AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Trial transcripts
Conde, David W.
application/pdf
30 OCTOBER 1946 2228 871 "Records of the Progress Theoretical Maneuvers Total War - N o . 1 " 627 872 630 - A 873 Group of Charts and tele- grams Secret Telegram from Nanking dated 14 Kov 1941 from the Chief of the 3rd Air Group at Nanking to the Vice Mini- ster of War and the Vice Chief of General Staff re Troop Movements 8941 8978 I N D E X Of EXHIBITS D o c . N o . Pros. N o . • • f o e N D 1356 870 13 56-A 8 70-A Description "First Table-Top Total War Maneuvers - N o . 1 " Excerpts therefrom For in Ident. Evidence 8928 8929 I N D E X Of WITNESSES Prosecution 1 s Witnesses HORIBA, Kazuwo (resumed) Cross by M r . Brooks (continued) " " M r . Levin 8939 8938 r f o o f Page 8869 9 5 6 8 8 8 8 I N D E X Of D o c . Pros. Def. N o . No. No。 628 874 628-A 654 1412-A 1448 1441 874-A 875 1412 876 8 76-A 877 878 EXHIBITS (cont'd) Description Monthly Wartime Report (KO) N o . 4 of the HA Corps dated Nov 194-1 Excerpt therefrom Top Secret Telegram from 0. TSUKADA, Chief of Staff of Southern Army to H . KIMUHA, Assistant Minister of War Military Administrative Measures to be taken in the Event of Japan"s Par- ticipation in War dated 12 Nov 1941 Excerpt therefrom Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories Measures to be taken Towards Foreign Countries re the Outline for the Execution of National Policies v/hich v/as Decided at the Council in the presence of the Em- peror held on 5 November; "Liaison Conference Decision 13 November 194-1" For In Ident. Evidence 8979 8979 8984 8985 8986 8987 8994 8,868 Wednesday, 3〇 October,194-6 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building T o k y o , Japan The Tribunal m e t , pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. Appearances: For the Tribunal, same as before, with the exception of the HONORABLE R . B . P A L , Member from India, not sitting. For the Prosecution Section, same as before, For the Defense Section, same as before. (English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.) 8,86Q HORIBA CROSS 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 •MARSHAL OF THE COIJPT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA, who is represented by his counsel. Captain Brooks. Iffi. BROOKS: I have to wait on the witness, your Honor. K A Z U ?/ 0 . H O R I B A , called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified, through Japanese interpreter S， cl o follows: CROSS-EXAMINATION BY J®. BROOKS (Continued): Q Mr. Witness, what was your duty while you were a member of the Institute? A My duties pertained to study and research -- basic study and research -- with respect to total war and with respect to the training of students in the Institute -- officials and students in the Institute. Q Did you have anything to do with the keeping of the records of the Institute? A I have had no connection with that matter. . Q On paragraph 7 of exhibit 869 you state that in your official capacity von examined the twenty-six documents annexed thereto, marked exhibit E . ^ o1f & Yelden H0RIB1 CROSS 8,870 1J 'ere you ever custodian of these documents or responsible for their keeping at any time? 1 A As I said yesterday, these documents were 3 left -- were turned over into the hands of the 4 Cabinet after the abolition of the Institute. My 5 6 7 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 office being next door to this T r i b u n a l , n a m e l y , the First Demobilization Ministry, and being readily available to the International Prosecution Section, I was r.sked by the authorities of the IPS to examine © number of documents and I did. Q Now, when you exemined this number of documents, did you have before you for examination all of the documents that had been prepared by various students during this three-year period of the Institute's operation? A Not all, only those which have been tendered as exhibits here. Furthermore, I could not -- as to the extent of my examination of the documents I cannot say that I was able to go into all of its details. I •was familiar with those pertaining to the years -- that is, pertaining to the one year when � was assoc- iated. with the Institute, but as to others, I was only- able to recognize by the form and nature and substance of the contents of the document. THE MONITOR: Slight correction: I could not 8,871- HORIBA CROSS go into each document and determine what it was. However, I knew all of the documents which had any- thing to do w i t h the year that I was with, and the other documents I could tell by the cover or outside what it was. Q "?hat was the total number of documents of the Institute from v'hich these twenty-six were selected, if you know? A I do not remember exactly, but I saw the list of documents which was sent by the IPS to the Cabinet and I do not think it was more than one hund- red. I think it was under a hundred in number. Q Now, was that list for only one year, or do you know? A No, they run over the three-year period. Q Now, v/hat was the main subject or topics discussed in these documents -- in these other documents -- outside of this twenty-six besides the prevention of war as you testified yesterday? MR. E N G L I S H : i ? e object to that, your Honor, as "being without the scope of this affidavit. This man does not attempt to set forth the nature of the contents of any documents other than those set forth in the exhibit. Jill of these documents are available to the defense. 8,872- 2 4 3 6 7 3 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 11 23 24 •!5 HORIBA CROSS THE PRESIDENT: As an f'ttempt to qualify the affidavit, it is both relevant and material but if you have the documents available, we can shorten the cross-examination if they are produced. MR. E N G L I S H : � e will be pleased, your Honor, to produce all the documents。 MR. BROOKS: If the prosecution will make these documents available, the defense will appreciate it very much. I am discussing the others besides this, if they have them in their hands. Q Nov:, Mr. Witness, in mentioning this subject, the prevention of war, yesterday, were there any lectures -- could you mention any lecture briefly concerning the prevention of war? Give us the name of possibly the lecture and whether there was more than one. A There were many of them and I do not recall each name exactly, but I shall try to recall some of them. As to the subjects handled by the Institute in connection with the general subject of total war, there v;ere four different categories or phases of the lectures, namely, ideological or thought measures, p o l i t i c s � measures, economic measures and armed measures. As to armed measures, these were considered to be employed as a last resort when no other possible 8,873 HORIBA CROSS means for any settlement of disputes was possible. THE MONITOR: Slight addition there: This means that the military measures came last and that meant that it was the last measure to be taken, only when it was unavoidable. A (Continuing) By the very nature -- this was considered to be the nature of modern war； that is, that it was total. It was regarded in the Insti- tute as being unpermissible, the resort to war with a v/ar consciousness, end that means other than military should be exhausted before resort to，,'’ar is taken. In this connection, it was the policy of the Institute to give as wide an interpretation and effect to the Japanese tradition of resorting to arms only in the spirit of justice when the use of arras is unavoidable; and it was our intention also to apply this principle to all other measures, namely, political, economic and others. As another example, I should say that a study over a long period was carried on with respect to an over-all or comprehensive study of modern v/arfare, primarily, as a means of studying the causes of war, and by knouing these causes, in finding means to prevent --r. As another example, I might mention that considerable time was devoted to a study of 8,874- HORIBA CROSS international law, as well as the developments in world history which pertain to the efforts toward the maintenance of an organization of peace and order. Also the study of the building of peace and peace structure was broadly handled as a subject of study and exercises end research by the students, as � e l l as in the lectures given at the Institute and studies were raade of the means and methods used — employed in the maintenance of peace or in the con- tinuance of peace since the beginning of rorld history and the conclusions reached by the students if found to be -- some of these points discovered were unjust, they were labeled as unjust and improper in order to find more just and better means. THE MONITOR: The basic concept around vhich the conclusion -- the basic concept that the conclusion brought about was that those who were unjust did not last long. A (Continuing) Ls to all other data, I might say that no studies, no lectures, no exercises v;ere carried on undrr the idea that war was necessary or that resort to v/ar must be had。 All data, studies and lectures v;ere devoted to an analysis and study of domestic and international questions in order to obtain understanding of basic matters pertaining to ^ 7 5 HORIBA CROSS national rnd international affairs. So, only on the principle that the maintenance of peace was necessary, and that if war started, that while war is being �'aged, studies and efforts should be made toward discovering ways of maintaining peace and order. THE MONITOR: whatever we studied about war \-jas just a basic common knowledge that one should know in case the war does start and counter measures should be knov/n by those who night be engaged, in it-- just the basic things about war that people should know. That tos as far as it went so far as the v^ar was concerned. THE PRESIDEITT: These answers are too long as you must appreciate, Captain Brooks. M R . BROOKS； Yes, I was just going to shut him off. THE PRESIDENT: They are really lengthy addresses and to be effective, his answers ought to be related to the publications issued by that body and the answers are not. Q As I gather, this Institute was not formed in contemplation of war and any lecture delivered Or maneuvers held were not in anticipation of any war� is that correct? THE PRESIDENT: T think he is trespassing on 8,876 HORIBA CROSS I our domain. 1 ァe must form our conclusions from the written documents produced by that body. are prepared to consider them all. If some of them have not been mentioned, they should be mentioned. The sooner you get a list of the documents not mentioned in his affidavit, the better。 M R . BROOKS: I understand that that is the order of the Court -- the prosecution is to furnish that list if they have it. THE PRESIDENT: r 'e want to knov all the publications issued by that body. Some of them nay show that it had other purposes than those suggested by the prosecution. MR. BROOKS: As I understood, Mr. President, the Court 1 s instruction to the prosecution was to produce not only these twenty-six but the other list of the other documents was to be furnished the defense so that on their part of the case they could be brought in 一 一 those things that the Court should consider in order to get a complete picture. MR. ENGLISH: Your Honor, we will produce as soon as we can a list of all the documents relating to the Total 'Jar Research Institute, that is, the titles, but v;e do not think that we should be made to translate and serve upon the defense all of those HORIBA CROSS documents. THE PRESIDENT: I mentioned the list. m . BROOKS: I vd.ll therefore not question on publications, your Honor, until we have all of those in Court. BY 腿 . B R O O K S (Continued): C Ncnv, as to merabership in this organization, M r . 7itness, v'as it open to anyone desiring to partic- ipate in one of these discussion groups? A The members of the Institute ?.'ere quite few in number and each of them handled subjects which he specialized in, and because of the very neture of total v/ctr,lecturers and others v/ere in- vited from a v/ide field, from people from official life and also people engaged in other occupations and fields of endeavor. 8,878 HORIBA CROSS 1 一 Q Now, how often did these people meet? T?T as it [ 2 3 4 5 , d a i l y , night or day, and for how long a period of time? A Are you referring to the -- Q Students. A (ContinuirLg) � -— staff members of the In- 6 7 stitute? The mornings were generally devoted to lectures, end tre first part of the afternoon was also 8 devoted to lectures, and the latter part of the after- 9 10 noon was devoted to physical exercises, on the principle that a healthy mind required a healthy body. li 12 13 14 15 16 In connection with so-called table-top dis- cussions and maneuvers, regarding which there were many questions put to me yesterday, I feel that there seems to be sore misunderstanding that these maneuvers were held all the year round. That is not so. The 17 primary emphasis was placed upon lectures and these 18 so-called table-top maneuvers were held, say, approx- 19 imately one month out of the year as a sort of a regu- 20 21 lar program of the Institute, one of the regular projects of the Institute. As further aids to the 22 educational urogram, inspection tours and field trips 23 were also undertaken. 24 Q Now, I'r. Fitness you say that these neet- 25 ings of the students were in the morning and after- noon. Now was that every"day, or how many days out c r 「 ！ l , c b e r ? & s p r a 11 8,879 HORIBA CROSS 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 of セhe month -- for one student I have in mind? A All the students were given lectures and training at one and the same time, and outside of field trips and maneuvers and special tours -- with the exception of field trips, special tours and maneuvers, ther.e lectures were given daily. Q Then I take from exhibit AA of document 869 that these students listed there did not perform any duties of public office dnrir.g the time that they were students in the Institute, is that cor- rect? A Y e s , they were not connected with official duties. . Q This exhibit AA says "List of Members." Now, as I gather from this, showing the former posts and return to the original posts, that that is really a list of the students 5 am I correct or not? MR. B R O O K S � Show the witness the affidavit there that has that in it, exhibit 869. A Ko, that is not so. The main members of the staff or members of the Institute were fixed by the 'government regulations governing the Institute � and by staff members � meant those who were perma- nently engaged in administrative duties of the In- stitute。 Students belonged to an entirely different 8,880 HORIBA CROSS category. THE MONITOR ； Slight correction; The regulation governing the organization of this Total 'War Research Institute states that the word "members" means that they are the staff membefs of the Institute. The word for the students is "research students." (Vherenpon, a document was handed to the witness.) Q These m e n , as エ notice on r>age 4 of this exhibit, had a period when they were in charge. ^ T hat エ am getting at i s , did they not instruct and also study at the same time? Was it an interchange of ideas among them as well as to the students under their charge? A Mepibers of the staff of the Institute were at the same time nominally teachers, The students or research students of the Institute received in- structions , t u t the subject of total warfare itself, being a rather new subject and the members of the staff laeking in experience in the subject, they also studied, but nominally they were given -一 they occupied thp posts of instructors. As far as the ptaff members are concerned, each handled their STibjects tn which they specialized because they were familiar with that particular subject, but total war 8,881 H O R I B A CROSS 9 10 11 12 1 5 14 1 5 16 17 18 1 9 10 21 22 23 2 4 25 requiring extensive and wide knowledge 5 and the subjects handled by each instructor being small, it was necessary that knowledge be obtained by other specialists in order to interchange ideas and to grasp a more general ever-all understanding of the subject on hand. Therefore, specialists from out- side agencies were brought in as a lecturer or a teacher for s p e c i a l , s p e c i f i c subjects. THE PRESIDENT: W e l l , it appears that it was all directed to total w a r . Q N o w , M r . W i t n e s s , this organization of the Institute as set up on the 30th of S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 4 0 , and following that p e r i o d ,エ think your first school or first period students, as shown on page 6 of the document, is from A p r i l 1 , 1 9 4 1 to March 2， 1 9 4 2； and on page 8 of the same document, exhibit 8 6 9 , the second period students, from the first of April, 194-2 to'March, 1943. Now, as a rule, the term of training "began in A p r i l and ended in March the next y e a r } is that correct? A Y e s . Q W e l l , o n page 1 0 , the third period students started the first of A p r i l , 1943 and continued to December 1 5 , 1 9 4 3 . Fhat was the specific reason that the third term ended earlier than u s u a l , o n December 194-3? HORIBA CROSS 8,882 11 12 13 14 15 1.6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 .25 A At that time the v:ar became extremely intensi- fied , a n d - b o t h within and without the Institute there were growing criticisms that the Institute was handling very abstract subjects and theories, and that the opinion gained currency that this Institute should be abolished as soon as uossible, and the members therein be returned to their original official positions where they might contribute more concretely to the job that was required of them, and that led to the abolition of the Institute. Q Fas this abolition by Imperial ordinance or rescript? A I am not familiar w i t h regulations very m u c h， but if the organization was created by Imperial Ordi- nance , I should think it was also dissolved b y an Imperial ordinance. Q Are you familiar with the budget for this Institute, the amount of annual budget? A As to the annual b u d g e t , I do not k n o w , but I knew a little of the outline of the budget when I was there. Q In general, the budget was very small, was tit not? A F i t h respect to the annual budget for the year 1 9 4 1 ,ェ think the amount totaled around HORIBA CROSS 8,883 1^9,000 y e n , of which 60,000 or somewhere around half the total figure was -- constituted salaries, and the rest administrative expenses, for the fiscal year 1941. As I recall, at that t'me nothing much could be done w i t h such a small "budget as 160,000 yen. Q N o w , let me a s k you if the objects or the objectives of the school had been attained, and was that the reason for the closing down on December 15? In other words, was there a purpose that had been accomplished at that time? Or was it -•- THE PRESIDENT; He has already told us that it was closed down or dissolved because its purpose was not accomplished。 ! ®。 B R O O K S s I had not finished — THE PRESIDENT; (Continuing) The subject that he is testifying about is most important, and he may be the only witness offered by the prosecution; but we think that the cross-examination has reached the stage when it does not help at a l l , a n d his answers are te.o long. M R , B R O O K Sミェ had not finished that question, your H o n o r ,エ was right in the middle of it. I was going to say, "or" -- but I vlthdraw it entirely. m . ENGLISH: May I poin^ cut to Che Tribunal in connection with the previous questions and answers HORIBA CROSS that on page 4 of exhibit AA it appears that the witness HORIBA left the Institute in August 1942. BY m . BROOKS (Continued): Q N o w , M r . W i t n e s s , had any director or any member of this Institute during the time tlvat you were there ever participated in any discussion or consultation of any real policy of the g overnment as distinguished from a hypothetical discussion for training? THE PRESIDENT； That question can be answered in one w o r d . A N o , not at all at any time. Q N o w , did this Institute or the students therein prepare plons for the use of the government or of any government agency, either as a duty or on a request of such agency? A N o , not at all, never. The question of education and actual policy was completely separated. 8,885 HORIBA CROSS Q Diti the General Staff or the Supreme Com- mand , t o your knowledge, or any of the planning "bodies such as those, or similar to that type of body, or the Cabinet, exercise any supervision over the activities of this Institute or utilize the work of its students or the students therein, in any way? A No, they had nothing to do with the Insti- tute. Q It was, then, purely, if I am correct, an academy of learning, or an institute, or an open forum for training of the government officials of the highest type, is that correct? A Yes. THE PRESIDENT; Mr. Levin. MR. LEVIN； Mr. President, directing your attention to exhibit No. 869， pages 21，22 and 23. THE PRESIDENT: That is the witness' affi- davit . m . LEVINj Yes. CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR。 LEVIN; Q Is it correct to state that only seven of the contemplated com-oilations were ccjr'rlev-ed prior to December 7，1941? A What do you mean by seven? 4 6 8 9 0 12 4 16 7 8 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 Greenbers & Eder HORIBA CROSS P,8P6 Q Seven compilations. A I have not been able to scrutinize the dates very closely, but on the face here probably of the documents considered h e r e , it might be just seven. THE PRESIDENT; At least seven, I should say. Because of the dates. The year 194-1 is stated without any specific date in some cases. THE.WITNESS: You could readily understand if you would observe the d a t e s . M R , LEVIN: That is w h y , M r . President, I asked the quastion. B Y M R . LEVIN (Continued): Q Some mention has been made in your testi- mony of the accused SUZUKI, Teiichi. Will you state whether or not you have any independent recollection that he was designated as one of the councillors? A As I said yesterday,エ do not r e c a l l . Q Then you would not be able to state whether or not he was active or participated either in management, instruction, or business ri-anagement of the organization? A T , T ell,エ can say this, as far as councillors are concerneds As ェ said y e s t e r d a y , their position 8,887 HORIBA CROSS 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in the Institute had no substance whatsoever, and t'rey were invited from various walks of life since the establishment of t e Institute, in order to re- ceive general nub'lic suo^ort through the efforts of these iren. THE PRESIDENT? That is enough. v e do not vjant th?t again. Y/e have had it often enough. M R . LEVIN: I did want a direct answer, Mr. President, bn.t under the circvirstances, in view of the character of the answer I think it is unneces- sary for ine to go intn it any further. THE PRESIDENT; He said yesterday he did not know who the councillors w e r e . He did not see them there. That ought to be sufficient. M R , LEVIN; There will be no further examina- tion by the defense of this witness, Mr. President. M R . ENGLISH^ There is no redirect examina- tion, Your Honor. ThE PRESIDENT- ‘ The witness may go on the usual terms. (^hereupon, the witness was exensed.) M R . ENGLISHs However, Your honor, at this 8,888 time I would like to point out to the Tribnnal the following entries in the affidavit of the w i t n e s s . Page 3 , exhibit "AA," in the second column. "President, Eanji OGA" r A, Vice-Admiral, Kaval attache to Japanese Embassy in C h i n a , From December 1942" -- it says "2" but obviously it means " 3 " - - 1 9 4 - 3 , "to January 194-5." And the next: "General Secretary, Kunio KAWAMOTO, Secretary of Great E a s t Asia M i n i s t r y , • December '43 to April '45." And the next: "General Secretary, Taro ヮADA, Secretary of Commerce and Industry M i n i s t r y , Aram-unit ion official of the ammunition Ministry" -- a member "From K a r c h 1 4 4 to April TEE P R E S I D E N T；町 e l l , you see what y o u have done by letting hirr 1 go without reexamination. L e has contradicted his affidavit and his contradic- tion stands。 MR。 EhGLISK: I would like to read one more entry, at the bottom of page 5 of exhibit n A A " . THE PRESIDENT: All you are proving now is that he contradicted himself.、’ MR . ENGLISHs Reference、is made to court exhibit 686-A, page 7416 of the record, being ex- 8,889 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ：! 13 14 15 16 j 17 1 8 i 2 0 ！ 21 22 23 24 cerpts from a document entitled "First Table-Top Maneuvers, a Top Secret £ymposi"um of the First Total Tr 'ar Military Gains of the Totalァar Research Institute, August 1 9 4 1 . " C o l o n e l R o s e n b l i t , of the Russian section, read several paragraphs from this excerpt. I w i l l read f u r t h e r , as follows s I will cormence w i t h tjage 1 . " D o c u m e n t Belctive to the Maneuvers for Total V r ar. August 1941. N o . 98 of 120 volumes . The Total ' : 'ar Research Institute." エ will omit pages 2, 3 and 4, except that I will read coluKn 6, headed, "The Outline of O-nerations'." Beginning on page 2s 11 The Outline of Operations• The following personal work are given to all. of the post-graduates：1.The investigation of our national policy. 2. Strategic planning for total warfare. 3. The judging of sitration neces- sary for the above. The nrinciple organs of Blue land will be constituted by all of the tdost-gradnates and they will be required to do the fn'llnvdng work; 1 . T h e planning of total war strategies. 2. Prepara- tions for the develcroment of total war strategies. Imaginary situation is given to the- TDrincinal organs of Blue land, and the management of the situ- 25 ation will b e s t u d i e d . 1 . C o m p l e t i o n of ^reparation 8,890 for total warfare within and abroad. 2. Prepara- tion armed warfare. The directing of psychological and economic warfare. 3 . The decision for w a r . 4. The directing of total war after this decision. 5. Directing t':a outbreak of w a r . 6, Directing of total war immediately after the outbreak of w a r . 7. Directing of total warfare during wartime accord- ing to circumstances. 8. The maneuvers will be sus- pended on t':.e morning of the 2 0 t h . 1 . D r a f t i n g of criticism. 2. Preparations for the Research Meet- ing. 1 . R e s e a r c h Meeting. 2 . Criticism after this the maneuvers vnlll be c o n c l u d e d . 1 . T h e arrangement of the results of the inane-avers. 2. Research for the future." 8,891 I w i l l rend pages 5 and 5a.: "Prescriptions for the Execution of the First Theoretical Maneuver for Total '•'Part.エ.The Object of the Maneuvers "Article エ . T h e object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-gradurtes cf tliis Research Bureau practice definite tnessures for total w a r f a r e , as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing re- searches on it as superior executives. "Article I I . The following are the nrinci- pal items yhich should be studied snd practiced during the maneuverss ” 1 ) T h e natj onal policy ？nd object which should be nropagsndizod within and abroed. "2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire. "3) The Doints in draft"' ng part of the var- ious nlans necessary for the execf.tion of total r/ar- f a r e . "4) The main noint.s of consolidotinp end strengthening ’positions for totfl w a r f a r e . "5) The out]ine .for directing total warfare. ”6) Pert of a definite policy for the- execu- tion of p s y c h o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c end diplomatic warfares 8,892 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 against a specific country. "7) Directing organs for total warfare, snd directing organs for psychologicsl,economic and dip- lomatic nrarfare, "8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution 'of total warfare by Japsn. "Article エエエ• The particulars of items for investigation ?nd nractice mentioned in the preceding articles ere nrescribed seperately in the outline of manouvor instructions. "Section I V . "Article 9 . 1 s ? h e n the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvc-rs are over, the Supreme Cora— mandcr マill comment on it for the benefit of those who Darticipsted. in the rasneuver. "The main points on which comments will be made arc apnroximately as follows? " 1 . F h e t h e . r the nlans set ut> beforshsnd were suitable or n o t . "2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or noセ， "3. T liether ex ：っost facto research was carr- ied out nroperly or not. "4. A e t h e r proper discipline was rasintained durin? the maneiivcrs or not. 8,893 " 5 . Instructions for the f u t u r e . "Article 1 0 . Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimated situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term mf.neuvcrs)，each umpire department shall submit materials for consent to the Supreme Comrnandcr. Each umpire der)srtraent, h o w e v e r , m u s t sdiust beforehsnd the opinions of the umpires belonging to that doprrtnent. regarding the materials for comment. "The draft of the comments shall be msde by the critics' c o u n c i l . " h e menbers who sre to attend the council meeting shall be s^cciclly designated. "Section V . - Gstherine the Results of the Ilanciivcrs. "Article 1 1 . E a c h staff member of this In- stitute shall ? defending on his assignment, arrange pnd つreserve the records of the maneuvers ss well as the opinions, e t c . , on the itens for research and matters vrhich should be improved concerning the nlsns of the msnetivcrs 5 or report them to other organizations which require such information. ’ , Section V I . - Specific Symbols. "Article 1 2 . I n order to っreserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations ？nd places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers；" THE PRESIDENTS We had those before, M r . English, but you might like to try them in here. M R . EFGLISHs They have been referred to. I shall, omit it, y e w Honor. THE IBESIDENTs 『e will recess for fifteen minutes。 (Whereupon, st 104:7，8 recess was taken until 1102 ? after v?hich the proceedings were resumed es followss) P,89 デ MARSHAL OF THE C )URT； The International Military Tribtmal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT； M r . English. M R . ENGLISH: Your Honor, the Russian Section referred to these specific symbols, but just to a few of them, and I think it would be helpful if エ were to reac, all of them. THE PKESIDEI'IT: Not all of them; a general description would be sufficient. Iffi. ENGLISH: (Reading) ‘ "A, United States of America; i、, the Soviet Union; G ? Australia; J . Inner South Sea； M.，. Manchukuo； P , Philipriae Islands； S , Singapore; U , Vladivostok; W , /leutian and Alaskan regions; B , Britain; E , Dutch East Indies； H, Hev/aii; K, Canada5 N, Japan; Q, Malay; T , Thailand； V , Burma5 X , the Axis Powers| X I , G e r m a n y； X 2 , Italy; C , China; F , French Indo-China； I , India; L, Central and South /merica; 0 , Borneo; R , Far Eastern Regions of the Soviet Union." I will read columns 2, and 7 headed, respec- ( tively, "Imaginary Time," "Functions for directing the ： maneuvers," and "The principal maneuver items," from pages 6, 7， and 8; "Imaginary Time, / u g u s t , 1 6 S h o w a , 1 9 4 1 . Functions for directing the maneuvers; The opening of ！ 17-34567890 1 2 3456789012 34 5 111111 1 111 2 22222 Morse & Abram 8,896 of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation foj: the third term. Ex- planations concerning the Empires will follow in the same way. "Secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue Country to the supervising section. The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 August. The criticism regarding this. Delivery and explanation of suprjlernentory situations. “The principal maneuver items s ( 1 ) N e g o t i - ations with A and the economic demands thereof. (2) The reply to X (that is the Axis Powers) and D (Soviet Union). (3) The preparations of war against D (Soviet Union)and A (America). "September. The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism re- garding this. Discussion of the situation for the Fourth Term. The announcement and explanation of the situation for the Fourth Term. Continuation of N o . 1 in the preceding term. Secret report to the super- visers on the general policy of the Blue country (that is， Japan). (2) The response to X (the Pxls Powers) concerning the NX Treaty. The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 September. The criticism regarding this. Annoimcemerit an.l explenation of additional siturtions. (3) Mer^ures rgrinst the stiffening rttitude "b-.t^een A (Americr) rnd N (Jr^rn), Septenber. The rnncnmcement rnd c'xplrnrセion of the siturtion. The reply to X (the Axis Powers). "October. The sccret report to the super- vising section on the generrl policy of the Blue Country. (2) Mer sures rprinst the suspension of the Gommcrcial relrtions rdth A (Americn), B ( B r i t r i n ) , E (Dutch Erst Indie: 5 -nd L (Centrrl rnd South Airericr.). The presentrtion of mersnres to be trkon until 20 October. The criticism regrrding this. The rnnounccinent rnd e x p l m r t i o n of rdaitionr.l siturtions. "November. The presentation of mersures to be trken until the end of October. The criticisin thc-reof. The rnnouncc-merit rnd discussion of the siturtion of the sixth t e r m .た j j Mersures in regrrd to the resolution to r d v m c e into E (Dutch Erst Indies). The r nn ounce- mont tnd explr.nr tion of the siturtion of the sixth t e r m . ( 1 ) R e s o l u t i o n to hrsten rctions rgrinst E (Dutch Erst Indies). The secret report to the- super- visory section on the generr.l policy of the Blue Country. (2) Negotirtions 前ith D (Russir). The presentrtion of rersures to be trken "until 20 Noveinter. The criticism thereof. The rnnouncement rnd e x p l m r t i o n of the F.dditionrl siturtion. 8,898 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 "December. The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of November. The criticism there。,. The discussion of the situation of the seventh term. (3) Measures for commencing the rdvance into E (Dutch East Indies). The announcement and explanation of the situation of the seventh t e r m . ( 1 ) T h e resolution for 'P' (Philippine) operations and the measures thereof. The secre-c report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue C ountry. (2) measures against B (Eritain) and D (Soviet Union). The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 December. The criticism thereof. The announcement of the additional situations. The presentation of measures to he taken until the end of December. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term." THE MONITOR: M r . English, will you put the earphone on? This is the Language Section speaking. The English translation of this document has lines, that is, it is easy for you to read one line and then continue on to the fifth column. However, v/hen this was trans- lated into Japanese it was not done in the same way. It is very difficult to read it simultaneously. Will you read it slow? M R . ENGLISH: I w i l l . T h e last column on page 7i 8,899 “(3) The measures in accordance with the out- breaks of wer between N (Japan) and A (America), B (Britain). "From January to M a r c h , 1 7 S h o w a , 1 9 4 2 . The announcement and explanation of the situation of the eighth t e r m . ( 1 ) T h e measures against the air-raid on Tokyo. The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue C ountry (Japan). (2) The measures towards the Diet. The presentation of messures to be taken until the end of February. The crticism thereof. The announcement and explanstion of additional situations. (3) The measures towards D (Soviet Union) and L (Central and South America). C4； The economic and political measures towards E (Dutch East Indies), F (French Indo-China), T (Thailand)， P (Philippines), and Q (Malay). "From April to October. The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of M s r c h . The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the ninth term. The announcement and explanation of the situation of the ninth t . ^ r m . ( 1 ) t h e continuation of the N o , 4 in the nreceding terra. The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of J u n e , The criticism thereof. The announcement end explanation of the additional situations. (2) the measures in 8,900 relations with D (Soviet Union). (3) The resolution of war against D (Soviet Union). The presentation of measures to be taken -until the end of August. The criticism thereof. The announcement and t xplsnation of the additional situations. (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue Country (Japan) henceforward. The presentation of the works of each participant. Heneuver to te stopped." 