AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
24 items
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Doc No. 4025B Page 1 NOTE TO TELEGRAM NO , 594, OF JUNE 19 P'ROM TOKJG PS? INDO-CHINA "Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict have come pretty late; the sacrifices which we in fact made for Japan (steppage'of sending war supplies to China and ccnsequenlly sacrifice of supply of important Chinese raw material) have as yet received no recognition from the Japanese, let alone economic compensation. Japan's desire for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat strange in view of the attitude Japan has taken re economic relations with Germany during the war. "If this is to be used in countering the Japanese Ambassa- dor in the forthcoming conversations, the following examples can be introduced; (1)From the first, Japanese shipping has com- pletely subscribed to the French and English blockade. (2) For a long time the Japanese Government had not met German wishes for transit of goods through Japan and had only in the dark shown in recent months some obligingness. Thus an assignment of wolfram from Canton and an assignment of tin from Columbia was sent on to Germany. Recently the Japanese Government even offered us 100 tons each of wolfram and tin from its own stocks to be delivered without cost. However, there are still unfilled requests -- e .gincreasing the Japanese shipping service to Vladivostock which is only made the port ol call three tines a month by one Japanese steamer. Also ? further shipment of tin from Columbia has not been possi- ble up till now because of the refusal of the Japanese shipping company. • (3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a mono- poly agreement with Manchuria for the supply of soya-beans without telling us anything, although we had been the biggest customers up till then, e.g. 800,000 tons in 1938. After our remonstration, Japan has up till now only released 70,000 tons to be supplied to us from Man- churia. (4) Japan still refuses to transport home in small groups from America the crew of the Colombus, nearly 500 men, because she regards them as combatants, following Doc. No. 4025B Page 2 the English interiDretation, although in the American interpretation they are styled as shipwrecked survivors. (5) It is true that Japan supplied us all the whale oil from the last haul of 75,000 tons. However, we know from confidential sources that it first offered half of this to England 3 and only decided to supply it to us, when it had received no satisfactory English offer. "Hereby submitted to the State Secretary, Berlin, 20 June 1940, /s/ WIEHL." 7147549/ AFFIDAVIT I, V/. I . Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later mover} by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral. documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1ヲ 5 1945； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, G'jrmany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which c ;rie into ray possession and custody ar;d. under my control in the manner above set forth, 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming W.》. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before rae this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GAHDE Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OFilCE OF MILITARY GCV腳翻、T FOR GERMANY (U.S.) Doc, No. 4025B Page 1 57q NOTE TO TELEGRAM NO. 594-, OF JUNE 19 FROM TOKYO RE: INDO-CHINA _ _ . "Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict have come pretty late; the sacrifices which we in fact made for Japan (steppage of sending war supplies to China and consequently sacrifice of supply of important Chinese raw material) have as yet received no recognition from the Japanese, let alone economic compensation* Japan's desire for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat strange in view of the attitude Japan has taken re economic relations with Germany during the war. "If this is to be used in countering the Japanese Ambassa- dor in the forthcoming conversations, the following examples can be introduced； (1)From the first, Japanese shipping has com- pletely subscribed to the French and English blockade. (2) For a long time the Japanese Government had not met German wishes for transit of goods through Japan and had only in the dark shown in recent months some obligingness. Thus an assignment of wolfram from Canton and an assignment of tin from Columbia was sent ©n to Germany. Recently the Japanese Governfoent even offered us 100 tons each of wolfram and tin from its own stocks to be delivered without cost. However, there are still unfilled requests -- e.g. increasing the Japanese shipping service to Vladivostock which is only made the port of call three times a month by one Japanese steamer. Also ? further shipment of tin from Columbia has not been possi- ble up till now because of the refusal of the Japanese shipping company. (3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a mono- poly agreement with Manchuria for the supply of soya-beans without telling us anything, although we had been the biggest customers up till then, e.g. 800,000 tons in 1938. After our remonstration, Japan has up till now only released 70,000 tons to be supplied to us from Man- churia, (4) Japan still refuses to transport home in small groups from America the crew of the Colombus, nearly 500 men, because she regards them as combatants, following Doc. No. 4025B Page 2 the English interpretation, although in the American interpretation they are styled as shipwrecked survivors. (5) It is true that Japan supplied us all the whale oil from the last haul of 75,000 tons. However, we know from confidential sources that it first offered half of this to England, and onl/ decided to supply it to us, when it had received no satisfactory English offer. "Hereby submitted to the State Secretary, Berlin, 20 June 1940., /s/ WIEHLJ' 7147549/ AFFIDAVIT I, W . I . Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: i 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department, of State on the Staff of the United States Iolitical Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Cffice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon, their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg t Germany, on August 15$ 19^5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after t.he same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office doc”.went which v;as captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which cつne into my possession and custody ard under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming w."p. CUMMING" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde . ~G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General 0FI-1CE OF MILITARY GCVEil脇1、T P.OR G3R1vlANY (U.S.) flfO Doc. 4027 3 Page 1 MEMOEA^mUM J ^ L. R. KFOLL On 19 June the Jap(?jiese Ambassador drew me into a conversation regarding the future of German—Japanese relations. He "began 'by referring to the ejected visit of the former IToreign Minister ifeotalce SATO and seemed to want to izake suggestions for the suoject of the conversation with Mr. SATO. The Air/bassador did not touch actual questions of German and Japanese policĵ *. • The Ambassador stated somevrhat as follows: "The knowledge that Japan 1 s welfare depends not on the Ifestern Powers, "but that an approach to G-erraany is of significance to Japan, "broke through, even in circles which till then had "been strangers to Germany, One indication for this is SATO 1 ^ vrish to come to G-ermanv now. I an glad that he thus takes the opportunity to get to know the new Germany from close "by and I pm sure that his visit will "be further material in /the process of/ winning over the circles which, up to now had no interest in Germany to the idea of an approach to Oermany. Today the "building up of heavy industry is regarded as the most irrrportant task in Jape.n. The light industry is ready for the ^eater part; where this is not the case its fiirtiner development is of no considerable political importance and can "be _ out aside. If, in the field of dcvolopment of hoav^ industry, a closc cooperation "between Japan and G-ermany is possible, which I do not dou"bt, Japan will gain freedom of p.ction towards the United States. The question of rp.w material supplies from England and America. I do not regard as so dangerous. The ra.w material countries are undor export pressure, especially if England should now "blockade 3arope. Therefore we need no七 foar the "boycott earnings. But if our economic circles see &orinaii7 ! s great industrial development and realize that Germany is not only not oohind tlio United States, "but has overtaken her in may fields t they w i l l , i n view of the unfriendly attitude of the united Str>,tos, gladly sv/itch over to G-crnpjiy. The inrprovomcnt of Jep^jicsc-Eiissian relations is, long as the present war lasts, a pre-rcquisite for this switching. TCGD and I aro feverishly working for it, and it iDecomos more and more clca.r in Japan that the future of Japan lies in the South, and that the cneniy in the ITorth. must "be made a friend. Certain military circles are OOTOsed to such a turn, "but there too OSHIM vrill have acted for their enlighteninent in the meantime. "After the war the G-crman-1 ir„n, Russipii, Jmanese-Chincse and American "blocks will vompln. It is important for Jrpan as well as for viermany that closc relations "between Japr.n and Germany will then remain or "be cstr-tlishod. I see the to that in the first t)laco in the economic field mentioned "before* Germany should consiî n to tiie JapanesG "block an runplc position in her post war economic prô rr̂ m.“ Doc. 4027 B Vf...gc 2 Ambassador SATO could "bo tolcl, in caso the convorsation with, him is held oil this or similar lines, thp,t the contrilmtion, vhlch is expected of Japan, is to show a more obliging attitude concerning G-ernany t s wants for rav; materials in Japanese (oil sources) And overseas areas. Especially the argument of the export pressure on the raw material countries points against the reserve in trp.nsit questions which Japan showed until now. Japan should not fear "boycott warnings or "bring forth this fear as an excuse in regard to allowing transit "businesses for Germany• A promise of delivery for the expansion of Heavy industry after the vmild today when Japp-n "believes in G-crmany 1 s victory, very pro"ba"bl7 lead to considora"blo giving—in in the "besn (Manchulaio) and transit questions. Berlin, 20 June 1940 Signed: I2T0LL. AFFIDAVIT I, V/. f . Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the United States Department of Stats on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Office files and archives. ••• 2. That said original Foreipn Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Doeuraent Center at Marburg, Germany, and vrere later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied, forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg } Germany, on August 1 5 ? 1 9 4 5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while エ.was stationed at Marburg, Garmany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under rriy control, 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document v/hlch was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody ai'.d under my control in the manner above set forth, 5. That sai铽 original document, of which the attached is 8‘photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said orjgirial is hereby furn- ished arid certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W . P . Cumming . W . P . GUivfflilKG Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. i '.'. > s/ G. H . Garde G. H. GAHDli Lt. Colonel,A.GD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY G O V E職細 T FOR GEBIviAKY (U.S.) ダ 切 Doc. 4027 3 Pa^e 1 MEMORANDUM L . E . KFOLL On 19 June the Japc?jiese Ambassador drew me into a conversation regarding the future of Oerman—Japanese relations. He "began "by referring to tiae expected visit of the former foreign Minister ITaotal^e SATO and seemed to want to make suggestions for the subject of the conversation with M r . SATO. The Ambassador did not touch actual questions of German and Japanese ；policy. The Ambassador stated somewhat as follows： "The knowledge that Japan 1 s welfare depends not on tlic ViTestern Powers, "but that an approach to G-erraany is of significance to Japan, "broke through even in circles which till then had "been strangers to Germany. One indication for this is SATOい wish to come to Germany now. I an glad that he thus takes the opportunity to get to know the new G-errnary from close "by and I pm sure that his visit will "be further material in /the process of/ winning over the circles which, up to now had no interest in Germany to the idea, of an approach to G-erinany. Today the "building up of heavy industry- is regarded ？.s the most iuportant task in Japan. The 1 ight i^dustiX-i- s ready_j£arL-the greater part: where this is not the case its further dovclopmcnt is of no considera'ble political importance and can be put aside. If, in the field of development of Jieavj, indnstr：/, a close cooperation "between Jra^jL and Germany is possilDle, which I do not dou"bt， Japan will gain freedom of action towards the United States. The question of r?.w material supplies from Sigland and America. I do not rc-gard as so dangerous. Tlie raw material countries are under export pressure, especially if England should now "blockade Europe• Therefore we need not fear the "boycott vrarnings • But if our economic circles see G-ormany ! s great industrial development and realize that G-crmany is not only not "behind tho United States, "but has overtaken her in may fields, they w i l l , i n view of the unfriendly attitude of tho united Sto.tos, gladly switch, over to G-crnp-ny. The inrprovemont of Jepancso—Russian relations is, as long as the present war lasts, a pre-rcquisitc for this sv/itelling, TOGO and I arc feverishly working for it, and it "becomes more and more clcar in Japan that tho future of Japan lies in the South, and that the ener^ in the Iforth must "bo nip.de a friend. Certain military circles are opposed to such a turn, "but there too O S H I M will have acted for their enlightenment in the meantime. "After the war the German-Itrliaiv, SussLり！！• Jpj)anese-Chinesg and American blocks will ron^in. It is import nut for J>pan as well as for G-ermany that closc relations "between J a p m and Germany will then remain or "bo c s t a t l i s h o d .エ see the to that in the first placc in tho economic field montionod "before. Germany should consign to the Japanese block an rjuplc position in her post war economic program.“ Doc. 4027 B Page 2 Ambassador SATO could "be told, in cr-.sc the convcrsa.tion with him is held on this or similar lines, thp.t the contribution, wliich is cxpccted of Japan, is to show a more obliging attitude concerning G-ernanv 1 s wants for raw materials in Japanese (oil sources) pjicL overseas areas^ Especially the p u rgument of the export pressure on the T9M material countries points against the reserve in transit questions which Japan showed until now. Japan should not fear "boycott warnings or "bring forth this fear as an excuse in regard to allowing transit "businesses for Germany. A promise of delivery for the expansion of Heavj^- industry after the war w u l d to dry whon Japan believes in Germany f s victor。、 very p r o t e M y lead to considcra"ble. givinを-in in the "bean (Manchulcuo) and transit questions. Berlin, 20 June 1940 Signed: I3T0LL. AFFIDAVIT If W . I . Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of the Una ted States Department of State on the Staff of the United States I'olitical Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in rny possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original cap- tured German Foreign Off ice files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved, by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said cen- tral documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That.I was Assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15$ •194-5; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I..was stationed at Marburg } Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document' which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth, 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furn- ished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W. P. Cumming ‘ W . P. C U B I N G Subscribed, and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H . Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, A.GD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY G C 狐 N M T FOR G 3 R M Y (U.S.) l^Cr 1ぬ。4025-a Page 1 To be kept in locked file. Telegram ( Secret Cipher Brocess ) Tokyo ‘へ广riマal 614 of 24 Tur.e 2Ji J\me 1940 110§10 tours 25 jî ine l^kO C230 hours I り ) i h o づ ot；七:’？o ^ntx-al Dtr-lj^on of taj 7/ar ministry, General Jij^C i'lris luC t-hs Jv5•ニ,:i.t.TL? .Vi:tacht j . ̂ aat tne Xipaneso krw would TTeloouc? it；…ぐ 07 wore prepared,, n3ed be 7 to e.ot as mediator in the a] ortsnded con.ciliatory ニks Ivst^en Jaj-ara and G H d Kfj•エ SHH^^ ••ニ に?う.er to ccnci^ie tins Gaina conflict ir> a ;7ay acceptable to Japan：, Tn-r 'Jt.ne.na.l declared further that Japan is very much interested in Xad>ベ七ina also for this reason。 Tae Military Attache promised to forwarl this ? and broached the question of Russians attitude to such a defelojinent 0 Ihe General replied tha-; the Japanese ^irmy considered conciliation with Russia to be neoessaryc General IJUIO 1 s inquiry is to be talcsxi as the official proposal of tlE Aoriyp accordiiig -uo .Japanese custonio ZL>) _ M n i s t e r of Overseas Affairs ? General K0I30, asked me in a conver-sation to which he had irivited 1113 ̂ what Germany、s attitude would be to the military activity of Japan in Indo- China and in isrts of the Netherlands Ir.ii3S« エ poiirhei to the well-kDCT/n declaration of tie Beich Governments according to wbich Germaay is not intsrest.ed in tlie questicn of the Netherlands Ip.dies and aided that we would probably raise no o-jjecticns to Japanese action ？jl Indo-Ghina； provided that Japan obliges herself to tie do^m /4r.5.rica in tte Pacific aroa P perhaps by a promise to avtae.k t-hs Philippines and H ; ^wa:.i in tiie evsnt of ^pisricas entry into the wur agair.st Qeirmr^^ The I/[ixiister of Overseas affairs re- plied that he wouJd bs pleased to pixrsue this idea farthor« Regarding a poysiblゴ Japanese n-i^gres3icn Jaot xrf.th Russia, the Minister thought that, for this Russia would probably ask for certain territorial concessions iî a pcrthv/estei^n province of Cliiiia and Oiiter-D^ngolia,which could bt；且丄sじusse^o Tie admitted that an agreement yith Russia and the realization of Japanese colonial T7i3b.es i?i Indo-China and in the Netherlands ]jidies would not only gradu'-Uiy ffiike Japan economically independent of /in).erica f , but would offer lo the expected KQNOYE Govori^Lieiib a promising smarting point for an agrsecient with CHI/JNfG L'AI SSiKa I the impression that the ambitious Minister of Overseas fairs v;anted to qualify himself for the i:e:n; cabinet by putting cr;t tiiese feeler III,) Al-^o “'embassador SHIRATORI, who is ever acre fi'eqaently named as •bhe coming i"breign Minister, alvocated a Non-Aggression rac J ; T7ith Russia in an ir-tar view yesterday with the Y O M H W I。 XV，) ！Ibday?s resignation of .^ince K0N0YE as Eresident cy： the Privy Council radicates contiauirig in vernal political developments v;ith the aim of forinatior-. o.f the nuw Goyermient and a new unity party under KONOYEe Since Isading personalities of the K0N0YE circle are obviously trying to make contact with m e ,エ ask for authorization to discuss with them confidentially the ideas of MUTO and KDISO, in order to establish what por.er is standing behind ttLem and xrhat possibilities result therefrom impression up to now that the possibility of the formation of a I^cific bloc of Japan, GHL1NG K'J SHEK China and Russia in asaociatibi TTith Germany, which ties daivu ；jnerica in the KLcific sphere and could cripple her freedom of action vis-a-vis Europe is becoming piominent. AFFIDAVIT I, W . P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t エ am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives, 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center, 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,194う:，and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ V/. P» Cummin且 " W . P. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G. H. Garde G. H. GARDE Lt» Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR G E R M N Y (U.S.) Doc. No. 1379 Page 1 IIEMCiLsNDTHJ On tiio conversation between the foreign Minister of the xleicii and the Japanese iirabassador, 3n.T0, in r.he presencs of ^uabassaodr KURUSU and Consul Gsnsral S T ^ S R , 8 July 1940. After a word of thanks for the hospitality siiown by tiie Gerraan Government and congratulations on the victory of G&rman： over France,-〜-ia"bassa.cior SATO declarod that just as in Lurope the new order would now be brouglit about ，oy Germany, Japan on her part had bson exerting herself for tiirea yettrs to establish a new order in. tiie ？ar ニし st a ad in tiie South Seas. In tiiese parallel efforts a vary close cooperation between Geraany and. Japan- sse^oa to iiave. t)しen in operation. _ For three years Japan Lad bsen iiolding tiis attention of tlie English, tlie Frcncii, and tiie i^iericun CS-overaaents and tiiereby in a certain sen so rGndarea Geriuan^ T s task in the establislnneiit of tiie new order in Europe easier. In this nanner the Goveniidents of both countries could mutually support sacii other. I, As far as Soviet Russia was concernod, Japan v/as under tie ezistins circiiastances obliged to seek to iUdintain good nei^liborly relations v;itii Russia, just as Geriaany was also oblised to naintain good relations witii Russia. In this re- spect also Japan and G-eraanv could cooperate. “bout •^nerica, “-^Lbassador S^TO 3tated that J"apan lias (irav/n tho attenticn of that country to iierself since tlie beginning of tho Oliinese war and tiiat slis tied up tlie American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that ^uierics lust not overstep her zone consisting of North and South Aiaerica. and raust not intervene in European or ffar Eastern matters. Tiie pursuit of this principle is also in tiie mutual interest of botii countries, ^abass^dor d^TO closed his remarks by stressing anev/ tlie coni.Jon interests of G-onaany and Japan anc； tiie necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation aust also enconp&ss econo.iic iaatters. In regard to China., ^ b a s s a d o r S^TO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chine so war, wiiicii lias lasted now for three ysars, in order to ciain fr^e hands. In tais connection lie pointed out tliat public opinion in Japan has boconie extraordinarily nervous in respect to ェndo-Cliina ^nd tho Dutch. 2a.st Indies. Doc. No. 1379 . Page 2 The HEICL /Olfflia-̂ “ エ 細 T S R noted witii satisfaction Jd-an's wish to cooperate with Geraany in all fields. He believed that G-ernian-Japanese cooperation in itself repre- ssnted notning new. iie liimself iiad been one of those who years ago had furtiiered t.:..:is cooperation witii KUHUSU's prede- cessor, G-easxaJL.OSIIBii, and .̂t liad already borne fruit for botii parties a Oermanjr had. uade noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn con- siderable advantages tiirougiiout tlie wiiole period of her struggle for China dcjvm to tiie present day fro.] the existence of a strong Gsr:aany. .uitiiout tlie existence of a re-strengthen' Germany", Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into xCnglish and other spheres of interest in Last ^sia as it lias actually iiappened, Tiie natural interest of botli powers in cooperation arises frosi these facts. Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Geraany and Italy h£.d already been tsucen into consideration some ti:i6 before. Tiiey liiscarried because 一 as appeared again from tlie latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concsrns. as a result of Seriiiany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed tliat in the future, further possibili- ties for friendly cooperation witii ^Tapan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. the present noaent lie would say no tiling of tiie details of tiie for.a wiiicii til is cooperation was to take, as ho was acquainted witii the Go m a n intentions but not witii Jap an' s political aims. Ee therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles ox* tlie political line which Japan proposed to pursue. Ke would be espGCia.llj interested to iiear fro.」tiie Japaiiese side wiiat vws their thought of cooperation with Ger..aany, whetlier o n l y in tiie economic sphere or in v/hicxi other way. Aiabassador SATO replied tnat it was comprehensible tjaat for outsiders tiie Japanese Policy iiad been difficult to under- stand. ^or nine yeai-s, tlict is, since the outbreak of the xianciiurian conflict, Japan iiad bben trying to orient lier policy in a set dirsction, but Iiad tiae and again subsequently been forced to moderate this nev/ orientation so,.iev;iiat. In regard to the nsw order in the jj'c.r i.ast, for Jaxoan it is above all a question of penaitting a new Cliina to arise vath. which, it could have frisndly relations. Tlie solidarity between tiiis new Cliina and Jajan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to aciiievs t^is a in, Japan liad for several Doc. No. 1379 . Page 3 years been 1 i o b s t i n a t e l y agdin&t the so-callcd regime f r o m T/Vashington wiiicL： f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n in tile t r e a t i e s o f 1 9 2 1 , e s p e c i a i . L v i n tJie ^ i n e r o w e r P a c t . T'iiis W a s h i n g t o n r c g i n o ‘ n o v g i v e C i i n a a n d o apan but t h e ^nglo-Saxons t h e p r e d o i i d n a n c e i n th>3 IFar li^st. Japa.n d i d n o t , h o w e v e r *， b y any rieans wisii tc eliiriii'ite tlie foreigners from the Far East. Q,uito t h e I t a l s o wislass t o c o n c e d e a n appropriate place to econoaic cooperation ^ixh Germany in Oliina. In its relations ;;itli xunerica Japan uust of course be very carei'ul. To tiie question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE HEICH as to 'viiat in reality then w.i.s tiie basic reason for the difficulties betweon Japan and i^aerica.. giiT0_ a n s ^ r e d that tills cau^e lay :,n the aLru-gl-a cf J^pan th3 systea o?~tlie N i n e :.-ov:sr T r e a t y . I n t h i s o a p a n w a s n o t f i g h t i n g against tlie funcfa^iental principles of tiiis treaty. Politic— all3 r j it was quite prepared to respect tlie independence of China. ニcono-;iically it was likewise in agreeuent with, tiio so-called principle of the Open Door； It 'Ijjĵ . h^^-""p-t*, wihh to exciia:ij.e roles and itself be the host wLi.le the other nations would be only suo&ts in ^aat “sia. } Mh&n tiie question by tiie Jorei^n .minister of tiie Reich concerning the deeper reasons for tlie difficulties which Japan was iiavinj, witli America was interpolated anew, 8^.T0 answered th^t the causss of friction mtli ^ s r i c a lay less in the econo-dic tlian in tiie hu.uani tarian s'oiisre. Aiderlcan s yap a till were Cliina. i-uaerica felt that sLe was in a v. r ay the protector of this country olid wants3 to extend her police pov/er in tii.3 i acific Occan with tlie Lielp of lier superiority at sea, Under tiiese circuiistances Japan was at pain& to end the war t/ith China soon. SATO declared that lie personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, (31 d. not beLi.£¥e_.tnat oagan could Jiarch to Chungking;. It was, therefora, necessary to sseic a solution of the Chinese cue at ion on so』e otiier than oil a military basis. iTor this reason Japan iiad supported tiie Sovern,ユent of Cliin^ Wei ^nd was prepared to conclude a generous agreement \,ith it. Japan absolutely did not Vvish to :aeddlo in Chinese affairs or i'orcs anytlain^ upon tlie Ciiinese, but on the contrary v/cs prepared to negotiate v/ith Wang Ciiing «vsi on the basis of ©quality. If the Ciiinese were sensible, a result would doubtless bs achieved, under which China would not lose face. In tiiis case Aiaerica would also perhaps s で c l i a n g a its attitude and be more Doc. No. 1379 . Page 4 f r i e n d l y t o w a r d J a p a n . - A m e r i c a 1 s e c o n o m i c , i n t o r e s t s i n - C n i n a vrere not larse, but just this fact alone did not a ' o s o l u t a l y T s Uす - t o H e l p c l a r i f y tiio s i t u a t i o n . I n v i e w of tiis considerable sconouic interests of England in this area, amrgrceHerit 6ou丄d Liuca u o r o easily be 丄aade with her "than with, ttte- Jiaericans, who- taice an entirely difx erent view of tilings. At the conjecture of t.Ue ？ or sign Minister of the Reich tiiat p e r h a p s i ^ e r i c a w a s u n e a s y a b o u t t h e r i s i n g p o w e r o f Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and tiiat the dif- *ferences of opinion v/itii that country were based on the fact t h a t ^ u a r i o a , w h o ut) t o n o w liad b e e n r u l i n g a l o n e i n t h e Pacific Ocean, now found iierself in the position of being forced to share this rule \ath J apan, 3“T0 answered in tiie affirmative and added that tiio efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity witii ^nierica, and tjas fact that Japan w a s k e e p i n g t h e nov; a d d i t i o n s t o ii&r f l a e t a s e c r e t h a d especially aroused ill f ec-l.i n,g in ^aerica, For tills reason, in particular after tiie entry of Stiiiison into the Government, J a p a n h a d t o b e v o r r car-Qful i n r e c o r d t o Aiuerica i n o r d e r not to provoke this country into .laking; severe neasure3 g a i n s t J a p a n . X"o b e s u r e , ^inorica iiad a l r e a d y abrog.at.e-il tiie c o a a e r c i a l t r e a t y , 'out j.n e x p o r t o n b a r g o a g a i n s t J a p a n iiad not yet been instituted. Because of tiie supply of petroleum and iron, tho Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on C l e r i c a . T h e K S I C H f O J I U H I N I S T E R r e p l i e d t h a t lie h a d a l w a y s held tlie view that a strong policy also promotes tlie economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. C-er. iany has ner own ezperionces in tiiis spile r e . ^.t t h e ti.,:.ie wlien s h e w a s p o l i t i c a l l y w e a k a n d t h e g o v e r m i e n t s a t tiie ti^ae m a i n t a i n e d t h a t o n e had. to g i v e w a y for economic reasons, Go m a n y liad, in the end, obtained no econoaic advantages for her conciliatory beiiavior. Now Gei-Jiany i s s t r o n g a n d h e r t r a d e is f l o u r i s i i i n g . Siie- g o t s a l l slie nooclo s u pフ l i e d fro..ユ otlLc,r l a n d s i n a d d i t i o n t o a l l "ti'ie e c o n o a i c a l l e v i a t i o n R .qup.it n a f.-r^di f.,q a n d t u e l i k e . Even a few .'..lontlis ago Gcir:.iany had b^ea considered as 一aji. encircled, ccuntri'. But now England is as coapletely en- circled as no other land in world ilistorj". In gold, wiiicii iias streamed in sucli aiiounta to ‘ îiiierica, Geruany is no “lore interested. Tlie German Roicli in its thousand years existenco woula never again build anything on gold. In „ Gor-iany s o l d h a s b e e n d e t h r o n e d a n d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w o u l d Doc. No. 1379 . Page 5 be bound to follow tliis exaaple. Uow, when England is so uenace^：, tSe stores of gold had been transported froa there to tiie United States, so that about 85-90タ of all tlie world's gold .'lî iit te found there。 一Tlie result of that is that tlie United States at tlie end of tiie war will be clioked bj gold 'and goods and would bo 3lad to sell to otiicsr lands, for eranr^G" "Japan, under favorable conditions cvsrytliing that I/|'hose .iaiia.5 ne<5dedT•一 Ger.aany， economically, is as good as coiapletely in- / dependent。 ,Iany tilings, which were previously iraported are 'produced 'oy horcelf or else sno lias found a substitute for tliê 'a. Aitor tho war the European economic spiiere will be co:::ipletel7 independont. That does not mean tiiat G-eraany no HO re desires aay マ orl& trade. R w uite the opposite ！ However til is new ./or Id trade ...mist run on tiie basis of tiie indopondsnce of the participating econonic spheres and tiie exchange of surplus. Tiie old 7/orld trade lasted on tlie possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading othsr countries and cutting off their raw material suppliss. In the New vforld Order Japan in ICast Russia in “sia., Germany and Italy in Europe would havo tiie power of decision and also in Africa would Gcr-iemy and Italy particularly, perhaps with. some other interested! party, exercise predominance. The Foreign ..Minister of the Reich then caae to speak on the attitude of the South •acierican countries. The South x^aericdn states, wiiicli Roosevelt triad to link econouically witii North ixoiGrica, appeared to jsnov/ that after the war the United States would not bo able to import the ooutii Cleric an raw pro ducts and. already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after tiie war. 3ut whoever wishes to trade witii Europe, raust in the future turn towards Gor-ianjr. SATO replied tliat he, not being an econoiiist, could not express any opinion on sconcuic questions. If, hov/ever, the exchange of goods rested no longer on tha gold basis, t'len ona could not vory well turn back to a -free exchange of goodsリitt the rojection cf conaercial arran^eaents with foreign bills of excliange and other trade barriers. As far as tiie United States are concerned, Japan wa3, possibly, net iupressed by the econonic pressure as aucii as by tJie iiiierican flset and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the Unitod States would, not be able to regain neutral in the Europe an conflict oacc siie ceuie into a con- flict v/ith .Tapun. Doc. No. 1379 . Page 6 The Heich Foreign .linister ad:.iitted tlaat tlie Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan liad to orient her p o l i c y e c c o r d i n s to tlie o p p o r t u n i t i e s of tlie s i t u a t i o n . H e stated noroover, regarding the gold question tiiat it v/a.s not a question of Ger. iany not possessing any gold, but that Crer.'ian econoniy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., oxi intorndtionsl speculation. xi.s regards Russia, ths バeicli Foroign minister referred to tiie efforts wJiicli .._.ie liad nada for scxae j r oars past to influence ^ibassacLor O&IIIIJA in the direction of an under- standing betwsen Janレ:！ and -lussitu Gor...any concluded a last- ing asroc.iont with Russia and the interests of both countries were very dearly outlined t>y one anotiier. He wGlcoued the efforts wiiioli Japan liad also ;aade, m tiie previous jnontlis, to coac to an understanding for iier part with Russia. In conclusion, SATO put up one more qusstion wiiicli he h i n s e l f s a i d w a s a l i t t l e i n d i s c r e e t , ""hat d o e s Ger-uany think the future sli&pc of Europe will be? TIig Reich Foreign minister replied tiiat tlie G-ernan Goveraient was only busyin.3 itself with one question at the x m a c n t , n a n e l y h o w is t h e v/ar to b e c a r r i e d o n a n d h o w is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason could not yet say •.auch. about tiie political future. Ths only thing tiiat is certain is that the still remaining ene：..̂ - of Gerraany - England - will bo defeated. Berlin, 9 July 1940. Signed SC^IIDT Envoy Document H o . 1379 A ? F I D A 7 I T Page 1. I, W . P . Cumming, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t I am an Attache of thr： United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on G-orman Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for G-ermany (U. S.). That in ray capacity as a"bove set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, theoriginal captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2 . That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained "by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, a.nd irnon their seizure and capture were first assembled "by said military forces at a Military Boanment Center at IferlDiirg, Germany, and were later moved "by ^"uthoriicd personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, a"bove referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. Tliat I was assiCT.ed to said dcciunent center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1 5 , 1 9 4 5 : and said captured German foreign Office files and archivesfirst came into ray possession and control while I was stationed at Marturg, Germany, and that thereafter the snme have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4- That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said G-ernian Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner a"bove set forth. 5 . That said original document, of which the attached is a photo- static copy, is "beingheld and retained "by me in order that it may "be examined and inspected "bv various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of s?id original is hereby furnished and certified to "because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons a,"bove set forth. m m n m i ? • e m m m Su"bscri"bed ？ind sworn to before me this 33rd day of April 1946 1 a . K . C-ARD?5 ' G. H . OASDS Lt. Colonel AC-D Acting Adjutant G-oneral OITFIC冗 07 MILITARY • E R B O F T FOR GSEMAITT (U. S.) Document No. 1379 Page 2. A P 7 I M V I T I, Paul 0. Schmidt, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 # That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in M^y 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German 'Foreipai Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferonccs "betwoen (rGrirtan Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments. g. That in addition to tein^ Chief Interpreter for the German foreign Office fis aforesrid. I vas also after ih^ y ^ r 193S the llep.i of the Secret- ariat General of the ？oreig: -1 . C^fi^e p.nd tint ny latest gcvernm^nt raJik wa.s that of a, M i n 丄 i n the (rennaxi Toreign Office, 3. ！That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did talce notes concerning the conversations that took -ila^b, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such ncr-ez a ^c^olcte and detailed record of what vras said and transpired at such meetings. That the records prepared ty me beeざ:.rne the Official German Government records of what was said end transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record xvas filed with the Ministers Office Section of the G-erman Foreign Office, which office actei in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of cacii of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German JoToign Kiniater. That a third copy of the record of each of euch neetings was retained "by me, 5, That said meetings, concerning which I made a. record as aforesaid, were of historj cal imiDortaiice and that such records were also prepared "by me for the express purpose of mainteinin-f； and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes. 6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prop^red personally "by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Eeich Foreign Minister and the Japanese am"bassador Sato in the prospnee of the am- bassador K u r u b u and the Consul-&eneral S t a h m e r. 7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last a^bove mentioned and that the record prr^p^red by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences. 8. That I have "been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit p.nd the document attached hereto may Tae used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the a"bove facts. Dr. PpuI 0. Schmidt Subscribed end sworn to "before of Mp.y 1946 PAUL C. SCHMIDT at llurnberg, Germany this third day Smith V . Brookhart f J r " Lt Colonel IGD Q-508524 Doc. No. 1379 . Page 1 IIEMCRiiNDni：.! On tiio conversation between the Foreign jminister of tlie Reicli and the Japanese jinbassador, oxi-TO, in the prosenco cf ^ibassaodr KURUSU and Consul Ganeral ST」:籠R, 8 July 1940. After a wori of thanks for the iiospitality siiown by tiie Gerraan Governjient and con.sratulations on the victory of Germain： over France, Aiubassador SATO declared that just as in Lurope tiie new order would now be brouglit about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for tiires years to establisii a new order in the Far East and in tiie South Seas. In tiiese parallel efforts a vary close cooperation between Geriaany and Japan soeus to iiave bt-en in operation. For three years Japan iiad bsen jiolaing tiie attention of tiie Snglish, tlie Frcncii, and tiie Cleric an G-overruaGnts and tiieraby in a certain sense rendered Gerraan；'-' s tosk in tiie establisinnent of the new order in Europs easier. In this laanner the Goverruaents of both countries could mutually support sacii otlier. As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circuiastances obliged to seek to radintain good nei^IiborlT relations v;itii Russia, just as Geriaany v/as also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia, In this re- spect also Japan and G-craany could cooperate. ^bout xiiierica, x^ubassador S^iTO stated tiiat Japan iias dravm tho attention of tiiat country to iierself since tiie beginning of tho Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in tiie Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that rtiaerica "lust not overstep her zone consisting of Iforth and South America and inust not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of tais principle is also in the mutual interest of botii countries.山:i!d as sudor cUTO closed iiis remarks by stressing anew tlie coiimon interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation £mst also encojipass ccononic iaatters. In regard to China., ^ibassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finisii the Chinese w&r, whicli iias lasted now for three ysars, in order to Ciain frt.e hands. In tliis connection lie pointed out that public opinion in Japan iias become extraordinarily nervous in respect to ェlido—Gliina and tiio Dutch East Indies. Doc. No. 1379 . Page 2 The HEICL JO:召エコ.さ，,•エ聽TUS noted witii satisfaction Japan's wisn'to codoerate with Geraan/ in all fields. He believed that Gerニdan-Japanese cooperation in itself repre— sonted notning n^w. ne iilnself iiad been one of those wlio years ago iiad furtiierad t..:.,is cooperation with KlIRUSU's prede- cessor, General OSEBLi, and ：-t iiad already "borne fruit for both, parties, G-eraany liacL uade notevrortiiy use of it in her fight for equal 3?ights, wiiilst Japan iia.d doubtless drawn con- siderable advantages throusiiout the wiiole period of her struggle for China dovm to the present day xro.a the existence of a strong Gsr:aany. '.nitiiout tlis existence of a re-strengthen Germany, Japsn could not liavo been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in Last ^.siu as it lias actually happened, Tiie natural interest of botli powers in cooperation arises froa these facts. Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, C-eraany and Italy had already been taKen into consideration some ti.ie before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns. ムs a result of Geriiiany's victory over ？ranee, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. Ee personally believed tliat in the future, further possibili- tias for friendly cooperation witii Japan vroaid exist in the framework of tlie New Order ia Europe now taking shape. ^t the present I'loaent he would say nothing cf tiis details of tiie forn whicli this cooperation was to take, as iio was acquainted "witii tlie Gcraaa intentions but not with Jap an' s Ijolitical alas. Ee therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of tiie principles of the political line which Jctpan proposed to pursue. Ke would be especially interested to iiear froa the Japanese side what wds their tliougiat of cooperation with Gsr..aaiiy, wiietiier only in tiie economic sphere or in whic^ other way. AMBASSADOR SATO replied that it was coi.aprshensi'ble that for outsiders the Japanese Policy iiad been difficult to under- stand. For nine years, tliat is, since the outbreak of the .lanchurian conflict, Japan iiad been trying to orient lier policjr in a set dirsction, but Iiad tiue and again subsequently been forcod to moderate this new orientation so,j.evi?iiat. In regard to the nsw_order in the n'c.r i.ast, xor Japan it is above all a. question of permitting a new Ciiina to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity betwesn this new Ciiina and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far Sast. In order to aciiievs ti,is a la, Japan Iiad for several Doc. No. 1379 . Page 3 years boen fi^iitin^ obstinate.ly agaln&t tiie so-called regime froii V/asixington whicli finds expression in tiie treaties of 1 9 2 1 , e s p e c i & l l y in tiie Wine 丄-ビ》/er Pact. Tiiis 'Jasiiington rogimo ‘ 'iia nov-- give Ciiirjd and oapan but the ^nglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far ic.st. Japan did not, however, by anv :aeans 'wisli tc eliffinats tiie foveigners from the Far East. Quite the 0cntrary, It. also winlisa to concede on appropriate place to cconoxaic cooperation vatii Gersianjr in Cliina. In :.ts relations with, •ainerica Japan uust of course tie very carei'ul. To tiie question of the F0I2LIG:、J L U S T E R OF THE HEICH as to -/iiat in reality then tlie basic reason for the difficulties oetweon Japan and iv,aerica, SA'TO axi.swered that tiiis cause iaj in tlie s.じz*uこ31s of Japan against the system of tlie Nine Pov/er Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against tlie fundaiiiental principles of tiiis treaty, rolitic- ally, it was quite prepared to respect tlie independence of Cliina. ^conoiaicaliy it v/as likewise in agreeaent with tho so-called principle of tiio Open Door. It did, liowever, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guosts in Sast ^sia. } 'When the question by the Foreign “mister of tiie Heich concerning the deeper reasons for tiie difficulties wMcii Japan was having witii America was .interpolated anew, 8^.T0 ansv/ersd th^t the causes of friction ;dtli America lay less in tlie econo-aic tiiaai in tiie iiu.uanitarian spliers, Auierican syapatliitis were witii Cliina. aiaerica felt that slie was in a way the protector of this country ana wanted to extend her police power in tiie i.acific Occan v/ith tiie lielp of her superiority at sea. Under tiiese circuia£ta.ncss Japan was at pains to end the war v/ith China, soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese ailitary authorities, did not believe that Japan could. Jiarcli to Chunglcins. It wds, therefore, necessary to sask a solution of tiie Chinase question on so^e other than on a military basis. tiiis rsason Japan Iiad supported tiie Soveraaent of -< r ang Oiling vVei und was prepared to conclude a generous agreement "..'itii it. J apan absolutely did not wish to —：ュ eddls in Chinese affairs or force any tiling' upon the Ciiinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate v/ith. Y/ang Ciiing «vei on tho basis of equality. If the Ciiinese were sensible, a result would doubtless bs achieved•， under which China vrould not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually cliango its attitude and be more Doc. No. 1379 . Page 4 friendly toward Japan. jnEierica's economic- interests in China were not lar^e, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tsnd to iielp clarify tiio situation. In view of tiis considsrablG sconoiiic interests of England in this area, an agreenont could .ducii ^ore easily be iiads with lier than witli tho ^uiiericans, who take an entirely different view of tHTn'gs • At the conjecture of the ？or sign .Jinister of the Reicli tiiat perhaps America was u n e a s f about tiie rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and tiiat tiie dif- ferences of opinion witii that country were based on the fact that x^aorica, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, nov/ found, herself in the position of being forced to sliar© this rule with Japan, o./PO answered in tiie affirnative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with. America, and tiis fact that Japan was keeping the ngv/ additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America.. For this reason, in particular after tiie entry of Stiiiison into the Government， J apan had to be vsr；' careful in regard, to America in order not to provoke tliis country into aaking severe neasures against J apan. To be sure, rfiaGrica had already abrogated the comnercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan iiad not yet been instituted. Because of tiie supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on た.lerica. The RSICH fO羽ic-N niNISTER replied that ie had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes tlie economy. It would always fare worse as a result of tiie forraulation of a weaker policy. G-er. iany has xier own experiences in tiiis s p h e r e .れ t the tiae vfhen she v/as politically weaic and the governments at the tLae .idaintained that one had. to give way for aconomic reasons, Guruany had, in tho end, obtained no econo.aic advantages for hsr conciliatory beiiavior. Now Geraany is strong and her trade is flourisiiing. Siie gets all she needs supplied froa otiier lands in addition to all the econc)ニlie alleviations s u c h as credits and the like. Even a few laonths ago Gerニiany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely en- circled as no othor land in world history. In gold, wtiicli iias streained in such. ,^reat araounts to ^uiierica, G-sriiany is no •aore interested. Tlie Gorman Roicli in its t-iousand years existencG would never again build anything on gold. In Ger-iany ^old has been dethroned and other countrias would Doc. No. 1379 5 be bound to follow tliis example. iTow, vuen England, is so uenaced, the stores of gold had been transported froa there to the United States, so that etoout Sう-90ジ of all tiie world's gold aisiit "be found there. Tiie result of that is that the United States at the end of tlie war will be choked, by gold and goods and would TDG glad to sell to other lands, for exan^lo Japan, under favoralale conditions cvsrythmg tliat those lands nec-ded. 