AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
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Record of Proceedings of the 一 ^ ^ . • 一 々 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan I h e United States of America, the Republic of しhina, the United Kingdom of Grea t Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of boviet Socialist Republics, the commonwealth of Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and the Commonwealth 4 of the Philippines S -Against- ARAKI , Sadao ； D O H I H A R A , Kenj i； H A S H I M O T O , Kingoro ； H A T A , Shunroku ； H I R A N U M A , Kiichiro ； H I R O， T A , Koki; H O S H I N O , Naoki ； I T A G A K I , Seishiro; KAYA, Okinori ； K I D O , Koichi ； K I M U R A , Heitaro ； K O I S O , Kuni- ak i ; M A T S U I , Iwane ； M A T S U O K A , Yosuke ； M I N A M I , J iro ； M U T O , Ak i r a ; N A G A N O , Osami ; OKA, Takasumi ; O K A W A , Shumei ； O S H I M A , Hiroshi ; S A T O , Kenryo; SHI - G E M I T S U , Mamoru ； SH.1MADA, Shigctaro ； S H I R A T O - RI , Toshio ； S U Z U K I , Teiichi ； T O G O , Shigenori: T O J O , Hideki ； U M E Z U , Youshijiro ； -Accused- Official Cour t Reporters Jack Grccnbcrg, Chief Prcd t. Abram JarrieS F. Barton Antoinette Duda Samuel Goldberg Robert B. Morso John J. JDaphne Spratt Elvira Whalea Julian Wolf Lorraine Veldea 8 NOVEIIBER 1946 Secretary of Ambassador June 1941 10000 220C (36) 1091 Oral St-:.tc:. cnt State handed NOMURA dated 220 C(37) 1092 Draft Proposal of a Settlement between Japan and the U.S. by the Secretary of Stote to the Japanese Ambassador dated 21 June 1941 10004 I N D E X Of WITNESSES (none) I N D E X Of EXHIBITS Doc, No. 4061B Pros. No. 1086 Def. No. 220 C(35) 1087 219P(77) 1088 I 1632WC52) 1 0 8 9 1632W(53) 1090 Description Telegram frorr Ott in Tokyo to Ribbentrop dated 11 June 194-1 Draft of the Proposal received from NOiilBA dated 15 June 19^1 Excerpt from Telegram of Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State Hull dated 16 June 1941 Entry in EIDO's Diary dated 18 June 1941 Entry in MDO 1 s Diary dated 20 June 1941 For In Idont. Evidence 9986 9988 9996 9998 9999 bv to 21 I N D E X Doc. Pros. Dcf. � o . No. No. 16327/(55) 1093 1632WC 56)1094 1632W(57)1095 4081C 1096 4081D 10^7 1 6 3 2 W ( 5 8 ) 1 0 9 8 219P(78) 1099 220C(14) 1100 1339A(5) 1101 220C(14) 1102 Of EXHIBITS (cont'd) Description For In Ident.Evidence Entry fror. KIDO1 s Diary dated 22 June 1941 Entry in KIDO's Diary dated 23 June 1941 Entry in KIDO's Diary dated 23 June 1941 Telegrrm from Ribbentrop rt the German Einbassy at Tokyo Telegram from the Germcn Files at Nuernberg from Ott to Ribbentrop dnted 28 June 1941 Entry in KIDO' Dirry deted 28 June 1941 Message from the American /.mbpssr.dor in Janrn to the Jnprnese Mini' ster for Foreign Affairs iaTSUOKA dated 8 July 1941 Excerpt from an Orel Stcte- merit of Ambassador Grew to Minister MATSUOKA dated 8 July 1941 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's Reply of Februcry 17 to Foreign Secretrry Eden Excerpt fron Press Release by the Department of Strte in '"rshiington dctcd 24 July 1941 10019 10023 10026 10029 10034 10036 10039 10041 1004-3 10047 I N D E X Of Pros. Def. No. IIo. 1103 1104- 1105 1106 EXHIBITS (cont'd) Description For In ェdent. Evidence Relating to Central Liaison Conferences held during 1941 Affidavit of the Honorable tr enry L. Stinson, dated 7 June 1946 Affidavit of i'lnbcssador Joseph Clsrlt Grew Excerpt fror; the Testimony of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull before the United States Con- gressional Comiriittoe for the investigation of the Pearl Horbor Attack (pp. 1 0 7 6 to I O 8 3 ) 10051 10067 10089 10109 9,985 ‘2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 13 | 16 1 7 18' 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 Friday, 8 Noveir.ber,194-6 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBIMAI FOR THE FAR EAST Court Hour-G of the Tribunal War Ministry Buiご ding Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal mot, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal,same as before with the exception of the HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from India, not sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before_ For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese to English interpretation was Language Section, IMTFE.) •and Japanese made by the 2 5 % 9 8 6 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far Last is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA, HIRANUMA and MATSUI who are represented by their respective counsel. We have certificates from the Medical Superintendent of Sugamo Prison to the effect that the accused HIRANUMA and MATSUI are still unable to attend the trial owing to illness. The certificates will be recorded and filed. Major Moore, LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): If the Tribunal please, referring to exhibit 106S, record page 9877, line 7， the words "his opinion" should read "my opinion." We recommend this correction be made. THE PRESIDENT: It will be adopted. Thank you, Major Moore. Mr. Williams. MR. E. WILLIAMS: We offer in evidence IPS document 40£l B which Is a telegram dated June 11, 1941 from Ott in Tokyo to Ribbentrop. It was recover- ed from the German files in Nuernberg. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 4061 B will receive exhibit No. 1086� I 4 5 6 Greenber?& B 7 ？ 8 0t ^ n 10 11 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 • , 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 9,987 (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1086 and received in evidence,) MR� E0 WILLIAMS; We read prosecution ex- hibit 1086; "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) "Tokyo' 11 June 1941 "Arrival 12 June 1941 "No. 927 of 11 June. "Prince URACH has informed us of a conver- sation with the Comr-ander-in-Chief of the KW/iNTUMG Army, General UMEZU, in HSINKII'JG; 'Commander-in- Chief of the KWANTUFG Army, General UMEZU, stressed that he welcomed the Neutrality Pact JAPAN-RUSSIA f©r the moment. Since, however, the Tripartite Pact is the unchangeable basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan's attitude towards the Neutrality Pact must undergo a change just as soon as the hitherto exist- ing German-Russian relations undergo an alteration. iigTT" 9,988 2 | 4 5 6 7 8 9 o 12 3 4 56 7890 12 34 ぅ 1 11 11 11 1112 2 2 2 2 2 We cffer in evidence IPS docment No. 220 C (35) from exhibit for identification 58, Vol- ume II，. which is a draft of the document or proposal received from NOMURA June 15，194-1. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COIIRT: Prosecution's dftcuinent No. 220 C (35) will receive exhibit No. 1087. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1087 and received in evidence.) MR, E. WILLIAKSs We read prosecution's document No. 1087: "DRAFT DOCUMENT RECEIVED INFORMALLY ？ROM ASSOCIATES OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 15，1941 "The Governments the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the. resumption flf traditional friendly relati«na. Uv,fith«ut reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the de- terioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and cor- rected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. 9,989 レシ/J 5 6 7 CU9 o 1 2 3 4 5 , 0 7 3 9 o 1!2.3:4'3 1T.I 1111111 1 2 22222 "It is our earnest hope that, by a coopera- tive effort, the United States and Japan may contri- bute effectively toward the establishment and pre- servation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consumation of an amicable imaerstanding, en- courage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civi- lization. "For such decisive action, protracted ne- gotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the reali- zation of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Government^ in honor and in act. "It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory con- cerns which could be deliberated later at a Conference. "Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit: "1.The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting the international relations and the character of nationso" 9,990 5 6 7 8 9 , 10 11 i 1 2 ！ 1 3 丨 1 4 | 1 5 j 1 6 j 1 7 | 18 i 1 9 丨 20 21 j 2 2 丨 2 3 | 2 4 ' 2 5 1 丨 "2. The attitudes of both Governnents tovrard 2 the European w?r. : 3 ! "3. Action toward r. nerceful settlement bc- 4 trreen China end Jc.non. "4, Connercc between both nations. "5. Eccncnic activity of both nations in the Prcific ？ren. "6. The policies of both nations affecting pc«* litical stabiliznticn in the Pacific ares. "7. Neutralization of the Philipnine Islands, "i.ccorclingly, the Governnent of the United Stntes nnd the Governnent of Jsp^n hrve conc to the following nutual understanding 广nci declrrrtion cf pclicyi "エ• The- crncepts of tho United Stct' ？ rnri of Jr.pen respcctinp- intGrnrticnr.l relations r:n,.-1 the charac- ter of nrtirns. "Both Gc.vernncnts nffirm thrt their nrtionnl policies r.re directed tc*»;nrd the foundrtion of a last- ing pe^ce rnr! the inr.ugurrticn cf n new ern of rc ci- procal confidence rnd coc^erntion between our peoples. "Both Governments declare thrt it is their trndltioric：!? r.nd present, ccncopt and conviction thpt nrtions nnd roces conpose 5 rs nenbers of s fnnily, one household livinp under the idc?.l cf universal concord through ；justice ̂ nd equity; ereh equally enjoying rights nnd r;dnitting responsibilities with n rmtuslity of interests regulated by perceful pro- cesses rnd directed to the mirsu.it rf their norril r-nd physical welfare, which they nre brunri to defend for thenselves r-s they ore bcund net to destroy for others； they further nd^it their responsibilities tr oppose the oppression or exploitaticn of ether people. "Both Governments nre fimly dctemined thnt their respective troditirnal concepts rn the chnrrcter cf nations and the- underlying ncrrl principles cf sc.cirl order end ncti^nal life will continue to be preserved and never trmsforned by foreign ideos or ideologies contrary to those noml orinciDles c?nd concepts. "II. The nftitudes of both Governnents tov^rd the European vmr. "The Gnvernnent of Joprn nrintciins thct the ourつose cf the Triprrtite Pr.ct was, ?nd is, defensive r.nd is designed to nre vent the anticipation of no- tions in the Europenn wnr net ot present involved in it. "The Governiient of the United Stctes nr.in- t.ains tĥ .t its attitude tcword the Europenn hostili- 9，992 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 24 2 5 ties is pnr! will crntinue to be detemined solely snd exclusively by ccnsiderrticns rf prrtccticn and self-defense; its nntirnal security nnd the defense thereof. "III� Actirn tcwarci n peaceful settlonent between Jr.pan and China • "The Gcvcrnnent of Jap^n hrving declared thrt the generrl terns 5 v/ithin the fmnewcrk rf which the Gcvernnent cf Jr>3nn ？/ill orr-orsc the ncgctiction of n nerceful settlement rf the Chin?. Affsir, ere innlied in the KONGYE nrinciples rnd. in the nr^ctical rpっlicrtion rf these nrinciples, the President rf the United States? relying ripen the nrlicy cf the Gcvern- nent of Japsn to establish r>. relrticn cf neighbcrly f riendship wi th Chinr. 5 will suggest tc tbe Gcvernnent rt Chungking thrt it enter with the Gcvernnent cf Jrpan into a negotiation for n terninnticn rf hostili- ties and rosurmtirn rf nenceful relrticns. "IV. CmマGrco between both n"ti^ns. "When officirl npnrobrtion to tho present understrnding hns been given by both Governments, the United Stotc s m d J?.p- n shall sssure ench other mutually to suodIv such comrdities rs ore5 respective- ly 5 rvrilable ond required by cither cf then. Both Governments further ccnsent to trke necessary steps 9,993 234 5 67 8 9m;=ci6I4l5wl7sl920HS2324 to resume normal trade relations as formerly estab- lished under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a now commer- cial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usunl procedure. "V. Economic activity of both nations in the Paci- fic area. "On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific aren. shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrim- ination in international commcrcial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate ench with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japnn and by the United States to commcrcial supplies of nnturnl resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and develop- ment of its own economy. "VI. The policies of both nations affcctins political stabilization In the Pacific area. "Both Governments declare that the control- ling policy underlying; this understanding is peace 25 ：in the Pacific area; that it is their fundnmental 9 , 9 9 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 li 1 2 | 1 3 ： 1 4 ' 1 5 16 : 口 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned. nVII� Neutralization of the Philippine Islands� "The Government of Japan declares its will- ingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the- United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty f or the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine indepen- dence shall have been achieved. "(Enclosure) "ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVTHMI^T OF THE UNITED STATFS "IV. Commerce between both nations. "It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-de- fense. Those limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against cither Government; 9,995 and, it is understood, that both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating ro- i lations with friendly nations." 9,99^ We offer;.in evidence IPS t1.: curxnt No. 219P (77) fror. wxhibit for identification 58, Vol- ume I, which is an excerpt froiri a telegram of Ar.bas~ saaor Grew to Secretary of State Hull, dated June 16,1941. THE PIIESIDEWT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 219P (77) will receive exhibit No. 1088. (Vi/hereupon, the document above re- ferred to viTf̂s marked prosecution7 s exhibit No. 1088 and received in evidence.) 皿 . E . WILLエブiMS: We read prosecution ex— hibit 1088: " T E L E G R A M "THE EMBASSADOR IN JハPiiN (GREW) TO IHI, SP.CIiLTi\RY OF STATE "TOKYO, June 16，1941-9 p.c. (Received June 16 -10:35 s.r:“） "Excerpts "830. Chungking1s 240, June 15, 3 p.n. Without delay I iEnediately sought an ？.ppointrnent with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and delivered to him in pers -n a signed note quoted below.エ made the most emphatic representations and pointed out the grave danger to American Japanese relations involved in recent bonbing attacks on Chungking which have now 9,997 resulted in hee.vy danp.ge to cur Embassy property, including the residence cf the Anbr.ssador, and serious- ly jeopardizing both the lives of the Anbassrdor nnd other American nr. t ions Is end the U. S. S. Tutuila. ，丨'Excellency: I hove the honor to inform your Excellency thot according to infcrnotion just received fron the American /mb^ssador ?.t Chungking, during an r.ir raid errly on the afternoon of June 15,19415 twenty-seven Japa- nese cirplnnes flying high bonbed Chungking and also dropped several ̂ ftbout five, bcribs within r.rers of one to three hundred ynrds of the entrrnce to the Enbrssy Chancery and the United States ship Tutuila. A bonb which dropped within fifty ynrds of the entrrnce to the Enbnssy dugout hit alongside of nnd hervily dnmr.ged the offices of the assistant military attache| rbout half between the Chancory and the United Stntes ship Tutuila. The con- cussion end flying debris danrged the Chancery, including the windows, tmnsons, tile roof, screens nnd shutters. Some donrge wr.s also cnused r.t the Anbassador' s residence a half mile o.vmy rnrl at the Strndcrd Oil offices ner.r the Chancery.'" 9,998 2 3 丨 4 丨 5 6j 7 8 I 9 1 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 j 1 6 I 1 7 1 8 ！ 1 9 ！ 2 0 j 2 1 | 2 3 | 2 4 2 5 We offer in avidence IPS document No. 1632W (52)， an entry in KIDO's Diory, June 18，1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns. CLERK OF THE COURT: Proseoation's document No.1632W (52) will receive exhibit No. 1089. (Whereupon, the docudent above re- ferred »to was csirked prosecution's exhibit No. 1089 pnd received in evidence*) MB. E.诋エLLIZkS: We read prosecution1s exhibit No. I O 8 9 ： Extract from Entry Froir Msrquis KIDO's Diary,18 June '41.' "June 18th, 1941-(Extract) " エ had e visit from the Preniier and the Foreign Minister Pt 11 a.m.. The Foreign Minister told me that instructions had been sent to heve the German Government negotiate with the Vichy Govern- ment in connection with the French Indo-China Prob- l&cu" * MR. LOGilN: If the Tribunal plepse, nay we have that exhibit referred to the Language Section? THE PRESIDENT; What do you suggest is wrong with it, Mr. Logan? MB. LOGilK: According to our translation, it should read: "I hpd e visit fron: the Precier and %999� 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 the Foreign Minister at 11 a.m.. The Foreign Minister told me that instructions had been sent to negotiate with the Vichy Government through the German Govern- ment in connection with the French Indo-Ghina prob- l e n . " THE PRESIDENT: There seems to be no sub- stantial difference, but we will refer it to the Language Section. IVIr. Willians. 皿 . E . WILLIAMS: We offer in evidence IPS document No. 1632W (53) which is sn entry in KIDO's Diary, June 20,1941. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terns. CLLBK OF 1HE COURT: Prosecution1s document No. 1632W (53) will receive exhibit No. 1090. (liliereupon, the document above re- ferred to was narked prosecution1s exhibit No. 1090 and received in evidence.) MR. E. WILLIAMS; We read prosecution's exhibit No. 1090: ,nExtract fron Entry from Mprquis KIDO's Di=ry, 20 June 1941. " Prince KONOYE called cn me at 5： 50 p.k. and informed me confidentially thpt there wps something hard to understand sbout the Foreign Minister1 s opinion in view cf the present strained international relations including the outbreak of the war between the Soviet and Germany. He tock this occasion to refer to the responsibility of the Cabin- et, but エ advised hiE that it was still too early to discuss this.エ promised him that we would talk over the nr.tter with Mr. HIRAiWM, Minister of Home ilffairs, at the earliest opportunity. He went hone after about sn hour's talk." MR. L0G/.N: If the Tribunal please, we would like to hnve this referred to the Language Section. THE PHLSIDEI^T: Why, Mr. Logan? MR. LOGAN: The middle sentence should re?d: "He took this 6でcasion to refer to the responsibility of the Cabinet, but エ advised hia that it was out cf the question." THE PRESIDENT: It will be referred. MR. E. WILLI/,MS: We offer in evidence IPS dociiBi&nt No. 220C ( 3 6 ) which is an oral statement by Secretary of Stpte handed to Ambassador NOMURA, June 21，1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns. CLERK OF THL COURT: Prosecution1s document No. 220C ( 3 6 ) will receive exhibit No. 1091. M 2 3' 4! 5 ！ 6 ！ 7 | 8 i 9 1 0 ！ 11 12 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution* s exhibit No. 1091 end received in evidence.) MR. E. WILLIAMS: We resd prosecution's exhibit No. 1091. 11 ORAL STAIELiENT H/.NDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THP, JAPANESE EMBASSADOR (NOMUKA) ON JUNE 21，194-1 "Excerpt. "The Secretary of Stcte has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Jap- anese /.inbsssador anc! his rssocietes as indicated ebove and woulcl support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accucruleting evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports fron: sources which over many years have deraonstreted sincere good will towerd Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which cplls for support of Nazi Gerneny snd its policies of conquest end thsit the only kind of line] erst ending v/ith the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of Hitler should the United Ststes becone involved in the Euro- pean hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self-defense. The tenor of recent public 10,002 statements grstuitously rnede by spokesmen of the Jap- anese Government eraphesizing Japan's cocmitment ».nd intentions under the Tripartite alliance execiplify an sttitude which cannot be ignored. So long cs such leaders maintain, this attitude in their official positions end apparently seek to influence public opinion in Jappn in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such ns the one under oonsideration offers a basis for achieving subst?nti?l results along the desired lineぎ？ "Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Gov- ernment to include in its terms for a peaceful settle- ment to be offered to the Chinese Government, a pro- vision which would permit the ststioning of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as 0 measure of p cooperation with China in resisting coi.munistic activities. IVhile this Gov- ernment has given cpreful thought to the considera- tions which hoTe prompted the Japanese Government to make such a proposal, and while this Government does | not desire to enter into the merits of such a pro- posal, it feels th?t the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese ムmtnsssdor and his associates, would not permit this Government to associate itself with a.ny course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, slthcugh in matters affecting cnly this country there might be sone lati- tude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the mptter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of s third country, end accordingly it is felt that this Government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a nstter. "The Secretary of Stste has therefore re- luctantly cone to the conclusion thpt this Government must await some clearer inclicrtion than ha j yet been given T>h??t the Japanese Government as n v;hole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the ob- jectives of the proposed understnnding. This Govern- ment sincerely hopes that the Japr?nese Government will manifest such an attitude. "NOTE: In order to bring the current cis- cussions up to date as far as the American o.ttitude is concerned, there is being hsndec the Japanese Ar:bessa- dor separately o revision, bearing the d-te of June 21, of the document marked 'Unofficial, Exploratory pnd without Conr-itnent' which was handed the Japanese An- bassador on May 31." THE PRESIDENT: Mr� Chief Counsel. MR. KESNAN； Mr. President, the prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document 220 C (37) from exhibit for identification 58, Volume 2, which is draft proposal of a settlement between Japan and the United States by the Secretary of State to the Jap- anese Ambassador June 21,1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. Mi. KEENAK: I hope the Court will permit me at this time to state for the clearer understand- ing ,not only of the Court but t?.�e defense counsel, that this is a document very similiar to exhibit 1078, Miich was a draft handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on 31 May 194-1. There are the following changes in this draft: One has reference to the exchange of views as to the attitude toward the European War of the' two nations by letters instead of by annexes to the document itself as of May 3 1 . T h e second change has reference to the treatment of the sub- ject matter of economic affairs in China, and the third, includes the entire Pacific area instead of the Western Pacific. The prosecution apologizes for its offering Morse & Abram this entire document, because it is so closely in 10,005 resemblance to the former one, but believes this part of the case is so important it craves the Court's in- dulgence for such purpose. So,with the Court1s per- mission, エ will read this exhibit, if the Court ad- mits it. THE PRESIDENT: Read it, Mr. Counsel. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220 C (37) will receive exhibit No. 1092. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1092 and received in evidence.) MR. KEENAN: (Heading) "DRAFT PROPOSAL HAKDEL BY THE SECKETAHY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AtiBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 21,1941. "Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment. "Washington, June 21,1941. "The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of under- standing as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations. "Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the 10,006 2 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 1 5 16 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 25 deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate con- sequences . ！,It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward, the establishment and preserva- tion of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world, peace and arrest, if not dispel,the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization. ''For such decisive action, protracted negotia- tions would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments5 therefore, desire that adequate instru- mentalities should be developed for tho realization of a general understanding which would bind, mean- while ,both Governments in honor and in act. "It is the belief of the tv/o Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference. "Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved, 10,007 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 to wit: "1.The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations. "2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war. "3. Action toward a peaceful settlement be- tween China and Japan. "4. Commerce between both nations. "5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area. 12 "6 . The policies of both nations affecting 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 political stabilization in the Pacific area. "7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands. "Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration eff 18 ！policy: 19:"I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan Respecting international relations and the character Sof nations, "Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peaco and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 10,008 peoples. "Both Governments declare that it is their tra- ditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity5 each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by per.ceful pro- cesses and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as tiioy are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples. "Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principl&s of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts. "II. Tho attitudes of both Governments toward the European war. "The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is ? defensive 10,009 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I 9 i 10 11 12 , 13 j 1 4 | 15 | 16 1 7 | 18 i 1 9 ！ 2 0 丨 21 22 1 2 3 1 2 4 丨 j 2 5 ； and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war. "The Government of the United States main- tains that its attitude toward the European hostili- ties is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense； its national socurity and the defense thereof, "NOTE (Thore is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subjc-ct which constituted a part of the draft of May 31,1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, vide the Oral statement handed the Jap- anese Ambassador on June 21.) "III. Action toward a peaceful settlement be- tween China and Japan. "The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States tho general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiations of a peaceful settle- ment with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in har- mony with the KOKOE principles regarding neighborly 10,010 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 i 1 1 ； 1 2 丨 1 3 I 14 I 15 | 1 6 丨 1 7 | I S j 叫 2 0 ！ H 2 3 2A ] . 2 5 I friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually ad- vantageous and accoptable for a termination of hos- tilities and resumption of peaceful relations. "NOTE (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion cf the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard tc suggestions that the language of Section Iエエ be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when tho section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.) "IV. Commerce between both nations. "When official approbation to the present under- standing has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, 10,011 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 24 2 5 respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take- necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between tha United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Gov- ！ ernments，it Vv'ould. be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures. "V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area. "On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimi- nation in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other to- I ward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan • and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safe- guarding and development of its own oconoLiy. "VI. The policies of both nations affecting J political stabilization in the Pacific area. "Both Governments declaro that the controlling ] . 0 , 0 1 2 policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area5 that it is their fundamental pur- pose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned. "VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands. "The Government of Japan declares its willing- ness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved •“ 4 5 6 叫 1 0 ！ 11 12 1 3 14 15 1 6 丨 - • • — I t I • - • m n - - I 1 I I s 9 o 1 2 3 4 r f , 11 2 2 2 2 2 2 10,013 "(Annex 1) "Annex and Supplement on the Pert of the Japanese Govprnment. "III. Action toward a peaceful settlement ‘ between China and Jaran. "The basic terms as referred to in the o"bove section £re cs follows: "1.Neighborly friendship, "2. (Cooperative defense cgninst injurious j communistic activities 一 一 including the stationing of Japanese trcops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion. "3. (Economic coonerrtion.) Suv iect to sgree-； I ment on an exchange of letters in regard to the I cation to this point of the principle of non-discrim- ination in inte.'.-nationrl cooire^cirl relr.tions. "4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and terri- tories . "5. MutAir.l respect for the inherent character- istics of erch nation cooperrting as good neighbors end forrainF an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace. "6� WithdrsY.'al of Japanese rrmed forces from Chinese territory as promptly ns possible r:nd in accorccnce with en agreement to be concluded between 10 ,014 7 1 Japan and China, 2 "7« No annexation. 31 "8* No indemnities. i 4 119• Amicable negotiation in regcrd to • : . ‘ . • • i 5 ！ Manchoukuo. 6 "(Annex 2) "Annex a.nd Supplement on the Part of the Ciovern- s merit of the United States. "IV. Commerce between both notions. * "It is understood tlint during the present inter- 11 national emergenoy end the United Strtes e<?ch 12 丨 shell permit export to the other of commodities in 13 amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, 14 except, in the case of esch, commodities w'lich it. needs 15 for its own puruoies of security nnd self-defense. :6 These limitatio ns r re mentioned to clnrify the obli- !'’ gations of eee vicv ferrjiiGrio. They ere not intended as restrictions r.gainst either Government; ?nd, it is 19 understood, both Governments will ap^ly suoh regula- tions in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations. "(Annex 3) "SuggeMed Exchange of Letters between the Secretary of State and the Jrpanese /mbas^rdor. "The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador： 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 10,015 i； "EXCELLENCY: In Section II of the Joint Declsr- 2 ： at ion which wr.s entered into today on behalf of our 3i two Governncnts, statements are made with regard to 4 ： the attitudes of the two Governments toward the Euronep.n 5 wrr. During the informal conversations which resulted 6 : i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s J o i n t D e c l s r こ t i o n I e x p l a i n e d 7 to you on a number of occasions the attitude End policy 8 ； of the Government of the United States toward the 9 ‘ hostilities in Europe end I pointed out that this attitude and policy were br.sed on the insliencble right ii;of self-defense.エ called special attention to en address which I delivered on Ar̂ ril 24 settinr forth fully the position of this Government upon this sub- 14 ject. ’’エ am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude toward the European w?r but in order that there msy be no mi sunders trnding I r,m again referring to the subject.エ shall be glad to receive from you confirmrtion by the Government of Japan that, with regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, which have been set forth ?.s indicated, the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require Japan to take rny action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present rgreement, 12 1 3 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 10,016 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 12 I 13 14 1 5 1 6 ！ 1 7 : 18 : 1 9 丨 2 0 | 2 1 ！ 22 2 3 ！ 2 4 丨 25 I to establish ?.nd to preserve perce in the Psciiic r.rees. "Accept, Excellency, the renewed pssurr.nces of my highest consideration. "The Japanese Ambasscdor to the Secretary of Statet "EXCELLENCY:エ hsve received your letter of June --. "I wish to state thrt my government is fully aware of the r.ttitude of i-.he Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe rs explained to me by you during our recent conversations 丨0nd as set forth in your r.ddress of April 24. I did not fごil to report to my Government the policy of the Government of the United States こs it h<?.d been exDl?ined to me, end エ may assure you thc.t my Government understrnds End appreciates the sttitude end position of the Government of the United States with regard to the European war. “エ wish also to assure you thrt the Government of Jspcn, with regard to the mersures which the Govern- ment of the United States may be forccd to ndopt in defense of its own security, is not under rny commit- ment requiring Japsn to trke r;ny action contrrry to or destructive of the fundr.ment?.! objective of the present egreement.“ 10,017 23 4 567 8 9 o 1 2 0 D 4 5 6 7 o o 9 o'1>21 3V- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 2 2 2 2 2 "The Government of Jcpan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely c.ssumc-d by the conclusion of this agreement， is determined to tcke no cction inimical to the establishment end preservation of percc in tho Pacific area. "Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration. "(Annex 4) "Suggested Letter to be Addressed by the Secretr.ry of State to the Jrpsnese Ambassador in Connection with the Joint Dcclsrrtion. "EXCELLEKCY; In the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of g genere1 agree— ment of understanding between our two Governments, you end your associrtc.s expressed fully m d frankly views on the iriセentions of the Jananese Gove^rnmcnt in regrrd to spplying to Jnprn's proposed economic cooperation with C hina the principle of non-d. is crimination in inter- national commercial relations . It is "believed thet it would be helpful if you could be so good ss to con- firm the statements already exDressed orally in the form of replies on the following points5 " 1 . D o e s the torn 1 economic cooperction' between Japan nnd China contemplate the. g renting by the 25 Government of China to the Ja'oanese Government or its 10,018 nationals of cny prefVrntial or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government r-nd Japanese nationals co :psrod with the Government r.nd nrtionnls of the United States snd of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inaugurrtion of ncpotirtions for a peaceful settlement b&t,voen Jr.pan snd Chinr the special Japan- ese companies，such es the North Chinr. Dovelopracn't Company end the Centre 1 China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, in so fir ？s Japanese official support may be involved, of any ； monopolistic or other preferential rights thrt they may cxercise in fact or thf;;t mc.y inure to them by virtue of present, circumstances in erees of China under Japcnese militrry occupation? "2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trcde nnd travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under J n n e s e military I occupation, could the； Jmenese Government indicrte approximately whet restrictions will be removed immedi- ately m o n the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiftions with the Government of Jnpr.n and \7hrt restrictions will be removed at later dates, with rn indicrtion in o p c h g s s g in so fer as possible of the r.pproximato time within which romovc.l of 1 0 , 0 1 9 restrictions would be cffocted? "3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government thst the Chinese Government shall exercise full snd complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese militsry notes which are beinp circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Jcnanese Government indicnte how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out? "It would be aprireciotod if os snecific replies as possible could be made to the questions above listed. "Accept, Excellency, the renewed rssurcnces of my highest considerEtion. "Foreign Relations Volume II, pages 486-492 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Higgins. MR. HIGGINS: We offer in evidence IPS docu- ment No. 1 6 3 2 V / (55), £n entry in KIDO's Diary, June 22， 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 16327/ (55) will receive exhibit No. 1093. 10,020 234567890 1 9 - 34 56 78 90 12 34 1 11 1 I 11 11 1 2 2 2 22 (Wheren-oon, tho document above referred to was marked provsccution* s exhibit No. 1093 ^nd received in evidence。） 2 5 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 丨 9丨 10 11 1 2 丨 1 3 | 1 4 ！ 1 5 丨 16 | 1 7 18 1 i9丨 20 I 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 丨 I. MR. HIGGINS： I read prosecution exhibit 1093： "Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 22 June 41. "June 22nd, 194-1-(Extract) "At 2 p.m. General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, telephoned me saying th?it the report relating to the outbreak of war between Soviet Russia and Germany had been received. Foreign Minister 1;IAT- SUOKA also telephoned me to say that the official report of the commencement of the war between Soviet Russia and Germany from Ambassador 0SHIMA had been received. So エ asked TOKUGA'.VA, the gentlemen in waiting on duty, to consult the Imperial convenience to see Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, and it was decided that he would "be granted an audience with the Emperor at 5.30 p.m. Before Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had his audience with the Emperor, I was received in audience by the Emperor to present my opinion based on my talk with Prince ICONOYE and Baron HIRANUIIA last night as follows: There has been a difference of opinion between the Premier ano the Foreign Minister concerning our foreign policy to be followec", i- case of war breaking^qut between Germany and Goviet Russia. As this war would have a predominant influence upon the future of this country, it was very desirable that his Majesty the 3 d . e . ; , D.jad , a l.OyOP.P Emperor should ask Foreign Minister MATSUOKA whether he had already consulted the Premier about it or not, and if not, prevail upon him to follow Prince KONOYE1s opinion. も 8 9 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 "At 5.30 p.m. Foreign Minister MAT5TJ0KA had his audience with the Emperor. After that I was 7 | requested to proceed to the Palace and was received in audience from 6.40 to 6.50 p.m. On this occasion, the Emperor was pleased to point out that the Foreign Minister1s policy would mean Japan1s positive advance to both the Northern and Southern regions and that it was quite doubtful whether or not the Government and the Supreme、マar Comrrund would agree and whether or not such policy would ever be appropriate in consideration of our national strength. His Majesty looked very anxious about this matter. I therefore telephoned Prince KONOYS to consult with him, but found he was not at home. Then I telephoned Baron HIRANUMA to say that it was desirable for him to pay careful consider at ion to this matter. At 9.30 p.m. I telephone Prince KONOYE to report the progress of Mr. HATSUOKA's audience with the Emperor, and to ask him to act with prudence at the Liaison Conference. At 00.30 T.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he hac just had a visit from Fcreign Minister liATSUOICA, who 10,023 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 explained th-t what ho had reported to the Throne yesterday was his prospect of the future and was never meant as a matter to be put into action immediately." THE PRESIDEIvT: Mr. Logan. MR. LOGAN;エ ask that this be referred to the Language Section, if the Tribunal please. THE PRESIDSOT； Why, Mr. Logan? IiR. LOGAN: Thero are so many corrections in 9 it that I think it yjoulc be quicker if I read the 1 _ • 0 entire report the uay vie have it rather than make the x : corrections line by line. 2： THE PRESIDENT: If they are lengthy, it will be sufficient if you point them out to !!ajor Moore， to v/hom we refer the natter. MR. LOGAN; Yes, sir. MR. HIGGINS: We offer in evidence IPS 1 document 1632-W( 56), which is an entry in KIEO's Diary June 23,1941. 19 THE PBESIDENTs Admitted on the usual terms. 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 CLERK OF THE COURT ： Prosecution1s document No. 1632-W(56) will receive exhibit No. 1094. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1094, and was received in evidence,) 5m. HIGGINS ； I read prosecution's exhibit 1094: 1 0 , 0 2 4 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 "Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 23 June 41. ，！エ v;ent to my office at 10 a.m.