AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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I. m 111:- ' » S & H - -fA Tliursday, 21 November 194-6 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Chambers of tho Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan PROCEEDING IN CHAIvIBERS On Paper No. - An Apiolication of the prosecution for leave to present the evidence in chief of Major K. A. deWeerd, a witness on behalf of the prosecution, in the form of a prepared state- ment instead of by oral examination. Before; HON. SIR. WILLIAM VK3B President of the Tribunal cjid Member from the Commonwealth of Australia Reported bys JACIC GREENBERG Chief Court Reporter IMTFE Appearances: FOR THE PROSECUTION SECTIONs MR. JUSTICE W. G. F. BORGERHOFF, Associate Counsel, acting on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands ̂ m . EUGENE WILLIAMS, 131. A. T. LAVERGE, ¥R. G. OSMOND HYDE. FOR THE DEFENSE SECTION: MR. WILLIAM LOGAN, JR, Counsel for the accused KIDO, Koichi MR. Ol'EN CUNNINGHAM, Counsel for the accused OSHIMA, Hiroshl FOR THE OFFICE OF THE GEI\TERAL SECRETARY, IMTFE: MR. CimS. A. MAOTZ, Clerk of the Court; MR. H. W. DELAfJEY, Deputy Clerk of the Court. 3 The proceeding vvas begun at 0900. THE PEESIDENT; Application on behalf of the Dutch section of the prosecution. Mr. Logan. lUl. LOGAN; Yes, your Honor. We received it yesterday, and I have examined it, and we '.'ish to enter our objection because, in the first place, no reason has been submitted by the prosecution why this witness should testify by statement rather than by question and answer. The statement itself is a carefully prepared historical summary covering a period from August 194-2 to September 194-?, and we believe the defense is prejudiced by presentation of a careful statement such as this rather than have the witness take the stand and be asked cuestions. This statement differs from some of the others where the Court has perm.ltted the witness to testify by statem.cnt because it is not an expert opinion, it is not technical; and to permit this exam.ination to proceed in this manner would be con- trary to the spirit of a fair trial. Furthermore, the statement contains many conclusions and opinions of the witness. TIIE PRESIDENTS Oh, you have seen the state- ment? m . LOGANS Yes. THE P?.ESIDENTs Is it lengthy? L'lR, LOGAN; It is 129 pages. It is a mass of details, so much so, that I think it would just clutter up the reco3'd. I'lR. WILLI/J'aS; Of course, it will take from five to ten times longer to give it by question and ansT/er. ITIE PRESIDENTS This is a compendious way of putting the Dutch evidence? 151. WILLIAMS: Yes. liin, LOGANs It is mereljT- a sujamarjT- of a.n investigator; that's all it amounts to. THE PRESIDENT; Well, put it this way, Mr. Logan; Suppose they did not come along with any witness or affidavit but simply tendered a report by an investigator. Y/e would be bound to admit it under the Charter, and your only remedy then ''.'culd be to ask us to call the investigator for cross- examination. IIR. LOGAN; We contend, your Honor, that is contrary to the spirit of a fair trial because, if that method were adopted, all the prosecution would have to do in Droving its entire case would be to 5 prepare a brief or a sw'inary of the evidence they expect to prove or hope to prove or think they are proving by virtue of the investigator's report and just submit it to the Court. THE RvSSIDENT: Well, now, take this case; There is such a niass of detail here that one could not hope to be instructed on every point about it. I mean, ho'-- could "ou? You see, this evidence, really, is of crimes, if we may call them such, not actually committed "by the accused themselves but which were done by others for whom, it is claimied to hold them responsible. Of course, they m.ay be held responsible, and in som.e aspects it is ver}'' necessary- for them to have the fullest opportunity to question every detail of it. But, looking at it in a practical way, how v/ould it be possible for themi rithin a period of months or even years to investigate everything and bring Vi/itnesses along to deny what v/as said there? ira. LOGAF; We believe, your Fxonor, if the witness took the "stand, much of this matter would not be permitted by the Court. TEE PRESIDENTS Well, as a m.atter of fact, — TIE. LCGANs It would not be within the issues of the case. 6 THE PRE. .51 DENT 5 Vifell, viould have to be trusted to look after that for you, Mr. Logan. After all, what we want are statements of fact and not of opinion. It may be the subject matter i<3 such that opinion is called for; I doubt it. Only in those cases would we pay the faintest attention to any opinion. But I do not suppose there will be any such cases in this dossier, imx, LOGAN; The detailed matter that this statement goes into, it is out of all proportions. THE Pl\ESIDENTs It seems lengthy, 129 pages. lUTi, LOGANS Oh, yes. It goes into great details various religious organizations, and the Courts, schools, administration under the Japanese; and some of the details there are just am-azing. I think the Court itself will lose sight of the forest because of all the trees that have grovm there. THE PPESIDEJJTs >Ve vran't be able to see the woods fcr the trees. m . LOGANS That's right. I.IR. Vi/ILLIAIlS; Of course, this suggestion may be made, Sir Williams The Netherlands Indies comprises approxim.ately thirty per cent of the popu- lation that were taken over b̂ / the Japanese. They represent a rich and im.portant part of East Asia. By means of this statement and a careful selection of docuin.ents they are comprising — thejr are com- pressing their case into a period of about a week. If we put that witness on and other witnesses to testify to these facts, we could extend the thing over a m.onth or five or six vijeeks. We believe that it is in the interest of time to put on this kind of testimony in that way. In the second place, we think that it is an advantage and not a disadvanta.^^e to the defense to have the matter before ther. a week or ten days before the witness actually te.kes the stand. And in the third place, we are only making this application as a m.atter of additional precaution because we believe, for two reasons, the witness' statement is admissible without an application. The first is that it is a report. THE PRESIDENT; Yes, an investigator's report. WILLIAMS; The second reason is that this m.an is not normally'- an English-speaking man. His own native language is Dutch. THE P.HESIDEKT: But you recognize, it would not be fair just to put in a report, and he should be cross-examined. 8 WILLIiUviS; Absolutely. And we are putting him on the witness stand so that he may be cross-examined to any length that the Court permits. LOGANj Of course, if there is a ques- tion of time — THIC PFiESIDENT; I will not decide it now. I will bring it up to my colleagues and see what they think about it. iSTi, LOGAIvS I wish you Vv'ould, Judge. I wish you would take a glance at the mass of details that is out of all proportions, I believe. m . WILLIAMS s The m.atter cf the counsel for defense determining what am.ount of detail the prosecution v;ill put on in the case is entirely aside from the issue. They have no right to determ- ine whether we should go into the matter in detail or put it on in broad strokes any rore than we have a right to determine how they should put on their case. MR. LOGAN: It is a mass of detail that is / not connected with any of the issues of the case. M . WILLI/JiSs If it is not connected with, the issues in the case, it vn'.ll not pre;iudice ĵ -ou any. We think it is very vitally connected with the issues irj the case. m . CUI^NINGHAM; May I make an observation or tv/o because we haven't had a chance to collaborate fully on this with just a day's digest? I suggest that if they condense this to the material facts involved in this case, it vrould take about tv/entjr pages rather than 129. That's the v;ay: a lawyer-like digest of the thing which would be material to the facts and to the issues covered by the Charter. Noy(7, ny preparation on the thing — twelve or fourteen objections to make to the substance of it as well as the form. And I wondered vrtiat procedure your Honor would suggest; if the object- ions be made at the beginning or at the end of it. THE PRESIDENT: At the end. Ifflt. CUNNINGHAMS At the end. THE PRESIDENT: I don't know whether my colleagues will allow it or not. Mind you, Colonel Wild made a very good impression. He was able to give his evidence orally; but this v/itness does not speak English well, and it may be different. M . CUNNINGH.y£; But I think that, if your Honor will read this, you will agree with us that it is just cluttered with imjnaterial, irrelevant matters that are just for historical record and not for evidence in this case. It has no bearing on the four' 10 questions that are involved; the Vv'ar and the crimes against peace and humanity. I-M. WILLIaI'IS; I am afraid that counsel has a verj^ limited view of the scope of the issues in- volved in this case. m . C U M I N G H M : I try to keep them con- fined. TPIE PRESIDENT; He ?rauldn't admit any otherwise. I v/ill reserve consideration of that with a view to placing it before m.y colleagues. (Y/hereupon, at 0920, the proceed- ing T;as concluded.) t Si i^vc. I N D E X Of ^'^ITNESSES 21 NOVEIfflER 1946 Prosecution's Witnesses Ballantlne, Joseph W. (resumed) Cross by Mr. Blakeney (continued) " " Mr. Blewett " " Mr, Cunningham " " Mr. Warren " " Mr. Smith Page 10986 10986 10994 11017 11035 11052 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Doc, No. 93 Pros. No, Def. No. 1247 Description Answer handed to Mr. Grê v in Tokyo and by him for- Vi/arded to the Department of State (From Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Hrrbor Attack - Congress of the United States) (pp.44-1-4-42) For In Ident. Evidence 10987 10987 94 1248 Mr. AMU's Book 11060 10,985 1 2 3. 4 ,5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Thursday, 21 Novem.ber, 1946 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before with the exception of the HONORABLE R. B, PAL, Member from India, not sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before, For the Defense Section, same as before. The Accused; All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is represented by his counsel. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, BiTFE.) 1 C , 9 S 6 BALLANTIIME CROSS G r 1 e e 2S n b 3 e r 4 5 & 6 B a 7 r 8 t 0 9 r 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I'lARSHAL OF THE COUPT; The iJiternational Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney. J O S E P H W. B A L L A N T I F E, called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows; CROSS -EXAI-INATI ON BY MI,, BLAKEI'IEY (Continued); Q We were discussing at yesterday's adjourn- ment the' delivery of the final Japanese note on the 7th of Decem-ber. I haw- just one more question on that, and that is thiss You remember that Ambassador NOMURA originally made his airpointment for one o'clock specifically to call on Secretary Hull at the Department of State. A That's correct. Q And. upon arriving at a later hour, m.ade explanation that he had been delayed for certain reasons. A That is correct. Q Now, in regard to the m.essage of President Roosevelt to the Em^peror, what answer was received to that? A I'm not very clear about that other than 10,987 BALLANTII® cross 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 what Mr. Grew may have received in Tokyo. I Q I should like to hand you a docuirent and ask you whether you can identify it as the answer handed to Mr. Grew in Tokyo and by him forwarded to the Bepartment of State (handing document to witness). I should have said this was defense document No. 93. A Yes, I have seen this doctunent before. I have seen this message before. I®. BLAKEIJEY; I now offer for identification defense document No. 93, CLEKK OF THE C0U;:T: Defense document No. . 93 will be given exhibit No. 124'/ for identification only. (V/liereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked defense's exhibit No. 1247 for identification.) m . BLAIffilv-EYs Exhibit No. 1247, constituting an excerpt from the report of the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, is offered in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. (Whereupon, defense's exhibit No. 1247 was received in evidence.) m . BLAKENEY: I do not propose to read it into the record unless the Tribunal so desires. 