8,901 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 24 25 MR。 ENGLISHs I will now read the remainder of the excerpt except certain paragraphs on pages 11, 11-a and 12, which were read by Colonel Hosenblit of the Hussian. Section. I will inform the Court of the para- graphs which are not to. be read。 Page 9. (Readings) "The Theoretical Maneuvers. for Total Warfare 5 No. 6 — 3 . No. 098 of the 100 volumes, 24 July,( Showa 1 6 ) 1 9 4 1。 Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for the total warfare ：エIiJUM, Yuzuru. " ( 1 ) T h e Situation。 As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Corrraand of the Govern- ment on July 24th regarding the strategy of total war- fare, vre have agreed on the following unanimously. " 1 . B l u e land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancin into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise。 "The Theoretical Hanuevers for Total Warfare, No. 6 — 5。 （Secret) No. 98 of 120 volumes. De- signated Distribution. Iiaintenance of Secrecy. Only for those concerned with the maneuvers. Disposal。 To be returned on conclusion of the maneuvers. "The 1st Theoi etical Ii^neuvers for Total VJar for 1941 (SHOWA 16). "The Report on Activities in Regard to the 8,902 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 15 16 17 13 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 Subjects Given for the Second Term of the llaneuvers. "Part I. The national policy of Blue land to propagandized internally and abroad. "Fart II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land. "Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOVi/A 16). "The Government of Blue land。 "(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau) "TABLE OF COi.TSNTS. "Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propagandized internallj'- and abroad. "1st Item - The statement of Blue land. "2nd Item - The conversation of the Prime Minister of Blue land. "Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land。 "Classification I 一 Tactics of total warfare of the Blue land plan. "Classification II - A part of the plan for the Blue land's army and navy. "Item I, Latters concerning the army. 1 1 1 . T h e classification and numbers of necessary personnel。 "2, The amount of important necessary materials. "3• The classification and number of requisi- 8,903 tioned ships necessary. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the civilian factories. "5. Summary of the military budget. "Item II. Matters concerning the navy. " 1 . T h e classification and number of the necessary personnel. "2. The amount of necessary important materials. "3. The classification and number of requisitioned ships necessary. "4-. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the principal civilian factories. "5. Summary of the military budget. "Item III. The outline of plan for defense against air raids throughout the nation. "Item IV. The plan for defense against air- raid in the Kanto District. "Item V . The plan for maintenance and control of marine transportation. "Classification III - The outline of foreign policy for Blue land. "Item I. The plan for diplomatic warfare. "Item II. The policy for the disposal of the China Incident. "Item III. The policy towards Manchuria. 8,904 "Item IV. The plan for administration of the occupied territories. "Classification IV - The plan for psychological warfare of Blue land. "Classification V - The plan for economic war- fare of the Blue land. "Item I. The principle of repletion of the economic power of Blue land. " 1 . T h e policy of expanding the productive power, "2. The policy of expanding and strengthening the economic co-prosperity sphere. "3. The commercial policy (the exchange of materials). "4. The policy for replenishing deficient materials. "Item エI. The outline for mobilizing the economic power. " 1 . T h e policy for the mobilization of materials. "2. The policy for the mobilization of capital. "3. The policy for the mobilization of labor. "4. The policy for the mobilization of trans- portation. "5. The policy for financial plans. "Item III. The plan for the execution of 8 , 9 0 5 economic w a r f a r e . "3 of N o . 1 3 — Total War Table-Top Maneuvers (plan) August 2 3， 1 9 4 1 (submitted at 0830). Superirrtendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers, IIKURA, M i n o r u . "Additional Situations and Problems of 9th Period Maneuver of First Total War Ta.ble-Top Maneuvers." I w i l l continue reading from page 11a, N o . 2： "Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land. "Classification I 一 Programme for Total Warfare for the Blue land (plan).。 " N o . 1 - T h e object of total w a r f a r e . " ( 1 ) T h e object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as w e l l as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East A s i a . "(2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A (America)， B (Britain) (including E》D u t c h East Indies) and C (Chimgkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D (The Soviet Union) エ w i l l omit the next paragraph. (Reading) "No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Tot已丄レ!/arfare* 8,906 "(1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C (China) Incident ac- cording to established principles； while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be com- pleted and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately wars with other hostile countries. "(2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing cf materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures. However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the cir- cumstances demand. When a war with A (America) and B (Britain) becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and declare w a r . We will exclude their in- fluences in East A s i a , and at the same time endeavor to make them give up their hostilities against us." エ will omit the next paragraph. " ⑷ Through cooperation with X (the Axis Powers), we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with h e r , while completing every possible preparation for an initiative wcr against A (America) and B (Britain) as. a precaution against A 1 s (America 1 s) participation in a war with X (the Axis Powers) THE PRESIDENT: M r . ,Logan. M R . LOGAN: Here we have a situation where a 8,907 witness was on the stand who knew about this document that is being read. In the first place, it is theo- retical end it is immaterial and irrelevant to any of the issues of this case. As a matter of fact % when this document was introduced b:, the Russian prosecutor, he referred to it as a "military game," which appears on page 7416 of the record. Furthermore, the affidavit submitted by the witness v/ho just left the stand, there are listed all the エPS documents and neither 1622, which is now being read, nor 1356A, which apparently will be the next document introduced by the prosecu- tion, are mentioned. On the basis of this, your Honor, I have an objection to make to the further reading of this document, on the ground it is immaterial f?nd ir- relevant ,and, secondly, that if this Tribunal believes that this document and the next document to be in- troduced by the prosecution has any probative value at all, that the previous witness be requested to re- appear for re-examination. THE PRESIDENT: V/ell, these maneuvers are relevant to the issue of preparation for war, or even to the issue of conspiracy. The prosecution lias the option of relying on the document alone or of for- tifying it by calling a witness。 Mostly they‘hsve re丄led on the document alone. Here they wanted to 8,908 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 prove related matters not found in documents and they called a witness. The Russian prosecutor did refer to these maneuvers as a "game," but エ took him to have beien speaking ironically or perhaps facetiously. This witness told us that all these maneuvers were based on hypotheses and they may have been. They certainly were not based on actualities 5 the war h a d n 1 1 occurred, but that doesn't prevent the maneuvers from being re- levant and material to the issue of preparation for war or conspiracy to commit it. I can think of no more relevant evidence than evidence of this type. We are' not bound by the answers of the witness in the box。 Where they are contradictory we have a choice. I am sorry that there wasn't an attempt made to en- lighten us in re-examination upon a certain point, but that is beside the point. The objection is disallowed. 腿 . L O G A N : Might エ say something further, your Honor, please? THE PRESIDENT: I didn't call on the prose- cution, and I don't think you should say anything. It would never do for us to review our decisions im- mediately they are given and that is what we are invited to do. P , n C9 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: Kny it pleasa the Tribu- nal, ma7 I be permitted to say something with reference to a matter which is within my personal knowledge and not within the knowledge of Mr. English? THE PRESIDENT: I think you should be, Brigadier, yes. BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: It has reference to tho list of cocumonts containod in exhibit E of that witness' Eiffii^Fivit。 As an example of the confusion that has r.risen, my friend, M r . Logan, has just referred to it as being a list of all tho documents of this kind in tha possession of the IPS. Ho criticized tho omission from that list of the document which is now being react. Tho point is ;his, as エ enn say of my own knowledge. It was plainly impossible for the prose- cution to introduce into evidence all tho publications of this Institute. Tharafore, in respect of those that were not going to bo produced in evidence, a list was compilco. We believe that to bo a fairly complete list of the documents held by the IPS, but a chock is now boing made in a d d i t i o n .エ have given an under- taking to ray friend, M r . Brooks, that we will endeavor to obtain from ATIS a list of any further documents relating to the Total War Research Institute held by Duda& Barton 8,910 1 2 3 4 J 5 ！ 6 � 7 � 8 i 8 � 9 10 11 1 2 � 13 ！ thrt organization. M R . LOGAN: If tho Tribunal ploasa, with all cue respect to my friond, here, I boliGve I stated, but the record will show it, and if I didn't state it what I intended to state was that tho documont attached to the affidavit of the vjitncss does not mention cocumont 1622 nor 1356"A. And tho Brigadier has not said that that statement is not corroct. THE PREaiDEIJT: M r . English. M R . ENGLISH: Parsgrpph 4 , page 12: 1 4 6 7 S 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 P，911 "(ム)Through cooperr tion vrith X (the Axis Powers), we shr.ll strive to realize the pirn for rn rlli.-nce trcrty ”ith her, ^hile comxileting every possible prepr.rrtion for m initiative wrr r grinst A (Americr), r.nd B (Britrin) rs r： pre- cr-ution rgrinst A's (Americr.' s) prrticiprtion in r wrr with X (the Axis Powers). "(5) Thererfter, we shrll decide on our different pirns in rccordrnce ^ith the trrnpitions in the situr.tion, thereby m t i c i p r t i n g the rchicvc- ment of the purposes of tot,1 wfrfrre. "The Guiding Principle of Armed Wrrfrre " 1 . A g r i n s t C (Chinr.). By rvoiding the expr.nsion of occrried rrers，we shrll oxccate reperted rnd rctive rrm.ed rctions rgrinst the Chungking Regime to destroy her rrrned power. At the srme time, we shrll trke p.ersnrc-s to den rive her people of their will to fight by destoying her estrbliShment rnd strengthening our economic blockrpe of her. In the presentrtion of Frr rgrinst other hostile countries, the principles enumfcrrted in the preceding rrticle shrll be strongly maiTi- trined in the hope thrt the conseauences will contribute to the surrtncicr of Chungking Government. "2. Agrinst F (French Indo-Chinr.) rnd P，912 T (Thrilrnd). The spirit of joint defense w i t h F v i l l be- stengthened. When the rttitude of T is unfriendly towrrds N (Japsn) nnd she does not comply T'ith our d e m r n d s , rnd rlso vhen A (Anoi'icr) rnd B (Britrin) try to excludc our infliaences in T (Thrilrnd) "we shrll inrke militrry r.dvmces into T . "3. Agrinst E (Dutch Erst Indies). If E's rttitude towrrds K is to be rgrrr.vrted -nd especirlly if she refrses to supply us v'ith the necessrry mrterirls, wc shrll jirke military rdvrnce on r frvorrble occrsion rith r resolve for wrr ^ i t h A rnd B . In crse r. wrr with A rnd B is inevitrble, we shrll rdvrnce into E . "4. Agrinst A rnd B . If r Frr with A rnd B bccoit;cs inevitrble, in the event o f , for instrnce, k prrticiprting in the wrr rgrinst X , or A completely cutting off rll conmercirl re- lrtionship r'ith F , or drngcr of rrmed collision v i t h A rnd our c o u n t r y , or F being thrertened with nilitrry invr sion by A , re ？rill trke the initirtive in strrtin^ r rrv rnd inanedirtely occupy P (Philippines), Q (Mrlry) rnd E (Dutch E r s t Indies), thereby strengthening our strrtepic m d economic situr tion; rnd rt the srmt time, we shrll pirn to destroy the enemy's militrry power P,9l3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 �.nd to mrke them rbrndon their hostilities towards us." � will omit the next prrrgrrph. "The Theoreticrl Mmetivers for Totrl -Wrr, N o . 1 0 . "No. 98 of the 120 volumes. "Appointed distributor Judge Mihidrijo of the Ministry of Commerce rnd Industry "14 August 1941 "Mrintenrnco of secrecy - only for (SHOv/A 16) memher? concerned in the mmc-uvcrs, "(delivered " D i s p o s - r l - t o be returned on the r t 1430) concltjsion of the- mrnetwtr, "Supervisor of the Theoreticrl K m e u v c r s for Totrl Wrrfrre. ” � I K U R A , Yuzuru "The circumstances rnd subjects for the Sixth Phrse of Theorcticrl Mrneuvcrs for Totrl Wrrfrre. "(1) The circumstrnces in the middle rnd end of NovGnter. "A. The internrtionr.l siturtion. " 1 . W i t h the r.pprorch of the severe cold of winter, the D-X (Soviet Union-Axis Powers) wrr is grrdur.lly nerring r strlement in the areas east of the River D o n , Moscow rnd Leningrrd. "2. There is not imich chrnge. in the BX 珊r.r excc.pt thrt there is rn indicrtion of rdvrnce tcwrrds the Suez rnd Gibrrlter. "3. There is rlso no grert chr.nge in the A-X w r r . It seetns pr.rt of A's forces in the Atlrntic seem to hrve Gomin.enced r. move to the Fr.cific. A declrred wrr rgrinst X on the 1st of November. 1 1 8,915 "4. Although the A , B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense pro- grams with what troops they have sta- tioned in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propaganda activities to divert N's movements。 Part of Blue l a n d 1 s plans seem to have been Intercepted by A , B and E . "5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propa- ganda activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A , B and C. "6. Although conditions in the R (マar East- ern Soviet territory) district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either to M (Manchukuo) or — " I am sorry. It is A . I am sorry, I cannot read it;. It is not printed there. "B. The conditions of the Supreme Command and the A^nav. " 1 . T h e 3 upreme Co umand of Elue land de- sires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible. "2. The preparations of the S upreme Command for action apainst E is now under pro- gress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November. "The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3 "No. °8 of the 120 volumes "15 August 1941 (SH0'"A 16) "(delivered:. 1200) "Appointed distributor Judpe Saidai1o of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry "Maintenance of secrecy - only for members concerned in the maneuvers. " D i s p o s a l - t o be returned on the conclusion of the maneuvers. "Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare — IlfTUEA, Yuzuru "Supplementary situations for the sixth phase 8,917 of the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare. "Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of November. " ( 1 ) T h e troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 November； and after mak- ing sudden attacks, they have secured effectively several important areas in E . (Names of places and the war situation stated orally, now and here- after. ) The casualties of the Blue land are slipht. 11 (2) E has declared she w i l l • resist to the utmost the invasion of N',and is ask- ing for the aid of A and B . Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually bein? pushed back by Blue land's army。 Of the economic in- stallations in the territories of E Country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been ex- posed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent. "(3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as followゴ： "Vessels 80,000 tons "Crude oil 210,000 kilolitres "Ordinary benzine 97,000 kilolitres "Heavy-oil 136,000 kilolitres "(4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A . It seems that part of A's naval forces in the Atlan- tic are beinp rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N , the true inten- tion of the government is not clear. "(5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own. "(6) Blank thousand soldiers and blank thou- ! i sand tons of vessels have been newly • „ mobilized in preparation for opera- tions against A . "The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, | P.919 "28 August 194-1 (SHOWA 16) N o . 