AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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31 JANUARY 1947 I N D E X Of PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENTS Page Prosecution1s Arguments showing connection of each Accused with alleged conspiracies and their criminal responsibility for crimes charged (cont'd) by Mr. Brown: SHIRATORI, Toshio 16912 SUZUKI, Teiichi 16925 TOGO, Shigenori 16939 TOJO, Hideki 16950 By Mr. Comyns Carr: UMEZU, Yoshijiro 16959 SATO, Kenryo 16964 OKA, Takasumi 16968 HOSHINO, Naoki 16977 16,911 Friday, 31 January 1947 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearancesi For the Tribunal, same as before with the exception of: HONORABIE JUSTICE NORTHCROFT, Member from New Zealand, not sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Tefense Section, same as before. The Accused: All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is represented by his counsel. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 26 21 22 23 24 25 16,912 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: Would the Tribunal permit mv friend Mr. Brown to read the next few sections of these remarks on my behalf? THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brown. MR. BROW: SHIRAiORI, TosMo The particular? with regard to SHIRATORI, Toshio, are to be found on page 33° of the chrono- logical summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are: Exhibit No. 2232, page of the record 16,003; exhibit No. 2233, page of the record 16,012, and exhibit No. 2234, page of the record 16,027. From the 31st of October 1930 to the 2nd of June 1933 he was the official spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, and was decorated for his services In the Manchurian incident, and later for services in the China affair, of the nature of which we have no other knowledge. Exhibit 179-Q shows him taking part in a discussion as t.o setting up a new regime in Manchuria. On the 4th of November 1935 SHIRATORI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,913 advised ARITA, by letter, that the threat of future calamity should be removed while Russia was com- paratively impotent. He advocated war if that appeared MR. CAUDLE: May it please the Court, that exhibit the gentleman refers to was introduced for identification only, as the record will show, and I object to him referring to it. THE PRESIDENT: Will the shorthand reporter please read to me what Mr. Caudle said? (Whereupon, Mr, Caudle:s state- ment was read by the official court reporter.) MR. COOTS CARR: I will send for the record and we will have a check made on that, sir. THE PRESIDENT: For the time being we will disregard it. MR. BROWN: I beg your Honor's pardon. THE PRESIDENT: The shorthand reporter will tell you what I said. (Whereupon, the statement of the President was read by the official court reporter.) MR. BROWN: On the 4th of November 1935 SHIRATORI advised ARITA, by letter, that the threat — " 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,914 MR. CAUDLE: If the Tribunal please, your Honor, that is the thing I objected to. MR. BROWN: Yes. I beg your pardon. T?hen OSHIMA was striving for a tri-partite " military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, SHIRATORI accepted the post of ambassador to Italy and journeyed to Rome in the latter part of December 1938 with the expectation that be would succeed in concluding the military alliance. (Exhibit 498, page of the record 6083.) Prior to that time both Ribbentrop and OSHIMA had failed in their efforts to bring Italy into agreement. SHIRATORI and OSHIMA conferred in matters pertaining to the proposed alliance and advocated an all-out military alliance without reservations. They endeavored to impose their convictions upon the Japanese government and endeavored to influence and direct Japanese policy with regard thereto. On the 7th of January 1939 SHIRATORI advised Count Ciano that Prime Minister HIRANUMA, who had succeeded Prince KONOYE as Prime Minister on the 5th of January 1939. was openly in favor of the proposed alliance, but that the new Foreign Minister, ARITA, was "rather cold toward the idea." (Exhibit 499-A, page of the record 6092.) This was followed on the 16,915 6th of February 1939 by a representation to Count Ciano by SHIRATORI that a Japanese counter proposal would be made which he secretly advised Italy not to accept. (Exhibit 501, page of the record 6095.) The compromise proposal was brought to Rome in February 1939 by the ITO Commission which was also charged with the duty of explaining to the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome the views of the government and instructing them that they must work within these views. (Exhibit 487, pages of the record 6072 to 6079.) As SHIRATORI and OSHIKA desired a military treaty without reservations on the part of Japan, they refused to follow the advice of the ITO Commission and refused to communicate the compromise proposal through official channels. They threatened to cause the fall of the cabinet by resigning from their posts unless the government reconsidered its stand. (Exhibit 499, page of the record 6096.) In April the Japanese government reconsidered its stand and presented a new draft of the treaty in connection with which it requested an agreement that in the publication of the pact an explanation be made which would tend to soften the attitude that would likely result on the part of England, France, 16,916 r 1 ; 2 ! 3 | 4 J c J j 6 ; 7 I 8 j ? J 10 I 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and America. The reason assigned by the Tokyo cabinet for the necessity of such a limited inter- pretation of the pact was that both for political and economic reasons Japan "was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposers of the three Democracies." SHIRATORI and OSHIMA again refused to communicate officially the Japanese government's proposal to the nations to which they were sccredited. (Exhibit 502, page of the record 6100.) A German-Russian non-aggression pact — MR. CAUDLE: May it please the Court: He said in April. May I inquire in what year? April of what year? MR. BROWN: April 1939, your Honor. MR. CAUDLE: Thank you. MR. BROWN: A German-Russian non-aggression pact was concluded on the 23rd. of August 1939 which contributed to the downfall of the HIRANUMA cabinet. On the 1st of September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. Notwithstanding the temporary setback to the con- clusion of a Japan-Germany-Italy military alliance, SHIRATORI continued his efforts to develop closer German-Japanese relations. On the 2nd of September 1939, in a conference with Mackensen, German 16,917 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 ! 2 1 ! 2 2 i I 23 ! 24 25 ambassador to Italy, SHI lATORI ex ressed the opinion that "with a new Japanese cabinet there was a well- founded chance for successful continuation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis powers," and asserted that for the purpose "of being able personally to work more effectively than was possible from Rome he was going to Tokyo." In another con- ference in Rome, SHIRATORI emphasized the severe blow that Japanese-German relations had sustained by the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and made known the fact that he was one of Germany's friends who "had been laboring to counteract this effect." As for the Japanese protest against the conclusion of the pact, SHIRi.TORI declared that he had got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone and had endeavored to stop it. (Exhibit 2232, page of the record 16,003.) After SHIRATORI returned to Japan, the German Ambassador reported on the 23rd of February 1940 that SHIRATORI and others remain "in an unchanged, friendly attitude and ready for every support." (Exhibit No. 511, page of the record 6141.) SHIRATORI and OSHIMA in the summer of 1940 worked in confidential cooperation with the German Embassy in Japan in stirring up Japanese ill feeling 16,918 against America by influencing the press and political leaders. (Exhibit No. 516, page of the record 6152.) On the fall of the YONAI Cabinet, MATSUOKA's appointment as Foreign Minister was generally % approved by the press as meaning with certainty that there would be s new orientation of Japanese policy. SHIRATORI and OSHIMA expressed themselves in a similar vein at press interviews, thus lending the weight of their influence to MATSUOKA's policies. (Exhibit No. 536, page of the record 6261.) SHIRATORI declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister, but accepted appointment as permanent adviser to the Foreign Minister, in which capacity he considered that he would be able to exercise a far-reaching influence. (Exhibit No. 538, page of the record 6265.) The new government formed a commission of twenty-four leading persons, consist- ing mostly of followers of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers, with the aim of planning suitable action for the adjustment of state affairs on an authoritarian basis. SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters on this commission. (Exhibit No. 548, page of the record 6296.) He held the post of adviser until the 22nd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,919 of July 1941, when he resigned owing to ill health. On the 7th of July (exhibit 1113, page of the record 10157) and again on August the 1st (exhibit 800, page of the record 7967) Ott stated that he was intending to resume an activist policy, and advocated war against Russia. The Tri-Partite Military Alliance was con- cluded on the 27th of September 1940. Soon there- after SHIRATORI endeavored to unite the nation behind the Pact by publication of various articles, one of which was entitled "The Three-Power Pact and the World, of Tomorrow." In this article, SFIRATORI stated that the character of the New Order to be crested under the leadership of the three powers was to be considered in the light of the fact that the three powers had discarded the ideologies of individual- ism and democracy and had adopted the totalitarian point of view. In Japan, he asserted, the nation had revolted against the so-called evils of liberal- istic civilization and its dissatisfaction had found expression in the form of the Manchurian Incident of 1931- This Incident was a challenge externally to unjust conditions long forced upon mankind by the democratic powers, and internally to all alien ideals and thoughts grafted upon the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,920 Japanese people. The characteristics of this movement in Japan, he said, had become accentuated in the current China affair the ultimate object of which, in consonance with the classic expression Hakko Ichiu, adopted as a national slogan, was the establishment of a New Order in East Asia. Unless the present wars were considered in the light of these statements, it was said, the real nature of the New World Order of Tomorrow which is to be established through Japanese-German-Italian coopera- tion could not be understood. (Exhibit No. 557, page of the record 6405.) 16,921 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In November 1940, SHIRATORI assembled in one publication a series of lectures which he had given all over Japan and which had appeared in news- papers ana magazines from time to time since his return from his ambassadorship in Rome. His purpose in re-public&tion -of these articles was to explain the world-wide significance of the Tri-Partite Pact. These articles have been read in evidence so recently that it is not considered necessary to quote them at length in this argument in order to demonstrate the leading part that SHIRATORI played in molding public i opinion in Japan in favor of aggressive policies. However, it may be appropriate to quote several excerpts which are worthy of ^articular notice. (Exhibit 2234, page of the record 16,029.) In lecember 1939 SHIRATORI stated: "I feel there is no need for hesitation in determining Japan's future foreign policy. In fact, ever since Japan embarked on her continental policy with the Manchuriaji Incident, her foreign policy has been established, and to back out or swerve from it now is not permissible.. Still, the presence of two different opinions in Japan today, ana the fact that the peonle are hesitating between them, is truly a wonder of this world. Howeve this is a transitory phenomenon. The inevitability 1 I- 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 L8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,922 of history cannot be altered by human power. In the long run, that which is bound, to happen will probably happen. However, the domestic and foreign situations at present will not allow hesitation and indecision for long. The new order of East Asia is linked with the hew order of the world. Theinew order cannot be realized in this part of the world alone if the rest of the world adheres to the old order or goes back in the opposite direction." (Exhibit 2234, pages of the record 16,034-16,035.) In an address delivered in November 1939, SHIRATORI stated, "I firmly believe that the fact that this war has broken out can be developed in favor i of Japan according to her aims arid policies." (Exhibit No. 2234, page of the record 16,040.) He continued, "Germany today will never be defeated, even under the worst possible conditions. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that there will be no great danger, if Japan, today, does show goodwill to Germany and fights on her side. Furthermore, if the countries that are trying to establish a new order in Europe should not be able to win, it would be impossible for the Japanese people to construct a new order in Asia. Generally speaking, the old order in Europe and Asia is represented by Britain and France. If the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1<>,923 countries that are endeavoring to maintain this old order cannot be defeated, a new order cannot be estab- lished either in the Occident or in the Orient. Japan, Germany and Italy are all countries whose mission it is to build in cooperation the new world order. Even without concluding a treaty, the aim of the three powers is one." (Exhibit No. 2234, page of the record 16,042.) On the 31st of January, 1941, the German ambassador to Japan reported that SHIRATORI was one of the leaders of the group advocating a preventive attack on Singapore. Such a surprise action, it was considered, would Deprive the United States of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific. (Exhibit 562, page of the record 6429.) In another report from the German ambassador on the 25th of March, 1941, it was stated that SHIRATORI stressed the necessity of tying up the British fleet. (Exhibit 576, page of the record 6476.) SHIRATORI from time to time communicated important information to the German ambassador to Japan. (Exhibit 800, page of the record 7968.) On the 17th of May 1942, he was one of those singled out by the German Embassy in Tokyo for a German oecoration of the Grand Cross. I quote from the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,924 citation^, "For a long time he was the nrincinal advocate of intimate cooperation with Germany. Member of the new Liet after recovering his health, SHIRATORI will probably again play an important part in foreign and home politics." (Exhibit 1272, page of the record 11,352.) While he is specially concerned with Count 5, we submit that he was in the general conspiracy from the beginning, and responsible under all the counts in which he is charged. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, I find, on checking the matter, that the objection to exhibit 774-A is entirely unfounded. It was admitted in evidence on page 7882 of the record after vour Honor had overruled the long objection, and it was read by my friend, General Vasiliev, on pages 7883 to 7887; and it is marked as being in evidence in the office of the Clerk of the Court. I ask that my friend, Mr. Brown, may now be allowed to read the passage which he omitted. MR. CAUDLE: I certainly want to apologize to the Tribunal. I had intended answering that docu- ment in my motion, sir, and through some mistake or misconception of mine I thought, or had the impression 16-, 92 5 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l i ! 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in checking'the record, that it had been introduced just for identification only ,and neglected for that reason to refer to it in my motion. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal accepts your explanation. We .nave no doubt you were under genuine misapprehension. MR. CAUDLE: I am very sorry about it. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brown. MR. BROWN; With the Tribunal's permission, I now propose reading the passage to which objection was taken. On the 4th of November, 1935, SHIRATORI advised ARITA by letter that the threat of future calamity should be removed while Russia was compara- tively impotent. He advocated war if that appeared inevitable in order to shut Russia out completely from advancing into East Asia. SUZUKI The particulars with regard to this accused are to be founo on page 340 of the summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are 2250 , 2252 , 2253 , 2266 , 2280. As early as 1927 the accused SUZUKI was a member of the General Staff Office. In 1929 he was an I assistant military attache in China, and on 9 January 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,926 1931 was a lieutenant colonel attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry. On 1 August 1931, he was appointed a member of the Military Affairs Bureau, which appointment he held at the time of the Manchurian Incident (18 Sep- tember 1931). On 7 October 1931 KIDO reports that Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI expressed his opinion on the current problems in the Army Lepartment. The activities in which Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to carry out the national reformation immediately, but it is to save the situation if something does happen in the future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the young officers. (Exhibit 179(0), page of the record 1926.) In August 1933» he was appointed Chief of the Press Section of the Wir Ministry, and in 1934 was an instructor in the Army Staff College. On 25 May 1935, he w?s again attached to the Military Affairs Bureau and was appointed an investi- gator in the Cabinet Bureau of Investigation, In August 1936, he commanded the 14th Infantry Regiment, ana in November 1937 was promoted to major general and attached to the headquarters of the 16th Livision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l i 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 On 16 December he was appointed head of the Political Department of the China Affairs Bureau and on 28 December 1938 appointed a member of the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet, On 21 February 1939, he was appointed to the Liaison Committee of the China Affairs Bureau and secretary of that committee. On 30 May 1939 he was appointed a Councillor of the Planning Bureau and in June 1939 made a member of the Opium Committee. On 16 August 1939 he was appointed Acting Commissioner General of the China Affairs Bureau ?nd Secretary of the Committee on China Affairs on 5 July 1939. He was a government delegate to the Imperial Diet in 1939 and in 1940, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 1 August 1940. On 21 December 1940 he assumed the duty temporarily of Commissioner General of the China Affairs Bureau and was appointed Councillor of the Total War Research Institute. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16, On 4 April 1941 he was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet and Pres- ident of the Planning Board and relinquished his appointment on the China Affairs Board. On 14 May 1941 SUZUKI was also appointed Vice President of the Investigation Committee for Price Counter Measures end on 19 June 1941 a member of the Thought Control Committee. On the formation of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet on 18 July 1941, SUZUKI continued to be a Minister with- out Portfolio and President of the Planning Board. On the formation of the TOJO Cabinet on 18 October 1941 he co.nt.incd to hold the offices of Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board which he did not relinquish until 8 October 1943 when he was appointed a member of the House of Peers. As early as May 1932 KIDO states in his diary that he had a conversation with Lt. Colonel SUZUKI which whows his interest then in political affairs. They talked about matters concerning measures to cope with' the Incident as well as the succeeding Cabinet (exhibit 2252, page of the record 16,215). In April 1933 KIDO reports that at a. part at the res- idence of Marquis INOTJE, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI described i 16,929 4 1 Russia as an abs^ute enemy and denounced any attempt 2 to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia (ex- 3 hibits 2253, page of the record 16,216). In 1933 or 1934- his interest in the expansion 5 of Japan is evidenced by the fact that he spoke at a 6 meeting of prefectural governors surraorting ARAKI 7 who explained that it was necessery for Japan to obtain 8 possession of the Maritime Province of the USSR, 9 Siberia and Zabaikalye (Takebe) (exhibit 670, page 10 of the record 7,730). 11 One 29 December 1938 KIDO writes in his diary that the accused SUZUKI advised him and insisted that KONQYE1s Cabinet should carry on (exhibit 2266, page of the record 16,232}. The Witness Goette states thzt in 1939 SUZUKI told him that as Japan could not get General Chiang Kai-Shek on her side, the war against China would go on (page of the record 3780). The interest of SUZUKI in military affairs is evidenced by the fact that on the 23 June 194-1, according to KIDO's Diary, the day following the invasion of Russia by Germany SUZUKI expressed his opinion that the Imperial General Headquarters should be unified and reinforced (exhibit 1094, page of the record 1 0 , 0 2 4 ) . 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,930 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 T/hile there is no direct evidence that SUZUKI was present at the important Liaison Conferences held after the end of June 1941, it is noteworthy that on 29 Octobcr 1941 SUZUKI reported the progress of a Liaison Conference to KIDO (Exhibit 1162, page of the record 10,314). There is, however, evidence that SUZUKI attended the Imperial Conferences on 2 July 1941, 6 September 1941, 5 November 1941, and 2 December 1941 (exhibit 1107, page of the record 10,140), and must therefore share in the responsibility for the decisions made at those conferences. As Presid^t of the Planning Board he attended a meeting of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council when Foreign Minister TOYODA explained that the proposed protocol between France and Japan relating to French Indo-China vras chiefly intended for carry- ing out the war against China by cutting the Burma Road (exhibit 649, page of the record 7,069), and on the same d ay attended a meeting of the Privy Council relating to the conclusion of the protocol between France and Japan (exhibit 650, page of the record 7,074). As President of the Planning Board he held a position of great authority, because that Board 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,931 controlled economic planning in Japan. It was that Board which prepared the National Commodity Mobiliza- tion Plan which was explained by SUZUKI and approved by the Cabinet on 22 August 1941. The key points of the plan were the prompt expansion of armaments and maintenance of coal and steel production in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (exhibit 1132, page of the record 10,205). On 30 August 1941 there followed the most sweeping of all control ordinances, "The Key Industries Control Ordinance" which wrs to serve rs a foundation for the complete control by the govern- ment of all major industries (page of the record 8403). On 1 September 1941 the Imperial Petroleum Company was formed and was an effective government instrument for the complete control of petroleum (page of the record 8476). On 5 September 1941 the "Traffic Mobil- ization Plan" was adopted and aimed the placing of land and sea transportation on a war-time basis (exhibit 1133, poge of the record 10,214). On 2 Sep- tember 1941 there followed the- "Workers Total Mobil- ization Plcn" jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office. The plan was explained to the Cabinet by SUZUKI and adopted. It wrs aimed at insur- ing the supnly of sufficient labor for the increase production of munitions (exhibit 1140, page of the 1 2 3 I 5 : 6 7 ! 8 : 9 ! 10 I i i ! 12 13 14 ; 15 ! 16 17 18 ! 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 r e c o r d . 