AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
application/pdf
1 Tuesday, 11 March 1947 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Chambers of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS On Paper No.. 756 - Application of the Accused TOJO, Hideki, for the production of witnesses under the Charter. Paper No. 759 - Petition of Prosecution for Order amending previous Orders in re: Receipts for withdrawal of Court Exhibits. In re: Procedure for examination of Defense Witnesses. Before: HON. SIR WILLIAM WEBB, President of the Tribunal and Member from the Common- wealth of Australia. Reported by Jack Greenberg Chief Court Reporter IFTFE 2 Appearances: lor tbe_ Prosecution S section; m , THAJvlK S. IAVEF','-TR. JR.; m . A. S. COIGNS CARR, Associate Counsel actinp on "behalf o ̂ the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and IR. SOUS KOH^ITZ. ?orn the Defense Section : KR. G. BLK7ETT, Counsel for the Accused TO JO, Eideki; I'Ti. WM. LOGAN, JR., Counsel for the Accused KIDO, Koichi; and Mil. G. A. ^URllESS, Counsel "or the Accused SEIGEFITSU, Famoru. For the Secretariat: m , J'. . DSLAI'IEY, Deputy Clerk of the Court. 3. The proceedings were begun at 0900. THE PRESIDENT: This is Paper No. 756, application for the production of witnesses by the accused TOJO. 1.31. FURNESS: I'll call Mr. Blewett. IC . HC •, ITZ: Mr. President, while waiting for Mr. Blewett, both the prosecution and the defense would like to bring to the attention of the President the agreement that they have reached about the order of witnesses. THE: PRESIDENTs You have reached an agree- ment? MR. HORWITZ: Yes. Shall I read it into the record, sir? Here is a copy of it. THE PRESIDENT: The Court may have something to say about it. MR. HORWITZ: I will just read what we have asked the Court to approve. THE PRESIDENT: Read it out for my benefit. MR.. HORWITZ: "For the purpose of expediting the proceedings, the following agreement is entered into as supplemental to the general rules of the Tribunal with respect to the examination of witnesses. "1. During the presentation of the general phases of the Defense ease, without the special per- mission of the Tribunal, net more than one counsel for the accused shall examine a witness in chief on the ratters then being presented. Upon the completion of this examination, counsel for the individual ac- cused may examine the witness on matters which specifically and particularly concern his client to the extent only that the,r have not been covered in the preceding examination. Such counsel shall state at the beginning of his examination that the examina- tion is direct. "2 < Upon completion of all direct examina- tion, if the witness has given evidence against the irterest of any accused, < oursel for such accused ma}' cross-examine the witress. If, in the course of a cross-examination by counsel for the accused, adverse testimony against any of the accused is adduccd, counsel for such accused shall, prior to the cross- examination by the prosecution, cross-examine or further cross-examine the witness. A defense counsel cross-examining a witness shall announce his intention so to do at the beginning cf his examination. "3. After all cross-examination ov counsel for the accused shall have been completed, counsel for the prosecution shall cross-examine. Without the special permission of the Tribunal not more than one prosecuting counsel shall cross-examine. "4. Upon completion of cross-examination by the prosecution, counsel for any accused regarding whom new testimony has been given in the course of the prosecution cross-examination may further cross- examine the witness. '•5. Upon the completion of all cross- examination, without the special permission of the Tribunal, redirect examination shall be conducted by the counsel who conducted the general direct examina- tion. Other counsel for individual accused may examine a witness on redirect examination only on matters specifically relating to his client and not covered by the general redirect examination." THE PRESIDENT: Y/hen do you propose to ask the Court to approve of that, today? MR. HORWITZ: Today. THE PRESIDENT: The sooner the better. MR. HORWITZ: Shall we present that at nine-thirty? THE PRESIDENT: I think so. It is just as well to get that out of the way. Well, I must con- gratulate you on reaching an agreement even to that extent. I know how difficult it is. Mr. Blewett. 6 We are dealing now with Paper 756,' the appli- cation by the accused TOJO for witnesses. He is asking for four witnesses: YOSHINO, OKADA, OWADA, and ONO. Have these witnesses been interrogated? MR. BLEWETT: They have all been interrogated, sir, and their affidavits reduced to writing. THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to examine them by affidavit? MR. BLEWETT: I am quite sure, sir. THE PRESIDENT: The application is granted. The next Paper is 759. It is an application by the prosecution for withdrawal of exhibits. Mr. Horwitz, do you appear? MR. HGRWITZ: I am appearing on this applica- tion, sir. This is in connection with the right to borrow materials from the Clerk's office. We wish to add two more names to our list of people. THE PRESIDENT: Order as prayed. (Whereupon, at 0908, the proceed- ings were concluded.) 11 MARCH 1947 I N D E X Of WITNESSES Defense1 7/itnesses Page YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi (resumed) 18083 Redirect by Mr. Roberts (cont'd) 18083 (Witness excused) 18088 INOUE, Takamaro (recalled) 18101 Direct by Mr. Roberts 18101 MORNING RECESS 18106 (Witness excused) 18115 ANDO, Kisaburo 18140 Direct by Mr. SHI03ARA 18140 Cross by Brigadier Nolan 18151 AFTERNOON RECESS l8l6l Cross by Brigadier Nolan (cont'd) l8l6l Redirect by Mr. SHIOBARA 18162 (Witness excused) 18163 11 MARCH 1947 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Doc. Def. pros. No. No. No. None 2355 None 2356 None 2357 None 2358 None 23 59 None 236O 598 2361 598(2) 2361-A 598(7) 2361-B 598(8) 236I-C Description A Book entitled "Nihon Shoki, a Chronicle of Japan" 1928 Edition A Book entitled "Commentaries on Nihon Shoki" by IIDA, Takasato, I889 Edition A Book entitled "Explanations of Imperial Rescripts" by TAKASU, 1934 Edition A Book described as "Dai Genkai" or "Great Diction- ary" by OTSUKI, 1934 Edition, 3rd Volume thereof 18115 A Book described as "Dai Genkai" 1932 Edition, by OTSUKI, 1st Volume thereof 18115 For In I dent. Evidence 18108 18108 18108 A Book described as "Diction- ary of Ancient Words and Phrases" by IIDA, Shiro- jiro Book entitled "Government In Japan" by Charles Fahs Excerpt therefrom ditto ditto 18115 18116 18116 18116 18122 NOON RECESS 18130 JUL MARCH 194-7 Doc. Def. Pros. No. No. No. 179 2362 583 2363 148 2364 292 2365 565 2366 (withdrawn) 435 2366 547 2367 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Description For In Ident, Evidence Statement of State Minister KONOYE before the Budget Comrrittee Session, House of Representatives, 76th Imperial Diet 8 February 1941 18132 Affidavit of ANDO, Kisaburo 18141 Excerpt from the Minutes of the Budget Committeee Meet- ing, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet, 28 January 1941 18164 Record of the 2nd Budget Committee Meeting of the House of Representatives on 24 January 1939 Affidavit of KUZUU, Yoshihisa 18167 18173 18173 18176 Affidavit of TSUGITA, 'Daisaburo Report on the Examination of the Revision of Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the War Ministry and one other subject, dated 6 May 1936 18183 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,079 Tuesday, 11 March 1947 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building s Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before* For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IIITFE.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,080 MARSHAL OF TF^ COURT: The International Filrtary Tribunal for the Frr Fast is nor in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused rre present except OKA1*rA, TOJO and SHIGSMITSU who are represented by their respective counsel. irfe hrve certificates fror the prison surgeor at Sugamo certifying that the accused SHIGEFITSU and TOJO are too ill to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed. Fr. ForT7i.tr; FR. HOR^ITZ: Mr. President and lumbers of the Tribunal; It will be recalled that ebout a. week ago the matter of rules of procedure in examining the witnesses was referred by the Tribunal to chambers. Since the reference there has been a number of meetings in chambers on t'-fe question. The matter has been re- ferred to nn agreement between the prosecution end the defense. This morning both the prosecution and the defense have come to rn agreement and recommend to the Court the adoption of thr following rule: For the purpose of expediting the proceedings, the following agreement between the prosecution and defense is entered into as supplementary to the general rules of the Tribunal with respect to the examination of witnesses. 18,081 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1. During the presort-1 ion of the general phase of the defense case, vithout the special prmis- sion of the Tribunal, not more than one counsel for the accused shall examine a witness in cMcf on the matters then being presented. Upon the completion of this examination, counsel for the individual accused may examine the witness on matters vr ich specifically and particularly concern his client to the ext-nt only thrt they hj-.ve not been covered in the preced- ing examination. Such counsel shall state at t\ e beginning of his examination that the examination is direct. 2. Upon completion of ell direct examin- ation, if the witness has given evidence against the interest of any accused, counsel for such accused may cross-examine th.r vitness. If in the course of a cross-examination by counsel for t*e accused adverse testimony against any of the accused is adduced, counsel for such accused shall, prior to the cross-examination by the prosecution, cross-examine or further cross- examine the vitness. L defense counsel cross-examin- ing a witness shall announce his intention so to do at the beginning of his examination. 3. After ell cross-rxamination by counsel for the accused shall have been cor-rlctcd, counsel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 for the prosecution shell cross-examine, "'ithout the special permission of the Tribunal not more than one prosecuting counsel shell cross-examine. 4. Upon completion of cross-examination by the prosecution, counsel for any accused regarding whom new testimony has been given in the course of the prosecution cross-examination may further cross- e x am in e t h c wi tn c s s. r>. Upon completion of' all cross-examination, without tho special permission of the Tribunal, re- direct examination shall bo conducted vy the counscl who conducted the general direct examination. Other pounsel for individual accused may examine a witness on redirect examination only on matters spf cifieally relating to his client and not covered by the general redirect examination. TFE PRESIDENT; Tell, the Members of the Court will require time to consider what you have read. In the meantime, the Tribunal may see fit to v if give you leave to apply t*ose proposed rules. Could we hrve copies of it, Fr. Korwit ? FR. KORTITZ: I will have copies for the Members of the Tribunal by the morning recess, sir. TFE P5FSIDFNT: Mr. Roberts. YAFAMOTO REDIRECT 1^,583 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 K U M A I C H I Y A M A M n T 0, called as e witness on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand end testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: REDIRECT TTAFIr'/.TION 3Y FR. ROBETS (Continued): 0 Mr. YAFAFOTO, after the Finistry for Greater Erst. Asia Affairs was set up v;rs m y thing done to strengthen the independence of various countries in fast Asia? A Tith the establishment of the Grerter East iisla Finistry various policies for establishing the independence of the several countries of Creator East «.sia wore carried out swiftly. Q The prosecutor has road to you from exhibit No. 134-4 concerning tho reported decision of the liaison conference to deny independence to the East Indies. I refer nov? to that same exhibit No. 1344 and read the second paragraph on page 2 which was omitted by the prosecutor: "At the time of tv- is doc' si on Pri^c Minister TOJO was rather in favour of independence and the For- eign Ministry rlso supported the plan, but the Supreme Command mcintr.ined strong opposition, as mentioned above; while othrrs again, took the stand that once 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YAFAFOTO REDIRECT independence was granted, Japan, for the sake nf her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position whan negotiations, peace, etc., came onr day to be considered, and that for this reason the strtus quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on." Does that reconcile with your statement that you and the Foreign Office werr not in agreement with that report, Mr. YAMAMOTO? MR. (TMYNS CAR1":: I must object to that question, y^ur Fonor. It is self-evident whether it does or does not. THE PRFSIDENT: It is for us to say whether they can be reconciled, his evidence and wh?t you have just read. Obje.-ction allowed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YA1IAM0T0 REDIRECT 18,085 Q May I ask you, Mr. YAMAMOTO, does that truly represent the situation as it existed in the Foreign Office and the stand taken by General TOJO at that time? A I believe that what you have ,iust read is a clear statement of the ideas held by General TOJO at the time as w^ll as the thoughts held in the Foreign Office fr^m the Minister down. At the sara<Q time it is a good — this statement is a good example of our thoughts and ideas concerning the strengthening of independence of the several countries of Greater East Asia to which you referred previously, and, again, in reply to your question, I would like to answer you giving a concrete example. Early in 19 — The year after the establish- ment of the Greater East Asia Ministry early in 1943, Japan gave up her extraterritorial rights in China I and returned her concessions to China — her settlements, j Not only this, the Japanese Government also took steps to return many factories which were under the management of the Japanese Army to the Nanking Government, and, furthermore, gave every cooperation to the National Government at Nanking in order to strengthen its political] power. In regard to countries other than China, whenever YAMAMOTO REDIRECT 18,086 there were points regarding these countries which were not in accordance with the New Order in Greater East Asia steps were taken to gradually reform such points. In Burma and in Indonesia, that is to say the Dutch East Indies, the wishes of the natives were taken into account and opportunities were given to thpm of par- ticipating in politics. There is one very great reason why the Japanese Government was able in this manner to carry out strongly and positively measures which had been considered very difficult to adopt because of the difficulty of coming to an agreement. One of these reasons was that among the Japanese people th<̂ concept of the New Order in Greater East Asia was beginning to take clear shape. Another great reason is that immediately before the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, the 'Emperor gave a very important measure- to Prime Minister TO JO. I shall state thp purport of that message very briefly: The Emperor called Prime Minister TOJO to the palace and stated that a New National Greater East Asia Ministry was to be established there with certain steps which Japan — correction — there are certain points which Japan must beware of in taking any measures towards the countries of Greater East Asia. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 YAFAMOTO REDIRECT 18,087 MR. COMYNS CARR: I submit there is a limit to the length of speeches the witness should be allowed to make in answer to a simple question, and it was past in that case. THE PRESIDENT* Not merely to the length but to the scope. The Emperor's directions to the Prime Minister doesn't seer to bear on these matters. MR. ROBERTS: This is all ~ THE PRESIDENT: Quite a generous statement. MR. ROBERTS: This is all THE PRESIDENT: No matter how long we won't i*•elude anything that is relevant and material, but quite a lot of this is neither. MR. ROBERTS: This is all relevant to the steps being taken to strengthen the independence of the various countries in the East Indies, very much questioned by the prosecutor. THE PRESIDENT: There is no use asserting that, If the facts be otherwise. The Emperor's speech was guite indefinite. MR. ROBERTS: This completes- our redirect. We vould like to reserve the right to resummon this witness i*or later phases or for other defendants who may care to jse him. MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, may I correct a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,088 YAMAMOTO statement of fact which my learned friend made in the course of his re-examination with regard to exhibit 1332, which is a report of a body described as "The Sixth Committee"to the Supreme Command — Government and Supreme Command Liaison Committee and the Cabinet Committee? My friend said that that Sixth Committee was a Committe of the Planning Board. Exhibit 1331 shows that it was not. It was a Committee of the Cabinet specially established on the 2nd"of December 194-1 to deal with thes^ particular matters. MR. ROBERTS: I move to strike out the statement made by the prosecutor. It was not a question. It was possibly something that belongs in summation, but ;certainly does not belong here, THE PRESIDENT: You corrected him. The applicatic is refused. The witness is no longer required for the time b^ing. He is released on the usual terms. (Whereupon, the witness was excused.) THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts. MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, at this time I would like, with the permission of the Tribunal, to read certain excerpts from exhibit Nos. 2351. 2352 and 2353« They arp very short. THE PRESIDENT: These are the speeches of the Greater East Asia Conference. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, MR. ROBERTS: I will first read from exhibit No. 2351, page 2, second paragraph, defense j document No, 664 marked previously. This is an excerpt from the address of His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon, representative of Thailand. I read on page 2, paragraph 2: i "The reasons, which I would like to bring to the support of what I have stated, are those which I would bring from the history of the development of Greater Bast Asia. The continent of Asia was the source of human development and had attained the highest degree of development and had attained the highest degree of development .from olden times. Such j development is the pure light that shines in the heart of humanity, that urges humanity to look for peace and happiness and is composed of friendship and good-will firmly based on the principle of righteousness. This is the principle of development inherent in the Thai nation that worships Buddhism as the national religion, and such principle of develop- ment is also the principle of culture traditionally held by Asiatic nations in general, or to put it in another way, development according to Asiatic traditions is culture. This is recognized by the people of the West as bcrne out by the saying, *ex occidente lex, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, ex oriente lux,' from the West, law, from the East, light." THE PRESIDENT: That is platitudinous stuff; argument ,"ou.ld be more convincing. MR. ROBERTS: I turn now to page 4, second paragraph. I read on page 4, paragraph 2: "In truth, Greater East Asia is a territory- abundant in wealth; it has natural resources and industrial localities capable of develspment so as to make this sphere co-prosperous in accordance with the principle of self-sufficiency. The Japanese Empire had, accordingly, followed the policy of establishing a Co-Prosperity Sphere, abiding by the ideal of Hakko-Ichiu, the union into one family on the basis of justice, righteousness and peace, and had adopted peaceful means in the execution of this policy, such as in the case of the dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, in which, in order to establish the friendship between the two countries on a basis free from resentment due to the loss of national territory, Thailand had requested the return from France of certain part of the lost territory, the Japanese Government kindly consented to mediate so that an agreement based on justice was reached. 18,091 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 j 11 I 12 ! I I 13 14 | 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The Thai people will never forget this favor on the part of Japan." I now turn to page 5, last paragraph: "Thailand, a country which had maintained close relationship with Japan for several hundred years with ties of friendship that have progressively grown tighter and firmer, has well understood the high purpose of Japan, and His Majesty's Government, under the leadership of His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers, have immediately cooperated as ally of Japan, as shown by the Pact of Alliance concluded with one another with, as its important object, the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and. the total elimination of the evil influences which stand as obstacles in the achievement of this aim. The principles laid down in that Pact are 1) the establishment of an alliance on the basis of mutual respect of each other's inde- pendence and sovereignty, and 2) the rendering of mutual assistance with all the political, economic and military means at each other's command." I now read an excerpt from the address of His Excellency Mr. Jose P. Laurel, representative of the Philippines. I begin on page 2, first paragraph: "In fact, as I look back, Your Excellency, 18,092 l 2 3 ! 4 ! 5 j 6 i 7 j 8 j 9 I 10 j 11 ! 12 | 13 14 15 I 16 17 I | 18 i 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and recall the history of human civilisation, I feel that this meeting of the peoples of Greater East Asia should have been held a long time ago. Whereas, in the past we have been kept as strangers, one and all, it is really gratifying to note that through the trying efforts of the great Empire of Japan, for the first time in history we are gathered and grouped together, never again to be separated as in the past, ready to fight oppression, exploitation and tyranny so that we may proclaim to the world that no longer shall the one billion peoples of .Asia be subjected to domination and exploitation by a few Western Powers. At this juncture, will you allow me, Your Excellency, to mention three reasons, why, In my opinion, we have not been permitted to meet, unite and discuss our common problems here?" I turn now to page second paragraph: "In other words, the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere is not being established for the benefit of any integral unit of that Sphere. According to Els Excellency, the starting point of the establish- ment of the Sphere is recognition, respect for the autonomy and independence of every integral unit, so that, with the recognition of political independence and territorial integrity, each nation may develop in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,093 accordance with its own institutions, without any particular member monopolizing the resulting pros- perity of any given country or nation, hut with the object in view of extending that welfare and the prosperity to the other integral units, on the theory that the prosperity of all is the prosperity of the integral parts, but that the prosperity of the integral parts is not necessarily the prosperity of the whole." i I turn now to page 9, last paragraph: "Your Excellency, it has been my privilege to join this conference with one single purpose in mind and that is, to contribute in a small measure to the general awakening of the peoples of our part of the globe. At the same time, I desire to express official- ly the gratitude and appreciation of the Filipino people for the great boon of independence which has just been granted to them and which has enabled me to come and attend this conference and meet the worthy representatives of the peoples of Greater East Asia te this august Assembly." I read now the last excerpts from the address of His Excellency Dr. Ba Maw, representative of Burma. I begin on page 2, first paragraph: "It is impossible to exaggerate the feelings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,094 which are born out of an occasion like this. 7<\r years in Burma I dreamt my Asiatic dreams. My Asiatic blood has always called to other Asiatics, In my dreams, both sleeping and waking, I have always heard the voice of Asia calling to her children. Today, for the first time?, I hear Asia's voice calling again but this time not in a dream. Vie have come together, Asiatics, in answer to the call, to the voice of our mother. I have listened with the greatest emotion to all the speeches delivered around this table. All these speeches have been memorable, moving, and — I may be exaggerating, but you must forgive me — I seem to hear in tVem the same voice of Asia gathering her children together. Somehow or other, whatever the different representatives may say, whatever local color they may add, the undertone, the voice, is the same. There is always unity of de- sign and purpose and mind which, I say, is the call of our Asiatic blood. This is not the time to think with our minds; this Is the time to think with our blood, and it is this thinking with the blood that has brought me all the way from Burma to Japan." I now turn to page 8, first paragraph: "As for the new Eastern order and economy, I am, as I have said, profoundly grateful to His 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,095 Excellency the Chairman for his clear and unequivocal statement on it. He has declared with his character- istic courage and decision its basic principles to be .justice, reciprocity, and mutual respect for one another's independence and sovereignty. These are clear, reassuring words. These will be forever an East-Asiatic Charter, a charter which will last as long as the new East-Asiatic order will last. Founded upon these principles the new Eastern Order will stand like a rock forever. This new East-Asiatic world has already the material conditions necessary for stabil- ity. Nature has as I have said, provided those material riches richly for this new world of ours. Materially, we lack nothing to make our world stable and strong against our enemies. But this decidedly is not enough. Together with th-is material unity there must be a spiritual unity based upon understand- ing and tolerance, upon the fundamental proposition of one for all and all for one. Together with our dif- ferent nationalism there must be a wider nationalism. Together with our territorial horizons there must be a single East-Asiatic world horizon. These are not mere sentiments or Phrases but a deadly task which we must accomplish or perish in the attempt." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,096 I turn nov/ to page 11, first paragraph: "I have spoken sufficiantly of East Asiatic oneness and the need to fight this war together as East Asiatics and to construct a world together as East Asiatics. We have started this work in the right way at this Assembly,. It is, however, necessary to continue the present work; further than this, much further, to extend the work we have begun so well today so that it should cover the whole area t»f the present war and the future peace. In other words, there must be a permanent East Asiatic central organ- ization which will guide the common destiny of East Asia in a planned collective way. This alone will make our unity real and effective, a weapon indeed for both war ana peace. Needless to say, the council will represent the free and equal nations of Greater East Asia. The road before us, therefore, is clear. We are only at the beginning of it now, but we shall march forward. Past history shows that whenever the Asiatic peoples came together, whenever they found unity and leadership, they were able to march any- where, even to the world's end," ME. COMYNS CAKK: Your Honor, there is a passage that my friend has omitted from that oration which throws ccnsiderable light on the parts he has 18,097 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 read. May I be permitted to read it now? THE PRESIDENT! I think you ought to be at liberty to indicate that there is a passage, but not to read it. You see you won't have another oppor- tunity to read it unless evidence is permitted in rebuttal, and I don't think that the Charter permits of that. But I won't all*w you to read that. MR. COMYNS CARR: Mav I point out that the passage is the first half of page 4, the first two paragraphs of page 4. MR. ROBERTS: I want to recall to the Court that I originally offered to read the entire document, i that is, the three speeches in full, and I stated my purpose at that time, that I did not wish any miscon- struction to be placed upon excerpts. However, pur- suant to tne wishes of the Court,I did have certain excerpts taken. THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to read the part that Mr. Carr referred to? You have an advantage that he did not possess: You could read parts of documents omitted by the prose- cution; the prosecution can't read parts of documents omitted by you unless there is evidence in rebuttal, as to whiah the Charter is silent. | MR. ROBERTS: Well, if we start to read lines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, and phrases that they like, we will have— THE PRESIDENT: We won't make you do that. MR. ROBERTS: We will have to read phrases in order to answer those phrases that they pick out. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr has indicated the part he desires the Court to direct its attention to, and that is sufficient. MR. ROBERTS: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to refer to prosecution exhibit No. 268 in order to recall the Japanese official position on their interpretation of the phrase, "New Order in East Asia." as set forth by Premier KONOYE on November 3, 1938. The complete document has been read by the prosecution', it is not my intention to read it again. THE PRESIDENT: Just refer to the page and the paragraph. MR. ROBERT^: I refer to page 1, second para- graph, beginning with the words: "It is the estab- lishment—" to the end of the paragraph. Also to the last sentence in the last paragraph on page 1. I also request permission to refer the Tri- bunal to page 2, paragraph 3, of the same exhibit. The fourth paragraph, beginning with the word "Japan" and ending with the word "collaboration? reference is 18,099 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 again made for the same purpose as heretofore stated. We now offer in evidence defense document No. 54 to show the first application or extension of the New Order in East Asia to the South Sea terri- tories. As testified by the witness YAMAMOTO, this wa.s expressly for the purpose of insuring stability in these territories. MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, we object to this document. It is a duplicate of prosecution exhibit 529. THE PRESIDENT: Both sides rely on it? Has the whole of it been read before, Mr. Carr? MH. COMYNS CARR: Fully read. Your Honor, there are some slight differences in the translation, and if any importance is attached to those they should have been referred to the language arbitration board long ago. THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying on the dif- ferences in language? Mh. ROBERTS: No, we are not. I will be content at this time to refer the Court to that docu- ment. I no?/ respectfully request permission to call the Tribunal's attention to prosecution exhibit No. 5^1 for the purpose of showing the first official 18,100 1 ! 2 | 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i use of the term "Greater East Asia," and its intention to appear as an expression synonymous with the phrase "Hnkko Ichiu," and not for the purpose of aggressive war or autonomy plan or conspiracy, particularly page 2, paragraph 1, entitled: "Pacific Policy." THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Has the whole of this been read before? ill. ROBERTS: I believe it has. But in view of the testimony we wanted to again recall it to the Tribunal's attention. THE PRESIDENT: But without reading it. MR. ROBERTS: That is correct. At this time we recall the witness INOUE. THE PRESIDENT: You tendered defense document 54, or are you withdrawing it? It was not admitted. LR. ROBERTS: 54 was not admitted did your Honor say? That is correct, if your Honor please. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 18,101 T A K A M k R 0 I N 0 U E, recalled '.as a witness on behalf of the defense, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: THE PRESIDENT: You are still on your former oath. I reminded him he was still on his former oath, but I am sure he didn't hear me without his ear phones. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ROBERTS: Q Hs-e you brought to court the books which you can refer to as authority for your definition of "Hakko Ichiu" and "Kodo?" A Yes, I did. Q Will you give us the name and date of publi- cation of the first book you intend to refer to? A I shall show it to you immediately. I shall begin with the first book, the author is SAEKI, Yugi, the title is "Rikkokushi." The first volume is "Nihonshoki." The original book was published in the year 720 A.D., and the one I have here is a later repro- duction. This book I have here was published in 1928. On the 95th page of this book what purports to be an Imperial Rescript by the Emperor JIMkU is INOUE DIRECT lG ,102 1 ; 2 ! 3 4 5 j 6 7 i 8 | 9j 10 11 I 13 14 15 | J 17 | 18 i 19 ! 20 21 i 22 23 24 25 set forth, MR. ROBERTS: May I ask first that this book be marked for identification. THE PRESIDENT: You can do that at the end of this examination on the book, MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, we are not objecting to the use of those books in this par- ticular instance, but I thought we should make it plain that we do not acquiesce in this method of introducing evidence through documents. THE PRESIDENT: If all he is here t* do is to produce books and documents of this quality, he need not even be sworn. I take it these are standard works and they can be referred to without evidence of this type, just as almanacs can be, or dictionaries. We did ask for these things, and he should refer to the page. Q Will you please refer to the page and give us the definition as stated therein? THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what the prose- cution's grievance is. Nevertheless, they relied upon the use of that term "Hakko Ichiu" and here the defense endeavor to explain what it means. I will s'y once again the thing is, what meaning it was given by the accused and what purpose INOUE DIRECT 18,103 they put it to. That is never overlooked. MR. TAVENNER Your Honor, I had no grievance to express with regard to the use of these hooks by this witness. My solo purpose was to make certain that the reading of excerpts from books by this witness would not be treated as a precedent in the introduc- tion of matters generally. THE PRESIDENT: I don't know why you have those fears. INOUE DIRECT | —^—W±±l you proceed, I'.'r. Witness, to give us the page number and the definition? 2 A Page 95 on this book gives the required 3 passages. The second book is calleo "Nihonshoki 4 Chushaku," "Interpretation of the Nihonshoki," and is 5 written by IIDA, Bukyo. In this book the explanation 6 of the term is given on page 1,209. 7 c; Will you please read the explanation as given 8 in that book? 91 A. "The phrase of the Imperial Rescript, 'gather- ing all parts of the world,' ot cetera, and 'covering the universe,' et cetera, these two clauses mean that the entire country should be our capital and that the universe should be our home." THE PRESIDENT: Now, is he giving his con- struction, or is he reading from page 95? T,re want .10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 S 22 S 23 24 25 .iim to'reao. from page 95, not to tell us what he ihinks it means. THE WITNESS: I was reaoing from page 95. There are a few words more: "This also means that the Imperial virtue nail embrace the entire country and all the people lall rejoice in the fruits of that virtue." Q Were you reading, now, from the— A There are still a few words more, but I think 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 18,105 that is sufficient. THE PRESIDENT: Now he has finished with two books, one published in 1928 and the one he is handling now. Let them be tendered to be marked for identifi- cation only. A (Continuing) The third book is by TAKASU, Yoshijiro, and the title of the book is "Eainihon Shochoku Kinkai," "Interpretation of the Imperial Rescripts of the Great Japan," published in 1934. On page 317 the following interpretation is given: "The meaning of the term is that the entire country shall be as one family and that the Emperor will love his people as his own chilcren, and the Imperial way — 'kodo,' the Imperial way, will be promulgated at home and abroad. This can also be defined as expanding into a love for humanity embracing the entire world as one family," In this explanation, the word "michi" or "way" is used. I should like to interpret this term "michi" as meaning not by force or by power, but through moral strength. "The term 'hakko ichiu,' starting from the basis of love for one's own country, expands into love for the entire world — love for humanity," correction. THE PRESIDENT: 7e will recess for fifteen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE CIREGT minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 18,107 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT; Ilr. Roberts. BY I.R. ROBERTS (Continued): Q Fr. INOUE, did you read the definition from the first book? A I did not read the original text from the first book; so I shall read that text now. Unless the previous passages are read it is difficult to grasp the interpretation of the term, "hakko ichiu." However, I shall begin from that part wherein this phrase is included. Q What page? A Page 95. Is it not good for us to cover the earth and make it our home? That is all. THE PRESIDENT: Why did you omit reading that in the first instance? It suggests lack of candor towards us. IR. ROBERTS: I believe it was merely an oversight, if your Honor please. He referred to having taken the definition from that book and then proceeded from the other. Q In reading from the book marked No. 3, you mentioned an interpretation of the word "the way." i"'as that your own interpretation or were 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT you reading from that book, Mr. INOUE? A I read it from the book. MR. ROBERTS: At this tine I will offer the first three books to be marked for identifica tion. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document, a book entitled "Nihon Shoki, a Chronicle of Japan, 1928 Edition, will be given exhibit No. 2355 for identification only. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2355 for identification.)' " Defense document, a book entitled "Commentaries on Nihon Shoki," by IIDA, Takasato, 1889 Edition, will be given exhibit No. 2356 for identification only. (T/hereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2356 for identification.) Defense document, a book entitled "Explanations of Imperial Rescripts," by TAKASU, 1934 Edition, will be given exhibit No. 2357 for identification only. (^hereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE CROSS 18,109 No. 2357 for identification.) BY MR. ROBERTS (Continued): Q Mir. INOUE, have the three books just narked for identification been in use up to the present time? A Yes, as you say. Q Till you now refer to y^ur next book, please, giving us the page number and the definition? A The name is Dai Genkai. This is a dictionary. The author is OTSUKI, Fumikiko, published in 1934, The third volume of this dictionary, page 868, the word is "hakko." "Hakko" means the same as eight sides or eight directions. Q Now, will you please refer to your next book end give us the page number and definition? THE PRESIDENT: Is not the word "ichiu" defined also? MR. ROBERTS: Yes, your Honor. A I shall now turn to the definition of "ichiu." The name of the book is the same book that I just referred to, and the author is the same also, only this is the first volume of that dictionary. The edition is that of 1932. The word "ichiu" is defined on page 279. There is one definition of it as a noun and another one as an adverb. I shall INOUE DIRECT 1 8 , 1 1 0 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 begin by reading the explanation of the word used as a noun. "House" — correction — "one house." Then next, I shall read the explanation of the word used as an adverb. This expression has come from the phrase, "all within the house — all the people within the house." The definition, "all," "everything."! Q Will you now refer to your next book? THE PRESIDENT: Before you leave that one, that is, the 1932 Edition, you would expect to find the phrase "hakko ichiu" defined in such an edition. Does the witness say that it is not defined in that edition? THE WITNESS! This word Is defined in many dictionaries, but in view of the President's order I brought two or three which I happened to have at the present. THE PRESIDENT: I asked about the phrase, "hakko ichiu." THE WITNESS: As I stated before, this phrase is defined in a book entitled "Explanations of the Imperial Rescripts," and I would like to refer to it later, and it is also given in other books. THE PRESIDENT: But you say it is not in the dictionary that you have just perused. THE WITNESS: There is no explanation of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 1 8 , 1 1 1 "hakko ichiu"' as a ptrr-wo'in the dictionary. BY MR. ROBERTS (Continued); Q T,Till you now refer to your next hook, again giving us the page number and definition? A The next book which I have brought here is the dictionary of ancient words and phrases. The author is IKEDA, Shirojiro. This book explains that the word "hakko" came to Japan from the Chinese language and gives the Chinese source of this word. On page — the definition is given or. page 1293. I shall read only the p-.tr r conccrning the source, the origin of the word "hakko." IB. Or,TENNER: If your Honor please, I do not see how we can be concerned wi th t'~>e origin of the phrase. THE PRESIDENTs Let us hear it. It is not worth objecting to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 18,112 JAPANESE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, the translation of this definition will take some time and it can only be a very free translation, because it is a translation from ancient Japanese, which is comparable to the English of Beowulf. THE PRESIDENT: Oh, one of our earliest poets. Well, I think that this should be put in an affidavit. All that the witness has to say — has still to say, can be put into an affidavit and we can have a simultaneous translation of it. Of course it is for the prosecution to object to that course if they so desire. NR. TAVENNER: The prosecution does not object, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: If we will accept it in an affidavit you can have no quarrel, Mr. Roberts. MR. ROBERTS: I would not quarrel with that, your Honor please, except that I intend to use these definitions as a basis for further questioning by the same witness. THE PRESIDENT: I don't think any Member of the Tribunal wants this witness to elucidate anything that appears in a dictionary or in a history of Japan. You can put your version in an affidavit and if the defense do not accept it they can refer it to the INOUE DIRECT 1 8 , 1 1 3 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Language Section and they can decide, — It the prosecution don't accept it. LR. ROBERTS: In that case it nay be neces- sary for me to recall this witness again for the purpose of putting the later questions to him. THE PRESIDENT: Fe can cover the rest of his testimony in an affidavit; we do not require him further to give oral testimony. T?hen we get his affidavit it will be time enough to decide whet we are going to do. MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps we can proceed with the definitions already given and cover the subject adequately. If your Honor has no objection I will proceed. THE PRESIDENT: I mean in an affidavit you can cover all he has said and all he has still to say if he remains in the box. Any affidavit will be con- fined to quotations from dictionaries and histories and will contain no attempt at elucidation. we could release this witness now, Mr. Roberts. I take it there is no desire to cross-examine. MP. TAVENNER: On the basis of the testimony at present we do not desire to cross-examine. THE PRESIDENT: Tell, I suggest we let him go, and proceed with other evidence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 18,114 MR. ROBERTS: May we request that the books which have been marked be returned to the witness, if your Fonor so please? TUE PRESIDENT: They will be available to him but in the custody of the Court. MR. ROBERTS: And may we have the privilege of recalling this witness, if it is so desirable, at I a later date for other defendants? THE PRESIDENT: At present I see no need for recalling him, but the Tribunal will decide the question when it arises. MR. TAVENNER: ?ould it not be proper, your Honor, for the dictionary to be presented for identi- fication the same as the other documents? THE PRESIDENT: Any book he has read from must be tendered for identification, but will be t tvailable to hirr although in the custody of the Court. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document described as "Dai Genkai," or "Great Dictionary," by OTSUKI, 1934 edition, third volume thereof, will be given exhibit No. 2358 for identification only. Defense document known as "Dai Genkai," 1932 edition, by OTSUKI, first volume thereof, will be given exhibit No. 2359 for identification only. Defense document known as "Dictionary of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INOUE DIRECT 1 8 , Ancient Words and Phrases," by IIDA, Shirojiro, will be given exhibit No. 2360 for identification only. (•"'hereupon, the documents above referred to were marked defense exhibits Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, respectively, for identification.) THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett. MR. BLE'"TETT: If the Court please, we offer for identification only defense document No. 598, being "Government in Japan," by Charles B. Fahs. I ask the permission of the Court to read an excerpt from this book, which is a study made by the Institute of Pacific Relations consisting of eleven nations. Sir, it is an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East and is s document found in the property of the United States Army. THE PRESIDENT: I suppose you would find Mr. Grew's book there too and Sir Robert Craigie's. That is not the test. T"/e will admit it only for its relevant and material statements of fact, if it pos- sesses any and if it is not merely repetitive. T7e have reached that stage where we have to consider now whether material is repetitive or not. (thereupon, the witness was excused.) THE PRESIDFNT: Mr, Tavenner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, V is fact can be easily exaggerated, no survey of mod err. Japanese governmental charges weuld be com- plete without consideration of its causes. That the Japanese cabinet must be a coalition between different groups and that the influence of each group depends to a considerable measure on ^ublic opinion have already been suggested. For a few years following the promulgation of the Japanese Constitution the major parties ir. the House of Representatives were excluded from representation in the cabinet. It was soon discovered, however, that this prevented effective operation cf the constitutional system, and since about 1896 every cabinet, with one or twc unsuccessful exceptions, has sought a working agreement with the Diet. This did rot mean that the Diet was given ccr- trol cf either the composition or the pclicies of the cabinet; it was merely admitted to participation in the coalition. Such an arrangement is consistent with the prcvisicns in the Japanese Constitution and with Japanese precedent. The parties, like other groups, sought to extend their influence and found support for their efforts in Western theories of constitutional government which assume, probably uncritically, that development toward full parliamentary control is a necessary or at least the 'normal' path of political 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 8 , evoluticn. Post-War trends in ether parts of the world were conducive to such