1 6 "No. 98 of the 100 volumes "Appointed distributor - "Maintenance of secrecy - only for members concerned in the maneuvers " D i s p o s a l - t o be returned on the conclusion of the maneuvers "Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for Total Warfare -- IIW^TA, Yuzuru "The Criticism of the First Theoretical Iianeu*ers for Total Warfare. "In concluding the first theoretical maneu- vers for total warfare,エ shall hereby state my opin- ions regarding the important matters in the maneuvers, and thereby contribute to future researches by parti- cipants. "The first term of the maneuvers, " ( 1 ) A l t h o u g h I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their pre- sentation of their studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations, I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration. At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours wore short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies." 8,921 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 “(11) In the third neriod of the maneuvers the diplomatic ^olicy of the government of Blue land is to take advantage of the noticeably easier crn- tcmporrry international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and エ am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain ^he object of the measures by diplometic means. For instcnce, in our relation with A ？nd B , I think it was s failure of curs to h?vo tpken a diplomatic policy airaod rt ev?ding wc.r with them. "(12) In the third period of the maneu- vers J I think the judgment that the nronosition of A resulted from its wenlmoss is SDnropristc ? but エ csnnot approve of a passive dinlomecy based on the propositions of A . '̂e should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by tnking sdvan- t?ge of her weakness end ”resenting positive pro- posrl of our own. Therefore-, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthen- ing the relations v , ith and X . "(14) In the fifth period of the manGuvors a more csrefill rnd deeper consideration will be nec- essary in the sdvsncc into E . For instance, vre should not concentrate merely on the period conccrning the ccmpleticn of nrcprrations. It will be necessary 8,922 to make a thorough-going invostigstion into our know- ledge of the general trend, the limit of cur present a i m , the muturl cooperative relstirns of the poli- ticel snd military strategies just before the ed- v ? n c e , the pctua.l domestic situation and the oolicy concerning them ? etc. "(15) Concerning' the judgment on the abi- lity to execute wrr ？gainst A ? B rnd E , it was an attempt a psrtiel outline only ss it was restri- cted by shortage of materials snd t i m e , b u t , to this extent エ rcknowledge it to be a comperctivcly fair ? ？.nd I ospeciclly pporove of the sincere atti- tude taken in the investigation, "However, in reality, we must c?refully study the material scone snd connection of military end civilian needs in all nhcscs, such ss labor and m a t e r i P l , s t a t i c or dyn?mic, ?s 前g11 es to plan ell these ps fn over-all geographic unitブ involving N , M snd C 5 snd from thr st^ndooint of tine Including the whole length of the w a r . M o r e o v e r , the ssscss- ment of the period until the coTnnencemcnt of ?11 the activities in tho c-Tdovg nlan is insufficient snd is altogether too short. "(16) The cooperative- activities of the political snd military strategies nrior to the ad- P.923 vance into E ere grfvely insufficient. After the de- cision is msde for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic 5 psychological snd economic war- fare should be actively clevoloDed imder s single policy so as to facilitrte one-rations. That is 5 to put A and. B off guard, to fscilitrtc their indivi- dual destruction, rnd to cptch E napning to get a chance for c. sudden sttack. In particular in order to complete the concc-ntrEtion of the nation 1 s total power by keeping the plpn secrct snd impgincrjr, it will be neccsspry to d.eveloり for e nloin rnd definite object all the rctivities of the セotsl oo?;er of a united, nation. "(18) It is wrong to have trcptcd lightly the mstter of declaring VJST on A and B under the cir- cumstances in the Irst stage of the sixth period. It will be- nt.cesspry to study crref 1 !]ly whether there can be no last measure to avoid, VJP.T with A snd B ? end. to consider prudently the： serious results arisinp from the outbrcpk of , c lthough it must always be kept in mind that there is advantsge in takinp： the initi- ative in declaring ynr on A snd B when they aro still unprepared. ” (Note) In order to facilitate study ? we- havo executed this maneuver on the supposi "cion that N's pcrticipation in the wer by virtue of the NX treaty is not sutomstic, “(19) However 3 I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circ'j.rast?.nces dctoining in the, early stages of the seventh noriocl mpneuvcrs。 Thc.rs has been a rapid de一 vGlopmcnt in the situation 5 end the intentions of A and S towerds N hevc become clesr. The general sit- uation demands our finding' indcoendently a way out of our impasse。 Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders ？s vie do today. This must be considered E good chRnce to make cur decision for starting wrr egninst A and B . "(20) The measures talcon by the Government of Blue la nd on the bssis of the； studies made before— hrnd by the Seeend Committef cbout th measures to be taken to*7?rd foreign countries in connection with the outbrocik of , were as ? whole quite suitable. "However 5 there is still room for study in regard to wor sims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of trcoos rnd peace terms) snd representa- tions to X sbout not concluding a separate pec.ce. "(25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had. been generally expelled from the SPQ districts end the main force of A 1 s army 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 had been destroyed, I think it w?s nccessary to study nnd determinG the nolicy for the subsequent direction of the wrr against A ，nd B . ”（26) It is good to note the improvement in the wcy you assessed the npticnal strength in the war sgsinst D compsred with that of the ^ar against A and B , but I desire to see farther creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency m&asnres to cone with the situation at a time rhen the national existence is at stake THE PRESIDENTs This is £ convenient break, Ilr. English. 卩e 双ill adjourn until いhereupon, at 1200 w?s taken.) h?lf p?st one. a' recess 8,926 AFTERNOON SESSION The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330. MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks. M R . BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I would like to call attention in relation to this exhibit 686A, that on page 1 1 , p a r a g r a p h 1 , t h e bottom of the page, in reference to a Cabinet Ileeting of July 10; and that on page 7^18 of the proceedings in the Russian phase, at the bottom of the page, it is quoted from the page 11エ；just referred to previously, that the Cabinet Meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D . Now referring back to page 16 of exhibit 686A, paragraphs 2 to 10 have been omitted. They discuss the student cabinets and functions of the students setting up cabinets and their actions and the criticisms of the teachers of these actions as they were playing cabinet member in the course of this Table-Top Maneuver; For clear understanding of this, if the Tribunal desires, the defense will trj尸 on its case to brinf in further evidence on these paragraphs To 1 f & Y e 1 d e n 8,927 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 .10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 omitted to show that this wc.s not facts that were considered here, as pointed out in further omissions. Paragraph 13 being omitted on page 16, is a criticism of one of the bodies set up of the students. Paragraph 17 on page -- Also on page 1 7， besides paragraph.17 omitted, there are paragraphs 21 to 24 omitted, and the remaining paragraphs from paragraph 27 to paragraph are omitted with the conclusion and. criticism of the teacher of the students, showing their need for further study; and it is a very profound critique upon their discussions and findings as members of these various student ea"binets and so forth. This is all matter of evidence and is in prosecution's document 686， if your Honor please, but it has not been translated into English. If the Tribunal feels that would be of assistance we would attempt to have that translated if the document is made available for that purpose. ^e will have to have it withdrawn from the Court. THE P R E S I D E N T :マ e are under no misapprehension as to the meanings of the expressions in the document to which you refer. M R . BROOKS: Thank y o u . THE P R E S I D E N T :マ e never have been under 8,928 234567C09O 1234567S9012345 1 11 1 1 11 11 1 222 22 ？ ^ ？ny misapprehension a"bout that. N o w , Captain B r o o k s , even if we w e r e , you know you should wait until you r.re piving evidence in the course of the defense to deal so fully with s matter like that. have prevented Japanese counsels from wedging their defense in in the course of the prosecution's case. M R . BROOKS: If your Honor please, the document is that thick (indicating) r.nd I rra on the documents committee, and if it is to be translated, we would h?.ve to prepare it a considerable length of time. That is why I brought it u p . I know my statement ha?- no value of its o"wn. T V E PRT3SIDENT: It is n，t practicable to herr the pro^acution and the defense together. We must her.r them in t arn. M r . English. m % M G L I S H : 谔 i l l the clerk mark for identification prosecution's document N o . 1 3 5 6 , entitled the "First Table-Top Total War Maneuvers." C L 观 OF TF"S COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 1356 will be given exhibit N o . 870 for identification only. (•"Thereupon, the document above referred to vas marked prosecution's exhibit N o . 870 for identification.) 8,929 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 1 7 'IS 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 M R . ENGLISH: I offer in evidence prosecution's document No.13ヲ6—A,being excerpts from prosecution's document N o , 13^6 ?nd being s record of Table-Top Maneuvers held by the Total "'ar Research Institute during the first half of August 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. C L 麗 OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 1356-A will receive exhibit N o . 870-A. ("/hereupon, the document above . referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 870-A and v:es received in evidence.) P , 9 3 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 M R . ENGLISH: I will commence reading from the middle of page 5 to the top of page 6; "General Policy of the Blue State Government concerning the Third Period Problems, (Project for Private Showing). " 1 . A g a i n s t A "To the proposal of A , we shall neither give our word clearly concerning the position of the Blue State, nor expect an ultimate peaceful settlement with A , but adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, repleting war preparations in the meantime. "2. Against D "We shall give to D the reply that the Blue State will not attack D positively, as long as D would faithfully observe the fulfilment of the Neutral Treaty between N and D . "3. Against X "We shall proceed along the policy of the maintenance of the status quo, and make them satis- fied with the effect of the Tripartite Pact between N , X 1 ( G e r m a n y ) and X 2 (Italy) ? restraining A's participation in war against X . "4. Against F and T "Against F， we shall proceed with the Total War policy previously decided upon. Against T , we shall 8,931- endeavor to enforce the political and military coalition, and take positive steps in order to con- clude a military alliance (Secret, if necessary). "5. Against E "We shall continue economic negotiations so that the relation between N and E will not grow worse than at present I will turn to page 7. "Keasijres of Foreign Minister to meet the sit- uation at the beginning and middle of A u g u s t . In conformity with the General Policy decided upon in the Five Minister's Meeting on blank of August, I aim, as an imminent question at preventing the relation be- tween N , A and B from getting worse than they are at present and at the completion of the Blue State's intention of advancing southward into T and F , and I will adopt the following steps ； "Against A "I will get the Ambassador in A to open negot- iations with the A Government concerning the proposal of August 10 from A and get him to sound out A's real intention and possibilities of her granting con- cessions without speaking our mind concerning our situation and without expecting a final peaceful settlement. And I will prevent the relations between 8,932 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 N and A from getting worse than they are. In the meantime, replete our war preparations and go on impressing A with our firm resolution to fulfill our duties of the N , , and ち Alliance, and to endeavor to restrain A's participation in war against X-]. (Further details will be stated in the accompanying docuaient in the telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador in A ) . "Against F "We shall superintend F's attitude so that she will not disturb o"ar actions in the stationing of troops, establishment of military equipments, etc., in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement. When necessary, we shall adopt coercive measures, "Against T "Though aiming at the enforcement of an economic, military and political coalition with T , and ultimately the conclusion of a military alliance, we shall endeavor for the time being to obtain staple commodities, and - to conclude an agreement needed for the financial and monetary coalition between N and T . Should this be difficult, wc shall endeavor to rmsh the negotiations concerning the agreement, by resorting to oppressive measures such as military pressure, repatriation of residents, etc. In case we cannot find any other 8,933- measures except the use of armed force which will cause military conflict with A and B v!e shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary instigation。 "Concerning the political and military coalition with T, v;e shall sound the intention of T' s authorities, and endeavor to promote the coalition。 But if we find it difficult to attain this object without re- sorting to pressure, we shall wait until the comple- tion of war preparations. "Against E "3y continuing economic negotiations with E , authorities thr-ougli the resident organs, we shall endeavor to prevent the relation between N and E from ^etting worse and to reduce the influence of the freezing of funds. If E's attitude is uncompromising and it becomes difficult to accomplish this, vre shall wait until the completion of war pr eparations, avoid- ing unnecessary stimulation. Moreover, we will supplemental*ily propose to A and B the necessity of sufplying N with E's goods and get them to advise E to mitigate her attitude." エ will continue reading from the bottom of page 9 and the top of page 10. "Foreign Policy (to be presented to the 8,934 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 Cabinet Keetinf). "I. Policy " 1 . K e e p i n g its intention secret, the Blue State will carry out a surprise advance against E in the middle of November. "II. Measures. "2. We will continue diplomatic negotiations with E as long as possible until the disembarkation is executed, without issuing an ultimatum. "3。 We will first land our advance troops, then tho main forces by surprise, on E on X day attempt ing, if possible, on this occasion to conquer E at one stroke. "4. In case A and B take up the guantlet after our military advance into E we will lose no time in advancing, overcoming these obstacles5 but in case they open hostilities against us before the event takes place, we will begin an attack on F and Q first of all, and later seize the opportunity and advar.je against E . "5. We will take no measures against A and B for the time being, and with the landing on E , propose the following Items: "(1) That N's advance into E is indispensable for the self-existence of the Blue State and peace 8,935- 12 3 4 5 678901234 5 67890.1»2»3>4>5 1111111111222222 in the Pacific, "(2) That we are prepared for a challenge from A and B at any time but we are ready to supply them with the necessary materials if they understand our real intention。 Against X we will request without delay that as we shall advance into E first of all to assist X against A and B； X shall not change her military operations against D into, a defense attitude throughout and shall carry out positively her war of economy and thoughts against D and moreover shall wage waで positively against A and B." I will contin-'e reading page 11? "Opinions to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting Foreign Policy Based on Supplementary Circum- stances. "I. Decision " 1 . T h e Blue State shall decide to initiate war against A and B and every possible measure should be taken to see that the internal and external situa- tions at the time of the outbreak of war be extremely favorable. "2。 The date of the opening of war shall probably be after the middle of December。 n I I . Measures 8,936 2 3 4567890 12 34 56 7890 12 3 4 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 " 1 . A g a i n s t 诨 "Besides waging a war of arms, we shall develop a strong war of thought and expect E's com- plete surrender in a short time. Further, we shall endeavor to send back ships and materials taking into consideration the temporary isolation of our troops which have advanced into E after the outbreak of the war against A and B , and to send beforehand the re- quired munitions. "4. Against A ajid B "We shall endeavor to keep our intention of opening a war secret by means of a compromising and concessive diplomatic policy and endeavor to seize an advantageous situation at the outbreak of the war. "5. Against X "We will inform X that the time of our opening a war against A and B is at hand, and present our demand indicated in the items of SOKIEN, Total War Table-Top Maneuvers No. 9, Part 4 . "6„ Against D "We will open negotiations on request. Though we will adopt a delaying policy, we shall maintain"the premeditated plan of granting Items 1, 2, and 4." 25 8,937- MR, LOGAN： If the Tribunal please THE FRESIEENT: M r . Logan. 