AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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3 a c ^ ^ i ^ ^ 3 DECEMBER 1946 I N D E X Of WITNESSES Prosecution's Witnesse.s pa^e Blackburn, Arthur Seaforth, Brigadier, Australian Imperial Forces (resumed) 11612 .Cross by Mr. Brooks (conロd) 11612 (Witness Blackburn excused) 11628 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Doc. Wo. Pros. Def. No. No, c 823B(1) 1284 823B(2) 1285 Description For In Ident. Evidence Foreign Office Announcements 1940 (Excerpt from exhibit No. 777 for Identi- fication) April15,1940; Foreign Minister ARITA Replies to Newspaperman on the Question of the Netherlands East Indies 11671 Foreign Office Announcements 1940 (Further excerpt from exhibit No. 777 for Identification) May 11,194-0: Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman re the Maintenance of Status Quo of the Netherlands East Indies 11674 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Doc. No. 220N 220P 220M 487 487B 1644 Pros, No. Def. No. 823B(3) 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1290A 1291 Description For In Ident. Evidence Foreign Office Announcements 194-0 (Excerpt from exhibit No. 777 for Identi- fication) May 13,194-0: Statement of the Foreign Office Spoiresman re the Netherlands East Indies I I 6 7 6 Press Release issued by the Department of State on 11 May, 1940 11679 Excerpts from Memorandum by the Secretary of State in Washington, dated 16 May 1940 11680 Excerpt from Telegram from the United States Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the United St tes Secretary of State, dated 24 March 1941 11686 Book entitled: "Addresses to Young Men" by the Accused HASHIMOTO 11689 ： Excerpt therefrom 11689 Statement of the Imperial Japanese Government re the Future of East Asia, dated 3 November 1938 11695 I N D E X Doc. Pros. Def. No. No.— No. 22QR 1292 220S 1293 1632FF 1294 1632GG 1295 220T 1296 823B(4) 1297 1632HH 1298 Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) For In Description Ident. Evidence Telegram from thf United States Secretary of State to the United states Ambassador in Japan, dated 22 June 1940 Memorandum by the United States Ambassador in Japan, dated'24 June 1940 Entry from Marquis KIDOr s Diary dated 27 June 1940 (Exhibit 178 previously marked for Identification) Entrv from Marquis KIDO1r Diary dated 1 July 1940 (Exhibit 178 previously marked for Identification) Oral Statement by the Japan- ese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the United States Ambassador bo Japan on 28 June 1940 Foreign Office Announcements 1940 (Excerpt from exhibit No. 777 for Identification) August 119^0: Announcement by the Japanese Government 1X714- Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, dated 10 August 1940 (Exhibit 178 previously marked for Identifi- cation) 11717 11702 11705 11708 11710 11711 I N D E X Pros. Dof. For In No. No. Description Ident. Evidence 587 1299 587-A 1299-A 3.204E 1 3 0 0 2748A 1301 2748A ( 1 1 ) 1 3 0 2 1632W(47) 1 3 0 3 403 8D 1304 Article by OS.IIMA, Hiroshi, Lt» General,former - Ambassador to Germany, appearing in 27 October 1940 edition of YOMITBI Newspaper Excerpt therefrom 11728 Address of Mr. Yosuko IIATSUOKA, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 76th Session of the Im- perial Diet dnted 21 January 1941 Certificate from the Japan- ese Foreign Office certifying prosecution documonts 2?48A(1) to 27他（20) Telegrair fror Foreign Ilinister MATSUOKA to the Japanese Delegate YOSHIZAWA in Batavia dated 28 January 194-1 Entry from Mcrquis KIDO's Diary dated 1 February 1941 (Exhibit 178 previously marked for Identification) Memorandum for the German Foreign Minister ro German-Japanese Questions d-̂ tod Berlin 21 March 19M 11734 11740 11742 11742 11743 11748 Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) 鑛• c o ON D I N D E X Doc, Pros, No, No, Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) For In Description Ident, Evidenc 2137F 1305 Decision by Imperial Head- quarters in April 1941 (Exhibit 5-1-0 proviously marked for Identification) 2137H 1306 Rg Acceleration of Measures in the South, "Decision of Liaison Conference ” dcted 25 June 1941 /Shovn 16/ 11751 11753 f o c N D 11,611 Tuesdoy, 3 Docember,1946 INTERNATIONAL HILITARY T RIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House- of the Tribunal ,,rar Llinistry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930, -tiPPG-nroncos: For the Tribunal, same as before. For tho Prosocution Section, same as before with tho addition of: MRS. C. R. STROOKER, LlomlDGr of tho Netherlands Division. For the Defense Scction, some ns before. The Accused: , All present ozcopt OKAWA, Shumci, who is roprGSGntod by his counsel. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by tho Language Scction, IHTFE,) BLACI3URN CROSS 11,612 MARSHiiL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. TEE PBESIDENT: Captain Brooks. The amendinents of the transcript sought by Major Blakeney and Captain Brooks, having been fcund to be in order, will be made. The same applies to amendments sought by Mr. Brannon. Captain Brooks. A R T H U R S E A F O R T H B L A C K B U R N , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecu- tion, resumed the stand and testified as follows: CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR�BKOOKSs Q Nbw, Brigadier, at the close of yesterday's session we started to discuss the principles of Bushido and its warriors' moral code„ Based on your readings > would you say that this warriors1 moral code outlired the proper conduct for rilitary forces? THE PEESIDEFT; The question is whether the Japanese observed the rules of warfare; in other words, whether they committed the offenses specified in the Indictment. Bushido has no bearing. MR�BROOKS; The purpose, your Honor, of iry questioning on that was to shew that although the 277456 7 890123456789012 3 4 5 1 2 5 - ^ _ < < K111111111222222 Goldbers & spratt BLACKBURN CROSS 11,613 Japanese were not bound necessarily by the Geneva Convention, that the teachings of Bushido were based "upon the teachings cf Confucius ； ar.d in the abstract sense comprise the essential qualities of the cus- toms of war and the principles of the Geneva Conven- tion. THE iRESIDENT; If Bushido is identical with the rules of warfare5 why not corfine your questions as to whether the rules of warfare were observed. We certainly have no interest in discover- ing whether Bushido is identical with the rules of warfare. BROOKS; I thought it wculd be wise to bring out that if there was such a principle and it was just — whether it was observed or not would be another thing. It was a code, though, of some type for their, to follow; it may explain some things. It miplrt explain some of the statements of these officers when the:, said they were apnlying the prin- ciples of Bushido. It would be wise to know what they were; whether they were or not is another question. THE PF.ESIDENT2 Well, Bushid© was mentioned to him by the Japanese. Ke has read a book on Bushido5 but he disclaims any knowledge of it, as I understand. In any event, it is not in issue, nor is 11,614 BLACKBURN CROSS 1 3 4 5 6 r 8 9 10 11 12 1$ 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 it relevant to any issue. So we will not hear any more about it. BY ML. BROOKS (Continued): Q Nov;, Brigadier, in these areas ••一 you say there neve certain areas to be set aside and that the men were to be shot if found outside of said areas. It is a custom in handling prisoners of war to set down certain restrictions, is it not? A That happened in Java ̂ and in my opinion it was a perfectly proper thing to do; and in the circumstances wculd be the only thing to do where they were unable to put us behind barbed wire at the time. Q Now5 Brigadier, on this question of the camp conditions in Mukdenyou said they were the best during the period "of your ccnfinement -- Manchuria, I mean, up in the Manchurian Camp. Was there any- outstanding examples there of proper treatnent by- camp coriKanders or guards that you would cite that would be ？worthy of praise? A Yes< On the general conditions of that canp the following points emerged: first， the sentries were in general kept on the outside perimeter of the YJire and were net irade frequently to parade through our quarters; secondly, for the first few Bt, CÎ BURN CROSS ew morths , we were noTl;oinxreil-&d---iCL__salute all apanese sentries; thirdly, the camp had a build- 丨ing constructed as a hospital, which was handed over to us； and, if エ may summarize it by saying that for the first few months, the attitude of the officers in that camp towards us was dignified. Q Now, Brigadier, during your period of stay in these various camps, did you ever receive any copies of the rules for the care of prisoners of war or "become familiar with any cf the Japanese rules for the care of prisoners of war? A Do you mean written rules? Q I am not talking abcut local rules necessarilyi I am talking about the general rules for the conduct --i A Do you mean written rules? Q Yes. I A I received a two-page list of offenses and the punishments which would "be incurred for any of those offenses -- if that is what you mean, if that covers what you mean Q That isn't exactly what I Eean. That is more what I would term as a local rule, applying to local circumstances, though it may have been in general terms. What I ft&ve in mDtui are rules as to the administration of prisoners by the Japanese I BIACKBURN CROSS 11,616 such as in the Japanese A m y regulations, a pro- hibition forbidding the beating of prisoners, telling how they would be fed and so forth. Have you ever seen any code like that? A ?l don't recollect ever receiving any such written series of rules of conduct or procedure. Q Did pu ever see any of the Japanese Army- regulations that have been translated into English dealing with tie care of prisoners? A Again, only this two-page list of what we must net do and the punishments if we did do it. Q You know, though, however, that there were certain Japanese laws and orders regarding tne care of prisorers of war in written form, do you not? A エ asrume that there trust have been, but the nearest I ever got to seeing it was that Lieutenant SOKIE. in-the Batavia Camp quoted to ire once from a book which he had in front of hin on a question of discipline• Q Then would you say that the Japanese guards and officers -- that it would depend upon their in- terpretation of their power or authority, or did these rules regarding the conduct and care of the prisoners that they would give ？ THE PRESIDENT； Hnptnin Brnnks 7 milpss yrm BLACKBURN CROSS 11,617 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 resort tc short, clear questicns, the translations wi"1 take post cf cur time. Q Brigadier, would you say that some cf these guards and officers observed the rules and laws nxre bv the breach than the observance? This would rot apply to all of ther. THE I-rESIDEI^Ts Well,I do not know whether the witness understands what ycu are driving at, but ncr>e cf us does. Are vou suggesting that Tokyo distributed the Geneva Ccnvertions relating to prisoners aisong the Ja anese, but the local Japanese •̂ ut their owr； cc.r struct ion or. them? .MR。 BROCKS; I am suggesting that the cciriranders ir the field had a broad authority of irternretaticn of general nrirciriles laid down and are sup-osed tc follow that� THE PRESIDENT; Brigadier, tell us what you knew about that, will ycu? THE WITNESS: Do you mean the rules of the Gereva Convention were more -- MR. BROOKS: No, at that time エ was talking more about the Japanese laws and orders for the ccrsduct of prisoners�エ withdraw the question. Q You have testified as tc the certain conditions "beirg better, and, therefore, I would lilre to ask if 11,618 BLACKBURN CBOSS the care and the punishirent of the prisorers really defended or the disposition, attitude and irterpre- taticn or disregard for prisorer of war rules by the guard or the officer in charge? A I car only say that the only time there was any marked improvement y;as the first few rrcnths in Manchuria, and on the way there we were informed b^ a Japanese captain that we 哪ere going to receive better treatrent because there had been a change of pc^ icy from the government; in Tokyo; and those better conditions lasted from October, 1944, to February, 1945. Q What was the date that this Japanese captain told ycu that there wcmld be a change in policy? A Between the 1st and the 5th of October, 1944, in Beppu. Q Did he say there was to be a change of pel icy or that there had been a change cf policy at that time? A He said there had been a change of policy ar.d that was the reason we were receiving -- then we had just started the first few days to receive better treatrent. Did he say whether it had any cornection with 1 1 , 6 1 9 BLACKBURN CROSS the Cabinet charge in July of 1944 cf that ye-ar? A He did not say so, and at that time I did not knew there had been that change in the governiriert. Q Do you recall what this Japanese captain1s nai?.;e was? A Nc, "but he was the captain in charge of the section of mi"' itarv police which took charge of us the day we arrived in Beppu. We were there for five days. Q Where was his headquarters at that time, Brigadier?ケ/here was the headquarters cf this captain? A We were taken to a comfortable, clean -- Q No. A I am trying to explain this -- to a comfortable, clean Japanese hotel in Beppn, He and his men then took charge of us, and he occupied one of the rooms alongside us. ‘Q Was there any nurrber designating his unit, any way we could locate that man, any other ir.for- iriation you. can give? A I can give yen no name or number, but he talked Er:g�ish and was in charge of the generals1 group in Beppu between those days -- the police in charge of the generals' group in Benpu in these days. 11,620 BLACKBTJRF CROSS Q Ncm, Brigadier, vou haye st?ted something about the t.al'lng of the bu' tons off j'-our clotbes� 'asn't the buttons taken o'f oハ all prisoners clothes and also shoestrings and belts removed, for security purposes? A I�了o, that is t!~e orly occasion エ have ！mo”'n that happen. Q You. are not familiar that there is a Japanese regulation covering the removal of such articles? A No. Q Mo??, you testified that t,he”e were, I believe? 350 r'rams of foodstuff, approxinr.telj'', given to vou in vou.r ration. A Would vou-- Q I may have been mistaken, but I unc'erstood you uad testified tbat. there were 350 grams of foodstuff in your day's ration5 is that correct or not? A I think vrhat I said wpヌ t' at on one occasion the basic f:へod ration was reduced to 375 grsras per officer. Q Do you know that at that time that the food �ram allowance in Jape.n was 300 grsras, and ths.t today- It is onlマ 350? T"T3 PRF.SIDE!TT; ,:7bat was the Japs lie se food h a 1 e n < • : D n-l.i a scale at that time? 11,621 BLACKBUM CROSS TEE WITNESS: I do not know, but our ration prior to this reduction bad been between 5?0 and 600. TÎ E PRESIDEFT: ^hat bearing has the Japanese ration here in Tokyo tod a；'- got on these issues? MR�BROOKS: Tl-at in detei,mining what is sufficient we have to deterrnine. M'retber 口e are talking of the quantity o!* food or bulk, or the calorie content, i if any. In using those terms looselv t'rev are very misleading, because even a full calorie content of food for t’-e Japanese inipbt not be sufficient in the cuality or in the quantity or t'"e 七マpe t'-at a man is accustomed to ar.d could still be s-sid to ba insufficient. T”E PRESIDENT； fc, the Japanese, i5.s the Brigadier s^vs, set t'-eir own stsndarc1.T' ey have been entitled to do so within tトeir own limits, e.nd they fixed it between 夕00 and 600. So tl'e ration today in Tokyo has ro bearing on t>e issue. MR� EROOKS: Except in comparison, v0ur Honor. T;re understand that the conventions do not provide that the Japanese were under duty to provide a better or a higher standard, but similar to -^hat they had for their own people in food. PRESIDEI-T ； Nobody said anything abou七 that. I said that t'̂ e -Japanese set the standard pncl they didri't follow it. I have spid that three tines no”. You are 11,622 BLACI3URW CIIOSS not listening, apparently. KH� BROOKS: Of course, if they have the power to set it, vou.r Honor, they have tVe po”Ter to change it, I ̂ ould t^ink. 0 Nov/, Fr. Witness, on this oath tftat you. were required to sign, this not. an oath of allegiance, was it? A Are マ or. referring to the first one in Bat a via, or the one in Formosa? o Either one of them. ‘ A In no sense viaa： it an oath of allegiance to Japan. Q Then it yiâ really onljr oath of obedience to carry out your duties efficiently and to do nothing c'etrimental to —he adninistration of that particular officer. It didn1t contemplate anything that would interfere with vour allegiance to your country. TITE PRESIDENT: Nov/, that is ？.r̂ ujnent. D In both instances, I mean. It wasn't an oath of allegiance-- TFE PP^SIDEFT: Captain Brooks. DIR� BROOKS: Sir? TTE PRESIDENT: Y^u he^vd >ne speak； and you respect rae when I do. ェ said yor arguing with the witness. 11,623 BLACXBUR!" CROSS 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 told, you 呵hat t'-e oath was and why be objected to signing it. MR�BROO&S: :r'rill the reporter read back wbat the witness told me that the oath was？ I didn't catch it, if he did. (Whereupon, the ？nswer :«;rs read by the official court reporter as follows: "A In no sense wps it s.n oath of allegiance to Japan.") 门 " r e l l , the question —.hat I -'ould like to ask, I.Tr. '"'itness, if this oath of obedience was a customary procedure with the milita" government, and was nothing that vould. "be in tte sense o:C a -orobibitive oat!- that is provided bv セhe convention, that allegiance or anj?-thing interfering wit!- your allegi?nce vras not provided to be signed. MR�JUSTICE • rAHSFIELD: I object, if this Tribunal pleases, on the ground that it is a natter :?or this Tribunal as to whether it was in conflict, wi.th .the | Geneva Conven-cion. The witness has given evidence in chief of "hat the contents of the oath actually were. i TT!E FRESIDEI'T: Objection upheld. M?" BROOKS ； I vrould. have liked to state to' the Court that the men is a "barrister and a brigadier end should know how to advise these people. But we will] 11,624 BLACIvBURF C つ OSS drop that. TTT? PT1ESIDSNT: YOU must know that even a barrister or a brigadier cannot take over the Court.1 s .?u.nctions and decide questions that t,l"e Court nust decide. MR�B-ROOTCS: I was thinking, your TTonor, not in the li.e;ht of today, as being today, "but. be did bave to make his decision at t'-at time and rr̂ at his bc.sis . was for it. Q , Brigadier, do you Idiot? of any other camp conms.nders in these various theatres t'".e.t vou.邛ere in who were praised ir.steafi of accused by former prisoners o.nd vbere the few acts of brutality were severely punished? A I know of no 'such cases within my o?/n tier- sonal knowledge. Q Then, these instances of ill-treatment, would vou say, were individual acts o � individual resporsi- bility, not. following out an ore?.er of any kind ； or do you know of any order t，-3.t such men would be working under ir sue，，treatment? A I have said already that certain junior officers told us that t，’ey regretted t,l"e acts of bru- tality tut haC. no po-'er to control them be cruse it v,，？s und？r orders. But I don't imagine for a moment that 11,625 BLAC'BtlRK CROSS ecch individiic.l sentry on each occasion that he beat up a prisoner received a diroct order to go and beat up that, prisoner. i 0 母ho did theマ say these orders came from? A Either -- yen: underspend— this, my menorv is rather vague over this e.s to tire exact ”ords. The impression P;iv~R ”,NS THAT It. Y;PS the orders of the authorities controlling tb「， prisoner o 'ar camps. I think that in one cs.se the フord "goverrmient" was us-^d. But I interDrctcd t，.，at to- ”eこn the rd^inistra- ‘ tive system. I 0 Administrative system v/bere? A Tho prisoner oハ \jc.t adninistr?tive system, o You rriean your locr.l svstcm, or the system of the higher headqua.-rtors? A 7r-nkl7, I clon' t knov; t.hc.t I h^ve considered ‘ . - that. Tl'.e second i一. command of the cr.mp in one c.nse told us that he much regretted t!�c- brutalities that were going on but he could do nothing to stop it because t'̂ ose wers t''e orders. Q You NIG?.N those -.'ere the orders not. to stop these brutalities? A No, to com.-i.it the brutalities. 0 YOL> mean t!:e orders, t'̂ .en, as I gather from you.r conversation T7itl： this officer, —'ere tl-'nt he had 11,626 BLACI^BimN cnoss instruct3.ons to commit brute lities. Fe and his ruards 'A'c-rc instructed from higher beaclquartGrs, possibly Tokyo, to commit brutalities. T�Tow, is that your contention, lTr. T-itnoss? A T7hat I mean is that )'.e conveyed to me that the orders T.7ere thet sentries wore to be at libcrtv to punish phjrsically, by assaults or other.''ise, s.ny prisoner that they srw fit to nujnis�, &nd he, gs 七1:-.e second in commend of tho c?.mp, hr:d no power to control it or stop it. That particular incident arose "because I r/ent to him and protested over the f-ct that ir： about an hour no less than I thinlc it ，.マas fort;y-t,,7o men bad been beaten up, tv;o of '7hem had to be removed to hospital for treatment. Q Now, I gather, Erig?.dier, that in that this officor was stating to you th�t this very action was at the discretion of the individu?.! puard or the' ̂ p.n on the spot, depending upon the circurostp.nces? A That is not vrhat I .