@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "History, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Fraser, Herbert Patrick Grant"@en ; dcterms:issued "2011-10-04T23:52:27Z"@en, "1965"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description """The purpose of this thesis is to study and analyse the development of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the effect of their respective outlooks upon the various proposals for settlement brought forward by the United Nations or their own leaders, and the reasons for each subsequent failure to resolve the eighteen year deadlock. Twelve years ago, Michael Brecher concluded in The Struggle for Kashmir that both India and Pakistan had economic, strategic and political interests in the State; and of the three, those brought about by the two-nation theory and the conflicting religious and secular policies were deemed to be the most important. While one cannot disagree with Brecher's general conclusions, this writer feels that the specific importance of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan at any given time is not a constant factor but instead has been influenced by contemporary foreign and domestic events and has been in a perpetual state of change. What was considered of primary importance in 1947, therefore, does not necessarily hold the same position today. Indeed, to single out one factor as the reason for the continuation of the dispute would not only be inopportune, but incorrect. Because of the very nature of the dispute and its international and domestic.characteristics, one is faced by a plethora of material - including White Papers on correspondence; over one hundred Security Council debates; many pamphlets and some thousands of diplomatic newsletters. It has been necessary, therefore, to sift through all available evidence and to extract only that which is pertinent to the topic. It must be realized that because of the importance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan;, all the information from governmental sources or written by their nationals contains the type of material calculated to present their case in the best possible light. Thus it becomes necessary in many cases - the Pathan incursions in October 1947, the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks and the Mohammed All-Nehru discussions, and the essence of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah proposals for federation - to read between the lines in order to trace developments. In the early stages of the dispute, one can sympathize with Pakistan's claim to Kashmir and her efforts to obtain a "free and impartial plebiscite." Unlike India, she accepted every practical proposal brought forward to settle the dispute. Although neither India nor Pakistan produced a statesman capable of resolving the deadlock, the former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, must be singled out as the major contributor to the continuation of the dispute. It was not that his actions were incomparable with his Pakistani counterparts; but rather that as a statesman of such magnitude, willing to solve the world's problems - with or without invitation he could adopt a self-righteous "Babu" attitude when dealing with the State. Indeed, Nehru appears to have become emotionally incapable of treating Pakistan as an equal; hence the dispute continued in deadlock. India's intransigence has continued in open defiance of the United Nations and in complete contradiction to her earlier promises for self-determination in Kashmir. Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan, in her effort to gain international support for her Kashmir policy, has virtually talked - herself out of any claim to the State, one can now sympathize with the Indian position. It is not that India is more right today than eighteen years ago, but rather that her interest in the State - originally a prestige issue - has now degenerated to the point where a plebiscite could possibly mean her internal collapse through the onslaught of communalism. She accepted and held Kashmir as a showplace for secularism and for the prestige offered by its geographic location; today she controls a monster within which could lie the seeds of her own destruction. The point of view taken in this thesis, therefore, is that the existing stalemate appears to be the only practical solution to the Kashmir dilemma, and that history may prove Nehru's negative attitude towards Kashmir to have been correct. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the voice of Kashmiri nationalism has yet to be taken into account."""@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/37784?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "T H E H I S T O R Y O P T H E K A S H M I R D I S P U T E : A N A S P E C T O F I N D I A - P A K I S T A N R E L A T I O N S by H E R B E R T P A T R I C K G R A N T F R A S E R B . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1963 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O P A R T S i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Me a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A A u g u s t , 1965 In presenting this thesis i n p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y avai lable for reference and study. I further agree that per-mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives . I t i s understood that, copying or p u b l i -cat ion of th is thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission^ H e r b e r t P a t r i c k Grant F r a s e r Department of Internatinnal Studies The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada Date A p r i l 21, 1965. ABSTRACT THE HISTORY OF THE KASHMIR DISPUTE: AN ASPECT OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS by Herbert Patrick Grant Fraser .A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1963 i The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o study and analyse the development of the Kashmir dispute between India and P a k i s t a n , the e f f e c t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e outlooks upon the various pro-posals f o r settlement brought forward by the United Nations or t h e i r own le a d e r s , and the reasons f o r each subsequent f a i l u r e to r e s o l v e the eighteen year deadlock. Twelve years ago, Michael Brecher concluded i n The Struggle f o r Kashmir that both India and Pakis t a n had economic, s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n the S t a t e ; and of the three, those brought about by the two-nation theory and the c o n f l i c t i n g r e l i g i o u s and secular p o l i c i e s were deemed t o be the most important. While one cannot disagree w i t h Brecher's general c o n c l u s i o n s , t h i s w r i t e r f e e l s that the s p e c i f i c importance of Kashmir t o e i t h e r India or P a k i s t a n at any given time i s not a constant f a c t o r but instead has been inf l u e n c e d by contemporary f o r e i g n and domestic events and has been i n a perpetual s t a t e of change. What was considered of primary importance i n 19^7 , t h e r e f o r e , does not n e c e s s a r i l y hold the same p o s i t i o n today. Indeed, t o s i n g l e out one f a c t o r as the reason f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the dispute would not only be inopportune, but i n c o r r e c t . Because of the very nature of the dispute and i t s i n t e r -n a t i o n a l and d o m e s t i c . c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , one i s faced by a plethora of m a t e r i a l - i n c l u d i n g White Papers on correspon-dence; over one hundred S e c u r i t y Council debates; many pamph-l e t s and some thousands of diplom a t i c newsletters. I t has been necessary, t h e r e f o r e , to s i f t through a l l a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e a n d t o e x t r a c t o n l y t h a t w h i c h i s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e t o p i c . I t m u s t b e r e a l i z e d t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f K a s h m i r t o b o t h I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n ; , a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m g o v e r n m e n t a l s o u r c e s o r ; v r i t t e n b y t h e i r n a t i o n a l s c o n -t a i n s t h e t y p e o f m a t e r i a l c a l c u l a t e d t o p r e s e n t t h e i r c a s e i n t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e l i g h t . T h u s i t b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y i n m a n y c a s e s - t h e P a t h a n i n c u r s i o n s i n O c t o b e r 19^ 7^ t h e J i n n a h -M o u n t b a t t e n t a l k s a n d t h e M o h a m m e d A l l - N e h r u d i s c u s s i o n s , a n d t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e N e h r u - S h e i k h A b d u l l a h p r o p o s a l s f o r f e d e r a -t i o n - t o r e a d b e t w e e n t h e l i n e s i n o r d e r t o t r a c e d e v e l o p -m e n t s . I n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f t h e d i s p u t e , o n e c a n s y m p a t h i z e w i t h P a k i s t a n ' s c l a i m t o K a s h m i r a n d h e r e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n a \" f r e e a n d i m p a r t i a l p l e b i s c i t e . \" U n l i k e I n d i a , s h e a c c e p t e d e v e r y p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l b r o u g h t f o r w a r d t o s e t t l e t h e d i s -p u t e . A l t h o u g h n e i t h e r I n d i a n o r P a k i s t a n p r o d u c e d a s t a t e s -m a n c a p a b l e o f r e s o l v i n g t h e d e a d l o c k , t h e f o r m e r I n d i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r J a w a h a r l a l N e h r u , m u s t b e s i n g l e d o u t a s t h e m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e d i s p u t e . I t w a s n o t t h a t h i s a c t i o n s w e r e i n c o m p a r a b l e w i t h h i s P a k i s t a n i c o u n t e r -p a r t s ; b u t r a t h e r t h a t a s a s t a t e s m a n o f s u c h m a g n i t u d e , w i l l -i n g t o s o l v e t h e w o r l d ' s p r o b l e m s - w i t h o r w i t h o u t i n v i t a t i o n h e c o u l d a d o p t a s e l f - r i g h t e o u s \" B a b u \" a t t i t u d e w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e S t a t e . I n d e e d , N e h r u a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e c o m e e m o t i o n -a l l y i n c a p a b l e o f t r e a t i n g P a k i s t a n a s a n e q u a l ; h e n c e t h e d i s p u t e c o n t i n u e d i n d e a d l o c k . I n d i a ' s i n t r a n s i g e n c e h a s c o n t i n u e d i n o p e n d e f i a n c e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n d i n c o m p l e t e c o n t r a d i c t i o n t . 6 h e r e a r l -i e r p r o m i s e s ' f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n K a s h m i r . N o t w i t h s t a n d -i n g t h e f a c t t h a t P a k i s t a n , i n h e r e f f o r t t o g a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r h e r K a s h m i r p o l i c y , h a s v i r t u a l l y t a l k e d - h e r s e l f o u t o f a n y c l a i m t o t h e S t a t e , o n e c a n n o w s y m p a t h i z e w i t h •• t h e I n d i a n p o s i t i o n . I t i s n o t t h a t I n d i a i s m o r e r i g h t t o -d a y t h a n e i g h t e e n y e a r s a g o , b u t r a t h e r t h a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e S t a t e - o r i g i n a l l y a p r e s t i g e i s s u e - h a s n o w d e g e n e r a t e d t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e a p l e b i s c i t e c o u l d p o s s i b l y m e a n h e r i n t e r -n a l c o l l a p s e t h r o u g h t h e o n s l a u g h t o f c o m m u n a l i s m . S h e a c c e p t e d a n d h e l d K a s h m i r a s a s h o w p l a c e f o r s e c u l a r i s m a n d f o r t h e p r e s t i g e o f f e r e d b y i t s g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n ; t o d a y s h e c o n t r o l s a m o n s t e r w i t h i n w h i c h c o u l d l i e t h e s e e d s o f h e r o w n d e s t r u c t i o n . T h e p o i n t o f v i e w t a k e n i n t h i s t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g s t a l e m a t e a p p e a r s t o b e t h e o n l y p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e K a s h m i r d i l e m m a , a n d t h a t h i s -t o r y m a y p r o v e N e h r u ' s n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s K a s h m i r t o h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e v o i c e o f K a s h m i r i n a t i o n a l i s m h a s y e t t o b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . i v TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE Integration and Boundaries 1 TWO Events Leading to Accession 11 THREE Accession and Co n f l i c t , 30, FOUR Kashmir and the United Nations 48 FIVE India, Pakistan and the Commission 63 SIX McNaughton Proposals, Dixon Report and Graham Missions 7^ SEVEN B i l a t e r a l Discussions: 1953-1955 97 EIGHT Renewed Security Council Deliberations 139 NINE The F i n a l Phase 167 TEN The Value of Kashmir to India and Pakistan 188 BIBLIOGRAPHY ' . ' 214 V TABLE OF MAPS -I ' Kashmir 223 II Religious D i s t r i b u t i o n 224 I I I Kashmir China Border . • 225 IV China-Pakistan Lines of Actual.Control 225 CHAPTER ONE INTEGRATION AND BOUNDARIES (A) I n t e g r a t i o n of the Ind i a n S t a t e s . The t r a n s f e r of power i n India was not simply the matter of lowering the Union Jack and r a i s i n g i n i t s place' the f l a g s of Congress or the Muslim League. Indeed, the t r a n s f e r of power i n August, 19^7, apart from a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s and the problems faced i n c r e a t i n g a new s t a t e , was f u r t h e r complicated by the h i s t o r i c d i v i s i o n of India i n t o two d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s - the provinces of B r i t i s h I n d i a and the P r i n c e l y S t a t e s . To the provinces of B r i t i s h I n d i a , which enjoyed by v i r t u e of the Government of India Act of 1935 and the sub-sequent e l e c t i o n s of 1937, v i r t u a l i n t e r n a l autonomy; independ-ence would mean the t r a n s f e r of a l l e g i a n c e from the B r i t i s h i n D e l h i to the Indian and P a k i s t a n i Governments i n New D e l h i and Karachi r e s p e c t i v e l y . To the 560-odd P r i n c e l y S t a t e s , on the other hand, the term independence would mean the lapse of t h e i r s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the B r i t i s h Crown and the end of an era. I t has been argued that the greatest B r i t i s h achievement i n I n d i a was t h e i r a b i l i t y to c o n s o l i d a t e the e n t i r e sub-continent under one p o l i t i c a l umbrella. Whereas many Hindu and Muslim r u l e r s , from Asoka and Muhammad B i n Tughlug to Aurangzeb, had undertaken such a monumental task, a l l had met wi t h f a i l u r e . Yet what Aurangzeb and h i s legions f a i l e d to do, - 2 -the B r i t i s h accomplished w i t h r e l a t i v e l y small numbers by adopting a p o s i t i v e p o l i c y based upon t r e a t y r i g h t s b e n e f i c i a l to both p a r t i e s . As e a r l y as 1798, under the Governor-Generalship of Lord W e l l e s l e y , a p o l i c y of s e c u r i t y as the p r i c e of dependence v i s - a - v i s the I ndian States was e s t a b l i s h e d . Although prim-a r i l y created at P i t t ' s i n s i s t e n c e because of Anglo-French r i v a l r y i n Europe and I n d i a , and of p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y throughout the sub-continent ( d i s r u p t i n g t r a d e ) , i t soon became one of the u n d e r l y i n g f a c e t s of B r i t i s h r u l e . Through t h i s p o l i c y of c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power without r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the B r i t i s h Government e s t a b l i s h e d one of the v i t a l p i l l a r s of t h e i r R a j ; and by c r e a t i n g a d i r e c t t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Crown and the i n d i v i d u a l , e s t a b l i s h e d a vast pool of wealthy a u t o c r a t i c supporters whose very existence depended upon the c o n t i n u a t i o n of B r i t i s h paramountcy i n I n d i a . Indeed, the r u l e r s of these .states, through t h e i r C o u n c i l of P r i n c e s , were so f e a r f u l of t h e i r s t a t u s that they adopted an a t t i t u d e of o p p o s i t i o n toward Indian i n -dependence or any other p o l i t i c a l arrangement which would a l t e r t h e i r favoured p o s i t i o n , and as l a t e as August, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal pleaded wi t h the Cripps M i s s i o n that para-mountcy should hotnbe t r a n s f e r r e d to an I ndian Government. When Ind i a n independence became obvious f o l l o w i n g the B r i t i s h Labour Party's v i c t o r y i n 1945 and when p a r t i t i o n be-'came i n e v i t a b l e f o l l o w i n g Jinnah's recourse to \" D i r e c t A c t i o n \" i n November 1946, the f a t e of the P r i n c e l y States was v i r t u a l l y - 3 -sealed. The t r e a t i e s e s t a b l i s h i n g B r i t i s h paramountcy would not be continued by the r e s p e c t i v e Governments of I n d i a and P a k i s t a n - they would lapse. Yet while these States would enjoy de f a c t o independence i t was made abundantly c l e a r that they must opt to j o i n e i t h e r India or P a k i s t a n . Furthermore, i t was impressed upon the Princes that t h e i r primary c o n s ider-a t i o n must be the welfare of the people and t h e i r geographic l o c a t i o n . Thus, when the time came to decide the new bound-a r i e s of I ndia and P a k i s t a n , i t s outcome would have a profound e f f e c t upon the f r i n g e s t a t e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the new Dominions. I s o l a t e d from t h e i r former benefactors, d i s u n i t e d among themselves and faced w i t h a triumphant and h o s t i l e Congress and Muslim League, the majority of the r u l e r s y i e l d e d to the i n e v i t a b l e and r e l i n q u i s h e d t h e i r favoured p o s i t i o n s on the sub-continent. The Hindu-majority s t a t e s , i t was understood, would opt f o r India while those w i t h a Muslim majority would choose P a k i s t a n . Oddly enough, given the supposed dawning of democracy i n I n d i a , the subjects of the s t a t e s were not con-s u l t e d and the choice rested w i t h the r u l e r s alone, thus pav-i n g the way f o r b i t t e r controversy and f u t u r e hardship. The i n t e g r a t i o n of the Indian States was accomplished s k i l f u l l y and without i n c i d e n t l a r g e l y because of the auto-c r a t i c e f f i c i e n c y of Sardar P a t e l and h i s suave c i v i l - s e r v a n t colleague V. P. Menon, sometimes described as the v e l v e t glove on the i r o n f i s t . Major d i f f i c u l t i e s arose only w i t h three s t a t e s , Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir; and i t was events l e a d i n g to the i n t e g r a t i o n of the l a s t named i n t o the I n d i a n Union which were to a l t e r r a d i c a l l y the r e s p e c t i v e outlooks of India and P a k i s t a n towards each other. F u r t h e r -more, the a t t i t u d e s of India and P a k i s t a n v i s - a - v i s Kashmir were destined to have a profound e f f e c t upon the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two Dominions by i n f l a t i n g the importance of t h i s P r i n c e l y S t a t e to the point where, to both Indians and Pak-i s t a n i s , i t became the very symbol of nationhood. (B) The R a d c l i f f e Awards. Of the many committees concerned w i t h the establishment of the new Dominions of India and P a k i s t a n , perhaps none were more important to the p o p u l a t i o n of both c o u n t r i e s than the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions. Whereas the d i v i s i o n of such items as r a i l w a y r o l l i n g stock or monetary reserves was of extreme importance to the Governments of the two s t a t e s , only the r e s u l t s of the Boundary Commissions were d i r e c t l y to i n f l u e n c e the i n h a b i t a n t s of Northern I n d i a . For on the grass r o o t s l e v e l , the outcome of the boundary awards were to r e p r e -sent, i n t e r r i t o r i a l terms, n a t i o n a l and personal a s p i r a t i o n s . O r i g i n a l l y i t was the Government's i n t e n t i o n to r e f e r the d e l i c a t e subject of boundary demarcation to the United Nations but t h i s p l a n was r e j e c t e d by Nehru who c o r r e c t l y f e l t that such a t r i b u n a l could not be c o n s t i t u t e d q u i c k l y enough. I t was proposed by Jinnah, t h e r e f o r e , that S i r C y r i l R a d c l i f f e (a B r i t i s h judge) be appointed to head both the Bengal and Punjab Boundary Commissions, and that he be given a c a s t i n g vote on both. This proposal met with r a p i d approval from the P a r t i t i o n C o u n c i l . Nehru managed to o b t a i n very simple terms of r e f e r e n c e , thus a l l o w i n g the Commission a f r e e hand i n the demarcation of the boundaries. By the end of June 1947, the procedure f o r d e c i d i n g upon the u n i t y or p a r t i t i o n of Bengal and the Punjab had been evolved. I n Bengal, f o l l o w i n g a vote of 120 to 90 i n favour of j o i n i n g the Pa k i s t a n Constituent Assembly, the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly s p l i t i n t o two pa r t s - the non-Muslims v o t i n g 58 to 21 i n favour of P a r t i t i o n and the Muslims v o t i n g 106 to 35 a g a i n s t . Under the terms of reference from the P a r t i t i o n C o u n c i l , however, Bengal was t o be partitioned.\" 1\" Whereas the Bengal Assembly met i n an atmosphere of r e l a t i v e t r a n q u i l i t y , the Punjab Assembly was forced to d e t e r -mine the province's f a t e behind barbed wire b a r r i c a d e s and a strong p o l i c e guard. But i n s p i t e of unstable c o n d i t i o n s i n the Punjab, the l e g i s l a t o r s followed the same path as t h e i r Bengal colleagues. The whole Assembly voted 91 to 77 i n favour of j o i n i n g the P a k i s t a n Constituent Assembly, and when di v i d e d i n t o Muslim and non-Muslim areas, the vote was 69 to 27 against P a r t i t i o n and 50 to 22 i n favour ...of c r e a t i n g an East and West Punjab. 2 Thus, as i n Bengal, p a r t i t i o n was assured because the non-Muslims did not wish to l i v e w i t h i n the confines of a Muslim s t a t e . The only remaining f a c t o r s , 1. E.W.R. Lumby. The Transfer of Power i n I n d i a , A l l e n and Unwin, London,1954, p. 179. 2. V.P. Menon. The Transfer of Power i n I n d i a , Orient Long-mans, London,.1957, pp.402-03. however, were the detailed demarcations of the respective boundaries. Under the terms of reference announced by the Viceroy on June 30 , 1947, the Bengal Boundary Commission was instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, i t w i l l also take into account other factors. 3 Thus the terms of reference for the Bengal Commission were purposely l e f t vague, and hence the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the actual demarcation of the boundaries rested heavily on the shoulders of i t s chairman, S i r C y r i l R a d c l i f f e and his Muslim h League and Congress-sponsored colleagues. In addition to the above-mentioned terms of reference, the Bengal Boundary Commission was also required to demarcate the Muslim .majority areas i n Sylhet and the contiguous Muslim areas of the adjoining D i s t r i c t s of Assam. Their task, how-ever, was a d i f f i c u l t one, for the Commission was faced with an impassioned flood of facts and figures from such groups as the India National Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the New Bengal Association on one hand, and the Muslim League on the other. In Bengal, only the non-Muslim areas of Midnapore, Bankura, Hooghly, Howrak,and Burdwan; and the non-Hindu areas' of C h i t t -agong, Nookhali, Tippera, Dacca, Mymen Singh, Pabna and Bogra 3. cited i n Ibid., p. 59. 4. These were: Mr. Justice B i j a n Kumar Mukherjee, Mr. Justice Charu Chandra Biswas, Mr. Justice A.S.M. Ahram, and Mr. Justice S.A. Rahman. - 7 -were free from communal discord. The remainder of the prov-ince, including the c i t y of Calcutta i t s e l f , was aflame with communcal s t r i f e , as Hindus and Moslems clashed openly i n the streets. In the Punjab, on the other hand, the communal issue was of no less importance, the major areas of controversy being the c i t i e s of Lahore, Multan and Jullundar. In addition, the d i f f i c u l t y of demarcating the boundaries of the Punjab was increased by the presence of a t h i r d group, the Sikhs, whose membership was scattered throughout the province and who wanted nothing to do with the new state of Pakistan. Indeed, the roots of the communal frenzy which reached i t s peak i n the Punjab can be traced to Sikh-Muslim hatred. As was expected, the Punjab and Bengal awards were made by R a d c l i f f e , for i n the face of the communal tension neither the Congress nor the League appointees were prepared to jeopar-dize t h e i r future standing i n the two countries by accepting the awesome r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of p a r t i t i o n . Furthermore, the ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for pub l i c a t i o n of the Boundary Awards rested with the Viceroy (Mountbatten) who, foreseeing a possible communal deadlock, had issued e x p l i c i t instructions that R a d c l i f f e was to remain i n complete i s o l a t i o n while carry-ing out his d i f f i c u l t and delicate task.^ O r i g i n a l l y the R a d c l i f f e Awards were to have been released 5. A. Campbell-Johnson. Mission With Mountbatten, Robert Hale, London, 1954, p. 131. - 8 -on August 13, but because of Mountbatten's journey to Karachi to inaugurate Jinnah as the Governor-General of P a k i s t a n , and h i s very r e a l b e l i e f that the announcement of the Awards would be inopportune p r i o r to independence, he w i s e l y w i t h e l d pub-l i c a t i o n . On Saturday, August 16, Mountbatten announced the Awards,^ and, as was expected, n e i t h e r the Indians nor the P a k i s t a n i s were pleased. The S i k n l e a d e r , Baldev Singh was stunned by the p a r t i t i o n of h i s a n c e s t r a l l a n d , w h i l e the dismay of Liaquat A l l Khan (the P a k i s t a n i Prime M i n i s t e r ) over the i n c l u s i o n of the Gurdaspur i n East Punjab and the l o s s of C a l c u t t a was immediately o f f s e t by P a t e l ' s resentment over the awarding of the Chittagong H i l l T racts to P a k i s t a n . Yet no one r e j e c t e d the awards. Indeed, no one dared, f o r a l -though there was a p r o v i s i o n f o r a l t e r i n g the boundary, n e i t h e r P a t e l nor Liaquat was prepared to repudiate i t s terms. The R a d c l i f f e Awards, and indeed R a d c l i f f e h i m s e l f , have been the subject of b i t t e r controversy by both Indians and P a k i s t a n i s . Yet of the two, only the charges from P a k i s t a n 6. Under the R a d c l i f f e Awards, the t e r r i t o r i e s were d i v i d e d as f o l l o w s : I n d i a P a k i s t a n (1) Bengal West Bengal 36$ - area 35$ - p o p u l a t i o n 16$ - Muslims East Bengal 64$ - area 65$ - population\" 42$ - non-Muslims (2) The Punjab East Punjab 38$ - area 45$ - p o p u l a t i o n West Punjab 62$ - area 55$ - p o p u l a t i o n R i v e r s : 'Beas, S u t l e j , Upper R a v i . Chenab, Jhelum, Indus. are d i r e c t l y related to Kashmir. One Pakistan writer, K. Sarwar Hasan, i n a scathing attack on Campbell-Johnson's Mission With Mountbatten goes so far as to charge that the awards were part of a \"master plan\" to give India control of Kashmir. His arguments, although not convincing, do merit some attention, f o r they most c l e a r l y indicate the i l l - f e e l i n g caused by the Awards.^ Hasan charges that the f i n a l outcome of the R a d c l i f f e Awards were part of a Mountbatten-Radcliffe-Government of India conspiracy designed to give Kashmir t e r r i t o r i a l contiguity with India. Thus R a d c l i f f e , considering not d i s t r i c t s as the basic unit, but t a h s i l s ( s u b - d i s t r i c t s ) , \"handed over to India the following t a h s i l s , with Muslim majority populations and contiguous to Muslim majority areas i n Pakistan: Gurdaspure (52.1$ Muslims); Batala (55.96$ Muslims); Ferozepur (55.2$ Muslims); Zera (65.2$ Muslims); Nahadar (59.4$ Muslims; Ajnala o (59.4$ Muslims); and Jullunder (51.1$ Muslims)\". The f i r s t two t a h s i l s , Hasan claims, \"were given away so that India should have access to Kashmir,\"^ and the remainder so as to disrupt the supply of water running into P a k i s t a n . ^ Further-more, \"the Government of India always intended that Kashmir should accede to India and took concrete steps i n pursuance of i t . \" 1 1 7. K. Sarwar Hasan. \"Campbell-Johnson's Mission With Mount-lobatten\", Pakistan .Horizon, V:2 (June 1952), pp. 9b. 109 8. Ibid.,.p.~T0T 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., p. 102 11. Ibid.-, p. 103 - 10 -What Hasan overlooks, however, i s the a c t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Gurdaspure d i s t r i c t and i t s importance i n the Kashmir dis p u t e . The award of Gurdaspure to India gave Kashmir t e r r -i t o r i a l c o n t i g u i t y w i t h I n d i a , without which, i t would have been impossible f o r Indian troops t o a r r i v e i n Kashmir w i t h -out v i o l a t i n g P a k i s t a n i a i r s p a c e . Furthermore, i t was the award of the Gurdaspure.and B a t a l a t a h s i l to India \"which rendered p o s s i b l e the maintenance of an Ind i a n f o r c e at Jammu based on Pathankot as r a i l h e a d , and which enabled India to co n s o l i d a t e her defences southwards a l l the way from U r i to the P a k i s t a n border\". Thus, i t may be argued,,the award of t h i s area to I n d i a , not only caused i n t e n s i f i e d b i t t e r n e s s i n P a k i s t a n , but a l s o made i t p o s s i b l e f o r a war to be fought i n Kashmir. 12. Lord Birdwood. Two Nations and Kashmir, Robert Hale, London, 1956, p. lh. - 1 1 -CHAPTER TWO EVENTS LEADING TO ACCESSION The crux of the Kashmir dispute has been aggression and i t s consequences. I n d i a , on one hand, has c o n s i s t e n t l y main-tained that P a k i s t a n coaspired to overthrow H a r i Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, or coerce him i n t o acceding to P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n , on the other, has a l s o c o n s i s t e n t l y claimed that she i s innocent of any c o m p l i c i t y , and that i n f a c t I n d i a i s g u i l t y of aggression. I t thus becomes necessary t o s i f t the evidence to determine both the b a s i s of the Indian charge, and the reasons, i f any, f o r P a k i s t a n i c o m p l i c i t y . For only i n t h i s manner can the r e a c t i o n s of India and P a k i s t a n towards the Kashmir c r i s i s be determined. The events surrounding the Pathan i n v a s i o n of Kashmir, the Poonch Revolt and Pakistan's alledged c o m p l i c i t y i n tftea i n v a s i o n , c u l m i n a t i n g i n the a c c e s s i o n of Kashmir to I n d i a , evokedivarious r e a c t i o n s i n India and P a k i s t a n . On the Indian s i d e , only the t r i b a l i n v a s i o n and Pakistan's c o m p l i c i t y were p u b l i c l y d i scussed, l i t t l e or no mention being made of the Poonch R e v o l t . P a k i s t a n i statements, on the other hand, not s u r p r i s i n g l y denied any o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the i n v a s i o n , and concentrated on the a c t i o n s of the Pathan tribesmen and the Poonch R e v o l t . Thus i t becomes necessary to separate these three f a c t o r s and discuss them against the background of I n -dependence and P a r t i t i o n . - 12 -(A) The Pathan Incursions The a c t i o n s of the Pathan t r i b e s of the North-West F r o n t i e r Province and t h e i r involvement i n the Kashmir d i s -pute must be kept apart from the main stream of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Although l a t e r P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s i n Kashmir cannot be denied, and indeed Karachi admitted t h i s t o the world, i t i s the w r i t e r ' s contention that o r i g i n a l l y , that i s on October 22, 19^7, there was no connivance between the Government of P a k i s t a n and the Pathan t r i b e s over a c t i o n s to be taken i n Kashmir. The Pathans, proud, f i e r c e l y independent, f i r m l y devoted to Islam and no. strangers t o v i o l e n c e , had been kept under loose c o n t r o l by the B r i t i s h Government through annual grants and the constant threat or use of f o r c e . Now i t was the very l a c k of t h i s f o r c e , or the c r e a t i o n of a power vacuum i n the North-West F r o n t i e r Province, which was t o make p o s s i b l e the unleashing of the Pathans upon Kashmir. When the B r i t i s h withdrew t h e i r g a r r i s o n s from the t r i b a l areas on the eve of Independence, l e a v i n g the c o n t r o l of the t r i b a l areas to the F r o n t i e r Corps and locally-recruitenforces the balance of power began to d e t e r i o r a t e r a p i d l y . This un-s t a b l e s i t u a t i o n was f u r t h e r increased by the frequent r e p o r t s a r r i v i n g i n the t r i b a l areas df S i k h a t r o c i t i e s against Muslims i n the Punjab which soon brought the already h i g h - r e l i g i o u s f e r v o u r of the Pathans to fever p i t c h . I n s p i t e of the attempts of B r i t i s h and P a k i s t a n i o f f i c i a l s to overcome passion w i t h reason, cautious preparations were made f o r a r e l i g i o u s e x p e d i t i o n against the Pathan's t r a d i t i o n a l enemy the S i k h s ; to be accompanied of course, by the usual prospects of plunder. Yet, as L. Rushbrook W i l l i a m s notes, only the more adventurous souls were prepared to undertake such an adventure because of the t r a d i t i o n a l f e a r of B r i t i s h r e p r i s a l s . 1 The tribesmen, t h e r e f o r e , were poised and eager; yet they h e s i t a t e d -r e q u i r i n g only a spark t o s t a r t the flames of communal hatred. The Poonch Revolt provided the necessary stimulus t o unleash the f u l l f u r y of the Patnans upon any Hindu or S i k h unfortunate enough to be w i t h i n s t r i k i n g d i s t a n c e . (B) The Poonch Revolt As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the Indian Government has con-s t a n t l y maintained that the a r r i v a l of Pathan tribesmen i n Kashmir aided both morally and m a t e r i a l l y by P a k i s t a n i o f f i c i a l s , marked the beginning of the c o n f l i c t between the two. Pak-i s t a n , on the other hand, i n s i s t s that a vigorous freedom movement was already growing i n the Kashmir j a g i r of Poonch, and that the c o n d i t i o n s a r i s i n g from events i n Fjoonch sparked the t r i b e s i n t o a c t i o n . In t h i s connection, s e v e r a l important factors.must be noted. I n 1933, p r o p r i e t o r y r i g h t s had been granted by the Maharajah to landholders throughout Kashmir. The j a g i r of Poonch, however, was not included i n t h i s fundamental reform. This r e s u l t e d i n deep-rooted resentment which found expression 1. L. Rushbrook W i l l i a m s . • The S t a t e of P a k i s t a n , Faber and Faber, London, 1962, p. 76. - 1 4 -o n A u g u s t 9 , 1 9 4 7 , w h e n , a f t e r a n a t t e m p t b y t h e M a h a r a j a h ( a H i n d u ) t o i m p o s e t a x e s u p o n t h e p r e d o m i n e n t l y M u s l i m I n h a b i -t a n t s o f , P o o n c h , t h e P o o n c h i s r e v o l t e d . T h e M a h a r a j a h i m m e d -i a t e l y d i s p a t c h e d t r o o p s t o P o o n c h , b u t t h e M u s l i m e l e m e n t o f t h e K a s h m i r S t a t e F o r c e s d e s e r t e d a n d t h e r e a f t e r t h e t i n y j a g i r \" b e c a m e a s e c u r e b a l e f o r a m o v e m e n t k n o w n a s ' A z a d ( F r e e ) K a s h m i r ' , t o s e c u r e a n i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r o n e S a r d a r M o h a m m e d I b r a h i m . \" B y d r a w i n g u p o n t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f P o o n c h a n d M i r p u r , w h o t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a d s e r v e d i n t h e I n d i a n A r m y , t h e A z a d K a s h m i r G o v e r n m e n t w a s q u i c k l y a b l e t o f i e l d a p o o r l y - e q u i p p e d f o r c e o f s o m e 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n - m a n y o f w h o m h a d r e c e n t l y b e e n d e m o b l i z e d f r o m t h e I n d i a n A r m y . - ' I t s h o u l d b e k e p t i n m i n d t h a t t h i s A z a d a r m y w a s f o r m e d p r i o r t o t h e l a t e r P a t h a n i n -v a s i o n a n d t h a t \" t h e y w e r e a b o d y o f m e n q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m » 4 t h e m o r e l o o s e l y o r g a n i z e d t r i b e s m e n . • I n d e e d , e v e n S h e i k h A b d u l l a h t h e p r o - C o n g r e s s K a s h m i r i n a t i o n a l i s t r e c o g n i z e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e f o r c e s p r i o r t o t h e ' i n v a s i o n , w h e n a t a P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e o n O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 4 7 , a t D e l h i h e s t a t e d : 2. L o r d B i r d w o o d . I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n : A C o n t i n e n t D e c i d e s , P r a e g e r , N e w Y o r k , 1954, p p . 2 1 8 - 1 9 . ~ 3 . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t p e r s o n n e l d e m o b i l i z e d f r o m t h e I n d i a n A r m y w e r e a l l o w e d t o k e e p t h e i r u n i f o r m s c o m -p l e t e w i t h i n s i g n i a . T h i s f a c t a n d t h e n u m b e r o f d e s e r t e r s f r o m t h e K a s h m i r S t a t e F o r c e s c o u l d p o s s i b l y a c c o u n t f o r t h e n u m b e r o f u n i f o r m e d p e r s o n n e l i n K a s h m i r d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l t r i b a l i n c u r s i o n . 4 . B i r d w o o d . A C o n t i n e n t D e c i d e s , p . 219. - 15 -The present troubles i n Poonch were because of the unwise p o l i c y adopted by the S t a t e . The people of Poonch who suffered under t h e i r l o c a l r u l e r , and again, under the Kashmir Durbar /the Maharajah/ who was ov e r l o r d of Poonch, had s t a r t e d a people's move-ment f o r the redress of t h e i r grievances. I t was not communal. 5 • • -•• - • Yet, as was so of t e n the case throughout the sub-continent, p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s were .soon overshadowed by communal v i o l e n c e . Indeed, as v i o l e n c e spread throughout the s t a t e the very nature of the r e v o l t against Dogra (the r u l i n g house i n Kashmir) oppression changed r a d i c a l l y , degenerating i n t o a communal bloodbath. R e l i g i o n became the war-cry, used by Dogra and Muslim a l i k e , to gather support be camouflaging the r e a l issues of the r e v o l t . The Commander-in-Chief of the P a k i s t a n Army, General Gr a c i e , recognized the danger of the c o n f l i c t i n Poonch, and i n a memorandum to the P a k i s t a n M i n i s t e r of Defence on Oct-ober 11, 1947} wrote: The matter i s important as P a k i s t a n Army r e c r u i t s l a r g e numbers from Poonch. I f urgent a c t i o n i s not taken we may expect many deserters w i t h arms from the army and a consequent i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the t r o u b l e i n Poonch. Mould Hon'ble Defence M i n i s t e r please consider making an immediate com-p l a i n t to the Kashmir Government and give the i n c i d e n t every p o s s i b l e p u b l i c i t y i n P a k i s t a n so r that troops know that Government i s t a k i n g a c t i o n . 0 A complaint was sent by the P a k i s t a n Government to the Mah-ara j a h on October .12, but i t had no e f f e c t . In s i m i l a r v e i n , the London Times correspondent reported 5. c i t e d i n . Kashmir Question (Extracts from S i r Z a f r u l l a Khan's speech before the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ) , Feb. 1950, p. 15. 6. Govt, of P a k i s t a n , Kashmir Before Accession, Lahore, 1948, pp. 21-22. / - 16 -that In the remaining Dogra area 237,000 Muslims were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y exterminated, unless, they escaped to P a k i s t a n along the border, by the for c e s of the Dogra s t a t e headed by the Maharajah i n person and aic'edaided by Hindus and S i k h s . This e l i m i n a t i o n of two-thirds of the Muslim p o p u l a t i o n of Jammu prov-ince has e n t i r e l y changed the present composition of Eastern Jammu province.7 This and many s i m i l a r charges formed the basis of the Pak-i s t a n i a l l e g a t i o n of genocide against both the Maharajah and the Government of I n d i a . Paced w i t h the very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of e x t i n c t i o n , members of the newly-formed Azad Kashmir Government, i n c l u d -i n g Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, s l i p p e d across i n t o the P a k i s t a n North-West F r o n t i e r Province w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of o b t a i n i n g arms from the t r i b a l a r s e n a l s . Again on October 2.1 Sheikh Abdullah notes The Kashmir S t a t e Forces sent t h e i r troops and there was panic i n Poonch. But most of the adul t p o p u l a t i o n were ex-servicementin the / j p r e - P a r t i t i o n / I n d i a n Army who had c l o s e connections w i t h the people i n Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated t h e i r women and c h i l d r e n , crossed the f r o n t i e r , and returned w i t h arms supplied t o them by w i l l i n g people.\" Indeed, the i n h a b i t a n t s of the North-West F r o n t i e r Prov-ince were only too w i l l i n g to give both m a t e r i a l and moral a s s i s t a n c e to t h e i r beleaguered c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s i n Poonch, or i n f a c t , throughout Kashmir. Large numbers, from peasant to government o f f i c i a l s , demonstrated t h e i r support. \"The House w i l l r e c a l l w i t h p r i d e \" , declared Premier Khan Sahib The Times, Oct. 10, 19^7. 8. Kashmir Question, p. 16 - 17 -before the North-West F r o n t i e r Province L e g i s l a t u r e Assembly, \"the f a c t that i n / I s l a m ' s / greatest hour of danger the Masauds responded to our c a l l by r u s h i n g to the rescue of oppressed Muslims i n Jammu and Kashmir.\"^ Events i n Kashmir, t h e r e f o r e , completely overshadowed those i n the Punjab. The Poonch r e v o l t was i n f u l l swing, wi t h rumors of harsh r e p r i s a l s against the Muslim Poonchis. The s i z e of the r e v o l t , combined w i t h the absence of any B r i t i s h f orces t o enforce s t a b i l i t y convinced the Pathans that the B r i t i s h were gone f o r good. Throwing c a u t i o n to the wind and e x c i t e d by prospects of l o o t , they began a t t a c k : on Kashmir. The p l i g h t of t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s i n the Punjab was soon f o r g o t t e n , as the Pathans swept unopposed over the P a k i s t a n f r o n t i e r i n t o Kashmir and embarked upon an orgy of savage d e s t r u c t i o n . That the Pathans were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n plunder and rape cannot be denied; and even though o p p o s i t i o n crumbled as the Maharajah's Muslim troops deserted and joined the i n -vader, t h e i r advance towards Srinagar slowed to a crawl be-cause of the intense d e s i r e f o r l o o t r a t h e r than t e r r i t o r i a l gains. Eye-witness r e p o r t s from Kashmir, moreover, i n d i c a t e d that captured r a i d e r s were heavy-laden w i t h booty. The nature of the a t r o c i t i e s against both Hindu and Muslim Kash-m i r i s s t r o n g l y suggests that the j i h a d (Holy War) i n favour of plunder i n the e a r l y stages of the i n c u r s i o n . 9. c i t e d i n Richard Symonds. The Making of P a k i s t a n , Faber and Faber, London, 1950, p. 122. - 18 • {...That the Pathan i n v a s i o n forced the Maharajah i n t o acced-ing,, to I n d ia cannot be doubted; but whether P a k i s t a n a c t u a l l y i n s t i g a t e d and d i r e c t e d the i n v a s i o n i s open t o considerable debate. (C) :Pakistan's C o m p l i c i t y The o f f i c i a l I n dian p o s i t i o n , was, and i s , that P a k i s t a n armed and c o n t r o l l e d the i n v a s i o n w i t h the long-range view of e i t h e r p h y s i c a l l y overthrowing the Maharajah or coe r c i n g him i n t o acceding t o Pa k i s t a n . Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru declared on November 4, 1947 i n the Indian Constituent Assembly On the 24th October we heard that l a r g e armed bands c o n s i s t i n g of both tribesmen...and ex-servicemen... were marching on Sr i n a g a r . These r a i d e r s had crossed P a k i s t a n t e r r i t o r y and were equipped w i t h Bren guns, machine guns, mortars and flame throwers and had at t h e i r d i s p o s a l a la r g e number of trans p o r t v e h i c l e s . . We have s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n our possession to demonstrate that the whole business...was d e l i b e r a t e l y organized by high o f f i c i a l s of the P a k i s t a n Govern-ment.! 0 Yet even i f one disregards the statements of the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r , s u f f i c i e n t outside.evidence e x i s t s to show some degree of P a k i s t a n i p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; the exact amount, and to what o f f i c i a l l e v e l knowledge of the r a i d s and a s s i s t a n c e reached, however, i s a matter of controversy. On October 30, the New York Times correspondent i n New D e l h i , Robert Trumbull, noted that the anti-Government f o r c e s , estimated at 10,000 were being conveyed towards Srinagar i n truck s and r e p o r t e d l y were \"armed wi t h 3.7 inch'mortars £a 10. J . Nehru. Speeches, M i n i s t r y of Information and Broad-c a s t i n g , New D e l h i , 1950. V o l . 1, 1946-49, pp. 164, 166-67. - 19 -standard B r i t i s h model/ and modern r i f l e s that could have been s t o l e n from an arms dump abandoned a f t e r the war or manufactured i n the tribesmen's own famous a r m o r i e s . \" 1 1 S i m i l a r i t y the London Times correspondent reported that he had seen a copy of an in t e r c e p t e d l e t t e r from F a g i r Mohammad, Quereshi, of B u n j i Kashmir to Bodshah Sahib Abdullah Hakim ( t r i b a l leader of the Mardan D i s t r i c t , North-West F r o n t i e r Province) i n which the author wrote that \"two Kashmiri Muslim leaders warned the Maharajah on August 30 that i f h i s s t a t e acceded to I n d i a , communal war would be declared.\" Furthermore, the F a g i r stated l ? that a copy of t h i s l e t t e r had been sent to Mr. Jinnah. Although these statements do not corroborate Mr. Nehru's d e c l a r a t i o n before the Constituent Assembly, they are among the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n s by f o r e i g n observers that P a k i s t a n was im p l i c a t e d i n the t r i b a l i n c u r s i o n . As the s i t i u a t i o n I n Kash-mir became c l e a r e r , numerous re p o r t s began t o emerge from Kash-mir i n d i c a t i n g more c l e a r l y the exact scope and nature of Pak-i s t a n ' s r o l e i n the i n i t i a l i n c u r s i o n and i n the Azad Kashmir f o r c e s . Margaret Bourke-White noted i n Halfway t o Freedom that she saw arms being issued to tribesmen from a l o c a l 1^ Muslim League o f f i c e , w hile the London Times correspondent wrote \"That P a k i s t a n i s u n o f f i c i a l l y a i d i n g the r a i d e r s i s c e r t a i n . Your correspondent has f i r s t - h a n d evidence that arms, 11. New York Times. Oct. 30, '47. (hereafter c i t e d as NYT.) 1 2 « Times, Oct. 31'47. 13. Margaret Bourke-White. Halfway to Freedom, Simon and Shuster, New York, 1949; P. 208. - 20 -ammunition and s u p p l i e s are being made a v a i l a b l e to Azad Kashmir forces...and however much the P a k i s t a n Government may. disavow i n t e r v e n t i o n , moral and m a t e r i a l support i s c e r t a i n l y f o r t h c o m i n g . \" 1 ^ Indeed, even as e a r l y as November 2, A l a n Moorehead noted that r e c r u i t i n g f o r Kashmir was openly c a r r i e d on i n both the t r i b a l areas and P a k i s t a n proper w i t h each v i l l a g e c o n s i d e r i n g i t an honour t o be represented at the \" f r o n t . \" 1 5 This reference by A l a n Moorehead and the Times correspon-dent, however, i s co n t r a d i c t e d by Margaret Parton i n the New York Herald Tribune who w r i t e s : I f P a k i s t a n i s g i v i n g d i r e c t a s s i s t a n c e to \"Azad\" (Free) f i g h t i n g i n Kashmir, evidence i s not.on the surface to be seen by p r y i n g f o r e i g n e r s . . . During the e n t i r e 600 mile t r i p /accompanying Liaquat A l i along the Pakistan-Kashmir border/ we s a w n ° r a i d e r s ' bases, no t r a i n i n g c e n t e r s , no sTocks of arms and ammunition and no P a k i s t a n s o l d i e r s s l i p p i n g o f f to the Kashmir f r o n t . Even those r e l i a b l e 'neutral ob-ser v e r s ' - B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s and c i v i l i a n s - denied the existence of any of those m a t e r i a l aids which India charges P a k i s t a n i s g i v i n g the f i g h t e r s i n Kashmir.16 | The f r u i t s of i n t e n s i v e research among these \" n e u t r a l observers\", moreover, enabled Lord Birdwood to note that on one occasion the B r i t i s h Deputy Commissioner at Mianwali was ordered t o provide r a t i o n s f o r 2.00 refugees from Kashmir, yet upon a r r i v a l , the presumed refugees were f u l l y armed and mov-in g towards Kashmir. Furthermore, Birdwood declares that \"the Chief M i n i s t e r of the F r o n t i e r Province, who had f a m i l y 14. Times, Jan. 13, '48. 