エ talked with the Chief Aias-de-Camp to the Smperor concerning the war between Germany and Soviet Russis. From 10：30 a.m. to 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor, anc expressed my opinion about such matters as the ForGign Minister's report submitted to the Throne yes- terday and the future outlook of the international situation. The Lord Chamberlain called on me at my office at 11:30 a.m. I informed him what I had just reportec to the Throne. At 1 p.m. the Chief Aido-de- Csmp to the Smperor cnllod on me to report on matters relative to the Chief of the General Staff1s audience with His Majesty, the Emporor. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace. We talked from 2:40 p.m. to 4 p.m. exchanging frnnk opinions on the changed situation caused by Gcrmnny's war against Soviet Russia. I went to my official residence at 4:20 p.m. when I had a call from General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, with whom エ exchnnged opinions. He put forth his opinion as to the unification and reinforcement of the Imperial General Headquarters. I agreed \n principle, but called his attention to the mattar concorning consultation with the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet 10,025 Admirals." MR. LOGAN: If tho Tribunal please, may we ha^e prosecution exhibit 1094 referred to the Language Section? THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better give you general permission to point out what you think are errors to Major Moore without coming for express pormiss ion. MR. LOGAN; Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: That will apply to all documents. 10,026 MP. HIGGIKS: We now offer in evidence IPS document l632W( 57), an entry of June 23，194-1,in KIDO's Diary. THL PRESIDENTi Admitted on the usual terms. CLSRr OF THE COIRT: Prosecution's document 1632W(57) will receive exhibit No. 1095. (Whereupon, the dociment above re- ferred to was narked prosecution1s exhibit No, 1095 and recoived in evidence.) MR. HIGG了! ^s I rr̂ .d prcsecution1 s exhibit 1095. "Entry from Ilarquic KIDO's Diary, 25 June 41 "June 1941-Full "Mr. HASHIMOTO, Director of tho Police Eureau, cane to rry house and reported about repercussions in various circles ir： this country. At 9 a.n. I went to Tokyo station co send off President ,S'ANG CHING WEI. After this I had an interview with Prince KONCYE who said that had a privata talk with WANG CHINC- WEI last ni ght, whon the latter had ex- pressed his opinion regarding general peace between China and Japan, saying that for the purpose of bring- ing about general peace, it was quite necessary as a matter of course to win over LI Tsung-jen and PAI Chung-Hsi, but at the same time our political demarche to CHIANG Kai-Shek^ was also necessary. Since we have to ask for the United States assistance r ~ .a.0.027 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 5 for this purpose, Wang further said, the pro-American politicians would inevitably gain influence once more, but to meet this situation we would have to get our comrades properly posted in the Government. The natter of the adjustment of relations between CHIANG Kai-Shek and WANG Ching-Wei would be placed in the hands of TOYAMA. As regards the Japanese General Army Headquarters in China, the senior officers have a good understanding of our Chinese policy but the contacts between 'Superiors and inferiors','left and right', and 1front and rear' are bad. In consequence, it is no easy task to carry out our Chinese policy on the spot. Corrupt practices of the Army in China also have been indeed rife. "At 9.20 a.m. Karoku NOMURA paid me a visit to talk with me. From 10.45 a.m. to 11.35 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor. At 1 p.m. I consulted the Chief Aide-de-camp to the Throne as to the holding of the Liaison Conference and on other problems. I went home, and then I left home again for the Empress Dowager's Palace to offer my con- gratulations on her birthday. At 4 p.m. the Premier, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief, of the Naval General Staff proceeded to the 10,028 234 5 67 8 9 SL1.L21.3J.4J516卩L8192021^32425 Palace to report on th decisions of the Liaison Conference regarding the Japanese troops' entry into French Indo-China. I met Prince KONOYE at 4.30 p.m. and had a talk with him," MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may I just point out at this tine that many of these excerpts have vary material errors in them, and I have checked it back with the translations that were made by the prosecution which thoy call "screen translationsas the Court will probably recall, and. some of these excerpts are those screen trans- lations. They are not revised. THE PRESID.ENT-. We can do no more than give you complete access to ^ajor Moore on all points, Mr. Logan. 腿. L O G A N : 1 appreciate that. I just wanted to point that out, that some of them have material erros -- very material. THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen Fiinutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the pro- ceedings were resumed as follows:) .0,029 腿SILiL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed. TH3 PRESIDENT: Mr. Higgins� MR. HIGGLES: Mr� President, we now tender in evidence IPS document No. 4081-C� This is a telegram dated 28 June 1941, taken from the Gernan files at Nuernber? and is from Ribbentrop at the German Embassy at Tokyo� TH^ PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns, CL^K n^ TH^： COURT: Prosecution's docuaent No. 4081-C will receive exhibit No. 1096. (T"hereuron, the document above referred to was narked prosecution's exhibit No. 1096 and received in evidence.) HP. SHIMAWOUCHI: I am counsel SHIMAMOUCHI. TĤ ! PRESIDENT: Counsel SHIHANOUCHI. m . SHIIMOUCHI: This document is sinilar to IPS document No. 4033 and it had been presented to the Court already nunbered -- received Court exhibit No. 587. The whole text was read by Prosecutor Hyde. THE PRESIDENT; You heard what he said, Mr. Higgins. I®. HIGGINS: Yes. your Honor. '70 1 f & e 1 d e n MR. H/iRDIN: If it please you, Mr�President, 20,030 our advice fron the record was that this was not-- this is "C," 4081-C, and thet the one that corres- ponded to 4033-D was 4081-B; ？nd 巧e left out-- THE PRESIDENT: But the counsel said this is already in as exhibit 587. irn.励DIN: If it is, it is an error of the record. MR. CUNNTKGHAI.1: If the Tribunal please— THU PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham. MR. CUNNING腿：The document which is nov/ introduced is the sane except for translation end the translation of one word changes the sense of the v.'holo docunent. THE PRESIDENT ： ，That one word is that's . M R . CUNNINGHAM: I would like to have it referred to the translation section to deternine whether or nnt the document introduced by I!r. Hyde is the correct translation or the docurient Intro- duced in this phase of the case is the correct translation. THE PRESIDENT: For our convenience, it night be read apain if it is important enough. MR. CUNNINGHAM: If your Honor please, it is not that important but I would like to csll attention to the translation section of the vital 10,031 feature. This document says that there is an agree- ment that OSHIM "should" use his influence and the other docunent says there is an agreement that 0SHI:Ui "will" use his influence, and I wo-ald like to h?.ve the correct translation. THE ffiESIDBNT: It seems very important so r ead it again and we will rq^er it to the trans- lation section. MR. HIGGINS: Very well, Mr. President. (Reading): "To be kept in locked file. "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) "Special Train 28 June 1941, 2010 hours "Arrival: 28 June 1941， 2030 hours "No. 267/R Gernan Foreign Office， 28 June "No. 560 of 28 June 1)German Embassy Tokyo 2) Cipher-Bureau, Secret remarks for officials in charge, "(Marginal note: Sent on to Tokyo under No. 916, 28 June 1941,2130 hours). "I have agreed with Ambassador OSHIIfA that he should influence his government to the effect of a speedy nilitary action against Soviet Russia. I also request you now to utilize all available possibilities to influence to the same effect the government there, snd other influential 1 0 , 0 3 2 circles. Please nake use of the following arguments: J "1)The war between Germany and Soviet Russia will not merely lead to the solution of more or less United individual pr obi ens, but will result in a fine.l solution through a fight to the finish /Tiidkampf-leesung/ of the Russian question. "2) The annihilation of Russian power by our military action, to be expected in relatively short tine, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fsct� If Germany gets hold of the Russian oil fields end wheat fields, sufficient provisions for the rhole of Europe is thereby guaranteed, so that the British blockade becomes entirely senseless. Direct lmd communication to E&st Asia will likewise be established at this occasion. "3) In this way all requirements then exist for making possible the New Order of the jJuropean Sphere as intended by the Axis Powers. "4) The present situation provides Japan, too, with a unique opportunity just as Germany in ISurope. Japan can now create the basis for the New Order planned by it in East Asia by a military action against Soviet Russia. Afte- the elnination of Soviet pov/er in the Par East also, the solution of 10,033 the Chinese problem as desired by Japan, will meet with no further difficulties. From the point of view of Japan's interests, the idea of a ncsve to the South in the direction of Singapore is and will be of great inportance. Since, at present, Japan is not ready for this, and in addition such move is not yet possible in the present phase of the war, it is in the utmost Japanese inter- est not to leave unused the at present available oprjortunity to solve the Russian problem in the Far East as well. She would thereby protect her rear for the move to the South. "6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Jap an should, without delay, decide upon a military attack against Soviet Russia. A Japanese move against an already beaten Soviet Russia would considerably injure Japan's moral and political position. "7) It nay be counted upon that the speedy conquest of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan tekes part in it from the East, will probably be the best way to convince the United States of the abso- lute futility of entering into the war on the side of England,.then completely isolated and facing the most powerful alliance of the earth. RIBBENTROP." 1 0 , 0 3 4 エ not? offer in evidence IPS docunent No. 4081-D, taken from the German files at Nuern- berg. It is a telegram, No. 1069， from Ott to Ribbentrop, 28 June 1941. 測 PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns. CL'iRK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu- nent No， 4081-D will receive exhibit No. 1097� ('"hereupon, the docunent above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1097 and received in evidence.) LIR. HIGGINS:エ now read prosecution exhibit No. 1097： "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) "Tokyo 28 June 4 1 1 1 4 5 hours "arrival 28 June 41 2210 hours "To be kept in locked file. "No. 1069 of 23 June Secret： "Re Telegram No. 1034 with Pol VIII, of 25 June. "，ithin the last days the leadership committee of the Cabinet has repeatedly net in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire Cabinet and deliberating committees without reaching a clear- cut decision as to Japan's future attitude to the 10,035 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 i 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 24 2 5 German—Russian war. As far as could be 'found out^ only preparatory measures fcr the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered thus far. As Army ！neraorandun confirms, preparatory measures have indeed begun with zest. Under the circumstances the preparations for attack against Russia will take at least six weeks, unless a decisive material and moral weakening of Russia in the Far Fast takes place "beforehand, According to reliable, confidential infornetion, Premier KONOYE and the majority of Cabinet Ministers, to be sure, seem to maintain the view thc.t nothing must be undertaken that would injure Japan's n.ilitary pos- ition in Chins. Hence, the Cabinet seens thus far merely to have resolved on tightening their grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions are allegedly bein? prepared. "In public and behind the scenes discus- sions concerning the attitude to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, ?:ho always closely work together with the 3nbassy, have held various confidential conversations — cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June -- in Y'hich caution towards the Soviet Union and determined action in the South was advocated. "The danger exists that the Southern 10,036 expansion desired by this group "will c.t first be United to French Indo-China, while their efforts* (* Clear text evidently missing) could hinder Japan's activity in the N-^rth. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the general directions, piven to ?ne rt Berlin, to v:ork, in the first place, for Japan's activity in the South while ignoring the Soviet Union, are still valid if a successful nove to the South beyond Indo-Ghina cannot be counted on at present. According to confidential reports coning to ne fron the Japanese Foreign Office, /nbassador OSHIMA is srid to have urgently advised the Japanese government to attack Russia soon. "I request telegraphic instructions. "Ott." 竹e now offer in evidence IPS docunent I Fo.1632” (58), which is p.n entry in KIDO's Diary, June 28，1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terns. C L观 OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docunent No. 16327 (53)扔ill recoive exhibit No. 1098. ('"hereupon, the document above referred to was narked prosecution's exhibit No. 1098 ？nd received in evidence.) H HIGGINS: I now read prosecution exhibit No. 1093: ""Txtract from entry from Marquis KIDO' s Diary, 28 June 41. "'"ar Minister TO JO proceeded to the Palsce, and after his withdrawal f m n the presence of the Emperor, he had. a talk with ne. He explained the following natters:(1)The Irny's policy dealing with the C-erman-Soviet r'ar is that the attitude of the Kr-antung ムrmy towards that war should be calm and prudent. (2) Various information from A^Vbasssdつrs in China regarding that war. (3) Political T moves or demarches towards YEN Hsi-shan, LI Tsunp-jen | end PAI C h u n g - h s i . � The strengthening of the Imperial General Headquarters, r.nd arrangenents for then to meet every day In the Palace." MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, in view I of the ruling this norning, may the record shov; after each one of these entries are read -- raay it appear after each nne is read in the record itself that that particular excerpt is referred to the language section without further order? TH^ PRESIDENT: Every counsel, defense and other counsel, is p.t liberty to refer any point of translation to the head of the language section, 10,038 Ma j or Moore, without the p emission of the Tribunal� If that right is fully exercised there will be no need for the Tribunal to refer any docunent to Major Moore. If Major Moore advises a correction he will notify the fact to the counsel who presented the document, who will read it as corrected unless he dissents when the Court may have to take other steps to secure finality, Taut we do not contemplate that in any circumstances. Dr. KIYOSE. DR. KIYOSE: I wish to make one request regarding the Court exhibit. I have been noticing this since yesterday that the translations presented to the Court by the prosecutors are, generally speaking, fairly accurate� However, in the translation of the diary of KIDO there are very many errors. It may be one way to read the documents here before any corrections are made and then corrected after consideration^ however, if it can be arranged so that the translations can be pre- sented to us beforehand, one day beforehand, I believe it would speed up matters here in the Court and there will be no misunderstanding on that point, and it would be much better both for the Tribunal and for us� I hope the Court will consider this matter. 10,039 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 THE MONITOR: Slight addition: If the translations are handed to us one da:, before the required tiwe and necessary corrections made ••一 one or two days beforehand -- so that counsel v/ill read, the corrected copy. THE PRESIDENT: If the Court's permission is availed of fully there will be no need for the Court to make any references to the lahgiia^e section. ，e insist on th^t course beinp follov ed. Mr. Hj.ggins. MR. HIGGINS: now offer in evidence IPS document No. 219P (78) from e.rhibit for identification No. Volume 1.This is an excerpt from statement of Ambassador C+re双 to Foreign Minister EATSUOKA, dated 8 July 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terras. CLERK OF Tim COURT: Prosecution's document No. 219P (78) will receive exhibit No. 1099. ("'hereupon, the document above referred to was marked, prosecution's exhibit No. 1099 and received in evidence.) 2 5 1 0 , 0 4 0 MR. HIGGINS': I now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1099. • "THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA). "Excerpt. No. 1845. TOKYO, July 8,1941. EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that during a severe Japanese air raid on Chungking on Jua^ 29,194-1, at which, time the British Embassy was badly damaged, the con- cussion from, bombs dropped on the south bank of the river caused some damage to the staff residence of the American Embassy." I now offer in evidence I. P. S. document No. 220C (14), which is an excerpt from the press release by the Department of State — no, I beg your pardon; I have skipped one — ( 1 3 ) from exhibit for identification 58, volume II, which is an excerpt from an oral statement of Ambassador Grew to Minister MATSUOKA, 8 July 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220C (13) will receive exhibit No. 1100. (^/hereupon, the document above 4 6 8 9 0 4 6 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 2 5 Goldberg & s p r a 11 referred to was narked prosecution1s exhibit V 1 0 , 0 4 1 No. ！L100 and received in evidence.) MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit No. 1100: "ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA). "Excerpt. "Since that timo, information has been received to the effect that certain cargo at Hanoi as well as at Haiphong has been seized by the Japanese military, but that it was impossible to check Ihe am cant and nature of the cargo so seized because the rightful owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouse;さ where their merchandise was storefl. Nevertheless, it is known that a substantial amount of American cargo has been taken away. "In bringing this subject again to the attention of the Foreign Office, it is urgently requested that immediate steps be taken to restore the merchandise to its rightful owners. The Govern- ment of the United States, as has been stated Tiefore, does net recognize the right of the Japanese military to take any action whatsoever in French -Indo China against property in which there is an American In- terest. The American Embassy has been instructed to 1 0 , 0 4 2 state that the result of persistence hy the Japanese in action suoh as that descri]^e| above can only be further deterioration in relafeipns between the United States and Japan. "TOKYO, July 8,1941.M 腿. H A R D I N : Mr. President, may ェ ask per- mission to depart from the oir<§§r here and introduce .？f f s in evidence I. P. S. document |Jq, 1339 '85). I desire this — this is the document which counsel " . 知 藝 - ： called to attention yesterday morning as being telegram No. 47. It does noli |how on the translation nor any of the English that ie |pund, but they say th«t from the Japanese it is t|jat telegram, and in obedience to your Honor' s req^,e|t we have investigated ‘ 餘 ‘：，'x ’ and are willing to accept thafe and read it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: It hajx not been read before? MR. HARDIN： It has 鄉！，It is similar to one which was read, but not ileiiijical. t % THE PRESIDENT: A di?fe?ent translation has f t : already been read, is that MR. HARDIN: No, si,??, another telegram very “ | ' similar to this was in evide|ige? but not this one. THE PRESIDENT: Adrat|tpd on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: prosecution's document N0.1339A (5) will receive e|||.pt No. 1101. ！ ； y ： 10,043 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 | 1 7 18 | 1 9 ！ 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 (YJhereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1101 and received in evidence.) MR. HARDIN: We read prosecution's exhibit No, 1101: "FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA'S REPLY OF F E B . 