腿 . L O G A N : When the last witness, M r . HORIBA, 'was on the stand he testified generally with respect to the various documents mentioned in his affidavit. In view of the fact that the prosecution has now read from documents, e^Jaibits 686-A and 87O-A, and that there might be certain inferences drawn from those documents, and the defense have had no opportunity to cross-examine this particular witness specifically on these documents, we ask that he be recalled and we be permitted to reopen our cross-examination of this witness. We further "believe it would be of assistance to the Tribunal in understanding these documents if the witness were recalled. THE PRESIDENT: I think I can safely assure the parties that the Tribunal does not need the further assistance of that witness. It is for the prosecution to say whether they want this particular document fortified by the evidence of that witness. MR. ENGLISH: We do not intend to call the w i t n e s s , your Honor. THE PRESIDENT: We do not think it is in the interests of justice to call the witness again. The application is refused. 8 , 9 3 8 - MR. ENGLISH: I offer in evidence prosecu- tion' s document No. 2228 entitled "The Records of the Progress of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War N o . 1 . " T h i s docioment sets forth the results of Table-Top Maneuvers from the third period, August, 1941, to the ninth period, October, 1942. The reports were prepared by the following agencies of the Insti- tute; The Cabinet, Foreign Ministry, the War Ministry, Minister of State, Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Planning Board, the Overseas Affairs Ministry, Ministry of Finance, the Manchurian Affairs Board, the Asia Development Board, the Information Board, the Home Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Railway Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Commerce, Justice Ministry, Ministry of Education, the Naval Minister, Metropolitan Police Board, and the Welfare Ministry. Will the Clerk assign an exhibit number? CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution"s document No. 2228 will receive exhibit No. 871 for identifica- tion. MR. ENGLISH: This document is tendered in evidence. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. (Whereupon, the document above 8 , 9 3 9 - referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit N o . 871 and was received in evidence.) MR. BRCOKS: If the Itibunal p l e a s e ,ェ wanted to make a n objection to its admission. Am I too late? May I be heard? THE FRESIDENT: Y e s , I the lectern when I admitted it, were there 5 I was not looking. didn't see you but apparently at you P,940 M R . EROOKS: The first ground of objection to 七his Gocument, if your Honor please, is that it hrs in the defense' mind no probative value since it is a table-top discussion based upon hypothetical cases and fact? assumed, and the actions described as the Prime Minister, the Arr.bcssadors and so forth in there, from the prosocution's own evidence in there cis shown, are those of students posing as Prime Ministers and such in certnin hypothetical situations r.nd that, I think, is irrelevant end immatericl to any charge of the Indictment against these accused since none of them were students and since none of them have been connected -- THE PRESIDENT: You ere taking the same objection that you took to earlier documents of apparerrtly the same character and for the same reasons. There is no need to repeat those reasons. V/e fully appreciate them. m . BROOKS; What I wanted to request of the Court was tしat the prosecution be required to K... •し a" brief showing of what probative value or what connection this has with the Indictmcnt or any charges in there they are attempting to prove in this case before it is admitted. 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 12 1 3 1 4 16 1 7 18 9 20 22 2 3 2 4 25 Goldbers&spr-at THE PPESIDEHT; No onus rests on them to do 8,77 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 any such thing, as vje will not take the responsibility of creating a new onus. The objection is overruled. M R . ENGLISH: Do I understand that the document was offered in evidence? CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 2228 现as given exhibit N o . 871 and admitted according to order of the Ccrurセ. M R . E N G L I S H ;エ vjill commence reading page 1. (Reading)； H C O T I D S OF TIE PROGP^SS CP TBS O P T I C A L I.iAITO:JU[ES FOR TOTAL '7AE H o . 1 ;i (Socrct) "/To "bo p. ruscd by > Director of the Inatitiitc, Tho Socrctrry Tho Staff/ "Tin T.Hir:D PERIOD (August, Showr. IS /l94l/) Tho racasuros trken by the G-oVwrrmiont of 'Blue Country 1 (fairing tho period wcro as follows Dccidcd，oy the Cabinet. ( 1 ) T o tcko measures for c"cloying A's'con- ‘cilir七ory proposal to :i (2) To reply to D'a request to the n o” , Co.oinct of 21n.o Country for manifesta- tion of its attitudo towr.rds D "oj saying 8,942 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 25 that ns long oa D obsorvoo tho ！M-D Tre.cty, H will raako no positive attack on Do (3) To pirn tho strcnsthonins of political rncl military collnborc.tion v/ith T . " ⑷ To loc vg tilings r s they aro regarding X , “[b) To strong七hen tho purpose of joint dc- foris'3 regarding “(6) To prevent further dotor5.oration in pre- sent conditions regarding 11 and to con- tin ug oconora5.c nogotictions. !t (7) To accoleratc imports from A , B , B ond. L in viow of the prospect of their ccs- sotion. "(3) To provide cxtrcordinary postal rogu- lr.七ions by cmorgcncy Imperial dccroc for tlio oponing, ccnaorins and. confis- cr.tion of m a i l s . "(9) To crcpand and alter commodity mobili- zation plan by 50グ“ ”(10) To take appropric.to mcas-arcs for the rcgulntion of f o o d consumption? main- tonanco of import trrdo; increased pro- duction cncl tho rr.tion cystsm (Rice 2 . 1 ' 3 0 f per day r.nd a composite ration- 8,943 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 IS 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 tickct syctom, ctc.). "(11) To sot up a rovised capital mobiliza- tion plon with cn ¥800,000,000 r3duc- tion in administrative er^rpensos. "II, The following monsuros wera reported in tho C a M n c t counc .1 "(1) Tclcgrr.phxc instructions wcro son七 to tho Amhnssaclor to k to sound A 's true intentions and tho possibility of o concession - Poroi^n Hinister. 11 (2) Mcasuron to 5.r]crc-aso sPippin3 and crcws and plans for narinc tronsportation - Cora- mionicotions Minister. "(3) Moosuros to cope with tho shortage of 300, 000 la'oourerG. - T'olfnro Minister, "(4) V nrious raoasuros regnrding the freezing of funds nncl. mensv.roa for industrial funds Pinancj J'lnistcr. "(5) Mccsuros for overlr.md tronsportction: (Pasrjongor mfi froi^ht - through Korc-a and Kanc'Tukuo) - Re.ilway Minister. ,ir riic fourth Poilocl (September, Showa IS /1941/) "Mccsuros taken durirag this period v;orc as follows: "I, Dscidcd by tho Cabinot ？ " ( D To reply that て!g shcill not deviate from F,944 our p o l i c y of abiding by tho Trnaty of 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 24 Alliance in nnsv^cr to X's riqucst thc.t N should iOTnediatoly participate In the war against A . sl (2) To establish our posit5.on grr；dually regard- ing T . "(3) To continitG our usno 1 policy regarding A and D . ”(4) To obtcin as much raatorinls from A , 3 , E and L ns the situation psrnits* ;I (5) To maintain strict control rgrinst the in- ternal aproad of fcO_30 rumors, cnn to give the people a more thorough. knov;lodgG of the proaont si 七nn tion. !l (6) To placo smnll-type transportation and freight trucks •under govornra^nt control r.s a mcosurc for smell scalo trancportction In apccial rroaa. n ('7) To sot up a Shipping Bocrd and to plnco oil private aliippino： dor govornmGnt control. (8) To r.djust and rcorgan!zo tho medium and srnrill-scr.lo trndesra-on r.ncl ^nniifc c11.ircrs, and thereby prevent the confusion arising 25 frow tho reduction of tlio volurio of civilian 8,945- goods, cs Y/oll as to rcdictribiito labour to lines -argontly needed in the oracrgoncy. (9) To anact an Imperial ordinance for fixing official pricca of shares. Mc七七：;rs rcportod p.t tho Ccfoinet Meetings- 11 ( 1 ) M 3 Q s v , r G s for socurlng r； propagandizins co-n- municr.tion network for coping w i t h v/nrtimo craersenciGs. "(2) Mensuros conccrning tho leakage of secrcts. !1 (3) Measures in the odiicctioncl field for os- tr-blishing c thon.ght guidance system, ex- citing tho morale of educators, end pcrfoctinp tlio labour nobilization systora of students. 11 (4) Pood policy. ”(i) Importation of 10,000,000 koku /Translator's Hote. 49,629,000 btishcls/ of foreign ricc. i! (15-) Enf orccraont of c composito i-at5.on- tickct s jn t ora. "(iii) Estrblishmsnt of n aelf-sufficient food supply "bloc. “(5) Jjloaauros for dealing with tho unsatisfactory importrtion of Korean rice, "(S) PIコn for proraotin^ tho subscription of Govorn- sient bonds rnd for mr.intrininrj； their moir- 8,946 ''The ! ,5. kct pricos* "(7) Countcr-mcaa'arcs for the iinoKiployracnt of modi lira and. 3ra0.ll-scc.lG. trrdeamcn end. rar.nu- facturcrs in the ovcrsaas, "(8) Civilian r. viation policy u (9) Plan for tho distribution of ocor.n vessels. . TOP SECRET Fifth Period (Octobcr, Showa 16 /l94l/) It vras dccidcd tlir,t S shall bo occupied by f o r c c , c nd inane d5.r. to rll-ou 七 prepare, tio コ s for ”广 r shall ba 1nunchod in anticipation of a wcr n^-inct A , B end S ; cmd that 七ho Suprsino Command sholl"bつ consulted at once, and "bo inforrasd that vq hope to appljr forcc 七]!:r-̂ c months honco, V,-.r5.ou3 mor— surcs wore discusood nnd dccidnd u p o n , roenrding the Cr.Mnct C o - i n c i l d c c i a i o n s on tho 15th Octo- iDcr for the invasion of B , Jraorgoncy air defense racc.suvon to mact tho in- tcrno.tioncl aituotion dccidcd upon and an estimation r/r.a rac.dc rs to how fcr X would coop- erate v/ith N in tho event of 31 ue.land partici- po.tj.ng In the \"ot r：gainst A , o t c . The Govornncnt f s o.nびr/cr to the roq-acst latoly sub- riiittcd to tho Government by the Supromo Cornncind a 3 kins for tho Govornmont 'a c oner otc viGY.^s ro- go.rding our prociso crpr.cltj for wngiris r;ar a- gairiGt A , B m d C , rre.s dj. sous sod oncl dcciclcd. A second c om alt too conni sting of tlio. vice miiiis- tors of the vcrion.s ministries concornod estoblishod, for the preparetion and proliminary study of medcvires nccessr.ry for 3七こ:rセins liostili- tics against A cncl '3. Reports x7ov:. rccoivod. from tho vorioun Ministers about mat torn i-indor their jurisdiction, the most important questions brought up boin^; cis followa "k丄j Food raoccurcs to copo v;ith tho docreasG of ricc and othor corocls. 8,948 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 24 25 “(2) Stock market measures to cope with the depreciation of shares. ' " ( 3 ) Measures for the disposal of savings in locel b a n k s . ”⑷ Measures for the cessation of trade ？/ith A , L , E , snd B . "(5) Measures for psychological warfare to conceal our intentions of invading E . "The Sixth Period (November, Showa 16 /194-1/) " 1 . I t was decided to reply that the Gov- ernment is .in complete agreement with the Supreme Command in their request for maximum speed in the ex- ecution of the actions pre-arranged against E and to thrt end will hold a joint conference where it hopes for Cabinet decisions. " 2 . Decision was reached on the questions to be discussed in the said liaison conference, of which the most important weres ( 1 ) D a t e and time of the armed i n v a s i o n , ⑵ Purpose and form of the ex- pedition, (3) and diplomatic policies at the t i m e . " 3 . I n view of the situation during the middle and latter psrts of N o v e m e b e r , it was decided that, while making up our mind to open forestalling hostilities rgainst A and B at a good opportunity as soon as preparations are completed, diplomatic P ， W negotiations s h a U . be continued ncccefully with them. " 4 . The Government decided cn a petition to the Emperor to convoke ?.n extraordinary session of the Imperial Diet immediately rftcr the invasion of E , end on the bills to bo introduced into the Diet, the more important of which are as follows? I will continue at the bottom of oage 6 . "The Seventh Period (December 9 ShoFa 16 /1。41/) "Cebinet decisions were rnsinly ss follows ”（ 1 ) T o make incrorsed efforts in prepsra- tions for agrinst A and B , and endr evonr to rchieve speedy results from our invrsion of E . "(The obove decision wfs introduced for con- sideration in the joint council with the Sunr： me Com- m a n d , and it was decided to rage wcr on A due to considerrtions of strrtegy. This decision received Imperial sanction.) 8,950- "(2) To file a strong protest sgrinst the •unlrwful sinking of our worships by A . "(3) To file a protest rgrinst A's dec- lrrrtion of a neutral ser. zone in the Far E a s t . "(4) To file s protest rgrinst A's oppres- sion of the Jrprnese nrtionrls in A , "(5) To inform third powers that v?e hrve strrted hostilities rgrinst E . "(6) To sign r secret rnti-wnr pact with D, "(7) To mrke it our policy to keep the L countries neutrrl. "(8) To trke, upon declarrtion cf wnr on A rnd B , the direct mersures reported by the Second Committee. The following food Tne^sures v/ere ”（9) d e c i d e d : - "(1) ” (2) "(10) mrrtial law• "(11) Br sic consumption of rice rnd cereals:• 1.9 'go' per day. To expedite the import of foreign rice rnd rice from outside J r p r n . To place the whole country under To mrke sure of our plens for rrilwpy trensportrtion at the time v;s.r is declared. "(12) Diet Measures a,951 "(l) To crrry out r generrl election. "(2) Mersures to shorten the period of rdjcurnment. "(2) Pirns for psychologicp.l wprfpre rt the beginning of 十.he w r r , rnd other iinportrnt mers- ures were reported in the Cp.binet Council. "The Eighth Period (Jrnurry-Iirrch, Showr 17 /1942/) " 1 . I t w?.s srrrnged, following consul一 trtion with the Supreme Command, to sovmd T rs to the possibilities of utilizing her for militrry purposes, short of turning ht.r into r.n rcturl brttlefield. "2. Trrnsportftion of wrr supplies from A to D by D 1 s ships 前ill not be interfered w i t h , tmt trrde between L rnd D through ne-utrrl ships will be discourrged ？s inuch r.s possible by the estrblishment of drnger zones rnd by p.pplicrtion of the principle of non-stop voyrges for vrrrtime contrrbr.nd I w i l l continue rerding from pr.ge 9 , "The Ninth Period." 8,952- "The Ninth Period (April-October, 1942) "The matters decided upon by the Cabinet council during the period were mainly as follows:- " 1 . T o enter a strong protest with D for having supplied A with bases and at the same time to suspend forthwith the facilities given D and make preparations for war against D . "2. To reply to X's request for hostilities by us against D by saying that X must be satisfied for the present with the blockade wc now intend to carry out, and tc request X in return to engage energetic- ally in the destruction of A's shipping. (These were the measures to be taken durinp April and May.) "3. To vanquish all the difficulties of the present situation and carry out the Manchurian emigra- tion policy, as already planned. "4. Things being what they were in July, the Cabinet did not reach agreement on whether or not we should open hostilities against D , due to the strong convictions voiced that the military supplies required by the Supreme Command (Revision of the commodity mo- bilization plan by lOCf' expansion) beyond the nation's capacity. "5. Conference was held regardinp tho pro- posed plan*for strengthening the Cabinet, but no con- 8 , 9 5 3 - elusion was rcached. "6. Offensive measures for economic warfare against A and E wore reported by the Finance Minister. "Records of the Progress of Diplomatic War- fare In the Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War N o . 1 "August 2 3 , 1 9 4 1 "Akira CHIBA, Foreign Minister "The General Outline of the Progress "Akira CHIBA, Foreign Minister "The Third Period (August 1941) "In conformity with the decisions of the con- ference held in the Imperial presence on 10 August, our diplomatic policies during this period were aimed chief- ly at preparations for our advance into the Southern Regions while at the same time maintaining the status quo between N and X and avoiding conflict with A and D by the following line of action:- " ( 1 ) W e avoidc-d making any definite reply to A's suggestion of 10 August to neutralize the alli- ance between N and X in view of the fact that ultimately the national policies of N and A were irreconcilable and we did our best to delay a clash with A by follow- ing a neutral policy." 8,954- THE PRESIDENT? You are not reading the letters correctly, Mr. English, but I take it they are going into the transcript correctly. M R . ENGLISHs Oh, I'm sorry. I will correct that part. (V'herGiipon, counsel for the vvosc- cution reread the last paragraph.) MR. ENGLISH (Reading): "(2) We endeavoured to promote friendly relations with D by settling trade and fishing probleirs with her. ? r e invoked the treaty of neutrality existing between K and D and thus en- deavoured to check A-D collaboration aimed against N . "(3) ^e sounded T on her inclination to cooperate politically snd rii'litr.rily with N and also endeavoured to strengthen economic cooperation with T . Finding T faced with numerous internal political difficvltics, wg concentrated the greater part of our efforts on the latter objective and obtained consider- able success during this neriod as v/ell as the next. "(4) W e endeavoured to obtain as iruch materials as possible from E , A , B and L , but without much success dtio to various obstacles during the next and subsequent periods ェ will continue at page 1 1 : " T h e Fifth Period. 1 1 8 , 9 5 5 - "The Fifth Period (Octobcr) - "Z at Irst opened hostilities p.gainst A . A interned H's ships; B 5 E and L followed suit. Econ- omic negotiations r.'ith E canc to a stop. On the- 15th rt e Cabinet C o u n c i l , i t decided th?t 'sre would march into E at n favourable opportunity on or after 1 December. Accordingly, our diplomacy during this period ttei.s as followss- " ( 1 ) X ngain requested us to open ？