15. The Observer, Nov. 2, '47. 16. New York Herald Tribune. Jan. 24, '48. - 21 -connections w i t h Kashmir, gave /the r a i d e r s / h i s b l e s s i n g and u n q u a l i f i e d a s s i s t a n c e , without which the operation might not 17 have been p o s s i b l e . \" Whether these o f f i c i a l s were a c t i n g upon i n s t r u c t i o n s from Karachi or through I s l a m i c zeal, however, i s d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n . A l l the above-mentioned evidence, w i t h the exception of Lord Birdwood's reference to government o f f i c i a l s , p o i n t s to u n o f f i c i a l P a k i s t a n i p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n both the t r i b a l i n c u r -s i o n and i n the support of Azad Kashmir. Some h i n t of u n o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , however, was given s e v e r a l years l a t e r at the United Nations. During the subsequent debates i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , when the Kashmir scene had a l t e r e d r a d i c a l l y , Gen-e r a l G r a c i e , the Commander-in-Chief of the P a k i s t a n Army, i n a memorandum of A p r i l 2 0 , 1948 recommending the use of r e g u l a r P a k i s t a n troops i n Kashmir, wrote, \"An easy v i c t o r y of the Indian Army i n the above-mentioned s e c t o r s . . . i s almost c e r t a i n to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against P a k i s t a n f o r i t s f a i l u r e to render them more d i r e c t a s s i s t a n c e and might w e l l 1 8 cause them to t u r n against P a k i s t a n . \" Although General G r a d e ' s l o g i c i s c e r t a i n l y c o r r e c t (as l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n w i l l show), i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the term \"more d i r e c t a s s i s t -ance\" i n connection w i t h the i n i t i a l t r i b a l i n v a s i o n . One can only s p e c u l a t e , however, about i t s ' i m p l i c a t i o n s . The most concrete evidence i n d i c a t i n g o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a -t i o n by P a k i s t a n i s given by an American c i t i z e n , Russel K. Haigh, who served i n the Azad Kashmir fo r c e s w i t h the rank of 17. Birdwood. Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 55. 18. S/PV. 464. Feb. 8 , ' 5 0 , p. 10, emphasis mine. - 22 -Brigadier, and who, i n an interview with Robert Trumbull openly declared that his forces received arms and p e t r o l from the Pakistan Government and that communications i n Kash-mir were maintained by regular Pakistan Signals p e r s o n n e l . ^ This statement, moreover, was made several months before the Pakistan Army openly moved into Kashmir to protect Pakistan's 20 borders from the advancing Indian Army. Furthermore, the mysterious \"General Tarig\" (who led the forces of Azad Kash-mir) has now been i d e n t i f i e d as Brigadier (later General) Akbar Khan, a general o f f i c e r i n the Pakistan Army, whose presence, as;commander of the Azad Kashmir g u e r r i l l a forces, could hardly have been kept secret from the Government i n Karachi. Thus i t can be said that Pakistani nationals did lend both moral and material support to both the tribesmen and the forces of Azad Kashmir. The controversy l i e s i n the i n t e r -pretation of the terms \" o f f i c i a l \" and \" u n o f f i c i a l \" and the extent to which Pakistani o f f i c i a l s preferred to turn a blind eye to the actions of Pakistanis under t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . This, however, w i l l probably never be known, for the deaths of both Jinnah and Liaquat A l l Khan without th e i r memoirs, and the continuation of the Kashmir dispute as a prime factor i n the foreign p o l i c i e s of both India and Pakistan have pre-cluded any o f f i c i a l from venturing outside the now established i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the early events i n Kashmir. 19. NYT. Jan. 29, '48 20. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Haigh maintained that the Pathan tribesmen were receiving large quantities of Russian and German arms, from Russia. - 23 -Prom the P a k i s t a n s i d e , there i s ample evidence to show that o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an i n v a s i o n of, or r e v o l t i n , Kashmir would be contrary to the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Whereas many examples of u n o f f i c i a l P a k i s t a n i a i d may be c i t e d , there are s e v e r a l reasons why the P a k i s t a n Government was unable to prevent the r a i d e r s from e n t e r i n g Kashmir and was v i r t u a l l y blackmailed i n t o supplying the f o r c e s of Azad Kashmir w i t h arms and ammunition. I t i s a l s o evident that the P a k i s t a n government, and many of i t s l e s s e r o f f i c i a l s , attempted to p a c i f y the t r i b e s and persuade them against embarking upon t h e i r adventure i n t o Kashmir. Throughout h i s tour of the North-West F r o n t i e r Province i n January, 1948, Liaquat A l i Khan \"was met w i t h complaints about l a c k of o f f i c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r the Kashmir campaign and about attempts of p o l i t i c a l agents to prevent 21 the departure of v o l u n t e e r s . \" On one occasion i n Mirahshah \"one agent alone stopped two r a i d i n g p a r t i e s w i t h a t o t a l s t r e n g t h of 8,000 r i f l e s . \" These i n c i d e n t s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , passed without comment by the Indian Press which seemed, nat-u r a l l y enough, f a r more i n t e r e s t e d i n the a c t i o n s of the ' Pathans i n Kashmir than i n the s u b t l e d i f f e r e n c e between an over-zealous Muslim League worker and a government c i v i l s e r -vant who was a c t i n g i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y . Furthermore, P a k i s t a n i claims of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o r i g i n a l t r i b a l i n c u r s i o n s are s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the obvious Pathan preference f o r l o o t over p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . I f the 21. Times. Jan. 26, '48. 22. I b i d . ' - 24 -Pakistan Government was behind the i n i t i a l invasion, for the sole purpose of seizing Kashmir by force, or was i n control of the actions of the Pathan t r i b e s , i t i s the writer's opinion that they would c e r t a i n l y have attempted to l i m i t a t r o c i t i e s (especially against Muslims) and concentrated on gaining p o l i t i c a l control over the State by capturing Srinagar. Moreover, any idea of a p o l i t i c a l pact between Pakistan and the Pathans can be dismissed as groundless for the tribesmen had made i t known that, regardless of the attitude of the Pakistan government towards the Poonch Revolt, they would a s s i s t t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s . '-' Indeed, Abdul Khan, the spokes-man for the f i f t e e n t r i b a l chiefs representing some 235,000 armed Pathans, told Liaquat A l l Khan and S i r George Cunningham i n no uncertain terms that they would not a l t e r t h e i r present 24 p o l i c y towards Kashmir nor accept p a r t i t i o n as a compromise. The heir apparent of Swat, i n a sim i l a r frame of mind, told the Prime Minister that every assistance would be offered to the tribesmen and that 400 men were sent to Kashmir \"to pro-tect Muslims.\" 2 5 In normal times B r i t i s h troops would have been called i n to deal with the rampaging Pathans. Yet the invasion of Kash-mir was taking place against a background of mass i n s t a b i l i t y and s o c i a l disorder. Pakistan, upon whose shoulders now rested the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for containing the Pathans, was i n no po-s i t i o n , p o l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l y , to f a l l back upon the 23. Birdwood. Two Nations, p. 53. 24. Times. Jan. 15, >48. 25. Ibid. - 25 -t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h p o l i c y of c o n t r o l l i n g the Pathans through the threat or use of f o r c e . I t would seem l o g i c a l , t h e r e f o r e , to conclude that the Pathans were v i r t u a l l y p r e s e n t i n g the Government of P a k i s t a n w i t h a f a i t accompli. Aside from the l e g i t i m a c y of the Indian and P a k i s t a n i claims over the o r i g i n a l causes of the t r i b a l i n c u r s i o n s one f a c t o r , and one too f r e q u e n t l y overlooked, was the i n -s t a b i l i t y of P a k i s t a n f o l l o w i n g P a r t i t i o n . Both wings of the country, e s p e c i a l l y West P a k i s t a n , were beset by the f o r c e s of anarchy and v i o l e n c e . With a c e n t r a l government i n Karachi v i r t u a l l y operating out of packing cases i n temporary accomo-d a t i o n , p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s s t r a i n e d by the i n f l u x of peasant refugees and the exodus of many Hindu and European c i v i l s e r v a nts, and an army s t r i c k e n by the upheaval of P a r t i t i o n , i t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g that the P a k i s t a n Government was i n -i t i a l l y unable to c u r t a i l the movement of Pathans i n t o Kashmir. In these c o n d i t i o n s the P a k i s t a n Government faced a d i l -emma. F i r s t , the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y the refugees from the Punjab and Kashmir who had suffered a t r o c i t i e s at the hands of the S i k h s , were sympathetic t o -wards the Pathans and t h e i r j i h a d against Dogra oppression. Hence they demanded f u l l P a k i s t a n i p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Kashmir. Second, i f the P a k i s t a n Government sought to c o n t r o l the r a i d e r s by f o r c e of arms, they would be faced w i t h the very r e a l prospect of a t r i b a l war w i t h p o s s i b l e wider i m p l i c a -t i o n s . The P a k i s t a n Army, as stated above, was v i r t u a l l y useless as an e f f e c t i v e f i g h t i n g f o r c e and any attempt to - 26 -repress the tribes i n t h e i r actual state of mind.would have only smashed beyond repair the d e l i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p so care-f u l l y nurtured by both B r i t i s h and Pakistani o f f i c i a l s . \"More-over\", writes Lord Birdwood, \" i n view of the p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l temper, at that stage Moslem troops ordered to oppose tribesmen bent on a jihad i n Kashmir would almost ce r t a i n l y have laughed at t h e i r orders and gone over to j o i n t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s i n the adventure\". As S i r Ambrose Dundas explained to the United Nation's Commission for India and Pakistan, Once i t started r o l l i n g , this onslaught could not be stopped, and any attempt to do so would have met with fury, i n v i t i n g war with Pakistan. / F u r t h e r -: • c more/ he claimed the further necessity of channel-ing the invasion by giving the tribesmen gasoline and l e t t i n g them board t r a i n s . Pakistan herself was i n a stage of administrative chaos, m i l i t a r i l y weak, inundated by millions of refugees, desolutely unable to r e s i s t the f a n a t i c a l onslaught.2 7 Further evidence to support Pakistan's non-complicity i n the i n i t i a l t r i b a l invasions i s given, a l b e i t unknowingly, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, who records that Mountbatten attended the October 2 5 meeting of the Indian Defence Committee during which !a message was received from the Pakistan Army Head-quarters stating that some f i v e thousand tribesmen had attacked a captured Muzaffarabad and Domel and that considerable t r i b a l reinforcements could be expected'. Reports showed that they were already l i t t l e more than t h i r t y - f i v e miles from Sr i n a g a r . 2 \" 2 . 6 . Birdwood. A Continent Decides, p. 2 2 2 . 2 7 . Josef Korbel. Danger'in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1 9 5 4 , p. 1 3 7 . 28,, Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 2 2 4 . - 27 -Although the r e c e i p t of t h i s telegram led t o the d i s p a t c h of V. P. Menon to S r i n a g a r , and hence the accession of Kashmir to I n d i a , i t s importance as evidence of Pakistan's non-com-p l i c i t y i s overwhelming. Indeed, i f the P a k i s t a n Government was i n any way i m p l i c a t e d i n the i n v a s i o n w i t h the u l t i m a t e hope of coercing the Maharajah, i t would most c e r t a i n l y not have released a \" S i t u a t i o n Report\" concerning \"troop\" move-ments and o b j e c t i v e s to a government keenly i n t e r e s t e d i n the f u t u r e of Kashmir. Moreover, both Jinnah and Liaquat A l i Khan must be c r e d i t e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e to have r e a l i z e d t h a t , given the Maharajah!so dangerously un-c e r t a i n s t a t e of mind, any attempt to coerce Kashmir i n t o j o i n i n g P a k i s t a n would only b a c k f i r e . Undeniably the Pathans and Azad Kashmir fo r c e s received m a t e r i a l a i d from P a k i s t a n . Indeed, many l o c a l P a k i s t a n i o f f i c i a l s have openly admitted, w i t h no s i g n of r e g r e t , that they supplied weapons, g a s o l i n e , v e h i c l e s and even men. Yet apart from these admissions no documentary proof has been produced to support Indian charges that t h i s a i d was given w i t h the approval of the P a k i s t a n C e n t r a l Government. That many senior o f f i c i a l s closed t h e i r eyes to the a c t i v i t i e s around them instead of opposing the adventure c e r t a i n l y seems t r u e , but the p a t t e r n of a c t i o n , both i n a i d i n g and o b s t r u c t -i n g the Pathan r a i d e r s , i s too i r r e g u l a r and unco-ordinated to suggest any o f f i c i a l p l a n . The a t r o c i t i e s against Muslims; the precedence of l o o t over geographical and p o l i t i c a l ob-j e c t i v e s ; the telegram from P a k i s t a n Army Headquarters to - 28 -the Indian Defence Committee; the t h r e a t s of the Pathans that they would not accept compromise over Kashmir; the pleas by the p o p u l a t i o n f o r o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; and the appeal by Liaquat A l i Khan and S i r George Cunningham, bargaining from weakness not s t r e n g t h , a l l bear witness to t h i s f a c t . Indeed, Jinnah had embarked upon a p o l i c y of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of the P r i n c e l y S t a t e s , and to have a c t i v e l y p a r t -i c i p a t e d i n the Kashmir im b r o g l i o would only have served to weaken Pakistan's p o s i t i o n regarding other S t a t e s . I t i s the w r i t e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , that events i n Kashmir, culmin a t i n g i n the Maharajahsls accession to India on October 2.6 and the a r r i v a l of Indian troops i n Srinagar on the 2 7 t h , d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r e d the P a k i s t a n i a t t i t u d e t o -wards both India and the S t a t e . I n i t i a l l y , the P a k i s t a n Government was h e l p l e s s to act against i t s Pathan tribesmen because of the disorganized s t a t e of the P a k i s t a n Army, and i t s very r e a l f e a r of a t r i b a l war on the F r o n t i e r i f f o r c e was used; the only a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e r e f o r e , was to await f u r -ther developments i n Kashmir. Indeed, fc.heePakistan Government had every hope that they would f a l l h e i r to Kashmir: on August 15 a s t a n d s t i l l agree-ment-was concluded between the two governments; P a k i s t a n was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r communications and p o s t a l s e r v i c e s w i t h i n the S t a t e ; the champion of Hindu-Muslim s e c u l a r i s m , Sheikh Mo-hammed Abdullah, was s t i l l i n d i s f a v o u r with the Maharajah; while both Jinnah and Liaquat A l i Khan were assured by Mount-- 29 -batten and Sardar Patel \"that accession /of Kashmir/ to Pak-is t a n would not be taken amiss by India.\" y Moreover, the Poonch Revolt had led to the establishment of the popular Azad Kashmir Government as a working alt e r n a t i v e to the Maharajah i n Srinagar.' The prospect of accession to. India, i t may be argued, was only a remote p o s s i b i l i t y given the current Indian attitude towards Muslim Hyderabad and Hindu Junagadh. Thus, when the actual accession of Kashmir to India did occur, the Government of Pakistan, and indeed the majority of the population, f e l t only too j u s t i f i e d i n crying f o u l . 29. Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 223; V. P. Menon. The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, MacMillan, New York, 195 ,^ p. 394. - 30 -CHAPTER THREE ACCESSION AND CONFLICT (A) Accession The news of the t r i b a l incursions struck Delhi l i k e a bombshell, and from the evening of October 24 onwards, events moved with increasing r a p i d i t y u n t i l r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan deteriorated to a state of near war. It was,the events between October 25 and November 1 , 19^7, moreover, that were the very basis of the dispute which remains the scourge of the sub-continent. Indeed, i f , as has been e a r l i e r sugg-ested, the t r i b a l incursions provided the l i t fuse, the powder-keg can be found i n events surrounding the entire act of accession. The report from Srinagar, however, was accompanied by a note from the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir pleading for material aid to protect his beleaguered State from the t r i b a l onslaught and the forces of Azad Kashmir. A second l e t t e r , also related to the invasion, came from Pakistan Army Head-quarters, stating that armed Pathans had crossed the border at several points and were moving on Srinagar. The f i r s t reaction of the Indian Government was shown at the October 25 meeting of the Defence Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten. According to Campbell-Johnson, the immediate wish of a l l senior government members was to rush i n arms and ammunition already requested by • - 31 -the Kashmir Government, which would enable the l o c a l populace i n Srinagar to put up some defence against the r a i d e r s . The problem of sending i n troops was considered but Mountbatten urged that t h i s would be a dangerous move unless Kashmir o f f e r e d to accede.1 Furthermore, Mountbatten i n s i s t e d that no a c t i o n should be taken u n t i l the Government had f u l l e r i n f o r m a t i o n . V. P. Menon, the able right-hand man of Sardar P a t e l , t h e r e f o r e , was dispatched to Srinagar to e x p l a i n the Indian p o s i t i o n , t o the Maharajah and t o gain as c l e a r a p i c t u r e of events i n Kashmir as was p o s s i b l e under the curcumstances. A r r i v i n g amid an \"atmosphere of impending c a l a m i t y , \" the Indi a n party was met by the Kashmiri Prime M i n i s t e r Mehr Chand Mahajan, who, according t o Menon \"seemed to have l o s t h i s equanimity...and pleaded f o r the Government of India to come to the rescue of the S t a t e . \" S i m i l a r l y , the Maharajah, whom, Menon l a t e r v i s i t e d , was \"completely unnerved by the t u r n of events and by h i s sense of lone h e l p l e s s n e s s . \" ^ I n r e c a l l i n g these events at a l a t e r date, Menon gives the reader no i n d i c a t i o n of the nature of h i s d i s c u s s i o n s with the Maharajah, and only notes that he urged the r u l e r to f l e e from the c a p i t a l to a % s a f e r refuge i n the c i t y of Jammu. On the morning of the 26th, Menon returned t o D e l h i and immediately reported h i s impressions of the s i t u a t i o n to the Defence Committee where he pointed out \"the supreme nece s s i t y .•4 • ' of saving Kashmir from the r a i d e r s . Mountbatten, however, again,, cautioned the Defence Committee against the f o l l y of 1. Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 22.4. 2. Menon. o£. c i t . , p. 398. 3. I b i d . 4. TbTcT., p. 399. - 32 -sending troops i n t o a n e u t r a l s t a t e on the grounds that Pak-i s t a n could do e x a c t l y the same t h i n g \"which could only r e s u l t i n a c l a s h of armed fo r c e s arid i n war.\"^ Indeed, upon the Governor-General 1s i n s i s t e n c e , Kashmir's a c c e s s i o n to In d i a was made the p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a i d . Menon, t h e r e f o r e , was again dispatched to Jammu on the same day to place the h a r r i e d and desperate Maharajah the Indi a n proposals - accession before a i d . The Maharajah, v i s -i b l y shaken by the events u n f o l d i n g w i t h i n h i s s t a t e , grasped the Indian hand of s a l v a t i o n and immediately signed the I n s t r u -ment of Accession. He then dra f t e d a l e t t e r to Mountbatten i n which he described the p l i g h t of h i s S t a t e and again r e -quested m i l i t a r y a i d . Furthermore, he informed the Governor General that he was forming an i n t e r i m Government w i t h Sheikh Abdullah, not t o become Prime M i n i s t e r as i s of t e n a s s e r t e d , but \"to carry the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h i s emergency w i t h my P r i m e M i n i s t e r . O n c e again, however, the content of the d i s -c u s sion i s ommitted by Menon, who, armed w i t h both the l e t t e r and signed Instrument of Accession, returned immediately to New D e l h i . 7 5. Campbell-Johnson. op. c i t . , p. 225. 6. Government of I n d i a . White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, New D e l h i , 1948, p. 46, h e r e a f t e r c a l l e d WPJK. 7. The remarks of Sheikh Abdullah p r i o r to h i s d i s m i s s a l as Prime M i n i s t e r of Kashmir on August 9, 1953 shed f u r t h e r l i g h t on the a c t i v i t i e s between the Maharajah and V. P. Menon. By t h i s time, d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h the b e n e f i t s of Indian r u l e , Abdullah f l a t l y asserted e \"accession had been forced on Kashmir by India who.would not help her against the armed r a i d e r s from P a k i s t a n un-l e s s she acceded.\" (S. 0. \"The Kashmir Problem\". The World Today, ( R . I . I . A . ) , September 1953, p. 395. - 3 3 -(B) India's Acceptance Following the return of V. P. Menon to New Delhi and the subsequent Defence Committee's discussion of the Maharajah's l e t t e r and the Instrument of Accession, Mountbatten again cautioned That i f /The members of the Defence Committee/\" were determined to send i n troops, the i n i t i a l pre-r e q u i s i t e was accession, and unless i t was made clear that t h i s accession was not just an act of a c q u i s i --tion, this i n i t s e l f might touch off a war. He there-fore urged that i n the reply his Government ask him to send on t h e i r behalf totthe Maharajah accepting his accession .offer he should be allowed to add that this was conditional on the w i l l of the people being ascertained as soon as law and order were restored.\" This proposal, f r e e l y accepted by Nehru and the remainder of the Committee, was Incorporated i n the l e t t e r of the 2.7th from Mountbatten to the Maharajah accepting his accession to India. It i s my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored i n Kashmir and her s o i l cleared of the invader the question of the state's accession should be settled by a r e f -erence to the people.9 It must be noted that this was a u n i l a t e r a l declaration made by the Government of India to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and that there was no intention of i n v i t i n g outside assistance of any kind i n i t s implementation. With the acceptance of the Maharajah's accession the way was cleared for the f l i g h t of the l / l l t h Sikh B a t t a l i o n to 8 . Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 2 . 2 5 . 9 . P. L. Lakhampal. Es s e n t i a l Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, International Publications, New Delhi, 1 9 5 8 , p. 5 6 . - 34 -Srinagar at f i r s t l i g h t on the morning of the 27th to rescue what Birdwood described as \"a vast s t a t e i n which l a r g e sec-t i o n s of the people were u n w i l l i n g to be r e s c u e d . \" 1 0 Even a f t e r t h i s d e c i s i o n had been reached and the f i r s t I n dian troops were a r r i v i n g i n S r i n a g a r , Menon records that both Mountbatten and the three ( B r i t i s h ) Chiefs of S t a f f of the Indian Armed Forces expressed t h e i r concern over the r i s k s i n v o lved i n such an undertaking. Nehru, however, \"asserted that the only a l t e r n a t i v e to sending i n troops would be to a l l o w a massacre i n S r i n a g a r , which would be followed by a major communal h o l o c a u s t . \" 1 1 Menon, on the other hand, pre-f e r r e d to express h i s concern f o r the European r e s i d e n t s i n S r i n a g a r , r a t h e r than h i s own countrymen - thus l e a v i n g one w i t h the d i s t i n c t impression that the f a t e of Europeans i n Kashmir was being used as a l e v e r to ga i n Mountbatten 1s f u l l support. Furthermore, one cannot but sense the overwhelming eagerness of the Defence Committee to d i s p a t c h troops to Srinagar from the very beginning of the i n v a s i o n . Although the P a k i s t a n i charges of a Mountbatten-Nehru-Pa'tel conspiracy t o gain. Kashmir can be dismissed as ground-l e s s on the bas i s of e x i s t i n g evidence, there remain s e v e r a l anomalies which cast a shadow over the otherwise l e g a l , yet p r o v i s i o n a l , a c c e s s i o n : ( l ) Why did Mountbatten and h i s B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f i n s i s t upon and o b t a i n the l e g a l t e c h n i c a l i t y of accession 10. Birdwood. Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 60. 11. Menon. op. c i t . , p. 400. - 35 -before aid? T e c h n i c a l l y the Maharajah was the r u l e r of an independent s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e had the r i g h t to request armed a s s i s t a n c e from a neighbour without any surrender of independence. Several years l a t e r , however, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, i n an attempt to deal w i t h t h i s awkward question of acce s s i o n stated ...the f a c t that Kashmir did not immediately decide whether to accede to P a k i s t a n or to India did not make Kashmir independent f o r the i n t e r v e n i n g p e r i o d . She was not independent, i t was our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as the co n t i n u i n g e n t i t y to see that Kashmir's i n t e r -ests were pr o t e c t e d . I wish to say t h i s , because, i t was undeniably our duty to come to Kashmir's a i d , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether she had acceded t o In d i a or not.\"12 I f the above statement i s a genuine r e f l e c t i o n of Government p o l i c y toward Kashmir, or any other S t a t e , why then was accession made a p r e r e q u i s i t e to aid? (2) S i m i l a r l y , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note that whereas Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru had p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d a s t a n d s t i l l agreement with Kashmir,on the grounds that there was no reference to the people, and had repudiated the acc e s s i o n to Pa k i s t a n of the Maharajah of Junagadh as a r b i t r a r y , he f u l l y accepted the eq u a l l y a r b i t r a r y a c cession of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. The two standards seem t o be incompatible. (3) F o l l o w i n g the s i g n i n g of the Instrument of Accession the Maharajah never returned to h i s c a p i t a l at Srinagar and on June 20, 1949 he was ordered to leave Kashmir and take up residence i n Bombay, an act which, i n i t s e l f , f o s t e r s the impression that the Maharajah had served h i s purpose and was 12. J. Nehru, Speeches, V o l . I I , 1949 to 1953, p. 340. Speech i n Parliament on August 7, 1952. - 36 -then discarded. This a r b i t r a r y action of the Government of India tends to give the l e g a l i t y of accession an a r t i f i c i a l appearance. (4) Perhaps the most flagrant anomaly, however, was the f a i l u r e of the Indian Government to inform Karachi of the drama unfolding i n Kashmir. Instead, Jinnah was only informed of the accession of Kashmir twelve hours a f t e r Indian troops arrived i n Srinagar. Thus he was presented with a f a i t accompli and the l a s t i n g impression that the accession was a fraud. (C) Pakistan's Reaction The Pakistani reaction to Kashmir's accession was pre-c i s e l y that predicted by both Mountbatten and his m i l i t a r y advisors. When Jinnah received word of the accession and of the a r r i v a l of Indian troops i n Srinagar, he was dining with Governor S i r Francis Mudie at Lahore. His immediate reaction was to telephone his Commander-in-Chief, General S i r Douglas .Gracie, at Rawalpindi and order him to send troops into the Jhelum Valley. Gracie, however, wisely declined to issue such an order u n t i l he had informed the Supreme Commander F i e l d Marshal Claude Auchinleck i n New Delhi. Furthermore, he begged Jinnah to delay the order u n t i l the Supreme Commander could come to Lahore for f u l l discussions. Indeed, wrote Lord Birdwood, \"not only was there the need for r e s t r a i n t i n order to prevent war between the two Dominions, but also the Pakistan Regular Army was i n no condition to undertake a - 37 -TO campaign.\" Auchinleck flew to Lahore on the 2 8 t h , and be-tween them, the two m i l i t a r y commanders persuaded Jinnah to withdraw his order. Paced with the threat of the possible withdrawal of a l l B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s serving i n the Pakistan Armed Forces, Hinnah re l u c t a n t l y agreed. Two or three units of the Pakistan Army sent into Kash-mir might have won Srinagar for Pakistan; but i n the war which would c e r t a i n l y have followed the entire east flank of West Pakistan would have been exposed. \"For Jinnah i t was a hard decision. His sense of f r u s t r a t i o n was complete, for he was being deprived of a country he f e l t r a c i a l l y and economic-a l l y to be part of Pakistan. But whether the m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l arguments weighed upper-most i n his mind he gave i n with a good grace and accepted his defeat with d i g n i t y . \" 1 ^ After withdrawing his order to the Pakistan Army, Jinnah then proposed that Mountbatten, Nehru, and Maharajah Hari Singh meet with him on the 29th i n Lahore with the object of reaching a settlement to what was now an international issue. Mountbatten, however, flew to Lahore alone on November 1, as Nehru, \"haggard and i l l \" was confined to bed by his doctor. Yet the chances of his making such a t r i p even had he not been indisposed were remote, for,as Campbell-Johnson records, \"the Cabinet pressure on Nehru's not going to Lahore was intense.\" 1' 13. Birdwood. Two Nations, p. 6 l . 14. Ibid. 15. Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 22.6. The reason f o r Hari Singh's i n d i s p o s i t i o n i s mentioned neither by Campbell-Johnson nor Menon. - 38 -The meeting, t h e r e f o r e , was between Jinnah and Mountbatten, yet i t only served to r e v e a l the vast powers of the Quaid - I-Azam (Great Leader) and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s imposed upon the Indian Governor General. Jinnah opened the t a l k s w i t h an i r r e s p o n s i b l e charge of fraud and v i o l e n c e , whereupon Mountbatten immediately answered that i f there was any v i o l e n c e i t was on the part of the Pak-istan-sponsored t r i b e s . Campbell-Johnson again notes that, during the course of the. d i s c u s s i o n , Jinnah proposed a sim-ultaneous withdrawal from the s t a t e , and when asked b.y Mount-batten how the tribesmen could be compelled to withdraw, Jinnah r e p o r t e d l y answered, \" I f you do t h i s , I w i l l c a l l the whole t h i n g o f f . - \" 1 ^ The exact i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s statement, how-ever, i s unclear, and i s subject to b i t t e r dispute by both feuding p a r t i e s . Nevertheless, what i s important i s Jinnah's three-point proposal i n c o r p o r a t i n g a c e a s e - f i r e , the mutual withdrawal of a l l \" a l i e n \" f orces and a p l e b i s c i t e . 1. To put an immediate stop to f i g h t i n g , the two Governors-General should be authorized and vested with f u l l powers by both Dominion Governments to issu e a proclamation f o r t h w i t h g i v i n g f o r t y - e i g h t hours n o t i c e to the two opposing f o r c e s to cease f i r e . We have no c o n t r o l over the for c e s of the P r o v i s i o n a l (Azad) Government of Kashmir or the tribesmen engaged i n the f i g h t i n g , but we w i l l warn them i n the c l e a r e s t terms that i f they do not obey the order t o cease - f i r e immediately the forces of both Dominions w i l l make war on them; 2. Both the f o r c e s of Indian Dominion and t r i b e s -men to withdraw simultaneously and w i t h the utmost e x p e d i t i o n from Jammu and Kashmir t e r r i t o r y ; 16. Campbell-Johnson, op., c i t . , . p. ,22.9. - 39 -3. With the s a n c t i o n of the two Dominion Govern-ments, the Governors-General to be given f u l l powers to r e s t o r e peace, undertake the a d m i n i s t r a -t i o n of Jammu and Kashmir S t a t e , and arrange f o r a p l e b i s c i t e without delay under t h e i r j o i n t con-t r o l and supervision.17 S u p e r f i c i a l l y i t i s easy to recognize Mountbatten 1s p o s i t i o n : c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y he was a figurehead - a symbol of r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . Yet i n f a c t he was f a r from a mere symbol, He wielded enormous power throughout the e n t i r e sub-continent, not because of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers, but ra t h e r through hi s tremendous p r e s t i g e and p e r s o n a l i t y . Indeed, he had a l -ready blocked the Indian Defence Committee's e f f o r t s to d i s -patch troops to Srinagar on October 25. Kashmir was gained on Mountbatten's terms, not Nehru's. Then why was he not w i l l i n g to accept Jinnah's proposals, or at l e a s t attempt to modify them? Why was he w i l l i n g to accept a United Nations p l e b i s c i t e , a proposal not even mentioned i n the Defence Committee, yet f e l t obliged to r e j e c t any formal co-operation w i t h Jinnah? Mountbatten, at that time, was p o s s i b l y the only r e s p o n s i b l e leader i n India whom Jinnah t r u s t e d , and by his r e j e c t i o n of Jinnah's moderate p r o p o s a l s , the door to r a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n was c l o s e d . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to envisage the exact motives behind Mountbatten's a c t i o n s , but one can suggest that they were based upon h i s a t t i t u d e towards h i s s p e c i a l r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of Government and upon Nehru's outlook towards the conduct of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y . As events have c l e a r l y 17. WPJK. p. 60. - 4 0 -shown, both before and a f t e r Independence, \" i t was Nehru who breathed l i f e into the foreign a f f a i r s a c t i v i t i e s of the Congress Party, who directed i t s foreign a f f a i r s research and who i n 1936 led the all-India^Congress Committee to create a foreign department.\" 1^ Even at this early stage of Indepen-dence, therefore, Indian foreign policy was the c h i l d of Nehru and the Prime Minister jealously guarded his private realm by holding the Cabinet positions of both Premier and Foreign Minister. Thus i t may be argued that Mountbatten's rebuff to Jinnah's proposals was based upon his genuine b e l i e f , that, while he was prepared to exercise his influence within the committee room, any public show of power, especially i n the realm of foreign a f f a i r s , could seriously damage the close relations between himself and his Prime Minister. The tragedy of the Mountbatten-Jinnah meeting, therefore, i s that there i s ample reason to believe that an immediate solution to the Kashmir dilemma could have been found. Jinnah's proposals were not unreasonable, and did, i n f a c t , closely resemble the many l a t e r resolutions passed by the Security-Council to no a v a i l during the 1948-1953 period: ( l ) a cease-fire; (2) the withdrawal of a l l \" a l i e n \" troops; and (3) an impartial p l e b i s c i t e . Whereas the dispute was pre-sented to the United Nations only a f t e r attitudes had hardened considerably, Jinnah's proposals were for immediate action under the joint sponsorship of both Governors-General. The 18. S.L. Popai and P h i l i p Talbot. India and America, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, n.d., p. 20. - 41 -problem of j o i n t co-operation, e s p e c i a l l y on the m i l i t a r y l e v e l , would have been many, and one's mind immediately turns to the f a i l u r e of the Boundary Forces to safeguard Indian and P a k i s t a n i refugees because of Hindu, Muslim and S i k h communal fren z y . But i t i s the w r i t e r ' s b e l i e f t h a t , given the f u l l support of both governments, the Governors-Genera1, w i t h a l l t h e i r s t a t u r e and i n f l u e n c e , could have reached an amicable settlement before the i s s u e of Kashmir became f i r m l y rooted i n the basic outlooks of both nations. Instead, Mountbatten and the Government of I n d i a , unknowingly chose the path of misery, hardship and needless l o s s of l i f e . (D) B a s i c Misunderstandings The a c t u a l act of a c c e s s i o n was the subject of consider-able correspondence and misunderstanding between India and P a k i s t a n , n e i t h e r Government being f u l l y aware of the other's p o s i t i o n . The e n t i r e a f f a i r was conducted against a back-ground of communal hatred and character a s s a s i n a t i o n , where neither Government had time t o analyse the other's a t t i t u d e s or p o l i c i e s . Hence charges and counter-charges were traded i n an i r r e s p o n s i b l e manner, while proposals were r e j e c t e d by both p a r t i e s f o r reasons seemingly t r i v i a l yet based on mis-understanding on the part of both Governments. The d i s c u s s i o n s between Mountbatten and Jinnah at Lahore only served to i n d i c a t e the wide i d e o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l gap between the two nations. The ensuing correspondence be-tween Liaquat A l i Khan and Nehru c l e a r l y shows that both :• - 4 2 -leaders were approaching the problem from d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . On November 6 , Liaquat A l i wrote to Nehru with reference to Jinnah's proposals: Lord Mountbatten promised to l e t me know your Government's reply to these proposals but we have heard no more about them. Your Government's policy i s vague. I s t i l l ask your Government to l e t me have your reply to our d e f i n i t e proposals.1 9 Nehru, however, replied on the 8 t h , that there had been a \"misunderstanding\" on the part of the Pakistani Prime Minister and restated Mountbatten's e a r l i e r statement to Jinnah that there could be no action by India u n t i l the tribesmen had vacated Kashmir - an attitude which t o t a l l y disregarded the dilemma facing Pakistan. It i s the writer's b e l i e f that when Jinnah stated that his Government had no control over the Pathans he was speak-ing the truth, and when he proposed that both nations take mi l i t a r y action against the t r i b e s , he was o f f e r i n g the only possible method of c o n t r o l l i n g the tribes through joint m i l -i t a r y action. The Indian Army was already f i g h t i n g the Path-ans i n Kashmir and, although the public pressure against Jinnah making such a move would have been tremendous, the entry of the Pakistan Army into the c o n f l i c t would do much to a l l a y the Pakistani fears of an Indian coup In Kashmir. Yet Nehru chose to disregard t h i s plea for co-operation, and offered i n return his own plan: (l ) That the Government of Pakistan should p u b l i c l y 1 9 . MPJK. p. 6 2 . - 43 -undertake to do t h e i r utmost to compel the r a i d e r s to withdraw from Kashmir; (2.) that the Government of India should repeat t h e i r d e c l a r a t i o n that they w i l l withdraw t h e i r troops from Kashmir s o i l as soon as the r a i d e r s have withdrawn and law and order are r e s t o r e d ; and (3) that the Government of India and P a k i s t a n should make a j o i n t request to the United Nations to undertake a p l e b i s c i t e at the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e . 2 0 He had e a r l i e r asked i n a broadcast f o r P a k i s t a n i co-operation, but when Jinnah responded favourably, he then i n s i s t e d on h i s own terms. E i t h e r Nehru genuinely f e l t that the i n c u r s i o n s i n Kash-mir were completely backed by P a k i s t a n and that Jinnah and Liaquat A l i (his c l o s e f r i e n d f o r many years) were out and out l i a r s , or e l s e h i s obsession over events i n the St a t e was so overpowering that he refused to accept any explanation or s o l u t i o n other than h i s own. I n any case, the proposals were framed i n such a manner as t o make t h e i r acceptance by Pak-i s t a n v i r t u a l l y impossible. Furthermore, Nehru was prepared to accept h i s colleague Sheikh Abdullah as spokesman f o r a l l Kashmiris, whereas the \"Lion of Kashmir\" was branded by the P a k i s t a n i Prime M i n i s t e r as a\"paid agent and a Q u i s l i n g . \" Again Nehru proposed United Nations p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p l e b i s c i t e - a p r o p o s i -t i o n already r e j e c t e d by Jinnah. Indeed, the d e s i r e f o r co-operation was non-existent; when Josef K o r b e l , Chairman of the United Nations' Committee f o r India and P a k i s t a n suggested at one point an Indian concession, \"Pandit Nehru 2 0 . WPJK. p. 62. 21. WPJK. p. 67. - 4 4 -reacted vehemently. In a f l a s h of bitterness he leaped onto a chair shouting 'you seem not to understand our pos i t i o n and op our r i g h t s . ' Jinnah, on the other hand, was bargaining from a position of weakness, and therefore many reasons can be presented why he should have attempted to reach an amicable settlement with India. Dominating the minds of the Pakistani leaders was the fact of India's superior economic and mi l i t a r y strength, the international status of her leaders and the close proximity of her armed forces just across the border. The Pakistani leaders f u l l y r e a l ized that P a r t i t i o n and the subsequent cre-ation of Pakistan went against the convictions of every Indian Congressman and hence was only accepted with grave misgivings. Moreover the speeches of Nehru and Patel, and India's action i n withholding the payment of Pakistani assets did l i t t l e to a l l a y Pakistani fears. Suspicion and mistrust of India, then, formed the very basis of Pakistani thought, and when Kashmir acceded to India, Jinnah and his followers f e l t that t h i s action was only the f i r s t step towards the incorporation of Pakistan into the Indian Union. It was thi s fear of India, moreover, which caused Liaquat A l i to write to Nehru It i s a matter for deep regret that even today responsible members of the Government of India, including yourself, openly declare t h e i r intention or hope of bringing Pakistan back into the Indian Union well knowing that this could be done only through conquest of arms...In other words Pakistan's very existence i s the chief casus b e l l i so far as 22. Korbel. op. c i t . , p. 130. - 45 -India i s concerned...India has never accepted the p a r t i t i o n scheme but her leaders paid l i p service to i t merely i n order to get the B r i t i s h troops out of the country...India i s out to destroy the State of Pakistan...The fraudulent procurement of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State / i s an a c t / of h o s t i l i t y against Pakistan whose destruction i s India's immediate objective.23 Nehru immediately rejected this accusation and made the counter-charge that Pakistan's complicity i n Kashmir was an \"act of aggression.\" Nevertheless i t was clear that the old issue of P a r t i t i o n was s t i l l uppermost i n the thinking of both governments. Events i n Kashmir soon reached a m i l i t a r y and diplomatic r impasse, and af t e r the i n i t i a l f a i l u r e to reach a common ground for discussion i t was clear that negotiations would remain deadlocked unless there was a r a d i c a l change i n the attitudes of both p a r t i e s . F r u i t l e s s negotiations continued throughout November, and i t was not u n t i l December 1947, that the two Prime Ministers managed to arrange personal discussions at New Delhi and Lahore. Although the Delhi Conference of December 11, f a i l e d to break the deadlock, i t did succeed i n providing the broad outline required for a possible solution and the basis for the Indian proposals before the Security Council. In essence, the proposals agreed upon i n p r i n c i p l e were: ( l ) that Pakistan should make every e f f o r t to persuade the tribes to withdraw from Kashmir and for the forces of Azad Kashmir to cease f i r e ; (2) that India should withdraw the majority of her forces from Kashmir leaving only a minimum number for the i n t e r n a l security; and (3) that the United Nations should 23. WPJK. pp. 83,85. - 46 -be c a l l e d upon to form a commission to hold an i m p a r t i a l ?4 p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir. Soon a f t e r the D e l h i Conference, however, the Indian p o s i t i o n hardened considerably. Sardar P a t e l and Baldev Singh, having concluded a tour of Kashmir reported t o the Defence Committee that \"large concentrations of invaders, i n c l u d i n g tribesmen were i n the West Punjab;\" that no sooner had Liaquat A l i Khan l e f t D e l h i than he began to encourage new r a i d e r s to invade the s t a t e ; and that theJ'number of a t r o c i t i e s committed by the t r i b e s against non-Muslims showed no signs of decreas-i n g . ^ This r e p o r t , according to Campbell-Johnson, when com-bined w i t h independent i n f o r m a t i o n reaching D e l h i \"hardened the Cabinet's heart against agreeing to the immediate p l e b -i s c i t e . . . o r even, to c o n t i n u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . \" The subsequent meeting between Nehru and Liaquat A l i at Lahore only showed the serious nature of the breach be-tween the two c o u n t i r e s , and i n s p i t e of the e f f o r t s of Mountbatten to r e c o n c i l e the divergent views, the deadlock was complete. Moreover, the Governor-General was now thorough-l y convinced that only the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a t h i r d party could break the dilemma f a c i n g both p a r t i e s . This d i p l o m a t i c deadlock was f u r t h e r complicated by the f a i l u r e of the u n i t s of the Indian Army to make any s u b s t a n t i a l headway i n Kashmir f o l l o w i n g t h e i r i n i t i a l landings at S r i n a g a r . By November 14 they reached Mirpur and s t a b i l i z e d a l i n e 24. Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , pp. 2.50-51. 25. I b i d . , p. -251. 26. TbTa\". - 47 -between Mirpur, K o t l i and Poonch. On November 21 Indian f o r c e s a r r i v e d at Poonch but they could not r e l i e v e the beleaguered S t a t e Forces w i t h i n the c i t y without a f u l l -s c a l e m i l i t a r y o f f e n s i v e i n v o l v i n g some two d i v i s i o n s . F u r t h e r -more, the Indian Army was s u f f e r i n g from over-extended l i n e s of communication and was hampered by the approaching w i n t e r ; w h i l e the f o r c e s of Azad Kashmir were strengthened by the bloodless coup i n G i l g i t and the accession of Swat, D i r and C h i t r a l to P a k i s t a n . Indeed, December was not a good month f o r the Indian Army. Thus by the end of December the deadlock was complete: on the d i p l o m a t i c side there was no ground f o r d i s c u s s i o n ; w h i l e m i l i t a r i l y , events i n Kashmir had reached an impasse. Such was the s i t u a t i o n when India placed her case before the United Nations on January 1, 1948. - 4 8 -CHAPTER FOUR KASHMIR AND THE UNITED NATIONS (A) Debate i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l Unable to r e s o l v e the Kashmir controversy through b i -l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P a k i s t a n , India invoked Chapter V I , A r t i c l e 35 of the United Nations Charter (the P a c i f i c Settlement of Disputes) and lodged a complaint against Pak-i s t a n f o r her c o m p l i c i t y i n the t r i b a l i n v a s i o n of Kashmir. This complaint, reviewing events from September 1947, and. i n c l u d i n g the Maharajah's ac c e s s i o n and Pakistan's r o l e . i n the t r i b a l adventure was set f o r t h i n the f o l l o w i n g charges (1) that the invaders are allowed t r a n s i t across P a k i s t a n t e r r i t o r y ; (2) that they are allowed to use Pa k i s t a n t e r r i -t o r y as a base of operations; (3) that they i n c l u d e P a k i s t a n n a t i o n a l s ; (4) that they draw much of t h e i r m i l i t a r y equip-ment, transport and sup p l i e s ( i n c l u d i n g g a s o l i n e ) from P a k i s t a n ; (5) that P a k i s t a n o f f i c e r s are t r a i n i n g , g u iding and otherwise a c t i v e l y h e l p i n g them.l India asked, t h e r e f o r e , that P a k i s t a n be c a l l e d upon to pre vent her n a t i o n a l s and Government personnel, both c i v i l and m i l i t a r y , from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n events i n Kashmir and t o de the tribesmen (who were a l s o P a k i s t a n n a t i o n a l s ) access t o Pa k i s t a n border areas f o r operations against Kashmir and m i l i t a r y and other s u p p l i e s which would tend to prolong the 1. S/62.8. Jan. 1, 1948. - 4-9 -warfare i n Kashmir. There was no mention of a p l e b i s c i t e or a request for United Nations assistance i n s e t t l i n g the fate of the Kashmiris themselves. 