1 7 TO FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN. "His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs is rather surprised to learn about the undue concern shown on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs which is, no doubt, based upon information emanating from the British Embassy in Tokyo and other sources. There is, of course, no way,to as- certain what kind of information the British Govern- ment has been receiving, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to avail himself of this oppor- tunity to state that so far as he can see there is no ground for entertaining such alarming views on the situation in East Asia. "On nore than one occasion the Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and even to the public at large that one of the primary purposes of the Tripartite Pact is to limit the sphere of the European war by 10,044 preventing those Powers not engaged in hostilities at present from ；joining the war and also to bring about its termination as quickly as possible. The Japonese Governmc-nt his so far found no reason or occasion to alter this avowed aim which constitutes a fundamental basis of its policy. The British Governnent may rest ssured on this point. "However, the ICinister for Foreign Affairs feels obliged to say candidly that he cannot help entertaining a certain amount of anxiety, if not misgivings, on the movements of the British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations with an eye to meeting supposed contingencies in the Pacific and the South Seas. Press reports about these move- ments originating fron American sources and else- where are causing increasing misgivings in Japan with the consequence that in some quarters it is even contended that Japan should lose no time in taking measures to meet the worst eventuality in these regloris. The concern felt is quite natural in thd face of these disturbing reports. If the American Government could only be persuaded to restrict its activities to the Western Hemisphere, and prudently j avoid causing unnecessary anxiety to the Japanese, 10,045 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 the situation would indeed be very much mitigated. "Having had the privilege of forming personal acquaintancesJilp at Geneva with His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs and prompted by t h e belief that a general exchange of fr̂ .nTk; views at this juncture will be of sswe ser- vice In enabling the two nr.tions to see eye to eye, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to take the liberty of making further observations. The upper- most thought in ny mind has always been world peace. He sincerely hopes th^t on the one hand, the China Affair will be brought to an end as soon as possible and on the other, the EuroDean war will see an early teraination. It is my earnest and constant prayer that the Powers may gather again to discuss at a round table their differences and disputes and deliberate on the gr^at question of organizing an enduring peace upon a ；Just and equitable world order. In this connection, I desire to assure ray eminent colleague that far from aspiring to control the destinies of, or to dominate, other peoples, it is Japan's established policy to innugur^te an era of peace and plenty and mutual helpfulness throughout tho region of Greater East Asia by promoting the spirit of concord and conciliation. As repeatedly 1 0 , 0 ^ 6 M 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 affirmed, Japan's motto is 'no concruest, no oppression, no exploitation.' I, therefore, strongly deprecate those biased reports designed to calumniate Japan. "The Minister for Foreign Affairs frankly confesses his utter inability to see any good purposes served by prolonging the war whatever the motive. IWntevet the outcome, whoever the victor, there are present in the world situation, especially in E u r o p e r elements of great danger such as would bring about a fearful state of chaos and confusion, possibly eventuating in the downfall of modern civilization. It takes statesmanship of a high order to foresee and meet in time such catastrophic contingency. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not lost hope yet that such statesmanship is not wanting in the British Empire« / "Lastlv, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply con- cerned as she is with an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over, or to take whatever action is calculated to recover normal conditions. "The Minister for Foreign Affairs trusts that 10,047 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ' 8 9 10 111 12 | 13 l 1 4 | 15 | 16 1 7 18 1 9丨 20 21 22 2 3 24 2 5 His Britannic Majestv's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs will not hesitste to share with him the conviction that upon the shoulders of the leading Powers rests the great and grave responsibility of restoring peace and saving modern civilization from the impending collapse. Such a responsibility can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesman- ship willing to display an accommodating and generous spirit in listening to others 1 claims and contentions. It is hardly necessary to add that whatever Japan may d o , she will always be actuated by the conscious- ness of the responsibility she owes to Humanity." We offer now in evidence I. P . S. document 220C (14), which is an excerpt from press release by the Department of State in Washington, dated July 24, 1941. THE PRESIDENTi Admitted on the usual terms. CLfeRK OF THE COURTi Prosecution's docunent No. 220C (14) will rebeive exhibit Ho. 1102. (Yifhereupon, the document above referred to was narked prosecution's exhibit^So* 1102 and received n.n evidence.) MR. HARDIN: "Je read prosecution' s exhibit No. 1102: "PRESS R3LSASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 10,048 - STATE ON JULY 24,1941. "In response to inquiries by press corres- pondents , t h e Acting Sec.'^tary made the following statement: •"It will be recalled that in 1940 the Japanese Government gave expression on several occasions to its desire that conditions of disturbance should not spread to the region of the Pacific, with special references to the Netherlands East Indies and French In(5o-china. This desire was expressly concurred in by many other Governments, including the Government of the United States. In statements by this Government, it was made clear that any alter- ation in the existing status of such areas by other than peaceful processes could not but be prejudicial to the security and peace of the entire Pacific area and that this conclusion was based on a doctrine which has universal application. "'On September 23，1940， referring to the events then rapidly happening in theIndo-China situ- ation , t h e Secretary of State stated that it seemed obvious that the existing situation w a s being upset and that the changes were being achieved under duress. Present developments relating toIndo-China provide clear indication that further changes are now being effected 10,049 - under duress. "'There is no doubt as to the attitude of the Government and people of the United States toward acts of aggression carried out by use or threat of armed force. That attitude has been made abundantly clear. "'By the course which it has followed and is following in regarl to Indo-Chinc y the Japanese Govern- ment is giving clear indication that it is determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force. "'There is not apparent to the Government of the United States any valid ground upon which the Japanese Government would be warranted in occupying Indo-Chinaor establishing bases 冬n that area as measures of self-defense. "'There is not the slightest ground for belief on the part of even the wost credulous that the Governments of the United States, of Grest Britain, or of the Netherlands have any territorial ambitions inJndo-Ghioa or have been planning any moves which could have been reparded as threats to Japan. This Government can, therefore, only eoncltide that the action of Japan is undertaken because of the estimated 10,050 - value tc Japan of bases in that region primarily for the purpose of further and ヮore obvious movements of conquest in adjacent areas. 10,051 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 腿. H A R D I N : We wish to tender in evidence I. P , S . document No. 1699, which is a document taken from the Japanese Foreign Office, Tokyo, duly authenti- cated, and which relates to Central Liaison Conferences he,*,d during 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1699 will receive exhibit N o . 1103. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit No. 1103 and received in evidence.) MR. HARDIN (Reading): "Liaison Conferences held during 194-1. "(An Abstract from Article in Asahi) "Date and place: 6:00 - 9:30 p. m.， on 13 January at Megro-Saryo (Japanese Restaurant). "Attendance: KONOYE (Prime Minister)； TOJO (War Minister)； SUGIYAMA (Chief of Army General Staff)； TOM IDA. (Chief Secretary of the Cabinet) ； ANAMI (Vice Minister of War); MUTO (Chief of Military Bureau)； TSUKADA (Vice Chief of Army General Staff)5 TANAKA (Director of Army General Staff) ； TOYODA (Vice Minis- ter of Navy)； OKA (Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau)； KOKLO (Vice Chief of Naval General Staff)5 UGAKI (Vice Chief of Naval General Staff) 10,052 "Remarks: Exchange of views." THE PRESIDEIW: M r . Hardin, the majority of my colleagues do not want this read. MR. HARLIN: Very well. We submit it in evidence. THE PRESIDENT; If it showed the nature of the business on each day, it would be different, but it does not in any detail, at all events. M R . HARDIN; We will offer it in evidence ： 丨 . ‘ without reading it, your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there any part you would like t o point out in particular? It may be an extremely useful document, but there is no advantage, so far as ェ can see, in reading it into the trans- cript if the nature of the business is so indefinite. M r . Smith. M R . HARD IN: We think it important as to each 'defendant in this case to show his attendance at Liaison Conferences during this period, even though this document does not show the business transacted at the Liaison Conferences. THE PRESIDENT: Well, what advantage has it as a part of the transcript that it does not possess qis an exhibit? M E . HARDIN: Well, M r . President,ェ do not 10,053 - know that there is any particular difference in its advantage on the transcript beyond its influence as an exhibit. It is the information that during this critical period these particular defendants were taking part in the conferences in this period leading to 一- and all the cGtitext of the evidence in the case shows important matters were on hand. THE PRESIDENT: As you deal with the happen- ings in those conferences you can indicate who was present. 皿. S M I T H : If the Court please, we wanted to record an objection. This document has no probative value at all. 腿..LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, it appears in the document which has been filed v/ith the Tribunal that it is a copy which was taken from, prepared by somebody from this newspaper, Asahi, and filed in the Cabinet Secretariat 1 s office. It does not appear from the document filed what date or dates of the newspaper were used in compiling that report which was 丄丄ed in the Cabinet Secretariat's office. The newspaper or newspapers in which these reports appeared have not been filed with the Tribunal, and, furthermore, it does not seem possible -- it may be so -- that a 10,054 - newspaper would publish data like this which is supposed to refer to secret conferences. THE PRESIDENT: You might consider for what purpose you are really introducing this. You may have some good purpose. It may be that it will be suffi- cient to meet that purpose if you read only part of it. Think it over during the luncheon adjournment, M r . Hardin. Vfe will rocess until half past one. (Whereupon， at 1 1 ヲ ヲ ， a recess was taken.) 10,055 - AFTERNOON SESSION M/RSHAL OF THE COURT; The International Ililitary Tribunal for the Far Ssst is now resumed. THE PRESipEIff; Ilajor Ho ore. L“NC-UAGE AR3ITER <r.ajor Iloore) 、： If the Tribunal please, referring to exhibit 587, record page 6562, line 18, and exhibit 1096, line 1 , a f t e r consult- ation with both prosecution and defense, it has been agreed to recommend that in exhibit 587 the word "will" be deleted and, in exhibit 10-96 5 the word "should" "be deleted. Thus, in both cases, the line will read, しSHIIIA that he influence," and so forth. T1IE P R E S I D E D s Both exhibits will be read accordingly。 Thank you, Major. Ilr. Hardin. L K . H.-1BDIN; Ilr。President, as to exhibit 1103, \'ie have conferred during the noon hour and are still of the opinion that the document is important, and we would liko to have it in the record. This document will be followed later during this trial with evidence from interpretations of the various defendants as to the purpose of these liaison confer- ences ? os to the questions discussed, and the de- cisions made at them. Greenberg & Barton 10,055 1/2 THE PRESIDENT: Should you not name them when you reveal what the discussions were to obviate 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 丨 1 7丨 18 j 19丨 20 21 i I 22 2 3 ！ 24 2 5 the need for us to refer back to this document? M R . HARDIN: I, of course, see the force of that. But, in those interrogations, they will not be definite a si to the number of these conferences or the dates of them and as to the individuals who attended. This evidence -- THE PRESIDENTS Can you not tell us then the dates and the persons present? M R . HARDINs Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: This document at this stage of the transcript would be no more useful to us than the exhibit itself if omitted from the transcript. M R . HARDIN: At this time, simply "because it is dated within this period, I am happy to give the names of the defendants and the dates of these con- ferences. In each case エ would like to add that Premier KONOYE was present at all of them but three. THE PRESIDENT: You had better read it.. MR, HARDIN: I shall start at the first although エ have read a little. (Whereupon, IPS document No. 1699， exhibit No. 1103 was read as follows:) "Liaison Conference held during 194-1. "Date and place: 6s00 - 9 ： 3 0 p.m. on 13 January at Megro-Saryo (Japanese Restaurant). 10,057 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 "Attendance: KONOYE (Prime Minister) ； TOJO (War Banister); SUGIYAMA (Chief of Army General Staff)； TOMIDA (Chief Secretary of the Cabinet)； aNAMI (Vice Minister of War); MUTO (Chief of Military Bureau)； TSUKADA (Vice Chief of Army General Staff); TAKAKA (Director of Army General Staff)； TOYODA (Vice Minister of Navy); OKA (Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau)； KONDO (Vice Chief of Naval General Staff)； UGAKI (VicQ Chief of Naval General Staff). "Remarks: Exchange of views. "Date and place: lis00 a.m. on 16 January at the official residence of the Prime Minister. "Attendance: KOSOYE; HIRANUMA (Home Minister); MATSUOKA (Foreign Minister)； TOJO; OIKAWA (Navy Minister)； TSUKADA; KOEDO. "Remarks； Exchange of informations and views on important matters. "Date and place； 9s00 - 1 1 : 0 0 a.m. on 17 January at the official residence of the Prime Minister. "Attendance: KONOYE; HIRANUMA, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, KONDO. "Remarks: Discussion of important matters. "Date and place; "10:30 a.m. on 19 January.“ No remarks, no record of attendance. 10,058 2 ニ 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 s 9 o 12 3 4 1£バ^J 2 2 2 2 "Date and place: 11:00 - 1 2 : 0 0 a.m. on 23 January. "Romarks； Conference on various matters of the d a y . "Date and places 4:30 - 6:30 p . m . on 3〇 January at the official residence of the Prime M i n i s t e r . "Attendance: KONOYE; M A T S U O K A , TOJO, OIKAWA, HIRANUli/lA, SUGIYAMA, KONDO, M U T O , OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of informations and v i e w s . HIRANUMA the d a y . "Date and place； 4:00 p . m . on 3 F e b r u a r y . "Attendance: K O N _， M A T S U O K A , TOJO, OIKAWA. ,SUGIYAMii, KONDO, M U T O , O K A . "Remarks； Exchange of views on matters of "Date and places 1 1 ; a . m . on 13 F e b r u a r y . "Attendance: KONOYE; M A T S U O K A , TOJO, OIKAWA, HIHANU1!A, SUGIYAMA, KONDO, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA. "Remarks； Exchange of views." THE PRESIDENT; They are all the same, are they not? M R . HARDIN; That is the same thing. I beg your pardon, n o . I reread it. M a y I correct a remark of a while ago? The 10,059 - sheet shows dittos on the two previous ones on the first p?ge insteed of no sttendance. (Reading) "11:00 a.ni, on 20 February. "Attendance: MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAfeA, HIRA- NUM/” S U G I Y腿, K O N D O , MUTO, OKA. "Remario： Exchange of views on problems concerning latest interne.tionsl affairs. "Date and p l a c e : 1 1 ; 0 0 a.m. on 23 February. "Attendpnce: i^TSUOKA, TO JO, O I K A M , HlH^— N腿, S U G I Y i J , ^ , KONDO, MUTO, OKA. "Remerks: Exchange of views on matters of the day. "Dpte and plpce: 5；00 - 7：30 p.m. on 2 March nt KONOYE's private residence at O.gikubo, Tokyo. "Attendance: KONOYE, TOJO, OIKAkA, MATSUOKA, HIRANUWl, kUTO, TOLIID,；, SUGIY/iMA, KONDO. "Rcnarkss Exchange of views. "Date and place: 11:0© 一 12:30 a.m. on 6 March at the official residence of the Prime Minister. "Attendance: KONOYE, M T S U O K A , TO JO, OIKilM, HIR^NUMA, SUGIY/J^” KCKDO, TOMIDii, MUTO. "Remprks: Exchange of views. "Date and plsce: 5s20 - 7：30 p.in. on 7 March "Attendence: KONOYE, MATSUOK ム ， T O JO, O i m « A , H I E A K 腿 , S U G I Y 通 , K O N D O , TOiilDA, MUTO." io,o6o Same as to remarks. "Date and place: 9^30 - 1 0 : 1 0 a.m. on 11 M a r c h . "Attendance:KONOYE, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, HIRAnUIlA, SUGIYAI/iA, KONDO, TOMIDA, MUTO.’’ Same as to remarks. "Date and places 4;30 p . m . on 10 April. "Attendance; K O N O Y E , TOJO, OIKAWA, H I M N U M A , OHムSHI (Vice Minister of Foreign Ministry)， SUGIYAMA, NAGANO (Chief of Naval General S t a f f ) , MUTO‘； O K A , TOMIDA. "Date and place: In the fore-noon on 17 A p r i l . "Attendance: K O N O Y E , T O J O , OIKAWA, HIRANUMA, SUC-IYAMA, NAGANO, OHASHI, IfUTO, OKA, TOMIDA。 "Remarks: Exchange of views on matters of the d a y . "Date and plr.ce: 1:00 p . m . on 3 May at the official residence of the Prime Minister. "Attendance: K O N O Y E M A T S U O K A , TOJO, OIKAWA, hihafuma, SUGIY/JIA, NAGMO, MUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of v i e w s . "Date and place: 11:00 - 1 2 : 1 5 a.m. on 8 M a v . "Attendance: K O N O Y E , HIllANUM, MATSUOKA, 10,061 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKi“" Sane as to exchange of views. "Date and p l a c e :ヲ : 0 0 - 6:10 p.m. on 12 M a y . "Attendance: KONOYE, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, HIRANUMA, SUGIYMIA, NAGANO, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA." Same as to remarks. "Date and places lis00 a.m. on 15 May. "Attendance; KONOYE, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, Hir:ANUMA, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA ? SUGIYAMA, M G A N O . " Same remarks. "Date and place: lis00 a . m . - I s 0 0 p.m. on 22 May. "Attendance; KONOYE, tiATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA, SUGIY•碰，NAGANO." Same as to remarks. "Date and place; 11:00 a . m . - 1 ; 0 0 p.m. on 29 May. "Attendance: KONOYE, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWA, KIRANIM/i, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA." Same as to remarks. "Date and p；! .ces 9；30 - 1 0 s 3 5 a.m. on 6 June. "Attendance: KONOYE, I.L-TSUOKA, HIRANUMA, 10,062 - 23456789 01234- 56 789 o 12 3 4 1111111 1112 2 2 2 2 TOJO. day. OIKAWA, NAGANO, TSUKADA, M U T O , OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Conference on problems of the "Dates and places 3 •ザ p.m. on 11 June. "Attendance: KONOYE, HIRANUMA, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIKAWi” SUGIYALIh, NAGANO ? MUTO', OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of views on important matters of the day. "Dates and place: 11:10 a.m.一 1:55 p.m. on 12 June. "Attendance; KONOYE, HIRANUMA, MATSUOKA, TOJO, O I M W A , SUGIYAKA, NAGANO, MUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of views. "Dates and place: 2:30 p.m. on 16 June. "Attendance: KONOYE,MATSUOKA, TOJO, 0 1 腿 A , HIRANUMA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, MUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of views on important problems of the day. "Dates and place: 3:0° p.m.. on 23 June, "Attendances KONOYE, MATSUOKA, TOJO, OIK/iWA, HIRANUMA, SUGIYALA, NAGANO, I.IUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Conference on matters of the 25 day. 10,063 - "Dates and place: 1:00 t).m».on 25 June. "Attendance: KONOYE, MATSUOKA, HIRANUMA, TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, MUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Conference on matters of the day. "Dates and place: 10:10 a.m. on 26 June. "Attendance: KONOYE, .TOJO, OIKAWA, MATSUOKA, HIRANUM/i, OHASHI, SUGIYAMA, TSUKADA, NAGANO, KONDO, MUTO, OKA, TOMIDA. "Remarks: Exchange of views on important problems of the day. "Dates anci place: 1:30 p.m. on 27 June. "Attendance: Same persons as yesterday. "Remarks； Continuous conference on the same subject as on previous occasion, "Dates and place: 2:00 p.m. on 28 June. "Attendance。