AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Administrative, biographical and background records
Conde, David W.
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Document No* 0003 Page 1 May it please the Tribunal. We rave been in some difficulty in preparing our answer to these motions partly "because of the svort notice we have had witVi regard to almost all of them, and partly because we have not known in how much detail t1 e Tribunal would desire us to answer them.. In the ordinary way we should neither be required nor allowed to sum up our case at this stage. We propose however for tve convenience of the Tribunal and subject to its approval, to handle the matter in the following way. First we propose to hand in and circulate to the Defense for tve convenience of ell concerned a Chronological Summary of the wvole of our evidence so far as it is reasonably capable of being dealt with in that way, down to the close of the Netherlands phase of the case on December 10, 194-6. This is a somewhat formidable document, the rrain part of which consists of 314 pages, the preparation of wMch has involved considerable labour. Great care has been tpken to avoid errors and omissions, but some may unavoidably have occurred. Bulky as it is, every item is necessarily much condensed, but we have given the reference to the page of tYe Record and tve Exhibit number for every statement so that tve reader can check and amplify it at will. At the end there are two Appendices; A gives a general indication of matters omitted because of their cvaracter not lending themselves to chronological treatment. T M s is of course particularly true of much of the oral testimony. We have also deliberately reserved the Class B and C offences for separate treatment. At the end of Appendix A is a list of the Exhibits w>ich are extracts from "Foreign Relations" dealing vTith the negotiations from April to December 1941 leading up ta the Pacific War. Appendix B deals separately with each accused, giving tve pages of the Main Summary on wvich . 'v. urv-nt No. 0003 " , Page 2 he is actually named, a list of Vis offices, etc., with dates and references to tve pages of the Iv'ain Summary covering those periods5 the Exhibit numbers of extracts from his interrogation; and of speeches or writings by vin (other than correspondence) , if any; and tve dates on wMch he received decorations for specific services forming part of the case. We have not had time to include anywhere tve evidence introduced since the close of the atrocities phase. I am incorporating a good deal of it in the following remarks, as well as correcting one or two errors wvicv have been discovered in the Summary. In rsking you to accept this document we are following tve practice prevailing in some courts, particularly in % erica, of banding in written briefs, but we would urge you to remember what it does, and wvat it does not, purport to include. May it be banded round? (Pause for any discussion, and circulation.) Next I propose to address you on these motions as a. wvole, covering generally tve position of each accused in relation to the Indictment. If when I Vave finished what I Vrve prepared for simultaneous translation, any member of the Tribunal wishes me to deal wit}1 anything wvich I have omitted, I srall Dt pleased to answer ov the. best of my ability. I will deal first of all with tve Indictment generally, beginning With Group One Crimes '-gainst Perce. Tvese consist first of five conspiracy counts, V e first count general, tve otVer four stressing particular aspects of the conspiracy as it developed* We have alleged that eacv of t^em began on 1st January 1928 and ended on 2nd September 1945, in my submission rigvtly, especially as to V~e latter date, because although for example tve Lancburian aggression may be said to Vave been accomplished in 1934, or even earlier so far . . liSonr No, 0003 Page 3 as t1 e four provinces themselves were concerned, the dorrina- tion of them lasted to tve end end they were used to the end to assist in furt1 er aggressions. Good examples of this are to be found in Exhibits 1214 and 1219 where TOGO is giving instructions on 4 and 7 December 1941 (and changing them wit1,in a few days) rs to the parts wvich Lancvuria and occupied Cvina were to play in the Pacific War end the Chinese end Russian evidence (extending rigvt up to 1945) ps to the preparations going on tvere m d the use of iv.rnchuria as a base for the further invasion of CMna end tve actual and contemplated invasion of the USSR. It follows that the guilt of the Manchuria conspiracy is not confined to tvose such rs Okawa, Fasvimot3 end Itagaki, wvo are proved to vave tpken part in the original plot, and Linami, Araki, Dohihare and Koiso, who we re rctive in it at ?n early date, but extends to all the other accused some of wvom ray not vave been active in it or even in favour of it at tve beginning, provided they are proved to have adopted it later. Counts 6-17 inclusive allege against all tve accused the planning and preparation of aggressive wars against a number of countries. lTert again tve charges cover the wvole period, in our submission rightly. Planning fa; preparation do not cease when actual war begins, nor are t>ey, or tve conspiracy to wage them, any t'~e 1 as offences because in a particular case tve actual war may vcr r r occurred at all or may technically have been started by the other party. Basically oî r proposition as explained by my friend Mr. Williams is tvat from the moment when a particular accused is proved to have joined tve conspiracy until t'-e moment, if any, when he is proved definitely to have severed vis connection witv it, "as leader, organizer, instigator or accomplice", to quote t>e Charter, he is guilty as a principal, not only of the conspiracy, but also of all substantive Document No* 0003 Page 4 offences contemplated by t-e conspiracy, w^ich may be "performed by himself or any person in the execution of sucv plan". In tMs and other rcspects t^e Charter only emphasizes legrl propositions familiar to most of us. Therefore it is not in our submission necessary to prove direct participation by any individual in the particular act or acts the subject of any count, provided tYey occurred after we prove that he joined tVt conspiracy, and were within its scope, and >e is not svown to have repudiated tVe conspiracy at t^at date. T>at being our view, I do not t>~ink it would be helpful to deal with eac1- accused count by count, wvicr would involve endless repetition. With regard to Counts 18-25 "initiating aggressive wars," we may pervaps have been unduly reticulous in drawing the Indictment, in not following tvat principle to its logical conclusion. Vie have not charged every accused in each of these counts with "initiating" at specific times, unless we expectcd to have evidence connecting him with the immediate responsibility for t>ose acts at t^e relevant dates. Fowever if we have failed in that in any individual case, but given you sufficient evidence to svow t^at at the date in question eacV named accused >-ad joined t>e general conspiracy, we submit that that is enough. We Vave been perhaps too meticulous also in another respect, namely that in the cases wvere an actual declaration of war came from another country before an attack by Japan we have made no charge in tvis category, even though, as in tve case of t^e Netherlands, we have submitted ample proof of Japan's aggressive intention and vave therefore made a charge of "waging aggres- sive war." TTis does not apply to cases such as the United States and tve British Commonwealth, t^e declaration of war came from tvem, but only because J-pan had made her attack, - • o• raent Wo 0 0003 Page 5 first without any declaration. Most of the above remarks apply to t^e "waging class of Counts 2.7-36. I would like to say a few words about the contention that because declarations contemporary witv the Kellogg- Briand Pact showed that it was not intended to exclude self- defence, and left each nation free to dccide whether it was obliged to have recourse to war in self-defence, therefore this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to enquire into that decision. This has been dealt with in the Nuremberg judgment at pp. 2-3-30. I would concede that some latitude must be allowed in this matter. If you find on the facts when the evidence of tve accused has been given, that such a view was both genuinely held and reasonable, it might afford a defence even if you did not agree with it. But we have given evidence to show that it was neither. It could only be entertained by giving to tve words "self-defence" a meaning which they obviously cannot bear, namely "tve enforcement of the policy of Japan in any part of the world". Sucv a meaning is sought to be given to them in a number of Japanese documents and statements by the accused which arc in evidence. Some of them will be mentioned when I deal with the cases of those accused. But it can be found very clearly in the amusing Lx. 1270A in which a committee of Japanese lawyers working for the Foreign Minister (Togo), tried to manufac- ture an excuse for the failure or deliberate omission, to give warning before the attacks on December 8th 1941. In so doing tvey destroyed most of those wvich have been suggested r t end fell back upon "self-defence". In truth there is not the slightest pretext for this contention. We have given evidence of planned aggression by Jep^n, acting by these accused, at every stage. In tve approach to the Pacific War every act of each o± t*e allies during 1940-41 was merely provoked by some new aggressive move of Japan, obviously Document No* 0003 Page 6 designed as a threat against one or more of then. Ther© is not the smallest evidence of an intention bv any of them to attack Japan, or even to interfere by armed force with her aggression in Chine , which they would have been well justified in doing. I do not propose to go through all the negotiations leading up to the Pacific Viar. The position at the beginning of them was that Japan had accomplished her aggression in Manchuria and had achieved large successes in, but had failed to complete K r aggression in the rest of CVina. If you accept our contention that this was actually an unjustified aggression that view must be the touchstone in considering the subsequent negotiations, tve members of the League of Nations, and of tve Brussels Conference, including the United States and Eritain, had so declared and refused to recognize these conquests. There was tvo Tri-Partite Pact and the advance to the South had begun. The European War was in progress and Frmce and tve Netherlands over-run. Russia and the United States were not yet involved. Japan was in esscnce seeking, so far as h c r negotiations were genuine at all, to do something which was obviously impossible. S^e was like a burglar in possession of his spoils, who wants to be received back into respectable society, not only without punishment, but with the retention of part of his ill-gotten grins. The only point on which she was prepared to compromise was how much of the gains, repeatedly described as "tve fruits of four and a.'half years of sacrifice in China" she should be allowed to keep. Any intelligent person must have known that on this basis there was never any Vope of success. I think it is sufficient to examine the question whether the United States note of November 26t> 1941, Ex. 12451 provided any legitimate excuse, as alleged by tve accused concerned, .for Japan to go to war. In my submission there is none. On the contrary, every proposal put forward is one wvich the United States and those who later bccare its allies had every right to demand, and Japan every moral and contractual obligation to concede. But even if this were not so, it does not contain tve slightest Vint of a throat that if it is not accepted the United States or any of the ot^er countries concerned would attempt to enforce it by war. It was only Japan, represented by some of these accused, which regarded and used the break-down of the negotiations as a cause for war. I now come to Group two: Murder, the inevitable coris^euarc^ of aggressive warfare, and the greatest of all "Crimes Against Feac?.n These Counts in our submission reduce this matter to its simplest and most conclusive form. The argument that the crime of aggressive war involves ex post facto law is invalid for (among others) the reasons given in the Furemberg Judgment. But when the charge is framed as murder it simply has ni application. v^ery statesman or commander who is a part.v to ordering his army to attack and kill an enemy, even in legitimate warfare, fulfils all the conditions of murder if it was done without lawful justification. However, if it appears that this was done in lawful "belligerency he is not guilty. Fow we must recognise the destinction "between that which is un- lawful and that which is criminal, "very criminal act is unlawful, "but not eve-.ry unlawful act is criminal. In charging that aggressive war is a punishable crim" in thr. individual who launches it, we have to establish that it is in itself such a crime, a "burden which we claim here, and the Furemberg Tribunal has found there to have been discharged. But when the matter is viewed a,s common lav; murder the point does not arise. The accus- ed who necessarily fulfils all the other elements of murder, in that he lias purposely ordered the killing of human beings , has to rely upon a lawful justification. He says war is such a justification, but if the war is unlawful his justification fails. Fow even if it wrre not established, as we claim it is, that aggressive war, in breach of a treaty, is itself a punishable crime, it is certainly not lawful, and therefore cannot afford a justification for what is otherwise plain murder. If this has never been recognized before it is only because the circumstances have never arisen "before, and it is high time it was recognized new. It has always been implicit in the. definition of murder in every civilised country. It disposes finally of the last vosti-s:e of plausibility in the "ex post facto1' argument. In group two we have alleged that the various acts of wa.refa.re were illegal, and the killings murder, for one or two er all of three reasons. Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 9 First that the war was undeclared and in the nature of a treach- erous surprise. Second, that it was in "breach of the treaties against aggressive war. Third, that the maimer in which it was conducted was contrary to the laws of war. This "brings me to Group three in the Indictment. Conventional war Crimes end Crimes against Humanity. Our legal argument on this subject is rather fully set sut in Appendix D to the Indictment itself. We have proved all the facts there alleged. We claim to have shown that the government of Japan was in effect "bound "by the Geneva Convention of 1939. But failing that we say the-"" were unquestionably "bound "by the Hague Con- ventions, particularly lies. 4 and 10 of 1907, and that all the Conventions arc merely declarator?/- of International Law. IVery outrage we have alleged comcs in our submission within all of them. These are the ways in which we claim to have proved the responsi- bility of the accused for these, outrages. 1. Article 4 of the Hague Convention and Article 2 of the. Geneva Convention provide that prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile government and not cf the individuals or corps which capture them. Ho government or member of it in face cf this can. evade responsibility by- trying to 3hift it on to a particular department such as the War or iTa.vy Ministry, or onto individual commanders in the field, though the latter and the officials of those Ministries may and do thereby acquire a responsi- bility of their own. The main responsibility remains with every individual member of the government. 2. livery one of the accused must have been aware of the horrible notoriety attache, to the Japanese army by the outrages at Tanking and elsewhere in China., and of the danger that this might recur. 3. We have proved a general similarity in the cha.ra.cter of the out- rages prevalent over all the theatres of war in which the Japanese army or Doc. Ho. 0003 Page 10 navy operated during the Pacific War, both with one another and with what happened in China, which establishes a universal plan or pattern, and in- dicates that this was a recognised policy of terrorism. 4. We have proved a l®ng series of protests over the air end through the Protecting Powers wlich must have brought to the attention of all the accused the necessity of using their authority to improve the conditions, a duty which lay upon them in any case. In so far as these were addressed to foreign Ministers Shigemitsu and Togo, we 3ay that they by no means dis- charged their responsibility by merely passing the complaints on to the Ministries directly concerned, and forwarding such few, meagre and obviously • Wi. .{•«!»•,. - '—- -wr~ a&jrSfy-ViG ' unsatisfactory replies as ihey received, to the Fi/o tec ting Powers. Their duty wa.s to bring the matter before the Cabinet, which presumably they did, and if they could get no satisfaction, to resign. 5.' In'a number of cases we have proved direct personal responsibility of individual accused for outrages, in general ..or in particular, including Matsui, Hat a, Dohihara, ..Muto, Itagaki, Kimura and Sato, who held commands in areas ..concerned, and To jo, Ximura, Muto, Sato and SJiimada, who held posts immediately, responsible at the centre,. The idea .that commanders in the . field were,..alpae responsible is .unfounded. But thev had a responsibility.. It is contended that by reason „of the usi. ot the.words r;imrfcatie . mutandis" the .Japanese. frovernment only bound to apply the provisions of the 1939 P. 0. W, Convention Insofar as the? -''ere not inconsistent with the provisions of Japanese internal laws and insofar as the exigencies of the war situation .permitted or. indeed ,at. their ,discretionThe answer to . this content .i.on, however,., is that, r .insofar as the Convention is binding or sets out international qommon law, the Japanese Government could not.shelter itself behind...eny domestic legislation which would be inconsistent with it. It lias ..never been denied„that persons may be criminally liable for violation of international law. Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 11 In the Yamashita case, the responsibility of a commanding officer was considered. The charge was that the commanding officer "unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit "brutal atrocities against people of the United States and its allies and he there- by violated the laws of war." The Supreme Court of the United States stated that, in its opinion, an army commander had the duty "to take such appropriate measures as are in his power to control the troops under his command in the prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile terri- tory by an uncontrolled soldierv". Responsibility, according to this ca.se, and, it is contended, according to international law, is based upon the "power to control". The. gneral proposition may, therefore, be stated that all persons who have the power to control the acts of others who commit breaches of the lews of war and who, knowing that such breaches have been committed, take no steps to prevent their repetition; or who, having reason to anti- cipate violations of the laws of war by persons under their control, fail to take proper measures to prevent their occurrence; or who, having a duty to ensure that their colleagues conform to the laws of war, neglect to per- form that duty, are themselves guilty of offences against the laws of war. In fixing the responsibility for violations of the laws of wax upon persons who, by rea.son of their official position, h-ve power to control the acts of subordinates, and who may be remote from the places where the atrocities are actually committed by the forces under their control, it may be contended that it is necessary that such persons should ha.ve knowledge •that atrocities are likely to be committed or have been committed before any responsibility for their failure to prevent the commission or the re- petition thereof «an be imposed upon them. Once it is shown that a, person has the knowledge or ought to ha.ve the knowledge that atrocities are likely Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 12 to "be committed or h w e be-~n committed "by others under his control, it is submitted that a duty immediately arises to exercise the power of control so as to prevent the commission or repetition of such offences. Ho person can rid himself of responsibility if he deliberately fails to" make inquirie and by reason of such failure does not acquire actual knowledge of atro- cities. If this were so, every member of a Government could gain immunity simply by neglecting to inform himself. It is also contended that, when a, state of things is widespread and notorious, there ia ?. prima facie presumption of knowledge which calls for rebuttal by the defendants. In the absence of such rebuttal, knowledge may be inferred. As to knowledge that atrocities were, likely to be committed after 7th December 1941, it is an important fret that the Japanese Government was at war with China from 1931 until 1945 and that during that period many atrocities and other flagrant brea-chss of the laws of war were com- mitted by the Japanese Forces against prisoners of war and civilians, a.nd that notifications and protests concerning such atrocities were sent to the Japanese Government in Tokyo and the general facts, if not the- exact details, were notorious throughout the world and particularly in Japan. Evidence of such protests was given by Dr. Sates. After ?th December, 1941, many letters of protest setting out de- tails of breaches of the lavs of war were sent "by the Swijs Minister cn be- half of allied Governments to the Japanese Foreign Minister. In most cases there was no reply at all, while in others, after reparted reminders, replies were forthcoming only after gr̂ r.t delay. In no case was any satisfactory answer ever received. Many requests to visit camps in Japan and elsewhere were made by the protecting power but, with a few exceptions, visits were always refused. When rrea.sons were given for refusal, they were, in most cases, fictitious. Permission to visit camps in Thailand, where the prisoners of war Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 13 and native labourers were held under the most appalling conditions, ws.s frequently requested, "but consistently refused by the Japanese Government on grounds which-were clearly unreasonable. Exhibits 473 and 475, with Colonel Wild's evidence, establish that the operation on which these un- fortunate men were forced to work was of strategic importance, ordered by Imperial General Headquarters, under the financial control of the Japanese Governemnt. The welfare of these men was deliberately sacrificed to so- called strategic necessity, which in itself nade their employment, even under good conditions, unlawful. In many cases, the conduct complained of by the allied powers wa„s the direct result of deliberate action by Japanese officials in passing laws and promulgating orders governing the discipline and punishment of allied prisoners of war in Japanese hands. The United States and British Governments on many occasions reminded the defendants of their obligations in natters concerning prisoners of war and reference may be made to the occasions on which they informed the Jap- anese Government that it could, not escape responsibility for the con- sequences of its disregard of the principles of international law. With ref.-rer.ee to the contention that the Potsdam leclaration and instrument of surrender did not refer to any war criminals other than those guilty of what are called "Conventional War Crimes". 3fot only i? unforrc!ed n." *, matt -r ,.<f eonstruntioi., but have now -craved that it is not based on fact, but that the then Japanese government fully understood that it included, those responsible for the war, by the entry "rom Zido's diary Ex. 1283 of Aug. 9th, 1945. Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 14 I will now deal with some further points in the G-eneral Motion of the Defence. Most of them I do not think it necessary to answer unless requested to do so by the Tribunal. The legal points were mostly dealt with on the motions directed against the Indictment itself, and are in our submission out of place at this stage. But I will add a few w^rds on some of them. Practically all of them are contrary to the plain terms of the Charter, but we prefer to meet them on their merits. I will take paras. 1 - 6 together. Wo repudiate altogether the idea that Internationa.! L&w is a matter to be proved by evidence (paras. 2 and 13). So far as we rely upon particular treaties we have proved them, or more correctly placed them before you. The only kind of law which requires evidence is the law of a country foreign to that in which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. This is an International Tribunal. Internationa.! La.w is your law. As to an international code and the right to establish an International Tribunal to enforce it, Japan and most of the countries here concerned recognized this at Versailles. The code is well defined in the Treaties existing at that time or agreed upon since then and in the common standards of humanity. This subject w&s dealt with in the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal pp. 36-42 and although it is not binding upon you, and could of course if you wish it be amplified, for the present I adopt that passage. It also disposes of the contentions in paras. 7-8 and 10. These I submit are peculiarly absurd: "you cannot indict a nation," it has been said, the reason being that the acts are those of the individuals who held power in that nation. How the converse is suggested: ,;You cannot indict the individual criminals because they committed their crimes in the name of their nation." So is the idea in para. 10 that because you cannot conduct a. government without agreement among the individuals who form it, they cannot be guilty of a criminal conspiracy it obyiously depends upon the question whether the policy on which they agree is criminal or not. The statements about Thailand in paras. 20 and 48 are contrary to the evidence. Exhs. 1186, 655, 602 and 1275 with the evidence of ̂ Colonel Wild, show tha.t it was Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 15 the intention to invade Thailand and that it vas done, before any agree- ment was reached. The contention in para. 48 with regard to Thailand and in para. 58 with regard to the Mongolian Republic that the Tribunal cannot deal with offenses against them because they are not represented in the Prosecution and are not proved to have consented to it is in our submission absurd. In no legal system that I know is the right of Prosecution limited to the injured party. * Coming now to the motions with regard to individual accused we observe a general tendency to suggest that many of them cannot be guilty because they were career officers or officials. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the position of such people in the Japan of this period a.nd in some of our own countries. In Japan the service ministers always had to be senior officers nominated by their colleagues, and from 1936 onwards they had to be on active service. With regard to the civilian ministers many of them from the beginning, and from Pebruary 1937 onwards almost all of them were also career officials. In each case the practice wan for there men to hold career positions one day, become Ministers of State another day, and revert to career positions again after they retired from what we should regard as political office. Sometimes, after they had retired from one cabinet or command, they became Cabinet Councillors or Military Councillors to a. la.ter one. Moreover, even in their career positions they did not maintain the tradition of such men in our countries that they merely carried out their instructions. Ive find service officers, both senior and junior, taking part in plots directed to alter the course of politics in Japan, and carrying out policies of their own in their commands, with the some- times reluctant acquiescence of the governments whom they were supposed to obey. We find the Army issuing officially statements of its views on questions of general as well as army policy. We find ambassadors threaten- ing to resign, and resigning, when they did not see eye to eye with the government at home. There was no discipline among them. Under all these circumstances it is idle for these accused to shelter behind the excuse, which might he valid in some countries, that they were r.-ly career men. When considering individual responsibility of each of these men it is our submission that- as long as they held their respective positions with knowledge of what was happening or with a duty to inquire into it, and without any attempt to relieve themselves of that responsibility, it attaches to them. This applies to all of them, whatever the nature of the position. A soldier can ask to be relieved of his command, if he disapproves of that fthich he is called upon to do. Ve have two instances given to us by the witness Tanaka of men, himself and one other whom he mentioned but did not name, who resigned important positions in the ¥p,r Ministry, the latter specifically upon the ground that he disagreed with the War Minister's policy* In the last resort it is the duty of even a soldier or a sailor, and equally certainly of a civilian, to disobey an order which he knows to be contrary to International Law. Ve have so many instances in the evidence of such men disobeying orders or a„cting contrary to the policy of their official superiors when they did not think it was aggressive enough, that it is idle for them to say,they could not have done the same when it xvas manifestly unlawful. In the case of cabinet ministers, members of the Privy Council, niad men summoned to the Liaison Conferences, Imperial Conferences, ana / meetings of ex-premiers, they could have done much more. Hot only could they have tbsolvod themselves from personal guilt by voicing their orotest, if they really dissented from the policies pursued, and resigning any office they held. They might easily by so doing have altered the whole course of events. The Japanese system was very stringent in the matter of cabinet unity and responsibility. One dissentient could, by refusing either to resign or to withdraw his opposition, f#rce the resignation of the whole cabinet. This is well « illustrated by contrasting what happened in the cases of Matsuoka in July Xi-xl £Ex». 1L. C-c) and Togo in Oeptembar 1»42 (ftx. 12731. In tiic Doc. Ho. 0003 Page " 17 case of the Army and Navy Ministers, they could and Arm:/ Ministers did "break up cabinets merely "by resigning. . \ve ha.ve in the evidence rather stressed the fact, because it is unusual, that certain individuals in the Army and Navy outside the govern- ment could prevent the formation of a cabinet, or break it tip ihen formed, by the exercise of their power of nominating, or refusing to nominate, or forcing the resignation of an officer in the service to those cabinet posts, iurther the evidence shows that this power was actually used to more effect by the Army than by the Navy, coupled with the occasions.! outbreak and constant threat of insurrection in the Army to a. greater extent than in the Navy. The Navy Chiefs therefore, if they had wishask to stop a. particular policy on conscientious or prudential grounds, could at any time have done so by using the same methods which the Army found so effective. Among the civilian ministers there was no outside crganization which could interfere in the way the services could, but each individual minister had his own power of action. Nor is it of any use for any individual to show that his opinion was opposed to a particular aggression, whatever the grounds of that opposition, if ha acauiesccd in it and retained his position. Coming now to the Privy Council, that body had a right to examine treaties and other matters of importance. Their meetings were attended by members and officials of the government to explain their views and the reasons for them. The responsibility for their decisions, which invari- ably supported the government, rests in our submission both upon the members and the explainers. The ex-premiers had the responsibility from July 1940 onwards, of consulting with Kido, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, on the a.dvice he should give to the Emperor as tcv the choice of a successor to an outgoing premier. It was his duty to report their views individually to the Emperor. On each of these occasions therefore they had the opportunity of testing the policy of each suggested candidate and influencing it by their choice. This Was particularly important in the choice of Tojo in October 1941, and. only less so in the wa.r-tims changes in July 1944 re- sulting in the appointment of Koieo, and April 1945 resulting in the Doc. Ho. ^003 - Page ' 18 appointment of Suzuki, Kante.ro. On each of these occasions Eirota end on the last two also Hiranuma as ex-premiers had opportunities of making a firm stand for peace. They didn't. On the first occasion Eirota* according to Kido (Ex. 1154), definitely supported Kido's recommendation of Tojo against Wakatsuki's proposal of Ugaki, who might really have stopped it. On the last two "both of them supported fighting the war to a finish and concurred in the choices made. Even more vital were the Liaison and Imperial Conferences in 1941 and the ex-Premiers meeting on November 29th of that year (Ex. 1196 which gives the views expressed by Eirota and Eiranuma). Everyone who attended those shares with the cabinet and with Kido the responsibility for what happened. If anyone who was opposed to war, especially anyone who was opposed to it on moral grounds, had spoken out boldly against it, regardless of internal repercussions, it is more than possible that the Emperor would have refused to sanction way; No one did - if indeed there was anyone who held such views in his heart. I notice a suggest ion,that three of the accused, Eoshino, Muto, and Oka, merely attended the conferences in a secretarial capcity. If that were true, in our submission it does hot absolve them. But actually, the evidence in our submission shows that, even if that is technically true, they were all persons of much greater position and influence than the word would imply. The decorations received by the various accused during the period, some of which are noted in Appendix E to the Summary, are in our submission of particular significance. They vary of course in importance with the rank and position of each accused at the time they were awarded. Particulars will be fouaid in the personnel records. We suggest that it is difficult for an accused, to deny responsibility for a. particular matter, when he has accepted Gi. decoration for his services in respect of it, especially a high decoa.ration. Particularly important are the decorations of certain of the accused by Germany, the deta.iled reasons for which are given in Exhibit 1272, and the actual award of some of which is recorded in Exhibit 2247. I now come to take the cases of the accused one by one.,'jc. CoGb page 19 ARArCE The particulars 'tith re.aru to ill ' art to bo foord on -jave SIS of the Suacnary. To para. b further extracts fsw.t his ihterronr.tioi-s iisve to be acdect. Tl.ey a_e Exhibits m o , 2217, 2218, 221?, 2220, 12221, 2222. To pr,ra. Ct is to ba added Exhibits o71 a x 22234. This aceuunt of tits y&rt jpiuyed by Araki i« tho Ov«ua.yii®cy is> n&ceoa- arily an. iccouiit us ftiveii in evidence before this tribunal. Wita so vast a story to tell aay account iauat be incomplete but, thou;^; nothinfc is hers stated which has not been proved, this statement does not purpart to "be a complete account, for all purposes, of the'part he played. It is impossible to exactly when Ar»-:i became a party to this con- spiracy but, if he was not one already he entered the conspiracy at least in Dece:fcer 1SS1 nucxi iie beet-.. :e Minister of War. For the five months before •this appointment he had been C..ief of the General Affairs Department of the Inspectorate General of Military Training and President of the Permanent Examination Committee for Army Officer Students so that he held both these senior positions at the beginning of the invasion of Manchuaa. He must * therefore have clearly understood what the Japanese forces were doing in Manchuria and, by accepting the post of Minister of war whilst the invasion was in progress, accepted at the same time responsibility for the invasion. Moreover not merely aid he, by accepting this position, accept responsibil- ity for the military policy which was already being pursued- but by order- ing further acts of aggression, showed how fully he participated in the whole conspiracy. He stated, during interrogation, that he himself decided on the occupation of General Chang's four provinces shortly after becoming war Minister and obtained the agreement thereto both of the cabinet and of the Privy Council (Exhibit 187A). Ho further stated, 'during interrogation, that he received a request from, the Xwantung ^rny to set up Monchuria as an independent state, that he could have refused to forward this request to the Prime Minister, but that he forwarded it (Exhibit 187). Itagahi told TanaKa, according to the latter's testimony (p. 15854) that the C'binet was opposed to Manchuria beiu<r procleiood an independent ot-ate but thot Araki •was in favor of it ana tola him (itagaki) so. It.