2 Instead of maintaining the i n i t i a t i v e i n the debate, as the injured party, India was soon placed on the defensive as S i r Z a f r u l l a h Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, launched a b i t t e r five-hour speech against India, which climaxed with a charge against India under A r t i c l e 35 of the Charter. Charg-ing India with a breach of international agreements, i n c i t e -ment of revolution, \"numerous attacks on Pakistan t e r r i t o r y , \" and an \"extensive campaign of genocide\" with the object of destroying Pakistan, the Pakistani delegate thus brought the dispute from the narrow confines of Kashmir to a f u l l discus-sion of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . ^ The Pakistan Government motive, undoubtedly, was to bring world attention upon every aspect of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s and thus enable the problem of Kashmir to be discussed i n what i t sincerely believed to be i t s proper perspective. Despite the volume of the Indian and Pakistani presenta-tions to the Security Council, v i r t u a l l y nothing new was added to the debate, as both sides based t h e i r respective cases on the November-December correspondence of the previous year. Pakistan regarded the dispute as i f i t were only an appendage of P a r t i t i o n whereas India attempted to focus world attention 2. S/PV. 227.« Jan. 15, 1948. 3. S/646. Jan. 15, 1948 and S/PV. 227. Jan.15, 1948. - 50 -on the issue per se. Every charge by Ayyengar, the Indian delegate was, however, s k i l l f u l l y transformed by Z a f r u l l a h Khan, and answered i n terms of the problems facing Pakistan at P a r t i t i o n . To the Indian claim that Pakistan had attempt-ed to coerce Kashmir into accession by an economic blockade, Z a f r u l l a h Khan replied that because of the large i n f l u x of refugees into West Punjab because of Sikh a t r o c i t i e s , supplies were i n short demand. Furthermore, he declared, what supplies were available could not be shipped because of India's i n -a b i l i t y to provide the Pakistan railways with coal - another consequence of P a r t i t i o n . The Indian charges of Pathan a t r o c i t i e s , on the other hand, were s k i l l f u l l y avoided by Z a f r u l l a h Khan who charged that the Government of India had openly encouraged the Sikhs and members of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (R.S.S.) to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a programme of 4 genocide against Muslims i n the Punjab. India consistently charged that Pakistan's approach to the dispute was merely a smokescreen to cover her obvious g u i l t , but whether or not t h i s i s a correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Pakistan's motives, i t i s c e r t a i n that the hard-hitting speeches and t a c t i c s of Z a f r u l l a h Khan served to weaken India's p o s i t i o n i n world opinion and rob her of what at f i r s t seemed certa i n support and v i c t o r y . But the Pakistani delegation must not receive f u l l credit for this diplomatic success for they were aided, a l b e i t unknowingly by the Indian delegation's inept 4. S/PV. 22,8 and 229. Jan. 16 and 17, 1948. - 51 -p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t s case. Indeed, Ala n Campbell-Johnson noted that i t had been \"abominably presented.\"^ Moreover, t h e i r s t r a t e g i c e r r o r s were even more damaging: ( l ) they f a i l e d to charge P a k i s t a n as a de f a c t o aggressor and d i f f e r -e n t i a t e d between the t r i b a l invaders and P a k i s t a n n a t i o n a l s , thus l e a v i n g room f o r doubt i n the minds of other delegates; (2.) t h e i r continued r e p e t i t i o n of t h e i r d e s i r e to l e t the Kashmiris determine t h e i r n a t i o n a l d e s t i n y y f ostered. the im-p r e s s i o n that India regarded the Maharajah's a c c e s s i o n as temporary; (3) Ayyengar f a i l e d to convince the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l of the l e g a l i t y of the Maharajah's a c c e s s i o n , even though t h i s formed the ba s i s of India's case; (4) the Ind i a n d e l e g a t i o n , u n l i k e the P a k i s t a n i , f a i l e d to make proper use of the a v a i l a b l e documents; and (5) t h e i r l i m i t e d use of Sheikh Abdullah who was present, and t h e i r f a i l u r e t o emphasize that h i s p a r t y , the N a t i o n a l Conference, consisted p r i m a r i l y of Muslims, f o s t e r e d the b e l i e f that Azad Kashmir was the only t r u e I s l a m i c movement i n Kashmir. Furthermore, the a t t i t u d e of the Indian d e l e g a t i o n which to many observers seemed s e l f -righteous and t h e i r obvious attempts to d i c t a t e terms t o the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a l i e n a t e d many of i t s members.^ Of the many t a c t i c a l e r r o r s made by the Indian d e l e g a t i o n , however, none had such f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences as the f a i l -ure of India to charge P a k i s t a n under Chapter V I I of the Charter (dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h acts of aggression) and 5. Campbell-Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 287. 6. c f . . M.'Brecker. The Struggle f o r Kashmir, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, New YorkJ 1953, pp. 03-66. - 52 -her r e f u s a l to obtain a r u l i n g on the l e g a l i t y of the Maharajah's accession. By doing so, India tiecO the hands of the Security Council and l e f t the way open for the continuation of a d i s -pute which could possibly have been shortened by po s i t i v e United Nations actions and a decision of the International Court. In the. eighteen years of United Nations p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Kashmir Dispute, the attempts of f i v e d i f f e r e n t parties to find peaceful solutions came to naught. Of the many reso l u -tions passed by the Security Council and proposals offered by i t s mediators, only one - a cease-fire - has had any continu-ing e f f e c t . While i t i s true that the Security Council achieved only this limited, a l b e i t important success, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s f a i l u r e must rest solely upon the shoulders of India and Pakistan. Paced with closed minds and fixed attitudes, the Security Council, with a l l i t s potential m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l and. economic might, was powerless against the determination of both nations to y i e l d nothing. From the s t a r t , the Security Council had to function i n an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust, which affected notjonly the p r i n c i p a l contest-ants,- but also the Council i t s e l f . Character assassination by the Pakistani press and government o f f i c i a l s and righteous indignation by their Indian counterparts were commonplace; while neither party improved the po s i t i o n of the Security Council by the constant threat of non-co-operation and \"black - 53 -f l a g \" demonstrations. Irresponsible statements were made by both Indians and Pakistanis that the only solution to the entire issue was the sword. The actions of the Security Council have been only documented up to 1953 by Michael Brecher, and subsequently described ineja more personal narrative up to 1956 by Josef Korbel, a former member of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. What i s s t i l l needed,' however, i s an analysis of subsequent Indian and Pakistani actions insofar as they a f f e c t the present-day status of Kashmir and the rela t i o n s between the two nations. (B) The Creation of the United Nations Commission fo r India and Pakistan ' The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was created by the January 2.0, 1948, Security Council Resolution which called for a commission of three to proceed to Kashmir as quickly as possible to investigate the s i t u a t i o n and exer-c i s e any mediatory influence l i k e l y to smooth away d i f f i c u l t -i e s . There was no mention, however, of the promised reference to the people, the withdrawal of tribesmen or a cease-fire; indeed i t was largely because of t h i s f a i l u r e to include the controversial, yet all-important issues, that i t was accepted by both parties without reservation.^ The sober s p i r i t of the January 20 Resolution was, how-ever, soon smothered under a flood of invective.. On January 22, 7. S/654. Jan. 20, 1948. - 54 -Pakistan won an important victory when the Security Council . changed the agenda from the\"jammu and Kashmir Question\" to the \"India-Pakistan Question,\" while India suffered another set-back when the delegates from the Argentine, Colombia and Syria called on the Council to consider a l l factors p e r t a i n -ing to the India-Pakistan Question - a proposal which proved g to be a major debating victory for Z a f r u l l a h Khan. Both parties had only one common point of agreement -a p l e b i s c i t e ; yet they were diametrically opposed to the mechanics of such an operation. India, r e f l e c t i n g her strong m i l i t a r y , i f not legal p o s i t i o n i n Kashmir, demanded: ( l ) that the f i g h t i n g i n Kashmirccease and a l l Pakistani tribesmen withdraw; (2) that the security of the state must be maintained by Indian troops; (3) that Sheikh Abdullah would be Prime Minister of the interim government; and (4) that a United Nations Commission should supervise and mediate the question of a cease-fire. On the question of a p l e b i s c i t e , India further proposed: ( l ) the e l e c t i o n of a National Government under Sheikh Abdullah; (2) the arrangement of a p l e b i s c i t e by thi s National Govern-ment under the advice and supervision of the United Nations; and (3) the writing of a constitution by the National Assembly. Pakistan, on the other hand, revealing her weak p o s i t i o n i n the dispute, wanted f u l l authority vested i n a United 8. S/PV. 231. Jan. 22, 1948, pp. 1449164. 9. S/PV. 236. Jan. 28, 1948, pp. 266-267. i t a l l i c s . mine. Nations Commission wi t h a mandate to ( l ) e s t a b l i s h an im-p a r t i a l i n t e r i m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( i . e . one without Sheikh Ab-d u l l a h ) ; (2) demand the withdrawal of a l l troops from Kash-mir; (3) seek the r e t u r n of Kashmiri refugees (mostly Mus-l i m s ) ; and (4) arrange f o r an unfettered p l e b i s c i t e . At t h i s p o i n t India made no mention of the for c e s of Azad Kashmir - p o s s i b l y because to do so would weaken her c l a i m that Sheikh Abdullah was the only true r e p r e s e n t a t i v e b'fe progre s s i v e Kashmiri p u b l i c opinion.. Instead, she wanted the p l e b i s c i t e i s s u e to be held over u n t i l the c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s . P a k i s t a n , on the other hand, wi t h c o r r e c t i n -s i g h t , i n s i s t e d that the Azad forces would only cease t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n i f a f a i r p l e b i s c i t e was forthcoming. Indeed, P a k i s t a n feared that once the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n became s t a b i l i z e d , a p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n would f o l l o w thus l e a v i n g India i n c o n t r o l of most of Kashmir. This f a c t o r was to play an important r o l e i n the despatch of r e g u l a r P a k i s t a n i troops i n t o Kashmir i n the s p r i n g of 1948. Although the January 20 R e s o l u t i o n was accepted by both nations p r i m a r i l y because i t was mild and void of controversy, the A p r i l 21 R e s o l u t i o n of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l v i r t u a l l y doomed the UNCIP on the day of i t s b i r t h . Presented a f u l l s i x months a f t e r the i n i t i a l t r o u b l e i n Kashmir, the S e c u r i t y Council's r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d f o r : ( l ) the increase i n theCommi s s i o n from three to f i v e members and i t s immediate despatch to 10. I b i d . - 56 -t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t t o o f f e r i t s good o f f i c e s t o b o t h d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s ; ( 2 ) P a k i s t a n i e f f o r t s t o s e c u r e t h e w i t h d r a w a l of her n a t i o n a l s and t r i b e s m e n t f r o m Kashmir; ( 3 ) t h e p r o g r e s s -i v e w i t h d r a w a l of I n d i a n t r o o p s t o a minimum r e q u i r e d f o r t h e maintenance of i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ; ( 4 ) t h e f o r m a t i o n of a c o a l i t i o n government t o r e p r e s e n t a l l phases of K a s h m i r i o p i n i o n ; and ( 5 ) t h e n o m i n a t i o n of an i m p a r t i a l p l e b i s c i t e a d m i n i s t r a t o r t o conduct b o t h the a f f a i r s of government and a p l e b i s c i t e . 1 1 N e i t h e r I n d i a nor P a k i s t a n was s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e A p r i l 21 R e s o l u t i o n , and b o t h d u l y r e c o r d e d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . The b a s i s o f Ayyengar's c r i t i c i s m was t h e l e g a l i t y o f Kashmir's a c c e s s i o n t o I n d i a , supplemented by the b e l i e f t h a t S h e i k h A b d u l l a h , a s t h e t r u e spokesman of p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n , would have t o be a l l o w e d t o chose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f rom t h e major p o l i t i c a l groups, Any P l e b i s c i t e A d m i n i s t r a t o r , he c l a i m e d , would o n l y usurp t h e l e g a l powers of t h e l e g i t i m a t e Govern-ment of K ashmir, and f u r t h e r m o r e , a \"minimum\" f o r c e w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g domestic law and o r d e r , would be i n s u f f i c i e n t t o check e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n . 1 2 P a k i s t a n ' s a t t i t u d e , on t h e o t h e r hand, was based upon the f e a r t h a t a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l p l e b i s c i t e c o u l d not be conducted under t h e p r e s e n t arrangements. Her d e l e g a t e s i n s i s t e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the f o r c e s o f Azad Kashmir c o u l d o n l y be compelled t o d i s a r m e i t h e r by f o r c e or t h r o u g h a 13. I b i d . , pp. 2047. 14. S 7 8 T 9 . June 3, 1948. - 57 -d e f i n i t e guarantee of an unhampered p l e b i s c i t e . Thus Z a f r u l l a h Khan, who had already obtained strong backing for the Pakistani point of view within the Council, was presenting the p r i n c i p l e s 13 his country was to follow for the next f i v e years. J Despite the Pakistani r e j e c t i o n of the A p r i l 21 Resolution, th e i r case before the United Nations was considerably strength-ened when, on June 3, the Security Council adopted a Syrian-sponsored r e s o l u t i o n d i r e c t i n g the Commission to study Pakistan's charges to genocide, the accession of Junagadh and the P a r t i t i o n 14 Agreements. This, however, was too much for India to accept. She had come before the Security Council i n January as the injured party, and presented her case, a l b e i t i n e f f e c t u a l l y , with every expectation that the Indian viewpoint would be quickly accepted. Instead, she had been denied that victory and found-herself facing charges which she regarded as extremely remote from the central issue of Kashmir. Accordingly, Prime Minister Nehru informed the Security Council that India could not accept the June 3 Resolution and could not promise co-operation with I S the newly-formed Commission. ^ This a t t i t u d e , however, was not r e s t r i c t e d solely to o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s ; a f t e r the Commi-ssion's a r r i v a l i n New Delhi, the New York Times correspondent Robert Trumbull reported: 13. J b i d . , PP. 2.047. 14. B78T9. June 3, 1948. 15. S/825. June 7, 1948. - 58 -The I n d i a n Press has begun to' l a y the groundwork f o r the r e j e c t i o n of any recommendations that the commission may make unless they favor India. 1 6 The Times correspondent, on the other hand, noted .-..in Kashmir i t s e l f Sheikh Abdullah's regime was averse from a l l o w i n g the commission to set foot i n the s t a t e and f e l t that p u b l i c resentment might take the form of b l a c k - f l a g demonstrations.1 7 The,Pakistan p r e s s , not wanting t o be overshadowed by t h e i r I n dian counterparts, a l s o promised s i m i l a r demonstrations and non-co-operation. During i t s f i r s t v i s i t to Karachi i n August 1948 the Commission was informed by Z a f r u l l a h Khan\"that three P a k i s t a n i brigades had been on Kashmir t e r r i t o r y s ince May.\" l o > This not only m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r e d the s i t u a t i o n i n Kashmir and s t r e n g t h -ened the Indian charges of aggression, but a l s o f u r t h e r i n d i -cated Pakistan's f e a r of India's motives. Thus ended the f i r s t phase of S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l p a r t i c i p a -t i o n i n the Kashmir Dispute. I n t h i s atmosphere, the second phase of the Commission:!s a c t i v i t i e s began; yet as one might expect, i t was destined to f a i l . (C) The Second Phase F o l l o w i n g lengthy d i s c u s s i o n s i n Karachi and New D e l h i , the UNCIP presented the f i r s t of many r e s o l u t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the Kashmir question. C o n s i s t i n g of three parts - Cease-Fire, 16. NYT. Aug. 7, '48 17. Times. J u l y 11, '48. 18. K o r b e l . op_. c i t . , p. 121. - 59 -Truce Arrangements and P l e b i s c i t e - the August 13, 1948 R e s o l u t i o n sought t o r e c o n c i l e the a t t i t u d e s of both d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s and hence r e s o l v e the ten-month deadlock. Part Two of t h i s R e s o l u t i o n (Truce Agreements) recognized the presence of P a k i s t a n i troops i n Kashmir as a \" m a t e r i a l change i n the s i t u a t i o n , \" and hence asked P a k i s t a n to w i t h -draw her troops f i r s t . Furthermore, P a k i s t a n was t o attempt to seek the withdrawal of a l l tribesmen and non-resident Pak-i s t a n i n a t i o n a l s from Kashmir, while these evacuated areas would be administered by the l o c a l (Azad) a u t h o r i t i e s under s u r v e i l l a n c e of the Commission. Only a f t e r the above had been completed, and the Commi-s s i o n duly n o t i f i e d , the R e s o l u t i o n continued, would India be required to withdraw the \"bulk of t h e i r f o r c e s . \" Part Three of the R e s o l u t i o n ( P l e b i s c i t e ) c a l l e d upon . both Governments ...to enter i n t o c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h the Commission to determine f a i r and e q u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s whereby /a f r e e and i m p a r t i a l p l e b i s c i t e / w i l l be assured.19 A f t e r much correspondence on phraseology, India accepted J , i - ^ the August 13 R e s o l u t i o n . P a k i s t a n , on the other hand, attached s e v e r a l important c o n d i t i o n s which, i n the words of the Commi-s s i o n , made \"impossible an immediate c e a s e - f i r e and the 19. Govt, of India Information S e r v i c e . U.N. Commission For India and P a k i s t a n ; Documents Connected w i t h the Cease-Fire Proposal of August 13, 1948, Washington, 1948, p. 5 . - 60 -beginning of f r u i t f u l negotiations between the two Governments 20 and the Commission...\" Pakistan's primary concern with the Resolution was the lack of a clear guarantee for a free p l e b i -s c i t e and the p o s s i b i l i t y of de facto p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n following a cease-fire. \" B a s i c a l l y , \" Korbel writes, \"the Commission was i n f u l l agreement with t h i s Pakistan po s i t i o n , but i t s resolution was designed f i r s t to stop h o s t i l i t i e s and l a t e r to negotiate about the d e t a i l s of the p l e b i s c i t e . \" In spite of the Pakistani r e j e c t i o n of the August 13 Resolution, both parties did reach agreement on a Cease-Fire, and at midnight, January 1, 19^9, the guns along the Kashmir front f e l l s i l e n t a f t e r more than one year of undeclared war. Although the ensuing negotiations over truce l i n e demarcation continued for a six-month period, the s p i r i t of the new year was shown i n the UNCIP's January 5, 19^9 Resolution. The January 5 Resolution supplemented the August 13 Resolution and spelled out the exact procedure for the imple-mentation of a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir. It calle d for the nomination of a P l e b i s c i t e Administrator by the Secretary General of the United Nations who would formally be appointed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, i t called for discussions with India over the f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of her troops i n Kashmir as soon as the Commission was s a t i s -f i e d that Part One (Cease-Fire) and Part Two (Truce 20. Ibid . , p. 31. 21. Korbel. op. c i t . , p. 144. 22. Fleet Admiral Chester ¥ Nimitz of the United States was nominated P l e b i s c i t e Administrator by Trygve Lie i n March 1949. - 61 -Arrangements) of the August 13 R e s o l u t i o n had been completed to the Commission's s t a i s f a c t i o n . This R e s o l u t i o n was'accepted by both d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s . Pakistan's acceptance, moreover, implied t a c i t acceptance of the August 13 R e s o l u t i o n which she had p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d . Indeed, t o a l l concerned, i t seemed as i f a new ef.a of co-operation and c o n c i l i a t i o n had been born: agreement was reached on the exchange of p r i s o n e r s of war; both side s were withdrawing t h e i r armed fo r c e s from the S t a t e ; f i n a l cease-f i r e orders were being completed; while arrangements f o r the demarcation l i n e and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a truc e supervisory team were being prepared. The Commission resumed ne g o t i a t i o n s i n February a f t e r spending a lengthy period at Geneva. At the f i r s t meeting Z a f r u l l a h Khan stated \"that considerable progress had already been made i n the withdrawal of tribesmenjand / n o n - r e s i d e n t / P a k i s t a n n a t i o n a l s . \" He \"believed that by the middle of /February/\"... the o b l i g a t i o n of the P a k i s t a n Government... would, have been f u l f u l l e d . \" 2 ^ Furthermore, both Khan and h i s Indian counterpart, S i r G i r j a B a j p a i , pointed out the nec e s s i t y of d e f i n i n g the terms \" l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s \" and \" s u r v e i l l a n c e \" i n order to reach a s a t i s f a c t o r y settlement. Then B a j p a i dropped h i s bomb. He demanded \"the disbanding and disarming on a l a r g e s c a l e of the Azad Forces as an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n 23. S.C.O.R. 4 t h Year. Spec. Supp. No. 7. Annex 47, P. 2.9. - 62 -24 to be f u l f i l l e d before any p l e b i s c i t e could be held. Thus i n a word, the c o r d i a l atmosphere was shattered. Pakistani fears of India immediately rose as Z a f r u l l a h Khan questioned India's good f a i t h . Negotiations immediately came to a dead-lock which has never been resolved. Yet,.in f a c t , India's demand only r e f l e c t e d i t s attitude towards the entire Kashmir issue. Both parties were able to obtain a cease-fire i n Kash-mir as a matter of p o l i t i c a l or economic expediency, but t h e i r basic outlooks towards Kashmir, as w i l l be shown i n the follow-ing chapter, remained unchanged. i 24. Ibid. - 63 -CHAPTER FIVE INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE COMMISSION (A) The Indian P o s i t i o n The Government of India's a t t i t u d e towards the e n t i r e Kashmir is s u e was, and i s s t i l l , based upon the premise that the a c c e s s i o n of the Maharajah to India was l e g a l and that P a k i s t a n i a c t i v i t i e s i n the disputed t e r r i t o r i e s c o n s t i t u t e d an act of aggression against I n d i a . This a t t i t u d e became a l l the f i r m e r a f t e r the open admission by P a k i s t a n i n August 1948 of the presence of her troops i n Kashmir. Furthermore, India has always claimed that since P a k i s t a n was the aggressor, she had no r i g h t t o be treated as an equal party to the dispute. The b a s i s of the Indian a t t i t u d e was, t h e r e f o r e , that she was i n Kashmir as a matter of r i g h t , and that P a k i s t a n , on the c o n t r a r y , had no locus s t a n d i i n the matter. From the f a c t of a c c e s s i o n , moreover, flowed the Indian c l a i m that she was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s e c u r i t y and a d m i n i s t r a -t i o n of the e n t i r e State and that any p l a n to withdraw forces from Kashmir must, t h e r e f o r e , take i n t o account the s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of I n d i a . This basic a t t i t u d e was to determine the Indian Govern-ment's approach to every Commission prop o s a l , suggestion or r e s o l u t i o n . I f the a t t i t u d e of the Commission coincided w i t h I n d i a ' s , then Nehru and h i s colleagues would give t h e i r whole-- 64 -hearted support. If not, then the Government was only too w i l l i n g to offer incompatible amendments or i t s unqualified r e j e c t i o n . Thus the Commission was not only hampered by this i n -transigent attitude but was also placed i n the unenviable p o s i t i o n of attempting to reconcile the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . ( l ) Troop Withdrawal The Indian attitude towards the withdrawal of troops following the cease-fire and the demarcation of the truce l i n e was based upon the b e l i e f that Pakistan, as the aggressor, could not be accorded the status of an equal. Accordingly, India claimed that any discussion pertaining to her own with-drawal - timing, size and stages - was s t r i c t l y a matter be-tween herself and the Commission. Her \"Pakistan has no locus - standi\" theory was supported by the Commission which declared that the August 13 Resolution \"does not suggest that Pakistan should be e n t i t l e d to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultation envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of with-drawal of Indian troops.\"\"1' Nevertheless, the Commission's proposals of A p r i l 15th and 28th, 1949, were rejected by India on the grounds that there was no mention of the disbanding and p disarming of Azad Kashmir forces. Furthermore, India rejected any suggestion of international a r b i t r a t i o n . 1. S/1196. Jan. 10, 1949. 2. S/1430. Dec. 9, 1949. - 65 -( 2 . ) Azad Kashmir The work of the Commission was further hampered by the presence of a large number of well-trained and equipped forces of Azad Kashmir, as well as by the r e f u s a l of Pakistan to admit that she exerted any p o l i t i c a l control over the Azad-controlled areas. In order to circumvent th i s problem Prime Minister Nehru sought reassurance from the Commission that the August 13 Resolution \"should not be interpreted... so as to afford any recognition of the so-called 'Azad.Kashmir Government',\" and that\"Pakistan should have no part i n the organization and con-duct of the p l e b i s c i t e or i n any other matter of i n t e r n a l administration i n the state.\" In reply, the Commission chair-man, Josef Korbel, stated that the Indian p o s i t i o n \"coincides with /the Commission's/ own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . \" ^ The August 13 Resolution, while admitting that the presence of Pakistani troops i n Kashmir represented a material change i n Kashmiri s i t u a t i o n (to India's s a t i s f a c t i o n ) , f a i l e d to take into account some thirty-two battalions of Azad Kashmir forces which Pakistan was creating as a possible replacement for her army. Indeed, while Pakistan refused to associate her-s e l f with the forces of Azad Kashmir, arguing that they were an e n t i r e l y separate entity, the Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan could remark: . During the nine months that have elapsed since the 3. Govt of India Information Service. Documents, pp. 7-8. - 66 -Cease-Fire i n Kashmir, and Azad Kashmir Government has reorganized i t s f o r c e s and now they are one hundred times b e t t e r than what they were when they had f i r s t r i s e n i n arms against the Dogra rul e . 4 A c c o r d i n g l y , India proposed during the d i s c u s s i o n s f o l l o w i n g the January 5, 1949 R e s o l u t i o n which gave r i s e to the cease-f i r e , that p r i o r to any withdrawal of her f o r c e s , the f o r c e s of Azad Kashmir must be disbanded and disarmed. In making t h i s p r o p o s a l , India r e l i e d l a r g e l y on the assurance given her by the Commission that \" l a r g e s c a l e disbanding and d i s -arming of Azad Forces\" uwould take place, as a c o n d i t i o n pre-cedent to any p l e b i s c i t e . P a k i s t a n , on the other hand, refused to accept the I n d i a n p o s i t i o n , and during the ensuing deadlock, India r e j e c t e d a l l proposals ( A p r i l 15 and 28, 1949) i n c l u d i n g the Commission's recommendation to submit Part Two (Truce Agreements) of the August 13 R e s o l u t i o n to a r b i t r a t i o n . (3) Northern Areas C l o s e l y r e l a t e d w i t h India's a t t i t u d e towards troop w i t h -drawals was her view of the status of the Northern Areas of Kashmir. Although t h i s r e g i o n had been spared the misery of war, India claimed that because i t was part of pre-accession Kashmir, i t was now under her sovereignty.^ A c c o r d i n g l y i n a l e t t e r to the Commission, Nehru wrote that a f t e r P a k i s t a n r e g u l a r s and i r r e g u l a r s had withdrawn from the t e r r i t o r y \"the r e s p o n s i l i l i t y of /this area/ should r e v e r t to the Government 4. P a k i s t a n Times (Lahore). Oct. 11, '4'9. c i t e d i n Brecher. op. c i t . , p. T02. 5. S/119oT Annex 4. 6. A curious exception, however, was made of the Muslim s t a t e of G i l g i t . - 67 -of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us.\" 7 The Commi-ssion, while ignoring the Northern Area because i t was outside the scope of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s , did recognize that \"the questions raised i n /Nehru's/ l e t t e r could be considered i n o the implementation of the ^ X u g u s t 137 Resolution.\" Despite the Commission's vague acceptance of the above, thi s became the rock upon which a l l e f f o r t s to secure troop withdrawals foundered. In an attempt to seek a compromise solution and hence open the way towards the implementation of Part Three (Plebiscite) of the August 13 Resolution, the Commission suggested that \"evacuated t e r r i t o r y \" meant only that t e r r i t o r y formerly under control of the Pakistan army and did not include that t e r r i t o r y where only l o c a l people ( i . e . Azad Kashmir) were f i g h t i n g the forces of India or Kash-mir. The Northern Areas came within this category. Further-more, the Commission suggested that the entry of Indian troops into t h i s area would be faced with the l i k e l i h o o d of l o c a l opposition.^ This proposal not only strengthened the Pakistan p o s i t i o n by de facto recognition of the true m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n within Kashmir, but also fostered the b e l i e f shared by many, that there were c e r t a i n sections of the Kashmiri population who were unwilling to be \"liberated\" by Indian troops. Given the attitude of the Indian Government, acceptance of the above would amount to' a wholesale r e j e c t i o n of her 7. S/1100. Nov. 2 2 , 19^8, p. 35. 8 . Ibid. 9. STTOO. Add. 1. Annex 35. Dec. 9, 19^9. - 68 -\"Pakistan has no locus standi\" theory, and therefore, rejected both the August 30, 1949 proposal c a l l i n g for a r b i t r a t i o n and the August 31 Truman-Atlee appeal to both parties c a l l i n g for acceptance of this suggestion. To the proposal of a r b i t r a t i o n , India could \"only express surprise and disappointment at the attitude of the Commission \"as i t was forgetting the moral ^ aspect of the entire c o n f l i c t . \" 1 0 This statement, i n f a c t , aptly summarized, the Indian attitude towards the Security Council and the reason for her steadfast r e f u s a l to a l t e r her outlook towards the entire issue. (B) The Pakistan Position The p o s i t i o n taken by Pakistan towards Kashmir struck at the very roots of the Indian claim. Whereas India consistently maintained that the l e g a l i t y of the Maharajah's accession and India's sovereignty over Kashmir were beyond question, Pakistan vigorously denied this assumption and based her attitude on f i v e basic arguments. ( l ) The S t a n d s t i l l Agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan debarred' the Maharajah from undertaking any agreement with India. (2) The Maharajah had no competence to sign the Instrument of Accession with India since he had been overthrown by his people and compelled (on advice from V.P. Menon) to f l e e Srinagar for his l i f e . (3) The accession, under these circumstances, was brought about by fraud and violence. (4) The conditional accession of Kashmir was u l t r a vires of the Indian constitution, and hence void. (5) The 10. Ibid., Annex 47. - 69 -creation of Azad Kashmir was spontaneous and indigenous. Prom these arguments i t can be seen that there was no common ground between the two disputing p a r t i e s . From them also comes the basic assumption of equality with India. On a l l matters per-tai n i n g to Kashmir - cease-fire, truce and the plebiscite. -Pakistan demanded an equal voice. While steadfastly maintaining this attitude throughout the f r u i t l e s s years of negotiation, Pakistan has been w i l l i n g to adopt a. f a r more f l e x i b l e approach towards the issue of Kashmir than has India. Conscious of her weak p o s i t i o n , the Government of Pakistan has accepted the p r i n c i p l e of compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , while the proposals of S i r Robert Menzies at the 1951 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, suggesting the use of Commonwealth troops i n Kashmir, also found favour i n Karachi. India, on a l l occasions rejected such proposals. (l) Troop Withdrawals Part Two (Truce Agreements) of the August 13 Resolution stated As the presence of troops of Pakistan i n the t e r r i -tory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change i n the situation...the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw i t s troops from that state.11 Only when thi s was completed, the Resolution continued, would the Government of India \"begin to withdraw the bulk of t h e i r 1? forces.\" This, of course, was not i n accordance with , 11. Gov't of India Information Service. Documents, p. 5 . 12. Ibid. - 70 -Pakistan's theory of \" e q u a l i t y \" w i t h I n d i a , and i n a memoran-dum to the Commission r e j e c t i n g the R e s o l u t i o n , Z a f r u l l a h Khan attempted to j u s t i f y the P a k i s t a n i p o s i t i o n : While the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l was s t i l l engaged on the c o n s i d e r a t i o n . o f the Kashmir case, India was stead-i l y b u i l d i n g up i t s Armed Forces i n Jammu and Kash mir...The Indian Army mounted a b i g o f f e n s i v e i n the beginning of A p r i l , thereby causing a m a t e r i a l change i n the s i t u a t i o n . This o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n has continued, ./xtfith/the p u b l i c a l l y declared i n t e n t i o n .../of securing/a m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n i n Jammu and Kashmir, thuspresenting the United Nations Commi-s s i o n /and Pakistan/ 7\" w i t h a f a i t accompli. This s i t u a t i o n not only put i n jeopardy the e n t i r e popula-t i o n of the areas under the Azad Kashmir Government, and led to a b i g i n f l u x of refugees i n t o P a k i s t a n , but a l s o c o n s t i t u t e d a d i r e c t threat to P a k i s t a n security.13 As an a l t e r n a t i v e proposal, and i n keeping w i t h Pakistan's i n s i s t e n c e upon e q u a l i t y , Z a f r u l l a h Khan suggested\"a synchron-ized and simultaneous withdrawal of /both/ - the P a k i s t a n Forces „ili and the bulk of the Indian Forces from the s t a t e . T h i s , however, was r e j e c t e d by the Commission. The f l e x i b i l i t y of Pakistan's a t t i t u d e was shown when she accepted the December 11, 1948 proposals l e a d i n g to the January 5* 1949 R e s o l u t i o n which supplemented Part Three ( P l e b i s c i t e ) of the August 13 R e s o l u t i o n and included arrange-ments f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . Although t h i s move implied t a c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of the r e j e c t e d August R e s o l u t i o n , the circum-stances surrounding such a c t i o n s cannot be overlooked: ( l ) the death of Jinnah on September 11, 1948 may have caused widespread concern f o r the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the n a t i o n ; 13. I b i d . , pp. 13-14 ( i t a l l i c s mine). 14. I b i d . , p. 16. - 71 -(2) the m i l i t a r y operations i n Kashmir and i t s accompanying economic war with India, were draining the limited resources of the country; and (3) the Pakistanis were probably im-pressed with the r a p i d i t y with which the Indian Army subdued Hyderabad and with the strength of the Indian contingents i n Kashmir during the same month. Thus, i t i s suggested, Pak-is t a n chose to accept the January 5 Resolution not through any change i n p o l i c y , but rather because the events of Sept-ember to November warranted such action. The acceptance of the December 22,, 1949 McNaughton Proposals (which w i l l be discussed i n the following chapter), moreover, indicated that there had been no basic change i n Pakistan's desire for equal-i t y with India on a l l fronts. (2) Azad Kashmir The Pakistan attitude towards Azad Kashmir was, as one might expect, exactly opposite to that of India, and hence a l l attempts of the Commission to deal with matters pertaining to the Azad Government or i t s Armed Forces were blocked by the wide abyss which separated the two disputing p a r t i e s . Whereas India refused to recognize the presence of an independent Azad Kashmir Government within t e r r i t o r y she con-sidered r i g h t f u l l y hers, Pakistan adopted a curious \"double-standard\" p o l i c y . While admitting that \"the Pakistan Army i s at present /August, 1948/ responsible for the o v e r - a l l command ...of Azad Kashmir forces,\" 1-^ the Pakistan Government stead-15. Ibid., p. 19. - 72 -f a s t l y maintained throughout the l i f e of the Commission that \" p o l i t i c a l control over the Azad Kashmir Forces vests i n the Azad Kashmir Government, and i t i s the l a t t e r Government alone that has authority to issue a cease-fire order to those forces, and to conclude terms, and conditions of a truce which would he binding on those forces.\"-^ Although the Pakistan Govern-ment offered i t s \"good o f f i c e s \" to the Commission, this view e f f e c t i v e l y strengthened Pakistan's position by providing an e f f e c t i v e wedge between India, which wanted Pakistan condemned and ejected from Kashmir, and the Commission, which wanted to find an amicable solution to the entire a f f a i r . This attitude towards Azad Kashmir, moreover, became an e f f e c t i v e and f l e x i b l e lever i n Pakistan's r e l a t i o n s with the Commission. Indeed, she could withdraw her troops from Kash-mir f u l l y r e a l i z i n g that the m i l i t a r y vacuum would immediately be f i l l e d by some thirty-two battalions of the Azad- Kashmir army. The f l e x i b i l i t y of this double-standard p o l i c y was shown on at least two occasions: ( l ) when Pakistan wanted a cease-fire, there was no recorded Azad opposition; ( 2 ) when India demanded i n the proposals leading to the A p r i l Resolutions the disarmament and disbandment of these forces, Pakistan could demand that similar action be taken against the Kashmir State Forces. Indeed, so e f f e c t i v e was Pakistan's use of Azad Kashmir, that the Commission, i n i t s search for a solution, was 16. Ibid., p. 23. - 73 -v i r t u a l l y forced to extend de facto recognition to Pakistan's legitimate claims, thereby removing any hope of c o n c i l i a t i o n with India. (3) Northern Areas The attitude of Pakistan towards the Northern Areas was again the opposite of India's; consequently any attempt by the Commission to break the deadlock only met with f r u s t r a t i o n and disappointment. Thus on a l l points - troop withdrawal, Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas - the Pakistan attitude was diametrically opposed to that of India. There was no meeting of minds be-tween the parties, no question of c o n c i l i a t i o n and no desire for settlement except on t h e i r own terms. The shooting ©war was over but the war of words continued unabated; i t i s thus not surprising that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan found i t impossible to bridge the wide abyss separating the two Governments.' - 74 -C H A P T E R S I X M c N A U G H T O N P R O P O S A L S , D I X O N R E P O R T A N D G R A H A M M I S S I O N S T h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e U N C I P , w h i l e a d m i t t i n g l i m i t e d s u c c e s s , c o u l d n o t o p e n l y s t a t e t h a t t h e i s s u e o f K a s h m i r h a d d e t e r i o r -a t e d b e y o n d t h e p o i n t o f p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . \" ' ' T h e y t h e r e f o r e s u g g e s t e d i n t h e i r f i n a l r e p o r t o n A u g u s t 13, 1949, t h a t a f r e s h a p p r o a c h b e m a d e b y r e p l a c i n g t h e C o m m i s s i o n w i t h a s i n g l e m e d i a t o r i n t h e h o p e t h a t t h e y e a r - l o n g d e a d l o c k o v e r d e m i l i t a r -i z a t i o n c o u l d b e r e s o l v e d . ( A ) T h e M c N a u g h t o n P r o p o s a l s O n D e c e m b e r 17, 1949, t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a p p o i n t e d i t s P r e s i d e n t , G e n e r a l A . G . L . M c N a u g h t o n t o t h e p o s t o f \" I n f o r m a l M e d i a t o r , \" w i t h a m a n d a t e t o d i s c u s s t h e p r o b l e m s o f d e m i l i t a r -i z a t i o n i n f o r m a l l y w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f I n d i a a n d P a k -i s t a n . F i v e d a y s l a t e r , h e p r e s e n t e d t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w i t h a p l a n , b a s e d l a r g e l y u p o n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e C o m m i -s s i o n c a l l i n g f o r (1) t h e p r o g r e s s i v e w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e r e g u l a r f o r c e s o f I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n f r o m K a s h m i r ; ( 2 ) t h e d i s b a n d i n g a n d d i s a r m i n g o f A z a d K a s h m i r s t a t e f o r c e s ; a n d (3) t h e a d m i n i -s t r a t i o n o f t h e N o r t h e r n A r e a s b y e x i s t i n g l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s u n d e r t h e . s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . H e a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e C o m m i s s i o n s h o u l d b e r e p l a c e d b y a s i n g l e m e d i a t o r p w i t h w i d e p o w e r s t o c a r r y o u t t h e C o u n c i l ' s d e c i s i o n s . 1 . A m i n o r i t y r e p o r t w a s p r e s e n t e d b y t h e d e l e g a t e o f C o m m u n -i s t C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w h i c h c h a r g e d t h a t B r i t a i n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w e r e u s i n g t h e S t a t e a s a n i n s t r u m e n t i n t h e C o l d W a r . 2. S / 1 4 5 3 . F e b . 6, 1 9 5 0 . - 75 -Pakistan accepted the McNaughton Proposals with only minor verbal reservations. India, i n e f f e c t , rejected them when she proposed two wide amendments - the disbanding and disarming of Azad Eorces and Indian control over the North-ern Areas.^ Once again the Council was subjected to the lengthy speeches of the Indian and Pakistani representatives where \"Recriminations were repeated... new accusations were exchanged, and the atmosphere was heavy with bitterness and h o s t i l i t y . \" ^ After both parties had re i t e r a t e d t h e i r basic p o l i c i e s towards Kashmir, a Pour-Power (United Kingdom, United States, Cuba and Norway)-was presented c a l l i n g upon both countries to prepare and execute within a period of f i v e months...a programme of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n on the basis of...General McNaughton's proposal or of such modifications of those p r i n c i p l e s as may be mutually agreed. Furthermore, the r e s o l u t i o n called for the appointment of a single mediator to a s s i s t i n the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n ...and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n /and to/. ..place before these Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, i n his opinion, are l i k e l y to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute.5 This r e s o l u t i o n was accepted on March 14, 1950 by a vote of 8 to 0, with India and Yugoslavia abstaining and the Soviet 3. 4. 5. S/PV. 470. March 14, 1950, pp. 3-4. Korbel, op_. c i t . , p. 166. S/1469. March 14, 1950. - 76 -Union absent. Pakistan immediately registered her unqualif-ied approval. India, as was expected, opposed the re s o l u t i o n and on March 14, S i r Benegal Rau informed the Security Council that while India accepted the replacement of the Commission by a single mediator, she rejected the McNaughton proposals upon which the Resolution was based. Thus by inference, India rejected the March 14 Resolution. On A p r i l 14, however, the Security Council appointed S i r Owen Dixon, the Australian diplomat and j u r i s t , as the United Nations Mediator. (B) The Dixon Mission Given the attitude of India towards the McNaughton Proposals, S i r Owen Dixon's mission to the sub-continent was doomed before he ar r i v e d , and although a f t e r his a r r i v a l on May 27, 1950 to implement the March 14 Resolution he made an extensive tour of Kashmir, convened a conference of Prime Ministers i n New Delhi, and tr a v e l l e d continuously between Karachi and New Delhi, a l l his ef f o r t s came to naught. Unlike his predecessors, S i r Owen made the f i r s t f o r t h -right c r i t i c i s m of the Pakistani case, when at the New Delhi Prime Ministers' Conference, he declared ...without going into the causes or reasons why i t happened...I was prepared to adopt the view that when the f r o n t i e r of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed...by h o s t i l e elements, i t was contrary to international law, and that when, i n May 1948, ...units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the t e r r i t o r y of the state, that too was inc o n s i s t -ent with 'international law.6 6. S/1791. Sept. 15, 1950. - 77 -( 1 ) D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n S i n c e P a k i s t a n h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e \" o r i g i n a l s i n \" S i r O w e n p r o p o s e d i n h i s p l a n f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n ( l ) t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f P a k i s t a n t r o o p s f r o m K a s h m i r f i r s t ; (2) t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f I n d i a n t r o o p s ; a n d (3) t h e d i s b a n d -m e n t a n d d i s a r m a m e n t o f t h e A z a d K a s h m i r a n d K a s h m i r S t a t e F o r c e s . P a k i s t a n a c c e p t e d t h e s e p r o p o s a l s , b u t a s w a s e x p e c t -e d , I n d i a r e j e c t e d t h e m b a s i n g h e r c l a i m o n t h e l a c k o f P a k -i s t a n i g o o d - f a i t h , a n d o n t h e p l e a t h a t i n a n y c a s e , o n l y t h e K a s h m i r G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d o r d e r a n y c h a n g e i n t h e s t a t u s o f 7 i t s a r m e d f o r c e s . 