广 Geruany, eccnonically, is as good as coiapletely in- dependents ,aany things, whicii were previously iiiported are produced "oy h-crself or else sac- has found a substitute for tlie.d. Ax'tcir the war the European economic spiiore will be coapletelj indepeiidont. That does not mean that Germany no nore desires any ^orld trade. Tjiite the o p p o s i t e i i o w e v e r this new ,/orld trade ,.:iust run on tiie basis of tiie indopcndonce of the participating economic spheres and the ezcliange of surplus. The old world trade rested on tiie possibility, always, possessed by Lngland, of blockading othsr countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New ; : v r orld Order Japan in jiiast Russia in usia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in ^frica would Gcrnany and Italy particularly, perhaps witli so.me other interested party, exercise predorainance. The Foreign •linister of the Reich tiiexi ca^e to speak on the attitude of the Soutli ^INIERICAN countries. TIig South ^nerican states, v/hicli Roosevelt tried to link econouically uith North America，appeared to Knov/ that after tiie v/ar tlie United States i/ould not bo able to import the South ^norican raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure ths export of their goods after tiie war. 3uc whoever wishes to trade witli Europe, xaust in the future turn towards Ge-r. ianj?-. SATO replied tliat he, not beiag an economist, could not express any opinion on econaaic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, t r ien 0X13 could not very well turn back to a. free exchange of ^oods"./ith the rojection of ctxuercial arran^einents with, foreign bills of oxciiange and othsr trade barriers, As far as tiie United States are concerned, Jdpan was, possibly, not impressed toy the economic pressure as aucii as by tiie ズu'lerican flGet and had to be carsful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to regain neutrul in the Luropean conflict once siie ca^ie into a con- flict v/ith Jaot.n. Doc. No. 1379 . Page 6 The Heicii foreign Minister admitted tliat tlie Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan iiad to orient her policy eccordin^ to tie opportunities of tlie situation. lie stated raSrZoverj regardins tlie gold question tliat it v/as not a. question of Ger.ianj not possessing any gold, but tliat Crer.ian economy would never again be depeiifient on sold, i.e., on iiitGnidtionGl speculation. ^s regards Russia, tiio Aeicii Foreign minister referred to the e f f o r t s マ]licii .lie Lad. n a l s f o r so_ae j-ears p a s t to influonce ^ibassador O&IIUJa in the direction of an under- standing betwsen Jan^.i und ^iussici. Gor^any concluded a last- ing asroc-iont with Ruswia and the interests of both countries were very dlcarly outlined by one another. He woloomed the efforts v/hich Japan iiad also :aade, in the previous .LiontiiE, to co,ユe to an understanding for her part with Hussia. In conclusion, SATO put up one more qusstion wiiicJi he iiii'isslf s a i d w a s a l i t t l e i n d i s c r e e t . t»liat d o e s Ger』any tiiink the future sIi&pG of Europe will be? Tiie Rcich Foreign minister replied tiiat tiie G-erraan Governisnt ids only busying itself with ons question at tiie iao-acnt, naraely how is the war to be carried on and ho\/ is it to be brou^lit to a victorious conclusion. For that reason lie could not yet say ..aucii about tlie political future. The only tiling tJa^t is ccrtain is that tiie still renaimng eneay of Geraany - England - will bo defeated. Berlin, 9 July 1940. S i g n e d S G 二,!IDT Envoy Documeiit K o . 1 3 7 9 A F F I D A V I T Pag© 1. I, ? . Cummin^:, "being first duly sworn on op.th, depose and say： That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such.エ am a reT>res(?)Dtatire of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.) • That in n;y capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, cu3todv, and control at the Serlin Documents Center, Berlin, G-ermany, theoriginal captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained "by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and ur>on their seizure and capture were first assembled "by said military forces at a Military Doaument Center at Marburg, G-ermany, and were later moved *by authoriLcd •personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, a"bove referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1 5 , 1 9 4 5 : .and said captured German Foreign Office files and archivesf irst came into ray possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Oermany, and that thereafter the spjne have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4 . That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner a"bove set forth. 5 . That said original document, of which the attached is a photo- static copy, is "bein^held and retained "by me in order that it may "be examined and inspected "by various interested agencies, and e, photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to "because of the unavailabi 1 it f y of said original for the reasons eJbove set forth. ¥ , P . CUMMING p . e m m m Subscribed sworn to "before me this 23rd day of April 1946 G. H . GABE^ G. H . GJffiDE Lt. Colonel AC-D Acting Adjutant General 0?FIC}!] OF MILITARY GOYEREWIMT FOR GERMAIII (U. S.) Document Jfo. 1379 Page 2. AFFIDAVIT 1. Paul 0 . Schmidt, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 # That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German "Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences "between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments, 2 . Tha.t in addition to "being Chief Interpreter for the German Joreign Office as aforesaid, I v;as also after the ye:-.r 123S the Head of the Secret- aria.t General of the &crmc.n foreign Office ？.nd that ny latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German foreign Office, 3. That while acting as intarpreter and/or secretary at cuch meetings a*bove referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took -place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a norrolcte and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings. 4 . That the records prepared ty me became the Official Gerinan Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record てvas filed with the Ministers Office Section of the Grerman Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of caciL of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained "by me. 5 . That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical imDorta,nce and that such records wore also prepared "by m© for the express purpose of maintainin'T： and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes. 6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally "by me in the manner herein aet forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 "between the Iieich foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the am- "bassador X u r u s u and the Consul-G-eneral S t a h m e r. 7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned, and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences. 8. That I have "been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein airidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the a,"bove facts. DR. Pp.uI 0. Schmidt PAUL C. SCHMIDT Subscribed end sworn to "before me at Ifurn'berg, Germany this third day of May 1946 Smith Broojchart f , Lt Colonel IGD 0-508524 ブ "DOMMENT V O . 1 5 9 0 D General Telegram Fo. 23144 Tokyo, July 13th, 1940 To Special Snvoy SATO, c/o Ambassador IiU?.USU, Berlin, Gormeny. rrom Minister -ASITA. Matter concerning J app.nes e-G-crman Cone or t Fo. 445 (Urgent t Secret Code) Hofr.rring to your ca"ble L ^ran ITo. 870 ( 1 ) T o u r convorsation with tho Foreign Minister EIB3S1TTH0P seems to have brought out clearly tho spirit of Gorman victory. You have informed mo that R I B S M I H O P showed you a non-con;niital”attitude concerning Dutch E^at Indies ^.nd ？re*ich Indo-China, Perhaps, he ted no concern with trioso problems. But did you not disconccrn his air to pursue something from Japan "by utilising J apan 一 for exp^Dle, J apan 1 s participation in EuroiDean war? iou stated that he predicted tho^ world would "bo divided into four Economic Blocks in the future. But, did you not roccive the inroression that G-erm^ay would not recognizc the superiority of a cortain stabilising power in each Block indiroctly, "but has "begum to hove for domination "by Germanァ of the French and Dutch colonics in Sast Asia also? (2〉 While RIBBSTOmOP expressed his optimistic opinion on the subject of Japane3e~Ainerica^i relation, you spoko of the tendency of deterioration of Japanese—American relation and yon hinted thp.t, if w. 0 -.r should come to exist "between the two countries it would c^.use G e r m n y an unfavorable reflection upon her ©xropean policy. Did you intend to ce.ll his attention by filing so, in the sense "tĥ -t the w。.r with the IT. S. A . would inevitably cp.use Japan to march on to the South Soas and thus bring out difficulties in accomplishing Gcrinan object? Or, did jon intend to warn hin tlip.t the -war v;ith U, S. A . vrould hp.ve an unfavorablo effect on thfi German war situation in Europe as a result of Japa" 5! s consumption of national曰trengtli and weaken the pressure on tho USSR? Furthermore, did you ^o so far as to say in .yovir conversation with SI35SbITH0? that the Japanese- Amoric&n war, if it occurreS, would develop into a 5erman-Americpii war? Please reply immediately• Doc. Fo.1590 D C E R T I F I C A T E T ザ.D. C. JTo. I. P . S. F o . 1 5 9 0 D Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Kajrashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official エ havo custody of tlie document horeto bached consisting of 2 pages f dated July 1 3 , 1 9 4 0 , ？.nd described cス follows: Telegram lo. 445 dated 13, J^ly 1940, from J?orci,7n.MiniQtor AEI'TA to ^pscial Envoy SATO in care of Am"bassador KUBIJSU, Berlin Germany I further certify that the attached record and docunftnt is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives pnd files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fvin f T also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office Signed rt ！Tokyo on this 6th day of September, 1946 /s/ K . Ha.yashl Signature of Official SEAL Witness: /e/ H a ^ h a r u Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Richard H . Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the G-encral Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the a*bovp described document was obtained "by me from the a*bovc signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of mv official1msiness. Sij^ned at Tokyo on this 6 day of Sept, 1946 /g/ Hichara H. Larsh M M E Investicrator.- IPS Official Capacity Witness: /s/ J . A , Curtis, 2d Lt. Document Fa. 1590 3 ann-ral Telegram H o . 23144 Tokyo, July 13th, 1940 To Special Snvoy SATO, _c/o Am"bassa.clor ICURUST；, Berlin, Geraany. I r o m 7oroi.;:n Minister iJlITA. Matter concerning J p.pane s o- G-cririan Cone or t Fo. 445 (Urgent, Secret Code) Hefr.rriiog to your ca"ble t zran Ho. 870 ( 1 ) Y o u r convorsation with tho ？ o r e i m i Minister HIB331TTS0P seems to have brought out clsarly the spirit of German victory. You have informed mo that RI33ErTTH0P showed you a "non-commital" attitude concerning Dutch 'E^st Indies and ?ro:ich. Indo-China. Perhaps, he had no concern with those problems. But did you not discorxcrn his air to ；our sue sornothing from Japan "by utilizing Japan - for exanrole, Ja.pan 1 s pp.rticipation in European war? iou sta.tod he; predicted the world would be divided into four Economic Blocks in the future. 3,ュt, did you not reccive the inroression thp.t Grernsiv/ would not rec っ the superiority of a cor tain stabilising povor in each 力丄ock indiroctly, "but has 'begun to hope for domination "by &ermanv of the French and Dutch colonics in 3ast Asia also? (2) While RIBBUcTHOP espressnd his optimistic opinion on the subject of tSapanese-Anerican relation, yov. Gpoko of the tendency of deterioration of Japanese-Amcrican relation and you hinted that, if wp.r should come to exist "between the two countries it would cause Germany an unfavora"blG reflection upon her European policy. Did ^ou intend to call his attention "by saving so, in the sense tĥ vfc the wへr with the IT, S. A . would inevitably cpxibb Japan to Tnarch on to tho South Seas and thus "bring out difficulties in accoraplishing Sera^n crtrject"? Or, did you intend to warn hin tli?t the 观 r with IT. S. A . vrould hr.ve an unfavorable cffect 011 thn G-erman war situation in Europe as k result of Japa^ ! s consumption of national strength and weaken the pressure on the IISSS? Furthermore, did vou so far as to s^y in jour conversation with EI3BSTTR0? that the Japanese- Americaユ war, if it occurred, would develop into a Serman-Americpn war? Please reply immediately. Doc. Fo.1590 D C E H T I S ' I C A T S I mm* • tm II IIII • • D . C. H o . I. P . S . Feu 1590 D Statement of Source and Authenticity I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected v/ith the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, J?ipancse Foreign Office and that as such official I havo custody of the document hereto .vt bached consisting of 2 pages, dated July IS, 1940, end described r^ follows: Telegram H o . 445 dated 13, July 1940， fron 7orci ? 7ii.Minister iffilUA to bpacial Envoy SATO in car© of Ambassador ETJHUSU, Berlin G e r m a n y I furtlier certify that the attached record and docmnent is an official document of the Japanese CTOvernmont, and that it is part of the official archives p,nd files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fyin{T also the file number or citr.tion, if any, or any other official desi : ^na.tion of the regular location of tlie document in the archives or files): Foreign Office Signed p.t Tokyo on this 6th day of September, 1946 [sj K . Hayashi Si,OTature of Official SEAL Witness: /s/ H a ^ h a r u Odo Official Capacity S七atemerit of Official Procurement I, Richard K . Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the G-encral Headctuartors of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the n'bovp described document was obtained by me from the above sipiea official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of m^r official "business. Signed at Tokyo on this 6 day of Sept, 1946 f _sJ Richard H . juarsh xIAJffl 丄iwe s t i 职 tor 4 IPS Wi tness: 's/ J . A . Curtis, 2d Lt. Official Capacity DocrimerLt H o . 1590 B aeneral Telegram N o . 20990 Berlin, July 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 To Toroign Minister AHITA, From Ambassador JCOHUSU H o . 9 0 1 ( S e c r e t Code) Hc-ferring to ^oxir T ; e3e^rram Ho. 445. Antessador SATO p^io^ercd. ( 1 ) I t amy not that Cnpr^ny does not cm'brn.co at all a hiddon intentiox::. to い:"U.!" c—.パしiごy •；.or noncorcnital attitude to the Japan's derianl m rr.i'^Uoニ tc • つ , ニ 、 ！ , etc. , "but, jud^i-g from the PJBBEETROP 1 3 at-;;, race, 。,c l ^ a . , 1 l i d net find such an air to request Japan 1 s participation in ivi? rar m k i ^ a .^ood v.&o of it as a n oa-it. I felt, ratlierT tiiat ftemanj, did not at fcaxh ijrrporbance to J apan T s national power at present s axceptir^ he? r^.val v o ^ v , I c^iinot, also, say so far that Sermany has- alrsacl^ f-Gcterod an aniloioion on the southern colonies• Conrparizig with the days I sent telegram iTo, 527, tcJav when G-ernany won the gres.t victory ir. Burope.?ニニ continent, it must not "be paased over that pretty la-rge chnngc arose in thought of Gerir^ny. (2) What I said concerning the "oroblem tows.rds America was not intended to restrain Germany 4 s pmbiticn on the South Soas, nor intended to mean what was rolPvted to the consuroticn of the Japanese national t)Ower and decrease of Japan ? s pressure on the USSR. As scen in my telegram Fo # 870 and its supplemcnbary oris, I inacle KI33HMTR0? pay attention, su^zesting tho possible dcvc\op^ient of the じ.S.-Japanese war to tlie U . S.