AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
20 items
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AFFIDAVIT I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1。 T h a t I am an Attache of the United States IJepartment of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such エ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,194う；and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and Tinder my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. •s/ W. P. Cumming — W . P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. — s / G. H. Garde _ — G . H. GARDE — Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GCVSRMiiEWT FOR GSRIviAxNY (U.S.) Special Trail Received (^§cret Cipher Process) 28 June 1941 No. 2671R, RAM of 28 June No. 560 of 28 June Most UrgentI 1.Diplogerma Tokyo 2. Cipher Bureau Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 II) Marginal Note Forwarded to Tokyo under No. 916. TELKO. 28 June 1941, 2130 hrs. I have reachPd an ngrfiemp.nt \ilth Ambassaj- dor OSH^A-that he will influence his governmen in the direction of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia. and I ask you now to uti ize on your part all the possibilities that pre sent themselves to influence the government there and the other influential circles in such a direction. In this connection I ask you to make use of the following points:“ 1 . ) W a r between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring with it the solution,of more or less limited individual problems, btrt will luring as a consequence a solution by final war of the Russian question in its en- tirety. 2. within will a ！.) The destruction of the Russian pjpSLejC-^—expected 1 a compar^tT.vely ̂ short time .—by our military move, !lso~make Germany's victorx_over Engl and able Tact; Germany"is in possession of the Russian oil wglTs and grain fields a sufficient supply for the who〕 _gf_EiinQjia. will thereov" be ensiire(r~s6 TRnt. the Englisti blocl ade_5Klll on 飞 h e \vhole_b^-Of—absolutely no avail. The direct lanH f»nnnp r fftlon with East Asia will likewise be 一 >rou^ht about on this occasion. - 3.) In this way all the preconditions are given whic) will render possible the New Order in the European sphere as intended by the Axis Powers. 4.) For Japan also a imique chance the present_,si t.fnn-. As Germany does is presented by.. this for Europe,i so can Japan now thrnngh p mintary action against Soviet Russia 由at••白 t.TTfi prerfimilRlt.es for the New Order planned bylfieF^irrKast - !s ia • After tha -cemov-a.1, of t.he^Soviet power_ln the Far East also, the solution of thg^Chines-e Question will be achieved In the way desired by Japan wltii_ out running Into any_jaiTrp fi 1 fficalties. hours ti Doc. No. 4033B U f レ Telegram (To be kept い ダ Page 1 locked file) 00 1 300 2 2 Doc. 4033B Page 2 5.) Pr^m t-hp standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive tov/ard? t'.:̂ south in the direction of iSTngggarfe lb diid I'^Jns a J ？ c of g^eat jmportance. As Japan has not yet b^en o^ep^rpa - on this point ana a pos- sibility for sucrt a ai-iVJ fias hcit yet been presented in the present or the wsr. it lies in tl->e urgent inter- est of Jp.uen つ o t — tつ l e a v e _urr'ised thj.s chnfiee row oTiereS to her^Tor solving - the Russien auestion In~tnG ^'^r'East too.- TIius sliê vj'o-aJ.d'"̂ 1 e ro^r to make a drive towrra^ fhe b^uth. 6.) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Jan^n should conie to a decision regarding the Idea of a iriliterv action a^Inst SovTot wi-5Hout_ hesitation. A Tn^annsQ ？^r.lnn against a Soviet JRuajala already beaten _to the s^ound. would be quite prejudicial to t.ne mora丄 ami go I il:i cr» L po^itior of -Tapan: 7.) It can t'^.^rcforp be considered that the swift overpov/er*ing oi ^"assi^, esncci&l丄.び if uprtl^, cjj>ates in ir. f-r̂ n. 1-.PO 11-L'-e bes-u meanr ごnrマTirifi一 the United Ctates _of tho absolute fcolishness _of_entering th p- yĵ r nrTTh° S ベ 」 C n ト、丄ncf, îlfrL-Gbrrî J qf.eti ran3 set against、 t he rasu^lTe^tr^orl^riatiiou in che v/orld. RI3BENTH0P AFFIDAVIT .1 9 W. P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such エ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1 was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1.5, 194-5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and. correct photostatic copy of an original Geraan Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession ana custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. Subscribed and sworn to before s/ V/. P. Cuim.iiri£_ w. P. CUMMING me this 23rd. day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OrFlCE OF GGVERWMEKT FOR MILITARY GERMANY (U.S.) Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 1. ちぶん Resolutions Concerning t^e Japanese-American Negotiations A.dopted. Through the Conferences in the Imperial Presence、 1 . T h r o u g h the Imperial conference on July 2,194-1. 2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6,194-1. 3. Through the Imperial conference on November 1941, Proposition (A.) Proposition (B) 4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1,194-1. 1.RESiDLUTION adopted throu.gh the Imperial conferences on Jnly 2,1941. A. summary of the Empire ‘ s POLICY according to the changes in the situation, I PRINCIPLE. a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and acrordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace» b Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for seif-existenes and self-defense. The Northern problems will be dealt with s.crording to the changes in the sxtTaations. c Japan will remove all obstacles for tha achieverrent of the foregoing purpose. II S m R Y . a In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, fur- ther pressure throngh the Southern regions will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chunking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China. Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 2. b For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures« For purpose ws shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo- china and Thailand following the r -Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion of our Scut.hern rolicj*.thsrsby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance, In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States. c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed pre- cautions 5 and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions. d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especial 1 in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States. e 1Fr e shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the ” r ar through, diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in ease she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military ac- tion will be decided independently. f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense. £ As to the definite measures we shall decide separately. 2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6,1941.“ Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy. Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 3. In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of cvur national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows: a In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October. b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain. The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet. c, If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October，’ we shall imme- diately determine to wage war against the rnited States (Britain and the Netherlands). All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed acording to the pre-arranged rational policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-A.merican combined front against Japan. ATTACHED DOCUMENT. Japan 1 s minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection. Sect* I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled, in her negotiations w.ith the United States (Britain). ( 1 ) M a t t e r s concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT. The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident. a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration. Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. b "Burma Route" will be closed5 and the United States and Britain will give Chiang : s Regime neither military nor economic support. REMARK 一一 The above does not obstruct Janan's existing conten- tions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity. Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intGntion of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident. It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly. (2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense. The United -States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defense. a Recognition of the special relations existing be- tween Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement. b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet terri- tory. . c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East. (3) Hatters concerning Japan 1 s obtaining necessary ma- teriais. The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources. a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Jaoan from their territories in the South- western Pacific, withTesources indispensable for her self- existence. b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China. ggcument No, 1652 Page 5. Sect. IT. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement, If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section Is ( 1 ) J a p a n , with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of tiie adjacent areas except China. (2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Inclo-China after an impartial peace will have bsen established in the Far East, (3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines. (NOTE) a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite 11 is nee, it will be affirmed that there T/ill be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement, : 'e shall not discuss, of our own acrord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Paot or the attitude of the United States toward the European Vlar v b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long a s Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both JaDan and ？ ,Janchuria. 3 . PR0P0S T TI0NS (A.) and. (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November ラ . 1 9 ^ 1 . PROPOSITION (A) ( 1 ) P r o b l e m of Commercial Indiscrimination. In case our propositi on of September 25 评 i l l have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, in- cltiding China. 11 (2) Problem of Interpretation and exerution of the Tripartite Treaty.» 呵e shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the maaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time. Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 6. v/e shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tri- partite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has al- ready had the acknowledgement of the United States. (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops. This problem will be eased as follows: a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China. Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and. on Hainan Island v/ill be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establish- ment of peace between Japan and China, Sinrultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Jauan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be comDleted within two years. ^Note^ If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years. b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China." Japanese government will respect French Indo- China 's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops no!" despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn imrediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an im- partial peace will have been established in the Far East. Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid Including the Four Principles in the formal agreements batween Japan and the United States (both understandings and other statements). PROPOSITION (B) • ( 1 ) B o t h the Japanese and the United States Govern- ments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast A.sia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo- China. (2) Both the Japanese and the United States Govern- ments v/ill mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies. Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. (3) Both the Japanese and the United .States Govern- msnts will restore their mutual commsrcial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets. The United States Government will promise Japan her necassnry supply of petroleum. (4) Ths United States Government will not take such action as to obstrurt Japan 1 s efforts for a peace v/ith China. (REMARKS) ( 1 ) I f necessary, after the conclusion of this agree- ment , i t may be promised that the Japanese troops will ba with- drawn after tha establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area. (2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interoretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A., be additionally inserted. Conference on / Our negotiations with the United States regarding the exe- cution of our national policy a dotted on November 5 have finally failed. J .-a pan. will declare war on the United States, Britain, •？.nd the Netherlands. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial 'embsr 1，194-1. Doc. Ho. 1652 Page 1 G E R T I ? I C A T E 1652 StatemGnt of_Sourco and Authenticity W.E.C. I.P.S. エ， H A Y A S E I Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected wiJ、 the Japanese G-overnrnent in the following capacity： Chief of the Archir Section, Japanese foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have c\ tody of the document hereto at baxhed consisting of 16 pages, dlated gee below , 1 9 4 1 • and described as -fellows： Resolutions concerning t' JaDanesG-AiTiGri？an no.^otiations_ado-oted^^throu^h the conference in the Imperial orosruce on JmIj 2，1941;一vSjpt, 6,1941; Eg v. 5，1941; and D e c , 1 ， 1 9 - 1 • 丄 ， . I further certify that the at bached record and. document is an off ic document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives ajid files of the following najned. ministry or department (speci- fying also the file mxrrfber or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)： Foreign Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 5th da；/" of S e n t . , 1 9 4 6 . /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness： /s/ Nagaharu Odo Official Capacitv Statement of Official Procurement 上，•Richard Larsh. herelDy certify that I am associated with the General headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, anc that the above described do cum en t was obtained by me from the above sign official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official tusinc Signed at Tokyo on this day of Sept.，1946 / s/ Hi chard H. Larsh. KAlvis o o Witness： /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf 2nd Lt., Inf. & ？ 1 . Investimator. I.F>S. Official Capacity v Kへ Doraraent No. 1652 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ — c y / Qo-l/^ Page 1. Resolutions Concerning the Japanese-jlmericaji Negotiations Adopted Through the Conferences r ^ in the Imperial Presence c ふ 、 1. 2. 3. Through, the Imperial conference Through the Imperial conference Through the Imperial conference Proposition (A.) • Proposition (B) or\£uly 2， 1 9 4 1 . ) on\September 6 , 1 9斗丄ジ’ on .November 5?1941 4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1,1941. 1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on July 2 , 1 9 4 1 . A. summary of the Empire' s POLICY according to the changes in the situation. I PRINCIPLE. a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater Jlast-Agia Co-prosp.srity Sphere" f and accordingly contribute to the establishment of v;orld-peac§. b Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defense. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations. c Japan will remove all obstacles for the achieverrent of the foregoing purpose. II a In order t、o hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, fur^： the? _pressure thrcrugn the Southern regions will be strengthened to fRe changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights, of war against ths Chunking Regime at the proper time 1 and shall confiscate the enemy conce'sFions in China. Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 2. b For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense.Japan， will continue necessary cliplomatic negotiations with relevant rfejtions"l.n The Sotitliern rep;ion_s and will also _promote other necessary measure, Epr thi?3 ^uripose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United Stat&s. First, we shall accomplish the execution of otiで schemes against French Indo-- Giiina and Thailand following the ^Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "T!atters concerning the Promotion of our S.era七h.wra Po:icy^thereby stabilising- ouu gtr-nr-j-n-pp fnで fha .q,->-!Ti:h"-fn pr'-r-̂ nrp- in order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japa:i will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United Slates. c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take vonmtary measures by secretly preparing"arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will ba continued with detailed pre- cautions 5 and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war pifi^ress f 马 r ^ n o n we snail execute arms to solve_ ~ •t̂ ie northerrL^xctihlsins^. thereby securing stability in the NorxfEern regions. d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especial" 1 in the case of execution of arms 3 must be decided_so_that there will be no great diffTcurty In maintaining our basic" pOStTlTS foF a War with"Sritain and the United States, n -- • • • e 1?T e shall do our utmost in preventing the United States particioatlon in ^Ehe w a r through dlpinmatlr! measures in the p^e-arranged programmes’ and every other Dossible way, but in case she shou.lcl participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military ac- tion will be decided independently. f We shall shift pronptly to the complete stabilization of internal waT-time structures, particularly v/e shall strive for the staDllization of national defense. £ As to the definite measures we shall decide separately. 2. RESOLUTION adoDted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6,194-1." Summary: Execution of the Empire’s Policy Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 3. Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with United States and Britain. In view of the present acute situation, especially the a ^S5®5Sive_movements the United States. Bxitaj.n and the INe^her-Lsmds have "assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the_.sup.Dreslsion ..of.._0T.T.r national power; Japan will execute her 一 Southern advance policy, related in the "Prjnfi-lple of Japap_ 7 s Policy According to tne"Change of Situations••” as follows: a In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japarij_ With a dfitai-m-rnar.!on tor a war with the Jnited States (Britain an4_ the Wethe-planrts^ t will have completed her preparations by_ 去he end oir OrtofeaT'. The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet. c Jf, through the above negotiations, our_demands have no. hope of fulfillment by the beginning of O c t o b e r w e shall irane- dlately determine to wage war against the t T nited States (Britain and. The NefherlandF). All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of “ a Russo-A.merican combined front against Japan. ATTACHED DOCUTE NT. JaDan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with Êie DniteT'States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in tEis connection. Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain). ( 1 ) M a t t e r s concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT. The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident. a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchukao-China Tripartite Joint Declaration. b the the Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. b "Burma Route" will be closed| and the United States and Eritain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support. REMA.HK -- The above does not obstruct Janan's existing conten- tions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the nev; arrangements made between Japan and China, v/e shall adhere to its necessity. Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident. It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly. (2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense. The United States and Eritain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan 1 s national defense. a Recognition of the special relations existing be- tween" Ja pan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement. b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet terri- tory. c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East. (3) Hatters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary ma- terials. The United States and Britain v/ill cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources. a They v/ill restore their commercial relations with Japan""and will supply Japan from their territories in the South Western Pacific, v/ithlesources indispensable for her self- existence. b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China. Document No. 1652 '‘ Page 5. Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement。 If the United States and Britain virill consent to our demands in Section I: ( 1 ) J a p a n , with French Indo-China as a base, ？/ill make no military advances into any of tiie adjacent areas except China. (2) Japan will be ready to withdrav/ her troops from French Inclo-China, after an impartial peace will have bsen established in the Far East。 (3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines. (NOTE) a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there 町 i l l be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the A.xis Agreement,マe shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States to?;ard the European War, b In case of an interrogation as to Japan 1 s attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect ths Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Jaioan and Manchuria. 3. PROPOSTTIONS (k) and. (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5« 194-1• PROPOSITION (A) ( 1 ) P r o b l e m of Commercial Indiscrimination. In case our proposition of September 25 只 i l l have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, in- cluiding China." (2) Problem of Interpretation and exerution of the Tripartite Treaty^ 1ガe shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time, document No. .1652 Page 6 we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tri- partite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has al- ready had the arknowledgement of the United States. (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops. This problem will be eased as follows: a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China. A.mong the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island v/ill be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establish- ment of peace between Japan and China, Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall coranence to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years. ^Notel If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years. b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China•一 Japanese government will respect French Indo- China 1 s sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops nov? despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn imrediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an im- partial peace will have been established in the Far East. T!oreovsr, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States (both understandings and other statements). PROPOSITION (B) ( 1 ) B o t h the Japanese and the United States Govern- ments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo- China. (2) Both the Japanese and the United States Govern ments will mutually cooperate to guarantee tha obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies. Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. (3) Both the JaD,?.nese and the United States Govern- ffients will restore their mut*aal comm.arcial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets. The United States Government will promise Japan hsr necessary siつply of petroleum. (4) Ths Unitsd States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China. (REMARKS) ( 1 ) I f necessary, aftar the conclusion of this sgree- roent, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will ba with- drawn after tha establishment of peaco betwasn Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area. (2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for intsrDretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition k，my be additionally inserted. 4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1，194-1. Our negotiations with the United Ststes regarding the exe- cution of otir national policy a donted on November 5 have finally failed. J.-3pan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. Docuncnt No. 4002 Page 20. C E H T i ? I C i T B W.D.C. ITo. I.P.S. No. 1653 Statesant of Source and Authenticity エ， H A Y A S H I Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected wil the Japanese G-overnnient in tile following capacity: Chief of the Archly. Section, Japanese foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have ci. tody of the document hereto at bached consisting of 16 pages, dated see below , 1 9 4 1 t and described as fellows： Resolutions concerning t'' Japanese—American n^.^otiationg一adoつ"ted through the conference in the Imperial orosrixce on July 2 , 1 9 4 1 ; S jpt. 6、1941; Kov. 5ュ1941; and Dec.1，19-1•丄，reoppr;ti''-el:r, I further certify that the at bached record and document is an offic document of the Japanese Government, and that it is pax七 of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also tJio file mimter or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): ？oreir?n Ministry. Signed at Tokyo on this 5th da^, of Seで七.，1946• /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness： /s/ ITagaharu Odo Official Capacity Statenent of Official Procurement I, Richard H . Larsh. here"by certify that I am associated with the Genoral headquarters of the Supreme Conunander for the Allied Powers, anc that the above described document was obtained by me from the above sign official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official "busiru Signed at Tokyo on this _ _ da^ of Sex)七.，1S46 /s/ Hi.chard H . Larsh 1UICE Witness： /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf Investigator, I.P.S. 2nd Lt., Inf. & PI. Official Caoacity DOCUl'iENT No. 956-B Page 1. "Minutes of Osmfersnce on the Conclusion of Agreement fo37] Cultural pooperation between Japan and Germany November 22，1938 - Original "Minutes of the Privy Council on ths Conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany. * 氺 氺 "Members presents C ha irman: I-imMJMA * 承 * Ministers: Wo. 8 Minister of Education - /IRAKI 幸 * 本 N o . 1 5 Minister of War - ITAGA.KI "Chairman HIFAi\iIJMÂ The conference will open from now on. The topic of discussion is the Conclusion of Agreament for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany. The reading aloud and first reading will be omitted and I request for a report from the Chairman of the Investigation Coranittee immediately. "Report Committeeman HARa： On the inquiry concerning the Con- clusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany, we officials who were recently aopcinted as an investi- gation committse, h9ld a committee meeting on the l6th day of this month. After hearing the explanations of the minister and various officials concerned, we have concluded the following strict investigation results； "For many years, on cultural matters concerning medicine, literature, legislation and various other fields 5 a mutual and close relationship existed between the two nations of Germany and Japan but with, and after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Agreement; in November two years ago, national intercourse between the two nations entered into a renewed amity. On the later part of September of this year the German Government proposed for a conclusion of a cultural agreement between Germany and Japan, a recent practice prevelant between the various countries of Europe, so as to legalize the enlightenment of cultural rsla- _ tionship between the two nations, thus leading to furthering the promotion of tha cause and provoking to strengthen all the more ov.r tie of friendship. Our Imperial Government approved this proposal. Thereafter the authorities of both parties con- cerned have conducted numerous negotiations and the arriving at an agreement led to the realization of this definite plan of a pact. However this does not mean that our Imperial Govern- ment prefers such an agreement with Germany alone. If condi- tions permit, similar agreements should, be concluded with DOCUl'iENT No. 956-B Page 2. other nations also, as this cultural intercourse has a tendency to contribute valuable service to achieve the general aims of c iplomacy. This was voiced by our authorized minister con- cerned. "This agreement lays down provisions and fundamental rules to legalize cultural relation between Japan and Germany, and as stated in the introduction, both nations by conviction should seek relations ke^z-ncting the characteristic spirit of Japan and the racial and national life of Germany, which respectively form the essence of aach nation 1 s culture. It will not only help to deepen relations with all forms of culture but also enhance the fur'Giiering of mutual knowledge and understanding to a better state so that the friendship and mutual trust al- ready existing between the two nations will be ever firm. In the text, Article I provides that the two nations, Germany and Japan, with close nrutual cooperation will put in every effort to establish cultural relation on a solid basis. Article II provides for this purpose, the two nations will systematically promote cultural relations in all fields as science 5 fine arts, music,literature, motion pictures, radio broadcasts, movement of child and j^outh, sports, etc. Article III provides that the detailed, necessary means of putting this.into practice will be left with and decided upon by negotiation between the respon- sible authorities of the two nations. Article IV states that this agreement will come into effect from the date of signing and it could be abrogated at twelve months notice from either party of the two nations. "Our investigation observes that a conclusion of such an agreement is an actual plan to develop cultural relation and promote a friend^ relationship of more sincerity between the two nations。 This agreement will also contribute to uplift the culture of both nations and at the same time aid to a marked degree in fostering the goodwill of national intercourse. For these reasons it is a pertinent principle and also v!e see nothing to fear which may be of any hindrance of any kind. Hence 5 the decision of the investigating committee by iinanimous vote is that the plan should be adopted as it stands. "The foregoing is a report on the result of our investi- gation. "No. 28 (ISHIZUXA). "In its introductory provision, which I take forms the basis of this agreement, it is said that the essence of ths culture of Japan and Germany as consisting of the character- istic spirit of Japan on one part and the racial and national life of Germany on the other. This seems somewhat out of co- ordination, but sines it so designated, I want to hear the reason, and what is ombraced in the term, 'the racial and national life of Germany.' According to German nationalism or Nazism and a currsnt conception of the present day, the German race is attempting to unify and assimilate even those people who inhabit other nations while banning another race even though living in her own country. Whereas the character- istic feature of our spirit holds equality on all races wi'thout prejudice. This exemplifies the differences in view between this and that nation. Although directly nothing is stated relative .to politics, this agreement may bring about some kind of influence politically. So I deem it important that special precaution be taken so that the people may not be misled. How- ever, I wish, to hear the government' s comment on this aspect. DOCUMENT No. 9 � 6 — B Page 3, "No.17 (ARITA.): "In short, the racial and nationalistic life of Germany is none othei- than the singular spirit of Germany. The reason for the adoption of tha term was because of the firm insistance on the part of Gerrany at the outset of negotiations ? explain- ing that their characteristic spirit being phenoc:inized in the racial and national life of Gerrany, it should, be n-ac 1 e the essenca of. her culture. "On the second point this agresrent proposes to aid in the liaison and systematic uplifting of the culture一of the two nations. It recognizes that cultural relations of Japan and Gerrany form the basis of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation. Therefore it is unlikely that there will be any influence politically. However, if there are such opinions of fear in tha carrying into effect of the agreer.ent, sufficient precaution shall be taken. "No. 28 (I3HIZUKA.); "On the whole I understand, but it is conceivable that during the long life of this agreement thera is a possibility that politics will be influenced. In particular, a tendency to go 现 i t h the Gsrran stream is not at all deniable in this country of late. In view of this fact, I repeat and hope that there should bs sor..e means to guard against ail possible r.is- take. on the part of our nation before this agreecsnt is con- cluded. "Chairman (KIMNUI.LO: Since there sr-e no other questions, we shall onit second reading and procednrGs and directly take a vote. Thosa T ,vho approve the oro"'ect, please stand up. (Everybody present stood up) "Chairman (HIRiKTJ 'X) i Decided in favor of, unanimously. This closes our meeting today. Doc. No. 956B C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 956B Statenent of Source and Authenticity I t M. TAKATSUJI hereby certify th?t I am offi- cially connected with the Jpp^nese Government in the following capacity: Sccrotary, Privy Ccimcil and thnt as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 22 pages, drted Nov. 22,19.^8, snd described as follows； Minutes of the Privy Council on the conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japgn and Germany, Nov. 22,19^8. I further certify thft the attached record nnd document is an officisl document of the Jappnese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of cita- tion, if any, or any other officir.l designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)； PriVy Council _ _ Signed at Tokyo, Jnpnn on this 26th day of August. 1946. /sノ M . Tr.kotsuji Signature of Official SEAL Witness : /s/ Klchi. Chosokabe Secret^.fy. Priv^ Council OiTicia.l Capacity Statement of Offlcj^l Procurement I, Edward P. Mona^han , hereby certify thnt I am asso- ciated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, snd thnt the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japa- nese Governnent in the conduct of ny official business. Signed at 'I'okjo , n Jr.pan on this 26th dr.y of A u< °;*ist, 194-6 /s/_ Edward P. Monr.^han — 一 " N M E f Witness: /s/_R • TL ^'rr^h Investigator v IPS Ofi'ieial Capacity Doo。 No. 4030B Page 1 Program for the Opening Session of the German-Japanese Culture Committee and the tea reception in the Hotel Kaiserhof. 1 . T h e opening session takes place in the Federal Council Hall of the Foreign Office. The guests arrive at about 1600 hours. The session begins at 1615 hours. It is introduced by a speech of welcome from Freiherr von Weizsaecker. His Excellency the Imperial Japanese Ambassador replies to it. Ambassador von Twardowski speaks last. Following that, the participators in the opening session go to the Hotel Kaiserhof, where a tea reception takes place. 2. The guests arrive at about 1700 hours in the Hotel Kaiserhof. After taking off their overcoats in the cloak- room, they meet in the Yellow Room. After arrival of the State Secretary, the guests seat themselves at the tables set up in the Great Hall. Tea and cake is first served, which takes about a quarter of an hour. The distribution of the guests at each of the tables is effected so that a prominent participant is named for each table, while the remaining guests freely apportion themselves to the various tables. After the guests have been served tea and cake ? the State Secretary greets those present at about 1730 hours and thus introduces a speech which Ambassador von Twardowski will give。 At the end of the speech, a brief, nonconpulsory meeting follows. Berlin, 3 April, 1940 /Signature illegible/ Doo。 No. 4030B Page 1 Your Excellency, Gentlemen. It is a pleasant duty to me to welcome you all today on the occasion of the meeting of the German-Japanese Culture Committee. And my special greetings go to you, Your Excellency, Ambassador KQRUSU。 Your presence here proves again your active interest in the Committee, which represents a further, and in many respects a new kind of, connecting link between Germany and Japan and has been called upon to play a signifi- cant part in the spiritual exchange between our two nations. You have, v/e know, besides your political and economic pro- fessional questions, occupied yourself most deeply with German philosophy and literature. For us. therefore, you are, as a personal expert in German spiritual life, the best guarantee for the advancement of the cultural correlation of our countries. The formation of the German-Japanese Culture Committee, proposed from the German side, has met with the agreement of the Imperial Japanese Embassy. The Berlin Committee, just like the corresponding comnittee in Tokyo is composed equally of five Japanese and five Germans. I vrarrily v;elcone the fact that Envoy US M I , as advisor in the Japanese Embassy has undertaken the leadership of the Japanese group in the committee, and that the other Japanese gentlemen happily represent all Japanese life in Germany. I thank you, gentlemen, for your readiness to under- take the office proposed to you, and gladly count on your lively participation in our common task. I thank you for your presence, State Secretary ZSCHINTZSCK as representative of the Reich Ministry for Science, Educatior and "National Education," and you, Ministry Director GREINSR, as representative of the Reich Ministry for National Enlighten- ment & Propaganda. In relations between Germany and Japan v/e cannot be satisfied that knowledge of each other 1 s country should be confined to a small circle of experts. Rather must a real rrutual understanding between the nations be extended to the widest possible circle in the nations concerned, by means of real knowledge and comprehension. National education and national enlightenment are the most important means for the attainment of the high goal we have in mind. Your presence bears witness that you will do your par七 in the spheres of your respective ministries to crown these efforts with success. Following the precedent in Tokyo, it seemed suitable to us that the Foreign Office should itself be presiding over the committee. Therefore the head of the Cultural Political Department, Envoy Doctor Von TWARDO??SKI has been entrusted with this task. Doc. No. 1418 E Page 4 Just in the last few years relations between organ- ization and societies in the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ and Japan have developed very gratifyingly. As exar^les of this I mention the fact that the Reich Board, of Health has con- cluded an agreenent with the Japanese-German Medical Society and that the Reich Youth Board is permanently represented in Japan by OBERGEBIETS-FuEJIRER SCHULTZ . As the utilization of the organizations and societies of the Nazi Party /ITtDAF/ should follow a unified point of view 5 the Foreign Office has asked the Fuehrer ‘ r deputy to send ？. represe.ii:atri/e to the Committee. I am glad that this proposal has hoen complied with, and heartily welcome Herr SCHTJLTE-STRATHAUS to this circle. This,like the addition of advisors and experts, is an innovation in the sphere of Culture Conmittees. I expect nuch for the activity of our committee from the effectiveness of these co-workers. I thank the parties here concerned for the fact that they are willing to fit their work abroad in their occasional special spheres into the great frame of our efforts and tasks in linking our peoples together. Through your share in the comittee you, the advisors and experts, will be currently informed of the whole picture of the Germar- Japanese Culture Committee and be put in a position to adopt suggestions an<? possibilities, which arise in the one sphere, in your own spheres of wcrk in the same way. In this way every fruitful chuiight and every show of initiative must "be made available i:o all concerned, and a naxiimim of achievement be obtained by systematic work which is only possible through the fitting of individual enterprises into the general fran®.. The German-Japanese Culture Committee is a working conmittee v/hich, in accordance with the German-Japanese agreement on cultural cooperation of 25 November 1938 will discuss and advise on practical measures, the achievement of which will "be suited to systematically furthering German- Japanese cultural relations. The activity of the already existing committee in Tokyo is above all serving the deepening of the knowledge of German culture in Japan. Similarly I see the task of the committee here as lj'-ing in the main in the direction of Japan-Gernany. that is as working for the spread of the knowledge of "things Japanese in Germany. The agreed and stipulated systenatisation of our efforts demands, however, that the activities of both conmittees are coordinated and that each committee for its ovm part furthers the enterprises of the other. This will be one of the essential tasks of the Foreign Office. From what has been said, our Japanese friends nay see that we have tried to create all the technical prereouisites for a close practical cooperation. Doo。 No. 4030B Page 1 A fundamental prerequisite, however, for the deopening and braodening of nutual international intercourse ic tire readiness of '".he nations thennelves to give spiritur.ily as well as to take. This readiness is in existence in wide circles of the G e r m n nc.ticn. To spread it ever wider is the task of this connittoe and the circles represented \i： it. A second, just as iimportant, fundamental of iiiteriiational cultural work has been expressed in the preamble to ths German- Japanese culture agTeeMent, Both governments have there declared that they are impressed with the realization that the German s.iicl Japanese cultures have their true basis in the German national and racial life on the one hand and the innate Japanese spirit on the other, and that the cultural relations between the two countries are to be built hereon. For the first time in the history of international agree- ments the spiritual basis on which the goal set by the agree- ment is to be worked for has been expressed and unalterably defined: the clear consciousness of each party of its racial and national self and the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and just on that account capable and ready to understand other nations. The work of this German-Japanese. Culture Committee will have to be steered along these supreme spiritual guiding lines. Gentlemen, to our universal satisfaction and joy, there has arisen in this committee a nev;, effective instrument which shall and will ever strengthen the_traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan. I am however convinced that the political friendship which so fortunately unites our countries will also be further deepened, and that Germany and Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful in- ternational intercourse. I declare the Ge r na n- Jap a ne s e Culture Committee •.. established. AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： / 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United Stat.es Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said. Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1 was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15 ? 194-5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Cfi ice files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5". That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cummin^ . P . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G . H . Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OrFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR G腿;AWY (U.S.) * ノ •f ‘ Doo„ No. 4 0 � O B Page 1 力 り Program for the Opening Session of the German-Japanese Culture Committee and the tea reception in the Hotel Kaiserhof. 1 . T h e opening session takes place in the Federal Council Hall of the Foreign Office. The guests arrive at about 1600 hours. The session begins at 1615 hours. It is introduced by a speech of welcome from Freiherr von V/eizsaecker. His Excellency the Imperial Japanese Ambassador replies to it. Ambassador von Twardowski speaks last. Following that, the participators in the opening session go to the Hotel Kaiserhof, where a tea reception takes place. 2. The guests arrive at about 1700 hours in the Hotel Kaiserhof. After taking off their overcoats in the cloak- room, they meet in the Yellow Room. After arrival of the State Secretary, the guests seat themselves at the tables レ set up in the C-reat Hall. Tea and cake is first served, which takes about a quarter of an hour. The distribution of the guests at each of the tables is effected so that a prominent participant is named for each table, while the remaining guests freely apportion thenselves to the various tables. After the guests have been served tea and cake, the State Secretary greets those present at about 1730 hours and thus introduces a speech which Ambassador von Tv/ardowski will give. At the end of the speech, a brief, noncoapulsory meeting follows. Berlin, 3 April, 1940 /Signature illegible/ -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 Your Excellency, Gentlemen. It is a pleasant me to welcome you all today on the occasion of the of the German-Japanese ゎ，仲 Qoimnittee. And my special greetings go to you, Your Excellency, Ambassador KUHUSII。 Your presence here proves again your active interest in the Committee, which represents a further, and in many respects a new kind of, connecting link between Germany and Japan and has been called upon to play a signifi- cant part in the spiritual exchange between our two nations. You have, we know, besides your political and economic pro- fessional questions, occupied yourself most deeply with German philosophy and literature. For us, therefore, you are ? as a personal expert in German spiritual life, the best guarantee for the advancement of the cultural correlation of our countries. The formation of the German-Japanese Culture Comraitta»r -proposed from the German siae, nas met wixTn the agreement of the impePl&l JafjL'JiUSW Ejiiliay-by. The Berlin Committee, just like the corresponding coinnittee in Tokyo is composed equally of five Japanese and five Germans. I r.'arr:ly we 1 cone the fact that Envoy US M I , as advisor in the Japanese Embassy has undertaken the leadership of the Japanese grotip in the committee, and that the other Japanese gentlemen happily represent all Japanese life in Germany. I thank you, gentlemen, for your readiness to under- take the office proposed to you, and gladly count on your lively participation in our common task. I thank you for your presence ? State Secretarj^ ZSCHINTZSCH as representative of the Reich Ministry for Science, Education and "National Education,'" and you, Ministry Director GREINSR, as representative of the Reich Ministry for National Enlighten- ment & Propaganda. In relations between Germany and Japan we cannot be satisfied that knowledge of each other's country should be confined to a small circle of experts. Rather must a real mutual understanding between the nations be extended to the widest possible circle in the nations concerned, by means of real knowledge and comprehension. National education and national enlightenment are the most important means for the attainment of the high goal we have in mind. Your presencn bears witness that you will do your part in the spheres of your respective ministries to crown these efforts with success. Following the precedent in Tokyo, it seemed suitable to us that the Foreign Office should itself be presiding over the committee. Therefore the head of the Cultural Political Department, Envoy Doctor Von TWARDOWSKI has been entrusted with this task. duty to meeting Doo。 No. 4030B Page 1 Just in the last few years relations "between organ- ization and societies in the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ and Japan have developed very gratifyingly. As examples of this I mention the" fact that the Hcicli Board of Health has con- cluded an agreer.ient with the Japanese-German Medical Society and that the Reich Youth Board is permanently represented in Japan by OBERGEBIETS-F週RER SCHULTZ. As the utilization of the organizations and societies of the Nazi Party /ITSDAF/ should follow a uniii*ed point of view, the Foreign Office has asked the Fuehrer 1 c aeputy to send e. representative to the Committee. I am glad that this proposal has been complied v;ith, and heartily welcome Herr SCHTJLTS-STRATHAUS to this circle. This, like the addition of advisors and experts, is an innovation in the sphere of Culture Conmittees. I expect much for the activity of our committee from the effectiveness of these co-workers. I thank the parties here concerned for the fact that they are willing to fit their work abroad in their occasional special spheres into the great frame of our efforts and tasks in linking our peoples together. Through your share in the comittee you,七he advisors and experts, will be currently informed of the whole picture of the German- Japanese Culture Committee and be put in a position to adopt suggestions and possibilities, which arise in the one sphere, in your own spheres of wcrk in the sane x^ay. In this way every fruitful thought and every show of Initiative must be made available co all concerned, and a naximum of achievement be obtained by systematic work which is only possible through the fitting of individual enterprises into the general frara®. The German-Japanese Culture Committee is a working committee which, in accordance with the German-Japanese agreement on cultural cooperation of 25 November 1938 will discuss and advise on practical measures, the achieveraent of which will be suited to systematically furthering German- Japanese cultural relations. The activity of the already existing committee in Tokyo is above all serving the deepening of the knowledge of Geraan^cultu.re _in_Japan. Similarly I see the task of the coramttee 'Feffi as lying in the main in the direction of Japan-Gernany. that is as working for the spread of the knowledge of "chings Japanese in Germany. The agreed and stipulated systenalization oT~our eiTofts demands, however, that the activities of both committees are coordinated and that each committee for its ovm part furthers the enterprises of the other. This v/ill be one of the essential tasks of the Foreign Office. From what has been said, our Japanese friends may see that we have tried to create all the technical prereouisites for a close practical cooperation. Doo。 No. 4030B Page 1 A fundamental prerequisite, however, for the deepening and braodening of mutual international intercourse ic -'ĉ e readiness of the nations tneraj;elves to r;ive spiritup.Ily as well as to take. This readiness .i s in existence in viride circles of the Gerv^.n net ion. To spread it ever wifier is the task of this conmittoe and the circles represented it. A second, just as ir.po.:"tc.nt, fundamental of iiitemational cultural work has been expressed in the preamble to tha German- Japanese culture agreement. Both governments have there declared that they ere impressed with the realization that the German and Japanese cultures have their true basis in the German national and racial life on the one hand and the innate Japanese spirit on the other, and that the cultural relationr between the two countries are to be built hereon. For the first time in the history of international agree- ments the spiritual basis on which the goal set by the agree- ment is to be worked for has been expressed and unalterably defined: the clear consciousness of each party of its racial and national self and the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and just on that account capable and ready to understand other nations. The work of this German-Japanese Culture Committee will have to be steered along these supreme spiritual guiding lines. Gentlenen, to our universal satisfaction and joy, there has arisen in this comnittee a new, effective instrument which shall and will ever strengthen the traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan. I am however convinced that the political friendship which so fortunately unites our counlries will also be further deepened, and that Germany and Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful in- ternational intercourse. I declare the German-Japanese Culture Committee ... established. AFFIDAVIT I, Vv r . P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1..That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Stai.f of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and Capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1 was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,19^5; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while エ was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under ray control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Cfi ice files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That sajd original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested, agencies, and a photostatic copy, of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumning_ w . P . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G . H . Garde G.. H. GARDE Lt.- Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERraiEKT FOR GEHMWY (U.S.) Secret‘ Doc. Ko. 40313 Berlin, 29 June 193S Page 1 Pro •ニaoicria I,) In the repeated discussions which rieicia “mister ft Foreign affairs von had r;itli the Japanese AiiibLiSsador in 3erlin, TOGO, over bhe economic construction /丄tyufbau/ in China., ths バeicii minister rccogniztd the special position •'..liich Japan holds in Oiiina and siiared tho view ;/itii tiio ^nbassador tnat Japan ^nd Ger lany ..uust coooertite econo.a- ically still lore closely in China in the spirit of tiie xvriti- C o,..lint e m Pucl: wiiicii iiad been concluded bet ./eon tiib t«;o countries.’れccordnngly, the -(eicii minister declarod to the ^libassador the willingness of th.6 G-sr.ian CTOvsrni.isnt to try to do its best ror cconouic ana technical cooperation vJitii Japan in China. He at the sane tii..ie expressed tiie wisii that the Japanese Govern ^snt for its part v/ould prccood in the sa,ae .aanner and that in particular it v/ould take an especially generous and considerate attitude especially as rogcirds G-eriian foreign trade in China. エエ•） After the .!iiabcissd.rior iiad inforjied tiie dapanete Government of the course and result of tlis converscitions as depicted above, tiie j-v.abassador \/as then instructed by the I.aperial Govern.lent to co.iaunicate the following to ths Geruian Goverrbuent:- Tiie Japanese Goverruaent is agreed with the points パmentioned in I,) and according丄;;，intsnds, with r&3ci.rd to the econoaic activity concerning G-ariiany.®3 foreign trade in Ciiina. to observe tiie follov/in^ linos m future. a.) In future the Tdpanese u-ovGrn..ient will oonsicier Ger_i〕.axiy parti cularly benevolently in hor econo...iic activities in China .」nci will at least grant her tiie .ニost favorable treat •lent tiaat third powers (excepting バ<aニchukuo，_ will en.ioTr, and ic accordingly prepared in intiividua丄 CdS3S， in wnicn future proposals ッ./ill be .,iade by uc-ruany „itn a boaring on this» to promote G-eraan interests who re possible. Tiiis benevolent treatnent of Germany of course does not exclude Japan's econo.uiic cooperation tiiird powers. b.) The Japanese &overn...'i3nt is of t.a& opinion that Greman foでfaign trade in China has to stand funcldj.aenta 11 y on the saiae footing witii the Japanese. It will consequently do its best for botli countries to an joy the sa^e troatuent as regards c us tons und accordingly in tiie evsnt of any special Doc. No. 40313 P d ^ e 2 import and export re^nldtions, . xa.na3e.1ent ox foreign bills exchange or other 2easurs3 for tiie control of goods and pay.aent arran^e.iiGnts be in 3 xaet ,/itii,\/liicli âlca tiie position of equality of G-Gr.aian;r practically luipossible, for exaiaple concerning tiie diffei-oiit nature of G e m a n or Japanese currencies, G-sr.ian interests /ill bs particularly ocnevolent- coiisidorred and at least ^he __ipst fovorcable J y&aマ.•力nt) til二t other rov\?ers i exoluliiii-, <Tdp;an ana ^i.aincliukuoen.jo/, wi 11 be granted to ]ie.r。 AFFIDAVIT I, W . I . Cumming, being first duly sv/orn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such ェ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth,ェ have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives v;ere captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,1945； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while ェ was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. sハV. P. Cumming V/. p . CUMMINCT Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 194-6. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, A.GD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) ’f) Doc. No. 4031A R.U. 240 Page 1 Tiie Japdiiese .cibassad0r- TOGO, »/iio had announced iilaself visited me today at 13•30 hours. He iianded £Le "the Pro i.:Ie..uoria. attaciied i:i the onclosure, As an sxplancition lie added that tiie Japanese G-overn.ient woulc like to avoid the ezpresBion :f North China'' in such a Pro Ivleaoria and would like to put ; 'China ; ' in its place. Jurthsr- :iore the Japanese G-ovsrn:lent v:as not able to assure Germany a better position than all otuer powers in a treaty f o m . Therefore the formula uenticned at the end of th.8 Pro Heiュoria had been clioson in order to :.ieet cur wishes as far as possible. エ declared jiyself not satisfied with txie for:iula. 0 ^.dong ofciier tiiiriiS エ sxplainea to the Japanese a-uuoaseador whether the formula in paragraph a.) of the Pro ふニeニoria could not be changed in sach u vray so that it vculd read: "to further G-er.ian interests to u specially ^reat decree'' .instead of "to further Ger ！.an interests as far as possible.“ Tho Japanese ^wbassacLor seaaed to consiaei-& c^aa^e of that sort possible„ After that ふie oncG uore erapliasj.zed in epic verbosity that the Japanese Govern.-ient vrouid do everjtning 丄iecessary to secure the Genaan interests. Tiie idea of iiis statements seemsd to be that ons was； to be sure, in practice willing to grant Ger.aany a better position tiian all tiie otiisr nations and to express this in the test as far as possible, but tliat one v;ould not ajroG to oo._uai—c oneself in a ciofin.ite treaty for"-l. 'Tiie Japanese -vabassacior x"urtrier declared that ho would also -,/illingly dcoep'i: xurther Gernan proposals for nodifica- tious regarding the i-ro . ie.aoria. I expldined to t.ie レ a n e s e 2-i.ibassador tiidt at り r e s e n t I could not taks up a. standpoint rosardiii^ tiie text of tlio Pro iienori-.. xo ..ie it soejicd tiiut tiie dra.j：t diu. not 30 further than the ^ost pref01-ontiul treat..xent 7>/hich, in view of Germany'3 special sicuaticn, vius not satisfdetory. However エ would have this ：lan tiioroughlj exa.a.i.:.:ieu oiia •••/ould then give h i a report regarciin^ the outcc.ie cf tills examination. The Japanese ^:j'ca&sador "C-'iaii r.rif/riy îojitiorisd tus present situation ci":iie G-enuan-w-panssB in. ̂ otiatiens for the ccx^ie:rci£ > treaty, Unfortunately Japan wss ut present not capable of paying foreign bills ox' extlianje to a greater extent. Doc. No. 1418 E Page 4 I declared tiiat I v/as not informed about details and referred hi,i to .."in. Dir. WIEHL. Tlis Japarese -^ibassador tlien expressed liis tiianlcs for the support wiiich .“in* Dii'。VOELTtlT had given JiLil at the whaling conference in Lond.on e エ tlien infor-aec1. the Japanese i-u-abassaaor that our .ailitar；" advisors wo aid probably leave rlankow on 5 July, It iiad not been alto^etlior easy to effect thej.r departure. In. connection with tiie recall of ^-jiroassador TRMITTEVIU a nuidber of couibina- tions .regarding severing of GerLian-Cliinese rslatioxis and the recognition of tiie ± J eking Governuent nad been in the Japanese p r e s s .エ would be tiianki'ul if tiie u cipbiit-se press could be influenced in ^ucii a. v/ay that it would refrain frcxd sucii co lbinations, The Japanese ^'lbassador then expressed 丄iruiself optiiuis- tically regiarding tiie further devslopnient of the ..ailitary operations, .xfter a capture of Iianko\/ tiie position of CEI.-i.NG KrtJ-SHSj：: seened to hi.ji untenable« Berlin, 25 June 1938 ‘ Signed HI33J1M.TR0P /135S44-6/ AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. C'oir.ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such 1 am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied ditionary Forces, and upon their seizure- and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That 1 was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on august 1ヲ，1945； and s ‘ id captured German Foreign Office f: : les and archives first came into ray possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Cfi ice files and archives, and v/hich came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumiiin£ w . P . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this ？ day of April 1946. s/ G . H . Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY G C V . J 細 F O R G^KmaWY (U.S.) も 6 s D o c。 � o . 40 31C aerli .17 1933 i^ags 1 ON ル CONVERS"TIしN ;J.ITH： ELu J^.J^S^i ,.:IBAS3^D0R, ON 6 J"ULY 193B TOGO, wlio had announced himself， :aade rsference to tiie fact that the ii&ic丄minister in tiie conversation of 29 ごune had referred t.im to xiie regarding details of tiie pending economic negotiations, ^t first he spoke about tiie present situation of the German-Japanese negotiations for tiie t.^ade agroeaent and said that, in tiie last conversation of liis Connercial attache SIIUDO with II.D. W0HLTE..T and L. ？ぃ V03S, v/e had expressed certain wishes for fclie acceptancs of Geraan goods by Japan up to the amount of 丄60 million yen, suggested by Japan, for n o m a l export, and had declared ourselves v/illin； to take into consideration the Japaness suggestion for aa agree二lent regardins an additional export of 150 aillion yen, half against Japanese goois, Iialf on credit, in tiie ovent of the Japanese govern:,lent considerins our v/isiisa favorably. He had tQle ; 3raphed tliis outcoiae of the conversation of nis Co..:ij"aercial ..ittaciie to Tokyo and. iiad reco.;tended consideration of our wishes. .^fter iiaving received instructions lie would again contact mc, Tiien tî s •̂ .raba.ssador bgain spoke about tiie I ro .ニg丄.ior-ia on Geruan-Japanese oconouic cooperation in Clima and insisted particularly and obstinately on his counterplan wiiicii he iiad iianded to the G-cr-aan foreign iJiniotcr on 29 June and "liicli tiie xteiciisvainister had already declared unsatisfactory. Tiie differences of opinion referred to the folio zing points： (1)According to our suggestion tiie fro ぃ e m o r i a was to refer to "tiie areas of China wiiicii are under Japaiiose influence". Tlis ^.nbassador wishes to repl&ce tiiesy v.ords tiirougiiout merely by "China" and brou^nt up as a reason that the Japanese goverruaent hoped to extend its influence over all of China, therefore it was for general rea.sona undesirable to acknowledge in this clocuLdsnt tiie possibility of a division of China into areas wiiicii either were or were not under Japanese influence, in answ-oi•丄 tlx is 1 stressed that, with our stipulation of text, .w.e merely v. is lie 6. to clarify tliat the agroclient did not apply to sucli areas .マiiich finally \/ould remain of C:airi& witiiout boing under Japanese influence. In itself this was natural becausc til3 J d. Oa 116S3 G>overniaent could of coursc only take over rasponsibilities for such areas in Doc. No, 4031C Page 2 v/hicii it had influence. Therefore エ was willing to ask for the Reiclis-'ainister 7 s decision whether lie approved of the Japanese suggestion, to put only n Ciiina ?? 111 the parts of tiie Pro ilcmoria concerned. (2) The Japanese counterdraft 'visiles to put tiie words "Geruan foreign trade" where, in various parts, it says ?T Ger ian trade” in Ciiina.エ declared to tiie Ambassador that we could net agree to this。 The reconstruction and securing of the coinriercial activity, of G^ivaan fir.is in Ciiina v/as for us an unavoidable prerequisite for the economic cooperation in Ciiina desired by both g〇vernncnts« This cOaLiercial activi- ty, however, not only consisted of tiie l ^ o r t and export of Geriaan goods by these fir^as to or fro二 1 G-er.lany, but also of trade within Ciiina. and of uediation i'or sx^ort of Ohineso goods to tliird countries i'or instance x^ierica and England. At last tiie ^r^assaaor concGdccl tiiis and consented that at the end of (1)and in ：エエ）"before th^ letter (a), just "Gomany f s trade in C h i n a s h o u l d ' to put in place of "foreign trade"« (3) The cTapanose suggestions for ciianges under the letters (a) and (b) present the main difficulty. Tiie ふ^abasse' persisted that the Japanese sovenraent could not pronise us a. batter position than tiiird pov/ers and equal treatuent with Japan regarding taxes, revonues, duties, traffic fees, etc, エ 1 1 unsveering エ declared to hlji again and a.gain that, in view of our support of th.G Japanese action in Ciiina rendered with considera'ble s a c r i f i c e s ? f e l t entitled to a "betto-r positioi than such powers wiiicii not only did not support Japan but laid, wiicroA/er tiiov could, obstacles in iier .way• In a/iy case I did not liave tiie right to 1 off fro丄a tiiis doiiiana in viev； of the binding instructions ox the “eicha,ニinister， otill tiie ^vibassador asked ..ie to again obtain the opinion of the Reiciiiiinister and. also referred to tiie fact tiidt VON HzJJlJER had promised him another exaaination, fro-.i tiie legal standpoin of the suggestions vrtiic：! differed fro^ our version. At last エ declared ir-yself ready to report to iiiid tiis final attitude of tiio RGichs.niiiister and the eventudl out coma of this legal exaoiinatioiie (4) Finally tiie ...