10 ' , 228 ) . On 29 September 194-1 .SUZUKI was requested by KIDO to make an investigation for the Emperor in respect to stocks of rubber and tin in the United States and rubber resources in South and Central America and other places where the United States would be able to obtain these resources (exhibit 1142, page of therecord 10,231). On 1 October 1941 KIDO writes that SUZUKI visited him and that they he "Id an informal talk about the national policy of Japan towards the United States of America (exhibit 2280, page of the record 16,253). In the month of October 1941 at the time of the fall of the 3rd KONOYE. Cabinet, SUZUKI clayed an important part and carried on negotiations between KONOYE and TOJO and KIDO and TOJO. He was present at the meeting in KONOYE's V>use on 12 October when TOJO, expressing the opinion of the Army, stated that there was absolutely no hope for the successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations (exhibit 1148, page of the record 10,250, exhibit 1147, page of the record 10,245, exhibit 2250) and a party to the decision there taken. On 14 October 1941 he called on KONOYE with a message from TOJO to the effect that since the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,933 opinions of the Premier and the 1?rar Minister had clashed head on, nothing could be done and suggested Prince HIGASHI-KUNI be requested to accent the Premiership (exhibit 1148, page of the record 10,250). On 15 October 1941 at the request of KONOYE, SUZUKI relayed this message to KIDO the purport of which was that if KONOYE would not change his mind, the general resignation of the Cabinet would be un- avoidable (exhibit 1150, page of the record 10,275). Later that same day KIDO asked SUZUKI to obtain a definite report on the intentions of the War Minister, end that night SUZUKI telephoned to KIDO that TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and Navy by the influence of the Prince (exhibit 1150, page of the record 10,275). The next day, 16 October 1941, SUZUKI called on KIDO who explained his reasons for his opposition to the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet. .That day KONOYE. resigned and upon formation of the new TOJO Cabinet, SUZUKI continued to hold the office of Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board (exhibits 102 and 126). 16,934 On 2 December 1941 the regulations of the 6th Committee were approved by the- Prime Minister. They provided that the Committee shall be established in the Cabinet for the purpose of discussing and drafting matters concerning economic plans and control centering around the acquisition and development of resources in the southern areas, French Indo-China, Thailandj and other southern areas. The regulations further provided that the general affairs of the Committee shall be handled by the Planning Board and that the President of the Planning Board shall be Chairman of the Committee (Exhibit 1331, page of the record 11,943). It was this Committee which made a report entitled "Outline of Economic Counter Piano for the Southern Area" en 12 December 1941 (Exhibit 1332, page of the record' 11,947). SUZUKI attended a meeting of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council. It was at this meeting that SHIMADA reported on the outbreak of war against America and England at Hawaii and J'ialaya, and the draft of the Imperial Rescript was approved, after war had started, A S President of the Planning Board SUZUKI is included in the list of- explaining members present at the meeting (Exhibit 1241, page of the record 10,690). On 8 December 1941 the Imperial Rescript 16,935 declaring war on the United States and the British Empire was signed amongst ethers by SUZUKI (Exhibit 1240, page of the record 10,685). On 10 December 1941 SUZUKI, as President of the Planning Board, was present at a meeting of the Privy Council pertaining to the proposal made by Japan to Germany and Italy respecting No Separate Peace Treaty. On 23 January 1942 in speeches before the Budget Committee it was explained by SUZUKI and TOJO that the aim of the measure under discussion was to secure raw materials necessary for the waging of war and the founding of the Greater Sphere Order, to prevent their flow to the enemy, and to secure the self-sufficiency of the Army in areas of operation (Exhibit 1271, page of the record 11,342). In Septem- ber 1942 the Planning Board was concerned with the transfer of prisoners of war to Japan to be employed in stevedoring in important ports. The areas in which the prisoners of war were to be employed are enumerated in Exhibit 1971-a, page of the record 14,505, and it is pointed out in the Exhibit th- t prisoners of war had been employed with satisfactory results to speed up the transportation of war materials in war time. In October 1942 SUZUKI played a prominent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,936 part in the meetings of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council relating to the establishment of a Greater East Asia Ministry. SUZUKI spoke in favor of the establishment of the new ministry which was designed to strengthen the combined fighting povrer of East Asia in order to secure' victory for Japan (Exhibit 687, page cf the record 12,070). When recommending SUZUKI for a German decora- tion on 17 May 194-2, Ambassador Ott states that in the scope of the task conferred upon SUZUKI as head of the Planning Board to bring Japan to the highest level of defense, SUZUKI wields decisive influence on the reor- ganization of Japan's inner administration including almost all cf the ministries. Ott further states that SUZUKI likewise controls economic planning in Japan as well as the organization cf economic and adminis- trative construction in the southern territories. He describes SUZUKI as an executive organ being the Gen- eral Secretary of the Beard cf Ccnstruction cf Greater East Asia and says that on the strength cf this au- thority his connections with the ^rmy and his personal relations with TOJO, SUZUKI has created a position for himself that can be labeled as a kind of Vice-Chancelor- ship. Ott further states that, although SUZUKI was formerly ambiguous in his attitude toward Germany, he 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 has retraxitl.y-' supported cooperation -with Germany and had an important share in the decision of Japan's entry . into the war. SUZUKI was appointed a Cabinet Coun- cillor on 17 November 194-3, which appointment he held until 28 October 194-4- (Exhibit 126). He was decorated on 29 April 1934- with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun for services in the Incident from 1931 to 1934-, end cn 29 April 194-0 was again decorated for meritorious service during the China Incident, It is submitted thut SUZUKI, being a member of the conspiracy, at least since 1931» is therefore responsible for all acts done in pursuance thereof, and the motion made on his behalf should be dismissed. There is one correction I have to make, your Honor„ On page 4 of the document I read — second pa rag raph I said, with reference to the Workers Total Mobilization Plan, that it followed on the — I believe I said cn the 2d of September; it should have been the 12th of September 1941.. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin. MR. LEVIN: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal, I move that that portion of the statement made by the prosecution in relation to the accused SUZUKI requesting the Tribunal to draw an inference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,938 from the statements and entries in KIDOJc Diary be disregarded. If I understood the ruling of the Ccurt several days ago, to the effect that any statements made by one accused in interrogatories should not be applicable as to other accused, or binding on other accused, it would seem to me as a logical conclusion that such statements made by KIDO in his diary as to other accused should also not be binding or applicable in any v/ay, THE PRESIDENT: The decision related solely to answers to interrogatories by prosecuting officers. The decision was based on the fact that the prosecution informed us that the answer of one accused to such an interrogatory was not tendered against any other accused who did not hear it and accept it. The decision had nc application to KIDO's Diary or to any other statement by an accused not made in answer to a prose- cuting officer. The philosophy underlying that, the attitude of the prosecution and of the Court in that matter, is very obvious I suggest, Mr. Levin. A sus- pect being interrogated by the prosecution, or by the police, will always have a tendency to exculpate him- self and to throw the blame on others, and his state- ments in those circumstances may not have much, if any, probative value. - 16,939 1 | Mli. • LE.V.1Ni _J I v a i X \>»d©rstand the r u l i n g 2 of the Court. It seems to me, howeVer, that as a ? i corollary the unilateral statement of an individual made by himself would have a tendency to implicate others and should not be binding en those who are c mentioned, simply because those who are mentioned have 7 no opportunity to refute within that document, itself 8 the statement that the individual makes or writes. 9 THE PRESIDENT: We are all agreed not to 10 give the decision the extension which you seek, Mr» 11 Levin* 12 Mr. Brown. 13 MR. BROWN: TOGO. The particulars with regard to the accused TOGO are to be found on page 34-1 of the Summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are Exhibits 1956, 1957, 1994, 2016-A, •2022, 2025-A and 2249. 18 14 15 16 Throughout the period covered by the Indict- ment TOGO was one of the accused most instrumental in the realization of Japanese-German and Japanese- Italian collaboration. At the time of the Manchurian Incident he wa s with MATSUOKii on the delegation of the League of 24 Nations, whose business it was to defend the aggres- z 5 sion and to give the assurances which were so often 16j940 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9: 10 j 11 12 ; 13 14 15 | 16 17 ; IS | 19 i 20 21 ! 22 23 24 25 broken. In February 1933 he became head of the European-American Bureau in the Foreign Ministry. At the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was con- cluded TOGO was Chief of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. This is one of the so-called four "geographic" bureaus in the Foreign Ministry. As its name indicates, it was charged with all business per to ining to relations with countries in Europe, including all matters ccncerning the conclusion of treaties with all European countries. (Page of the record 602.) In his official function TOGO was present as a government representative at the meeting of the Privy Council which considered and approved this pact. Exhibit 485. This shews his close connection with its preparation and conclusion. For his services in con- nect icn with the conclusion of the pact he was later duly rewarded. Exhibit 127. The secret agreement attached to the Anti- Comintern Pact cannot be considered other than as a military alliance directed against Russia. This is clear from negotiations following the conclusion of the pact to extend the agreement to other countries than Russia and in that way to achieve a complete mili- tary alliance between Germany and Japan. Exhibit 497- It also follows from the fact that when Germany concluded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 ^ 4 - 1 a non-agferession. pact with. -lois-siix the .Japanese .Govern- ment considered this a serious violation of the secret • agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact and filed a solemn protest with Germany* Exhibit 486-L, On 25 November 1941, while TOGO was Foreign • Minister, the Anti-Comintern Pact was extended and many new countries, Which at that time were under Ger- man or Japanese domination, adhered to it, thus con- tinuing a strong link in the alliance between Japan and Germany and the countries which were or shortly would be allied with them in the war. Exhibits 495 and 496. THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen minutes, (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, foloowing which the pro- ceedings were resumed as follows:) 16,942 W 0 1 f & y e 1 d e n l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Erown. MR. BROWN: With reference to the Anti- Comintern Pact, in his explanation before the Privy- Council meeting, which had to approve the extension of the Pact, TOGO stated that there was the closest relation between the Soviet Government and the Third International. Exhibit 1182. In view of this the allegation to the opposite in the motion in his behalf does not seem to be based on facts. In 1940 when the negotiations were being carried on for the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact TOGO was Ambassador to Russia and was working feverishly for the improvement of Russian-Japanese relations because it was considered that this was in the existing circumstances a prerequisite for the switching over by Japan from reliance upon the Western Powers to an alliance with