10,988 BALLIINTIKE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: Read it, please. Hm. BLAIiKEY; May I inquire whether the Language Section is prepared to make a simultaneous translation? T?IE MONITOR: Yes, we are, sir. m , BLAKENEY: (Reading) "At 7 a.m., December 8 (Japan tire) Ambassador Grew was awakened by a telephone call from an official of the Japanese Foreign Office v;ho requested him to call on Foreign T^inister TOGO as soon as possible (ex. 30 p. 493)» "'hen /jnbassador C-rew arrived. Foreign Minis- ter TOGO, 'grim and formal,' handed him the Japanese Government's memorandum, breaking off the negotiptions. The Foreign T^inister said that he had been in touch v;ith Emperor Firohito, who desired thrt the memoran- dum be regarded as his reply to President Roosevelt's messape. /unbassador Grew reported to the State De- partm.ent that the Foreirn Tinister thereupon made to him. the following oral statement: It r Mis Majesty has e>:pressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the corcial message of the President. Fe has graciously let knora his wishes to the Foreign r'inister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the President as a reply to the letter's message. 10^989 BALLANTIMil CROSS 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "'Sorae days ago, the President made inquiries re- garding the circumstances of the augmentation of Jaj-anese forces in French Infio-China to which His Fajesty has directed the Government to re- ply. '"ithdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China constitutes one of the sub,1ect m.at- ters of the J&panese-American negotiations. His Fajesty has commanded the Governrrient to state its viev̂ 's to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, de- sired that the President will kindly refer to this reply. '"Establishm.ent of peace in the Pacific, and con- seruently of the v/orld, l as been the cherished desire of His Ifejesty for the :-eali7=ition of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact.' (ex. 178)" 10,990 BALLANTI^E CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 i 12 13 14 15 16 17 i I 18 I 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BY IS. BLAKEMEY (Continued): Q Now, lastly, Mr. Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the modus vivendl proposal. Is it correct that the United States draft modus yivendi proposal prepared in the days prior to the 26th of November included provision for supply of some. petroleum, to Japan? A That is correct, a sm.all quantity for civilian uses. Q That small quantity for civilian uses, was it not a far more lim^ited provision than the equiva- lent provision contained in the Japanese modus vivendi proposal of the 20th of November? A It is very small, indeed, compared to what the Japanese in^L^.ted in one of their intercepts they were going to ask for. Q IVas this petroleum question one of the vital differences between the two nations at that time? A I don't know exactly vifhat you m.ean. Q I m.ean', was it one of the problems which seemed most difficult of solution? A I'Vell, the Japanese Government had asked in their proposal of November 20 for such petroleum, as Japan m.ight require. That presented great difficult- ies for us. 10,991 BALLANTII® CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 i 18 ; 19 20 22 I 23 i 24 j 25 Q Since what time, particularly, had the petroleum question been a most serious issue? A Since about the time of the freezing orders. I'd like to complete my answer on that. President Roosevelt had given a statement which was made public, which is in the "Foreign Relations," Volum.e II, in regard to that petroleum question. Q V.'hen you mention the time of the freezing orders, may I ask vi/hether they included also an embargo on the shipment of aviation gasoline and, perhaps, other petroleum products? A Now, I'm not sure about this, but I think that the freezing orders were blanket and didn't include any specific provisions but that there were some restrictions before that on aviation gasoline. Q y/ould it be fair to say that from that approximate time of those freezing orders, the State Departm.ent had considered it apparent that there could be no agreement on the petroleun^ question? A If Japan had reverted to peaceful courses, there would have been no difficulty about any petrol- eum or any other trade question. Q veil, I'm asking you whether, as a practical m.atter, the State Departm.ent believed that Japan was going to do anything which would render an agreement 10,992 BALLANTII® CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 on this petroleuin q-uestion at all likely, A IVhen Japan moved into southern Indo-Chlna in a position to attack us, we couldn't see our way- clear to give Japan petroleum .for that purpose. Q If the petroleum question was one on which the parties were so far from agreement, did the State Department believe that there was any real lorospect of an agreemiont on the miodus vivendi at all? A We thought there was very little rirospect of any acceritance by Japan of the miodus vivendi that had been drafted. Q Do you remem.ber Secretary Hull saying sor-e- thing about their being one chance in three that it v;ould be acceptable? A He said, I believe, "not m.ore than one chance in three." Q Yes, I believe that's correct. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull did urge it upon the Chinese Ambassador on the 25th of IMovember, did he not, saying that "we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress so far"? A Yes, he proposed it to the Chinese Ambassador. Q So that the Department felt, did it not, that there was some reasonable prospect that the presenta- tion of the modus vivondi would result in the achieve- 10,993 BALLAWTIIffi CROSS 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 nent of further progress? A Tie didn't think there was a reasonable prospect. He thought there might be a very slight prospect of the thing — the proposal was a worth- vrtiile proposal, but he didn't think there \¥as very p^uch chance of the Japanese accepting it. The Japan- ese had given a very clear indication in their inter- cepts that that Novcnbcr 20 was their ninimum pro- posal, and what we were offering was chicken feed coEiDared with what they were asking. Q You already said, I believe, that modus vivendi s&s never presented. A I don't remember whether I said it or not, but that is a fact. Q Would it be correct to say that it was not presented finally because of the opposition of the Chinese as expressed by the Chinese Ambassador? A That was one important factor in the situa- tion. There v:ere other factors. Q At this tim.e, however, the position of the Department of State was, was it not, that it was not acting for the other interested nations? A The proposed modus vivendi — our proposed modus vivendi called for certain steps in cooperation by these other countries. It could not have been 10,994 EALLAKTINS CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 carried out by the United States alone. Q The modus vivendl draft vvas thought of, was it not, in the Department of State,as being merely a continuation of the previous conversations? A The modus vivendi was a part of the whole . proposal. The communication of November 26 — the whole comjnunication vms a part of that, too, of v^hich the m.odus vivendi was to be just one part. What we envisa .Died was that during; the life of the m.odus vivendi we would carry on conversations toward the objectives of a permanent peaceful agreement. Q And those conversations would have te^^n a continuation of the conversations which had been in progress, would they? A That is correct. I;IRo BLAICFNEY? That is all. Thank you. TKE PPiESIDEKT: Mr. Blewett. lIBo BLEV^niTT; If the Court please, I shall restrict m.y inquiry to matters not heretofore covered wherever possible. THE PFESIDENT: We expected that. 1 0 ^ 9 9 5 BALLANTIMil CROSS 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY HKl, BLETOTTj Q Mr. Ballantine, what do you mean by the phrase "Japan attacked against us" as far as the region of Indo-China is concerned? A Could you tell me where that passage is, please? Q Just a m^oment ago, sir, in answer to a question hy the examiner Yi?ith reference to petroleum you used those words, A In southern Indo-China, Japan placed herself in a position where she stood over the Philippine Islands, was able to have threatened vital trade routes affecting our trade with the Far East, and she v̂ as also in a position to threaten the terri- tories of our friends who ?jere resisting aggression. Q Then you had in mind, in part at least, our business interests. A Our business interests wevc a. very small part of the consideration. The main part vras, the Far Eastern region is a region of great production of strategic comm.odities such as tin and rubber which we used in great quantities. Q You referred to 1905 with regard to Japanese investment in Manchuria. Did not JaDan invest in and 11,996 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 develop Manchuria at that^time under a recognized treaty agreement? A Would you tell me where that passage is, please? Q There is just a reference to it on the first page near the bottom. A I fall to find that reference. I said, "In 190? Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease to the Kx^antung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway." Q Vifell, doesn't that mean that thejr entered into a treaty or agreement legally? A Yes. Q Now, is it not a fact that,in the early stages of the negotiations the attitude of the United States with regard to the v.;ithdrawal of troops in China was quite reasonable vifhich later became limited? THE PRESIDENTS Suggest to him, Mr. Blewett, « v/hy it was reasonable in the first place and why it became limited later, if you can. Maybe he has told us all he Imows about that, and we do not want those things repeated. iffio BLEV'JETT; I expect to follow that, if your Honor please, with regard to developments along about that time, in 'A].. 10^997 BALLANTIMil CROSS M O r s e 1 2 3 4 ^ 5 A 6 b r 7 a m 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 is! 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 BY m. BLE'A'ETT (Continued): Q Did the United States continue to £id China under lend-lesse or other legislation during the pendency of the negotiations? A You mecn during the oeriod of the converss— tions? 0 Yes, sir. A That is correct. Q Now, prior to Ĵ Jine 22, 194-1, the United States c.greed . ith J&rian as far as suggestions for the re- tention of troops agains communistic activity as is evidenced by the draft. A That is not correct. Q Just a moment, Tell, then, maybe I better go back to thi t if yov. say it is incorrect. I was under the impression that according to the drafts and according to your testimony that prior to June 22 the United States did have some understanding with regard to the retention of troops so far as communistic activities were concerned. A You will note that in exhibit 3 of my affidavit, page 4, Roman numeral III, /rsbic numeral 2, vie have in parenthesis "cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities, including stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory" close -0,^98 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 prrenthesis, "Subject to further dlscrsslon." Q "'ell, thct implies, of course, thrt there wrs some discussion regr^rding thct proposition. A We hsvc been having discussions — we hnd been hr.vin? discv.ssions on that question from the very beginning rlmost to the end. Q Wss there or not any chr^nge in the attitude of the State Berjcrtment subsequent to Germany's attack on Rvssia? A Our attitude on that question v;as the same from the beginning to the end. 0 Did you or anyone in the State Denartraent have any notice of the imminence of Germany's attack on Russia prior to June 21, 1941? A Yes; certainly. That is a matter of oublic record, that the Acting Secretary of State informed the Russian Government that we had intimation that Germany was poing to attack Russia. Q Did that fact have any bearing or influence on the question of the removal of troops from China so far as the draft of June 21 was concerned? A That never entered our minds at all. Q "'as the draft of June 21 considered in any vv-ay in line with the supposition thot the attempted German landing in England was not a near prospect? 