,ar on A fit once, to which we- rnswcrcc? that our resolution to fbide by the tr&rty 抓こs nnchsnged and that we would soon be invading E . Fc notified X of the p.ssis- tance ve expected from her in esse N pushed south- ward or declared, war ngsinst A . ’’（2) We cvoided provoking A end confined onrselves to ？ protest rg?inst A's internment of our ships； without resorting to rct?.lirtory m & s s u r c s . We Plso lodged similar protests sgsinst the intern- ment of our ships by B rnd L . "(3) v 'o warned E against the internment of our ships rnd the seizure of our goods. The Gov- ernraent still entertained some hopes of oeaccful settlement in snite of the decision of the Cabinet Council on the 15th, ？nd dccided to reopen economic ncgotictions but could not rcrch nn agreement rith 8 , 9 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Supreme Command Headquarters os to the methods b y which the negotiations should be carried on. The G o v e r n m e n t , thGrefore, had no rltcrnstive bnt to notify its envoy in E . (The F o r e i g n Minister pro- posed sending nn ultimrturn just before we resorted to e.rmud f o r c e , but the Supreme Comnand Headquarters objected to this arguing the necessity of concealing our intentions.) "The Sixth Period (November) "In response to A's declaration of wer on X ?nd strengthening of its nosition against N in the early prrt of this period, it was decided to carry- out our っl?ns et sn earlier date and. str.rt opera- tions agrinst E on the 15th of this m o n t h . "(1) We imraediPtely lodged with E our minimum economic requirements end opened negotiations, b u t E refused our r e q u e s t s . On the 15th we started operations rgainst E . "(2) Just before the invesion of the l ^ t h , we rsked X for assistance from the rear by intensi- fying her operations against D . "(3) Immedirtely following our invrsion on the 1 5 t h , wg notified A r.nd B of the objective of our cdvence and of the necessity of our taking counter- meesures if we were interfered w i t h . A and B declared a severrnce of economic relations with N and de- manded the withdraw?! of our consulste personnel. They also detpiled their forces in prepcrstion against u s . So the i「 T ar, Navy end Foreign Ministers urged the Government to take the initiative in start- ing hostilities ngainst A ？nd B , but the Government could not yet bring itself to this decision." I v/ill continue on p?.ge 1 3 , "The Seventh Period." 8,958 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 25 "The Seventh Period (December) "It \'ie s while our operations rgainst E were progressing frvourcbly thrt A on the 1st un- Irwfn.lly declared a neutrrl zone in the see.s off P , thus impeding our operrtions, and on the 5th •unlrwfullj srnk cur transports. F e egrin urged the Government to make a decision r.nd with the understanding of the C-ovornment we took the follow ing actions: " ( l ) F e lodged e strong protest with A agrinst her "unlawful actions 3 Then on the 10th the Cebinet Council decided to start hostilities pgr inst A . On the 20 th, we begrn att?eking the strategic point of P . A rnd B declrred wrr on us. "(2) We took the necessary steps both internally rnd for third countries regrrding A end E's declaration of w r r , ”（3) We proposed to X the issuing of a ；joint decle.rrtion on the otjectives of the w ? r , to which X agreed； r.nd we issued i t . And at the same time N and X concluded a non-single-perce trerty. "(4) In response to E's declaration of w?r rt the beginning of this m o n t h , we started hostilities ？gainst her. 8,959 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ”(5) At the beginning of this month, vie requested D to sign r. secret priti-wrr p?ct. This w?s signed ？t the end of the month. "The Eighth Period (Jr.n-ur.ry-Mrrch, 1942) " ( 1 ) k request wrs mrde by the Supreme Commrnd Herdqurrters regarding cooperrtion vdth T . Accordingly, rs the result of r. joint conference ,’ith the Supreme Commrnd Herdqurrters, the Govern- ment decided to sound T on her intentions• "In Februrry we were in the middle of this when B invrded T , which grve us the opportunity for concluding r joint-dGfense r.greement between N rnd T . M rnd T ^ere to jointly oppose A rnd B rnd N wrs offered facilities for her troops to pr.ss through T . "(2) There wrs some suspicion thrt D wrs connected with A , so we ^rrned D in order to check h e r . On the other hrnd, in respect to D's request for r g u r r m t c e in obtrining goods from A , we decided to r.ccord to D facilities for her vessels to prss through the below-mentioned drnger zones rnd en- dervcurcd to observe the secret trerty. In Mrrch D r sked our r.ssistrnce in obtr ining goods from C , F , T , P rnd Q , but we refused for operrtionrl rersons. "(3) There were signs of rn increrse in trrde between A rnd D by merns of L's ships; our 8,960 n r v y declrred r. drngc^ zone in our neighboring sers rnd took mersures to mrke it physicrlly im- possible for neutrrl ships to get t h r o u g h . A l l of the L co-untries, except A , B rnd C , demrnded the vithdr-wrl of our diplomrts rnd retrlirted by- severing relrtions 抓；ith them. "The Ninth Period (April-July, 1942) "(1) A 1 s rttrck upon u s by rircrrft rnd submrrines incrcrsingly deepened our suspicions of m u n d e r s t m d i n g between A rnd D , so we sus- pended sometiwe in Mry the frcilities for D ! s ships to prss through the drnger zone rnd lodged r strong protest with D for violrting the stcret rnti-vrr.r trerty. "(2) To X's rcauest thrt we strrt hostilities rgr.inst D , we vsked her to "be srtisfied w i t h our intei.sified operrtions rgrinst A rnd B rnd the pressure 柯e vere exerting upon D . "(3) As it be erne certr.in in July thrt A yips rnrking use of R , the Foreign Minister urged the Government to trke p. strong rttitude tovrrds D . The Governroent, however, rerched n o decision on counter persiires. Our diplonrtic nersures viere to be considered rs soon rs the G o v e r n m e n t 1 s decision ^rs nrde." 8 , 9 6 1 - THE PRESIDENTj Is it necessary to read so m u c h to iDut your points clenrly? Yo"u w i l l not hear me unless you wear those headphones. M R . E N G L I S H :エ will endeavour to eliminate some of the material I had intended to r e a d , your H o n o r . (Reading): "THE RECORD OF THEORETICAL MANEUVERS FOR TOTAL ”’AR N o . 1 . ( C o n f i d e n t i a l Docu- ments) By: Pseudo F a r Ministry. Date: August 1941. "Record of Maneuvers. "By Minister SEIRAI Masatatsu (the V 7 ar Ministry) "Vice Minister OKAEURA Shun (the W a r Ministry) "The Third period of maneuvers (August) " 1 . M e a s u r e s apainst A: "Against A's proposal of August 10th, the Minister firmly insisted at the Five Ministers * Con- ference , t h a t 'we should not agree to it, but should push chcad independently ^ith the preparations for sdvance into E . ' But in view of the demand from the Supreme Command Headquarters that 1 they desire to secure materials from A ? L , etc., cs much as possible,' the Conference adopted a teir.norizing nolicy for the negotiations with A." I w i l l continue r e a d i n g , page 1 6 , "The Fourth P,962 Period." "The fourth -oeriod of maneuvers (September) " 1 . E x t e r n a l measures. "In view of the intcrnationGl situation, we presented tn the Cabinet Council our considered opin- ior that, 'Blue Country should continue to expedite her preparations for southvjard advance, while securing her position on the side of X.' As this opinion was generally in cccord with the proposal made by the Foreign Minister, we further expressed our desire to know the real intentions of X's peace offensive against B." I will continue reading from page 17, "The Fifth Period. 1 1 "The fifth period of ironeuvers (October) " 1 . E x t e r n a l measures. "In view of the international situation, the Minister firmly insisted in the Cabinet Council, that 'Blue Country' must promptly complete all her prep- erations against A and B , and cerry through her economic demands ngainst E by intensified pressure . He also urged emphatically that, it was time for 'Blue Country' to adopt concrete measures for advancing into E (anticipated to tcke place nfcout one month later). However, since some thought a date some three months 8,963- later would be more appropriate, no decision was rcached even by midnight. The Cabinet went to the Liaison Conference r.rmed with both proposals, where they decided on a measure for iDlanning for armed r.dvancc into E by grasping c good opnortunity any time after 1 December." I will continue reading from page 18, "The Sixth Period." "The sixth period of maneuvers (November). " 1 . E x t e r n a l measures. "In this period, it became clear that the Supreme Command Headquarters 'scarcely expected the acceptance of our demands by E prior to our armed ad- vance into E and hoped the date of the advance would be speeded up. 1 "Thus, the qiiestion of whether or not to adopt a step tantamount to an ultimatum, and the question of the convocation of the Diet which had been pending since the last period, were settled." 8,964 2 エ continue reading on page 19. "The seventh period of maneuvers (December) " 1 . E x t e r n a l measures. 3 ！ 4 ； "After explaining that the war against E 5 was progressing, that the war against A was inevitable, 6 and that both internal and external conditions of 7 'Blue Country‘ were supremely favorable for the im- 8 mediate opening of hostilities against A , we strongly 9 urged that f'Blue Country， 1 should suddenly open hostili- io ： ties against A in the middle part of December and first ii丨 of all swiftly capture P . But as some again proposed ‘ 1 2 ！ a more cautious attitude towards A , the Council was completely divided in opinion. As time was pressing, the Cabinet adopted the Premier's arguments for cir- cumspection, but at the Liaison Conference which it attended, thanks to the strong demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters, it decided to start war against A (B) I will read from page 20. 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 8,965 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "The eighth period of maneuvers. (January- March) 1。 E x t e r n a l measures. "At the demand of the Supreme Command Head- quarters regarding T, we proposed in the Cabinet Council an immediate occunation of T . Eut most of the Llinisters oc^osed the proposal, emphasizing the disadvantages to us if the war extended to T , and as it was felt that the demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters were not backed up by conditions of sufficient urgency, the Cabinet Council decided first of all to sound T's real intentions." I will read from the middle of page 2 1 , t h e ' ninth period, just the first paragraph, Aoril to October. "External measures. In view of the fact that the damage caused by A's air forces and sub- marines , whose base was certainly R , was steadily increasing, the Minister maintained in the Cabinet Council that 'Blue Country* while continuing its hostilities against A and E , should step up its preparations for war against D and adopt a strong minded attitude in ensuring the fulfilment of the secret agreement, in particular, we should promptly put an end to imports by D's ships, and at the same D u d a &rid e r 8,966 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 time notify D that, if we secure positive proof that D is permitting A to use its bases, we will attack these bases. The Council agreed in general to the proposal, but it was decided about the notifi- cation that, at a time when a decisive battle against A was imiEinent 5 we should avoid provoking D by what we could not put into practice." エ will continue reeding from page 3〇. "The Record of Maneuvers of the Planning Board, Submitted ty: The President of the Planning B o a r d . Date Submitted: August 23. "The Record of Maneuvers of the Planning Board. "The Third period (from the beginning to the end of August, 1941) "I. After a complete re-examination of the plan for economic warfare which had been decided in the above-mentioned maneuvers, we re-drafted the mobilization plans for raw materials, capital, labour, and traffic. These were submitted to and adopted by the Cabinet. "II. To meet the request of the Siroreme Command Headquarters, the above-mentioned commodity mobilization plan, which had already been decided in 8,967 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Crbinet C o u n c i l ,巧 r s rmended to prc-prre for the vrr rgrinst A , B rnd E . Following its rd op tion in the Crbinet C o i m c i l , this pirn "r.s submitted rs the Govern- ment 's plr.n to the Lirison Conference of the Govern- ment rnd the Supreme Hcrdrurrtcrs. W i t h the exception of r prrt concerning steel products, which w s m e n d e d , the drrft ^rs rpproved rs it stood when submitted « I 妒ill continue rerding pr§re 31• 硬!！1he fourth period. (From the beginning to the end of September) ”ムs ve hrd been reauested by the Supreme Commrnd Her dour rters to strtc- our opinion concerning the rbility of 'Blue Country 1 to prosecutc- wrr in the event of hostilities ^ith L , B rnd E under the prtsont siturtion, ”'e submitted to the Crbinet meeting our judgment on our nrtionrl strength in respect to nrtionrl morrle, shipping, mrterirls, cr.ptirl,lrbour, etc. The- Crbinet Meeting r.dopted this judgment. "2. The mrtters which -^cve discussed with the Government offices conccrned were rs follows:" I vill continue rerding from prge 3 2 , the Fifth period. "The Fifth period (from the beginning to the end of October) 8，968 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 5 " 1 . S i n c e it was necessary to reinforce war preparations in view of the increasing drift toward wsr with A , B and E , the commodity mobilization plan was re-examined. Especially in regard to sur^lying power, examination wss made from the following stand- points : "(a) The cessation of imports from A , B , E and L . "(b) The drop in coastal transportation •. capacity as the' result of the requisitioning of 、. . s h i p s . "(c) The drop in efficiency of labour snd internal transportation capacity. "(d) Increased production, collection/of resources/', savings, and also the supnlylng pov/er of II, C . F and T to Japan. "At the same time we examined military and civilian requirements by periods in order to ensure, propriety of planning, and reported our findings to the Cabinet .leeting. "2. It was decided at the Cabinet Meeting that thereafter the commodity mobilization plan should be drrfted every three months." I will continue reeding page 35， Fifth period. 8 , 9 6 9 - "The fifth period (October 1941) "In connection with the problem of runs on banks, we explained the overseas financial situations individually. "In response to the demands of the Supreme Co肥and Headquarters of Blue Country to consolidate the whole nation's strength, wes proposed the enforce- ment of a railitery conscription system in KOREA and the adoption of a special volunteer system in FORMOSA. This was approved. The enforcement of the military conscription system in KOREA was passed and fixed in the regular session of the D i e t , which con- vened in December of the ssme yesr." I will continue reading page 4 9 . "(Confidential Document) "THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF MANEUVERS The First Committee. " 1 . A t 9 a.m. August 8 (by Real Calendar). "The first consultation meeting of the First Committee WRS opened. "Bills. "(1) The basic policy for the management of the various areas of the Southern R e g i o n . "(2) Allotment of the business of the com- mittee. 8 , 9 7 0 - "2. The following decisions resulted from this meeting: "(1) The policy for the management of the . various areas of the Southern Region (Future menage- ment). "(a) Netherlands Indies: "Java and Sumatra shall be combined into one independent state snd the other re- maining areas shall be annexed to it. "(b) Malaya: "For the time being, the whole of it shall be united into one, though the subject requires further study. "(c) The Philippines： "The entire region shall be made independent, "(d) French Indo-China. "While strengthening the existing situation, we must promote the infiltration of our country's power. "(e) Thailand: "While respecting her independence, we must promote the infiltration of our country's power." 8 , 9 7 1 2 2 う 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 24 25 I will continue reading page 91. "To: The GovGrnmcnt of Blue Country. "From: Tho Minister of Education. "Measures acopted by tho Education Ministry in the 1st Thoorotical Total Wsr Uanoeuvres. "Period 3 (middle and latter pert of August, 1941). "A national spiritual mobilization was car- rioc out in collaboration v,'ith tho Imporisl Rule Assistance ^ssoci-ition. In particular notion-wide organizations liko schools, c u l t u m l organizations, etc., wore utilized to emphssize the nGcd of putting the national spirit on a basis of preparation for war, to promote the spirit of public servico, to oncourago savings； to drive homo tho significance of travel restrictions; to start a movement for g now v^artimo mode of living; and to got stue'ents to givo their services for labour. (Details 诃er'3 as contained in tho reports of the Impcrirl Rule Assistance Association. I will continue roacing page 97, Sixth Period, No, 3 . "On 15 Novonbcr 100,000 tons of ships and 200,000 tons of oil tnnkors were roquisitionod in preparation for the war agsinst P . "Seventh Period llsnoouvrass (12 to 31 Docembor, 8 , 9 7 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 period when wp.r agsinst A and B was started). " 1 . R o p l e t i o n of armaments and war prepara- tions were continued." I offer in evidence prosocution 1 s document N o . 627, which is a group of charts and telegroms, for the purpose of shoeing the- quantities of munitions, smmunitions, machinery, fual, oil, grecse for motor cars and parts for repairing munitions that were to be delivered to various seaports in Japan and dis- tributed on the 10th, 12th, 13th, and 15th of Novem- b e r , 1941, to the 55th, 56th pnd l6th Divisions; and that in October 1941 notification was dispatched to various govGrnmontal agencies to keep socret the goncrnl plan for "Opero.tion ' A h , n that was to bo put in effect in F r a n c h Indo-China. エ r/ill road page 2 of the-- TH3 PRESIDENTS Admitted on tho usual terms. CLSHC OF TH3 COURT: P r o s o c u t i o n 1 s document N o . 