1 (2) A z a d K a s h m i r I n a n a t t e m p t t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m o f A z a d K a s h m i r , S i r O w e n , s u g g e s t e d ( a s h a d h i s p r e d e c e s s o r , t h e U . N . C o m m i s s i o n ) t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h i s a r e a b e e n t r u s t e d t o l o c a l m a g i s t r a t e s w h o w o u l d i n t u r n b e s u p e r v i s e d b y U n i t e d N a t i o n s o f f i c i a l s . T o e n s u r e c o m p l e t e f r e e d o m f o r t h o s e u n d e r S h e i k h A b d u l l a h ' s r u l e , h e p r o p o s e d t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f U n i t e d N a t i o n s s u p e r v i s o r s w i t h w i d e s p r e a d p o w e r s w h i c h i n c l u d e d o b s e r v a t i o n , i n s p e c t i o n , r e m o n s t r a n c e a n d r e p o r t . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o a r r e s t s w e r e t o b e m a d e w i t h o u t t h e w r i t t e n a p p r o v a l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o f f i c e r . A g a i n , a s m u s t h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d , I n d i a r e j e c t e d t h e p r o p o s a l s o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t P a k i s t a n w a s b e i n g o t r e a t e d a s a n e q u a l . 7. I b i d . 8 . T B T c T . - 77 -(1) D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n Since P a k i s t a n had committed the \" o r i g i n a l s i n \" S i r Owen proposed i n h i s p l a n f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n ( l ) the withdrawal of P a k i s t a n troops from Kashmir f i r s t ; (2) the withdrawal of'-, Indian troops; and (3) the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir and Kashmir State Forces. P a k i s t a n accepted these proposals, but as was expected, India r e j e c t e d them basing her c l a i m on the l a c k of P a k i s t a n i g o o d - f a i t h , and on the plea that i n any case, 'only the Kashmir Government could order any change i n the status of i t s armed f o r c e s . (2) Azad Kashmir In an attempt to solve the problem of Azad Kashmir, S i r Owen suggested (as had h i s predecessor, the UI'N. Commission) that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h i s area be entrusted t o l o c a l magistrates who would i n t u r n be supervised by United Nations o f f i c i a l s . To ensure complete freedom f o r those under Sheikh Abdullah's r u l e , he proposed the appointment of United.Nations supervisors with widespread powers which included observation, i n s p e c t i o n , remonstrance and r e p o r t . Furthermore, no a r r e s t s were to be made without the w r i t t e n approval of the United Nations o f f i c e r . Again, as must have been expected, India r e j e c t e d the proposals on the grounds that P a k i s t a n was being o treated as an equal. 7. i b i d . 8. i b i d . - 78 -(3) N o r t h e r n A r e a s T o S i r O w e n ' s p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e N o r t h e r n A r e a s b e c o n d u c t e d b y P o l i t i c a l A g e n t s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , I n d i a i n r e p l y c h a r g e d t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n ' . ' , o f t h i s p l a n w o u l d i m p l y a c c e p t a n c e o f P a k i s t a n ' s r i g h t t o b e i n t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e s t a t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n -m e n t m a i n t a i n e d t h a t i t m u s t h a v e t h e r i g h t t o s t a t i o n g a r r i -s o n s i n t h e N o r t h e r n A r e a s f o r i t s d e f e n c e . T h u s a l l a t t e m p t s b y S i r O w e n t o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m o f d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n a s a n n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e t o a p l e b i s c i t e c a m e t o n a u g h t . I n a n a t t e m p t t o k e e p n e g o t i a t i o n s o p e n , h o w e v e r , h e s u g g e s t e d t h r e e p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h i f a d o p t e d , w o u l d b y - p a s s t h e t h o r n y p r o b l e m o f d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . F i r s t , h e p r o p o s e d t h a t a s i n g l e g o v e r n m e n t b e f o r m e d f o r t h e p e r i o d o f t h e p l e b i s c i t e - a c o a l i t i o n , .:. n o n - p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h i t s c h a i r m a n a p p o i n t e d b y t h e U . N . o r w i t h a n e x e c u t i v e c o n s i s t i n g o f U . N . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . A l t h o u g h S i r O w e n d o e s n o t r e c o r d i t , t h e P a k i s t a n r e a c t i o n w a s p r e s u m a b l y f a v o u r a b l e , w h e r e a s I n d i a ' s r e p l y w a s n e g a t i v e . I n h i s s e c o n d a t t e m p t t o r e a c h a s o l u t i o n , S i r O w e n s u g g e s t e d a p l e b i s c i t e c o n d u c t e d r e g i o n b y r e g i o n o r t h e a l l o c a t i n g t o e i t h e r c o u n t r y o f t h o s e r e g i o n s w h i c h w o u l d u n q u e s t i o n a b l y v o t e f o r I n d i a o r P a k i s t a n , t h u s l i m i t i n g t h e P l e b i s c i t e t o t h e V a l e o f K a s h m i r . I n h i s r e j e c t i o n n o t e , t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f P a k i s t a n n o t e d t h a t I n d i a w a s c o m m i t t e d t o a - 79 -state-wide p l e b i s c i t e . India, on the other hand, while accept-ing such a proposal, claimed t e r r i t o r y , which according to S i r Owen \"appeared...to go much beyond what according to my concep-t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n was reasonable.\"9 For his t h i r d and f i n a l proposal, S i r Owen suggested the p a r t i t i o n of the state along r e l i g i o u s lines with a p l e b i s c i t e i n the demilitarized Valley under the administration of the United Nations. This was rejected by both India and Pakistan. Having exhausted a l l possible means of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , S i r Owen reported the f a i l u r e of his mission to the Security Council. In the end, I became convinced that India's agree-ment would never be obtained to d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i n any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the p l e b i s c i t e of any such character, as would i n my opinion permit the p l e b i s c i t e being conducted i n conditions s u f f i c i e n t l y guarding against intimidation, and fairness of the p l e b i s c i t e might be imperiled.10 Furthermore, he concluded There i s I believe on the side of India a conception of what ought to be done to ascertain the r e a l w i l l of the people which i s not that t a c i t l y assumed by me. Doubtless i t i s a conception which Pakistan does not share.H (C) The Graham Mission In his e f f o r t s to break the deadlock over the mechanics of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , S i r Owen Dixon made proposals that went d i r e c t l y to the roots of the problem. When his e f f o r t s came 09. Ibid., p. 19. 10. Ibid., p. 16. 11. Ibid., p. 2.6. - 80 -to naught, he placed the blame for his f a i l u r e where he thought i t belonged, and returned the entire issue to the United Nations. Whereas S i r Owen could p u b l i c l y admit f a i l u r e , the Security Council could not, for to do so would undermine the sagging prestige and limited authority of the world organization. ' Con-sequently, i n an attempt to resolve the two-year deadlock, an Anglo-American resolution was introduced on February 21, 1951, thus breaking the five-month United Nations silence. This proposal, and a modified version introduced on March 21, while affirming the Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, called for the appointment of another United Nations representa-t i v e who, af t e r three-months of consultation with both govern-ments would report to the Council a l l points outstanding be-tween the t\\\\ro disputing p a r t i e s . In case of f a i l u r e , the reso l u t i o n continued, both parties would be called upon to accept a r b i t r a t i o n of outstanding differences. This was accepted on March 30, 1951, by a Security Council vote of 8-0 with India, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. abstaining. Pakistan accepted t h i s r e s o l u t i o n without q u a l i f i c a t i o n primarily on the grounds that It condemned the convening of a Constituent Assembly i n Indian Kashmir and recognized her long-held view that outstanding differences should be settled by compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n . India, on the other hand, rejected the r e s o l u t i o n p r i n c i p a l l y on the grounds that she could not allow the fate of Kashmir to be decided by a thi r d person. 12. S/2017/Rev. 1. March 21, 1950. - 81 -Furthermore, at a press conference, Nehru b i t t e r l y declared /The United S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n / have complete-l y l o s t the c a p a c i t y to t h i n k and judge anything... No o r g a n i z a t i o n and no country has any business t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h what i s done i n Kashmir by India or the Kashmir people...So f a r as we are concerned, we w i l l t o l e r a t e no nonsense about Kashmir come what may...The whole t h i n g i s f a n t a s t i c nonsense.13 One month l a t e r , Dr. Frank P. Graham was chosen United Nations Representative. A d i s t i n g u i s h e d American mediator and former member of the United Nations Indonesian Commission, Dr. Graham i n h e r i t e d the same problems as h i s predecessors -the immediate r e j e c t i o n of h i s terms of r e f e r e n c e . Upon h i s a r r i v a l i n the sub-continent, Dr. Graham was faced with an atmosphere of w a r - l i k e t e n s i o n . Troops were h e a v i l y concentrated i n East and West Punjab, Karachi p r a c t i s e d a i r - r a i d d r i l l s and b l a c k o u t s , while the economic war between the two c o u n t r i e s continued unabated. In February, the World Muslim Conference met i n Karachi and urged a l l Muslim nations to support the people of Kashmir \"whose t i e s w i t h the people of P a k i s t a n no power on earth can break. The P a k i s t a n i p r e s s , led by Dawn, c a l l e d f o r a holy war of l i b e r a t i o n , while the Grand M u f t i of Jerusalem, known f o r h i s infamous r o l e during World War Two and during the P a l e s t i n e t r o u b l e s , v i s i t e d Azad Kashmir i n March 1951 and c a l l e d f o r a j i h a d . The Indian a t t i t u d e , on the other hand, remained h o s t i l e 13* The Hindu (Madras). June 12, 1951.• c i t e d i n K o r b e l . op. c i t T 7 P. 182. 14. . Times. Feb. 15, '51. - 82 -and unyielding. The Times of India, commenting upon alleged v i o l a t i o n s of the cease-fire l i n e declared i n unrestrained words: If Karachi believes that by such t a c t i c s i t can intimidate the Government and .people of this country, i t mistakes the temper of India. Delhi has always been w i l l i n g to parleywwith reason.but sword w i l l be met by .the sword...If h o s t i l i t i e s unfortunately break out again, they cannot be confined to the t e r r i t o r y of Kashmir and w i l l involve a f u l l - s c a l e war between the two countries neither of whom can afford t h i s costly venture. Pakistan i s playing with fire.15 On June 2, Sheikh Abdullah declared that, i n spite of the United Nations r e s o l u t i o n condemning the formation of a Constituent Assembly i n Kashmir, elections for such a body would be held i n September 1951, while Prime Minister Nehru, supplementing this decision, declared that Dr. Graham could not expect courtesy, but l i t t l e else. It was against t h i s background, Dr. Graham sought to reach an amicable solution. Unlike his predecessor, S i r Owen, Dr. Graham expressed genuine confidence that the entire problem could be resolved. Instead,of attempting to break the deadlock through broad proposals, he chose for himself the r o l e of a patient mediator deliberately avoiding any reference to the March Resolution, l i s t e n i n g c a r e f u l l y to both sides seeking to bring about r e c o n c i l i a t i o n on minor issues with the expressed desire that this would lead to a solution of the most c r i t i c a l problems of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n and the induction of the P l e b i s c i t e 15. Times of India. July 11, '51. cited i n Brecher. op. c i t . , p. 121. - 83 -Administrator into o f f i c e . His f i v e reports to the Security Council reveal his t i r e -less determination to reconcile the two p a r t i e s . But his e f f o r t s were i n vain, as negotiations grounded on the issue of the.size and character of the Indian and Pakistani forces to remain i n Kashmir. F i n a l l y a f t e r two years of f r u i t l e s s negotiation, Dr. Graham reported to the Security Council that because of the great d i s t r u s t held by both p a r t i e s , the technical problems of size and nature of the troop withdrawals leading to the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of Kashmir could not be resolved. He asked, therefore, on March 27, 1953 that the issue be returned to the two nations for further d i s c u s s i o n . 1 ^ This technical problem, which prevented an amicable solution to the Kashmir dispute, was not, by i t s e l f , beyond solution, but i t s basis was f a r more profound than mere arithmetical differences, for i t r e f l e c t e d the attitudes of both countries towards the entire United Nations e f f o r t . (D) United Nations The Security Council and i t s various agencies formed to resolve the Kashmir Dispute are not t o t a l l y free from c r i t i c i s m . From the inception of the dispute, the Security Council was hampered by weak and vague terms of reference, and the i n a b i l i t y of one or both parties to agree to i t s various proposals. 16. S/2967. March 27, 1953. - 84 -Although t h i s was not of the S e c u r i t y Council's choosing, i t was forced i n t o the dilemma of f o l l o w i n g a path which, i n r e t r o s p e c t , could only lead to f a i l u r e . I n December 1947, the only p o i n t of agreement between the Governments of India and P a k i s t a n was t h e i r common d e s i r e to hold a p l e b i s c i t e i n the s t a t e but they were at odds as to the mechanics of such an undertaking. In order to f a c i l i t a t e the des i r e s of both na t i o n s , however, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l was forced i n t o p a r a d o x i c a l dilemma of wi t h h o l d i n g de jure r e c o g n i -t i o n of the Azad Government and Pakistan's c l a i m f o r e q u a l i t y w h i l e extending de f a c t o r e c o g n i t i o n t o both Governments f o r 17 the purpose of- s e t t l i n g the dis p u t e . 1 To re f u s e to recognize the i n t e r e s t s of both p a r t i e s would o b l i t e r a t e any p o s s i b l e chance of c o n c i l i a t i o n , w h i l e to extend even de f a c t o r e c o g n i -t i o n to P a k i s t a n f o r the sol e purpose of a c h i e v i n g a s e t t l e -ment, a l i e n a t e d the Indian Government. C r i t i c i s m could a l s o be made of the S e c u r i t y Council's and Commission's approach towards the implementation of the August 13, 1948 R e s o l u t i o n . Although t h i s R e s o l u t i o n provided a f i r m base from which t o operate, the Commission and i t s predecessors were f o r c e d , i n t h e i r process of seeking a s e t t l e -ment, to become enmeshed i n the f i n e r p o i n t s of the dispute and were f i n a l l y deadlocked, as i n the case of the Graham M i s s i o n , on the iss u e of the number of Indian and P a k i s t a n i troops to remain i n Kashmir. Furthermore, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , through vague terminology - \"the bulk of Ind i a n troops,\" \" l o c a l 17. S/1430. Dec. 9, 1949. - 85 -a u t h o r i t i e s , \" and the \"Northern Areas\" - and the p r a c t i c e of endless \" c l a r i f i c a t i o n s \" and \" r e s e r v a t i o n s \" , obscured the major issues of the dispute and provided both India and Pak-i s t a n w i t h the opportunity of strengthening t h e i r own p o s i -t i o n s at the expense of o b t a i n i n g a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n to the Kashmir dilemma. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , hampered by the l a c k of a l e g a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the l e g a l i t y of the Maharajah's ac c e s s i o n and India's subsequent f a i l u r e to charge P a k i s t a n under Chap-t e r V I I of the Charter, was h e s i t a n t to f u l f i l l India's per-s i s t e n t demands that P a k i s t a n be charged as an aggressor f o r f e a r of completely a l i e n a t i n g the l a t t e r . I t s hands were f u r t h e r t i e d by the l i m i t i n g powers of Chapter VI of the Charter while i n c l u d i n g such methods as c o n c i l i a t i o n , media-t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n did not make any of i t s d e c i s i o n s b i n d -ing on the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s . Thus i n order to reach any agreement, the S e c u r i t y Council was v i r t u a l l y forced to approach the Kashmir problem i n the same manner as one would climb a t r e e - the higher one ascends, the f u r t h e r he i s away from i t s roots and the more entangled he i s i n i t s f o l i a g e . Beginning from a broad base, ithe August 13, 19^8 Resolu-t i o n c a l l e d f o r a c e a s e - f i r e , d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n and a p l e b i s c i t e , and when t h i s f a i l e d , the Commission, McNaughton, Dixon and Graham i n t u r n sought agreement on disarmament as the key to a p l e b i s c i t e . Indeed, only S i r Owen Dixon openly recognized that the presence of P a k i s t a n troops i n Kashmir was a v i o l a t i o n - 86 -of International Law, and sought to reach the crux of the problem through straight p a r t i t i o n along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s . Yet l i k e the others, a l l his e f f o r t s came to naught. The Security Council's e f f o r t s to resolve the Kashmir dilemma were further hampered by i t s pre-occupation with crises of more - immediate importance which prevented the world organi-zation from applying i t s f u l l weight upon the disputing part-i e s . The Palestine Question and the Arab-Israel war, the economic s i t u a t i o n i n Europe, the China Question, and most important, the Korean War and the Cold War distracted the members of the Security Council and thus overshadowed the question of Kashmir. One cannot, however, blame the United Nations for i t s f a i l u r e to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Its shortcomings which were limited to procedure and terminology were more than counterbalanced by the patience and dedication of i t s various mediators. When given a chance to operate outside the arena of petty nationalism - as i n the case of the Cease-Pir e and t r u c e - l i n e demarcation - the Security Council proved that i t could conduct i t s a f f a i r s i n a forthright and impartial manner. Yet neither India nor Pakistan were prepared to accept a solution except on i t s own terms. There were no concessions, no gestures of open co-operation, nor any sign of complete f a i t h i n the world body, and therefore the burden for f a i l - • ure must be placed d i r e c t l y upon the shoulders of India and Pakistan. - 87 -(E) Pakistan's Position Pakistan's attitude towards the various agencies commi-ssioned by the Security Council during 19^8-1953 period to resolve the dilemma of Kashmir, developed from open suspicion i n the summer of 19^ 8 to one of guarded yet c r i t i c a l co-opera-t i o n during the early months of 1953. Although Pakistan's record of agreement with the various resolutions and proposals of the Security Council i s much more impressive than India's, i t i s the writer's contention that this did not imply any greater trust or f a i t h i n the United Nations. Indeed, through-out the precarious years of negotiation, c e r t a i n elements i n Pakistan waged an unending and v i t r i o l i c war against both the i n t e g r i t y and effectiveness of the world organization. Yet i n spite of t h i s a majority of Pakistani o f f i c i a l s f u l l y r e a lized that only ihrough the United Nations could t h e i r primary aim, a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir, be f u l f i l l e d . Since the basic' Pakistani attitude was firmly cemented i n the b e l i e f that the Maharajah's accession was i l l e g a l , the Pakistan Government was only too w i l l i n g to use every power within i t s means to achieve recognition as an equal party to the dispute. Once t h i s goal was accomplished through de facto recognition, i t s approach d r a s t i c a l l y changed as the Govern-ment reorientated i t s p o l i c y towards aiding the. Security Council i n the implementation of the Kashmiri p l e b i s c i t e , without, however, modifying i t s claim for equality with India or r e -linquishing m i l i t a r y control over the disputed t e r r i t o r y to - 88 -any agency except that sponsored by the United Nations. From the inception of the dispute the Pakistan Govern-ment was deeply alarmed at the p o s s i b i l i t y that India would attempt to force a m i l i t a r y solution i n Kashmir and thus pre-sent the Security Council, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y Pakistan, with a f a i t accompli. Hence Liaquat A l i Khan despatched reg- ' ular troops of the Pakistan Army into Kashmir i n the spring of 1948 -indan attempt to hold what t e r r i t o r y they could against the advancing Indian Army. The Pakistan Government was also deeply disturbed over the very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y that once a cease-fire had been accomplished and a truce l i n e established, t h i s m i l i t a r y s t a b i l i z a t i o n would be followed by i t s p o l i t i c a l counterpart and the permanent d i v i s i o n of the state. Thus i t accepted the January 1, 19^9 cease-fire only as a matter of strategic and economic expediency and when the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n became obvious i n 1951 with the proposed con-vening of a Constituent Assembly i n Indian Kashmir, the Pak-i s t a n Government attempted to thwart the Indian plans by f u l l y supporting the Security Council's condemnation of the Indian proposal and i t s attempt to resolve the problem of a p l e b i s c i t e through the establishment of the Graham Mission. Indeed, the Pakistan Government f u l l y r e a lized that only two roads were ava i l a b l e . The f i r s t was to respond to the cries of the Pakistan press and such r e l i g i o u s p e r s o n a l i t i e s as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and undertake a jihad to l i b e r a t e Kashmir - a p o l i c y which could only lead to the complete - 89 -destruction of the infant state. The second, and f a r more reasonable, approach was to attempt to f u l f i l l the nation's basic desire through complete co-operation with any agency prepared to support the Pakistani claim for an unhampered p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir. Although the former approach was never f u l l y rejected by members of the Pakistan Government, the majority seemed determined to overlook the emotional c r i e s of irresponsible publishers and zealous p o l i t i c i a n s who grew impatient with the-obvious shortcomings of the United Nations. As previously mentioned, Pakistan was prepared to adopt a f a r more f l e x i b l e p o l i c y towards the question. Unlike India, Pakistan was f u l l y prepared to accept S i r Robert Menzies' suggestion following the 1951 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference (which i n c i d e n t a l l y Liaquat A l i refused to attend unless Kashmir was included on the agenda) that the deadlock over d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n be solved by ( l ) the stationing of Commonwealth troops i n Kashmir; (2) a:joint Indo-Pakistan force; or (3) a force of l o c a l troops raised and controlled by an appointed p l e b i s c i t e administrator. S i m i l a r i l y , having no qualms over the purported abridgement of sovereignty, Pakistan also accepted the March 21, 1951 Security Council . Resolution ivhich, i n part, called for the stationing of f o r -eign troops i n Kashmir during the period of the p l e b i s c i t e . Furthermore, the Pakistan Government was again f a r more 18. Times. Jan. 17, '51. - 90 -f l e x i b l e i n i t s attitude towards a p o l i t i c a l l y independent Azad Kashmir, and once de facto recognition was achieved i n the January 5, 19^9 Resolution, the Government never again used the excuse that any attempts to disband Azad Eorces would have to be accomplished through negotiations with the Azad Government of Sardar Ibrahim Khan. Indeed, once the de facto equality of this area was obtained, Pakistan ceased using Azad Kashmir's dubious p o l i t i c a l independence to ham-s t r i n g negotiations with the Security Council. Moreover, i t was quite w i l l i n g to vest administrative control of Azad t e r r i t o r i e s i n the United Nat-ions without claiming that the p o l i t i c a l powers of the Azad Government were being usurped. In similar vein, Pakistan also approached the question of compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n of outstanding differences with an open mind, for with no cla irm-- of as over e i gnt y over Kashmir i t had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n agreeing to a l l proposals of a r b i t r a -t i o n as suggested i n the March 21, 1951 Resolution. The above does not imply, however, that Pakistan's o f f i c i a l attitude towards the Security Council's actions was one of complete c o n c i l i a t i o n . On the basic issues of the p l e b i s c i t e , the introduction of a p l e b i s c i t e administrator and the balance of troops i n Kashmir,^ Pakistan remained unyielding. Yet underlying this resolute attitude there appears the d i s t i n c t impression that Pakistan was grasping at straws i n order to prevent the permanent absorption of the 19. These were the major causes of Graham's f a i l u r e to reconcile both partie s . - 91 -s t a t e i n t o I n d i a . ' T h u s w h e n S i r O w e n D i x o n s u g g e s t e d t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a u n i t e d o r c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t i n K a s h m i r i n a n a t t e m p t t o c i r c u m v e n t t h e d e a d l o c k o v e r t h e m e c h a n i c s o f d i s a r m a m e n t , P a k i s t a n o f f e r e d h e r u n q u a l i f i e d a p p r o v a l . A l -t h o u g h , s u c h a m o v e w o u l d n a t u r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e r e c o g n i t i o n o f - . P a k i s t a n a s a n e q u a l p a r t n e r i n t h e d i s p u t e , i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e l a y i n t h e f a c t t h a t P a k i s t a n w a s w i l l i n g t o c o - o p e r a t e i n a g o v e r n m e n t c o n t a i n i n g S h e i k h A b d u l l a h , w h o t o m o s t P a k i s t a n i s w a s a d e s p i s e d \" Q u i s l i n g . \" F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n S i r O w e n , i n h i s f i n a l p r o p o s a l , s u g g e s t e d t h e p a r t i t i o n i n g o f K a s h m i r w i t h a U n i t e d N a t i o n s p l e b i s c i t e , i n t h e V a l e , P a k i s t a n , ' w h i l e r e -j e c t i n g t h e p r o p o s a l o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t I n d i a w a s c o m m i t t e d t o a s t a t e - w i d e p l e b i s c i t e , e x p r e s s e d t h e a r d e n t d e s i r e t h a t 20 t h e t o p i c w o u l d r e m a i n o p e n f o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . P a k i s t a n ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s K a s h m i r c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h a t e x p r e s s e d b y t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l m e m b e r s , a n d a l t h o u g h t h i s m e e t i n g o f m i n d s g a v e t h e g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e t w o w e r e j o i n e d i n a n u n i f i e d e f f o r t t o s o l v e a c o m m o n p r o b l e m , i t w a s , a s f a r a s P a k i s t a n w a s c o n c e r n e d , l a r g e l y a m a t t e r o f e x p e d i e n c y . F u r t h e r m o r e , when f a i l u r e b e c a m e i m m i n e n t , s h e s h o w e d n o h e s i t a t i o n i n a b a n d o n i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n a n d s e e k i n g , o n c e a g a i n , t o r e s o l v e t h e d e a d l o c k w i t h I n d i a t h r o u g h b i - l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . ( F ) I n d i a ' s P o s i t i o n I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s e f f o r t s 20. S/1791. - 92 -was f a r more paradoxical than Pakistan's, yet i t does serve to i l l u s t r a t e the curious Indian double standard of diplomacy. In the early years of the dispute, Prime Minister Nehru r e -iterated the Indian desire for a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir: I want to stress that i t i s only the people of Kashmir who can decide the future of Kashmir. It i s not that we have merely said that to the United Nations and the people of Kashmir, i t i s our con-v i c t i o n . . .-We would w i l l i n g l y leave Kashmir If i t was made clear to us that the people of Kashmir wanted us to go...21 Conversely, Lord Birdwood stated: Mr. Nehru proposed the p l e b i s c i t e and appears to have been regretting i t ever since. It would seem that he has been tryi n g to r a t i o n a l i z e what has been i n fact an i r r a t i o n a l process i n his own mind. 2 2 It i s , however, th i s \" i r r a t i o n a l process\" which has dominated the entire Indian approach tovrards the Security Council and Kashmir. As. has been shown, the Indian attitude was and remains based upon the premise of Pakistan's aggression i n Kashmir, and the theory that she has no locus standi i n the dispute. India charged Pakistan under Chapter VI of the Charter, and throughout the e a r l i e r stages of the dispute ( o r i g i n a l years) the Indian Government demanded that Pakistan be recognized as an aggeessor, a term not l i s t e d under the' heading \" P a c i f i c Settlement of Disputes.\" This attitude' was further complicated when, i n the words of an Indian delegate to the United Nations, \"India did not i n s i s t on Pakistan being declared an aggressor 21. Nehru. Speeches, Vol. I, pp. 333-39, Speech i n P a r l i a -ment, August 7, 1952. 22. Lord Birdwood. \"Kashmir Today.\" The Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XLII. (July - Oct., 1955), P. 251. 93 -view to avoid any grave r e p r e -I t seems beyond doubt that the n o n - o f f i c i a l support of the t r i b a l i n v a s i o n and movement of r e g u l a r P a k i s t a n troops i n t o Kashmir was contrary t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, and made India's i n d i g n a t i o n understandable. But a f t e r the Indian d e l e g a t i o n to the United Nations denied i t s e l f the r i g h t of submitting the dispute under Chapter V I I of the Charter; accepted the various r e s o l u t i o n s of the U.N.C.I.P.; and a f t e r S i r Owen Dixon o f f i c i a l l y recognized that P a k i s t a n a c t i v i t i e s i n Kashmir were contrary to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand why India continued to pose as the i n j u r e d p a r t y and continue to base her e n t i r e case on Pakistan's a l l e g e d aggression. I t seems incomprehensible that Nehru, i n a speech before the Indian N a t i o n a l Congress at Hyderabad, could complain about the d e n i a l of j u s t i c e to I n d i a . During a l l these years we have p a t i e n t l y waited f o r a proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the problem and :yet i t i s most strange that the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l has never given thought to the basic issues underlying the Kashmir problem. Because the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l has ignored basic f a c t s and t r i e d to by-pass fundamental i s s u e s , i t has o f t e n gone wrong. 2.4 Furthermore, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e India's p o s i -t i o n towards P a k i s t a n i aggression i n Kashmir and her a t t i t u d e towards the entry of Chinese troops i n t o Korea. While India t e c h n i c a l l y , s o l e l y w i t h a cussions.\"^3 23. ' C. Kondapi. \"Indian Opinion of the United Nations.\" I n t e r n a t i o n a l . O r g a n i z a t i o n , V:4. 1951. p. 715. 24. The Hindu (Madras f. Jan. 18, »53. - 94 -v o t e d f o r t h e t w o o r i g i n a l r e s o l u t i o n s o n K o r e a , s h e r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e r e s o l u t i o n c h a r g i n g C h i n a w i t h a g g r e s s i o n p a r t i -a l l y o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t s u c h a m o v e w o u l d a l i e n a t e C h i n a a n d • h e n c e d a m p e n a n y c h a n c e s f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . C h i n a , I n d i a u r g e d , m u s t b e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a s a n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y . T h i s a t t i t u d e , h o w e v e r , w a s t h e r e v e r s e o f i t s p o s i t i o n o v e r K a s h m i r , y e t t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e t w o c a s e s . T h i s c l o s e d - m i n d a t t i t u d e o f I n d i a t o w a r d s K a s h m i r a n d • P a k i s t a n h a s a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s m a n d a t e . S o c o n v i n c e d o f t h e r i g h t e o u s -n e s s o f h e r c a s e w a s - t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t t h a t i t r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t a j u d g e m e n t b y t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o r c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n o n t h e i s s u e o f d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , e y e m e t h o u g h b o t h A r t i c l e 33 o f t h e C h a r t e r c a l l s f o r a r b i t r a t i o n a n d A r t i c l e 51 ( d ) o f t h e I n d i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i e s t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s h a l l \" e n c o u r a g e t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s b y a r b i t r a -t i o n . \" . I f t h e K a s h m i r d i s p u t e w a s n o t a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e i n t h e t r u e s e n s e o f t h e w o r d , b u t s o l e l y a m a t t e r b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a s t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t c l a i m e d , t h e n w h y w a s P a k i s t a n c h a r g e d u n d e r C h a p t e r V I a s a p a r t y t o t h e ' d i s p u t e ? I f t h e K a s h m i r d i s p u t e w a s t r u l y I n t e r n a t i o n a l , t h e n I n d i a s h o u l d h a v e a b i d e d b o t h b y t h e C h a r t e r a n d h e r o w n C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h e r e j e c t i o n i ' o f a n y f o r m o f a r b i t r a t i o n , i t i s s u g g e s t e d , w a s t h e i n h e r e n t f e a r o f a n a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n w h i c h w o u l d e i t h e r a w a r d t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f - 95 -Kashmir, including the Vale, to Pakistan; or force the Indian Government to accept unfavourable conditions leading to a p l e b i s c i t e . While Pakistan i s not free from c r i t i c i s m and on many occasions demonstrated that her attitude towards Kashmir could be. :just as firm as India's, she was f a r more anxious than India i n her desire to obtain the oft-promised p l e b i s c i t e . In f a c t , procedures acceptable to Pakistan were supported through-out the 19^8-1953 period by no less than eighteen Security Council members.2^ Supporters for the Indian proposals, how-ever, were few and far between and came i n the form of Commun-i s t abstentions to Security Council resolutions. India's attitude, on the other hand, remained not only fixed but also unmoved by pressure from the majority of the Security Council's members. Whereas Pakistan at least sought c o n c i l i a t i o n and was w i l l i n g on several occasions to make concessions to reach a settlement, no such reaction came from the indignant Indian Government. Indeed, even the mere sugges^-t i o n of a concession by Josef Korbel, brought Nehru into an 26 uncontrollable rage. India negotiated with an a i r of righteous indignation - the world did not understand her; she refused to accept Pakistan's genuine interests i n Kashmir and expected the world body to accept her \" i r r a t i o n a l process\" and follow suit£ 25. United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, S y r i a , Egypt, Cuba, Ecuador, B r a z i l , The'Netherlands, Lebanon, Greece, Chile and''Norway. 2.6. Korbel. op. c i t . , p. 130. - 96 -and a l l pleas f o r moderation, a r b i t r a t i o n or c o n c i l i a t i o n , except on her own terms, f e l l upon deaf ears. Thus I n d i a , on balance, must accept the major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the f a i l u r e of the United Nations i n the f i r s t years of the d i s -pute. - 97 -CHAPTER SEVEN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS: 1953-1955 On March 27, 1953 the Security Council u n o f f i c i a l l y accepted the f a i l u r e of Dr. Graham's F i f t h Report and asked India and Pakistan to reopen negotiations at once to de-m i l i t a r i z e Kashmir as the necessary prerequisite for a pleb-iscite.\" 1\" It was f e l t by a l l concerned that since neither party was sincerely confident i n the United Nations' policy towards Kashmir, only b i l a t e r a l negotiations, conducted i n a frank and forthright manner, could bring about a genuine understanding of each other's attitudes. In t h i s context, Sisar Gupta of the Indian Council of World A f f a i r s , i n a data paper presented to the 1958 Lahore Conference of the Ins t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, wrote only i f the two Governments' representatives sat across a table would the problem of Kashmir be discussed i n the l i g h t of the larger content of the history, and p o l i t i c s of the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent and of the general state of Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s as affected by canal waters, evacuee property, minorities, etc.2 It i s int e r e s t i n g to note that the above attitude coincided with Pakistan's view of the Kashmir issue as expressed before the Security Council i n January 1948. Unfortunately,at that t'ime i t was not accepted by India and hence valuable time was lost i n procedural wrangles. 1. S/2967. March 27, 1953. 2. Sisar Gupta. \"India's Relations with Pakistan, 1954-57.\" Aspects of India's Foreign Relations, (I.C.W.A.), New Delhi, 1957, p. II-4. Even though informal talks would allow the respective negotiators:? to speak f r e e l y on a l l matters partaining to Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , neither the Indian nor their Pak-i s t a n i delegates could have remained completely oblivious of public opinion and the strong emotional undertones of the Kashmir dispute. In this respect, the Government of India enjoyed an advantage over Pakistan. Prime Minister Nehru's Kashmir po l i c y enjoyed the f u l l support of the majority of informed Indians and was, i n f a c t , consistently c r i t i c i z e d only by members of the Hindu Mahasabha and similar communalist groups, and on occasion by the Sardar Patel, who u n t i l his death i n 1950 always held that Pakistan could be called to order by firmness on the part of the Indian Government. The Pakistani delegates, on the other hand, be-cause of the very nature of the dispute, would be faced with a dilemma.since Kashmir was the primary national issue or even obsession, any overt sign of c o n c i l i a t i o n by Liaquat A l i or his successors, was viewed by the majority of Pakistanis (especially West Pakistanis), including the press and members of his own cabinet, as appeasement of Bharat (India) and treason against the very nature of the Muslim State. \"No public f i g u r e , \" wrote the late Keith Callard, \"would f e e l that his l i f e was safe i f he declared i n public that he was w i l l i n g to accept as inevitable the incorporation of Kashmir 3. S. Natarajan. \"The Mind and Fact of Secularism.\" The Economic Weekly, (Bombay.). July 1964, p. 1255. . - 99 -with India.\" Indeed, Kashmir has become the very symbol of nationhood, and woe to him who weakened or betrayed the national cause. In 1953, therefore, Mohammed A l i (the new Pakistani Prime Minister) was l i t e r a l l y forced to continue t h i s dual p o l i c y towards Kashmir: one of extreme militancy for domestic con-sumption and a second of guarded c o n c i l i a t i o n for use at the conference table. It i s l i t t l e wonder that on many occasions throughout the years of negotiations the Indian Government could genuinely challenge Pakistan's good f a i t h and s i n c e r i t y . The 1953-55 period of b i l a t e r a l discussions marked the watershed of the Kashmir dispute; i t was during this period that any hopes for future settlement were dashed upon the rocks of f r u s t r a t i o n as both i n t e r n a l and external p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y developments d r a s t i c a l l y altered the approach of the p a r t i e s . Mutual recrimination poisioned Indo-Pakistan relations as the dispute, i n the words of Prime Minister Nehru, became \"fundamental\", i n nature. (A) The F i r s t Phase Following the plea of the Security Council to resume direct negotiations, the atmosphere over the sub-continent brightened. Optimistic statements were made by statesmen and p o l i t i c i a n s of both sides, while the \"press of India and Pakistan was f r i e n d l y as i t had never been before.\" 5 The 4. Keith Callard. Pakistan: A P o l i t i c a l Study, MacMillan, New York, 1957, p. 309. 5. Korbel. op. c i t . , p. 192. - 100 -two Prime Ministers met i n London on the occasion of Queen Elizabeth's coronation i n June 1953 and the Kashmir issue was informally discussed. On July 25 , Nehru v i s i t e d Mohammed A l i i n Karachi to discuss the entire range of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Agreement was reached, however, only on such minor issues as the exchange of Cpoch Behar enclaves and removal or minimiza-6 t i o n of r e s t r i c t i o n s on tra v e l and trade. On the issue of Kashmir there was no more than recognition of the differences of opinion between the par t i e s . Dispite the continuation of the deadlock, however, discussions were conducted i n an atmos-phere of c o r d i a l i t y . It appeared to many observers, including both Prime Ministers, that a new era of Indo-Pakistani under-standing had dawned on the sub-continent. The strange calm which hung over both countries was shattered on August 9, with the Indian Government's abrupt dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and the appointment of Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi as Prime Minister of Kashmir. Mohammed A l l ' s f i r s t reaction was to telegraph the Indian Prime Minister on the 10th to express Pakistan's deep concern over these events i n Kashmir and to point out the obvious need for an early settlement of outstanding differences. Nehru, on his part, noted that frequent changes had been made i n Azad Kashmir without any undue Indian concern and that \"on the larger issues over p o l i c y ^oiir Kashmir policyJZ remains what i t was and we s h a l l stand by the.assurances we have given.\" 7 Nevertheless, 6. High Commissioner for Pakistan, Ottawa. Press Release. July 28, 1953. Hereafter called Pak. Press Release. Times. Aug. 11, ' 53 . - 101 -the reaction of Pakistan public opinion was immediate - the press published reports of bloodshed i n Srinagar, a complete hartal (boycott) of Indian goods was observed i n Karachi, while the aging s i s t e r of the .Quaid-I-Azam, Fatima Jinnah, led an anti-Indian demonstration through the streets of the c a p i t a l and called for \"Mar with India\" and \"Liberation of 8 our Muslim brothers i n Kashmir.\" Public opinion reached such a fever-pitch that the Government was forced to cancel a l l f e s t i v a l s arranged for the forthcoming August 14 Independence Day celebrations. The significance of the dismissal and imprisonment with-out t r i a l of Sheikh Abdullah had been subjected to various interpretations and although his dismissal marked the beginn-ing of a new stage of Kashmiri integration into India and the removal of the last serious o b s t i c a l to complete incorporation, i t s immediate effect was only to indicate once again the seriousness of the dispute and showed the influence of i n t e r n a l events i n Kashmir upon the populations of.both nations. \"Me are not concerned with the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah,\" said Mohammed A l i , \"but what we are concerned with i s the salvation of the people of Kashmir.\" This then, was the message he carried with him to New Delhi on August 16. It i s to the credit of both Prime Ministers, that i n such an atmosphere of tension, especially i n Srinagar and Karachi, 8. Pak. Press Release. Aug. 13, \"53. 9. Times. Aug. 15, '53.. - 102 -they could achieve noteworthy success. Following three days of b r i e f and informal t a l k s , the Prime Ministers issued an optimistic joint communique: The Prime Ministers are happy to record this large measure of agreement on v i t a l matters a f f e c t i n g their two countries and they trust and believe... that a l l the problems... should be solved s a t i s f a c t -o r i l y . But/Tn reference to the press of both countries/\"\" progress can only be made i n this d i r e c -t i o n i f there i s an atmosphere of peace and co-operation between the two countries. -1-0 With s p e c i f i c reference to Kashmir, the communique continued. The Kashmir dispute was s p e c i a l l y discussed at some length. It was t h e i r firm opinion that t h i s should be settled i n accordance with the wishes of the people of that state... The most f e a s i b l e method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a f a i r and impartial p l e b i s c i t e ...Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement i n regard to c e r t a i n preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agreed that these preliminary issues should be considered by them d i r e c t l y i n order to a r r i v e at agreements i n regard to t h i s . •These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a . p l e b i s c i t e administrator. In order to f i x some kind of pr o v i s i o n a l time table, i t was decided that the p l e b i s c i t e administrator should be appointed by the end of A p r i l 1 9 5 4 . 1 1 Herein lay a new approach to an old problem: i t confirmed the need f o r a p l e b i s c i t e , recognized that d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n was the major obstacle and mentioned for the f i r s t time a s p e c i f i c date for the introduction of the p l e b i s c i t e admini-strator ( s t i l l Admiral Chester Nimitz). Thepe was no mention, .however, ofi the United Nations. 10. Pak. Press Release. Aug. 21 , ' 5 3 . 11. i b i d . - 103 -H a r d l y h a d t h e i n k t i m e t o d r y o n t h e A u g u s t 20 j o i n t c o m m u n i q u e , w h e n i t s w o r d i n g , i n s t e a d o f l e s s e n i n g P a k i s t a n i f e a r s , a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g I n d o - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s , p r o v o k e d b i t t e r r e a c t i o n a m o n g t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e P a k i s t a n i p a p e r s a n d a m o n g t h e c o m m u n a l i s t p a r t i e s i n I n d i a . N . C . C h a t t e r j i o f t h e H i n d u M a h a s a b h a , d i s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m N e h r u ' s r e -a f f i r m e d s u p p o r t o f a p l e b i s c i t e a n d s t a t e d \" t h e M a h a s a b h a h a s a l l a l o n g m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e a c c e s s i o n . o f K a s h m i r t o I n d i a i n 1947 w a s f i n a l a n d i r r e v o c a b l e . \" 1 2 P r i m e M i n i s t e r B a k s h i o f K a s h m i r , w h i l e p a y i n g l i p s e r v i c e t o t h e D e l h i A g r e e m e n t s , r e p u d i a t e d S h e i k h A b d u l l a h ' s s t a n d f o r a f r e e p l e b s i c i t e , a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t \" n o p o w e r o n e a r t h c a n s e p a r a t e t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . \" E v e n t h e * l e a d e r o f t h e P r a j a S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , D r . R . L o h i a , o p e n l y s u p p o r t e d t h e c o m m u n a l i s t c r y 1 o t h a t \" t h e a c c e s s i o n o f t h e s t a t e t o I n d i a w a s f i n a l . \" D T h e P a k i s t a n p r e s s r e a c t e d i n a t w o - f o l d m a n n e r . N o t o n l y w a s t h e r e g r e a t a l a r m o v e r t h e s t a t e m e n t s b y I n d i a n c o m m u n a l i s t s a n d t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f K a s h m i r , b u t a l s o w i d e -s p r e a d c r i t i c i s m o v e r t h e v a g u e n e s s o f t h e D e l h i A g r e e m e n t a n d i t s f a i l u r e t o b r i n g t h e s o l u t i o n o f K a s h m i r a n y n e a r e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , m a n y i n f o r m e d P a k i s t a n i s l o o k e d u p o n t h e I n d i a n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s - K a s h m i r , t h e a b r u p t d i s m i s s a l o f A b d u l l a h , a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s i n N e w D e l h i , w i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d p e r p l e x i t y . T h e r e w a s n o o p e n I n d i a n p o l i c y t o w a r d s K a s h m i r : o n o n e h a n d P r i m e M i n i s t e r c o u l d r e - a f f i r m 12. T i m e s . A u g . 