@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "Philosophy, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Peacey, Arthur Thomas"@en ; dcterms:issued "2012-03-16T16:19:34Z"@en, "1951"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description "Since we accept a democratic society as desirable, it is important to have a sound basis for ethical action. To substantiate such a basis it is necessary to controvert the ethical relativity which has become widespread as a result of the anthropological evidence of the diversity of customs and standards in different societies. This thesis maintains that it is possible to adopt a naturalistic position and at the same time hold that ethical value transcends culture. If it is assumed that within man is focussed the highest development of the universe, the ethic relevant to humanity acquires a universal character. An evolutionary approach provides the justification. Ethical value concerns the \"ought\" and comes into being when one person considers the rights of others and modifies his conduct accordingly. Ethical action has two manifestations: (1) Intrinsic value conferred on others; and (2) Ethical value, the expression of an obligation, which incidentally leads to an accession of intrinsic value by the agent performing an ethical action. Ethical value is viewed as a basic function of human nature regardless of any specific culture and the corresponding \"ethical ought\" is distinguished from the \"social ought\" which is a rule of conduct imposed implicitly by society. It is maintained that there is a universalism implicit in the ethical ought--man is an ethical creature; the ethical ought is an obligation to foster what is right and can not be reduced to custom or convention. After considering briefly the influence of psychology on ethics, the evolution of man's ethical nature is traced, and the endeavour made to show that ethical value is an evolving capacity of man. Anthropological data showing the influence of training and society on personality is reviewed, and criteria for comparing cultures advanced. It is suggested that our present culture with all its faults is superior to others and that the final influence of Western democracy, if its full implications are realized, may be beneficial. Four criteria are presented as constituting the essential marks of ethical conduct; reverence for life, honesty, truth telling, and respect for personality. A rapid survey of a number of societies suggests that while no definitive pattern can be found, it is a reasonable hypothesis that men behave within certain limits of acceptable conduct, and that a social need lies behind departures from the criteria mentioned. The conclusion is drawn that ethical value, the moral imperative, is the expression of a capacity natural to man as a species (although it can be manifested fully only under conditions of mature development of personality and environment) and that since humanity is greater than any specific culture, ethical value does transcend culture."@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/41477?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "DOES ETHICAL VALUE TRANSCEND CULTURE? by ARTHUR THOMAS PEACEY A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the standard r e q u i r e d from candidates f o r the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Members of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1951 A B S T R A C T Since we accept a democratic society as desirable, i t i s important to have a sound basis f o r e t h i c a l action. To substantiate such a basis i t i s necessary to controvert the e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y which has become widespread as a res u l t of the anthropological evidence of the d i v e r s i t y of customs and standards in di f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . This thesis maintains that i t i s possible to adopt a n a t u r a l i s t i c posi-t i o n and at the same time hold that e t h i c a l value transcends culture. I f i t i s assumed that within man i s focussed the highest development of the universe, the ethic relevant to humanity acquires a universal character. An evolutionary approach provides the j u s t i f i c a t i o n . E t h i c a l value concerns the \"ought\" and comes into being when one person considers the rights of others and modifies his conduct accordingly. E t h i c a l action has two manifestations: (1) I n t r i n s i c value conferred on others; and (2) E t h i c a l value, the expression of an obligation, which i n c i d e n t a l l y leads to an accession of i n t r i n s i c value by the agent performing an e t h i c a l action. E t h i c a l value i s viewed as a basic function of human3nature regardless of any s p e c i f i c culture and the corresponding \" e t h i c a l ought\" i s distinguished from the \"s o c i a l ought\" which i s a rule of conduct imposed i m p l i c i t l y - II -by society. It is maintained that there is a universalisra implicit in the ethieal ought man is an ethical creature; the ethical ought is an obligation to foster what is right and can not be reduced to custom or convention. After considering briefly the influence of psychology on ethics, the evolution of man's ethical nature is traced, and the endeavour made to show that ethical value is an evolving capacity of man. Anthropological data showing the influence of training and society on personality is reviewed, and criteria for comparing cultures advanced. It is suggested that our present culture with a l l its faults Is superior to others and that the final influence of Western democracy, i f its f u l l implications are realized, may be beneficial. Pour criteria are presented as constituting the essential marks of ethical conduct; reverence for l i f e , honesty, truth telling, and respect for personality. A rapid survey of a number of societies suggests that while no definitive pattern can be found, i t is a reason-able hypothesis that men behave within certain limits of acceptable conduct, and that a social need lies behind departures from the criteria mentioned. The conclusion is drawn that ethical value, the moral imperative, is the expression of a capacity natural to man as a species - I l l -(although i t can be manifested f u l l y only under conditions of mature development of personality and environment) and that since humanity i s greater than any specific culture, ethical value does transcend culture. - i i -TABLE OP CONTENTS Chapter Page ABSTRACT D e t a i l e d Table of Contents i i i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 I . Some P r e l i m i n a r y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 4 I I . D e f i n i n g the Scope of the I n q u i r y 14 I I I . The R e l a t i o n between E t h i c a l Value and Culture 32 IV. The In f l u e n c e of Psychology on E t h i c s 48 V. E v o l u t i o n a r y E t h i c s 54 VI. Anthropology and E t h i c s 66 V I I . Is There a Common E t h i c a l P a t t e r n In A l l C u l t u r e s ? 77 Conclusion 91 B i b l i o g r a p h y 92 - - 0 - -- i i i -DETAILED TABLE OP CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Page 1 The s i s stems from concern about c y n i c i s m d e r i v i n g from e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y - 1, Loss of f a i t h i n cosmic s a n c t i o n r a r e l y accom-panied by e f f o r t t o f i n d b i n d i n g e t h i c - 2, For democratic s o c i e t y (which i s accepted as d e s i r a b l e ) i t i s important t o have a sound b a s i s f o r e t h i c a l a c t i o n - 2, T h e s i s : p o s s i b l e adopt n a t u r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n and at same time maintain t h a t e t h i c a l value does trans c e n d c u l t u r e - e v o l u t i o n a r y approach provides b a s i s - 3. CHAPTER I : SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS page 4 E t h i c a l views c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h metaphysics- 4, E t h i c a l imperative a unique aspect of p e r s o n a l i t y f u n c t i o n i n g as a whole - 4, I n t u i t i o n i s t t h e o r i e s r e j e c t e d - i f man and a l l h i s experiences i n c l u d e d no need t o r e l y on another realm - 5, E t h i c s compatible w i t h n a t u r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n - 6, Man e v o l v e d probably from cosmic dust f i n d s him-s e l f possessed of e t h i c a l c a p a c i t y - 7, Does t h i s vary from one c u l t u r e t o another, or i s i t a possession of man as a s p e c i e s ? - 8, Man has det e s t a b l e p r o p e n s i t i e s , but t h i s i s only p a r t o f the s t o r y - 9, Philosophy seeks t o evaluate r e l a t i o n o f man to whole universe - 10, We b e l i e v e people s h o u l d develop f a c u l t i e s f u l l y - p l a n e t a r y \" e s p r i t de c o r p s \" - 11, R e l a t i v e Absolute Theory of E t h i c s adopted w i t h q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t i f we assume t h a t w i t h i n man i s focussed highest development of the process of u n i v e r s e , the e t h i c r e l e v a n t t o man a c q u i r e s a u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r - 12, A source of value outside human nature only c r e a t e s f u r t h e r mystery - e t h i c a l conduct r e q u i r e s knowledge and command over m a t e r i a l resources - 13. CHAPTER I I : DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY Page 14 The V a l i d i t y of the Method of I n t r o s p e c t i o n i n E t h i c a l Theory : 14, A mature, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y t r a i n e d i n t r o s p e c t i o n can be an e f f i c i e n t t o o l of e t h i c a l a n a l y s i s - 15, D e f i n i t i o n of Terms \"Culture\"' the sum-total of i n h e r i t e d f a c t o r s not t r a n s m i t t e d through the germ-plasm -\"Transcend\" See Chapter I I I . \" E t h i c a l Value\" F i e l d of Value: I. Instrumental Values I I . I n t r i n s i c Values. I I I . A e s t h e t i c Values. IV. E t h i c a l Value. E t h i c a l value i s \" s u i g e n e r i s \" - i t e x i s t s i n connection w i t h the concept of \"ought\", an o u t f l o w i n g to others -I t i n v o l v e s the r e l a t i o n between two or more persons - comes i n t o being when one person considers the r i g h t s and needs of some one e l s e and m o d i f i e s h i s a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y -Does man as a s p e c i e s respond to same e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e ? E t h i c a l a c t i o n has two m a n i f e s t a t i o n s : (1) I n t r i n s i c value c o n f e r r e d on some one e l s e (2) E t h i c a l v a l u e , the e x p r e s s i o n of an o b l i g a t i o n E t y m o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g term e t h i c a l value f o r e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n or ought In e t h i c a l act the performer a l s o d e r i v e s i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , which, however, i s not the motive of a c t i o n -The Nature of the Good Involves two problems: (1) What Is the nature of \"ought\"? (2) What i s the nature of I n t r i n s i c v alue? The Good has meant both which are c l o s e l y connected Goodness a l s o two meanings corresponding to (1) and (2) above -There can be goods (\"bona\") without goodness i n e t h i c a l sense, but s c a r c e l y goodness without goods O b l i g a t i o n has two a s p e c t s : S u b j e c t i v e , I n t e r n a l sense of s u b j e c t i o n t o mandate, O b j e c t i v e , e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e to act r e q u i r e d to be done -D i s c u s s i o n of r e l a t i o n between the two aspects Why i s ah e t h i c a l a c t good? Would s u p e r s e s s i o n of e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n by spontaneous choosing of a c t i o n l e a d i n g t o maximum i n t r i n s i c value mean a higher development? Are e t h i c s good? - r T r e a t i n g others w e l l i s e t h i c a l even when co e r c i v e sense of o b l i g a t i o n i s overcome; so, e t h i c s presumably w i l l never be superseded -- V -Two elements i n i d e a of good so f a r have -been d i s c r i m i n a t e d - 28, (1) The i n t r i n s i c good t o o t h e r s , (2) The added i n t r i n s i c good to the performer of the act Is there a t h i r d element? 29, The ought contains an o b s t i n a t e element - 29, No d e f i n i t i v e d i s p o s a l of f e e l i n g a value accrues by v i r t u e of e t h i c a l a c t i o n i n i t s e l f , a p a r t from I n t r i n s i c value r e a l i z e d by performer and r e c i p i e n t of deed -The Nature of I n t r i n s i c Value 30, An adequate theory of value must c o n t a i n eudaemonism and s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n - c r i t e r i o n of human welfare Value an e x p r e s s i o n of l i f e which i s u l t i m a t e - 30, CHAPTER I I I : THE RELATION BETWEEN ETHICAL VALUE AND. CULTURE Page ,32 The question of the t h e s i s answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e - 32 E t h i c a l value a b a s i c f u n c t i o n of human nature r e g a r d l e s s of s p e c i f i c c u l t u r e - 32, D e f i n i t i o n of E t h i c a l Ou&ht - of nature of law which men must f o l l o w i f they are to be true t o t h e i r nature as members of the human sp e c i e s - 32, D e f i n i t i o n of S o c i a l Ought - a r u l e of conduct imposed i m p l i c i t l y by s o c i e t y - 33, Commentary on the E t h i c a l Ought . - 33, A u n i v e r a a l i s m i m p l i c i t i n the e t h i c a l ought man an e t h i c a l c r e a t u r e - e t h i c a l ought an o b l i g a t i o n t o f o s t e r what i s r i g h t - i t can not be reduced to custom or convention E t h i c a l value an e v o l v i n g c a p a c i t y of man - 34, I t has an a e s t h e t i c element and a sense of 35, f i t n e s s - i n a d d i t i o n i t means a genuine g i v i n g e l i c i t e d by p i t y , u n s e l f i s h le?ve, or d e s i r e to p r o t e c t and serve Conscience i s not a n e u r o t i c compulsion - 35, Commentary on the S o c i a l Ought - 36, Considered as sense of o b l i g a t i o n wholly determined by s o c i e t y - 37, Could be c a l l e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ought - 37, I n t e r a c t i o n of E t h i c a l and S o c i a l Ought 37, The experienced ought i s complex, compounded of b a s i c human nature and c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e - 37, H e r e d i t a r y f a c t o r of primary importance because i t i s the i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o u n d a t i o n f o r a l l moral conduct, while i n f l u e n c e of t r a i n i n g and s o c i e t y merely mould i t to a p a t t e r n - the term \" e t h i c a l \" f o r the ought may be r e t a i n e d -An e t h i c a l ought can be v a l i d i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c s e t t i n g -P a r a l l e l w i t h problem of h e r e d i t y and environment Meaning of \"Transcend\" -E t h i c a l value has locus of f u n c t i o n i n g on plane of humanity and not on l e v e l of a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e Por man as a s p e c i e s there e x i s t s a l o y a l t y which expands from the group t o embrace a l l l i f e -The Republic of Humanity -S o c i e t y i s p o s s i b l e because man i s e t h i c a l , not man i s e t h i c a l because s o c i e t y makes him so E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y -(a) Extreme E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y - ought e n t i r e l y s o c i a l - ethos of a s p e c i f i c c u l t u r e s e t s l i m i t s t o e t h i c a l development O b j e c t i o n , i m a g i n a t i o n can t ranscend l i m i t s of c u l t u r e — e t h i c a l progress C r i t e r i o n of e t h i c a l p r o g r e s s , r e a l i z a t i o n of more of man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s Culture borrowing i n d i c a t e s s u p r a - c u l t u r a l f a c t o r s Problem of good i f e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y (b) Moderate E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y -C l o s e - l o p o s i t i o n i n t h i s study except l a t t e r s t r e s s e s h e r e d i t a r y f a c t o r What Is the C r i t e r i o n f o r Right A c t i o n ? No s p e c i f i c e t h i c a l values - what are d i f f e r e n t are i n t r i n s i c v a l u e s ; e t h i c a l value changes o n l y i n ends towards which d i r e c t e d -C e n t r a l f a c t i s e t h i c a l nature of man In a l l s i t u a t i o n s there i s p o t e n t i a l l y a r i g h t course of a c t i o n — r i g h t because of o b j e c t i v e f a c t s . - Reason o b j e c t i v e f a c t s r e l a t e d t o r i g h t a e s s i s t h a t l i f e , i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , and e t h i c a l value are i n t i m a t e l y and i n d i s s o l u b l y connected — they are u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i a f o r any f i n i t e judgement - t h e r e f o r e , my duty bound up with my l i f e - e x p e r i e n c e and my duty Is t o promote human we l f a r e E t h i c a l c o r o l l a r y , the sovereign worth of human p e r s o n a l i t y E t h i c a l economy - v i i -CHAPTER IV: THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY ON ETHICS Page 48 Could p s y c h o l o g i s t s devise experiment t o throw l i g h t on nature of the ought? - 48, Hypnotism - 48, Psych o a n a l y s i s - s e l f - a n a l y s i s - 49, Is there a process of e t h i c a l maturation? - 50, P h y s i o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e f o r f e e l i n g and emotion and hedonie tone - 50, s Is there such a c o r r e l a t e f o r e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ? - 52. CHAPTER V: EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS Page 54 Man's e t h i c a l nature passed through long process of e v o l u t i o n - 54, K r o p o t k l n , nature not amoral - three elements of m o r a l i t y : mutual a i d , j u s t i c e or e q u i t y , and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e - 54 Moral elements i n man's nature as a species - 55, Darwin, a l t r u i s t i c element i n e v o l u t i o n f o u n d a t i o n of moral f e e l i n g i n s o c i a l i n s t i n c t s - n a t u r a l sympathy - 56, L. T. Hobhouse, b a s i s f o r s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of l i f e a l r e a d y l a i d i n animal nature o f man - 57, Westermarck, s o c i e t y i s the b i r t h p l a c e of the moral consciousness - 57, e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y - 58, J u l i a n Huxley, c o n t r o v e r t e d g r a n d f a t h e r , T. H. Huxley, t h a t cosmic nature i s opposed to e t h i c a l nature the former maintains the e t h i c a l f a c t o r arose w i t h i n the n a t u r a l e v o l u t i o n a r y process - 58, Emphasis on d i r e c t i o n , not s t a t u s - 59, B i o l o g i c a l s e l e c t i o n l a r g e l y superseded by s o c i a l s e l e c t i o n - 60, Sense of r i g h t and wrong from c o n f l i c t i n c h i l d , one t o three y e a r s , between love and hate f o r mother - p r o t o - e t h i c a l mechanism - 60, \"Moral d e f e c t i v e s \" - 61, C o r r e l a t i o n between p h y s i c a l organism and temperament - 62, High e t h i c a l system i s s a n c t i o n e d by s c i e n c e -i n t e r n a t i o n a l order - g l o b a l e t h i c s - 63, CHAPTER VI: ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS Page 66 R e l a t i o n between c h i l d t r a i n i n g and person-a l i t y p a t t e r n - 66, - v i i i -Two s t u d i e s : (1) Margaret Mead, Hypothesis d i f f e r e n c e s i n temperament between sexes c u l t u r a l l y d e t e r -mined - three p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s s t u d i e d : (a) Mountain Arapesh - both male and female r e v e a l feminine p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s (b) Mundugumor - both male and female r e v e a l masculine t r a i t s (c) Tchambull - men d i s p l a y feminine, women masculine t r a i t s (2) Ruth Benedict, Hypothesis each s o c i e t y one p r i n c i p a l m o t i v a t i o n - each i n d i v i d u a l moulded t o dominant p e r s o n a l i t y p a t t e r n three c u l t u r e s s t u d i e d : (a) Pueblo Indiana - \" A p o l l o n i a n \" - sober, moderate, co- o p e r a t i v e (b) Kwakiutl Indians - \"Dionysian\" -a g g r e s s i v e , c o m p e t i t i v e , b o a s t f u l -(c) Do bus - h a t e - r i d d e n and f e a r f u l F u r t h e r re E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y - some c u l t u r e s not v i a b l e account h a t r e d -Obj e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of c u l t u r e s not beyond competence of man -A. L. Kroeber, three c r i t e r i a f o r judging r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of c u l t u r e s -R e j e c t i o n o f argument t h a t s i m p l e r c u l t u r e s b e t t e r Ways of rankin g c u l t u r e s complexity - a l s o three important c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s : d i s e a s e , ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o u s f e a r s , c o n t r o l of environment - ^ T ^ R K Suggestion t h a t our c u l t u r e with a l l i t s f a u l t s i s b e t t e r -C l a s h of c u l t u r e s great tragedy, but i f f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s r e a l i z e d , f i n a l i n f l u e n c e of Western democracy on other peoples may be b e n e f i c i a l CHAPTER V I I : IS THERE A COMMON ETHICAL PATTERN IN ALL CULTURES? Some 200 c u l t u r e s , a l s o 20 odd h i s t o r i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s - c o l l a b o r a t i o n between p h i l o -sophers and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s i n stu d y i n g p o s s i b l e r e g u l a r i t i e s of conduct -Four C r i t e r i a suggested as e x p r e s s i n g e s s e n t i a l marks of e t h i c a l conduct -In l i e u of d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n , r a p i d survey of v a r i o u s s o c i e t i e s r e g a r d i n g four c r i t e r i a leads t o commentaries -(1) Reverence f o r L i f e - hypothesis t h a t s o c i a l need l i e s behind s a n c t i o n e d k i l l i n g I n f a n t i c i d e Gerontocide, Cannibalism, Head-bunting (2) Honesty - r e s p e c t f o r possessions of others probably g e n e r a l (3) T r u t h T e l l i n g - complicated b u s i n e s s . o f s o c i a l l i f e r e q u i r e s prevalence of t r u t h -t e l l i n g over l y i n g (4) Respect f o r P e r s o n a l i t y - f a r from r e a l i z a t i o n e i t h e r amongst p r i m i t i v e s or i n c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t i e s - treatment of women - b e a t i n g wife i n Chaucer's time O b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r t r a n s l a t i n g e t h i c a l i n s i g h t s i n t o p r a c t i c a l l i v i n g -c h i l d labour - s l a v e r y I n f l u e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l s on extending r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n a l i t y - treatment of m e n t a l l y i l l No d e f i n i t i v e p a t t e r n emerges from the survey but i s i s reasonable hypothesis t h a t men behave w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s of acceptable conduct - v a r i o u s o b s t a c l e s - d i f f i c u l t environment and s h o r t food supply -U n i v e r s a l sense of j u s t i c e , R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n Hobhouse, u n i f o r m i t y of moral judgements Con c l u s i o n t h a t no fundamental b a r r i e r t o b e t t e r e t h i c a l order i s r e v e a l e d -CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION This thesis stems from a concern about the apparently widespread ethical cynicism which Is encountered today. Amongst contemporaries the opinion that ethical standards are simply relative to the