AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
application/pdf
o Doc. Ho. 1810 A Doc. "GO" Ho. 568 - Dated 11 July 1944 From: Minister SUZUKI To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam, Mr, Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, sent us a telegram, as annexed in this report. Its translation is attached herewith. Concerning the return of seriously wounded and ill prisoners of war proposed by th.3 International Red Cross Committee, there will be much difficulty in its execution and therefore an answer will be made that it would be difficult to make such arrangements at present. The problems of the transfer of prisoners and transportation and distribution of medical supplies requested should be included, together with the solution and execution of the transportation of relief supolie which is now being negotiated between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States. I would like to send the above reply, and would appreciate your suggestion. Address of this communication: War Minister The Prisoner of War Information Bureau The Navy Ministry. Doc. No. 1810 A Page Z (Translation of telegram dated 23 June 1944, sent by Mr. Max Hube"-* Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee to the Foreign Minister) "Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam The International Red Cross Committee has the honor to inform the Japanese Government that it requests Japan to give every possible assistance for the well-being of the prisoners who are interned in the prisoner of war camps in Surma and Siam for the purpose of preparing for the traditional service which is offered voluntarily to all "belligerent nations to guarantee more we J fare cf the prisoners of v?ar and non- combatant civilian ji 'tcmeos. They a.vo suffering from illness due to medical and other ca-gob, especially iiacla morbid by the climatic conditions of tho piaco of internment. Regarding this matter, the International Red Cross Committee has the honor to propose to the Japanese Government that she give con- sideration for entering into a reciprocal agreement with the governments of the belligerent nations in reference to the transfer of those coming under Articles 59 and 72 of the Geneva Convention concluded in 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. The International Red Cross Committee requests the Japanese Government to consent to the transfer of said prisoners of war to an area with better climatic conditions, and to guarantee better conditions for prisoners of war as a first step until the settlement of such an arrangement. To achieve this objective, the International Red Cross Committee is prepared to collect necessary modical supplies if the Japanese Government will give consideration for their transportation and distribution. The International Red Cross Committee will greatly appreciate any intimation from your Government on this matter. I take this opportunity to renew assurances of my highest esteem to your Excellency." Doc. No. 1810 A Page Z Prisoner Supply No. 36 Prom: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau To: Chief of C-eneral Staff of the " I " Unit. Chiefs of Staff: OKA, MORI and I0MI Units Commander of the Pield Railway Unit of the Southern Army Chiefs of Prisoner of War Camos in Burma and Siam Subject: Concerning the treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma Regarding the above subject, the Poreign Ministry has applied to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as per enclosed. Please inftrm me immediately whether such conditions existed or not, and to submit confutation data. Doc. So. 1810 A Page 4 Prisoner Supply So. 35 dated 29 July 1944 Prom: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau To: Minister SUZUZI Subject: Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma In reply to your telegram So. 599 regarding the above subject, I "beg to reply as follows: i (l) The prisoners of var in question interned in Burma belong to the prisoner of war camps in Siam or Malaya. The names of prisoners of war in Siam and Malaya camps have already "been reported, which amounted to 10,000. The names of prisoners of war who died in that area are "being reported successively. (2) Regarding matters other than the a"bove, I will reply after in̂ - vestigating the facts. Doc. No. 1810 A Page Z MORI KATA PUEU Ho. 7 Prom: Chief of Staff MORI 7900 Unit To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau Subject: Reply to the inquiry re British prisoners of war in Burma In answer to the Prisoner Supply No. 36 (Prisoner of War Telegram Ho. 49) re the above subject, the reply is as follows: The case was investigated, but since a long time has elapsed since the occurrence, most of the people concerned have died in action or in illness, or hav^ been transferred. Although we cannot investigate in detail , we core.1 "-de that the contents of the protest are contrary to the facts and tha.t trivial matters have been exaggerated. Protest Ho. 1: This case may concern chiefly the prisoners of war interned in the Moulmein branch of the Siam prisoner of war cang? who were sent from various districts in the south to construct the railroad between Siam and Burma, under command of the headquarters of the Southern Army. However, no facts as stated in the protest are available. Protest Ho. 2 : Although we cannot investigate in detail because there are no persons who know the circumstances at that time, the fa.cts are not true. Address of this information: Chief of the Tokyo Prisoner of War Camp (for information, SHIH 1160 Chief of the Prisoner of War Camp in Siam) Doc. Ho. 1810 A Page 6 Malaya Prisoner "PU" No. 721 dated 9 October 1944 Prom: Chief of Malaya Prisoner of War Camp To: Chief of Prisoner of Wax Information Bureau Subject: Eeport on the investigation re British prisoners of war in Burma I report as per enclosed with regard to the " I " SALT 3 Secret No. Addressee of this information: " I " (for information: OKA Unit, Prisoner of War Information Bureau) Re: Item Ho. 1 : It concerns the time of the first occupation in 1943, and we have investigated tiie MGB1 Unit bub were unable to find any record. The following is a suaWn^ai' of prisoner wiio is now Interned in branch No. 4 of this camp, and wao wag in Mculraein at that time: 1 . Concerning the Moulmein district : A. It is not. tru.D that about 20 ,000 prisoners were interned in or around Moulmein in 124-2. During March to June 1942 about 120 British prisoners of war, including officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners of war war3 interned in Moulmein, and about ?9 Irdian prisoners of war and enemy civilians were interned in Daboi. B. No British prisoners of war were left in Moulmein and its neighborhood after June, 1942. During the internment period mentioned above, five British (one of thom due to wounds received in action) and five Indians died. However, the foci supplied to the prisoners in Movlmein prison was prei'ty bad. Both British and Indian?, ware said to have been given o^all amounts of food •• tv>-;o-> a day, eookotj by Lvnnessj. The present treatment was said to be a thoaaaad times better than that compared to Mediae in. In Daooi the provisions were said to have been much better. C. Although I have no means to investigate the existence of such facts, I do not believe that prisoners of war were interned in Moulmein at that time. 2 . At the front lines: According to reports of the Army Unit, no such facts existed. Doc. No. 1810 A Page 7 " I " SAN 3 Secret No. 578 - dated 23 October 1944 Prom: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army To: Chief of Prisoner of War reformation Bureau Subject: Information re treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma I send you a report regarding tbe subject mentioned above by the Prisoner Supply No. 35 dated July 29, az i have received the following report: NAN YA TETSU RO No. 51 - dated 6 October 1944 Prom: Commander of the Southern Ar-iuy Pi old Eailv.'ay Unit To: Chief of Staff of the. Scr&'ioru A-.-ny Subject: Report re British prisoners of :-rar in Burma I am sending you a report- in reply to " I " SAN 3 Secret No. 336 concerning British prisoners of war in Burma (districts allotted for the construction of railway connecting Siam with Burma.) 1. The number of patients and deceased prisoners of war who were engaged in the construction of the railway connecting Siam and Burma are as in Tables I and I I . The prisoners of war include both British and Dutch and there is no way to investigate the British prisoners of war separately. Por strategic reasons the completion of this railway was most urgent. Since the proposed site of the railway line wa3 a virgin jungle, shelter, food provisions and medical supplies were far from adequate and much different from normal conditions for prisoners of war. During the rainy season of 1943, transportation was frequently interrupted and both Japanese roldiera ard prisoners of war were obliged to put up with, hctrdsbip. The Japanese array Medical Corps tried in vain 1;o stem the violent oai-T-r-;:̂ of malaria and siofcuegaGe of digestive crg&LS. Kovovor, vitn the opening of the said railway in uovo"r>or3 both the ntua'uer of patients and deaths diminished with the completion of provisions and facilities . 2 . I know nothing about the insulting of British prisoners of war in Moulmein since Moulmein is out of the work aroa. DoCo Noo 1810 Page 8 TABLL, i<0o 1 Prisoner of Tar Patients during the period between January, 1943 and July 1944. (Investigated by Siam Prisoner of ffar Camp) Month Total No, of P0II j£mt>loved Patients in Siam Patients in Burma Total No. Ratio to Total No. No. Ratio to Total No. No. Ratio to Total. No, 1243 Jan- 37,086 18,052 48.6 11,496 31.o_. 29.548 79.0 Feb. 42,337 20,634 48 o7 12,074 28.5 32,710 77 o2 Mar. 47,009 21,516 45.8 14,987 31.9 36,498 77.7 Apr. 49.776 19,892 40 o0 11,982 23.5 31,623 63.5 May 49,489 18,012 36 = 4 13,288 26.8 31.300 63 ,2 June 48,832 24,351 50.0 12,933 26.5 37,284 76.5 July 48,116 23,407 48.6 12,192 25.3 35,599 73-9 Aug. 47,162 23,269 49-3 12,538 26.6 35,807 75.9 Sept. 46,103 21,225 46.0 13,496 29.3 34,721 75.3 Octo 45.277 230801 52.6 12,141 26.8 35,942 79.4 Nov. 44o699 19,474 44.7 9,619 21.5 29,593 66.2 Dec« 44.372 19,497 43°9 12,380 27.9 31,877 71.8 1944. Jan0 43,695 23,285 53-3 • 23,289 53 -3 Feb, 43.316 22,977 53.0 22,977 53.0 March 43,173 20,427 47 03 20,427 47.3 April 43,116 20,324 47=1 20,324 47.1 May 43*083 20,080 4606 20,080 4606 June 43,028 17,418 40.5 17,418 40 .5 July 40096O 5,468 13«4 5.468 13-4 Total 383,613 1 148,872 532,485 Doc. Ho. 1810 A i TAHLa NQ. I I Page 9 No. of Deaths since Organization, from August, 1942 to August, 194ii. (Siam Prisoner of "̂ ar Oamn) Total No. Deaths in Siam Deaths in Burma Total of POW Ratio to ' Ratio to Ratio to Month Emoloved No. Total No. - No. Total No. No. Total No 1942 1 : Aug. 4,235 2 0.05 2 0.05 Sept. 4,234 2 0.05 2 0.05 Oct. 8,711 10 0.12 10 0.12 Nov. 26,484 54 0.20 10! 0.04 64 0.24 Dec. 29.536 68 0.23 13 0.04 81 0.27 1943 . Jan. 37,086 62 0.17 58 0.15 120 O.32 Feb. 42,337 50 0.lj> 37 0.09 87 0.21 March 47,009 255 0.54 7 0.02 262 O.56 April 49,766 186 0.37 20 0.04 206 0 ,41 May- 49,489 271 0.55 5 0.01 276 0.56 June 48,832 578 1.18 80 0.16 658 1-34 July 48,116 585 1.20 133 0.28 718 1.48 Aug. 47,162 800 I . 6 9 154 O.33 954 2.02 Sept. 46,103 895 1.94 164 O.36 1,059 2.04 Oct. 45,277 656 1.45 171 O.38 827 I . 8 3 Nov. 44.699 477 1.06 101 0.23 578 1.29 Dec. 44,372 340 0.77 4 0.01 344 0.78 1944 Jan. 43,695 390 0.87 289 0.66 679 i°53 Feb. 43.316 416 0 .96 416 0 .96 March 43,173 145 0.34 145 0.34 April 43.116 57 0.13 57 0.13 May 43,083 64 0.15 64 0 .15 June 43,028 60 O .14 60 0 . 14 July 40,960 40 0 . 09 40 0 .09 Aug. 40,313 37 0 .09 37 0 .09 Total 6,500 1,246 7,746 Doc. Ho. 1810 A Page 10 Siam Prisoner of War "PU" Ho. 384 Prom: Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in Siam To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau Subject: Information re British prisoners of war in Burma I am sending you a report regarding the facts A and B in Item Ho. 1 of the 3ritish protest as stated in the Prisoner of War Supply Ho. 36. This matter concerns the sacrifice of the administration of the prisoners of war for strategic reasons and contains no material for refutation against the enemy protest. Item following , :C" has no relation to us. Branch Camp Ho. 3 was opened in Burma September, 1942 to intern 9 ,535 prisoners of war transferred from Java. Branch Camp Ho. 5 was opened in January, 1943 to intern 1 ,946 prisoners of war. These camps are -under the command of the Pifth Railway Regiment and the prisoners of war were engaged in constructing a railway between Burma and Siam. At that time, provisions and rations were scarce. Quarters and establishments were poor and medical facil it ies were inadequate. Moreover, for strategic reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by August, 1943 , and the work waB pushed forward at a terrific pace, with the result that many prisoners of war became i l l and many died, as per attached sheet. Following the opening of the railway to traffic in October, 1943, all prisoners of war in Burma, were concentrated in Kanchana, Buri, Honbodog (phonetic) and Termacam, except a few who were to assist the Eailway Unit. Both the quarter facilities and provisions have been improved at present and both the number of patients and deaths have decreased considerably. (Stamp shows receipt by Prisoner of War Information Bureau 4 October 1944) Doc. No. 1810 TaBLS islO. i \ page 11 Trisoner of War Patients during the period between January, 1943 and .Tnly 1944 „ (Investigated by Siam Prisoner nf War—Clamp.)— Month Total No, of POW TCmplnvftd , Patients Mo„ in 3iam Ratio to Total No. Pnti ants Nn - in Rnrrna Ratio to Tntnl Mn Tnti - Nn. 2_L Ratio Total Jan. 37,086 18,052 48.6 11,496 31 .0 29,548 79-0 Feb. 42,337 20,634 48 = 7 12,074 28.5 32,710 77 .2 Mar. 47.009 21^516 45° 8 14,987 31 .9 36,498 77-7 Apr. 49.776 19,892 40 .0 11,982 23.5 31,623 63.5 May 49.489 18,012 36.4 13,288 26 .8 31.300 63.2 June 48.832 24,351 5 0 . 0 12,933 26.5 37,284 76.5 July 48,116 23 D4o7 48.6 12,192 25.3 35.599 73 .9 Aug. 47,162 23,269 49«3 12,538 26,6 35,807 75-9 Sept. 46,103 21,225 46 o0 13,496 29.3 34,721 75-3 Oct. 45,277 23,801 52 .6 12,141 26 .8 35,942 79.4 Nov. 44,699 19,474 44 .7 9,619 21.5 29.593 66.2 Dec. 44,372 19,497 43 .9 12,380 27.9 31,877 71 .8 iq/iii Jan. 43.695 23,285 53 o3 23,289 53 . 3 Feb. 43,316 22,977 53 o0 22,977 5 3 . 0 March 43.173 20,427 47 .3 20,427' 47.3 April 43,116 20,324 47 .1 20,324 47-1 May 43,083 20,080 46 .6 20,080 46 .6 June 43s028 17,418 40 .5 17,418 40 .5 July 40,960 5 ,468 13.4 5 . 4 68 1 3 4 Total 383,613 148,872 532 ,485 Doco No. 181C page 12. TABI.R MO. I I No. of Deaths Since Organization,, from August, 1942 to August r iQii/'j (,1-iam PriaoriRr of War finrniO Total No. ns-ath.q in 3irtrn npath.g in Burma Tnt.al of PC«f Ratio to Ratio to Ratio to Month 1Skz •Rrr̂ plovfid NOn Total, No. 0 Nn« Total No . No. * Aug. 4.235 2 0.05 2 0 .05 Sept. 4.234 2 0 .05 2 0.05 Oct. 8,711 10 0 .12 10 0.12 Nov. 26,404 54 0.20 10 0.04 64 0.24 Dec. 29,536 68 0.23 13 0.04 81 0.27 1243. Jan o 37,086 62 0.17 58 0.15. 120 0.32 Feb, 42.337 50 0 .12 37 0 .09 87 0.21 March 47,009 255 C.54 7 0 .02 262 0.56 April 490766 136 0.37 20 0.04 206 0.41 May- 49,489 271 o*55 5 0.01 276 0.56 June 48,832 578 1 . 18 80 0.16 658 1.34 ' JUly 48,116 585 1 .20 133 0 .28 718 1 ,48 Aug. 47,162 800 I . 6 9 154 0.33 954 2 .02 Sept. 46,103 895 1.94 164 0.36 1,059 2.04 0cto 45,277 656 1-45 171 0 .38 827 1.83 Nov. 44,699 477 1.06 101 0 .23 578 1.29 Dec. 44.372 340 0.77 4 0.01 344 0 .78 m Jan. 43,695 390 0.87 289 0.66 679 1 .53 Feb. 43.316 416 O.96 416 0.96 March 43.173 145 0o34 145 0.34 April 43,116 57 0 .13 . 57 0.13 May 43,083 64 0.15 64 0.15 June 43 ,028 60 0.14 60 0.14 July 40,960 40 0.09 40 0.09 Aug. 40,313 37 0.09 37 0.09 Total 6,500 1,246 7,746 Doc. No. 1810 Page 13 TABLE NO.Ill No. of Cases of Cholera Amon^ Prisoners of Ttar Camp District No. of Cases No. of Deaths Branch No.3 Burma 34 13 Branch No.5 Burma 5 4 Total 39 17 Doc. 5To. 1810 e n i n i c a t s W. D. C. Fo. I . P. S. So. 1810 Statement of Source a,nd Authenticity. I , Shibuya Shin hereby certify that I ~m officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: the Secretary of Invest gation Section, POW Information Barep.u and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 573 pages, dated Feb "5, 1S44, and described as follows: Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam. I further certify that the attachod record and document is an official document r* thn Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives î &rl files of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the reruir.r location of the document in the archives or files) : 1st Demobilisation Bureau (former War Ministry) Investigation Section of POW InformationBur'eau File number Q£2. Sighed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of Aupist, 1S46 /s/ Shibuya Shin Signature of Official the Secretary of POW Information Bureau SEAL /s/ Shibuya Shin Official Capacity Witness: Aryama Yakitaka Chief of the Section of Archives of the Secretary of POW Information Bureau Statement of Official Procurement. I , Richard H. La.rsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the ahove described document was obtained by me from the above si-rned official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Aug. 1S46 /s/ Richard 5. Larsh FAME Witness: /s/ J . A. Curtis 2nd Lt. M.I . Investigator Official Capacity r o h Page 1. Report "by Japanese Government, "Purina-Thailand Railway" . / Report on P-rployment of War Prisoners in Siam-Burma Railway Oonetruction. Contents Pref ace Part 1— Protests.- by Allied Powers. Chapter I. Protests by British and Australian Governments regarding Treatment of War Prisoners during Construc- tion of Slam-Burma Railway. Chapter Treatment of English War Prisoners in Burma (Kaulmein Diotrict . ) Part 2—Details of Investigations. Summary Chapter 1 , Outline of Construction Progress Paragraph 1. Particulars of Construction and Situation early stagp. (June 1942 - middle of Feb. 1943) Paragraph 2 . Situation during period of expedited con- struction (Kiddle of Feb. 1943 - Middle of July, 1943) Paragraph 3. Particulars; concerning extension of construct- ing period and situation during extended period. (Middle of July' 1S43 - Oct.. 1943) Paragraph 4C Situation after completion of work. (ITOV. I S 4 3 - Aug. 1S45) Chapter 2 . Effects on Construction and War Prisoners control and measures taken in respect thereto. Paragraph Cannes of making construction and War Prisoners control difficult . Paragraph 2„ Measures oaken to cope with the above diffi- culties and jabrequent state of affairs . Summary (1 ) General supplies and provisions (2 ) Billeting ! 5) Sanitation Chapter 3v Outline of control and employment of War Prisoners Paragraph 1 . Particulars about employment of War Prisoners Paragraph 2 , Relatione between controllers and War Prisoners Paragraph 3, Outline of control and employment of War Pri- soners, Chapter 4 . Unfortunate Incidents during Construction. Paragraph 1 . Insult to remains of War Prisoners Paragraph 2 , Other incidents. Chapter 5. Explanation regarding particular cases in respect to protests by Allied Powers. Paragraph 1, Questions concerning treatment of War Prisoners during construction of Siam-Burma Railway Document Ho. 1509-A Page 2 . Paragraph. 2 . trict Treatment of War Prisoners in Maulmein Dis- Conclusion. Tables and Sketches. Table 1. Monthly Statistics of Prisoners Labour Service. Table of Patients Classified by Diseases (Siam District) Table of Patients Classified by Diseases (Surma District) List of Monthly Investigation concerning Patients. Table showing outbreak of cholera cases among War Prisoners. List of Deaths among War Prisoners engaged in construction of Siam-Burma Railway. List of dead War Prisoners classified br races. List of monthly deaths since formation of Prisoners' labor corps. A sketch showing positions of War Prisoners Camps in Siam. Sketch showing Route of War Prisoners March tr-aeral sketch of Siam-Burma Railway. Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 2. 3. 4 . 5 . 6. 7. 8. Sketch' Sketch Sketch If 2. 3» )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a PREFAES 1. The so-called "brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war during the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway shall "be divided into two categories; tl) Misconduct in the form of direct cruelty to the prisoners of war (the cases known as maltreatment of prisoners), and (2) incidents involving a considerable number of deaths from illness among the prisoners during the work. Cases coming under the first cate- gory shall be dealt with a3 cases of ordinary maltreatment of prisoners, whereas the unfortunate incidents coming under the second were caused under the circumstances that were unavoidable during the waging of war. It should, therefore, be noted that there is a distinct difference in character between cases ' l ) and ( 2 ) . 2 . In the present report, a plain statement will be made of the actual state of affairs and of the treatment of the prisoners of wax which have led to the comparatively large number of deaths from sickness during the construction of the railway under ( l ) . Under Part 1 of this report the protests made by the Allied Powers will be dealt with; under Part 2 a description wi l l be given re- garding the investigations conducted into general affairs relative to the prisoners' treatment and the special cases of those under protest, and finally Part 3 will give the measures taken by the Japanese authorities in respect to the foregoing (2) (judicial decisions) . With regard to cruelty directly inflicted on prisoners under ( l ) , no data are available in Tokyo, and liaison with the Japanese troops on the spot is at the moment virtually impossible, for which reason the cases under ( l ) are excluded from this report. Accordingly it is hoped that inquiries will be made on the spot by the Allied Powers in respect thereto. 3 . Although the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway was C03npleted \in October 1943, some of the prisoners were still employed in repair work jn the termination of the war, but the present report chiefly describes the situation during the construction of the railway. Summary of Statement in House of Commons by Sir James G-rigg, British Secretary for War, on Maltreatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam. Out of some 1 ,300 English and Australian prisoners of war, about 150 were rescued by a U . S . Submarine and English survivors have recently returned home. In view of their health conditions, only preliminary examinations have fo far been made, but further statements will be made with the pro- gress of the examinations of the survivors. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Ac a result of the examination, the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war in the southern parts of East Asia, has, for the first time, "been "brought to light and "by this the policy adopted "by the Japanese militar- ists in the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma, Siam and East Indies has "been ascertained "beyond any doubt. But it should "be noted that the present information has nothing to do with the treatment given to the prisoners of war and civilian internees at the camps in Hong Kong, Formosa, the occupied territory of China, Korea and Japan proper; treat- ment in those places seems to he comparatively lenient. The prisoners in Singapore and Java were at the beginning of 1942, transferred to Burma and Siam, and Australian prisoners to Burma "by sea. In the transportation, they were crowded into holds of ships, four feet high. The English war prisoners were transported by train from Singa- pore to Siam end they were so crowded that the men could not l ie down curing the whole five dayc of the journey. Then they were forced to march on foot for 80 miles. They were compelled to work for the railway construction in the dis- ease infected and insect-full jungle area together with natives who were engaged in compulsory labor. The camps were poorly equipped against squalls and heat peculiar to the tropical zone and the Japanese did not replace worn-out clothing. Food was supplied three times a day, each ration consisting of some rice and one pint of water. The labor was continued at the cost of human liver- and pains to prisoners no matter how great they might be and no rest was given. The death rate estimated at a minimum was As the construction of the railway was completed in October 1943, all the prisoners except those who were engaged in the maintenance work, were transferred to camps in Siam. The camps there could shelter the men from rain and the food situation and sanitary conditions were im- proved. Those men thought to be suitable for a certain kind of work were removed to French Ind.ies for a time and then transferred to Singapore on their way to Japan. The war prisoners who were rescued, had been on a board a steamer which departed from Singapore at the beginning of September and 1 ,300 English and Australian prisoners were aboard. When the steamer was sunk, the Japanese were busy rescuing their own people and the war prisoners were left to their fate; consequently most of them died. In presenting this to the House of Commons, I would like to express our profound thanks to the U.S.Submarines for efforts they made to rescue our survivors in disregard of the danger to themselves and also for the care they took of the rescued men. We have asked protecting Powers to make the strongest possible pro- test to the Japanese. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Prom the accounts of all the survivors I saw to ay surprise that, despite the treatment of the Japanese, the morale of our prisoners of war had been maintained. Especially, our surgeon miraculously achieved a high measure of success in attending to the sick and wounded in spite of the insufficiency of medicines and medical fac i l it ies . I can't express my profound sympathy toward the relatives and friends of the prisoners of war. I regret that the matter has not "been publicly announced, hut it is necessary to let the Japanese Government know that we have come to posaess these facts. We are collecting infor- mation from the survivor?. All the details of the accounts which they give of other prisoners of war shall "be immediately communicated to their next kin — and, while the present report is in preparation we have obtained from our protecting powers the information that the Japanese Government has not permitted representatives of the International Red Cross or of the protective powers to visit the prisoners of war camps in the areas occupied by ^apan. The above fact explodes the denial by the Japanese Government of the Foreign Secretary's Commons statement regarding the treatment of prisoners of war detained in Burma and. Thailand. This outrageous treatment of prisoners of war constitutes one reason for our continuing warlike endeavors, even after the termination of the war with Germany until we thoroughly crush, in cooperation with our Allied Powers, the baneful militaristic autocracy which reigns supreme in present Japan, Tentative Translation of the Oral Message dated July 4 , 1944 from Swiss Legation, Tokyo. By the letter dated September 15, 1944, addressed to His Excellency -General Hideki Tojo, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs , and by the letter dated December 9, 1944, to His Excellency Masayuki Tani, the Swiss Minister had the honor to communicate the apprehensions which the British Government entertained as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war at the Rangoon Camp. The London Government furnished, at the same time, a certain number of d.etailed. facts relative to the same treatment. By letter Ho 33/C R . , dated February 1945, His Excellency Foreign Minister answered to the Swiss Minister that the facts as mentioned, in the above letter did not exist. The Swiss Minister never failed to convey the contents of this letter to his Government in behalf of the U.K.Government. The Swiss Legation has the honor to acquaint the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the fact that the British Government has, in a new communication made the following request to the Imperial Government for information as regards the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a " 1 . First complaint concerns area of Moulmein and falls under three headings: A. Notifications: According to postcards printed by the Japanese Authorities, about 20 ,000 British and Allied prisoners of war are detained in or near Moulmein. Transfer of prisoners of war to this camp has never been notified; and it is believed that capture of many prisoners of war now in this and other Burmese camps has also never been notified. Nor has any notification been received of numerous deaths that are known to have occurred there. B . Conditions: Conditions under which prisoners of war in Moulmein camp are detained are known to Eis Majesty's Government to be at least as bad as, if not worse, than those which existed in Thailand ( c . f . the letter of the Swiss Minister to His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, dated 5 July 1943) . During October and November 1942, prisoners of war in Moulmein itself are known to haye died at rate of approximately 10 per diem; the principal cause of death being dysentery. In other camps administered by the Japanese authorities in or near Moulmein an even more appalling rate of mortality has occurred amongst prisoners of war working on that Burmese railway. These deaths are direct and inevitable result of con- ditions in camps and in particular of the wholly inadequate rations pro- vided by the Japanese authorities, of the latter 's failure to provide medicines or equipment in hospitals, of almost complete lack of adequate . clothing or even footwear and of severity of labor exacted from prisoners of war. C. Exhibition of prisoners; In February of 1944, 25 prisoners of war were paraded through the town of Moulmein. They were in an emaciated condition and were forced to carry notices in Burmese stating that they had recently been captured on the Arakan front (which was not the case . ) They were further held up to ridicule and contempt by a Japanese officer who accompanied the parade. Such proceeding are clearly contrary to honorable standards of warfare and unworthy of a nation calling itself civilized, apart from being a breach of Article 2 of the Prisoners of War Convention. Letter dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Protest by British and Australian Governments) Tentative Translation of the Letter dated December 4 , 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs . I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency with the fact that the British and Australian Governments have requested my Government to convey the following communication to the Japanese Government. Some 150 Australian and United Kingdom survivors from the Japanese transport S .S . "Rakuyo Maru" torpedoed in South China Sea on September 12, have reached Australia and Great Britain . Following is a brief summary of the knowledge which has consequently come into the possession )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a of Ei s Majesty1 s Governments in the United Kingdom and Australia regarding treatment of British and Australian prisoners of war by Japanese military authorities; ail available prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved early in 1942 to Burma or Thailand. Australians were sent by sea to Burma crowd-d into ships' holds which had been horizon- tally subdivided so that ceilings were no more than 4 feet high. Prisoners from the United Kingdom were sent by rail to Thailand so crowded into steel cattle trucks that they could not even l ie dovm during the journey. They •'''ere then marched some 80 miles. All were sent to work on the construction of a railway through primitive disease infected jungle in Thailand and Burma. Conditions under which all these men lived and worked were inhuman; such accommodation af was provided, gave l i tt le or no protection against tropical rains or blazing run, Worn out clothing was not replaced and soon many lacked clothing, boots and head covering. The only food provided was a pnnikin of rice and a small quantity of watery stew three times a day but work had to go on without respite whatever cost in human suffering or l i f e . The inevitable result was a dreadful death rpfce, the lowest estimate being 20 per cent. These con- ditions continued until the railway was finished about October, 1 : 4 3 , when those not needed for maintenance work were moved to camps in Thailand end later to Singapore en route to Japan. The rescued men were on a ship which left Singapore early in September 1944. There were probably 1300 United Kingdom and Australian prisoners of war on board. After she was sunk, the Japanese deliberately picked up all Japanese survivor? but left the prisoners to their fate. State- ments of our men conrtitute direct and unimpeachable evidence of the out- rageous treatment by the Japanese of defenseless prisoners of war. I add that I communicated to His Excellency Minister Suzuki in the letter dated November 18, that the rescued men from Gakuyo Maru according to British information, arrived in England and Australia and that a public announcement would be given in both countries on the basis of the accounts of those" men as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war in Thailand and Burma. I hereby express my high regard to Your Excellency. Swiss Minister )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Part I I MATTERS OP I2TTESTIG.ATI0ET General Outline 1 . By order of the Imperial General Hsadquarters, the preparations for the construction of this railway were commenced in June 1942 by the South Army with the view of using it a3 a ground supply route and. a trade and traffic one between Thailand and 2araa ; being urged on by the proposal of the South Army and the <?cn.-vi,ruction wort was virtually began in November 1942 in hopes ->f completing it by the end of 1943. But while counter attacks, pa -tioularly "bombings, of the British Indian Army rapidly became fier m aid she sitoaSions in this area considerably serious sines the end of die rainy season of 1942, our sea-transportation from Malay to Burma gradually became hard, As there could be found no ground transport route for its substitute, it was clearly estimated that, if the situations were left as they were t i l l the end of the next rainy season, transportation to Burma would bs almost entirely interrupted, and even the defence of the area, not to mention positive actions* impossible and. further more the work itself quite difficult . Por these reasons the Imperial General Headquarters ordered early in February 1943 to shorten the term of the work by 4 months. With this the South Army, together with the leading staffs of the General Headquarters, urged the work on, taking the best possible measures and. the working troops also did their best, so that the work ma.de favorable progress for the time being. How- ever, as the rainy sea„son earlier than usual set in, in addition to the bad. conditions in jungles since April or March of 1943 which the Japanese Army had never encountered before, victims of the work gradually increased, not to speak of the delay of scheduled work. Confronted, with these bad conditions, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last to postpone the period of the work by 2 months in spite of the fact that this order had. a gra.ve influence uoon the operations in Burma, considering the general situations of Burma front a.t that time, and that the prospect of communication with Burma was becoming clear with the pa,rtial completion of the railway and local employment of newly constructed road.s and water- ways paralled with the railway. 2 . It is not unnatural that a great many persons should be em- ployed. in such construction work in order to strengthen operation capacity. Though, the South Army levied laborers on the spot and employer them in the work besides Japanese troops, it was so difficult to gather a great many laborers immediately that the South Army asked, permission to employ POW1s in the work of the Imperial General Headquarters. Considering that the work was. carried on in the rear far away from the firs~t front, and. that the railway would serve in the future as a trade route between Thailand and Burma, the Imperial General Headquarters complied, with the request and sanctioned the employment of POV's., Then the forced con- struction work was carried out in precipitous jungles spreading over 400 k.m. conquering natural hindrances such as influence of bad weather, particularly that of the rainy season and. the environment injurious to health etc. and. surmounting technical hindrances, such as time-limit due to operational needs, imperfect preparation due to it , inadequate accomo- dations along the L . of C. and inferior technical skill of the Japanese Arm; Document Ho. 1509-A Page 9 . 3 . Though the Japanese Army did its "best in taking the best pos- sible measures conceivable at that time in order to improve the treatment of the P 0 V i s cooperating with the Japanese troops, laying stress on billeting, ration and health, many P0W'3 fell victim of the work at last much to our regret. We should like to declare the Japanese troops participated in the joys and sorrows of the POW'ji and native laborers in the construction work, and by no means completed or intended to complete the work only at the sacrifice of P0W Js. (HOTS) The Director cf construction cherished the mottcv"P0W !s and and laborers are Fathers of Construction," and consequently ' endeavored to improve the treatment of POW1 s. Chanter I . C-INERAL OUTLINE 0? CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS. Section 1. Details of the Construction and State of Affairs in the Earlier State (from June 1942 to the middle of February 1943) A. Details of the construction. 1 . With the deveio oment of the North Burma*.operation, to construct a railway connecting Thailand and Burma as an operational supply route and a trade and traffic one between both countries had become so urgent that the South Army propose^ its construction to the Imperial General He-dquarters. Therefore the latter directed its preparation to the former in June of the same year. 2 . The preparations of the constructions are summerized as follows: (1) Route: ftbout 400 km, from Nonpradoc to Tambisaya, along the River Keonoi. (2) Transportation capacity: About 3 ,000 tons a day to each direction. (3 ) P T i o c : Scheduled to complete by the end of 1943. (4) Materials: Mainly to use the materials on the spot and a part is transferred from the home islands. ( 5 ) Military strength: The Railway Inspection Office, 2 railway regiments, the Railway Material Depot and some other auxiliary troops. (6 ) Labor (auxiliary personnel): Laborers levied on the spot and P0W !e. Document Ho. 1509-A Page 10 3. In conformity with the above preparation items, the South Army, setting about survey along the railway, negotiations with Thailand, establishment of construction bases, preparation of construction materials, arrangements fcr laborers, survey of military geography and sanitary arrangements, moved the railway units in Surma to the construction bases one after another and made them deploy. Thus it prepared for the con- struction. As the negotiations with Thailand were concluded at the beginning of Hovember of the same year, the order of the Imperial General Headquarters concerning execution of the railway construction was issued and soon after, in accordance with the above items the order concerning the construction was issued by the South Army. 4 . The ehiof inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office (staying in Bangkok) took command of the following units of which the South Army Railway Corps was composed. The 5th Railway Regiment ( i ts base was in Tambisaya) was allotted the duty of construction on the Thailand- side, and the 9th Railway Regiment ( its base was in Kanchanaburi) that on the Burma-side. The main part of the let Railway Material Depot was deployed in Honpradoc and the other part in Rangun. Thus the preparations made progress ctep by step, and virtual construction work was begun in December, conrolyinr with the above mentioned orders. The South. Army Railway Corps. C0MMAHD3R: ^The_Chief_ Inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office Major General Shimoda The Second Railway Inspection Office The Fifth Railway Regiment The Ninch Railway Regiment The 7iret Mateiial Depot Two units serving on land Two building units Two field well-drilling units The Field Epidemic prevention and Water-supply Depot Co-operators. The Thailand Internment Camp The Field Supply Park. 5 . The Thailand Internment Camp, having finished preparations, cooperated in the construction work from the beginning by order of the South Army. 6 . Allotment of duties, business system, system of P O W s and out- line of duties, concerning the construction are shown in Annex 1 , 2 and 3. Document Noc 1509-A Page 11 Annex I ALLOTMENT OP DUTIES CONCERNING T"E RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION OPEICE AND UNIT RESPONo 33ILITY DUTY AND BUSINESS Imperial Gen- eral Headoua: ters. Directions concerning ib.?> Railway Construction South General Srmy Chief Super- visor of Rail- way Construc- tion. 1 , Negotiations with the Ministry of War concerning estimate and materials. 2., Diplomatic negotiations through the Ministry of War. 3,. Orders conccrning the railway construc- tion (directives of the Imperial General Headquarters). 4, To help supply of materials necessary for the construction. 