident and establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as well, we must first clearly grasp what is the real enemy and consider him as an enemy. It is only in compliance with tho above that our position as the leader of the East Asiatic races will be confirmed, the only way in which the areas vital to the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere will be prevented from falling away from and rebelling against the Go-prospority Sphere Construction Camp. Loreover, we can expect active establishment of tho cooperative relation betwoon us and those races. A truly moral state with all its hardships can be expected to proceed with vigorous strides, while if a state should tend too much to profiteering, there would be the danger of her losing the lucid impulse for racial progress. However, what must be borne in mind here is that no matter how much the lowering of the power of re- sistance of the Soviet Union, no matter how much the decline in tho weight of Far Eastern Army appears to be a fact, it is extremely dangerous to place too much simple faith in England's impotence and the U.S.A.'s dilemma* but we must not be over discreet in grasping the opportunity, and get ourselves farther into a predicament. Doc, No.2524-A Page 4* What is necessary for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere and the adjustment of China Incident? And what should we do about it? For one thing should we not be brave to take the necessary steps—based on independent necessity and on virtue— to make the places vithin the Co-prosperity Sphere feel deeply that their scope is really an essential element of the Co-prosperity Sphere: and must we not consider how to express our wisdom9 Including the above-mentioned, the American- Japanese negotiations ard the new situation created by a German victory in the Russo-German war should be considered by carrying out more thoroughly the three great principles, namely the Tripartite Allianc the disposition of the China Incident and the estab- lishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Doc. No. 2527 Page 1 C E R T I P X C A T S tf.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 2524 Statement of Sourcc and Authenticity I, Shiheta. Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police Affairs Section — in charge of library of Home Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attachod consisting of pages, dated Nov - Doc. 1341, and described as follows: Printed Journal ''NAlZO" (Heronsbruction) Vol. 25 No. 21. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sept., 1946. jsj. Signature of Official /s/ SSaL Witness; /s/ Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard E. Larsh. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Fowers, and that the above described document was obtained by mo from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at . Tokyo on this 5. day of Sept. 1946 Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. M.I. /a/ Richard H. Larsh liAME Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc. Bo. 13 C. Eftswrpts fron tho Article entitled "A MESSAGE TO YOLTG 1-031*" ^ . ('•Sexxien Shoshi 1M. Iau&u«) hv Xingo/j PJiSKIMOTO. published in "This August I retired from P.Rtire military service and entered with high spirit the front line cf the renovation movement, "'-lien one is in the military profession, the prosecution of his own aspirations is restricted in no small degree, hub when one retires from public life, he finds himself in the happy situation of being able, if lis would only try, to work fully from a broadminded, high vievpo'.nt,. 1 decided at ones to begin a new action for the n^n-,r^fl the Greater Janaa YonngTgen1 a P&rly (mi snirEPio}.» "Our aim is renovation.. In order to effect renovation,^JilnoiLaasL enthusiasm fib .3 o lately es-ger.tLrOu The blood and enthusiasm thus required ai*e the possessions of young men.!l * * * * * * ni?rom the physical point of view, old people never can accomplish such a great work as the second ore-it ion of the world. For the sake of the renovation I hope that purs, sincere and ardent young people will surely succeed in it. To make young men become the framework cf Hew Japan and to unite the whole strength, bctu. tangible and intangible, of the Japanese race in our Eipercr, is the vr-y to be loyal to our country, and that is also the spirit of the DAI IMPOST SSI308B20.K Excerpts from the Article entitled. "The Reform of Parliamentary SysiemlLgearing in .tJie ,'I'niyo- Iki..Sipp.oa.Janaai¥_jLZPage l * * * m * "Responsible government - Party Cabinet system - rune absolutely \ counter to the Consti frution^ It is tho democratic government which j ignores the "ggSTO* goveIusjgai, Then what is the nature of L'tate ministries? The above mentioned 'Exposition of the Imperial Constitution* says; 'The way for stats ministries to serve the Throne is to strive to enJourage good and correct wsrongs, and if they commit any mistakes, they shall not evade responsibility under the pretence of having made them under Imperial co^and.' It further says: 'According to the Constitution, state ministers have the heavy responsibility of assisting the Throne and possess great administrative powers. They not only cccopy posts of making decisions on their own responsibility, but also have the unties of correcting wrongs. Hence, they should themselves bear responsibility for them ! " * si' * * * ^To matter how much the existing politic?! parties, imitating the constitutional system of Europe and A me fie"-mignc try to make it the bail 3 or party government o* dsr the pretence of responsible government, it'~is very clear that it rune counter to" the '"'•I'Ŝ O3 government, which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the constitution granted by the Emperor." Doc. Fo. 13 C Page 2 "Dissolve the Political "Parties at Once. They who destroyed, the national structure, desecrated the Constitution and corrupted the government, not realizing their faults, are now "bewildered hy the demand for the rejection of party government and the reformation of the parliamentary" "system end are trying their 'best to glorify their own rule "by deceiving the people in the name of 'Movement for the defensa_$fLJiiie- Constitution." When we consider their dangerous anti-national structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils, we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan." * * * * * "Prohibit Party Cabinet by Enacting a Political Party Law or a State Ministers' Limitation Ordinance. That i S | V/6 subjects cannot know to whom His Majesty orders to form a new cabinet since this is divine will, but whoever becomes a State Minister must, on entering the cabinet, renounce membership in a political party and also resign from the Diet." * * * * * Excerpts from the Article entitled, "From the Point of View of National Defense. It is the Duty of the Military to Mix in JB̂ I i t.i rg ( "—appearing -in .the T.alyo Dai-Fippon 17- March 1937, Page 1. "In the present 70th session of the Imperial Diet, liberalists who stand for the maintenance of the status quo, are busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This is a subtle trick on their oart to spread anti-military thought among the people through the Diet, thereby separating the people from the military and obstructing the military's movement for political renovation. Ws must watch closely their speech and conduct. The liberalists cry aloud against the mixing in politics by the military, quoting the Imperial Rescript wherein it is graciously commanded, 'Do not be mislead by public opinion and do not meddle in politics, but devote oneself solely to the performance of loyal service.' But we interpret the Imperial words, 'do not meddle in politics' to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics.' Heedless to say, not only soldiers, but also other persons, whether they be physicians or merchants, have their own works according to their occupation. However, is there any reason why, because of this, soldiers, physicans and merchants should not mix in politics.? There is no reason where politics should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians." * * * * * Excerpts from the Article entitled, "Powers are Desperately Building Up Air Forces - Build Up an Invincible Air Force," a appearing in Taiyo Dai Fipuon July 1. 1937, Page ^ j) Doc. Fo. 13 C. Page 3 * A * "In comparison with such desperate efforts of the powers to enlarge and reinforce their air forces,. Japan is in a pitiably poor condition at present. If we allow things to Tenia'!n in their present state, it is certain that there will be an irretrievable handicap between Japan and the other powers in the future. Especially how shell we be able to battle against the Soviet Union which is not making irreststable progress? The declaration by Kingoro HASHIMOTO says: 'Hake an invincible air force the mainstay of armaments, got rid of the concept that the air force belongs to the amy and foster instead the concept that it is the air force of the State> the same a3 cur ancient concept of the sword.1 In other words, the strongest and most promising air force should constitute the mainstay of armaments, with* which we intend to complete an invincible structure." Escerots from the Article entitled, "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (Dai Toa Koka TCen)ir by ICingoro HASHIMOTO, President of Dai Fippon Sekisei Zai, appearing in Taiyo Dai Fippon, January 5, 1942, Page 1 "The wa.r to bring an end to the Euro-American culture which has dominated for several centuries the peoples of the whole world, has been started. The blow struck in the Pacific on the 8th of December, 1041 is a blow of initiation of the movement for the turning of world history. The world culture based on the old principle of domination will probably meet doom with a violent crash. The utmost efforts of the leaders of the world to avert such a situation were all in vain. History, like the universe, revolves in a stately form. It is beyond the poorer of man to control it. Tfhy does history revolve so? People may say: 'from liberalism to totalitarianism from national economy to regional economy: from the old order to the new order.' But there are merely superficial views of the matter. The world is striding forward as if it were the divine will, toward a greater, higher and truer principle of governing mankind. The present great world upheaval is a scene of strife where we are groping for a high philosophy and principle of governing mankind. Seeing this scene of strife, u AKA1T0 IHEfeSftFTiSltl 10 KAMI' (the creator of the universe) must be very anxious to make us grasp the highest principle of guiding mankind. 'veil, then, what is the highest principle of mankind? That is our national structure. It is the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu' (universal concordia)." jfe s*e a)c jfc "Such capitalism and communism have no significant philosophy, nor any humanitarianism, and yet 3ritain, America and U„ S. S. P. have theologized these shallow principles, and have tried to exploit the people of the world. But they have now reached their last days in the present great world war. Hitler said that the present great world Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 4. war vf s a w»r of the outlook of the world. I would like to say that it is a. war for the establishment of a guiding principle. It should he called a war for the establishment of the great ideal of ,T-Iakko Ichiu.1 Whether we like it or not, the world is progressing steadily toward the above-described guiding principle. The Greater .last Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere end the European Co- Prosperity Sphere of Germany and Italy are the manifestations of this progress. The I'orth and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere is, in its pattern, a similar manifestation, although it is still bearing the name of old capitalistic guiding principle for co-prosperity, it is certain that it '"ill have to rely on our guiding principle someday in the future. Among these three regional blocs, the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere pc-ssesses the highest and most philosophical guiding principle. 3y guiding principle, I mean the principle of 'Hakko Ichiu', a. principle similar to that cf the human body. And that is why I call this sphere 'Dai Toa Zoka "en1 (The Greater "ast Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence). That is, in the 'T'oka ?'en', the constituent countries form an organic whole, with Japan as the brain, growing and developing as one living substance under the august virtues of His Majesty the Emperor. If it is only a. horizontal federation of the countries of Greater East Asia, it not only lacks life, but is also very far from the ideal of •Hakko Ichiu.1 * r A A * :,It follows that, as the first cardinal point of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Imperial Influence, the races of Greater East Asia must religiously grasp the above described principle. Otherwise, it would be meaningless. In order to achieve this, first of a.ll the Yamoto race mast be fully imbued with this principle and disseminate and inculcate it into other races. The Yamoto race must be fully imbued 'fit1* and practice this principle. This is Shova Renovation. Without this it is not possible to establish the Greater East Asia. Sphere under Imperial Influence. In fixing the limits of the Greater East Asia. Sphere under Imoerial Influence, we must turn our attention first of all to national defense, because however abundant our resources may be, and however solid the political combination of the va,rio*as races may be, *-e shall be very easily destroyed by outsiders if our national defense is deficient. Prom the national defense point of vie*-̂ in the light of the present world situation, it is absolutely aocessrry to include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in our national defense sphere. This is because we shall automatically be able to control the countries of the Sphere if we gain control of the saas. Little consideration needs to be given to the armaments with reference to countries within the Sphere, but armaments against those outside the Sphere a.re necessary. The mainstay of our national defense is our invincible air force. Erom this standpoint the minimum requir-emeni is the inclusion cf islands within the line extending in the a°st from Hawaii and "lev Zealand, pnd in the DOC NO. 13 C« age j West from the Persian Gulf eastisard. In the north it is necessary to take possession of the Aleutian Islands. J refrain from saying here about the U. £. S . R . sector, but you can imagine what I rant to say. Besides these, japan, iianchuria, China and other countries on the continent should be added of course, and further, greet naval ports are necessary in the northern part of japan, Singapore, the southern point of indie, Sidney and Dovao. with these places as operational bases, it is necessary to establish many air bases and bases for minor wer vessels in the neighboring islands. By means of a series of operational spheres of our air forces, we should ensure the safety of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, end at the same tine post s considerable arms'- ° n the continent and other countries of the Sphere under Imperial influence. Next the Japanese army and navy as the axis should supervise local armaments and defend the Sphere untfer imperial influence. The military expenditures should be borne jointly by all the constituent countries. This is only proper from the ideology of co-existence. Time will come in the future v.hen minor weak countries will not be allowed an independent existence. Already, the time has arrived when there is no other way than to extend a nation's own existence under the protection of a greet power. That does not mean, however, that the independence of minor -eak countries will be impaired, it is true independence to maintain independence under the protection of a great power, just as a child grows1 up freely tinfi' safely under the protection of his father. There is no room whatever to doubt this ieeling if we become thoroughly imbued with the principle of the Sphere under imperial influence. Then I should like to think that the Greater East Asia Sphere includes the undermentioned countries. With respect to the western boundary line especially, this is the time to fix the line of demarcation from the Italo-German co-prosperity Sphere. Japan, Menchukuo, China, the Soviet Fer East, French Indo-China. Burma, Falay, the Dutch East indies, India. Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. We cannot yet decide whether all these countries should be incorporated at once into the Sphere under jQmroerir. 1 influence, but it is at lesst absolutely necessary to include for the sake of national defense these countries in the sphere of our influence. Although full studies are necessary and careful considerations should be given to the racial, historical, economic, military and other factors in deciding how these countries should be divided and administered. I think it appropriate to apply the following general principles: 1. Give independence to each race and give each its proper place, m corpora te completely into Japanese territory those areas where the inhabiting races have no capacity for independence, or areas which are strategically important. Doc. No. 2527 Page 6 From this standpoint, Greater East Asia nay be divided administratively as follows: 1. Districts which are to be Japanese territory: * a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong. b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast of India. d. Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand, e. Other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar) 2. Independent Countries: Manchukuo, China (special areas to be designated in North China and Fakien). Burma (including Bengal area of India), French Indo-China (French control to be withdrawn in the future), India, Philippines, Afghanis- tan (to be given Baluchistan), Siam (to be given por- tions of Malaya and Burma), and Java. Territories incorporated into Japan should be administered by Governor-Generals, while Japanese advisers should be ap- pointed for independent states., Military and diplomatic af- fairs should be placed absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters also should be controlled by Japan. A Supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be set up in Tokyo, under which there should be set up a Planning Board for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence in order to handle business affairs. In the Greater East Asia War, the most important matter in the future will be economic warfarea From this point of view, Greater East Asia has great significance. The following is an enumeration of various things to be done in respect to the economy of Greater East Asia; 1. Greater East Asia should have a self-sufficient economy, doing away with gold economy as a whole and replacing it with community economy. 2. It should exchange goods with the European Co-Prosperity Sphere but not with the American Sphere, thereby "bringing to submission the American Co-Prosperity Sphere in respect to material resources. Although decision should be made in the light of the future situation in respect to whether Doc. No. 2^24-A Page 6 * the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal should be made the point of contact with the European Co-Pros- perity Sphere, it would be advantageous to make it as close to Europe as possible without considering the sacri- fices on our part 0 3. With respect to currency, the note-issuing banks of each locality should be taken over and other paper currencies should be additlonaJij issued* The exchange rate between the local currencies and the yen should be 'based on tne exchange quota- tions prevailing at each tine- A greater East Asia Central Bank should be established in Tokyo to effect financial control. Doc. Fo. IS C Page 7 4. Resources In. stock should "be immediately recovered in order to replenish as quickly as possible the war attrition of Japan. 5. In the early stage of government, the local states should be so guided as to conceatzate their efforts on economic activities. With the vast resources to "be made available from such activities, we should improve to the greatest extent Japan'3 heavy and light industries. 6. Therefore Japanese people in their status of officers in the direction of economic affairs, should grasp only the main lines of economy of the various countries, and not interfere with minor details. 7. Of course, economic plans based on geographical, economic and other relevant factors should be drawn up for each country, and cheir industries appropriately distributed. In making this distribution, attention should be paid with a view to making the countries incapable of separating from Japan politically.. 8. In respect to economy, Japan should plan and supervise the main points, and make each country proceed toward laissez-faire economy. 9. Prom the point of view of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Rule, Japan's industries should be re-examined and reorganized with a hugh measurement. 10. Australia should be mapped up as a heavy industry district in the future. 11. In order to supplement the labor power in the districts with scarce population, Chinese, Indians aud some of the local inhabitants should be migrated.. Only these Japanese who are left over after the adjust- ment of internal industries should be migrated, Furthermore, Japanese should be migrated in the capacity of officers, as much as possible. 