particular society in which they occur i s exceedingly widespread and tends to Induce moral cynicism. The impact of modern science, especially the principles of biological evolution, led to a destruction of old absolutes and the great differ-ences in cultures, set forth by Westermarck in his monu-mental study, Ethical Relativity, projected into popular thinking the idea of the rela t i v i t y of a l l values. This concept weakens the ethical sense because the natural reaction to the discovery of extreme cultural diversity is that i t i s a matter of historical chance what particular code one i s subject to and the primary binding character of the obligation is dulled. When the absolute element is taken away from ethical action the meaning tends to die; the belief that standards of conduct are purely relative to time and place, introduces an adventitious character which destroys the central character of ethical conduct, namely, the compelling power and sense of inescapably binding nature. If moral standards are relative, i t i s a short step to deny any validity to them at a l l beyond - 2 -that of ease and convenience. They become a r t i f i c i a l conventions and a neo-Sophistic position results. When moral codes are considered to be compromises to make social l i f e possible, i t is not far to moral scepticism. The loss of faith in the absolute character of ethical value i s rarely accompanied by the patience, desire, or ab i l i t y to find an ethic binding on man which is based on other than cosmic sanction. No statistics exist to show how prevalent this attitude i s but there can be no doubt that very many people feel that i t does not matter very much what ethical standards are observed. If a democratic and humanitarian society i s desirable — and this we accept — then the loss of ethical sensitivity i s to be deplored. Since i t i s essential for a democratically ordered society that citizens believe in the rights of others, as well as in their own, i t is of great importance that ethical theory should be able to substantiate the position that action which considers the rights of others is not based on i l l u s i o n . Therefore, an inquiry as to the nature of ethical value in relation to culture has more than theoretical interest, and the possibility of substan-tiating and providing a sound basis for ethical action has great importance. The exploration of such an abstract problem In a time of c r i s i s i s accordingly ju s t i f i e d when - 3 -i t has practical implications in actual human livi n g . It is the contention of this thesis that i t i s possible to adopt a naturalistic position and at the same time maintain that ethical value does transcend culture. The evolutionary approach to man's adventure in the cosmos provides the basis for a dynamic, progressive ethical value and the endeavour w i l l be made to set this forth. CHAPTER ; i SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS I t has been f r e q u e n t l y p o i n t e d out t h a t e t h i c a l views are c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h one's metaphysics. Man has t o have some p e r s o n a l theory of l i f e , or e l s e j u s t b l i n d l y f o l l o w custom and t r a d i t i o n . One's e t h i c s depend on the p o s i t i o n one takes as t o whether the u n i v e r s e i s h o s t i l e , f r i e n d l y , or i n d i f f e r e n t t o man. On one hand are those who say that there can be no e t h i c a l value u n l e s s there I s a cosmic guarantor and s u s t a i n e r of v a l u e s . On the o t h e r , are those who deny any s p e c i f i c a l l y e t h i c a l v a lue and describe the \"ought\" as s o c i a l l y determined, a f u n c t i o n of s o c i e t a l l i f e . A f u n c t i o n , because the ver y business of m a i n t a i n i n g the myriad r e l a t i o n s necessa-r i l y c o n s t i t u t i n g s o c i a l l i f e c a l l s f o r r e c i p r o c a l c o n s i d e r a -t i o n of one another and t h i s g i v e s r i s e t o what i s d e s c r i b e d as e t h i c a l a c t i o n . The f a c t of an e t h i c a l Imperative i s an amazing phenomenon, e s p e c i a l l y i f we accept i t as p a r t o f man's n a t u r a l endowment. The e t h i c a l experience has emotional components, but i t i s something more than a complex of emotions. I t r e q u i r e s the e x e r c i s e of reason and judgement f o r i t s o p e r a t i o n , but i t i s more than reason. I t i s a unique aspect of the p e r s o n a l i t y f u n c t i o n i n g as a whole. - 5 -Since different temperaments characterize different persons, the ethical temperament -- the tempera-ment which finds ethieal promptings congenial and not i r k -some w i l l predominate in some people more than in others. It might be asked which type of person i s beat f i t t e d to study the problems of ethics. The man who experiences ethical pleasure may be biassed in thinking he i s serving an absolute law; the man who has l i t t l e experience of ethi-cal commitment may lack a necessary element in coming to grips with the problem. Those who deal with evolutionary phenomena incline to a naturalistic theory. Those, particu-l a r l y in the past, concerned primarily with abstract ideaa, tended to absolute theories. But at the present conjunc-ture of human thinking, we can not find adequate evidence for accepting a metaphysical order from which ethical value descends to man through intuition or revelation. We must reject intuitionist theories which imply or posit a realm of a different order from the natural universe, including within the laat term a l l those phenomena which are mani-fested through human beings. If we include man and a l l his experiences there i s no need to rely on another realm. Some temperaments, however, can not accept a naturalistic explanation; they must go beyond material categories and postulate aome divine source of the ethieal Impulae. Those who undergo mystical experiences may have their varying interpretations of the ultimate reality which gives rise, as they believe, to their experiences. The ethloal experience, indeed, may sometimes have a f f i n i t i e s with the type of experiences which are called mystical — i t is transporting in character and i t is ineffable. However, those who perceive the dangers and inconsisten-cies of a mystical interpretation, whether they reject this method outright or not, are not prevented thereby from incorporating the ethical experience, with a l l i t s vivid promptings of the s p i r i t , within their philosophy. Por them, i t i s sufficient to accept the fact of the ethical Imperative with a l l i t s d i f f i c u l t y of comprehension. Its existence in such a universe as man's matured and total experience presents to him, makes him wonder, but i t i s no solution to push the mystery back on to some even more mysterious, remote power-; or principle which exercises i t s creative energy -in some other area of the cosmos. A naturalistic position may be accepted without derogating from the supreme Importance of ethics. Even though we may believe, that there w i l l never be any complete unfolding of a l l the unknown factors in the universe, i t i s a sound and v i t a l methodological principle that the universe should be regarded not as an ineffable mystery defying understand-ing, but as a problem to be solved. Man should confront the natural universe and operate on the assumption that - 7 -by p a t i e n t r e s e a r c h and d i s c i p l i n e he w i l l be able t o maintain a worthwhile e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i n q u i r y r e c o g n i z e s then, that man f i n d s h i m s e l f i n a u n i v e r s e which has e v o l v e d i n some manner out of cosmic dust, i n other words, out of p r i m i t i v e p h y s i c a l p a r t i c l e s , which by c o l l o c a t i o n and de-velopment through a f a s c i n a t i n g and not y e t d e f i n i t i v e l y determined c o s m o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n have produoed a race of l i v i n g organisms, a t the apex of which i s man. T h i s c r e a t u r e , man, l a i n a s o r r y and awful dilemma, and y e t one which c o n s t i t u t e s an e x q u i s i t e and tremendously moving drama. The great Greek dramatiats w i t h t h e i r concept of Pate had a v i s i o n of t h i s stupendous cosmic a c t . Man f i n d s h i m s e l f possessed of animal impulses which have t h e i r own accompany-i n g v a l u e s aa w e l l as being the b a a i s f o r c r u e l t y and viciou8 a c t i o n s . He has a l s o emotional powers and f e e l i n g s which c a r r y p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r enhanced l i v i n g or f o r degrading b e a s t l i n e a s . He f i n d s h i m s e l f capable of s p i r i t u a l ex-p e r i e n c e s which are so t r a n s p o r t i n g i n t h e i r i n c i d e n c e and e f f e c t t h a t he p e r f o r c e r e f e r s them t o a transcendent being of a h i g h e r and p e r f e c t order. Then h i s powers of a n a l y s i s show him the u n l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s and he banishes the gods from the s k i e s and can o n l y accept the s p i r i t u a l e xperiences as a c t u a l i t i e s w i t h i n h i s e x p e r i e n c e . A s c r u t i n y of a l l the f a c t s nece8Sitates the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the human animal has as one of i t s c a p a c i t i e s the p o t e n t i a l i t y of o r d e r i n g i t s a c t i v i t y along what we c a l l e t h i c a l l i n e s . Prom t h i s - 8 -s t a r t i n g p o i n t , t h e n , we seek t o determine whether t h i s e t h i c a l c a p a c i t y v a r i e s from one c u l t u r a l environment t o another, or whether i t i s a p o s s e s s i o n of the s p e c i e s . I t would seem t o me that e t h i c a l v alue i s an e x p r e s s i o n or m a n i f e s t a t i o n of p l a n e t a r y man. A l l men, r e g a r d l e s s of r a c i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , o r of any oth e r economic, s o c i a l , o r c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n , can p o t e n t i a l l y have equal commerce with and enjoyment of t h i s e t h i c a l v a l u e . A t h e o r y about e t h i c s must not be s o l e l y an a b s t r a c t s p e c u l a t i o n but must envisage the extreme modes of behaviour manifested by men. In seeking t o d i s c e r n a h i g h e t h i c which i s p o t e n t i a l l y w i t h i n the moral compass of a l l men, our sc a n s i o n must not dismiss the e a r t h l y scene of concrete human a c t i o n f o r realms of pure imagining. Nor must the e v i l p r o p e n s i t i e s of human beings — the moral b l i n d n e s s , the r a p a c i t y of wicked men and t h e i r c h i l l i n g i n d i f f e r e n c e t o the r i g h t s and f a t e of t h e i r v i c t i m s , the pred a t o r y d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of modern war be di s m i s s e d from thought. I f we are r e a l i s t i c we see onl y t oo c l e a r l y how s e l f i s h , c r u e l , and d e t e s t a b l e a c r e a t u r e the human s p e c i e s can be. No great s t r e t c h of e v a l u a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o su b s c r i b e t o the sentiments of Mark Twain i n h i s p i t i l e s s d e n u n c i a t i o n of humanity i n What i s Man? And i t would be easy t o y i e l d t o the temptation t o agree w i t h S w i f t ' s m e r c i l e s s judgement: I cannot but conclude the bulk of your n a t i v e s t o be the most p e r n i c i o u s race of l i t t l e odious vermin t h a t nature ever s u f f e r e d t o crawl upon the s u r f a c e of the e a r t h . 1 I f t h i s e v a l u a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d the whole t r u t h , a f i n a l judgement would be easy, and we c o u l d r e s i g n o u r s e l v e s t o l i v i n g i n a s o c i e t y i n which the most t h a t c o u l d be hoped f o r would be a set of r u l e s designed t o f a c i l i t a t e the most harmonious i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s p o s s i b l e between the members of the community — a r e f i n e d s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t o modify the \" s o l i t a r y , poor, nasty, b r u t i s h and s h o r t \" e x i s t e n c e of Hobbes. But the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n i s more complex; the human experience can not be compressed w i t h i n any s i n g l e c a t e g o r y . We do f i n d i n s t a n c e s of conduct whieh i s e t h i c a l . T h i s r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n . A theory whieh d i s m i s s e s the human adventure as an e x e r c i s e i n s e l f i s h n e s s i s inadequate and Indeed denotes an a b d i c a t i o n from the t a s k of framing a s u i t a b l e h y p o t h e s i s . I t i s qu i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t mankind may pursue an e v e n t u a l path of extreme s e l f i s h n e s s ; i t may even destroy i t s e l f , though complete a n n i h i l a t i o n i s un-l i k e l y ; l i f e w i l l probably go on ag a i n at some l e v e l . Man as a s p e c i e s w i l l probably always have the chance of growing t o h i g h , e t h i c a l s t a t u r e . 1 S w i f t , Jonathan, G u l l i v e r ' s T r a v e l s , Toronto, MacMillan Co., 1946, p. 152, Chapter VI., P a r t I I . - 10 -\"High e t h i c a l s t a t u r e \" -- such phraseology almost r e q u i r e s a word of e x p l a n a t i o n . I t smacks per-haps of pious a s p i r a t i o n . W e l l , pious a s p i r a t i o n has nothing wrong with i t i f i t i s not e x e r c i s e d i n an un-r e a l i s t i c e l o u d l a n d of s e n t i m e n t a l vapouring; i f i t i s accompanied by a f r a n k avowal of the f a c t s of human con-duct. To d i s c u s s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of one l i n e of human development should not be f o r b i d d e n because a r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of the p r o b a b i l i t i e s suggests t h a t t h a t l i n e of development may never be f o l l o w e d . P h i l o s o p h y , as one of i t s i n t e r e s t s and i n s p i t e of the p o s i t l v i s t s who would r u l e out a l l s p e c u l a t i o n which bears no immediate r e t u r n i n the form of demonstrable p r o p o s i t i o n s , seeks t o ev a l u a t e the r e l a t i o n of man t o the whole u n i v e r s e as i t e x i s t s now and may e x i s t h e r e a f t e r . I f such c o n j e c t u r e does not d e t r a c t from the r e s o l u t e coping w i t h the p r e s s i n g problems of the age, i t i s not i l l e g i t i m a t e . A c c e p t i n g then t h i s p r o b i n g i n t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e of man's pl a c e i n the u n i v e r s e , we face the most awful of f r u s t r a t i o n s . We are see k i n g t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o questions f o r which we w i l l never know the answers. Each i n q u i r e r reads o n l y a few pages i n the book of l i f e and i s f o r b i d d e n , f o r e v e r we b e l i e v e , t o look up the answers i n the back of the book, assuming even that these answers are w r i t t e n somewhere, or w i l l ever be w r i t t e n . Cursed with t h i s u l t i m a t e s t u l t i f y i n g of h i s p a s s i o n t o know, the sea r c h e r has the r i g h t t o put f o r t h - 11 -h i s t h e o r i e s and a i r h i a s p e c u l a t i o n s . To suggest a p o s s i b l e e t h i c a l f u t u r e f o r mankind ahould not draw down s t r i c t u r e s . Somehow we f e e l t h a t people ought t o behave i n that way which w i l l enhance t h e i r own enjoyment of e x i a t -ence. We would p r e f e r , other t h i n g s being e q u a l , t h a t men l i v e ao aa t o develop more of t h e i r f a c u l t i e s . T h i s a p p l i e a not j u s t t o some peraons we know i n our own community at t h i a present time. I t c o u l d be made as a h i s t o r i c a l judge-ment of people l i v i n g i n a p r e v i o u s age. We f e e l t h a t i t would be more f i t t i n g t h a t a l l people should u t i l i z e t h e i r powers i n auch a way t h a t they and thoae a s a o c i a t e d with them 8hould e x t r a c t the maximum of advantage from e x i s t e n c e . T h i s reduces, In a aen8e, t o a duty to the r a c e . I t would be d e s i r a b l e t o develop a p l a n e t a r y \" e a p r i t de c o r p s \" . Should we not have p r i d e , a f t e r a l l , i n man a8 a c r e a t u r e who, although s u b j e c t to 80 many v i c i s s i t u d e s on a l o n e l y p l a n e t , t o chance and circumstance and a thouaand hazard8, y e t manages t o work toward a b e t t e r f u t u r e ? Every e v i l a c t derogates from the f i n e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f achievement of the human r a c e . I f we a r e , i n t r u t h , i n the p e r i l o u s predicament of d w e l l i n g i n a l o n e l y u n i v e r s e , with c e r t a i n e x q u i s i t e f e e l i n g a and s e n s i t i v i t i e s which make us f e e l a c u t e l y the wonder and myatery and f r i g h t e n i n g immensitiea of the coamoa, and moreover, w i t h no sure guide nor mentor t o t e l l us what i t i a a l l about; then the v e r y l e a s t we - 12 -i should do is to be dignified and live our lives according to the best plan we can find. This mode of action is en-joined on ua by the kind of nature we find ourselves possessed of. If i t be objected that only those persons trained in a certain way have this kind of ideal envisageraent of the possibilities of human l i f e , we can reply that some-where in the human adventure this concept has come into existence and those who have the vision should seek to expand and make i t available to more and more people. This ia not just to indulge in wishful thinking but to be the vehicle of a tradition — the human tradition. The criticism of high ethical thinking which dismisses i t as merely wishful thinking would seem to overlook the fact that a creature has been able to wish along these certain lines. The naturalistic position assumed in this thesis is close to the relative absolute position of Dr. Barnett Savery, with one qualification,which is this. If we assume that value exists only in conjunction with man and that there are no powers external to him supporting him, and i f , further, we assume that man Is the highest species developed, i f , that i s , within man is focussed the highest development of the process of the universe, then the ethic which is relevant to man acquires a universal, i f not absolute - 13 -character. If a transmoral source i s postulated for ethical value, that only creates a further mystery; we are s t i l l l e f t with the i n i t i a l problem of what we experience as ethical. If there i s a general value as well as specific values, how can the general become specific? The f i n a l sanction for right conduct need not be cosmic; i f i t i s binding on one in order to f u l f i l his nature as a member of his species, that i s a valid sanction. This, of course constitutes a much more d i f f i c u l t ethic than one based on supernatural authority. Whitehead said that neither matter nor l i f e can be understood in isolation; likewise, ethics are not a mere conceptual system but have meaning only in conjunc-tion with l i f e . Ethical conduct to be f u l l y manifested requires more than good motives. Also essential are the following; Intelligence and knowledge; (Socrates was correct) Primary emphasis on this l i f e ; Reasonable freedom from unconscious complexes, repressions and motivations; Abundance of material resources; A high degree of command over natural forces. These requirements constitute the indispensable matrix with-in which a mature human ethics could develop, as w i l l be made more explicit in the later chapter on evolutionary ethics. - - 0 - -- 14 -CHAPTER I I DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY The V a l i d i t y of the Method of I n t r o s p e c t i o n i n E t h i c a l Theory Has the method of I n t r o s p e c t i o n any value and cogency i n the r e s o l u t i o n of e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s ? I f t h e r e i s an e t h i c a l ought which operates i n human beings, i t i s o n l y i n them t h a t i t c o u l d be d e t e c t e d and a n a l y s e d and the method of i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l to determine I t s nature and content. P o s s i b l y t h i s Is the only t o o l a v a i l a b l e t o the I n q u i r e r to get at c e r t a i n f a c t s . E t h i c a l t h e o r i e s can not be baaed on one person's f e e l i n g s , on the d e l i v e r a n c e of one person's inward i n v e s t i g a t i o n . But i f aome agreement can be reached amongst d i f f e r e n t o b s e r v e r s , then the method has v a l i d i t y . I f a person has p a i d complete a t t e n t i o n t o the I n f l u e n c e of unconscious p r e j u d i c e s , needs, d e s i r e s , and mental h a b i t s on the conscious judgement, and l a a c u t e l y aware of the danger of forming p r e j u d i c e d o p i n i o n s which s t r i k e him as o b j e c t i v e Impressions, then h i s c o n c l u s i o n s may a f t e r a l l be of v a l u e . The i n t e r n a l i n s p e c t i o n must be f a r more than an emotional r e a c t i o n t o the i n n e r working; i t must be informed by s c i e n t i f i c method, by an i n t i m a t e knowledge of the v a r i o u s e t h i c a l theorle8, by the f i n d i n g s of modern p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h i n t o the nature of the - 15 -emotions, and i t must above a l l be a c u t e l y aware of the g i g a n t i c c a p a c i t y of the human mind t o deceive i t s e l f and adduce estimable motives f o r the conduct f o l l o w e d . An informed and r e f i n e d t o o l of i n t r o s p e c t i v e a n a l y s i s should, t h e r e f o r e , be r e c o g n i z e d as an e f f i c i e n t instrument of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and should be accepted f o r t h i s purpose. Such an instrument, i f i t b r i n g s i n the v e r d i c t t h a t the ought, the sense of o b l i g a t i o n , i s more than an i m p u l s i o n induced by s o c i e t y , should not be d i s m i s s e d as a suspect, s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y l a c k i n g i n a l l s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y . There i s a l l the d i f f e r e n c e i n the world between an e m o t i o n s l , i g n o r a n t i n t r o s p e c t i o n and a mature, informed, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y t r a i n e d mode of i n t r o s p e c t i v e r e p o r t i n g . DEFINITION OF TERMS: By d e f i n i n g the terms of the t i t l e , \" e t h i c a l v a l u e \" , \"transcend\", and \" c u l t u r e \" , as used h e r e i n , the scope of t h i s I n q u i r y w i l l be i n d i c a t e d . The three present an i n c r e a s i n g degree of d i f f i c u l t y and w i l l be d e a l t with i n r e v erse o r d e r . What i s meant by \" C u l t u r e \" ? C u l t u r e i s a term denoting those a c t i v i t i e s of man which s e t him o f f from the r e s t of the animal kingdom — the sum-total of i n h e r i t e d f a c t o r s which are not t r a n s m i t t e d through the germ-plasm. Lowie uses the term \"the s o c i a l - 16 -t r a d i t i o n \" ; L i n t o n ' s term \" s o c i a l h e r e d i t y \" i s amended by Kroeber t o \" s o c i a l i n h e r i t a n c e \" , which i s as apt a c h a r a c t e r -i z a t i o n as any. Two a c t i v i t i e s of man which make the t r a n s m i s s i o n of the elements of c u l t u r e p o s s i b l e are speech and the f a c u l t y of sy m b o l i z i n g . Culture c o n s i s t s of a l l n o n - b i o l o g i c a l elements and denotes not merely the ways of winning a l i v i n g from the p h y s i c a l environment and Instruments and a r t i f a c t s , but a l l the complex of h a b i t s , customs, and values g e n e r a l l