5, Directions of the construction complying with the operational needs. 6, To decide whether the employment of P O W s is appropriate. 1 . To estimate and concentrate military strength and labor necessary for the rail- way construction. Supply, maintenance and sanitary arrangements for them. 2c To mske PQW s cooperate with the con- struction units or to allot them to the units. Directions concerning the employment of P0W s„ 4 . Planning of the railway construction. 5., To keep harmony between the railway construction units and cooperating attached units. 6, Maintenance of traffic routes and waterways necessary for the construction. Railway Commander -in- 1 , Inspection survey and construction of Inspection Charge of Rail- the route according to the railway con- Office way Construction scruction plan., 2, Employment of the railway units and attached units. 3.. To make POW's and laborers cooperate vith the railway units or to allot them to the units. 4 , Directions concerning the employment of POW s. •5„ Negotiations with the Internment Camp concerning the employment of POW1s. 6 , To take care of billeting, maintenance and health of POW s. Document Ho, 1509-A Page 12 OPTICS AL7D UNI? RE3P0HS IBILITY DUTY AFD BUSIi^SS Railway Regiment Ct.irmander in charge of Pail- way const.oictn.on in the allotted district » 1„ Construction of railway in the allotted district, 2.. Employment of the allotted and co- operating P O W s according to the directives of the commander in charge of railway coi>- «truction„ 3 : negotiations with persons in charge of supervising POl'ii's. 4 . To take caie of "billeting, maintenance and health of P O W s . Internment To assist and Camp control the rail- way construction in the capacity vf the supervisor of POW' s. 1 , To make P0T,Ms cooperate with the rail- way construction units or to allot them to the units by order of the South General Army, 2„ negotiations with railway construction units concerning the employment of POW's. Chieflv to take care of billeting maintenance and health of P O W s and to request assistance to the units concerned. 4,. Execution of the business of super- vising POW's. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Inn ex 2 BUSIHESS SYSTEM COHC^RHIHG THE RAILWAY COHSTRUCTIOH. r Supervis?r of j 'Chief of : ; POW Internment Camp;* Internment belonging to it ) I i -Branch Camp' : j 1 "I " ! At the begin- ning : cooperating, A part is Cooperating: (Cooperating in .the work. Chief Supervisor of Railway Con- • struction 1 i Army Dept. I Imperial ( General : Headqua?- , ters. *T\nrr, • tffcerjallotted 1 -allotted to tto . i | - 1 i .Commander in . Commander in > charge of railway charge of Rail-j construction ; way construction . in the allottedi district. t, V .. L' V Army J 1 Commander of [.Railway unit Railway Regi- ment A part of them is allotted to -Engineer unit L. of C. troops •Guard unit Sanitary unit J V ' ocument No. 150S-A Page 12-"b Annex 3 CHART SHOWING SYSTEM OP EMPLOYING POW's AND ALLOTTING DUTIES FOR THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION Supervisor I-, of Int era- 's ment Camp Formal Chief Supervisor of POW I Army Dept j Imperial ;— General | Head- | quarters J Chief o^ ;POW helongir. Intern- ~ -^to it . ment ; Eranch Camt) i ; At the h eginning: cooperation.^ allotted After: allot- to — ted to . i Cooperating cooperation a part is in the wor1 Commander oi;! i South Gsn- M-—! r= ommander of -^Railway Con- 7 f |Ministry of Warj JPOW Intslli era^. Army | i istruclion communication j Co.nmunicat ion . t- intercommuni-- — * * i -j Commanderj I Railway j of Rail- Unit j j way Regi-j " ( ment • ;>igenc3 Bureau .1 cation refer- ence, reply > i • Supervision Chief Officer of POW Business ••f 4 Engineer Unit*>v'\ A part Hi i B _ 'U allotti * L ' . p f ' K t r o o p s ^ to •v Guard I • i t .17 ZW J Sanitary unit' Document Ho. 1509-A Page 13 (B) State of Affairs in the earlier stage (from June 1942 to the middle o^ February 1943) . 1 . In accordance with the above details, the preparatory works such as survey work, collection of materials necessary to maintenance of the bases and a part of ground-construction etc. were commenced. The construction was commenced from both sid.es, Thailand and Burma, and the supply in the rear was assisted by the Army stationing in Thailand in the a-se of the former and b t the Burma Army Group in the case of the latter. 2 . Virtual construction work was commenced in ITovember, 1942; an order to put it into practice being given. 3. However, the ar as where the railway was to be constructed were covered with great Jungles and if we had waited the completion of the sur- vey of the whole route, the construction period would, have been so pro- longed. that the work was carried out keeping pace with the survey. There- fore, as to estimation of quantity of labor and materials, sufficient measures could, not be prearranged.. 4 . In January 1943 when the work was smoothly progressing, Major General Shiaoda, the commander of the construction, while patrolling over the construction ar a in an airplane, in order to inspect the work, was killed. V crashing against a border mountain between Thailand and Burma, Major Irie, the chief staff of the construction, riding with him in the same plane was a?.so killed, at the same time, 5 . In this period the number of P O W s increased by degrees and POW s in Java and Singapore were transferred to the construction areas. The Thailand Internment Camp gradually enlarged itself and assisted the cinstruction work on the Thailand-side with main strength while that on the Burma-Fide with the other strength. SECTION I I State of Affairs in the Period during which the Construction was urged on. (From the middle of Feb. 1943 to the middle of July, 1943) A. How and why the constriction per od was cut short. 1 . Since the end of the rainy season of 19*2, the counter-attack on Burma of the British Indian Army became so raoidly violent and the situations ir this area so serious; the British Army being steadily re- inforced with military strength and goods. Besides, the only transport route by sea became so dangerous as was almost interrupted by the enemy's disturbance both from the sea and. air . Hence the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters keenly felt the necessity of completing the rail- way connecting Thailand and Burma and intended to urge the constract ion on. Document No. 1509-A Page 14 Namely at that time transportation of military strength arid goods with whic.' the Burma Army Group was being greatly reinforced to cope with the critical situations in Burma caused "by the counter-attack of the British Indian Army, relied on the sea route from Singapore alone. But in addition "co the shortage cf chipping this route was extremely menaced both by the enem- planes and submarines and thus the prospects of transportation increasingly became dark. Though we tried to cut a load from Rohrng to Moulmein via I-.esot, it was unsuccessful as too many trucks were required and the labor was out of proportion to the effect. At last we faced such plight as we had to rely upon forced supply execu- ted by small beats. This transportation by force could be barely executed by taking advantage of the rainy season and was expected to be available only till September 1943. Under the circumstance that suspension of the sea trans-* :jport and gen^.^l counter attack of the British Indian Army were expected immediately after the rainy season, a ground transport route for its sub- stitute was absolutely necessary for the Japanese army. Moreover, it was expected that unless it was completed by the end of the next rainy sea,son, the Army grouo operating in Burma, would come to a crisis and at the same time the construction of the railway connecting Thailand and Burma would become quite difficult . The Imperial General Headquarters, not to mention the South Army, were much anxious about the circumstance and discussed the counter- mearures and tried to find a br-ak in the deadlock. Finally they could not but conclude that there was no other way than to complete by the end of the rainy season the railway connecting Thailand and. Burma under construc- tion that time and intended to cut short- the-.-construction period, having been driven to the last extermity. 2 . Then, the Imperial General Headquarters consulted with the South Army, and being aware of many difficulties such as shortage of military strength, labor and materials, great amount of the work, destructive in- fluence of the rainy season and unhealthy surroundings, yet both agree- ing upon speeding up of the work by all possible means and shortening of the work, took necessary measures respectively. Viz , estimating the whole amount of the earth-work from the result of the surve executed by that time and prudently examining the military* strength, labor and materials the Headquarters lowered, the construction guage (from 3,000 tons a da.v to each direction to 1 ,000 tone) and as to militar- strength, labor and. material, took every measure possible in the capacity of the Central office, expecting to shorten the construction period of 4 months and to complete the work by the end of August 1943. They can be summarized an follows: ( l ) To restore the 4th Battalion, the 5th Railway Regiment in Kwantung to the home regiment. To alter the demobilization schedule of the 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit and to prepare for its allotment to the railway construction units. Document Ho. 1-509-A Page 15 (2) To deliver 150 km. rails which are under charge of the central office and reserved in the south area, many rock-drills and a large quantity of ejqoloBive. (0) To despatqh medical veterans in order to intensify mea- sures against malaria. 3 . A? the tactical situations in East Hew Guinea were critical at that time, and "breakdown of the fighting front in this area expected iminent, quick reinforcement to the front of Vest Hew Guinea and. Banda Sea areas was "being carried out} transportation units, supply depots and airfield construction •units which could he diverted to this purpose, were despatched or were en route to these areas. As to laborers, they were insufficient to a certain degree, owing to the necessity of building up self-support industry on the spot caused by insufficient supjol" to the South Army, airfield construction for defence and despatching laborers to the above diverted units: shortage of labor was rising even in the over-populat- ei Java.. Then the South Irray, according to the order to cut short the 'construction period of the Thailand-Burma railway, diverted the following units which had been by that time employed in urgent operational duties to the railway construction, and at the same time ordered, that each sector commander of Burma, Thailand, Trench Inco-China, Malaya and Java districts should give assistance to the railway construction, anc took appropriate measures especially in the svstematic supply and maintenance of laborer?.. As to POW's, they were transferred there all the way from French Indo-China and Java, taking into consideration the above mentioned situation. Thus we tried to increase labor capacity. (1) The 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit, the 41st Independence Ga." rison Infantry Battalion, the Imperial Guards Railway Regiment, the 54th Engineer Regiment, the 4Pnd L , of C. Area Unit, the Eield Construc- tion Service Unit of the 14th Division, main part of the Epidemic Pre- vention and Water-supply Depot of the South Army and the Pield Hospital of the 21st Division. (2) 'Tito internment branch camps in Malaya (about 10 ,000 FOW's) . (3) A motor-car company and 300 trucks. B . Transition of situations. 1 , Because of the arrival at the construction spot of the military strength, labor, POT s and construction materials reinforced according to the above measures, the work further progressed since the end of March. 2 , ( ^ A f t e r Major Gen e r al Sh imoda's death Major General JTakasaki succeeded him as the commander of the railway construction, and arrived at the spot in the middle of February of the same year, and the work .was being eagerly carried on as before. Document Ho,' 15Q9--A Page 16 3- Contrary to our expectation, the rainy season set in one April in Thailand and in the middle of April in Burma, which influence upon the work and supply were tremendous. 4 . At the same time, cho3 era which had "been prevalent in some area.s of Burma, was spread over Ihe "border line between Thailand and Burma, "and 3f.rn.il t an eously with the set ting-in of the rainy season, became increasingly prevalent, Jane was its mo ft prevalent time when there broke out about 6 0C0 cases (of which 1 ,200 were the P0W! s) of which about 4 , 0 00 pr.vve^ fatal (of which about 500 odd were the FOW's) . , Thus many fell victim of the work in a short time. As this fact inspired fear in the laborers on the spot, many fled away and even some cases stole out of a hospital. The situations, dangerous both from the view- point of epidemic prevention and the work'itself , were brought about. 5 , As cholera was prevailing, the Headquarters not onljr dispatched medical author-ties there, but sent- some staff officers in order to make them take nc-.ce-ic-a.-y sveps; and the South Army, also, often dispatched principal medical cf.fleers and seme staff officers in order to cope with the situation: thy construction units ful f i l led their duties, overcoming unfavorable circumstances: the prisoners of war earnestly cooperated with them. 6. On the other hand ; as an emergency road for automobiles and the newly constructed railway were often destroyed and the bridges often washed away beaausc of the long heavy rain, the ground transportation was apt to be tied up ; and as it was impossible to sail up the Keonoi to the urper reaches for one month, its rising being slow, we were freauetl faced with a crisis. Particularly, the construction unit on the Burma.-sid.e, having no parallel waterways, toiled and moiled at the construction of a rain-tight road, by which it fiouid. transport necessary materials. For this reason, the railway construction work wa? inevitably suspended for a while. The construction unit on the Thai.land-side, waiting the rising of the Keonoi, mace use cf it and narrowly e caped. starvation. At that time though rations to units in the innermost regions was below the standard owing to such circumstances,, yet considering the characteristics of POW s food, scores of cattle were driven by land in order to sup'oly them with meat. 7, The above-mentioned difficulty of transportation caused delay of supply arid, gave rise to malaria, endemic, and gastroenteric disorder, together with malnutrition. Coupled with difficulty in medical supply, the number of the patients increased in spite of the toil of medical units. It is clear that the prisoners of war who were not use. to wild l i fe , would greatly suffer. Document jSo. 1509-A Page 17 8, Towards the eni of April , Major General Takasaki, the commander of the railway construction, caught malaria, and yet he continued to ful- f i l l his duty until he foil down on bed. 'The situations came to the worst 9 . The working units, however, endeavored to fu l f i l l their duty, overcoming all diff iculties . Sect. I l l How arJ why the period of construction work vias delays-.a by two months and state of affairs during that period. (From the middle of July to October, 1943) . 1 . Confrontel with the state of affairs above-mentioned.^the Imperial General Eeadquartors dispatched the I'ircor-cr of .Transportation and 'Communication aad ui-imbcrs of the General i.Haff to the scene of con- struction work to observe the state of a~\airt there, and came to the conclusion that if fchsc forced work were to be continued with the aim of completing the plan by the end of August, nothing but unnecessary sacri- fice would, follow, and considering the genera] situations of Burma front at that time, the prospect of communication with Burma becoming clear with the partial completion of the railway, and local employment of newly constructed, roads and waterways parallel with the railway, order was at last given to delay the completion of the construction work by~trwu months in order to reduce viotims} in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence u-?on the operations in Burma area. Major General Ishica was newly appoihted to the director of construction for perfect realizat- i o n of thl» scleras. 2 . \Major General Ishida, 'the new director of construction arrived at his fT-.o ir*-,T-.a>.-r-.Ti iaiKt^iat. 1943„ He aimed at the completion of the work by the end of October, renewed the organization of the staff, endeavored to stimulate the morale, and was always in the van of the party the main object of reorganization being in the innovation and improvement of the supervision of working conditions. He ch&rrlshed the slogan, 'Prisoners of war and laborers are fathers of construction' , corrected the erroneous idea, of 'mastership1 prevailing among the officers and men, and. was foremost in making per- sonal inspection and improvement of the normal l i f e of the prisoners of war, 3. The rainy season which culminated in August, gradually reduced the amount of rainfall 4 and the working party did their best for the com- pletion of the woik, surmounting ever increasing difficulties in the innermost regions. The activities of the water line of communications making use of the River Keonoi and the strenuous efforts of the working troops and the cooperating units in carrying on forced work favored the coordination between the preservation of military strength and labor (completion of supply work begun at the ending of the rainy season in September at the ends :.n the inner regions) and the execution of tasks. Document ITo. 1509-A Page 18 Thus, on the seventeenth of October, 1943, the two railways, started from east and west, 43 5 Kilometers in length, were joined together at Konkoiter and the formal ceremonies for the opening took place on the 25th. of the same month. Sect, IV Conditions after the completion of the Construction (from Nov. 1943 to Aug, 1945) l .With the completion of the construction work, the South General Army, in accordance with the genera], situation at that time, took greatest care in restoring the health of the prisoners of war, enlarged and improved the sanitary arrangement at Thai Internment Camp and endeavored to concentrate prisoners of war at salubrious quarters where bi l letting and supply - ere easily accessible, two branch camps of the Malay Intern- ment Camps being merged to the Main Internment Camp in Shonen (Singapore?1. 2 . The railway working troops cooperated, in the concentration activities, rendered services in sending back invalid prisoners, in accommodating billet facil ities , and employed not more than one thousand healthy prisoners in urgent and indispensable supplementary construction work, the rest being left with lessened labor. By special order of the Director of Construction, a. monument was errectrd each in Thailand and Burma__t.a_cnnol^those dgpartecL spirits" of the prTsoners_,,oj—Max. and ordinary laborers engaged in this construction work, a mass was held and their souls (deeply •venerated in the fashion of Inrpefia.1 Japanese ceremony.) 3 . The railway working troops also wheeled round successfully into Burma,, and from March 1S44 on, the remaining work was carried out entirely by a party mainly composed of the 4th Special Railway Unit, and part of the staffs of the Thai Internment Cajnp cooperated in the remaining work while the main body tried to regain their physicai s t rength, only making preparations for sending prisoners back to Japan. » 4 . Prom that time on, thousands of prisoners of war were employed ^or maintaining railway services until the end of the war, bving taken special care of the preservation and improvement of their health. During this period, there were no small casualties suffered by the Allied air bombing, CHAPTER I I Influence or the Construction and on the supervision of POW s, its ccuntarmeasures and their realization. Section 1. Various factors making difficult the construction and supervision of POW's: Document Ho. 1509-A Page 19 (A) Technical hindrances, 1 . Operational demands restricted the term of construction work (F .B . to be completed in about ten months after it was started in earnestl). This '-'as a forced construction and there followed many unreasonable demands in various quarters. 2 . The inexperience of the Japanese Army in gr*at construction work in the"7ungle mad5~5Tt fcepeeiSHylliffic^lt for them to make fair estimation of their work there, which was the great cause of miscarrying the programme and hampering the execution of construction work, and fchey found it very difficult to make scrupulous and appropriate preparations beforehand* 3. The Japanese Army were poor in mechanized tools and materials and in the equipment of supply. They had to accomplish this work with manpower, instaad of mechanical power, with r.io small w^ste of physical strength which followed. (B) Uatural hindrances. 1 . The construction way a hazardous one which had to be carried out through the geographical hindrance of a great jungle belt extending on the border of Thailand and Burma untrodden before, where epidemics and pestilence are prevalent. This construction work was 415 Icilometers in length, the total amount of earthwork 4 ,000 ,000 cubic meters, rock- clearing about 300 :000 cubic metres, the total length of bridging about 15 kilometres. On the Thai side, there were rather too many spots on the line where rock-clearing had to be done: the River Mecron had to be crossed near the "base, and excavation of cl i ffs was necessary in order to go along the Eeonoi"Valley. On the Burma side, the two rivers, Shittan and Salwin, hindered supply from the base in Rangun. (F .B , the iron railway bridge on the Shittan had been destroyed, and t?ie working troops hurriedly constructed a wooden railway bridge 2 kilometres in length, and ran locomotives brought from Burma.) Roads'were the only routes of supply, there were no waterways running in parallel, many rivers intersecting the line of construction. •?-. Generally speaking, the temperature is high with high percentage of humidity, but among the mountains, it is chilly in January, and, during the rainy season, the temperature sometimes fa l ls . )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a In this district, we suffer a good deal from the influence of the rainy season, especially on the Burma sideG (F .B . Tenaserium District is noted for its maximum rainfall ) . During the rainy season, hurriedly con- structed motor roads and newly "built railroads were very difficult to maintain, and were a great cause of hindering supply, On the Thai side, since the middle of May. a through motor car communication was suspended, on the Burma side, with difficulty kept up "by every available means. "'Qien the waters of the Keonci rose, it could be utilized for naviga- tion, serving as a line of communication, but when in flood was rather a hindrance to communication. Also, immediately after the rainy season sets in, no navigation is possible for about twenty days when the waters rise slowly. During this period, there lurks the danger of suspension of through communication both on land and on water. On the Burma, side, both railway bridges and road bridges on the Mezari and Winyau (both rapids, with driftwoods in them) were swept away and the supply was in crisis . 3. Bad sanitary conditions. Malignant malaria is prevalent in those regions where the con- struction work was carried, on. Moreover such epidemics as cholera, pest, small-pox etc. are raging all the year r.ound. The influence cf the rainy season and the native laborers brought into these regions made worse the sanitary conditions there, Another hindrance to be specially noticed is the fact that the rainy season set in one month earlier than usual. For this reason, various count -measures against the ra.iny season had not yet been complete, when ,-e were taken by surprise, with the consequence that most of our utmost endeavor came to nothing. The effect was decisive and fatal to our work, supply and maintenance-, to the sanitary arrangement .-etc,, and coupled with the simultaneous sudd.en prevalence of cholera., the construction work and the superintendence of prisoners became much more difficult , and the number of victims increased. Sect I I . Various count ermea.sures and their execution. Summary. 1 . The success of this construction solely depended upon the pre- paredness in the rearward area. Therefo e, the South General Army fully acknowledged the necessity of: (1 ) Preparation for supply (2) Measures for sanitary arrangement. (3 ) Securing and maintaining labor (4) Securing and pooling of materials of construction, and every endeavor was made for the realization cf this plan, 2 . In June 1942, at the time when order was going to be given for the preparation of this construction work, the South Array had dispatched line of communication troops, especially transport troops to other front (mainly in Burma) and owing to the scarcity of transportation capacity to send for these -roops to the scene, the construction work made no rapid )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a progress. Moreover, there was a great flood in the autumn of 1942 in the "basin of the river Menam in the central plain of Thailand, and Bangkok, one of the "base depots on the line of communications, was under water, "became like an isolated island, and greatly hampered the preparations for construction. 3 . On the other hand, these preparations in the rear were "being made through diplomatic negotiations with Thai Government, and no speedy solution could "be hoped for. Under these circumstances various prepara- tions could not be made satisfactorily, and we ere obliged to begin the construction work step by step. 4 . In February 1943, two months after the construction was started in earnest, the necessity of opefations due to the circumstances above mentioned suddenly demanded curtailment by four months of the period of construction, and every measure was taken to cope with the situation. The Imperial General Headquarters and the South Army did their best in lowering the guage of construction, and in increasing fighting strength and material, the working party was no less active in making desparate efforts for thfe realization of the plan. But these counter-measures of shortening the period of construction were not speedily put into execution for various reasons: especially the road for concentrating troops was stretching too far and the transporta- tion capacity too low. The concentration of fighting troops, labor and supply was at its height during the rainy season (the earlier setting-in of the rainv season cannot be overlooked), and it was our greatest regret that we could not fully display our fighting strength. (A) Supply ahd maintenance. 1 . With the curtailment of construction period, establishment of supply system become a burning question for securing and maintaining the increased military strength and labor. But in this period, there wa.s a serious lack in the line of communication troops (which were the main force in this are?i).especially in motor trucks, and it was not before the earlier part of April, 1943 that the deployment was over of the line of communi- cation troops (which had. by every means been extracted and allotted to this area and that systematic supply in the construction area wa.s started. The delay of making preparations for line of communication system, coupled wit.'- the early setting in of the rainy season, made the general counter- measures for rainy season discordant, followed by the difficulties of supply during that season. 2 . Measures taken for the establishment of supply and transportation system were as follows: (a) Emphasis was laid on the counter-measures for the rainy season, and considering the topographical characteristics, on the Burma, side, preparations were made, from the outset, for the construction of -v.i ro„ 1509-A Page 22 rain-tight roads, and on the side of Thailand, hurried construction of motor roads parallel with the railway was urged. At the same time, we were ready for utilizing waterline of communication along the river Keonoi, and negotiations were made for the procurement of barges in large quantities. (b) As the construction work progressed, the South Army sent two motorcar companies and 500 supply motor trucks and increased motor repair corps (two corps five sections; , H .B. There were no considerable reserve units at that time, and measures were baker, for employing war materials in store for use by groups operating in isolated islands, (c) Plans were made for pushing forward the head of heavy construc- tion train, and on the Tv: iside, efforts were centered round the spot 90 kilometres from the starting point for cutting through cliffs , and plans were made for the preparation of pushing supply base as far forward as Wanyai (125 kilometres from the starting point) . In Burma, ar a, the head of heavy construction train was pushed forward 18 1cm from the starting point) . (d) Pushing supply point forward. On the Thai side, a branch office of th*3 freight depot was pushed forward from ''Panpon1 area to Eanchanaburi; which was a march of 50 km into the construction area, On the Burma side, supply points were pushed forward from Rangun area to Moulmein area. 3 . The above-mentioned counter-measures were put into execution as follows, accompanied by such results as are stated, below and influenced by the rainy season: (a) The hurriedly constructed, parallel motor read was completed on 5th April 1943, but on the Thai side, it was nothing mure than an improve- ment of packhorse way with many curves, upon which motortrucks ran at an average speed of about 10 km per hour with an average maximum loading capacity of 1 ton (average — about 500 kg . ) The main part of the newly delivered supply motor trucks (200 cars) were put into active use for only about twenty rays before the rainy season set in, and only 40 fs of these ca.rs were f it for service, many of them often breaking down. Therefore, every effort was made for the supply of fixed ration3v and attemps were made to pile up reserve stocks of provi- sion and forage for use in the inner regions during the rainy season, but were not successful. During this period there was no great difficulty in the supply of staple ration, although a certain quantity of supplementary rations were lacking in the inner regions. The motor trucks were sent there too late: the construction of the motor road was not complete within the appointed time; during the dry season, the road was in active use only for a short time; there was a shortage rri transportation capacity; these were the main causes for the lack of rations above-mentioned. Document ITo. 1509-A Page 33 On the Burma side, the road constructed parallel with the railway was comparatively well prepared, and as a whole, there was no difficulty for supply during the dry season. (b) On the side of Thailand, the head of the heavy construction train re ched Wanyai (125 km. from the starting point) about the middle of May, "but the rainy reason set in May, and the r o a d b e d was "broken in many places. In July the River Eeonoi overflowed it8 "banks, the railway was flooded "between Eanchansburi and Panpon and trains on the newly con- structed line were held up for about twenty days. The stretching work further than Wanyai made but l ittle progress hindered by the difficulty of rock-clearing. On the Burma side, the head of the heavy construction train reached the spot about 40 km. from the starting point by the middle of April , but during the rainy season, it was difficult to stretch the railway of the heavy construction train on account of the soft and weak road bed. (c) Thus, the supply was comparatively easy during the dry season, but as soon a3 the rainy season set in, the roads both in Thailand and Burma were full of mud with marshy places here and there, which permitted no motor-car traffic, while the waters in the rivers did not r ise rapidly. Por a month (in May$, through traffic both on land and water was held up, the supply was cut short, and those stationed in the inner regione — 100 km. along the line , had to be contented with half or one third of the supply of fixed rations. But with the rising of waters in the River Keonoi since June, lend traffic was superseded by water traffic , the water line of communi- cations was stretched, and by the end of July, establishment of the water line of communications was completed between Pan Don and Hiike (?70 km); on the other hand, the Government of Thailand was urged to offer ships; •from March on, ships were gradually gathered together and by the end of July more than 700 tugboats and 1200 lighters were secured, by which critical situation of Bupply could be entirely swept away. During this period, the activities in the upper rapids of the Water Transportation Corps of the Imperial Guard Engineer Regiment, the activities on the water of the personnel from the company serving on land and from the motor car company, the efforts of the line of communication troops in the unified employment of these activities , together with the water transportation supply carried out by the internment camp itself , enabled to discharge the duties of supply work during the rainj season. (d) During the time when transportation and communication bdth on land and on water had been suspended, shortage of supply was locally covered by sending and receiving stocks accumulated in various parts of the inner regions. Special consideration was given to the daily food especially the side dishes, of the prisoners of war, and from the middle of May on, herds of cattle were driven by land into the inner regions every several days. This was successful and nearly one thousand of cattle were secured on the Thai side alone. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a <e) On the Burma si.ie, where there were no waterways available, supply had been going on smoothly until the middle of April, but with the rainy season setting in about that time, its influence was consi- derable, and in June, railway bridges and road bridges on the Mezari and Winyau were swept away. The working troops concentrated their efforts on relay intercommunication and maintenance of the road, held to the line of supply dseparately and could barely continue supply, but near M i k e in the inner regions motor trucks broke down one after another, the supply was suspended and some of the troops were withdrawn from that region. But with tha rising of waters, waterline of communications was stretched from the side of Thailand and in July, supply could be made as far as Hiike. ( f ) As is evident from the above-mentioned circumstances, difficulty of transportation in rupply arose from the influence of the rainy season, end distress existed in various parts of the inner regions. All the Japanese working troops and a l ittle leas than one third of the prisoners of war were suffering from the influence. Details of supply for the prisoners of war are given below. (g) Japanese army stationed in Thailand and Burma Army Group were responsible for supoly to the internment camps, but since the establish- ment of line of communications early in April 1943, the task of supplying provisions was assigned to the railway unit. In supplying provisions to the prisoners of war, special atten- tion was paid for allotting fixed, rations in accordance with various prescriptions of the law, and at the beginning of 1343 an addition of 50 gr. in the supply of both staple food and supplementary rations was decided upon by the South Army. Furthermore, provisions were revised and several times the amount of the fixed rations for the P O W s was in- creased on account of their being engaged in heavy labor. (h) As is mentioned above, the branch internment camps situated innermost regions suffered from shortage of rations in the same degree as the Japanese soldiers during the rainy season. In order to facilitate the supply work at the ends, executed by the internees themselves, the construction party delivered 30 motor trucks and scores of boats successive: since the latter part of March 1943. Besides this, the internment camp had about 50 motor trucks and about the same number of boats, and was actively engaged in transporting supplies. ( i ) Acquisition in large quantity of supplementary rations, especiall vegetables, was difficult , and during the dry season they were liable to be spoiled while they were being carried a long distance; while during the rain>r season, the?/ were always lacking owing to the difficulty of trans- portation, To cope with these situations, a great effort was made to encourage growing of vegetables so as to be able to do without the supply of supplementary rations, and considerable results were obtained in this way. Fishing in the River Keonoi had to be prohibited for a long time (from May to September)as cholera was prevailing along its banks, which was a great hindrance to better nourishment. Document ITo. 1509-A Page 25 ( j ) Articles of luxury for internees ("butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, "black tea, etc. ) were specially supplied "by the South Army. (k) Spare suits of clothes were supplied "by the South Army, hut were not "by any means enough. ( l ) The difficulties of supply wcrk during the rainy season were as above-stated. Enemy counter-attacks in Eurma with the end of the rainy season could clearly he foreseen. Therefore, an army group en route to Burma (two divisions, part of troops under direct control of the Army, individual soldier ar.~ civilian emp'j.oyee)marched along the railway under construction from April to September 1942, It was natural that the construction troops assisted them with munitions and there occurred no small shortage in the store of provisions. To sum u under the circumstances in that period, billeting and supply could not he anything hut unsfccisfaetory, and both Japanese army and prisoners of war were obliged to endure hardships ana privations. ( I I ) Billeting. 1 . Billeting facil ities in Thailand were somewhat different from those in Burma. On the Tha.i side, the working party had the advantage of utilizing the watercourse for supply during the rainy season, and employed the method of deploying on the whole line and of working all along the line simultaneously; curtailment of the construction period, however, necessi- tated quick deployment in the inner regions, and,there was no time to hvrTl_d ^nrmgh rpt-yages (a kind of hut made of b a j ^ ^ ^ B P F S s a n d 1 chaku' — foofplant — c a l l e d nipper-house) to billet the working party. Tents ~ggre generally used, _onjy key prHnt.g cf construction having billeting faci l it ies . The South Army, therefore, issued almost all the campaign tents on hand to the construction pert 7, to accommodate nearly fl£fcfe. thousand men, and afterwards ten odd. thousand for supplementary uPeT " 2 . On the Burma side, consideration had from the outset been given to the supply work during the rainy season, and. method of working from the ends had been taken in order to steadily push forward working sectors by gradually establishing supply from the starting point. Groups of billeting hui«s {'nipper-ho use*) were built at intervals of from 5 to 10 km, tents being sometimes uced for carrying about during movements. 3 . The POW"s in the Internment Camp, following the example of the construction party, built huts by theme elves T anc1T^e~cbn'stiuctToh "party cooperated, with thera when necessary. Considerable working personnel were allotted for the work of the Internment Camp itself and for the improvement^of its supervision and maintenance, ( c f . Attached Table I ) Page 26 Document ITo. 1509-A 4 , Since May, after the setting-in of the rainy season, camp l i fe proved defective: a wet pit was especially unwholesome; every effort was mad.e to raise floors and spoiled, beddings were exchanged for new ores. At the same time, nipper-houses gradually took the place of tents. Only bamboo poles could be obtained on the spot, roof-plant (chaku) being imported from other districts. But the supply of chaku was not sufficient owing to the diffi- culties of securing anA transporting them in large quantities. Thus, nipper-houses were built almor,t everywhere excepting the inner regions about 100 km. along the line cf construe >,icn. But even those nipT>er- houses were not complete to bear -';he heavy rain coming dovTn every day. 5 . In order tc acconmiodate the marching troops, (into Burma) pre- paration were made for arranging resting placec with tents (standard capacity 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity 500 men) were almo st completed early in Kay. These facil ities were util ized by the working party and the prisoners while they were shifting places within the construction area. ( I l l ) Sanitary arrangements. 1 . Outline of Medical service. 1 . Taking into consideration the characteristics of this con- struction work area, preservation of health of the working party was a matter of greatest concern, success of this railway construction de- pending upon it . The South Army, therefore, attached greatest importance to the service of sanitation, and, following the example of building a canal at Panama, made reenforcement in sanitary organization. "The main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Corps, which was the only standing epidemic prevention water supply corps throughout the South Area, was allotted tha duties of service of sanitation; at the same time almost ail the sanitary organizations under the direct control of the South A m y were exhaustively concentrated and were placed under the control of the Director of Railway Construction. Moreover, necessary medical service corps were extracted from the army corps engaged in first line operations and were allotted to the medical organization. Considering the situation of the general opera- tions ft that tine, this effort can never be underestimated. 