Germany. TOGO realized that Japan's future lay in the south and that for this reason the enemy in the north should be made a friend. Exhibit 522. This shows clearly TOGO 'S participation in the new line-up of nations which had started when Germany concluded a non- aggression pact with Russia and started war with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,943 England and her Allies and found its logical develop- ment when Japan allied herself with Germany in September 1940. TOGO'S attitude toward this new alliance is also clear from the fact that when Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the summer of 1940 recalled a great number of Japanese diplomatic repre- sentatives, whose attitude was not supposed to be in accordance with Japan's new foreign policy, TOGO remained as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Exhibits 127, 548. The motion on his behalf alleges that this is not true, but no evidence to the contrary is before the Tribunal. TOGO carried on all the negotiations for the conclusion of the"No Separate Peace Treaty" with Germany and Italy even before the outbreak of war on 8 December 1941 and was mainly instrumental in its conclusion. Exhibits 604, 605. He also carried out the negotiations in the summer of 1938 for the conclu- sion of an agreement with Germany regarding collabora- tion between these countries in China. Exhibits 591, 592, 593, 594. As regards China, TOGO'S attitude is clearly outlined in his statements during the above-mentioned negotiations. TOGO insisted that the economic agreement to be concluded should include the whole of China and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16, not only the parts at that time occupied by Japan as Japan intended to extend its influence over the whole country. Earlier, in January 1933, attempts were being made by Germany to mediate in the conflict between Japan and China. TOGO then stated that Japan would continue the war in China until the i bitter end and that there was no other solution than the complete defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek • government, which could no longer be recognized. Exhibit 486-D. For his services in connection with the China war TOGO was later decorated with the highest Japanese award. Exhibit 127. It is also clear that TOGO was an active exponent of Japanese expansion in Asia and domination by Japan of all areas under its control. He was a member of the National Policy Research Association, which, although a private organization, received considerable government support and fiercely propa- gated Japanese expansion and conquest. Exhibit 683. His attitude is also shown from the speech made by him before the Imperial Diet on 21 Jan; iry 1942 which, as the German Ambassador pointed out, clearly revealed Japan's basic policy for the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan. Exhibits 1338-A, 1271. That this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,94-5 policy aimed at the complete subjugation and ex- ploitation of all countries under Japanese control has been conclusively demonstrated on numerous occasions. TOGO actively participated in this policy, both as Foreign Minister (October 1941-September 194-2, Anril 1945-August 1945) and as Minister for Greater East Asia (April 1945-August 1945). As regards the Japanese American relations ana the general events leading up to the outbreak of war in December 1941, it is considered unnecessary to review in detail all the evidence which has been intro- duced, but it is pointed out that TOGO in his function as Foreign Minister not only participated in the decisions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations,! but in his official position was directly in charge of these negotiations, even after the decision to open hostilities had been taken. Ey contrasting the private communications passing between him and his ambassadors, the secret decisions of the government to which he was a party with the official communications handed by his orders to the State Department, one can realize the career of deception on which he was embarked, the chronological method adopted in the summary (pages 255-300) gives special point to this. It Is submitted that he must have been a party to the•scheme to hold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16, up President Roosevelt's last message, particularly as Exhibit 2249 shows that he had refused to authorize NOMURA to ask for it. The interviews with Ambassadors Grew and Craigie on the early morning of 8 December are sheer deception. Afterwards he was responsible for the futile attempt of the Japanese lawyers to evolve an excuse for it. (Exhibit 1270-A). It has been contended that TOGO, although knowing that hostilities would be opened against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, allowed the negotiations to continue, hoping till the very last that a peaceful settlement could be arrived at. This is in direct contradiction to all the known facts. On 22 November 1941 TOGO informed NOMURA that the dead-line date would not be extended anc"! that Japan would not wait beyond 29 November. Exhibit 1188. On 28 November 1941 TOGO in a wire to NOMURA stated that the negotiations would be broken off,'- adding that NOMURA should avoid giving any impression to this effect until he got further instructions, thus showing a deliberate intention to deceive the United States Government. Exhibit 1193. Two days later, on 1 December 1941? he informed NOMURA that in order not to arouse America's suspicion the press had been in- structed to write that the negotiations would be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i continuedi Exhibit 1208. However, long before that date the negotia- tions were serving as a camouflage for war prepara- tions. As early as 22 October 1941 NOMURA had informed TOGO that he wished to resign because he did not wish to continue a hypocritical existence deceiving others. Exhibit 1161. The sending of Ambassador KURUSU to the United States was, according to the accused KUTO, who like TOGO attended all liaison conferences, nothing more than a deliberate move to deceive (witness TANAKA, Record, page 15,871). It is unacceptable that the accused. TOGO, who was In charge of Japanese foreign relations, and who attended all the liaison confer- ences from the time he entered the Cabinet as well as the Imperial Conferences of 5 November and 1 December 1941 and participated in and agreed to all the decisions taken, should disclaim full responsi- bility for Japan's foreign policy during this period* It was TOGO who instructed the Japanese informants in Honolulu to submit their day to day reports concern- ing the position of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor. Exhibits 1256, 1258. He also sent out the general in- structions to all Consular personnel in the Netherlands Indies to report all movements of ships. Exhibit 1330. It was TOGO who in the last week before the outbreak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,948 of war gave Instructions to open negotiations for a declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States and for the conclusion of a "No Separate Peace Treaty." Exhibits 604, 605, 606, 607. Finally it was TOGO who was responsible for the text of the final note to be delivered to the United States and for the setting, together with the Chiefs of Staff, of the exact time of its delivery. Exhibit 1202. As regards the so-called "Conventional War Crimes," it was TOGO who informed the Allies that the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention would be applied "mutatis mutandis" and that the national and. racial manners and customs of the prisoners would be taken into consideration. Exhibits 1956, 1957. During both of his terms as Foreign Minister all protests regarding ill treatment of prisoners of war and civil- ians went through his hands and he was therefore well informed of the innumerable flagrant violations of the Convention as well as of the fact that the guarantees given by him were consistently not being fulfilled. He also knew that the many protests which were sent to the War Ministry for investigation were never answered. He at no time took any steps to ensure that the guarantee given by him would be fulfilled or to stimulate the investigation of the many atrocities 1 2 •5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 ? 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2?, 24 25 16,949 committed. Exhibits 2016-A, 2022, 2025-A. The mere fact that the actual investigation of complaints was entrusted to another government department can in no way relieve him from his responsibility as a member of the government and Foreign Minister to ensure the observance of treaties and assurances by which the Japanese Government was bound. Especially during his second term, of office numerous protests went through his hands and innumerable crimes took place such as the execution of Allied flyers, which had been ordered by the Japanese Government. Exhibit 1994. Through his participation in the government., he identified himself with the policy of his govern- ment as regards treatment of prisoners and through his position as Foreign Minister he actively partici- pated in the carrying out of this policy. 16,950 1 2 mJ 4 6 9 10 11 l? 13 14 15 16 17 16 19 20 21 2? 23 24 25 TO JO The particulars in respect of the accused TOJO are to be found at page 342 of the Chronological Summary. His history is one of steady and rapid advance- ment throughout the life of the conspiracy, from the position of colonel and section chief of the Army General Staff, through increasingly important and powerful positions, until as War Minister in the third EONOYE Cabinet, he attained such power that he brought about the fall of that cabinet, became Premier and War Minister, led Japan to attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, during the earlier years of the war with these countries and until the beginning of her final defeat. As Colonel, as Section Chief (1 August 1931-5 March 1934) and as Major Gpneral Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade (1 August 1934-1 August 1935) TOJO played a sufficiently important part in the Manahurian Aggressions to be awarded a decoration for his services. (Exhibit 128) His further activity in Manchuria continued whilo he was chief of the Kwantung Military Police (21 September 1935 and 1 March 1937, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and Japanese Member of the Manchukuo 16,951 1 2 ? 4 5 i 8 Q 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2<r Joint Economic Committee (1 March 1937-30 May 1938). On 9 Juno 1937 TOJO telegraphed the Vice War Minister and Chief of i-'taff in reference to operation for war against the U.t-'.e.R. and advised that Japan should first deliver a blow against China by attacking Nanking and thereby "removing the menace in the rear." (Exhibit 672, page of the record 7337) It is significant that this occurred within a month. From his position in the field TOJO graduated to be Vice Minister of War, and simultaneously held numerous posts connected with other departments. (30 May 1938-10 December 1938) He acted as Inspector General of Army Air Forces (10 December 1938-22 July 1940); then as War Minister (22 July 1940-18 October 1941); and finally as Premier and War Minister, holding from time to time other ministries» He was decorated for his services in the China rIncident" on 29 April 1940. On 22 July 1940 TOJO and MATSUOKA collaborated in drawing an authoritative foreign policy program for Japan ( Exhibit 573, page of the record 6262); on 1 August 1940 he attended a Four-Minister Conference, which stressed German-Japanese friendship and cooperation (Exhibit 542, page of record 6278; on 4 September 1940 another Four-Minister Conference concerning strengthening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,952 of the Japanese-German-Italian Axis was attended by TOJO (Exhibit 541, page of the record 6307); on 26 f-'eptember 1940 a conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held at which TOJO, HOfcHINO and MUTO were present and at which the matter of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact and the conditio of the army for war with the United F+ites were discussed (Exhibit 552, page of the record 6350); the same day the Privy Council, with TO JO and HOfrHINO present, approved a draft of the Tri-Partite Pact (Exhibits 553, 1030, page of the record 6379). On 27 September 1940 the Tri-Partite Pact was signed. At that time TOJO was War Minister, President of the Manchuria Affairs Board and Vice President of the China Affairs Board (Exhibit 43). In the Imperial Rescript issued on that day the names of TOJO and HO^HINO appear as principal officers of the Government (Exhibit 554, page of the record £394). It will thus be observed that TOJO's interests and activities by this time had embraced the Kwantung Army (the school of militarism and ultra-nationalism), Manchuria, China, relations with Germany and Italy, and possibly war with the United states. All these are the very core of the conspiracies pleaded and proved in this case. 16,953 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Furthermore: On 5 and 21 November 1940, TO JO attended ministers' conferences at which it was decided to help Piam in her boundary fight with Indo-China, and to make her cooperate politically and economically in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia (Exhibit 618-A, page of the record 6873). At Liaison Conferences, as TOJO himself tells us, the decisions and proposals were made and formulated which were later presented to and adopted by Imperial Conferences. At Liaison Conferences decisions were made, not by a majority, but were unanimous (Record', page 10,173). 