レ.ibassador told ae tiiat lie iiad been em- powered by liis govornijient to -give tho planned Pro Memoria a legally idore binding for. by a autual provisional signing.エ responded thdt ェ would "brin^ tiiis to tiio notice o± tiie Doc. No, 4031C Page 3 Reichs.:,iinistor but j ointed out tliat tins j.ieicii3j,iinister, as was kno'.^m, iiad proposed ti丄rouslx VCN R̂ ITi-IER tiie foru of an exchange of notes。 The ^'ub-iscador was of tiie opinion tiiat liis ^overmaont ijipractical on tiuic consuiiiins considered account of consent of the for.a of an excxiange of notes tiie necessary but difficult and tiie x'rivy Council. oigned ハ._IEHL /'135S51-3/ AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cuinming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State o n ' t h e Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ray possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2, » That said original Foreign Off ice files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1ヲ，1945； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into ray possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg y Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original docurnent, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined, and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic•copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ 17. P . Cumnin且 ‘ V . P. CUIvIMING Subscribed and sv/orn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GAKDS Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOV通MEKT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) 脆 OiUNDUM On 2? July 1938 I went to see the Japanese Aznbassador and told him on instructions of the German Reichs Minister 0 that the Reicha Minister, even after another thorou^i deliberation^ did not find satisfactory the last Japanese proposal for the wording of the *pro Memoria* regarding North Chinac acaordijag to which Garmaay was to be promised only an n especially favorable* treatment and that he stands on the demand for a promise for ^preferential treatment oror against third states。* This demand was merely the natural consequence of the special relation between our two countries and tiie great sacrifices with nhich we were supporting the Japanese advance in North China。 A treatment ifhich is only * especially favorable H 9 however 0 did not sufficiently do justice to this situation. Several reports from our representatives in China liad contributed to the decision of the German Reicha Minister 9 from which it could be seen that also in the already peaceful part of North Qiina erery foreign trade waa being ruthlessly eliminated in favor of the Jaipanese 9 and that thereby any more favorable treatment of the German trade.was izi no way taking place• This action induoed the iii5)res3ion 0 that the long range Japanese ©conomia policy in North China systematically lead to principally eliminating erery foreign trade 0 even the G e r m n 9 and only permitting it in 30 far as Japan itself was not capable of delivery or receipt。 Aa evidence of this I presented the aiobasaador the note enclosed in copy 9 in trhich five cases of complaint are presented and made supplementary oral explanations based 011 a detailed memorandum regarding the situation of German economic interests in North China 0 especially regarding the complete exclusion, of Germany nixioh has set in since the Japanese occupation in two fields in iihich we have had a leading position for many years 0 namely 0 in the delivery of railroads and the hydro-electric field o It folloired from all of this that it was not a question, of an especially favorable treatment, not to speak of a preferential treatiosnt of Geriaany in North China。 I added 0 that Ambassador d ぶ would b© commissioned to present these con^Iaints in Tokyo and to ask the Japanese government for information regarding its intended future economic： policy in North China。 Ambassador OTT 0 during his presence her© 0 had also been informed of the w u r s e of the discussions here regarding economic cooperation in North China and informed of the differences of opinion vdiicsh still exist regarding the wording of the pro Memoria. and would 0 when the opportunity presented itself 0 on his part inform the Japanese government in Tokyo of the concept of the Reichs Minister 0 Especially the latter atateiaent was obTioualy extremely disagreeable to Mr。TOGO and upon ay report on the conaraissioning of Azzibassador OTT, which were at first more indicatory 9 he posed several counter questions, until I made this eomnissioaing more precise in the manner sho?m above• Doc:。NOo 40l|JL page 2 Impartially (speaking), Mr。TOGO objected that he had always done his best to do something about sudx German complaints re s North Chinao and in two instances he had even succeeded in the (later findings showed that he had actually gone to aoxa& trouble regarding Point 2 of the Appendix, that 0 however 0 the Japanese assent irhicli had been given to it was not sufficient)« He would now report to Tokyo the con^lainta enumerated in the appendix and in my oral statements。 If up to now no ©specially favorable treatment of Germany in. North China has taken place 9 then this was related to the fact that an agreement could juat not be reached on the pro Meinoria in liiich thia especially favorable treatment was to be agreed upon. I expressed my astonishment at thia remark 0 pointing out that from general circumstances alone 9 suc^i an especially favorable treatment even irithout agreement was understood to be a matter of course o After a few excuses the Aoib^ssador admitted thia 0 maintained 0 however 0 that the stopping of war material delivery to China and ©speaially the recall of the military advisors had only coine about sudtx a short time ago that the effect of this gesture of frienship could not yet have carried through, to (ehange) the attitude of the Japanese authorities everyirtiere in Bforth China。He, too 0 presumed that on. account of this gesture of friendship xmch would now improT© of its oim accord along the lines of our wishes 0 Finally the ambassador made remarks concerning other details of the wording of the pro Memoria® from v̂hicli I could surmise that he was, nevertheless 0 yery much interested in a further discussioc also here on thisVsub ject/, and that he possibly still has one or another concession on hand 0 which up to now 0 he has not brought forth。 He also inquired as to nhat attitude the German Reicha Minister had taken to the form of the Pro Meaoria 0 naiaely execution by mutual signing 0 I answered that the Reichs Minister had not taken any attitude towards these other details 0 aa it was of no use to go more deeply into these quest ions 力 aa long as the main point 0 namely the demand for preferential treatment was rejected by the Japanese side。 But since Mr。TOGO insisted, and as it could b© of advantage to find out something about, other possible Japanese concessions 0 and as he seems to be aomevriiat under pressure by the parallel action of our Ambassador in Tokyo, I at laat promised him that I would get the decision of the Reichs Minister regarding continuation of the discussion。 signed WIEHL To be submitted to - the Reichs Minister the 5ecretary of .̂ tatft Docs。Nc>o 4041 page 3 mto L。Bo vcsa W VII Polo VIII To bo submitted to the Ikticha Minister 0 via the State Secretary, with the request for a decision on ilie last sentence of the iaemorandut&o Aobassador OTT has been informed by telegraph., and asked to raise complaints in the saro® direction, with the Japanese Government。 IISIL AFFIDAVIT I, P. Curriming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as siach I am a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ray possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Off ice files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Docimnnt Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied, forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on august 1 5 } 1 9 ^ 5； and. said captured German Foreign Office f.1les and archives first came into ray possession and con- trol while エ was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Cfi ice files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document， of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumi.ilrig_ V'/ . P . CUIvIIviING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 194-6. s/ G . H . Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General Off ICS OF MILITARY GCV灘MEK'T FOR GEHivI/iNY (U.S.) 一 ， “ 旧 Document No. 4041-B Page 1. Copy to V 738 g Account Concerning tho situation つ.;？ Gei‘nsn Economic Interests in the p.?.rts of China occupied by Japan, In view of the rea^ tions which the Japane se-Chinese conflict inevitably exorr.isss upon foreign sconcmic interests in China, ths Japanese C-ovsmLisnt has repeatedly declared its intention to rsspect these foreign irroerests and to maintain the principle of the Open Dcor nnd the principle of the equal possibilities. In addition to てh^.t the Japanese Government has promised our economic interests in a prafsrsntial treatment in con- sideration of t.he spocial re'L:.'. T ..icns e^is^irg between Germany and Japan and the great friendship v/hich Gernany has shown since the conclusion of the anti-Comintern a ̂ rceoent, through the recogni- tion of Ifenc'aiiria, the recall of military advisors and the sus- pension of all war material supplies to Chini. One could not see claarly ？/iiat practical consequences those Japanese promises for the German oconcraic interests had as long as the aroa of TIENTSIN, PEKING and 1SINGTA0 in North Chin?, and tho triangle Shanghai-Nanking-Harxgchew in Kiddle Chins were battle araas «s long as there was fighting, it was doubtful whether the measures of the Japanese mi'LLt^r-y authorities were conditioned by war and tsmporary or whsthor they were the expression of a policy calculated to bs permanent• Now that these territories are for the great pnrt pacified and opsncd for tho admission of Japanese civilians (pecliilors, traders and mamfacturers), tha Gorman authorities could gain a clearer picture of tho Japanese economic policy in China and its reactions on ths Gorman interests'丨 They confirm in nunox-ous reports that tiie Japanese military •authorities are striving to subjugate the Chinese economy under Japanese domination, to use this aconomy exclnsivsly in the Japanese interest, and to push aside and. el5.tnlnate all foreign interests. In this the Gorman interests aj G treated no better than any other foreign interests^ Principally, .Japan wants to exploit China only in her own interest. Foreign cooperation only cones thon into the qusstion whera tiie Jn^snese rriaans do not suffice, but even there cnly in a ？;a;v vrhich guarantees Japan's leadership (Japanese majority in Eiixed enterprises), Considerabla orders o to be givon i n t g r n a t i 1 l y , wheriloy Germany does not possess an> Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. special advantage ovor other intions. the atセitudo of the Japanese milit'iry auしhoriti^ i n North 霄 1 riddle China is basically ths same towards Q̂ rtTian econoiulc 1 1 上レりwq+：フ ^ c^r'tain cliffersnce is shown in the a s riood; The 八も“..た，つ它へ— nv which protects the .Tnp-ncso fln-k ir： rJiUCHTBIA. and Inner ：、:..たリ golia against Racisi^) saoxis l c-r^ain v-ill'-rsnass for cccperaし.-.., with. Gorreany whereas they conscictisiy pra^udice thsms-lvos ovor against the English, On the othsr hand, the ccmr' i erci t }l expert reports about the Japanese attitude in Middle China (W VII 1731 of 23 June); ,; Wharea3 the Gc；r-man rrorchants in. North CHINA are shown a certain consideration， the Japanese military and officiaZ sources hero are apparently ashamed of this friendship, especially over agains-c tho Eln^li'sho Instead of avowing oneself openly to it Ly par-dttiiib ths German morchants something which one v/ant," to refuse to tho others, one onl》 always t3Iks about cooperation v» T ith Gormany, and this as much as poo. ; :iblG in privato circles ? that is, for the purpos of rsprcacliirig -js or to demand someihing from us." Consul Gon-sral FISCHER hns referred the Japanese Consulato Genara in Shanghai, witn T. r hich h ご wis r.e go tic?, tin .2; about a f.sw factories which are tinder Gsrinan influence 5 to the assurance of tho Japanes Govornmsnt to treat Gorman interests proforont.ially, The Japanese Consul SCIJS answerod to this that the Japanese Consulate had not recoived cny such instruntions and that it was impossible to make a distinction in tlia treatment of the members of the vsrions foreign nax^icns。 Consul Gen；'rr-1 FISCHER - who wa3 speclflcaily characterized by Lt. Genornl OoKr i rs a porson approved of by Japanese railitar authorities - cones to tho conclv,sior. that the military authori- ties "up to now have not allowed themselves to becoir.s discon- cortsd by all tho statener.ts ircm Tokyo no out the rospecting of foreign rights and interests in tho ruthloss utilization of thair position cf powsr and have not t'-il:«n cogniznncs of tho fact "chat Gorman into rests should be ti'eatQd with car-G in the strangulation of for^i^n com^arce. I! -2- The cccnomic て'.）】icy Eiims at the control of all th important iharoM tries o n forth in-I ？llddle China. ‘\s objects of this national-Ji.Dnnese 丄て']-.iニ. ar~ r.r,ra?o amongst othersr. sbippin£ railways and ottier conrnrur」c:r.:-J.')nつ..â jort?ikirigs, nino3 ; 丄f." production, mills, s;: J.'incrivis ani -wen ving mills, cemcnt 5 choinic^ • faetories, the wdoI silk industiias. Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. In practice it has proeoedad in the following way; All public or seriii-t/ublic installations of the Central Provincial Government and the local Adroinistrationss railways, telephone, telegraph and Y/ircless stations, arsenals and workshops, mines and salt-fields •o.fttur£ l lIy havs been seized by the Japanese nilitary authorities, The greator part of faccoriss of private industry have been destrojod, The machines have been taKen apart so far as they were still useful and the rest has been sent to Japan as scrap metal, As Consul SONS imparted to tho German Consul General, Jap^n wants to r3tain the power for the decision whether the devaloprnant of certain industries in China should be permitted ^t all.； wuich 'rculd be regulated according to the requirement of tha japanes 5 economy. /Is far as the .Chinese factories are still existing, they will be taken over fcy the J^paneso. For instance, tho cotton sDinning induscry of Middle China has thus besn taken over by- Japan and tos been divided up for tranagement by Japanese Spinning mills, - Usually this happened in such v;ay that one day Japanese anginaers, most of the time with xailitary escort, appeared, hoisted the Japanese flag and put up signs on which it was an- nounced that the factory v;as now a Japanese enterprise. The Japanese smph?.sized that the:?" only aspire to "cooperation" with the Chinese owners who are invited to bear the repair expenses, which are iistially considerable, to agree to the appointment of a Japirese manager and a t eclrn^lcal advisor and to be content with a partition of the net proeeeis (W VII 1876)， Should the Chinese ownars object, then they are put under pressure either oy refusal of admission to the factory buildings and other administrative maasnras cr the resumption of the n^Mgeraent takes place without Chinese consent. In this pro- ceduro it is not the arbitrai/y acts of individual nilitary authorities, hut they are tha systematic attempt, which is approved by the Jrip^nsse Government to manage Chinese industry - as fir as it is permitted - i.n ''cooporc.tion" with the Chinese as a Japanese monopoly, That Japanese enterDrisss in China are to Be erected on the ba.Tis of Gpscr'.al privileges also follows, arocng other thingsノ fron article il of the Japanese law concerning tao North and Csntral China Development Co, which states: "The Govarnment shall make efforts to nake the new Govern- ment cf China consider granting special treatment to the nroposod company and its affiliates." Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. The results cf 七his Japanese policy are very s arious for the German commercial activity in China, How incisive they are, is already shovn by contempl-iting two fields which the Japanese want to ros?- v 70 ” •.r ：:ニ.:..:scl」バ r-ail双ays a m Electric In the field of railway congtructlon, Garmany has always been 33tive and ha s 'oarticipated to a great extent since the building of the SHANTUNG ^nd the Tientsin- ; Fakow railway, C-ern?ans wora ths fi:;*£t v/ho asai上“i took up the railway enterprise after tha est^^llshnant of tho Cninese national government and who, with t;ie assistance of middle termed delivery credits ma do possible the building of the Hingehow-Yushan-Nanchang-Pinghsiang railway. It was expccted tliat in a nationally united China a grand dsvelopmont of c omjrAir：1 c at tons would take place and that Germany, together with fingland 5 v/ould take a prominant part in it. On 15" Jnn.3 cf this yea.T i ?,000 Icilometers of tha estimated 11,000 kilometers cf tha rai3.road lines 议ere under Japanese control. Now they arc run by the South Mancbjrian Railway Co. The Japanese saw themselves forced to procure an "Ersatz" be- cause the Chinos a could have taken with tliem nearly the entire rolling stock, and havs ordered first of all 250 locomotives and 10,000 coaches in Japan-, Tha orders went exclusively to Japan. It is to be expectod that tha ff.t'j.rG ordors will also go to Japan ancl that ws will lose the eld Chinose railways as customers. In addition to th' s the receiiots of tha Tientsin-Pukow liii for the losns of 1908 and 1910 and the raceipts of the Psking— Hangkow line for a rrucfoer ol middle' term3d delivery credits werr mortgaged to us。 These lines at prusenセ havo no rocGipts. In order to ma int ̂ in c'...r rigiib2, after the English had availed themselves of the uso of the Tient3in-Pukov; and Huktiang loans from Japan on the 2nd cf ？'lay of this year., W3 haマe demanded the same treatment for the Gerniffn shares of tliese loans as well as the advance (L6'70 c 000) cn the TiGntsin^-Pulcow lines. Ths Japanese Government up to now has not ansv/ered this demand. In tho field cf Chinese hjc 1 roeIgctrici17 the SIE¥EA T S company has had a leading position : T ox raany yaars. A.ccording to Tvhat ths firm reports now, one can alraady cloarly see today that Japan is net goir'g -co drav; any non-Japanese firms in ths future into the Chinese territories occupied by J^pan, and that she is going to lat the Nihon Bonshin Ko.ji Kabushiki Kaisha (half national rind half pertinent industry) carry out all supply and construebion ^obs s Examples of the Japanese advance already exist: Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. a) A.t the time of the oufbreak of the conflict, a delivery of Gnlarge^Grtt equipment had ；just arrived for the auton'iT;io talsphcns exoh?ngo which had been, built by SiGMons ".vd E a " 1 . , l h a Oap^nesa did not accept these, but ordered a •:>•.•_+: tic oxchanga from the Nilion Donshir Dom/ri K^.b-asliili, TCnisha, b) The same firm received crdars for deliveries for two public autcnntic telephone exchanges in Shanghai. • c) The sai'iG firm participated in the founding of a com- pany for nows exchange in Kalgan together with 1"Mon- golian Govornwent" (Kwantung Army) and received the order for' i public zt f:on̂ t'ic tolophone exchange „ d) Up to now ？.r.d HAL'KS was almost exclusively thし only firins supplying telephone and telegraph eqi^.ipmant for Hianj.fold utilization of overland •！vires. In the •territories accupisd by Japan such orders are only given to Japanese firms from now on, (Up to now two throe- rhannal tolophono conntruetions for Worth China and one ons-channol do for Ti&nbsin-Paking)„ From the 3xaripios given above one can clearly S3e th-t tiie German fî ir 1 has boon ent^'.ely pushed out by the Japanese from fields, which in the r^ast have been its steadily huge customers. It is to bo faared that Vv8 will pake the same experience on all fields where Japanese moncpolies provail^ until finally Japaneso orcopied China will be just as closed to our co•.ハmsree as Korsa or Formcsa. B. Outside of the official ofricos which crdc-red railways, hydlro-electric and water po^er nlants, mine arid arsenal 3qnip- nant in Garraany the Chinese private industry "was our best custorer. Due to tho Japanese action, in the industrial field doscrib ( abovo, tho Chine38 private indastry is mainly ruined. German trad ) has boon heavily, damaged bj t'ao fact that nany Chinese factory ovmors bscarre -u.na':le to oay, so that thoy could not accept ord:red goods and could not pay ther and that for the future they ha72 b.sen elimlr_at3d as customars. Most of ther will be forced to buy in Japaa in the future if thay want to c ont working. In a fc マ-! cises whers lor^g-tor-Trod bus ins s s relations ex:'.st9G and whare the G^r 1 - an damands on Chinase undertakings wore espscially largo, the German firms had constituted liens for Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. themselves in the trndertalcings or had transferred them to thsmsGlvas for ド e c u r i . b y . Their rruinber is not large 5 because the Consul (-antral in Shanghai watched carefully that such cessions wore ;: bona fids 1 ' and that t'.iey weyc oornereially iustified and not fictitio-as bargains. In the roain it con- cerns the following cases ； German Paini Trading Co, W/IIBEL & CO. Five dyo-Y/orks <, Thoy were established l">7 C h i n e s e w h o a r a c l o s e to D E F A G , in order to \ntroduc3 new dyeing i-i6thods, and were technically taken care of by the D^FA-G. Tho DEFA.G had high claims on all of thorn, In ord^r to secure these, D^FA.G took a mortgage on the fiye works in tiie snrannar of 1937 and in Deceubcr had it transfGrred for security 1 s sake. The Japansse do not want to recognize the transfer. FttrthormorQ they prevent the rasumption of work of the 2, 4 an卩 5 works. SIErSSEN & CO, Sh.?.rî iiai Portland Camsnt '"forks. Many years of close business contacts and high claims by SiE^SEN, Transfer for security' s sako on 27 October .1937。 