12. With respect to shipping, enemy ships in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be seized as much as possible, and new ships constructed with great speed. Education and Peligion 1. The cardinal principle is to spread, and inculcate the id.ealogy of the Greater Bast Asia ophers under -Imperial Influence. 2. The spirit of labor should be cultivated. 3. Anti-American and Anti-British movements should be launched and soli Gari ty s ought, 4. Culture should be improved and guidance given so as to develop superior race*. This is to prepare for the great future fight between the white race and the colored rac's3 whose culture is inferior to that of the European races. Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 8. 5. There should 'be freedom of religion, cut Christianity should he destroyed step "by step, while i;TEZJ0" teaching should he de- ssiminated and thoroughly inculcated step "by step. 6. The Japanese language should he the common language in the Greater Bast Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence. Let's become a great Yamato race! The Yamato race is no longer an island race as "before. It is the Yamato race of the world, the leader of the race. It is necessary for us to he broadminded and to have the magnanimity worthy of a great race. furthermore, the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence which we ere going to establish has no precedent. In this age, the old rules, customs end manners no longer count. The bureaucratic spirit is taboo. Matters should be disposed of only by creativfi power. It is necessary for us to be brcadmir-ded enough to adept ''Kalcko IchiuR as our rule. At the same time, wo should place analytic studies into secondary importance and devise a system of synthesized studies of national defensej politics and economics. Exccrots from Article entitled "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 1 May 1939 issue of the Taiyo "Dai ITlppon: "On coming back to the homeland from the battlefield, the first pledge I made is to 'pay homage to the soldiers.' We can pay no higher homage to them in leading the China. Incident to its solution, and the cardinal point of the solution lies in solving the problems in connection with England and the Soviet Union who assist Chiang Kai-Shek, Without solving these problems, all our efforts in destroying Cniang Xai-shek would be fruitless. Tho longer wo fight, the firmer..the Chinese people'will'. unite, adoring Chiang as their hsro. Chiang ICai-shek is a, puppet fed and manipulated by England ana the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key of solving the Chinese problem lies in the destruction of chose supporters of Chiang. The chief supporter is. England rather than the Sovietu She has great interests in China, and as her retreat from China leads necessarily to her retreat in India and in her other territories in Asia, it is perfoctly natural that she is making desperate efforts to stick to China. When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union will bo left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural and impossible for tho Soviet Union to make an alliance with England, Communism, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union, axvocatos a challenge to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy to have ma.de Hussia. intone on the oriental affairs. If we show our decision to attack England, the Soviet Union will immediately turn the point of her spoar toward India, the treasure house of capitalism. Wo must defend on the north and sdvancc toward the south. - Our destiny will bo decided in- the south. Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 9. I have heard recently of the need of strengthening Axis collaboration. Prom the viewooint that tho success' in solving the China Incident depends entirely upon the expulsion of 3rgland, the policy of German;?- and Italy to destroy England and France are on the same foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial Tri-Partite Pact, including democracy as well as communism as the object of attack. If we strengthen our collator.- sicn, it is easy to put an end to England and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy will eliminate communism and democracy, the two enemies of human civilization, and in Asia, in the area east to India at least, Japan will expel those countries which are founded upon communism and democracy." Excerpt from Article entitled, :!Sxpel the British Influence from the Far East" by HASHIMOTO, Kisgoro, which appeared in the 15 May 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon" "Under the present condition, it i,-3 very easy to bee.t England. We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hong Kong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East? The British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore, For we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100.000,000 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if we need 100 airplanes to sink a warship, the account is entirely on our side.'1' Short Cutting Remarks on the Present Situation by HASHIMOTO, Xingoro which appeared 3n the 1 June 19"J3 j ssuo of Taiyc Dai Nippon; "It is a humiliation to have a talk with England." "Define England as the enemy !" "Our way is one: Expulsion of England." "Arm the Axis!" "The enemy that blocks our way to the South of England." Excerpts from the article entitled ,!The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the expulsion of England" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 20 June 1939 jgir-ue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon: "If it had not been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the Incident will be brought to an end immediately. The Premier and the Foreign Minister have told us that it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration, but they have been hesitating to conclude the Military Alliance. It is because they are afraid of England. If the Tri-Partite Military Alliance is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must instantly proceed toward it. The Foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack. Because the whole nation has recognized its necessity, the Government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack / Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 10. instantly. Tho attack should not he stopped at Tientsin, hut extended to Shanghai and to Hong Kong. This is the only possible solution of the China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England I" Excerpt from an article entitled, "Organize a Class A Wartime Cabinet that Has no ?oar of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro appearing in the 10 July 1^59 is rue cf the Taiyo Pad Hipnon; "Sow our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there isonly one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic bloc^de? Even if it should be enforced, it is only a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole can make her way through with a complete war-time system in which every subject returns his property to the Emperor. A Government without policy and decision is a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion, power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear. What we need now is a war-time cabinet with the highest authority." Excerpt from an article entitled "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with. Japan as its Loader" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the SO July I?5'j issue of Ta'yo Dal Nippon; "The public opinion of the whole people has taken an anti-British turn, This is natural and satisfactory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do not know what to do with China. My opinion is as follows: 1. The thorough destruction of the old order is necessary. We must destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government, and the economic, political and idealogical influences of England and Russia* 2. China and Manchukuo should organize a state union with Japan as its leader. We must organize a self-supplying bloc within the Ear East, and that economical, defensive block must be led by Japan, the saviour of East Asia. We should then have friendly terms with those countries that recognize our union state, and allow no commercial relations with other countries.!l Excerpt from an article entitled, "ITo More Compromise!" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 25 September 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Uip-pons ; _ "I have often pointed out that England and America have been hostile to us throughout the China Incident. The Government authorities also have recently warned the nation of this fact, Morever, have they not been tp.king such challenging attitudes as to give birth to the term ffABCD bloc"? Tne abolishment of the commercial treaty by England., TAr.erica?s freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is no hope of readjusting the friendly relations between Japan and the two countries, Germany and Italy have already gene into a state cf war with America. What Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-?artite Pact. Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 11. The Incident will come to an end when the leadersof China "become aware of the true facts and "become oriental again. If we should put an end to the Incident now, by compromising with England and America, China will be left as she has been ~ dependent on England and America. If this should happen, how could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed themselves for the cause? Tho Government seems to be taking the attitude of an opportunism . It is not a good attitude. We Japanese must decide by ourselves. It is up to us to create our own victorious history.;i DOCTJMSTT NO. 13 PAGE 1 c i n n n A H W.D.C. HO. I.P.S. NO. 13 .. Statement of Sonrce and Authenticity I, SHIBATA, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Librarian, Home Ministry . and that as such official I have custody of the d&cuments hereto attached consisting of pages, dated 17 Dec. 1936 - 25 Hov. 1943 and described as follows: Magazine entitled. "TAIYO DAI NIPPON" an organ of the "DAI NIPPON SEIN1N JO1' later called '-DAI ft If P 03 SMI SEI KAI". (2 volumes) _______ I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Sent , 1946. /s/ (in Japanese) Signature of Official SEAL (in Japanese) Witness: /s/ T. K. Mortor.v Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Bichard H. Larsh , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Sept. , 1946 /s/ Richard PI. Larsh NAME' Investigator. IPS Witness:/s/Robert P. Mahon Official Capacity % * v- ,'•»•*' J- • vĵjrx . QViv i ̂ VC^JW , Bcrt)6H_. . «J!iA>: M P^'S "Cil/- v ! ' ' • • *'f 'W, .Cil .2 IM» adt .o t-cloaMB (jJs'-iiri '.tr £ :• •) Jy.,^1 , . Isiotilo et iwfc inoo i :>a - s . • •• i-v \ ..••-. . ...... x . i. ";• . • , 1 ^y^M-V _ . • • . I }_ \e\ '.o -/. ta >1/1 t'i io -fib "JI \)it. • ,'z0 iBioJt'it if'^i o *vao% c{ led silt 0 't< yli Ydsisci telKSfl .riO«. uiJ xil taOf.vfiSt )8i • L : • •18-X̂. L . i If iwioxH \ \ . f. s;.-rl : . • . lo 5 " trirf no c • is •'"-1 . to W i .3.3 •• - - + : r. . Doc. No. 1955 J J FRCIl TIE "03.J& 11-11" OF J^IlIJg 31. lQh.2 \ A GREAT Ullia-I OF a51A by TAITAKA ITamokichi The "ieiji Renovation, Showa Renovation and the World Renovation form together a consistent highway of the world history. Because on the first step a modern Japan has beexi established by the iji Renovation in opposition to the fate of the poor colonized Asia, secondly, a great union of Asia is to be completed after the expulsion of the imperialistic influences of Western powers by the Showa Renovation, and further through the next closin0 i.var in the World we will be able to realise our great idea of'"The World of One Family" cherished since the beginning of our nation. Thus the present is the epoch of the Showa Renovation progressing steadily through the manchurian Incident, Sino-Japaneee Incident and Greater East Asia War. In fact, we aro living in the great epoch-making period in the world history, the mission of which consists in the extension of the ideal of ĵ eiji Renovation into Asia for the purpose of re-establishment of a modern Asia. This is nothing but the union of Asia directed by the moral league or organization of nations through the emancipation of the Asiatic nations from the fetters of European and American Powers, thus preparing ourselves for the certain victory in the closing war in tho world. We have been calling the east region of Singapore "mast Asia", and emphasized to unite East Asia immediately through the emancipation from the imperialistic influences of the Western countries. And the Sphere of this union should be extended steadily according to the develop- ment of might of Japan. The first cornerstone for this union was laid when i-anchoukuo has become an independent state through ̂ anchuria Incident which has been made identified with. Japan. China, however, had advocated the chauninism against Japan 30 loudly without any recognition of the direction of tho world hiutory. that China conflict has broken out finally. But out of this rebellion in ~ast Asia our proclamation of establishment of a new order in East Asia has been explicated home and abroad, the new national government founded, and the movement developed between Japan, China and ̂ anchukuo to form a moral league in East Asia. Chunking Regime has continued the anti-Japanese conflict aided by America ana Britain, whose defeat of this time has given so great a shock that it is expected the Chiang Regime will surrender and parti- cipate in the co-prosperity sphere of East Asia in a short time. How that the might of Japan has been rapidly extended to the south according to the growth of Great East Asia '.'Jar, Thailand declared war upon America and Britain after the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Japan, and French Indo-China is co-operating with Japan as a member of our union. i.t the 79"kh diet session Premier To jo stated that Japan would warrant the independence of P. I. and Burma if they co-operate with Japan. The very mission charged on Japan, who occupies Doc. N0. 1955 the position of a senior in -»sia, consists in the countenancing of independence of Asiatic Nations, who have their proper culture, through the emancipation out of the fetters of the whites. Thus, the day might not be far distant when Thailand, -nnam, P. I., Burma, etc. will become members of One family in last -*sia directed by Japan. Besides, if the influences of our enemy, -.morica and Britain, are swept away from the Pacific 0Cean and Indian Ocean by the Great last -sia ̂ ar, the freedom of Australia and independence of India will be realized, and the release of Eastern Siberia nay be attained with a fundamental adjustment of relations between Japan and Russia. In that way, the last Asia co-prosperity spaere will develop into the union all over -vsia, as well as the sphere under the real power of Japan will extend. ^s above mentioned, for the purpose of great union of ..sia, it is to bo the first step to unite morally Japan, China and Manchuria, under the leadership of Japan, the second is a participation of Thailand, -'imam, P. I. , and Burma in this union and tho third- to effect the emancipation of Australia, India and Siberia. '•'e have expected that the league of' Japan, -fenchuria, and China would develop into the co- operation of Great Asia, but judging from the bright triumph of our troops, it might be possible for us to expect the accomplishment of the third step almost simultaneously with those of the first and second. The Great last Asia Z'ar which is being waged by us at present is the one that is to determine Japan's fate and Asia's destiny. It must be a great achievementof the establishment of ̂ sia. Therefore, it is rsquired for us to continue our advance towards our ideal of great union of -.sia, never relaxing our war spirit and solidifying our footing ground step by step. (The writer i3 a professor of the lUtsumeikan Jniversi ty). Doc. No« 1955 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify: 1. That I am C^ief of tvc Document Division of the International Prosecution Scction, G,T",Q., S.CJUP., and as sue1" have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Sections 2. Tl-at Document No0 lr-55 was delivered to me from the Imperial Library of Tokyo as being a file of the Osaka Jiji Shimbun for January 19-12 including the issue of 31 January 1942 and suet document has been continuously in my costody since sacv delivery© 9 September- 1946 /s/ E. E. Denly E. E. DANLY Doc. Mo, 1955 Page 1 C E E T I F I C T E I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that one copy of the "Osaka jiji Shimpo" dated January 31. Shows 17 /194-2/ year owned by the Imperial Library was, ex the request of the International Prosecution Scction, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Scction on May 24, Suowa 21 /1946/ yearc Dated t^is 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ yearf ,/s/ Sokocri Ishiguro (Seal) DOCUMENT NO. 2459 A < DOCUMENT 2459 A ' /Cover of took/ "TAI - KOKU" (Thailand) "Advance to the South" Library No 4 Price 1.30 ¥ Imaginary map of New East Asia Federation. There is a small island called "Greenwich" situated, oneminute and so many seconds Biorth latitude in the southern extremity of the territories governed by the great Japanese Empire. If we draw a circle like the rising sun with this small island as the center and its radius extending to Lake 3aikal, to the north of Manchoukuo, it will include the Maritime Provinces, Kamchatka Peninsula, the Aleutian Islands and the Hawaiian Islands in the North, India in the West, Australia and New Zealand in the southeast and thousands of islands scattered in the Southern Pacific like big and small stars. The creation of New East Asia is certainly nothing but the realization of a great ideal which embraces the Great South Seas. This as has been stated in our announcement is to be economic, geographic and racial unity with Japan as its leader. This will be the way to freedom from past aggressive exploitations and the utilitarian white evils. Page 173 Compiled by Nampo-Sangyo-Chosakuay. (The "Industrial Research in the South" Society) Tokyo, Kanda, Asahi-cho No 2 Published by Nan-Shin-Tsya on January 15, 1942 Tokyo, Kanda, Asahi-cho No 2. Price ¥1.30 Doc6 No. 2459 Page 1 Certificate I, SokicVi Isbipuro, cvief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that the book entitled "Thailand," Volvme IV of tie Southward Advance Series, author Southward'Industrial F.cscrrch Society ("Nampo Sangyo Chosa Kai"), published by Nanshinsha in Showa 17 A942/ year, book-s>-clf number 919/131, was, at the request of the International Prosecution SectionSCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on Tune 13, Sbowa 21 /1946/ year. Dated this 20tb day of September, Showa 21 A946/ year. /s/ Sokichi Ishiguro (Seal) / • Document No. 22'33 Page 1, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST United States of America, et al. vs. ARAKI, Sadao, et al. SS AFT IDAVIT nt-tW r ^ x t V I I, Kazuo YATSUGI, state as follows:- I was born in NISHIKIE-T1URA, SAGA Prefecture in 1899. I held the office of the Chief of the Business Bureau of NajtxcnaL-Jlaltcy Investigation 1 s soc iatioi}_/KOKUS&321 KENKYUKAI JH1UKYQKU cho/ from February 1937 to June 194-5. At the same "time I was entrusted"with the business of the Pesearch Section of the War Ninistry from December 1938 to the end of 194-4. During the above period I was made to know and did the following which I am going to testify to, according to my duties. The National Policy Investigation Association was instituted bv„BajoiL KINTIOCHI 0KUR1,. a member of the House of Peers, myself and others in 19^7,with the purpose to investi- gate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese Government and to the public. 1. The number of individual members of this Associatio. was approximately 2000 and the number of the juridical persons about 150, all of them paying a subscription. Among the members of this \ssociation, there were in- cluded Japanese Statesmen, political leaders, high officials, retired officers who had formerly held positions of leadership, representatives of the learned class, some Japanese concerns, the representatives of industrial companies as v/ell as banking facilities, etc. A list of some juridical persons who were members to tl. Association is as follows:- Dcv.vanm; No. 2233 Page 2. 