y . Through e d u c a t i o n new generations are i n d u c t e d i n t o the c u l t u r e , l e a r n i t s ways of doing t h i n g s and become i n t e g r a t e d w i t h i n i t s system of i n s t i t u t i o n s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y a ttuned t o i t s e t h o s , or t o t a l c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n , i t s essen-t i a l a t t i t u d e to the e x t e r n a l world and the uni v e r s e g e n e r a l l y . What i s meant by \"Transcend\"? T h i s term i n v o l v e s the r e l a t i o n between what can be c a l l e d the e t h i c a l ought and the s o c i a l ought and w i l l be d e a l t with i n the next chapter. What i s meant by \" E t h i c a l Value\"? I t would be as w e l l not t o speak of the realm of v a l u e s ; t h i s might Imply a kingdom of ends; a s u p e r n a t u r a l or t r a n s - n a t u r a l realm s u b s i s t i n g a p a r t from men. The term - 17 -f i e l d o f value w i l l perhaps be more a p p r o p r i a t e , although not e n t i r e l y s u i t a b l e . The f i e l d of value may be d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : I . Instrumental Values. I I . I n t r i n s i c V alues. I I I . A e s t h e t i c Values. IV. E t h i c a l Value. I . Instrumental V a l u e s : A value i s i n s t r u m e n t a l or e x t r i n -s i c which subserves some end beyond i t s e l f . I t i a a meana t o i n t r i n a i c v a l u e . I I . I n t r i n s i c V a l u e s : I n t r i n s i c v a l u e s are those which are v a l u e d f o r themselve8 a l o n e . Economic value i a a broad, g e n e r a l category l a r g e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n nature. There a r e , however, economic v a l u e s , i t would aeem, which are p r a c t i -c a l l y , i f not d e f i n i t i v e l y , i n t r i n a i c j they aubserve no f u r t h e r purpose but that of p e r s o n a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n and enjoyment. They are i n s t r u m e n t a l only i n the l a r g e r sense of m i n i s t e r i n g t o human l i f e . Economics i a concerned w i t h the management of men'a a f f a i r a and r e l a t e a e s s e n t i a l l y t o hi8 w e l f a r e . Economic value may, t h e r e f o r e , be taken as the type of a broad set of valu e s which are i n t r i n s i c , and y e t are not a e s t h e t i c or e t h i c a l . They denote v a l u e , worth, good t h i n g s which men value f o r themaelves. - 18 -I I I . A e s t h e t i c V a l u e s : A e s t h e t i c v a l u e s are those d e r i v e d from the a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e . The term \" a e s t h e t i c \" i s d e r i v e d from a Greek word meaning \" p e r c e p t i o n by the senses\" and the a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , s i g n i f i e s sensuous r e c e p t i v i t y t o impressions of a l l k i n d s , from works of a r t , the forms and c o l o u r s of the n a t u r a l world, and those a r i s i n g from v a r i o u s modes of p e r s o n a l a c t i v i t y . The term i s f r e q u e n t l y and u s e f u l l y r e s t r i c t e d t o denote s e n s i t i v i t y t o beauty but i t need not n e c e s s a r i l y be so l i m i t e d . A e s t h e t i c value might be shown as a s u b d i v i s i o n of i n t r i n s i c value s i n c e i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e d and enjoyed by human beings j u s t as any o t h e r value which c a r r i e s i t s own meaning and v a l i d a t i o n w i t h I t . However, on account of the s p e c i a l i z e d I n t e r e s t possessed by a e s t h e t i c s i t i s sound t o c l a s s i f y i t by i t s e l f . IV. E t h i c a l V alue: We may note t h a t e t h i c a l value i s \" s u i g e n e r i s \" ; i t has a r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a from a l l other v a l u e s . E t h i c a l value e x i s t s i n connection w i t h the concept of \"ought\". I t s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g mark i s moral duty, v i r t u e , o b l i g a t i o n , moral e x c e l l e n c e . Ordinary v a l u e s and those c a l l e d a e s t h e t i c are r e c e i v e d and enjoyed by the person concerned. E t h i c a l v a l u e , i n c o n t r a s t , i s an o u t - f l o w i n g to o t h e r s , a g i v i n g . F u r t h e r , e t h i c a l value i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d - 19 -from the other valuea as f o l l o w s . One person i n i s o l a t i o n can enjoy a e s t h e t i c value beauty, f o r example, and the othe r i n t r i n s i c and i n s t r u m e n t a l values i n d i c a t e d . T h i s i s not t o say, o b v i o u s l y , t h a t other people are not v i t a l l y and n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d . In r e l a t i o n t o a e s t h e t i c v a l u e , f o r example, the a r t i s t must e x i s t ; and a l l the persons concerned i n the p r a c t i c a l and mechanical f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d i n g other i n t r i n s i c values must e x i s t a p a r t from the a p p r e c i a t o r . But the a c t u a l value t r a n s a c t i o n concerns o n l y the l a t t e r as f a r as the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the value i s concerned. One s i n g l e human being may enjoy the aes-t h e t i c experience of viewing a sunset, or some a r t - o b j e c t . E t h i c a l v a l u e , i n c o n t r a s t , has an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r which g i v e s i t a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s . I t i n v o l v e s the r e l a t i o n between two or more persons. E t h i c a l value necess-a r i l y , and by d e f i n i t i o n , concerns a number of people, two at a minimum, i n a c e r t a i n form of i n t e r a c t i o n . E t h i c a l value comes i n t o being when one person c o n s i d e r s the r i g h t s and needs of some one e l s e and m o d i f i e s h i s a c t i o n a c c o r d -i n g l y . The sense of ought comes i n though i t may be t h a t the ought i s not a necessary p a r t of the hi g h e s t e t h i c a l a e t i o n . A fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i s t o be noted between a e s t h e t i c and e t h i c a l v a l u e . To i l l u s t r a t e , Robinson Crusoe on h i s i s l a n d c o u l d experience the f i r s t , but never the - 20 -second, u n l e s s some other human being came i n t o r e l a t i o n -s h i p with him. Or u n l e s s , f u r t h e r , the sphere of the e t h i c a l i s h e l d t o i n c l u d e other than human beings — animals or other p a r t s of nature, on the one hand, and a d i v i n e or cosmic f o r c e on the other. T h i s i s beyond the scope of our study. I t can not be s a i d t h a t the f o u r s u b d i v i s i o n s are f o u r species of one genus. T h i s p o i n t s out a g a i n t h a t e t h i c a l value i s d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d from the other v a l u e s noted. Our study i s now c l a r i f i e d t o the e x t e n t t h a t we may view i t as the attempt t o answer the quest i o n whether what we may f i n d t o be e t h i c a l value i s d i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , or whether man as a sp e c i e s responds t o the same b a s i c e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e . At t h i s j u n c t u r e more must be s a i d as t o the a t t r i b u t e s of e t h i c a l v a l u e . Is \" e t h i c a l v a l u e \" the most accurate d e s c r i p t i o n of what we are concerned with? Our study r e v o l v e s about the f a c t of n o n - s e l f - r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n ; the f a c t t h a t people do a c t towards others i n an u n s e l f i s h way, wit h the good of the other person i n mind, at l e a s t t o some degree. Does t h i s l e a d t o d i f f i c u l t i e s ? The person who i s the r e c i p i e n t of the e t h i c a l a c t i o n r e c e i v e s value which Is not e t h i c a l f o r him. I t i s a form of value which f o r him i s i n t r i n s i c . - 21 -Does an e t h i c a l a c t , then, i n v o l v e two types of value r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n nature? That i s , the type of value enjoyed, which i s n o n - e t h i c a l , and the value i n v o l v e d c e n t r a l l y i n the a c t of u n s e l f i s h n e s s ? What i s the l o g i c a l s t a t u s of the l a t t e r ? What j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s there f o r c a l l i n g i t e t h i c a l value at a l l ? Can we say t h a t the two v a l u e s are the same e n t i t y viewed from two aspects — the two s i d e s of a c o i n of v a l u e , or the concave and convex si d e s of an arc of v a l u e ? Rather, i t might be more accurate to say t h a t what i s i n v o l v e d i s one a c t which has two m a n i f e s t a t i o n s : f i r s t , the i n t r i n s i c value c o n f e r r e d on someone e l s e ; and second, what we have chosen t o c a l l e t h i c a l value which i s the e x p r e s s i o n of an o b l i g a t i o n . There i s an e t y m o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r adhering t o the terminology \" e t h i c a l v a l u e \" . The meaning of \" value\" d e r i v e s from the Old French \" v a l o i r \" — \" t o be worth\", which comes from the L a t i n \" v a l e r e \" -- \"to be s t r o n g \" . The e t h i c a l a c t i s of supreme value i n making an ordered e x i s t e n c e p o s s i b l e . Since value i s i n t i m a t e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h and a r i s e s out of the e t h i c a l a c t , the term \" e t h i c a l v a l u e \" f o r the e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s l e g i t i m a t e and appro-p r i a t e . I t seems f i t t i n g t h a t e t h i c a l value should be equated with the \"ought\". - 22 -I t may f u r t h e r be noted t h a t i n performing a genuine e t h i c a l a c t , the person who does so derives a mode of value h i m s e l f . T h i s i s a s p e c i e s of i n t r i n s i c v alue which i s not, however, e t h i c a l i n i t s e l f . In e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y , then, the c e n t r a l value the essence r e v e a l i n g the nature of the act — i s what we are p r i n c i p a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n . A r i s i n g from t h i s i s (a) the value c o n f e r r e d , and (b) the p o s s i b l e value r e s u l t -i n g t o the person performing the a c t i o n , as mentioned above. The conscious i n t e n t i o n of the a c t o r i s t o c o n f e r the value r e c e i v e d by the other person concerned. The concomitant value which he may i n c i d e n t a l l y r e c e i v e , i s something added, a g i f t t o him from f a t e . I f , however, he pursues the e t h i c a l course f o r the sake of the emotional glow and the s e l f -s a t i s f a c t i o n d e r i v e d i n f e e l i n g v i r t u o u s , h i s a c t l o s e s I t s e t h i c a l c h a r a c t e r . By e t h i c a l v a l u e , t h e r e f o r e , we mean the c e n t r a l nature of the mode of a c t i v i t y i n which the doer Intends b e n e f i t t o accrue t o another being; t h i s c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i n c l u d e s w i t h i n i t s c o n n o t a t i o n the concepts of v i r t u e , duty, c o n s c i e n c e , u n s e l f i s h n e s s , and moral e x c e l l e n c e . I n t r i n s i c value i n c l u d e s the numerous degrees of v a l u e , p o t e n t i a l and r e a l i z e d , expressed by the v a r i o u s terms d e s i g n a t i n g value i n enjoyment or p o t e n t i a l i t y , as w e l l as the d i f f e r e n t aspects of value which are s t r e s s e d i n v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s . A l l the f i r s t three d i v i s i o n s noted - 23 -above are e s s e n t i a l l y one. Value i s t h a t which i s of v a l u e or worth t o human l i f e . Only e t h i c a l value i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t and t h a t by reason of the e n t i t y with which i t i s concerned, namely, the sense of o b l i g a t i o n . THE NATURE OF THE GOOD: I t seems apparent t h a t i n s t u d y i n g the nature of the good, p h i l o s o p h e r s have been concerned with two problems which have not always been c l e a r l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d , and p o s s i b l y t h i s p a r t l y accounts f o r the f a c t , which i s r e a l l y i n c r e d i b l e , t h at the most p e n e t r a t i n g i n t e l l e c t s over some 2500 years have not been able t o reach a g r e a t e r measure of agreement. The two problems are the f o l l o w i n g ; A — What i s the nature of \"ought\", or, i n other words, what i s the nature of e t h i c a l v a l u e ? B — What i s the nature of i n t r i n s i c v alue? The e x p r e s s i o n \"The Good\" has sometimes meant one; sometimes the other; sometimes, no doubt, the two t o g e t h e r . For there i s no doubt t h a t the two are very c l o s e l y connected and u n l e s s t h i s were so the c o n f u s i o n would not have a r i s e n . The word \"goodness\" i s a l s o used; i t can have two meanings; (a) the goodness i n t h i n g s , the goodness exper-i e n c e d by somebody; and (b) goodness as v i r t u e , the c a r r y -i n g out of one's duty. There can be goods (the o l d L a t i n term \"bona\") without goodness In the e t h i c a l sense, but i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o envisage goodness without goods, e i t h e r r e a l i z e d , or envisaged, or intended, i t would - 24 -c l a r i f y these two concepts i f the above two c a t e g o r i e s , A and B, were designated as goodness and the Good r e s p e c t -i v e l y . The l a t t e r term would then be a c o l l e c t i v e one f o r v a r i o u s goods. T h i s study i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h problem A , the nature of the e t h i c a l impulse. I f we can determine t h i s , much l i g h t w i l l have been thrown on the c e n t r a l problem of the t h e s i s , whether t h i s value transcends c u l t u r e . The e x p e r i e n c i n g of o b l i g a t i o n has two a s p e c t s : f i r s t , there I B the i n t e r n a l sense of being s u b j e c t t o compulsion, t o the d i c t a t e of a law or mandate of some k i n d , which may be overwhelming. T h i s might be c a l l e d the sub-j e c t i v e component. Then there i s the e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e t o the a c t r e q u i r e d t o be done. T h i s i s the o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r . What i s the r e l a t i o n between these two f a c t o r s ? Is the i n t e r i o r sense of command always the predominant one? I t would seem always to be so a c c o r d i n g t o the c l a s s of e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s which conceive duty i n terms of adherence t o a law or p r e s c r i p t i o n . L o y a l t y t o the c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , f o r I n s t a n c e , would seem t o l a y the primary and overwhelming s t r e s s on the s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r . Those t h e o r i e s which take the f u r t h e r a n c e of an i d e a l as c e n t r a l , such as happiness o r s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t , r e v o l v e around the o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r . - 25 -I t i s i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the o b j e c t i v e element t h a t the connection between the good c o n s i d e r e d i n t r i n s i c a l l y and without e t h i c a l c o n n o t a t i o n s , and the e t h i c a l imperative l i e s . The moral Imperative has as f i n a l g o a l o r consummation some a c t which e f f e c t u a t e s human good i n the primary i n t r i n s i c sense. T h i s accounts f o r the i n -c l u s i o n of both e n t i t i e s under the one concept of the good. When we say, f o r example, \" i t i s good t h a t the State should p r o t e c t a l l i t s c i t i z e n s \" , or \" i t i a good t h a t human p e r s o n a l i t y should be reapected\", our statements are c l o s e l y connected w i t h e t h i c a l goodness. We do not mean simply t h a t i n t r i n 3 i c good i s being enjoyed by aomeone i n the way intended when we say, \"This apple i s good\". In the l a t t e r statement we mean that the apple b r i n g s good t o us and we r e f e r the q u a l i t y t o the apple i t s e l f . I f we say, \" I t i s good to eat applea\", the r e f e r e n c e i s t o the act or t o i t s e f f e c t on our own w e l l - b e i n g ; there i a l i t t l e , i f any, o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e . But, more important, there i s no e t h i c a l r e f e r e n c e . But when we make the f i r s t two s t a t e -ments the referen c e aeems to be t o the q u a l i t y of e t h i c a l g o p d n e s 8 . Take the f i r s t sentence; \" I t i s good t h a t the State should p r o t e c t a l l i t a c i t i z e n s . \" Ia there an e t h i c a l r e f e r e n c e ? I f so, on whom l i e s the o b l i g a t i o n ? Is the State conceived as an e n t i t y i n i t s e l f ? But the assertion, c o u l d be made by someone who d i d not conceive of the State as e x i s t i n g apart from the t o t a l of i t s c i t i z e n s . In t h i s - 26 -case, the statement does not mean simply t h a t good i s con-f e r r e d on some human beings, and by i m p l i c a t i o n , a m a j o r i t y , when the maxim i s observed. I t means a l s o ! t h a t some i n d i v i -duals have an o b l i g a t i o n t o perform c e r t a i n d u t i e s and i t i s good t h a t t h i s should be done. A s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n a p p l i e s t o the second statement, n I t i s good t h a t human p e r s o n a l i t y should be r e s p e c t e d . \" But why i s i t good? T h i s i s a more d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n than appears at f i r s t g l a n c e. I t may be s a i d t h a t a s o c i e t y which h a b i t u a l l y r e s p e c t s human p e r s o n a l i t y achieves a h i g h e r degree of i n t r i n s i c v alue f o r i t s c i t i z e n s than one i n which t h i s i s not the case. Again, i t would probably be agreed t h a t i t i s b e t t e r t o have a s o c i a l s i t u a -t i o n where persons co-operate harmoniously owing t o n a t u r a l sympathy and a f f e c t i o n , than because of any sense of duty. So a s o c i e t y i n which spontaneous observance of r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n a l i t y o b t a i n e d would be b e t t e r because i t achieves i t s quantum of value without any deduction f o r the negative value chargeable f o r the f e e l i n g of c o n s t r a i n t . I t may be s a i d t h a t noble a c t i o n ( the obeying of an e t h i c a l impulse) produces an i n t r i n s i c value of i t s own over and above the value d i r e c t l y r e s u l t i n g . T h i s i s c o r r e c t ; i t i s the added value a c c r u i n g t o the person a c t i n g e t h i c a l l y r e f e r r e d t o above on page 22. But I t may be i n t e r p r e t e d more r e a l i s -t i c a l l y as the value r e s u l t i n g from the sense of joy or w e l l - b e i n g brought about by e f f e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f innate - 27 -c a p a c i t i e s i n harmonious p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i e t y . The question must be asked whether e t h i c s are good. Would the s u p e r s e s s i o n of e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n by spontaneous choosing of the course of a c t i o n l e a d i n g t o the maximum of i n t r i n s i c good not mark a h i g h e r stage of human development? Suppose we c o n s i d e r two s o c i e t i e s which are i d e n -t i c a l except t h a t i n the f i r s t , p a r t of the t o t a l i n t r i n s i c v alue enjoyed r e s u l t s from e t h i c a l a c t i o n , whereas i n the second a l l a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g others a r i s e s spontaneously. The r e s p e c t i v e balance sheets might res^d: (A) I n t r i n s i c value c o n f e r r e d by agents Added value from e x e r c i s e of e t h i c a l f e e l i n g , enjoyed by agents Less account sense of c o n s t r a i n t f e l t by agents Nett value r e a l i z e d - 100 U n i t s 10 TTO\" 5 105 (B) I n t r i n s i c value c o n f e r r e d by agents Added value from sense of w e l l - b e i n g In harmonious s o c i e t y , e n j o y e d by agents T o t a l value r e a l i z e d 100 U n i t s 10 \" 110 \" T h i s accords w i t h what we should expect. I t would not be reasonable that the s o c i e t y a c t i n g spontaneously i n an admirable manner would not have more i n t r i n s i c value than the o t h e r . - 28 -But t h i s i s to r e s t r i c t unduly the meaning of e t h i c a l v a l u e . Even i n the most advanced s o c i e t i e s con-c e i v a b l e there would be e t h i c a l v a l u e . T r e a t i n g others w e l l i s e t h i c a l even when the c o e r c i v e sense of o b l i g a t i o n Is overcome. Indeed the sense of c o n s t r a i n t when e x e r c i s i n g one's duty i n d i c a t e s f a i l u r e t o achieve the maximum i n t e -g r a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y . When the sense of o b l i g a t i o n i s not f e l t , except by i n t r o s p e c t i o n , the deed done spon-t a n e o u s l y i s s t i l l the r e f l e c t i o n of an o b l i g a t i o n . I t Is not p o s s i b l e t o do more than one's duty. I f a c e r t a i n course i s f e l t t o be the best under the circ u m s t a n c e s , i t i s r i g h t t o do i t ; i n other words, there i s an o b l i g a t i o n to do i t . So e t h i c s presumably w i l l never be superseded even i n the h i g h e s t mode of l i f e which ean be envisaged; what c o u l d happen would be t h a t the i n n e r and out e r harmony, that i a of I n d i v i d u a l s and of a o c i e t y , would be so h i g h l y advanced t h a t no c l a s h would occur. But i f , i n some unusual s i t u a t i o n , there were qu e s t i o n of some necessary o r s u i t a b l e a c t i o n not being done, i t would immediately become the duty of the person concerned t o do i t . So f a r we have d i a c r i m i n a t e d two elements i n the id e a of good i n the sentence, \" i t i s good t h a t human person-a l i t y s h ould be r e s p e c t e d \" , as f o l l o w s : (a) The i n t r i n s i c good r e a u l t i n g t o o t h e r s . T h i s i s the more important f a c t o r . (b) The added i n t r i n s i c good a c c r u i n g t o the person who a c t s e t h i c a l l y . - 29 -A p u r e l y n a t u r a l i s t i c theory c o u l d stop at t h i s p o i n t . But we must ask whether there i s a t h i r d element. The t r a d i t i o n a l aura of s a n c t i t y or awed r e s p e c t accorded e t h i -c a l value i n i t s e l f , w i l l cause those f o r whom a metaphysi-c a l e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e has taken the place of God, t o b e l i e v e t h a t i f the value r e a l i z e d i s the r e s u l t of e t h i c a l a c t i o n , then by reason of that very f a c t and r e g a r d l e s s of the l i f e e xperience of a l l the persons concerned, i t a t t a i n s a h i g h e r degree of value than i t would i f no one had t o a c t e t h i c a l l y . How a n a t u r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n can be chosen and yet r e c o g n i t i o n be given t o the f a c t t h a t the ought c o n t a i n s an o b s t i n a t e element d i f f i c u l t t o dispose of f i n a l l y . When I witness commendable a c t i o n I can make a judgement t h a t i t i s good. Since I am under no o b l i g a t i o n myself, the judge-ment would seem to be o b j e c t i v e . And y e t I seem to judge t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o the i n t r i n s i c value r e a l i z e d by the r e c i p i e n t and the performer of