AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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H /9</t V _ 1? NOVEMBER 1?46 I N D E X Of WITNESSES Prosecution1s Witnesses Page BallaMtine, Joseph W. (resumed) 10609 Direct by Mr. Keenan (continued) 10809 Cross by Mr. Blakeney 10850 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Doc. Pros j Def. For In No. No, No. Description Ident. Evidence 2215 1245-H Exiiibit "X" of Affidavi of Joseph TrT. Bsllantine 10311 2215 1245-1 Exhibit from above affidavit 10815 2215 1245 -J Exhibit "M" from above affidavit 10825 2215 1245-K Exhibit "N" from above affidavit IO83O 1 0 , 8 0 8 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Tuesday, 19 November, 1946 INTERNATIONAI MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before with the exception of the HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member fre>m India, not sitting, For the Prosecution Section, same as before, For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) t BALLANTINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 0 9 D U d a & W 0 1 f 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKATA, who is represented "by his counsel. That will be taken to be the case at all future sessions of this Court until I announce otherwise Mr. Chief of Counsel. J O S E P H W. B A L L A N T I N E , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) MR. KEENAN: Mr. Ballantine, will you proceed with your testimony. THE WITNESS: "The Japanese, soon after receiving this Government's memorandum of October 2, redoubled their emphasis upon the need of haste in reaching an agreement. They offered new formulas for dealing with limited and specific problems, and they stated that Japan had now placed all of its cards on the table and they had gone as far as they could in the direction of making so-called 'concessions.1 In their new formulas, there was not discernible any evidence that the Japanese Government was moving even one step toward committing itself to courses of peace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 0 and that it contemplated receding even one step from insistence upon full attainment of its declared objectives — which were, in effect, political, economic, and cultural domination of the entire western Pacific area and China. After the new Japanese Cabinet, headed by General TOJO, came into office on October 17, the Japanese became even more insistent in urging upon this Government a quick decision on the Japanese Government's proposals, but, while pressing this Government for a decision, the Japanese Government showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position and no desire to apply practically in actual situations the basic principles of justice and equity essential to the building of a lasting peace in the Pacific. "Although throughout the conversations with the Japanese representative, the Secretary of State repeatedly made it clear that the American Government would consult with the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, China and the Netherlands before entering into actual negotiations with the Japanese Government affecting the interests of those governments, at no time did the Secretary of State make any statement to Japanese representative which would have warranted the Japanese In assuming that in the informal conversations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 1 the Secretary of State wrs delegated to speak or act for the other powers mentioned. "On November 15, Mr. Saburo KURUSU, whom the Japanese Government had decided to send to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations, reached Washington. Shortly thereafter, on November 20, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. KURUSU presented to the Secretary of State a proposal which, on its face, was extreme. A copy of that proposal is annexed as exhibit K." MR. KEENAN: And with the permission of the Court we offer it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2215-K will receive exhibit No. 1245-H. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1245-H and received in evidence.) MR. KEENANs With the purmission of the Court the prosecution would read this exhibit. THE PRESIDENT: Read it, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. MR, KEENAN: (Reading) "Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (NOMURA) to the Secretary of State on November 20, 1941." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 2 "1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advance- ment into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present. "2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo- China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace,in the Pacific area. 11 In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement. "3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the s two countries need in Netherlands East Indies. "4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets." BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,813 "The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil. "5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China." 3ALLANTINE DIRECT 10,814 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE WITNESS: (Reading) "Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador NOMURA and Mr. KURUSU talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate. "Acceptance by the American Government of the Japanese proposal of November 20 would have meant con- donement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western ! Pacific and eastern Asia 5 it would have destroyed the chances of asserting and maintaining American rights and interests in the Pacific-, and in its final analysis would have meant a most serious threat to American national security. Japan also clung to her vantage point in Inco-Ghina which threatened the security of the countries to the south and menaced vital trade BALLANTINE LIRECT 10,815 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 » j 20 21 22 23 24 25 routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indo-C'nina to northern Indo-China was meaningless as they could have brought those troops baok to southern Indo-China within a cay or tir,o, and furthermore they placec no limit on the number of troops they might continue to sencl there. "On November 26, the Secretary of State made a reply to the Japanese representatives in the form of two documents, the first, an outline in a tentative form of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, and the secono, an explanatory statement in regard to it. A copy of that document is annexed as Exhibit L." MR. KEENAN: Prosecution offers said exhibit In evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. CLERIC OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2215-L will receive exhibit No. 1245-1. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marl-red prosecution's exhibit No. 1245-L, and was received in evidence.) MR. KEENAN: (Reaoing) "Washington, November 26, 194-1. "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Jaoan have been 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2.3 34 25 BALLANTI1TE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 6 carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the ournose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based unon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolabil- ity of territorial integrity and. sovereignty of each and all nations: the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries5 the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportun- ity and. treatment5 and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the pre- vention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. "It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the -Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area^ that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful, out- come of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 34 25 BALLANTINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 ? could bo agreed upon to be in effect while the conver- sations looking to a. peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in re- gard to temnorary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated, "The Government of the United Stctes most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out of a broad-guage program of peace through- out the Pacific area. The proposals which were pre- sented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 con- tain some features which, in the opinion of this Govern- ment, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a nart of the general settlement under considera- tion and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under lav/, order and justice in the Pacific area, and It suggests that further effort be « 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 8 made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental prin- ciples already mentioned. "Fit1- this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one pr-ctical e>o molificrticn of r urogram which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations. "The plan therein suggested represents an ef- fort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 194-1 and the Japanese draft of September 25" by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. ?Te hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited." "Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (KOriJRA) on November 26, 1941. t 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAILANTINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 1 9 "Strictly Confidential Tentative and Without Commitment. "Washington, November 26, 194-1 "Outline of Proposed Brsis for Agreement Between the United States and Janan "Section I "Draft Mutual Declaration Policy "The- Government of the United States and the Government of Japrn both being solicitous for the oeace of the nrcific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threaten- ing other countries or of using military force aggres- sively against any neighboring nation, and that, accord- ingly, in the national policies they will actively support and give nrrctical application to the follow- ing fundamental principles u-oon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are brsed. "(1) The principle of inviolability of terri- torial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. "(3) The principle of equality, including 3ALLANTINE DIRECT 10,820 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. "(4) The principle of reliance upon inter- national cooperation and conciliation for the pre- vention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peace- ful methods and processes. "The Government of Japan arid the Government of the United States have agreed that toward elimi- nating chronic nolictirl instability, preventing re- current economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic re- lations with each other and with other nations and peoples: "(1) The principle of non-discriminating in international commercial relations. "(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as 1 expressed in excessive trade restrictions. n(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies. "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements 1 2 3 4 • 6 7 a 9 \0 11 12 14 15 16 17 IS 19 .0 21 22 23 24 23 10,820 1/2 BALLANTINE DIRECT "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend, aid to the essential enterprises and the 10,821 BALLANTINE DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 i a 9 *;0 2.1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 21 22 23 24 23 continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries. "Section II "Steps To Be Taken By the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan. "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression nrct among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States. "2. Both Governments will endeavor to con- clude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the N'therland and Thai Governments an agreement where- under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China. and , in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial intcgrit?