10^999 BALLANTIMil CROSS 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A I didn't quite clearly understand your ques- tion. Q V/as the question of whether or not an attempted landing of Germany on English soil considered in any vvay in the negotiations or in the drawing up of the draft of June 21? A It certainly was not in my mind and I he(?rd no reference to it from anybody else. Q -"as there, at any time, any serious consider- ation by the State Department relative to the recog- nition of Manchukuo? A Our position right along was that that was a question between Chins and Japan. If China v;ere voluintarily,through amicable negotiations, "villing to agree to it we had nothing to say. Our position is clearly stated in the June 21 draft: Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo. Q Then your Department would not have objected to it? A As far as I knov;. If there had been peaceful negotiations J without duress, and China had been will- ing to agree to it, I don't think that anybody would have had anything to say. That is ;)ust ray personal feeling. That is the clear implication of this draft, Q Am I correct or not, then, in assuming'that 11,000 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 D 4 5 6 I I 7 : i I 8 I 9 10 11 ' 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 there was a change of attitude in co for as the Kovembei' 26 draft v/as concerned, inasmuch as it insisted that j I cll negotiations must be made with Chungking? j I A V/e consistently took the TDOsition that the National Government of China, with temnorary cEr)ltal at Chuiigkiug, was the government v/hich we recognized end that was the government of China. We never changed in th£t position. Q Did not the economic plan of Jr-pan concerning China, Jar^an and Llanchukuo, conform to the tendency among nations at that time? A Conform to the tendency of the Axis x^owers, a tendency which we were doing our best to change. Q V/ere there not other trade blocs, so-callod trade barriers, in existence among other nctions out- side the Axis? / I believe there were. I am not an expert on that subject. Q Can you tell us vvhether or not, as an official of the State DeTDartment, if the United States was unablf to break these trade barriers elsev;here, was it not Insisting upon a .unilateral obligation for Jai^an by insisting upon free trade between China and Janan? A You used the word "insisting." I wor ld like to make a little exiolanation of that Doint. 11,001 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ! 10 : I i 11 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: Thr t Is argiamentative. m . BLEWTT; I think I psked the witness, your Honor, if he could ansv/er that as an official of the State Lerrrtmont. He is attempting to, sir. THE PRESIDENT: You ere asking him can he provide an argument as an official. 'Fe don't want that, '̂'e '.vant fact from him. Q Do you have, Mr. Ballantine, from your long stay in Japan and China, any particular prejudice toward the Chinese as opposed to the Jenanese'^ A I hope I have no prejudice against rny rcor,le Q Did you \«/rite m y other books, pamphlets or articles, other than your Jcpancse grammar? A I don't recall any published articles or pamphlets. Q I think you stated thrt, in your cross-exam- ination, with regard to .the removal of troops, in one instance the Department did not consider it seriously because it v;ould not be approved by Chiang Kai-shek. Is that correct" A I believe that what I said w.'-s that whatever formulas v/e had received from the Japanese, there were no foiTiUlas'-.thit we thought on that question that we had received that Chiang Kai-shek would accept. Q Fas there not a very strong, influential 11,002 B A L M T I N E CROSS 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 business group in the United States thrt ori-oosed any 2 agreement between Japan end the United Strtes thrt did 3 not exclude g 1 1 troops fromChinD? 4 TIE PRESIDENT: He csn speak only for the Stcte 5 Deportment. We don't went his orinion sbout whrt the <5 Amcricrn people thought independently of that. m . BLFV'ETT: I meant to specify thc?t, your Honor, but I overlooked it. ^ Q I mccnt, was there any pressure brought uron your Dc-partment by any business group or individuals with regard to an agreement between Japan and China or the United States? A There ?;as not. Q Were there not reports received by you, as director of Far Easter&irAffairs, indicating that Japan was becoming largely a competitive nation? A I wasn't director of Far Eastern /ffairs at that time. Q Well, then, in your capacity in the State Department as adviser. / I supTDOse from time to time there were ques- tions raised by trade groups in regard to Japanese trade, but those — if there were they vrent to our economic people and I don't know much about that. In any case, that had no bearing unon the conversations 11,003 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 or our attitude tov/rrd the thing which was governed by the fixed principles of the United States xvhich hr.ve been'traditioncl in our Fr.r Erstern policy end the most complete embodiment of v/hich is found in the Nine--owcr Trerty of 1922. Those principles we wrnted to see crrried out in m y new cgreement ;/hich the Jc?pDnese Government p.sked us for. '"e weren't seeking cny nev/ rgreement. We v;ere srtisfied with the exist- ing agreement. Thus, when the Jr-.rnese crme to us end cskcd us for B new rgreement, we said thrt v̂e v/orld be willing pro:^iding it conformed to our fixed i^rinciDlci 0 V'cre there not references in the discussions to the contemplFted action of Congress r.s concerns this trerty or agreement? A Nrturally we had to consider whrt kind of rn agreement we could ccrry Congress with. Q Is it not r, fnct, ''Ir. Br-llrntine, th?,t I/Irdrme Chirng Kai-shek hrs msny very influential friends in '""ashington rnd in the United States? THE PRESIDENT: That is beyond the sco^e of the affidavit. Q Regarding the freezing order of July, 19^1, what was the meaning of the State Department in term- ing it c move for self-defense? A Vvell, v/hen a desperado gets in position to 11,004 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ! 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 shoot you, you don't v;rnt to give him Emuiunition for that purpose. Q Wcs not thr.t order considered by the Strte Department rs prcicticp.lly the wcging of economic wrr- fr.rc? A I think the Stete Ce^rrtracnt rccopnized thrt economic measures of that chrrrcter could only be taken in a very serious siturtion, but then we v/ere conccrned at thrt moment with a very imminent and overt act which necessitated our taking steps of self-defense. Q Do not the records of your department indicate that most wars in history have been economic? THE PRESIDENT: He need not answer that ques- tion. Q Can you tell us, Mr. Ballantine, from your Rjpartment's knowledge of the psychology of the Japanese generally, might not this action of freezing be con- sidered by the Js'nanese as an act of hostility? A We were conoerned, as I scid before, then with this question of self-defense which, in view of the imminence of the peril that v/as created by Japan's move into southern Indo-China — that consideration over-rode any other consideration in the siturtion. I think I explained that in my affidavit. Q • ell, what I v̂ -anted to know, if you can tell 11, CO5 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 me, is, from your knowledge of the Jr.pr.nese people, how th£t ection wrs received out here, not whr-t the attitude of the United States wrs concerning it. THE PRESIDENT; He isn't here as possessing any expert knov/ledge of the Japanese. In any case, I suptjose the Tribunal can be trusted to form its 0¥.ti conclusions as to the purpose and effect of freezing. m , ELEFETT; Yes, sir. Q I assume, however, Hr, Ballantine, thrt it must have had some deterrent as regards to the negoti- ations, did it not? A The Secretary of State had rlready suspended the conversations before the freezing order, and after the freezing order it wcs the Japrnese who came bsck to us and asked that the conversations be resumed. Q Wss the entry of Japanese troops into Indo- china concluded under an agreement or not? A V/e don't know the nature of rll the factors that went into that siturtion. Thr.t was between the Japanese and Hitler ?nd the Vichy Government. Q 7/ell, wes there not a formal tresty drawn up and signed by the prrties involved? A My understanding is thct there was, Q Was it not considered at the time of the nego- tiations that an actual state of war existed between 11,006 BALLANTIKE CKOSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I I 9 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Japan and China, regardless of the terms? A Obviously. Very large scale hostilities had been going on for four years. Q Could or could not Japan have been justified in sending troops to Indo-China as a measure against the Chinese? THE PliESIi^EKT: That calls for an opinion which we don't want fron the v/itness. Q Representations were mace to the Department of State by someone early in :.pril, 1 9 4 1 , that Japan was prepared to enter into an agreement nulifying the Tripartite Pact, he you recall v/ho made those repre- sentations, llr. Ballantine, and 7;hether or not they were ever reduced to 7/riting or any document? A As I indicated — or perhaps I didn't -- Father Drought told me orally that that was whet his Japanese contacts had said to him. l̂ e got nothing in writing from any authoratitive source on that. Q There is no document or any record of that conversation or that proposal anyv/here in the depart- ment? Throughout the negotiations there seems to be some indication v^ith reference to President Roosevelt and SecretarjT- Eull that there was a variance betv/een the representations made by the accredited representatives of Japan and the Japanese press, bid your Department 11,007 BALLANTINE. CROSS feel thf.t these ambassadors vjere ruthorlzed to execute an rgreement if r meeting of the minds had occurred? ^ A If a meeting of minds had occurred and vie had 4 proceeded to negotiations, then there would have been 5 full pov/ers communicated, exchanged between the tro <5 governments as to whom the negotiators would be. That 7 question, therefore, never arose. ^ THE PRESIDENT; We will recess for fifteen minutes. ('"'hereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after xvhich the proceedines were resumed as f ollo?;s J) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 i 25 ! 11,008 BALLAI'LTINE CROSS D u 1 d a 2 3 W 4 o 1 5 f 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSriAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribimal for the Far East is now resumsd. Ti.E PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett. BY I'jR. BLE^"ETT (Continued): Q Are yon familiar, Mr, Ballantine, with Mr. Hull^s testimony before the Pearl Harbor Committee? A I am.. Q Is it true that he stated that these negoti- ations were taken up for the purpose of peace in the Pacific and at the same time to get tim.e for armament of the U.S.A.? A I'd like to refresh my memory on the exact quotation of his statement, Q He stated — THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett, be careful when you purport to say what Mr. Hull said that you quote his exact words. You may have done so. m ^ BLE^/ETT: I have a quotation, sir., that I think is correct from that statem.ent, but if the witness does not recognize that, sir, I will not pursue it. THE PRESIDENT: He may if you put Mr. Hull's exact words. m ^ HIGGINS: Mr, President. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Higgins. 11,009 EALLANTII® CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I I I 11 I 12 13 I i I 14 : i 15 i 16 i 18 I 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. HIGGINS; I object to this testlmf^ny. It is not an act of Mr. Hull as Secretary of State, but as a witness before some Investigating committee and the report of that would be the best evidence of what Mr» Hull said, if he did make a statement. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett is pursuing the conventional course. We cannot very vi/ell stop him. We do not want the whole of that inquiry in evidence. The witness has said he is familiar with what Mr. Hull said. m . HIGGINS: There is no evidence that Mr. Ballantine was present. THE PRESIDENT; Hesrsay is admissible in this Tribunal. m.. BLEV.'ETT: I read, sir, from page 554 of Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack of the 2 7 t h , just one paragraph, sir: "But our policy was not to say'no'to the Japanese ultimatum of Novemiber 20. It vms not to remain silent even. It vjas to grab at every straw in sight in an effort to keep up the conversations and to give time to our armies and navies here and among our future allies, to make further preparation and also to show our continuing interests in peace." Q Was that a concept of the State Department's 11,010 EALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 policies at that time? THE PRESIDENT: During the negotiations. m . BLEVffiTT: Yes. A I think you will find a similar statement in the summary of conversations in the record of'Foreign Relations, United States-Japan, 1931 to 1941." It v̂ as our desire and our hope to meet the expectations of the American people who desired peace. Fe wanted to keep alive the spark of peace to the last split second, lie wanted to clutch at every straw that might make possible the continuance of peace. Surely there was nothing inconsistent betv̂ feen that objective and giving our armed forces and those of our friends time to prepare adequately for self-defense. Q Could you, therefore, confidently have any great discernment or realization that an agreement could be reached under such circumstances? TKE PRESIDENT: Did the Department think that one could be reached under those circumstances? THE WITNESS: Under those circumstances we would be all the more anxious to take anything that was possible, but surely we werenH going to sacrifice our principles. Q Did the President of the United States, in his Navy Day speech on October 27, 1941, infer that the 11,011 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 .24 25 United States was ready to fight Japan? THE PRESIDENT: Put it this way: "Did the President make this observation on that date;"" then quote his exact words, if it is not already in evidence, and I do not think it is. m . BLEV.FETT: V̂ e have sent to ^'ashington for a copy of the speech, sir — for an excerpt — but it has not been received by us as yet. I do not know whether the prosecution has it. I think the witness is familiar with the speech however, your Honor. If he says not, I shall not pursue the question. THE WITNESS; I am not familiar with the speech. THE PRESIDENT: Fe want nothing but the exact words used in these speeches, MR. BLE^.'ETT: I understand, sir. 11,012 BALLA?^TINS CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Are vou familiar .̂vii'h the speech o""̂ Kr. Churchill shortly therer.fter at the Lord Mayor's dinner, "'hich excerpt has been admit••ed in evidence here? A I vrould have to have my raemorv refreshed on th?t. •̂•R, BLE'"ETT: If -our Honor insists, I do not have the ezl :bit handy so I sm unable to read it. May I quote one porrion of it to the •̂•ritness r.nd see if he recalls that" TIIE PR^;SIDEK • : Are yov. roin^ to ?sk him what V'/as the effect of Fr. Churchill's -̂O'̂ ds on the Anerican State Department? I do not see you should ask the question because his speech is in evidence. 0 In vie"' of these manifestations throughout the attempted negotiations, incli^din.s t'-e freezing order, embargoes, aid to China, ?;as it inconceivable to vour Department th.at Japan m.ight have had some doubts as to the United States' sincerity? TI-? PRESIDENT: Can he testify as to the Japanese doi^bts î̂ ithout expressing ?n opinion unless they told hir̂ t'-at they had them and what they ?;ere? m . BLE'ETT: I ^ould assume, sir, that there must have been some indication of their attitude "throughout these Ion'-' discussions. 11,013 c;ioss 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TrJE PRESIDE]":'; He told us yesterday that he wasn't affected by t'-eir deneanor. Apart fi-o'-̂-'. that, vie have onlj'' their "'ords and t'^elr acticns. I-R. BLF'-STT: '•-el]., it" your Honor please., the witness r(ii,p:ht possibly be an expert in so far as his knowledge of the Japrnese psychology na'̂'' be concerned. PHESIDEI'T; For the ti-ne being lÂe recoi^nise no such expert. 0 "as it unreasonable, i"" the opinion of tl-e Sta'-.e Department, to feel — cross out "feel" — as regards Japanese preparations for '7ar, inaspuc'- as the United States vas undergoing the same progress at the time? A United States Tvas not out in force on a course of widespread aTfression, Our self-defense prepara- tions began to take place a long tir̂ e after the Japanese forv/ard movement began. 0 If the foreipn policy of the •'̂ tate Department was positive in May or June was it not set forth explicitly; and if not received or not accepted by Japan, why were not t'-ese negotiations, closed and concluded? A The A'-^erican C-overrjnent was sincerelv and earnestly desirous of working for peace to t'-e last possible moment at an^^thing the Japanese cane -'o us 11,014 BALLASTINE crioss 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 anc' said tbe^/ wanted a peaceful set.tlerient. •7e explored patiently and up to t̂ -e end the possibilities of peace. q MajT- arsuire from your affidavit, Mr. Ballan- tine, that at no time during the course of t:\es8 nego- tiations were the Japanese i-epresentatives si-^cere"' TFE PliESIDEi'T: "'ell, that ar̂ âin asks him to express an opjrion on the state o-'' nind of the Japanese. He has already dealt v;ith that verv fully. m . BLFVSTT: I pot that intimation from his affidavit, vour Fonor, that t'-at ŵas his expression, that that was his opinion, that they ners not sincere, at no time. Of course, he can ans'.7er that. If net, why that is so. But that is t'-e impression I received from reading the a'^fidavit. THE FHESTD3NT: Let hin anŝ -'er. A It is difficult to elaborate r-n what I already said. We had to take into consideration, when we entered into the conversations, Ja^oan's past record. At t:-e outset of '-he conversations there was nothing particularly that indicated insinceritv. B\it es con- versations progressed, it was difficult to reconcile these assertions of their peaceful desires with the specific formulas that they proposed for settlement. 0 Would or not, in your opinion — if the Japanese Government had accepted the terns of 11,015 EALLAITTIIOS CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 November 26, '̂ ould the.t not, hs.ve -practically made a subjugated state or nation of J?pan? TITf; PRESIDENT; That is a matter o" opinion for us, not of fact for hin. 11,016 BALLANTINE GROSS G ' 1 0 1 2 d b 3 e' r 4 g 5 & 6 S P 7 r 8 • a t t 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Mr. Ballantine, did you write or dictate this affidavit personally? THE PRESIDENT; That ŷ as answered almost at the beginning of the cross-examination. M . BLKVETT: It is my recollection, sir, that it has, but I thought at that time he referred to the preparation of it. THE PRESIDEM:; Well, it is a short answer. Get it from him. m . BLEVfflTT; It is not important, sir. I will waive it, if your Honor thinks that — THE PRESIDENT: Let him answer. A Yes, I dictated f-at affidavit. Q Now could not your s'.atement in great part be based upon a reconstruction of happenings and events in the light of Pearl Harbor; and could they not have been formed on what appears to you to be a deliberate prepared policy, but what actually constituted a sincere effort to effect an agreement by Japan for peace and economic security? THE PRESIDED: If we understand that question rightly, you are still asking for his ©pinion. Iffl. BLg^ffiTT: Well, your Honor, hindsight sometimes creates — may not create the proper viewpoint 11,017 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in a situation. The past events may be strongly indicative of a course of action, but I am simply asking the witness if this prepared statement might not have been made on a reconstructive basis. THE PRESID^.KT; I suppose he acted on every bit of knowledge he possessed including the war. You are asking him, in effect, what sort of an affidavit would he have drafted or have signed if Pearl Harbor had never happened. That is purely hypothetical. liR. BLS''ETT: I am enceavoring, your Honor, to p'Hint it more specifically tf-̂ the attitude of these representatives of Japan while these negotiations were going on. Now, after all these years, and after the developments, it may strongly indicate that they were insincere. THE PRESIDENT; Has not the Court to decide that in the light of all of the evidence before it without any assistance from Ilr. Ballantine's opinion? MR, BLEv/ETT: I believe your Honor is correct in that, sir.^^ That concludes my questioning. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham. CROSS-EXAIHNATION (Continued) BY m . CmiNINGHAM: Q If the Tribunal please: Mr. 'Titness, were you present, Mr. Ballantine, at all of the Hull-Stimson 1 1 , 0 1 8 3ALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 conferences concerning Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s whi le the negot iat ions vi?ere going on? A I was not present at any of the conferences between Mr. H u l l and Mr. Stimson. Q Then do you know from the records of the State Department oa what date — exact date — Mr. H u l l declared to Mr, Stimson that negot iat ions were no longer useful? A I do not r e c a l l the words \7hich you quote at a l l . Q Yesterday, you t e s t i f i e d that Mr. H u l l had to ld to l l r . Stimson i n e f f e c t that the negot iat ions v/ere through. Can you t e l l us the exact date of that conversation? A I sa id yesterday that Mr. H u l l had sa id : "The matter i s now i n the hands of the Array and Navy," I f I r e c a l l c o r r e c t l y , he said that on November 27th. I n any case, the f a c t s are set f o r t h i n the P e a r l Harbor I n q u i r y , Q V/hat I am gett ing to , Mr. B a l l a n t i n e , i s : I f Mr. H u l l , according to the records of the State Department, made any preparatory remarks at any other time during the negot iat ions to Mr, Stimson before t h i s f i n a l conversation? A As I s a i d , I was not present at any of the 1 1 , 0 1 9 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 conversations or conferences between Mr. H u l l and Mr. Stimson. My knowledge of ?Jhat was said i s derived e i ther from what Mr. H u l l tolo me personal ly afterwards, or from the records i n connection with the P e a r l Harbor I n q u i r y ; and I could not undertake to g ive any c l e a r sequence of those statements without ref resh ing my mind from the P e a r l Harbor record. Q Now l e t us go to the American State Depart- ment's a t t i tude toward the T r i p a r t i t e Pact . -Vould you say that i t was d e f i n i t e l y the f o r e i g n p o l i c y r.f Mr. H u l l and the State Department to t o t a l l y divorce Japsn from Germany i n the event of the extension of the war i n Europe to include the United S t a t e s ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ? A Japan came to us and asked for an agreement covering peace i n the P a c i f i c area. N a t u r a l l y , before concluding such an agreement, we wanted to make sure that Japan vvould not a t tack us i f we got involved i n Europe, Q That does not answer my quest ion, Mr, B a l l a n t i n e . Would you say that i t was d e f i n i t e l y the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of Mr. H u l l and the State Department to t o t a l l y divorce Japan from i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under the T r i p a r t i t e Pact to Germany i n the event I l j 0 2 0 BALLANTIIJE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the United States became Involved i n the European war? TIIE PRESIDENT That involves the determina- t i o n by the i.7itness of Japan's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to Germany and I t a l y under the T r i p a r t i t e Pact . MR. CUMINGIL'O.'i: May the witnors answer? TEJ; PRESIDENT: No. He can say whether i t was the des i re of America to keep Japan out of a war should the United States becoKie involved i n one i n Europe - - the des i re of the State Department — and he gave h i s answer i n the second part of the l a s t answer. Q Well , Mr. B a l l a n t i n e , was t h i s p o l i c y that was expressed to the Japanese Ambassadors a l l through the negot iat ions? A I don't know what you moan by " t h i s p o l i c y " , Q The p o l i c y which you have expressed. A We mxade our p o s i t i o n c l e a r to the Japanese from the very outset of the conversat ions. Q •?as i t the p o s i t i o n of the State Department that i f Japan had made an agreement to annul the . r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under the T r i p a r t i t e Pact that that would const i tute a breach of that pact? A Mr. H u l l repeatedly to ld the Japanese that he would leave i t to the Japanese what they could do. 1 1 , 0 2 1 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Was the f a i l u r e of the p a r t i e s to agree on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of Japnn under the T r i p a r t i t e Pact one of the c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r s i n the two p a r t i e s ' i n a b i l i t y to complete the negot iat ions? A