the deed, i t i s i n some sense good t h a t the a c t i o n s h o u l d have been performed. I t i s good i n i t s e l f . Perhaps t h i s i s merely a s u b t l e p r o j e c t i o n from the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t i n t r i n s i c value i s gained. Or i t might be a r e f l e c t i o n of my unconscious s a t i s f a c t i o n at l i v i n g i n the k i n d of s o c i e t y I want t o l i v e i n where such a c t i o n takes p l a c e . But as a matter of r e c o r d the f e e l i n g that an absolute c h a r a c t e r p e r t a i n s i n such s i t u a t i o n s can not be completely dismissed. - 30 -THE NATURE OF INTRINSIC VALUE: Although not c e n t r a l t o our problem, an i n d i c a -t i o n should be given of the nature of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . An adequate theory of v a l u e , i t would appear, must combine the p approaches of eudaemonism and p e r f e c t i o n i s m . S e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s happiness are complementary. The g r e a t e r the degree of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , so we must b e l i e v e , the g r e a t e r the happiness secured; and the e x p e r i e n c i n g of happiness must i n v o l v e s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n of the p e r s o n a l i t y . The c r i t e r i o n , i n b r i e f , must revolve around the concept of human welfare which embraces the i d e a of both happiness and s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . I t i s the enhancement of mature, e f f e c t i v e human l i v i n g . Value must be an e x p r e s s i o n of l i f e which i s the u l t i m a t e f a c t . Value i s not s y n t h e t i c a l l y added t o l i f e , but i s an i n t e g r a l component t h e r e o f . We p e r f o r c e must accept e x i s t e n c e as a good. I f we quest i o n the value of l i f e we at the same time q u e s t i o n the e x i s t e n c e of v a l u e . I f we go on l i v i n g we have vote d i n favour of l i f e ' s being more good than bad. We have i n the past r e c o g n i z e d c e r t a i n t h i n g s or experiences as good; t o t h a t e x t e n t we accepted l i f e as worthwhile. But when l i f e i s r e j e c t e d , then value 2 Although the term \"hedonism\" i s sometimes«s«xtended from t h a t of plea s u r e t o i n c l u d e the wider concept of happiness, i t seems p r e f e r a b l e t o use the s p e c i f i c a l l y apt term \"eudaemonism\". - 31 -Is r e j e c t e d . We are not t a l k i n g of the person who s a c r i -f i c e s h i s l i f e f o r an i d e a l ; nor of the case where the s u i c i d e i s c a r r i e d out because of the shame or l o s s of honour (so regarded) which would come to r e l a t i v e s --here there i s an e t h i c a l reason f o r the a c t , even though i t may be erroneous. But i f the t a k i n g of one's l i f e i s done s o l e l y because of the s u b j e c t ' s own concerns, perhaps because of unendurable p h y s i c a l p a i n , then the a c t might be the r e s u l t of r a t i o n a l b a l a n c i n g of p l u s e s and minuses. The q u a n t i t a t i v e assessment r e v e a l s a l a c k of i n t r i n s i c value and l i f e , the v e h i c l e of v a l u e , i s no longer worthwhile. - 0 -- 32 -CHAPTER I I I THE RELATION BETWEEN ETHICAL VALUE AND CULTURE Next we come to the r e l a t i o n between e t h i c a l value and c u l t u r e . I t i a my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a v a l i d mean-i n g can be a s s i g n e d to the statement \" E t h i c a l value t r a n a -cends c u l t u r e . \" The quest i o n of the t h e a i s i a , t h e r e f o r e , anawered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . I f e t h i c a l value transcends c u l t u r e , then a l l human c r e a t u r e s are i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s i n f l u e n c e d by the aame baaic e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e . E t h i c a l value i a a baaic f u n c t i o n of human nat u r e , r e g a r d l e s s of the a p e c i f i c form of c u l t u r e i n which i t i s manifested. In other words, a n a t u r a l i s t i c and r e a l i s t i c view of human nature i s able t o re g a r d i t as comprising an element which i a e t h i c a l and w i l l express i t s e l f i n some form or another r e g a r d l e s s of the c u l t u r a l environment. Men as human beings w i l l n e c e a s a r i l y l i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o each ot h e r w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s of accep t a b l e conduct. The ought expresses the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e and I t i s necessary t o probe t o the u l t i m a t e aemantic r o o t of t h i s term. The f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n s ahould make c l e a r the d i s t i n c t i o n t o be drawn between the e t h i c a l ought and the s o c i a l ought. The e t h i c a l ought: The e t h i c a l ought i a of the nature of a law which men must f o l l o w i f they are t o be t r u e t o t h e i r nature as members of the human apecie8. - 33 -The s o c i a l ought: The s o c i a l ought i s a r u l e of conduct imposed i m p l i c i t l y by s o c i e t y and v a r i e s from one s o c i e t y t o another. Commentary on the E t h i c a l Ought: There would seem to be a u n i v e r s a l i s m i m p l i c i t In the e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e ; i t i s an i n e s c a p a b l e , i n h e r e n t tendency of man to e s t a b l i s h c e r t a i n e f f e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s w ith a l l o t h e r l i f e and i s not an a r b i t r a r y r u l e of conduct which he i s f r e e to d i s c a r d as soon as he questions the a u t h o r i t y of h i s c u l t u r e . The f a c t t h a t the e t h i c a l sense i s m a n i f e s t e d i n a v a r i e t y of moral codes does not e x p l a i n away the e t h i e a l sense i t s e l f . Man i s a c r e a t u r e who i s i m p e l l e d by h i s own nature t o formulate an e t h i c a l code of some k i n d or another by which to l i v e . Man has a c a p a c i t y , indeed a need, t o behave a c c o r d i n g to what he b e l i e v e s to be j?ight. E t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , of c ourse, i s not a separate f a c u l t y i n the sense of a r i s i n g from a s p e c i f i c organ or avenue of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t u i t i o n . The e t h i c a l ought i s an o b l i g a t i o n to f o s t e r what i s r i g h t . Whatever i s r i g h t Is so not because the person's conscious d e s i r e claims i t , nor because i n an unconscious, s u b t l e , but i n e v i t a b l e way i t f u r t h e r s the l i f e of s o c i e t y , but because i t i s a n a t u r a l and i n e s c a p a b l e concomitant of l i f e . That i s , i n paying a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t t h a t he e x i s t s (and i n d e a l i n g with the problem o f e t h i c a l value - 34 -we assume t h a t man does have an i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e ) man unavoidably f i n d s h i m s e l f i n v o l v e d i n the experience of e t h i c a l v a l u e . I t can not be reduced t o custom, s o c i a l convention, h a b i t , or i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e . F u r t h e r , the e t h i c a l c a p a c i t y i s one which w i l l make s a c r i f i c e s . The f e e l i n g (and we have suggested e a r l i e r t h a t r e f i n e d i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s a d m i s s i b l e ) i s that the law to be f o l l o w e d has a v a l i d i t y which transcends the moulding i n f l u e n c e of s o c i e t y . A concept such as \" h i g h e r e t h i c a l t r u t h \" seems t o have meaning. The word \"higher\" here would seem t o connote an escape from imprisonment w i t h i n the s e l f ; the a c t i v i t y has r e l a t i o n s w i t h more of the t o t a l l i f e m a n i f e s t i n g ; i n the u n i v e r s e . The reason the scope of the law i s e n l a r g e d i s not because s o c i e t y impels t h i s a c t i o n ; the requirements of s o c i e t y , when c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d , f a l l f a r s h o r t of what im a g i n a t i v e e t h i c a l a c t i o n r e q u i r e s . E t h i c a l v a l u e , then, must be seen aa an e v o l v i n g c a p a c i t y of men, aa w i l l be s e t f o r t h more e x p l i c i t l y i n the chapter on e v o l u t i o n a r y e t h i c s . The area of o b l i g a t i o n i s extended from one 1a own group t o i n c l u d e neighbouring and r e l a t e d groups and e v e n t u a l l y a l l humanity. T h i s proceas accompanies the i n t e l l e c t u a l comprehension of the wider e t h i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . There i s al8o aomething of an ae8thetic nature about e t h i c a l v a l u e . Juat aa an a r t i s t might cr i n g e at - 35 -some d i s p r o p o r t i o n i n p a i n t i n g or music, so one of the components of the e t h i c a l a c t i o n i s a s e n s i t i v i t y t o r i g h t p r o p o r t i o n s i n conduct. Another element i s the i n t e l l e c t u a l sense of the f i t n e s s of t h i n g s . J u s t aa an engineer might f e e l t h a t some clumsy arrangement of part8 v i o l a t e d sound p r i n c i p l e s of mechanics, ao an e t h i c a l l y a e n a i t i v e person o f t e n f e e l s a senae of v i o l a t i o n . There i a aomething con-gruent and a t t r a c t i v e t o see performed t h a t a c t i o n which i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . But there would aeem t o be a f a c t o r i n e t h i c a l conduct over and above t h e s e , conduct which i a more than t h a t seen to be f i t t i n g i n a g i v e n a i t u a -t i o n . I t i a the senae of something done from a generoua motive; something given beyond what the a t r i c t requirements of the s i t u a t i o n demand. I t must be 8tripped of a l l a e l f i s h elements. I t 13 not the g i v i n g which m i n i a t e r a t o aome unconscious need f o r f u l f i l m e n t i n order t o overcome an I n f e r i o r i t y complex. What i s meant Is a genuine g i v i n g e l i c i t e d by p i t y , u n a e l f i a h l o v e , or a atrong d e s i r e t o p r o t e c t or aave someone, or t o give l i f e g r e a t e r meaning t o a person In need. The a c c u s a t i o n might be l e v e l l e d t h a t conscience i a a apeciea of n e u r o t i c compulsion. I t i s f a r e a s i e r t o admit i n t e l l e c t u a l e r r o r , d i f f i c u l t though t h i s be, than t o abandon o b s t i n a t e e t h i c a l concepts, I would augge3t t h a t there i s a h e a l t h y form of conacience which i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from paychaathenic d i a o r d e r . In n e u r o t i c compulsion, when there i a i n s i g h t i n t o the con-d i t i o n , the compulsive d r i v e i a f e l t as an a f f l i c t i o n , as a burdensome i m p o s i t i o n , eacape from which would be welcome; e t h i c a l compul3ion may be f e l t as i n f l i c t i n g a d i f f i c u l t courae which may be troublesome, but i t i a regarded, n e v e r t h e l e s s , as being r i g h t and proper i n a manner - , which the promptinga of the n e u r o s i s never possess. Commentary on the S o c i a l Ought: The f a c t of the great d i s p a r i t y of customs, i n s t i t u t i o n s and procedures i n d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s haa the e f f e c t of suggesting very p e r s u a a i v e l y t h a t the e t h i c a l prompting i a i n 8 t i l l e d by a o c i e t y . I t i s c r e a t e d by the c u l t u r e and wholly determined t h e r e b y , being of the nature of an automatic r e a c t i o n between the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s a o c i e t y . I t i s a matter of convenience and ease of l i v i n g , a l t h o u g h t h i s need not r u l e out what we would c a l l u n s e l f i s h a c t i o n . The human s p e c i e s can be t r a i n e d t o be u n s e l f i a h . Is an e f f e c t i v e and wi8ely planned system of rewarda and puniahments a matter of pure common 8ense and does i t take away the e t h i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the a c t ? That i s , i a the c h i l d taught t h a t i t i a t o h i s advantage t o conform and t o c o n s i d e r the r i g h t a of others i n c o n j u n c t i o n with h i s own? The peraon who a c t s e t h i c a l l y i s merely a c t i n g i n the way he haa been taught; he i s f o l l o w i n g a h a b i t i n s t i l l e d i n him i n c h i l d h o o d . He r e f e r s h i s n o n - s e l f - r e g a r d i n g conduct - 37 -to an e t h i c a l impulse which, however, i s only the I d e a l i -z a t i o n of the p a t t e r n impressed on h i s mind by h i s t r a i n i n g . Conscience i s the r e s u l t , not n e c e s s a r i l y of f e a r ; i t may be of the d e s i r e t o p l e a s e . Since s o c i a l anthropology pr o v i d e s the i l l u m i n a t i n g i n s i g h t that man's very nature as a f u n c t i o n i n g i n d i v i d u a l depends on h i s thousand t i e s and binds with the l i f e of the s o c i a l group, h i s sense of s o c i a l o b l i g a t i o n i s i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h the l i f e of the group. The s o c i a l ought might a l t e r n a t i v e l y be d e s c r i b e d as the p s y c h o l o g i c a l ought, s i n c e the sense of o b l i g a t i o n i s a f f e c t e d so g r e a t l y by c h i l d h o o d t r a i n i n g . The I n t e r a c t i o n of the E t h i c a l and S o c i a l Ought: I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t the ought a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d i s a complex e n t i t y a r i s i n g from the i n t e r a c t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n h e r e n t c a p a c i t i e s , the t r a i n i n g he r e c e i v e s , and the v a l u e - i d e a s of the s o c i e t y i n which he develops. E t h i c a l conduct i s compounded of b a s i c human nature and the c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e . The reason f o r t a k i n g the h e r e d i t a r y f a c t o r as of prime importance i s th a t i t i s the i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o u n d a t i o n f o r a l l moral conduct, while the i n f l u e n c e of t r a i n i n g and s o c i e t y merely mould i t t o a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n . The term e t h i c a l f o r the ought may, t h e r e f o r e , be r e t a i n e d even i f i t i s not viewed as grounded - 38 -i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l power. I t i s worth emphasizing t h a t an e t h i c a l ought can be v a l i d i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c s e t t i n g . The reasoning about the e t h i c a l and s o c i a l ought haa a c l o s e p a r a l l e l w i t h the o l d problem of h e r e d i t y and environment. Both are neceaaary f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of good organisma, but the overwhelming emphaals on environment which obtained some years ago i 3 now balanced by r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance of h e r e d i t y . Unleas the g e n e t i c a t r u c t u r e , the \"formal cause\", i s adequate, the best environment w i l l not produce good r e s u l t s . In a c e r t a i n fundamental aenae the h e r e d i t a r y f a c t o r Is pr e p o t e n t . A l l the t r a i n i n g i n the world would be f u t i l e i f man were not an e t h i c a l animal. Meaning of \"Tranacend\": Having di8tinguished between the e t h i c a l ought and the 80cial ought, we may now e x p l a i n i n what senae e t h i c a l value tranacenda c u l t u r e , as promised i n the pre v i o u s c h a p t e r . Our main c o n t e n t i o n i s , as i n d i c a t e d above, t h a t e t h i c a l value haa i t s locus of f u n c t i o n i n g on the plane o f humanity and not on the l e v e l o f a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e . The e t h i c a l imperative i n i t s f u l l e s t m a nifeata-t i o n cornea from human nature and not from s o c i a l t r a i n i n g . Por man as a apeciea there i a an abaolute l o y a l t y ; the e a r l y l o y a l t y t o the r e s t r i c t e d group expands i n the process of e v o l u t i o n i n t o l o y a l t y t o a l l l i f e . The good i s an i n s t i n c t -i v e p r o p u l s i o n , an i n e s c a p a b l e , i n h e r e n t tendency t o - 39 -e s t a b l i s h e f f e c t i v e and harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p with a l l other l i f e . The good i m p e r a t i v e , as we have I n d i c a t e d , must be supplemented by knowledge. Man i s concerned w i t h a dynamic given element of h i s e s s e n t i a l s e l f ; t o t h i s e xtent the command i s a b s o l u t e . Man makes a mess of h i s e t h i c a l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s because, f o r one t h i n g , of h i s ignorance. E t h i c s t r a n s c e n d c u l t u r e i n the sense t h a t the l o f t i e s t e t h i c a p p l i e s t o the Republic of Humanity and not t o any s p e c i f i c e u l t u r e . The pl a n n i n g of Utopias i s not an u t t e r l y f u t i l e p u r s u i t -- i t does have an i n f l u e n c e i n the l i v e s o f men. I f a l a r g e p a r t of the p o p u l a t i o n were adequately educated t o comprehend t h e i r membership i n the human r a c e , the g e n e r a l standard of behaviour could be improved r a p i d l y . The Republic of Humanity i n c l u d e s those dead who have pione e r e d the way to a b e t t e r order of s o c i e t y as w e l l as those i n the f u t u r e . The f i g h t e r s f o r l i b e r t y i n past c e n t u r i e s and i n modern c o n c e n t r a t i o n camps are members. Imaginative as w e l l as a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n such s t r u g g l e i s open t o a l l s i n c e r e t h i n k e r s who see beyond the l i m i t s of t h e i r own time and p l a c e . To summarize b r i e f l y , e t h i c a l value transcends c u l t u r e because the f o l l o w i n g would appear t o be t r u e : S o c i e t y i s p o s s i b l e because man i s an e t h i c a l c r e a t u r e ; not man i s e t h i c a l because h i s s o c i e t y makes him so. - 40 -E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y : The acceptance of the ought as s o c i a l or psycho-l o g i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r leads t o e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y . In broad terms, two forms may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . (a) Extreme E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y : T h i s a r i s e s from the view t h a t the ought i s s o l e l y a s o c i a l one, t h a t value i s d e t e r -mined completely by the e u l t u r e . The r e s u l t s of a thorough e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y are not p l e a s a n t t o contemplate. What would u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l might c o n c e i v a b l y be e t h i c a l chaos, a complete breakdown of ordered s o c i e t y , or e l s e the sub-j e c t i o n of s o c i e t y t o an a r b i t r a r y r u l e imposed from above. The c o m p l e x i t i e s of modern i n d u s t r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n n e c e s s i -t a t e a more developed e t h i c of mutual understanding and harmonious c o - o p e r a t i o n on p e r s o n a l , n a t i o n a l , and i n t e r -n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . E t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y , I t h i n k , i n i t s p r a c t i c a l judgement comes t o t h i s , t h a t the ethos of a s p e c i f i c c u l t u r e s e t s l i m i t s t o the e t h i c a l development w i t h i n i t . But i m a g i n a t i v e t h i n k e r s and o c c a s i o n a l e t h i c a l geniuses seem to have the c a p a c i t y t o t r a n s c e n d the l i m i t s of t h e i r c u l t u r e and extend the area of e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t o o t h e r s . T h i s r e v e a l a what seems t o be a f a t a l o b j e c t i o n t o the ex-treme r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n , namely, the f a c t t h a t e t h i c a l progress seems t o be a meaningful concept. I t would r u l e out any q u e s t i o n of one e t h i c being b e t t e r than another. The t a l k of progress i s meaningless i f one e t h i c a l system - 41 -i s as good as another. No c r i t e r i o n c o u l d be found f o r judging between one c u l t u r e and another. But I f a t r u l y h umanistic e t h i c i s adopted, one a p p l i c a b l e t o p l a n e t a r y man, then the c r i t e r i o n can be found. I t would l i e i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of more of man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . To the scep-t i c a l query as t o what value l i e s i n r e a l i z i n g more of l a -t e n t c a p a c i t i e s , i t must be s a i d t h a t a l l experience and judgement suggest t h a t l i f e can be r i c h e r and express more meaning i n one context than another; the f a c t of c o n t i n u i n g with the business of l i v i n g c a r r i e s as l o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y the imp u l s i o n t o e x t r a c t the utmost value p o s s i b l e from t h a t l i f e . I f complete e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y i s a f a c t , what meaning c o u l d be given t o the admonition; \"Do what you t h i n k i s r i g h t and don't worry about what anybody says\"? Does i t imply t h a t the su b j e c t makes h i s e t h i c a l e v a l u a t i o n and co n s i d e r s that he can b e t t e r p e r c e i v e what the s o c i a l r e q u i r e -ment i s than other men i n the s o c i e t y ? But i f the e t h i c a l impulse i s merely a product of s o c i e t y how c o u l d t h i s i n j u n c -t i o n have any meaning? Must we not conclude t h a t e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y breaks down i n attempting t o d e a l w i t h conduct which f o l l o w s what seems t o be a h i g h e r prompting than the c u l t u r e e n j o i n s ? Why, we must ask, i s h a b i t , or what s o c i e t y expects of one t r a n s l a t e d i n t o an ought a t a l l ? Does i t a r i s e out of a t e n s i o n between my own d e s i r e s and what I must do to win the approval and r e g a r d of s o c i e t y or those members of i t whose o p i n i o n I v a l u e , or good e s t i m a t i o n I want t o - 42 -r e t a i n ? But I f i n d t h a t although I do what I f e e l i s r i g h t and know i t w i l l please o t h e r s , I do not do i t s o l e l y f o r tha t reason, but p r i n c i p a l l y because I know i t i s the r i g h t t h i n g t o do. Perhaps man seeks a p p r o v a l fundamentally because he i s an e t h i c a l being. The f a c t of c u l t u r e borrowing i n d i c a t e s supra-c u l t u r a l f a c t o r s . I t Is not a v a l i d r e j o i n d e r t o a s s e r t t h a t the adoption of an e t h i c a l custom from another c u l t u r e enables the borrowing s o c i e t y t o r e a l i z e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s not p r e v i o u s l y p e r c e i v e d , j u s t as the m a t e r i a l environment may be more e f f i c i e n t l y e x p l o i t e d i f Inf o r m a t i o n from another c u l t u r e i s u t i l i z e d . F or one t h i n g , the ve r y c a p a c i t y t o make judgements as to the s u p e r i o r m e r i t s of some e t h i c a l h a b i t of another s o c i e t y i n d i c a t e s a f u n c t i o n of the mind tr a n s c e n d i n g the l i m i t s of the f i r s t s o c i e t y . Next, the f a c t t h a t conduct can be m o d i f i e d In the l i g h t of i d e a s and customs adopted from without i n d i c a t e s a f l e x i b i l i t y not c o n s i s t e n t with complete r e l a t i v i t y . For example, n a t i v e s i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s sometimes e x h i b i t a shrewd and p e n e t r a t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o the a c t i v i t i e s of m i s s i o n a r i e s . Outward forms are observed i n order t o please the m i s s i o n a r i e s . Dr. Gordon Brown of Toronto gi v e s an amusing i n s t a n c e . In Samoa the n a t i v e s bathe naked i n p u b l i c , but i n deference t o the teachings of the C h r i s t i a n m i s s i o n a r i e s they w i l l , i f bat h i n g openly at some v i l l a g e bath p l a c e , cover themselves i f a mi s s i o n a r y appears. - 43 -There i s , however, genuine borrowing. One i n s t a n c e i s Gandhi adopting the e t h i c of no n - r e s i s t a n c e from the West and a p p l y i n g i t i n an advanced degree which would appear extravagant i n s o - c a l l e d C h r i s t i a n c o u n t r i e s . A l s o , Nehru and Rajagopalachari and other l e a d e r s i n I n d i a who have borrowed the concepts of freedom and democracy from Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . Some one s a i d t h at men face two i n e x p l i c a b l e f a c t s -- the problem of e v i l and the problem of good. The t h e i s t has to face the f i r s t . We may a s s e r t t h a t the extreme e t h i e a l r e l a t i v i s t has t o face the second. Recently I watched three s m a l l c h i l d r e n c u t t i n g bread and showing great concern t o cut the s l i c e s s t r a i g h t . The e l d e s t l i t t l e g i r l about e i g h t years o l d s a i d , \"You shou l d give y o u r s e l f the worst.