2 . In taking care of the health of the prisoners of war, the system of the _suna£yising o,',garazation_of_]jri.'3oners of war was mainly followed, and, about 900 medical personnel of the Allied captives and some of the jjapanege_ meaica.1 pern >nnel were^engaged in the service. About fifty-five invalids " e r e in charge of one medical personnel, and this ratio was high compared with those of Japanese army (ihOO cases to one medical personnel attached to a unit) and ordinary working party )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a (200-300 cases to one medical personnel). 3ut the composition of sanitary corps "belonging to the Internee cams was not suited to f ield maneuver ah il it and could not "be made to display its ability to the f u l l . 3. At the outset, the Thai Internment Camp was in cooperating relationship with the construction party, and the service of sanitation was being carried out by the corps itself , Japanese medical corps going to its assistance when necessary. But there -rose the necessity of intensifying the general control of the medical service, and in July, 1943 this camp was placed under the control of the Director of Construc- tion, after which unification of medical service was realized, resulting in the innovation of medical activities. 4 . The organization of the Railway Mcdical Corps, South Army, is as is shown in Attached Paper IV. On the Burma side, medical services were carried ouh by the medical organs belonging to the Burma Area Army, under the superintendence of the Railway Medical Corps, South Army. Table of Railway Medical Corps, South Army. Chief of the Medical Corps — Colonel Kitagawa, A .M .C . (succeeded by Colonel Eayama, A .M.C . after killed on the f i e l d ) . Main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water supply Corps. 2nd Division Pield. Hosoital (Transferred from Shonan) ( » » Malay) 21st Division Pield Hospital (• " " French Indo-China) 16th Line of Communication Hospital (Transferred from Burma) 5Sth Division Field Hospital ( Transferred from Burma) Part of each of 31st Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps. (Passing Army Group) Part of each of 2nd Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps (Transferred from Malay) 54th Division Field Hospital (Passing Division) 16th Sick Transportation Section (Transferred from Thailand) Other med-ical personnel belonging to railway units and line of communication area troops. Prisoners of war Medical Service Personnel (special organization) co-operated by Local Laborer's M-d.Lcal Corps 2nd Army Hospital, South Array (3angkok) 5. Why there was a difference in the number of casualties between the POW's and Japanese Army. (a ) Japanese army, especially railway units, were only about 4 ,000 in nuniber, even when two regiments were put together. ITaturally enough they were enployed mainly for supervision of construction work and in the delicate technical work, P O W s being mainly engaged in usual tasks. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a The result was that the decline of physical strength on the part of the Japanese army was not so remarkable as in the case of the prisone-s of war; this is why some differences is noticed in the figures indicating the r suits of medical activities under the same conditions. (b) Compared with the Japanese, prisoners of war were not so well accustomed to the primitive life and had less power of resistance. (c) Many cases of tropic-?!, ulcer occurred on account of their dress (knee-breeches), which accelerated their decline of physical strength. 6. The number of the deaths among the POW1 s, Japanese army and laborers are approximately as follows: — "To-'al Deaths POW1 s . about 50, ZOO about 10,000(20$) Japanese Army., . . . . . . . . .about 15,000 about 1,000(7^) Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . .about 100,COO about 30,000(30^) (fugitives include 7. Colonel Eitagawa, Chief of the South Army Railway Medical Corps, was killed, by an aeroplane accident while actively engaged in making arrangements for the supply of medical materials. 1 . Outbreak of cases and its counter-measures. (a) How malnutrition occurred. In november 1942, after the prisoners of war had begun their work, members of the South Army Medical Corps were dsspatched to the scene of their activity in order to inspect and further improve their treatment in respect of supply and maintenance, increase of fixed ra- [ tions was mads (50 gr. both in staple food and meat) and additional mosquito-nets arid blankets were delivered. But since the setting-in of the rainy season, in May 1943, traffjc was sometimes suspends!, and in the inner regions fixed rations had to_be. reduced by half v while the' ""construction work was forcibly carried on. The work made such rapid rngrpfla that, tha had po lelr.nre; either time or material wa.s_ not found enough to complete billeting facilities and sanitary conditions were anything but satisfactory. Under such unfavorable conditions, and as a result of forced work, since the .aiddle of l c 4^ der.Hna of tihfIJ2!Z!!ir'a'' s t rength oTTHe PO'.?1 sZT w JTconspicuous,_jaany caries of malnutrition appeared and the number of deaths increased. Therefore, serious cases were gradually transferred to~tKe vicinity of 3angkok to receive treatment. Those who were in a stage of convalescence were assembled near Hanchanaburi, given snail work and were allowed to recuperate there, Eor the rest,, less amount of work was allotted, as much ration as possible was provided and every effort was made to restore their physical strength. Thus in 1944, they gradually regained their physical strength and the number of deaths dwindled.. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a 2 . How Cholera "broka out.. Prevention of acute infectious diseases, toe-ether with precautions against malaria, was a most pains--taking task, and in order to prevent infection through water all the sanitation water filters available "by the South Army were assembled in this construction area and they numbered 454 (including 7 motor-car f i lters} , Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Section composed of one Allied, medical officor arid four non-comml.vjxoned medical officers and privates, equipped with a sot of sanitation water f i lter (B or C) and considerable amount of epidemic prevention and emergency sanitary materials, were allotted to every working company of tho Prisoners of War and every neces- sary measure was taken for prevention, medical examination an<" attendance. The headquarters of the medical corps was at Eanchanaburi, anc was active in coaching the prevention, in the examination and disinfection of bacteria and in other precr: tions., Every one of those who w re going to the construction area, was inoculated against cholera. Cases of cholera first broke out among the local laborers on the side of Burma in November 194-', and in spite of desperate effort to aheck it , cases spread into Thailand across the frontier in April, 1943. At the time of its outbreak, the number of cases among the natives swelled, and shrunk with alternating intervals until at last, since May, there broke out cases among the Japanese and PCW'-s. Therefore, the South Army often dispatched medical personnel to the scene to coach prevention. Every working party and sanitary organ d.id its best in prevention activi- ties, sometimes entirely suspending construction work. At last , by the end of July, the plague_cuieted d.own except in some_j^vu"t-a^T Although 'more ca3TFsrJbroke"out—afteiward.s, they gradually dwindled, away and in October completely died down. In Jane staffs of the medical Bureau in the War Department were dispatched to the scene. Outbreaks of cases by the end. of June 1943 are as follows: 1st Period JTov.- Dec., 1943 43 2nd Period Feb,-Mar. 1943 48 3rd Period Apr.--May. 1943 586 4th Period June 3rd - June 30th,1943 2046 TOTAL 2723 The grand total by August 10 was about or000_L_of which abfl_u£_4,000 -jlied. Among thes^ figures, aboxit 1 .200 are the cases-of-pr-i genera, and it is our greatest regret that about half of them never survived. pop* 6 20 Document Ho. 1509-A The main causes of such raging were: ( 1 ) Fugitives among the native laborers suffering from cholera dispersed bacteria, (2) Cases broke out on the upper reaches of the River Zeonoi and infected the construction work area, (?) Imperfect prevention instruction on the part of civilian employee in charge of the P0T'TI 3, >rho " a s poor in the knowledge and ability and inferior in the qua', ity. (4 ) Difficulty of supplying epidemic prevention materials due to pressed transportation. It was largely due to the activities of the Sanitary Organs that the epidemic died down in comparatively short period and that great bursting out could be prevented, in spite of the unfavorable conditions under which they had been placed. 3. How cases of malaria occurred. Greatest emphasis wao laid on the prevention of malaria in the ser- vice of sanitation. Malaria prevention par by was organized (composed of 341 officers and men, allotted at the ratio of one party to 5 , 000 laborers) and allotted to each unit, and vas controlled by the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Corps; every possible science and technique was put into active use by them. The following five items were measures of prevention. (a) To give complete knowledge and training of malaria prevention. (b) To prevent biting of mosquitoes, to prepare mosquito-nets and clothing, to fumigate. (c) To prevent the breeding of mosquitoes and to exterminate them, drainage, oil-sprinkling, cleaning, etc. (d) To take 45 dozes of sulpher-quinine and 3 dozes of "Flesmohin" internally per capits per month; every Japanese, prisoner and native laborer is required to take the same quantity. (e) Early discovery and separation of the case and keeper of "malaria protozoan1'; Doctor Kimura, professor in the Research Institution of Tropical Medicine, authority an malaria-prevention, came to the assistance of this service as a non-regular member of tne staff of the South Army. The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring during this construc- tion work is as follows: Japanese Army l-7p Prisoners of War C-ll-'j Local laborers 10-20:* N .3 . The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring in New Quinea area rose to about 20$ )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a As is shown above, the raio of malaria cases occurring among the Japanese army is comparatively low, "but "by the end of the construction period, the refcio of the keepers of malaria protozoan among the Japanese had risen to nearly 100^s and only by internal use of dozes could some of the units prevent the attack of malaria. Generally speaking, the r£io of cases per month was about throughout the Japanese and prisoners of war, which was a rather favorable indication compared with those of other theatres of war, and we may conclude that satisfactory results were obtained from the preventive measures. 4 . Tropical Ulcer Tropical ulcer which was prevalent among prisoners of war was incur- able and we found difficulty in its remedy. As a precautional measure, we made war prisoners put on leggings made of bamboo and had them wear boots. As a remedy permanganic acid ealvarsan were used. In addition to these measures, each unit made ointment from lard by itself , and used it . Inert skin, bare legs and insufficient auxiliary medicine such as disinfectant due to inexperience of the Japanese Army etc. were the reasons why this disease was prevalent especially among prisoners of war. Though we despatched medical veterans to the infected districts and made them study it, a complete remedy could not be found because of inexperience of the Japanese Army. 5 . Other pr-vailing. diseases. Generally speaking, coupled with malnutrition, many cases of dysentery, beriberi and gastroenteric disorder occurred. Pestilence and. smallpox against which great precautions were taken broke out for- tunately only a l ittle at the beginning of 1943. As above mentioned, various diseases were so prevalent that the per- centage of the war prisoners in service vras from sixty to seventy per cent in the average. But it fell to forty percent in the innermost and most unhealthy areas. On the contrary about eighty per cent was maintained in good controlled and healthy areas. Of about f i f ty thousand war pri- soners, about three thousand were in hospital on 8th, July, 1943. ( 6 ) State of occurence of war prisoner cases is shown in Annex 2 and C 3 . Supply of medical supplies. The South Army layed great stress on supply of medical supplies to these construction units and tried to prepare abundant malaria medicine and materials for epidemic prevention. Though quinine which was produced in Java was sufficiently supplied and materials for epidemic prevention, especially sanitary water-filters, were nearly sufficient, the South Army suffered from shortage of medical supplies in general, as the other medical supplies were all transported from the home islands and quantity supplied from the central office to the South Army was about 50 ,000 boxes )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a (about 1700$) in 1943 and about a half of 1943 in 1944, of which 20 per cent were lost as result of sinkings. The Bangkok Field goods Depot eagerly endeavored to supply the construction units: nevertheless it could not supply in so large quantity as was expected because of insufficient stocks and difficulty of transportation. The South Army ordered that ratio of supply to the war prisoners and to the Japanese troops should be equal. 4 . To sum u , we took every measure possible under the circumstances and die our best to maintain the health of the prisoners of war, The main reasons why such a miserable result was brought about in spite of our efforts are as follows: ( l ) As a result of the forced construction worv , various defects were brewed. Especially, the work was commenced without sufficient sani- tary arrangements. (3) In addition to bad conditions of the roads, traffic during the rainy season was tied up, so that supply was v ry difficult and the stan- dard of ration fell down. ( 4 ) Mixing of the native laborers who had no knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks. 5 . Main body of foremen were Koreans and their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygiene could not be thorough. It is ciuite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and many invalids and. deaths occurred. Chap,III Outline of the Supervision and Employment of the Prisoners of War. Sect , I How the War Prisoners became to be employed. 1 . It is natural that the labor which is primary constituent of this building requires an enormous number of the assistant workers, in addi- tion to the troops. Therefore, though the local laborers (Thailanders, Malaysians, Burmese, Chinese, Javanese, Armamese) *'ere raised, it was v=ry difficult to get a large number of laborers without delay, on account of various circumstances, and moreover, those natives who ©re inferior in their physical conditions and ability could not be made the leading part of the labor for this construction which ought to be com- pleted in a short time. 2 . Hereupon the South General Army requested the sanction of the General Headquarters concerning the employment of the war prisoners. The General Headquarters sanctioned the employment of the war prisoners, because this construction was partly a work to be done far from the front, and partly bore the mission of the trade route between Thailand and Burma. Page 33 At tfc&t tine the Army, as a whole, had a view that it is rot against the Geneva Treaty on the Wax Prisoners to employ the prisoners of war in such a work. 3. Consequent to the sanction, in the "beginning of the preparation for construction, the South Army ordered the railway troops to supervise a part of prisoners of war and to engage them in the preparation work. After that, subsequent to the organization of the Thailand camp, the South General Army made those of the cam:- he engaged in the construction work under their control. 4 . And after the considerable progress of the construction, especially as it became more and more indispensable to increase tne labor, because the term for the construction was shortened, a great number of war pri- soners in Java. "Borreo, Singapore ar* Indo-China were transmitted to the Thailand Uaiap sui newly two br.nches. of the Malay Camp were attached to the commander of the construction troops. 5 . The prisoners of war in the above paragraphs were transported, those on Thailand side by railway, those on Burma by ships respectively, to the construction aiva, while their removals within the construction area were done on foot. The details about this transportation will be shown in Chapter V, "Explanation for the Protests". Ot-Cv•• l.i' Priations between the Supervising party and Employing Party. 1. Outline of the supervision of prisoners of war and their missions to construct > o. ir- >?.. O p'spor, abo^i. 2 . After the Thailand Camp was organized, (August, 1942) , it was designed to cooperate with the constriction troops about for a year since July, 1 °43 . 3. The delay in the progress of the work owinr to the increase of patients due to the influence of the weather an ' climate made necessary etill closer relation between the working troops and the camp, regarding the improvement of supply -w -.citation, ^ we': 1 a^ the working capacity, t ill at .'.afib ii. July, on* csu^ \x< or-der xha -.omnand of the construction commander . I-cws"-?.r, a • of war prisoners located on Burmr. siae, (two bxac.ch.er • •;.ch ifonu!- 3 30f; prisenfrs) '••as since July, 3,941 put under the c\,2r_.'?nd of r'is soo w . v ' o f r-he fitis railway regiment, who was concurrently the coiflio&uder of the construction work in that area, bv the reason of the. difficulty of l iaison, the remoteness and the inconvenience of supply. But as to the supervision of the war prisoners in the proper sen&e, bhr.y were under the control of the head of the Thailand Oaup. "iitosreo in the Burma nrea, the camps were under the direct management of the construction commanders, but were never put undor the o.irect control of the working troops. 4 . The fact that two branches 18-.3, and put uader the control crib ed in the above paragraphs, of the Malay Camp were Bet up in May, of the construction commander vas des- 5. On the eraployfuant of prisoners of war, they were not attached, separately to voicing br:»opo on ths spot. As regards employing them on the spot, the branch loadvc'3 of the caaps and the commanders of "battalions and companies negotiated together and regulated the working hours of employed members That means that, after che csmras were put under the control of construction coumandors, the camps delivered the required number of persons to the required places in accordance with the orders of the construction commanders, who were not entitled to inter- fere in the business of supervision itself, according to the above mentioned method of employment, and the construction troops cooperated in improvement of the supervision as far as their circumstances permitted. 6. When some of prisoners of war who have a special ability were to be temporarily detached. bh-;y were attached along with the supervising per- sonnel after viae negotiation between the camps and the employing parties. For instances, some were estpioysd as chauffeurs for the commissary troops or as technical men for the material depots. 7. Subseouent to the progress of the worv, a special attention was paid at the time of the moving forward of the camps. Their removals were limited only within a small range so that the waste time and the unneces- sary establishments might be saved as far as possible. Since August, they werr ordered to remove only when the accommodations and food staffs had been completely prepared, 8. As is mentioned above, the close relation was kept on between the supervision party anc. the employing party, and much attention was paid to the prisoner's health and a special effort was made to improve the situation of supervision on the basis of their customs and manners. This can be seen from many instructions rendered by the command era of the camps to their men ai-d those rendered on the port of embav-cation to the prisoners to be transported, on the occasion of their transportation to the hom —land. Sect. I I I . Outline of supervision and service. 1, Tho Thailand Camp completed its organization at Bangkok in the middle of August, 1942. At its opening, the number of the -or:..toners of war waj about 3 .000, and they were put into service in the preparation worx of each troop located at the bases for the railway construction.. After that, from October of the same year to *<iaxch: 1843, tho war prisoners, 50i.637 in ail (including the dead) wore transfered several times to Bangkok and Moulmein from tho Malay and Java caipe, and the neat of them (3d,000) were caused to cooperate with the Sbh railway regiment whose mission was to woi'A en the I'Cfi.i jai.'.d sijds.. ^hjJ e rv..?- x uieti cooparatec wiw.u tr.o £>ta regiment whose mission was to work on the Burma side. Document 1T&. 1509-A r u 2 . Subsequently, in April, 1943, to accelerate the construction work mor -. twbranches of the Malay Camp (about 10 ,000 war prisoners) were despatched and cooperated in this work, deploying near ITiike and Kinsaiyork. 3. At the beginning, the equipments of the camps were in so poor state that they had no vehicle, and the lorries for the construction troops were used at the sane time for the sake of supplying. For that reason, the war prisoners tc be transfered were obliged to march on foot, to d.eploy in the remote places; walking a long distance under the burning sunshine. On their arrival the destination, a l ittle more than 30-3 fell i l l , and in addition to that., the insufficient accommodations and. the unsteady supplies by reason of the bad condition of the transportation route, accelerated the increase of patients. 4 . In May, 1943, the track was opened to Wanyai, Thailand (at 120 kilometres from the starting point) while in Burma, the head of the upper construction of the track was toward, the vicinity of Anakwin (at 40 kilometres from the starting point) . However, as mentioned above, as the rain season set in about one month earlier, and because of the enor- mousness of railfall , the transportation of supply did not go as it was intended. As in remote places, the ration of food stuff was sometimes reduced to a. half or one third by the above reason and. the temperature was low, there broke out a sudden consumption of energy. But the work was still continued in accordance with the order which commanded to f in ish it by the end of August working in the rain, the supervision of the war prisoners fell unproper. As a result, many patients came out; above a l l , as unex- pectedly cholera became prevalent and cases of tropic ulcer increased, the service rate extremely lowered, 5 . At the end of <Tunes cholera broke out in some working troops, and as it threatened to spread over, still more surgeons, medical non- commissioned. officers and privates of the war prisoners, 230 in all , were attached to the railway troops from the Malay camp and charged to check the disease. 6. In September, *hen the rainy seaeon was over, the condition of roads became better, and also in addition to the advance of the head of the upper construction of tracks., the concurrent employment of the water-route of the Zeonoi River became possible. Therefore as the transportation of supply got better, the regular ration could be given with the aid of the commissary troops and by the great effort of the transportation section of the troops. However, owing to the fatigues accumulated within more than one year past, and the deployment in the remote places insufficiently equipped with the sanitary arrangements, the number of patients and the deceased did not shrink. 7. After the completion of the work in October, 1943, the Thailand camp despatched 1 ,000 healthy prisoners alternatively from the flat country to the remote places and caused them engage in the reinforcement work of the rail'-ay; and at the same time, successively transfered and collected this )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a main "body over the level ground, and endeavored especially to recover the health of the prisoners. The supervision, too, became normal. Especially many camps were established in the rendezvous, such as Panpon Eanchanaburi and. a camp hospital was built at the cost of 1 , 5 00 , 000 yen at Nakonpaton. Besides making such a great effort to give medical treatment to the patients, the supplies x^ere given beyond the regular ration. So the health condition of the prisoners got b-tter step by step and- the number of patients and the dead dwindled. The two branches of the Malay camp were restored, successively to their proper positions by the one. of that year and th ir health condi- tion also recovered.. 8 . The disposition of the Thailand, carno wil l be shown in the annexed Chart I . 9 . An outline of the services of the prisoners and the list of patients and the dead during the construction work can be seen in the annexed Table I and. V I I I . HOTS — To improve the supervision, the camp organized transportation and supply sections and accommodation, building, and. special medical sections and so on; and made effort to eliminate inade- quate circumstances, alloting a considerable personnel. (See Table I . ) Chap.IV. Disgraceful Affairs during the construction work. Sect. I . Insults upon corpse. 1 . On a day in June, 1943, there broke out a case that Lieut. Fu.jii Ziyoshi, commander of the recond company of the 9th Railway Regiment, ordered one of the war prisoners to shoot his fellow who was suffering from cholera (dead) in consideration of checking the disease. 2 . Fa was brought to trail in the r.ourt martial of the Thailand Occupa- tion Army, but war acquitted of. As for h ' ^ tr l f , the commander cf his own troops gave him a maximum punishment for his unproper treatment. The Army Department suspended him from office and relieved of his post, causing him to return to the homr- land. 3 . The railway construction commander disciplined, the commander of the 9th Railway Regiment to which Fujii belonged. 4 . The details are not certain, as the docamants were burnt down. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Sect. I I . Other Affairs. 1 . Concerning any other affairs than that in Sect. I . it is quite difficult for the central authority to search into them. It is desired the local authorities he investigated. But there was not such a case as 600 men were pushed down to d.eath from a precipice. Chap. V. Explanations on some special items in relation to the protests of the Allied Powers. Sect I . On the treatment of war prisoners during the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway. 1 . ©int. As for the treatment of war prisoners during the preparatory course and construction of the Thailand-Burma. Railway, it will become clear when the circumstances and the actual state of affairs at that time are understood, namely, though the greatest effort at. that time was made under the above mentioned circumstances, many fell unavoidable victims. Further explanations, apart from the above circumstances, about the transportations to and the marching within the construction area will be given hereafter. 2 . Railway transportations. a. Railway transportation of the war prisoners in Thailand, and Malay at the time of thr construction wor?r. The transportation capacity required from the viewpoint of the opera- tion and military administration ran short conspicuously, while about 3,500 cars possessed in Malay were reduced to - .̂bout 1 ,^00 usable cpjts by- extreme decadance and. the means of communication was in a very poor state, and various kind of cars of French Indo-China, Thailand, Malay, and Japan were used mixedly. As a. result, they had. hard work to draw up a transpor- tation plan and to manage the cars. The 3rd Field Bailway Headquarters took charge of the planning and managing of the railway transportation, basing on the south army Ordinance on the management of the railway transportation. In the transportation of the persons, it was not unusual that one train war limited to take 700 persons on board (25 carriages, with 28 parsons per carriage) in Malay-Sou •:»-- a Thailand line ~ Punenben(7). This standard was adopted indiscriminately for the war prisoners and the native laborers as well . The cars used consisted of five uncovered waggons which were used to put on brake (LS) and other covered ones (CG-). These were mainly cars transporting rice from Thailand, to Malay and coming back ™ith no load. ) )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a The transportation of war prisoners was as a whole carried out on this organization. It was owing to such a situation that even Japanese officers as a rule were t-.'ren on "board the waggons at that time. But in seme places theremight have "been some instances 'here the rate of covered and uncovered waggons in organizations was subject to a slight alternation in accordance with the car situation at the time or more persons than the full capacity were forced to "be taken on board. ITote The Management of the cars at that time is as follows: 1 . Shingapore — Bangkok: Two trains 10 days x 25 cars x 2 trains= 500 2 . Punonpen — northern District: One train 15 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 375 car' 3. Shingapore—Kura Isthmus terminus: One train 8 days x 25 cars x 1 train 300 car: 4 . Shingapore—Awalsta: Coal train Fifteen trains 6 days x 25 cars x 1 tre; 225 carr 5. Local military train: One train 6 cays x 25 cars x 1 train= 150 cars. TOTAL 1,600 ca When a necessity for special trains besides these ordinary ones occurred or an incident broke out, the want of cars was felt intensely, and so above mentioned condensed transportation was indispensable on the rail- way line within an area where an operation was constantly carried out. 2 . Supply and sanitation during the transportation. As for the supply, the staple food was received from the Army in agreement with the South General Army Intendance Ordinance, the side dishes w Gre served after the menu was drawn up. The actual condition was regularly reported to the Army. The side dishes of fixed auantity were acquired with great pains from all over Thailand, Malay, and French Indo-China and a great effort was made to improve the menu. Regards to the sanitation during the transportation, an overseer sent from a prisoner camp took charge of it and it was ordered that he wou! act in concert with medical institution'^ oncernsd through a commander of the nearest station. As the actual instances show, the commander paid a special attention to keeping up such prisoner's health as it was on his arrival, and inspected the management of transportation of prisoners at the station, and issued orders carefully about the supply, sanitation and treatment. Document Ho. 1509-A Page 39 3, Transportation by ships. 1 . G/ncc che "b^girrning of the war, Japan lost rapidly as it is known a lav^e num^e" of ve.'uals, 2, The o ant ar-measure for the want of vessels and the conditions of transport-acn.-- --ore as f o i l : vs.. A, Count -r-oc-a-urc of transportation. i., r , o a the b e a r i n g to the middle cf 1942: Tonnage pel n--ad -- 5 gross tons. p-cm ab"'at \h? middLe to the end of 1942: "Joz-lag's per head — 2-15 gro\r# tons, i i i . Iron about the beginning to the middle of 1943: 'i1-.:rinage par head — 1-2 gross tor.3, iv. Prom a V u t the nvuVilo of 1943; T->nr.-:-igc- per head — 1 gross tor. b . Transportation of automobiles and other weapons,. Since the mMdle of 1942. they were as a rule decora-nosed and transporte About 7C-30 gloss bona were m i n t e d for a whole lorry when it was to be transfer bed, b about 20- dO gross cons was alloted for a decomposed one. c. Transpoitat1on of horses, i . From the b eg inning of th<s war to the middle cf 1942. connnge per hoiae — 10 gross tons. i i . Prom the ..riddle to the end of 1943. tonnage per horse 9 gross tons ( i i i . Since 1913, it was made a rule that the horses were not trans- port -d on a"court of the v.ant cf vessels^ though the transportation of then we.s •J.adi;»p -ns.-bi 3 for the lpc.j aticn. H O T S 1 . A hcrse cannot be dismembered to rcducc the tonnage, as a lorry can. 2 . A horse cannot be packed up as a person can be . 2 , The situation cf transportation,. The condition of the closely packed carrying cf the tic-ops, otfirjg to the rapid loss of vessels, can be understood tn/ough i'ote I . Tile instances are as follows; Document Ho. 1509-A Page 40 a. On* division which, was to he transported to deploy in the central ps-.r'fic and icn isted of about 15 .000 man, about 200 automobiles and munit-jo:.r <.f about 0 months (.tor example, the 29th Division) war. brans- ported by only tnree ish'ps, each a ,000 or >.0,000 gross tons in all (the Mi ike-Ma:: u 1j. : 003 t-?no, -ja'rt-tc-4Ipra 7 ,900 tons, and the Zyczan-Maru 8 .600 tons), b . Jurther :'.n a case of a transportation to be deployed in the Central Pa>v:f:'o. ab.jut 5 , 0 ( 0 .ion. about 60 automobiles and other muni- tions were o&^i\-3d from lu>.au, '!• •?.cJoaa ."> Guam in a vessel of 6 , 000 gross tons (the T&mahoko-Maru, with alu'• tiona.' , 5t3Ubo"s : accommodation), c. In th--? Southern districts (for example, the Pugo-Maru, 1 ,900 gross tons, w ! oh we res jald alio bed to the transportation from Shinga- pore to P.an^oor.i„ i the ressei was made the best use of, by rationing banana and ho or. as a aacttrance to avoid cooking in a ship. Such sort of transportation w°s catltsc a ,:"iar.ana'? transportation. In a "Banana" trans- portation. the actual situation vr.s about 29 men per "tsubo", when the whole of men on board i.s divi .bd by fill "Tsubo!i of berths. d. Tho equipments lor transportation of personnel are as follows 1. Setting aside indispensable vessels, all were twe storied. Still further in every spare room on tho decks, two or three storied berths were equipped as it was called the "Decisive battle transportation". Thus the capacity was increased, 2 , The space between the upper and the lower stories was regulated not to touch, the h«,ad in sitting attitude (about 0 , 7 5 metre in minimum,) •3, As tho capacity was increased as far ao possible, with an equip- ment of such berths as sail in j and ?, each person lost the freedom of his action ir a ship when the ship was damaged bv a torpedo and any per- sons and munitions; were runk to the bottoms of the sea. This caused the greatest difficulty in tho operation of the Japanese army and its fighting power of long duration, About this ratter, it is supposed that. your navy hr.ovs well . The bad ventilation and the bad and inconstant sup ly and the loss of sleep (it was impossible to l ie down) due to the closest packing caused, the conspicuous increase of patients during the transportation. Even those who did not fall i l l during the transportations, must be at rest for a tine after landing, or else, they sometimes became unable to fight a severe battle. Por that reason, the shipping n a c e was calculated to economize as far as possibles the water-closet being put outside gunnel. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a C. Transportation of munitions As the battle became severer and severer, the rapid production of airplanes was desired more and more. Therefore the transportation from the South of bauxite, and other materials indispensable for the rapid production of airplanes grew more necessary in its priority, on account of this . a. The vessels for the South, alloted to carry bauxite were decided to carry nothing but personnel on its ouvward passage to increase its frequency. This matter checked vary much the transportation of munitions to the troops in the South. b . On itt? homo passage from the South, bauxite war overloaded to such an extremity that the load- line was ignored. The home-coming troops from the South and so on were taken on the docks or on the top of the munitions. c. Instances of country-measures for transportation and its actual conditions accompanying the want of vessels were as above mentioned. It is desired that you acknowledge the war prisoners were not closely packed up only because they were war prisoners. That they were kept from coming out on the decks may be from the viewpoint of guarding and preventing of espionage o£ the voyage of ship groups. It may be supposed that the war prisoners transported to the Thailand-Burma Railway area were treated better than in any other areas. An instance of ''Decisive battle" Equipment. 1 . Two or three-storiod equipments in boats, (boats wore hung outside gunnel.) By this mean.;, '.15 to ?0 "Tsubo1' could be additionally in- creased in 5 ,000 gr. t„ class ships. 2 . Two-storied equipment on both sides of or in rear of the bridge. By this m a n s 5 or 10 ''tsubo" could, be additionally increased. 3 . Two-storied equipment of a half or almof t all saloon. For example, in the Isissho-Maruc about 40 "tsubo" was additionally increased. 4 . Two-storied equipment of the cabins. 3?or example, in tho HIssho-Maru, each cabin was equipped with two stories. The capacity of the cabins became about three tines, as much as before. 5 . A part of coal-bunker and a store-room was put in order and. equipped with berths. Document Ho, 1SQ9-A Page 42 4 . Hew two brancL-'s of the Malay camp were removed on foot within tho construction ai'«sc, to the spvt. A. Outline In May. 1943, to promote the work, two b, ancvies of the Malay camp were newly attached io. th^ rnilway r o t l . Cue of thrm was moved to Hi ike ahd tha other to Fin^aiyork, bring traaspoorto:! ty railway from Shingapere to Panpon, from vhero trey went on foot. According to the circumstances at that time, it was the want of the transportation meant? that forced them cc march on foot. 3 . Then was just the time the & spicy the forces and labor to the remote places accompanying the progras.'i of the work. At the same time the only means of transportation, that is lorries, were scarce exicu^a to be used for the supply, and rathe•: -..hoy were soma times in want,, Tnore- fore, they could net be u-si for the transportation of persons.. Also the water-routes did nc.t cwoil yec, so that the use of ships were res- trained. C, For that reason, the following action was taken to remove them on foot. a. At the end of April, the commissary facilities were estab- lished along the line of construction;, and they were used to give the aid in the aocommodations and ^applies,. At ever" 20 or 25 kilometres along the march line, a pavilion (cam-Ding by means of tent) was set up, with a tea-supplying place in the interval. b.> The march, was as a rule 20 or 25 kilometres a day and made by night to avoid the heat. c. A great effort was made to check the epidemics cn the march- ing road and stragglers were taken in to the nearest sanitary institution. For this means, motor cars were driven along in order to make liaison and to take stragglers in. d. In consideration of the supply, an echelon was made up of 200 or 300 persons It was male a rule that they should rest one day, when they marched two or three days. D« And .at that time, the 31 st Division ("Hetsui: Divicbn) which were marching to Surma were ail walking on foot from the middle of April in the same way aj above. 2 . In short, tho marching on foot va® not avoidable, if th« circusv- etances were considered. Even a squadron on an urgent operation was, as it really was compelled to march more than 400 kilometres, and ve assure that it was decidedly not only on the war-prisoners that this was com- pelled. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a Sect. I I . On the treatment of war prisoners in Moulmein Area. 1 . Gist. Though researches about this natter have "been made into every local authorities concerned from the end of 1944, the details are unknown, for the persons concerned at that tim- had almost all been dead or trans- fer ed, as a long time elapsed since then. It can be considered that some contents o* your protests have discre- pancies in the period and the figure, and some are exaggerated and some are not founded. In the following they ; i l l be explained on the ground of the data which are distinct at present. 2 . About the report. A. There is no fact that nearly 20 ,000 war prisoners were accommo- dated in Moulmein and its vicinity at the beginning of 1942. 