I v;ould put i t t h i s way; The f a i l u r e — our f a i l u r e to obtain c l a r i f i c a t i o n from the Jap-inese as to 'vhat they would do i n case we became involved i n the war i n the A t l a n t i c was one of the f a c t o r s which made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r us to reach an agreement. Q Did not — was not the Pact i n e f f e c t when Germany and Russ ia went to war and Japan not j o i n i n g Germany, d i d n ' t that give the United States s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s for determining whether or not Japan would go to vjar i n the event of further extension of the European war? THE PRESIDENT: I t i s not f o r him to answer that . THE '^TNESS: I did not understand you, Mr. Pres ident . THE PRESIDENT? I t i s not for you to answer that . You are asked to weigh up considerat ions and g ive your own opinion, do you r e a l i z e i t ? Q During these negot ia t ions , had not the State Department understood that Gorm_any considered 1 1 , 0 2 2 BA.LLANTIxNE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 a v i r t u a l s tate of vjar e x i s t e d between the United S t a t e s and Germany from Pres ident R o o s e v a l t ' s Navy Lay speech and other ac ts that v^ere committed a f t e r that and before that? THE PRESIDENT I Read that quest ion to me, Mr. Reporter , p l e a s e , (Whereupon, the l a s t quest ion was read by the o f f i c i a l court r e p o r t e r . ) THE PRESIDENT; He may answer i f he can. A I don't know Vv'hat Germany considered, Q The State Department was c a r r y i n g on d i p l o - matic r e l a t i o n s wi th Germany at that t ime, were they not? A We had d ip lomat ic r e l a t i o n s . Q Now, Mr. B a l l a n t i n e , we w i l l go to another s u b j e c t , '?hat d i d the State Department have i n mind, or vj-hat was t h e i r p lan or program i n the event those n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l e d ? A I don't know that any conc lus ion had been reached on t h a t . The Japanese had sa id that i n the event of f a i l u r e of the n e g o t i a t i o n s , that the conse- quences would be most unfortunate, '̂"'e f e l t that we could go so f a r , and i f we cou ld 'not go any f u r t h e r , v/e V7ould j u s t stand and take the conscquences. Q I n your answer to Mr. Blewett you suggested 11,023 BALL/iNTIWE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that unless tho arrangomonts or the f i x i d ^ p o l i c y of the Unitcc States as set t led by the 1922 ConforoncG were c a r r i e d out, that you could not make an agreement. Nov; t h i s f i x e d p o l i c y , as you have expressed i t , i t was the opinion of tho State Department that unless t h i s f i x e d p o l i c y was c a r r i e d out, oven i f i t meant war, i s that correct? A I t meant that wo were u n w i l l i n g to surrender our p r i n c i p l e s no matter what the consequences. Q B i c i t not a l so mean that oven in tho l i g h t of the changed circumstances bet^veen the time of the f i x e d p o l i c y was s e t t l e d u n t i l the time the negot iat ions were going on, you would not go beyond a c e r t a i n l im.it even i f i t meant war? A The changed circumstances were Jj^pan's breaking away from the Nine-Pov.'or Treaty of which she was a par ty . Our p o s i t i o n on that i s abundantly set c l e a r i n a note v/hich wo addressed to the Japanese Government on December 30, 1938, which I be l ieve i s i n evidence before t h i s T r i b u n a l . THE PRESIDENT; \'c w i l l adjourn u n t i l h a l f - past one. ("hereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) 11,024 BALLAKTII^ CROSS G 1 r e 2 e n 3 b e 4 r g 5. & 6 B 7 a r 8 t o 9 n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tr ibuna l met, pursuant to recess , at 1330. MRSHAL OF THE COUTiTs The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I J i l i t a r ' - Tr ibuna l f o r the Far E a s t i s now resumed, THE PRESIDINT: Mr. Cunningham. J O S E P H W. B A L L A N T I N E , c a l l e d as a witness on behalf of the prosecut ion, resumed the stand and t e s t i f i e d as fol lov/s; CROSS-EXiililNATION BY I;IR. CUNNINGHAM (Continued): Q Mr. B a l l a n t i n e , we go now to the question of to what extent were the Japanese-American n e g o t i - at ions which were going on made p u b l i c at the time? A The3'' were not made p u b l i c , Q Well , was Germany, with whow. diplomatic r e l a - t i o n s continued u r . t i l December 11, 1941, kept informed or were the negot iat ions purposely kept from them by both s ides at the request of the USA? A We were conducting in formal , exploratory conversations to determine whether a b a s i s for a negot iat ion e x i s t e d . The stage of the negot iat ion was never reached. 1 2 7 16 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 ,025 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS Q Did the Department of State f e e l that a b a s i s of negot ia t ion had never been a r r i v e d at? A That i s c o r r e c t . 3 ^ Q Were the B,C,D Powers kept informed of a l l ^ the conversations and exploratory conferences? ^ A Thej'- were informed that we were having i n - forrral , exploratory conversat ions. But, no — they 8 were not given any ir^formation i n regard to the con- 9 tents of those th ings except i n conriection with the xo Japanese-proposed modus y lvend i and our proposed 11 modus v i v e n d i . I do not r e c a l l d e f i n i t e l y whether 12 the exact Japanese proposal of November 20 — whether 13 they were informed of the d e t a i l s of that , I am not 14 sure about that , 15 Q Did the State Department express i t s o f f i c i a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n at IvIATSUOICA's expression of view concerning the negot iat ions which came to the a t t e n t i o n of the German o f f i c i a l s ? 19 ' A I am not c l e a r to what you r e f e r . Q I n a speech by MTSUOILA i n which he discussed the n e g o t i a t i o n s , was there not an o f f i c i a l protest or suggestion m̂ ade by the United States that these negot iat ions be kept secret? A I n so f a r as I r e c a l l , no representations were made to the Japanese C-overnm.9nt or to the 1 1 , 0 2 6 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Japanese representat ives requesting that the conver- sat ions be kept s e c r e t . On the contrary , i t was the Japanese who asked us or who impressed upon us the d e s i r a b i ] . i t y that the conversations be kept secret . Q Was t h i s F o r e i g n Minister TOYODA or Fore ign Min is ter MTSUOKA's p o l i c y ? A I don't know whose p o l i c y i t was, Q Did the State Departroent consider that Germany was w i t h i n her r i g h t s i n ask ing Japan to adhere to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under the T r i p a r t i t e P a d i n the event America entered the European War? A I don't knov; that the State Deioartment gave cons iderat ion to t h a t . Q Nov; v;e pass to another quest ion, Mr. B a l l a n - t i n e . During your course of negot iat ions as an o f f i c i a l of the State Department, d id any other nat ion o f f e r i t s good o f f i c e s i n m.ediation of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the United S tates and Japan? A The only thing I r e c a l l of that nature was a conversat ion between the A u s t r a l i a n representat ive and the Secretary of State H u l l towards the l a t t e r part of November. He proposed to have a t a l k with the Japanese representat ives . Mr. H u l l sa id he had no object ion but thought that nothing v;ould come of i t . 11 ,027 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25. Q Who was t h i s gentleman or o f f i c i a l ? A I bel ieve that Mr. R ichard Casey v/as the A i i s t r a l i a n Minister at that time. THE PRESIDENT; Did Mr. Casey c la im that he was act ing at the instance of Japan? THE ift'ITKESSs He did not. THE PRESIDENT; The only relevance of that quest ion put by Mr. Cuimingham i s i t s bearing on the Hague Convention of 1907. BY M . CmiNGHAM (Continued): Q Can you name, Mr, B a l l a n t i n e , any leader or pov;er suggested i n any of the d e l i b e r a t i o n s on the United States or Japan's s ide, which had not taken stand on the war at the tiF:e, which could have judged the matter and s e t t l e d the d i f ferences i m p a r t i a l l y ? I f so, who was that power, and what was the inf luence? A That queg-tion never arose at the time, Q Was any attempt made by the State Department or Japan at the beginning of the negot iat ions to a r b i t r a t e or submit the d i f ferences to an i m p a r t i a l body? A I don't know what Japan d i d . The State Department — the Japanese cam;e to us and asked for an agreem.ent, and v̂ e entered into conversations 11,028 BALLANTIMi] CROSS 1> 1 2 3 , 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 17 I 18 19 20 21 22 23 1 24 25 toward that agreement. The quest ion d i d n ' t a r i s e . Q Then you considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of war on ly on one s i d e . That c a l l s for your opinion, and I w i l l withdraw that . Had not Great B r i t a i n and the Netherlands an§ Canada and other countr ies shown t h e i r w i l l i n g - ness to stand by the dec i s ion of the United States on these matters? A I have no knowledge that those governments gave the United States a blank check to s e t t l e th ings for them i n any way. What we had envisaged was that , a f t e r reaching what we thought was a b a s i s of an agreem.ent, that wo would go to these other powers and d i scuss the matter with them then. Q Did you or Mr. H u l l or any other o f f i c i a l i n tho State Department have any conferences wi th the B r i t i s h and other Ambassadors and' representat ives , keeping them, informed of the developments? A Mr. H u l l had conferences with the diplom^atic representat ives of the f r i e n d l y T^cwers from time to t ime. I c a n ' t r e c a l l offhand the exact d e t a i l s of what he sa id . But, so far as I know, there was no d i s c u s s i o n of the d e t a i l s of the progress of the conversations i n regard to the points involved t h e r e i n . 11.C29 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Were they not disposed r-o loave tiie d e t a i l s of the negot iat ions i n the hands of Mr. Hoosevelt and the Secretary of S t a t e , Mr. H u l l ? A As I have sa id "before, vie hadn't got up to any negot ia t ions , Q Let us revert to the Chinese-Japanese r e l a - t i o n s . Was the State Department i n a p o s i t i o n to present a plan on August 10, 1>'37 that the Japanese- United States r e l a t i o n s concerning China Vi/ere such that America could act as mediator for China and Japan settlement? A My understanding i s that we did not o f f e r mediation; we merely offered good o f f i c e s , Q Was t h i s to promote the i n t e r e s t s of the United States or for some other purpose? A I t was for the purpose of r e s t o r i n g and main- t a i n i n g peace. Q A l l of these transact ions between the United S tates and Japan were c a r r i e d on uninterrupted regard- l e s s of who occupied the Cabinet or the main govern- mental posts i n the Japanese Governir'ent, i s that correct? A Are you r e f e r r i n g to conversations i n 1941? Q I am, r e f e r r i n g to the general course of Jap-anese-American r e l a t i o n s over the period of years 1 1 , 0 3 0 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 t e s t i f i e d to by you i n your a f f i d a v i t . A We pu^^sued a cons istent p o l i c y towards . Japan throughout our r e l a t i o n s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of what group or power — party might be i n power i n Japan. Q Were j'-our negot iat ions s o l e l y with the o f f i c i a l s i n rjower, or were there other negot iat ions during that period with economic and i n d u s t r i a l and other i n t e r e s t s ? A Negotiat ions of the State Department were w i t h the Japanese Government, Q From, j^our ansv/er to Mr. Blewett , I be l ieve i t was, or Mr. Blakeney, you suggested that Mr. Grew was only g i v i n g the point of view of Tokyo, and I wondered i f i t was o f f i c i a l Tokyo which you were express ing the about. A ^ihat I rntended was, Mr, Grew was g i v i n g the viewpoint as he saw i t from where he was i n Tokyo. Q I n response to a question by Mv, Blevirett you suggested that America began preparat ion for vmr a long tim.e a f t o r t'-e Japanese forward movement began. Ca.n you give us the date at which the State Depart- ment determined that "movem.ent began"? A I don't know i f the State Department made any o f f i c i a l determination as to Ti/hen that forward movement beean. 