-. I'c. CCC3 Page 20 During interrogation Araki stutecl, in relation to tlie Shangai Incident on January 28th., 1932, th^t: he first heard at a Cabinet meeting thattue Japanese Ayvy had landed there, that, cs the Aavy Minister, who Hade the announcement, "said it (the incident) could be settled quickly no one was worried*, that the Navy Minister later told him that the naval forces might be destroyed, he (Arcki) thereupon agreed, as did the Cabinet, that more than a division (about ten thousand troops) should be sent in support and that when the first division sent suffered difficulties he sent another d iv is ion in support (Exitib it 2221). An affidavit by Mr. Stiifsoii, the then United States Secretary of State, stated that on June 23rd 1932 he heard from Mr. G ew, the then United States Amfccssador to Japan, that Araki bad stated that the League of A. t ioas resolutions about Mane uric, and the Japanese Government * s statements about Manchuria made before M-inchukuo was proclaimed independ- ent were not binding on Japan (Exhibit 1104:). ^raki's responsibility for the acts of aggression during the period ne was Minister of "iar ia also shown by his statements during interrogation that (1) forces cannot be sent overseas without the consent of the War, Aovy, and Ecieign Ministers and the Premier (Eahibit 221o) and [?.) is war had ensued as the result of Japan rejecting another government's protest the whole Cabinet could have been held responsible (Exhibit 2219). IT the government and .aaki, the j-r Minister, had desired only peace with Russia is it conceivable that the Japanese Military attache in M T S C O W should have spoke?, in a report of July 14th 1932, of being "reedy to aopeal to arras against Russian, C.: ina and under certain circumstances against America?" (Emibit 701). Perhaps even more significant, in this connection, is the despatch of July loth 1932 by the Chief of the R.issinn S ction of the 2nd L. at. of the J -panese General Staff to the Japanese Military .attache in Moscow of a statement that "it was decided that preparations for waging war against Russia should oe completed before the middle of 1934s'. (Zahibit 702) Moreover Exhibit No. 670, an affidavit of Takebe, Rosvuco, stated that as a Governor, he heard .araki' spcach to the ^-refecturul Governors in 1933 Doc. No. 0003 Page 21 and that Araki, on a nap of the U.S.S.E. and Manchuria, explained Japan's need for the maritime province of Siberia and Zabaikalye. / Significant for more than one reason is Araki's speech in the film "Critical Period for Japan." (Exh. No. 148A). It is significant "both because of the aggressive sentiments it contains and perhaps even more so. "because Araki should have been the governments spokesman to the public in this connection. It is evidence of the leading position he held as an exponent of aggressive nationalism. Araki was a member 'if the Cabinet Advisory Council, which, en his own admission during interrogation, was set up to advise on the China Incident, from "almost immediately after its formation,: in October 1937 till he became Minister of Education and again from September 1939 (a month after he ceased to be Education Minister) till August 1940. On his own admission the Council met once a week and it was compulsory to attend (Exh. 2217). Cne incident which occurred during his hembership of this Council wss the Eape of Nanking. As Minister of Education, a position he held from May 1938 to August 1939 Araki is cleax-ly responsible for the actions of the Japanese Government during that period. Not merely is his statement, already quoted, about the responsibility cf the whole Cabinet for a policy resulting in war, relevant in this connection, but, on his admission, during the time he was Minister of Education foreign affairs were usually discussed at the usual Cabinet meetings held once a week, where the Prime Minister, Eoreign Minister and Army and Navy Ministers would also bring up matters of importance (Exh. 2218) During this period the following incidents occurred:- Araki, as Minister of Education, made p speech on Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and U.S.S.E. (Exh. 671). Successive attacks on Soviet territory took place (Exhibits 753, 757). The Japanese G-overnment issued an official declaration abcut China (Exhibit 1291) stating that Japan hrd practically achieved her end in China, with the national government reduced to a local regime and the main terri- tory conquered but would fight on until it wrs completely destroyed. A cultural agreement was made with Germany (Exhibit 589). Military training in boys' schools was increased by an ordinance. r&i coos - issued on h'c-venber 30til 1938 (Exhibit 155). T-'-o x'.. eiaier I'Coaoye on 22 December 1233 stated J".--pan's detcrnin tv-i. to extcmiu-. te the Xuoaintaiig Government (Exhibit S72). The Jiati-Co-iintem. ct was strengthened by first hungary and lt-n- churia end then 5 ,- in being admitted. EL inuii Inland Was scizcQ by the "forcible landing of J panose forces" It .as whilst such t: policy was being pursued th. t .jraki was appoint- ed President of the Gkneral If tional Mobilization Comittoo on 28 March 1939. It is clv'xly inconceivable tir-t such a post should have boon con- fided -_t such a trie to anyone who was not heart, and soul in sympathy with, and an active supporter oi the criminal conspiracy for ••••orId conquest on hich the J panose Go-'exnaeat was eng ged. It is submitted that the confidence thus shoan in .r hi by his fellow conspirators after all these yccrs of aggiession is very significant of their confidence in hin. I'; is further submitted that his whole record shows that this cc. fidenco was fully deserved. although he protests thi t he was friendly to 3'- it a in and ..jierica t i s is not in accord with his sp eches on th„ teaching of the film in which he appeared, and v«» sub.lit that the ;;ar inst then was the logical result of the policy he all along advocated.Document No, 0003 Fase 23 Dohihara v The particulars with regard to him are on nage 319 of kwen- dix B0 In addition he is mentioned in the following pages of the record:- 2024, 2028/9, 2034, 2036-8, 2041, 2104/5, 2113, 2120, 2124-6, 2130-3, 2139, 2284 (Ex 197), 2312-6, 2334-7, 2336/7, 2362/3, 2367-70, 2374, 2381, 2436-40, 2442/3, 2448, 2794, 2^15/6, 3018, 3102/3, 3211/2, 3231/3, 3237, 3729, 3730, 3756/9, 3816, 3962 4124, 5491, 14273-8, 15713-30 (Ex 2190A) , 158-57, 15921-15937 and 16258 (Ex 2282), P-̂ icr to 1931 Dohihara had spent almost 18 years in China, I- July 1931 he left Tokyo to take charge of Special Service Organ isation at Mukrm and to investigate death of Captain Nakamura. He arrived in Mukden on 18 August hut was again back in Tokyo early in S^ntember (Ex 2190A), Tho-e he was quoted by the press as "the advocate of a solution of all sending issues if necessary by force and as soon as nossible" (Ex 57 Lytton Report at page 66) Dohihara was then a Colonelr He arrived back in Mukden a few days after the Incident had broken out and was made Mayor of Mukden, a position which he held until 26 November 1931• At the end of October we find him at Tientsin with instruc- tions from Kwantung Army to interview Pu Yi and to tell him that the Kwantung Army would welcome his return to Manchuria (Ex 2190A) If these were his only instructions he greatly exceeded them, A series of consular telegrams to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA (Exhibits l8l, 2P-8-294, 300 and 303) show him as actively engineer ing the return of Pu Yi and family to Manchuria against the wishes of his government and its national policy; they show him as admitting that the state of affairs in Manchuria had been brought about by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria; they show him hinting that, if the government intervened in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army would separate from the government and assassinations would break out in Tokyo, and they show him as Document No. 0003 ; r&se 2 - * engineering an oî tbreak at Tientsin to prevent evacuation of Japanese forces therefrom. Exhibit 57 Lytton report, at pages 75/6 shows that trouble did break out in Tientsin on P and 26 November 1931. At the end of November he took charge of the Special Servic Organisation at Harbin (Exhibit 2190A). Shortly after this he is endeavouring to arrange for 'Chinese General Ma Chan-Shan to accept the post of Minister for War in tie Changchun puppet government (Powell 3231 et seq.) In April 1932 his work in Manchuria completed for the time being he returned to Japan where he remained until July 1934, Ching Teh Chin at p. 2334 characterizes him as the instigate of the Mukden Incident and on p. 2438 tells the Tribunal that a week before the Incident mutual friends of DOHIHARA and himself had told him that DOHIHARA was e;oing to Manchuria to embark on some big projectr ?u Yi, who would be in a position to know, stal that at the time of the Incident he was reliably informed that for whatever accident or,incidents that then happened DOHIHARA was the man who was pulling the strings behind (p„ 4124). His own government in 1934 was happy to give him the credit of playing an important role as, on the 29 April, he was "decorated with the Order of Double Rays for Meritorious Service in the Incident between 1931 and 1934" (Ex 104). But from April 1932 to July 1934 he was a Ma ,1 or -General commanding a Erigade at Hiroshima, Japan, so obviously the services that were being requited, were those rendered before May 1932. From the foregoing it appears that DOHIHARA was an instruc- tor and very active participant in the Manchurian Incident. So far is he from a soldier carrying out his duties that many of his actions were in defiance of and against the wishes of the government by whom he was employed. In July 1934 he is back at MUKDEN with the Special Service organisation and. again attached to the Ewantung Army. Throughout Document No. 0003 •Dp - f ; r v ' — the "Period from 1931 to 1935 the control of opium was vested ' / the Special Service Organisation of the Army, Large revenues were delivered from it, and these presumably remained with the Army until 1935 when Onium Control Board was set up and revenue went to Manchukuo Government (record do* 15,^55^8)» After the Chahar Incident of June 1935 he goes to Peiping and represents the Japanese in negotiations to settle the incident. The final terms were such as to greatly weaken the Chinese National Govern- ment in Chahar (pe 2313), On the orders of the Commander-in- Chief of Kwantung Army he endeavoured to set up an autonomous regime in North China,. To do this he attempted to estrange the local g overnment from, the National Government, He succeeded in setting ut> the Hopei-Chahar Regime and East Hopei Regime in November 1935? but failed to establish the North China autonomous government (2028-2034)f He exerted pressure on General Sung to proclaim a North China autonomous government and made political and economic demands the re lection of which according to the evidence of General Ching Teh Chun (2323-2334) led UP to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Confirmation of attempt to form autonomous government in North China is contained in consular telegram to Foreign Minister Hirota on 2 October 1935 (Ex 197). In February or March 1936 he returned to Japan where he remained as Lieutenant-General c ommanding a Division until 25 August 1937o He then went to North China as Compander of 14th Division and took part in drive from ^eiping towards Hankow, He went to Japan on 1 June 1938 but was sent back to China by his government from August IQ38 to June 193° to see what he could do about settling the war* Is Chief of the Mission he conducted some negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek through intermediaries but nothing came of them. From that time onwards he commanded 5th Army in TAONAN, Manchuria until June 1940 (Ex 2190A), Document No, 0003 Fase 26 On 29 April 194-0 he was decorated with the 2nd Class of the Golden Kite for meritorious service in the Chinese Incident,, He became Supreme War Councillor on 28 September 194-0 a post which he seems to have held sometime concurrently with other appointments until March 1944, He was promoted to General on 2^ April 1941, appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General on 9 June 1941, On 17 May 1942 (Exh. 1272) he was recommended for the German Grand Cross and I quote from the citation: "By constan close and friendly co-operation with tie Air Attache he has in a leading position contributed, in the true sense of the Tripartite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the military alliance", He became Commander of the Eastern District Army on 1 May 1943 (Ex 104), This Army Command embraced an area around Tokyo (Ex 2282) in which prisoners of war camps were situated. There is evidence of his having visited the NAOETSU POW Camp in NIGATA prefecture in September or October 1943- At this camp 60 prisoner died from starvation and ill-treatment„ Conditions did not improve after his visit (p. 14270-142.^0) „ Article 3 of the Prisoner of War Internment Cairo Ordinance (Ex 92) Places res- ponsibility for administration of Camp on Army Commander, and therefore DOHIHARA has a direct responsibility for conditions at this camp and others in his area of command and deaths that resulted therefrom. In March 1944 he became Commander of 7th Area Army at Singapore and retained that appointment until early April 1945 (Ex 104)r This Command embraced MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA and Borneo (Ex 2282)„ It is sufficient to direct attention generally to evidence given as to treatment of Prisoners of war in those areas and the thousands of murders and unnecessary deaths that took place there. For the reasons stated above D0HIH1RA must take direct responsibility for treatment of prisoners of war in those areas between March 1944 and early April 1945* Examples are Exhs. 1513A - 1516A, 1518A, 1528a, and Colonel Wild's evidence P, 5491. Document No, 0003 Fase 27 It is submitted- that DOHIHARA was an active participator in the conspiracies alleged, at least from some time prior to the Manchurian Incident, that he continued to participate in them until the end, and that he was one of the instigators of the Manchurian and Marco Polo Bridge Incidents, that as a professional soldier he furthered the conspiracies and committed the crimes alleged against him sometimes by exceeding his instructions and duties and at others, notably in connection with treatment of prisoners of war, by failing to Carry out the obligations imposed on him by virtue of his military command.r o c . Ho. ?CC3 Page 28 His particulars are in Appendix E, page 320. The additional documents particularly relating to him are Exhibits 2185 to 2188. His main function in this conspiracy was as a propa- gandist — his proved, activities in this direction extending from 1931 (See e.g. Exhibits 12°0A and 2185) to anuary 194-2 (Exhibit 675A). If Okawa was rather the man who provided the ideas behind the conspiracy, Hashimoto was a principal among those who modularized them, Exhibit 734— .A shows that as early as 1929 he was ad- vocating sabotage in the U.S.S.R. d possible military occupa- tion of the Caucasus, The evidence of Tanaka, together with that given at Okawa'.s trial (Exhibits 2177-2178A and 2231), and Exhibit 179F from Kido's Diary, establish the leading pert he played, while a lieutenant colonel in the Army General Staff, in the plotting of the "ukden Incident and in all the associated plots of that period for the overthrow of the comparatively peaceful cabinets in office then in Japan. He organized in 1931 the Sakura-Fai, and later the Dai-Nippon Senen-to, both extremist societies. He was serving as an artillery commander in the neigh- borhood of Nanking at the time of its fall and after. He ad- mits that it was he who fired on H.'< T .S. Ladybird, though he > . claims it was by superior orders.Doc. No. OCC3 MATSUI âge 29 (Particulars with regard to this accused are to he found on page 330 of the Summary), There are no additional documents. The accused MATSUI was born on 27 July 1873. He graduated from the Military Staff College and after having held various military appointments was appointed Commander of the 11th Division in 1^29 (Exhibit 11?). On 9 December 1931 he proceeded to Geneva as a dele- gate to the Disarmament Conference and was appointed Supreme War Councillor on 18 March 1933 (Exhibit 115). In 1933 he was appointed Commander of the Formosan Army Corps and on 28 August 1935 placed on the Reserve List, On 15 August 1937 he was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary P'orces (Exhibit 115)* On 30 October 1937 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces and concurrently Com- mander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces (Exhibit 115). MATSUI was released from service on 5 March 1938 and or 20 July 1938 was appointed a Cabinet Councillor, which appoint- ment he held until 23 January 1940 (Exhibit 115). On 5 July 1939 he was appointed to the Committee of the East Asia Commission„ Exhibit 168, page 1674, dated 8 July 1942, discloses that he was Vice-President of the Greater Japan East Asia Pros- perity Alliance and advisor to the Jap?n Imperial Rule Assistance Feadauarters Adult Corps„ The same Exhibit discloses that he was advisor to the Central Headquarters of the Greater Japan Imperial Rule Assistance Association. On 29 April 1934 he was decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for meritorious service during the war 1931-1934; and 29 A^ril 1°4C< he was decorated with the First Class Order of the Golden Kite for meritorious war service during the China Incident (Exhibit 115). At the time of the "Lady Eird" and "Fanay" Incidents, MATSUI was Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, which consisted of two armies, - one commanded by Prince ASAKA Doc. No. OOC3 -"age 30 and the other by Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA. While it is clear from the interrogation of the accused HA&KIMOTO that the order tc sink all vessels proceeding towards Nanking, without regard tc their nationality (Exhibit 2188, page 15678), was issued by Lt. Gen. YANAQP. A, it is submitted with or without that evi- dence that as Commander of the entire forces responsibility for the order falls upon the accused T'ATSFI. Prior to the attack upon Nanking, MITSUI issued a pro- clamation, which was widely distributed by airplane, declaring that the Japanese Army had only good will for the peaceful citizens *f China and would do no harm to those who did aot resist the Imperial Army (page 2632, Dr. ?:. S. Pates). The troops that entered Nanking from the 13th to 16th of December 1937 vrere experienced troops officered by experienced men (Exhibit 257, page 34-60, interrogation of KATSUI). The evidence discloses that there was no resistance in the city on the part of the Chinese (page 2628, Dr. M. S. Bates). Page 3894, .John G. I'agee, there is also evidence that on the 13th of December all Chinese soldiers had left the city (page 2558, witness I-Isu-Chusn-Ying). On tre 17 December 1^37 HATSUI entered the city and a military review was held 'hich was followed on the 18th of December by a memorial service and a press release by Gen. FATSUI, dated the lSth December 1937 (Exhibit 262, page 3510) states that the army having become considerably exhausted it is necessary f©r troous in general to take a little rest be- cause the army has been engaged in unremitting landing opera- tions for four months• The accused liATSUI, left Nanking one week after his entry on 17 December when he returned to Shanghai. (Exhibit 257, page 3459, interrogation of liATSUI). Evidence of Dr. R. 0. T ilson (page 2536), G. A. Fitch (page 4460), Dr. !<?. S. Betes (nages 2629, 2630) and John G. Magee (page 3894) makes it clear that thousands «f civilians, including women and children, were killed by Japanese soldiers L - c . N c . OCC3 ' ^age 3 1 inside the walls of the City and thousands more were marched to the bank of the Yangtze River and mowed down by machine gun fire. The witness, Dr. M. S. Bates, further states that more than 30,000 soldiers, who had surrendered and laid down their arms, were $ut down "by machine gun fire within the first 72 hours, immediately outside the walls of the City, (page 2630). Exhibit 324, page 4-53.7, being a chart showing victims buried, shows a total of 155,337, while Exhibit 327h page 4547 being a. report on War Crimes at Nanking prepared by the Pra- curator of the District Court, states that the number of victims killed totalled 278,5860 There were thousands of cases of rape (page 2634, Dr. M. S. Bates) and looting was carried on on a vast scale. In some cases it was well organized and fleets of armed trucks under the direction of officers were used to remove the stolen property (^ge 2635)« Approximately one-third of the city was destroyed by fire (paee 4592, Exhibit 329). A German For^i.^n Office in China report (--?"e t '04, Exhibit 329) states that the fall of Nanking clearly shows a lack of discipline, atrocities and criminal acts not of an individual but of an entire army. In our submission much of it must have been deliberately ordered. Both Dr Bates (page 2644) and John G. Magee (page 3928) state that there were an inadequate number of military police available in Nanking and that the gendarmes began to do the same things the soldiers were doing. The evidence shows that complaints were made almost daily t© the Japanese Embassy at Nanking (page 3922) and reports from members of the diplomatic corps, and their press men, that the Japanese Army at Nanking had committed atroci- ties were reported to the Foreign Office (ITO, page 3506). mhe atrocities continued for weeks after the fall of the city and Dr. Bates states (page 2644) that after February 6 and 7 there was a notable improvement in the situation and Doc. No.. 00C3 Page 32 although many serious cases occurred between then and the summer they were no longer of a mass or wholesale character, Mr. Fagee (page 3922) states that after abouVsix weeks it began to taper off, although many individual things happened after that. The witness, Hsu-Chuan-Ying at page 2954 says that the Japanese authorities did not try to stop the atrocities and not a single proclamation or notice was put on the street to ston them. Both John G. M&gee (page 3941) and Dr. Bates (page 2642) say that there was no serious effort made to stop the atrocities, It is interesting to note that so far as punishments were concerned, MATSUIfs recollection is that the only en- tries in his diary concerned the court martial of an officer, and perhaps three soldiers, in connection with rape of Chinese in Nanking* MATSUI returned to Japan in February of 1938 and was succeeded by General KATA on the 17 February 1938 (Exhibit 256, page 344-5)* Upon his return, according to his interro- gation (page 3464) MATSUI was not asked to make a report but states that while he does not know for certain there must have been investigations and reports. That his recall was merely window-dressing is shown by his appointment within a few months as Cabinet Councillor and his subsequent high decoration for his services. With regard to his political activities, in 1929 MATSUI in his capacity as Director of the Second Section of the General Staff, called a meeting in Berlin of all the military attaches in European countries (interrogation of TlATSUI, Exhibit 733A, page 7644) at which meeting there was discussed sabotage measures to be taken in case of war with the USSR, and a survey of the future activities of White Russians in foreign countries and the intelligence work against the USSR by Japanese military attaches stationed outside ©f the USSR. Exhibit 732A, page 7658, the witness, General Ching Teh-chun, states that in the autumn of 1935 MATSUI was in Doc. No. OOO3 Page 33 Peiping hoping to establish & branch of the Greater East A,4ia Association and advocated in his conversation with General Ching that Asia should be the Asia of the Asiatics and that European and American influences should be expelled (page 2317). On the 14 July 1937, according to KIDO's diary7 MATSUI called and he ta'Jke:? on -natters such as discontinuing the dispatch of troops to North China snd became indignant (Exhibit 2254, page 1621?) vnd the affidavit of YAMAGITA, Com- mander of the Kwantung Province Defense Army, describes MATSUI as one of the military authorities in Tokyo active in the occu- pation of Manchuria fExhibit 723, page 7580b At the time of hie arrest MATSUI w&s President of the League for the Revival of Greater East Asia and belonged to a number of Pan-Asiatic organizations (interrogation of MATSUI, Exhibit 733A, page 7644). It is submitted that MATSUI was a member of the conspiracy throughout the entire period charged and the motion made on his behalf should be dismissed.Doc. Ho. 0C03 Page 34 EATA The particulars with respect to Eata, Shunroku are to "be found in Appendix B, page 321 of the Susmsry. Ho additional documents were presented at the conclusion with relation to this accused. It appears from his interrogation (Exh. 256) that the date given in these particulars for the termination of his first period in China, taken from his personnel record, is inaccurate and that he was in fa.ct there until Hovember 1938, "being a. Military Councillor concur- rently. On the other hand his commend \iras during that period confincd to Central China. This accused participated in Japan's over all aggression in at least three different ways: (l) He carried on aggressive warfare in China, a.t two different periods of time as commander of various armies in China. (2) As Minister of War from August 30, 1939 to July 22, 1940, he helped determine the national policy and vorked on the plans and preparations f'*r aggressive war during that period; and (3) Ee was one of the prime movers in the overthrow of the lonai Cabinet thus giving new direction and expansion to the entire conspiracy. After serving for many years in the Army, the a.ccused at the time of the outbreak of tie Marco Polo Bridge Incident was commander of the Torinosan Army. In August 1937, shortly after the outbreak, he was recalled to Tokyo to become Inspector General of Military Education, one of the three highest offices in Japan which controlled army policy and, through its control of the War Minister, could effectively control cabinet and other governmental policy and. decision. (Exhibit 102). At the very outset of the Chine Incident, the accused w<r s in a strong strategic position to affect policy. On Pebruary 14, 1938, the accused was appointed to succeed the accused Katsui as Chief of the Expeditionary Porces to Central China (Exh. 102) and admittedly assumed command, ox: Pebruary 17th. (Sec. 3445). Ee remained there until Hovember and while there he directed the Beige and capture of the city of Eangkow (Hoc. 3447-3451; Exh. 256)'. Doc. Ho. 0C03 Page 35 After his return from China he occupicd the position of military counsellor and from May 25, 1S39 to August 30, 1940, he was chief side de camp to the Emperor. On August 30, 1939, ho "became Minister of War in the Abe Cabinet and retained s.s such throughout the Ate and Yonai Cabinets until July 22, 1940. During his administration several of the important acts involving furtherance of the conspir&cy were carried out. Certain industries such as the Cast Iron Manufacturing Facilities industry were "brought under control. (Sec. 6327, 6403, 829S). On octcDor tnc apousoa appointed the reused i'iutj as onief of cfce highly important Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry and as a t member of several government todies such ae the Planning Board, Manchurian Affairs Board and the Cabinet Information Board (Exh. 192 and 118). In Hovember, Imperial General Headquarters, which had never "been established heretofore except in ca.se of waa4, was set up (Exh. 60). During the A'be / Cabinet in Uoventer 1939, pressure was put on Prance to give Japan special rights in French Inc.o-China (Exh. 61SA, 618A). Shortly after the lonai Catinet was formed on January 16, 1940, pressure was put on the Hetherlpncc for cpecial rights in the Dutch East Indies (Exh. 1309A). On Fetruary 15th, the Military Mission at Eartin drew up a plan for establishing a Par Eastern iinti-Comiritern to unite sabotage activities against the Soviet Union (Exh. 736) . During this administration the economic policy for relieving Japau of its dependency on the United States for military goods necessary to carry out the divine war was adopted (Ext. 1007). During the same month of March the program of the Zwantunt' -«-rmy for Aggression against the Soviet was sanctioned (Exh. 705). On March 30th the puppet Central Government of Wang Ching Wei at Nanking was established (Exh. 275A). Severer regulations \vere put into effect by the War Ministry vrith respect to military training in echoolr- (Exh. 137). The accused attended the four ministers conference of Juno 13, 1940, which decided to make certain requests upon Prance, and in the event of refusal to use force (Exh. 619). Following this a further program of pressure was out into effect against Prance (Exh. 615A, S18A). Doc. Ho. 0C03 Page 36 In the meantime the aggressive war was being pushed ahead in China. In Merck. 1940, the accused as War Minister made it clcar that Japan's progress would not "be stopped by the Nine Power Treaty (Exh. 514). 'Throughout his administration, efforts at reviving the proposed pact with Germany vera constantly "being made- On July 12th end 16th, 1940, there were joint conferences "between the War, Navy and Foreign Offices, in which it was decided that there was a strong demand for the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy to realize Japan's plan for expansion in East Asia and the South Seas, where"by Japan and Germany would respectively support each other's policies (Exh. 527, 528). To "bring about an agreement with Germany and Italy the military lied decided that the Yonai Cabinet was unfitted for the task. On July 8th this accused had let it "be known that the Yonai Cabinet was not suitable to negotiate with Germany and Italy (Exh. 532) in view of the then world situation. On July 15th Hata. submitted his resignation and at the Three Chief Officers Meeting of which the accused wa.s a member, it was found impossible to name a successor and the Cabinet wa.s compelled to resign on masso (Exh. 532). As War Minister the accused was one of the three men who deter^'ned whether or not the War Minister w. uld repign and who, if anyone, would be allowed to become his successor. While it is true that control of the arm;- was divided between matters of administration, being handled through the Cabinet ana r«.ttere cf hieh dommrnd, it".should hoi vc; oVwVl i/ok*/ ... 1 v cc '-..el f >. Live dcfiT.so ha^ : v ̂ rlo oked that the War Minister nimself had a dual role. The evidence is clear that on the one hand he wa.s in charge of administration for the cabinet, while on th* other hand he was a member of the high command. So far as policy 0.1 da s"cin,.ui,rhed irom operations i«j concerned, in the carrying out of which function he was not subject to cabinet control. Kata, as a member of the grvup of Three Officers Meeting had to concur in all three actions taken: (l) the determination of his own resignation; (2) the refusal * to appoint a, successor, and (3) the designation of a successor in the new cabinet. In all three decisions the accused Eata played an active Dee. Ho. 0003 Page 3 7 role. As his last official act as War Minister he put into office as War Minister the accused Tojo, having designated him to the Ecperor "oefore Eonoye had rie.de known, his new cabinet. (Est. 532) . From March 1, 1S41 to November 22, 1944, the accused was commander in chief of the Expeditionary Forces to China (Esh. 103, 106). Exhibits 1887 to IS15 describe the conditions and treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees during his administration, and while he was commander in the area with "basic responsibility fc* ijii. . I ® : Ling oi ji isoc.