Arts, Faculty of
History, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Norris, John MacKenzie
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
In the years between 1760 and 1770 the British nation and empire underwent a profound change in structure and function. Some of the change was made necessary by the survival of old institutions and of old forms of still vital institutions beyond the point of obsolescence, while some came as a result of contemporary disruption in the life of the nation. Obsolescence was particularily apparent in the administrative structure of the Empire, the so-called mercantilist system. The beliefs of mercantilism were largely inherited from the ecclesiastical society of the Middle Ages. Thus, while individualism and nationalism triumphed over Church in the sixteenth century, the idea of regulation, now adopted by the national state, continued to suppress economic individualism for two centuries longer. Imperial self-sufficiency was the ideal of the mercantilist theorists, and in an attempt to achieve this end, direct control by the mother country of the political and economic activities of all parts of the Empire was instituted. As the Empire expanded, however, it became increasingly more difficult to maintain this control. Special local complications, particularily in the cases of Ireland and India, aggravated the problem. Finally, the challenge of political and economic independence in America was successful in fringing to an end the old imperial system. In the mother country public life was dominated by the Revolution Settlement of 1688, and needed reforms were neglected. Parliament was unrepresentative of the majority of the nation and local government and local interests were far too powerful in relation to national government and national interests. In politics, party differences had been dissolved in 1688 as a result of the nation’s need for tranquility, political life became a struggle, not for principles, but for patronage and place, between factions of the now-predominant Whig Party. The corruption in politics at this juncture was without precedent in English history. In addition to these factors of obsolescence and decay, there were a number of disruptive influences which prevented the tranquil reform and change of institutions. A determined monarch was successful for a time in subverting the new institution of responsible government through cabinet. Out of the confusion thus caused, the political parties of the nineteenth century were simultaneously being developed. New classes were arising to seize political power, as a result of the economic revolution of the eighteenth century. In addition, the exhaustion of the nation, resulting from the Seven Years' War, aggravated the disruption. The economic organization of the nation was also in a state of dynamic change. In agriculture, the expansion of markets and the increase of population forced the adoption of new techniques and a new economic structure for farming on a large scale. This expansion, in turn, made necessary new marketing and price systems and an improved communication system. The chief economic phenomenon of the era, however, was the industrial revolution. The old domestic system of industry had been disintegrating since the beginning of the century, and, in any case, expanded markets demanded a larger scale of production than the old system could achieve. By 1770, the two principal phenomena of industrialism, capitalism and the factory system were widespread in the nation. Power machinery was applied to industry, and with this application the location of industry was shifted northwards. Moreover, a new individualist economic philosophy was developing, which rejected not only control by the state, but also the responsibility of the individual to the community as a whole. The new influence was reflected in such various aspects of the life of the times as taxation policy, parliamentary reform, the law, trade unionism, the factory system and the poor law. .Its most alarming result was the profound social schism created in the nation. In her empire, in her public life and in her economy, Britain was at a crossroads in the first decade of the reign of George III. If the transition was to be successful she needed peace, prosperity and order. The decade, however, was one of struggle, depression and disruption. The result was a retreat in British public life.
The B r i t i s h Retreat; 1760-1770. by John Mackenzie N o r r i s . ABSTRACT of a t h e s i s submitted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r the degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the department of HISTORY U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia September, 1949. • THe British Retreat: 1763-1770^ b y John g&efewrale Morris. iiBB2R&GT i thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requireaients for the degree of BASTKS. of mis in the department of rnmmm 0M varsity of British Columbia September, 194d« The B r i t i s h R e t r e a t : 1760-1770. ABSTRACT. In the y e a r s between 1760 and 1770 the B r i t i s h n a t i o n and empire underwent a prof o u n d change i n s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n . Some o f the change was made n e c e s s a r y by the s u r v i v a l o f o l d i n s t i t u t i o n s and o f o l d forms o f s t i l l v i t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s beyond the p o i n t o f o b s o l e s c e n c e , w h i l e some came as a r e s u l t o f contemporary d i s r u p t i o n i n the l i f e o f the n a t i o n . Obsolescence was p a r t i c u l a r i l y apparent i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f the Empire, the s o - c a l l e d m e r c a n t i l i s t system. The b i l i e f s o f m e r c a n t i l i s m were l a r g e l y i n h e r i t e d from the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l s o c i e t y o f t h e M i d d l e Ages. Thus, w h i l e i n d i v i d u a l i s m and n a t i o n a l i s m triumphed o v e r Church i n the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the i d e a o f r e g u l a t i o n , now adopted by the n a t i o n a l s t a t e , c o n t i n u e d to suppress economic i n d i v i d -u a l i s m f o r two c e n t u r i e s l o n g e r . I m p e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y was the i d e a l o f the m e r c a n t i l i s t t h e o r i s t s , and i n an attempt to a c h i e v e t h i s end, d i r e c t c o n t r o l by the mother c o u n t r y o f the p o l i t i c a l and economic a c t i v i t i e s o f a l l p a r t s o f the Empire was i n s t i t u t e d . As the Empire expanded, however, i t became i n c r e a s i n g l y more d i f f i c u l t to m a i n t a i n t h i s c o n t r o l . S p e c i a l l o c a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r i l y i n the cases o f I r e l a n d and I n d i a , a g gravated the problem. F i n a l l y , the c h a l l e n g e o f p o l i t i c a l and economic independence i n America was s u c c e s s f u l i n f r i n g i n g to an end the o l d i m p e r i a l system. In the mother c o u n t r y p u b l i c l i f e was dominated by the R e v o l u t i o n S e t t l e m e n t o f 1688, and needed reforms were n e g l e c t -ed. P a r l i a m e n t was u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the m a j o r i t y o f the n a t i o n and l o c a l government and l o c a l i n t e r e s t s were f a r too p o w e r f u l i n r e l a t i o n t o n a t i o n a l government and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . In p o l i t i c s , p a r t y d i f f e r e n c e s had been d i s s o l v e d i n 1688 as a r e s u l t o f the nation&s need" f o r t r a n q u i l i t y , p o l i t i c a l l i f e became a s t r u g g l e , not f o r p r i n c i p l e s , but f o r 2 . patronage and p l a c e , between f a c t i o n s o f the now-predominant Whig P a r t y . The c o r r u p t i o n i n p o l i t i c s a t t h i s j u n c t u r e was w i t h o u t precedent i n E n g l i s h h i s t o r y . In a d d i t i o n to these f a c t o r s o f o b s o l e s c e n c e and decay, t i i e r e were a number o f d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e s which p r e v e n t e d the t r a n q u i l r e f o r m and change o f i n s t i t u t i o n s . A determined monarch was s u c c e s s f u l f o r a time i n s u b v e r t i n g the new i n s t i t u t i o n o f r e s p o n s i b l e government through c a b i n e t . Out o f the c o n f u s i o n thus caused, the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f the n i n e -t e e n t h c e n t u r y were s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b e i n g developed. New c l a s s e s were a r i s i n g to s e i z e p o l i t i c a l power, as a r e s u l t o f the economic r e v o l u t i o n o f the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . In a d d i t i o n , the e x h a u s t i o n o f the n a t i o n , r e s u l t i n g from the Seven Years' War, aggravated the d i s r u p t i o n . The economic o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the n a t i o n was a l s o i n a s t a t e o f dynamic change. I n a g r i c u l t u r e , the e x p a n sion o f markets and the i n c r e a s e o f p o p u l a t i o n f o r c e d the a d o p t i o n o f new t e c h n i q u e s and a new economic s t r u c t u r e f o r f a r m i n g on a l a r g e s c a l e . T h i s e x p a n s i o n , i n t u r n , made n e c e s s a r y new m a r k e t i n g and p r i c e systems and an improved communication system. The c h i e f economic phenomenon o f the e r a , however, was the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . The o l d domestic system o f i n d u s t r y had been d i s i n t e g r a t i n g s i n c e the b e g i n n i n g o f the c e n t u r y , and, i n any case, expanded markets demanded a l a r g e r s c a l e o f p r o d u c t i o n than the o l d system c o u l d a c h i e v e . By 1770, the two p r i n c i p a l phenomena o f i n d u s t r i a l i s m , c a p i t a l i s m and the f a c t o r y system, were widespread i n the n a t i o n . Power machinery was a p p l i e d to i n d u s t r y , and w i t h t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n the l o c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y was s h i f t e d northwards. Moreover, a new i n d i v i d u a l i s t economic p h i l o s o p h y was d e v e l o p i n g , which r e j e c t e d not o n l y c o n t r o l by the s t a t e , but a l s o the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l to the community as a whole. The new i n f l u e n c e was r e f l e c t e d i n such v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f the l i f e o f the times as t a x a t i o n p o l i c y , p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e f o r m , 3 . the law., t r a d e u n i o n i s m , the f a c t o r y system and the poor law. .Its most a l a r m i n g r e s u l t was the profound s o c i a l schism c r e a t e d :- i n t h e n a t i o n . In her empire, i n her p u b l i c l i f e and i n her economy, B r i t a i n was a t a c r o s s r o a d s i n the f i r s t decade o f the r e i g n o f George I I I . I f the t r a n s i t i o n was to be s u c c e s s f u l she needed peace, p r o s p e r i t y and o r d e r . The decade, howerer, was one o f s t r u g g l e , d e p r e s s i o n and d i s r u p t i o n . The r e s u l t was a r e t r e a t i n B r i t i s h p u b l i c l i f e . Argument In the years between 1760 and 1770 the British nation and empire declined in strength and at the close of the decade was already set on the path which led to Yorktown and the Peace of Versailles. Many of the root causes of this decline are to be found in the empire i t s e l f , and these causes have been emphasized i n studies of the period, to the disregard of those factors of disruption to be found i n the mother country. A study of these latter factors, i n con-junction with an examination of the breakdown i n the admini-stration of the empire as a whole, i s the purpose of this thesis. The basic system of imperial administration of the time was mercantilism. A study of this system i s neoessary to an understanding of the eighteenth century decline of the empire. The main burden of government was centred in the mother country, and as the empire grew, so did the weight of government. In the f i r s t decade of the reign of George III, this weight.became too great for the mother country to support, and her collapse was hastened by p o l i t i c a l , economic and social dislocations at home. The struggle between the royal executive and the forces of popular representative government was i n i t s f i n a l stage, with the royal executive temporarily i n the ascendant. The agricultural and industrial revolutions were i n their primary, or essentially disruptive stage, and their long-term benefits had not yet begun to make themselves f e l t . Finally, a schism was developing between the various classes of English society, largely as a result of the two preceding factors. Thus a general retreat was forced upon the British people i n this decade. TABLE OF CONTENTS . . Page P a r t A. The M e r c a n t i l i s t Empire 4. C h a p t e r I . The Theory and S t r u c t u r e o f M e r c a n t i l i s m 36. C h a p t e r I I . The Breakdown o f t h e M e r c a n t i l i s t E mpire: 1760-1770 34. P a r t B. The P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s : 1760-1770 149. C h a p t e r I I I . S e t t i n g t h e S t a g e : 1760-1763 ... 151. C h a p t e r I V . The R o y a l P r e r o g a t i v e 210. C h a p t e r V. The P o p u l a r Power 235. C h a p t e r V I . T r a n s i t i o n i n P a r t i e s 266. P a r t C. Economic and S o c i a l D i s r u p t i o n 336. C h a p t e r V I I . The R e v o l u t i o n i n A g r i c u l t u r e and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n 337. C h a p t e r V I I I . The R e v o l u t i o n i n I n d u s t r y 365. C h a p t e r I X . The R e v o l u t i o n i n Economic P h i l o -. sophy and t h e S o c i a l S chism .... 387. C o n c l u s i o n 430. B i b l i o g r a p h y 437. 1. THE BRITISH RETREAT: 1760-1770 When one has been used to glory under Mr. P i t t , I sigh to think how he and we are f a l l e n ! We are.afraid to meddle even i n Corsica, though the French have so woefully miscarried there; and we enjoy half the empire of the Mogul only to t r a f f i c on India stock! We are no. longer great any way.. We have no great men; no great orators, writers or poets. One would think they had a l l been k i l l e d i n the last war. Nay, our very actors are uncommonly bad. I saw a new tragedy the other night, that was worse played, though at Drury Lane, than by any strollers I ever beheld; and yet they are good enough for the new pieces ( l ) . So spoke Horace Walpole, barely six years after the victorious Peace of Paris, at which Britain had been con-firmed in the position she had won during the Seven Years' War as the most powerful nation i n the world. In 1763 her armies had stood everywhere on conquered s o i l . Half a continent had been subdued through the leadership of Pitt's "Young Men." In the East, Clive had set her on the road to the subjugation of India, and i t s wealth began to pour into the British Treasury. The French West Indies, Cuba and the Philippines had a l l been wrested from the withered hand of the Bourbon Alliance. William P i t t presided, as the war lord par excellence, over an empire that had never seemed so rich and powerful and so secure as then. Yet, six years later, Walpole, i n this case at least a reliable witness, declares: "We are no longer great any way . . . " I The decline was apparent. The heritage of P i t t (1) Walpole, Horace, Letters. (Toynbee ed.) Vol.VII, p.250. 2. appeared to have been wasted and P i t t himself had declined into p a r t i a l i n s a n i t y . The leadership of Rockinghans and Graftons could not f i l l the place of the "Great Commoner.* Yet the age was not barren of leaders, though they seemed powerless to control events. And the events and forces? What were these which, i n s i x short years, had reduced the most powerful of nations to moral and s o c i a l bankruptcy, and were to reduce her s t i l l further? I t w i l l be the purpose of t h i s study to outline some of these forces and to show how, i n the t h i r d quarter of the eighteenth century, B r i t a i n was set upon the path that l e d to the worst defeat i n her hi s t o r y . Many of the.causes of t h i s decline were to be found i n the method of governing the empire, under the m e r c a n t i l i s t system, which was then the basic pattern of imperial admini-s t r a t i o n . The system involved e s s e n t i a l l y a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of control, which, together with weaknesses, inherent and inheri t e d , gradually made the burden of government unbearable f o r the mother country. Yet weaknesses i n the public l i f e of the mother country were also contributing f a c t o r s . P o l i t i c a l l y , a decline was hastened by the struggle between popular power and the roy a l executive, with the l a t t e r temporarily i n the ascendent. Economically, the complacent pattern of mercan-t i l i s t domestic economics was being shattered by the Indus-t r i a l and A g r i c u l t u r a l Revolutions, i n the i r i n i t i a l , and e s s e n t i a l l y disruptive stages. S o c i a l l y , a schism was widen-3 . ing between the various classes of the English, people, and the process was to continue and increase i n scope. 4. Part A. The Mercantilist Empire Adam Smith's criticism of the mercantilist system i n the fourth book of the Wealth of Nations established the nature of i t s commercial aspects for a long time as essentially gold-getting and gold-keeping. The animadversions cast on the system*s colonial aspects by nineteenth century liber a l s , l i v i n g i n an easier age of deadly certainties, are even more notorious. Both Smith and the " L i t t l e Inglanders" received the doubtful tribute of having their errors per-petuated i n the thinking of succeeding generations of scholars. Fortunately, i n the interest of fairness and historical accuracy, economic historians have imposed extensive modi-fications on the picture of mercantilism i n i t s economic aspects. Yet the old colonial empire s t i l l remains, for many p o l i t i c a l historians, as the embodiment of a l l that i s e v i l i n imperial administration. The dominance of American nationalist historians i n the f i e l d i s probably the chief reason for this situation. Prominent British and continental historians, however, without the obvious demands of making a case for their own nations, have to a great extent failed to -revise the standard conclusions i n the light of recent modifieations i n imperial theory. Mercantilism was not the epitome of narrow-minded power po l i t i c s that i t has often been pictured, l o r was i t the ultimate sophistication of economic and social develop-ment which i t s contemporary supporters declared i t to he. It was essentially a way of l i f e and a method of directing the efforts of the community to what was supposed to be i t s greater welfare. It possessed a moral foundation to a far greater degree than the succeeding system of laissez-faire. Its mistakes grew largely out of the times i n which i t flourished, and i t s triumphs were no less triumphs because they were achieved i n the name of national aggrandizement. 6 . Chapter I. The Theory and Structure of Mercantilism "For where your treasury i s , there w i l l your heart be also." Matthew. VI, 21. Mercantilism, though i t implied i n many of i t s aspects a conscious control over the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l , cannot be said to have had a conscious body of doctrine (2). The philosophy underlying i t , however, was admittedly one of ce n t r a l i z a t i o n , and was the chief heritage from the Middle Ages to the commercial era. The f i r s t major inheritance from the Middle Ages was the national state. The creation and growth of the state, i n f a c t , p a r a l l e l e d that of commercial p o l i c y and i t was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the future of mercantilism that the o r i g i n a l form of the state was an absolute monarchy. Actually, the degree to which mercantilism was devoted to the cause of (2) The discovery of the existence of a body of mer-c a n t i l i s t b e l i e f was made i n the eighteenth century by men who found security for t h e i r own f a i t h i n a system of natural law. The bond of mutual sympathy among these observers was created f a r l e s s by any s i m i l a r i t y i n th e i r p r a c t i c a l recommendations than by t h e i r common d i s t r u s t of the current expedients of s t a t e c r a f t i n Western Europe ... I t was perhaps only natural that they should seek to strengthen the outlines of t h e i r own proposals by systematizing the theories which they discovered l u r k i n g behind the i n s t i t u t i o n s that came under t h e i r f i r e . Judges, A.V., "The idea of the mercantile state," Transactions of the Royal H i s t o r i c a l Society. 4th ser i e s , Vol. XXI, p.4£. 7. national unification was limited, and almost entirely uncon-scious. The lack of organization i n economic matters at the close of the Middle Ages was apparent, and the mediaeval centralizing influences were adopted as a result of habit. During Tudor times, the real commercial policy was formulated i n the Navigation Acts, commencing with that of 1540. On the domestic scene, the Statute of Art i f i c e r s of 1563 and the Elizabethan Poor Law supported Industry and maintained a labour force for i t . I t was of importance, however, i n the character of mercantilism i n the future, that such measures were instituted at the high point of monarchial absolutism i n England. The national administrative machinery also developed, evolving outwards and downwards from the Crown to the Council, to Parliament, and to the f i r s t representatives of modern local government, the justices of the peace. Thus, both the economic and p o l i t i c a l aspects of the new age, beginning at the same starting point, evolved i n different directions, the one inwardly, the other outwardly. As the scope of p o l i t i c a l government control widened, the necessity for delegation of power became apparent. Economic govern-ment, however, and with i t the administration of the overseas empire, was subject to the demands of r i v a l r i e s among the states of Europe, and centralization became all-important. Economically, Inter-state relations were the primary con-cern of the mercantilists, and these had repercussions i n 8 . domestic and imperial policy. It was to be the f a t a l weak-ness of the imperial administration that, considering the weakening force of geographic diffusion, no recognition of the necessity to delegate authority, such as had been realized in the national p o l i t i c a l sphere, was or could be successfully made i n the imperial or economic spheres. As late as the end of the fourteenth century, the comprehensible world for Europeans consisted of their own continent, with the fringes of Africa and Asia. Outside this was the misty, half-legendary realm of the tales of Marco Polo and Prester John. Then, as the latent energy of mediaevalism burst into ithe f u l l flower of the Renaissance, Europe broke i t s bounds. Henry the Navigator and his Portuguese pirate-explorers l i k e Diaz and da Gama, pioneered the long route around Africa to India. The Atlantic became a part of the world, as Columbus, Cabot, Yerrazzano, Cabral and their successors followed i n the tracks of numberless and nameless Norse and Breton mariners to the "New" world. The Far East was discovered again, and the riches of both Indies poured i n to give the Iberian peninsula a fleeting prosperity, and a l l western Europe a new commercial outlook; and later, in the seventeenth century, with commerce, came empire and the imperial idea. For England, the creation of the Board of Trade and Plantations in 1696 marks the transition from a national to an imperial system. By that date England possessed an 9 . empire, small i n area, but spread i n the form of coastal settlements almost around the globe. The power of the old absolute monarchy had declined, and the new settlement of the "Glorious Revolution" had brought tranquility to the nation and transferred the real power of the state into the hands of a parliamentary oligarchy. Yet the old mores of centralized absolutism continued to influence imperial policy for another half century. Another heritage from the Middle -Ages was, of course, the origin of the commercial idea i t s e l f . From the end of the Middle Ages, the twin foundations of commerce, money and credit, had been developing to replace the old limited barter trade. More and larger goodf,better transportation and a new supply of precious metals, a l l combined to increase the volume of trade and introduce the new system. Banks and exchanges developed as international trade grew, and i n England the change was marked by the transition of the nation from passive to active trading. With this change there came a new realization of economic nationalism, which was trans-lated, eventually and haphazardly, into government action. The merchant, moving among foreigners as he does, require.8 organized assistance more than the farmer or land-owner. In addition, trade i s social i n i t s nature, requiring the intercommunication of peoples, while agriculture begins and ends with self-sufficiency. Trade must therefore be much more the subject of legislation. The urban trading 10. element i s almost always over-represented i n government, and long after the mercantilist system passes into discard, i t continues to dominate governmental economic activity. In addition to activity by the state, trade was pushed abroad by the survivals of i t s mediaeval predecessors, the guilds, and newer organizations, such as the Merchant Adventurers and the chartered monopolies became active for this purpose. Finally, the ultimate complexity and anchor of the mercantilist trading system, the Staple, was developed. The regulation of trade also owed much to mediaeval precedents. There had been an orderly control of the small-scale trade of that era through the precepts of Canon Law. The so-called "just price" placed a limit on profit, and under the Great Summa, usury was forbidden and the theoretical guide for a l l contracts was moral justification. This l e f t a heritage of order and control i n trade matters, which the mercantilist system very quickly adopted. ' A Staple or Magasin for forraigh Corn, Indigo, ~ Spices, Raw-silks, Cotton wool or any other.commodity whatsoever, to be imported w i l l increase Shipping, Trade, Treasure, and the King's eustomes, by export-ing them again where need shall require, which course of Trading, hath been the chief mean to raise Venice, Genoa, the low Countreys, with some others; and for such a purpose England stands most commodiously, wanting nothing to this performance but our own diligence and endeavour. Mun, Thomas, England's treasure by forraign trade. (1664), p. 13. 11. Under the new regime, problems were discussed ration-a l l y , without reference to religious tradition, and the distinction between ethical and economic considerations was clearly drawn. The obsessions of the eighteenth century were with property, contract, trade and profits. Locke, the chief philosopher of the age, saw the main purpose of government as being the protection of property, but his definition of "property" included l i f e and liberty as well as worldly goods, and was not narrowed to that materialist profit-protecting concept of nineteenth century theorists. The collection of interest on loans, without restriction, was now accepted, the moral prohibition oa usury having no application to the necessity of p r o f i t . The mercantilist, however, s t i l l looked to a higher authority to set the rate of interest. Unlike the supporter of laissez-faire i n the next age, but like the mediaevalist, the mercantilist did not believe i n a "predetermined harmony i n the nature of U) economic phenomena." There was no guarantee that unre-gulated trade would promote the best interests of the state, and i t might lead to chaos. Attempts at regulation were often ill-founded, but the mercantilist believed that the desirable economy could be achieved i f the proper steps were taken. When mistakes were made, the conclusion drawn was not that there had been too much regulation, but that the (A) * ' Heckscher, E l i P., Mercantilism. Vol. II, p.318. 1 2 . regulation had been inadequate or badly directed. Externally, the guiding principle behind the management of foreign trade was a favourable balance of trade. The classic expression of this canon Is that of Thomas Mun i h the seventeenth century. The ordinary means ... to increase our wealth and treasure i s by Forraign Trade. wherein wee must ever observe this rule; to s e l l more to strangers yearly than wee consume of theirs i n value ... because that part of our stock which i s not returned to us i n wares must necessarily be brought home in treasure ( 5 ) . Dazzled by the huge flow of bullion to Spain and Portugal, monarchs were prepared to accept the advice of those experts who called for a high t a r i f f policy to ensure a favourable balance of trade. Very early i n the seven-teenth century, prohibitions were enforced on the export of articles considered to be of paramount importance i n the nation's bid for economic power, among them bullion, naval stores and raw wool. Bounties were l a i d on the export of corn and of certain manufactures, and duties were imposed on certain foreign and exotic products which were considered expensive luxuries. English shipping was protected by the Navigation Acts which ensured special privileges to English ships in English ports, a monopoly i n the Indian and colonial trades, and the exclusive English composition of the crews of English ships ( 6 ) . (5) Mun. England's treasure by forraign trade, p. 7 . (6) The value of our exportation likewise may be much - - advanced when we perform i t ourselves in our own ships, for then we get not only the price of our wares as they Colonization was encouraged for national gain, as expressed i n many of the colonial charters. Prestige was one motive for this expansion, but the expectation of find-ing new sources of supply i n the colonies must be regarded as the most potent argument offered i n favour of English colonization (7). Certainly in regard to naval stores, salt sugar, tobacco, spices and dyestuffs, there was a great urge to obtain control of the source of supply, hitherto i n con-tinental or Levantine hands. In the eighteenth century this purpose was carried into effect with the great overseas conquests, but the desire for these exotic products remained, and those colonies which did not supply them were largely neglected, or discriminated against. For England the need for new markets was also press-ing, since her manufacturing industry, especially i n the case of woollens, was increasing at a time when the frequency of continental wars made her regular markets especially precarious. By the eighteenth century, this need too was approaching satisfaction, but commercial greed outlasted the considerations of high policy, and there was s t i l l a very real appreciation of the value of empire i n the trade structure. (6) cont'd. -are worth here, but also the Merchant gains the charges of ensurance and fraight to carry them beyond the seas. Mun, England*s treasure by forraign trade, ^ n ^ ___ s (7) - Knorr, K.E., Br i t i s h colonial theories, p. 55. 14. Previous to 1660, the p o l i t i c a l and economic theorists i n England placed the chief emphasis on over-population as a reason for colonization. The drain of excess population to the colonies was not only accepted, hut encouraged. With the influx of large supplies of precious metals from the American continents, there was widespread misery among the labouring classes, while the wage-levels lagged i n adjustment. The consequent unemployment was therefore a major factor i n emphasizing the belief i n over-population (8). The current horror of unemployment, and especially of the social unrest arising therefrom, certainly inspired many of the coloni-zation schemes of the period. I t was only with the C i v i l War that doubts as to the sufficiency of the English popu-lation seemed to acquire any substantial support. F i f t y years later the fears of under-population dominated a l l colonial theories. Sir William Petty even urged the return of the population of New England to the mother country (9). The belief had grown up that maximum production required a maximum producing population, and that since there was a labour shortage i n Britain, colonial settlement should be discouraged. Other mercantilists, however, successfully urged that the overseas population should be employed in the national interest, thereby eliminating the undesirable aspects of migration. ( 8) Knorr, B r i t i s h colonial theories, p. 45. ^ Petty, Sir William, Economic writings. (Hull ed.), Vol. I, p.301. 15. Internally, once the stagnation of the Middle Ages had been overcome, the prices and quality of goods could not longer be closely regulated i n the widespread domestic Industry. Officers of search and inspection were s t i l l employed, however. Labour was subject to the Statute of Ar t i f i c e r s , which regulated wages, usually at a subsistence level. The Elizabethan Poor Law, i n support of the doctrine of production for the nation, declared the obligation of the able-bodied to engage i n productive labour, and provision was made for training under the Statute of Apprentices. In addition, spasmodic attempts were made to control con-sumption (10). In this connection, t a r i f f legislation was used to restrain a taste for foreign luxuries. The establish-ment of p o l i t i c a l liberty among the upper classes, those who were the greatest consumers of such luxuries, made the administration of the regulations impossible. There was, however, a higher degree of success i n the colonies i n this connection. there i s exported communibus annis of our own native commodities for the value of twenty two hundred pounds sterling, or somewhat more; so that i f we were not too much affected to Pride, monstrous Fashions, and Riot, above a l l other Nations, one million and a half of pounds might pl e n t i f u l l y supply our unnecessary wants (as I may term them) of Silks, Sugars, Spices, Fruits and others; so that seven hundred thousand pounds might be yearly treasured up in money to make the Kingdome exceeding rich and powerful i n a short time. Mun, England's treasure by forraign trade, pp.98-99. 16. A study of the amorphous body of philosophy which has been called the doctrine of mercantilism must necessarily view i t s beliefs from their three points of application, namely: the control of foreign trade, the regulation of the domestic economy, and the management of the colonial empire. The three, of course, were interrelated. The control of the domestic economy was advocated, not only as a survival of the mediaeval concern for a well-balanced social and economic structure, but also to assist i n the promotion of foreign trade. Encouragement of colonial ventures was a corollary of the other aspects, since such colonies were intended to assist and strengthen the mother country i n i t s drive for economic and commercial dominance. Mercantilist theory on foreign trade begins with the bullionist school. This school held to the elementary notion that precious metals meant wealth and that the accumulation thereof increased the national prosperity and power. As early as the reign of Henry YI, the government required gold to be paid into the Mint whenever payment was received for a sale abroad (11). There was also a general policy of support for those trades which brought bullion into the nation. By the end of the sixteenth century, the growing complexity of international trade had introduced the system of exchange as a major factor in trade. The fluctuation of (11) Buck, The -politics of mercantilism, p. 22. such exchanges, however, introduced a complication which caused Gerard de Malynes and others to urge the necessity of management of the exchanges by the state, for the pro-tection of the nation's bullion hoard. They were answered by Edward Misselden, in The c i r c l e of commerce and other pamphlets, i n which he declared that the nation should manage the general balance of trade but not interfere with exchanges. This was substantially Mun's view also and received further support from such later economists as S i r William Temple, and Sir James Steuart (12)* The nationalist characteristics which the doctrine came to assume, demanded the use of t a r i f f s , bounties, pro-hibitions and enumerations, and eventually the extensive control of domestic manufacture and raw materials. S i r James Steuart 1s declaration of this argument i s typical of the eighteenth century attitude to the enlarged scope of controls. Both Mun and Misselden were connected with the East India Company, and i t was i n defence of the Company's spice trade that they wrote. That organization had adopted the hitherto unprece-dented practice of paying i n gold for Its products, being assured that their sale i n Europe would bring considerably more than the value of the gold exported and that ultimately the ba-lance i n "Treasure" would be i n favour of England. This chief tenet of the new "Balance of Trade School" i s outlined i n the fourth chapter of England's -treasure by forraign trade. 