opinions and, for a few years, principally from 1924 to 1932, party cabinets ruled Japan. Their control was never complete, however,1 fcr the traditional position of the civil and military services, the Privy Council, and the House of Peers cculd not be violated without recrimination and retali- ation. "The course of Japanese politics during the late 1920's was punctuated by a series cf clashes between the cabinet and the other organs of the government, ostensibly over such questions as financial aid to banks in the panic of 1927, the issuance of amendments tc the Peace Preservation Law in the guise of an emergency ordinance, certain phrases in the Pact for the Renunciation of War, or the ratification cf the London Naval Treaty. Each also represented a protest against the attempt to alter radically the political balance of power in favor of the parties in the House of Representatives at the expense of the peers,; the Privy Council, the civil and military services and the Jiushin. The parties might have carried the day had they enjoyed genuine popular confidence. Instead it was common knowledge that bribery in elections was the rule rather than the exception and that part? leaders 18,44 depended on big business for the millions of yen necessary for each political campaign. Interference with elections through the party-controlled Department of Home Affairs was so common that it was said the government in ^ower never lost an election. Corrupt deals between government officials and private interests were frequently rumored and occasionally exposed. The parties were therefore vulnerable to the countercharges of the non-elected organs whose share ir. cabinet control they were attempting to reduce. "The world depression and events connected therewith spelled failure for the party campaign, at least for the present. Economic collapse weakened the prestige of Western social theories. Japanese who had advocated greater powers for the legislature on the strength cf Western experience found their arguments . contradicted by a Western swing toward greater executive is| powers. Nationalism, resurgent in Japan as everywhere else , reinforced the arguments cf those who wished to preserve the customary balance ir. political life. Growing recognition of the economic character cf national defense and the Manchurian Incident increased the pres- tige and widened the legitimate concern of the profession^ military services. Crisis conditions, both economic and diplomatic, plus European precedents, led to demands for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, a moratorium on partisan strife and for the establishment of a coalition cabinet. In short, everything conspired to weaken the party campaign against the prerogatives of the other governmental organs. l;vhen the tottering WAKATSUKI Cabinet fell in December 1931 as a result cf the advocacy of a coalition by one of its own members, it was already clear that, in the absence of far-reaching political reforms, no new party cabinet would have much hone for long life. It was reported that the rrer.ro. Frince SAICNJI, before nominating HULAI for the premiership, had warned the latter of the serious situation and had inquired whether he was confident cf his ability to control it. IIUKAI was sImila rly warned by the usually liberal Asahi news- paper. The SEIYUKAI Cabinet, born under the cloud of exchange speculation, was criticized for failure to resign in acceptance of responsibility for an attempt on the life cf the Emperor (the Sakurcdamon affair of January 8. 1932), and lost prestige with the assassina- tions cf INOUE, Junnosuke (February 9, 1932) and Baron DAN (March 5, 1932). A reform program would perhaps not have stemmed the tide, but even this the SEIYULAI Cabinet did not have. When the premier was assassinated on May 15, 1932, party cabinets, which had ruled at--best fcr but a decade or so, came to an end, and Japan returned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,12 again to the earlier system of'a coalition wider in scope thar the groups in the House of Representatives. "The parties were still recognized, however. Since lc32 the major parties have been openly condemned only by the short-lived HAYASKI Cabinet. All other cabinets have welcomed party co-operation and limited party representation. YCNAI has welcomed the president of the Minseito into his cabinet. At the same time each cabinet has urged political reforms to aid in the rehabilitation of the Diet in public opinion." The next paragraph on the pa.ee, sub-heading 3 = "Onl" two cf the eleven cabinets which Japan has had during the last ten years have been headed by generals -- these of HAYASHI in 1937 and aBE in 1939. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the China policy of the HAYASHI Cabinet was somewhat more liberal than that cf its predecessors and that the Cabinet also sought a rapprochement with Great Britain." I shall omit reading 598(7) and offer in evidence defense document 598(8). THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, I don't know whether the Tribunal, having heard that excerot read, considers that it Is sufficiently material and helpful 18,47 tc wish to hear arother. In my submission, what we have heard is either immaterial, or so far as it is material at all we have in vidence a great deal more about the material parts cf it alreadv than is contained | in this summary. THE PRESIDENT: It contains a number of statements cf fact the probative value of which the Tribunal may wish to consider. This further excerpt is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK CF THE COURT: Defense document No. 598(8) will receive exhibit No. 236I-C. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked defense exhibit No. 23£l-C and received in evidence.) MR. BLF:ETT (Reading): "The Diet has obviously been able tc check every move for any radical change in its composition or powers. One cf its chief weapons has been a counterattack on weak points in the civil and military services. Thanks to the acumen I and political ability of Field Marshal YAMAGATA -- " THE MONITOR: Mr. Blewett, could you kindly tell us what you mean by 3-5? What was your signal? •hat dees this mean, please, 3-5? MR. BLErfETT: I meant No. 8. THE MCI ITOR: I see. Thank you. No. 8. 18,48 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MI.. BLE'.'FTT (reading continued): "--Japan has for soire forty years enjoyed most of the features cf a modern administrative civil service which have recently been advocated for the United States by President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Reorganization. Lately, however, there has been a trend in England, the United States, and Japan to question some aspects cf the civil service program, particular!^ the cffects on efficiency and initiative cf rigid civil service guarantees of tenure. The unusual influence of civil servants in Japan has given such arguments added cogency, and they have recently been exploited tc the full in the Japanese Diet, administrative reforms were promised by the KCFOE Cabinet and studied during the spring, summer, and fall ef 1938. After the installation of the KIFAFUFA Cabinet, the Seiyukai and Finsoito threatened to adopt a resolution providing for civil service reforms (in the direction of curtailment cf civil service privileges) but were finally dissuaded from doing so. HIT'AFUKA deferded the civil servants, (he was cne himself) and acceded to Diet demands enly to the extend cf addressing a memorandum to all civil servants, admonishing them to greater endeavor, impartiality, and humility. Criticism ; of the civil service has, however, stimulated cabinet 18,49 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ministers to more continuous- efforts in the direction of improvement of personnel administration in the v-'.rious departments, notable in the Department of Foreign Affairs. "The Army and Navy present a special problem although they are, of course, in much the same situation- al the civil services. The tenure of military officers is even more protected than that of other state officials. Their political influence has increased more markedly during the last decade, and their record has been marred by a number ef instances cf partici- pation by active or reserve officers in assassinations or in conspiracies against important statesmen. The military services are still extremely jealous of their independent position under the supreme command and their freedom from political influences. Post-World-War emphasis on the wider meaning of national defense has, however, led officers to concern themselves with an ever wider range of political questions. The resultant increase in internal disputes over policy coincided with a decrease in the unity cf principles and control due to the deaths of the genre XAK/.GATA and CYAMA and to the displacement of clan leadership by new men trained since the Sino-Japanese War. 18,50 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Theoretically, the amy and navy are under direct Imperial commend, but their actual adminis- tration has been divided among several officers each of whom enjoys the privilege of direct report to the sovereign. This situation was tolerable as l©ng as unity was maintained by the authority of the genre, but caused trouble when that authority dis- appeared. A conflict in 1931 within the army "big three" — the minister of the army, the chief of staff, and the inspector-general of military educa- tion — led to the appointment in 1932 of a member of the Imperial Family, Prince KAN-IN, as chief of staff to serve as an arbiter. Friction between Minister of the Army HAYASHI and Inspector-General of Military Education MAZAKI over personnel policies led to the forced resignation of the latter in 1935 and was indirectly connected with the assassination of Major-General NAGATA in August of that year and with the assassinations of February 26, 1936 (of which the new inspector-general of military educa- tion, WATANABE, was a victim). A somewhat similar problem in the navy was evident in 1929 when the minister and the chief of staff disagreed over the ratification of the London Naval Ireaty. There was thus a double problem for both the army and the navy -• 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,51 a proper adjustment of relations with the cabinet and the Diet and a unification ">f internal control. Neither aspect of the problem could be solved except by a process of political adjustment: no formula was immediately applicable. As a result, the re- cent course of the'army and navy in Japanese poli- tics has not been entirely consistent. Nevertheless, the main lines are tolerably clear. The develop- ment in the navy has been less spectacular than that in the army, which may be taken as an example for both. Army leadership has, particularly since 1936, been concentrated increasingly in the hands of the minister of the army who has assumed full control of personnel shifts. Continuity in the personnel and political policies of the Department has been strengthened by a return to the earlier limitation of the position of minister to generals ir lieutenant- generals in active service, excluding those on the reserve list like General UGAKI. Army officers have been prohibited from publicly expressing views on political affairs, and since February 26, 1936, those involved in illegal activities have been dealt with most severely. The Reservists' Association has also been brought under the control of the Department. The army has thus recognized that irres- 18,52 i 2 3. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ponsible political agitation by military officers cannot be permitted. The converse of this recogni- tion is that the political voice of the army is concentrated in the minister of the army whose in- fluence in the cabinet has consequently increased, "What, then, is the legitimate sphere of influence of the service ministers? The position which General TEkAUCHI and subsequent ministers of the army hnve tried to maintain is that while the army, under modern conditions of national defense, cannot be indifferent to general economic and politi- cal problems, will express its vie?;s through the minister of the army, and reserves the right to refuse to cooperate with any cabinet net showing a proper understanding of such problems^ the army will, nevertheless, not attempt to dictate either specific policies or the details of their applica- tion. These are the proper functions of the civilian branches. This distinction between readiness to block cabinets in which it lacks confidence and avoidance of interference with non-military legis- lation and administration is a very narrow one, and its practical application leaves much room for dis- satisfaction on both sides. It amounts, however, only to reaffirmation of the customary share of the 18,53 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 j 11 I 12 ' 13 1 14 I 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 services in the Japanese political coalition. During recent years the minister of the army has advocated many types of legislation — control of the power industry, agrarian relief, organiza- tion of a national welfare department, reform of the House of Peers, and a general mobilization act, to mention only a few. Yet none of these has been dic- tated. Some remain unaccomplished; others h-ve been adopted only after formulation -"nd debate by the civilian ministries, extended discussion in the Diet, and frequent amendments. The influence of the army and navy departments on domestic legisla- tion and administration has increased during the last decade, but not to the point of dictatorship. "Army influence in continental policy is a different problem and one which cannot be fully examined here. Obviously the army controls Japanese activities in Manchuria and in China to a far greater extent than it does domestic affairs. This power on the continent is based on various factors: the right of direct appeal to the Throne, the special position of the Kwantung Army under the South Man- churia Railway Concession and the Kwantung Peninsula, lease, the regulation of Sino-Japanese affairs since 1932 and 1933 by military truce instead of diplomatic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,54 treaty, and the existence of military hostilities since 1937- The beginnings of a compromise similar to that in Japan proper can, however, be seen in the growing integration of domestic and overseas poli- cies discussed above and in the establishment of such organs as the Manchurian Affnirs Bureau and the China Board. "Altogether the Japanese political coa- lition — the House of Representatives, House of Peers, Privy Council, ministers close to the Throne, army, navy, civil services — h?s not been radically altered during the last decade. The Hcuse of Representatives has lost influence but has retained all of its legal powers and has benefited from some reforms. Its influence would probably grow once more if its major parties could iron out their own domes- tic disputes which h-̂ ve recently made a very bed impression. The Privy Council continues as before an important check on cabinet actions between ses- sions of the Diet. The House of Peers remains approximately unchanged in both legal powers and influence, Ihe ministers close to the Throne have probably somewhrt declined in dey-by-day influence, but they retain a voice in the appointment of new cabinets, and so continue to furnish indirect guidance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,55 of political developments. The rrmy and navy have increased their influence but have also carried out internal reforms which seem to assure somewhat more responsible exercise of their powers than during the early 1930's. The civil services, tor, have gained in strength but not decisively. In general, the power of the administrative branch of the government has increased while that of the legis- lature has decreased, but this is a universal phenomenon. The increasing role of national defense considerations in governmental decisions is not peculiar to Japan." THE PRESIDENT: These differences among the Japanese themselves throw no light on their attitude toward other peoples. Vie will adjourn until half-past one. (thereupon, at 1200 hours, a recess was taken until 1330 hours.) 