^i'6 oi wax 'ct'jr«. Ssii. xS&i: Hati on 13 August 1942 issued regulations for punishment of enemy air crews providing for death penalty. v He is charged in Count 45 with responsibility for the attack upon ,-nd rape of Hanking, when he held his important post at the War Ministry, and in Counts 47-50 with similar attacks upon and outrages in other cities in China which hove been proved to have taken place at dates when by his own account he was commander in chief of the Expeditionary Forces in the parts of China concerned. See See. pp. 33S2-9 and 4S0S as to Hankow. Count 47: pp. 4612-3 as to Changsha. Count 48: pp. 4611-2 as to Eangyang. Count 49: pp. 4653-4 as to Eweilin and Liuchow. Count 50: see also Exhibits 331-42, 344, 350, 3-51, 360. The attack on Canton, Count 45 was made by the South China force and he can only be held responsible for that on the basis that it wa.s an act of the conspiracy of which we contend he was a member. Evidence is pp. 4648 - 50. In our submission these charges, which are brsed both upon the unlawful character of the war and the barbarous manner of conducting it, are adequately established, as well as the charges under Counts 44 and 53—55. \Doc• Ho.00C3 page 38 M'fA 9 The particulars in his case are on p. 326 of the Summary. There are no additional documents. Ec was a finance official throughout, one of those who passed to and fro "between what wo should call Parliamentary end Civil Service positions. We submit- that this was part of the pernicious system by which the government of Japan was taken in 1S37 out of the hands of those who had some kind of responsibility to the people of Japan, and handed over to "bureaucrats such as Kaya. But we also submit that those "bureaucrats had Just as much responsibility for their acts as aBy other holder of Parliamentary office. The extracts given do not indicate more than a fsw of the numerous offices he held, which may be seen in Exh. Ill, and show that from time to time he had a finger in a great many pies. Ec was Vice-Finance Minister 2 February - 4 June 1337 in the Eayashi Cabinet, and Minister from then until 26 May 1938 in the 1st Eonoye Cabinet. The first period saw adoption cf the 5-year plan for steel, of the 3rd Administration policy towards China (3xh. 218) the idea being to obtain naterial for munition industries. Many measures relating to the control of Je.pp.nese industry and development for war pur- poses were started. Ho sooner had he become Finance Minister than the mPtin 5-year plan was adopted and vigorously put into execution through- out his period. When the new "China Incident" broke out he was a party to the Cabinet decision of July 11th to extend it. From then on he shares the responsibility which I have already described in other cases for the whole course of the Chinese aggression ana tie rape of Nanking. I do not propose to repeat even the very brief account of this period which I have already given. It can be more fully studied in the Summary pp. 45-71 and by reference to the evidence there quoted. We submit that it was one of the worst periods of Japan's career of aggression. Soon after he left the post of Doc. Ho. 0003 Page Finance Minister he "became an adviser to his successor, and on 14 August 1939 he "became president of the North China Development Company. This was an official organization formed to promote the Japanese policy of controlling and developing the economics of North China in the interest of the Japanese forces and for building up munitions supply. See the testimony of liebert p. 8474 and Erh. 459A. We submit that in this office he was promoting the conspiracy just as much as if he had continued to hold Cabinet rank:. On October 18th 1941 he again became Finance Minister in the Tojo Cabinet, end so<continued until February 19th 1944. -He was thus a member of the Cabinet responsible for starting and continuing the Pacific W>r. He was responsible for the decision on 31 October to issue the military currency for the areas proposed to be occupied (Erh. 852) • He was one of the four Ministers vho answered at the same time the question propounded by the Liaison Conference (Exh. 132&, 1329) ac to the probablo effect a tl war. Tho Cabinet v»f which he was a'me: bor_ decided" pr. 4 llovember (Eyh. 1167) to conceal from the Japanese public all information as to war preparations and give them hope for the future, and on 28 November to put the press on a war- time basis. He attended the Imperial Conference of 5 November which i in effect decided on war. He was present at the fatal Imperial Conference of December 1st, and assented to the final decision to make war (Exhs. 588, 1107); and shares the responsibility with other members of the Cabinet for all that was done in that connection. Ee attended the Privy Council meeting on December 8th (Exh. 1241) which approved the issue of the declaration of war when they knew very well the war had started some hours earlier, and heard Tojo say that the " negotiations had only been continued since December 1st for the sake of strategy, and that the avoidance of a declaration against the Netherlands was for strategic convenience. Ee took part in this discussion. He heard the secretaries report Doc. Ho. 0003 Page AO that they had "been informed "by Tojo at 8:00 p.a. on December 7th that the action would begin in the...early morning next day and that the declaration would come during the day. He made no protest, expressed no surprise, and retained office. We submit the irresistable inference is that none of it was news to him. He attended the Privy Council meeting on 10 December on the agreement with Germany and Italy for joint waging of war against United States and Britain, no separate peace, and collaboration for a now order (Exh. 1267). Both these meetings he attended* not as a member of the Privy Council, to receive information and pass upon it, a responsibility serious enough, but as a member of the government, to explain and defend their action. When he finally left office on 19 February 1944 he again promptly became an adviser to the Finance Ministry until the sur- render. With regard to B and C offenses he not only had the re- sponsibility of every member of the Cabinet during his two main periods of office, which I have described above, but it is impossible to conceive that such a large operation as the construction of the Buraa-Siam railway could have been carried out without consultation with and consent of the Minister of Finance. If he was ignorant of the outrages in China, end throughout the theatres of the Pacific War, which is incredible, it could only.have been by deliberate abstention from using the obvious sources of knowledge, which it was his duty to invoke.Doc. No. C003 Page 41 HIRANUMA The particulars with regard to him are on p. 322 of the Summary. Additional document specially relative to him is Exh. 2229, speech as premier in March 1939. He was the founder and president of the Kokuhonsha, a rightist society (Exh. 164), and at the same time vice-president of the Privy Council from 1926 until he became president on 13 March 1936. For that purpose ho was compelled to resign from the Kokuhonsha which was dissolved. He remained president of the Privy Council and also a cabinet councillor until he became premier on 5 January 1939. During all his service in the former capacities we submit that the positions he held not only gave him the opportunity of passing judgment upon all the principal decisions taken, especially with regard to international agreements, but gave him the power to register his objections, if any, to the general policies pursued. As he continued to hold his offices he must be taken to have accepted them. In particular on 13 September 1932 (Exh. 241) he approved the proposed agreement between Japan and Manchukuo, based on recognition of the latters so-called independence. On 3 July 1935 he approved a similar agreement for a joint economic committee (Exh 0 850). On 25 November 1936 he approved the Anti-Comintern Pact (Exh. 485). On 20 January 1937 he approved the bill relative to the formation of a South Seas government Department (Exh. 909A). On 6 November 1^37 he approved the admission of Italy into the Pact (Exh. 492). On 2 November 1938 he agreed to the final withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations because of the attitude of the League to the "China affair." On 22'November 1938 he approved the cultural agreement with Germany, the political influence of which was mentioned at the meeting. As a cabinet councillor he was there to advise on the whole of the early stages of the China affair, and could have made his protest, but he Doc. No. 0 003 pn.ge 42 retained his offices. In Exh. 2265 Kido records a talk with him on 26 December 1938 about a plot to establish the puppet government of China, and he insisted that Konoye should remain premier to see it through. His premiership from 5 January to 30 August 1939 was chiefly remarkable for the negotiations for a military alliance with Germany and Italy, which only fell through because of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, which caused his resignation. At the cutset Shiratori reports him to Ciano as openly in favour of it (Exh. 490A). On 22 February he attended as premier a Privy Council meeting which approved the admission of Hungary and Kanchukuo to the existing pact. On May 6th Ctt reports that he has reconciled the conflicting views of Itagaki and others in his cabinet and that the treaty may therefore go through. He seems to have wanted the alliance to be directed mainly against Russia (Exh. 501). In the speech to the Diet above-mentioned (Exh. 2229A) he said that those who resisted Japan in China must be exterminated. During this period the 5-year plans, the narcotisation of China, the consolidation of pro-Japanese regimes there, the interference with the trade of other countries, and the Chinese aggression generally (see e.g. Exh. 998 and 272) made steady progress. The hold of the government over means of propaganda was strengthened by the Motion Picture Law (Exh. 155). Other major events of this period ?;ere (1) the forcible occupation of Hainan Island in February in spite of protests from the United States, Britain and France (Exh. 613A). (2) The aggression against the U.3.S.R. and Mongolian Republic in May (Exh. 766). poo. No. 0003 P»ge 43 In June occurred the mistreatment of British subjects in Tientsin (Exh. 1003). In fact, the Hiranuma cabinet was no less aggressive in ever}' direction than its predecessor. Hiranuma returned to office as Minister of State in the 2nd Konoye cabinet, on 6 December 1940, becoming Home Minister on 21 December until the formation of the 3rd Konoye cabinet on 17 July 1941, when he again became Minister of State until its fall on 17 October. He was not included in the To jo cabinet. By jciirtnfc Koncye (whose appointment he had supported, Exh, 53?) he adopted the Tri-Partite Pact which he had tried to negotiate himself, and while he held office he was responsible for the whole of the aggressive preparations acts, and resolutions of that long period. In particular he attended almost all of the many Liaison Conferenc in the first six months of 1941 (Exh. 1103), and the Imperial Conference of July 2 (Exh. 585, 779 and 1107). Whether he continued to attend Liaison Conferences after July we do not know, because publication was stopped. He did not attend the Imperial Conference of September 6th, but as a member of the cabinet was responsible for its momentous decision. We would again point out that the subsequent attempt of some members of the Konoye cabinet to recede from this was not a matter of principle but purely of expediency, owing to the doubts of Oikawa, the then Navy Minister as to the success of war. We do not know Hiranuma's part, if any, in this discussion. He attended the fateful ex-premiers meeting of November 29th (Exh. 1196). He made no protest against war. On the contrary he said that public sentiment must be braced up to face it. His next appearance is on 17 July 1944, when a meeting of ex-premiers was held at his house to consider replacing the Tojo cabinet, not to bring the war to an end, but "to build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly Doc. No. 0003 P a S e (Exh. 1277). The next day, Tojo having resigned he attended the official conference to choose his successor (Exh. 1278). He advocated a military man, suggested Admiral Suzuki, Kantaro, and finally recommended Terauchi, Koiso, Hata or a naval man. When Koiso resigned he again attended the Conference (Exh. 1282) and said they must fight to the end. He wanted to recommend the principal ministers as well as the premier. He strongly opposed any advocacy for peace. He again recommended a military or naval man, finally proposing Suzuki, Kantaro, who had expressed h i s readiness to die fighting for the Emperor. In our submission Hiranuma was a member of this conspiracy and every phase of it, from start to finish.Doc. No. 0.003 Page 45 KIDO The particulars with regard to him are to be found on p. 329 of the Summary. To para. 3? the Exhibit numbers of extracts from his diary now have to be added: 1985? 1986, 1987, 2191, 2192, and 2251-2280. Exhibit 2250 is a writing by him, and Exhibits 266, 1189, which is replaced by 2249, and 1193 particularly refer to him. These documents are the main source of information about him. In our submission when one reads them (as a whole and not by quoting half-sentences, as in the motion) one is driven to the following conclusions: 1. He was a strong and influential character. From the beginning, when he held the comparatively minor office of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he was frequently consulted by people then more important than himself, who took his advice. Every office that he held he made more important than it would have been in the hands of most men. In his later offices he was almost always consulted, not only about policy, but frequently about appointments to Cabinet office. 2. He-was a cautious man. He was not so much concerned with the right or wrong of any policy as with the risks accompanying it. 3. His particular concern was always to avoid internal quarrels in Japan. He did not so much mind what they agreed upon as long as they agreed. He was in the early days against constitutional innovations, but changed this attitude later. 4. His attitude to the Emperor was to dissuade him from taking a firm line about anything for fear it should bring him into controversy. 5. He was a whole-hearted adherent of Konoye until Konoye fell, when he transferred his allegiance to Tojo. 6. He was or became in favor of Japanese aggression, but also of caution and delay in applying it. Doc. No. 0.003 Page 46 In the beginning he was anti-militarist and we do not suggest that he was one of the original conspirators. Even then, however, the above-mentioned attitudes are illustrated by Exhs. 179E of September 10th, 1931, 179 I of September 22nd and 2251 of January 28th, 1932, which show that he was not against the Llanchurian aggression on principle, but because the Army was getting too powerful, and was against the Emperor doing anything to stop it; We submit that he fully joined the conspiracy in 1937, when he became Education Minister on 22nd October and Welfare Minister on 11th January 1938 (concurrent until 26th Kay). By the time he joined, the domination of Manchuria was complete, the cabinet was fully committed to the extension of the China aggression, having decided on 11th July to send more troops and push forward although the original incident was being settled locally. The cabinet was also committed to the 5-year plan in Japan and Manchuria. The offices held by Kido had no direct connection with war policy, but Exhs. 2255-61 show that he took a prominent part in it and approved of all the fstal decisions taken. Exh. 2257 in particular shows that he knew this was an offensive operation, and that the talk of self defense was all humbug. It is remarkable that he makes no reference to the horrors of Nanking, although they were in full force from 11 December 1937 to 6 February 1938, when the situation began to improve. The indignation of the world cannot have been unknown to him and the cabinet, but nothing was done to stop them until Matsui was recalled on 5 March and made an adviser to the cabinet of which Kido was a member on 20 July. Kido may not have been responsible for the outbreak of this orgy of atrocities, but he was certainly to blame for its continuance. During his time as Minister of Education it published in the Tokyo Gazette Exh. 266 "The Japanese Spirit". We submit that it is inconceivable that this would have appeared without Doc. No. 0.003 P a g e 4 7 the full knowledge and approval of the Minister, especially a man of Kido's character as revealed by his diary. The article preached full support of all that had happened in China down to and including the refusal to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. Also, the ideal of Greater East Asia under Japanese leadership, and the welding of all Japanese Into a unified state* That these were his opinions is shown by the diary extracts quoted. He continued in the Hiranuma cabinet as Home Minister, thus having an unbroken period of cabinet office from 22 October 1937 to 30 August 1939. We submit that he has a general responsibility for all the events of this period, shown on pp. 55-100 of the Summary. In particular for the two aggressions against the U.S.S.R., in the summers of 1938 and 1939. During this period the following Exhs. show his activities in support of military alliance with Germany and Italy and his knowledge of Germany's aggressive intentions: 2262, 2268-71, 775. We submit that if his activities had stopped here there is ample material on which he should be convicted on the con- spiracy and the Counts relating to China. These are in fact the guide to understanding later events. Kido was one of the protagonists in the formation of the new one-party political system in Japan on the Fascist model. •Exhs. 2263, 2274-6. He would have been its Vice-President under Konoye, had he not decided on 1 June 194-0 (Exh. 2276) to accept the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal instead. His position in this office was largely made by himself. His views as to the duties of his position are to be found in Exhs. 2273 and 1066; it amounted to this, that the Lord Keeper was the Emperor's principal adviser, especially on foreign affairs. He developed a new function, that of advising the Emperor on the choice of every nev/ premier, with the assistance of the ex- premiers and the president of the Privy Council. When he was out of office (Exh. 2273) he thought the Lord Keeper should not Doc. No. 0.003 Page 48 interfere in this, but when ho became Lord Keeper he dropped this idea and took upon himself the duty of advising the Emperor on this question, attaching such weight as he thought fit to the views of the ex-premiers and managing to bring at least a majority of them to the view he had usually formed in advance. By these means he was responsible for the choice of Konoye on 17 July 1940 (Exh. 532) and again on 17 July 194-1 (Exh. 1117); of Tojo on 17 October 1941 (Exh. 2250); of Koiso on 18 July 1944 (Exh. 1278); and of Suzuki, Kantaro, on 5 April 1945 (Exh. 1282). His attitude towards the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands appears from Exhs. 2272, 2277, 619, 1294, 627, 1065, 1095, 1125, 1129, 1130, 1146, 1239, 1276. It may be summarised by saying that it was at least from 1940 on, hostile though cautious. It is quite clear that he supported the expansionist policy at the expense of these countries but con- sidered that Japan needed a longer period of preparation before putting it into effect. But when those favouring immediate action prevailed, he fell in with their view. Perhaps the most important of these is Exli. 1130 where he advocates a ten-year postponement of the advance to the Southern regions, and meanwhile friendly relations with the United States while intensive preparations are pushed on. No doubt if his advice had been taken we should not be holding this trial today; and If he had resigned when it was rejected we might not have included him except with regard to China. He did not, and this document proves him an aggressor at heart. Even in Exh. 1270 of January 1944, when he was considering the possibility and necessity of a compromise peace, though he did nothing about it, he suggested that after peace Japan should build up cooperation with the U.S.3.R. and China against Britain and America. Do-. MO 0003 Page 49 An important aspect of his case centers round the appoint- ment of Tojo as premier on October 17, 1941. It is quite clear from Exh. 2250 that he had determined on this before the ex- premiers met to consider it, He knew very well that Tojo had been pressing for immediate war, and was only restrained by the cautious attitude of the Navy. It is true that he succeeded in inducing Tojo to abandon the resolution cf the Imperial Conference of Saptember 6th for war in mid-October, and to prolong the negotiations, but he made no attempt to induce him to adopt an attitude towards them which would offer the slightest hope of their success. The crucial point is that in this dispute between the Army and the Navy, which was not concerned with the merits of war, but only with its prospects of success, he not only procured Tojo's appointment as premier, but induced the Emperor to give, or gave in the Emperor's name, an instruction to the Navy which could only mean that they should appoint a Navy Minister who would do whatever Tojo told them. They appointed Shimada—and he did. Kido was intelligent enough to know that there was net the slightest hope of or justification for the United States adopting any terms to which Tojo would agree, and that the arrangements which he made could not postpone war for more than a few weeks* It is significant that he makes it clear in Exhs. 1196 ?nd 2?50 that he rejected the appointment suggested by Wakatsuki and others, of General Ugaki the only man who might perhaps have averted war altogether. It is also significant that in Exh. 2?50 written in November, he abandoned altogether the excuse for appointing Tojo which he had given the Emperor on 2 October (Exh. 1155). On 26 November Nomura and Kurusu suggested to Togo (Exh. 2249 replacing Exh. 1189) that they should induce President Roosevelt to send a peace telegram to the Emperor (which he later did) and asked him to consult Kido. On 28 November Togo rejects the suggestion, saying that he had consulted him. Doc. No. 0.003 Page 50 The entry which convicts Kido of entire complicity In the plot for the surprise attacks of December 8th is Exh. 1^39, which shows that at the very time when he was taking part in th- farce of delivering the President's long delayed telegram to the Emperor, if it was delivered even then, he knew very well of the plans for the surprise attack. With regard to the B and C offences we submit that the guilt of Kido is shown not only by his position of adviser to the Emperor on foreign affairs, and by his knowledge of the way in which Japanese forces carried on warfare as shown at Nanking while he was in the Cabinet, but by Exhs. 1985-7, which show that he v.'as well aware of what was happening. It is hardly con- ceivable that Togo and Shigemitsu should not have told him of the complaints coming in through the Swiss Legation, or that he should not have known of Eden's broadcast in January 1944, which was heard by Colonel Wild in the prison camp at Singapore (especially as he admits knowing of Eden's broadcast about the Hong Kong atrocities in 1942). We submit it was his duty to advise the Emperor to insist on having these outrages investigated and put right, and in any case to insist on adequate steps being taken to prevent a recurrence of what had happened earlier in China. From start to finish it does not appear that he ever drew the attention of the Emperor, whose adviser he was to the moral aspect either of the initiation of the Pacific War or of the manner in which it was conducted. His whole mind was on expediency. We submit that from at least October 1937 he was a member of this conspiracy and responsible for all that was done in pursuance of it.Doc. Wo. 0C03 • „ Page 51 II I R 0 T A The pa. ticulars with regard to h m are to be founc1 cn p. 323 of the Summary and tlr- additional Exhibits w'.ic. dir^r.jy -.."feet him are 2200 a, P.. C- 2226-8, 2260. 'While anbassador to the USSR in 1931 he advocated a firm pol- icy towards the Soviet En., on and readiness for immediate war, no- to preserve J a an from communis:-:, but to et possession of Eastern Siberia (Exhibits 092-3). On 31 December 1931 Litvinov offered Japan a non-aggression pact (through Ilirota and Yosiiizawa), but it was not accepted (Exhibit 744). He was continually in office, first as Foreign hi lister in the Saito and Okada cabinets, and then as Premier, from 14 September 1933 to 2 Februar< 193 7, from 9 March 1936 as Pre- ier. during that period, and especially dunn his premiership, although his utterances to other powers were often conciliatory enough, his actual pol cy and the events for which we submit he is responsible were of a different character. Fu-yi was appointed Emperor of hanchukuo (L:h bits 234, 437a), and the control of Japan over that territory consolidated, es- pecially in the direction of econo ic monopol •. (e. g. see Exhib- its 965, 939? 941, 850, 445, 948.) "he hanchurlan Affairs Board was established (Exhibit 451). he policy of controlling f.nd developing Japanese and i an- churian industry fo' war was initiated and carriod on. 'the so-callod "independence ovements" in various parts of North China and Mongolia were instigated and encouraged by Japan. Hirota actively su ported this (Exhibit 215). '/he object was boUTf anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet. The stimulation of the sale of narcotics in China proceeded rapidly. Japan denounced 'he Washington Naval treaty, and put forward at the London Naval Conference the proposal for a com on upper limit in place of the 5-5-3 ratio, which of course meant that unless Britain and America neglected their responsi ilities in other parts of the world, Japan would dominate the Pacific. y'hen this was re- ^oc, TC. 0003 'Page 52 jected", Japan withdrew fron the conference and 'Tiro a assumed responsibility in .xhiui' 222., in which he attempted to cover up "die position wi h fair words in spite of w ich Japan steadily and secretly increased h r naval arm ents. after ...-.rota succeedec" Okada as premier, following he 26 February re ellion, the power of the Military was increased, es- pecially by restoring the rule t at ar and i'Tavy , inisters rust be on active service (Exhibit 93)• In the SUM: er of 193- a R.ost important series of uinisterial confeiences were held (Ixhit.ts 9/8, 9v .7, 21c, 704, 217, 979), at which national policies were laid c"o";n cover..n. the whole gist of the conspiracy we allege. ! irota was personally present a three of them, and of course, responsible for all. They envisage an ag- . gressive policy in China, East Asia, and the South Seas, and steps to be taken aga~nst USSR, Britain and USa. -his was o be achieved by jc _nt efforts of diplomatic skill and "national defence"- thus showing plainly -ha. in Hirota's mind "national defence" did lot stop at defending Japan or resisting attack, but meant aggression. _his was the first time tha - these policies were formally adopted by a government, and show 1, rota as their official godfather, if not their originator. Some of them were secret. In the autumn the Anti-Comintern Pact was negotiated and signed on 25 November with secret protocol (Exhibit 3^)• Its real objects may be better gathered from Exhibits 4c2, 479, 484, and 485, Privy Council Meet- ing attended by ILirota, than from its text. It was accompanied by border raids on Soviet territory (Exhibits 753, 751). ihe cabinet fell on 2 February 1937 as the r suit of simultan- eous attacks from the Seiyukai party for being too militaristic and bureaucratic (2208A) and from the army (2208 3 and C)> because of '•" ose attacks and because it still contained some representa- tives of political parties. "he army made prompt use of the new powers Hirota had given them to prevent the formation of a Ugaki cabinet. Doc, No. CO'̂ 3 Page 53 On 4 June 1937 Hr.rota was o?.c . as Foreign :.: .nister in 1st Konoye Cabinet and President of the firs'c Planning ^oard, and on 11 July was responsible for the decision to take advanta -,e o: the harco Polo Eridge incident by launching an invasion of China. He was also responsible for the "5-year plan" (Exhibits 841,842 and especially 2227, 239), which elaborated the industrial measures begun in his former period of office. _he whole course of the Chinese aggression of 1937-8 I have already dealt with in the case oj Kido and wi11 not refer to here. H'.rota was directly responsible from the beginning until he left office on 29 hay 1938. hs Forei n minis.er he was particularly to blame for the rejection of all outside efforts to mediate the conflict (e. g. Exhibits 94-9', 950), and protests (e. g. Exhibits 988, 955? 957 and innumerable others from then on), and of the interventions of the League (Exhibits 958, 962, etc.) and of the Brussels Conference (Exhibits 954- A-B). ..'he only attempt at mediation which he tolerated was G r-an and that was killed by the intransigeant altitude of the cabinet on 16 January 1938 (Exhibits 486 C, 978 h., 26-, 268, 22^0). i'he G. m a n Foreign Office had no doubt that the oft-repeated experience of E rota, or other Japanes Foreign H"nisters, saying one thing, and the army doing another, was a trick (Exhibit 486 E). T - s ' cr .0. . Afte this Japan proceeded to set up a series of puppet regimes in the parts of China progressively occupied, and to es- tablish a commercial system by which in China Japan c..me first, Germany second and the rest might have the loav'ngs, if any. (Ex- hibit 2268 shows Hirota's personal responsibility for this.) .We have a speech by him about China in the r>iet on 22 January 1938 (Exhibit 972 G). On 18 June 1937 (Exhibit 9^6), and again on 12 February 1938 (Exhibit 58, Record pa.̂ es 9230 and 9236) he was taking a hand in' Japanese na al plans. On the latter occasion he refused a revues' by „he U. S., Britain and France to disclose or give an under- taking about her building program. Doc. No. O003 pa ̂ e 54 Hirota tried to dispel American apprehensions about Japanese intenii ns in the South Seas after the occupation of Hainan and Spretley Islands, although this was really the policy he had him- self laid down as premier in August 1936. Fro!:1 13 larch to 3 August 194-0 Hirota was a Cabinet Councillor at this time Japanese moves with regard to French Indo-China and the N. E. I. were initiated. After August 1940 Hirota!s only activities at present known to us are his appearances at the vital ex-premiers' conferences. On 22 July 1940 (Exhibit 532) and 17 Jul 1941 (Exhibit 1117), he advocated a military premier and cabinet, though IConoye was in fact appointed with army support. On 17 October 1941 (Exhibit 2250) he gave firm support 1,0 _ojo. On 29 November 194-1, when called upon to advise the Emperor as to the Pacific War he agreed, that war w«s inevitable, but suggested a postponement and possible diplomatic solution after its outbreak. On 17-18 July 1944 (Ex- hibit 1278) he said the prosecution of the war was first and fore- most and suggested a member o. the Imperial family as premier but agreed to Terauchi, Koiso or Hata. On 5 April 1945 (Exhibit 1282) he was still emphatically in favour of fighting through to win the war, and thought it could be done. He advocated the War or Navy minister as premi.r. In our submission he was an aggressor from start to finish, and the contrast between his public and private words and acts shows that he was a particularly clover one.Document No. 0003 Page 55 ITAGAKI T^e particulars with regard to vira are on p. 325 of the Summary. Additional documents having special reference to him ere Exhs. 1973-6, 1998, 2177A, 2178A, b. 2231, 2191- 2201, 2214, 2262, 2263, 2266 ?nd 2271. He is shown to have been one of the original planners of the Mukden Incident (Evidence of Tanaka, Record pp. i960 and 15,853? Exhs. 2191, 2193-6) end related plots, (Exh. 2177A, p. 22), as a member of tYe Kwantung Army Strff, on which he rem?ined until 1 March 1937, rising from colonel to major-general and Cvief of Staff on 23 Kerch 1936. He took part in the appointment of Dohihara as mayor of Mukden (Exh. 2194), and in tvc detacvment of Manchukuo from CVins (lochs. 303, 2191, 2195, 2196). TTe was a founder of Kye-wa-Kai, a society to create t1 e Manchukuo state to help Japan in her figvt against Anglo-Saxon and Comintern aggression (Ex1'. 731A). At t?e time of tue Frrco Polo Incident he was a Lt. General on the General Staff, and became War Minister under Konoye on 3 Junu 1938, remaining in that office until the fall of the Firenume Cabinet on 30 August 1939. I have dealt several times with the events of these periods, for which we submit he was responsible, and will not repeat. Personal activities of his at tVe time are shown in / Exhs. 856, 857, 271, 589, 612, 491, 504, and 76I, all of wvicv rre included in the Summary, and 2197, 2198, 2199, 2201 and 2214, which are not. Tvey prove what could properly be assumed without them, Vis active participation in the aggressive moves and preparations of Vis period of office. From 7 July 1941 to 7 April 1945 he was commander of the Korean Army, and as sucv responsible for the illegal sending of POW to Korea for exhibition purposes (Exhs. 1173-5), t Document No. 0003 p* g e for cnforccmcnt of illegal regulations with regard to them in that area (Lxh. 1976). and for illegal sentences upon 4 them (Zxh. 1998), From 7 April 1945 until the surrender he was in command 1 of the 7th Army in Malaya, While he held this command at the end of tve war serious outrages against POW occurred. It covered Mr lays, Java, Sumatra and Borneo (Lxh. 228°) „ * As an example, out of 827 POW rt Sandaken camp, Borneo, on 29 May 1945 only 5 survived, the rest having been murdered or died of illtreatment or starvations Some ot^er Exhibits covering POW offences in the area at this time are; 1513 A (R. 12,914), 1514 A, 1516 A, 1517 A (Itagaki's visit to carp), 1518 A, and Col, Wild's evidence (Record 5491). We submit that t>erc is ample evidence against him at all periodso ! i K J o e I S Z Z - FILE NO. 383 RE: ITAGAKI, Seishiro DATE: 14 May 1946 \ >a /y. \ REPORT BY: R. H. GILLILAND 1st Lts, Inf. STATUS : Pending On 18 April 194-6 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyoc Complete personnel records of the subject were micro-filmed. Photostatic comes, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 701. Following is a transcript of the translation: ITAGAKI, Seishiro DATE OF BIRTH: 23 January 1885 RESIDENCE : Iwate Prefecture SOCIAL STATUS: Saururai 1903 May 30 Graduated from the Central Military Preparatory School; Appointed as a cadet, assigned to the 4th Inf. Reg. 1904 Oct 24 Graduated from the Military Academy 1904 Oct 28 Appointed as a Probationary Officer 1904 Nov 1 Commissioned as Sub-Lieutenant, attached to the recruited battalion of the 4th Inf. Reg. 1904 Dec 8 Granted the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank 1906 Jan 29 Attached to the 4th Inf. Reg. 1906 Apr 1 Decorated with the 6th Class Order of the Rising Sun 1907 Dsc 21 with Single Ray; Awarded the Meiji 37-38 War Medal; Granted a sum of ¥4.00 as Imperial gift Commissioned as Lieutenant of Infantry COPIES: Original to Exhibit No. 701 3 File 383 / 5 A A 1908 Mar 20 1908 Oct 22 1913 May 20 1913 Aug 31 1913 Dec 13 1914- Feb 20 1914- May 16 1915 Dec 1 1917 Aug 6 1918 Jul 10 1919 Apr 12 1919 Jul 25 1920 Apr 1 1920 Jun 25 1921 Apr 20 1920 Nov 1 1922 Apr 1 pec Granted the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank Attached to the student's company of the Military Academy Granted the Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank Appointed as Captain, assigned as Company Commander of the 4-th Inf. Reg, (Cabinet Order) Admitted by order to the Army College; Graduated therefrom on November 25? 