1 8 . The whole purport of this plan i s to point out the operation of three very easy principles. The f i r s t , That i n a country entirely taken up with the object of promoting foreign trade, no competition should be allowed to come from abroad for articles of the f i r s t necessity, and prin-cipally for food, so as to raise prices beyond a certain standard. The second, That no domestic competition should be allowed articles of super-f l u i t y , so as to raise prices beyond a certain standard. The third, That when these standards cannot be preserved, and that from natural causes, prices get above them, public money must be thrown into the scale to bring prices to the level of those exportations (13). The barometer of prosperity for this new school of mercan-t i l i s t s , therefore, was the balance of trade rather than mere gain i n treasure. Treasure i t s e l f was, however, important as the chief asset i n time of war, furnishing the means of provisioning the armed forces at short notice. In peacetime, gold and silver constituted a far larger proportion of the currency base than they do at present. Precious metals, outside the framework of exchange, were regarded as factors of production, yielding interest as land yields rent. The greater the quantity i n the country, the lower the interest rate. Inside the exchange structure, however, increased quantity meant increased circulation, and unless the productive level rose, there would be a general rise i n the price level. Such high prices were recognized as stimuli to trade, though they limited the f l u i d i t y of exports. Treasure to the mercantilist, Steuart, Sir James, Principles of p o l i t i c a l economy. (1767), Yol. I, p.270. therefore, was a useful index of the national economic wel-fare. Mun even saw i n i t s acquisition the chief determinant of domestic land values (14). The development of the balance of trade theory, moreover, was limited to some degree by the belief that there was only a fixed amount of trade i n the world and that the nation must gain as large a share as possible for i t s e l f . Thus, Sir William Temple declares: ... i t seems to be with trade, as with the sea ( i t s element) that has a certain pitch above which i t never rises i n the highest tides, and begins to ebb, as soon as ever i t ceases to flow; and even loses ground in one place, proportionable to what i t gains i n another (15). Trade, the later mercantilists believed, was the only true source of national wealth and the chief yardstick of a nation's economic welfare. Yet the proper regulation of trade was impossible without the regulation of the nation's domestic economy. The regulation of the domestic economy was an extremely complicated undertaking, since i t involved a more direct contact with the bulk rather than with a section of the people, and was, moreover, i n unfavourable contrast to the steady progression toward p o l i t i c a l liberty. In addition, a wide variety of schemes had to be evolved to control such aspects of the national l i f e as industry, labour, agriculture, and the domestic consumption. (14) Mun, England's treasure by forraign trade, pp. 29-30. (15) Temple, Works. (1757), Yol. I, p.203. 20. Externally, industry was assisted by the imposition of t a r i f f s , as trade had been directed by such imposition. Protection for home industry and the prohibition of certain foreign imports was the goal. There was a belief that exports should be, as far as possible, manufactures, both because manufactures; by reason of the value of the labour put into them, were supposedly of greater value t nan raw materials (16), and because the export of raw materials provided rivals with the means of production. In addition, raw materials were to be secured as easily and advantageously as possible, and convenient home industries, which might hold a near-monopoly i n production, were to be protected at a l l costs. Of such a type was the English woollen industry. Much of the controversy of the earlier years Of mercantilism centred around woollen manu-facture. The exportation of raw wool was continuously for-bidden. Despite these regulations, however, a lucrative smuggling trade grew up i n wool, and i t was calculated that by 1760, nearly half the wool crop of England was being smuggled abroad (17). Such a loss caused the orthodox mer-ca n t i l i s t grave concern, and i t was even urged that the atrociously neglected I r i s h woollen industry should be con-trolled and protected i n the interests of the English manu-facturer. (16) Steuart, P o l i t i c a l economy. Yol. I, p. 336. (17) Gipson, Lawrehce, The British empire before the American-revolution. Yol. I. Great Britain ancPTreland, p. 52. 21. Besides encouraging export, the mercantilist wished to preserve the home market for home producers, and throughout the eighteenth century writers condemned the entrance of foreign textiles to England, especially those from India. The s i l k weavers were at a constant disadvantage, since the French and Italian products were superior i n quality and cheaper i n price. Other industries, such as leather, t i n and iron, also sought, at different times, to come under the wing of the protective t a r i f f system. Foreign imports were to be marked for re-exportation wherever possible. This general attitude toward protection was a part of the hi s t o r i c a l sequence of attitudes toward commodities, as outlined by Professor Heckscher. The merchant desires mere exchange, while the consumer wishes access to an ample supply and the producer favours restriction. In historical sequence, these are represented by the staple and provision policies (charac-terized by the prohibition on the export of corn) of the Middle Ages; and by the protective policy (the limitation on imports) which comes as mediaevalism decays,and i s the dominant feature of mercantilism - "the fear of goods," as Heckscher c a l l s i t (18). The mercantilists urged the state to action, not only with respect to those industries already existing, but also to those to be created or to be revived. In the fishing industry, so v i t a l to the maritime dominance of England, the ( 1 8) Heckscher, Mercantilism. Vol. II, p.57. 22. Dutch, had long maintained a lead. It was often proposed to set the unemployed to work i n the industry, though l i t t l e was done i n this respect, the hard, uncomfortable l i f e of a fisherman being universally unpopular with a l l but those trained to i t . Certainly the neglect of the Ir i s h fisheries, during the long, hungry decades of the eighteenth century, was inexcusable, though here the problem of personnel was even greater than i n England. During Elizabeth*s reign f i s h days were proclaimed, but these had been allowed to lapse under the Stuarts. By 1670, proposals were even being made that the state should take over the industry outright, advancing i t money for i t s operations and regulating those operations (19). Sometimes the method of setting up a monopoly was adopted, and through i t the government controlled the industry. This method became, i n fact, a useful part of the Stuarts' f i s c a l evasions i n their search for an independent income. The method's application to colonization i s perhaps i t s best known phase. By 1700 i t had become discredited and various plans for encouraging invention and bonusing enterprise were suggested. Steuart's plan may be taken as typical of these later suggestions: Buck, The p o l i t i c s of mercantilism, p.55 23. The ruling principle, therefore ... i s to encourage the manufacturing of every branch of natural productions, by extending the home con-sumption of them; by excluding a l l competition with strangers;, by permitting the rise of profits, so far as to promote dexterity and emulation i n invention and improvement; by relieving the industrious of their work, as often as demand for i t f a l l s short, and u n t i l i t can be exported to advantage, i t may be exported with loss, at the expense of the public. To spare no expense i n procuring the ablest masters i n every branch of industry, nor any cost i n making the f i r s t establishments; providing machines and every other thing necessary to make the under-taking succeed. (20) 1 By such assistance, however, the state purchased rights of control in the interest of establishing standards of form and quality which would ensure markets abroad, would keep a favourable balance of trade and would protect the home consumer. The need of state interference for economic strength rather than for imposing the Canonist code of the "just price" was the purpose of such regulation, however. The marketing of goods also needed regulation. The real concern of the government, however, was with enterprise. Capital and investment (treasure) was only significant when put to work. Hence the mediaeval precedent of the regulation of usury was used i n the regulation of investment. Interest rates were kept low enough to make capital available to the merchant imperialists of Britain. High interest was now, not a mortal sin as in the Middle Ages, but a p o l i t i c a l offense. Even John Locke, essayed to enter the economic l i s t s against high interest with his (20) Steuart, P o l i t i c a l economy.! Vol. I, p.304. 24. Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest (1691). A national bank and mobilization of public credit were envisaged as a means of controlling usury to the national benefit. The concern with interest rates was the result of the recognition of the importance of trading capital. Mun wanted treasure to drive England's trade; James Steuart wanted low interest to stimulate domestic manufacturing. In the control of the factors of this production, mercantilists believed labour to be one of the most productive of a l l resouroes. It was therefore important that labour be regulated for the maximum production. Theoretically, i t could be dealt with far more easily than other factors of production since i t was not "produced," and therefore did not involve questions of economic principle i n i t s regulation (21). The chief, and almost only principle was that wages should be kept as low as possible, with the largest possible population in productive employment. Since the factory system had not developed, such regulation was tantamount to regulation of the whole process of production. Manufactures were believed, because of the value of their labour, to be of more value than raw materials. Hence i t was incumbent upon the nation to have as large a producing population as possible, to ensure the greatest economic strength. One worker was considered as good as another before the advent of machines, so that numbers rather (21) Heckscher, Mercantilism.. Vol I I , p.152. 25. than quality were striven after. Population was encouraged, especially after 1700, when the older belief that England was over-populated seems to have been dropped (22). Yet i f the people were to work the state must pro-vide training, force the poor to accept employment, care for the indigent and regulate wages. The belief that the Industrial Revolution created child labour i s a fallacy. In the mercantilist view no child was too young to go to work. Such writers as Coke and Gee had many suggestions as to work-houses, apprenticeships and similar measures to make sure that people worked. The doctrine was, of course, accom-panied by that of low wages. In agriculture, the chief effort was concentrated upon increasing the area of t i l l a g e , to make the kingdom self-sufficient i n food, especially i n the cheap food con-sumed by workers who produced for export. Attempts were made to reclaim land, with Only moderate success, but also, and more important, improvement i n farming methods was sponsored. Between 1500 and 1800 English farming became modern. too) ' I t i s multitudes of People, and good Laws, such as cause an increase of People, which prin-cipally Enrich any Country; and i f we retrench by Law the Labour of People, we drive them from us to other Countries that give better Rates, and so the Dutch have drained us of our Sea-men and wollen Manufacturers; and We, the French of their a r t i f i c e r s and Silk Manufacturers. Child, Sir Josiah, A new discourse on trade (1694), p.xi. 26. Manor farms with strip farming and very few head of stock promised l i t t l e p o s s ibility of progress or development. A larger unit of operation and greater freedom of tenure were required before significant advances could be made i n agricultural science. The obvious solution was the enclosure of the waste commons and an increase i n the unit of production. Enclosures began i n the fifteenth century with a few sheep walks, but i t was not u n t i l the eighteenth century that the enclosure movement really became a major economic and social factor. Mercantilists, wishing greater national production, supported the movement, and the equity and the social con-sequences were largely forgotten. Adam Moore, i n his pamphlet, Bread for the poor (1653), even thought that the nation might profit by the discipline on the poor and idle that would result from the disruption of the enclosure movement (23). The various corn laws also reflected the growth toward government supervision. In the reign of Elizabeth the mediaeval ban on the export of corn was l i f t e d . Under Charles I i t s export was bountied. Eighteenth century legis-lation restricted imports of corn and continued to encourage export. Actually, the great population increase during the century and the industrial developments which far outpaced those i n agriculture, caused an overall shortage of food i n (on) x 1 Moore, Adam, Bread for the poor (1653), cited by Buck, The pol i t i c s of mercantilism, p.50. the nation which, at times, became acute (24). Consumers* interests were guarded to some extent by giving clerks of the market power over sale prices and practices i n the trade, but the opposition of the provision merchants on one side, and the lack of concern for the poorer class of con-sumer on the other, prevented any really beneficial regulation being instituted. Despite this failure, mercantilist support of agriculture was linked, i n theory at least, to the doctrines on trade and wages - the price of labour, re-gulated by the price of food, would be reduced with better agriculture and render manufactures cheaper to produce. In order to make the control of the domestic economy complete i t remained only to regulate domestic consumption. Would you believe that such a granary as England has been i n as much danger as your mountains? not of famine, but of ri o t s . The demands for corn have occasioned so much to be exported, that our farmers went on raising the price of wheat t i l l the poor could not buy bread; indeed, they w i l l eat none but the best ... Yesterday the King, by the unanimous voice of his Council, took upon him to lay an embargo which was never done before i n time of peace. It w i l l make much clamour among the interested, both i n interest and p o l i t i c s ; but i n general i t w i l l be popular. The dearness of everything i s enormous and intolerable, for the country i s so rich i t makes everybody poor. Walpole, Horace. Letters. Vol. VII, p.42. To Horace Mann, Sept. 25, 1766. Walpole*s minimizing of the effects of the corn shortage i s by no means an accurate picture of the situation, though his diagnosis of i t s inflationary secondary effects i s reliable. 28. It was proposed to increase income and at the same time decrease expenditure i n the interests of national trade. P o l i t i c a l considerations, previously referred to, prevented any well-organized system of rationing. The more immoral or extravagant expenditures could, however, he regulated with a certain degree of popular support, through the so-called sumptuary laws. The mediaeval Canonists had used such legis-lation i n the interests of morality. The sentiment of the mercantilists, however, as stated hy Bishop Berkeley, was to the effect that i f sins of extravagance must be committed, they should be committed with the produce of and to the benefit of one's own oountry (25). Sumptuary laws, too, by restraining expenditure, could make more revenue available for taxation. In summary, however, the ultimate effect of the sumptuary laws, i n contrast to the mediaeval justification for them, was to justify luxury, and to stimulate i t , i r r e -spective of the status of the purchaser, i n a l l cases where i t guaranteed a market for the country's products, and put money into circulation. The third aspect of orthodox mercantilism was the regulation of the empire. In part, the mercantilist imperial organization was an outgrowth of the mercantilist domestic structure, though the maift outlines of mercantilist doctrine (25) Berkeley, George, Essay toward preventing the ruin of Britain. 1721, i n Works, ed, by A,C. Eraser . Oxford, 1871, p.200, cited by Buck. The p o l i t i c s of mercantilism, p.54. 29. did not crystallize u n t i l the acquisition of an overseas i-empire brought the demand for a larger economic system. Control of trade was considered just as important to the empire as to the mother country, and i t was hoped to build up a unit, powerful economically and p o l i t i c a l l y , but also serv-ing the old mediaeval function of providing a well-balanced social and economic integration. The navigation policy was used to adjust the relationship of the new territories to the old, and f i t the plantations into the scheme. The best argument for the navigation laws was, of course, defence. Even Adam Smith admitted that: "As defence, however, i s much more important than opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of a l l the commercial regulations of England." (26) The close a f f i n i t y of the merchantman to the man-of-war made the merchant marine the nursery of the navy, and i t s support was v i t a l to the security of the maritime power. The economic defence of the Aots followed the argu-ment that the high shipping rates (for Britain had the highest shipping rates of any of the great powers), would i' / - v • accrue to the benefit of Britishers and not to that of foreigners, even though the goods would, in the end, be more expensive. The laws, i n this connection, had a special significance for the colonies. The task of the mother country was to protect the colonies, but they must ensure her (26) Smith, Adam, Wealth of nations. (1784), Vol.11, p.195. 30. oorameroial advantages, and particularly, were they to direct their productive effort along lines beneficial to the mother country. Thus, with the exception of colonial defence, i t was economic rather than p o l i t i c a l motives which directed policy. The system, the purpose of which was the power of the state, indicated i n other aspects a primary concern with the principle of self-sufficiency (27). Mercantilists applied the fundamental concept of British self-sufficiency to their relations with the colonies. This desire to free England from the necessity of purchasing from foreigners formed the underlying basis of English commercial and colonial expansion; i t led directly to the formation of the East India Company and to the colonization of America." (28) Production overseas came to be regarded, generally, as British production, and such production was often more profitable to the various individuals concerned (both manufacturers and merchants), than i t would have been had i t been located i n the mother country. Such diffusion of industry, however, was generally discouraged as much as possible, for the mercan-t i l i s t ideal of a unitary empire demanded that the factors of economic power should be concentrated where they could most easily be brought to bear i n the battle for European economic dominance, that i s , i n the mother country. The idea of an overseas empire had a further d i f f i c u l t y , i n that i t might depopulate the mother country. (27) Heckscher, Mercantilism. Vol. II, p.40. (28) Beer, G.L., Origins of the Bri t i s h colonial system, New York, Macmillan, 1922, p.57. 31. This belief grew up in the eighteenth century, where before, emigration had been encouraged to r i d the country o f i t s permanently destitute and disaffected elements. The return of such population was impossible. Mercantilist thought, therefore, rationalized the situation, accepting the exist-ence of the plantations and their population as an added productive unit, self-supporting and contributing a great deal toward the self-sufficiency of Britain also. More was expected from the colonies, however, than mere exotic goods and tropical products. They were to be lucrative suppliers of such necessities as naval stores, foodstuffs and raw materials, and were to provide valuable manufactures. The power of the state was therefore invoked to monopolize this valuable trade for the mother country, through the navigation laws and a huge and expensive customs structure. Industry and manufacture i n the colonies also required regulation, lest there be colonial competition with similar endeavours at home. A distinction was made between the plantations and colonies which produced commodities different from those produced i n the mother country and those which were, to some degree, i n competition with her. Thus the tropical and sub-tropical colonies oame to be most highly valued. The preoccupation with the sugar, rice and indigo economies of the West Indian Islands, which were even then i n a state of decay, may thus be better understood i f considered 32. i n the light of the necessity for such economies as comple-menting the economy of the mother country (29). Hence, also, the disfavour with which New England was regarded because of her shipbuilding and furniture industries (30). On close examination, i t may be-seen that the old colonial policy was merely the expression of the mercantilist economic doctrines applied to the new imperial problems. Control over colonial trade received the sanction of historic precedent, since there had been t a r i f f controls over English mercantile activity long before the colonies were planted. The argument among Brit i s h leaders In 1762 as to whether to keep Canada or Guadeloupe under the forthcoming Treaty of Paris, illustrates this con-cern over West Indian interests. The decision i n favour of Canada was made partly because of the insistence of P i t t that the acquisition of Canada would remove the menace of France from North America, and partly because the London West Indian magnates realized that their vested interest i n the older B r i t i s h West Indies would be neglected for the new acquisitions, and demanded that the Guadeloupe project be given up. (30) Of a l l the American Plantations, his Majesty hath none so apt for the building of Shipping as New-England, nor none so comparably qualified for breeding of Sea-men, not only by reason of the natural industry of that People, but principally by reason of their Cod and Mackerel Fisheries: and i n my poor opinion there i s nothing more prejudicial, and in prospect more dangerous to any Mother Kingdom, than the increase of Shipping i n their colonies, Plantations or Provinces.. Child, Sir Jbsiah, A new discourse on trade, pp. 213-216. 33. To justify the restriction of colonial industry there was the supervision of English manufacturing since the days of the Tudors. The demands, f i r s t of economic, and then of p o l i t i c a l power i n the highly competitive relationships of Western Europe, marshalled, under the banner of mercantilist doctrine, the forces of overseas trade, domestic production and the colonial settlements. At this point, therefore, with the general outlines of the mercantilist system determined, i t i s necessary to turn to a discussion of that system's operation i n the middle decades of the eighteenth century, showing i t s gradual decline through both external and internal factors; and how that decline accompanied, and i n part caused, the decline of the British nation and empire. 34. Chapter II The Breakdown of the Mercantilist Empire: 1760-1770 I thirik I can trace a l l the calamities of this country to the single source of our not having had steadily before our eyes a general, comprehensive, well-connected, and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings and relations. Burke, Speech on the Nabob of Areot's debts. (31) The British Empire in 1760 was as widely spread and widely diversified a p o l i t i c a l entity as had existed up to that time. Nearly fifteen millions of a l l races lived under the British flag. The forms of government of i t s components (excluding the military conquests of the Seven Years' War), varied from theoretical equality with the mother country, to no autonomy at a l l , and from legal ownership by the Crown to mere economic penetration by chartered companies. In a l l there were thirty-five separate governments subordinate to that of the mother country. These governments may be grouped into several main types. The trading colonies were at once the most primitive and the most directly commercial of the Empire's components. These included the Hudson's Bay Company's lands (which ex-tended throughout the drainage basin of the great bay), the Royal African Company's lands (including Gambia, Gold Coast, Wydah Coast, Bight of Benin, and the newly captured Goree and Senegal), and the holdings of the East India Company (31) Burke, Edmund, Works. 1803, Vol. IV, p.201. Chapter II The Breakdown of the Mercantilist Empire: 1760-1770 I thinkl can trace a l l the calamities of this country to the single source of our not having had steadily before our eyes a general, comprehensive, well-connected, and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true hearings and relations. Burke, Speech on the Nabob of Aroot's debts. (31) The B r i t i s h Empire i n 1760 was as widely spread and widely diversified a p o l i t i c a l entity as had existed up to that time. Nearly fifteen millions of a l l races lived under the Bri t i s h flag. The forms of government of i t s components (excluding the military conquests of the Seven Years' War), varied from theoretical equality with the mother country, to no autonomy at a l l , and from legal ownership by the Crown to mere economic penetration by chartered companies. In a l l there were thirty-five separate governments subordinate to that of the mother country. These governments may be grouped into several main types. The trading colonies were at once the most primitive and the most directly commercial of the Empire's components. These included the Hudson's Bay Company's lands (which ex-tended throughout the drainage basin of the great bay), the Royal African Company's lands (including Gambia, Gold Coast, Wydah Coast, Bight of Benin, and the newly captured Goree and Senegal), and the holdings of the East India Company (31) Burke, Edmund, Works. London, F. & C. Rivington, 1803, Vol. 4, p.201. 35. (including St. Helena, Bombay, Calicut, Surat, Gomroon, Basra, Fort St. George, Fort St. David, Masulapatam, Vizagapatam, Fort William, Bencoolen, Fort Markborough, Benjar, and the newly acquired dominance i n Bengal). The next group was that of the Crown possessions without popular representation. This included Minorca, Gibraltar, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. The latter was given a legislature with limited powers i n l^-^and i n 1766 Prince^ \ Edward Island was made a separate ^ ocO^jrjwith similar p r i - / vileges. The Royal Colonies, each of which possessed a legis-lature of sorts (though these varied i n power), included New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South Carolina, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands and Barbados. The newly conquered areas of Canada and the Floridas were promised legislative government, though nothing was done about this immediately. The Proprietary Colonies included Pennsylvania (owned by the Penn family), the lower Counties on the Delaware (shared between the Penns and the Crown), and Maryland ( s t i l l held by the Baltimore family). The Trusteeship of Georgia was i n a separate category, the colony being ruled and the Governor appointed, by a Board of Trustees in London,- in Conjunction with the Crown. Massa? chusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Connecticut, as corporate colonies, were the most highly developed in terms of autonomy, since their original charters guaranteed them a high degree of local power. Finally, the Empire also included the associated and dependent Kingdom of Ireland, which had the most com-pletely developed governmental machinery and yet was r i g i d l y subordinated to the Br i t i s h government. The responsibility for governing this diverse empire was divided between a number of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s in the mother country. The Lords of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer controlled the collection and expenditure of revenue for imperial purposes, though they had no control over the customs, which was placed under a Commissioner of Customs, who owed a vague and divergent allegiance to both the Admiralty and the Treasury. The Bishop of London ruled the Anglican Church i n the colonies, but his functions were not very important, since the majority of the colonists were not Anglicans. The Secretary of State for the Southern Department (33), was probably the most important colonial o f f i c i a l , since he administered the p o l i t i c a l relations of the colonies with the mother country and with each other. His was the responsibility for corresponding with the governors of the various colonies and for giving them instructions and altering such instructions from time to time. In addition there was a sub-committee of the Privy (33) In the Seventeenth Century the two secretaries had - come to divide the work of external relations, one handling relations with Catholic (southern), and one with Protestant countries. A third secretary was added for colonies i n 1769, but the office was abolished i n 1782, wheat the offices were divided as to functions, - Home and Foreign a f f a i r s . In 1794 a third secretary was added, for War and Colonies. Council, the Board of Trade and Plantations, which was the only body constantly in touch with the colonies, and which was supposed to transmit subjects of paramount importance to the Secretary of State for action. Actually, however, i t had come to act only on the i n i t i a t i v e of the Secretary of State and was practically a branch of his department (33). These were the chief, and indeed, the only o f f i c i a l s with any real power in colonial matters, though there were many others, such as the Commissioner of the King's Forests, who held subordinate posts. During the whole of the eighteenth century the empire was i n a condition of constant, and often of violent change. It can be seen from i t s divisions, both as to the diversity of the colonies themselves and as to the respons-i b i l i t y for control over them, that the task of governing i t was a supremely d i f f i c u l t one. The implicit necessity of conforming to mercantilist doctrines of self-sufficiency and orientation om the mother country added to the d i f f i c u l t y . Actually, there was a basic struggle throughout the century between these mercantilist demands and the demands of governing a widespread empire effectively from a central point - the "weight of government" of the empire. The latter (33) The riv a l r y of Bedford and Newcastle in 1748 led to the increase of the powers of the Board of Trade at the expense of those of the Secretary of State (Bedford). The President of the Board, Lord Halifax, who had wide experience i n colonial matters, was admitted as a cabinet member and gained the right of appointing officers. This power was suspended, however, i n 1761, when Halifax became Secretary of State. 38. necessitated some degree of delegation of power to local authorities and a considerable improvement i n the existing centralized machinery of government. During the decade with which this chapter i s concerned, there occurred a transfer i n emphasis, by which an attempt was made to meet the new and almost overwhelming problems of imperial govern-ment, at the price of f a t a l l y damaging the mercantilist structure. It was the misfortune of those who were res-ponsible for this effort that i t came too late, and that the weaknesses of the imperial system were already i r r e -parable. The great increase i n the size of the empire during the early decades of the century, and especially as a result of the Seven Years' War, must be accounted as a principal contributing factor to the decline. By the various treaties of peace between England and France i n the seventy years preceding and culminating i n the Treaty of Paris (34), England acquired t i t l e to the largest part of North America, a controlling position i n India, and a great number of lesser coastal settlements. The cost of administration and defence, especially with regard to the inland areas, was enormously increased. The problem of collecting revenue to meet this cost had, as a result of crushing war debts and a disrupted home economy, (34) Treaties of Ryswick, 1697; Utrecht, 1713; Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748, and Paris, 1763. assumed alarming proportions. The growing p o l i t i c a l and social separatism i n the American colonies increased the d i f f i c u l t y of meeting these problems. Finally, the trans-i t i o n to parliamentary government in the mother country and the disruption i n that government during the decade, rendered imperial administration more than usually inefficient at a time when efficiency was a v i t a l necessity. The faults of the old colonial system were most apparent i n Ireland. Here, where the weight of government should have been extremely light and the kingdom might have been rendered self-supporting, the need for reform was desperate. The faults of mercantilism and of i t s application were not entirely to blame. Loeal social and economic conditions and the age-old enmity between the two nations accentuated the weaknesses of a dying system. Moreover, opposition to i t s more disastrous measures caused those same measures, i n reaction, to be more vigorously and obstinately enforced. Economically, Ireland was not a promising country. The climate, under the excessive moderating influence of the ocean, seemed to have an enervating effect on the population. This lack of energy coupled with the discouraging terrain (in many places half bogland and half scree), produced a situation which only progressive education and land improve-ment over several centuries might have corrected. Other factors, however, made such reforms impossible. Land became 40. more valuable as the changes in agriculture began to take effect and as the expansion of overseas trade brought increased markets. Resulting higher rents drove the poorer tenants out, and new price levels for basic commodities rendered these beyond the purchasing power of the average peasant. Despite these high rents and high prices, the I r i s h peasant did not turn to handicrafts and cottage industry as did his brethren i n England and Scotland. The rentals were lower than i n Great Britain, but the Ir i s h earning capacity was even lower i n proportion (35). There was also a huge structure of sub-leases of the land, which tended toward inefficiency and divided the landlord from his tenants, encouraging neglect (36). Tenants, too, when they found \ooi i t i s not uncommon i n Munster to charge from 4 to 5 guineas per acre for potato-ground; but we shall suppose the price but four guineas, that i s ninety-one shillings; the daily wages of labourers i s four pence per day; there are three hundred and sixty-five days i n the year of which fifty-two are Sunday, and suppose but thirteen holidays, the remainder i s but three hundred working days, the wages for which i s an hundred shillings, that i s , nine shillings above the price of their land; of which five shillings are paid for the tythe; and two for hearth money; and the remaining two go toward the rent of their cabins. What i s left? Nothing - And, out of this nothing they are to buy seed for their garden, salt for their potatoes and rags for themselves, their wives and children.' From The Enquiry into the Whiteboys Out-rages, 1760. Cited.by Gipson, Great Britain, and Ireland. p. 205. (36) In the beginning of the century, when absenteeism was especially common, and when the conditions of residence were often not only disagreeable but dangerous, i t was their (the landlords') main object to obtain from their land a secure revenue without trouble or 4 1 . they could not renew leases, often did a l l they could to destroy the usefulness of the farm, mining the s o i l in the last year of tenure, and neglecting to keep up the fences and farm buildings. Farming was done on an extensive, rather than on an intensive pattern, with tenants demanding forty and f i f t y acres on long leases, and farming the same i n * effi c i e n t l y and extravagantly. Thus the landlord was encouraged to conveirt his land into sheep walks i n order to make farming a paying concern. Such changes freed the land-lord from a l l responsibility for the welfare of those who had previously occupied the land. Conditions among the poorer cultivators were considerably worsened by their tendency to place the chief dependence for livelihood on the potato. At the same time, the peasantry showed a strong sense of attach-ment to the land, to the extent of preferring to l i v e on scrub land, after the farm lands had been enclosed, rather then emigrate to relative comfort i n the colonies. The food of the people consisted of l i t t l e more than milk, potatoes and salt (37), while the Iri s h seas teemed with fish, which were caught almost exclusively by the Dutch. (36) cont'd. . expense, and i n order to attain this end, they were prepared to grant f i x i t y of tenure at extremely low rents. Leases, sometimes for ever, more often for lives extending over forty- f i f t y , sixty or even seventy years, were granted. This led to the creation of a class of middlemen, small.country gentlemen, tenants themselves, but the immediate cause of the de-population of large d i s t r i c t s and described as the pest of the country. - Leeky, A history of Ireland i n . the eighteenth century. Vol. II,.p.6. (37) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p.213. The agrarian abuses, i n fact, led in the opening years of the reign of George III to the series of uprisings known by the general name of the Whiteboys Rebellion. The more immediate causes of the troubles were the enclosure movement, the rise in the price of cattle (and hence i n the price of a l l necessaries), and the abuse of the law of 1727, which had provided that not less than five i n every hundred aores i n each tract of land should be under cultivation. The magistracy was powerless to enforce such laws as this last, since they were under the domination of the Protestant landlords, whose interest i t was to prevent enforcement. The tithe system, too, by which a minority religion was sup-ported by an impoverished peasantry, was a major contributing factor to the insurrections (38). The tithe-proctor, who collected tithes for the clergymen, and the tithe-farmer, who bought them from him at a fixed rate, were among the most reprehensible figures In I r i s h l i f e , and were at the same time the inevitable product of the Iri s h ecclesiastical system. The disruption of the wars of conquest, the