/ cf Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation, with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treat- 10,822 BALLANTINE DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 S3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 racnt in its trade or economic relations with Indo- china and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China. "3». The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and aolice forces from China and from Indo-China. "4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not suonort—militar- ily, politically, economically—any government or rep-im^ in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chung- king. "5. Both Governments will give up all extra- territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settle- ments and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extra territorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations 10,823 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. "7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and. on /merican funds in Japan. "8. Both Governments will agree upon a. plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocrtion of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. "Q. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of 21 peace throughout the Pacific area. 22 "10. Both Governments will use their influence 23 to cause other governments to adhere to and to give 24 practical application to the brsic nolitical and eco- 25 nomic principles set forth in this agreement." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,824 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT TxiE'WITNESS; (Reading) "Although, it subsequently appeared, the Japanese treated the November 26 proposal as finally disposing of the ques- tion of negotiating a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area, they kept up the appearance of continuing negotiations right cown to December 7. "On December 2, the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Embassador and Mr. KURUSU in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indo-China. On Lecer.-iber the Japanese Ambassador called and presented to the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, a reply to the President's inquiry of I. ecember 2 containing the specious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indo-China as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory. On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a per- sonal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the 'tragic possibilities' in the situation be avoided. At the President's express direction the message was sent in the 'gray' code, a non-confidential code which the Japanese would have no difficulty in deciphering. In order to assure prompt decoding and delivery by Ambassador Grew of that message, a brief telegram was sent him shortly in advance to be ready for a message BALLASTIKS DIRECT 10,825 to the Emperor which was being put on the wires. The alerting message was dispatched on December 6 at 8 p.m.; the message to the Emperor at 9 p.m. There is annexed! as Exhibit M a copy of the message to the Emperor." MR, KEENAN: The exhibit is tendered in evidence. 7 | THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. 8: CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 9 No. 2215-M will receive exhibit No. 1245 -J. 10 ('."/hereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution1s exhibit No. 2215-1", and was received in evidence,) MR. HIGGINS: I will read prosecution's exhibit No. 1245-J. "'Fresident Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan' '"(Washington), December 6, 1941 "'Almost a century ago the Fresident of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the peonle of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 2 6 prospered end hrve substantially helped humanity. "'Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address +0 Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation. '"Developments are occuring in the Pacific area which threaten to derrive erch of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long perce between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities* '"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly wathhed the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the nrescnt conflict between Japan and China. Fe have hoped that a pe^ce of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of anjr nation. '"I am certain that it will be clear to 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,827 Your Majesty, rs it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat0 This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives. "'More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops î ere permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China, I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been mrde upon Indo- China, nor that any has been contemplatede "'During the past fe^ weeks it has become clear to the T"orld that Japanese military, naval and air forces hrve been sent to Southern Indo- China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this contin- uing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character. "'Because these continuing concentrations 1 0 , 8 2 8 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 i 18 i 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and -̂ he soirthwest. corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that +he people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Melryr and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Jrprn are preparing or intending to make attack In one or more of these manv direc+ions "'I am sure that Your Majesty will under- stand that the fear of all these ^eo^les Is a legiti- mate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance rt the establishment of military, naval and rir bases manned and equipped so greatly as tc constitute rrmed forces capable of measures of offense. "'It is clear that r continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. "'None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit cither indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite. "'There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,829 withdrawn therefrom. "'I think thr.t we crn obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area. '"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that "both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world. "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT "(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 784-786)" 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 3 0 THE•WITNESS: (Reading) "The press was informed by the White House at about 7*40 p.m. on December 6 of the fact that a message to the Emperor was being dispatched. "On Sunday, December 7, at about 12 o'clock noon, the Secretary of State, in response to a telephone request from the Japanese Ambassador, mace an appoint- ment to receive the Ambassador and Mr. KURUSU at 1 p.m. Shortly after 1 p.m., the Ambassador and Mr. KURUSU asked by telephone that the appointment be postponed until 1.4 5 p.m. They arrived at the Department of State at 2.05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2.20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Government to deliver a paper at 1 p.m., but that difficulty in decoding the message had delayed him. He then handed the Secretary a document, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit N„" MR. KEENANs Exhibit H is tendered to the Tribunal in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2215-N will receive exhibit No. 1245-K. ('•''hereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1245-K, and was received in evidence.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALIANETINE DIRECT 1C,831 MR. HIGGINS: I read Prosecution exhibit No. 1245-K. "Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Am- bassador (NOMURA) to the Secretary of State at 2.20 P, M. on December 7, 1941. "'1. The Government of Japan, promoted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understand- ing with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the "^acific Area. "'The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months. "'2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 1 0 , 8 3 2 all nations to find each its proper place in the world. "'Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan con- cluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. "'Howver, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Janan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,833 inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order,^thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have stengthened their military preparations perfecting an encircelement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire. "'Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting In principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential auestions. "l3. Subsequently, on September 25"th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in pro- ducing readily an agreement of view. The present BALLANTINE DIRECT 10,834 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims re- garding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But, the American Government, ad- hering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no nrogress, '"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points: '"(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. '"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those go6ds and com- modities of which the two countries are in need." BALLANTIHE DIRECT 10,835 v'(3) Both Governments mutually under- take to restore commercial relations to those pre- vailing prior to the freezing of assets. '"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the recmired 7«.,'entity of oil. "'(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between JapanVnd China. '"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo- China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area 5 and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. "'As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 21: » introducer * of peace between Japan and China as 22 was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Jrpanese 23 24 --5 j peace when the two parties have commenced direct 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,836 negotirtions. '"The American Government not only re- jected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer'of the President to act as so-called 'introducer1 of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those prin- ciples it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a. source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. '"4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China ouestion which constituted, an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAILAMTINE DIRECT 10,837 Government expressed its desire to see the spid principle applied throughout the world, and de- clared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activ- ities of third powers pursued on an equitahL e basis.. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the iFapanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the sit- uation. '"It is presumed that the spirit of con- ciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government. "'On the other hand, the American Govern- ment, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the 1 2 3 4 6 -7 / 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE s DIRECT jr 10,838 American Government especially to the following points: "rl. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.*" BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,839 "'Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese- American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption. "'Again, the proposal to conclude a multi- « lateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the reali- ties of East Asia. "'2. The American proposal contained a stipu- lation which states—'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area'. It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government."' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,840 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT "'The American Government, obsessed with its own .vviews and opinions j may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Eritain and preparing to attack, in the name of self- defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striv- ing to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means. "'3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international, rela- tions should be condemned as it is at times more in- humane than military pressure. "'4. It is impossible not to reach the con- clusion that the American Government desires to main- tain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hither- to occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,841 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world. "'The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, --Japan,the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,— except- ing France, should undertake among themselves to re- spect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that ter- ritory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an exten- sion to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine-^ower Treaty structure which is the chief factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,842 responsible for the present predicament of East Asia. "'5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the nrinciple of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual cnditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding there- by the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This de- mand of the American Government falling, as it does, V - in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to Fast Asia. "'5. In brief, the American proposal con- tains certain acceptable items such as those concern- ing commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in ?hina. On the other hand, 1 2 $ 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,843 however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself end disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it can- not accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation. "'6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese- American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Nether- lands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China? it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position. "'7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,844 Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hone of the Japanese Government to adiust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and nromote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. "'The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agree- ment through further negotiations. '"Washington, December 7? 1941.' "(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 787-792.)" 1 2 3 4 5 . 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BAL LAI* TINE DIRECT 10,845 THE WITNESS (Reading): "The Japanese message was not a declaration of war with reasons or an ultimatum. It was not even a declaration of intention to sev^r diplomatic rela- tions . "The allegations in the Japanese messape are contrary to fact. Since the outset of the conversations between the two governments, the effort of the Japanese Government was directed toward inducing the United States to surrender its basic policy, while the Japanese Govern- ment maintained intact its policy of aggression and force. The immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure the stability of East Asia was predicated, upon establishing at the outset a complete Japanese military and economic stranglehold over China, calling for Japa- nese control over strategic Chinese industries and facil- ities, referred to euphemistically in terms such as 'economic cooperation with China,' and. retention in large areas of China for an indefinite period ef large Japa- nese garrisons to protect Japan's holdings, a stipula- tion cloaked under the innocent sounding provision 'joint- defense against Communism.' Thes terms were embodied in the so-called 'treaty' of 1940 between Japan and the puppet Wang Ching-wei regime. The Japanese Government sought to obtain American assent to the imposition of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DIRECT these terms on the Chinese Government„ At no time did the Japanese Government budge from insistence upon these terms, and for the Japanese Government to speak of making the utmost concessions is a monstrous distortion of the facts. It was because of this intransigent position of the Japanese Government that it would heed no suggestion looking toward an amicable adjustment of its differences with China. The conten- tion that the Japanese Government's proposal of Septem- ber 25 was based upon the American proposal is not sus- tained by a comparison of the two proposals. An analy- sis of the essential characteristic of the Japanese proposal of November 20 has already been nres2.nted. above. "Refusal on the part of China to come to agreement with Japan of Japan's terms was due not to failure on the part of China to understand Japan's true intentions, as alleged, but to the fact that Janan's true intentions were clearly understood by China. The American policy of assisting the Chinese Government was inspired by a. desire to prevent Japan from coercing China with a peace settlement under which China would become comoletely dominated by Japan. The policy of the United States and its friends, in- cluding the imposition of freezing measures, was one of self-defense against the publicly proclaimed Japa- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTI NE DIRECT 10 ?84'7 nese nolicy of genorrl aggression. The offer of the Government of the United States, contained in its proposal of June 21, under which the 'President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hos- tilities and re Sum ti.cn of peaceful relations' was of course made contingent upon Japan's entering into a general agreement along the lines of the June 21 pro- posal and was never withdrawn. The American Govern- ment's nronosal of November 26 represented a practical application of principles which had been under dis- cussion during months of negotiations, and was nothing new; it offered Japan various benefits which would have been welcomed, by any country bent on pursuing peaceful courses. Such delay as occurred in the conversations arose entirely from the firm adherence of the Japanese Government to its fixed policies of aggression. It is not clear what is meant by the Japanese contention that the American proposal for a multilateral non-aggression pact was far removed from the realities of East Asia, unless it was that the proposal conflicted with the Japanese plan for establishing Japanese domination of the entire Western Pacific area. The charge that the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,848 BALLANTI NE DIRECT United States was scheming for an extension of the war was, on its face, preposterous. The charge that the United States, in conjunction with Great Britain, was exercising economic pressure in order to deal with international relations refers obviously to the freez- ing measure which was resorted to as a necessary measure of self-defense after Japan had launched its large- scale forward military movement ^nto Southern Indo- China so as to imperil the security of American, Brit- ish. and Dutch territory. The charge that the United States desired to maintain and strengthen its alleged dominant position in China is, on its face, absurd as the United States never sought nor did it ever have a dominant position, in China or in the Far East. V.'ith regard to the contention that the United States sought to obstruct the creation by Japan of a new order in East Asia, it is of course true that the United States was consistently opposed to Japan's pretensions to the arrogation to itself of a position of Mi l i tary dominance throughout the Far East and. the western Pacific area. "The Secretary of State read the Japanese document, turned to the Japanese Ambassador, and said, •I must say in all my conversations with you /the Japanese Ambassador/ during the last nine months I BALLANTIME DIRECT 10,84-9 1 I 2 I 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 j 10 I 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.r "The Ambassador and Mr. H.TRUSU then took their leave without making any comment. "This interview, as later appeared, took place more than an hour a^ter the Japanese armed forces had struck without warning at Pearl Harbor and over two hours after an actual Japanese landing in Malaya and four hours after they had crossed the boundary of the International Settlement at Shanghai. These facts were net mentioned by NOMURA and KURUSU.'5 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 8 5 0 MR. KEENAN: You may cross-examine. MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, the Tribunal has already stated that it would not trike into consideration any conclusions of the witness. At the conclusion of the testimony of this witness the defense believes that his master affidavit, not the documents which he introduced In support thereof, but his master affidavit in its entirety, not only amounts to a conclusion of the witness, but in addi- tion, to a summation, a summation of the prosecution's viewpoint on this matter, and is not the testimony of the witness. We, therefore, ask that the master affi- davit only, not including the exhibits, be stricken from the record for that reason, so that the defense will not have to contend with It in this cross-examina- tion. THE PRESIDENT: There is much in the affidavit th^t is admissible, much that is not. We gave our decision yesterday, and we are not going to review it. Major Blakeney. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY: Q Whr- prepared your affidavit, Mr. Witness? A I prepared it largely myself from the records. Q That is to say, you wrote it yourself? 10,851 BALLANTINE CROSS 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ; IS 19 i 20 21 22 23 24 25 A Largely myself* Q Since I note that approximately sixty-five per cent of it is taken verbatim from the Department of State's "Peace and 2War" or its "Diplomatic Rela- tions" or Mr. Hull's Statement to Congress, may I assume that you wrote those documents also? A There were a number of people that collabo- rated in the drafting or preparation of the documents. I was one of those people. Q As one of the staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State in 1941, did you participate rather extensively in the Japan- ese-American conversations? A I was present at most of the conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese rep- resentatives . THE PRESIDENT: Speak closer to the micro- phone, please, Mr. Ballantine. The IBM Is out of order. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045? a recess was taken until 1100. after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,852 BALLANTINE CROSS MARSHAL OF THE. COURTs The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: This Court will not sit on Thanksgiving Day which Is Thursday of next week. That is because it has been decreed a holiday by the Supreme Commander. Will the reporter kindly repeat the last three questions and answers ? (Whereupon, the official court reporter read as follows:) "Q Who prepared your affidavit, Mr. Witness? "A I prepared it largely myself from the records. "Q That is to say, you wrote it yourself? "A Largely myself. "Q Since I note that approximately sixty-five per cent of it is taken verbatim from the Department of State's 'Peace and War' or its 'Diplomatic Rela- tions' or Mr. Hull's Statement to Congress, may I assume that you wrote these documents also? "A There were a number of people that collabor- ated in the drafting or preparation of the documents. I was one of those people. "Q As one of the staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State in 1941, BALLANTINE CROSS 10,853 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 did you participate rather extensively in the Japan- ese-American conversations? "A I was present at most of the conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese representatives. THE PRESIDENT: Speak closer to the micro- phone, please, Mr. Ballantine. The I. B. M. is out of order. We will recess for fifteen minutes. BY ME. BLAKE FEY (Continued): Q Did you also, then, Mr. Witness, attend to the drafting of proposals and counter proposals and other documents submitted in the course of these conversations? A I collaborated as one of a team in the drafting of documents. Q Was that team under your direction? A That team was under the direction — constant direction of the Secretary of State him- self, and I was the most junior member of the three principal advisers of the Secretary of State on Far Eastern matters. Q May we have the names of the other two, please? A Stanley K. Hornbeck, adviser — political 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,854 adviser, and Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Q You were, then, however, quite familiar with the course and progress of the conversations, were you not? A Yes. Q The explanation of these conversations given in your affidavit commences with the suggestion which had been informally brought to the attention of the Secretary of State. This you say was followed by discussions between the Secretary of State and ttfe President and the Japanese Ambassador. A Yes. Q And you then referred to the Japanese pro- posal of the 12th of May, which is exhibit B to your affidavit. Was there not actually a preceding draft ' proposal of some nature? A There was a draft proposal brought inform- ally to the Secretary of State on April 9. Q That is the document, is it not, which has been introduced in this case as exhibit No. 1059, entitled "Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941 ,,Jr A Yes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 8 Q And the existence of this document then explains the references in your exhibit B to amend- ments to the original draft proposal, does it not? A That is correct. Q Can you tell us who prepared this original draft presented on the 9th of April, 1941? A I do not know. It would, be just an assump- tion on my part. Q Well, let me put it this way: Who were the priviate individuals, American and Japanese, whom you knew to be working on this question and who dis- cussed it with the Department of State? A The private individuals were a Mr. WIKAWA, Takao and a Colonel IWAKURO, and a Father Drought of the Llaryknoll Mission, and also, I believe, Bishop Walsh of the Maryknoll Mission. Q Was Postmaster General Walker also one of that group? A As far as I know, he didn't participate in any drafting; he simply acted as medium for communica- tions . Q Bishop Walsh and Father Drought had visited Japan either early in 1941 or late in 194-0, had they not? A According to what Father Drought told me, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,856 he and Bishop Walsh had visited Japan in the latter part of 194-0. Q Did they also tell you that while in Japan they had had talks with Premier KONOYE and other individuals in high offices? A They told me that they had talks with high individuals. I do not recall definitely whose names they specifically mentioned except Mr. KATSUOKA. They did mention him specifically, I recall definite- ly. Q Then you do not know whether these people prepared the original draft rroposal, hut they were interested in it and working on the matter. A That is correct. Q How was this -'.raft actually brought to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State? A If I recall correctly, it was delivered to the Secretary of State by the Postmaster General, but I couldn't swear to that. Q In discussing the matter, you used several times the expression "it was represented that." Kay I ask who made these representations? I am re- ferring to paragraph six of page 7 of your affidavit. A It was represented — my information on it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,857 was derived froir Father Drought; and, from what he told me, he had got his word from WIKAWA. Q Mr. WIKAWA was a private citizen connected with a bank in New York, was he not? A So far as I know, at that time he was not; he was connected with the Cooperative Banks in Japan. Q After this draft proposal came into the hands of the Department of State, it was discussed, was it not, between Secretary Hull and Ambassador NOMURA? A It was discussed on April 14 and April 16 as the record in Foreign Relations will show. Q Ambassador NOMURA told Secretary Hull that he was aware of the existence and nature of this draft, did he not? A Yes. He said he collaborated with these private individuals. Q However, there was no suggestion that the draft had official standing, was there? A That is correct, Q On either side. Now, leaving the question of this draft out of consideration for the moment, I ask you at whose initiative the Japanese-American conversations were I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,8 BALLANTINE CROSS commenced? A I think you will find in the record on — some time in March that Mr. Hull and Ambassador NOMURA had agreed that such efforts to be made to improve Japanese-American relations v/ere to be considered a joint initiative. Q Isn't it a fact that so far as the records show, the subject was first raised by President Roosevelt in talking with Ambassador NOMURA on the 14th of February, 1941? A I don't know how far you could go on that. It would normally lead between the Ambassador coming to present his credentials to the President — the President would take the lead in a conversation of that nature. Q Well, the point that I am asking you to con- firm Is that, whatever would usually happen, on this occasion the President did, in effect, invite Am- * bassador NOMURA to initiate informal discussions with the Secretary of State. A Well, I think that record speaks for itself. Q In any event, may we assume that the record as published in the Department of State's "Foreign Relations" is correct? L 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,859 BALLANTINE CROSS A Yes.. Q Have you any information as to the light in which the Japanese representatives -- the Ambassador and others — viev/ed the draft proposal of the l6th of April and, specifically, whether they viewed it as being an American proposal or a Japanese proposal or a private individuals' proposal? A I think the Secretary of State made it perfectly clear to the Japanese Ambassador that it was not an American proposal because he explained that there were some parts in it we could accept, some parts that would require revision, some parts we couldn't accept. Q May I ask whether Secretary Hull also re- quested Ambassador NOMURA to obtain instructions from his government on the basis of this draft proposal before conversations should start? A As I recall, Mr. Hull said to Ambassador NOMURA that he could not have official conversations except on a proposal that the Japanese Ambassador presented under instructions. I think that he also left to the Ambassador the question of whether he wanted to get instructions on that particular pro- posal. Q And Ambassador NOMURA then did later state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 6 0 BALLANTINE CROSS that he had been authorized to commence discussions, did he not? A He did so when he presented the draft of May 12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 6 1 BALLANTINE CROSS Q The draft of the 12th of May purports to he a proposal of amendments to the original text of the 16th of April. Do you consider that there are sig- nificant differences between the two drafts? A In the first place, the question of whether it is an amendment or a redraft is a matter to be inferred from their explanatory statement. There are quite a few differences, however, between the April 9 draft and the May 12 draft. Q In your affidavit you have undertaken a com- parison of the draft of the l6th of May with the American counter proposal of the 21st of June. /s I understand from this comparison, what you designate as essential differences of substance between the two drafts fall into three broad classes. These are, first, the question of the attitudes of the respective governments toward the European War, or what we might call the Tripartite Pact question. Is that so? A That is one. Q Second, the question of Chinese-Japanese relations and the settlement of the China Affair. Is that another0 A That is correct. Q And, thirdly, the question of the economic activities of the two nations in the pacific area and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,862 especially with reference to non-discriminatory commercial opportunity in China. A rell, the third I would modify to sa; non- discriminatory -- the principle of non-discrimination in international intercourse throughout the Pacific area. Q Very well. ?