\" When I asked her why, she r e p l i e d immediately and w i t h complete assurance, \"Because i t ' s not very n i c e i f you don't.\" In u l t i m a t e a n a l y s i s and as a p r a c t i c a l judgement r e g a r d l e s s of c u l t u r e , i t w i l l not be very n i c e f o r humanity i f i t does not a c t e t h i c a l l y . (b) Moderate E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y : Man has an e t h i c a l capa-c i t y which may be moulded by environment and c u l t u r e . T h e r e f o r e , the e t h i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s r e l a t i v e t o the c u l t u r e . T h i s i s not f a r removed from the p o s i t i o n adopted h e r e i n . The d i f f e r e n c e appears t o l i e i n the r e s p e c t i v e - 44 -emphasis p l a c e d on h e r e d i t y and environment. The moderate e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s t s t r e s s e s the l a t t e r ; i n t h i s t h e s i s the h e r e d i t a r y endowment i s c o n s i d e r e d the prime, inescapable f a c t o r . Man has a d e s t i n y t o r e a l i z e , a l t h o u g h he f i n d s that d e s t i n y i m p l i c i t i n h i s own nature and not i n the s t a r s . What i s the C r i t e r i o n f o r Right A c t i o n ? T h i s t h e s i s deals p r i n c i p a l l y with the f a c t t h a t man responds t o e t h i c a l m o t i v a t i o n , which i s the supremely important f a c t i n viewing the human scene. However, a sug-g e s t i o n should be given of what should c o n s t i t u t e r i g h t a c t l n n . I t i s t o be noted t h a t we have spoken of e t h i c a l value i n the s i n g u l a r . T h i s f o l l o w s because we are concerned with the f a c t of o b l i g a t i o n . I am f o r c e d t o conclude t h a t there are no s p e c i f i c e t h i c a l v a l u e s . When we spontaneously regard some p a r t i c u l a r v a l u a b l e a c t i o n , such, f o r example, as r e s p e c t i n g p e r s o n a l i t y , as an e t h i c a l v a l u e , we are r e g i s t e r i n g i n l i n g u i s t i c usage the coalescence of two separate elements: f i r s t , the i n t r i n s i c value t o the person most v i t a l l y concerned who has enjoyed enhancement of h i s e x i s t e n c e because others have r e s p e c t e d h i s p e r s o n a l i t y ; second, the e t h i c a l f a c t o r i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c o n d i t i o n by some person who ac t e d e t h i c a l l y i n r e s p e c t i n g that person-a l i t y . So there are not d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l values f o r d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s . What are d i f f e r e n t are i n t r i n s i c values - 45 -and the conduct i n v o l v e d i n a c h i e v i n g them. I n t r i n s i c values may d i f f e r from c u l t u r e t o c u l t u r e ; e t h i c a l value does not change except i n the ends t o which i t i s d i r e c t e d . But i s t h i s not a l l t h a t we mean by saying t h a t e t h i c a l value i s r e l a t i v e ? The answer i s no because the c e n t r a l f a c t i s the e t h i c a l nature of man, the c a p a c i t y to f o l l o w the ought. Of n e c e s s i t y the end of the e t h i c a l impulse w i l l depend on the nature of the c u l t u r e and v a r i o u s p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l circumstances. T h i s i s t o be expected i f man's e t h i c a l nature i s s u b j e c t to growth. In a l l s i t u a t i o n s there i s p o t e n t i a l l y a r i g h t course of a c t i o n . I t i s r i g h t not because the best human judgement so decides but because the o b j e c t i v e f a c t s — a l l the o b j e c t s and events c o n s t i t u t i n g the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n — make i t so. The o b j e c t i v e f a c t s p e r t a i n t o the world expe r i e n c e d by man (but not n e c e s s a r i l y as experienced by man) and not to a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l realm. The reason the o b j e c t i v e f a c t s are r e l a t e d to what c o n s t i t u t e s Tightness f o r man i s th a t these t h r e e : l i f e , i n t r i n a i c v a l u e , and e t h i c a l v a l u e , are i n t i m a t e l y and I n d i s s o l u b l y connected. They are u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i a f o r a f i n i t e judgement which i s a l l man can make. I t , t h e r e f o r e , f o l l o w s t h a t my duty i s bound up wit h my l i f e - e x p e r i e n c e and i t becomes my duty t o promote human w e l f a r e . An e t h i c a l c o r o l l a r y of thia i s the aovereign worth of human p e r a o n a l i t y . - 46 -We must b e l i e v e that there i s an o b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n from which omniscience c o u l d deduce the r i g h t course of a c t i o n , o r we meet an i r r a t i o n a l element i n l i f e . I do not b e l i e v e that there i s an i r r a t i o n a l element. I f men maintain e f f e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s with other people they w i l l f i n d mystery i n the uni v e r s e but not i r r a t i o n a l i t y , i t seems t o me. I t may be i n t e r p o s e d t h a t f r e q u e n t l y incompatible e t h i c a l claims produce c o n f l i c t which d e f i e s r e s o l u t i o n . In r e p l y , f i r s t , I would say t h a t a completely i m p a r t i a l t r i b u n a l c o u l d render a v a l i d d e c i s i o n i n many of these cases, although human i n t r a n s l g e n c y may refuse f o r a long time to come to accept such judgement. We may note that i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s as y e t i n c h o a t e . Second, i f mankind i s not able t o r e s o l v e d i f f i c u l t c o n f l i c t s , t h a t merely r e g i s t e r s the f a c t of man's present ignorance and f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s . The utmost achievable p r a c t i c a l l y i s what a . mature u n p r e j u d i c e d person i n p o s s e s s i o n of a l l r e l e v a n t knowledge would judge t o be a p p r o p r i a t e . In any p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n the d e c i s i o n w i l l be f a l l i b l e and depart from complete o b j e c t i v i t y . Conduct i s wrong e t h i c a l l y i f a person does not use h i s I n t e l l e c t t o the best extent he can. But we judge the c h a r a c t e r of an e t h i c a l act not pu r e l y by motive, nor s o l e l y by r e s u l t , but by a combina-- 47 -t i o n of the motive and the resources of knowledge the person had at h i s command. T h i s indeed would h o l d under e i t h e r an absolute or a r e l a t i v e a b s o l u t e e t h i c v In v i s u a l i z i n g an e t h i c a l economy we ask these q u e s t i o n s : Why i s i t b e t t e r t o use the m a t e r i a l resources of a country t o best advantage? Because more human good r e s u l t s . A l l men would agree t h i s i s d e s i r a b l e -- assuming e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n and proper i n t e g r a t i o n with other values o f l i f e . Why i s i t b e t t e r t o make t h i n g s as b e a u t i f u l as p o s s i b l e ? In order t o maximize the amount of beauty In the world. Again g r e a t e r b e n e f i t accrues t o human beings. And again a l l men would agree t h i s i s d e s i r a b l e . Why i s i t b e t t e r t o a c t e t h i c a l l y ? S t i l l a g a i n , because the sum t o t a l of human happiness and w e l l - b e i n g would be g r e a t e r . And s t i l l a g a i n , a l l , or n e a r l y a l l , men would agree. I t i s uneconomic, u n a e s t h e t i c , and u n e t h i c a l not t o u t i l i z e a l l the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the p h y s i c a l environment and of man 1s nature. - - 0 - -- 48 -CHAPTER IV THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY ON ETHICS The f i n d i n g s of psychology have had an enormous i n f l u e n c e on e t h i c a l thought. Much l i g h t has been shed by s t u d i e s of the nervous system and the mechanisms of behaviour. The r e v e l a t i o n s of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s concerning the e x i s t e n c e and preponderant e f f e c t of unconscious moti-v a t i o n have been of paramount importance. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s whether p s y c h o l o g i s t s c o u l d devise any k i n d of experiment t o throw l i g h t on the nature of the ought. One p o s s i b l e approach might be through hypnotism. I t seems t h a t unconscious memories of e a r l y l i f e d a t i n g back t o i n f a n c y can be e l i c i t e d under h y p n o s i s . The famous case c i t e d by Dr. Morton Prince i s i l l u s t r a t i v e . A man, by t h i s t echnique, was able t o r e c a l l the numbers of houses on a c e r t a i n s t r e e t i n Boston along which he had been taken as a baby before he c o u l d have l e a r n e d numbers or counting. The houses had subsequently been t o r n down but h i s reco-l l e c t i o n of the numbers was v e r i f i e d from c i v i c r e c o r d s . Whether such r e p o r t i n g c o u l d b r i n g t o l i g h t i n f o r m a t i o n as t o how the sense of o b l i g a t i o n to others a r i s e s -- whether i t i s f e l t p u r e l y as an i n s t r u c t i o n from parents and t e a c h e r s , or whether as an innate prompting, i s a matter of c o n j e c t u r e only, a t the present s t a g e . Quite p o s s i b l y t h i s method would never be accurate enough i n r e c a l l i n g mental s t a t e s t o give c e r t a i n knowledge. Perhaps the t e c h -niques of ps y c h o a n a l y s i s would provide more c e r t a i n data. A d o c t o r i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , E. Pickworth Farrow, i n a book t o which Sigmund Freud wrote an approving foreword, recounts h i s a b i l i t y t o go back i n memory t o the age of s i x months; he was thus enabled t o d i s c o v e r f e e l i n g s o f rage which he experie n c e d a g a i n s t h i s f a t h e r . I t may not be beyond the bounds of p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some acute s e l f -a n a l y s t e o u l d use the same technique of f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n to d i s c o v e r whether h i s f e e l i n g of o b l i g a t i o n was e n t i r e l y im-posed from without, or whether he d i s c o v e r e d an i n n e r sub-j e c t i o n t o e t h i c a l d i r e c t i o n . On the other hand, i t might be that i f the e t h i c a l sense r e q u i r e s maturation, perhaps by the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a developed i n t e l l e c t u a l element, the f u l l e s t r e covery of p r i s t i n e impressions would not provide a s o l u t i o n . Since a c h i l d has t o be t r a i n e d e a r l y t o a t t a i n i f i r s t rank as a musi c i a n , when the innate m u s i c a l c a p a c i t y i s p r e s e n t , i s i t not p o s s i b l e t h a t a c h i l d ' s e t h i c a l sense should be developed e a r l y ? Perhaps there i s an optimum p e r i o d f o r i n s t i l l i n g e t h i c a l i d e a l s which embrace a wider sphere than the p r e v a i l i n g ethos r e q u i r e s , as there i s t o 3 E. Pickworth Farrow, Analyze Y o u r s e l f , w i t h Foreword by Sigmund Freud, New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press Inc., 1945. - 50 -l e a r n c e r t a i n s k i l l s . I t i s an o l d t r u i s m , a t t r i b u t e d t o the J e s u i t s , t h a t i f the r e l i g i o u s t r a i n i n g of the c h i l d i s c o n t r o l l e d f o r the f i r s t few y e a r s , the c h i l d w i l l r e t a i n the precepts implanted f o r the r e s t of h i s l i f e . Under what c o n d i t i o n s w i l l l a t e r i n f l u e n c e s o v e r - r i d e the e a r l y t r a i n i n g i n c e r t a i n cases? Is there a process of maturation a t work which i n some i n s t a n c e s w i l l r e i n f o r c e the o r i g i n a l t r a i n i n g and i n others a l l o w i t t o be neglected? I t may not l i e beyond the e v e n t u a l competence of p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o throw l i g h t on these problems. In an essay e n t i t l e d , S c i e n c e , Humanism and the Good** d e a l i n g w i t h value i n a g e n e r i c sense, P r o f e s s o r P h i l i p B l a i r Rice draws a t t e n t i o n t o r e c e n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l researches i n t o the n e u r a l f a c t o r s concerned w i t h f e e l i n g s ; f e e l i n g s and emotional s t a t e s have p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s . Rice s t a t e s t h a t r e c e n t experiments suggest t h a t hedonic tone ( t h a t i s , pleasantness or unpleasantness) i s a d i r e c t f u n c t i o n of s t r e s s e s i n the c e n t r a l nervous system, but t h a t the exact c o n d i t i o n s are not yet known. Pleasantness i n many i n s t a n c e s seems c l o s e l y connected w i t h the r e l e a s e of t e n s i o n , but sometimes, however, wi t h i n c r e a s e d a c t i v i t y . There are a l s o experiments r e f e r r e d t o which i n d i c a t e t h a t 4 P h i l i p B. R i c e , S c i e n c e . Humanism, and the Good, Essay i n VALUE: A7 Co-operative Inquiry,\" Ed. Ray Lepley, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Sew York, 1949, pp. 261 - 290. - 51 -pleasantness i s c o r r e l a t e d w i t h smooth f u n c t i o n i n g i n the c e n t r a l nervous 3ystem. As p s y c h o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e advances on t h i s f r o n t , p o s s i b l y John S t u a r t M i l l ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t there are d i f f e r e n t q u a l i t i e s of p l e a s u r e w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Or i t may be shown t h a t p l e a s u r e s of a l l types d i f f e r , as f a r a t l e a s t as the p h y s i c a l evidence i s concerned, merely i n degree of i n t e n s i t y . Assume the l a t t e r t o be the case; would t h i s d e f i n i t i v e l y dispose of the problem of q u a l i t a t i v e p l e a s u r e s ? Or might i t not be t h a t p l e a s u r e s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t a l l have the same p h y s i c a l c o r r e l a t e ? A meticulous study of the p h y s i c a l organism would r e v e a l o n l y t h a t p l e a s u r e of a c e r t a i n i n t e n s i t y and d u r a t i o n was being experienced, but would give no i n d i c a t i o n of the nature of the p l e a s u r e . E t h i c s i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h hedonic tone as I t i s experie n c e d and not i n i t s n e u r a l c o n s t i t u e n t s . Por p r a c t i c a l questions o f conduct, the conscious aspect of the emotion or f e e l i n g i s the only important one. People l i v e d through a l l the experiences o f l i f e and e v o l v e d a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e s , without knowing anything of the Intimate r e l a t i o n between the mental aspect, s o - c a l l e d , of emotion and the p h y s i c a l a s p e c t . G e t t i n g back t o man's enjoyment - 52 -of v a l u e , t h i s does not l i e i n the p a r t i c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the p h y s i o l o g i c a l organism but i n the conscious impress on the p e r s o n a l i t y . I t may be s t a t e d t h a t a c e r t a i n minimum of b o d i l y harmony must e x i s t f o r pleasure to e x i s t . T h i s I s p e r f e c t l y true but the bare statement does not go beyond the Greek i d e a l of a sound mind i n a h e a l t h y body. A c c e p t i n g , then, t h a t value has a p h y s i c a l c o r r e -l a t e , what are we t o judge r e g a r d i n g e t h i c a l v a l u e ? Does the i n n e r sense of owing a l l e g i a n c e to a moral law c a r r y w i t h i t a c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h 3ome c o n d i t i o n of the p h y s i c a l organism? I f so, c o u l d t h i s be measured? Would the e t h i c a l imperative be e x p e r i e n c e d i n a pure s t a t e or always accom-panied by an emotional component? I f the l a t t e r , c o u l d the nervous system be a c t u a t e d i n d i f f e r i n g ways? How c o u l d t h i s be e x p e r i m e n t a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d ? Would the v a l u e , the f e e l i n g of w e l l - b e i n g which sometimes accompanies the p er-forming of one's duty and whieh i s an a c c e s s i o n of i n t r i n s i c value t o the performer, r e g i s t e r i n the n e u r a l processes and obscure any e f f e c t of the e t h i c a l prompting? I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t t o s e t up c o n t r o l l e d experiments would be of the utmost d i f f i c u l t y . I f , i n s p i t e of the complexity and d i f f i -c u l t y of the t a s k , i t should be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a p h y s i o l o g i -c a l c o r r e l a t e f o r e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n does e x i s t , then; since t h i s would presumably be a component of man as a s p e c i e s , - 53 -i t c o u l d be concluded that e t h i c a l value does tra n s c e n d c u l t u r e . I f such c o r r e l a t i o n s h o u l d not be e s t a b l i s h e d , then the problem remains as be f o r e . T h i s inadequate examination of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f psychology i n r e l a t i o n t o e t h i c s has been made f o r the reason t h a t s i n c e e t h i c a l problems remain u n s o l v e d a f t e r so many hundreds of years of study, any department of i n v e s t i g a t i o n which may a s s i s t t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n i s a t l e a s t worthy of a t t e n t i o n . The s u b j e c t w i l l be f u r t h e r d e a l t with i n the chapter on e v o l u t i o n a r y e t h i c s . 0 - -- 54 -CHAPTER V EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS We f i n d suggestions f o r the s o l u t i o n t o our problem i n the f a c t t h a t man's e t h i c a l nature has gone through a long process of e v o l u t i o n as w e l l as h i s p h y s i -c a l organism. I n s t e a d of seeking the o r i g i n of the moral sense i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l realm, we seek i t i n the course of the e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s . P r i n c e Kropotkin i n h i s two volumes, Mutual A i d and ETHICS: O r i g i n and Development, a s s e r t e d t h a t nature i s not amoral, but t h a t the f a c t o r of s t r u g g l e i s balanced by the f a c t o f mutual a i d . Kropotkin indeed s t a t e s t h a t mutual a i d i s the predominant f a c t i n nature. He denied the connection of m o r a l i t y w i t h r e l i g i o n and metaphysics and a s c r i b e d i t s source e n t i r e l y t o the n a t u r a l sphere. Por him the three elements of m o r a l i t y are mutual a i d , j u s t i c e or e q u i t y , and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , which he f i n d s a r i s i n g i n the n a t u r a l o r d e r . In o p p o s i t i o n t o Thomas H. Huxley i n the l e t t e r ' s famous Romanes Lecture i n 1893 ( i n t h i s Huxley opposed the realm of Nature or the eosraic order on the one hand t o the e t h i c a l on the o t h e r ) , Kro-p o t k i n , r e f e r r i n g t o the l e c t u r e , s t a t e s t h a t Huxley i s by t h i s v e r y o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e d t o acknowledge the e x i s t e n c e * 55 -of the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e outside of nature. But s i n c e t h i s d i d not accor d w i t h Huxley's p h i l o s o p h y , he r e t r a c t e d t h i s p o i n t of view i n a l a t e r remark i n which he re c o g n i z e d the presence of the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e i n the s o c i a l l i f e of a n i m a l s . 6 In h i s E t h l c s , which he d i d not f i n i s h , Kro-p o t k i n suggests t h a t i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e of man and of a l l s o c i a l animals, there are causes i m p e l l i n g them p r e -eminently toward t h a t which we c a l l m o r a l i t y . S o c i a l l i f e , he s t a t e s , came before the s e l f - a s s e r t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y : \"We\", not \" I \" , was the c e n t r a l f a c t i n consciousness; the \" I M was absorbed by the c l a n or t r i b e i n t h i s K r o p o t k i n f i n d s the root of a l l e t h i c a l thought. He re c o g n i z e s the importance t o e t h i c s of the question of the source of the f e e l i n g of o b l i g a t i o n of which men are conscious and h i s manuscript concludes thus: The f a c t i s , t h a t while the mode of l i f e i s determined by the h i s t o r y of the development of a given s o c i e t y , c o n s c i e n c e , on the other hand, as I s h a l l endeavour t o prove, has a much deeper o r i g i n , namely i n the consciousness of e q u i t y , which p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y develops In man as i n a l l s o c i a l animals . . . 8 What Kropotkin i s a s s e r t i n g i s that the moral elements i n man's nature are h i s as a n a t u r a l s p e c i e s . We may, t h e r e f o r e , conclude t h a t i f the b a s i c elements of 5 K r o p o t k i n , ETHICS: O r i g i n and Development, New York, D i a l P r e s s , 1934, p. 13. 6 I b i d . , p. 13. 7 I b i d . , p. 60 . 8 I b i d . , p. 338. - 56 -m o r a l i t y come i n t o e x i s t e n c e i n the development of man as a n a t u r a l s p e c i e s , then they w i l l be i n g r a i n e d i n him as a member of h i s sp e c i e s and not as a member of h i s s o c i e t y . A horse i s a horse r e g a r d l e s s of what c o n t i n e n t i t i s found on and r e g a r d l e s s of how i t got t h e r e , whether by n a t u r a l means or by being t r a n s p o r t e d by man. Lik e w i s e , man i s a man and an e t h i c a l c r e a t u r e by v i r t u e of the nature he has evo l v e d , r e g a r d l e s s of the p a r t i c u l a r p a r t of the e a r t h ' s s u r f a c e he l i v e s on. Charles Darwin gave a fundamental impetus t o the n a t u r a l i s t i c s e a r c h f o r e t h i c 3 . He r e f e r r e d t o the a l t r u -i s t i c element i n e v o l u t i o n and found the fo u n d a t i o n of moral f e e l i n g \" i n the s o c i a l i n s t i n c t s which l e a d the animal t o take pleasure i n the s o c i e t y o f i t s f e l l o w s , t o f e e l a c e r t a i n amount of sympathy w i t h them, and t o perform v a r i o u s s e r v i c e s f o r them.