11 ,031 BALLiillTIKI'; CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Then how can you set the tinie at which the United States hegan preparation for v^ar? A I n the autunn of 1940, Japan concluded an a l l i a n c e v</ith H i t l e r ' s Germany and Y;ith I t a l y . I f you w i l l read some of the speeches of some of the Japanese leaders fo l lowing that a l l i a n c e and read the speeches of the German representat ives , you w i l l see many references to the c reat ion of a New Order throughout the world. I t was a world m̂ ovem̂ ent of conquest. Q Then how can you set the time when the United States began preparat ion for Vvar? That ' s my quest ion, A I t i s p e r f e c t l y c lear that the United States was a peace lov ing nat ion, that the United States was not cove-ting anybody e l s e ' s t e r r i t o r y or was not out on a course of aggress ion. I t i s p e r - f e c t l y c lear that our nat ion d id not want war even as l a t e as the summer of 1941. The exters ion of the S e l e c t i v e Serv ice Act wa-̂ -passed by only one vote i n the House of Representat ives, Q When did the State Departm.ent n o t i f y the War Department that they better get ready for war? A The Secretary of S t a t e , the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the President were 11,032 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i n consulat ion throughout the adrninistrat ioi i . I don't know when any p a r t i c u l a r statement was made i n regard to the matter. Q I j u s t want to know what you mean when you say, "A long time a f t e r the Japanese forward movement began, the United States began preparat ion for war." A Japanese invas ion of Manchuria i n 1931 was i n c l e a r v i o l a t i o n of the Nine-Povirer Treaty. That c e r t a i n l y was a forward movement. Q That 's what you sa id i n your a f f i d a v i t , Mr. B a l l a n t i n e . But, was that ever decided by a t r i b u n a l or any body created for the purpose of determining a l e g a l l i a b i l i t y under the Nine-Power Pact? A I th ink the League of Nations had something to say about that . Q Well , i t looks l i k e we are st\Tnied on that quest ion. L e t ' s go to the nexts Did not the State Department consider that wire tapping and in tercept ion of m a i l and messages was an unfriendly act not countenanced between f r i e n d - l y nat ions and contrary to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? THE PRESIDENT: I f wire tapping was the cause of the war and there could be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t , there m.ight be something i n that quest ion. im. CUNNINGHMf: My only reason i n ask ing 11 ,033 BALLANTIfJE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 , 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that viras to show that there was bad f a i t h i n the t r a n s a c t i o n . How could there he good f a i t h — THE PRESIDENT: I cannot argue with you at t h i s stage, Biir. Cunningham. But, i t i s not a prac - t i c a l v iewpoint. 11 ,034 BALLKNTIKE CROS: 1 LI 0 2 r s 3 e 4 & 5 b 6 r a 7 m 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BY Lih. CUNLIINGHAIvI: (Continued) Q Now, about the intercepted messages. Were the intercepted messages transmitted immediately to the State and War'Departments from the time the i n - tercapt ion began? A They • were communicated to the State Depart- ment when they vaere t r a n s l a t e d . •̂i And were they then transmitted to the War and Navy Departments immediately? The War and Navy Departments v;ere on the r e - c e i v i n g ?-^d — were on the sending end. The' State Department was on the r e c e i v i n g end. Q That \vas my understanding, Mr, B a l l a n t i n e , but I merely wanted to show that those departments had rece ived the messages. Mr, B a l l a n t i n e , when the exp lorat ion of a b a s i s for negot iat ions began was i t understood by the State Department o f f i c i a l s that i f an agreement were not reached that a s tate of v/ar would ensue? A No. Q V/hen d id that eonclusion - - when was that conclus ion a r r i v e d at by the Stato Department? TiiE PRESIDENT: They d i d n ' t a r r i v e at any. Ke gave you a negative answer. You asked him whether war would be decided upon i f the negot iat ions f a i l e d . 11,035 Br^LLAiiTINE CKOSS 1 He s a i d that there was no such d e c i s i o n . That i s 2 the end of i t . ) 5 Mt. CUKillNGKAl/I: A few q u a l i f i c a t i o n ques- t i o n s , your Honor, that were passed over i n the be- g inn ing . Q LIr, B a l l a n t i n e , i s your appearance here voluntary? Did you ask to be sent here as a witness? A I d i d not. Mh. CUNWINGHAM: That i s a l l . THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Warren. iJw WAiaiEN: I f the Tr ibuna l p lease. GhOSS-EXAMIMTION (continued) BY IkiL. WARKEK: Q Now, i n ansv^er to a question by Itir. Cun- ningham you stated i n substance that i t was p e r f e c t l y c lear that l a t e i n the year of 1941 that the United States d i d not want v/ar. A That i s a f a c t . Q Were you speaking of the people of the United States or the men i n h igh s t a t i o n s , such as 22 C o r d e l l H u l l and Pres ident Roosevelt and h i s ad- v i s e r s ? 24 A I am speaking of both. 25 G î 'ovr, I v r i l l ask you i f you are f a m i l i a r with a statement by President Roosevelt as e a r l y as 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 23 11,036 BALLAKTIl^H CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 October 8, 1940, i n v/hich he stated, and I quote, that ' I f the Japanese attacked Thai land.and the Kra Peninsula or the Dutch East Ind ies we would not enter the war; that i f they even attacked the P h i l i p p i n e s ho doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not alv/ays avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations exparuied, sooner or l a t e r they would make a mistake and we would enter the v^ar, A I have no r e c o l l e c t i o n of such a statement. Q Do you r e c a l l a Cabinet meeting on November 25th, which v/as attended by Secretary H u l l , Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson, General Marshal l , Admiral S t a r k — r a t h e r , I sa id Cabinet meeting; I meant a conference — i n vrhich the s i t u a t i o n was discussed and at that tim:) they started on the problem as, I am quoting, how we should maneuver''.them,'the Japanese, into the p o s i t i o n of f i r i n g the f i r s t shot without allov/ing too much danger to ourselves? A Are you r e f e r r i n g to Mr. St imson's report i n 194-5 of that conference? I am r e f e r r i n g to a meeting that took place on November 25th, ?<3riich i s re fer red to i n the i n - v e s t i g a t i o n s of that committee wi th reference to P e a r l Harbor, 11 ,037 BALLANTINE CKOSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A I hr.ve read the record of that P e a r l Harbor, but i n 194-1 1 had no knov/ledge v/hatsoever of any content of such a meeting such as you read. Q I am r e f e r r i n g only to your statement that nobody i n h igh place i n the United States as l a t e as 1941 Y/anted Vv'ar. Now, are you f a m i l i a r with the d i s c u s s i o n s that C o r d e l l H u l l , together with other men, had wi th the Pres ident of the United States v;ith' reference as to whether or not the people of the United States wouî d back them i f they determined upon a course of war a g a i n s t Japan? A I a 1 sure that nei ther C o r d e l l K u l l nor the P r e s i d e n t ever had i n mind an aggress ive v/ar a g a i n s t Japan. I am not ask ing for your opin ion. I am ask ing you. i f i t i s n ' t a f a c t that those d i s c u s s i o n s took p l a c e . A I have no knowledge of d i s c u s s i o n s of the nature you have descr ibed other than what I read i n the P e a r l Harbor Leport . Q As one of a team of a d v i s e r s to Secretary K u l l , were j'-ou not informed of the opinion and the u l t imate aim of these men i n h igh s t a t i o n s ? A I was informed that i t v/as the aim of these men i n h igh s t a t i o n that they should s t r i v e for peace 11,038 BALLANTIIJE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I S 19 2C 21 22 23 24 25 to the very l a s t , Q With reference to that , are you acqualiited v/ith a Stanley Hornbeck? A I am . Q What was h i s p o s i t i o n at the time you v/ere on t h i s advisory commission r e l a t i v e to Ccl^dell Hu l l? THE PhilSIDENT: Ho has a lready to ld u s . He can say i t aga in . M . WAHKEN: I d i d n ' t hear your Honor's r e - mark, THE PRESIDENT J He already to ld us of h i s p o s i t i o n , but he can repeat i t . 0 IvlH. MliHEN: Your Honor, perhaps the question i s misunderstood. I mean v^hat was h i s p o s i t i o n r e - l a t i v e to C o r d e l l H u l l , not h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n - as to f r i e n d s h i p , and so f o r t h . THE PKESIDENT: Wel l , you d i d n ' t suggest f r i e n d s h i p , A I am not i n a p o s i t i o n to t e s t i f y as to any- thing more than h i s p o s i t i o n i n the State Department. £5 I s i t not true that Iiir. Hornbeck was mcvre i n the confidence of Corde l l H u l l than any other per- son i n the State Department, deal ing with Far Eastern questions? A Mr. H u l l made h i s own d e c i s i o n s . I n 1 1 , 0 3 9 E..LLArITIKE GKOSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 conferences Ivlr. Eornbeck, i j?. Hr.milton r̂ nd myself , v.-ere a l l treated as equals. TEE PRESIi^EWT: You t o l d us before you v/ere the junior of the three, but you were s t i l l treated as an equal. TliE "JvITieSS: That ' s r i g h t . Q I take i t 3/ou are p e r f e c t l y f a m i l i a r \"ith the numerous memoranda prepared by Hornbeck and for Mr. H u l l that got rather \7lde c i r c u l a t i o n through the State Department, concerning Japan and our r e l a t i o n s with Japan, were you not? A I was. Q Those memoranda dealt with the economic s t r a n g u l a t i o n that v/as being placed on Japan by the United States Government i n connection ^.'ith other governments, d id they not, for the most part? A Llr. i iorhbeck's riemoranda dea l t with a great v a r i e t y of s u b j e c t s . Q Quite r i g h t , but almost i n v a r i a b l y i s i t not true that they refused — I mean r a t h e r , that i n h i s memoranda he refused to c r e d i t Ambassador Grew and lir.Dooman's advice on the s i t u a t i o n i n Japan and the Far East? A I wouldn't conc-ar i n any such g e n e r a l i z a - t i o n . 11,040 BALLANTiriE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q We w i l l put i t on the major i s sues to which you have tes^ti f ied. A I don't th ink that even on the mr.jor i ssues thst i t would be f a i r , without a considerahle amount of thought end reviev/ of those memoranda, to make such 8 statement. Q Wow, with reference — I ask you i f you were f a m i l i a r with the memoranda he wrote concerning the s t rangu lat ion by economic sanctions against them — rather , not sanctions but economical . s t rangulat ion of Japan — to force J ' ^ a n to do v/hat the United States wanted Japan to do. /.re you f a m i l i a r v/ith that? A I don't r e c a l l such a merrioranda. Q Do you know what happened to h i s menorands as _ soon as war was declared? A I do not. Q I s i t not a f a c t that i t was common knowledge i n the State Department that a mad scramble was made to recover a l l of those memoranda and keep them from the knowledge of the American people? A I t c e r t a i n l y wasn't w i t h i n my knov/ledge. Q Do you know whether a s i n g l e one of those memoranda appear i n any record i n the State Department at the present time? A I th ink you have to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between 11,041 BALLANTiriE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 two kinds of memoranda: memoranda which are i n the o f f i c i r l records and a personal memoranda. So f a r as I know, the memoranda i n the o f f i c i a l records i s s t i l l there. I do know that a l l the recorded memoranda i n which the P e a r l Harbor Committee v;as interested were made a v a i l a b l e to them. Q Do you not a l so knov; that i n a l l the mass of mater ia l g iven to the P e a r l Harbor I n v e s t i g a t i n g Committee th?t not a s i n g l e one c f iiir. Hornbeck's memoranda was produced, h i s o f f i c i a l memoranda r e l a t - ing to the subjects we have under d iscuss ion? A I d i s t i n c t l y r e c a l l a number of h i s memoranda on these subjects being mimeographed by the P e a r l Hrrbor Committee. Q Were these the memoranda i n which ho sr5oke very f r e e l y concerning h i s a t t i t u d e toward Japan? A I have no d e f i n i t e r e c o l l e c t i o n of the con- tents 01* those memoranda. Q P r e c i s e l y , Now I w i l l ask you i f C o r d e l l H u l l and Mr. Hornbeck were not opposed from the very o n t s a f to having President Roosevelt meet v; ith Pr ince KONOYE i n an attempt to s e t t l e the d i f f e r e n c e s between the tviTo nations? A Mr. H u l l v;as n inety-n ine and nine-tenths per cent of the State Department. Mr. H u l l ' s a t t i tude 11,042 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 on thst thing i s made d e e r i n the record. Thr.t i s to sG.y that he f e l t , r.s we a l l f e l t , that some c l e r r commitnents by Japan on generr l p r i n c i p l e s end t h e i r a p p l i c p t i o n should "be a r r i v e d at p r i o r to a meeting. 