/e will accept your amendment. Then these three main questions represented, as of that time, the fundamental points of difference between the two governments, did they? P That is correct. Q And is it also correct that, broadly speaking, these three questions furnished the subject matter of the conversations from beginning to end? A Except as created by the new situation, by Japan's movement into southern Indo-China. There was the Indo-China question and the resulting freezing measures which added two further topics. Q Then it wrs these three questions which I have mentioned, plus the Indo-China rnd freezing of assets question which you have added, which finally resulted in the failure of any agreement? A I world say so except that these questions were — represented applications of principles of peace which caused the failure to reach an agreement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,863 Q Yes. That, is to soy that, as usually occurs in diplomatic negotiations, the principles were agreed upon but the applications could not be agreed upon. Is that so? A Well, even the fundamental principles,there were no clear-cut commitments by the Japanese. Q In any event, let us discuss these points of difference seriatim, and first the Tripartite Pact question. Now, is this a fair statement of the problem involved, that the problem on our side was to convince the Japanese that our involvement, which we foresaw, in the European War was being brought about by the demands of American self-defense, and that in a situation so brought about the Japanese should agree not to consider themselves bound to action under the Tripartite Pact? A Our problem was to -- we envisaged an agreement for peace covering the entire Pacific area. One of the possibilities through which war might come in the Pacific area was if Japan, interpreting its obligations under the Axis, thought it might have to attack us if we got involved in the European War. We wanted to make perfectly clear to the Japanese our concept of becoming involved through acts of self-defense. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Ballantine, to save time will you kindly speak in short sentences and pause for 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,864 translation, at the end of each sentence? Q Had you finished your answer? Yes. Q The differences between the parties on this point eventually turned on the definition of self- defense, did they not? A No. The difference turned on the failure of the Japanese to give us any assurance that we would not -- that Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, as she interpreted herself, did not require Japan -- or might not reqnire Japan to attack us. There was no difference in the concept that each country must be its own judge of its own self-defense. 0 lid net the Japanese negotiators, time after time, state to the officials of the Department of State that they did dissent from the American contention that each nation had a. right to judge the requirements of self-defense? A I don't recall any contention of that nature. Q So there shall be no misunderstanding whatever, I will put it still more specifically. Did not Ambas- sadors NOMURA and KURUSU repeatedly state to Secretary Hull and to you that they could not accept the American definition of self-defense because it was too broad? A There was no difference on the point that each 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,865 BALLANTINE CROSS h«.tion must be the judge of what should constitute its own self-defense. Whet the Japanese representatives said was they could not, in an agreement, give us a blank check and agree not to attack us on our concept of self-defense. Q Attack us, that is, if we became involved in the European War acting in self-defense? A They said that if we became involved in the European Wrr they would independently make their own interpretations of what their obligations were under the alliance. Q But we s'id that if, acting in self-defense, we becaK5 involved in that war there wes no room for interpretation of their obligations. MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I would like to enter an objection to the question in that form unless Mr. Blakeney explains whom he means by "we". He is representing Japanese defendants accused in this case. MR. BLAKENEY: I have been an American all my life and I still speak as one. THE PRESIDENT: The objection, of course, was to your making a statement to the witness instead of putting a question to him. You can use your own dis- cretion as to the extent to which you will identify yourself with your Japanese clients. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 6 6 BALLANTINE CROSS MR. BLAKENEYs I will be glad, if the Tribunal desires, to add "is that not so." THF WITNESS! May I have the question repeated again? (Whereupon, the question was read by the official court reporter as follows: "But we said that if, acting in self-defense, we became involved in that war there was no room for inter- pretation of their obligations, is that not so?") A We wanted clarification from the Japanese as to what their attitude was, what they would do in case we became involved through acts of self-defense, and we 7 explained clearly what we meant by self-defense. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half past one. (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) 10,867 BALLANTINE CROSS o i 1 f 2 & 3 D 4 u d 5 a 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed, THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney, J O S E P H W. B A L L A N T I N E , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows: CROSS -EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY (Continued): MR. BLAKENEY: May I ask the reporter to read the last answer. (Whereupon, the answer was read by the official court reporter as follows: "We wanted clarification from the Japanese as to what their attitude was, what they would do in case we became involved through acts of self- defense, and we explained clearly what we meant by 'self-defense. Q Then I ask you again whether the Japanese response was not in effect this: That they agreed unconditionally to the existence of the right of BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 8 6 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 self-defense, but could not accept your explanation of its scope? A The right of self-defense was not at issue nor v;os the question as to its -- our definition as to its scope at issue. The question of their giving us any commitments after v«/e explained what our attitude was. Q But did they not explain to you that the reason that they could not give that commitment was that they could not give you a blank check for anything which you might call self-defense. A That is correct, but I should like to explain. The Japanese came to us and asked for an agreement covering peace in the whole Pacific area. There was one factor which might be likely to cause a disruption of that peace. Japan was a member of the Tri-Partite Alliance. There was a possibility that we might become involved in the war in the Atlantic. We wanted to ascertain from them their attitude, their obligations under the Pact as it affected that possibility. Q And your nositiof. was, the position of the United States was, was it not, that certain acts were being taken which in the view of the United States were self-defense? A Certain acts were being taken or might be taken 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,869 BALLANTINE CROSS in the future. Q And the United States was requesting Japan to agree that if such acts of self-defense were taken in the future and did lead to Involvement in the European war,that Japan would not he eommited to action under the Tri-Partite Pact; is that a correct statement? A That is only part of the story. The rest of the story is that we didnrt ask for a new agree- ment. Japan came to us and asked for an agreement; so when they proposed us this proposal of May 12, we wanted clarification on that point. Q And the Japanese wanted clarification on the point of how far you contended that your right of self-defense extended; did they not? A We volunteered that information to them at the outset. Q How far did the right of self-defense extend? MR. KEENAN: I object to that question, Mr. President, as being an improper one. THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to ask him whether the extent of the right was discussed and decided upon? MR. BLAKENEY: Yes, sir, I do. THE WITNESS: I think that that right of self-defense is made clear in that speech that Mr. Hull 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,870 made, which is in the record. Q That is Mr. Hull's speech of the 24th of April, 1941? A I am not very good at remembering dates, but I believe that is correct. Q At any rate, was that the.speech wherein he stated that the defense of tho United States called for resistance wherever resistance would be most effective? A I didn't quite get the point of your ques- tion. May I have it repeated, please. (Whereupon, the last question was read by the official court reporter.) A (Continuing) That is correct. Q Did he also point out in that speech that the United States need not await an attack on the American continent to call into exercise that right of self-defense? MR. KEENAN; If the Court please, the prosecution objects to that on the ground that the spoech is in evidence, speaks for itself, and. there is no point in having this witness repeat certain parts of it. MR. BLAKENEY: The witness is not being asked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,871 to repeat anything. He referred to the speech for his definition and I am asking him if the definition from that speech, as I stated it, is correct. THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him whether '"Mr. Hull is correctly reported in that speech, If you really challenge itfe -accuracy. MR. BLAKENEY: I do not challenge it's - accuracy, sir. I am trying to make sure that the witness refers to the definition in the speech which I am offering to him as being the State Department's definition presented to the Japanese, THE PRESIDENT: The objection is upheld if that is so. Major Blakeney, I do not want to Interfere with the cross-examination, or I should say the Tribunal does not, but it does appear to me at all events if you put to this witness the things which you say NOMURA and KURUSU said to him, or to Mr. Hull, and which do not appear in the exhibits, you will give us the maximum assistance. We will get very little assistance from any academic discussion about the mean- ing of self-defense, or the right to it, MR. BLAKENEY: I propose doing what your Honor suggests.