627 will reccive exhibit N o . 8 7 2 . (Whereupon, tho document sbovc referred to v;ns marked prosecution 1 s exhibit N o . 872, and vns rocoivod in evidence.) M R . E N G L I S H :エ will read page 2 and Chart N o . 1 nno from the top part of Chart N o . 2 . Page 2: "Ar.'fiy - Cliina"- G uiif 1J c； 111 i-a±v "Instruction from tho adjutsnt to tho Vice- Diractor of tho Army Ordnanca Headquarters. "By ord2r I inform you tint you aro diroctod to have tho prepared arms, stated in the 'Army-China- Conficontial N o . 3898, do.tea November 7, 1 delivered to all troops at each placo in accordnnce with the attached table. "P.S. Its expenditure is to bo paid out of the extraordinary military budget account. "Army - China - Confidential N o . 4004, Favombor 11，Showa 16 "Army - China - Confidential N o . 10578 rocoived by tha :、r Ministry. "Top Sccrot. Array Department in Imperial Headquarters. (Army) "No. 4 0 9 . Part 3 . "Thw notification to koep in secrecy the identification of tho officors Dispatched to Frc-nch Indo-China. "15 Octobor 1941. "The Chief Secretory of Gonoral Affairs of tho Army Staff of Imperial Hoadquartors. Tndaichi V/akamatsu (Signature). "To the Adjutant of tho Army Ministry. 8 ,974 - Nawoichi Kawihara。 "The notification. "To keep in socrocy tho general plan for 'Operation A h 1 , I request your doop consideration to kjop in socrocy at present, by'wearing civilian clothes, ctc., tho identification of tho officers and the essential monbors of tho st^ff of the Army Ministry who aro to bo dispatched to Fronch エndo-China. "This notification to b3 sent to the follow- ing off icos, i.3., Array Ministry; Aviation Section of Army Ministry; Soa Transportation Headquarters of Army Ministry. "Ch-'.rt N o . 1 . S u p p l o r n c n t shoots of the cistribution of munitions kept bv tho SocrGtariat. "The 16th Division "Tho 55th Division ”Tho 56th Division "Army Ordnance Hoadquartors. "Classifications of tho distribution of munitions. Late of tho distribution. Namo of troops to be cistributoc.. Rerairks . "'Jin' 一一 ' B o r . 1 2 t h N o v . The 55th Division. Tho 56th E‘ ’-ion. '"Hoi,' «Ho,' ' H e * . 1 3 t h N o v . The l6th Division. 8 , Q 7 5 " ' T o i ' . 1 5 t h Nov. Tho 55th Division. " ' H o i ' . 1 5 t h Nov. The 16th Division." I w i l l read only tho top p?.rt of this Chart 2. THE PRESIDENT: It is now a quarter to 3:00. We will recess for fiftoon minutes. (Whoreupon, at 1445, a r O C G S S was taken until 1500, after which tho pro- ceedings wore r Gsumod as follows；) 8 , 9 7 6 - M h S H A L OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. TKE FHESIDSNT： Captain B r o o k s . M R . BliOOKS: I would like to have the record show,-if the Tribunal please, that exhibit 872 is the start of an official document rather than hypothetical discussions of the Table-Top maneuvers. I think it is only fair that it be called to the attention of any- one examining the record. THE PRESIDENT: The certificate shows that it came from the War M i n i s t r y . M R . ENGLISH: May I say, your H o n o r , that document 627 is not a Total War Research document? That phase of this case is finished. TKE FEESIDEKT: We are getting concerned with the amount of material you are reading into the transcript. M R . E N G L I S H :エ will not read the chart on page 2 of the excerpt, b u t merely direct the C o u r t 1 s attention to it. THE PRESIDENT； If there are any features of these documents you might stress them without reading the whole document. M R . ENGLISH: I might r e a d , your Honor, the A b r a m & Morse top of the document. (Reading) 8 , 9 7 7 - "Kept by the Secretariat, the l6th Division, the 55th Division, the 56th Division。 Secrete Separate Paper N o . 1 . T h e table of articles and quantities of munitions and ammunitions to be dis- tributed in Japan proper." エ now offer in evidence prosecution's document No. 630A, a tocret telegram from Nanking, dated 14 November 1941 from the Chief of the Third Air Group at Nanking to the Vice Minister of War and to the Vice Chief of General Staff, regarding troop movements, for the purpose of showing that the chief of the aerial group and his staff officers would leave Nanking on the 15 November 1941 to establish a command post at Saigon in Southern Indo China on and after 16 November 1941. Will the clerk please assign this document an exhibit number? CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution 1 s document No. 63OA will receive exhibit No. 873, (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit N o . 873.) IviK. ENGLISH: (Reading) "Telegram. Secret。 Despatched from N a n k i n g , 1 4 t h N o v . 1941. Despatched at 1128. Received at 1330. Addressed to the 8 , 9 7 8 - Vice-Minister of W a r , Vice-Chief of the General S t a f f . Despatched by the Chief of the Third Air Group. Telegram — The Third Air Group Tel. # 2 7 0 4 . " 1 . T h e Chief of the Aerial Group will leave NANKING early tomorrow morning -- the 15th -- with the staff officers required for the south part of Indo- China and will establish a command post in Saigon on and after the l6th. "2. The Chief of the Staff and the staff officers required shall rem&in in N A M I N G to carry out the concentration of aerial forces and measures with regard to shipping and transport." THE PRESIDENT: That; document has been ad- mitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 63OA was given exhibit K o . 873 and admitted, ac- cording to order of C o u r t . (Whereupon, the said document, pro- secution 's exhibit N o . 873 was received in evidence。） IviR. ENGLISH: W i l l the clerk mark for identification prosecution 1 s document N o . 628, HA Corps monthly report, dated November,194-1? CLERK OF THE COURT: Is ihat next document 628 or 654A? 8 , 9 7 9 - ENGLISH: The next document is 654A. CLi弧 OF THE COURT: Yes. Prosecution's document No. 654A will be marked exhibit K o . 874- for identification. M R . ENGLISH: There is a correction. This document is document K o . 628 and not 654-A. CLERK OF THE COUKT: Prosecution's document K o . 628 will receive exhibit K o . 874- in place of ex- hibit as before announced, for identification. (Whei-eupon, prosecution's document N o , 628 was marked*prosecution 1 s exhibit Ko. 874 for identification.) M R . ENGLISH: I offer in evidence prosecu- tion' s document Mo. 628A, an excerpt from prosecu- tion's document K o . 628, for the purpose of showing that the Japanese Army made military preparations for the capture of Hong Kong• THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COUKT: Prosecution 1 s document Ko. 628A will receive exhibit No. 874-A. (Whereupon, the document above re- ferred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit No. 874—A and received in evidence.) Ivii. EKGUSii: I will r&ad pages 1 , 2 ? and 8,980 one-half of page 3 . (Heading) "Top Military Secret. Title: Monthly Wartime Report (KO) No. 4 of the HA Corps. Date: Nov. 1941. Headquarters of the HA Corps. Content: "I. General Condition of the Corps. "II. Preparation for the Attack on Hongkong. "Ill, Operations and Garrison Duty. "IV. The State of Public Pee.ce. "V. The Investigation of Topographical Data. "VI. The State of Traffic and Communications. "VII. Outline of the Rear Conditions. "VIII. The Condition of the Army of the New R e g i m e . "I. General Condition of the Corps. " 1 . T h e Corps is preparing whole heartedly for military operations against Hongkong, and also intensifying the blockade against the enemy. " 1 . P r e p a r a t i o n s to attack Hongkong are progressing smoothly, and are expected to be com- pleted early in December. "2. Fortifications under construction for the defense of CAi\'T0N and its surrounding strategic points v'ere completed during the latter part of November. "3. The 18th Division, the 21st Keavy Field Artillerjr Battalion, the 4th and I5tli Independent Engineer hegiments, the 8th and 11th Epidemic Pre- vention and Water-Supplying Sections, and the 10th River Crossing Materials Company left the command of the Corps c.t thoir respective positions at 00.00, 15th inst. "4. The 45th Air Regiment, the main- force of the 10th Independent Air Unit, a part of the 18th Independent Squadron, and the direct cooperation unit of the 44th Air Regime丄rt were assigned to the corps at end of this month. n 5。 As the エMAI Branch Unit in HAINAN had re- turned to their original units the M T S U O Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 1 Infantry Battalion) was or- ganized e.nd despatched to above place from Shantou. "6. The units of the SAW Corps in CmiNGMEN districts were relieved of guard duty in the middle of this month by the newly organized BANJOME Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 2 Infantry Battalions). "II. Preparation for the attack on Longkong. "Upon receiving unofficie.1 instructions to attack i.ongkong, the corps wholehe&rtGdly prepared and began concentrated movements of the units to • attack ?.t the end of this month. " 1 . G a t h e r i n g of Information. Gathering of 8,118 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 information was started, from the middle of Showa 15 /194-0/. In August of this year, the focus of the gathering of information was directed toward Hongkong and endeavored to grasp all aspects of Hongkong by air reconnaissance, reading sir photographs, car- rying out investigations in actual places, and utilizing all types of intelligence, moreover, the units to execute the attack were ordered to gather the information. 41 2s Training. The SANO Corps, as vrell as being appointed to guard /duty/ since the end of Showa 1 5 /1940/ commenced training for the attack /on Hong- kong/ , a n d especially executed training of the staff in attacks, building of fortifications, attacking for- tifications of a special type, and the usage of mat- erials in iugust of this year, and field training to about a 1000 officers and men who are to be the main body of units attacking fivざ positions. Furthermore, in the beginning of Octobo?, when the KOMODA Corps jvere relieved of guarding the guard area excluding the intermediate district, units were coneentrated and executed regular training. "Since the KITAO'IIvIA branch unit was stationed near the British-Chinese frontier, the branch unit devoted themselves to training for the attack on e，9?3 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 H o n g k o n g . "3. The Repair of the Transportation Road in the R e a r . * ^ "Since the end of September repairs of the motor-road between HUMEN and P A O A K , w h i c h is the main transportation road in the r e a r , were commenced and completed on the 8th O c t . as prearranged. "4. Commencement of /Troop/ M o v e m e n t s . In the last part of this month SANO Corps units stationed in CHUNGIaEN were cone antra ted in FUSHAK and units under direct army command in the CANTON area have commenced movements gradually to the H I M E N , TUNGKUN, and SHEKLUNG a r e a s , secretly by the CANTON-SAIuSHUI and CANTON KOVvLOON l i n e s . "5. Thus, the Corps has ordered, on the 30th inst., preparations for the attack on Hongkong and endeavoring to keep the plan secret are awaiting the opportunity to open hostilities." P,984. I offer in evidence prosecution's document N o . 654A,a top secret telegram doted November 2 2 , 1 9 4 1 , from 0. TSUKADA, General Ch5.ef of Staff of the Southern Army to KIMURA, H . , Assistant Minister of War, for the purpose of showing th?t the headquarters of the Southern irmy wes to secretly move from Tokyo on the 25th of November, 1941, to Taihoku, Formosa, where it remained until sbout December 5th and that steff officers were stationed at Saigon, French I n d o - C h i n a .ァ i l l the Clerk please give the document an exhibit number. CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document N o . 654A will receive exhibit N o . 875. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the ususl terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 654A, given exhibit N o . 8 7 ヲ ， w a s admitted accord- ing to order of the C o u r t . (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution* s exhibit N o . 875 and received In evidence.) M R . ENGLISH: I w i l l rc?.d the telegram: "Top Secret telegram from 0. TSUKADA, Chief of Stsff of Southern Army to K I M U R A , H . , Assistant Minister of T "ar. "November 2 2 , 1 9 4 1 Top Secret. "'Forwerd movement of Southern Army.' P，鄉 2 o 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Addressed to Assistant Minister of W a r , H。 KIMURA. "From General Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada. •The Headquarters of the Southern Army will advance e。 follows. Special secrecy is requested. ''November 25 to leeve Tokyo. "November 26, embark from Ujina by Suwa-Maru. "November 25 5 landing at Ke^lung. "After thst the Headquarters will "be located at Tnihoku until about December 5. The staff officers will be about 5 and others will be stationed at Saigon." Will the clerk mark for identification prose- cution' s document N o . 1412, entitled "Military Admin- istration Measures to be taken in the event of Jspan's Participation in ^'ar. 11 CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document No. 1412 will be given exhibit N o . 876 for identification. (Whereupon, tho document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 8 7 6 for idontificstion only.5 MR。 ENGLISH; I offer in evidence prosecution's document N o . 1412A for the purpose of showing that as part of Japan's general preparations for wer precedents of military administrative mc：ssures were prepared for use in arees to be occupied by her forces. Only the 8,986 l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 outside cover and the table of contents are tendered for the reason that prosecution's document N o . 1448 sets forth in detail the measures that were to be. taken in creas to be occupied. THE PRESIDENT; Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF TI-IF COURT: Prosecution's document N o . 1412 Willi be given exhibit N o . 8 7 6 在 ， ( T 'hereunon, the document above referred to wrs msrked prosecution's exhibit No. 87bA and received in evidence.) MR。 ENGLISH^ I will reed the excerpt; M t M i l i t c r y Administrative H--asures to be Taken in the Event of Japan's Pcrticipa'tion in Y/ar 1 -- 12 NovemlDer 1941. "Secret "In dealing with this copy, espcclrl care must be taken in rogcrds to outsiders. "12 November 1941。 "Concerning measures to be taken in the event of Jappn's participation in wsr. (Supplement N o . 1 ) "(Prrcedents of military administration in occupied crers.) "The Second r。.r)ertment of the Treaty Bureau. "Contents e,987 "(1) The Sino-Jspanese Wsr Page 1. "(2) The Russo-Japanese Wsr Page 1 5 . "(/•.) Mane hurls and Kwantung leased Territory Poge 15 "(B) Saghslien Page 41 "(3) The First World ”.ar (Chiaochou Boy) P£gc 4 5 . "(4) The Siberian Expedition Psge 52." I offer in evidence prosecution's document 1448 entitled "Detr.ils of the Execution of Administra- tion in the Southern Occupied Territories" and being decisions by the Liaison Cojifcrencc betv.'eon the Imperial Headquarters end the Government of Jcpan of Noveiuber 20th regarding the general policy and the details thereof for the military Edministration to be put into effect in areas to be occupied. THr^ PRESIDENT： Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT : Prosecution's document N o . 1448 will receive exhibit N o . 8 ? 7 . (Whercmnon， the document sbove referred to was mr.rked prosecution's exhibit N o . 877 and rcccivcd in evidence.) M R . ENGLISH: I will read the document; page 1: "No. 3 8 of forty volumes. 8,9<°8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 "National Top Secret. "Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupicd 'Territories. "Decisions by the liaison conference between the Imperial Headquarters r.nd the Government of Japan on November 20, " 1 . G e n e r a l Policy. "For occupied areas a military administration is to be temporarily enforced for the purpose of re- storing public peace and order, for the immcdiete ac- quisition of resources vital for our nstionrl defense, end for nu-intsining the self-sufficiency of our oper- ation?l forces. "The finel reversion of the territories we have occupied end their future disposal are to be decided later. "2. Details. " 1 , I n the execution of military adminis- tration, such adrainistr?tion org?ns as still exist will be made as much use of ss possible and all obtaining socirl c.nd racial customs will be respected. "2 f As far as operations allow, our Occupation Forces will take measures to obtain ell resources vital for our nationpl defense end to ex- pedite their development. 8,125 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Resources vital for our national defense which sre developed or obtained in tho occupied areas will form &n integral part of the Materials-Mobilization Plan of the Central Executive and everything needed by our operationsl forces for local self-sufficiency will, as a rule, be assigned to them locally in accordance with the Executive‘s distribution plans. ”3. The transporation of resources to Jroan will be assisted in every way possible by the Nrvy snd rmy alike, v/ho will do their best to moke full use of the,ships they have requisitioned. "4. The Occupation Forces will keep control of railways, shipping, harbours, aviation, communica- tions snd the post. 1 1 5. The Occupation Forces will control trade rnd. exchange snd in particular will prevent any leakage to the enemy of resources of spccial importrnce, such as petroleum o i l , r u b b e r , tin, tungsten, quinine, etc. "6. Existing I O C P . 1 currencies w i l l , A S a rule, be utilized and circulated as far as possible, but in unavoidable eases military notes of foreign denomina- tion will be used. "7. Natives will have to reconcile them- selves to such pressure &s is unpvoidt°bly involved for them in our requisition of resources vital for our 8 , 9 9 0 - 又 ‘ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n£tional defense rnd the local self-sufficiency of our Occupetion Forccs. Demands for their Dacification will riot bo tolcr&ted if they militate against these objec- tives . ” ' . A m e r i c a n , British rnd Dutch nationals will be directed to cooperstc with our military admin- is tra tion. For the rocalcitrsnt, deportation or other appropriate measures will be devised. Tho existing rights snd interests of the Axis Powers will be rcspccted but any future extension of them will be li : restricted cs far as possible. 