destruc-tion of the Ir i s h clan system and the religious restrictions a l l contributed to the despair and apathy of the Iri s h people. This despair i n turn made them much l e s s adaptable to new conditions. This was a people, l i v i n g i n a dismal past, and ensuring for themselves, thereby, an even more dismal present. The Irish woollen industry, which might have (38) Lecky, A history of Ireland i n the eighteenth century. Vol. I l l , p.14 43. successfully absorbed much of the excess labour force, was hamstrung from the beginning by such measures as the Br i t i s h statute of 1699, which limited the export of Ir i s h woollens to Britain, imposing duties of up to 20 percent. The Iris h provision trade was also restricted, both by government action and by unfair practices on the part of English com-petitors. Yet any signs of the revival of the Irish eeonomy were condemned by the mercantilist theorists. Sir Josiah Child disapproved of: .... the late great improvement of Ireland ... the consequence whereof i s , that the Country now supplieth Foreign Markets, as well as our own Plantations i n America, with Beef, Pork, Hides, Tallow, Bread, Beer, Wool and Corn, at cheaper prices than we can afford, to the beating us out of those Trades, whereas formerly, v i z . presently after the late I r i s h War, many Men got good Estates by Transporting English Cattle thither (39). Insofar as imports were concerned, only tobacco was consumed in sufficient quantities by a l l classes of Iris h to be sig-nificant. Only a quarter of the population had by 1760 sufficient wealth to purchase other types of imports. The spasmodic freeing of I r i s h exports in the 1740Ts raised a storm of protest i n England, for the cheaper costs of I r i s h production made the competition too s t i f f for English producers. Despite handicaps, however, the Ir i s h cloth industry, especially linens, continued to survive and even to prosper, to the point where the reforms of 1782 (39) child, A new discourse on trade, pp. 45-46 gave the Irish economy i t s f i r s t real chance i n advancement. The s k i l l of the Ir i s h weavers was recognized and respected abroad. Despite regulations, I r i s h products were smuggled to the continent, to compete successfully with B r i t i s h goods. By 1750 the linen industry was the most important i n Ireland and was out-producing that of England. In that year the exportation of" Irish linen to Britain had reached 9,077,712 yards (40). The application of the mercantilist restrictions to Ireland, as elsewhere, was not done on any pattern, and varied i n intensity as economic conditions i n the mother country seemed to demand. The Navigation Act of 1660 gave equal rights to English and I r i s h ships, but these privileges were taken away by the succeeding Acts of 1663 and 1696. The latter Act, i n fact, completely subordinated Ireland's trade to that of England. Her exports and imports had to pass through England and could only be handled by English ships. I r i s h commerce, I r i s h shipping and Ir i s h geographic advantages were eliminated. This was the worst aspect of the mercantilist system. I r i s h industry had already been almost destroyed at the behest of English competitors. The export of Irish cattle to England, and the import to England and the export to the colonies of Ir i s h woollens was pro-hibited by an Act of the Bri t i s h Parliament. The Ulster (40) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 229 4 5 . linen industry, during the seventeenth century, had been protected against foreign competitors, but i t was later abandoned in favour of a much less productive counterpart i n Scotland. The chief reasons for such restrictions on the part of Britain were p o l i t i c a l . The safety of the realm and the increase of strength and wealth i n her struggle with con-tinental powers was seen as the paramount raison d f etre of the British Empire. The later free trade empire was made possible only because Britain, as the monopoly industrialist of the world, required free markets and free sources of raw material. She could afford, nay, required, to have the barriers destroyed. But i n the old empire such advantages were not present. The method of aggrandizing the mother country, the necessity for which was no less apparent in the new empire, was more primitive i n the old. The withholding of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t i e s seemed, in the case of Ireland, a necessary corollary to the withholding of economic l i b e r t i e s . The division between Catholic and Protestant was fostered with these ends i n view. The fault lay i n attempting to apply a policy i n Ireland which was repressive; a policy with which the more enlightened course followed i n England was i n sharp con-trast. Sooner or later-the Irish Protestants, and s t i l l later, the I r i s h Catholics, were bound to rebel against i t . Further, the system of repression was difficult._to apply i n the face of even so minor a limiting geographical factor as the Irish Sea. The struggle to control the empire from a central unit was an attempt to retain that empire as a direct weapon for Britain i n her long struggle for European security. The **weight of government" would have been far less had she permitted local economic control; yet the benefits accruing to Britain would have been far less certain. It was a choice between an in e f f i c i e n t l y centralized empire and a decentralized, non-contributing empire. It i s not surprising that B r i t i s h statesmen, unaware of the degree to which the machinery of government had worn down, chose the former alternative. Burke's dream of a mercantilist empire administered for the common good of a l l i t s parts, l i k e so many of that statesman's dreams, could have no counterpart i n fulfilment. It i s true that he granted the ultimate supremacy i n i t to Britain, but this compromise would have been worse than either of the extremes advocated elsewhere. The cession of p o l i t i c a l control by Britain would have meant the ultimate cession of economic control, i n a world peopled by so many potential competitors. Similarly, the cession of economic control, as with the later British Dominions, meant the loss of p o l i t i c a l control. The two were interdependent. The empire was doomed to dissolution on i t s current basis. P o l i t i c a l l y , the situation was clearer. Britain, in 1689, had conceded the right of the Anglo-Irish to Protestant ascendancy, but rejected their proposal for p o l i t i c a l union. Ireland remained a subordinate kingdom, under the tutelage of Britain. Her executive, appointed by the Br i t i s h Privy Council and responsible to i t , had the d i f f i c u l t task of most subordinate executives of having to reconcile the opposing opinions of the British government and of the hostile Irish Parliament. The Irish Parliament was subordinate to that of Britain, but could be kept in that state only by a large and complex structure of government patronage and corruption. The Ir i s h House of Lords, and to an even greater extent, the Iris h C i v i l L i s t , bore an unusually heavy load of English patronage as well, being fantastically overloaded with the demands of Court hangers-on. The franchise for the Iris h House of Commons and e l i g i b i l i t y for government offices was much restricted, since Roman Catholics were automatically excluded by the Revolution Settlement, and Iris h Presbyterians, the majority of the Protestant element, were largely excluded by the Test and Corporation Acts. Thus a minority of a minority, the I r i s h Anglicans, ruled the country. Pbynings Act of 1494 had provided that no I r i s h Par-liament could be summoned u n t i l measures to be submitted to i t had been previously approved by the King i n Council. Early i n the eighteenth century, however, the Ir i s h Parliament ventured to assert i t s authority, especially over revenues, and the Ir i s h House of Lords re-asserted i t s ancient right of having f i n a l appellate jurisdiction for the kingdom. The 48. British, however, rejected these claims, and by the Declaratory Act of 1719, took away completely the appellate powers of the Lords and re-affirmed the supremacy of the British Parliament. The long duration and irregular sessions of the Ir i s h Parliaments was also a serious grievance, to remedy which the Ir i s h ventured to pass a Septennial Act i n 1761, modelled on the B r i t i s h Act of 1716. This was rejected by the British Privy Council but the Act was revived to plague succeeding administrations. The principle of judicial independence was also urged. The Ir i s h judiciary were appointed at the pleasure of the administration, and their salaries not being fixed, they were dependent for tenure on the goodwill of their appointors, Since 1689, I r i s h of a l l denominations had protested Poynings Act, and especially those clauses thereof which required that money b i l l s must be certified by the Privy Council before being presented to the Ir i s h Parliament for what amounted to almost perfunctory r a t i f i c a t i o n . Not only was legislation delayed by having to be sent to London, but the Ir i s h Parliament was deprived of the only power which i t might conceivably have possessed over the executive. The army i n Ireland was set by an Act of 1698 at an establishment of 18,000. I t was made up exclusively of I r i s h Protestants, and, though paid for by the I r i s h nation, was organized as an integral part of the B r i t i s h army and sub-ject to the British Mutiny Acts. .The Irish, in fact, had far more reason, especially with regard to economic restrictions, to question B r i t i s h supremacy than had the American colonies. The tradition of protest had a long and, i n Ireland, an honourable history, but the more modern protests begin with Molyneux and Swift* The f i r s t parliamentary leader of the movement was Charles (41) Lucas of Dublin, who i n 1747 founded the Citizen's Journal, devoted to criticism of the arbitrary rule of Dublin Castle. The Seven Tears' War was at once, an opportunity for the Ir i s h to show their loyalty and to improve their case for greater liberty, and for the English to acknowledge their debt of gratitude. On the one hand, the opportunity was taken advantage of in generous measure - on the other i t was neglected. The Irish Commons voted £500,000 for the war, increased their army establishment to 15,000, and sent drafts of 12,000 overseas, as compared with 17,000 from the much Charles Lucas (1713-1771), Iri s h apothecary and p o l i t i c i a n , f i r s t issued p o l i t i o a l addresses i n 1748-49 i n the Citizen's Journal; the Ir i s h House of Commons voted him an enemy of the country i n 1773. In the following five years he studied medicine at Leiden and practised i n London. He was elected Member for Dublin i n 1761. His letter to the Viceroy, Lord Halifax (September 19, 1761), was one of the f i r s t and most famous manifestoes of I r i s h freedom* In the 1760's his Addresses to the Lord Mayor were the leading p o l i t i c a l commentary on the times i n Ireland. After 1770 the leadership of the opposition was taken over by G-rattan and Flood. He died on November 4th, 1771. larger British standing army (42). Pitt's m i l i t i a had i t s counterpart in Ireland, though the inveterate and unreason-ing fear of the power of Catholicism prevented the accept-ance of thousands of Catholic volunteers for the war against the two chief Catholic countries of Europe. After 1763 the wartime establishment was reduced to the original 12,000, although i n 1765, Grenville, i n an attempt to save the British Treasury i n i t s increased military expenditures, proposed unsuccessfully to increase the I r i s h Army. Other measures of the Grenville Ministry were more easily put into force. The Stamp Act was applied to Ireland at the same time as to America, and with a much greater degree of success, although the revenue which could be extorted from the poverty-stricken nation was s t r i c t l y limited (43). In 1767, the new Viceroy, Viscount Townshend, was instructed to push through the Ir i s h Parliament a b i l l for the raising of the Irish military establishment to 15,000 (42) Coupland, R., The American revolution and the Brit i s h Empire. 1930, p.86. (43) The professional class, upon whom the burden of the tax was to f a l l , was extremely small i n Ireland, although the number of transactions in that l e g a l i s t i c age, and among a l i t i g i o u s people, was quite large. As a result, the tax was evaded as often as possible (though not so successfully as in America), and the returns were l i t t l e more than the cost of collection. 51. The purpose, as has been pointed out, was not for greater security at home - for, despite the Whiteboys risings, the miserable kingdom was generally quiescent - but to make a contribution to the defence of the Empire, and especially to make up the deficiency caused by the non-cooperation of the American colonies. As a concession in order to secure the easier passage of the measure, Townshend, without authority, granted the independence of judi c i a l commissions. The arrangement was vetoed i n practice, i f not i n principle, by the London government, who, under the influence of the absentee landlords, tacked such amendments on to i t as rendered i t useless (44). At the same time the duration of Ir i s h Parliaments was shortened by a Septennial B i l l , which the Privy Council changed to an Octennial B i l l (45). As any shortening of the Parliaments was an improvement, the B i l l was passed, and from this time the Iris h Parliament began to take effective con-t r o l of the country. The augmentation scheme, meanwhile, had met with violent opposition, since the finances of the nation were not on a condition to meet the added expenditure. (44) The B i l l was returned with clauses making i t necessary for addresses from the two Ir i s h Houses for the removal of a judge to be cert i f i e d by the Privy Council, and making the Ir i s h judges removable by the Brit i s h Parliament, whereas i n the original Act the addresses of. the two Iris h Houses and Royal assent had been sufficient.. Lecky, A history of Ireland i n the eighteenth century. Vol. II, p.82. (45) The change of the requisite b i l l , from septennial to octennial, was actually an improvement since the I r i s h The scheme failed to pass the Irish Commons, the opposition demanding a dissolution before being asked to give a decision on the measure. A dissolution was granted i n May, 1768, and i n 1769 in the succeeding Parliament, the Act was passed. Because of the rejection of a money b i l l proposed i n London, contention arose in the I r i s h Commons which resulted i n the Viceroy pro-roguing Parliament for fourteen months. The population movement at this time was such as to give alarm to the orthodox mercantilists. Twenty thousand were driven into exile by the decline of the woollen industry between 1768 and 1772 (46), and many more fled from the limitations imposed by Anglican ascendancy. The largest part of these latter were Ulster Presbyterians and they were to form a large Loyalist element i n the Southern colonies i n the forthcoming struggle for American independence. Town-shend pleaded for a bounty to support the Belfast linen industry, but i t was only i n 1774,after thousands of weavers and machines had been lost to America that regular support for the industry was agreed to by the British. This d r i f t to America had one further result. American revolutionists (45) con'td. Parliament sat only every second year, and also there would be inconvenience i f the general elections i n England and Ireland were simultaneous. -Lecky, A history of Ireland i n the eighteenth century. Vol. I I , p.91, (46) Coupland, The American revolution and the British Empire, p.151. were able to point to Ireland as an example of what would happen to the colonies under closer B r i t i s h supervision. By 1773 the economic and p o l i t i c a l situation i n Ireland had reached i t s nadir. Despite the fact that excise regulations were most r i g i d l y enforced and the revenue was collected by the army, Ireland was fast becoming a dependent area, financially as well as economically and p o l i t i c a l l y . The country was extremely poor, and i n that year i t was estimated that no more than three-quarters of the revenue necessary to meet the costs of aiimini s t r a t i on could be collected. (47) The arrears on the establishment were estimated at £300,000 annually. With a view to increasing the revenue for the nation, and at the same time mitigating some of the evils of absentee-ism, i t mas proposed by the Viceroy, Harcourt, t_jajb/,.a.. 10 percent tax on the incomes of absentee landlords be imposed. The I r i s h Parliament was eager to pass the tax and i t had the support i n Britain of North, Chatham, Shelburne and Adam Smith. Rocking-ham and his party, however, through the voice of Burke, de-nounced the measure which would limit their incomes so dras-t i c a l l y (48). They declared i t to be a violation of the Declaratory Act of 1719, which had proclaimed Br i t i s h supremacy. However, North, fearful of an alliance between the City (47) Lecky, History of Ireland i n the eighteenth century, p.118. (48) Burke, Works. Vol. IX, p.174. 5 4 . merchants and the landlords, ordered the government majority in the I r i s h Commons to reject the measure. This they did, and the poverty of the Ir i s h establishment continued. Simultaneously the normal money bjills were modified and the government increased the tax on tea. In the following year the I r i s h Habeas Corpus B i l l , which had been submitted annually by the Irish Parliament, only to be rejected by the Privy Council, was once more rejected with the order that i t was not to be passed again. Thus, on the eve of the American Revolution, Ireland presented a picture of absolute destitution, and a terrible example of the faults of British administration where British interest was not considered as v i t a l . A change was coming, with the succession of Grattan and Flood to the leadership of the opposition im Ireland, with the prosperity that war was to bring to the country, and with the concessions which defeat i n war were to force from the British. Though there were to be dark days imthe future history of Ireland, the f i r s t decade of the reign of George III was by far the worst. Why was Ireland, among a l l the dependancies of Britain, singled out for the harshest treatment? The answer to this question must take account f i r s t , of the geographic position of Ireland. Contiguous to Britain, i t was inevitable that the task of enforcing the mercantilist- regulations would be much easier than i n the overseas plantations. Secondly, the traditional h o s t i l i t y between Irish and English, and the gross p o l i t i c a l and social inequalities i n the country (legacies of the conquest), ensured a hatred of authority on the part of the Ir i s h and an obsession for i t s exercise on the part of the English and Protestant Irish ruling minority. Thirdly, the value of Ireland to Great Britain was not readily apparent i n the eighteenth century. Her exports to Britain of cattle, butter, woollens and linen goods, not only were not v i t a l to the ecojiomy of Britain, but were actually i n competition with the produce of the mother country. Exports to Ireland could not be assured of a market because of the low purchasing power of a majority of the population. Certainly, the repression - with i t s resulting misery - to which the actions of the English statesmen sub-jected the Irish i n the misguided belief that i t was essential to the strength of Britain, was quite unnecessary for such purpose. Great improvements could have been effected in the lot of the Irish, through easing the p o l i t i c a l and commercial restrictions, without affecting the real str.ength of Britain. The ferocity with which religious and r a c i a l divisions were encouraged and widened, would have been avoided in a less savage age. The age-old attitude of the English, of regarding the Irish as being an inferior species was much to blame here. It was as natural to oppress the Iri s h as to support England's overseas trade. Both were age-old habits, and both, happily for the English attitude of mind, coincided with what appeared to be her interest. I t was far more d i f f i c u l t to impose similar restrictions on the overseas planations, because of their greater distance from the mother country, their greater size and wealth, the absence of an economically dominant class of Br i t i s h i n the oolonies, and by reason of the absence of that tradition of English dominance which had unhappily marked Anglo-Irish relations since the days of Strongbow. Ireland became, and remained, an expensive deadweight on the Imperial structure, the plaything of a few absentee landlords, and the despair of B r i t i s h statesmen for four and a half centuries. I f Ireland presented an example of the defects of too much control under mercantilism, the British possessions i n India suffered from too l i t t l e supervision. The old East India Company, decadent after a century and a half of v i t a l activity, held power while avoiding the responsibility for giving adequate government to i t s vast te r r i t o r i e s . While India was believed to be a more lucrative f i e l d than America for Imperial endeavours, and the problems of government were in many ways much simpler, mis-government i n the f i r s t decade of George I l l ' s reign reduced the company to bank-ruptcy and the country to chaos. Mir Jafar and Mir Kasim played at po l i t i c s while the Company acted as umpire, increasing British power by encouraging Indian divisions, and gradually establishing i t s power over an ever-increasing extent of the great sub-continent. From the beginning there was power without responsibility, and i t was only through a 4.ong process of t r i a l and error, i n which the great administrators, beginning with Clive and Warren Hastings, were made martyrs to the Inefficiency of the system, that the British Government assumed i t s f u l l responsibilities with regard to i t s Indian dominions. For a long tiiae after the f i r s t establishment of English trade i n India, the danger in the situation was only potential. The Company, concerned only with trade, desired no t e r r i t o r i a l conquests in India, and no p o l i t i c a l power beyond the confines of i t s few trading townships on the coast, so long as the native administrations were able to maintain the order and security which trade' demanded. With very few interruptions this policy was adhered to for a century and a half. Then, i n the middle of the eighteenth century, the situation was suddenly changed. The collapse of the Mogul Empire, the resultant spread of internecine s t r i f e and anarchy and the growth of French economic and p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y combined to force the Company to concern i t s e l f not merely with the maintenance of i t s trade, but with i t s very foothold i n India. From commerce the Company was forced into active p o l i t i c s ; and in a few years, throughthe instrumen-t a l i t y of Clive, the Directors in leadenhall Street were faced with the, to them, appalling fact that they were res-ponsible as masters of a huge area i n Eastern India. The situation was without a precedent. And so, unchecked and almost unobserved, the Company followed the line of least resistance. It ignored the change; i t pretended s t i l l to be only a trading organization. In order to maintain the 58. pretence i t kept i t s responsibilities to i t s new subjects to their absolute minimum and public opinion at home did not appreciate the true situation. A major factor in this decay was the form of organi-zation of the Company. With no responsibility to the public, i t was ruled by i t s legislative body, the Court of Pro-prietors, who elected an executive, the Court of Directors, annually. The Court of Proprietors consisted of every share-holder owning £500. or more worth of stock. Its deliberations evinced much of the same i n s t a b i l i t y and irresponsibility as at the time characterized the national Parliament, with the important difference that i t did not have the modifying influence of constituents to check the dross of i t s turgid. rhetoric and useless recommendations. Parties and factions grew up within i t , and partisan quarrels of progressively increasing ferocity were carried on, to the complete dis-regard of the welfare of trade or of the subject peoples (49). The Directors had an almost impossible task i n attempting to administer such an organization while fending off as best they might the continual and ill-timed demands of the Pro-prietors for increases i n dividends to stockholders. After 1760 the factions gradually formed themselves into parties, opposed to or i n support of the r i s i n g star of (49) For an able discussion of the p o l i t i c a l intrigues i n the Company during these years, see Sutherland, L.S., "Lord Shelburne and the East India Company p o l i t i c s , " E.H.R.. July, 1934, pp. 450-481. 59. the Company's fortunes, Lord Clive. He had returned to England after the conquest of Bengal, with a fortune which made him the richest man i n the kingdom. In the councils of the Company, however, there was not the same unanimity i n greeting the hero as had been shown by the nation. Under one, Sullivan, a party of opposition was formed to oppose further extensions of the Company's p o l i t i c a l control, and to resist the encroachments which were even then being made by the Government - with the encouragement of Lord Clive - on the sovereignty of the Company (50). Trade, i t was argued, should be the main purpose of the Company. In India i t s e l f , the situation was only more serious i n that the game there was played with human lives rather than with directors' votes. By the settlement after Plassey, the Company became the controlling power i n Bengal. The Nawab, or viceroy of the Mogul, was responsible for the government of the country, but was dependent on the Company for military power. Thus the Company held the real power, and i t s authority - de facto at least - was soon extended to include the revenue collection as well. Clive l e f t India i n 1760 and before his weak successor, Vansittart, had arrived, the Company o f f i c i a l s In (50) As early as 1759, Clive had written to P i t t , urging that the Crown should intervene and take effective control of the huge area won at Plassey. Foster, Wm. "The India board, 1784-1858," i n Transactions o f the Royal Historical Society. 3rd Ser., Vol.XI, p.61. 60. Calcutta replaced Mir Jafar (the Nawab-designate after Plassey), with his nephew, Mir Kasim. The ease with which the Company was able to effect this was a revelation to i t s o f f i c i a l s of their power. Mir Kasim had to empty the Bengal treasury to purchase his promotion, and he was also forced to transfer to the Company's administration the three richest d i s t r i c t s of Bengal (Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong). The revenue fiom fchese three d i s t r i c t s was purportedly to defray the cost of the Company's army in Bengal. The arrangement was not, i n i t s e l f , unfair, since the cost of the army was ruinously heavy, and the Company's government of the d i s t r i c t s was better than that i n the rest of the country. Mir Kasim proved to be an efficient ruler, suppressing abuses, retrenching his finances and improving the efficiency of his army. In his efforts he had the support of Vansittart and Hastings, now Resident i n Bengal, but the majority of the Council i n Calcutta were alarmed at the growing strength of the ruler. The real grievance against Mir Kasim was his attempt to suppress i l l e g a l trading. The revenues of the Indian princes were largely derived from t o l l s on the transit of merchandise. Since the beginning of the century, however, the Company, on the requisition of the head of each local factory or post, had enjoyed the right of free transit for i t s goods. Since the servants of the Company were underpaid, the temptation to abuse these requisitions was obvious, and an i l l i c i t trade for personal gain grew up among the o f f i c i a l s . Armed with 61. Company passes, they forced the natives to deal with their own native agents, to buy dear and s e l l cheap. They mono-polized the provision trade and grew rich on the miseries of the people. Such private trade and similar irregular practices, while they did l i t t l e to benefit the Company, made the fortunes of many of i t s servants, the so-called "nabobs." Horace Walpole has recorded the awe with which these fortunes were regarded i n England i n his account of the return of Clive from his last mission. Lord Clive i s arrived, has brought a million for himself, two diamond drops worth twelve thousand pounds for the Queen, a scimitar, dagger and other matters, covered with b r i l l i a n t s , for the King, and worth twenty-four thousand more ... (51). Because of these abuses, native traders had almost disappeared and the revenues of the country f e l l drastically. Mir Kasim, aroused by the starvation of his people, the i l l -treatment of his officers and the robbery of his treasury, determined to put a stop to the depredations of the Europeans and, with the concurrence of Vansittart, abolished a l l t o l l s on trade, i n order to give the native traders, an equal chance with their competitors. The Council promptly over-ruled Vansittart and ordered the t o l l s re-imposed. Mir Kasim promptly revolted, was beaten and fled to Oudh, Mir Jafar being re-instated as Nawab i n 1763. (51) Walpole, Correspondence. Toynbee ed. Vol.VII, p.119, , To Horace Mann, July 20th, 1767. Clive did not bring back personal riches, however. 62. The troubles of the country were to increase. The Nawab of Oudh invaded Bengal i n support of Mir Kasim, bring-ing with him the Mogul - now bereft of authority. His army was defeated at Buxar i n 1764, Oudh and the Mogul were now at the mercy of the Company, and the inland penetration of the British i n India had really begun. These revolts and battles, however, had cost the Company a great amount of money. Further, the revenue from Bengal was not available during the uprisings. While the servants of the Company grew rich, the disruption of the peace and normal affairs of the country loaded the Company with debts. It was at this juncture, i n 1765, that the Company sent Olive out on his last mission. To pacify the new areas gained at Buxar and at the same time to work out some method of governing Bengal, whereby the Company might reap a profit and yet not be too deeply involved i n the government of the country, were his immediate concerns. The f i r s t problem was that of the Mogul. His presence with the British gave an a i r of legitimacy to the new arrange-ments, but any power given to him had to be carefully curbed. To this end, Clive settled him i n Allahabad, under the Company's protection, with an annual tribute from Bengal of £260,000. Oudh was restored to Its Nawab on payment of half a million pounds and the Nawab remained a separate, dependent a l l y of the Company u n t i l 1856* It was i n the government of Bengal, however, that Clive became mainly engaged. He legitimized the position of 63. the Company in Bengal by gaining a grant from the Mogul" of the diwani, or right to collect revenues there (52). The Company was now to collect the revenue, paying to the Nawab, as the administrative head of the government, the expenses for that government, which were reckoned at £600,000. In practice, the Nawab had control only over a limited field of domestic administration, the Company controlling a l l external relations. This was the famous system of "Dual Government." In theory i t was sound, since i t was a revival of a native Indian institution, but in practice the division of authority was-to lead to trouble. The system lasted for seven years, but was not i n the long run successful. The division of powers was not clear, and while the real power belonged to the Company, the responsibility for government remained with the Nawab. Mir Jafar died in 1766 and a regency was set up under a Company nominee, Mohammed Reza Khan. Moreover, the Company did not actually collect the revenues of the state (since i t refused to be distracted from its own business) and appointed Mohammed Reza Khan, naib, or deputy diwan. He was thus deputy for both the Nawab and the Company and dual government was destroyed. Thus the Nawab had lost a l l power, Mohammed Reza Khan, afraid of the Company, refused to act with vigour, and the Company refused to accept the ultimate responsibility. (52) Under the Mogul's government, the Nawab had functioned as the military-governor of the province, while the diwan was the treasurer. The system of Dual Govern-ment was intentionally patterned on this. 64. The.Company was, however, s t i l l determined to profit from the revenues of Bengal, despite the fact that these were now desperately needed to meet the bare costs of admin-istration. Expectations of profit from this source were very great and the shareholders i n England and the home government both demanded a share. Mohammed Reza Khan was unable to maintain order, the administration of iocal government and justice f e l l into chaos, and the revenue of Bengal declined steadily. Meanwhile, i n London, the Company was very much con-cerned over the problem of increasing the dividend payable to sihareholders. Between 1756 and 1766 the dividend had remained at the wartime level of 6 per cent and the Court of Proprietors, dazzled by the extravagance of the "nabobs", declared that the Company must be able to afford an increase. The directors, in. closer touch with the affairs of the Company, claimed that the debts of the Company were too great to warrant such an increase and that the stock might be inflated to such a point that the values could not be main-tained , with resulting panic and crash. At the same time the Chatham-Grafton Government issued a warning that i t intended to investigate the affairs of the Company. It' wasj realized that the Company had a d e f i c i t which i t would soon have to ask Parliament to make good, and Chatham planned at that time to institute a general enquiry and settle what revenues and powers should be sur-rendered to the nation. At the end of 1766, therefore, when 65. a shortage of government revenue made the matter more press-ing (53), Chatham, with the concurrence of Grafton and Shelburne, planned to have Parliament decide the Company's rights. The Cabinet was not, however, unanimous on the plan (54). Pending the enquiry, the Proprietors again raised the dividend - to 12§ per cent this time. They argued that the Company was a national institution and that limiting dividends interfered with the national interest. The opposition to Chatham's proposal i n Parliament was extreme and vociferous. Such action was declared to be an invasion of the rights of private property and " A l l who enjoyed any property by abuses, took the alarm, and they who desired to obstruct any measures of the Government, were sedulous not to l e t the panic cool." (55). Burke, who was one day to plead the cause of the people of India i n the interests of party advantage, opposed any interference what-soever, with the oppressive Company government. In the (53) The c i v i l l i s t was heavily i n debt, the navy needed a grant, and i t was proposed to settle an annuity on the Queen of Denmark. This last was f i n a l l y taken out of the.already overburdened I r i s h revenues. (54) Grafton and Shelburne supported the idea of Chatham for outright expropriation. Townshend and, to a lesser extent, Conway, wished for the less severe method of a treaty with the Company. (55) Walpole, Memoir of the reign of George III. Vol.11, p.277. 66. councils of the Cabinet, Chatham, unfortunately, was declin-ing mentally, and would not suggest an alternative to the Company government, preferring to leave the whole matter to Parliament to decide (56). No course of action had been outlined for the various members of the government, Conway, the Commons leader, had no f u l l information, even the Duke of Grafton knew nothing of the details which required considera-tion in connection with the plan, and Charles Townshend, the most talented as he was the most unpredictable of the Cabinet members, was violently opposed to expropriation of the Company's rights. Thus, when the presentation of the Company's affa i r s before Parliament i n the spring of 1767 was cautiously made by Townshend, the Directors were easily able to set one faction off against the other and open the way for a negotiated treaty. The agreement f i n a l l y reached confirmed the Company i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l revenues, but found i t to pay the Crown the sum of £400,000. per annum for two years, at which time a new agreement was to be negotiated. Dividends were to be restricted to 10 per cent. A new treaty was made i n 1769, whereby the Company was permitted to raise i t s dividends to 12g per cent i n the following five years at the rate of not more than 1 per cent per year. At this time i t was noted (56) Walpole, Memoir of the reign of George III. Vol. II, p. 278. that the Company had some £6,000,000. of debt (57). Not only had the debt assumed alarming proportions but immediate and future requirements of expenditures showed no likelihood of decrease. The revenue derived from Bengal had not increased, despite the fact that more direct control had been assumed i n 1769 through three supervisors acting directly under the Council (58). In addition, i n the same year the Madras Presidency had blundered into a war with Hyder A l i , the Sultan of Mysore, and had lost heavily i n the encounter. The Carnatic was devastated and the revenues and military establishment of Bengal were heavily drawn upon to make up deficiencies. As a result of the disastrous peace forced on the Company by Hyder A l i , the shares of the Company f e l l by 60 per cent. In the following year a famine k i l l e d off a third of the population of Bengal and that province became a l i a b i l i t y to the Company. There was a f a i r l y well-founded suspicion that the Company's servants had been hoarding corn for profit and had thereby increased the severity of the famine. In the following year, as i f to complete the destruction of the Brit i s h dominion i n (57) Annual Register. 