24, '53. 13. i b i d . - 104 -the p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir and his desire not to suppress the desires of the Kashmiri people, while on the other hand, he could disclaim 'any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the dismissal of Abdullah and the appointment of the pro-Indian Bahshi and the l a t t e r ' s statements that the union of Kashmir and Ind.ia i s irrevocable. To many Pakistanis, therefore, the Indian attitude towards Kashmir was self-contradictory. H. S. Suhrawardy, former Minister of Bengal, president of the Jinnah Awami League, summarized Pakistani apprehension when he declared i n a l e t t e r cited by the Time's: The accession of Kashmir to India, limited though i t i s by i t s nature,, i s sought to be j u s t i f i e d by the Indian Government on the ground not only of the rul e r ' s w i l l but of the people's choice, as t y p i -f i e d by Sheikh Abdullah, who was acclaimed by Mr. Nehru as the true representative of Kashmir and was denounced by Pakistanis as a stooge of India, a t r a i t o r of Pakistan and the Muslim nation. Then came the elections to the Constituent Assembly.of Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah won a personal v i c t o r y . Today the same Sheikh Abdullah, the vaunted r e p o s i -tory of public opinion, has been put i n prison be-cause he does not choose to f a l l i n l i n e with Indian opinion. It i s l i t t l e wonder that fb.ll6wihg«the agreements i n Delhi and the continued barrage of communal c r i t i c i s m against Nehru's paradoxical move, Sardar Ibrahim Khan of Azad Kashmir could declare It has been natural for Bharat to devise some means to blanket her stark misdeeds and to camoflage the r e a l s i t u a t i o n i n the Valley...^TheeDelhi Agreement/ has not brought the p l e b i s c i t e a b i t nearer than i t was i n 1949.15 1 4 « Times. Aug. 15, '53-15. Times. Aug. 20, '53. - 105- -Thus i t seemed to many Pakistanis that t h e i r country, was once again, receiving the short end of the s t i c k i n her bargaining with India. It i s doubtful, moreover, whether a c o r d i a l atmosphere could have been maintained over the sub-continent and agree-ment reached over the future of Kashmir. For even i f one accepts the August 20 communique as a genuine r e f l e c t i o n of Nehru's f a i t h i n a p l e b i s c i t e , evidence exists to show that the Indian p o l i c y towards Kashmir was changing r a p i d l y . No longer was the Indian attitude based upon a p l e b i s c i t e per se as the key to resolving Indo-Pakistani difference. Instead, concern was voiced over the long range consequences of such a p l e b i s c i t e . (B) India's Kashmir Policy Changes The issue of communalism has long haunted the sub-con-tinent. Pakistan was born largely through communal discon-tent, while the Congress Party, blaming Hindu-Muslim disunity on the B r i t i s h , never accepted the two-nation theory and the underlying concept of Pakistan. Disunity, they reasoned, would cease once the B r i t i s h l e f t India. Nevertheless, Nehru and his Congress colleagues recognized the danger of communalism, and i n Toward Freedom, he wrote \" i f /Hindus and Muslims/' can-not agree as organized groups, i t w i l l be unfortunate for India, and no one can say what the consequences w i l l be.\" 1^ 16. J. Nehru. Toward Freedom, Beacon H i l l , Boston, I96I, P . 385. - 106 -A f t e r Independence when communalism remained and i t s d i s a s t -rous effects were obvious, he l a i d down a p o l i c y for India which he f a i t h f u l l y followed to his death: \"Me s h a l l not l e t India be slaughtered at the a l t a r of b i g o t r y . \" 1 7 Though inconsistent by nature, on one issue he remained t o t a l l y con-si s t e n t ; he despised the ideas and philosophies of the Muslim League. \"He genuinely hated parties based upon narrow r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e s . To him communalism was a'monster, whose head was the League and whose claws were stained with the blood of 1 8 innocent men murdered i n the sordid streets of the c i t i e s . \" Yet the League and i t s ideas lived on i n Pakistan, and i f Nehru hated communalism and i t s tragic consequences, there i s l i t t l e doubt that t h i s hatred was inspir e d by fear. The safety of the r e l i g i o u s minorities was t o t a l l y depend-ent, upon the state of r e l a t i o n s between the two governments. Although this problem existed i n both countries i t was a major dilemma facing not only the forty m i l l i o n Indian Muslims, but also the Government of India charged with t h e i r protection. I f , as i n 19^7, communalism gained the upper hand and rendered authority powerless, then a l l material and s o c i a l progress could be destroyed. Indeed, communal co-operation provides the door to India's future unity, and although the nation's development faces many other obsticales,.progress cannot be made without peace and order. Kashmir, one would suggest, provided the key. The continuation of Kashmir within India 17. Nehru. Speeches, Vol. I I , p. 310. 18. Michael Edwardes. The Last Years of B r i t i s h India, Cassel, London, 1963, p. 107. - 107 -would support and strengthen the concepts of Nehru's secular state, while Hindu-Muslim unity would at least be saved from s a c r i f i c e on the a l t a r of r e l i g i o u s bigotry. I f , on the other hand, the Kashmir key opened the caged t i g e r of communalism then the foundations of the state - Nehru's state - would be severely damaged. As early as January 16, 1951 Nehru had noted the possible communal dangers inherent i n the Kashmir dispute, when i n reply to a query by Prime Minister A t t l e e , he had remarked: that no steps should be taken which might lead to an upsetting- of the somewhat unstable equilibrium that had been gradually established between India and Pakistan during these past few years. There was a grave danger that i f a wrong step was taken i t would rouse passions a l l over India and Pakistan and r a i s e new issues of v i t a l importance. That would be a tragedy.19 Furthermore, the Indian Prime Minister declared, that the Government of India was not \"prepared to apply /the two-nation theory_7 to Kashmir i n any event.\" That /he continued/7\" would be bad for Kashmir, but i t would be worse s t i l l f or India and for Pakistan. It would go counter to the p r i n c i p l e s that governed us and might produce upheavals both i n India and Pakistan. We had only recently witnessed an up-heaval of th i s kind i n Bengal, which had with d i f f -i c u l t y been controlled by the agreement between the two Prime Ministers.20 On the s p e c i f i c item of a p l e b i s c i t e conducted along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s , moreover, Nehru asserted that If this kind of thing was going to take place I'gj. Nehru's Note on Commonwealth Premiers Meeting on Kashmir. cited i n Lakhampal. op. c i t . , p. 226. 20. Ibid.., p. 228. - 1 0 8 -b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g t h e p l e b i s c i t e p e r i o d t h e n t h e r e w o u l d b e n o p l e b i s c i t e b u t c i v i l u p h e a v a l , n o t o n l y i n K a s h m i r b u t a l l o v e r I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n . 2 1 O n t h e i s s u e o f K a s h m i r , P r o f e s s o r W i l f r e d C a n t w e l l S m i t h , r e c o g n i z i n g t h e e f f e c t s u p o n I n d i a n M u s l i m s o f t h e p o s s i b l e a c c e s s i o n o f t h e s t a t e t o P a k i s t a n t h r o u g h a p l e b i s c i t e w r o t e \" a t r a n s f e r o f K a s h m i r t o P a k i s t a n w o u l d , a n d e v e n p r e s s u r e f o r s u c h a t r a n s f e r d o e s , m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r M s u l i m s i n I n d i a . \" 2 2 I n d e e d , n o g r o u p r e c o g n i z e d t h i s d a n g e r m o r e t h a n t h e I n d i a n M u s l i m s , a n d i n a b r i e f p r e s e n t e d t o D r . F r a n k G r a h a m , D r . Z a k i r H u s s a i n , V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r o f A l i g a r h M u s l i m U n i v e r s i t y a n d l a t e r V i c e - P r e s i d e n t o f I n d i a , w r o t e t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s K a s h m i r p o l i c y c a n \" o n l y b r i n g u s s u f f e r -i n g a n d d e s t r u c t i o n . \" 2 3 A l t h o u g h m a n y M u s l i m l e a d e r s h a v e c o n t i n u o u s l y p o i n t e d o u t t h i s p r o b l e m t o t h e i r P a k i s t a n i c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e m a j o r i t y o f P a k i s t a n i s s e e m u n a b l e t o c o m p r e h e n d t h i s i m p o r t a n t f a c t . T h e P a k i s t a n l e a d e r s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e d - a n d s t i l l b e l i e v e - t h a t o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a p l e b i s c i t e i n K a s h m i r c o u l d t h e d a r k c l o u d s o f f e a r a n d . m i s -t r u s t b e r e m o v e d . I n d e e d , m o s t i n f o r m e d P a k i s t a n i s c o u l d o n l y a g r e e w i t h M o h a m m e d A l l ' s b r o a d c a s t t o t h e n a t i o n w h e n h e d e -c l a r e d \" a f r e e p l e b i s c i t e i n K a s h m i r w i l l u s h e r i n a n e w e r a II p h o f f r i e n d s h i p b e t w e e n b u r t w o c o u n t r i e s . 2.1. i b i d . 22. W . C . S m i t h . I s l a m i n M o d e r n H i s t o r y , M e n t o r , T o r o n t o , 1957, P . 270. - - \" • 23. Z a k i r H u s s a i n ( e d ) . N o t e s o n I s l a m , C a l c u t t a . V o l . 4 , p . 1 0 4 . c i t e d i n D . E . S m i t h . I n d i a a s a S e c u l a r S t a t e , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , P r i n c e t o n , 1963, p . 4 1 3 . 24. T i m e s . S e p t . 2, '53. - 109 -Thus both countries were approaching the problem of a p l e b i s c i t e from dif f e r e n t angles: Pakistan was resolute i n her b e l i e f that only a free p l e b i s c i t e could remove the cancerous growth marring Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s ; India, on the other hand, was having second thoughts as to the effect of such a p l e b i s c i t e upon her forty m i l l i o n Muslims. It appears, moreover, that the Indian Government, while reaffirming i t s b e l i e f i n a p l e b i s c i t e through the August 20 communique, was not prepared to accept the r e a l r i s k of los i n g Kashmir through such a method. These Indian second thoughts, however, presented Nehru's Government with a dilemma. If any change i n attitude were to be made public without any s o l i d explanation, i t would naturally arouse world-wide indignation by t h e i r open r e j e c -t i o n of the United Nations' resolutions at a time when India was attempting to increase her international prestige. Further-more, such an overt move would mobilize public opinion i n Pak-i s t a n and lead to a further deterioration i n Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Secondly, i f India were openly to admit her con-cern over the consequences of the possible accession of Kash-mir to Pakistan through a free vote, she would be admitting the f a i l u r e of secularism over communalism, a prospect which Nehru would never accept. It i s probable, therefore, that i n pressing for the complete absorption of Kashmir into the main-stream of Indian economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e , Nehru was choos-ing the lesser of two e v i l s . ) - 110 -Although no documentary evidence Is available to indicate the precise moment or event which sparked th i s change i n atti t u d e , i t i s known that on August 20 Prime Minister Nehru promised a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir and almost immediately a f t e r , i n the words of Mohammed A l i , stated that although a p l e b i s c i t e was to be held i n the entire state, this p l e b i s c i t e i n i t s e l f would not decide the question of accession of the state to India or Pakistan. The question according to him, was to be decided aft e r the res u l t s of the p l e b i s -c i t e had been examined i n the l i g h t of geographic, economic and other considerations with a view to preventing immigrations from or disturbances with-i n the state.'^5 The Indian fear of communal disturbances following a p l e b i s c i t e was further indicated i n a l e t t e r from Nehru to Mohammed A l i on September 3, 1953, which stated i n part: We should not allow ourselves to accept a p o s i -t i o n which might offer some temporary r e l i e f today but v;hich might r e s u l t i n sowing the seeds of future trouble and conflict...While the interests of the people of Kashmir are paramount, there are also cer-t a i n national issues of India and Pakistan which come into c o n f l i c t over th i s Kashmir affair...The large minorities i n India and Pakistan w i l l be affected by that solution. I f i t i s wrongly done, then the p o s i t i o n of these minorities might well suffer and new problems might be created, even bigger than the one of Kashmir. We must a t a a l l costs avoid t h i s . 2 \" This problem was p u b l i c a l l y expressed by Prime Minister Nehru on September 17, 1953, when during debate i n the Lok Sabha, 25. High Commissioner of Pakistan. Ottawa. Pakistan News and Views. December 1955. Speech of Nov. 2.6, 1955. (emphasis mine). 26. Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime ' Ministers of India and Pakistan, (July 1953 - October 1954). White Paper. Ministry of External A f f a i r s (New D e l h i ) , 1954. Letter of September 3, 1953. Hereafter called WP. - I l l -he claimed We have always regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic f o r us, and i t has f a r - r e a c h i n g conse-quences i n I n d i a . Kashmir i s symbolic as i t i l l u s t r a t e s that we are a sec u l a r state...Kashmir has consequences both i n India and P a k i s t a n , be-cause i f we dispose of Kashmir on the basis of the old two-nation theory, obviously m i l l i o n s of people i n India and m i l l i o n s i n East P a k i s t a n would be a f f e c t e d . Many of the /cbmmuna 17* wounds that had healed might be opened again. Therefore t h i s problem i s not, and never has been, a prob-lem of a patch of t e r r i t o r y . . . I t i s a problem of much deeper consequences.27 Thus i t can be suggested that the Indian p o l i c y became one of ensuring that c o n d i t i o n s would never e x i s t f o r a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir, and as the f o l l o w i n g events w i l l show, the dead-lo c k over Kashmir, which was s t i l l p r i m a r i l y over disarmament, was s u c c e s s f u l l y guided to a po i n t where i t became \"fundamental\" i n nature and the P a k i s t a n i f e a r s of a p o l i t i c a l f a i t accompli became r e a l i t y . ( l ) Refugees The f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n of Indian i n t r a n s i g e n c e came on August 27, when Mohammed A l i sought c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t , as provided i n the January 5, 19^9 R e s o l u t i o n of the UNCIP, Kash-mir refugees would be allowed t o r e t u r n to t h e i r homeland to ?8 vote i n the forthcoming p l e b i s c i t e . On September 3, how-ever, Nehru r e p l i e d \"as f o r refugees v o t i n g , I r e f e r r e d t o t h i s i n the course of our /Xugust 17-2.6/ t a l k s and pointed out the ext r a o r d i n a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s that we would have to face i f w e l t r i e d to g i v e . f a c i l i t i e s f o r such v o t i n g . \" 2 9 Although 27. Nehru. Speeches. V o l . I l l , p. 213. 28. WP. L e t t e r of August 27, 1953. 29. I b i d . L e t t e r of September 3, 1953. - 112. -one can c e r t a i n l y sympathize with the Indian Prime Minister's l o g i c , nevertheless, i t disfranchised some 500,000 Kashmiri-Muslim refugees and served to throw sand i n the delicate mechanism of Indo-Pakistan negotiations. (2) P l e b i s c i t e Administrator Whereas the issue of refugees was only of a comparatively minor nature, the attitude of the Government of India towards the p l e b i s c i t e administrator c l e a r l y indicated that the Indian approach towards a Kashmir p l e b i s c i t e had indeed changed. The August 2.0 communique issued by both Prime Ministers, gave for the f i r s t time a s p e c i f i c date for the introduction of the United Nations p l e b i s c i t e administrator.3° Hardly had the proverbial ink had time to dry on the communique when Nehru began to a.dd his conditions. At; a press conference following his meeting with Mohammed A l i , he stated \"due to the serious c o n f l i c t between the major pollers, I have put i t to the Pakistan Prime Minister that the P l e b i s c i t e Administrator may be chosen from one of the smaller countries.\" \" i n any case1,\"\" he'declared somewhat undiplomatically,\"the fact of Nimitz's nomination as administrator by the United Nations i s now a h i s t o r i c a l moment and I had almost forgotten about i t . \" - 3 According to Nehru, moreover, this suggestion was accepted by both Mohammed A l i and his Foreign Minister Z a f r u l l a h Khan, but they did not want a. statement made on the subject 30. The question of the removal of Admiral Chester Nimitz as plebiscite'administrator was not raised. 31. NYT. Aug. 29, '53. - 113 -before they could confer with the Cabinet. Again on Sept-ember 3, Nehru formally wrote to Mohammed A l i and- suggested that the p l e b i s c i t e administrator \"should be chosen from small •50 and more or less neutral country.\" The Pakistan press, however, immediately denied the existence of any such agreement while Dawn declared e d i t o r i a l l y that Nehru's intentions were to drive a wedge between Pakistan \"5-2 and the United States. On September 1 Mohammed A l i declared i n a nation-wide broadcast \"that suggestions that he had agreed to the dropping of Admiral Nimitz and the appointment of some other person as p l e b i s c i t e administrator were without founda-t i o n . \" J This denial was reiterated on September 5, when the Pakistani Prime Minister accused the Indian Government and Press of applying t h e i r own interpretations to the Delhi Agree-ments and thus creating d i f f i c u l t i e s for him i n his own country. Indeed, the Indian Government was placing i t s own interp? • pretation on the Agreement and on December 19, two days before the scheduled meeting of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y experts was due to convene i n Delhi, Nehru again wrote to Mohammed A l i , \"I have made i t p e r f e c t l y clear that we cannot accept any p l e b i s c i t e administrator from major countries or from countries involved i n international tensions. \"3°\" Although the ensuing discussions ended i n a deadlock, and future meetings planned for Karachi i n the spring of 1954, Nehru made i t abundantly clear on 32. WP. Letter of September 3, 1953. 33. NYT. Aug. 29, '53. 34. Times. Sept. 2, '53. 35. NYT. Sept. 6, '53. 36. WP. Letter of December 19, 1953. - 114 -January 18, that there would be no further discussions or ^7 negotiations over Kashmir u n t i l Nimitz was replaced. 1 On January 12, however, Mohammed All:'' remarked that while he could not understand Nehru's reasoning, he would be w i l l -ing to accept a p l e b i s c i t e administrator from a smaller country. This offer was repeated on February 4, when i n a l e t t e r to Nehru, the Pakistani Prime Minister formally agreed to the replacement of Nimitz, and expressed his intense desire to re-open discussions to resolve outstanding differences and pave the way for the introduction of the yet un-named admini-39 strator. Nehru rep l i e d that further discussions could not be held because the preliminary issues had not been resolved. Thus the second meeting of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y experts never convened and the A p r i l 30 deadline passed with the deadlock complete and negotiations suspended. (3) M i l i t a r y Aid Although the barring of Kashmiri refugees from voting and Nehru's intransigence towards the appointment of a p l e b i s -c i t e administrator served to indicate India's desire to hamper negotiations, they were not i n themselves s u f f i c i e n t reasons to close the door on the oft-promised p l e b i s c i t e . What Nehru needed was an excuse or j u s t i f i c a t i o n through which a l l pre-vious agreements and commitments could be rendered void; and i t seems almost cert a i n that the United States M i l i t a r y Aid 37. i b i d . Letter of January 13, 1954. 38. Times., Jan. 13, '54. 39. WP. Letter of February 4, 1954. - 115 -Agreement wi t h P a k i s t a n provided the hinge with which the door to a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir could be closed f i n a l l y . I n November 1953, while the press war continued unabated i n both c o u n t r i e s , rumors were a f l o a t that the United States was prepared to f u l f i l l a P a k i s t a n i request f o r arms and m i l i t a r y equipment. The immediate Indian r e a c t i o n to these rumors, which at the time were sharply denied by both Pak-i s t a n and the United S t a t e s , was to denounce any suggestion of American m i l i t a r y a i d or bases on the s u b - c o n t i n e n t . ^ 0 On February 22, 1954, however, P a k i s t a n f o r m a l l y asked the United States f o r m i l i t a r y a i d under Mutual S e c u r i t y L e g i s l a t i o n . This request was granted on February 24 by President Eisenhower, who, w e l l advised and f u l l y aware of India's concern, announced that such a s s i s t a n c e \"was s o l e l y to maintain i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y and i t s l e g i t i m a t e self-defence ...Any r e c i p i e n t country a l s o must undertake that i t w i l l not engage i n any act of aggression against any other n a t i o n . \" Furthermore, the President declared, that misuse of American arms would be met with \"appropriate action.\"'^' 1\" Thus i n e f f e c t , India was r e c e i v i n g a m i l i t a r y guarantee from the United S t a t e s . To ease Indian f e a r s , Eisenhower wrote a personal l e t t e r to Nehru on February 24, a s s u r i n g him that such a i d would not be used against India and suggested that i f the Government of ho India so wished, they too could apply f o r such a i d . c This 40. NYT.. ...Nov. 22, '53. 41. Department of State B u l l e t i n . V o l . 30. March 15, 1954. p. 401. 42. i b i d . o f f e r , n a t u r a l l y enough, - 116 -was refused by the I n d i a n Government. On May 19, 1954, the Pakistan-United States Mutual Defence Agreement was signed. I t was not a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e : i t n e i t h e r provided f o r American bases i n P a k i s t a n , nor committed the l a t t e r t o a l t e r her f o r e i g n p o l i c y towards the West. I t simply strengthened the P a k i s t a n i Armed Forces, supposedly against communist expansion, and permitted scarce funds to be channelled i n t o the c i v i l economy. I n d i a , however, questioned Pakistan's motives. There can be l i t t l e doubt that the f e a r of India was instrumental i n Pakistan's acceptance of m i l i t a r y a i d from the United States - apprehension of communist expansion was only secondary. \"Even wi t h 70 percent of the revenue budget a l l o c a t e d to defence,\" wrote a v P a k i s t a n i commentator, \"Pak-i s t a n ' s f r o n t i e r s were not secure against v i o l a t i o n by her neighbours. The only guarantee of s u r v i v a l was m i l i t a r y a i d „44 from the United S t a t e s . Furthermore, wrote K. Sarwar Hasan, \" i t must be recognized that P a k i s t a n was a c t u a l l y compelled to a l i g n h e r s e l f w i t h the United S t a t e s , e n t i r e l y because of India's a t t i t u d e towards her.\"^^ P a k i s t a n had neither arsenals nor munition f a c t o r i e s . She needed arms to p r o t e c t h e r s e l f from a \" h o s t i l e \" Bharat, and the United S t a t e s , f o r 'other reasons, f e l t obliged t o comply. 43. NYT. March 2, '54. 44. Mushtaq Ahmad. The United Nations and P a k i s t a n , P a k i s t a n I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , K a r a c h i , 1955. 45. K. Sarwar .Hasan. The S t r a t e g i c I n t e r e s t s of P a k i s t a n , P . 9. - 117 -T h e r e c a n h e l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f P a k i s t a n w i s h e d t o u s e t h i s d u a l c o n c e p t o f m i l i t a r y p a r i t y w i t h I n d i a a n d f r i e n d s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o s t r e n g t h e n h e r p o s i -t i o n i n K a s h m i r . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , b y j o i n i n g t h e D u l l e s t e a m t h e y c o u l d p e r h a p s o b t a i n a c t i v e A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r p o l i c i e s o v e r K a s h m i r , a n e x t r e m e l y v a l u a b l e f a c t o r g i v e n t h e l o w s t a t e o f I n d o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s i n 1953; w h i l e i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h c o u l d b e u s e d a s a b a r g a i n i n g c o u n t e r i n d e a l i n g w i t h I n d i a n i n t r a n s i g e n c e o v e r K a s h m i r . \" T h i s , \" w r o t e t h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s K a r a c h i c o r r e s p o n d e n t , \" i s a c o m m o n a d m i s s i o n p r i v a t e l y e x p r e s s e d . \" 4 ^ A l t h o u g h t h e p r o p o s a l o f m i l i t a r y a i d t o P a k i s t a n w a s o p p o s e d b y I n d i a f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s - t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e c o l d w a r i n t o N e h r u ' s \" s p h e r e o f p e a c e \" , t h e v i o l a t i o n o f I n d i a ' s b a s i c p o l i c y o f n o n - a l i g n m e n t , a n d t h e r e l a t i v e c h a n g e i n t h e m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e o f p o w e r o n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t -i t s c o n s e q u e n c e s i n r e s p e c t t o K a s h m i r w e r e i m m e n s e . I n d e e d , t h e m e r e r u m o r o f a i d , a s w i l l b e s h o w n , p r o v o k e d b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m t h r o u g h o u t I n d i a a n d w a s d e s t i n e d t o p l a y a n i m p o r -t a n t r o l e i n t h e b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e f u t u r e o f K a s h m i r . F o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s i n W a s h i n g t o n i n N o v e m b e r 1953 b e t w e e n t h e P a k i s t a n G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , G h u l a m M o h a m m e d a n d P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r , r e p o r t s r e a c h i n g D e l h i i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a m i l i t a r y p a c t w a s a m o n g t h e s u b j e c t s d i s c u s s e d . 4 6 . N Y T . N o v . 2 2 , ' 5 3 -- 118 -Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru's r e a c t i o n was immediate, and at an ensu-ing press conference, he noted This i s a matter on which c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y or other-wise i t i s none of our concern what Pa k i s t a n and the U.S.A. are doing. But p r a c t i c a l l y i t i s a matter of the most intense concern t o us and something which w i l l have f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences on the whole s t r u c t u r e of things i n South A s i a and e s p e c i a l l y on India and Pa k i s t a n . On December 9, he wrote f o r m a l l y to Mohammed A l i , expressing h i s general objections to such a m i l i t a r y pact and h i s b e l i e f that \"Pakistan's f o r e i g n and defence p o l i c i e s w i l l become d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed .../to India's andJ7 the area of disagree-ment between India and Pa k i s t a n would expend over a wider f i e l d . \" S p e c i f i c a l l y on Kashmir, herwrote I n e v i t a b l y i t w i l l a f f e c t the major questions that we are co n s i d e r i n g and more e s p e c i a l l y the Kashmir i s s u e . We have been d i s c u s s i n g f o r a long time past the question of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i n Kashmir S t a t e . The whole i s s u e w i l l change i t s face comple-t e l y i f heavy and r a p i d m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of P a k i s t a n i t s e l f i s t o take p l a c e . . . i t becomes r a t h e r absurd to t a l k of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i f P a k i s t a n proceeds i n the reverse d i r e c t i o n w i t h the help of the United States...the question before us becomes one of m i l i t a r i z a t i o n and not d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . I t i s i n t h i s context that we have to consider t h i s i s s u e of Kashmir.48 47. NYT. Nov. 16,''53-48. WP. L e t t e r of December 9, 1953. According to the l a t e K.M. Panikkar, I n d i a , l i k e every b i g Power, had her own area of primary economic, p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c impor-tance, i n t r u s i o n i n t o which by a f o r e i g n power would be considered as a threat to her own s a f e t y , and t h i s area included Nepal, Ceylon and Burma. \"According to him, India had made i t c l e a r to f o r e i g n (big) Powers that she would not t o l e r a t e any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the a f f a i r s of the three c o u n t r i e s . \" Although there was no mention of Paki s t a n i n Panikkar's address and the existence of an Indian \"Monroe Do c t r i n e \" was denied by Nehru, India's r e a c t i o n to U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d i n d i c a t e d that India did i n f a c t have a \"Monroe D o c t r i n e \" , and that P a k i s t a n was w i t h i n i t s sphere of i n f l u e n c e . . M.S. Ra'rjan. \"Indian F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n A c t i o n , 1954-56.\"•Indian Q u a r t e r l y . XVI:3 (July - September i960) pp. 228-229. - 119 -On December 21, Nehru again wrote to Mohammed A l i We,:lin India have endeavoured to follow a foreign policy which we f e e l i s not only i n the interests of world peace but i s p a r t i c u l a r l y indicated for the countries of Asia. That p o l i c y i s an independent one and of non-alignment with any power bloc. It i s clear that the p o l i c y which Pakistan intends to pursue i s d i f f erent...It means that Pakistan i s tied up i n a m i l i t a r y sense with the U.S.A. and i s aligned to that p a r t i c u l a r group of powers...This produces a q u a l i t a t i v e change i n the existing s i t u a t i o n , and, therefore, i t a f f e c t s Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , and, more espec i a l l y , the Kashmir problem.49 ; On December 20, the very day before the meeting of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y experts was to convene i n Delhi; government -inspired nation-wide demonstrations broke out throughout India. During the week of negotiations Nehru and his Congress c o l l e a -gues called for national a g i t a t i o n against the United States, which soon degenerated into a \"Yanks Quit Asia\" movement and an anti-Pakistan campaign. S p e c i f i c a l l y on Kashmir, Nehru declared \"that the whole context i n which these agreements were made w i l l change i f m i l i t a r y aid comes to P a k i s t a n . \" 5 0 J u s t i f i a b l y perturbed by the Indian h o s t i l i t y , Mohammed A l i could only a f f i r m that United States m i l i t a r y aid would enable Pakistan to achieve adequate defensive strength with-out having to assume increasing burdens on our economy and that under th i s mutual security l e g i s l a t i o n \"any country r e -ceiving aid has to undertake not to engage i n any act of aggression against any country.\" 5 1 Furthermore, on March -12, 49. MP. Letter of December 21, 1953-50. WT. Dec. 2.4, '53. 51. Pak. Press Release. Feb. 26, '54. - 120 -S i r Z a f r u l l a h Khan, commenting on Indian fears that Pakistan might u t i l i z e American aid to solve the Kashmir problem through mi l i t a r y means, noted that \"this i s u t t e r l y baseless and with-out foundation. President Eisenhower's declaration i n public and his l e t t e r to Mr. Nehru should make i t clear beyond doubt that by no stretch of the imagination could American aid lead to that most undesirable r e s u l t . \" Mr. Nehru, he continued, \" i s wrongly informed and grossly mislead.\"-' 2 In early 1954, Nehru's attempts to pressure Pakistan out of. receiving American m i l i t a r y assistance verged on \"hysteria.\" Yet a l l e f f o r t s f a i l e d . The Pakistan Government, on t h e i r part remained resolute. \"Our independence i s being questioned declared Mohammed A l i , \"no amount of Indian pressure w i l l pre-vent us from obtaining American m i l i t a r y aid.\"5^ As mentioned e a r l i e r , the disputed m i l i t a r y agreement was signed, yet even before that event, a well-informed Indian commentator noted that a settlement based upon a p l e b i s c i t e c c was impossible. ^ (4) Further Integration of Kashmir In January, Prime Minister Bakshi of Kashmir commented that \"the day /Epvll 30/ Pakistan was dreaming of would never dawn. 1 0 Indeed, i t never did, for the Indian Government 52. ' Ibid. March 12, '54. 53. Ian Stephens. Pakistan, Pelican, London, 1963, p. 268. 54. Pak. Press Release. Jan. 4, '54. . 55. Sisar Gupta. op_. c i t . , p. 11-17. 56. Times. Jan. 6, '54. - 121 -thwarted In i t s attempts to prevent American m i l i t a r y aid from reaching Pakistan, sought to exploit t h i s controversial issue i n the dispute over Kashmir. 'On February 7, 1954, following a two week meeting i n Delhi between Indian and Kashmiri leaders, the Kashmir Consti-tuent Assembly voted 60 to 0, with 15 members abstaining (several of them were i n j a i l ) to complete the State's accession to India. This decision, stated Bakshi, was taken \"after f u l l e s t consideration and with a f u l l sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i t i s i r r e v o c a b l e . \" 5 ^ The Kashmiri Prime Minister also rejected any idea of succession from India as \"unreasonable\" and against the interests of the Kashmir people. Whereas th i s decision, l i k e the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, was greeted enthus-i a s t i c a l l y by both Indian press and communal groups, the Government of India remained s i l e n t . Yet, as the New York Times asserted e d i t o r i a l l y , i t would be the height of naivete to believe that t h i s move was made without India's p r i o r knowledge-or even d i r e c t i o n . 5 o > This act was immediately denounced by the Pakistan Government as \"contemptuous\" and i n complete disregard of the Delhi Agreement and the Indian committments under the United Nations Commission's resolutions. ^ The long Indian silence was broken on February 12, when i t s delegate to the United Nations noted that while i t was the r i g h t of the Assembly:to choose i t s course and destiny, 57. NYT. Feb. 1, '54. 58. NYT. Feb. 8, '54. 59. WP. Letter of February 12, 1954. - 122 -the Indian Government s t i l l stood by i t s commitments f o r a p l e b i s c i t e under \" s u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s . \" ^ 0 This a t t i t u d e was r e a f f i r m e d by Nehru i n a p u b l i c speech on February 22, w h i l e i n a l e t t e r to Mohammed A l i he stated that the Constituent Assembly had every r i g h t to express i t s wishes and that t a l k s had broken down because P a k i s t a n had accepted m i l i t a r y a±6.^1 Nehru's r e a c t i o n towards American a i d t o P a k i s t a n was. again shown on March 1, when he r e j e c t e d President E i s e n -hower's o f f e r of m i l i t a r y a i d and demanded the withdrawal of a l l Americans s e r v i n g w i t h the United Nations truce teams i n Kashmir on the grounds that they could no longer be c l a s s i -f i e d as \" n e u t r a l \" observers. The a t t i t u d e of the Indian Government hardened consider-ably f o l l o w i n g the s i g n i n g of the Pakistan-Turkey \"Treaty of F r i e n d l y Co-operation,\" the forerunner of the Baghdad Pact, and although t h i s t r e a t y could not be condemned per se f o r the Indian Government had s i m i l a r agreements w i t h Indonesia, Burma and Nepal, i t did b r i n g about a f i r m e r Indian a t t i t u d e towards American m i l i t a r y a i d and consequently towards Kashmir. Whereas the Kashmir Government had continuously stated that i t s t i e s w i t h ' I n d i a were \" i r r e v o c a b l e , \" the I n d i a n Government remained o f f i c i a l l y a l o o f and s i l e n t . This s i l e n c e , however, was shattered on A p r i l 12. On t h i s date President 60. NYT. Feb. 13, '54. 61. NYT. Feb. 23, '54; WP. L e t t e r of March 5, 1954. 62. NYT. March 2, '54. American observers were not Immediately withdrawn, but were g r a d u a l l y replaced as t h e i r terms of s e r v i c e expired. - 123 -Prasad made the f i r s t o f f i c i a l pronouncement on the f u t u r e of Kashmir v/hen he declared i n Srinagar that India and Kashmir 63 would continue to be t i e d by the c l o s e s t bonds. On the 13th, while seeking to j u s t i f y the above remarks i n the content of m i l i t a r y a i d to P a k i s t a n , Nehru wrote t o Mohammed A l i s t a t i n g that the l a t t e r ' s acceptance of American arms had changed the s i t u a t i o n e n t i r e l y and, i n effeet,•, made the i n t r o d u c t i o n 64 of a p l e b i s c i t e a d m i n i s t r a t o r by A p r i l 30 impossible. This Indian i n t r a n s i g e n c e , and un w i l l i n g n e s s t o discuss the Kashmir is s u e was c a r r i e d by Nehru to the F i v e Power Colombo Conference i n A p r i l 1954, and when Mohammed A l i expressed h i s d e s i r e to place the subject of Kashmir on the agenda,U...NU of Burma, supporting Nehru's o b j e c t i o n s , declared that there was l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y of s o l v i n g a seven-year dispute i n s e v e r a l h o u r s . ^ Delegates to the Conference, however, remarked to the New York Times correspondent that Nehru's r e a c t i o n to the P a k i s t a n i proposal amounted to an 66 \"ultimatum\" and a\"veto. Thus India was not prepared to discuss the Kashmir issue on e i t h e r the n a t i o n a l or i n t e r -n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Indeed, Pakistan's \"dream\" of i n t r o d u c i n g a p l e b i s c i t e a d m i n i s t r a t o r by A p r i l 30 was not r e a l i z e d . I n I n d i a , however, the stage xras set and the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Kashmir was about t o begin. 63. Times. A p r i l 12, '54. 64. wp. L e t t e r of A p r i l 13, 1954. 65. Times. A p r i l 29, '54. 66. NYT. A p r i l 29, '54. - 12.4 -In a May 14 press r e l e a s e from the Indian President's O f f i c e , f i v e days before the United S t a t e s - P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r y a i d agreement was signed, n o t i c e was given that the f a t e of Kashmir was a l l b u t sealed. I n e f f e c t , t h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l decree (the A p p l i c a t i o n of Jammu and Kashmir Order): ( l ) extended the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Indian Supreme Court t o Kashmir t o deal with c i v i l cases and gave the Kashmir High Court p r o v i n c i a l s t a t u s ; (2) abolished the t r a d i t i o n a l custom duties and replaced them xvith ansubsidy of Rs. 25 m i l l i o n ; (3) provided f o r Indian c o n t r o l over the telegraph s e r v i c e s , broadcasting and meteorology; and (4) extended the a u t h o r i t y of the Indian E l e c t i o n Commission and the Auditor-General of India t o Kashmir. Furthermore, the current f i v e - y e a r p l a n was extended to the S t a t e , i n t e g r a t i n g i t economically w i t h the Indian Union. Indeed, there was no chance f o r Kashmir's 67 independence or accession to P a k i s t a n . 1 This d e c i s i o n was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y accepted throughout I n d i a , yet one could only agree w i t h Mohammed A l i when he r e g r e t f u l l y came to the c o n c l u s i o n that India's a n x i e t y t o 68 reach a settlement was not matched by her performance. On J u l y 14 Mohammed A l i wrote to Nehru and expressed h i s doubt that \"any u s e f u l purpose can be solved by f u r t h e r c o r r -espondence;\" I n h i s l a s t l e t t e r t b the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r on September 21, he r e l u c t a n t l y accepted the p o s i t i o n that 6?. c f . Birdwood. Two Nations and Kashmir, pp. I 8 I - I 8 3 . 68. Pak. Press Release. June 2, '54. - 125 -no room remained f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s . P r i o r t o t h i s l a s t l e t t e r , however, tensions between In d i a and P a k i s t a n increased, as the l a t t e r took a f u r t h e r step i n t o the Western a l l i a n c e . On August 14, i t was announced i n Karachi that the Government would attend the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l meeting of the South East A s i a Treaty Organization i n Manila on September 6, 1954. S u p e r f i c i a l l y , Pakistan's motives were :; to block the spread of communism i n A s i a ; yet her f e a r of India as the prime reason f o r membership was revealed when she asked that the term \"aggression\" should not be l i m i t e d to the communist v a r i e t y - the obvious inference being the u n d e r l y i n g f e a r of I n d i a . Although t h i s move was not greeted i n I n d i a ' w i t h the same h y s t e r i c a l r e c e p t i o n as the American arms agreement, i t nevertheless represented a further•encroach-ment of Western i n f l u e n c e and the Cold War i n t o what India considered to be her \"sphere of i n f l u e n c e . \" 7 ^ (C) The Second Phase With the dawning of 1955 the s t a t e of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s seemed t o b r i g h t e n . At the Indian Republic Day ceremonies i n January, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed (by now the r e a l power i n Pakistan) declared \" I am convinced that Jawaharlal d e s i r e s happy r e l a t i o n s between our two countries,';' while President Prasad receprocated by s t a t i n g \"as the year c l o s e s , we f i n d a pleasant change i n our r e l a t i o n s w i t h our 69. MP. L e t t e r of J u l y l4>, 1954; L e t t e r of September 21, 1954. 70. K. Sarwar Hasan. The S t r a t e g i c I n t e r e s t s of P a k i s t a n , pp. 12-15.-- 126 -nearest neighbour f o r whom we have nothing but good wishes.\" 7 At t h i s time agreement was reached to a meeting over Kashmir i n May. In s p i t e of these mutual d e c l a r a t i o n s of good f a i t h , they were only s u p e r f i c i a l ; the basic outlooks of India and Pa k i s t a n remained unchanged. Even as these c o r d i a l exchanges were t a k i n g place on the sub-continent, the Pa k i s t a n High Commissioner'in London was urging that the Commonwealth should take the i n i t i a t i v e i n s o l v i n g the d i s p u t e ; ? 2 on February 9, i n London, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru hinted that a p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n t o the Kashmir problem' could be found i n p a r t i t i o n (presumably along the Cease-Fire l i n e ) . 7 3 Mohammed A l i , r e p r e s e n t i n g the a i l i n g Ghulam Mohammed, and accompanied by General Iskander Mirza and Abid Hussain, a r r i v e d In D e l h i on May 14 t o discuss such problems as the fu t u r e of Kashmir, border clashes and the f u t u r e of the In d i a O f f i c e L i b r a r y . I n contrast t o the c o r d i a l atmosphere surrounding the d i s c u s s i o n s i n August 1953, the Indian a t t i t u d e was cool - t e n s i o n i n Kashmir increased as border clashes increased i n both magnitude and f e r o c i t y . Because of the absence of Ghulam Mohammed, moreover, the d i s c u s s i o n s over Kashmir between Mohammed A l i and Nehru never reached the f i n a l stage, and the conference ended i n the vague communique agreeing to continue d i s c u s s i o n s at a l a t t e r date.'7^ 71. Pak. Press Release. Jan 18, '55. 72. Times\" Jan. 21, '55. 73. I b i d . Feb. 10, '55. 74. NYT. May 19, '55. - 127 -While the n e g o t i a t i o n s were underway the American, B r i t i s h and Indian press began to speculate on the nature of the d i s -cussions and the prospects f o r a r a p i d settlement. The Times correspondent noted that P a k i s t a n had decided not t o p e r s i s t \" i n t h i s obviously u n p r o f i t a b l e approach /of a p l e b i s c i t e / 7 n75 f o r the time being. ^ The New York Times correspondent went even f u r t h e r and not only stated that p r i v a t e l y P a k i s t a n had recognized the f u t i l i t y of demanding a p l e b i s c i t e and was not only prepared t o accept the p o s s i b l e p a r t i t i o n of the s t a t e w i t h a p l e b i s c i t e . i n the V a l e , but was a l s o w i l l i n g to use 76 her f u t u r e w i t h i n the Western a l l a i n c e as a b a r g a i n i n g p o i n t . The Observer, moreover, divulged that Mohammed A l i was pre-pared to bargain away American m i l i t a r y a i d f o r India's accept-ance of a United Nations p l e b i s c i t e a d m i n i s t r a t o r . F u r t h e r -more, Pakistan's Intense d e s i r e t o solve the dispute wa-s.-vrav.ealed when the P a k i s t a n Prime M i n i s t e r was reported t o be w i l l i n g to a l l o w Nehru to decide how many Indian troops should remain i n Kashmir. - a r a d i c a l ' d e p a r t u r e . T h e i n f l u e n t i a l Eastern Economist, on the other hand, disregarded the vagueness of the j o i n t communique and asserted that a s o l u t i o n other than on the 78 b a s i s of a p l e b i s c i t e , - was not too d i s t a n t . Even the- o f f i c i a l pronouncements gave r i s e to the b e l i e f that a t o t a l l y new s o l u t i o n was i n the o f f i n g . On May 18, 75. Times. May 19, '55. 7 6 • NYT. May 19, '55. 77. The Observer. May 2.2, '55. 78. \"The S t a t e of Indo-Pakistan R e l a t i o n s . \" The Eastern Economist, New D e l h i , May 20, 1955. - 128 -Mohammed A l i remarked that the approach was new and l e s s r i g i d ; Nehru, on h i s p a r t , summarized the conference w i t h the s t a t e -ment that the approach was not only f r i e n d l y but a l s o construct--79 i v e and-not the old \"deadwall\" approach. With statements l i k e the above, i t was l i t t l e wonder that the press became h i g h l y s p e c u l a t i v e . Whereas the Western and Indian press adopted an o p t i m i s t i c a t t i t u d e , the Pa k i s t a n press and p o l i t i c a n s reacted i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t manner. Instead of p r a i s i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of a.soluti'oh to the Kashmir i m b r o g l i o , a l l p a r t i e s unleashed a b i t t e r a t t a c k against Mohammed A l i and h i s m i n i s t e r s f o r b e t r a y i n g the people of Kashmir and \"appeasing\" Bharat. In three successive e d i t o r i a l s , the i n f l u e n t i a l Dawn demanded' a- c l e a r statement of the D e l h i proceedings, and although Mohammed A l l remarked that there could be other methods of a s c e r t a i n i n g the w i l l of the people, i t r e p l i e d that i f the task of s e t t l i n g the Kashmir i s s u e was too b i g f o r them, they should spare themselves the unequal e f f o r t s . This a t t a c k was continued by the leaders of the A l l - P a k i s t a n Dastoor Party and Jaamiat-i-Ulema who j o i n t l y declared that the Geverhment had \"betrayed\" both the nat i o n and i n h a b i t -ants of Kashmir, and that Mohammed A l i had b e t t e r c l a r i f y h i s remarks or wash h i s hands e n t i r e l y of the t a l k s . On May 25, the P a k i s t a n i Prime M i n i s t e r reversed h i s 79. Times. May 19, '55. NYT. May 24, '55. 80. c i t e d i n S i s a r Gupta, op. c i t . , , p . 11-15. - 129 -e a r l i e r statements and asserted that he had' not agreed to any other method of a s c e r t a i n i n g the Kashmiri w i l l except by a p l e b i s c i t e . Unconvinced, Dawn c a r r i e d an e d i t o r i a l on the same day which s t a t e d : I t i s q u i t e c l e a r that Mr. Nehru w i l l never be able to b r i n g himself to that reasonable, f a i r and honest frame of mind i n which h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitment to abide by the agreed procedure f o r the settlement of the dispute w i l l outweigh h i s overmastering greed to hold on to his l o o t by hook or by crook....Our Government... should here and now decide to have no more b i l a t e r a l t a l k s w i t h the B h a r a t i aggressor, and instead take the issue back to the United Nations...°2 As happened so often i n the past, i t was the press and zealous p o l i t i c i a n s who were guiding the P a k i s t a n i a t t i t u d e towards. Kashmir, and reg a r d l e s s of the agreements reached or a t t i t u d e s expressed i n D e l h i , Mohammed A l i was forced to bow to p u b l i c pressure. A c c o r d i n g l y , on June 1 he remarked that i f agreement could not be reached between the two Prime M i n i s t e r s at t h e i r next meeting, \"then there w i l l be no point i n c a r r y i n g the d i s c u s s i o n any f u r t h e r . O n June 8, more-over, the Pa k i s t a n Government completed i t s v o l t e f a c e , when Mohammed A l i declared that no s a t i s f a c t o r y progress was made at D e l h i , and \"there was no question of g i v i n g up our stand 84 f o r a p l e b i s c i t e . \" Indeed, a p o l i t i c i a n must remain popular, and Mohammed A l l , \"in appeasing p u b l i c opinion and co n t i n u i n g the \"hard l i n e \" against I n d i a , proved no exception. 