AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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1 / / o ^ •1 Ji; .-1 iWif̂'l I I i 14 NOVEMBER 1946 I N D E X Of WITNESSES Prosecution's Witnesses SHIRAO, Tateki Direct by Brigadier Nolan Cross by Dr. KIYOSE I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Page 10,567 10,567 10,573 Doc. No. Pros. Def. No. No. 1532D(15) 1193 15-H 1194 1532(10) 1195 1632W(86) 1196 2496 1197 2496-A 1197-A 1632^(87) 1198 2593D(22) 1199 2593D(23) 1200 2505 1201 For In Ident. Evidence Descrroticn Telegrrin from Foreign Minister TOGO to An- bpssrdor NOIdRA drted 28 Ncvenber 1941 10442 Telegrpm drted 29 November 1941 from Tokyo to Wrshington 10444 Telegrrm from N O m A to Foreign Minister TOGO dated 30 November 1941 10449 Extrrct from Entry of Mrrqu.is KIDO's Dipry dr.ted 29 November 1941 10452 Prrent document of Inter- rogation of Defendant NAGANO on 26 March 1946 10461 Extrpct therefrom 10461 Entry from KIDO's Diary dated 30 November 1941 10468 Telegram of 30 November 1941 from Tokyo to OSHIMA 10469 Telephone conversation betTf'een KURUSU and YAMMOTO on 30 November 1941 10473 Parent docum.ent from the TOJO interrogation of 20 February 1946 10479 Doc. Mo. 2505A 2513 2513:1 2506 2 506-A 2504 2504A 2 503 2503A 411® Pros. Def. No. No. 1201-A 1202 1202-A 1203 1203-A 1204 1204-A 1205 1205-A 1206 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (Cont'd) Bescrl-otion Extrect therefrom For In Idcjrt. Evidence io4ro Prrent doctiinent fron the TOJO interrofrtlon ôf 18 Mrrch 1946 10481 Eztrrct therefrom (-^^,1-4) Prrent dociiment TO JO ' s interrofetion of 21 Fcbrupry 1941 1048 Extrrct therefrom 10482 :7 10487 Prrent document ~ TOJOTs interropption drted 19 Fehriirry 1946 10491 Extrrct therefrom Prrent document - TOJO'f interrofrtion drted IP FehTVPTj 1946 10501 Extrrct therefrom Prrent document - TOJ0's Interrogrtion drted 26 Mrrch 1946 I0505 10492 10501 4119A 1206-A Extrrct therefrom. 10505 -p. r-. iV U ij A Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Doc, Pros. Dof, Ho. No. No, For I dent In Evidence f 4115 1207 4115A 1207-A 2593D(26) 1208 2500 1209 2500A 1209-A 163 2?/(88) 1210 2593D(30) 1211 1532D(11) 1212 2593D(34) "1213 2593I)(35) 1214 220-J 1 2 1 5 Description Parent docwnent of TOGO'S interrogation dated 11 I'arch 1946 10508 Extract therefrom 10509 Telegram dated 1 December 1941 from To:c«o to Washington I O 5 1 6 Parent document of TOJO's interrogation dated 8 February 1946 10519 Extract therefrom 10520 Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary dated 1 December 1941 10523 Telegram from TOGO to NOIiiURA (Havana) dated 2 December 1941 10524 Telegram dated 3 December 1941 to NOIIURA to TOGO 10526 Telegram from NOLIURA in reply to TOGO'S telegram dated 3 December l''-41 IO528 Telegram from Tokyo to Hsinking dated 4 December 1941 10530 Extract from Foreign Relations of the U.S.-JgT3an 1931-1941 Vol. II (p. 784) "Statement handed by the Japanese Airi- bassador N0I.IURA to the Secretary of State on 5 December 1941" 10532 2 0 0 - 1 2665 2 581 2405 2597 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Doc. Pros. Def. No. No. No. 1532D(12) 1216 1532D(13) 1217 2593D(39) 1218 2 593D(38) 1219 l632w(89) 1220 Description Telegram from TOGO to NOIIURA dated 6 Dece-mber 1941 Telegram from TOGO tc NOMURA dated 6 December 1941 Telegram of 7 December 1941 to m v m A from TOGO Telegram from the Tokyo Foreign Office dated 7 December 1941 Extract from Entrjr from Marquis KIDO's Diary dated 7 December 1941 Cable sent by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State Hull dated 6 December 1941 Synchronized Time Chart for 6, 7, and 8 December 1941 Comparative Time Table Based on Tokyo Proceeding Eastward on 7 and 8 December 1941 Affidavit of Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew dated 23 Jure 1946 Affidavit of SHIRAO, Tateki For Ident In Evidence 10534 10536 10537 10538 10541 10542 10544 10549 10551 10562 10,440 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Thursday, 14 November, 19'1-6 INTERNATIONAL lELITARY TRIBUIJAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal 7ar Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment. at 0935. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before "vith the exception of the HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Mer bcr from India, not sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to J'Qpanese and Japanese to English interpretation was m-de by the L-ngv.sge Section, BITFE.) 10,441 G 1 0 1 2 d b 3 e 4 r g 5 & 6 S 7 P r 8 a t 9 t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MRSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session, THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA and HIRANUMA, who are represented by their respective counsel. have a certificate of illness of HIF̂ A- NUI.fe. from the Medical Superintendent of Sugamo Prison. He is unable to attend today. Dr. KIYOSE. DR. KIYOSE: Yesterday afternoon I made a remark on the words "Minister of the Navy" appear- ing on page 2 of exhibit I I 8 9 . May we have this term excluded? The defense counsel V7as able to obtain the correct wording of this telegram, and later I will be able to prove that ray wording was correct. THE PRESIDENT: Your explanation yesterday was accepted. There is no need for any further action, Mr. Fihelly. m . FIHELLY: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal, we are now up to the date November 28, 1941. As tending to show that Japan had decided to go to war with the United States and v;as using her 10,4-42 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i negotiations to assist her, as sho^m by International Prosecution document 15'32-D(15), a wire of Noveinber 28 from Tokyo to Y/ashington, which we now offer in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1532-D(15) will receive exhibit No. 1193. ('//hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No, 1193 "iHd received in evidence.) ICR. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1193i "To: Ambassador NOIIURA "From: Foreign Minister TOGO "Dispatched: 28 November 1941 8:05 P.I'. "Subject: Japan - United States Negotiation "Telegram No. 844 (Ambassador's Code) "Your telegram No. I I 8 9 and others have been received. In spite of the efforts vou two am- bassadors have made, it is surprising and regrettable that such a proposal as the recent one had been made toward Japan by the United States. It is impossible for us to negotiate on the basis of their proposal. V/ith the submission of the Imperial government's opinion of the American proposal (which will be 25 10,443 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 telegramed in tv;o or three days) , the situation will be such that there will be nothing left but to prac- tically drop the negotiation. But we wish you to re- frain from giving the impression to the United States government that the negotiation is broken off. Tell them that you are waiting instructions from the home government and while not making clear to them the intentions of the government, explain to them, as your personal opinion, that Japanese claims have been just and especially that although Japan has made intolerable concessions and has taken a conciliatory attitude in maintaining peace in the Pacific area, the United States government has not reacted to co- operate and has made the solution of the negotiation extremely difficult. "Furthermore, because of the aforementioned situation, the measures which you have suggested in your telegram No. 1180 have all been considered im- proper at this time, although they had been referred to the parties you mentioned. Please acknowledp-e the above-mentioned situation, "/end/" 10,444 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 For thp sane purpose we offer in evidence International Prosecution docuisint Noe 15-H, a ̂ vire of November 29th from Tokyo to v/ashington. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual toras. CLEHK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 15-H will receive exhibit No. 1194. (V/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to narked prosecution's exhibit No. 1194 and received in evidence. M , FIHELLY: I will now read prosecution's exhibit No, 1194, and I ask the Tribunal to pay- particular attention to the last paragraph, as it has a connection with the following document which will be introduced. (Reading): "(Secret)" "FROM: Tokyo "TO : '-ashinfton "29 November 1941 "Re my -'̂-844. / wish you would -nake one nore attempt verbally along the following lines: f'The United States povernnent has (always?) i taken a fair and judicial position and has formu- 10,445 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 lated its policies after full consideretlon of the clains of both sides, "T-oivevT, the Inperisl GovernrBnt is at a loss to understand ivhy it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have nade cannot be nade the basis of discussion, but in- stead has nade new proposals wî ich ipnore actual con-̂ .itions in last /sia and would preatlj'- in- 1ure the ":'restirG of the Inperial Governnent. ""ith such a chanfe of front in their at- titude toward the China problen, what has be- cone of the basic objectives that the U. 3. fovernnent has nade the bpsj.s of our negotia- tions durin," these seven northsV f̂n these points we would requf̂ st careful self-reflec- tion "n the part of the United States eovern- nent." I-!Ii. FIHHLLVj Now we cone to t'-e particular phrase I nentioned. "fin crrryinp out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to am^thinp like a breakinp off of nepotiations.)" 10,446 1 2 3 4; 5 i 6 7 8 9 10 . 11 i 12 ' 13 I i 14 I I 1 16 17 I 18 ! 19 i 20 21 22 23 24 . 25 : MR, LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may I inquire of the prosecution if exhibit 1193 is an intercepted inessage? m . FIHELLY: Mr. President, I will have the book checked. I can't tell by just looking at it. ''̂e have the intercepted book here, and we will check it, and will inforn Mr« Logan. For such assistance as it may give the Tribunal, we now offer in evidence International Prosecution document No. 1532-D(10}, a document which was found in the Foreign Ministry which appears to be the official copy of eithsi- tine same wire which has Just been read or one substantiallj'' like itr Strangely, * the last line we have Just referred to is missing from the Japanese text, but the Japanese doc-ament shows that there was some additional writing at one time at the end of that document, and that an attempt has been made to cross out and cover up that particular I will first offer the Japanese text from 1532-D(10) and read the document. THE PRESIDENT: You will give evidence of that attempt to which you refer, I take it. m . FIHELLY: Just by showing the Court the physical Japanese document. THE PRESIDENT: Expert evidence could be 10,447 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 given on such matters. That is quite froquent where erasures have been made in docurpents. IfR, LOGAN: May we have a direction at this tine, if your Honor please, to the prosecution to refrain from making such statements in the future when he is introducing documents. There is a proper way -of doing that, as your Honor just suggested, by calling experts to show it. 1:5.. FIHELLY: We have offered the document and ask that it be narked, Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: I have got a note: If the document shows it, why should we need the expert to dep'̂ '̂ e? By the use of acids and that type of thing you can now very often bring up the original writing. That is my experience as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. I1R. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, if the prosecution has any evidence as to who raade any change in that document, if there has been a change made in it, we ask that they produce evidence to that effect. I;K. FIHELLY: This xvas a document, as I told the Tribunal before, all this series of 1532- documents'Were found at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. 1 C , 4 4 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 7/e have no evidence at this time as to who made that obliteration, but I believe we have a right, Mr. Pres- ident and llewbers of the Tribunal, to introduce this document which was an official document of the Japanese Government and let it speak for itself. THE PRESIDENT: You will save time, I think, and reduce the number of protests from the defense if you are satisfied, Mr. Flhelly, simply to say that on this document there appears to be an erasure and invite the Court's consideration of it or inspection of it. Apparently, It is not an erasure. It is / not an erasure; it is an obliteration, and you should have no difficulty in restoring the original writing by the use of acids or infra-rays or whatever is used on those occasions; and we expect you to do it. m . FIHELLY: Mr. President, I do not think I used the word "erasure." I did use the word "obliteration." I am sorry if the Court was misled. THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I assumed that it was an erasure because you had made no attempt to bring up the writing. You are dealing now with the most Important documents in the whole of this trial. I dj not think it Is too much to say that. m . FIHELLY: We will be glad to use every 1 mep.nT̂ vithin CV.T -.-rT-er tr ree; ™hFt c-ri he fone to 2 bring thrt cnt. "̂ e hpc fiven it tc different tr?ns- 3 liters tc sPre if thê r covlc -nick up eny T'orc", pnd 4 were unsble to pet rny PFtisfrctor-'r ?nŝ 'er. VJe î lll 5 he gl?d to further c m "̂ e done, the Court ^ instructs. ^ Also., in viê '- of '̂'hpt vour Honor hfp sfid, ^ wotilc' it not he better tc hfve this docunent rrrked rs F court erhihit so thet it reripins in custqc'ig lepis in the custod̂ '- of the Court,. I 10 TiIE FRi:SIIErT: It is rlrepdy nrrked ?s rn ^̂ exhî ît. It is rdritted on the UFUFI terns, if I heve 13 not plrerd-̂ ' srid so. im, FIHi.LLY; '-̂ hrt vr- the nunher of thrt, 15 ' 16; 17 18 19 20 21 2 2 i 1 23 24 ' 25 Mr. Mpntz? CLLFiK OF COURTS Prosecution's document No. 15^2-3(10), exhibit Fr, 11Q5. (VJhereu.'-ion, the docur^nt rhove referred tc VT^ rfrked -orosecution's ex'-'ihit No. 11.95 rnd received 3n evidence.) im. LOGIN: If +he Trihunrl T̂ ier-e, the other nessFfe cmcerninp "̂'''ich "'e yere iust "f"Flki.ng, •nrosecr+ion' s ey'̂ ibit 119̂ -, is Fn interce-nted ref̂ f̂ r̂ e, but it hrs no+ the dFtc thrt it trrvrlrted on it,.. Mr-*' "-e hFve thFt frrr tl'S -rc^ecutirn? •4- 10/5^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 7 8 I I 9 i 10 I 11 ! 12 : 13 14 15 16 I I 17 i 18 I 19 ! 20 21 22 j 23 24 I 25 FIiriLLI'; If tu-'r in'-ercir'̂ i-ec' pp̂ ^ î̂ ch c'etr, re l-)e 'Irrl to pive it t.o l.'r.. Kr. F-z'-̂jliit nc"".' "He re?̂ "? THE FPJir.IDHlTi It t^^y. ex'-ibit No. 1195 = "Tcs ArobrsPc e'er FOlITi in . 'TrTi; Fcre5pn Tinister TOGO "^nhiect; r,S.-Jr^?n6«?e Fefrti?tictt* "Disr̂ p tehee I'rverb^r IP^i A; 20 L.U, "Tele?r-m F-̂ . (i-mhr psff"rr Gof'e) "Be r̂"- telcgr^r Fr. T M fnrtifB of t^e telefrpm Fissinf in rnfli'^b/ "'Yfe "ish """CI"' •̂'cti.lc' rrke on pcre vert^rlly rlrn--' ̂ bc fcllô '̂inp lines: "The U. Gcvernpent con.'̂ iders thrt it IF eifflcvlt for them to br re aipcussion on ovr nê ' rrcprsrl of the ?Ctb, i"hich y;-- drr^n tî rfter ccn- ^iderrble deliberrtion herrin.? In rind the clpirs o-̂ both side.s rnd br<̂ ed ^n our j-uft rtpnd'ocint. "The Irrcripl Governnent is rt r Iĉ ?; to vnderstrnd the nev' Troposrl of the P'̂ t̂h ̂ "hich hrs ipnored rctt̂ rl crrd^ticns in Irst i.sir ?nd ̂ 'ouJ.d prsFtlv injure the --re^tipe cf the Ir-erirl Govern- ment." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 '"''e Ccnnrt biat ĥ lf' p fcv^tfvl + fovirrd" the fimr'cF.entrl T̂ lrnr cf the i.rcricFn Gov- f-rnrent in r̂ eprtlrtion.'̂ r'vrlRp. the -̂ r̂ ̂ t rcntĥ ,. /-pntence In tb*-: rrrgin not trrn^^lftpe/ On the-e --rdn-'-s '̂-e verve.'-t crrefvl ^elf-reflcotion rn tbe î rrt of "' he TTnitoc"": Strtes noTrc rnrpnt. 10,452 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 : 9 10 11 I 12 ! 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We next offer In evidence International Prosecution document No. l632-T/(86), which is an extract from the KIDO Diary of November 29, to show that a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held on that date in connection with the matter of war with the United States. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. ' CLEFK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. l632-?^(86} will receive exhibit No. 1196. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked T)i'osecution's exhibit No. 1196 and rec(5lved in eviC.enceJ Lrt. FIHELLY: 1 now read from prosecution's exhibit No, I I 9 6 , the extract from the KIDO Diary^ November 29, 194-1: "From 2 p.m. to 3 P»n. the Emperor asked Senior Statesmen's opinions concerning the present political situption. "The :^peror remarked on the difficult tines we were poinp through, "Baron ".VXtTSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual poxver, but regarding material power we must make a careful ! study, "Admiral OKADA said that he had grave doubts ; 10,453 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 f!s to our supply opacity in reprrd to materials, rnd thoupht the Governnent's statenent about this nctter to drte was quite incomplete, "Baron HIK..NUI'L: ?freed vdth Ilr. ':\1K.-TSUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Jrpanese nation, rnd urged further measures to awaken natroitic sentiment, "r-rince KONOYr̂ stated thct it was quite re- rretteble that our negotiations were going to be a fpilure In srite of our strenuous efforts since last ixpril. But he 'vrs of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just becpuse of the rurture of the negotir?tions as we might be able to recch a wise solution in some wa-"* or other, while continuing our struggle pĝ -inst difficulties. "Admiral YONxU srid that he could not base his opinion on definite drta. but it was his desire thft wo should be careful not to lose wh?t little •"e -posses by trying to avoid becoming poorer by inches, "Nr., HIJiOT. said thct although our policy hpd been to rrevent ..nglo-Americrn interference in the C^inr Incident, things had reached their present siturtion, "'e should be rble to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two coun- 10,4-54 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2tt 21 22 23 24 25 tries rvsn rfter the connv-DncenGnt of hostilities, if vc sincere erouph in '->ur cliplomrtic efforts. "̂ -enerpl I st-tefl thr.t rs he i-r.d no d&tr for his opinion, he could do no thin,?" but believe the decisions of the Inneripl Ho?'''ciU3rt̂ :"s end the Oovernnent. "GenerRl I3~!. sfid that rccordinp to the Governnent stpte'-ient the nopotietions hpd cone to n deadlock in spite of strenuous efforts on our part. He v/ps sure that the Governnent hrd studied the world politicrl situation fron various anFles with laborioi's ninuteness, for v/hich v;e were thankful. Put it would be auite nrcessrr-̂ '- to ray nuch nore attention to the attitude of the Chinese people than to the vapT with the U.S./,., othcri-'ise we would lose the fruits of victory in the Chinese Incident. "Mr. •'V.IG.TSUICI said that the war should be fou,'"ht to the iFst, even if the^e was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for the cause of our national existence and self-defense, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realise our ideals such as 'the .".siatic Co-prosperity Sphere' or 'the stabilisinr of pô -'̂ r in ̂ .sia', because such a war would be very danperous." 10,455 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 J®. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I realize fully your decision on reference of these excerpts to the Language Section, but here is a meeting that was held on Novenber 29, 19^1, and as read by the prose- cution it is nore or less of a summary of what took place. I Eight say that the summary here is practi- cally Identical with what the prosecution has ad- mitted is a rough translation of the Diary. The translation we have is in the first person, and not in the third person; it covers two and one-ha]^ pages and not one and one-half pages; and it is more ex- plicit and explains fully what these various people said at this meeting. THE PFiESIDENT: If you are not prepared to refer the matter to Ma^or Moore, Mr. Logan, and abide by his decision, you then must be satisfied to give this as part of the defense evidence. As I said be- fore, we can never agree to allow two translations to be given in the course of the prosecution's cases one by the prosecution, and the other by the defense. The defense translation will be received during the course of the evidence for the defense, if it is offered. We cannot prevent you from contesting a translation at the proper time. IIR. LOGaN: My point is this, your Honor: 10,4^6 4 I 5 6 7 I 8 9 I 10 i 11 12 13 ; 14 15 I 16 17 I IS i 19 20 21 22 23 24 That here is an inportant conference in which Marquis KIDO quotes what was said by two of the accused here, and I think the Tribunal would be'in- terested in hearing our translation of this particu- lar conference. I should think that they would want to find out what our translation says. I do not think it is exactly fair, your Honor, for the prose- cution to be presenting rough translations of a docu- ment they have had for practically a year, particu- larly when it refers to this stage of the case. THE PRESIDENT: Until the contrary appears, we will assume that they are presenting the best translation they have. You will be able to show the contrary, perhaps, in the course of giving evidence for the defense. I have got a note here to this effect: •̂•e do not want a partisan translation if there be a dispute. In such case we should have one only, and that is from our own Language Referee. I have already said that you nay approach the Referee, and if he says the translation should be s certain thing, then you must accept It. But, as I just said, if the defense do not accept it In the course of the prosecution's case, they can give evidence of their translation when they are giving 3 I 4 5 6 evidence later. I hope that if any counsel is under misapprehension, will he come to the lectern and tell me vjhat it is so that I may clear it up. I/!r. Smith. 9 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 19 20 21 22 ^̂ 23 24 25 — I 10,458 G 1 r e 2 e n 3 b e 4 r g 5 & 6 B 7 a r 8 t 0 9 n 10 11 12 13 i 1 . t 1 4 ! 15 16 17 i 18 1 19 ! 20 21 22 , 23 24̂ 25 Iffl, SiaTH; If your Honor please, in a good many documents there were minor errors. We can well understand how your Honor would not want to be bother- ed v̂ ith it frequently and have it referred to the L.anguage Section as a matter of course. But, as we understand it, practically everything in this ex- hibit 1195 is in error so far as the translation goes; and I would liVe to ask' your Honor, when serious iris- translations occur such as this and that deal with a m.atter of this im.^ortance, that the Translation Sec- tion of the Court should give priority to the cor- rection of these docum.ents and come in as soon as it is completed and reread the matter to the Court as the Court's own section translates it. It m,ay be four or five months before we have reached this subject in our own case; and, where we are dealing with thousands of documents and counsel are sv;amped with all these things, I submit, your Honor, it is only fair that we clear as m.uch of this confusion a\vay as we go along and as is possible in the case. THE PRESIDENT: Do not leave the lectern, T)lease, I have alreadjr directed to be done what you ask me to do now. If the defense question a trans- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I 11 I 12 13 14 15 16, i 17 j 1 8 1 19 i 20 ! 21 22 ! 23 24 : 25 ! lation when they receive it they are at liberty to go to the head of the Translation Section and put their representations before him. If he agrees with thep, he will see the prosecution, and the correction will be ir.ade at the lectern bv the counsel presenting the document or reading it. If he does r̂ pt agree with theip, the defense then will be able to ,'7ive their versior. in the course of giving evidence for the defense. As I am reminded by a colleague, I have already told you that twice within the last four days. ffi. SMITH: Your Honor, since the blanket ruling, an automatic referring was made about a week ago*, and counsel have referred a number of docum-ents to the Translation Section, and so far none of them have come back corrected. THE. PRESIDENT: Ma;]or Moore spoke to me about| this matter this morning, and it appears that he is asked to make a choice between the use of these two _.wor_̂ _j '^a^tening" and "expediting." He was quite reasonable about it and, in all seriousness, wanted to know whether it was worth correcting. 10,4-60 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 : 16 : I 17 13 I i 19 20 21 I I 2 2 j I 23 ! 2:i will be overworked. He vail never be able to com- plete his work, I should say. 1®, SMITHS I am sure, your Honor, that none of the defense counsel are taking any captious attitude. All we are begging for is the substance. The whole point of vi;hat I said this morning is that in a document of this extreme im.portance, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, that the m.atter ought to have pri- ority and that the Court direct the Translation Section to take this matter up imrediatelv and to com-e back as soon as possible vjith the corrections. THE PRESIDEKT: A colleague questions the right of the defense to give evidence of their translation if it is not accepted by EUajor Moore. I will say no more about it. I 'ill take the de- cision of the whole Tribunal and abide by it faith- fully. (V/hereupon, a discussion was had off the record by the Memibers of the Tri- bunal.) THE, PRESIDENT: Mr. Fihelly. Iiffio P'lHELLY; To show that im.portant Liaison Conferences were held in these late days of Novem.ber 194-1, and for other pertinent information contained therein, we nov; offer in evidence International 10,4-61 J Prosecution docunent No. 249--A, which is an extract 2 from the interrogation of the defendant NAGANO on 3 March 194-6, pages 11 to 13; and we ask that the 4 iDarent docurr.ent be rrarked for identification. 5 CLERK 0? TKT. COURT: Prosecution's document 6 No. 2496 Will receive exhibit No. 1197 for identifi- 7 cation only. 8 (Vifhereupon, the document above re- 9 ferred to was marked -crosecution's exhibit 10 No. 1197 for identification.) 11 THE PRESIDENT: The excerpt is admitted on ^̂ the usual terms. ^̂ CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docum.ent No. 2496-A will receive exhibit No. 1197-A. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was ff'arked prosecution's exhibit No. 1197-A and received in evidence.) FIHELLY: I now read the questions and answers on pages 1 and 2 of the exhibit with respect to the Liaison Conferences, being near the end of page 2; "Q, About when, Admiral, did you place your ap- proval UDon the clan to attack Perrl Harbor? "A. Either in the end of October or the beginning of November, There was ccnsiderrblc argument between 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 i 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Fleets r.nd the Nr.vril ODcrrtirnol Burcnu, The Fleets v;crc In frvor of ottrcklng Perl Hnrbcr, vjhcre- rs the Ncvnl Affr.irs Bureau considered It too nuch of r speculntion and preferred the nore conscrvrtive ncthod of waiting for the Anericrn Fleet in the South Pacific Islands. Admiral YAMAIiOTO v;as very adanant in his belief in his nlan tr attack Pe^rl Harbor and he threatened to resign along with his staff if that i nlan were not carried out,- | "Q. Prior to this ti'-e the nlan had been nerfccted j by rirelininary naneuvers rt sea and also on naper at j the Naval Headquarters, had it not, Adniral? j "A, Yos, the Fleet studied it very greatly. "Q, And v.'hen, Adniral, was it that you decided the conflict bctv/ocn the Navy Affairs Bureau and Adnir- al Y;JIAMOTO in frvor of the attack uoon ''earl Harbor? "A, I originally agreed v;ith the Naval Ooerotional Dcpartnent but as Y/JCAMOTO vms so avid in about the end of October or early nart of Novenbcr, as I pre- viously stated, 1 agreed vdth the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Thu Naval Affairs Bureau v/ere in frvor of using the plan that they had held for nrny years of waiting for the Anericnn Navy in the South Pacific I slands» "Q. Nevertheless, Adniral, as I understand it, 1 2 3 4 5 6 • 1 i 8 i 9 I 10 j 11 i 12 ! 13 i i 14 I 15 16 17 I I 18 ! 1 19 ! 20 I 21 I 22 ; 23 24 i 25 ! notwithstanding the dosiros of the Nrval Affairs Bureau tc r̂ dhere to tho r̂ lnn vdnich hnd been in effect for nany yerrs, you cr.nc tc the conclusion that tho plan to attack ^carl Harbor v/as best and settled the conflict by giving your apnroval to the Pearl Harbor Plan, is thrt not correct, /dniral? "A, I vas for the Plan of the Naval Affairs Dcprrtnent as that secned to be the nore logical but net tc have the Connandor of the Fleets resign, as he v.'ould have, if his olan did not go through, I thought the best thing to do wr.s tc approve, "Q, And you did approve, is that correct, the Plan for the Pearl Harbor attack? Yes. "Q. As I understand the situation, Admiral, your approval of the sane vas the decisive factor in carrying thrcxigh the attack rn Pearl Harbor, is that not right? "A, Yos. "Q, /nd as I understand it, A'-'̂ nirrl, I assume that in tho light of that fact, ycu are willing to assuno respcnsibil:'ty for the sane. Is that correct, Adniral? "A. Naturally. "Q. /.dniral, about when was the fleet first ID,464 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ordered tr take pcsiticn in rrdcr tr carry thrrugh the Per.rl Harbrr at trek? . Thi. Fleets were rsso bled at Chiahina in the niddle rf Hcvenbcr. On Nrvenbor 26 or 2? they started out for Pearl Harbor. . . . "Q. Adn.ira], as a natter rf fact, there was a liaison,, conference held rn rr about Nnvenber 28 or 29j 1941, there net, at v/hich there were oresent ^re- nier TOJO, Foreign Hiristcr TOGO, Finance Tinistcr KAYA, President rf the Cabinet Planning Brard STJZUKI, /rny Chief of Staff SUGIYATUi, Arny Vice Chief of Staff General TANABE, yourself as N-vy Chief of Ftaff, IJo.̂ry Vice Chief of Staff Rear Adr.iral ITO, Co-'-unications Ilinister TERASfII':A, Agriculture Jlinister IFO, the Cabinet S,-̂ cretary HOSHINO, Gcm^ral IITto as Head of the !:i].itary Affairs Section for the A m y and Head of the Navy General Affairs Secticn Vice Ad- iral OKj". to con- plote the deter-inatirn for view up-n the United States, is that not correct? "A. I an not sure of the d-̂ te but 1 believe you arc corrcct on that. Horrever, until the very last v.'e v;ere honinp that po'-ce could bo est'^bjished and were prenared to abandon the Plan until the very ].ast, for the attack on -ê 'rl Harbor. You can add tr the list the Navy I^inister ..dniral SHI'^^DA." 10,465 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TIIE PllESIDERT: Ifr. Brannon. IvIR. BRANMON; If the Tribunal please, rnany objections to these interrogations -̂ /̂ill probably be presented at the time of our defense, but the accused NAGANO has specifically requested r̂e to inform the Court that all through this particular interrogation the use of the words "Naval Affairs Bureau" is in- correct. Since the prosecution, I believe, is not TDarticularly stressing the usage of thos©- words, I would like to call to the Court's attention that, there being no such thing as a "Naval Affairs Bureau," it being really a "Military Affairs Bureau of the Navj'' Ministry," this docun-ent may tend to implicate another one of the accused -.ho was ac- tually the head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. If I may, I would also like to inform the Court that this interrogation o.nd, I understand, many others taken by the prosecution were not submitted to the defendants for these technical corrections after they were taken. Consequently, on matters of this kind which, v/hile the-'' are technical in nature, may have a m.ore forceful effect upon the reading thereof, I believe they should be called to the Courtis attention at the time they are introduced. 10,466 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I I 8 9 10 11 12 ! i 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mr. President, soire of the defense counsel have been in doubt as to the proper procedure to take in reference to the question and answer forir of these interrogations, that is, whether to object to the type of question asked as being leading or argumentative or assuming facts or whether to treat this as an entire docur.ent and to make no objection to "'"he specific question as asked. May we request an expression of the President in that regard? THE PRESIDENT: Aether or not the Tribunal is prepared to scan these interrogatories I cannot say until I consult them, I will give no decision on the matter until consulting all the Members. The question is raised rather late. The other matters m.entioned by Mr. Brann.on are noted, Wi. OKUYMA: I am Gounsel for the defendant NAGANO. As there was a serious mistake in the inter- rogation, I would like to point it out to the Tri- bunal. As it is v/ell known, NAGANO was Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time of the Pearl Harbor incident -- at the time of the outbreak of war. V/hen NAGANO was replying to the questions of the prosecutor, it goes without saying that he was well aware that the Naval General Staff of which he was 10,467 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Chief was different from the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy, and he, hirself, will never say "Mili- tary Affairs Bureau." In spite of this, the translator has trans- lated the "Naval General Staff" of which he was Chief as the "Naval Affairs Bureau." i^ds illustrated how little the interpreter knew of Japanese and how little he kne'." of the system of organization of the Japanese Government, Therefore, I wish to call the attention of the Court to the fact that this interro- gation was interpreted by dji interpreter who was not very familiar with the Japanese language and also was not familiar with the Japanese system of government, TKE PRESIDENT: The right time at which to give that information is in the course of giving evidence for the defense, I repeat that ̂ nauseam^ perhaps, but apparently it is necessary. m . FIHELLYj May I proceed? THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Fihelly, MR. FIHELLY: We next offer in evidence International Prosecution document No. I632VY (87), an entry from, the KIDO Diary of Novem.ber 30, as tend- ing to show that the plans for war with the United States wQ,re still being m.ade despite the fact that some wished to avoid war. 10,468 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COIff;T: Prosecution's document No. 1632W (87) will receive exhibit No. 119'8. (Whereupon, the document a'oove re- ferred to was narked prosecution's exhibit 1198 and received in evidence.) I'/IU FIHELLY: I now read from prosecution exhibit No. 1998, the extract from the KIDO Diary entry of November 30, '41: "I visited the Emperor at 3:30 p.m. in re- sponse to his request. He said that Prince TAKAÎ IATSU had told him that the Navy's'hands were full, and it appeared that he wished to avoid war, but did not know what to do, I advised the Em̂ rieror to ask the opinions of the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier, for the situation was really grrve. could not be too prudent in the matter. At 6:35 p.m. I again visited the Em.pcror in response to his request. He said that he had ordered the Premier to act according to program on account of the affirmative answers of tbe Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff concerning the ques- tion as to the success of the war." To show the feeling of Japan at this tim.e and to show the r.art that the Tripartite Pact was 10,469 3 4 5 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 playing in the negotiations, we now offer in evidence International Prosecution document 2593D 22, the wire of November 30, 194-1 from Tokyo to OSHIMA. THT:: PBESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2593D 22 will receive exhibit No. 1199. (V/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 1199 and received in evidence.) FIEELLY; I now read prosecution ex- hibit No. 1199: "From; Tokyo "To i Berlin "November 30, 194-1 "Purple "7f986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Pert 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department) "1. Japan-American negotiations were com.m.enced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued, if'ithin that period the Imperial Government adam.antly " stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vici.