1769, p.34 (58) The proposal of the Company to send out super-visors i n 1769 was countered by a demand from the Government that one of these be a naval officer appointed by the Government, and that he have over-riding powers. The Company refused this last term and was informed.that i t s plan was i l l e g a l . The Company f i n a l l y was able to accept the naval officer, while limiting his powers to matters of peace and war. Ibid. p.5£. 68. India, the warrior confederation of the Mahrattas overran a l l central India and captured Delhi and the Mogul. Supported by these outward and vis i b l e signs of sovereignty, they demanded the Mogul's tribute from the Company and the Nawab of Oudh. It was more than time that the Brit i s h Government intervened. The worst danger, however* was financial. By 1772 the Company was practically bankrupt and, far from being able to pay i t s tribute to the Government, had to borrow £1,000,000. Lord North seized the opportunity to intervene and abolish once and for a l l the pernicious system of divided respons-i b i l i t y . Select and secret committees enquired into the Company and i t s Indian af f a i r s . North pushed through a b i l l to forbid the Company to extend i t s system of supervisors, thereby forestalling an attempt to mitigate the evils of the system at the last moment. Burke declared that such a violation of the Company's rights under i t s original charter was a dangerous precedent for similar violations of private property and that the government had extorted £400,000. annually from the Company and had given nothing i n return. Despite such rhetoric, however, a Regulating B i l l was passed in June 1773. By this Act, a loan was made to the Company of £1,400,000, and the annual payment of £400,000. was remitted u n t i l the loan was paid back. Future dividends were restricted as to amount and time, and increase and acceptance of b i l l s of exchange from India by the Company was curtailed. 69. Accounts were to be submitted to the Treasury and British goods were to be exported to India to a certain minimum value annually. Tea, of which the Company had a surplus of seventeen million pounds, could be exported directly to America free of duty. The administration of the possessions was also re-" formed. A court of supreme jurisdiction was established, with a chief justice and three puisne judges paid by the Crown. The governor of Bengal was to be the governor-general of India, assisted by a council of four. A l l military and c i v i l matters which came before the Company were to be sub-mitted to Parliament for i t s consideration. The weak link i n the system was to be the usual one of indefinite division of responsibility. The relations between the supreme court and the council and between the governor-general, the directors and the Crown, should have been defined more carefully. The governor-general, who was the supreme authority, representing the British Government, should not have been l e f t i n a position i n which he could be over-ruled by his council, which spoke merely with the voice of the London directors. In addition, Members of Parliament should not have been permitted to hold executive positions under the Indian Government. The Regulating Act undoubtedly began a new and better era i n Indian history, however. The decade between 1763 and 1773 was probably the worst in the history of B r i t i s h India, and certainly reforms were needed. It was fortunate for 7 0 . B r i t i s h power i n India that, almost simultaneously with the passage of the Regulating Act, Warren Hastings,one of the greatest of imperial administrators, arrived i n Bengal as governor.. I t was the beginning of the e f f e c t i v e r u l e of the B r i t i s h i n India. We have seen that i n Ireland, where control by the home government was strongest, the r i g i d i t y and awkwardness of the mer c a n t i l i s t system* was most apparent. Local con-siderations, s p e c i f i c a l l y the mutual hatred of the I r i s h and English, further jeopardized the success of the English r u l e . In India, on the other hand, the control of the home govern-ment was weak, and the rotten structure of company government, burdened with the new problem of imperial r u l e , was crumbling ra p i d l y . Thus at two points, widely separated i n t r a d i t i o n , culture and distance, the me r c a n t i l i s t imperial system was breaking down i n the f i r s t decade of the reign of George I I I . The American colonies, however, were the .most important part of the empire, and i t was on t h i s stage that the culminating act i n the decline was to be played out. In t h e i r structures of government, as i n t h e i r o r i g i n s and s o c i a l organizations, the B r i t i s h colonies i n America varied widely. As has been noted before, the most numerous and most c l o s e l y t i e d to the mother country were the so-called Royal Colonies. These were New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, V i r g i n i a , North Carolina, South Carolina and the new acquisitions o f the Fl o r i d a s and Canada. They were l a r g e l y under the power of the Crown. The Privy Council assumed the 71. responsibility of selecting and instructing the governors and helped to choose the council of each colony from among i t s leading citizens. In addition there was, of course, an assembly elected on a franchise which varied from restriction by the narrowest of property qualifications i n Virginia and New York, to qualifications i n New Jersey and New Hampshire which were almost tantamount to manhood suffrage. The powers of the governor i n the Royal colonies were extremely wide i n theory. He was coixanander-in-chief, vice-admiral, head of title council i n i t s judicial capacity, he held the veto power over a l l acts of the assembly, he could summon, adjourn, prorogue and dissolve that assembly, and could make appointments to the lesser, non-elective posts. Further, he was usually the commissioner for the Indian lands of the colony and supervised their sale and distribution. The governor was, however, responsible to and reported to the home government as i t s representative. He was, so to speak, i t s eyes i n the colonial f i e l d . Unfortunately, both as representative and as observer, he from time to time made himself very unpopular. He was under the necessity i n most colonies, of satisfying not only his imperial masters, but also the assembly, on which he depended for his salary and for most other revenue necessary for the administration of the colony. Instructions from Britsin, months out of date, and often wholly inadequate to the situation, were showered on him. In this dilemma, strong governors followed their own judgments, weak ones temporized alternately with either power, to be labelled as rogues by the home government and tyrants by the colonists. In the proprietary colonies the division of authority made possible the growth of a greater degree of popular government. Pennsylvania and the colony comprised in the Lower Counties on the Delaware were.owned by the Perm family, although the administration in the latte r colony was shared with the Crown. Maryland was owned by the Baltimore family, while Georgia, founded by Oglethorpe i n 1723 as a haven for imprisoned debtors, had been controlled by a complicated trusteeship, and i n 1750 became a Royal colony.Ihthe pro-prietary colonies, land was granted by the proprietors on such terms as they saw f i t , often on a restricted monopoly basis, under the system of quit-rents, which had not spread to the other colonies. Governors were appointed by the pro-prietors i n conjunction with the Crown, the councils being completely under the control of the Proprietors. The assemblies had gradually widened their own powers, beyond those held i n Royal colonies, by playing the proprietors o f f against the Crown, and by shielding themselves, i n the last resort, behind the legal protection of the archaic terms of the original grant. In addition, special rights were i n some instances possessed by these colonies under their terms of incorporation. Maryland, for instance, alone of the Royal and Proprietary colonies, was exempt from a l l royal taxation except such as her assembly would permit in wartime under royal letters of requisition. The corporate colonies had the best developed form of popular government. Each had a charter which guaranteed wide privileges, exemptions and powers of self-government. Rhode Island and Connecticut, i n fact, could make their own laws without royal approval, and could select their own governor. A l l three had the freedom to appoint their councils, but for Massachusetts Bay, under the amended charter of 1691, a royal governor was appointed, and royal approval for a l l laws was required. The governors were usually f a i r l y able men, who cer-tainly made an attempt to retain the goodwill of the people, but their conflicts with the assemblies, except i n the cases of Connecticut and Rhode Island, tended to limit their popularity. The governor was, i n fact, the symbol of the attempt to centralize the empire. To the colonists, he was the appointee of a government with which they never came i n direct contact, but which nevertheless presumed to regulate every aspect of their lives. Another agency of control was the huge customs structure which was developed i n an attempt to regulate colonial trade. Courts of vice-admiralty were also appointed in the second half of the century, to try violations of the Acts of Navigation. The jurisdiction of these courts was f i n a l , and no jury t r i a l was permitted therein. They were appointed by royal commission, and were paid on a stipendiary basis from the fines and penalties imposed. A Surveyor of the King's Woods for North America was also appointed, as well as a receiver of of royal quit-rents, 74. and deputies to the Postmaster-General i n North America (59). The most important organization i n the relations between the mother country and the colonies was,from the colonial viewpoint, the London agency. Each colony or some branch of i t s government had a representative i n London. His instructions were carefully defined by the assembly of the colony, and his powers were carefully limited, although he was to serve as a medium of constant communication between London and the colonies. This institution, however, met with much i n i t i a l opposition i n i t s creation, the colonies them-selves expressing reluctance to having representation i n London (60). The agencies became permanent after 1688, and were encouraged by the Board of Trade,since they served to lighten to a considerable extent the weight of governing the colonies. Among the duties of the agents (except i n the cases of the representatives of Maryland, Connecticut and Rhode Island), was that of convincing the Attorney-General and the Board of Trade of the value of colonial laws when they were up f o r review before the Privy Council. In addition, the agents attempted to prevent the cancellation or amendment of the charters of the charter colonies and dunned the home government for reimbursement for colonial military expendi-ture during time of general war. Their influence wa»paramount (59) Benjamin Franklin was deputy Postmaster-General for over twenty years i n the colonies. He l e f t the office to become the Postmaster-General of the Revolutionary United States. (60) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 15. in the capital, so far as the oolonies were concerned. Such agents as Franklin, for Pennsylvania, and Jared Ingersoll for Connecticut, were considered the chief authorities on their respective colonies and were almost invariably con-sulted by British o f f i c i a l s , not only on the affairs of their own colonies, but on North America i n general. Some colonies had some degree of autonomy, but no law of a colonial assembly could withstand a refusal by the Privy Council to uphold i t . Legally, the King was s t i l l the source of authority, because his sanction, through letters patent, had created the oolonies i n the beginning. By 1760, however, such authority had come to mean the Privy Council, a royal bureaucracy. The Royal authority, while i t , i n fact, galled the colonists, and i n the end was the agency by which rebellion was excited, was not resented i n the same degree as the attempt, i n the eighteenth century, to extend the ambit of Parliament over the colonies. In point of fact, the logical application of the constitution, as i t had been amended by the Revolution settlement, demanded that Parliament should have, in this as i n other matters, paramount authority. Among the applications of this authority, between 1713 and 1760, the following may be br i e f l y cited as indicative of the attempt to close the gaps i n mercantilist practice, and make the empire a self-sufficient whole. No place of trust i n law or having to= do with the Treasury might be i n the hands of other than natural-born subjects i n any of the colonies; lands might not be sold to aliens without the consent of the Crown; lands in the colonies were to be liab l e for the debts of their owners (61); debts owing i n the plantations might be proved before a magistrate i n England; unlawful stocks and business undertakings in the colonies were to cease; foreigners l i v i n g i n the plantations for seven years and taking the prescribed oaths were to be deemed naturalized subjects; governors might be tried in England for offenses charged against them i n the colonies; pine trees designated as serviceable to the Royal Navy were not to be destroyed; the value of foreign coins i n c i r -culation was established; minors consenting thereto might be bound to service in the colonies; no wool, woollen yarn, or woollen manufacture was to be exported from the colonies and beaver hats manufactured i n any plantation were not to be sent directly to another plantation, and plantation hatters were not to have more than two apprentices. Actually, there was widespread violation of these acts, and i t was primarily. (61) This measure and the two following were enacted - largely as a result of the efforts of the Virginia legislature, especially after 1748t to limit the enormous interest b i l l which the tobacco planters were annually compelled to remit to London i n cash or goods. The practice of pledging crops i n advance had, of course, been resorted to, but the decline i n the price of tobacco, especially after 1760 when the habit became unfashionable, caused the London merchants to demand their returns i n cash. An attempt was made to devaluate the debt by an act of the Virginia legislature, which decreed that a certain proportion of i t should be paid i n Virginia currency, a medium the exchange value of which was almost negligible. 77. an attempt to enforce them, rather than to extend any uncon-stitutional authority over the colonies, that f i r s t aroused the wrath of the colonists. _Qf a l l the possessions of Britain, the West Indies were considered the most valuable. The production of the tropical and exotic items, for which there was a market i n Britain and, more important, on the continent, was considered the most lucrative contribution to imperial self-sufficiency. Rice, indigo, logwood and spices were a l l exported, but i t was on sugar that the main reliance for the economic welfare of the West Indies was placed. Unfortunately, by the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the sugar lands i n the British islands had declined in productivity. Even under modern methods of cultivation, sugar i s very destructive of the s o i l . Under the relatively primitive methods of the eighteenth century, this was even more the case. For almost a century the islands had been producing and the land was nearly exhausted. Export of sugar, by 1760, was restricted to the luxury market i n Britain, protected by enumeration and bounties, and only carried on at an excessive cost of production., The French islands, on the other hand, and to a lesser extent those of the Dutch and Spanish, were new land, more extensive i n area, and more productive. Thus, while Britain was the chief sugar producer i n 1700, by 1760 the continental markets were almost entirely closed to her and even her colonies ignored the mercantilist restructions, to trade with the French and Spanish islands. 78. The indigenous population of the West Indies, moreover, was neither numerous nor strong enough to provide manual labour for economic development, and the climate militated against the employment of Europeans. This labour shortage was therefore f i l l e d by African slaves. The slave trade was revived and modernized on a greater scale than hitherto. Trading factories were set up on the Guinea Coast and slave ships began the triangle trade between Africa, the West Indies and New England. The economic blight of slavery upon the West Indies was the worst aspect of the mercantilist system i n the islands. The moral e v i l has been over-emphasized as one of the blackest pages i n mercantilist history. Actually slavery has existed i n a l l climates and ages, and certainly the lot of the West Indian negroes under the abolitionist, moralist, profit-making regime of the nineteenth century plantation owners was no happier than that of their fore-bears. It can be seen that the variety and complexity of the types of administration alone were increasing so alarmingly as to limit the effectiveness of mercantilist administration and tend towards the breakdown of the system. Other aspects of the system, however, were also adding to the burden. Fi r s t among these was the ever-present problem of imperial defence. The geographic diffusion of the empire created a problem of control which had to be solved in one of two ways. F i r s t , there was naval supremacy, which Britain possessed i n the period under discussion. Wherever the ships of Britain could make their power f e l t , she had complete security. But empires have a tendency to grow beyond the phase of a series of naval bases and coastal settlements. What of possessions which include the major portion of a continent? Beyond the range of the Royal Navy, Britain's f i a t could not run, unless she was prepared to raise and maintain standing armies i n her possessions for defence, and i t s ultimate corollary, conquest. By 1763, i t was apparent that a major change was taking place i n the empire. Clive had begun the process which, i n a century, was to give Britain control over the whole of India. In North America, the Thirteen Colonies were no longer a chain of trading settlements, huddled close to the sea for protection. More than half the continent of North America was now safely within the British grasp. Huge tracts of land i n the Mississippi and Ohio valleys and i n Canada beckoned the settler to come inland, away from the friendly seas. The defence of the colonies i n America had been a perennial problem. From 1758 on the practice was adopted of having Parliament vote sums for the compensation of the colonies for the military contributions they were required to make i n their own defence, in time of gene r a l war. The old, inefficient and non-remunerative system of royal letters of requisition was dropped. Each year the Secretary of State urged the raising of troops and promised the parliamentary 80. grant i n r e t u r n . Much of the grant, however, was i n p r a c t i c e a f r e e g i f t (62). Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York were the only c o l o n i e s who even approached t h e i r f u l l quota of troops. The r e l a t i v e l y unprotected c o l o n i e s of Pennsylvania and Maryland were among the worst offenders. P i t t ' s plans f o r 1758 had envisaged a l e v y of 26,000 men from the c o l o n i e s , but the response was nearer 23,000, w i t h Massa-chusetts, under the r u l e of Pownall, being e s p e c i a l l y a c t i v e . The d i v i s i o n s of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the p r o p r i e t a r y c o l o n i e s had a very bad e f f e c t on r e c r u i t i n g . Thus the c r e a t i o n of a standing army i n both America and I n d i a became, not an i m p e r i a l i s t l u x u r y , but an urgent n e c e s s i t y . The c o n t i n u a l wars of the East I n d i a Company to maintain and extend i t s hold on Bengal, Oudh and the C a r n a t i v , were a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n of the urgency of the problem i n the east, and P o n t i a c ' s R e b e l l i o n i n America, i n 1763, demon-s t r a t e d at once the scope of the coming problem of t h e f r o n t i e r and the i n c a p a c i t y of the separate c o l o n i e s under t h e i r current o r g a n i z a t i o n , to d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h i t . The t h r e a t from France a l s o remained. The peace of 1763 was considered by her as merely a t r u c e , and the con-tinuance of Spanish power i n North America might, through the agency of the Family Compact, be a convenient medium f o r the r e v i v a l of French power i n the new world. Meanwhile, t h e (62) Beer, G-.L., B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , p.57. 81. conquest of the new territory brought the entire fur trade into British hands and necessitated the effective occupation of the posts founded by the French in the interior. The military question was thus closely related to the regulation of Indian trade and western settlement. Up to about 1750 Indian affairs were the responsibility of the separate colonies and were almost universally neglected. The depredations of the traders and settlers on Indian lands kept the frontier continually in a state of guerilla warfare. The success of the French i n trade, as i n Indian a f f a i r s , had been due to centralized government, eliminating destructive competition and even more destructive alienation of the Indians. The land hunger of the English, however, added to their failure to control their traders, had angered the Indians far more than the extensive trade penetration of the French. The Albany Congress of 1754, although i t fa i l e d i n i t s purpose of uniting the colonies, did manage to gain agreement for the appointment of two Indian superintendents responsible for p o l i t i c a l and commercial relations with the natives. Proposals for licensing traders were also advanced, but no attempt was made to put these into operation u n t i l after the war (63). With the reduction of the forces in 1763, the method of royal requisitions for raising troops was reverted to. (63) Such governors as Spotswood of Virginia and Burnet . of New York were only exceptions to the rule of colonial indifference or incapacity in Indian a f f a i r s . The Indian threat, more than any mercantilist restriction, kept the colonists behind the Appalachians before 1763. 82. Formerly Pennsylvania and Virginia, with their interests i n the Ohio valley, had been much more willing than the northern colonies to supply troops. The Southerners had raised strong objections to sending their troops to fight i n Canada,,and i n the case of Maryland, the war effort was restricted by quarrels between the governor and the assembly. Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, as the chief con-tributors between 1755 and 1763, supplied over 70 per cent of the troops.(64) Britain therefore decided to maintain a standing army of 10,000 men i n the colonies, to be paid for by the mother country i n the f i r s t years, after which the colonies would gradually shoulder the expense. Both Burke and Franklin regarded this as reasonable and even desirable (65). The task of this army was very great - the defence of a three-thousand-mile frontier with few natural barriers, and the garrisoning of a chain of outposts. Amherst, the commander-in-chief, hoped to be able to re-enforce this outpost line with a barrier of settled territory, but disagreement between the home and colonial governments rendered this plan im-possible of fulfilment. The fallacies of the colonial Indian policy were drama-t i c a l l y demonstrated by Pontiac's r i s i n g . It resulted from (64) Beer, Br i t i s h Colonial policy. 1754-1765. p.68 (65) Franklin, Works. Vol. IV, p.89 83. the trading abuses mentioned above and from the abandonment of the French practice of present-giving. There was certainly some foundation also for the claim that the French traders had incited i t . The war against Pontiac was primarily a colonial one and the British Parliament, therefore, with considerable justification, refused to vote the large grants for assistance which had been forthcoming during the common effort of the Seven Years 1 War. The main burden would there-fore have fallen on the colonies, had they hot defaulted i n respect of most of their obligations. In the event the main brunt of the f i r s t attack and of the decisive battle of Bushy Run f e l l upon less than a thousand time-expired regulars from the frontier garrisons (66). The incapability and disunity of the colonies i n this, as i n other matters, seemed to demand the intervention of the home government. The f i r s t evidence of this intervention was the promulgation, i n October, 1763, of the great proclamation of that year. The proclamation, among other things, forbade permanent settlement beyond the Appalachian divide and for-bade Indian trading without a license. This was primarily a preliminary standstill arrangement, pending regulation of trade to protect the Indians. In 1764, on the advice of S i r William Johnson, northern superintendent of Indians, the trade was restricted to certain licensed posts. The plan, (66) Headlam, Cecil, Imperial reconstruction. Chapter XXII of Cambridge History of the British empire. Vol. I, p.638. Pennsylvania, under duress from her frontiersmen, f i n a l l y faised a force of m i l i t i a against Pontiac, but half of i t deserted before reaching the frontier.. 84. however, was not put into operation at the time, because the problem of obtaining sufficient revenue from the colonies . had not been mastered. The d i f f i c u l t y lay i n making the trade self-supporting and at the same time avoiding the contentious subject of taxing the colonies. The appointment of Lord Shelburne to the Secretaryship of State for the Southern Department i n 1766, revived interest i n the problem of reorganizing the new territory. While Shelburne was not aware of the extent to which the Proclamation of 1763 was defective, his desire to change the basis of the imperial structure and his willingness to consult the reports of his agents i n America made i t possible for new plans to be l a i d . The reports of c i v i l and military authorities... were now to convince him that the old policy of imperial administration and support had broken down. On the one hand, the endless complaints of i n -sufficient authority to punish crime, to maintain order, or to prevent i l l i c i t settlements, the reports of the activ i t y of French traders i n the I l l i n o i s country, the t e l l - t a l e returns of the fur trade, and the gloomy prophecies of the Indian superintendents, on the other, the angry.protests of Canadian traders against 3uch restrictions as had been imposed upon trade!,, the land-hungry frontiers-men, the representatives of land companies, the heavy burden of expenditure, and the pressure for economy and retrenchment, a l l these forced him to devise some alternative plan (67). His f i r s t proposal was for a return of Indian affairs to provincial jurisdiction, and for the immediate establishment of several colonial governments i n the new territory. His (67) Humphries, R.A., "Lord Shelburne and the British colonial policy, 1766-68," E.H.R.. April 1935, p.260. 85. f i n a l , modified plan, however, was framed in accordance with the desires of the business interests. The plan for a colony i n the I l l i n o i s country met with some opposition, but the complete organization might have been accomplished, had not Shelburne had the control of colonial affairs removed from his department i n January, 1768, with the setting up of the third secretaryship. Shelburne's plan did have the merit of linking the colonies and the mother country together i n a westward expansion, and might, had i t been adopted, have post-poned, i f not averted, the Revolution. The system of leaving the responsibility to the individual colonies was reverted to, largely because there was no asuitable option ready. Since the British debt i n 1763 stood at £130,000,000 and the land tax at 4 shillings i n the pound, there was a great deal to be said for the colonies bearing a part of the burden of their own defence. Bute's government f e l l before plans for a more efficient system had matured, but i t was taken up by the succeeding administration of Grenville. The new Secretary of State, Bgremont, questioned Shelburne, the President of the Board of Trade, as to, (a) what form of government should be established i n the colonies, (b) what military force should be sufficient for their protection, and (c) what was the easiest and most acceptable method of getting the colonists to contribute toward the new expenses. This last question began to assume paramount importance im the relations of the oolonies with the mother country, and a study of the British trade i n i t s relation to the overseas 86. empire i s necessary to i t s understanding. The position of the empire in Britain's trade showed that the purpose of i t s existence was the monopolization of colonial trade and through such monopoly, to make a contri-bution to the self-sufficiency and hence prosperity of Britain. Exports to the colonies were controlled by such measures as the Staple Act, by which nearly a l l imports had to be shipped through the mother country, thereby adding duties and handling charges to the cost prices of these ar t i c l e s . Actually, the high degree of competition among British merchants contributed to the lowering of these prices to lowest possible level consonant with profit. Because of the lack of operating capital among both merchants and planters i n America, the trade was largely carried on with Bri t i s h credit, based on. the huge potential wealth of the new country. By.1760, British exports to the colonies amounted to £2,000,000. per year i n value, but £4,000,000. worth, of American debts were carried on British books (68). In the South, the planters mortgaged their future crops, while New England relied upon cash gained from the i l l e g a l triangle trade with the Guinea Coast and the French and Spanish West Indies. The basic idea of the controlled trade, however, was not exploitation of the colonies by the mother country, but rather the maintenance of an empire i n which every part contributed to the best of i t s a b i l i t y (68). Miller, Origins of the American revolution, p.23. 87. toward the goal of self-sufficiency. The welfare of the empire as a whole was the motivating factor i n such control. In this connection, the value of each colony to the imperial whole was weighed, both as to i t s contributions and as to i t s purchases. In the North American trade, Yirginia and Maryland were regarded originally by the British authorities as the most valuable colonies because they supplied tobacco. The pro-hibition against the growing of tobacco i n England was enforced. After 1760, however, as has been noted, the value of the North American trade rapidly declined. In Carolina, the cultivation of ri c e was begun. From 1730 on this colony was permitted to export rice to southern European countries. With these countries, Britain's provision trade was not extensive. The middle colonies were regarded with some dis-favour i n i t i a l l y because their production competed with that of Great Britain, but Pennsylvania_ and later New Jersey and New York, proved to be lucrative sources of lumber and pitch for the navy. The most serious doubts arose as to the value of the New England colonies. These were a replica of Old ^ England i n their production, sold provisions to the West ^Indies and supplied many of their own manufactured wants, largely because of the local shortage of hard money or ex-changeable goods. Even the quantity of naval stores produced, which production was once fostered by the British government to discourage competition i n other goods, was swallowed up in the local shipbuilding industry; added to which, the local cost of production was higher than that of the Baltic countries and soon discouraged Britain's purchases from New England. Some asserted, i t i s true, that the provision trade of the New England colonies increased the value of the colonies, since this trade contributed toward the self-sufficiency of the West Indies i n time of war, but this advantage was more than balanced by the loss to the British Treasury resulting from abuses of the trade i n time of peace. The limits of colonial production were fixed by what was desirable rather than by what was possible or profitable. The needs of the pioneering inhabitants were not entirely disregarded, but there was a tendency i n examining the larger picture of imperial welfare, to subordinate their interests to those of the more p o l i t i c a l l y vocal and seemingly more important section, i.e. the people of Britain. The cottage industries of Britain had expanded easily to production for export, and were selling i n a highly competitive world. Therefore, the obvious step of ensuring a protected market was taken, especially by the Acts of 1699,1703 and 1709, against colonial or Iri s h woollen manufacture. These Acts did not affect the overseas markets of the colonists much because such a trade had not yet grown up, but production for local markets created competition with British exports. Actually, however, i t was only after 1713 that the real con-cept of a self-sufficient empire took shape. The diversion of British trade from i t s natural channels necessitated the bountying of certain products necessary to Britain's welfare, yet costly to produce i n her own territo r i e s . This course was followed for a short time as affecting colonial naval stores, but thenAdmiralty objected to the low quality of the products, the Treasury to the expense of the bounty and the merchants to the unnatural direction of lucrative trade, with the result that the policy was gradually abandoned. While the bounty system was found too expensive, the encouragement of the inter-colonial pro-vision trade was the only alternative method of keeping the New England colonies within the mercantilist structure. The supply was greater than the demand i n the other colonies, however, and i l l e g a l trade with the British, French, Spanish and Dutch West Indies grew up. In the West Indies, the British sugar trade was i n a state of permanent decline. Sugar had been an enumerated ar t i c l e since the imposition of the Navigation Acts, and had to pay export duties i f exported from Britain, and plantation duties i f exported from one of the colonies. The increased consumption of sugar i n England i n the f i r s t decades of the century resulted i n a decrease i n the surplus available for export to other European countries. More important, however, the French, Spanish and Dutch were now producing sugar i n their islands, and at a lower cost of production than the British could attain. The s o i l of the British plantations was exhausted and the British sugar exports, i n any case, bore heavier charges for export than did the foreign sugar. As a result, the West Indian planters i n 1724 demanded the abolition of the enumeration, so that British sugar might compete on better terms with foreign sugar on the continent. The Board of Trade, however, realizing that there would be less sugar available for the Br i t i s h market and therefore less revenue from the importation, refused to abolish the enumeration. There was the added danger that the free export of sugar to the continent might mean the reciprocal free import of continental manufactured goods into the West Indies and the destruction of a lucrative British market. The enumeration, however, had governed only the question of the f i r s t destination of exported sugar. It did not prevent Britain or her colonies from importing foreign sugar, and although protective duties were.placed on sugar from the beginning of the century, i t was not u n t i l 1715 that the Neutrality Treaty with France of 1686 was invoked, to stop not only the importation of foreign sugar, but the colonial trade with the foreign West Indies and the trade between the West Indian colonies of the various nations (69). It was a further complication i n an already complicated situation that the Br i t i s h West Indies were i n the habit of purchasing not only provisions but sugar from foreign (69) The Treaty of Neutrality between France and Britain of 1686 guaranteed to each power the exclusive right to the trade with i t s own colonies. The further interpretation, however, that there was included in i t permission to seize one another's ships for violation of the monopoly was not sound i n law. Certainly the seizure of colonial ships for trade with the possessions of the opposite party to the Treaty was not sanctioned. In practice, only war would stop the trade. 91. plantations and re-exporting i t as their own product (70). Local acts against this practice only served to raise the price of the British sugar and limit i t s sale. It was even more d i f f i c u l t to deal with the trade between the foreign West Indies and the northern colonies. Sugar, and more especially molasses, from the French West Indies, was cheap, because i t was excluded from France and because the cost of production was low. The rum d i s t i l l a t i o n industry was a growing one i n New England, especially i n Rhode Island. The British sugar industry did not produce molasses on the same scale and could not i n any case meet the low price of the French competitors. One further incentive for trading with the foreign islands appeared. In the sale of provisions or slaves to the islands, the New Englander could take his payment i n molasses or hard money. Thus the chronic shortage of specie i n the northern colonies was met through this i l l e g a l trade. The Br i t i s h sugar industry, however, was crippled and the Board of Trade was forced to take action i n an attemptto correct the situation* Three solutions were suggested: 1. The duties on British sugar might be reduced; this would mean a loss to the Exchequer. 2. Sugar might be removed from the enumerated l i s t and i t s export permitted to foreign countries; this would jeopardize the gains made by Br i t i s h shipping, raise the British price of sugar, and possibly open (70) Rees, J.F., Mercantilism and the colonies, Chapter XX in Cambridge history of the B r i t i s h empire, Vol. I, p.581. 