\" 9 The s o c i a l i n s t i n c t , he says, i s \"an impulsive power widely d i f f e r e n t from a search a f t e r p l e a s u r e or h a p p i n e s s . \" 1 0 Darwin d e a l t with the c r u c i a l e t h i c a l problem of duty which d e r i v e s from the s o c i a l i n s t i n c t . I t i s made c l e a r t h a t mutual sympathy, l e a d i n g e v e n t u a l l y t o e t h i c a l a c t i o n i n man, i s an important f a c t o r i n the l i v e s of animals below man and i s p a r t of the animal i n h e r i t a n c e of the l a t t e r . 9 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, New York, C o l l i e r and Son, 1902, pp. 135 - 136. 10 I b i d . , p. 163. - 57 -L. T. Hobhouse, an e v o l u t i o n a r y n a t u r a l i s t i n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , made important c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o e t h i c a l t heory i n h i s study of p r i m i t i v e morals and t h e i r development. He acknowledged the s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e of sympathy i n the b a s i c f o r m a t i o n of e t h i c s , but d i d not co n s i d e r i t adequate. He wrote: ... i t i s not sympathy alone t h a t draws men t o g e t h e r . Men have need of each o t h e r , p h y s i c a l need, and a l s o a moral need, f o r which sympathy i s too simple an e x p r e s s i o n . H He r e c o g n i z e d permanent mental q u a l i t i e s i n humanity: Thus when we come t o human s o c i e t y we f i n d the b a s i s f o r a s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of l i f e a l r e a d y l a i d i n the animal nature o f man . . . His loves and ha t e s , h i s joys and sorrows, h i s p r i d e , h i s wrath, h i s g e n t l e n e s s , h i s boldness, h i s t i m i d i t y — a l l these permanent q u a l i t i e s , which run through humanity and vary o n l y i n degree, belong t o h i s i n h e r i t e d s t r u c t u r e . ^ 2 Another e v o l u t i o n a r y n a t u r a l i s t , of major impor-tance i n e t h i e a l t h e o r y , i s E. A. Westermarck, who amassed a huge amount of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data and came t o the con-c l u s i o n t h a t s o c i e t y i s the b i r t h p l a c e of the moral c o n s c i o u s -ness. Moral judgements are based on emotions which l a c k o b j e c t i v i t y and the p a r t i c u l a r questions i n v o l v e d derive from the p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l context i n which they a r i s e and not from any absolute e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e . The f i r s t moral judgements expressed emotions f e l t by s o c i e t y at l a r g e . 11 L. T. Hobhouse, Moralg i n E v o l u t i o n , London, Chapman & H a l l , 1923, p. 15. 12 I b i d . , p. 10. - 58 -Men have a tremendous need f o r the a p p r o v a l of t h e i r f e l l o w s and from t h i s a r i s e the e t h i c a l sentiments. In g e n e r a l , Westermarck denies u l t i m a t e v a l i d i t y t o any p a r t i c u l a r moral judgement. His c h i e f c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s the s c e p t i c a l one of e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y . T h i s brings us t o the heart of our problem.!5 A c o n t r i b u t i o n of major s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the r e s o -l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e i s made by J u l i a n Huxley, the b i o l o g i s t and grandson of Thomas H. Huxley. In 1943 he d e l i v e r e d the Romanes Lecture i n England, which he e n t i t l e d E v o l u t i o n a r y E t h i c s . In t h i s he f o l l o w e d Kropotkin i n showing t h a t h i s gra n d f a t h e r i n the Romanes Lecture of f i f t y years before i n 1893 had been wrong i n p r e s e n t i n g the e t h i c a l process as c o n t r a d i c t i n g the cosmic process -- cosmic n a t u r e , the world e x t e r n a l t o man, i s the enemy of the e t h i c a l nature man f i n d s h i m s e l f p o s s e s s i n g . J u l i a n Huxley l i k e w i s e shows t h a t t h i s i s a f a l s e o p p o s i t i o n ; the e t h i c a l f a c t o r i n l i f e arose w i t h i n the n a t u r a l e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s . In a study of e t h i c s w r i t t e n subsequently and p u b l i s h e d i n 1947, J u l i a n Huxley br i n g s t o g e t h e r the f i n d i n g s of s c i e n c e , n o t a b l y of g e n e t i c s and psychology, b e a r i n g on the problems of e t h i c s , and combats the extreme view of e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y . In o p p o s i t i o n t o Westermarck, to whom he pays t r i b u t e f o r the 13 Edvard A. Westermarck, E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y , New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932. - 59 -scope and suggestiveness of h i s work, he w r i t e s as f o l l o w s : ... systems of e t h i c s are d e f i n i t e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the major types of s o c i e t y i n which they are found. T h i s r e l a t i v i t y , however, does not imply msre a r b i t r a r i -ness and l a c k of o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y f o r e t h i c s . But i n order t o d i s e n t a n g l e e s s e n t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s from un-e s s e n t i a l v a r i a t i o n s , we must t h i n k i n terms of d i r e c -t i o n r a t h e r than of s t a t i c . a n d immutable standards. Here, i t seems, Westermarck was confused by the m u l t i -p l i c i t y and v a r i e t y of the v a l u a b l e f a c t s of moral n a t u r a l h i s t o r y which he h i m s e l f had done so much to d i s c o v e r . I 4 We note here t h a t there i s a r e l a t i v i t y r e g a r d i n g e t h i c s which i t would be erroneous and s t u p i d to deny, but i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we be c l e a r as t o where the r e l a t i v i t y l i e s . I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the r e l a t i v i t y l i e s i n the mode of e x p r e s s i o n of the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e and not i n the p r i n -c i p l e i t s e l f . The emphasis on d i r e c t i o n r a t h e r than on e x i s t i n g s t a t u s i s of primary s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t i t i s b e t t e r t o know where one i s going than where one i s at some p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n t . The s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n g i s not any s p e c i f i c code i n which the e t h i c a l march has been a r r e s t e d , but the u n i v e r s a l i s t g o a l . One of J u l i a n Huxley's main p o i n t s , which, of c ourse, has been s t r e s s e d by other t h i n k e r s , i s t h a t f o r mankind s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n i s now more important than 14 T. H. Huxley and J u l i a n Huxley, Touchstone f o r E t h i c s , New York and London, Harper & Bros., 1947, p. 24. - 60 -b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n . Huxley saya: ... the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t w i t h the advent of man, evo-l u t i o n had reached a new l e v e l , i n which the b i o l o g i c a l agency of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , o p e r a t i n g through the mechanisms of h e r e d i t y , had been l a r g e l y suspended by the a p e c l f i c a l l y human agency of s o c i a l s e l e c t i o n o p e r a t i n g through the mechanisms of t r a d i t i o n . 1 5 We thus see that man's development, i n c l u d i n g h i 8 e t h i c a l progreaa, i s o r i e n t e d about a u n i v e r a a l f o c u s , the sum-t o t a l o f h i s resources as a p l a n e t a r y s p e c i e s . Huxley w e l l saya : However, e t h i c s do not merely vary at random; they a l s o e v o l v e . That f a c t p r o v i d e s our c l u e . Our e t h i c s evolve because they are t h e m s e l v e 3 p a r t of the e v o l u -t i o n a r y p r o c e s s . And any standards of Tig h t n e s s and wrongness must i n some way be r e l a t e d t o the movement of t h a t process through time.16 We come now to a m o 8 t important p o i n t . J u l i a n Huxley d e r i v e a the 8 e n 3 e of r i g h t and wrong from the c o n f l i c t i n the i n f a n t between love and hate f o r the mother during the p e r i o d from one t o three years of age. He w r i t e s : ... the fundamental p o i n t t h a t man i s i n e v i t a b l y (and alone among a l l organisms) s u b j e c t t o mental c o n f l i c t as a normal f a c t o r i n h i s l i f e , and t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of t h i s c o n f l i c t i s the necessary b a s i s or ground on which conscience, the moral sense, and our systems of e t h i c s grow and d e v e l o p . 1 7 Huxley coins the term \" p r o t o - e t h i e a l mechanism\" t o serve i n s t e a d of the t r a d i t i o n a l term \"conscience\" or the Freudian \"super-ego\". The p r o t o - e t h i c a l mechanism, he s t a t e s , \" i s an 15 I b i d . , p. 18. 16 I b i d . , p. 131. 17 I b i d . , p. 4. - 61 -I n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , deduced on s c i e n t i f i c grounds, l i k e the atom or the g e n e . \" 1 8 The c r i t i c a l time f o r i t s formation i s i n the e a r l y p a r t of the baby's second year of p o s t - n a t a l l i f e . The author c i t e s recent s t u d i e s of s o - c a l l e d \"moral d e f e c t i v e s \" — c h i l d r e n who l a c k any normally o p e r a t i v e moral sense. He says: In the m a j o r i t y t h i s i s due not t o any h e r e d i t a r y d e f e c t of mental make-up, but t o the absence i n the i n f a n t ' s l i f e of a mother or e f f e c t i v e mother-s u b s t i t u t e during the c r u c i a l p e r i o d from about one t o three years o l d . Without a mother, no s t r o n g love focused on a p e r s o n a l o b j e c t ; without such l o v e , no c o n f l i c t of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e impulses; without such con-f l i c t , no g u i l t ; and without such g u i l t , no e f f e c t i v e moral s e n s e . 1 9 I t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r whether Huxley i s d e a l i n g with the p r o t o - e t h i c a l mechanism i n r e l a t i o n t o our own s o c i e t y or as the manner i n which conscience became i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the i n h e r i t e d s t r u c t u r e of man. But he emphasizes t h a t both h e r e d i t y and environment are e s s e n t i a l I n g r e d i e n t s i n the formation of the moral sense: Por while i t seems c e r t a i n t h a t environment...is necessary f o r the formation of an e f f e c t i v e moral sense, yet i t i s at l e a s t e q u a l l y c e r t a i n . . . t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n moral sense may o f t e n be due, wholly D r i n p a r t , t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n h e r i t e d ( g e n e t i c ) p r e d i s p o s i t i o n . 2 0 18 I b i d . , p. 121. 19 I b i d . , p. 31. 20 I b i d . , p. 154. - 92 -B l B L I O G R A P H Y Bane d i e t , Ruth, Patterns of C u l t u r e , (1934), New York, P e l i c a n Ed., 1946. ~ Bsnedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, New York Houghton, M i f T l i n , 1946. Broad, G. D., Five Types o f E t h i c a l Theory, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trutoner & Co, 1934. Breastedj James H., The Dawn of Conscience, New York and London, Chas. Scritoner's Sons, 1934. Chase, S t u a r t , The Proper Study of Mankind, (An I n q u i r y i n t o the Science of Human R e l a t i o n s ) , New York, Harper & Bros., 1948. C l a r k , G. H. and Smith, T. V. eds., Readings i n E t h i c s , New York, C r o f t s & Co., 1947. C o l l i e r , John, Indiana of the Americas, New York, Mentor Books, The New American L i b r a r y , 1948. C o n k l i n , E. G., Man Real and I d e a l , New York, Chas. S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1943 Darwin, C h a r l e s , The Descent of Man, New York, C o l l i e r & Son, 1902, Dunham, Barroiss, Man Against Myth, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown Co., 1947 \"• - ..• Everett,\"W. G., Mbral Values (A Study of the P r i n c i p l e s of Gonouet, New' York; Henry Holt / 1918. . Ewing, A. C., The. De f i n 1 t l o n of Good, New York, MacMillan Co., 1947. Fromm, E r i c h , Man f o r Himself (An I n q u i r y i n t o the Psycho^ logy o f E t h i c s ) , New York, RineRart, 1947. 1 Havemeyer, Loomis, Ethnography, Boston, New York, & Var., 1929, Hobhouse, L. T., Morals i n E v o l u t i o n (A Study i n Comparative E t h i c s ) , London, Chapman & H a l l , 1923. Huxley, T. H. &' J u l i a n , Touchstone f o r E t h i c s f 1895 -• 1945, New York & London/Harper & Bros. , 1947. - 63 -i n e a r l y months. T h i s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the next chapter. The author gi v e s an i l l u m i n a t i n g p i c t u r e of an e t h i c a l system which,being s a n c t i o n e d by s c i e n t i f i c f i n d i n g s , might be achieved by mankind. Any system which re p u d i a t e s u n i v e r s a l i s r a and r e v e r t s t o group ethiC3 must be condemned. He advocates an i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, a g l o b a l e t h i c s ; t o achieve g l o b a l u n i t y i s the major e t h i c a l problem f a c i n g mankind; anything l e s s w i l l n e i t h e r r e a l i z e the p o t e n t i a l i -t i e s of human nature, nor enable man t o r e s o l v e the l e t h a l t e n s i o n s which t h r e a t e n him. The f o l l o w i n g passages must be read i n the l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t they are w r i t t e n by a s c i e n t i s t of the 20th century who r e p u d i a t e s i n t u i t i o n a l e t h i c s and a d i v i n e l y guaranteed moral order. ...the e v o l u t i o n a r y m o r a l i s t . . . c a n t e l l us t h a t the f a c t s of n a t u r e , as demonstrated i n e v o l u t i o n , g i v e us assurance t h a t knowledge, l o v e , beauty, s e l f l e s s m o r a l i t y , and f i r m purpose are e t h i c a l l y g o o d . 2 4 I t i s t o be noted t h a t t h i s e s t i m a t i o n of e t h i c a l v a l u e s p a r a l l e l s c l o s e l y the i n s i g h t s of past u n i v e r s a l i s t e t h i e s . I t i s baaed on the a8sumption that l i f e i s good, t h a t the supreme values are i n t e g r a l t o the l i f e - p r o c e s s , and that these values thereby r e c e i v e t h e i r c e r t i f i c a t i o n as the h i g h e s t goods f o r man. I t might be 8aid t h a t Huxley's judge-ment i n t h i s passage i8 f r e i g h t e d w i t h r e s i d u e s of t r a d i t i o n a l 24 I b i d . , p. 234. - 64 -e t h i c a l a s p i r a t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , embodies a c o n s i d e r a b l e element of f a i t h . T h i s , however, i s j u s t i f i a b l e , s i n c e there i s a reasoned b a s i s f o r the a s p i r a t i o n and i t i s i m p l i c i t i n the w r i t e r ' s whole approach t h a t f u t u r e study must be made to b r i n g f u r t h e r proof of the v a l i d i t y of these c o n c l u s i o n s . T h i s f i n a l q u o t a t i o n p r e s e n t s an epitome of the author's a t t i t u d e t o the e t h i c a l i s s u e s of contemporary s o c i e t y . The e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t of v i e w . . . e s t a b l i s h e s the r e a s s u r i n g f a c t t h a t our human e t h i c s have t h e i r r o o t s deep i n the non-human u n i v e r s e , t h a t bur moral p r i n c i p l e s are not j u s t a w h i s t l i n g i n the dark, not the i p s e d i x i t of an i s o l a t e d humanity, but are by the nature of t h i n g s r e l a t e d to the r e s t of r e a l i t y -- and indeed t h a t only when we take the t r o u b l e t o understand t h a t r e l a t i o n -s h i p w i l l we be able t o l a y down e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s which are t r u l y adequate. Furthermore, while to the e v o l u t i o n i s t e t h i c s can no longer be regarded as having any absolute v a l u e , y e t t h e i r r e l a t i v i t y i s n e i t h e r c h a o t i c nor meaningless; e t h i c s are r e l a t i v e t o a process which i s both meaningful and of i n d e f i n i t e l y long dura-t i o n -- that o f e v o l u t i o n a r y progress.25 I f man f o l l o w s the promptings of h i s own nature he w i l l be l e d to the n e c e s s i t y f o r a g l o b a l e t h i c s . T h i s important f a c t , i t seems to me, i n v a l i d a t e s the c o n t e n t i o n of the complete e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s t . Man's success as a species depends, not on l i m i t e d moral codes a p p r o p r i a t e f o r s o c i e t i e s i n ah e a r l y phase of development, but on e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l men. What we were l e d to p o s t u l a t e on t h e o r e t i c a l grounds, a r i s i n g out of 25 I b i d . , p. 256. - 65 -i n t r o s p e c t i v e r e f l e c t i o n , i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the f i n d i n g s of modern s c i e n c e . Indeed, we may say that the e t h i c a l i n s i g h t s of the past have been s u b s t a n t i a t e d by i n d u c t i v e s c i e n c e i n the 20th century. In i n t r o s p e c t i o n , we c o u l d not e l i m i n a t e the s t r o n g suggestion t h a t our f e e l i n g of ought c o u l d not be adequately accommodated to a s o c i e t a l environment; i t c a r r i e d the stamp of a wider amplitude. I t i s of great importance t h a t a t h i n k e r of the s t a t u r e of J u l i a n Huxley should provide s c i e n t i f i c evidence t o support t h i s view. Even though we may not accept In i t s e n t i r e t y h i s c o n c l u s i o n that the b a s i s of the moral sense i s c h i l d h o o d c o n f l i c t , we must recognize t h a t we have i n t h i s t h e o r y a reasonable e x p l a n a t i o n of the o r i g i n of the sense of o b l i g a t i o n without r e s o r t i n g t o m y s t i c a l or s u p e r n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . - 66 -CHAPTER VI ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s of the l a s t two or three decades have thrown much l i g h t on the r e l a t i o n between c h i l d -hood t r a i n i n g and the nature of the p e r s o n a l i t y p a t t e r n e s t a b l i s h e d i n d i f f e r i n g s o c i e t i e s . S o c i e t y imposes c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s o f behaviour on c h i l d r e n and thus e s t a b l i s h e s norms f o r a d u l t s . Abram Kardiner says there i s a d i a l e c t i c , or r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , between the bas i e p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e (the term he employs) imposed by a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y on i t s members and the i n s t i t u t i o n s of th a t s o c i e t y . He r e f e r s a l s o t o a group b a s i c p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e con-s t i t u t e d by the common denominator of p e r s o n a l i t i e s , which i s the f o c a l p o i n t of c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 2 6 The s o c i e t y shapes the i n d i v i d u a l and the i n d i v i d u a l i n t u r n shapes the s o c i e t y . I f t h i s d i a l e c t i c e x i s t s , then the i n d i v i d u a l i s not the automatic r e f l e x of the s o c i e t a l f o r c e s . There i s a v a s t wealth of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data a v a i l a b l e concerning man's r e l a t i o n t o h i s c u l t u r e and the presence i n human a t t i t u d e s and a c t i o n s of the b i o l o g i c a l i n h e r i t a n c e i s give n ample r e c o g n i t i o n . So long as t h i s i s pr e s e n t , i t f o l l o w s n e c e s s a r i l y that there can be no complete r e l a t i v i t y . Mention w i l l be made here of two of the s t u d i e s which are of e x c e p t i o n a l v a l u e . 26 Abram K a r d i n e r , The I n d i v i d u a l and His S o c i e t y , New York, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1939. - 67 -The f i r s t study i s of three p r i m i t i v e forms of s o c i e t y i n New Guinea, made by the noted a n t h r o p o l o g i s t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Margaret Mead, and d e s c r i b e d i n h e r book, Sex and Temperament i n Three P r i m i t i v e S o c i e t i e s and a l s o i n her recent work, Male and Female. She s t a r t e d from the hypothesis that d i f f e r e n c e s i n temperament between the sexes are c u l t u r a l l y determined. A l l t h r e e s o c i e t i e s s t u d i e d are very s m a l l i n numbers and e x h i b i t the most marked d i f f e r e n c e s i n c h i l d h o o d t r a i n i n g and i n t h e i r r e s u l t a n t p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . The f i r s t group i s the Mountain Arapesh, g7 a poor, m i l d , undernourished people who are g e n t l e , non-aggressive, and n o n - v i o l e n t . They are responsive and c o - o p e r a t i v e , and a l t h o u g h there i s never enough t o e a t , each man spends a great p a r t of h i s time h e l p i n g h i s neighbour. The Arapesh t r e a t t h e i r babies as s o f t , v u l n e r a b l e , p r e c i o u s o b j e c t s ; they are brought up w i t h l o v i n g care and the mother never r e f u s e s the breast i n f e e d i n g the baby. T h i s l a v i s h l y a f f e c t i o n a t e treatment r e s u l t s i n the gentleness of the e n t i r e people mentioned. The s o c i e t y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as one i n which both male and female r e v e a l what are commonly regarded by us as feminine p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . 2 ^ 27 The Arapesh people l i v e i n three environments, on the beach, on the p l a i n s , and i n the mountains. I t i s the l a s t group which possesses':r.-tfce p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s r e f e r r e d t o . 28 Margaret Mead, Male and Female. New York, Wm. Morrow & Co., 1949, pp. 53, 65 - 68, 417 - 68 -The second s o c i e t y s t u d i e d was the Mundugumor. u n t i l r e c e n t l y c a n n i b a l i s t i c , a v i o l e n t and agg r e s s i v e t r i b e , w i t h every man a c t i n g f o r h i m s e l f — i n marked c o n t r a s t t o the Mountain Arapesh. C h i l d r e n were not wanted and b a b i e s were t r e a t e d c a l l o u s l y , and deprived o f a f f e c t i o n . T h i s l e d t o h o s t i l i t y between f a t h e r and son, antagonism between the sexes, and the g e n e r a l a g g r e s s i v e p a t t e r n of behaviour i n d i c a t e d . T h i s i s summarized as both male and female showing what are commonly regarded as masculine t r a i t s . The t h i r d group i n v e s t i g a t e d was the Tchambull, an a g r i c u l t u r a l people numbering o n l y some 600 i n a l l . The u p b r i n g i n g of the c h i l d r e n i s marked by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the sexes; the boys are given l e s s c o n s i d e r a t i o n than the g i r l s and are taught t o be submissive. The women perform the main economic f u n c t i o n s while the men wear orna-ments and go i n f o r a r t i s t i c p u r s u i t s . The r e s u l t i s a s o c i e t y where the men d i s p l a y what we c a l l feminine t r a i t s , and the women masculine a c t i v i t y . 3 0 Margaret Mead s a i d t h i s was the onl y s o c i e t y i n which she had worked i n which l i t t l e g i r l s of ten and e l e v e n were more a l e r t , i n t e l l i g e n t , and e n t e r p r i s i n g than l i t t l e boys. I t i s co n s i d e r e d t h a t Margaret Mead s u b s t a n t i a t e d her hypothesis t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree i n s p i t e of p o s s i b l y 29 I b i d . , pp. 53 - 54, 420 - 421. 