AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
application/pdf
c f / J * Co? c 21 JANUARY 194? I N D E X Of WITNESSES Prosecution's Witnesses Page TANAKA, Ryukichi (recalled) 15853 Direct by Mr. Comyns Carr 15853 Doc. Pros. Def. _Ncu_ No, __No_«. 2910 2191 1632VT(8) 2192 2943A-1 2193 2943A-3 2194 2789 2195 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Description For In I dent. Evidence Extract from the 11 January 1932 Entry from Diary of Marquis KIDO Extract from the 30 May 1935 Entry from Marquis KIDOfs Diary Telegram No. 623 sent by Consul- General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA dated 19 September 1931 Cablegram from Consul-general HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA dated 21 September 1931 Cable No. 1532 sent by Consul- General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister INtTKAI dated 14- December 1931 15731 15733 15735 15736 15738 I N D E X Of Doc. No. 2788 Pros, No. 2196 Def. No. 2913 2197 4047C 2957 2198 2199 2958 2959 2200 2201 1903 2202 EXHIBITS (Cont'd) Description For I dent, I n Evidence Cable No. 1258 dated 12 November 1931 sent by Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minis- ter SHI DEHARA Extract from "The Japan Ad- vertiser" Tokyo Sunday, 26 June 1938 (Page 3) en- titled "Long Preparedness is Urged by ITAGAKI" Cablegram sent by Ambassador Ott to the Army High Com- ma nd and Air High Command on 6 September 1939 Extract from "The Japan Ad- vertiser" Tokyo Sunday 2 • October 1938 (Page 1) en- titled "KONOYE CABLES HITLER HIS CONGRATULATIONS ON 'SPLENDID SUCCESS'" News story entitled "Japanese Press Comments" (Page 6) of "The Japan Advertiser" dated 17 March 1939 Extract from the 7 July 1939 issue of "The Japan Times & Mail" Second Edition (Pages 1 and 2) Cony of "The Osaka Asahi" dated 1 July 1931 15752 15740 15741 15744 15745 15746 15749 1903 2202-A Excerpt therefrom 15752 I N D E X Doc. No. 827 827 1426 1426 831 831 1483 1483 1869 1144 Pros. Def. No. No, 2203 2203-A 2204 2204-A 2205 2205-A 2206 2206-A 2207 2208 Of EXHIBITS (Cont'd) Description Biography of General MINAMI by Y0SHITAKE, Ken. "Days of V'ar Minister and Man- churian Incident" Excerpt therefrom Foreign Ministry Becords: Manchurian Incident-Public Opinion and Press Comment (pp. 241-242) Excerpt therefrom Minutes of Meeting of the Privy Council on 9 December 1931 re Report on the China Incident Excerpt therefrom For I dent, 15756 I n Evidence 15759 15761 Foreign Ministry document con- taining foreign press comment re North China Incident of May and June 1935 15769 Excerpt therefrom Interrogation of General MINAMI ? Jiro "Details Re Movements of Right- ists Bodies in connection with Change of Government" publish- ed by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April 1937 15790 15756- 1575? 15761 15769 15783 1144A 2208-A Excerpt therefrom 15790 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (Cont'd) Doc. No. 327 827 1426 831 1483 1483 1869 1144 Pros. Def, No. No, 2203 220 3-A 2204 1426 2204-A 831 2205 2205-A 2206 2206-A 2207 2208 Description Biography of General MINAMI by Y0SHITAKE, Ken. "Days of V'ar Minister and Man- churian Incident" Excerpt therefrom Foreign Ministry Becords: Manchurian Incident-Public Opinion and Press Comment (pp. 241-242) Excerpt therefrom Minutes of Meeting of the Privy Council on 9 December 1931 re Report on the China Incident Excerpt therefrom For In I dent. Evidence 15756 15756' 15759 15759 15761 15761 Foreign Ministry document con- taining foreign press comment re North China Incident of May and June 1935 15769 Excerpt therefrom Interrogation of General MINAMI, Jiro "Details Re Movements of Right- ists Bodies in connection with Change of Government" publish- 15769 15783 ed by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April 1937 15790 1144A 2208-A Excerpt therefrom 15790 I N D E X Of Doc. Np, 1144B 1144C 1144D 1144E 646 2900 2907 28°6 2922 Pros. Def, No, 2208-B 2208-C 2208-D 2208-E 220° 2210 2211 2212 2213 E O T FITS (Cont'd) Description Excerpt from exhibit No, 2208 For I dent, Excerj 220? from exhibit No. Talk by General UMEZU, Vice Wrr Minister Notice to the Ex-Solxders Organizations fron Vice War Minister UMEZU Transfer of Secret Funds from the Manchurian Incident Ex- penditure Account to the Accused UMEZU Secret Expenditures for the Kan- churian Incident - Record re Payment of Money to the Accused KOI SO, Kuniaki, Vice Minister of ^ar Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident - Record re Payment of Money to the Accused KOI SO, Kuniaki Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident - Record re Payment of Money to the Accused KOI SO , Kuniaki Secret Expenditures for the Manchurian Incident - Re- cord re Ps yment of Money to the Accused KOI SO, Kuniaki i n Evidence 15794 15796 15798 15800 15804 15809 15810 15811 15811 I N D.E X Doc. Pros. Def, No. No. No. 4043G 2214 2954 2215 2954 2215-A 2342B 2216 2344B 2217 2254B 2218 2347B 2219 22 53C 2220 22 53B 2221 2248B 2222 For I dent. Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Description Domei Radio presents an ITAGAKI- KOISO interview Extract from the Minutes of Second Joint Conference of Sections I, II, III and IV of the Committee of Accounts of the I'ouse of Repre- sentatives, 75th Session- of the Imperial Diet on 1? March 1940 15830 Excerpt therefrom Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit Fo. 187-L) Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit No. 187-N) Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit No. 187-G) Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit No. 187-Q) Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit No. 187-F) Excerpt from Interrogation of ARAKI Excerpt from Interrogation of the Defendant ARAKI (exhibit No. 187-A) In Evidence 15815 15830 15832 15833 1583 5 15840 15843 15843 15845 Doc. Pros. Def, No. No. No. 2155 2223 2155B 2223-A I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Description Speech by the Defendant ARAKI Excerpt therefrom For In Ident, Evidence 15847 15847 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,720 Tuesday, 21 January 194-7 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before. For the Prosecution Section, same as before. For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 •'5,721 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The. International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused ere present except OKAWA and MATSUI who are represented by their counsel. We have a certificate from the orison surgeon of Sugr.mo that the accused MATSUI is ill and unrble to attend the trial today. The certificate will be recorded and filed. Major Motre. LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): Mr. President: With the permission of the Tribunal we submit the- following correction: Exhibit 2182A, record page 15,622, line 2, substitute "Washington" for "Versailles.' THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane. LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: (Reading:) "5th February, 194-6, pages 6, 7, 8. "Q Nov;, General, in our first interrogrtion my first question was when was it you first went to Manchurlr for t'n« first time. Now, your answer was August 15th, 1931. "A Yes, I said that, but later changed it to the 18th of August. I corrected you the last time. I h'd that difference of three days, which I corrected. "Q That is the first time you ever were in Manchuria? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,722 "A Yes, I did go there once long ago. I went In 1911, rnd thrt wes the first time I set foot in Manchuria. "Q And you were not in Manchuria then between 1911 and August 18, 1931? "A No. Thrt is not correct. I have been in Manchuria in between. I went there once in 1929. "Q How long were you there then?- "A I wes there about six months. "Q What were your duties then? "A At that time I went as an aide to MATSHI Nanao, who is advisor to Marshal Chrng Tso-lin. "Q Where was Marshal Chang Tso-lin at that time? "A At first he wes in Peking and later he returned to Mukden. "Q You were, with the Tokumu Kikan? "A My first connection with Tokuku Kikan was 18 August 1931. "Q You never had anything to do with it before then? "A I had no connection prior to that time. "Q No?/, as a matter of fact, General, were you not the Resident Official for the Japanese Special Services organisation in Mukden prior to August 18, 1931? end for several years before th:t time? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,723 "A No, I wes not. "Q Prior to August 18, 1931, how much of your r.rmy scrvicc wes in Chine immediately preceding end continuing "before August 18, 1931? "A I spent almost 18 y:rrs in China, but during that time I had returned to Japen for a short period. "Q Most of that 18 years was with the Jepenese Special Services organisation, was it not? * "A No, it was not. Most of the time I was an aide to Lt. Gen. BANZAI. Lt. Gen. BANZAI was advisor to Yua n Shih-kei, Ti Huang end Fong Yui-Shie.ng — different Chinese leaders, in other words. "Q But during all this time, General, that you spent in Chine, the only times you got to Menchuria were in 1911, sometime in Februery or March, 1929, when you stayed for six months as aide to the /clvisor to Marshal Cheng Tso-lin, end on August 18, 1931, when you finelly went over to the Japanese Special Service organisation? "A That is true, except in 1911, I just passed through Manchuria, in 1929 I went there as eide to MATSUI, but had no connection with Special Service organisation, and /ugust 18, I went there with the Specif 1 Service Organisation. "Q General, whet wes the connection between 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,724 Dr. Cheo Hrin-Po end the murder of Marshal Cheng Tso-lin on June 3, 1928? "A I don't know if there wes any connection, but I do know Chco Hrin-Po, who wes the edvisor to Cheng Tso-lin, end I think the date was the 4th of June, 1929. "Q The historical record of the murder of Marshal Cheng Tso-lin shows beyond a doubt it was June 3, 1929- "A That may be so, but I recall it as 4 June, 1929. "0 Does that change the story about when you wcre in Manchuria during the 1920's. "A Yes, it will. I thought it was in 1929 that I wes there, but I could be mistaken, but I remembered it to be 1929, so if it was 1928, it would change my story. I am quite sure it was in 1929? end that was the time that Chang Tso-lin wr.s murdered, and I was there at the time. "5 February 1946, Pages 10 - 11. "Q General, do you still insist that the story you gave me that your sole mission on being sent for on August 18, 1931? w s to investigate the murder of Captain NAKAMURA? "Q That was not the only puruose of my going there, but that was the most important. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,725 "Q You told mo the other dry th't was your only purpose. "A I think the.t I told you thet vie.s my most important job, but since I wes the heed of Special Service Organization I had other duties. "Q Whet were those other duties? "A The other two duties were investigrtion and liaison with Chinese forces. UQ What does investigation mean? "A The investigation consisted of determining the strength of Chinese forces, their training, their communication end the condition in the civilian popu- lation. "Q You were sent from Tokyo to take charge of the Special Service organizations in August 1931? is thet correct? "A I left from Tokyo end travelled through Shanghai, Henkow, Peking, Tientsin and Mukden, arriv- ing at Mukden on the 18th of August. "Q What date did you leave Tokyo? "A I cannot rccrll accurately, but I think it was early part of July. "Q "stiy did you meke that long swing to go up to Mukden? "k The Chief of Staff felt thet it would be a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,726 good idea to find out the conditions in Chine, before taking this post in Mukden, so I took thct round-about trip. "12 February 1946, Pages 7, 8, 9. "Q Right. Now, General, at the time you had this meeting with Henry Pu-yi at Tientsin as you remember in October 1931 you were Mayor or Governor of Mukden, weren't you? "A Yes. "Q What were you doing at Tientsin? "A I was sent there to convey the order from the Kwantung /rmy. Also I wes the Mayor but the actual work was delegated to Choo Hain-no — the work of my office — and then went to Tientsin. "Q Then you were sent to Tientsin for the specific purpose of contacting Henry Pu-yi, is that correct? "A Thrt is correct. "Q Who sent you? "A By Kwangtung Army. "Q Who issued the order; what person in Kwantung Army headquarters? "A The commander of the Kwangtung /rmy. "Q Wes General HONJO still the commander then? "A Yes, sir, he was. 15,727 "Q Did General ITAGAKI have an}/thing to do with it? "A Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff. "Q Well, did he have anything to do with sending you to Tientsin? "A Yes, order to proceed to Tientsin wrs issued by General HONJO, the Chief. However, detail as to my meeting with Pu-yi at Tientsin was arranged by Colonel ITAGAKI. "Q vhr.t was Colonel ITAGAKI's order, do you remember? "A In substance, my instruction was to convey to Pu-yi that should he return to Manchuria the Kwmgtung Army would welcome his return, and, next, « he arranged for my transportation and expenses, ctc. "Q Were you to suggest to Henry Pu-yi that the reason why the Kwmgtung Army would welcome him back was because they would like to have him head the new puppet government that you were setting up in Manchuria" "A I believe the Kwangtung Army must h-vc had that idea in order to save Manchuria, however, I did not have, any such idea. "Q But you know, didn't you, General, that when you convenyed this welcome greeting to Pu-yi that he would understand that was what it meant, didn't you? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,728 "A That is true although I did not have my plan; however uron receipt of instruction from the Kwangtung Army I felt that such things would he required to settle the Manchoukuo turmoil where so many factions are competing against each other and causing disturbances I happened to think of that more than about what the Chief of the Second Section told me at the time. "Q Good. "A That was to the effect that he warned me that I should not force him to return to Manchoukuo and if he wants to come back it would be fine. "Q .Why on earth did he warn you to thrt effect; had you suggested that it might be wise to try to force him? "A He definitely told me that there would not be a necessity to bring him back forcibly. "Q Well, that does not answer my questionv General; answer it, please. "A Perhaps the Chief of the Second Section might have had some other idea to control the situation in Mrnchuria even though Pu-yi may not return. "Q But why is it thrt he was afraid you might use force, was that your usual method in handling things like this9 "A Thrt I don't know. Thrt is up to ITAGAFI. 15,729 1; 2 3 I 4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 "Q Well, answer the Inst part of thrt question. Was that your usu; 1 method of handling things like this' And by that I morn was it your 0"ti personal method or the method of the Kwangtung Army, cither one? "A I do not know what method the Kwangtung Army used, however, it is my motto that whatever the order I receive I see to it that purpose is accomplished. "12 February 1948, page 10. "Q What wrs your report regarding the situation in North China that you made to the Kwangtung Army that you ref.rred to a minute ago? "A Upon my return to the Kwangtung headquarters? "Q Yes. "A I don't remember so well, it took place sometime ago; however, I mentioned the fact that the situation in North China remained unsettled, and also a distribution of enemy forces throughout that area meaning Tientsin armies. Also gave information on the subject of how to be ready in case the troops in Manchuria should spread over to North Chi, . 21 "12 February 1946, Page 11. 22 "0 General, you -now what the Nine Power Treaty 23 is, don't you? 24 ''A I know what that is; however, I dor't know as 25 to each provision it contains. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,730 "Q You. know, don't you, that it guarantees the sovc rsignty of China? "A Yes, I know that. "Q You knew that in October 1931 when you we re- sent to contact Henry Pu-yi, didn't you? "A Yes, of course, I did. "Q Then you knew, didn't you, th. t when the Kwangtung Army was planning to set un an independent state called Manchoukuo that that was going to violate the Nine Power Treaty, didn't you? "A Yes, I did, but at that time Japan made some proclamation about her attitude toward the treaty. I do not remember the details of it." Mr. Lopez will carry on the -presentation of the case of the prosecution at this stage, if the Tribunal pleases. 15,731 THE PRESILSNT: Mr. Lopez. MR. LOPEZ; If the Tribunal please, we offer in evidence IPS document No. 2910 which is an extract from the January 11, 1932 entry of the diary of the defendant KILO, to show the defendant ITAGAKI1s inner connection with Japanese activities in Manchuria. The KIDC Diary has been marked exhibit 178 for identification only (pages 1,921 and 1,922 of the record.) THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2910 will receive exhibit No. 2191. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2191 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ; We read the complete extract. "January 11 — At 10:30 o'clock this morn- ing in the antechamber connected to the lecture hall of the Imperial Palace, I, together with persons close to the Emperor, heare from Colonel S. ITAGAKI, staff officer of the Kwantung /<rmy, the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia. Colonel ITAGAKI first explained the situation concerning the progress of campaign against soldier bandit forces in Manchuria 15,732 and Mongolia as well as the progress in establishing a new state in Manchuria. Regarding the establish- ment of a new state, Colonel ITAGAKI gave hint that Manchuria would be placed under a new ruler, and Japanese Army would take charge of a national defense of the new Manchurian state. Colonel ITAGAKI further explained that Japanese people would participate in the management of a new state as high government officials and such Japanese becoming Manchurian officials would be invited to become Manchurian subjects. Under such circumstances, Colonel ITAGAKI further says that they are now studying regulations concerning the naturalization and dual certificate of nationality. Hearing this from ITAGAKI I was rather astonished to find that there are a wide difference between my 'head' (T. N. idea?) and that of theirs." We tender in evidence IPS document No. 1632W(8) which is an extract from the May 30, 1935 entry of the diary of the defendant KILO, to show that defendant ITAGAKI and others were endeavoring to have the military, instead of the diplomatic circles, undertake negotiations with the Chinese Government9 THE PRESILENT; Admitted on the usual terms. 15,733 l 2 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2̂ CLERK CF THE COURT: Prosecution's documont 1632WC8) will receive exhibit No. 2192. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to w as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2192 ana received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: From this document wo read the first five paragraphs: "May 30, 1935. "Thursday (Extract) - According to this morning's newspaper, the Japanese garrison in North China are reported to have lodged a momentous claim against the Chines-e Government. "In reply to my questions on the matter, Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU made a general observa- tion to the following effect: "On the one hand, the new development seems to be connected with conferences conducted by Japan- ese officers at Lairen, Shanghai, and so on. Al- though Yu Hsueh Chung, originally a member of Chiang Hsueh Liang defeated party, has invariably opposed to our military objectives, the Chinese Government has been powerless to take any counter- measures. "On the other hand, the report that SAKAI, Chief of Staff of the Japanese garrison, on the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2« 24 25 15,734 occasion of his trip to Tokyo, not only abused tho Central Army authorities but also complained of the unfair distribution of honours. He also thought it possible that the absence of the ,;7ar Minister may affori the Japanese garrison an opportunity of taking up a positive attitude. "At any rate, this step against China is based on the idea that ITAGAKI and others who have been intending to let the military, instead of the diplomatic circles, take the lead in negotiations with the Chinese Government, just as in the case of Manchuria. For the attainment of such an end, they wore going to utilize the Manchurian Railway Company and tho Japanese garrison in Tientsin, as has indeed been revealec by the recent action of that garrison." We introduce in evidence IPS document No. 2943A-1 which is Telegram No. 623 sent by Consul- General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHILEHARA, 19 September 1931, to show that the defendant ITAGAKI was deaf to any plea to prevent the unnecessary aggravation and expansion of the Mukden Incident. THE PRESIIENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 2943A-1 will receive exhibit No, 2193. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,735 fHiid^d 1£f '-/Xlfciittj'rfti (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2193 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ; We read the whole document except the l^st two paragraphs: "1931 \ "Despatched MUKLEN 19th A.M. "Received This Ministry 19th September A.M. "/T.N. From; Consul-General HAYASHI "/T.N. To: Foreign Minister SHIBEHARA "/T.N. Telegram No. 024./ "Re: Outgoing telegram No. 623. "In view of the fact that there ĥ .ve been several requests from the Chinese side to settle the Incident amicably, I telephoned Staff Officer ITAGAKI that, as both Japan and China had not yet entered formally into a state of war, and, moreover as the Chinese side has been declaring to the ef- fect that it would adhere strictly to the non- resistance principle, it would be essential at this juncture to endeavor not to " ggrandize the Incident unnecessarily and to arrange to settle the Incident through diplomatic channels. However, the said Staff Officer replied that, as it was a matter con- cerning the prestige of .the State and of the Army, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2% 24 25 15,736 — j although efforts would bo made for the protection of foreign residents, the Army's policy was that, as the Chinese Array had attacked our troops, it had to be dealt with thoroughly. As he thus failed to show the • slightest sign of complying wit a. my request, I repeated to him the above-mentioned purport to arouse his attention." We tender in evidence IPS document No. 2943A-3, which is a cablegram from Consul-General HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, sent 21 September 1931, to show that ITAGAKI was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army that set up a municipal administration with a Japanese military man as mayor. THE PRESIDENTS Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2943A-3 will receive exhibit No. 2194. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2194 and received in .evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: We read the whole document with the exception of the last three paragraphs thereof: "1931 "Lespatched MUKISN 21st A.M. "Received This Ministry 21st Sept. A.M. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,737 "/T.N. From/ Consul-General HAYASHI "/T.N. To/ Foreign Minister SHILEHARA "/T.N. Telegram/ No. 676 "The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army is to issue a proclamation on the municipal administration ! of this city during today, the 20th instant, as per 1 telegram sent separately. My visit was requested 1 for by the Army Headquarters this morning, but as I I was out at the time, MORISHIMA visitec them. He found the Chief of Staff MIYAKE, Chief of the J 1 Military Police /T. N. Kempei-Tai/ NINOMIYA, and ] Staff Officer ITAGAKI present, and was told that the Kwantung Army is going to issue a proclamation today pertaining to the municipal administration, although it is not intended to establish a military adminis- tration. So saying, the said proclamation was shown. MORISHIMA requested them to reconsider the matter, but failed to have them agree on the ground that it has already been decided upon and approved of by the Commander. "I therefore met the Commander subsequently and had an informal talk, in the course of which I pointed out the mistake of the virtual establishing of a municipal administration by the Japanese and the appointment of a military man as Mayor. On the whole, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,738 tho Commander endorsee ray opinions but remarked that inasmuch as the order had already been duly issued it could not be altered, and that it would only be a matter of a few days, as it was intended to .ventu- ally hand same /T.N. the administration/ over to the Chinese." We introduce in evidence IPS document No. 2789 which is Cable No. 1532 sent by Consul C-eneral HAYASHI at fluke.on on Xecember 14, 1931 to Foreign Minister INUKAI, to show that the defendant ITAGAKI was represented to have met and negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on t he usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2789 will receive exhibit No. 2195. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2195 and received in evidence.) 15,739 w 0 1 f & Y e 1 d e n l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. LOPEZ: We read the entire document except the last paragraph: "From Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden. "To Foreign Minister INDKAI. "Despatched from Mukden P.M. Dec. 14th 1931. "Received P.M. Dec. 14th 1931. "Cable No. 1532 (Cipher Code, Secret). "Tsang Shih - I returned to his home after being released on the night of the 13th, but, accord- ing to information received from a reliable source, the Army authorities, with a view to saving the situation, are intending to summon all the Provincial Government Governors here, and, with regard to the foregoing, Staff Officer ITAGAKI is said to have met and negotiated with Tsang today, the 14th." We introduce in evidence IPS document No. 2788, which is a certified copy of Cable No. 1258 sent 12 November 1931 by Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, reporting on the activities of the defendant ITAGAKI with reference to the coming of Pu-Yi to Manchuria. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2783 will receive exhibit No. 2196. (Whereupon, the document above 15,740 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit • No. 2196 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ (Reading): "From Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden. "To Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA. "Despatched from Mukden P.M. Nov. 12th 1931. "Received P.M. Nov. 12th 1931. "Cable No. 1258 (Cipher Code, Secret) "Referring to your Cable No. 'Go' 1421, on asking the Commander of the Army on the 12th regarding Emperor Hsuan-Tung's /T.N. Same as Pu-Yi/ coming to Manchuria, he replied saying that, not only had he heard nothing whatsoever, but that he even had Staff Officer ITAGAKI notify the Tientsin Garrison several days before that they were not to hurry about the Emperor's coming to Manchuria as the time was not yet sufficiently ripe. "On my stating that it would be extremely impolitic to carry out the plan of reinstating the monarchy at once at this juncture when the military affairs in the Amur District have not yet become settled, and the regimes in the various districts have not yet been firmly established as well as when inter- national relations too are extremely tense, and also that, even should tho said Emperor come to Manchuria, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,741 it would be advisable not to set him up at once, the Commander agreed with me in general, at the same time promising that, in addition to exerting his efforts so as not to start upon any immediate movement even in the event of the said visit to Manchuria, he would promptly notify us of his arrival." We tender in evidence IPS document No. 2913 which is a news story entitled "Long Preparedness is Urged by Itagaki," published in the "Japan Advertiser" V for Sunday, June 26, 1938, to show that the defendant ITAGAKI, on his first important press interview since joining the cabinet as Minister of War, expressed no need for formally declaring war on China, a determina- tion to prepare for a war of more than ten years' duration with China, and a resolve to fear not third power interference in China. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2913 will receive exhibit No. 2197. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2197 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: From said document we read tho following extracts: on page 1, the headings and the first and third paragraphs: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,742 "LONG PREPAREDNESS IS URGED BY ITAGAKI "War Minister Says Army Should Be Ready to Prosecute "Fighting for 10 More Years "POPULAR SUPPORT ASKED ''No Formal Decision Reached Yet on Enforcement of "Mobilization Law, He Reveals J "Because it may be the intention of General Chiang Kai-shek to 'resist Japan for the rest of his life,' the army should be prepared to continue the hostilities 'perhaps for ten more years,' War Minister Seishiro ITAGAKI declared in a Domei interview at Kyoto jresterday. "The first Important interview since Lieutenant- General ITAGAKI recently joined the Cabinet was given after the War Minister yesterday visited the Ise Grand Shrines to report his assumption of office, the Kashi- wara Shrine and also the Momoyama Mausoleum. "Chiang's Tactics Seen "General Chiang Kai-shek is not counting on victories on the first line of battle, but is hoping to overcome Japan by imposing a burden on the country's resources over a protracted period, the Minister said. The Japanese forces in China 'indeed, are accomplishing splendid work,' he declared, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,743 emphasizing that continued cooperation on the home front 'alone is the key to overcome the emergency by throwing upon it the whole weight of the country.1" From page 2 we read the second paragraph as follows: "Voicing his conviction that the country is able to withstand future hostilities over an indefinite period, the War Minister hoped that the nation will enter into the spirit of the Government program for conservation of national resources and extend unstinting: cooperation toward the authorities." And from page 2, the last paragraph: "Commenting on the international situation, he said: 'It is natural that Third Powers are resort- ing to various maneuvers f-sr the sake of protecting their interests in China. It should suffice for Japan to follow its own policy without fear or hesita- tion. There has been talk of the advisability of formally declaring war on China, but in view of the Government's official declaration of January 16, personally I see no need for that action.'" We offer in evidence IPS document No. 4047-C which contains among others a captured cablegram sent by Ambassador Ott to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939, to show the determined 15,744 ! efforts of the defendant ITAGAKI, as War Minister, to 2 "bring about an alliance between Germany and Japan, ,, THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 5 No. 4047-C will receive exhibit No. 2198. 6 (Whereupon, the document above 7 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 8 No. 2198 and received in evidence.) 9 MR. LOPEZ: We read the entire cable of 6 September 1939, from page 4: "Telegram (Secret Cipher Procedure) "Tokyo, 6 September 1939 - 1350 hours "Arrival: 6 September 1939 - 1410 hours "For O.K.H. and O.K.L. "/For Army High Command and Air High Command/ "The speeches on the Japanese side exchanged at yesterday's reception of German Military and Air Attaches by former Japanese War Minister, General ITAGAKI, and successor, General HATA, were of a definitely hearty character. ITAGAKI pointed out his most sincere efforts, on behalf of a close German- Japanese connection, which had failed as a consequence 24 of European developments. Emphasized that his successor 25 shared his views completely. HATA referred to the Japanese Government's non-intervention declaration, 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ?0 21 22 23 24 25 15,745 but emphasized that he himself as a soldier had full understanding of the German action. "Grenan, Matsky "Ott" We tender in evidence IPS document No. 2957 which is a news story published on page 1 of the Sunday edition, 2 October 1938, of the "Japan Advertiser" with reference to the defendant ITAGAKI sending a con- gratulatory telegram to Adolf Hitler. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2957 will receive exhibit No. 2199. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2199 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: From that document we read the second paragraph: "War Minister Seishiro ITAGAKI sent a tele- gram to Chancellor Adolf Hitler yesterday morning saying: 'The Imperial Army expresses deep admiration and felicitations for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue and prays that Germany's national fortunes will ever rise and that the friendship of the German and Japanese Armies, united, on the anti-Comintern front, will be strengthened more than ever.' Navy 15,746 1 2 3 Minister Mitsumasa YONAI instructed the naval attache at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to deliver a similar message to the Reichsfuehrer and, Domei reports, also 4 sent a representative to the Czechoslovak Legation here 5 to convey a message of felicitation." 6 We offer in evidence IPS document No. 2958 7 which is a news and editorial round-up entitled "Japanese Press Comments" published in the "Japan 9 Advertiser" of March 17, 1939, to show that the de- 10 fendant ITAGAKI, as War Minister, expressed on the 11 j floor of the Diet the belief that friction with third 12 | powers was unavoidable in the execution of Japanese 13 policy for the creation of the so-called new order in 14 East Asia. 15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2958 will receive exhibit No. 2200. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2200 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: From this document we read the complete two paragraphs on page 4 under the subhead "Powers Must Be Ejected": "Powers Must Be Ejected "MIYAKO 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 \ 15.;74? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "The Powers, especially Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, have been hostile toward this country since the Manchurian and China incidents. War Minister Seishiro ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Mitsumasa YONAI had the attitude of these Powers in mind, when, in reply to interpellations in the Diet, they declared that it would be impossible to avoid fricti:n -with third countries in the execution of the policy for the creation of a new order in East Asia. In the same statements, they gave expression to the resent- ment felt by the people over the attitude of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. Evidently they had these same Powers in mind when they argued that unless third countries supporting the Chiang Kai-shek regime are ejected, there can be no hope of settling the China incident. If the Powers which are giving aid to the Chiang regime in the struggle against this country do not reform their attitude in time, this country will be compelled to take steps which will lead to a situation, the consequences of which will be serious. "Following its action in making a loan to the Chiang regime, Britain has established a fund to stabilize the Chinese currency. The people consider this step as an act of hostility against Japan and the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,748 Provisional Government at Peiping. This impression is confirmed by the representations which have been made by Britain, America, and France, pretesting against the exchange control which has been enforced in North China. There is no doubt that these countries deliberately misinterpreted the aims of the step taken by the Provisional Government in order to hamper the work of creating a new order in East Asia. The three Power demarches cause us to anticipate that the Powers will attempt to put further obstacles in Japan's way as the community of interests between Japan and China increases. The service Ministers were quite right when they told the Diet that it was their con- sidered opinion that the China incident will not be brought to a conclusion until Powers supporting the Chiang regime are ejected." We present in evidence IPS document No. 2959 which is a news story entitled "ITAGAKI, YONAI Score Powers' Interference," published on page 1 of the July 7, 1939 issue of the "Japan Times & Mail," 2d edition, to show that the defendant ITAGAKI was for stamping out interference by third powers in what he considered as Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 15,749 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2959 will receive exhibit No. 2201. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2201 and received in evidence.) MR. LOPEZ: From this document- we read all of page 1 with the exception of paragraph 3 and the last paragraph: "'ITAGAKI, YONAI SCORE POWERS' INTERFERENCE. Warn Nation Must Not Relax in Determination for China Affair Goal. '"Unjust interference by third Powers in the i. execution of Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia'must be stamped out, it was said b" both War Minister Lieutenant-General Seishiro ITAGAKI and Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa YONAI Thursday night on the eve of the second anniversary of the China Affair. "'The world is well aware of the fact that the invincible Japanese troops of His Majesty the Emperor have gained victories on land and sea and achieved such remarkable success which is unique in the history of the world.' "BLAMES THIRD POWERS '"The stubborn Chiang Kai-shek regime is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,750 still continuing resistance against Japan in complicity with third Powers which have ambitions in the Far East. It has now been laid bare that Japan's immediate enemy is not limited to the Chungking Government. "'It is necessary, therefore, to crush the anti-Japanese policy on the part of Third Powers in order to put an end to the resistance campaign by the Chiang's regime against Japan. This must be accomplished at any cost no matter how long the present hostilities continue, Accomplishment of this point is the key to put an end to the current affair. "'At the same time, it must be pointed out that the affair cannot be regarded as ended even if the Chiang Kai-shek's regime collapses tomorrow. In order to make China free from the semi-colonial condi- tion and build up a new order in East Asia, any maneuvers on the part of pro-Chiang countries must be checked and the nation must fully be ready to cope with the possible crisis in the world. "All the people in the country must express their firm determination that Japan will never abandon her aim of making East Asia for the East Asiatics. No pains must be spared for the attainment of the goal."' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,751 MR. LOPEZ: Colonel Woolworth will address the Court, if your Honor please. MR. WOOLWORTH: If it please the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Woolworth. MR. WOOLWORTH: General MINAMI advocated and planned the Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931) and was responsible for expanding that incident while Minister of War, and was responsible for the sending of reinforce- ments into Manchuria and committing acts of aggression in violation of treaties and assurances. As Commanding General of the Kwantung Army — THE PRESIDENT: Mr. McManus. MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, I realize the Court's ruling on statements before the introduction of evidence, but I still insist that the Court should draw some line on the prosecutor testifying. I know that this statement here from the outset, if the Court pleases, your Honor can determine immediately that it is more than an explanation. Let the evidence speak for it- self. I object to any lengthy explanation rather than the evidence speaking for itself. THE PRESIDENT: We assume, Colonel Woolworth, that you will not say more than appears in the evidence you are about to adduce. So far you have not offended. MR, WOOLWORTH: As Commanding General of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,752 Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo (1934-1936) he conspired with others of the military clique to further aggress against China in violation of treaties and assurances. I will now offer documents in proof of the above facts: Prosecution offers for identification only document 1903, which is a copy of the Osaka Asahi of 1 July 1931, and introduces in evidence an excerpt there- from,. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms, CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution1s document No. 1903 will be given exhibit No. 2202 for identification only. The excerpt therefrom, the same document number, will receive exhibit No, 2202-A. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecutions ex- hibit No. 2202 for identification; the excerpts therefrom being marked prose- cution's exhibit No. 2202-A and received in evidence,,) MR. W00LW0RTH: (Reading) "Osaka Asahi "1 July 1931 "The War Ministry invited Manchurian railway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,753 authorities to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems. "At noon on 30th UCHIDA, President of the S.M.R., YEGUCHI, Vice-President, KIMUBA" — but not the accused — "TOKAWA, KAMIMUCHI, GOPO, OHORI AND OKURA (all of them Directors) were invited to luncheon at the War Minister's Official residence, "From the Army side, MINAMI, Minister, M A Y A , Chief of the General Staff, MTGIYAMA and ITO, Vice-Ministej NINOMIYA, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, KOIfO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, TATEKAWA, Chief of the 2nd Section and OKI, Chief of the 3rd Section, were v - • -a ' • : | present. They had luncheon together, and after that, they exchanged their outspoken opinions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian problems, "Minister MINAMI made the following statement, after the unofficial military councilors1 conference on the 30th: ,,!The Army has long recognized the necessity of increasing our divisions in Korea and we hope the day will come when more divisions will be dispatched there. However, this question is not dealt with in our draft for the reformation of the Army organization, I must make it clear that this question has not yet been decided upon at the Big Three Conference. Therefore, such things as what division will b^ disnatched to Kore.^ or where it will be stationed are not discussed at all. In order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,754 to avoid unnecessary anxieties on the part of the local people, I state this.'" I omit the last paragraph. Prosecution offers for identification only document No. 827, which is a Eiography of General MINAMI by YOSHITAKE , Ken, and introduces in evidence an excerpt therefrom, document 827. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Toshio OKAMOTO. KR. T. OKAMOTOj I object to the presentation of this document on the ground that the biography of General MINAMI is only an excerpt th-reef. I submit that no leave of the Court for the presentation of an excerpt of a biography was given by the Court. THE PRESIDENT: Docs that suggest the rules have not been observed? The use of every excerpt must be the subject of an order under the rules. MR. W00LW0RTH: If vour Honor please, I read to the Tribunal yesterday the agreement of the defense that this excerpt could be used; a waiver of Rule 6b(1). THE PRESIDENT: If I recollect rightly, such an agreement was made a consent order, but I do not know what it covered. MR. W00LW0RTH: It covered this document, sir. MR, T. OKAMOTO: I am not aware — This counsel, the present counsel, is not aware of the consent or waiver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,755 of the order — rule — which the prosecutor just stated to the Court. If there was any such similar agree- ment or consent it was — it pertains to excerpts which are going to be presented during the time of the defense's case and it does not apply to this kind of document which is being presented by the prosecution. THE PRESIDENT: I think it had better be cleared up. I do not recollect every detail in Chambers. There was a large attendance of counsel on the occasion. MR. T. OKAMOTO: Mr. Blewett notified me that such an agreement was concluded between counsel Logan and the prosecution section. Therefore, I withdraw the reason of my objection^ However, I should like to ask of the prosecutor what relevancy has page — has the content in page one and page two of exhibit 827? Under the title of "Biography of General MINAMI", I find in this document a piece of a cartoon taken from a newspaper, and souvenir or remembrance or recollection concerning outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. I am not sure or rather I am doubtful whether those two docu- ments or materials, which appear in the evidence have actually been taken or have been taken from the book itself. THE MONITOR: Slight correction: Instead of souvenirs and so forth, just remembrances of the outbreak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,756 of the Manchurian Incident. THE PRESIDENT: The counsel can consult the original. The prosecution have no obligation to explain the noint of their evidence to the defense. They have such an obligation to the Court and they have discharged it. The objection is overruled. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2203 for identification and the excerpt therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2203-A and received in evidence.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,757 Mi. W00LW0RTR: (heading): "Biography of General MINAMI by YOSKITAKE, Ken. Days of War Minister and Manchurian Incident. "Not many days after the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident, a caricature contained in a news- paper showed MINAMI drawn in colossal firure sunk back in a chair with arms folded. Finance Minister INOUYE in smaller form sat in the same chair with his back against the general, while the Premier, WAKATSUKI, and the Foreign Minister sat beneath the chair with folded knees. It was an aSARI issue of about the middle of October 1935, when the Finance Minister was being spoken of as preparing for the next presidency of the Minsei-to (Democratic Party.) This reflects upon the fact that the WaKaTSUKI Cabinet, after the Manchurian Incident, was substantially led by General MINAMI. (p. 115) "General MINAMI believed from the very beginning in the 'strongists1 policy, that the Manchurian issue could be effectively settled by use of arms alone. To the so-called softist, this came as a matter of sur- prise, but to the general, as a matter of course. Firm was his determination and solid as a rock. Consistence ruled his beliefs from start to finish, iio wonder then that soon after accepting the chair of the Ministership, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,758 in August of 1931? when war clouds hung heavily over Japan and China because of the assassination of Major Shlntar.o NAKAMURA, that the general in his position as Minister of War delivered a speech at the conference of divisional commanders saying, 'Guard our lifeline Manchuria J' The voice of the strongest eventually prevailed and the nation came to accept the cry 'Guard the lifeline' as their own voice. (pp. 115-116." THE PRESIDENT: This is only the opinion of an editor or caricaturist. MK. WOGLWORTH: That is true. THE PRESIDENT: Why put that before us. If the world knows that we get this stuff and believe we act on it what will they think of us? It is nonsensical. We are judging these men not the editors of the Japanese press or the caricaturists, and .we judge them from what they say and do and from what others in associa- tion with them say and do. MR. WOOLwOKTH: If the Court please, I will read no further from this document. ThE PRESIDBKTs Counsel 0KAM0T01s objection was well taken, but we didn't appreciate it at the time. We have to read what you tendered first. MR. W00LW0RTH: The prosecution offers for identification only document No. 1426, which is "oreign 15,759 Ministry Records: Manchurian Incident-Public Opinion and Press Comment, pp. 241-242, and introduces in evidence excerpt therefrom which is a translation of War.Minister MINAMI's statement appearing in the New York EeraId-Tribune on or about 18 October 1931' THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLELK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1426 will receive exhibit No. 2204 for identifica- tion only, and the excerpt therefrom, same document number, will receive exhibit No. 2204-A. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2204 for identification, the excerpt therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2204-A and received in evidence.) MR. W00LW0HTH: (Reading): "Foreign Ministry Records: Manchurian Incident- Public Opinion and Press Comment, pp. 241-242. "Translation of War Minister MINAMI's statement cabled by a New York Herald Tribune correspondent on or about 18 October, 1931. "Today's statement made by the military authorities has clarified the base of the Government's policy objecting to American participation. War Minister MINAMI stated that: 'It is doubtful whether United < 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, States intervention would contribute to the settle- ment of the matter in question, that this matter should be dealt with directly between Japan and China, that we cannot admit the intervention of any third party and that whatever steps the League Council would take with the United States, it is quite evident that Japan vrould under no circumstances alter her policy in re- gard to the question that has a bearing upon her national vicissitude. According to the Rengo semi- official press agency, a certain high ranking army officer remarked that the conduct of the United States in Manchuria went too far in interfering with par- ticular Japanese interests and if the United States criticizes the Chinchow Incident, then what about the Nicaragua question? He said that it was a regrettable thing that the League and the United States were showing attitudes of ignoring Japan's special interests in Man- churia; that the fundamental policy of the Army is to disapprove third power intervention in settling the matter in question; and that this stand is definite and immovable." I will omit the last paragraph. £he prosecution offers for identification only document No. 831, which is minutes of meeting of Privy Council 9 December 1931, and introduces in evidence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,761 excerpts therefrom, pages 16 to 32 of the Japanese text, document 831. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 831 will receive exhibit No. 2205 for identifica- tion only5 the excerpt theiefrom will receive exhibit No. 2205-A. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2205 for identification, the excerpts therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2205-A and received in evidence.) i^ yfj - j « ( • • i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 I 24 25 15, l . I-. OtfAKOTO: I should like to point out two important mistakes in connect ion with the docu- ment which has just >een presented end received. The first one in page 1 in the seventh lire under the heading "WAR MINISTER MINAMI", line seven of that paragraph. The-e 1 e find the words "the com- marder of the above force." It can be taken as -- I am afraid it will be taker tc mean the commander of the Kvantune Armv. Whereas, if vou compare the J c I text with the original Japanese text, vou will find cut that those words mean "the Central Army authorities"j and this mistake will be very easily fourd out if you compare the text with the Japanese original. In the second line — I mean the next line immediately underneath the words I pointed out previously you will find the wo^ds "12.40 P.M." This should read either "12.40 hours" or "00.40" and is another obvious mistake. Ther coming down to the page 2, fifth line of the third paragraph., "the affair would be extended" . s'- ould read "the affair would not be extended." That is also an obvious mistake. THE PRESIDENT: I think the shortest way to deal with this is to refer the matter to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,763 Board of Reference and to ask them to consider any representations that counsel OKAMOTO makes. THE INTERPRETER; I should like to terminate the words of the counsel OKAMOTO. It means the contrary if "not" is added between "would" and "he extended." THE PR: SIDENT; The Board may have revised the exhibit be ore we meet again. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until lino, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows;) 15,764 B l a r 2 t 0 3 n 4 K a 5 P 1 6 e a 7 u 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the lar East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel ,<Toolworth. MR. i"OOL"TORTH: If your Honor please, as I understand it, before I read this document there will be a report on the translation. THE PRESIDENT: We thought that one might.be made during the recess. -"ell, procred to read it and we can make any corrections necessary later. MR. ,:T00LT'T0RTH: (Reading) "MINUTES or T?r. CONFERENCE ON THE CHINA IN- CIDENT REPORT DAT^D DECEMBER 9TH 1931. "Report on the China Incident (Map Annexed). "The meeting was opened at the office of this Council Building at 1:30 P.M. on Wednesday, 9th De- cember 1931." I will omit the parsons present. "("TAR MINISTER MINIMI): 'I shall now report on conditions in the Chinchow district. In the con- centration of an army it is a principle in military tactics to send one unit ehead. Now, as you know, our forces were distributed over Tsitsihar, Ssupingkai, and other places. So, in order to concentrate them, one unit was sent to the Chinchow district. Accordingly an order was issued commanding all units in the said 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,765 area to receive instructions from the commander of the above force in all their operations and following this an order was issued, at 12:40 P.M. on the 27th November that the unit should return to a position east of Ksin-Min-Tun. Incidentally, information to the effect that if Japan so demanded the Chineese would evacuate ChinchoW came Into our hands. Thus, there was no necessity -for any strong offensive action. Perhaps this might have led to the report which ap- peared in the newspapers, etc., to the effect that the Chief of Staff, the Minister of ,,rar, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had come to an agreement that the attack on Chinchow should not be carried out.' "COUNCILLOR EGI): 'Although I think it is reasonable that attack should be made under some pre- text on Chinchow where CHANG HSUEH-LIANG has his head- quarters, but great will be our loss of credit with the League of Nations and the great powers. Though it might be very convenient for Japan to have Mancbnukuo an independent state, I do not believe the great powers would accept it. It might be well for Manchurian people to work for their independence on their own accord, but are we not losing general confidence as a result of continually taking action under the pretext of self- defense, 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,766 "(W/X MINISTER MINAMI): ,T"c do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Manchuria and Mongolia.' "(COUNCILLOR SAKURAI): 'After our planes bombed Chinchow our country quickly lost the confidence of the League of Nations which is certainly a, matter of regret. Must we all regard this loss as inevitable?' "(WAR MINISTER MANIMI): 'I too consider it regrettable. However, apparently Europeans and Americans are mistaken in thinking that we made use of the large bombs such as used in the European War. Moreover, the contrast between this incident and the frequent govern- ment announcements that the affair would >e extended has caused a strong reaction amongst them.' "(COUNCILLOR SAKURAI): "rrhat is meant by the term "benitai'?' "(WAR MINISTER MINAMI): ' 'Benitai' means units which engege in battle wearing plain clothes and not uniform. No small inconvenience has been exper- ienced in fighting them because they make it their practice to indulge in espionage activities.' "(COUNCILLOR MIZUMACBI): '̂ That do you think are CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's real intentions?' "(T,TAP. MINISTER MANIMI): 'As far as my own judgment goes, he intends to go brck to his own base so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,767 that he might maintain his livelihood. But as it is, he has no means of raising income tax, and it is very likely he is worrying how to carry on. His recent ac- tivity against Japan may offer some excuse to the Nan- king Government and partly indicates what might be termed a desperate action.' "(COUNCILLOR EGI): 'Regarding my interpolation the other day when I asked a question regarding the im- proper action taken by some of the young officers of our Army. It is not at all suitable for the maintenance of military discipline to leave the matter of punishment ambiguous. Once they rebel is it not a matter of course that they should be punished? I fear some sol- diers may rise up in indignation. It is desirable that such matters should be publicly disposed of.' "•(WAR MINISTER MINAMI): '1,Te thank you for your warning, but the questions of punishment is still under consideration. However, the authorities EISO deem it important to maintain discipline, so please leave the affair to the Army.' "(COUNCILLOR EGI): 'I am quite satisfied to hear your answer. I am not at all concerned about the details of the punishment. "(CHAIRMAN KURATOMI): 'We thank thenar Minis- ter for his giving us the detailed information he has I 15,768 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 given us. Today's meeting is now adjourned.' "(Adjournment took place at 3:30 P.M.)" 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, MR..W00LW0RTH: The prosecution offers for identification only document No.. 1483, Foreign Ministry document containing foreign press com- ment, North China Incident of May and June, 1935, and Introduces in evidence marked excerpts there- from. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted en the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1483 will receive exhibit No. 2206 for identi- fication only, and the excerpt therefrom, the same document number, will receive exhibit No. 2206A. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2206 for identification; and the excerpt therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2206A and received in evidence.) MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, my c©-counsel tells me that in this document 2205A which was just introduced, where there was some mis- translation, that the translation is very bad in several other places, and there is actually a page that he never pointed out. On that account I think we should refer the minister's statements, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that is, War Minister MINAMI'S statements, therein to the Language Section for a careful check on a matter of this importance. THE PRESIDENT; It is already referred for consideration and such representations as the Jap- anese counsel might make. MR.- BROOKS: If the President desires, we can list the athers, but there are so m m y ethers that I think, for the purpose of saving time, that the four ®r five paragraphs, that is, of MINAMI'S statement,'should all be checked and presented all at one time. It is as you desire. THE PRESIDENT. We want you to consider every representation made by Japanese counsel, Major Moore. V.e don't want you to deal with the matter piecemeal. Japanese counsel mentioned some matters to us; apparently there others that he wants to name, so don't read what you have to say until you see Japanese counsel again, Major Moore. LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: This document is admitted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,771 on the usual terms -- 1483. MR. WOOLWORTH: (Reading) "Excerpts from the Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1935. "JAPAN THREATENS STRONGER ACTION IN NORTH CHINA. "By a Staff Correspondent ©f The Chris- tian Science Monitor. "Tokyo, May 31 - Sino-Japanese co-operation, carefully nurtured by the Japanese Foreign Ministry during the last months, was somewhat blighted by the drastic action of Japanese military leaders who presented to Chinese authorities in North China a series of demands containing all the features of an ultimatum except a definite time limit. "Accusing Chinese authorities, especially the Governor of Hopei Province, Gen. Yu Hsueh Chung, of violating the Tangku truce by instigating or conniving in political banditism in the demilitarized zone and by the assassination of two Chinese editors who were considered Japanese agents, the Japanese Chief ©f Staff in North Chinr, Colonel Sakai, stated that if China did not Immediately halt all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo activities and abolish all organizations resorting to terrorist acts, the Japanese Army would take steps to cope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,772 ambassador to the Japanese-protected state." i.nd I read from page 8 in the next to the last paragraph: (Reading) "'We seek a solution of all Sino- Jap problems, including that of the puppet regime. By the latter phrase I mean China's recognition of the new empire,' asserted Major-General Rensuke liTiAl Japanese military attache and spokesman." I read from page 9, beginning the third paragraph from the bottom of the page: (Reading) "Lieutenant-General Yoshijiro i.'v"S2U, commander of the Japanese garrison in North China, said at the close of the day's discussions, that future Japanese action depends upon 'the sin- cerity of the Chinese in dealiag with the Japanese 'requests.' "He declared that the removal of Chinese officials in that area to other positions was 'evading the issue and that the root of the trouble remains although on the surface it appears that the Japanese demands have been met.' "Major-General ISOGftl was quoted by Rengo (Japanese news agency) as saying China faces the necessity of establishing a new government 'capable of cooperating with Japan in maintaining peace in I 15,773 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 with the situation. "A Foreign Office spokesman today intimated that Japanese action, in the event of the Chinese non-compliance, would probably take the form of occupation of the demilitarized zone for the purpose of maintaining order. He expressed doubt whether the occupation would include Tientsin and Peiping. However, inclusion of these cities within a new demilitarized zone is possible if the incident takes a serious or protracted turn. "The present move was not sudden, PS Japan- ese military leaders for some time have expressed growing dissatisfaction over the alleged failure of the Chinese to carry out the letter and spirit of the Tangku truce. So far the Japanese Foreign Office has made no representations to Nanking, the matter being considered exclusively military. "High Japanese Army officers have repeated- ly proclaimed dissatisfaction with what they con- sidered a too conciliatory Foreign Office policy toward China, and openly protested against the recent raising ef the Japanese Legation at Peiping to the status of an Embassy. Simultaneously with the emer- gence ©f a serious crisis in North China, milder I 15,774 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 differences arp-se at Shanghai and Nanking, Japan objecting to Chinese action in raising the tariff 10 per cent and in instituting a sugar monopoly. "The present flurry coincides with the period when the Japanese Army and Navy formulated demands for next yearns budget appropriations. Military action or the constant threat thereof may conceivably prove a means of inducing China to recog- nize the independence of Manchoukuo. "Excerpt from the New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1935- "JAPAN EYEING INNER MONGOLIA, ITS RULER SAYS "Prince Teh Tells of Bid by Nipponese to Establish airdrome in Territory. "Seen Aimed at Russia. "Tokio Demands Chinese Bow to 14-Pt. Ulti- matum. "By Victor Keen. "From the Herald Tribune Bureau. "Shanghai, June 2 (Sunday) - Priace Teh, virtual ruler of Inner Mongolia, asserted to newspaper men in Peiping yesterday that there had been renewed Japanese efforts to extend the borders of Manchukuo into Inner Mongolia as a spearhead pointed toward Soviet Russia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,775 "T'he Prince reported that recently a Jap- anese airplane landed at Panchiang, in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, bearing a Japanese military representative. This envoy informed Prince Teh that the Japanese desired to build an airdrome in the vicinity of Panchiang, establish a branch of the special service bureau of the Kwantung (Japanese continental) army there, and also erect a wireless station. "Furthermore, the representative submitted a request by the Japanese military authorities that the Inner Mongolian capital be removed from Pailing- miao to Peisiemiao, 100 miles to the north. Peisie- miao is the key to the motor highway between Manchu- kuo and Mongolia. The Japanese demands indicate, therefore, a desire to extend Manchukuo's borders westward. "Chinese Face Ultimatum. "Meanwhile, the North China situation continued today to occupy the attention of the Chinese military and political leaders. Its peace- ful solution apparently hinged on China's unquali- fied acceptance of the Japanese*military demands. These were summarized here as follows: "The removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,776 Governor of Hopei Province (whose capital is Tientsin), and of Chang Ting-so, Mayor of Tientsin. "The abolition of the Peiping branch of the- Chinese military affairs commission. "The transfer elsewhere of all troops under direct Nanking control or under generals formerly owing allegiance to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. "The abolition of the Chinese gendarmerie headquarters in Peiping, which are under the direct control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. "The maintenance of peace and order in the Peiping-Tientsin area by means of peace preserva- tion corps and militia. "The complete abolition or rigid curtail- ment of the city branches of the Kuomintang (National People1s party, in power in Nanking) in Peiping and Tientsin. "The abolition of political training cen- ters maintained by the Kuomintang, and the removal of the headquarters of all secret terrorist socie- ties, such as the Blue Shirts. "The handing over to the Japanese authori- ties for punishment, under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, of the murderers of Pa Yu-yuan 15,777 and Hu teen-pu, pro-Japanese editors assassinated in Tientsin last month. "Parallel to Shanghai Cited. "The Shanghai "Nichi Nichi,' Japanese daily, characterizes the North China situation pis not dif- ferent from that which precipitated the SJianghsi nnd Mukden incidents. "General Chiang Kai-shek will arrive in ankow from Chungking on June 10 to discuss '£he si tuit- ion with Wang Ching-wei, Premier; Huang Fu, i'in- ster of Interior and chairman of the Peiping Politi- 1 Readjustment Commission, and Ying Tung, naging director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway. "Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Consul General Nanking, staVd yesterday that Chi-ng had in- ducted Marshal Chang to 'deal adequately' with neral Yu, this Hopei Governor, who has incurred s wrath of tibe Japanese military authorities in th China bfccause of his alleged anti-Japanese a© ii-, ;itios^ General Yu is quoted in Japanese dis- patches a.r; spying that he will not resign his post iMljess specifically ordered to do so by the Nanking l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 II 9 10 31 11 c 12 13mi 14 if 1§ fr am 24 25 porities. "Yi:, Seen Slated to Go, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, "Japanese press dispatches from Nanking state that the Chinese Government leaders have decided to demand the resignation of General Yu. "Lieutenant General Yoshijiro UI.^U, commander of the Japanese force in North China, returned to Tientsin yesterday following a hurried visit to Hsingking, capital of Manchukuo, where he conferred with General Senjuro HAYASIJI^ Japanese War Minister, and General Jiro K'i'iMLMI,, commander of the Kwantung army. Their discussion covered alleged Chinese violations of the Tsngku peace agreement of 19.33." THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Woolworth, when you began to read this document we treated it as a series of news items in which there would be state- ments by the accused, or some of them, or statements by those associated with them, but to a very large extent there are no such statements. MR. WOOLWORTH: There are some appearing throughout these items as we go along. There is a statement at the time of the activities of the accused MINAMI ana the accused UMEZU. THE PRESIDENT: Some of the extracts have i nothing at all in them that seem to connect the accused with any allegation. However, you had 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, better proceed to read this, but in the future will you do a little more editing of this, Colonel Wool- worth? MR. W00LW0RTH: Very well, sir. I will read from page 6: (Reading) "Shanghai, June 6. - Japanese military authorities at Tientsin today cancelled departure orders for all troops scheduled to return to Japan June 15 upon the expiration of their enlist- ment terms. Major-General Yosjiro UMZZU,*, ^hief commander of the Japanese garrison, issued the order. He stated that the cancellation of leave was due to 'a critical situation existing.'" I read the sixth paragraph of the same page: (Reading) "In additl»n to the forces at Tientsin, the Japanese now have one brigage sta- tioned within the demilitarized zone northeast of Peiping. In the event hostilities develop, now regarded as practically inevitable, all the Japanese forces of North China will be placed under the com- mand of the Kwantung army, which controls the 'puppet regime' of Manchukuo. They.are commanded by General Jiro MINAMI, who serves concurrently as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I 15,780 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 • 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Far East, 1 "New Japanese troops are expected to arrive June 12." THE PRESIDENT. That adds nothing whatever to what we have already heard about the Japanese attitude toward China., 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,781 MR. w00LW0RTH: I road fron page IS at the top of the page: "A dispatch from Hsinking, Manchoukuo, said that orders to place Japan's war machine in Manchuria in readiness to roll southward across the Great Tall if Chins, fails to submit to the ultimatum, were issued from the general headquarters of .General Jiro FANIMI, - Japanese Military Chief-in Manchoukuo." I will read from page 19 at the top of the page: "JAPAN ARMY GETS SECRET ORDERS IN CHINA RÔ ". TIENTSIN AND PEIPING FACr OCCUPATION, "Tokyo Orders all demands for clearing region be complied with— THE MONITOR: Mr. Prosecutor, the last paragraph; you have just read has not been translated by the Inter- national Prosecution Section and we haye no prepared text. Shall we do it by relay? MR. "DOL^ORTH: Yes. I will read one paragraph. THE MONITOR: Just one paragraph? MR. T"00L1'T0BTH: Yes. THE MONITOR: "'ill the Court Reporter read the passage just read by the prosecutor? 0"here"upon, the official court re- porter read the last statement of the prosecutor as follows): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 . . —R- 15,782 "JAPAN ARMY GETS SECRET ORDERS IN CHINA RG». TIENTSIN AND PEIPING FACE OCCUPATION. "Tokyo orders all demands for clearing region be complied with—" THE MONITOR: Is that all? 4 T 35,783 M o T 5 e 6 G 0 1 d b e r cr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: T/e are a-ting r-uch time about material which many of us, if not all of us, think has little or no value. MR. V-OCD'.ORTH: Very well, sir. The prosecution offers in evidence document 18C9s excerpts from interrogation of General MINAMI, Juro. THF PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. IP'9 will receive exhibit No, 2207. (Whereupon., the document above re- ferred to wa« marked prosecution's exhibit No 2207 and received in evidence.) MR. T. OKAMOTO: I should like to ask for the leave of the Court to point out some other errors, although I know it is rather annoying, because the matter is important. Tenth line from the top of page 2, the answer there reads: "From 3° March 1944 until 15 August 1945^" However, it should read: "From 30 March 1945", instead of "1944", Muntil 15 August 1945". It is obvious accordingly if ^ou look up the personal history of General MINAMI attached to the Indictment. Then the eleventh line, next page, it reads: "and did not go East of this aforementioned 15,784 l 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 river." However, it should reads "did not go West" instead of "East". It may well be said that the whole text of the translation is incoherent as it was translated v,y someone who cannot distinguish . East from West. THI PEESIDOT: We will refer the matter to the Language Section. In the meantime, read it. LF.0 WOOLWCRTH: %.s'***When Vice Chief of Staff at the time the Sainan Incident took place ... was quick in. action and notable in decision,. He adopted a strong attitude when the incident broke out. He at once ordered troops to Shantung for the second time.' Is that statement true which I have just repeated to you from that book? "A. That was under the orders of the Chief of Staff and the TANAKA Cabinet which decided that troops should be sent to Shantung*****. "Q Do you recall a speech you delivered about the 4th of August 1931 "to Army Cor anders and Commanding Generals of Divisions at the War Mir istry? "A. Yes. Did you sav in the course of that speech, 'Guard Manchuria, our 1ife lire!'? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,785 "A. I do rot recall that state-met, but the sentiments are correct." V.Tien did you take command of the Kwantung Army? "A. December, 1934. % . Ard you remained ir command of that army for upwards of two years? "A. Ore year and three months..... "Q. How many troops did you have under vour command ir Manchuria at that time? "A. About £0,0po? i believe. Ycu were concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo while Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, were you not? "A. Yes. " "Q. You had given General HONJO blanket authority to take any actior he saw fit ir.. Manchuria just rrior to the Mukden incident? "A. No. The Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army has this privilege and has had it for over twenty-five years. Then he could take any war-like steps he wanted over there under the prerogative of supreme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,786 command? "A. Within the jurisdiction of his own area he can do practicallv anything he wishes. "C. Ard did -rou approve of the action he took? "A. Yes." "Q. General 5 you stated that you were a * me.iber and President of the Greater Japan Political Association? "A. Yes. "Q. Now tell mej how long were you a member of this society? I want the dates. "A. From 3° Marcv 194 4 until 15 August 194r. %.. Now you said that one of the principal aims of this society was to extend the Greater East Asia Co-ProsDerit-"- Sphere? "A. Essentially that right be termed cneo of its principal aims..." 5}c 5}: Sjc 9jc >J< :{< 3{c 5|C "Q. How far did you want to extend tvis Co-Prosperity Sphere? To what geographical limits? "A. Exactly as the Government had outlined. 'V Ho?" was that? "A. Asiatics. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24. 