^nthered. I gathered that he ncant to convey to me 77as that the method of punishment, of prisoners of war wr's for tl_e sentries to assault them without, any trial. Q Is your memory clear or ex-ctly what he did szy to you, not what you. interpreted? A ェ dor—ft pretend to re-membor the ex?.ct words. 1 1 ブ 6 2 ? BLACKBDEN CROSP He conveyed to me his personal regret and conveyed to we tbp.t he v7P.s unable to interfere vrith it beer.use that フas the system. Q That ？；?.s t.̂ e system. In other -?ords, that it was within this sentry' s or guard' s authority,つ.]id he did not. 'A'ant to interfere with it, is t]-at correct? A !To, t'-at it was 1 T'thin the gu.r.rd' s outl~ority, but he did �ish to interfere '.'itb it but couldn't. Q That is rigbt. ?Tov, what v/zs the name of this command sr? A Either Lieutenant K7.TAKWII or KITAOTJl,エ can't novr rononber <'hichy sccond in cc^mc.nd o:? t':e Cycle Cnrap, Batavia, Q ,:rhat date? A From about Fpy 1942 to, I think he left in SoptombGr or October 1942. Ho ':'ss an infrntry o "ficê . who told, me that !~e '-as lec.virg tho cs.rnp to rejoin his unit» Q These incidents, then, that, you. s.re speaking of all happened prior to this cl:.rnge of policy? A (Witness nods bead.) IIPぃ BROOKS s No other cross-exn^'inatio'i« ^our Zonor, TIE PRESIDE T; Jus tic c： Mansfield. ?:]� JITSTICH! 了 SFIELD: No re-examination, ELACICBURN CROSS if tbs Tribunal please. TI E P.RESIDE?TT ； You are rcdc?.っcd, Brigrdier. on the usual terms. You nav go back to Australia on those terms. C 'hcrcunor, the ”'-.tness フ。s ercu.scd,) THE PRESIDENT; Trr. Higgins. KR. RIGGIKS: Mr. Justice Borgcrhoぐf rulclcr. r.rsociつt.c prosocutor ？rom the Xi--:̂ doTn of tho lct!:cr- lands, will have ci..?rge of the pでosecution1 s caso c-.s it relates to the Japanese sggressiors ar^inst the Nc-tberlr.nds. I present rr, Borgcrboff Iくuldcr. in ,629 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham. MR, CraNINCHAIvh If it rlease the Tribunals The defendant represented by this counsel objects to the introduction of the Netherlands phase of the esse by the counsel for the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and objects to their participation in this trial for the reasons to follow: Nothing in this record of this case officially or otherwise grsnts this Court jurisdiction to uerrnit presentation of the Netherlands phase of the esse by any other than American counsel, if any authority exists for that 5 That the Appointing Authority has no rower over Dutch forces and, therefore, no jurisdiction to enforce trial of offenses to their national honor and dignity or the violation of the rules of land warfare against their armed forces； That the Appointing Authority has no nower over prosecutors of the Netherlands； neither hes the Chief of Counsel authority to delegate resr)orisi"bili.ty to them; That no oath office or notice of appoint- ment or letters of authority have been filed in these proceedings "by the Netherlands prosecution staff, as Morse , - i Barton is required in all courts appointed by the Supreme 11,630 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Commander under his congressional or presidential authority; Thst the Netherlands Government wes not a party to the Potsdam Agreement and is, therefore, not a proper party to these proceedings; that the terms at Potsdam cannot be enlarged upon or extended to any nation not a party to that agreement; That the views exrressed in the Indictment and In the opening statement of this phase of the case do not represent those of the leaders of the Dutch East Indies but of the Imperial Government of the Netherlands which was in exile at the time the ects complained of occurred and, thus, not a legally- constituted government under internetional law but a government functioning in exile; The defendant is entitled to know by whst authority the complaint of the Netherlands Government is pressed against him and the nature of the appoint- ment of the prosecutors and the government to v;hora they are responsible; The proseci'tion here is attempting to prove the crime "Chtrge against Humanity," and strict proof of the right of the prosecution end evidence of the nature of the appointment and the extent of the representation is required "by international 11 ? 631 law; To permit them to prosecute this cause before a tribunal created by the Amnrican Supreme Allied Commander would constitute fatal error find require Vocation of the proceedings if the record stands as it now stands. I might szy thct I expect these objections to loom to greater proportions as this phase of the case progresses and that is why エ raised the question before the prosecutor made his openin-7 ste.tement. (V/hereuDon, Mr. Higgins s^nror.ched the lectern.) THE PRI.SIDEWT: . re don't want to hear you, Mr. Higgins. The objections heve no foundstion in fact or law or reeson. They are overruled. 'Je will recess for fifteen minutes. (？/hereupon, at 1045, e recess wrs taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 11,632 MARSHAL OF TEE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PhESir'ENT: Mr. Levin. i/jK. LEVIN: Mr. President, while I believe the opening statement of this phase of the case con- forms rather fully to what an opening statement should be,エ should like to reserve for the defense the right to make any objections that we may see fit at the conclusion of the opening statement. THE PRESIDENT: Hr. Justice Mulder. im. JUSTICE BOKGERKOFF kULDER: (Reading) ”Mr� President and Members of the Tribunal: "The subject of this phase of the case is the Japanese aggression apainst the Netherlands� The evidence to be presented will relate more especially to Counts 1,4, 14 and 32 of the Indictment, and will substantiate charges set forth in the remaining Counts. It will elaborate on and prove the allega- tions made in Section 10 of Appendix A of the In- dictment. "It will be shown how Japan, when at the end of the 1930s a speedy conclusion of the war in China seemed improbable, gradually turned her thoughts to an expansion southward and to the acquisition of the southern territories, rich in mineral resources 4 6 7 8 9 0 2 13 4 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A b r a m & E d e r 11,633 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and agricultural products; how this idea gradually took shape in the minds of the Japanese '7ar Leaders and how with the outbreak of the Second World War this idea took concrete form. ':Je will show how af- ter Germany's victories in Western Europe these plans were put into execution, through negotiations with Germany, through a Japanese advance into Indo-China and through the exertion of pressure and threats on the so-called 'orphaned' Netherlands Indies. We shall further show that at tho same time a military expansion southward was planned in case the attempt at peaceful domination should fail; that when the Netherlands East Indies would not yield to Japanese pressure, aggression and military conquest were de- cided upon, and that the Japanese southward advanco into the Netherlands Indies and surrounding territory was one of the main motives for the Japanese aggres- sion in the Pacific in December 1941. T.astly, it will be shown how after a ruthless war of aggression, and after the military occupation of almost the en- tire Netherlands Indies, previously prepared plans to bring these territories under the hegemony of Japan and to accomplish their virtual annexation, wore put into execution, and how this policy to assure for Ja- pan tho future domination of the whole- Southern 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 11,63^ Pacific, and to construct a new Japanese Empire, was pursued until the final Japanese surrender in August 1945. "The evidence to be presented in order that it may be fully comprehended and understood in its proper perspective, must be viewed in the light of the centuries of amicable relations that had existed between Japan and the Netherlands. "Some of the ovidcnce relating to these facts has already been introduced in earlier phases of the case. As the Japanese aggression against the Netherlands formed an integral part of the overall Japanese aggression, of which other phases have al- ready been presented to the Court, this is,of course , inevitable. The negotiations with Germany and the results obtained therefrom, the military and econ- omic preparations for the advance southward, the se- curing of bases in French Indo-China and the con- struction of military bases in the Mandated Islands, as a prelude to further aggression, and the general decisions loading up to the final aggression in De- cember 1941, have already been dealt with by others. Only when necessary for full comprehension wil"1 the evidence relating to those subjects bo brought to the attention of the Court to place the further facts 11,6.35 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1.7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 which we intend to prove in their proper light and to present to the Tribunal a complete picture of the Japanese aggression against the Netherlands. More specifically the evidence to bo presented will dis- close the following facts: "1.Treaties and assurances binding Japan to respect the integrity of Netherlands Territory: "By the Treaty concluded on 13 Dcccmber 1921, the United States, Great Britain, "'ranee and Japan undertook to rcspoct each other's riphts in re- spect of their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific Ocean and to settle all diffcrcncos aris- ing among themselves on this subject by peaceful means only. The Netherlands was not among the sig- natories to this Treaty, but on 4 February 1922 a solemn declaration was issued by cach of the contract- ing governments that tho rights of the Netherlands in relation to its insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean would be rospccted. The communications thus addressed to the Netherlands Covornmcnt by the four governments concorncd worc word for word identical, and each of them v;as, therefore,bound in the same way to res poet the territorial integrity of the. Nether- lands Indies. "No indication was ovor given that Japan no 11,636 234567890123456789012345 1.1 11111111222222 longer dteraud herself bound by this Pact. On the con- trary, in the final years precoding the Japanese ag- gression toward the south, the Japanese Covcrnmont, while planning and preparing this aggression, repeat- edly declared that Japan1 s intentions wore' wholly peaceful and on various occasions reiterated its assurances not to attack the IMcthurlands Indies. "On April15,1940 and again on May 11, 194-0, one day after the Kothorlands bocamc involved in the war with Germany, the Japane so Foreign Minis- ter ARITA stated publicly that the Japanese： Govern- ment was deeply concernrd about any development that mipht affcct th. statu^ quo of the Netherlands Indics, and that his govornrat.nt was desirous that this status quo be riialntaitiLd. Official notico of this statement was given to the United Stat- s, Brit- ish and Fronch Governments, the other parties to the Four Power Pact ? which caused them in their turn to make similar declarations and to reaffirm their re- solve to continuG to ruspoct the integrity of Nether- lands territory in the Pacific Occan. "On May 16,1P40 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, in a conversation with the American Secre- tary of State, repeated that his povemmont was en- tirely satisfied with the situation, following the 7 3 6 1 i — _ declaration to respect the status quo of the‘Nether- lands Indies by each of the four governments interes- ted, and that there wes no purpose in raising any- further controversy in this connoction. "Almost a year later， on March 24,1941, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, then on his way to Germany to confc r with tho German loaders nnd to discuss with them Japan's participation in the war, stated emphat- ically to the American Ambassador in Moscow, that under no circumstances would Japan attack any of the Anicrican, British or Dutch possessions and insisted that Jnpan had no territorial r.mbitions whatsoever. "2. Development of Japanese Policy regarding south- ward expansion: "While it was thus the professed policy of Japan to maintain pcacoful relations with the Nether- lands , a new actual policy was be., ing concc ived, which was directly opposed to her official assurance s. "In November 1938 the First KONOYE Cnbi- net, which was then in power, and of which at that time the accustd, ARAKI, ITAGAKI and KIDO were motn- bc rs, issued the official declaration that tho ulti- rnnte aim of Imperial Japan was the c,stablishriKTit of a New Ordt r throughout East Asia. Although it was not stated which countries were supoos�d to be 11，6ス8 includfd within this Sphere of tho Now Order and the southern regions were not then mentioned by name, Ja- pariese propagandists, such as the accuscd HA.SPIM0T0, had for some time in books and spcechos advocatc d Japanese expansion to the； south. "V/ith the outbreak of thし war in Europe, however, Japan, foiled in hor attempts to bring the war in China to a succrssful conclusion and .judginp tho moment opportune ? grasped at the possibility for southward expansion. "In a conversation witli the German FDrしign Minister in Soptombcr 1939? Ambassador OSI-IIKA pave, as his opinion that Jnpnn, especially the Japanese Navy, was rondy for an advaneo in Southfast Asia and Count TERAUCFI, who was then visiting Gcrmany, stated that he considered an advancc to the south preferable to a continuation of the war in China. It wns not un- til April 194-0, however, when Foreign Minister AF'.ITA, in his statement that Japan desired tht.. maintenance of the status quo in tho Netherlands Indie s, declared that Japan was closcly bound to the N； therlands Indies through a relationship of mutuality and inter-depen- dence ,that the； Ng t ho r lands Indi&s we .re first offici- ally included, although by implication only, wlthin the Japanese Sphere for a Nov; Order. 11 11 ? 639 "Immediately after the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany in I cy 194-0, the Japanese GovornmGnt sought for a declaration by C-ermany on her attitude tovard the Netherlands Indies. After the German Ambassador, on orders from his govern- ment ,had dcclarcd that Germany not interested in this question, ho v;as able- to report that this declaration of German lack of interest was considered a 1 cartc blanche' for Japan. Nevertheless .on 24 Juno 1940 the Minister of Overseas Affairs, tho accused KOI SO, inquired again what C-orraany' s attitude would be to military activity by Jcpan in Fronch Indo- china end the Netherlands Indies. Germanyposi- tion camo onco more under discussion at the joint conference bet'.vt.cn Army, N?.vy and Foreign Office re- presentative s on 12 -nd 16 July,1940 on the strength- ening of Japanese-German relations. It wr.s r- solved that Germany would have to recopnj ze that the Scmth- sens formed part of the area in which Japan wou"1 d estriblish her Ncv/ Order and over which Japan would ex- ercise political le-dors； ip to the exclusion of all others. "While these negotiations v/ith Germany were goinp on, the Japanese Govcrnraont was approached by the American Ambassador with a proposal for a 11 ? 640 Treaty to guarantee once more the status quo in the Pacific. Tho proposal was rejected as it wrs con- sidered that Japan wanted to keep her hands free in regard to the southern regions, especially the Neth- erlands Indies. "On 22 July 1940 the Second KONOYE Cabinet came into office, of which the accused HOSHINO, TOJO, and at a later str;g£ also the accused HIRArTTlIA and SUZUKI were members, A Cabinet decision on 26 July 194-0, which a fer: days later was published as an of- ficial Japanese- Government declaration, affirmed that the first and fundamental aim of - Japan1s national policy would be the construction of a New Order in Greater East Asia, with Japan, China and Manchukn.o as the center. "That nt this time Japan definitely in- cluded the whole of the southern regions in her Sphere of a Naw Order is clear from the official declaration mnde by Forcipn Minister FATSUOKA to the Privy Common on the occasion of the conclusion of tho Tri-partitc Pact in September 1940. Greater East Asia, including the southern regions, would be the area of future Japanese domination. Japan's econ- omy wr.s to be planned with a view to this ultinnte objective, and, as will pre;sently bo shown, these p]丄ns 11,641 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | 16 | 17 I 18 | 1-9 j 20 I 21 I 22 | .23 24 ‘ 25 were immediately rc-flccted in Japan's economic de- mand s on the Ft ther"! ands Indies. "Although at this time definite pl:.ns for a military conquest of the southern regions seem rs yet to have been vrgue, such a military conqiiost w-s ccrtainly already envisaged, I mentioned earlier the accused KOISO1s inquiry as to Germany's attitude to military activity by Japan towards the south. Two months later, in August 1940, the Chief of the Na- val General Staff gave as his opinion that an im- mediate military operation in tho south was impossi- ble and, as it would take at locst eight months to ge t rcac\y, the longer the war was postponed the be-1- ter. A comprchonsivo p],:n dated September 1940 and found in the files of the Japanese Government deals with the cstcblishmcnt of the Greater East Asia Co- prosperity Sphere-, either throuph peaceful means by making Japan the mediator in the present かrid "ar, or through military conqucst. This Ir.ttor part of the plan goes into some detail as to how to ニchic -e a military conquest of the Netherlands Indies, without too great damage bo ing caused to its natural resources r.nd industrial equipment, and how to make the Nether- lands エndi&s a puppet state in Japan's Sphere through the stirring up of an indepondenco movement and the 11 ? 642 establishment of a new constitution. A similar poli- cy wr.s to be followed in al1 other southern rc-fions from Burma to the Philippines. Furthermore, in Oct- ober 1940 the accused OSHII.—A, commenting on the Tri- partite Prct, evaluated it as the final clear recog- nition of Japan's mission in the South and urged that Japan should be prepared to ovcrcomo by any means the obstacles which would bo placed in her waye "In January 1941 in a speech before the � ‘ Diet, Foreign IJinister IvlATSUOKA for the first time asse:rt:d publicly that the Netherlands Indies formed a part of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and sent out instructions that in no case should official statements deny that the Netherlands Indies formed prrt of Japan's Go-prosperity Sphere. From this time onward, although, as I will relate • presently, the efforts to make tho Netherlands Indies yield to JapanosG demands fo^peaceful penetration continued until tho middle of 1941, the concept of military expansion gradually took more definite form, "In February 1Q41 Foreign Minister U A T O K A stated that he wculd like to make poncc. with China so as to concc-ntrato Japan' s whole energy on the main question now facing Jr-.pan, tho soluti'm of the south- ern problem. The same month the German Foreign 11 ? 643 Minister discussed the reconstruction '�f Europe and East Asia after thし war with the accused OSHIMA, and the same subject cnmc up for discussion on the occasion of MATSUOKAvisit to Berlin - the Japan- ese Go-JGrnmont apparently being anxious to make Japan the intormodinry in all of Germany's future relations with countries within thし.Co-prosperity Sphere. A further point arisinp during LIATSUOKA' s discussion in Germany was how to acquire the oil fields in the Netherlands Indie：s intact, which prob- lem would have to be considered in planning the mili- tary operation. "At the Liaison Conference between the Gov- ernment and Imperial Pie ad quarters on 25 Juno 1941 it was dccided that, the Netherlands Indies having re- fused to yield to the Japanese demands, Japan would have to occupy the southern part of French Ind^-China t") establish air and naval bases for a further ad- vance to the s^uth. "The Imperial Confcrencc on 2 July 1941 de- cided that Japan would under all circumstanccs adhere to the principle of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, hnsten her southward advance, and remove all obstacles for the achicvcmont of that purpose. 11 ? 644 "In the socond half of July the occupation of the whole of Fronch Indo-China was effected with the aim to launch from there a rapid attack south- ward as soon as the situation would be opportune. "3. Direct relations and negotiations b e - ' twecn the Netherlands and Japan in 1940 and 19.41: "Until the beginning of the year 1940 the relations between Japan and. the Netherlands, at least on the surfacc., were friendly. Japan's share in the economic relations of the Netherlands Indies with other countries was comparatively small and these re- latiuns were governed by the usual‘Most Favored Na- tion Clause1, which prevents any discrimination. Moreover, by a Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitra- tion and Conciliation, concluded between Japan and the Netherlands In 1933, both countries vrcrc bound not to seek settlement of disputes of any character which might, arise between thom by ->ther than pr.cific moans. This Treaty which camc into cffect for five years when ratifications wore c-xchanged in August l°-35, wou1d automatically have been valid for a further five years after 194-0, had it not boon denounced by Jar an in January of that yc-ar. "On 2 Fe.bri-.ary 194-0 tho Japanoso Minister in the Hague presented a memorandum requesting the opening 11 ? 