1916 Attached to the 4th Inf. Reg. Decorated with the 5th class order of Sacred Treasure Relieved of present post, assigned Company Commander of the 4-th Inf* Reg, Relieved of present post, attached to the Army General Staff Office Granted the Junior Grade of the 6th Court Rank Relieved of post, attached to the Army General Staff Office; Attached to the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central China (Army Order) Relieved of post; attached to the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central China; Appointed Staff Officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central China (Army Order) Commissioned as Major of Infantry (Cabinet Order) Decorated with the 4-th Class Order of Sacred Treasure Relieved of post as Staff Officer of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central Chinaj Appointed Battalion Commander of the 47th Inf. Reg. (Army Order) Awarded a cam of ¥550 as Imperial gift in recognition of services in 1915-1920 War Relieved of present post; Appointed member of the Army General Staff Office and concurrently instructor of Military Science of the Army College (Army Order) hoc 1923 Aug 6 Appointed Lt. Col„ of Inf. (Cabinet Order); Granted the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank 1923 Sep 3 Attached to the Kwanto District Martial Law Headquarters (Array Older) 1923 Sep 8 Appointed Secretary of the Provisional Earthquake Relief Office (Cabinet Order) 1923 Oct 2 Relieved of post, attached to the Kwanto District Martial Law Headquarters (Army Order) 1923 Oct 16 Relieved of post as secretary of Earthquake Relief Office (Cabinet Order) 192-4 Jun 9 Appointed Assistant to the Military Attache of the Japanese Legation in China (Cabinet Order); Relieved of present and additional posts (Army Order) 1926 Aug 6 Relieved of present post (Cabinet Order); Appointed member of the Army General Staff Office (Army Order. Concurrently appointed instructor of Military Science of the Army College (Army Order) 1927 Jun 30 Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of Sacred Treasure 1927 Sep 16 Relieved of additional posts (Army Order) 1928 Mar 8 Appointed Colonel, assigned as Commander of the 33rd Inf. Reg. (Army Order 1928 Apr 16 Granted the Junior Grade of the 5th Court Rank 1929 May 14 Appointed Staff Officer of Kwantung Army (Army Order) 1932 Aug 8 Appointed Major General (Cabinet Order); Attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters - Not Gazetted (Army Order) 1932 Sep 1 Granted the Senior Grade of the 5th Court Rank 1934 Feb 7 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of Sacred Treasure 1934 Aug 1 Attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters (Army Order - Not Gazetted) 1934 Dec 10 Concurrently appointed Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo (Cabinet Order) - 3 - r C / 5 ? 2 1934 Dec 10 Relieved of post, attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters; Appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (Army Order - Not Gazetted) 193A Apr 29 Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of Golden Kite with an annuity of a'/OOj Decorated with the Order of the Rising Sun with Double Rays in recognition of services of 1931--1934- War 1936 Mar 23 Relieved of additional post as Military Attache of the Imperial Embassy in Mancnukuo (Cabinet Order); Relieved of post as Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army; Appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (Army Order - Not Gazetted) 1936 Mar 28 Appointed Japanese member of the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee (Cabinet Order) 1936 Apr 28 Appointed Lt. Gen, (Cabinet Order) 1936 Jun 1 Granted the Junior Grade of the 4-th Court Rank 1937 Mar 1 Assigned as Commander of the 5th Division (Cabinet Order) 1937 Mar 6 Relieved of post as Japanese member of Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee (Cabinet Order) 1937 Mar 1 Relieved of post as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (Army Order - Not Gazetted) 1937 May 8 Decorated with the 1st Class Order of the Sacred Treasure 1937 May 25 Attached to Army General Staff Office (Army Order - Not Gazetted) 1938 Jun 3 Relieved of post, attached to the Army General Staff Office Army Order); Appointed War Minister and concurrently President of Manchurian Affairs Bureau (Cabinet Order) 1938 Jun 15 Granted the Junior Grade of the 3rd Court Rank 1937 Jul 7 Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for services in the 1931-1934 War 1939 Aug 30 Relieved cf present post and additional posts at his own request (Cabinet Order) - U - 1940 Apr 29 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of the Golden Kite in recognition of the services in China War 1941 Jul 7 Appointed General (Cabinet Order); Appointed Commander of the Korean Army (Cabinet Order) 194^ Aug 1 Granted the Senior Grade of the 3rd Court Rank 1945 Feb 1 Appointed Commander of the 17th Military District Army and concurrently Commander of the Korean Military Area Army (Cabinet Order - Not Gazetted) 1945 Apr 7 Appointed Commander of the 7th Military District Army (Cabinet Order - Not Gazetted) P E N D I N G - 5 -Do OCT trie No, 0003 Pase 57 Kols o Tve particulars with regard to vim arc on p. 329 of the Summary and the additional documents directly referring to him are Exhs. 2202A, 2210-14. Koiso was one of the original leaders of the Manchurian plot and the related internal plots (Exhs0 179F, pp. 18 and 20 of Exh. 2177A, 2178/0, Fe was a major-general, director of tv-e important Military Affairs Bureau (Exh. 2177A, not "war service bureau'1 as stated in the particulars) from 21 August 1930 to 29 February 1932, end as such responsible for the Military budget, without wvich no reinforcement could have been sent to Manchuria (Tanaka, Record p. 15? 859). He then became Vice VJar Minister until 8 August, then Chief of Staff, Kwantung Arrry until 5 March 1934. Fe was decorated in connection with the Mrnchurian affair. Before the incident occurred he attended with Minami a meeting with the directors of tvc South Manchuria railway to discuss problems in Manchuria and Mongolia (Exh. 2202A). Fe handled very substantial sums from Manchurian incident Secret Service Funds from time to time (Exhs, 2210-3). On 4 June 1932 he received a sccret cable from the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army about the taking over of customs in Manchuria to acquiie revenue (Exh. 227). On 3 November 1932 ht was corresponding with his sucecssor as Vice War Minister about an outline for guiding Manchukuo (Exv. 230). On 5 December 1935 to 15 July 1938 he commanded the Korean Army. From 7 April - 30 August 1939 vc was Overseas Minister in the Firanuma Cabinet, and again from 16 January to 22 July 1940 in tve. Yonai Cabinet. On 8 May 1939 he was discussing with Itagaki tve lilitery Alliance with Germany and Italy (Exh. 2214). Document No. 0002 On 24 June; 1940 be; end Muto were discussing with the Germr.n Ai. fcpssndor such matters as military aggression in Indo-CH.na, mutual support of Germany and Japan against America, and a. Japan-Russia, non-aggrcssion pact to free Japan econor ically from America (Exv. 523), and advocating these courses. From 29 lay 1942 to 22 July 194^ be was governor-general of Korea, and from then to 7 April 1945 he was Premier. During tbe latter period be made a speec}° which is Exb. 277. As Premier ve bears a. beavy responsibility vit>- regard to outrages against POW and others. By the time be took office tbe wvole matter bad become notorious. Eden's first broadcast bad taken place two years before and M s second six months before. As Premier "He obtained tbe right to attend Imperial / General Feadqurrters (Exh. 1282). xv,£ fojlowing arc a few of' tve Exhibits having particular reference to offences against POW during his term of office: 2012-4, 2016A, 2022, 2025A, 2110-2, fi. p. 15, 221, 2092, fu pp. 15; 154, 15148-50. If he didn't know of all these things we say it was Vis duty to enquire into them and prevent them. We submit that we br.ve made out an ar pie case against him on all Counts,~ o o • a o • ,CG<6 P a g e 5 9 Page GEBESiiL MI1TAKI, 'Jjro The particulars with regard to General MI1IAMI are to "be found on Page 331 of the Sunmary, and the additional Exhibits which directly affect hie are: Exhibits 186, 2202-a, 22C3-A, 2204-A, 2205-A, 2206-A, 2207, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 2251. While General MI3SAMI tog Minister of War (14 April 1931 to 13 December 1931) there are several occasions Which indicate his participation in the aggression against China, not only in the "Incident" of 18 September 1931, but in the further aggression in taking over north China in 1935-1336. Previous to the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931, is noted the conference of 30 June 1931 for the discussion of the Manchurian-Mongolian problems (Exhibit 2202-A). Shortly following this, on the 4th of August 1931, occurred his speech to the .army Commanders and the Commanding Generals of Divisions, which indicated his attitude toward Manchuria (Exhibit 186) (Page 1, Exhibit 2207) . Then followed the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931. His attitude concerning that Incident is shown by Exhibit 2204-A. Ee approved General Hondo's aggressive action in Manchuria (Exhibit 2207, page 2 ) . His attitude tovrard the extension of the Incident into occupation of all Manchuria is shown by the Privy Council Meeting of 9 December 1931 (Exhibit 2205-A). Marquis KIDO's Diary shows that on 28 January 1932 General MII.AKI delivered a lecture before the Emperor on the situation in Manchuria., which shows his aggressive plans toward Manchuria (Exhibit 2251, Hecord pages 16213 - 16214). While Commander in Chief of the Zwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Maachukuo - 10 December 1934 to 6 March 1936, that he conspired to further aggress against China, which resulted in the acquiring of the four provinces of ITorth China., is indicated by the excerpts from the records of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Exh. 220S-A), Doc. Ho. 0003 Page 6 0 arudhe admitted that Lis troops went 'beyond the "Great Wall'" (Page 3, Exhibit 220?). He further admitted that "his advice" to the Government of Manchukuo was, in substance direction" (Pag© 3, Exhibit 2207). He was a mer.ber gri President of the Greater Japan Political Association, one of the principal aims of which was the extension of the 0rcs.tcr.3Ast. Asia Cc^Prospcrity Sphere, which included India, iuroa, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, and he believed in Asia for the Asiatics (Page 2, Exhibit 2207) . While Governor-General cf Korea, he approved the sending of POW to Korea for illegal purposes, as is shown by the correspondence between General ITAGAEI and the War Ministry (Exhibit 1373, 1974 and 1975). It is believed that General MINAMI was one of those at the bottom of the conspiracy toagfioes against China, and that he was a n important figure in future plans for aggression.Doc. Ho. 0003 Page 63 MUTO The particulars with respect to MUTO, Afcira, are to be found, in the Stcasary, Appendix B, page 332. Additional documents in relation to him are Exhibits 2235-2247. It is readily apparent that the answers of MUTO in his interro- gation (Exh. II©. 2239) and other documentary and oral evidence support each count of the Indictment in its allegations against MUTO. The evidence, likewise, substantiates the accuracy of the statement of MUTO'e individual responsibility as set out in the Indictment. Append?..-: E, page iv. The accused MUTO is shewn by the evidence to have participated in Japan's over-all aggression in at least two capacities or lines of activity: (l) As an Army officor in the field, (2) As an Army officer in the Iter Ministry at Tokyo. The evidence is sufficient to show that the accused has a re- sponsibility for the Manchuria, and still more the China Affairs. He is shown to have been one of the so-called, younger Army officers, a Major on the Army General Staff (Hec. 2006) at the time of the incident of 18 September 1931. He vras a Colonel and Staff Officer of the Ewantung Array in 1936-1937 (Hec. 16,118). He vras Adjutant of the General Staff, Morth China Army, in 1938-1939 (Hec. 16,118). His services against China tie indicated by the evidence (Exh. No. 1272) that he was decorated in 1934 for his services in 1931-1934 "War" and in 1940 for his services in the China "Affair." The Military Affairs Bureau is shown to have been headed by the accused as Director or Chief from October 1939 to April 1942 (Hec. 16,118) throughout the period of preparation and initiation of the aggressive attacks by Japanese armed forces against the United States, Great Britain, Hetherjsacs East Indies and French Indo-China. The accused first served in this Bureau, as a Section Chief in 1935-36 (Hec. 16,118). On 12 October 1039 MUTO was appointed (Summary, pages 10&-23S; Exhibits 102 and 118) Chief of the Bureau, Secretary of the iC3. 3c. 0003 Page 62 National General Mobilization Council and a member of other 'bodies, including Planning Board, Manchurian Affairs Board and Cabinet In- formation Board. The accused in these official positions is shown to have exercised directing or possibly controlling influence over domestic and international policies and politics, over propaganda arsf press control (Rec. 15,870-1), and over military and naval action. 3?or instance, in June 1540 he was with KOISO in a discussion with the German Ambassador of various aggressive schemes (Exhibit 523). The accused participated regularly in liaison conferences and conferences before the Throne in 1941. On 13 January 1941, he attended a liaison conference with I0J0 and OKA (Rec. 10,057). MUTO attended a liaison conference, *iih TOJO and others, on 30 January 1941 (Esc. 11,057), on 3, 13 and 20 February (Rec. 11,057), on 2, 6-7 and 11 March, on 10 April, on 3, 8, 12, 15, 22 pud 29 May, and on 6, 16£17, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 28 June. (Rec. pages on a. 332, App. B, Summary). At the conference on 25 June it was decided to make aggressive advances to the south, first by diplomacy if possible, then if necessary by arms (Rec. 11,753). MUTO attended the Privy Council Meeting on 28 July 1941 (Rec. 7,069), and Imperial Conferences on 6 September (Rec. 8,814), 5 November (Rec. 10,333), and 1 December (Rec. 10,519). MUTO attended also the Inquiry Committee meeting of the Privy Council at 7':<30 a.m. on 8 December, at which the "belated declaration of war against the United States and England was discussed. The last evidence of TALT.iA about him is so fresh in the mind of the Tribunal that I will not quote it. MUTO was recoLiaended to Ribbentrop f©r the decoration of the Great Cross by Germany because of his contribution to German-Japanese cooperation (Rec. 11,352, Exh. 1272). I quote from the Military Attache's words: "Without regard to the vacillations of Japanese policy, he always advocated the coiv- clusion of a German-Japanese alliance in a most important position," ana from the Ambaesador1s comments: "Muto, as head of the political Doc. Ko. 0003 Page 63 section of the War Ministry has often "been mentioned in reports. In vievr of the political influence wielded by the Japanese army, his attitude v/as end is of great importance. " According to TAIJAZA?s evidence which is corroborated by the witness SUZUKI and the numerous documents passing between the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry about POV it is clear that his bureau had a great responsibility with regard to them, although in his case for a rather short time- As one of those entitled to attend Imperial General Headquarters he must, we submit, have been aware.of the entries in the War Diary about the outrages at Singapore in February end March 1942 (Exhibit 476), before he proceeded on 20 April to command the 2nd Imperial Guards Division in Sumatra which vac in the came army area, of which the CinC wars General Yamashita. he was there until October 1944 during which period there is much evidence of atrocities in the command, and then joined the same General in the Philippines as Chief of Staff until the surrender. It is during this period that some of the worst atrocities were committed there. The evidence now in the record is such that the mation to dicmics the Indictment with respect to the accused MUTO should, it is submitted, be overruled.Doc. No. 0003 _ _ Pq-ge 64 The particulars with regrrd to him era on p. 328 of the Summery. He was decorated for his services in both the Manchuria and China "inciaents", but apart from the fact (E:ch. 2282) that the 32nd Division which he commanded ras serving in China, and that he was Chief of Stafif of the Hwan'tung Army, October 1939 - October 1940, and member of a number of Japanese Lanchurian joint committees, we have no knovled o of what he did. On 10 April 1941 he became Vice far Minister. You have heard evidence to the effect that there were limitations upon the importance of this office. Nevertheless it placed hi: in a posi- tion not only to know but to take an active part in, and to as- sume responsibility foi he events of his period of. office. It may be judged best from hxh 1272, which shows the reasons why he was recommended for the German decoration of the Great Cross in hay 1942. The German Military Attache says, ''He was in Germany 1922-4. In his position of Chief of Staff of the hwantung Army October 1939 to October 1940 (which is omitted from his per- sonnel record, but is mentioned in Exh. 102 though without a date) he has especially worked on behalf of Germany. Vice Minister of ar since 10 April 1941, he is one o_ the principal advocates of German- Japanese milltar/ cooperation." The Ambassador adds his own comment; "Kimura has closely co-operated with minister of • ar and Prime Minister Tojo already on the Kwantung Army. His personal relationship to Tojo as well as his (i. e. Tojo's), primary preoccupation in his position of Prime Minister have • enhanced his (i.e. Kimura's) influence in the leadership of the War Ministry, as well as his position in regard to the other Vice- Ministers to a marked degree." We submit that these remarks are obvious common sense, and that heving regard to the predominant position of the army at this period even the Vice-Minister has a greater share of responsibility than the Minister of some ether Departments. At all events that he has enough. During his Doc. No. 00C3 Page 65" period of office he was also a Councillor of numerous other of- ficial bodies, including the Planning Board and the total car Research Institute. The activities of the latter at this time are shown in Lxhibits 87(>' and 871 fro:.: August to October 1941, which shows clearly that the lrciv of clarity in Japan1 s communica- tions to the U.S. was intentional, because the object of them was not peace but delay while war preparations were completed. Zxhs 686A, 688A and 1336 also come from them, and the -Iwo latter sketch Lhe "Co-Prosperity Sphere", and plans to annex the Soviet Karitime Provinces. When we come to the questions of PC' offences we have much more direct evidence of Himura's activities. It was he who communicated to the Foreign : inister of January 23, 1942, the undertaking which /as transmitted to the allied governments to observe the Geneva Convention mutatis mutandis and to give due consideration in regard to food and clothing to the racial habits and customs of interned prisoners (Exl. 1958). .'let he retained his office until .larch 194-3 while this undertaking was daily and flagrantly disregarded, lie had access to all the information and attended Imperial General Headquarters and trie meetings of Bureau Chiefs where those ma ters were discussed and decided. He must share responsibility for the decision of April or Hay 1942 to make POWs work regardless of rank and to send them for exhibition to places in Japan, Korea (R. 14288), for fojo's speeches about "no work no food." (',x\s.. i960 end 1962), for the ^ailure to answer and the untruthful answers sent to allied protests which he had to approve (R. 14287). As a member of I.Q.H. he must, we submit, 1 have access to the war Diary r.nd seen the account of outrages past and intended in Malaya ouoted in Sxli. 47C-. Above all he must h-ve been a pa:, ty to the il legal decision to use POYv labour on the rushed construction of the Burma-Sian railway, with its inevitable tragic consequences. He also shai"- s the responsibility for Exhibits 1964-1976. He personally issued the ore for the death penalty on captured air- men, Sxh.1992. He was r"sponsible for the POW punishment law, Doc. No. 00^3 6 6 Exh. 1998. He porsonr.lly ordered the illegal employment of 1500 PC "' on munition work in Manchuria in August 1942 (Exh. 1970). From 30 Au ust 1944 to the surrender he ;as com ander of the army in Burma. The outrages which took plr.ee there during that period arc described in Exhs. 1573A, 1574a, 1552a, 1553A, 1 555a, 1558A. For these wo submit he is directly responsible, and that the motion by him should be dismissed.Doc. i:0. 0003 ^ h / u M E I Page 67 OF A A. Particulars are on p. 334 of the Summary, Additional documents are 3xhitits 2177A-2184, 2331. The main c^se agair.st him is that he was one of the originators of the pernicious ideas which gave "birth to the conspiracy and took a lead "by speech and writing in popularising theiru__ Sxhs. 217SA and 2180A show that as early as 1025 and 19.36 he was reaching a war between Bast and est, denouncing the League of Nations an! the Anglo-Saxon races, and call in . upon Japan to arouse Asia against them. Later in 3xh. 2181A, published in 1939, he explains that the foundation of Manchukuo was merely the "beginning of the Greater Sgst Asia plan, and roused a great nationalistic spirit in Japan, and welcomes the victories following the Marco Polo Incident. In spite of the assistance of England» France and the U.S.S.R, to China, Japan must use irresistible force over a long -period to establish the Jew Order. In Exh. 21S2A, published in 1943, he lauds the ideas of a former writer who foresaw Japan "riling over the foundation of the world", advocating that s'ie should absorb China, first, then Siam and India, the whole area of the South 3e'as, the Philip-Dines, opposing Britain, and obtaining the control of the Islands in the Indian Ocean and French Indo-China. He refers to a, number of former writers who had -reached similar ideas, he then describes at length and with enthusiasm the development of the Kanchurian and Chinese aggressions, and traces it as the precursor of the Pacific VJar, maintaining that the most important thing for Japan is to complete the subjugation of China. In Hxh. 2183A he apDroves of the same writer's view that the maritime provinces of Siberia must be occupied against Russia and the South Sea Islands against England. Doc. So. 0003 - n oho evid^nca which he gave at his trial in September 1934 for his part in the various plots of 1931-3 he boldly justifies his actions and gives a description of the -Darts played "by hixvijf, the accusrd Hashimoto, Itagaki, Dchihara, Koiso and others in those plots and in the Manchurian affair with which he says they were linked, and cf the propaganda he had carried on at putlic meetings as well as by writing in their support. He also explains in detail the ideas, similar te those above-mentioned, which they were advocating (Uxhs. 2177A, 2178A). He also put in a document ( Sxh. 2178B) describing his work as Director of the 3ast Asia Research Institute of the South Manchuria Railway, a post he appears to have occupied throughout the period of the Indictment except when in prison as a result of this triad, carrying on an elaborate propaganda tc stir up the Japanese people to take action in Manchuria, in cooperation with the chiefs of the Kwantung Army. He was thus both a thinker, a propagandist and an active plotter. —V We submit that he was one of those responsible for this conspiracy and all its results.. F*ge 69 Document No. 0003 Q£HIHA The particulars with regard tc Oshima, Hiroshi are to "be found on i "page 335 of the Chronological Summary, and the additional exhibits viiich directly affect him are: Exhibit No. 2106 (Record Dage 15,186); Exhibit « Ho. 2230 (Record Page 15,99C) ; Exhibit Ho. 2232 (Record page 16,003). From 1st August 1931-5 March 1934 he was a member of the Army and xlavy General Staffs anfi was decorated for his services in the "incident". The requirement that Japan secure the political strength and bar- gaining power which a military alliance with Germany would afford, and the reasons therefore, have T5een fully discussed. The first step in the accomplishment of this A®sired end was taken in the Spring of 1935 by the accused Oshima who was then Japanese military attache to Germany. The original negotiations were not initiated through diplomatic channels but were conducted by the Military Attache. It was not until the Spring of 1936 that the negotiations were conducted through regular diplomatic channels. The accused Oshima assisted in these negotiations. (Exhibit So, 477, Record page 5913) This resulted in the conclusion of the 1 Japanese--German Anti-Comintern Fact on 25 September 1936, the purpose and importance of which have been explained. He was again deccrated for this. Close collaboration was maintained between the Japanese and Germans under the provisions of the protocol of the Anti-Comintern which took the form of espionage and subversive activities against the Soviet Union. It was shown in a report of Keichsfuehrer, H. Himmler, on 31 January 1939, that the accused Oshima had succeeded in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Generalissimo Stalin, and that Oshima had purchased a tract of real estate in Falkensee in the name of a middle man, where • • " " * Russians were employed in writing propaganda pamphlets which were conveyed from Poland into Russia by means of small balloons. (Exhibit' No. 489, Record page .6026), Document Ho. 0003 P-ge 70 Germany at first opposed, military aggression "by Japan in China under the guise of fighting communism in third, states, tut upon Japan i iving evidence in January 1938 of a determination to wage a major war against China, Germany re-oriented hor policy end Japan thus gained the support of Germany in her plans against China as well as against Russia. At this time, 4 February 1938, Chancellor Hitler assumed supreme command of the armed forces in Germany. In line with the expressed fie?-, re to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, Iiibbentrori and Oshima, still Militaiy Attache to Germany, discussed the advisability of closer colla- boration between Germany and Jat)an which resulted in a proposal for a mutual aid treaty aimed at the entire world. (Exhibit Ho. 497, Record page 6051)n Oshima, elevated to the rank of Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany on 8 October 1938, conducted the negotiations for a Japanese- German military alliance. Italy temporarily refused to unite in such an alliance. Oshima, after obtaining the approval of the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government, went to Italy in December 1938 for the purpose of inducing Mussolini to unite in such an alliance. (Exhibit Ho. 487, Hecord page 6061). As a result of the division within the Japanese Cabinet as to the extent to which Japan should commit herself in the proposed alliance, Oshima was advised in December 1938 that the Ito Commission would be sent to Europe to make known the Government's exact position. (Exhibit No. 487, Hecord page 6062). Oshima and Shiratori conferred on matters pertaining to the proposed alliance and contrary to the views of the Japanese Cabinet they advocated an all-cut m i l i t a r y alliance aimed at the world. They endeavored to impose their convictions upon the Japanese Government and exercised the utmost pressure in their endeavor to influence and direct Japanese policy in this regard. The Ito Commission on its arrival in Berlin instructed Oshima that he must work within the views ef the Government (Exhibit Ho. 487, Hecord pages 6072-6079), but Oshima, desirirg a military treaty without reservations cn the part of Japan, refused to follow the advice cf the Ito Commission and refused to communicate through official channels a P i g e 71 • Document No. 1003 Japanese compromise proposal. Acting vith Shiratori, then Ambassador to Rome, Cshima threatened to bring about a fall of the Japanese Cabinet by resigning from his post unless the Government reconsidered its stand. (Exhibit Ho, 499, Record page 6095), In .April 1939 the Japanese Government reconsidered its stand and presented a new draft of the proposed treaty in connection with which it requested an agreement that in the publication of the Fact an ex- planation be made which would t3nd to soften the attitude that would likely result on the part of England, France and America. The reason assigned by the Tokyo Cabinet for the necessity for such a limited interpretation of the Pact was that both for political and economic reasons Japan "was at the moment not yet in a pcsit ion to come forward openly as the oppcser of the' three democracies," Cshima, for the second time transcending the rols of a ministerial officer, refused to officially communicate the Japanese Government- ? proposal to the nation to which he wau accredited. (Exhibit Ho. 503, Record page 6100). Ey this action he endeavored to impress upon the Japanese nation the policy which he and the accused advocated and which was necessary to assure Ja'oan the political and military support for their aggressive action in East Asia. Hibbentrop informed Ambassador Csnima that a German-Italian pact would be signed during the month of May, and that it was desirable that the Japanese Government reach its final decision quickly, so that it would be possible to formulate secretly the Tri-Partite Pact simultaneously with the signing of the German-Italian Pact (Exhibit Ho. 486, Record page 6115). Such a pact was concluded on 22 May 1939 (Record page 6120). In the last days before its conclusion the Japanese Cabinet made strenuous efforts to come to a final decision. In a strictly confidential and unofficial conversation, Ambassador Oshima adv1 -jd von Ribbentrop that he had received a telegram from Foreign Minister Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of a European conflict. For the third time, Cehiima endeavored to influence the policy of his government in linr with his view and that of his asso- ciates by refus ing to pass this matter on to the German Government. Page 72 Document No. 100.3 He advised Arita of this "by telegraph, thereupon War Minister Itagaki intervened and requested Oshima to hold up further action with regard to Foreign Minister Arita in order not to disturb the dis- cussions anions the various factions in Tokyo, promising that the army was "firmly rebolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow-." (Exhibit Nr. 2230» lie cord page 15,990). As early as April 1939 Ribbentrop advised Ambassador Oshima that if negotiations for the Tri-Partite Alliance were delayed too long it might become necessary for Germany to consider a non-aggression pact with Russia. (Exhibit Ho. 487, Record pesge 6080). Such a pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 (Record page 6123), Ambassador Oshima was directed ic file a protest to Germany's action in concluding the pact, but in order to preserve his own policy and that of most of the accused with regard to Japanese- German relations and collaboration for which he had so energetically worked, he disobeyed his governments instructions for the fourth time by postponing delivery of the Japanese memorandum of protest until 18 September 1939, when the matter was handled in a surreptitious and unofficial manner. (Exhibit No, 506, Record page Ci24)„ The expediency of quickly concluding a German-Russian non- aggression pact on 23 August 1939 became apparent upon the dramatic German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Notwithstanding the temporary set-back to the conclusion of a Japanese-German-Italian "iliance, Cthima continued in his efforts to develop closer German- Japanese relations. In September 1S39, he agreed with Ribbcntrcp that Japan's fate was linked with Germany's fate and that if Germany could sricceed to mediate for a settlement between Japan and Russia, the result would be that Japan would be free to extend her power in East Asia toward the South in which direction her vital interests lie. Ribbentrop considered it would be of great importance for the policy of collaboration that General Osh.