30 I b i d . , pp. 54, 97 - 98, 424 - 425. - 69 -having o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d the f a c t s to f i t her theory. And there must, of course, be mentioned a g e n e r a l n e g l e c t of the p a r t p l a y e d by the fundamental b i o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between men and women. In any event, the d i v e r s i t y of temperament from what i s u s u a l l y regarded as normal i s most remarkable. The second study i s the a r t i s t i c a l l y w r i t t e n work by Ruth Benedict, Patterns of C u l t u r e , i n which she compares three c u l t u r e s each r u l e d by one predominant m o t i v a t i o n . The assumption here i s t h a t each s o c i e t y has a p a t t e r n of c u l t u r e whieh moulds the p e r s o n a l i t y of i t s members who each l i v e a c c o r d i n g to the dominant c o n f i g u r a t i o n . The s o c i e t y rewards c e r t a i n t r a i t s , o r punishes by w i t h h o l d i n g a p p r o v a l . The f i r s t c u l t u r e examined i s t h a t of the Pueblo Indians of the South-west p a r t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . They are n o n - a u t h o r i t a r i a n , non-aggressive, l i v i n g i n harmonious co- o p e r a t i o n w i t h each o t h e r . They are moderate and sober i n t h e i r customs and t h e i r p a t t e r n of a s s o c i a t i o n i s d e s c r i b e d as A p o l l o n i a n , borrowing a term from N i e t s c h z e . The second c u l t u r e i n v e s t i g a t e d i s t h a t of the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver I s l a n d , whose p a t t e r n i s designated as Dionysian- They were f i e r c e l y c o m p e titive and strove f o r p r e s t i g e by e l a b o r a t e p o t l a t c h e s , and e x t r a -vagant b o a s t i n g . They were a g g r e s s i v e , danced t o exhaustion - 70 -i n t h e i r ceremonial dances and i n d u l g e d i n symbolic c a n n i -b a l i s m , which probably r e p l a c e d the r e a l p r a c t i c e of an e a r l i e r p e r i o d . They underwent e c s t a s i e s of trance experience and mani fested tendencies to paranoid d e l u s i o n s of grandeur. The t h i r d group i s the Dobus of Melanesia, a p r i m i t i v e group l i v i n g on an i s l a n d o f f New Guinea. Hate and s u s p i c i o n are the dominant marks of t h i s c u l t u r e . There i s b i t t e r competition f o r the l i m i t e d \"garden magic\" a v a i l a b l e and no advantage can be gained, so they b e l i e v e , except at some one e l s e ' s expense; the i d e a of c o - o p e r a t i o n i s f o r e i g n t o them. They are s o r c e r e r s and much f e a r e d by t h e i r neighbours. T h e i r h a t r e d and d i s t r u s t extend to m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s and they f i n d no a f f e c t i o n i n marriage and sex r e l a t i o n s . T h i s b r i n g s us up s q u a r e l y once more a g a i n s t the problem of e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i t y . The essence of the extreme r e l a t i v i s t i c view i s that there i s no way of judging between c u l t u r e s e t h i c a l l y ; t h a t one i s as good as another because each can o n l y be judged from w i t h i n . Do not the f o r e g o i n g i n s t a n c e s of tremendous c u l t u r a l d i v e r -s i t y destroy the p o s i t i o n we have adopted? F i r s t , we w i l l d e a l w i t h c u l t u r e s which e x h i b i t s u s p i c i o n and h a t r e d t o an extreme degree. These are not adequate c u l t u r e s f o r humanity and can be r e j e c t e d on the ground of f a l l i n g t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . Of the Dobus, Dr. Reo Fortune - 71 -made the comment, and i t was d e s c r i b e d as h i s only v a l u e -judgement as a s c i e n t i s t , t h a t he wondered why they con-t i n u e d t o l i v e when t h e i r l i f e was marked by such hate-r i d d e n c o n d i t i o n s . He doubted whether i n the long run the c u l t u r e was v i a b l e . Turning t o the Mundugumor t r i b e , we f i n d t h a t Margaret Mead was of the o p i n i o n t h a t t h e i r h a b i t s of h o s t i l i t y were such t h a t the s u r v i v a l of the group was threa t e n e d . There was almost no t r i b a l s o l i d a r i t y and i f the s o c i e t y had not c a p i t u l a t e d i n i t s customs t o the r e l i -gious m i s s i o n working amongst i t , i t s e x i s t e n c e would not have long been maintained. A c e r t a i n minimum of co-op e r a t i o n and o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a c t i v i t y i s ap p a r e n t l y r e q u i s i t e f o r s o c i e t y t o s u r v i v e . Our seeond comment i s t h a t o b j e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of c u l t u r e s i s not beyond the competence of man. The s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t should be able t o shed the p r e j u d i c e s and s u b j e c t -i v e i n f l u e n c e o f h i s own c u l t u r e and assess i t s m e r i t s on a r e a l i s t i c b a s i s . On t h i s assumption, then, we might ask whether a v i s i t o r from some oth e r galaxy would not judge our own Western c u l t u r e , i n i t s i d e a l and p o t e n t i a l form to be su r e , t o be of a h i g h e r order than any we have r e f e r r e d t o above. Of a h i g h e r order because i t r e a l i z e s more of good f o r I t s i n d i v i d u a l members and suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a form of human s o c i e t y may e v e n t u a l l y a r i s e i n which the e t h i c a l concept and i t s e x p r e s s i o n w i l l be of a h i g h e r order than the utmost we can now conceive. - 72 -A. L. Kroeber suggests three c r i t e r i a f o r judging the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of c u l t u r e s . F i r s t , i n p r o p o r t i o n as a c u l t u r e f r e e s i t s e l f from r e l i a n c e on magic and super-s t i t i o n i t may be s a i d t o advance. Second, a l e s s e n i n g of the o b t r u s i o n of p h y s i o l o g i c a l or anatomieal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t o s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g b l o o d o r animal s a c r i f i c e s and preoccupation with the dead body, l i k e w i s e shows p r o g r e s s . T h i r d , advance i n technology, mechanics and s c i e n c e . 3 ! Next, l e t us take a l e s s extreme argument, namely, t h a t c u l t u r e s are comparable, but t h a t our c u l t u r e i n f a c t can not be adjudged as b e t t e r than c e r t a i n o t h e r s . Perhaps the Pueblo, f o r example, a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , l i v e d a b e t t e r e x i s t e n c e than we do wit h our t e n s i o n s , wars, and dread of the f u t u r e . There i s an appeal i n t h i s argument. I f not the Pueblo mode of l i f e , then some other simple, harmonious e x i s t e n c e c l o s e t o the s o i l and the v i s i b l e aspects of the n a t u r a l o r d e r , c a r r i e s i t s appeal as p r e s e n t i n g a welcome a l t e r n a t i v e t o the f r e t and f e v e r of present i n d u s t r i a l e x i s t e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s w i l l be r e j e c t e d on r e f l e c t i o n as a temptation t o escape the d i f f i c u l t y and challenge of f a c i n g and f i n d i n g s o l u t i o n s t o present problems. Not onl y p r i m i t i v e s with t h e i r love of adventurous l i v i n g can l i v e dangerously. C i v i l i z e d man can, t o o , i n the ways a f f o r d e d by h i s c u l t u r e . Moral e q u i v a l e n t s f o r war w i l l presumably 31 A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1948, pp. 298 - 303. - 73 -e x i s t f o r as long as can be contemplated a t the present time, assuming man w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h s u b s t i t u t e s f o r the r e a l t h i n g . One way of rankin g our c u l t u r e , i n i t s i d e a l form, as h i g h e s t i s t o c o n s i d e r i t s complexity. Mere com-p l e x i t y i n i t s e l f , o f course, i s of no assured v a l u e , but i f the complexity i s ordered and i n t e g r a t e d the c u l t u r e s h o u l d be a r i c h e r one. The world community envisaged by i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s does not embrace a d u l l u n i f o r m i t y of c u l t u r a l e x p r e s s i o n but, to use the happy e x p r e s s i o n of I. K. Frank \"a world o r c h e s t r a t i o n of c u l t u r e s . \" T h i s c u l t u r a l symphony would combine many d i f f e r i n g themes i n a harmonious whole. Analogously, a c u l t u r e comprising many p e r s o n a l i t y types would be r i c h e r than one developed around one c u l t u r a l theme o n l y , such, f o r example, as the Pueblo. In making comparisons w i t h more simple c u l t u r e s , there are three c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which would seem t o weight the>scales h e a v i l y i n f a v o u r of our i d e a l Western c u l t u r e . F i r s t , i n c r e a s i n g c o n t r o l over d i s e a s e . The h o r r i b l e i n c i -dence of disease on some p r i m i t i v e s i s a f a c t many people have no conception o f . A l b e r t Schweitzer w r i t e s movingly of the shocking s u f f e r i n g caused the A f r i c a n n a t i v e s by h e r n i a as w e l l as many loathsome t r o p i c a l d i s e a s e s . Second, the removal of ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o u s f e a r s . The mental burden caused by dread and apprehension - 74 -of the unknown f o r c e s of the un i v e r s e i s f o r many p r i m i t i v e s and many people even yet i n c i v i l i z e d communities, an i n t o l e r -able one. Knowledge i s one of the i n d i s p e n s a b l e a t t r i b u t e s of a worthwhile e x i s t e n c e f o r man; we come back t o t h i s once a g a i n . W i t c h c r a f t and the treatment of i n s a n i t y come under t h i s heading. A t h i r d p o i n t which might be mentioned i s the i n c r e a s i n g c o n t r o l over the environment and the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s s u r i n g an adequate food supply and other m a t e r i a l requirements f o r a l l members of s o c i e t y . T h i s should a l s o be ranked as an advantage, i n r e s p e c t of those s o c i e t i e s s u b j e c t t o want and p r i v a t i o n . I suggest with h u m i l i t y but with assurance t h a t no one who r e a l i z e s the promise Western c u l t u r e holds would choose t o l i v e i n any other s o c i e t y . I f he h i m s e l f would not choose otherwise, he can not c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y pronounce some other c u l t u r e b e t t e r f o r other men. T h i s statement i s made i n the f u l l consciousness t h a t our c i v i l i z a t i o n may have been — and may i n the f u t u r e prove t o be — l e s s true t o i t s i d e a l s than many another simpler s o c i e t y of the past . I t i s not a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of c u l t u r a l b i a s , I hope, s i n c e i t i s based on a survey of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of our way of l i f e r a t h e r than on present a c t u a l i t i e s . L. T. Hobhouse s a i d he was not c e r t a i n whether our c i v i -- 75 -l i z a t i o n was b e t t e r than some o t h e r s . 3 2 i t qu i t e probably i s not i n p r a c t i c e . Dr. Brock Chlsholm i n a recent broad-c a s t s a i d there are c i v i l i z a t i o n s i n the East which show more gentleness and understanding than ours. But knowledge and the other values o f the mind are needed t o c o n s t i t u t e an advanced c i v i l i z a t i o n . Bsrtrand R u s s e l l d e s c r i b e d the good l i f e as one based on knowledge and guided by l o v e . An open c u l t u r e i s b e t t e r than a c l o s e d one. Ours i s open to s e l f - c r i t i c i s m and l e a r n i n g from the experiences of other c u l t u r e s and i t s a s p i r a t i o n s p o i n t the way t o a high e r form of human a s s o c i a t i o n than any c i v i l i z a t i o n has yet ach i e v e d . Of course, a judgement t h a t some other way of l i f e was, or i s , b e t t e r f o r a c e r t a i n people may be made on the b a s i s of the circumstances and knowledge a p p l i c a b l e t o tha t people. T h i s , however, would r e g i s t e r the f a c t t h a t i n the e s t i m a t i o n of the person making the judgement the other way of l i f e i s l e s s advanced. But i f the more p r i m i t i v e people eould be given our knowledge and v i s i o n how c o u l d they be a s s i g n e d t o a l e s s promising c u l t u r e which we would not choose f o r o u r s e l v e s ? More p r i m i t i v e c u l t u r e s copy Western man's customs, use h i s t o o l s , and adopt h i s i d e a s . The c l a s h of c u l t u r e s has produced many gre a t t r a g e d i e s but more s e n s i t i v e r e p r e -32 L. T. Hobhouse, Morals In E v o l u t i o n , p. 31. - 76 -s e n t a t i v e a of our c i v i l i z a t i o n now seek to i n t e g r a t e s i m p l e r s o c i e t i e s w i t h i n modern i n d u s t r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n without v i o l a t i n g t h e i r e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n s of l i v i n g or s a c r i f i c i n g t h e i r a r t i s t i c forms. I t may w e l l be t h a t i f i t s f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s can be r e a l i z e d , the f i n a l i n f l u e n c e of Western democracy on other peoples w i l l be b e n e f i c e n t . I t i s t o be observed t h a t throughout t h i s chapter, i n comparing d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s what we are a s s e s s i n g are v a r y i n g degrees of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . In the absence of data as to the p r e c i s e i n f l u e n c e of the sense of o b l i g a t i o n , s o c i e t i e s must be compared on the b a s i s of the i n t r i n s i c v alues r e a l i z e d by them. S i n c e , as we have p r e v i o u s l y noted, there i s an i n t i m a t e connection between e t h i c a l value (the e t h i c a l ought) and the i n t r i n s i c value a c h i e v e d by f o l l o w i n g the admonitions of conscience, i t i s not i l l e g i t i -mate t o adopt t h i s procedure. I f a s o c i e t y e x h i b i t s a h i g h degree of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , i t may f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes be assumed t h a t the e t h i c a l imperative n a t u r a l t o man i s being r e a l i z e d t o an accordant degree. I f we accept the c o n c l u s i o n s t a t e d e a r l i e r t h a t e t h i c a l v alue a p p l i e s t o p l a n e t a r y man, the problem then presents i t s e l f whether, i n s p i t e of the r a d i c a l d i v e r s i t y i n c u l t u r a l forms, any r e g u l a r i t i e s appear i n the main modes of e x p r e s s i o n of the e t h i c a l i n j u n c t i o n . To t h i s q u e s t i o n we t u r n i n the next chapter. - - 0 - -- 77 -CHAPTER VII IS THERE A COMMON ETHICAL PATTERN IH ALL CULTURES? I f i t i s true t h a t a l l men respond t o a b a s i c e t h i c a l impulse, i t i s to be expected t h a t i t s e x p r e s s i o n i n conduct w i l l be marked t o some extent by a p a t t e r n of r e g u l a r i t y . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n of common pa t t e r n s of human l i v i n g should throw l i g h t on man's growing knowledge of h i m s e l f . There are some two hundred c u l t u r e s extant i n v a r y i n g stages of development. I f we c o u l d e s t a b l i s h agreed c r i t e r i a of the minimum e t h i c a l standards r e q u i r e d f o r a t r u l y human s o c i e t y , i t should be p o s s i b l e t o study these e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e s , as w e l l as the twenty or so h i s t o -r i c a l c i v i l i z a t i o n s , i n r e l a t i o n t o the c r i t e r i a and thus a s c e r t a i n whether a b a s i c r e g u l a r i t y does, on the whole, e x i s t . I f ph i l o s o p h e r s found from a d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n of e x i s t i n g a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data t h a t c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to e t h i c a l development were m i s s i n g they might suggest questions t o a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s f o r t h e i r f u t u r e s t u d i e s amongst p r i m i t i v e peoples. I f c e r t a i n r e g u l a r i t i e s appeared t o be i n d i c a t e d , supplementary data necessary f o r c o n c l u s i v e f i n d i n g s might be gathered by workers i n the f i e l d . A f r u i t f u l c o l l a b o r a t i o n c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d between ph i l o s o p h e r s and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s i n the study of human conduct. - 78 -Doubtless such an undertaking c o u l d s c a r c e l y be c a r r i e d out by one person w i t h i n any reasonable p e r i o d . As an a l t e r n a t i v e t o a c o l l e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e , a s i n g l e i n v e s t i g a t o r might c l a s s i f y e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e s i n t o a l i m i t e d number of c a t e g o r i e s on the ba s i s of such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as dominant p e r s o n a l i t y p a t t e r n , fundamental e t h o s , p r e v a i l i n g emotional a t t i t u d e s , and then study two or three from each category. I t may be noted, however, t h a t q u i t e p o s s i b l y s o c i e t i e s c o u l d not be thus c l a s s i f i e d u n t i l they had been s t u d i e d . The d i v i s i o n i n t o separate groups of c u l t u r e s might have t o be done on the b a s i s of geography, p e r s o n a l judgement, or g e n e r a l i z e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e a d i l y a v a i l -a ble data. Por i n s t a n c e , Margaret Mead i n her study of c u l t u r e s i n New Guinea s e l e c t e d those to be i n v e s t i g a t e d on the b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d from government o f f i c i a l s concerned with a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g f o u r c r i t e r i a are suggested as ex p r e s s i n g the e s s e n t i a l marks of e t h i c a l conduct worthy of mankind: (1) Reverence f o r L i f e : Human l i f e (other l i f e need not be c o n s i d e r e d i n the present study) i s not to be taken wantonly or u n n e c e s s a r i l y . An absolute command a g a i n s t k i l l i n g might be d e s c r i b e d as merely a mechanical r u l e ; e t h i c s r e q u i r e judgement and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not the auto-matic compliance w i t h an a u t h o r i t a r i a n command, even though that command be from a moral a u t h o r i t y . In any case, l i f e - 79 -t o be a f i t t i n g c r i t e r i o n must be of a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y . The c r i t e r i o n must be not mere q u a n t i t y of l i f e , but l i f e of a q u a l i t y which has worth f o r i t s own sake. (2) Honesty: T h i s i s necessary f o r a s t a b l e s o c i e t y . (3) T r u t h T e l l i n g : T e l l i n g the t r u t h by most of the people most of the time would a l s o seem t o be necessary f o r an ordered s o c i e t y . (4) Respect f o r P e r s o n a l i t y : The concept of the d i g n i t y and supreme worth of each human p e r s o n a l i t y i s the h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e of e t h i c s . The other three c r i t e r i a above can be subsumed under t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t human p e r s o n a l i t y s h o u l d be respected. Por i n s t a n c e , t h i s c r i t e r i o n o v e r - r i d e s t h a t o f reverence f o r l i f e . Mere d u r a t i o n i n time i s not i n i t s e l f the highest good. The one s i n g l e human a c t i v i t y which deserves u n h e s i t a t i n g condemnation i s unnecessary and u n p r i n -c i p l e d c r u e l t y . A l l v i o l a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i n v o l v e s c r u e l t y , p h y s i c a l or mental, i n some degree. Other important aspects of e x i s t e n c e t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n s i d e r e d moral a f f a i r s , such as marriage, sex and f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s are b a s i c a l l y unimportant so long as the above c r i t e r i a are observed. Obviously customs, s o c i a l e t i q u e t t e , ceremonials, forms and a t t i t u d e s , a r t i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n , as w e l l as c l o t h i n g s t y l e s and p e r s o n a l adornment vary widely from c u l t u r e t o c u l t u r e . Such are not of major s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e i r bearing on e t h i c s , and pro-v i d e d i v e r s i t y and r i c h n e s s i n the t o t a l l i f e of mankind. The f o u r p o i n t s , however, would appear to be the minimum standards e n l i g h t e n e d people would now regard as necessary. - 80 -Economic e x p l o i t a t i o n i s , o f course, a major concern but can be i n c l u d e d under P o i n t (4) Respect f o r P e r s o n a l i t y . A l s o under t h i s heading would come the a c t i v e h e l p i n g by a s o c i e t y of those unable t o provide f o r themselves. In a d d i t i o n to the main i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p a t t e r n s of behaviour, two s p e c i a l l i n e s of i n q u i r y might be as f o l l o w s : (A) whether t h e r e are many \"shame\" c u l t u r e s , as Ruth Benedict d e s c r i b e s Japanese s o c i e t y , 3 3 or whether t h i s i s a r a r e development among men. Can one s a n c t i o n , shame or g u i l t , be r a t e d as s u p e r i o r t o the other? Which i s s u e s i n the b e t t e r a d j u s t e d and happier s o c i e t y ? ( B) Is there a c o r r e l a t i o n between observance of the f o u r c r i t e r i a and the success of the s o c i a l group? Is there evidence t o i n d i c a t e whether s o c i e t i e s have long endured which i g n o r e d them? In l i e u o f such d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n , some observa t i o n s can be made based on a r a p i d and inadequate survey of some 25 c u l t u r e s . Such examination r e v e a l s tremendous d i v e r s i t y of moral customs. There i s no p r a c t i c e Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Boston, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1946, pp. 222 - 223 In a \"shame c u l t u r e the major s a n c t i o n f o r good behaviour i s e x t e r n a l . The f e e l i n g of shame r e s u l t i n g from non-conforming conduct can not be r e l i e v e d by con-f e s s i o n . In \" g u i l t \" c u l t u r e s , of which ours i s one, the s a n c t i o n i s an i n t e r n a l i z e d c o n v i c t i o n of wrongdoing. A person may s u f f e r from g u i l t though no one knows of h i s misdeed. Confession w i l l r e l i e v e the sense of s i n . Regarding the Japanese, however, the author suggests t h a t they sometimes r e a c t as s t r o n g l y as any P u r i t a n t o a p r i v a t e accumulation of g u i l t . - 81 -too b i z a r r e , no p e r v e r s i o n of r a t i o n a l motive too gro-tesque, t o have been f o l l o w e d by some human group some-where. I f , however, a l l the f a c t s are viewed i n the l i g h t of the e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s , p i c t u r i n g man as p a s s i n g through a long e t h i c a l development wi t h a g r a d u a l l y growing sense of the worth of human p e r s o n a l i t y , a g r e a t e r p a t t e r n and coherence e n t e r s the r e c o r d . There i s a reason l y i n g behind c r u e l and e x p l o i t a t i v e p r a c t i c e s -- ignorance, poverty of m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s , f e a r o f s u p e r n a t u r a l f o r c e s . I t must be remarked t h a t t h i s study produces a s t r o n g f e e l i n g of the poor q u a l i t y o f e x i s t e n c e l i v e d by most i n h a b i -t a n t s o f what we u n t h i n k i n g l y c a l l backward c u l t u r e s . With the e x c e p t i o n of some of the Indian t r i b e s o f North America and some of the Po l y n e s i a n groups, which r e a l i z e d a l i f e of d i g n i t y , a v e r d i c t i s e a s i l y rendered t h a t our own way of l i f e w i t h a l l i t s f a u l t s i s s u p e r i o r i n q u a l i t y of l i f e and m o t i v a t i o n t o other s o c i e t i e s . Our own c i v i l i z a t i o n has i t s dark s i d e s but I t i n c l u d e s i n a d d i t i o n the concept of progress and possesses the knowledge and l a t e n t power t o transform the blackness i n t o a worthy l i f e f o r a l l human beings. A commentary on the four c r i t e r i a f o l l o w s : (1) Reverence f o r L i f e : There i s much wanton and m e r c i l e s s k i l l i n g , though u s u a l l y a g a i n s t peoples o u t s i d e the group. The employment of magic t o b r i n g about the death of enemies i s widespread. The Melanesians are i n f e r i o r g e n e r a l l y i n - 82 -t h e i r conduct t o the Polynesians and some of them employ h i r e d a s s a s s i n s to secure revenge f o r r e a l or imagined i n j u r i e s . ^ 4 The Aztecs went t o war f o r two c h i e f reasons, t o take c a p t i v e s as v i c t i m s f o r s a c r i f i c e t o the gods, and t o extend t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . I f a r e a l cause was not found, one was i n v e n t e d or a q u a r r e l was p i c k e d . 