9£. the West Indies market to foreign manufactures. 3. The cost of production might be lowered by lowering the price of provisions; this would have involved further restrictions on the northern colonies, and would have been very d i f f i c u l t to enforce. Powerful pressure was exerted by the West Indian planters, however, with the result that the Molasses Act was passed i n 1733. This Act imposed on foreign sugar, molasses and rum imported into the colonies duties of five shillings a hundredweight on sugar, sixpence a gallon on molasses, and ninepence a gallon on rum. Such heavy duties would have been ruinous to the trade i f they had been enforced, but enforce-ment proved to be impossible. The Act, however, did not for-bid the sending of cargoes to foreign islands, so that as long as the duties charged on the return cargoes could be evaded, the lucrative trade continued. To assist the planters further a drawback of the whole duty on sugar re-exported from Britain was granted, so as to permit competition in the European market. In 1739 the privilege of exporting sugar directly to Europe was granted, but British sugar was s t i l l unable to com-pete with the foreign-grown product. In an effort to bolster the sagging economy of the West Indies, and partly as a result of the abiding faith of the orthodox mercantilists i n the wealth of tropical colonies, the London financial interests poured capital into the islands in the form of long-term credits, increasing thereby that London-West Indian interest 9 3 . which was to have such an influence in the p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e of the nation after 1760. This pre-occupation with the West Indies, however, tended to stereotype the attitude to colonies i n general, and to retard changes i n the system long after these were proven necessary by the experience of the continental colonies of North America. Such r i g i d i t y made successful imperial administration impossible and was, i n fact, one of the major faults to be found in the mercan-t i l i s t imperialism. The concept of a mercantilist empire was sufficiently sound and was, moreover, the only method of administration possible under eighteenth century conditions. The fault lay i n the r i g i d interpretation of that Concept. While the sugar problem i s an excellent i l l u s t r a t i o n of the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s which had arisen between the colonies themselves, the controversy over the iron industry i s an example of tbhe d i f f i c u l t y of reconciling the interests of the mother country and the colonies. By 1715 the English output of iron was restricted by the depletion of her forests and the resultant shortage of charcoal for smelting. Pig iron had to be imported from Sweden,and at the beginning of the century this supply, because of a rupture of relations with that country, was very uncertain. Attempts to find an alternative source of supply included consideration of the overseas colonies, but the international c r i s i s passed before anything was done to encourage the colonial iron industries. Meanwhile an incipient iron industry had developed to 9 4 . supply the shipyards of Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland, despite a ban by the British, who wished to retain the colonial market for themselves. By 1730 Britain was import-ing 20,000 tons of foreign pig iron, of which 15,000 came from Sweden, 5,000 from Russia, and,only 2,000 from America (71). By 1750, the revived enmity of Sweden induced Parliament to pass an act which permitted the importation of colonial iron but to the port of London only. The r e s t r i c -tion i n the Act was removed i n 1757, but the volume of colonial iron imported was never very great, not exceeding 10 per cent of Britain's total imports. Gradually the increased use of coal put the Br i t i s h iron industry on a self-sufficient basis and the importation ceased almost entirely. The removal of the import restrictions on pig iron were counterbalanced by the ban, i n the act of 1750, on the future erection of r o l l i n g , plating or s l i t t i n g mills i n the colonies. Such limitations on local production, however, were not serious, since in most cases the articles could be secured as cheaply from England, for, as production became more efficient, the price of such goods dropped, thS quality was improved, and there was no restriction i n any case on colonial production for colonial use. The most important inter-colonial trading - i n shoes, soap, candles, coaches and leather - was not affected at a l l . The restrictions on the colonial iron industry limited the Pennsylvania iron (71) Rees, Mercantilism &nd the colonies, p.587. production, and after 1767, pradtically destroyed i t for several generations, but the purchase of iron products from Britain was much more profitable, especially as the indus-t r i a l revolution developed in scope. Even under the more stringent restrictions after 1765 there was an era of general prosperity, a significant fact i n assessing the causes of the American Revolution. It was a feeling that the mother country was attempting to deprive the colonies of their share i n this prosperity which lay at the bottom of much of the unrest and discontent, although the ostensible issues raised were largely p o l i t i c a l and constitutional. The advantages of being within the protected trade area of the British Empire were acknowledged, but the colonists f e l t that they must profit to the maximum from this protection without having to pay for their privileges to what they considered an alien authority. By 1750 a revision of opinion with regard to the relative importance of the colonies was coming about. Jamaica was i n a chronic state of decline, with a white population of barely 12,000, which contributed l i t t l e to the economic welfare of that colony. Barbados and the Leeward Islands were i n no better condition. In the whole West Indian possessions there were barely 40,000 whites, compared with a population of one million for the North American continental colonies, which population doubled with each generation. The raised standard of l i v i n g i n the northern colonies, moreover, had led to a higher purchasing power, 96. with an increase i n purchases from Britain. The defence of the colonies from the great outflanking movement of the French i n the Mississippi valley had also increased their importance to Britain. This last, against the precepts of mercantilism, involved, on balance, a net contribution from the mother country for their defence, and border wars took on the aspect of major campaigns. It was therefore apparent that, because of the pressure of circumstances, great changes would have to be made in the system. Even during the Seven Years' War, an effort was being made to correct some of the faults i n the application of mer-cantilism. The f i r s t attempts, however, were towards enforc-ing the existing regulations. The fact that the French West Indies, blockaded during the war, were dependent on New England for their supplies, caused the passage of an Act i n 1757 to forbid the export of provisions elsewhere but to Britain or to British colonies. This act, however, continued to be violated, to the extent that i n 1760 P i t t issued instructions to the Navy to enforce the regulations, thereby establishing the precedent of naval enforcement of the customs and trade regulations (72). The Contraband Rule of 1756, apart from declaring the Br i t i s h position concerning contraband (72) ... an i l l e g a l and most pernidous trade carried on by .the king's subjects i n North Ametica, to the West Indies, as well as to the French settlements on the continent of North America, and particularly to the rivers Mobile and Mississippi; by which the enemies, to the great reproach and detriment of government, are supplied with provisions and other necessaries, whereby they are principally, i f on the high seas, l a i d down the principle that a trade pro-hibited i n peacetime cannot be thrown open i n time of war. The French, however, were able to profit from smuggling operations through such free Spanish ports as Monte Christ! i n San Domingo. Developments i n colonial expansion, therefore, suggested ways in which the existing system of commercial regulation could be applied to future acquisitions. Unfor-tunately there was an inclination to overlook the d i f f i c u l t y of reconciling conflicting opposites. Enumeration was designed to bring profit to the mother country, especially i n the commodities of tobacco and sugar. Tobacco, decreasing i n value, was largely re-exported, while the sugar planter exploited the enumeration to his own advantage, but could not hold off the inevitable decline of his economy. Bounties, such as those on pitch and naval stores, profited under-developed areas like the Carolinas, but failed to stimulate production i n New England. The Navigation Acts helped to foster the New England shipping industry to the detriment of British shipping, although they aided i n maintaining a balance of trade between Old and New England. Bans on local woollen, hat and iron industries were more of a nuisance than (72)(cont'd.) not alone, enabled to sustain and protract this long and e±pensive war. And i t further appearing that large sums of bullion are sent by the king's subjects to the above places, i n return whereof commodities are taken, which interferes with the product of the British colonies themselves, i n open contempt of the authority of the mother country, as well as the most manifest prejudice of.the manufactures and trade of Great Britain ... Annual register. 1760, p.219. a serious economic restriction. On balance, Britain was able to maintain her lead in trade, as the exponents of mercan-ti l i s m desired, but the British private credit structure may-have had as much to do with this result as the o f f i c i a l restrictions and regulations on trade. The British investments i n the West Indies have already been mentioned. On the North American continent, the situation was more serious only because those who con-trolled British credit were disinclined to rescue the economy of an area which was considered unprofitable. In Virginia an attempt was made to palliate the burden of colonial indebtedness, to some extent, through the Virginia Debts Act of 1748. This Act provided that sterling debts could be settled i n local currency at 125 per cent of their original value. Because exchange fluctuated, and was at times as high as 40 per cent, some London and Liverpool merchants com-plained about the Act (73). The law, however, through an oversight on the part of the Board of Trade, had already been confirmed by an Order-in-Council before the complaints had been registered. It could thus only be repealed by the joint action of the Crown and the colonial legislature. Modifications made i n 1754 and 1755 placed the fixing of exchange for the payment of debt in the hands of the local courts. This was also distasteful to the Brit i s h merchants (73) Beer, British colonial -policy. 1754-1765, p. 179. who had the added burden of inflation through the issue of great amounts of Virginia paper money after 1755, which by 1762 depreciated 6 5 per cent i n value. The-governor could not enforce the regulation of paper money over the opposition of the Assembly, and there were serious doubts as to the legality of the limitations of 1754 and 1755. Thus debts, which had been contracted on a far lower exchange rate, were almost voided by the acti ons of the Virginia courts and legislature. Ossa was piled on Pelion when the Virginia Assembly i n 1758 made many debts payable i n tobacco, the price of which was inflated during wartime, at the rate of two pence per pound of tobacco. This "Twopenny Act" was greatly resented by the merchants (74). Relief was i n sight, however. In 1751 the abuses of local currency had led to an Act forbidding i t s issue i n New England (75). In 1764 this prohibition was extended to a l l (74) Beer, British colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.183 (75) B i l l s of credit were used by the colonies to raise supplies during wartime, to be redeemed later by colonial taxation, within a specified length of time. During peacetime the practice was developed of issuing paper money for private loans on mortgage security. Such paper was, however, over-issued and depreciated i n value. This led to the passage of the acts of 1751 and 1764. In addition, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1720 was extended to the colonies to forbid the founding of private banks with the right of note issue in the colonies. 100. the colonies. Such a restriction, however, had a weakening effect on the trade of the colonies. With the banning of paper money, long-term credit from B r i t i s h merchants was the only legitimate source of capital for the colonies. This, to many colonists, was the real British domination, - not the Acts of Trade or the regulation of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Currency, i t i s true, did come into the country i n the form of the Spanish pieces of eight or dollar, and was almost the only real "hard" money used i n the colonies. The rate of exchange for this money i n the colonies was fixed in 1708 &t[P**'^ shillings, or one-third higher than the sterling rate of four shillings and sixpence, although the coins were sweated and clipped ahd lost even more of their face value. Actually, the rate of exchange varied from eight shillings in New York to six i n New England (76). Credit b i l l s to England were based on the local rate and dealings with the various colonies were thus s t i l l further complicated, the rate of exchange being normally unfavourable to the colonists because of their high degree of indebtedness. Demands for shipment of specie in payment for goods when the rate became too unfavourable led to a shortage of hard money i n the colonies. This restriction of credit and the lack of hard money were more severely f e l t , once the Acts of Trade were vigorously enforced. The available supply of specie was (76) Sumner, W.G., "The Spanish dollar and the colonial s h i l l i n g , " American Historical Review. Yol. I l l , pp.607-619. immediately cut off and the purchase of Bri t i s h goods would have had to be curtailed even without the action of the colonists in passing non-importation resolutions. These were originally intended to ease the result, or burden of the indebtedness mentioned above, but they soon developed into a weapon against the Stamp Tax. The volume of trade f e l l greatly and many merchants were able to take advantage of the altered rate of exchange to discharge their debts. L i t t l e progress was made in the development of local industries, the flow of capital s t i l l being to foreign trade, to fisheries and to the fur trade on the frontier. The South could not look to local industry at a l l , being bound by i t s plantation economy to servitude to London. Merchants continued to import (since they were largely B r i t i s h ^ 7 7 ^ ) but the fear of losing their investments caused the London interests to urge the repeal of the Stamp Tax. Actually, the members of this group were not eager to see the debt liquidated but sought to pass the blame to the government for i t s continuance. Under the Rockingham administration they and the West Indian interests were able to put the older mercantilist policy back into practice. ( 7 7 ) The British (and especially the Scottish) merchants in the Southern colonies were especially hated. Their unpopularity, i n fact, was somewhat analogous to that of the moneylender i n present-day Indian villages. When the Revolution came, they remained loyal, and were per-secuted by the revolutionists with a virulence that had no counterpart i n the northern colonies. 102. The continual depression in the northern colonies through.this lack of specie and the unfavourable credit situation, kept resentment against Britain alive. In 1765 the London merchants protested vigorously against the imposition of the Stamp duties, and this protest was a major factor influencing the repeal of the duties. Thus, up to 1765 at least, British investments i n the northern colonies were s t i l l sufficiently large to cause the merchant class, i n order to protect i t s interests, to go to the length of opposing the British Governors. By 1767, however*- the situation had changed. The London merchants did not oppose the Revenue Act'. Br i t i s h trade with the continent of Europe had f i n a l l y revived, and there were good harvests i n Britain. A basic re-orientation of British trade was developing. The disadvantages of the colonial trade were now apparent, and the constitutional issues raised by the Americans were not popular. B r i t i s h merchants began to foreclose on their investments i n the colonies. The new industry of Britain, as well as European markets, began to take up much of the available capital. After 1783 these developments led to the creation of the "Free Trade Empire," and the British trade dominance i n manu-factured products. By 1763 the national debt of Britain had swollen to £140,000,000, and Grenville, good financier as he was, f e l t that after the free wartime expenditure of P i t t , some retrenchment was necessary. At that time the collection of £2,000 of customs in the colonies cost almost £8,000. ... the British customs service i n the colonies was i n part both inefficient and venal. The trade with the enemy had been in some degree carried on with the corrupt connivance of these o f f i c i a l s . By law they had extensive discretionary powers, of which the chief was the authority to accept i n f u l l payment amounts less than the lawful duties. (78). This discretionary power was exercised to the f u l l . Over £700,000 worth of goods were smuggled annually, European goods being smuggled i n and tobacco smuggled out. At home, British taxation had reached an unprecedented level. Taxes on stamps, windows, excise, and malt and cider were especially unpopular. The greatest weight f e l l on the landowners, with a land tax of four shillings in the pound, imposed during the war, remaining in "force (79). Interest (78) Beer, British colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.231. (79) Miller gives a new explanation for the British demand for colonial taxation: It i s the plight of the landowners rather than bribery or corruption that explains the administration's huge majorities in Parliament. The scheme of drawing a revenue from the American colonies required no vote-buying; on the contrary, the squires pricked up their ears whenever the ministers mentioned the 'sweet welcome sound' of revenue'... To the squires, a colonial revenue meant paring the land tax to the peacetime rate of two shillings i n the pound and paying off the national debt with the help of the colonists ... A Br i t i s h government that sought to surrender the right of taxing the colonies could not have survived the onslaught of the exasperated squires in the House of Commons. Miller, Origins of the American revolution, p.88. This explanation, of course, discounts the success of the government on non-American issues, the fact that Newcastle's p o l i t i c a l machine was transferred intact to the Court, party, and the fact that the real Tory squires were almost universally opponents of the Court and sup-porters of P i t t . The sentiment i n favour of taxing the colonists was almost universal, except among a small group of London merchants. 104. charges alone on the British debt were £5,000,000 annually, while the total American debt was only £2,600,000. The Seven Years' War had also enriched the colonists greatly, especially through privateering and smuggling. The surface wealth of the colonists was certainly very great, especially among the New England merchants and the Virginia planters. Although the Americans often declared that they relied solely on British credit for their prosperity, by 1767 many of the colonies were entirely free from debt. These factors and the fact that the Seven Years' War had begun i n the colonies gave a moral basis for the British demands that the colonies share the cost of i t . The current cost of defence of the colonies also had to be met. The government had to choose between burdening s t i l l further the already over-burdened British taxpayer, whose objection could be expressed directly, and,in terms of p o l i t i c a l power, uncomfortably for the government; or placing part of the burden on the colonies and risking only an argument on the constitutionality of the taxes. It i s not surprising that the government chose the alternative which, on the face of i t , promised the least expense and opposition. That they chose rightly under the circumstances i s hard to doubt. Grenville f i r s t set himself to correcting the abuses in the existing regulations. Shipmasters were compelled be-fore loading to give bond for a l l articles, even for those which were not enumerated. Royal Navy officers were employed to blockade the coasts and see that the regulations were 105. carried out, a measure which was especially unpopular (80). The practice of permitting partial payment of duties was for-bidden and, late in 1765, a l l absentee customs o f f i c i a l s were ordered back to their posts (81). The powers of the vice-admiralty courts were enlarged, and the judges paid a 5 per cent commission on the fines imposed (82). The counter-suit for false accusations was abolished and the vice-admiralty courts were centralized in Halifax. At this time, reports were called for from the colonial governors as to the extent and nature of i l l e g a l trade i n the colonies. In the older colonies, such as Jamaica and Barbados, there was almost no i l l i c i t trade. Dominica and St. Vincent, on the other hand, entirely French in population, traded almost exclusively with the French i n St. Lucia. On the mainland, North Carolina, Maryland and Virginia were f a i r l y free from i l i c i t trading, while the situation i n Massa-chusetts was complicated by the presence of a very venal set of customs o f f i c i a l s . New York carried on direct trade with (80.) ... a l l naval officers do occasionally act as tide waiters ... and i t i s hardly probable that, having once tasted the sweets of taking rich prizes, they should a l l at once shun these opportunities. ^Annual Register. 1764, p. 19. (81) Beer, British colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.252 (82) There were, of course, no juries i n vice-admiralty courts, as i s the case to the present day. From this fact stems the later accusation on the part of the revolutionaries that the British had deprived them of their right of t r i a l by jury. Beer, Bri t i s h colonial policy. 1754-65, p.248. Holland and Rhode Island lived almost entirely by the i l l e g a l triangle trade. The violation of the staple rights of the mother country was more serious. Direct importation, especially of f r u i t and wine from Portugal, luxury and tropical goods from France, and gunpowder from Holland, was general. The right of Britain to regular trade and the general method of regulation were acknowledged by both the Bri t i s h and the colonists, and justified by the fact that naval defence was ensured by Britain. Thus Franklin and Otis both express their acceptance of the customs duties, and of the right of Britain to impose them (83). The change i n attitude toward customs duties came, of course, with the improvement in enforcement. In 1764 higher duties were imposed on imported mer-chandise and the export of lumber, raw s i l k , potash and whale fins was prohibited save to the mother country. The logwood trade, a new English staple, was enumerated, coffee and pimento imports were taxed and the import of wine was forbidden, except through England. The readjustments to the system were not made entirely with a view to enforcing the restrictive laws. Bounties, bonuses and protective duties on colonial produce were a l l re-adjusted, largely to the benefit of the colonial producer. (83). These kind of secondary taxes, however, we do not complain of, though we have no share i n the lay-ing or dispensing of them ... Franklin, Writings, Vol. I l l , p.236. 100. Experimental pioiuction of s i l k and potash was begun i n the colonies and protected from foreign competition (84). High-priced colonial lumber competed successfully with that of the Baltic countries only because of the protective duties, although these duties were modified i n 1765 to permit the Irish and Portuguese trade in American lumber to expand. Rice exportation to the French West Indies, i l l e g a l after 1763, was i n 1764 again permitted i n order to assist the economic recovery of the Carolinas, and this despite the protests of New England, whose i l l e g a l provision trade was seriously threatened thereby (85). In the enforcement of a l l these regulations, moreover, a significant change had been made. The Treasury, not the Board of Trade, was the chief agent, since revenue, not colonial administration, was the chief object. The old mercantilist ideal of a self-sufficient empire was being given up temporarily. There was a return to the revenue policy of the Stuarts (86). As has been mentioned before, the Molasses Act of 1733 imposed a prohibitively high duty on foreign molasses and sugar, encouraging evasion and a consequent loss of revenue to the Treasury. With the enforcement of customs regulations, however, i t was realized that the trade would be k i l l e d and a (84) Beer, Bri t i s h colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.283. (85) Ibid., p.866. (86) Ibid., p.234. 108. lucrative source of revenue, as well as the prosperity of the northern colonies might he destroyed. It was therefore pro-posed to lower the tax, in order to permit a revival of the trade and to gain revenue. The Sugar Act of 1764 reduced the duty to threepence on the gallon of molasses and made similar reductions for other sugar products. The hoped-for revival was limited, however, by the trade depression which hit the New England colonies and by the fact that the sugar trade could not bear even the nominal duties imposed on i t . The Massachusetts Assembly appointed a committee to correspond with the other colonies on the subject, thereby instituting the use of reciprocal committess of correspondence for pur-poses of protest. Arguments developed as between one part of the empire and another. The British West Indies prospered because a plethora of lumber, fis h , horses and provisions brought a drop in the price of these a r t i c l e s . The price of molasses went up. The amount of specie i n the colonies de-clined, as did the value of paper money. Americans overlooked the revenue purposes of the Act and blamed the government for pa r t i a l i t y to the interests of the West Indian sugar planters. (87). * Although the act had passed with only one dissenting voice (88), Sam Adams and other American leaders warned the British that there would be resistance. Here the colonists relied, not on force or legal argument, but on the fact that British trade might also be ruined. The Empire, they declared, was too interdependent to survive such treatment. • ' • (87) Namier, L i B . , England i h the '..age of the American revolution, London, Macmillan & Co., 1930, p.£79. (88) This was Huske, an American, born in Boston. The need for revenue was only one aspect of a larger problem, that of lessening the weight of governing the Empire. The determinant of geographic diffusion demanded the modification of orthodox mercantilist doctrine i n the interests of more efficient government. It was essentially both an attempt to delegate authority in the economic sphere, and an attempt to centralize more completely the authority,in the p o l i t i c a l sphere. After 1763, British colonial policy, although s t i l l favouring the merchants, was i n many of i t s most important parts, dis t i n c t l y at odds with them. The Proclamation of 1763, the Stamp Act, the Declaratory Act, the Quebec Act of 1774, and the Carleton Commission and instructions of 1775, were none of them mercantilist i n their objectives. With equal truth i t may be said that the Sugar Act, the Trade Acts of 1764-66 and the Townshend Acts were designed much more i n the interests of revenue which the exchequer greatly needed than of the business prosperity of the capitalists .., The British government had other interests at stake than those of the merchants and always found i t d i f f i c u l t to -satisfy the merchants as much as the merchants wished to be-satisfied, a situation of which the latter frequently complained. It i s sheer assumption to assert that i n England at this time the acts of the executive and the legislation of Parliament were necessarily determined by business pressure, for the one thing the mercantilists did not want was parliamentary taxation of the colonies (89). ' (89) Andrews, CM., The colonial period of American history, Vol. IV, England's commercial and colonial policy, p.426. 110. The f i r s t , and most pressing problem was the inclusion of the newly acquired territories i n the Empire. On June 8th, 1763, Lord Shelburne, as the President of the Board of Trade, outlined a plan for three new colonial governments: the West Indies, the Floridas and Quebec. The question then arose as to what to do' with the new Indian territories i n the Mississippi Valley. Their organization was complicated by the presence of vaguely defined Indian rights and by the almost equally vague and conflicting claims of the colonies. The area had been prohibited to the colonists i n time of war, but future prohibition would have to be reconciled with the royal grants given to North Carolina, Virginia, Massachusetts and Connecticut, to lands reaching as far as the Pacific. The Crown, however, proposed to void these grants, i f possible (90). Shelburne, moreover, regarded the interests of the Indians as a royal trust, and urged that the area around the Great Lakes should be made a reserve for them, open to trade, but not to land grants or settlement. The boundary was to be determined by the Indian superintendents, though Virginia was to be permitted to expand into the Ohio Valley. The bound-aries of Canada were to run north of the Great Lakes, to pre-vent settlers thereon from removing to remote places where: "they neither could be so conveniently made amenable to the (90) Pennsylvania, the boundaries of which were fixed, supported Crown ownership of the area. 111. jurisdiction of any colony nor made subservient to the interest of trade and commerce of this kingdom by an easy communication with and v i c i n i t y to the great River of St. Lawrence." (91) Shelburne resigned soon after, and the Proclamation of October 7th, 1763, based on his proposals, was promulgated by Lord Hillsborough. The emergency allowed of no delay in the fixing of the boundary of the new reserve. The crest of the Appalachians was fixed upon as an interim boundary, although i t was to remain fixed u n t i l after the Peace of 1783. The new territories were to be under four governments: Grenada, East Florida, West Florida, and Quebec. Newfoundland was granted the coast of Labrador and Nova Scotia Cape Breton Island. Grenada included the Windward Islands, Dominica, St. Vincent, the Grenadines, Grenada and Tobago. The governors of Canada and the two Floridas were for-bidden to issue warrants for survey or settlement beyond the boundaries of their governments or beyond the crest of the Appalachians. A l l land to the west of this crest, not under the Hudson's Bay Company, was reserved to the Indians, under British sovereignty. No private purchase of land from the Indians was permitted, and public purchases had to be negotiated by the governors at public meetings with the Indians. Licenses were required for trade with the natives. (91) Shelburne's minute to the Cabinet, cited by Headlam, , "Imperial Reconstruction," Chapter XXEI, i n Cambridge history of the British empire. Vol. I, p.641. 112. Such regulations were an attempt to organize the hitherto haphazard pattern of Indian affairs and strengthen the western boundaries of the colonies from attack. One shortcoming of the Proclamation was that i t did not allow for the acknowledgment of French language and customs in Quebec. The intention was that some later measure would be introduced for the purpose, but this was delayed u n t i l the Quebec Act of 1774, guaranteed the rights of the French. In the interim a l l the colonies were placed under English law and institutions and the instructions to Murray at Quebec were the same as to the other governors. In practice, how-ever, both Murray and his successor, Carleton, gave wide latitude to the French, thereby laying the groundwork for the later Act. While the administrative machinery was being improved and the control of the home government was re-asserted over the colonies, there was a movement, particularly on the part of English opposition parties, to give the colonists a larger voice i n the administration of the Empire. The quarrels over the Stamp Act brought the matter to the fore, but long before this event, plans had been put forward for a centralizing of the administration of the empire, especially in North America. Before he f e l l from power in 1761, P i t t had even sketched out a proposal for the representation of the 1 1 3 . colonies in the House of Commons (92). Union among the ( 9 2 ) Chatham had an idea for a federal House of Commons which would have included the following representation for the colonies: Group 1 : Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, four each, or less i f desired; Group II; Connecticut, New York and Jamaica, three each, unless Jamaica wished to be included i n Group I; Group III; Canada, the Jerseys, Mary-land and South Carolina, two members each, unless Maryland and South Carolina may wish ,to, be in Group II; Group IV: Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, the Lower Counties on the Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, West Florida, Bahamas, Bermudas, Barbados, Antigua, St. Christo-pher, Nevis, Montserrat and Grenada, one member each, unless Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Barbados and Antigua may wish to be i n Group III. Islands which found one member too expensive might join together to elect a member or elect one by rotation. Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago might also be represented when settled sufficiently. Other terms of the plan included: 1 . The members to be elected by the local assemblies. • 2 . Members would have to be exempted from the property qualification of British M.P's. 3; On dissolution, American M.P*svwould have to retain their places u n t i l such time as their assemblies could re-eledt them or choose others. 4. Special time limits would have to be placed on the new writs; for American members. Six to twelve months was suggested. 5 . The residence of every American member, in or near London, should be l e f t in writing with the Speaker. 6 . Internal taxation on the colonists should be limited to a pound rate on their estates (unless the colonial assembly petitioned for a preferable form of taxation), and the rate would not exceed 3 d . i n peace and Is. i n war; on these conditions the mother country was to proteet the colonies without further requisitions. 7 . The l i f t i n g of the restrictions on the American maritime and inland trade would be considered afterwards. 8 . The Act of Navigation was to be preserved intact, since A r t i c l e 6 thereof ensured the interests of the colonies and i t was reasonable that the interests of the mother country should also be preserved. The plan would have increased the Commons by up to 5 2 members. Williams, Basil, "Chajbtoam^ the colonies in the imperial parliament,'* English historical review. October, 1 9 0 7 , p . i 7 5 6 . 114. colonies themselves, whenever proposed, broke down through jealousy, and the Americans never really seem to have adopted the idea of legislative union with enthusiasm. Franklin declares that the proposal of 8an union with the colonies, i s a wise one; but I doubt i t w i l l be thought so here (London) t i l i t i s too late to attempt i t . The time has been when the colonies would have esteemed i t a great advantage, as well as an honour to be permitted to send members to Parliament; and would have asked for that p r i -vilege i f they could have had the least hopes of attaining i t . The time i s now (1765) come when they are indifferent about i t , and w i l l probably not ask i t , though they might accept i t i f offered to them; and the time w i l l come when they w i l l certainly refuse i t (93)." The colonists were not entirely unrepresented i n the House of Commons, but the argument made by some supporters of imperial powers that these American-born Members repre-sented the colonies could not be reconciled with reality. The argument that the colonies were as well represented as most parts of Great Britain was made on sounder ground, since the unreformed Parliament represented barely five per cent of the people of Britain. While there were no Americans in the f i r s t Parliament of George III, five were returned between 1763 and 1783 (94). In the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, however, Massachusetts led the other colonies, to (93) Franklin, Writings. Vol. IV, p.400. (94) The five Members were Barlow Trecothick, Henry Cruger, John Huske, Paul Wentworth and Charles Garth. The f i r s t two were elected after the revolutionary con-f l i c t had started, for the mercantile constituencies of London and Bristol respectively. 