1. Prime Minister's Secretariat - Yearly subscription ¥3,000 2. War Ministry " " ¥3,000 3. Naval Ministry " " ¥3,000 4. Home Ministry " " ¥1,000 5. Oversea Affairs Ministry " " ¥ 500 6* Foreign ?!inistry " " ¥1,000 7. Communication Ministry 8. The Mitsubishi Concern 9. The Aikawa Concern 10. The Mitsui Concern about ¥1,000 ¥5,000 ¥5,000 from ¥3,000/ to ¥5,000 11. The South Manchurian Railway Co. " " ¥1,000 12. Other big companies and banking facilities also subsidized IL the Association. The annual fee of an individual member was from ¥50 to ¥200. The annual budget of this Association was ¥170,000/l80?000 for the purpose of carrying out specially important investiga- tions, it received extra contributions. For instance, we received ¥300,000 to cover the special expenses of planning a ten yearsr programme for the construction of the East \sia Co- prosperity Sphere, including ¥100,000 which was received from the*Governmental organizations (viz. ¥20,000 from the Cabinet Information Board which was under the direct control of Hldeki, TOJH, ¥20,000 from the irTar Ministry through Akira, MUTO, ¥20,000 from the Fore 1 gn J 'inistry, through the Vice Minister, the then Minister being TOGO, ¥20,000 from the Naval Ministry, and ¥5,000 from the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc. 2. ¥100,000 was contributed by the big companies (includ- ing ¥20,000 from MITSUI, ¥10,000 from the SUMITOMO through Keijiro KITAZAWA, a director to the company, and large sums of about ¥10,000 to ¥20,000 each from some other companies. The above stated ¥300,000 was received in response to a letter addressed to the above named Government office and the brains of the public concerns in which we explained the ways the money was going to be spent. Document No. 2233 Page 3. ¥240,000 out of the above-mentioned sum was spent in mak- 4 ing the plan for the ten years' programme. The document was issued by this Association in AprUL 1943 and sent to the Greater East Asia and Foreign Ministries. I assure you that the document written in Japanese entitled "The Plan for the Measures for Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in four parts which you showed (and which had been seized when the residence of Baron OICQF.A was searched) is the very document for which compilation this Yssociation received the above stated subscription of ¥300,000. The Board of Managing Directors which assumed leadership in the Association had ten members including: 1. Kinmochi OKURA (Member of the House of Peers) 2. Michio YUZAWA (Prior to his taking the Portfolio of Home Minister) 3. Hiroshi SEITT0MURA (Later took the Office of Minister without Portfolio and in the SUZUKI Cabinet was appointed Chief of the Information Board) I, as the Chief of the Business Bureau, which consisted of 30/40 clerks, was looking after the affairs of the Association. The work of the Association was sometimes participated in by those who were qualified as not the members of the Associa- tion. (For instance, Lt. Gen. Akira ?*UT0 who was in active service not only made speeches two or three times in the interest of the Association but gave financial suiroort as stated above. Lt. Gen. Kenryo SATO also mace speeches more than once. Besides the above, some influential Japanese statesmen who were not members participated in the important works of the Association.) The reports, documents a.nd plans which were made by the Association on the most important problems were submitted to the Government (The Premier's Secretariat) and the Ministers concerned on the instructions of the Board of Managing Directors. The Governmental Organizations furnished us with necessary materials and data (including those of top-secret character) for investigating important problems regarding national policies and presenting our opinions about them. Document No. 2233 Page 4. In October of the l6th year of Showa (1941) when it seemed definite that Japan should enter a war in the near future, the Board of Managing Dir. ectors of the National Policy Investiga- tion Association instituted a Committee for Administrative Measures with the purpose of working out a plan to be submitted to the Government in preparation for wars in the North and in the South. This Committee consisted of a fine set of men, such as former ministers and generals who were in close connection with the Government and military authorities, including the following principal figures; Nobujmki,-ABE^.Premier in Showa 14/15 /'39/'40/, President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa 17 /142/.~ Fumio GOTO, A member of the House of Peers, Acting Premier in Showa 11 /1936/, Minister without Portfolio in TOJO Cabinet. President of Imperial Rule Issistance Association in Showa 18 /1943/. Seizo K03AYASHI, Admiral. Vice Minister of Navy. Minister without portfolio in ICoiso Cabinet. Sankichi, TAKAHASHI, Admiral. A war councillor. Shinsuke, KISHI. The Commerce and Industry Minister of TOJO Cabinet. Since Showa 18 /1943/, Minister with- out portfolio, Vice Minister of Munitions, and others. I affirm that the document you showed to me entitled :,The Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures" is the very report that was made by the above-mentioned committee and submitted to the Premier, Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers in October 1941. During the war, three men of the Committee for Administra- tive Measures were appointed by the Government to be adminis- trative leaders in the Southern occuDied areas, viz. Lt. Gen. Rensuke ISOGAI to be Gov. Gen. of Hongkong; Shigeo OTATE to be Mayor of Singapore andEyozoro SAKJJRAI to be political adviser to Burma. Document No. 2233 Page 5. As stated before, I was on the non-official staff of the Research Section of the rrar Ministry during the period of Showa 13-19 /1938-1944/. The Chief of the Research Sec- tion was Major Gen. Naofuku MIKUNI during Showa 15-17 /1940- 1943/. Early in Showa .17 (1942), there arose a necessity to make clear the official idea of the Greater East. Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere. It was needed for carrying out the func- tion of this Association in investigating this same problem. I requested the War Ministry to show me the documents wherein was exp-essed the official opinion on this subject. Early in Showa 17 (1942), in February or March, I borrowed two documents, the titles thereof were - "The Gist of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occunied as a Result of the Greater East Asia War" and "The Plan for the Disposal of Land, in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphers" from the research section of the War Ministry (although my memory cannot identify the person). I affirm that judging by the consents the photostated copies of the two Japanese documents shown to me are those of the a.bove-mentioned documents which I received from the War Ministry early in Showa 17 /1942/. I made a report to Baron Kinmochi OKUPuA at that time con- cerning these documents. By my autograph signature I certify that each of the 29 nhotostated pages, judging by the con- tents, is the same as that of the document in question. The fact that the Overseas Affairs Ministry participated in com- piling these documents is clear as is written in them, and the participation of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff is also doubtless, considering that the dis- position of the Army and Navy forces in the Southern Areas is mentioned in these documents, such matters being under the exclusive charge of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff, even the Army and Navy Ministries claiming no function in them. /signed/ Kazuo YATSUGI 30th August 1946 Doc. No. 2527 Page 7 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese end English languages, and that this day, the said YATSUGI, Kazuo w,-,s duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood pnd comprehended by said Affiant. * Da,ted this 30th day of August 1946, at Tokyo, Japan. /s/ James MURAKAMI. 2nd Lt. A.U.S. Lt. James MURAKAMI Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named YATSUGI K̂ .zuo, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 30th day of August, 1946. /s/ Arthur A. SANDUSKY ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY Capt., J.A.Gr.D. f f M 'j Document No. 2289 A Tentative Plan Concerning the Scope and the Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Prawn -up hy the Secretariat of the National Policy Research Association (E0E7JSAZtt-ZMIFJU-XiI) on 18 Pehruary 1942 (Showa 17) iiij.rAĉ ' This is a tentative plan drawn up hy the Secretariat as a reference material for discussion concerning the scope and the structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which is"to he discussed hereafter hy a small com- mittee of the Investigation Committee on the Problems of Greater East Asia. For convenience* sake, this tentative plan was drawn up hy dividing the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere into Greater Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Further, the tentative plan leaves behind many problems concerning the scope and composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Pre-perity Sphere. We should sppreciate hearing especially the views of each member of the committee in regard to these points. Doc, No, 2229 Page 2 CONTENTS I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, II. The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere» III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. IV. The problem of organizing ma:;or countries which are to assist the leading country for the smooth manage- ment of the Greater jUast At-ia Co-Prosperity Sphere. V. The position of the border zones* jc ijc >|; sjc I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, A. The Greater Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 1, The inner sphere0 Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malayaj Burma? Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, other Oceanic Islands, and Hawaii® 20 The border and the neutral zones (including unfortified areas)« ae The border zones Islamic zone in the Near East, and Alaska. b« The neutral zones. Parts of Africa bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, land and sea of the North and South Poles. Doc. No, 2229 Page 2 Document No. 2229 Page 3 B0 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 1. The Inner Sphere, •TheL zone along_the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea, Inner•and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China? Thailand, Malaya, Burma, the Phili- ppines, the Bismarck'Archipelego ana lew Guinea, and New Caledonia0 (Should we include the eastern part of India?) 2. The border and neutral zones (including unfortified areaso) a„ The border zones„ Australia, other Oceanic Islands, and India0 The neutral zones® Hawaii, the Islamic zone in the Near E^st, parts of Africa bordering on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, the land and sea zones of the North and South Poles. Unfortified areas. The Aleutian-Islands. . The points tq_be discussed„ (1. The counter-plan for preventing the con-centration in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from the European part of Russia. 2« The areas (Islamic zone, the Indian Ocean Coasts, Africa and the southern part of South America) where tve should demand the establish- ment of emancipated zones in the Euro-American Co-Prfsa perity Sphere in return for our emancipating India and Australia as our border zones. Document Noa 2 229 Page 3 IOC, No a 2229 Page 4 3s Matters concerning the sea fishery rights which should he secured from the standpoint of the East Asia Co "•Prosperity Sphere,, II9 The composition cf the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere a A, Independent states« 1, Existing independent states, 2„ The areas which should be made newly- independ ant B, Protectorates® Ce Areas under direct control® (What should be their positional relation with Chosen and Taiwan?) D. The disposition and the status of the European and American possessions in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Spheref III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. A. The kernel area from tire stand-point of national defence against countries outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere. i« The plan for the northern frontier under the threat of a powerful Russia. % 2, The plan for preparing against America. 3, The plan for preparing against the strong powers of Europe0 B. The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing peace in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Specifically, the stand- point of completely shutting out any possibility of another war against the Chinese*) It The formation of the satellitic countries to check the Chinese in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Eoc* No, 2229 Page 4 Document No. 2229 Pago 5 a e Northern area»....Manchukuo, Inner and outer Mongolia.-, ho Southern area Burma (?) Annam (?) 2* The division and the independence of China herself-- "For example, whether China should he divided up into North? Central, South and Interior China, with E~.rth China as the kernal zone* 3. Plans for controlling the fate of China or of checking her resistance power through economic measurese C„ The kernal zone from the standpoint of securing and developing the superior characteristics of the Yamato race, D. The actual composition of the kernel zone combining the foregoing points. IV. The problem of forming states which are to assist the leading power for the smooth management of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. A0 A-Class states (Director-class)0 le The satellitic states of the leading power. Large states, under direct control9 such as Manchukuo and Malaya* (Should Mengchiang be included?) 2« Powerful independent states, China (should it be divided into independent states and made into separate units?), Thailand, Burma (?), 3 e Problems o a. The problem of whether many satellitic states should be selected as director-states. Document No. 2229 Page 5 Doc a Noc 2229 Page 6 b, The problem of how to manage such colonies as French Indo-China« c, The problem of what consideration should be given to the construction or selection of Director states from the standpoint of checking the Chinese, Be B-class statosc 1- Other independent states- 23 B-class states under direct control. Co C-class states. 1, Protectorates and C-class states under direct control <, 2. Problems. a* How to deal with Chosen and Taiwan in respect to their status in the composition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. V. The status of the border zones. A. The problem of what relation should be established with the outer zones > 1• Po s itive domand s. 2C Passive demands (such as demilitarisation and special treaties with third countriese) B. What treatment should bo given In the Co-Prosperit Sphere to the states in the border zones »V •>'•» -T- -R -T- Doce No, 2229 Page 6 (final) 19 June 194-6 Seizure of Evidentiary Documents On 3 June 19-4-6 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Inte- lligenco Corps representatives - three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuyaku, Sakuraguoka, No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following 1. Preliminary Draft of,.the Borders of the Great East Asia Co- Prosperity,. Sphere and it!s structure, 18 Febc 194-2 (General Affairs Bureau of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu-Kai" society). 2. "Kainmeibo Narabi Yoran" - book cf reference and list of mem- bers of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu - Lai" society. ("Kokusaku Ken- kyu - Kai" Publishing House, Tokyo? 1942) The aforementioned seizures was made under authority given in AG 200,2, 10 November 1945, CIS, SCAP Index No. 261. I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. /s/ James Williamson Special Agent, CIC Hereby I aknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home. /s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo CERTIFICATE: I, Junior Lieutenant BORIS ALECSANDROVICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations. Today YATSUGI, Kazuo in my presence signed the above said document and I certify that this document has been correctly translated from the English language into Japanes and was correctly understood, I am duly warned that for the false translation I bear responsibility according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.C. Criminal Code. Signature: Br Petrov BORIS PETROV. Junior Lt. The Certificate is taken by Military Interrogator Major BASENKO. •A ^ . . 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J 1. - R*— - 126 'SO 136DOCUI-tEFT FO. 3363 PAGE 9 the Russian, emigrants + Xivyd on the "Inn̂ liO as to the other emlgraafcs1 settlements, they would "be super- vised respectively "by the headquarters of the Japanese Army in the areas of which they resided. in IS34 as a rest"it of negotiations between me and t-fav-r Ch:'l ef of the Japansse Military Mission, the qucation of the creation of the whiteguard emigrants' organization in Manchuria, vae finally decided. When in 1934 MDO and I met in the "ffagoya Hotel" in Mukden we composed a draft of the whiteguard emigrants organization to "be in Manchuria, and came to an agreement as to the noai'ieed for the leading postn in the organization. In the same year, 1SJ4, the organization of the Russian emigrants in Manchuria was created and 'by suggestion of the Ewantung Army Headquarters was called the sRnesian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" , abbreviated; i:35Sm". • "J must say here that the creation of the "Russian Emigrant & Affairs Bureau* must by no means be considered as an expression of the Japanese's care for the Russian emigrants„ Although they needed the whiteguard emigrants as an instrument for carrying on work hostile to the Soviet Union, they did not at all carc to give them any rights whatsoever* Oo.ite the contrary, the Japanese encouraged ail sorts of manifestation of ill-will against Russians as- the representatives of the white race. General F.CI50 was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination, as"Vol1 as religious persecution policy! !Te~~was cnXef of the Zwantung Army Headquarters from 1933 to 1935 and later on Prime--Minister of Japan. T^n. •lUlou'q urgent request an instruction of the_Japanese Miniitry of Education found its applicatioij^jLthe Japanese f schools, that instruction preacribijn̂ jLlia-tcaahars as a matter of obligation to inculcate in the Japanese children hâ rea.Towardŝ b.ss iar.s^Am^icgns.^joL^g1 *• <mbnr> than with the iaea cx"~tne Japanese be^y; a IHghar race in comoax ision -with the other nat:_oii,?"*r .Also it was on KOI30} 8 iniciat.jve that in 1940 in Manchuria was published PU-YI;s manifesto which prescribed the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of the loligxous convictions of these or those national groups, to worship the Ĵ vv̂ -̂ ftp. goddess Araa/borase. The persecution of Russians became still worse following the beginning of Japan's wax against the U. S. A., and Great Brittain, when one could see Russians beaten openly by the Japanese in the streets of Eharbia and Dairen. These facts prove that Japan needed the ^BREm" only in view of her war against the TJ. S. S, R. /Question; T'̂hat I' chr^ DOCUMSBT 110. 2353 QUESTION! AITSWSE: What lis.sic task3 were given the ,!P.ussian Emigrants Affairs / / a^^0^- Bureau8 in Manchuria by the Japanese? By the c-reaiicn of vote pursued 'the aims of the consolidation of the anti~3cviet ideology among the emigrants and of the preparation of them for war against the Soviet Union on the side of Japan, work of the was carried on in accordance with these tasks. The sChief Eussian Emigrants Affairs Bureau." was in Share in, At the beginning General EYCHEOJ _wa3 at the head of it. Mâ jov:--General Y-AJZE7D:.£I, who~wai "jater on appointed by tne Japanese to the post of the Chief of the "BEEm", was my personal representative in the Chief "BSEm". There were five sections in the chief BSEmJ Is v—Propaganda { 2nd—-Military training of the wh.ltoguard emigrants; 3rd—Indulgence ana counter-intelligence; 4oh—^Economic; Eth— Charity. Besides, the council of nationalities was organized in the EEEm. It was composed of the chairmen of the national communities: Br, EA.I7ij']nIAJ>HT of the Jcwlsn Community. Professor KULYABKO—.ZOESTSKY of the Ukrainian Community, and also the representatives of the Turkic-Tartar and Armenian, groups. The council of nationalities periodically held conferences with the Chief of the i;BP-Era!; and decided questions concerning contact of the national organisations with one another. Anti-Soviet propaganda was widely disseminated among the emigrantst Upon my approval BUBZAUV̂ &LY who escaped from the Soviet Union in lc-'25 was appointed -she Chief of the propaganda section. Ze started intensive anti-Soviet activities. On the initiative of AKISJSA, Deputy Chief of the Japanese Military Mission, a print-shop was equipped in Kharbin in 1954. fiOBSAEYSlY supervised the publishing of the news- paper "Hash Pub- (.Slut "v'ay)_ and the Magazine ''Iflatsia" (Hat ion), which were printed in thaVprint-shop. At that time was also started the printing of pamphlet* and leaflets which were widely spread in Manchuria, and part of those publications were printed on especially fine paper-to. facilitate their smuggling to and a cottar ing thr̂ ighô *- the U0S.S.H. Fri or to the transfer cf the EaC,K,R, into the hands of the Japanese, KOPZAEYSO' told me that they managed to smuggle their pamphlets and leaflets into the UcS.S.E. with the assistance of the railroad employees. In 1541, when the U..-S-S.3.--Japanese Pact was concluded, the Zwanfeung Array Eeadquar tors ordered that they should change the tone c © DOCUMENT HO. 2363 PASS 11 tons of their publications with regard to the U.S.S.H., "but it was pointed out that the antl- -Soviet propaganda should not "be cheeked altogether and that it should he conducted by publishing and spreading pamphlets and leaflets among the emi graate„ The nevepaper "Fash Put" office was transferred to Shanghai, whereas the cover of the aNafcsia!l Magazine began \ , to tea:-? an jjiecrlptlcn of allegedly alsn jpublished in Shanghai; thougn it was still-bein^ -published in_Kharbin. Along nth all thrt the Japanese instructed that oral propaganda should be intensified through various literary and historic circles. The sole aim of such circles was conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. It was at that tine that the young emigrants began to be drawn into the created cy the Japanese "Kyo-Wa-Eai" association (Commonwealth of ilaticnr;). wnere they were to familiarise themselves vlth the Japanese politics. The !!'Eyo~wcV-Kai:? was created in 1932, by the Japanese pursuant tc Emperor P'J-11' a special manifesto. The "Eyo-Wâ - Kai,; was an organization spread widely among all the strata of the Manchurian population including the white guard emigrants. The aim of that organisation was to implant in the minds of the population the ideas requisite to the Japanese and justifying Japan's aggressive designs. The Ê-yo-Wtv-iiai1' also preached the idea of Japan" s domination over the other nations of East Asia. The Ewantung Army Headquarters supervised the activities of . the "EYO-̂ fv-IIai" and its directives were obligatory for the leadership of the society. Manohoukuo Prrme Minister CEIMG-CHIH-EUI was the President of the "iCyo-afsw-Eai-5, hut its actual supervisors were the Japanese T^KSSA and M7AZI, former Chief of the ,Zwantung Army Headquarters, The Central Office of the "Zyc-Va-Kai" was in Changchun, and there were the local branch offices of the ''Xyo-ife-Xai" in other towns, which cupcrvised the network of the primary „nuclei among the population. \ In 1938 1 published a book under the title of "About Myself^ in which I described the progress of my struggle against the Soviet power during the Civil War, arid pointing out to the mistakes made by toe »hiteguardn army. I developed the idea ( of the necessity of uniting the vhiteguard emigrants with the ( viow of overthrowing the Soviet power. I Jn 1942 I wrote another book following the suggestion of Ĵ enora], DPI. Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission,. The title of the book was "Thoughts on the Hew Era"; I handed the j manuscript to the Japanese. / / / In DOOJMSKT HO. 2363 PAGE 12 In this book I advocated, the idea of Japan's "being the leader of E "t; As ia, and suggested that an authoritative body be established in Japan Which would represent the block of the states of East Asia. I proposed that the whiteguard emigrants be given a separate territory in Inner Mongolia. In addition to those, on the order of Colonel HOI and Major--General KAMATSIJ, the Chiefs of the Military Mission, I wrote articles directed against measures carried out in the Bed Army. In this way the ideological preparation of the whiteguard emigrants for war against the TJ.S,3.II. was combined with military training carried out on a 'large scale. QUESTION: How was the military training of the whiteguard emigrants conducted? MSWEH: "The Whiteguard Emigrants Affairs Bureau" included military training in the curricula of the emigrant schools, and begin- ning from 1933 special military detachments were organized. One of these detachments, 500 men strong, was stationed at Hantachedsa, the second-500 men strong-at the railroad station Sungari 2„ Throughout the existence of both de- tachments 4.500 emigrants were given complete training, and subsequently they were mustered every summer for additional training. In Zakhinganye Area (the area beyond the Khingan Mountain Bange), where the whiteguard emigrants were ma-inly occupied in agriculture, and it was not profitable for the Japanese to have them interrupt their work, the young emigrants were mustered for a three-week period of military training every year. Colonel POBTiFYAGIH' b detachment was stationed, in Ehailar and another, under the command of Cossack Captain PESHKOV, was stationed in Yakishi. Each of those detachments was 1,200 men strong. During their musters the said detachments were used for military operations against Chinese guerrilas. All those military detachments were trained to be ready for military operations together with the Japanese against the U.S.S.E. Question: . What was your particular role in the Japanese plans__of attack on the Ja-ovrê ~JntffhT Answer: Iji 193n, T was galled by Ma.l^r-^rif-P1 &1CTyi. the Chief of the ̂ Japanese Intelligence Service in Manchuria who informed me that he wanteri to initiate me into the military plans of the / Japanese 2. ^ - C ^ ^ c f ^ , J V ->"7 - DOCUMENT 10. 2363 PAGE 13 Japanesej AL7B0 started that the Japanese Government had planned for the nearest future to effect the invasion of the Japanese troops into the Soviet Primorye, where it was planned to create a limitrophe state of Manchoukuo type, in which I should play the leading role. In the same year 193G, I met General OKAMUEA, Chief of the Zwantung Army Headquarters"! I~Tearned £rom him, that accord- ing to the Japanese plan of invasion, the Ussuri region was to he incorporated into Manchoukuo, and a buffer state was to ho created extending from, Lake Baikal to the East, with myself at the head of the^Gcvernment. QUESTION: M S WEB: Tell the names of the Japanese politicians and military war lords, who initiated those aggressive plans. War Minister General ARAPCI most strikingly expressed the — C D Japanese aggressive aspirations at that perioc.. We were friendly.. General AT1ZL and myself, since the 1S18-1922_ Japanese intervention, it that time APAZI was chief of the Japa_nese Military Mission in Kharbln._ When from 1931 ARASI became War Minister and then a member of the Supremi- Military Council of Japan I repeatedly went to see him in Tokyo and had lon<; talks with him. In_1955 AR.AICI told me that Japan was striving at the creation of heavy industry in Manchuria, in as short time as possible, with the task of partial prevision of the Kwantung / y Army needs. Ensuing the creation of this industrial base Japan would /(/ /['A^A begin war against the Soviet Union. It was then that I . — — — learned for the first time from ARAZI that AIKAv'JA, a repre-/ sentative of the industrial, circles_ was appointed to supervise the creation of the Maneboivian industrial Tbsise for the amy. ARAZI characterised AI2AWA as one of the official industrial leaderŝ — " At that time under the supervision of AIKAWA the intensive construction of an iron-and-steel plant was started in Southern Manchuria, as well as the reconstruction of the Anshan and Mukden works. When enlarging on the question of war against the U.S.S.R. AELAJCI told me that the Japanese plan at that time essentially was to effect the annexation cf Eastern Siberia and the Primorye from the U.S.S.3. by the use of force and to create a limitrophe state on that territory. Along with that ARAH stated that only the seizure of the Primorye might be effected by Japan at first, which would in no way mean the cessation of the further advance into the core / of DOCUMHET JTO, 2363 PAC-E 14 of the U.S.S.H., the ultimate aim of Japan, ARAKI concluded, for all times being the territory immediately East of Lake Baikal. Towards the end o.f onr conversation AEAKI suggested that I should maintain a close contact with the E wanting Army Head- quarters, whose immediate task it was to carry the plan of the seizure of the Soviet Ear East into effect. When later on ABACI and I met, he was always true to his word and confirmed his ptavious statements to the effect that the preparation for war against the U.S.S.H. was the main purpose of his activities. In 1933 the Japanese General Staff decided to reconnoitre the power of the Sed Army in the Ear East "by "battle, and opened hostilities In the Lake Hassan district. Major YAMAOKA, a General Staff Officer, came to Dairen from Tokyo to soe me, with a special task to inform ana have me prepared for the events which ware taking place. YAMAOKA. warned me that I with the whiteguard emigrant units had to he ready to participate in the operations 3s> provided the operations in the Lake Hassan district progressed successfully, large forces of the Japanese Army would be thrown into the Soviet Primorye, and the whiteguard emigrants units would be used for the consoli- dation of the occupied territory. When thu Red Army liquidated the Japanese break-through into the Soviet territory in no time, and peace negotiations were started, the Japanese Command initiated the preparation for a new diversion in the direction of ths M.P.E. and the Soviet SLabaikalye. I was to take part in this operation, and, in case of a successful break-through, I, with the whiteguard emigrants units, had to begin an advance in Inner Mongolia through the M.P.E. into the Soviet Union. The Japanese pointed out that the main strategic direction of the Japanese blow was the Zabaikalyc which in the opinion of the Japanese was the narrow outlet thru which went the supplies for the Soviet Primorye. Major--General AEDO in his talk with me said that the Japanese reckoned that in case they succeeded in intercepting the Eed Army communications at Lake Baikal, the Soviet Far East would be annexed from the Soviet Union. Although the Nomongan Incident ended in a defeat for the Japanese they wont on drawing plana of war against the U.S.S.H. and McP.E. I was included in this work as well. At the end of 1941. by order of 0clone! UKAI, Chief of the Dairen Military Mission, I worked out a plan of the formation of Mongolian units, taking into consideration the modern technic and the oeculiarities of the Mongolian armed forces. / With DOCUMENT KO. 2363 PAGE 15 With the view of the utilization of the Mongols in the var against ths U.S.S.H. and the M.P.E., the Japanese wore deciding the question of what particular type of units would "be most suitable for them and sought my collaboration in the working out of this plan. I handed in my plan of the formation of Mongolian Units to Colonel UKAI in November, 1941, when the battles betwsen the German troops and the P.ed Army were raging on the approaches to Moscow. Cfiionol UKAI, who had the right of direct contact with the Japanese General Staff and was always informed about the decisions, taken in the General Staff, told me that the time was approaching when Japan would enter into the war against the U.S.S.H. I reminded UKAI of the existing peace treat;/ between Japan and the U.S.S.H. To this UKAI replied that the Japanese General Staffjhad already taken the daciaiaw to launch an attack on the Soviet Union and would certainly realize it as soon as the fall of Moscow became known. "The Army General Staff1s. attitude to the peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.H., UKAI wont on, was as follows: If the Japanese are benefited by the observance of the treaty, it should bo observed; if, on the contrary, gains may be obtained bjf violating the treaty,—violated it must be by all means. The following fact is worth one1 s attention, though. Japan went through great military hardships in 1944-1945, the Japanese military circles did not give up their designs of attacking the U.S.S.H. In 1S44 I was called by Major-General AEIKUSA, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission, who informed me that tho Japanese units would possibly soon retreat from their positions in China, and if this was the case, the Army General Staff would not consider the possibility of Japan's war against the U.S.S.H. fully eliminated; therefore it was necessary to consolidate the Inner Mongolian military base by means of forming new Mongolian Military Units. I was commissioned by the Japanese Army General Staff to lead these formations. In connection with this decision, the Manchurian detachment formed by the Japanese under Lieutenant-General GAEMAEV- UBZHIJT and consisting of sir cavalry regiments and an artillery division, which were to constitute the backbone of the Mongolian Army to be, were transferred from Khailar to Khingan. / / In D0CUME3T 170 . 2363 PAGE 16. In June 1945 I had a talk with Major-General KU30, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. Ee said that if Japan succeeded in coming to terms with China on the conclusion of peace, Japan would "be able to transfer her troops now engaged in China to Manchuria, and then she would have her hands free to begin war against the Soviet Union. Saying this KUBO referred to the alleged decision of the Japanese Government on this question. Prom that conversation with KUBO I came to the conclusion that the Japanese Army General Staff had a specially worked out plan of an attack on the Soviet Union. I personally witnessed how throughout 1944—1945, in view of the realization of that plan, the Japanese actively consolidated the Kwantung Army and prepared for the invasion into the territory of the U.S.-S.F.. But the offensive oper- ations of the Soviet troops in Manchuria smashed all their military plans, The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me. Signed /SEMEillOV/ Interrogated: Counter—Intelligence Officer Lieutenant-Colonel / S0K0L0V/ DOCUMENT NO. 2363 PAGE 1? C E R T I F I C A T E The City of Moscow. April 11, 1946. I, Semyonov, Grigory Michailovich, sign this certi- ficate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the cast of the main Japanese War Crimi- nals . I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the H.S.F.S.R, Signed: /SEMENOV/ The certificate is taken by the Counter-intelligence Officer Lieutenant-Colonel /S0K0L0V/ CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OE THE ABOVE DOCUMENT: I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby curtify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document. Signature: V. Kaplan Poc. Ho. 2366 Page 1. ALLIED COULTCIL POF. JAPAN TOKYO OPPICE OP TPE MEMBER TOR T:^ UIrI0xT 07 S0TI7T SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt-Colonel Kurkov, Chief of the Secretariat of the Office of thr. Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Jaoan, hereby certify that the Map of the Soviet Par East and Forthorn Manchuria has been prepared by tho Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan and for this purpose was used part of the Administrative Map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is an official publication of the Department of Topographical Survey and Cartographv under the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs of the U. S. S. R. , of 1537. September 13, 1946 Allied Council for Japan Office of the Member for The Union of Soviet Socialist Republi Chief of Secretariat Kurkov CSRTi:. IGATE OP TBAIiTSLATIOF OP EXCEEPTS OP THE AB07P DOCUMENTi I, V. A. EAFLAF, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct ?.nd true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document. September 13, 1946 ure V i'apln.n Doc. No. 2367 " Page 1. Talks Between General ARAKI and ISHIWATA, Secretary General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. From the "Kokunin Shimbun" of August 14, 1941, -r^'17^7 jMMhuU.. f thf dm r Looking back at the Siberian Expedition, I feel that e plans were complete, but it seens there had been consider- able regret on account of the failure to make the expected last stroke. There is a proverb, 'History repeats itself,1 nd I believe this principle is still the sane today.J "hat will happen if we shall be satisfied by merely looking on with folded arms without dispatching troops or doing anything? Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. Unqualifiedly, we simply call it the Siberian Expedition, but there were many very complicated circumstances lying in its background. Japan's present ambition to dominate the Continent may fully be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition. Unfortunately, however, I feel that, in the execution of this expedition, there had been lacking in contemporary internal situations, the courage and the determin- ation to strive for the calculated ends by deciding on a Cabinet resolution under a firm and resolute policy. With a very complicated and congested environment as its background, it had been very cl-verly planned. However, it is exceedingly regretful that we had met with various obstacles which had arisen at home and abroad »and that we had been unable to carry this plan to perfection. 1 irnr* )' lot I, The first foundation of the Siberia incident, thus looking from all angles, has been justified as an impartial and proper measure. So_at that time if our country had held strict confidence, had'not hesitated to carry OUT: a national etaliatory measure to return for the violation of interhaTTcn-^— r. • - •, _ ._ J.!, .— ..̂ _ _— -i— 1 _aiagreement. lav;, linclar the guarantee of .real ability, ana nacT proceeded resolutely for the stability-o-f Sast-Agiaj_j3resentin; a common rront with the countries with goodwill for us, such ^lUvemeiiL as l.ir^rnstamishnent. of new order "whTr.h is also heaviest task up to the present would have bspn pbpy,t icT rigde prop-r-q?̂ T How I am thinking about it thus deep emotion.| roc. So. 2367 C E R T I F I C A T E I, E. E. DA2TLY, hereby certify: 1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G-. H. , S. C. A. P., and as such have possession custody and control of original or oopies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said section. 2. That. Document Fo. 2367 was delivered to me by the Russian Division of International Prosecution Section as being a file of the Japanese Fewspaper ,;Kokumin Simbun" for 1941 including the issue of 14 August 1941, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery. 9 September 1946 /s/ E. S. Danly E. E. DAFLY Doc. No. 2367 CERTIFICATE I. SOKICFI ISFIGURO , Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library do hereby certify the following, vizj- The book Title: "KOKUMIN SFBiBUN" of July and August 194-]. (incl. issue No0 17867 of Aug, 14). Publisher: KOKUMIN SFE BUN SFA Year of Publications 1941 No. of Volumes: One Book-shelf No, ~~~J5T~ owned by the Imperial Library, was at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of t^e Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 12, 1946, Dated the 28th day of September, 1946. SOKICFI ISFIGURO (sign and seal) TO /UimJ Doc. Ho. 2457A Pago 1 EXCSPPTS PROH THE BOOK ^ "Conference cn the Limitations of Arma- ments in 1922" (Baron Shidehara's statement). THE 0E.1ISMA1T (speaking in English); I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Par Eastern Questions to report to the Conference that in the discussion of matters relating to iIberia tho following statement was made to the Committee by Baron Shi"! char a on behalf of the Japanese Govern- ment. The statement is as follows: "The military expedition of Jasan to Siberia was originally under- taken in common accord ar.d in cooperation with the United States in 1518. It was primarily intended to render assistance tu the Ozecho-Slovak trocps who, in their homeward journey aero sr. Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect tho railway lircs which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense. "Jn January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. Por come time thereafter, Japanese trcops continued alone to carry out tho duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks. "The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been locking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her~?roops from Siberia^ The maintenance of such trcops m a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless under- taking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacu- ated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Eikolsk. "It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there are a considerale number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guaranties of treaty established them- selves in Siberia long before the 'tolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American™Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9,717, In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can h -.rd'ly be crpected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other auth- orities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those trocps have evacuated Doc. Ho. 2457A Page 2 in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have "been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. 'While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok, ?.n which a larger number of Japan©ne have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested. "There is another difficulty by 'which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province, Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security cf the Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those he?tile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Kunchun ?jid committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself. "Having regard to those consideration?!, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacua- tion of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without ade- quate provision for the future, they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question end of maintaining order and security in Korea. "It should bo made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese tioopa r.re still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confinod to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are net in occupation of these districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed. "The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolehak, They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various politi- cal groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they rith-hcld all assistance from General Rozanow against the revolu- tionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1320. They maintained an attitude cf strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired. tjj Doc. So. 2457A Page S "In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it nay "be useful to refer "briefly to the past relations "between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to have "been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will "be remembered that the growing rapprochement "between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in ".usa i a In the early part_J2f_ 1913 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied "by those countries and stored in Vladivostok 5Ig5t ue removed 'by the l-olshcviks to European Russia, for the use 01 tne Germans. Ataman fjem<2:ioif v/as '"then"" in Siberia, and was organizing a movement to check such Bo'Lshovi'K activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. Ib wis in this situat-on that Japan, as well as some of the Jii.lies, began to give suptort to the Cossack chiefT" After a ley montns. tsUJh ̂ "t-jJOTt Cy tno other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese wore reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some time their conncction with Ataman Werneroff. Tĵ ey hg.d, however, no_ intention '.