16,954 B a r t o n & g p r a t t 1 2 3 4 t? 6 o / 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 ?0 21 2? 2? 24 25 So"e idea of the activity of TOJO and of his close association with his co-defendants may be gathered from an analysis of the Liaison Conferences held between 13 January and 30 June 1941, which was a very important period in this conspiracy. Examination of exhibit 1103 10057-10063) discloses' 29 such conferences. The accused present included: TOJO at 29 conferences; liUTO at 27 conferences; OKA at 23 conferences; HIRANUMA at 27 conferences; MATSUOKA at 26 conferences; NAGANO at 16 conferences. Further notice should be taken that as the moves were being made toward further aggression southward (French Indo-China, July 24, 1941), and for war upon the United States and Britain, a decision was reached at the meeting of July 21 that the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other ministers should meet with the High Command and the War Minister, the Navy Minister, and the Chiefs of Staff, to exchange views on national policies. (R. 10064). On 2 July 1941 TOJO, SUZUKI, HIRANUMA, and OKA attended an Imperial Conference at which important decisions in reference to Greater East 16,955 Q Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, disposition of the China Incident, matters connected with the Northern Problems were made, and a decision ^ to remove all obstacles in attaining Japan's policy to pursue her schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand, to negotiate and "take measures" with relevant nations to the south to secretly arm against the Soviet and prepare for war against Britain and the United States, 1 0 was made, (exhibits 588, 1107, 779, R. 6566). The Imperial Conference of 6 September 1 2 1941 attended by T0J0, SUZUKI, NUTO, and OKA, -̂i decided: 14- (l) That Japan would continue her 15 southern advance; 16 (2) That Japan would complete her 17 plans aiming at war with the United States, 18 Britain and the Netherlands^ 19 (3) That Japan would try to gain her 20 demands by diplomatic means and if not success- 21 ful, by early October, would determine on war 22 with the United States, Britain, and the Nether- 23 lands; 24 (4) That she would try to check the 25 formation of any Russo-American Combine). 1 2 ^ 4 cr • 6 n ( 8 Q / 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,956 (exhibits 588, 1107, R. 8814). About October 12, 1941 TOJO made the final moves in the plan which was to lead him to the Premiership and Japan to attack the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. At a meeting between himself, KONOYE, OKAWA (the Navy Minister), SUZUKI (President of the Planning Board), and the Foreign Minister, TOJO, demanded a strong resolution for war. OKAWA wanted to avoid war (exhibit 147, P. 10246, exhibits 1148, R. 10251; exhibits 1136-A, R. 10272). At a Cabinet Meeting of 14 October, there was a deadlock on this subject (exhibit 1148, R. 102 58-10263). On October 15, SUZUKI delivered a message from TOJO to KIDO that unless KONOYE came to TOJO's views, a general resignation of the cabinet would be inevitable (exhibit 1150, R. 10276). Later SUZUKI 'phoned KIDO that TOJO's idea was to establish harmony between the Army and Navy (exhibit 1150, R. 10276). The result was that the KONOYE Cabi- net resigned (exhibit 10285), TOJO became Prime Minister, OKAWA was deposed as Navy Minister, SHIMADA took his place, and NAGANO continued as 16,957 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2<r Chief of the Naval General Staff. TOJO had gained his ends — with SHIMADA as Navy Minister and NAGANO as Chief of the General Staff, harmony was restored — there world be no dissent to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Khota Bahru, Davao, and Hongkong. On October 31, TOJO, KAYA, SKIMADA gave final directions for the handling of mili- tary currency in dollars, pesos and guilders for the use of Japanese invading armies of the south (exhibit 350, 1. 8458). The Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, attended by TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA (exhibits 1169, 1107, R. 10333), and that of 1 December 1941, atterded by TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA? SUZUKI, NAGANO, MUTO and OKA (exhibits 588, 1107, R. 10519) made final decisions for war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Further details are unnecessary. In his interrogation of 7 February 1946 TOJO ad- mitted his responsibility (with other members of the cabinet and army and navy chiefs), for the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and United States and British possessions (exhibit 1243-A, R. 10706). 16,958 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A consideration of all the eviderc e P leads to the inevitable conclusion that TOJO was one of the "young army" officers who in the early days of the conspiracy plotted for the conquest of all East Asia, that he served in that conspiracy with ever-extending importance through- out the Manchurian and Chinese wars of aggres- sion to become the effective leader of the conspiracy on 18 October 1941, and to continue to lead it until 22 July 1944. His direct responsibility for the tragedy of the Prisoners of War ana other outrages has been so amply nroved, and admitted, that it is needless to labor it by quotations. It is submitted that TOJO is criminally liable for every crime of v;hich he is accused. MR, COMYNS CARR; Kay it please the Tribunal, there are two small corrections in what my friend has just read. On the 12th of October, 1941, the reference should be to exhibit 1147, not 147. And in one place my friend inadvertently described SEIMADA as Army Minister; of course it should be Navy Minister. 16,959 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 * 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2<r UMEZU The particulars with regard to UMEZU are to be found on page 34-3 > ' the summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are: exhibits Nos. 2208-A, 2208-B, 2208-C, 2208-D, 2208-E, 2206-A, 1970-A, 1994, 1995, 1978, 1998, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2022, 2025-A. The more important periods of his career in positions of responsibility may be divided as follows: Period No. Is From 5 March 1934 to 1 August 1935 he was Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in China. His participation in and re- sponsibility for Japanese aggression in North C'rina, finally resulting in the taking over of the four northern provinces by Japan, and setting up of the "Autonomous Government," and the so- called HO-UMEZU Agreement of June 1935, has been the subject of considerable testimony and docu- mentary evidence. In this connection, attention is invited to exhibit No. 2206-A, which was introduced against General MINAMI. Period No. 2: From 23 March 1936 to 30 May 1938, he was Vice-Minister of r'ar, and by virtue of his position, carried responsibility 16,960 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 . 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 for the aggressive acts of Japan against China during that period, ample evidence of which has already been introduced. His ministry prepared the various drafts of the 5-year plan (exhibits 841, 842, 2227) in May and June 1937, which was shortly after adopted by the First KONOYE Cabinet. It was during this period that the power of the military clique, of which General UMEZU was a potent member, was exhibited in its refusal to permit General UGAKI to form a Cabinet under Imperial Mandate (exhibits Nos. 2208-A, 22C8-B, 2208-C, 22G8-D, 2208-E) which show his personal activity in this matter„ Period No, 3. From 7 November 1939 to 18 July 1944 he was Commander of the Kwantung Army (later Commander-in-Chief) and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, for which he bears re- sponsibility for the ill-treatment of prisoners of war held in Manchukuo and for the illegal use of prisoners of war on munitions work in Manchukuo (exhibit .. I97O-A). Period No. 4: From July 1944 to 2 September 1945 he was Chief of the Army General Staff, and therefore, responsible for all acts of the Japanese Army on all fronts as well as in 16,961 Japan proper, There is already ample evidence that during this period, on all fronts and in Japan prouer, the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war continued. Since the date of the summary to which reference has been made, there has been introduced evidence to establish the following acts which properly may be charged to this defendant. Illegal sentences and trials of prisoners of war by the Kwantung Army (exhibit No. 1998); execution of eleven members of American air crews after alleged trial by Court Martial 11 July 1945 (exhibit 1994)5 execution of two American fliers 18 July 1945 (exhibit 1995); during July and August 1945 thirty-eight American fliers were put to death in Japan without trial (exhibit 1922); instructions from the 1var Ministry were issued in March 1945 regarding the disposi- tion of prisoners of war, contrary to treaties and assurances and to laws and customs of war (exhibits 2012, 2013); orders were issued from the War Ministry in March 1945, placing no limit on the hours of 'work of prisoners of war (exhibit 2014); an order from the War Ministry of 17 March 1945 provided for "emergency measures" against 16,962 prisoners of war, and among other things, provided for keeping prisoners of war at work even in areas being bombed (exhibit 1978)5 continued notices to the Japanese Government re ill-treatment and atrocities committed on U. S., British and Australian prisoners of war, up to as late as 1 August 1945, were received, but atrocities and ill-treatment continued to the end (exhibits 2022, 2025-A). On 2 November 1938 he was granted a reward for services rendered in concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact. His services in this re- spect were performed during the time he was Vice-Minister of Far and concurrently Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. Upon his assuming the position of Commander of the Kwan- tung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Man- chukuo, he continued the transformation of Manchukuo into a military base for an attack against the Soviet Union (exhibit 670). The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was set up by the Kwantung Army with the view of using it in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union (exhibit 699). The Kwantung Army controlled the activities of the Whiteguard elements and c -orrnn'opaganda hostile to the Soviet Union (exhibit 723). During the time he was Chief of Staff of the Army the attacks upon Kweilin and Liuchow took place in November 1944 (exhibit 234). As Chief of Staff of the Army, he was responsible for not only this, but for the atrocities com- mitted by the Japanese in the Kweilin and Liuchow areas in the winter of 1944 and the atrocities in Changsha (exhibit 359). Evidence of preparation for aggression against the USSR may be found in the following pages of the Record; 7560-63; 7609-12; 8143; 8079; 8081; 7580-84; 7705. It is submitted that UMEZU was responsi- ble for illegal Japanese aggression against China from 1934 on, in violation of treaties and as- surances; for preparation for aggression against the USSR; for the ill-treatment of prisoners of « war; for their illegal employment 5 and for atrocities committed against them. One correction: In Period No. 3 I am told I said that it began on the 7th of November, 1939. I should have said September. 