-G-orman war• I talked him those, a little in a threatening way, supposing the participation of the IT. S. in the war against G-er*ns.iiv might "be the great pain to her vhile ^he ^was QT^rinr： in the operations to Britain devotedly ana she v;as endeavoring to avoid the long war. I OT.e.38ed whfit he felt then was just this very weak point. However, I avoided to uttor such a direct narration ss to say it would develop to Japanese-American war, but used the exprespion pぶseen in iny telegram. Doc. No. 1590 B Page 1 at Tokyo on this d&y of "September, 1946. /s/ K . Ha エ ashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: /s/ Na^aharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I， Richard H. Larsh , hereby certify that I am asso- ciated with the Genera丄 Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me fron the above signed official of the Japa- nese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of Se^p , 1 9 4 6 /s/ Richard H. Larsh NlME _C E R T T F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. N o . 1 ヲ 两 B Statement of Source and. Authenticity I， Hay?shi- Kaoru , hereby certify that I am officially- connected with the -tapanese Government in the following c a p ? c i t y : Chief_.of , t h e , j . r c M v e s S e c t i p n ^ ^ a n e s e „ F o r e i ^ n . Office and that as such o^fioir.l I have custody of the document hereto attached consist; ng of 2 pages, dated July 15 , 1 9 40, end described as followss Telegram No. 901 dated 15 July 1940 from KTJRUSU to ARITA . I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the follow- ing named ministry or department (specifying rlso the file rniw^er or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular locetiQn of the document in the archives o^ files): Foreign Ministrj.. d e h n t §6 i s Witness: /s/ J. jU Curtis, 2nd Lt. Investigator L IPS Official Capacity 4 Document No. 1308 Pageilf ご l;Iinutes of the Joint Conference of War, Navy, and Foreign Ministries on StreDgthening of Harmony Between Japan 3 Gerir.£.tiy and. Italy. Those present；: War Ministry Navy Ministry Naval General Staff Foreign Ministry "A.NDO: '• The Foreign Office gave instructions to Ambassador SA.T0 some time ago て;o confer v/i^h German authorities up on strengthening the coalition between the v?,o countries, and Mr. SkTO was able to exoiian?;^ tlews with Foreign Minister HIBBSNTHOP e At that conference, I\IBBEUTRO? said that he could not undei'stand in the leasi; what; Japan was after. Therefore, it is deeited necessary to draw and p:c-aaent to him a more con- crete and further penetraoed draft and thereb;/ intensify the coalition betvresn 3"ap£.:i and Germanyr The draft distributed among you is only a t'entativs plan made by our Foreign Office, but I want you xo discuss it and let me hear your opinions.' "(Upon request of Lieutenant Colonel TAKAYA. TT A., he explains the substance of the draft») "A.ND0i draft .fe^^Tn^^asti with the aim of intensifying the coalition of and Germany upon suuDosition that Germany will conq'aer -ijglann., have the hegemony of Europe and Afvj.ca, and establish New Crdei* tbsre,, Regarding our Soviet policy, which is an important prob'Lem to us, we want to ciieck Soviet through the infiaonce o.f J a p a t le 3 e - G e r ma n coalition, There is a prcbabilitj of the foraaticn of a U, S,-Soviet coalition, but we hope to check tb.id likewise by Japanese-German coalition.. A. 3 to the limit; of Ja pa no g e -G c rraa n coalition, it is deemed wise for us to avoid to participate in the European War, as is shov'n in the draft and in view cf our present domestic and e con onto conditions as v^ell as our relations with Soviet and the United States. ( r 'e have asked the opinions of the ^rmy 12 July 1940 Lt„ Col. TAKAYA? ff A Coinman.ier S H I M Captain 0N0 Section Chief MTOO Section Chief ISHIZA?/A. Secretary TOKUMGA Document No. 1308 Page 2. and the Navy on this subject, and they both have expressed approval.) Our plan is to join hands with Germar^ to the fullest extent but within the scope of being driven into the war. x "TA.KAYAMi: 'Is this plan merely to have the three ministries come to an agreement and to submit their opinions to the higher authorities for discussion?' "A.ND0: 'A.s this matter needs to be carried out promptly, I want to submit it to the higher authorities and have them put into practice as our national policy as soon as the three ministries arrive at an agreements' "(The Army and the Navy gave consent to his proposal, and ATJDO goes into explanation of the substance.) "A.WD0: '.A. plan has been proposed some time ago to the effect that Japan should have Germany recognize its free hand concerning French Indo-China, Dutch Enst Indies and other South Sea Islands. But as the meaning of free hand is some- what vague, if it is expressed more definitely ? it will be as <Traf tsd. I - should, like to hear your opinion on this point. The object of this draft is to have Germany "understand that Japan has no territorial ambition over these spheres, but Japan wants to firrely establish not only the freedom of economic activities b-ut also political leadership, In ordc-r to have this approved by Germany, it will be necessary to choose a form easy for dermal^" to approve.' "TA.KiY-!\.MAL: 'Yon say you want to make Germany recognize Japan's political leadership in the South Seas, but 3 what rela- tion does it have with Japan's political leadership in China and Manchuria?' "ar®0； ' A.s I regard our political leadership in China and Manchuria as a matter of course, I did not enumsrate it here. f "iNDO; 'Concerning British, French and Dutch territories we will discuss the details later.' "4KD0: ' Concerning German sup'oort to the settlement of the Chinese Incident, our attitude should be ab^olutelr inde- pendent. For instance, concerning such matters as German mediation of the Chinese Incident v/hich has recently almost come into Question, we should have Germany mediate from a point of view that as a part of the general problem of Japan-German Document No. 1308 Page 3. cor.lition, the quick settlement of the Incident and the solidifying of Japari f s position will become a favorable faetor to Germany, T;;r e should avoid assuming a supplicatory attitude. It is also necessary to 3tudy concretely the recognition of the new regime and the prohibition of exports to CHIANG. 1 "ANDO: 1 The question of trade v/ith Europe and Africa and on other econcmic matters has been raised, because, if Germany should resort to a closed economy In case of forming a block economy in Euiooe and A.fr:.ca, Japan would fall into difficulties. To ェeet this problem we hope to maintain trade between the East A.sia anc 3 South Seas economic sphere of Japan and the new economic sphere of Germany, and to make clear whether or not other economic relations should exist, as well as the difference /'of Japan and Germany J s positron in the two spheres/.' "ANDO； 'The rrost important problem among Japan's promises to Germany wi]1 be the restraint of British activi- ties in East as much as possible in order to facilitate Germany's conquest of England (refer to Article (2)), and on this point I should like to request the A.rmy and the Navy to study what practical measures exist, is far as I am c(m- cerned, oppression of British political rights and interests in East Asia or a secret assistance to the native independence movements in India and Biirma, in accordance with the changes in the situation, rray serve as restraining measures. 1 "A.ND0: '-Point 3 specifies compensation for Germany's recognition of our political predominance in the South Sea Islands. Germany craves for ''olfram m b b e r , and tin from China and the South Seas! and we will supply Germany with them. We will also give favorable consideration to Germany's economic activities (including investment and enterprises) in China and the South Seas, (a) and (b) will keep an even balance.' "OSTO: ' ̂ fter the conclusion of the T;ar there may be occasions when Germany might carry out active economic opera- tions towards the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-Cnina, and China,, and especial 1 ;/ after Germany makes France and the Netherlands somewhat like subject states, it is probable that she will dispatch active members of the Nazi Party to French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies and keep these two colonies under her political leadership even if she would not go so far as to make them her own territories. Therefore, Japan's policy toward French エndo-China and the Dutch. East Indies must be hastened in order to prevent such movsrrierit ；/on the part of Germany/ and she must also endeavour to sever French Indo-China an<? the Dutch East Indies from European influence as soon as possible, 1 Document No. 1308 Page 4. "A.ND0: 'As to our Soviet policy referred to in ⑵ , i t is equally favorable to both Japan and Germany to maintain peace with the Soviet Union at present. However, we cannot forecast to what direction Germany will turn its relations with Soviet after cessation of the European War. It will be necessary for us to make some sort of arrangement with Germany beforehand as Japan and Germany will be in the same position in their relations with Soviet. However, the relation between Germany and Soviet at the present moment is delicate, and there probably may be something which Germany cannot tell us unreservedly. For this reason, the latter part of article ⑵ may be dropped according to circumstances.' "TAKA.YA.M: 1 Germany would not like to see Soviet pene- trate into Rumania. Should Germany request us to check Soviet in the East, what measures could be considered? 1 "Concerning the above measures, discussions followed. Then the subject was turned to Japan's U. S. policy, Article (3) of Chapter II. "TAKAYAMA: 'Does this mean that Japan will not try to reach any particular understanding with the United States after all? For example, if such an agreement as to guarantee the peace of the Pacific should be reached, and if the United States should, as a consequence, no longer sense msnaoe in the Pacific, it may interfere with European affairs, which Germany will no doubt detest.' "A.ITO0J "No.' Even if such an agreement should be reached, the agreement will be made in a manner that the United States will confine itself to tha American continents and it will not interfere with the affairs of the South Seas and other parts of the world. Recently, Hitler propounded that the United States should mind its own business of the /American continents and should not interfere with the affairs of other continents, and RIBBSNTROP, in his conversation with our Ambassador S久TO, did not seem to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American rela- tion to restrain the United States. Apparently, Germany‘s wish is to maintain a peaceful relation with the United States at present and in the future, as long as the latter does not take an offensive attitude. Consequently, Germany is not likely to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation. 1 "TA.K.1YAM:- 'Will not Germany demand us to take some measures in order to prevent the United States from partici- pating in the war on Britain's side?' Document No. 1308 Page 5. "u^DO: 'Such anxiety was felt in the early stage of the present ァar, but we have practically no such "uneasiness now, for Germany does not anticipate the United States' participa- tion in the v/ar any longer.' "ISHIZY?A.: 1 There is one thing that we should keep in otir mind in respect of our relation with the United States. After two to three years from now, the U. S. Navy will become a far greater power. Japan and Germany prust necessarily check it together. W N D O : 'Both Japan end Germany should not positively be antagonistic to the United States, but should restrain it peaceably.' "ISHIZA.WA.: 'Judging from each assertion made by Japan and the United States, there is a considerable difference in opinions between the two, and it will require unusu?：1 efforts to ac 1 jnst it. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the New Order in Europe, the United States will find it difficult to interfere in European affairs, and as a conse- quence, it will intervene in Far Eastern affairs, with the Philippines and Hawaii ?.s its m v a l bases. Should a peaceful order be established between Japan and the United States, the latter may insist upon pretty severe conditions to be accepted by Japan. A.nd if we try to make Germany restrain the United States, we mny tiim out to be ?liability to Germany.' U I D O : 'However, should the United States put .pressure upon Japan, Japan's power of restraining Soviet rnp.y be weak- ened, anc Germany w u l d not like it. So Japan's relations with the United .States and Soviet and that G e r m a n y will eventiiF.lly become the same.' "T^KA-YiMA.: 'Germany has considerably advanced into South iraerica since pre-war time, and y;on' t it be as absolutely necessary for Germany to advance to South America after the war as well? If so, the United States would not approve of this movement and don't you think a conflict will arise between Germany and the United States? 1 "Discussions followed. "SHIBA： 'According to Helfrich who recently visited Japan, it was said that, contrary to Japan's erroneous assump- tion, Germany' s industrial -oower which had expanded during and before ths war would undertake great economic activities in order to extend the market for German industrial products in post-war time. It is certain that Germany will penetrate economically into China and the South Seas also.' Document Mo. 1308 Page 6. ”擁 0 : 'Concerning article (4) of Chapter II, as it w?.s decided, we cannot accept a request to join the war, even if Germany should ^.ake such a request to us. 11 な N D O : ' Concerning Chapter III, which is the coalition between Jaoan <?.nd Italyj Italy has hitherto reiterated that it would support Japan in her Erst Asiatic policy. It would be also important that we maintain a friendly relation with Italy to restrain G e m n y which would pride itself upon its victory. I think it will be an adequate measure to present our coalition proposal to Italy at the s a .me time 呵.3 do to C-ermany.' "The Urmy and Ncvy ？.pDroved his suggestion, "Then someone asked, 1 One of the most important matters for Japan in connection with Italy is Italy's relation with Soviet. But, is Italy willing to maintain peace with Soviet? r "TAKiYA T ' T A.: 'As l o n g a s t h e p r e s e n t E u r o p e a n V/ar is in progress, Germany and Itciy's policy toward Soviet v/ill be more or less the same.' "A.ftsr there were some arguments sbout the formality of the agreement, it was decided that the agreement be written in the form of a c 1 iplom^tic note, unless the other government is anxious to have it i-irritten in the form of a regular pact, as it would take a long time to enter into a formal pact, anjr- how. (Ho'srever, in a case as ' the recognition of Japan's position in French Indo-China ancl Duセcti East Indies, f it was resolved that tlie formality of an agreement may bs is sued.) To sum up, they agreed to carry out the matter quickly. Furthermore, it was tmanimov-S^ npprovsd tliat ths detail of concrete problems involved in each article ba carefully stvidied." Document No. 1308 Page 7. trade give favorable consideration to Japan 1 s economic illations with Europe and Africa. (b) J a pan promises Germany: i) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under ths German leadership; ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East \sic. in order to facilitate her sur- render; Plan For Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Drafted July 12th 1940) I. The object of strengthening the harmony. The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present inter- national upheaval, ths attainment of our Imperial nim bv quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East ksia including the South Seas, snd Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in the faca of the world situation after the European II. Japanese-Gerraan coalition. Principle -- To maintain an intimate connection with each other and to have a concrete political understanding as re- gards the mutual assistance in diplomatic and economic affairs. Points (1)， （a) Germany promises Japan: i) not to interfere with the autonomy or inde- pendence of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and othar races of the South Seas areas, to recognize that the above araas are within the sphere of Japan's influence, and to approve and support J a m n ' s political Isadsrship and cooperation in those arsas; (ii) to give proper support for the disposition of the China Incident; o r t G h t )o . 1 . 