••hatover of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it war found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all rela-_ tluns with him1 and no mimurl of kind has since been extended to him byjthe Japanese author-.-tipp. "The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government. "Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right cr advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and prop- erty of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guaranties for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda, over the Siberian border. Should adequate provi- sions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province. "The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incider.t of 1920 at ITikolaicvsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognised Japanese Consul and his family end his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. Ho nation worthy of respcct will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. ITor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. T ^ ^ r. ITS/. Doc. ITo. 2457A Pago 4 Under the actual condition of things; Trypan found no alternative "but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority v;ith whoa she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction. "Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Bussia for prose- cuting selfish designs. -Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the 'jreat "far. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every gyflrjC'e.thctin interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation ox the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally ccme to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government. "In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions." I, S. S. Danly, do hereby certify that the foregoing extract is a true and correct copy of the statement of Baron SKIDEBARA which appears on pages 340 to 346 of the volume ''Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922", published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., and is in my custody, /s/ E. E. DANLEY 13. S. DAELT Chief, Document Division, IPS DOCTF^NT No. 2239 Affidavit of the Fitness KHABAROVSK 26 March (SHOWA 21) 1946 I, Colonel of Justice BAGIKYAN, Military Interrogator for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, with Lieutenant Petrov as interpreter, interrogated, having warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 25 of the Criminal. Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness the below named, who testified: 1. Name - TAKEBE, Rokuzo 2. Age - 54 3. Name of Profession - Former Chief of General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Government. 4. Kind of Political Party - None. 5. Present Address - Khabarovsk, The certificates of the witness being warned of the respon- sibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit. Interrogation was done in Japanese, )"1 Q. Mention the names of persons among the leaders of Japan with whom you had close relation. A. ky acquaintances or those whom I met are the following: GENERAL TOJO5 Former F^khe Minister KOISO; Former Prime Minister SUZUKI5 Former Priue Minister ABE, Nobuyuki5 Generals UlĈ SU and YAMADA 5 Lieut-Gen. PI ATA 5 Former Com- mander of the Kwantung Army UEDA 5 Former Commander of the Kwantung Army TINAMI; Former Minister of Greater East Asia Affairs AOXI, Kazuos MA'ISUOKA; and ODATE, Shigeo, Former Minister of Home Affa rs and Former Head of General Affairs Bureau during SHOWA 11-12 (1936-1937), and Chief of General Affairs just before my installation5 H0SE1N0, Naoki, and Former President of the South Manchurian Railway and Former Transportation Minister KOEIYAMA, Naotc. Q. What was the purpose of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria'.' A. The most important aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent. Q. Against what country was this base built? A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China. 0. Where did you find out that the aim of the Japanese occupa- tion of Manchuria was to make Manchuria a military base against the U.S.S.R. and China? A. This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and the Kwantung Army. I know that the problem of preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed at the head- quarters of the Kwantung Army. I heard about it from the Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals UFEZU, UEDA, MINAMI, and Lieutenant-General IKEBA. I have attended con- ferences held at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army when I held high positions of leader in Changchun. Q. What was the fundamental mission of the Kwantung Army? A. The Durpose of the Kwantung Army being stationed in Man- churia was for defense, and. it maintained an offensive -stand to" attain this purpose. ̂ lirSHDvB~lTTL944) the GreatelFSast Asia War became very difficult and disadvan- DOCUMENT No. 2239 Page A. Q. A, tageous 5 attitude and at the same time the Kwantung Army changed its to a defensive one, Until the Nomonhan Incident^ :ne the Kwantung Army had tak-?r- an offensive stand towards E. . , bufar ter the aocve i attitude of aggress3ve_ became absolutely on the nrgyfen1j--l-t changed to an After SHOWA 19 (1944) it defensive, Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concern- in.cr t.hp -operation of the base of operation against the ng UcS he.q P J - 0 . within Manchuria? /The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret, | demanded the government to take up many kinds of I in political and economical administration. but it measures From whom and what kind of orders did you receivo? First I received orders from the Kwantung Army concerning the first and second plans on developing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to develop industry, to supplement the demands of the Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads wnich can be useful in the case of a war breaking cut against the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base* Q. A. The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an economical >.3 A. Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. \4. Q. A. base V for operations against the U.S.S.R., wasn't it? es, it was for an attack against the iT.S,S Q. r7hen and from whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the first and second plans? I received documentary orders through the secretariat, and I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army to talk it over. Also, ^very ĵ ear I went up to Tokyo to report and received orders concerning my future work. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concern- ing the preparation of the base for a war against the U i. 3 o S . R? After all the political and economical demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the preparation for a war against the U,,S.S.R. I received orders "from the Com- mander (Generals of the Kwantung Army UMEZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieut, Generals KIMURA, YOSHIMOTO, KASAHARA, and HATA), Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieut. Generals HATA and IKEDA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels KUEOKAWA and OBI). Have you ever talked with the Japanese War Minister? Yes, I have. what kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister? I didn't receive anjr concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOJG by aero- plane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia, War Minister TOJO said only that it was necessary to re- inforce the Kwantung Army and didnEt explain the reason. Trjhat was the reason for the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which began about the summer of SI-IOWA 16 (1941)? The" reinforcement of the Kwantung Army began just after the beginning of the Russo-German T"ar, and its purpose was to complete the preparation for the war against Soviet Russia. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What do you know about the measure by the "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre, the plan called "Kantokuen"? A. The "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre" was a name for keeping secret the actions of the Kwantung -Irmy. Actually the Kwantung Army was reinforced by this plan. According to this plan there were orders concerning the delivery of food and other things, supplying laborers, and transporta- tion of goods. Q. ,3rhen and by-r whom were you made to know the existence of the "Kantokuen"? A. I heard about it at the beginning of July SHOWA 16 (1941) froj KUROKAWA, Chief of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and also from UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army. Q, What kind of concrete things did UMEZU say concerning the "Kantokuen" plan? A. During his talk with me, UITSZU told me about the increase- ment of the troops of the Kwantung Army and demanded the delivery of food for these troops. Q. Under jrour command what measures should be taken by the Manchurian Government regarding the "Kantokuen" plan? A. First of all, the delivery of goods necessary for the re- inforced troops, transportation of these goods, the mobili- zation of laborers, and anything else necessary for the Army. Q. When were the measures of the Manchurian Government ac- cording to the Kantokuen plan to be realized? A. Its measures were to be realized within six months. Q. was food to be replenished with the crop cf SHOWA 16 (1941)? A. At the beginning food was prepared with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940). Q. It proves that the measures had to be realized in a very short time, doesn't it? A. Yes, there was no time to wait for the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941), and we had to prepare it with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940). Q. What really did the head of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army inform you concerning the plan of the Kantokuen plan? A. He informed me of two things, One is that the troops of the Kwantung irmy would be greatly reinforced, and the other is the delivery of goods for the Army must be in- creased* Q. What kind of steps did you take towards the organs under you in the Manchurian Government to realize these measures A. Conferences which I attended were held many times. Q. To whom did you report about the demands concerning the Kantokuen plan? And in what way did the actual realiza- tion of the plan begin? A. I informed the Prime Minister of all the demands of the Kwantung Army, and also the vice-chief. I also held meet- ings of the vice-chiefs of each section. Q. Was the military mobilization cf the government officials to be prepared by the Kantokuen plan? A. Yes, I relieved the officials so that they might be mobilized by the army by the Kantokuen plan. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What do you think is characteristic of the political and military actions of TOJO? A. I think that TOJO should take the responsibility of pre- paring for the attack on Soviet Russia, and also of start- ing a war against America and England in the South. Q. What part did TOJO play in the war against China in SHOWA 12 (1937)? A. At that time TOJO was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and I think he is responsible for leading the troops of the Kwantung Army into a certain district of China and also, after he became War Minister and Prime Minister, for the whole management of the China Incident. Q. "ras the National Service Law of SHOWA 14 (1939) in Man- churia proposed by the Japanese? A. The National Service Law was proposed by the Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand cf UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army. Q. What was the reason for this demand? A. The reason was that it was necessary to have a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R. Q. By whom was the mobilization of laborers enforced in Man- churia? A. The mobilization of the laborers was enforced in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way, and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law. More than a million people were mobilized every year,, Q. How long was the term of this mobilization? And in what way was it realised? A. The mobilization of the laborers was compulsory. They were mobilized for from 4 to 6 or S months„ By the Labor Ser- vice Lav/ youths of 21 to 23 years of age were mobilized and by executive order people were mobilized regardless of age. Q. By whose proposal was the mobilization carried out? A. It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU. Q. When was mobilization by the Labor Service Law enforced in Manchuria? And what was its purpose? A. The mobilization of laborers by the Labor Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in SHOWA 18 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of laborers in the military pro- duction factories, q. 1?rhat do you know about the KYOWA KAI? A. I myself was a member of this association, and also a mem- ber of the Central Headquarters Committee. The leader of ' the KYOWA KAI was Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader was Lieutenant-General MIYAKS, Chief of Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems con- cerning guidance of the Manchurian people were discussed. For instanco, the problem of the mobilization of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the KYOWA KAI. ;OCUMSNT Ho. 2239 Q. By whose proposal was the KIOWA KAI organized? A. The KIOWA. KAI was established by the proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO, former Commander of the Kwantung Army, In this association, the Japanese held the position of leaders and through this association the Japanese thoughts were made known, Q. How was the KIOWA KAI made use of for the preparation of the war against the U.S.S.R.? A. As mentioned before, the government received orders con- cerning this from the Kwantung Army, but the KIOWA KAI cooperated in making Manchuria a base for preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R. Q. Mention the facts of the cooperation between the KIOWA KAI and the Japanese Government in preparing for the war against the U.S.S.R. A. The KIOWA KAI aid not cooperate directly with the Japanese Government but only through the Kwantung Army. Lieutenant- General MIIAKE, representative of the Kwantung Army, appointed the leaders of the KIOWA KAI. Also, officers of the Kwantung Army often attended the conferences and took the lead in its actions. p.8 Q, How many members were there in the KIOWA KAI? A. There were more than 4,000,000. Q. what do you think is distinctive of the activities of AIUKAWA in Mancnuria? Ho-played an import.int part in developing the heavy in- dustry in Manchuria according to the first 5-Iear Plan. Almost all of his activities were concentrated upon the establishment of the munition industry* He directed the production of coal, iron, light metals, aeroplanes and motor cars, He established the Manchurian Heavy Industry Develop- ment Co,, Ltd., and directed it from December of SHOWA 12 (1937) to SHOWA 17 (1942). L\)if A. Q. Did AIUKAWA1S activities in Manchuria bring forth great profit? A. All the industries un.der AIUKAWA's direction showed a deficit. Q. Who supplemented the loss? A. The Manchurian Government granted a subsidy. From SHOWA 12 (1937) the total subsidy came to be about 500,000,000 yen. 0. Was the compulsory mobilization of the laborers mainly for AIUKAWA1s work? A. The laborers who were mobilized were, in the fxeld of.developing heavy industry, used for AYUTIA.fA'} s w>rk. P*10 Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI's speeches? A. Hien I was the governor of AKITA Frefecture around SHOWA 8 or 9 (1933, 1934), I heard ARAKI's speech at a meeting of prefectural governors. He was at that time the War Minister. AFAKI hung up a map of the U.S.S.R. and Man- churia, anc1 explained the necessity of the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R"., Siberia and Zabaikalye (Phonetic) for Japan. SUZUKI, Teiichi also spoke on the same thing as ARAKI did. DOCUMENT No. 2239 Q. What did you learn from OSHIMA, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany? A. I have never met OSHIMA. personally. But I have heard of him from MORISKIHA, Japanese Minister at Moscow. Accord- ing to MORIS HIM 5 OSHIMA trusted the ability of Germany and Hitler, and he always reported to the Japanese Govern- ment that Germany would surely win. Last year, when the Japanese residents of Germany passed CHANGCHUN, I heard from them that OSHIMA had prohibited them from reporting to Japan the actual circumstances in Germany. (Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo I prove by my signature that the above answers are written in my own handwriting„ (Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo Interrogator; Interpreter Military Interrogator for the U.S.L at the International Military Tri- bunal for the Far ^ast in Tokyo* Colonel erf Justice BAG IKY AN. Lt. Petrov Secretary-Stenographer Timoleeva Beginning of Interrogation lis 35 Close of Interrogation 17°-15 C E R T I F J C A T ,E. At Khadarovsk, 26 March 194b Swearing that I, former Chief of General Affairs of the Manchurian Government TAKEBE, Rokuzo, will, as a witness, make only true statements concerning the chief war criminals to Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Inter- rogator at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, I deliver this certificate. Doc. No. 2527 C E R T I F I C A T E Page 1 I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARANENKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that this photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in July 11. 1938 issue of "Japan Advertiser"5 was delivered to me by the library the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section on or about July 26. 1946, and thafc the original of the said document may be found in the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, the Far East. (S gd) Lt.Cola !ARANENKO Tokyo, Japan. ARAKI CHIDES NATION FOR EXTREME ECONOMY-: CAN'T GO WITHOUT SHOES FOR 20 YEARS5 HE SAYS. Government officials and the people at large are go- ing too fsr In their efforts to support the campaign in China, Education Minister General Baron Sadao ARAKI told members of the Politics and Economics Study Society in Osaka yesterday. Since Japan is determined to continue the war for 20 or 30 years if necessary, emergency measures and stringent savings cannot be continued indefinitely, he insisted. "In today*s economy, national attention is concentrat more 011 materials than on money, on men rather than materials and on thoughts instead of men'", the retired general pointed out, according to Bcmei. "Japan*s deter- mination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade. In spite of this circumstance, however, the nation. seems to be carrying its sacrifices to extremes. To me, seekin£ a quick victory seems too hasty, It is contrary to the Doc. No. 25'27 Page 2 real trend of events„ People are being encouraged to wear "geta" rather than shoes. If the war ends in a year lor two, this is all right, as the public can go without leather footwear for a while, but we cannot be shoeless ifor 20 or 30 years. "I want to call to the attention cf both officials and citizens the need for re-examining their basic ways of thinking about the war> The Japanese have a habit of respecting the occupations handed down by their ancestors* However., the idea that unemployment can be solved merely by put-ting "he jobless to work on tasks for which they are net adapt sc. is a mistaken cne". J/c. ̂ o* 2527 C ^ H T I l I C i i T S I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial library, do hereby cortify the following, viz.» The book, Title: "The Japan iu^TZRTIa2Rn of July and .-ugust 1938 ^ear of -ublication; 1938 Ho. of Yolumos: One Bookshelf No.; Y/28 owned by the liup .rial J-ibiVw.y, v/ua, at the roguest of the Internationa Prosecution Section, 3upreiae Cô iaund of the J*lliod 1'owers, loaned out the said Section on U^y 2b,, 194^ • Dated the 28th day of ̂ ptcmbor, 1946. y 3 (-T . ;e. 1341 Page 1 T ZjLjiiGR/ii '70 Ultra Secret Urgent o : Vice-V'ar I inister and Vice-Chief of General Staff rem: Chief of Staff of Kwantung ;.rmy 9 June 1937 1. Judging the present situation in China from the point of view f military preparations against Soviet Russia. I am convinced that if ur military" power penults we should deliver a blow first of all tpon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back. If our military power will not permit us to take such a step, think it proper that vc keep a strict watch on the Chinese govern- ont that they do not lay a single hand on our present undertakings in Jhina until our national defence system is completed. rre will thus ;ait for the Chinese government to reconsider. :e should not take the initiative to become friendly with the .anking government, which has no intension whatsoever of adjusting l.iplomatic relations "itL Japan, for, judging from their national :haracteristics, such a step will only aggravate their disdainful ittitude toward Japan. 2. us for Japan's policy toward China, as stated in the telegram rom Shanghai (No. 121) and hanking (No. 159), we of the Kwantung '.vny re entirely of the same opinion. For further particulars, I shall eport to you 1 yself -"hen I go to Tokyo. But I hope for the present that a del:berate scrutiny will be dded to the practical plan toward China and the leading policy in orth China which were made public at the ti .3 the cabinet was changed omo time ago. X Doc. No. 184-1 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 1841 Statement of Source^ and Authenticity I> K. Hayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated , 193Z* a n d described as follows: file of telegrams. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the fol- lowing named Ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreiffn Ministry«. . Signed at Tokyo on this™ 30 th day of August, 1946. /s/ K« Hayasbl Signature of Official Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo S E A L Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard E. Larsh, hereby certify that I am assoc- iated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of 1946. /s/ Richard H. Larsh NAME Witness: /s/ J3| A. Curtis 2nd Lt. M.I. " Investinator, IPS Official Capacity Doc. Ho. 2368 Page 1 iCE JAPANE SE- E1TGLI SI-CH HIE SE WJG by KQKPO Shigeki Published by The He search Institute for Chinese Problems (Page 74, line 5-10) What is it that has been influencing Jhirope, which is a peninsula of Asiat and the whole world, if not the propellent force of Japan in the far distant East. Has not Japan been the actual, the only motivating power in modern world hiet'.ryV Sino-Japanese War Husso—Japanese War World War I Manchurian Incident The Uazi Regime in Germany The Annexation of Ethiopia The Spanish War The Occupation of the Hhineland The China Incident The Annexation of Chechoslovakia, Austria and Albania (Page 78, line S, 10) Thus, the fall of modem Europe will mean the rise of Asia, and great propaganda for the Imperial way in which all races will be -unified. Develop the European Incident into a world-wide incident I The Japanese—English-Chineas War All rights reserved Printed 21 October 14 Showa /1939/ Published 1 November 14 Showa ,/l939/ Price 40 sen Author: KONPO Shigeki Publisher: OGUPA Toraji. The Pcsearch Institute for Chinese Problems. 1 - Chome 4, Yurakucho, Kogimachi-ku, Tokyo-Shi Printer: ITATuVlUPA Eakuzo. 1- Chome 14, Yurakucho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo-shi Printing Office; Daisansha Coy. Ltd. 1 - Chome 14, Yurakucho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo-shi Flace of sale: Sekai Sozosha, inside Kikuchi Building. Chome 5, Ginza West 5, Kyobashi-ku, Tokyo-shi Telephone: Ginza (57) Bo. 3546 Transfer accounts No. 116142 Tokyo i>oc. No. 2368 I, Sokichi -shiguro, Chief of Section II of the imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.: The book, Title: nJapanoso-British-ChiacsQ War" (Volume I of the War Culture Series) Authors Shigeki Imafuji Publishers Piesoareh Institute on Chinese Problems Year of Publications 1939 Ho. of Volumes* ^nc Bookshelf Ho.* 751/255 owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the international Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Po-/ors, loaned out to the said Section on ulay 24, 194'̂ • Dated the 23th day of September, 1946. Sokichi Ishiguro (Si^n. & Seal) Doc. No. 2524-A Page 1 * C E R T I F I C A T E I.P.S. No.' 2'-24 Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Shibata,.J'osabur o hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police_Affairs„ Section --_in charge of, library of Home J-inistry and that""as such""official I have custpdy of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated lov-Pec. 1941. and described as follows0 Printed Journal ^KAIZO^ iRsc6nstruction)J/ol^, 23_No._21 I further certify that the~attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home_I inistry Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sept., 1?46 (sirned) Kesaburo Shibata Signature of Official SEAL Witness: (signed) O.H.C. Norton Folice Affairs Section (illegible) of Hone Ministry Second Class Secretary Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H._Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headcuarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by mo fro;?' the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this day of Sept . 1946 V 7 Richard II. Larsh HAIJG Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. : .1. Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc. No. 2524-A Page 2 * Excerpts from the magazine "KAIZO" (Reconstruction) Vol. 23, No. 21 of November, 1941 TANAKA's article "A NEW STAGE OP S C VIET-C-ERMAN WAR and. JAPAN" (pp. 206-211) (Page 206) (Title) "The New Development in the Busso-Gorman Wer and Jaran" by TANAICA, FAN A3 /Hit.lp-p's speech on the night of Oct. 3 w a s a declaration of German victory ov'eT Russia, and thp' world soon came to 'mow this concretely." The Soviet-German front, for a long time stable, had turned active in the area of Vyazma east of Smolensk with a death struggle of 7 million men, and the last Timoshenko army 70 divisions was being encircled and annihilated. While Russia was proudly showing her tough power of resistance in the seige battles of Leningrad and Odessa, Moscow and Donetsk industrial zone have approached the crisis. Th3 attack on Moscow, which appeared impossible before the end of year, seems to have become an accomplished fact during these ten days. -—•> Qf-vvujvaJL Before the arrival of "-frsrman Winter" the firm resolution of the German army will make impossible the recurrence of "Napoleon's defeat" which the Anti- Axis countries are expecting. The faces of America and Britain, so long self- complacent, have assumed wry expressions. Here again has began another agony for Churchill and a worried look for Roosevelt. Thus we may say that the world- wide struggle between the Axis and the anti-Axis is gradually approaching its turning point. (Page_210) How should Japan move at this time,2—-Japan's standpoint is definite. Japan rejoices in and hopes for the victory of Germany, her confederate . Doc. No. 2^24-A Page 3* Needless to say Japan should make efficient use of the world situation created by the victory of Germany in order to achieve her primary great mission. However, this does, not mean that Japan depends upon German victory, nor should our attention be drawn to a single phase of battle or to one isolated diplomatic battle. What we should do is to plan to be ready for a fir.ht when opportunity knocks and to take what measures are necessary for the three principles which have been r jpeatedly advocated during these 5 years of the China Incident, that is, respect for the Tripartite Pact, the settlement of the China Incident, and the estab- lishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (Page 211) What does that mean on this occasion? It means to see into the essence of America, to resolve not to rely upon what can not be relied upon, and to give concrete form to what follows from the above. In disposing of the China Incident and establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as well, we must first clearly grasp what is the real enemy and consider him as an enemy. It is only in compliance with the above that our position as the leader of the East Asiatic races will be confirmed, the only way in which the areas vital to the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere will be prevented from falling away from and rebelling against the Oo-prospority Sphere Construction Camp. Loreover, we can expect active establishment of tho cooperative relation between us and those races. A truly moral state with all its hardships can be expected to proceed with vigorous strides, while if a state should tend too much to profiteering, there would be the danger of her losing the lucid impulse for racial progress. However, what must be borne in mind here is that no matter how much the lowering of the power of re- sistance of the Soviet Union, no matter how much the decline in tho weight of Far Eastern Army appears to be a fact, it is extremely dangerous to place too much simple faith in England's impotence and the U.S.A.'s dilemma* but we must not be over discreet in grasping the opportunity, and get ourselves farther into a predicament. Doc. No. 2524-A Page 4 * What is necessary for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere and the adjustment of China Incident? And what should we do about it? For one thing should we not be brave to take the necessary steps—based on independent necessity and on virtue— to make the places vithin the Co-prosperity Sphere feel deeply that their scope is really an essential element of the Co-prosperity Sphere; and must we not consider how to express our wisdom9 Including the above-mentioned, the American- Japanese negotiations ard the new situation created by a German victory in the Russo-German war should be considered by carrying out more thoroughly the three great principles, namely the Tripartite Allianc the disposition of the China Incident and the estab- lishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Doc. No. 2524 Pago 1 C E R T I J i C A T S tf.D.C. Ho. I.P.S. Ho. 2524 Statement of Sourcc and Authenticity I, Shibata. Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police Affairs Section — in charge of library of Home Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attachod consisting of pages, dated Hoy - Doc. 1341, and described as follows: Printod Journal Â.T.ZO" (Reronsbruction) Vol. 25 No. 21. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or filas): Home Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sept., 1946. jsj. Signature of Official /s/ SSAL Witness; /a/ Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard E. Larsh. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Fowers, and that the above described document was obtained by mo from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at . Tokyo on this 2. day of Sent. 1946 Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. M.I. /a/ Richard E. Larsh liAME Investigator. IPS Official Capacity Doc. So. 13 C. Eftswrpts fron tho Art!els entitled "A MESSAGE TO YOLTG MEL?" ^ . (̂ 'Ssxuen Sho«hi 1M. Tsugu«) bv Xingo/j HASKI^OTO. published in "This August I retired from P.rtire military service and entered with high spirit the front lino of the renovation movement., "'-lien one is in the military profession, the prosecution of his own aspirations is restricted in no small degree, hub when one retirs3 from public life, he finds himself in the happy situation of using able, if lis would only try, to work fully from a broadmiacUid, h'gh visvpo'.nt,. I decided at ones to begin a new action for the n r-.-r!-. ^̂••.-•ra r-;,y,i r.-n.-i n-^n-, the G/ea ber Jaisan YoungT^en1 s P&rly (mi ssot-.^jotig).i( "Our aim is renovation.. In order to effect renovation, enthusiasm ?ye f-bsoiafcfcjy es geniital. The blood and enthusiasm thus required ai*b the -possessions of young men.!l * * * * * * ni?rom the physical point of view, old people never can accomplish such a great work as the second ore-it'ion of the world. J'or the sake of the renovation I hope that pure, sincere and ardent young people will surely succeed in it. To make young men become the framework of Hew Japan and to unite the whole strength, be to. tangible and intangible, of the Japanese race in our Erperor, is the wr-.y to be loyal to our country, and that is also the spirit of the DAI HTPOS SSISJSEUO." Excerpts from the Article entitled. "The Rsfcrm of Parliamentary SysiemlLgearing in .tJie .iVuyo. Ifei..2ipp.on_Jannaiy_12f_1232*-J=!aga_l * * * « * "Responsible gcvernment - Party Cabinet system - runs absolutely \ counter to the Corstifro.tioru. it is'the democratic government which ] ignores the "TEaTO" goveIusjgai, Then what is the nature of l'tate ministries? The above mentioned •Exposition of the Imperial Constitution' says; 'The way for state ministries to serve the Throne is to strive to enjenrage good and correct wrongs, and if they commit any mistakes, they shall not evade responsibility under the pretence of having made them under Imperial command.' It further says: 'According to the Constitution, state ministers have tho heavy responsibility of assisting the Th/one and possess great administrative powers. They not only occupy posts of making decisions on their own responsibility, but also have the duties of correcting wrongs. Hence, they should themselves bear responsibility for them i " * si' * * * ^To matter how much the existing politic?! parties, Imitating the constitutional system of Europe and Am&fic"-mignc try to make it the basi3~~oYparty government u*dsr the pretence of responsible government, it~is very clear that it rune counter to" the *T3!!30* government, which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the corstitution granted by the Emperor." Doc. Fo. 13 C Page 2 "Dissolve the Political "Parties at Once. They who destroyed the national structure, desecrated the Constitution and corrupted the government, not realizing their faults, are now "bewildered hy the demand for the rejection of party government and the reformation of the parliamentary" system and are trying their "best to glorify their own rule by deceiving the people in the name of 'Movement for the defensa_$iLJihe- Constitution." When we consider their dangerous anti-national structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils, we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan." * * * * * "Prohibit Party Cabinet by Enacting a Political Party Law or a State Ministers' Limitation Ordinance. That i S | V/6 subjects cannot know to whom His Majesty orders to form a new cabinet since this is divine will, but whoever becomes a State Minister must, on entering the cabinet, renounce membership in a political party and also resign from the Diet." * * * * * Excerpts from the Article entitled, "Prom the Point of View of National Defense. It is the Duty of the Military to Mix in JB̂ l i t.i rg ( "—appearing -in. .the Talyo Dai-Fippon 17- March -1937, Page 1. "In the present 70th session of the Imperial Diet, liberalists who stand for the maintenance of the status quo, are busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This is a, subtle trick on their -Dart to spread anti-military thought among the people through the Diet, thereby separating the people from the military and obstructing the military's movement for political renovation. Ws must watch closely their speech and conduct. The liberalises cry aloud against the mixing in politics by the military, quoting the Imperial Rescript wherein it is graciously commanded, 'Do not be mislead by public opinion and do not meddle in politics, but devote oneself solely to the performance of loyal service.' But we interpret the Imperial words, 'do not meddle in polities' to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics.' Heedless to say, not only soldiers, but also other persons, whether they be physicians or merchants, have their own works according to their occupation. However, is there any reason why, because of this, soldiers, physicans and merchants should not mix in politics.? There is no reason where politics should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians," * * * * * Excerpts from the Article entitled, "Powers are Desperately Building Up Air Forces - Build Up an Invincible Air Force," a appearing in Taiyo Dai Fipuon July 1. 1937, Page ^ J ) Doc. Fo. 13 C. Page 3 * A * "In comnarisoa vith such desperate efforts of the powers to enlarge and reinforce their air forcesJapan is in a pitiably poor condition at present. If we allow things to Tenia'!n in their present state, it is certain that there will b=j an irretrievable handicap "between Japan and the other powers in thn future. Especially how shall we be able to battle against the Soviet Uhion which is not making irresistable progress? The declaration by 2ir;goro HASHIMOTO says: 'Make an invincible air force the mainstay of armaments, got rid of the concept that the air force belongs to the amy and foster instead the concept that it is the air force of the State> the same a3 cur ancient concent of the sword.1 In other words, the strongest and most promising air force should constitute the mainstay of armaments, with' which we intend to complete an invincible structure." Excerpts from the Article entitled, "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (Dai Toa Xoka TCen)1' by F.ingoro .HASHIMOTO, President of Dai Fippon Sekisei Zai, appearing in Taiyo Dai Flop on, January 5, 1942, Page 1 "The war to bring an end to the Euro-American culture which has dominated for several centuries the peool.es of the whole world, has been started. The blow struck in the Pacific on the 8th of December, 1?41 is a blow of initiation of the movement for the turning of world history. The world culture based on the old principle of domination will probably meet doom with a violent crash. The utmost efforts of the leaders of the world to avert such a situation were all in vain. History, like the universe, revolves in a stately form. It is beyond the poorer of man to control it,, Floy does history revolve so? People may say: 'from liberalism to totalitarianism from national economy to regional economy: from the old order to the new order.' But there are merely superficial views of the matter. The world is striding forward as if it were the divine will, toward a greater, higher and truer principle of governing mankind. The present great world upheaval is a scene of strife where we are groping for a high philosophy and principle of governing mankind. Seeing this scene of strife, " AI-'A1T0 inE&K&l̂ jSIiI 10 KAMI' (the creator of the universe) must be very anxious to make us grasp the highest principle of guiding mankind. Fell, then, what is the highest principle of mankind? That is our national structure. It is the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu' (universal concordia)." jfe s*e a)c jfc "Such capitalism and comnrauism have no significant philosophy, nor any humanitarianism, and yet 3ritain, America and U„ S. S. P. have theologized these shallow principles, and have tried to exploit the people of the world. But they have now reached their last days in the present great world war. Hitler sa.id that the present great world Doc. So. 13 C Page 4. war vf s a war of the outlook of the world. I would like to say that it is a war for the establishment of a guiding principle. It should "be called a war for the establishment of the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.1 Whether we like it or not, the world is progressing steadily toward the above-described guiding principle. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere end the European Co- Prosperity Sphere of Germany and Italy pre the manifestations of this procress. The I'orth and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere is, in its pattern, a similar manifestation, although it is still bearing the name of old capitalistic guiding principle for co-prosnerity, it is certain that it "ill have to rely on our guiding principle someday in the future. Among these three regional blocs, the Greater East Asia Co- Pro so erity S-.-here possesses the highest and most philosophical guiding principle. 3y guiding principle, I mean the principle of 'Hakko Ichiu', a principle similar to that cf the human "body. And that is why I call this sphere 'Dai Toa Zoka "en' (The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence). That is, in the 'T'oka ?'en', the constituent countries form an organic whole, with Japan as the brain, growing and developing as one living substance under the a.ugust virtues of His Majesty the Enroeror. If it is only a horizontal federation of the countries of Greater East Asia, it not only lacks life, but is also very far from the ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.' * r A A * :'It follows that, as the first cardinal point of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Imperial Influence, the races of Greater East Asia must religiously grasp the above described principle. Otherwise, it would be meaningless. In order to achieve this, first of all the Yamoto race must be fully imbued with this principle and disseminate and inculcate it into other races. The Yamoto ra.ce must be fully imbued 'fit1* and practice this principle. This is Showa Renovation. Without this it is not possible to establish the Greater East Asia. Sphere under Imperial Influence. In fixing the limits of the Greater East Asia. Sphere under Imoerial Influence, we must turn our attention first of all to national defense, because however abundant our resources may be, and however solid the political combination of the vario-as races may be, *-e shall be very easily destroyed by outsiders if our national defense is deficient. Erom the national defense point of vie*-̂ in the light of the present world situation, it is absolutely necessary -co include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in our national defense sphere. This is because we shall automatically be able to control the countries of the Sphere if we gain control of the saas. Little consideration needs to be given to the armaments with reference to countries within the Sphere, but armaments against those outside the Sphere a.re necessary. The mainstay of our national defense is our invincible air force. Erom this standpoint the minimum requirement is the inclusion cf islands within the line extending in the a°st from Hawaii and "ew Zealand, and in the DOC JJD. 13 C« 'age j) West fl-om the Persian Gulf eastiHard. I11 the north it is necessary to take possession of the Aleutian Islands. J refrain from saying here about the U. E. 5 . R . sector, but you can imagine what 1 imnt to say. Besides these, japan, iianchuria, China and other countries on the continent should be added of course, and further, greet naval ports are necessary in the northern part of japan, Singapore, the southern point of indie, Sidney and Dsvao. with these places as operational bases, it is necessary to establish many air bases and bases for minor wer vessels in the neighboring islands. By means of a series of operational spheres of our air forces, we should ensure the safety of the Greater Fact Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, end at the sane tine post a considerable arms'- o n the continent and other countries of the Sphere under Imperial influence. Next the Japanese army and navy as the axis should supervise local armaments and defend the Sphere untfer imperial influence. The military expenditures should be borne jointly by all the constituent countries. This is only proper from the ideology of co-existence. Time will come in the future v.hen minor weak countries will not be allowed an independent existence. Already, the time hâ- arrived when there is no other way than to extend a nation's own existence under the protection of a greet power. That does not mean, however, that the independence of minor ..eak countries will be impaired. It is true independence to maintain independence under the protection of a greiit power, just as a child grows1 up freely and' safely under the protection of his father. There is no room whatever to doubt this ieeling if we become thoroughly imbued with the principle of the Sphere under imperial influence. Then I should like to think that the Greater East Asia Sphere includes the undermentioned countries. With respect to the western boundary line especially, this is the time to fix the line of demarcation from the ptalo-German co-prosperity Ephere. Jepan, Menchukuo, China, the Soviet Far past, French indo-China. Burma, Falay, the Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. We cannot yet decide whether all these countries should be incorporated at once into the Sphere under Imperial Influence, but it is at least absolutely necessary to include for the sake of national defense these countries in the sphere of our influence. Although full studies are necessary and careful considerations should be given to the racial, historical, economic, military and other factors in deciding hor these countries should be divided and. administered. I think it appropriate to apply the following general principles: 1. Give independence to each race ana give each its proper place, in corpora te completely into Japanese territory those areas where the inhabiting races have no capacity for independence, or areas which are strategically important. Doc. No. 13 C Page 6 From this standpoint, Greater East Asia nay be divided administratively as follows: 1. Districts which are to be Japanese territory: * a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong. b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast of India. d. Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand, e. Other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar) 2. Independent Countries: Manchukuo, China (special areas to be designated in North China and Fakien). Burma (including Bengal area of India), French Indo-China (French control to be withdrawn in the future), India, Philippines, Afghanis- tan (to bo given Baluchistan), Siam (to be given por- tions of Malaya and Burma), and Java, Territories incorporated into Japan should be administered by Governor-Generals, while Japanese advisers should be ap- pointed for independent states., Military and diplomatic af- fairs should be placed absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters also should be controlled by Japan. A Supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be set up in Tokyo, under which there should be set up a Planning Board for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence in order to handle business affairs. In the Greater East Asia War, the most important matter in the future will be economic warfarea From this point of view, Greater East Asia has great significance. The following is an enumeration of various things to be done in respect to the economy of Greater East Asia; 1. Greater East Asia should have a self-sufficient economy, doing away with gold economy as a v/hole and replacing it with community economy. 2. It should exchange goods with the European Co-Prosperity Sphere but not with the American Sphere, thereby "bringing to submission the American Co-Prosperity Sphere in respect to material resources. Although decision should be made in the light of the future situation in respect to whether Doc. No. 13 C Page 6A the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal should be made the point of contact with the European Co-Pros- perity Sphere, it would be advantageous to make it as close to Europe as possible without considering the sacri- fices on our part 0 3. With respect to currency, the note-issuing banks of each locality should be taken over and other paper currencies should be additionally issued. The exchange rate between the local currencies and the yen should be based on the exchange quota- tions prevailing at each time- A greater East Asia Central Bank should be established in Tokyo to c-ffect financial control. Doc. So. 13 C Page 7. 4. Resources In. stock should "be immediately recovered in order to replenish as quickly as possible the war attrition of Japan. 5. In the early stage of government, the local states should be so guided as to concentrate their efforts on economic activities. With the vast resources to be made available from such activities, we should iuf-rrve to the greatest extent Japan's heavy and light industries. 6. Therefore Japanese people in their status of officers in the direction of economic affairs, should grasp only the main lines of economy of the various countries, and not interfere with minor details. 7. Of course, economic plans based on geographical, economic and other relevant factors should be drawn, up for each country, and cheir industries appropriately distributed. In making this distribution, attention should be paid with a view to making the countries incapable of separating from Japan politically.. 8. In respect to economy, Japan should plan and supervise the main points, and make each, country proceed toward laissez-faire economy. 9. Prom the point of view of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Rule, Japan's industries should 'be re-examined and reorganized with a hugh measurement. 10. Australia should be mapped up as a heavy industry district in the future. 11. In order to supplement the labor power in the districts with scarce population, Chinese, Indians and some of the local inhabitants should be migrated.. Only those Japanese who are left over after the adjust- ment of internal, industries should be migrated, Eurthermoxe, Japanese should be migrated in the capacity of officers, as much as possible. 12. With respect to shipping, enemy ships in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be seized as much as possible, and new ships constructed with great speed. Education and Eeli gion 1. The cardinal principle is to spread, and inculcate the idealogy of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence. 2. The spirit of labor should be cultivated. 3. Anti-American and Anti-British movements should be launched and soli Gari ty s ought. 4. Culture should be improved and guidance given so as to devel-p superior racei. This is to prepare for the groat future fight between the white race and the colored rac's3 whose culture is inferior to that of the European races. Doc. So. 13 C Page 8. 5. There should 'be freedom of rc-ligion, cut Christianity should he destroyed step "by etsrp, while i;TEZJ0" teaching should he de- ssiminated and thoroughly inculcated step "by step. 6. The Japanese language should "be the common language in the Greater Bast Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence. Let's "become a great Yamato race; The Yamato race is no longer an island race as "before. It is the Yamato race of the world, the leader of the race. It is necessary for us to be broadminded and to have the magnanimity worthy of a great 2ace. furthermore, the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence which we ere going to establish has no precedent. In this age, the old rules, customs end manners no longer count. The bureaucratic spirit is taboo. Matters should be disposed of only by creative power. It is necessary for us to be brcadmir-ded enough to adept ''Eakko IchiuR as our rule. At the same time, wo should place analytic studies into secondary importance and devise a system of synthesized studies of national defense; politics and economics. Exccrots from Article entitled "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 1 May 1939 issue of the Taiyo E?i ITrpnon: "On coming back to the homeland from the battlefield, the first pledge I made is to 'pay homage to the soldiers.' We can pay no higher homage to them in leading the China. Incident to its solution, and the cardinal point of the solution lies in solving the problems in connection with England and the Soviet Union who assist Chiang Kai-Shek. Without solving these problems, all our efforts in destroying Cniang Xai-shek would be fruitless. The longer we fight, the firmer,the Chinese people'will'. unite, adoring Chiang as their hsro. Chiang ICai-shek is a puppet fed and manipulated by England ana the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key of solving the Chinese problem lies in the destruction of chose supporters of Chiang. The chief supporter in England rather than the Soviet- She has great interests in China, and as her retreat from China leads necessarily to her retreat in India and in her other territories in Asia, it is perfectly natural that she is making desperate efforts to stick to China. When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union will bo left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural and impossible for the Soviet Union to make an alliance with England, Communism, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union, advocates a challenge to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy to have ms.de Kuaaia intent on the oriental affairs. If we show our decision to attack England, the Soviet Union will immediately turn the point cf her spear toward India, the treasure house of capitalism. We muet defend on the north and sdvancc toward the south. - Our destiny will be decided in- the south. Doc. So. 13 C Page 9. I have heard recently of the need of strengthening Axis collaboration. Prom the viewooint that tho success' in solving the China Incident depends entirely upon the expulsion of 3rgland, the policy of German;?- and Italy to destroy England and Prance are on the same foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial Tri-Partite Pact, including democracy as well as communism as the object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, it is easy to put an end to England and Prance. In Europe, Germany and Italy will eliminate communism and democracy, tho two enemies of human civilization, and in Asia, in the area east to India at least, Japan will expel those countries which are founded upon communism and democracy." Excerpt from Article entitled, :!Expel the British Influence from the Par East" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 15 May 1939 issue of Taiyo .Cai ITlppon" "Under the present condition, it is very easy to beat England. We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hong Kong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Par East? The British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore, Por we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100.000,000 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if we need 100 airplanes to sink a warship, the account is entirely on our side.'1' Short Cutting Remarks on the Present Situation by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro which appeared 3n the I June 19"J3 j ssue of Taiyc Dai Uiopon: "It is a humiliation to have a talk with England." "Define England as the enemy i" "Our way is one: Expulsion of England." "Arm the Axis!" "The enemy that blocks our way to the South of England." Excerpts from the article entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the expulsion of England" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 20 June 1939 of the Taiyo Dai Mppon: "If it had not "been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the Incident will be brought to an end immediately. The Premier and the Foreign Minister have told us that it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration, but they have been hesitating to conclude the Military Alliance. It is because they are afraid of England. If the Tri-Partite Military Alliance is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must instantly proceed toward it. The Foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack. Because the whole nation has recognized its necessity, the Government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack / Doc. So. 13 C Page 10. instantly. Tho attack should not he stopped at Tientsin, "but extended to Shanghai and to Hong Kong. This is the only possible solution of the China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England I" Excerpt from an article entitled, "Organize a. Class A Wartime Cabinet that Has no Pear of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO, Eingoro appearing in the 10 July 1^59 is-mo of the Talyo Dai Hip-pon: "Sow our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there isonly one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic bloc^de? Even if it should be enforced, it is only a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole can make her way through with a conplete war-time system in which every subject returns his property to the Emperor. A Government without policy and decision is a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion, power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear. What we need now is a war-time cabinet with the highest authority." Excerpt from an article entitled "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with. Japan as its loader" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the SO July J.?5'j issue of T---..'yo Dal Nippon; "The public opinion of the whole people has taken an anti-British turn, This is natural and satisfactory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do not know what to do with China. My opinion is as follows: 1. The thorough destruction of the old order is necessary. We must destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government, and the economic, political and idealogical influences of England and Russia* 2. China and Manchukuo should organize a state union with Japan as its leader. We must organize a self-supplying bloc within the Ear East, and that economical, defensive block must be led by Japan, the saviour of East Asia. We should then have friendly terms with those countries that recognize our union state, and allow no commercial relations with other countries.'' Excerpt from an article entitled, "ITo More Compromise!" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 25 September 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Hip-pons ; _ "I have often pointed cut that England and America have been hostile to us throughout the China Incident. The Government authorities also have recently warned the nation of this fact, Morever, have they not been ta.king such challenging attitudes as to give birth to the term ^ASCD bloc"? The abolishment of the commercial treaty by England., TAr.erica?s freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is no hope of readjusting the friendly relations between Japan and the two countries, Germany and Italy have already gene into a state of war with America. What Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-?artite Pact. Doc. Ho. 13 C Page 11. The Incident will come to an end when the leadersof China "become aware of the true facts and become oriental again. If we should put an end to the Incident now, by compromising with England and America, China will be left as she has been ~ dependent on England and America. If this should happen, how could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed themselves for the cause? The Government seems to be taking the attitude of an opportunism . It is not a good attitude. We Japanese must decide by ourselves. It is up to us to create our own victorious history DOCTJMSTI NO. 13 PAGE 1 C E E T I P I . C A T E W.D.C. JJO. I.P.S. NO. 13 .. Statement of Source and Authenticity I, SHIBATA, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Librarian, Home Ministry . and that as such official I have custody of the d&cuments hereto attached consisting of pages, dated 17 Dec. 1936 - 25 Kov. 1943 and described as follows: Magazine entitled. "TAIYO DAI HIPPQH" an organ of the "DAI KIPPQI SEIKjJT JO" later called '-DAI ft If P 03 SMI SEI KAI". (2 volumes) _______ I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Se-pt , 1946. /s/ (in Japanese) Signature of Official SEAL (in Japanese) Witness: /s/ T. K. Mortor.v Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Bichard H. Larsh , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 13 day of Sept. , 1346 /s/ Richard PI. Larsh IAKE Investigator. IPS Witness:/s/p.obert P. Mahon Official Capacity . ft ^ y^i i rv̂ f- cr€-j I cr/ % » v- 1 , : ,'•»•*' J- • vĵjrx . OVA i ̂ VĈ JW , Bcrt)6H_. . P̂ 'S :-'Ciir- 'v r.. » v.fji m .-rn ?.:o<rir* im» ma .o Af:i» / , . Xaioitio itfi et twin, nob iwfc inoo i :»a . -' -; ! . • •• i-v \ ..••-. . ...... x . i. ";• :.. • •, 1 tl :- ' .:!)„„ \e\ '.o J.* >1/1 io -fib "JI S_> *vao% c{ led silt 0 't< yli ydoTsn' telKSfl AQ«. >dt ctl toot, r̂ s* )8i • l : • •IB-X*? L . i bfj'.iOiiH \ \ . f. s;.-rl : . • . lo 5 " frxt̂t no c • •"-1 . to w i .3.3 •• - - + : r. . Doc. No. 1955 J J Ehul THE "03.JCi't 11-11" OF J^IlIJg 31. l Q h . 2 \ A GREAT Ullia-I OF a51A by TAMAKA ITamokichi The "ieiji Renovation, Showa Renovation and the World Renovation form together a consistent highway of the world history. Because on the first step a modern Japan has beexi established by the iji Renovation in opposition to the fate of the poor colonized Asia, secondly, a great union of Asia is to be completed after the expulsion of the imperialistic influences of Western powers by the Showa Renovation, and further through the next closin0 i.var in the World we will be able to realise our great idea of'"The World of One Family'"1 cherished since the beginning of our nation. Thus the present is the epoch of the Showa Renovation progressing steadily through the manchurian Incident, Sino-*1 apaneee Incident and Greater East Asia War. In fact, we arc living in the great epoch-making period in the world history, the mission of which consists in the extension of the ideal of ĵ eiji Renovation into Asia for the purpose of re-establishment of a modern Asia. This is nothing but the union of Asia directed by the moral league or organization of nations through the emancipation of the Asiatic nations from the fetters of European and American Powers, thus preparing ourselves for the certain victory in the closing war in the world. We have been calling the east region of Singapore "East Asia", and emphasized to unite East Asia immediately through the emancipation from the imperialistic influences of the Western countries. And the Sphere of this union should be extended steadily according to the develop- ment of might of Japan. The first cornerstone for this union was laid when Manchoukuo has become an independent state through ̂ anchuria Incident which has been made identified with Japan. China, however, had advocated the chauninism against Japan 30 loudly without any recognition of the direction of the world hidtory. that China conflict has broken out finally. But out of this rebellion'in ~ast Asia our proclamation of establishment of a new order in East Asia has been explicated home and abroad, the new national government founded, and the movement developed between Japan, China and Manchukuo to form a moral league in East Asia. Chunking Regime has continued the anti-Japanese conflict aided by America and Britain, whose defeat of this time has given so great a shock that it is expected the Chiang Regime will surrender and parti- cipate in the co-prosperity sphere of East Asia in a short time. How that the might of Japan has been rapidly extended to the south according to the growth of Great East Asia '.'Jar, Thailand declared war upon America and Britain after the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Japan, and French Indo-China is co-operating with Japan as a member of our union. i.t the 79"kh diet session Premier To jo stated that Japan would warrant the independence of P. I. and Burma if they co-operate with Japan. The very mission charged on Japan, who occupies Doc. N0. 