3 5 . On the other hand, there i s much evidence of gentleness and r e s p e c t f o r l i f e . P r i n c e Kropotkin s t a t e s t h a t when t r a v e l l i n g i n S i b e r i a he o f t e n n o t i c e d the care which h i s Tungus or Mongol guide would take not t o k i l l any animal u s e l e s s l y . 3 6 The r e l i g i o u s s e c t i n I n d i a , the J a i n s , w i l l not take l i f e of any k i n d , i n c l u d i n g i n s e c t s . Amongst the Todas of southern I n d i a , a t r i b e of p a s t o r a l b u f f a l o h e r d e r s , crime seems to be a b s o l u t e l y n o n - e x i s t e n t and there i s no recorded case of a murder or t h e f t . 3 7 While more data would be needed.to s u b s t a n t i a t e i t , i t would seem a not unreasonable hypothesis t h a t a s o c i a l need l i e s behind a l l k i l l i n g which i s s a n c t i o n e d by any c u l t u r a l group. I f the e v o l u t i o n a r y concept a p p l i e s t o morals, we should not expect to f i n d a c l e a r c u t p a t t e r n r e g a r d i n g k i l l i n g amongst a l l peoples. As the e t h i c a l con-cept grows the area i n which k i l l i n g i s s o c i a l l y s a n c t i o n e d becomes l e s s . In our own s o c i e t y d u e l l i n g has d i e d out, 34 L. Haveraeyer, Ethnography, Boston, New York, London, e t a l , 1929, p. 14o\\ 35 I b i d . , p. 370. 36 K r o p o t k i n , E t h i c s , p. 59. 37 C P . Murdock, Our P r i m i t i v e Contemporaries, New York MacMillan Co. , 1934, p. l i b : \" £ - 83 -penology tends t o a b o l i s h the death p e n a l t y , and war i s co n s i d e r e d a crime by numerous people. The Incas of Peru sought with success t o s u b s t i t u t e animals f o r human beings i n s a c r i f i c e s . 3 8 Amongst p r i m i t i v e s , murder, and other crimes, are punished i n most s o c i e t i e s , i f not i n a l l . The s o c i a l need which l i e s behind much k i l l i n g a p p l i e s i n two c h i e f ways — i n the economic sphere on account of a l i m i t e d f o o d supply, and i n connection w i t h s u p e r s t i t i o u s f e a r s and the p r o p i t i a t i o n o f unknown powers. These may be i l l u s t r a t e d under four headings. (a) I n f a n t i c i d e : A b o r t i o n and i n f a n t i c i d e are common i n a l l s o c i e t i e s . Economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s probably p l a y a la r g e p a r t i n the motives f o r k i l l i n g g i r l b a b i e s . Of the P o l a r Eskimos, l i v i n g i n northwest Greenland l e s s than 1000 mil e s from the P o l e , i t i s r e p o r t e d t h a t although they g r e a t l y d e s i r e o f f s p r i n g , parents are f r e q u e n t l y forced by circum-stances, the l a c k of adequate means of support, t o destroy c h i l d r e n . 3 9 I n f a n t i c i d e i s common amongst the v e r y p r i m i t i v e t r i b e s of c e n t r a l A u s t r a l i a . One of the causes i s an i n t e r -e s t i n g one. Since the groups move about from place t o place i n search o f food, a mother can h a r d l y c a r r y two i n f a n t s i n a d d i t i o n t o her o t h e r . l o a d . T h e r e f o r e , i f a c h i l d i s born before the next o l d e r i s able t o walk, i t i s put t o d e a t h . 4 0 38 I b i d . , p. 443. 39 I b i d . , p. 211. 40 Havemeyer, Ethnography, p. 117. - 84 -In Tasmania, the inconveniences of nomadic l i f e , the want of food, and sometimes the d e s i r e t o spare a d a u g h t e r a wretched l o t , were amongst the causes of i n f a n t i c i d e . 4 1 (b) Gerontoclde: T r a v e l l e r s have s t a t e d t h a t the nomadic Lapps wandering with t h e i r r e i n d e e r herds i n northern Europe, k i l l e d the o l d people as r e c e n t l y as the c l o s i n g years of l a s t century, when a h a r d winter reduced the food supply t o a dangerous p o i n t . The i n t e n t i o n was to preserve the e x i s t e n c e of the group and the o l d people accepted t h e i r f a t e calmly when there was not s u f f i c i e n t f o o d f o r a l l t o s u r v i v e . (c) Cannibalism:, P r a c t i c a l l y a l l the Congo peoples i n A f r i c a a r e , or were, c a n n i b a l s and eat human f l e s h because they l i k e i t . Not i n f r e q u e n t l y f a m i l i e s who are f r i e n d l y AO exchange the bodies of dead r e l a t i v e s to be eaten. The reasons l y i n g behind c a n n i b a l i s m are numerous and complex. The p r a c t i c e i s o f t e n r i t u a l i s t i c , or adopted f o r reasons of p r e s t i g e , or because of s u p e r n a t u r a l f e a r . Sometimes there i s a genuine need f o r food and i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s was the p r i n c i p a l reason i n the o r i g i n of the p r a c t i c e . (d) Head-hunting: The N e g r i t o head-hunters on Luzon I s l a n d i n the P h i l i p p i n e s b e l i e v e t h a t each f a m i l y must take at l e a s t one head per year or s u f f e r misfortune from s i c k n e s s , s t a r v a t i o n , or d e a t h . 4 3 41 I b i d p. 136. 42 I b i d p. 59 . 43 I b i d p. 179. - 85 -Hobhouse mentions t h a t the Dyaks of Borneo, who are courteous and h o s p i t a b l e , are a l s o murderous head-h u n t e r s . 4 4 One of the reasons f o r the p r a c t i c e of head-hunting i n Borneo was so t h a t those who were once the enemies of the head-hunters might thereby become t h e i r g u a r d i a n s . 4 5 Wise Dutch a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n r e c e n t years have succeeded, a f t e r e a r l i e r f a i l u r e s , i n wiping out the p r a c t i c e by s u b s t i t u t i n g a symbolic a c t which s a t i s f i e s the needs of the n a t i v e s . These i n s t a n c e s give some evidence t o substan-t i a t e the hypothesis t h a t s o c i a l need l i e s behind much of p r i m i t i v e k i l l i n g . I t i s seldom done f o r pure d e s i r e f o r k i l l i n g i n i t s e l f . (2) Honesty: Some degree of honesty, i t would appear, i a necessary f o r ordered a o c i e t y . There Is a aect i n I n d i a which i8 r e p o r t e d t o accept s t e a l i n g as l e g i t i m a t e , but t h i s i s not a widespread s t a t e of a f f a i r s . In Lacedemonia c l e v e r t h i e v i n g was a d m i r e d . 4 6 In South A f r i c a , the Bushmen were p r o f e a a i o n a l c a t t l e t h i e v e s and p e r i o d i c a l l y r a i d e d the herds of t h e i r neighbours, c h i e f l y the H o t t e n t o t s . T h i a p r a c t i c e a t one time t h r e a t e n e d t h e i r a u r v i v a l , f o r t h e i r 44 Hobhouse, Moral3 i n E v o l u t i o n , p. 26. 45 Havemeyer, p. 206. 46 W. G. E v e r e t t , Moral Values, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1918, p. 322. - 86 -47 depredations aroused vigorous r e p r i s a l s . Many peoples , however, are found to be honest, i n c l u d i n g the I r o q u o i s and many other I n d i a n t r i b e s , and the Dyaks of Borneo. Amongst the Seraang, a race of t r u e pygmies, i n the Malay P e n i n s u l a , each a d u l t male owns s e v e r a l w i l d t r e e s which nooone e l s e molests. 4® I t Is probable t h a t r e s p e c t f o r the possessions of others i s more g e n e r a l than otherwise amongst peoples of the world. (3) T r u t h T e l l i n g : A c c o r d i n g t o L. H. Morgan, who made a c a r e f u l study o f the I r o q u o i s , t h i s f i n e people had a deep love of t r u t h and r e g a r d l e s s of the consequences would speak what was true at a l l times.* 5 7 i n Samoa there i s an i n t e r e s t i n g c u l t u r a l form a r t i s t i c l y i n g . I t i s c o n s i d e r e d a s o c i a l accomplishment t o create v e r b a l f a c t s ; the l i e , however, must be c r e d i b l e or i t w i l l be regarded as i n a r t i s t i c . But t h i s c o u l d not extend t o a l l areas of l i f e . In winning an e x i s t -ence from nature the Samoans have t o observe the t r u t h . For example, i f they see a s c h o o l of f i s h approaching, there i s no l y i n g ; the segment of l i f e i n which l y i n g i s re c o g n i z e d as an a r t and s o c i a l l y accepted i s only a smal l p a r t of the whole. There i s a l s o the case of Arabs d e s c r i b e d by T. E. Lawrence. At f e a s t s , the Arab c h i e f t a i n s would make e x t r a -vagant promises which they subsequently would not keep. I t was accepted and known t h a t the promises were not Intended 47 Havemeyer, p. 14. 48 Murdock, p. 93. 49 Havemeyer, p. 263. - 87 -to be observed. But t h i s i s not d e l i b e r a t e d e c e p t i o n . The complicated business of s o c i a l l i f e can not be c a r r i e d out without some degree of mutual understanding and t h i s i s impo s s i b l e u n l e s s t r u t h t e l l i n g p r e v a i l s over l y i n g . (4) Respect f o r P e r s o n a l i t y : The absolute worth of per-s o n a l i t y during i t s time-span — which, i t i s to be noted, i s not the same t h i n g as the absolute worth of l i f e i n a d u r a t i o n a l process -- sums up and expresses a l l o t h e r e t h i c a l c r i t e r i a . I t i s f a r from r e a l i z a t i o n , e i t h e r among p r i m i t i v e peoples or i n our own c i v i l i z a t i o n . I t i s necessary only t o r e f e r t o the i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n accorded women with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on such p r a c t i c e s as suttee i n I n d i a , t o s l a v e r y , t o c h i l d l a b o u r , t o widespread c r u e l p r a c t i c e s ; examples would be s u p e r f l u o u s , As f a r as c r u e l t y i s concerned, the h i s t o r i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s have probably a worse r e c o r d than p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s . The treatment by the white race of A f r i c a n n a t i v e s , and of the Indians of North .and South America, Is an u n b e l i e v a b l e r e c o r d of c a l l o u s I n f l i c t i o n off extreme p a i n , h u m i l i a t i o n , and mental s u f f e r i n g . ^ Apparently i n Chaucer's time i n England i t was the accepted t h i n g to beat one's w i f e . A man who d i d not do so would be c o n s i d e r e d as f a i l i n g t o do h i s duty. I f we regard such a c t i o n as a v i o l a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y and, t h e r e f o r e , as u n e t h i c a l , i s such judgement merely a p r e j u d i c e of our 50 John C o l l i e r , Indians of the Americas. New York, ; Mentor Books, The New American L i b r a r y , 1948. - 88 -c u l t u r e , or does i t denote an e t h i c a l p e r c e p t i o n l a c k i n g In an e a r l i e r and ruder age? Could we say that men i n Chaucer's time should have t r e a t e d t h e i r wives more as human beings? Or should i t not be acknowledged t h a t i n the context of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y , with i t s e x i s t i n g knowledge, t r a d i t i o n , and s o c i a l arrangements, the be a t i n g of wiveB was n a t u r a l and proper? As f a r as judging a c t i o n i s concerned, men must be judged a c c o r d i n g t o the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s a v a i l a b l e t o them. But was i t b e t t e r f o r that s o c i e t y t h a t women should have r e c e i v e d the treatment they did? S u r e l y , the sum t o t a l of human happiness and d i g n i t y would have been g r e a t e r i f g r e a t e r r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n a l i t y had been r e q u i r e d by the e x i s t i n g mores. The i n f l u e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l s who are e t h i c a l l y i n adv/ance of t h e i r time v a r i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y a t d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s . In many Instances o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s must achieve a c e r t a i n optimum before e t h i c a l i n s i g h t s can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p r a c t i -c a l l i v i n g . The attempt t o l i m i t c h i l d labour i s an example. Again, the a b o l i s h i n g of s l a v e r y over l a r g e p a r t s of the e a r t h became a r e a l i t y only when economic c o n d i t i o n s and trends of i n d u s t r i a l development made i t f e a s i b l e and l e d t o g r e a t e r economic e f f i c i e n c y . But the f a c t remains t h a t the b e t t e r way of l i v i n g was p r e v i o u s l y envisaged by prophets and t e a c h e r s , and p r a c t i s e d q u i e t l y by i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r own l i v e s . Other e t h i c a l advances can be brought about by i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . The improvement i n the treatment of m e n t a l l y i l l persons i n the U n i t e d States brought about by the work of - 89 -Dorothea Dix i n the n i n e t e e n t h century, provides an example of the way an i n d i v i d u a l c onception of how human beings should be t r e a t e d can b r i n g about a r a d i c a l change i n the a t t i t u d e of soc i e t y ^ t o a l a r g e group of i t s members. Here the i n d i v i d u a l c h a n g e d i s o c i e t y ; not s o c i e t y the i n d i v i d u a l . P o s s i b l y no great economic or m a t e r i a l o b s t a c l e s e x i s t e d t o a more e n l i g h t e n e d p o s i t i o n of women i n Chaucer's time; great changes i n outlook, and perhaps of r e l i g i o n , might have been necessary, but some pe r s o n a l example might have been e f f e c t i v e i n a m e l i o r a t i n g the c o n d i t i o n . I t i s c l e a r from the f o r e g o i n g survey t h a t no d e f i n i t i v e p a t t e r n of conduct emerges. But i t i s , neverthe-l e s s , a reasonable hypothesis t h a t men i n c o n f r o n t i n g other men n a t u r a l l y behave towards them w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s o f acceptable conduct, when not prevented by v a r i o u s o b s t a c l e s . Winning a l i v i n g i s primary and t h i s would o v e r - r i d e any n a t u r a l tendency t o a l t r u i s t i c behaviour. When the d i f f i -c u l t i e s of environment and u n c e r t a i n t i e s of food supply t h r e a t e n p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e , i t i s v i r t u a l l y i m p ossible f o r a l l but a,few e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y e t h i c a l persons not to act i n harsh, ways. The p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l need e x p l a i n s many h a b i t s which are u n d e s i r a b l e even t o the group concerned. The p r a c t i c e had a sound reason u n d e r l y i n g i t i n i t s o r i g i n , but i t f r e q u e n t l y i s continued when no longer r e q u i r e d on account of i n e r t i a . Some o r i g i n s are l o s t i n a n t i q u i t y ; some are unearthed,by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . - 90 -The Zulus i n A f r i c a spent much time and t r o u b l e s i i n a r r i v i n g at what they c o n s i d e r e d j u s t i c e . A well-known a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , Radcliffe-Brown, s a i d t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n a l l men have a sense of j u s t i c e . The f o l l o w i n g judgement coming from ah e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r who made a d e t a i l e d study of the e v o l u t i o n of morals, i s worthy of note and g i v e s support t o the hypothesis suggested i n the pre v i o u s paragraph: Indeed, the comparative study of E t h i c s , which i s apt i n i t s e a r l i e r stages t o impress the student w i t h a b e w i l d e r i n g sense of the d i v e r s i t y of moral judgements, ends r a t h e r by impressing him with a more fundamental and f a r - r e a c h i n g u n i f o r m i t y .... . when a l l i s s a i d and done, we can h a r d l y deny t o any race of men or any p e r i o d of time the p o s s e s s i o n of the primary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s out of which the most advanced moral code i s c o n s t r u c t e d . 3 2 The c o n c l u s i o n can be drawn t h a t the v a r i a t i o n s i n man's conduct do not i n d i c a t e any fundamental b a r r i e r t o a b e t t e r e t h i c a l order. Man has deep, unconscious, aggress-i v e t e n d e n c i e s , but knowledge o f f e r s i n c r e a s i n g a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l and r e - d i r e c t these d e s t r u c t i v e p r o p u l s i o n s . I t may be t h a t such aggressions can never be e l i m i n a t e d ; p o s s i b l y the dynamic c h a r a c t e r of man's temperament stems from p s y c h i c c o n f l i c t . T h i s a g g r e s s i v e element, however, need not, on the evidence, be regarded as an i n t r a c t a b l e f a c t o r f o r b i d d i n g the hope of a c h i e v i n g a b e t t e r e t h i c a l way of l i f e f o r a l l humanity. - - 0 - -51 Havemeyer, p. 39. 52 Hobhouse, Morals i n E v o l u t i o n , pp. 28 and 29. - 91 -CON c m SI OH In c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e to say, i n s p i t e of the dismal prospects f a c i n g s o c i e t y today, t h a t the human spe c i e s r e a l l y has a good chance of g e t t i n g some-where worthwhile, i f the o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s of technology and n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , and the s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s o f knowledge, i n s i g h t , and emotional m a t u r i t y are f u l l y u t i l i z e d . We have sought t o maintain t h a t e t h i c a l v a l u e , the moral i m p e r a t i v e , i s the e x p r e s s i o n o f a c a p a c i t y n a t u r a l t o man as a s p e c i e s ; i t can be manifested f u l l y o n l y under the c o n d i t i o n s of mature development i n d i c a t e d . I t may be t h a t the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e w i l l never be f u l l y developed i n a l l men, but p o s s i b l y those who do f e e l the h i g h e s t promptings w i l l s et the e t h i c a l tone and standard f o r t h e i r s o c i e t y . Since then, e t h i c a l value i s an e x p r e s s i o n of the nature of man, and humanity i s g r e a t e r than any s p e c i f i c c u l t u r e , we may conclude t h a t e t h i c a l value transcends c u l t u r e . - 92 -B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y Benedict, Ruth, Patterns of C u l t u r e , (1934), New York, P e l i c a n Ed., 1946. Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, New York Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1946. Broad, C. D., F i v e Types o f E t h i c a l Theory, London, Kegan Paul. Trench, Trubner & Co, 1934. Breasted, James H., The Dawn of Conscience, New York and London, Chas. S c r l b n e r ' s Sons, 1934. i n t o the Science of Human Relationa),\"New York, Harper & Bros., 1948. C l a r k , G. H. and Smith, T. V. eds., Readings In E t h i c s , New York, C r o f t s & Co., 1947. C o l l i e r , John, Indians of the Americas, New York, Mentor Books, The New American L i b r a r y , 1948. C o n k l i n , E. G., Man Real and I d e a l , New York, Chas. S c r l b n e r ' s Sons, 1943 Darwin, C h a r l e s , The Descent of Man, New York, C o l l i e r & Son, 1902. Dunham, Barrows, Man Against Myth , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1947. E v e r e t t , W. G.f Moral Values (A Study of the P r i n c i p l e s o f Conduct, New York, Henry H o l t , 1918. Ewing, A. C , The D e f i n i t i o n of Good, New York, MacMillan Co., 1947. Fromm, E r i c h , Man f o r Himself (An I n q u i r y i n t o the Psycho - logy o f E t h i c s ) , New York, R l n e h a r t . 1947. Havemeyer, Loomis, Ethnography, Boston, New York, & Var.. 1929. Hobhouse, L. T., Morals In E v o l u t i o n (A Study i n Comparative E t h i c s ) , London, Chapman & H a l l , 1923. Huxley, T. H. & J u l i a n , Touchstone f o r E t h i c s , 1893 - 1943, New York & London, Harper & Bros., 1947. '. Mankind, (An I n q u i r y - 95 -Kluckhohn, Clyde, M i r r o r f o r Man (The R e l a t i o n of Anthro-pology t o Modern L i f e , New York & Toronto, McG-raw-Hill. 1949 e Kroeber, A„ L,, Anthropology, New York, Harcuurt Brace, 1948. Kropotkin ( P r i n c e ) , ETHICS O r i g i n and Development, New York, D i a l P r e s s , 1924. Kr o p o t k i n , ( P r i n c e ) , Mutual A i d , P e l i c a n Ed., Harmonds-worth, England, 1939. Lepley, Ray, Ed., VALUE A Cooperative I n q u i r y , New York, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press,,1949. L i n t o n , Ralph, The Study of Man, New York & London, D. Appleton-Century Co., 193b. Malinowski, B., Magic, Science and R e l i g i o n (and Other E s s a y s ) , Boston, Beacon P r e s s , 1948. ' Mead, Margaret, Male and Female, New York, Wm. Morrow, 1949. Moore, G. E., E t h i c a , London, Williams & Norgate, 1912. Moore, G„ E., P r l n c l p i a E t h i c a , Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y Press 1922. Murdock, Geo. P., Our P r i m i t i v e Contemporariea, New York, MacMillan Co., 1934. Otto, M. C , Things and Ideala (Essaya i n F u n c t i o n a l Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt, 1924. Rader, M e l v i n , E t h i c s and S o c i e t y (An A p p r a i s a l of S o c i a l I d e a l s ) , New York, Henry H o l t , 1950.' Robertson, A., Morals In World H i s t o r y , London, Watts & Co., 1947. S c h l i c k , M o r i t z , Problems of E t h i c s , New York, P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1939. . Thomas, Wm. I . , Source Book f o r S o c i a l O r i g i n s , Boston, R. G. Badger, 1909J Urwick, E. J . , The Values of L i f e , Toronto, U n i v e r s i t y of \"Toronto P r e s s , 1948. Westermarck, E. A., E t h i c a l R e l a t i v i t y , New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932. - - 0 - -"@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0302634"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "Philosophy"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "Does ethical value transcend culture?"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/41477"@en .