0 As a r e s u l t of h i s a t t i t u d e he used h i s i n - f luence to dissuade President Roosevelt from having a meeting, i s that not true? /I As f a r as I 'mc.w, the Pres ident and Mr. H u l l had e x a c t l y the same a t t i t u d e on that proposed meexing, Q Are you acquainted with the r e a l o f f the record proceedings and d iscuss ions r l t h President Roosevelt about that and h i s d i s c u s s i o n with Admiral KOf'X^\? A I v/as not present at any d i scuss ions which the Pres ident had X7lth the Japanese re-nresentatives, therefore I only know what i s on the record. Q Now, what I am interested i n , of course.^ i s your personal knowledge of these mr-tters, becauso we have the record. I w i l l ask you t h i s s i f i n th"t instance h i s d i s s u a s i o n , or h i s concurrence with the Pres ident , whichever i t may have be.-̂ n — i f he d i d n ' t refuse to fo l low the advice o f . b i s Ambassador here i n Japan? THE PRESIDENT: He covered t h i s yesterday. Can he say more? im, "JARREN? Your Honor, I th ink so. Here i s 11,043 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 my reason for i t . THE PRESIDENT: Ask him. m . WARRFN: What? THE PRESIDENT; Ask him. A A l l I con scy i s th i s? that Mr. Grevir's recommendations, whet he s tated, i s i n the record. I l r . H u l l ' s p o s i t i o n from the beginning, and the P r e s i d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n are c r y s t a l c l e ? r . I don't know v;hct I .ccn c.dd to them. Q You could add a great deal i f you would, con- cerning your personal knowledge of the workings md cross-?/orkings of the State Department there and the opinions of some and the opinions of others that you must have come i n contact with. THE PRESIDENT: You must not suggest the witness i s suppressing anything, MR. WilRREN: Wel l , I don't mean t h s t , your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: Unless you can put to him something which you know he i s suppressing, or be l ieve he i s . MR. WARHEK; Your Honor, I am s o r r y . The man askr4 me a question and I see t h r t he d i d n ' t under- stand what I was d r i v i n g at r.nd I merely to ld him. I don't th ink he i s suppressing anything because I don't 11,044 BALLANTiriE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 th ink he i s thrit type of mr.n. I th ink ht i s very- t r u t h f u l . Q IVhy d id Llr. H u l l suddenly cbsndon the Dodus v ivendl? A As Mr. H u l l explc ined i n h i s P e a r l Harbor testimony very c l e r r l y , the Chinese v^ere very much opposed to i t . f e l t , or Mr. H u l l f e l t t h r t i t would be £ very d iscourag ing fp.ctor on the Chinese, v;ho were being very hard pressed, might cause t h e i r res i s tance to c o l l a p s e . The other pov/ers were lukewarm tovvard i t . There was a strong body of opinion i n the United St:-tes v/ho we f e l t v/ould be opi^osed to i t . THE PRESIDENT: w i l l recess for f i f t e e n minutes. (Fncreuoon, at 1445? " recess was taken u n t i l 1500, a f t e r v/hich the proceedings were resumed as follov/s ;) 11,045 BALLA!'Tir^ ClOSS W a 1 f & D u d a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ! I 9 I 10 11 ^ I 12 13 14 ! i 15 I 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF TPS CO^TtT: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I ' i l i tar^^ T r i b u n a l f o r tl-e ?ar East i s no '̂ resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel ^'.'arren. m . "^ARHEIT: Thank you, s i r . BY m . "'.'AHP.EN (ContinuinrO : Q I don't knor: wh^sther you have been asked t h i s question or not; I s i t not a f a c t that one of the reasons advenced to President Roosevelt by the State Department f o r not wanting to t a l k with Prince ICOrOYE r;as the f a c t that the State Depart,nent d id not be l ieve that the Aray and Navy i n Japan isrould back Pr ince KOrOYE? A 111 I can say i s that i t Tjas the b e l i e f of the Pres ident — as f a r as I kno^-', because I d i d n ' t t a l k to him — and of the Secretar*^ of State that the Japanese Government, whoever happened to be the spokes- nan at that t i n e , w?s not l i k e l y to y i e l d on the courses which i t xres pursuing. Q r a y I tske ^'our ansv^er to mean that that was one of the reasons advanced f o r not wanting the meeting? T/.T] PPiESIDEI'T: Y - u are asked, what \JPS President Roosevel t ' s atc i tude? T'TR. ".'ARREN: No, your Fonor, I am asking him i f that ^'asn't one of the reasons advanced by the State Departm.ent to President Roosevelt to get him to 11,046 BALLA?'TINE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 change his- mind about the neet ing . A '^iTell, a l l I kno'v about the mattor i s wh?.t i s i n the record. I don ' t know of anj'' — I don' t know the contents of any conversat ions ^?hich I-'r, H u l l may have had 'with the Pres ident other than ^7hat i s i n the record . 0 " ' G i l , i s t h a t i n t h e r e c o r d ? A I n the record i s what the Pres ident s a i d i n h i s .messages and h i s c o m u n i c a t i o n s to the Japanese. Q I s i t not true that the State Depart;nent informed Ambassador Grew that such was the case and that they d id not b e l i e v e that any agreement made by Pr ince KOI'TOYE would be backed up by the Army and Navy? A I do not kr.o'-f O'" any i n s t r u c t i o n s sent by the Depr^rtment of S tate other than — of t l 'at nature other than those report ing or communicating the contents of the stirtenents that wg had ,^ivon to the Japanese, At l e a s t , I cannot r e c a l l any at the present moment, Q Now, I am r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y to th ings that occurred outs ide the record i n the in formal t a l k s or in formal telegrams that ^'ent back and f o r t h . A A l l our telegrams to K r . Grew were o f f i c i a l telegram.s and I t h i n k a l l of them — I am sure a l l of them were m.ade a v a i l a b l e to the P e a r l Harbor Committee; and I do not r e c a l l any such message. 11,047 BALLAFTII^T3 CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q I s i t not true that the Japanese GovernmGnt had fone so f a r as to have a sh ip under steam i n Tolcyo Bay with the higl-est Navy and jfirmy o f f i c e r s obtainable ready to accompany Pr ince KONOYE at any time that Mr. H u l l or the President •'̂ :ould say the '̂rord? A That i s what they to ld us . q I s i t not a l so true that Prince KOFOYE informed Ambassador Grew that a f a i l u r e to br ing about the rneeting would mean a f a l l of h i s Cabinet, and that unquestionably he was the l a s t person i n Japan who could p o s s i b l y br ing about a s i t u a t i o n where peace might be restored between the two nations? A ^-^ell, I don't remember the exact words, but g e n e r a l l y so'^iething to that e f ' e c t VT . Grew reported to us . Q Yes . Mr. Grew a l s o reported that he bel ieved Pr ince KOrlOYE was t e l l i n g the t r u t h , and that the s i t u a t i o n was extremely grave and a c t i o n should be taken on i t , d id he not? A I f I r e c a l l c o r r e c t l y , he reported to that general c f f e c t . 11,04-8 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0 I t WES common knov\/l9dge w i t h i n the State Department, was i t not, that abandonment of the pro- posed modus v i v e n d i and the note vjhich was subst i tuted by Mr. H u l l for the modus v i v e n d i would end negot iat ions v j i th Japan; wasn't that genera l l y knovm? A None of the matters r e l a t i n g to the eo.n.--- versat ions were matters of comron knov\/ledge i n the Department. I t was — the knowledge was confined to a very few persons. Q That i s what I thought. But those persons did not then nor of t h e i r own v o l i t i o n have they s ince m.ade a f u l l d i s c l o s u r e to the American people of the i r n e g o t i a t i o n s , have they? A Would you mind repeating that question? Q ^"111 the reporter read the question, (Whereupon, the l a s t question was read by the o f f i c i a l court r e p o r t e r , ) A There i s only one person to make a statement of act ion by the Department of S t a t e j that i s the Secretary of S t a t e , I consider that the Secretary of State has made a very f u l l statem.ent — complete statement. Q •̂''fhen, and where i s i t ? When did he make i t and where i s i t ? A I would say Fore ign Relatipins Japan, 1931 to 11,049 BALLARTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 '6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 194-1, Vi?hich was published as soon as we could get the p u b l i c a t i o n together afterwards, and a l so the P e a r l Harbor record. I th ink the P r e s i d e n t ' s report on December 1? — I th ink the J o i n t Committee of Congress, December 15, 1941, was — We got together as much mater ia l as we could h u r r i e d l y to make that p u b l i c , a l s o . Q Do you know whether the p u b l i c a t i o n that you re fer to has a l l of the o f f i c i a l documents contained i n i t ? I be l ieve that the p u b l i c a t i o n or̂ Fore ign Re lat ions contains a l l the m a t e r i a l matter a f f e c t i n g Japan and'the United States a lone. The conversations with t h i r d powers were not included at that time, because of the war s i t u a t i o n . I n the P e a r l Harbor record a l l the mater ia l v^as made a v a i l a b l e to the Committee, even that which had not l e e n put i n baifore. Q Who edited the p u b l i c a t i o n to which you re fer and determined the matters which were material? A The D i v i s i o n of P u b l i c a t i o n s i n the Department i edited tVie m a t e r i a l which they thought might be of i i n t e r e s t to h i s t o r i a n s , and i n the P e a r l Harbor record the question of s e l e c t i o n was l e f t e n t i r e l y to the i J e i n t Committee. Q I s n ' t i t true that i n the P e a r l Harbor 11 ,050 EALLAKTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I S 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i n v e s t i g a t i o n that a f t e r the testimony of Mr. Grow and before Mr. Dooman was c a l l e d to the stand that the major i ty of the Committee decided that they would not i n v e s t i g a t e anything further wi th reference to the State Department other than what dealt d i r e c t l y with m.atters immediately preceding :-;and fo l lowing P e a r l Harbor? % A To the best of my knowledge Mr. Dooman never t e s t i f i e d ire the P e a r l Harbor Committee and I know nothing about the matter which you — the r e s t of the matter to which you r e f e r . Q You do know that Mr. DoomaR was subpoenaed, don't you? A No. Q Fhere i s Mr. Dooman? What i s Mr. Dooman's o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n at the present time, i f any, i f you A So f a r as I know, Mr, Dooman has r e t i r e d from the Fore ign S e r v i c e . Q Did he ever t e l l you the reason why? A I f he d i d , I don't r e c a l l them, ' Q Did Mr, H u l l submit himself to cross-examinationj on h i s negot iat ions p r i o r to P e a r l Harbor and i n the : I P e a r l Harbor Committee? A Mr, H u l l was not cross-examdned by the Gommitteei. 11,051 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 However, Mr. — Senator Feri.u^'on sent him a quest ion- n^ilre over a hundred questions to which he gave w r i t t e n r e p l i e s , Q I s i t t rue , i f you knov/, that a report was prepared by Ambassador Grew and h is counselor, Mr. Dooman, during t h e i r internment a f ter the commencement of h o s t i l i t i e s , vjhich was t h e i r l a s t report to the State Department that Mr. H u l l refused to accept? A I know nothing of a report of that descr ipt ion . 