3 . In Moulmein and its vicinity, from March to June, 1942, about 120 prisoners of English officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners and in Tavoy 79 Indian prisoners who were interned together with hostile citizens were held, •The war prisoners in Moulmein and those in Tavoy were removed to Rangoon Pield Camp (established on the 19th of March, 1942) in June, 1942 and in February 1943 respectively. (The above is the report from the Malay Camp.) C. nevertheless, it was decided that the war prisoners should be employed to make good the want of labor when the constriction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was discussed, and 9 , 535 prisoners from Java, and 1946 prisoners from Shingapore were removed to the vicinity of Tanpizaya in Burma (about 50 kilomotres south of Moulmein), in November 1942 and in January 1943 respectively. D . And as they were composed into the Thailand Camp, it must have been reported relating to an opening place of thf- Thailand Camp. 3 . State of Affairs. A„ The deceased while being accommodated before the constriction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were five Englishmen (one of them on account of the wound caused in the battle) and five Indians. (The above is a report of the Malay Camp*) And as it was just at the beginning of Burma operation, and. it was almost impossible to send the supply the rear, the collecting of materials on the spot was not carried out as it was desired. Consequently the supply may not have been enough, but the same was with the Japanese Army. )ocument Ho. 1509-A Page 12-a 3 . The number of the deceased prisoners in the district to the east of Tanbizaya after the construction of the Thailand--3urma Railway w?,s begun (abou since October 1942) , is as s^own in the annexed Table T i l l . Even in all Surma to the west of Tahbizaya (at this time there was no prisoners in Moulmein) Jc there was 10 deceased in October and 1? in November, 1942. It is unfounded that at that tine so many were dead as in your protests. C. As the construction of the Thailand Burma, Railway was most urgent for the operation as mentioned beforehand, the work must be forced even with what materials and equipments the Japanese army had. Moreover, the districts along the projected railway line were the jungle where no man had even trodden and the accommodations and supplies and sanitary facil it ies were quite different from the normal l i f e of the war prisoners and the traffic was interrupted frequently during the rainy season of 1943. On account of these causes, the war prisoners as ^ell as the Japanese soldiers were obliged to suffer great pains, Especially, though the main forces of the sanitary facilities of the Japanese army "ere concentrated to prevent the prevalence of malaria and disorders cf the digestive system, they could not be checked. Still more with the civilized prisoners unaccustomed to the wild l i f e . When the railway was opened in October 1943, every establishment and equipment were made complete and the number of the patients and the deceased remarkably dwindled. As for the details, refer to the Chapters I and I I I . 4b Display of the war prisoners. A. There is no fact that the war prisoners were contemptuously dis- played in February 1044 as your protests mention. B . But it is not certified whether or not some of those who were engaged in the supplementary work were employed in order to transport the foodstuff and materials in the city of Moulmain after the completion of the construction of the Thai land--Burma Railway. CONCLUSION 1, The foregoing is an explanation of the circumstances which com- pelled a heavy toll of l i fe during the progress cf the construction work. In the final analysis, causes of the tragedy may be traced principally to the placement of a tine limit on the construction, the immense difficulty in making thorough preparation and to the precipitancy with which the Japanese soldiers, despite their lack of experience in such large-scale construction work and meagre scientific equipment, dared to carry on their "Document LTo. 1509-A Page 45 work in strict obedience to orders which they characteristically regarded as imperative. Thus the occurrence of the casualties, it must he declared, was by no means due to any deliberate intention on the part of the Army authorities. As regards the employment of prisoners of war in the above construc- tion work, it maj*- be stated that at the time the Japanese Army as a whole entertained the ideas that the employment of prisoners of war in any work other than military operations- was not a breach of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it is to be insisted that the incident was of a radically different character from the so-called maltreatment of pri- soners of war. 2 . The incident, already stated was an inevitable outcome of the situation then prevailing, and, if anyone is to be called to account for the dreadful death rate, the responsibility ought to be placed on the then Chief of the General. Staff ..C&enera! Sugiyama) who ordered the construction, the ¥ar Minister (General To jo) who sanctioned the employ- ment of prisoners, and the Commander--in--Chief of the South Ar--a Corps (General Terauchi) who was entrusted with the construction on the spot. 3 . As regards individual cases of maltreatment of prisoners of war, it is desired that investigation be started upon the further receipt from the Allied Powers of a report of the details, particularly the ranks, and names of the suspectod offenders, and if as a result, they should be found guilty severe measures should, be meted out to them. / End. No. 1 i . i S t o f f i f t h l y Statistics of C o n d i t i o n on 13-; 5 oner of V^r H ^ e m ^ t I V * H triSoneYi; Operatic* o"n Construotiori of RcJ. Lwjay B r a n c h e s of /\coider\ts Fates Of fs/umbfcf t» T>t4 }N/aiviber- of prisoner's timber of foo^i turfed to to Total Nu^bei' PriSCTs] [Smb&y >f .WtrrKtd Total "Ritfenfe ftxtei-. UTM jS/â be/' Am- Asn hi 04. fijc fat ^2/7 3/6 6>/3 c,8'7 Sept. / 722 f / 3 t>,89- ® c t . oJi / 636 6,ZD t?, S3 N o v , J 3. !U to, m m s 63o C.'/o P e c . Jg.ltl 13.013 64*1 UiS A 30 /f*J J-a-M 3-7,(33 13-60$ 7,0?! 0>/'j sM 6>36 tJZ T e b 33. 776 nss3 m m i orf M CLY ft>. $34- o t t 7Si f>7?3 O&L a m cay 0,75 Apr 4-33/3 Z^./o} wr/ 0</6 o>3/ 0 j j M a * 4-7 ?Z2- Z4-.M a-6 S3 032 cJS. Jur>£ 4-3338 A/? <21.6/6 638 o7z J u l . 4-7 538 ZU& r/M m f o</Z 22*16/ 049- 0,73 f 7-731 w m 021 fa/3 o S3 6>>tt HZ Sept. 6,34 S e t . ft./30 033 M i h/z Mffl • / O'ts 033- N o v . 4-4,9f.T /H75 6,23} irts c,42. V - -eStabt^Kwut of the. co-^p, ftoweve/, a$ fay <u November MtVMe. b«j iK tW Htm A*t . S ^ t IVo\) pfeC Wb /Way. Apjl M a y List oj-MgnM*) $foUs&{* of C^^ii^4 NuAMba^c-f prlscrxe/fs w/gvfcfed ^ ^•II6 j ? . / / J . , J * . W . f M 3 f f . / z o / s r . / / 7 a^d OtHeW ( M ^ 5 7: ? 3"?,02f teW? o FS3 4-2/. U-z. Mrs 77-737 K 3 3f?o 'Z&1U / f s . s~tt 27ZU3 224-, y o Z23- 220 / t f j / z •9-/0. /33 J-fo. 7/F 7/3 /£•/ Stf / ? / . 121 T o "Dm, M i l l <7?3, 2 fO 7* 4. f7j_ s n w e m / t s ? / / 99-9 f f [• otro i e £ L J t / 3 7/0,210 © c £ 4-S-/30 732,37!; 72f.cS/ T o t a l 37779(~7 z m / 7 3 9272, 09/ M C . No. 2 , ! /Ist of fcinJ ofVrisoners o{ d / s e a - s t ^ 'm Tb< ohe.K / tf •22Ai-y %u<r JrtJL Vy-fr •uLtl-.i- 1U+JL H J "V > J ft « ? / J > / 1/ IAS) esvt Ztsiu U/ J3S- / TO/ J4 a? 142' nil Zfr? 3/2, J./4-c J 2. 5 /iZ > • / nJ /> ?. op 2. ijj $4.2 i •f f A*/ /. ??S z 7 } JU^^tsMrJL^ 1 f Hi / /J n /u h / t z /fi" m 92)' / 2J. 'hoUUiAJls j' j V ; t j ftzLu,, /J* u —'r- 7 -2 0! } J <r • / / /Of jr 2L — Ao/4^ X.3U r /9- -4 j-^t^unJt' P . •» // / Z/2. A 4ft ? F tf /H J zr ?TJ / /. A? A y/o 2o.36<> 2.3c J v ^ / •2.1+1% AZ?t ^vM. Gt^sUJ u <111 s~ ? l/jyw./x^'jj Qj's, Mrtut-a^ 7 C . X'J ^ * / /1\ f<J6 r*^. a.— / Z-? - jftv* 4-0 f r-tJ* f r f— C. 0*/3 " 7 /ZG . (IXJkpsv ̂ r) .jif O rrffl- -t / T! Sx.hi. /st tLZZ? < / ? / t f. ru. 3 JJM. V ' / ST) , ^ 3/ v« / / i/, .. . i . - (uLs,^ Z. . i o / 2 /Zf / JT 2~ ' •(zdMYuJi ij . ' // 7 /3<A ft W r,m ' /it rt> t* Z.9 o • ^ SCL^/WJ^G,*. 'jjy^, itfrCA s. )'o /3 Z " / - b? ^LJS- 2-37 /// Ttr /j> /W/7.. .,( i. . // /a 2.3.7*1 " 11 * j.sy/ jlp tffte: % ToJ^J i M Jbciry&itA. P ^ i J, 22J /// E n c i . N o L i S t o f |< ;n<l of f>his»ners°f (i*Burm<0 Wit's p ntiSt Qcto b e r i H 3 Karros of Disease s* to ftod/cuid I c 2. S D'664 Se Old M ert C h o l e h a D / s e h t a/^K . Z M a /a hi 4 I n f l u e n z a . 8 e r f bef- i Pel a J M foiSon/rt^ M e n t i l PiSea^e i i i J fcejfj a t ^ y Disease pneumoh t4 pica his/ others If H e a H Acute lA±Li±L r. Di?-es- p i s e a s e A c l n t 6 . i t I < i es ca fca rrh 0 -thehi J ) i s e d s e VI 11, ^77 JoUl Ml JA X?} JJL li 1A IH-3 I / ! m JJL a m i jLkâ l JLhI / . ^ j j L I L L J j L J J / X) / W J£3 nr IW n? 7 * / / W X! m iz n y 231 1L ¥31 gjma/naj; T7 -3 /2Z y / 2° 2 a \ 5 E y e U i T k ^ s i ™ a AthUtio j M F u r u w e k Ctufw (A^Coumd)^ T!SSa£ bfclclSl flther P<£ U C S U ^ ^ J o W o t h e r / H y pc de V?yvi/C£> " E x t e r n ! s ^wu /n®- —tF7~ JTT r O t h e r 3=r o^fPH W.V" tj. otdjL- rJot-. r' e r [NewPaT/^ Tofcui "TyWjMCKT P-tacT 1 z^f-oS" h t t c l . N o . tf Fro ?>t JfL71 ifU-J (J st Showing rfonthlfr fiepoyfo / 'R&poriS ffo^ jriSoXe^} To Ju/f r / ? l f f o f fyjjenft *t fU$6Tt&r$ of \ °f ^ f C<L»f i* Til* < / ^jotc foU] prisons Wf Wat Worked (?i ThW fatierf in 8urm<{ roui tiu7>iber Rates t» r t>uj MUM b er KG-US TO 7oUI hlwn her fates ti TOF* I J^n, J f f l m l // 4ft J/>P #23)7 A o J j f J 2 . 7 / 0 Mar, t W o O f 2 A t/l f j L 7 Z 7 //; rf2 //, ftJ- j/< / Vf.vtf 2 7 J J A J OO a — JHU. -HA3J-/ J-o> O /2>fJJ JLJT J 7 July. 1 AJS 7 <7?J 72,/?2* 117./U J L U 7 A ? 5 ^t- A ? J Oct. tel. 2 L U J A f ^ N w , ITIF'I I 1 /II ?J'f ppr.. ' W.d 72. J A F77 J Gun, / • R J-J-3 if J A J f f J-J.3 Feb. / ^ J// J - J , o / 2 2 J 7 7 J-J.s <£3X / 7J // i ! .... _.,.. / - - J2 ¥ i M ofrd 7 H7l' /7, v-'J / 7, Jill*. fi0 / f M f M ¥ • • / J. Total J / J , / / J / M J 7 - Z £/?<?/ Ji/4 o ' O u t b r ^ / i cfeko/*r^ A p n j < > r ? w f i < V * r { tft/ie of /i JTttitit f/i>m6er y , 7 i 1st Prn&lt M*.\n\*f bwYz In Hi d ? jpn bi /3 a> K ^ bit* / prwek T^fiVYL / y S vy^s rAjwfl in t*^** fyyto- )n \A*t w fit 1 s t dtbckxi fyvrfch I * 1st A-tiuhlftffl p ? tj/\tUJ forth 1 i/A TfauW. V l A n ^ l A O ' 1 droke jn. Are<x P ^ * * 1 {row - j f c u * ^ J a*--? JiJp otfor A ye^s tHAivty > J ^ f Iff / U D 7 3 S 3 H m t k u / r ? S 3 O h Vfa^k Hiff^to o ) H*5f>Ta I frlsfin^rs rf YY«r Htyik/ i o> / ? / 3rd ffantll d v m o t / J sik franc A s - Tfiuf j v r D/ot* X 7A/S /istshews tft/ tfxj %QJober Atfer dik QSober fi**P4,**t fas Vof 3, faf as T h e f 1 < m e $ Th>3« /'ritK as fcreate no Hip*, //r 4 L i s T t f p e * d < ? f ft a r it Consffwf'/o'H o't '~ ftie fahfV* tilentn \ mcyft^]^ famUr cj pwJ of in a t ( / A / W A - •tf P^ff^^p tn ffkUjt*. fltsfa fyatek of f>,oM Ca*p 7 V f e | f < H 3 J M feb. /*? H a y . //? / J ? / 4PK .N 'tst^bisM -EsfctofeJ 2 " 7 ///' i jvlt 7 / / dijf s - j o / s ? s«pt / ort. (fCtC T o f c l t • tJOV. ^ 7 / Dec. / 7 ? F ^ b , T b f c 1 o? 7 — r i <=>>. ^ . / r / | i j £syu>1 H O 7 o-f: dj&d- Ft oM % fouxo 3 V/^/y^ I. V*- 1 > \s/fV) - '.'V / ( K A V U ^ ! pf* Ur>'A.~ P i f W T ^ T 4 otficti wvtfCaV- ntiyyi C<yyn/VVlA$CMWi> "taiAC I / 314c 3 * < P / Holloed Jr 73 / 5 Awtt- ralut I EVfWd / . 7 m C3 HtfllfW^ 7 r j l > rtoMivwi // Z /. 2- - 2 , / ^/MUM, ) 7 E H ^ W J f J 3 H e : z / / / / AmoDwc i / Mvr / / T U ^ A •A/ Hdia-nf / / * 2 . 1 Y I i t ^ A / / / Htfllw^ 2. /t> /? /ft? B ^ SoUfycr^ .FMlif*- // 0 ) /VÛ —' /J TotoJL ^•touM E W f M 2 , 7 / 2 / // - 7 O S U J fWland 7 2.6, / c f < £ 2 Z / /7 flMStjTi/ / • 6 ^eali** / / Sn^u TotaJL- Tp-fe/l W / SW/k 3 1 Not! .. faftf ra^ ^ ^ i d . ArfAl an.A $ aoJ&toi. swo /yu) dtfytftJ <7 O v F '^fV Samu ^fabUshtiMt T t r"'A*-6 i a 4 U e Tot&\'An»bei Of RO .W , w'ovK^fi D eads U • hcU- t'u, To t&L 'i Jibber X^rAke-Y"- Xf 1 / H 2 1 5-2 pt -2L a of — / eri// JO Os! 2- j JO M ' oao /o 04C oai /3 t o t <?/ ¥ JiVYu SlfiU A ? / - 2 0 O "Feb ' t 0s\2 > 1 Je>t7 .. / „ j M a r W O O Q 7 • T/ -JC" / 'pit* A 3 7 2-0 h o ^ l m y L A t f - 0*0./ w i J W i A / ^ r <?>/6 [ ^ ^ c f ^ k 3 jvt! H i /S3 Orxf A ^ j - 5 e f t 46/0? / m 0(X' M f r . . . . > 2 L M 3 HoV Aot> ? A ^ D <2C M ? A * o/ j w x JiVYt (hi 7 o M 1 in1) A J S fab' < £ 3 3 / * j ^ *4t> • 1 w b M a r A P V n o i 7 0 } 3 Os/3 M a / c J f JHw^ 4 3 o-zjr I do o*/jc r J ^o n o Os oq A H o^oq. I 3 7 OVOQ Total! i M O . - L/nc C L i J (?{3/\j Bna^cli fx. ( J (jv&ikdA ' jlfrM (r[ (jtttackfi Rutncfu KM (l^ym-tt flUftckf j fcflmcil /OS 3 , 3 0 ^ f^itleX^ (ItiAiJyu! | W | /o5 l&taJL D o c I Z O J u L y " 1 r t i Br^cl\0tiroH^utj / " Krn bm&tM v(t pAlAJrtuA. 1 t/T. ftttaA^l loo frf^ p / u ^ J i Jit. fyiMLfrtit \ m t t( [CtiuU E ^ M A L 5 ^ 0 I Bunt i 2 0 3 1-kJL ( t e k t U ' B ^ 2 1 1 W x I Vooo\ - x - x - — ^ X f l ^ w sI'uktMJ YbuvJUsL o/$A<Utfu ufe^v X f to •Opfe tojf K -X I V ^ ' " \ T ' l i M ' * ^ Ta U'r * *P * >5 I- ? X 1 • y ° * M l c ^ J f r & 1 - 4 I f j t • I<f tWickef I ' I X t/w TlilM iifitL^S^bn^Jx N W .3 fuy-C^e fst (hfcduuitifac'* . m | . ? 5 1 y no , m • IzZoJL • Poc t/W IVO. j C< 1st b/lOMcA V ^ Y S c & ^ t S U , <yVvl6»-<*-<X ^ . /I ~ /7 f*l It A t~\ S | HQ<$ 3 N / N C^Jjl^ cjAtk B ^ ^ i , -JU_. lOa^cfjii Hea^uakhu^' yCULMck 3 , 1 ? 0 htoxj^uAefiu. | $X O^XadJo W i . U 5 I C ^ O ('I i W f V ^ (ItfejlW p/i^Kcii / u g . ^ 5 X I T F v u l & jS'3 l&tc-Jl 12.0 |3o \ 3 o ^ 0 | | vWl/4-0 i L £ £ ± c ^ £ 1 uV 11 U- / O \ IS® j.0̂ ^ ^ —0—0-— \ A 't Do* ' LT' n Q V t y w y * oj- A c W e e E > J . D l a o y ^ N o . 2 ° ReMarK 14 W h o cUwoe, to (xsoev îV fke o Bills-i pUoe' . < M; r ordinal ^pelllM^ flu. s ® Bi l let placfi well e^ipped o f p U c & s ayid ^ u C o m m i s s a r y p l c ^ s p e l l tfuevn j , ^ m n , l e x e r s . •fb ( j ^ c j bUtf*** R a ^ Jlcd c^d B ^ t l r S W ^ iff tOnA, C e u ^ , ^ ' M * I • C [-1 p / i A o - T ^ v d tr/ u m ^ ' © +1 // • 4", ^^wji^j e>-tvAA.£vXmrv-v u h ^ . * ' K j C Y ^ r ( 1 1 = ) ^ I W I A J 1 • ® E x k™ fJ-UT^-SehcpJl^) , /re ooo , , , , x R ^ y * * . r ( ^ r 5 S <rfcv <r TA.IL (ydgiAaJl Doc. No. 2647 P a g e 1. C E R T I F I C A T E W . D . C . N o . I . P . S . N o . 1 5 Q 9 S t a t e m e n t of S o u r c e e n d A u t h e n t i c i t y I , e x - M a j o r G e n e r a l F a r u o K O N U M A h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I am o f f i c i a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h f i e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c a p a c i t y : V i c e O i o f o f t h e L e g a l R e s e a r c h S e c t i o n of t h e 1 s t D e m o b i l i z a t i o n B u r e a u and t h a t a s s n c h o f f i c i a l I h a v e c u s t o d y of t h e d o c u m e n t h e r e t o a t t a c h e d c o n s i s t i n g of 91 p a g e s and 1 1 a t t a c h e d t a b l e s i n t h e J a p a n e s e a n d 69 p a g e s i n t h e E n g l i s h , d a t e d u n k n o w n , 1 9 5 a n d d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s ? R e p o r t b y J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t ' o n t h e B u r m a - T h a i l a n d R a i l w a y . I f u r t h e r c e r t i f y t h a t t ^ e a t t a c h e d r e c o r d a n d d o c u m e n t is a n o f f i c i a l d o c u m e n t of t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t , a n d t v a t it is p a r t of t h e o f f i c i a l a r c h i v e s a n d f i l e s of t h e f o l l o w i n g n a m e d ministry o r d e p a r t m e n t ( s p e c i f y i n g a l s o t h e f i l e n u m b e r or c i t a t i o n , if a n y , o r a n y o t h e r o f f i c i a l d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e r e g u l a r l o c a t i o n of t ^ e d o c u m e n t i n t h e a r c h i v e s o r f i l e s ) : 1 s t D e m o b i l i z a t i o n B u r e a u ( f o r m e r W a r M i n i s t r y ) . S i g n e d a t T o k y o o n f ' i s 2 7 d a y of A u g , 1 9 4 6 . / s / F a r u o K o n u m a ( S e a l ) S i g n a t u r e of O f f i c i a l ( S e a l ) W i t n e s s : /s/K-mo I s h i b a s h i ( S e a l ) 1 s t D e m o b i l i z a t i o n B u r e a u O f f i c i a l C a p a c i t y S t a t e m e n t of O f f i c i a l P r o c u r e m e n t I , R i c V a r d F . L a r s h , h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I a m a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s of t ^ c S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r f o r t h e A l l i e d P o w e r s , a n d t ^ a t t h e a b o v e d e s c r i b e d d o c u m e n t w a s o b t a i n e d b y m e f r o m t h e a b o v e s i g n e d o f f i c i a l of t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e c o n d u c t of m y o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s . S i g n e d a t T o k y o o n t h i s 2 8 d a y o f A u g , 1 9 4 6 / s / R i c h a r d F . L a r s h N A M E W i t n e s s : / s / J . A . C u r t i s , 2d L t . L I I n v e s t i g a t o r . IPS O f f i c i a l C a p a c i t y / ^ / w t ^ r , . " " v 1 r ' " " " T h e E x c e r p t f r o m the D i a r y , ^ H JJr Hsuv^ _ F e b r u a r y 1 8 t h . J ± w a s a p p o i n t e d the ^oniTnpnder of the g u a r d ? in S i n g a p o r e a n d w a s o r d e r e d to c o m m a n d the 3rd__Bat.t.a1 ion,. 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t and the 1 s t B a t t a l i o n , 4 1 s t i n f a n t r y , and m i l i t a r y p o l i c e i n c l u d i n g a s s i s t a n t g e n d a r m e s , and to t a k e c h a r g e of the d e f e n s e of S i n g a p o r e . . A t 1 0 a . m . I r e p o r t e d at the a r m y h e a d o u a r t e r s and r e c e i v e d o r d e r s and i n s t r u c t i o n s on d e f e n s e and a l s o r e c e i v e d n e w s of the a t t a c h m e n t of the e x t r a s t a f f o f f i c e r , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l HAYASIII. , H / .i ' v I h a v e issued o r d e r s c o n c e r n i n g the g e n e r a l g u a r d i n g . F e b r u a r y 1 9 t h . I h e a d r e n o r t s f r o m the O H A S H I u n i t , m i l i t a r y p b l i c e , w h i c h w a s in c h a r g e of g u a r d i n g and i n s p e c t i o n of the c i t y . T h e p i l l a g i n g b y c i t i z e n s is s t i l l g o i n g o n . T o w a r d s e v e n i n g , the d e f e n s e h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d to F o r t C a n n i n g in the c i t y , the f o r m e r g e n e r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s of the B r i t i s h f o r c e s . / The s a m e e v e n i n g , a c c o r d i n g to i n s t r u c t i o n s , I i s s u e d orj-h^rs r e q u i r i n g the w h o l e s a l e r o u n d i n g " u p of u n d e s i r a b l e C T o n e s e r e s i d e n t s T wlHeli Is tu b e mifoTC'e'd f r o m the 2 1 s t . ' ^ 0 — • E s p e c i a l l y I u r g e d the gatherijig_j2iLJ]]iineM m a l c o n t e n t s in_o a c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t e d a r e a to "be s e p a r a t e d f r o m the , ^ , / T e s t of the c i t i z e n s . "> y F e b r u a r y 2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d . F e b r u a r y 2 3 r d . T h e w h o l e s a l e r o u n d ud w a s i n f o r c e d . A t 1 1 a . m . the m e e t i n g of c o m m a n d e r s w a s h e l d and w e h e a r d the v a r i o u s r e p o r t s f r o m e a c h p a r t y , on the c o n d i t i o n s of a r r e s t a n d l a t e r r e p o r t e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n to the a r m y c o m m a n d e r . Doc. No. 2647 Page 2. F e b r u a r y 2 4 t h . F r o m t o d a y , e x t e n d i n g o v e r t h r e e d a y s , t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e b r a n c h d i r e c t o r s o f the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s is to b e h e l d . I h a v e t o d a y a t t e n d e d t h e m e e t i n g . F e b r u a r y 2 5 t h . T h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e f o r c e s m a d e a r o u n d of i n s p e c t i o n s , and e x a m i n e d t h e d e f e n s e s i t u a t i o n s in t h e c i t y . M a r c h 1 s t . I h a v e r e c e i v e d o r d e r s to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e g u a r d of C h a n g i d i s t r i c t f r o m t o d a y . T h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n , 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t w a s a s s i g n e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . M a r c h 4 t h . I h a v e r e c e i v e d a n o r d e r to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e d e f e n s e of t h e e n t i r e i s l a n d of S i n g a p o r e . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of the a r m y , I h a v e i s s u e d o r d e r s f o r t h e e f u g e e s in S i n g a p o r e to go b a c k f r o m w h e r e t h e y c a m e f r o m . M a r c h 5 t h . T 7e r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e g a r r i s o n on B i n t a n I s l a n d , t e l ' i n g of t h e l a n d i n g o f 1 , 0 0 0 D u t c h t r o o p s o n t h e n e i g h b o r i n g i s l a n d . I m m e d i a t e l y I d i s p a t c h e d t h e K A Y A S H I b a t t a l i o n ( t h e f o r m e r a s s i s t a n t m i l i t a r y p o l i c e ) o f t h e 1 8 t h D i v i s i o n . M a r c h 7 t h . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n , S t a f f - o f f i c e r K A Y A S H I w h o w a s a t t a c h e d t o u s , w a s o r d e r e d t o b e a t t a c h e d to t h e G u a r d D i v i s i o n . M a r c h 8 t h . S i n c e the g e n d a r m e s w e r e r e v e r t e d to t h e i r o r i g i n a l d u t i e s v;e h a v e g i v e n o r d e r s to b o t h a i r f o r c e s a n d r a i l w a y c o r p s f o r l o c a l d e f e n s e s . M a r c h 9 t h . I t b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e n e w s of l a n d i n g o f e n e m y o n B i n t a n I s l a n d a n d i t s v i c i n i t y w a s false., H A Y A S H I b a t t a l i o n d i s p a t c h e d to t h e s p o t r e t u r n e d h e r e t o d a y . Doc. No. 2647 Page 3 . M a r c h H t h . T h e b r i g a d e h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d t h e 4 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t h a v e b e e n d e c i d e d t o b e "used f o r s o m e o t h e r p u r p o s e s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e n e w d u t i e s , a n d t o d a y I h a v e .received a n u n o f f i c i a l a n n o u n c e m e n t to p r e p a r e f o r t h i s . M a r c h 1 7 t h . EandJjag—over the d e f e n s e d u t i e s .to t h e s u c c e e d i n g b r i g a d c o m m a n d e r , 'Major G e n e r a l S U G I U R A b e g a n . M a r c h 1 8 t h . A t n o o n , t h e r e l i e f o f t h e d e f e n s e w a s c o m p l e t e d . Doc * No. 2647 Page 4 . E x t r a c t s f r o m t h e d i a r y of M a j o r G e n e r a l K A W A M D R A , t h e 9 t h I n f a n t r y B r i g a d e C o m m a n d e r . F e b r u a r y 1 6 . D e s p a t c h e d M a j o r K O B A Y A S H I a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 0 o f f i c e r s a n d m e n u n d e r h i s c o m m a n d a s a n E m e r g e n c y M P u n i t to t h e R a f f l e s c o l l e g e b y 1 0 a . m „ . G o t a l l u n i t s to c l e a n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . T h i s d a y , d e s p a t c h e d the u n i t u n d e r M a j o r M I S H I B A ' s c o m m a n d to h a n d l e t h e P W s 1 m a t t e r s . F e b r u a r y 1 7 O u r h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d t o t h e C l u b h o u s e f o r the r e a s o n of i n c o n v e n i e n c e in c o m m a n d . L a t e a t n i g h t I w a s o r d e r e d t o t a k e c o m m a n d of b o t h b a t t a l i o n s o f t h e 1 1 t h and 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t s a n d t h e E m e r g e n c y IIP u n i t a s t h e n e w l y - a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r o f t h e S i n g a p o r e G u a r d F o r c e , a n d t o t a k e c h a r g e of t h e g u a r d i n g of t h e c i t y . F e b r u a r y 1 8 . P r e s e n t e d m y s e l f to A r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s a t 1 0 a . m . to r e - c e i v e the o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g m e to b e G u a r d F o r c e C o m m a n d e r . A t 1 2 a . m . I w e n t to R a f f l e s C o l l e g e a n d i s s u e d t h e n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s . S t a f f O f f i c e r H A Y A S H I w a s a s s i g n e d to m e . F e b r u a r y 19« I n s p e c t e d t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e c i t y f r o m 1 0 a . m . L i s t e n e d to t h e r e p o r t c o n c e r n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n s f r o m M P U n i t C o m m a n d e r O I S H I a n d h i s m e n . ( p . l ) fw^.q im-nT'<=>Rspfl w i t h the i m n c r f e c t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n o f o u r o f f i c e r s a n d m e n . T ~ —- — I n t h e e v e n i n g , o u r h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d to F o r t C a r n i n g . I s s u e d a n o r d e r to mak-? who"! j noii^nt_ C h i n e a a T T r o m t h e 2 1 s t and t h e r e b y a d v o c a t e d t h e i r a s s e m b l y in a c e r t a i n a r e a . Doc * No. 2647 Page 5. F e b r u a r y 2 0 . H e l d a m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e for t h o s e w h o l a i d d o w n t h e i r l i v e s a n d a c e r e m o n y o f a w a r d i n g c e r t i f i c a t e s of m e r i t . F e b r u a r y 2 1 . S t a r t e d t h e w h o l e s l a e a r r p ^ . g t o d a y . H e l d a m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e I n t h e D i v i s i o n . L a t e r , i n s p e c t e d the s i t u a t i o n s of s e a r c h i n g b y t h e C e n t r a l A r e a U n i t . F e b r u a r y 2 2 . I n t h e m o r n i n g , i n s p e c t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n s _ o f t h e E a s t AreaJLInjjL r _tim c a m p f o r B r i t i s h n o n - c o m b a t a n t s a n d t h e N o r t h Area] - I n t h e a f t e r n o o n , a t t e n d e d t h e m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e o f t h e O K A B E U n i t a n d l a t e r i n s p e c t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n s of t h e C e n t r a l Area. U n i t . F e b r u a r y 2 3 . H e l d a U n i t C o m m a n d e r m e e t i n g f r o m 1 1 a . m . a n d l i s t e n e d to the r e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n s of s e a r c h i n g to t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h o s e w h o h a d b e e n p u n i s h e d n u m b e r e d approximateJjE- 5 , 0 0 0 w h i c h i m p o r t a n t p e r s o n s a r e c o n t i n u i n g _ t O — h s - d a t a i n e t a n d a r e u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I n t h e e v e n i n g , w a s i n v i t e d to t h e d i n n e r i n the D i v i s i o n . H e a r d t h a t t h e D i v i s i o n w i l l s h o r t l y b e d i s p e r s e d to v a r i o u s a r e a s . It w a s a f a r e w e l l p a r t y f o r m e . M e m o r y : It is i n m y m e m o r y t h a t on t h e 2 3 r d I w e n t to t h e A r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s to r e p o r t a f t e r the U n i t C o m m a n d e r M e e t i n g h a d a d j o u r n e d . F e b r u a r y 2 4 . 2 5 . 2 6 . H e l d a m e e t i n g of c M e f s of t h e M i l i t a r y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t o n 2 5 t h , t h e A r m y C o m m a n d e r c a l l e d o n u s d u r i n g h i s i n s p e c t i o n t o u r . O n 26th, t h e A r m y C o m m a n d e r g a v e a s p e e c h to the e f f e c t t h a t w e s h o u l d t a k e u p a f a r m o r e p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e , i n s t e a d of t h e h e r e t o f o r e i n t e r n a l g u i d a n c e . M a r c h 1 . F r o m t h i s d a y , t h e g u a r d i n g o f C h a n g i w a s t a k e n o v e r b y t h e 3 r d D i v i s i o n , 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t . Doc. No. 2647 Page 6 . M a r c h 2 . I n s p e c t e d t h e P W s in C h a n g i . T o d a y , c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e c u r i t y p r e c a u t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e S h o n a n I s l a n d , I g a v e n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s . M a r c h 4 . T h e g u a r d i n g u n i t s t h r o u g h o u t S h o n a n I s l a n d w e r e c h a n g e d , at 1 2 p . m . t o d a y . F r o m t h i s d a y , o r d e r e d t h e r e f u g e e s to l e a v e t h e p l a c e . M a r c h 5 . E a r l y in t h e m o r n i n g I r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m n a t i v e s t h a t a b o u t o n e t h o u s a n d D u t c h t r o o p s h a d l a n d e d f r o m B i n t a n g I s l a n d , so I o r d e r e d t h e i n c r e a s e b y h a l f of t h e H A Y A S H I B a t t a l i o n o f t h e 8 t h D i v i s i o n , i n o r d e r to p r e p a r e f o r t h e i r s u p p r e s s i o n . O n t h e 6 t h w e l e a r n e d t h a t it w a s a f a l s e a l a r m . M a r c h 7 . H A Y A S H I c h a n g e d h i s p o s i t i o n a s a s t a f f o n t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n u n e x p e c t e d l y . M a r c h 8 . A c c o r d i n g to t h e e n a c t m e n t o f the M . P . S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , I o r d e r e d t h a t s t a t u s of M . P . s be c h a n g e d so t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e d i s p a t c h e d and h o l d a n a d d i t i o n a l p o s t in e v e r y D i s t r i c t d e t a c h m e n t . M a r c h 9 . T h e H A Y A S H I B a t t a l i o n i n B i n t a n g I s l a n d r e t u r n e d . M a r c h 1 1 . P a s t 1 2 o ' c l o c k a c a p t u r e d P o w d e r M a g a z i n e e x p l o d e d . T o p r e v e n t p l o t t i n g b y r e b e l s , w e e n f o r c e d a n e m e r g e n c y g u a r d , a n d d i d o u r b e s t t o r e l i e v e t h e r e f u g e e s . M ^ c h 1 1 . T o d a y I a n d t h e 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t r e c e i v e d a n A r m y O r d e r t o d e p a r t a g a i n in t h e n e a r f u t u r e to f u l f i l l n e w d u t i e s . M a r c h 1 4 . F o r t h e p u r p o s e of g a t h e r i n g t h e t r o o p s t o g e t h e r , I i s s u e d a n o r d e r t h a t I C H I K A W A B a t t a l i o n s h o u l d s u b s t i t u t e i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f e m e r g e n c y g u a r d f r o m t h e 1 5 t h irst. Doc * No. 2647 Page 7 . M a r c h 1 6 . M a j o r G e n e r a l S U G I U R A a r r i v e d at S i n g a p o r e . M a r c h 1 7 . T r a n s f e r of d u t i e s . M a r c h 1 8 . T h e r e l i e f f i n i s h e d a t 1 2 , a n d I r e p o r t e d to t h e C o m m a n d e r in C h i e f a b o u t i t . Doc. Wo. 2647 Page 8 . Gibs-tracts of the S u b j e c t s C o n c e r n e d ) f r o m t h e " G r e a t e r E a s t A s i a t i c T o p S e c r e t O p e r a t i o n ' D i a r y of t h e I m p e r i a l H e a d c u a r t e r s T h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e w h a t w e r e r e p o r t e d to t h e I m p e r i a l H e a d q u a r t e r s b y t h e 2 5 t h A r m y , e x c e p t i n g t h e 2nd c l a u s e o f M a r c h 1 3 t h , Ytrhich is tho r e p o r t f r o m t h e S o u t h e r n G e n e r a l A r m y . F e b r u a r y 7 . T h e a r m y e n t e r s a t o n c e i n t o t h e n e x t o p e r a t i o n w i t h o u t the c e r e m o n y of t r i u m p h a l e n t r y . F e b r u a r y 1 8 . 1 . T h e a r m y m a d e a b o u t t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s of i n f a n t r y a n d t h e s e c o n d f i e l d g e n d a r m e r i e u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of B r i g a d i o : K A ^ A M U R A m o u n t g u a r d o v e r t h e c i t y o f S i n g a p o r e , and the m a i n f o r c e l o c a t e d in i t s v i c i n i t y a r e e n g a g i n g i n c l e a n i n g t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e c o m i n g o p e r a t i o n . 2 . E a c h o n e c o m p a n y of 5 D s u c c e s s f u l l y l a n d e d o n t h e i s l a n d s " B u k u m " a n d " S a m b o . " / p h o n e t i c e q u i v a l e n t s / F e b r u a r y 2 0 . S A S A K I B a t t a l i o n o f 5 D l a n d e d o n B i n t a n g I s l a n d / w i t h o u t b l e e d i n g . F e b r u a r y 2 1 . T h e r e a r e f a i r l y m a n y v o l u n t e e r s _ a n d . M a l a y a n s jgho j o i n e d the e n e m y _ L s — f o r c ^ a s a v o l u n t e e r a r m y a n d t h e f i f t h c o l u m n . T h e a r m y is n o w i n s e a r c h of t h e m . T h o s p w h o w e r e t a k e n in s o o n a f t e r t h e f a l l of f S i n g a p o r e : \l6 C h i n e s e v o l u n t e e r s , 3 6 0 M a l a y a n v o l u n t e e r s ^ ? F e b r u a r y 2 4 . 2 5 . 2 6 . O n t h i s o c c a s i o n w h e n t h e m a i n o p e r a t i o n o f M a l a y h a s c o m e to a n e n d , a m e e t i n g of t h e h e a d o f f i c i a l s o f t h e b r a n c h e s of the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e n t w a s h e l d . F e b r u a r y 2 7 . v r i t h c a p t i v e s and c a p t u r e d n r m g vin q n r g a n i gp^^fclya^ S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d D e f e n s e C o r p s . A l l of t h e s e v e n t y t h o u s a n d r Doc * No. 2647 Page 9 . of c a p t i v e s c a n n o t b e c o n s u m e d b v t h i s a r m y . T h e a r m y w i s h e s t o u s e t h e m d i s p e r s e d in e a c h n e c e s s a r y f i e l d , and i m m e d i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n is d e s i r e d . F e b r u a r y 2 8 . T h e s t a t e of a c t i v i t i e s of " d e G a u l l e " f a c t i o n h e r e is n o w b e i n g c l a r i f i e d b y a n d b y . " G l a i r e , " / p h o n e t i c / a J e w , " R e m a n l , " / p h o n e t i c / a s p y of t h e m i l i t a r y c o m m i t t e e of the "de G a u l l e " f a c t i o n and " C a u s e l l e , " / p h o n e t i c / the M a n a g e r of the F r e n c h I n d o - C h i n e s e B a n k ; h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d to i n t e r n m e n t and i n a u i r y . M a r c h 1 . t A s it h a s s e r i o u s i n f l u e n c e o n t h e f u t u r e a c t i o n of t h e jarmy, w e w i s h to k n o w if y o u h a v e a n i n t e n t i o n to m o v e t h e Ipresent c a p t i v e s h e r e to a n y o t h e r p l a c e s t h a n M a l a y P e n i n s u l a p r e s e n t , 8 5 , 0 0 0 c a p t i v e s . M a r c h 3 . T h e o c c u p a t i o n o f S i n g a p o r e is g o i n g s m o o t h l y and t h e o c c u p a t i o n b u s i n e s s b y c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s w a s c o m p l e t e d a t t h e end o f F e b r u a r y . S t a t e of a f f a i r s i n t h e c i t y of S i n g a p o r e : S o o n a f t e r the o c c u p a t i o n , w e g r r e s t e d a n d e x e c u t e d a b o u t d e l i n q u e n t p e r s o n s a s t h e f i r s t c l e a r i n g and., r u r t n e r , w e a r e p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e n e x t c l e a r i n g . T h e a p p e a s i n g c a m p a i g n to t h e c i t i z e n s is a s f o l l o w s (the f o l l o w i n g : c o n c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n c y ) . T h e m o v e m e n t of the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n s h a s b e e n t a k i n g its r e g u l a r c o u r s e . M n r c h 1 3 . T h e m a i n f o r c e s u c c e e d e d in l a n d i n g a t 0 7 0 0 a n d Y O S F I D A D e t a c h m e n t , a t 0 5 4 0 . j 2 . T h e o p e r a t i o n o r d e r of t h e S o u t h e r n G e n e r a l A r m y N o . 8 5 : T h e h e a d of t h e T O H I c o r p s s h a l l h a v e t h e 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y , 2 S e c t i o n / 26 P s u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of t h e C h i e f of 9 t h i n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n e n t e r u n d e r the c o m m a n d of t h e h e a d of t h e W A T A R I c o r p s . M a r c h 1 7 . S i n c e thn n n r o p n f w i o n t nf ifelav op P: R a t INN^.-WP h a v e k e e n w a t c h i n g s t r i c t l y t h e m o v e m e n t o f t h e _ C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s . Ai'ter t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n of S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d , t h e i r JLnte2^s±_Jj2 J an a n M a b a w i InL'JiibiP rggfcr—At the same tltne, rlgapous- m e a s u r e s w e r e a d o p t e d t o s u c h a n t i - J a n a n e s e C h i n e s e a s t h e Doc. 2647 P a g e 1 Q . v o l u n t e e r s . T h u s , t h e i r m o v e m e n t h a s t a k e n d e c i s i v e d i r e c t i o n T h a t i s , t h e y t a k e a n a t t i t u d e to s u b m i t t h e i r l i v e s , p r o p e r - t i e s a n d a l l t h e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s to t h e J a p a n e s e a r m y a n d to w a i t p e n i t e n t i a l l y f o r a n y o r d e r s , k e e p i n g t h e s e t h i n g s f o r t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y p r o p o s e t h a t If the_ c o m m a n d e r o f t h e J a p a n e s e A r m y w o u l d ^ x e m p J i _ i h ^ m _ f r o m d e a t h a n d would_ g i v e t h e m a f a v o r to c a r r y o n t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n s a t e a s e , £iiey_ w o u l d s w e a r t h e i r . f\ 1 t.nrL£__faitETulness "and e c o n o m i c a l c o n t r i - ' b u t i o n a n d - m i l d c o n t r i b u t e o n e h a l f o f t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s to t h e J a p a n e s e n r m y ^ - A s t o t h e o f f e r i n g of o n e h a l f of t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s ^ w.£_ajoeept o n l y t h e i r a n d i n s t e a d of o n e _ h a l f w e r e c e i v e c a s h of f i f t y m i l l i o n y e n . W i t h t h e f o r e - ~ g o i n g s , t h e f i r i t step of t h e m e a s u r e s t o w a r d t h e C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s i n M a l a y is c o m p l e t e d . N e x t , t h e s e c o n d m e a n s s h a l l v e t a k e n . M a r c h 1 8 . F r o m C o l o n e l T s u j i : I i n t e n d to t a k e m y p o s t t h e r e a f t e r t h e i n s p e c t i o n of b a t t l e c o n d i t i o n of B u r m a a n d P h i l i p p i n e t h e a t r e a b o u t t h e l a t t e r p a r t of M a r c h . A p r i l 1 0 . T h o u g h t h e p u b l i c p e a c e of M a l a y P e n i n s u l a is g o i n g to r e c o v e r b y t h e a c t i v i t i e s of r e s p e c t i v e g u a r d i n g u n i t s , s t i l l , s e c r e t m o v e m e n t s of C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s he: e h a v e n o t e n t l r e l y c e a s e d yet". M a r c h 2 £ . Approximately 1,500 persons in Celenban and Malacca \rr:cc captured at once and a lot of arms were confiscated, and the na.jorfty '̂ho were captured were released after investi gatior" M a r c h 2 9 . (At the d i s t a n c e of 1 6 k . m . t o the n o r t h of K w a n t a n ) The_ d e n o f c o m m u n i s t s w a s ^ r i p p l e d a n + i r " l y 'ind T 5 n f > 1 * t < ; . m e m b e r s w e r e c a p t u r e d ("the l e a d e r c o m m i t t e d s u i c i d e ) at'. 1 tile - end of M a r c h . A t t h e l o c a t i o n of 1 5 k . m . to t h e s o u t h - e a s t of T Cagayan a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 0 h i d i n g c o m n u n i s t s a r e b e i n g s e a r c h e d w i t h the a t t e m p t of o u s t i n g . Doc , No., 26A-7 Page 11 A p r i l 5 . FJ.fty- t h r e e a n t i - J a p a n e s e r a d i c a l s w e r e c a p t u r e d a t T a i p i n . A t P e n a n , ~ W a r e "to m a k e a r o u n d u p b e f o r e l o n g . A p r i l 1 6 . A s t h e r e s u l t of the s e a r c h b y o u r G e n d a r m e r i e , w e h a v e d i s c l o s e d t h e p l o t m o v e m e n t of B r i t i s h b a t t l e b e a t e n r e m a i n i n g s o l d i e r s and a c e r t a i n p a r t y of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s (it s e e m s to b e u n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of C H 2 N G - C H I E H - M I N ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , a f t e r t h e f u r t h e r s e a r c h i n g o u t o f t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e w i r e l e s s a p p a r a t u s , w e e x p e c t to c a p t u r e t h i s g r o u p . Doc. JTo. 2647 Page 12 SECRET A proccs-verbal concerning the punishment of Chinese residents in Singapore 3 y the 4th unit 23 Oct . , 1945 1 . Circumstances of manoeuvres by Chinese residents in tho Malay Campaij During the MALAY camoai , Chinese residents vers very active in their manoeuvres from the beginning to the end around "he battle-fields and especially in the rear, obstructing our campaign and causing us much difficulty . Thai is to say. near the battle-fields they chiefly communi- cated with the enemy, consequently our plan ox operation* was perceived enemy, placing us in a r*ry di sadvar tagei/us tm>«3 bion; or areas where our troops were concentrated were oonbarded. thus it was act only oncc that our troops had to suffer meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our com- missary lines were attacked, "lines of communication, military commnicat lines were destroyed, and our military materials damaged, delaying the arrival of those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-fields, consequently often the MALAY campaign, which necessitated speed, was ob- structed end made diff icult . Examples are as follows: 1 . Toward the end of December, 1941, in a battle near KAMPAE. /pho- netic / , signal bombs were fired at night near our reserve artillery position, and immediately /our position/ was showed with enemy shells, causing many useless sacrifices on our side. We searched the vicinity and captured two Chinese residents at one place, and found out that most of the activities were done by the Chinese residents, (a part by British troops). ' 2 . In the above battle, a battalion of the A1JD0 regiment intending to cut offEAMPAB /phonetic/ from the west, made a detour at night, but a signal shell was fired from a village which was passed. Consequently, not only was our plan discovered, making our rear isolation unsuccessful but when crossing the river in the southwest of KAMFAB. /phonetic/(around the place were swampy lands,) they were met by a fierce enemy counter- attack. Thus our operations went to pieces and we suffered a great loss Immediately after the signal bomb was fired , about one company searched the village and captured a Chinese who failed to escape. . Accordingly we found that the incident was done by the Chinese residents. 3 . At the battles near Gemas /phonetic/ and Segamat /phonetic/ in the middle of January, 1942; at KOLAS /phonetic/ , YOH&PEHG- /phonetic/ an BATU PAEAT /phonetic/ in the end of January of the same year; at Singapo in the beginning and middle of February of the same year, signal bombs were incessantly f ired . Artillery positions, reserve units and higher Doc. N©, 2647 Page 13 command posts were suddenly bombarded, causing many meaningless casualties. It was discovered that most of these acts were committed by the Chinese residents. 