^si- tudes of the international situation, In the 10,470 rdjnstrnent of diplomrtic relrtions between Japrn rnd the United States, she hss besed her hopes 3 for ? solution definitely T!>;ithin the scope of that p.llirnce, vVith the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assuined the attitude of carrying through these negotiations, "2. Therefore, the present Cabinet, in line with your messrge, with the viev; of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just ?nd equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views rnd ours on the nu.estion of the evacuation of troops, û ôn which the negotiations rested, (thej?' demended the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in oprosition to each other, "Judging from the course of the negotiatins that have been going on, we first came to logger- heads "̂hen the United States, in keeping with its 22 traditional ideological tendency of managing inter- 23 nationrl relrtions, re-emphasized her fundamental 24 reliance upon this traditional polic]/- in the ccn- 25 versations carried on between the United States and England in txhe Atlantic Ocern. The motive 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 10,471 0 A 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of the United States in f11 this wrs brought cut her desire to -revent the estrblishment of ? nev order by J?p?n, Cernpny, rnd Itf.ly in Europe rnd in the Frr Erst, th?.t is tfc sê '-, the ?iins of the Tri-Prrtite Alli ?nce• A F long ?s the Enpire of Je-nen T«?S in ellipnce ?'ith C-crnpny rnd Itely, there could be no nrintenrnce of friendly rela- tions bet?'een Jrprn and the United Ste.tes wrs the strnd they took. From this point of vievr, they begpn to demonstrrte ? tendency to demrnd the divorce of the Inr.erirl C-overnnent from the Tri- Prrtite Allirnce, This wes broupht out et the lest meeting, Thrt is to s?y that it hrs only been in the negotirtions of the Irst few drys thet it bps becone grrdurlly nore end nore clear thrt the Im-orriel Governr^ent could no longer con- tinue negotirtions T?;ith the United Strtes. It becFri.e clerr, too, th?t p continuation of negotiations 'ould inevitably be detrirentrl to our cause." "(Part 2 of 2) "3. The pro-̂ osal -resented by the United States on the 26th-nade this attitude of theirs clearer then ever. In it there is one Insulting clause '"hich says that nc" matter ?.'hat treaty either pa.rty enters into i.«ith a third -nover it will not be 10,472 ' . intrr-^reted rs hf-vinp eny bearing npon the bpsic object of this trert3r, n?mely the nplntenrnce of ^ -̂ epce in the Prcific, This mepns s-^ooific?lly the Three-FoTJer Ppct, It Fieens thct in crse the United States enters the Euro-^e?n tt-t ?t en:/ time the Jrppnese Enpire ?.'ill not be rlloT̂ ed to give ps- si'̂ trnce to Gr-;rrApny rnd It?ly. It is cleerly e. trick. This clptise Plone, let plone others, ppkes it in'cossible to find rn̂/- bcsis in the Americpn ^ro^,ospl for ncfotiptions. Whet is nore, before the United Stptes brought forth this pirn, < they conferred •'•'ith Englpnd, Austrplip, the Nether- Ipnds, ?nd China — they do so rê eetedl̂ ?-. Therefore, it is clepr thpt the United Stptes is no?/ in collvsion with those nptions pnd h?s decided to regprd Jpppn, plong ŵith Gerrorny pnd Itply, ps pn eneny," 4 ; 5 I 6 i 8 i 9 10 I 11. i 12 n 1 14 ! 15 ' 1 6 1 I I 17 : 18 r9 I 20 21 ! 22 25! 24 25 I 10,473 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The translation date arir̂ earing on the first page is "Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)"; on the second page, the page I just read, "Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)." V/e next 'offer in evidence International Prosecution docuirent No. 2593-D-23 which relates to a telephone conversation from KUF.USU to Tolcyo on November 30, 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLtRK OF THE COURT. Prosecution's document No. 2593-D-23 will receive exhibit No. 1200. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was narked prosecution's exhibit No, 1200 and received in evidence.) I'.'iR. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1200: "Brom: Washington "To: Tokyo "30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST) "Telephone Code" THE- PRESIDENT: You will read it after the recess, Mr. Fihelly. V/e will recess now for fifteen minutes. (\Vhereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceed- 1 ings were resumed as follows:) 1 0 , 4 7 4 M 1 0 r 2 s e 3 (S: 4 A 5 b r 6 c. 7 Hi 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MARSHAL OF TliF: COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far Erst is now resumed. THi" PRESIDENT: Mr. Fihelly, before you pro- ceed I will give the decision of the Tribunal on the language question. I cannot do better than repeat what appears in a note drafted by one of my colleagues who ?;as fullyauoro of the situation. It reads: "Mr. Pres- ident, while you v/ere in Australia we v;ere told on all ' hands that v/e would be faced throughout the trial with competing translations. V/e came to the conclusion that the only way to solve such questions was to s^t up a board of referees. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers appointed one member of the board — nominated one member of the board — the Japanese Government nominated another, and a third was nominated by the prosecution. All three v;ere appointed by the Court. The idea was to appoint an authoritative and Impartial board of experts because it was understood if we allwed competing evidence and competing translations the trial would be prolonged indefinitely and the Judges would have no means of deciding between them and would still have to rely on the decision of the board of experts." In viev; of that decision, I withdraw what I said as to the right of the defense to give evidence 10,475 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 j 11 12 i 13 14 1 15 : 16 j i I 17 I 13 i 19 : 20 ' 21 22 23 24 2T> of competing trrinslr.tions. The defense will be con- fined to r,n arpeal to the board of referees, whose decision will be final. They v;ill go directly to the board of referees instead of making application to the Court for a reference thereto. In other words, they will follow the procedure that I have already out- lined on more than one occasion. Mr. Fihelly. MR. FIHELLY: I will read prosecution exhibit No. 1200; "From: Washington "To: Tokyo "30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST) "Telephone Code. "Transpacific "Radio Telephone. "(NOTE: Following is a Toreliminary condensed version of conversation between Ambassador KLiRUSU and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief YA.'ALIOTO on Sunday night) "KURUSU: 'It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. ijVe received a short one from you, didn't we? V/ell, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one.' (i.e. 10,476 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ! 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ! 22 23 24 25 telegrcm. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposf^ls.) "YAI^AMOTO: 'Yes, I see.' "KURUSU: 'The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.' "YAMAMOTO: 'Is there m y specir-l significance to this?' "KURUSU: 'The newsnapcers hrve made much of the Premier's speech, and it is hoving strong reper- cussions here,' "YAyJUvIOTO: 'Is th^t so.' "KURUSU: 'Yes. It wrs a drastic! statement he made. The newspapers carried large herdlines over it: and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other rersons, but this is the reason the nev/spapers are giving,' "(Pause) "'Unless greater crution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it nuts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must wctch out about those ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr, TAKI.' "YA13AH0T0; 'We are being careful,' "KURUSU: 'Y/e here are doing our best, but these reports are seized unon by the correspondents and the 1 0 , 4 7 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 worst fertures enlarged upon. Please cnution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister thrt we hcd expected to herr something different, some good word, but instead"' ("insiead" it is5 it may be tynogrrphlcr.l) '"but instead we got this.' (i.e. Premier's speech) "(After s pause, KURUSU continues, using voice code) "tXIRUSU: ''hr.t rbout the internel siturtion?' (In Jsprn) "YAMAIiOTO: 'No pcrticulr.r - - (one or two words fcded out) - "KURUSU: 'Are the JpTDrnese-Americcn negoti- ations to continue?' "YAMMOTO: 'Yes,' "KURUSU: 'You were very urgent cbout them before, weren't you; but now you wrnt them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier nnd the Foreign Minister will need to chfnge the tone of their speeches 1111 Do you understand? Please all use more discretion,' "YAMMOTO: 'When will you see them. The 2nd?' "KURUSU: 'Let's see...this is Sundry midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday 10,478 ^ morning here.' 2 "(Pause) '"Actup.lly the rerl T>roblem we r re ud rgrlnst i i 4 is the effects of hrppenings in the South. Zou under- j ^ str.nd don't 7 0 U ? ' ; 6 "YMAMOTO: 'Yes. Yes. How long will it be I -J before the President gets brck?' 8 "KURUSU: 'I don't know exrctly. According c, to news reports he strrted r.t 4:00 this rfternoon. JO He sould be here tomorrov; morning sometime.' 11 "YAiilAIvIGTO: 'Well then — Goodbye.'" 12 Certrin symbols at the left bottom of the 13 pr.ge, the word "secret (M) Krvy trrns. 30 Nov. 1941 14 (R-5)" 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,479 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I'ffi. FliiELLY: As further showing the events which transpired in Japan just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and particularly in connection with the sending and timing of the last note to the United States and to indicate the part that certain of the defendants played in them, v;e v/ill now offer in evi- dence a series of extracts from the interrogation of the defendant TOJO. Vile first offer in evidence International Prosecution document 2505-A, which is an extract from the TO JO interrogation of February 20, 194-6, pages 2, and 5, and we ask that the parent document be marked for identification. CLERK OF TliE COUI-lTs Prosecution's document No. 2505 will receive exhibit No. 1201 for identifi- cation only. (V/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1201 for identification.) THE PRESIDENT: The excerpt is admitted on the usual terras. CLERK OF THE COUl-.T; Prosecution's document No. 2505-A, an excerpt from the foregoing, will re- ceive exhibit No. 1201-A. (^Tiereupon, the document above 10,480 3 4 •5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 I 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1201-A and received in evidence.) MR. FIKELLY: I now read from prosecution exhibit 1201-A, extract from the TOJO interrogation February 20, 194-6, pages 2, 4, and 5? "Q What v/as the date of that last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference of 1st or 2nd of December? "A I think that last Liaison Conference be- fore the Imperial Conference was on the 30th of November. However, as I have said before, I am not sure of the date of the Imperial Conference. I rather think it was the 1st, but it may have been the 2nd. "(pp. 4-5) "Q How many times did the Emperor ask you to be certain that the note was to be delivered before the attack? "A Repeatedly. "Q Can you give us any idea of the number of times? Y.'as it three times, six, a dozen? "A I was going to the Emperor about every other day and he warned me many times about it. "Q What was the earliest date he warned you, as you recall? 10/81 1 3; 41 5 6 7 i 8 ' 9 10 I 11 12 i 14 15 16 I 17 i 18 i I I 19 i 20 21 22 I 23 ! 24 i 25 : "A Ke was always warning !r.e about matters having to do with foreign relations, but I think the first time he v;arned about the delivery of the final note was just after the Imperial Conference of the 1st or 2nd of December 1941. "Q V/as not the Emperor afraid that the actual attack might take place before the note was delivered? "A Yes, he v/as afraid of it. Ee said to be careful to see that it did not happen." For the same purpose v/e now offer in evi- dence International Prosecution document 2513--̂ , which is an extract from the TOJO interrogation of March 18, 1946, pages 1 to 4. \ve ask that the parent document be marked for identification.' CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2513 will be given ejdiibit No. 1202 for identi- fication only. (Vifhereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1202 for identification.) THE'P£.ESIiJENT: The extract is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2513-A, an exccrpt from the fore?-oing, will be given exhibit No. 1202-A. 10,482 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 (Vifhereupon, the document above referred to v/as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1202-A and received in evidence.) Mi. FIHELLY: I now read both pages of prosecution exhibit 1202-A from the TOJO interroga- tion of March 18, 194-6, pages 1 to 4: "Q The text of the final note to America was approved, first by the Liaison Conference, and later bj'- the Cabinet, was it not? "A The gist of it was approved by the Cabinet, but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Minister, Of course, it is my responsibility^ too. "Q Did not also the Liaison Conference first approve the gist of it? "A Yes, of course. They did. TOGO says that he composed the text of that note on a basis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference and that the text, after being written, was peesented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. Is this correct? "A Yes. "Q" After this had happened, the cabinet also approved it, did it not? "A As I recall it, after the Liaison Ei. ifv'' 10,483 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Conference had approved it, the gist of it was given to the Cp.binet by the Foreign Minister, after which they approved it. In any case, if my memory is correct, I do not believe that the text was distributed to all the members of the Cabinet. "Q After TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staff had decided that 1:00 P.M., 7 December 1941, Wash- ington time, was to be the time for the delivery of the final note, this fact was reported to and ap- proved by the Liaison Conference, was it not? "A No. The Liaison Conference, which I was, you might say, head of, delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister the task of setting a time prior to the attack. The three-man com- mittee did not report back to the Liaison Con- ference. I don't remember that the three-man com- mittee reported back to the Liaison Conference on the time. I am reporting to you the facts, but the results of those facts are my responsibility. "(p. 3) "Q Did the Foreign Minister knovi of the time and the day set for the attack? /deferring to the Pearl Karbor attack./ "A Yes, the Foreign Minister kney/ it, too. The President of the Planning Board also knew. " 10,484 4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 "Q As you recall It, the Liaison Conference 2 did not approve the time set for the delivery of 3 the note nor approve of the length of time between the delivery of the note and the attack? 5 "A The Liaison Conference delegated the carry- ^ ing out of this matter to the Foreign Minister and the tv/o Chiefs of Staff and, in that sense only, approved. "(p.4) "Q In addition to the Minister of V.ar and Foreign Minister, were there any other cabinet mem- bers present at the Liaison Conferences immediately preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 194-1? "A I do not remember eractl'.)-, but I suppose that the Commerce and Industry Minister and the Communications Minister attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping v/as in- volved. Of course, the President of the Planning Board and the Navy Minister were also there, "Q Was the Minister of Finance there? "A Yes, he vjas always at Liaison Conference meetings. Those five were always there - War, Navy, Planning Board, Foreign, and Finance Ministers." 10,485 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. FIHELLY: On the same generol subject, we next refer to prosecution exhibit 1158A which is a further extrr.ct from the TOJO interrogation of March 12, 194-6, end rend from pages 3 and 4 of the exhibit, which will be pages 9 and 10 of the interrogation extract: "Q Were there any differences between TOGO and the others relative to this? (Referring to the delivery of the final note to the United States.) "A No, there were not. They were the same — to celiver it before the attack. "Q Was any decision arrived at in the Liaison Conference as to hov; lonr it v/as to be delivered before : the attack? "A I have explained this before. The decision as to the time was not made ct the Liaison Conference. The Supreme Command and the Foreign Minister were to meet together and decide the time v;hich would comply with the diplomatic and also the str-- tegic requirements. "Q '-'rs this delegation of authority decided upon at this same final Liaison Conference? "A Yes. "Q Do you knov; that such meeting or meetings were held pursuant to this delegation of authority? "A No, I don't know. "Q Did you learn what decision had been 10,486 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 r.rrlved in re'gr.rd to timing by these men to whom the r.uthority hr.d been delegated'' "A I did not ler.rn precisely the time set, but it wr.s decided thr-t the Chiefs of Stoff end the Foreign Minister would settle that so as to comply with both the diplomntic nnd military requirements. It WES settled at the Liaison Conference thnt the delivery of the finr.l note would precede the rttnck. (Lr?st sentence of this cnswer reod back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness.)" That is all I intend to read from the inter- rogation. 10,427 D u 1 d 2 & i 3 ! W 4 0 1 5 f 6 7 8 9 1 1 10 11 12; 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 i We next offer in evidence International Prosecution document No, ^^OS-A, which is an extract from the TO JO Interrogation of February 21, 194-6, pages two, three and four and we ask that parent document be marked for identification, CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution^s document No, 2506 will receive exhibit No. I203 for identification only. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No, 1203 for Identification.) THE PRESIDENT: The extract is admitted on the usual terms, CLERK OF T1:E COURT: And prosecution's document No. 2506-A, an' extract therefrom, will receive exhibit No. 1203-A, ^Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1203-A and received in evidence-.) MR. FIHELLY: I now read the entire excerpt consisting of an extract from the TOJO Interrogation of February 21, 1946, pages two, three and four: "Q You and the Gabinet realized, did you not, that the shorter the notice given the United States, the more probability there was of a mishap? 10,488 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "A It can be said so, theoretically, "Q Did you and the cabinet not recognize that as a practical possibility? "A Yes, from the practical point of view, it is also true that the shorter the time allowed, the more chance of a hitch, but it is not enough to leave it at that. Ambassador NOMURA was a very res- ponsible official and we relied upon his carrying out so grave a responsibility perfectly. Also, the Foreign Office had time to study and perfect all phases of the procedure in the light of its great responsibility. "Q V'hy was not the message itself sent sooner to Ambassador KOl'IURA so that there would be sufficient time? "A I can't answer such a question as that* It is a problem for the Foreign Minister. The orders were that the final note was to be surely delivered. Since the Foreign Ministry had such an orderj the question of how or why it was not carried out is a technical one which is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. "Q Did not you and the members of the cabinet ! see the contents of the note before it was sent? i ! "A I heard the gist of it. The cabinet all : 10,489 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 heard it at the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference. "Q Did not you and the cabinet agree with the contents of that message? "A Yes, we did agree. The gist of the note was explained by the Foreign Minister at the Liaison Conference meeting. The whole text was not read and passed about. After the meeting, the matter became the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, "Q This Liaison Conference, at which the gist of the final note was read, was the last one before the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2iid, was it not? "A Yes. "Q And all members present agreed with the substance of the message as it was read to them? "A Yes. "Q Why was it that that message was not sent to NOMURA until practically a week later? "A I can't help it if you keep asking me questions about specific matters like that that were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister, I can't answer them." I read the last page, page three, of the exhibit for identification: 10,490 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 I 20 j 21 22 ; 23 ' 24 25 : "Q You knew the attack was going to be made and approved it, did you not? "A I knew that it was to take place, but I did not approve it because, under the Japane S9 systcnij i approval by the Premier or Minister of War is not called for in a uroblem of command, "Q Regardless of approval, you were in favor of such an attack being made, were you not? "A I thought it would be good if it was successful, I thought that if the Supreme Command was confident of success that it was a good ideai "Q You kneiT; for'̂ E' month or more previous to the attack that Admiral YAMAl/IOTO«s plan for a sur- prise attack on Pearl Harbor had been decided on in case of war with America? "A No, I didn't know about it. In Japan those matters are matters of command. It was a strategic plan, "Neither the government nor the V/ar Minister would know about a Navy operating plan. That is positively the case® Command matters were kept highly secreti They were the most important secrets of all, "Q When did you first know that, in case of war with the United States, Pearl Harbor was to be attacked? 10,491 1 2 3 4 5 t 6 i 7 8 ! I 9 i 10 11 12 i 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "A I learned at the Liaison Conference just before the Imperial Conference. Before that, it was very secret," We next offer in evidence International Prosecution document No® 2504A, containing extracts from the TO JO interrogation of February 19, 194-6, pages one, two, four, five, six, seven, eight and 11, I intend to read it all with the exception of page five which refers to a later matter and will be read at that time, I ask that the parent document be marked for identification, CLERK OF TliE COURT: Prosecution's document No, 2504 will be marked exhibit No. 1204 for identific- ation only, (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No, 1204 for identification-) THE PRESIDENT: The extract is admitted on the usual terms, CLERK OF TEE COURT: Prosecution's document No, 2504A, an extract from the foregoing, will be given exhibit No, 1204-A (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 10,492 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Noo 1204-A and received in evidences) LIE. FIHELLY: I will now read the extract from 1204-A; all with the exception, as I mentioned of page five, which will be read later. Questions from pages one and tv;o extracts; 10,493 1 "Q "ou stated at the last interrogation that 2 Japan felt that, by her final note breaking off dip- 3 loraatic relations, she acquired freedom of action from the standpoint of international treaties. Did she ac- 5 quire the same freedom from the standpoint of inter- ^ national law? ^ "A I think so. "Q Prior to making the attacks on the United States and Great Britain, this whole matter of the re- sponsibility under treaties and under international law had been considered by you and the cabinet? "A Of course, they were. It is important to remember that this matter was the grave responsibili- ty of the Foreign Ministry. "Q Vifhat did the Foreign T.'inistry report to the cabinet on the matters of treaties and inter- national law prior to the cabinet making its decision? "A The Foreign Minister reported only the gist of it to the cabinet. What was done afterwards was the sole responsibility of the Foreign Minister. "Q And the gist of what was reported by the Foreign Minister to the cabinet was that there was nothing in the treaties or international law that pre- 25 vented the attacks on the United States and Great Britain after the last note had been delivered? " 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 10,494 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2J 24 25 "A The whole cabinet attended the Imperial Con- ference on the 1st or 2nd which made the decision for war. Hence, the whole cabinet knew, generally speak- ing, that that decision had been made, since every- one attended, but the problem of how the final note was to be dispatched was a technical question which was handled by the Foreign Minister. "Q Who informed you and the cabinet that there was nothing in any treaty or in International law that would preclude the attack being made on the United States and Great Britain? "A It was the result of my research. We had been challenged and were acting in self-defense. Therefore, I thought that we v/ere not impeded from the standpoint of international law or treaties. "Q Did the cabinet agree with you? "A Yes. They all agreed. "Q Did the Foreign Ministry agree? "A Yes. They also studied the question and agreed. "Q We will read all that back to you to make sure there is no mistake as to the questions and your ansYi/ers, "/This v/as done and the witness agreed as to its correctness./" 10,495 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Q When did you begin to study these matters? "A From the time that the problem arose," 10,496 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 On Page "Q 4t this last Liaison Conference pre- ceding the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, you expressed the same views on international laws and treaties which you arrived at as a result of your studies? "A Yes. "Q So that when the Liaison Conference arrived at a final decision to attack America and Great Britain, they had accepted your views on these matters? "A Yes, of course, they had. "0 Who, in addition to yourself, spoke at that conference, expressing similar views in regard to international laws and treaties? "A The Foreign Minister spoke on this point since he was the one chiefly responsible, and my researches resulted in my agreement with his views. There was no question raised by any other • member present since the responsible officials had 21 22 23 24 2) made that decision. "Q Prior to the attacks on Great Britain and the United States, why was not a declaration of war made to either? "A We thought that when the final note, 25 10,497 1 2 i 4 I 5 ! i 6 ! 7 \ 8 i I 9; 10 i n 12 13 ! i 14 15 i 16 I ] i t ! 18 I I 19 : 20 j 21 i 22 : 23 i 24 25 ' implying a rupture in diplomatic relations, was de- livered, that treaty procedure was finished and that we acquired freedom of action. Especially on the assimption of acting in self-defense in responss to the challenge from the Anglo-American side, we thought that it was particularly appropriate," 10,498 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 io 21 22 23 24 25 "Q How long before the p.cturl rttpck wrs the note to be delivered? "A There were vrrious opinions pdvenced pnd rrgued ebout between the Chiefs of Staff ?nd the Poreifn Minister, There wcs one ider. that the delivery of the note should precede the ?ttrck by ?n honr pnd a half; mother, that it should precedc it by an hour, another, by thirty minutes, and so forth, I do not dearly remember x'jhat was the final decision, "Q But all views -̂ ere to the effect that the hour set for the time of the delivery of the note was to be one that v;ould not interfere with the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? "A It should not interfere with the success of the surprise attack, but also, from the Foreign Minister's point of view, the note had to be deliver- ed before the attack,- "Q But the prim.ary matter was to have the attack ? successful one, "v?s it not? "A Since it was a matter of war, the success of the surprise attack was very important, but also the diplomatic procedures i"ere of great im.portpnce. It was not a nuestion of vihich was most important - they were both extrem.elj'- im-portant. Especially 10,499 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I IS 19 : 20 21 22 23 24 25 since the Emperor hrd c?\itioned -us in regprd to it, the Iftter point nrs important. "Q If the diplomatic procedure "res so iinporttî -t rnd the Emperor hed specificelly cr.iitioned you ?bout it, nhj •'-''PS it not rrrrnged so that more notice would be given to the United States? "A From the standpoint of stretegy, since it vjas war, the necessity for victory hrd to be con- sidered plso, and the possibility of vi ctory was intimately related to the nuestion of time. I was extremely anxious as to the success of this surprise attack. That also was a grrve matter. "0 "̂e will read the answers back to you so there will be no misunderstrndings. "/This was done and the witness agreed that they were correct/." Now skipping page 5 "nd going to page 6: "Q You and the cabinet intended four surprise attrcks to be executed at the same tim.e against possessions of the United States and Great Britain? "A The cabinet did not know. I knew, in my capacity as ̂ .̂'ar Minister. "Q The cabinet did knew that America pnd Great Britain were going to be attacked without warning? " 10,500 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 19 20 "A No. At that time thay and I thought that Ambassador NOIIURA would have delivered the note before the attack. "Q How much notice did you and the cabinet believe that either the United States or Great Britain was going to get in this connection? "A As I explained before, there were various theories as to the amount of time *•• an hour and a half, one hour, thirty minutes, I thought that there would be at least thirty minutes." 21 22 23 24 25 10,501 J We next offer in evidence International ) 2 I Prosecution document No, 2503, which is an extract 3 i from the TO JO Interrogation of February 18, 194-6, 4: pages one to four, and we ask that the parent docu- 5 ment be marked for identification. CLEEK OF TIIE COURT: Prosecution's document 7 No. 2503 will be given exhibit No. 1205 for identification ^: only. ' (Whereupon, the document above ^̂ • referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit i KG, 1205 for identification.) V THE PRESIDENT: The extract is admitted ^̂ ; on the usual terms. ' CLERK OF TtiE COTJRT: Prosecution's document ^̂ No. 2503-A, an extract from the foregoing will be given exhibit No. 1205-A. 17 i I (Whereupon, the document above ]8 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit If i i No. 1205-A and received in evidence.) 20 MR. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution exhibit 21 I No. 1205, an extract from the TOJO Interrogation 22 i ' I of February I8, 1946, and read the entire amount j of extracts contained on page one and two of the 25 I exhibit. , ; "Q Last week I was talking to Admiral 10,502 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 i 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NOMURA and asked him if he considered the final note sent by Japan to the United States a declaration of war. He said that he absolutely did not. Do you agree that it was not? "A I think it was a final note.- It was a final note breaking off diplomatic relations, "Q You have not answered the question,- Do you agree with him that it was not a declaration of war? "A It was a note breaking off diplomatic relations but it was different from a direct declar- ation of war. It was a note breaking off diplomatic relations and, hence, making possible freedom of action. That point is in reference to international treaties. This is an important matter though and this next point also applies. Japan had been challenged militarily and economically by various countries, especially England and America, and her existence was threatened. She exercised the right of self- defense," Three and four extracts: "Q Was not everything connected with this note your responsibility and the responsibility of the Cabinet? "A It was my responsibility and also that 10,503 ^ i 1 7 I I 3 I t 4 j 5 ' 7 i 9 10 I I 12 : I 13 I 14 15 : 16 ; 17 I 18 ; I 19 I 20 : 21 j 22 : i I 23 i I 24 ' 25 of the Foreign Minister, "Q Didn't the cabinet know that the note was to be sent and approve it? "A Yes. They knew about it and of course they approved it, "Q What international treaties were you speaking of in connection with sending the note? "A I am not just sure of the names now. At the time, of course I knew them, but I am not so sure now. Isn't there a Hague Treaty, or something, that applies to these matters? "Q Did not the Hague Convention call for a declaration of war prior to an actual attack? "A I think that if a nation is challenged, it is not restrained from exercising the right of self-defense, "Q You still have not answered the question. I repeat: Did not the Hague Convention call for a declaration of v;ar prior to an actual attack? This is a question that can be answered 'yes', or 'no', or 'I don't know.' "A At that time I studied this matter carefully, but now it is five years later and I have I not the treaty here and I don't remember too v;ell j I abaut it, but I believe that we had freedom of action 10,504 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 under international treaties. "Q In connection with the attack on America and Great Britain did you or the members of the cabinet give any thought to the Kellogg-Briand Pact being violated by Japan? "A Of course, we did, "Q So that you and the members of your cabinet felt that it was necessary to disregard treaty provisions and make the attack on America and Great Britain? "A No, we had regard for them, but we did not feel that we were bound because of the reasons I have mentioned. That applies to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, too, "Q So that you and the members of the cabinet, because of the reasons given, felt that Japan was not bound by any treaty provisions in connection with the attack on tVie United States and Great Britain? "A Yes.!' 10,505 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 f 18 ^ 20 21 22 23 24 25 To shew the viev/s of the defendant TOGO on these same vital matters, we next offer in evidence International Prosecution document 4119, an extract from the TOGO interrogation of Harsh 26, 1946, pages 4 and 7. Tlia PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. I'lR. FIHELLY: And the parent document I kindly ask be marked for identification. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 4119 will receive exhibit No. 1206 for identifi- cation only; and the excerpt therefrom, bearing the same document number, will receive exhibit No. 1206-A. (Wheraupon, prosecution's document No. 4119 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1206 for identification. The excerpt therefrom, bearing the same document number, was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1206-A, and was received in evidence.) IB. FIHELLY: I now read from prosecution exhibit 1206-A, excerpt from the TOGO interrogation of March 26, and read the entire exhibit, pages 1 and 2.1 (Reading) "Q Did you have the prime responsibility for the contents of the final note delivered by KURUSU and NOMLTIA on December 7, Washington time, to Hull? " 10,506 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "A The note was written oy the Foreign Office but in accordance with the views expressed in the discussions in the liaison and other conferences and the note was a general summary of those views. Therefore, the Foreign Office and I, as Foreign Iv'inister, cannot take the responsibility. Further- more, as the matter vms related to the question of war, the high coriimand naturally had to be consulted and various matters discussed with them, in regard to the note. Such being the case, the government alone cannot take the responsibility, for the high command is also connected with the matter. And that being the case, even within the government, I alone as Foreign Minister cannot take sole responsibility on a matter of such supreme or major importance. "Q Would you nam.e the individuals who you would consider as equally responsible with you for the contents of the note. "A All m̂ embers of the liaison conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with this question," The first question on page 2 is this: "Q Did you say anything to the Emperor concerning the telegram from -KURUSU and NOmjRA with respect to President Roosevelt?" 