115. insi s t upon the abandonment of any proposals for legislative union. The fact that they owned their own land gave the colonists a sense of independence and they were therefore averse to being represented i n the legislature of a "foreign" country. In any case the problem of distance was almost i n -surmountable. Yet the chief reason for refusal hinged upon the constitutional and economic issues raised by the attempts of the government to obtain revenue, through the successive measures of the Sugar, Stamp and Revenue Acts. The Revolution settlement was s t i l l sufficiently recent to seem to British eyes the perfect expression of constitutional liberty; and so, compared to other systems then i n existence, i t was. American separatism, however, not yet formulated into the doctrine of independence, was searching blindly for some way out of the impasse into which the conflict of the societies two/had brought them. It i s not proposed here to discuss the constitutional issues involved, but suffice i t to say that where the economic or p o l i t i c a l privileges of the colonies conflicted with the demands of a home government for which American spokesmen continually expressed undying loyalty, these demands were rejected rather than that the colonists should surrender their privileges (95). Franklin's theory (95) The extent to which economic factors were re-sponsible for the American Revolution cannot be easily measured. At f i r s t sight i t i s natural to attribute the disruption of England's f i r s t empire to a policy avowedly designed to make overseas settlements 'duly subservient and useful.' Yet contemporary English opinion held that of the imperial structure illustrates this separatist bias: (95) - cont'd. colonies 'felt the benefit more than the burden' of the Acts of Trade, and the view on the whole-appears well-founded. Irksome as these dis-a b i l i t i e s may seem on paper, the working of the system was not unduly onerous in practice. It was modified by concessions such as those which enabled the colonies to carry on trade direct with southern Europe i n certain commodities, o£ i t was evaded with the open connivance of the American authorities. This lax administration of the system helped to bring the authority and prestige of the mother country into disrepute; and habitual dis-regard for the laws of the parent state fostered a s p i r i t of independence, which made any attempt at enforcement of the laws appear a gross act of tyranny ... Against their d i s a b i l i t i e s , real or nominal, must be set the reciprocal advantages which the colonies enjoyed in the shape of the protection, the credit and the market of the mother country. The old colonial system, as the ruthless destruction of tobaceo-growing i n England demon-strated, was far from one-sided. Lipson, Edward, The economic history of England. Vol. I l l , pp.194-196. " The British empire i s not a single state; it-comprehends many ... We have the same King, hut not the same legislature." Or: "... the Parliament has no right to make any law whatever, binding on the colonies, ... the king, and not the king, lords and commons collectively, i s the sovereign." Or again: "Every man i n England seems to consider himself as a piece of a sovereign over America; seems to jostle himself-onto the throne with the King, and talks of our subjects i n the colonies." (96). This last aspect, the social cleavage between the two peoples, w i l l be discussed hereafter. Without arguing the merits of Franklin's case, however, i t i s apparent that the application of such ideas could not be reconciled with the constitutional ideas current in Great Britain or America, and the British interpretation, i n the event, was the only one which could be legally binding. Proposals for American representation in Parliament, i f carried through, would certainly have limited the effective-ness of American protests of "oppression." Defeated con-stitutionally and legally, the colonists turned to popular opinion, u t i l i z i n g the propaganda value of restrictions which were often ineptly enforced. When the force of public opinion i n Britain, as represented by the Chathamites and the Rockingham Whigs, proved insufficient, the one alternative of independence remained. Chatham and Burke might thunder about "taxation without representation" and press for American representation i n Parliament, but when Grenville, as the leader of the government, consented to such representation, (9T1 : ' : Franklin, Writings. Vol. V, p.280; Vol.VI, p.144: Vol.V, p.17. 118. American spokesmen dropped the proposal. Independence, to ensure the colonies against taxation, just or unjust, external or internal, was the prime concern of the popular leaders from this point on. It was the innovation of the insistence on collection, rather than the imposition of the taxes which made them burdensome, and was a major contributing factor to the independence movement. Like the men of the Great Rebellion, American leaders looked back to mediaeval customary guarantees of the rights of the individual. But these rights were overridden by the pre-rogative powers of the executive. Therefore any declaration of rights which was to last must, i n the last analysis, be based upon armed rebellion. The argument of the colonists for free-dom, l i k e that of the English parliamentarians of 1641, was based i n logic rather than law or history; "Stone dead hath no fellow," said the Earl of Essex in justifying the attainder of Strafford as an act of self-defence. The underlying philo-sophy of the statement was to be that of the American leaders after 1770. The new expenditures necessitated by the new imperial administration were soon found to be beyond the revenue-raising powers of the existing tax machinery. A l l the measures of the Sugar Act were not sufficient to produce more than a quarter of the £100,000 considered necessary by Grenville for the defence costs in America, let alone sufficient to provide the £350,000 necessary for a l l administration costs. In March, 1764, therefore, Grenville announced in Parliament that he would 119. have to dhtain additional revenue from the colonies, probably-through a stamp duty, such as was already in operation in Great Britain. George Grenville has been pictured as the corrupt politician who, because of a stubborn insistence on arbitrarily imposing the Stamp Act on America, lost an empire for Britain. Such a picture does not take account, either of Grenville's attitude toward the colonies while in office, or of the steps he, as the most cautious of ministers, took to ensure a favour-able reception for a measure from the imposition of which even Sir Robert Walpole had shrunk. His announcement of the proposed duty was made only after consultation with the colonial agents. At a meeting with them he declared that he was not wedded to the stamp duty, and was willing to accept any reasonable alter-native they might propose.which would bring in the same revenue. None of the agents (except that of Rhode Island) could suggest an alternative at the time, and the various colonial assemblies were unwilling to commit themselves, hoping that the tax would not be put into operation, or might be avoided. Thus, a year later, when opposition to the measure was mounting in the colonies, the colonial agents tried to dissuade Grenville from imposing i t . On being asked again for an alter-native source of revenue, they again temporized, Franklin for Pennsylvania suggesting a return to the old method of royal letters of requisition. , Grenville, realizing that the re-quisition had never produced adequate revenue, then asked what proportion of the revenue each colony would supply. Franklin suggested a colonial congress to decide this, but a l l agreed that the calling of such a congress would only be an oppor-tunity for the colonies to quarrel over the sharing of the burden. Jared Ingersoll then suggested a tax on the fur and slave trades (his own colony, Connecticut, being engaged i n neither). Grenville seems to have given the agents a f a i r hearing, and even declared himself willing to support a scheme for colonial representation in-Parliament. On the necessity for revenue, however, he was obdurate. As the minister responsible for the finances of a nearly-bankrupt nation, he could hardly, in this case, have been otherwise. In any case, the announcement of the proposal to institute the tax came at an unfortunate time, insofar as i t s popularity in America was concerned. Pontiac's rebellion had recently been put down, not, i t i s true, through any great efforts of the colonists; but the finances of the colonies were near collapse, and there was a general air of exhaustion throughout America. The chronic indebtedness of the colonial planters and merchants to London was becoming increasingly burdensome, as the demands of the creditors increased with post-war inflation. The restriction of the lucrative smuggling industry could not be employed as a legitimate grievance, but the employment of naval officers for enforcement of trade regulations was pro-tested. The new duties on foreign trade were also unpopular, although great care had been taken to encourage increased trade with the mother country at the time they were imposed. While the customs revenue, rather than the stamp duties, were 121. the real burden, American demagogues picked on the latter to attack, as having the least constitutional justification. The chief advantage of the English Stamp Act, as i t had operated for many years, was that i t was almost self-executing; i t did not require enforcement officers with powers of enter-ing houses and prying into private a f f a i r s . Documents without a stamp were void: therefore each citizen saw to i t that he procured stamps (97). The cost of extending the system to the colonies would be almost negligible - only one warehouseman would have to be added to the staff i n London, and deputy commissioners could be appointed in America. In addition, con-ditions i n America seemed to make the stamp duties an ideal (97) The English Stamp duties between 1756 and 1763, had grossed £287,307, of which £260,647 was net revenue. Only £7,901. was collected for Scotland, where the cost of collection consumed half the gross receipts. The duty on pamphlets averaged £285., but was actually a fluctuating revenue, while that on almanacks was £3,000. and a regular revenue. Ale house licenses-went up i n 1756 from one s i l l i n g to one guinea, and the average receipts therefrom were £56,883, with £24,557 from wine licenses at £4 each. Playing cards yielded £15,307, dice £252, and apprentice premiums £4,203, - this last subject to great frauds. Insurance policies were also uncertain, yielding an average of £12,000. B i l l s of lading produced £1,710, debentures £1,106, and transfers of stock £717. The sustem of granting commissions to the collectors on a poundage system produced great inequalities between l o c a l i t i e s . Hughes, Edward, "The English stamp duties" -English historical re7iewT'YoI7"56"," 1941, p.251. 122. form of taxation from the point of view of the Br i t i s h Government. The people were very l i t i g i o u s , haling each other into court on the slighest pretext. Since a l l legal papers required a stamp, either the weakness for going to law would be curtailed, or the British Treasury would benefit. News-papers were required to bear a stamp, and the colonists were great newspaper readers. The tax f e l l on those best able to pay, and yet was not excessive. The burden was to be shared equally between the West Indies and America, an important feature, i n view of inter-colonial r i v a l r i e s . Only a part of the expense for the defence of the colonies was expected to be raised and no part of the revenue was to go toward the payment of the British debt. Grenville prided himself on having asked nothing unreasonable. The f i n a l b i l l was drafted by Thomas Whateley, Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with Franklin and Ingersoll (98). The possible revenue was expected to be between £60,000 and £100,000. The British were later to blame Grehville for risk-ing the empire for such a paltry sum, but i t was because the total amount of the tax was to be small that i t was thought that the colonists would not object. Ingersoll declared at the time that the right of Parliament to impose the tax was (98) Sometime in 1764 a circular letter had been sent to a l l colonial governors asking for returns on a l l public trans-actions, law proceedings, grants, conveyances, etc., probably on the i n i t i a t i v e of Charles Jenkinson, who, with Whateley, had been the moving s p i r i t behind the Stamp Act. The immediate decision on i t , however, was taken by Whateley. 123. acknowledged, but that the tax would be unpopular (99). In Parliament there was very l i t t l e debate on the measure. Only William Beckford and Colonel Barre objected and General Conway c a l l e d for the acceptance of c o l o n i a l p e t i t i o n s against the measure (100). The act came int o operation on November 1st, 1765. Restrictions on trade were s l i g h t l y relaxed, and a bounty on timber imported into England was granted, as well as freedom to export i t to Ireland, Madeira, the Azores and every part of Europe south of Cape F i n i s t e r r e . Colonists were appointed stamp masters, and t h i s l u c r a t i v e o f f i c e was much sought a f t e r by indigent friends ofthe o o l o n i a l agents (101). (99) Headlam, Imperial reconstruction, Cambridge h i s t o r y of . . the B r i t i s h Empire, Vol, I, p.646. (100) The debate on the passage of the act was so tepid that Horace Walpole, ever a keen observer of p o l i t i c a l events, records i n a l e t t e r to h i s cousin, the E a r l of Hertford: "Inere has been nothing of note i n P a r l i a -ment but one-slight day on the American taxes (February 6th, 1765), which Charles Townshend support-ing, received a pretty heavy thump from Barre, who i s the present P i t t , and the dread of a l l the vociferous Norths and Rigbys, on whose lungs depended so much of Mr. Gr e n v i l i e 1 s power." Walpole, Letters. (Toynbee ed.), Vol. VI, p.187 Letter to the E a r l of Hertford, February 12th, 1765. (101) Richard Henry Lee, the future r e v o l u t i o n i s t , was stamp master f o r V i r g i n i a , while F r a n k l i n secured the appointment i n Pennsylvania f o r his f r i e n d John Hughes, and Jared I n g e r s o l l assumed the o f f i c e i n Connecticut. M i l l e r , O r i g i n of the American revolution, p.114. 124. The Sugar Act, the prohibition of paper money i n 1751 and 1764, and the enforcement of the customs regulations i n 1763 and 1764, had a l l aroused American opposition to such an extent that the colonists were not in a mood to accept the Stamp Act. The post-war slump of 1764, in addition to impoverishing the mother country, had hit the colonies hard. Specie was rapidly disappearing from the northern colonies and land values were reduced. Unemployment i n the colonies increased and the London merchants viewed the decline i n trade with alarm. It was unfortunate for the popularity of the measure, and for a l l attempts to justify i t , that i t was instituted in a time of depression. What i t s success would have been i n more prosperous times i s a matterfbf conjecture. On paper, Grenville had raised the revenue by £234,000, and reduced expenditure by £130,000. The depression was, of course, utilized to the f u l l by opponents of the tax. Petitions against the tax emphasized the i n a b i l i t y to pay rather than any constitutional objection to internal taxation. The lack of hard money i n the colonies and their own impending bankruptcy were both emphasized hy the colonists. The refusal of Parliament to accept the petitions against the tax, on the ground that money b i l l s could not be petitioned against, drove the colonists to more definite action. Protests against the act on grounds of actual hardship were in greatly exaggerated terms, but since tavern keepers, printers, lawyers and merchants, the most influential groups in the community, were the hardest hit, 185. their hardship could be represented as the grievance of the whole people who were'already restive under British trade and settlement restrictions. Possibly the most widespread cause for complaint against the tax was that i t could not be evaded. The colonists looked back with pleasure upon the easily evaded system of royal requisitions and called for a return to this royal, i n the place of Parliamentary taxation; i n effect a cry, for colonial purposes only, for a reversal of the Revolution Settlement. (102) The Act was also looked upon as a precedent for further taxation of the same type, in support of what the colonists considered British extravagance. The precedent of encroachment was, however, the most dangerous aspect. Governors, judges, assemblies, and churches might a l l be brought under British control, i f once f i s c a l independence was given up. The general opinion in America before May 1765 was that the tax could not be evaded, and most of the colonists followed the lead of Franklin i n accepting i t philosophically. It was from the malcontent element of the population, the ruined merchants and unsuccessful professional men that the f i r s t opposition came. The presentation of the seven resolutions of Patrick Henry i n the Virginia House of Burgesses i n May, 1765, provided the necessary spark for the insurrection. Although (102) This was the origin of the proposals of the radical wing of the Stamp Tax Congress and later of the New York Assembly i n dealing with the Mutiny Act, to address only the King, rather than the King and Parliament, i n the petitions. 1 2 6 . Virginia i t s e l f was not an enthusiastic supporter of Patrick Henry's extreme point of view, the other colonies took up the resolutions enthusiastically. The mob actions which followed were certainly not spontaneous or unpremeditated, being the result of careful .encouragement and planning on t he part of many who belonged to the commercial and planter classes. It was in their interest to limit the regulatory power of the home government. Some of the leaders of the mercantile class, such as Hancock and Livingston, publicly encouraged the mobs or marched at their head. This was a surprising and alarming phenomenon to the o f f i c i a l s , for they did not realize the degree to which a feeling of social frustration existed among the petty aristo-cracy of America. The chief pre-occupation of the mobs, at f i r s t , was with hounding the stamp masters out of the country. Oliver of Massachusetts, Coxe of New Jersey, Hood of Maryland, and Messerve of New Hampshire, were a l l forced to give up their ooiimiissions as stamp masters. Even the stamps themselves were a subject for mistreatment, the mobs burning nearly half the supply sent over, and using the search for them as an excuse for working off private grudges. Once the f i r s t wave of terrorism had died down, such demagogues as James Otis and Sam Adams stirred the f i r e s again with accusations as to the source of the original suggestion for the tax. It had, of course, originated i n the Treasury, but such a moderate opponent of the Act as Thomas Hutchinson was mobbed and bis bouse burned. In Philadelphia, Franklin's adherents, l i k e Franklin, supported the Act and were mobbed. At the same time-that the Virginia Resolutions were being proposed, Otis suggested in the Massachusetts Assembly that a continental congress should be called to discuss the Act, and make an united protest against i t . The suggestion was taken up and the congress met i n October 1765, one month before the Act was to go into effect. New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia, Nova Scotia, and Virginia were not represented and the representatives of South Carolina, Connecticut and New York were not empowered to sign any-protest. A protest was nevertheless drawn up i n the name of a l l the colonies. Some radicals proposed to petition the King direct, thereby deny-ing the authority of Parliament, but thewe were over-ruled, and the f i n a l petition was addressed to King, and the Lords and Commons, acknowledging thereby colonial dependence upon Parliament. The proposition of no taxation without represent tation was also rejected, since i t implied colonial rights over a l l taxation, a doctrine not yet accepted by the majority of the colonists. The Act was not, however, resisted everywhere. In the West Indies only St. Christopher's and Nevis resisted, and i n the former the opposition came largely from American seamen i n the port. Halifax and Quebec accepted the Act without a murmur. In Georgia, the governor, the merchants of Savannah and the Georgia rangers united to enforce the Act. The firm-ness of the governor here stopped the insurrection, while i n 128. other colonies, the lack of military strength prevented even protective measures being taken (103). The co-operative attitude of the West Indies towards England at this time led to a threat on the part of the New England merchants to cut off the provision trade to the islands, although this would have been economic suicide for New England. The extremes to which the riots were carried after the imposition of the Act, especially in New York, led the more conservative elements among the insurrectionists to urge the peaceful method of protest through non-importation. Such luxuries as lace, ruffles, plate and carriages were foresworn, although not for long, since increased exports to the mother country soon improved the economic position of the colonies. The colonial boycott of British goods in 1765 became a formid-able threat to British trade (104), and in this situation i t seemed as though the f a l l of the American merchants might bring down the British economic structure as well (105). Moreover, the drainage on specie caused by the Stamp Duties had dried up the return on Br i t i s h investments. (103) The Sons of Liberty had urged a military union of the colonies against British coercion. Certainly the British military weakness was alarming, since the army of 10,000 regulars which Grenville had proposed had not materialized for lack of money and only fifteen time-expired battalions remained in North America after the peace. (104) The annual consumption of Br i t i s h goods in the colonies was estimated at £3,000,000. Annual Register. 1764, p.24 (105) In the p o l i t i c a l sphere, P i t t , i n his speech on the imposition of the Stamp Tax, pointed this out: In Britain, the belief that full-scale rebellion had broken out was widespread. The Stamp Act, i t was thought, was merely the ostensible cause of insurrections which reflected the s p i r i t of rebellion inherent in a l l Americans. The extremes of the rioters and the moderation of the tax combined to convince Englishmen that Americans must have other, more definite grievances, or none at a l l . Free traders blamed mercantilism and anti-imperialists (like Burke) blamed "oppression." ^ t was a mixture of such opinions which formed the p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the Rockingham Whigs when they assumed office i n July, 1765, determined upon the appeasement of the colonists. The new government was willing to take the colonists at their word and not only treated the Stamp Act as the real cause of the trouble, but also re-asserted the authority of Parliament over the colonies. In thus trusting to the doubt-f u l behaviour of a people and forces over which they had no (105) cont'd. "Sir, I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to a l l feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been f i t instruments to make slaves of a l l the rest .... I know the valour of your troops. I know the s k i l l - o f your officers. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the force of this country can crush America to atoms. But in such a cause as this your success would be hazardous. America, i f she f e l l , would f a l l l i k e the strong man. She would embrace the p i l l a r s of the state, and pull down the Constitution with herl Is this your boasted peace? Not to sheath the sword i n i t s scabbard, but to sheath i t i n the bowels of your countrymen!" Mahon, Lord, History of England in the eighteenth century. Vol.5, pp.202-203. control, the Rockingham Whigs placed their p o l i t i c a l future i n jeopardy. The support of the London interests and the Court was v i t a l to the repeal, and i t was fortunate for the government that the decline of the American trade and the King's temporary support of the Whigs coincided. P i t t declared his eccentric theory of taxation vs. legislation, hut this could have no basis in law (as Mansfield pointed out). It was used only to justify Pitt's claim that internal taxation should be controlled by the local assemblies (106). As a preliminary to dealing with the Act i t s e l f , a Declaratory Act was passed on February 18th, 1766, modelled upon a similar statute passed i n respect of Irish legislation. It reiterated the supremacy of Parliament over a l l local legislatures and the right of Parliament to legislate for the colonies i n a l l matters. The question then remained as to whether to enforce or repeal the Stamp Act. The support of the King, which was necessary to the existence of the government, was obtained for repeal of the Stamp Act, but only after the fact that military enforcement (106) Taxation i s no part of the governing or legis -lative power. At the same time on every real point of legislation I believe the authority of Parliament to be fixed as the Polar Star, - fixed for the reciprocal benefit of the mother country and her infant colonies. ... The distinction between legislation and taxation i s essential to liberty. The Crown, the Peers, are equally legislative powers with the Commons. If taxation be a part of simple legislation, the Crown,.the Peers, have rights in taxation as well as yourselves; rights which they w i l l claim whenever the principle can be supported by might. Mahon,Lord, History of England i n the eighteenth century, Vol.5, p.199-200. 131. was the alternative was pointed out. Actually, the King had wished for a peaceful, but definite enforcement. He resented the humiliation involved in acceding to the policy of his Ministers, and determined to r i d himself of the Rockinghams at the f i r s t opportunity. In the colonies the repeal was received with gree/t cele-brations, and the Declaratory Act notwithstanding, the colonial assemblies now considered themselves sovereign. The problem of insufficient revenue for the mother country continued, however, and had been aggravated by the fact that the administration of the Stamp Act had resulted i n a d e f i c i t of £631. 9s. The chief result of the Act, apart from a small revenue obtained from the West Indies, had been to c a l l i n question the constitutional position of Britain vis a vis the colonies. The "weight of government" had, i f any-thing, been increased. The Rockingham Government also reduced the duty on molasses from 3d. to Id., secured the repeal of the cider tax and increased the bounties on colonial produce. "Thus £130,000 was cut from the revenue and the peace of the empire was maintained, even i f only temporarily and uneasily. Chatham's ministry, which took office i n the summer of 1766, although i t had a transient popularity with the colonists, found i t s e l f called upon almost immediately to deal with several grievances which i t had been beyond the powers of the Rockingham Government to abate. The Mutiny Act, extended to America i n 1765, provided for the private 133. quartering of troops in the colonies, since the lack of colonial support for the military had resulted in a shortage of barracks. The Act had been altered to permit such quartering only in empty barns, sheds, etc., but the boy-cotting of the "lobsterbacks" continued. It was only after the repeal of the Stamp Act, however, that the colonial agitators had time to turn their attention to this grievance. The Act had obliged the colonists to provide, i n addition to shelter, f i r e , candles, beds, vinegar and salt. This provisioning was now construed as taxation without repre-sentation. With the arr i v a l of military re-enforcements i n Boston, the quartering issue came to a head. The Council of Massachusetts, obedient to the law, voted provisions for the troops, but the House of Representatives refused to sanction them. The British government, cautious from the outset, failed to punish the offence and the other colonies followed the lead of Massachusetts. New York's disobedience was the most flagrant, with a direct refusal to obey the Act, although an offer was submitted to obey royal requisitions of supply. Other colonies either qualified their accep-tance of the Act, or passed their own Acts to supply the troops. Only Pennsylvania carried out the Act to the letter. While the colonists f e l t that an army of occupation was being imposed on them unconstitutionally, in Britain the chief concern of the government was with the far-reaching problem of upholding the prestige of Parliament and retaining 133. the control in the hands of the central authority. Although Charles Townshend has been blamed for the subsequent attempt at legal and economic coercion, i t was apparent by 1767 that a l l British p o l i t i c a l parties were alarmed at the excessive claims of the colonists, and that the extent of the measures to meet them, rather than the method, was the chief point at issue. The decline of Chatham into mental decay gave Town-shend his opportunity to endeavour to bring the colonists into line. Although Chatham may have opposed the Revenue Acts, i t i s almost certain that he was moving towards a viewpoint similar to that of Townshend. In the popular reduction of the land tax (107) in the spring of 1767, Townshend found his excuse for reviving the colonial taxation issue. The advantages of the Revenue Act over the Stamp Act were apparent. As, in substance, i t provided for a series of importation duties, the former could not be rejected by the colonists as internal taxation. In addition, the sources of revenue under i t were far more lucrative than those of the Stamp Tax. Duties on glass, lead, paint, paper and tea were imposed (108), the proceeds from which were to go toward (107) The tax was reduced from 4d. to 3d. in the pound. Townshend does not seem to have supported the reduction, although he did not heartily oppose i t and was able, because of the shortage of revenue created thereby, to propose taxation of the colonists. (108) Owing to the concessions made to the East India Company so that i t could compete with the Dutch, tea could be sold cheaper i n America than i n England. In 134. defraying the cost of administration and defence of the colonies. At the same time, Townshend urged that an American Board of Commissioners of Customs be set up to enforce the navigation acts and the new revenue laws. The revenue from the new measure was not expected to be above £40,000 annually. In addition, an accompanying b i l l was passed to enforce the Mutiny Act and to suspend the' assembly of New York u n t i l such time as i t complied with the Act. Warnings against the Revenue Act were heard on a l l sides. Burke denounced i t as merely a repetition of the Stamp Act. Grenville, on more precise grounds, pointed out that the levy was on British goods and would do great injury to Bri t i s h trade. The Act, however, passed quickly through the (108) conttd. - England, under the Old and New Subsidies, tea paid i h 1767, £23. 18s. 7§d. per £100. gross price i n customs, or about 24$. In addition, after being sold at auction, i t paid inland duties which were one s h i l l i n g a pound, and a further duty of £25 i n £100. Duties were thus nearly 50$ and one s h i l l i n g on the pound. By an act (21 Geo. 2 c. 14) of 1747, teas could be re-exported to Ireland and America without payment of the inland duty. The Townshend Act removed the one s h i l l i n g a pound inland duties and instituted a drawback of the whole of the customs duties on condition that the East India Company make good any deficiencies i n revenue. The Company, however, found the burden too heavy, and despite the lowering of prices by 25$, tea sales were not much increased. In 1772 the Act was changed to allow a drawback of only three-fifths, but with no indemnity required. In 1773, a l l importation duties were relaxed and the Company gained the right of direct importation, making teas only a fraction of the English price. The jealousy of American merchants led to the famous "Boston Tea Party" and the restriction of tea sales once-more. Farrand, Max, "The taxation of tea, 1767-1773," American historical review. Vol. I l l , pp.266-269. House with the usual large government majority. It was unfortunate for the British Empire that this measure, inherently sound and just, should have been imple-mented when i t was. Three years earlier i t might have pro-vided the revenue needed and avoided the conflict. The rejection of Pitt's f i c t i t i o u s distinction between legis-lation and taxation was, perhaps, a mistake, for in the very short term i t might have been used to placate the colonies. By 1767, moreover, even the safety-valve of protest from the British mercantile interests was not available. The Industrial Revolution and increased markets in Europe were now absorbing British capital and trade to a degree which placed America in a secondary position i n the eyes of Brit i s h investors. Similarly, the use of the Mutiny and Revenue Acts to underline the meaning of the Declaratory Act was a serious blunder, even although they were instituted in the interests of improved administration. Townshend gave the extremists among the colonists what they wanted; a chance to reject any compromise with the mother country. The intransigent position has been stated by John Dickinson, i n his Letters from a Farmer. The authority of Parliament over the oolonies was completely denied (109). External duties were admitted to be within the powers of (109) Beer, British colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.189. 136. Parliament, but they were not to be intended for the purpose of raising revenue, that i s , they were to be for purely regulatory purposes (110). Dickinson also declared, with considerable significance for the future, that the colonies were now an united p o l i t i c a l body (111). After the death of Townshend i n September, 1767, the mosaic government of Chatham f e l l apart. The Bedfords, strong supporters of coercion, joined the administration, and as a concession to them, Lord Hillsborough was appointed to a separate Secretaryship for the Colonies. The change might well have improved the situation, but the f i r s t action of the new Secretary was to enforce the Mutiny Act on the colony of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts assembly promptly "outlawed" the "standing army" and threatened to raise an army of i t s own. Virginia led the other colonies in support of the "Resolutions of 1769" against what the colonists regarded as encroachments by the mother country on colonial authority. At the same time the non-importation agreements were re-affirmed. The non-importation movement was at f i r s t a protest against commercial and financial restraints and impositions, and was inspired and led by the merchant classes. As i t . (110) This was to counter the declaration of the -framers of the Tea Act, who had declared i t to be for revenue purposes only. (111) "Our Strength depends on our union. United we conquer,-divided we die." 137. progressed, however, i t passed out of their hands into those of men who were primarily concerned with individual and p o l i t i c a l privileges and li b e r t i e s . Prominence was given, not to the commercial grievances which might eventually have been redressed, but to constitutional claims which Parliament would not recognize as valid. Behind these claims, in turn, lay a great variety of local and particular grievances -t e r r i t o r i a l , governmental, religious and financial - which inspired each particular colony to uphold the larger claim, as a common cause for them a l l . In Britain there was a growing weariness with colonial affai r s . A proposal was made to repeal the tax on tea, which had yielded only £300 (lis), and other revenue measures were also called i n question. The breakup of the mercantile structure seemed an accomplished fact. Hillsborough informed the colonists that there was no intention of imposing further taxes on them, thus announcing, i n effect, that the attempt to make the colonists share i n the expense of their own defence had been abandoned. With the f a l l of the Grafton Ministry in March 1770, a new influence in the government began to make i t s e l f f e l t . A planned policy of careful conciliation, with the mother country s t i l l retaining legal supremacy, was instituted. Lord North secured the repeal of the Revenue Act, except,for (112) The proposal was rejected by only one vote in the Cabinet. 138. the tax on tea, which was retained for purposes of prestige (113). He was, of course, fortunate in that a revival of trade and an era of prosperity had developed at the turn of the decade, so that the need for revenue was not so pressing as with his predecessors (114). There was also a lessening of the threat from France, since the latter had become involved in the conquest of Corsica. The garrisons were strengthened inthe colonies and i t seemed- as though a new and better era had begun. (113) It was remarkable on this occasion that the minister condemned these duties i n the gross, and the law by which they were founded, as so absurd and pre-posterous that i t must astonish every reasonable man, how they could have originated in a British legis-lature; yet, notwithstanding this decisive sentence, proposed a repeal of part of the law, and s t i l l con-tinued the duty upon tea lest they should be thought to give way to American ideas, and to take away the impositions, as having been contrary to the rights of the colonies. Annual Register. 1770, p.74. (114) In 1766 Lord Shelburne had formulated a plan for gaining revenue from America through a taxation of quit-rents i n the colonies. This method would probably have been less unpopular than any other scheme proposes for taxing the colonies, but i t was rejected by the Grafton Administration once Shelburne himself l e f t office. Humphries, R.A. "Lord Shelburne and British colonial policy, 1766-68." E.H.R., April , 1935, p.274. 