4 . When the enemy attacked Kualarunapin /phonetic/ by air at night in the middle of January, 1942. a signal chell was fired from the aero- drome of Kualarumpun /phir otic/, using this as a target the enemy "bombed /the aerodrome/, burning r.e/sra1 our planes, and causing many casualties among the troopr, As the rc3U.lt- of the capture of Chinese residents, it was disclosed that the signal .shells were fired by Ciiinese residents. 5 . In the middle of January 1942, whan the Imperial Guard Division was crossing the River Mrarh /phonetic/ , Chinese residents indicated the point to be crossou and dod the night-bombing of the enemy planes, con- sequently crossing the ravar waa extremely difficult and with a great loss. 6 . Between ir>e "-idala and end of January,- 1942, during the battle around Malacca and Batoboh&to /phonetic/ , in which the Imperial Guard Division is involved, Chinese residents communicated with enemy submarines on the sea of MaJacia <?nd other then assisting the smuggling, guiding and protecting of soies from the submarines, they indicated the location of our units and made it easier and more advantageous for naval bombardment from ships in the strai'-n of Malacca. As a result of the above bombardment the operations of the Imperial Guard Division was not only made extremely difficult and disadvantageous, but also a large amount of munitions and weapons were damaged and many casualties among the troops. 7 . While the OGAKI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the ET.W. in the fighting around BATCBAHATO /phonetic/ toward the end of Jan . , 1942, was discovered as a result of the Chinese residents com- munications with the enemy. Subsequently, they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack and becoming isolated, the battalion commander and most of the men wero killed. 8 . In the end of December, 1941, in a forest to the north of Taipin /phonetic/ , a hundred odd armed Chinese residents were planning to disrupt our supply lines, and burn our munitions. As this was discovered before- hand, /the area/ was cleared of Chinese residents. 9 . In the middle and end of January, 1942, the Chinese residents often felled trees and laid them across the road between GEMAS-SSRENGBAN /phonetic/ and EABIS-SEGAKATT /phonetic/ , so that our vehicle transporta- tion was stopped, and making good use of these opportunities fired from the forests on both sides. As a result many men were killed, the valuable munitions being stolen, thus preventing munitions being sent forward, and made our operations very d i f f icult . . 10. There were often destruction of the railroads, but as the des- truction of the railroad in the forest south of IBO /phonetic/ and in the Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 14 forest "between S5R3HG-Bi.il and. G-3MAS /phonetic/ happened just at the tine when munitions were to "be forwarded most urgently for the Singapore cam- paign, it had a tremendous effect. As a result, not only did the comment ment of the Singapore campaign have to "be postponed from the 3th Feb. to the 9th Feb . , "out the forwarding of supplies, especially ammunition, aftc the commencement of the campaign did not operate as desired. Therefore front line ammunition was so scarce that temporarily the campaign was endangered — /omitted/ — and "brought about — /omitted/ . In each case of obstruction the offender was captured and it was discovered that thin was mainly the work of Chinese residents. 11. There were numerous cases of the destruction of military commu- nication lines that there was noi time to arrest the culprits. The aforementioned are only a few examples, the manoeuvres of the insurgent Chinese residents during the MALAY campaign are beyond description and have cut deep down into the heart of our troops. 2 . The state of public peace in and around Singapore after the surrende of the British forces. The British forces in Singapore surrendered or. the 15th of February and the island immediately alter tne fighting actioffs was covered with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to be noted is the fact that there was a two-three day gap between the day of the British surrender and the day of the Japanese entry into that city. Thus, during this interval^ implements^of war such a3 riflep, ammunitions, machine'gunr.7 revolvers, ~i7frR^^^THpT-mt'^ITgKt automobiles.. etc. "word moved "away and concealed in the houses of Chinese and natives. Such state became clear gradually, and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic wirea running between the headquarters of al 1 the army corps in the suburbs and the "city were cut off Intentionally rendering it impossible to mair* t«nr"fEe communication between them. An& it became clear that the C h i n c h in the suburbs or_in the urban districts of the city plundered provision clothes and fuel, etc. and concealed thone things in their store-houses* or above the ceiling or under the floor of individual houses, etc. In the meanwhile, what constituted our primary consideration wan th it was impending to draft a major proportion from our forces to prepare for tho approaching operation, and that we were to jnaintain the public ggace in the occupied area, with a minor force. Theadvance towards the south of our arm;'- was very speedy. On the other hand, there were still number of bases in the went coa.t of Mpl&v peninsula left for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on tcp of this, the hostile Chinese disperse in the Ehio islands., south of Singapore, lingu island and the Ananbu islands after the fall of Singapore seeaedTTo"be ^reoaricg forI.tiielx._fu action in coo-oeration with their comrades in Singapore and Malay ~o en ins- and the runorg about the British rcinforjements to arrive were circulate So we feel keenly the necessity to secure -public peace with some drastic measure and control to check the false rumors in Singapore island. (Seference). Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 15 Tiie status of the activities of De Gaulle' s group was likely to hav: been made clear gradually by the 28th of February; Klay /phonetic/ , a jei Lumor /phonemic/, a spy of the military commission of the DeGaulie'o party, and Coceil /phonetic/ , the manager of the French Indiai China Bank, were then arrested and detained, 3 . Regarding investigation and execution of Chinese residents in "Singa- pore" . Under the consideration that simultaneous advance of the various corps of the expeditionary forces into the city of Singapore should rather cause a difficulty in keeping pâ p-p. and nfdey of the city, the military order was given, on Feb. 17, to detail a force in a size of noarlythree infantry battalions plus the 2nd detachment of Field Milita' Tolice~/T5I-l?5lfIl7 under thi~ command of .%t1or-General K A ^ M U g i ^ commagde~ of^the <jth Infantry Bngade";~while~th¥ ma,jor part of the military opera- tion~forces was~placed back to station at the northern suburb of 11S" city, thus to have only small number of the unit put on duty for the gue of the city. The said guard commander, on the following day, v iz . the 1 visited the General Headquarters and did the required liaison. ( l ) Posting The posting at the beginning was as shown on the attached map showing the status of disposition, but .afterward the guard was_gxt£iide&-all__9ver tiie_islandson March 2nd with a movement of military strengths occurring since then. (a) Search for hostile Chinese. The investigation was executed during the_4 days period from Feb. 17 to 20 mainly on the basis of " a _list of the anti-Japanese Chinese" which had been secured at "IjlQi" and with reference to search materials of the roster of the detective bureav criminal lists of the Police Office and the statement made by rescued Japangge. The police officials of the Malay detective bureau -were caused to attend to this"occasion.^ (b) The number of persons searched during the first series lasting for 3 days, Feb. 21-23. about 5 ,000 -persons; the second series, Feb. 18-March 3, about 1 , 500 personr, ; tte third series at the end of March, about 300 perrons. Among them, about 2 ,000 persons were releasee1 ^.fter the investigation. (c) Reason for the search and the execution. There exists no written order p-iven to the Guard Commander; ib is , however, almost cler that the Guard Commander had issued orders to cope with the idea of the Army, and in the light of the situation of the mopping up operation throughout the MALAY peninsula, it is clear thac tne Guard Commander did not is&e orders based on his c«m personal view. It is , however, vej doubtful whether the mass execution ox Ch:ne^e was due to the order of ihe^commancLer-in-caiel' or not_j_____ ~~ Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e As Lieutenant-Colonel KAYASHI who was Chief of Staff in charge at that time died on the f ield , it is impossible to find the fact. / (d) Execution of the punishment. The objectives of the punish- fment constitute mainly those who communicatecT~secretly with the~~ener.iy; J those wno lea. the hostile DomDing of our airf i m d s : those who diet maricr J of targets of artillery gun f ire ; those who disturbed rear transport li \ those who did not change the" attitr.de 'Apposition to Japan and self confessed t"He continuance of the act to oppose Japan at our investigatlo These were the~laaders of" the Federated Association.of . Chinese Volunteer" / to oppose Japan, and member of Communists party in Malay;., those who ( vfeir£ ^Uhished'strictly'Tota.l about 5 ,000 up to t,ha._end of Marckt___ 4 . The Present Situation of Regulating Operation in MALAYA Peninsula. (1) The Present Situation of the Public Peace in MALAYA Peninsula. We have already mentioned the conditions of the Chinese manoeuvring during our MALAYA operation. Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE many . anti-Japan Chinese have entered secretly into cities and jungles and de- v d a r i n g com-iunism and communicating with each other, some of them have cgntittued to be active in order to.develop the systematic anti-Japan movement under the strict and strong system and try hard to obtain \teapo' ammunition, provisi5n&+-. nqpp.y ard merbRTi while looting our stock of weapons obtained in tfte battle f ield , killing secretly our soldiers and officers, and were agting independently in destroying, the networks of communications and_traffic and killing^.threatening, looting good citize V ThougiTtho battle was over there was great anxiety about the public peac in MALAYA. (2) The Present Situation of Regulating Operation. Our Army has recognized the importance and necessity of subjugation operations after the surrender of SINGAPORE and till nearly the end of February despatched the 18th Division to "JOHORE" Province, the 5th Divi- sion to other provinces in MALAYA outside of "JOHORE" Province from SINGAPORE Island and made each of them stand guard over the public peace in the district in charge also carrying out the subjugation operation against the anti-Japan Chinese. The 5th Division divided the districts in its charge into several parts and made detachments take charge of portion. "MALACCA" Province. "NEGRISEMBILAN" Province "SELANGOR" Province 11th Infantry Regiment 41st Inf . Reg . , 5th Artillery Regiment, 5th Transport Regiment Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e "P3RAH" Province "PAHAm" Province "KEDAH" Province, 42rwi Inf . Reg. 5th. Cavalry Regiment "TREFGCAHU" Province, "ZEIAETAN" Province 21st Inf . Reg. The 5th and 18th Division commenced the subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of Karch. Carrying out the research and subjugatior of anti-Japan Chinese in cities and jungles we caught wicked Chinese till the end of April; about 1 ,000 in "J0H0R3" Province, about 1 ,500 in " S S S a - M " , "MALACCA", about 300 in "SELA1TG0R", about 100 in "P"2RAE" , abo 50 in '"I AHAIG-", and about 200 in "KEDAE" and "PENANG", and confiscated many weapons, but after investigation released most of them the same way everywhere. There were, however, many cases in which at the arrest tne Chinese resisted by firing guns, which induced us to return fire and per- sons on both sides were injured and killed . Many people (leaders) were .there who committed suicide, recognizing their unfavourable circumstances Doc. Ho. 2647 t Page 18 Since the "beginning of May also, the anti-Japan ?hine»e still con-^ 3d anti-Japan activities, hiding themselves from «he eyes of the J a p a n e s " e T ~ " a n 5 . h l i c peace was _oft£P. jeopardized. Our Army carriod on subjugations and tried to keep tho public peace, often traversing jungles and meeting with groat difficulties and suffering considerable damages, but never succeeded in entirely sweeping a m / the anti-Japan Chinese. The subjugation which is noted among those since May is that in the forest to tho north of KWAIA LOkPUR. Finding out a rsport that^abqulJiQO-- anti-Japan. Chinese were planning the assassInatTon_of_Japimin aa soliiora. and the'Hirrung of Japanese barracks, we sant a punit ivenforce to sub- jugate them, taking tne Initiative against them. A f ; e r a b a t t l e the defeated Chinese fled away deap into the forests. Ia this battle, the bodies left dead in the field numbered 200. (3) Conclusion. In short, the regulating operation in the Malay Peninsula was not only for tho Japaneso Army itself, but was an action for the purposo of guarding tho public peace which was carried on for the protoction of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens (including the ordinary Chinese, Malayans, Indians, etc.) and though it is to be rogrotted that tho circumstances in details, are not clear on account of lack of material it is plain enough that all those dead Chinese died by tho Jfcullets during tho battles of subjugations.During these difficult sub- jugations-a considerable number of victims appeared on our part also. V. About the handling of this investigation cf punishment of the Singapore Chinose. I . Tho enemy's protest has not yet come, but the reports concerning this problem is as follows: (1) The story by Maj5r-Mo»is-J2ti£ton /phonotic/ and Captain Thomas Ellis /phonotic/ "We wero pushed into freight-cars and brought to Siam, after tho feJLl of Singapore and wore used in the construction of the railroad between Bangkok and Mouimein. Many died on account of hunger and the tropic diseases, the medicines for which ware very scanty. According to the talk of a member of the Australian advance-party, all of 1840 in number except 34 members died before they reached the ppot 130 milos off to the wost. (2) The report sent from London on Sopt. 5. Tho announcement cf the terrible cruel actions of the Japanese toward tho prisoners of tho allied powers and those detained people have caused tho anxiety of thousands of families in the world. Every evening papers in London has Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e reported, "tho_Singaporo radio has said that when a comulote document is mado nublic^thc c'.vili?;d v.-or Id w i M "bo aga.in:-.t the cruel d.-ieda nf t.Vin Japanese. A Chinese wr s xorccd to pekroloum and a Japanese throw r. kindlod match into tho mouth of tho Chinese." A groat-massacro of the Chinas troop A ar-I ^i^iVnnn irr"H1»ir\ guns took place in Singapore, and Dr. Bcdlcr /phonetic/ the foi-nor physician of the Sultan of Johore "believes that more tha-u 1^0,000. Asiatics (not including military men) wore punishcd'or"torturcd to -5:v,th by "the ~Jnp^r.3se sc~crot "police. Tne Xargcst~majority of them arc Chi nose and. the doctor said tha t, ijjT the small are® of Dab on /phonetic/ alcno, somo 30 thousand were killed by tho Japanosc sccrct policc, -nd th-~t it was a matter of coursc that tho Chinese hated tho Japanese so much. Tolling the story of tho ill treatment, the PWs released in Hongkong said that thoy received only a small portion of tho packages sent by the Rod Cross. (San Francisco Sep. 5 . ) A correspondent on board of an American hospital ship reported the barbarism of the Jap^nose toward tho Australian, British rnd Dutch prisoners who worked in oil-rofinories and machine—f^ctorics. Atrocities committed while tho road construction was under way in Burma and Siam were also reported to tho effect that "Even invalids wcro forcod to walk to the placc of constructional work and break stones." (Sept. 5. Australia.) According to the report roachcd the Army Headquarters in South- Eastern Asia, allied powor prisoners wore groatly sufforing from malaria, bcri bori, consumption and dysontory. (Sopt. 5. San PranciBCO.) 3 . Singapore internment camp. (A London broadcast reported or. Sopt. 6, about the Japanese atrocities •t tho Singapore internment camps as follows:- (1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all nationalities including men, women, and children were interned, but Rod Cross has never boon permitted to visit there. All males above 10 years old wore compelled to undergo heavy labor and were suppliod with rations even less than h^lf of that issued by the "Malay" Prison Bureau ns punishment before the war. V.hcn the roscue arrived at, all begun to roast snails. (2) During tho period of more than 3 years, there was only a single periva when a logical control was prevailed; this occurrod in the period when the commandant was a Japanese "civilian. 3. There o:-:isted always the terrors of many atrocities and every- body was beaten day and night for not saluting properly. Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 20 4 . Spy suspects wore especially ill-treated. Oil October 2nd, 1943, the police started a barbarous search to find avidancna of spy flnapftqfra in the camp. 57 men and women were confined in a small guard-room, and for many hours they were made to cit with their legs bent in Japanese style and without being given even a minimum of decency they were forced to stay there for many months. One European was tortured for 55 hours and the other was struck 144 times. There was a record with tho full particulars of the devilsh torture, which Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and recorded in which a Japanese poured water into the mouth and nostrils of one of the suspects and th«D pressed tho swollen stomach of the latter with his foot or Jivmjcd o:i tho uppor part of the stomach. Seme of the prisonexa ci' war will bear the soars of the Japanese torture forever. 5 . The captives released at Singapore talked of the ill-treatment: forcod labor, worst food ration and beating. (2) Judging from the attitudes adopted by the United States and British especially the public opinion provailing in those countries the British protest against Japan is not so bitter as the United States at present, but Britain will f i le a pretest on completion of further close investigation pfter the recovery of tho ex-occupation area. It is , therefore, necessary for us to take a measure to cope with the situation. 1 . Though it is not necessary to produce these invectigption materials at present as long as Britain or the United States does not make any roquost and yet preparation should be mada so as to moet the changing situation. 2 . The execution of Chinese residents at Singapore to some extent was unavoidable considering the circumstances which arose at that time, but since tho execution had roachod a considerable number, Britain, (the United States) and China will announce it aa a big massacre and will lodge_a protoet wlfn us. _ So that_J^-j^lIjl^o~^e~iiBCQsanjy to make a preparation for the punishment of those responsible. Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e S E C T I O N III O U T L I N E OF T H E I N V E S T I G A T I O N C O N C E R N I N G I N H U M A N E ACTS ( P R I N C I P A L L Y A G A I N S T T H E C H I N E S E P R O B L E M ) D U R I N G THE. M A L A Y A ( S I N G A P O R E ) O P E R A T I O N S G r o u p N o . 4 A d d r e s s e d t o : PO ,,r A f f a i r s I n v e s t i g a t i v e D e p t . P O W A f f a i r s C e n t r a l I n v e s t i g a t i v e C o m m i t t e e . T h e O u t l i n e o f t h e P r o t e s t a n d R e p o r t s b y G r e a t B r i t a i n o n I n h u m a n e A c t s i n M a l a y a ( S i n g a p o r e ) A r e a . A l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e a l m o s t n o p r o t e s t s f r o m G r e a t B r i t a i n , t h e r e w e r e s o m e h i g h l y e x a g g e r a t e d a n d s u p e r f i c i a l r e p o r t s m a d e i n E n g l a n d a f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e w a r . 1 . O n 1 0 M a r c h 1 9 4 2 , B r i t i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r E d e n g a v e a f o r m a l e x p l a n a t i o n i n t h e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s o n t h e o u t r a g e o u s a c t s o f t h e J a p a n e s e f o l l o w i n g t h e s u r r e n d e r o f H o n g k o n g , o f w h i c h t h e g i s t is as f o l l o w s : G I S T : A c c o r d i n g t o t h e r e p o r t s of t h o s e w h o e s c a p e d f r o m H o n g k o n g , p r i s o n e r s o f w a r a n d c i t i z e n s i n H o n g k o n g w e r e / t r e a t e d i n h u m a n l y r e g a r d l e s s o f r a c e . F i f t y B r i t i s h s o l - / d i e r s w e r e b o u n d h a n d a n d f o o t a n d w e r e then_bay_one±±ed I t o d e a t h . E v e n a f t e r t e n d a y s f r o m t h e s u r r e n d e r of H o n g k o n g , t h e w o u n d e d w e r e l e f t o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s , a n d t h e d e a d w e r e n o t b u r i e d , E u r o p e a n s a n d A s i a t i c s a l i k e w e r e a b u s e d a n d k i l l e d w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . J T h e _ C h l n e s e q u a r t e r s of__the c i t y b e c a m e a n e s t o f T h e s e o u t r a g e o u s a c t s c a n b e c o m p a r e d to t h a t o f t h e g r e a t R a p e o f N a n k i n g i n 1 9 3 7 . T h e r e w e r e n o w i n d o w s , d o o r s o r l i g h t s I n t h e p r i - s o n e r s ' c a m p s w h i c h w e r e m e r e h u t s w i t h o u t s a n i t a r y f a c i l i - t i e s , F o o d w a s v e r y n o o r , m o r t a l d i s e a s e s b r o k e o u t > a n d d e a t h s c o n t i n u o u s l y o c c u r r e d , F u r t h e r m o r e , ZxiP. J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d n o t a l l o w t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ci t h e Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e P r o t e c t i n g P o w e r s a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e d C r o s s t o v i s i t t h e d i s t r i c t . W e d o n o t p o s s e s s a n y i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r i s o n e r s i n M a l a y a . W e o n l y k n o w t h a t 7 5 , 0 0 0 C h i n e s e h a d b e e n c a p t u r e d i n t h a t a r e a . I t is n o t t r u e t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e a r m y a c t o n t h e s p i r i t o f c h i v a l r y . 2 . W e h a v e b e e n n o t i f y i n g a n d p r o t e s t i n g t h a t w e h a v e d e l i b e r a t e l y s t u d i e d t h e g r e a t q u a n t i t y o f e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e t r e a t m e n t o f d e t a i n e d B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l s i n E a s t A s i a w h i c h w e r e o b t a i n e d b y t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t o n 2 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 a n d w h i c h h o l d n o g r o u n d f o r r e f u t a t i o n , b u t t h e r e is n o t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g M a l a y a . 3 . R e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g M a l a y a ( S i n g a p o r e ) a r e as f o l l o w s a l t h o u g h t h e r e is n o p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h i s a r e a f r o m t h e h o s t i l e p o w e r : (1) C o n v e r s a t i o n s o f M a j o r M o r r i s D a y t o n a n d C a p t a i n T h o m a s " E p r i s " : " A f t e r t h e s u r r e n d e r o f S i n g a p o r e w e w e r e c r o w d e d i n t o a f r e i g h t c a r a n d w e r e t a k e n to S i a m w h e r e w e w e r e e m p l o y e d i n t h e c o n s t r u c - t i o n o f a r a i l r o a d f r o m B a n g k o k t o M o u l m e i n , b u t m a n y d i e d o f t r o p i c a l d i s e a s e a n d f r o m s c a r - c i t y of m e d i c i n e . A c c o r d i n g to w h a t w a s r e l a t e d b y t h e a d v a n c e p a r t y o f A u s t r a l i a n s , a l l b u t 3 4 o f 1 , 8 4 0 s o l d i e r s d i e d b e f o r e r e a c h i n g a p o i n t o f 1 3 0 m i l e s w e s t * " ( 2 ) T h e a p p a l l i n g a n n o u n c e m e n t s o f J a p a n e s e a t r o c i - t i e s t o w a r d s p r i s o n e r s o f w a r of t h e A l l i e d P o w e r s a n d i n t e r n e d c i v i l i a n s , i n t h e r e p o r t s d e s p a t c h e d f r o m L o n d o n o n 5 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 5 h a s g i v e n a n x i e t y t o m a n y t h o u s a n d s o f f a m i l i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d . E v e r y e v e n i n g p a p e r i n L o n d o n r e p o r t e d t h a t S i n g a p o r e r a d i o a n n o u n c e d t h a t " T T t h e c o m p l e t e d o c u m e n t f s ~ m a 3 i T ~ p u b l i c , t h e c i v i l i z e d w o r l d w i l l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e a t r o c i t i e s o f t h e J a p a n e s e . C h i - n e s e w e r e c o m p e l l e d to d r i n k p e t r o l e u m a n d t h e J a p a n e s e t h r e w l i g h t e d m a t c h e s i n t o t h e i r m o u t h s " , I F ^ s e x e c u t i o n s b y - m a c M n e ^ i n of C h i n e s e a r m y /. u n i t s e n d c i v r S f e n s w o r e ^ r p r r l e e l c u t i n S i n g a p o r e , a n d / P r o f e s s o r ''Betsudora" w h o w a s r.he f o r m p ^ pi->y£T~->i cn ^-p -t^o I B u i t a n o f J o h o r e * b e l i e v e t.Viat 1 c.-r^w, ft^pt^g No. 2647 Page 23 f (not i n c l u d i n g s o l d i e r s ) w e r e e x e c u t e d b y t h e J a p a n e s e V s e c r e t p o l i c e o r d i e d o f t o r t u r e i n S i n g a p o r e . T h e Ng^reater p a r t of t h e s e p e o p l e w e r e C h i n e s e , a n d t h e p r o f e s s o r f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t i n t h e s m a l l a r e a of " D a b o n " t h i r t y t h o u s a n d w e r e k i l l e d b y t h e J a p a n e s e s e c r e t p o l i c e a n d it is n a t u r a l t h a t t h e C h i n e s e s h o u l d a b h o r t h e J a p a - n e s e as t h e y d o . A c c o r d i n g to t h e t a l e s of i l l - t r e a t m e n t t o l d b y t h e p r i s o n e r s s e t f r e e i n H o n g k o n g , t h e y h a d r e c e i v e d o n l y a v e r y s m a l l p a r t of t h e R e d C r o s s p a r c e l s . ( S a n F r a n c i s c o , 5 S e p t e m b e r ) . C o r r e s p o n d e n t s o n a n A m e r i c a n h o s p i t a l s h i p h a v e r e p o r t e d o n t h e b a r b a r o u s a c t i o n s of t h e J a p a n e s e t o w a r d s t h e A u s t r a l i a n , B r i t i s h a n d D u t c h p r i s o n e r s w o r k i n g i n o i l r e f i n e r i e s a n d m a c h i n e f a c t o r i e s . T h e a t r o c i t i e s c o m m i t t e d o n r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n i n B u r m a a n d S i a m w e r e a l s o r e p o r t e d . E v e n t h e s i c k w e r e c o m p e l l e d t o w a l k to t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e r o a d w a s b e i n g m a d e a n d to b r e a k s t o n e s . ( A u s t r a l i a , 5 S e p t e m b e r ) , A c c o r d i n g to r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d a t t h e S o u t h E a s t A s i a H e a d q u a r t e r s , it s e e m s t h a t t h e p r i s o n e r s o f t h e A l l i e d P o w e r s h a d b e e n s u f f e r i n g s e v e r e l y f r o m m a l a r i a , b e r i b e r i , c o n s u m p t i o n a n d d y s e n t e r y . ( S a n F r a n c i s c o , 5 S e p t e m b e r ) . ~ ( 3 ) U L o n d o n b r o a d c a s t s o f 6 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 5 _ r e p o r t e d as f o l l o w s oTl the aU'oc.1 t i e s o f t h e J a p a n e s e i n S i n g a p o r e i n t e r n m e n t c a m p s : ( a ) " T h e r e w e r e 4 , 5 0 0 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n of e v e r y n a t i o n a l i t y i n t e r n e d i n S 5 r r a p o r e , b u t t h e R e d C r o s s w e r e n e v e r a l l o w e d to v i s i t t h e m . Lll m e n a b o v e t e n y e a r s o f a g e w e r e f o r c e d t o w o r k b u t w e r e g i v e n l e s s t h a n a h a l f o f t h e a m o u n t o f f o o d w h i c h t h e P r i s o n B u r e a u of M a l a y a h a s g i v e n as a p u n i s h m e n t b e f o r e t h e w a r . W h e n r e s - c u e c a m e , t h e y h a d b e g u n r o a s t i n g s n a i l s f o r f o o d . (b) " D u r i n g t h e t h r e e y e a r s , it w a s o n l y o n c e t h a t r e a s o n n b l , ^ a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s e x e r c i s e d , " a n d t h a t was_ w h e n thecomiT]f>nripr' w a T - n J^xiane s e _cyrt±ipri. (c) " T h e r e w a s a l w a y s t h e c o n s t a n t f e a r of a l l k i n d s o f a t r o c i t i e s a n d t h e y w e r e c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g b e a t e n f o r s u c h s i m p l e c r i m e s as n o t b o w i n g c o r - r e c t l y . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e (d) ^ T h o s e w h o w e r e s u s p e c t e d o f e s p i o n a g e r e c e i v e d ' w o r s e t r e a t m e n t . O n 2 O c t o b e r 1V4-S, i^np J n j n n p g p "prii i n o c o n m e n c e d hs>-pha T»nn s s p n r e h p s nf n p m f r . H e s p i o n a g e w a s d i s c o v e r e d in_jthe_jiamp. F i f t y - s e v e n m e n a n d w o m e n w e r e locked"-up in a "srna 1 1 w e r e d e p r T v e d of e v e r y d e c e n c y . T h e v w e r e compelled__to_ s i t w i t h , t h e i r l e g * h P n + in t h p .Tnpanppp w a y f o r a l o n g t i m e SnrTt.hpy WP-PP n n n f i n e d i n t h a t r o o m f o r s e v e r a l ^ TTInnth..q.. A c e r t a i n E u r o p e a n w a s i n t e r r o g a t e d f o r f i f t y - f i v e h o u y s , a n d a n o t h e r w a s b e a t e n a h u n d r e d a n d f o r t y - f o u r t i m e s . T h e r e is a m i n u t e r e c o r d o f t h e d e m o n i a c a l t o r t u r e s , a n d R i c h a r d S h a r p , a c o r r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e B . B . C . w h o h a d r e a d this" r e c o r d s a y s t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e , a f t e r p o u r i n g w a t e r i n t o t h e n o s e a n a m o u t n o r tfie p r i s o n e r . would~pTesrs" ~ th~e~ s w e l l i n g s t o m a c h w i t h t h e f o o t o r j u m p u p a n d d o w n o n t o p o f i t . S o m e o f t h e p r i s o n e r s w i l l c a r r y t h e m a r k s o f J a p a n e s e t o r t u r e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r l i v e s . (e) " P r i s o n e r s set f r e e i n S i n g a p o r e t e l l a b o u t t h e i r l i f e o f f o r c e d l a b o u r , t e r r i b l e f o o d r a t i o n s , blow§_and i l l - t r e a t m e n t . " I n s h o r t , t h i s h a s c a u s e d n o g r e a t p r o - b l e m u n t i l t o d a y , b u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t e n d e n c i e s o f t h e U . S . A . a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n , e s p e c i a l l y t h e p u b l i c o p i n i o n o f toth c o u n t r i e s , E n g l a n d w i l l t h o r o u g h l y i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s m a t t e r a s s o o n as s h e r e g a i n s h e r f o r m e r t OT ' T> ' 1 ' p* 3 ^ n d t h e r e is s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y of h e r 1 m m r i h i n g p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t j a - piru S o w e m u s t a l s o i n v e s t i g a t e a n d a n n o u n c e ie_ t r u e f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e m a t t e r s . " I I i n M a l a y a ( S i n g a p o r e ) G e n e r a l S i t u a t i o n / a n d t h e M a n a g e m e n t o f t h e N a t i v e s b y t h e M i l i t a r y b e f o r e T "ar B e f o r e t h e G r e a t e r E a s t A s i a W a r b r o k e o u t , M a l a y a , S i n g a - p o r e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , w a s t h e c e n t e r o f p o l i c y a n d s t r a t e g y i n t h e s o u t h and w a s t h e n u c l e u s of pressure__a£aixtsi. J a p a n A T h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e nativesT . n general, e s p e c i a l l y t h e C h i n e s e , w e r e v e r y v i g o r o u s a n d t h e p r e s s u r e w a s c a r r i e d o u t i n e v e r y s o r t o f f o r m , s u c h as d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , b o y c o t t a n d t h r e a t s , so t h a t t h e r e w e r e s o o n m o r e ~ a n d T l n o r c J a p a n e s e r e t u r n i n g to J a p a n . Doc, No, 2647 Page 2? T h u s S i n g a p o r e n a t u r a l l y b e g a n t o d r a w t h o a t t e n t i o n o f alii t h e J a p a n e s e . T h e m i l i t a r y w e r e k e e n l y a w a r e o f t h e necessity o r a s p e e d y o c c u p a t i o n o f M a l a y a , e s p e c i a l l y S i n g a p o r e , a n d a s t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n M a l a y a w e r e t h e f i r s t to be s t a r t e d i n t h e S o u - t h e r n o p e r a t i o n s a n d i n v i e w o f t h e a i m o f t h e G r e a t e r E a s t A s i a W a r , it w a s n e c e s s a r y t o a s s u m e a n a t t i t u d e o f e n d e a r - m e n t t o w a r d s t h e n a t i v e s so a s to e x a l t t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e Im- p e r i a l A r m y t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d , a n d a d e t e r m i n e d a t t i t u d e w^ t a k e n t o w a r d s t h o s e w h o i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f th$ a r m y . T h e m i l i t a r y a d o p t e d t h e p o l i c y o f s t r i c t l y o b s e r v i n g m e r i t s . I l l G e n e r a l S i t u a t i o n d u r i n g t h e O p e r a t i o n s I n o u r M a l a y a o p e r a t i o n s , w e a t f i r s t h a d n o t h i n g to g i v e u s t r o u b l e i n t h e r e a r t h o u g h w e h a d m u c h i n C h i n a , b u t f r o m C e n t r a l M a l a y a o n , C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s b e g a n to b e a c t i v e i n m a k i n g t r o u b l e n e a r b a t t l e - f i e l d s a n d s p e c i a l l y i n t h e r e a r and c o n s e q u e n t l y o u r s o l d i e r s w e r e v e r y w a t c h f u l a g a i n s t t h e m . ( 1 ) T r o u b l e - M a k i n g of C h i n e s e E m i g r a n t s i n our M a l a y a O p e r a t i o n s . N e a r b a t t l e f i e l d s , t h e e n e m y g o t t o k n o w o u r p l a n s o f o p e r a t i o n c h i e f l y t h r o u g h f r e q u e n t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s , a n d o u r t r o o p s w e r e p l a c e d a t a g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e o r w e r e s h e l l e d o r b o m b e d w h i l e i n m a s s f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e s u l t b e i n g t h a t w e o f t e n l o s t a l a r g e n u m b e r o f s o l d i e r s to n o p u r p o s e . I n t h e r e a r \ o f battlefield?:-, o u r l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e a t - \ t a c k e d ; o u r l i n e s o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d l i n e s o f m i l i - I t a r y c o m m u n i c a t i o n w e r e d e s t r o y e d ; o u r m u n i t i o n s w e r e 1 d e s t r o y e d ; a n d o u r m u n i t i o n s , or.pocially a m m u n i t i o n w e r e \ d e l a y e d o n t h e i r w a y t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s a n d t h u s o u r j M a l a y a O p e r a t i o n s , m u c h p r e s s e d f o r t i m e , w e r e o f t e n ' o b s t r u c t e d and b e s e t w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s . E x a m p l e s a r e as f o l l o w s : (a) A t t h e e n d o f D e c e m b e r , 1°41 > m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d a r m e d C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s , a s s e m b l e d i n p l a n t a - t i o n s nor-oh o f T a i p i n g , a t t e m p t e d t o p u t o u r l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c u t o f o r d e r a n d t o b u r n o u r m u n i t i o n s , b u t w e g o t to k n o w o f i t a n d d e a l t w i t h t h e m b e f o r e Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e t h e y c o u l d t r y a n y t h i n g , (b) T o w a r d s t h e e n d of D e c e m b e r , I°4i i i n s b a t t l e n e a r K a n b a h r u , s i g n a l s h e l l s w e r e o f t e n f i r e d a t n i g h t n e a r our v a r i o u s a r t i l l e r y p o s i t i o n s u p o n w h i c h t h e e n e m y c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r fire-, k i l l i n g a l o t of n-n-r .qnl- ffiS.de a s t r e n u o u s search a n d s u c c e e d e d i n f i n d - n g t w o C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s a n d p u t t i n g t h e m i n c u s t o d y t h e y p r o v e d t o b e g u i l t y . ( c ) I n t h e a b o v e b a t t l e , o n e b a t t a l i o n o f t h e A n d o R e g i m e n t t o o k a v e r y c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e b y n i g h t f r o m t h e w e s t i n o r d e r to c u t o f f " K a n b a h r u " f r o m the r e a r , b u t a s i g n a l s h o t w a s f i r e d w h e n t h e y w e r e p a s s i n g a v i l l a g e a n d , o u r p l a n b e i n g t h u s k n o w n t o t h e e n e m y , w e w e r e not- o n l y u n s u c c e s s f u l i n c u t t i n g o f f " K a n b a h r u " f r o m t h e r e a r , b u t a l s o s u s t a i n e d a s e v e r e c o u n t e r - a t t a c k w h i l e c r o s s i n g t h e r i v e r s o u t h w e s t o f " K a n b a h r u " (the n e i g h b o u r i n g b a s i n w a s s w a m p y ) , a n d r m s t a i n e d h e a v y l o s s e s , o u r o p e r a t i o n b e i n g a c o m p l e t e failure., f!o s o o n e r h a d t h e s i g n a l s h o t b e e n f i r e d t h a n a. p l a t 001 s e n t to s e a r c h t h e v i l l a g e . T h e y c a u g h t a C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t w L o h a d f a i l e d to m a k e g e t - a w a y , a n d w h o p r o v e d to b e g u i l t y . ( d ) I n b a t t l e s n e a r a n u a r y j 1 9 4 2 , i b a h a t a t t h e en i n g a p o r e a t t h e „ - a l s h e l l s w e r e „ p o s i t i o n s , r e s e r v e u n i t s and h. r e c e i v e d c o n c e n t r a t e d e n e m y fi: Tt. ws<! f o u n d t h a t m o s t o f t h i s G e m a s a n d S e g a m a t i n t h e m i d d l e n e a r K l u a n g , "Vt'ompen" a n d a n d i n t h e b a t t l e liiixiig ux r«Lii-u.t'.ry of t h e s a m e y e = r , freciuently f i r e d a n d o u r a r t i l l e r y o T"i V» "1 ri»Vt r^ •>"» In r\ nil o > » +• /-<>•»<*« Of tO**1 o f J , n b a t t l e s K l u a n g , B a t u d o f J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 2 , a o f S t h e b e g i n n n g o f F e b r a r y 1 s i g n v e r y o u e n t a n n < ? i H n n s . PPSPT-VP u n i t s and h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s r e a n d s u s t a i n e d h e a v y l o s s e s 's t h e — J I w a g r a n t s , rork o f C h i n e s e e m i - (e) I n t h e m i d d l e of J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 2 , w h e n t h e e n e m y m a d e a n a i r * r a i d o n K u a l a L u m p u r . a s i g n a l s h e l l w a s f i r e d f r o m t h e a i r f i e l d t h e r e ; t h e e n e m y p l a n e s b o m b e d i t , t h e r e s u l t b e i n g t r r t s o m e of our v. ,:rej w e r e b u r n e d o u t , and a c o n s i d e r a b l e n-moer ot so'...6 L i-a • • :< , • k i l l e d o r w o u n d e d . ( f j I n t h e m.'di.ie or G u a r d D i v i s i o n cross-3'.; c c a t e d t h e crossing- p:;:,nt ar.w b o m b i n g a n d w e oonse-iVientiy i n g t h e r i v e r a n a s u s t a i n e d J a n u a r y , 1 9 + 2 , w h e n t h e I m p e r i a l c- ?V...ar, C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s i n d i - h a a 'octed t h e e n e m y ' s n i g h t m u c h d i f f i c u l t y i n Cx'oss- "I , -C-. ,t) l o s s e s , n-v Ou Jena:-TV. ( g ) Frc-r- m e p.t i d l e co the oi .Vi aaj-ry, 194;? ? w h i l e the I m p e r i a l Gaard D i v i s i o n ^a;; l i ^ i . r n g n e ^ r ' itf a!, acoa and B a t u b a h a t , Chinese merchants s e c r e t l y communicated w i t h Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e e n e m y s u b m a r i n e s i n t h e s e a s o f f M a l a c c a . T h e y n o t o n l y s e c r e t l y b r o u g h t i n s o m e s p i e s f r o m t h e s u b m a r i n e s , g u i d e d a n d p r o t e c t e d t h e m b u t a l s o m a d e i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h e p o s i t i o n s o f o u r t r o o p s to m a k e t h e e n e m y ' s s h i p b o m b a r d m e n t e a s i e r a n d m o r e e f f e c t i v e . T h e r e s u l t w a s t h a t t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n h a d a d i f f i c u l t a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s o p e r a t i o n . ( h ) A t t h e e n d o f J a n u a r y , 194-2, n e a r a b a t t l e n e a r B a t u b a h a t , t h e O k a k i b a t t a l i o n o f t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n w a s t a k i n g a r o u n d a b o u t r o u t e t h r o u g h a r u b b e r p l a n t a t i o n to i n v e s t B a t u b a h a t w i t h t h e a i m o f c u t t i n g it o f f f r o m t h e r e a r , w h e n C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s s e c r e t l y i n f o r m e d t h e e n e m y , w h o m a d e a m a s s c o u n t e r - a t t a c k u p o n t h e b a t t a l i o n a n d c o m p l e t e l y i s o l a t e d i t ; t h e b a t t a l i o n h a d t h e m i s f o r t u n e t o b e n e a r l y a n n i h i l a t e d , t h e c o m m a n - d e r and a l m o s t a l l t h e o t h e r s b e i n g k i l l e d . ( i ) F r o m t h e m i d d l e to t h e e n d o f J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 2 , C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s f e l l e d t r e e s a c r o s s r o a d s b e t w e e n G e m a s a n d S e l e m b a n g a n d b e t w e e n L a b i s and S e g a m a t , b r o u g h t o u r M T to a s t a n d s t i l l , a n d p o u r e d a h a i l o f f i r e d u p o n t h e m f r o m b e h i n d t h e t r e s s o n b o t h s i d e s o f t h e r o a d s . As a r e s u l t , o u r v a l u a b l e m u n i t i o n s w e r e p l u n d e r e d and p r e v e n t e d f r o m r e a c h i n g t h e f o r t , a n d o u r o p e r a t i o n w a s p l a c e d a t a g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e . ( j ) T h e r e w e r e m a n y o b s t a c l e s to r a i l w a y t r a n s - p o r t a t i o n , b u t a m o n g o t h e r s , t h e r a i l w a y s w e r e d e s t r o y e d i n p l a n t a t i o n s , s o u t h o f I p o h , a n d b e t w e e n S e l e m b a n g a n d G e m a s , j u s t w h e n w e h a d t o s e n d m u n i t i o n s f o r o u r S i n g a - p o r e o p e r a t i o n s . It h a d r v e r y g r e a t e f f e c t u p o n u s , f o r w e w e r e f o r c e d to p o s t p o n e t h e a t t a c k u p o n S i n g a p o r e u n t i l F e b . 