18,56 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Tho International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. UZAWA. DR. UZAWA: With the Court's permission, I should like to report on the reason for the witness YAMAMOTO's delay yesterday morning. Upon investigation by the Office of the Defense Counsel it was found that the motor car which had set cut to g^t witness YAMAMOTO broke down on the way. As the accident occurred at a place where there were no telephones within easy access, the driver was unable to communicate. It was indeed a matter of the most profound regret. We have taken steps to see that such accidents will not occur in the future and have instructejd the drivers to be careful. That is all, sir. THE PRESIDENT: That is satisfactory. Mr. Blewett, MR. BLEWETT: We shall now produce evidence to show the true aims and purposes of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance 18,,132 i 2 3 ' 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 13 12 15 14 15 16 I 17 | IS 19 20 ! 21 22 23 24 25 Political Association to prove they were contrary to the purposes alleged by the prosecution, and we shall also show that neither was organized or controlled by these accused as part of a common plan of conspiracy to force Japan into a war of conquest. We offer in evidence defense document No. 179 to show the nature of the I.R.R.A. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 179 will receive exhibit No. 2362. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked defense exhibit No. 179 and received in evidence.) MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit No. 2362, if the Court please $ the statement of State Minister KONOE before the Budget Committee, 8 February 1941: "State Minister KONOE: "I wish here to make clear the opinion on the part of the Government as to the nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. "As for the movement for an Imperial rule assistance, I think you are already acquainted with its general outline through the statement which I made in the Preliminary Conference for the Establishment of a New Organization in August last year. But it will not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 IS,133 be unnecessary to explain the aims of the movement on this occasion. "Japan is now confronted with the greatest crisis in her history. At this juncture it is needless to say that, in order to take adequate measures aiming at a broad leap in our national progress, it is necessary to unifv the power of the whole nation into one harmonious whole by consolidating the national defence organization of the state and to exert the national power thus unified to the fullest extent. And the basis for this so-called * strong national defence organization of the state1 consists in establishing an effective system within the nation. And in my opinion this in turn is possible only on the basis of a national organization which will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance. The aim of such a national organization is to unify the power of the whole nation in order that all the subjects of the Emperor may discharge their respective duties in organic unity, thus participating in the Imperial rule assistance. This aim requires that all the people participate in this great task effectively by discharging their respective everyday duties in their various tasks. It is only under such a national svstem that policies of the Govern- ment can be expected to permeate the remotest corners 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 _ Us 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 | 25 18,59 of national life to be realized there infallibly and promptly, and that the real conditions of the people's life can be reflected vividly upon the mirror of politics. I believe that only in this way can the power of the whole nation be concentrated upon affairs of the state. "Now, the Imperial'rule assistance" movement is one which is to be carried on by the whole nation, and which aims, in cooperation with the Government, to establish a national organization whioh will enable the whole population to participate effectively in the Imperial rule assistance to facilitate its working and thus to afford a basis for faithful discharge of the dutie of the subjects. This movement has sprung up out of the; necessity of establishing a strong national defence organization of the state. It is a movement which, standing aloof from any special interests of political parties, aims to remove all internal strifes in all fields of national life and to concentrate all the activities of the nation upon faithful discharge of national duties,, It is a truly totalitarian national movement based on mutual cooperation between the Government and the people,, "The Imperial Rule Assistance Association is a body organized for the purpose of pushing forward suchj a national movement. Its proper mission as the nucleus of this movement is to lead the van and to become the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I 18,60 propelling force in the right and effective discharge of national duties. In order to fulfil this mission I believe it Is necessary to strengthen the organization of the Association as well as to consolidate its spiritual unity and thus to make it exert its power to the full in the discharge of Its function to cooperate with the Government Organizations in deciding upon and oarrying out national policies, by communicating the will of the Government to the people and revealing the real condition of the people's life to the Government. As is clear in the above, the activities of the Association are quite different, both in function and in aim, from those of the National spiritual Mobilization Movement or of various movements carried on by political parties. Its highly political character can also be ascribed to the same circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,61 "It is needless to say tnat in the actual working of the association the purpose for which it has been organized should always be kept in view, therefore, as for the relation of the association to the Uover-nment, the former should cooperate with the latter in making the spirit of national policies fully understood by the people and in iacilitating their adequate enforcement. Its mission of commun- icating the will of the Government to-the.people and revealing the real conditions of the people's life to the Government means nothing but to furnish the authorities with necessary materials to be referred to by them in deciding upon various measures. Consequently the Association has no intention to enforce a certain set Oi principles of their own independently of the Government. It is of course needless to say that it has nothing to do with any movements struggling for political power. "lo sum arize the foregoing, the nature of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not compatible with struggles between mutually opposing parites in the political arena nor with any activ- ities aiming to enforce a particular set of political doctrines independently of the Government. And this is precisely the reason why the Government exempts 18,62 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the association from the application ox some provis- ions in the rerce tolice Act, on the ground that it does not fall within the category of 'associ- ations concerning political affairs' as presecribed in that Act. uut, inasmuch as it is a kind of association, those articles in the Act which pro- vide for associations in general and associations concerning public affairs except political affairs should of course be applied to it. Further, it goes without saying that any act on the part of the Association should be governed by relevant regulations. "The War Minister and the i*evy Minister have stated that, considering the spirit of the foundation of our army members of the a m y or navy on the active list would not be permitted to enter the Association except when those who occupy special posts, such as the minister, the vice-minister, the chief of the Military Affairs .bureau, etc. , enter it to handle liaison with the army or navy, uut this does not mean that soldiers on the active list should not enter it, because it falls within the category of 'associations concerning political affairs' prescribed in the reace Police Act. This only means that it would be incompatible with the idea of unity and discipline of the army for individual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,63 soldiers on the active list to enter directly such an association. "It is but very recently that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized. And although therefore its nature and aims have not yet been understood w»ll enough by the public, and its activities are as yet unsatislactory in many respects, we wish to do our best to get the hoped- for results by driving hone to the people's mind its true nature and aims on the one hand, while on the other hand using every care for the betterment of its organization and working. "In connection with this, it is necessary for us to see to it thrt the Association should not involve itself in any acts outside the scope of its aim and mission. "kow the situption within ^nd without requires urgently the firm and harmonious unity of the whole Japanese nation. The movement of Imperial rule assistance has sprung up out of this urgent necessity. Without an effective development of this movement, it would be extremely difficult to tide over the impending crisis. I have already stated in my opening speech at the jjiet that the Govern- ment desires a rapid and active development of this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24- 25 18,64 movement. Indeed, the Government is firmly deter- mined to exert utmost efforts in encouraging this movement of Imperial rule assistance. IVe sincerely ask your cooperation." We shall now call the witness ANDO who will be examined in chief by Mr. SHIOBARA, attorney for KIMUKA. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,140 ANDO BIhRCT K I S A B U R O A ft b 0, called as a witness on behalf of the defense, being first duly- sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHI CP'. AH A: Q What is your name, pleaseY A My. name is ArJ)0, Kisaburo. Q Were you in your past Minister without Portfolio, Home Minister — and Home Minister in the 10JO Cabinet and also vice president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association? A I wa s. Q Are you held at present in Sugamo Prison? A Yes. Q I will now show you defense document No. 5o8. Will you look at it and state if it is your affidavit? (Whereupon, a paper was handed to the witness) A Yes, this is my affidavit without the shadow of a doubt. MR. SHIOBARA: I shall now tender in evidence defense document No. 588 in evidence and read excerpts therefrom. I shall now read defense ANDO DIitECT 18,141 l 2 3 4 'I « i 7 | 8 9 10 11 12 13 | 14 i ! 15 | 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 document No. 5^8 omitting the ports between parr- graph 3 on the second page and the eighth line -- the line at the very bottom of the eighth line of the second page -- on the third page of the Japanese- affidavit, and in the English translation or.it ting the parts between paragraph 3 in the second page m d line 15 on the same page in the fourth paragraph on the same page. IHE INTERPRETER: I shall omit from the top of -age 2 all of paragraph 3 and part of para- graph 4 up to the 15th line before the end, just before the words, "I left Peking." 1HE PRESIDENT: I take it you mean to tender it. It is admitted on the usual terms. You need not specify in advance how much you are going to read. CLERK 01 TEE COURT J Defense document No. will receive exhibit i*o. 2363. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2362 and received in evidence.) IKE PRESIDENT: Proceed to read the parts you intend to read. kii. SHIOBARA: (Reading) "I, ANDO, Kisaburo, after having duly made oath as per attached paper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT 18,145 in accordance with the form prescribed in my own country, state as follows: "1. Inly name is AiJDO, Kisaburo. I wrs born on 11 lebrurry 1879, rnd my permanent domicile is at 115 Kitr.-Shinmr.chi, Sasayama-machi, Trki-gun, Kyogo Prefecture." ILL PRESIDENT: In the future omit those formal parts. They r-re never read. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A.ND0 DIRECT 18,143 IE. SHIQB-ARA: I shall begin from the middle of page 2 from "I loft Peking," that is, fifteen lines before the last line. "I left Peking by air for Tokyo the next morning, 20 October, arriving there by train on the 21st, my plane having b;een delayed on the way. I immediately saw the President (TOJO) and thereupon for the first time received a formal invitation to become Vice-President of the IB.M and concurrently Minister without Portfolio. Since I had never had anything to do v.ith politics either during my term of active service or after my retirement to the re- serve list, I did not have a single friend among politicians. Therefore, I told the President that if this organization was connected, with politics, I would like to refuse his request. The President told me, however, that it was not c. political party; that it was a public organization coming under the provi- sions of the Japanese Security Police Law; and that this fact had been clearly stated by Home Minister HIRANUJJA in the previous Diet. "He concluded by urging me to assume this post, since the IRAA was an organization of a people's movement. Thereupon, I replied that, if this organi- zation had no connection with politics, I saw no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT 18,145 reason why I should become a Minister of State and that I would accept the President's offer only if he were content for me to assume the Vice-Presidency as a private citizen. Premier TOJO said that if that was the way I felt about it, he would accede to my wishes. Thus, on the following day, 22 October, I became Vice-President of the IRA,': without assuming the pest of Minister without Portfolio. "Immediately after my assumption, newspaper reporters came and asked me what thoughts I had on taking this new step, so I told then what I have re- lated in the preceding paragraph, and added a clear- cut statement, saying that as a member of the Japan- ese nation In common with other members of our people, I hoped to carry out whatever duties a Japan- ese subject should carry out in this China Incident, and that, therefore, I had no intention of sitting in a special seat and of giving orders to the people. This statement appeared in the newspapers of that day. "Since I had little knowledge of the situa- tion within and without the IRAA at the time of my assumption, for a time I quietly observed what was going on inside the association, and I also exerted myself to read its past records from the tine of its 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT 18,145 founding. In this way* my daily duties at the time did not include anything special or out of the way. "But the IEAA had already decided to hold a Cooperative Council Ileeting (TN - General Meeting) around December, and already, before my assumption, notices had been sent to local councils throughout the country informing them of matters to be discussed in this forthcoming meeting. Being yet very new at the job, I had been hoping that the meeting would be held as late as possible. For one thing, I was ansious at least to glance through the minutes of previous Cooperative Council meetings. Because of these reasons I gave sly consent to have the meeting held on the 8th, which was the last of four proposed dates, namely the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th. These dates had been decided in the course of business around the beginning of December, I believe. In view of these circumstances it is utterly inconceivable that a great event such as the Greater East Asia r7ar should have been foreseen as one of the subjects for discussion at that meeting. I believe the re- cords of those days are still in existence and will bear re out. "Later, on December 8th, I learned for the first time by telephone that war had broken out 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT 18 early in the morning. But since the same telephone call told me not to announce this fact yet, I went to the Cooperative Council meeting without telling the news to anyone. At the meeting, President TO JO gave a