1 d • 1 n - c p i Document No. 1308 Page 8. iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China nnd the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activity of G e r m n y in China and in the South Seas. (2) Japan ？.nd Germany shall cooperate in mointnining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war v/ith the Soviet Union, the othar party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one p.?.rty should be threatened, by the Soviet Union. (3) Japan and Germany sh^.ll cooperate in ordsr thit the Unitod Statas shall not interfere with affairs outside the A.merican continent, and if the Unitsd States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall acopt such a oolicy as to check the U. S., never supporting her» (4) Japan shall not accept, at tha present stage, Germany's request to join tho even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part. (5) Though it T70"uld be good to have Ambassador KITPJJSIL- negotinta 双ith Foreign Minister RIB3IBNTR0P, If that is •つ impossible, negotiations shall be concucted at Tokyo. III. Japsness-エtalisn coalition. In parallel v/ith the Japnness-German negotiations, the negotiations v/ith Italy shall be commenced at ！Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in gener?.!. Itill•？in policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order sround the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany. Document Mo. 1308 Page 9. Plan for Strengthening ths Harmony 3etv;een Ja pan, Gsrmimy and Italy. I. Ths object of strengthening the harmony. The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the presant inter- national upheaval,the attainment of cmr Imperial aim by quickly embodjH.ng an intir.ate cooperstivs relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East usi^. including ths Sou ! :h -Sgo.s, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for ？‘ new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future internationnl position in fsce of the world situa- tion aftar the European Wnr. II. Japanese-German coalition Principle -- With the common aim of sstablishing 2. New World Order, J?p,?.n and Germany shall maintain close liaison with one another and shall in parallel engage in the estnblishmsnt of the new order raspsctivaly in ニ Isic including the South r.ess, and in Europe and /Vfrica, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplo- matic and economic cooperation riGcess^.ry for tho above. Points: (1)，(s) Germany promises Japan: i) to recognize thnt French Indo-Chin?., Dutch East Indies and other South -Seas nreas are politically and economicnlly within the sphere of Japan's influence and that thejr shnll ba able of their own fre-3 will to enjoy autonomy or indepandence in the f-uturo, to racognize accordingly ttet Jnp?.n' s approval crust be necessary for the alteration of their political status quo, and to support the economic development of J npan in those ara^s, not preventing ths implantation of her political power; ii) to assure Japan of the indiscriminatg trsat- ment of her trade with Europe anc 1 Africa under the German influence, and to give f.ivorable considar^.tion to her othar economic relations; iii) to have harmony in economy and technique be- ty/ean Jnp?.n ？nd Germany. Document No. 1308 Page 10. (b) Ja pan promises Germany: i) to support tho Germe.n policy in IVarope and Africa r.nd to i.pprovs the "Germnn-dirs-ctGd New Order in Europe; ii) to as sura Germany the supply of essenti ri l ma- terials in China and the South Seas 5 iii) to recognise indiscriminate treatment of trade in China and tha -South Seas, and to give favorable consideration to German economic activities. (2) Japan ？.nd Germany shr.ll cooperate in mnint?.ining peace with tha Soviet Union, If by any chance one of the parties should onter war with ths Soviet Union, tho other party must not assist tho latter, and moreover, ths two coun- tries shall confer on whnt accion to tako either in the aliovo case or in the event one party should be thraatanod by the Soviet Union. (3) Japan snd Germつny sh?.ll cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outsida the /Imerican conti- nent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Garmany and J^.pan must not adopt sn.ch a policy as would support the United States. A.^ain, both J?.Dnn sncl G a m a n y shall rack a comr. on cause with each othor against ths IT. S. In t hair Central and South amGricsn policy. (4) To contrive ths fで.11 of British influence by tho partition of her colonias. In order to fncilitete Britain's snrrander Japan shall check h.sr as fnr cs possible in East Isia by such ma a sure s as the withd.ravral of British forces, cismrnd for the disarmament of Hongkong (Singapore), demand for the cession of British torritories in the South 8es3 5 independance of India, Buiすma cmc，othors, capture of British ships. For this end, Gorraany sin 11 give adequnte political support for disposition of the China Incident, (5) J n .pnn sh'ill not accept, at tha present stage, Gerrnaザ s raqusst to join the v/o.r, even if Germany should in- sist upon the duty on our part. (6) Though it would ba good to fevs imbr-.ssador KLTRUSU nsgotiats with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impos- sible, negotiations shall be conducted a.t Tokyo. Document No. 1308 Page 11. III. Japanese-丄t;alian coalition In parallel with the J；?.panese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will .apply correspondingly tQ the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranaan Saa approved, othor matters being the sama as with Germany. Plan for Strengthening the Harmony Between Jap'in 3 Germany and Italy. (Drafted July 12th 1940) I. The object of strengthening the harmony. The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present inter- national upheaval,the attainment of our Imporial aim by quickly embodying ?.n intimate cooperative relation bstv;een onr Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including セhe South Seas 9 and Germany and Italy which are fighting for the New Order in Europe, and to strengthen our futurs intornational position in the face of the world situa- tion after the European マ II. J.?.pnnese-C-erman coalition. Zllincijole -- With the common aim to establish the World New Order, Ja^an anc!. Gar many sh?.ll be engaged in the estrblish- ment of tha new order respectively in East A.sia including the South Seas and Europe and Africa, in parallel and keeping an intimate cormection with each other, and shall have a concrete politico 1 Lmderstanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the purpose, Points; ⑴ , ( a ) Garrn.?.ny promises J?.^an; i) to recognize that French Indo-Chim, tho Dutch E^ist Indiss and other South Seas craas are within the spher.3 Document Mo. 1308 Page 12. of Japan's influence and thnt Japan's approval is nocossary for any altoration in thair political reversion, and support ths political guidance and economic aid of Japan toward those JL <_/、.‘。， ii) to give adecmata political support for the man?, gemsnt of tho China Incident 5 iii) to givo favorable consideration to Japan's trade s.nd other economic relations with Europe and Africa. (b) Japan promises Germany: i) to supoort German policy in Europe and へ. f r i c a and approve the New Order in Europe under German leadership^ i i )セ o take staps as far as possible to check Britain in E?.st Asia in order to facilitate her surrender5 iii) to supply Gsrm^ny with essential mat oris.Is from China and the 8ou ch Seas and to give favorabls consid- eration to the economic activities of Gormany in China and the South Seas. (2) Japan pnd Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If Ly any chance one of the two parties should enter war with tho Soviet Union, the othar party r'mst not assist the latter, and moreover, ths two countries shp.ll confer on notion is to be taken Git;nGr in the Ebove caso or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union. (3) J?.pan nncl G o r m n y slia.ll cocperato to keep the United Stat.3s from interfering Kith affairs outside thG AmGrico.n continont, nnc" 1 if the Unit ad St^tos should put political or oconomic pros sure either upon J^.pan or Gorn^ny, both Ge^msny and Japrm shall not ndo^t sueh a Dolicy as would suppori; the United States. Lg-yj.z, botn. Jr/p^n end Gertrnny shall make coiriKon cans3 v/ith cacti othsr in their policy in Central Lind South A.mericas. (4) Jap?,n shall not accept, at the present stags, Germany's req-aest to i c in the war, a van if Gorimny should insist upon the duty on our part. (5) Though it would ba good to tove A.nbassador ICDTUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impos- sible, negotiations sh^ll bo carried on Tokyo r Docunont No. 1308 Page 13 III. Japanose-Italian Harmony. In parallel with tho J?, p a ne s 8 - Ge rman ne got is t ions, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and tha substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general, Italian p o l c y in Europe and Africa shall he supoortsd and the new order around the Mediterranean Soa approved, other matters being the same as with GsrEany. Doc. Ho. 1308 Pa^e 1 C E I' I IT I C A T E w.D.C. No. I.P.S. K o . 1 5 0 8 Statement of Source a.nd Authenticity I, H^XxrJHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected v/ith the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chi ef of Archives Sectioru Jg:oa.ncse iureign Off!ce and 七hû t as b^ch off l.c i al I have cii^t^u.^ of the document hereto attached cons? 3しテき oi 24： pages f 弋んじeし J q\y 12 1 9 4 0 _ , and described, ac . £, ollo;vs: , Kinwtet ol .：,̂i'xl conference of the Army, Fqyv a an.J ?orc;ign Office i'-.fê か::？ j.-.xtenpifying the ... coalition loetiflTfâ n •了a-cごn. G-ermany and 丄tこdv. j'̂ a.t̂ d Juiy 1 2 , 1 9 4 0 > I further certify that the at cached record aad aocuinent is an official document of the Jaoanese G-overmneiit, end that it is part of the official archives and files of the follov:ing named ministry or department (specifying also the file numlDer or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of A u g u s t • 1 9 4 6 . /s/ K . Eayg.shi Signature of Official SEaL Witness: /s/ I^a^aharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Eichard H> Lg.rsh• herety certify that I am associated v/ith the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained, "by me from the a Dove signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official "business. Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug • 1 9 4 6 /s/ Richard K. Larsh SiiicS V/itness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator> IPS Official Capacity Doc. Wo. 1392 raga 1 "(Part II) "HTNUTES OF ,T0MT CONMl^NGE 05" :iAVY s ilKD F O つ ： A U T H O R I T I E S 0?エ LTZSNSI^IGムTIOF G Q A J m AIIONQ JAPAN, GE:て..IANY AND ITALY. h,. t,]ie foreign Office oii the 16til Juljr 1940. "Attendances: ANTO-^Chio. I,j."IZA' • T A J i a i -.ご T O K U H ， TAKAYxU'Ik’ • 广 of a bee bion, the Foreign Office Cni of of a. Section ? tiie foreign Office neforo adjourii.rmt) 01'a ;5oCtiou. the rcreign Office liocretary, ^ho "foreign Office It. Colonel, t.ii3 -.'ar .-.i.nistry iajcr； t:り.e General StaTi. ufi'j.ce (witiidiew SKIB^., Co.ni.aand3r, tiie Kavai iiinistry "iiNTO (Foreign Ox'iico) utters: .'for today,エ req_ue&t ムiviy and Kavy to give us tiioir opinions concerning tiie plan (proposal) relating to the intensiiicatio.i of coalition among Japan, Geraany and Italy which. I •ニarvo yea on the occasion of tiie previous conference. Please start v/itii xirray. ，’ TAKATA2..IA (War .linistry)：ェ &5reG upon this plan as a who le- an d will -give you our opinion in d e t a i l : a s to tiie raeaning of tiie vrord NANYO / T". N. SoutiL Seas/ contained in til a piirase 'tlie construction of a naw order j.n tiie ?ar Sast including the South vSess, ' nientioned in clause エ would like to iiave it uean as -lapan's intention to include tlie territory e2:tending fro.i B u m a and. th;-. eastern part of India on the west to Australia and Z&aland on the oast, but since there siic.uld be a Soutii SoaB of xirst sense and also ox' tiis second sense, "tlie 0011th deas to be expressed ao Japan' s attitude for the_ present should be a narrower Sout.li Soas ercludins Australia, New Zealand and 3urraa. ^evertiio- less, I think shoulc 1 . consider as Japan r s attitude the NANTO of the 'A/idor senrâ ；. "ANTO (Foreign 0:i:i jc 3) : ^s <1 apan's ideal, Australia, New Zealand &n<i Pur^aa. of course, saould be included, but as a. concrete quustion T we alio u Id adoot tiie Sou til 3eas of the xirst sense ±cr the cino baing, In regard to tliis point,エ aw v;holly in agreeing at with Lt c Col. TMAYjaMA. “Dr.IBk ^Naval ^inifctry) : I agree to that. Doc. No. 1392 Page 2 "TiJCAYAIIA (War -lini&try) : Next, in regard to tiie outline of clause (2) , J 城ondei* if it isn't necessarj'' to discuss the point that is to become tlis bacis of tiie outline, that is tiie funda..iental point, bofox-a the outline is decided with Geraany. "̂ -JSTTO (Foreign Office) : Sineく〕the fun.da.ienta.1 point is tiiat since both countries ars on a coajon footing -- that is, tiie establishment of a new order in Europe and Africa by Geruiany as her spiiero of liveliiiood and tiis e stablisiiraent of a nsw order 111 East xj-sia.； including the South 3eas, by J"apc.n as her sphere of livelihood； dees it ••loan tiiat botii countries should recognize and respect each other's spiiore and assist and cooperate in tiio establishment of the new order within the respective spiiere? ”TaKAYAT.Ia (War ministry) : Yas. ”aNTO (Foreign ministry)：ェ . .HAVE no objection to the opinion of Lt. Colonel T̂-uv̂Yxii；̂'! in rsgard to settling tiie funda-aental point with G e m a n y . "TAKAYaMa (V/ur ministry): Ihat is, in regard to discussing this .natter with Giir.aa.ny, tlie outline and details should be らntc.red into only after tiie fuiidaiaental point has been discussed first. "iUSfTO (Foreign i-iinistry)：エ agree with you. "(Navy agrees) "TiiKAYJiH/L (War i-iinistry) : N e x t , l e t us go into the contents Ox tiis outline. In clause 1 , t h e r e is ^ phrase T not to interfere with tne s e 1 f - go v em-usnt and independence of tiie various races,' but エ believo it is not necessary to .aaice GeiMany express til is. ".•JNfTO (Foroign Office) : It is tiiere for tiie purpose of siiowing tliat Gcr:.:iany lias no intention of acquiring tiiese territories. "TiJL-MIA. (War Ministry)：ェ don't tiling it is necessary to -:iake iisr say it distinci.13-.エ wonder if it would not be sufficient if we raalce her recognize tlie fact that rencli Indo-Ciiina and Dutch Indies are witiiin tiis Gpharo of livelihood of Japan and. Japan's political leadership in these areas, “fter a l l , i t v/ill bo 'recognize tlie fact that the ooutii oeas area is witnin the sphere of livelihood of Japan. 1 Doc. No. 1392 Page 3 '’ T‘ :“H -'linist.：-;^； N ^ z t , t h e q u e s t i o n is abou•； t h e .ぃieanin.3 o f p o l i t i c a l l a a d c r s L i p , Tiie s t r c n ^ i i s t o f t h i s i s o c c u p a t i o n T _ b u t •胁 are n e t tliliikiiig cデ nfi^np^fcinn pt. ^ ^ & e n t » ^ % s y w a y , i z 2.1 n a u o s s a r y t i a t t n e wn.ole c o u n t r y c o n s p i r e a n d u n i t e o n t h e p o i n t o f p o l i t i c a l . L e a d e r s h i p a n d •aake u - e r ^ a h y recognize as £trong_ a political icadsrsiiip as po&siblo. " A N T O ( F c r ^ i f ^ Office]1 I tiiniv hero l i s a o n e o f t-iia iiost difficult points in. rt^ar'l to the queetion of intensification o f t h i s p r o b l e m , A.3 3 s e n riezilv b y tiie c a b l e fro^ii iuiibassador SaTO， i s n ' t it, t," s ii, t e n t i o n o f C.er.adny t o g r a s p tiio p o l i t i c a l leadership for hcrs^li' .mi give Japan cn.lv the econoiiic interest i n r e g a r d t c ：.cii I n d o - JIiiDa a n d x^otiisrlands E a s t I n d i e s . I n o t h e r vvords, i'； a p p e a r s a s i f G-or^iany w i l l n o t r e c o g n i z e J a p a n 's r i ^ n t o f p o l i t i c a l l e a d o r s l i i p , " T ^ a Y i J L i (V'ar “i n i s . t r y )：エ f e e l t.丄lut .aiysolf, a n d i t i s n e c e s s a r y to f o r c e Gervicny t o r e c o g n i z e a s s t r o n g o , l e a d e r s h i p a s p o s s i b l e o f .French Inio-Cii丄nd ^ n d tiie Jutcli I n d i e s . "ANTO (Foreign Officc)：エ tliis point xill be first tiling ar^uod. wiic.a thし talk on Uig question of intensification of tliis ハ.latt.sr is taken up, but according to tiie cable fro,a Consul- G-oiieral Y A J I A J I , tlie o til o r d a y , G e r a a n y r e p o r t e d l y is w i l l i n g t o o f f e r 0 a p a n t h e s a s t e r n p a r t o f t h e D u t c h . I n d i e s : I n a n o t h e r s e n s e , i t a e a n s t h a t Gar.viany i s t.iking J a v a , S u m a t r a , e t c . " T i J ^ Y . u L ^ (i/ar 地 i n i s t r y )：ュ 3 t o v/iiat a t t i t u d e &ir..jiany w i 1 1 "bake t o w a r d s Jo p a n j.n f u t u r e c o n c e r n i n g tiie Dutcxi I n d i e s a n d French Indo-C;.Aina depends largely upon ths attitude siie will take towards Soviet Hassia after the ware ^ince U•しr._aai:iy 丄ids no inten- tion to dispoce of Russia. Ljoedistely after tlie war, siie iiight leave i'rcncl: Indo-China. end tb^ -•人：し'了•"ふ.