12 ： "Chinese emigrants will be mcde to ronoimce allegir.ncc to the Chicng Government and to sympathize end cooperate with our measures. "Nrtive inhabitrnts will te directed so as to promote their feelings of dependence on the Imperial /rmy. Fc must avoid giving rise to any premature indeptndGnce movement. "9. Japanese will be strictly examined as to their fitness before they ccn make their first trip into enemy lend, rfter the start of operations5 pr. ferenti?l consideration, will be given to the return journeys of those who were once resident in these areas, but v/ho hr.ve returned to Japan." THE PHESIDENT.: "Enemy Isnd" is also "the 13 14 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 8 , 9 9 1 - occupied territory" in our copies. M R . ENGLISH; Instead of"enemy land" the "occupied territory after tho start of operations; preferential consideretion will be given to the return journeys of those who were once resident in these areas, but who hr.ve returned to Jspsn. "10. The following measures are to be taken in connection with the execution of military adminis- trrtion: "(a) /II important matters concerning our local military odministrstion shsll be decided by means of lieison conferences between the Imperial Head- quarters end the Government. Local troops will bG notified of decisions of the Central Executive by tho Navy snd Army respectively. "(b) Schemcs and regulations for the requi- sition end development of resources will for the present be mnde by the Central Executive orgenizrtion, under the lccdership of the Planning Bo?:rd. The letter's decisions shall be carried out in accordance with ( a ) . . "(c) In the case of French Indo-China and Thailand, our pre-crranged policies will be adhered to and no military administration will be enforced. Measures will be decided later in the event of any 2 5 sudden change in their status. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Notes s 1 . T h e military administrr.tion machinery will be. gradually amalgamated, readjusted or taken over by the new organization which the Govern- ment will set u p , depending on the progress of the Imperial policies towcrd the Occupicd Territories." THE PRESIDENT; Is there m y t h i n g to §iow the yeor of thet document? D R . KIYOSE; This document does not hrve the date of the year on it, Does the prosecutor have any material which would identify the date of this'docu- ment? THE PFxFSIDENT? r "ell, in the certificate it is assumed to be 1941. MR。 ENGLISH; I might also point out, your Honor, at pege 2, paragraph % the words "after the start of operations" would date tho instrument. 8,993- M R . LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, that might be 1942. THE PRESIDENT: I quite agroo, M r . Lognn. M R . ENGLISH: Tho important point is, your Honor, that th-aso measures were drawn up prior to the outbreak of oporations in southern occupied territorios. I offor in evidence prosecution 1 s document N o . 1^41, entitled "Measures to be T^ken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for the Execution of National Policies, which was decided nt the Council in the Presenco of the Emperor held on November 5?" for tho purpose of showing that a liaison conference decided on November 1 3 , 1 9 ^ 1 ? to disclose to Germany and Italy, Japsn's intention to stnrt war against the United States of America and Britain as soon as her war preparations wore ready, and that Jnpp.n notified Gormany and Italy that the participation by thorn in the war p.gainst the United States and Japan vas p?.rt of Japan's war preparations. Tho document is also offered to show Japan's policy towards Thailand as decided by the liaison conferonce regarding the passage and stationing of troops, the construction of military ostablishnonts, the billeting nnd feeding of Japanese troops, and 1234567890123456789012 3 4 5 1111111111222222 Duda & Barton loans to defray necessary military expenditures. TH3 PRESIDENTS Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT s Prosecution's document N o . 1441 will bo given exhibit N o . 8 7 8 . (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution 1 s exhibit No. 8 7 8 , and was roccivGd in oviaencG.) 8,995- M R . ENGLISH: (Rending) "Measures to be teken toT.Trds Poi-'oign Co-antries rolc.;t: vc to the Ovitlin:. for tho execution of llr.tionrl Policios, v:Iiich was docidcd c.t the council in the prcscnco of the Smporor held, on November 5. "Liaison Confcrcncc Docicion "November 13th, 1941. ! 1 Policy Tov;rrda icminny r.nd Italy. '^"lion tho prosont negotiations ?;5.th tho Unitod Statos of Amoricc broak dot/n end. a war with hc.r Liecomcs unavoidable) (prosr.racd to bo' aftor Novom- loor 25th), tho Jrpaneso G o v o m m o n t shall notify Ger- many (and Italy), vA. thout dolr^y, of our 5.ntcntIon to start wor こ3「inst tho United States of Ancrica ond "Britain cs 3Don as our m preparations arc rer.dy, and chc 11 open ncccssc.ry nosotir.tioriG with th:-r>i in con- nection with the follovans mnttcra, tolling セhem thet thcac arc a part of our x:cr prcparr tions: "1.Pr.i'tic5.pation of frcnncny (r-nd Italy) in tho trar cgr.inat tho Uhit:d States of Ajncricn. t ! 2. Ko separate por.co.“ I will turn to pr.gc 2 , "Policy towards T lie Hand., " 1 . J u s t before corr^-ncing tho advr.ncc 5.r】to Dud c.;ゥJcBrrt o n 8 , 9 9 6 - / T h a i l m d / , the following domnnds aim 11 bs made r.nd their imraodlr.ts complinnce obtainod; "Our troops shall nd.vance /into Thpi land./, ar prorrrongod, even if our demr.nds arc rojeeted by Thcilrnd. Howevor, efforta shall bo made to localize ns nuch as pos.iiblo military collision betv;3cn J^pan ond Thnilnnd, "(o) Eight of passage of Jnpc.nese troops through hor torritory nnd. tho grnnt of various facilities in- cidental thorcto. “(b) Ir ; imcdiEit^ -UTf orcoracnt of moasures to avoid, possible collisions b:.t\?een the troops of Japan r.nd Thailand, ov/ing to t h ) passng© of Japaneso troops• "(c) Concltision of r. joint defense agroGmcnt, if Thailand desires it. "Note: No apecir-1 change in our attj.tud.3 townrds Thailand shell be made b of or 3 the comj'aon ce- ment of the negotiations• In particular, great ccrc shall bo taken to conceal our plon of opening ^jcw, "2, After the penetrotion of our troops, we shall 5.r:imodintely open negotiations vrith the Govern- ment of Thciland for ccmcrニ七:s a i T m g c m G n t s on tho foilenrf.ng mnttcrs : "(a) 'letters concerninc tho passr^o and ate tion- 8,997 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ing of Jcpanose troops. !I (lo) Provision, construction end enlcrgGmcnt of mi lit cry cstrblis brie nta. :t (c) Provision of nscossary traffic and. coiranuni- cation fccilitioa o.a woll ns factory facilities. "(d) Matters concerning billeting c.ncl nuntori- ancc for the J-pr：neao troops prssing through or statioioccl in Thr.ilcnd. 51 ( G) Loans to D O F R C Y N C C O C S O R Y M I L I T A R Y expen- cl5-turo. ! 1 EcmarkG ； In tho n.sgotia 七 ions on It one 1 end 2 , we ahcll definitely promise to respc-ct hor sovereignty r.nd torritorial Intosrity in conf orrii5.ty with the Out lino of Policies - to\rards Frcnch Inclo — Chinn and Thailand, tirhich ZT s dccided ct the Lir.is on Conf cr- oncc of Imperial HQr.clqnr.rtcrs and the Government hold on Pobruciry l e t , 1941. "Moreover, dopcnd5-ng on the 。ttitudo of TliailnncI, '7o shall try to turm the ne- gotintions to our advantage by suggesting thot wo will in iruturo considor the cession of a pa rt of 3 tirraa or Malay to Thnilir.nd. !l 8,998 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1 9 20 21 22 2 3 2 4 25 TH3 PRESIDENT； Captain Brooks, M R . BROOKSi If the Court ploaso, I think that in fairnsss, pags 4 of this document, paragraphs 3 and 4, as to ths time this plnn was to be carried out, should be called to tha Court's attention. I don't kno\7 whether it would be permissible tc have that read irto the record or not at this time. M R , ENGLISH; % will road into ths rocord page 4, paragraph 3. First of all,v;e shr.ll ro”d the note immediately preceding porngraph 3: "Though the IntGrnationr.l Settlements and tl:e Legation Quarter in Poking shall ba brought under our actual control after driving out the enemy's mili- tary forces, these areas shall not bo complc-tely tr.kon over since they also include interests of coun- tries friendly to us. "3. Tho abovG-raentionod plnns shall bo car- ried out only after the declaration of war agninst the United States of Amorica and Britain, lest our intentions bo rovoaled. "4. Our right of belligeroncy against the Chungking Regime shall not be obtained by a declara- tion or other formalities, but tho actunl effect of belligerency will be obtained by a declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain." 8 , 9 9 9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE PRH1SIDSFT; That appeors to apply only against China. It COEO S under the honding "Policy towards China." L!R. ENGLISH; Th?.t is corroct, your H o n o r . Roferonce is mado to Court exhibit N o . 809, page 7987 of the rocort 1 ,being a rosenrch report entitled "Japan's Decision to Fight," N o . 131, dated LecGinbGr 1 , 1 9 4 5 , preparoo by Allied Translators and IntGrprcjtcrs Soction and published for the infornntion of all concornod b y command of General MacArthur. I will now read, if tho Tribunal ploaso, nc.ditional part's of this documont to provo the Japanese preparations for the for Greater Er.st Asia far ante-d^te the nctunl outbreak of hostilities on 7 December 1 9 4 1 , ^ n o thr\t the Japanese Government had positively committed itself to the waging of vjar against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands by tho end of Octcbor 194-1. I \7ill commonce rending from page 1. M R , 3 R A M 0 N s We wero inquiring, M r . Presi- cont, if this document, 1628, is slreroy in evidence, or whether it has just been tsneered. THE PRESIDENT； Didn't M r . English call it exhibit 809? M R . ENGLISH; Your H o n o r , I chc-ckea the 9 , 0 0 0 Clerk's record and found thnt it was rcimittod in evidence, a^id th^t 809 is the exhibit number boing admitted in evidence. M R . F U R N E S S : If the Court please, I remcmbGr when that was introduced, and I objected because the data was not shown on the excerpt we h a d . W h e n it was introcucGG we had no complete copy^ and I suppose it is still subject, therefore, to attack on the u s u a l terms. M H . B R A N N O K : I nm B r n n n o n , counsel for the accused N A G A N O . THE PRESIDENT; M r . B r a n n o n . M R . BRANNON: M r . President, if document 1628 has alreacy boon 3omittea, I feel that thore is no objection that I can now mnke to its admission. TKE PRESIDENT: A documont wes admitted under the circumstances indicated by Mマjor F u r n e s s . I cannot say which documont. If it was this, we will henr whnt you havo to say against its reception in evidence finally. The t m n s c r i p t should indicate the conditions under which it was received. M R . BRANNON: At least, M r . P r e s i d e n t ,エ am certain we had no copy of this before this phase of tho ense* T H E PRESIDENT: The Hule 6 ( l ) b , or 6b(l), 9,001 ヌ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 1 5 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 has not been complied with\ is that so? M R . BRANKONi To my personal knowledge it has not b e e n . M R . ENGLISH ； Your Honor ? in order to cloar up any misunderstanding, I now offer to put in evidence prosecution's document 1628. THE PRESIDENT: That gets us no further, if the rule has not been complioc with。 M R . ENGLISHミ Your H o n o r , 've nre offering the entire docuraort. THE PRESIDENT; What about the translations? m . BHAKNON: We have it before us n o w , M r . P r e s i d e n t . It has been duly served on us for this phase. THS PRESIDENT; If you have the translation, w e l l , the document should bo ad; rait ted y unless you have some further ground. M R . BRANNON: M a y vie at this time, M r . Presi- d e n t , interpose our objection to this document? Thank y o u . This Gocuraont 1628 is more than just a docu- ment . I know it is difficult to ask this C o u r t to rule out ovidenco arid at tho snrae time to keop the Court from looking at it. THE PRESIDENT: A judge may do so, but not 9,002 a j u r y . MR. 3 R A N N 0 N : T'mt is oxactly wh^t I m e a n . Howovor, I fool th°,t thoro is some Gviaonce which should not properly bo placed before the Court for consideration at ill, and I will state my reasons. With reference to this d o c u m e n t , on tha first page it m?y be observed thnt it is m a d e , roportod, by ATIS, which is known as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. These of us who may rc-^c the rocord of this proceeding in the yonrs to come unfamiliar with military terms て1ould not know what A T I S was or whether it was an organization qualified as an expert. To m y knowledge, the prosecution has done- nothing to so qualify this organization, which is nothing rnoro than one of tho many sections under 3 C A P . THE PRESIDENT: It comes within the express provisions of Article 13 of tho Charter, doesn't it? It is 13c(2), "Report by an Invostigntor." m . BRANNON: This is more thnn a report b y an invostigntor, M r . President. It is a roport probably by hundrods of investigators. THE PRESIDENT; The singular imports the plurnl in those circumstances. 腿. B R A N N O N : It would me.nn thnt we would 9,003 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 24 have no chance to cross-cxamino or otherwise inves- tigate a report of this k i n d . THE PRESIDENT: Your difficultios in coping with it, of course, do not restrict its admissibility, M R . BR A M O N ; エ do not boliove tho Ch-rtor contemplated thnt an investigator woulei make n.n export roport, M r . President. THE PRESIDENT； That could nevar be ATIS' criniGj the distinction botvjoen expert and non-export r e p o r t s . Tho language is comnrehensive. It refers to reports of investigators. m. BRf ]MONs マhich brings me to m y next point, that this document, when I say it was moro than a documont, is a conglomeration of difforont sources. THE PRESIDENT ? That is almost a necessary characteristic of an investigator's report. W e 1 1 ,W G appracinte your difficulties， M r . B r . m n o n , but they GO not rondor this document inad- missible. M R , B R A M O N j I:r. President, if tho prosecution are allowed to proceed with P. COCunicnt of this k i n d , it would be perfectly possible to prosent the entire case in a brief form containing ovidonce in the nature of diarios, testimony， expert witnesses and conclu- sions. 9,004 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 1 9 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 THE PRESIDENT: The Court will determine all issues. M R . 3HANW0N； I do not wish to impose upon tho Tribunal's time, but I merely wish to nako ny point. It gives thvi prosecution a double chance to sum u p . This littlo document is a beautiful sun皿atiom— T H E PRESIDSNT: I have not ro^d it. I co not k n o w . M R . B R A N N O N : --of f。cts which neither have been offered in evidence or proved. SincG， M r . President, it was prepared after the period of this Indictment, I believe th.̂ .t tho prosecution should bo forced to present the individual evidence contained in this oocuraent, rathor than the mass of evidonco put together with the conclusions of thoir investigators. I would like to add, if tho Tribunal please, that in a certain appendix in this book tno prosecution offers ovidcnce as tc the Pciarl Harbor attack. T h e y get their .information from a questionnaire submitted to throe； or four cx-Jap^nese naval officers. THE PRESIDENT: They are admissions from enemy sources. M R , BRANNON: Y e s , but nfter the hostilities have endod .nnd from pure memory of the Japanese 9,00? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 25 o f f i c e r s . Theso officers are alive today in T o k y o . I havo talked to them n y s e l f .エ submit that it w o u l d bo mriCh batter if we were able to have these men cnlled into the courtroom to testify, or at lonst to testify by sworn affidavit rather than b y an inves- tigator 1 s r o p o r t . That is ？.11, M r . P r e s i d e n t . M r . L o g a n , of the Rules Committee. THE PRESIDENT: M r . L o g a n . M R . LOGAN: , If th<2 Tribunal please, I would like to add an observation which I think might be portincnt. As has boon stated, this document is issued under tho Gencrnl Kondquartors, Supreme Con- imnder for the Allied Pov/ors. It seor^B ironical that a document which would cone up for review in this record should be- issued by tho Suprene Commander 1 s office r‘nd bo permitted to be admitted in evidence in this case. THS PRESIDENT: You mean a review of a sen- tencG or sentences by the Supreme Commander, M R . L O G A N ; ェ appreciate it is a review of tho sentences, your Honor, but in ordar to dntorrnine v^hothcr there should be any mitigation the entire evidence will be considered, as I understand it. THE P R 3 S I腿 T : W e have- dGcided, M r . Logan, 9,006 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to look into the documont bofore coining to any deci- sion. Vife will ask thst tho document bo distributed nmong tho judges, a M . LOGAN; May we have opportunity to argue further tomorrow morning before the Court arrives at its decision? THE PR3SIDENTs W e l l , I tnke it you still havo further argumont to offer? M R . LOGAN; Y e s . THE PRESIDENT: W3 will adjourn new until haIf past nine tomorrow morning. (Whoroupon, at 1600, an adjournment was. tn'con until Thiarsiday, 31 Octobor 194-6, o.t 0930.)
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Image provided for research and reference use only. Permission to publish, copy, or otherwise use these images must be obtained from Rare Books and Special Collections http://rbsc.library.ubc.ca
University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections
Text