139. It came too late, however. The damage had been done. Insurrections such as the "Boston Massacre" and the "Boston Tea Party" could no longer be considered as protests, but as acts of war. On the one side, the course of repression, and on the other that of independence, had proceeded too far. The relative quiet that existed from 1770 u n t i l the Battle of Lexington was the ominous silence of preparation. By 1770 the "weight of government" had broken the last bonds of amity between the mother country and the colonies. In addition to divergences on matters of policy, there existed a wide gulf between the basic modes of thinking of the two peoples which no administrative reform or plan of con-c i l i a t i o n could close. It should not be forgotten that the North American colonies, and New England in particular, were not normal extensions of the English state, but a schism therefrom. With the c i v i l and religious quarrels growing out of the upheaval of the Renaissance came the inevitable penalties to be imposed on the losers i n differences with constituted authority. In the less moderate thinking com-munities, these took the form of capital and other extreme punishment; in England, transportation of offenders to the colonies was a common sentence. Thus, geographically isolated and, by reason of their grievances, individualistic and self-opinionated i n the highest degree, the outcasts developed separate communities for themselves, and claimed the rights denied them i n the mother country. Self-government was established in the New World and 140. was tolerated by the home government, as i t eased the weight of government. Legislatures, i n the flush of the parlia-mentarianism of the seventeenth century, were established in nearly a l l the colonies. Governors and councils acted as checks on the assemblies, yet were dependent upon them. Even in the West Indies the idea of separatism grew (115), and i t was observed that i t varied in inverse ratio to the strength of Britain's traditional enemies, France and Spain. Each colony, moreover, had i t s own historical traditions, and i t s own peculiar customs and usages, to which the home government had perforce to adapt i t s e l f , thus giving the imperial administration a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y at the price of the loss of symmetry. To a great extent, pride of race, had disappeared in the colonies and patriotism was bounded by the physical limits of each province. "The colonist, i n general, regarded himself not as an Englishman, nor even as an American, but as a Barbadian, a Virginian, and so on throughout the entire l i s t of Brit i s h colonies. Thus the Empire was a loosely organized p o l i t i c a l structure, com-posed of a number of heterogeneous colonies with different economic institutions and with varying degrees of local self-government, a l l tending, however, toward virtual autonomy."(ll6) In such an organization i t is hardly surprising that the application or re-enforcement of mercantilist controls was extremely d i f f i c u l t . Economic considerations forced (115) Beer, British colonial policy. 1754-1765, p.165. (116) Ibid.. p. 3 Britain to take action regarding the d i f f i c u l t i e s and troubles which had arisen -in the administration of the Empire at a time when constitutional troubles made a satisfactory-settlement impossible. By 1763, neither Britain nor the world had.reached the stage of p o l i t i c a l and constitutional develop-ment when a federated empire of autonomous states was possible. Royalty, a s t i l l vigorous factor i n British p o l i t i c s , was reviving i n power. Any exercise of i t s functions as a bond between the various components of the empire, without being accompanied by the functioning of parliamentary rule, would, however, have been regarded by Englishmen as a dangerous manifestation of tyrannical prerogative. George III functioned within the British parliamentary system, and thus, inevitably, King and parliament were to be aligned against the separatist tendencies of the colonists. Not that a dislike of British institutions formed any large part of this separatism.- In his evidence before Parlia-ment on the repeal of the Stamp Act, Benjamin Franklin declared that the attitude of Americans toward Britain before 1763 was: .... the best in the world. They sub-mitted willingly to the government of the Crown, and paid, in a l l their courts, obedience to acts of Parliament. (117) And as to the position of that Parliament i t s e l f in the affections of the colonists: (117) Franklin, Writings. Yol. IV, p.418 143. "They considered i t as the great bulwark and security of their li b e r t i e s and privileges, and always spoke of i t with the utmost respect and veneration. Arbitrary ministers, they thought might possibly, at times, attempt to oppress them, but they relied on i t , that Parliament, on application, would always give redress." (118) Yet however much this enthusiasm for the Constitution might have been i n s t i l l e d into the colonial mind, and however much the colonists might think themselves brothers in liberty with the citizens of the mother country, there remained the separatist cast of mind, which could not, under most circum-stances, generate a high degree of enthusiasm for the British Empire as their homeland. Thus, though Franklin could say that "to be an Old-England man was, of i t s e l f , a character of some respect, and gave a kind of rank among us n (119), when the privileges of the colonists, especially those privileges which guaranteed their economic profit, were curtailed i n the interests of the Empire, he could l i s t as legitimate griev-ances of the colonists against Parliament: ... restraints lately l a i d on their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of mak-ing paper money among themselves: and then demanding a new and heavy tax by stamps; taking away, at the same time, t r i a l s by juries, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions." (120) It was significant of the attitude of the colonists that the reaction to such restrictions was a drive toward self-sufficiency; i n effect a move toward independence and a (118) Franklin, Writings, Vol. IV, p.420. (119) Ibid., p.419 (120) Ibid., p.420. 143. transfer of the ideal of a self-sufficient empire to the level of a self-sufficient nation, or group of communities. Franklin, certainly one of the best representatives of the colonial mind, declared, after v i s i t i n g the Yorkshire cloth mills i n 1771: "I am more and more convinced of the natural Impossibility there i s that, considering our Increase in America, England should be able much longer to supply us with Cloathing. Necessity therefore, as well as Prudence, w i l l soon induce us to seek Resources in our own Industry, which becom-ing general among the People,.... w i l l do Wonders. Family Manufactures w i l l alone amount to a vast Saving in the Year; and a steady Determination and Custom of buying only of your own A r t i f i c e r s wherever they can supply you, w i l l soon make them more expert in Working, so as to dispatch more Business while constant Employment enables them to afford their Work s t i l l cheaper ... tho 1 s t i l l Trade enough should remain between us and Britain to make our Friendship of the greatest importance to this Nation." (121) The sanguine expectations of Franklin as to independent economic development of America were not to be f u l f i l l e d for a century, since the accident of the Industrial Revolution served to prolong Br i t i s h industrial domination, even i n the American market. The reference to American population expansion was of importance, however, The population of the colonies was doubling with each generation, and the education and control of such a volatile mass of humanity in the tenets of orthodox imperial thought was beyond the powers of Franklin, Writings, Vol. V., p.327 144. any government, even i f the attempt had been seriously made. Certainly the attitude of mind of the Brit i s h toward the colonists was not generally conducive to understanding. The mind of the colonist was incomprehensible to the English o f f i c i a l class. As an example of this unfortunate lack of knowledge of the colonies in high places, the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, on the value of the recently acquired territory of Canada, may be cited: "Canada i s a cold northern climate, unfruit-f u l ; furnishes no trade to Europe that I know of, but the fur trade, the most inconsiderable of a l l trades; and therefore never compensated to France the expense of maintaining and defending i t . Its products are mostly or nearly of the same kind.as those of Great Britain, and consequently w i l l take off not much of ours. Besides, i f you remove the French inhabitants, this Kingdom and Ireland cannot furnish, or procure people enough to settle i t i n centuries to come; and i f you don't remove the French inhabitants, they w i l l never become half subjects, and this country must maintain an army there to keep them i n subjection." (122) Can: i t be wondered that there were many wjio preferred Guade-loupe as an acquisition? Yet i t was at the social level that the widest cleavage between the two peoples was most apparent. The class distinction i n Britain was over-emphasized, while that of America was under-emphasized. The social structure of England was, however, very compact and complex. Outsiders were not easily admitted. The social structure of the (122) Namier, England i n the :aae of the American revolution, p. 324. 145. colonists on the other hand, was extremely simple - aristo-cracy, bourgeoisie, labourers and slaves. The statement that 'Mr. Hancock may be a very good Englishman among Bostonians, but he i s no more an Englishman amongst Englishmen, than General Gage i s a King among Sovereigns (123) i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of the exclusiveness of the English attitudes. The concept of British superiority over the colonies was based, not on social distinctions, but the "fetishism of places,"(124)which implied a certain superiority i n favour of the inhabitants of the mother country over those who had l e f t i t . It was largely the result of thinking of i t i n terms of personified countries. The break between England and America came, not as a revolt against real "oppression" .- excessive importance must not be attached to the American fears of being "enslaved" by means of stamps or of a tea-duty; such catastrophes are common wherever Anglo-Saxons play at p o l i t i c s , and are called upon to pay taxes ... The revolt was against the superiority assumed by those who stayed behind. The bonds remained close, and there was no real estrangement in the sense of feeling alien to each other ... the idea of the "mother country" and her "children" i s pushed to i t s logical conclusion - as children-grow up, the parents become old and weak, which analogy about 1770 produced the belief in America that Great Britain was declining; and the f i n a l conclusion i s that her inheritance i s to pass to the Americans. (125) Almost the only people i n Britain who saw a community of interest between Britain and America were the English Dissenters. These saw the freedom of American Dissent as an (123) Public Advertizer. August 25, 1775, cited by Miller, Origins of the American revolution, at p. 204. (124) Namier, England i n the .age of the American revolution, p.44. (125) Namier, "The soul of America," The nation (English) January 26th, 1929, p.577. 146. earnest of their own aspirations. The unity of Dissent, however, was based upon religious particularism, was unable to expand beyond i t s own prejudices, and did not appeal to the bulk of Englishmen (and certainly not to the ruling classes). The possibilities of unification through the Established Church were even more remote, since only in Mary-land and Virginia was i t the faith of the majority of the colonists. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, although i t provided a missionary link, did not sufficiently enter the lives of the average colonist to become a unify-ing factor. Finally, the largest group of Britishers i n constant contact with the colonists, the army, was a source of division, rather than unification. The contempt of the British officer for the "Provincials" has become proverbial. In view of the failure of colonial legislatures to provide adequate troops and supplies during times of c r i s i s , and the high proportion of desertions of the colonials under f i r e , there was at least some ground for such contempt. For the colonials, i t must be admitted that even junior officers i n the British army were given precedence over colonials (126), and the supreme power exercised by the army over Indian affairs also gave cause for much legitimate dissatisfaction. In the (126) Toward the close of the Seven Years' War, P i t t had f i n a l l y gained recognition of near-equality of status under certain conditions for colonial officers under the rank of colonel. Such recognition, however, was very l i t t l e regarded by officers who had been used to treat-ing the colonials with contempt and saw no reason to alter their conduct. 147. older provinces the supremacy of the military was resented by both legislature and executive, although the former was naturally much more vociferous in i t s denunciations. The chief sufferer i n prestige i n the enforcement of the Mutiny and other Acts was the Royal Governor. He was between two fires; i f he yielded to the assembly he was held responsible by the Commander-in-chief, under whose authority came the only police power i n the colonies. If he yielded to the military and co-operated in enforcing the law, he lost prestige as governor. In addition, in matters of social precedence, he was usually over-ridden by the Commander-in-chief. In the time of General Gage, moreover, the office of Commander-in-chief was employed as a convenient listening post for the Cabinet in America, a fact only too well-known by the popular party and i t s leaders. It i s hardly surprising that one of the chief grievances of the Americans, recited in the Declaration of Independence, was that the King "has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the C i v i l Power." It can be seen that the decline of the Empire, a very simple process with very simple causes for such publicists as Adam Smith, was, i n fact, a long, complicated, and by no means continuous process, with the most involved circum-stances contributing to i t . Yet not a l l the factors were present in the Empire or i t s administration. A tree, the branches of which wither at the extremities, may be a f f l i c t e d only with external plagues; but i t may also be rotting at 1 4 8 . the r o o t s . I n the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the i m p e r i a l t r e e , the b a s i c sapping of i t s s t r e n g t h was a t l e a s t a s much r e s p o n s i b l e as the more apparent p e r i p h e r a l decay. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s of t h i s study, the d e c l i n e i n the p u b l i c l i f e o f B r i t a i n i t s e l f w i l l be s t u d i e d as a f a c t o r i n b r i n g -i n g about the B r i t i s h R e t r e a t . Part B. The P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s : 1760-1770. 149. The f i r s t decade of the reign of George III was of v i t -a l importance i n the development of the B r i t i s h nation, as i t was i n that of the Empire as a whole. In the p o l i t i c a l sphere, the constitutional framework as established i n 1688 continued unshaken. It was, i n fact, too out-dated to meet successfully the challenges made to i t . The institution of cabinet govern-ment, which had been developing since 1688, was temporarily rejected, as a determined monarch, aware of the wide theoret-i c a l latitude permitted to the monarchy, attempted to revert to the personal monarchical government of William III. In the f i r s t decade of his reign, George III was successful i n de-stroying the cabinet system temporarily. In the second decade of his reign he wielded more real authority than any English ruler since Charles I I . B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i n any case, had reached i t s nadir. Corruption flourished as never before or since, and the party system had disappeared. The nation, moreover, was exhausted from the drain of the Seven Years' War and seemed unable to meet the new needs for efficient govern-ment. Even while this dismantling of the old system was going on, the foundations of nineteenth century p o l i t i c a l l i f e were being l a i d . In the mercantile supporters of Chatham and Wilkes one may see the forerunners of the industrial and trading classes who were to rule England in the nineteenth century. 150. Moreover, i n this decade, the new party system was formed, based largely on the issues created by the royal encroachments on cabinet government. The disruption created i n the nation, both by the constitutional adjustments and the rise of new parties and classes, was of major importance i n the disruption of the Empire as a whole. 151. Chapter III. Setting the Stage: 1760-176^ .•. the last hundred years of p o l i t i c a l mysti-fication, during which a people without power or education had been induced to believe themselves the freest and most enlightened i n the world, and had submitted to lavish their blood and treasure, to see their industry crippled and their labour mortgaged, i n order to maintain an oligarchy that had neither ancient memories to soften nor present services to justify their unprecedented usurpation. (127) The transfers of p o l i t i c a l power at the accession of George III are often characterized, superficially and erron-eously, as a change from whiggism to Toryism, or from parlia-mentary democracy to arbitrary rule by royal prerogative. Such explanations do not take account of the character of the p o l i -t i c a l parties then i n existence, of the constitutional position of the Crown, i n theory and i n practice, and of the functioning of the parliamentary system. Thus, the decay i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country during the f i r s t decade of the reign of George III Is viewed as the result of a gigantic plot on the part of the monarchy, with the connivance of a corrupt nobil-i t y , to subvert the constitution, and to wreak a private ven-geance on the democrats of both England and the colonies. Actually the old p o l i t i c a l system was by no means so liberty-loving, nor the royal power so arbitrarily-minded as such explanations would infer. (127) Disraeli, Sybil. (Earl's ed.), p. 17. 152. The structure of po l i t i c s in.1760 was extremely complex as compared to the present-day two, or at most, three-party system. In effect, there was only one party i n I76O, the Whigs. The Tory Party, out of office since 1714, and out of power since 1688, had almost disappeared, insofar as i t s party structure was concerned (128). Before 1688, the division between parties had been too extreme to guarantee tranquility in the nation. It was as a reaction to this unrest, therefore, that both parties had com-bined to effect the Revolution Settlement. Thereafter the cleavage on fundamental issues disappeared. Unfortunately the division on minor issues was also destroyed. The party system depends for i t s effectiveness on certain perennial causes which do not strike at fundamentals, but upon which party platforms may be constructed. From 1714 to 1760 these did not exist. Hence p o l i t i c s became a matter of one party s p l i t into factions based only on the insecure foundations of place and patronage. (128) The decline of the Tory party was caused partly by the Jacobite rebellions, with which the party was associat-ed i n the minds of the public, and partly by the consumate p o l i t i c a l organization developed by Walpole i n the inter-ests of the Whigs. Once the failure of the "Forty-five" ensured the ultimate disappearance of Stuart claims, even the more rabid Jacobites made peace with the House of Hanover. Tory opinions, however, did not die out, and were to contribute significantly to the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the reign of George III. Williams, The Life of William P i t t . II, p.125. 153. As a result of this one-party system, and because of the relative newness of p o l i t i c a l parties i n general, there was no real party organization or party discipline, comparable to that of the present day. Followers of the government and even members of i t , would on particular occasions speak and vote against i t , and a government, which normally could count on a very considerable majority, would at times find i t s e l f i n danger of defeat. At such times every possible means was used to bring up votes to the government support, and to prevent the opposition from doing likewise. There was, however, no regular pattern of discipline, the whole organization being conducted on an ad hoc basis. Only 'general support 1 was expected from 'friends to the Administration 1 while a certain latitude of judgement on particular issues was conceded to them, at least so long as the govern-ment was not i n serious danger. It was the line taken on the king's speech and the address which, served as a primary test of p o l i t i c a l alignment, and the importance which to this day attaches to these theoretical exercises, i s possibly an un-conscious reminiscence from an age when not every single issue i n the house was a 'party question'. (129) Thus factions grew up inside the Whig Party, based on agree-ment on questions of the moment and owing allegiance to par-ticular luminaries of the party, as the demands of profit and advantage seemed to direct. By 1760, there were at least three such factions, under the leadership respectively of the (129) Namier, L.B., "The circular letters of an eighteenth century whip to Members of Parliament", E.H.R.f October, 1929. p. 588. 154 Duke of Newcastle, the Duke of Bedford and William P i t t . With the disruptions of the new reign, these were to s p l i t and re-form into a number of others. The most important branch of the government, even i n this relatively undemocratic age, was the House of Commons. The social history of the age, as Professor Namier has said, could be written i n terms of the membership of the Commons (130). At a l l times, election to i t required some form of popular consent, and i t was usually f a i r l y representative of the various interests and parties i n the nation. Membership i n the House, despite the venality of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , was con-sidered a necessity for social acceptance among the gentry. Witness Lord Chesterfield, writing to his son on the subject: I am of a very different opinion from you, about being i n Parliament, as no man can be of consequence, i n this country, who i s not i n i t ; and though one may not speak like a Lord Mans-f i e l d , or a Lord Chatham, one may make a very good figure i n the second rank. (131) Certainly the benefit of the country was not considered as the paramount reason for the existence of such an institution (132). The election of these members and the distribution of p o l i t i c a l (130) Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution. P.3. (131) Chesterfield, Letters. Vol. II, p. 368. (132) Namier, The structure of p o l i t i c s at the accession of George III. Vol.1, p.4, "Men went there (Parliament) 'to make a figure', and no more dreamt of a seat i n the House i n order to benefit humanity than a child dreams of a birthday cake that others may eat i t . . . " 155. patronage was based even less on altruism. The system of rot-ten boroughs, by which, the economic and social r e a l i t i e s of eighteenth century England were translated into p o l i t i c a l terms, at the expense of a slight nod of acknowledgement to the popu-lar prejudice for equality, had grown to such a degree, that less than fifteen hundred men and women were ultimately respon-sible for the election of a majority of the Members of the House of Commons (133). If i t i s remembered that nearly a l l of these fifteen hundred were either members of, or connec-tions of members of the House of Lords, the concentration of p o l i t i c a l power may be realized. It i s hardly surprising, then, that of the nine ministries between the accession of George III and the Peace of Versailles i n 1783, seven could be and were led from the House of Lords; a method which has become practically impossible today. The chief part of the corruption and electoral abuse came i n the borough constituencies, for the counties were re-presented by the most static and the most secure of the p o l i -t i c a l elements of the country, the landed gentry. Corruption was the mark of p o l i t i c a l activity, of transition i n an age of privilege. Few of the leaders of government represented the county seats. The boroughs, under government management or acquired by the Government at the time of election, opened the gates of the House to budding statesmen and to able c i v i l (133) Petrie, The four Georges, p.123. 156. servants (who were not yet disqualified from such p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ) . The men who had the most varied experience of ad-ministration had thus an opportunity of p o l i t i c a l prominence, which the normal workings of the democratic process might have denied them. Pocket boroughs performed the further function of ensuring a class turnover i n the government of the country, since the nouveaux riches of every generation could buy p o l i t i -cal control. At the same time the dominance of the various branches of B r i t i s h commerce was reflected, as these came into prominence. Among the rotten boroughs there were a few places, such as Old Sarum (which had only two qualified voters for the last few years of i t s existence) which could be put down as abso-lutely and — under the system — irrevocably under the control of one man. In the control of the boroughs i t required phen-omenal bad luck or negligence to lose the seat, but there was always room for anxiety, especially, as i n 1760, when a new reign brought possible disruption i n the p o l i t i c a l structure of the country. This was true even i n the "burgage" boroughs, where control of the electorate was practically guaranteed by the system of land tenure. In addition to the purchase of votes, either through outright bribery, or through control of the livelihood of the voters and their property, bargains were made between various interests controlling the boroughs, with no regard for the wishes of anyone but the borough patrons. For example, an 157. agreement between Lord Townshend and Lord Weymouth concerning the election of a Member for the borough of Tamworth i n 1765, states that: In consideration of the present Contest against Mr, Edward Thurlow the Candidate upon the Manour Interest being dropt, and of Lord Townshend's con-curring i n his Election; Lord Weymouth agrees that upon Lord Townshend and Mr. L u t t r e l l contributing each Five Hundred Pounds towards i t , Lord Weymouth w i l l provide a seat i n and during the next Parlia-ment for a Person to be named by Lord Townshend.,, (134) The attitude toward such corruption was largely governed by the accepted definition of corruption, which differed great-ly from that current today. Voters regarded their votes, bor-oughs their representation and Members their seats i n Parlia-ment as valuable assets, for the sale of which the granting of privileges and advantages was expected. Members were ex-pected to secure benefits to their constituents, just as they themselves expected "marks of favour" from the Government i f . they were included among i t s friends. By the middle of the eighteenth century these things had come to be considered perfectly legitimate and honourable; and i t was merely the manner and the circumstances i n which they were received, and the person from whom they were solicited that dis-tinguished finding one's legitimate account from taking a bribe. A Member could expect to be pro-vided for by the leader of his party or group, and his not being offered any favours would mark him as an insignificant and neglected person; but an interested change of sides at a c r i t i c a l moment was (134) Great Britain, Historical Mss. Commission. Rept. 11, App.,pt.4, "Marquiss Townshend", p.401. 158. corrupt. In the same way, every constituency up and down the country, especially every borough constituency, had to he nursed, but such loving 'care allowed of i n f i n i t e variations. (135) The idea that the p o l i t i c a l l y active part of the nation had a claim to maintenance by the State was generally accepted, i f only subconsciously. It i s a belief that i s held i n vary-ing degrees i n communities which have a representative type of government, yet where strong issues pre-determining votes are absent. The "cohesive power of public plunder" becomes the unifying factor i n party p o l i t i c s and, at the same time the issue upon which elections are fought. Two further fac-tors, however, obtained i n the eighteenth century. F i r s t , the number of offices and appointments available as rewards, ise. made at pleasure and not under competitive regulations, was much larger than at present. The fighting services and the c i v i l service were both exposed to Parliamentary patronage to the detriment of the national effort, especially i n time of war. In the second place, the proprietary character of the seats i n the House of Commons demanded that a proper return be made for investment i n a pocket borough. Where the number to be rewarded became too great for the conventional means (as with the voters of the more populous urban boroughs) i t became (135) Namier, Structure of politics at the accession of George III. Vol. I, p. 199. Possibly the nadir of politi-cal honesty was reached, at least i n England, i n 1771 j when the electors of Shoreham banded together to s e l l the seat to the highest bidder. The practice was universally condemned by a l l parties, yet i t was a far fairer way of distributing the benefits of corruption, than the propri-etary system of borough-mongering. Cf. Annual register T 1771, p.54. 159 a matter of legislative benefits for the whole community, such as bounties for local industry, public works, or commercial treaties. (136) The system of rotten boroughs and Parliamentary spoils tended to grow worse, since i t affected a l l levels of the p o l i -t i c a l structure. It was bound to have a weakening effect on the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country. Without the contribution of other factors i t could, i n i t s e l f , have led to the downfall, at least temporarily, of B r i t i s h power and prestige. As an example of the long term effects of the system, i t may be noted that i n the seven general elections between the accession of George III and the end of the century, i n which fifty-two coun-ties In England and Wales chose 644 Members of the House of Commons, there were, i n a l l , only fifty-seven unsuccessful can-didates — that i s to say, fewer than one i n eleven of the members for the counties of England and Wales i n those years met with even nominal opposition (137)• The turnover was nat-urally larger among the boroughs where the class barriers did not operate so exclusively, but even here, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Members were returned without,serious opposition. (136) Namier, Structure of pol i t i c s at the accession of George III, pp.21-22. (137) Petrie, The four Georges, p.124. In 1750 the division between the two bodies of opinion, labelled conventionally Whig and Tory s t i l l existed but i t was not focussed on particular problems and was not therefore as clear as the personal po l i t i c s of the last thirty years. Ter-r i t o r i a l magnates dominated the Court, as the makers and pre-servers of the Revolution settlement. By 1750 these were a l l Whigs, whatever their previous loyalties. They were forced, however, to all y themselves with the Crown and with leaders of p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y . A class monopoly of government was thus an impossibility and the " o f f i c i a l " class, based on a b i l i t y , was the chief organ of actual administration. Numbering among i t s members such figures as Walpole, Henry Pelham, P i t t and Henry Fox, i t included younger sons of peers, country gentle-men, and intelligentsia. With their double capacity of politicians and placemen, such administrators and their landed colleagues could not enter permanent opposition, i f their benefits from the spoils system, present and future, were to be assured. Thus the administra-tion, whether under monarchical or oligarchical control, was always guaranteed a substantial number of supporters and quasi-supporters. To this class may be added that of the merchants and the government contractors, the so-called "Treasury Whigs". The rise of party organizations narrowed and f i n a l l y abolished the freedom of choice of the Sovereign over his Cabinet, and was followed' by the elimination or royal influence i n p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l influence i n the services. l 6 l . The country gentlemen, formerly the bulwark of the Stuarts, came to the support of the throne, but abhorred the Court faction, believing i n authority but disliking the Gov-ernment. Toryism by 1 7 5 © represented the opposition of local rulers to central authority. Such men were not noted for p o l i -t i c a l acumen, nor for eloquence i n debate, but for independence of character and indifference to office, , Their i n i t i a l enthus-iasm for George III arose out of the belief that he would de-stroy the "Court" system against which they had contended so long. They were bound to be disappointed, however, since there could be no government without bureaucracy. Throughout the changes of administrations their character remained the same, and they were the elements of the purest type of class representation i n Brita i n ( 1 3 8 ) . Although they were valuable i n giving an appearance of respectability and independence to ( 1 3 8 ) The landed gentry was the deciding element i n most county elections, though a certain number of seats were conceded by them to the great noble houses — i n I 7 6 I , 16 out of 8 0 knights of the shires were sons of peers and nine of them courtesy lordsj of the remaining 6 4 , 6 2 were country gentlemen. The electorate i n the counties formed an independent and f a i r l y large class; s t i l l , i t would be ludicrous to talk of any "democracy" i n 3 9 out of the 40 counties. Taking England as a whole, probably not more than one i n every twenty voters at county elections could freely exercise his statutory rights, and the County Mem-bers. . .constituted the purest type of class representation In Great Britain, to a high degree, of an hereditary char-acter. Of no less than 3 0 among the 8 0 knights of the shires returned i n 1 7 6 1 , the fathers had previously re-presented the same counties, while another 1 9 had been preceded by more distant ancestors i n the direct male line..• Namier, The structure of politics at the accession of George III, p.9 2 . 162. the House, their numbers were not such as to disturb the ef-ficient workings of government. They were not great p o l i t i -cians but they were reliable underlings, and provided the necessary stiffening to the party system when i t emerged. The Government's control over them was negligible, and any inter-ference i n county elections had to be conducted through the big landowners who controlled a l l the counties but those im-mediately contiguous to London. The smaller businessmen of the City were the urban counterpart of the Tory gentry, and were radical under George III, i n sympathy with the mob of London. Dissatisfaction among this last group found expression, not i n p o l i t i c a l ac-tion, but i n r i o t s , which were exploited for p o l i t i c a l advan-tage by various factions, and were made easier of accomplish-ment by the almost total lack of police forces i n the large urban communities. Any serious threat of revolt on the part of these lower classes, however, brought a complete repudiation of them by the self-styled p o l i t i c a l radicals of Parliament. By 1760, the inclusion of P i t t and his Tory supporters i n the wartime government had tended to confuse party align-ments even further. Examples of the change may be seen i n the new allegiance of the families of Manners and Russell, whose heads were the Dukes of Rutland and Bedford respectively. These families had both been important i n the Revolution but began to show distinct Tory loyalties from about 1755 on (139). (139) Waffliey. England i n the age of the American revolution, p. 223". 163 Many amnestied Tories, on the other hand, a l l i e d themselves with the Newcastle Whigs, i n order to gain patronage or re£ gain position. On such an issue as that of general warrants the majority of the older Tories voted with the Opposition, while a majority of the Whigs was s t i l l tied to the Treasury. A survey of the Whig connections may be obtained from a series of l i s t s made up by the Duke of Newcastle i n prepar-ation for the election of 1761. The names l i s t e d are those of luminaries with sufficient influence to command the votes of that number of Members l i s t e d opposite each name, or of placemen who were assigned to secure the attendance of Mem-bers for Government boroughs (14-0). 1. Duke of Bedford, 10 19. Lord Bateman,M.P., 5 2. Duke of Devonshire, 12 20. George Onslow, M.P., 6 3. Lord Rockingham, 10 21. Lord Rochford, 2 4. Lord Powis, 11 22. Lord Albemarle, 4 5. Lord Anson, 15 23. Lord Kinnoull, 5 6. Lord Hardwicke, 14 24. Andrew Stone, 4 7. H. Fox,M.P., 12 25. James West,M.P., 4 8; Lord Barrington,M.P., 11 26. F. Gashry,M.P., 3 9. Lord Sandwich, 5 27. A. Wilkinson,M.P., 3 10. Lord Northumberland, 5 28. Lord Lincoln, 7 11. Duke of Rutland, 4 29. Duchess of Newcastle, 4 12. Lord Buckinghamshire, 4 30. Lord Mansfield, 4 13. Lord Darlington, 4 31, Lord Grantham, 4 14. Duke of Bolton, 4 32. E. Eliot,M.P., 2 15. Lord Exeter, 4 33. Thomas Pelham,M.P., 2 16. Lord Archer, 4 34. Lord Ashburnham, 2 17. Duke of Aneaster, 3 35. Lord Root.Bertie ,M.P., 1 18. James Brudenell, M.P., 3 36. John Page,M.P., 1 The Members i n group 1. were mostly relatives, personal friends and hangers-on of the Duke of Bedford, and those under (140) Add.Mss.. 32930, f f 37-42. cited i n Namier, op.cit., p.236. 