^ but I should like to point out that I think this witness can give us great assistance in one other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 7 2 BALLANTINE CROSS way. I think that we laymen, or at least this layman, require considerable assistance in under- standing diplomatic negotiations,and here you have an expert on the subject. • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,873 THE PRESIDENT: From what I told you yester- day I think you should have inferred that we are not treating hin as an expert; that is, as a person who can draw conclusions for us. There is no diplomatic language, really,; there may be a diplomatic style. But we reserve the right to give our meaning to the words used without any help from any diplomat. MR. BLAKENEYs Perhaps the term "expert" was ill-chosen. I meant to suggest that this witness actually conducted many of these negotiations, many of the conversations which do not appear in the pro- posals and counter-proposals but supplement them. THE PRESIDENT: It may occur to the Members of the Tribunal that the Japanese put all they had to say in writing. If you have been instructed that something has been left out, something that was said to Mr. Hull or to Mr. Ballantine, you aay put it to him to see whether he accepts it or not. MR. BLAKENEY: Obviously, sir, it was not all put in writing, because the witness has testified at length about informal conversations which went on over a period of six months. THE PRESIDENT: There will be, of course, much reiteration, and there will be much stating of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,874 sane thing in different ways. But we can rest assured that the Japanese did not fail to put in writing any- thing that was really material; unless you are instructed that something material was omitted and was known to Mr. Hull or to the witness. MR. BLAKENEY2 No, sir, I am not instructeo to that effect. But my position, which I apparently haven't yet clearly stated, is that the negotiations, them- selves, the conversations, are material. Many of these documents on their face seem to say that the parties were in agreement, but we know that they were not. And I am trying to get— THE PRESIDENT; It is going to be most difficult for us to pass over the documents and rely on conversations which the witness nay or may not recollect. MR. BLAKENEY: I do not ask the witness for his nenory of the conversations. They are recorded. THE PRESIDENT: Then you are asking him to interpret for us the writings which record them. We will not let him do it. MR. BLAKENEY: I am asking him to narrow down for the Tribunal the actual issues in dispute so we can see what they came to. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,875 BY MR. BLAKENSY (Continued): Q We were speaking of self-defense. Was the American position on the scope of the right of self- defense also defined in a speech by President Roose- velt given over the radio on the 27th of May 194-1? MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I object to that question. There is nothing clearer than that the President of the United States is the chief execu- tive of that government. What he says is recorded in writing and speaks for itself, and this Court can interpret the language as well as either this witness or counsel for the defense. MR. BLAKENSY: I do not ask him to interpret. I ask bin whether it is a fact that there was such a speech defining the right of self-defense. MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, if I may be per- mitted to observe, the speech is in the record. It is an exhibit in this case. I would suggest again that counsel is indirectly attempting to do that which I understood the Court said it did not wish to be done. Therefore, I object. THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to a speech already in evidence, Major Blakeney? MR. BLAKENEYj Well, frankly, sir, I do not' know. There are one thousand two hundred some odd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,876 exhibits, and I am just not sure. MR. KEENANs Mr. President, we have a speech in the record of President Roosevelt dated in October. That nay be a differjnt one that Major Blakeney is referring to. THE PRESIDENT; Mention the date of the speech to the witness. Q 27th of May, 1941. A I do not have any present recollection of that speech. Q Do you remember any speech of President Roosevelt in the spring of 1941 in which he stated that the United States will decide for itself whether and when and where our American interests are attacked or our security threatened? A I have no clear recollection of any speech at any particular time. Q Do you agree that acceptance of the American definition of the right of self-defense required foreign nations to give advance approval to America's involvement in the European War as self-defense when- ever and however it might have come about? THE PRESIDENT: He told you the definition recognized by the State Department was in Mr. Hull's speech; and it will be for us to say what it means. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 33 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,877 BALLANTINE CROSS Q When the United States War Council, so-called, and the Cabinet of the United States on various occa- sions^such as the Cabinet meeting of the 7th of November j I 1941 discussed the possibility of ourselves attacking Japan, was that considered in the light of an act of self-defense? MR. XEENAN: The prosecution objects to that question as being without the scope of the cross- examination, proper cross-examination. MR. BLAKENEYs It seems to me that the^ scope of proper cress-examination of the witness who conducted these negotiations involving these questions is any- thing concerning the interpretation of the question — not of documents, but the question. TEE PRESIDENT? We will permit him to testify only as to what was said and done during the negotiations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,878 BALLANTINE CROSS Q Was any such statement as that made to you b^ Secretary of St°te Hull or any other American official — high official? A No. Q I refer to the Executive Order of the 26th of July, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in the United States referred to on page 10 of your affidavit, paragraph 3. You stated that, if I understand you I correctly, that this executive order was an act of self-defense. Was f his action, freezing assets, taken .•jointly by agreement with the governments of other nations? A I do not know. Q Do you know whether that action of the United States Government was followed on the following day -- was adopted on the following day by the govern- ments of Great Britain end the Netherlands? A I merelv- know that that action was either followed or taken about the same time by these two other governments. ^ Are vou able to state whether the effect of the British and Dutch action upon trade between those nations and Japan was the same as the effect of the American action upon Japanese-American trade; that is, to bring about its virtual cessation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,879 BALLANTINE CROSS A I do not know. Q Do you know whether the effect of the war -in Europe had been to bring about a virtual cessation of trade between Japan and European countries? THE PRESIDENT: That is beyond the scope of the affidavit, which is confined to the United States TDOS it ion. MR. BLAKENEY: Well, possibly he does not know, but he does testify in his affidavit about the freezing of assets by Great Britain and the Nether- lands . THE PRESIDENT: The American freezing. Q Well, let me sum it up this way: Do you know whether after the freezing of assets by these governments Japan .was in effect cut off from commercial, intercourse with all of the world except those parts of Asia adjacent to her? A I have no direct knowledge of the fact. I have not seen any trade figures, but it would be just a matter of assumption. Q Do yon know whether it is correct to say that the result of the freezing of assets by these various nations and the conseauent cessation of trade had the effect of reducing Japan's foreign trade by about seventv-five per cent? Pardon me, I meant to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,880 BALLANTINE CROSS say "imports", not "foreign trade." A I don't think I have ever made a calculation of that. o Are you able to sav that that'is approximately correct without making a calculation? A Well, I would make it within a much wider ? range than that. It might be seventy-five percent, but then it might be, for all I know, it might be fifty-five per cent. 0 Then is it not true that the freezing of assets with the consequent cessation of trade to Japan constituted economic warfare upon Japan? THE PRESIDENT: He is invited to express an opinion, and we do not want his opinions. Q Did the State Department know in taking the steps tow^d fretting of Japanese assets that such steps would inevitably drive Japan to seek elsewhere and perhaps in other ways the necessary imports and raw materials upon which to operate? A One could hardlv know in advance what some- body else is going to do. Q Did not the Department of State consider it highly probable that Japan would be compelled so to do? A Not necessarily, because at that time the President offered Japan a peaceful alternative to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,881 course that she was pursuing. Q T'ttiat offer do you refer to? A His offer for the neutralization of Indo-Chin of July 24th. Q But I refer to the time when it was decided to impose the assets freezing order, and I ask you whether the State Department did not consider it highly probable then that with the imposition of that order and its consequent effects Japan would turn elsewhere to secure the necessary trade and supplies? A That was only one alternative. The other put by the President's offer in regard to Indo-China was still pending. It was only two days since the offer was made. Q Well, mention of the Indo-China question brings up another point. You knew, of course, the Japanese contention and complaint that Japan was being encircled? A We had heard a great deal about that. Q Now was there not in truth an A, B, C, D, .American, British, Chinese, Dutch cooperation on the subject of Japan and Pacific relations? A Naturally, in the situation then prevailing, it was necessarv or desirable that the countries affected would consult with each other about means of 10,882 BALLANTINE CROSS self-defense. Q Then you of the Department of State did know that from, say January 1941, there had been military cooperation among- these nations plus Australia with respect to possible action against Japan? A I ";ould say military consultations. Q And did you of the Department of State know during the year 1941 that the joint defense plans of those nations were the only plans in existence for military defense of American Pacific territories? A I do not know that any particular plans of consultation were the only plans for defense. 