81. i b i d . 82. i b i d . 83. NYT. June 2, '55-84. NYT. June 9, '55'. - 130 -This v o l t e face by the P a k i s t a n Government was i n t e r p r e t e d by D e l h i as f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of P a k i s t a n i i n t r a n s i g e n c e and determination to f o r c e upon India an i m p r a c t i c a b l e United Nations-sponsored p l e b i s c i t e . Yet India could i l l a f f o r d such a p l e b i s c i t e and consequently the P a k i s t a n \"hard l i n e \" was duly followed by an Indian counterpart as both nations went t h e i r separate ways. On J u l y 8, the Indian Home M i n i s t e r , Pandit Pant, addressed a press conference i n Sranagar, where he placed the blame f o r the f a i l u r e of n e g o t i a t i o n s squarely upon P a k i s t a n and declared that the d e c i s i o n of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to j o i n 8C India could not be disregarded. ^ Nehru, in' a s i m i l a r frame of mind, r e - a f f i r m e d Pant's remarks and stated that there was no use \"going round and round w i t h our eyes b l i n d f o l d e d \" and that w h i l e India s t i l l stood by her commitment f o r a p l e b i s c i t e t h i s was not the only method of s e t t l i n g the i s s u e . ^ The i n f e r e n c e was t h a t , since P a k i s t a n had changed the c o n d i t i o n s on the sub-continent and s t i l l demanded an u n r e a l i s t i c p l e b -i s c i t e , India could f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n applying her own s o l u t i o n . The f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s f i r m e r Indian p o l i c y came i n October 1955 w i t h the a r r e s t and detention of s i x t e e n Kashmiri o p p o s i t i o n members, cl i m a x i n g with the a r r e s t on November 20 of Mirza Beg, the leader of the Kashmiri P e l b i s c i t e F r o n t . ^ I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that t h i s overt move was unanimously accepted 85. NYT. J u l y 12, '55. 86. i b i d . 87. Times. Oct. 2.1, '55; Nov. 21, '55. - 131 -by a l l Indian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . For t h e i r p a r t , the new P a k i s t a n Government of Chaudhuri Mohammed A l i continued the p o l i c y of i t s successors i n demand-in g a p l e b i s c i t e . At a r a l l y on October 21, the Prime M i n i s t e r declared I t i s . . . d i s a p p o i n t i n g that i n I n d i a , where the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of other people i s proclaimed, not one p o l i t i c a l p arty i s prepared to apply i t to Kashmir.°8 Furthermore, i n l a t e November, an A l l - P a r t y Conference r e p r e s e n t i n g a l l shades of p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s o p i n i o n met i n Karachi and unanimously condemned In d i a n i n t r a n s i g e n c e and approved a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n K a s h m i r . T h e d i f f e r e n c e s between the d i s p u t i n g nations were becoming t r u l y \"fundamental i n nature.\" (D) S o v i e t I n t e r f e r e n c e i n Kashmir Up to t h i s date the Kashmir dispute had been p r i m a r i l y an i s s u e between India and P a k i s t a n , and although there were, di s c u s s i o n s at the United Nations, i n f o r m a l meetings at Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r Conferences, and attempts by Pak-i s t a n to place the dispute on the agenda of the Colombo Conference, the Great Powers, to t h e i r c r e d i t and d i s p i t e a l l t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , s t e a d f a s t l y refused t o draw Kashmir i n t o the area of Cold War p o l i t i c s . The Soviet Union, how-ever, deserves the dubious d i s t i n c t i o n of breaking t h i s 88. I b i d . Oct. 21, '55. 89. Govt- of P a k i s t a n . A l l Party Conference on Kashmir, K a r a c h i , 1955. t r a d i t i o n . - 132 -I n December 1955, the Sov i e t l e a d e r s , Bulganin and Krush-chev, on tour i n I n d i a , s u r p r i s e d t h e i r hosts by expressing t h e i r d e s i r e to v i s i t K a s h m i r . 9 0 \"Without paying a v i s i t to Kashmir\" declared Bulganin, \"our tour of India would be i n -complete.\"^ 1 While i n Srinagar, Krushchev, obviously perturbed over Pakistan's acceptance of American m i l i t a r y a i d and member-ship i n the Western a l l i a n c e and f u l l y aware of Nehru'\"'s f e e l -ings on the su b j e c t , \" d e c l a r e d : \" I t i s too l a t e f o r changes / i n Kashmir/...the question...has been decided by the people of Kashmir i t s e l f . \" 9 2 Prime M i n i s t e r Bakshi's Immediate r e a c t i o n was t o - c l a i m \" t h i s i s the Soviet view, and they have every r i g h t to hold i t . \" Ghulam Mohammed Sadig, President of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, however, was f a r more emphatic when he declared \"This i s a most powerful endorsement of our stand, and the world seems t o be r e a l i z i n g our a s p i r a t i o n s . \" 9 - ^ Nehru, obviously pleased by t h i s sudden t u r n of events, agreed, and welcomed 94 t h i s S o v i e t support. The P a k i s t a n r e a c t i o n , as one might expect, was one of extreme b i t t e r n e s s . The r e a l a t t i t u d e of some P a k i s t a n i s 90. The Manchester Guardian Weekly. Dec. 8, '55. 91. Times. Dec. 10, '55. \" 92. The Observer. Dec. 11, '55. This statement was v i r t u a l l y reversed by Anastas Mikoyan, when during a v i s i t t o Pak-i s t a n i n March 1956 he declared that the Kashmir is s u e should be solved by the Kashmiris; h i s remark consequently was widely ignored i n I n d i a . 93. Times. Dec. 12, \"55. 94. NYT. Jan. ^4, '56. - 133 -towards the Western - a l l i a n c e was revealed on January 3, when a r e s o l u t i o n was placed before the Muslim League Convention c a l l i n g upon P a k i s t a n to withdraw from her a l l i a n c e unless she received more support against India.^5 The I s l a m i c Review, however, With f a r more l o g i c , r e c a l l e d the P a k i s t a n i d e s i r e to r e t u r n the dispute to the S e c u r i t y Council and the S o v i e t Veto, noted w i t h d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and considerable f o r e s i g h t \" t h i s veto might be the end of t h i s long drawn out attempt at peaceful n e g o t i a t i o n s . . . / a n d / a heightening of t e n s i o n s p r i n g i n g from the b e l i e f that / India/ i s r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g Kashmir as part of her t e r r i t o r i e s . \" ^ (E) I n t e g r a t i o n of Kashmir i n t o India The year 1956 could be described as one i n which both India and P a k i s t a n , having already accepted the f a i l u r e of b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , vied w i t h each other t o o b t a i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l support f o r t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Kashmir p o l i c i e s , and i n the case of both n a t i o n s , the approach was modified as l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l arguments were reviewed f o r the f o r t h -coming debate at the United Nations. As prophesied by the I s l a m i c Review, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru took f u l l advantage of h i s new-found and u n s o l i c i t e d Soviet support t o strengthen h i s p o s i t i o n i n Kashmir: he was n e i t h e r prepared to discuss the Kashmir problem except w i t h i n i t s new 95. NYT. Jan 4, '56. 96. The I s l a m i c Review (Woking, S u r r e y ) . XLV:1 (January 1956), PP. 3-4. - 134 -concept nor t o l e r a n t of any outside (Western) i n t e r f e r e n c e . On January 28, t h e r e f o r e , a new move by the P a k i s t a n i Govern-ment to reopen n e g o t i a t i o n s , dormant since May 1955, was r e -buffed by India as \" i n o p p o r t u n e , 1 , 9 7 x\\rhile on March 8, the communique issued by the SEATO powers .'meeting i n Karachi a f f i r m i n g \"the need f o r a quick settlement\" i n Kashmir was denounced by Nehru as \"a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i s backing one country, namely P a k i s t a n , i n i t s disputes w i t h India.\"98 A l s o aware of the Soviet statements i n S r i n a g a r , V. Krishna Menon warned the SEATO members that India \" w i l l not t o l e r a t e any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n a f f a i r s which concern our n a t i o n a l sov-' ereignty.\"99 In a speech before the Lok Sabha on March 27, the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r announced that Kashmir was an i n t e g r a l part of India and that four m i l l i o n Kashmiris had v o l u n t a r i l y chosen to become part of I n d i a . He went on to say that a C o n s t i t u t i o n would be drawn up by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to r e -place the P r e s i d e n t i a l Order issued i n May 1955. This pro-nouncement was folloitfed by a statement which not only affirmed the Indian a l l e g a t i o n s of P a k i s t a n i aggression but a l s o r e -i t e r a t e d what by now must be considered the main reason f o r India's i n t r a n s i g e n c e - the fe a r of a communal holocaust.' ...We want to avoid any steps being taken which would be d i s r u p t i v e , which would upset things that have s e t t l e d down and which might lead to migra-t i o n of people...and which f u r t h e r , would again lead to c o n f l i c t w i t h P a k i s t a n . There i s no s e t t l e -ment of the Kashmir problem i f the manner of s e t t l i n g 97. NYT. Jan.29, '56. 98. WT. March 9, '56; March 21, '56. 99. NYT. June 2, '56. - 135 -i t leads to f r e s h c o n f l i c t w i t h Pakistan.1°° On A p r i l 2, Nehru openly r e j e c t e d the p r i n c i p l e of a p l e b i s c i t e and charged that United States m i l i t a r y a i d , Pak-i s t a n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Western A l l i a n c e (SEATO and Bagh-dad) and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments on the sub-continent made i t necessary to \"discuss /Kashmir/ from another point of view; t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the new c o n d i t i o n s that have a r i s e n . On the withdrawal of P a k i s t a n i troops from Kashmir, the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r declared \" i t makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e now to what extent P a k i s t a n withdraws...There i s much more m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l - s i t t i n g on the other s i d e . I t makes a huge d i f f e r -102 ence.\" Thus India was u n i l a t e r a l l y r e j e c t i n g not only her o f t - s t a t e d p o l i c y towards a p l e b i s c i t e but a l s o the two United Nations Resolutions of 194§ and 1951. Chaudhury Mohammed A l i ' s r e a c t i o n to the above came on A p r i l 6 when he declared i n the Assembly: Quite obviously i t i s India's i n t e n t i o n to go f o r -ward w i t h t h i s bogus Constituent Assembly, to a l l o w i t to frame a c o n s i t u t i o n f o r Kashmir to hold e l e c -t i o n s on the basis of that c o n s t i t u t i o n c l a i m that Kashmir had f i n a l l y become part of I n d i a . 103\" The P a k i s t a n Prime M i n i s t e r ' s f o r e s i g h t was c o n s i d e r a b l e , and w i t h the exception of \"the shadow of Indian bayonets\" (which depended s o l e l y upon one's n a t i o n a l b i a s ) , t h i s was p r e c i s e l y 100. Nehru. Speeches, V o l . I I I . pp. 223-4. 101.. NYT. A p r i l 3, '56. The new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s '. \" '. obviously r e f e r r e d t o the movement to re-organize the Indian States and the formation of the I s l a m i c Republic of P a k i s t a n i n February 1956. 1 0 2 • NYT. A p r i l 3, '56. 103. NYT. A p r i l 7, '56. - 136 -the step taken by I n d i a . Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru c l a r i f i e d h i s A p r i l 2nd d e c l a r a t i o n on A p r i l 13th when he stated that even though I n d i a could adopt a l e g a l approach to the question of Kashmir, what was needed was a p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n t a k i n g i n t o account the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and m i l i t a r y developments i n the preceeding years. He not only suggested s t r a i g h t p a r t i t i o n along the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e and i n exchange India would drop her l e g a l claims to the t e r r i -t ory occupied by Azad Kashmir, but a l s o he declared t h i s sugges-t i o n was presented at the D e l h i d i s c u s s i o n s i n May 1955, where i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , P a k i s t a n suggested the p a r t i t i o n of the Sta t e w i t h a p l e b i s c i t e only i n the Vale. These proposals were immediately rejected, by P a k i s t a n and hence a l e g a l approach 104 became i n e v i t a b l e . The two Prime M i n i s t e r s i n f o r m a l l y discussed the Kashmir iss u e at the June Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Conference i n London. Yet these meetings only i n d i c a t e d that there had been no fundamen-t a l change i n the a t t i t u d e s of both c o u n t r i e s . When asked at a press conference i f a s o l u t i o n could be worked out along the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e , Chaudhury Mohammed A l i r e p l i e d : \"That sugges-t i o n i s wholly unacceptable, not only to P a k i s t a n but a l s o the people of Kashmir.\"\"'\"05 On J u l y 5, moreover, Chaudhury, as i f . a t t e m p t i n g to remove the communal wind from India's ,104. NYT. A p r i l 15, '56. Such p a r t i t i o n along the cease-f i r e l i n e would give India two-thirds of the t e r r i t o r y and f o u r - f i f t h s of the po p u l a t i o n . 105. Times. June 25, '56. - 137 -s a i l and appeal to world o p i n i o n , stated at a Friends of Pak-i s t a n S o c i e t y meeting i n London I f people of Kashmir were t o decide i n a f r e e vote to go to I n d i a , we might f e e l h urt. But we w i l l n o t ' r a i s e our l i t t l e f i n g e r and we w i l l say \"God bless you - t h i s i s your f r e e choice.\"106 Nevertheless, P a k i s t a n s t i l l claimed the r i g h t to appeal to r e l i g i o u s emotion during any such vote. Yet Nehru was not prepared to accept t h i s s o l u t i o n , f o r , as the Round Table India correspondent wrote: \"In the u n l i k e l y event of India's agreement to a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir, i t would be fought e x c l u s i v e l y on the issue of r e l i g i o n . . . M r . Nehru cannot p o s s i b l y a l l o w t h i s to happen...\"107 On October 10, the P a k i s t a n i f e a r s of an Indian f a i t accompli i n Kashmir increased when the Bakshi Government presented i t s d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n to the Constituent Assembly f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n and approval. This d r a f t , unanimously accepted on November 17, not only declared i n S e c t i o n 3 \"the Sta t e of Jammu and Kashmir i s and s h a l l be an i n t e g r a l part of the Union of I n d i a \" but a l s o included p r o v i s i o n s which would prevent the i n t r o d u c t i o n of any b i l l or amendment which would a l t e r the State's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h I n d i a . This act by the Constituent Assembly, purely d e c l a r a t o r y i n nature, was promulgated on January 26, 1957 whereupon the Assembly d i s s o l v e d i t s e l f f o r new e l e c t i o n s . S e c t i o n 3, however, became e f f e c t i v e •106. Times. J u l y 6, '56. 107. \"India and Her Neighbours.\" The Round Table, No. 184, (Sept. 1956), p. 346. 108. Lakhanpal. op_. c i t . , p. 269. - 138 -on November 17 of that 'year. Accompanying t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y a c t , f o r the Constituent Assembly was a sub-sovereign body, were the Government of India's States R e o r g a n i z a t i o n Act of 1956 and the C o n s t i t u -t i o n (Seventh Amendment) Act of 1956, both of which came i n t o e f f e c t on November 1, 1956, and i n f a c t removed the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p enjoyed between Kashmir and D e l h i . 1 0 9 To I n d i a , the i n a u g u r a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r Kashmir, and the r e c o g n i t i o n of Kashmir as one of t h e i r fourteen S t a t e s , was simply a formal r e c o g n i t i o n of the status which had In f a c t e x i s t e d since the Maharajah's- accession. The reason behind t h i s Indian and Kashmiri move was r e -vealed by Nehru on January 31, 1957 when he declared Nothing should be done which might b r i n g before us the horrors of August, September and October 1947. This i s the governing c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n our minds. Every step we have taken has been guided by that thought...! do not want, i n the name of a p l e b i s -c i t e , to be now made the scene of a f r a t r i c i d a l war. Such a war would spread to other parts\" of India and would upset the delecate balances that have been e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s a matter, t h e r e f o r e , of utmost concern and consequence to us that no step be taken i n Kashmir which: w i l l have these tremendous r e a c t i o n s . . . l i u Thus as f a r as India was concerned the case of Kashmir was closed. I t remained f o r the Government of India t o , j u s t i f y i t s a c t i o n s , i n l e g a l r a t h e r than emotional terms, before the bar of world opinion. 109. A r t i c l e s 356 and 357 of the Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n (Pres-ident's r u l e ) were not extended to Kashmir u n t i l Dec-ember 1964. 110. Nehru. Speeches, V o l . I l l , pp. 2.34-35. i t a l l i c s mine. - 139 -CHAPTER EIGHT RENEWED SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS (A) The J a r r i n g Report and Graham M i s s i o n On January 16, 1957, the P a k i s t a n i delegate, F i r o z Khan Noon, charged i n the S e c u r i t y Council that I n d i a had aggravated c o n d i t i o n s on the sub-continent and v i o l a t e d her i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitment be r e f u s i n g to hold a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir. He th e r e f o r e asked the S e c u r i t y Council to r e s t r a i n India from accepting the d e c i s i o n of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and to s p e l l out the o b l i g a t i o n s expected of both nations under the various S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and United Nations Commi-s s i o n r e s o l u t i o n s . Obviously aware of the success of the United Nations Emergency Force i n Egypt, Noon suggested the p o s s i b l e use of a United Nations f o r c e to poli c e * Kashmir dur-ing the p l e b i s c i t e period.\" 1' Thus P a k i s t a n was as f i r m l y committed to a p l e b i s c i t e as ever. R e p l y i n g at length on January 23, the Indian delegate V. K. Krishna Menon, r e s t a t e d the o r i g i n a l I ndian p o s i t i o n which can be summarized as f o l l o w s : (1) the s t a t e had l e g a l l y acceded t o I n d i a ; (2) i t was a co n s t i t u e n t u n i t of the Indian Union; (3) P a k i s t a n had committed an act of aggression against the s t a t e and had not withdrawn from the v i o l a t e d t e r r i t o r y ; (4) circumstances had changed on the sub-continent ( m i l i t a r y 1. S/PV. 761. Jan. 16, 1957. - 140 -ai d to P a k i s t a n , membership i n the Western a l l i a n c e and a pending Kashmir c o n s t i t u t i o n ) and that India could not f o r -ever regard the p l e b i s c i t e as b i n d i n g ; and (5) the promise of a reference to the people had been made u n i l a t e r a l l y to p the Maharajah of Kashmir and nonone e l s e . On the s p e c i f i c charge that the ac t i o n s of the Constituent Assembly were i n v i o l a t i o n of India's i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitments, Menon de-cla r e d that i t was a \"sub-sovereign body\" ( s i c ) and that i n e f f e c t a l l that would happen on January 26, would be that I t would \" d i s s o l v e i t s e l f . \" 3 The m a j o r i t y of the S e c u r i t y Council remained uncon-vinced, and even before Menon had f i n i s h e d h i s marathon speech (8 hours, 40 minutes) a r e s o l u t i o n was presented r e c a l l i n g the previous C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s and s t a t i n g that the a c t i o n s of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly were contrary to those p r i n c i p l e s . This was passed by a 10 to 0 vote w i t h the Sov i e t 4 Union a b s t a i n i n g . Menon immediately served n o t i c e that h i s Government was ne i t h e r a party t o the r e s o l u t i o n nor bound by i t s contents. Consequently, the new Kashmir C o n s t i t u t i o n came i n t o e f f e c t on January 26, and the Assembly d i s s o l v e d i t s e l f f o r f r e s h e l e c t i o n s . 2. S/PV. 762, 763; Jan. 23, 1957. 3. S/PV. 763. PP. 34-35. 4. For h i s f i r m stand on Kashmir, Krishna Menon was acclaimed as the \"Lion of Kashmir\" - thus r e p l a c i n g Abdullah. 4. S/3779. . Jan. 2.4., 1957. . 5. S/PV. 764. Jan. 24, 1957. - 141 -In answer to Pakistan's request f o r concrete steps l e a d -i n g to the implementation of a p p l e b i s c i t e , a second r e s o l u t i o n was presented: (1) v o i c i n g concern over the l a c k of progress i n the dispute; (2.) g i v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the p o s s i b l e use of United Nations troops i n connection w i t h d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n ; and (3) asking the President of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l (Gunnar J a r r i n g of Sweden) to help achieve d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n and f u r -6 ther a i d i n the settlement of the dispute. This r e s o l u t i o n , b i t t e r l y denounced by Menon, was vetoed by the Soviet Union - an ominous forewarning of the f u t u r e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the S e c u r i t y C ouncil and Russia's r o l e i n the dis p u t e . In s p i t e of t h i s setback a second r e s o l u t i o n was pre-sented on February 2.1 which excluded mention of d e m i l i t a r -i z a t i o n and the p o s s i b l e use of United Nations troops. Void of a l l controversy, and hence accepted by the S e c u r i t y Council members, i t simply asked J a r r i n g t o examine any proposals \" l i k e l y to c o n t r i b u t e t o a settlement\" and i n v i t e d the co-operation of the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s . 7 Once again, however, Krishna Menon made i t abundantly c l e a r that Kashmir was \"by law, by. e q u i t y , by every moral and p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n \" part of I n d i a , and although J a r r i n g would be welcomed as a o guest, India could not guarantee co-operation. J a r r i n g ' s mission to the sub-continent l a s t e d from March 14 to A p r i l ,11=,. and perhaps r e c o g n i z i n g the overtones of the Cold War and h i s country's n e u t r a l i t y , he could o f f e r no 6. S/3787. Feb. 14, 1957. 7. S/3793. Feb. 21, 1957. 8. S/PV. 774. Feb. 21, 1957. - 142 -concrete proposals f o r settlement. What i s i n t e r e s t i n g how-ever, i s the nature of J a r r i n g ' s proposals and the Indian and P a k i s t a n i r e a c t i o n s . Although J a r r i n g stated that any charge of aggression was i r r e l e v a n t , he went on to say that notwithstanding the \"grave problems that might a r i s e i n connection w i t h a p l e b i s c i t e \" and the grave concern \"expressed i n connection w i t h the changing p o l i t i c a l , economic and s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s , \" he s t i l l proposed a r b i t r a t i o n t o determine whether or not Part One ( D e m i l i t a r -i z a t i o n ) of the August 13, 1948 r e s o l u t i o n had been implemented. P a k i s t a n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y accepted J a r r i n g ' s recommendation i n favour of a r b i t r a t i o n ; I n d i a , on the other hand, r e j e c t e d i t completely on the grounds that \"such procedures would be i n -c o n s i s t e n t with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and that since P a k i s t a n had no locus s t a n d i i n the dispute any a r b i t r a -t i o n would increase her s t a t u s . Paced with t h i s i r r e c o n c i l -able stand, J a r r i n g had no choice but t o admit f a i l u r e and t a b l e h i s report w i t h the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . D i s c u s s i o n on J a r r i n g ' s report opened i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on September 2.4, and, as was expected, both sides offered t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to place t h e i r case i n the best p o s s i b l e l i g h t . P i r o z Noon saw i n the report a condemna-t i o n of Indian i n t r a n s i g e n c e f o r her r e f u s a l t o accept a r b i t r a -t i o n ; Krishna Menon, i n t e r p r e t e d J a r r i n g ' s \"changed c o n d i t i o n s \" as a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of the de f a c t o s i t u a t i o n on the sub-S/382.I. A p r i l 29, 1957. - 143 -continent and denounced P a k i s t a n f o r her \" m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . \" 1 ' Menon did not, however, comment upon J a r r i n g ' s reference that aggression was i r r e l e v a n t . 1 1 The Indian delegate a l s o claimed that he was not prepared to accept the \" B a l k a n i z a -t i o n \" of h i s country f o r \"an a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e which does not e x i s t \" , and that i f there was any d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i n 12 Kashmir, i t would only apply to P a k i s t a n . On November 15, a B r i t i s h - s p o n s o r e d d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n was c i r c u l a t e d c a l l i n g f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a p l e b i s c i t e and asking Dr. Frank Graham (the United Nations mediator) fro procede to the sub-continent to devise a method of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n which should be c a r r i e d out three months a f t e r agreement has been reached. -J Menon's r e a c t i o n was immediate and b i t t e r as he launched a personal t i r a d e 14 IS against S i r P i e r s o n S i x o n , the B r i t i s h delegate. ' ^ The Soviet delegate, s i d i n g w i t h I n d i a , declared that the r e s o l u -t i o n was u n r e a l i s t i c and i f brought to a formal vote he would have no a l t e r n a t i v e but to e x e r c i s e h i s veto. In an e f f o r t t o salvage the r e s o l u t i o n , Sweden proposed two wide amendments which deleted mention of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n and Graham's p r e -vious r e p o r t s as w e l l as the paragraph on d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n 10. S/PV. 791, 795. Sept. 24, Oct. 9, 1957. 11. S/PV. 796. Oct. 9, 1957-12. S/PV. 798. Nov. 11, 1957. 13. S/39H. Nov. 15, 1957. 14. Although much of t h i s speech was l a t e r s t r i c k e n from the record and Menon f o r m a l l y apologized, i t s remnants c l e a r l y show the Indian f e a r over the p o s s i b l e r e s u l t s of a p l e b i s c i t e . 15. S/PV. 803. Nov. 18, 1957. - 144 -procedures. On December 2, t h e r e f o r e , a weak r e s o l u t i o n was approved: ( l ) c a l l i n g f o r both nations t o attempt to create and maintain a c o r d i a l atmosphere; (2) requesting Graham t o make recommendations t o a i d i n the implementation of the August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 r e s o l u t i o n s ; and (3) ask-i n g him to v i s i t the sub-continent and report back as soon as p o s s i b l e . 1 ^ Once again India r e j e c t e d the S e c u r i t y Council's l a t e s t attempts when Menon announced: \" I am authorized by and asked to s t a t e on behalf of the Government of India that we do not accept t h i s r e s o l u t i o n . \" 1 7 Notwithstanding India's r e f u s a l to accept the December 2 r e s o l u t i o n , Dr. Prank Graham a r r i v e d i n New D e l h i on Jan-uary 12, 1958 to car r y out di s c u s s i o n s w i t h Indian and Pak-i s t a n i leader's. -In 'his r e p o r t , t a b l e d on May 31, Graham \"\"'noted that on the eve of h i s departure, February 15, he had presented ~\\ Pi the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by both p a r t i e s : ( l ) a renewed d e c l a r a t i o n by both coun t r i e s to maintain a favourable atmosphere and to r e f r a i n from statements or ac t i o n s which would aggravate the s i t u a t i o n ; (2) mutual respect f o r the i n t e g r i t y of the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e ; .(3) the withdrawal of P a k i s t a n i troops and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the evacuated areas by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s under United Nations s u r v e i l l a n c e ; (4) the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian troops; (5) agree-ment on Part Three ( P l e b i s c i t e ) of the August 13, 1948 16. S/3922. Dec. 2, 1957. 17. S/PV. 808. Dec. 2, 1957. 18. S/3984. May 31, 1958. - 145 -r e s o l u t i o n ; and (6) n e g o t i a t i o n s under United Nations auspices. Furthermore, Graham suggested the p o s s i b l e use of United Nations troops i n the area evacuated by P a k i s t a n . 1 9 According to Graham, P a k i s t a n agreed to a l l h i s sugges-t i o n s . I n d i a , on the other hand,.rejected a l l the proposals and blamed P a k i s t a n f o r f a i l i n g t o implement the e a r l i e r r e s o l u t i o n s and vacate her aggression i n Kashmir. India claimed that P a k i s t a n had no locus s t a n d i i n the dispute and that any new d e c l a r a t i o n ori maintaining a \"peaceful atmos-phere\" or r e s p e c t i n g the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e might denote a displacement of previous engagements - an I n t e r e s t i n g a s s e r t i o n since India was not prepared to honour hers. On the s p e c i f i c t use of a United Nations f o r c e , India declared that t h i s was 2 0 \" h i g h l y improper and indeed an u n f r i e n d l y a c t . \" ' U n l i k e the J a r r i n g Report, the f r u i t s of Graham's mission were n e i t h e r discussed nor debated, as i t s r e j e c t i o n , l i k e that of i t s predecesj&or,,was a foregone c o n c l u s i o n . The seventeen-month renewed e f f o r t by the S e c u r i t y Council to solve the,,,.lndia-Pakistan Question only served to i n d i c a t e the I n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the world body to solve ah I n t e r s n a t i o n a l dispute when faced by an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ' p a r t y . With nothing to l o s e , P a k i s t a n could, and indeed d i d , accept every one of the Council's r e s o l u t i o n s ; whether or not she would f a i t h f u l l y 'implement a'ny r e s o l u t i o n wa's' purely a matt'er\":s*of ' s p e c u l a t i o n . I n d i a , on the other hand, remained adamant i n 19. i b i d . i t a l l i c s mine. 20. I b i d . , p. 9. - 146 -her d e s i r e not t o a l t e r the Kashmir status quo - except.,- of course, i n her favour. She had u n i l a t e r a l l y set the condi-t i o n s r e quired f o r a p l e b i s c i t e , and not only r e j e c t e d a p l e b i s c i t e but a l s o refused to a l l o w any e x t e r n a l a r b i t r a t i o n or or mediation to determine whether or not these c o n d i t i o n s had been f u l f i l l e d . Furthermore, by d e c l a r i n g that Kashmir was an i n t e g r a l part of I n d i a , and that t h i s could not be questioned, India was p r e s e n t i n g not only P a k i s t a n , but the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , w i t h the prophesied f a i t accompli. With Pakistan's determina-t i o n to hold a p l e b i s c i t e i n Kashmir, and I n d i a ' s , not t o change the status quo, there could be no meeting of minds. (B) The Interregnum With the c o l l a p s e of parliamentary government i n Pak-i s t a n , and the ensuing r u l e of the former Chief of S t a f f , F i e l d M a r s h a l l Mohammed Ayub Khan, i n October 1958, i t seemed to many observers that the Kashmir dispute could take a new t u r n . Free from the c r i e s of- i r r e s p o n s i b l e p o l i t i c i a n s who were only using the Kashmir i s s u e as a whipping board f o r p u b l i c support, Ayub Khan was i n a p o s i t i o n to r e c o n c i l e t-I n d o - P a k i s t a n i ^ d i f f e r e n c e s without appealing f o r or respons-i b l e to parliamentary support. Well versed i n the B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n s he f u l l y recognized the n e c e s s i t y f o r the j o i n t defence of the sub-continent - e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the menace of Chinese i n T i b e t . Consequently, the new Pres-ident held out the hand of f r i e n d s h i p to India only t o f i n d i t promptly r e j e c t e d . Once again the dispute hardened as - 147 -Ayub Khan adopted the Kashmir p o l i c y of h i s predecessors. With the s i g n i n g of the Indus Water Treaty and the s e t t l e -ment of the canal waters i s s u e i n i960 along l i n e s proposed by the World Bank, Kashmir, the l a s t major source of i r r i t a t i o n , once again became the f o c a l p o i n t of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . One would expect, t h e r e f o r e , that a concentrated e f f o r t would be made by both p a r t i e s to remove the f i n a l obstacle hinder-in g c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between the two nations; and although Nehru was on record that he would not take the i n i t i a t i v e f o r any negotiated settlement, h i s Finance M i n i s t e r M o r a r j i Desai had hinted that other disputes (obviously Kashmir) could be 21 s e t t l e d i n the same manner as the canal waters i s s u e . Notwithstanding t h i s w e l l - p l a c e d remark, there s t i l l remained no meeting of minds as to the best method of s o l v i n g the d i s p u t e . Both Nehru and Ayub Khan recognized the i n h e r -ent dangers i n Kashmir, yet as- the f o l l o w i n g statements w i l l show, there was not even agreement on the best method of approaching the i s s u e . On October 8, i960, Nehru t o l d a New York press conference that h i s Government was i n favour of maintaining the status quo i n Kashmir, f o r the \"moment pp you t o u c h ' i t i s l i k e opening 'Pandora's Box'.\" Ayub Khan, commenting on the above remarks, stated that Kashmir was more l i k e a \"time-bomb,\" and \"the answer i s to defuse i t as q u i c k l y p ^ as p o s s i b l e and that cannot be done without touching i t . \" D (2.1. A s i a n Recorder, p. 3295. Hereafter c i t e d as AR. 22. NYT. Oct. 9, '60. 23. A R T p . 5665. - 148 -The two leaders informally discussed t h e i r differences at the March 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference i n London. At this time, moreover, Ayub Khan went on record as w i l l i n g to consider an a l t e r n a t i v e to a p l e b i s c i t e - a ges-ture of no great importance since he did not qualify his statement. Instead of taking the i n i t i a t i v e i n carrying t h i s declaration\"'\"to\" f r u i t i o n the Indian Government continued i t s p o l i c y of aloofness.,, culminating with Nehru's statement -on June 20 that India was not prepared to discuss the issue with Pakistan u n t i l the Pakistan Army \"disappears\" from Kashmir (C) Renewed Security Council E f f o r t s Faced with the near im p o s s i b i l i t y of re-opening formal negotiations,, Ayub/,Khar.n.^ ai-nnOunG'eid\" on November 25 that he was returning the issue to the Security C o u n c i l . 2 ^ This state-ment was q u a l i f i e d on January 12, 1962 when i n a l e t t e r to the Council Pakistan requested a discussion on the Graham Report and expressed concern over recent statements by r e -sponsible Indians that t h e i r Government should force a solu-t i o n i n Kashmir and requesting a discussion on the Graham D . 2 7 Report. 24. Times. Mar. 23, '61. 25. AR. p. 4069. 26. NYT. Nov. 2.6, '61. 27. §75058. Jan. 12, 1962. On Jan. 4, 1962 Sanjiva Reddy, the Congress President, declared at the Annual Session that \"We hope that within a short period the Government w i l l take steps to liberate.../Azad/ Kashmir,\" while Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence, e a r l i e r stated \"We have not abjured violence i n regard to any country who violates our i n t e r e s t s . \" _ 149 -The India r e a c t i o n to Pakistan's l a t e s t move was, as one might expect, extremely b i t t e r ; and i n a l e t t e r to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , P a k i s t a n was denounced f o r attempting to \" e x p l o i t the 2 C o u n c i l as a propaganda forum against the Government of I n d i a . \" Furthermore, India claimed that the door was always open to ne g o t i a t i o n s and hence there was no need to use the Council to r e s o l v e d i f f e r e n c e s . Another P a k i s t a n l e t t e r , d e l i v e r e d on January 29, not only denounced India's attempts to block d i s c u s s i o n but a l s o claimed that the s i t u a t i o n on the sub-continent was \" d a i l y becoming more p r e c a r i o u s . \" 2 9 In order to cope wi t h Pakistan's obvious concern the Council c a l l e d a meeting f o r February 1, which heard representations from both p a r t i e s as to the need f o r d i s c u s s i o n , and then, upon India's request, adjourned u n t i l a f t e r the Indian General E l e c t i o n s . 3 ° While t h i s correspondence was being exchanged, and both p a r t i e s were preparing t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e populations f o r the forthcoming debate, President Kennedy, r e c a l l i n g the e f f e c t i v e -ness of the World Bank i n r e s o l v i n g the waters d i s p u t e , offered the good o f f i c e s of i t s P r e s i d e n t , Eugene B l a c k , to act as a mediator i n reaching settlement. This was immediately accepted by Ayub Khan on January 18, but declined by Nehru ten days l a t e r . Q u a l i f y i n g h i s r e j e c t i o n on February 2, 28. S/5060. c o r r . 1. Jan. 16, 1962. 29. S/5068. Jan. 29, 1962. 30. S/PV. 990. Feb. 1, 1962. 31. .NYT. Jan. 17, '62. - 150 -Nehru declared that he was opposed to a r b i t r a t i o n or mediation because India's sovereignty was in v o l v e d . He pr e f e r r e d b i -32 l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . On March 1 the Indian High Commissioner to P a k i s t a n , Rajeshwar Dazal, extended Nehru's i n v i t a t i o n to Ayub Khan to v i s i t I n d i a . I n r e p l y , the P a k i s t a n President proposed pre-paratory d i s c i s s u i o n at m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l p r i o r to any v i s i t , and asked that these should proceed independently of those at the United Nations. I n r e t u r n , however, Nehru declared that n e g o t i a t i o n s would be useless i f P a k i s t a n continued to press f o r d i s c u s s i o n i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Paced w i t h t h i s ultimatum, Ayub Khan r e p l i e d that a v i s i t to India under the present c o n d i t i o n s would not be worth h i s while.33 Thus de-bate i n the S e c u r i t y Council became assured and the one hundreth meeting on the I n d i a - P a k i s t a n Question began on A p r i l 27. Opening the debate, Z a f r u l l a h Khan (by coincidence Pak-i s t a n ' s o r i g i n a l negotiator i n 1948) declared that i f there was any pronouncement by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l that P a k i s t a n was i n d e f a u l t with regard to a n y , o b l i g a t i o n s , h i s Government would r e c t i f y that f a u l t \" w i t h i n the shortest p o s s i b l e time... so that the /Kashmir i s s u e / s h a l l be decided i n accordance wi t h the wishes of the p e o p l e . \" 3 ^ Furthermore, i n an attempt to appeal to world o p i n i o n as the defender of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n 3.2-. AR. p. 4452. 33. Keesings Contemporary A r c h i v e s , p. 18943. Hereafter c i t e d as Keesings. 34. S/PV. 1007. A p r i l 27, 1962. - 151 -and to f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e I n d i a , he announced that P a k i s t a n would accept any a r b i t r a t i o n award from any group, i n c l u d i n g one chosen by I n d i a . S p e c i f i c a l l y on the Graham Report, the P a k i s t a n delegate asked the. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t o determine: (T) the o b l i g a t i o n s of India and P a k i s t a n under the various United Nations Commission r e s o l u t i o n s ; (2) what was h o l d i n g up implementation of these r e s o l u t i o n s ; (3) whether or not e i t h e r p a r t y was i n d e f a u l t ; and (4) what was needed to be 35 done by e i t h e r party to reach implementation. ^ With regard to a r b i t r a t i o n Z a f r u l l a h Khan noted that Nehru had proposed a r b i t r a t i o n w i t h China over t h e i r boundary d i f f e r e n c e s and that the Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n ( A r t i c l e 51d) s p e c i f i c a l l y enf courages the \"settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes by a r b i t r a -t i o n . \" - ^ Why then,he claimed,must Kashmir be regarded as the exception r a t h e r than the r u l e ? I f the P a k i s t a n approach was p o s i t i v e and c o n s t r u c t i v e , bearing i n mind t h e i r previous determination upon a p l e b i s -c i t e , the a t t i t u d e taken by Krishna\" Menon->. the new \" L i o n of Kashmir\" was indeed the very opposite. On May 3 , Menon f l a t l y - d e n i e d any Indian commitment f o r a p l e b i s c i t e because of changed c o n d i t i o n s on the sub-con-t i n e n t and Pakistan's f a i l u r e t o vacate her aggression. He declared that since the accession of Kashmir was f u l l and complete; the Government of India was not prepared to 35. S/PV. 1008. May 2, 1962, p. 58. 36. I b i d . , pp. 56-57. - 152 -undermine her economy or s t a b i l i t y and that the India Con-^7 s t i t u t i o n did not provide f o r the secession of any s t a t e . Thus India remained as u n y i e l d i n g as ever. F o l l o w i n g nearly two months of b i t t e r debate between both p a r t i e s , during which time a l l members urged the r e -opening of d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , an Irish-sponsored r e s o l u -t i o n was introduced (1) reminding India and Pa k i s t a n of the previous r e s o l u t i o n s ; (2) urging both to enter i n t o negotia-t i o n s i n accordance w i t h A r t i c l e 33 of the Charter; (3) appealing f o r a c o r d i a l atmosphere on the sub-continent; and (4) requesting the a c t i n g Secretary-General to provide h i s s e r v i c e s to e i t h e r government. 3^ This r e s o l u t i o n was en-t h u s i a s t i c a l l y accepted by Pa k i s t a n . I n d i a , however, r e -jected i t completely. Speaking on the resolution,•Menon l i s t e d the c o n d i t i o n s required by India before any progress could 'be made: (1) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the s e c u r i t y of Kash-mir r e s t s w i t h I n d i a ; (2) the sovereignty of India over the e n t i r e S t a t e \" s h a l l not be c a l l e d to / s i c / question;\" (3) p l e b i s c i t e proposals s h a l l not be bi n d i n g unless P a k i s t a n \"vacates her aggression / s i c / ; (4) the Azad Kashmir Govern-ment w i l l not be recognized nor consolidated by P a k i s t a n ; (5) a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the evacuated areas w i l l r e v e r t to the Stat e of Jammu and Kashmir; (6) Azad Kashmir forces w i l l be disbanded and disarmed; and (.7) P a k i s t a n w i l l be excluded 39 from a l l i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . Thus, i n e f f e c t , India was 37. S/PV. 1009.' May 3, 1962. 38. S/5134. June 22, 1962. 39. S/PV. 1016. June 22, 1962, pp. 37-39. - 153 -t e l l i n g P a k i s t a n that the only way to reach a settlement was to give her complete l e g a l , economic and m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l over the S t a t e . I n view of Menon 1s e a r l i e r statement that there was no p r o v i s i o n i n the Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the secession of any s t a t e , the d i f f i c u l t question would a r i s e -what would remain to be s e t t l e d ? Notwithstanding the mile nature of the I r i s h r e s o l u t i o n , Menon apparently made i t abundantly c l e a r to the non-aligned A f r o - A s i a n members of the S e c u r i t y Council that t h e i r support of i t would be considered an \" u n f r i e n d l y a c t . \" Consequently, Ghana and the United Arab Republic (to Pakistan's dismay) abstained from v o t i n g i n the r e s o l u t i o n which was vetoed by the S o v i e t Union. By t h i s time i t should have been c l e a r t o both the Western members and P a k i s t a n , that no amount of diplo m a t i c pressure could f o r c e the In d i a n Government to re v e r s e , or even modify i t s stand over Kashmir. Furthermore, as the l a t e s t S o v i e t veto had i n d i c a t e d , the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l was no longer compe-tent to deal w i t h the issue of Kashmir and th e r e f o r e some settlement,would have to be sought through b i l a t e r a l negotia-t i o n s . (D) The Aftermath of the Chinese Invasion I t was f e l t by many observers that the sudden outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s along the Sino-Indian border i n October 1962 - 154 -would a c t u a l l y serve to uni t e both India and Pa k i s t a n i n the face of a common enemy. Indeed, i t seemed f o r a few days that at l a s t the two d i s p u t i n g nations had r e a l i z e d the f u t i l -i t y and dangers of remaining at loggerheads, and were i n f a c t w i l l i n g to r e s o l v e t h e i r many d i f f e r e n c e s . F o l l o w i n g the i n i t i a l Chinese a t t a c k , moreover, intense d i p l o m a t i c pressure was put upon Ayub Khan and Nehru by A v e r e l l Harriman and Duncan Sandys \"whose experts made no secret of t h e i r b e l i e f that only through co-operative e f f o r t could the sub-continent be e f f i c i e n t l y defended.\"^ 0 The f r u i t s of t h e i r e f f o r t s came on November 30 w i t h a j o i n t Ayub-Nehru d e c l a r a -t i o n that a renewed e f f o r t should be made t o r e s o l v e the out-standing d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e i r countries of Kashmir and other issues.../With the hope of ach-i e v i n g an/ honourable and eq u i t a b l e settlement.41 This statement, the f i r s t p o s i t i v e pronouncement on the Kash-mir i s s u e s i n c e May 1955, c a l l e d f o r m i n i s t e r i a l d i s c u s s i o n s as a p r e r e q u i s i t e to an Ayub-Nehru conference, w i t h the f i r s t meeting to convene i n Rawalpindi on December 27. S u p e r f i c i a l l y , one might have expected that at l a s t common sense had p r e v a i l e d on the sub-continent and that f i n a l l y both Indians and P a k i s t a n i s r e a l i z e d that a common de s t i n g required j o i n t e f f o r t and co-operation. T h i s , u n f o r t u n a t l e y , was not to be, as the November 30 d e c l a r a t i o n , l i k e a l l i t s predecessors, became clouded w i t h extraneous issues and manifestations of 40. hi. Margaret F i s h e r . \"India i n 1963; A Year of T r a v a i l . \" A s i a n Survey, IV:3. (March 1964). p. 740. ART p. 4953. - 155 -b a s i c outlooks which only served to i n d i c a t e that - i n war and i n peace - the Indo-Pakistan d i f f e r e n c e s over Kashmir were indeed i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . The armed at t a c k s by China upon India marked the end of Sino-Indian f r i e n d s h i p and s o l i d a r i t y . This was not, however, a sudden occurrence; and a s t u t e P a k i s t a n i observers, r e a l i z i n g that a l l was not w e l l between the co-sponsors of Panch S h i l a , decided t o e x p l o i t these d i f f e r e n c e s and' seek a rapprochement wi t h China. Thus even before the Chinese armies began i n -t r u d i n g i n t o the North East F r o n t i e r Agency and Indian-con-t r o l l e d Kashmir, and India stood d i s i l l u s i o n e d before the world as a v i c t i m of naked aggression, a d i p l o m a t i c r e v o l u -t i o n was i n the making. Whereas the majority of informed P a k i s t a n i s f e l t that China was .a general threat t o a l l of A s i a and that there was no reason to b e l i e v e t h e i r country would be chosen as a s p e c i f i c t a r g e t ; many I n d i a n , and e s p e c i a l l y the Defence M i n i s t e r Krishna Menon had made i t only too c l e a r that Pak-i s t a n was India's enemy number one. Thus when Dawn asserted - \" I f the main concern of the C h r i s t i a n West i s the c o n t a i n -ment of Chinese Communism, the wain concern of Muslim P a k i s t a n i s the containment of m i l i t a r i s t and m i l i t a n t Hinduism?' -few P a k i s t a n i s would disagree. This underlying f e a r of India was given f u r t h e r impetus 42. P a k i s t a n News Digest. (Karachi) May 1, '63. Hereafter c i t e d as PND. . - 156 -i n October 1962 when i t was announced that B r i t a i n , the United S t a t e s , and to a l e s s e r extent Canada, would provide India w i t h m i l i t a r y a i d i n order to r e s i s t the Chinese t h r e a t . Here, however, o f f i c i a l P a k i s t a n i p o l i c y d i f f e r e d from that of the West: \"From the very o f f s e t /wrote President Ayub7 i t has been our view that the fighting...was only i n the nature of a border c o n f l i c t , \" and although P a k i s t a n was not against the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Western Arms i n t o India f o r defensive purposes, she was deadly a f r a i d that once the border rproblem w i t h China was s e t t l e d , I n d i a \"would r e v e r t to her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of i n t i m i d a t i o n of P a k i s t a n \" w i t h the very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of using her new-found strength 43 against her enemy number one. I n t h i s v e i n , Ayub Khan sought assurances that t h i s a i d would not be used against P a k i s t a n but l i k e Nehru i n 1953, he remained unconvinced by the forthcoming pledges. Furthermore, the Pa k i s t a n Govern-ment made i t abundantly c l e a r that m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e should be given to India only when and i f she would s e t t l e such out-44 standing problems as Kashmir. The Western nations,, admittedly i n an unenviable p o s i t i o n , were u n w i l l i n g t o exert any more pressure on India other than to press f o r the opening of d i s c u s s i o n s ; and once again the P a k i s t a n i s reasoned that Kashmir had been s a c r i f i c e d on the a l t a r of Western i n t e r e s t s . \"Do we have to c l i n g to /The 43. Ayub Khan. \"The Pakistan-American A l l i a n c e : Stresses and S t r a i n s . \" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , (Jan. 1964). p. 202. 