Tho Japanese have removed the "Uiventiiries of goods and part cf the naehine^ fchey do not recognize the transfer, SIE^SEN fears tlia七 it will be taken ovaT by force by the Japanese. CARLOWITZ & CO. Shun Chang Stone Pulverizing マ o r k s . China Wool Manufacturing Co.. Ltd, Many years of tidiness contacts and high claims by CARLOWITZ Transfar of property not recognized by Japanes The mortgaging and transference } respectively,' of these works has bean reported, to the Japanese Consulate General in each c a s e , w i t h the r e s u l t that shere s y s t o m a t i c p r a n d e r i n g g e n e r a l l y stopped in front of those enterprises tmder the German flag。 When the German firms v, T ant3d to start running these enterprises again, it was not possible tc got tho necessary permivssion from the Japansse Con.3ulat3 Qonsrol,ano the -Japanese Military Authorities began to g。t serious alxnrb the seizuro of those works. Therefotg 5 tha Ge-finan Cons'alato General found itself forced to take up negotiations with the Japanese Consulate GenG^al, At this occasion tiie Japanese Consul SONE took the following attitudes a) No distinction wculd bo made in Germany ? s favor in the treatment of the various foreign nations\ Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. b) The efficacy of the transfer of property from Chinese to Gorman nationals depends upon recognition by the JapanGse, Japan wa i in a pcsitr.cn to er丄feres its will by refus- ing work pei-mitc; or other measures> which, if nGce<3~ sary ? could be takon by ths newly sot up Chinese Govern- man-c 1 The lack of .?. judicial foundation for th5.s prp- codu.ro was expressly confirmed, As reason for Japan's attitude Consul S0N3 stated that the sought- for Chine so-Japano so n Cooparation ;i would be hindered if the Chinose v;ould find safety behind foreign f i m s。 Councillor of Embassy Fischer defended the judicial standpoint that Gornnn firms 5 evon if thsy possessed no claims against a (Jhlnose firm, wore ontitlod to ac- quire property from and that .for this no Japanese pormission was necessary; howo^er, declared himsolf willing to onuor into further discussions with the aim of finding a solution locally, In view of the woll known econosic policy cf the Japanese military authori- tias he i3 5 lio\/eV3r 5 c.onvinccd that in tho long 'ran a basic discussion is "unaTOidablo with the Japanese Gov.3rnm.3nt rogardins tho conflicts with legitimate German interests, ar"i£:ins fro:n thGir economic policy. c) The Gornan eccnonic activity in the Japanese oc- cupied torriton es is genorally encroached npon in that tha Germans 1 just as tho rest of the foreigners, are prohibitsd from ontoring into tho tsrritorios al- ready pacified, •vvheraas they are visited by groups of Japansso peddlers, traders and othar civilians. This applies to North Chine along the Poking-Faotou railway as wall as to the trianglG Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow, In Inner Mongolia,七he Kwanirong fl.rmy has ordered the represontativas of the firm MSLCEERS & CO。 to leave the area at once "as this wa" necGSFar；' for the personal safety of the employees" 5 aithcugh Japanese bf.sinec&men go cn working there as before, Tirus tho buying organizatiens cf the German firm, which for many y&ars has bougat wool and skins セ h e r s are para- lyzed, and tha businoro iinf boon concluded into ths hands, of a Japanese Fonopoly Ccmpany^ The sane ceas-aras have besn taken in TmFCHTRIA. where ^ne M/iNCHURIAN LIFE3T0CK CO. has re- ceived a monopoly, The provisicnary govornraont in PEKING has further de- clared that the export of skins and furs from tho ports of TI3NTSIN, CHEFOO, and TSIIJC.TAG is prohibited, on 3〇 June of Document Nq. 4041-B Page. 2. this year. The Garraan firms, which have about a ^0% share in this GXt)ort 5 aro heavily damaged by this. Ths German Chamber of Concorce in Tiontsrln rooticsts rononstrances to the Japcneso Governnent, as this noasnrG 巧: 1 s taken at the ind-ucenent of the Japanese in the intsrss'u of Japanese war oconony. k pro- hibiting cf tno export of cotton is s-3id to ba imn-inent. Ill in all tho raports of the German officials in North and iTidfllo Chine, s'.'ioマ uhaz tte C-erman economic interests in China aro worso off In the JaponGSG occupied areas than was cr^r the c^.se in rryfcicnsIL Ghin-°. ? avon at tne time of the sharpest an t i -imp e 1 a I i s t i c Kuomintang propaganda. This fa to is shared by tho Gamori s vr.th all other foreign int ores ts. Howaver, no sirjns of a pr jfc-.rcin;ial troatnent of tho Gernan interests bj J?.pan arc- to bo round„ Part of tho InjnriGs uiidor v;iiich the German ocononiic interests s'tjffor ara cortaii-ily to bo traecd to tho situa- tion and tho ur^ort critical situation, which forces Japan to tako measures which othor^'i ce it would not take. In the main, however, it concorris no asdics -A.hieh originate froui a conso- quontial ocononic po 1 icy of J a pan and aim at "cho abolition of all foreign inflf^c-ncos in China. Tho Gxanple of Korea and Formosa shows wharo this devoioprront will lead to if wg do not dofonc' our intorcsts with •？,11 our vigor. The Japnn.ssG havo pronissd us, at tho vory least do facto, a preforontial position. Ths lacts give us tho risht to ask Japan in what rospact it has carried out thsso promises and how it intends to carry then out, and what tho attitude of this prGferGrLtial position will be toward tho status quo ante. Herewith rGspoctfuily s'alorr.ittod to Ministry Diroctor Wiehl. Berlin, 24 July 1938 AFFIDAVIT � > VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t ェ am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such ェ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Gertnany (U.S.) . That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and a r c h i v e s . 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture v/ere first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That エ was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 194う；and said captured German Foreign Cffice files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control, ‘ 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct phbtostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which c:;me into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original docxament, of which the attached is a'photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ V/. P. Cuiraning ‘W•一P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel,4GD Acting Adjutant General OFfICS OF MILITARY GCVEiiNK^IvT FOR GSRIviAKY (U.S.) Doc # No. 4043-2 Extract from a letter of Jtob^s^dor OTT - TOKYO - of 15 JVferch, 1939 '‘"'ni^t^r^^T Director WIEHL, \ in the question of our preforential treatment in China I was able to gather from conversations in the ibreign Ministry that itobassador 03FIIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in accordance ^itii our interests /in ISiserem 3inne/. Generally I have the impression that one is not inclined to admit in writing the preferential treateent, “is a way out, one is thinking of a de facto pr^erential treatment which is to be confirmed solely by actual deeds without fixation. However, the actual deeds offered by Japan up to rxow are not very encouraging Signed OTT Copy toj Bureau ram ST.S. POL VIエエ U.S # T.S # W VII Dg. POL Dg. W s igned W U H L AFFIDAVIT ェ> VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth,エ have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said, original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the- Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3 . That エ was a s s i g n e d to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15)1945； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into ray possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original docurnent, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original ig hereby furn- ished ar-d. certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming ‘ W . F. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE CF MILITARY GCVER脇i\T FOR GSRLA^Y (U.S.) DOC 40i|.2E Berlin, 8 fctober iwommim I informed the Japanese Airibassador on i| October that we would like to make use of his offer, thi t ja .an could bxay raw materials from Mother- lands B-St ladies for us ？ in excess of her own demands and pass then on to us • Regarding details of our vaslies T handed him a note with the following contents：り million reichsnark in foreign bills of exchange for tin, rubber and castor-oil plants * seeds or castor o i l . 1 inillion reichsniark in foreign bills of exchange for about 1 iOOO tons of spices • Ja the first place information is requested on the Quantities that can be delivered, and the tiiae of delivery. The amounts of foreign bills of exchar^e could be paid in full to the working associeticn of tha three biggest Japanese business concerns for a receipt and a declaration of obligation that the goods con- cerned would be hanusd over within a period of two months to the confidant on the German side in Da iren (T'anchukuo). in the event of a part cf the goods not being delivered before the expiry of the period of time, the firms promise to pay back the equivalent of the undelivered parts immediately in foreign bills of exchange according t‘： Geraan choice. n The Japanese Ambassador promised to telegraph my information to his govermiieat•放 remarked, he would then suggest to his government that on acquiescence of our proposal on its j^art, it expresses the desire to obtain an enlarged market in Geririany and the countries occupied by Germany or those economically dependent oil Germany for such Japanese -nrcducts, ch Japan, due to the reaction to the Tripartite Pact, will probably not be able any- more to cell in countries cf Fnglish-American influence» to the previous extent. rith regard to this T told the Ambassador that we would be pleased to examine such wishes. ： • ； (signed) WIEHL , CPpies to： St. S. U- 5Jt. ^ c l , p o l VIII 9 DG W, W VII with the request to inform the deDartments and the Ifcbas&y in Tokyo. /l36i.34-5/ AFFIDAVIT ェ> VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such エ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth,1 have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned, to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15)194う；and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the d o c u m e n t to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files ana archives, and which cane into my possession and custody and. under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming . W . p. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY G c v a m u m i f o r g s h m a n y (u.s.) Doc. Ho. 4024 A ら10 Page 1 SECRET STATE AFPAIR Dir. Ha. Pol.丄阶 Berlin, 28 April 1941 Work Frcgran for the Iconomic Sutcommission of The Tripartite Pact in Berlin. I) The eccr-cmiv?. B^ncrr^rission has the task of advisinf； what can be dorie "bet v/e en the countries "belonging to the tripartite Fact in order to secure mubual support, esuecially in the economic field, in war and in the pes七war period. It la^ys down the results of its deliberations in vrovozala tc the main commission. The inaividAial negotiations neces^arj for the cxaoation of the proposals after these have "been appx oved m d n coming ssion, will "be conducted directly "between the particij^awing governments. II) The economic subnisGion will "be charged with examining the possioilitiee ox an accord and mutual BiipP or ^ at firct in the follow- ing fields： 1 ) I n waging the commercial and economic war "bv econouic measures (niilitary measures are dealt with "by the military "Gii'ocom- nission). 2) In the procureEient of raw materials. 3) In construction and extension cf ；plans for • railitary and defense econorny prypara.tions- 4) In the trbilization and exten«ion of trade routes. 5) In the promotion of economic conffcinations "be七ween the stages Idelonging to tiie Tripartite Pact. Ill) Tne examinations and proposals are at firs七"bo include the measures practicable and necossary for the period of the pressnt war, "but should also already now extend as fa- as possible to tiie prepara- tions for the postwar period. IV) In the begir.iiiri,? the po?^i"bilities existing "between the three main powers are to be o^anlriecL, "bu/i: alrea,dy rふow 3 as far as it is possiol^ and neces^ar^, the participation of the other states whicii have joined the Tripartite Pact is to be considered. Internal Eicplaiia七ions On 1 ) t o 5) On l)Meant is, for instance, exchange of economic information be- tween the governments and their repr8senuatives in neutral countries, Doc. Ho. 4024 A Page 2 supervision cf the trade cf ru..a. ; :でeooutri•八• 。lレ,.i c.101̂ " c airtr丄gg, control of inter±"erence purchaser in neutral ccontries, common economic pressure on neutral couirLries, economic measures to deprive the enemy cf shipping space, ！ n s a z u r e s against enemy property, common economic d^fcncie tV̂ airiGt fore:..:";n rasaciires such as freezing of credit, confiscation cf Bhip^, etc, vviiether joint neasr-res for the running of the enemy "blockade shcu丄d be dealt with "by tho military or economic suocomission remains to "be decided. On 2) Matual. support in the -orccurement of raw materials will have to extend to pii::'chasing, transporting and financing. Regarding transport measures coupare So. 4). On 3) Meant is mut'iial transmission of patents and licenses, granting of technical assistance, partnerships regarding capital. On 4) Meant is： a) Qaestion conceding railways, for instance Bjrntonisation of negotiations WjA>h Soviet Riiweia regarding u??e cf the Siberian railway. In doing this the keeping secret of our ajrirangemen七s with Russia must not be endangered, Therefore I Lallan prcCT.rements from the Jar East "by the Siberian railway must; not come to 1?ght. Td) Questicns of ship-oing, for instance improvement of the Japanese shipping lines to Ylaaivcstck, the txsri^por-o of raw materials from the letherlandG-Irxdies, Thailand, Indo—China， and China to Japan; later on also accord in the operation of tha main routes of world shipping. c) QueGtions regarding air transpci i;, for instance ostao丄:Lshment of the air-route Home—!Berlin—Tokyo, later on also accord regarding the main routes of world air transport. Oil 5) Meant is, for instance, removal of orders and iiinaering or limiting exchange of goods; ee七七:?ng up of principles for future loai- ana currency policy, etc. 'To pub the promotion of commercial inter- conrse also "between the countries and areas under the de jure or de fa、:.' supremacy or the influence of Germany, J-taly, and Japan, already now on the order of the day is not recoiu r '.enclscl, "becau.se that night Ifead to the discussion of questions nob yet rive for Judginent, as, for instance, incorporation of the Hetiieriands Indies in tiie G-reat East Asia Sphere, direct trade of Germany with the countries of the G-reat East Asia Sphere etc. AFFIDAVIT ェ> VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such ェ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives v;ere captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred, to, and known as the Berlin D o c u m e n t s C e n t e r . 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit Is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming W. P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of,April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GCVSitMaNT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) • CC. No. 267 0 Page 1 i-DOLF FITLER, German Chancellor 7lis Majesty, The Emperor of Japan, Your Majeotyl by the desire to fill again the post of German Am^a:sador in Tokyo which was vacant owing t« the recall cf Ambassador Dr. Von DIRKSEN,エ have resolved to confer tVis post on Major General EUGEN OTT, Fis "bested qualities entitle me to expect that he will succ^ea in presenting to Your Majesty this letter which is vo accredit M m as my envoy extraordinary and plenipotem:iary s 、 I beg you to receive M m wit>" good will,fully trusting everything that he will be called upon to state in my name or on orders of the German Government. I avail myself of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty of my complete respect and sincere friendship, at the same tims expressing my best wishes for the well being of Your L?jesty and the happiness and welfare 1 of JAPAN. FUNDBRUCK, 5 April 1938. /s/ A . Fitler Ribbentrop -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 C S K T I F I C A T E J^ZQl statement of Sonrce end nthenticit二 I ? 0D0 N a g a M r u , — , Vereby certify tVst I am officially connected with tVe Japanese Government in the following capa- city; Assistant C M g I of the • て 弦 — s 丄 o j j ^ i L , — and that as such official I 'have custody of tre document here- to attacT-cd consisting of T、0 pages、dated_.l_April 1918, and described as f o l l o w s 西 ぶ . は , of Credentials to tYe jap?nsse CoverrDicn'U エ further ccrtify that the attached record end document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and tVat it is part of tトe offi- cial archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also tYe file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of t v e regular location of the document in tte archives or files): Archives Fection Foreign Office. Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of Sept. 1946 9 /?./ NagaT^aru Odo Signature of Official SIAL W i t n e s s T . Pato Asst，Chief,,JVrehivcs Section Officisi Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, John Curtis ,トtrcby certify that I am associated witV tre General Feadquartcrs of t v e Fuprcme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that tl'e above certification was obtained by me from t"he rbove signed official of the Japanese Government in tT-e conduct of ny official tusiness。 Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of 3cDt, 1946 _/s/ J r し Curtis^ 2d Lt_. NAI"IE Witness: /s/ T/4 T. TcCT.chi Investigator Official Capacity Certificate:- I. Ulric v Straus , hereby certify t?at I am t v o r o u g M y conver- sant wit!" t̂ rc Gerr.an and Eny-isV, languages, and as a res-alt of the comparison between the German and the ^gljLsh texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No 0 2670, o c N N /s/ Ulricv .'、0 Straus 1X-C,, I'.Oc � O •ふ Page 1 Icyo,、う ifcrcii 1941 To the Vice 5t>roign Minister] Sir, ェ aa honored to inforn your Sxcelloncy that ェ will leave Tokyo toaしy and will ^o to for a short ti.:i«D i:a order to take part there in che conversations of the Inp^rial Japanese jo reign. Minister, Mr 0 Yosuke MilTSUCK.'^ with. Tiie Fuehrer and Clianccllor and the leaders of the Qernan Gover:iment 0 During ny absence the pienipotentiary minister Dr« Erich Boltzo will conduct tiie business of the Unbaesy in tiie nature of a tanporary charge d'affaires© I avail rjyself of this occasion for again assuring Your Excellency of my high. osteera 0 OTT His r^cellency The xmperic.1 Japanese Vice foreign. Minister IT. 0HA3Hェ Tokyo Doc, ::。• 2c«71 page 2 W.D.C. No. _ _ I.T.S. 一 Stateraunt of Sourco^and Autiienticity I, ODO N^gatiaru, Iiereoy ce-rtify taat I an officially connected Tdth 七 h e Japanese Governraeat in the following capacity 1 Assistant Ciiief_ of tb.e_ju , ciiives 3ect ion — jjoroi^n office _ and. that as such officialエ have custody of the docmacnt hereto attached consisting of 一 o n e dated 5 ^ r c h 1941» ^ ^ described as follows： TeraporarY Lし？マご of Absence of tiie G •し m n ；;:ibassaaor to japan, irojone 〇tt, fro::: his -gost Minister 1 Boltze naaod to fulfill tiie post teuporary. 一 I further corti-y that the attached record and docu:nent is an official dlocuaerit of the Japanese Goverinnent, and taat it is part of the official archives and files of the follo^inc iimod ninistry or depart- inant (specifying also the file nuraber or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of tiie doc^nent in the arciaivos or files)；—ンヒivus Section, ：一 PDreign Office -- 一 Signed at Tokyo — orx thic 26tli da^ or Sept. 1946. Witness： /s/ T. 3ato Nagaaaru ODO Signature of Official (Seal) “sst_ Ciiiof! .ii'chives Section Official Capacity Statc.-icat^of official procure::‘c;iit I, John Curtis, hereby certify tliat エ am associatod T/ith the General Headquarters of tne Suprene Co-ixjider for the iJLlie£' powers, and that tlio above certification vas obtained by ine froia tiie above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of ny official business. Signed at Tokyo 011 tlaia 26th day of Sept # .I946 / s/ J # Curtis t 2nd. Lt. Nane Witness, /s/ ^/k T» To^uchi Investigator Official Capacity -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 Certificate エ,XJlrici'i sじでaユs, hereby certify that エ am thoroughly conversant r^ithtiie n•りrnaニ and Hi^isli languages, and as a result of the conparison between the G^i^ian and Saglish texts,エ havo established that this is a true and correct translation of international prosしcutioii Docu..ient No e 26yic /s/ TArich Ac* Straus DOC 4070B Westphalia t 21 Nov. 1941 Diplogerroa TOkyo N。，2136 T e l ^ r a m in ciphers (Secret Cipher Process") (Secret State-Matter)' in regard to telegram no c 2472 of 18 Ndv» Page 1 Bureau RAM 230 ^ 一 I ask you to inform verbally the leader of the division of Foreign Armies yourself, or, if you consider it to be more correct, through the military attache, of the following in regard to his remarks» You had made a report on this statement to Berlin and. you were to3 that the idea' there of concluding peace or armistice only jointly in aase japan or Gerioariy beocmes involved in war against the united States, no matter for what reason f is looked upon as natural and that one would be ©nxirely willing to put down a corresponding /statement/ in' an agreement to be made for this case. Telegraphic report on execution. RIBBESfTROP /60879/ AFFIDAVIT ェ> VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That In my capacity as above set forth,エ have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign- Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces ynder the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and viere later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August I5j 194う；and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the a t t a c h e d is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming . W . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before rae this 23rd. day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE .Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Ado'utant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GCVEHM^^T P'OR GSRIwANY (U.S.) DOC 4070 Page 1 To be kept in locked file Tokyo Arrived Telegram (Secret ciRXer Process 23 Nov 191il 24 ndv 19tl 10c00 s 3o00 hours NOo 2526 of 23 N3V 19kl Fost Urgent For the Reich Foreign Minister e x) RAM 230 m answer to telegram Kb e 2136 x) cf 21st. I first informed General 0IC..M0T0 orally through the military attache of the above telegraphic instructions, adding that 丁 \.bs myself prepared for discussions any time。 General CKAMOTO then aslced to received by me and in a subsequent conversation made the following statement. The Japanese Minister of 想r Expressed his deepest gratitude for the statements ^iade through the Military Attache« He, CKAF〇T0 f 洒 s very pleased to find the fact once mors confirmed that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of a conflict w^th the United States. H3 asks for informa- tion whether , in my opinion, G e m ^ n y would likewise consider herself to be at war with the T、So in the event of a Japanese commenc€ar,ent of var against her I referred to the formulation of -the above mentioned telegraphic instructions and to our readiness to conclude/a reciprocal agreement on this matter. CKAM0T0 declared the army be made on an advance in the So- talks would have to be awaited set for these discussions, the season favorable for an operatii ^'ehrmacht/ asamed that a decision would soon ith. To be sure, the result of the KURUSIT- [irst. Even if no final time limit had been irmy surely insists on speeding up since the )n in the South ras imminent • With regard to operationa]J intent ions, 丁 gc’t the follovdng impression from the conversation. A surprise occupation of Thailand about as far as the Kra isthraus seems to be pi? .niied. At the same time seizure of the oil wells of ]MDrth and B^st Borneo should take place. Tt seems not yet to have been decided how the Philippines should be dealt with* J explained, in connection with earlier instrucrfcions that, with the presupposition of the preparation of sufficient forces* in view of American weakness, a hesitant attitude would be initially possible and suitable, in order to drive the U-S. to a decision, difficult from the domestic political standpoint, 011 entry into the v;ar. t further pointed to the necessity of stopping American supplies to Vladivostok, vniiich?appeared to be obvious to QKAIviOTO. DOC 4070 Page 2 OKAMOTO expressed his thanks for my stat^mexits, aid declared he hoped to be able to inform me soon of the result of further deliberations of the anny c He requested me to treat the conversation Confident ially and in the first place to confine /it/ to ariiy/Wehrinacht//chamels. I got the impress ion from the coiyrersation that discuss ions v/ithin the army /I'^hrmacht/ hadbecome much more >6oncrete, but that a decision on the question of ail ad% r anc8 in the South .fed not yet been reached. OTT AFFIDAVIT ェ> VV. I- . Cum'ming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15，1945； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which v/as captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into ray possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. T h a t said o r i g i n a l document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming W. ~P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde 一 G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GCVSR腿ENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.) Doc. No, 2593 Page 1 "From: Berlin "To: Tokyo "29 November 1941 "#1393 (in 3 parts, ccnipiete) ； ' ノ "By his request ? I vras supposed to have called on Foreign Minister R i b b e n t r o p darir.g the evening of yesterday, the 28th a Suddenly, however, he requested taat tiie time te postponed and it v;as net imtil ]lCh30 at night that I finally saw hia. "This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long con- ference of the bigwigs of tha government and military, fron Goering down, was being held at the official residence cf the Fuehrer. The. war against the Soviet rnion has now taksn definite shape and the outcome can "be unerringly foretold. Next year ’ s campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into considera- tion the points brought up at the conf'arence cf the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe, It is an ab- solute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference。 ”1.Rib"bentrori opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japenese-U.S. negotiations. I replied tnat I had received no official word, "Ribbentrop； 'It is essential that Japan effect the New い： Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will bo a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time ? and Gerinany goes ahead and estab- lishes her European New Order, all the m i l i t a r y might cf Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan。 "'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, thars are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States . We have received advice to the effect thaセ there is practically no hope of the Japanesc--IJ«Sa negotia- tions being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front. "'If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I an confident that that will not only be to the interest of Ger- many and Japan jointly, but would bring atout favorable results for Japan herself. 1 -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 " ェ ： ' I can n?ke no definite statement ns I an not aware of any concrete intentions of <.rapr.no Is Your E;-:cellency indi- cating that ？. state of ac tual is to 'be es cataished between Gnr^iany and the United Statesこパ11 "Ribbentrop: Roosevelt 1 s a fanatic , so it is impossible to tell whrt h© would do.' "Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Rio"ben- trop has said in t'ne pp.st thot the United States would undoubted- ly try to avoid neoting Gernan troops", ？nd from the tone of. Hitler's recent speech r.s well r.s thrt of Ribbentrop ! s, T fael that Gernan attitude toward the United States is being consid- erably stiffened, There are indicaticns at present that Germany would net refuse to fight the United States if necessary» "2, I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union. "Ribbentrop: 1 The Fuehrer has stated that he is now deter- mined to crush the Soviet Ifnion to an even greater extent than be had planned first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state p.nd went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives h?.d bsen attained arid that a greater part of the Gern?n ti-oops would shortly be brought back to Ger- many. "'Following up "liiose campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be lnilnched in ,, liext sprirt-ĝ i^ernany will advance to and cross tiie Ural Mountains and cha^e Stalin deep into Siberia. f "I: 'Approximately when do you expect that?' "Ribbentrop: ; The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules. ! "I: 'According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bi c in her Russian campaign, We hope that air coniiee.じions between Gernsiny and Manchukuo can be established st an early tine. 1 "Fiibbentro-/: 'That is ?.n item tha^-Oerman^ has boen con- sidering for some tine， By summer o.fノ关xt year 1 do not Relieve that air connection from the Ural^ar-^a to Mrnchuka^- will te an (Part 2) inpossitility -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 "3• I then asked him aboî .c the on.npirLgn against Englar.d proper to which he replied 七}!？it before IsnniMng landing opera- tionS against Englard, G^x-nany 7r\11 probably comyj.ete'iy wipe out Britain 5 s inl'lusracs in tlia î 'aar E':ist v Aj.'ric.a,, Ri bral car and the Mediterranc?an S e a , 1 " g o t the .impress -o:.i that a emphasis IS being placed cn this area than here bofore * So r I ？.sked whether it was Qenn^ny1" s intention to concrade the war Tirithou'l; attempting to go tlirough with a campaign against Eng- land 0 "Ribbentrop: 'Germany lias, of course，made all necessarv preparations for th^.3 こ-ampp.ign。 Kowever, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seon to indicate tiiat all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives； that Chur- chill' s influence is on the wane; that Be'vin, Chief of the Labor Party, is rdvocatlng revolutionary neasures n All of these are tending to nake the preser-'aticn of order there in- creasingly difficult., u 1 Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this• However, I am convinced, that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances. it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may caa-iie Englard to fall even without our going through with car landing operations against England herself. • 1 M In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England, We are determined to remove all British influence from E'aでops« Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs, The Island Empire of Britain nay remain, but all of her other possessions throTighout the world will probably be divided three ways by Gernanj^ the United. States, and Japan。 In Africa 5 Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were fornerly G e m a n colxnies, Italy will be given the greater share cf the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russiaノ "4。 In concltision, I said: 'I am fully aware of the fact •that Germany ‘ s war campaign is progressing according to sche- dule smoothlye However, suppose that Germany is f a c e d ?dth the situation of having not only Great Britain as an sctual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such eircuns.ta.nces, the vrar area will undergo considera>le expansion, of course 0 ' Wnat is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality? 1 Docuncnt No. 4002 Page 4. "Ribbentropt ： 'We would like to end this war during next year, However, under certain circumstances, "it is possible that It will have to be continued on into the following .yaar, " 1 Should ^ap^n becone engaged In a: ‘ war さ g a i n s t the United States, Germany, of ccnii-̂ e，. would join the war imediately。 TheTe is stisolutely no possibility of Gern&ny : s entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances The Fuehrer is determined on that•point.' • • ： • • •.‘ “ "In. closing this conference. Foreign Minister•Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our tsiks "be kept a strict secret Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this m e s s a g e * ' "I have shown copies of this .message to the military and naval attache' s Lt e -Gen» (Vice Adjn,?) Nomura, ahd Maj-Gen (Rear Adn'•？) Abfî , Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in. Tokyo-, too, 、’...， .•'. . . . . . . . ("In 'the last section of the first 'part of this message, we TOotfe ' 1 the U t S-. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops' That should have read: { the U.S. would un- doubtedly try to avoid war，..） 2 5 5 5 6 ^ “ *See end of nessag©. (D) M v y Trans. 12-1-41(7) Doc。 No。 2593 S E C R E T 7AR DEPARTIENT ,r AR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF INT3LLIGSKCE DIVISION ^ASHirGTON 25， D. C. 24 July 1946 I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the T 7ar and Navy Departnents, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is h u m a n e possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script。 /s/ Carter ¥ . Clarke CAHTSH W。 CLARKE Colonel, G.S.C. S E C R E T Doer. 21J37D Page へ ‘ ‘ス . � . J , iixcerpt^ from Interr ogaticn of dcxied ？ebruar-y-^.1ジム 6ニ s^a to ask.) but I y。u proceed with up arcana the first 、.’n ttio Japar..3 3e Governuient to Tae gi'.sv of this ^ele^raiD .•む.s a^ folic，.觀 i that the Jaoan.3ge Ck^-era^ent in caoo of a ^iilved • •； e s ^ J n n aマ角 conflict aesir a'l Gd。;：, 3 paT nicipa wicit in tin ̂ mr.. and rur thi；:.? i that tb.e Japanese G o v e r c m e rんふし t i v ^ a tic- s-para i：̂ paac^ ;pact be signed. In this regard エ had heard some-n^e ia November ‘ani had comreyed this news be Japan $ from a man a?.mod Die-briohi ’ the chax (head of the O-exman press u:odeT' Goebbels^ ,th^ Propaganda Mirxis-'cer) ^ that nitler would be in favor o:iT 丨 entering the cĉ ni'IIc'c in case a United St-ates-Japs.D.ese comMict \ startedo Basel on this informatics the Japanese Governmen-：. In this telegram to me 3ts.ted that they ^ere desjJ'ous of hav].:Gg hb approach Hitler in regard tc German^/" s entry in case of war ¥;ith t.he United States,^ n 0, o General ff I have some aueations on. tbe.se nHt J ; think we -will clefer those for a time and let your narra tiveo "A C The no-Separa be peace pa^t vaベ firどt V»rc>ugh.t or second of D^oeidl'Sr 2.̂ -u ？ ty a telegrai)..r.r エ n t e r r o g a t i o n of C^BIAm Eiroshi dated 27 February .191|.6J General,yoa may prcoeed with your narrative at the point where you left off y^st^iixrrjo % ‘ t "Ao To clear up this before 1 go any fur;ふe‘t̂ a]most since the beginning <2).f unitoo t̂a-.'es apanesa tales 山 haj. received s.bso.lutv̂ no •information concerning uheir progress froia the Japanese Gove’.，•ヒ menj 3 nor had 丄 : c e o e i v e-1 euy iiij"crmat';： c:a abou,J: relations -Aitb. the Suvier, Uniorio The inajn reason for tb is p I be lieve y wmb th.3t formerly we had used ccuriej'3 ':o car；)：;/ information of ob.ia sort but due to the 6:if:f bie^ bocaiise of the Geimaj：- Soviet v/ar •じhis becaiaa inpossiblc； ‘ a.r A cJ for ae our ivy 7 aason^ no c、mしmioai:土 on,r; o"!? 3-yrv 7/ere . ^ e u t A r c u n d t he 2Sj ch or 30 ch oT Hc./ejiher ^ 〕.i-e0c;i'7ed word Japan tc i.he effect t La 1；S3 じ rs じary of 31: axe Hull^8 reply ox、Novejnl,s：：' 26 ? tc- j'apaneae ]pr‘:.!.：TO? eic^'em^ly seve!；? in tone. NOT; lincli about what- ube N-S^obiatioa^ had covered 0 エ was no*; abi e to make an ana,!：/'-ひト bte -situat'Lcrî tn "beiug the first; coimnaD ic a t io :a regarding "'fcn.tecl >S ：. a to 3 aoa ns 3 ̂ i/ Doc, 2157D Page 2 negotiations that : ha 1 received^ Following this, I believe it •was arour.d て}!。ぃrd of ̂ ovc^bez 1 cv the very beginning of December, f エ rec.eiVGd ar.otae.v c(rarr;mic^tion i:o the ef feOu that the Japanese I Governme^-t had an cr̂ 'ler to it^ Consulates in tho United I States jco Jnza all h.rh a very small portion of their codeso Did the 3e coirnroi) icaticB^ all come from the ?orei3n Off ice 夕 H A 0 Yesc Now $ these were the two comiunications that エ had receive5 before the orders frcxa the Crcverrnnent regarding the no-separate peac^j pact 9 cf v/hich I have told you« This message that you referred to yesterday that you got cn. the first or the second of December I94I came froiii the foreign Office also, did it? M A a I am not absolutely certain whether this ccannunicatiori re girding the no-separate peace pact came before cr aftor the one that told me of the orders to burn, code boo.u's» In any case エ may be a couple of days off in my dates and 丄 have the feeling that this one regarding the no-separate peace was around the third of December - エ just wish to clear up this matter cf dates, "A, These telegrairs or those despatches that you received from the Foreign Off ice s エ suppoGe 9 were all signed M^TSUGEAな "A^ MTSUOEA was no lor.ger ？ o r o i g n Minister at this time.) In any casG 0 signabu.ra or no signature, all these despatches came from the Foraiga M i n i s .し T h e Foreign Minister at this time was TCXJO^. 冷 冷 氺 Doc. No. 1418 E Page 4 Gen. No. 37421 Telegram No. 1405 / (Ambassador 1 s Code) To: Foreign 3itLnister~I^0 (B6c'd 3 Dec 1941) From: Ambassador OSKIHA (BeWAn) Despatched 2 Dec 1941 Top Secret / Referring to your telegram No. 140lT?-- ( 1 ) I n accordance to his request, I visited the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop again at 7200 P.M. of the 1st (Gaus in attendance). Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stated that, much to his regret, he has been unable to contact Chancellor Hitler today, due to the location, but believes that he night be able to contact hin the following day or probably'the day after tonorrow, and since the German side fully understands the haste on the part of Japan, utmost efforts shall be exerted to contact Hitler, -z „ (2) On that occasion Gaus asked ne, in regard to the question of immediate participation in wars against America, whether it would be proper for him to interpret the aforenentioned obligation as being mutual；to which your Ambassador gave affirnative answer. Furthermore, in regard to the "draft of the declaration providing- for non-conclusion of separate peace", I stated that in ny opinion it would be better for the three countries of, Japan-Gernany-Italy to issue a ；joint declaration since a Japanese-German and a Japanese-Italian declaration issued separately would be too juridical and feared to produce less political effects. However, since Foreign Minister Ribbentrop earnestly requested ne not to despatch any telegran to Japan to that effect as the natter has not yet received the approval of the Chancellor, I re- quest that you will take this matter into consideration. (3) As mentioned previously, I have not yet succeeded in contacting Chancellor Hitler. However, as soon as it becone possible, your Ambassador shall meet hin and directly suggest to hin the import of your instructions. D c c . N o . 1532A Prge 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No.1532A Str.tcnent of Scurco rnd Aut1"cnticity I, FAYASFI Kaoru, hereby ccrtify t^c.t I rn officielly connected with the Jr.pr.ncsc Governncnt in the following cr.prcity: C^ief of tYc Archives Scction, Jr. pr no so Foreign Office, and that cs such official I Ir.ve custody of the dociment hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, drtcd , 19 , and described c.s fellows: Tclcgrr.ni fron Ambr.ssr.dor OsMria despctchcd 2 Dcc 1941 to Foreign Tinistcr Togo, rcc 'cl 3 Dcc 1941, No. 1405. (Gen. No. 3 7 4 2 1 )ェ further ccrtify that the r.ttochcd rccord p.nd docuncnt is r.n cfficie.1 docuraent cf t^c Jrprncse Govormcnt, r.nd tトr-t it is part of the officirl r：revives rnd files of the icllowing nrnod ministry or deprrt- ncnt (specifying r.lso the file rrunber or citcticn, if any, or any other official designrtion cf tl-e regular locr.ticn cf t^c docuraGnt in tYc crchives or files): Foreign Officc, Signed at Tokyo cn t M s 3rd dr.y of Sept., 1946 /s/ K . KP^-sM Signrture of Official SEAL Witness : /s/ Tckegoro Sato Official Cepacity S tatcncnt of Officir.l Procurerient エ， E d w r r d P. Lonrghan, hereby certify tVat I m rssocir.ted wit ト tte Generr；! Feedquarters of t>~e Sup rone Coranandcr for the Allied Powers， end t^et t尸e stove described docunent wrs obtained by me from tl°e r.bove signed officiol cf t>e Jrpanose Gcvernncnt in the conduct of Eiy official business. Signed c.t Tokyo on this 3rd dey of Sept.,1946 /s/ Edwr.rd P. l onr.ghp.n m m Witness: /s/ Richard H。Lr.rsh Investigator, IP? Officir.1 C&pp.city Doc. No. 2593B S E C R E T WAR DEPARTI1SNT WAR DEPARTJSOT GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WASHINGTON 25, E. C. 24 July 1946 I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japarvese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated, by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departncnts, and are accuratc and authentic to the best of ny knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script. /s/ Carter W. Clarke CARTER T. CLARKE Colonel, C-.S.C. Doc. No, 2593 Page 85 "From: Rome "To: Tokyo i "3 December 194-1 (Pnrple-CA) " # 9 8 5 "Re your message #985* to Berlin. "On this day, at 11 o'clock in the norning, I accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the develop- ments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin. "Mussolini: 1 1 have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks fron the very beginning and therefore an not at all surprised to receive your report. As a natter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should, say-thaレthe out- come was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the ains of the United States is to nake the Far East her own, fron an economic standpoint. I.,have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first-snd then inter- vene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature. - "'As Your Excellency さnd Your Excellency 1s predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I an one who is firnly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.' "I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to para- graph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being nade between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop.) "With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal,i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the' British navy checked in the Mediterranean. Doc. No. 2593B Page 2 1 2 - 6 - 4 1 ( W : "Mussolini: 'Recently, the formation of an Italian- Gernan air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now. 1 "Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare vrar on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise imediately? Mussolini replied s 'Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Gernany would also be obligated to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this pointノ "With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message 7 f987***, as one proposal, and asked hin whether he preferred It to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done sinultaneously v/ith Gernany it did not make nuch difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of nore strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAJCKENZEIJ. "Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all. (Translator's note: Up to this point, message was in Purple-CA. The following paragraph was not encoded, in the CA. Cannot find phrase referred to, in the text) "In the first part of this message, please correct 'N-NKEM T 7A' to 'KINKENSHA W A “ _) Navy Trans (D 53 52 55) 25833 JD-1： *JD-ls 69ベ-3 (S. I。