-i- r, Jc-oaii easier tlian a x p t c t s d . B u t i f r-iio しre t o s t a r t witli tiie o ^ K + . , n i c t i o n ot a n e w o r d e r i n T . u r o p e , t丄じ q u e s t i o n o f ^rencii I n d o - G i i i n a a n d 〕utcii I n d i e s w i l l tecoLio c o n s i d e r a b l y troubloso-iie. i-uia a s f o r Jc.pan, s h e siiculd, f o r tlx a t i a e o s i n g , c o n s i d o r tiist & e r a a n y n a 3 i n t e n t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l l y t a . c m g o v e r x^renca エ n d o - G n i n a a n d tlie D u t c h エ n d i i s a n d s h o u l d b e p r e p a r e d f o r i t . jfor tliat, a considerably f ir.i determination is necessary, f , /JMT0 ( F o r s i g n O r r i c e ) ； エ a g r e e xritu y o u . w e sliould o b j e c t •^tron^ly t o Gcri^isny，s i n t e n t i o n t o a s s u m e p o l i t i c a l l a a d s r s h i p i n D u t c h . Ta-lics, e t c . Doc. No. 1392 J?age K "ISHIZA^.VA (Fortoigii -Ministry) ： X agree co-uipletoly, (General French and D -C£ , I tliink the question of < Staff Oi'f: .し C/.'J. -1.'c i S o I n d i e s d e p e n d s e n t i r e l y u p o n n a v a l p o w e r anf. w h o L a s n o Jiavul p o w e r , w i l l n o t b e a b l e to oppose Japyn within tliS sphere of Japansse n a v a l influence no matter liow stoutly ；.a.7 rsbist. Oonsequently, the question lies solely in Japaa' s dgterj.3.ati0n, "i-i.NT0 (TTcreign O f f i c e ) : i thinii y o u ar-3 rigiit 5 Du.t. G-erniaziy, i n suc.A a n E フ , JIIAHT た.ry て0 u t i l i s e 2 u £ s iユ s n i c L s c k o a p a n froi.i the north, I'his, + ん、0， is a point to bs taiven into considera- ti on. " T ^ E . H R / i (Gi-Gnei-al 3 t a f r O x f i o t ) : I d o n ' t tiiin:^ tiiat e v e n Soviet Russia vjcuici. te a tool of G-cr-iany and carelessly Lieddle i n t o t h i s w i t h tiio h o p 3 o f s e c u r i n g tiiG n o r t h e r n s e c t i o n o f -aanciiuria. Soviet -si a would probably s e e k f o r tlie I'Jo&r Sast ^ a n d India. ”Tj'JdAI..‘Li (V7ar ministry) : How about setting aside (B) 'to a s s u m e a m e a n s o f c h e c k i n g t o e x p e d i t e t k s s u r r e n d s r o f Hingland' as a separate c la use, to 36 til or wit.i x'oregoing clause 'to give appropriate support for tiie disposition of the China incident‘？ This is beoau&e it ia a current pro'bl&ui or a matter "to be concluded in a siiort period ratlier tnan one tliat v/ill r e g u l a t e tiLQ f u t u r e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n J o p a n a n d G e r m a n y。 "ANTO (Foreign Office) : “s this was considered, as a r..compensation for Ser.iaiiy in return for recognition of tiie N e w O r d e r in East Asia i n c l u d i n g t h e S o u t h S e a s a n d f o r h e r support in the disposition of" the Incident, tilers is no reason for any objection again&t nakin^ it a separate clause. / "TAKAYAl.IA ( T 'fer Ministry) : It is stated that a restraining .measure will be taken against England, but エ wonder if there is any rsally effective restraining ..10asure? "3jSIBA (Naval ministry) : It's very difficult as a concrete p l a n . "TAKAYAI^ (War Ilinistry) : T]:ien, is it not necessary to cliange tlie workins of this clause? " � ’''TAJ丁：RI (Foreign O f f i c e ) : Tiie newspapers c a n be utilized. Doc. No. 1392 Page 5 "TAKAJAITA (War ニinistry) : Tlie checking of Sngland by Japan and Geraany's support for tiie disposition of tlie incident can be regarded as "balancing eac.a other, and in regard, to the recognition of 'the new regiae to be considered in connection witii th& disposi- tion of tiie incident, tiie balance can be obtained by the recognitic of P o l a n d and so 1'ortii,but in r e g a r d t o o b t a i n i n s lier c o o p e r a t i o n in the econonic construction of China, I v/onder if the ciieck agains England can't be regarded as its bulance? " A N T O (IToraign O f f i c e ) : ^.s c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r lier c o o p e r a t i o n in ths econonic construction, tiie supplying of wolfram and other tilings, whicli G a m a n y w a n t s , a n d h e r p d r t i c i p a t i o n i n tlie e n t e r - p r i s e to scx;ig e x t e n t c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d . "TiLtCaY/il'-Ia (V/ar ministry)：エ tiling we siiould refrain from allov/ing her to participate in tlie enterprises in Ciiina. as ,.aucii as possible. "TANSMURA (General Staff Office): In case of the worst, we siiould s h o w o u r ^eneroaitjr of a l l o w i n g h e r to p a r t i c i p a t e in as ::auch as lialf of the e n t e r p r i s e s . "TJiKAY.dlk (War uinistr力：.、'e do t h a t , I w a n t t h a t t o b e rsstrioted tc tiie .AiniJiuu, ” U I Z I (Foreign Office) : AS for Germany' s ；political support in connection with ths disposition of tiie incident, it probably is h e r p e a c e m e d i a t i o n f o r tiie t i m e b s i n g . I n r e g a r d t o tiie 3Conomc problea, it is cooperation in sconony and technique, a n d as c o m p e n s a t i o n , w a c a n .give G 己 : h s u v y i n d u s t r i e s aarkets in Ciiina and tiie Soutii Seas. " T U A I I A (War -••linistry) : Tiiere is a necessity to consider Italy togetiior witii Geriaany. "TAJIRI (Foreign」inistr:/) : i-is cofiipensation, &erjiany lias bsen conducting coastal trade since the outbreak of tiis incident, and エ believe it better to recognize sucii tilings as this coastal t r a d e a n d i n d u s t r i a l tec.'.inical a s s i s t a n c e . エ i/'roiidsi* if i t i s n ' t necessary for Japan to lo-arn 6Cono.aic technique fron G s m a n y . "i^NTO ( F o r e i g n o f f i c e ) : I t ' s n e c e s s a r y , ^ a e r i c a ' s h e a v y i n d u s t r y is r i c h i n Liateric;l3. I n otiiar w o r d s , it is a h e a v y i n d u s t r y of tiie r i c h - a n d Geriaany's i s tiiat of t n e p o o r .ボヌ f o r J a p a n , it is n e c e s s a r y f o r lier t o 1 tidrn Gerraa-'iy'» p o o r 's iieavy industry. Doc. No. 1392 Pago 6 " L J U R a (General Staff Office) : F o r Japan, it is extreiaely i.lportant for iie^ to develop the heuvy industry in lvlanciauria, i Consequently, if we can't sxpect to toi^e in anjrtiiing f ro-a iu.derioa, r^e nuist think of taking i.ユ these froa Geraany. If Gariiany 's ！ technique flo:vs into Soviet aX't^n.. 1,7ar, it will be a igrave problera for Japan. We should consider introducing Germany's tecimique into Hdncliuria and China after t h ^ war. "ANTO (Foreign Office): Returning our discussion to the "beginning, does it iban, after a l l , t h a t tliere is no concrete plan for checking ^nsland? "TAJIRI (I-orsign Office) : England, can be checked to a. certain extent by utilizing the newspapers. "ANTO (Foreign Office) : Tlie instigdtion of an indepandent moveiuent in India cind Burma secretly according to the ciiangs of international situation can be resuraed as an effective cLack against England. "MELIORA (General Staff uffice) : I thinii it v;ould bs an estreaiely effective clieck against England to take a strong attitude in regards to problems against England in connection witii the Oiiina incident； for instance, taking a strong attitude in regard to problems pertaining to Hongkong, Siiangiiai and Tientsen. "T^JIRI (Foreign Office) : Depending on tlie occasion, it may be a splendid idea to demand for the disarmament of ixongkong. "/iNTO (Foreign Office) : .-.f fcer all, it ueans firstly to exclude the political rights and interest of iingland. from C.ixna ana secondly, to insti.3a.te tLe independence of Buriaa. and India. U U i l A (War .ministry) : Tiiese should be executed to tiie extent of not rasorting to arjis. "iLNTO (Foreign Office)：ュs for tlie 贝avy, couldn't slie make use of vessels of unknown nationality? •"3HIBA (Navdl x-linistry) : That could be done. (Naval ilinistri^) : Is 111 ere no measures to take a. step further and strike Sugland rather tlian to clieck her? " T a J I R I (foreign Office): That can be done wlien Chiang '.ai-shek surrenders, but, for the tirae being, we had better not r lo it. Doc. No. 1392 Page 7 " S H I B a (Naval ilinistry) : DocsnFT it .dean that we licid be'utor participate in tiie； war uj.'on tlie disposition of tiie inciioL.t'? "T.X^Y.ill. ( 1 .7ar' ニ丄n.—stry) : for the tiae bein^. it is best to proceed according to the present degree. "SEIB ム ( N a v a l Ministry): If we discuss til is q.uesti on of c lie eking England './itt G-er.aany -night start ask us to occupy Singapore-, ” TjIJLRI (Foreign Office) : ' ie can tell iier tiiat we will do that wiion the incident is settled. " T H E T R a (General Staff Office) : It would be all right if we claim tiiat tho attack on Singapore is to be carried out on our own accord. "TAKaY^Mk (War ilinistry)： -fter all, it would be better to negotiate with Germany 'dtii the attitude tiiat Japan will have no responsibility in regard, to tiie qusstion of taking part in tne war, but ニ:lay engage in a v/ar v/itix England indepsiidently. y "Tx-JLxYiil-Iii (War ministry)：ムs to tiie relations witla Soviet Russia mentioned in clause 2， it is to keep peace for the time b e i n g a n d e v e n t u a l l y t o g u i d e S o v i e t xiussia i n sucii a w a y a s t o conform to tlie common standpoint of Japun and Germany. Depending 011 the occasion, the turning of Soviet Russia's spearhead toward Burma and India can be considered. "T .K-lYj^Li (War Ministry) ： Regarding our relations witli j^iTisrica, it is possible as a future problem tiiat J"apan and Germany may take a joint action in Soatli Anierica agcinst ^ e r i c a and tliat whether J"しpan sliould sustain Gsr+nany in iier economical policy toward South -cierica :aay become a probleia. “ence,エ wonder if it v/ouldn' t be better for Japan to consider nov; the possibility of taking joint action m.th G-or.iant7 against •oaerica after the establisiineni: of tiie nsw order in iiast “sia a few years iienco? "ANTG (Foreign Office): In regard to the question of - j a e r i c a , t h e r e is a n e c e r j s i t y o f g i v i n g i t g r e a t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . G s m a n j , at present, is cuita optiaistic about ^uacrica and concerning the post-v/ar cdx'ainistration, 'Schaht' is tliinking of getting xiaerican loan, ^hile other Nazis ara tEinking of depending o n tlie ' b a r t e r ' s y s t e . a r ^ -^rter a l l , a s t o wiiat a t t i t u d e G-erraany "-•Till take against ‘America，:ve cannot tell until after Genaany iiGs d e f e o t e d . E n g l a n d , “t p r e s e n t , Geri.au.ny's a t t i t u d e i s '-^aerica sliould not interfere in European probleムis, ' Jrom the Japanese— Ter.uan discussions, ;ve can't tell anythins more tiian びhat has o e e n i n d i c a t G d . i n t h e p l a n a t p r e s e n t . Doc. No. 1392 Page 8 " I L ^ ^ m L i (War Ministry} : That's riglit， but as for m e n t a l a t t i t u d e , i t is n e c e s s a r y t h d t s h s t a k e i n t o cori..3ide cat; o n those matters heretofore discussed. In this respect, ic is proper t o liave i n iaind Japanese-0-er.acn c o o p e r a t i o n i n tiie econoiaic expansion into South x^erica. "TnJIRI (Foreign Office) : I think Ger.aany is looking down u p o n iuaerican e c o n o m y a s a m o n e y eccncuay i n c o n s i d s r i n ; g lier f u t u r e e c o n o m i c debouciiiient i n t o S o u t L iuaerica. “t a n y r a t s , i t i s necessary at least to sound out vmat G-er^iany is tiiinking of in regard to ^ e r i o a snd Soviet Russia for tie future. For Geraany, ajiierica's sup; ort of Soviet Russia is a great threat e " T - H U E ^ (General Staff Office) : J?ron my opinion, a dispute between Germany and ^rr.erica iaay materialize before long. There is the possibility of a dispute being caused by defense against Gsruany's dejouc^iment into Soutii ^aerica. ‘‘s South.雁eric j/o a very good market for Jap an cilsc,エ tiiinic v/e should plan to •undertake debouciiiiient into South ^aerica in cooperation with Germany. ".JTTO (Foreign Office) ： ニfter all, these matters are con- tained in the policy restricting iiinerica to only within tlie ianerican continent, ^ilthoush it is necessary to hold, as our •;aental attitude, trie points stated, by Lt. Colonel TlJG丄YxJ'li, won't the original draft be about enough for tlie time being as points to be written on paper? ”TiiKAYAiLi (W“r i.iinistry)：ムs to the question of our obligation to participate in tlie war stated in clause 4, Japan as already discussed sliall not be bound, but we siiould koep in mind that v;e might liave to wa^e v/ar against England independently. "TxxKAYJd'lili. (War Ministry) : In conclusion,エ agree to the original draft in regard to cooperation v/itii Italy。 "TnJTRI (Foreign I linistry)： What about drawing up a simpler plan separately v/ith Itaiy? ”_oNT0 (Foreign Office) : had better to treat Italy in tiie ssuae w a y a s a n d a t t h e sa:ie t i n e w i t h G.sr^aiiy。 ” H H (W“r irnist recognize that and political power i/Iinistry)： there is a ixeretcfors ii.s to Geriaany and Italy, we difference between tiiem of economic possessed in China. Doc. No. 1392 Page 9 ”TょHJL‘ (War illnistry) : Regarding the question of --^viet Hussia, won't it be necessary to change our proposal to -tdly" "； x N T O (Fcreign Office) : S'rori tlie latest report of Mr。 Giiuiclii Ohaslii, is coneidoririg the uso of Moliamuiedans to advance into the Iran and Indian area. Siiould Soviet Russia advance into Iran, Italy .iiei-se丄f would have a. considerable interest in regard to tiie question of Scvist Russia, “"t any rate, Germany and Italy, t.tLougli different in degrees. are in a common poaition in regard to tne question of： Soviet Russia, Tlierefore -we could xaake a similar proposal to both. Germany and Italy. ".iNTO (Foreign Office) : Kextly, I like to iiear the opinion of Navy side. n SHIB人(Naval ..Iinistry) : V/e agree to v/hat Lt. Colonel TL.JLiYAMA has already stated. In st-rengtliening tiio cooperation between Japan and Germany, we should .lake the recognition of tlie respective spheres of new order and the cooperation between Japan and Ge'rmaujr the framework of tho plan and never to show that Japan wants things. Besides, in strengthening our coalition, I wonder if it isn't necessary to push, tha discussion further in regard to the j^iaerican and Soviet Russian prcbleuis. Tliere is 110 real dif- fer eace between Jupdn and ^ e r i c a . Present oppositions between Japan and ^iiaerica are most economical and for tiio most part emotion al. Besides, in regard to the Soviet relationship, it is necessary that Japan und Germany guide it profitably. Only it is a question as to v/hetlier tiiese points siiould be exposed in the text of the treaty. (V7ar xlinistry) : The problem of ^aerica and Soviet Hussia siaould not bs exposed, but snould be dealt with, in a secret clause. " T m (V/ar ministry) : What kind of steps are you going to take to realize tiiis original draft (plan) ？ ".J\TTO (Foreign Office) : Periiaps this Mfill be discussed between Japan and Germany and the main points exchanged through official aocunents， "iJNfTO (Foreign iiinistry) : Now the opinion among us officials concarnsd lies beon unified. It is essential that no time be lost in its execution. Doc. No. 1392 Fate "(All agreed.) " T m (V/ar KinirtrjO •’ ェ"tiiinis ェ couli settle with Aray along tiis line discussed heretofore. " 3 H I 3K (Haval Ministry) ： It's SA.:ae witii Uavy> " T / m (War Ministry) ； If tlie dincussion is to be tLeld in Germany, it may be necessary /fpr someone/ to go ana explain our intent ion : as it is impossible to express it thorougiily by telegram. "(All agreed.}" -•-̂ OC. ivio. 1392 Page 1 C E R T I F I C A T E .iJ.C. Ho.一 ふ丁o. _13ッご otatement of Source g,nd Authenticity I, 上 A-g,oru horc"by certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of •archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto r.tta.ched consisting of 15 pages, dated July 1 6 . 1 5 4 0 , and descri"becl as follov/s： (Part 丄丄j Minutes of joint conference of Army, Navy, and foreign Office authorities of intensification of coalition asiGng Japan, Germany and Italy. Dated July 1 6 . 1 9 4 0 . I further certify that the attached record and document is a.n official dncujnent of the Japanese (Government, and tha.t it is part of the official archives and files of tho following named ministry or department (specifying also the file numlier or citation, if any, or any othor official designation of the regular location of the document in the archivos or files)： ？