10,507 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 j 1.1 i 12 13 14 15 I 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 Before reading the answer to that question, I -would like to refer to prosecution exhibit 1189, which shows that very wire, in which there is this pertinent part. i "lYe might suggest one thing for saving the | i situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we | might propose, first, that President Roosevelt v/ire . i i you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan j and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance | of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us ' i what 3'-ou think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply v/ith a cordial message, there- by not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time." I repeat the question for elarity: I "Q Did you say anything to the Emperor con- I cerning the telegram from KUHUSU and NOMURA with « I respect to President Roosevelt? ' "A As I recall, I did not mention that ; telegram to the Emperor in that the matter had pre- ^ viously been discussed with both KIEO and TOJO, at which time the opinion was that such a step would not contribute toward the satisfactory settlement of jie^otiations between the two countries, therefore, 10,508 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 i 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 % the matter was not reported to the Throne. Don't you think that the Emperor was entitled to know of such a proposal? "A The Emperor actually was entitled to ask questions on any or all subjects, but in so far as this particular telegram was concerned the general view vi/ithin the government v̂ as that it was not of a nature that would contribute to a settlement and that, such being the case, it was not worth putting so much weight to and so it was not brought up to the Emperor," For the same purpose, we now offer in evidence International Prosecution document 4115, an extract from the TOGO interrogation of March 11, 1946, pages 1 to 6. We ask that the parent document be marked for identificption, CLERI-: OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 4115 will be given exhibit No. 1207 for identifi- cation only. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1207 for identification.) THE PRESIDENT; The extract is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURTS The excerpt therefrom, bearing the same document number, will receive 10,509 1 2 5 4 5 6; 7 8 9 ! 10 i 11 12 I 13 14 15 I 16 17 : 18 I 19 i 20 2 1 j 22 23 24 25 i exhibit No. 1207-A. (Wheroupon, tha document above referred to v̂ as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1207-A, and Vi/as received in evidence.) IB.. FIIIELLY; I now read prosecution exhibit 1207-A, extracts from the TOGO interrogation of March 11, 194-6, and v;ill read the entire exhibit. "Q '''7ho ¥;ould be considered responsible, who vjould vou consider responsible for the composition of that note? "A That notification, as I have previously axplainec, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note Itself vras written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for tne c^'mposition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter v/as also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection. Could you give me the names of the indi- viduals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet mem.bers who would be considered responsible for the 10,510 ^ ̂ ontonts of the note? 2 "A As I have said at a previous meeting, 2 members of a liaison conference who vi/ere responsible 4for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, 5 ̂ HIMDA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUI'CADA, ITO, EAYA, SUZUKI, 6 and the three secretaries, HOSHINO, UUTO and OKA. 7 i.s to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitu- 8 9 11 12 iion they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, jven on matters outside of the competence of their !0 :'espectivo offices. "Q I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain hac been decided upon at 14 1.5 16 (7 1,8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it ?;as presented for approval to the Cabinet on L* e cem.bor 1, L941, at which time the Cabinet apDrovod it. Is my understanding correct? "A The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should nice to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, 10,511 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (3 14 !5 16 17 15 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 previous to tho Imperial Confercnca th3 main points of the note to bo sent \7erc reported to the Cabinet 5 but as to the draft-ing of the note, that came af teri/ards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points v/ere further explained and the continuation of the expla- nation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seoms to be around Movent) er 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirnied later. "Q From ŷ hat you have stated would you consider^that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, ivhose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible vi/ith you as regards to the contents of tho note and its delivery? "A As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all tho members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they \̂ ould have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depencs whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to vie?/ it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a differcnoc in tho degree of responsibility by tho liaison conference and 10,512 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the CabinGt because not all the CcLblnot members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever vias approved by the liaison conference v;as approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility. "Q, Who knevj and approved of the details con- cerning the manner of the delivery of the note? "A As to the delivery of the note, instruc- tions vrere sent previously to the Embassy in ''-ashing- ton stating that it was to be delivered at IsOO FM, December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the , specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding; the sending of such instructions, all mem- bers of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it v;as approved as a matter of course." I will not read page 4. I see now it relates to another matt-r. Tl-IE KESILSNT j This is a convenient break,. •7e will adjourn until half past one. (Thereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.) G 0 1 d b e r g & S P r t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal net, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL CF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed, THE PRESIDENT: I!r. Fihelly. Iffl. FIHELLY: We bad reached, Mr. President and Menbers of the Tribunal, the date, December 1, 19^1, Just before lunch. To show that there was a meeting of elder statesmen held ;3ust prior to Decenber 1st, we next refer to Court exhibit 1158-A, which is an extract from the TOJO interrogation of March 11, 194-6, and read pages 6 t o 8 of the interrogation from pages 1 to 2 of this exhibit. (Reading): "Q, When and why v:o.s o meeting of ex-preniers held Drior to the last Imperial Conference cf 1 Decem- ber 1941? "A. You nean the Senior Stntcsnen? "Q. Yes. "A. Thrt wrs convened by the Enperor. "Q. When? "A. It vras either on the 1st or the 31st, "Q. if̂Tiat was the rjurncse cf calling thrt meeting?" I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "A, The Enoeror vras very cnxlrus Pbrut the questicn of war vrith Anericr nnd he crnvened then In rrder tr herr erch ncn's opinion, "Q. I'Tio Drcsided nt thct neeting? "A. Let's see - those were FAKATSUKI, OKADA, Senjuro HAYASHI , YONAI, Mobuyuki ABE, KONOYE, HIRAmHA. "Q, Ycu still hrve net rnŝ vered vrhc Drcsided, "A. I thjnk perhr.ps VAKATStJKI presided. I don't really know, "Q, Did yru "rke r.ny str.tcnents at that meeting? "A. Of course,I was there^too, as the Prenier at that tine. Yes, I did. The Enoeror v;as there and heard each nan's opinion in turn. I vras there and fron tine to tine SDoke, giving the governncnt's point of view, "Q, '̂Tiat did yen str-tc as the governrcnt's point of viev/? "iL. I explained various things, but I don't re- ncribcr the details now. I explained the inevitableness of war, "Q. Did the Ena ror nako any statcnent at all at th't neeting? "A, No, he only listened. This v/as not a con- ference, It was only that the Enneror wished to hear the opinion of each nan," 10,515 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Did ycu express your cplnicn before any of the others expressed theirs? "A. It ^̂ es this wny: The Amy, Nr.vy rnd For- eign Ministers, President rf the Cabinet Planning Borrd, and I, as Prenier, net vrith the Senior States- nen in the norning and explained the situation to then. Then after a Court din̂ êr with the Enoeror, the forner Preniers and I net with the Enoeror ?/ho heard erch nan's ODinion in turn. The other cabinet nenhers '̂ ere not nrescnt at that tine, only I fron the governnent. There was one other forner Prenier nresent HI ROT A." io,5I6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The rest of the Interrogstion covers matters which were generally covered this morning with respect to the final note and liaison conference, I will not read it* Yfe next offer in evidence as tending to show that Japan did rot want the United States to know the>real status of the negotiations, Inter- national Prosecution Document No. 2593-D-26, the wire of December 1st from Tokyo to Washington. THE PRESIDENT: .-dnitted on the usual terras. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2593-D-26 will receive exhibit No. 1208. ('Afhereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1208 and received in evidence.) Iffi. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution ex- hibit No. 1208, headefl "SECRET". (Reading): "From: Tokyo, To: Washington. "1 December 1941 "(Purple-CA) "#865 "Re m.y "1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increas-'ngly critical. Hoŵ -̂ver, to prevent the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 i 24 25 i United States fro!7) beco'̂ .̂lng unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only vour information.) "2. 'lie have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to ToVyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only. "3. There are reports here that the Pres- ident's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier TOJO's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investi- gations into this matter." Marked "SECRET" below. In connoction with translation data, "(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)." We next read from prosecution exhibit No. 1107, the data which appears at the end, page as to the attendance at the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941; 10,-^18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 F 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 "TOJO TOGO SEMXK Ki.YA SUZUKI IIASIIIDA I NO KISMI TLULSllllU. KOIZUMI • SUGIYAliA NAGANO HOSHINO I,!UTO OKA TANAEL ITO EIM- Friirie Minister -nd W?.r Mjnister Conciirrentl3̂ Foreign Minister Nfv̂ r Minister Finrnce Minister President of Fl?nninp Ecrrd Jr.stice Minister I'dncFtion Minister Agricfilture Minister Coinnerce Minister Coiran'unicrticn Minister V/plfere Minister Chief cf Amy General Strff Chief of Nfv?.1 Generel Stpff Chief Secretrry of the Crbinet Director of Military Affrirs Btirepii, Ministry Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Nrw Ministry Vice-Chief of Army General Staff Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff -"resident of Privy Council" 10,519 2 i 3 i 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 likewise refer to Court exhibit No. 588 in connection \vith the Imperial Conference of 1 Dece'̂ ber 1941, and read the last page of that document which relates to that particular Imperial Conference, page 8. (Reading): "RESOLUTION adopted through the Iipperial Conference on December 1, 1941. "Our negotiations with the United States repardinp the execution of our national policy- adopted on November 5 have finallv failed. Japan will declare war or the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands." To give the defendant TOJO's version of v/ho attended the Iipperial Conference of December 1, 1941, we next offer in evidence International Pros- ecution Document No. 2500-A, which is an extract from the TOJO interrogation of February 8, 1946, page 2; and we ask that the parent document be marked for identification. CLERK OP THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2500 will be given exhibit No. 1209 for identi- fication only. (•"'hereupon, the document above mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1209 for identification only.) 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: The extract is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2500-A, the excerpt therefrom, will be given exhibit No. 1209-A. (iVhereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1209-A and received in evidence.) MR, FIHELLY: I now read prosecution exhibit No. 1209-A, extract from the TOJO interrogation of February 8, 1946, page 2, which appears on page 1 of the exhibit: "Q Who attended the Imperial Conference on December 1st or 2nd, 1941? "A I was there as Premier; the President of the Privy Council was there, and all or nearly all of the other Cabinet Ministers, as I recall. The two Chiefs of Staff were there. I am not sure wheth- er the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were there or not, but the Cabinet would know. Those were the respon- sible people that were there. There were also probably three other persons in the capacity of secretaries for these three usually came to Imperi- al Conferences. The three were the Chief Cabinet secretary, Mr, HOSHINO; the Chief of the Military • 10,521 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Affairs Section of the War Minister, Mr. Sho I'lUTO, who was then a Major General, I believe. (At the end of the war, he was General YAI14SHITA's Chief of Staff); and the Chief of the Military Affairs Section ! of the Navy Ministry, Vice Admiral OKA. These last three are according to my recollection. I am not | positive that they were there..." 10,522 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 To give tba accused TOJO's version of who presided at that Imperial Conference and the purpose for which it ?;as called, v/e now quote from prosecution exhibit No. 1153-A, pages 2 and 3 of the Interrogation, page 1 of the exhibit; "Q Vi/ho presided at the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, 1941? "A I did, as Prime Minister. The others were seated down both sides of the table in accordance with their court rank, "Q Did you state the purpose of the meeting or was it knovm by them before they came to the meeting? "A Of coursejl explained the purpose of the meeting at the very first. After I had explained the purpose of the meeting, each of the ministers and the two Chiefs of Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of his own responsibilities," 10,523 1 2 3 4 5 6 : 7 8 1 i 9 10 I 11 12 i I 13 14 I 15 ! i 16 j •17 i 18 i 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 To again shov; that war -î'lth the United States was definitely decided on at this Imperial I Conference although the fleet had sailed on November 26th, we next offer in evidence an entry from the KIDO Diary of December 1, 19^1, International Prosecution Document No. 1632-7^-38. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COUl̂ T: Prosecution's document No. 1632-W-88 will receive exhibit No. 1210. ("'/Tiereupon̂ the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's "̂ xhTbit No. 1210 and received in evidence.) IIR. FIHELLY: I now read from prosecution's exhibit No. 1210, extract from KIDO's Diary, 1 Decembei 1941: "...At 2 p.m. the Council in the presence of the Emperor was held and at last the war between « Japan and the U.S.A. was decided UDon. At 4:30 p.m. the Premier visited me to consult about the Imperial Proclamation of '"ar." v/e next offer in evidence International Prosecution Document No. 2593-D-30, the wire of December 2nd from TOGO to NOKURix to show the last- minute steps taken by TOGO and the Foreign Office preparatory to going to war. 10,524 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 i 16 I 17 i 18 I 19 20 21 ' 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: Adirltted cn the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 2593-D-3O will be given exhibit No. 1211. ("•hereupon, the document above re- ferred to v̂as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1201 and received in evidence.) in, FIHELL^: I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1211: "From: Tokyo (TOGO:),'' "To : Havana "December 2, 1941 "J15-K9 "Circular #2445 "Strictly Secret. "Take great pains that this does not leak out. You are to taKe the following measures immedia- tely: "1. With the exception of one copy of the 0® and L^ code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication, "2, As soon as you have completed this operation wire the one word Haruna. "3. Burn all secret documents and the work 10,525 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 sheets on this message, "4. Be especially careful not to erouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential docu- ments are all to be given the same handling. "The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm , "Also sent to ©tta^a, "̂ /ancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Henolulu, Seattle and Portlandc Marked "SBCRBT" at the bottom. "Trans. 