1955 the position of a sanior in -»sia, consists in the countenancing of independence of Asiatic Nations, who have their proper culture, through the emancipation out of the fetters of the whites. Thus, the day might not be far distant when Thailand, Annam, P. I., Burma, etc. will become members of One family in last -*sia directed by Japan. Besides, if the influences of our enemy, -morica and Britain, are swept away from the Pacific 0Cean and Indian Ocean by the Great Gast -sia T?ar, tho freedom of Australia and independence of India will be realized, and the release of Eastern Siberia may be attained with a fundamental adjustment of relations between Japan and Russia. In that way, the last ~sia co-prosperity spaere will develop into the union all over -̂ sia, as wall as the sphere under the real power of Japan will extend. ^s above mentioned, for the purpose of great union of ..sia, it is to bo the first step to unite morally Japan, China and Manchuria, under the leadership of Japan, the second is a participation of Thailand, -nnam, P. I., and Burma in this union and tho third- to effect the emancipation of Australia, India and Siberia. '•'e have expected that the league of' Japan, -fenchuria, and China would develop into the co- operation of Great Asia, but judging from the bright triumph of our troops, it might be possible for us to expect the accomplishment of the third step almost simultaneously with those of the first and second. The Great "ast Asia Z'ar which is being waged by us at present is the one that is to determine Japan's fate and Asia's destiny. It must be a great achievementof the establishment of ̂ sia. Therefore, it is rsquired for us to continue our advance towards our ideal of great union of -.sia, never relaxing our war spirit and solidifying our footing ground step by step. (The writer i3 a professor of the Ritsumeikan Jniversi ty). Doc. No« 1955 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify: 1. That I am CMef of tvc Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G,T",Q., S.CaA.P., and as sue1" have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section^ 2. That Document No0 lr-55 was delivered to me from the Imperial Library of Tokyo as being a file of the Osaka Jiji Shimbun for January 19*12 including the issue of 31 January 1942 and such document has been continuously in my costody since suc^ delivery© 9 September- 1946 /s/ E. E. Danly E. E. DANLY Doc. Mo, 1955 Page 1 C E E T I F I C T E I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby ccrtify that one copy of the "Osaka jiji Shimpo«: dated January 31. Shows 17 /1942/ year owned by the Imperial Library was, ex the request of the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Scction on May 24, Suowa 21 /I946/ yearc Dated tvis 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ yearf ,/s/ Sokocri Ishiguro (Seal) DOCUMENT NO. 2459 A < DOCUMENT 2459 A ' /Cover of took/ "TAI - KOKU" (Thailand) "Advance to the South" Library No 4 Price 1.30 ¥ Imaginary map of New East Asia Federation. There is a small island called "Greenwich" situated, oneminute and so many seconds Biorth latitude in the southern extremity of the territories governed by the great Japanese Empire. If we draw a circle like the rising sun with this small island as the center and its radius extending to Lake 3aikal, to the north of Manchoukuo, it will include the Maritime Provinces, Kamchatka Peninsula, the Aleutian Islands and the Hawaiian Islands in the North, India in the West, Australia and New Zealand in the southeast and thousands of islands scattered in the Southern Pacific like big and small stars. The creation of New East Asia is certainly nothing but the realization of a great ideal which embraces the Great South Seas. This as has been stated in our announcement is to be economic, geographic and racial unity with Japan as its leader. This will be the way to freedom from past aggressive exploitations and the utilitarian white evils. Page 173 Compiled by Nampo-Sangyo-Chosakuay. (The "Industrial Research in the South" Society) Tokyo, Eanda, Asahi-cho No 2 Published by Nan-Shin-Tsya on January 15, 1942 Tokyo, Eanda, Asahi-cho No 2. Price ¥1.30 Doc6 No. 2459 Page 1 Certificate I, SokicVi Ishipuro, cvief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that the book entitled "Thailand." Volvme IV of the Southward Advance Series, author Southward'Industrial Research Society ("Nanpo Sangyo Chosa Kei"), published by Nanshinsha in Showa 17 A942/ year, book-s>"elf number 919/131, was, at the request of the International Pros ecu!'ion Section-, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on Tune 13, Showa 21 /1946/ year. Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21 A946/ year. /s/ Sokichi Ishiguro (Seal) / • Document No. 22'53 Page 1, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST United States of America, et al. vs. ARAKI, Sadao, et al. SS AFT IDAVIT nt-tW x t V I I, Kazuo YATSUGI, state as follows:- I was born in NISHIKIE-T1URA, SAGA Prefecture in 1899. I held the office of the Chief of the Business Bureau of jSa^xonaX^Ealicy Investigation As soc iatioi}_/KOKUS&321 KENKYUKAI JH1UKY0KU cho/ from February 1937 to June 194-5. At the same "time I was entrusted"with the business of the Research Section of the War Tintstry from December 1938 to the end of 194-4. During the above period I was made to know and did the following which I am going to testify to, according to my duties. The National Policy Investigation Association was instituted bv„BajoiL KINTIOCHI OKURA,. a member of the House of Peers, myself and others in 1937,with the purpose to investi- gate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese Government and to the public. 1. The number of individual members of this Associatio. was approximately 2000 and the number of the juridical persons about 150, all of them paying a subscription. Among the members of this \ssociation, there were in- cluded Japanese Statesmen, political leaders, high officials, retired officers who had formerly held positions of leadership, representatives of the learned class, some Japanese concerns, the representatives of industrial companies as v/ell as banking facilities, etc. A list of some juridical persons who were members to tl. Association is as follows:- Dcv.vanm; No. 2233 Page 2. 1. Prime Minister's Secretariat - Yearly subscription ¥3,000 2. War Ministry " " ¥3,000 3. Naval Ministry " " ¥3,000 4. Home Ministry " " ¥1,000 5. Oversea Affairs Ministry " " ¥ 500 6* Foreign ??inistry " " ¥1,000 7. Communication Ministry 8. The Mitsubishi Concern 9. The Aikawa Concern 10. The Mitsui Concern about ¥1,000 ¥5,000 ¥5,000 from ¥3,000/ to ¥5,000 11. The South Manchurian Railway Co. " " ¥1,000 12. Other big companies and banking facilities also subsidized IL the Association. The annual fee of an individual member was from ¥50 to ¥200. The annual budget of this Association was ¥170,000/l80?000 for the purpose of carrying out specially important investiga- tions, it received extra contributions. For instance, we received ¥300,000 to cover the special expenses of planning a ten yearsr programme for the construction of the East \sia Co- prosperity Sphere, including ¥100,000 which was received from the*Governmental organizations (viz. ¥20,000 from the Cabinet Information Board which was under the direct control of Hideki, TOJH, ¥20,000 from the irTar Ministry through Akira, MUTO, ¥20,000 from the Fore 1 gn J 'inistry, through the Vice Minister3 the then Minister being TOGO, ¥20,000 from the Naval Ministry, and ¥5,000 from the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc. 2. ¥100,000 was contributed by the big companies (includ- ing ¥20,000 from MITSUI, ¥10,000 from the SUMITOMO through Keijiro KITAZAWA, a director to the company, anc large sums of about ¥10,000 to ¥20,000 each from some other companies. The above stated ¥300,000 was received in response to a letter addressed to the above named Government office and the brains of the public concerns in which we explained the ways the money was going to be spent. Document No. 2233 Page 3. ¥240,000 out of the above-mentioned sum was spent in mak- 4 ing the plan for the ten years' programme. The document was issued by this Association in ApriJL 1943 and sent to the Greater East Asia and Foreign Ministries. I assure you that the do-eument written in Japanese entitled "The Plan for the Measures for Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in four parts which you showed (and which had been seized when the residence of Baron OICURA was searched) is the very document for which compilation this Yssociation received the above stated subscription of ¥300,000. The Board of Managing Directors which assumed leadership in the Association had ten members including: 1. Kinmochi OKURA (Member of the House of Peers) 2. Michio YUZAWA (Prior to his taking the Portfolio of Home Minister) 3. Hiroshi SEITT0MURA (Later took the Office of Minister without Portfolio and in the SUZUKI Cabinet was appointed Chief of the Information Board) I, as the Chief of the Business Bureau, which consisted of 30/40 clerks, was looking after the affairs of the Association. The work of the Association was sometimes participated in by those who were qualified as not the members of the Associa- tion. (For instance, Lt. Gen. Akira ?<UT0 who was in active service not only made speeches two or three times in the interest of the Association but gave financial suiroort as stated above. Lt. Gen. Kenryo SATO also made speeches more than once. Besides the above, some influential Japanese statesmen who were not members participated in the important works of the Association.) The reports, documents and plans which were made by the Association on the most important problems were submitted to the Government (The Premier's Secretariat) and the Ministers concerned on the instructions of the Board of Tranaging Directors. The Governmental Organizations furnished us with necessary materials and data (including those of top-secret character) for investigating important problems regarding national policies and presenting our opinions about them. Document No. 2233 Page 4. In October of the l6th year of Showa (194-1) when it seemed definite that Japan should enter a war in the near future, the Board of Managing Di" ectors of the National Policy Investiga- tion Association instituted a Committee for Administrative Measures with the purpose of working out a plan to be submitted to the Government in preparation for wars in the North and in the South. This Committee consisted of a fine set of men, such as former ministers and generals who were in close connection with the Government and military authorities, including the following principal figures; Nobujmki,-ABE^.Premier in Showa 14/15 /'39/'40/, President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa 17 /142/.~ Fumio GOTO, A member of the House of Peers, Tcting Premier in Showa 11 /1936/, Minister without Portfolio in TOJO Cabinet. President of Imperial Fiule Assistance Association in Showa 18 /1943/. Seizo K03AYASHI, Admiral. Vice Minister of Navy. Minister without portfolio in ICoiso Cabinet. Sankichi, TAKAHASHI, Admiral. A war councillor. Shinsuke, KISHI. The Commerce and Industry Minister of TOJO Cabinet. Since Showa 18 /1943/, Minister with- out portfolio, Vice Minister of Munitions, and others. I affirm that the document you showed to me entitled :,The Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures" is the very report that was made by the above-mentioned committee and submitted to the Premier, Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers in October 1941. During the war, three men of the Committee for Administra- tive Measures were appointed by the Government to be adminis- trative leaders in the Southern occuDied areas, viz. Lt. Gen. Rensuke ISOGAI to be Gov. Gen. of Hongkong; Shigeo OTATE to be Mayor of Singapore and Eyozoro SAKIJRAI to be political adviser to Burma. Document No. 2233 Page 5. As stated before, I was on the non-official staff of the Research Section of the rrar Ministry during the period of Showa 13-19 /1938-1944/. The Chief of the Research Sec- tion was Major Gen. Naofuku MIKUNI during Showa 15-17 /1940- 1943/. Early in Showa .17 (1942), there arose a necessity to make clear the official idea of the Greater East. Asia Co- Prosperity Srhere. It was needed, for carrying out the func- tion of this Association in investigating this same problem. I requested the War Ministry to show me the documents wherein was exp-essed the official opinion on this subject. Early in Showa 17 (1942), in February or March, I borrowed two documents, the titles thereof were - "The Gist of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occunied as a Result of the Greater East Asia War" and "The Plan for the Disposal of Land in tliQ Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" from the research section of the War Ministry (although my memory cannot identify the person). I affirm that judging by the consents the photostated copies of the two Japanese documents shown to me are those of the above-mentioned documents which I received from the War Ministry early in Showa 17 /1942/. I made a report to Baron Kinmochi OKURA at that time con- cerning these documents. By my autograph signature I certify that each of the 29 photostated pages, judging by the con- tents, is the same as that of the document in question. The fact that the Overseas Affairs Ministry participated in com- piling these documents is clear as is written in them, and the participation of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff is also doubtless, considering that the dis- position of the Army and Navy forces in the Southern Areas is mentioned in these documents, such matters being under the exclusive charge of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff, even the Army and. Navy Ministries claiming no function in them. /signed/ Kazuo YATSUGI 30th August 1946 Doc. No. 2233 Page 7 C E R T I F I C A T E I, Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said YATSUGI, Kazuo w,-,s duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the adninistration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant. * Da,ted this 30th day of August 1946, at Tokyo, Japan. /s/ James MURAKAMI. 2nd Lt. A.U.S. Lt. James MURAKAMI Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named YATSUGI Ẑ .zuo, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 30th day of August, 1946. js / A r '-,hur A. SAEEDUSKY ARTHUR A. SAMDUSKY Capt., J.A.G.D. ff M 'J Document No. 2289 A Tentative Plan Concerning the Scope and the Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Prawn up hy the Secretariat of the National Policy Research Association (E0E7JSAEOT-ZEmiLXiI) on 18 Eehruary 1942 (Showa 17) PlijEAĈ ' This is a tentative plan drawn up hy the Secretariat as a reference material for discussion concerning the scope and the structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which is"to he discussed hereafter hy a small com- mittee of the Investigation Committee on the Problems of Greater East Asia. For convenience* sake, this tentative plan was drawn up hy dividing the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere into Greater Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Further, the tentative plan leaves behind many problems concerning the scope and composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Pre-perity Sphere. We should appreciate hearing especially the views of each member of the committee in regard to these points. Doc, No, 2229 Page 2 CONTENTS I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, II. The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere» III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. IV. The problem of organising major countries which are to assist the leading country for the smooth manage- ment of the Greater Ecsfc At-ia Go-Prosperity Sphere. V. The position of the border zones* •Jz jc ijc >|; sjc I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, A. The Greater Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 1, The inner sphere0 Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malayas Burma? Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, other Oceanic Islands, and Hawaii® 20 The border and the neutral zones (including unfortified areas)» a«, The border zones Islamic zone in the Near East, and Alaska. b. The neutral zones. Parts of Africa bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, land and sea of the North and South Poles. Doc. No, 2229 Page 2 Document No. 2229 Page 3 B0 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 1. The Inner Sphere, •TheL zone along_the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea, Inner•and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, the Phili- ppines, the Bismarck'Archipelego and New Guinea, and New Caledonia0 (Should we include the eastern part of India?) 2. The border and neutral zones (including unfortified areaso) a„ The border zones0 Australia, other Oceanic Islands, and India0 The neutral zones® Hawaii, the Islamic zone in the Near E^st, parts of Africa bordering on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, the land and sea zones of the North and South Poles. Unfortified areas. The Aleutian-Islands. 0 The points tq_be discussed„ (1. The counter-plan for preventing the con-centration in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from the European part of Russia. 2. The areas (Islamic zone, the Indian Ocean Coasts, Africa and the southern part of South America) where we should demand the establish- ment of emancipated zones in the Euro-American Co-Prfsa perity Sphere in return for our emancipating India and Australia as our border zones. Document No. 2 229 Page 3 IOC, No a 2229 Page 4 3s Matters concerning the sea fishery rights which should be secured from the standpoint of the East Asia Co "•Prosperity Sphere. II9 The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere a A. Independent states® 1, Existing independent states, 2„ The areas which should be made newly- Independ ant B. Protectorates® Ce Areas under direct control® (What should be their positional relation with Chosen and Taiwan?) D. The disposition and the status of the European and American possessions in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Spheref III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. A. The kernel area from the stand-point of national defence against countries outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere. i« The plan for the northern frontier under the threat of a powerful Russia. % 2, The plan for preparing against America. 3, The plan for preparing against the strong powers of Europe0 Be The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing peace in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Specifically, the stand- point of completely shutting out any possibility of another war against the Chinese*) It The formation of the satellitic countries to check the Chinese in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Eoc* No, 2229 Page 4 Document No. 2229 Page 5 a e Northern area»....Manchukuo, Inner and outer Mongolia.-, b,, Southern area Burma (?) Annam (?) 2* The division and the independence of China herself-- "For example, whether China should be divided up into North? Central, South and Interior China, with E~.rth China as the kernal zone* 3. Plans for controlling the fate of China or of checking her resistance power through economic measurese C„ The kernal zone from the standpoint of securing and developing the superior characteristics of the Yamato race, D. The actual composition of the kernel zone combining the foregoing points. IV. The problem of forming states which are to assist the leading power for the smooth management of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. A0 A-Class states (Director-class)0 le The satellitic states of the leading power. Large states, under direct control9 such as Manchukao and Malaya„ (Should Mengchiang be included?) 2« Powerful independent states, China (should it be divided into independent states and made into separate units?), Thailand, Burma (?), 3 6 Problems o a. The problem of whether many satellitic states should be selected as director-states. Document No. 2229 Page 5 Doc a Noc 2229 Page 6 b, The problem of how to manage such colonies as French Indo-China« c, The problem of what consideration should be given to the construction or selection of Director states from the standpoint of checking the Chinese, Be B-class statosc 1- Other independent states- 23 B-class states under direct control. Co C-class states. 1, Protectorates and C-class states under direct control <, 2. Problems. a* How to deal with Chosen and Taiwan in respect to their status in the composition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere» V. The status of the border zones. Ac The problem of what relation should be established with the outer zones > 1• Po s itive domand s. 2C Passive demands (such as demilitarisation and special treaties with third countriese) B. What treatment should be given in the Co-Prosperit Sphere to the states in the border zones »V •>'•» -T- «V T4 Doce No, 2229 Page 6 (final) 19 June 194-6 Seizure of Evidentiary Documents On 3 June 19-4-6 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Inte- lligenco Corps representatives - three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuyaku, Sakuraguoka, No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following 1. Preliminary Draft of,.the Borders of the Great East Asia Co- Prosperity,. Sphere and it!s structure? 18 Febc 194-2 (General Affairs Bureau of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu-Kai" society). 2. "Kainmeibo Narabi Yoran" - book of reference and list of mem- bers of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu - Lai" society. ("Kokusaku Ken- kyu - Kai" Publishing House, Tokyo? 1942) The aforementioned seizures was made under authority given in AG 200,2, 10 November 1945, CIS, SCAP Index No. 261. I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. /s/ James Williamson Special Agent, CIC Hereby I aknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home. /s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo CERTIFICATE: I, Junior Lieutenant BORIS ALECSANDROVICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations. Today YATSUGI, Kazuo in my presence signed the above said document and I certify that this document has been correctly translated from the English language into Japanes and was correctly understood, I am duly warned that for the false translation I bear responsibility according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.C. Criminal Code. Signature: Br Petrov BORIS PETROV. Junior Lt. The Certificate is taken by Military Interrogator Major BASENKO. •A ^ . . 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Ex.730-772. Japanese actions in Siberia. German-Japanese relations
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