645 of discussions for the lifting of existing import, export and immigration restrictions in the Nether- lands Indies and the consideration Tf further meas- ures to enable Japan to hnvc a greater part in the development of that archipolago. This request had not yet boon answered, when in May 194-0, a few days after the occupation cf tho Netherlands by Germany, another memorandum was presented to the Netherlands Government insisting on a speedy rcplv and further re- questing a guarantee that the Nothc-rlands Indies wriuld in the future conttnuc 七つ supply Japan with specified amounts of certain war materials. A non- committal answer which, however, did not excludo fur- ther negotiations wrs handed to the Japanese Govern- ment in June and soon thereafter Japan made clear its intention to send an Economic Mission t ~ tho Nether- lands Indies for diroct negotiations. This Mission, consisting of some thirty delegates hended by the Minister of C°mmorce in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, which was then in office, arrived in Soptombor 1940, a few days be fere the conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact. *' One of the ma in objoctivcs of the Mission, which incluilcd ropresontatives tnth of the Army and the Navy, was t' ensure a continu >us flow of raw 11 ? 646 1234 5 678910n^13141516nls1920 materials fr^m the Netherlands Indies, both to strong- then Japanese war production and to provide Japan's partners under the Tri-partite- Pact with materials essential for the prosecution of the war. Indeed, promises were made by Japan to Germany that rubber今 tin ,?.nd other materials wつ，，lcJ be obtained for her from the southern regions. "Hov/evcr, a more ambitious pr•つgram'had been drawn up, aiming at tho domination of the wh^lo of the Netherlands Indies through the latter's compliance with far reaching Japanese- dctriands* T^ qinte an ex- ample ,one of tho most pressing Japanese needs was the acquirement of oil* Nevertheless, instructions were given that in the oil ncg^tiati-ns with the Neth- erlands authorities emphasis should be laid on the ac- quisition of nil concessions, rather than .)n the ob- taining of the finished product. Close contact w^uld have to be maintained with the military authorities in the selection nf areas for these concessions, as these were intended to serve as bases fハr a military foot- hold in the Netherlands Indies. "A Cabinet decisi.)n of 25 Get'ber 1940 nut- lined an initial prograci for Japan's participation in the. economic development cf the Netherlands Indies, 25 the subject on which the Economic Delegation was then 11 ? 647 negotiating in Batavia. It was decidod that recog- nizing Japan's dominant pnsitioh in the Netherlands Indies by virtue ハf the Tri-partite Pact, the first . measures to be taken would be to liquidate the Neth- erlands Indies economic relations with the European and American�continents; tn remove tho vari'us exist- ing restrictions on the ocon^mic r.ctivitios of Japan so as to enable her to secure preferential treatment for herself; to arrange for tho j'int development by Japan and the Netherlands of tho Netherlands Indie s； to place under Japanese contr"1 the production and ex- port of essential war materials； to place the ex- change-contrnl of the Netherlands Indies under Japan- ese guidance； to liquidate f"reign financial holdings in the Netherlands Indies; and to place the formula- tion and execution of all economic policies under tho c�ntr'�l of a j^int Japanese-Netherlands E c u i c Commission. In general terms, it was added that all gc ̂ n^mic measures v/ould bo f • rrnulatcd from tho broader viewpoint of establishing the Co-pr~>spority Sphere of Greater East'Asia." 11 ? 45 "I»Ief.nv/liilG in Batt.vie.,し.ftしr initirl ncgotic:tions concerning tn^ more dircct end press- ing need to obtain for Japan the necesscry exports of oil hf-d. teken place しnd the attempt to lerse certuin territories ；. s oil concessions for Japan hc.d failed, tho above more general program wes pre- sented in tho form of long list of demands in January 1941. Foreign Linistor ..i^TSUOI^'s spocch including the Ntitherl.:..nds Indies in tho Go-pros一 perity Sphere teiaporr-rily brought nogotiutions to し halt しnd caused the houd. of thu Japanuse Mission to W£,rn iv̂iTSUOlv̂'i. that, unless tiic utterc.nccs of the J&pc.nos6 Government しnd tho Jrpanose press became more mod ere tt,, thu ^ ttom.pt to make ti"e Netherlands Indies ti pert of the Co-pro-sperity Sphere through peaceful ncgoti-.tions was bound to full,in which ct.se c resort to しrmed force would be inevitnble, "Altliough the negotiatiorxS continued for sevurcl more months, it was clocr that tho Jopcn- ese demands could not be sotisfiud, as tho Nether- lands wore unwilling to accord Jr.pen c.ny spccicl privileges or to recognize c.ny dominant position of J"しpし！！ in tho southern regions. At tho ond of May 1941, tho l:..st Jap' ,rusじ .rd Netherlands muraor- und a v/oro oxch.-.nyod .nd, no .grueacnt h:,vinr been 1 2 34567890 12345678901 2 34 5 1 L 1 i 1 1 1111222 0 . ^ 22 wolf & YGlden 11 ? 649 rucohcd, J"c.prrx discontinued the negotiations in June end tho Mis,sion r^turnud to Jupun. The same month Foruign Minister 1-U.TSUOKA stated thct no fur- tiiしr nしgotiしtiens would tf-ko plcco end thrt, before proceeding further ：gainst thし Netherlands Indies, busos in Fronch Indo一Chiru: would have to be secured. "In July the Jて pt. noso occupation of the southern p-rt of French Infio-Chinじ took plcce, re- sulting in tho freezing of (.11 J^.panose ；..ssets in thj Nothurl-nds エ n d i し f r o m this tiao onward, no further ti'c.do yes possible しnd coraiacrci^l relations be two on JVpcin i nd tho N^tliorl .nds Indies practi- cclly carâ to しn しnd« J-'Dunose Subv、;rsiv。Activities in the Nctlicrlands Ecst Indies: "An し:xtensivc system of cspionしgし was built up by the Japanese in the Netherlands Indies rru.ny years before the outbreck of war between Japan rnd the Nothorlands. A great p；.rt of th^ ra;..ny thou- sends of Japanese residing in the Netherlands Indies, held closoly under thg control‘nd supervision of the Jr.pnnose authoritites through numorous local J"c.p̂ ncsc associations, took nn cctivo pert in the get hiring of inform, ti on of nilitcry importc:ncc3. Jcpcncse consuls c.nd consulf.r agents sじv/ in the i i , 6 fro colloction rnd dispatch of this military informution through diplomatic channels one of their main tasks ond J"しpLuese profussionじ1 spies were attached, cs consular pursonnol to several Japanese consulates. "In addition to the cctivitit-js of the Jap- し nose residents and Jr. pc no so diplomatic personnel, the J;.ponosG Array end Ncvy erch hf;d their ovrn agcnt3 in tho more importc.nt plL'.cos in tho Nしthcrlしnds Indios. Special omphesis was 1ニid on Japanese pro- paganda umong the Ciiinusci nd Indonosic.n inhebitants of tliし Nethurli-nds Indies, for VJhich 1しrge sums v/cre expended, und m„ny Chines^ ugents \vcr>j brought ovur from the J"apしn�sti occupied pしrts of China. . ProDC.rc.tion for War : nd IvIilitarY Opor tions^ July 1941 to March 1942. "From July 1941 onward it wac clear that tLe rusolvcr to. c.Qntiiiue.- the .しdvしncc to tho south, under any circunstonccs and �-gainst .'.11 obstacles, could only bo effected through tho actual exertion of military foroti, ..This in itseli1 proved no deter- rent to tho Jcpanose plcns. If in some quarters there vゾしs still l ccrtc-in hositrtion, it was causod through the ror..liZc,tion that しn c dv nee into tho Nothorlr.nds Indies end toward th.e South, in gencrr.l would involve Jnpm in u v;cr v'ith both tho United 1 1 ? 6 5 1 States and Grci-t Britain.ム11 tho pre^limint.ry moves hしd been made, the b .scs for the attack hed been sccur^d, it iu d bben ''.sccrt; ined thct the Ncth^rlunas authorities would not yield voluntarily to Jcpcnose demands unci rlso that the '.rrncd forcos the dis- posal ox the Netherlands Indies would not by tlicira- sclvos be sufficient to withstand c ruil scalo Japan- ese tt<,ck; for long, ”ムt thし Imperial Confc-runco of 6 Sopteしbしr 1941 it wus decidod th�t， in of the ； cuto situ— c-tion, the execution of J p'.n1 s southern .- dv.noc policy nocessit'.tod . notGrrdn'.-tion for w.r with the United St'..tes, Gr(-:..t Britain the Ncthcrlrnds by the ciiddle of October, Bhould Jap-.nese aemr.nds for British-^jnoric-n gu .r-ntoc not to strengthen their position in tho South bo rcjcctcd. In ox- ch^ngo would bu Vv'illing to guurantoo the neutrality of thu Philippines, but *uiy n^ntion of the Ncthorlcnds Indies w s onitttod. ”エ siu..ll r . frr in frora dec-.lj.ng oguin with tho oxtensivo preperations for the Intended military conquest,しs thしy h::-ve fully boer. brought to tho attention of the Court in MI Gf.rliGi- ph'.so of the ct-se. All pl tns provided for ； n tt:..ck upon the Netherl nds simultしILしously witL the ODGning of 11’牧 hostilities ��g�-ixist the Unitbd. Stt-tos c.nd Gr^at Brituin. Occupation currency for tho Netherlands Indies hしd bt^n ordered as fしr b:.ck January 19U1 -nd tho first deliveries h ..d been mf.do in Mr.rch of thct yocr. The so-called ‘ T:.blo Top Mc neuvcrs* held in i-iugust 1941 by thし Total \,LT Rしscorch In- stitute went into gro^t f otail \s to how :.nd v̂ hon to st'.rt c-.mpi ign g:..inst tho Methorl .nds Indies ：nd. dcしIt extensively vit'i tho oxp.jctod military op^r tions, cither (�sしinst the Ncthorl- nds :;lone, or in conjunction with c gcncr'.l vr.r in tiiu Pacific. In September 1941 fw.r gt:,nしŝ vんrし hold by tho N: vy nt the K .vy . :.r Collog:, • nd further c： refui pl'.ns v/crc worked out by th^ Ariay . nd N'.vy in Sしptc.mtifji* -nd October. The Coriri：. nd or-in-Chief of .11 Army units in tilし southern regions VA S ’ ppointod in Oct一 obor しnd N vy units for tho opcr-tions in tho Nしtiiし！*l>_.jacls Indius wし！•し selGct^d. Th^sc- pi ns \rorc so dotcilod cs to spしcify th..t curt, in oil rofincrics in the Nuthorlonds Indies would be ：.drainist̂ d diroctly by tho J：. . S o N^vy to cov^r its own n^ods. ”ムftしr tho Third KONOYE C binot Ib.d been succcedしd in Octobor 1941 by the TOJO C binct, of whicii tho ； ccuscd U“，Sliliv仏!)ム，SUSITI：! .nd TOG-O werし ncmbcrs, thu prしp. .:ia tions wしr、， intensified end 11 ? 653 a genorc.l ro-oxuriiin̂ .tion of c.11 questions concerning the prospective w, r took jp!L.ce， such .s tho con— sidorと.tion whutiior �-n attack towしrd the south would bo possible vithout directly involving the United Stc.tcs しnd Great Britcin in tho war. "At tho エmpしrixl. Confcronco of 5 Novonbor 1941 it was decided to bしgin hostilities somotino uftcr the 25th of Novciiibor c nd it vvus pi： .nned. to open Hyw negoti.'.tions with the Nothorl：nds Indies for thu purpose of concocling 二nd disguising tho Jr:pt;\nesu pl:,ns for ;:n じtt�..cic upon tlic;t country. "On 5 --nd 7 November 1941 Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Orders Nos.1‘.nd 2 u c issued, of which nontion h：: s be�ノn n： c]し b^for-o. Further し.ns provided for the est'/olishnont of L. torapor； rjr mili- tary i..dninistr .tion for th^ territories which were to be occupied until 一 definite decision reg： rding their future situs could bt； ニ 1しde. Evcntu:.lly., nost of the southern し.;reしs to bo gr -ntod a cort'-in degree of sclf-govo r rirac n t unci or tho control of ..nd outlines for thしse future nG,-sur&s were drしwn up." 11 ? 654 i!At tliG Inpsriel Conforencs of 1 December 1941 the fへnal decision to doclrre war on the United. Strtr;s, -rurt rite5.n vn-1 the i:：etberlends wc.s mode. On 8 December 1941，«Ttpan attacked. c\ud s'nsequently dsclarcc1 vi/cr upon t:...c ̂ itec? Strtos and .3ャcct '"ritain. ro ^ornal doclrrct：'-on of I.TI-�y Joprn on the Fotherlmds wns ncdo, of, corte-Tolrtec, as nccorc.\n^ to F'rjjnc Kin.istcr 70JO, xi:- '：.-• c.xocnss.-' n；： this cv.est: on in tho Fr.ivy Council,sveh :， stip viô lc" hz ^.ndosxrrblr, for strptc^ic reasons. T-ô v̂c'：- ‘ in the I i t of tb.© knorm foctc, the 'Tothorlnn as へ ovsrmnsnt covld. herb or no doubt thst the. rttrc:''て：o，Poarl”rtoot rrd Sin.-re- pore were hnt c つrol”c_;j to ハ vj Htn «： - conqr.os r of tho ンctlici.lrnds Ir)d:ioc. According"1", it rocov;n:Ucd tho cxistcnco of n strtc of nrcr ami for.で：Lly. doc In rod vrar on Jr pr n, ;;":crnv:hilc, on 2 Docc r;er 1941 c now Cr.Mnot Con-i.itto3 to con3rider -•••oaŝ .rcs for the oconornc control on6. ezpioitntior] of tho shortly to be occupied southern regions hed jecn set v.p ^ndcr tho Ch£iirmnnnhip of the Pr.^idont of t] c Fir,nnin.3 "'OP.r-d, tl�3 r.cc-.sccl S—2丁巧:1，ハni the first venort, containin,-'ご:enercl o”.tli!:)is of inoosnros to 'je takorj in this rcspcct, vrcs px-onQn1-._d to t'-o Cabinet on 12 Dcc.vibcr. Another plr.n of t^j so•で dp to for the 1 1 ? 6 5 5 military and political rneoŝ .res in tbo soutbern areas provided for the final disposal of all terr.itoriss to bo broi^ht under the control of Jrprn. ;,In tlie roonths of Novcnbsr 1941 to I?ebruory 1942 extorsive reports wcro prepared "oy the Total Vlcr Pcsovrch Institute on the sane question, goii?^ into great detail concerning the -.loaGures to bo tp.!;:en in tho political, military nnd econoraic fiolds over r：Ion2 psriod of years to ensvrG for Japan tho definite of tho wliolo Erst Acir o.nd fdjoin- 5.ng regions. "On IS January 1942, the first Jcpanssc troops landed. In the ‘ cthorlonds Indj.ca nnd the Jrn^nose Govcrmaoi；；-issued n dcc lorn tier: 5.n ch it regrottocl bo?.ir~ co.̂ pcllsci to wcごe c vir,r cc.uscd "jj NotherlnnO.s v ^ s sion. "At tJ.'C oponins of the 79th Diet Session on 22 .Jannnry 1942, foreign T:-inir?セTOJO oncc aご;rin expi'o&sod his ro^rst vt bnving "oscn forced into ^ r by tho roth.orl^nds, ont added ；?.t tho srrae tine that t.be of tho wnr wna th.o cstr.blishnc^t of Grooter I:つ;3t ；sis undor t；-Icrdei-sMp of Jr.prn, for which piir-oosc nil rrcrs of str^tc-ac ?.mportrr;co マonld hevc to be grrspccl">y Jnpan, s5j�cc sl:c wr,s 11，び 6 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 rcsoons:".blo for t:?o ar.fo-koopi'-•• o.? tnc Co-prospor11j Sphere セ by third powers. This wos rocffir-icd Iny Fri- Hininter TOJO, who ale o laid do-.Tn the f•'•'ijan.icntoli rinciplss on which セ、.e con- struction of Ire" ter 3r�t ニsis. '?ould ’�e brscd. CorT'icntinn; on the spccclic c, the G.�r’nr.n :">mbr.ssndor wes rblc to rs-port to govornmont thot tbsso ”r-:lie cinnonncc-つ.-.:nts of the Prims ond ？orciだn LiniKt. rs represented ？ now ::ofj.nitoly estoblish^cl nroo;rora for the cons tr :.ctf. on of the Grocter "rat -•air. Sphere，二n son�rscions v/o-.ld r；o rata； nod by Jr.pnn, 'Thilc othcr.3 -vo^l,like ""rnchukuo, >0 .3m--1七cd no:ninr.1 indencndcnee. “‘lGcn77"-'ilc, t]ic Jrnc.norje forccs ponotroted father in10 t1•，c rotosrlnRdG Indies. I ^Irondy tionocl thct one of tho in concsrns of the Jopmssc l.ocdors 77.es ' to cjcqujj.'c the oil res onrc'ĵ in tlio ：:".t̂ crlcnds Indies ”nclp .で;jecl. v:.n- occu;-:i:.ic the first inportrnt instrll r -i-.̂ons on the Ialr.nd of Tarr- ko n, and fin din '；• the O5.1-WG!1S destroyed, an ultimctr^ s son七 to the Cosr^ndor of t'--.s town of .^alikpcpcn in .-Borneo, the con tor of one of t.'?c ..'.，ost irportrnt oil rirod'-cin̂： ro ions :ln the I'othcrlmdG Indies, strtin;; thnt if tie oil instr.llntions vrcro not sつ.rrs:'ダベン:reel intoct t^e wbole white "oopT-.l-1?.on wovlrl 1 1 / ’ ヲ 7 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 he.vc to pny r̂ ith tho:' •lives. Sv^sjquontl^", tho to'Tn マrs "ttcc'r-d by ヶン心 Jrprnc^o,セhe oil vrclls vr̂ ro dcstroyocT, rn..: the rvLit.. popnl."tion ro-ondscl up ni)cl •n.rd̂ rcc'：. ;iOn 1 TIcvch 1つ42 lcndln^iJ took plcco on t：-.て:in iolmo. of the I'ut'ic.rlrnrk： Indict, the iclr:ニ6 or .Jr vr . Fn v? n ；；: ap;-roocbcd. t̂ .c i-.-iport̂ nt tOV;d of 'l-cndocn̂ ; in th.: crnt'or of the islnnd, the Jr;prnosc tV'cr，フ7t thrt th: thrこ.C.OPG for final snrrondor. Pc.jeetin- t:ニん offer bj the i"othc->"lfincia rvtl.oritioK to s ̂ rrcrdor tl:c tov-n, t1-： J-pmcso Corn -.rndor-in-Chiof •？ vo-.:od. Mr; \n ton tion to .̂ ovfo 口d "'-••troj tレぐ to^n, unless rll rotherl-nda forccc cr? pitulr-tcd. ?vrti'.cr rcsxatrncc hr.^in™ by th?.s tine bcco 'ic •isolô f.;, the -̂：/icRflc.：- tool: plccc. ilic Jcpcnoa： thror t, rnd m th '"he occiipation of Jr- va c6nplctcC, most O:L tbc rornninclcr of tb.c Ivcthcrlmus Indi&s wo. s occuplod shortly ."xtcrT.^rds. S. Occu.pction r nd Gonsolidrtion .UiJH巧.o_ GonquoAt3 ,_ :�r.ch 19—4及 to -：^.t.IMS. ;'To con'pi'： -he tbc picturc of Jr panose cc;rcnsx on nnd Jr:っrnos? ettいっpts to ^rin domnrtion of •1�1ニこ rrvt af t? . rro-ld, -It .'.a d'： cmcd fitting •to prcs---.it to the Triv.iinr 1 r： s-vr-vcj of tbc cms 对マ】ブ1-ch Jrpc.n, ':.ndoy t c .̂vlso of const---.ct;inT c 11 ? 658 Sph-：:.-o of Coronon Pronpc-rity nno Co-cxiatonc.'；, attoiiptod to rcbicvc tl:.o o.^oxation of tho tcTi :t oric o overrun by riLlitryy pggrccsion nnd their ^ncorporrtion ヒin c. ncr Jnpcnc,3c： :::rapirc. In t1-c ”rc3c'つtr.t�. on of the cvidenco on this siで.-.、jeet， r survey v£ 11'00 ^Ivcn of tho three r.nd r br.lf venr-s of Jcpnncac rule .in セレc licthorlrncia I" dies， ro'-jy cvont-s on the islmtl of tLo r ！- I'cdirrj ArcMpcl the .�csl-.nd of Jr vr ,-マill. bo dor It vd. th in so..:に.o.otril.ムlthov^h corm°?" ,tivcly sn^ll in ore- } this ialr.ncl，ov;；n raoi'G dcviccly popu- tc,d tbrn J n n itsolf； coひprisc.s nonrly 30：'. of tho totol population of oil the Sou.thv,rrj Tcrritoriss マI,., c: err•！o ”ndcr t，.c f.,o- ？.nrf on of Jrpnn, incl v.din：- "nrvao , フでこnc� Inこ o-Chin厂，Mp.lnyr,, tho rhxlinninoE r.nO. the I"ot]-:crlr.nds Irdios. It is highly clove 1 ped r.s revere.3 :oth mdi-stry nnd "i-d for these roc son a �.:ry bo considered one of tho nost :Lnportmt of th: Jr.pnnoso conquests. "Ho'wcvcr, it nxiat bo strossocl t]�ごt dovoloprnonts in other countriGs occupxed -3 tbo result ox Jnpr.ncac n^^roasion w-vrc not iDrsicclly d5.fforont xro/n tlvoso in Jrvo, or- in tho rest of the Netb.crlr.rjds Iiju\es. Locrl vr.rirtions on tho a0.•-.?c thono there TTCrc: out the brcin of the Jnpmcsc occnpntion policy \ic.3 11 ? 659 セlie sr.nc cvor-rrlicro, end xi-?s cli::'r‘3厂3 coorciirir.tec； v/itli 0"r;rr.ri's n:i.r!is of "-:pnniC.ion r'n.cl tioi：. :!:;ntion Iirs been t/.c 0:" Jcprnr.-so plcns drovn up ^of oro the Joprp'cso con quest of tb.c Southern R0.31 oris hr.d been offcctod, or even before tho out- iDrc^k of the ".T,r in the Fr c:".f ic. These plcns, br aod on 七ho pcrmcncnt rctcr;t:.on of the j°ruitrj of Jr.つ�nose conqv -st, dealt rlth the finrl disposrl of territories to Idc c izccL by Jr.pen :，ncl with tho "ions”.res ncgsspr-;r for tho n chic vo men t of thr t ；: nd.. -̂-rt re more，Princ Hinistor TO JO, in M s -f o^o-i.cntionod g pooch rt tbo "79th Scsnion of the Diet on 22 Jonnr ry h^d a to tod publicly thnt Jr-prn vovld in tT:.o fut^.rc cloninrtc G-rc a t or Erst Acir. "Hr.d thoac niona o.Rd clGclcrntions prioi' to tlic Jrpr.nc..つ c occv.pt' tion loft m y don.̂ t c on c m in ~ Jnpnn 'a rin to r c^iovo the dominr.tion of '.•：,：:51 Asr'.r ncl--rkc セ1•レン ciffcr-nt coratries thereof subservient to herself, this dou.bi; would so or linvo "boon diGoo llocl "oj the nctu.r.l nolici.a foilov:od lov Jr.nr.n in ".icr of the occupiccl territories.." 11,660 "The first measures to be tsken after the occupation was effected, Fere to eradicate the ex- isting forms of government and to sever all contacts with r'estern influence and tho outside world. All government officials of Western origin were dismissed and interned, to be followed soon by the rest of the Occidental Dopulation, women and children included. This mass internment and strictly eriforced isola- tion from the outside world gave free rein to Japa- nese propaganda, whl oh immcdiritely mononoiized all means for disreminnting information. The territory of the Netherlands Indies was split ur> into various parts, some bej ng placed under the military administra- ti,on of the Army, some under the vNavy. The existing Government Dopartrac-nts were abolished and. replaced by centralized Japanese Army and Navy executive bodies staffed by Japanese cersonnel. "All renresentative advisory and legisla- tive councils were dissovled. An entirely new sys- tem of iccaX government along autocratic Jaoanese lines was introduced. All existing law courts were abolished and reolaced by a Japanese Judiciary, administering differently conceived orincioles of law, unaccentable according to democratic standards. All political parties were dissolved and a]1 politica 11,661 activities forbidden. . "Immediately a strangle-hold was laid uoon the economic structure of the country. As a first measure all existing banks, including the Central Bank, were closed down, liquidated, and replaced by Japanese banks. All i;'estern-ovned agricultural enterprises and all rmblic utilities were taken over by the JaoariGse authorities, v/ho excloited them directly or allotted them to Jananose governmcnt- controlled or nrivsセe comDanies . v 'ide-scale confis- cation of private property took nlace , either vith a nominal or without any compensation. All further economic activity was controlled by the Japanese authorities by uniting those who took oart in the economic life of the country, e.g., farmers, traders, mrn\ifact;”.rors, etc., within autocratically directed organizations. By these measures Japan achieved a thorough exploit?tion of the country to strengthen the Japanese war machine and to enrich herself end those of her nationals y"ho osrticiDated in it, there- by causing hardship, ooverty and hunger to the entire population. Hundreds of thousands ^erc deported as slave—laborers for the Jeomese Army and the greater rjprt of these victims perished through lock of food, shelter and medical attcrrcion." 