S。#255 **JD-1； 6944 (S。I.S. #25554 ***Not available. - D o c . No. 1418 E Page 1 COUNT CIANO DIARY * * * December ス， 1 9 4 1 Sensational move "by Japan. The Japanese Ambassador asks for an audience wit v the Duce and resds him a long statement on tトe progress of t^e negotiations with America, concluding wit>. the assertion that they "have reached a dead end. Tben, invoking the apposite clause in the Tripartie Pact, ！be asks that Itsly declare war on America immediately after tトe beginning of hostilities between Japan and America and that Italy and Japan sign an agreement not to conclude e separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving t"he right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased witlp the communication. He said: "We are now on t^e brink of the inter-continental war which エ predicted as early as September 1939•“ Wlrat does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt ト a s succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into t、e war immediately end directly, he Yes entered it indirectly by letting M m s e l f be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, end t^at it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. WT^o will be be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, "because Fitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive. December 4，1941 Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of facing Americ?'s intervention pleases てトe Germans less and less。 Mussolini, on tトe other hand, is pleased about it. I receive a message from Gainbara. Naturally, be is offended by the fact that t^e command was given to Rommel, but aside from t M s he regards tYe siguation as difficult end full of unknown factors. Nistri - wトo is an ardent Fascist snd an intelligent officer - is very pessimistic ？lid adds verbally the things w^ich Gambara was unwilling to put in writing. Fe says that the exhaustion of our troops is considerable, that t^e enemy has infiltrated all parts of Cyrenaica end ? finally, tl^at we are not in a -Doc. No. 1418 E Page 1 position to witトstand en e»rly res-umption of t^e British offensive^ shall \iake it a gloriou^ fight to tトe end," be conclijried, "However| t M » will not prevent |.t from being t^e end霹 , December ヲ， 1 9 4 1 A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two dsys, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my." house to submit a plsn for triple action on Japanese intervention and tl̂ e p l e d g e not to make a separate peace. Fe wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and t^e latter vjas very glad I Vadn't• I gave Mussolini a copy of Gambara 1 s letter, from wMcト, however, I l̂ ad removed the anti-Roramel points. The Duce is so proud of having given the conunand to fhe Germans that be would —ave been furious with Gainbara» All tトe more as Cavallero is working toward this end； he ^as no love for Gambara. Their characters differ: one is a 3oldier, tie other a scheming politician. December 6.1941 I write a few lines in answer to Gambara*s letter - lines of friendship and good wishes. But the situation is not improving in Libya, end I am afraid that we are facing bitter days. December 7 T 1941 Bad news from Libya• Our forces are no longer able to attempt a prolonged resistance 5 it will be necessary to "break off contact witト tine enemy and break it off decisively in order to attempt e defense of tトe Djibel. Mussolini is calm end even talks of the possibility of rallying• Cavallero, on t^e other hand, is gloomy, and ト e regards everything as dependent on Frenc v concession of the harbor of Bizerte. Fe thinks I should discuss this with Darlan on Wednesday. However, in tine evening Mackensen comes to tell me in Ribbentrop's name that I must not start any definite negotiations wit、 tトe French on this subject. This is Fitler's exact wish of v/hicト Mussolini ト a d already "been informed through Rintelen. Fitler is right. Tunis is 101 percent de Gaullist; any inopportune pressure would serve only to ト s s t e n the separstion of the French Empire from the Vichy Government. But, according to Csv?llero, without Bizerte, Libya is lost. Doc. No. 1418 E rage 3 マ い ” This morning the Duce was much (irritsted by tトe small number of casualities in East Africa X Sixty-seven men were killed at Gondar in November 5 IdybO^ were taken prisoner. It does not take any long reflection to understand these figures mean. December 8,1941 A night te]epVone scJ1 from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about tトe Japanese attack o丄i America• is 30 Trappy ニ"bout it tY~s.t I am rappy witr ^ trough エ am net too sure about the final advantages of -.7'rat happenec\ One t M n g is now certains tl°at Amerio.r will enter t^e c o n f l i c t , and that the conflict will Lo so long t^at she will be able to realize all "her potently.', ipecru This morning I told this to the King vパつ0 トad Leen pJ.ca^od about the event. Fe ended by admitting that in the : 'long run" I may be rig^t. Mussolini was happy too. For s long time he ト e s wented the reel relations between Ar-erics and tVe Axis to be definitely clarified. In Libya things seem to be going a little better. In 计 e Dtice's opinion, tire danger of t、e last forty-eight >ours is past. BotV Cavpllero end Admiral Riccardi i-nform rae that t^ere will be a great navel operation to force the blockade on t、e 12th,131^, and 14tV of t^is rnontv. All the s、ips end all t^e sdmirals on t^e sea• Feaven send us good luckI Mackensen gives an account of the conversations between Goring, Petain, end Darlan. No facts; words, suggestions, end advice. I do not t v ink that my interview willトeve any better results. December 9.1941 At Turin to av/ait the arrival of Admiral Darlan. December 10.1941 I have made e verbal transcription of t^e meeting witト Darlan. Fe makes a favorable impression: a little man. energetic, wilful and somewhat abrupt, x&o talks without beating about the bush end calls a spade e spsde. Fc is s. soldier v/̂ o is having a taste of politics, and since he is a Frenchman he maneges it 'jvltY a certain finesse. Sincere? I would not like to commit myself except on one point: Tre is sincere in M s Vetred of t^e British. Certain words and certain expressions cannot be feigned. Furthermore, Tre declares t^at for ト.im, personally, t^ere is no cl-oice; if the British were to win the \var, M s fate would not "be pleasant. Docuncnt No. 4002 Page 90. Results of yesterday 1 s meeting: None, except for an i m p r o v e m e n t in r e l g t i o n s v/itト t h e F r e n c h } w h i c h， i n s n y case, is not difficult to acMeve^ It is enough for us to see each o t h e r . R e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e wトen w e uo n o t see each o t t e r . And t v i s ^ s s alv/eys b e e n t^e r e c i p e u s e d b y M u s s o l i n i viYen h e d e s i r e d a b r e e k . V/hen he h a s tplked to t h e m , ^e h i m s e l f ト a s n o t b e e n a b l e to p r e v e n t s r a p p r o c h e m e n t . E v e n the p o p u l s t i o n of T u r i n w a s c o r d i a l toward the guests? a p p l a u s e , t^ougV s c a t t e r e d , was n o t l a c k i n g . Amazing reports of t v e Japanese navel victories continue to arrive. The military situption, however, in Liby? rnd Russia, is not very good. T^ese ere tトc. incredible surprises of tレis war. Docember II.194-1 M u s s o l i n i t ? k e s very l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n t v e D a r l a n c o n v e r s a t i o n . F e is occupied wit^i t v o u g V t s of w a r a g a i n s t A m e r i c a . A t 14：30 I r e c e i v e t^e C h a r g e ' d ' A f f a i r e s , s n i c e , rs.ther timid man witト whom I ^ave never had much contact. He thinks thrt I ト e v e smnoned M m in order to discuss the arrest of sone journalists but エ immediptely set ト i m right. E e p a l e s as Ye — e a r s t're d e c l a r a t i o n of w p r . Ye s a y s , "It is very t r a g i c T v e n he gives mc s personal messpge from Phillips who, realizing t v at tho zero ト o u r was near, had t e l e g r e p h e d to e x p r e s s M s g r a t i t u d e end e x t e n d M s good wishes to me. Phillips is a fine men, and he ltves Italy; I em sure t T "st t、is is s sad day for M c u Mussolini spoke from the balcony. A s^ort and cutting speech wトicv fell upon e square overflowing witト people. Demohstration showed much _jpro-Japanese sympathy; the news of the n p v e l v i c t o r i e s 下 a s e xcited the i m p g i n e t i o n of the I t a l i a n s • On tYe h o w e v e r ^ t h e d e m o n s t r r t i o n w a s not very entl-asi?stic ； it must not be forgotten it w e s tfrce o ' c l o c k in i、e a f t e r n o o n , t v e p e o p l e w e r e h u n g r y , end tトe d e y w e s r?tlher c o l d . T h e s e p r e f g c t o r s w ^ i c h are n o t c o n d u c i v e to a r o u s i n g e n t h u s i a s m . In the evening Ribbentrop asks us to join s German move to urge t^e countries of the Tripprtie Allienee to declare wer on the United States. W〜t about Sppin? December 1 2 ? 1 9 4 1 The Vic h y press spe?ks of the cordiplity of the reception in Turin and tト.is V P s inede t>~e Duce nervous. I gave M«cken- sen tVe report of my telle witv Dprlan; I emphasized t^e gdvissbility of sending ？ political representative to Vic^y. T M s w o u l d a l s o d e p r i v e the A r m i s t i c e Coronission of.tトe politicpl functions it is not competent to carry out end wVic'i generals do not alv;?ys handle very successfully^ Docunont No,137 � Page i T ^ E G R A M (Secret Cipher Process) r,1 0 B? W r I'd LGHKED FILE Tokio 5 December 1941 5 0100 hour- Arrived, 6 December 1255 h。'.ニ No. 2657 of 5 D9c-,uoer 1 9 ^ Si. T H For the Reich Fcx ci.gn >Iln:ister In strict confidence I was n-nfcr^ed from a Fo.-sigr KinivStry source that the Japanese reply to zhe Araeri^an note of November 26 has not been sent yet. The reply is expected to be composed； but finn. It will declare that American principles are not applicable to the Far East. It is expected that then the United Str^e.z will break off the negotiations. Upon an oral inquiry by Secretary cf State Hull to uhe two Japanese Ambassadors as tc the aim of the Japanese preparations in Indo-China, they have been instructed to reply that the Japanese Government is making preparations which have become necessary in view of Chinese massing of troops in Yunnan, The preparations are, further- more, being kept vdthin the limits of the contracted stipulations with France, as has been declared in the meaivhijie by Vichy. The confidante notices in this connection that e. iimitation oi tho nvjnber of troops to 25,000 exists only for Northern Irdo-Chirid^ whi丄o no maximum limitation has been stipulated in the agreement for the South. The Foreign Ministry is at the moment endeavoring to strass vis-a-vis us the determination of Japan to take measures against the encircloment. For instance it was intimated to Italian liinbassy which apparently has not been notified about the Imperial Confer once at the end ci 丄 ast week about which 0 S K I M will have informed Perl in, that Italy must start considerations to v;hich other pov:or she wishes to transfer the handling' of her interests in the futuro. A leading official of the Foreign Ministry stated in a conversation that Japan has always been of the opinion as already announced by MA.TSU0KA, namely, that Article III of the Tripartite Pact is to be considered as applicable in any conflict botneen one of the three powers and the United Statos except in the ease ン for exaiiipie, that one of these powers would for ins bance attack without reason the American Continent. I took proper cognizance of this* SHIHATORI explained to 刃e that tho leading circles of Japan have come to tho corv/ictioR that Roosevelt v:ants nov/ to ontor the war by means of a conflict in the Far TCast. From various sides the opinion has been advocated that the United Statos aro now sure of the coalition of tho A B C D States and Russia^ which has Document No, 1374. Page 2 boon striven for for sioro than ten years • Therefore, IloosevaL*c believes that the moment for a sottloaient has come, since cno cannot be certain of tho adhcrcnce cf these ？ t s t e s in the future• Deliberations are under xray i n F o r e i g n Hin'.siuy in uhich manner Japan should Gpen a corxflict 忍hiじh cannot bo avoided •11:-oy tend to tho opinio：'： that for reasons of intorior politics it un- avoidable to dociara tho e::istcncG of a state ぐ.ひ or to declare war on America si:? 4 rltanooiasly or after tho bog.i^xing of hostilities, I have in acoorcia:\cc xiith the hitherto existing iuatructions about official stâ oi'ic-a-js advocated the opinion that if: a direct attack is avoided >s (r.hc cic'.で ocxo cf the cablo is missing) , • • * co*uId bo put upon tho ILiJ.vcd Sta^o-i fev ^.hie diffic,で：/•う rogardring cntranco into the war« In ぐ/1 c.h(-: L?iportar/i：- role vjた:iご]:i-̂ his point might play in tho gradual a^prava d^ri of the- Iridic n and in tho conflict botivoon tho whicn I have frc^'-^" ̂ 7 c^ionod I TOuld apprcciauo an early instruction• (sigGoa.； I , E . S . D A N L Y , j-ierebj? - cortify: 1 . T h a t エ an Ciiief of the Document Division of the エntei.na、tional Prosecution Section, G-.H. , 3.C.A.P., and as such iicive poEGe3Gion, custody and control of original or copies cf captured eae^y docu丄ents obtained oy the said Section. 2. That the attached document was delivered, to ニle by the United States Der.artiient as being a print of a raicrofilia in the files of the Liepart.aent cf State, v^iich was cidde of a Geri.ian dGCuaent capturod by ^aericBii uilitary forces in Europe, ^nd such docu:aent, has been continuously in ray custody ti^co sach delivery. E . E . U L Y document Ho. 4002 Page 94 TOP SECRET Aufz. Pue 66/41 gRs Reception of tho Japanese MbassadLor, General Oshiraa, "by the Fuehrer on 14 DbこsmLer 1941 9 from 1300 to 1400 o* clock in the pre- sence of the Roich foreign Minister。 t First the 5\ieh.rer prenonts Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Mariu of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowlorlges Ids services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperatiorij v.iiich. lias now obtained ite culmination in a close "brother- hood of arm':、， General Oyhimp. expresses his th-onks for the great honor and emphasizes how .^lad he is that this "brotherhood of arms has now cone ahout "between G-ermany and Japan* The Fuehrer coiitirmes•• "You gave the right declaration of warl" This method is til© only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as pos- si'ole # But If tha/t ie^ii^ei^e^ted^aiilj^in^putting one .玲 H , in shaming and humiliating one, and is not will int to come to an .agroement, then one should strike 一 一 as hard aa paaailile, indeed 一 一 and /not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese, He himself negotiated with infinite patience at timer, for exnnrple, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realised, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. Ee would continue to go this way in the future. The Japanese G-ovornnent did indeed not act thoughtlessly; it had^ he nust say, shown angelical patience toward that ruffian, Roosevelt^ There is a German proverb, saying; "The most virtuous cannot livo in peace if his evil nei^h"bor dislikes it" # The so are words containing a "bitter truth. If the neighbor is unwilling, one just has to destroy him # The enbry of Japrx. into the war was a great relief to Germany, He must freely aclmit having "been worried about the prospects for success of the sulDmrine war. How could a commander tell when ho could torpedo and when not? AD.erican ships went in convoys and under dimmed lights, ai5.cl besides the ^jnericano had delivered to the English 50 destroyers of a type of which they themselves had 80 more. One could not expect a U— "boat commander to work t h r o u ^ an entire "book "before each torpeding in DociimGiit Ho. 4002 Page 2 ordor fco es.bablisli whether the ship were English or American, The U— "boa*c conaanders had "been under an intolerable psychological strain, for in ths lant aa^J.ysis each one of them felt tho enormous responsi- "bility at the tno^k-t that ho ini^ht "bring his country into a new war "by a misjudged torpsdoing^ These days were now definitely past. He had given tho Gor.nan T J一"boat commanders orders to torpedo everything in siglit. The G-ernan surface naval forces could also feel moro free to operate. Up till now iiaerican ohips had stood nearly and radioed until the British navcul forces： without any posaiTDility for the G-emans to clef end themselves against this» Ee would now send the U— "boats up to pcrtr, and would not have to take the three-mile zono into consider ax ton any raore. He v tho PaGii.o^iv was convinced that Soosevelt mast "be tnat en. It was a grea-'o feat of t-he cTapaneso that they had destroyed at tiie very staxb the niribus Au.ican superiority. Then he tells of th© American fighting cap t ?,oi(;yj, which he does not consider high, and gives examples fron tiie year 19丄8。 At that time the Gernan troops were e2diausted and tired and the OI:GS fresh and well fed. ！ l e v e r t h e l e B e , wherever G-ermans net A r :iericaa$^ tiie latter were so thoroughly "beaten that they re- quired weeks before they could "be sent into action again* How could troops whose God i3 the dollar hold firm to the last? CI ear conditr.ons had now "been created. A weight had "been liftea fron the minds of the Crerman U—"boat c o m m a n d A l l the Jewisli con- cepts like ''v/ostorn heinisphere"j, "^OO-niile zone", etc. had "become \m- tenrJble. Germany would make the ocean insecure. In 1939 he had faced an inrportant decision. He would either have had to send the German U-'"boats into com"bat and would then have had no raore crews for the PUDsecaient mass production, or he would havo had to use the greatest -part of the available U-lDoats for training purposes, in order to have s'affiaient sub marine personnel for the future. Thank Gocl, he had decided to adopt the second solution, and this would now have its effect， since 19,20 even 24 U-"boats would "be put into ser- vice monthly. The imager of our U-"boats would increase enormously each, month, especially since, on the average, we had hitherto lost less than two U-"boats a month. General Oshizna tello the fuehrer that Japan had fought under similarly difficult conditions, vhon Hanking was "bcia"be4 and th© pilots had orders to spare the foreign legations under all circumstances. This was en iiirnossilDle restraint for the pilots^ It was infinitely fortunate, the Fuehrer continues, that now he could relieve the men in the submarines of the resp nsilo illty and now once nore "bore it hit . '"Doc-Jiaent Uo # 4002 Page 3» On the remaining front there now o came the vrinter standstill. Unfortunately a temperature drop of 38 had occurred ri^it in the miさdie of the devolopment of a hi疼 operation. Any operation ceases at such a temperntirre* Besides the "burden for the individual nan of fight- ing in this cold weather^ there is the trouble v,ith the notorized vehicles. Above all, however, the automatic weapons would not o-nerate any nore. Of course, rone operations would "be cocipletod. First, Sevastopol must "be taken: the preparations for this were almost Can- eluded。 Then， the ciego of Leningrad would "be continued f and third, p.7 he hoped soon to "be aole to resume tho operations in the direction of the Caucasus, He n^s'L align the remaining sectors of the Ens tern front on as short a 13ne aa -po^ible^ corresponding approximately to a straight lino from Leningrad to Ta r 7anrog. This would th^en give him the possibility of v/ithdrawin^： the nooorised r»jid arnored units and the "best infantry d i v i s i o n i n order to freshen then up during the winter. Large-scale op or nti one would then oe resumed, in the spring. In the mea:itin6 he would now take strong action in the Mediterranean^ IText week 5 51 Goxman U^boats would "be in the Mediterranean, and in the mean tine a large rxmo cr of motor torpedo "boats had also arrived there, Tho Luf bwaff£ was noring an entire air force (Lxiftflotto) under the coiomand of G-oneral Kessell ing there. In the end the English would have to pay daarly for their stay in the Mediterranean. In this con- • nection ho recalls the Horway undertaking, where the English fleet suf- fered oucli losses through the action of U-toats and Luftwaffe that it finally had to v/ithdrav;. pi8 His major objectives at present were tho destruction of Russia, the southward drive ©ver the Caucasuo, and the torpedoing of the An^lo- Saxon navy and nerchant marine # Today the tonnage of the Anglo-Saxon nations was already too small to carry an expeditionary force to the continent^ • Above all, the aerial torpedo weapon inust "be further developed. In this regard the Japanese Government was of great assistance by supplying Japanese torpedos. Ihe fact that we are still "backvarA with this weapon was due to the mistake that the torpedos were constructed and tostod "by the Uavy, while the planes designated to carry then were constructed and tested by the Luftwaffe. The development was parallel t>ut was not carried on in unison, General Oshima asks whether these Japanese torpedos could not "be utilised soon. Germany now had 70 of them and also the corresponding drawings. He is convinced that Germany could have great success with it* since the training was not too aii'n- cult and tho German pilots were very valiant # The English did not know that Oernany had Japanese torpedoes, and so a surprise would "be possi"ble # p % 9 The Fuehrer agrees with Oshiraa and says that he would make use of the torpedo weapon soon» For quite some time now an entire wing (G-eechwader) had "！