44. K h a l i d B i n SayeedT \"Pakistan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y : An An a l y s i s of Pakistan.Fears and I n t e r e s t s . \" A s i a n Survey, IV:3 (March 1964). p. 746. —157 -Western a l l i a n c e / /declared the Pakistan Times/ when even i t s sponsors would w i l l i n g l y do without us.\"^^ Accompanying this primary fear of India and further frustrations over Kashmir, was a rapidly changing attitude towards China. In I 9 6 0 , when no progress was being made with the Sino-Indian border discussions, President Ayub ordered the Pakistan Foreign Office to take up the issue i n an attempt to demarcate their common Kashmir-Sinkiang boundary - a provisional settlement pending the outcome of the dispute with India. Although t h i s move could be hailed as one of p o l i t i c a l expedience - for Pakistan had neither the means nor desire to enter into a boundary dispute with China - i t cannot be denied that both parties relished the idea of f u r - • ther i s o l a t i n g India, and the p o s s i b i l i t y (at least as f a r as Pakistan was concerned) of strengthening her bargaining p o s i t i o n i n Kashmir. These negotiations, which were b i t t e r l y protested by India who claimed that Pakistan was bargaining with Indian t e r r i t o r y , culminated i n a provisional agreement to demarcate the boundary on May 3, 1962; and complete i n p r i n c i p l e on December 26, 1962 - the eve of the f i r s t round of talks over 46 Kashmir. Against this background, and following the joint Indo-45. PND. Dec. 15, '62. 46. FND. May 15, '62; Jan. 1, '63: Peking Review. May 11, \"rb2; Dec. 28, '62. - 158 -P a k i s t a n i d e c l a r a t i o n of November 30, there was no i n d i c a t i o n that the basic P a k i s t a n i a t t i t u d e had changed. President Ayub r e i t e r a t e d h i s demand f o r a p l e b i s c i t e on December 24; although he added \"we are prepared to consider any b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n i f Mr. Nehru had i t im mind,\" there was every reason to b e l i e v e that P a k i s t a n would bargain from her 47 new-found and somewhat a r t i f i c i a l p o s i t i o n of strength. From the Indian s i d e , on the other hand, there was noth-i n g to i n d i c a t e t h a t , even i n t h e i r hour of gravest p e r i l , they were w i l l i n g to a l t e r t h e i r basic a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir. Indeed, on the very day the j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n was re l e a s e d , the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r q u a l i f i e d h i s a c t i o n s by 48 d e c l a r i n g that Kashmir would not be p a r t i t i o n e d . This theme was repeated by the then Home M i n i s t e r , L a i Bahadur S h a s t r i , on December 3, when he emphatically a s s e r t e d : \"Me 4Q are not prepared t o p a r t i t i o n Kashmir. ^ On the s p e c i f i c subject of a p l e b i s c i t e the Government . of India remained u n y i e l d i n g : on October 15, t h e i r delegate to the United Nations, B. N. Chakravarty, r e j e c t e d a p l e b -i s c i t e because \" i t would be d i s a s t r o u s f o r I n d i a , \" while on the eve of the f i r s t I n d o - P a k i s t a n i meeting at Rawalpindi, Nehru declared that a p l e b i s c i t e on r e l i g i o u s grounds would 50 be undesirable. The t i m i n g , moreover, was unfortunate, f o r 47. AR. p. 5022. 48. Lok Sabha Debates. November 30, 1962. c o l . 3975. 49. PND. Dec. 15, '62. 50. The Indiagram (Ottawa). 78/62, Oct. 18, '62; 101/62, Dec. 28, '62. - 159 -coming i n the wake of a h u m i l i a t i n g m i l i t a r y defeat, the Indian p o p u l a t i o n was i n no mood f o r appeasement to Pa k i s t a n . Thus there xvas no i n d i c a t i o n by e i t h e r party that they were w i l l i n g to modify t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s and gen-u i n e l y attempt to seek an \"honorable and eq u i t a b l e s e t t l e -ment.\" With a t t i t u d e s l i k e t h i s , t h e r e f o r e , the f a i l u r e of the meetings t o re s o l v e d i f f e r e n c e s became a foregone con-•> • 51 e l u s i o n . F i r s t Round The f i r s t round of t a l k s opened i n Rawalpindi on Dec-ember 26 w i t h Sardar Swaran Singh, M i n i s t e r of Railways and Z. A. Bhutto, M i n i s t e r of I n d u s t r i e s (and l a t e r of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s ) r e p r e s e n t i n g India and P a k i s t a n r e s p e c t i v e l y A l -though the November 30 d e c l a r a t i o n stated that d i s c u s s i o n s would encompass Kashmir as w e l l as other important i s s u e s , and a c c o r d i n g l y the Indian delegate presented a l i s t of t o p i c s a's a basis f o r d i s c u s s i o n , the P a k i s t a n delegate i n s i s t e d that the t a l k s must be r e s t r i c t e d s o l e l y to the Kashmir dispute. I n an attempt to break the i n i t i a l deadlock, Sardar Singh agreed t o l i m i t d i s c u s s i o n , but made i t c l e a r from the very beginning that India's sovereignty covered the entirV s t a t e and could not be questioned.^3 India a l s o r e j e c t e d any idea of a p l e b i s c i t e . 51. In a l l s i x rounds of di s c u s s i o n s were h e l d : Rawalpindi, December 27-29; New D e l h i , January 16-19; K a r a c h i , Feb-ruary 8-11; C a l c u t t a , March 12-14; K a r a c h i , A p r i l 20-25; and New D e l h i , May 16. 52. PND. Jan. 1, '63; India gram. I/63, Jan. 3, '63. 53. Lok Sabha Debates. August 13, 1963. - i6o -These d i s c u s s i o n s , however, were completely over-shadowed by the S i n o - P a k i s t a n boundary agreement i n p r i n c i p l e on December 26 which caught the Indian d e l e g a t i o n unaware; and although P a k i s t a n termed t h i s r e l e a s e an \" a c c i d e n t a l c o i n c i d e n t \" 5 ^ I t did much to hamper the t a l k s from t h e i r outset. Thus on December 29, when i t was obvious that no progress was being made, the conference ended wi t h a b r i e f communique c a l l i n g f o r the c r e a t i o n of a c o r d i a l atmosphere and r e s t r a i n t by both p a r t i e s . 5 5 i Second Round The second round of d i s c u s s i o n s opened i n New D e l h i on January 16, 1963. Both p a r t i e s presented t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e views as to what was \"'required f o r settlement; but no con-c r e t e proposals were r a i s e d and d i s c u s s i o n s ended on Jan-uary 19 w i t h a communique c a l l i n g f o r continued \" d i s c u s s i o n t o f i n d an honourable and e q u i t a b l e settlement. \" 5 t 5 T h i r d Round At the opening of the t h i r d round i n K a r a c h i , the Pak-i s t a n delegate presented India w i t h four f a c t o r s which h i s country considered of prime importance i n any settlement: 54. President Ayub claimed that the date of t h i s announce-ment was f i x e d by Peking: Margaret F i s h e r . op. c i t . , P. 740. 5 5 * Indiagram. 1/63. Jan. 3, \"63. The f i r s t round of t a l k s was disrupted by the inopportune r e l e a s e by the then Prime M i n i s t e r John Diefenbaker that Western a i d to India would t o t a l $120.million. 56. AR-. 4953. - 161 -( l ) the f a t e of the Vale of Kashmir; (2) the economicinter-ests of P a k i s t a n (which included c o n t r o l of the r i v e r s Indus, Chenag and Jhelum); (3) the wishes of the Kashmiris; and (4) the s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of P a k i s t a n (which included defence i n depth to p r o t e c t her r a i l w a y s and the Grand Trunk Road).57 Bhutto f i r m l y r e j e c t e d p a r t i t i o n along the cease-f i r e l i n e , but suggested that a d i v i s i o n along communal l i n e s would be acceptable.5 8 Furthermore, he i n s i s t e d upon a f i r m Indian d e c l a r a t i o n that the status of the Vale would remain open. N a t u r a l l y enough these proposals were t o t a l l y unaccept-able to I n d i a ; Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru denounced t h i s l a t e s t P a k i s t a n i communal d i c t a t e s as \"a v i c i o u s communal approach repugnant to the e n t i r e s p i r i t animating our n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e f o r independence.\"59 Thus there was no meeting of minds, and d i s c u s s i o n s ended on February 11 w i t h both p a r t i e s r e c o g n i z i n g that wide d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n e x i s t e d be-6 0 tween the two. Fourth Round P r i o r to the opening of the f o u r t h round of d i s c u s s i o n s ; i n C a l c u t t a on March 12, tensions between India and P a k i s t a n increased considerably. On March 2, the S i n o - P a k i s t a n 57. AR. 5107. 58. This would i n e f f e c t leave India w i t h only Hindu Jammu and p o s s i b l y Buddhist-Ladakh which at t h i s time was under p a r t i a l Chinese .occupation. This was the f i r s t time that the P a k i s t a n Government deviated from i t s o r i g i n a l goal of a p l e b i s c i t e . 59. Lok Sabha Debates. August 13, 1963. 60. India gram\" 12/63, Feb. 12, '63; AR. p. 5107. - 162 -boundary agreement p r o v i d i n g f o r the demarcation of t h e i r common border was fo r m a l l y signed and i n s p i t e of Pakistan's i n s i s t e n c e that i t was p r o v i s i o n a l and contingent upon a settlement i n Kashmir, i t was b i t t e r l y denounced by India as \" i n v a l i d and inacceptable\" and as i n v o l v i n g a surrender of 61 over 13,000 square miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y . Thus i t was i n a s t r a i n e d atmosphere that t a l k s re-opened i n C a l c u t t a . • Once again Bhutto i n s i s t e d upon the d i v i s i o n of the Stat e along communal l i n e s , ami although i t was reported that P a k i s t a n would modify her p o s i t i o n towards Jammu i f India would adopt a more f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e towards the V a l e , no 62 agreement was reached and the d i s c u s s i o n s ended i n deadlock. F i f t h Round F o l l o w i n g the f a i l u r e of Bhutto and Sardar Singh to re s o l v e t h e i r c o u n t r i e s ' d i f f e r e n c e s , President Ayub once 1 again declared the fundamental p o i n t s required by P a k i s t a n i n any settlement: s e c u r i t y , s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and the economic i n t e r e s t s of Pak i s t a n . I n the case of the l a t t e r , moreover, he expanded Bhutto's e a r l i e r demands f o r p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab r i v e r s (which were guaranteed by the i960 t r e a t i e s ) to incl u d e complete c o n t r o l 61. PND. March 15, '62; Indiagram. 21/63, March 5, '62 a ¥ 22/63, March 7, '63^ For t e x t of agreement and maps see Peking Review. March 15, '63. A l i s t a i r Lamb i n The China-India Border: The Orig i n s of the Dispute claims \" a l l that has i n f a c t been s u r r -endered has been the t h e o r e t i c a l advanced boundary of the kind which S i r John Ardagh proposed i n 1897.\" (p. 175). 62. AR. p. 5160. - 163 -63 of t h e i r watersheds. This important pronouncement was followed by a statement by the Pa k i s t a n delegate on the eve of.the f i f t h round of t a l k s i n K a r a c h i , openly r e j e c t i n g p a r t i t i o n but suggesting the p o s s i b i l i t y of a state-wide 64 referendum. Thus, when di s c u s s i o n s re-opened i n Karachi on A p r i l 20, there were few prospects of settlement. I t was at t h i s meeting, however, that the Indian delegate proposed p a r t i t i o n as a concession \"unprecedented i n magni-tude and magnanimity\" - which perhaps a p t l y summarizes the 6s e n t i r e Indian a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir. v According to Indian sources the de f a c t o boundary would be extended f u r -ther east but would not i n c l u d e the major bone of contention - the Vale of Kashmir. D i s c u s s i o n t h e r e f o r e centered around t h i s l a t e s t I ndian proposal and the f u t u r e of the Vale; and, as one might expect, there was no agreement. A f u t u r e meet-ing was scheduled f o r New D e l h i on May 16. S i x t h Round P r i o r t o the l a s t round of di s c u s s i o n s the Pa k i s t a n a t t i t u d e hardened c o n s i d e r a b l y : Ayub Khan r e i t e r a t e d Bhutto's e a r l i e r r e j e c t i o n of p a r t i t i o n , w h i l e on May 9 the P a k i s t a n i delegate not only r e j e c t e d p a r t i t i o n but a l s o any p o s s i b i l i t y of j o i n t c o n t r o l over the Vale. Indeed, i t was to be a l l or nothing. The reasoning behind t h i s r e s o l u t e n e s s , moreover, was revealed by Dawn which declared r a t h e r r e g r e t f u l l y that 63. PND. A p r i l 15, '63. 64 . PND. May 1, '63. 65. Indiagram. 46/63. May 20, '63. - 164 -Ind i a had not found the danger from China s u f f i c i e n t l y grave to persuade her from modifying her extravagant demands on K a s h m i r . ^ Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, on h i s p a r t , r e - o f f e r e d h i s \"no-war d e c l a r a t i o n \" which would i n f a c t maintain the status quo and declared that despite recent setbacks, he 67 was\"determined\" t o have c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h P a k i s t a n . ' Yet, as with P a k i s t a n , there was no i n d i c a t i o n of any major change i n Indian p o l i c y . When the s i x t h and f i n a l round opened i n New D e l h i on May 16, P a k i s t a n revealed her hand and declared that the best way to solve the Kashmir problem and thus ensure f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s would be to give her c o n t r o l over the e n t i r e S t a t e . As i f o f f e r i n g a major concession, Bhutto suggested that Indian c o n t r o l over Ladkh could continue f o r a s i x to twelve month period (to a l l o w India to solve her problems wi t h the Chinese) and that the Vale could be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d pend-in g a p l e b i s c i t e . ^ When t h i s was r e j e c t e d , the P a k i s t a n delegate immediately prepared to leave the conference but was f i n a l l y persuaded by Sardar Singh to s i g n an abrupt communique expressing \"regret that no agreement could be reached over the settlement of the Kashmir d i s p u t e . \" ^ 9 There was no mention of f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s ; at Palam A i r p o r t , Bhutto set the stage f o r f u r t h e r t e n s i o n when he brusquely 66. PND. May 15, '63. 67. Indiagram. 4 1 / 6 3 . May 1 0 , '63. 68. Indiagram. 46/63. May 2 0 , '63. 69. W. p7~B254. - 1 6 5 -declared \" a l l p e a c e f u l means have been exhausted.\" N a t u r a l l y enough, both India and P a k i s t a n blamed each other f o r the f a i l u r e of t h e i r l a t e s t rounds of t a l k s . I f blame i s to be apportioned i t must equally r e s t upon the shoulders of both p a r t i e s : n e i t h e r was prepared nor w i l l -i n g to a l t e r her long-standing - and even t r a d i t i o n a l -p o l i c i e s towards the S t a t e . P a k i s t a n continued t o press f o r a p l e b i s c i t e and when t h i s was r e j e c t e d she was prepared to accept the p a r t i t i o n of the S t a t e along communal l i n e s . I n asking f o r the imposs i b l e - complete c o n t r o l over the State - she revealed that her e n t i r e a t t i t u d e towards the d i s c u s s i o n s was based on the premise that India would be prepared or even coerced i n t o making l a r g e - s c a l e concessions i n Kashmir as the p r i c e f o r P a k i s t a n i f r i e n d s h i p or even n e u t r a l i t y . T h i s , however, was not to be, as India made i t c l e a r from the very beginn-i n g that her basic p o l i c y towards Kashmir remained unchanged she claimed'that her w r i t ran throughout the e n t i r e S t a t e and t h e r e f o r e any settlement would be treated as a major concession on her p a r t . Thus both sides m i s i n t e r p r e t e d not only the then e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n but a l s o each other's outlooks towards Kashmir. I t would be u n f a i r , however, to blame P a k i s t a n , as the Indian Government d i d , f o r d e l i b e r a t e l y sabotaging the t a l k s 70. Indiagram. 46/63. May 20, '63. 7 1 . i b i d . - 166 -I t would be equally u n f a i r to blame India f o r f a i l i n g to make appropriate \"concessions\" to achieve \"an honorable and e q u i t -able settlement.\" Both p a r t i e s had t h e i r own s p e c i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as to the nature of such a settlement; yet n e i t h e r r e a l l y understood the basic f e a r s and i n t e r e s t s of the other. - 167 -CHAPTER NINE THE PINAL PHASE (A) Impasse F o l l o w i n g the breakdown of d i s c u s s i o n i n May 1963, r e l a -t i o n s between India and P a k i s t a n reached t h e i r lowest p o i n t since P a r t i t i o n . Gone was the. facade of a p o s s i b l e rapproche-ment, as P a k i s t a n worked i n tandem wi t h China to achieve her r e g i o n a l ends; while the l a t t e r worked assiduously to i s o l -ate I n d i a . India not u n n a t u r a l l y embarked upon an i n t e n s i v e diplomatic campaign against P a k i s t a n - yet w i t h every pro-nouncement she pushed P a k i s t a n c l o s e r to Peking. Indeed, i f R i c h e l i e u was r i g h t i n saying that one must choose one's a l l i e s f o r t h e i r geographical or p h y s i c a l s t r e n g t h , and not f o r t h e i r i n t e g r i t y and charm, then P a k i s t a n was p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i e d to \" f l i r t \" w i t h Peking. This d i p l o m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n which perhaps could be described as a sheep seeking refuge from the wolf i n a t i g e r ' s den, was f u r t h e r complicated by Western m i l i t a r y a i d to. I n d i a , r e s u l t i n g as one P a k i s t a n i claimed, i n the former \"adopting an i n c r e a s i n g l y d e f i a n t and i n t r a n s i g e n t posture\" over Kashmir. 1 I n a speech i n Srinagar on June 18, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru 1.- Round Table, 213, (December 1963). p. 90. - 168 -declared that he would never accept the p a r t i t i o n of the Vale or i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ; on the 23rd, as i f show-i n g that he was s t i l l w i l l i n g to compromise, he offered t o s e t t l e the dispute on the ba s i s of the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e w i t h some minor adjustments - an o f f e r p r e v i o u s l y r e j e c t e d by 2 P a k i s t a n . On August 11, however, a f t e r intense American and B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s i n New D e l h i and Rawalpindi, P a k i s t a n agreed to accept mediation on the f o l l o w i n g condi-t i o n s : ( l ) India must give a c a t e g o r i c a l commitment that she-would abide by the mediator's v e r d i c t ; (2.) India must s e t t l e the iss u e by s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; and (3) the mediator must be given a s p e c i f i c time l i m i t t o present h i s recommenda-t i o n s . The I n d i a n r e p l y t o t h i s l a t e s t Western e f f o r t came on August 13, when i n a statement i n the Lok Sabha, Nehru declared \"there i s no question of our c o n s i d e r i n g any pro-posals f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g or d i v i s i o n of the V a l l e y , , or j o i n t c o n t r o l of Kashmir.../and/ the concessions which we off e r e d P a k i s t a n are no longer v a l i d and we must t r e a t them •t 4 as withdrawn. Thus a l l Western attempts t o obta i n a settlement were i n v a i n ; the p o s i t i o n of both p a r t i e s r e -mained as i n t r a c t a b l e as ever while the propaganda war con-tinued unabated and soon degenerated i n t o a campaign of ' personal v i n d i c t i v e n e s s and character a s s a s s i n a t i o n . ^ 2. AR. p. 5318. 3. PND. Aug. 15, '63. 4. India Information S e r v i c e s . Kashmir: Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru's Statement i n Parliament. August 13, 1964, New D e l h i , p. 7. 5. The Indian and P a k i s t a n i government r e l e a s e s , on t h i s subject - e s p e c i a l l y the Indian - were shockingly i n -temperate. - 169 -Accompanying t h i s b e l l i c o s e d i p l o m a t i c campaign was an i n -creased number of armed clashes along the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e r e s u l t i n g i n the strengthening of the United Nations truce ' 6 teams i n December 1963. (B) I n t e r n a l Communal and P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y The general s t a t e of I n d o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s was f u r -ther worsened by communal and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , not only i n Kashmir, where the i n i t i a l t r o u b l e began, but through-out the northern part of the sub-continent. ( l ) The R e s i g n a t i o n of Prime M i n i s t e r Bakshi On October 4, Prime M i n i s t e r Bakshi announced that he would r e s i g n h i s premiership ostensibly' under the Kamaraj Plan - described by one correspondent as the \"massacre of m i n i s t e r s . \" 7 Accompanying t h i s important d e c l a r a t i o n was an announcement that l e g i s l a t i o n would be introduced to change the names of the S a r d a r - i - R i y s a t (Head of S t a t e ) and Prime M i n i s t e r to Governor and Chief M i n i s t e r r e s p e c t i v e l y ; and that i n the f u t u r e a l l Kashmir r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to the Lok Sabha would be elected d i r e c t l y by the people instead of nominated by the S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e . Furthermore, he took the wind out of the P a k i s t a n i s a i l s be d e c l a r i n g that A r t i c l e , 6. ' NYT. Dec. 4, '63. 7. Eastern World. X V I I : 1 0 (October 1 9 6 3 ) . p. 17. The Kamaraj p l a n was devised to a l l o w Congress ministers-of the States and c e n t r a l governments to r e s i g n to work f o r the r e a c t i v a t i o n of the Party. - 170 -370 of the Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n (which gave Kashmir s p e c i a l Q -s t a t u s ) would remain. This seemingly p a t r i o t i c move, i n i t s e l f an anomaly since the Kamaraj Plan was purely a Congress Party i n v e n t i o n , was f u r t h e r dampened by rumors i n New D e l h i that Bakshi was being pressured i n t o retirement because of h i s general un-p o p u l a r i t y and h i s i n a b i l i t y to cope w i t h the State's economic problems, and that he would r e s i g n on the understanding that h i s l e f t - w i n g Education M i n i s t e r , G. M. Sadiq, would assume the o f f i c e of Prime M i n i s t e r . ^ This was not to be. On Oct-ober 10, the Revenue M i n i s t e r Khwaja Shamsuddin was appointed Prime M i n i s t e r by the N a t i o n a l Conference, Sadiq being dropped from the new cabinet. Shamsuddin's tenure of o f f i c e was as short as i t was unpopular, and when faced w i t h i t s f i r s t major c r i s i s - the t h e f t of the Hazratbal r e l i c - the r u l e of the law crumbled. (2) The Theft of the \"Hair\" On December 26, i t was announced that a h a i r of the Prophet Mohammed had been s t o l e n from the Hazrathbal shrine, • :in Srinagar. 1\" 1' Almost immediately communal r i o t s broke out 8 ' Keesings. p. 19987. 9. Evidence has r e c e n t l y come to l i g h t that Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru was t o y i n g w i t h the idea of r e l e a s i n g Sheikh Abdullah but the Sheikh, not wishing to undermine h i s strong p o s i t i o n i n the S t a t e refused t o be released by Bakshi. Consequently, Bakshi was removed from o f f i c e . The Hindu Weekly Review, March 22, '65. 10. Keesings. p. 19987. 11. WT. Dec. 27, '63. - 171 -as f a r away as East P a k i s t a n and West Bengal, India charging that the P a k i s t a n r a d i o and press were making a n t i - I n d i a n statements and r a i s i n g the Cry \" i s l a m i n Danger\" i n an e f f o r t to fan the flames of communal hatred and thus em-taarass India's i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e as a sec u l a r s t a t e . Furthermore, the Indian Government charged that \"undoubtedly /the t h e f t / was the work of co n s p i r a t o r s i n the pay of f o r -eign i n t e r e s t s set on c r e a t i n g chaos i n Kashmir\" - the obvious i m p l i c a t i o n being that P a k i s t a n was to blame.\" I n Pa k i s t a n , on the other hand, the blame was placed on Hindu extremists and .\"demonstrations were held throughout both 13 wings of the country. Appeals by...both Nehru and Ayub Khan to h a l t the spread . of v i o l e n c e proved futiler.ahd.the communal carnage continued. The Indian Army was forced t o take over c o n t r o l of Ca l c u t t a i n an e f f o r t to r e s t o r e t r a n q u i l i t y , and i n s p i t e of charges and counter-charges as to who was o r i g i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s l a t e s t outburst of Hindu-Muslim animosity, India claimed that by February 1, some 52,000 persons had f l e d i n t o India xtfhile the P a k i s t a n i s claimed that over 50,000 refugees had entered East P a k i s t a n and that some 75,000 were homeless i n 14 C a l c u t t a alone. 12. Indiagram. 1/64. Jan. 3, '64. 13. NYT. Jan.11, '64; PND. Jan. 15, '64. 14. AR. p. 5713; PND. Feb. 1, '64. The t o t a l f i g u r e of refugees from P a k i s t a n reached 400,000 by June 1, 1964. - 172 -Whereas the Hazratbal incident sparked communal v i o l -ence a thousand miles away from Kashmir, demonstrations i n the State i t s e l f were p o l i t i c a l rather than communal and de c i s i v e l y showed that no one - least of a l l Prime Minister Shamsuddin - could rule without assistance from the Indian Army. Violence was aimed, not against the Hindu and Sikh minorities, but at the personal property of the former Prime Minister and National Conference o f f i c e s , while many Cabinet Ministers, fearing for t h e i r l i v e s , sought refuge behind the bayonets of Indian troops. Of the many Con-ference leaders,'only G. M . Sadiq could walk the streets of Srinagar i n comparative safety. J Accompanying th i s anti-National Conference f e e l i n g were demands for the formation of a new government and even the occasional voice was raised for the release of Sheikh Ab-dullah. It was l i t t l e wonder, therefore, that-the Pakistan Government claimed i t to be an anti-Indian u p r i s i n g . j n a way this was p a r t i a l l y correct; but what the Pakistan Govern-ment overlooked i n i t s haste to condemn India, was the fact that the Kashmiris, d i s t r u s t i n g t h e i r own leaders' judgement as to the authenticity of the \"hair\" v o l u n t a r i l y turned to-wards Delhi. Three persons were arrested for the theft - the aged keeper of the shrine, a small boy and a trader with vague 15. Keesings. p. 19990. 16. PND. Feb. 1, '64. - 173 -\"connections\" i n Azad Kashmir - yet the motives-behind t h i s crime are shrouded w i t h h a l f - t r u t h s and inuendoes. There are rumors, w i t h l i t t l e proof, that the t h e f t was designed to prove \"that no one - l e a s t of a l l Premier Shamsuddin -could r e a l l y r u l e Kashmir as e f f e c t i v e l y as ex-Premier Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had done.\"'1'7 From the P a k i s t a n i s i d e , however, the t h e f t was simply another example of Hindu a r r o -gance which made p o s s i b l e \"such c r i m i n a l acts of s a c r i l e g e 1 P and vandalism.\" The Indian Government, on the other hand, made l i t t l e secret of the f a c t that they thought P a k i s t a n and the P l e b i s c i t e Front r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e n t i r e a f f a i r . As' e a r l y as January 1, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru i n h i s appeal f o r the r e t u r n of communal s a n i t y , declared that \" i t i s c l e a r that the c r i m i n a l s who did i t i s no f r i e n d of Kashmir 1Q or of I n d i a . J Obviously alarmed over the unpopularity of Shamsuddin'1 s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the p r o - P a k i s t a n i nature of the Kashmir demonstrations, L a i Bahadur S h a s t r i - now the a i l i n g Prime M i n i s t e r i s c l o s e s t confidant - flew to Srinagar to mend the obvious r i f t i n the N a t i o n a l Conference ranks. A r r i v i n g on February 2.8, he t o l d a N a t i o n a l Conference meeting that \"he c l e a r l y v i s u a l i z e d the nece s s i t y f o r a change i n the present 17. ¥. H. Morris-Jones. \" I n d i a : Under New Management, Business as Usual.\" A s i a n Survey, V:2 (February 1965), p. 66. 18. is/5517. January 16, 1964. 19. Indiagram. 1/64. Jan. 3, '64. On February 12 Home' M i n i s t e r Nanda i n f e r r e d i n the Lok Sabha that the e n t i r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l a y w i t h the P a k i s t a n - o r i e n -tated P l e b i s c i t e Front. (AR. pp. 5689-90). - 174 -p o l i t i c a l s e t - u p . \" 2 0 The att e n d i n g delegates q u i c k l y grasped the message and ex-Premier Bakshi nominated the o r i g i n a l con-tender - G. M. Sadiq - who was unanimously e l e c t e d . As i f i n a f t e r t h o u g h t , the deposed Prime M i n i s t e r Shamsuddin was elected deputy leader on March 3. Thus t h i s absurd i n c i d e n t P brought about a complete shake-up i n the Kashmir hie r a r c h y . On the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene, the seriousness of the Indo-P a k i s t a n r i f t was c l e a r l y shown at the United Nations. (C.) Renewed S e c u r i t y Council D e l i b e r a t i o n s On January 20, P a k i s t a n , t a k i n g f u l l advantage of the communal unrest i n both c o u n t r i e s , urged the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l to meet and discuss the Kashmir i s s u e ; and f o l l o w i n g an ex-change of correspondence, during which India charged that P a k i s t a n had d e l i b e r a t e l y s t a r t e d t h i s l a t e s t t r o u b l e to obtai n a hearing, the S e c u r i t y Council agreed to a meeting 21 on February 3. From the outset i t was obvious that any debate would simply be an extension of the I n d o - P a k i s t a n i \"cold war.\" Indeed, p r i o r to h i s departure from Bombay, the Indian delegate and Education M i n i s t e r , M. C. Chagla, had declared that India would take an uncompromising a t t i t u d e towards the Kashmir status quo and since the State was a \"domestic i s s u e \" they would t o l e r a t e no \"outside i n t e r f e r -e n c e . \" 2 2 20. Keesings. p. 19990. 2 1 • Indiagram. 6/64. Jan. 22, '64. 22. NYT. Jan. 30, '64. - 175 -Discussions began on February 3> and the remarks of both delegates r e f l e c t e d the general s t a t e of Indo-Pakistan r e l a - . • t i o n s . Opening the debate, Z. A. Bhutto, reviewed events i n the S t a t e since 19^ 7 and charged India w i t h v i o l a t i n g her commitments under the'various Council r e s o l u t i o n s . He charged that u p r i s i n g s over the l o s s of the \" h a i r \" were the d i r e c t r e s u l t of India's p e r s i s t e n t p o l i c y of communal persecution.' -^ Answering at length on February 5, the Indian delegate b i t t e r l y attacked Pakistan's communal nature as \" r e l i g i o u s a p a r t h e i d \" and made i t c l e a r . t h a t h i s Government would not welcome another r e s o l u t i o n on the i s s u e . Furthermore, he charged that any idea of a p l e b i s c i t e was out of the ques-t i o n because of ( l ) Pakistan's f a i l u r e to withdraw from Kashmir; ' (2) the S i n o - P a k i s t a n i Boundary agreement and the \" g i f t \" to China of 2,000 square miles of Kashmir t e r r i t o r y ; and (3)'the change-d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments on the sub-continent. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note, however, that since India was r e c e i v i n g Western arms and Soviet a i r c r a f t , no mention was made of Pakistan's r e c e i p t of American arms or her membership i n the Western A l l i a n c e as a f a c t o r prevent-i n g a settlement i n Kashmir. Instead, the delegate charged that P a k i s t a n and China were p l o t t i n g to keep India weak -o i l an obvious bid f o r Western and Soviet support. 23. S/PV. 1087. Feb. 3, 1964. 24. S/PV. 1088. Feb. 5, 1964. This was i n s t r i k i n g c ontrast to India's stand during the 1953-5^ b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s and the 1957-58 and I962 S e c u r i t y Council debates. V - 176 -On February 10, the B r i t i s h delegate, S i r P a t r i c k Dean, voiced h i s Government's support f o r a l l previous C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s and urged that a bold new approach be taken to solve the Kashmir dilemma. 2 5 This so incensed the Indian d e l e g a t i o n that they p o i n t e d l y boycotted a r e c e p t i o n i n New 26 York f o r the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r R. A. B u t l e r . The American delegate, A d l a i Stevenson, i n a s i m i l a r v e i n , sup-ported a l l the previous r e s o l u t i o n s and r e c o g n i z i n g the r i g h t of Kashmiri s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , c a l l e d f o r mediation under the good o f f i c e s of U Thant. 2 7 The Soviet delegate, on the other hand, although s t i l l supporting the Indian p o s i -t i o n , seemed to sense the urgency and seriousness of the 28 c o n f l i c t and urged d i r e c t d i s c u s s i o n s . On February 17, the I n d i a n delegate announced that h i s country would attend b i l a t e r a l t a l k s - but not those based upon old United Nations' r e s o l u t i o n s . 2 ^ Debate, however, was postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y f o l l o w i n g Bhutto's attempts to •seek an adjournment f o r one week, o s t e n s i b l y to consult h i s Government but i n f a c t to be present f o r Chou-en-Lai's v i s i t t o P a k i s t a n ; thus, i n the words of the I n d i a n Government, \" d i s m i s s i n g with the contempt i t deserved, Pakistan's bogus complaint against I n d i a . \" 3 ° 25. S/PV. 10901 Feb. 10, 1964. 26. NYT. Feb. 13, '64. 27. S/PV. 10Q1. Feb. 14, 1964. 28. i b i d . 2 9 . S7PV. 1093. Feb. 17, 1964. 3 ° - Indiagram. 15 /64 . Feb. 19, '64. - 177 -As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l debate only served to widen the breach between the -two nations and harden the p o p u l a t i o n of both countries i n t o two i r r e c o n c i l -able camps. Thus, when c e r t a i n p a r t i e s made a genuine attempt to achieve a rapprochment, i t was too l a t e . (D) The Release of Sheikh Abdullah On A p r i l 7, the two Home M i n i s t e r s , G. L. Nanda and Habi b u l l a h Khan met i n New D e l h i to discuss ( l ) the r e s t o r a -t i o n of communal harmony; (2) the movement and care of 31 refugees; and (3) the problem of i l l e g a l immigrants. A l -though the Kashmir is s u e was not on the agenda, d i s c u s s i o n s ended on a c o r d i a l note w i t h both p a r t i e s agreeing that the r i g h t s of m i n o r i t i e s i n India and P a k i s t a n must be protected. While these t a l k s were underway, tensions were f u r t h e r eased by the r e l e a s e of Sheikh Abdullah, former Deputy Revenue M i n i s t e r Kwaja A l i Shah and S u f i Mohammed Akhar - a l l of whom had been detained i n 1958 to undergo t r i a l i n the Kash-mir Conspiracy Case which cost the Indian Government over 32 seven m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . The o f f i c i a l Indian p o s i t i o n regarding the re l e a s e of Sheikh Abdullah on A p r i l 8, xras that i t was purely an i n t e r -nal matter and symbolic of the new-found s t a b i l i t y i n the St a t e . Nevertheless, news of the Government's d e c i s i o n was greeted w i t h mixed r e a c t i o n i n the LokSabha. J There can 31. Indiagram. 30/64. A p r i l 10, ' 6 4 . 32. NYT. A p r i l 9, ' 64 . 33. AR. p. 5797. - 178 -be l i t t l e doubt, moreover, that the 1 Indian Government f e l t that a f u r t h e r f i v e years i n c a r c e r a t i o n , changed constitu£\" t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s i n Kashmir and the S i n o - P a k i s t a n i detente would be s u f f i c i e n t to erase the b i t t e r n e s s of 1958 and swing the Sheikh's a t t i t u d e s i n t o l i n e with those shared by the majori t y of the N a t i o n a l Conference. Once again they were 34 wrong. At a press conference on A p r i l 9, the Sheikh - i n an obvious bid to r e a s s e r t h i s p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p and f i l l the p o l i t i c a l vacuum l e f t by the recent c r i s i s - declared that he was not convinced that s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n had been expressed i n Kashmir.^5 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the r e a c t i o n of the I n d i a n Government was immediate: on A p r i l 11, L a i Bahadur S h a s t r i p a r a d o x i c a l l y declared that while I n d i a enjoyed complete freedom of speech, \"there can be no f r e e -dom f o r preaching some kind of independence or secession from the Indian Union;\" on the 12th Chagla (by now the b i t t e r -est c r i t i c of Pakistan) exclaimed that \"the law w i l l take i t s course i f Sheikh Abdullah does not maintain h i s l o y a l t y to the C o n s t i t u t i o n and the country of which Kashmir i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t . . . t h e r e i s no freedom of speech to preach secession or s e d i t i o n . \"-^ Abdullah, on the other hand, f a i l e d to agree wi t h the above remarks and addressing a crowd of some 40,000 i n Doda 34. The Hindu Weekly Review. March 22, '65. 35. AR. p. 5797. 36. AR. p. 5798. - 179 -d e c l a r e d : India says that t h i s issue i s s e t t l e d and that there can be no t a l k i n g about i t . Me have to impress on the leaders of India that we w i l l never surrender our r i g h t t o determine our own future...37 On A p r i l 18, he was welcomed by a crowd of 250,000 i n S r i n a g a r , and on the same day denounced both India and P a k i s t a n f o r t h e i r s e l f i s h Kashmir p o l i c i e s before a r a l l y of l40,000.^ 8 The next day the Sheikh stated that India's c l a i m t o Kash-mir was based purely on might.39 indeed, i t was obvious from the moment of h i s r e l e a s e that once again the Sheikh was the true spokesman f o r \"Kashmir\" na t i o n a l i s m . I n s p i t e of these attacks on both India and P a k i s t a n , i t was c l e a r that Abdullah recognized the dangers inherent i n the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the dispute. He f u l l y r e a l i z e d that because of Nehru's serious i l l n e s s and the complexity of the Kashmir i s s u e , a n y , s o l u t i o n must come w i t h i n the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r ' s l i f e t i m e - or p o s s i b l y not at a l l . ^ 0 Nehru, i t i s suggested, shared e x a c t l y the same view. (E) The Nehru-Abdullah Proposals I n one-year r e t r o s p e c t , i t i s c l e a r that f o l l o w i n g x,h±s c r i p p l i n g stroke at the Bhubaneshwar Congress s e s s i o n on January 7, 1964, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru genuinely sought t o b r i n g about a rapprochement between India and P a k i s t a n . As 37. Keesings. p. 2,0215. 38. i b i d . 39. AR. P . 5809. 40. AR. p. 5797. - 180 -I f r e c o g n i z i n g the strong forces which would emerge, and indeed have been emerging, since h i s death, the a i l i n g Prem-i e r attempted to solve the Kashmir dilemma - not by a p l e b i s c i t e or p a r t i t i o n , but through what could be termed a c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l approach. But by the time he made h i s dramatic move p u b l i c o p i n i o n had hardened and h i s l i f e was reaching i t s end. F o l l o w i n g the breakdown of di s c u s s i o n s i n May 1963, i t seemed t o a few libe r a l - m i n d e d i n d i v i d u a l s - at lease those i n India - that the only method of r e s o l v i n g d i f f e r e n c e s lay i n the formation of a loose d e f e r a t i o n or confederation of I n d i a and Pa k i s t a n . Although such a pr o p o s a l , i n c l u d i n g p o s s i b l y Bhutan and Sikki m , was not new, i t seemed to many to be the l o g i c a l c o r a l l a r y of P a r t i t i o n . Indeed, i t was hoped that once emotions had cooled, reason would again pre-v a i l and t h i s unnatural s e p a r a t i o n cease. But reason had not p r e v a i l e d - l a r g e l y because of the Kashmir dispute -' and by forming a loose f e d e r a t i o n i t was f e l t that the Kashmir i s s u e could be circumvented: a r a t h e r negative approach but nevertheless one which has merit. On A p r i l 2.9, 1964 Sheikh Abdul l a h , accompanied by h i s p r i n c i p a l l i e u t e n a n t , Mirza A f g a l Bag, a r r i v e d i n New D e l h i f o r t a l k s w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, and notwithstanding the f a c t that h i s recent statements regarding the status of Kash-mir had aroused the i r e of Indian p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s , the importance of h i s v i s i t was shown by h i s welcoming committee ? - 182 -the aging C. R. Rajagopalachari i n Madras, the Sheikh again announced that a\"positive.and p r a c t i c a b l e s o l u t i o n \" had been found but that i t would be unwise to r e v e a l i t s nature un-t i l presented to the Prime M i n i s t e r . 4 ^ Whether or not t h i s s o l u t i o n was the same as that i n d i c a t e d on May 1 i s d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n , but one can r e a d i l y assume, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h Ra j a g o p a l a c h a r i ' s involvement, that i t included f a r - r e a c h -in g proposals designed to b r i n g India and P a k i s t a n c l o s e r together. Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru's s i l e n c e on Abdullah's e f f o r t s was broken on May 6 when he declared to the Executive of the Congress Parliamentary Party that there would be no change i n the status of Kashmir. He a l s o announced i n the Lok Sabha on the same day that i f anything came out of h i s t a l k s w i t h the Sheikh, or h i s e f f o r t s , Parliament would have the f i n a l say. He d e c l i n e d , however, to .reveal the nature of the Abdullah-Ra'jagopalachari t a l k s i n Madras. On the same day Abdullah received a l e t t e r d i r e c t l y from Ayub Khan i n which the President not only expressed h i s d e s i r e f o r a peaceful settlement to Indo-Pakistan problems, tout a l s o declared \"you w i l l understand our anxiety that no settlement i s reached without due c o n s u l t a t i o n and agreement wi t h us,\" i n e f f e c t , i n v i t i n g him to v i s i t Rawalpindi to present h i s p r o p o s a l s . ^ 5 I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that the Indian Government did not object to t h i s breach of p r o t o c o l and one 44. i b i d . 45. PND. May 15, '64. - 183 -i s l e f t w i t h the d i s t i n c t impression that Nehru had given the Sheikh a carte blanche to attempt to reach a settlement w i t h P a k i s t a n . This was given. f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n on May 15 when the-.. Prime M i n i s t e r once again,, expressed h i s support f o r Abdullah, who, i t must be remembered, was s t i l l q u e stioning the f i n a l -i t y of Kashmir's accession. In an address to the A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee i n Bombay, Nehru declared -that i f the Sheikh could improve Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s ...he w i l l have done a great s e r v i c e to both count-r i e s . We w i l l have to help him i n t h i s attempt, but i n doing so, we must adhere to our p r i n c i p l e s as w e l l as to our b a s i c a t t i t u d e s towards Kashmir.46 Upon being questioned the Prime M i n i s t e r declined to r e v e a l e i t h e r the nature of t h i s a i d or the outcome of h i s l a t e s t d i s c u s s i o n s . Although the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p between Nehru and Ab-d u l l a h i s u n c e r t a i n , i t i s known that both genuinely desired to b r i n g about a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h P a k i s t a n . E n q u i r i e s show that the Prime M i n i s t e r l e f t no record of h i s d i s c u s -sions and correspondence, yet i t i s obvious that both were t h i n k i n g i n terms of an I n d o - P a k i s t a n i confederation, w i t h a modified status f o r Kashmir. Whether or not thepe was agreement as to the exact nature of t h i s c o n f e d e r a t i o n , i s pure conjecture. At t h i s time New D e l h i was a f l o a t with rumors that the proposed settlement envisaged e i t h e r a 46. AR p. 5837. - 184 -condominium or a t r u s t e e s h i p i n Kashmir. The former, which would i n c l u d e a j o i n t guarantee f o r defence and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s as an a l t e r n a t i v e to access i o n , was unequivocably r e j e c t e d by P a k i s t a n because i t presupposes that the improbable can become the probable and / t h a t / two sovereign States can u n i t e over the defence...of a t h i r d t e r r i t o r y while t h e i r own armies face each other...Besides defence i n -volves f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and Pa k i s t a n i n v o l v e s f o r -eign p o l i c y , and Pa k i s t a n which f o l l o w s a p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence and, f r i e n d l i n e s s to a l l nations i n c l u d i n g China, cannot have a common f o r -eign p o l i c y w i t h I n d i a , which i s m i l i t a r i s t i c and m i l i t a n t . 4 ( To the idea of a t r u s t e e s h i p - simply another v a r i a t i o n of an independent Kashmir - i t was obvious, as the l a s t round of S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l d e l i b e r a t i o n s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d , that neither the Government of India nor the Prime M i n i s t e r would countenance the surrender of t h e i r p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l over Kashmir to any other outside agency thus p r o v i d i n g a pre-cedent f o r f u r t h e r State autonomy. According to q u a l i f i e d sources, Nehru asked Abdullah to v i s i t P a k i s t a n on a two-fold mission. F i r s t , the Prime M i n i s t e r had received many l e t t e r s from Kashmiris l i v i n g i n Azad Kashmir and West P a k i s t a n and ther e f o r e decided that the Sheikh would be the i d e a l person to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e i r con-d i t i o n (which i n c i d e n t a l l y i n each case was wretched) and a s c e r t a i n t h e i r d e s i r e s . Second, and by f a r the more im-po r t a n t , was h i s d e s i r e to a l l o w the Sheikh to explore the 47. \"Kashmir: A Settlement Deferred.\" Round Table, 216. (September 1964) p. 389. . 48. Hindu Weekly Review. March 22, '65. - 185 -prospects f o r a general r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ; . i n c l u d i n g the poss-i b i l i t i e s of an Indo-Pakistan confederation w i t h Kashmir as part of I n d i a , and i f t h i s was agreed upon then the S t a t e could develop i n t o a semi-autonomous .entity w i t h i n t h i s f e d e r a -t i o n - - \" i n about a decade.\"^ 9 There was no i n d i c a t i o n , how-ever, as t o the exact nature-of these proposals or even t h e i r o r i g i n a t o r , and although no one could t e l l the Prime M i n i s t e r of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e a l i n g with P a k i s t a n over Kashmir, Abdullah seemed so sure of h i s new-found r o l e as the s a v i o r of the sub-continent that no one, l e a s t of a l l Nehru, would discourage him from pursuing what he believed to be h i s destined path.. Sheikh Abdullah a r r i v e d i n Rawalpindi on May 2.4 and was met by the M i n i s t e r of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Z. A. Bhutto, the President of Azad Kashmir, K. H. Khurdish, the the l a r g e s t crowd i n the h i s t o r y of the c i t y . 