12/8/41 (3)" 10.526 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 to 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 21 22 23 24 25 Tc shoY/ other steps taken by the accused TOGO, at this time vie now offer in evidence International Prosecution Section Document No. 1532-D-ll, a wire of December 3rd to NOI/IURa from TOGO. THE PRESIDENT'. Adr̂ itted on the usual terms. GLEnK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1532-D-ll will be given exhibit No. 1212. (•'/hereupon, the document above re- ferred tc was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1212 and received in evidence.) I.IR, FIHELLY: I novi read prosecution's exhibit No. 1212: "Telegram No. 87—" looks like "5" or "6", I can't make out the last number— (Ambassador Code) - "To: Ambassador NOKUHA (Washington, U.S.A.) "From: Foreign Minister TOGO "Despatched 3 Dec. 1941, 9:00 P.M. "T!ost Urgent. "Re:-American-Japanese Negotiations. "Referring to your telegram No. 1232, we request that vou will respond to the American side with the following purport: "'"'e consider the rumor concerning the increase and streng^-hening of our troops in French Indo-China 10,527 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to be caused from reports exaggerating the facts of our increasing and strengthening of troops, in parts of northern French Indo-China, providing against Chinese troops which have been ĉ r̂rying on repea-ed activities recently on the French Indo-China and China borders; and, that in connection with this, of the troop movements of the southern area which was just natural. have never crossed the limits of the Franco-Japanese Joint Defense Protocol." THE PRESIDENT: That telegram number is 875 according to my copy. 10,-̂ 528 1 2 3 4 5 I 6 7 8 9 i 10 11 12 i 13 14 15 16 17 i 18 i 19 ! 20 21 22 I 23 24 i i 25 ! We next offer in evidence International Prosecution document No. 2593~D(34-), a telegram of December 3rd from NOMURA to TOGO answering the last TOGO wire. NOMURA, in this document, expresses strong satisfaction with the wire and asks for a reply which would give some indication of Japan's peaceful Intentions. THE PRESID3IW; Admitted on the usual terms. CLEHK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2593--D(34) will receive exhibit No. 1213. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prtssecution's exhibit No, 1213 and received in evidence,) I®. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 121?: "SECRET" rt top "From: Vif?shington (Non-ure) "To : Tokyo "December 3, 1941 "Purple (Urgent) "#1256 "Re your 875̂ .̂ "I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultstions and profound consideration. The United States Governm.ent is attaching a great deal 10,529 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of importrnce on this re-ply. Es'^ecially "̂ ince the Prepident issued his strtenent yesterdey, it is being riincred einonf the joiirnrlists that this rerl3̂ is to be the kejr deciding î 'hether there -p̂ ill be wer or --erce between Jrp?n ?.nd the United Strtes. There is no spying but whrt the United Stetes Governnent i7ill tpke e bold step depending î pon how our reply is nrde. If it is replly the in- tention of our government to errj.ve rt e settle- ment, the expl?nrtion you give, I em rfrpid, i"ould neither setisfy them, nor -orevent them trking the bold step referred to - even if your revly is m.rde for the mere --'urpose of keê îng the negotiptions' going. Therefore, in view of Tr̂ hpt h?.s been eluci- dated in our ttot^ospI ^̂ hich I subm.itted to the President on IvTovemiber 10th, I would like to get e reply ?'hich gives ? cleprer impression C'f our pepceful intentions. V'in jrou, therefore, recon- sider this PLiestion vith this in m.ind pnd ^ire me pt once." Footnote, -"Exiol?nption of Jrppn's increpse of their forces in French Indo-Chin?," "SECr^T" At the bottom "Trpns. 12/7/41 (l)." 10,530 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 V/e nex"- offer in evidence Internaticnal Prosecution Document No. 2593-D-35, a fron ToVyo to Hsinking of December 4th to show st this time the I'̂ snchouVuo Government v/ns being controlled and directed by Japan. THE PRESIDENT: Ad̂ '-itted on the usual terras. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 2593-D-35 v'ill be given exhibit No. 1214. ('•ITiereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1214 and received in evidence.) IIP.. FIEfELLY: I now read from prosecution's exhibit No. 1214; "From; Tokyo "To: Ksinking "December 4, 1941 "Purple "#909 "(Strictly Secret.) "Re my 7-892.® "On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, decided upon steps which we will have ."anchukuo take in case the inter- national situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my 7^873®our policy was changed as follows: 10,531 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 " '"'Tnen the Japanese Empire commences hostili- ties, for the tine being Manchukuo -vill not partfci- pp.te. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United Sta'-es and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly.' "'^arever 'England and the United States' and 'English and Americans' occur in the text, vie changed them to 'England, the United States, and the Netherlands' and 'English, Americans and Nether- landers.' " Footnote "Not available," the vord "Japanese" in parentheses, "Trans. 12/11/41 (5)." We next offer in evidence International Prosecution Document No. 220-J, a statement handed to the Secretary of State on December 5th by N O M A to show that Foreign rinlster TOGO'S former instructions, ,iust re-̂ d to the Court within a fê v minutes, were carried out in ̂ '̂ ashington. THE PRESIDENT; admittf-d on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 22^-J will be given exhibit No. 1215. ("''hereupon, the document above 10,532 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 r'<-ferrec! to '"as marlcnd prosGCutlon's exhibit No. 1215 find received ir pvldence.) !"J-l. FIHELLY: I now rend prosecution's exhibit No. 1215, extract from Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-194-1, Volume II, page 784: "Statement handed by the Japanese Ambassa- dor CNOLiURĴ to the Secretary of State on December 5, 1941. "Reference is made to your enquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with re- gard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-Cbina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows: "As Chinese troops have recently shown fre- quent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precaution- ary measures, ha'̂'-e been reinforced to a certain ex- tent in the northern part of French Indo-China. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been mode of these move- ments. It should be added that no measure has been 10,533 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France." 10,534 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ! 12 i 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Te next o ff̂ r̂ in evidence Internaticnal Prosecution Document No. 1532-D-12, a telcgrsm of December 6th fron TCGC to NOi'̂ URA to show the detailed steps ?jĥ 'ch ̂ njere taken by the Japanese Government in connection with transmitting its final and last note to the TJnn^d States. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK CF THE COITRT; Prosecution's document No. 1532-D-12 v;ill receive exhibit No. 1216. (''/hereupon, th<̂- document above re- ferred to marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1216 and received in evidence.) I>IR. FIHELLY: I noxv read prosecution's exhibit No. 1216: "Cipher Telefrem No, 901 (ijnbassador' s Code) "Sent: December 6, 1941 8:30 p.m. "To: .Embassador NO!fURA in U. S. i... "From: Foreign Minister TOGO (6th of Dec.. 1941) "In reference to: Outgoing Telegram No. 844 "1) Tl-e government has given careful delibera- tion in the Imperial presence to the proposal of the U.S. of the 26th of NOV. c?nd has decided upon the m.emorandum to America (in English) as per telegram No. 902. "2) It is possible that the receipt of the said 10,535 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 neî oranclun in its entirety (to be telefra-nhed in 14 parts), will be delayed till to-̂ .orrov; ?s it is long. However, ps the situation at present is exceedingly delicate, it is hoped that the receipt of it will be ker-t strictly confidential for the tine being. "3) Although the exact tire for rresenting the said nenorandun to ^̂ nerica will be telef̂ rar̂ bed later, all necessaî ŷ preparations, such as arranging docu- nents, etc., should be -i.ade, upon receirt of the said nenorandun, for presentation to /nerica, so that it can be ca'-ried out as soon as instructions for such action is received." 10,536 For the saire purpose Twe now offer in evi- dence International Prosecution Document No. 1532-D- 13, a \7ire of December 6th, 194-1 from TOGO to 4 NOHURA. 5 THE P^3SIDENT: Adr̂ itted on the usual terms. 6 CLSRK 0? THE COURT: Prosecution's document 7 No. 1532-D-13 will receive exhibit No. 1217. 8 ("'hereupon, the document above re- 9 ferred to xvss marked prosecution's exhibit 10 No, 1217 '̂ n̂d received in evidence.) 11 IIH. FIHELLY: I vjill now read prosecution's 12 exhibit No. 1217: 13 "Cipher Telegram No. 904 (ilmbassador's Code) "Sent: December 6, 19^1. 11:00 p.m. 15 "To: Arpbassador NOI'UHA In U. S. A. "From: Foreign I'inister TOGO (6th of Dec. 1941) "In reference to: Outgoing telegram No. 902 "Although it is not necessary to give th^s caution, Tve trust that you v̂ill leave nothing to be desired in keeping the memorandum strictly confi- dential, by absolutely avoiding the use of 'typists' etc. in its preparation," y'e now offer in evidence International Prosecution Document No. 2593-0-39, being a telegram 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,537 1 2 I 3 i 4i i 5 i j 6 : 7 i 8 ; 9 10 ! 11 12 i 13 1 14 I I 16} I 17 i 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Of December 7th from TOGO tc NOMURA to show the timing of the delivery of the last note as it related to Pearl Harbor attack. ^HE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2593-D-39 will be given exhibit No. 1218. ("Tiereupon, the document above re- ferred to Vv'as marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1218 and received in evidence.) JrlH. FIHELLY: We now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1218: "TOP SECRET "From: '̂ rkyo "To: T/ashington "December 7, 19^1 "Purplp (Urgent - Very Important) " # 9 0 7 . To be handled in government code. "Re my #902.^ "'"ill the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (If possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time." Note below "TOP SECRET, Trpins. 12/7/41 (s)" 25 1 10,538 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We next offer in evidence International Prosecution document No, 25'93-D(38), with respect to wire of December 7th sent from the Tokyo Foreign Office tending to show the preparations which had been made and orders given to take over British and other properties in China on the opening of hostili- ties and particularly indicating that the Nanking Government was being directed and given vital orders by the Japanese Government. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms, CLSEIK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2593-D(38) will receive exhibit No. 1219. ('^hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's ê diibit No. 1219 and received in evidence. ) ra. FIHELLY: I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1219: "From Tokyo. "To: (Circular) "7 December-1941 "(Purple) "Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available). "In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy 10,^39 6 I I 1 regarding the China affair, which was decided on at 2 ; the liaison :!onference held on November 13th, the ' following steps v̂ ill be taken in China: "(1) British concessions - upon issuance of orders, the present force will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort v;ill b e made to accomplish this and through the instrumentality of existing set-ups. "(2) Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation compounds: Upon Issuance of orders, our troops will take over these groundsj however, without exceeding their present strength they v̂ ill make every effort to maintain order and avnid causing confusion. 17 18 20 21 : i 22 ; 23' 24 i of the existing set-ups and their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies, "(3) Am.oy settlement: The same procedure as the above will be employed," Bottom of page, the word "SECRET," With respect to translation, "(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)." 10,540 G 1 r e 2 e n 3 b e 4 r g 5 & 6 B 7 a r 8 t o 9 n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Part 2 reads as follows, the same heading as has been read for part 1: "Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nan- king government will not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain close rela- tions and absolute cooperation with Janan. "(10) In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale and organiza- tion so that it may help alleviate Japan's burden in participating in a protracted world war, "(11) Steps will be taken to propagate among the people through the cooperation of the Nan- king Government, the true meaning of the present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order am.ong the general public. "(12) Regarding economic plans in China, i with a view to retaining and increasing mutual eco- nomac self-sufficiency, the emphasis will be placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicita- tion of local capital and investments, increased production of comm.odities.. For this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of. "Note: Those departments in the above category which are connected with the Nanking Govern- 10,541 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 rcent will continue to maintain even closer contact with that government." At the bottom: "SECRET (A) Navy Trans, 12-8-41 (6-AR)." TliE PRESIDENT: That is headed "Part 3 of 3, Part 2 not available." MR. FIHELLYj It was just called to my atten- tion. The heading on page 2 is: "Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)-." International Prosecution document l632-Yif-S9, an entry of December 7 from the KIDO Diary, is next offered in evidence as additional evidence of the part that the defendants KIDO and HOSHINO were play- ing in the fateful events of these days. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1632-W-89 will be given exhibit No. 1220. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No, 1220 and received in evidence.) m , FIÎ IELLY: I now read prosecution exhibit No. 1220: "Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 7 December '41. "Decem-ber 7th, 1941 (Extract) 10,5^2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 I 23 24 i 25 "At 9s30 p.m. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, visited me to consult about the war with the U.S.A. and England." lo a final nove to avoid war, President Roosevelt on December 6 cabled a personal appeal for peace to the Emperor of Japan. That message will be treated in detail in the testimony of Mr. Ballantine. As showing the exact manner in which this particular cable was sent b" President Roosevelt, we offer in evidence International Prosecution document No. 220-1, a brief message of December 6 from Presi- dent Roosevelt to Secretary of State Hull. THE RESIDENT: Admitted on the usual term-?. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220-1 will receive exhibit No. 1221. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to vîas marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1221 and received in evidence.) Iffl. FIEELLY: I nov/ read prosecution exhibit No. 1221: "Extract from Foreign Relations of the United States - Japan 1931-4-1, Vol. 11, page 784: "President Roosevelt to the Secretary of I State. The Vlliite House, Washington (December 6, 1941;.! Dear Cordell: Shoot this to Grew - I think it can go 10,543 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in gray code - saves time - I don't mind if it gets picked up. "F.D.R." Ivlr. President, at this time there are a series of documents which will be introduced in evidence by Brigadier Nolan, THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan. I BRIGADIER NOLAN: May it please the Tri- bunal, at this point the precise tim.ing of events becomes of such importance, and the confusion due to the difference in nominal tim.es at different places so great that we have prepared a synchronized time chart. This docum.ent has not in itself any evi- dentiary value, except in so far as each item of it is separately proved by the prosecution. It is a convenient sumroar" of the whole, is IPS document No, 2665, v̂ hich I now offer in evidence. TIIE PRESIDENT: I.ir, Logan. M , LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, this docuiT:ent m̂ ight more properly be used on a suimr.ation of the case, but I do not think it should be intro- duced as having any evidentiary value at this tim.e. It also contains some conclusions of events, for example, No, 6, which I do not think is proper, THE PRESIDENT: You said this would have no 1 0 , 5 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 value unless every item was proved as to particulars. BRIGADIER NOLANs Yes. m x°RESIDf:NT: There is no objection to it in those circuinstances. Admitted on the usual terns. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 2665 will receive exhibit No. 1222. (Vi/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1222 and received in evidence.) BFIGADIIR NOLAN: I now read from exhibit 1222. It is entitled "TBI CHART "for December 6, 7, 8, 1941." It is divided under headings: "TOKTO TIM PLACE LOCAL TIIiE EVENTS December "1. 7th 0940 Washington 1940 - 6th American Press told telegram going to Emperor. "2. 7th 1000 l/mshinpton 2000 - 6th Mr. Hull cables Mr. Grew that telegram on way. "3. 7th 1100 Washington 2100 - 6th Mr. Hull sends President's message to Emperor to Mr. Grew; both Mr, Hull's cables marked 'Triple Priority.' By President's order message sent 1 2 3 4 in easily decipherable code, "4. 7th 1200 Tokyo 1200 - 7th President's message received in Tokyo. "5. 