AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
application/pdf
1 I u-7 I $ ' > 7 / v \ 12- MARCH I947 I J D E X Of WITNESSES Defense' Witnesses YOSHINO, Sliinji Direct by Mr. SEIOBARA MORNING RECESS Direct by Mr. SHIOBARA (cont'd) Cross by Brigadier Quilliam (Witness excused) OWADA, leiji Direct by Mr. SHIOBARA NOON RECESS Direct by Mr. SHIOBARA (cont'd) AFTERNOON RECESS (Witness excused) •KADA, Kilmsaburo Direct by Mr. S. OKAMOTO Page 18198 18198 18222 18223 18230 18242 18243 18243 18246 18247 18269 18270 18271 18271 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS •PnT1 In Doc. Def. Pros. . F v i d p n C (: No. No. No, Description Mllii' LZlSenc^ 690 2368 Affidavit of YOSHINO, Shinji elated 14 February 1947 at Tokyo, Japan lo^ud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,190 Wednesday, 12 March 1947 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, « at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before with the exception of: HONORABLE MR. JUSTICE BERNARD, Member from the Republic of France, not sitting. For the Frosecution Section, same as before. For the tefense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1C,191 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East Is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKA'?TA, TO JO and ARAKI, who are represented by their respective counsel. Te have certificates from the prison surgeon at Sugamo certifying that the accused ARAKI and TOJO are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. Mr. Blewett. MR. BLK?rFTT: Sir, I shall give the Court the names, the office and the location of each accused on September 18, 1931. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, we submit that this is not a matter of evidence. The evidence is already before the Tribunal with regard to that, and, in the document which re handed to the Tribunal, a chronological summary. That was done, not as a matter of evidence, but as a matter of convenient summary of existing evidence for the Court. If the defense have any criticism, as to the accuracy of the list they are provided they can put it at the proper time, but we didn't treat it r.s evidence. It isn't 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,192 evidence; it is an argument on evidence. VTe are quite prepared to correct it if the defense can show any particular in which, it is wrong. But in my sub- mission the defense are not entitled to take up the time of the Court by putting in now as evidence something which is not evidence. TF" PriESIDEJfT: Did you say you were going to embody in this, or have embodied in this document vou are about to read, the contents of some thirty V 7 exhibits tendered by the prosecution? The Court would be only too happy to receive even at this time anything that would help to reduce the number of exhibits we must read to discover this information. That was the impression I formed yesterday after consulting my colleagues, and I said so at the time. Now what do you propose to give us? One document? MR. BLT77ETT: Sir, this is a list of the accused on certain dates. This was compiled from exhibits 103 to 129, which have been put in evidence by the prosecution. THE PRESIDENT: It is a summary of their evidence? Have you written it all out? m . BLET.TT: Yes, sir, I have it listed. THE PRESIDENT: ^ave you copies? is ,193 MR. BLF'"ETT: No, sir. THE PRESIDENT: ,fTell, how many pares does it cover? MR. BLF'JETT: About eight pages, your Honor. I think it would, not consume more than a half hour. THE PRESIDENT: Does it cover all the infor- mation in the prosecution's thirty exhibits, or only some of it? MR. BLETSTT: It is simultaneous transla- tion. The Language Section has a copy of this. THE PRESIDENT: "tell, if you can get in eight foolscap pages all the prosecution have in some thirty exhibits there is sore advantage in what 15 you are proposing. 16 Mr. Comyns Carr. 17 J®. COI.TNS CARR: Your Honor, in my sub- is mission, if it is to be done at ell it should be L9 j processed and circulated so that we can check it, and 20 may I say at once that if, as my friend says, it is 21 ba s ed on exhibits 103 to 129 only, and ignores 22 exhibit 102, it will certainly be wrong. 23 MR. BLITETT: It includes 102, sir, and 24 also the Indictment. 25 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we would i 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 | 9 ' 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i I 18, like copies, but I hate to ask you to go to the trouble of providing copies, only to find the evidence rejected later. I think, however, for the time heing you had better postpone this part of the case and the Judges will consider what they are going to do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,195 MP. BLEWETT: I shall work that out, sir. If I may refer to defense document 635, the chart of the various cabinet members, investigation was made, if the Tribunal please, and we have ascertained that the number of living cabinet members since 192? to 1941 who have not been indicted are sixty-two in number. THE PRESIDENT: That, by the way, is exhibit 2344. MR. BLEWETT: Thank you, sir. THE PRESIDENT: But, if it be material to prove the number of living cabinet ministers, that must be "tone by evidence in the ordinary way, and we require, perhaps, certificates of death of those who do not survive. MR. BLEWETT: I can give a list of those surviving on this chart, sir, if the Tribunal is interested, THE PRESIDENT: We would require at least certificates of some sort. i MR. BLEWETT: They are all living, sir. THE PRESIDENT: All those men who have been cabinet ministers since '27? 1 MR. BLEWETT: I see what your Honor means. MR. COMYFS CARP: Your Honor, in my submis- sion it would be entirely irrelevant to dr so, and I 1 8 , 1 9 6 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 hope that the Tribunal is not accepting the accuracy of document 234-4 until we have an opportunity of com- menting on it. THE PRESIDENT: That document was admitted on the usual terms which preserves your right to attack it for inaccuracy. Well, you eannot prove the sixty-two are living by merely stating the fact. You must prove it in the ordinary way, if it be relevant and material. MR. BLEWETT: Vfe shall be prepared to do so, sir. For the time being, if the Members of the Tribunal please, that will conclude subdivision 3 of division one;, and Mr. Log^n, the chairman of that committee, will resume. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan. MR. LOGAN: Our next presentation was with respect to the economic situation in Japan; but, owing to certain difficulties we have had, we are unable to present our documentary evidence, but we do wish to present our witnesses at this time. The documentary evidence will probably come some time later, if that meets with the Tribunal's approval. THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to open that evidence now, Mr. Logan? 18,197 i i 2 3 I 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24' 25 MR. LOGAN: From witnesses, yes. THE PRESIDENT: You have a right to make an opening statement covering each phase. Are you about to make an opening statement? MR. LOGAN: No. We will present the wit- nesses, We have made our opening statement, THE PRESIDENT: I do not recollect one touching this particular phase, but I recollect the general rtpehing. However, you do not propose to have a particular opening? ICR. LOGAN: That's right. This comes under that general opening statement made at the beginning of division 1. THE PRESIDENT: Proceed to call your wit- nesses . Mr. SHIOBARA. MR. SHIOBARA: May the witness YOSHINO be called. YOSHINO DIRECT 18,198 1 2 3 4 5 6 J 7 | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 S H I N J I Y O S H I N O , called as a witness on "behalf of the defense, having first been duly sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIOBARA: Q Please tell me your name, the date of your birth, and your address. A My name is YOSHINO, Shinji. I was born on September 17, 1888. My present address is Shinagawa Ku, Kamiosaki, Chojamaru 270. Q Please give us a succinct statement of your education and of the public offices you have occupied. A I graduated from the Law College of Tokyo Imperial University. As for my career I was twice connected with two companies: the Tohokukogyo and the Manshujukogyo, the Manshu Heavy Industry Company. And I have also served as prefectural governor. How- ever, on the whole, I think I can safely say that my whole career has been spent as an official of the Commerce and Industry Ministry. The main posts which I held in that office are as stated in my affidavit. Q Mr. Liebert made a very long statement — gave very long testimony in this court about Japanese economy. Have you read it? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, YOSHINO DIRECT THE MONITOR: Economic preparations for war in ©ctsber of last year. A Yes, I did. Q I will show you document — defense document No. 690. Will you tell us if this an affidavit which you have made yourself after reading and studying Mr. Liebert's testimony and prepared in answer to it? THE PRESIDENT: What is the delay due to? Why the delay? Ml',. SHIOEARA: I wish to read the affidavit of the witness, if it is his and he is satisfied that he has certified that it is his. The affidavit is not here, and we have gone to fetch it, sir. THE PRESIDENT: '/Veil, you should have given notice, and it would have been here. I f , 0 0 o YOSiilNO DIhEGT L 1 u d 2 a Hr 3 Cx 4 W h 5 a 1 6 e n 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Then while we are waiting I would like to put another short question to the witness. You hav# stated that your curriculum vitae is contained in your affidavit, but could you give us a very brief outline of it here? A I graduated from the university in 1913 snd immediately entered what was then called the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce as a junior clerk. In 1925 this ministry was remodeled into two departments called the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Sinew entering the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce I served continuously in that ministry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, sometimes as section chief, sometimes as bureau chief, until in 1936 I was appointed Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry. I believe t:iere has been a mistake in the interpretation: In 1936 I resigned as Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry, and I was appointed as such in 1931 — 1927. THE MONITOh: Correction, There has been a mi3tako in the translation: I did not state that I was appointed as the Vice-Minister of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, but rather that I was appointed as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SRIN0 DIRECT IO,?01 Vice-Minister in 1927. THE PRESIDED: The Clerk of the C c j t informs i me that the affidavit of this witness has net been filed in the office of the General Secretary, but that it iJ5 now in the office of one of the defense attorneys whom he named. A In 1937 I was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry, and I resigned the following year, 1938, May. In the eight months between the time of my resignation as Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry and my appointment as Minister of Commerce and Indus- try I served as president of the Tohoku Kogyo Develop- ment Company. And in 1938 I was appointed vice- president of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company and served as such for two years, at the end of 1938. During the war I served as Governor of Aichi Prefecture for two years. That is the whole of my public career. MR. SKIOBARA: I am very sorry of this delay in getting the original, but the copies of the affi- davit have been distributed to everybody. MR. TAVENKER: If your Honor please, in the interest of time we will not raise an objection to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,202 Y0SEIN0 DIRECT reading from the copy in 1.1qu or the* ̂ ha^ce of original, THE PRESIDENT: Proceed with the copy. (Whereupon, a document was handed to the witness.) Q With the Court's permission, I have given you a copy of defense document No. 960. Will you please lock at it, examine it, and tell us if this is the affidavit you have made in reply to Mr. Lie- bert's statement. Correction: 690. A There is no mistake. MR. SHIOBARA: I shall present the original in a moment when it comes. I wish now to present in evidence defense document 690, and. read it. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. Tender a copy with the consent of the prose- cution. You can tender the original later. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.. 690 will receive exhibit No. 2368. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense document No. 2368, and was received in evidence.) THE PRESIDENTS He looks at a document handed tio him by the Marshal of the Court.. MR. SHIOBARA: I shall start reading this YOSHINO DIRECT 12,20' 5 6 7 I 8 ! 9 | 10 | 11 12 I 1 3 ! 14 | 15 16 17 18 19 j 20 i 21 ! 