16,964 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SATO The particulars with regard to hir are on page 336 of the Summary. Additional documents are exhibits 2235-2238A. He is a younger man than most of the accused, and the evidence relates chiefly to the later periods. In 1931 he was in the United States engaged in military . study. He joined the Military Affairs Bureau on 1 August 193C and became concurrently Secretary of the Planning Board on 26 November 1937 (at the outset of the five-year plan) and Army spokesman on 15 July 1938. In the latter capacity he made two speeches on the China affair in 1938 in which he said Japan made what amounted to a declaration of war, that North China would be put completely under Japan's control, and Inner Mongolia would be the same (R. 481, Exh. 270, Exh 2235). From Ma- 1939 to March 1941 he was deputy Chief of Staff, South China Expeditionary Force, at the time when the occupation of Northern French Indo-China took place and the attack on French troops occurred on 22 September 1940. He admitted he was in Indo-China on several occasions during this period (Exh. 2238). He was decorated for the Manchuria and China Incident though in the former he did not know the nature of the services. He returned to the Military Affairs Bureau — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,965 as head of 1st Section in March 1941 until 20 April 1942, when he succeeded MUTO as Chief of the Bureau. TAMARA says (B. 15,872) that SATO was held in great confidence by TOJO. SATO told him that when KONOYE resigned he went to see Generals ABE and HAYASHI (both ex-premiers who would attend the conference to choose his successor) and told them that unless TOJO became Premier it would be difficult to control the Army. At the meeting ABE supported TOJO and HAYASHI, after suggesting Prince HIGASHIKUNI, acquiesced. As there was only a majority for TOJO, SATO's efforts may have influenced the result (Exh. 1154 and H. 2250). SATO says that he agreed with TOJO's policies (Exh. 2238). He was a member of the General Commission under Article 4 of the Tri-Partite Pact (Exh. 559, R. 950). On 11 March 1942 SATO made a speech in which he stressed the importance of the choice of date for starting the wax For various reasons December 8th was the last opportune j 1 coment. Pie lauded the decision of Japan to start the Greater East Asia War on that day. He described the armament production plans for 1936-7 and made clear that they were evolved before and not for the purpose of the China Incident, and that only a small part of the in- creased production had been used for that purpose; thus the fighting power of the Japanese Army was more than 1 2 •3 4 e 6 r j t 5 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,966 three times what it was before the incident. He said the march into Indo-China gave powerful footing for the Greater War. (Exh. 849). On 17 May 1942 Major General SATO was one of those recommended for German decoration as belonging to "the immediate group surrounding TOJO who will presumably retain for some time their decisive influence on the shaping of Japanese policy". SATO is described as "Chief of the Political Section of the War Ministry, definitely pro-German; representative and adviser... the importance wielded by him during the last three months before Japan's entry into the war has obviously increased,," (Exh. 1272). On 18 August 1943 SATO attended the Privy Council Meeting with MIHAMI, TOJO, SHIGFMITSU and OKA I to explain the proposed treaty by which Siam was to be rewarded by giving her part of Malaya, when TOJO made the remark already quoted about International Law. As Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, en- titled to attend Imperial General Headquarters, until December 1944, it is our submission that SATO bears a major responsibility for all the prisoner of ™ar of- fenses. He was at the meeting of Bureau Chiefs of May 1942 already mentioned, he received the Swiss protests, as controller of the War Ministry budget he must have 16,967 4 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 1? 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 approved the Burma-Siam railway decision. Exh. 1961- 1977, 1979A, 473, 475, 476, 1988-2001A, 2003, 2010, 2016A-2026 are among the exhibits which, coupled with the evidence of TANAKA, fix the responsibility on him. In our submission all the charges are properly brought against him. I understand that in dealing with the circum- stances under which TOJO became Premier I inadvertently read it as TOGO. THE, PRESIDENT: I suppose it will take you more than five minutes to put your next case against the accused? MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes sir. THE. PRESIDENT: We will recess for until half past one. i (Whereupon, at 1155, a recess was taken. I 16,968 E d e r & D u d a 1 2 7 4 5 / c 7 8 o / 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2?, 24 25 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT; The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: The particulars with regard to OKA are to be found on page 333 of the summary, and the exhibits which directly affect him are Nos. 102, 120, 1103, 588, 650, 1128, 1169, 1107, 1241, 1266, 1275, 1979-A, 2022, 2023, 2025-A, 2026$ record pages 15,025, 15,028, 15,019, 19,980-1, 15,154 (exhibit 2092), 15,109-126, 15,148-50, 15,185 (exhibit 2105). This naval officer, after serving in the grade as a member of the Naval General Staff from 1933 to 1936, became Chief of the No. 1 Section of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, where he served from January 19*38 to October 1940, and at the same time was Secretary of the Bureau of Manchurian Affairs from January 1938 to October 1931. He was decorated for his services in the Manchuria and China Incidents. He became Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs and attached to the Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters 16,969 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 Q 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 on 15 October 1940. He occupied this position until 18 July 1944, when he became Vice-Minister of the Navy. On 23 January 1941, he was appointed Japanese member of the joint Japan-German-Italian Commission. The importance of his position as Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs is shown by the fact that he attended twenty-four liaison conferences between the crucial perioo from 13 January 1941 to 30 June 1941, among which conferences was the one of the 25th of June, 1941, at which it was decided to station troops in Indo-China and Thailand and acquire naval and air bases by diplomacy if possible, or that failing, by resorting to arms. (Record page 11,057.) This bureau held the corresponding position in the Navy Ministry to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry. It was the political bureau, and among its many important functions was to maintain relations with other ministries and the public, and especially with the War Ministry. Indeed, it was sometimes known as the Bureau of Military Affairs. In fact, OKA, throughout his long period in the office, was the opposite number first of MUTO and then of SATO in the War Ministry, and seems to have kept in close touch with them. For instance, in KIDO's Liary for 15 July 1941 (exhibit 1115) MUTO and OKA are shown to 16,970 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 » 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 have direct influence on the formula to be used in the Japan-United States negotiations since KILO states that if the Foreign Minister has no objection to the formula prepared by them it will be pushed through, and later when the deadlock between KONOYE, TOJO and OIKAWA occurred in October, it was by negotiation between MUTO and OKA that an attempt was made to settle the matter (exhibit 1148). We submit that OKA was just as important a figure in the navy as MUTO in the army. Like MUTO and afterwards SATO, he occupied a great variety of positions coneected with other departments, such as the secretaryship of the General Mobilization. Committee and many other posts, listed in exhibit 120. When OIKAWA resigned with the third KONOYE Cabinet and SHIMADA succeeded him, being as we submit obviously chosen as the men in the navy prepared to do TOJO's bidding, OKA retained his position while the navy was putting into operation its long-prepared plans of attack. When the holding of and attendance at liaison, conferences ceased to be published in July, we submit the obvious inference is that he continued to attend as before. He attended the four decisive Imperial conferences in 1941 of 2 July, 6 September, 5 November 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,971 and 1 December. He attended the Privy Council meeting on 28 July 1941, where the protocol between France and Japan was discussed regarding military cooperation. It was decided that clarification would be made to show that the occupation of French Indo-China was in agreement with France and not by force, so that the United States would understand. Of course, this had in fact been brought about by pressure on the Vichy Government through German aid. The second meeting was held and agreement with France approved for military cooperation, airfields and naval bases, quartering of troops in French Indo-China and freedom of movement. (Record page 7079, exhibit 650.) On 14 October 1941, after a cabinet meeting which produced a deadlock, MUTO offered to give way if the navy would come out definitely against war. OKA for the navy refused to do this and left it to KONOYE, but TOJO and MUTO would not accept. (Record page 10,258-63) (Exhibit 1148) If he had declared opposition it seems the war would not have broken out. At 7:30 a.m. on 8 Lecember 1941 he attended the Investigation Committee of Privy Council, where SHIMADA reported on the starting of war against the United States. At this meeting TOJO said that "since 16,972 the first of December negotiations were continued merely for the sake of strategy." (Record 10,690, exhibit 1241.) On 10 December 1941 he attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council where agreement with Germany as to no separate peace was discussed. (Record page 11,304, exhibit 1266.) On October 20, 1942, he attended a meeting of the Privy Council where the formation of the Greater i East Asia Ministry was discussed, and another meeting on the 21st of October 1942 (page 12,070, exhibit 687). On 18 August 1943, he attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council In connection with the Japanese-Thailand Treaty, where the annexation of the Shan States by Thailand was discussed. At this meeting TOJO stated that Japan would recognize international law as long as the enemy did so but would interpret it from the viewpoint t of the war according to her own opinions (record page 11,364, exhibit 1275). Even if the truth is that he had no vote at any of these meetings, this is of little importance because the proceedings were always unanimous. The important point is that they fix him with full know- ledge of the policy to be pursued, which we submit his 16,973 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 position gave him great power of shaping, and he retained that position. When the TOJO Cabinet was tottering in July 1944, it was OKA and SATO who tried to save it by inducing YONAI and others to join and bolster it up (exhibits 1277-8). Record pages 14,980-1 and exhibit 2036-B show that the Military (or Naval) Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry was responsible for matters con- cerning prisoners of war and its functions were parallel to those of the Mllita ry Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The testimony of SUZUKI, Tadakatsu (record pages 15 , 506-533, and "exhibits 2170, 2173 and 2174, show that copies of protests from the protecting power regarding treatment of prisoners of war were customarily sent to the Navy Ministry ana sometimes addressed to the Vice-Minister of the Navy, sometimes to the Minister of the Navy, and sometimes to the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Exhibits No. 2022, 2023, 2025-A and 2026 are protests from the protecting power regarding mis- treatment of prisoners of war. On 7 October 1943, Rear Admiral SAKAIBARA ordered the exacution of ninety-six American prisoners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,974 of war on Wake Island (exhibit 3036-A, record page 15,046). In October 1943, Vice-Admiral ABE received a report from Admiral SAKAIBARA of the death of the ninety-six prisoners of war at Wake Island (page 15,025). Captain OBARA testified that Vice-Admiral ABE on October 10, 1942, gave him the following direction: "In accordance with a directive received from central headquarters, it has been decided to execute the Makin prisoners here and not send them back to Japan.