7th 1500 Tokyo 1500 - 7th U.S. Radio 5 announces a message on the way. ^ "6. yth 1800 Tokyo l800 - 7th By this time at latest contents of message known in Japan- g ese Government offices. 9 "7. 7th 2230 Tokyo 2230 - 7th Mr. Grew 10 gets the message from Mr, Hull. 11 "8. 8th C015 Tokyo 0015 - 8th Mr. Grew 12 sees Foreign Minister TOGO, reads message to 13 him., asks for appointment to deliver it 14 personally to the Emperor, and goes hom_e. 15 "9. 8th 0045 Shanghai 2345 - 7th The Shang- hai Bund (International Settlement) occupied 16 by Japanese troops, "10. 8th 0140 Kota Bahru 2400 - 7th British^ beach defenses shelled from the sea. "11. 8th 0200 Washington 1200 - 7th Mr. NOrJRA asks to see Mr. Hull at 1300 hours. "12. 8th 0205 Kota Bahru 0025 - 8th Japanese landing at Kota Bahru in Northern Malaj'-a." THE PRESIDENT: Does that continue to be the same local time? No. 12 — read the line across, 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,546 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There inaj'- be a mistake in the paper: The difference between "0205" and "0025." BRIGADIER NOLAN: There is a difference, I think, of almost two hours between Tokyo and Eota Bahru. THE PRESIDENT?. You said they were the same, but I cio not think you mean that, Brigadier. Look at No.- 10. BRIGADIER NOLAN; I say they are not the same because item No. 10 shows a difference in the tvro times. I will have to have that translated, Mr. President, in the correct.time in Kota Bahru. The difference, Mr. President, lies in the difference in date. In the earlier item. No. 10, it will be observed that "0140, Tokyo" was "2400" on the 7th in Kota Bahru. In the result, Kota Bahru is one hour and forty m.inutes ahead of Tokyo, TIIE PRESIDENT; The difference between mid- night and Is40. BRIGADIER NOLAN: (Continuing to read) "TOKYO TII^ PLACE L0Ci.L TIIZ EVENTS Decem̂ ber "13. 8th 0300 Washington 1300 - 7th Mr. NOMURA asks for postponement of meeting with Mr. Hull to 1345 hours. " 10,547 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1& 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "14. 8th 0305 Singora 0125-8th About this time at Singora and Patani in Southern Siam, Japan- ese landed and advanced towards Malayan border. "15. 8th 0320-25 Pearl 0750-55 7th Attack at Harbor Pearl Harbor. '̂ 16. 8th 040^ Washington 1405 - 7th Mr. MOIILT.A arrives at Mr. Hull's office. "17. 8th 0420 Washinr^ton 1420 - 7th Mr. NOMURA •hands Mr. Hull document No. 2215 N, the docu- ment terminating negotiations. "18. 8th 0520 Shanghai 0420 - 8th H.M.S. Peterel sunk with casualties, " 1 9 . " is withdrawn, My Lord, from this chart. "20. 8th 0610 Singapore 0430 - 8th Air Raid on Singapore. "21. 8th 0700 Tokyo 0700 - 8th Tokyo Radio gives fir<̂ t announcem.ent that hostilities have begun. "22. 8th 0730 Tokyo 0730 - 8th Mr. Grew calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his re- quest and TOGO hands him. copy of docurient handed by Mr. NOMURA to Mr. Hull, -describing it as Fmperor's answer to President's mes- sage. / " 2 3 . 8 t h 0800 Tokyo 0800 - 8 t h Sir Robert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 ; 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 I 17 i I 18 I 19 20 CraigiG calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and is handed a copy of the same document. "24. 8th 0805 Guam 0805 - 8th Guam attacked. "25. 8th 0900 Hong Kong O8OO - 8th Hong Kong attacked^ Between Between "26. 114-0 and 1200 Tokyo 1140 & 1200 Imperial Rescript issued." The first stage in the proof of this chart is to show how the times are synchronized, for which I offer in evidence IPS document No. 2581. This not only shows how the times on the chart are converted from local time to Tokyo tire, but will enable the Tribunal to convert for themselves any timed event at any one of the material places into the time at any other. Items, 1, 2, 3, 11, 13, 16 and 17 on the chart will be proved by Mr. Ballantine. 21 THE PBESIDE^T; This last dociunent is ad- 22 mitted on the usual terms. 23 CLERK OF THE COUFT: Prosecution's document 24 No. 2581 will receive exhibit No. 1223, 25 (Whereupon, the docum.ent above re- ! ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 10,549 No. 1223 and received in evidence.) BRIGADIIR NOLMs Exhibit 1223 is an affi- 3 davit of Philip Earl Sanders, Chief Boatswain's Mate, ^ United States Wavy, "now attached to the Internation- al Prosecution Section of S.C.A.P., being duly sworn, depose and say that I am qualified in Navigation and have r.ecentlv exc.mined United States Navy Hydro- graphic Time Tables. "I have examined the variations in time be- tween t)laces narked on the first line of the attached Time Table and sav that ther are accurately set out. I have, by arithmetical calculations, prepared the said Time Table for the 24 hours of December 8th, 1941, Tokyo Tim.e, and these calculations are, to the best of m.y knowledge and belief, true. Varia- tions in time for any oth^r date can be calculated accordingly," Signed "Philip Earl Sanders, "Chief Boatswain's Mate, "United States Navy. 22 I "Subscribed and sworn 23 to before m,e this I 24 i 8th day of August, 1946 25 "Harr jTEan Dorsey " C a p t a i n , JAGD." 5 6 7 8 9 10 i 12 : 13 ! i 14 ; 15 16 I 17 i 18 19 20 21 10,550 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The docmient itself is described as a com- parative time table based on Tokyo, proceeding east- ward on 7 to 8 December. At the top of the document it will be ob- served that there are certain localities or places set out. They are: "Tokyo, Pearl Harbor, Washington, Greenwish, Bangkok, Kota Bahru and Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Manila." It will also be observed that each hour is divided into five-m.inute periods. I will not take up thQ time of the Tribunal in reading this docum̂ ent which has been prepared according to the m.athematical calculations for the assistance of the Court. THE PRESIDENTS Major Furness. MFi. FURI'^SS: May the defense inquire whether the man who prepared this chart is in Tokyo and vi/ill be called for cross-examination? (Whereupon, a discussion was had off the record by the Members of the Tri- bunal. ) THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us any reason for calling him for cross-examination? r.©o FURNESS: Just to inquire whether these are based on any international tim.e belts or based on geographic calculations, I notice that in the 10,551 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 preceding exhibits most of the different times are exact hours apart, "but in Kota Bahru particularlj'- it was not hours apart but hours and some odd minutes. In other words, ?;hether it is based on geographical calculations or on specific time belts on which people would a^ree. THE PBESIDEIW: For the time being, the Court can see no good reason for calling him. MR. FURKESS; Could we inquire whether he is in Tokyo so that, if he is, we can talk with him? • BRIGADIER NOLM: I have made inquiries, Mr. President, and he is not in Japan. We now offer in evidence IPS document No. 2405, an affidavit of Mr. Grew, one time the United States Am.bassador to Tokyo, which, in our submission, proves item.s 4, 5, 7, 8 and 22 of the time chart marked as exhibit 1222. THE PRESIDENTs Admitted cn the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docum.ent No. 2405 will receive exhibit 1224. (V/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1224 and received in evidence.) BRIGADIER NOLAN: I now read exhibit No. 10,552 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1224 ORitting tho preamble. "Tovm of Manchester, ) County of Essox, - ' ' ) Comromvealth of Massachnsetts , ) United States of Aiaerica. ) ss. "15 JCSEPK CLARK GREW, boin? drO.y sworn^ cn rr.thj denrse ^nd say; "1. I lA'as in Japan es nnited States Ambas- sador fron 6 Jrne 1932 to 25 Jv.ne 1942. At abmit 1500 hours in the afternoon on 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time) it WES announced by a radio station in the United States that the President of the I'nited States had sent a message to the Emeror of Janrn, but no jnforniation was piven as to its substance or the channel of trans- mission. "2. At about 2100 hours (Tokyo time) there was delivered to me a telepiî am, marked ' triple priority,' from Ilr. Co3?dell Full which had bean disnstched at 200© hou.rs on 6 December ("•"•ashington time) an:"! received in Tokvo 7 DecGmbel- (Tokyo time) stating that a telegram was then being encoded containing a message from the President whj.ch I was to communicate to the Emneror at the earliest possible moment. "3. At about 2230 hours (Tokyo time) 7 Decem- ber, the actual message was de]ivered at the ̂ 'nited States Embassy in Tokyo. Tbe telegram was officially 10,553 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 stamped ss I-evinr heeri receiver"', ct the Jsncnese tele- prrnh rfflce at 120C hnurs sn<'' wes nr.rkecl 'triple nri- crityt disnatched 6 Decem'^er, 210C hcî rs ("'ashinp.ton tine) . The text is --rintec? at nâ ês 784-6 of 'Paners relating to ti-e ForGi."'-̂ Pclatirrs of the T'niter' Statess Ja-orn Vol„ II, "4o I inneclj-ptely Cc'-'-'sed a tele"'hrne ries- sape to he sent to the Secretar̂ '- to the Ja-'anese Foreign IlinisFer TCC-0, askinf' ôr an frpent an-Trj ntîi.ent '-'ith the J'inister aroî nd midnip;ht. The Tecretar]^ ashed if the matter T.-as so rrp-ent that it could not v/ait u.ntil the next day, hut ultj-^atelv nade the â -ioint'ient. As soon as the telepran v/as decoded pnd f«'"ned, I took it to the ':inister's official residence an-r' saw hin at- ahcit 001"̂ hc.irs, 8 Decen'-.er (""ok-̂'-o ti"̂ e) . I requested aa a'idience with the Enneror in order to ^resent the the President's nessace which I then rea/̂ . aloud and of which I then handed a copy to TOGO. The letter at first said that he vrvld. study the dociiinent, h'.it T̂ hen I asked if that meant some doubt as to whether he wou.ld ask for an aduience for '"le. he reolied that he would present the matter to the Throne. Pie mf'-̂'e some further re-narks about the -̂̂ âshington Conversations, hut when I said that I had not yet received a renort of "̂l̂e conversa- tion of 5 Decen'-er and it would nerelv conolicate 10,-̂ 554 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 I 22 I 23 24 2? matters if I undertook to renecit his con-'ents to the Dencrtment, he s?id it not necessary, I left hir̂i Bt Bhovt 0©30 hours. "5. At ahou.t 0700 hciirs on H Decenher (Tokvo tine) I 3̂ ".?skened by a telenhone call from sn official of the Foreign I^inistn/ askinp rie to come to see the Minister as soon as possible, ?Ie said that he had heen tryj.n.r to tele'ohrne to me ever since C500 honrs, but could not '̂ et throurh. I arrived ;'t the Kinister'?; . official residence and SBV' hin at about 0730 hours. He said that he had seen the Emneror and handed me a copy of the memorandum which is reproduced at uaf̂ es 7^7-792 of the above-mentioned Volume headed '"emorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador (V017''M.) to the Secretary of State at 2s20 n.m. on 7 December 1P41.' TOGO said that he had seen the Emoeror (at aboî t 0300 hours I understand) and that this memorandum constituted the Emneror's reply to the President's messape. I immedi- atel;?- reminded TOGO that I had asked for an audience Fith the Emoeror and that I still i-'ished to nresent the President's messrpe to the Em -eror personally. TOGO merely renlied that he had no do sire to stand between the Throne and myself. He then made a little speech thanking me for mx'- cooneraticn durinp the conversations and came downstairs to see me off at the door, Hot a 10,555 i 1 jword was said about war having broken out anyv/here or 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 about Pearl Harbor, "6. Shortly after returning to the Embassy X was informed through a newspaper bulletin (Gogai) that Japan was in armed conflict with the United States and Great Britain. "Later in the morning of 8 Decem̂ ber (Tokyo time) an Official of the Foreign Office celled at the United States Embassy and read the official announce- ment that armed conflict had commenced." (Signed) ' "JOSEPH CLARK GREW" "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of June, A. D. , 194-6. "Raymond B. Roberts, Notary Public." TPIE PRESIDEKT: We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after vjhich the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 10,556 A 1 b r 2 a m 3 & 4 M 5 0 r 6 s e 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 . 25 MAItSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far Bast is now resumed. THE PRESIDE^fT: ¥T , Logan. tiR. LOGM: If the Tribunal please, in vi-̂ w of the submission by the prosecution of a further affidavit by Joseph Clark Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, we renew our request that Ambassador Grew be brought to this Tribunal to present himself for cross- i examination. This affidavit further strengthens a statement that we made the other day to the effect that Ambassador Grew knew many of these accused and spoke v;ith them and would be able to assist this Tribunal in arriving at the facts in triis case. Of i all the witnesses who have been named and have ap- peared at this Tribunal, it seems to us that a man who: was in Toky-j and had his finger on the pulse of the Japanese nation should be produced so that he can be cross-examined. THE PRESIDENT: Well, this second affidavit does not make a material difference to the position as it was when vie dealt with the matter previously, however I vrill leave the matter to my colleagues. Mr. Kiggins. I\iR. HIGGIKS: Mr. President, at Tuesday's session, November 12, pages 10,249 and 10,250 of the 10,557 3 4 5 6 10 record, objection \vas m&de to the introduction of IPS document ivo, 497, which was admitted and read as prosecution exhibit No. 1148. The document described the reasons for the fall of the third KOKOYE Cabinet. According to the certificate it was dictated by Prince KONOYE to one of his secretaries, corrected by him, but the certificate of authenticity was signed by a 8 different secretary. The Court asked that we make 9 an investigation and report. It has been ascertained that the foregoing 11 ! document was obtained by IPS on 26 December 1945 12 from Lieutenant Branstad of the Interpreter-Translator 13 Section, CIS of SCAP Headquarters. It has been 14 ascertained that CIS obtained the document with a 15 number of others from the summer residence of Prince KONOYE at Karuizawa on 17 December 194-5, v/hich ^ was the day following the Prince's death. 18 Investigation discloses that AKAYA, Shigeki, ^ I the,former secretary to whom the memorandum was I I dictated, died in March of this year. MR. LOGAN: I am sorry, your Honor, but was : a question addressed to me before about this Am- bassador Ore?/ matter? Lly radio wasn't working. THE PRESIDENT: I said the second affidavit did not add anything material, but 1 would consult 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 J 553 i 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 my colleagues. iiiR. LOGAN: As I recall it, your Honor, may I point out that in his previous affidavit it skipped several months and all of a sudden we get another affidavit v̂ here he testifies about December 7 and December 8, and we firmly believe, in view of the fact that this trial involves one of the great moments in history, where we have a man who T/as really here that he should be produced so that we can cross-examine him. 1 understand in his previous affidavit it ends at the period of about May 30, and I an not making this application pro forma, may it please the Court, but I urge with all the sincerity at my command that he be produced. Ivm. HIGGINS: iilr. President, it is our in- formation that Mr. Grev; is physically unable to make the trip from the United States to Tokyo.) I'/iK. FUiiNESS: If the Tribunal delay on this, if L'Ir. Grew's physical condition is in issue, Colonel T/̂ arren, as I said, has Just returned and if he is in the building tonight — today — he can come in and tell just what Mr. Grev/'s condition is. He has talked to Mr, Grev; within the month and v/e are sending nov/ to ask Colonel Warren to come into the courtroom. TilE PRESIDENTS Why can't he be examined in 10,559 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the United States on commission? Is it suggested that we might gain something if we see him give his evidence; that his credibility is in question? i^. FUIiNESS: I am sure that his credibility will be in question, but that will not be the only purpose of our cross-examination. There are collateral matters, and there is a long gap between the events which he testified to in his first affidavit and the events which he testified to" in this. THE PRESIDENT: If the question of his cre- dibility is not raised, of course he can be effectively cross-examined in the United States. I am expressing my own opinions, because there are mixed views about this. IvIR. BROOKS: Ivlr. President and Members of the Tribunal, I know in this case there are many divergent opinions among the attorneys, and the accused, as represented by one attorney, the interests and the matters that he has specifically in mind are not those of another. THE PRESIDENT: If the -defense want him and apply to me I shall find it hard to resist the ap- plication, if he is able to come. Mi. BROOI£: And as to the taking of the matter ijp, v̂re v»rant to bring out by Yie.y of commission 10,560 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in the United States, with all due respect to my other eolleagues, I don't know of any attorney that has an understanding of my part of the case that I would want to delegate that to, or likewise that I would want to accept the responsibility for inquiring into his phase of the case. 10,561 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: There seems to be a majority against calling him for cross-examination, but I can say candidly here if you ask me to allow you to sub- poena him I would find it most difficult to refuse a subpoena because he can give material evidence, or you may be able to show he would be able to give material evidence, in your f?vor. You hsve said he csn do so. BROOKS: Of course, the Court realizes the defense doesn't feel thst a subpoena for this man would give us the opnortunity that we would have on cross-examination because we world have to treat him as s hostile vatness. Possibly I should say a prose- cution witness rether than a hostile witness. And further thpt in the light of one defendant cross-examining on possibly a diplomatic phase or militsry phase or economic phase, others may have other matters peculiarly within their knowledge of their defense that would be very important to Dlace before this Court. THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Warren. MR. '"ARREN: Thank you, Your Honor. If I may be permitted a word, about ten drys ego I talked with Ambassador Grew in Washington, D.C. I was im- pelled to believe from my conversation with him that he, in common with many other persons who write books, 10,562 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 has a tendancy to place a different interpretatit-n than v/h£t this Tribunrl or those v;ho read the book might plaae upon his v-ords. m -RESIDENT; The hook isn't in evidence. I'.CR. '•VARRIN; No, sir; no, your Honor, that is true. But other documents comriiled by him vfhich are contained in his book are in evidence and unquestionably before the conclusion of this trial his book will probably reach the evidence, i'nd to that extent I cm anticipating what will cce before the Tribunal. However, y;ith reference tô Ambassador Grew's health, of course, I am not a medical man and I can't :.ay that he is in sound physical condition. Certainly he is not decrepit and he ci"cp Go r s to be in ss normal health as you could possibly expect for a man of his years, which I ujiderstand to be seventy-two. I don't believe his health is im̂ âired in any manner except due, perhaps, to his age, end before he is characterized as an invalid, unable to travel to the Orient, I think that he first should be consulted himself. THE PRESIDENT; Colonel V/rrren, Mr. Brooks | [ mentioned many matters uron which :;Ir. Grew might testify^ but I must remind you — I have been reminded of it myself — that if he is called here for cross-examin- ation you will be corfined to matters arising out of his 10,563 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 exarnlnetion in chief, that is to say, arising out of his affidavit. If you ccll him as your witness, though, there vvill be no limit of that kind, and, according to the representations of sooe of the defense counsel, at least one or more of the accused could safely call him. Perhaps you had better think it over. 1.