22 23 24 25 document from now. However, there is a correction on page 12: The sixth line from the bottom where it has "shipping charges," this should be corrected to "ship building costs." THE PRESIDENT: Was that a copy that was handed to him? We don't know. The nature of every document handled by a witness in the box must be disclosed in the record. What is that document that was handed to him by the Marshal? I don't know. MR. SRIOBiiRA: The document handed to the witness by the Marshal of the Court is the original of the document 690 which has to be tendered. THE PRESIDENT: I suspected that was so. Now, you know that must be tendered. Ask him whether that is the original and whether that is his affidavit. Q Mr. Witness, did you see the original? A Yes, I did. Q Is that your affidavit of which we have been speaking up to now? A Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Well, tender it. MR. SHIOBARA: I tender this document No. in evidence. CLERK OF THE COURT: It will bear the same I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSKIliO DIhECT 18,204 number as the copy already tendered. Defense document 690 has received exhibit No. 2368. MR. SHIOBARA: I shall begin reading. THE PRESIDENT: We have no copies. Where are the copies? (Whereupon, copies of the document were handed to the Court.) MR. SHIOBARA: May I begin? THE PRESIDENT: We all have copies. Proceed to read. MR. SHIOBARA: "Sworn Deposition. Deponent YOSLINO Shinji. Having duly sworn an cath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows: On this 14 day of February 1947 at Tokyo. "Deponent YOSHII'O, Shinji (s3al). 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 DIRECT 18,204 number as the copy already tendered. Defense document 690 has received exhibit No. 2368. MR. SHIOBARA: I shall begin reading. THE PRESIDENT: We have no copies. Whero are the copies? (Whereupon, copies of the document were handed to the Court.) MR. SHIOBARA: May I begin? TEE PRESIDENT: We all have copies. Proceed to read. MR. SHIOBARA: "Sworn Deposition. Deponent YOSLINO Shinji. Having duly sworn an rath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose 5= follows: On this 14 day of February 1947 at Tokyo. "Deponent YOSHII.O, Shinji (s-al). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO L I R S C T 18,205 "Statement Refuting Mr. Liebert's.Testimony. "I entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1913 as a junior clerk. (Later, in 1925, this ministry was remodelled into two independent departments, namely, the Ministry of Agriculture anc Forestry and Ministry of Commerce and Industry.) Since then, I had been continuously in charge of administrative affairs in the Commerce anc Industry Ministry until I resigriec in 1936, as Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry. In 1937, I was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry and, as such, was responsible for formulating and executing wartime economic policies of our country for one year at the outset of the China Incident. Therefore, I can safely state that I was concerned either directly or indirectly with almost all of the various economic policies touched upon by Mr. Liebert in his testimony. I understand that Mr. Liebert regaros these policies as acts preparatory for an aggressive war. Upon my part, I will try to explain briefly the reasons pointing to the contrary from the viewpoint of one of the government officials of that period. j "I shall refrain from speaking here of the matters subsequent to the outbreak of the China Inci- dent, because of the fact that economic measures YOSHINO DIRECT 18,221 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 acoptea after the outbreak of the Incident are indi- cative of genuine wartire economy rather than of war preparations. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts made by the Government then to check the aggravation of the Incident, the situation turned unfortunately from bad to worse. Thus, it was only natural that the control of various fields of domestic economy was being tighteneo from day to day. Furthermore, having retired from tne service in 1938, I had no relation whatsoever with the events which occurred thereafter. I will explain the points raised by Mr. Lieb'ert with regard to our commercial and industrial policies prior to the China Incident, dividing them for convenience's sake, into two separate chapters. "(1) Policy for the Establishment of Basic Industries. "With "/orId War I as the turning point, great changes had taken place in the relationship between war and economy both in theory and practice. Even previous to that, war was not wholly unrelateo. with the economic power of a country especially in such matters as food supplies, arms, ammunitions and mili- tary expenditures. However, it was usual for a major belligerent Power to be able by itself to cater to all its needs within the limits of its own economic power, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 LIRECT inasmuch as the sc-a-lo of a war was smaller and — efficiency ana quality of arms undeveloped. Had there been shortages in some particular articles, it could always avail itself of supplies from neutral countries as there had never been a case of the entire world being involved in the same war. For instance, Japan fought the Russo-Japanese War relying on her loans from the United States and Great Britain; in other words, she fought on while importing materials necessary for the prosecution of war. However, international trade was completely interrupted in World War I as the major powers of the world were practically all involved in the tumult of the war. Battles which were waged on an enormous scale callec for the exhaustion of all economic resources. Especially, the advent of high explosives, aircraft and chemical arms such as poison gas proved the existence of grave deficiencies in the past military and naval armaments as a means of national defence. Therefore, it became a matter of common sense in formulating economic policies of a country to strive at all costs for the building up of necessary industries in order to guarantee its independence and security. This practice which started during war tirre remained as an important factor even in the management of the postwar economy in every 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO LIR3CT 18,208 country. One would readily understand the inevita- bility and reasonableness of the facts pointed out by Mr. Liebert, if one recalled that the economic thought prevalent and the policies adopted after World War I were reflected in the practical measures taken by the powers since that time. : "I shall try to explain a few instances on the basis of Mr. Liebert's statement. "a) Lyes and Glycerine. "It was shown by the German dye industry in the course of World War I that high explosives and poison gases could be manufactured In the process of making dyes. Prior to the war dye manufacturing was monopolized by Germany, the rest of the world depending on her for its supplies. Therefore, a decision was adopted in 1917 at a conference among the allied powers in Paris recommending the development of the dye industry in various countries for the reason that, I although it was a belated step to be of any use in that stage of the war, a monopoly of the world's d.yes market by the German dye industry could not be allowed to continue as it would remain a menace to the world peace. The powers suffered from a famine of dyes due to the stoppage of the imports of German dyes while the United States, Great Britain, Franc.;, Italy and I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO DIRECT 18,226 Japan frantically pushed ahead their respective dye industries. Established then in England was the Government supported British jDyestuff Corporation which, if my memory serves me right, later was merged with the Imperial Chemical Company. In the United States companies such as Dupont and the National Aniline Co. were set up. Also in our country, which was then in need of dyes as well as glycerine enacted in 1917 a law called the 'Law for the promotion of the manufacture of dyes and iredicines. ' On the strength of this law the government set up two companies, one for the manufacture of dyes and the other of glycerine, which it guaranteed against all losses and for the payment of an 8 per cent dividend on their paid up capital. This method of guarantee was continued until after the war. Even after the expiration of the term of ten years of governmental support, subsidies per unit were paid to the dyes produced. It is a well- known fact that both the United States and Japan enforced the import license system when they again imported German dyes after the termination of the war. For its inception the Japanese dye manufacture is indebted to the policies of protection and encourage- , ment, however lukewarm they may have been. That it would be turned into an arsenal of chemical arms in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,226 YOSHINO DIRECT [ case of war was a foregone conclusion since the time of Its establishment. The same applies to the case of glycerine. The production of glycerine was negli- gible before the war since it was made onlv as a by- product of the manufacture of soap ana the bulk of the demand was met by imports from abroad. Hence the manufacture of glycerine hac to be started by dissolving fatty acids using as the basis beef tallow imported from Australia. This was easily cone as the process was not so difficult tecnnicall^ as compared with the manufacture of ayes, so much so that the pay- ment of government subsidies was discontinued before the exniration of the ten-year term. However, coagulated fish oil was later used as the raw material for manu- facturing fatty acids, as it was considered prejudicial to national defence to depend on the supplv of beef tallow from abroad. Since fish oil could be obtained in large quantities from inshore fisheries, it was decided to export it abroad in peace time and use it as the_ basis for the manufacture of glycerine in case of an emergency. Therefore, it Twas only natural that the production of glycerine was boosted following the outbreak of the China Incident as the wartime economy developed in Japan. "b) Iron Production. YOSHINO DIRECT 18,222 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "The establishment of the iron industry was a pending question in our country since the restoration of 1868, as it is an industry so basically important among the industries of a nation that the modern period following Industrial Revolution, has also been called the 'era of iron and coal.' This, however, was a difficult task for our country which had little iron ore and coal resources for the manufacture of iron. The Japanese iron industry went through successive changes from the time of the inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works after the Sino-J'apanese War to 1933 when the Japan Steel Manufacture Co. was established. It would suffice to mention here the fact that the Japan Steel Manufacture Co. was not found in a single day, as I cannot afforo to recount here in detail the history of the iron industry in Japan. The Law for the Promotion of Iron Manufacture, providing for special privileges and the power for compulsory use of land to protect the iron inaustry, has been enacted since 1917 when a dearth of iron occurred due to World War I. As early as in 1916, the government instructed the Board of Investigation of Iron Manufacture to coordinate the governmental and civilian iron productions despite the fact that the development of the civilian iron industry was still negligible as yet. A report was 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,226 YOSHINO DIRECT made by the Board of Investigation of Emergency Financial and Economic Affairs, during the period of the financial depression, brought about as an aftermath of World War I, recommending that large-scale joint-management of the governmental and civilian iron foundries should be made with the Yawata Iron Works as its nucleus. In the meantime, the- government's basic policy towards the iron industry changed. Utmost i importance was first attached by the Government to iron manufacture relying on pig iron imported from the Chinese Han Yeh Pin Corporation. Later, n complete process of steel manufacture was acopted in view of economizing fuel and obtaining by-products such as gas and tar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO DIRECT 1£,213 It was not a long time ago that a full-fledged iron industry was finally established in Japan when arrangements had been made to import coal and coke from China and iron-ore from Korea, China and the South Seas. The Extraordinary Industrial Council, which met in 1930 to discuss measures to overcome the prevalent economic depression, decided in conclusion to set up a single iron manufacturing company by amalgamating the government-oT,,rned Yawata Iron Foundry and civilian iron foundries mainly manufacturing pig iron or ordinary steel materials. It was thus that the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company came into being, "c ) Petro>leum "The output of petroleum in our country during the period between For Id War I and. the beginning of the Showa Era (TN. 1926 and later years) was only about 300,000 kilolitres. Even so, the demand for petroleum in our country in 1910-1920 was not so great that until 1920 Japan could meet half of her domestic demands with her home production. However, the demands for petroleum, especially benzine, increased considerably along with the popularization of automobiles and the development of the manufacture of rubber and grease. With the production of petroleum at home remaining on the former level, its proportion against the domestic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSI INO DIRECT 16,219 demands became nothing but a trifle in recent years. Therefore, the government conducted, after World War I, various