5 0 W i t h i n an. hour he was d i s c u s s i n g h i s proposals w i t h Ayub Khan, but as with h i s various meetings i n India there was no i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r nature. On the 25th, the Sheikh addressed a r a l l y i n the c i t y , and showing that he was nobody's stooge, declared that amity and not animosity was the key to b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s and stressed Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru's d e s i r e f o r a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the two c o u n t r i e s . P a k i s t a n i enthusiasm, however, r a p i d l y waned because of h i s frequent mention of India's s e c u l a r nature and the need to p r o t e c t m i n o r i t i e s i n any 49. Round Table, 216. ' p. 388. 50. PND. June 1<> '64. - 186 -settlement.51 On May 26, Abdullah announced that Ayub Khan and Nehru would meet i n New D e l h i i n June t o attempt to solve the Kash-mir dispute. Although the s p e c i f i c date was not revealed, i t was g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d that such a meeting would precede the Ju l y Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Conference. The import-ance of t h i s announcement was two - f o l d : f i r s t , i t was to be the f i r s t v i s i t to New D e l h i by President Ayub since I960; second, i t was the f i r s t time that Ayub had accepted a v i s i t to I n d i a to discuss Kashmir without i n s i s t i n g - .upon p r e l i m i n -ary m i n i s t e r i a l d i s c u s s i o n s or p r e - c o n d i t i o n s - a t r u l y s i g n i f i c a n t development.5 2 Just as t a l k s were en t e r i n g the c r i t i c a l stage - Nehru died. Abdullah immediately cancelled the remainder of h i s v i s i t and returned to New D e l h i f o r the f u n e r a l . I t was l e f t c t o President Ayub to r e v e a l and r e j e c t the Sheikh's proposals. At a d i v i s i o n a l meeting of the Muslim League at Lahore on May 31 the President declared that he had r e j e c t e d the Sheikh's proposals f o r confederation on the grounds that even-with respect to defence, f o r e i g n a f f a i r s 'and communica-t i o n s , there had to be one centre and that t h i s would event-u a l l y encroach upon r e s i d u a l S t a t e powers. Obviously t h i n k -in g of h i s problem c h i l d - East P a k i s t a n - the President 51. AR. p. 5951. 52. NYT. May 2.7, '64. - 187 -declared \"the object of our Kashmir p o l i c y i s to l i b e r a t e Kashmir and not undo P a k i s t a n . \" 5 3 F o l l o w i n g the death of Nehru, Ayub Khan c a l l e d f o r a moratorium on the Kashmir d i s p u t e , and In h i s June 1 broad-cast he made a s p e c i a l plea f o r a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e -ment to I n d o - P a k i s t a n i d i f f e r e n c e s . With the emergence of Prime M i n i s t e r S h a s t r i , however, i t became c l e a r that the In d i a n a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir remained r e s o l u t e , and i n f a c t , had hardened considerable; removing at a stroke the theory that Nehru's Kashmir background was a prime f a c t o r i n India's Kashmir p o l i c y . But before d i s c u s s i n g any pros-pects f o r a f u t u r e settlement under India's new l e a d e r s h i p , i t i s germane to answer the question: \"Why are India and P a k i s t a n so concerned over the f u t u r e of the S t a t e ? \" 53. PND. June 15, '64. - 188 -CHAPTER TEN THE VALUE OP KASHMIR TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN With the death of Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru and the r e j e c t i o n of h i s f i n a l proposals to r e s o l v e the Kashmir d i s p u t e , there now seems to be l i t t l e chance of a general r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between India and P a k i s t a n over the f u t u r e of the S t a t e . .Indeed, of the many proposals brought forward to solve t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l dilemma those suggested by Nehru on the eve of h i s death were without question the most p r a c t i c a l and f a r -s i g h t e d . Yet l i k e the previous ones, a l l have been r e j e c t e d by one party or the other, o s t e n s i b l y on the grounds that any change i n the State's status would be contrary to t h e i r presupposed l e g a l or moral p r i n c i p l e s . I n d i a , while c l a i m i n g that Kashmir i s l e g a l l y hers and that P a k i s t a n has no locus s t a n d i i n the S t a t e , has con-s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t e d any reference t o the World Court to determine t h i s l e g a l i t y on the grounds that one cannot . s negotiate her sovereignty. But i n r e f u s i n g to s e t t l e ' t h e Kashmir d i s p u t e , except on her own terms, she has brought i n m i l i t a r y a i d , membership i n m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and f r i e n d -ship w i t h China as reasons f o r not complying w i t h the' many United Nations r e s o l u t i o n s . Such reasoning must seem l o g i c a l only to Indian o f f i c i a l d o m . P a k i s t a n , on the other hand, has presented h e r s e l f to the world as the standard-bearer f o r Kashmiri s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and has c o n s i s t e n t l y held - 189 -up India to r i d i c u l e f o r her two-faced Kashmir p o l i c y . Upon examination, however, one f i n d s that Pakistan's a t t i t u d e t o -wards Azad Kashmir i s a u t o c r a t i c and f a r removed from the basic precepts of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and democracy. Tb see the fundamental reasoning behind these incon-s i s t e n t and i l l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s towards Kashmir one must leave aside questions of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and l e g a l r i g h t s and examine at grass roots l e v e l the s t r a t e g i c , economic and p o l i t i c a l values of Kashmir t o both nations. Some reference has already been made to the value of Kashmir to India and Pa k i s t a n . But these f a c t o r s , under the i n f l u e n c e of f o r e i g n and domestic i s s u e s , have not been cons-t a n t . I t becomes necessary, to discuss each one separately i n the pe r s p e c t i v e of eighteen years. ! (A) The S t r a t e g i c Values of Kashmir to India and Pa k i s t a n I t can be argued that the developments i n m i l i t a r y science s i n c e the Second World War have made geographic boundaries obsolete; and although the a b i l i t y of a nation p h y s i c a l l y t o invade and occupy a neighbour's t e r r i t o r y i s dependent t o a la r g e degree upon geographic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the a b i l i t y to wage war i s now t h e o r e t i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d . Never-t h e l e s s , geographic considerations can be extremely important i n determining the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of any stage. (1) India The s t r a t e g i c importance of Kashmir to India has a l t e r e d - I n -considerably since Independence. In 1947> while the Indian Array was moving i n t o the S t a t e , Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru declared that Kashmir because of her geographic p o s i t i o n w i t h her f r o n t i e r s . . .with the Soviet Union /Incorrect/7, China and Afghanistan, i s i n t i m a t e l y connected wi t h the s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l contacts of I n d i a . 1 Indeed, I t was Kashmir which provided India with her window to C e n t r a l A s i a . From the p o i n t of s e c u r i t y , however, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n the exact r o l e of the S t a t e i n the defence of I n d i a ; and upon examination, one i s l e f t w i t h the f e e l i n g that u n t i l 1962, Kashmir was. a luxury r a t h e r than a nec e s s i t y . I n the e a r l y years of Independence, the Western nations and not the S o v i e t Union and China were looked upon by India w i t h s u s p i c i o n as expansionist or c o l o n i a l i s t powers. To the Indian l e a d e r s , i n c l u d i n g Nehru, the Soviet Union was the f r i e n d of the c o l o n i a l peoples and t h e r e f o r e no p h y s i c a l t h r e a t ; while China, i n the throes of v i o l e n t r e v o l u -t i o n , was considered a k i n to India and consequently no danger to her s e c u r i t y . Communism was recognized as a p o s s i b l e i n t e r n a l menace, but not communism i n the guise of Chinese or Russian n a t i o n a l i s m . The threat to I n d i a , t h e r e f o r e , l a y i n the r e t u r n of Western i m p e r i a l i s m - and that could harldy re-emerge from the passes of the Himalayas. 1. Nehru. Speeches', V o l . I . p. 6 0 . There i s no d i r e c t contact between Kashmir and the Soviet Union. - 191 -Even i f the Sov i e t Union should cast covetous eyes on I n d i a , i t was u n l i k e l y that Kashmir would be chosen as an i n v a s i o n route; f o r the C h i t r a l and Khyber Passes ( i n Pak-i s t a n and Afghanistan r e s p e c t i v e l y ) would provide easy access to the Indus V a l l e y and the Punjab. The l o g i c a l route from Russian C e n t r a l A s i a , t h e r e f o r e , would l i e across Afghanistan and P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n i leaders have c o n s i s t e n t l y pointed out the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e i r n a t ion to any i n v a s i o n from the West and the need f o r the u n i f i e d defence of the sub-continent, yet t h e i r pleasghave always f a l l e n on deaf ears. With the Indian r e j e c t i o n of any Russian i n v a s i o n through the most l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l r o u t e , i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y that any serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n was given to the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n v a s i o n across the high mountains forming the north-ern boundary of Kashmir. From China, on the other hand, i t was most improbable that any i n v a s i o n of India would come through e i t h e r * t h e Karakoram Pass i n S i n k i a n g of the Konga Pass i n Tibet -which during the e a r l y stages of the dispute was f r e e from Chinese c o n t r o l . I f China were planning a serious i n v a s i o n of the sub-continent the l o g i c a l , route would be through Assam and Burma and then across the Gangetic P l a i n , r a t h e r than through Ladakh. Indeed, how l i t t l e importance India f e l t f o r Kashmir as a s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y can be shown i n the a b i l i t y of the Chinese t o construct a m i l i t a r y highway across the A k s a i Chin Plateau and to occupy some 15,000.square miles of Indian-claimed launched. t e r r i t o r y 192 -p r i o r to any formal p r o t e s t being I f one assumes that P a k i s t a n i s India's number ong....enejiy^ - a n d there are many Indians who hold t h i s view - Kashmir would s t i l l be of secondary importance. There i s l i t t l e i n the S t a t e of s t r a t e g i c value - no important roads, r a i l w a y s or v i t a l i n d u s t r i e s - and even i f an i n v a s i o n of India by Pak i s t a n were- planned, It's1 l o g i c a l path\" would\" he along\" the t r a d i t i o n a l i n v a s i o n routes of Alexander and Timur across the Indus P l a i n and not through Kashmir. P r i o r t o 1962, any Indian c l a i m to Kashmir purely upon s t r a t e g i c grounds was untenable; and there can be l i t t l e doubt that India looked upon the State as a g e o - p o l i t i c a l p i v o t i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h C e n t r a l A s i a , and the r e f o r e a.-necessity only i n s o f a r as i t would f u r t h e r enhance her status by p r o v i d i n g d i r e c t contact w i t h Afghanistan and, as Nehru suggested, c l o s e r l i n k s w i t h the S o v i e t Union. Kashmir, t h e r e f o r e , was a p r e s t i g e i s s u e , or as the P a k i s t a n i s p r e f e r to c l a i m , a luxury. With the Chinese i n c u r s i o n s and border wars of 1962,'. Kashmir assumed a p o s i t i o n of primary importance i n the defence planning of I n d i a . Now the S t a t e i s p a r t i a l l y occupied by two \"enemies\" who are i n c o n t r o l of a major p o r t i o n of i t s t e r r i t o r y , and are (according to Indian sources) supposedly l i n k e d i n a conspiracy to keep India weak. A l -though China now has c o n t r o l of some 15,000 square miles of - 193 -Ladakh, i n c l u d i n g the v i t a l mountain passes, and has connected her forward m i l i t a r y outposts w i t h an all-weather road, the o p p o r t u n i t i e s provided by c o n t r o l over t h i s area are not un-l i m i t e d . Nevertheless, Kashmir has now assumed unprecedented importance, and i t would be an unwise commander, as the past has c l e a r l y shown, who would neglect the defences of the S t a t e . India's c l a i m to Kashmir has f l u c t u a t e d from one based upon p r e s t i g e to that required f o r her defence. Yet i t i s the w r i t e r ' s contention that the importance of the S t a t e has been blown up out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to the p o i n t where once again i t has become an issue of p r e s t i g e and n a t i o n a l honor. I f India were w i l l i n g to negotiate w i t h China on the b a s i s of a c t u a l t e r r i t o r y under c o n t r o l or required\" f o r each other's defence, instead of maintaining that China has no claims along the A k s a i Chin, then the s t r a t e g i c value of the S t a t e would once again.dwindle. The I n d i a n a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir had hardened long before the Chinese ever appeared i on the scene, and while the s t r a t e g i c value and importance of the S t a t e has increased immeasurably, one must look f u r -ther f o r Indian motives. Thus, f o r the f i r s t time i n the h i s t o r y of the Kashmir d i s p u t e , India can r i g h t f u l l y c l a i m to have a genuine i n t e r e s t i n the s t r a t e g i c value of the S t a t e . P a k i s t a n i s , on the other hand, have c o n s i s t e n t l y shown concern over developments i n the S t a t e ; f o r , i n many r e s p e c t s , Kashmir to them seems poised - 194 -l i k e an ax over them. (2.) P a k i s t a n Pakistan's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n Kashmir are t o t a l l y dependent upon x^ ho i s i n c o n t r o l of the S t a t e , and u n l i k e India p r i o r to 1962, the occupation of the e n t i r e State' -or those areas adjacent t o P a k i s t a n - would be a major threat to the s e c u r i t y of the country. Indeed, w i t h the two main s t r a t e g i c highways and the West Pa k i s t a n r a i l w a y system runn-ing p a r a l l e l to Kashmir, and even the new c a p i t a l of Islam-abad only a few miles from the f r o n t i e r , i t i s l i t t l e wonder that the P a k i s t a n Governments look upon Kashmir as a s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y . On February 10, 1950, Pakistan's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mohammed Z a f r u l l a h Khan declared that India's s e c u r i t y would not be a f f e c t e d one ounce by the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.../On the other hand/ the whole of the defence of /West Pak-i s t a n / i s based upon the f a c t that /these communica-t i o n l i n k s / would not be threatened.2 Although t h i s presupposes that India i s Pakistan's number one enemy, and t h i s f e a r was one of the primary f a c t o r s l e a d i n g to the d e c i s i o n to send troops i n t o Azad Kashmir i n 1948 and the demands f o r defence i n depth during the 1963 d i s c u s s i o n s , i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w that an Indian i n v a s i o n would come through Kashmir. I f India was i n t e n t upon des t r o y i n g P a k i s t a n through f o r c e of arms, then an army - e s p e c i a l l y armour - could 2. S/PV. 464. Feb. 10, 1950. pp. 4-8. - 195 -operate more e f f i c i e n t l y i n the Punjab than on the barren h i l l s of Kashmir. This was c l e a r l y shown by the i n e f f e c t i v e -ness of the mechanized u n i t s of the Indian Army to make any n o t i c e a b l e headway during the 1947-48 f i g h t i n g and the nature of the border clashes which have plagued the two coun t r i e s ever s i n c e . Nevertheless, i f good fences make good neigh-bours and P a k i s t a n i s genuinely concerned w i t h defence i n depth, then the r e t e n t i o n of the border p o r t i o n s of Kashmir w i t h i n the P a k i s t a n i sphere of i n f l u e n c e would be an' import-ant f a c t o r i n any settlement. This concern over the f a t e of Kashmir has placed the P a k i s t a n Government i n a p a r a d o x i c a l p o s i t i o n : leaders from Liaquat A l i Khan to Mohammed Ayub Khan have claimed that once the Kashmir dispute i s s e t t l e d a new era of Indo-Paki-i s t a n i f r i e n d s h i p w i l l begin. At the same time they c l a i m that such a settlement must take i n t o account these s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . The o f f i c i a l P a k i s t a n i p o s i t i o n towards the Himalayan f r o n t i e r of Kashmir, t h e r e f o r e , has remained e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged since P a r t i t i o n . I n 1951, Mohammed Z a f r u l l a h Khan declared: For any reasonable time i n the f u t u r e , nobody expects that any major threat to the s e c u r i t y of' /the sub-continent/ can be made e f f e c t i v e from the northern ranges of the Himalayas. Minor t h r e a t s may a r i s e ; but no major i n v a s i o n can be undertaken from the north through the Himalayas.3 Pakistan's r e a c t i o n towards the Chinese a t t a c k s i n 19o2, 3. M. Z a f r u l l a h Khan. Pakistan's F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , p. 9. - 196 -t h e r e f o r e , was that t h i s was not a major i n v a s i o n but r a t h e r a minor border war brought about p r i m a r i l y because of Indian r e c a l c i t r a n c e . Although one can say that Ayub Khan would not be d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the northern f r o n t i e r s of the State were i t not f o r Pakistan's c o n t r o l of Azad Kashmir, he was s u f f i c i e n t l y alarmed over the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r o u b l e along the Azad Kashmir-Sinkiang boundary, that he l o s t l i t t l e time i n agreeing w i t h China to i t s formal demarcation. The s t r a t e g i c importance of Kashmir to P a k i s t a n i s r e l a -t i v e , and i f the P a k i s t a n Government i s only concerned w i t h the f u t u r e of the S t a t e i n s o f a r as i t provides defence i n depth, then one can say that t h i s has already been accom-' p l i s h e d through the c r e a t i o n of Azad Kashmir and the s i g n i n g of the boundary agreement w i t h China. But the dispute con-t i n u e s , p r i m a r i l y because of P a k i s t a n i i n s i s t e n c e , and t h e r e -f o r e one must search elsewhere f o r motives behind the Pak-i s t a n i a t t i t u d e s . (B) The Economic Value offKashmir Economically, Kashmir i s one of the poorest and l e a s t -developed regions on the sub-continent. The s o i l i s poor and badly eroded because of harsh c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s , while (according to L. Rushbrook W i l l i a m s ) even the p h y s i c a l s t a t e of the l i v e s t o c k - c a t t l e stunted to the s i z e of l a r g e dogs - i s a constant reminder of a depressed environment. Only the Vale of Kashmir, which shines l i k e a jewel i n a poverty-- 197 -s t r i c k e n s e t t i n g , would be a worthwhile p r i z e to any invader. Indeed the S t a t e has only two major n a t u r a l resources -minerals and water. There are major deposits of c o a l , copper, b a u x i t e , l i m e -stone, manganese and uranium, but to date there has been l i t t l e development l a r g e l y because of the l a c k of c a p i t a l and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . Both India and P a k i s t a n , and e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , which i s desperately short of mineral d e p o s i t s , are obviously aware of these economic p o t e n t i a l -i t i e s ; yet n e i t h e r has seen f i t to a d v e r t i s e the economic value of Kashmir i n i t s claims to the S t a t e . To do so would only transform high moral p r i n c i p l e s i n t o a modified form of economic i m p e r i a l i s m . The major n a t u r a l resources of Kashmir w i t h respect to India and P a k i s t a n are her r i v e r s : the Indus and i t s t r i b -u t a r i e s - the Jhelum, Chenab, R a v i , Beas and S u t l e j . These provide the i r r i g a t i o n and i n many cases the d r i n k i n g water f o r the Punjab and t h e r e f o r e are a v i t a l n e cessity to the economic w e l l - b e i n g of both S t a t e s . Indeed, i t can be sa i d that whoever has c o n t r o l over the headwaters of these r i v e r s has h i s f i n g e r s at the throat of the Punjab - a prospect which has caused j u s t i f i a b l e alarm i n P a k i s t a n since India c o n t r o l s these headwaters, and has, on s e v e r a l occasions, d i v e r t e d water destined f o r the West Punjab. F i v e years ago one could have presented the canal waters iss u e as a major f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g Indian and P a k i s t a n i a t t i t u d e s - 198 -a t t i t u d e s towards Kashmir. Now, however, the Indus Water Treaty of i960 under the World Bank formula, has e f f e c t i v e l y solved the d i v i s i o n and c o n t r o l of these waters to the s a t i s -f a c t i o n of both p a r t i e s . Nevertheless, P a k i s t a n i s ' s u s p i c i o n of India's motives has remained, and during the 1963 d i s -cussions they demanded ( f o r the f i r s t time) complete c o n t r o l over the Indus waters and watershed as a necessity i n any Kashmir settlement. With the exception of c o n t r o l over Kashmir's waters -which to a l l i n t e n t s and purposes i s guaranteed by Treaty -there i s l i t t l e of economic value i n the S t a t e worthy of the massive I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y and economic ex-penditures. The State has been, and indeed i s , a d r a i n on the exchequers of both c o u n t r i e s , and i t s economic e x p l o i t a -t i o n by e i t h e r cannot begin to compensate f o r the over-i n f l a t e d m i l i t a r y budgets of the past eighteen years. (C) The P o l i t i c a l Importance of Kashmir As has been p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, India and P a k i s t a n were founded on d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed concepts of nationhood; to t h i s day, the p r e - p a r t i t i o n p o l i c i e s of the Congress Party and the Muslim League r e s p e c t i v e l y have provided the theor-e t i c a l basis f o r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h each other. To Pak-i s t a n , the p a r t i t i o n of the sub-continent represented de jure r e c o g n i t i o n and acceptance of Jinnah's' two-nation theory and the f a c t that Muslims, who enjoy d i s t i n c t c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l and r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s from both Hindus and S i k h s , c o n s t i t u t e - 199 -a separate nation. The underlying b a s i s of t h i s theory was that Muslims and Hindus could not c o - e x i s t w i t h i n one s t a t e and that since Congress Raj would mean Hindu Raj w i t h \"an a s s e r t i o n of Hindu hegemony over the Muslims,\" the Islamic 4 way of l i f e would be i n constant danger. Thus t h e i r only hope of s a l v a t i o n as a r e l i g i o u s group lay In s e p a r a t i o n from the mainstream of I n d i a n , or Hindu l i f e . Since Pak-i s t a n was created on the b a s i c precept that Islamic a f f i l i a -t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d nationhood, Kashmir i s claimed as a matter of r i g h t . . I n d i a , on the other hand, while agreeing to P a r t i t i o n along communal l i n e s , did so only as a matter of p o l i t i c a l expediency - the a l t e r n a t i v e s being anarchy, c i v i l war or even the w i t h h o l d i n g of immediate independence. Nehru and the Congress never accepted the v a l i d i t y of the two-nation theory, and while t a c i t l y extending de jure r e c o g n i t i o n t o Jinnah's concepts of P a k i s t a n , never deviated from 'their goal of a n a t i o n founded along s e c u l a r l i n e s . Indeed, Nehru's a t t i t u d e towards the two-nation theory i s c l e a r l y shown i n h i s b i t t e r outburst to Josef Kortael of the United Nations Commission f o r India and P a k i s t a n : \"We are a secular State which i s not based on r e l i g i o n . ...Pakistan i s a medieval S t a t e w i t h an impossible t h e o c r a t i c concept. I t should never have been c r e a t e d . \" 5 Thus there was nothing i n the s t r u c t u r e of the new India to prevent the a c c e s s i o n of any State 4. S e l i g H a r r i s o n . \"Troubled India and Her Neighbours.\" Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s , 43:2. (January 196-5). p. 319. 5. K o r b e l . Danger i n Kashmir, p. 130. - 200 -r e g a r d l e s s of I t s r e l i g i o u s composition. For India to accept the v a l i d i t y of the two-nation theory would be to deny the b a s i s of the Freedom Movement and the concept of the secular S t a t e . For P a k i s t a n , on the other hand, anything l e s s than such an admission would cast doubt upon the l e g i t i m a c y of the n a t i o n a l homeland. ( l ) P a k i s t a n Since P a k i s t a n was founded on the b a s i s that r e l i g i o n c o n s t i t u t e d nationhood' and that Kashmir i s claimed as a matter of r i g h t , the P a k i s t a n i side of the Kashmir dispute i s simply an extension of the two-nation theory. The roots of t h e i r case l i e i n the f a c t that since Kashmiris are pre-dominantly Muslims, they must p r e f e r - as did t h e i r brothers i n the North West F r o n t i e r Province and Sylhet D i s t r i c t - ' i n c o r p o r a t i o n with P a k i s t a n . I t i s i n a d m i s s i b l e that any Muslim i n h a b i t a n t of the State might p r e f e r p r o s p e r i t y w i t h India to hardship i n P a k i s t a n . Indeed, the I n d i a n Govern-ment has p e r s i s t e n t l y held out the b l e s s i n g s of Indian r u l e to the Kashmiris - but always i n the most derogatory manner: Whatever the people of the Kashmir V a l l e y may de-cide...does l i b e r a l o p inion s e r i o u s l y t h i n k that India - s t a b l e r , more democratic, and more pro-g r e s s i v e i n her p o l i t i c a l and economic ideas -would be a worse choice than P a k i s t a n , which i s t h e o c r a t i c , unstable, retrograde and now h e l p l e s s -l y dependent upon f o r e i g n a i d . W i l l Kashmir's accession to P a k i s t a n which w i l l leave I n d i a with a permanent sense^of i n j u r y , be a g a i n f o r democ-racy and freedom? 0 6 ' Round Table, XLV:1. (Winter 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 ) . P« 72. (Indian Correspondent). - 201 -Although co n d i t i o n s i n both countries have changed consider-a b l y , t h i s s c o r n f u l a t t i t u d e continues. Accompanying t h i s P a k i s t a n a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir i s the f e e l i n g that India never r e a l l y accepted P a r t i t i o n , and that her p o l i c i e s are d i r e c t e d toward ev e n t u a l l y destroying P a k i s t a n nationhood and thus a c h i e v i n g r e u n i f i c a t i o n of the sub-continent. Indeed, there i s much evidence to support these f e a r s . P r i o r to P a r t i t i o n , the A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee passed a r e s o l u t i o n which i n part declared: The A.I.C.C. ea r n e s t l y t r u s t s that when present passions have subsided, India's problems w i l l be viewed i n t h e i r proper p e r s p e c t i v e and the f a l s e d o c t r i n e of the two nations of India w i l l be d i s -c r e d i t e d and disgarded by a l l . 7 The Maulana Kalarn Azad, l a t e r the Vi c e - P r e s i d e n t of India and himself a Muslim, r e j e c t e d J i n n a h 1 s concepts of n a t i o n -hood and s t a t e d : \"The d i v i s i o n i s only on the map...and not i n the hearts of the people, and I am sure that i t i s . . o going to be short l i v e d . \" S i m i l a r l y , the militant' Hindu Mahasaba i s on record that \"India i s one and i n d i v i s i b l e and .there w i l l never be any peace unless and u n t i l the separate areas are brought back i n t o the Indian Union and made i n t e g -r a l p a r t s t h e r e o f . \" ^ i t was deeply exasperating to many Hindus that P a k i s t a n should be created out of the Mother India envisaged by the ancient s c r i p t u r e s ; and i t was equally 7. • Menon. The Transfer of Power i n I n d i a , p. 382. 8. I b i d . , p. 383. : — ' 9. I b i d . , pp. 384-5. - 202 -f r u s t r a t i n g that when Hindus were to r u l e Muslims f o r the f i r s t time i n t h e i r long h i s t o r y , so many Muslims should escape t h e i r appointed f a t e . 1 0 Even Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru has r e g i s t e r e d h i s regret over P a r t i t i o n and has declared that \"one day i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l i n e v i t a b l y come.\"1\"1' Perhaps t h i s was one of the guiding motives behind h i s e f f o r t s to form an Indo-Pakistan con-f e d e r a t i o n i n the S p r i n g of 1964: undo P a r t i t i o n and solve the Kashmir dispute i n one bold s t r o k e . The majority of informed P a k i s t a n i s f e e l , t h e r e f o r e , that given the opportunity India would g l a d l y t u r n the c l o c k back to p r e - p a r t i t i o n times - and they look upon India's a t t i t u d e toward Junagadh and Hyderabad i n contrast to Kash-mir as proof of her double standard of e t h i c s and her de-t e r m i n a t i o n t o smash the very idea of an Islamic S t a t e . Kash-mir has become the symbol of nationhood - a nation challenged from b i r t h and under constant duress. Consequently, P a k i s t a n i n a t i o n a l i s m has been a n t i - I n d i a n , or more c o r r e c t l y , a n t i -Hindu. The stand taken by P a k i s t a n toward Kashmir i s incon-s i s t e n t and p a r a d o x i c a l . I f Pakistan's leaders were to admit or accept the permanent accession or attachment of the S t a t e to I n d i a , i t s r a i s o n d'etre would seemingly disappear; yet 10. H a r r i s o n , op. c i t . , p. 319. 11. K o r b e l . op. c i t . , p. 128. - 203 -i n order to strengthen i t s p o s i t i o n i n i t s dispute w i t h India they have v i r t u a l l y t a l k e d away any c l a i m to the S t a t e . Lord Mountbatten's speech to the Princes i n J u l y 19^ 7 f i r m l y l a i d down the p r i n c i p l e that while accession was an i n d i v i d u a l p e r o g a t i v e , \"You cannot run away from the Domin-i o n Government which i s your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects f o r whose welfare you are respons-1P i b l e . \" I n s p i t e of t h i s pronouncement, Pa k i s t a n accepted the accession of the Maharajah of Junagadh whose s p l i n t e r e d , predominantly Hindu S t a t e was separated from P a k i s t a n by s e v e r a l hundred miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y . Perhaps i n defence of P a k i s t a n i motives, i t could be s a i d that t h i s i r r a t i o n a l move was only taken to s p i t e India and cause her f u r t h e r hard-s h i p ; but nevertheless, i n doing so, one can say the P a k i s t a n i s not only accepted the r i g h t of the r u l e r to accede to whichgv-ever country he chose but a l s o r e j e c t e d the theory that t h e i r s was to be a purely I s l a m i c S t a t e . When i t came to Kashmir, they r e j e c t e d the Maharajah's accession to India as unlawful and demanded the State on the basis of i t s Mus-l i m m a j o r i t y . Thus there were two i n c o n s i s t e n t a t t i t u d e s : one based upon s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and the other based upon the s t r i c t l e t t e r of the law. I n both cases, however, Pak-i s t a n came out the l o s e r . Even the i s s u e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n has plagued 12. Lakhanpal. op. c i t . , p. 23. - 204 -P a k i s t a n i leaders. On one hand they have c o n s i s t e n t l y de-manded s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n Kashmir, and have r i d i c u l e d India's moral support f o r l i b e r a t i o n movements i n A l g e r i a and Angola as proof of her two-faced p o l i c i e s . ^ 3 On the other hand, the P a k i s t a n Government has refused to accept the idea of an independent or semi-autonomous Puktoonistan - or Pathan S t a t e - and have kept the Red S h i r t Leader Khan 14 Abdul Ghaffar Khan under detention since 1947. I t i s worth noting that the o r i g i n a l two-nation theory ceased t o e x i s t on August 14, 1947. Indeed, on the eve of P a r t i t i o n , the i n s t i g a t o r of t h i s concept, Mohammed A l i Jinnah, looked forward t o the day when i n the new Pa k i s t a n \"Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not i n the r e l i g i o u s sense...but i n the p o l i t i c a l sense of the same S t a t e . \" 1 5 This statement was l a t e r ex-panded by Prime M i n i s t e r Suhrawardy - a le a d i n g proponent of Indo-Pakistan amity - when he decla r e d : The two-nation theory was advanced by the Muslims as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p a r t i t i o n of India and the c r e a t i o n of the S t a t e made up of geographic-a l l y contiguous u n i t s where Muslims were numeric-a l l y i n the majority /both of which would i n c l u d e Kashmir/ 7. Once the State was created, the two-nation theory l o s t i t s f o r c e even f o r Muslims.16 13. The basis of India's case against Goa was f o r s e l f -determination. 14. c f . George L. Montagno. \"The Tak-Afghan Detente.\" Asian^Survey, 111:2. (December 1963). PP. 616-624.. 15. Constituent Assembly of Pa k i s t a n . Debates, V o l . I . . August 11, 1947. c i t e d i n K e i t h C a l l a r d . Pakistan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 19. 16. N a t i o n a l Assembly of Pa k i s t a n . Parliamentary Debates, V o l . I I . October 10, 1956. p. I&T. c i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 20. - 205 -Since P a r t i t i o n the P a k i s t a n Government has d i s s o c i a t e d i t -s e l f from India's f o r t y m i l l i o n Muslims and has f i r m l y stated that they - as c i t i z e n s of I n dia - must look toward New D e l h i f o r guidance and p r o t e c t i o n . Indeed, the P a k i s t a n Government today p r i d e s i t s e l f on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i t s communal groups; although t h e i r communal record has been f a r from s p o t l e s s - though not as bad as India would have one to b e l i e v e - the mere f a c t that Hindus and Muslims c o - e x i s t i s s u f f i c i e n t proof that the two-nation theory i s obsolete. I t has even gone so f a r as to s t a t e that \"Pakistan has not suggested that Kashmir should accede to P a k i s t a n on the grounds that the m a j o r i t y of the people of Kashmir are Muslim.\"\"1\"7 Thus the question a r i s e s : Why does P a k i s t a n continue to c l a i m Kashmir? P a k i s t a n i n a t i o n a l i s m from i t s i n c e p t i o n has been neg-a t i v e , nurtured by the f e a r of an a s s e r t i o n of Hindu hegemony over the Muslims of undivided India and l a t e r over P a k i s t a n i t s e l f . The present s i t u a t i o n i n Kashmir, i s .not the cause of I n d o - P a k i s t a n i animosity, but the e f f e c t . I t i s the symbol of everything bad i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two c o u n t r i e s . The s t r u g g l e f o r the S t a t e has become a n a t i o n a l crusade - the very symbol of Pakistan's defiance and defence against an aggressive Bharat supported by a l l p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s groups. That P a k i s t a n has undertaken various plans to develop her n a t i o n a l i s m along more p o s i t i v e and c o n s t r u c t i v e 17. P a k i s t a n News and Views. No. 20. A p r i l 9, 1962. - 206 -l i n e s i s t r u e , but to date, every p l a n or p r o p o s i t i o n has met w i t h l i t t l e or no success as i t soon f a l l s back i n t o the old r u t of Hindu-Muslim animosity i l l u s t r a t e d by the Kashmir dispute. Indeed, f o r P a k i s t a n to deny any c l a i m to the S t a t e or t o modify her stand against India i n Kashmir, would be to deny the b a s i s of her nationhood. (2.) India India's p o l i c y towards Kashmir during the past eighteen years has been t o t a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . The Maharajah acceded to her, and hence she has f u l l l e g a l and moral j u r i s d i c t i o n over the e n t i r e S t a t e . As has been shown e a r l i e r , however, her-reasoning behind her n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t of the promis'ed r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n has been t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t . In the e a r l y years of the d i s p u t e , Indianclung to Kashmir i n a determined e f f o r t to prove to the world - and e s p e c i a l l y to P a k i s t a n - that her t h e o r i e s of statehood were su p e r i o r and that r u l e from New D e l h i was f a r more b e n e f i c i a l than r u l e from K a r a c h i . She had as her popular leader i n the S t a t e , Sheikh Abdullah, an ardent supporter of secularism and a Kashmiri n a t i o n a l i s t who genuinely believed that the f u t u r e of h i s people lay i n continued a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h I n d i a . Nevertheless, the f u t u r e of the S t a t e was s t i l l open: Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru s t i l l professed h i s b e l i e f i n a p l e b i s c i t e -on h i s own terms of course - and continued to s t r e s s that i f the Kashmiris chose to j o i n P a k i s t a n , India would not stand i n t h e i r way. In a speech before the Lok Sabha i n August 1952, - 207 -the Prime M i n i s t e r declared: Me would w i l l i n g l y leave Kashmir i f i t was made c l e a r to us that the people...wanted us to go. However,sad we may f e e l about l e a v i n g , we are not going to impose on them at the p o i n t of a bayonet.19 Two years l a t e r , however, the Indian Government claimed 'that the a c c e s s i o n of Kashmir to India was i r r e v o c a b l e and that changed con d i t i o n s had forced the removal of the oft-promised p l e b i s c i t e . The o f f i c i a l I n dian explanation of t h i s sudden about-face was that ( l ) P a k i s t a n had accepted American arms; (2) she had joined the South East A s i a Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact; and (3) the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had voted to accede to I n d i a . In 1964 the reasons were again brought forward, but t h i s time the emphasis was on Pakistan's detente w i t h China.. C e r t a i n l y India was concerned over the p o s s i b i l i t y of a strong P a k i s t a n or the entrance of the cold war i n t o her sphere of i n f l u e n c e ; but t h i s was a matter a f f e c t i n g Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s i n general and of no p a r t i c u l a r importance to the f u t u r e . o f Kashmir. I t seems probable that the use of such shallow reasons as Pakistan's r e c e i p t of m i l i t a r y arms and membership of the Western A l l i a n c e was merely an excuse to cover a problem.of much deeper s i g n i f i c a n c e . By 1953, i t was c l e a r to Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru that the s e c u l a r character of India had not a f f e c t e d the basic 19. Nehru. Speeches, V o l . I I . pp. 338-39. - 208 -philosophy of Kashmir's Muslim p o p u l a t i o n and that any p l e b -i s c i t e i n the S t a t e would be conducted, not on p o l i t i c a l issues as l i b e r a l Indian opinion would have l i k e d to b e l i e v e , but on the b a s i s of the two-nation theory, a prospect which Nehru abhorred. In a speech before the Lok Sabha on Sept-ember 17, 1953, l e s s than one month a f t e r he and Prime M i n i s t e r Mohammed A l i had agreed to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a P l e b i s c i t e A d m i n i s t r a t o r f o r the f i r s t time, he d e c l a r e d : We have always regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic f o r us, and i t has f a r - r e a c h i n g conse-quences i n I n d i a . Kashmir i s symbolic as i t i l l u s t r a t e s that we are a secular S t a t e , that Kashmir, with a l a r g e m a j o r i t y of Muslims, has nevertheless, of i t s own f r e e w i l l , wished to be associated xvith I n d i a . Kashmir has conse-quences both i n India and P a k i s t a n , because i f we disposed of Kashmir on the basis of the old two-nation theory, obviously m i l l i o n s . . . w o u l d be a f f e c t e d .^3 The idea of a p l e b i s c i t e was now out - and Nehru worked assiduously to j u s t i f y h i s a c t i o n s . In August 1953, the Kash-mir leader Sheikh Abdullah, who considered the State's acces-s i o n t o India as temporary, was a b r u p t l y a r r e s t e d i n a mid-night r a i d i n S r i n a g a r ; i n December Nehru announced that i f P a k i s t a n accepted American m i l i t a r y a i d the promise of a p l e b i s c i t e would be rendered n u l l and v o i d . In the s p r i n g of 1954 f u r t h e r steps were taken to i n c o r p o r a t e Kashmir with I n d i a . Indeed, nothing was allowed that would permit a change i n the Kashmir status quo. The major f e a r , i t would seem, was not the r e j e c t i o n of 20. J . Nehru. Speeches, V o l . I I I . p.- 213. emphasis mine. - 209 -the two-nation theory,by. three m i l l i o n Kashmiri Muslims a f t e r a period of benevolent government; but r a t h e r the e f f e c t upon India's f o r t y m i l l i o n Muslims i f the Kashmiris f r e e l y voted to j o i n P a k i s t a n . The Hindu r e a c t i o n a r y element i n India at t h i s time was stronger than g e n e r a l l y supposed and communal te n s i o n was at a high p o i n t owing to the i n f l u x of refugees from East P a k i s t a n . Although the outcome of such a P l e b i s -c i t e must be pure conjecture, given the h i s t o r i c a l precedents of P a r t i t i o n and the mass-movement of refugees, the conse-quences can be w e l l imagined. The immediate r e s u l t would be the mass exodus of Hindus from the State - accompanied by t a l e s of a t r o c i t i e s and r e p r i s a l s against the Muslim popula-t i o n of northern I n d i a . The long range e f f e c t would be that Hindu communalists - who \"lit must be remembered found a sympa-t h e t i c audience among the masses of r u r a l I n d i a - 'would c l a i m that a few Muslims are Indian be choice and a l l are s e c r e t l y l o y a l to P a k i s t a n i \"The r e s u l t s of such a s i t u a t i o n would be c a t a s t r o p h i c : bloodshed and v i o l e n c e would r e t u r n t o the sub-continent; the economy of the country would be d i s r u p t e d ; and India's c a r e f u l l y nurtured i n t e r n a t i o n a l image as a sec-u l a r S t a t e would be tarnished or smashed completely - prospects which no Indian Government could a l l o w . This was one of the foremost co n s i d e r a t i o n s i n the mind of Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, and i n every speech i n defence of h i s Kashmir p o l i c y , he mentioned the awesome consequences of a Kashmiri p l e b i s c i t e . On August 13, 195^, he de c l a r e d : - 210 -• \"We c r i t i c i z e and condemn communallsm because I t Is the very opposite of the conception of broad to l e r a n c e and India's emotional u n i t y , \" v/hil-e i n December 1956 - two weeks before Kashmir was once again placed before the S e c u r i t y Council -he stated that \" i f we maintain t h i s kind of communalism... India w i l l cease t o be what i t i s . I t w i l l go to pie c e s . \" Indeed, on January 31, 195.7, Nehru declared: Nothing should be done which might b r i n g before us the horrors of August, September and October 1947. This i s the governing c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n our minds. Every step we have taken has been guided by that thought. I do not want Kashmir to be made the scene of a f r a t r i c i d a l war...It i s a matter, t h e r e -f o r e , of utmost concern that no step be taken which w i l l have these tremendous reactions.22 • Prom t h i s date the Indian Government has claimed that the i s s u e of.Kashmir i s cl o s e d . She has c o n s i s t e n t l y used Soviet support i n the S e c u r i t y Council t o render impo:tent-a i l P a k i s t a n i attempts t o ob t a i n a p l e b i s c i t e , while f o l l o w -• i n g the border clashes with China - when she desperately needed a f r i e n d i n P a k i s t a n - she s t e a d f a s t l y refused to give up her c o n t r o l over the Vale of Kashmir. I n accepting the p r o v i s i o n a l accession of the St a t e on the grounds that i t could become the showplace of secu l a r i s m , she In h e r i t e d a communal monster which could b r i n g about her own destr u c -t i o n as a nation. When asked why India refused t o agree to a p l e b i s c i t e , V. K. Menon, the former M i n i s t e r of Defence, candidly declared: \"Because we would l o s e i t . Kashmir 21. Nehru. Speeches, V o l . I I I . p. 4^5. 22. I b i d . , pp. 23;4-5. - 211 -would vote to j o i n P a k i s t a n and no Indian Government respons-i b l e t o agreeing to the p l e b i s c i t e could s u r v i v e . \" F u r t h e r -more, he conceded that \"there may--be nei t h e r l e g a l or moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r India's p o s i t i o n on Kashmir,\" but that the question was not \"what was r i g h t , but what was opportune.\" 23 Thus Kashmir has become a matter of l i f e or death to the Indian Union; but the paradox and tragedy i n the Indian c l a i m to the State l i e s i n the f a c t that w h i l e i t s r u l e i s main-tained to show the world i n general - and P a k i s t a n i n p a r t i c -u l a r - that Nehru's concept of secularism i s t r u l y opera-t i o n a l , the a c t u a l workings of secularism i n India i s so precarious that the Government cannot a f f o r d to r e l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l over Kashmir. (D) Summary Both India and P a k i s t a n have a genuine i n t e r e s t i n the f u t u r e of Kashmir, but i t would be f u t i l e to apportion.blame as to which party should bear the major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the dispute. I t continues today, as i t did eighteen years ago, because Kashmir i s considered by both States to be of v i t a l importance to them. Anything l e s s than an e q u i t a b l e settlement, t a k i n g i n t o account each other's f e a r s and i n t e r e s t s , cannot but f a i l . I t i s not a t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e , and h e r e i n l i e s the tragedy: the State's f o u r m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s have had l i t t l e or no say* i n t h e i r 23. c i t e d i n Arthur T o u r t e l l o t . \"Dilemma of a People A d r i f t . \" Saturday Review. March 6, 1965. p. 18. - 212 -f u t u r e and have become pawns In a much l a r g e r game, a con-t e s t which n e i t h e r India nor Pa k i s t a n b e l i e v e they can a f f o r d t o l o s e . Both c o u n t r i e s seem emotionally incapable o f ' r e c o g n i z -i n g each other's i n t e r n a l compulsions behind t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Kashmir p o l i c i e s ; consequently both c l a i m that t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the S t a t e i s one hundred percent c o r r e c t and that a u t o m a t i c a l l y the adversary i s i n e r r o r . Compromise and con-c e s s i o n are forbidden words, Mohammed Ayub Khan continues to search f o r e x t e r n a l support i n the hope that P a k i s t a n may gain c o n t r o l of the e n t i r e S t a t e ; while L a i Bahadur S h a s t r i , i n an e f f o r t t o gain p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h , moves c l o s e r towards the establishment of a genuine Hindu S t a t e , the z e n i t h of P a k i s t a n i f e a r s , and a p o l i c y from which can come l i t t l e good. 2 1 1' L i t t l e can be gained by prophesying f u t u r e developments on the sub-continent and t h e i r e f f e c t upon Kashmir; but given the trends i n both India and P a k i s t a n today, there i s l i t t l e hope f o r a general r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The border clashes w i l l probably continue, both coun t r i e s c o n t i n u i n g to devote large sums of money to i n f l a t e d defence budgets and to propaganda war. 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CHMK • N 1 1S° T *~* « ' t "@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0302281"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "History"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "History of the Kashmir dispute : an aspect of India-Pakistan relations"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/37784"@en .