-ona remain a3 Ambassador to Germany, in which capacity he had en.joyed the complete confidonco of Hitler and the German Army. (Exhibit No. 507, Record page 6127). Wnen General Oshima resigned as Ambassador, Ribbentrop advised the German Ambassador to Japan that General 0shl.ua on his return would Page 73 i, 1003 work further for German-Japanese friendship and requested that Oshima "be allowed to transmit in code telegrams to the Reich Foreign Minister per- sonally and to forward letters addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister unopened. (Exhibit No. 508, Record page 6131). Ochima, timing his action with the initiation of war "by Hitler against Foland, advised the Japanese Government to proceed with military aggression in the Southern areas of Greater Fast Asia and against Hong- kong, for which the Japanese Navy, in his opinion, was prepared. (Exhibit So. 509, Record page 6136). After Oshima's return to Jauan, the German Ambassador reported on 23 February 1940 that Oshima and others remained "in an -unchanged friendly attitude and ready for every support." (Exhibit No. 511, Record page 6141). The downfall of the Yonai Cabinet and its replacement by a stronger pro-alliance and pro-German Cabinet has been discussed elsewhere. The new Cabinet concluded the Tri~?artite Pact of 27 September 1940, the final milestone in the 'carrying out of that part of the conspiracy directed toward German and Italian assistance in the accomplishment of Japan's so-called divine mission. Upon the conclusion of the Fact, Foreign Minister Matauoka offered Oshima the appointment of Ambassador to Germany. General Oshima at first declined reappointment to this posi- tion on the ground that it would interfere with the continuance of his politically active work in Japan for the Tri-Partite Pact. However, upon the exertion of pressure by the Foreign Minister and upon insistence by the Army, supported also by important Navy circles, General Oshima accepted reappointment. (Exhibit No. 560, Record page 6422). Foreign Minister Matsuoka, at a farewell party for Oshima on 15 January 1941, stated that "the efforts exerted by our country for establishing the New Order in East Asia which began with the Manchurian Incident, and the efforts exerted by Germany and Italy to break down the Versailles system both hare a fundamental common cause which, in turn, will contribute to the establishment of the New Order of the World." With German-Japanese relations destined to become closer, he said that Oshima1s ability would be relied upon in an extensive way. (Exhibit No. 473-C, Record page 6423)- Docu,^nt ho, 1003 P°-ge 74- Oshima, in a conference with the State Secretary of German Foreign Ministry on 22 February 1941, stated with regard to British possessions in East Asia that Singapore must "be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land, although he considered it necessary to take Hengkong first. (Exhibit No. 570, hecord page 6457). On the fol- lowing day, in a conference with liibbentrop, Oshima asserted that pre- parations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May; that prudence required preparations for war against both England and Ame rica; that the moment for the occupation of Singapore must be co- ordinated with operations in Europe arid that the occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need. (Exhibit No. 571, Record page 6459). Oshima promised Bibbentrop that he would procure maps of Singapore in order that Hitler, considered as the greatest expart on military questions at that time, could advise -Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. (Exhibit No. 580, Record pa^e 6529). Oshima was a member of the General Commission established under the provisions of the Tri-Fartite Pact, (Exhibit iMo. 121, Record page 768). On 22 June 1941 Germany invaded Russia. Hitler had informed Oshima of his intention as early as 6 June (Exhibit No. 1084). Shortly thereafter, Oshima agreed with Ribbentrop that he would influence the Japanese Government in the direction of speedy military action against the Soviet Union. (Exhibit No. 58/ , Record page 6562). Between the first and third of December, 1941, Ambassador Oshima began the definite negotiations for a "no separate peace pact" between Japan, Germany and Italy, which was concluded nn 11 December 1941. The ou.estion had been raised by the General Staff as early as 18 Novemb r, and aft assuiance given by Ribbentrop on 21 November (Exhibit No. 601). On 14 December 1941, Chancellor Hitler gave a recent ion in honor of Ambassador Oshima at which Oshima was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in Gold. At this reception Hitler acknowledged Oshima's services in the achievement of German- Document Ho. 10C3 Japanese cooperation which had culminated in a close "brotherhood in arms. In the discussic-n that followed, Ambassador Oshima explained the progress of the war in the Pacific and stated that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India and that it was important for Germany to synchronize its attack against India from the west as Japan attacked from the East. (Exhibit Ho. 609, Record page 6670), In March 1943s Oshima attended a conference with Ribbentrop in which Ribbentrop suggested that Japan institute similar warfare as Germany had been doing and in which Ribbentrop discussed with Oshima the German IKBoat Order of September 1942 in regard to failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed merchant vessels. Oshima conveyed to the Japanese submarine authorities information regarding the German oper- ating policy, namely, complete destruction of personnel as well as the ship. (Exhibit Ho. 21C6, Record pages 15,137-15,189). While Oshima is particularly concerned with the conspiracy alleged in Count 5 of the Indictment, we submit that the evidence shows that he was linked with the more general conspiracy from the beginning, or at least from an early date, and responsibility for all the acts alleged in the Counts in which he is charged.Doc* So. 0003 P a S 8 7 6 SHIGEMITSU, The particulars with, regard to S {IG-A-iITSU, Mamoru are to "be found on Page 3?7 of the Chronological Summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are: Exhibits iio. 123, 2279, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2031, 2022, 2023, 2024 r 2025-A,. '2026, 983, 1017 (Record Page 9683), 1018 (R.P. 9688), 1023, (S.P % 9712), 2016-A, 1275 (R.P. 11,364), 773-A (R.P. 8061), 973 (R.P. 7876, 829-A (R.P. 8007), 662 (R.P. 7159), 664 (R.P. 7183), 1274 4 This able diplomat, after service in the Foreign Ministry and China., was appointed in 1935 as Councillor of the Board of Manchurian Affairs, having previously "been decorated for his services in China, 1931-1934; in 1936 was appointed Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; in September, 1938 was appointed Anbas^aior to Great Britain; in 1941 (February) he became Embassador to the Republic of China, and finally, 20 April 1943, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which position he held until 7 April 1945 (Inhibit 123). • 'hile still Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (2 January 1938) he was rewarded for services in concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact (Exhibit 983). In May 1940, while Ambassador to Great Britain, he cabled ARITA (Foreign Minister) to aooly National Policy to the South Seas Areas (This after the German Conquest of Belgium and Holland) (Exhibit 1017). On 5 August 1940 he cabled '.ATSUOKA (Foreign Minister) to dispose of France and the Netherlands in Bast Asia first to profit Japan most (Exhibit 1023). In September* 1941 he talked with KIDO about U» 5. negotia- tions (Exhibit 2279). •hile Foreign Minister he consistently denied requests of protecting Powers to visit POV: Camps, which was in violation of treaties and assurances (Exhibits Nos. 2016-A, 2017, 2018, 2019). Doc. No. 00^3 Page 77 He refu 3ed t« permit the protecting Power to ask certain questions of POW in the few visits permitted to PCM Camps (Exhibits iios. 2020, 2021).j He was at Privy Council Meeting which supported the annexation by Thailand of Shan States from Burma (violation of treaties) (Exhibit la. 1275' pnd heard without protest TOJO's cynical remarks about International Lav;, a matter peculiarly within his province. In September, 19-13, he made a sorech glorifying the Tri- partite Pact (Exhibit So. 771-4); and in December, 1943, he made another speech accusing the U.S.A. an^ England of being forces of aggression (Exhibit Ho. 973). He v;a" n^tifie^ by the Swiss (protecting Povrer) of the ill-treatment of PC"./ uonMnuousJv - 1943-13^5 ( E * M M t Fo. 2022). Ee was notified particularly of mistreatment of PO'i in Thailand, an^ denied f-aao, <?1 "though reprrt of Dad corditions had been made to the ^stpauese Government (Exhibits i?os. 473, 2023, 1989). He received pr^terts through ^he Srisa re mistreatment of U. S. interned civlliaas, but ma^e fa 1 ne -"epoits concerning their treatment (Exhibit Fo. 2024j . He recited protects through the Swiss re the use of U . S. PO-:/ for labor in counj ' W i operations of war, but made false answers thereic (l94C-194o) (Exh.'bit So- 2025-A). He protests through the Swiss and International Red Gross re l»ci: of r.-tod •for POv.', aud infused to make a change (Exhibit 2026). On 11 • fanuar^/ 1945 he made a speech in the -iet saying, " . . . . s-cred nio.-sion to keep fighuing for common war aims of international Justice in war of self-existence and self-defense" (Exhibit -:o. 829-A). Doc. No. 0003 Page 73 On 3 March 1945 he received a telegram from Saigon re camp in French Indo-China (Exhibit ifo. 66,3) and made no objection to Japan taking over control there 10 March 1945, although in vio- lation of treaties and assurances (Exhibits ilos. 662, 664), While the aggressions against China were going on in Manchuria, he was councillor of the Embassy and Consul-General in China - 1930-1934; then after the aggression in Manchuria was a "fait accompli" he becajne Councillor to the Poard of Manchurian Affairs (1935-1936), and thereafter was decorated for services in y China "Affair". (Page 337 narrative Summary). During the crucial period - 1936-1938, when it 'fas essential to keep the U.S.S.R. quiet while further territory of China was seized, he was there as Ambassador. Then 1938-1941 he v/as Ambassador to Great Britain wiring back to Jap-^n to further aggress in Southeast Asia against the weak poxvers. He was part and parcel of the conspiracy to 1 age a war of aggression from 1931 on. He became a. member of the Government as Foreign Minister 30 April 1943 and continued as such until 7 Aoril 1945. To protests re mistreatment of ?0.. r and violation of treaties and assurances he turned a deaf ear. He delayed responses to, he denied, he treated with contempt, and he lied about the protests from the U . S. and Eritain, submitted through Switzerland, the protecting Power. lie cannot now be permitted to hide behind such a defense as that sub- mitted in his motion that the Army "misinformed him". He was responsible for permitting to ccntinue the violations of treaties and assurances and the customs and laws of war. As Foreign Minister it was his duty to see that Japfn abided by her treaties and assurances. He failed in his duty, either through wilful ignorance or design - the evidence points to the latter.Document No. 0003 6 SHIMADA The particulars with regard to him are on pf 33^ of the S u m m a r y T h e only additional document sneciallj^ relating to him is Exhibit 224-8. The Defendant SHIMADA joined the Navy in the year 1901 when 18 years of age, and remained in that service as an active officer until January 1945<- It is probably unnecessary to refer to his career prior to the year 1929 excepting to point out that his promotion UP to that time had been fairly rapid and that for a period during the First World War he served as a Naval Attache in Italy. In 1929 he was promoted to the ^ank of Rear Admiral and from that year onwards he held increasingly important appointments and received numerous honors and awards. He was at various times associated with the Naval General Staff and was Vice Chief in 1 9 3 A m o n g the appointments held by him were those of membership of the Investigation Council of National Resources and of the Naval Preparedness Board of Supreme Headquarters„ He received awards in 1934- for his services in connection with the 1931-4 war, in 1938 for his services in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact, and in 194-0 for his services in the China War, It is suggested that the award to a Naval Officer for his services in connection with the Anti- Comintern Pact has special significance. He was promoted to the rank of Admiral in November 1940c The Defendant held no political office until he became Naval Minister and Vice-President of the China Affairs Board in the Tojo Cabinet formed in October 1941. He continued to hold the appointment of Naval Minister until July 1944 and from February to August 1944 he was Chief of the Naval General Staff, In August 1944 he -was appointed to the Supreme War Council,, It will be recalled that the Imperial Conference of 6th September 1941 had decided on war if by early October the ' Ppge 80 Document No. 0003 ' ' negotiations with the United States were not successfully concluded (Transcript P. 10,252), and early in October the Supreme Command Group stated that they would not wait beyond the l^th October (Ibid), When the time came the then Naval Minister OIKAWA while refusing a definite opinion was prepared to leave the decision to XONOYE who wished the negotiations to continue, an^ would not support TOJO v;ho contended that there was no hope of a diplomatic success and that war was inevitable, (Transcript pp. 10,246 and 10,2?2). The KONOYE Cabinet accordihgly resigned on the 16th October (Transcript, P. 10,2?5) and on the 18th October TOJO formed a new cabinet in which SHIMADA became Navy Minister in the place of OIKAWA. When KIDO had procured the appointment of TOJO he also delivered to him and OIKAWA messages in the name of the Emperor ordering that agreement should be reached between the Army and Navy (Exhibit 2 2 50). As the new premier was the Army Minister the only possible conclusion was that a new Navy Minister must be chosen who would agree with TOJO. SHIMADA was chosen. It is submitted that the evidence shows that in addition to SHIMADA carrying out his duties as Navy Minister and a member of the cabinet, be attended the numerous Liaison Con- ferences which were held after TOJO became Premier, and also the Imperial Conferences held on 5th November and 1st December. As regards the Liaison Conferences Exhibit 1103 shows that in respect of the period to the end of June 1041 the Navy Minister was present at every conference excepting one and on this occa- sion the Vice-Minister attended. It must be inferred that the Navy Minister continued to attend the conferences held from October onwards. Exhibit II63, Transcript p. 10,316, strongly supports this. This document, is a telegram sent by TOGO to NOMURA on 2nd November and states that "since the formation of the new cabinet, the government has been holding conferences for a number of days with the Imperial Headquarters". The irresist- Page 81 Document No, 0003 ible conclusion is that as an important. member of the govern- ment the Navy Minister was present. As regards the Imperial Conferences, the attendance of the Defendant is established by Exhibit 1107« • It will be recalled that these Conferences were concerned with the negotiations with the U,SC and the policy to be adopted towards the U. S., Great Britain and the Netherlands, They show throughout that it was intended to go to war with these countries, the final decision being made at the Imperial Conference on 1st December when it was decided to open hostilities (Transcript p, 10,519) •> Plans and preparations for war against these countries had been formulated and executed for several years. In particular, plans had been adopted in June 1937 which had as their object the achieving by the year 1941 not only the maximum production of equipment and supplies necessary for waging the wars but also the maximum potential for future maximum produc- tion* To carry out these plans, steps were taken to bring about national self-sufficiency at a cost which normal legitimate enterprise would not justify. In order that Japan could wage war it became in substance a totalitarian state and abandoned, normal economic standards substituting an economy which was based solely on her schemes for expansion and domination. The evidence of Mr. Liebert and the documents produced by him. show in detail the nature of these production, economic and financial plans, the extent to T,.'hich they were realized an^ the controls that were exercised an'" the other methods employed to give effect to them. But there was not only economic Planning and preparation for warc In addition there were military and naval preparations which were directed towards the same end, namely the wars intended to be waged against any country which opposed Japan's schemes for domination and expansion. Document No, 0003 ^ For example the evidence establishes that in violation of treaty obligations, Jinan's mandated islands 'fere secretly fortified over a period of several years pr^or to December 1941, and it is submitted that these fortifications were an essential part of the plans and•preparations for aggressive war. It is also submitted that the Tribunal shoiild draw the inference'that the Defendant was well aware of the fortifica- tions and of their object. It is submitted that the Defendant joined the Tojo Cabi- net because he was, and was known to be, an active supporter of the Tojo policy and that bis participation in the con- spiracy prior to October' 1941 must be inferred from his join- ing the cabinet at that juncture. It is also submitted that the award made to him in 193R for his services in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact is further proof'of his partici- pation in the Conspiracy at that time. However, whatever part SHIMDA took in these matters before he joined the T0J0 Cabinet m d even if it be assumed that he took none, by his joining that Cabinet and by his sub- sequent actions he adopted all that had been done, and lent his assistance to the furtherance of the aggressive plans. SHIMADA has admitted that he knew that YAMAM0T0 had prepared his nlan for the attack e arly In 1941 and that the plan was adopted in May or June, (Transcript p. 10,194),. He also ad- mitted that he knew that early in 1941 the Navy commenced the development of a shallow water torpedo because the water at Pearl Harbour was shallow and that the fleet practised the use of this torpedo during the summer of 1941 (Ibid),- On the 5th November 1941 NAGANO (Chief of the Naval General Staff) issued the first order for the putting into execution of the YAMAM0T0 plan (Transcript p. 10,347)«. Soon after that date an order was issued that X-day, the day of the opening of hostilities, should be 8th December (Ex. 809, P* 11). SHIMADA knew that the Document No. 0003 • fage £3 Task Force for the attack moved on the 27th November (Tran- script^, 10,422). The evidence shows that in addition to SHIMADA taking part in the Cabinet Meetings and Conferences, he performed various acts and had various matters referred to him as Navy Minister which had direct reference to the war preparations. For example, in November '1941 he authorized expenditure from the special "War Expenditure Account" (Transcript cf 8542), and his approval was sought at the end of October 1941 for the issue of military currency notes for use in the countries in- tended to be attacked (Ibid p. 844-6). Special significance must be given to Kido's statement that the Emperor on 30th November 1941 on his advice consulted SHIMADA and th- Chief of Naval General Staff with regard to a suggestion that the Navy wished to avoid war, and that they having answered the Emperor's question with considerable confi- dence, the Emperor had instructed Kido +o tell the Premier to proceed as planned (Transcript p, I0,46P and pc 12,4-80). The Defendant was a signatory to the Imperial Rescript declaring war (Transcript p. 10,686) and as Navy Minister he reported to the Inquiry Committee Meeting of the Privy Council concerning the declaration of war which was held at 7:30 o'clock on the morning of 8th December 1941 (Ibid P„ 10,690). This support cf the Policy of aggression and expansion is clearly shown in the speech made by him at a Diet Committee Meeting on 10th February 1942 when he strongly advocated ex- pansion and Japan's leadership in Greater East Asia and the elimimtion of any element not conforming to tie Japanese will (Tr:i iscript p. 16,183, Exhibit 2248). That he was a politician as well as a Naval Officer is shown by Exhibit 1273, where Kido records that it was he who in September 1942 peric.ded Togo to resign rather than break Document No. 0003 J 'Page 84 up the cabinet over his dissatisfaction with the formation of the new Greater East Asia Ministry, It is also to be observed that SHIMADA was a member of the Imperial Rule Association Political Society and that when in July 1944 the reorganization of the Cabinet was under con- sideration, including a change of Navy Minister, TOJO, accord- ing to KIDO's diary (Exhibit 1277, Transcript P. 11,376) sug- gested the advisability of SHIMADA being appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of that society in the Cabinet,, The general reasons why we submit he must be held re- sponsible for war atrocities have already been given, and in addition the following comments should be made. The evidence shows that copies of the complaints lodged by the Swiss Lega- tion were sent by the Foreign Ministry to the Navy Ministry (Evidence of Suzuki, Todakatsu, Transcript p. 15,506 and following pages and Exhibits 2170, 2173, 2174). It is also submitted that the Navy Minister must be held responsible for the top secret naval order for submarine operations (Exhibit 210Transcript P. 15,1^4) requiring the complete obstruction of the crews of the ships sunk by submarines, particularly as OSHIMA has stated that this was the German policy and that after discussions with Ribbentrop the German policy was com- municated to the Japanese Naval Attache at Berlin (Exhibit 2106, Transcript pp. 15,1%, 15,195.) Doc 7512 FILE no. 36 RE: Shigetaro SHIMADA DATE: 20 February 1946 Page 1 REPORT BY: R. H. GTLLIL/.M) STATUE Pending On 9 January 1946 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyo. Complete personnel records of the subject -. ere micro-filmed. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 102. Following is a transcript of the translation; SHIGETARO SHU'ADA BORN : 24 September 1883 RESIDENCE: Tokyo RANK : Military Class FAMILY : Father - MEISHU - Sep 23, 1859 Mother - IAEA - Sep 20, I856 1901 Dec 16 Assigned as a student at the Naval Academy (Naval Acadcmy> 1904 Nov 14 Graduated from the Naval Academy; Ordered as a Naval Cadet (Navy Department); Assigned aboard the Eanzaki-Faru (Navy Department> 1905 Jan 3 Released from assignment on the Fanzaki-Maru and assigned aboard the Tzumi (Navy Departments Aug 31 Promoted to Ensign; Assigned to the Isumi (Navy Departments Oct 4 Conferred 8th Court Rank, penior Grade 1906 Feb 16 Assigned aboard the Anekai^a-Maru for training (Navy Department) Jul 6 Relieved of assignment on the Tzumi and attached to the 7th Division COPIES: Original to Exhibit No. 102 3 File NO, 36 Doc 7512 Page 2 1906 Apr 1 Decorated vith. the imperial Order of the Single Ray of the Rising Sun (Granted ?350.,00 and received the Far Medal, Russo-Japanese War - 1905) 1907 Aug 5 Relieved of current duties and assigned as a student of General Courses ax the Gunnery School Sep 28 Promoted to Lieutenant (j-.g..) (Cabinet) Nbv 30 Conferred the 7»h Qaurt Rank, Junior Grade Dec 16 Released as student at the Gunnery School and assigned as a student at the Naval Torpedo School in a general course (Navy Department) 1908 Apr 20 Released from the General Course of the Naval Torpedo School (Navy Department); Attached to the Training Division (Navy Department> Oct 23 Relieved of current duties and assigned aboard the Niitaka (Navy Department) Dec 23 Released from assignment aboard the Niitaka and reassigned to the Otoua (Navy Department) 1909 Oct 1 Released from assignment on the Ctovsa and ordered to assume temporary duties on the Ctovra (Navy Department) Oct 11 Promoted to Lieutenant; Appointed Divisional Officer of the Otona Nov 16 Relieved of current duties and appointed Divisional Officer of the Yokosuka Nrval Barracks Dec 20 Conferred the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade 1910 May 23 Relieved of current duties; Assigned as student of Class B of the Naval War College Dec 1 Reassigned as student of advanced courses at the Naval Torpedo School 1911 May 23 Released as student after completion of course; Appointed Tsukuc'a Divisional Officer 1912 Apr 15 Relieved of current duties and appointed Divisional Officer of Se+tsu May 24 Decorated vrith the Imperial Order of tine Sacred Treasure, 5th Grade Doc 7512 Page 3 1913 Dec 1 Relieved of current duties and assigned as student of Class A of the Naval Far College I915 Jan 30 Conferred the 6th Court Rank (junior Grade> 1915 Sep 25 Appointed as an Attendant of Referees for the Grand Naval Maneuvers (Far Department) Dec I3 Promoted to Lt„ Con,; Released as student on completion of the Class A student course at the Naval War College; Appointed Gunnery Officer of the Shikishima 1916 Feb 10 Relieved of current duties and ordered to station in Italy Aug 1 Concurrently appointed as an assistant in the Italian Embassy 1915 Nov 7 Received the medal of war of 1914-1915 1917 Nov 27 Decorated with the imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Grade Dec 1 Assigned as Naval Attache in the Italian Bnbassy (Cabinet*); Relieved of additional post (Far Department"); Released from post in Itrly (Far Departments; Additional appointment as Inspector of Shipbuilding and Manufacturing of Aims (Far Department") Dec 7 Relieved of the additional post as Shipbuilding Inspector (Far Department) 1918 Mar 1 ordered to return to Japan (Cabinet) Aug 11 Relieved of current duties (Military Attache to the Japanese Bnbassy in Italy (Cabinet) 1919 Aug 5 Relieved of additonal post (Far Department1) ; Appointed to Staff of the Training Fle.et Sep 25 Appointed as a Staff Officer of the 7th Division while the fleet was being organized as a squadron, for the Special Grend Maneuvers in 1919 1920 jun 30 Conferred the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade May 22 Awarded the 3rd Medal of the Crown by the Emporer of Italy and allowed to wear it (Bureau of Decorations"!; Awarded the medal of the 4th Order from the Italian Emperor and allowed to wear it Jun 3 Relieved of current duties and appointed to the Naval General Staff (Ifcvy Department) Doc 7512 Page 4 1920 Sep 1 Additionally appointed as a member of the Technical Council of the Naval Technical Headquarters (Navy Department) Dec 1 Promoted to Commander (Cfebinet) Nov 1 Decorated rrith the Imperial Order of the Small Cordon of the Rising San (Granted ¥2,100<,00 for meritorious service during YJar of 1922 Feb 1 Relieved of cui'rent duties and additionally appointed as a member of the Naval Training HeacNfcarters (Navy Department?) Sep 20 Additionally appointed as a member of Army General Staff (War Department) Nbv 20 Relieved of current duties and additional post; Appointed ExS'juCxve officer of the HYUGA (Navy Department>j Relieved of additional post as member of the Army General Staff (War Department) 1923 Dec 1 Relieved of current duties and appointed as an instructor at the Naval Staff College (Navy Department") Nov 30 Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd Class 1924 Dec 1 promoted to captain (Cabinet) Dec 27 Conferred the $th Court Rank, junior Grade 1926 Oct 15 Relieved of current dubics and attached, to the Kure Naval District (Navy Department) tiec 1 Appointed Commander of the 7th Submarine Division (Navy Dept.) 1927 Nov 15 Appointed to serve in the Naval General Staff (Navy Dept.) 1928 Aug 20 Appointed as Captain of the TAMA. (Navy Department) Dec 10 ippointed as Captain of the HIE (Navy Department) 1929 Nov 30 promoted to Rear Admiral (Cabinet); Appointed Chief of Staff of the 2nd Fleet (Navy Depr5J""tnent,) 1930 Jan 16 Conferred the 5th Court- Rank, Senior Grade Dec 1 Appointed as Chief of staff of the 1st Fleet and additionally as Chief of staff of the Combined Fleet flfevy Department) Doc 7512 Page 5 1931 Dec 1 Appointed President of the Naval Submarine School (Navy Dept.) 1932 Feb 2 Appointed Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet (Navy Dept.) Jul 28 Appointed to the Naval General Staff and additionally as a member of the Naval Technical Council (Navy Department') 1933 Aug 25 Specially ordered attached to the Military inspector (Navy Dept.) Oct 1 Appointed as Chief of Class A of the Naval General Staff and Additionally as member of l&val Technical Council (Navy Dept.) Oct 19 Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class 1934 Nov 15 Promoted to Vice Admiral (Cabinet) Dec 1 Conferred the 2j.th Court Rank, junior Grade 1935 Feb 20 Appointed to serve in the l&val General Staff (Far Dept.) 1934 Apr 29 Decorated with the Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class (Annuity: ¥750.00) 1934 Apr 29 Awarded the imperial Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun (meritorious service - War of I93I-I934) 1935 Dec 2 Appointed as Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff (Navy Dept.) Nov 4 Appointed as a member of the Reform Council on Instruction and Learning (Cab inet) Dec 10 (Abolished by the imperial Ordinance No. 85) Appointed as a member of the Investigation Council of National Resources (cabinet) Nt>v 13 Appointed (furt official of the Imperial Household (imperial Household) 1937 Dec 1 Relieved of current duties; Appointed Commander of the 2nd Fleet (Not published in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) Dec 9 Relieved as Court official of the Imperial Household (Imperial Household) 1937 Nov 20 Appointed member of the Navy preparedness Board of the Imperial Headquarters (Navy Department) Dec 15 Conferred 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade Doc 7512 Page 6 1938 Nov 2 Awarded a set of silver cups (Meritorious Service - Ant i-Comintern Pact of japan and Germany) Nov 15 Relieved of current duties; Appointed as Commander of the Kure Naval District (Nat published in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet*1 1939 Apr 13 Decorated with the imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 1st Class 1940 May 1 Appointed Commander of the China Area Fleet (Nbt published in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) Apr 15 Appointed to servo in the Naval General Staff (Navy Dept.) Nbv 15 promoted to Admiral (Cabinet) 194fl Eec 2 Conferred the 3rd Court Rcnk (junior Grade) 1941 Sep 1 Relieved of current duties; Appointed Commander of the Yokosuka Naval District (Not published in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) Additionally appointed as a member of the Naval Officers' Council (Navy Department) Sep 10 Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun Oct 18 Appointed Minister of the N&vy (Cabinet) 1940 Apr 29 Dccorated with the Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite, 2nd Class; Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun (Meritorious Serviee: China Incident> 1942 Dec 15 Conferred 3rd Court Rank (Senior Graded 1944 Feb 19 Appointed as chief of the Naval General Staff (Cabinet) Jul 17 Relieved of current duties at his own request (Cabinet); Specially granted the privileges of hisi former post (Cabinet) Aug 2 Appointed to the Supreme Far Council (Wot published in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) 1945 J^n 20 placed on the Reserve Status at his request (Nbt published in the official Gazette) (Navy Department) P E N D I N GDoc. Ho. C003 Pago 85 SEIEATOEI. Toahio The particulars with regard to SHIEATOEI, Toshio, are to "be found on page S39 of the chronological summary, end the additional exhibits which directly affect him are: Exhibit No. 2232, R. 16,003, Exhibit Ho. 2233, R. 16,012, and Exhibit ITo. 2234, R. 16,027. Trot 31 October 1930 to 2 June 1933 he was the official spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, and was decorated for his services in tfce Manchurian incident, and later for services in the China affair, of the natare of which we he.ve no other knowledge. Ex. 179Q, shews him taking part in a discussion as to setting up a. new regime in Manchuria. On 4 November 1935 SrIIRATORI aclviset» £RITA, by letter, that the threat of future calamity should be removed while Russia was compara- tively impotent. He advocated war if that appeared inevitable in order Russia to shut/out completely from advancing into East Asia. (Exh. 774-ii, R. 7884)• When 0SHIMA was striving for a tri-partite military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, SHRAT0RI accepted the post of ambassador to Italy and journeyed to Rome in the latter part of December 1938 with the expectation that he would succeed in concluding the military alliance. (Exh. 498, R. 6083). iirior to that time both Ribbentrop end 3SEIMA had failed in their efforts to bring Italy into agreement. SHIRAT0RI and 0SEIMA conferred in matters pertaining to the t proposed alliancc and advocated an all-out military alliance without reservations. They endeavored to impose their convictions upon the Japanese government and endeavored to influence and direct Japanese policy with regard thereto. On 7 January 1939 SEIRATORI advised Count Ciano that Prime Minister EIBAUUMA, who had succeeded Prince K0H0YE as Prime Minister on 5 January 1939, was openly in favor of the proposed alliance, but that the new Foreign Minister AELITA "rather cold toward the idea." (Exh. 499-A, R. 6092). This was followed on 6 February 1939 by a representation to Count Ciano by SHIRATQRI that a Japanese counter Doc. Ho. C 0 0 3 Pago 86 proposal would "be na.de which ho secretly advised Italy not to accept. (Exhibit 501, P. 6095). The compromise proposal was brought to Roes in February 1939 "by the ITO Commission which was also charged with the duty of explaining to the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome the views of the govern- ment and instructing them that they must work within these views. (Exhibit 487, R. 6072-6079). An SHIRATORI and 0SEIM& desired a military treaty without reservations on the part of Japan, they refused to -follow the ndvico of the ITO Commission and refused to communicate •the compromise proposal thxt'dgh official channels. " They threatened to cause the fall of the cabinet by resigning from their oosts unless the government reconsidered its stand. (Exh. 499, S .6096) . In April the Japanese government reconsidered its stand and pre- sented a new draft of the treaty in connection with which it requested an agreement that in the publication of the pact an explanation be made which, would tend to soften the attitude that would likely result on the part of England, Frace, and America. The reason assigned by the Tokyo Cabinet for the necessity of such a limited interpretation of the pact was that both for political and economic reasons Japan "was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposers of the three Democracies.11 SEIRATORI and OSEIMA again refused to communicate officially the Japanese government's proposal to the nations to which they were accredited. (Exh. 502, R. 6100). A Carman-Russian non-aggressien pact was concluded on 23 August 1939 which contributed to the downfa.il of the KIRAFJMA. cabinet. On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland, notwithstanding the temporary setback to the conclusion of a Japan-Germany-Italy military alliance, S1--IHAT0RI continued his efforts to develop closer German-Japanese relations. On 2 September 1939, in a. conference with Mackensen, German ambassador to Italy, SEIRATORI expressed the opinion that "with a new Japanese cabinet there was a well-founded chance for successful continu- ation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis powers," and asserted that for the purpose "of being able personally to work more effectively than was possible from Rome he was going to Tokyo." In another conference in Rone, SKIBATOHI enphasized the severe bic« that Japan®so-German relations had sustained "by the conclusion of the German-Russian Kofk-Aggression Pact end Hade known the fact that he i was one of Germany1 s friends who "had been laboring to counteract this effect." As for the Japanese protest against the conclusion of the pact, SHIRATCRI declared that he had got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone and had endeavored to stop it. (Exhibit 2232, R. 16,003). After SHIFiAT'ORI returned to Japan, the German Ambassador reported on 23 February 1940 that SEIRATORI and others remain "in en unchanged, friendly attitude and ready for every support." (Exh. Eo. 511, Record "oaee 6141). SHIBATORI and OSEIMA in the summer of 1940 worked in confidential cooperation with the German Embassy in Japan in stirring up Japanese ill feeling against America, by influencing the press and political leaders. (Exhibit Ho. 516, Record page 6152). On the fall of the lonai Cabinet, MATSUOEA1 s appointment P„s Foreign Minister vjas generally approved by the press as meaning with certainty that there would be a new orientation of Japanese policy. SHISATORI and OSHIKA expressed themselves in a similar vein at press interviews, thus lending the weight of their influence to MAT3tJ0IA:s policies. (Exhibit Ho. 536, Record page 6261). SKIRATORI declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister, but accepted appointment as permanent adviser to the Foreign Minister, in which capacity he considered that he would be able to exercise a far- reaching influence. (Exh. Ho. 538, Record page 6265). The now govern- ment formed a commission of twenty-four loading persons, consisting mostly of followers of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers, with the aim of planning suitable action for the adjustment of state affairs on fen authoritarian basis. SHIRATORI was appointed the repre- sentative for foreign political natters on this commission. (Exh. 548, Rccord page 6296). Doc. Ho. C 0 0 3 Pago 88 He held the post of adviser until 22 July 1941, when he resigned owing to ill health. On July 7th (Exh.1113, R. 10,157) and again on August 1st (Ejch. 800, R. 7967) Ott stated that he was intending to resume an activist policy, and advocated war against Russia. The Tri-Partite Military Alliance was concluded cn 27 September 1940. Soon thereafter SEIRATORI endeavored to unite the nation "behind the Pact "by publication of various articles, one of which was entitled "The Three-Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow." In this article, SEIRATORI stated that the character of the Hew Order to be created under the leadership of the three powers was to "be considered in the light of the fact that the three powers had discarded the ideologies of individualism and democracy and had adopted the totalitarian point of view. In Japan, he asserted, the nation had revolved against the so- called evils of liberalistic civilization and its dissatisfaction had found expression in the.form of the Manchurian.Incident of 1931. This Incident was a challenge externally to unjust conditions long forced upon mankind by the democratic powers, and internally to all alien ideals and thoughts grafted upon the Japanese people. The characteristics of this movement in Japan, he said, had become accentuated in the current China affair the ultimate object of which, in consonance with the classic expression Kakko Ichiu adopted as a national slogan, was of 9. feay y. tSflAfS* 1&* it: ':•»!