0 Now,of course,the United States never accepted the implications of the term "encirclement," did it? A The Acting Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that the American policy was the opposite of encirclement policy. r Nevertheless, accepting or rejecting the concept of encirclement, must we not concede that there was a basis in fact for the Japanese view that there existed the A, B, C, D combination for action against her? MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution objects to that question as being without the scope — proper scope of cross-examination. This witness is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 8 8 3 ; offered to tell~what he kr.er* ,rnd what he snvr^nd what he heard with reference to conversations leading towards peace. Now he is being asked about military combinations without the scope of the State Department or without the scope of M s direct examination, THE PRESIDENT; He is asked in effect to assume the Japanese h"d a certain view, and then he is asked whether on that assumption there was not a basis for that view. That does not aprear to be. a proper question- to put in cross-examination. You, Major Blakeney, should know upon what the Japanese based their view, if thev held it, and you should put to the witness that such were the facts; but you cannot properly ask him whether the Japanese view, if they held it, was properly held. MR, BLAKENEY; I do not Insist on the ouestion at all. sir, but I should like to point out that the witness has testified in chief in very sweeping terms as to the attitude of the Department of State in negotiating. -"HE PRESIDENT: I told vou the Tribunal would disregard everything in the affidavit except statements of fact; that we would disregard his opinions, and only to his opinions can you justlv apply the term "sweeping." - "Well, let us return to the negotiations. On 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,884 the auestien of the Tripartite Pact, did the positions of the parties gradually drnw closer together? A No. Q Wo were referring to your comparison of the draft proposals of the 12th of May and the 21st of June. Meanwhile, however, hav^ you not omitted one of th° intervening drafts, that of the 31st of May? That is the American draft of the 31st of May. A I did omit th-t in my affidavit. 0 Was there any particular reason for its omission exceut that r̂ou considered it of little importance? A Well, our June 21st draft was up to the time of our November 26th proposal, our last complete pro- posal. It represented the end of the thinking out and the discussions together of their original pro- posal of Mav 12th and, therpfofe, I thought to save time that I would make a comparison between those two proposals. Q This draft, however, I refer to the 31st of May draft, does appear in the Department of State's "Foreign Relations," Volume II, does it not? THE PRESIDENT: Have you seen Exhibit 1078, Major Blakeney? MR. BLAKENEY: Which is that, sir? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,885 THE PRESIDENT: It bears on that question. MR. BLAKENEY: 1078? I do not recognize it by number, sir. THE PRESIDENT: It is the proposal of the 31st of May, by Mr. Hull to Ambassador NOMURA. MR. BLAKENEY: Th^t is the document in question, and I wish to ask the witness to confirm that it contains this statement concerning the Tri- partite Pact question. THE PRESIDENT: The document speaks for itself, Major. We do not want his elucidation of it. MR. BLAKENEY: I do not know any way to call the Tribunal's attention to the point I am trying to cross-examine unless I can call it to his attention. THE PRESIDENT: Very well, proceed. Q Very well. Then the 31st of May draft was redrafted in your June proposal, was it not? A Thnt is correct. Q And was it on the basis of this June draft, or the May draft, or both, that on the 28th of August Ambassador NOMURA said to Secretary Hull that he did not feel there would be any difficulties about the Tripartite Pact question at the proposed Roosevelt- KONOYE meeting? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,886 A I do not know the basis of NOMURA's contention. Q Well, the June draft proposal was the then current one, if any was, was it not? A That is correct. Q Do you remember that at that time, in dis- cussing the proposed meeting between President Roose- velt and Premier Prince KONOYE, that Ambassador NOMURA said that the Japanese people regarded their adherence to the Axis as merely nominal? A I do not recall that definitely at that time, but I do know th~t there was a great deal of confusion and conflict between what they would say at one time and another time. THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes. ("Tiereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) BALLANTINE CROSS 10,887 G 1 r e 2 fi n 3 b e 4 r g 5 & 6 B 7 a 8 r t 9 0 n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney. BY ML. BLAKENEY (Continued): Q During the negotiations on the subject of the Tripartite Pact, was it the position of the Department of State that Japan should be required formally to abrogate the Pact? A As far as I know, we *never took any position on that point, only we didn't want any situation or interpretation of that Pact which was inconsistent with the peace agreement which the Japanese sought for the Pacific. Q Then the Department of State was requiring, and would have been satisfied, would it, merely with such an interpretation by Japan of the Pact as would not be in conflict vi/ith the peaceful settlement in the Pacific? A I think I can answer that question best by referring you to the point — I believe it was point 9 -- in the steps to be taken by the two countries in the November 26 proposal. Q Yes. That is, then, what was demanded was an interpretation, not a denunciation of the Pact. A I think that that provision — the wording 1 2 o 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 0 , 8 8 8 BALLANTINE CROSS speaks for itself. But, when you use the word "demand," that should — you should consider that in reference to the paragraph in our explanatory statement, the penultimate paragraph of the explana- tory statement, the paragraph before the last. Shall I read that provision? Q If you will just tell us what page it is on. A It is on page 2 of exhibit L. Q Yes. I think you need not read it. Do you remember what your representative in Japan, Ambassador Grew, advised the Department on the 29th of September relative to the Tripartite Alliance? A I would have to have my memory refreshed on that point. Q I refer especially to the following words of Ambassador Grew as taken from his book "Ten Years in « Japan," page 441; that the Ambassador points out that in regard "to Japan's Axis relations the Japanese. Government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter formally into ne- gotiations with the United States." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,889 Do you now recollect that despatch of Mr. Grew1s? A Yes, I recollect it. Q What was the view of the Department on that suggestion of Mr. Grew's? A With regard to that point, there needed to he something much more definite and concrete. Q "Much more definite" — what? A "And concrete." Q Was anything more definite and concrete offered thereafter by the Japanese Ambassadors? A I believe that KURUSU said at one time that Japan might do something to outshine the other alliance, but that wasn't made any more explicit than that, Q Did not the Department of State understand that remark of Mr. KURUSU's as meaning that the con- clusion of an agreement for general peace in the Pacific would so unequivocally fix Japan's orienta- tion that the Tripartite Pact would be a dead letter? A We didn't reach that point in the conversa- tions. We didn't reach a point where all the other things were so clear that we would have to reach a decision on this one remaining question. There were 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,890 too many outstanding questions. The Japanese proposals were being successfully narrowed down. Q You see, Mr. Witness, you repeat that the Japanese proposals were being narrowed, but I am trying to find the basis of fact for that statement. I am asking you now whether the Japanese representa- tives did not give a series of different suggested phraseologies for the interpretation of this Tri- partite Pact in the endeavor to meet the American position, A The furthest they got was to say that they would interpret the Pact independently. Q Did they explain "independently" of whom? A Well, from the context it was clear that they meant to imply that they weren't under German domination and that they were an independent nation, and that they would reach their own decision without reference to Germany. I suppose that's what they meant. Q Was not that explanation of an intention to interpret the Pact independently considered by the Department of State to be sufficient evidence of Japan's desire to escape from the Tripartite Pact without formally denouncing it? A We had no basis for reaching that conclu- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 .,891 BALLANTINE CROSS sion. At one time, I believe, the Secretary of State said that the Cabinet of Japan might change, and what might go for one Cabinet might not go for the next Cabinet. Q Let me call your attention to exhibit J to your affidavit which is the oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on the 2nd of October. THE PRESIDENT: That is exhibit No. 1245-G. Q (Continuing) I refer to page 4 of para- graph 2 thereof where the language is that, with reference to the Tripartite Pact -- I am paraphras- ing — "this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Governrrient to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries." Now, if the Japanese position in this matter was being consistently narrowed, what was the further step which was noted with appreciation? A The position of the Japanese Government was being consistently narrowed primarily in regard to commitments of peaceful intent — they were qualifi- cations, and also in regard to qualifications in regard to non-discrimination of international inter- course. The very next sentence after the one you BALLANTINE CROSS 10,892 quoted shows clearly that the American Government was not satisfied with the step that the Japanese Govern- ment had taken. Q Yes, I was going to ask you about that. The American Government was not satisfied, and yet here it clearly states that some progress had been made, does it not? A I think you will note the general tone of that note. We