studies and investigations of measures for obtaining an adequate supply of petroleum and had the necessary installations made. Subsidies paid I for encouraging the prospecting of oil deposits since 1900 when a geological survey was conducted and, with a view to making studies in liquid fuels, the Fuel Research Institute was set up as a governmental organization whose mission was to conduct researches in low temperature carbonization and coal liquefaction. No way was found, however, to alter the Tact that the main portion of the oil supplies had to be imported from abroad in order to satisfy the domestic demands. But the importation of gasoline particularly was con- trolled practically by the American Standard Oil Company and the British Rising Sun Petroleum Company. "There have also been established recently petroleum refineries which rely on imported crude oil. A strange phenomenon was presented in about 1932, when the retail price o-p gasoline in Japan be- came cheaper than in any other market in the whole world, as both Japanese oil refineries and the American and. British companies held large stocks of gasoline and competed, intensely among each other. YOSHINO DIRECT 18,215 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 • 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Competition between the Japanese and foreign companies soon ended following the conclusion of a mutual agreement between them. But in 1933, there appeared again signs of excessive competition among oil dealers, as the importation of gasoline from Soviet Russia was started anew. Although a cheap price of gasoline was welcome, it would ultimately have proven disadvantageous to the consumers if the market were plunged in confusion due to extreme l over-stocking and competition. The Law for the Pet- roleum Industry was therefore enacted in 1934 with a view to stabilizing the oil market. This law stipulated, on one hand, that the government would guarantee to the existing oil refineries and importers the protection of their vested business interests ! but, on the other hand, it made them bear certain | obligations towards the government, one of them being that of keeping stocks. Originally dealers held, as a rule, stocks of oil sufficient to cover about three months in order to ensure smooth operation of their business. However, it was ordered that this be increased to a six-months supply, but there was not a single reason given that it was for military purposes. The purpose was to ensure a sufficient supply for the domestic industries. To order the dealers to retain YOSHINO DIRECT 18,222 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 I 20 21 22 | 23 J 24 25 a certain fixed quantity under certain specified conditions followed the example of Trench legislation. At any rate, inasmuch as our petroleum market was under the'control of foreign petroleum, if, in case our supply is cut off by some circumstances, it would place our country Into very great difficul- ties. Although possession in stock of a six-month supply does not necessarily mean that the stock would ensure security, the idea was nothing more than that in the meantime further supplies could be obtained. As it was thought by the legislative authorities that the importation Soviet gasoline would make the two Anglo-American companies momentarily feel uneasy, the policy would be to permit, in principle, importers to monopolize the importation of petroleum in the future which would induce them to gladly keep a throe-month stock. "However, upon the enforcement of the law, it became clear that the two Anglo-American companies •would not agree to keep stocks over and above what they already had from the standpoint of their business requirements. Thus the dilemma was confronted that the law would be ignored and that furthermore if we could not have the two companies import oil, we would face difficulty. Thereupon, representatives were sent 18,217 YOSHINO DIPiSCT l 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 by the head offices of the Anglo-American companies to Tokyo where frequent negotiations were conducted. As a result, a compromise was reached whereby the two companies also would keep a six-month supply in stock as provided by the lav; but the government would pay, in return, the cost of the petroleum, cost for the construction of oil tanks, cost of depreciation of the oil during the said period, cost of insurance, interest, etc. Even in case of negotiations with the Ministry of Finance in connection with the payment of the costs, the purpose of stocks referred to above would be based upon industrial requirements. If the purpose were military, then the request would be made out of the Army and Navy expenditures. It was • the opinion of the then Finance Minister, the late TAKArlASRI, Korckiyo that a request for funds under the guise that it would be used for national defense, hiding behind the government department in charge of the Industrial matters, cannot be permitted. That was the reason why the costs referred to were included in the appropriations assigned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO DIRECT Md) Construction of good ships. "I was connected with the program for dis- mantling old ships and building superior vessels en- forced in 1932 as ?. member of the committee formed for that purpose, although the matter was princi- pally under the charge of the Communications Ministry. Prior to this and during the time of depression after 192.9, investigations had been made by the Commerce and Industry Ministry with a view to rationalizing the shipbuilding industry. In my understanding, the shipbuilding industry does not limit itself only to the construction of the ship itself but is also linked with numerous other industries because of the necessity of installing various equipments in the ship interior, which fact makes it a composite industry. Therefore, the rise cr fall of the shipbuilding in- dustry affects, needless to so.y, shipyards as well as a number of other industries, particularly hard hit » among them being medium and small-scale industries. According to the result of the special studies con- ducted in those days, it became known that more than half of the shipping charges were being spent for the benefit of industries other than shipbuilding. Therefore, the problem whether or not there is work in the shipyards is closely related with the problem 1 2 -3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSI INO DIRECT 16,219 of unemployment in other industries. It was from this point of view that the program for dismantling old ships and building modern and superior vessels was formulated in 1932. It was only natural that the policy of building modern and superior vessels was adopted inasmuch as the shipping charges con- stituted an important element for maintaining our international trade balance as a source of revenue other than from ordinary trade. The same explanation can be given to the case of the enforcement by Eng- land of the Trade Facility Act in 1921. The said law provided from the viewpoint of the prevention of unemployment, for the government's guarantee of pay- ment covering both the principal and interest of the loans raised by the shipbuilding companies. Before the law was abolished in 1927, the government had guaranteed for the loans totaling 74,251,780 pounds, of which more than 21,600,000 pounds or about thirty per cent were raised by civilian shipyards, ranking fi.st among the companies. I believe that this example is ample proof of the importance attached to the shipbuilding industry as a means to cope with the depression and to give relief to unemployment. "2. Measures for Rationalizing the Industries. "The movement for the rationalization of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 DIRECT Itf ,220 industries was started in our country in 1930-1931 following the world-wide depression of 1929• I n those days, it was not a problem which merely concerned our country but was an economic policy common to all the countries in the world including Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Italy. Our country was rather late in following suit and the measures which we enforced were modeled after those of other coun- tries. I cannot afford to idle away time here in explaining fully the basic ideology of industrial rationalization, suffice to say, it was a problem of readjusting industries which had sprung up in all countries like so many mushrooms after the rain during World War I. All the belligerent powers had not only expanded their existing industries but also had set up new industries, as best they could, in order to produce various articles for the supply of which they had depended on other countries prior to the war. This tendency was not limited only to the belligerent powers, but neutral powers and also to adopt economic policies of self-sufficiency as the result of the complete paralyzation of international trade. As a result, world economy was confronted when the war ended, with extremely excessive supplies as compared with the demands. In addition to it, the 1 2 3 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 18,221 YOSHINO DIRECT purchasing power of the countries had been decreased tremendously due to wartime dissipations. "Therefore, it was incumbent upon the world 4 powers then to adopt new economic policies whereby 5 to readjust and. wind up war industries. The execu- 6 tion of such policies, however, would have given rise 7 to severe unemployment in various fields of industries. 8 It was something that the statesmen of a country were 9 utterly unable to do at a time when the current of labor unrest was sweeping all over the world. Hence, 11 efforts to maintain industrial equipments and. instal- 12 lations, expanded or commenced during the time of the war, were made at unreasonable costs. The universal economic principle of 'Give and. Take1 was not ob- served any more by the powers which now followed the policy of 'Take and Take.' Onn would readily under- stand the situation which prevailed if one recalled measures taken by the countries at that time in order to encourage the use of domestic products. In England, even postage stamps bore a slogan discouraging foreign products and which branded those using foreign articles as 'traitors.' Our country also followed suit by 74 starting in the late 1920's, a movement '"or the pro- motion of the domestic industries and use of home products." 25 YOSHINO DIRECT 18,222 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: That will do for the tine being. This, of course, is not merely a statement of fact5 it is an argument? and we must decide matters that this witness purports to decide for us. That will be understood, even in the absence of an objection by the prosecution. We will recess for fifteen minutes. ('•'hereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 DIRECT 10,223 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SHIOBARA. MR. SHIOBARA: (Reading continued) "It was then that we realized afresh the necessity for firmly establishing the manufacturing industries which would become the foundation of all the industries of a country. Discussions were made of the measures aimed at establishing such industries as iron manufacturing, air nitrogen fixation, ball bearing, soda ash and petroleum. In spite of desperate efforts, however, there appeared no prospects of recovery, as it was a case of economic depression resulting from a disparity between demand and supply, excessivo supply, and over-capitalization of the industries. Especially the peculiar feature of our industry was that it largely depended on the numerous medium-and small-scale manufact- urers for the production of articles for export. It is a well-known fact that some overseas markets were once plunged into such confusion due to reckless com- petition that vigorous complaints were made by the dealers of Japanese goodo abroad. Although it seemed superficialljj true that the cheaper the articles importers buy, the greater would be their profits, it was not necessarily so, for the Japanese articles, which the importers thought YOSHINO DIRECT 18,215 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 were bought at a cheap p£ics, would be undersold by still cheaper articles that would flow into the market a short while later, thus incurring ultimate loss to the earlier importers. Japan was flooded then with complaints, coming from all over the world, for tagging unnecessarily low prices to her go<rds and with requests to give them even if higher, more stable prices to her export articles, Japan was thus confronted with the necessity to maintain order at least among those of the m-dium-and small-scale industrialists who were manufacturing important export items and to suppress reckless and excessive competition among them. However, we were reluctant to allow the / government's authority to interfere wantonly with popular economic activities, in as much as our successive cabinets since the Meiji era, had been observing the principle of Free Industry as their golden rule. As a result, the system of the industrialists' associations was devised with a view to maintaining order in the same line of trade. Nevertheless, even when the majority of the industrialists had reached an agreement of views, there always remained a handful or perverse heretics, who, far from opposing the agreement itself of the association, i hoped inwardly for the materialization of the agreement among the members of the association to act freely as 'outsiders' and reap unreasonable profits by taking 1 YOfcHIND DIRECT 18,225 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 advantage1 of the control enforce^ by the associations. It may be said that they formed a sort of 'parasitic industry.1 Therefore, it became unavoidable to exercise the government's authority to cope with such practice, for had it been loft unrestrained, order could not be maintained in the fields of medium-and-small-scale indus- tries nor their wholesome development expected. "It was purely in this sense that control was enforced on the association system. It aimed, namely, at compelling the minority that has not joined the I association to comply with the agreement of the association r in cases where the majority of thp members autonomously concluded an agreement in order to maintain order and stability within the field of their own industry. Simultaneously, a policy was adopted whereby the state supported the community institutions of the association so that the industrialists would benefit by joining the association also in respect to their individual business managements. At the outset, this policy was applied exclusively to the medium-and small-scale manufacturers of important export articles. However, shortly after the enforcement of the said system, it became known that the distinction between the products for domestic use and those for export purposes was not necessarily iclear and that excessive competition among medium-and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO DIRECT 18,226 small-scalp manufacturers of the articles for domestic use also tended to bring about harmful confusion in the field concerned. The law was, therefore, revised so as to make it applicable without distinction to all modium- and small-scale industries. Meanwhile, the government assumed in the beginning an attitude of laisse-faire towards .