_•: -.ce.v' ric hv t.e.V; vt -.us .nu real nature of the I3ew *orld Order of Tomorfow which is to be established through Ja.pa.nQse-&erman-Italian cooperation could not be understood. (Exh- Im©. 557, Record page 6405). In November 1940 SEIRATORI assembled in one publication a series of lectures which he had given all over Japan and which had appeared in newspapers anc magazines from time to time since his return from his ambassadorship in Rome. Eis purpose in re-publication of these articles was to explain the world-wide significance of the Tri-Partite Pact. These articles have been read in evidence so recently that it is not . .. „ t&iA-, M."ft? MtMf Doc. No. 0003 P'J.p « >,o considered necessary to quote them at length in this argument in order to demonstrate the leading part that SHI5AT0RI played in moulding public opinion in Japan in favor of aggressive policies. However, it may oe appropriate to quote several excerpts which are worthy of particular notice. (Exhibit 2234, R. 16,029). In December 1939 SHIRATORI stated: "I feel there is no need for hesitation in determining JAPAN's future foreign policy. In fact, over since JAPAN embarked on her continental policy with the Manchurian Incident, her foreign policy has been established, and to back out of or swerve from it now is not permissible. Still, the presence of two different opinions in JAPaN today, and the fact that the people ere hesitating between them, is truly a wonder of this world. How- ever, this is a transitory phenomenon. The inevitability cf history cannot be altered by human power. In the long run, that which is bound to happen, will probably happen. However, the domestic and foreign situations at present will not allow hesitation and inde- cision for long. *** The New Order of East Asia is linked with the New Order of the world. The New Order cannot be realized in this part of the world alone if the rest of the world adheres to the Old Order or goes back in the opposite direction." (Exhibit 2224, R. 16,034- 16,035). In an address delivered in November 1939, SHIRATORI stated, "I firmly believe that the fact that this war has broken out can be developed in favor of Japan according to her aims and policies." (Exhibit No. 2234, Record page 16,04C). He continued, "Germany today will never be defeated, even under the worst possible conditions. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that there will be ne great danger, if Japan, today, does show good-will to GERMANY and fights on her side. Furthermore, if the countries that are trying to establish a new order in EUROPE should not be able to win, it would be impossible for the JAPANESE people to construct a new order in ASIA. Generally speaking, the old order in EUROPE and ASIA is represented ty Britain 7vrn,-e. If the countries that are endeavouring to maintain this old ordur cannot be defeated, a. new order cannot be established either in the Gccid nt or in the Orient. JAPid.", GERMANY and ITALY are all countries whose mission it is to build in cooperation the new world of'drr. Even without concluding a treaty, the aim of the three powers is one." (Exhibit Ho. 2234, Record page 16,042). On 31 January 1941 the German ambassador to Japan reported that SHIBATORI was one of the leaders of the group advocating a. pre- ventive attack on Singapore. Such a surprise action, it was con- sic! -red, would deprive the United States of the possibility of military wxfare in the Pacific. (Exhibit Ffi?, 6̂ -29)- Jr. another report from the German ambassador on 25 March 1941 it was stated that ShlBAlOBI stressed the necessity of tying up the British fleet. (Exhibit ITo. 576, R. 6475). SHIRATORI, from time to time, communicated important information to the German Ambassador to Japan. (Exhibit 800, R. 7968). On 17 May 1S42 he was one of those singled out by the German embassy in Tokyo for a. German decoration of the Grand Cross. I quote from the citation, "for a long time he was the principal advocate of intimate co-operatio . with Germany. Member of the new Diet after recovering his health, Shli-Al'ORI will probably again play an important part in foreign and home politics." (Exhibit No. 1272, R. 11352). While he is specially concerned with Count 5, we submit that he was in the general conspiracy from the beginning, and responsible under all the Counts in which he is charged.Doc.. No. 0C03 SUZ.UICI -age 91 The particulars with regard to this accused are to be found on p. 340 of the Sua*..-a-7, and the additional Exhibits which directly affect him are 2250, 2252, 2253, 2206, 2280. As early as 1927 the accused Suzuki was a member 01 the general staff office. In 1929 he was an assistant military attache in China, and on 9 January 1931 vas a Lt. Colonel attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War L'inistry. On 1 August 1931 he was appointed a membercf the Military Affairs Bureau which appointment he held at the time of the Manchurian Incident (3.8 September 1931) • On 7 October 1931 Mi do reports that Lt. Colonel Suzuki expressed his opinion on the current problems in the array Department. 'Jhe activities in which Lt. Colonel Suzuki takes part do nov intend to carry out the national reformation immediately, but it is to save the situation if something- does happen in the future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the young officers. (Exhioit 179 (0) , p. 1926). In August 1933 he was appointed Chief of the Press Section of the War Ministry, nnd in 1934- was an instructor in the ,,rmy Staff College. On 25 May 1935 he was again attached to the Military Affairs Bureau and was appointed an investigator in the Cabin, t Bureau of Investigation. In August 1936 he commanded the 14th Infantry Begiment and in November 1937 was promoted to Major General and attached to the Headquarters of the 16th Division. On 16 December 1936 he was appointed head of the Political Department of the China Affairs Bureau a.'.d on 28 December 1938 appointed a member of the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. On 21 February 1939 he was appointed to the Liaison Committe of the China Affairs Bureau and Secretary of that Committee. Doc. No. OOO3 Page 92 On 30 I'iay 1939 ho was appointed a Councillor of the Planning Bureau and in June 1939 made a member of the Opium Committee. On 16 August 1939 he was appointed Acting Commissioner General of the China Affairs Bureau and Secretary of the Committee on China Affairs on' 5 July 1939. He was a government delegate to the Imperial Diet in 1939 and in 194-0 and was promoted to the rank of Lt. General on 1 August 1940. On 21 December 1940 he assumed the duty temporarily of Comrissioner General of the China Affairs Bureau and was appointed Councillor of the Total War Research Institute. On 4 April 1941 he was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the 2nd Konoye Cabinet and President of the Planning Board and relinquished his appointment on the China Affairs Board. On 14 May 1941 Suzuki was also appointed Vice President of the Investigation Committee for Price Counter Measures and on 19 June 1941 a member of the Thought Control Committee. On the formation of the 3rd Konoye Cabinet on 18 July 1941, Suzuki continued to be a Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board. * On the formation of the Tojo Cabinet on 18 October 1941 he continued to hold the officxs of Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board which he did not relinquish until 8 October 1943 when he was appointed a member of the House of Peers. As early as May 1932 Kido states in his diary that he had a conversation with Lt. Colonel Suzuki which shows his interest then in political affairs. They talked about matters concerning meas- ures to cope with the Incident as well as the succeeding Cabinet (exhibit 22^2, p. 16,215). In April 1933 Kido reports that at a party at the residence of Marquis Inoue, Lt. Colonel Suzuki de- scribed Russia as an absolute enemy and denounced any attemptto conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia (Exhibit 22535 P» 16,216) i-'oc. Nc . 0CC3 Page 93 In 1933 or 1934- bis interest, in the expansion of Japan is evidenced by 'die fact that he spoke at a meeting of pre- fectural governors supporting A'aki who explained that it was necessary for Japan to obtain possession of the liaritime Province of the USSR, Siberia and Zabaikalye (Takebe) (Exhibit 670, p.7,730). On 29 December 1938 Kido writes in his diary chat 'che accused Suzuki advised him and insisted that Konoye's Cabinet should carry on (Exhibit 2266, p. 1 6 , 2 3 2 ) . The witness Goette states that in 1939 Suzuki told him that as Japan could not get General Chiang Kai-Shek on her side, the war against China would go on (p. 3780). The interest of Suzuki in military affairs is evidenced by the fact that on the 23 June 194-1, according to Kido's diary, the day following Jne invasion of Russia by Germany Suzuki expressed his opinion that the Imperial General Head- quarters should be unified and reinforced (Exhibit 1094, p.10,024). While there is no direct evidence that Suzuki was present at the important Liaison Conferences held after the end of June 1941, it is noteworthy that 011 29 October 1941 Suzuki reported the progress of a Liaison Conference to Kido (Exhibit 1162, p. 10,314). There is, however, evidence that Suzuki attended the Imperial Conferences on 2 July 1941, 6 September 1941, 5 November 1941, and 2 December 1941 (Exhibit 1107, p. 10,140, and must therefore share in the responsibility for the decisions made at those conferences. As President of the Planning Board he attended a meeting of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council when Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that the proposed protocol between France and Japan relating to French Indo-China was chiefly intended for carrying out the war against China by cutting the Burma road (Exhibit 649, p. 7,069), and on the same day attended a meeting of the Privy Council relating Doc. Mo. 0003 ' Page 3k to the conclusion of the protocol between France and Japan (Exhibit 650, p. 7,074). As President of the Planning Board he held a position of great authority, because th.it Board controlled economic planning in Japan. It was that Board which prepared the National Commodity Mobilization Plan which was explained by Suzuki and approved by the Cabinet on 22 August 194-1. The key points of the plan were the prompt expansion of armaments and maintenance of coal and steel production in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Exhibit 1132, p. 10,205). On 30 August 1941 there followed the most sweeping of all control ordinances. "The Ke Industries Control Ordinance" which was to serve as a foundation for the complete control by the government of all major industries (p. 8403). On 1 September 1941 the Imperial Petroleum Company was formed and was an effective government in- strument for the complete control of petroleum (p. 8476). On 5 September 1941 the "Traffic Mobilization Plan" was adopted and aimed the placing of land and sea transportation on a war-time basis (Exhibit 1133, p. 10,214). On 12 September 1941 there fol- lowed the "Workers Total Mobilization Plan" jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office. The plan was explained to the Cabinet by Suzuki and adopted. It was aimed at insuring the supply of sufficient labor for the increased production of munitions (Exhibit 1140, p. 10,228). On 29 September 1941 Suzuki was requested by Kido to make an investigation for the Emperor in respect to stocks of rubber and tin in the United States and ruboer resources in South and Central America and other places where the United States would be able to obtain these resources (Exhibit 1142, p. 10,231). On 1 October 1941 Kido writes that Suzuki visited him and that they held an informal talk about the national policy of Japan towards the United States of America (Exhibit 2280, p. 16,253)* In the month of October 1941 at the time•of the fall of the 3rd Konoye Cabinet, Suzuki played an important part and carried Doc. No. 0003 . P^gc c_5 on negotiations between Konoye and Tojo and Kido and Tojo. He was present at the meeting in Konoye's house on 12 October when Tojo, expressing the opinion of the Army, stated that there was abso- lutely no hope for the successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations (Exhibit 1148, p. 10,2 50, Exhibit 1147, p. 10,245, Exhibit 22 50) and a party to the decision there taken On 14 October 1941 he called on Konoye with a message from Tojo to the effect that since the opinions of the Premier and the Vfor Minister lt d clashed head on, nothing could be done and sug- gested Prince Kigashi-Eimi be requested to accept the Premiership (Exhibit 1148, p. 10,250). On 15 October 1941 at the request of Konoye, Suzuki relayed this message to Kido the purport of which was that if Konoye would not change his mind, the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable (Exhibit 1150, p. 10275) • Later that same- day Kido asked Suzuki to obtain a definite repo"t on the inten- tions of the Vfar Minister, and that night Suzuki telephoned to Kido that Tojo's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and Navy by the influence of the Prince (Exhibit 1150, p. 10275) ° The next day, 16 October 1941, Suzuki called on Kido who ex- plained his reasons for his opposition to the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet. That day Konoye resigned end upon formation of the new Tojo Cab- inet, Suzuki continued to hold the office of Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Board (Exhibit 102 and 126). On 2 December 1941 the regulations of the 6th Committee were approved by the Prime Minister. They provided that the Committee shall be established in the Cabinet for the purpose of discusang and drafting matters concerning econo ic plans and control center- ing around the acquisition and development of resources in the southern areas, French Indo-China, Thailand, and other southern areas. The regulations further provided thru the general affairs of the Committee shall be handled by the Planning Board and thrt Doc. No. 0003 Ppge 96 the President o.t the Planning Board shell be Chairman of the Committee (Exhibit 1331, p. 11,94-3). It was this Committee which made a report entitled "Outline of Economic Counter Plans for the Southern Area" on 12 December 1941 (Exhioit 1332, p.- 11,947). Suzuki attended a meeting of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council. It was at this meeting that Shimada reported on che outbreak of war against America and England at Hawaii and lialaya, and the draft of the Imperial Rescript was approved, afte; war had starred, AS President of the Planning oard Suzuki is included in the list of explaining members present at the meet- ing (Exhibit 1241, p. 10,690). On 6 December 1941 the Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States and the British Empire was signed amongst other? by Suzuki (Exhibit 1240, p. 10,685). On 10 December 1941 Suzuki, as President of the Planning Board, was present at a meeting of the Privy Council pertaining to the proposal made by Japan to Germany and Italy respecting No Separate Peace Treaty. On 23 January 1942 in speeches before the Budget Committee il was explained by Suzuki and Tojo that the aim of the measure un- der discussion was to secure raw materials necessary for the wag- ing of war and the founding of the Greater Sphere Older, to pre- vent their flow to the enemy, and to secure the self-sufficiency of the Army in areas of operation (Exhibit 1271? p. 11,34-2). In September 1942 the Planning Board was concerned with the transfer of prisoners of war to Japan to be employed in stevedoring in important ports. The areas in which, the POW were to be employed are enumerated in Exhibit 1971A, p 14,505, and it is pointed out in the Exhibit that prisoners of war had been employed with satis- factory results to speed up the transportation of war materials in war time. In October 1942 Suzuki played a prominent part in the meet- ings of 'the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council rdatmg to the establishment of a Greater East Asia Ministry. Suzuki Doc. No. 0003 Prfchs? spoke in favor of the establishment of the new ministry .Jhich was designed to strengthen the combined fighting power of East Asia in order to secure victory for Japan (Exhibit 687, p. 12070). when recommending Suzuki for a G- man decoration on 17 lay 1942, Ambassador Ott states thet in the scope of the task conferred upon Suzuki as head of the Planning Board to bring Japan to the highest level of defence, Suzuki wields decisive influence on the reorgani- zation of Ja./:. :i's inner administration including al ost all of the ministries. Ott further states that Suzuki likewise controls economic planning in Japan as well as the organization of economic and administrative construction in the. southern territories. He describes Suzuki as an executive or-an being the General Secretary of the Board of Construction of Greater East Asia and says that on the strength of this authority his connections with the Army and his personal relations with Tojo, Suzuki has created a position for hiiself that can be labeled as a kind of Vice-Chancelorship. Ott further states that, although Suzuki was formerly ambiguous in his attitude toward Germany, ne has xecentj.y bc-ppoi icd cooperation with Germany and had an important share in the decision of Japan's entry into the war. Suzuki was appointed a Cabinet Councilor on 17 November 1943, which appointment he held until 28 October 1944 (Exhibit 126). He was decorated on 29 April 1934 with the middle Cordon of the Rising Sun for services in the Incident from 1931 to 1934 and on 29 April 1940 was again decorated for meritorious service during the China Incident. It is submitted that Suzuki, being a member of the conspiracy, at least since 1931? is therefore responsible for all acts done in pursuance thereof and the motion made on his behalf should be dis- missed. .TOGO The particulars with regard to the accused TOGO are to be found on page 341 of the Summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are Exhibits 1956, 1957, 1994, 2C16-A, 2022, 2025-A and 2249. Throughout the period covered by the indictment TOGO was one of the accused most instrumental in the realization of Japanese-German and Japanese-Italian collaboration. At the time of the Fanchurian Incident he was with Fatsuoka on the delegation of the League of Nations, whose business it was to defend the aggression an3 to <*ive the assurances which were so often broken. In February 1933 he became head of the European-American Bureau in the Foreign Ministry. At the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded TOGO was Chief of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign T'inistry. This is one of the so-called four "geographic" bureaus in the Foreign Finistry. As its name indicates, it w^s charged with all business pertaining to relations with countries in Europe, including all matters concerning the conclusion of treaties with all European countries. (R.P. 602) In his official function TOGO was present as a government representative at the meeting of the Privy Council which considered and approved this pact. Exhibit 485. This shows his close connection with its prepara- tion and conclusion. For his services in connection with the conclusion of the pact he was later duly rewarded. Exhibit 127. The secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact cannot be considered other than as a military alliance directed against Russia. This is clear from negotiations following the conclusion of th$ pact to extend the agreement to other countries than Russia and in that way to achieve a complete military alli- ance between Germany and Japan. Exhibit 4">7» It also follows from the fact that when Germany concluded a Non-aggression Pact with Russia the Japanese Government considered this a serious violation of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact and filed a solemn protest with Germany. Exhibit 486-L. Doc. No. 0003 Page 99 On 25 November 194-1, while. 'TOGO was Foreign Minister the Anti -Comintern Pact was extended, and many new countries, which at that time were under German or Japanese domination, adhered to it, thus continuing a strong link in the alliance between Japan and Germany and the countries which were or shortly would be allied with them in the war. Exhibits 4955 496. In his explanation before the Privy Council Meeting, which had to approve the extension of the pact TOGO stated that there was the closest relation between the Soviet Government and the Third International. Exhibit 1182. In view of this the allegation to the opposite in the motion in his behalf does not seem to be based on facts. In 1940 when the negotiations were being carried on for the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact TOGO ^as Ambassador to Russia and was working feverishly for the improvement of Russian Japanese relations because it was considered that this was in the existing circumstances a prerequisite for the switching over by Japan from reliance upon the Western Powers to an alliance with Germany. TOGO realized that Japan's future lay in the south and that for this reason the enemy in the north should be made a friend. Exhibit 522. This shows clearly TOGO' participation in the new line-up of nations which had started when Germany concluded a Non-aggression Pact with Russia and started war with England and her Allies and found its logical development when Japan allied herself with Germany in September 1940. TOGO'S attitude toward this new alliance is also clear from the fact, that when Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the summer of 1940 recalled a great number of Japanese diplomatic repre- sentatives, Whose attitude was not supposed to be in accordance with Japan's new foreign policy, TOGO remained as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Exhibits 127, 548.' The motion on his behalf alleges that this is not true, but no evidence to the contrary is before the Tribunal. Doc. No. 0003 Page 10C TOGO carried on all the negotiations for the conclusion of the "No Separate Peace Treaty" with Germany and Italy even before the outbreak of war on 8 December 1941 and was mainly instrumental in its conclusion. Exhibits 604, 605. He also carried out the negotiations in the summer of 1^38 for the conclusion of an agreement r'ith Germany regarding collaboration between these countries in China. Exhibits 591, 592, 593, 594. As regards China, TOGO'S attitude is clearly outlined in his statements during the above-mentioned negotiations. TOGO insisted that the economic agreement to be concluded should include the whole of China and not- only the parts at that time occupied by Japan as Japan intended to extend its influence over the whole' country. Earlier, in January 1938, attempts were being made by Germany to mediate in the conflict between Japan and China. TOGO then stated that Japan would continue the war in China until the bitter end and that there was no other solution than the complete defeat of the Chaing Kai-shek Government, which could not longer be recognized. Exhibit 486-D For his services in connection with the China war TOGO was later decorated with the Highest Japanese award. Exhibit 127. It is also clear that TOGO was an active exponent of Japanese expansion in Asia and domination by Japan of all areas under its control. He vras a mer.ber of the National policy Research Association, which, although a private organization, received considerable government support and fiercely propagated Japanese expansion and conquest. Exhibit 683. His attitude is also shown from the speech made by him before the Imperial Diet on 21 January 1942 which, as the German Ambassador pointed out, clearly revealed Japan's b^sic policy for the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan. Exhibits 1338-A, 1271. That this policy aimed at the complete subjugation and exploitation of all countries under Japanese control has been conclusively demonstrated on numerous Deo. \o. 0003 J:". occasions. TOGO actively participated in this policy, beta as Foreign Minister (October 1941-September 19*2, April 1945- August 1945) and as rinister for Greater East Asia (April 1945- August 1945). As regards the Japanese Anerican relations and the general events leading up to the outbreak of war in December 1941, it is considered unnecessary to review in detail all the evidence which has been introduced, but it is pointed out that TOGO in his function as Foreign Fillister not only participated in the decisions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, but in his official position was directly in charge of these negotia- tions, even after the decision to open hostilities had been taken. By contrasting the private communications passing between hin and his ambassadors, the secret decisions of the government to which he was a party with the official communications handed by his orders to the State Department, one can realize the career of deception on which he was embarked, the chronological method adopted in the Summary (pp 255-300) gives special point to this. It is submitted th-t he must have been a party to the scheme to hold up President Roosevelt's last message, particularly as Exhibit 2249 sho,rs that he had refused to authorize Nomura to nsk for it. The interviews with Ambassadors Grew and Oraigie on the early morning of 8 December -re sheer deception. Afterwards he w-s responsible for the futile attempt of the Japanese layers to evolve an excuse for it. (Exhibit 1270-A). It his been contended that TOGO, although knowing that hostilities would be opened against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, allowed the negotiations to continue, hoping till the very last that a pe-ceful settlerent could be arrived -t. This is in direct contradiction to all the known facts. On 22 November 1941 TOGO informed Nomura tint the dead- line d-te would not be extended and that Japan would not wait beyond 29 November. Exhibit .1188. On 28 Nove.-.ber 1941 TOGO Doc. No. 0003 Pc.,30 102 in a wire to Nomura stated that the negotiations would be broken off, adding that Nomura should avoid giving any impression to this effect until he got further instructions, thus showing a deliberate intention to deceive the United States Government. Exhibit 1193* Two days later, 011 1 December 194-1, he informed Nomura, that in order not to arouse America's suspicion, the press had been instructed to write that the negotiations would be continued. Exhibit 1208. However, long before that date the negotiations were serving as a camouflage for war preparations. As early as 22 October 1941, Nomura had informed TOGO that he wished to resign because he did not wish to continue a hypocritical existence deceiving other;:. jxiJ iii-i Hi.' .. j.ac ^ai. \.t 'v." i.u.oiuv j>.vr * c o ;..br United States, was, according to the accused. Muto, who like TOGO attended all Liaison Conferences, nothing more than a deliberate move to deceive (witness Tanaka R.P. 15,871). It is unacceptable that the recused TOGO, who was in charge of Japanese foreign relations, and who attended all the Liaison Conferences from the time he entered the Cabinet as well as the Imperial Conferences of 5 November and 1 December 1941 and participated in and agreed to all the decisions taken, should disclaim full responsibility for Japan's foreign policy during this period. It was TOGO who instructed the Japanese informants in Honolulu to submit their day to day reports concerning the position of the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Exhibits 1256, 1258. He also sent out the general instructions to all Consular personnel in the Netherlands Indies to report all movements of ships. Exhibit 1330. It was TOGO who in the last week before the outbreak of war gave instructions to open negotiations for a declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States and for the conclusion of a "No Separate Peace Treaty". Do". "1 o 0 0 0 3 Exhibits 604, 605, 606, 607. Finally it was TOGO who Wc.̂ responsible for the text of the final note to be delivered .6 the United States and for the setting, together with the Chiefs of Staff, of the exact tire of its delivery. Exhibit 1202. As regards the so-called "Conventional "Tar Crimes", it was TOGO who informed the Allies that the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention would be applied "mutatis mutandis" and that the national and racial manners and customs of the prisoners would be taken into consideration. Exhibits 1956, 1957. During both of his terms as Foreign Minister all protests regarding ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilians went through his hands and he was therefore well informed of the innumerable flagrant violations of the Convention as well as of the fact that the guarantees given by him were consistently not being fulfilled. He also knew ttr>t the many protests which were sent to the War Ministry for investigation f'ere never answered. He at no time took any steps to ensure that the guarantee given by him would be fulfilled or to stimulate the investigation of the many atrocities committed. Exhibits 2016-A, 2022, 2025-A. The mere fact that the actual investi- gation of complaints, ̂ s entrusted to another government department can in no way relieve him from his responsibility as a member of the government and Foreign Minister to ensure the observance of treaties and assurances by which the Japanese Government was bound. Especially duriig his second term of office numerous protests went through his hands and innumerable crires took place such as the execution of Allied flyers, which had been ordered by the Japanese Government. Exhibit 1094. Through his participation in the government he identified himself T:rith the policy of his government as reg-rds treatment of prisoners and through his position as Foreign Minister he actively participated in the carrying out of this policy. D0CU1IENT #7511 FILE NO. 1 RE: TOGO, Shigenori D^TE: 27 February 1946 Page 1 REPORT BY: R. H. GILLIL.JJD STATUS Pending On 9 January 1946 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined -t the Uiet Building, Tokyo. Complete personnal records of the subject were micro- filled. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 110. Following is a transcript of the translation: TOGO, ohigenori 10 December 1882 Kagoshima. Prefecture Samurai BORN RESIDENCE CLnSS 1908 Jul 11 1912 Oct 16 1912 Nov 15 1913 Jan 30 1913 Jul 21 1914 Dec 25 1915 Dec 27 1916 Hay 10 1916 Jul 1 1916 Apr 1 1916 Dec 26 1917 Jan 31 1918 Jun 28 1918 Dec 28 1919 Jua 30 Graduated fro . the Literature Department- of the Tokyo I xperial University Passed the Diplomatic and Consular Service Exam- ination Received appointment as a consul eleve diplOiaat and was conferred the 7th Rank of the Higher Civil Service; (Cabinet) ; Was granted the 5th class salary and assigned for duty at the Hankow Consulate (Foreign ilinistry) Conferred the 7th Class Court Rank, Junior Grade assigned for duty at the x.ukden Consulate ..'as granted the 4th class salary was granted an annual salary of ¥1,700 Received appointment as a eleve diplomat and was conferred the 7th Rank of the Higher Civil Ser- vice (Cabinet) ; -•/as granted the 4th class salary and assigned for duty at the Consulate in Switzerland (Foreign i/Iinistry) Was granted 3rd class salary (Foreign Ministry) Was awarded the 6th Order of i«lerit and the Order of tne Sacred Treasures: Received the Imperial Grant of ¥200 for meri- torious services during 1914-1915 Conferred the 6th Rank of the Higher Civil Service and was granted the 3rd class Salary (Cabinet) Conferred the 7th Class Court Rank, Senior Grade xippointed 3rd Class Secretary of the Legation and was conferred the 6th Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet); Granted the 2nd class salary and was assigned for duty at the Switzerland Legation (Cabinet) Yi/'as granted the 1st class salary Conferred the 5th Honk of the dither Civil Service and was granted the 2nd class salary (Cabinet, Foreign ministry) DOCUMENT #7511 Page 2 1919 Aug 11 Conferred the 6th Class Court Rank, Junior Grade 1920 J"an 10 Ordered member of the Peace Treaty Enf or cement Committee (Cabinet) 1920 Fab 2-8 Appointed 3rd Secretary of the Embassy and was con- ferred the 5th Rank of Higher Civil Service(Cabinet• Granted the 2nd class salary and assigned to the Embassy in Germany (Cabinet) 1920 May 26 Relieved from post as member of the Peace Treaty Enforcement Committee (Cabinet) 1920 Jul 1 Appointed 2nd secretary of the Embassy and was con- ferred the 5th Rank of tne higher Civil Service (Cab m e t) 1920 Sept 7 Awarded the 5th Order of Merit and the Sekko Kyokujitsu medal with ¥1300 for meritorious ser- vices during 1915-1920 1920 Jul 1 Granted the 2nd class salary and was assigned for duty in Germany (Foreign Ministry) 1920 Dec 28 Was granted the 1st class salary (Foreign Ministry) 1921 May 18 Appointed diplomatic commissioner and was con- ferred the 5th Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet); Received the 4th class salary (Foreign Ministry) 1921 Jun 17 Ordered as provisional member of the nigher Civil Service Examination Board (Cabinet) 1921 Dec 26 Conferred the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet) 1921 Dec 28 Granted the 3rd class salary (Foreign Ministry) 1922 Jan 20 Conferred the 6th Class Court Rank, Senior Grade 1922 Jun 5 Ordered as provisional member of the Higher Civil Service Examination Board 1923 Jan 11 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign uffice and was conferred the 4th Rcoik of the nigner Civil service (Cabinet); Granted the 3rd class salary and was assigned to Chief of the First bection, iuropean-American Bureau (Foreign ministry) 1923 Mar 8 Ordered as government representative in the Diet for matters under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office (Cabinet) 1923 May 31 Ordered provisional member of the Higher Civil Service Examination Board (Cabinet) 1923 Jun 30 Granted the 2nd class salary 1924 May 23 Ordered provisional member of the Higher Civil Service Examination Board (Cabinet) 1924 May 31 Received the Imperial Gift of one set of Silver Cups 1924 Jun 30 Conferred the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service and was granted the 1st class salary (Cabinet and Foreign ministry) 1924 Sept 15 Conferred the 5th Class Court RanK, Junior Grade DOCUMENT #7511 Page 3 1925 Feb 29 1925 Dec 26 1926 Feb 10 1929 Jun 29 1929 Jul 15 1930 Jul 30 1931 Nov 7 1931 Dec 9 1933 Feb 1 I 1933 Mar 29 1933 Jun 1 1934 Jun 1 1934 Jun 13 1934 Jul 3 1934 Jul 16 1935 Feb 28 1935 Apr 1 1935 Jun 1 1935 Jun 11 Ordered provisional member of the Higher Civil Service Examination Board Appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and was conferred the 3rd Ran.