9 t h , t h o u g h it h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n f i x e d f o r F e b . 8 t h . M o r e o v e r , a f t e r w e b e g a n to a t t a c k , w e c o u l d not get our munitions in the quantities we required, and f o r w a n t o f a m m u n i t i o n , w e w e r e o n c e i n a v e r y d a n g e r o u s s i t u a t i o n . T h e c r i m i n a l s w h o h a d c a u s e d t h e s e o b s t a c l e s w e r e c a u g h t a n d it w a s f o u n d t h a t C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s h a d b e e n c h i e f l y r e s p o n s i b l e . (k) O u r l i n e s o f m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i c a t i o n w e r e d e s t r o y e d o n i n n u m e r a b l e o c c a s i o n s , (2) P e a c e a n d O r d e r o f S i n g a p o r e a f t e r the S u r r e n d e r of B r i t i s h T r o o p s , S i n g a p o r e w a s c a p t u r e d o n t h e l ^ t h o f F e b r u a r y , a n d a t f i r s t , a f t e r a c t i o n c e a s e d , p r o s p e c t s f o r t h e o r d e r a n d Doc. No. 2647 Page 26 p e a c e of t h e p e n i n s u l a l o o k e d v e r y g o o d b u t a r u m o u r s p r e a d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h pnfl D u t c h t r o o p s would c o m e t o t h e r e s c u e a n d t h e r e w a s t h e f u r t h e r a g i t a t i o n of s o m e c o m m u n i s t s w h o h a d beeri~~releas_ed_ o r escaped. f r o m p r i s o n ani^ C r i m i n a l s at l a r g e whicTPproduced' a n u n d e r c u r r e n t o f u n e a s i n e s s a I n p a r t i c u l a r , as t h e r e w a s a g a p o f two~~or tlarep d a y s b e t w e e n t h e g1iH ;: in3eT r "''cr t h e * B r i t i s h T r o o p F ^ a n d t h e e n t r y of t h e J a p a n e s e t r o o p s i n t o t h e c i t y o f S i n g a p o r e , n o t o n l y w e r e w e a p o n s s u c h as r i f l e s , r i f l e a m m u n i t i o n , m a c h i n e g u n s , r e v o l v e r s a n d m o t o r - c a r s w i t h s m a l l t y p e r a d i o sets dispersed a n d h i d d e n i n t h e h o u s e s o f C h i n e s e emigrants, bat foodstuffs a n d o t h e r m a t e r i a l s w e r e s t o l e n ; a n d moreover c u r l i n e s of c o m m u n i - c a t i o n b e t w e e n o u r v a r i o u s C o r p s ' H Q i n t h e o u t s k i r t s a n d t h e c i t y i t s e l f w e r e f r e q u e n t l y a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y s e v e r e d , to t h e g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e of o u r t r o o p s . It w a s a l s o f o u n d t h a t m a n y C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s i n t h e o u t s k i r t s a n d t h e c e n t e r o f t h e c i t y h a d s t o l e n f o o d s t u f f s , c l o t h i n g a n d f u e l a n d c o n c e a l e d t h e m i n t h e -warehouses o f t h e i r r e s i d e n c e , i n tho c e i l i n g a n d u n d e r t h e f l o o r . A s o u r f o r c e s w e r e a p p r o a c h i n g t h e n e x t s t a g e i n t h e i r o p e r a - t i o n s a n d w e r e v e r y s o o n to w i t h d r a w t h e m a i n s t r e n g t h of t h e i r t r o o p s , t h e r e w a s o n l y a s m a l l n u m b e r o f o u r s o l d i e r s to b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p e a c e a n d o r d e r of t h e c i t y a f t e r t h e o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r a p i - d i t y o f o u r A r m y ' s s o u t h w a r d m a r c h h a d l e f t a. g r e a t m a n y g u e r i l l a b a s e s s c a t t e r e d o n e i t h e r s i d e of t h e r o a d , a l o n g t h e w e s t c o a s t of t h e M a l a y P e n i n s u l a . T h e r e w e r e c l e a r s i g n s , m o r e o v e r , t h a t a f t e r t h e f a l l o f S i n g a p o r e m a n y a n t i - J a p a n e s e C h i n e s e e m i g r a n t s w h o w e r e s c a t t e r e d a m o n g t h e R i o u w , L i n g g a , a n d A n a m b a s I s l a n d s s i t u a t e d s o u t h of t h e P e n i n s u l a , w e r e m a k i n g b a s e s o f t h e s e i s l a n d s f r o m w h i c h t h e y w e r e p r e p a r i n g f o r f u t u r e a c t i v i t i e s i n c o n c e r t w i t h t h e i r s y m p a t h i z e r s o n S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d a n d t h e M a l a y P e n i n s u l a . I n v i e w o f t h e r u m o u r s o f B r i t i s h T r o o p s c o m i n g t o t h e r e s c u e o n c e m o r e , t h a t k e p t s w e e p i n g t h e e i t y , o u r t r o o p s f e l t it v e r y i m p o r t a n t to s t r i c t l y s u p p r e s s a l l u n f o u n d e d r u m o u r s a n d w i l d t a l e s i n S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d a n d m a i n t a i n t h e p e a c e a n d o r d e r of t h e i s l a n d o f S i n g a p o r e w i t h a l l p o s s i b l e s p e e d e ( R e f e r e n c e ) D e t a i l s o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e D e G a u l l e f a c t i o n i n / S i n g a p o r e s i n c e F e b . 2 8 t h h a v e b e e n c l a r i f i e d b y d e g r e e s . / C l a r e , a J e w , a n d L u m o r , a n a g e n t o f t h e M i l i t a r y C o m - / m i t t e e of t h e D e G a u l l e f a c t i o n , a n d C o l c e i l ( ? ) , m a n a g e r / o f t h e B a n q u e d e l r I n d o - O h i n e w e r e d e t a i n e d and i n t e r r o - \ g a t e d . i Page 29 Doc. So. 2647 CHAPTER 4 Clearing of battle-field3 and mopping-up operations after the capitulation of the enemy. Believing that it would not only answer the purposes of our "Sacrgd- Wslc!1 i hut also "bring about good results in further operations in the southern areas especially in the Sumatra and And?mans operations, which were our army's next tasks at that time—to set up a. firm military administration in Malaya and especially in Singapore, as soon as possible after the capitulation of the British Army, our army at first stationed only Kempel in Singapore itself and avoided sending big units into the city. Major-General KAWAMURA Saburo was given command of I'o. 2 Kempeitai (with about 2 companies of auxiliary Kempei and armoured car and tank company from I'o. 5 and Ho. 18 Imperal Guards Divisions attached to them, and the necessary troops, and put in command of Singapore city, while thr» nr.inforcrs of the Irmrrial Guards Divisions were put in Charge of Singapore island (excluding the greater part of the city) and continued their work of clearing the battle fields rapidly and their mopping-up operations. By these means, our army tried to establish public ordrr and at the same time prepared for the next round of operations. Considering the importance of Singapore to the forces and the fact that it was infested with pla.in clothes bandits who had obstructed our military 'operations for the whole~~period of our operations in Malaya, our a.rmv decided on a strict attitude in dealing with the Chinese emigrants. On Feb. 17th, our army issued an Army Order and dispatched Major 5AYASHI Tadao, a staff officer to Singapore garrison headquarters, mainly for the purposeof dealing with this matter. In the latter part of February the main strength of the 5th and the 18th Divisions successively moved to Northern Malaya and Johore State and assumed the same duties as those mantionad above. 1 . The clearing of the battlefields and the mopping-up operations on Singapore Island. Mafjor-General KATOAMURA. Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, who__ had been newly appointed as the commander of the Singapore Garrison Forces, appeared at the army headquarters on the 18th. 3esides making the necessary contacts, he issued, in view of the above-mentioned situation, an order to the 2nd Field Gendarme Unit, it mainly to clear the battlefields and mop up tho on?mips within the city,. Moreover, the main strength or tne imperial Guards Division was transferred from its operational area to the key points on the island where it continued the clearing up of the battlefields andjnopping-up operations. (a) Outline of command system and detailing/of troops/ Pace 30 A m y C o m m a n d or Commander of Sinpapore "Garrison F o r c e s I si/" 2nd F i e l d Gen- d a r m e U n i t ( M a i n s t r e n g t h p o s t e d in the c i t y , and a p o r t i o n at k e y p o i n t s on-the peninsiilkl G e n d a r m e s U n i t (About 2/3 of t o t a l s t r e n g t h ) A u x i l i a r y G e n d a r m e s U n i t (After some p e r i o d of time the g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e m w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r the d i r e c t c o m m a n d of the c o m m a n d e r of the G a r r i s o n F o r c e s ) \y I n f a n t r y U n i t ( A l t h o u g h the d a t e is u n k n o w r i it s e e m s that t h i s u n i t t o o k d i r e c t s u p e r - v i s i o n of the a u x i l i a r y gendarmes') Doc. Fc. 2547 Page 3 1 (Detailing of troops as per attached chart) > However, with the participation of the Imperial Guards Division in the Sumatra Campaign, the Singapore Garrison Forces assumed the patrol of the entire island on March 2 . (b) The outline of the clearing up of the battlefields and moppin^-up operations. The bat tlefields clearing-up and raopping-up operations which the various corps (including those corps subsequently transferred to other areas) conducted on Singapore Island following the surrender of the British Army were mainly as follows: 1 . Mopping-up operations on the islands in the vicinity of Singapore Island. 2 . The disposition of the wounded and dead of both sides. 3 . The collection and. arrangement of munitions and firms. 4 . The arrangement and detention of war prisoners and internees totalling about 100 ,000 . 5 . Memorial service for the dead. 6 . The disposition of enemj'- Chinese merchants,'hiding in (and out) of Singapore city. The search for and the disposition of anti-Japanese Chinese merchants. 1. The army's policy toward the Chinese. In view of the great obstructions to our operations put up by the anti-Japanese activities of Chinese subsequent to the operations in central Malay,_we wore obliged to chance the original attitude, toward the Chinese which we had held at the time of the outbrcak-of war. We were obliged to deal with the di^ni-ir^i e-rt- ^ a gtnrn manner. ~ The collection of data concerning anti-Japanese suspects among the Chinese. On the basis of mainly the register of anti-Japanese Chinese as well such other data, as the register of the Detective Bureau, police offic register of criminals, advice by rescued Japanese residents, and the information supplied by some of the anti-Japanese Chinese merchants who were arrested, a register of disobedient Chinese suspects wa.s drawn up during the four days from February 17 to 20 and the suspects were detained at several places and detected beginning from the 21st. In making the detections we made sure of obta in ing a c c U r ®^by using the above-mentioned registersas our basis and also obtaining tho presence of the police from the Dfetective Bureau of Police Office . The number of persons examined as suspects during the courSo of detections was roughly as follows J \ First time Feb 21 to 23 (3 days) about 5 , 000 \ Second " Feb 28 - March 3 about 1 , 500 Third " Fnd of March about 300 / Doc. ITo. 2647 Page 3 ' 2 After the examination for the detection of suspects about 1 , 000 to 1 , 500 persons were released and about 5 , 000 persons were apparently punished as anti-Japanese spies (those who guided the enemy in bombing airfields , gave indications of the direction of artillery shelling, attacked or disturbed the rear conraissary linos, or guided such activities , the leaders of anti-Japanese organizations, members of the anti- Japanese Volunteer Army, and members of the Malay Communist Party) (Annex 2) I I . The conditions in Singapore, according to the "Fotes on the Hew Life of Chinese" by HU M I , wore as follows: 1 . Field-Marshal Pophan reported on December 22 the war situation. There were criticisms anions- the inhabitants of Malay against the withdrawal from Ponang). 2 . Governor-General Thomas called a conference of the Government- General on December 25 and reauested the Chinese to display their full strength in resisting the Japanese. On the basis of this request, the ESiyC—IT.A Anti-Enemy Mobilization General Association wa.s established and held its inaugural meeting on December 27. Three hundred seventy-two (372) organizations with total representa- tives of more than 2 ,000 attended this meeting. Z. Under the direction of the ESI1TG-HCJA Anti-Enemy General Association, a volunteer army with the Communist party as its mainstay, a.nd also a defense army under the slogan of the people's three principles were established to cooperate in putting up resistence. 4 . The conditions after the entry of tho Japanese Army. l y (A) Investigation of all Chinese between the ages of 15 and ^6^ war? conducted from February 21. (E) Governor-General Thomas isscd the following proclamation: » Proclamation of the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements and Minister Plenipotentiary for Malay, issued 1. Tho commander of the Japanese Army has/the following bulletin, (a) All exirting administrative organs a.nd economic structure will be allowed to be continued. The personnel of these organs may hold their present positions for the time being. (b; All enterprises a.ffecting public welfare must be speedily restored and the employees must continue their work as usual. (c) Communications and broadcasts by means of wireless telegraph and telephones are prohibited. (d) Air defense regulations must be strictly observed as heretofore. This is particularly as in regard to black-out control. Doc. So . 2647 Pace (e) All communications and connections with outside sources are strictly prohibited. ( f ) All public health organs and medical treatment works must he speedily opened and operated- If there are defects, improvements within the extent pos-si'ble must he made immediately. All employees must carry on their work as usual and give protection as much as possible to the eick, wounded and prisoners. (g) The Japanese Army will surely protect the inhabitants. All inhabitants except those permitted to move by the Japanese Army* must remain at their present place of residence. ( h ) All hostile acts against the Japanese Army, such as spyingN military secrets and supplying intelligence to the enemy are J prohibited. 2 . The civil administration >.organs of this island intend to brings Singapore to a normal condition in cooperation with the Japanese Army. Accordingly, various commissons will be set up to help solve the following matters: (a.) Administrative problems (b) Public health and sanitation problems. (c) Economic and financial problems. (d) War prisoners1 problems. (e) Military administration problems, namely, the problems of peace and order, communications and the requisitioned production of munitions. ( f ) Marine problems. (g) Air-defense problems. In sdiiticn to the foregoing commissions, a, liaison commission will be established t<-» handle affairs concerning the transfer of administrative rights over this island. 5 . All citizens of Singapore must take the initiative to restore pea.ee and order, hold themselves responsible for the clearing up of the f i lth , and prevent the spread of epidemics. This is the duty which we must not shirk for the sake of the wounded women and chvxuren an{?_ those who have no place to wander. I earnestly solicit your cooperation. Doc. ITo. 2647 Page 34 4 . I hereby respectfully express my appreciation to you who have diligently performed your duties during the past several months and also express my deep appreciation to the citizens who have coped, with the situation with calmness. February 16, 1S42 Thomas / s / (Annex) (C) The statement of the Commander of the SHCffifAIT/Singapore/ Garrison Forces. _ " -—- The Chjji»s£ of SHOHAKT port have been misled until this day by. the propaganda of the Chungking Regime, cooperated with T^i t.m'n7 and con- tinued political and economic assistance to the Chungking Regime. That is , the fact that they obstructed our operations and always played an a.ctive part in the front-line of anti-Japanese operations by organizing a volunteer army which joined the British Army and serving as guerrillas and spies, constitutes an obstruction to the construction of Greater East Asia and hence they should be called the traitors of East Asia . However, upon the fall of Singapore, a part of them fled, but it is quite clear that others disguised themselves as law-abiding citizens and awaiting the chance to conduct guerrilla activities . I f they are left as they are, it would be forever impossible to bring about a cheerful Malay. It is most essential a.t the present time to- :tnop-up these traitorous Chinese and establish pea.ee and order thereby bringing peace and security to the masses. It is the intention of the Imperia.l Japanese Army to arrange a new order and establish tho East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the glorious ideal of "hakko ishiu'r/ universal brotherhood/ thereby hoping for the everlasting develoJ5!ii«nl of Malay. This is the declaration of the Commander of the Japanese Army. He who obstructs our righteousness is the arch enemy of mankind. Irrespective of whoever he may be, he will be dealt with firmly without mercy. But those law-abiding citizens who repent their past wrong and voluntaril-'- join in the construction of a new order, which is our gree.t ideal, and actively cooperate with us in developing a cheerful, fr.?e, and solid Malay, we will always treat them as universal brethren, irrespective of whether they are Chinese or other people. The Imperial Japanese Army will protect their property and is determined to ensure the growth and development of their posterity. Such is the true intention of the Imperial Japanese Army. If there are any persons who conduct undesirable activities , we will not forgive them but punish them sternly, whatever race they may belong to. Doc Ho. 2647 Page 35 The masses should understand Japan's time intentions and engage in their occupations with their minds at rest. At the same time they should observe the following matters and hoal the wounds of war to the "best of their ability, thereby constructing a cheerful Malay and cooperating in the construction of Greater East Asia of the East Asiatic peoples. 1 . 3e diligent in speedily resuming work. 2 . In case there are any enemy elements and other undesirable elements, they should be immediately disolosed or reported to the Japanese Army. 3 . All forms of looting said outrages shall bn punished. 4 . Any person possessing or discovering arms and ammunition, even a single shot, must speedily hand them over to the Japanese Army. 5 . Everyone should cooperate in cleaning the streets and restoring order. 6 . Labour should be voluntarily furnished to the Japanese Army. Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 36 Commander of the Japanese Garrison Forces (Annex) The statement of the Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces (D) concerning the maintenance of peace and order on the island. The Commander of the_Jaoanese Army has "been striving his "best to restore and maintain peace and order on the_ialanfl. ever since the capture of Shonan Island. For this purpose, the Japanese Army authcrities have permitted no Army to enter the city, "but only the gendarmes, who bear the responsibility of protecting the citizens at large and distressed people. However, some rebellious elements disturbed the peace and conducted acts benefiting the enemy. Accordingly, the Army intends to strictly punish these evil and rebellious elements, persons possessing of military arms ar.d persons who have committed outrages and looting, in. order to maintain the peace of the entire inhabitants. T W 1 n£_ the__rfibels who had been arrested, and^a certain other person were killed by_firing squad at a certain place on the 2lst and 22nd, respec- tively. The Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces hereby serve public notice that persons who remain unrepentent and continue their evil acts shall likewise be strictly punished. (E) The proclamation of the military authorities concerning the return of the distressed Chinese to their homes. In order to secure peace end order and promote the smooth adjustment of the demand and supply of necessities of l i fe on Shonan Island, all Chinese now taking refuge should return to their original pla.ee of residence within 10 days from Maxell 4 . Those who f a i l to return within this period without good reason shall be strictly punished. I I I . The state of purging on the Malay Peninsula. 1. The state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula. The intrigues of the Chinese during the Malay campaign were as described already. Even after the f a l l of Singapore, numerous anti- Japanese Chinese hid themselves in cities and forests. Some of them, standing for communism, and maintaining mutual connections among them, continued active operations under a firm organization in order to carry on a systematized anti-Japanese movement. They made efforts to obtain arms, ammunition, provisions, as well as comrades-in-arms. Meanwhile, they looted the surrendered arms which we had assembled, assassinated our officers and men, destroyed our communication and transportation lines, killed , threatened and pillaged law-abiding citizens at large. Thus the state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula after the war was still alarming. Doc. No. 264? Pago 37 2 . State of purge. Recognising the necessity of conducting purging operations of the Malay Peninsula following the fall of Singapore, the Army dispatched from Singapore by the end of Feiruary the 18th Division to Johore State and the 5th Division to the Malay Peninsula other tnan Johore State, to take charge cf the peace and order in the respective districts and at the same time conduct purging operations against the anti-Japanese Chinese. Iu the cafe of the 5i.h Division, the district assigned to it was subdivided as follows to bs placed under the charge of its component units: Mallaeca and Negri Seubiran Provinces 11 I Selangor Province 41 I , 5A, 5T Pera Province 42 1 Paha.ng Province 5K Zeda, Penang, Trenganu, and Eelantan Provinces 21 I The 5th and the 18th Divisions generally commenced purging opera- tions from the early part of March, conducting mopping-up operations of anti-Japanese Chinese in the mountains .and forests. By the end of April about 1 ,000 undesirable Chinese were arrested in Johore State, about 1?<500 in Selanbang and Mallaeca Provincess about 300 in Selangor Province, about 100 in Pera. about 50 in Paha.ng and about 200 jn Keda and Penang Provinces. Numerous arms were also seized. After examination, the greater part of these persons were released. However, casualties often occurred on boi-h sides at the time of making arrests, since the Chinese fired at us, causing us to return fire also. Moreover,. a considerable numbe£_Xjhe_leaders) killed themsclvas when they realized the situation tcTbe against them. " Even after May the anti-Japanese Chinese continued underground activities, with the result that peace and order remained unsatisfactory. Our forces often penetrated through jungles and with considerable difficulties and damage to cur sic.e; carried on the punitive operations in order to securo peace and ordor, but failed to eradicate the anti- Japanese Chinese. Of the purging operations after May the prominent ono wa.s the punitive operations in the forests north of Kuala Larrpur. Upon receipt of intelligence that a b o u t 3 0 0 an^i-Japanese Chinese were scheming the assassination of our officers anThnen and the^&omETnf; of our barracks.,. we supprpasftd them bv a fores tailing attack. Following the battle, the remnant Chinese fled further deep into thejungles, ^febout 200 dead bodies were left in the battlefield as the result of this battle. Doc. Ko. 2647 Page 38 In short, the purging operations on the Malay Peninsula represented peace preservation patrol activities to protect not only the Japanese troops themselves "but also the life and property of the people at large (Chinese, Malayans, Indians, e t c . ) . Although we regret to say that we have no clear idea of the detailed situation owing to lack of data, the anti-Japanese Chinese who lost their lives were principally those who fell under our bullets, etc. during battle in the course of the purging operations. Our side also suffered considerable casualties in the course of the difficult punitive operations. (Annex) The collection of the contributions from the _Chin"3RiL which was carried out without reference to the arrests of Chinese in Singapore, sgemed to J)e mainly a count,ar measure adopted to cope with in f lat ion^ foljLovttngThe occupation of Malay. Since the currency in circulation reached St. $260 ,000 ,000 following the surrender of the British troops as compared with St. $210 ,000 ,000 in pre-war days, it was decided to have the difference. St. $50 .000 ,000 . donated. The donations viere collected about the time of the transfer of GeneFal YAMASHITA to another post. * 5. Judgments. In short, it can be understood from the guiding policy of the Army Commander at the beginning of the war that utmost efforts were made to prevent and chock the inhumane aots committed during the course of the Malay (Singapore) campaign. ( l ) . With regard to the question of the disposition of the Chinese in Singapore, it is clear that Commander YAMASBITA, following the surrender of the British Army, issued to the various commanders of the corps and of the Garrison Forces an order concerning the clearing up of battle-fields and purging operations (mopping-up operations) with the determination to eradicate spies ana disturbers of peace and order, in view of the intensive obstructive measures and anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese during the campaign. However, no written order for the punishment of the Chinese alone exists. The Commander of the Garrison Forces at Singapore, on tho basis of the above-mentioned order and the Army's intention, carried it out as a part of the operations for clearing up the battle-fields and of the purging operations. Judging also from the objective situation at that time and the state of mopping-up operations throughout the entire Malay Peninsula, it is clear that it was not based on the personal view of the Commander of the Garrison Forces. I should judge that, in punishing the Chinese, prepara- tions were made beforehand and various measures adopted after entry / in to Singapore/ in order to ensure propriety. Doc. No. 2647 Page 39 (2) Since the araests and punishments of the Chinese were conducted during the course of clearing up the "battle-fields and mopping-uo operations following intensive fightings it is needless to say that it is difficult to judge such acts on the "basis of the standard for normal times, even though efforts were made to ensure their propriety. It appears that the reports "by enemy newapa.pers include those who_died from war. "sickness during operations and even citizens at largewho were victims of "bombing. They also exaggerate things^ Accordingly, it seems proper to estimate thfl-rmmber of soiesLandJir.ti.-Japr ne s e undorsirat 1 e~~c 1 cments vfio ware punished at about 5,000. In Hu HSING's "Notes on tho Hew Life of the Chinese" it is written that there was a fairly large number of undesirable Chinese who obstructed operations and instigated and looted law abiding citizens. This gives an idea of the situation. (3) Although it is not possible to guarantee that, in making the arrests and punishments, the staff officers concerned did not "overdo" themselves, and although it is difficult to get a clear idea of the situation then because Lt. Col. HAYASHI, who was the staff officer in charge of it (staff officer attached to th.3 headquarters of tho Shonan Garrison Forces) and Chief of Staff Lt. General SUZUKI have died in action, it may become further clear if Major General IgSTANI. v/ho was the chief of the operations section, and Colonel TSUJI, who was the staff officer in charge of operations, are 'interrogated * Do C. ^^UtlJiU) 't^ff^u, ,'n.to / -1 If ' ' - L u c t - t l i - iic/ , . / ^ ^ 7)1 ) pSX ^ ^ r " U^rC't^- <f I MCJMTVI N S// Doc. No. 2647 \ Page 1 . \ \ T h e E x c e r p t f r o m t h e F e b r u a r y 1 8 t h . I w a s a p p o i n t e d the c o m m a n d e r of t h e g u a r d s in S i n g a p o r e a n d w a s o r d e r e d ' t o c o m m a n d t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n , 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t and t h e 1 s t B a t t a l i o n , 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y , a n d m i l i t a r y p o l i c e i n c l u d i n g a s s i s t a n t g e n d a r m e s , a n d to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e d e f e n s e of S i n g a p o r e . A t 1 0 a . m . I r e p o r t e d a t t h e a r m y h e a d o u a r t e r s a n d r e c e i v e d o r d e r s a n d i n s t r u c t i o n s o n d e f e n s e a n d a l s o r e c e i v e d n e w s of t h e a t t a c h m e n t o f t h e e x t r a s t a f f o f f i c e r , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l H A Y A S H I . F e b r u a r y 1 9 t h . I h e a d r e s o r t s f r o m t h e O H A S H I u n i t , m i l i t a r y p o l i c e , w h i c h w a s in c h a r g e of g u a r d i n g a n d i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e c i t y . T h e p i l l a g i n g b y c i t i z e n s i s s t i l l g o i n g o n . T o w a r d s e v e n i n g , t h e d e f e n s e h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d to F o r t C a n n i n g in t h e c i t y , t h e f o r m e r g e n e r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e B r i t i s h f o r c e s . T h e s a m e e v e n i n g , a c c o r d i n g to i n s t r u c t i o n s , I i s s u e d o r d e r s r e a u i r i n g t h e w h o l e s a l e r o u n d i n g u p of u n d e s i r a b l e C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s , w h i c h is to b e e n f o r c e d f r o m t h e 2 1 s t . E s p e c i a l l y I u r g e d t h e g a t h e r i n g of C h i n e s e m a l c o n t e n t s i n ' o a c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t e d a r e a to b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e r e s t of t h e c i t i z e n s . F e b r u a r y 2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d . F e b r u a r y 2 3 r d . A t 1 1 a . m . t h e m e e t i n g of c o m m a n d e r s w a s h e l d a n d w e h e a r d t h e v a r i o u s r e p o r t s f r o m e a c h p a r t y , on t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a r r e s t a n d l a t e r r e p o r t e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n to t h e a r m y c o m m a n d e r . I h a v e i s s u e d o r d e r s c o n c e r n i n g t h e g e n e r a l g u 9 r d i n g . T h e w h o l e s a l e r o u n d u c w a s i n f o r c e d . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e F e b r u a r y 2 4 t h . F r o m t o d a y , e x t e n d i n g o v e r t h r e e d a y s , t h e m e e t i n g of t h e b r a n c h d i r e c t o r s o f t h e m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s is to b e h e l d . I h a v e t o d a y a t t e n d e d t h e m e e t i n g . F e b r u a r y 2 5 t h . T h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e f o r c e s m a d e a r o u n d of i n s p e c t i o n s , and e x a m i n e d t h e d e f e n s e s i t u a t i o n s in t h e c i t y . M a r c h 1 s t . I h a v e r e c e i v e d o r d e r s to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e g u a r d of C h a n g i d i s t r i c t f r o m t o d a y . T h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n , 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t w a s a s s i g n e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . M a r c h 4 t h . I h a v e r e c e i v e d an o r d e r to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e d e f e n s e of t h e e n t i r e i s l a n d of S i n g a p o r e . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of the a r m y , I h a v e i s s u e d o r d e r s f o r t h e e f u g e e s i n S i n g a p o r e t o g o b a c k f r o m w h e r e t h e y c a m e f r o m . M a r c h 5 t h . 7 e r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e g a r r i s o n or B i n t a n I s l a n d , t e l l i n g of t h e l a n d i n g o f 1 , 0 0 0 D u t c h t r o o p s o n t h e n e i g h b o r i n g i s l a n d . I m m e d i a t e l y I d i s p a t c h e d t h e K A Y A S H I b a t t a l i o n ( t h e f o r m e r a s s i s t a n t m i l i t a r y p o l i c e ) of t h e 1 8 t h D i v i s i o n . M a r c h 7 t h . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n , S t a f f - o f f i c e r K A Y A S H I w h o w a s a t t a c h e d t o u s , w a s o r d e r e d to b e a t t a c h e d to t h e G u a r d D i v i s i o n . M a r c h 8 t h . S i n c e the g e n d a r m e s w e r e r e v e r t e d to t h e i r o r i g i n a l d u t i e s w e h a v e g i v e n o r d e r s to b o t h a i r f o r c e s a n d r a i l w a y c o r p s f o r l o c a l d e f e n s e s . M a r c h 9 t h . I t b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e n e w s o f l a n d i n g o f e n e m y o n B i n t a n I s l a n d a n d i t s v i c i n i t y w a s false,.. H A Y A S H I b a t t a l i o n d i s p a t c h e d to t h e s p o t r e t u r n e d h e r e t o d a y . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e M a r c h 1 3 t h . T h e b r i g a d e h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d t h e 4 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t h a v e b e e n d e c i d e d to b e u s e d f o r s o m e o t h e r p u r p o s e s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e n e w d u t i e s , a n d t o d a y I h a v e r e c e i v e d a n u n o f f i c i a l a n n o u n c e m e n t to p r e p a r e f o r t h i s . M a r c h 1 7 t h . H a n d i n g o v e r t h e d e f e n s e d u t i e s to the s u c c e e d i n g brigad c o m m a n d e r , M a j o r G e n e r a l S U G I U R A b e g a n . M a r c h 1 8 t h . A t n o o n , t h e r e l i e f o f t h e d e f e n s e w a s c o m p l e t e d . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e E x t r a c t s f r o m t h e d i a r y of M a j o r G e n e r a l K A W A M U R A , t h e 9 t h I n f a n t r y B r i g a d e C o m m a n d e r . F e b r u a r y 1 6 . D e s p a t c h e d M a j o r K O B A Y A S H I a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 0 o f f i c e r s a n d m e n u n d e r h i s c o m m a n d a s a n E m e r g e n c y M P u n i t to t h e R a f f l e s c o l l e g e b y 1 0 a.m„» G o t a l l u n i t s to c l e a n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . T h i s d a y , d e s p a t c h e d t h e u n i t u n d e r M a j o r M I S H I B A ' s c o m m a n d to h a n d l e t h e PWs* m a t t e r s . F e b r u a r y 1 7 O u r h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d to t h e C l u b h o u s e f o r t h e r e a s o n of i n c o n v e n i e n c e in c o m m a n d . L a t e a t n i g h t I w a s o r d e r e d t o t a k e c o m m a n d o f b o t h b a t t a l i o n s of t h e 1 1 t h and 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t s a n d t h e E m e r g e n c y IF u n i t a s t h e n e w l y - a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r o f t h e S i n g a p o r e G u a r d F o r c e , a n d to t a k e c h a r g e of t h e g u a r d i n g of the c i t y . F e b r u a r y 1 8 . P r e s e n t e d m y s e l f to A r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s a t 1 0 a . m . to r e - c e i v e the o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g m e to b e G u a r d F o r c e C o m m a n d e r . A t 1 2 a . m . I w e n t to R a f f l e s C o l l e g e a n d i s s u e d t h e n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s . S t a f f O f f i c e r H A Y A S H I w a s a s s i g n e d to m e . F e b r u a r y 1 9 o I n s p e c t e d t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e c i t y f r o m 1 0 a . m . L i s t e n e d to t h e r e p o r t c o n c e r n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n s f r o m M P U n i t C o m m a n d e r O I S H I a n d h i s m e n . ( p . l ) (•?as i m p r e s s e d w i t h t h e i m p e r f e c t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n of o u r o f f i c e r s a n d m e n . ) I n t h e e v e n i n g , o\ir h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e r e m o v e d to F o r t C a n n i n g . I s s u e d a n o r d e r to m a k e w h o l e s a l e a r r e s t s of d e l i n a u e n t C h i n e s e f r o m t h e 2 1 s t a n d t h e r e b y a d v o c a t e d t h e i r a s s e m b l y in a c e r t a i n a r e a . No. 2647 P a g e 5 . F e b r u a r y 2 0 . H e l d a m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e for t h o s e w h o l a i d d o w n t h e i r l i v e s a n d a c e r e m o n y of a w a r d i n g c e r t i f i c a t e s of m e r i t . F e b r u a r y 2 1 . S t a r t e d the w h o l e s l a e a r r e s t s t o d a y . H e l d a m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e in the D i v i s i o n . L a t e r , i n s p e c t e d the s i t u a t i o n s of s e a r c h i n g b y the C e n t r a l A r e a U n i t . F e b r u a r y 2 2 . In the m o r n i n g , i n s p e c t e d the s i t u a t i o n s of the E a s t A r e a U n i t , the camp f o r B r i t i s h n o n - c o m b a t a n t s and the N o r t h A r e a , In the a f t e r n o o n , a t t e n d e d t h e m e m o r i a l s e r v i c e of the O K A B E U n i t a n d l a t e r i n s p e c t e d the s i t u a t i o n s of the C e n t r a l A r e a U n i t . F e b r u a r y 2 3 . H e l d a U n i t C o m m a n d e r m e e t i n g f r o m 1 1 a . m . and l i s t e n e d to the r e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g the s i t u a t i o n s of s e a r c h i n g to the e f f e c t that t h o s e w h o had b e e n p u n i s h e d n u m b e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 , 0 0 0 , of w h i c h i m p o r t a n t p e r s o n s a r e c o n t i n u i n g to b e detainee and a r e u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In the e v e n i n g , w a s i n v i t e d to the d i n n e r in the D i v i s i o n . H e a r d t h a t the D i v i s i o n w i l l s h o r t l y be d i s p e r s e d to v a r i o u s a r e a s . It w a s a f a r e w e l l p a r t y f o r m e . M e m o r y : It is in m y m e m o r y t h a t on t h e 23rd I w e n t to the Arms'- h e a d q u a r t e r s to r e p o r t a f t e r the U n i t C o m m a n d e r M e e t i n g h a d a d j o u r n e d . F e b r u a r y 2 4 . 2 5 . 2 6 . H e l d a m e e t i n g of c h i e f s of t h e M i l i t a r y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t on 2 5 t h , the A r m y C o m m a n d e r c a l l e d o n u s d u r i n g h i s i n s p e c t i o n t o u r . O n 26th, the A r m y C o m m a n d e r g a v e a s p e e c h to the e f f e c t t h a t w e should take u p a far m o r e p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e , i n s t e a d of the h e r e t o f o r e i n t e r n a l g u i d a n c e . M a r c h _ 1 . F r o m this d a y , the g u a r d i n g of C h a n g i w a s t a k e n o v e r b y the 3rd D i v i s i o n , 1 1 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t . ec - No, 264-7 . Page 6 . M a r c h 2 . I n s p e c t e d t h e P W s in C h a n g i . T o d a y , c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e c u r i t y p r e c a u t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e S h o n a n I s l a n d , I g a v e n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s . M a r c h 4 . T h e g u a r d i n g u n i t s t h r o u g h o u t S h o n a n I s l a n d w e r e c h a n g e d , a t 1 2 p . m . t o d a y . F r o m t h i s d a y , o r d e r e d t h e r e f u g e e s to l e a v e t h e p l a c e * M a r c h 5 . E a r l y in the m o r n i n g I r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m n a t i v e s t h a t a b o u t o n e t h o u s a n d D u t c h t r o o p s h a d l a n d e d f r o m B i n t a n g I s l a n d , so I o r d e r e d t h e i n c r e a s e b y h a l f of t h e H A Y A S H I B a t t a l i o n of t h e 8 t h D i v i s i o n , in o r d e r to p r e p a r e f o r t h e i r s u p p r e s s i o n . O n t h e 6 t h w e l e a r n e d t h a t it w a s a f a l s e g l a r m . M a r c h 7 . H A Y A S H I c h a n g e d h i s p o s i t i o n a s a s t a f f o n t h e I m p e r i a l G u a r d D i v i s i o n u n e x p e c t e d l y . M a r c h 8 . A c c o r d i n g to t h e e n a c t m e n t o f the M . P . S e r v i c e R e g u l a t i o n s , I o r d e r e d t h a t s t a t u s o f M . P . s b e c h a n g e d so t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e d i s p a t c h e d and h o l d a n a d d i t i o n a l p o s t i n e v e r y D i s t r i c t d e t a c h m e n t . M n r c h 9 . T h e H A Y A S H I B a t t a l i o n i n B i n t a n g I s l a n d r e t u r n e d . M a r c h 1 1 . P a s t 1 2 o ' c l o c k a c a p t u r e d P o w d e r M a g a z i n e e x p l o d e d . T o p r e v e n t p l o t t i n g b y r e b e l s , w e e n f o r c e d a n e m e r g e n c y g u a r d , a n d did o u r b e s t t o r e l i e v e t h e r e f u g e e s . M a r c h 1.3. T o d a y I a n d t h e 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t r e c e i v e d a n A r m y O r d e r to d e p a r t a g a i n in t h e n e a r f u t u r e to f u l f i l l n e w d u t i e s . M a r c h 1 4 . F o r t h e p u r p o s e of g a t h e r i n g t h e t r o o p s t o g e t h e r , I i s s u e d a n o r d e r t h a t I C H I K A W A B a t t a l i o n s h o u l d s u b s t i t u t e in t h e p o s i t i o n o f e m e r g e n c y g u a r d f r o m t h e 1 5 t h i n t . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e M a r c h 1 6 . M a j o r G e n e r a l S U G I U R A a r r i v e d at S i n g a p o r e . M a r c h 1 7 . T r a n s f e r o f d u t i e s . M a r c h 1 8 . T h e r e l i e f f i n i s h e d a t 1 2 , a n d I r e p o r t e d to t h e C o m m a n d e r in C h i e f a b o u t i t . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e A b s t r a c t s of t h e S u b j e c t s C o n c e r n e d f r o m t h e G r e a t e r E a s t A s i a t i c T o p S e c r e t O p e r a t i o n D i a r y of t h e I m p e r i a l H e a d q u a r t e r s T h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e w h a t w e r e r e p o r t e d to t h e I m p e r i a l H e a d q u a r t e r s b y t h e 2 5 t h A r m y , e x c e p t i n g t h e 2nd c l a u s e o f M a r c h 1 3 t h , w h i c h is the r e p o r t f r o m t h e S o u t h e r n G e n e r a l A r m y . F e b r u a r y 7 . T h e a r m y e n t e r s a t o n c e i n t o t h e n e x t o p e r a t i o n w i t h o u t t h e c e r e m o n y of t r i u m p h a l e n t r y . F e b r u a r y 1 8 . 1 . T h e a r m y m a d e a b o u t t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s of i n f a n t r y a n d t h e s e c o n d f i e l d g e n d a r m e r i e u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of B r i g a d i o . KA T <7AMCJRA m o u n t g u a r d o v e r t h e c i t y o f S i n g a p o r e , and t h e m a i n f o r c e l o c a t e d in i t s v i c i n i t y a r e e n g a g i n g i n c l e a n i n g t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d p r e p a r i n g f o r the c o m i n g o p e r a t i o n . 2 . E a c h o n e c o m p a n y of 5 D s u c c e s s f u l l y l a n d e d o n t h e i s l a n d s " B u k u m " a n d " S a m b o . " / p h o n e t i c e q u i v a l e n t s / F e b r u a r y 2 0 . S A S A K I B a t t a l i o n o f 5 D l a n d e d o n B i n t a n g I s l a n d w i t h o u t b l e e d i n g . F e b r u a r y 2 1 . T h e r e a r e f a i r l y m a n y v o l u n t e e r s a n d M a l a y a n s w h o j o i n e d the e n e m y ' s f o r c e a s a v o l u n t e e r a r m y a n d t h e f i f t h c o l u m n . T h e a r m y is n o w i n s e a r c h of t h e m . T h o s e w h o w e r e t a k e n i n s o o n a f t e r t h e f a l l of S i n g a p o r e : 1 6 C h i n e s e v o l u n t e e r s , 3 6 0 M a l a y a n v o l u n t e e r s . F e b r u a r y 2 4 . 2 5 . 2 6 . O n t h i s o c c a s i o n w h e n t h e m a i n o p e r a t i o n o f M a l a y h a s c o m e to a n e n d , a m e e t i n g of t h e h e a d o f f i c i a l s o f t h e b r a n c h e s of the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e n t w a s h e l d . F e b r u a r y 2 7 . v r i t h c a p t i v e s and c a p t u r e d a r m s w a s o r g a n i z e d t h e S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d D e f e n s e C o r n s . A l l of t h e s e v e n t y t h o u s a n d Doc. No. 2647 Page 9 of c a p t i v e s c a n n o t b e c o n s u m e d b y t h i s a r m y * T h e array wishe.3 to u s e t h e n d i s p e r s e d in e a c h n e c e s s a r y f i e l d , a n d i m m e d i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n is d e s i r e d . F e b r u a r y 2 8 . T h e s + a t e of a c t i v i t i e s of " d e G a u l l e " f a c t i o n h e r e is n o w b e i n g c l a r i f i e d b y a n d b y „ " G l a i r e , " / p h o n e t i c / a J e w , " R e m a n l , " / p h o n e t i c / a s p y of t h e m i l i t a r y c o m m i t t e e o f the "de G a u l l e " f a c t i o n and " C a u s e l l e , " / p h o n e t i c / t h e M a n a g e r of the F r e n c h I n d o - C h i n e s e B a n k ; h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d to i n t e r n m e n t and i n q u i r y . March 1 . A s it h a s s e r i o u s i n f l u e n c e o n t h e f u t u r e a c t i o n of t h e a r m y , w e w i s h to k n o w if y o u h a v e a n i n t e n t i o n to m o v e t h e p r e s e n t c a p t i v e s h e r e to a n y o t h e r p l a c e s t h a n M a l a y Peninsulr. A t p r e s e n t , 8 5 , 0 0 0 c a p t i v e s . M a r c h 3 . T h e o c c u p a t i o n of S i n g a p o r e is g o i n g s m o o t h l y a n d t h e o c c u p a t i o n b u s i n e s s b y c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s w a s c o m p l e t e d a t t h e end o f F e b r u a r y . S t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the c i t y of S i n g a p o r e : S o o n a f t e r t h e o c c u p a t i o n , w e a r r e s t e d a n d e x e c u t e d a b o u t 5 , 0 0 0 d e l i n q u e n t p e r s o n s a s t h e f i r s t c l e a r i n g a n d , f u r t h e r , w e a r e p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e n e x t c l e a r i n g . T h e a p p e a s i n g c a m p a i g n to t h e c i t i z e n s is a s f o l l o w s (the f o l l o w i n g : c o n c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n c y ) . T h e m o v e m e n t cf the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n s h a s b e e n t a k i n g its r e g u l a r c o u r s e . M n r c h 1 3 . : T h e m a i n f o r c e s u c c e e d e d in l a n d i n g a t 0 7 0 0 a n d Y O S H I D A D e t a c h m e n t , a t 0 5 4 0 . j 2 . T h e o p e r a t i o n o r d e r of t h e S o u t h e r n G e n e r a l A r m y N o . 8 5 : T h e h e a d of t h e T O M c o r p s s h a l l h a v e t h e 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y , 2 S e c t i o n / 26 P s u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of t h e C h i e f of 9 t h I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n e n t e r u n d e r the c o m m a n d of t h e h e a d of t h e W A T A R I c o r p s . M a r c h 1 7 . S i n c e t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of M a l a y o p e r a t i o n , w e h a v e b e e n w a t c h i n g s t r i c t l y t h e m o v e m e n t o f the C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s . A f t e r t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n of S i n g a p o r e I s l a n d , t h e i r i n t e r e s t in J a p a n h a s b e e n i n t e n s i f i e d . A t the same t i m e , r i g o r o u s m e a s u r e s w e r e a d o p t e d to s u c h a n t i - J a p a n e s e C h i n e s e a s t h e D o c . 2 6 4 7 P a g e 1 0 . v o l u n t e e r s . T h u s , t h e i r m o v e m e n t h a s t a k e n d e c i s i v e d i r e c t i o n T h a t i s , t h e y take an a t t i t u d e to s u b m i t t h e i r l i v e s , p r o p e r - ties and a l l the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s to the J a p a n e s e a r m y and to w a i t p e n i t e n t i a l l y f 5 r a n y o r d e r s , k e e p i n g t h e s e t h i n g s for t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y p r o p o s e that if the c o m m a n d e r of the J a p a n e s e A r m y w o u l d e x e m p t t h e m f r o m d e a t h and w o u l d g i v e t h e m a f a v o r to c a r r y on t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n s at e a s e , t h e y w o u l d swear t h e i r f u t u r e f a i t h f u l n e s s a n d e c o n o m i c a l c o n t r i - b u t i o n and ^ o u l d c o n t r i b u t e one h a l f of t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s to the J a p a n e s e a r m y . A s to the o f f e r i n g of cne h a l f of t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , w e a c c e p t o n l y t h e i r s p i r i t and i n s t e a d of one h a l f w e r e c e i v e c a s h of f i f t y m i l l i o n y e n . W i t h the f o r e - g o i n g s , the f i r s t step of the m e a s u r e s toward the C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s in M a l a y is c o m p l e t e d . N e x t , the second m e a n s s h a l l .-e t a k e n . M a r c h 1 8 . F r o m C o l o n e l T s u j i : I i n t e n d to t a k e m y p o s t t h e r e a f t e r t h e i n s p e c t i o n of b a t t l e c o n d i t i o n of B u r m a and P h i l i p p i n e t h e a t r e a b o u t the l a t t e r p a r t of M a r c h . A p r i l 1 0 . T h o u g h the p u b l i c p e a c e of M a l a y P e n i n s u l a is g o i n g to r e c o v e r b y the a c t i v i t i e s of r e s p e c t i v e g u a r d i n g u n i t s , s t i l l , s e c r e t m o v e m e n t s of C h i n e s e r e s i d e n t s h e r e h a v e n o t e n t i r e l y c e a s e d y e t . M a r c h 2 A p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,500 p e r s o n s in C e l e n b a n and M a l a c c a w a r e c a p t u r e d at o n c e and a l o t of a r m s w e r e c o n f i s c a t e d , and the m a j o r i t y "-'ho w e r e c a p t u r e d w e r e r e l e a s e d a f t e r i n v e s t ! g a t i o n . M a r c h 2 9 . (At the d i s t a n c e of 16 k . m . to the n o r t h of* K w a n t a n ) The d e n of c o m m u n i s t s w a s c r i p p l e d e n t i r e l y and 15 of its m e m b e r s w e r e c a p t u r e d (the l e a d e r c o m m i t t e d s u i c i d e ) at"." the end of M a r c h . At the l o c a t i o n of 1 5 k . m . to the s o u t h - e a s t of K a g a y a n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 0 h i d i n g c o m m u n i s t s a r e b e i n g s e a r c h e d w i t h the a t t e m p t of o u s t i n g . Doc-, No, 2647 Page 11 A p r i l 5 . F i f t y - t h r e e a n t i - J a p a n e s e r a d i c a l s w e r e c a p t u r e d a t T a i p i n . A t P e n a n , w e a r e t o m a k e a r o u n d u p b e f o r e l o n g . A p r i l 1 6 . A s t h e r e s u l t of the s e a r c h b y o u r G e n d a r m e r i e , w e h a v e d i s c l o s e d t h e p l o t m o v e m e n t of B r i t i s h b a t t l e b e a t e n r e m a i n i n g s o l d i e r s and a c e r t a i n p a r t y of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s (it s e e m s to b e u n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of C H E N G - C H I E H - M I N ) , A c c o r d i n g l y , a f t e r t h e f u r t h e r s e a r c h i n g o u t o f t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e w i r e l e s s a p p a r a t u s , w e e x p e c t to c a p t u r e t h i s g r o u p . Doc. Ho. 2647 I^^AjJ - Page 12 I ef¥C SECRET A pro ees-verbal concerning the punishment of Chinese residents in Singapore By the 4th unit 2? Oct., 1945 1. Circumstances of manoeuvres by Chinese residents in the Malay Campai? During the MALAY campaign. Chinese residents were, very active in their manoeuvres from the beginning to the end around the battle-fields and especially in ohe rear, obstructing our campaign and causing us much difficulty. That is to say. near the battle-fields they chiefly communi- cated with the enemy, consequently our plan of operation0, was perceived enemy, placing us in a v-»ry disadvartageous position; or areas where our troops were concentrated were bombarded, thus it was no-; only once that our troops had to suffer meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our com- missary lines were attacked, lined of communication, military commhicat lines were destroyed, and our military materials damaged, delaying the arrival of those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-fields, consequently often the MALAY campaign, which necessitated speed, was ob- structed end made difficult. Examples are as follows: 1. Toward the end of December, 1941, in a battle near 2AMPAR /pho- netic/, signal bombs were fired at night near our reserve artillery position, and immediately /our position/ was showed with enemy shells, causing many useless sacrifices on our side. We searched the vicinity and captured two Chinese residents at one place, and found out that most of the activities were done by the Chinese residents, (a part by British troops). 2. In the above battle, a battalion of the AHDO regiment intending to cut offEAMPAR /phonetic/ from the west, made a detour at night, but a signal shell was fired from a village which was passed. Consequently, not only was our plan discovered, making our rear isolation unsuccessful but when crossing the river in the southwest of KAMPAR /phonetic/(around the place were swamps'- lands,) they were met by a fierce enemy counter- attack. Thus our operations went to pieces and we suffered a great loss Immediately after the signal bomb was fired, about one company searched the village ana captured a Chinese who failed to escape. Accordingly we found that the incident was done by the Chinese residents. 3. At the battles near Gemas /phonetic/ and Segamat /phonetic/ in the middle of January, 1942; at KULAH /phonetic/', YOHGPSHC- /phonetic/ an BATU PAEAT /phonetic/ in the end of January of the same year; at Singapo in the beginning and middle of February of the same year, signal bombs were incessantly fired. Artillery positions, reserve units and higher Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e command posts were suddenly "bombarded, causing many meaningless casualties. It was discovered that most of these acts were committed by the Chinese residents. 4 . When the eneny attacked Ku.alarunapin /phonetic/ by air at night in the middle of January, 1942, a signal shell was fired from the aero- drome of Kualarumpun /phorotic/, using this as a target the enemy bombed /the aerodrome/, burning several "f our planes, and causing many casualties among the troops, As tho rc3U.lt of the capture of Chinese residents, it was disclosed that the signal afcells were fired by Chinese residents. 5. In the middle of January 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division was crossing the River Muarh /phonetic/, Chinese residents indicated the point to be crossou and ?pid?d the night-bombing of the enemy planes, con- sequently crossing the r^vor was extremely difficult and with a great loss. 6 . Between [->e middle and end of January,- 1942, during the battle around Malacca and Batobahato /phonetic/, in which the Imperial Guard Division is involved, Chinese residents communicated with enemy submarines on the sea of Malacca and other then assisting the smuggling, guiding and protecting of suies from the submarines, they indicated the location of our units and made it easier and more advantageous for naval bombardment from ships in the s t r a f e of Malacca. As a result of the above bombardment the operations of the Imperial Guard Division was not only made extremely difficult and disadvantageous, but also a large amount of munitions and weapons were damaged and many casualties among the troops. 7. While the OGAKI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the N.W. in the figxhting around BATCBAHATO /phonetic/ toward the end of Jan . , 1942, was discovered as a result of the Chinese residents com- munications with the enemy. Subsequently, they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack and becoming isolated, the battalion commander and most of the men wero killed. 8. In the end of December, 1941, in a forest to the north of Taipin /phonetic/, a hundred odd armed Chinese residents were planning to disrupt our supply lines, and burn our munitions. As this was discovered before- hand, /the area/ was cleared of Chinese residents. 9. In the middle and end of January, 1942, the Chinese residents often felled trees and laid them across the road between GEMAS-SSRENGBAN /phonetic/ and RABIS-SEGAMATT /phonetic/, so that our vehicle transporta- tion was stopped, and making good use of these opportunities fired from the forests on both sides. As a result many men were killed, the valuable munitions being stolen, thus preventing munitions being sent forward, and made our operations very difficult . . 10. There were often destruction of the railroads, but as the des- truction of the railroad in the forest south of IBO /phonetic/ and in the Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 14 forest "between SERSHGBAH and. GEMAS /phonetic/ happened just at the time when munitions were to he forwarded most urgently for the Singapore cam- paign, it had a tremendous effect. As a result, not only did the comer.' ment of the Singapore campaign have to "be postponed from the 3th Feb. to the 9th Feb . , but the forwarding of supplies, especially ammunition, aftc the commencement of the campaign did not operate as desired. Therefore' front line ammunition was so scarce that temporarily the campaign was endangered — /omitted/ — and brought about — /omitted/ . In each case of obstruction the offender was captured and it was discovered that this was mainly the work of Chinese residents. I I . There were numerous cases of the destruction of military commu- nication lines that there was noi time to arrest the culprits. The aforementioned are only a few examples, the manoeuvres of the insurgent Chinese residents during the MALAY campaign are beyond description and have cut deep down into the heart of our troops. 2 . The state of public peace in and around Singapore after the surrende of the British forces. The British forces in Singapore surrendered on the 15th of Februarr and the island immediately after tne fighting actions was covered with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to be noted is the fact that there was a two-three day gap between the day of the British surrender and the day of the Japanese entry into that city. Thus, during this interval, implements of war such as r ifle? , ammunitions, machine guns, revolvers, wireless equipment, light automobiles, etc. wero moved away and concealed in the house* of Chinese and natives. Such state became clear gradually, and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic wires running between the headquarters of all the army corps in the suburbs and the city were cut off intentionally, rendering it impossible to mair> tain the communication betvreen them. And it became clear that the Chin? in the suburbs or in the urban districts of the city plundered provision clothes and fuel, etc. and concoalod those things in their store-hous.es or above the ceiling or under the floor of individual houses, etc. In the meanwhile, what constituted OUT primary consideration wai th it was impending to draft a. major proportion from our forces to prepare for tho approaching operation, and that we were to maintain the public peace in the occupied area v/ith a minor force. The advance towards the south of our army was very speeiy. On the other hand, there were still number of bases in the went ccaro of Malay peninsula left for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on top of this, the hostile Chinese disperse in the Rhio islands, south of Singapore, Lingu island and the Anambu islands after the fall of Singapore seemed to be preparing for their fut action in cooperation with their comrades in Singapore and Malay peninai and the rumors about the British reinforcements to arrive were circulat: So we feel keenly the necessity to seours public peace with some drastic measure and control to check the false ruirors in Singapore island. (Reference). Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e The status of the activities of De Gaulle's group was likely to hav been made clear gradually by the 28th of February: Klay /phonetic/ , a jcv Lumor /phonetic/ , a spy of the military commission of the DeGaulle1 a party, and Coceil /phonetic/ , the manager of the French India) China Bank, were then arrested and detained. 3. Regarding investigation and execution of Chinese residents in "Singa- pore" . Under the consideration that simultaneous advance of the various corps of the expeditionary forces into the city of Singapore should rather cause a difficulty in keeping peace and order of the city, the military order was given, on Feb. 17, to detail a force in a size of nearly three infantry battalions plus the 2nd detachment of Field Milita Police / K f f i P S m i / under the command of Major-General KAw'XMURA, commande of the 9th Infantry Brigade; while the major part of the military opera- tion forces was placed back to station at the northern suburb of "S" city, thus to have only small number of the unit put on duty for the gur of the city. The said guard commander, on the following day, v iz . the 1 visited the General Headquarters and did the required liaison. ( l ) Posting The posting at the beginning was as shown on the attached map showing the status of disposition, but afterward the guard was extended all ovei the island on March 2nd with a movement of military strengths occurring since then. (a) Search for hostile Chinese. The investigation was executed during the 4 days period from Feb. 17 to 20 mainly on the basis of " a list of the anti-Japanese Chinese" which had been secured at "IPOH" and with reference to search matorials of the roster of the detective bureau criminal lists of the Police Office and the statement made by rescued Japanese. The police officials of the Malay detective bureau were cause to attend to this occasion. (b) The number of persons searched during the first series lasting for 3 days, Feb. 21-23, about 5 ,000 persons; the second series, Feb. 18-March 3, about 1 ,500 perronr> ; the third series at the end of March, about 300 perrons. Among them, about 2 ,000 persons were releasee after the investigation. (c ) Reason for the search and the execution. There exists no written order given to the Guard Commander; it is , however, almost cler that the Guard Compander had is rued orders to cope with the idea of the Army, and in the light of the situation of tho mopping up operation throughout the MALAY peninsula, it ie clear thac t.i, Jvard Commander did not is§Je orders baaed on his c«ra personal view. Xt is , however, vej doubtful whether the mass execution ox Ch:ner,e was due to the order of the commander-in-chief or not. Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e As Lieutenant-Colonel HAYASHI who was Chief of Staff in charge at that time died on the f ield , it is impossible to find the fact. (d) Execution of the punishment. The objectives of the punish- ment constitute mainly those who communicated secretly with the enemy.; those who led the hostile bombing of our airfields ; those who did marki? of targets of artillery gun f i re ; those who disturbed rear transport li: those who did not change the attitude of opposition to Japan and self confessed the continuance of the act to oppose Japan at our investigation These were the leaders of the Federated Association of Chinese Volunteert to oppose Japan, and member of Communists party in Malay; those who were punished strictly total about 5 ,000 up to the end of March. 4 . The Present Situation of Regulating Operation in MALAYA Peninsula. (1) The Present Situation of the Public Peace in MALAYA Peninsula. We have already mentioned the conditions of the Chinese manoeuvring during our MALAYA operation. Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE many- ant i- Japan Chinese have entered secretly into cities and jungles and de- claring communism and communicating with each other, some of then have continued to be active in order to develop the systematic anti-Japan movement under the strict and strong system and try hard to obtain weapor ammunition, provisions, money and members, while looting our stock of weapons obtained in the battle f ield , killing secretly our soldiers and officers, and were acting independently in destroying the networks of communications and traffic and killing, threatening, looting good citizei Though tho battle was over there was great anxiety about the public peac* in MALAYA. (2) The Present Situation of Regulating Operation. Our Army has recognized the importance and necessity of subjugation operations after the surrender of SINGAPORE and t i l l nearly the end of February despatched the 18th Division to "JOHORE" Province, the 5th Divi- sion to other provinces in MALAYA outside of "JOHORE" Province from SINGAPORE Island and made each of them stand guard over the public peace in the district in charge also carrying out the subjugation operation against the anti-Japan Chinese. The 5th Division divided the districts in its charge into several parts and made detachments take charge of portion. "MALACCA" Province. "NEGRISEMBILAN" Province "SELANGOR" Province 11th Infantry Regiment 41st Inf . Reg . , • » 5th Artillery Regiment, 5th Transport Regiment \ Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 17 "PSRAH" Province "PAHAUG" Province "KEDAH" Province, 42nd: Inf . Reg. 5th Cavalry Regiment "TRETGGANU" Province, "XELAETAH" Province 21s.t Inf . Reg. Tho 5th and 18th Division commenced the subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of torch. Carrying out the research and subjugatio. of anti-Japan Chinese in cities and jungles we caught wicked Chinese til] the end of April; about 1 ,000 in "JOHORS" Province, about 1 ,500 in "SSREMRAI!" , "MALACCA", about 300 in "SSLA1TG0R", about 100 in "P73RAH", abo 50 in '"FAHAHG", and about 200 in "KEDAK" and "PEHAHG", and confiscated many weapons, but after investigation released most of them the same way everywhere. There were, however, many cases in which at the arrest the Chinese resisted by firing guns, which induced us to return fire and per- sons on both sides were injured and kil led . Many people (leaders) were there who committed suicide, recognizing their unfavourable circumstances / Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e Since the "beginning of May also, the anti-Japan Chinese still con- tinued. anti-Japan activities, hiding themselves from the eyes of the Japanese, and the public peace was often jeopardized. Our Army carried on subjugations and tried to keep tho public peace, often traversing jungles and meeting with groat difficulties and suffering considerable damages, but never succeeded in entirely sweeping away the anti-Japan Chinese. The subjugation which is noted among those since May is that in the forest to the north of KWALA LOMFUR. Finding out a report that about 300 anti-Japan Chinese were planning the assassination of Japanese soldiers and the burning of Japanese barracks, we sont a punitive force to sub- jugate them, taking the initiative against them. After a battle the defeated Chinese fled away deep into the forests. In this battle, the bodies left dead in the field numbered 200. (3) Conclusion. In short, the rogulating operation in the Malay Peninsula was not only for tho Japanese Army itself, but was an action for the purpose of guarding tho public peace which was carried on for the protection of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens (including the ordinary Chinese, Malayans, Indians, etc.) and though it iB to be regretted that tho circumstances in details, are not clear on account of lack of material it is plain enough that all those dead Chinese died by tho bullets during tho battles of subjugations. During these difficult sub- jugations a considerable number of victims appeared on our part also. V. About the handling of this investigation of punishment of the Singapore Chinose. I . Tho enemy's protest has not yet come, but tho reports concerning this problem is as follows: (1) The story by Major Moris Deeton /phonotic/ and Captain Thomas Ellis /phonotic/ "We wero pushed into freight-cars and brought to Siam, after the fall of Singapore and wore used in the construction of the railroad between Bangkok and Mouimein. Many died on account of hunger and the tropic diseases, the medicines for which were very scanty. According to the talk of a member of the Australian advane©-party, all of 1840 in number except 34 members died before thoy reached the spot 130 milos off to the wost. (2) The report sent from London on Sopt. 5. Tho announcement of the terrible cruel actions of the Japanese toward tho prisoners of tho allied powers and those detained people have caused tho anxiety of thousands of families in the world. Every evening papers in London has / Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e reported, "the Singapore radio has said that when a complete document is made public, the o\ri\izworld will bo against tho cruel deeds of tho Japanese. A Chinese wr.3 iorcod to cr-'.r.k petroleum and a Japanese threw n kindled match into tho mouth of tho Chinese." A g r c t ma.ssacrc of tho Chinese troops and civilians by machinc- guns took place in Singapore, and Dr. Bcdler /phonetic/ the former physician of the Sultan of Johore believes that more than !rO,OOG Asiatics (not including military men) wore punished or tortured to davth by the Japanese socrot police. The largest majority of thorn aro Chinese and the doctor said that, in the small nrea of Dabon /phonetic/ alones somo 50 thousand were killed by the Japanosc secret policc, ~nd th-t it- was a ma.tter of coursc that tho Chincso hated tho Japanese so much. Telling tho story of the ill treatment, the PWs released in Hongkong said that thoy received only a small portion of the packages sent by the Hod Cross. (San Frnncisco Sep. 5 . ) 1 A correspondent on board of an American hospital ship reported the barb--rism of tho Japanese toward tho Australian, British and Dutch prisoners who worked in oil-rofincrios and machino-f-~ctorios. Atrocities committed while the rord construction was under way in Burma and Siax were also reported to the effect that "Even invalids woro forccd to walk to the placc of constructional work and break stones." (Sept. 5. Australia.) According to the roport ronched the Army Headquarters in South- Eastern Asii, alliod powor prisoners wore groatly suffering from malaria, bcri bcri, consumption and dysentery. (Sopt. 5. San Francisco.) 3 . Singapore internment camp. A London broadcast reported on Sept. 6, about tho Japanese atrocities r.t tho Singapore internment camps as follows:- (1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all nationalities including men, women, and children were interned, but Hod Cross has never been permitted to visit there. All males above 10 y c r s old wore compelled to undergo heavy labor and were suppliod with rations oven less than h<-If of that issued by the "Malay" Prison Buroau "s punishment before tho war. When the rescue arrived at, all persons have just begun to roast snails. (2) During tho period of more than 3 years, there was only a single perivr when a logical control was prevailed; this occurred in the period when tho commandant was a Japanese "civilian. 3. There existed always the terrors of many atrocities and every- body was better, day and night for not saluting properly. L Doc. Ho. 2647 Page 20 4 . Spy suspocta were especially ill-treated. On October 2nd, 1943, tho police started a barbarous search to find evldencos of spy suspects in the camp. 57 men and women were confined in a Bmall guard-room, and for many hours they were made to sit with their loga bent in Japanese style and without being given even a minimum of decency they were forced to stay there for many months. One ICuropean was tortured for 55 hours and tho other was struck 144 times. There was a. record with tho full particulars of tho devilsh torture, which Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and recorded in which a Japanese poured water into the mouth and nostrils of one of the suspects and thon pressed tho swollen stomach of the latter with his foot ur jumped o;i tho uppor part of the stomach. Seme of the prisoners cf war will bear the scars of the Japanese torture forever. 5. The captives released at Singapore talked of the ill-treatment: forcod labor, worst food ration and beating. (2) Judging from the a.ttitudos adopted by the United States and British especially the public opinion prevailing in those countries the British protest against Japan is not so bitter as the United States at present, but Britain will f i le a pretest on completion of further close investigation after the recovery of the ex-occupation area. It is , therefore, necessary for us to take a measure to cope with the situation. 1 . Though it is not necessary to produce these investigation materials at present as long as Britain or the United States doos not make any roquost and yet preparation should bo made so e.s to meet tho changing situation. 2 . The execution of Chinese residents at Singapore to some extent was unavoidable considering the circumstances which aroso at that time, but since tho execution had reached a considerable number, Britain, (the United States) and China will announce it as a big massacre and will lodge a protest with us. So that it will rlso be necessary to make a preparation for the punishment of those responsible. / Loo. Hoc 2156 B / Excerpt from Interrogation of OSHIKA, Hlroshi, 1 February 1946, pages 16, 17, 18t 21, 220 Page 1 1. / 4 Doc. 2156B Page 1 Q. When did you first "become acquainted with RIBBENTROP? A . In 1935, for the first time. * * * Q,. What was the occasion for these numerous meetings with RI3BELTTR0P in 1936? A . In 1936 we concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was finally signed "by Ambassador MUSHAKOJI, "but I had a good many talks on matters pre- ceding the final settlement. *:• * * Q,. Had you ever discussed with Mr. HACK the subject matter of this pro- posed alliance against Russia with Germany? A. Yes, I had discussed \:ith him, and in this regard, if you desire, I sha-ll tell you of the ovents leading up to this pact in detail . . - I shall tell you all I know about this pact, including secret matters, pertaining to it . To start with it was in the spring of 1935, in May- or June, I believe, that HACK came to mo and said the following '.fas RIBBENTROP's own idea and had not* ir.g to do with tho policy of the German government, bat would there not be a possibility cf come sort of defensive alliance against liussia betweon Germany and Japan. In this regard they knew that the Japanese army had penetrated into Manchuria and might have an interest in such an alliance - the reason for this being that the army was on the borders of the U . S . S . R . » * * Q,. Did you havo an idea that probably HACK would carry these ideas back to RIBBMTROP7 A . Naturally, I thought so. However, I could not definitely give any answers, unless I knew exactly how GHQ, f e lt . Q,. Continue with the story. A . Subsequent to this RI3EENTR0P said that he wished to see mo and I met him for the very first time at HACK's home in October of that year. At this meeting RIBEWTRQP said that this was r.imply his own idea -and he did not knew how Hitler or the Government felt about it , and he said further that he believed there would be some possibility of its being jut into cffcct . However, ho asked me what the Japanese military would think about it , ard I said that there was no way of knowing, so that he asked me to find out exactly how they would foel , Doc. 2156B Page 2 and he asked me t~ communicate with tho Japanese military and find out how they would feel about it.- I subsequently sent the telegram to GHQ, about the natter. At this tine HIBBETO.OP stressed the fact that this was his own personal idea- end for me not to feci bad about nattors in case the German Govi mi ont did not back him up - I said tho same thing in regard to my own Government. Q,. This is the second communication to Tokyo relative to this proposal? A . Yos. Q,o Continue. A . (HACK was at this meeting ar.d there were just the three of u s . ) Following this ccnruaication of mine to Japan I received the reply fron GHQ, that there was no overall opposition to tho proposal, but that they wished to look into nattors more fully before they crre- mitted themselves, ar.d in this regard they would send I t . Col. WAKAMATSU of the German Division of QEQ,. This officer arrived in Berlin in early December 1935, I believe, although I am not too 3urc of dates. During this interim I did not have any comm.un3.cation with RIBEENTROP. Ou, Did. you have any communication with your own Foreign Office relative to this communication? A . No. This was simply a. military matter. Prior to Lt . Col. VMAMS^J* s arriving in Berlin HACK cams to see me sev3ral time3 and I told him that he should wait until the arrival of the abovemontlened officcr. When he camo X took the Colorol to SOP P.IBBFITF.OP and also General BLOMBERG and W.\KAfO'.TSU toll them that GHQ, was in favor of a more or less general treaty, but that it was his duty, as this was still given only as RIBBEfTPO?'s persona.! idea, to find cut what the German Government felt about it . Also W.'X&iATSU stated that while tho Japanese Army favored it , to bring it into fruition tho Government would have to be consul t«d. * * if. Document No. 2156-0 Page 1 3KCE3PT FROM INTERROGATION OP C S H I M , HIHOSHI, 1 February 194$ ,pp. 18 ,19 . A. I wish to point out to you that tho Japanese military and naval attaches are not under the jurisdiction of the ambassador, "but are directly responsible to tfc.9 respective staff headquarters in Tokyo, As far as the embassy goes, thoy are under the ambassador, but as far as their duties go they are responsible to their mili- tary superiors in Tokyj* Q. Are thq^autborized by virLure of their position as military attache to enter into negefciaticno with the military of another nation, looking towards a pact or a treaty or an intornational agreement between the two nations? A, Yes, if it was a strictly military matter they may discusr these matters without going through tho ambassador.„, Before I go any further I would like to B.rosis hero that thoy were sounding out the opinion of the Japanese armv a.nd not that of the Japanese government because if they had. been that would have been the ambassador5s duty. v.**1 0 Q. Is it not also a fact that if Ribbentrop or any one else in Germany could sell the military of Japan on this idea that the military was then probably in a position whereby they could per- suade the Foreign Office to go along with the idea? A. Yes, that io one point and quite true that the army had enough power to very probably sell the pact to the Japanese government. The second point is the one I stressed before that Ribbentrop was not in an official capacity at the time. Particularly, in this point, ho had r.een how the Japanese army had taken possession of Manchuria and. therefore, naturally, concluded from that that the Japanese army would be in the strongest position to push a treaty of this typo . „ t I would say that no treaty could possibly have been made on this if the army had not wished it . A \ 2 V C f I J r _ Doc. 954 ~ j y ^ Page 1 THE INVESTI GAT I ON EXPORT Oil THE CONCLUSION OP THE JAPAN-GERMAN A1TTI-C0MINTEF.N PACT, BY CHAIRMAN OP THE EXAMINATION COMMITTEE, ARAI (VICE PRESIDENT OP THE PRIVY COUNCIL), COMMITTEE MEMBERS BEING KAKEXO, 2AWAI, ISHII , ARIMA, MOTODA, ISHIZUKA, HAYASHI, KARA (PRIVY COUNCILLORS). NOV. 20 , 1935 P . 1 . We having heen appointed members of the investigation committee con- vened a committee meeting on the 13th and 18th of this month to consider the conclusion of the Japan-Germany pact, which has heen submitted for discussion. In consideration of the special importance of the matter, wc made every effort to perform our duty, by scrutinizing minutely the pro- posals and listening to the explanation of the Ministers of State or the officials concerned. According to the explanation of the Ministers concerned, recently, Soviet Russia is zealously pushing forward the completion of her national defense, especially concentrating her energy in collossal military pre- paredness in the Par East, as well as domestic construction according to the first and second five years plans. P . 2 . Consolidating her international position in Euro-oe by the conclusion of special treaties like the Non-Ag.-ression Treaty or the Treaty for Defining Aggressive Powers with adjacent countries in Europe, next, joining with the League of Nations or concluding the Mutual Aid Treaty with Prance a.nd Czecho-Slovakia last year, her pressure upon East Asia is becoming more and more outstanding. On the other hand the Communist International (the so-called Comintern) /hereafter mentioned as the Comintern/ which is inseparable with Soviet Russia, has been stimulating P . 3 the Bolshevik movement throughout the world, but has recently turned its direction from Europe to East Asia , its main objective of activities beinf Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and China Proper. In 1931, the Central Govern- ment of the Chinese Soviet Republic at Shuikin in Kiangsi was established, their army numbering 350 ,000 . Although the Kiangsi Soviet region was abandoned, on account of Shuikin being captured by Chiang Kai-shek's expedition in November 1934, they hold none the less an obstinate in- fluence in Shensi, Kansu and Szechuan regions. Moreover, since the Seventh International Meeting in 1935, the Comintern has been intensify- P . 4 ing its activities toward China by adopting new tactics of the popular front against Japan through the Chinese Communist party. In Manchoukuo, also, in spite of the strict vigilance kept by Japanese and Manchurian authorities, the Comintern directing the Manchurian Committee of the Chinese Communist party, is concentrating its efforts upon guerrila tactic in various districts,and strivingf6r the incitement of local bandits and the implantation/of the Communist network/. At this very moment, the frequent appearance of guerilla units at different places in Manchoukuo can be noticed. Indeed the influence of the underground activities of the Comintern in the Par East cannot be ignored. The activity of the P . 