KONOYE, MATSUOKA, HIRANUMA, TOJO, OIKAWA, SAKAMOTO (Director of Euro-Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Ministry), SUGIYAMA, TSUKADA, NAGANO, KONDO, TOMIDA, MUTO, OKA. "Remarks; Exchange of views on the important problems of the day. "Dates and place: 5:00 p.m. on 30 June, "Attendance: Same persons as above. "Remarks； Exchange of views. "Dates and place: 4:00 p.m. on 21 July 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 o 12 34 56 7 8 9 o 12 34 5 111111111122222 ? " at the office of the High Command situated at the Imperial Grounds. "Remarks: It was decided that the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other Ministers concerned, should attend this place occasionally and exchange views and project national policies with W a r , Navy ministers and Staffs of the High Command." ( THE PRESIDENT: M r . Logan. M R . LOGAN: May we have a direction from the Tribunal that the prosecution furnish the defense with the date that this report was made and the date or dates on which the extracts appeared in the news- paper Asahi? THE PRESIDENT: This exhibit is the document as you found it, I take it. You have not made it up from the newspaper. W e l l , I do not know why we should direct that you supply the defense with the material from which the Japanese made it up. Iv!R. HARDIN: Yes, sir. We will be happy to do that. OhI f'p P R E S I D E D : If you would like to do so, we will not prevent you; but I do not think we will direct you to do it. M R . HARDIN: I did not understand. 10,86 - 234567 89 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 0 1 2 3 4 I 1 1 1 l i 1 ,i I 2 2 2 2 2 THE PRESIDENT: We cannot give the direction sought by Mr. Logan, 腿* HARDIN: We now offer in evidence IPS document No* 2216 which is an affidavit of former Secretary of State Stimson. We ask that it be marked as an exhibit. ‘ * • ： ‘ •. THE PRESIDENT: M r . Logan. M R . LOGAN: The defense objects to testimony of the Honorable Henry L. Stimson by affidavit on the grounds that no reason has been advanced by the prosecution why M r . Stimson could not be here and testify in person. THE PRESIDENT: He Is in America and not in Japan. MFU LOGAN: Secondly, he was, at the time of the eventsitestified to by h i m , Secretary of State, a high official of the United States Government5 and he has set forth certain facts and certain con- clusions in this affidavit in which certain acts are characterized by him as "being aggressive. The de- fense should be given an opportunity to cross- examine him on these facts and the： conclusions which he has drawn, THE PRESIDENT: We have decided — 腿. L O G A N : And by his absence we have been 10,066 - deprived of the fundamental right, as we all know it, of cross-examination of this witness. Furthermore, it is a method adopted by the prosecution of proving a case by ex parte evidence which we do not believe should be permitted with a witness of Mr. Stimson's caliber. I understand, although he is in his seven- ties , that M r . Stimson is in good health5 and, in the event thr.t this affidavit is admitted, we ask that a subpoena be issued by the Tribunal for him to appear here and testify. THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks. m . BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I want to request that, due to the importance of this wit- ness , i f the affidavit "be accepted that it be done conditioned upon the production of the witness by the prosecution for cross-examination. MR. HARDIN: M r . President, our highest hope was to have -- (Whereupon, a discussion off the record was had by the Members of the Tribunal.) M R . HARDIN: Our highest hope was to have Mr. Stimson here. My information was that due to his age he was unable to undertake the travel across 10,067 - the ocean to get here. THE； PRESIDENT: We have decided to receive the affidavit and, therefore, to overrule the ob- jection to its admission. If further examination of M r . Stirason is desired by the defense, it could "be done on commission in America, or by way of interrog- atories . We can see no need for his attendance here. He is a statesman in the highest category; and no such statesmen were called in Germany, at all events. That is not conclusive, of course. Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THI" COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2216 will receive exhibit No. 1104. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit No. 1104 and received in evidence.) 10,068 MR. HARDIN: We read prosecution's ex- hibit 1104: "INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAK EAST. "The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CEIKA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN I R E L A N D " — THE PRESIDENT: Don't read that. You can say "United States and others against ARAKI and others." MR. HARDIN: All right, sir。 （Reading) "United States of America, Against IRAKI, and others "COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, STATE OF NEW YORK, UNITED STATES OF AMEltlCA. "I, Henry L . Stimson, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say: "I was Secretary of State of the United States of America from March 5 , 1 9 2 9 , to March 4 , 1 9 3 3 . Prior to that time, in 1928,エ was appointed Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which office I held untilエ was named Secretary of State. "On the basis of my personal observation and contacts, as well as on the information coming to‘me in the course of my official duties, I' verily be- lieve the following statements to be true: 2 6 f 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 5 1 A b r a m & M o r s e i I 16 I I 17 IS 19 20 21 22 2?) 24 2 5 10,069 - "When エ took office as Secretary of State, Japan, together with the United States and various other nations, was a party to the following treaties, pacts, and agreements, and others, or had sub- scribed to the principles therein announced: "(1) The Convention for the Pacific Settle- ment of International Disputes, signed at The Hague 29 July 1899; "(2) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague 18 O c t o b e r 1 9 0 7； "(3) The Hague Convention No. Ill relative to the Opening of hostilities signed 18 October 1907; "(4) Agreement effected by exchange of notes between the United States and Japan, signed 30 November 1908, declaring their policy in the Far East; 11 (5リ Treaty between the British Commonwealth of Nations, France, Japan, and the United States re- lating to their Insular possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific O c e a n , 1 3 December 1921; "(6) The Treaty between the United States of America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, Bel- gium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, concluded and signed at Washington 10,070 6 February 1922, known as the Nine-Power Treaty; "(7) The Treaty concluded and signed at Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and as the Pact of Paris 5 "(8) Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on land, signed at The Hague 18 October 19〇7. "As a party to the above listed treaties, pacts, and agreements, and others, or as a subscriber to the principles therein announced, Japan had agreed, inter alia: "To use its best efforts to insure the Pacific settlement of international differences 5 in case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers; not to commence hostilities without previous and explicit warning; to maintain the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean and to defend the prin- ciple of equal opportunity for commerce and in- dustry in China and to support the independence and integrity of China5 in event of controver,sy in any- Pacific questions to invite other Parties to a joint Conference；to respect the sovereignty, independence, 10,071 - and the territorial administrative integrity of China; to use its influence to effectually establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China 5 to refrain from seeking special or monopolistic privileges in China detrimental to the rights or interests of other foreign powers or their nationals; to condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and to re- nounce war as an instrument of national policy; not to move troops or convoys across the territory of a neutral Power. "In 1931 Manchuria was actually and legally part of China. Japan claimed some exceptional rights in Manchuria, and many of these rights, while always asserted with emphasis, were not attested by documentary- evidence which was unchallenged. Some of the treaties upon which Japanese claims rested were asserted by- China to be either unauthentic or to have been executed under duress. Under cover of these treaties, however, Japan exercised powers of the ad- ministration and police throughout a zone which bordered the South Manchuria Railway, based upon the armed forces she was permitted to maintain. These .25 areas included towns and portions of cities like 10,072 Mukden and Changchun. "While there was no cleavage in Japanese feel- ings as to the existence and importance of special interests in Manchuria, there was a very fundamental difference in political thought in Japan as to the method by which that interest should be supported and enforced. This difference in general corresponded with the alignment between those leaders who were following the ideals of popular government on the one hand, and the conservative and military leaders on th« other• The policy of the latter group rested ultimately upon military force, and assumed that Japan's rights were political and sovereign. "On the night of September 18，1931, armed hos- tilities broke out in Manchuria, and Japanese forces occupied not only the city of Mukden, but other cities in South Manchuria. The incident which was claimed by the Japanese to have caused their action, namely an alleged act of sabotage by the Chinese on the South Manchurian Railway, diminished to such small proportions as strongly to suggest its actual non- existence. Meanwhile the Japanese array was found to have acted with suoh promptness as to make it evi- dent that they were movrn w under a previously ar- ranged strategic plan. By the afternoon of September 10,073 - 1 9， 1 9 3 1 , cities like Antung, Changchun, and New- chwang, several hundred miles from one another, had been occupied by the Japanese forces, who at once assumed the place of the civil authorities in those cities. Within forty-eight hours the whole of southern Manchuria, not only along the Japanese South Manchuria Railway, but also along some of the railroads built by the Chinese had thus been ef- factively occupied. The evidence pointed to a de- liberate action planned and authorized by the highest Japanese authorities in Manchuria and possibly with direction from the high military command in Tokyo. "On September 2 5 , 1 9 3 1 , the Japanese Ambassador in Washington left with the Under Secretary of State a Statement issued after an extraordinary meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on September 2 4 , 1 9 3 1 . This Statement contained an assurance that while on September 21 a detachment was despatched from Chang- chun to Kirin it was not with a view to military- occupation but only for the purpose of removing the menace to the South Manchuria Railway on flank and that as soon as that object had been attained it would be withdrawn. The Statement contained' a firm assurance that the Japanese Government harbored no 10,074 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 U I 12 | 1 3 1 4 1 5 ； 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 territorial designs in Manchuria, as early as October 8， following this firm assurance on the part of Japan, I was informed by the American Charge in Tokyo that the Japanese General Staff had issued an information bulletin to foreign military attaches stating that Japan found it impossible to withdraw the Japanese Army to their original stations or even to the con- tiguous territory. "After the capture of Mukden by the Japanese on September 19，1931， tho headquarters of the Chinese Government and forces had been removed to Chinchow. Soon after September 3 0 , General Honjo, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, publicly announced that the Government of Marshal Hsueh-liang would no longer receive Japanese recognition. Other state- ments follov/ed to the effect that Japanese forces would not cease their activities until Marshal Chang and his government were driven entirely out of Man- churia . N o t only were these statements left without reprimand from the Tokyo government, but Japanese military planes began to enforce this policy in a most drastic manner. On October 8 , 1 9 3 1 , a squadron of eleven Japanese planes dropped thirty or forty- bombs upon the unarmed and unwarned city of Chinchow, killing and wounding a number of the inhabitants ^ 10,075 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 111 1 2 ！ 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 "On its face this was an indefensible act of aggression. In the latter part of October, the Japanese high com- mand. in Manchuria sent a military expedition to Tsitsihar in northern Manchuria, This was several hundred miles north of any portion of the South Man- churia Railway and far outside the zone of any of the treaty rights which Japan claimed. This expedition defeated and destroyed the forces of Chinese General Ma Chan-shan and thus destroyed all the organized forces of Marshal Chang in North Manchuria. "The capture of Tsitsihar left the Chinchow Dis- trict as the only fragment of Manchuria in which Marshal Chang's authority remained intact, and to- wards the latter part of November the Japanese forces began to move towards Chinchow. On behalf of the United States エ made vigorous representations through diplomatic channels, and the Japanese forces were withdrawn to Mukden on November 2 8 , 1 9 3 1 . On November 2 4 , 1 9 3 1 , the Japanese Foreign Minister stated to the American Ambassador that 'the Premier, the Secretary of War 5 the Chief of Staff and he are agreed that towards Chinchow there shall be no hostile operations and orders have been issued to that effect. 1 After December 1 1 , 1 9 3 1 > however, the movement towerds Chinchow was resumed and that city was seized by the 10,076 1 Japanese array on January 3 , 1 9 3 2 . This completed the 1 2 destruction of the organized forces of Marshal Chang 3 and left the control of all Manchuria in the hands of ！ 4 the Japanese. 1 5 "On October 2 6 , 1 9 3 1 , the Japanese Government 6 made public fundamental points upon which normal re- 7 lations between China and Japan should be based, and 8 it appeared then that they included the settlement of 9 the entire question of the disputed treaty rights of 10 Japan in Manchuria. While Japanese representatives 11 disclaimed her intention to use military force to 12 achieve her national objectives, it seemed clear that • I 13 i she was bent on doing just that very thing. Her army ； 14 was not withdrawing! it was actually pushing forward 15 and the Japanese government was declining to in- 16 terfere until all these fundamental questions of 17 national policy between the two nations should be 18 settled. • 19 "On December 2 2 , 1 9 3 1 ? I received from the 20 American Ambassador in Tokyo a telegram in which the 21 Ambassador stated that the Prime Minister of Japan had 22 called at the .American Embassy and assured him that 23 Japan would never ..allow a situation to arise in Man- 24 churia which would be fraught with the danger of war, 25 and that Chinese sovereignty would never be impaired；' 10,077 - "The Prime Minister reiterated that Japan merely de- sired the protection of Japanese persons and in- terests . I n the sane telegram the American i.m- bassador reported that active preparations were con- tinuing for further operations in Manchuria where a free hand seemed to have been given to the military. 1 1 10,078 2 3 6 7 C O C \ o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 o 1 2 3 4 5 1111111111 2 22222 "On December 2 2 , 1 9 3 1 » エ requested the Americen Ambassador in Japan to inform the Foreign Minister of my apprehension of Japanese forces taking action against Chinese regulars south of Chinchow. I requested the Ambassador to inform the Foreign Minister that a new attack by Japanese forces on Chinese regulars would be regarded as unwarranted and would be interpreted es indicative of indifference to obligations assumed in various treeties to which Japan and Chinaj as well as the United S t a t e s , were parties. On December 2 7 , 1 9 3 1， エ received a memorandum from the American Ambassador which had been delivered to him by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in which it was stated that the Imperial Government was determined to remain loyal to the League of Nations Convenant, the No War Treaty, other various treaties and the two resolutions edopted by the Council of the League of Nations regarding the ianchurian situation. On December 29，1931? the /mericr.n Minister in China informed me that Marshal Chtng Hsueh- lisng ordered withdrawal of oil Chinese forces from ！Manchuria, stating that he was motiveted by a desire to deprive Japanese of any excuse for further aggres- sion in North China. "On January 7 � 1 9 3 2 , I sent a note to Jaran and hina informing them thct the United States ccv.ld not 10,079 - ！ ！ admit the legality of any situation de facto rnd did i 2 ； not intend to recognize r.ny treaty entered into be- 3 1 tween those Governments which might imDcir the trer-ty ( r i g h t s of the United States or its citizens in Chi.nr,, 5 including these which relate to the sovereignty, the 6 independencej or the territorial and administrative 7 ! integrity of China, or to the intern?t~ : oncil policy s relctive to Chine. commonly known es t'" e oi)en door 9 policy, &nd that the United States did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or rgreement which 11 might be brought ebout by meens contrary to the 1 2 obligations of the Pact of Peris of August 27，1928. I ^ j On Janucry 1 6 , 1 9 3 2， the J?psnese government replied ] 4 丨 to our note of January 7. The argument m^de in thr.t 1 5 note w?s to the effect thst China was in an 'unsettled 1 6 i end districted strte 1 rnd thet this fact relieved Jsprn 1 7 1 from the obligation to carry out the covenants of the 1 8 i ；Nine-Power Treaty ？nd the League of Nations Covenant, 1 9 1 which mry be fairly said to have become the argument 20 upon which Japan thereafter relied with the greatest 21 assurance, tat which wss rejected es untrue a^^ un- 2 2 丨 | sound by the unanimous reoort of the Lytton Commission. 2 3 丨 In the rn ; ddle of Janucry, 1^32, Japrn's Eggres- 24 1 . ,sion in Manchuric seemed to have achieved success. By ；May 1 , 1 9 3 ? 5 Japan had attempted to extend her 10,080 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 1 j aggressive action to the Yangtze River and to break up 2 � the efforts of the Chinese at Shanghai to maintain 5 ： economic boycott cgcinst her business. There J?r?r;n 4 j received a military set-back in being checked "by 5 Chinese soldiers. In the hostilities rround Shr.nghci, 6 on January 2 8 , 1 9 3 2 , the Japrnese forces bombed the 7丨 unwrrned and helpless civilian native quarter of Chspei. 8 This was an act of inexcusable cruelty. Not only were 9 bombs dropped uoon positions held "by Chinese troops, io but incendiary bombs were used which soon had the enzire quarter in flcmes. Thereafter, the Japrnese barriccded the streets in the Internrit ional Settlement of Shanghei, disr-rmed the police, end pr.rc:lyzed sll regular municinr.l functions. Numerous excesses aeainst the Chinese popu- lation were committed, including many summery execu- tions, and e veritable reign of terror resulted. The Japanese troops even invaded the Americcn sector of defense st Shr.nghai where they committed acts of violence against Chinese. On Februery 2 4 , 1 9 3 2 , I sent to Senator Borah, Chairmen of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senrte. a letter in which wf..s outlined the position and policy of the Araericnn Government with respect to the situation in Chinn in relption to the applicrtion of treaties. "Almost immedictely aftr.r its rrmy hsd 10,102 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 1 1 3 | 1 4 1 5 l 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 overthrown the Chinese Government of Manchurir, Jaoen commenced to establish political and economic control over that country. This was done by forcible crer.tjon of ？n ostensibly independent but really puppet strt.e controlled by Japan rnd known ss Mr.nchukuo. Thereafter, as soon c.s other nc.tions had nrinounced their intention not to recognize as vclid rny fruits of this conquest, 七he Japanese government proceeded to take further stops designed to mcke this policy of the rest of the world as difficult erd ineffective cs possible. "On April 4-,1932, the Jrprnese Ambassador in Washington called udoii me rnd in the course of discus- sion, admitted that promises made by Jcpan hrd been broken but said thst chcuvinist conditions were so ccute in Jrppn that the Government could not tr.ke Bny other position. On June 2 3 , 1 9 3 2 , I received v. telegram from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo thrt the press had ccbled to /raericn a statement by Generp.l ARAICI, Minister of Wrr, before the Supreme Military Council to the effect thst the resolutions of the League of Nations nnd statements made by Jspsn in regard to Mnnchuri? before the estab- lishment of Msnchulcuo could no longer be considered cs binding on Japan. "On Janusry 1933j the Jar>enese Ambasssdor in Washington called uioon me and stated thet in nny 10,082 4 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 24 2 5 i |event Japan had no,territorial ambition south of the 2|Grert W a l l . He stated that his information es to the 3 ！ affair in Shonhaikwan was t h r t it v;ss a locsl incident, provoked by a minor outbreak of Chinese against 5 !Japanese there. On February 2 3 , 1 9 3 3 , the Japanese 6 1 /mbassador cnme to tell me on the instruction of his Government th?t the State of Manchukuo was determined to sunpress irregular forces in the Province of Jehol, 9 I rnd thc.t under the trerty between Manchukuo and Jnpsn, Japan wss obliged to support Mcnchukuo and ? therefore, the Japanese forces were co-operating in this movement in -Jehol. On February 27，1933? I reminded the Japanese Ambassador thrt when the Manchurirn outbreak occurred in September, 1 9 3 1 ,ェ hr.d not attributed it to the Government of Japcn or to the statesmen whom ェ"used to know or to the people of Japan but to the efforts of a small group of persons of militrristic ambitions rnd desires. The Ambassador said thrt he knew this very w e l l . I pointed out the importance of the trerties as instruments to preserve peace end the Ambsssrdor said that he recognized this. He also said that, on his part c.It hough he had been disappointed meny times when he hod given me sss^rrncos which were afterwards not carried out in Manchuria he still believed in his people and thet sooner or later the moderate elements would 10,083 - not disappoint us. I told him at thrt time th?t エ joined in his hope th:t this would be so. "I retired ss Secrertry of Stcte on March 4, 1933? end wfs succeeded by the Honorable Cordell Hull who then assumed the burden of office in connection 6 j with Japanese-American relations." (Signed) "Henry L. Stimson." "Subscribed end sworn to." We now offer in evidence IPS document No. 239. This is en affidavit of former /mbassador Joseph C . Grew, end WG ask that it be identified as a exhibit in the evidence. THE PRESIDENT; M r , Smith. MR。 SMITH: If your Honor plerse, we object to the admission of this affidavit unless the prosecu- tion produces the witness here for cross-examination。 We make the point th?t M r . HIROTA -- Neither M r . HIROTA or the other defendants in this case can have that fair trial contemplated by the Charter unless the accused are confronted by the witnesses against them. The right of r:n rccused to be confronted by the witnesses against him is found in nearly every constitution in the world, ond it is in the new Jrr>snese Constitution which has been promulgr.ted with the approval of the Supreme Commander, end ェ submit to your Honor thrt the 10,084 1 I 2 j 3 丨 4 丨 5 ！ 6 7丨 8 9 10 11 i 12 i 1 3 1 4 1 5 | 1 6 丨 1 7 丨 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 Supreme Commarder could not hr.ve had a lesser require一 mtnt in 'mind when he provided in this Charter for c feir trial. In this a f f i d a v i t ,他 i c h consists of about fifteen p o g e s , double spaced., M r . Grew covers practicf.lly ten yeers in which he w c ?s Americrn Ambcs- scdor in T o k y o . This effidevit is written in a terse, sweeping style rnd rarny of the statemcnts in it sre misloeding in their present form rnd are contradicted b y M r . G r e w 1 s own widely published b o o k s , "Ten Yenrs in Japan" and "Report from Tokyo." Your H o n o r , v/e h•‘ vc no funds to tnke rny depositions fnd if your Honor adheres to the ruling mcde in connection with the Affidavit of M r . Stimson we would like to hrvo the Court advise M r . Grew thct we will tcke his deposition r.nd mnke some provision to pay for the expenses of -tckiixg it. M r . Grow lives in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . He is in good health and I undcrstr/nd he is about 72 years of age. Counsel just raised s controverscy c-s to how I know M r . Stimson is jn good h e r l t h . THE PRESIDENT; M r . G r e w . M R . SMITH: I mcrn M r . G r e w . I wes born in Washington, D . C . , and I lived there nearly ?11 my life until I came to Tokyo. I sew M r . Stimson quite often. THE PRESIDENT : M r . G r o w . 10,085 - MR. SMITH: I mer.n, Mr. Grew. Before he came to Toky and after he returned from Tokyo. And just a fewweoks ago I got out here a copy of the New York Times which showed Mr. Grew attending a social function which, as エ remember， was to "be in very good health in KGW York City. He appeared and spirits. 10,086 MR. LEVIN: I don't want to add anything to what has already been mentioned both by Mr. Smith, in relation to this affidavit, and by Mr* Logan in relation to M r . Stimson 1 s affidavit. There are two things which I would like to s u g g e s . t : ( 1 ) " h a t this affidavit was made on May 2 8 , 1 9 4 6 . Had the prosecution notified the defense that this affidavit had been t aken it would have been possible for us to have cross-examined him either by commission or interrogatories, in viev/ of the fact that a numb or of defense counsel have been in Wash- ington since that affidavit was m a d e . I believe, M r . President, there is greater validity in requiring M r . Grew to be present than Mr. Stimson, because Mr. Grew,工 understand] is still presently connected with the State Departnent. I am advised by my colleagues that M r . Grew has been recently retired, although he was connected with the State Depai'tnent for quite some time. It does seem to us that a witness of this calibre, having made the affidavit that he did May 28th, should have been examined. That is, the defense should have had an opportunity to examine him orally, and I believe that opportunity should still be given 4 6 7 8 9 0 1 3 4 1 5 16 7 8 1 9 20 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 E d e r & s P r a t t him. 10,087 - I should like to add that Major -- that it is contemplated that Major Furness will go to the United States very shortly, and when he does he could cross-examine him at that time. M R . HARDIN: M r . President, it is pleasing information that the gentleman is able to find M r . Grew in good spirits from his picture. It is my information that Mr. Grew has been in not good health, a bad state of hearing -- his hearing almost gone -- and that he has been retired from service in the State Department for quite a while -- just how long I don't know. M R . FURNESS: If the Court please, the health of M r . Grew can be checked very readily, in short order. Colonel Warren has just come back from the States and I can telephone him and, T think, find out just what his state of health is. I think it is a well known fact that M r . Grew has been almost totally deaf for many years. He makes that statement in his book. But it didn't prevent him from leading a most active life. M R . LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I would just like to add that a witness of the stature of K r . Grew, whose name has predominantly appeared 23 throughout this trial,should be produced by the 10,088 prosecution to give us a first-hand story of the situation as he saw it and the facts as he knew them. He knew, perhaps, all of these accused, talked to many of them, and a great deal more, I believe, could be acquired by the Tribunal•from information obtained from him from the witness' box, and seeing him and listening to him, than what can be obtained from reading a cold affidavit. MR。 HAHDIN: Mr. President, what I have said is not to oppose the interrogatories or even a deposition from M r . Grew, I do not believe he could come here. THE PRESIDENT: Neither the new Japanese Constitution nor General MacArthur's attitude towards it has any bearing on the question of a fair trial. No matter what may be the state of health of M r . Grew at present, we see no immediate need, at all events, to bring him here. We have decided to admit his affidavit and to overrule the objection to its admission. An application can be made to me in Chambers to have Mr. Grew examined on commission or by way of interrogatories in the United States. The ques- tion of expense can be dealt with before me in Chambers. If a corsraission is decided upon it will b e , 10,089 - of course, a great convenience to have it taken while Major Furnes's is in America. The affidavit is admitted on the usual terms. . CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu- ment No. 239 will receive exhibit F o . 1 1 0 5 . (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1105 and received in evidence.) THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a con- vonient break. This is a long affidavit and it will take most of the afternoon. We will recess for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 15〇0, after which the proceed- ings were resumed as follows:) 10,0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 j 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 MARSHAL OF TH2 COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: M r . H a r d i n . M R . 難 D I N : (Reading) "The United States of America," and others, 1 レAgairst AHAKI, S a d a o , M and others. "City of Washington, District of Columbia, United states of America. '•I, Joseph Clark Grew, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say: "I served ps United States Ambassador to Japan, at Tokyo, from June 1932 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7，194-1. Diplomacy has been my life work since 1904. Prior to Torld '"ar I, I served in the United States Foreign Service in Egypt, Mexico, R u s s i a , Austria-Hungary snd Germany. I was counselor at the American Embassy in Berlin during ,,T orld ^ r I. In 1918 I became acting head of the Western European Division of the United States State Department. I took part in the peace negotiations at Paris and also represented the United States during the negotiations with Turkey, at Lausanne, in 1922. I also served as Minister to Denmark and to Switzerland, as Under Secretary of 'Tolf & Y e l d e n Stete, c-nd, just prior to my aiDpointraent to Tokyo, 10,091 - 2̂ 4 56789 G1234 56 7 0 0 9 ^ H222324M 11111111112 2 2 2 :1 as Ambassador to Turkey. "•The statements hereinafter set forth relate to matters which arose from time to time in connection with the carrying out of my duties at Tokyo as diplomatic representative of the American Government in Japan, and I vouch for the truth thereof. "At the time I became J\mbassador to Japan, as aforesaid, Japan, along with the United States and other nations, w?s a party to the following treaties, pacts and agreements, and others, or had subscribed to the principles therein announced: "(1) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 29 July l699> "(2) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 18 October 1907; "(3) The Hague Convention No. Ill rela- tive to the Opening of Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907; "(4) The agreement, signed 30 November 1908, effected by exchange of notes between the United States end Japan, declaring their policy in the Far East. »« 10,092 "(5) The Treaty between the British Commonwealth of Nations, France, Japan and the United States relating to their Insular possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific O c e a n , 1 3 December 1921; • "(6) The so-called 'Nine-Power Treaty' concluded and signed at 7adiington 6 February 1922； "(7) The so-called 'Kellogg-Briand Pact' concluded and signed at Paris 27 August 1928; "(8、） The Convention respecting the Rights and Duxies of Neutral Powers and Persons in ^ars on Land, signed at the H a g u e , 1 8 October 1907. "As a party to the above-listed treaties, pacts and agreements, and others, or as a subscriber to the principles therein announced, Japan had agreed, inter alia: "to avoid the use of force in the settle- ment of international differences； in case of serious disagreement or conflict to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly power; not to open hostilities without a declaration of war； to submit international disputes to arbitra- tion; to respect and support the sovereignty, in- dependence and territorial administrative integrity of China; to use its influence to effectually 10,093 2 4 i 2 5 establish p.nd maintain the principle of equal opriortunity for the commerce and industry of all n?tions throughout the territory of China； to re- frain from seeking special or monopolistic privileges in China detrimental to the rights or interests of other foreign powers or their nationals； to renounce war as an instrument of national policy; not to violate the territory of neutral powers. "At the time I became Ambassador as aforesaid Japan had gained military control of Manchuria and had established there the Japanese controlled puppet state of ITanchukuo. The official records of the United States Department of State with respect to the Manchurian affair, with which I had familiarized myself, indicated that Japan had pursued its course of action in Msnchuria despite frequent protests by the United States and other nations that its aggressive action was in contraven- tiOTi of Japan's treaty obligations. . The Depertment's official records further indicated that Japan had consistently defended its aggressive action as a purely defensive measure for the protection of Japanese nationals, and had repeatedly assured the United States Government that Jepan h?.d no territorial ambitions or intentions of disturbing the rights and 1C,094 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 I 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 interests of third parties, in China. "During all of my stay In Tokyo as United States Ambassador I repeatedly called to the atten- tion of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and occasionally the Japanese Prime Minister, and other responsible government officials the fact that the American Government considered the Japanese military operations in China as a violation of Japan's obligations, under various treaties and agreements hereinbefore mentioned, to respect the territorial integrity of China, to maintain the principle of the Open Door in China and to refrain from endangering the lives and interests of nationals of the United States and other powers^ to refrain from the use of force in settlement of disputes, to submit disputes to arbitration and ebide by results thereof. I pointed out that Japan v’'as rapidly losing the good will of the American Government and people and of other peoples if the world, by its aggressive policy and by the excesses of its militefy forcesi The excuse given was thrt the military operations were purely defensive measures against Chinese bandits ole Communists whom the Chinese Government was unable to control, or v/ere for the protection of Japanese nationals and interests in China from abuses resulting 10,095 - from the anti-Japanese feeling deliberately aroused by the irresponsible Chinese Government. I was re- peatedly assured by the officials referred to that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China, that Japan was solicitous of the rights and interests of third parties and was earnestly endeavoring to pro- tect them and preserve the status £uo, and, up until the end of 1938, that Japan intended to preserve the principle of the Open Door in China. "I protested repeatedly against the in- discriminate bombing of non-military objectives which endangered the lives and properties of non- combatant Chinese and foreigners. A few of the more flagrant examples were the bombing and sinking of the IJ.S.S. Pan ay on the Yangtze, in which two American nationals v:ere killed, and the machine-gunning of the small boat in which the Panay 1 s captain and others were being taken ashore, the deliberate bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking, the reckless and wanton bombing of residential and business districts of Nanking after a totally inadequate warning had been given, the machine-gunning by a Japanese plane of five Americans while horseback riding within the International Settlement at Shanghai, the bombing of American-owned mission property in Tungpeh in which 10,096 - an American national (Phoebe Nyhus) was killed, the destruction by Japanese planes of a commercial passenger plane belonging to the Chinese National Aviation Corporation (in which Pan-American Airways had a large interest) resulting in the loss of lives of a number of noneombstant passengers and the en- dangering of the life of the American pilot, the destruction by five Japanese planes of another properly marked Chinese Aviation Corporation com- mercial passenger plane, which had just landed at Chanyi and in which the American pilot was killed, the bombing and complete destruction of an American church at Chungking after eight previous bombings all of which hed been raade the subject of separate protests. The number of instances in which churches, schools and other American properties were repeatedly bombed and damaged could not but compel the conclusion that the attacks were intentional. Furthermore, in most cases the Japanese had been furnished beforehand with maps on #i-ich had been marked the locations of the properties In question. In virtually all in- stances the Japanese Government disclaimed responsi- bility on one pretext or another, claiming, among other things, that the property was too close to a military objective or was used by Chinese forces 10,097 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 (which excuses were not justified by facts brought out by investigations), or that the bomb release mechsnism in the plane apparently did not function properly, or merely that a mistake had been made. "In spite of my protests American business men snd missionaries were prevented from returning promptly to Nanking even after hostilities in that area had ceased, as, for instance, when the Shanghai University property was evacuated by Japanese troops snd the American missionary societies which owned the property were not permitted to immediately reoccupy it, even for the purpose of preventing its further deterioration. In refusing American nationals per- mission in such cases to return and resume business or protect snd preserve their property, the excuse given was that peace and order had not been sufficient- ly restored. The lack of any basis for this excuse was usually illustrated by the presence of many- Japanese merchants and their families in the areas in question. "On July 7，1934- I forwarded to the Japanese Ilinistry for Foreign Affairs an informal memorandum regarding the establishment by the authorities in Manchuria of a discriminatory petroleum selling monop- oly. Attention was invited to the fact that the 10,098 cooperation and approbation of the Japanese Govern- ment in the project, viiich would close the door in Mrnchuria to sales by /jnerican oil companies of their products, would violate the principles of the Open "^oor, to which Japan was committed, and which it had declared it would uphold, end, further, that the proposed project would contravene the provisions of Article 3 of the Nine-Pc'er Treaty of 1922 and the explicit provisions of the Sino-^jnerican Treaty of 1884. In a reply thereto dated nugust 2，1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that since Manchukuo an independent state the question was one concerning the American and Manchukuo Govern- ments, snd denied that contravention of any treaty oblifations by Japan vms involved. I again addressed an informal memorandum to the Japanese Tflnister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out th?t the project planned ‘ ‘ would unquestionably result in a monopoly prejudicial to the treaty rights of American nationals and counter to the principles of the Open Door, and that since plans therefor vrere being formulated with the concur- rence and cooperation of Japanese nationals, the participetion of quasi-official organizations such as the South Manchuria Railway, end the assent or approval j of the Japanese Government, the carrying out of the 10,099 project would be in contravention of Japan's treaty obi ip at ions as r/ell as of her unqualified assurances previously fiven to the American and nther govern- m e n t s . , "It was undeniable, of course, thet Japan h?.d assured maintenance of the Open Door policies in Manchuria even ？