11,662 "Immediate action was also taken in the field of education. One of the first sets of the Japanese was to close all schools, which were only partially raopened after the curriculum had been thcroughly revised and restricted: the teaching of JaDanese language end customs bccame obligatory; the teaching of other foreign languages was prohibited； Japanese history replaced the teaching of general history; the boundaries of the world were narrowed dcTO to those of the Greater East Asia Cc-prosoerity Sohcro. Scon cne centrsl 'Youth Movement' w?s es- tablished in which young men between the ages of 14 and 25 were to take part, and which aimed at the development of a militaristic soirit and the imbuing of the younger generation with veneration for Japan. "Through the creation of this and other centrally directed movomGnts, the v;hole socinl struc- ture was brought under rigid Japanese control and the way was paved for the inculcation of a totalitarian sp ir i t , a de sire for wnr, cruelty, and hatred of the 仰 st • Ir— the religious field, efforts were made to induce the Ilohammedan religious leaders to declare the ^ar for Greater Epst Asia a 'holy' vrs.r for all Moslems, At the s?me time, the system of Emncror worship was rigidly enforced, and all ” /ho had any 11,663 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 I 12! 13 I 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 っ3 24 25 officlnl or semi-o'TiciGl function had tc s*?err eternal allegiance to Japan. "Through those and other measures, the exe- cution of which was enforced by meons of s greatly expanded nolice force, trained 5 n Jnnanesc police methods nnd by e rrign of terror of the notorious Jcpa- nose Military Police, 0 thorough Jnpanizr.tion in all brrnchos cf society in the Nethcrlrnds Indies fss sccomolished in little more thrn one year. "Anort from the establishment of Jancnese M L O , the future formal stctus of the SGVC ral occupied territories, vhich vcrc under the military rdmirdstre- tion cf the Army nnd the Havy, h?d to be settled. To achiove the Jananosc cim of domlnstion of Eost Asia, two wpys ycre open. Firstly, it was nossiblc to annex the occuoicd areas outright and have thorn ruled di- rcctly by Japan, whether or not with s ccrtain degree of nominal sclf-govGrnmcnt, Secondly, sorie or all of the occuDicd areas might sooner or lr.tcr be given a semblance of indenendcnce by creating nuppet-rc-gimes under Janftnose control.In any esse, the final su- pervision rnd direction over all arcrs would ronain in Tokyo, for which purpose in November 194-2 the Greater East Asia Ministry wss set up, Fbich, it was intended, should regulate both the internal end external affairs 11,664. 2 ！ 3丨 4丨 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 1丨 12 I 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of al丄 countries within the Grerter Eest A sis Co— prosncrity Sphere. "In the middle of 1943 the first measures wern initiated for the execution of this policy. Burna and the Philippines were granted nominal independence, but no such stop was taken in regard to the Netherlands Indies. General Staffs of both the Army and the Navy, who were cPch responsible for the admj nistrstion of pert of the archipelago, wciv strongly opposed to the granting of any degree of self-govornmcnt despite pres- sure in this direction fro?n IOCPI army authorities. Accordingly, it wrs decidod that the Nethcrlrnds Indies vould continue to bo ruled directly by Japan. However, wore Janrncsc clpirns to have liberated the country from Amcricrn, British and ITcthcrlrnds oppression not to remain wholly i.;nsubst?ntirtcd, seme concessions would have to be tnede to the： inhabitants, from whom cctivc prrticinr.tion in tbe Ja none so wr r effort wr. s exacted. "Consequently, in his speech rt the 82nd Session of tho Diet in June 194-3 Prime Minister TOJO promised tho population of the Netherlands Indies a certain degree of particiontion ‘n the government of these islands. However, this Dsrticination, when ^ut into effect, nroved to be of no actual significance and fe.li fsr sho "t of the political rights enjoyed Dy 11 ? 665 the population before the Jananese occuDSti'on. "As the V'ic T progressed, however, ond Janen' s Dosition became precarious, more demands hrd to be Tnc.de on the Inhabitants of the occupied regions to strengthen the Jsnrnesc war effort. For thct nurpose, it became necessr.rv on the one h?nd to continue the nolicy of coking even rider nromises 2nd on the other to strengthen the Japanese hold on tine life of the 'country. ”In Fovenbor 1943, and Assembly of Greater East Asiatic rations was held in Tokyo. Thorc-, reprcs3ntrtives of the vrrious Jananese pup -:ct-govern- ments horrd Prime liinistor TOJO decler- thot the na- tions of Greater E?st Asia would heve to str.nd together and defend themselves jointly against their common enemies. After ronffirming their adherence to Japan and their fcith in Janaricsc leadership for Grcrter Frst A sir, the Conference r.doptcd a 'Grcrtor East Asia Declrration', which crllod for r common effort by ell Asiatic peoples in the nrosccution of the wrr. "The Netherlands Indies, being under dircct JrornCSG rule, WCRR not represented ？t this m cting of so-called free n?ナions; nevertheless increrscd ef- forts were mrdc by the Jsnnnes' authorities to rehieve the regimentation of the whole oopulotion for the 11,666 fiithorrnce of the jEpnncse war effort m d to induce or coerce the male population to join the railitrry organizations whi ch wc-rr to assist the JaDnncse armies. "In July 1944, the war situation Moving be- come increasingly grrvo, tho TOJO C^binot went out of office-, ond v/rs roplrced by 0 nev: Cnbirmt under thし accused KOI SO r.s Prime Minister, while the accused SHIGEIIITSIT, who hnd alrordy been Foreign Minister in the TOJO Co binct sinc>: April 1943, remained in that post r:nd beenme concurrently Ilinistcr for Greater East Asia. One of the first moves ‘of the now Cabinet, under further prossnrc from local array authorities, v. r as to revise tho Jn^nncsc policy rcg^rdinp the Ncthcrlends Indies. Commnicrtions between Jr.pen and the Southern Regions had bocome endangered, and it wrs new nccessory to mrke further efforts to ensnre ful] cooperation from the locrl Dopulr.tion. Accordingly, Prime Minister KCISO, in his speech before the 8ヲth Session of the Diet on 7 September 1944, promised future indoDcndencc to tho Ne the Tin nds "Indies. No further dotnils フ ere given, hcwcvr'T, c.s to how, when, rnd to v^hrt extent, independence would bo grrntcd and, indeed, even at this str.ge there virs no intention to trke definite steps in that direction, "The main purDose of the Jopnnesc oromisc- 11,667 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 】4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 v/as to induce セhe pomilr 1 tion to r.ssist to tトc ntmost in the Jannn:se war effort by stimuir ting their nntion- rlistic fcolinp's. Definite instructions ns to tho policy which the loeel Jnpnnese r.utborities should ^ollov to th:s end でciv sont from Tokyo. One of the mersurcs taken v'as the training of tho entire popula- tion to p^.rticipp.te in anticipated Japanese guerilla warfare. "During the vintcr of 1944 pnd the spring of 1945, tho wrr situation bccarae incrof 1 ,singly grpvc for Jr pan. r i t h the loss of the Philinriine Islands, lines of cormnunicrtion be two OR Jaorn nnd the Southern Regions became entirely disrupted. 11 v.'?s not until Mry 1945, hoロever, vrhen it wr s npnorent thet the v;pr co^ld not be nrotrrctcd much longer, thrt orders vwre given by the Jananose Government to initiate me?sures for the grrnting of indcncndcnce, while in July of thr.t ycrr instructions wore issued fro their further r. ccclcrr tion. "Prcpnrrtions hrd hardly started, however, when on 14 August 1945, Jopr.n surrendered. Rognrdless cf this ncr situation, the Jrppnesc srv tc it thrt a Japanese fostered stctc- would still be established. During one f m n t i c vicek, while the noys of the sur- render v/ns being kept secret, the ncccssfry Droocro- 11,668 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 tions rcre mrdo m d the independence proclaimed. On 2 ！ 22 August 1945, the news of the Japanese surrender 3 ‘ v;rs published nnd the J?DancsG Commr.nder-in-Chicf in | ‘ J'rva strted in a farewell message to the population that Japan v/ould nov hrive to lor.ve tho Southern Regions, but thrt eternal friendship between Jnpcn end the people of the new-born strte hrd been immutPbly estnblished. "These then rre the main outlines of the development of Jnnr nese ngeression c： grinst the Nether- lands , n n d of Jrnrneso rttcmnts to hold on to the fruits of this aggression m d secure； the domination of the countrios of the South Ser.s imtil the very lrst "With tト-permission of the Court, ve rrc no双 prepr.red to oroceed ri th the ere sentr.tion of the evidence. I n this trsk I will be rssisted by M r . G , Osmond Hyde, Spocir.l Assistnnt to the Attorney General of the United Strtes, nnd by my rssociGtes L t . Colonel J . S. Sinninghc Daraste, I'Ir. A . T... Lrvorge m d Mrs,. C . R . Strookcr." THE PRESIDENT: We will recess nor until h?lf tjrst one, (thereupon, at 1158 c reccss vrs taken.) 25 11,7 669 AFTEKNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant tc recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE CC UET s The International I : ilitary Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Laverge. MR, LAVERGE s The first number of documents will be introduced by Mrs. C. R . Strooker of the Netherlands Division,' who up to now has not been Introduced to the Court. THE PRESIDENT; Mrs. Strooker. MRS。 STROOKER: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal, we shall first present or refer to a number of documents concerning treaties, pledges and assurances by which Japan was bound to respect the integrity of the Netherlands territory. The Court's attention is invited to exhibit 24, being the Treaty between the United States 5 the British Empire, France and Japan, signed in Washing- ton on Decemter 1 3 , 1 9 2 1 . By this Treaty the four signatory Powers agreed to respect each others' rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific Ocean, and to settle all differences arising amongst themselves or this f-2345678910ll121314;216f18192css2s3425 Goldbefbo & spratt 11,670 subject by peaceful means only. The next document we wish to refer to is exhibit 26。 As this exhibit has not yet been read we will now, witト the Court 1 s permission, proceed to read it. THE PRESIDENT: You may read it, Mrs. Strooker, MRS。 STROOKER (Reading): "DECLARATION OF JAPAN REGARDING HER RESOLU- TION OF RESPECTING EIGHTS OF FET服【LMDS IN HELATICN TO HER INSULAR POSSESSIONS IN REGION OF PACIFIC OCEAN. "Dated February 5 , 1 9 2 1 (10th year of Taisho) "Published August 1 7 , 1 9 2 3。 "Japan has concluded on December 13th, 1921, with the United States of America., the British Empire and France a treaty with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the r e g i o f the Pacific Ocean, They have agreed thereby as "between themselves to respect their rights in relation to these possessions and dominions« "The Netherlands not being a signatory of the said treaty and the Netherlands possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, therefore, not being 11,671 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 included in the agreement referred to, the Govern- ment of Japan, anxious to forestall any conclusion contrary to the spirit of the treaty, desires to declare that it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of tie Netherlands in relation to her insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." To show that in Aprilヅ194-0. the Japanese Government still officially adhered to its professed desire that the status c[uo in the Netherlands Indies would net be changed, we offer in evidence prosecu- tion document 823B(1) 5 being an excerpt from court exhibit 777 for identification, a collection of official Japanese Government announcements for the year 194-0. We will now read exhibit -- THE PPESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. | CLERK OF THE COURTs Prosecution document No. 823B(1) will receive exhibit No. 1284. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit Ro. 1284 and received in evidence.) • S , STROOKERs We will now read exhibit N o . 1284. "FOIffllGK OFFICE 遍 T 0 U N C m ? S 1940: ‘‘ん)r.13,1940. Foreign Hinister AHITA Replies to News]つ〔‘-geiv.丄en on the Question of the 11,672 Netherlands Ec.st Indies, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "On being questioned by nowspc.po-mcn con- ccrning J. p. n's position "with regard, to the possi- ble involvenent of the Netherl..,nc!s in tho European unci its rcpercussions in the Nethorl： nds Er.st Indies, tho Foreign Linistor Mr.ムRITバ roplicd cs follows： "With the South Sc:..s regions, cspociully tho Notiiurli-nds E,.....st Indies.， J..pr,n is oconouicし]..ly bound by .̂n intia, tu rしlo.tionsiiip of uutu lity in Liinistcririej to one ..notli,..r' s need. Similarly other countries of ^.^st D. .ulCv ii丄tしin closし economic re- lations with these regions, Th.i t is to sr y, J' pan, those countries こ.nd these rcgionG togoth«.r c.rc con- tributing to the pro spority of E: st ハsir. through mutual t.id and intcrdepGiacicnce. "Should tho hostil土*fciしs In Huropio be ex- "tendeci to the NQthGrlcnds, i.iid produce repercussions, -s you scy, in the Nuthuric.nds Sc.st エndios， it would not only int^rf.りrし with the mx intentnco ncl further- しnee of the l；bove-nontion^d rulc.tions of economic inturdopeBd'^nce,しnd of co-bXistencc へnfi co-prospority 5 but lso give risu to '.n undじsir'.ble situ tion from the standpoint of tho pu. Cb . nd stability of 2cst ^^si:,• In viol// of thしsじ consider., tions the 11,7 673 Govしrnmbnt cしn not but bo deeply conccrned over any dbvolopricnt, occonpLnying tho c.ggr。vf..tion of tho w:.r in Europe, th. t nしy affect tho status quo of the Ncthorl： nds Ecst Indies, " ^ r i l 1 8 l 1940. St:.toi.ient of the Foreign Officc. Spokcsn.n Concerning thu Question of tho Netherlands E ,st Indies. 1u-vg rupeivcid c report from our M i n i s t ^ ！ ct tho Hague, ivir.エt:ro ISIIII, to th.. following cffect, "Minister ISHII cc.llcd on the Netherlands Foreign lviinistor, M r . v m Klcfi':.ns, on th^ 16th of れprilしnd cxpluinod to the li.tt^r tho attitude of the Jcp^nusc Govurmiunt vith rogc.rd to thし question of tho Nuth^rl. rids L,.st Indies. The Netherlands Foreign Mini- ster oxpr^ssod tlic ；Netherlands Guvornriont 1 s apprecia- tion of tho Govcrm.icnt' s ；.ttitudo しnd ct th- sm'iio tii.iu stated tli:-t the NcthL-rlr.nds Govcrni.iGnt h^d not sought nor would sook in tho future c.ny country*s protection of tho Noth^rl..nds Ecst Indies, end th:.t the Ncthor.1'. nds G-cvormiunt dctuniinod to refuse any offer of protv.ctiJii of intervention of ny kind which night bo nf-dし by i.ny country. "Tho KotiiGrl .nds Liinxstur t Tokyo, General J". C, Pc'bst culled on the Foroign kinistor, M r . Hachior； ハRITパ,toacy i.no confiraod tho .beve report of Llinistor ISHII,” 11,674 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We respectfully call the Tribunal's atten- tion to exhibit 1013, a press release "by the United States Department cf State on A p r i l 1 7 v 1940, con- taining an official declaration by the United States Government in regard to Minister ARITA's statement. In this declaration emphasis was laid on the fact that each of the four signatory powers to the afore- mentioned Pact of 13 December 1921 continued to be bound to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Indies. We next offer in evidence a further excerpt from exhibit 777 for identification, prosecution document 823B(2)， being a declaration by the Japanese Government on May 11,194-0, concerning the mainte- nance of the status quo In the Netherlands Indies, to show that after the Netherlands had been invaded by Germany the Japanese Government still officially declared that the status quo in the Netherlands Indies should not be changed. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. G L E H OF THE COURT: Pi»osecnti〇n document 823B(2) will receive exhibit No. 1285. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked Drosecution's exhibit N o . 1 2 8 5 and received in evidence.) 11,7 675 We will now read exhibit 1285： "FOREIGN OFFICE A翻OUNCEMENTS. 1940, "May 1 1 , 1 9 4 0 . Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Maintenance of Status Quo of the Netherlands East Indies. "Considering the possibility of the war in Europe spreading to the Netherlands, the Japanese Government made public on the 15 of April their attitude of deep concern over any development that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, and subsequently they notified the Nether- lands Government to that effect. In connection with this, the Netherlands Government expressed their deterrr.ination not to alter their policy of maintain- ing the status quo cf the said Netherlands, colony under any circumstances. "As the European war has now spread to the Netherlands, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachior ARITA， invited the Netherlands Minister at Tokyo, General J. C. Pabst, to the Foreign Office this afternoon, and informed the latter that the Japanese Govern- ment earnestly hope that the Netherlands Government will firmly maintain their said determination regard- ing the question of the Netherlands East Indies. "The Foreign Minister has also called 11,676 attention of the representatives in Tokyo of bellig- erent ccuntries, namely v Great Britain, Germany and France, to Japan 1 s concern over the said question. "The Foreign Minister has informed the representatives of two neutral countries, the United States and Italy, for their reference,.the fact that the Japanese Government made the above notification to the government of belligerent countries concerned." This new declaration b;^ the Japanese Govern- ment caused Great Britain and France to make similar declarations. These are contained in prosecution document 823B(3), an excerpt from exhibit 777 for identification. We offer prosecution document 323B(3) ih evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 823B(3) will receive exhibit No. 1286. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1286 and received in evidence.) MRS。 STROOKER: We will now read 1286; "FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENTS 194-0: "May 1 3 , 1 9 4 0 . Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Netherlands East Indies. "The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, 11,7 677 at 6:00 o'clock this afternoon, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro AEITA, at the latter's official residence with the reply of his home Govern- ment to the representation made by Foreign Minister ARITA on May 11 regarding the Netherlands East Indies. The British Ambassador told Foreign Minister ARITA that the British Government fully share the Japanese Government‘s concern over the Netherlands East In- dies but believe that the Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies are sufficient for the maintenance of the status quo of those islands, while Great Britain has no intention whatever of intervening there. The British Arbassador left the Foreign Office at 6;40 o 1 clock this evening. "May 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 . Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Netherlands Minis- ter 's Notification with F:egc t rd to the Netherlands East Indies. "At 10:00 A . M . today, the Netherlands Minister, General J. C. Pabst, called on the Foreign Minister 5 Mr. Hachiro AEITA, at the latセerts official residence under instructions from his home Government with reference to the Foreign Minister's communication tc the Netherlands Government made on the 11th of this month, and stated that the Netherlands Govermrent 11,7 678 a r� of the belief that Great Britain, the United States and France have no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies. "The Netherlands Minister took leave of the Foreign Minister at 10:20 k. M . ,! May 1 6 , 1 9 4 0 . Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the French Ambassador's Notlficiation with Kegard to the Netherlands East Indies. "The French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsene- « Henry, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro ARITA, at the Foreign Office at 3s30 P. M . today under instructions from his home Government with reference to the Foreign Minister ! s communication to the French-Ambassador made on the 11th of this month regarding the maintenance of status j^uo of Netherlands East Indies, and stated that the French Government entirely agree with the Japanese policy on the ques- tion. "The French Ambassador left at 4:00 P. M.“ 11,7 679 MRS. C, R。 STROOKER; We offer in evidence prosecution's document 220N, being e press release issued by the Department of State on May 1 1 , 1 9 4 0 . THE PRESIDENT： Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document N o . 220N will receive exhibit No. 1287. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1287 and received in evidence.) MRS, C . R。 STROOKER; We will now read exhibit No。 1287: "Foreign Relations of the United States-Jspan, 1931-1941, V o l . I I , p . 285. Press Release Issued by the Department of State on May 1 1 ? 