5 Comintern in tho so-called popular front in Spain is very outstanding. Judging from the reed state of the internal disorder in Spain, it is evident that the Soviet and the Comintern are penetrating into the interna mecnanism of other countries and disturbing the domestic welfare and the peace among nations through their Bolshevization operation. As the abovementioned military pressure of Soviet Russia and the aggravation of the Bolshevization operations of the Comintern in the Par East not only Doc. 2156B Page 2 presents a direct menace to the security of "both Japan and Manchoukuo "but also a serious obstacle in executing our East Asia, policy, we cannot "but regard the counter-measure / toward this red peril / as the most urgent P . 6 and important of all diplomatic problems confronting us. Therefore our Imperial Government stressed the frustration of Soviet Russia's aggressive intention and the obstruction of the Bolshevik encroachment as the main point of our foreign policy. Cooperation on the pa.rt of China for the elimination of the red peril was mentioned as one of the three principles for negotiation with China and with the perfection of national defense. We have established a plan to carry out the above policy through P . 7 appropriate diplomatic measures. However, in Germany, the relations with Soviet Russia were aggravated by the resolute enforcement of the anti-communist policy of the Nazi regime which was set up in 1933 under the leadership of Hitler. Moreover, the conclusion of the Mutual Aid Treaty among Soviet Russia, Czecho-Slovakia and France caused much antipathy and unrest, and then the Seventh International Meeting resolved to regard Japan and Germany as enemies and to make it the duty of Commu- nists all over the world to organize a united front against them. P . 8 Thus Germanywas pla.cea in a similar situation as Japan in her relation- ship with Soviet Russia a.nd the Comintern and found it convenient to cooperate with Japan in regards to national defense and counter-measures against the red peril . (Therefore, as the first step for executing the above foreign policy, the Government planned coordination with Germany and since the spring of this year has instructed the Japanese Ambassador to Germany to carry on negotiations with the representative officials of the German Government/along the line of joint defence against the red p e r i l / . As a. result of this negotiation, both governments have come to an understanding that a suecial pact should be established for the above mentioned coordination. Subsequently this pact was concluded.) p . 9 This pact is composed of two agreements, of which one deals with the Communist International, the other, the attached secret agreement dealing with Soviet Russia, each havinc collateral documents. The follow- ing is a gist of the documents. No. I Pact against Communist International: The object of the Pact is cooperation for the defense against destructive activities of the Communistic International or the so-called "Comintern". Toe contracting parties shall agree to mutually P . 1 0 exchange information regarding activities of Comintern, to discuss the necessary defensive measures and to accomplish these measures through close cooperation. (ARfICLE I ) The contracting parties shall agree to take defensive measures, according to the spirit of this pact, for the sake of any third power whose internal pea.ee is threatened by destructive "comintern" activities , or to collaborate in inducing that nation to join this pact. r Doc. 2156B Page 3 (ARTICLE I I ) The original text of this pact written in "both German and Japanese shall "be the official text, and it shall come into effect from the date of signature "oy the plenipotentiaries ot "both nations. The term of validity shall "be five years; and as regards the attitude for ? . l l mutual cooperation thereafter, ar. understanding shall be reached by plenipotentiaries of both nations at some suitable time before the espiration of the Pact. (ARTICLE I I I ) It shall be stipulated in the supplementary protocol of this Pact that the couriexent authorities of both nations shall exchange information regarding Comintern activities and shall closely cooperate in the enlightening and defensive, measures against "Comintern", and that they shall take strict measures within the bounds of the present laws, against those who are directly or indirectly engaged in its services at home and abroad and also those who assist in its destructive P . 1 2 activities . To facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities •of the above two nations, a standing committee shall be established which Xfill investigate and discuss the various measures necess?,ry to prevent the destructive activites of "Comintern" Ho. II Secret Supplementary Agreement to the Pact against Communist International The object of this agreement is to protect the common interests of Japan and Germany against any military pressure from the Soviet Union. It shall be agreed that in case one of the contracting nations should, P 13 without voluntary incitement, be attacked or threatened to be attacked by the Soviet Union, the other nation shall in no way take such measures likely to result in relieving the burden of Russia 's position, and the contracting nations shall immediately discuss the measures to be taken to protect their common interests. (ARTXCU! i ) It shall be agreed that, while this agreement is valid, the contracting nations shall not, without mutual consent, conclude any other political agreement with the Soviet Union incompatible with the spirit of this agreement. (ARTICLE I I ) It shall be agreed that the original text of this secret agreement written in both German and Japanese shall be the official text and it shall come into effect simultaneously with P . 14 the preceding pact under Ho. I , and shall have the same term of validity. (ARTICLE I I I ) Supplements Ho. I and Ho. I I of this pact, which are the official documents exchanged between plenipotentiaries of both Germany and Japan, shall stipulate that the Fishery Treaty and the Rights and Interests Treaty between Russia a.nd Japan; the treaty on the border-problem among Japan, Manchukuo and Russia; Doc. 954 Pa-re 4. and other similar treaties to he concluded "between Russia and Japan, shall not be included in the political agreement as prescribed in Article -II of this Pact. The official e> chpn.ro documents Ho. I ll and Fo. IV of tho rame pact shall confirm the opinion of the German Government acknowledging that the articles of the political agreements like the Rapallo Treaty P .15 of 1922 and the neutrality Pact of 1926, both in existence between Germany and Russia, do not contradict the spirit of this pact as well as Germany's obligations to this pact, insofar as no object is lacking at the time of the enforcement of this Pact. In the above understanding, both nations shall agree to keep secret this Pact and the Supplementary Official Documents, and even if it may be of advantage to both nations to notify tho contents of this Pact to a third power it shall be done with mutual consent." P .16 In reply to our questions regarding the object and others in the conclusion of this pact, there were some explanations by the Government authorities. The principal points are as follows: ( l ) The sole purpose of this pact is no other then cooperation between Germany and Japan in the defense against destructive "Comintern" activities and in checking armed oppression by Soviet Russia. Therefore, Japan's coalition for this purpose with Germany under the present pact does not necessarily mean that we will unconditionally approve of all her principles regarding matters of P .17 internal affairs and will act in total concert with her. In announcing what has to be revealed on this pact the Government should make a state- ment on its purpose and shall not neglect to take all other proper measures in order that we shall not leave the slightest doubt and misunderstanding on this matter at home and abroad. ( 3 ) The purpose of this pa.ct, as has already been related, is solely to prepare against Comintern and the Soviet Republic. There- fore, it is needless to say that we must refrain, as far as possible, P . 18 from taking such actions as likely to aggravate our relations with Russia., even after the conclusion of this pact. The Government should always pay the strictest attention in regard to border demarcations, the disposal of border-disputes, and other matters of negotiation between Japan and Russia so that relations between the two powers may be properly adjusted. Moreover, we shall hope that the Government will also put her fullest effort, at all times, in maintaining and developing Japan's friendly relations with the two powers, Great Britain and the United States, especially that with the former. (3 ) It will be necessary to deeply consider what influences the conclusion of this pact will have upon the present negotiations between P .19 Japan and China. The fact that the conclusion of this pact will further strengthen Japan's position, will have considerable bearing on China's decision of her attitude. Doc. 954 Pa-re 5 . Therefore, "by utilizing such a situation, there will he chances of favorably developing the Sino-Japanese negotiations. It is hoped that the Government will have left no schemes regrettable in coping with the situation. (4 ) The conclusion of this pact is attributable to the recent change in the political situation in German with the establishment of the Nazi Regime. Accordingly, the true effect of this pact, P . 2 0 of course, depends much on the future destiny of the Nazi Regime. Germany hae undergone various hardships since the World war and her successive governments have incurred dissatisfaction among the general public. Following this appeared the present regime which is gradually obtaining results in Germany's internal administration and foreign relations, and is winning the popularity of a great many people under its unique principle, without resorting to any revolu- tionary procedures. So it will not easily break down, not, at least in the near future, and there shall be no particular obstacle in obtaining the true results of this pact in the future. P . 21 (5 ) It is afraid that there is slight indistinction in the words prescribed in the official documents No. I ll and No. IV, supple- mentary to the second agreement in the preceding. However, they are the confirmation of the opinion of the German Government accepting that the articles of the Rapallo Pact and the Neutrality Pact presently existing between Germany and Russia which are contradictory to the spirit of this pact and also to Germany's obligations to this pact, have lost their effect by having lost their objects in view of the situation at the time of enforcement of this pact. Referring to the P . 2 2 telegram which read: " have firm belief that the spirit of this pa.ct is tho only basis for Germany's future policy toward the Soviet Union", sent to the Foreign Minister by Japan's Ambassador to Germany with the approval of Germany's representative during tho negotiations on this pact, I find there is no room for doubt on this matter It seems to us that this Japannse-German pact based on the commo; interests of tho two countries, has tv.ro aims, that is , taking proper measures to defend themselves cooperatively against the destructive activities of the Comintern, and keeping in close contact with each other P .23 in order to check the military-pressure of Soviet Russia. It is needless to say that the cnnclusion of such a special pact with the German Govern- ment has a great significance, and as tc the repercussion at home and rtbroadj which tno conclusion of this agreement may have, it is obvious that deliberation is required. However, in view of the present inter- national situation confronting us , we regard it rather as an opportune step that our government has concluded this pa.ct with the German Govern- ment, a..nd adopting an attitude of cooperation with Germany in order to P . 2 4 cope with the aggressive pressure of the Comintern and Soviet Russia. So we approve the stipulations of this m e t as well as those of the annexted document. However, as mentioned in the preamble of this 1st Pact, the object of the Comintern is the destruction and suppression Doc. 954 Pa-re 6. of existing nations through every possible means, and their activities are giving a serious menace to the peace of the world, we call to the powers of the world for cooperation when we take necessary steps for joint defence and exchange of information on the Comintern's activities . P . 25 Therefore it is our earnest desire that after the establishment of the pact in accordance with article 2 , the Imperial Government in cooperation with the German Government will as far as the circumstances permit do their utmost to invite as many third powers as possible into our anti- Comintern camp or persua.de them to take defensive measures according to the purport of the treaty, in order to attain the objective which is mentioned in this pact. Hereby we, the members of the investigation committee, have decided unanimously to pass this pact. The above is our reuort on the result of our investigation. 26 To President of the Privy Council Baron HIEAETJMA, Kiichiro. Prom the Chairman of the Investigation Committee, ARAI, Xentaro. (Vice-President of the Privy Council) Committee Members: KA1IAK0, Kentaro; Xawai, Misao; I sh i i , Xikujiro AFJMA, Byokichi; KARA, Kado; MOTODA, Hazime; ISHIZUKA, Eizo; HAYASHI, Gonsuke. (Privy Councillors). •uoc. No. 9d4 Fage 1 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D .C . No. I . P . S . No. 954 Statement of Source and Authenticity I , M._TAKA3?SUJI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the fallowing capacity: _ Secretary.._?rivy_Counci.1 and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2? pages, dated Nov. 20 . 1936. and described as follows: _Invec£iga_y onjreport. £.n_the_c on elusion _ o.f_the_Japan-German Anti-Com3_nt.ern_Pact. made_to. thq_ President. o . f J ? : _ i v y _ C o m i c i . l _ o n Nov._20 ,_1936 . I further certify that tht attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and f i les of the following named ministry or department (speci- fying also the f i l e number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or f i l e s ) : _ Privy. Council Signed at Tokyo. Japan, on this 25th day of August. 1946. / « / M. fpfrptcn^— Signature of Official SEAL Witness: Kichi Chosokable (signed) Secretary, Privy Council Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I , PiaEpJ5^ MONAGHAN , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo. Jaoan on this 26th day of August , 1946 / s / Edward P. Monaghan NAME Witness: / s / R. H. Larsh Investigatar. IPS Official Capacity Doc. 15611' Page 1 IHCLOSURE I I Berlin, 25 November 1S36. Mr. Ambassador, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of today concerning the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, in which I was informed of the following: " I have the honour to inform your Excellency, on the occasion of the signing today of the secret attached agreement bo the Agreement, against the Communist International r~tha,t the Japanese Government and the Gorman Govern- ment are fully agreed on the following point: / "The 'political treaties' designated in Article I I of the above secret attached agreement include neither fishery treaties nor t aties concerning concessions, nor treaties concerning border questions betwoen Japan, Manchukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the assent of the German Government to the above interpretation. At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency. (signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo- tentiary of the German Reich TO His Excellency the Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Pien .potent iary Viscount Kintomo Mashakoji * Doc. 15611' Page 1 Berlin West 8 : 23 October 36 Wilhelmstrasse 54 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich Mr. Ambassador I I have the honor to acknowledge to your Excellence the receipt of the communication of 23 inst. I took cognizance thereof as well as of the contents of the telegram to the Foreign Minister, Mr, AltlTA, copy of which was enclosed. At the same time I welcome the opportunity to renew to your Excellency the expression of my highest esteem. (signed) 705 PaBr.i'JTkO? To His Excellency, the Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Viscount MUSHAKOJI Doc. 1561C 1 IITCICSU L IV Berlin 25 November 11 Showa Mr. Ambassador, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's communi- cation of today on the subject of the secret attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, signed today, in which I was informed of the following: " I have the honour to inform your Excellency on the occasion of tho signing today of the secret attached Agreement .,o the Agreement regarding the Communistic International, that the German Ckjveromeat does not regard the provisions of the existing political treaties b; tween toe German "eich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — such as the RA>AL"J 0 Treaty _Cf 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 2926, in so far as they have not become null and void under the conditions existing at the time of the coning into effect of this agreement — as being in contradiction to the spirit of this Agreement and the obligations arising from it. I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency, that my Government acknowledges this communication with sincere satisfaction. At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency. Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary TO His "excellency the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Rcich Herr Jcachim von Ribbentrop Doc. 15611' Page 1 Agreement regarding secrecy of the "Secret Attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist Internationale" and incloaures. Agreement exists between the two High Contracting States in considering the secret attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist Inter- nationale as well as the inclosures I to IV as secret. If it would be at some time in the interest of the two High Contracting States to inform third states about the contents of the secret agreement, then such an information may only take place upon a mutual understanding. Berlin, 25 Nov. 1936, i . e . 25 Nov. 11 Showa (signed) JOACHIM VON RIB3MTE0P Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Heich (signed) VICOMTE KINTOMO MUSEAKOJI Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Doc. 15611' Page 1 SECRET ATTACHED AGREEMEHT TO THE AGREEMENT AGAIHST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. The Government of the German Beich and The Imperial Japanese Government In the recognition that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is wcrking toward the realization of the goal of the Communist International and wants to use its Army for this cause, In the conviction that this fact not only threatens the existance of the High Contracting States, "but World Peace in general in a most serious way, Have agreed for the preservation of common interests as follows: ARTICLE I Should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or an unprovoked threat of attack by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the other High Contracting State obligates itself, not to carry out any measures which would, in their effect, be apt to relieve the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Should the case, mentioned in Clause I occur, the High Contracting States will immediately consult which measures they will use to preserve their common interests. ARTICLE II The High Contracting States will during the validity of this agreement and without mutual assent conclude no political treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which do not conform to the spirit of this agreemenl ARTICLE III The German as well as the Japanese texts will be regarded as the original? of this agreement. It goes into force at the same time as the agreement against the Communist International which was signed today and has the same length of validity. Witness thereof, the signatories, well and duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement and have sealed it. Done in duplicate at Berlin, (signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop the 25th of November 1936, Ambassador Extraordinary and i . e . , the 25th of Hovember of Plenipotentiary of the German Reich the 11th Year of Showa. (signed) Vioount Kintomo Mushakoji Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Doc. 15611' Page 1 INCLOSTHB I I I Berlin, 25 November 1956. Mr. Ambassador, I have the honour to inform "our Excellency, on the- occasion of tho signing to-day of the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communistic International, that the German Government docs not regard the provisions of the existing political treaties between tho Carman Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repoblics — such as the DA" ,LL0 treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Treaty of 1926, in so far as they have not become null and void imdor the conditions existing at the time of the coming into effect of this Agreement -•••• as being in contradiction to the spirit of this Agreement and the obligations arising from it . At the sane time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency, (signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich To: His Excellency The Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Viscount Kiritomo Mu shak-0 j i Doc. 15611' Page 1 DTCL03U 3 I Berlin, 25 November 11 Showa Mr. Ambassador, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, on the occasion of the signing today of the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, that the Japanese Government and the Gorman Government are fully agreed on the following point: The "political treaties" designated in Article I I of the above secret attached agreement include neither fishery treaties nor treaties conccrning concessions, nor treaties concerning border questions between Japan, Manchukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I should be obliged to your Excellency if I could be assured of the assent of the German Government to the above interpretation. At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency. Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary To: His Excellency the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop Doc l*o. 1561 CERTIFICATE W. D. C. Ho. I . P . S. Fo. 1561 St~tenant of Sourer', and Authenticity I , Eayashi Zaoru hereby cortify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in tho following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated , 19 , and described as follows: Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and German:/- dated Nov. 25, 1936, with attached protocols and letters relating thereto. I further cortify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the f i le number or citation, i f any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or f i l e s ) : Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946 E . Ea.y,-,shi Si. nature of Official SEAL Witness: Nagaharu Odo Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I , Sichad E . Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of tho Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug, 1946 Hichard K. Larsh Investigator I . ?., S. Official Capacity Witness: Edward P . Monaghan Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e A F F I D A V I T C O N C E R N I N G T H E C A P T U R E , P R O C E S S I N G A N D P R E S E R V A T I O N O F G E R M A N D O C U M E N T S »• I , G E R A R D S C H A E F E R , b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n o n o a t h , d e p o s e a n d s a y ; 1 . T h a t I a n a c o m m i s s i o n e d I n f a n t r y o f f i c e r o f t h e A r m y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a , a n d m y S e r i a l N u m b e r is 0 - 1 3 3 2 1 0 2 . 2 . T h a t I j o i n e d t h e s t a f f o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l f o r t h e P r o s e c u t i o n of A x i s C r i m i n a l i t y o n t h e 3 1 s t o f J u l y , 1 9 4 5 , w ? s m a d e C h i e f o f t h e F i e l d B r a n c h a t t h e 7 t h U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y D o c u m e n t C e n t e r , a n d s e r v e d i n t h a t c a p a c i t y u n t i l t h e 2 5th o f O c t o b e r 1 9 4 5 . T h a t d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d o f t i m e I w a s i n c h a r g e of t h e s c r e e n i n g a.nd a n a l y z i n g o f c a p t u r e d e n e m y d o c u m e n t s p n d t h e d i s p a t c h i n g b y c o u r i e r o f p e r t i n e n t d o c u - m e n t s to t h e O f f i c e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l , D o c u m r n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n a t N u r n b e r g , Germany. 3 . O n t h e 2 5th. o f O c t o b e r 1 9 4 ? , I w a s c a l l e d to t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l a t N u r n b e r g G e r m a n y , a n d a p p r - n t e d C h i e f of t h e T r a n s l a t i o n B r a n c h o f s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n , a n d s e r v e d i n t h a t c a p a c i t y u n t i l t h e 3d o f D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 5 . T h a t d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d of t i m e I w a s I n c h a r g e o f , a n d s u p e r v i s e d t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f a l l d o c u m e n t s t h a t w e r e s e l e c t e d f o r t r a n s l a t i o n b y s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n . 4 . O n t h e 3d o f D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 5 , I w a s a p p o i n t e d E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e r o f s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n a n d s e r v e d i n t h a t c a p a c i t y u n t i l t h e 1 8 t h o f M a r c h 1 9 4 6 . T h a t d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d o f t i m e I w^s. f i r s t a s s i s t a n t to M a j o r K e n n e t h R . B o y l e , w h o w a s t h e t h e n C h i e f o f t h e s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n , a.nd as s u c h I w a s i n c h a r g e o f , a n d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r , t h e o j w r a + i o n o f s a i d D i v i s i o n s u b i e c t o n l y to t h e o r d e r s o f s a i d Fa lor K e n n e t h R . B o y l e . 5 . T h a t o n t h e 1 8 t h o f M a r c h 1 9 4 6 I w a s a p p o i n t e d C h i e f o f t h e D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n of th§ O f f i c e of" t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l a n d h a v e c o n t i n u o u s l y s i n c e s a i d d a t e a c t e d i n t h a t c a p a c i t y , a n d as s u c h am i n c h a r g e o f , and r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e o p e r a t i o n of s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n , 6 . T h a t C o l o n e l R o b e " t G . S t o r e y s e r v e d as C h i e f o f s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n o f t h e O f f i c e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l ^ r o n i t s i n c e p t i o n o n t h e 1 s t o f Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e J u l y 1 9 ^ 5 u n t i l t h e 2 2 n d o f O c t o b e r 1 9 4 5 , a n d w a s s u c c e e d e d as C h i e f b y M a j o r W i l l i a m H . C o o g a n , w h o s e r v e d u n t i l t h e 2 8 t h o ^ N o v e m b e r 1 9 ^ 5 , a n d w h o w a s i n t u r n s u c c e e d e d b y M a i o r K e n n e t h P., B o ^ l e , w h o a c t e d i n t h a t c a p a c i t y u n t i l t h e 1 8 t h o ^ M a r c h 1 9 4 6 , a t w h i c h t i m e I w a s a p p o i n t e d C h i e f , a s a f o r e s a i d . 7 . T h a t t h e U n i t e d S + a + e s C h i ~ f o f C o u n s e l i n J u l y 1 9 4 5 c h a r g e d t h e F i e l d B r a n c h o f t h e r o c i T n e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i n g , e v a l u a t i n g a n d a s s e m b l i n g d o c u m e n t a r y • v i d e n e e i n + h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r f o r u s e in t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of n a j o r A x i s w a r c r i m i n a l s b e f o r e t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mill" a r " T r i b u n a l . 8 . T h a t I h a v e s e r v e d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y f o r t h r e e y e a r s a n d , b a s e d o n m y e x p e r i e n c e a s a U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y o f f i c e r a n d m y p o s i s i o n a n d e x p e r i e n c e as a b o v e s e t f o r t h , I am c o m p l e t e l y ^ n d t h o r o u g h l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Armj^ i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s e i z i n g a n d p r o c e s s i n g c r c a p t u r e d e n e m y d o c u m e n t s a n d t h e m e t h o d s u s e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f ti e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l i n o b t a i n i n g , p r o c e s s i n g , f i l i n g , t r a n s l a t i n g a n d p h o t o s t a t i n g a l l d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l . 9 . T h a t as t h e A r m y o v e r r a n G e r m a n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y , a n d t h e n G e r m a n y itself, c e r t a i n s p e c i a l i z e d p e r s o n n e l s e i z e d e n e m y d o c u m e n t s , b o o k s a n d r e c o r d s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c and. t a c t i c a l v ? l u e . D u r i n g t h e e a r l v s t a g e s s u c h d o c u m e n t s w e r e h a n d l e d i n b u l k a n d a s s e m b l e d a t t e m p o r a r y c e n t e r s . r o w e v e r , a f t e r t h e s u r r e n d e r o f G e r m a n y t h e y w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d . to t h e v a r i o u s d o c u m e n t c e n t e r s e s t a b l i s h e d b y A r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Z o n e o " O c c u p a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n t o ^ h e d o c u m e n t s a c t u a l l y a s s e m b l e d at s u c h C e n t e r s , A r m y p e r s o n n e l m a i n t a i n e d a n d s e c u r e d cons^'derab] e d o c u m e n t s ''in s i t u " a t or n e a r t h e pl.~ce o f discover?/'. 'Then s u c h d o c u m e n t s w e r e l o c a t e d a n d a s s e m b l e d t h e v w e r e c a t a l o g u e d b y I r n y p e r s o n n e l i n t o c o l l e c t i o n s , a n d r e c o r d s w e r e m a i n t a i n e d w h i c h d i s c l o s e d t h e s o u r c e a n d s u c h o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e c o n c e r n i n g t h e p l a c e a n d g e n e r a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e n c o u i s i + i o n o f t ^ e d o c u m e n t s . 1 0 . T h e F i e l d B r a n c h o f t h e D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n C o f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S" ! es C h i e f o f C o u n s e l w a s s t a f f e d b y p e r s o n n e l t h o r o u g h l y c o n v e r s a n t w i t h t h e G e r m a n langu.age. T h e i r t a s k w a s to s e a r c h f o r a n d s e l e c t c a p t u r e d e n e m y d o c u m e n t s i n t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r w h i c h d i s c l o s e d i n f o r m r t l o n r e l a t i n g to t h e n r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e m a j o r A x i s w a r c r i m i n a l s . O f f i c e r s u n d e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e C M e f o f sr-id F i e l d B r a n c h w e r e p l a c e d o n d u t y a t v a r i o u s D o c u m e n t Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e C e n t e r s , a n d a l s o d i s p a t c h e d o n i n d i v i d u a l m i s s i o n s to o b t a i n o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s . W h e n d o c u m e n t s w e r e l o c a t e d such, o f f i c e r s m a d e a r e c o r d of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h t h e y w e r e f o u n d * S u c h d o c u m e n t s w e r e f u r t h e r i d e n t i f i e d b y F i e l d B r a n c h p r e - t r i a l s e r i a l n u m b e r s a s s i g n e d b y s u c h o f f i c e r s w h o w o u l d t h e n p e r i o d i c a l l y d i s p a t c h s u c h d o c u m e n t s b y c o u r i e r to t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l . 1 1 . U p o n r e c e i p t o f t h e s e d o c u m e n t s t h e y w e r e d u l y r e c o r d r d a n d i n d e x e d . A f t e r t v i s o p e r a t i o n t h e y w e r e d e l i v e r c to t h e S c r e e n i n g a n d A n a l y s i s B r a n c h o f t h e D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n of t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f of C o u n s e l , w h i c h B r a n c h r e - e x a m i n e d s a i d d o c u m e n t s i n o r d e r to f i n a l l y d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r or n o t t h e y s h o u l d b e r e t a i n e d as e v i d e n c e f o r t h e p r o s e c u t o r s . T h i s f i n a l s c r e e n i n g w a s d o n e h y G e r m a n s p e a k i n g a n a l y s t s o n t h e s t a f f o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l . W h e n t h e d o c u m e n t p a s s e d t h e s c r e e n e r s it w a s t h e n t r a n s m i t t e d to t h e D o c u m e n t R o o m o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l w i t h a c o v e r i n g s h e e t p r e p a r e d b y t h e s c r e e n e r s s h o w i n g t h e t i t l e or n a t u r e o f t h e d o c u m e n t , t h e p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , a n d i J -s i m p o r t a n c e . In t h e D o c u m e n t B o o m a t r i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n n u m b e r w a s g i v e n t 0 e a c h d o c u m e n t , or to e- c ch g r o u p of d o c u m e n t s i n c a s e s w h e r e it w ^ s d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e s a k e o f c l a r i t y to f i l e s e v e r a l d o c u m e n t s t o g e t h e r . 1 2 . U n i t e d S p a t e s d o c u m e n t s w e r e g i v e n t r i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n n u m b e r s i n o n e o f f i v e s e r i e s d e s i g n a t e d b y l e t t e r s : " P S " , " L " , " R " , " C " a n d " E C " , i n d i c a t i n g t h e m e a n s o f a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e d o c u m e n t s . W i t h i n e a c h s e r i e s d o c u m e n t s w e r e l i s t e d n u m e r i c a l l y . 1 3 . I n a l m o s t a l l i n s t a n c e s t h e o r i g i n a l c a p t u r e d e n e m y d o c u m e n t w a s d e l i v e r e d to t h e D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n o f t h e O f f i c e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l a n d p r o - c e s s e d i n t h e m a n n e r h e r e i n set f o r t h . In a c o m p a r a t i v e l y f e w i n s t a n c e s , h o w e v e r , t h e A r m y D o c u m e n t C e n t e r s r e t a i n e d p o s s e s s i o n of o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t v a r i o u s o t h e r a g e n c i e s d e s i r e d a c c e s s t o s a i d o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s a t s a i d A r m y D o c u m e n t C e n t e r s . In a l l s u c h l a t t e r i n s t a n c e s t r u e a n d a c c u r a t e p h o t o s t a t i c c o p i e s o f s u c h o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s w e r e rn?de b y s-^id A r m y D o c u m e n t C e n t e r s a n d s u c h p h o t o s t a t i c c o p i e s w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d to s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n at N u r n b e r g G e r m a n y , a n d w e r e t h e r e u p o n p r o c e s s e d i n t h e s a m e m a n n e r as o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s . It w « s a l m o s t exclii.sivelj'' w i t h -reference to c a r t u r e d G e r m a n f o r e i g n o f f i c e d o c u m e n t s t h a t P h o t o s t a t i c cor>ies o f t h e o r i g i n a l c a p t u r e d d o c u m e n t s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e o r i g i n a l s t h e m s e l v e s , w e r e d e l i v e r s to s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n . T h e s e o r i g i n a l c a p t u r e d f o r e i g n o f f i c e d o c u m e n t s w e r e a s s e m b l e d p r i m a r i l y at t h e . M a r b u r g G e r m a n y D o c u m e n t C e n t e r a n d w e r e , a n d s t i l l a r e , i n Doc. No. 2628 A P?5.;iG 4 , gre^t demand by many agencies; and as a result, the originals were retained by said Army Document Center and photostatic copies of the originals dispatched to the said Documentation Division at Nurnberg, as aforesaid. 14. A f t e r a d o c u m e n t w a s so numbered i t vr:.s t h e n s e n t to a G e r m a n s p e a k i n g a n a l y s t w v o p r e p a r e d a s u m m a r y o f t h e d o c u m e n t w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e r e f e r e n c e to p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , i n d e x h e a d i n g s , i n f o r m a t i o n as to t h e s o u r c e o f t h e d o c u m e n t as i n d i c a t e d b y t h e Field. B r a n c h , a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o ^ the d o c u m e n t to a p a r t i c u l a r p h a s e o f t h e c a s e u n d e r investigation. N e x t , t h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t t h a t h a d b e e n received b T? said D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n w?s r e t u r n e d to t h e D o c u m e n t P o o m a n d w a s t h e n c h e c k e d o u t to t h e P h o t o - s t a t i c D e p a r t m e n t w h e r e p h o t o s t a t i c c o p i e s w e r e m a d e . U p o n r e t u r n f r o m p h o t o s t a t i n g it w a s p l a c e d i n a n e n v e l o p e i n o n e o f t h e s e v e r a l f i r e - p r o o f s a f e s i n t h e r e a r of t h e D o c u m e n t R o o m . O n e o f t > e s a i d p h o t o s t a t i c c o n i e s o f t h e d o c u m e n t w a s s * n t to t h e t r a n s l a t o r s a n d t h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t r e c e i v e d b y s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n t h e r e a f t e r r e m a i n e d i n t h e s a f e . A c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r or W a r D e p a r t m e n t e m p l o y e e h a s b e e n , a n d i s , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f + h e d o c u m e n t s i n t h e s a f e s . A t a l l t i m e s w' e n h e is n o t p r e s e n t t h e s a ^ e is l o c k e d and a m i l i t a r y guard, is o n d u t y o u t s i d e t h e o n l y d o o r . If t h e o f f i c e r p r e p a r i n g t h e c e r t i - f i e d t r a n s l a t i o n , or o n e o f t h e o f f i c e r s w o r k i n g o n f h e b r i e f s f o u n d i+ n e c e s s a r y to e x a m i n e t h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t , t h i s w a s d o n e w i t h i n t]-. G D o c u m e n t R o o m i n t h e s e c t i o n s e t a s i d e for t h a t p u r p o s e . m h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n to V is s t r i c t r u l e h a s b e e n w h e r e it h a s b e e n o c c a s i o n a l l y n e c e s s a r y to p r e s e n t t h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s f o r e x a m i n a - t i o n . In t 1 is c a s e t h e d o c u m e n t w a s e n t r u s t e d to a r e s p o n s i b l offic^fr o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s t a f f . 15". T h a t a l l o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s or p h o t o s t a t i c c o p i e s o f o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s t h a t w e r e o b t a i n e d a n d p r o - c e s s e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f o f C o u n s e l as h e r e i n set f o r t h a r e no?/ l o c a t e d i n t h e s a f e s o f t h e D o c u m e n t R o o m o f s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n Divisi o n , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h o s e d o c u m e n t s t h a t h a v e b e e n i n t r o d u c e d i n e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y T r i b u n a l a t N u r n b e r g , G e r m a n y . S u c h d o c u m e n t s t h a t h a v e b e e n so i n t r o d u c e d i n e v i d e n c e as a b o v e set f o r t h w e r e r e m o v e ^ f r o m s a i d D o c u m e n t a t i o n D i v i s i o n a n d d e p o s i t e d w i t h G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y o f s a i d I n t e r n a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y T r i b u n a l , c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h e i r r e c e i p t i n e v i d e n c e , a n d a r e n o w i n t h e c u s t o d y o f , a n d u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l a n d s u p e r v i s i o n o f s a i d G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y . Doc. No. 2628 A Page 5e 1 6 , T h a t I m a k e t h i s a f f i d a v i t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e f o r e g o i n g f a c t s . /_s / Ge r a r d S c h ae f e r G e r a r d S c h a e f e r S U B S C R I B E D A N D S W O R N T O b e f o r e m e t h i s 1 5 t h d a y cf A p r i l 1 9 4 6 . / s / J o h n W . A u c h i n c l o s s J o h n W.''Auchinftloss 0 - 2 0 5 2 1 5 2 C a p t . , J A G D /
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Image provided for research and reference use only. Permission to publish, copy, or otherwise use these images must be obtained from Rare Books and Special Collections http://rbsc.library.ubc.ca
University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections
Ex.505-528. German-Japanese relations (10 items, Doc. 1509-2647)
Text