< of the Higher Civil Ser- vice (Cabinet) ; Assigned for duty in the U.S.A. (Foreign Ministry) Awarded the 4th Order of the Merit and the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of Meri- torious services in the negotiation of the Russo- Japanese Treaty Appointed Councillor of the Embassy and wa.s con- ferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet); Assigned for duty in Germany and was awarded the 3rd class salary (Cabinet and Foreign Ministry) Conferred the 5th Class Court Rank, Senior Grade Ordered as a member retinue of the Imperial dele- gates to the 11th General Conference of the League of Nations held at Geneva, Switzerland (Cabinet) Awarded -the 3rd Order of Merit and the urder of the Sacred Treasure Ordered as a member retinue of the plenipoten- tiary to the general meeting of the <nar Disarma- ment Conference in Geneva (Cabinet) Appointed Chief of the European-American Bureau of the Foreign Office and was conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet) Appointed as standing member and commissioner for the Higher Civil Service Examination Board and the second section of the Higher Civil service Exami- nation Board (Cabinet) Ordered as reserve member of the Civil Service (Ordinary) Limitation Board r Appointed Chief of the European-Asiatic Bureau and was conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil . Service (Cabinet) and ordered as reserve member of the Committee for the Civil Service (Ordinary) Limitation Board'(Foreign Ministry) Ordered as standing member for the Higher Civil Service Examination Board and also for the Second Section of the Higher Civil Service Examination Board (Cabinet) Conferred the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet) Conferred the 4th Class Court Rank, Junior Grade Appointed government representative in the Diet on matters under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Of- fice for the 67th session of the Diet (Cabinet) Received Imperial grant of an additional annual salary of ¥600 Ordered member of the Overseas Development Com- mittee (Cabinet) Ordered as a member of Relief Investigation Board (Cabinet) J DOCTJLSNT #7511 r Page 4 1934 Apr 29 Awarded the 2nd Order of i-erit and the Order of txie Sacred Treasure for meritorious services during 1931-1934 1936 May 6 appointed government representative in trie Diet on aatters under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office for the 69th session of the Diet (Cabinet) 1936 Dec 24 Appointed government representative in the Diet 011 .natters under the jurisdiction of the For- eign Office for the 70th session of the Diet (Cabinet) 1937 Jun 11 appointed member of tne belief -investigation Board (Cabinet) 1937 Jul 15 Ordered as reserve ie.aber of the Civil Service (Ordinary) Limitation Board (Foreign Ministry) 1937 Jul 29 appointed government representative in the Diet on aatters under the jurisdiction of the For- eign Office for the 71st session of the Diet (Cabinet) 1937 Jul 30 Relieved f ro i post as member of tne Relief Investigation Board (Oabinet) 1937 uct 27 appointed as an Envoy ±»xtj. a ordinary and Am- bassador i lenipotentiary to Ger.jany (Oabinet) 1937 Nov 15 Conferred the 4th Class Court Rank, Senior Grade 1938 Oct 15 appointed embassador to U.S.C>.R, and concurrent- ly relieved from post in Germany (Oabinet) 1938 Nov 2 Awarded, the Ryokujitsu Juko medal for meritorious services rendered in tile conclusion of the Tripartite Fact 1939 Dec 2 Conferred the 3rd Class Court Rank, Junior Grade 1941 May 9 awarded the First Order of M^rit and tne urder of the oacrcd Treasure as per instructions No. 898 by the Bureau of awards of 22nd may 1940 1941 Oct 18 appointed to tne dual posts of tiia Foreign Minister and the minister of overseas Affairs 1941 Dec 2 Relieved from tne post as Minister of Overseas Affairs 1942 Feb 12 appointed as ..1 ember of the J„ucnese Committee at the Tripartite Joint Technical Conference j h^ld at Tokyo 1942 Sept 1 Relieved from post on request and was appointed as Member of the house of Fo^rs in accordance f with No. 4 of the First Article of tne Rules and Regulations of tne peerage 1940 Apr 29 Awarded the First Urder of merit and the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun 1942 Sept 29 Conferred the 3rd Class Court Rank, Senior Grade, by a special act of grace fro 1 the Throne 1945 Apr 9 Appointed Minister of the Foreign Office and the Minister of the Greater Fast ^sia Ministry 1945 ^ug 17 Relieved from dual posts on request P E N D I N G xI/O. 0003 TO JO The particulars in respect of the accused T'OJO are to "be fo^l at page 342 of the Summary. His history is one of steady and repid advancement throughout the life of the conspiracy, from the position of colonel and section chief of the Army General Staff, through increasingly important and powerful positions, until as War Minister in the third K01TCY3 Cabinet, he attained such power that ha "brought about the fall of that cabinet, became Premier and Var Minister, lad Japan to attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, during the earlier years of the war with these countries and until the beginning of her final defeat. As Colonel, as Section Chief (l Aug 1931-5 March 1934) and as Major General Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade (l Aug 1934- 1 Aug' 193$) I0J0 played a sufficiently important part in the Mauchurian Aggressions to oe awarded a declaration for his services. (Dxh. 128). Kis further activity in Manchuria continued while he was chief of the Kwsntung Military Police (21 Sept. 1935 and 1 Kerch 1937), Chief of Staff of the Zwantung Army, and Japanese Member of the Manchufcuo Joint Economic Committee (1 Mar 1937-30 May 1938). On 9 June 1937 TOJO telegraphed the Vice War Minister and Chief of Staff in reference to operations for war against the U. 3.S.R. and advised that Japan should first deliver a "blow against China by attacking Hanking and thereby ""removing the menace in the rear." (Exh. 672, R. 7337). It is significant that this occurred within a. month. Prom his position in the field TOJO graduated to be Vice Minister of War, and simultaneously held numerous posts connected with other departments. (30 May 1938-10 Dec. 1938). Ho acted as Inspector General of Army Air lorces (10 Dec. 1938-22July 1940); than as War Minister (22 July 1040-18 October 1941); and finally as Premier and WPr Minister, holding from time to time other ministries. He was decorated for his services in the China "Incident" on 29 April 1940. D o c . H o . 0003 Pa.L,e i c 5 On 22 July 1940 TOJO and MAISUOKA collaborated in drawing an authoritative foreign policy program for Japan (Exh. 573, R. 6262); on 1 August 1940 ho attended a Jour Minister Conference, which stressed German-Japanese friendship and cooperation (Ex. 542, R. 6278); on 4 September 1940 another Pour Minister Conference concerning strengthening of the Japanese-Geroan-Italian Axis was attended "by T3J0 (Exh. 5411 R. 6307); on 26 September 1940 a conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held at which TOJO, EOSHIHO and MUTO were present and at which the matter of the conclusion of the Iri-Partite Pact and the condition of the army for war with the United States were dis- cussed (Exh. 552, H. 6350); the same day the Privy Council, with TOJO and EOSHIH® present, approved a draft of the Iri-Partite Pact (Exht 553, 1030, R. 6379'), On 27 September 1940 the Tri-Partite Pa.ct ias aigned. At that time TGJO was War Minister, President of the Manchuria Affairs Board and Vice President of the China Affairs Board (Exh. 43). In the Imperial Rescript issued on that day the names of TOJO and HQSEIBO appear as principal officers of the Government (Exh. 554, R. 639i). It will thus be observed that TOJO's interests and activities "by this time had embraced the Kwantung Army (the school of militarism and ultra-nationalism), Manchuria, China, relations with Germany and Italy, and possible war with the United States. All these are the very core of the conspira.ci9s pleaded and proved in this cpse. Purthermare: On 5 and 21 November 1940, TOJO attended ministers' conferences at which it was decided to help Siam in her boundary fight with Prench Indo-China, and io make her cooperate politically and economically in the establishment of a. jfev. irdei in Ea st Asia. (Ex. o 18-a, R. 6873). At Liaison Conferences, as TOJ^ himself tells us, ihe decisions and proposals were naue and fr.rr:\-.lated which were later presented to and adopted "by Imperial CorJfe-ont^e Ah Liaison Conferences decisions were made, not "by a majority, ju+ wre ursaimous, (E. 1A,173). D o c . H o . 0003 Page 1P6 Some idea of the activity of T3J0 and of his close association with his co-defendants nay he gathered from an analysis of the Liaison » Conferences held "between 13 January and 30 June, 1941, which was a very japortant period in this conspiracy. Examination of Exh. 1103 (E. 10057-10063) discloses 29 such conferences. The accused present included: TO JO - at 29 conferences MUT0 - at 2? conferences OKA - at 23 conferences EIIiAffUMA - at 27 conferences MaTSUOKii - at 26 conferences EAGAKO - at 16 conferences Further notice should ho taken that as the moves were "being made toward further aggression southward (French Indo-China, July 24, 1941)„ and for war upon the United States end Britain, a decision was reached at the meeting of July 21 that the Price Minister, Foreign Minister and other ministers should meet with the High.Command end the War Minister, the Kavy Minister, and the Chiefs of Staff, to exchange views on national policies. (R. 10064). Thereafter these meetings were no longer published. On 2 July, 1941, T0J0, SUZUKI, EISASUMii and OKA attended an Imperial Conference at which important decisions in reference to Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, disposition of the China Incident, matters connected with the northern Problems were made, and a decision t© remove all obstacles in attaining Japan's policy to pursue her schemes against Erench-Indo-China and Thailand, to negotiate and "take measures" with relevant nations to the south to secretly arm aga.ir.st the Soviet and prepare for war against Britain and the United States, was me.de. (Exh. f>SP, " E f e . . jivl 6566). The Imperial Conference of 6 September, 1941, attended by I ©JO, SUZUKI, MUT0 and GKA, decided: (l) That Japan would continue her southern advance; ('2) That Japan would complete her plans aiming at war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands; D o c . Ho . 0003 Page 1P6 (5) That Japan would try to rain her demands by diplomatic moan3 and if not successful, "by early October, would determine on war with the United States, Eritain, and the Netherlands; (4) That Bhe would try to check the formation of any Eusso- American Combine) > (ZzhBc 58S, 1107, H. 8814) About October 12, 1941, TOJO made the final neves in the plan which was to lead him to the Premiership and Japan to attack the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. At a meeting "between himself, KONOYE, O K a U (the Navy Minister), SUZUKI (President of the Planning \ Board), and the Foreign Minister, TOJO demanded a strong resolution for war. 01KAVJA wanted to avoid war, (Exh. 1147, H. 10246, Exh. 1148, H.10251; Exh. 1136-A, E. 10272). At a Cabinet Meeting of 14 October, there was a deadlock on this subject, (Exh. 1143, E. 10268-10263). On October 15, SUZUKI delivered a messe ;e from TOJO to KIDO that unless KONOYE came to TCJO's views, a gantral resignation of the cabinet would be inevitable. (Exh. 1150, P.. 10276), Later SUZUKI phoned KIDO that TCJ0!s idea ftts to establish harmony between the Army and Havy (Exh. 1150, E. 10276). The result was that the KONOYE Cabinet resigned (Ex. 10285), rOJO became Prime Minister, OIKAWA was deposed as Havy Minister, SHIKADA took his place, and NAGANO continued as Chief of the Naval General Staff. TOJO had gained his ends - with SEIMADa as Havy Minister and SAG-AISO as Chief of the General Staff, harmony was restored - there would be no dissent to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Khota Bal-.ru, Davao and Hongkong. On October 31, TOJO, KAYA, SEIMASA, gave final directions for * the handling of military currency in dollars, pesos and guilders for the use of Japanese invading armies of the south. (Exh. 850, E. ,8458). Tho Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, attended by TOJO, TOGO, SHI MAD A, XAYa, SUZUKI, HCSHINO, MUTO and OKA, (Exhs. 1169, 1107, I>oc. Ho . 0 0 0 3 Page 108 E. 15333), and that of 1 Lecamber 1941, attended by TOJO, TOGO, SEIIUTi , KA.YA, SUZUKI, NAGA1J0, MJTO and GEA (Sxhs. 588, 1137, H. 1*519) made final decisions for war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. Further details are unnecessary. In hio interrogation of 7 February, 194S, TOJO admitted his responsibility (with other members of the cabinet and army and navy chiefs), for the attacks on Pearl Harbcr, and United States and British possessions- (Exh. 1343-A, H. 1C706). A consideration of all of the evidence leads to the inevitable conclusion that TOJO was one of the "young army" officers who in the early days of the conspiracy plotted for the conquest of all East Asia, that he served in that conspiracy with ever-extending importance throughout the Mgnchurian and Chinese wirs of aggression to become the effective leader of the conspiracy on 18 October 1011, and to continue to lead it until 22 July 1344. Eis direct responsibility for the tragedy cf the Prisoners of War and other outrages has been so amply proved, and admitted, that it is needless to labour it by quotations. It is submitted that TOJO is criminally liable for every crime of which he is accused. vDoc. No. 0003 P a g e 1 0 9 Tjygsu The particulars ,vitn regard to UM2ZU are to be found on I&ge 343 of the Sumnary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him erei Exhibits: Nos. 2208-̂ ., 2208-E, 2208-0, 2208-D, 2208-2, 220&-A, 1970-A, 1994, 1993, 1978, 1998. 2012, 2013, 2014, 2022, 2025-A. The more important periods of his career in positions of responsi- bility may be divided as follows: Bsriod No. 1: From 3 larch 1934 to 1 August 1935 he wa3 Conraander in Chief of Japanese Forces in China. His participation in and responsibility for Japanese aggression in North China, finally resulting in the taking over of the four nortnern provinces by Japan, and setting up of the "Autonomous Government, "and the so-called HG-U..ICZU Agreement of June 1935. been the subject of considerable testimony and documentary evidence. In this connection, attention is invited to Exhibit No. 220o-A which was introduced against General i-DNAivEI. P- ,-iod No. 2 From 23 larch 19J,6 to 30 May 1938, he was Vice Minister of 'War, and by virtue of his position, carried responsibility for the aggressive acts of Japan against China during that period, ample evidence of •which has already been introduced. His ministry prepared the various drafts of the 3-year plan (Exh. 841, 842, 2227) in May and June 1937 which was shortly after adopted by the First Konoye Cabinet. It v/as during this period that the power of the Military Clique, of which General TMEZU was a potent member, pas exhibited in its refusal to permit General Ugalci to form a Cabinet under Imperial JV&ndate (Exhs. Nos. 22o8-.ii, 2208-B, 22u8-C, 2208-D, 2208-") which 3how his personal activity in this matter. Iferiod Mo. 3 Srom 7 September I939 to 18 July 1944 he w^s Commander of the Kwantung Arm;, (later C in C) and concurrently .Ambassador of ivjsnchukuo, for which he bears responsibility for the ill-treatment of POUs held in Maachukuo and for the illegal use of PCv»s on munitions work in ̂ achukuo (Exhibit No. 1 9 7 0 - * ) . Doc. No. 0003 Page 110 Iteriod Mo. 4 Erom July, 1944 to 2 September 1945 w a s Chief of the Army General Staff, and therefore, responsible for all acts of the Japanese Army on ail fronts as well as in Japan proper. Thei'e is already ample evidence that during this period, on all fronts and in Japan proper, the inhuman treatment of POW continued. Since the date of the Summary tc which reference has been made, there Las been introduced evidence to establish the following acts which properly may be charged to this defendant: Illegal santences and trials of BJW by the Kwantung Army (Exhibit No. 1998); execution of eleven members of .wnsrican air crews after alleged trial by Court Martial II July 1945 (Exhibit 1994); execution of two American fliers 18 July 1945 (Exhibit 1995 ; during July and August, 1945- thirty-eight American fliers were put to death in Japan without trial (Exhibit 1922); instructions from the War Ministry were issued in Jferca, 1945 regarding the disposition of PuW, contrary to treaties and assurances and to laws and customs of war (Exhibits 2012, 201j); orders were issued from the War Ministry in Mirch, 1945« placing no limit on the hours of work of POW (Exhibit 2014); an order from the War Ministry of 17 LLrch 1945 provided for "emergency measures" regarding POW, and among otaer things, provided for keeping POW at work even in areas being t ~:̂ bed (Exhibit 1978); continued notices to tne Japanese Government re ill- treatment and atrocities committed on U. S., British and ^tstralian POW, up to as late as 1 August 19451 were received, but atrocities and ill-treatment continued to tne end (Exnibits 202.1, 2025-A). Qa 2 November 1938 he v'as granted a reward for services rendered in concluding the Anti-Comintern l^ct. His services in this respect were performed during the time he was Vice Minister of War and concurrently Councillor of the I&ncnurian ->.ffairs Bureau. Upon his assuming tie position of Commander of the Kwantung -army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo, he continued the transformation of iVknchukuo into a military base for an attack against the Soviet Union (Exhibit 6 7 0 ) . Do«. No. 0003 Page 111 The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was set up by the iwantung Army with the view of using it in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union (Exhibit 699)- The Kwantung Array controlled the activities of the Whiteguurd element and carried on propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union (Exhibit 723). During the time he was Chief of Staff of the Array, tne invasion of Kweilin and Liucnow took place in November, 1944- (Exhibit 234). As Chief of S^aff of the Army, he was responsible for not only this, but for the atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Kweilin and Liuchow areas in the winter of 1944 and the atrocities in Changsha (Exhibit 359)* Evidence of preparation for aggression against tne USSR ma/ be found in the following pages of the Records 7560-63; 7609-12; 8143; 8079; 808I; 7580-84; 7705. It is submitted that UIVEZU was responsible for illegal Japanese aggression against China from 1934 on> i-1 violation of treaties and as- surances; for preparation for aggression against the USSR; for the ill- treatment of POW; for their illegal employment, and for atrocities com- mitted against them.Prge lxi-; . Doc. No. 0003 The particulars ~ith regard, to hia are on page 33- of the Summary, •additional documents aro Ibchs. 2233-2238^. Ho is c. younger man then most of the ocuscd, cad the evidence relates caiefly to the later periods. In 1931 he • ..3 in the United States, engaged in militar.. stud: . He joined the iJilitcry affairs Bureau on l>ugust l>3-: a ad bee. .me concurrently'- Secretary of the Planning Board on 26 November (at the oufcet of the five-year plan) and .^rmy spokesman on 15 July 1 .38 . In the latter capacity at made tao s..etches on the China affair in 1'933» in rhich he said Japan at.de "..hat amounted to a declaration of r.ar, that Horth China r.ould be put completely under Japan's control, and Inner r&ngolia aonld bo the seuae (ft. 4°I» -xh. 270, Jlxh. 2233) . From lice 1939 to lire a l$ifl he ~as deputy Chief of Sbaf.. , South China Sxpeditionar„ Force „.t the time rrhen the occupation of Northern Stench Indo-China took place and the attack on French troops occurred on 22 depteaibor 1540. He admitted he -..a3 in Tndo-uhina on several occasions during this period (i&h. 22j3). Ho v.as decorated for th i.Oanchuria and China Incident, though in the former *..e did not knoa th. nature of his services. He returned t^ the lHlitar„ -ffairs Bureau as head of 1st Section la .area 194I until- 20 ..pril 1942, ~;hen he succeeded Huto as Chief of the Burea. . Tanaka says 15 .^72 ) that Sato aas held in' great con- fidence b- Tojo. ctto told nia that aea Honeys resigned he aent to see General . Hoe and Hayashi ^botii on-premiers v.hj v.ould attend the confer- ence to choose his successor) and told them that miless To jo became Premier it aould he difficult to control the armj . j»t the meeting Hoe supported To jo and Hayashi, .after sug .cstin^ 'j^iaov Hig-. shikuni, acouiesed. ..s there -as only a majority for To jo, S to': • efforts jbec have influenced the result (iSxh. 1134 and. 2 2 j 0 ) . S. to cys that he agreed rmth To jo ' s policies ^2xh. 2233) . He '.as a member of the Ceneral Co.anission under mrticle 4 of the Tri-Fartite Pact (ibax. 559» •ri» 95G)- On 11 Hare a 1942 S&to made a speech in 7.'hich he stressed the importance of the choice of date for starting Doc. No. 00-3 Page 113 the war. lor various reasons December J3ta was th~ last opportune moment. He lauded the decision or Japan to start tde Greater Sast «sia t J on tdat day. He described the armament production plans for 1936-7 and made clear that they were evolved before and not for the purpose of the China incident, _.nd that only a small part of the increased production had been used for that purpose; thus the fighting po'.?er of the Japanese arm, was snore than three tines 7;hat it was before the incident. He 3aid toe march into Indo-Ghina gave powerful footing for the Greater '.«ur. (Exh. 349) . On 1? liti 1942, lis.j. Gen. Sato was on- of those recOc.ai-nd6d for German deoration as belonging to "the immediate group surrounding To jo who will presumably retain, for some time their decisive influence on the shaping of Japanese polic„ . 11 aato is described as 'Chief of the Pbiitical Section of the .i'ar -linistry, definitely pro-German; representative and adviser . . . the importance wielded by aim during the last three months before Japan's entry into thu war has obviously increased." (feh. 1272) . On 13 august 1943 Sato, attended the Erivy Council Iicceting with mitiami, To jo, ^aigemitsu and Oka to explain the proposed treaty by which Siam was to be rewarded by giving her part -f Lal .ya , when Tojo made the remark already quoted about International taw. is Chief -f the Military Affairs Bureau, entitled to attend Imperial General Headquarters, until December 1944, it is our submission that Sato bears a major responsibility for all the PC., offences. He was at the meeting of 4urea\i Chiefs of way I >-42 already mentioned, he received the Swiss protests, as controller of the war Ministry budget he must have approved the Burma-Sian railway decision. Jich. I96I-I9.77, 1979--. 47... 475. 476. 1988-2001*, 2003, - 0 1 0 , 2016^-2026 are among the exhibits which, coupled with the evidence of Tuaaka, fix the responsibility on him. In our submission all the charges are properly brought against him. FILE Nv. 7? PEPORI1 BY; R» H. GI uLru&Si) 1st It,,, Inf . RE: SATC, Kenr;?o DATEi 9 Iferch I9&6 STATUS t Pending On 9 January l9/'.t> the records cf the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined at the Diet Buil?ing, T<*Kye. Complete personnel records of tne subje.it were mi'-ro-filmed. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 118. Fallowing is a transcript of the translation: KEMP Y'O SATO BORN i 1 June 1895 RESIDENCE: Ishikawa Prefecture 1914 Mar 21+ Graduated from the Eanazawa 1st Middle School in Ishikawa Prefecture. 1914 Oct 29 Appointed sjs a cadet and assigned to the 1st Field Artillery (Far Dept.) 1914 Dec 1 Entered the 1st Field Artillery Regiment? Granted the rank of artillery Pf« (First Field Artillery Regiment) 1915 Jun 5 Promoted to artillery superior private (First Field Aroilleiy Regiment) 1915 Aug 1 Promoted to artillery corporal (First *'ield Artillery Regiment) 1915 Sep 1 Promoted ^o artillery sergeant (First Field Artillery Regiment) 1915 Nov 28 Entered the Military Academy 1917 May 25 Graduated from the Military Academy; Recumed to the crigi.ua! regiment; Promoted to artillery sergeant-major and o.rdered t.-> be a probationary officer in the 1st Field Artillery Regiment (First Field Artillery Regiment) 1917 Nov 26 Passed in the 3fficer3 : Selection Council \n accordance with Article 12 of the Army Replacement Ordinance 1917 Dee 25 Commissioned 2nd I>t. in the artillery (Cabinet); Ordered attached to the 1st Fiels? Artillery Regiment (War Dept.) 1918 Feb 20 Granted the 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade 1921 Apr 1 Promoted to 1st Lt . in the Artillery (Cabinet) 1921 May 20 Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Junior Prad,e (Cabinet) 1922 Dec 14 Ordered to enter the Army General Staff. College (War Dept.) 1926 Jun 15 Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade . 1926 ilug 6 Prometed to Captain in the Artillery (pablnet) 1,926 Aug 27 Released from the principal post and appoimted as a Company Commander in the 1st Field Artillery Reginsient (War Dept.) 1926 Dec 10 Ordered to serve in the Readjustment Bureau of the '^ar Department (Vfar Dept.) 1926 Dec 22 Released from the principal post and ordered to be attached to the 1st Field Artillery Regiment ('<?ar Department) 1928 Feb 2ly Ordered to be attached to the Army Ordnance Main Depot and concurrently as section staff member of the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Dept. 1929 Nov 25 Ordered to be stationed in the U .S ,A . for study of military affairs ('•ar Dept.) 1930 Jul 8 Granted the 6th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure 1931 Jul 15 Promoted to the 6th Court Hank, Junior Grade 1932 Jun 4 Ordered to bo attached to the 3th Medium Artillery Regiment ("tfar Department) 1932 Aj.g 8 Promoted to Major in the Artillery; (Cabinet) Appointed as a Battalion Commander in the 8th Medium Artillery Regiment( .far Dept.) 1933 1 Ordered to be attached to the Army Ordnance Main Depot and concurrently as a staff member of the Mobilization Plans 3ureau ("tfar Department) 1934 -'^g 3 ° Appointed officer in attendance to the inspector for the maintenance of munition supplies (if ar Dept.) 1935 Au,g 1 Appointed as instructor of strategy at the Army General Staff College (-/ar Dept.) • 1934 Apr 29 Promoted t:> the ijtb Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure in rccogn..tior. of nis service between 1931-^934-' 1936 Aug 1 Promoted to the fcth Co rrt Rank, Senior Grade; Oi'aored to be? C a c h e d to the Army Ordnance Main Depot and cocfurrcotly as a soctioii staff menbejr of the Bureau of Military .»f i ei ra (ftir Dcpte) 1937 Mar 1 Prom ••ted to Lt. Col. in the Artillery (Cabinet) 1*937 Jun 24 Appointed as an investigator of the Planning Office (Cabinet) 1*937 Aug 3 Commissi'." ned special member of the North China Incident General Mobilization Business Affairs committee (ifct reported in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) 1.937 Aug 6 Prcmoted to Lt, Crl„ in the Air F o n e ( (Cabinet )t Appointed' as an investigator of the Planning Office (Cabinet.)? commissioned special member of. tho North China lucid en- Gensrej. Mobilization B u s i n g s Affairs committee (Not reported in the Cfficial Gazette) (Cabinet) X*' 1-937 Sep 2 The name-of tho North China Incident . General Mjbili'zaMon IVbbili-^ation Business affairs Ccrar.ittee t?us changed to China Affair General lobil i-ation Business Affairrs Committee. 1-937 Aug 6 Attached tc the Army Ordnance Main Dop.-rt and assigned con- currently as a section staff member of the Bureau of Military Affairs of tho 'Tar Dept. (Not reported in the Official Gazette) (VTarDept.) U 9 3 7 3ct 25 The post of investigator of the Planning 3.oard was abolishec by Imperial Ordinance No* 605 t ]£L937 Nov 26 Appointed secretary (jimukan") of ttoe Planning Board E938 Jul 15 Promoted to Colonel in the Air Force (Cabi.net)\ Appointed member of the Cabinet Jn^Tormat i.on Board Committee (Cabinet) - 1938 Jul 29 Relieved of the post of secretary of the Planning Board (Cabinet) Relieved of the post of special member of the North China Incident General Mobilization Business Affairs Committee (Not reported in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) 1938 Jul 15 .^pointed concurrently to serve in the Bureau of Military Affairs (.Tar Dept.) 1938 Sep 1 Promoted to the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade 1938 Dec 12 Released from the post of member of the Cabinet Information Board Committee (Cabinet) 1939 Jun 17 Granted the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure 1941 Mar 14 Appointed Government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the War Department in the 76th Diet (Cabinet) 1941 Mir 15 Appointed secretary of the liaison coimittee of the Asia Development Board (Cabinet) 1941 Mar 18 appointed secretary ("jimukan") of the Manchurian A f f a rs Board; Appointed secretary of the Committee for the Assessment of Government Assets Invested in the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company (Cabinet) 1941 •'•pr 2 Appointed secretary of the China Affair Damage Investigation Committee (Cabinet). This was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 839 dated Sept. 3 , 1941. 19/p- Jun 9 Appointed secretary of the Oversea Colonization Investigation Committee (Cabinet) 1941 Oct 15 Promoted to Maj. Gen. (Cabinet) 1941 Nov 15 Appointed Government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the Jar Department in the 77th Diet (Cabinet) 1941 Nov 15 Promoted to the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade 1941 15 Appointed government commissioner dealing with affairs--under the jurisdiction of the War Department in the 78th Diet (Cabinet) 1941 Dec 25 Appointed government commissioner dealing with affairs, under the jurisdiction of the War Department in the 79th Diet (Cabinet) 1941 Dec 29 Appointed secretary of the Enemy Property Administration Csmmittee (Cabinet) 1941 Dec l6 Commissioned secretary of the 6th Corapittee (Cabinet) 1,942 F9b 21 Appointed as an assistant-secretary o,f the Greater East Asia Construction Council. (Cabinet) 1942 May 11 Appointed as a Councillor r,f the General Affairs Bureau of the .Agriculture and Forestry Department; Appointed as a member of the Agricultural and Forestry Planning Committee (Cabinet) 1942 May 12 Released from the post of secretary o f the 6th Committee (Not reported in the official gazette) (Cabinet) 1942 May 13 Appointed as a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Board; Appointed as a Councillor of the Planning Board; .appointed as secretary of the National Mobilization Council; Appointed as secretary of the Greater* East Asia Construction councij Apvoia'Sud as a member of the Liaison .Conmittoo of the Asia I'oTelC'pnjnt Board? r F - - ! ? Released from the pest of secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Board; Released fron the post of assistant-secretary of the Greater East Asia Construction Council; Released fron the post of secretary of the Liaison Con- nittee of the Asia Development Board; Released from the post of socrctary of the Cormitteo for Assessment of Government Assets Invested in the North China Development Company and the Central China Develop- ment Company (Cabinet) 1942 lay 26 Appointed government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the Jar Department in the 84th Diet (Cabinet) 1942 Jun 9 Released fron the post of secretary of the Overseas Colon- ization Investigation C-omittee (Cabinet) 1942 Sep 16 Appointed as a member of the ihemy Property -.administration Committee; (Cabinet) Released as manager of the Enemy Property Controlling Committee (Cabinet) 1942 Nov 1 Appointed a member of the Liaison Committee of the Greater East Asiatic Affairs Dcpartncnt (Cabinet) 1942 Nov 21 Appointed a member of the Liaison Committee of the Home Ministry (Cabinet) 1942 Dec 10 Commissioned member of the Temporary Production Promotion Committee (Not reported in the Official Gazette) (Cabinet) 1942 Dec 17 Appointed as Japanese Government representative on the Italo- Gernan-Japanese Mixed Conmi ssion of Experts held at Tokyo (Cabinet) 1942 Doc 21 appointed a member of the Committee for the Training of Essential Men for Greater East Asia (Cabinet) 1942 Dec 24 Appointed government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the ^ar Dept. in the 81st Diet (Cabinet) 1943 ^ ^ 27 Appointed a Councillor of the Instruction and Education of the Education Department (Cabinet) 1940 Apr 29 Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Golden Kite and the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun (in recognition of servico in the China affair) 1943 ûrn 15 Appointed government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the *7ar Department in the 82nd Diet (Cabinet) 1943 Jul 21 Appointed a member of the Judging Committee on Specially Salvaged Copper (Cabinet) 1943 4 Appointed as a Councillor of the Racial Research Institute (Cabinet) 1^43 Sep 6 -.ppoiiited concurrently as an Investigator of the Planning Board 5 Promoted to the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet) Ordered to be attached to the General Affairs Chamber of the President's Secretariate of the Pla:nning Board (Cabinet) 1943 Sep 9 appointed to the retinue of the Administrative Inspector; ordered to join the retinue of Administrative Inspector, Tujihara 1943 Cct 2.3 -ppointod as government commissioner. dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the /ar D 2pt. in the 83rd Diet (Cabinet) 1943 Oct 29 Released fron post of nenber of the r-etimuc of the Admin- istrative Inspector ( Cabinet) )cc 7 ̂ i 3 1943 ^ct 3 ° Released from the concurrent post (Cabinet) 1943 22 Appointed as a Councillor of tho General Affairs Bureau of tho -agriculture and Commerce Department (Cabinet) 1943 ^ec 24 Appointed as Government commissioner dealing with the affairs under the jurisdiction of the V/ar Dept. in the 84th Diet (Cabinet) 1943 Dec 27 Appointed concurrently as munitions official of the Munitions Ministry (Cabinet) 1943 Dec Appointed to the retinue of the Administrative Inspector; Ordered to join the retinue of the Fujihara Administrative Inspector 1944 Jan 27 '-ppointed as a member of tho Religious Enlightenment Policy Committee (Cabinet) 1944 Jen 28 Appointed as a member of the Council on Commodity Prices (Cabinet). This was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 114 dated Mar. 10, 1945c 1944 »'-pr 19 Released from the retinuo of the Administrative Inspector (Cabinet) 1944 Jun 10 Commissioned as member of the •fertimo Food Problems Council (Agriculture and Forestry Dept.) 1944 ^un 3 ° Appointed as a Councillor of the Munitions Ministry (Cabinet) 1944 Sep 6 -.ppointed as government commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the '^ar Dept. i,n the 85th Diet (Cabinet) 1944 Sep 19 Appointed to the retinue of the Administrative Inspector (Cabinet) 1944 ^ P 19 -".ppointed to tho retinue of Administrative Inspector, Toyoda (Cabinet) 1944 Dcc 15 Appointed as a member of the Preparation, Committee for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia. Museum (Cabinet) 1*944 Dcc 27 Released from the post of member of the Preparation Com- mittee for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Museum (Cabinet) 1.945 Jnn 12 Released from the post of Councillor of the Instruction and Education Bureau of the Education. Ministry (Cabinet) 1 Released from tho post of Councillor of the Munitions Ministry (Cabinet) 1.945 Jen 23 Appointed as a member of tho Religious Enlightenment Policy Committee (Cabinet) 1.945 Jen 27 Released from the post of secretary of the National General Mobilization Council (Cabinet) 1X945 Fcb 8 Released from the post of member of the Enemy Property Ad- ministration Committee (Cabinet) 11945 Feb 19 Released from the post of councillor of .the General Affairs Bureau of the Agriculture and Forestry; Ministry (Cabinet) 11945 Mer 1 Promoted to Lt. Gen. (Not reported in .the official gazette) (Cabinet) 11945 Mar 15 Promoted to the 4"th Court Rank, Junioc Grad^ j j r c i i 3 1945 -pr 7 Appointed corxiander of the 37th Division (Not reported in the Official Gazette) 1945 ^ n 1 Released frcn the retinue of the Adninistrative Inspector (Cabinet) P E N D I N G - 6 -TV', "'c; C0C3 Page 1"> \ OKA The particulars rath regard to OFA are to be found on rago 333 of the Summary, and the exhibits ~hich directly affect him are: Exhibits Nos. 102; 120; 1103; 588; 650; 1128; 1169; 1107; 1241; 1266; 1275; 1979-A; 2022; 2023; 2025-A; 2026; Record Pages 15025; 15028; 15019; 19980-1; 15154 (Exhibit 2092); 15109-126; 15148-50; 15185 (Exhibit 2105). This naval officer, after serving in the grade as a member of the Naval General Staff from 1933 to 1936, became Chief of the No. 1 Section of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, where he served from January, 1938 to October, 194-0, and at the same time was Secretary of the Bureau of Manchurinn Affairs from January, 1938 to October 1939. He was decorated for his services in the Manchuria and China "Incidents." He became Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs and attached to the Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters 15 October 1940. He occupied this position until 18 July 1944, when he became Vice Minister of the Navy. On 23 January* 1941, he was appointed Japanese member of the joint Japan-German-* Italian Commission. The importance of his position as Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs is shown by the fact that he attended twenty-four liaison conferences between the crucial period from 13 January, 1941 to 30 June, 1941, among which conferences was the one of the 25th June, 1941 at which it was decided to station troops in Indo-China and Thailand and acquire naval and air bases by diplomacy, if possible, or, that failing, by resorting to armi. (Record Page 11057)• This Bureau held the corresponding position in the Navy Ministry to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry. It was the political bureau, and among its many important functions was to maintain relations with other ministries and the public, and especially with the War 'Ministry. Indeed it was sometimes known as the Bureau of Military Affairs. In fact, OKA, throughout his long period in the office was the opposite number first of Muto and then of Sato in the War Ministry, and seems to have kept in close touch with them. Doc. No. 0003 P a g e 1 1^ For instance, in Kido's diary for 15 July, 1941 (Exh. 1115) Muto and Oka are shorn to have direct influence on the formula to be used in the Japan-United States negotiations since Kido states that if the Foreign Minister has no objection to the formula prepared by them it will be pushed through, and later ?