1 9 4 0 . "In response to inquiries "by correspondents concerning press reports from Tokyo relative to the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies 5 the Secretary of State made the following statement: "'I have no full report about the matter referred to in the pre^ss despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States 5 have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the stetns cmo of the Netherlands East Indies. This was in harmony with definite 11,680 commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government assumes that each of the governments which has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments • On A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 4 - 0 , in a public statement エ said: "'"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any slteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, rieace, end security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." "'In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of intention to rcspect the status quo of the Netherlands Last Indies cannot be too often reiterated.'" V/e offer in evidence prosecution document 220P, a memorandum by the United States Secretary of State, dated May 16,194-0. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THF COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220P will receive exhibit No. 1288. (Whereupon, the document atove re- ferred. to was marked prosecution's exhibit No。 1288 and received in evidence.) 25 MRS。 C . R。 STROOKER; I will now read narts of 11,681 exhibit 1288: "Memorandum by the Secretary of State. "(Washington) Mcy 1 6 , 1 9 4 0 . "The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request." エ will now continue to read from the second paragraph on page 2 of the English text onward. "I then kicked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in whxch the Japanese Government is reported to "be discussing every day or two some phases of the Nether- lands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I hsd not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Govern- ments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commit- ment that each was obligated to respect the status auo in the Netherlands East Indies and I hed thought that settled, the matter as anong our four countries, since cach country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the ^status_quo, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Jspsn, there was continuslly 11,7 682 coming out of Tokyo additionel discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to rtspcct and preserve the status .quo had not been made. I said that these were news reports snd I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself end others to preserve understanding and fair play end fair tre&tmcnt between our two countries by causing misunderstanding end increasing hostility on the part of the people in eech country. I said that エ would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Jspen. I added finally that my Government strives for neace year in and year out and it d.esires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controvrrsy arises, the fault will not lie st the door of this Government. I ssid further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and ^reserve pescc, boxh with other countries and among other countries,エ hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunder- stood . » The Ambasssdor undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he wes subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated thr.t his 11,7 683 Government wss < ntir&ly satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the st&tus quo,in respcct to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four govern- ments interested 5 and thst it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them, I remarked thst, since my Government wss interested, I had made inquiries of the British and the French, and gc-the rod the "unequivocal understanding that they had no idea whatever to intervene in the Nctherlends East Indies in any way. "The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in conn-:, ction with the West Indies situation, end I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government thr.t, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal sceess to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to irrmosc- in the Pccific Ocean area, the United States and other countries arc to be dc-nicd equality of trsde end industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation. n I again brought to his attention the information 11,7 684 contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese ncwsricpers, as stated, were under- trking to keep a.livc and emphasize some supposed spesial interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there v;ss en intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to rcod.-stly take in the great r.rchipelago comprising the East Indies, prrsumnbly with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to dcmanci equality of trade opnortunitics in every other part of the world； thot there did not exist any selfish or othor reason on the part of other nations to inter- fere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. Tho Ambassador again stated thft his Government ソas satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of erch of the throe other governments intcrestefl,end that the y had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contr.ct the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his state- ment , b u t c.?sin reminded him of my difficulty to / 11,7 685 understand the policy of the Jnpr.nese Government or the Jrpsncse press, whichever it was， to continue virions lines of discussion indiceting r claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Nether- lands East Indies situ?tion; that in a recent statement, エ had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government thct the strtus guo should be rcspectcd and preserved by ecch of the four governments; th'?t the real question Drc.scn'tcd. actually relrted to the entire Pacific area and thst no further elaboration beyond my rccent stetemcnt on this subject would ap^err to add to anything I then seia. "I still-interpret the Ambasscdor's visit cs one under instructions to develop a pretext to surmort J?pen in connection with its ^lans and purposes toward the N e t h e r l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s . "C( ORDELL) H( l 7 LL)" We invite the Tribuncl's attention to court exhibit 1014, r memorandum by the rnited States Ambassador to J a p m , dated 10 Juno 194-0. In this uieraorandum the Ambr.ssador quotes the Japanese Foreign Minister as asserting crtegoricslly that Jepcn enter- tained no territorial ambitions and that sny suspicion thc.t Japrn intended to procced against the Netherlands 11,686 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 Indies was entirely unjustified. We next offer in evidence prosecution document 220?!, a telegram from the United states Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the United states becretarv of 卜tate, dated 24 Marc’。1941. THE PREt-'IDEKT: Admitted on the usual terras. CLERK CF THE COURT: Prosecution 1 s document No. 220M will receive exhibit N o . 1289. (7/hereu^on, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit N o . 1269 and received in evidence.) . C . R.トTROOKE'fU We will now read the f p a r a g r a p h cnly of exhibit No. 1289. "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (btsinhardt) to セhe ドecretarv of J-tate. "(Paraphrase -- Extracts) "Moscow, I'arch 2 4 , l c 4 1 - - 3 p.m. "(Received liarch 2 5 — 7 . 3 0 a.m^) "This corning I was given the opportunity by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to tal> with i'ATt-UOKA for an hour. "MATとUCKA was emphatic in stating that under no circrastances would Japan attack ‘、.ingapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no territorial arbitions." ，、r..プ..:;.'‘ • ' r v . . . . v へ ： " バ ー ： ： ズ ベ , . ザ へ : , た ‘ ’ t � ” 广 ぬ 、 - . ^ ^ 11,7 687 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Japan, he sand, was ready at any moment to ,iom the United tat^s in s guarantee of the tGrritor.ial in tepri tv or independence of the Ph?lipy. :'ne Islands. As an evidence of Japan's lack of territorial ambitions, JIATMJOia referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-'.C-hiHa P He said that Japan would not go to war with the United ."-tat^s, and added that frora his reading of American hi storv it appeared that it was the United rtat : ";S which went to war with Dther countries; if a conflict shoulS taVe place it would cone about only as the result of affirmative action by セhe United f^tat-s." We srall now; present to the Tribunal a i number of documents, showing how a police of military expansion southward, was gradually conceived and later officially adopted by Japan. We respectfullマ call the Tribunal's attention to court ux^ibit No. 979, entitled "The Fundamental Principle of our National Police," dated 11 August 1936, and signed by the Prime Minister and the War, Navy, Finance and Foreign Ministers. We would like to point out that at this time thっ accused HIROTA was Prime 1 inister and the accused NAGANO was Navy Minister. 11,7 688 With the Tribunal's permrssion we would like to read the first paragraph oclv of exbibit 979. THE FRE.-IDENT： You may. MRb. C . R . STROOKER; Thank you. (Reading)： "’The fundamental principle of our national policy,' (signed bv the five ： inisters -- the Premier, War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers-- 11 August 1936) 6 "Fundamentals of our National Policy, "I The fundamental principle of administering the state based on righteousness lies in realizing the ideal of our national foundation b^ strengthening the foundation of our country internally and prospering externally, th^rebv making the Japanese Empire develcp into the stabilization Power, nominal and v i r t u a l , i n the East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind throughout the world. In view of the situation of the Empire, both home and abroad, to establish the fundamental national policy consists in securing a steadv footing of our Empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the fouth ^eas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic sJ'ill and national defense. The general basic principles are as follows:" I don't think it will be necessarv to read them. 11,689 We offer for identification only, Prosecution Document 487, a book bv the accused FASFIHOTO, entitled 2 "Addresses to Young Men", published in 1937. 3 n � e offer in evidence Prosecution Document 487B, 4 being excerpts from the aforesaid book. 5 TEE PRES.IDEi f T: Admiv.ted. on the usual terms. 6 CLERK OF TEE CO'^T: Prosecution's Document No. 487 可ill be given exhibit No. 1290 for identification only, and the excerpt t'-'srefron, to-^it., Document 4.87B will receive, 'exhibit No. 1290A. (^hereupon, Prosecution's Document No. 487 was marhed Prosecution's Exhibit No. 1290 for identification. Prosecution's Document 487B w?s marked Prosecution's Exhibit No. 1290A, and was received in evidence.) ！6 ； MRS. STROOKER:' We s： all now read pert of 1 7 iexhibit 1290A, from the very beginning: "Addresses to I . •' ！ 8: Young Men by HASFIMOTO Kin-:oro. Cl' ap^er Vエエ• The 19 | - orld's Japan; Japan's T;rorld. 20 1 ' r 'fe have already said that there are only 21|three ways left to Japar to excape fron the pressure of surplus population. Our situation is liレe that of several dozens of people crammed into a small room of about sixt) r feet square. And t: ： re are only three doors of escape left, oper for us, nariely smifration, inroads 22 23 24 25 1 1 , 6 9 C , into world markets, and expansion of territories. The first door, emigration, has been slammed in our faces by the anti-Japanese iciiriigration policy of other countries; The second door, inroads into world markets, also is being pushed back by high tariff walls, and the abroga- tion of commercial treaties. "V/l-iat must Japa- do when t-7o of the three doors have been closed against her? "It is quite a natural force of circumstances for Japan to rush to th2 last, door remaining open* maマ sound 1 dangerous when we spea!: of terri- torial expansion, but. th? territorial expansion which we have in mind does ."ot necessarily nean the occupation of other countries' territories, tbe planting of the Japanese flag thereon and the declaration of their annex- ation to Japan. It simplv mepns that since the powers of the -orlc' have gone too far in suppressing the pene- tration of Japanese materials and. merchandise abroad, we are looking for a place so'-ie^'here beyond ths seas マトere Japanese capital, skill and labour can have free without the oppression of the white race. ,r:je shall be satisfied ^ith this much. What moral rights have t卜e ,;, orld powers ”.'hic!, have already closed rrith their o^n hands the two doors of emigration and inroads into world markets to criticize Japan's 11,691 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 attempt to rush out of the t ird door open to her? "If they do not approve of this, they should oつen the doors ch they themselves had closed against, us and permit ^reecom of activity/ abroad to Japanese emigrants and merchandise. "Thus, the Manchurian Incident suddenly broke out in September of Sho'7a 6 /Iり31/” Fow, continue reading from the l6th line frora t ; ?e bottom of page 2 onward: "Then, suppose there is still on this earth l?nd endowed, -n'.tb abundant underground natural re- sources whic u has not yet been developed si七 all by the white race, would it not be God's wishes and Providence's will for the Japanese to go over there and develop it for the well-being of mankind? "And there still remain many mp.ny lands of this kind on this e&rth. "The SOUTH SEAS ISLAMDS are one example. "The SOUTE SEAS ISLANDS are located at a very short distance from the southernmost point of FORMOSA. Thev are also located at a point where they can be rescued by motor fishing boats from our SOUTH SEAS MANDATED ISLANDS. "There are large islands, such as B'OR^IEO, CELEBES and KEW GUIKEA scattered throughout the seas." 11,692 cell them islands, but GUIr^EA are large islands, JAPAN. "The Fetherlands in reality B O � 0 and KK" larger than the whole of is the titular owner of most o:? those islands, and thus thev are called IST^EilLAnDS EAST IIIDIES. However, what the Dutch have actually develoned is tha small island of JAVA only, the other islands being left, almost untouched. The Netherlands, even if they wished, fine 1 their bands fullマith the isle.ncl of JAVA alone, ？.nc 1 have no reserve -?ower for the development of the other j.slo.ncls r r e row corj'"inv'.e reodirr from paragraph 11 on p?.ge 4 orwards: "Fcr this reason •••;e demand lands in the north, south, east anr' weft of JAPA1>* マhere the Ja.p-nese people m?.y freely develop their mowers. What we seek is not nominal territories, "but a new land 卞ere Japanese labour and technology and merchandise ？.nd capital may freely display without any persecution thsir activities and develop the riches no 1 '? lying idle. We loudly ce.11 unon the world for such lands. "However, lot us turn our thoughts to the tine when JAPAN makes up her mind and starts her southward development. We must be -orepared to encounter a great obstacle lying obstinately in our w a y . Although the 11,7 693 Nefcherlands owns the grante-r つart of the SOUTI" SEA ISLANDS, the actual power which protects these islands is the BRITI. C :F EMPIRE, which boasts of the greatest navy in the T'orld." We now continue to read from the fourth line on page 5' "Therefore, "before ”?e aspire to effect over- seas development, we must make a gro?t resolution. If .r'e are thought loss enough to plan this aclvnice with- out t K 'is preparation, cr:r scheme --,oulcl show a reckless failure t.o understand historv. "K^verth"lGSs,、 T e call upon the ヮorld for our right, to expand overseas. We demand, this because, un- less ”,e arc to starve willy-nilly in this small island coun'ry, the onl；'' way out of it is to effect overseas development by seeking new lands in the wide world around us. "As alrr^rdy stated the world has no noral right, to deny us this right. "Of course, it. would be out of the quest ion if the Japanese rccG "/ere an inferior rf;ce without the ability to dovclop ns-7 lands r.nd without the qualifica- tions to govern. However, the superior ability of the J?.panose race has already been tested." " v e read from the third line on page 6 onv/ard: 11,7 694 "Frets spGa 1 r most eloquently.. If, is only a. droc.m of days gone by that only the： white men are entitled to rule the T /oriel.The- facts show plainly T :hich of the tヮo, tho.コhit.e men or tbe Japanese are bettor qur.lif isd to develop overseas lands. M 0i course, we do not wholly, extol our past rule of KOREA and F0Rl r 0SA. There sre too many defects to enumerr.te here«, Anc' yet in spite of these defects must s'r.y that lr.nd.s developed and peoples ruled "by such s. superior rc ce as the Japanese are fortunate com- pared with those under tbe tyrr.nnical rule of the white m e n . "Te arc ？.ble to s J ..T!te these facts to the whole world "ith no diffic oncG nh.£tGver. n 11,7 695 We offer in evidence prosecution document 1644, being an official declaration by the Japanese Government on November 3，1938„ At this tims the accused ARAKI, ITAGAKI and KIDO were members of•ふケiae O-^inet, THE ;'Pl.:5SIDENT: Admitted on the usual terras. CLERK OF THE C O U R T P r o s e c u t i o n 1 s document No. 1644 玟ill receive exhibit No» 1291• (thereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit N a . 1 2 9 1 , and W3s received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: (Reading) "ST/.TIMINT 0 ?IFE IITERIAL JAPAI^FE GOVLF;NMENT CON- CERNING THL FUTURE OF EAST ASIA "3 N o v e m b e r , 1 9 3 8 "Ey the ？upust virtue of His Mejesty, the IrrrperislふTwy rnd N r v ? l forcer heve succeeded in oc- cupying C e n t o n , i r r - uchang, H?11kov, end Heu , r &ng, end the Fein territory of Chins hs? been conruere^• The Ne- tionel Government hps been reduced to a locel regime. B u t , es long rs the regime oontinues the anti-Jppan end pr•—Communist policy, InperiflL JFpsn will never 1 lay down frms until the regine is completely destroyed. The ult.irate air of Imperipl Jppgn is to establish a New Order which will secure eternel peece In the Fer 11,696 Er '-t, end this is the finr 1 purpose of the present "Tbe foundrt:on of the New Order cpn be es- trblished thrcuph the collfborftion of Mpnchukuo m d Chinp with J r p m in econornics, politics ？nd culture•， "hf'sed on cooperation rnd mv.ti-r 1 fid. The New Order should rim rt the ertrblishirent of internrtionrl jus- tice ,rnti-Comr^unist cooper?tion, the neF culture rnd econonic unity in the Frr I'r.̂ t., This is whet strbilizes A sir rnd proroセes ’"?orld developrnent a ^hv t J? nrn expects of China is for her to +rke pprtirl charge of the duty of estrblishing the New Order in the Frr . Imperi?l Jrprn expects the people of Chinp to under- strnd Jpprn's sincerity ？nd replv to J?p ？n by giving her cooperrtion. In cese the Nftionel Government strrts its life rneて"'by crpting fwey the old policies rnd chrnging its stpff, it will not be refused entry into the crrtip of the New Order, "Becfuse Imrterirl Jr-prn believes thet the powers will rightly understmd J?pen's intentions ?nd thrt they �i l l chrnge their rttitude in order to suit the si turtion in Erst A sir, Jrprn ir- especially grrte- ful for the kindness of the Allied Nrtions. "Believing th?t the esteblishment of the Ne^ Order in the Fpr Erst is. originrting frora the spirit 3f 十he rartionrl foundrtion, tho copplr-tion of the tr?k i? the Floriour mission irpcsed on the people of J r r m . IinDerif 1 Jr^rn should t.rke firm steps to renovrte the vrrious internr1 systems, tc develop the totr] ^o^er of the nrtion m d should rdvrnce to rttpin the r.ention- ed mirpose. "Thi-? is the unnovrble principle rnd resolu- tion of the Iiroerirl Government." 11,698 THE PRESIDENT: M r . Logan. M R . LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, on behalf of defendant KIDO I.call your attention to the fact that the certificate attached to this docu- ment just read shows that it was found in the Foreign Ministry, In General Mulder's opening statement, he said, on page 5, lit November 1938，the first KCNOYE Cabinet issued the official declaration." I wish to call the Tribunal's attention to the fact there is nothing in this document which,; shows it v;as issuad by the' Cabinet. THE PRESIDENT: ，e note -jvhat you say, K r . Logan, without necessarily agreeing with it。 MRS. STROOKSR: The T r i b u n a l s attention is invited to Court exhibit 509, being a report on a visit by the accused OSHIMA and General TSHAUCHI to German Headquarters in September 1939。 On this occasion the accused OSHIMA gave as his opinion that Japan was now reacy for an advance to the go : uth. We invite the Tribunal's attention to exhibits 517, 518 and 519, being telegrams exchanged between the German Ambassador in Tokyo and ths German Foreign Minister in May 1940. In these talegrnras the German Ambassador reported that he had explained to the Japanese Government that Germany was not interested in the Netherlands Indiss, and he further stated that this declaration by Gsrrmny was considered by the Japanese press as a "carte blanche" for Japan. The Tribunal's attention is called to Court exhibit 523, being a telegram from the Gerimn Ambassador in Tokyo to ths German Foreign Minister, datad 24 June 1940. The Geriran Ambassador reported that ths Japanese Minister for Overseas Affairs, the accused KOISO, had enquired from him what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies. The Tribunal's attention is invited to Court exhibits 527 and 528, being the minutes of a joint conference of Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities on 12 and 16 July 1940, in which Japan's attitude toward the southern regions and Japan's future domination of these areas iwere extensively- discussed. THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks. 11,7 700 M R . BROOKS: If tho Tribunal please, in re- ge.rご to the Minister of Overseas Affairs, KOISO, I would like to state thct on nage 6 of the opening stc.t.Gmont., document No 3 6912 of the prosecution,エ think the Court may have judged the つ''ay it • -as ro- fGi-rad to .