- You will take charge of carrying out this /execution/." (Record nage 15,019.) Vice-Admiral ABE testified that he ordered the execution of nine American prisoners of war from Makin at Kwajelein in October 1942 as a result of a visit from Lieutenant Commander OKAEA of the General Staff in Tokyo, "who told me not to ship prisoners of war back to Japan but dispose of them on the spot, which j I judged to be the navy's policy." (Record page 15,028.) Vice-Admiral ABE further stated as to the nine American prisoners of war, "A directive was issued to me from the highest navy central headquarters to dispose of them on my island." (Record page 15,030.) 16,975 9 10 11 During 1943-1944^ the crews of the British ships Daisy Moller, British Chivalry, Sutley, Ascot, and Nancy Moller, were destroyed (page 15,154, exhibit 2092). On 2 July 1944 the crew of the Jean Nicolet was destroyed. (Pages 15,109, 15,126.) On 29 October 1944 the crew of the John A. 7 Johnson was destroyed. (Record page 15,148, 15,150.) Record page 15,186 shows OSHIMA's talk with Ribbentrop about submarine warfare, Germany sent two submarines to the Japanese and Ribbentrop talked 12 about failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed 13 merchant ships and German U-Boat Order of September 14 1942 that they would not rescue survivors. OSHIMA 15 reported this to Japanese Naval Attache. 16 The following is a translation of an extract 17 from a Japanese document captured at Kwajelein atoll: ig "Flagship Hainan Maru at Truk, 20 March 1943, Military, 19 Ultra-Secret (Gunki) Copy 24 of 70 — 1st Submarine Force Secret Operation Order #2-43" — do not stop with sinking of enemy ships and cargo; at the same time that you carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's chips, if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy." (Record page 15,185, 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,976 ftxhibit 2105.) i The responsibility of OKA for government action from the time he became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, is inescapable. He took part in practically every important liaison conference dur- ing 1941, attended Privy Council meetings, and Imperial conferences continuously up to the outbreak of the war and thereafter. At the cabinet meeting of 14 October when he had the opportunity to act for the navy against war, he declined to act. The Imperial conferences and liaison meetings and cabinet and Privy Council meet- ings which he attended, all decided on aggression. He was the officer of the Navy Ministry responsible for prisoners of war and received protests by the protecting power against mistreatment of prisoners of war, but did nothing about it. The record of wanton slaying of prisoners of war not only on land but at sea, taken in -connection with the order of the 1st Submarine Squadron, shows that it must have been the navy policy to wantonly put to death such helpless prisoners. With regard to SATO, which I read this morning, your Honor, I omitted to point out the last two items of his career. He was Deputy Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force from December 16,977 2 <7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Orf 1944 to 7th April 1945, and from the latter date to the 2nd September 1945 he was Commander of the 37th Division, which exhibit 2282 shows was stationed in Siam. Exhibit 2027 is an Allied protest against mistreatment of prisoners of war in Siam during that period, with regard to their being compelled to remain in places where military operations and bombing were in progress. H0SHIN0 The particulars with regard to him are to be found at page 324 of Appendix B. Additional references are made on pages 15,952 to 15,976 of the record, exhibits 2224, 2225. In July 1932 HOSHINO went to Manchuria to become director of the General Affairs Bureau from 1932 to 1936 (record pages 5119, 5120). During that time there was a constant liaison between the bureau and Kwantung Army (pages 5121, 5159). Throughout this period his most important activities appear to have been: (1) In connection with contract for under- writing and subscription of the Manchoukuo Government National Foundation Bonds dated 19 November 1932. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,978 This he signed on behalf of Manchoukuo. (Exhibit 375, page 4684.) It provided for the raising of thirty million yen for Manchoukuo by issue of bonds in Japan secured by the Opium Monopoly Office and the Kirin-Heilung-Kiang Transport Toll Office; (2) That he worked with KISHI on the economic plans for the development of Manchoukuo (page 5127); (3) That he took a prominent part in the drawing of the 5-year Industrial Plan for Manchoukuo (exhibit 446.) This was adopted in 1937 (page 5069.) The Kwantung Army agreed to and supported the plan (page 5129). In 1936, HOSHINO joined the Manchoukuo government as Vice-Minister for Finance and in December 1936 he became Chief of the General Affairs Boa rd of Manchoukuo (5134). The board took charge of the budget, statistics, personnel, legal matters and information. The board controlled the other bureaus and it was one of the most important divisions of the government (page 5135). It had the duty of directing and guiding political and economic affairs in Manchuria in the interest of Japan as well as Manchoukuo (page 1998). PU.-YI says that HOSHINO was engaged in exploiting Manchurian industries and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16, in the control of affairs (page 4021). The Five-Year Industrial Plan was announced in 1936 and adopted in 1937. Under the heading of Policy, the Plan states that emphasis has been placed on opening up resources in Manchoukuo which may be required in time of emergency. The meaning of "time of emergency" is clearly indicated in sub-paragraph 1(a) "munition industries for weapons of war, air- planes, automobiles, and rolling stock will be firmly established." (Exhibit 446.) In 1937 TOJO became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and HOSHINO and TOJO worked together (5172). In May 1938 the Five-Year Industrial Plan was revised. The revision more than doubled the original estimate of funds required. Heavy emphasis was placed on materials which could be used for production of munitions and weapons of war (exhibit 446, pages 30 and 54). On the 29th o.f April 1940 HOSHINO was decorated for meritorious service in the China Affair (exhibit 109). As Chief of -General Affairs Board in Man- churia, HOSHINO was the most powerful and influential man In the government and took directions only from the Kwantung Army. He utilized his position r 16,980 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (1) enormously to increase production of war potentials in Manchoukuo; (2) enormously to increase production of sale of narcotics. In the latter con- nection he fostered the opium monopoly in Manchuria and as previously stated, secured Manchoukuoan National Founding Bonds on this monopoly. This was definitely in furtherance of the policy of the Kwantung Army. In Juh§ 1932 revenue from opium monopoly was 10,000,000 yen (exhibit 227). In 1939 net profit from monopolies were estimated at 56,000,000 yen after payment of 15,000,000 yen to General Account Reserve Funds and National Loan Funds (record page 4,751). In July 1940 he left Manchuria and. returned to Japan (record page 5,136). The numerous reports from United States officials quoted in the Summary show that under the cloak of carrying out the League of Nations policy against narcotics (the policy of a committee of which Japan remained a member) the sale was in truth being vigorously pushed by the agencies for which HOSHINO was responsible. On his return to Japan he became Director of the Cabinet Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio in the second KONOYE Cabinet (record page 5,136). The board provided for the organization of industries in the same line of business into a solid group which 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,981 undertook to carry on under government control (page 5,131). Tbe Planning Board made the necessary plans to supply materials required by the army, navy and civilian authorities. The army and navy demands increased year by year (pages 514-8-5150). On 27 July 1940 at the Liaison Conference a decision was made concerning improvement of con- ditions at home and abroad and the acceleration of the China Incident and the settlement within limits of the southern problem. Policies of fostering strong political ties with Germany and Italy and obtaining by strong diplomatic policies raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies were also decided. HOSFINO was President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio at this time (exhibit 1310). In August 1940 (exhibit 1311) a draft of alternative demands to be made on the Netherlands East Indies set out various demands regarding enterprises and investments, mining, shipping, agriculture, fishing, newspaper propaganda, etc. HOSEINO was Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board at this time. In September 1940 (exhibit 550) MATSUOKA gave an explanation regarding the conclusion of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16, Tri-Partite Pact. On 26 September 1940 (exhibit 552) there was a conference of the Investigation Committee of the Frivy Council on the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact. HOSHINO was present and as Chief of the Planning Board gave estimates of Japan's strength stating she was not yet complete in supplies or self-sufficiency of reserves; however, they were quite prepared. He gave estimates on oil, petrol, etc., and stated that through the Commodity Mobiliza- tion Program provision has been made for civilian living. The same material is shown in exhibit 1030. 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,983 Exhibit 553 is the record of the meeting of the Privy Council of the 26th of September 1940 re- garding the strengthening of relations with Germany and Italy (Tri-Partite Pact) in view of the increasing difficulty of the international position. HOSHINO was present. Exhibit 554 is the Imperial Rescript of 27 September 1940 proclaiming the Pact. HOSHINO's name is on this document. Exhibit 1298, an entry in KIDO's diary of 28 September 1940, states that KIDO had been informed by the Emperor of the government's present wish to avoid force against the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore and in view of the fact that eight months' preparations are necessary for war, the later war comes the better. HOSHINO was still President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio. Exhibit 868-A contains the Ordinance of Organization of the Total War Research Institute, HOSHINO was director of this Institute from 1 October 1940 to 11 January 1941 and Councilor from 2 May 1941 to 24 November 1941. He was also a member of the committee to establish this Institute and for part of the time was Minister without Fortfolio and for another part of the time was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 S* 10; 11 12 15 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,984 (8,862). The outline of the Ten-Year Plan for Block Economy of Japan, Manchukuo, and China was announced by the Government Information Bureau on 5 November 1940. The carrying out of this plan envisaged Japan exercising rights of sovereignty over China with which Japan was then at war. The plan was stated to be the result of the government's study principally with, the Planning Board. HOSHINO was then President of the Planning Board (Exhibit 2224, page 15,952). On 22 January 1941 the Cabinet outlined its population policy stating that it was the mission of the Empire to establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to secure Japan*s leadership in East Asia. HOSHINO had. given explanations and opinions at the meeting and the plan was unanimously adopted (see Exhibits 865 and 1067). As the object of the plan was stated to be to increase the population in order to provide greater war strength, it destroys the excuse sometimes put forward for Japanese aggression that an outlet was required for surplus population. On 8 March 1941 it was publicly announced that the detailed regulations of the National Mobiliza- tion Law would be put into force on 20 March. HOSHINO was Minister of State and Director of the Planning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10*= 11 12 15 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,985 Board at this time (Exhibit 1055), but resigned