©. WARREN: Your Honor, would the Court indulge me for just one further observation. I am of the opinion — and it is purely my opinion and not a fact — that Ambassador Grev/ would place an entirely different interpretation upon the meaning of his affidavit than what has aT)peared before the- Tribunal. TH7' PRESIDENT: That statement is ivholly un- warranted . MR. WARREN: Perhaps I put it a little crudely, I am telling the Tribunal, as I consider myself an officer of this Court, that that is merely my opinion. And without the opportunity of cross-examining the man here before the Tribunal, I see no manner in which we could bring to the Tribunal those assertions — I mean, not those assertions bn.t the true feeling of the vatness. I hcd not in any manner meant to, as I realize now, I hadn't meant to attempt to judge the consider- ation of the Tribunal's feelings towards this matter and I realize my remark Indicated that I had. So, for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that matter, I £sk the Court to forgive me for not hav- ing had a very good choice of words. I era spesking solely as to the mcnner in which it has been interpreted by counsel in their discussions which, of course, hrs not come to the Tribunal. I have nothin.f further, your Honor, on the matter. Thfnk you very much. .••iwi.. 10,565 w 0 1 f & D U d a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Iffi. KEENAN: Mr. President, may I be per- mitted briefly to state that the prosecution has been at all times informed that Mr, Grew is unable physically to make the trip. Mr. Grew, in the humble opinion of the prosecution is a very important witness,and , in view of the statement of defense counsel, we will make our own inquiries forthwith and if there is any practical} possibility of Mrc Grew being here, the prosecution will present him as its witnesst THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the defense are satisfied with what the Chief of Counsel has said, but I repeat .that^if an application is made to me in chambers,we will have the question of his ability to travel fully investigated. I think the consensus of opinion of this Tribunal, I have not gathered it fully, is that he should be defense witness and not a witness for the prosecution, unless the prosecution want to call him. MR. LOGAN: As it is indicated, your Honor, we would rather have him for cross-examination than for direct-examination. I believe it is the consensus of the defense attorneys that we will accept the prosecution's offer to see what they can do to get him here for cross-examination. 10,566 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRESIDENT: We will leave the matter as it stands. It can be raised again at some appropriate time. BRIGADIER NOLAN: At this stage, Mr. President, I desire to call as a witness, Mr, SHIRAO, Tatekl, whose affidavit, IPS document No. 2597, the circumstances under which the delivery of the telegram to Ambassador Grew was delayed will be proved,; and, also, item six on the chart, namely, that by , 1600 hours and certainly by l800 hours on December i I 7, the President's message had been decoded and its contents ?;ere generally known in Japanese Government offices. 10,567 SHIRAO DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 T A T E K I S H I R A O , callecl as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, being first duly svi/orn, testified through Japanese interpreters as follows: THS PRESIDENT: Are you tendering this affidavit directly or through the witness, Brigadier? BRIGADIER NOLAN: I vms tendering it through the witness, Mr. President. As soon as I have had the i witness say he made the affidavit, I will rec?.d it my- self to the Tribunal by reason of the language difficulty DIRECT EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER NOLAN: Q What is your full name, please? A SHIRAO, Tateki. Q And whera do you live? A Tokyo-To, Suginami-Ku, Nishi Takaido, 1 Chome, 139. Q What is your present employment? A I am. a secretary in the Commiunications Office. BRIGADIER NOLAN: Will the Clerk have the affidavit No, 2597 shown to the witness, please. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was handed to the witness.) Q I show you a document dated l8 August 194-6. What is that document? Is that your affidavit, . 1 0 ^568 SHIRAO DIRECT i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SHIRAO? A Y e s . . BRIGADIER NOLAN: I o f f e r i n e v i d e n c e , Mr,. P r e s i d e n t , I P S document No, 2 ^ 9 7 , b e i n g t h e a f f i d a v i t o f SHIRAO, T a t e k l . THE PRESIDENT: A d m i t t e d on t h e u s u a l term^,- CLERK OF THE COURT: P r o s e c u t i o n ' s d o c u m e n t ' No, 2597 w i l l r e c e i v e e x h i b i t N o . 1225.- ( W h e r e u p o n , t h e d o c u m e n t a b o v e r e f e r r e d t o was marked p r o s e c u t i o n ' s e x h i b i t Ho. 1 2 2 5 and r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e . ) BRIGADIER NOLAN: I now r e a d f r o m e x h i b i t No. 1225: 10,569 SHIRAO DIRECT 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 j "I sn Sin:Ri--0, Tetekl, et ^resent eranloyed 8t the !Iinistr7 of Conmimlcrtions in Tokyo cirr! i live c.ts "̂ okyo-to., Supinsirl-kHj Fishi Ta'-.aiclo, 1 Chome | "In Fovern'oer 1 * 5 4 1 I v jes in chrrge of the cle- | nertnent of Censorship which is e section of the Ilinis- | I tr7 of Coiran;.nicftions. i j '•On ITovenher 29th 19415 my friend Lt. Colonel j ! TCin.TRA. I'orio, •'"ho iwos then emloyed in the connunicf:tions section of the Chief of Stef", tc-le-ihrned ne et ny 'ori- « vete house in the eveninp end told me th. t for security rear.ons a].l foreign teleprcns f̂ 'ere to ^e deleyed in delivery by five hrurs. I ct once tele-ihoned to the centrr.l tele,fr?.-oh office, and gfve orders that all in- coninp" and ovt-pr-ing tele.!?Ta'''is sho'''.].d hs dels.ved for five hci^rs. This a-̂ -̂)] 1 t o all teierr^ms exce'it those of the Jenanese Goverrnent and, I think, those concern- inp the Gorman and Italian. GovernTfl.ents. At the time I j did nothinp more in the matter, | i "Or. December 4th~ havinp' discr^ssed the matter ' -M*. i ' j T'dth members of the I.'.inistry, I iss'ied • riteen instr^^c- ' ! tions to a]l branch telefra-^h offices in the Tokyo area and to all other sections of m" censorship staff. I do no think it likely that any con*̂ of these -Titten in- structions stil?: exists. At no ti-Cj so far as I re- member. did I ever receive '̂-riteen co.nfirmation rf the 10,57r SEIRAO DIRiXT 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 jtelnnhono instructions of Colonel TCIFRA. "On Decomher 6th ny orders fron Colonel ss 'tc the clelev •i n tele.!̂ rc-i<̂ v-ts vr.riecT and.̂ in f̂ iture ̂ I v»fs tol̂ '' to dele?" the delivery hj'" five ho-Ts ?nd ten hci.rs on altsrn«tG dŝ '-s. "On Decen^er 7th I hnovj certainly before 6:00 vhen I left the office; end I think sr^a tine between frr.r c.nd six p.nic of the contents of the message of the President of the IT. s. A. to the Emoeror of J?nen. I crnnot rcroein'̂ er, for certain 5 who told ne; but I think it ii/ss Colonel TCIURi. yho p;?ve no this infornrtion in the course of a conversation on the tcleohrne thst sfter-| noon. He tel.ephored ne to sav that henceforth all teleprfms were to be delayed b̂- fifteen hou.rs and I .''cve instructions to vxy s^ibordinates accordinjzily. "It '-'JEs the cus-̂ on at this -̂•î-'o "or the Foreign Office ar"-'' •'"or the Chiefs r-f Staf" of the A m y and of the Naw to send a messenger to ny de^artnent at least once a day, c-enerally :ln the raornin?̂ , to take away conics of teleprrras in code which they thouf̂ ht '̂ .ipht interest then. As Dcconber 7th -t-vas a dav cf ? reat excitement, there were nrobably messengers in and out all day, I cannot say et what tine -f-.he President's teleprari î ould have b- en taken away by sn}/ of these messenpers. I do know, however, rs 1 hove alrcad^ ex- SHIRAO DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 p l s i n o d , t h a t C o l o n e l TOIIJR^i of t h e L ' i n i s t r y was tcll:^nr': rie t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e tGlegrc.i-T. -^robehly bj?- 4 o ' c l o c k ond c e r t a i n l j ' ' 6 o ' c l o c k t h ? t c v c - n i n g . "I s ho i ^ . l d G x n l & . i n t h c t , a l t h o i i o i h p y d c - i c r t - roent i s c s l l e d t h e D©n<?rtmcnt o f C e n s o r s h i p , a.nri w s h c r e f o r e r e s p o n s i b l e '̂ ôr d e c o d i n p t e l . c p r s n s i n c o d o j i t I'Ts o o e r r t j n r "for " i u b l i c end co~'r^'.rcic ]. co''''cs only and d i d n o t h c n d l e s o c r e t c o d So "On D e c e n b e r 8 t h I T'̂ es ceIToc' on -i-he t e l e p h o n e a b o u t 4 r 3 0 s . m . b v l ! r . I^AKii^'ArA, y^ho f ? s Chj e f o f t h e F o r e i p n T o l e p r s m S c c t i o n of t h e T e l e c o n m i i n i o r t i o n ^ i i r e a u o f t h e l ' i n i s t r y of Conntinicc t i o n s end a s sucV , rny i m - "•iiediPte s i l v e r i e r 9 f : ^ i c e r . He t o l d ne t h r t he h s d r e - 0 c e i v e d an o r d e r fron t h e Ar.or- t o s t o ^ a l l conniunic£ t i c n w i t h Forei:'='n C o u n t r i e s . I i r i ' - ' cd ir te] ' ' " t e l e p h o n e d t h e o r d e r t o a y o f f i c e , dresser^ and v e n t t h e r e , a r r i v i n g a b o u t 6 ; 0 0 a,Tn. T h e r e I f o u n d C o l o n e l n ^ K A I J of t h e War I l i n i s t r y , and L t . C o l o n e l TOLURA, v ^ s i t i n f . f o r n o , and we d i s c u . s s e d a l l futi.i .re c o n t r o l o f c o m " a i n i c r t i o n s . " A t noon on t h i s dajt.,- t h e M i n i s t e r o f C o n n u n i - c a t i o n s r e r d o u t t o t h e S t a f f of t h e l ' i n i s t r y t h e I n - p c r i a l R e s c r i p t o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of w a r . '•'I an c e r t a i n o f rnam'- e f r^j ti-'-ies and a l l my d£-tes i n t h i s n e r i o d a s I V.ent a D i a r y , and i t i s a f t e r r e f r e s h i n g my memory f r o m t h i s D i r r v t h a t I h a v e rnrde 10,572 SHIRAO DIRECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the nrcsent Affidavit. " I , SITRAO,^ T s t c k i h?ve re.'r" th^' above s t r t c i T i o r t i n F n ^ ^ l i s h , c ].sn,piiaf?a ?-hich I im^ ' .e rs tsnd. I s'^esr on Tn.Y consc ience 'i-^ct t he c o n t o r t s o f t h e shove s t&t t iT icn t e r e t r r c to t h e h o s t o f -'V I r n o ^ l c d r c and rocollcction o f f c C t S . "S\T?orn End suhscri ' -^cd t o b e f o r e t)7o i^nc lers ignc^ h - t h e ehove ne^-iod SHRkO, T a t e k i c t t h e Wrr Ili-.iGtr-- B-iiildinr, T'0k3'-0j this l8th dav of Aup'ust 19̂ -6 /s/".Johjq FHunmel "Ileior, J.A.G.O." I hav3 no cuest.lons furtajr to ask tho Tvltness. 10,573 SHIRAO CROSS 1 2 o 4 5 6 8 9 10 20 21 22 23 24 25 TEE FRESIDEMT5 Dr. KIY0S3. LR, XIYOSE: I have throe or four questions to ask this witness. CR03S-EXfvMINATI0N BY DR. KIYOSE: Q You have stated in the last part of your affidavit that you read and understand English and understood the contents of this affidavit. Lid you OTite this affidavit in English? A No, in Japanese. ^̂ Q Then, old you listen to the English trans- 12 lation of the Japanese afficavit v/hich you niade, and 13 signed that? 14 A Yes, I reac the translation into English and 15 affixed rny signature thereto. 16 TiiE MONITOR; "I was asked to read it, ̂ î/hich 17 I did, and then signed." 18 Q Then you did not see the Japanese text of 19 this affidavit? A Your question is not clear, sir. Q The Japanese affidavit has been circulated among us defense counsel. Have you never seen or read the Japanese affidavit? A I saw it. Q There is no — you are sure of its contents? 10,574 SHIRAO CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A Yes, I am. Q Then I will ask you soma question, basing them on the Japanese text, on the Japanese affidavit. Will vou toll us of your position at the time, in the period • cover3d by this afficavit; that is to siay, v;ill you explain in detail the organization of your ministry? That is, in the first part of, Locember, 194-1. A At that time I occupied the position of Cormunications Secretary or Official in tha Ministry of Communications; and I was assigned to the Foreign Telegnph Section of the Tele-Corimuntcations Bureau of the Ministry of Co!.:m.unications. Q 7hat is the organization imniediately above this bureau? A That is the Tele-Communications Bureau of the Ministry of Gommunicationsj and the Foreign Tele- graph Section is under the Tele-Communications Bureau. Q Is the Tele-Communication Bureau under the direct control of the Minister of Communications, or is there another intermediate agency? A Yes, it is under the direct supervision of the Minister. THE MONITOR; "I bc-lieve." Q I am asking you concerning the department 1 i I 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 25 10,575 SHIRAO CROSS i n w h i c h you w o r k o c . ' "hon you say " I b e l i e v e , " t h a t ! i s n o t v e r y e x a c t . Lo you mean you b e l i e v e , o r a r e you su re? A Do you F.ean t o say t h a t t h e TGlo-Co-^amunicaticn, Bu reau i s n o t v e r y c l e a r t o you? Q No, TTiy q u e s t i o n — I asked you my q u e s t i o n because you s a i d , " I b e l i e v e " t h e T e l e - C o K F . u n i c a t i o n s „ Bu reau was under t h e d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f t h e T J i n i s t e r o f o 1 I C o r p n u n i c a t i o n s , T h e r e i s t h e V i c e - K i n i s t o r o f Com- m u n i c a t i o n s unde r t h e J ' j n i s t e r , so I wanted t o ask you w h e t h e r you knew i t f o r a f a c t t h a t t h e T e l e - 12 Commun ica t i on Bu reau was u n d e r , d i r e c t l y u n d e r , t h e 13 l - i n i s t e r o f Commun ica t ions? 14 THE PRESIDENT: D r . KIYOSE, t h e r e a s o n f o r 15 t h e s e q u e s t i o n s i s f a r f r o m c l e a r . Do you s u g g e s t 16 t h a t he was n o t employed as he c l a i m s ho was? 17 LR. K IY03E : M r . P r e s i d e n t , I m e r e l y wan ted 18 t o a s c e r t a i n where he go t 1 i s o r d e r s f r o m . T h a t i s 19 t o s a y , I w i s h t o ask as my n e x t q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t ho r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r on Decemiber 7 f r o m h i s ^^ im.mediate s u p e r i o r , f r o m someone f r o m whom he s h o u l d ^^ r e c e i v e t h a t o r d e r , or n o t . ^^ Q I f you c a n , p l e a s e r e p l y t o my p r e v i o u s ^^ q u e s t i o n . I f you c a n n o t , I s h a l l go t o w-r n e x t q u e s t i o n . 1 0 , 5 7 6 SHIRAO CROSS 5 6 7 8 9 10 il 12 13 U 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A No, I shall try to raply. I said that the Tele-Communications Bureau was under the direct charge of the Minister of Communicptions, but in betv/een there is the office of the Vice-Minister. Therefore, I must say that it also receives supervision and orders of the Vice-Minister, who assists the Minister in the acministration of the Ministry. Q You said you wore employed in the Foreign Tolegram Section. 'Vho was ycur section chief? A NAKAYAIJA, Jiro. Q '7ith that, the organization of the Ministry has become clear. In the third paragraph of your affidavit you state tl;at orders were given for all incoming telegrams to be delayed for five hours. Where did these orders come from? A From Lieutenant Colonel TOMURA, of the Army General Staff. Q From about when? A From the end of November. Q Did Colonel TOMURA, that is to say, did the Arm-y General Staff have the right to order, to give orders to you or to your section? A No, he did not have the authority to give orders, but we interpreted it as being the request 10,577 SHIRAO CROSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of tho army. THE PRESIDEJIT: We will adjourn now until half past nins tomorrow morning. At half past ten we will adj-^urn until half past one. (WhGr2upon, at l600, an adjoumTaest was taken until Friday, 15 November 19^6, at 0930.)
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