~©mparativ-ly large-scale industrialists, as it took the view that they would be different from the medium-and small-scale industrialists who had little culture, technique, and experience, and that, if they wished to avoid the harms of wanton competition, the larb*-scale industrialists should and would arrange their matters by their own hands. While the worldwide economic depression W3s being aggravated with the year 1929 as the turning point, Japan, on her tart, adopted a number of counter-measures, including the lifting of the) gold embargo, which, however, resulted momentarily in a complete suffociation of our industrial activities. Just then, the government was going ahead with its efforts for Industrial rationalization and assisting in various ways the large-scale industries such as ship-building, fertilizer, electricity, machines, iron and cement, in effecting their liquidation, joint-management or merger. But none of such efforts brought about a satis- factory settlement owing to diverse reasons. It was then 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 DIRECT 18,227 that the government came to take the view that the state , should exercise its authority also on the large-scale I industries at the time of an economic crisis. Under those circumstances, the Law For The Control of Vital Industries was enforced in 1931. Judging from its name, the said law serins to be strongly tinted with the ideology of Totalitarian economy, but, by examining its content, one finds that it is not so in the least. "This law aimed, as a whole, at the controlling 7 7 of medium-and small-scale industries and at voluntary agreement among the industrialists in the same line of , trade. It was based upon the principle that the state would intervene with its authority to control the minority of the industrialists only when it did not comply with the desires of the majority. It was not, therefore, purported to allow the wielding of the authority of the government in order to satisfy the needs of the national policies against the desires of the majority of the industrialists. It was, it may also be said, a measure for promoting cartels. Opinions are divided as to whether cartels should be supported or discouraged and every country has its own practical prlicy which may differ from that of any other country. Whereas the United States government placed the trusts under a strict control since the enactment of the Sherman Act prohibiting the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOt-HINO DIRECT 18,228 trusts, !fhe National Industry Recovery Act enforced by President Roosevelt openly announced the government's support and protection of the trusts and cartels as a means to overcome the emergency. The European countries arp generally prepared both for supporting and controll- ing them according to the circumstances. "With respect to th^ cartel question, the Japanese government drafted cartel legislation, generally using as reference, studies made and published by the League of Nations. Among the stipulations in the law for the control of vital industries, there are stipulations for the control of cartels in addition to those for their promotion. The order for the registration of control agreements are in line with the idea of giving them due publicity. It appears as to be nothing more than registration, but as a matter of fact it follows the principle of the Clayton Act in the United btates which seeks to expose such matters widely to public opinion i and criticism by giving publicity to the contents of such measures, a step which is considered to be more preferable than control of penalties. Plan for industrial ration- alization in our country, especially the various plans in connection with the control of enterprises, follows the orthodox methods practiced by the various countries since the World War I and does not, In any way, deviate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 •irHINO DIRECT 18,229 'rom those methods. The establishment of the Special leasures Law of 1937 concerning import and export restrict-? .T .ons falls into an entirely different category. This is . basic law for the enforcement of war-time economy. A mmber of war-time economic laws were created on the )asis of the foregoing law, but this is a measure adopted >y other countries as well out of the compelling necessitie >f the war and requires no explanation*" That is all. You may cross-examine. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 v 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO CROSS 18,230 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Cuilliam. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the Tribunal, I assure that there is no further exam- ination or cross-examination on the part of the defense. THE PRESIDENT: Your assumption appears to be correct. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER QUILLIAM; 0 Witness, I want to draw vour attention to a sentence from your affidavit commencing at the bottom of page 1. It is as follows: "I shall refrain from speaking here of the matters subsequent to the outbreak of the China Incident because of the fact that economic measures adopted after the outbreak of the incident are indicative of genuine war-time economy rather than of war preparations." Now, Witness, when you refer to genuine war-time economy there, may I take it that you are referring to the war in China? A Yes, I use the word "genuine war economy" in connection with the China Incident. 0 And you meant that all economic measures after the China Incident had reference to the war 1.8,231 YOSHINO CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 i 22 23 ! 24 | 25 I in China? A What I have written in my affidavit pertains to the one year that I was in the office of Minister of Commerce and Industry with respect to the plans and policies taken by that ministry during my tenure of office, and generally my statements in the affi- davit were written with reference to the statements made by Mr. Liebert.. To the extent that the matter was treated in the statement given to this Tribunal by Mr. Liebert, I explained our economy as being a war-time economy, and therefore it does not necessarily mean that the economic policies taken during this one year are entirely of a war-time nature, that is, the policies taken by the govern- ment. Q Very well. Now, you were familiar, were you not, with the various production plans that were made during the year 1937? A I do not recall very definitely as to what particular plan or plans were taken in the year 1937? that is, war-time production plans, but I do know that various plans were made in the face of war-time necessity — for instanoe, with reference to the production of synthetic petroleum, that Is, YOSHINO CROSS 18,236 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the increase in the production of synthetic pe- troleum. 0 £nd you remember the war officers' plan for the production — the 5-year Plan for the produc- tion of important war materials? A I do not know. 0 Do you remember that being referred to frequently in Mr. Liebert's statement? A Yes, I frequently noticed that in the statement of Mr. liebert, and also a number of references to 5-year plans; but I do not have any recollection whatsoever of having been associated with a 5-year Plan as the responsible head of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Q Very well, I will bring that to your notice later. Now I want to draw your attention to a speech made by the accused SATO on March 10, 1942. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: This is exhibit 849, if the Tribunal pleases. 0 Do you remember that speech? A I do not have any recollection. 0 It was made on the Army Day commemora- tion in 1942. Does that refresh your memory? A I do not know. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 CROSS 18,235 0 All right. I will read you a portion of that speech from page 5, at the bottom of the page. THE PRESIDENT; Are you going to adopt Sir Charles Russell's formula: Would you be surprised to know.that SATO said this? It is very question- able. BRIGADIER GUILLIAM: Fay it please the Tribunal, I thought he would know, but it is immaterial for my purpose whether he had heard the speech before or not. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read the follow- ing extract: "In 1936 our army formulated a national defense plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments and productive power in order to secure and develop the results of the Kanchurian Incident. As the expansion of armaments and rearma- ment by the European Powers were to be completed by 1941 or 1942, we anticipated an international crisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it necessary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO CROSS 18,234 1937 to 194-2, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941." May it please the Tribunal, I had hoped that I would be able to read the whole of this extract in one reading. I thought that the trans- lation section would be able to deal with it, as they were given notice that I was going to use this exhibit. THE MONITOR; Brigadier Ouilliam, we can, sir, except that we have to know where you will start and where you will end in that case. If you will tell us that we will have it put on the I.B.M. and have it read simultaneously. Can you tell us tha t now? THE PRESIDENT; They want the pages of the Japanese text, I suppose. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM; I began at the bottom of page 5. THE MONITOR: Yes. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: And I am going to the end of that paragraph, on page 6, to the words "a rough estimate." THE MONITOR: Th^nk you: sir. Is that all? BRIGADIER OUILLIAM: That is all. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 CROSS 18,235 (Continuing) "In 1937, the first year of this plpn, the Lukouchiao Incident broke out." THE MONITOR: Just a minute, Brigadier Ouilliam; the sound engineer is adjusting the machine. All right. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will repeat those words: "In 1937, the first year of this plan, the Lukouchiao Incident broke out. What worried us most was the fear that this incident might cause the break-down of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five-Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident would not end in a war of attrition to our side. Accordingly, generally speaking, we spent 40% of our budget on the Chinese Incident and on armament expansion. In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20% on the Chinese Incident and 80% on the expansion of armaments. As a result, the air force and mechanized units have been greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese Army has been increased to more than three times what it was before the China Incident. I believe that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China Affair must have perfected aad expanded its fighting power. Of course, produc- 18,236 YOSHINO CROSS tive power of the munition industry hps been ex- panded 70 to 80$ at a rough estimate." Q Witness, do you now recall anything of that speech0 A I do not. 0 Having heard that extract read, do you still say that the economic plans adopted after the outbreak of the Incident are indicative of genuine war-time economy rather than of war preparations? A Ps I have said before, my affidavit has been prepared viz a viz the statement given by Mr. Liebert, and that is the primary purpose of my affi- 13 davit, and that after the outbreak of the China 14 Incident I state that we entered a period of war- 15 time economy — a genuine war-time economy. 