̂hr.t 'the Minister of Overseas Affairs, the accused KOISO, inquired again ？?het Gornanjr r s atti- tude , . I d c n f t tbink the "again" referred to Gcn- erel KOISO., but to a previous paragraph. But to avoid any misunderstanding I waited until it vas rrised at this tirae by rcfcrcnco to the document., •"'l-.ich is the only document in question, pnd call tbe Court, r s attention to na.ge 6l65 of the procGedings ? pa.ge 6175 ?.nd alro 6826 v^hcre t'-at was discusscd fully in a previous ense •マit上 the prosecution's side. It will be recalled that there pas confusion of the ^oi-cign Ministry and Ministry of Overseas Affairs. It T'as also pointed, out, that KOISO 巧as in rotircment es a private c.it.izc-n e.t that tiM.G. I'IRS。STR00K3Rs Your Honor, I ？.m instructed •to deny that KOISO was a private citizen at that, time, Ze …ごs Kinis'-er of Oversoas Aff airs. Pieferr5-n? to exhibit ズ23, -'hich is dated the 24th of June 1?40, in paragraph 2; "The Minister of Oversees lff?.irs, General K O I S O , asked me ir. a 11,7 701 convorsption... “ Vo "'as Minis"or of Overseas Affairs until 22 July. M R . BROOKS： I SSG n o — — T-JS PRESIDENT: Well no巧,^'G are not going to have any debntc about it. You can prove othor^ise in tha course of the evidence for the defense. Xou are not goin^ to take OV;T the つrosecrtioru M R . BROOKS: I don卜 ^nnt to debate r.bout it , your Honor,エ；Just", co.ll r3f: rcnco to those ャ。;,3s th':t I Our position is clear. 11,702 「 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TH3 PRSSIDSNTs Mrs. Strooksr. MRS. STROOKER: The next five documents, which we will introduce in evidence, deal with a proposal by the American Government to the Japanese Governrnant in June 1940, that a formal declaration ba made that neither Japan nor the United States should allow a change in the status quo in tho southern Pacific and the reasons why Japan refused to make such a formal declaration. We offer in evidence prosecution document 220-R, being a tolegram from the United States Secretary of State to the United States Ambassador in Japan, dated 22 June 1940, THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THS COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220-R will receive exhibit No. 1292. (Whereupon, the docuirent ^bove referred to s marked prosecution 1 s exhibit No. 1292, and was received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: We will now read exhibit 1292. "Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan, 1931-1944. Pages 86-87. "The Socretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew). (Paraphrase)" 11,7 703 "Vvashington, June 2 2 , 1 9 4 0 - noon. "Unless you parceive any objection, it is my desire that at an early moment you csll upon the Foreign Minister and in strictest confidence explore with him in continuation of your conversations of June 10 and June 19， ths question of possibly arriving at nn understanding betwo in the American Government nnd tho Japanese Govarninsnt through an exchange of notes "X 1 ong the following lines: "The interest of both cogntries in keeping to a minimum the adverse effects of the war in Europe Is the b asis upon which tha undorstanding would be premised. Tho undorstending would rof-ar to this interest. In the proposed notes there would be expressed the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Japanese Government that they ha^e a corcmon desire that tho status quo, except as it may be modified by peaceful means, be maintained with regarc to the possessions and territories of belligerent European powers in the Pacific arsa. There might also bo in the proposed notes a provision for consultation bet-veen tho GovGrnments of the two countries should any question arise involving the status QUO in rospect to the PTC?Fic possessions and territories of belligerent Europ:.?n powers which 11,704 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 renders consultation desirobla in the opinion of either the Japanese Government or the Government of the United States.. "In the proposed exchange of notes this Goverrnnent envisages and would understand tha phrase relating to possessions and territories in ths Pacific area of belligerent European powers to cover and include their possessions and territories in all parts of the Pacific Ocoan. "This suggestion relates to a particular and definite problem, that of averting gn introduction of new complications and new possibilities of difficulty and fription into the general situation in the Pacific, As you will realize ana will ioep constantly in mind, it does not involve っnd should not be inferred to imply any withdrawal from positions heretofore taken regarding any specific problems in the relation- ships between the t;vo countries. It is intended as a preventive rather than a curative mensure. At the same time, it is our belief, and we hope it will be that of the Japanese, that tha possibility of contributing substantially toward m-aking situations batter is ivithin procedures which tend to prevent situations from bacoming worse. If adopted, we believe this procedure woulo tend to turn public 11,705 公 c 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 thought toward consideration of peaceful and cons- tructive processes. It would tend to dissipate various suspicions which apparently prevail among the public and to curtail various types of inflammatory discussion and agitation. It woula take gare of the particular present and future problem to which it would expressly relate, and, although it would in no way dispose of the many and various specific questions which have b een and are the subject matter of current; and past discussion betweon our tv.'o Governments, it might facilitate solution of some of them. "Hull." We introduce in evidence prosecution docu- ment 220-S, being a memorandum by the United States Ambassador in Japan, dated 24 June 194-0. THE PRESIDENT: Admittod on the usual terms. CLERK OF THS COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220-S will rGceivo exhibit No. 1293. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked pros.ocution' s exhibit No. 1293? and was received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: We ^ill now read exhibit 1293. "Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan, 1931-1941. Pages 88-89. "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew). 11,706 "(Tokyo) Juno 24，1940. "When I called on the Foreign Minister at 11 o'clock this morning at tha private house of a . common friend, we discussed in strictest confidence the suggestion proposed in the Dopartment's telagr^m No. 215, June 22, noon, with raferenco to an exchange of notes regarding upholding the status quo with regard to tho Pacific territories and possessions of belligerent European countries. •"Tho Minister gave his close attention to the diverse points in my oral argurcsnt and all the questions he put to mo were coverod in the Department's instructions. ,f /hen asked whether tho PactCCLc mandatoa islands wero included in our proposal,I 'ins?i?orod that if he desired I would submit the point to my Government, but he did noセ pursue the subject. "The Minister said finally that the sug- gestion would be givsn his closa study and that he would reply soon. Ho stated further t h a t u n l e s s a number of the many outstanding differences between the United States and Jap?,n v;ero first solved, ho, offhand, ana in his own opinion, thought that tho suggestion might ba difficult to accept. When askod to which difficulties ho rsforrad in particular, the Ministar replied that the absonce of a commercial 11,707 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 treaty was the outstanding difficulty, "In view of some of his comments I made clear at the conclusion of our talk that our present proposal must not bo misunderstood to imply any retreat from positions previously held regarding any particular problems botween Japan and tho United States, but エ added that I found it significant in my own opinion that our exploration today was regarded by my Governmont as the continuance of the conversations of Juno 10 ond 19, which woro ants-rod into with the express intent of discovering means to ameliorate American-Japanese relations. "Mr. ARITA said that the Japanese press must have callod my attention to tho trend of public opinion in Japr.n, which vjas strongly for closer relations with Germany and Italy and was continually growing in strength. He claimed that he was personally, as I well knew, in flavor of a rapprochemont with the Unitod States, but that the situation tod^.y opened him to severe criticism, and that the problem was extremely difficult. "J(osoph) C. GCrevj)." W3 offer in evidence prosecution document 1632-FF, being the entry for 27 Juna 194•弓 in the diary of the accused KIDO, exhibit 178 for 11,708 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 identification. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURTs Prosecution's document No„ 1632-FF will recoiv：' exhibit No. 1294. (Whereupon, tha document above referred to was marked prosocution'3 oxhibit No. 1 2 9 4 - ,飞 n d was received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: Wo will now read a part of exhibit 1294. "KID0's Diary. 27 June, 1940 (Thurs.), Rainy. "Finance Minister SAKURAUCHI exiled ？nd opinions were exchangoa on tho str .rngthening of the political structure and other problems. "Went to tho office at 10:00 wharo M r . OKANE, Chief of the General Affairs Section, camo to mo for consultation upon the matter of the Emperor's visit to HAYAMA. "Talked to Chief Secrotary, MA®SUDAIRA, regarding tha procedure at the time of the G abinet change. Foreign Minister, ARITA, came to the Palace and v;e had a talk as follows: "Ambassador Grew recently requested a- meeting, saying thaC he has a proposal for a treaty, ^vhich it is desired to conclude, bot T .v sen Japan and America, which will maintain the status quo in the Pacific and 11,7 709 prevent forceful changes. However, sines it is an extremely delicato imtter and since it '/vould b^ in- advisable ?.t this t iras to have Japan's activities, including those in the Netherlands, rostrlcted ana sine a it will probably end in something like a revival of th-3 Nino—Power Treaty, prcinpt -seceptance will be difficult. If it were limited to th3 question of Japanese and American Pacific Islands it might possibly be considered." 11,710 MRS。 STR00KER: ？/e offer in evidence prose- cution document 1632 GG, being the entry for July 1, 1940, in the diary of the accused KIDO, exhibit 178 for idcntificction. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on tho usual terms. CL>RK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's documeht No. 1632 GG will rcceivt exhibit No. 1295. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1295 and received, in evidence.) i]fks,STROOKER: We will now read a part of exhibit 1295： "1 July 1940 Monday (firie) ’'SURITATE visited mc at 9 a.m. Went to the office c.t ten. The Aide-d&-Camp came- to see mo. He told me the Army's advocacy and views regarding Foreign Minister ARITA's broadcast which we.s featured in this mornings papers. ‘ "Audience from 10:35 to 11:10. "Replied to the Emocror' s questions e.s to the oc-tual facts cbout the Foreign Minister 1 s broadcast end other things. "At 11:20 talked eFoin with the Aide-de-Csmp on the seme matter. Before attending the luncheon held by the Manchukuo Emperor I hrd a tr.lk with the Foreign 11,7 711 Minister ARITA rnd ho':rd from his ovm li^s the truth r/bout the brocdccst. After luncheon we met again find the Foreign Minister discussed the followin'. matters ； " 1 . T h e circumstances of the ARITA brocd- ccst. "2. The tense situation in Hongkong rnd so forth -- in regard to this the- real facts are not yet cleor. "3. Concerning the； mrttcr of the str.tus _guo in the Pacific proposed by Ambc.ss ; dor Grew, his idee is the- t the time is not epproprictc for r settle- ment regarding territories which woじId include those of the belligerent nrtions. However,if it were limited to matters between Jspan £nd America it could be con- sidered. " Wc introduce in evidence prosecution docu- ment 220T being cn oral stc.tcmont by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the United Strtes Arnbcssrdor to Jr.nan on 28 June 194-0 as reported by the Ambassador. TH1. PRESIDENT: Admitted on the ususl terras. CLFRK OF THI ; COURT; Prosecution's doc腿;nt No. 220T will reccive exhibit No. 1296. (Whereupon, the document r.bove referred to was msrkcd prosecution's exhibit No. 1296 and received in evidence.) 11,712 2 3 4 5 6 4 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MRS. S T R O O K E R ; � e will now read pcrts of this document; "Orr.l Statement by the Jr.penese Minister for Foreign Affairs (AHITA) to the American Ambassador in JD.pc.n (Grew). "Tokyo f June 2 8 , 1 9 4 0 . ，’エ hf、ve given the most ccreful study to the proposal which Your Excellency sot forth c.t our meeting on June 24. In vi..:w of present intcrnrtional condi- tions , h o w e v e r , I doubt ？/hether considorction should be given to ？n exchange of formal notes between our t'.vo countries on the b£.sis of r policy of giving effect directly to this proposal. In Fur ope r:t tho present time hostilities are progressing. Japan is greatly concerned with the effect which the development of the hostilities w ill hrve on the strtus of the possessions こnd territories in the Pccific erea of Europecn belligerent nations. Under this siturtion, during ？. transitionrry period, for the. United States end Jo.D?n, which countries are not belligerents, to conclude any sort of r.n cgreement concerning? these possessions r,nd territories would, it must be feared, give rise to very delicate relationships for Jrpan which hes tnken £ position of non-involvement. I am, therefore, endeavor- ing et this time to offset rnd to Torcvcnt the snrecd 11,713 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of the E u r o p e m disturbance to the Pacific Ocean rnd で:/ith that purpose in mind m d from thrt point of view, エ believe it to be timely rnd appropriate to consider vnfcther or not there is no room for discussions of problems concerning only the United States and Jnpan. "As エ stated on the 24th, ho T ever, we csrmot consider the American proposal dissocistcd from con- versc.tions which hr.ve been held hitherto, r.nd in order to make- further progress in our conversations concern- in- your proposal I believe, it to be ncccsscry in the first plcce to be informed of your Government's views with regsrd to the strte merits set forth in my oral statement drtod Juno 12th." The Tribtuirl's attention is invited to Court Exhibit 54-1 containing r, Crbinet decision of 26 Jujy 194-0. T M s decision is m outline of Je.pen' s basic national p o l i c y .エ may point out thr.t on 22 July 1940 the YONAI Ccbinet h£(J been renleced by the Sccond KOKOYE Cabinet of which the accused HOSHIHO end TOJO, and at a lctor st&ge also the r.ccuscd HIRANU:;IA and SUZUKI were members. Following the Cabinet decision of 26 July 1940, contained in Exhibit ^A-l, the Japanese Govern- ment published en official rnnouncernent regarding the be sic Japanese Government policy on August 1,194-0? 11,7 714 rnd the new Foreign Minister .MATSTJOI-'A issued a dcclcrstion on the. same subject. Tlicsc two stctcracnts are contained in prosecution document 823B (4), being excerpt from court exhibit 777 for identification. We offer prosecution document 823B ⑷ in evidence. THI PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE. COURT: Prosecution's document No. 823B (4) will receive exhibit No。 1297. (' f ."hereu^on, the document r;bove referred to wrs mc.rked prosecution's exhibit No. 1297 ？.nd received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKIH; We will now reed parts of exhibit 1297? top of ppge 1: "Foreign Office Announcements 1940: "August 1,194-0. Announcement by the Jnpanose Govcrnms-.nt. "The world stends ct & grer.t historic ttim- ing point, rnd it is obout to witness the crertion of new forms of government, cconomy, r.nd culture, be,sad upon the growth rnd development of sundry groups of states. jEpr.n, too, is confronted by c great trif,l such f.s she hns never experienced in history. In order to carry out fully at this juncture our nrtionr.l policy in accordance v/ith the lofty spirit in whニcih the 11,7 715 country we.s founded, it is r.n important tesk of urgent necessity to us thrt we should g m s p the inevitrble trends in the developments of world history, effect speedily fundrmentrl renovations rlong r l l l i n e s of government, rnd strive- for the perfection of z. strte structure for nたtionrl defense. Accordingly, tho .eeri- er rl lines of the ccuntry' s fundrnental national policies have been formulc.t>: d as follows ； "Summery of FundamGiit&l National Policies. " 1 . B r . s i c Policy. "The- bPsic rim of Jrpr.n's nationcl policy lies in the firm cstcblishmcnt of world peace in eccordcnce v/ith the lofty spirit of HAKKO ICHIU, in which the country was founded, and in the construction, r.s the first step, of c.反'.order in Grc-rttr Lest Asio, hrving for its foundation tho solidarity of Japan, Ilanchiikxio and China. "Japnn w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , devote the total strength of the nr.tion to the fulfillment of the rbove policy by setting up swiftly cn unshckr.blc notionrl structure of her own F:d rip tod to meet the； requircra し nts of new developments both c.t home and ctiror.d." We will now continue to re.?d from the bottom of pege 3 • 25 "August 1 , 1 9 4 0 . Stctemcnt of Mr. Yosuke 11,716 MATSUOKA, Minister for Foreign Affcirs. "I h?.v(. :..l\;r:ys ssid thr t the mission of Jrocn is to proclaim rnd demonstrate the KODO throughout v t.ho world. Viewed from the s t and point of internr tion- c.l relationsず this amounts, I think, to enabling nil xir.tions c.nd rrces to find crch its proper tsl^ce in the world. Accordingly, the immedir tc rim of our foreign policy at present is to f stcblish, in r.c cord-.nee ’ "ith tho lofty spirit of the KODO , a greet Frist Asi^.n chc：in of cr>ranion prosperity with ths Jrran-Mc.nchoukuo-China 'group cs one of the, links. •みshall thus be cblc to demonstrc.te the in the most cffcctivc manner, rnd pr-vc the wry toward the establishment of ？n equitrblc： world iDeccc. Wg should be rcsolv:d to surmount ell ^bst??cles, both material rnd spiritual, lying in our pr.th. Furthermore, in concert with those friendly Powers which r-re crcparcd to co—oyv rr•セc with u s , we should strive with courage rnd determination for the fulfillment of the ideal nnd tht hesven-ordained mission of our country.“ The Tribunal's attention is invited to exhibits 550 rnd 552, containing Foreign Minister "IATSUOKA，s xplcnrtion rogcirdinf the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact for the Council in the Imrerirl 25 Prcscncc r.nd the minutes ©f the meeting of tho Privy 11,7 717 Council Invcstigrtion Committee on 26 September 1940， discussing this seme trcrty.‘ In both exhibits the bound<•: ri-. s of the Grr.tcr I.rst Asir Co-prosperity Sphere, over v,hich Jcpan v;or.ld c xort lerdcrship, r rc outlined by Foreign :Iinistf r I^ATSUOKA. The vholc southern r..rしr5 including the Nf th, rlc.nds Indies， is stated to fr.ll within this Co-nrospc rity Srhorr und:r the leadership of Jnprn. The Tribunrl's rttcntion is c&llc a to Court exhibit 86l, being r JnTDcncse Govcrru::en+ Crbinet decision of 3 Octobor 194C, concerning the. t concmic nicr.sures to be tr ken for the organize tion of the Co- prospcrity Sphere .-nd for the expension of this Sphere to souther stern Asia and the southern cr-^fis. To show thrt at this time consideration wr.s given to ； n cxprsnsion through militnry rggression soi^th- wcrd we offer in vvidence prosecution document 1632HH, being the entry for 10 August 1940 in the rccusod KIDO's Dicry, exhibit 178 for identification. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usurl terms. CLERK OF THF COURT: Prosecution's docum nt N o . 1632HH will receive exhibit N o . 1298. (Whereupon， the document t ';bovc referred to tos m-rkod prosocntion's exhibit He. 1298 rnd received in evidence.) 11,718 MRS. STROOKER: (Reeding) "10 August 1940 (Scturdry) (Cloudy 一 roiny). "V/ent to the office c.t eleven. "At 11:30 conferred with chief Aide-de-Camp re the progress of the carapnign pgainst the Chungking regime since the last time. "At 1;45 wes rcceivcd in cudiencc. "The Lmpcror told me whnt he r.nd Prince FUSHIMI, Chief of tho N' 可 General Staff, had talked こbout when they dined together. The Prince scid that the Nr.vy e.t present wishes to r.void the use of force against the Netherlands Indies rnd Singapore, end thrt, since rt lc&st eight months will be required for prcprrこtion after a decision for wcr is mrde, the lcter war comes the better." We invito the Tribune1's rttention to court exhibit 628 ? containing four serrrr.te documents, of which the first is dr.ted 28 September 194-0 end entitled "Outline of Jspp.nese Foreign Policy," rnd the second one is dated 4 October 1940 rnd entitled "Tentative Plan for Pelicy Towcrd the Southern Regions." As only s few pr. rts of these documents hrve been read, we will now, v/ith the Tribunal's permission, ror.d further prrts from them. 11,7 116 We will begin reading at the middle of page 1： "TOP bECRET. Outline of Japanese Foreign Folicv. (28 t - e p t . 