11,052 BALLANTINE CROSS G 0 1 1 d 2 b e 3 r 4 g & 5 6 S P 7 r a 8 t t 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I S 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Nov̂ , notwithstanding ¥TO Grove's report to the State Department with reference new to Pr ince KONOYE's being ready to Gome over, what reason did you members of the State Department have f o r d i s - regarding h i s recommendations? TliE PRESIDEJIT; He has a lready given that ansvjor m.ore than once, m . WARREN: I an sori-y. .That question was handed to me by another counsel. I did not th ink he had answered i t , your Honor, m. SMITH: I f the Court pleases THE PRESIDENT: LIr. Smith. CROSS-EX/J;!INATION (Continued) BY !,!R. SMITH: Q Mr, B a l l a n t i n e , were you i n Tokyo i n A p r i l , 1934-? A I was not . Q You have a paragraph i n your a f f i d a v i t on page 2 which reads : "Nevertheless, on A p r i l 17, 1934-, the Japanese For|)ign Of f i ce spokesman gave out a t rucu lent o f f i c i a l statement known as the 'AI'-AU' statement. I n that statement Japan made c l e a r her purpose to compel China to fol low Japan's d i c t a t e s and to permit other countr ies to have r e l a t i o n s with China only as Japan allowed, A copy of that statement 11,053 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS 1 2 3. 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I S 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i s annexed as e x h i b i t A ." I s n ' t i t an error to r e f e r to the AI-IATJ statement of A p r i l 17, 193.4 as an o f f i c i a l statement of the Japanese Fore ign Off ice? I f you w i l l look at your e x h i b i t A, i t i s headed, "AI.!AU Statement — U n o f f i c i a l Statement by the Japanese Fore ign O f f i c e . " A I v/ould th ink that that u n o f f i c i a l statement— my understanding of that i s i t was an i m o f f i c i a l s t a t e - ment i n E n g l i s h of a statement that had been made by > Mr. AlilAU. I may be wrong about that . Q Your a f f i d a v i t appears to be based on personal knowledge, and am I to understand ttiat you do not know anything about the subject of your own personal knowledge? A I s a i d i n paragraph 2 of my a f f i d a v i t : "The matters herein deposed to are mainly w i t h i n my personal knowledge, otherwise they are matters wi th which I am f a m i l i a r from records of the Department of S t a t e . " Q The paragraph I have j u s t read out of your a f f i d a v i t , was that w r i t t e n by you? A I t h i n k , i f I r e c a l l c o r r e c t l y , i t was | I suggested to cover a l l such p o s s i b i l i t i e s of matters that I should c l a r i f y i n the s i t u a t i o n , and I th ink the wording — the exact wording i s my ovm wording. 11,054 BALLANTI]\IE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Wel l , the same v/ordlng appears i n the statement given i n testimony of Mr. H u l l before the P e a r l Harbor I n v e s t i g a t i n g Committee. Can we assume that you wrote that statement from Mr. H u l l ' s t e s t i - mony? A I f I r e c a l l c o r r e c t l y , the idea vjas sug- gested to mo by counsel here, and I vjrote my own v/ord- ing independently of having before me or having i n mind any s i m i l a r statement by Mr. H u l l . I don't even r e c a l l now that he had a s i m i l a r statement i n h i s testimony, Q After 1934 you came to Tokyo as F i r s t Secretary under Ambassador Grew; i s that correct? A Yes , i n 1936 I was temporari ly on duty here f o r four months. Q When you made the statement which I read out of your a f f i d a v i t , d id you have i n mind an o f f i c i a l communication from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State , found i n Fore ign Re lat ions Volume I , page 227, and e x h i b i t 936 i n t h i s case, y^hich reads as f o l l o w s : V "This morning I had an interview with the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . Mr. HIROTA re fer red , on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e , to the subject of the AMAU statement —" THE MONITOR: Mr. Smith, can you give us the prosecution document on that? 11 ,055 b a l l a n t i m : c r o s s 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 MR. Sl/ITHj 936. 2 TH3 MONITOR; I s that the P. D. number? I 3 MR. SMITH: No, that i s the e x h i b i t number. 4 Prosecut ion Documsnt No. 219P(23). I t i s not very 5 l o n g . 6 THE I.'ONITOR: A l l r i g h t , s i r . 7 Q (Continuing) "—regarding the -attitude of 8 Jap^n toward f o r e i g n i s s i s t a n c o to China, and said that j 9 j ho wished to c l a r i f y that statement to rne i n confidence. | He to ld mo that undor questioning by ncxYspaper men, | ^^ AMAU had givon out the st^,temont vjithout h i s knowledge | or apnrovfil, and th^.t the world had received a ^.vholly f a l s e impression of Jr>panese p o l i c y , that Jap.'̂ .n had no i n t e n t i o n "'/hatever of seeking s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s i n China, of encroaching upon the t e r r i t o r i a l and admin is t rat ive i n t e g r i t y of China, or of c reat ing d i f f i c u l t i e s for the bona f i d e trade of other countr ies with China. Various f o r e i g n a c t i v i t i e s have tended to d i s turb peaceful condit ions i n China, and Japan i s n a t u r a l l y very much interested i n those peaceful condit ions owing to her nearness to China, But that does not mean that there i s any i n t e n t i o n or des ire on the pa t̂ of Japan to c la im a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n i n derogation of the r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to v/hich the s i g n a t o r i e s of the Nine-Power Treaty are e n t i t l e d . 11,056 BALLANTIIJE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The p o l i c y — " THE PRESIDSNTs Oh, you are reading too much. }iiR, SMITH; I am down to the l a s t sentence, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT; Wel l , you have read too much a l ready . You are not going to do that here. I f that document i s too lengthy , you should dea l w i t h i t i n another way. You should endeavor to summarize i t . T h i s i s not a case i n which i t i s necessary to use the exact words of the person t a l k i n g . I/IR. SMITH; There i s one more short sentence, your Honor. Q (Continuing-) "The p o l i c y of Jap?n i s complete observance and support of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Nine-Power Treaty i n overy r e s p e c t . " Now my quest ion i s whether you had that document of Mr. Grevi; i n mind v^hen you made that statement i n your a f f i d a v i t ? A I had i t i n m.ind, but I a l s o had i n mind the subsequent mani festat ions of Jap.mese p o l i c i e s and a c t i o n i n China. Q Mr. AMU as the s o - c a l l e d spokesman of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e occupied a p o s i t i o n analagous to the American S tate Department of a c h i e f of the Press 11,057 BALLANTiriE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Sect ion , I s that not r i g h t ? A The Chief of the Press Sect ion i n the State Department i s never spoken of as the spokesman of the State Department, The spokesman of the State Depart- ment i s the Secretary of S t a t e . Q >'Vell, w i l l you agree that Mr. AMD was not the Fore ign Minister of Japan ?Jhen ho made t h i s statement? A "/el l , c e r t n i n l y I w i l l agree, Q Have you read Mr. Grew's book "Ten Years i n Japan", e s p e c i a l l y as i t deals with t h i s AMAU s t a t e - ment? A I read i t when i t f i r s t came out, but I don't r e c a l l d e f i n i t e l y . Q I w i l l read a short sentence to see i f i t refreshes your r e c o l l e c t i o n . Referr ing to the AMU statement, he says : THE PRESIDENT; Page? m . SMITH; Pago 128, your Honor. Q (Continuing) " I t i s d i f f i c u l t these days to judge whether AMAU i s regarded i n Japan as an enfant t e r r i b l e or a hero. I t rather depends on whether you seek opinions from the cnmp of the moderates or that of the c h a u v i n i s t s . " Does that r e f r e s h your r e c o l l e c t i o n about the matter? 11,058 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A I have no r o c o l l e c t i o n of i t . Q lYe l l , then, would you exp la in i n d e t a i l why you chose to accept an u n o f f i c i a l statement of a F o r e i g n Of f i ce spokesman i n preference to what the Prime Minister of Japan sa id on the subject to Mr. Grow? A I n the f i r s t p lace, Mr. AMAU's statement that he made was never repudiated p u b l i c l y by the Japanese Government so f a r as I r e c a l l . Mr. HIROTA's statement was a p r i v a t e statement, not a publ ic s t a t e - ment. F i n a l l y , as I have already stated, subsequent developments i n Japanese p o l i c i e s i n China bore out that AMAU's statement seemed to represent more c l e a r l y vi'hat vjas — v/hat conform.ed more c l o s e l y to subsequent developments i n Japanese p o l i ® y , Q Are you aware that on A p r i l 21st , 193^, Mr. AMAU mace another u n o f f i c i a l statement to the newspapermen i n which he expressed des ire — I mean surpr i se — at the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which the press had placed upba h i s statement of A p r i l 17th. Are you f a m i l i a r v'ith that statement? A Nevertheless, subsequent developments and manifestat ions of Japan's p o l i c y i n China would bear out the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that \7as made, which would feeem to be the sound one. 11,059 BALLANTINE CRCSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q I h a v G j u s t ted handed to you Mr; AJ/IAU's notobook as to tho statement he gave out on A p r i l 21, 193"^. I •̂ •'ould l i k e to have you read i t and sec i f you rcinember that statement? A I do not r e c a l l having read t h i s before, but I do not t h i n k that t h i s e x p l a r s t i o n helps very mucjh. There i s , for example, a passage i n here, "We should not forgot for a moment that Japan, serv ing as tho only cornerstone f o r the e d i f i c e of the peace of East A s i a , bears the e n t i r e burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s Q What e l s e do you f i n d i n there thr?.t does not help us any? THE PRESIDSJTT: You need not answer. m . SMITH: Wel l , your Honor, the Y(7itness has now read a part of a statement he has not i d e n t i - f ied* I would l i k e to o f f e r i t for I d e n t i f i c a t i o n so as to br ing some order out of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . THE PRESIDENT: Tender the book f o r i d e n t i - f i c a t i o n . Is that the book? MR. SMITH: That was obtained from Mr. AKAU, who i s now i n Sugamo P r i s o n , I t i s h i s own book, and wo w i l l have to return i t . I t would be much better to g ive i t an I d e n t i f i c a t i o n number and allow me to put an excerpt i n for the b e n e f i t of tho C l e r k 11,060 BALLANT DIE CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 tomorrovi; morning. THE PRSSID3NTI '̂I'here you read from a book or a document v;ithout tendoring i t , we expect i t to be marked for I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , and that means custody by the Court. UR. SL ITH: Your Honor, could we have a photostat subst i tuted for the a r t i c l e i n the book? I t does not make any d i f ference to me how i t i s handled, but I assume that Mr. AMAU wants h i s note- book back. THE PRESIDENT; You may make copies , not n e c e s s a r i l y a photostat. CLERK OF THE COURT: S h a l l I mark i t for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ? m . SMITH; V / i l l you, please? THE PRESIDEI'tt; I t must be marked now. GLSRK OF THE COURT; Defense document No. 94, i d e n t i f i e d as Mr. AMU's book, w i l l receive e x h i b i t No. 1248 f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n only. ("'hereupon, the document above mentioned was marked prosecut ion's e x h i b i t No.1248 for I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o n l y . ) THE PRESIDENT: We w i l l adjourn u n t i l h a l f past nine tomorrow morning. 11,6 BALLANTlIi'E CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I S 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Whereupon, at l600, an adjournment was taken u n t i l F r i d a y j 22 November, 194-6, at 0930.)
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November 21, 1946 (p.10,985-11,061) Proceedings in Chambers
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