oreign Ministry* Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of A u g u s t • 1 9 4 6 . /s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official Witness： /s/ Ua^aharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Hichard ii> liarsh, herooy certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the a"bove descrilDed documont oTDtainod "by me from the a"bove signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 34 day of A-qg： • 1 9 4 6 /s/ Richard H. Larah 脑 I S witness： s/ Edward r. :tfionaglig..n Investigator IPS Official Capacity 1C03 Page 1 "The International Situation and Japan 1 s Position. "(AddresB of Foreign Minis tor, lir. Hachiro A R H ， delivered over the air on June 2 9 , 1 9 4 0 ) Japan 1 s ideal sii;ce the foundation of tiie Snp-j rc h^c 'nesr that all nations should ’oe enaoled. to find their propel places in the \ orrd- Onr foreign policy has also "been "based upon this i d e a l , f c ? i^hich we have not hesitated at times even to fight- "by staking cur national existence. What the entire mankind lon^s for is つ h e firm •astiblishne.二っ of -world peace. But it goes withoat saying that peace can never encmc^ ^i/tiers it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places, Unfcrt'ana'beiy, however» the establishment of world peace in thi3 sense is difficalt of speedy realiza- tion at the present stage of human progress. In oi ̂ .er io realise such, a great iaeal, therefore, it seems to "be a most na^'aral r>tep that peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally and economically should first form a sphere of their own for cc-er.isterile and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within -shat Jv^cre, ana at the same time secure a relationship of common existenca a^i prcsperily with other spheres. The cause of ctrifes mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the r.^cessity cf some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrat;ionalitios and injustices of old. Til© war in Europe brings hom« the truth of this with special eniphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international paa^e on a permanent foundation every effort must "be exerted for the rectification of the blunders tiiat have been committed in this regard. It is in this spirit that Japan is nov; en^a^ed in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettaole, therefore, that there should oe those who not only fail to understand Japan 1 s great undertaking based upon this fundamental principle, "but on the contrary, obstruct the establish- ment of peace in East Asia "by supporting the regime cf Chiang Kai-shek• We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone •unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek. Sometimes there are tiiose who would disapprove a change of the status QUO by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of "bringing atout a just and permanent peace that Japan has "been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking "beyond the immediate present. The sword she has dravm is nothing, other than a 1 life—giving sv/ord 1 that destroys evil and makes justice manifest. The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geo- graphically, historically, racially and economically very clcse丄y related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another 1 s needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all the3e regiono under a single sphere on the "basis of common existence and the insuring there"by the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion. N o . 1008 Page 2 The idea to estaoli3h first a righteous peace in each of tho various regions and then establish collectively a just peacc； f.rr tro xhclc ‘ or\0. has long existed also in Europe and America- Tnia ^ .• ”. e;r .っ： ニ existence of a statilizins force in oacli region, •い•」i•“ ..一.- n • u c： er t_ic peoples witJiia that region are to sacuro their c o - s t e r i l e and co-prosperity as well as the staToility of their sphere. It alさo presrppose^ that tiiese groups wi丄1 respect one another 1 ^ individualじharac'coric七上es， political, cultural and economic, and they will cooperate and fulfill one another 1 s needs for their common good. vfhen the iDresent Eurcroean war "broko ouo, tho バ 1、つ 0 : . \ a t once declared their policy of non-involvanient and. made ii; e丄Par th^.t thlr： cr.antry did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the sa-^e t:.n:e did no七 \ T ant to see the war ？proad into East Asia. Quito naturally Japan expocts tiaat "the Western Powers will do nothir^ ohat will ejeert any un'lo'.Ti.ra'ble influence upon the stability of East Asia. Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her tas]： cf ccn3tracting a new order in East Asia, is paying a seriotis attend ion t c de -eiepmonte in the European war and to its repercussions in the vcjricu 5 c-ers cf Ea^t Asia, including tiie South Seas region. I desire to decLs.ぐe t-ha.t the destiny of these regions一一any development therein, and arjy disposal thereof.一一is a matter for grave concern to Japan in v±ew of her ai-.d 1 sspcnei'bilitj" as the sta"biliciri'5 force in East A s i a . Doc. No. 1008 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.P.S. No. 1008 Statement of Source and AuthenticitY I, KAIASHX hereby certify that I an officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following c a p a c i t y C h i e f of Archives Section. Japanese Foreign Office • and tbrt as such o f f i c i a l I have custody of the document h e r e t o a t t a c h e d c o n s i s t i n g o f 6 p a ^ e s i n J a p a n e s e , 5 p s ^ e s in English , dated 一 , 1 9 , and described as follows: Address of Foreign Minister ARITA。 delivered over the rir on June 29r 1940, The International Situation and JaT3rn' s Position* I further certify that the attached record and document is en official document of the Jpp?nese Government, and that it is pp.rt of the officir.l archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying P I S O the file number or citation, if r.ny, or ?ny other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Poreign Ministry Signed ?.t Tokyo on this 22nd d?.y of August,194-6. B^yrshi Signature of Official SEAL r itne-ss - /s/ Nagahpm Odo c s Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurcnont I. Binhp.rcl H. Larsh hereby certify that I an associa- ted with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Coninander for the Allied Powers, and thrt the above described document was obtained by ne from the a bove signed official of the Japa- nese Government in the conduct of ray official business. Signed p.t Tokyo on this 24 day of Auc ,19^6 /s/ R5 chnrd E. Larsh _ " NATTE ‘ i . ‘ . t Witness: /s/ Edword P. Monnghon Investigntor T IPS Official Capacity ニ. ニ. J • Page 1 "The International Situation and Japan 1 s Position. "(Address of Foreign Minister, K r . Hachiro iffll?!, delivered over the air on June 29,1940) Japan 1 s ideal since the foundation of the Enpvre nrx 'fes^. that s«ll nations should "be enatled. to find their proper placec in the vox： i.. Our foreign policy has also "been "based upon this i d e a l , f c ? ^hich we have not hesitated at times even to fight "by staking our national 'ixiste^we, What the entire mankind longs for is つhe flin ^^ca^iishne^-： of vvcrld peace. But it goes without saying that- peace can never endtu：'̂ 'onlees it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. UnfcrtTinately, however, the establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realiza- tion at the present 3tage of human progress. In oilier •しo realise such a great ideal, therefore, it seems to "be a most nat-oral step that peoples v/ho axe closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally and economically should first form a sphere of their own f x ' cc-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order wivhin •じhat. 3ph3re, and at tlic same time secure a relationship of common exist one a a ふi prosper?, ty with other spheres. The cause of strifes mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity cf some 3iicii natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrationalities and injustices of old. The war in Europe brings home the truth cf this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international pea3e on a permanent foundation every effort must "be exerted for the rectification of the blunders that have been committed in this regard. It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in Ea^t Asia. It is extremely regrettaole, therefore, that there should oe those who not only fail to understand Japan 1 s great undertaking based upon this fundamental principle, "but on the contrary, otstruct the establish- ment of peace in East Asia "by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-cshek^ We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection, We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all actiyitiee for assisting Chiang Kai-shek. Sometimes there are those who would disapprove a charge of the status quo "by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of "bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has dravm is nothing other than a 1 life-giving sv;ord ! that destroys evil and makes justice manifest. The countries of Sast Asia and the regions cf the South Seas are geo- graphically, historically, racially and economically very cl03ely^related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another 1 s needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the "basis of common existence and the insuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion. ； . i r Page 2 The idea to establish first a righteous peace in oach of the regions and then establish collectively a just peaco fr,r tr.e whole v crid has long existed also in Europe and America. Tnis syat-cm presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in oach. region, witii \ihicii a center tne peoples within that region are to secure their co-existence and co—prosperity as well as the stafoility of their sphere. It al^o tliat tiiese groups will respect one another 1 h individual uharacvoriri-i^^, f»ciit_.craJ， cultural and economic, and they will cooperate fulfill one auotixer' s needs for their common good. vflien the "oresent Suropean war broko out, the Jap^-ior.o Gov^erp.n.2nt at once declared their policy of non-involvement and made io c丄ハar ; xi^t thlf. c。uiitry did not intend to intervena in Europe and at the sgue did act \ant tc see the war spread into East Asia. Q7j.ito naturally Japan ezpoctc that the Western Powers will do nothing lihat will exert a,ny influence upon the statilitv of East Asia. Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her ta^-： of ccn3trusting a new order in East Asia, is paying a 3erior.s attention tz do - eiepmente in the European war and to its repercussions in the ュ•icruら ̂ icirGets cf East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiry of these regions一一any development therein, and ariy disposal t h e r e o f , ~ i s a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her ai-.d エ 3spon”i,oility as the s t a M l i z i n ^ force in East i^sia- Doc. No. 1008 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No.^ . I.P.S. No. 1008 statement of Source,, and Authenticity I, HAYASHI knoru hereby certify that I officially connected vd七h. the .Japハnese Government in the following c a p a c i t y C h i e f of Archives Sect.lon T J n ^ n e s e Foreign Office 一 and thrt s.s such offlcirl I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages in Japanese, 5 pages in English , dated ，19 ， and described as follows: Address of Foreign Minister ARITA, delivered over the air on June 29f 1940. The International Situation snd Jp^cn's Position. _ I further certify that the sttr.ched record end document is an official document of the J?p?nese Government, and that it is pp.rt of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying ？lso the file number or citation, if ?ny, or ？ny other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files)s — 一 _ Foreign Ministry Signed ？.t Tokyo on this 22nd dry of Aupist, 1946. _/s/K. Hp/^rshi 一 Signature of Official SEAL Witness： A / Nagahcru Odo — r x Official Capacity- Statement of Official Procurcncnt Ric.hnvd H . Larsh hereby certify th?t I am associa- ted with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and thrt the above described document was obtained by me fron the above signed official of the Japa- nese Govermient in the conduct of my offici&l business. Signed r.t Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug • 1 9 4 6 /s/ R]'chard H . Larsh NAME Witness: /s/ Edwrrd P. Mon?.gh?n 一 Investientor, IPS Official Cr.pecity DOG. 110. 4028A Telegram (Secret Cypher Process) T o k y o , 1 July 1S40 1.30 A r r i v e d : 1 July 1940 10,20 hours Io. 642 of 1.7 Hef. D.1T.B. Tokyo 482 ff ro: Foreign Minister AHITA 1 s radio speech on Japan 1 attitude in the international situation. The originally intended attempt of the Foreign Minister to gain contact vith internal political deTeiopment "by announcing a nore active foreign political fixin of aims /Zielsetzungen/ and therapy, to sfcrongfchen the cabinet 1 s position; tills is "being wrecked "by protests from tlis oppoailion led "by the army, which forced the original text to "be s-atstaiitiaiiy mutilated This explains the lack of concrete ideas, a fact which a section of the too, has pointed, out. The growing influence of the army aLao results from the stronger military attitude toward Hong Zong arid Indo-ChinH.,. Internal political developments sliow characteristic signs of initial oppression /Sedrueckung/' and indicate ar. early change of cabinet. OTT AFFIDAVIT I, W . P . Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say： 1 . T h a t ェ am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such ェ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)。 That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives。 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center。 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 1 5 , 1 9 4 5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document TAfhich was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said, original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W . P 0 Cummin且 w . P . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. s/ G . H . Garde G. H. GARDE Lt。 Colonel,AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR G S R誦 Y (U.S.) TeZ.e^ram (Secret Cipher Process) hours hcurs Doc, No, 40283 Tokyo - 3 Jaly 1940 Arrived s! !i No. 648 of 3 July In ansv:sr to tel9grein of 2 -7---0 (.No. 5'42) 3 according to a leading article in tie = ASA.H. 1 ' < clo^rly inspired bv the Press Chief c± tne Fcreipn M m i s f r y ? the Foreign Minister lircenlTsar^Eo stress in his radio speech that the present government has never deviated from the A..x.is policy, and has always had full sympathy for the Q e m a n demand for a New Order in Europe, KG rruoh the irore since J?pan herself is striding for 5 Nsw Ord.er in Asia,， The government is determined to consoliclate A.iris friendship. The army pro- tested against this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above' pel icy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and be- cause tlie army wcntcci to avoid the YOIIAI-^P.ITA cabinet using ？ sudden sti-ess on friendship with the Axis as a chess move to take the wind cut cf the sails of the opposi- tion, which is close to us and to save its own existence. The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, who disclosed the original text of ARITA. J s speech to 1 A.SAHI' and snnounced the army s s pretest publicly in a press conference 5 caused, ^reat Indignation in army circles. As I have learaad confidentiall.y 5 the Press Chief was arrested and grilled by the military police on account of this indiscretion,, i f f J o 5 丄o o n ニ ご 「1J-\l OTT AFFIDAVIT I , W . P . Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1 . T h a t エ am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on Ger- man Affairs, and as such エ am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)。 That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15,194-5； and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and con- trol while エ was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that there- after the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. s/ W . P . Cumming. w . P . CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946. • s/ G • H« Garde G. H. GARDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERN腿NT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
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Ex.579-599. German-Japanese-Italian relations
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