tried to be as conciliatory and friendly as possible. The first sentence should be interpreted in the light of that atmosphere that we were trying to create. Q Well, now, Mr. Witness, that first sentence either does or does not mean what it say-. Which is it? A You will note the very first paragraph of that communication we had in mind, that Japanese proposal of September 6, was what we were largely addressing ourselves to. The Japanese proposal of September 6 is contained in exhibit Gt and under C of that report the Japanese had gone a little further in their proposal of May 12. That is the last clause, C: "In case the United States should par- ticipate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,893 be independently decided." I can't say positively at this late date that that was the point to which we were referring, but I think that that was, that they had taken this further step. Q Yes. Well, that's what I was trying to get at there, that they had not narrowed their position at that point as the State Department said. Now, on the 10th of November, Ambassador NOMURA called on President Roosevelt, did he not, and at that time read to him a memorandum? A That is correct. Q I note that this memorandum also is not included with 3̂ our affidavit or referred to therein, from which fact I infer that the Department of State considered it of little importance in the negotia- tions . A Perhaps you will recall that among these intercepted Japanese telegrams which were released at the time of the Pearl Harbor Inquiry there was a telegram of November 5. That telegram will not be in this "Foreign Relations." It will be in this volume that was -- it was the first exhibit in the Pearl Harbor Inquiry. I don't know whether it is in evidence here or not. In that telegram there was an instruction to Ambassador NOMURA in regard to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10, BALLANTINE CROSS question of stationing troops in China which shows a complete lack of good faith because he was in- structed to make specious explanations of their reasons for wanting to state, and be vague and indefinite as to what they wanted. In the light of that aspect of the situation, that had to be taken into consideration in connection with any Japanese proposals that were being made to us about that time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,895 Q Well, if I follow you, then, your answer is "Yes," you didn't consider this of much importance. A You couldn't take any one point at a time; you. had to consider the whole situation as a whole. Q My question was why you omitted the Japanese proposal in question from your discussion of the negotiations in your affidavit. I did not suppose there was any reason for your omitting it, that you f considered it of little importance. I wonder if that is correct. A We were at that time exploring the whole field. Q Yes, hut wl y was this document not mentioned in your affidavit, Mr. Witness? A That was one of many documents that were not mentioned in my affidavit, because it was one, in my judgment, of lesser importance. Q Yes, so I assume. Now, in connection with the Tripartite Pact, I want to call your attention to the occasion when this document was presented by Ambassador NOMURA to President Roosevelt on the 10th of November. Do you remember thrt at that time in discussing with the President the matter of the Tripartite Pact the Ambassador said as follows: This is in Foreign Relations, Volume 2, page 716. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,896 BALLANTINE GLOSS "The present circumstances under which Japan is placed do not permit my Government to go any further to write in black and white than what is proposed in the draft of September 25th, which I have just quoted. All I have to ask you is to read between the lines and to accept the formula as satisfactory." / A Isn't there a line there that the Ambassador erased? Q Yes. That is what I want to ask you about. The last sentence in the publication is lined out and is followed by the notation, "deleted by Ambassador NOMULA." Was any explanation given of why he de- sired it deleted? A I wasn't at that conversation, and if any explanation was made to me 1 don't recall it. Q Now, continuing on the matter of the Tri- partite Pact for just a moment, was there any feeling in the Department of State by say November that the parties were measureably near to agreement of the Tripartite question alone? A I don't recall that there was any such feeling. As I say, we were trying to look at this question as a whole and getting a little closer, slightly clostir on one point without getting any nearer on other points. I don't think that they 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 10,897 attached too much importance to any single point because we were so far apart on many of those ques- tions as a whole. ML. KEENAN: Mr. President — THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel. MR. KEENAN: For the purpose of keeping this cross-examination confined within proper limits with reference to inquiry about the Tripartite, I res- pectfully call the Court and counsel's attention to exhibit 1245-K, which is the note from Japan de- livered to Secretary Hull approximately an hour after Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941. On page 4, paragraph 2, of this last official document from the Government of Japan the language is as follows: "The American proposal contained a stipu- lation which states both governments will agree that any agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as a conflict with the fundamental pur- pose of this agreement, the establishment and pre- servation of peace throughout the Pacific area. This version, with the above provision, has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligation under Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe and as BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 8 9 8 such it would not be accepted by the Japanese Gov- ernment ." Mr. President, in the face of that what is the purpose of consuming all of this time in at- tempting to find out from this witness what was the position of Japan with reference to the Tri- partite Pact? THE PRESIDENT: I take it you are objecting to the cross-examination about the Tripartite 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,599 BALLANTINE CROSS MR. BLAKENEY: Well, I can stats my position very shortly about that. The witness states repeatedly in his affidavit that the Japanese position became extreme, thet it became narrowed, or that the State Department considered that to have occurred. Sines the witness is the man, as the prosecution assures us, who was the official representative of the United States of /merica. in these negotiations, I think we can cross-examine him to find the factual, basis for" those statements. He has told us that there were three large points of difference between the two nations, 'e are examining now about one of them. THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to be gained by it in view of the very explicit terms of that la^t document received in evidence? Japan's adherence to that pact is made clear beyond any question. And what does it matter if you establish that during the course of the negotiations the Japanese may not have expressed that view so clearly? MR. BLAKENEY: There is, of course, no question whatever that in the end Jaran adhered to the Tripartite Pact. I am not contending that. THE PRESIDENT: Not merely that, but they suggest there they had that adherence throughout. If that be the fact, were they sincere in whet they may 51 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BALLANTINE CROSS 1 0 , 9 0 0 have said in the course of the negotiations to modify that? LIB. BLAKENEY: Of course, the contention is not made that the Japanese ever, at any given time, were not adherent to the Tripartite Pact. That is not the question. They continued as an adherent to the Pact because no agreement superceding it was ever reached. I am trying to find why it was not reached. THE PRESIDENT: In the fact of that very clear declaration delivered to the Secretary of State on the 7th of December, 194-1, the cross-examination would appear to be quite unhelpful and the objection is up- held. I cannot say it is irrelevant in view of the affidavit, but it. is wholly immaterial. MR. BLAKENEY: To I understand then that cross- examination on no aspect of negotiations concerning the Tripartite Pact is permitted? That is, I do not understand the scope of the objection and the ruling and I should like direction. THE PRESIDENT: In view of the very explicit statement to which I have just referred, the attitude of the Japanese as to the Tripartite 3act in the course of the negotiations becomes wholly immaterial. I should say the apparent attitude. Immateriality is a ground for excluding evidence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,901 BALLANTINE CROSS MR. BLAKENEYi Yes. Of course, I should like to point, out that when the time comes that the defense has the opportunity to go into the ruestion of this apparent attitude mentioned by your Honor, the oppor- tunity for cross-examination will be gone. THE PRESIBFNTs That does not make the cross- examination material. MR. BLAKENEY: Very well. BY MR. BLAKENEY (Continued): Q Now, let us return to consider the second of the big points of difference between the two nations in these conversations. This was, I believe you said, the question of the settlement of the China Affair within which is included the question of stationing Japanese troors in China. Is it correct to say that, of all, this was the question which most concerned and interested the t'nited States in the problem of this Pacific settlement? A I wouldn't say that, no. Q Well, perhaps we had better simply say this, then, that it was a problem which loomed very large, which was raised on the American side, and which, in the end, proved to be one of the chief stumbling blocks to agreement. That much is correct, is not it? A That is correct. BALL ANT I >15' CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Nov;, in order to attempt to define clearly the problem involved, I call your attention to the following language on page 14 of your affidavit, para- graph 3, that: "The immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure the stability of East Asia was predicated upon establishing at the outset s complete Japanese military and economic stranglehold over China, calling for Japanese control over strategic Chinese industries and facilities, referred to euphemistically in terms such as 'economic cooperation with China,' and retention in large areas of China for an indefinite period of large Japanese garrisons to protect Japan's holdings." THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question tonight, please. Did you finish that question? MR. BLAKENEY: No, sir. THE PRESIDENT: You had better repeat it in the morning. ' e will adjourn now until half past nine. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until 0930, '"'ednesday, 20 November 1946, at 0930.)
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