16 Now, the speech with reference to the 5- 17 year Plan given by S.AT0 is an entirely separate ques- 18 tion, and so far as I know, I don't know of any 19 5-year Plan during my tenure of office as Minister 20 of Commerce and Industry, and we did not have any 21 competence to formulate any production plans with 22 reference to purely national defense matters; we, 23 that is to say, the Commerce and Industry Ministry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 S 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 CROSS 18,238 directly connected with me when I was holding this office and inasmuch as I wasn't directly connected, with these matters I didn't touch u-on them berause I felt that I wasn't in a position to sneak about them authoritatively. May I add just a word? The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is in charge of administra- tion of manufacturing industries but not all of the industries and manufacturing in Ja^an. For instance, ship building was in the hands — was under the juris- diction of the Ministry of Communications while the manufacture of aircraft was entirely outside of the competence and jurisdiction of any economic ministry. Q Witness, at the moment I am not concerned with whether these plans came under your ministry or not. Is that clear ? A Yes. Q What I am-r^^vJO^ned about is this: that you have come along you say, to refute Mr. Liebert's testimony. 'That is so, isn't it? A Well, you...have used the word "refute" but my pnrrdSe^xn writing my-affidavit was to point out the facts with which I wa-s personally directly or indirectly connected .r;ith. and by doing so to point out any errors in fact that existed in Mr. Liebert's statement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO CROSS 18,234 Q "itness, I have used the word "refute" because that is the word you used in your statement. Is that clear? THE. MONITOR; Brigadier Quilliam, in the Japanese text the word "refute" is not there. It just says statement vis-a-vis Mr. Liebert's statement which is translated into English as "refute". A That seems to be a language question. I have read Mr. Liebert's statement in its entirety and there are many matters and far-reaching matters with which I have never been personally connected with and, therefore, I have never throughout my affidavit used the word "refute." I have constantly said — mentioned my position — my statements vis-a-vis Liebert's state- ment, And, therefore, I have said that I am only dis- cussing matters with which I was personally and directly connected with and that I am merely tying to point out facts in which I find myself at variance with that of Mr. Liebert. In the final analysis It may amount to the same thing but at least my position is that I am not trying to refute but trying to point out the mistakes. Q The point I am interested in is this: Am I to understand that you do not attempt in any way to deal with the five year plan mentioned in Mr. Liebert's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Y0SHIN0 GROSS 18, Statement? Is that so? A This is a matter with regard to which I have not only no recpllection but no knowledge and so if \ questions pertaining to them were asked me I should think I should be unable to answer them. Q But before coming here you made no attempt to find out what was in those plans? A That I didn't do at all because I didn't have any data in the first place and I have no knowledge of it. Q And yet you say in yrur statement that you were concerned either directly or indirectly with almost all of the various economic policies touched upon by Mr. Liebort in his testimony. A Perhaps explanations were insufficient in that regard but what I meant to say was that as an administrative officer I was referring to matters to which I was either concerned as an administrative officer in connection with matters pointed out by Mr. Liebert in his statement as en administrative officer of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. BRIGADIER QFILLIAM: Under those circumstances, if it please the Tribunal, I will not proceed with the cross-examination. THF PRESIDENT: Perhaps you might point out 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YOSHINO CROSS 18,24 In Mr. Liebert's statement where Liebert dealt with SATO's exposition of the five year plan. Unless this man knew the five year plan he couldn't purport to sr>eak with any assurance on Japanese economy during that period. BRIGADIIR QUILLIAM: I thought that a witness who came along here to deal with Mr. Liebert's 'evidence would at least have taken the trouble to understand the basic features underlying Mr. Liebert's evidence, i?nd I was amazed to find, if it pleas'^ the Tribunal, that although in Mr. Liebert's evidence the extract from SATO's speech is quoted and given point apparently the witness has never heard of it. THE. PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks. MR. BROOFS: I think if the counsel will not get unduly excited about this you will find there will be another witness that will t ake UP a subsequent period and reference to page 1 of the witness' testi- mony, the second paragraph says he is talking of the matters prior to the outbreak of the China Incident of which he has knowledge and there will be other witnesses who will take up this matter and deal with it. THE PRFSIDEN1 : Captain Brooks, you should have left that to Mr. SHIOBARA. Unfortunately we do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,234 YOSHINO CROSS not know when you come to the lectern, -what you are going to talk about. BRIGADIER QUILL I AM: We assumed, may it pi*- your Honor, that the Minister of Industries and Commerce during the year 1937) when these plans were being put into effect, would be able tc give this Tribunal some assistance. MB, SHIOBARA; I think it is asking too much to expect phis witness to speak about the five year plan inasmuch as he had no personal connection what- soever with it. With respect to this question, the defense expects LO have the witness OKADA, Kikusubaro appear as a witness to testify. No redirect, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released on the usual terms. (Whereupon, the witness was excused.) MR. SHIOBARA: I call the witness OWADA, Teiji. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 or ADA 18,243 T E I J I O W A D A , called as a witness on behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIOBARA: Q Please eive your name, date of birth, place of birth and present address. A My name is 0VADA, Tei;)i. I was born in OITA Prefecture. My present address is Shibuya "''ard, Yoyogi Oyama-ch^ 1071. Q Will you give us briefly your curriculum data and your official carreer? A In 1915 I graduated from the English Law Department of the Law College of Kyoto Imperial Uni- versity. From 1917 until May of until August of 1918 I was an official in the — until August of 1940 I was an officiaV in the Ministry of Communications. I was in the Ministry of Communications for twenty- three years all together and during this time I held the Office of the chief of the Bureau of Electricity, director of the Bureau for the Preparation of Electric Power Control, and finally Vice-Minister of Communi- cations which was the last Position held. Q Mr. Fitness, were you personally connected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 8 > ? 4 4 OWADA DIRECT ss an official of the government with the enforcement of the National Electric Power Control Law? A On orders from the Minster of Communications I was directly concerned with the drafting and carrying iV into effect of this law. Q Did you read, Mr. ir'itness, the sections relating to electric power in the statement given by Mr. Liebert to this Tribunal? A I read — I heard over the radio and also read in newspapers that Mr. Liebert had given testi- mony on various economic and financial matters concern- ing Japan and I also noticed that he had eiven testi- mony in connection with the matter of electricity with which I was directly connected, concerned, and so I read the accounts of his testimony very briefly. THE PRESIDENT: Didn't he read the evidence as Mr. Liebert gave it in court? If he didn't, his evidence isn't going to be as valuable as it might be. If he read only a brief account of Mr. Liebert's evidence he certainly isn't qualified to contradict it. Q I think I showed you the statement given by Mr. Liebert to this Tribunal to you. Have you seen it and read it? A I read extracts from his testimony which 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT 18,245 dealt with electricity and clectric power with which I was directly concerned. THE PRESIDENT: Now, that isn't dear enough. - He said he read a brief account of the evidence. Did he read all the evidence that Liebert gave about this particular branch ofindustry? Q Now, may I as'k you, Mr. Fitness, you have read the entire statement of Mr. Liebert in connection with electricity, did you not? THE INTERPRETER: In so far as it relates to electricity. A I read all of what I considered to be Mr. Liebert's statements regarding elec':iic power and electricity and also I read extracts from the trans- cript of the proceedings of this Tribunal which related to that subject. r IE MONITOR: Which related to Mr. Liebert's examination and his statement. THE PRESIDENT: You should not have led him as to what he read, Mr. SHIOBARA. A (Continued) When I said I read it over briefly I didn't mean to say that I didn't read the whole of it but to say that I didn't take the time to read it with a scrupulous regard to every single detail of that testimony. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,24-6 OWADA DIRECT THE PRESIDENT: The position isn't a harpy one hut we will recess now until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1ZCSI- a recess was taken.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1/ / 0T'rADA DIRECT AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330, the Honorable Henri Fernard, Member Iron the Republic of France, now sitting. MARSHAL 01 THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SHIOEARA. T E I J I 0 W A D A, Colled as a witness on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY in, SHIOBARA (Continued): 0 ™hat is the date of the enforcement of the state control system of electric power? THE MONITOR: Of the national electric power control law. A The main provisions of the national electric power control law were put in force from the 10th of August 19 38. 0 T|7ere there any cases where studies and investigations were conducted concerning utilization or control -- development or control of electric power by government and civilian officials concerned -- government officials and civilians concerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0~"ADA D m w T prior to enforcement of the present law? And if there were any such cases please state the reasons and circumstances leading up to the enforcement — leading up to the investigation and studies, briefly. A I have heard in connection with this question of generating electric power from water — when this whole question of developing water power was brought up, the question of whether or not it would be better to let the development of Water be carried out by non-governmental agencies, was quite a serious one. The reason is that since water rower is a natural resource it should be developed in a way that would be of benefit to the public at large, that it should not be used simply for the purpose of making profit. For these reasons this question was — became a serious problem — was considered a serious problem from the very beginning of setting up our administrative policy regarding this matter. In ord.°jp to generate electricity by water power there is a great need for fixed assets and consequently a large expense is necessary. ArJ therefore in the very beginning it was decided that an appeal would be made to the people's desire for OWADA DIRECT 18,249 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 personal profits, and capital to begin such enter- prise would be gathered in that way. Therefore, whenever the use of water power was permitted it ?/as always on the understanding that in case of public necessity such — the privilege of such utilization would be returned to the government. THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Ouilliam. BRIGADIER OUILLIAM: May it please the Tribunal, we are reluctant to object, but we submit that this evidence is quite irrelevant to any issue in this case or to the evidence that he has come here to give. THE PRESIDENT: That is the impression I have formed too, but I suppose we will have to per- sist, to see if he is going to say something that is relevant and material. MR. SHIOBARA: This witness is called here to — not only to refute testimony given by Mr. Liebert concerning state control of electricity, but also to explain the real aspect of state control of electricity that was enforced in Japan at that time. A Therefore the government, for its part, has for the past several decades always held to -- firmly held to its — to the principle that should an occasion of public necessity arise the system of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 j OWADA DIRECT 18,250 utilizing water power for profits would be changed to a system of utilizing water power for the public benefits. However, as time went on it was found that the private ownership — private utilization of water power for profit, had several faults in it, and therefore NODA, Utaro, who was Minister of Communication from 1918 to 1921, concrete steps were taken to investigate the advantages of public control of electric power, and a draft plan was tentatively formulated. Concerning this problem at the time there is a record of the questions and answers given in the House of Peers on this problem tetween Mr. FAKAJOJI, member of the House of Peers, and Minister NODA. THE PRESIDENT: This appear? to be all very remote from the real question, whether and to what extent, if at all, the development of water power in Japan was directed to war purposes more specifically. A The reason I have given this answer — these answers — is that on reading Mr. Liebert's testimony I received the impression that Mr. Liebert strongly stressed that the sole reason for the state control of electric power was for — to prepare for war, and I wish to over-turn the basis of his testimony 18,251 OWADA DIRECT on the — by revealing the fact that it was not that at all, but that the Communications Ministry had from the very beginning always considered this problem of state control of electricity. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 OWADA DIRECT 0 Leaving it at that, T shall now ask you about the circumstances leading up to the enforce- ment of the electric power state control law, its object and its contents. Will you answer to those points briefly? A Before answering this question, may I state, Mr. President, that before — the circumstan ces at the time this law was being considered and leading up to the actual carrying out into effect of this law were circumstances in which Japan found herself — correction — which Japan found very — faced with very serious aspects. May I therefore state — touch somewhat on these aspects, which I believe to be of some importance? THE PRESIDENT: They can be important only so far as they bear on the issues, vrtiether all this development of water power in Japan was direc- ted toward war purposes. We don't want a disser- tation on the electric situation in Japan. Brigadier Ouilliam. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May It please the Tribunal, may I venture to remind the Tribunal that Mr. Liebert gave evidence that until 1938, when thi control law was passed, all the generating companie were private concerns. The Issue raised by bit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT 18,253 was that from the adoption of that law the indus- try became totalitarian. THE PRESIDENT: Well, this witness purposed to give evidence to the effect that for decades, I think is the expression he used, they were tending toward totalitarianism in public interest to avoid the making of large profits by private industry. Perhaps we have heard enough on that sub-issue. BY MR. SHIOBARA: Q Well, then, Mr. Witness, you are no* re- quired to explain in detail the circumstances lead- ing up to the enforcement of this law, but explain briefly the purpose of this law and the contents of it so that the doubts will be cleared about this question. MR., SHIOBARA: Mr. President, I wish to get leave of the Court to let this witness use his memo, if he has any with him, if he coires across dates and figures in the course of his testimony, so that he can testify correctly. THE PRESIDENT: He will always be allowed to refresh his memory in a proper way. Froceed to questien him. THE WITNESS: Then, I shall continue my testimony. The President has just referred to this OWADA ? DIRECT 18,254 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ! 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | 23 24 25 question, to the fact that it seems that Japan- ese industry was — that we were trying to swing Japanese industry towards totalitarianism, but as far as electric power industry was concerned we had no such idea. Only as far as electricity generated by water power is concerned, this industry — we considered that that industry must be given a public nature, ^'ater power is almost the only natural re- source of Japan. I understand that even in countries such as America and the U.E.S.R., which have abund- ant resources of water power, the opinion has been held that the development of this water power should be carried on as a public enterprise. Nov/, if I may state the purpose — now, if I may state for what purpose we intended to develop water power as a public enterprise, I believe that self-sufficiency is the means by which 3 country can avert war or autocracy5 but as everybody knows, Japan is a country which absolutely cannot become a. self-sufficient country. THE PRESIDENT: His function here is to contradict Liebert, if he can, that is, to make statements of fact which are inconsistent with Liebert1s evidence. From the evidence given by Liebert and the witness the Court will draw infer- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,255 0V:ADA DIRECT ences of feet and on those facts will come to its conclusion. This witness is endeavoring to argue the case. Let him confine himself to statements of fact. MR. SHIOBARA: I understpnd. However, as this witness is one of the leading figures who contributed to the enactment of electric power state control law, I thought it was useful to the Court to listen to the opinion of this witness, which can be treated as a fact. THE PRESIDENT: No matter who he is, he cannot decide questions which we must decide. In his position he should have valuable knowledge, apart from opinions, which would help us. P As Mr. President just pointed out, will you try to avoid expressing your opinion and testify on the basis of facts the purpose and the contents of the electric power state control lav.'? f A I understand well the President's advice. One thing I do wish to say, however, is that Mr. Liebert states pt the very beginning of his testimony concerning this matter that the electric power state control law was passed for the sole pur- pose of preparing for war. OWADA LIRECT 18,256 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: v/e said at the time we would disregard that. V/e are not accepting Fr. Liebert's opinions. THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I shall answer your question. One purpose of the Electric Power State Control Law was to insure development of Japanese water power over a long period of time. Th^t is to say, if the development of water power were to have been continued in the way it had been at that time, in a pi.corneal sort of way, the available water power in Japan would have been exhausted in a v?ry short time. Therefore, if this method wore to bo changed for one of developing water power on a large sc?.le, unnecessary waste of water power could bo avoided and the water power could be utilized in a most economical and useful way. N£!xt, concerning the situation relative to each generating station, the western part of Japan is very scarce in water power. In contrast, the eastern part of Japan is rich in water power. Were those generating stations in east and west to be joined by power lines, the western section of Japan would be able to economize on the conl which had hitherto been used for generating purposes and do away with the generation of electricity by coal. The economization OWADA DIRECT 18,257 ••of-coal- was- another one of the purposes of this 1 Electric Power State Control Law. 2 Third, the question of sending prwer to agri- 3 cultural districts. In comparison with sending electric 4 power to agricultural districts, from a purely profit- 5 making point of view, it was much cheaper to send power 6 t o large cities; and thus the electric power industry 7 had a tendency to concentrate around large cities. 8 Thus, whan we compare the consumption of electric power 9 in Japan with that of other countries, we find that 10 the average consumption of electric power consumption n per person is 400 kilowatt hours. In America, this average is 888 kilowatt hours. In Norway, one person is using — the average for one person works out to as much as 5800 kilowatt hours. Q You may look at your memo. A Thank you. These figures mean that the average household in Japan does not utilize electric power as much as it should. And when we were consider- ing this question of electric power control, we took Switzerland as a model. That is to say, Switzerland, ike Japan, is a country which lacks natural resources, ut because the use of electric power was widely taken Advantage of in homes, small-scale factories with the home as a unit grew up in Switzerland and thus aided in 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 251' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT 18,258 maintaining Switzerland's economy. Therefore, we considered that Japan also must develop household industries in order to maintain her economy in the future. But we considered that if the development of electric power were to be continued on a profit-making basis, the bringing of electric power to the household was impossible. Furthermore, as I stated before, electricity can be supplied to large- scale industries at a far lower cost than to ordinary homes and smaller establishments. So that in connection with this, the problem of antagonism between large cities and rural areas also arose. It is for these reasons that we drafted plans for large-scale develop- ment and maintenance of electric power. The next question naturally follows: Why did these plans come to completion around the vear 1938 — I why were these plans adopted around the year 193^? I touched on this subject very briefly before. But from around the year 1934- — beginning from around the year 1929, international bloc economies began to be set up so that Japan was faced with the necessity for setting up a minimum economy of self-sufficiency. I wish to say at that time that we hoped that by effectuating state control of electric power, electric power would be made plentiful and also OWADA DIRECT 18,259 available to the public-at-large at low cost, which would enable us to make use of other resources and to maintain a minimum standard of living. To sum up, the motives for the purpose of effectuating state control of electric power by means of water power was, first, to utilize available water power in the most rational and effective manner, and to utilize it so that it could be utilized one hundred per cent. OWADA DIRECT 18,260 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 Next, to economize oil and coal which are 2 very scarce natural resources in Japan by the wider 3 use of electric power for heating purposes. 4 Third, to make plentiful the generation of 5 electric power, and thus to make it available at 6 low cost, and, as far as cost was concerned, to make 7 it available at a special low cost to whatever was of a public nature, to make it the motive power for — 9 correction, By sending electric power to homes and to agrarian areas, to encourage the development of small-scale industries, and by synthesizing these small-scale industries try to maintain Japan's economy. Next, concerning the production of fertilizers, Japan had been importing fertilizers such as nitrates and sulphuric ammonia from abroad, but if electric power were to be made more plentiful it would be possible to manufacture these fertilizers to a certain extent in Japan. And by these means we hoped to increase the production of food to a certain extent also. In this way we hoped at least to establish even seme semblance of a self-sufficient economy, and we considered that this was a symbol of a movement for peace. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have told us what 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT 18,261 your hopes were. What were your achievements? Liebert, as you know, gave evidence to the effect that a very large proportion of electric power was consumed in wur industries, in those more directly connected with the production of munitions of war and implements of war. MR. SHIOBARA: Just as you say, Mr. President. However, in my last question I asked the witness to testify about the contents of the Electric Power State Control Law -- also to which the witness has not replied yet. THE WITNESS s Then, may I reply first of all to the question from the defense counsel? THE PRESIDENT: There is a limit to the extent to which he can deal even with relevant and material matters. THE WITNESS: As for the question of what the achievements of the execution of the Electric Power Control Law were, we started from the premise th^t in order to achieve what we hoped to achieve, first of all, the large scale development of electric power as well as the transmission of electric power was necessary. Therefore, the basic policies on the development of water power and the supply of electric power were to be decided by the- government^-' Therefore, OWADA DIRECT 18,262 ^ 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 ! 