1 W ) . "A Policy. "?e must promptly strengthen the ccslit士on between Jatan and tho German-Italian Axis baaed on the worlfl policy, and raake, further- more , a rapid improvement in and adjustment of the Japanose-hoviet dipl^matic-r^lations. At the same timG we must make effort to realize the general peace between Japan and China by making use of the pressure of Germany and the Soviet Union, and, thereby, prompt the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Frosper- itv t-phero. Giving pressure, in this way, to the Anglo-American Axis, accompanving the intensification of Japan's diplomatic machinary, w e should offer our good offices at a proper time to Britian in order that she may make peace with Germany, and, moreover, we should carry nut an epらc-making adjustment of Ja,ianGse- AmGrican diplomatic relations. Thus, we expect to es- tablish a peaceful system araonぎ Japan, Gormanv, Italy, thn Soviet Union, Armrics and Britian for the recon- struction of world peacn. "Outline of th« iplan "I. v 1 - tr~-ngthening ef coalition between Japan 11,720 and the German-Italian Axis. "should be carried 行ut according to the de一 cision made by the council in セhe Imperial presence on v v ept.18, and tho Tripartite Alliance among Japan, Gormany and Italy on 卜ept, 27. "II. Adjustment of tovist-Japanese Diplo- matic Relations. "Should bG carried out according to 'Draft Plan for Adjustment of f-oviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations v in th'"： accompanying paper. "III. Establishment of general Peace between Japan and China. "should bo carried out according to P61icy of Rapid Disposition of the China Incident* in thf- accompanying paper. 16 "IV. Establishment of the Greater East Asia 17 Co-Prosperity sphere. " ( 1 ) I n the regions including French Indn- China, Dutch East Indies,卜trait irnttlement, British , Thailand, Philippine Islands, British Borneo and Brrma, with Japan, Fancbukuo and China as centre, we should construct a sphere in which politics } ^•conorav and culture of those countrios and regions are combined. "(a) French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies. 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11,721 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "We must, in the first place, endeavor to conclude a comprehensive economic agreement (including distribution of resources, trade adjustment in and out of th-3 Co-Prosperity inhere, currency and exchange agreemjnt, etc.), while planning such political coal- itions as the' recognition of independence, conclusion of mutual asdiatance pact, etc. "(b) Thailand, 'Va should strive to strengthen the mutual assistance and coalition in political,economic, and military affairs. . "(2) Towards the countries outride the Co- Frosperity Sphere, v/e must take every measure so that thoso countries will admit tho ostablishment of our i*Co-Prosperity Pphrre' and co-operate with it." THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen minutos• (Whereupon, at 144 5, a rocprfs was taken until 1500, after which the procoed- ings wore rosumod as follows：) 11,722 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker. IviKS. STROOKER: We were reading exhibit 628. I ask to be allowed to continue on page 4, the second, plan. (Heading): "Very Secret. Tentative Plan for Policy towards the Southern itegions. October 4 , 1 9 4 0 . "Although the objective of Japan's penetration into Wis Southern regions cover, in its first stage, the whole area to the west of Hawaii excluding for the time being the Philippines and Guam; French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, British Burma and the Strait Settlements are the areas where we should first control. Then, we should gradually advance into the other areas. However, depending upon the attitude of the United States Government, the Philippines and Guam will be included We will continue to read from the second paragraph on page 6 of the English text onward: "(3) British kalaya and the Strait Settlements. "(a) To avoid the danger that the natural re- sources in the Dutch East Indies may be destroyed, within the possible limits of war strategy, we should use military power in these areas prior to using it 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 12 34 567 8 90 12 3 4 5 111111122222Z E d e r & Abram 11，7?3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in the Dutch East Indies. (There is a necessity that we investigate the strength of Singapore, and also in case we lay our hands on one of the British ter- ritories , whether or not we are strategically forced to extend to the other British territories immediately after.) "(b) We should conclude a military alliance with Thailand, and use Thailc.nd as a rear base. However, in order to delay hc-r in mr.king preparations, it is v/ell to pretend that the diplomatic relations between Japan and Thailand are not secure until we start military action. (In case we consider that the mili- tary aliience cannot be kept in strict secrecy because of the internal affairs of Thailand, there is room for consideration that we should set up a secret com- mittoe based on the non-aggression treaty between Japan and Thailand to enable us to enter into a military alliance as soon as we start military action.) "(c) Military operations shall be started simul- taneously with German military operations to land on the British mainland or after the lapse of a proper period. However, we must maintain close contact with Germany, keeping her to act in concert with us. "In case Germany gives up her intention to land on the British mainland, we, maintaining liaison with 11,7 724 Germany, should start our military operations at the time when Germany carries out her most severe brittle, or when an appropriate period has passed after that. In case Britain should yield to Germany prior to the common cement of our military action, even though the internal situation is not favorable to Japan, we must at least by diplomatic means, on the occasion of peace between Britain and Germany, make Britain re- move the defense installations on Singapore and make her conclude an economic treaty with Japan which will be advantageous to Japan. "(d) In case we こre forced to act without relation with our plans in regard to Chiang Kai-shek, by using the pretext that Britain is aiding Chiang Kai-shek by the Burma route, and in c?.se the plans have proved to be a success, by using the pretext that we cannot stand the Oriental peace being threatened by the British military force.】 based in Singapore, we should request Britain to return Hong Kong, British Lfelsya, and the Strait Settlements (including British Borneo depending upon the circum- stances) to the races in East Asia and upon her re- fusal, start war. (The above pretexts hamper in some ways our relations with the United States, but it is likely that something which we can use as a direct 11,725 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 reason, will rise by that time.) "(e) Following the caso of French Indo-China, the former territory of Thailand shall be returned to Thailand and the other regions shall be made pro- tectorates . feut the Strait Settlements must be placed under the direct rule of Jppan. ”(f) In the newly established independent countries the enterprise rights of the nationals of the third countries witn which v/e are at peace shall follow tho case in French Indo-China. "(4) Dutch East Indies. “(a) While the attack on Singapore is going on, or immediately after it, by showing at tlie proper tine our state for attacking the Dutch East Indies, we should present the following requests, and if they are not admitted, VTG should use military power. "(i) As the Dutch Government in England, which the Dutch East Indies considers to be its suzerain, does not exist according to international law, the Dutch East Indies shall at once declare its in- dependence for the peace of Greater East Asia, snd announce e.n appropriate name for itself. "(ii) The s-overeign and the constitution shall be decided by a committee consisting of several Japanese, Duteh people born there, natives, and 11,726 Chinese # (It must b.e so arranged thst the total number of the Japanese and natives number more than half of the committee,) Until the sovereign and the constitution are decidod, this committee shall carry- out the administration, "(iii) The Governor-General and all other Dutch officials of the highest rank shall be forced to resign. But their official titlos, honors and pay should be loft as they are. The position of the Dutch people other than the aforementioned v/ill be recognized as they are. "(iv) If any of the important natural resources should be destroyed, all the persons connectcd with the raw material, ten government officials concerned, shall be severely punished as being the responsible persons. (This matter should be announced widely be- forehand by radio and other means.) "We should, if possible, at a proper time before presenting the aforementioned requests ? cause an in- dependence movement to stir up anong the natives. “(b) If it is considered a better plan from the viewpoint of strategy thc.t we act first with the Dutch East Indies, the time- to start the activity against this cres would be at the same time ss the opening of Germany's military operation to land on 11,7 727 the British mainland, or after the lapse of a proper period. "In case that Germany gives up her intention to land on the British mainland, we should start action, choosing an appropriate time before Britain and Ger- many cease hostilities. "(c) After the jjutch East Indies become in- dependent, wo must conclude a protective"treaty under the name of military alliance, and make her appoint Japanese military economic advisers who will bo in powerful positions. We must lease the places which are important from the military point of view. “(d) The enterprise rights of the nationals of the third countries with which we are at pec.ce shall follow the c?.se in French.エndo-China." With the Tribunal's permission, we will turn back to Page 5 to read the paragraph re 0 erred to here, which is paragraph (d), near the middle of that page: ."(d) In the new independent States, the right of enterprise for the nationals of the third countries ^ith which we are at peace will be recognized. But, they v/ill have to follow the Government' s instructions in developing important resources, and in disposing of the products." ll,7?8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We will now continue to read where we left off near the middle of Page 9: "(5) British Bornero and Others. "(a) After we have grasped real power in the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, we must take proper measures to got hold of real power in other British territories. "(b) Hongkong is to be returned to China* (However, if it is important strategically, it shall be reconsidered.) "(c) Following whet has been str.tecl about French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, i'talaya, etc., we shall consider locally the administrative system in each place. "(6) Australian Territories。 "To be considered separately„" We present for identification ^nly prosecu- •fcion document 587, being an issue of the Yomiuri newspaper for 27 October 194-0. The Tribunal 1 s per- mission is requested to substitute a photostat copy of the newspaper exhibit for the original, which has been tendered in evidence, as the original document should, if possible, be returned to its owner. CLERIC OF THE 'COilhT: Prosecution's document No. 587 will receive exhibit K o . 1 2 9 9 , for identification 11,7 729 only. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to vie.s marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1299 for identification.) MRS. STKOOivKR: An excerpt from this nev/s- paper, prosecution document 587-A, being an article by the accused OSHIMA, is offered in evidence. 11,7 30 THE PRESIDENT： Fr. Cxmningham. m . CTOININGHAM: If the Tribunal please, I would like to object to the introduction of this document for the reason that it is not an article writtrn by the defendant. OSFIMA, in the first place, and in the second place, is that it is not an official document of the Japanese government. I ask that its reception be deferred until the party making the certificate can be called for cross-examination to test if 37 as to the conditions under which the article was created, for the following reasons that it arose while the defendant wss in retirement and held no official position in the Japanese govern- ment . I should like to have the editor of the paper who made the certificate here for cross-examir.ation before it is received in evidence. MRS. STROOKER: Your Honor, I would re- quest to "be allowed to read the certificate attached to the excerpt. THE PRESIDENT: Before you do so, of course it isn't necessary that an accused should be a government o f f i c i a l . A man can eonspire in his private capacity. You ma：/ read the certificate. MRS. STROOKER (Reading): "AFFIDAVIT 11,7 731 "I, Yusai TAKAHASHI, certify tl-c.t from 1°33 until Decenber 1945 I was editor—in-chief of the 'Yomiuri Shinbun 1 and that I recognize the attached Internstional Prosecution Section document number 587A as an article written u”der the ”ame of Firoshi OSFIFA appearing ir the Yomiuri Shinbun of October 2 7 , 1 9 4 0 . "I further certify that t卜e above mentioned article was published under the name of Firoshi OSFIKA with his consent." Signed Yusai TAKAHASHI. I submit, your ? T onor, that with セトat certifi- cate the burden of proof is upon the defense if they wish to call the certifier to prove, THE PRESIDEFT: It is quite a common tYing if an affidavit is used by one side for that side to be compelled to produce the deponent for cross- examination. I T r. Cunringham is within hir> rights. 1TT e will consider whether we will 'call hir 1 or not. The document is admitted on the usual terns. w i l l the court reporter please read what r T r. Cunningham said about OSHIFA's attitude towards that; article? (hereupon, the official court reporter read Fr。 Cunningham's remarks, 11,732 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 as follows:) "腿.CUNNINGHAM: If the Tribunal please, I would, like to object to セhe irtroduction of this document for the reason that it is not an article written by the defendant OSPIIfA, in the first place, and in the second place, is that it is not an official document of the Japanese government. I ask that its reception be deferred until the party making the certificate can be called for cross-examination to testify as to the conditions under which the article was crrated, for the followinf reason3 that it arose while the defendant was in retirement and held no official position in the Japanese govern- ment. I should like to have the editor of the paper who made the certificate here for cross-exemination before it is received in evidence." THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham, v/e would like to know whether you are denying the truth of the certificate, whether you allege the certificate contains a false statement, and if so； where is the false statement. MR. CUNNINGHAM: I might explain that by stating the circumstances that -- THE PRESIDENT: I want you to answer that. HR. CIWINGHAJI: I claim the certificate 11,7 733 234567890123456789012345 1111111111222222 doesn't go far enough. THE PRESIDENT: You don't deny any state- ment in it? MR. CIWINC-HAM: It is — I only state that it is mislesding and I would like to explain it. THE PRESIDENT： There is nothing to explain, as far as I can see. The deponent says be recog- nizes the document as an article written under the name of OS? 1 IMA, and then he goes on to say he certi- fies that the article was published under the name of OSI T II-A, with M s consent. You don't deny the truth of that, so why do you want him called for •cross-exarnination? MR. CUMIKGT'AM: It is my thought that it would affect tbe probative value of the document, that if I stated that a newspaper reporter went to his home and asked M m for an interview and pub- lished the results of the interview. THE PRESIDENT: ” r ell, it's not a case for callirf the deponent for cross-examination, but there is nothing to prevent OSFIMA from going into the box and giving his version of the interview, of course, but not while the prosecution are putting their case. So the application to have him called 11,7 734 for cross-examination is dismissed. CL”RK OF THE COURT: Prosecution r s docu- ment No. 587-A, wh3.cb is excerpt from exhibit No. 1299, will be giv,en exhibit No. 1299-A. ("•"hereupon，the document above re- ferred. to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1299-A and received in evidence.) MRS. STRGOFER: Before I ask the Court to bear with me while I read parts of that exhibit I would ask for a ruling from your Honor tc be allowed to withdraw the .original newspaper and substitute a photostat copy しf it, the complete newspaper, in order to be able to withdraw the original from Court, THE PRESIDENT: You have the Tribunal's permission to do that. MRS. STROOKER: ^e will now read parts of exhibit 1299-A. At the. top of page 1 : ( R e a d i n g ) "Activate the Alliance. "Shun Diplomatic Passivity. "One cannot fail to be- deeply- stirred by the ‘ fact that a three-power alliance with Germany and Italy has been concluded an Imperial. Rescript has been issued on the subject,-.and the road which lies ahead of Japan's millions has been made cle&r." Te will continue rp&ding from the beginning of ll,73 r ' the second, paragraph from page two onv^ard. (Reading) "Indeed, from one point of view, as this treaty calls for our cooperation in establish- in f the r.pw order of Germany ard Italy in Europe, an - additiopc.l responsibility is irposed upon us, and we have to make up our minds to this. Furthermore and in particular, as tトere are nations in the rorld desirous cf main'cair.ir.p x.Ye olc system, there vvi]1 be c-pses v'hpre obstruction is offered to the attain- irent of tKs co[::non sims of the three-pov-c rs. ''"e roust, not count upon this not }.'sppeつirず,but rether upon having to eypect it, end the ration, with unsverving resclutiur., must make ca: eful prepara- tions for this. Unfcrtunsitely s Irs reoenx years there has been & tendercy for all sorts of conflicting opinions to eri?e within the country and for useless and indeed, h&ririful i'riction and disputes to develop. If this sort cf tbirg contirues in the future, we shall cortainly not be able to accomplish our mission in the world; indeed we should reaiirf that tlie result niifht unexpectedly imperil the future of the Empire. 了f in the past there msy liave been a lack of clarity on soir.e points, n o w w i t ! " the conclusion of this new alliance, the prs.&t object j ve for ich we must strive, the unexampled task of founding a 11,736 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 new world order stends illuminated, as when a sトsft of sunlight pierces a bank of cloud. Our people must not indulge in vain bickerings but stand foursquare, ready to burst through any bsrrier to the achievement of our aii?s. v Tnen a great work is undertaken, certain attendant risks are to be expected. This ye?r is the 2600th year of the Imperial Dj/nasty. If wc cast our trinds back to the foundinf of the country in the distant dsys of the Emperor Jummu, or if we consider the two wars •with Cr ina snd Russia in more recent times, we realize that the YAMOTO race, has never flinched from danger, but has pone steadily forward, staking its destiny on spreading the benefits of the Imperial •"ay. But never have resolute deteraine.tion and firm courage beer so necessary if our nation is to fulfill its miss ion as they are todsy." 25 11,737 c 1 r«.-ac! tli:ニ one rjarngr•入-!h o n ge 3 : "To return to the main a r g m e n t , if there are some who consider the conclusion of the three- po-A'er alliance imposes an additional strain on Japanese-American relations, I think this opinion mistaken. Our missinn to set up a new order in Greater East Asia and our determination to establish a relationship with the 'Southern countries' con- ducive to F.utual harmony and prosperity, are already matters of long standing, and it cannot be sup-oosed that the new alliance has given rise to them. Of course,in some circles in America,there are likely to be those who vie J the new treaty as a warlike challenge directed against America. But such feelings will certainly not arise in the minds of those who read the treaty with any comnosure. Furthermore, I suvvose nobody knows better than America herself J that Japan neither plans to attack America, nor is she prepared to do so. One cannot,therefore,avoid セhe conelusion that those who iraintain this opinion either dislike the idea of a new order being established i in East Asia, or have designs upon East Asia them- selves . A n d I feel ’'•了e should have to face opposition from these people whether the treaty existed or not. Indeed, should the feeling arise in Ame?ica that she ！ i 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 ‘1 22 23 24 25 1 1 1 1 1 2 マ o l f & Y e 1 d e n 11,738 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 34 25 should obstruct our establishment of a new order in East Asia by force of arms, this alliance is more likely to have the effect of nipping such a sense- less idea in the bud." エ will continue reading on the top of page 4 ； "The treaty is now in writing. But its concrete realization is work for the future. The present state of the world being what it is, the treaty mist te activated with all speed. And the firsセ essential step to this is to complete our preparations for action rapidly. Now what concrete steps should we take with regard to our position of leadership in Greater East Asia under the treaty? • : ' 7 e must establish a relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity with the Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-China, India, the South Sea Islands, etc. we must then settle the relationship of this area with the new order in Europe 5 these are the points on which consultation with Germany and Italy is necessary. From the military point of view,too5 cooperation is necessary between the nations of the East and the ’ t r est,フe must perfect a plan which vill leave no gaps in the bonds of mutual cooperation between the three countries； and in the diplomatic field, too5 the three countries must march ahead in perfect concord to protect our common interests against any outside country. Furthermore, as the policy of Germany and Italy for prosecuting the war in Europe is so closely bound up with the establish- ment of a nev; order in East Asia, discussions will be necessary in this connection also. This being the case, there is a tremendous amount of preliminary セo be done "with regard to a relationship with Germany and Italy, and within our own country itself. "Of all things the one most to be avoided is passivity, allowing the other party to make the first move. Particularly in war and diplomacy is this prohibition absolutely imperative. Careful preparations must be made before the event 5 the •world situation must be constantly watched; care must be taken to let slip no opportunities； situa- tions must be handled speedily and decisively. I believe that these must be the principles of our diplomatic policy from n,ow on, and that with this in mind the people must stand solidly behind the government. "The country's policy has already been clearly laid down, so anxiety about the matter is uncalled for 5 but if by any chance faith in this 11,74-0 alliance should waver, or if it should be mismanaged anc the treaty become a dead letter, then not only vill the dignity of the Empire be impaired, but also the セask of setting up a new order will be made more difficult." Tho Netherlands Indies were publicly included in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in a speech before the 76th Session of the Diet by • Foroign Minister Matsuoka on 21 January 1941. This speech is contained in prosecution document 1204-E, which we now offer in evidence* THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLiRK OF THE COURT： Prosecutien's document N o . 1204-E will receive exhibit No. 1300. ( T , 7 hereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1300 and received in evidence。） I.mS. S T R O O K E R :叮e will read only the last two paragraphs on page 3 of the English text. (Reading) "Let me now make a "brief survey of our relations with the Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-C'nina, and Thailand, which lie within the above-mentioned sphere of common prosperity. "The Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for geographical reasons, should 11,741 t 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 29 34 25 be in intimate and inseparable relationship with owe country. Therefore, the situation which has hitherto thwarted the development of this natural relations hit) irust be thoroughly remedied and re- lations of good neighborliness secured for the promotion mutual prosperity. With this in view, early in September last, the Government despatched M r . Ichizo KOBAYASIil, Minister of Commerce snd Industry, to the Netherlands East Indies as a special envoy. M r . KOBAYASHI was obliged to return to Japan by circumstanctis preventing his prolonged sojourn abroad, r'hen a definite stage had been reached in l':,.is negotiations with the Netherlands 3ast Indies authorities concerning purchases of oil and other urgent questions. As his successor, the Government have recently sent to the Netherlands East Indies M r . Iwnkichi YOSHIZAWA, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had already resumed the negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies authorities We offor in evidence prosecution document 2748-A, being a certificate from the Japanese Foreign Office, certifying prosecution documynts 2748-A (1) to 274-8-A (20)， some of which vill presently be introduced in evidence。 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 11,742 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2748-A will receive exhibit N o . 1 3 0 1 . (Whereupon, the docurajnt above referred to was marked prosecution's exhitit No. I3OI and received in evidence.) I".®S。 STROOKER: ,r e v;ill not read tnis exhibit. We offer in evidence prosecution document 2748-A (11)，a tele gram from Foreign Minister i-AT£U0IvA to the Japanese delegate in Batavia, dated 28 January 194-1,to show tliat after public inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere the Japanese Foreign Minister sent out instructions that the fact that the Netherlands Indies formed part of this sphere should henceforth not be niiblicly denied. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT； Prosecution's document No. 2748-A (11) will receive exhibit No. 1302. ("thereupon, the docuraynt above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1302 and received in evidence。） MRS. STROOPER; will reed exhibit Ko.1302; "Telegram No. 2524 "January 28，1941 7-00 P.M. 11,7 743 "A copy of a telegram from Foreign Minister MATSDOKA to Delegate YOSHIZAWA in Batavia. "Concerning Delegate YOSHIZAWA"s statement. "Cipher Commercial Kogotiation N o . 24. "Strictly Secret. Very Urgent. "Concerning your telegram, Commercial Negotiation N o . 33• It goes vjithout saying that you should absolutely refrain from the usage of-such expressions that world deny Japan's hegemony within セhd Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere when announcing to outsiders JJe offer in evidence prosecution d.ocument 1632-W (47)，the entry for 1 February '1941 in the diarjr of the accused KIDO, exhibit 1 7 8 for identifi- cation, to show that at that tima Japanese expansion southward cons id e red the Dain -oroblem facing the Japanese government. THE PRESIDENT； Admitted on the usual terras. CLERK OF TKE COURTi Prosecution's document N o . I 6 3 2-W (47) will receive exhibit N o . 13〇3. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosooution's exhibit N o . 1303 snd received in evidence.) ilRS. STROOKER s Ve will now read exhibit N o . 1303： 11,7 744 "Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary. "1 February (Saturday) /1941/ "Fine. "; ?r ent to the office at 10 A.M., and spoke v-ith Premier E0IT0YE e Prince FUSHIMI, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Premier 觀 聰 and S U G I Y A M , Chief of the Army General Staff came to the Palace together. They were received in audience by His Majesty and reported in outline to the Emperor the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand decided at the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and t le Government on 30 January. It is a new precedent for the Chiefs of Staff, and the Premier to be received ir audience "by His Majesty and to report at the same time. Up to the present , important decisions of the Liaison Conferences have been reported to the Throne at Imperial Confer- ences , a n d other decisions individually by the government and Imperial Headquarters. However, this time as an intermediate vjay both parties have presented a report to the Throne at the same t i m e .エ was told that in this connection the Premier -oroposed that an Imperial Conference be held, but as the broad prin- ciple had already been approved by the Emperor, they asked Him in this way. At 10:10 the Chief 'Aide-de-Camp visited me and spoke approximately as follows : "Re the general principle of the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand: "The purpose of this plan is to establish the leading position of the Empire in French Indo- China and Thailand .by irtilizing the opportunity presented by their having accepted our arbitration, in order to contribute to the preparation for the Southward policy. The ITavy aims to use Camranh Bay and the air bases near Saigon- But as this cannot be stated openly it has been decided to represent the action taken as aimed at the preservation of trade and comirrunicat.ions , and security against war between French Indo-China and Thailand. In case military force is to be used to attain, the .objective, it has been decided tp ask the further approval of the Emperor. "At 11:30 Prince KOKOYE came to my office after having "been received in audience by His Majesty and we talked about policies and other matters. "At noon Foreign Kinister MATSUOKA came to my office after having been received in audience by the Emperor, and spoke approximately as follows 2 ,5 v r hen the "broad policy towards French 11,7 746 Indo-China and Thailand was decided, the Amy planned to limit the time to the end of March, "but he bad opt;osed it as being impossible, and had made the Army cancel it. He intends to conduct future diplomacy on the following lines as reported today to tho Emperor. It is assumed that the liaison conference on the third ？dl'l decide on the plan which he will take witli him on his visit to Germany and Soviet Russia. He will shortly visit Germany and find out the actual state of German policy towards Britain from HI/ T.N. Hitler/, R 1/ T.N. Ribbentrop/ and others, and he will make full arrangements with them. At the same time he vjnu.ld like to adjust our relations with the Soviet Union and to contrive a g e n e r a l加ac e with China by thu end of A p r i l . T h e n he intends to concentrate our whole strength toward the South. Without a solution of the S o u t h e r n q u e s t i o n , no r e a l solution of the China Incident can be attained ^ therefore, the Southern question is an important one, one on which the nation's fate hangs. For this reason, he continued, it would be necessary to bring about a state of things which would enable thu v;hole energy of the nation to be concentrated on it。 And so forth. "At 7-30 P.M. M r . G^nki AEE called on me and we talked We respectfully call the Tribunal's attention to court exhibit 571,b'eing a report of a conversa- tion between the German Foreign Minister and the accused OSHIMA on 23 February 1941, during which the principles for the construction of Germany's and Japan's spheres after the war were 'discussed. 11,748 t 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 We offer in evidence prosecution document 403B-r>, being r memorendum for the German Foreign Minister concerning Germnn-Jcpanese economic relations during and rfter the war. As this Mocument is in the Germr.n lcnguage only those parts on which the prosecti- tion intends to rely hove been translated. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usunl terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 4038-D will receive exhibit No. 1304. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1304 rnd received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: We will now read exhibit NOe 1304: "Berlin, 21 March, 1941 "Notes on German-Japanese Economic Questions for the Conversrtion with the Japanese Foreign Minister. "2 (b). Raw Mr.tcrinl Orders through J a p a n . We shell have to buy raw matorir.ls from third countries through Japan rnd get thorn into Germany, e.g. rubber and tin from tho Netherlands Indies and Thailand； wolfram from South China； tin from ， olivi?, For this purpose we are roady to place foreign bills of exchcngo ot the disposal of Japan, Thus fpr, in deference to England 25 end Americr., and because of her own supply situation 11,749 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 r.nd lack of tonnnge, and so forth, Jppan has done little in this direction, But even where such reasons did not exist, burenucrntic restraints and involved procedural rcgulntions have produced difficulties nnd delays. On the be sis of a promise by MATSUOKA, the Wohlthat Delegation should probably be able to obtain improve- ments . "We are likewise counting on Japanese help でith blockederunners end auxiliary cruisers for the transportation of such rnw materials to Germany. "2 (e). Mew Form of Economic RGlr.tions after the War. According to the Germp.n conception, the great possila丄it-ics which exist for the new order of eoonomic relations between the European-African economic sphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy end the Greater Asiatic economic sphere under the leader of Japan ccn only "be fully realized if rarittors ars carried out in a grand manner. For this reason the freest possiblle trr.de exchange should take place. As a matter of principfLe one should reserve to oneself preferences over third countries. Over~centralizr.tion with its unsvoid?;'blG hindrances should bo shunned. Rather, Japan should "be able to carry on business r.nd make trade agreements directly with the independent countries in the German- Italian Sphere, and conversely, Germcny and Itcly with 11,750 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the independent countries in the Japanese Sphere. On the other hand, the Jspsncse conception according to previous statements of government representatives in Tokyo is that Germany should hsve trade dealings with countries like China, Indo-China and also the Nether— lsnds Indies not directly, but only through Japan» No fundamental aggravntion of this question has yot occurred, cs we hr.ve been dependent anyway on Japanese support in imports in our trade during the war with the countries mentioned。 "Heroby offered through the State Secretary to the German Foreign Minister, "Signed Wiehl" We respectfully call the Tribunal T s attention to Court exhibit 580, being a report of a conversction between the Gc-rman Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister on 29 March 194-1,in which once cgain an attack toward the South and the construction of German end Japanese spheres of domination were discussed r.nd during which the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed his fear that if Japan cttackod the Netherlands Indies the Netherlands Indies 1 oil fields would be set on fire, We offer in evidence prosecution docomcnt 2137-*Fj r. decision by Imperial Headquarters in April 194-1. This is one of the group of documents included 11,751 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 38 19 20 21 22 23 25 (in prosecution document 2137? which has heretofore been marked exhibit Â-0 for identification. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2137-F will receive exhibit No. 1305. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1305 nnd received in evidence„) MRS. STROOKER: We will now read exhibit No. 1305： "'COVER 1 " "Separate Document 13 "Determined by Army and Nevy Department, Imperial Headquarters, in early April, 3H0WA 16/1941/. "Gist of Imperial Headquarters, Army and Navy- Department Policy conccrning Measures to be taken in the South. "Determined Toy Imperial Headquarters, in early April SHOWA 16/194-1/. ’，I. The aims of the measures to be taken by the Empire in the South are to promote the settlement of the China Incident rs well as to expand our overall national defensive power in the interests of self- existence nnd self-defense. "For these purposes, 11,752 2 v 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 " 1 . T o establish close and inseparable joint relations in military affairs, politics nnd economy with French Indo-China and Thailand. "2. To establish close economic relations with the Netherland Indies. "3. To maintain normal commercial relajbions with the other various countries in the South. "II. The foregoing purposes s h a l l , o n principle, be accomplished through diplomatic measures. "Ill. In executing the foregoing measures resort to rrms in the interest of self-existencc and self-defence will be taken only when the following instancjes should occur and when no means for solution of same con be found:~ " 1 . I n c?se the Empire's Self-existence should be threatened by the Embargoes of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. "2. In case the situation of the Anti- J apanese encirclement by the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China becomes so tense that it crnnot be tolerated in the interests of national defense In June 194-1, the Japanese attempts to obtain a foothold in the Netherlands Indies, on which subject evidence will be presented hereafter, had failed. The next four documents will show that preparations were 25 11,7 753 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 msdc to occupy bnses in the southern part of French Indo-China, needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies. We offer in evidence prosecution document 2137-H, a further document from exhibit 54-0 for identi- fication, being s decision of the Liaison Conference between the government and Imperial Headquarters dated 25 June 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 2137-H will receive exhibit No。 1306. (Whercrupon, the document above re- ferred to was merked prosecution ; s exhib.it N o . 1 3 0 6 end received in evidence.) MRS. STROOKER: We will now read exhibit N o . 1306: "Re Acceleration of Measures in the South " D e c i s i o n of Liaison C o n f e r e n c e . " "25 June 1941/Showa 16/ "(Memorandum) "Decision of the Imperial Headquarters- overnment Liaison Conference， 25 June 1941/Showa 16/ " 1 . I n view of the various existing conditions, 24 •；he Empire shall,, in sccordsnce with its fixed policy 25 accelerate its measures towards French Indo-China end 11,754 争 t 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 U 25 Thailand, Expeciclly, in connection with the return of the Japanese Delegate from the Dutch Indies, a military union shsll be established with French Indo- China ss soon as possible for the purpose of the stabil- ity and defence of East Asia. "Concerning the establishment of joint military relations with French Indo-China, the ssscntial factors which the Empire should stress upon are as follows "a) The establishment or use of Air Bases and Harbour Facilities in specified areas in French Indo- China , a n d stationing of the necessary troops in the southern part of French Indo-China,. "b) Furnishing of fscil:. .las in connection with the stationing of Imperial troops, "2. To cJpen diploractic negotiations for the purpose of the preceding pcragraph, "3. In case the French Government or the French Indo-China authorities do not comply with our demands, we shall attain our objective by force of arms. n 4 . In order to deal with such circumstance ?.s mentioned in the above paragraph, preparations shall be commenced beforehand for the despatching of troops 11,7 755 The Tribunal 1 s attention is invited to exhibit 639-A, a telegram from Bangkok to Berlin, dated 4 July 1941, VTith the Tribunal's permission we •will read the heading and one paragraph of this exhibit: 'To be kept under lock and key. Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) Bangkok, July 4 - , 1 9 4 1 - 1 ; 〇 5 o'clock Received July 4 , 1 9 4 1 - 2 0 ： 1 0 o'clock Ho。169 of 7/4- Urgent Secret Affair of the Reif.a. 'tikev^ise for the Atts^h^ rin-rion of the High Command of the Army and I.cal High Command. "The Japanese Secretary of Embassy, Fn.ruuchi des Gaimusho, who is on an orientation journey, confidential^/ informed the Military Attache;" We will now read paragraph 3’ '丨3) Failure of Japan's economic negotia- tions iraith the Netherlands-Indies would oblige her to take over the oil resources there by force, since her fleet would otherwise be incapable of action. Prior to this there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo-China in order to procure a con- centration area and jumping-off ports against the Netherland-Indies. The occupation of Thailand is 11,7 756 not envisaged. The preparation and the carrying out of the operations is to be made by the staff of General USHIHOirj on the South China Front, in Canton. Conduct of the English forces in Singapore is considered to be rmrely defensive. 1 1 " r e will read the last few lines of the telegram on nage 2 of the exhibit: "A telegram of the same tenor was sent to Tokyo. "Schol "Thomas "Note: Through the telegraph office expedited to the Code Sender of the High Command of the Wehr- macht and the Naval High Command. "Telegram Ktr. - July 5,1941." 11,7 757 The Tribunal 1 s attention is imvited to exhibit 5"88, being a document containing the resolu- tions adopted through the Imperial Conferences of 2 July, 6 September, 5 November and 1 December 1941. In the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 the principle of Japan's policy was laid down in three points: Japan would sdhere to the principles of establishing a Greater Ecst Asia Co-prosperity Sphere regr.rdloss of any change in the international situation. 2 . Japan would step ud the southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self- existence nnd self-defense. 3. Japan would remove all obstrcles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose." THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker, my colleagues end I who have her.rd you assure you that we rc-gard you as g distinct acquisition to the Bar of this Tribunal, MRS. STROOKER: Thank you, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: We adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning, (Whereupon, at 1600, an sdjourn- ment wes taken until Wednesday, 4- Eecember, 1?46, st 0930.) I
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