25 15,787 To extend It over all Asia? "A. Yes-. "Q Under that ^ou include India, Burma, the Dutch Indies and the Philippines? "A. Yes. "Q. You weren't concerned with how the proper sovereignties felt about India., Burma., the Dutch Indies, China, or the Philippines? "A. Yes, I believed that Asiatics wished to be freed of the yoke of foreign domination. "Q,. General i you believed then in Asia for. Asiatics. "A. Yes." While you were Minister of War ir. 1931 the Japanese Army waged war upon China;, did they not? "A. Yes." "A. We concluded cur engagements at the Ryoga River in 1931 and subsequent to that consolidated the territory "Q. What do you mean by coordinating your position? "A. (General MI KAMI showed on a map he drew that the South Manchuria Railroad ran from Harbin to the Chinese border and the Ryoga River cut the territory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,788 of Manchuria more or less ir half.) "At the time I was War Minister we were guarding the route of the railway and did rot go East of this afore mentioned river. Now when I was Commander in / Chief of the Kwantung Army, the whole of Manchuria had >̂ een occupied and was now Manchukuo. Certain units of the Armv mav have crossed over the Chinese border in skirmishes- but the Army as such never took part in any engagements. As Ambassador to Manchukuo, what -ere vour principal duties? "A. To preserve the independence of Manchuria "Q. Your Army occupied practically all of Manchukuo then, did it not? "A. Yes. % . And some of y ur troops went beyond the great wall? "A. Yes." "Q. VThat did vou have to do with the govern- ment of Manchukuo at that time? "A. Essentially I advised them on such matters as agriculture, transportation, education, etc. "Q. And your advice was accepted, I suppose? "A. Yes. I 15,789 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Q. Infact, vour advice ir:. substance was a direction, was it rot? "A. You might say so. -- Yes." This concludes the additional evidence against the defendant MINAMI. This is in regard to General UMEZU. UMEZU, while Vice Minister of War, was the leader of the military clique which was responsible for the failure of General UGAKI to form a new cabinet ir January, 1937 by refusing to name a War Minister. This usurpation of authority by the military to make and unmake cabinets gave them practic- ally control over Japan's governmental policy. In March, 1935, he was appointed Commanoer of the Japanese Army stationed in China. There, in conjunction with General MINAMI, then Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, and. with the approval of the War Ministry, he engineered the taking over of North China and establishment cf the -North China Autonomous Government. He was the author of the well-known HO-UMEZU Agre ment of 10 June 1935 which resulted in the with- drawal of Chiang Kai-shek's forces from. North China. Prosecution will now offer dccumc-nts in proof of the above facts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,790 The prosecution offers for- identification only document No. 1144, which is "Details Regarding Movement of Ri.htist Bodies in Connection with the Change of Government," published by the Peace Section, Police Bureau, Heme Ministry, April, 1937, and offers i- evidence document Fo. 1144-A, which is an excerpt from pai~.es 5 to 8 of that document. THI PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLEH CF THE COURT: Prosecution document No 1144 . will receive exhibit No. 2208 for ider.tificL.tior. cnly. :.r " the excrpts therefrom, document No. 1144-A, will receive exhibit No. 220°-A. 0-'hereupon, the documents above re- ferred to were respectively marked prosecution's * » exhibit No, 2208 "or identification and prose- cution's exhibit No. 2208-A in evidence.) MR. y<>0LV02TH: The prosecution will now read exhibit 2208-A. (Reading) '"Declaration issued by the SEIYUKAI Pary Mass Meeting (20th of January 1937) "Excerpt from pages 5-8 of 'Details Regarding Movements of rightist Bodies in Connection with Change of Government' published by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April 1937. "Owing to the mu tiplicity of the Government's I 15,791 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 diplomatic policy, it is not clear where responsi- bilities rest, ioreover, the Government has persis- tent ly adhered to secret diplomacy, originating in bureaucratic self-complacency, thereby failing to carry out national diplomacy characteristic of a Modern State. The purport of the JAPAN-GERMAN Pact was defence against the Comintern, which desires to destroy cur State organization through Communism. But the Government bunr-led the matter so as to cause other Powers to suspect the formation of a rightist, dictatorial State, The Government can never be absolved from responsibility for diplomatic failure as to procedure, time and method in concluding the Pact. Our Partv is very anxious about the matter, and herein lies the reason why we are going to seek thorough clarification of the matter at the Diet. "The Government formulated many ulans dog- matically concluding that a semi-wartime organization is necessary. If those plans, however, discourage industrial development and result in a menace to national livelihood, the nation will turn from its present attitude to grudge and resentment against the Government, and laxity of national spirit will be caused thereby. Our Partv is determined to subject Government plans to strict examination in the Diet, I 15,792 1 2 ' 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and rectify their demerits relentlessly. "The present Cabinet calls the State control of electric power and the extension of corrroulsorv education period products of all-out administrative reform. Our Party is willing to agree to the Govern- ment's claim in principle. But pure bureaucratic control of economy is harmful without being useful in any way. Autonomous control should be encouraged, with State control exercised when necessary. Only thus may free progress be promoted. "It has long been our desire t.c elevate the educational level of the nation. Which is more urgent, however, the extension of the period or the rerletion of the substance? Moreover, necessity of sweeping reforms in the educational system has for rnanv years been the -public opinion of the nation. If the Government disregards it at this time, it will bring discredit on civil administration. Measures adopted by the present Cabinet are not generally based or the nation, but are influenced by the dogmatic prejudices of the bureaucrats and the military. "The bureaucrats are wedded to self-complacency. The Military are overflowing with superiority complex. And they want to interfere in every sphere of State function. If this evil grows the will of the people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,793 will he prevented from, free realization, constitutional government "become nominal, and oligarchic tyranny introduced. This, we fear, is contrary to the funda- mental principles of our State, which are based, on the whole upon the national allegiance to the single Sovereign, and betrays the prirciple that the civil and military services should keep to their respective duties, vie herewith intend to live uo to the spirit of the Constitution, strengthen parliamentary poli- tics with solemn determination, to devise a new departure for our Party to forge ahead to regeneration and to make strenuous efforts day and right, thereby to requite Imperial favour and to serve the State." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,794 Prosecution offers in evidence document No. 1144P, rn excerpt from exhibit 2208. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1144B will receive exhibit No. 2208B. (Wher cupon, the document rbove re- ferred to wes marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2208B and received in evidence.) MR. WOOLWORTH: (Reading) "Detrils Regarding Movements of Rightist Bodies in Connection v/ith Change of Government /T.N. Cabinet Changes/. "Peace Scction, Police Bureau, Home Ministry. "Views expressed by Army authorities. "(Night of 21st January 1937) "Under the prevailing atmosphere it is rbsoiutely impossible to discuss any all-out administra- tive reform with the present dry political parties. Tiic political parties mr ke it their sole business to attack the militrry authorities all the time without reflecting on their own conduct. The political parties are advocating an all-out administrative reform, but they do not possess any concrete plans. The only pi: ns they have are of a negative nature and arc inclined to the maintenance of the status quo. An 15,795 all-out administrative reform to create a Conservative - ' ' -fv - (Retrogressive) Japan runs completely counter to the 3 loud cry for cn cll-out administrative reform that 4 arose immediately after +he February 26th Incident. Such a reform is like crying wine and selling vinegar, 6 and our 100,000,000 compatriots cannot possibly be satisfied with same. Has not a positive wholesale 8 administrative reform rimed at the existence and expansion of our people, with the Empire /T.N. Japan/ as the stabilizing power of Fast Asia, always been the ii very cry of our 100,000,000 compatriots? Would not the abandonment of a positive policy imply being 13 cramped up within Insular Japan? Could we thereby 14 ever fulfill the heaven-ordained mission of the Yamato 15 Race? We agree indeed to a positive all-out admin- istrative reform as the general will of the people, 10 16 17 but we cannot agree to a negative all-out administrat- is tive reform. Ought we not to get rid of the present 19 state of P;rliament that has hitherto given itself up 20 to party interest and party politics and ignored, 21 national interests rnd the welfare of the people, and return to true parliamentary politics conforming to the 23 Constitution, and, hand in hand, clarify the national 24 polity, develop industry, complete national defence, 25 stabilize the living of the people, and steadily cis- •S pose of important questions9 . irhat was expected to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,796 come hrs /T.N. finally/ come; that is, the collision between the /T.N. advocates of the/ status quo and /T ,N. the advocates of/ the destruction of the status quo. Japan stands now at the turning-point where she should realize a positive all-out administrative policy in order to overcome the present difficulties and tide over the existing international crisis." Prosecution offers in evidence document No. 11440, being excerpts from exhibit 2208. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 11440 will receive exhibit No. 2208c. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2208c and received in evidence.) MR. W00LW0RTH: (Reading) "Publication of War Minister TERAUCHI•s iTalk. (8-25 P.m. 23rd) "Because there are matters in the present political situation which differ from my beliefs, I took steps for presenting my resignation yesterday, the 22nd. There are said to be some people who say that Mr. HAMADA's speech is the cause of matters htving come to this stage, but that is not the reason at all. It is because I ascertained the fact that the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,797 views on the /T.N. present/ situation by the party which has v*«me members sitting as cabinet members for the purpose of cooperating wlci.. the execution of the policy of the present cabinet, differ fundamentally with ours. This is clear in view of the declaration made at their party meeting prior to the opening of the Diet session, the speech of the party leader, the speech of the party representative on the first day when the Diet recon- vened after the recess, the atmosphere in the House, etc. I think it is utterly impossible to tide over the present situation by temporizing under compromise between those who fundamentally vary in their cognition of the present si.~ation. In short, under such cir- cumstances, ' I believe it to be absolutely impossible to enforce military discipline, the completion of national defence, an all-out administrative reform, etc., to which I have exerted my utmost efforts since I took office. This is why I have humbly tendered my resignation /T.N. to His Majesty*/" Prosecution offers in evidence document No. 1144D being extracts from exhibit 2208, "Talk by General UMEZTJ, Vice War Minister." THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLIRK OR THF COURT: Prosecution's document 1144 D will receive exhibit No. 2208D. (Whereupon, the document above 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,79' referred to wrs mrrked prosecution's ex- hibit No. 2208D rnd received in evidence.) MR. W00LW0RTH: (Reeding) "(P.M. 27th Jmuary 1937) "Whether General UGAKI would accept the Imperial mandate or not depends upon the attitude of General UGAKI's Office for the Crbinet Formrtion, end as for 1,he Army it will not crll m y particular meet- ingnor take m y measures to check the formation of a cabinet by General UGAKI. As you know the Army is just watching calmly the development of the situation. Rumour is circulating among the public that General UGi.KI is persistently trying to continue the work of cabinet formation even by resorting to drastic measures, and because of this the nation is feeling great unrest. "This, however, is an intentional rumour made • by those who still do not understand the real intentions of the Army or by those who for certain purposes dare to avoid understanding. The Army firmly believe that such malicious rumour has not been uttered from the mouth of Genercl UGAKI himself and it is clear that a crbinet which has been formed unreasonably is not the best one. "Viewing the objective situation, the formation of a cabinet by General UGAKI is now most difficult and it can't be imagined that General UGAKI who is 15,799' supposed to be c greet strtesmen would resort to e A v „ temporizing met sure even at the expense of sa-crific- _ ing his dignity. I, therefore, firmly believe thc.t , he would respectfully decline, and that his attitude would be such as thct he as r General, a great superior , Army officer, would decline peacefully not leaving the Army in the lurch but obtaining true understanding of s the Army's standpoint rnd sympathizing with their rerl ., intentions. 10 "I think that among the public not a few u people are doubtful of the Army's rerl intention since 12 the Army has not published the rersons till today as 13 to why it is so strongly opposed towards General TTG• FI, 14 i and to my great regret I still cannot disclose openly 15 the true state of affairs. 16 "And yet if you look back upon the Army's 17 determination for the maintenance of discipline through is purge which was carried out resolutely -t the expense 19 of many victims -s well as upon the results gained 20 thereby, the reasons for the general will af the Army 21 having stood against General UGAKI would naturally be -2 understood. Although I cannot disclose the true state 23 of affairs right now, a word may be piven t* the effect 24 that the objection is a result of full consideration 2- by the whole Army united for the sake of completion of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i5,8co the maintenance of discipline end the control of the circles /T.N. cliques/. Therefore it was against General UGAKI himself that the Army raised an objec- tion and the policy to be announced by General UGAKI was not in question. I firmly believe, without mentioning those who are indifferent to the maintenance of discipline and control of the circles /T.N. cliques/ that anyone who has an ardent wish for these would surely be good enough to understand an approve the Army's present attitude." Prosecution desires to introduce in evidence document No. 11445 which is a notice to the ex-soldiers organizations from Vice War Minister ULIEZU, out of exhibit 2208. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1144E will receive exhibit No. 2208E. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's ex- hibit No. 2208F. and received in evidence.) MR. W00LW0RTH: (Reading) "Notice to the Ex-Soldiers Organizations from Vice T ar Minister (Umezu). "Matter pertaining to the measures taken by the Army authorities in conrection with the present political changes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,801 "1) Summary of Development. "On receipt of the report that the Imperial mandate had been given to General UGAKI on the evening of 24th January (Sunday), the Army established the view that now they are making progress toward the maintenance of military discipline that from an impartial and really fair standpoint whoever might be nominated as Var Min- ister on behalf of the Cabinet headed by General UGAKI, he would not be capable of bearing the heavy responsibil- ity of controlling the Army because the formation of the cabinet by General UGAKI who had been alleged to have some connection with a certain incident while he was occupying the post of War Minister and widely believed to be a responsible person for the clan struggle among the Army, would make it more difficult to maintain military discipline and moreover there is much fear that the control of the Army would greatly be embarrassed. "In view of the above, the 1:ra.r Minister when he received a visit from General UGAKI at 4 p.m. on 25th (Monday) for recommendation of a succeeding Trar Minister, replied to the effect that although the Army would not dare to check the formation of a cabinet by General UGAKI, the Army would ask him to fully consider his behaviour from the standpoint of the Army 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,802 maintenance and control. "At 11 a •EI. on 26th (Tuesday), the Inspector- General of Military Education SUGIYAKA called on General UGAKI and asked further consideration giving full explanation of the situation within the Army. In the afternoon of the same day, the three Chiefs' meeting was held to decide a choice of candidates for succeeding War Minister in accordance wi+h General UGAKI1s request for recommendation, but none of the candidates accepted the post in view of the fact that eh would not be able to fulfill the duty of War Minister in the present situation, and they came to the conclu- sion that others besides the candidates would also feel the same. Therefore, the War Minister called on General UGAKI at 5^30 p.m. on the same dry to reply accordingly. "At about 11 a.m. on 28th (Thursday), the ar Minister received a call from Seitoku IMA IDA but replied according to the above-mentioned point. Thus since nobody was willing to accept the post of irar Minister for the UGAKI cabinet, General UGAKI finally respectfully declined the Imperial mandate. "2) Regarding the Army's attitude for the present political situation. "As explained in the above-mentioned development, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,803' the Army's behaviour in the present political situation is based on its inmost hope to complete the control and maintenance of the /rmy in order to disply the true feature of the Imperial Army, and the measures were moderate and legal; there existed absolutely no such fact as would impinge upon the Imperial prerogative ] . I and the replies to General UGAKI were given with every mark of respect and left no room for criticism." THE PRESIDENT; We will adjourn until half past one. (Whereupon,•at 1200, a recess was taken.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l i v e * AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to reoee* -Tt 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE' PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner. MR. TAVENNER: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal> IPS document No. 646 shows the transfer of large secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account to the accused TOJO and UMEZU. I offer it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document No. 646 will receive exhibit No. 2209. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to w.as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 220-9 and received in evidence.) THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks. MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I wish to object to the introduction of this document for its lack of probative value standing alone, and to ask also that the title designating certain funds be checked for correct translation, as there are several related documents dealing with funds in which the word "kimitsuhi" appears, and has been translated in 15,805 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 several instances as "secret service funds." This, we contend, is an error, and the defense states that the meaning of this word implies a fund without accountability for official use for entertainment or special expenses similar to our "general staff officers funds," and that the mere transfer of funds to an offi- cial of these capacities designated does hot have any probative value as to the use thereof. I would like to also add, if the Tribunal please, that the defendant K0IS0 is not named in this document or the position he held either. THE PRESIDENT: This document, like other documents, has been admitted for whatever probative value it has. There is no reason for rejecting it instanter. What effect we will give to it we will deterrine later when we consider it. The language question will be referred to the board of reference. We note what Captain Brooks says about KOISO. MR. TAVENNER: Page 2 of exhibit No. 2 2 0 9 appears to be in the nature of an authorization or receipt, which is endorsed by a number of officials. I will read only the caption and the names of those of the accused whose names are signed to this docu- ment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,806 "Transfer of secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account, 13 April 13th year of Showa, 13 April 1938. Vice-Minister UMEIZU," followed by his seal. I will now read page 3 of the document: "Draft of Notification to the Chief of the Extraordinary Army Intendance Section in Tokyo, 'Riku Man Mitsu' /Military Manchuria Secret/. "Secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account shall be transferred upon dis- bursement as follows: "Items: "To TOJO, Hideki, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army: 700,000 yen." I will omit reading the next item. "To UI/JEZU, Yoshijiro, Vice-Minister of War: 77,800 yen. "Riku Man Mitsu No. 134- / Army Manchuria Secret/ 6 April Showa 13 /1938/" THE PRESIDENT: What is the significance of this? We know that the Japanese had an army in Manchuria and that it involved expenditure from Japanese funds: and we know who were the army heads in Manchuria, and it would follow that any expenditure would be disbursed through them, wouldn't it? Has 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 0̂ 21 22 23 24 25 15,807' it any greater significance, Mr. Tavonner? MR. TAVENNER: We anticipate that it may, your Honor. If we were certain that it had no greater significance than your Honor has indicated we would not have had the document processed. These do not appear to be ordinary military expenditures. However, the extent to which the evidence may go in showing what they are is a matter on which we will have to await further developments, and I cannot at this time make any statement with respect to that. MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, the document on its face shows that it is a large numbered page of several documents, and they are, as can be readily ascertained if the prosecution wishes, complete records of all the financial transactions of the army, includ- ing this. MR. TAVENNER: IPS document No. 2900 is a similar record relating to the payment of money to the accused ICOISO. I offer it in evidence. MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I would like to make the same objection to this document and ask that the word here appearing be also checked with the translation section; and I would call the prosecu- tion's attention that there are other documents that he can very well ascertain that the 20,000 yen of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,808 K0IS0 as Vice-Minister of War on page 2 is set down for entertainment funds for the parties of that Ministry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,809' MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, on the basis of Mr. Ta.venner's answer to your Honor's ques- tion with, respect to the last document, it is quite apparent that neither this nor the previous document has any nrob-.tive value, it is purely speculative, ana the arevious document shoulo be stricken and this document now offered shoulo not be permitted to be introduced in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: I mace an inquiry and received a reply which aid not warrant the rejection of the document. The objection taken by Captain Brooks and by Mr. Logan is overruled.. The document is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2900 will receive exhibit No. 2210. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2210 and received in evidence.) MR. TAVENNER: I will read from page 2 of exhibit No. 2210. "20,000 yen to KOISO, Kuniaki, Vice-Minister of War." IPS document 2907 is a similar record relating to an additional payment to KOISO. I offer it in eviden9e. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,810 MR. BROOKS; Sans objection, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT; Objection overruled. Admitted on the usual terns. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2907 will receive exhibit No. 2211. (Whereupon, the document -:bove referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2211 and received in evidence.) MR. TAVENNER: I will read from page 2 of exhibit 2211. "18,500 yen to Kuniaki EOISO, the Vice- Minis ter of War." IPS docunent No. 2896 is a similar record relating to the payment of money to the accused UMEZU. I offer it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I would like to enter the same objection, and also point out in connection with this that KOISO, at the date of this instrument, was in Korea during this period for a. little over a year as Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army. THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2896 will receive exhibit No. 2212. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,811 (Whereupon, the cocumant above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2212 and received in evidence.) MR. TAVENNER: I will read from page 2 of exhibit 2212. "Disburse from the Manchurian Incident funds, secret expenditures as follows; "To: Vice-Minister of War Yoshijiro UMSZU, 150,830 yen. Riku-man-mitsu No. 85. Army-Manchuria- Secret. March 8, 1938," IPS document Ho. 2896 is n similar record relating to the payment of money to the accused UMEZU. I bag your pardon, I have introduced that document. IPS document No. 2922 is a similar record relating to the payment of money to KOISO. I offer it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. MR. BROOKS: May the same objection be noted for the record. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2922 will receive exhibit No. 2213. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was narked prosection's exhibit No. 2213 and received in evidence.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,812' MR. TAVENNER: I rend from page 2 of this exhibit. "Disburse from Manchurian Incident Funds, Secret Expenditures as follows; "December 27, 1933. "Tos Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, KOISO, Kuniaki, 1,970,000,00 yen." MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I would like to call attention to the center of page 2, where this fund was turned ovar "as required by your Armies up to the end of the current year have been disbursed fro a the Manchurian Incident Funds." And the records previously referred to show that it was used for the suppression of bandits. MR. TAVENNER: Prosecution document No. 4C43-G is a — THE PRESIDENT; Observe the red light, Mr. Tnvenner. MR. TAVENNER: Thank you, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Lr. UZAWA, DR. UZAWA: Mr. President, may I have the Court's permission for Mr. MIMACHI, Associate Counsel for the defendant KOISO, to address this Court in the absence of Mr. SAMMONJI, Chief Counsel for the defendant KOISO? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,813' THE PRESIDENT : He c?.n only take nn objection if one is open. I understand he wishes to take an objection. i 15,814' MR. MIMACHI: I object to the introduction of this document on the following grounds. In the first part of this document we find the words, "meeting between KOISO and ITAGAKI," but in the next twelve lines we can find no mention of this supposed meeting between KOISO and ITAGAKI at all. Next, w© find the words printed on top of page 2: "Raw Material - For personal information only - Without editoi-ial guarantee." Besides these, besides showing itself in this manner as being a very irresponsi ble document we find four lines before the end of the page the following translator's note: "A~IITA," and then, "/T.N.: sic; error for KOISO?/." The defendant KOISO says that since he was not Foreign Minister he never made such a statement. Therefore he believes that it was Foreign Minister ARITA but this document does not show whether it was ARITA or KOISO. There- fore I must say that this document has no probative value. Furthermore, the prosecution in its last phase shows no signs of presenting any documents which x?ill prove this document. In connection with this I would like to object — I would like to say that we defense c®unsel have taken great pains in drawing up our motioris to dismiss. After being written they must 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,815' be typewritten, stencils must be cut and they must be mimeographed. After we have drawn up these motions, when documents like this document which have very little probative value are submitted, it causes us great trouble — great inconvenience. May I have the consideration of the Court on this matter9 THE PRESIDENT: Many of the matters mentioned are matters for the defense to give evidence of when their turn comes. The other objections raised g© not to admissibility at all but to weight only. What you say will be noted but the document will be admitted on the usual terms and the objection is overruled. MR. BROOKS: Will the Court allow the language section to check the translation of the name "KOISO" or "ARITA" and see which is correct? CLERK 07 THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 4043-G will receive exhibit No. 2214. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2214 and received in evidence.) i THE PRESIDENT: Only one counsel will be he ard on behalf of each accused. % MR. TAVENNER: I will read this document: "Tokyo, 8 May. - Domei Radio presents an ITAGAKI-KOISO interview. 15,816 1 2 3 4 - 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "War Minister ITAGAKI declared it to be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound, them- selves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe. ITAGAKI ascribed the confusion of the European situation to the lack of equilibrium between old and new rising Powers. Asked whether the possibility existed that Japan might enter the Italo-German Military Alliance, ITAGAKI declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deeply rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers. * * * "9 May 1939. "Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed toward the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. As a private observation KOISO stated: 'Whether such negotiations lead to the goal or not depends entirely upon whether Germany and Italy understand Japan's point of view and power in East Asia as well as their own position in Europe.' He stated further that it would be suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, her policies, while it would not only not be suitable but downright dangerous for Germany and Italy to attempt to carry out their policies vis-a-vis the encirclement measures of their opponents without the closest cooperation with Japan, the strongest power in East Asia. The difficulties are constantly causing the lack of mutual understanding, explained KOISO further. Therefore it lay in Japan's interest, as well as Italy's and Germany's for Germany and Italy to understand not only their own position hit also that of Japan and her point of view in the Far East. Nearly all Japanese had more knowledge of Germany and German affairs than the Germans of Japan and Japanese affairs. Japan was convinced, ARITA" — and there appears a translator's note — (/T.N.: sic; error for KOISO?/) emphasized, of the 'necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact' in view of Japan's earlier experiences and present position In order to be able to face the international situation from 'Japan's own standpoint.' As for the Roosevelt Message, ARITA declared that this was a dual-purpose action, namely, first as a domestic political gesture and second as a measure to inflame world public against Germany and Italy. Finally having been directed to the China conflict, ARTITA emphasized that Japan's I 15,818 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 historic and racial mission lay in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia in closest cooperation with China and Manchoukuo, although third powers were trying to bring into discredit Japan's military actions in China." THE PRESIDENT: That is a document brought from Germany, we notice. SCR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir; a German captured document. THE PRESIDENT: If the defense question any translation, they may refer the matter direct to the board of reference without mentioning it in Court. 15,819 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. TAVENNER: I offer in evidence prosecution document No. 2954, which is an excerpt taken from the minutes of the Second Joint Conference of Sections I, II, III, and IV of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. THE PRE ir I DENT s Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document No. 2954- will receive exhibit No. 2215. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's ex- hibit No. 2215 and received in evidence.) MR. TAVENNER: It relates to proceedings on 17 March, 194-0. This document reflects the views of the accused, KOISO, with regard to Japanese expansion in the South and shows that he participated in the planning of the Japanese program. I will read this document: "Extracts from minutes (Shorthand) of Second Joint Conference of Sections I, II, III and IV of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives. "As for instance, as regards Davao in the Philippines, the population has not decreased so much"— I would like to begin over. This is a state- ment by Committee-Man FUKUDA, which is finally answered 15,820 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 by KOISO; so, I begin with the statement by FUKUDA. "As for instance, as regards Davao in the Philippines, the population has not decreased so much although approximately over thirty-five years have elapsed till the present day. Moreover, business is reported as flourishing, and those engaged this day in the cultivation of hemp are said as not having us^d fertilizers even once during thirty years'time. For instance, in | the Lake Tondano/phonetic/ region in Celebes, in the experience of more than ten years in cultivating rice, thev have had three crops annually, without using any fertilizer at all, which; if used even for once, would spoil everything. There are such places as these which | are indeed inconceivable from the agricultural view- 1 point of the Japanese, How about then going ahead and seizing those places? Of course, we cannot lo so; never- theless, the development of the Southern Regions would not necessarily be an impossibility, if we should be prepared to suffer such hardships as in dealing with Manchuria or Russia, or if we possess an equal amount 22 of determination, effort and financial power as required 23 in overcoming the difficulties of the North China 24 Incident. Such being the case, we believe that Japan will 25 be confronted with considerable difficulties unless the Minister of State/T.N. KOISO/ would carry out a drastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,821 reform in the national policy in such a way as to make some two-fold policy — one phase being for defense, and the other for advance. No'w, as for Taiwan /T.N. Formosa/ or the South Sea Islands Government Office /T.N.fNanyo- Chof'/ they were able to become independent either shortly after its occupation or its inauguration of government. As regards Chosen and Manchuria — though Manchuria is an independent nation, Japan is at present obliged to defray enormous sums of money in accordance with armament and other agreements., This may possibly last for scores of years to come. In the case of Chosen, which was the first to be annexed to Japan, not only has she as yet been unable to become independent, but enormous subsidies have to be granted to her. Such are the conditions even in so nice a place like Chosen. I wish to state that it is all the more unnatural to send farmers — constituting Japan's higher-class labour — to North Manchuria where even coolies and Koreans are ! unable to go. The policy that they must be sent over is all very fine, but, as that kind of unnaturalness is \ very hard to overcome, I wish you to kindly give your consideration to this point, and our national policies in the future should be such that whatever difficulties may crop up, — we are the people that could endure many years of difficulties and hardships as we have been 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 15, since we started the so-called t-ino-Japanese Incident of today -- if we have the determination to go through hardships, we shall find the true treasure house on the Southern Pacific, where probably 200 times as much coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum as found in the whole of China. If Japan should have such resources, she would no longer have to suffer from her present plight of being unable to wage a war as she would like just because of the scarcity of resources„ S-uch being the case, we must, for the sake of establishing the national j policy of the State, have a fundamental change made at this juncture in the traditional national policy of the past. We are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister, of State KOISO has, at Cabinet Conferences and the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line or dwelling upon the policy in that line. So, although things may not go so easily as I say — although it would be splendid if they did — and things may be difficult, nevertheless even if we are to sacrifice a great deal of our national power, what is to follow could not be compared with the results of the efforts in Manchuria or China» We have been thinking this way. If peace is restored now, it is needless to say that Japan will suffer from over-population. As you have just mentioned, most of our farmers hold only five tans. 15,823' 8 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1 (T.N. approximately 1.2 acres). As they own only that 2 much of land, although we talk about family system in 3 agricultural villages, children born in those villages 4 must necessarily go out — if there are five children, 5 four of them, either male or female, must go out and get 6 a job. The eldest son will be left behind and the rest 7 must be abandoned as unnecessary if we wish to enable the Japanese nation to keep on living — such is the actu4l condition in Japan's agricultural district today. This 10 fact alone will make you realize that we shall suffer from over-population when peace is restored. What should we do about it? It is quite clear that we shall feed on each other and fall together if we stick to the five- tan-^arming. We must establish a great national policy right now. Here lies the basis for our discussion However, in regard to sending people over to Manchuria -> -f we have heard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 families over there — it can not be carried out very easily. Much money is spent with no results. Moreover, people are not interested in going in spite of our encouragement to go0 I would like to tell you that unless you take into consideration, when establishing 24 national policy, some place where people would by all 25 means go even if they are told not to go rather than the place where people would go and come back, the 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,824' great task of reviving Japan, of constructing Japan will never be accomplished. In regard to matters in this direction, the military so far have been concentrating too much upon the North. I wonder if this is not mistaker a little bit. I say, mistaken as Japan's national policy. I do not know what you would say from the viewpoint of national defense, but this is, I think, a little mistaken when we consider the great task of reviving Japan, of constructing Japan. Therefore, we must replace this with what we call / the principle of/ having both South and North as our objectives, and make utmost exertion toward the South. We must establish policies which will enable us to overcome the difficulties involved in the task," "CHAIRMAN AOKI: Mr. FUKUDA, please state the gist of your opinion, as we have no more time. "COMMITTEE-MAN FUKUDA: I hope the state Minister will study further in that direction — we have become members of the committee for accounts and have studied the enormous budget for the coming year of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs. Ev^n if you will make extreme exertions, It will be impossible to achieve hoped-for effect since it will be very difficult to have any results at all, we had better take the neutral point, and in the execution of this budget also we wish you to 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,825' direct vour efforts to attaining the true object. As the Ministry for Oversea^ Affairs has profound under- standing as to the South regarding the matters of that kind, and as we require great efforts of both Formosa and the South Sea Government today, and as we expect you to make development in the firld of economics and others, we would like to know what your opinions along that line are. We should be much obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs would inform us with his opinions regarding those national policies." "MINISTER OF ,-?AT3 EOIsQ: I fully endorse Mr, FUKUDA's remarks regarding having both North and South as our objectives. The Ministry of Overseas Affairs is also advocating the idea of having both North and South as our objective. There is, however, a slight difference in views in regard to the path to be followed and its substance. In a nutshell, according to the; opinion of the Overseas Affairs Ministry who are to carry out the idoa of having both North and South as our objectives, special emphasis is to be laid on the following points: As towards the Continent, movement of population, which must naturally be accompanied by economic development, and as towards the South, economic expansion, which must by all means be accompanied by movement of population, as this is our way of thinking. Therefore, as regards 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,826 Continental Expansion, we consider movement of population as of primary importance, and economic expansion of secondary importance; whereas for Southern Expansion, we consider economic expansion as of primary importance and movement of population of secondary importance. This is the idea on which we /T.N. the Overseas Affairs Ministry/ are proceeding along. Please note, nevertheless, t that as regards the idea of having both North and tsouth as our objectives, I am in full accord with Mr. FUKUDA's opinion." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,827' Colonel Mornane will now address the Court. I beg your pardon, it will be Mr. Comyns Carr. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal, first of all I have to ask the Tribunal to correct a misprint which has been detected in the Indictment in count 25. That count is based upon the same facts and evidence as count 52. In count 52 the list of accused is correctly printed and the last name is "TOJO," but in count 25 the last name has been printed as "TOGO," which is incorrect. We ask you to amend count 25 by substituting the name of "TOJO" for "TOGO." THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett. MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, it looks like it may be an error, a clerical error; however, the matter has not been brought to our attention until just a few moments previously and we feel almost under an obligation to make an objection to save ourselves on the record. MR. COMYNS CARR: The accused TOJO would not be in any sense taken by surprise or prejudiced because he already knew that he had to meet the same facts under the charges in count 52. MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, we have noticed this in drawing up our motion for dismissal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, and have already referred to it therein. THE PRESIDENT: Technically until now TOJO did not know that count 25 was directed at him; that is to say, after over eight months. MR. BLEWETT: I recollect, sir, I took advantage of that in my motion to dismiss and also in all my references to the various counts called attention to 25 and asked that he be — that the defendant be relieved from any responsibility under 52 on that basis. MR. LOGAN: Before the Tribunal rules on this we wish to enter a general objection to the prosecu- tion amending the Indictment after issue has been V joined. We know— THE PRESIDENT: Substituting a new accused as regards that count after eight months. MR. LOGAN: Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Right at the end of the prosecution's case; however, it is a matter that .. we should seriously consider among ourselves before we come to any decision. We will reserve our decision on that point, Mr, Carr. Mr. Tavenner. MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I would like for the record to show that exhibit 2215 was 15,829' introduced for Identification only and that excerpts were taken from that document which were introduced in evidence, and that the record show that the correct number of the document which I read be No. 2215-A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,120' THE PRESIDENT: What are you aski ~ me to do? I do rot. anoreciate it you wart re to do arythirg in particular? HI'.. TAV01ER: I merely request that the Clerk so record it by direction of your Honor. THE PRI•• IDFI'T• Is it c^ ar to vcu, Mr Kantz? ClhLK C? Tn: CCDKT: Yes, your Honor. ( hereupon, documert No 2954, previously marked prosecution's exhibit No. 221f ir evidence, we s marked prosecution's exhibit No 2215 "for identification; and the excerpt therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 221;-A and received in evidence.) THE Pr.ESIDEMs Have you considered Count 3,c to which mv attention is directed by mv colleagues? t MR. C ( i Yl-S C A T R - j Yes, -our Bonor. If amendment is granted, the T-eference in Count y„ would be to the defendants ir: Count 25 as amended, whic^ is what it was originally intended to be. THI PR SIDITT; That is if we decide to amend Count 25. ML. C O m S CAR::; Yes. The prosecution now offers in evidence documents al" vut one of which are excerpts "rom 15,831 irte<topations of the defendant ARALI. A'1 these excerpts are from exhibits already admitted for identification or the 10 Ju3": l°4f, pages 2215 and 221:' of the record. The prosecution first offers in evidence IPS decurner t No, 2342-B, beinr excerpts from IPS dccumert No 2342, which is exhibit No 187-L. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,832' THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CL~HK Or TF^ COURT: Prosecution's document No. ?.*342-B will receive exhibit No. 2216. ('"hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2216 and received in evidence.) MR. COOTS Cr-RR (Reading): "0. What I mean is that the KONOYE Cabinet, or if the Premier KONOYE was not in favor of aggression in China, how did it happen that the Japanese forces were making progress in advancing? "A. During wartime what the Cabinet wishes and what the Army does are two different things. I be- lieve that the Army and Navy were in favor of aggres- sion in China. KONOYE was not in favor of the aggres- sion. However, since KONOYE was outnumbered two to one I possibly think that the forces took the best of the deal and made the aggression. "Q. '"hat do you mean — outnumbered two to one? "A. The Army and Navy within the Cabinet. "0. Because General SUGIYAMA and MITSUKASA Yonai were in favor of advancing and tbev vere Army and Navy members that their word went ?*ith the Emperor and not KONOYE1s. "A. Since forces cannot be sent overseas withou 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,833' the consent of the ,,Ter, Navy, Finance, Foreign Ministers and the Premier, I believe that it was approved by t!;ese I Tin''..tries that the China affair be carried through." The prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document No. 23A4-B, being excerpts from IPS document No. 2344 which is exhibit No. 187-N. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CL-m OF TIT COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2344-R will receive exhibit No. 2217. ('""hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2217 and received in evidence.) MR. COI'YNS CARR: "0. I understand, also, that after that resignation the General became a member of what in ^nglish is called the Cabinet Ad- visory Council which - -as established by an ordinance, an Imperial Ordinance of October 14, 1937? "A. I became a member or this Cabinet Advisory Council at request of Prince KONOYE who came to me for advice in connection with the China Incident. "0. xjid that council was set up to advise concerning the situation in China? "A. Yes. "0. How often did it meet? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,834' "A. Once a week. "0. That was in 1937 that you 1 ere appointed, I believe? "A. Yes. "0. i.nd did you remain a member of that until you ^ere made Minister of "ducation by Prince KONOYE? "A. Yes, I was a member until I was appointed. Do you remember whs t date it was you •became a member of the Advisory Council? "A. i.l^ost immediately after the formation of the Cabinet Council. "0. And then after you were Minister of Education you were again appointed to the same council i n 1 9 4 0 ? "A. I left the Education Ministry in 1939. "0. And when ^ere you made a member of the Advisory Council again? "A. I thin'- in September, 1939, I am not sure. "0. Did yo'- attend most of these meetings v hen you rere a member of this Council? "A. It was compulsory to attend and I attended all the meetings once a week." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I 15,835' The prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document No. 2254-B, being excerpts from IPS document No. 2254-, which is exhibit No. 187-G. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2254-B will receive exhibit No. 2218. (Whereupon, the document above re- i ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2218 and received in evidence.) MR. McMANUS: If your Honor pleases, I call your Honor's attention that these are excerpts, how- ever I shall not press my objection at this time, as your Honor has already ruled on the admissibility of these excerpts. I do request the Court, however, that in considering the motions to dismiss and also in considering this testimony that they read at least the interrogation of that particular day, which is the exhibit 187 and lettered "N" and so on, rather than just a page of excerpts. THE PRESIDENT: We won't give the prosecution any direction. You will have ample scope for amendment or the motions to read additional material. MR. COMYNS CARR: heading exhibit 2218: "Q When I was here on the 7th of this month, I asked you this question: (heading) 'Then I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,126' understand that when you were Minister of War you attended these meetings but when you were Minister of Education later, you did not attend the meetings con- cerning foreign affairs,' and you answered as follows: (Reading) 'During my tenure of office as War Minister there were very few of these meetings to the best of my recollection, but during the time I held office as Minister of Education these matters were usually discussed at the usual cabinet meetings held once a week.'1 Do you remember those answers? "4 Yes. When I wa s Mi nis t e r of Education, I did not attend these meetings. If a question regard- ing foreign policy came up, this would be discussed at the usual-cabinet meetings. "Q And you were appointed Minister of Education in May, 1938, and held that position until August 29, 1929, and I understand then that Important mattc-rs concerning foreign affairs were discussed at full cabinet meetings during that period? "A At one time the Premier requested SUETS.UGU, Nobumasa who was Home Minister, and myself J,o confer with him on the China question. It was decided to hold these meetings regularly but as my views and SU3TSU§U's views differed so widely and we could not agree, it was decided after the second meeting to hold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, no more. I do not know whether SUSTSUGU was re- quested to attend this meeting as Homo Minister or as an Admiral. "Q That is SUETSUGU who is dead now, who was Minister for Home Affairs? VA Yes. "Q I assume that the Prime Minister was the one who decided what foreign affairs were important enough to discuss in the full cabinet meetings, is that correct? "A Yes, that is correct. "Q Did the Foreign Minister ever bring up a question as to foreign affairs for the full cabinet meeting to discuss? "A Yes the foreign minister would also have to bring up the question at full meetings. "Q And did tue War Minister bring up such ques- tions before the full cabinet meetings? "A As this was during the China incident, and the War and Navy Ministers were deeply concerned, they would also bring up such questions before the full cabinet. However, matters of great importance to the foreign office, the War and Navy and Finance Ministries were usually not put before the full cabinet meetings as interference by other ministers was not relished 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and matters were usually discussed by the respective ministers direct with the Prime Minister. "Q That seems to contradict what you said up to now. Do I understand then that the full cabinet has nothing to do with decisions made? "A Yes, the full cabinet was concerned with decisions made, but if the four principal ministers mentioned previously, and the Prime Minister decided on a line of policy, this would be pushed through the cabinet In spite of opposition. "Q If there was opposition in the cabinet to a decision made by these four would a vote be taken on the question submitted? "A Ho, a vote would not be necessary. The Prime Minister would request opinions from the other members, but when he had decided, the measure was put through. If that became impossible, the cabinet would fall, or the member opposing any measure up for discussion would resign." The prosecution offers in evidence IPS document Ho. 2347-B, which is excerpts from IPS document No. 2347, which is exhibit No. 187-Q. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings l were resumed as follows: 2 -i i 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 : 11 ; 12 i 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,840' MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far Fast is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr. MR. COMYNS CARR: The prosecution offers in evidence, in this order, IPS document No. 2253C and 2253B, being excerpts from IPS document No. 2253 which is exhibit No. 187F. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. Are you going to read exhibit — MR. COMYNS CARR: I beg your Honor's pardon. T had not read that. CLERK OF THE COURT: The last document which you introduced, prosecution document 2347B, was given exhibit No. 2219. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2219.§nd received in evidence.) MR. COMYNS CARR: That is right. (Reading) "Q Did the Cabinet, along about this time, in the fall of 1938, when in session, discuss the trouble with the United States over United States rights in China, if you remember? "A I do not remember any discussions nf these things took place. It must have been the Foreign Minister and the War and Navy Ministers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,841' "Q Well, this is the rejection of the United States' protest. Now, if war had ensued on this ac- count, do you think that the hlame would have been entirely on the Foreign Minister and could the Cabinet have said it was not its fault that war took place? "A No, the Cabinet could be held responsible for the outbreak of the war. If there was actual danger of war breaking out, the matter would be dis- cussed thoroughly in the Cabinet. "Q I understand then, General, that you were on the Cabinet here, and a statement was made for which, under the Constitution, the Cabinet ought to be responsible, to a friendly power, and you didn't approve the statement, had nothing to do with its issuance, and yet under the Constitution were re- sponsible for that statement and whatever happened by reason of its issuance. Is that correct? "ii As a member of the Cabinet, and according to the Constitution, I could be held responsible. If there had actually been danger of war breaking out as as a result of this defiance, the matter would cer- tainly have come up for discussion and judgment in the Cabinet, Around 1938, I had several talks with three British Ambassadors, namely, Lyndley, Clive, 1 2 3 4 5 6 f 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, and Craigie. Also with Major Pigott, Military Attache to the British Embassy. In my conversations, I always advocated that Japan, the United States and England should work together and establish the foun- dations for a peaceful world. With such views, I am certain that if a matter such as the defiance of the United States had come up, I would have had plenty to say. Perhaps it was not considered a very import- ant matter at the time. "Q Let me ask you, General, if in 1938 or 1939, while you were in the Cabinet, there ever was a discussion of the friction between the United States and Japan on account of America's claims that her treaty rights were being violated in China by Japan. "A WO, I do not remember this ever having been discussed, however, my own view is that violations of treaty rights were some times unavoidable, and if the matter were referred to me, I would have advocated settling these violations to the satisfaction of all by diplomatic .means after the settlement of the Incident in China." The prosecution now offers in evidence, in this order, IPS document No. 2253C and 2253B, being excerpts from IPS document No, 2253 which is exhibit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,843' No. 187F. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 22530 will receive exhibit No, 2220, and document No. 2253B will receive exhibit No. 2221. (Whereupon, prosecution's document No. 22530 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2220, and prosecution's document No. 2253B was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2221, and both were received in evidence.) MR. COMYNS CARR: Exhibit 2220: "After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General Chang's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval." Exhibit 2221: "The Japanese naval commander ordered the landing of troops in Shanghai on January 28, 1932. I do not remember discussions in the Cabinet. The Cabinet could not recall the troops because the battle was going on. I do not think the attack was to cripple the Chinese boycott. I do n«t remember that it was 15,844' discussed in the Cabinet. They did discuss the means of ending the incident. The naval commander in Shanghai reported the landing bo the Navy Minister who reported it to the Cabinet, and that was the first time I heard of it. Since the Navy Minister said it could be settled quickly, no one was worried. On February the 2nd or 3rd, the Navy Minister came to me and stated that due to the hard fight, the naval forces might be destroyed and could the army send some forces. I conferred with the Cabinet and it was agreed that the army would send supporting forces quickly. Troops were sent the following day on destroyers to Shanghai. "It the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign, Finance, Prime, War and Navy Ministers at least were there. I think it was agreed to send one and one- half divisions. These were sent. Approximately ten thousand men. It was after the Cabinet approval ''.hat I ordered that troops be sent and also that the incident be localized. The troops were sent as sup- port for the Navy, the Navy waging a losing war a- gainst the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army. "The first division I sent was under General UEDA, but since he suffered great losses and was having difficulties, I sent another supporting division and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,845' when the Nineteenth Army heard of this, they started to withdraw and at that tine General SHIKAKAWA either talked to the Nanking Government or with the Nanking Army and urged that fighting cease. Just before the supporting division landed, the battle was concluded. After this conclusion, a representative of the League of Nations, a representative from Japan and from China, came to an agreement that Japan should have one Japanese brigade remain in that area, but I thought all troops should be withdrawn from China." The prosecution offers in evidence IPS document No. 2243B, being excerpts from IPS document No. 2248 which is exhibit No. 187A. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2248B will receive exhibit No. 2222. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2222 and received in evidence.) MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading) "Q Who was present at the special Cabinet meet- ing of March 17, 1933 at which it was finally agreed in the Cabinet that.Japan should withdraw from the League? "A The Prime Minister (SAITO); War Minister 1 2 t> 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,846' (AKAKI); Navy Minister (OSUMI); Finance Minister (TAKAHASHI); Foreign Minister (UCHIDA); Home Minister (YAMAMOTO); end Education Minister (KOYAMA). "Q All Ministers were present? "A Yes. "Q And all agreed that Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations? "A Yes. "Q The Foreign Minister went to the Emperor to call the Privy Council for advice as to Japan's with- drawal, is that correct? "A Yes* "Q A special committee appeared from the Cabinet before the Privy Council? "A Yes. "Q Who were they? "A SAITO (Prime Minister); OSUMI (ifevy Minister); AKAKI (War Minister); UCHIDA (Foreign Minister). I think there was a full Cabinet Conference later." That concludes the excerpts from interroga- tions . The prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document No. 2155 for identification. The prosecution offers in evidence IPi document No. 2155B which consists of two speeches by the accused AKAKI taken from the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 exhibit. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2155 will receive exhibit No. 2223 for identifi- cation only; and the excerpt therefrom, document No. 2155B, will receive exhibit No. 2223A. (Whereupon, prosecution's docu- ment No. 2155 was marked prosecution's ex- hibit No. 2 2 2 3 for identification; and prosecution's document No. 2155B was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2 2 2 3 A and re- ceived in evidence.) MR. COMYNS CARR: I now propose to read excerpts from the first speech: "On the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Imperial Rescript on the Awakening of the National Spirit "Minister of Education, Baron ARAKI, Sadao. "On 10 November 1923, the Emperor TAISKO, being greatly concerned about the contemporary condi tion of our Empire, reverently issued an Imperial Rescript on the Awakening of the National Spirit. "For the past fifteen years since then our people have observed its spirit day and night and 15,848 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 have endeavored earnestly for its realization. The 10th of -October marks its fifteenth anniversary. "This is just the time when CANTON and three principal cities near HANKOW have been cap- tured in succession by our Imperial Army marking one- phase of this incident. We have finally come to a period for actual activities in the long-term con- struction. In view of the graveness of the present situation of our Empire, I believe our poople should proceed with the subjugation of difficulties with a determination much firmer than that made after the KWANTO earthquake disaster. "And now, as we await the anniversary of the issuance of the Rescript, I believe we must proceed on the path of supporting the Emperor's undertaking of expanding the Imperial Way by renewing the spirit with which we had received the Imperial Rescript." And another excerpt on page 2 at the bottom: "As I have often repeated on several occas- sions, the fundamental question of the present situa- tion does not lie in the China Incident but the pre- sent situation must be regarded as a sign of the laws of a new world peace. Therefore, it is a great mistake to think that the occupation of some important strate- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,849' gic points in China will moan the settlement of the present situation. On the contrary, at present, we have only seen the first ray of the dawn of a new world that has b^en gradually approaching since the close of the World War. It is our country that has been playing a leading part in it as a pioneer, and I believe that Japan is in a position to play an important role in the coming new world. Consequently, we have an important duty imposed upon us, and we must be fully prepared for any emergency. Japan, who has sprung from 'Japan in the Orient' to 'Japan in the world,' is now placed in such a difficult condition. So we must bear in mind, as the Japanese subjects, the honor and the duty to play an important role on the world's stage in settling the present difficult question. The present condition, I think, will not come to an end in near future. Whatever Chiang Kai-shek or the world may say about us, we must be pushing forward, slowly but steadily, towards the construction of a new world, ever storing up the national strength, ever reflecting upon our own es- sence and ever eradicating the roots of evils, as the subjects of a glorious country who is holding a heavy responsibility upon themselves, at this dawn of a new world." 15,850 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 And then — I now propose to read excerpts from the second speech, heading: "Instructions at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools. "I have just been appointed by the Emperor « to the post of Education Minister, and am to manage the educational administration. In view of the present situation, I am aware of the extremely heavy responsibility of the task, and expect to exert ny utmost in carrying out my duty. "At this critical period the most important thing is the strengthening of the national spirit." On the bottom of page 6: "Next, in view of conditions in our country, I think it is very important to devise the overseas expansion of the people. Especially, in order to carry out the national policy based on the unity of Japan, Manchukuo and China, the most urgent mission is the advancement to the Continent of many youths possessing thorough education and firm faith, I de- sire everyone of you to fully understand the state of affairs in our country and endeavor to promote the spirit of overseas expansion of the Y a M A T O Race." That concludes the documents with regard to A R A K I , and I now propose to recall General T a N A K A for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 further evidence with regard to a number of small points relating to several different defendants. 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,852' TEE PRESIDENT. Mr. Logan. MR, LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we renew the objections made when General TANAKA was called the second time, with the same force and effect as if made today, and there has been no reservation by the prosecution at the time he left the stand the second time for permission to recall him at this time. MR, COMYNS CARR; My friend is in error in his last remark. The Tribunal may remember that I applied at the time when he viras here on the second occasion and informed the Tribunal that we would have been perfectly prepared to proceed with this matter then, but that as some of the evidence which he is to give affects the accused MUTO, who was absent on that occasion, and also his counsel, owing to illness, we asked leave to postpone it. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will receive further evidence from TANAKA. The objection is overruled. MR. McMANUS, If your Honor please, concern- ing the last document read by Mr. Comyns Carr, may I call the Tribunal's attention that where it was mentioned "overseas expansion" the speech was 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA IIRECT 15,143 delivered from the standpoint of an agricultural pelicy; R Y B - K I C H I T A N A K A , recalled as a wit- ness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: THE PRESIDENT "(to th'3 witness): You are under your.former oath. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS CARR: Q The first thing I want to ask you, General, is about another conversation with the acci-ed ITAGAKI concerning the Manchurian Affair. Do you remember the conversation to which I am referring? A Yes. Q About when did that conversation take place's A In the summer of 1935. Q Now, would you tell us what ITAGAKI told you; A In December of 1931 General HONJO, Commander- in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, made up his mind that Manchukuo — that Manchuria must become an indepenc1,- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA IIRECT 15,854 ent state; and when ITAGAKI wont to Japan to convey this opinion to the Japanese Government, he con- veyed -- ITAGAKI conveyed HONJO'S opinion to the government and army circles, whereupon,concerning complete independence, these circles showed some difficulty. But War Minister AKAKI said that.com- plete independence was the only way in which the Manchurian Incident could be solved, and concurred with this opinion of HONJO'S. This is what ITAGAKI told me. Q according to what he told you, was the Cabinet in favor of this policy or against it; A The Cabinet was against it. Q Did ARAKI, according to ITAGAKI, give him any instructions as to what he was to do? A I believe that he didn't give him any instruc- tions. I heard only that War Minister ARAKI agreed ?/ith this opinion, saying that that line ^f policy should be taken. Q And v/hat happened'; A In March Manchuria declared her independ- ence. Q Now, were there in the army at that time certain factions, divisions of opinion between the high officers? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15 TANAKA DIRECT A Yes, there were divisions of opinion. Q Ivhat were the names of the principal groups' A All these factions had as their fundamental aim the renovation of the corrupt politics at that time and the complete reformation of the corrupt government of the time. One of these factions was called the Kodo faction, r-r +ne Imperial Way fac- tion, The other faction was uelled the lesei fe&iion, or the Control faction. Both of them were for the reformation of Japan. Q Viho was the head cf the factions A The leaders of "he Kodo faction were Genera! ARAKI, General MAZAKI, aud Lieutenant General YANA- GAU'A. Q Had that faction any particular views with regard to war: A The principal motto of tne Kodo faction was reverence for the Emperor — was the direct rule of the Emperor, and wa. s — a nd this faction was en- tirely opposed to communism. Therefore it was very antagonistic towards Soviet Russia. It had no enmity -- no special enmity towards other nations. Q Now quite a different subject; During the early years of the Manch.orian Affair what organize.- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15, TANAKA DIRECT tion controlled opium traffic in Manchuria'; A Until 19355 when the Opium Control Board was set up, the opium trade was controlled by the various special service organs of the army. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA DIREST Q In Southern Manchuria who was at the head of the special service organ in question? A It was the Mukden Special Service Organiza- tion. Q Yes. And who was in command of that? A Major General ISHIHARA was in charge of the special service organization at Mukden when the Manchurian Incident broke out. Later, for a short time, someone whose name I do not remember occupied that position, and then again Major General 30HI- HARA became the head of that organization. Q And did he remain in that position until the change-over that you have spoken of? A Correction. At the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident the head of the special service organization was Major General DOHIHARA in Mukden. Q Then, to go to my next question, did he remain at the head of that organization right down to the time when the control of the opium traffic was trans- ferred? A Yes. Q Now, who were the people who principally brought about that change, that transfer of control? A The ones who made efforts to take away the control of opium traffic from the various special 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA IIRECT 15,858 service organizations and to establish the opium monopoly bureau were these three, namely: General MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army; his Chief of Staff, General ITAGAKI; and the next Chief of Staff, General TOJO. Q Now, when the transfer had taken place what was the relation between the new bureau and the Government of Manchukuo? A. The duties of this monopoly bureau was to collect and to sell opium as one of the outer bureaus of the Manchurian Government. Q And what was the effect of that change upon the finances of Manchukuo? A Although I do not remember exactly, I believe that at the time I was there the yearly revenue from this source was about twenty million yen. Q And did that go to the Manchukuo Government? A Yes. Q Now, I want you to tell us a little bit more about the position of the Military Affairs Bureau ir- the War Ministry. MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, that subject was covered fully the last time General TANAKA appeared upon the stand, and the prosecution had no further redirect at that time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA IIRECT 15,859 THE PRESIDENT: There was much evidence about it, but I do not think the position was made as plain as it might be. BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued): Q In the first place, what were the powers of that bureau with relation to measures taken by the General Staff? A The General Staff Office draws up plans for the operations, mobilization, and organization of the army; but these are only plans, and in order to put these plans into execution the General Staff must gain the agreement of the Military Affairs Bureau. In other-words, since the War Ministry controls expenses i and supplies, in drawing up any plans for operations, organization, and the mobilization of the army, the General Staff Office must have the expenses and supplies given to it from the War Ministry, and, there- fore, in making such plans the General Staff Office requests the War Ministry for such expenses and supplies. Upon receiving such request the War Ministry, after studying the funds and supplies it has, carries out the General Staff's plans, and the Military Af- fairs Bureau is that section of the War Ministry for carrying out these plans, which does these things. Q I think you told us before that they control 15,860 TANAKA CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 the budget; is that right? A Yes, that is true. Q And now, if they have enough money them- selves for the purpose, do they need to ask anybody else's consent before handing it over to the General Staff? MR. LOGAN: I object to that as leading, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: It is not leading, in my opinion. The objection is overruled. A The General Staff does not receive any of the budget of the army. The War Ministry itself apportions out the funds according to the directions of the War Ministry. The budget for the army is a budget which has been passed by the Diet. 16 Q Now, taka the case where they have not got 17 within the budget already passed sufficient funds to 18 carry out what the General Staff recommends, what do 19 they do then? 20 A The War Ministry reduces the budget — reduces '21 its expenses. 22 1 2 t o 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15,861 TANAKA IIRECT Q If they wish to spend the additional money, to whom do they apply for it? A The General Staff puts in a request to the War Ministry, which then puts in a request to the government, ana the government, after drawing up an additional budget, presents it to the Imperial list, and after receiving the consent of the Imperial Liet then the adcitional expenditure is granted and is apportioned out by the. War Ministry to the necessary sections. This work is carried out under the direction of the Military Affairs Bureau. Q Now, a different subject. When we find from time to time a statement of policy being issued by the army — not by any individual but in the name of the army — who are the people or what office is responsible for preparing and issuing such a statement? MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, that— THE INTERPRETER: The witness replied, "It is the Military Affairs Bureau." MR. LOGAN: That question is highly speculative, to try -̂ nd find out who is responsible for a certain general policy. If the prosecution has any particular policy in mind and this witness knows who made the statement, that would be proper, to ask him that. TANAKA IIRECT 15,862 But for a general policy to include everybody in it in a sort of blanket manner is certainly objectionable. I understand that the witness answered the question. I also ask that his answer be stricken out. THE PRESIDENT; He did not answer as far as I am aware. I did not hear any answer. I understand the interpreter says he did. THE MONITOR: Yes, your Honor, the witness answered, "The Military Affairs 3ureauy" sir. THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will take his answer. But I see no reason why the question should be stricken. It seemed to me to be a reasonable question and answer. Apparently one body is responsible for statements of policy, ana that is the Military Affairs Bureau. Who was responsible on any particular occasion is a matter to be determined $ I mean, what individuals associated with the bureau. Q Now, when questions required to be settled between the army and the navy, which department in the army and which department in the navy would deal with them? A All negotiations with sections outside the respective ministries were done by the respective military affairs bureaus. Q Now, I want to come to ask you some questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA IIRECT 15,863 with regard to the relations between TOJO when he was War Minister and afterwards also Prime Minister, and, first of all, MUTQ and then SATO. Take MUTO first. From your personal obser- vation when you were in the War Ministry, what would you say were the relations between TOJO and MUTO? A Lieutenant General MUTO became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in October 1939; ana because of his brilliant brains and political ability, he was the outstanding character he was one of the prin- cipal figures in the War Ministr In July 1940- when the YONAI Cabinet fell and War Minister HATA resigned, he continued, MUTO continued, in his post as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. And when Lieutenant General TOJO succeeded General xIATA as ,;;rar Minister he continued in this post. And in October 1941 when General TOJO became Prime Minister and con- currently War Minister, MUTO was still Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and MUTO continued in this post until April 1942, when he bocane Commander of the Imperial Guards Division. Luring these years, in reality the army was the driving force in Japan, and as a matter of fact, almost all the policies of the army were evolved from the brilliant mind of this same General MUTO as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TANAKA Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. THE PRESIDENT: I don't suppose you expected answers just in that terminology. That is outside his province as a witness. We will adjourn now until half-past nine tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, 22 January 194-7, at 0930.) 15,864 IIRECT
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January 21, 1947 - Index (p.15,720 - 15,865)
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