15 1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ths government made the decisions as to the basic policies. But in making these decisions they were not drawn up merely by government officials, but on the basis of questions submitted to the Electric Power Investigation Committee and the replies which that committee made. As for the composition of this committee, the greater part of the members were repre- sentatives of consumers and th<.y consisted of members of the House of Peers, members of the House of Repre- sentatives and other people who had a high level of intelligence and experience. Now, in executing these policies drawn up by the government on the basis of such questions and answers, the government did not carry it out itself. It sot up a special company known as the Japan Elec- tric Power Distribution, Generation and Transmission Company, and made this company carry it out. This company is a company set up as other companies. The stockholders of this company are entirely private individuals such as those of other companies. Q When the Japan Elcctric Generation and Transmission Company was established was there any such law which was called "law for the development — increase of production of electric power?" If there was any such law, would you please explain what it 1 JL 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,263 OWADA DIRECT is, briefly. A Of courso, there was a plan for the increase of power production. However, as for the figures, I do not have the details — I do not have them down to the very small numbers, so I should like to be permitted to give thc-m in round numbers. I do not have the exact notes on the figures here. Before that, I should like to state that before the Electric Power Control Law there was an Electric Power Business Law — Enterprise Law. By this law an clectric commission was set up. THE PRESIDENT: If this witness persists in going in this roundabout way we may take control. We may require him to answer our questions. THE WITNESS: I shall soon reach my conclu- sion. By means of this electric commission the plans for the increase of electric power were set up year by year oven before the promulgation of ,tho Electric Power Control Lav/. By the promulgation of the Electric Power Control Lav; the only change made was that these yearly plans were not drawn up by individual, small- scale profit-making companies, but were drawn up by this one Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company on a largo scale. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DliiECT 18, The development plans of the Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company wore put into effect in 1939 when a four-year plan was drawn up, and this plan called for the development of 350)000 kilowatts per year. Besides this there were small- scale generating stations operated by individual factories and others, so that the total plans for the production of electric power came to about 500,000 kilowatts per year. I 2 3 4 5 6 fj 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 o n AD A DIRECT 18,265 Q In this connection, Mr. Liebert said, as the Tribunal also pointed out, that the electric po"'er works generated was almost all switched to war indus- try. Now, Mr. Witness, will you explain the plans *or distribution of electricity which were, in force at the time you were con ected with that enterprise? A I have no exact recollection of how it was planned, to distribute electric power at the present moment. » 0 Is that all you have to say? A We understand that at the same time of the enforcement of the Electric Power State Control Law a system or pather a commission by the name of Extraordinary Electric Power Research Commission was appointed. Q Now, of what kind, of people did this commission consist? A This commission was set up by the representa- tives on this commission from the Communications Minis- try, which was the .parent ministry, who were merely the Parliamentary Vice-Minister and the regular Vice- Minister. Also, the regular Railway Vice-Minister was also on this commission; but aside from these three officials, of the thirty-five members of this commission thirty-two were private individuals and were . 1 8 , OWADA DIRECT l 2 ! 3 I 4 j 5 6 j 7 j 9 j | 10 11 12 13 20 21 22 23 24 25 representatives of the comsumers of the electrical enterprises or were men — were intellectuals and men of experience and were either members of the House of Peers or of the House of Representatives. Q What was the purpose of the control imposed on the distribution of power? A The question was not quite clear. Q I said control on the distribution of power. A Since this control of the distribution of electric power was ejected after my resignation from the ministry my answer may not be very satisfactory. I believe, however, from what I know,, that the purpose of this was that even if the Japan Electric Generation i 14! and Transmission Company were set up. unless distribu- 15 ; tion agencies which directly distributed this electric 16 1 power to the consumers came under some kind of con-i ± 17 trol, there would be not much sense in having set up is i this company. And I also believe that the research 19 ! which was conducted in the Communications Ministry on the British bridge system also had come effect in determining this policy. THE PRESIDENT: This man was called to contradict Liebert. So far he has not devoted much time to doing it. Q I shall now ask you a simple question. At OWADA DIRECT 1S,267 i i 2 | 3 j | 4 ! 5 | 6 ! 9 j 10 ! I li ! 12 13 14 15 16 I 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the outset of Mr. Liebert's testimony the following is written. In the statement of Mr. Liebert it Is written: "The electric power industry was one of the first Japanese industries to be nationalized, and as such one of the original pillars in the new structure in support of total war." As one of those who actually practically dealt with the problem, i?*ould you answer to the following two points? HE PRESIDENT: I told you we disregarded Liebert's opinion. Let, him deal, if he can, with the figures Liebert gave; otherwise his mission here fails. THE WITNESS: In view of the President's previous ruling, that the opinions of Mr. Liebert are to be disregarded, I do not think it is necessary for me to answer this question. There Is one thing I would like to say as witness. The President has stated that I was called here to refute Mr. Liebert's testimony; but when I came here I had no idea that I was being called for that purpose, BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May It please the Tribunal, as I understood the witness, he announced that he was about to make another speech not in answer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT If, 2 68 to any question put by counsel. THE PRESIDENT: He came here, he said, after reading Liebert's evidence to reply to it, apparently. That is the only conclusion I could draw. Why did he read Liebert's evidence unless he was going to meet it? He was not called here to confirm it, was he? 1®. SHIOBARA: As you say, we have shown him Mr. Liebert's statement, and he also may have testified, expressed his opinions. However, «ur purpose of calling hirn here wasn't merely to refute testimony made by Mr. Liebert, but it was also our purpose to let him testify about the motives and , purpose for which the Electric Power Control Law was enforced in those days, as the witness is one of those who was responsible for the enforcement of that law — for the enactment of that lav;. THE PRESIDENT: Well, subject to what my colleagues think, I think we have heard enough on those points. Can he deal with the figures that Liebert gives? MR. SHIOBARA: Mr. Liebert's testimony was fcased mostly on the materials which he had obtained from the Japanese Government, and as far as the figures are concerned they are mostly correct. How- ever, as to the conclusion drawn .from those figures 1 X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OWADA DIRECT 18, and object of those plans as interpreted by Fir. Liebert, I should like to point out that there are sorie facts, some conclusions and interpolations which lead to misunderstanding. Therefore, I called this witness here to let him testify about the motives and purposes for which this man as one of the leading figures in the enactment of the law at that time held. THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 14-45, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceed- ings were resumed as follows:) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 nWADA 18,270 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed, THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it pleasetthe Tribunal, we do not propose to cross-examine the witness, THE PRESIDENT: The witness is excused on the usual terms, (Whereupon, the witness was excusedu) MR. SHIOBARA: No redirect examination. THE PRESIDENT: There can't be. MR. S. 0KAM0T0: I am counsel OKAMOTO, Shoichi. I should like to call on OKADA, Kikusaburo as the next witness. This examination will be based on documents 841 and 842, I should like to know if the Bench has those documents, THE INTERPRETER: "Documents" should read "exhibits." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,271 OKADA DIRECT K I K U S A B U R O O K A D A , called as a witness on behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows; DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. £5. OKAMOTO: Q What is your name? A OKADA, Kikusaburo. Q Will you sum up your personal history? A In 1918 I was commissioned Second Lieutenant and since then have served in the army. In 194-3 I was appointed Major General. THE PRESIDENT: What is your present address? We must have that for identification purposes. THE WITNESS: My present address is Tokyo City, j A (Continuing) In 194-5 I was appointed a member of the Military Affairs Bureau and was in that post when the war ended. While I was in the Military Affairs Bureau the war ended. From 1935) except for a very short period, ^ I was in the War Preparations Section of the Mobilization Bureau of jthe War Ministry and have been connected for all that time with national mobilization and military mobilization. Correction: I have been connected with the formulation of plans for national mobilization '18 OKADA DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and ril.it-ary utilization. I®. t*. 0KAM0T0:' May the wifcn̂ srf bo ahown exhibits No. 841 and 842. (Whereupon, the documents above re- ferred to were handed to the witness.) Q Were you connected in any way with — correction please — With reference to document No. 841, I should like to ask you, Mr. Witness, if you were connected in any way with the outline — with the drawing up of the outline of the Five-Year Plan for production of war materials, War Office, June 23, 1937; and now turning to the exhibit No. 842, Essentials of the Five-Year Program of important industries, War Ministry, 29 May 1937? Then the second part of the same document, Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of summary of Five- Year Program of important industries, dated 10 June 1937, and, finally, the part three of the same document entitled Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by Planning Board. THE MONITOR: Slight correction on the first date. The date should road June 23, 1941. That is the first date mentioned by the interpreter. A Expecially concerning exhibit 841, this was drawn up by myself, Q What was the original purpose for formulating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18,273 those plans? A Each plan had a-definite purpose, but,if I should state that purpose in a word, it moans,the increase of our national power. Exhibit 841 is entirely concerned with military plans. Exhibit 842 has a good deal of military aspects in it, but it is a plan for the establishment of a peace-time- economy. At the time, our country was in a position — in such a position that it had to beware of and to take measures to ropf, with the phenomenal expansion in military power of the Russian — of t-oviet Russia — of the national power and military power. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, OKADA DIRECT Q In those days what information did the army receive concerning the development of industrial plans in Russia end what estimates were made by the ermy in those days? A The U.S.S.R's development of its industries could only be called, startling after passing through the first and second five year plans. If we take the example of steel production, in 1929 it had attained a pre-war level but after the completion of the first end second five year plans it attained a level throe and a helf times in excess of pre-war days. In 1933 the production of steel in — correction: in 1933 the U.S.S.R. ranked third in the production of steel among the countries of the world and sccond among the countries of Furopc. The following year it hed ad- vanced to sccond in the world end first among European countries. A final report of the — it wes finally disclosed that in 1937 the production of steel in the U.S.S.R. had reached 17,700,000 tons. Furthermore, we were in a position to believe th£t with the com- pletion of the second five year plan the Soviet Union was about to begin a third five year plan energetically. In these circumstances we were forced to come to the conclusion that Japan also should at least endeavor to reach half of the Soviet Union's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,275 OKADA DIRECT planned production at the time of completion of the third five year plan. Q How did the plans on the part of Japan advance? A The first demands the army made -on the govern- ment were that by the year 1941, rhiich was the year scheduled for the completion of the plan, the produc- tion of steel in Japan and Manchuria would total ten million tons. However, the enforcement of the plan was delayed because of retarded decision of the govern- ment and the first, -- at the end of the first goal the amount produced was a little lower than the. expected amount of production including 995 million tons in Japan and 62 million tons in Manchuria, making a total ] of 157 million tons. - THE1 INTERPRETER: 10,570,000 tons. Q May we understand then that this nlrn