fter the establishment of the so- called independent regime of Fanchukuo, for the maintenance of those policies had been promised in the speech of Count U C H I M (then Minister for Foreign Affairs) before the Diet on “ugust 2 5 , 1 9 3 2 , and in the Japanese Government's public statement of September 1 5 , 1 9 3 2 , issued on the occasion of the recognition of Manchukuo. Moreover, the protocol between Jepan and Hsnchukuo, of September 15，1932 itself was predicated upon observance by Ifenchukuo of international obligations applying to that ter- ritory, as shovm by the second paragraph of the Preamble of the Protocol, reading: """hereas Manchukuo hss declared its intention of abiding by all international agreements entered into by China in so fe.r as they are applicable to Ifanchukuo,. * * * 1 Consequently, on November 3 0 , 1 9 3 4 I delivered another memorandum to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 10,ICO reitersting ray previous protests at establishment of the oil monopoly in Ifenchuria In violation of treaty obiigetions and assurances to the contrary. I had a long discussion vith Mr 4 ^IHOTA on the subject. He remarked that iiRiericans were free to purcha se stock in the petroleum company and that, therefore, the door was not being closed to them. The fact was, however, as I informed him, that forty percent of the stock had already been issued to the South Manchuria Railway, a quasi-official Japanese organization, twenty percent to the Government of I'anchuria and forty percent to four Japanese companies. Mr. HIROTA said he thought vie and the British were taking too legalistic an attitude. The discussion continued for ha.lf an hour, but the Minister's arguments were specious, and it was obviously impossible for rae to get anywhere. "On A p r i l 1 0 , 1 9 3 5 , the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs forwarded to me an answer to my note of November 3 0 , 1 9 3 4 , on the Manchurian oil matter, which consisted of a repetition of the prev- ious denials of Japan's responsibility for the actions of the Government of Mf-nchukuo. I communicated the contents thereof to the >jnerican Government, and, as instructed by the Secretary of State, advised the 10,101 Japanese Foreign Minister, by note dated A p r i l 1 5， i 1935, of the American Government's refusal to recog- nize the contentions advanced by J?pan, snd of the American view thst the ultimate responsibility for injury to American interests would rest upon Japan. エ called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on A p r i l 1 6， 1 9 3 5 , to point nut again the American view thet Japan was violating its treaty obligations pnd also the assurances it had made on prior occasions (identifying them specifically) that the principles of the Open Do‘っr would be maintained. His only reply was that these assurances were con- ditioned upon recognition of Ifenchukuo by the interested powers. "On December 1 , 1 9 3 7 I registered with the Japanese Foreign Minister an objection to the manifesto issued by the Manchurian Government regard- ing extra-territorial rights of foreigners other than Japanese, and to the prnrnulgation of a lav/ under which an American branch bank e.t H?rbin hcd been advised to prepare to repister and to appoint a representative and I called attention to the fact that the extra-territorial rights of United States nationals in Manchuria were governed by treaties be- tween the United States and China and that the law 10,102 - by which the Manchurian Government sought to assert -jurisdiction over American nationals was in direct contravention of American treaty rights. The Foreign. Minister's reply merely disclaimed any responsibility on Japan's part for the acts of the Government of Manchukuo. "/s in the case of the oil monopoly in Manchuria, I protested frequently and strongly against the taking over of the Chinese Customs Administration by the Japanese at Shanghai, Canton, Swatow and other places, and the revision of customs regulations to favor Japanese imports. I protested further in the case of the seizure of the Salt Tax Administration. I pointed out that large American snd other foreign loans had been secured apalnst custons revenues and salt tax revenues and that the United States and other nations hrd vital financial interests in the adminis- trative integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and the Salt ^dministrction and were entitled to be con- sulted in connection with any change in regulations or procedure or diversion of revenues. These protests v/ere，like all others, to no avail, the Japanese For- ei.^n Minister end other officials claiming that the steps taken were required by military necessity and by the fact that Chinese officials would not cooperate. «» 10,103 - 123456 7 89 o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 C O 9 o 1 2 3 4 I I 1 1 1 11 11 9 1 22 "Other specific instances when assurances which were later violated were given to the American Government, through me or in statements issued to the press by the Japanese Government for publication, were the following: ( 1 ) O n April 2 5 , 1 9 3 4 the Japanese Foreign Minister (HIROTA) assured me personally that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China, of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona-fide trade of other countries in China, He further stated that there was no intention ! | or desire on the part cf Japan to claim a privileged I position in derogation of the rights and responsibilities to which the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty were entitled, and that the policy of Japan v;as complete- observance and support of the provisions of the Nine- Power Treaty in every respect, I observed to him that the American Government and people would Le less impressed by statements of policy than by more concrete evidence• "(2) On September 1，1937 the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (KORINOUCHI), in a radio broadcast to the United States, defended Japan's actions in China on the ground of China's anti-Japanese acts and asserted 25 that Japan's intentions were peaceful; he stated that 10,104 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 the ultimate object of the current hostilities in North China and Shanghai was the realization of a state- permitting genuine cooperation between the two countries and declared that the Japanese forces in China had not been sent there for aggressive purposes and that Japan had no territorial designs. Mi-. HORINOUCHI‘ s radio address was similar to speeches subsequently made in the 3Ket by the Foreign Minister (HIFtOTA) and the Prime Minister (KONOYE 1 ,). "(3) On February 17，1939， in an interview with the Minister for Foreign (ARITA),エ reminded hira of his government f s previous statements to the effect that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China; I called his attention to the recent occupation of Hainan Island by Japanese forces;and I asked for an expression as to the intentions cf the Japanese Government in connection with the occupation of the island in view of the fact that there were numerous American residents and substantial American missionary and educational properties on the island. The Minister replied that the purpose of the occupation tjss to strengthen the blockade of the South. China coast and to hasten the suppression of the Chiang Kai- Siek regime5 he repeated the former statements of the Japanese Government that Japan had no territorial ambitions In China and added that the 10,105 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 occupation 'will not go beyond military necessity.' “ ⑷ On A p r i l l ^ i W O the Foreign Minister (ARITA), on being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to the possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, stated that 1 the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may a ffect the. status quo of the Netherlands East Indies.' "In J u l y , 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister assured me that Japan hac! not so far considered the possibility nf joining the hostilities against Russia. During that month I had forwarded to the Japanese Prime Minister a memorandum expressing the hope nf the United States Government that there was no truth in tbe reports that Japan intended to enter upon hostilities against Russia, referring to contemporaneous statements of responsible Japanese officials that Japan desired to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area. The reply thereto, which came from the Japanese Foreign Minister, recited that maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific had always been the since and genuine clesire of the Japanese Government which had consistently contributed earnest efforts toward 10,106 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 ニ i ニ | 2 5 丨 achieving that purpose and that Japan had not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union. "During 1938 the establishing of a new order in East Asia began to be mentioned. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister referred to the extension of the campaign in China from Manchuria to North China and thence into Central and South China and expressed the hope for the emergence of a new regime in China cooperative with Japan, repeating, however, the customary assurances of intention to continue the policies of the Open Door and to protect the rights and interests of third powers. Later the Foreign Minister indicated that the hostilities in China would go on to a finiAh; that no dealings would be hed with General Chiang Kai-shek even if he should sue for peace5 and (significantly) that since the main purpose of the campaign was to make possible economic and social cooperation of China and Japan, it was a f small matter' whether the territory- was Chinese or Japanese, and that China should be powerful enough to put itself in order before extra- territoriality and unequal treaties could be abolished in that country. Then, in N o v e m b e r , 1 9 3 8， the Japanese Foreign Office, in announcing the fall of Canton and three Wuhan cities. stated 'all vital areas of China 10,107 10 li 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 have thus fallen into our hands» 1 No mention was made of the rights or interests of third parties, the statement merely expressing Japan's confidence that other powers would adapt their attitude to the new condit- ions prevailing in East Asia, The Japanese poeple were cautioned, however, that these victories would not bring an era of peacc but rather that since Japan was entrusted with the tp.sk of constructing a new Far East ' the 9 !actual fighting has ；just started. r By the end of 1940 the idea of a new order in East Asia had progressed and developed to the point where the Japanese Government openly admitted it was determined to secure for Japan the position in 'greater East Asia including the South Seas' to which it considered itself entitled as a result of its growth as a first-class power in the modern world, and which would remove the territorial and economic restrictions previously hampering it. "In making the representations, protests and objections on behalf of the American Governir.ent, as herein set forth, I was always dealing with the Japanese individual or individuals who, as the official records of the Japanese Government will show, were filling the indicated civil office in the Japanese Government at that time. In most cases I took up the matter in question with the Japanese Minister for Foreign-Affairs; 10,108 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 j some were referred to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and some to responsible subordinate officials of the Foreign Ministry; and a few cases were referred to the Prime Minister* The matters herein related con- stitute a small, but representative, proportion of all those which occurred during my Ambassadorship. At the end of 1938 over 400 separate protests had been filed by me and the number of instances of depredations against American property, discriminations against American business men, and endangering of American lives by the Japanese in China was steadily increasing and so until the end of my term as Ambassador, continued to do /s/"Joseph Clark Grew." 2 5 10,109 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | 9 10 i 11 12 I 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 With the permission of the Tribunal, we now wish to offer in evidence I. P . S . document N o . 2007B, 7;hich is an excerpt from the testimony of former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, given before the United States Congressional Committee for the in- vestigation of the Pearl Harbor Incident, and we ask that this be identified as an exhibit in the prose- cution's testimony. THE PRESIDENT: M r . Logan. M R . LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we are not making any objections to the introduction of this docuraent, but we do wish to point out that the prosecution's excerpts of the prepared statement which Secretary Hull gave before the Committee — thp.t this prepared statement covered a period up to and including December 7，194-1, but that the prosecu- tion is only offering that part of the statetoent up to June 2 1 , 1 9 4 1 ; and it does not include any of the answers which Secretary Hull gave to questions which were asked him before the Committee. THE PRESIDENT! M r . Smith. M R . SMITH: If your Honor please, I object to the matter which appears on the first page, because it is too remote. It goes back to 1895， 1 9 0 ? , 1 9 1 •， snd 191夕，and if we have to answer for the Russian- Goldbers&spratt Japanese W a r , we will just have to fight that all over again, and this case will never come to an end. M R . HARDIN: Mr. President, as to Mr. Logan's objection, you nay recall that request was nade -- application was cade for the right to present ex- cerpts , a n d the defendants asked for additional, and we have supplied them by due processing with all the additional that they asked for. As to M r . Smith's objection, that is just briefly some of ths background and history whioh has some effect, however remote, upon the relations be- tween the countries involved in this inquiry. THE PRESIDENT: Of course, nay discover upon considering these various statements that there is much in them that is not properly evidence before u s . I would not care to say that what happened in 1895 was relevant to any issue. The objection is not overcome by calling it background. However, we are not in a position just now to undertake a revision of these various documents which contain, perhaps, statements which are not proper -- which cannot properly be regarded as evidence. In Mr. Stimson's affidavit there are con- clusions there that we are not going to be bound by simply because he draws them. W e l l , of course, the lc^iii Court will pay regard only to such matters as are T)roper‘y evidence directed to the issues, and will disregard other natters. The statement of Mr. Hull is admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2007B will be given exhibit N o . 1106. (Tfliersupon, the document above referred to was given exhibit No, 1106 and received in evidence.) M R . HARDIN: We read prosecution's exhibit No. 1106? , : EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGnTICN OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. "pp. 1076 to 1083. »i. background of 1941 convers/'tions. "The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was ir.ade early in 194-1. Before ac- cepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of 10,112 - international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far E a s t , in Europe, and in the United States. "A. Japan's Record of Aggression: "The President and I had to bear in mind aad to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Fnr E.iot, 1 •ぶ.!mst from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of aodera- tion appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation. "In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China'，Japan annexed Foivmoaa' and tried unstlc- cessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria, "In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese w a r , Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by- acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that 10,113 - time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin. "In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue. "In 1915 Japan took advantage of the pre- occupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands. " A t t h e e n d of the f i r s t V/orld w & r J a p a n participated in tho Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a nar.'ty to the treacit .；： -j on eluded there. Among those treaties was the Nino-Power Treaty relating tし.principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for her- self an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to t he policies of self-r©iJtraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested. "In 1928， however, following the advent of the C a b i n e t of General T A N M A in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called -'positive 1 policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs. "In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under — 10,114 - the name of 'Manchukuo. 1 By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan, broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Con- ference treaties. "I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 2 1 � 1 9 3 4 ) by M r . HIROTA, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan 'that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution. 1 In my reply (March 3，1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes. "Only a short tine after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basi® purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by- powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 3 4 the Japanese Foreign Office spokes- man gave out a truculent official statement known as the 'hands off China• statement. In that state- ment Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed." 10,115 - "On Doccnber- 29 ? 1 9 3 4 J m n n gnve fortncl notice of its intention to withdraw r.t the end of 1936 from the Nr.vr.l Linitntion Trer.ty signed 1 r. shingtcn cn February 6 5 ,1922. That notice wcs another clenr end significant move in the direction of a course cf conquest. Follotdng the giving of thnt notice 5 Jr prn proceeded energetically to in— crease her cminments, nreprrrtor^r to lrunching her invasion in Chino. "About thrt time Jrpcn entered into ccn- versr.tions \n-th Uazi Germr.ny which resulted in the conclusion by the trro countries, on Fovcmbcr 2 5 � 1936, of ths i.nti»Conintcrn Pr.ct. In 1937 Itrly r.dhered. lf liilG the ?r,ct wes ostensibly for self— protection rgr.inst comnunism } rctunlly it c preparrtcry riove for subsequent measures of forcoful exnrnsion t>y the br.nd.it nrtions -- the first step in the crcrtion of the so-crllod 'Axis. 1 "In July 1^37, Jrprn deliberately took rd- vnntr.ge of a minor incident betv/een Chinese end. Jo- p^nese forces rt r. rsoint nerr Pciping rnd bcgr.n fIr-grrntly to invr.de Chinr cn n huge scole. She poured into Chi nr. inncnsG rrmics which snrcrd fnn- linc over prert rrers, including industrirl nnd other key centers. These r m i e s rr.pe-3 ? robbed, murdered, ご‘ 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 wus131415«6n18s>2021222324 rnd cormittcd nil kinds of lawless acts. Pr.rticulcrly 25 10,116 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ！ 