on the 4th of April 1941. Exhibit 870--A dated August 1941 is a record of Table Top Maneuvers held by the Total War Research Institute. It shows that under these maneuvers the general policy of Japan concerning Third Power prob- lems was that Japan would not give to the United States a clear explanation of her position nor expect a peaceful settlement but did adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations at the same time completing war preparations. HOSHINO was a Councilor of this Institute. On 25 September 1941 the Total War Research Institute reproduced a secret document containing particulars in framing a program for extension of important industries. This included a summary of five years' program of important industries prepared by the War Minister 29 May 1937, a resume of policy relating to execution of essentials of a five-year program — trial graph prepared by the Army — 10 June 1937, and summary of a program for extension of pro- ductive capacity, prepared by the Planning Board in January 1939. HOSHINO was a Councilor of this Insti- tute (Exhibit 843). On 18 October 1941 HOSHINO became Chief 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,986 Secretary of TOJO's Cabinet. On 4 November 1941 the Cabinet made and issued instructions to the Informa- tion Board in connection with releasing news on preparation for war and strategic news. This pro- vided that the suppression of reports on the tense- ness of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States should be eased and the people given hope for the future. News and speeches enabling the enemy to see Japan's war preparations were ex- cluded as well as all activities which might incite the public to take action against residents of Third Powers (Exhibit 116?). At the Imperial conference held on 5 November 1941, measures toward foreign countries in relation to the plans of execution of national policy towards the Empire were decided upon (Exhibit 1169). On 11 November 1941 a liaison conference was held and at this meeting the principal reasons alleged for commencement of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain were stated. (Exhibit 1175). Although the names of those present were not listed, it may be assumed that HOSKINO by virtue of his official j position attended. Exhibit 1176 dated 12 November 1941 sets out the general outline for extending the conclusion of war 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,987 against the United States, Great Britain, Netherlands and Chungking. This provided in essence the plan to be adopted towards foreign powers which has alreadjr been set out in exhibit 1169 relating to the Imperial conference of 5 November 1941. Exhibit 878 dated 13 November 1941 is a record of the meeting of the liaison conference held on that date. It is substantially the same as exhibit 1169 with some additions in respect to China. There is 110 list of those who attended but it may be Inferred that HOSHINO was present. On 28 November 1941 it was officially announced that the Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed — the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed (Exhibit 496). At a Cabinet meeting on 28 November 1941 a new press system was approved. This placed the Japanese press on a wartime basis. HOSHINO attended the liaison conference and the Imperial conference on 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 1107). Early in December he attended a Cabinet meeting at which was decided that In the event of Japanese negotiations with the United States being unsuccessful, Japan would go to war (15,971). On December 7, 1941 KIDO's diary (Exhibit 1220) states that HOSHINO visited KIDO to consult about the war with the United States and England. 16,988 1 2 3' 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 At 9 a.m. on the 5th December 194-1, after Japanese forces had already attacked Great Eritaln and the United States he was present at the meeting of the Privy Council when war was declared on the United States and helped to compile necessary Imperial Rescript relating thereto (15968, 15976). On October 9, 194-2 he was present at the meeting of the Privy Council relating to the Greater East Asia Ministry. There TOJO explained that in order to achieve victory it was an absolute necessity for the combined fighting power of East Asia to be strengthened, and that it was desirable to establish a Ministry to achieve these aims and to ensure swift and decisive action (Exhibit 687). He was also present at subsequent meetings of the Privy Council dealing with the same matter on 12th and 14th October 1942 (Exhibit 687). On 6 November 1942 he attended the Assembly of East Asiatic Nations at which the joint declaration of the meeting was approved (Exhibit 1346). He retained his post as Chief Secretary until 22 July 1944, serving on various government committees during the interim. Except for the brief period between 4 April 1941 and 18 October 1941 HOSHINO was either a Minister of State or Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. While a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,989 Minister of State he was also President of the Planning Board. In these capacities he was privy to and took an active part in the continuance of the war with China and preparations for war with the Allies. From October 194-1 onwards he attended all Cabinet meetings and knew that Japan, while pretending to negotiate with the United States, intended to strike. Later he knew that Japan had attacked without any declaration of war but still retained his Cabinet post. One cannot resist the conclusion that from at least 1936 onwards HOSHINO favored the expansion of Japan even at the expense of peaceful neighbors, that he joined in the various conspiracies charged and lent powerful assistance towards their fulfillment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,990 Your Honor, subject to any matters — I made a small mistake I understand, your Honor, in date. The date of the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact was the 25th of November, not the 28th as I read. Conversely, I am told that for the important Privy Council meeting immediately after the outbreak of war I said "the 5th of December,"' when it should be the "8th»" . Your Honor, unless the Tribunal has any questions to put to the prosecution that concludes our reply to these motionso THE PRESIDENT: Mr, Logan, I®. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, there are two matters that I wish to speuk about. The first is the reservation of our objection on document 0001. The defense strongly objects to the use of the material designated as document No, 0001 for the reason that it was offered at a time that the prosecution had closed its case and it was not entitled to offer ad- ditional evidence at that time. If the view be taken that it is not additional evidence but given only to assist the Tribunal we object to it on the ground that it is not even a matter which could properly have been ac cepted during the prosecutions case, A cursory examination of it shows that it contains inferences, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,991 omissions have been noted, and it may contain factual misstatements all of which would properly invite a rebuttal by the defense and would unnecessarily prolong the present activities« Furthermore, it is not properly argument in answer to the motions to dismiss nor has it been offered by the prosecution as such0 Certainly, if it is allowable at all, it should be contained in a summation of the prosecution's evidence at the conclusion of the entire case. It is not a true chronology. We submit it is merely a prosecution summation prejudicial to the accused and can be of no assistance to the Tribunal as a factual guide of what is contained in the record, MR. COMYNSiCARR: Your Honor, I hope — THE PRESIDENTi Mr. Comyns Carr6 MR. COMYNS CARR: I hope I have made it clear that the document in question does not purport to be evidence. For that reason it would not have been proper to introduce it until after the close of our case. It is a document which, in my submission, the Court is entitled to receive if they think it will be of assistance and use to them and which I strongly suspect, whatever my learned friend may say, that the defense would be most reluctant to surrender now that they have got it. It purports to be nothing but a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,992 guide to the evidence which the Tribunal may regard as part of our argument if they think fit, quite content to adopt it as such. As I have already stated, of course, we cannot guarantee it against the possibility of errors here and there, but as any are discovered we will bring them to the attention of the Court, THE PRESIDENTS The document 0001 was not tendered or received or marked as evidence. We under- stood it was really part of the reply, Subject to the defense objections we received it as such. Those objections will be entertained — will be considered. We will give our decision on the objections with our decisions on the motions. Owing to the valuable assistance we received from counsel for the defense and from counsel for the prosecution we hope to be able to give all decisions on Monday morning and with that in view we will adjourn until half-past nine on Monday morning next. MR. £0GANs If the Tribunal please, that was the second point that I wished to talk about. We, the defense, would like an opportunity to reply to this answer of the prosecution, either orally or in writing and reply that we contemplated will be strictly confined to the statements of fact contained in the prosecution's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7- 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16,993 answer to our motion. THE PRESIDENT: Well, in any jurisdictions that I am familiar with there would be no reply to such a motion. That is to say, by the party moving the motion but I do not know what my colleagues think about it. We have not considered it. YJe did not expect this application. You see, one side points out the absence of evidence and the other points out the presence of evidence and there is not much scope for reply ordinarily. The majority of the Court thinks there should be no reply by the defense. Captain Brooks. MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, pursuant to an order of the Tribunal dated 23 December 194-6, that was Court paper No. 6l8, the prosecution's applica- tion for an order directing that the accused OKAWA, thumei be further examined as to his mental and physical condition by two competent medical psychiatrists was granted. Now, at this time, as supporting evidence in relation to said medical reports to be filed, I request leave to file the affidavit of Mrs. Kane OKAWA, wife of said accused as an exhibit relating to the actions and mental condition of the accused. THE PRESIDENT: As you have done hitherto, 16,994 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2<r make the application in Chambers. If possible, I would like the report of the medical referees on his present condition before we meet again on Monday. A further examination is ordered if my memory serves me correctly. MR. BROOKS: Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: That was weeks ago and I have heard nothing further, I will deal with the matter in Chambers at any time you approach me. MR. BROOKS: If your Honor please, on the medical examination, I have checked on that three separate times and I think it is the red tape of trans- ferring for the examination that has been holding this matter up and a sufficient order has been given and I have asked — THE PRESIDENT: The whole matter should be dealt with before this day a week. I will be back In Tokyo on Friday next at the latest and I will be here on Monday. MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, may this exhibit be filod for reference of the Court at the time that the examining medical certificates are received? They are to be hereinafter proffered and I think will be during this recess. Now, whether I will be here or will be available 16,995 at that time, as it will not come through me, I would not know when the Court received them and I would like them to have this matter to study at the time because it does deal with his medical condition now. THE PRESIDENT: That matter is referred to Chambers, We will adjourn now until half-^past nine on Monday next* (Whereupon, at 1430, an adjournment was taken until Monday, 3 February 1947 at 0930.)
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January 31, 1947 - Index (p.16, 911-16, 995)
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