was based primarily on military needs" A This plan was a plan for the establishment of a. peace time economy in which, however, a good deal of the military element was included. Q Those military requirements to which you referred, do they mean that they were military require- ments necessary to wage a war? A No, we had. no such idea, of waging a war from OKADA DIRECT 18,276 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 our side. Q Whet was the ^rlmary object of the establish- ment of peace industry? A Because many of Japan's important industries depended for their raw materials heavily on imports from abroad, the economic basis of our country was very shaky and ccrnomic independence was not a reality. Therefore, our country was at a great disadvantage in intern?tional trade. This fact, as the world began to divide up into blocs, became more end more severe. Hitherto our country hrd been able to maintain a precarious trade balance by developing the textile in&netry — primative industries fs well as a few light industries. We- believed that it was necessary at that time- that Japan should develop her heavy industries so that she would be fully qualified as a modern state and also for the future welfare of her people. Q By what elements or factors were the periods of those plans decided? A At the time we believed that the Soviet Union would embark upon c third five year plan- and we regulated our plan so that it would come to an end around the time when we believed the — in conjunction with the third five year plan, but in reality there is no special deep meaning behind the year on which 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18,277 our five year plan was scheduled to end, THE INTERPRETER: The previous statement the witness made should be corrected to: In drawing up our plans for this five year plan we kept in mind the Soviet's third five year pirn — the termination period of the third five yccr plan. A (Continuing) It goes without saying that any plan for Industrial development must naturally cover a certain cycle of years and as it will be clear if one glances at the documents of the '<"ar Ministry we intended that when the first five year plan was finished we would embark upon a second five year plan and go along in those cycles of five years, so no importance was placed on the end of 194-1 when the first five year plan was scheduled to end. Q You have, now referred to part one of War Ministry Plans. Now by thrt did you mean Exhibit No. 842? THE INTERPRETER: The first part of exhibit 842. Is this the document you were referring to? A Yes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18, Q Was the possible outbreak of the China Incident -- was taken into consideration when those plans were made? A It was not in our minds at all. Q Now, Mr. Witness, can you make it clear by quoting passages from this document — from these docu- ments that the plans as announced in documents — ex- hibits number £41 and in parts 1 and 2 of exhibit 842 were not formulated in anticipation of the China Incident? * (Whereupon, papers were handed to the witness.) Would the Marshal of the Court please leave the document — those documents in the hands of the witness because he will require them often. Q (Continuing) Will you examine those docu- ments before giving your answer? A I can prove that by many points. First, con- cerning exhibit 841, Outline of the Five Year Plan for Production of War Materials, this plan, because of the sudden outbreak of the China Incident, was not even used. It died a natural death. Next, as to exhibit 842, this plan also — because of the outbreak of the China Incident, the plans of the various ministries which were in charge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18, of the mobilization of goods were set completely awry so that this plan — the carrying out of this plan during the year 1937 was not possible, and the actual execution of this plan was only begun in 1938. There- fore, this which was supposed to be a five year plan became a four year plan. This can be ascertained if we look at the heading of part 3 of exhibit 842 in which the date on which this plan was decided by the cabinet conference is given as well as on page 2 of the same part where the yearly estimates for the pro- duction of each kind of material are given. Next, as for exhibit 841, as I stated, this was not actually used because of the outbreak of the China Incident which necessitated a much bigger — much plans for the increase of production on a far wider scale, especially for the mobilization of muni- tions. And, in order to carry this out, and in order to use as much as possible for military — for direct military consumption, the plans given in exhibit 842 had necessarily to be curtailed and changed in great measure so that the actual carrying out of this plan is quite different from the plan itself. Fourth, both exhibits 841 and 842 planned only a very limited economic control. But, because of the unforeseen outbreak of the China Incident, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18, first of all, the mobilization of Industry was made necessary and, second, a large scale economic mobiliza- tion was made necessary. And finally, a total mobili- zation of the national strength had to be carried out. Lastly — correction; These facts are proof that, in drawing up these plans, we did not take all possibilities into consideration and that, because of the outbreak of the China Incident, these plans, in their fundamental ideas, were set completely awry, and we had to draw up new ones. In short, these plans were only possible of execution and of being carried out upon the assumption that a great incident or a great wa.v would not occur during the period of the carrying out of that plan. THE; PRESIDENT: Witness, you are giving .your evidence in a way that we can hear, but there is no need to speak so loudly. You have a microphone in front of you. It is rather distressing to have to listen to a loud voice in these circumstances. Q Besides those plans, were there any plans in Japan ready for waging of war against China? A No. Q Mr. Witness, you testified that the outline of the Five Year Plan for Production of War Materials, as set out in the exhibit No. 841, was abandoned be- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18, fore its realization. Now, Mr. Witness, it was a very- important statement that you mado there. Are you sure theft it was true? A I am sure. There is no mistake. Q Were any orders given — were no orders given concerning the execution of plans as embodied in the exhibit No. 841? A No, there were no such orders. Q Does that mean, then, that those plans were not official plans? A They are official plans. These plans re- ceived the approval of War Minister TJGIYAIIA on June 23, 1937. But, in conncction with this approval, approval was not given which would actually carry this plan into effect; that is, of conveying this plan to the various departments of the army. Q Why was not the approval obtained concern- ing the carrying out of those plans? A Before this plan could be carried out there were many, many problems which had to be materialized — which had .to be taken care of. If this plan were to be conveyed to the various departments of the army without first taking care of these various problems, it would be quite meaningless, C; Were there any parts which concerned other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT 18,282 ministries other than the War Ministry? A Yes, there were. Q How were they dealt with? A Concerning plans which had to do with the other ministries, those parts which could he embodied in exhibit 84-2 were thus — so embodied, and the- re- maining portions we planned to carry out after dis- cussions with the various ministries concerned on each occasion. Q Were not the plans in exhibit 841 approved by the War Minister after having gone through due con- sultations with other ministries ccn^rned? A This plan was sot up without any previous consultation with other ministries. This plan was merely an indication of the direction in which we planned to go] and, in order to carry this plan out, we intended to take up the various details of this plan in consultation with other ministries one by one. Q Well, then, those plans -- correction, please: Well, then, the Finance Minister was not con- cerned with those plans — as far as those plans go, the Finance Minister had . c connection whatsoever with them. A That is so; he had no connection with these 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,2? OKADA DIBLCT plans — this plan. Q Does the document itself show that it — or, rather, those plans obtained the approval only of the War Minister? A If you look at the top of this document, you will see the words "military secret" -- look at the cover If this document was a document to be circulated among the various departments in the army, in accordance with the regulations concerning secret documents within the War Ministry, this document should have been given -- specified as ''Military Secret," and then a number slvuid have been given a classifica- tion number shoule have been given,. Q However, is it not true that preparations for the execution of those plans could be made later, sub- sequent to the approval given by the War Minister? A If the matter had been carried out according to plan, probably it would have gone on in the direction which you just mentioned. But, two weeks after June 23, when the War Minister's approval was given, the Lukouchiao Incident suddenly broke out on July 7 — correction: War Minister SUGIYAMA — it was impossible to carry out in detail and to try to put into effect the various matters which pertained in this plan within those short two weeks. But, upon the sudden OKADA DIRECT 18,284 outbreak of the China Incident, the army was faced with the necessity of giving a much more detailed and much more specific order which would adequately cover the needs of the situation to the various departments concerned instead of this very rough and small-scale plan. Q That is a very important point. Will you enlarge on it? A In order to meet the requirements of the China Incident, it was necessary to have quite a large supply of goods in order to fill up the attrition which would 'be caused by war. However, exhibit 841, the plan given in exhibit 841 is a peace-time plan and was concerned with how to guide the development of munitions industries with the small peacetime budget of the army' -- in the framework of the small peace- time budget of the army. With such a plan it was impossible to keep up with the heavy losses which a war -- which the incident would entail. In the first place, the plan given in exhibit 841 is a plan based on — which based on the amount of the budget which the army expected to be able to secure during the years 1937 to 1943. I The total amount of the budget which the army hoped to secure in those seven years was three billion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 OKADA DIRECT But, after the outbreak of the China Incident, first an expenditure of three billion ven was authorized, and then, in the extraordinary session of the Diet which met in September of 1937, a special budget of fourteen billion yen was authorized for the army. That is to say, within only half a year -- within barely half a year the army used approximately twenty billion yen; and from 1938 and succeeding years, the army's budget increased by several tens of billions. I believe that this alone would suffice to clarify the fact that this plan given in exhibit 841 was quit insufficient to meet the requirements of the China Incident. ti Can you prove by quoting a passage or pas- sages from the document 841 that those plans were based upon peacetime -- small peacetime budgets? A Yes, I can. To begin with, under No. 4 of the preface, these words are given: "From the standpoint of controlling the pace of its execution, this outline shall depend firstly on the basis of the sixth war budget." Next, on page 3? in the paragraph "1, Policy," these words are given: "In order to cope with the present situation and to establish the found' ation of our national defense powers accompanying the OKADA lttUECT 18,284 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 perfection arw^merits" — I should like* to explain this In detail. In the army "believed that, in order to cope with Soviet expansion, it was necessary to complete — to replenish military preparations in the six years be- tween 1937 and 1942. Within the army this was called "The Six Year Plan for Military Replenishment." After negotiations with the Finance Ministry, the amount of the budget which the War Ministry had originally planned was cut, and the length of the years was lengthened by one year so that it became a seven year plan, and the total budget, thirty-three billion yen, which the Finance Ministry at the time gave in- formal consent — to which. But this informal ap- proval was given on the understanding that — for the actual spending of this money, discussions will be conducted on the basis of the actual situation year by year (tnd after the whole thing had been presented tc the Diet for approval. TKi: PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half- past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn- ment was taken until Thursday, 13 March 1947, at 0930.)
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March 12, 1947 - Index (p. 18, 190-18,286)
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