/hen the deadlock between Konoye, To.jo and Oikawa occurred in October, it was by negotiation between Muto and OKA that an attempt was made to settle the matter (Exh. 1148). We submit that OKA was just as important a figure in the navy as Muto in the army. Like Muto and afterwards S^to, he occupied a great variety of positions connected with other departments such as the secretaryship of the general mobilization and many other posts, listed in Exhibit 120. When Oikawa resigned with the Third Konoye Cabinet and Shimada succeeded him, being as we submit obviously chosen as the man in the navy prepared to do Toio's bidding, OKA retained his position while the navy was putting into operation its long- prepared plans of attack. When the holding of and attendance 'at Liaison Conferences ceased to be published in July we submit the obvious inference is that he continued to attend as before. He attended the four decisive Imperial Conferences in 1941 of 2 July, 6 September, 5 November and 1 December. He attended the Privy Council meeting on 28 July, 1941, where protocol between France and Japan was discussed regarding military cooperation. It was decided that clarification vould be made to show that occupation of French Indo-China was in agreement with France and not by force, so that the United States would understand. Of course, this had in fact been brought about by pressure on the Vichy Government through German aid. The second meeting was held and agreement with France approved for military cooperation, air fields and naval bases, quartering of troops in French Indo-China and freedom of movement. (Record page 7079, Exhibit 650) On 14 October 1941, after a Cabinet Meeting which produced a deadlock, Muto offered to give 'way if the Navy v'ould core out definitely against war. OKA for the Navy refused to do this and left it to Konoye, but To jo and Muto would not accept. (Record Page 10258-63) (Exhibit 1148). If lie had declared opposition it seems the war would not have broken out.. At 7:30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 he attended investigation committee of privy Council where Shinada reported on the starting of war against the U.S. At this meeting, To.jo said thnt "since the first of December negotiations were continued merely for the sake of strategy." (Record 10690, Exhibit 1241). On 10 December 1941 he. attended a meeting of the Investiga- tion Committee of the Privy Council where agreement with Germany as to no separate peace was discussed (Record pnge 113C4, Exhibit 1266). On October 20, 1942 he attended a meeting of the privy Council where the formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry was discussed, and another meeting on the 21st of October 1942 (Page 12070, Exhibit 687). On 18 August 1943 he attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council in connection with the Japanese- Thailand Treaty where the annexation of the Shan States by Thailand was discussed. At this meeting Tojo stated that Japan would recognize International Law as long as the enemy did so but T'ould interpret it from the viewpoint of the war according to her own opinions (Record Page 11,364, Exhibit 1275). Even if the truth is that he had no vote at any of these meetings this is of little importance because the proceedings were always unanimous. The important point is th^t they fix him with full knowledge of the policy to be pursued, which we sub. it his position gave him great power of shaping, and he retained that position. Dcc. No. 0003 P a g S 1 1 7 When the To.jo cabinet was tottering in July 1944 it was OKA and Sato who tried to snve it, by inducing Yonai and Record page 14,980-1 and Exhibit 2036-B show that the Military (or Naval) Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry was responsible for matters concerning POW and its functions were parallel to those of the.Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The testimony of SUZUKI, Todakatsu, (Record, Pages 15,506-533, and Exhibits 2170, 2173 and 2174, show that copies of protests from the protecting power regarding treatment of P0W were customarily sent to the Navy Ministry and sometimes addressed to the Vice Minister of the Navy, sometimes to the Minister .of the Navy and sometimes to the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Exhibits No. 2022, 2023, 2025-A and 2026, pre protests from the protecting Power regarding mistreatment of P0W. On 7 October 1943, Rear Admiral Sakaibara ordered the execution of 96 American POW on Wake Island (Exhibit 3036-A, Record Page 15,046). In October, 1943, Vice Admiral Abe received a report from Admiral Sakaibara of the death of the 96 POW at Wake Island (Page 15,025). Captain Obara testified that vice Admiral Abe on October 10, 1942, gave him the following direction: "In accordance with a directive received from Central Headquarters, it has been decided to execute the Makin prisoners here and not send them back to Japan. You will take Gharge of carrying out this /execution/." (Record Page 15,019). Vice Admiral Abe testified that he ordered the execution of 9 American POW from Makin at Kwajelein in October 1942 as a result of a visit from Lt. Commander Gkada of the General Staff in Tokyo, "who told me not to ship POW back to Japan, but dispose of them on the spot, which I .judged to be the Navy's policy" (Record page 15,028). Doc. Mo. 0003 • Pa§e 1 1 8 Vice Admiral Abe further stated as to the 9 American POW, "a directive was issued to me from the highest Navy Central HQ to dispose of them on my island." (Record Page 15,030). During 1943-1944, the crews of the British ships "Daisy Holler," "British Chivalry", "Sutley," "'Ascot," and "Nancy Holler," were destroyed (Page 15, 154, Exhibit 2092). On 2 July 1944 the crew of the Jean Nicolet was destroyedc (Pages 15109, 15126). On 29 October 1944 the ere-'" of the John A. Johnson was destroyed. (Record Page 15,148, 15,150). Record Page 15,186 sho^s Oshima's tall-' with Ribbo.-ntrop re submarine warfare, Germany sent two submarines to Japanese and Ribbentrop talked about failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed merchant ships and German U-Boat Order of September, 1942 that they would not rescue survivors. Oshima reported this to Japanese Nav-1 Attache'. The following is a translation of an extract from a Japanese document captured at Kwajelein atoll: "Flagship Hainan Haru at Truk, 20 March 1943, Military, Ultra-Secret (6unki) Copy 24 of 70 — 1st Submarine Force Secret Opord #2-43" - "***do not sto] with sinking of enemy ships and cargo; at the same time that you carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships, if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy." (Record Page 15,18-5, Exhibit 21C5). The responsibility of OFA for Governsent action from the time he became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, is inescapable. He took part in practically every important liaison conference during 1^41, attended Privy Council meetings, end Imperial conferences continuously up to the outbreak of the war and thereafter. At the Cabinet meeting of 14 October when he had the opportunity to act for the Navy against war, he declined to act. The Imperial conferences and liaison meetings and cabinet and privy council meetings which he attended, all decided on aggression. . Jo. 0003 I 1 Q Pie was the officer of the Navy I-inistry responsible fo" POT and received protests by the protecting Po*,Ter against nis- treatment of PO'r, but did nothing about it. The record- of wanton slaying of POW not only on land but at sea, taken in connection ^ith the order of the 1st Submarine Squadron, shows th^t it must have been the Navy policy to wantonly put to death such helpless prisoners. vPage 120 Doc. Ho. 0003 E03HIS0 The particulars with regard to him are to he found at rage 324 of Appendix B. Additional references are made on rages 15952- 15976, Record, 3xhs. 2224-5. In July 1932 HOSHIBO went to Manchuria to "become director of the General Affairs Bureau from 1932 t« 1936 (5119-20). During that time there was a constant liaisnn "between the Bureau end Fw an tune :rmy (5131, r,159). Throughout this ceriod his most important nctivi-iea appear to have been - (1) in connection with contract for unlerwriting and sub- scription of Manchsikuo Government national Foundation Bonds dated 19 November 1932- This he si ned on behalf of -anchukuo. ( -x. 375, F. 4684). It oroviied for raising of 30 million yen for Manchukuo by issue of bonds in Jap^n secured by the Opium Monopoly Office and the Kirin-Heilung-Kiang Transport Toll Office; ( 2 ) that he worked with KI3HI on the economic plans for the development of Manchiikuo (5127), (3) that he took a prrminent^part in the drawing of the 5 year Industrial Flan fer Manchukuo (-Ex. 4'6). This was adooted in 1937 (5069). The Kwantung Army agreed to and supported the plan (5129). In, 1936, .'jo.-IxJO joined the Manchukuo Government as Vice Minister for Finance an I in December 1936 he-became Chief of the General Affairs-Board-of Manchukuo (5134). The ">ard t»ok charge of the budget, statistics, personnel, legal matters and information. The "oard controlled•the other.bureaux ?nd it was one of the most important divisions of the government (5135). It had the duty of directing and guiding political and economic*.affairs in Manchuria in the interest of Jarvn as well as Manchukuo (1998). • FU YI says that nOSHIMj-was engaged in exploiting Manchurian industries and in the control, of economic affairs (4021), The five I ear Industrial Flan was announced in 1936 and « adopted in 1937. Unier the heading of Folicy, the Flan states that emphasis baa been placed on opening up resources in Manchukufi , hich Doc. No. 0003 Fage 121 may "be required in time of emergency. The meaning of "Time of Emergency" is clearly indicated in sub paragraph 1 (a) "munition industries for weapons <\f war, airplanes, automobiles, and rolling stock will "be firmly established". (Ex. 446) In 1937 TO JO became Chief ®f Staff cf the Kwantung Army and EQoHIHO and TOJO worked together (5172). In May 1938 the Five Year Industrial Flan was revised. Tho revision more than doubled tho original estimate of funds required. Heavy emphasis was placcd on materials which could "be used for production of munitions and woapens cf war (Ex. ^-46, P. 30, 54). On the 29th of April, 1940, HOSHIKO was doccrated for meritorious service in the China Affair, Ex. 109. As Chief of General Affairs Board in Manchuria, ROSHItfO was the most powerful and influential man in the Government and took directions only from tho Kwantung Army. Ho utilized his position to (l) enormously increase production of war potentials in Manchukuo ( 2 ) to enormously increase production of sale of narcctics. In the latter connection he fostered the epium monopoly in Manchuria and as previously stated, secured Manchukucan fiati^nal Founding Bends on this monopoly, This was definitely in furtherance of tho policy of the Kwantung Army. In Juns 1933 revenue from ^pium mcnopol was £10,^00,000 (Each. 227). In 1939 net profit from monopolies were estimated at £56,000,000 after payment of £15,000,000 to General Account Reserve Funds and National Loan Funis (47'~l). In July 1940 'he left Manchuria and returned to Japan (5,136). The numerous reports from U. S. officials quoted in the Summary show that under ths cloak of carrying out the League of Bat ions policy against narcotics (the policy of a committee cf which Japan remained a member) the salo was in truth "being vigorously pushed "by the agencies for whijh HOSHIKO was responsible. On his return tc Japan he "became Director of the Cabinet Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio in ths Second Konoye Cabinet (5,136). The Board provided for the organization of industries in tho same line of business into a solid group which undertook to carry on under government control (p. 5,131). The rlanning o*rd ma-̂ e the necessary plans to supply materials required "by the Army, Payy • nl civilian authorities. mhe Army and - avy demands increased year year (Fl'8~"150). On 27 July 1940 at the Liaison Conference a decision w*s made concerning improvement of conditions at home and abroad and the acceleration of the China Incident and the settlement within limits of the southern -oroblfein. Policies of fostering strong oolitic?! ties with Permany an^ Ital? and obtaining by strong diplomatic oclicies raw materials from the etherlands Hast Indies were also ieeided. "aOShlu'O was ?resilent of the ilannin^ Poard ar.d Minister without Port- folio at this time (Pxh. 1210). In August 1D40 (Pxh. 1311) a iraft of alternative demnnds to he made on the Netherlands :ast Indies set out various demands regarding enterprises awl investments minin~ tshiip'" "s-^ici? t'.r?., •fi-M:--.er newspaoer propaganda, etc. POc -Ix 0 was Minister without Portfolio and President of the Planning Poard at this time. In September 19*0 (Pxh. -c50) .-iptsuoVo gave an explanation re- garding the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. On 26 September 19-4-0 (&xh. ^52) there was a conference of the Investigation Committee of the rriv' Council on the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. '.o IPO was oresent anl as Chief of the lanning o-rd ?ave estimates of Japan's strength stating she was not v ->t comolete in su? lies or self- sufficiency of reserves, however, they were auite orepared. -e »ve estimates on oil, petrol, etc.j and stated that through the Commodity Mobilization Program provision has bepn made for civilian living. The s--me material is shown in Pxh. 1030. Document No. 0003 "O n r- p Exh. 553 is the record of the meeting of the Privy Council of the 26th of September 1940 regarding the strengthening of relations with Germany and Italy (Tripartite Pact) in view of the increar ng difficulty of the international position. HOSHINO was present. Exh. 554 is the Imperial Bescript of 27 Se"te?.:ber 1940 pro- claiming the Pact. HCSHINO's name is on this document. Exh. 1298, an entry in Xido's Diary of 28 September 1940, states that Kido had been informed by the Emperor of the government's present wish to avoid force against the Netherlands Past Indies and Singapore and in view of the fact that eight months preparations are necessary for war, the later war comes the better. FOSKIiJO was still President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio. Exh. 868A contains the Ordinance of Organization of the Total '.rar kesearch Institute. HOSHINO was Director of this Institute iron - Stakes '•:<, iA ari4 lyuuciilo? i'roe & Obj to 24 November 1941. He was also a member of the committee to establish this Institute and for "Dart of the time was Minister without Portfolio and for another part of the time was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet (8,862). The outline of the Ten Year Plan for Block Economy of Japan, Manchukuo, and China was announced by the G-overnraent Information Bureau on 5 November 1940. The carrying out of this plan envisaged Japan exercising rights of sovereignty over China with which Japan was then at war. The plan \iras stated to be the result of the government's study principally with the Planning Board. BOSFINO was then President of the Planning Board (Exh. 2224, p. 15,952). On January 22 1941 the Cabinet outlined its population p-»liĉ ' stating that it was the mission of the Empire to establish the ^ast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to secure Japan's leadership in East Asia. HOSHINO had given explanations and cpinions at the meeting and the plan was unanimously adopted (see Exh. 865 and 1067). As the objoct of the plan was stated to be to increase the population in order to provide greater war strength, it destroys the excuse sometimes put Document No. 0003 ' r forward for Japanese aggression that an outlet was required for surplus population. On 8 March 1941 it was publicly announced that the detailed regulations of the National Mobilization Law would be put into force on 20 March. HOSHINO waa Minister of State and Director of the Planning Board at this time (Exh. 1055), but resigned on the 4th of April 1941. Exh. 870A dated August 1941 is a record of Table Top Maneuvers held by the Total War .Research Institute. It shows that under these maneuvers the general policy of Japan concerning Third Power problems was that Japan would not give to the United States a clear explanation of her position nor expect a peaceful settlement but did adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations at the same time completing war preparations. HOSHINO was a Councillor of this Institute. On 25 September 1941 the Total War Research Institute reproduced a secret docunent containing particulars in framing a program for extension of important industries. This included a sum- mary of five years program of important industries prepared by the War Ministry 29 May 1937, a resume of policy relating to execution of essentials of a five year program — trial graph prepared by the Army — 10 June 1937, and summary of a program for extension of productive capacity, prepared by the Planning Board in January 1939. HOSHINO was a Councillor rf this Institute (843), On 18 October 1941 HOSHINO became Chief Secretary of Tojo's Cabinet. On 4 November 1941 the Cabinet made and issued instructions to the Information Board in connection with releasing news on prepara- tion for war and strategic news. This provided that the suppression of reports on the tenseness of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the United States should be eased and the people given hope for the future. News and speeches enabling the enemy to see Japan's war preparations were excluded as well as all activities which might incite the public to take action against residents of Third Powers (Exh. 1167). At the Imperial Con'er^nce held on 5 November 1941, measures toward foreign countries in relation to the plans of execution of national policy towards the Emptre were decided upon (Exh. 1169). Document No, 0003 On 11 November 1941 a Liaison Conference was held and at this meeting the principle reasons alleged for commencement of hostilities agains the United States and Great Britain were stated (lxh. 1175). Although the names of those present were not listed, it may be assumed that HOSEINO by virtue of his official position attended. ixh. 1176 dated 12 November 1941 sets out the general outline for extending the conclusion of war against the United States, Great Britain, Netherlands, and Chungking. This provided in essence the plan to be adopted towards foreign powers which has already been set out in Fxh. 1169 relating to the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941. Each-. 878 dated 13 November 1941 is a record of the meeting of the Liaison Confer- ence held on that date. It is substantially the same as Sxh. 1169 with some additions in respect to China. There is no list of those who attended but it may be inferred that EOSFINO wa3 present. On 25 November 1941 it was officially announced that the Anti-Comintern Pact had been sicned {'^xh. 496). At a Cabinet meeting on 28 November 1941 a new press system was approved. This placed the Japanese press on a wartime b&sis. ECSHINO attended the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941 (^xh. 1107). Sarly in Decemte: he attended a Cabinet meeting at which was decided that in the event of Japanese negotiations with the United State3 being unsuccessful, Japan would go to war (15,971). On December 7, 1941 Eido's Diary (Fxh. 1220) states that BOSKINO visited Kido to consult about the war with the United States and England. At 9 a.m. on the 8th December 1941, after Japanese forces had already attacked Great Britain and the United States he was present, at the meeting of the Privy Council when war was declared on the United States and helped to compile necessary Imperial Rescript relating thereto (15,968, 15,976). On October 9, 1942, he was present at the meeting of the Privy Council relating to the Greater Fast Asia Ministry. There Tojo explained that in order to achieve victory it was an absolute necessity Page 126 Document Ho. 0G-03 for the combined fighting power of East Asia to "be strengthened and that it was desireable to establish a Ministry to achieve those aims and to ensure swift and decisive action (Exh, 687). He was also present at subsequent meetings of the Prity Council dealing with the same master on 12th and 14th October 1942 (Eth. C37). On 6 Novamber 1942 he attended the Assembly of East Asiatic Nations at which c-he joint declaration cf the meeting was approved (Exiu 134C). He retained his post as Chief Secretary until 22 July 44 serving on various Government Committees during the interim. Except for the brief period between 4 April 1941 and 18 October 1941 Hoshino was either a Minister of Stats or Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. Whilst a Minister or" State he was also President of the Planning Board. In these capacities he was privy to and took an active -cart in the continuance of the war with China and preparations for war with the Allies, From October 1941 onwards he attended all Cabinet meetings and knew that Japan whilst pretending to negotiate with the United States intended to strike. Later he knew that Japan had attacked without any declaration of war but still retained his Cabinet post, One cannot resist the conclusion that from at least 1936 onwards Hoshino favoured the expansion of Jap^n even at the expense of peaceful neighbours, that he joined in the various conspiracies charged and lent powerful assistance towards their fulfillment*DOC 7510 REPORT BY: R.H. GILLILAND 1st Lt. Inf. FILE NO. 118 RE: MATUSOKA, Yosuke DATE: 7 February 194-6 On 9 January 1946 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyo. Complete personnel records of the subject were micro- filmed. Photostatic copies,together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No, 89. Following is a transcript of the translation: NAME: Yosuke MA TSUOKA BORN: March 4, 1880 RESIDENCE: Yamaguchi Prefecture 1900 June 1904 Oct. 20 1904 May 4 1904 Dec . 23 1906 July 31 1906 Oct. 25 1906 Nov. 29 1907 Feb. 1 Graduated Lav/ School, Oregon State, University, Portland, U.S.A. Passed the Diplomatic Service and Con- sular Examinations. Appointed Acting Consul; conferred the 7th Grade of Higher Officials (Cabinet); Granted salary 5th Order (Foreign Office); Ordered to serve at Shanghai (Foreign Office). Granted 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade. Granted salary 4th Order (Foreign Office) • Appointed Secretary to the Kwanto Toto- fuku (Government at Dairen, Highest Offic«e in the District): Granted the 6th Order of Higher Officials (Cabinet) Granted Salary 7th Order (Kwanto Totofuku.) Appointed Chief of the Foreign Depart- ment of the Kwanto Totokufu. Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade. SOC 7510 19CY Feb. 23 .' ppointod Acting Chief Secretary of tho -Secretariat vhile Koniehi jUGJritt v/as absent (Kwanto T»P.)» 1906 ;>pr* 1 Osccratod with tho fit:- Grado of "orit and with Order of linslo ftsy of the Hisin̂ Sun an.:. Granted. 300 Tr.; for neritorioua service during Russo->Japaneso war. 1907 Sept. 23 Appointed Acting Chief S-?rotnry to tho Secretariat end Ac tin;" Gh i of Secret art' to the Archives and document Section while tho Chief, Koniehi '3UC-IU.Lv v:as absent. 1907 ; ov. 1C '.ppolntod Secretary ia the Foreign Office. Conferred with the Cth Grado of "igher Officials (Cabinet) Granted 7th Qrade Salary and appointed to servo in bureau of fclitical Afitnira (Foreign Office). 190C June 30 Grantod 6th Grade Salor „ (Foreign Offiec). 1>0G )cc. V. Appointed 3rd Secretary to the Legation.. Conferred tho 6 th Grade of Higher Official ..(Cabinet) Conferred the 1st Grade of Salary. (Foreign Cfficc) Appointed to service in Belgium (Foreign Office). 190S Fob. 10 'ippointed to service in China. 19C9 July S Granted tho third order of merit of Or a-jon by the Chinese Go Vermont. 1909 Sept. 17 Appointed additional post to the Consul. 1909 ".opt. 17 Conferred the 6th Grade of Sighor officials. 1909 Oec.. 28 Conferred the 5th Grade of gher Officials, Special ir©motion. {.'Krxr.sr* office and -ddiona) Office? (G-M >et) Conferred the 3rd Grade of Gaiary. 1>10 l"ar. £2 Grantod tho 5th Court tanh, Junior Grade. 1;10 Apr* 1 Salary .Schedule loguJ- tion of ne "Tidier officials wag rovis 1910 19 Relieved of tho additional post, 1910 Sont» 3 Appointed tho 3ocond secretary to t o Lo "ration. Appointed to 5th Grade of High Official (Cabinet). Conferred tile 3rd grade of salary (F. 0.) . 191C 27 Conferred tho 2nd Grade of Salary (̂ .0.). 1912 June 2 ' fJonferrod the 5th Order of ; .ri;' of Sacred Srcastaro. DOC 7510 1912 June 30 Conferred the 1st Grade of Salary 1912 Aug. 2 Appointed the 2nd Secretary to the Embassy, Granted the 5th G"*ade of Higher Official (Cabinet) Conferred. 1st Grade of Salary (Foreign Office) Appointed to service in Russia (Foreign Office). 1912 Dec. 28 Conferred 4th Grade of Higher Official (Cabinet). Conferred 3rd Grade of Salary (Foreign Office). 1912 Feb. 20 Conferred the 6th Court Ranlc, Senior Grade. 1912 Aug. 1 Awarded the Commemoration Medal for the ann- exation of Korea.. 1913 Oct. 29 Appointed to service in U.S.A. (Foreign Office). 1915 Dec. 17 Conferred the 2nd Grade of Salary, 1916 Apr. 1 Decorated with the 3rd Order of *%rit of the Rising Sun with Double Rays and granted 600 Yen for meritorious service during 1915-1916. 1916 July 1 Appointed the ^irst Secretary to the Embassy; Promoted to the 4th grade of High Official (Cabinet); Conferred the 2nd Grade of Salary (F. Office). Appointed to ser/ice in the U.S.A. as well. 1916 Dec. 26 Special promotion to the 3rd Grade of High Officials (Cabinet); Conferred the 2nd Grade of Salary (F, Office). Recalled from service in U.S.A. (F. Office). Ordered to be temporarily ongaged in the Affairs of Foreign Offices Received frill salary while waiting orders. 1917 Feb. 12 Appointed 3usiness Officer as well as Secretary to the Foreign Office (Foreign Office); Conferred the 3rd grade of High"Officials ( Cab.) 1916 Dec. 23 Approved to receive and wear the Order of St0 Stanirus Second Class granted by Czar (Emperor of Russia). 1917 Feb. 12 Granted the 2nd Grade of Salary. 1917 Sept. 10 A ppcinted to the Specifej Committee for Diplo- matic ana Concular Examinations (Cabinet). 1917 Nov. 22 Appointed to additional pest of Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs .(Cabinet); Conferred rank of 3rd Grade of High Officials (Cabinet). 1917 Jan. 21 Granted 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade. - 3 - DOC 7510 1918 May 8 1918 May 8 1918 June 13 1918 June 29 1918 Aug. 16 1918 Aug. 21 1918 Sept 29 1918 Dec. 3 1919 Feb. 5 1919 Dec. 9 1920 May 1 1920 May 7 1920 May 31 1920 Sept 7 1921 June 29 1921 July 4 1920. July 11 1925 July 3 Released from the additional post as Secretary of Minister of Foreign Affairs (Cabinet) Appointed additional post as Secretary to the Prime Minister, Conferred the 3rd Grade of High Officials and the 1st Grade of Salary, Decorated with the 4th Order Merit and the Order of Sacred Treasure (Cabinet) Appointed Special Committee for State Examinations (Cabinet) Appointed Secretary of a temporary committee for assisting financially Siberian economic conditions, Released from additional post of Secretary to the Prime Minister (Cabinet) Ordered to Europe (Cabinet) Ordered to accompany the Peace Plenipotentiary. Ordered to go to Fuchuo (China) (Foreign Office). Appointed Consul General; Granted the 3rd Grade of High Officials (Cabinet); Service at Bureau of Political Affairs (Foreign Office). Special Promotion to 2nd Grade of High Officials; Conferred the 1st Grade of Salary (Foreign Office) Granted 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade. Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit of Rising Sun and 2,800 Yen for meritorious service during the war of 1916-1921 and the concluding of the peace treaty with Germany (Board of Decoration). Released from post by request (Cabinet). Appointed the Director of the South Manchuria- Railway Co., Ltd. Granted 4th Class Court Rank, Junior Grade, by special promotion. Expiration of the term as Director. - 4 - DOC 7510 1925 July 4 A ppointed as the Director of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. (Cabinet). 1925 Mar, 10 Released from the post by reouest. (do) 1927 July 19 A pointed Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. (Cabinet) 1929 June 21 Appointed lice Governor to the Company by Imperial Ordinance No. 178. 1929 Aug. 17 Released from the post by request (Cabinet-*. 1930 Feb. 20 Elected as a Member of Parliament, Imperial Diet. 1930 Jul" 3 Appointed Member of a bommittee for the Inter- national Tourist Bureau. 193^0ct. 11 Appointed Representative of Janan to the extra- ordinary general Meeting of League of Nations at Geneva, Switzerland. " " " Appointed by the Emperor himself to be treated as an officer. (Cabinet). 193^ May 8 Released fron the post (Cabinet). Dec. 27 Resigned as M. P. of the Diet. 193J 1935 Aug. 2 Appointed the President of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. (Cabinet). 1935 Sept. 21 Appointed to the Colonial Committee Conference. 1935 Oct. 23 Decorated with the First Order Merit of Sacred Treasures for meritorious service during the war 1931-1934. 1937 Sept. 18 Appointed for the Organizing Committee for the Imperial Fuel Manufacturing Co., Ltd, (Cabinet) . 1937 Oct. 15 Appointed Councilor of the Cabinet (Cabinet). 1938 Jan. 20 Released from the Organizing Committee for the Imperial Fuel Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (Cabinet) . 1938 Apr. 30 Appointed to the Organizing Committee for the North China Development Co., Ltd. and the Central China Promotion Co.. Ltd. 1939 Mar. 24 Released as the President of South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd., by request. 1939 July 5 A pointed to the Koa Committee Meeting (Cabinet;) 1938 Nov. 8 Released from these posts (Cabinet). - 5 - Doc 7510 1 940 J;an 23 Roloassd ns Councilor of the Cabinot by rsi'-* nnt (Cabinet) 1540 July 22 pointed ••Tinist-nr for Forai;;: Affairs and additionally appointed ft 0 the I'inistor f or 0vur3oao Affairs (Cabinet), 1940 July 31 Released from the T'oa Committee rooting by request (Cabinet). 19i|0 AU3» 1 Granted the 3rd Court lank, Junior Grade. 1940 Sept. 28 Relieved of additional post as the J!inistor £>r tho Overseas Affaires (Cabinet).- Appointed a representative of the Ifciairo to nodi at a the conflict b rstn̂oii Si a;: and French Tndo-China over their borders Appointed as n 'lopresontativo of the ire efc tho mixed 0e:".Tr it tec ace tin;1; of nations - Japan, Germany and Italy- at Tokyo. ("Tot roportod official gazette) (Cabinet*. Appointed to ̂ 0 to Suropo (Cabinet),. ftalsacsd fro:?, the post by raquost (Cabinet), .omitted to receive aid wear tho 1st Ordor "orit of white "Slcphant; -ranted by tho ̂ rporor of Si an (Ttoard of Decoration) Decorated with the First Order T'orit with the Grand Cordon of Rising Sun for meritorious servioe in the China war. (Boerd of Decoration). 1̂ 41 Fob. 5 1941 Jan. 23 1941 rar, 12 1941 July 13 1541 July 21 1940 Apr,. 1'; a E N D I N G
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