lecture, and then left for the Palace in order to report to the Throne in his capacity as Premier, so that the meeting recessed for that period. After the Premier's return iron; the Pa Lice, the meeting was reopened, I bliove around noon, and news of •the proclamation of an Imperial Rescript declaring war was announced before the assembled members. This is all I have to suy regarding the situation at and around the time of my assumption. "5. Next I wish to state the mission and organization of the IRAA. I knew that before my assumption several changes had been made in its or- ganization and directors, and that several personnel shifts '."ad also been carried out. At the time I took office, in my opinion the association was not yet functioning as a harmonious whole, the sense of unity was very weak, and systematic order had not yet been established. "The main work of the association consisted in conveying to the people, without error, matters that had been decided upon as policy and natters ; j fDO DIRECT 18,147 f l 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | 17 I 18 | 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 on these policies which each ministry as part of its administrative functions, desired the people to prac- tice. Furthermore, the association's task was to gain the people's understanding concerning these mat- ters, to systematize as far as possible detailed methods for carrying them out, anc! to urge the people to do them. Of course, since the association was only a private organization of a public nature, the directors of the association were employed merely by contract, so that there were no strict rules of duty such as Government employees must obey. Also, it goes without saying that the association had no power to give orders to the people. Therefore, all the as- sociation could do was to gain the people's under- standing regarding matters that should be carried out as part of a subject's duties, and to urge the actual execution of these matters. Also, concerning the administration of the various ministries, since from the people's standpoint there were many matters which seemed contradictory or inconsistent, in order to eliminate hidden grumblings as much as possible the IRAA made it a practice to take up the people's hopes and criticisms and, after studying and digest- ing them, would pass them on to the various govern- ment departments as material to be considered in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT 18 \ connection with the administration of the various ministries. The Cooperative Council was a special organization whose purpose was to serve as a medium for conveying governmental intentions to the people as well as the popular desires to the Government and thus effectuate a true spirit of cooperation. Furthermore, the IRAA aimed at reaching out to all the people in a loose sort of way without having any specialized system, so that if it had any special object of attention, one would have to say it was all the 100 million people of Japan. "Therefore, as far as the people in general were concerned, no distinction was made between mem- bers of the association and non-members. District associations, village associations, end local chapters of the IRAA in prefectures, towns and villages were nothing more than a kind of clerical organization. "In the preceding paragraphs I have outlined the various functions of the IRA.", at the time of my assumption and throughout my tenure of office. These functions,, were expressed in a popular slogan of those days as fulfilling of our duties as subjects. "6. Regarding the Greater East Asia War, we never heard anything that would lead our associa- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A EDO DIRECT 18,149 tion to believe such a war imminent, either at the time of n - assumption of office, or after my assump- tion, in any guidance received from any ministry, in any instructions or demands from them, either out- wardly or confidentially, until the issuance of the Imperial Rescript declaring war. As a concrete example, on Dueember 8th, the first day of our scheduled Cooperative Council meeting, the planned program for tsis meeting was set completely awry by the Imperial Rescript declaring war, and there was much confusion, as we were l:ept busy until night- fall buying railway tickets, paying travel expenses, and attending to sundry other matters in order to suddenly send home delegates who id assembled from all parts of th country. "I have heard it said that many people be- lieve the Cooperative Council meeting had been called in anticipation of the outbreak of war because the first day of this meeting happened to be the first day of the war. But the actual circumstances are as I have related. As far as tile association was con- cerned, it was a bolt fro: the blue; and it is a fact that we were totally unprepared to take any steps in the case of war. Besides, it is unthink- able that the Government should ever let the staff 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO DIRECT of a private organization who vere not even public officials, know of a top war secret such as tĥ . da of opening the war, or even to let them know priva ly. A good example is myself. Although I was Vic President, I heard of the outbreak of war from the President for the first time on the morning of the 8th of December." Prosecution nay cross-examine. If there is c.ny cross-examination -- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,1 ANDO JROSS CROSS-EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER NOLAN: 0 I observed, General ANDO, that in your affi- davit, exhibit 2363, you declined to become a minister without portfolio in October of 194-0 — '41, that Is correct, '41. I also observed that you were appointed minister without portfolio in June of 1942. Is that correct? A That is correct. Q at caused you to change your mind, General? A My real intentions never changed, but it was already six months after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia Tar. Previously I had been mobilized during the China Incident and had been a — had served as a divisional commander in Japan. During my tenure — during this service J — by my orders many men on the reserve list were called up for active ser- vice and sent to the front. THE MONITOR: During ray tenure as division commander. 0 General, when you were asked to become a minister of state without portfolio in October 1941 you say in your affidavit that you saw no reason why you should become a minister and that you would accept the president's offer only if he were content for you to assume the vice presidency as a private 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,77 ANDO CROSS citizen. A I was just beginning to explain my reason when you stopr.ed me. V "Jell, please be good enough to explain it to me in a few words. A I am a military man. Military men, when- ever they are ordered to do so. are ready to sacrifice life itself on the battle front, and many did actually die ard many were wounded. During a time of emergency such as the Great War. which we were then going through, I received repeated requests from the Premier an^ concurrently Fresident of the IRAA, General TOJO, to become vice president — to become minister with- out portfolio, and thinking if I was needed in that post as minister of portfolio I should accept whether I liked it or did not like it, I finally agreed. However, concerning ray -- correction — I, myself, am well aware of my inability to participate in political life. THE MONITOR: Lack of qualifications, instead of "inability." A In view of my previous statement, when I had assumed the vice presidency, that I would not become minister of portfolio, which statement I had given out to the press, at that time I felt some pangs ANDO CROSS 18,153 of conscience on finally deciding to accept this post l in June of the next year. 2 For these reasons I refused once again General 3 4 5 6 7 TOJO's request, whereupon General TOJO said, "As far as the people of Japan are concerned I, myself, will make it abundantly clear to them that you die"' not assume this new post by your own free will," and this 8 fact was actually published in the newspapers of the 9 time. 10 TFE PRESIDENT: That is enough; we have heard 11 enough. "Te have heard some loquacious witnesses in 12 this court, but none so loquacious as you. You must 13 try to speak and express yourself clearly and briefly. 14 You are taking up too much time with explanations. 15 Q How long did you hold the office of vice 16 president of the IRAA? A From October 1?41 to April 1943- 0 And the accused TOJO was the president of that association when you became vice president? 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A Yes, he wa s. 0 And who was the president before the accused TOJO? A I believe Prince KONOYE, in his capacity as Premier. 0 '"as It the invariable rule that the president ANDO CROSS 18,154 was the Prime Minister of Japan? A I do not know if there was any specific rule to that effect, but the fact is as you have just said. 0 The fact is as I have ;>ust said, that all the presidents were Prime Ministers of Japan? A Yes. 0 And it was the Premier of Japan who appointed all the high ranking officers of this association? A I do not — I an not well aware of the extent — correction -- I am not aware what category of people would be included in the term "higher officials." I believe that certain officials were appointed by the president. 0 Were the advisers appointed by the president, ar.d. were the managing directors appointed by the pres ident? A I believe that is so; however, I have no record of that. 0 You say in your affidavit that — on the top of page 4 — that later, on December 8, you learned for the first time by telephone that war had broken out early in the morning? A Yes, that is so. Q Who gave you that information by telephone? 18,154 ANDO CROSS A I believe it was the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, in accordance with instructions from the Prime Minister. 0 And what time was it? A In my present recollection I believe it was between 6:30 and 7:00. However, I am not exact on that point. 0 'There were you when you received the news? A I was at home. o in bed? A Yes. 0 In your affidavit you say it is unthinkable that the government should ever let the staff of a private organization, who were not even public officials, know of a plot or secret such, as the date for opening the war, or even to let them know privately. A My common sense told me to assume that. ^ And who was the Secretary of the Cabinet who communicated with you? A I recollect it was Chief Secretary HOSHIRO. .'\NDO CROSS 18,156 Q I also observe from your affidavit that the Cooperative Council meeting opened on the 8th of December 1941. A Yes, as you say. Q Who fixed that date? A It had been a practice for the officials of the various ministries who were in charge of such matters to assemble ana consult at the Cabinet j Information Board, and on the occasion of this meet- ing the same practice was followed. Q What did the Cabinet Information Board have to do with your association? A It had no direct connection with my organization. Q You said something about the organization of this association, and I'd like you to tell me where the money came from which supported it. A The greater part of its funds came from government subsidies, Q And the amount of that subsidy was eight million yen for the fiscal year '41-'42? A I have no exact recollection. However, I have a faint remembrance that it was somewhere between six and eight million. Q And additional monies were obtained by special financial grants from the ken, were they not? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANLO CROSS 18,157 A In the various prefectures the local branches of the IRAA received subsidies from the prefectural office. I Q And in addition, there were voluntary subscriptions, were there not? A I do not remember our organization ever received any contribution. Q You do remember that on the 30th of April 194-2 there was a general election in Japan? A Yes, I do. Q At that time there were no political parties in this country, were there? A The political parties had been dissolved. i Q How did a candidate receive a nomination in this election? A There was another body which had been specially set up in order to conduct election activities. Q A political party? A I believe it registered itself as a political party. Q What was the name of it? A Later it was called the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. However, I believe this organi- zation was a predecessor of this society, and I have no clear recollection of the first name it had. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO CROSS 18,83 Q You do know that the IRAPS did not come into existence until aftei the election in April '42, don't you? A I am aware that an organization was set up specially to conduct election activities; that is, to recommend candidates and to conduct election movements. ANDO CROSS 18,154 Q So that in tftT~rcsu.Lt t'K/ or i ul id aLe^ in that election were recommended? A That is true. But not all the candidates were recommended. Q What happened to those who were not recom- mended? Were they elected? A I remember that some of them were. Q Do you remember what percentage of the seats were gained by the IRAA in the April election of '42? A Since those who became candidates had to resign from their positions in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association before running for office, there were none from the IRAA who actually ran. MR, SHIOBARA: I object to this question on the ground that it is out of the scope of the examina- tion in chief, and also on the ground that this witness is not an expert qualified to answer those questions. TEE PRESIDENT: As far as I can judge he was called to show that this association had no connection with military operations or with aggressive war. It seems to me the cross-examination is well within the examination in chief. The objection is overruled. Q Is it not a fact that in the election of April '42 IR^A-sponsored candidates obtained over eighty per cent of the seats? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i ANDO CROSS 18,160 A I do not know of any such fact. Q Well, you know that they had a very large majority in the Diet immediately following, don't you? THE PRESIDENT: This also goes to credit I take it? BRIGADIER NOLAN: Yes. j A Since the great majority of the people joined in the Imperial Rule Assistance movement I do not quite understand from what basis you have gotten that percentage, Q What, was the IRAk Youth : psV A It 5 membe; s were composed cf those who posi- tively exerted themselves to carry out the Imperial Rule Assistance movement, Q Was the IRAA pledged to support the establish- ment of a Greatcx- East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? A It conducted no activities outside of — directed to areas outside of the country. MR. SHIOBARA: I object to that question on the ground that it is out of the scope of the examina- j tion in chief. THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled. Q If it took no part in affairs outside of Japan, what was the function of the Bureau of East 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,154 ANDO CROSS Asia of the IRAA? THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes, (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER NOLAN (Continued): Q At the adjournment I was asking you, General ANDO, what was the function of the Bureau of East Asia in your association? A The East Asia Bureau existed primarily for the purpose of contact and liaison with Manchukuo, China and other areas in East Asia with the idea of promoting the welfare of the region. TEE MONITOR: Correction: The purpose was to maintain contact and liaison with organizations with the object of promotion of the idea of East Asia prosperity which existed in Manchuria, China, and other areas in the Far East — East Asia. There were also many organizations within Japan itself with the purpose of Asiatic development, i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO and liaison and contact work with these organizations wore also maintained. Q Just one more ouestion, General ANDO. When i I you said in your affidavit that you were informed early in the morning of the 8th of December, 1941, by the accused HOSHINO that war had broken out he told you not to announce that fact at that time, did the accused HOSHINO tell you why you wore not to announce the ?act that war had broken out9 A He didn't tell me anything as to the reason why. BRIGADIER NOLAN: That is all. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SHIOBARA. i MR. SHIOEARA: Mr. President, I want to examine this witness. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIOBARA: ! Q I am going to ask you a few questions by way of supplementing my previous questions. Is it correct to understand that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Political Society are two completely different and separate things al- though they are somewhat similar in their names. INTERPRETER: To which the witness replied, "Yes." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ANDO REDIRECT 18,163 A They are entirely different organizations. 0 You testified that the Premier at that time was concurrently president of the Imperial Rule Assist- ance Association. Was he connected in any way with the Imperial Rule Political Society at the same time as president or something like that? A He had no position in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. Q As vice-president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association were you, Mr. Witness — did you, Mr. Witness, concurrently hold a post in the Imperial Rule Political Society — Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society? A I believe I was an advisor of some kind. MR. SHIOBARA: That is all. MR. BLEWETT: I think that is all for this witness, sir. THE PRESIDENT: He is at liberty on the usual terms as far as we are concerned. (Whereupon, the witness was excused.) MR. BLEWETT: We offer in evidence, if the Court please, defense document No. 148 for the purpose of showing the distinction between a public and a purely political association. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,164 CLERK 07 THE COURT: Defense document No. 148 will receive exhibit No. 2364. (Whereupon, the document abov«? referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2364 and received in evidence.) MR. BLEWETT: I shall read exhibit 2364: "Excerpt from the Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet. The meeting opened at 10:12 A.M., January 28, 1941. "Member of the Committee, HIRAKAWA: I have uJid?ersv>ood what the Premier explained. I should like to put a question to the Home Minister about one point. This point has already been raised at the Co-ordination Conference (T.N. KYORYOKU KAIGI) and is whether or not the Imperial Rule Assistance Assoc- iation is a political association coming under the Public Peace Police Laws. In regard to this question, I am of the opinion that it Is evident that the Im- perial Rule Assistance Association is in no "-ay a public organization, but a private organization; and there can be no doubt that it is a political associa- tion. That being the case, I believe it naturally comes under the category of political associations prescribed in the Public Peace Police Laws. Furthermore 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,165 there are many amongst the people who also believe that is so. Concerning this point, I saw a press report to the effect that there had been a contention at the Central Co-ordination Conference by Mr. 7OTIADA, Head of the Internal Affairs Department, that although the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an assoc- iation, the said law is not applicable to it. Polit- ical association prescribed in the said law means either a secret association or one which necessitates governmental supervision from a standpoint of pre- serving public peace, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not included in the organizations of such kind. I think the purport of his contention may probably be that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is an organization working in unison -ith the government, that it is neither a secret association nor one detrimental to the public peace and order, and that it should not be subjected to governmental supervision. But what are his grounds for regarding it as working in unison with the government? It is the Imperial Rule Assistance Association itself which insists that it works in unison with the government. There is no legal ground at all. It may be said that it does not disturb public peace and order. However, whether or not its activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,166 disturb public peace and order should be determined by the government responsible for the supervision of organizations of such kind. I think it is decidedly unjustifiable that a certain organization standing under the supervision of the government should deter- mine for itself that it does no harm to the public peace and order, and in consequence, the Public Peace Police Laws are not applicable to it. The said lav; admits no exception. Should that law not be applicable to such an organization as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, it might lead, to the unreasonable conclusion that, when a certain organ- ization with similar nature and purnose to those of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is newly organized, it need not be subject to the said lav;. If the said law is not applicable to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, we cannot be sure that another organization of the same kind to which the said, law is not applicable would not be organized. This is a very serious problem. So I should like to hear the Home Minister's opinion about this point. State Minister, HIRANUMA: I will answer your question. I have previously expressed, my opinion that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is not an organization which carries out its activities in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,167 accordance with any political view of its own. The purpose or the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is that :T.shall make our nation thoroughly understand alio cooperate with the state policies fixed by the go /eminent. It. does not fall under the category of politica. association prescribed in the public peace police l?.w, 30 ley. as it is not an organization which may determine and propagate its own political views, However, there is no dcibr. that it is an organization, and ccevafore an association. It may come under the category public association prescribed m hhe Public P.r.iAe Police Laws Accordingly„ .-.s a public association, it must be subject to che said law. At ox .seat, we have no intention, cc sioer-lse the Impe:ial Rule Assistance Association as a political association according to the Public Peace Police Laws." We offer in evidence defense document 292 t.e show the true meaning of the phrase, "Imperial "/ay.1 an.' its contrast fco totalitarianism. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERIC 0.1 THE COURT: Defense document No. 292 will receive exhibit \o. 2365. v/v/he^eupon, th- doeum-rt above referred to wan marked defense exhibit fio. 236; and received ir. evidence.; 1 2 3 4 < J 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,168 IE. BLE'TSTT: I shell read exhibit 2365. "Record of the 2nd Budget Committee Heeting of the House of Representatives on the 24th of January, 1939. "Committeeman AZUMA. "Next I. should like to ask Premier HIRANUI.1A a few questions but as to the spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of all the people assisting the Imperial rule, I am one of those who are somewhat acquainted with Premier HIRANULIA's attitude towards this matter and have listened earnestly to your repeated explana- tions in the plenary sessions of the Diet that it was an ancient phrase, but politically a new one, and that it meant concentrating the total strength of our country on national policy and realizing the policy with the so-called spirit of the Imperial Way, or that of the entire people assisting the Imperial rule. I should like to request you to explain a little more explicitly, however, as to the difference between parliamentarism and the spirit of national assistance for the Imperial rule. Up to this time, I think, Premier HIRANUMA has been misunderstood by the public more than once. It has been suspected if he weren't trying to enforce a Fascist policy. At the time of the investiture of Premier KIRANU1IA the stocks of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,169 KABUT0-CH0 went down, because the public feared that Fascism would be enforced and that everything would become terrible. But our people, I am sure, under- stood your true meaning by your successful statement in this House to attach importance to the Diet and to promote parliamentarism. There are leftists and rightists in the world in fast, however, even among my fellow Members. Among the rightists many are liable to insist upon totalitarianism and the uenial of parliamentarism at the slightest provocation. Your Excellency, the Premier, I think, knows about this matter better than I. Totalitarianism and the doctrine of the Imperial Way are often confused, but in regards to this point I have heard the Premier's declaration in this House of the necessity to ob- serve the provisions of the Constitution and to emphasize parliamentarism. Consequently, political parties would naturally rise, and it would be wrong to negate this. But, I think, the spirit of 'one sovereign for the whole people1 or totalitarianism considerably differs from parliamentarism in the way of methods of realization. There are some who say opposing parliamentarism is often acting contrarily to the spirit of assisting the Imperial Way. And although totalitarianism is like assisting the 7 8 9 Imperial Way "?rb-feas.. certain poir ts vi. w'.ich it differs l ! entirely, As r. result of your explanation in this 2 House, we understand that what Premier FIRANUMA calls 3 / thte spirit of \ssisting the Imperial Way consists in stressing parliamenearism increasingly on the basis a constitutional government, Bu1: we are not en- fco Premier IIIRANUIIA's • lew on totali- Impe: ial Way, and 10 11 12 ightened as arianism, the doctrine of the constitutional f.o\ a-nrnenc. If poss. 'ole, therefore, ;u have you explain c; em 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 I "I1 */ 25 I I should more. .Ac !>'. . L i . us once ! ' : • - .j 5 t.-.'.x-. >L • - Xn questioi is, : a a sense, very difficult to answer, and I doubt whether I can satisfy you. I understand that totalitariarism is a word upud In opposition to the so-called, individualism of the Western countries, and I think it means that its object is net the individual, but the whole, or that, for the sake of tha whole, the individual must obey the whole irrespective of whether it be advantageous or not to one's own interest. The doctrine of the Imperial Woy in our country has no such meaning I believe. The scul of the doctrine of the Imperial Way in oi country is, I believe, to enable all people to fine, their own places and not leave anyone without hi] 18,171 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 own place. When viewed in this light, we must think about the whole and we must think about the individual also and is quite different from the absolute idea of sacrificing the individual for the whole. This from the viewpoint of the doctrine of the Imperial Way, becomes the entire nation's assistance to the Imperial rule. In other words with everyone observ- ing the purport of the Imperial Benevolence"not one person shall be denied gaining his rightful place and concentrating on this fundamental is what I be- lieve to be '"he so-called assistance of the entire nation to thi- Imperial rule. In country, there- fore, it follows that in obedience to this great Spirit enabling every person or thing to have his or its own place, constituting political institutes first and last of course but also the others irre- spective of what occupation they pursue, all should concentrate themselves on this point. This is my understanding. Consequently, I believe that there is a fundamental difference between the idea of totalitarianism which was developed in the "'estern countries and our doctrine of the Imperial Way." We offer in evidence, if the Court please, document 681, an excerpt from Ambassador Grew's book which has been offered for identification as exhibit 18,172 l 2 n o 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2306. THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan. BRIGADIER NOLAN: Can the prosecution object to the introduction of evidence of defense document 681 on the ground that the Tribunal will decide whether or not there has been an attitude of strong resistance in this country or not, and that is purely a matter of opinion of the ex-Ambassador? MR. BLEWETT: Hay I speak, sir? THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. IB. BLEWETT: I understand the Tribunal's opinion regarding opinions; but certainly, sir, this seems to be a factual report or observation by a man who was stationed in Japan to note just such condi- tions and report them to his own country. THE PRESIDENT: But how is it relevant? Whether it be an opinion or statement of fact, how is it relevant? m . BLEWETT: We were under the impression, sir, it would be relevant to the conspiracy charge of the prosecution. THE PRESIDENT: "'hat bearing has the Japanese Constitution or political setup upon the question we have to decide? Is it assumed that a country must be 18,173 totalitarian before it can be guilty of aggressive war? Whatever the political complexion of Japan or the accused, the question is what they said and what they did. This investigation would never end if we let in this type of stuff. I will take the views of the Tribunal, nevertheless. The majority of the Court think that this exhibit, this document should be rejected. The objection is upheld. MR. BLEWETT: I offer, sir, defense document 565 in evidence, which is the affidavit of KUZUU. TEE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 565 will receive exhibit No. 2366. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2366 and received in evidence.) MR. 3LEWETT: I have just been advised, sir, that the witness will be called later on in another phase of this case. So I shell withdraw that'document. THE PRESIDENT: You have leave to withdraw it. MR. BLEWETT: Thank you, sir. CLERK OF THE COURT: Exhibit No. 2366 is withdrawn. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 6 , MR. BLEWETT: We shall now show the true reasons for the promulgation of the Imperial Ordinance relative to the Army and Navy lists relative to cabinet appointments. I refer to prosecution's exhibit No. 93. I offer in evidence defense document No. 435, the sworn deposition of TSUGITA, who at the present moment is ill and unable to appear in Court. THE PI IcIDENT: Brigadier Nolan. BRIGADIER NOLAN: Mr. President, the pros- ecutin is of the opinion that this document should not be offered until the deporent is well and able to come before the Tribunal and submit to cross-examin- ation. MRo BLEWETT: We will be glad to produce the witness for cross-examination, sir. THE PRESIDENT: I can only assume that the prosecution, having read this affidavit, want to cross-examine him. Otherwise, they would not ask us to wait until he is well. BRIGADIER NOLAN: We do desire to cross- examine him, Mr. President. THE PRESIDENT: Well, we allowed jrcu, the prosecution, to read affidavits subject to the deponent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,175 being called for cross-examination if the defense thought he should be called. YIe must do as much for the defense, BRIGADIER NOLAN: I remember, Mr. President, such a ruling in the case of those witnesses who were not available to come to give evidence by reason of the distance away from the Court in which they lived, but my memory is that -those who were in or around the vicinity of Tokyo were asked to present themselves here with the affidavit. TEE PRESIDENT: Not sick men, Brigadier. Sick men are in the same category as men at a distance. If this man is not sick, well, he should be here; but is there any question about that? MR. BLEWETT: No question about it, sir. He was here last week ready to testify and he has been subpoenaed and I just learned shortly that he is now in bed with a cold unable to appear. THE PRESIDENT: If we do not allow the affi- davit to be read now, we may throw the defense case out of order which we do not want to do. Well, I think I will take a vote on this. By a majority the Court has decided to allow the affidavit to be read. CLERK CF THE CCLIT: Defense document 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18, No. 435, to wit, the affidavit of TSUGITA, Daizaburo, will receive exhibit No. 2366. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked defense exhibit No. 2366 and received in evidence.) MR. 3LEWETT: I shall read exhibit No. 2366: "Sworn Deposition. "Deponent: TSUGITA, Daizaburo. "Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows: "On this 13th day cf January, 1947. "At Tokyo" Signed. "I was the chief of the Bureau of Legislation in the HIROTA Cabinet from March, 1936 to February, 1937. "The HIROTA Cabinet, which came into existence following the 'February 26 affair', had as its mission a rigid enforcement of military discipline, the calming down of the people's mind and the establishment of a peaceful diplomacy. Premier HIRCTA adhered to this policy consistenty. At the first Cabinet conference held scon after the inaugural ceremony in March 9, 1936, he made an important statement as fellows: "'When I presented the Cabinet members list 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,177 today, the Emperor told me firstly to conduct civil administration in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution; secondly, not to conduct diplomacy forcibly and thirdly, to avoid any sudden charge in the financial situation. I am going to render my services to the State in obedience to the Imperial intention, so I hope, therefore, every one cf you will cooperate with me.1 All ministers respectfully agreed. In this connection, in my diary of March 9, 11th Year of SHOWA, 1936, I wrote the following description: "'March 9 "'About 9 a.m. Mr. DAWASAKI, Takukichi rang me up. Secretly asked if I would accept the directorship i of the Bureau of Legislation and consented. At 9.30 I was summoned, went to the Premier's official residence and paid respects to each Minister. Went into the Cabinet room. The Imperial opinion confided to the Premier when he presented the list of Cabinet members: firstly, to govern according to the articles and chapters of the Constitution; secondly, not to conduct foreign policy by force; thirdly, avoid a sudden change in the financial situation. Each Minister understood the point of the Finance Minister's talk. The War Minister said he was sorry for the Incident and he would take care that such 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,178 an event should not occur again in future.' The part of the said diary referring to the War Minister's talk shows a firm resolution declared by him to enforce militar,r discipline considering the February 26 Incident. "The reason why the HIECTA Cabinet reformed the Army and Navy ministries official organization was to enforce military discipline. It was at the extraordinary session of the Diet in May 1936 that this reform bill was introduced into the Cabinet from the Army and Navy Ministries. The military and naval authorities explained: 'The Army and Navy Ministers have the duties cf supervising troops belonging to the supreme command, of maintaining military discipline and of strengthening the Unity of the army; therefore, equally, they themselves must be soldiers belonging to the supreme command, that is, on the active list. Indeed, this is brought cut by the fact that all of the War and Navj*- Ministers were soldiers on the active list sirce the r form of the government organization in the second 3̂ ear cf TAISHO (T.N. 1913) (i.e. the reform in which generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list were also allowed tc become Ministers). Now, soon after the Incident, keenly feeling the necessity of restricting the Ministers to officers on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,179 the active list in order to strengthen the power of the Ministers, to enforce military discipline and to solidly preserve unity, we intend to make the system correspond with actuality b" reforming the government organization.' When I asked them the meaning of, 'seen after the Incident we keenly feel the necessity of restricting the Ministers to the officers en the active list,' they answered as follows: 'We will place several generals ard lieutenant-generals who are responsible for the Incident on the reserve list, but under the existing system some of them could become War Minister in future and could bring about such a disgraceful event as the Februarjr 26 Incident or an even n:ore serious one than that. In order to prevent such a calamity, we intend to make the system one under which generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list cannot become Ministers.' "Moreover, the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy said, 'As the Premier has already consented to this bill, we want it to be passed quickly.' After I asked the Premier about that. I nrepared a C-abiret bill and submitted it to the Cabinet conference. "In the conference Premier HIRCTA asked TEJ ADCHI, the Army Minister, and next NAGANO, the Navy Minister, 'Will this reform not lead to a situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,180 in which those ccrranded to form the Cabinet will find it difficult to appoint future War and iavy Ministers?1 They both answered, 'There is no fear that such a situation will arise.' With this exception, no special utterance was made ard the bill was passed in its original form. "I did rot ascertain how each Minister thought about the bill and why he consented to it. Only Mr. BABA, the Finance Minister, expressed his opinion directly to me when I spoke with him about it before the conference. 'Enforcement of military discipline is a serious question in hand and a very difficult task, but the War Minister is resolved to take it upon himself and carry it cut at any cost. Now that he eagerly desires this reform in order to perform the task, the Cabinet reforms the government organization to save his face but in return for that, he shall enforce military discipline thoroughly. That is the best course for the Cabinet to take, I think.' Thus he indicated his consent to the original bill. "There are some who held that the reform caused the Army to participate in politics afterwards. I will relate one or two facts as material for judging whether this observation is right or wrong. The formation of the HIPiCTA Cabinet naturally took place before the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,181 reform of the Army and Navy Ministries and to choose ministers from generals and lieutenant-generals on the reserve list was still permissible from the legislative point of view. Informing his Cabinet, however, HIROTA met with several demands from the Army concerning the selection of the Ministers and if he rejected those demands, it was feared that he would be unable to get an Army Minister. His attempt to form the Cabinet met with great difficulty; he continued negotiations foi about a week after he had received the Imperial mandate and during that time the formation was several times in danger of aborting, but finally, after acceding to most of those demands, he succeeded. In this case the system under which Ministers could be selected from generals and lieutenant- generals on the reserve list was of no use in preventing the Army from participating in politics. "Next, when the KCISO Cabinet was formed in July, 19th Year cf frROWA (T.N. 1944), the Ivar and Navy Ministers were required tc be generals and lieutenant- generals on the active list in accordance with the government organization of the War and Navy Ministries, but Admiral YONAI who was on the .reserve list was appointed Navy Minister. Ir order not to conflict with the rules cf the government organization, however, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,182 Admiral YONAI was placeu on the active list just before he was inaugurated, with the special consideration of the Emperor. In this case, even,, the reform could not prevent a general officer on the reserve list from becoming Navy Minister." 1 2 3i 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,183 MR. BLEWETT: re offer in evidence defense document No. 5473 being a report on the examination of the revision of the Imperial Ordinance. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 547 will receive exhibit No. 2367. (^hereuponj the document above ref- erred to was marked defense exhibit 2367 and received in evidence.) MR. BLEWETT< I shall read exhibit 2367. "Report on the Examination of the Revision of Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the War Ministry and One Other Subject. "we have been appointed members of the Committee of Examination with.regard to revisions in the Organization of the v'ar Ministry and of the Navy Ministry which have been referred to the Privy Council for deliberation. We held a committee meet- ing on the thirtieth of last month and listened to explanations given by the Ministers of State and the government officials concerned and have made a thor- ough examination of the subject matter. "The two points in question have for their purpose to revise the stipulations with regard to qualifications in the appointment of Ministers and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,184 Vice-Ministers for the "rer Ministry and the Navy Ministry. It is to he noted that the stipulations in the organizations of the ®ar and Navy Ministeries prescribing that those who are appointed Ministers (full general or lieutenant-general in the case of Minister of War and full admiral or vice-adiriral in the case of Minister of the Navy) or Vice-Ministers (at one time was called secretary-general) (lieu- tenant-general or major-general in the case of Vice- Mini ster of War and Vice-admiral or rear-admiral in the case of Vice-Minister of the Navy) that would limit them to generals or admirals on active service originated in the thirty-third year of Meiji (1900). "Later, in the second year of Taisho (1913) the above-mentioned limitations were rescinded by Imperial Ordinance No. 165 of the second year of Taisho (1913) relative to the revision of the Organ- ization of the r'ar Ministry remark No. 1 of the attached list was rescinded and by Imperial Ordinance No. 168 of the same year relative to the revision of the Organization of the Navy Ministry remark No. 1 of the separate list was rescinded), thereby mak- ing it clear that those to be appointed Ministers or Vice-Ministers of War and of the Navy were not to be limited to generals_ or_admirals on active ser- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,185 vice. These have been effective up to the present day. It is further to be noted that all these re- visions of the Organizations were not referred to j the Privy Council for delibi- nation, According to explanations given by the Ministers concerned Mth the revisions now proposed, the following points are pointed out: Ministers of ̂ ar and of the Navy core under the system of the Supreme Command and bear the heavy responsibility of directing and con- troling the officers and men of the /rmy and the Navy who are subject to the Supreme Command, of maintaining strict military discipline and of keep- ing up a solid unity of the entire Army and the Navy. Vice-Ministers assist their Ministers, put Depart- mental affairs in order and supervise the work done by the Bureaus and the Divisions. Therefore, it is actually essential that both the Ministers and the Vice-Ministers be officers on active service who come under the system of the Supreme Command and have powers of command the under the Supreme Command. Moreover, in the case of the £rmy, the results, following the above-mentioned revision of organiza- tion in the second year of Taisho (1913) procedure of handling affairs in the Ministry, the General Staff Office and the Department of Military Education 18,186 1 brought about duplication of work and waste of 2 personnel, causing great inconvenience. In addi- tion, the .Army has come to feel an urgent necessity for remedial measures to be taken with regard to the unfortunate incident recently having taken place not only to establish commanding authority, to en- force military discipline., and to strengthen the unity of the Army, but also to trv to carry out improvements in the existing system in order to bring about economy in personnel and to expedite the work handled. For these reasons, it should be prerequi- site that Ministers and Vice-Ministers be limited to general officers on active service. Moreover, since the above-mentioned revision of organizations in the second year of Taisho (1913) and up to the present day, there has not been an instance of a general or an admiral other than those on active service having been appointed Minister or Vice- Minister of r'ar or of the Navy. Reflecting on this 21 fact, it is appropriate to have matter express by 22 stipulated in provision and make things correct with 23 to fact both in name and reality. For these rea- 24 sons aad in order to revert to the old system which 25 was in force prior to the second year of Taisho (1913) to limit the Qualifications for appointment o 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,187 for Ministers and Vice-Ministers of T?sr or of the Navy to generals or admirals on active service that it is proposed to introduce the two points in ques- tion to carry out partial revision in the existing organizations of the 1;ifar Ministry and of the Navy Ministry respectively by adding the clause 'Those who are appointed Ministers or Vice-Ministers shall be generals or admirals on active service' to the beginning of the remarks of the attached and separate lists of the respective Organizations. "After giving due consid-ration. It is clear that the two points in question have for their ob- ject to restore the old system with regard to quali- fications in the appointment of Ministers and Vice- Ministers of r"ar or of the Navy and to limit them to generals or admirals on active service by stipula- tions in the Organization. And although at the pres- ent time there may still be some concern regarding the reason why the said limitation stipulated in the Organization was removed in the past, the revisions now proposed can be recognized as a timely measure in bringing the control of the /rmy ana the Navy to perfection, taking all things of the present into consideration. Therefore, the Committee of Examination has unanimously decided that the two 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,188 matters in question shall be approved exactly as they are. "We have the honor to report the above as the result of examination. "The 6th day of May of the eleventh year of Showa (1936) to the President of the Privy Council, "'Baron, HIRANUMA, "Chairman of the Committee of Examina- tions, " and so on. We now refer the Tribune 1 to prosecution exhibits 103 to 129 and the Indictment, to show the position and location of every accused on certain important dates stressed by the prosecution. Shall I start reading this listr- THE PRESIDENT: Hasn't it been read already? MR- BLEWETT: No, sir. THE PRESIDENT- Are you going to read very much? ME BLE"rETT: I think perhaps, sir, it would be more consistent to start and finish it at one time rather than to break it in two pieces. THE PRESIDENT: Fell, it is before us as an exhibit and there is one thing we certainly won't 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18,189 overlook, those matters you are about to read. MR. BLEFETT: I have this arranged, sir, and it is not exactly a chart, but it is in the form of a chart. I tried to make up a chart to show the exact position of each one of these accused on each one of these important dates. MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, it would seeir that the method of presenting this matter is one that pertain to the argument of the case or summation of it. THE PRESIDENT: My colleagues, I think without exception, would like it in more convenient form than it is in now, and Mr. Blewett may have it in more convenient form. V'e will adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600 hours an adjourn- ment was taken until Wednesday, March 12, 194-7, at 0930 hours.)
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March 11, 1947 - Proceedings in Chambers; March 11, 1947 - Index (p .18, 079-18,189)
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