0 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 1 3 , 1 9 3 7 . "On Decernレr 1 2 � 1 9 3 7 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U . S . &• Panay in the Yangtze River. "To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as 'the new order in Greater East A s i a 1 and 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 1 The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development. "In August and September 194-0 Japan with German assistance extort广<3 an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indo-China. "In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was de- signed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone. "On October 4 , 1 9 4 0 Premier KONOYE 10,117 - was quoted by the press in a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part: ’"If the United States refuses to under- stand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts . . . those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic telations and will make every offort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manouvers to Induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime. "B. Japan's Reeord of Duplicity: "The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact thst the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently over- rode commitments which civilian Japanese had given. " I n 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's in- depeadence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. " I n 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of 10,118 - China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915， Japan presented to China the notorious 'twenty-one demands.' "In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one p o w e r , w e r e to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subse^uontly needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakia!! forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enter- prise an opportunity, in which they were eventually- unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops. "In the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect C h i n a 1 s sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges. "On November 2 1 � 1 9 3 2 , Mr.MATSUOKA t h e n Japanese delegate to the league of Nations, said: '7/e want no more territory. ' By the end of 1932 4 5 6 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10,119 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China, "On July 2 7 , 1 9 3 7 , Prince KONOYE, then Japanese Premier, said 'In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explains d in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia.' In order to 'preserve the peace of East Asia,' Japanese forces for four years had carried, war- fare and suffering over the greater part of China. "On October 2 8 , 1 9 3 7 , the Japanese Foreign Office said, T Japan nr^er looks upon the Chinese peo- ple as an enemy . • Japan showed its friendly feel- ing for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and c r u e l t y . " 2 5 10,120 - "On A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 , M r . ARITA, then Japanese Ministor for Foreign Affairs, said the 'Japanose Government cannot but be deeply concerned ovor any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies'. Following the occu- pation of the Netherlands by Gefmany that spring, Japan sent a Comraorcial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practic- ally to a Japanese colony. "After the outbreak of Japan's undoclirsd war against China in July, 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that Amarican rights would ba respected. Tima and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assur- ances ... "pp. 1084 - to 1088 "Time anc； again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there wore reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. "Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected, Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put 10,121 - into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monop- olies wore set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, one. subjected to inciignitios. "C. Divergence between Japanese and American Policies: "The Prosidont and I have very much in mind the fact that the UnitGd States and Japan hnd widely Different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to in- fluence Jnp".n to adopt peaceful policies. "Wo recalled that Japan 1 s action in 1931 in embarking on a course of ag^rrossion, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever wiaoning conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of nairx"cr.ining peace. Our Govern- ment 's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria wns set forth in a communication acdrossod by the then Secretary of Stnte, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7， 1 9 3 1 - - " That is blurred. I c a n 1 1 mpJco it out for sure. "--and in a further communication of February 2 5 , 1 9 3 5 ? to the Secretary General of tho 1 0 , 1 2 2 - League of Nations. "On January 1 7 , 1 9 3 3 the Presidont-Glect, M r . Roosevelt, made clocr his support of tho principle of sanctity of international treaties by- writing out, in reply to a question, a statomGnt as follows: “ *エ am wholly willing to make it clcar thst American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all rolations bot^een nations must rest.' "In his first inaugural address, on March 4 , 1 9 3 3 , President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of tho gooo neighbor -- 'the neighbor v;ho resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others -- the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. 1 "Thus in 1931-1933, while Japrn was carrying forwnrcl its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahoacl in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes. "On May 1 6 � 1 9 3 4 I had a general conversation 10,123 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 with Jap-.nose Ambassador GAITO, one of many conversations in which I endoavoroc to convinco the Japrnese that thoir best interests lay in following policios of peace. "Throe days later I talked again with tho Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation tho Ambassador repeated i;he formula which his GovcrnraGnt had been putting fon'。rd publicly for some weeks to the effect that Jap「:n had a superior and special function in connocticn. -;ith tho preservation of poace in Eastern A?ia. I brought to the Jap;.、‘neso Ambassa- cor's attention the. < loar implications contained in the Japaneso formula of tho intention on tho part of Japan to oxerciso an overloidship ov;-r neighboring nations ^no territories. "On Juno 1.2, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Grent Britain, I told the Arabr.ssacior that tho impression of the American people s that Jaonn sought the economic domination first of E a s t e r n Asia and then of other areas such as it might SGlcct, and that this would ultimately mean political as wgII as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Jnpan from its associating itsolf in a peaceful and constructive program." 10,124 10 "Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes. 7 j ”エn a further statement of August 23, 8 : 1 9 3 7 , I applied the principles of the July 16 9 i statement expressly to "Uig situation in China. I I stated that the issues, in that situation, of 11 1 concern to the United States went far beyond the 1 2 1 immodiate question of the protection of American 1 3 nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities 1 4 ； in any part of the world were of concern to all ] 5 ； nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities. "On October 6 , 1 9 3 7 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was incon- sistent with tho principles which should govern re- lationships between nations and v;as contrary to 1 the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kallogg Pact, "In November 1937 the United States partici- 1 6 1 7 18 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 pated with eighteen other nations in a conference 10,125 held at Brussels to 'study penceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails' in the Far East. The conforence was held in nccoranncG ^ith a provision of the Ninc-Powor Treaty of 1922. The repantea refusals of tho Japanese Government to participate in the conference 7 | effectively preventoe efforts to bring obout an 8 ！ end to tho conflict by nodi-stion and conciliation. 9 On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings. IO I "PP. 1089 n ： "On A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 the Japanese Foroign 12 ！ Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to tho South Se-?.s regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. 15 ! On A p r i l 1 7 I took cognizance of that statemc-nt. I 1 6 | pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Incies in international relationships. I said that intar- 1 8 volition in the domostic affairs of the Netherlands l<> ' Incies or any nIteration of their status quo by 1 3 14 21 22 2 3 2 4 2 5 other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the c.^use of stability, poace, and security, not only in the region of the Nothorlands Inc'los but in the entire Pncific aroa. I urged that peaceful principles bs applied not only in every part of the Pacific aroa bat in overy part of tho world." 10,126 - "p. 1090 "During the winter of 1940 ,)nd the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind 一一 and エ was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact -- thnt it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of tho entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and thoy thought thoy had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrdgited to themselves. "I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I hac commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying' to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach tho Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanose to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. "p. 1092 25 "The President had an eye to the situation 10,127 - 23456789 01234- 56 7 8 9 o 1C232425 11111 11 1 1 . . 1 . 2 2 2 2 2 2 in the Far Enst 坍h:2n on January 6,194-1 in his acdross to Congress he dyclaroo that 1 at no previous timo has /.Tierican security baen as seriously threatenod from without as it is today'. The President said that tho whole pattern of democratic life had beGn blotted out in an appalling number of inciGpGndont nations and that tho assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small. "p. 1093. "On Jrnuary 15,194-1, in a statement in support of tho Lend-Lease Act before the Connnittoe on Foreign A F f n i r s in the H O U S G of Benresentatives, I said: " 1 It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire ragion of the Western Pacific. Hor leaders have openly c'eclarid their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to makG themsolvos master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region. 1 " 10,128 "I pointed out th?.t raankincl was face to face with organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abjding nations 'is the key to the security of the Western Hernisphore". THE PRESIDENT: Well, you hnve just finished part I. We will hear part II on Tuesday morning. We will adjourn until haIf-past nine on Tuesday morning. (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until T u e s d a y , 1 2 November, 1946, at 0930.)% • It.-. V Friday, 8 November 1946 INTERNATIONAL MILITABY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Chambers of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS On paper No, 513 - Application of prosecu- tion for leave to employ AKIRA TORISAWA, IMTfE Translator and Interpreter, to assist in translations for the prosecution. On paper No. 539 - Application of the Accused ARAKI by Counsel, relative to the status of the prosecution regarding witnesses to be produced on behalf of the defense under the Charter, Before: HON, SIR WILLIAM TOBB, President of the Tribunal and Member from the Commoravealth of Australia, Reported by: Julian Wolf Official Court Reporter IMTFE i Appearances: For the Prosecution Sectloij,; MR. W. G. F. EORGERKOFF MDER,Justice, Associate Counsel, acting on be- half of the Kingdom of the Netherlands MR. SOL IS H0R7JITZ For the Defense Section; MR. LA^'RENCE P. McMNUS, Counsel for the Accused ilRAKI, Sadao m , O m N CUNNINGHAIil, Counsel for the Accused OtHIMA, Hiroshi I/iR. MICHAEL LEVIN, Counsel for the Accused SUZUKI, Teiichi For the Office of the General SecretarVy IRfTFE m . C. A. MANTZ, Clerk Of the Court MR. H. W. DELAKEY, Deputy Clerk of the Court The proceeding was begun at 0900, THE PRESIDENT: This is an application for leave — an application by the prosecution — for leave to employ Akira Torisawa, the Tribunal's translator and interpreter to assist the associate prosecutor for the Netherlands. Who is appearing on this application? ICR, HORWITZ; I am appearing here, your Honor, General Mulder is not hero right now, but the problem is this: In order to get the documents translated from Dutch to Japanese, which is one step, they have to have some one Y;ho knows both of those languages. The number of people in Japan who know them both are extremely limited. We have known of one, but he cannot do that work all by himself. This other gentleman, employed by the Tribunal, is the other one available in Tokyo, who can do that work and his work on that — of translating these documents — will be completed before that phase of the case goes on and get that direct translation from Dutch to Japanese. General Mulder is here now. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. General, I am just dealing with your application} I suppose it is yours, to employ Torisawa? m . JUSTICE BORGERPiOFF IIULDER: Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: He is now employed by the Tribunal? MR. JUSTICE-BORGEREOFF, MULDER: Yes, sir, he is. We need him as an interpreter. He' is the sort of person — THE PRESIDENT; And he is invited to assist the prosectition; that is vjhat it amo-unts to, I am not inclined to favor this application. I do not think the Tribunal staff should tc.ke part in the preparation of the prosecution's case, m . HORVJITZ: I do not think that has anything to do with the preparation, your Honor, That is using a particular skill to translate. Now, we either have to do it that way or have the translation done in open court by him looking at it, examining it then and doing it. He would have to do it before or else do it in open court from the Dutch, If you have no translator who can translate from Dutch to Japanese there is only one vmy to do it then. If there is one in open court that would have to be done then. THE PRESIDENT: V'in some of the witnesses speak in Dutch? MR. JUSTICE BORGEREOFF MULDER: Yes, sir, THE PRESIDENT: Is it in connection with the taking of evidence that you require this assistance? MR. JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: And there is no doubt about the charter permitting witnesses to speak in their own language. I do not think any Member of the Court can test that; otherwise it v/ould restrict the amount of evidence that might be given by one side or the other. The most vital witness might not speak either English or Japanese» You say the position is this: That unless this interpreter assistant is made available to the prosecution v;e would hav«» to Tall back on his .services in court — m . HORWITZ: That is right. THE PRESIDENT: (Continuing) as our officer when these Dutch witnesses are called. m . HORWITZ: With this alternative: That his services to us m.ay ¥Jell shovj that he may not be needed as a witness, vjhereas, the other way, we m.ay h&ve to bring him in for the first time in open court to find out he is needed as a vjitness. THE PRESIDENT: Yes. He would not be receiving any remuneration from the prosecution? M . HORWITZ: Not that I know of. THE PRESIDENT: He will be under no obligation to them? MR. JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: No, sir. THE PRESIDENT: His independence will be preserved as an official of the Tribunal? M . JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: Yes, he is the only one we intend to use, THE PRESIDENT: You say if his assistance is given to you. General, you will be able to save time for the Court; is that v^hat it amounts to? IviR. JUSTICE BORGERHOFF MULDER: Yes, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Or you may be able to do so. The application is granted. The next application is a request for an order of the Court by the accused, ARAKI, that the prosecution be prohibited from interviewing, questioning or other- wise approaching any of this particular accused's witnesses prior to the Trial. MR. HORWITZ: Well, this application, your Honor, has not been served as yet,:ut when the matter does come up for a hearing, I believe it is going to be very strongly opposed. THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to be heard on this? MR. HORWITZ: Very definitely, sir. Our position is this: Fe are very nructi opposed to this proposition. THE PRESIDENT: Rightly or wrongly, I take the view that if a -witness is under subpoena, or you knew he wcs going to be called by the defense, you would not be ;iustifled in approaching him. J/iR. HORWITZ: I am not so sure, your Honor, that that is the law as followed in most of the Courts. THE PRESIDENT: If you want to be heard, and that was my impiaession, certainly you would not have comc to any conclusion nt this hearing, m . HOR^^TZ: Fe wish to be heard in this matter and prepare a statement on him, THE PRESIDENT: It would be brought up on the application for the witnesses. Still, you have an application now dealing with this position, m . hORWITZ: Yes. I/iR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, in the meantime, if this is going to be put over to any other date, I request the Court instruct the prosecutors that the contents of this affidavit be carried out until such time as the matter is heard. I mean, that the witnesses shall not be approached,or interviewed or interrogated until the time that the matter is heard. THE PRESIDENT: A sort of interim injunction. 8 MR. McMANUS: Yes. TliE PRESIDENT: Arc there any here now that the Torosecution are likely to approach^ MR. hORV/ITZ; I do not know of any one on the list that they are likely to approach at this time, but even an Intarim injunction is one that should not be granted in this type of case, I think that we may state our views a little bit to your Honor in advance, that ofis; we believe there is no such thing as a prosecution cr a defense witness, A witness is a Court witness. A witness is to give the Court the facts,and what the Court is inter- ested in is getting facts and getting the knowledge of v/hnt the v/itness knovjs, THE PRESIDENT: On it, of course, the Charter says otherwise. It speaks of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. It does not talk of other witnesses. IvER. HORWITZ: It hears of witnesses produced by them, but a witness in court becomes a Court's witness. The witness is always there. I am not going into another point of binding by testimony. I wish — I do not think that enters this picture. THE PRESIDENT: I can easily see that in extreme cases the prosecution would be prevented altogether from interviewing witnesses if the defense, say, subpoened every possible person. MR. KORVJITZ: Well, that is the point I wish to bring up. We have a duty over and above this particular case of investigating all"class A" crimes. We have a duty, and it is a duty being carried out, of investigating "class A" crimes for further trials. Now, there are two things; one is the right and the second thing is the ability to even enforce this order which always enters into an injunction. There are many problems that are going to enter into that, if it is granted, for this Court, First of all, suppose there are twenty-six other defendants -- ARAKI has asked for these twenty-seven odd defendants — now, suppose we wish to see these witnesses in connection, not with ARAKI, but with other defendants, are we to be barred from that, and if not, is the Court going to enter into extended hearings to show to what extent the prosecution is going to prevent that? In the second place they are not accused in this case. THE PRESIDENT: Put it this way: You and the defense may require the same witness. The defense subpoena him first; that should not prevent you from subpoening that witness also. MR. HORWITZ: This is not a question of 10 subpoening a witness for evidence. As a matter of fact, these twenty-seven witnesses have been subpoened for the purpose of finding out YJhether they will be v;it- nesses. It is a question of taking evidence in the first instance, THE PRESIDENT: The defense can stop you from putting a case at all if they subpoened any possible witnesses that you might have. That case does not arise, does it? MR. HORFITZ: That is exactly it, I say that that case can arise and since this is based and must be based only on a belief that there be bad faith exercised by the prosecution, the prosecution in turn must take the position that bad faith might be exercised on the other side and might put in a blanket subpoena completely preventing the prosecution from carrying on its duties. We have got to consider that angle and that is the basis of the petition. I know of no instance where neither side is prevented in a case from getting a witness unless it is alleged, a most important allegation, that the witness has been Intimi- dated from giving evidence. THE PRESIDENT; What I had in mind was this, and I thought the defense did: Is a case where you have not called a person to give evidence, but where they 11 have decided to do it, wouia it be right for you to approach that person? It would happen that is the kind of case I had in mind. m . HORFITZ: We do not know — TKE PRESIDENT: I am assuming you are not going to call people \iho already appeared, m , HORFITZ: No, but we have other witnesses who have been brought into court ,or who will be brought into court, who we have interviewed or are in the process of interviewing. Are we to be stopped from interviev/ing them? THE PRESIDENT: They would^prevent you from putting a case at all, but I do not think that is the sort of thing they had in mind. m . HORWITZ: I think that is what it comes down to, sir, THE PRESIDENT: I do not take that view. However, we will hear later about that. You v^ant to be served with a copy of this application and I will fix the date for the hearing, IvIR. McMKUS: In the meantime if your Honor decided to grant that sort of interlocutory decree — I mean — THE PRESIDENT: I will not do that, Mr, McManus, because I might hang up the Trial. 12 MR. McMANUS: I beg your pardon, TIIE PRESIDENT: They may contemplate calling some of these people you have in mind. If I prevented them from calling them I would hang up the Trial. I am not prepared to do that, ME. McMANUS: If your Honor please, this is a long vireek-end and I have submitted my twenty-seven witnesses as far as the order goes and the Charter goes, I am sure, if your Honor please, if any'of these witnesses are approached I certainly cannot possibly get the truth out of them again, THE PRESIDENT: Will you require them before Monday? m , HORWITZ: '̂e are not going to bother with them before Tuesday. The next hearing is the twelfth; is it not? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, next week. Will you give an understanding not to inter- view them before the applications are presented? m, HORWITZ: Yes, I will give that under- standing. THE PRESIDENT: Very well. (Whereupon, at 0909, the proceeding was concluded.) -Ŝn-T
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University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections
November 8, 1946 (p.9985.10,128) Proceedings in Chambers
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