DO en training with aerial torpedoes exclusively^ He would make a concent rat ed surprise attack, an attack on which everything would "be staked. DocuiHGnt H o . � 0 0 2 Page 4. General Oshina now spreads out a nap and r ^ives the fuehrer a com- prehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and the Archipe- lago area. lie tells the ruehrer of the successes of the Japanese air fcitce and fleet and aDout the advance of the Japanese land forces in the Philippines anc 1 . the Malay Peninsula, At the conclusion of his report on the situation, Oshina says that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India. In this conneoiion h/ considered it in^por七ant that German and Japanese operations should te synchronized^ It woulA，oe very advantageous if when Japan attacked Inclia from the East, the G-ernaii troo;os woulcT threaten In'"ia from the West. The Puelirer again explains to Oshima his plans for the Spring anr'. says that first he intends to v.10 attack in the South, since a thrust to 七lie Caucasus, also with re^arc5. to ‘oil, and an advance to Iraq an己 Iran 一 一 which also implies a threat to India 一 一 w o u l d of primary importance, to "begin with。 Only then v/ould he resume operations in the center of tiie Easterzi front* The Russians thought we woulc: want to take Moscow first, "but this v;as of lesser inpor- tance to him. Meanwhile, he would turn his entire attention to Worth Africa. We would furthermore, as he had already mentioned, torpedo every ship we en- countered, and he believed that thereby he^vy damage could "be inflicted on the Anglo-Saxon fleet。 Oshima expresses his great desire that in all these German and Japanese undertakings the operations should be synchronize If this were done cleverly and if the method of operations workea as a sort of lever or exchange action^ this would inevitably lead to the ruin of the Anglo-Saron powers. To this the Fuehrer agrees and declares fur- p.11 ther that Hoveraber and Eeceinber are alv/ays the worst months to carry on warfare. As soon as the weather inxpToved he would again ruthlessly attack English ports and dockyards. The Luftwaffe had already made extensive preparations for this. With the English ports and docks ruined, England would "be helpless. Then C-eneral Oshima spoke a"bout landing warfare, which had "been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past 30 years. On the island of Hainan, which' vas occupied "by Japan, the attempts and ex- ercises had "been carried out with great energy. The necessary landing "boats had also "been extensively developed. He suggests that as soon as contact has "been reestablished "between Germany and. Japan 一一 which is possible by air and surely will soon "be possible "by long — distance U~"boa^s ——delegates of the German Wehrmacht should come to Japan to study the methods developed "by the Japanese. p.12 The Fuehrer "briefly mentions the necessity of stopping American shipments to Vladivostok^ Oshima says that it would, "be an easy task to halt American shipments to Vladivostok, since, In order to get there 9 American ships have to pass through straits which could "be covered "by artillery: "besides, he is of the opinion that America would not make any more shipments to Russia. Doc. No. 1418 E Page 4 III. (Photostatic cy i .. Doc. ^m.) I, GERARD SCHAEFER, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose and 1 . T h a t I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Wu.rn"bGrg, Germany, and as siich have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies o a certain original captured enei^r documen-fc. That said photostatic copiee have "been numbered 29o2-FS "by said Documentation Division. 2. That said a"bove referred to original docunent was captiired and obtained Tdv military forces under tiie comnand of the Supreme Conjnander, Allied Expeditionary lorcos, fron G-erman Foreign Office Files and Archive- 3. That caid original captured enemv docTmer.t after its seizure was retained, "by the Unitfcd. o^abes Amy Document Center at Marb"org, G-ermany, and such a"bovo nen-'-ioroa pnn^os^-atic copies wore delivered to, filed, nur. "bered and prcces^ed by "Oh^ Bncrimen十.ation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Cccntel at Kurnterg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail "by me in a certain affidavit made "by me anc dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture Processing and Preservation of German Docu^ents n , and which said af土idavi I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavi ty reference. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostn/bic copy of said, original captured enemy document aDc referred to. 5. That said a"bove referred to original captured enemy document is, to the "03ir»t of mj' r knowledge ana "belief, "being held and retained "by tt© United States Arxr̂ y" document Center Su"b-Secfeion in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, G-ermany, for in- spection "by various authorized agencies, and that a. "photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and cortifi3d to because of the unavai] "bility of said original document for the reasons above set forth. /s/ G-erard Schaefer Gerard ScJriaeier SIBSCRIBED AKD SWOEiT TO before me this 16th day of April 1946. ノ s / John W . Auchincloss John W. Auchincloss 0-2052152 Capt., JAGD document Ho. 4002 Page 1 TOP SECRET Aufz. Fuo 65/41 gRs Receptipjuof the '̂-fioaiiese Ambassador f General Oshiraa, "by the Fuehrer on 14-JD^ceinL or 1941 9 from 1500 to 14G0 o t clock in th© pre- sence of the Hoich Foreign. Minister。 i First the iYehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Cidor of Marit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of Gernian — Japanese cooperations vhich has now obtained its culmination in a close "brother- hood of arms,. General Osliimn exorosses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this "brotherhood of arms has now cone r?l)out "between Germany and Japan. The Fuehrer continues: "You gave the right declaration of warJ" This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as pos- si"ble # But if one ceeo that other is interested only in putting one p.2 off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willint to com© to an agroemont, then one should strike 一 一 as hard as possible, indeed 一 一 and not waste time declaring war* It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He hinself negotiated with infinite patience at time?., for exaniple, with Poland and also with Russia^ When he then realised, that the other did not want to come to an agreement t he struck suddenly and without formalities, Ee would continue to go this way in the future. The Japanese Government did indeed not act thoughtlessly; it had, lie must Ba7 t shown angelical patience toward that ruffian, Roosevelt• There is a G-ernan prover"b, saying: "The most virtuous cannot live in peace if his evil neighbor dislikes it" # These are words containing a fitter truth. If the neighbor is unwilling, one just has to destroy him. P*3 The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany. He raust freely admit having "been worried about the prospects for success of the submarine war, Eow could a commander tell when he could torpedo and when not? American ships went in convoys and under dimmed lights, and "besides the Americans had delivered to the English 50 destroyers of a type of which they themselves had 80 more. One could not eroect a U- "boat conmancler to work through an entire "book "before each torpeding In Document Ho. 4002 Pag© 2. ordor fco establish whether the ship were English or American. The U- "boa-c commanders had "been under an intolerable psychological strain, for in th.e last analysis each one of them felt the enormous responsi— "bility at the tnou^.t that ho might "bring his country into a new war "b.y a misjudged torpedoi.ng。 These days were now definitely past. He had given tho Germaji T J一“boat coininaiiders orders to torpedo everything in si^lit. The Sercan surface naval forces could also feel more free to o："orate. Up till rxow i^ierican Bhips had stood nearby and radioed until tho British naval forces arrivr.d, v/ithout any 'pos3i"bilitv for the G-ernans to defect thonselves against this. He vrould now send the U— toats ur： to •Ar.cnri'ふつn -jor-：̂ and would not have to take the threo-mile zone into consider-TO ion rx.Y nore # He s ir-rao convinced that Roosevelt must "be "boaten. It was a gx-ea - : of i he (Japanese the.t they had destroyed at the very start the ni:rib«.3 i!:i^rican superiority # Then he tells of th© American gliding c^xpaoi vjhich he does not consider high, and gives examples from the year 1 9 1 8 A t Lhat tine the (Jernan troops were exhausted and tired and the OIIGS 十Yesh nnd. well fed. Heverthelese, wherever Germans net inericarぁ the latter wero so thoroughly beaten that they re- quired weeks efore they could "be sent into action again. _ How could troops whose God i3 the dollar hold firm to the last? Clear condit5.ons had now "been created. A weight had "been lifted from the ninds of the Gerinan U—"boat c o m m a n d e r s A l l tho Jewish con- cepts like "v/estern hemisphere" v w 300—mile zone", etc. had "become un- tenpJble. Sernany would make the ocean insecure. In 1939 he had faced an inrportant decision. He would either have had to send the German U—"boats into comlDat and would then have had no more crews for the cuosecpient mass production, or he would havo had to use the greatest Dart of the available IKboats for training purposes, in order to have sn^ficient submarino personnel for the future. Thank God, he had decided to adopt the sec one', solution, and this would now have its effect, sine© 19^20 even 24 U-boats would t)e put into ser- vice monthly. The number of our U—"boats wouJLd increase enormously each month, ©specially since, on the average, w© had hitherto lost less than tvro U-lDoats a month. &en:ral Oshima tells the 5\ieh.rer that Japan had fought under similarly difficult conditions, when Henking was oemted and th© pilots had orders to spare the foreign legations under all circumstances. This was ail inpossilDle restraint for the pilots. It was infinitely fortunate, the Puehrer continues, that now he could relieve the men in the submarines of the resi*) risibility and now once more TDore it i Document Uo # 4002 Page 3丨 On tha remaining front ther© now came the winter standstill. Unfortonabely a temperature drop of 38° had occurred right in the middle of the devolopiaent of a IDI^： operation. Any operation ceases at such a tenipeivaturea Besides the "burden for the individual nan of fight- ing in this cold weather, there is the trouble with the notorized vehicles. Above all, however, the autonatic weapons would not operate any nore. Of course, sone operations would "bo cocr)letod. First, Sevastopol must "be taken; tho preparations for this were almost fan— eluded。 Then, the oiege of Leningrad would te continued, and third, he hoped soon to "be a"ble to resume the operations in the direction of the Caucasus 0 He align the remaining sectors of the Enstern front on as short a line ns possible, corresponding approximately to a straight line from Leningrad to Ta^anrog^ This would th'en givo hiin the possibility of withdrawing the mo'sorized and armored units and the iDest infantry ('.ivisions, in order to freshen then up during the winter. Large-scale operations wonlci then "be resumed in the spring. in the ！neantine he v/ould now take strong action in the Mediterranean. ITcxt week:; 51 Goxiuan U••七oats would "be in the Mediterranean, and in the meant m e a large nurib er of motor torpedo "boats had also arrived there, ^ho Luftwai'fli was noTirxg an entire air force (Luftflotte) under the command of G-eneral Eesselling there. In the end the English would j have to pay Aoarly for their stay in the Mediterranean. In this con- nection ho recalls the Norway undertaking, where the English fleet suf- fered ouc]i losses through the action of U—"boats and Luftwaffe that it finally had to v/ithdrav/. pl8 His major objectives at present wore the destruction of Russia, the southward drive over the Caucasua, and the torpedoing of the Anglo- Saxon navy and nerchant marine. Today the tonnage of the Anglo-Saxon nations was already too small to carry an expeditionary force to the continent # Above all, the aerial torpedo weapon must "be further developed. In this regard the Japanese Government was of great assistance 'by supplying Japanese tor^edos. The fact that we are still backward with this weapon was due to the migtake that the torpedos were constructed and tested "by the Ilavy, while the planes designated to carry then were constructed and tested "by the Luftwaffe. The &evelopiaeirb was parallel "but was not carried on in unison. General Oshima asks whether these Japanese torpedos could not "be utilized soon. Germany now had. 70 of them and also the corresponding drawings. He is convinced that Germany could have ^rreat success with it, since the training was not too diffi- cult and tho German pilots v/ere very valiant # The English did not know that G-ernany had Japanese torpedoes f and so a surprise would "be possible^ P%9 Ehe fuehrer agrees with Oshima ajid says that he would make use of the torpedo weapon soon。 Por quite some tine now an entire wing (Greschwader) had ooen training with aerial torpedoes exclusively. He would mate a concent rat ed surprise attack, an attack on which everything would "be st^ked # Docuncnt No. 4002 Page 4. General Oshima now spreads out a nap and gives the Puelirer a com- prehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and tiie Arcliiiie- lago area» He tells the Fuehrer of the successes of the Japanese air fqctce and fleet and a^out the advance of the Japanese land forces in the /Philippines anc 1 . the Malay Peninsula. At the conclusion of his report on the situation, 0silica says that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India。 In tliis connection h? considered it important :tliat German and Japanese operations should "be synchronized. It wonlrl "be / V e r y advantageous if when Japan attacked Inclia from the East, the & e m a n ‘'’troo:)s woulrT threaten In'^ia from the West. The ]?uehrer again explains to Oshima his plans for the Spring anr 1 . says that first he intends to •10 attack in tiie South， since a thrust to the Cr.ucn.sus, also with regard to ‘oil, and ail advance to Iraq and Iran 一 一 vrhich also implies a i:lireat to India 一 一 w o u l d 1 ° >e primary importance, to "begin with. Only then would he resume operations in the center of the Eastern front• The Russians thought we would want to t' n ire Moscow first, "but this v/as of lesser inpor- trjice to him. Meanwhile, he would turn his entire attention to Horth Africa. We would furthermore, as he had already mentioned, torpedlo every ship we en- countered, and "he "believed that thereby h e d a m a g e could' "be inflicted on the Anglo-Saxon fleet. Oshima expresses his great desire that in all these German and Japanese undertakings the operations should "be synchronizeo If this were done cleverly and if the method of operations worked as a sort of 1 ever or exchange actions this would inevitably lead to the ruin of the Anglo-Saxon powers. To this the Fuehrer agrees and declares fur- •11 ther that Uovember and December are always the worst months to carry on warfare. As soon as the weather inrproved he woula again ruthlessly attack English ports and dockyards. The Luftwaffe had already made extensive preparations for this. With the English, ports and docks ruined, England would "be helpless. 1 Then General Oshima spoke about landing v/arfare,, which had "been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past 30 years• On the island of Hainan, vhich ^as occupied "by Japan, the attempts and ex- ercises had "bean carried cut with great energy„ The necessary l a n a m g "boats had also "been extensively developed. He suggests that as soon as contact has "been reestablished between Germany and Japan 一 一 which is possible ,oy air and surely will soon "be possible "by long-distance U-“boaセs 一 delegates of the German ¥ehrmacht should come to Japan to study vhe ' m e t h o d s developed "by the Japanese. ).12 The Fuehrer "briefly mentions the necessity of stopping American shipments to Vladivostok^ Oshima says that it would "be an easy task to halt American shipments to Vladivostok, since, in order to get there, American ships have to pass through straits which could, be covered "by artillery: "besides, he is of the opinion that America, would not mate any more shipments to Russia. Doc. Uo. 4002 Pa^e 1 III. (Ph.otostatic cy i 一 Doc. ^m.) j^riDAVIT I, GSRARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and ‘ 1 . i ？hat I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United) States Chief of Counsel, Num"berg, Germany, and as such have possession^ , cujstody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies o a certain <i Jridlnal captured enen̂ /- document. That said photostatic copies have oeenyi； lumbered 29o2-FS "by said Documentation Division. K M 2. Thdi t said above referred to original document was captiored and obtained "by \ military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expedi^ tionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archive: 3- That' said original captr.rei enemy doctuner.t after its seizure was retained "by t ^ e United. Staues Amy Dociiment Center at Marburg, Germany, and such a"bove rienfiored pno^ostatic copies were delivered to, ixled, nur： "bered. and prcce ̂ .-'od by で と 。 D o C T ^ n t a t i o n Division of said Office of the United States C^hief of Cccniel at lrarn"berg, Germany, in the manner set forth and descril'bed in detail "by me in a certain affidavit made "by ne and dated the 15th o\ f April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture Processing and Preservation of G-erman Documents", and which said affidavi I hereby verify,\ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavi "by reference. 4. That the (i^ocuinent to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document a"bc referred to» 5, That said a"o ove referred to original captured enemy document is, to the 'oo^t of my knov /ledge and "belief, being held and retained by 七 ke United States Arr̂ /" Eocい:unent Center —Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for in- spection ty various au1^、orized_ agencies, and that a. Dhotostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and. cortif i rd to tecause of the unavail "bility of said original c\ocuiP-ent for the reasons above set forth. w r _sJ G-erard ^chaefer Gerard Schaefer SUBSCRIBED ASD SW0EI TO tefo.re me this 16th day of April 1946- /s/ John W . Auchincloss John W . Auchincloss 0-2052152 Capt., JAGD 6 Doc. No. 2577 Sxcerpt from "Importput Decisions Regarding International and National Policies 一 August and Novem"ber 1938" Despatched to tho foreign Ministry November 26th at 1 p.m. Th© agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at 'Fire Minister Conference on 25th Uovem'ber 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting now Sino-Japanes© re- lationship. While the iaain purpoee in settling the prosont incident is the. establishment of a now order in -Asia, "based on the security gained "by military victories, we must also guard against a third power checking our activities. However for this purpose our attitude toivards a third power should "be dofensivo at present, meanwhile without neglect ing to supply our arioTancE navy witla necessary drmamenia* backed, by this potontial fore© ve must oxert our effort in the diplomatic A"bove mentioned points aro only an outline of our present policy for adjust ing th© Sino-Japf»nese relationship and may "be regarded as a oart of our national policy• But there is an urgent need at tho present juncture to r e i n v e s t t h thn , "basis of our national policy for "both defensive end diplomatic ？ r o u t 8 in order to estatlish a policy capable of coping with tho new situation. The agenda, introduced "by the Uavy Minister and agreed at Jive _Ministor Coiif orence _on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on €5ie pFincip丄e for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship. As for the Hainan Island, it vrill be captured by military action m case of nocossity. (Hote) Exclusively for live Minister Conference. Section 7 TtoTJ： l / V Doc. Ho. 2577 a � Understanding of foreign Minister lTovcm"bor 25ti% It is naturnl that tho economic activities and intGreets of e. third power in China should "be affected to some extenb *by the strongthoning of economic ties bstween Japan, Manclmko and China. But, I understaM that this cooperation sJiould not extend to tho limit imposed "by the necessity for national defonso and existercv and tho activities â id interests of e. third power should in no way nてfor p.cco7?J in^ly. Othe.wj se, it would not only complicate the international situation unnecessarily "but woこd also chock Jawji 1 s economic expansion olsewhore out- side of China considering from the widor point of view IU would "be a great disadvantage to Japan. f 2 E 2 , T I F I C A T E I.P.S. No. 2577 .、Statement of Source and Authenticity I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I an officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief 一 of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document A u g , hereto attached consisting of_12_pages, dated Nov. _j_193o and described as follows: Sections from handwritten, type- written and miip.eo.grached binder re. "Important Decisions re_gardin^_international and nstional policies" November 1938. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number i. » r i ̂» » m -.‘..“ or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 21th day of SeDt.,,194-6. K. HAYASHI Signature of Official SEAL Wit玖ess: Nagaharu Odo Statement of Official Procurer.ent Chief Archives Section Official Capacity I, Richard H, Larsh, hereby certify that I an associated with, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Coinr.ander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was ob- tained by me from the above,signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of cy official business. Signed at Tokyo on this £5 day of S e p t . . 1 9 4 6 . RICHABD H. LARSH NAME Witness: Tノ4 Ta^uchi Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
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Ex.663-681. German-Japanese relations
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