164. the Duke of Devonshire's name were i n a similar category. Powis and Rockingham were great t e r r i t o r i a l magnates and con-trolled the Members i n their groups. Those opposite Lord Anson's name include eleven Members controlled by the Admiral-ty. Hardwicke's were largely family or legal connections. Pox, owning no pocket boroughs, controlled his seats by p o l i -t i c a l loyalty, being one of the few real faction leaders i n the group. Barrington, Kinnoull, West, Stone, the Duchess of Newcastle, Lord Lincoln and Thomas Pelham were a l l figure-heads, the ostensible leaders of groups controlled by New-castle himself. The Duke of Cumberland had been the royal leader of the Whigs, or at least the dissentient section thereof, before his military-failure i n 1757 caused him to resign his commissions and with them, most of the power to reward his followers with patronage. Bedford, Fox and Sandwich l e f t him to form a new faction of the Whigs under Bedford's leaderships the infamous "Bloomsbury Gang", notorious for i t s rapacity for the p o l i t i -cal spoils and i t s unscrupulous conduct i n gaining them. It consisted largely of persons who voted with the Grenville Ministry from 1763 to 1765 or who were dependents of the Duke of Bedford. Its p o l i t i c a l fortunes were i n the ascendant from 1761 to 1765 and declined from 1765 to 1767, at which latter date the faction was absorbed by the faction of the "King's Friends"• 165. In the House Itself over half the Members appear never to have held an office, pension or contract from the govern-ment (141). Of the placemen, some held offices for l i f e and were independent of the Government and some were army officers. Including four Cabinet members i n 1760, there were only about f i f t y whose places were not secure from Government interfer-ence (142). So much for the idea that threat of removal from office brought big majorities. In fact, i t was hope of future rewards, rather than security for those passed, that ensured Government majorities. Pensions on the Plantations or Irish establishments, baronetcies and Ir i s h peerages were eagerly sought after by the nouveaux riches, such as the East Indian "nabobs". The more important sought English peerages, or promotion i n the peerage. It was an age of peers, i n which thirty-five dukes were created i n less than half a century, and Pelham's Cabinet contained no less than eight (143). As respecting monetary benefits made available to venal legislators and administrators, two sources were notorious, though only one j u s t i f i e d its. reputation. The Secret Service Fund, administered by each of the great Whig prime ministers i n turn, was actually a branch of the Privy Purse, made avail-able for electioneering and other secret purposes. Its (141) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution. P.257. (142) loc. c i t . (143) Turberville, The house of lords i n the eighteenth century, p . l65. 166 reputation, however, outstripped i t s usefulness for such purposes: Newcastle spent from the Fund - from March, 1754 to November, 1756 and from July, 1757 to May, 1762 - £290, 848 : 17: 2-|, or approximately £291,000. Of this £55>000 were spent on elections and constit-uencies; and £68,500 i n pensions to Members of Par-liament - thus £124,000, i.e. almost 43 per cent, was spent on the House of Commons; £50,000 were doled out to the aristocracy, £56,000 went i n addi-tional salaries and to secret agents, £40,000 to friends of friends of the Government, and £21,000 to Germans. The vast engine of Parliamentary cor-ruption called "secret service money", when measured, has proved surprisingly small i n size, a mere supple-ment to places and other open favours; and on further enquiry i t i s found that there was more jobbery, stupidity, and human charity about i t than bribery. "For the wicked are more naive than we think; and so are we our selves!*. But the Buke of Newcastle was not even wicked, nor were Sir Robert Walpole, and Henry Pelham, George III and Lord North. (144) The second source of i l l i c i t wealth i n the governmental structure was more personal i n i t s effects i n that i t ben-efitted directly only one person at a time, although i t pro-vided him with the means to benefit others. This was the Army Pay Office. The Paymaster was entitled to use the large sums passing through his hands as i f he were a private banker. In time of war i t was especially lucrative. Not only was the Paymaster entitled to the interest on the balance i n his hands, but also to any capital profit he might make by i t s investment. Henry Fox, the most notorious and the most successful of the (144) Namier, The structure of politics at the accession of George III, p.290. 167 many occupants of the office, has l e f t an amusing explanation of his methods. The Government borrows money at twenty per cent discount. I am not consulted or concerned i n making the bargain. I have, as Paymaster, great sums i n my hands, which, not applicable to any present war, must either be dead i n the bank, or be employed by me. I lend this to the Government, i n 1761. A peace Is thought certain. I am not i n the least consulted, but my very bad opinion of Mr. Pi t t makes me think i t w i l l not be concluded. I s e l l out and gain greatly. In 1762, I lend again: a peace comes, in which again I am not consulted, and I again gain greatly. (145) It i s only necessary to add that Fox was Paymaster General for six years during the Seven Years' War; that some £49,500,000 passed through his hands and that some of i t remained i n the hands of his executors eighteen years after his resignation (146). Bribery i n this era was effective because i t was wide-spread and accepted as the custom of the country. No dis-honour was f e l t i n mis-appropriating Government funds and the prizes were such, as to attract the average man. The only mys-tery connected with i t was that there should have had to be a secret service fund, since most of the subsidizing of p o l i t i c -ians was done i n the open. It was probably a survival from the days when monarchs, not wishing to be openly associated with the regular p o l i t i c a l jobbers, were more scrupulous of their (145) Lennox, Lady Sarah, Life and Letters of. (Ilchester Stavordale edd.) Vol. I, p.29. (146) Hobhouse, J.C., Fox, p.2. 168. reputations. The relationship between the King and his counsellors is of interest, i n that the generalizations usually made as to the subservience of George II to the Whig junto and as to his grandson's domination of i t have the usual untrustworthi-ness of such generalizations. Ministers then as now, were held responsible to the people for the measures of the King's Government. They must therefore have no rivals i n the Kingis confidence, otherwise they would have to be responsible for measures not originated by them. As has been stated before, the Crown has no choice concerning the Ministry where there are firmly organized parties and a clear majority. In the eighteenth century, however, the role of the Prime Minister was of too recent and too uncertain an origin to command much respect from politicians. George II to some extent and George III to a great extent, were considered by most p o l i t i c a l lead-ers, as rightfully performing that function. In addition there was a definite belief i n the iniquity of formal opposition. The Tory Party, i t i s true, #ight have been designated as the Opposition, but forty-five years of Whig dominance and two Jacobite risings i n which i t had been indirectly implicated, had reduced i t to a p o l i t i c a l nonentity. The Whig leaders (with the exception of P i t t , whose talent for gaining popular support placed him above such generaliz-ations) were naturally reluctant to partake of active opposi-tion when a short turn of the p o l i t i c a l wheel of fortune might 169. place them i n power, responsible for carrying out measures which they had heartily condemned i n opposition. The impossi-b i l i t y of organizing splinter groups was also an apparent cause of the p o l i t i c a l disruption and lack of formal opposi-tion. The lure of the seals of office and the patronage at-tendant upon their possession kept men together i n govern-ments, but the frui t s of opposition were negligible. Finally there s t i l l remained some superstitious doubt as to the moral right of opposing the King's Government. The King, i t was believed, had a right to choose his ministers and not have them forced on him from the ranks of opposition. The actual person of the King was the centre of poli t i c s and opposition smacked of disloyalty. Even lesser members of the Royal family, such as the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Cumberland aspired to be leaders of p o l i t i c a l factions. A l l these factors operated in the reign of George II and were to operate with even greater force i n the reign of his grandson. Thus the royal function of p o l i t i c a l leader was merely continued and. expanded. When nowadays ... support for an independent executive i s required, i t i s obtained through "of-f i c i a l members", an expedient which, had i t been adopted i n the sixteenth century might have funda-mentally and irrevocably distorted the character of the House, while the means actually employed tended to adjust the scales within i t . As such a make-weight i n favour of stable government, the regal influence i n elections continued to be worked after 1688. When the struggle commenced between George III and his grandfather's "under-takers" , an outcry was raised against "preroga-tive" the term was s t i l l current by force of 170. ideological and linguistic survival; for ideas outlive the conditions which gave them birth, and words outlast Ideas. In reality, George III never l e f t the safe ground of Parliamentary govern-ment, and merely acted the primus inter pares, the f i r s t among the borough-mongering, electioneering gentlemen of England. (147) The Opposition changed In personnel, but not i n character, and continued to be ineffectual. Lord North was the direct p o l i t i c a l descendant of those leaders of the "Broadbottom Junto" who abhorred the "disloyal!?; taint of opposition to the t King's Government. The p o l i t i c a l situation i n I76O was also characterized by several occurrences which can only be described as fort u i -tous. Chief among these was the amazing power of survival of the politicians of the day. The two older generations of politicians, those of the reigns of George I and George II, seemed a l l to be l e f t alive. Only Walpole, Frederick, Prince of Wales and Henry Pelham, of those of note, seemed to have died. The King, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Argyle, Ligonier, Anson, Bath, Granville and Dodington were a l l from the seven-teenth century. The next generation, with Cumberland, Bed-ford, Devonshire, P i t t , Temple, Grenville, Egremont, Granby, Sandwich, Holdernesse, Legge, Mansfield, Fox, Townshend, Beck-ford and Charles Yorke, was also nearly complete. Thus there was bound to be a conflict of generations i n the new reign. (147) Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution, p.4. 171 Between I76O and 1770, however, the great majority of the old-er politicians were to disappear, leaving a long gap to the next generation of leaders. This gap helps to explain the pro-minence of such nonentities as Rockingham, Grafton, Richmond, Dartmouth and Conway. It was not u n t i l the closing years of the American War that the ruling families were able to produce new leaders of sufficient seniority and talent to lead the nation. This gap also helps to explain the very early pro-minence of William P i t t the Younger and Charles James Fox (148). Another factor, not s t r i c t l y speaking fortuitous, was capable on occasion, of disrupting the even tenor of p o l i t i -cal l i f e . This was the a b i l i t y of a popular leader to upset the workings of the government p o l i t i c a l machinery, despite large government majorities. The lack of such leaders was always severely f e l t among the Government ranks. To gain prominence, however, the leader required a popular issue on which to challenge the Government. Thus P i t t , i n November, 1756, was able to overthrow Newcastle's administration on i t s conduct of the war, although he had only sixteen followers i n the House at the time. General elections, however big the apparent majorities they yielded, did not settle the event of the' sessions - witness Newcastle's worries i n Sep-tember, 1754, when he had no f i r s t - c l a s s leader to put at the head of his enormous majority ... the influence of the Court could secure and command (148)= Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution, p.70. 172. numbers, but not leaders; and the real leader counted for at least as much i n the scales as the 'voting herd'. (149) This was the problem which had to be faced by the successive ministries of Bute, Rockingham and Grafton* That of Grenville was indifferently led, and only North.was sufficiently a mas-ter of the House (although not of the King) to form a lasting ministry. By 1760, the over-all managing features of the office of Prime Minister, created by Walpole, had disappeared. The popular leader, P i t t was the real minister. In the alliance of the great Ministry, P i t t was the "Minister of Measures" while Newcastle was the "Minister of Disposal" controlling Government patronage. Unfortunately for the latter, the mono-poly of patronage rather than mistakes i n policy was the chief source of criticism of the government, and a host of enemies was raised against Newcastle. He chose and managed the House of Commons, but his very success worked against him. Sir Robert Walpole had a policy and used the royal patronage to secure i t ; and under Henry Pelham there was less policy and more patronage; with the Duke of Newcastle a policy was hardly traceable; nor did much real opposition remain -the number of "Whigs" was continually growing, and the d i f f i c u l t y of the Administration was merely 'to find pasture enough for the beasts that they must feed'. This the Duke of Newcastle (149) Namier, The structure of po l i t i c s at the accession of George I I I , vol, I., pp.11-12. 173. made the task of his l i f e , leaving the work of Government to stronger men.... (150) Newcastle's whole personality was warped by jealousy for power. Intelligent, sensible and kindly, he appeared outwardly to be foolish, dishonest and cowardly through his anxieties. He was overawed by the stronger men who dominated him and was anxious for their favour. Pitt's remark: "Fewer words, my Lord, for your words have long lost a l l weight with me." (15D i s de-scriptive of the attitude of Newcastle's colleagues toward him. Such lack of resolution and decision was a prime factor i n the indiscipline of the Whig Party and i t s ultimate break-up. iAlthough lacking i n a l l the qualities of mind necessary for a great statesman, the Buke of Newcastle had, by assiduous application, raised the control of majorities i n Parliament to a fine art, of which he alone seemed to possess the secret. He was one of the f i r s t leaders i n English p o l i t i c s to realize that the secret of party success lay i n organization. Poss-essed of estates i n nine counties and owning most of Notting-hamshire, he was able, for a generation, to control elections over the length and breadth of England. The episcopal bench was crowded with his nominees, and peers and excisemen had the common bond of obligation to the Duke. It was a measure of (150) Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution. P.73. (15D Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol,II, p.34. 174. his power that one unpopular, although able, Court favorite, Carteret, was unable to stay i n power i n the face of the hos-t i l i t y of the Duke's p o l i t i c a l machine; while another, Bute, even more unpopular, although less able, successfully weathered the storm by f i r s t allying himself with, and later (through Henry Fox) controlling the party machine that Newcastle had created. Patronage, and patronage alone, was the foundation of his p o l i t i c a l power. He was the guardian of majorities he could not use, a leader of men who controlled him. His pro-mises were valueless, his business methods dilatory. Even the King, whom he was supposed to control, overawed him. Above a l l he feared the opposition of P i t t . He clung to office from habit, from jealousy of others and from a feeling that he was doing his duty. For forty years he had bought men u n t i l there were very few l e f t to buy. Three generations were i n his pay, and only the country gentry, the inveterate opponents then, as later, of a Court party, remained outside his system. Schisms had appeared i n the Party, i t i s true, but not i n the system. In or out of office, the Foxes, Sandwichs, Rigbys and Dysons were ever 'placemen', unwilling to partake of active opposition for fear of permanently losing the royal countenance and the royal patronage. Thus, when the time came for Bute to throw off the tute-lage of the Duke, he was able to carry the latter's erstwhile 175. followers with him. Bute was, without a shadow of a doubt, the new King's favourite. Therefore the road to patronage lay-past Bute's door,: and the hoards of placemen, obedient to the Newcastle tradition, turned from the old master to the new. The Duke died i n 1768, i n the midst of the transition which he had unwittingly done so much to bring about. His epitaph i s written i n the biting remark of Lord B r i s t o l to Lady Chatham: This morning died the Duke of Newcastle, an event which-will make no alteration but with re~ gard to the University of Cambridge, which has a Chancellor to choose. (152) His system lived on r not i n his own party, but i n the Court faction which he had done so much to create. He be-queathed to succeeding Whigs, only the name of a faction. The new Whigs such as Savile, Dowdeswell, Verney, Richmond, Burke and Portland, were a l l either newcomers or former Tory oppon-ents of the old Duke. In the Whig Ministry of 1765 there was a general distrust, on the part of Newcastle, of the leaders of a generation twice removed from his own. Place and profit were the cements of the old Whig structure. Opposition to royal policy-making was to be that of the new. The policy of the party i n I78O was to destroy the structure of p o l i t i c s set up by the party f i f t y years before. George II died on October 2 5 t h , I76O, to be succeeded by his grandson as George III. The chief p o l i t i c a l interest (152) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.256, quoted from Chatham Mss. 24. 176 of the time was then centred i n the Seven Years' War, up to that time, the most successful i n Britain's history. The un-doubted leader of the nation was William P i t t , the successful war minister who had created victory. The preceding year, 1759, had seen overwhelming victories i n India, Canada and at sea, and I76O was devoted to rounding out Britain's conquests. Certainly a Ministry and a Minister responsible for such suc-cess would seem to be as secure as any i n history. By 1760, however, the war had lost both i t s novelty and i t s popularity. No people were less intoxicated with their success. Victories became familiar to us. and made l i t t l e impression... Besides the nation had occasion for peace. Though her trade had been greatly augmented... her supplies of money, great; as they were, did not keep up with her expences ( s i c ) . The supply of men, too, which was nec-essary to furnish the waste of so extensive a war, became sensibly diminished, and the troops were not recruited but with some d i f f i c u l t y , and at a heavy charge. (153) The drain on the resources of Brita i n was certainly very great, but certainly not beyond her power. However, the people had reached a state of mind i n which, sated with victory, they re-jected further participation i n war, however glorious. Wit-ness Horace Walpole's comments to Henry Conway on the wars If a l l this did but starve us I would not much mind: I should look as well as other people i n haughty rags, and while one's dunghill is the f i r s t dunghill i n Europe, one i s content. But (153) Annual register. 1762, p.4-5. 177. the lives! the lives i t w i l l costI to wade through blood to dignityJ I had rather be worm than vulture. (154) A study of the reasons for Pitt's f a l l from power i n 1761 would not be complete i f i t did not take into account the desire of the p o l i t i c a l l y active part of the community for peace. In a more recent idiom, the nation was ,,war-weary,,. In yearning for repose i t was also natural that i t should yearn for more restful leaders. This sentiment i n the nation, which was responsible for the otherwise incomprehensible rise to power of Henry Addington i n 1801 and of Mr. Baldwin i n 1923, helps to explain the relatively easy transition from the ad-ministration of P i t t to that of Bute i n I76I. In addition, opinion was divided between the claims of various theatres of war. The policy of opposing French en-croachments on the continent of Europe was traditional with Whig statesmen, and had been followed by the Duke of Newcastle before the accession,of P i t t to office. P i t t , however, showed his countrymen a new and lucrative way of making war by f l i n g -ing expeditions across the world to crush the economic strength of France and bring her military power to the verge of collapse. The older Whigs adhered to their policy of a continental war, but the majority.of the nation, and especially the commercial classes, wished to desert the continent for the profitable conquest of the French colonies. The dislike of the English (154) Walpole, Letters. (Toynbee ed.) Vol. V., p.123. 178. for the German and especially for the Hanoverian connection was also a factor i n this feeling. France, who has only contracted her expenses by the loss of her navy, encouraged us to enter deeper and deeper into the inextricable t o i l s of a German war, i n which we waste our strength only to entangle ourselves further.... The a l l i e s , i f they deserve the name, supply not the smallest part of the expense. The Hanoverians and Hess-ians contribute to our service only be enabling us to protract s t i l l longer our efforts i n a system, i n which nothing can so effectually serve us as being defeated as early as possible. (155) As i n the nation, so i n the Cabinet. Here the division of opinion was complicated by the overbearing attitude of P i t t . His i r r i t a b i l i t y , which stemmed i n equal parts from his poor health and from his impatient conviction that he was right, alienated his colleagues, to the extent that they would gladly have been r i d of him i f they could have conducted the war without him. As the war went on from year to year and the expense mounted ever higher, the fear became common that even complete victory would leave England bankrupt. This fear was not entirely unfounded. The debt with which Britain was bur-dened as a result of the Seven Years' War was certainly an im-portant factor i n that train of events which led from a B r i t -ish budget de f i c i t i n 1763 to the American Revolution i n 1775. The dissatisfaction thus caused centred on P i t t . Small though his actual responsibility was for the wasteful methods of (155) Annual register. 1760, p.52. 179. expenditure and for the raising of taxes (156) he was blamed for a l l the government's mistakes, and his colleagues were so alienated by his reproaches that they were not disposed to lighten his burden. On the cost of the German war particularly, he and New-castle disagreed violently. Originally an opponent of the German war, Pitt had become converted to its support in the middle of the war, and in public urged the necessity of sup-porting England's ally , Frederick the Great in Germany. He was to state later thats America has been conquered in Germany, where Prince Ferdinand's victories have shattered the whole military power of that great military monarchy, France. (157) The expenditures on the continental war, however, were the least popular and the most extravagant of those that Britain was called upon to make. Pitt resented this and on one occas-ion even accused Newcastle of wilfully passing an exorbitant demand for the Hessian troops1 forage, in order to render "his war" unpopular with the country (158). In the whole cabinet, (156) The land tax, for example, was raised in 1757 to the unprecedented level of 4 shillings in the pound. Pitt dictated the policy of the Treasury where i t concerned the conduct of the war, but such interference was not consistent or uniform and was much resented by the Chan^ cellor of the Exchequer, Legge, and by the Duke of Newcastle. Williams, The l i f e of William Pitt . Vol . II, p.50. (157) Williams, The l i f e of William Pit t . Vol . II, p.131. (158) Ibid. T p.51. 180. he had only one al l y , his brother-in-law, Temple, and his dis-dain of p o l i t i c a l jobbery ensured that his support i n the House of Commons would be small on any issue but the war. He did not, however, desire to continue the war inde-f i n i t e l y . He realized the need for peace as well as anyone, but his success i n war, apart from the fact that i t did not f i t him for the role of negotiator, had roused the French to an obstinate determination to refuse any but the most lenient peace terms. As P i t t declared i n the House of Commons i n I76O* Anybody could advise me i n war; but who could draw such a peace as would please everybody? I would snatch at the f i r s t moment of peace, though I wish I could leave off at the war. (159) In addition to the intransigence of the French, B r i t i s h inter-ests dictated that most of the conquests already made should be kept. Certainly the,British public, however much i t might desire peace, would not permit the Ministry to surrender what had been won at such great cost of men and money. Peace was very much desired i n another quarter, but for a very different reason. The new King, under the influence of his sententious preceptor,' the Earl of Bute, and of his ambi-tious mother, desired peace i n order to reform the p o l i t i c a l structure of the nation and increase the royal power for what he considered the good of the nation. This necessarily in-volved the displacement of the present Ministry and the (159) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.74. 181.-promotion to office of the miscellaneous group of hangers-on who were the p o l i t i c a l friends of the new monarch. These hangers-on realized, however, that their talents for war were very limited and granted the indispensability of P i t t to the Ministry while the war was on. Hence the urgent need for peace. The leader of the group and the formulator of i t s policy was John, third Earl of Bute. He was a pompous, pedantic Scotsman with l i t t l e a b i l i t y but with a genuine affection for the King and a determination to protect his interests. He was aware of his unpopularity as a Scotsman, and of his incapacity for public business, but he had an unbounded f a i t h i n the soundness of his private advice and so, unfortunately for the nation, had George III. His grasp of public affairs, however, was sufficient to make him realize that the time was not yet ripe for his assumption of power and that i n the unpopularity of the German war he had a lever with which to pry P i t t loose from the p o l i t i c a l throne. P i t t had refused, on the night of the accession, to come to any terms with Bute, and neither was prepared to under-take an administration i n opposition to the other. The King and Bute realized that the presence of P i t t i n office was nec-essary u n t i l the conclusion of the peace; and because Newcastle was the necessary figurehead for Pitt's administration, New-castle must remain also. Party leaders, City merchants and party dependents also wished for the retention of the old Duke. Finally the Duke's ambition for continued control of the p o l i -t i c a l machinery, the pastime of forty years, was probably the 182 strongest supporter of a l l . Thus, blithely did Newcastle f a l l into the snare set for him, and provide the necessary transi-tion from the war policy of P i t t to the "prerogative" policy of Bute. During the preparations for the general election, nec-essary on the demise of the Crown, Newcastle began to realize the character of his servitude. The royal declaration that no public money would be spent on the election (160) coupled with several petty intrigues of Bute, put Newcastle into a terror of anticipated dismissal. He even imagined a plot on the part of Bute and P i t t to remove the management of the elec-tions from him ( l 6 l ) . This led the Duke to bargain f i r s t with Bute, and when rejected, with the Bedford faction, for p o l i t i -cal support. Actually the influence of Bute did not extend beyond a few over-ripe and disgruntled Whigs who flocked to greet the rising p o l i t i c a l sun. In any case, so long as New-castle remained at the Treasury and kept his p o l i t i c a l organi-zation intact, organized interference by a p o l i t i c a l amateur like Bute was almost impossible. The time was not yet ripe for the employment of Henry Fox, the only p o l i t i c a l manager who could presume to r i v a l (160) Elections went very much as Lord Bute wished, who made use of the King's money privately, which was publickly, ostentatiously and really too, refus'd to the Duke of Newcastle for these purposes of elections. Henry Fox, Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, p.41. (161) Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution, p.154. 183 Newcastle and who had the incentive to do i t . Bute was not yet prepared to accept Fox, nor Fox prepared to desert the Duke of Cumberland (162). The only persons of any p o l i t i c a l acumen whatever surrounding Bute were the relatively inexper-ienced Earl of Shelburne (soon to become an inveterate oppon-ent of the Court Party) and the superannuated Bubb Dodington, the former boon companion of the King's father. Both encour-aged Bute to take an active part against Newcastle i n the election. In the dispensing of patronage, Bute vied with New-castle but, more Important to the nation, on measures of pol-icy he came into conflict with P i t t . Although not holding an administrative office, Bute, since the accession of George III, by reason of his appointment as Groom of the Stole, had taken (162) As early as December, 1760, there i s a record of Bute's negotiations with Fox and there i s reason to be-lieve that they began even before George's II's death. The chief obstruction i n the way of their successful con-clusion was George I l l ' s disapproval of Fox on moral grounds and because he had been instrumental i n having Bute re-moved from the court at Leicester House i n 1756. Necess-it y recognizes no such scruples, however, and i n January, I76I, Bute was authorized to approach Fox openly. The latter stipulated for a peerage, but at the f i r s t creation of the reign, i n 1761, he was omitted purposely, since Bute f e l t that his interest i n the work ahead could only be kept alive by hopes of future ennoblement. After fur-ther negotiations he was promised that his wife would re-ceive a peerage at the next creation and that he himself would receive a peerage when he had captured the House of Commons for the Court. Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, pp.21-24. 184 part i n Cabinet Councils (163). He was drawn toward the Duke of Newcastle's point of view on the war, because the latter was the weaker of his two opponents and because- the war was the gap i n Pitt's p o l i t i c a l armour. By January, 1761, there-fore, Newcastle seems to have recovered from his i n i t i a l fear of the Favourite and to have been quite willing to make Bute a Secretary of State over the opposition of P i t t . Meanwhile the new Parliament was chosen, largely through the influence of Newcastle. The very great possibility of converting i t to the cause of the Court was, however, envisaged by Bute. The peace, i f i t was to be made, must have an unwaver-ing supporter in office, and the Whig lords, while weary of the tyranny of Mr. P i t t and dissatisfied with so much triumph i n which they played only subordinate roles, were not prepared to risk the fury of the people, i f the. terms set by France were unfavourable. Bute, however, with the single-mindedness of a fanatic, was prepared to suffer martyrdom for his King. (163) In 1740, the Cabinet consisted of the archbishop of-Canterbury, the lord chancellor, the lord president, the lord privy seal, the lord steward, the lord chamberlain, the master of the horse, the lord-lieutenant of Ireland, the two secretaries of state, the groom of the stole, the f i r s t minister for Scotland, the chancellor of the exche-quer, the f i r s t commissioner of the navy, the master of ordnance, while the Duke of Bolton had a seat i n the cab-inet without office, and Sir John Norris was called i n when advice was wanted on naval matters.... In 1757 and 1765 Newcastle drew up plans of administration, and each time, the archbishop and the officers of the household were included. Winstanley, D.A., "George III and his f i r s t cabinet" E.H.R.. October, 1902, p.679. 185. On March 13th, 1761, he was appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department i n succession to the time-serving Earl of Holdernesse. It was only by taking office that Bute could seriously interfere with P i t t , since the business of the Secretary of State was conducted under the harsh light of public opinion. George III, moreover, had unlimited confidence i n Bute (a confidence Bute himself did not entirely share). He saw i n the Earl the chosen instrument for that reformation of p o l i -t i c s which was the f i r s t and most abiding of the Royal obsess-ions. There was actually nothing unconstitutional i n this support of Bute, the only limitation on such an appointment being that the Minister required a majority in the House of Commons for carrying on the Government. Parties were not pro-perly organized i n I760, so the choice of Ministers could not be made within their narrower bounds. Nevertheless, the choice of a person unpopular with the nation as a whole, as Bute un-doubtedly was, could be supported by a government majority i n Parliament only for a limited time. Bute's failure i n 1763 was due, not to a lack of royal or parliamentary support, but to violent opposition from the people (and especially the London mob) and to a lack of courage on his part to maintain his position i n the face of such opposition. P i t t seems to have acquiesced for the time i n Bute's accession to office. He had l i t t l e personal feeling i n the matter and was prepared to work with Bute or anyone else who 186. would agree to his policy (164). The King and Bute, on the other hand, were distrustful of both P i t t and Newcastle, and wished to have the latter propose the change so as to be com-mitted to i t . Bute's future policy, despite some pointless dissembling before P i t t , seems to have been common knowledge, for Horace Walpole wrote before the new appointment had been announced that: . . . i t i s believed that his taking the Seals in so particular a juncture was determined by the pro-spect of his being able to make a popular peace, France having made the most pressing offers. Noth-ing else, I think, could justify Lord Bute to him-self for the imprudence of this step, which renders him the responsible minister, and exposes him to a l l the danger attendant on such a situation. As Groom of the Stole he had a l l the credit of favourite without the hazard. (165) Bute realized that Newcastle needed P i t t i n the Govern-ment, but stipulated for the Duke's support against him. New-castle soon found himself between two very galling f i r e s , how-ever. On one side, P i t t complained of his lack of support for the war, and Bute, on the other complained that Newcastle re-fused patronage to Bute's supporters. Newcastle, for his part, complained that he had lost a l l power (which was s t r i c t l y true) and that the Treasury was not consulted on measures, i n parti-cular on appointments for the new Queen's household. He even (164) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p . 7 3 . Fox, on the contrary, declares that P i t t and Bute disagreed from the moment of the latter's appointment. Life and letters of Lady Sarah LennoxT p.42. (165) Walpole, Letters. Vol. V., p.35* 187 toyed with the idea of resigning, but the time for effective resignation had passed. It would have had a poor effect on public credit, the Whig Party and the war effort, and i n ad-dition he had a shrewd suspicion that he would not be missed very much. He therefore accepted Bute's pre-eminence i n dom-estic p o l i t i c s , and refused to take part i n opposition. The major differences between P i t t and the rest of the Cabinet came to a head over the peace. Negotiations had been commenced as early as 1758 by the French and the terms became progressively more favourable to Br i t a i n as each succeeding year brought more B r i t i s h victories. In 1759> Choiseul, the French war minister, had proposed a return to the status quo ante bellum. Although Pi t t was eager for peace, believing that another year of war might jeopardize B r i t i s h conquests, he would not and could not accept such terms. Late i n I76O conversations were begun on the basis of a joint peace, i n -cluding Prussia, and envoys were exchanged to discuss terms (166). The limiting factor for B r i t i s h bargaining power was the extremely weak position of herself and her a l l i e s i n Ger-many, and i t was the chief obstruction to more definite, negotiations that P i t t refused to desert his al l y , Frederick (166) ..Hans Stanley was appointed for England and the Abbe Bussy for France. 188 the Great (167). Pitt and Temple were, i n fact, the only mem-bers of the Cabinet who supported a total war. Most of the older Whigs, led by Newcastle and Earl Granville, were i n favour of restricting the nations effort to the German war. Bute, not yet sure of his position, was i n favour of carrying on only the overseas expeditions, since these were popular with the mercantile interests. The Duke of Bedford, brought back from Ireland to join the Cabinet and give support to the peace, was possessed of the traditional narrow pacifism of the Russells, and wished a l l conquests to be given up and peace made at once on any terms. Thus Bute gave the appear-ance of being the moderating influence i n the Cabinet. Once the negotiations were begun, a further complica-tion was introduced by the continuous series of B r i t i s h (I67) The desire for peace was very great on the part of Frederick in the autumn of 1760, at the time that the pacifist counsels of Bute and George III were making themselves f e l t i n England. By January, 1761, Frederick was even assuring the B r i t i s h ambassador, Mitchell, that he had no objection to England's seeking a separate peace, provided that the terms were reasonable. Of his enemies, Austria was nearly exhausted, France was feeling the strain of having to give financial support to her a l l i e s , and Russia, despite the capture of Berlin, was unwilling to fight Frederick alone. The B r i t i s h declara-tion:.of war on Spain, on January 4th, 17&2, changed the situation, however, since the B r i t i s h contributions available for the war i n Germany had now to be severely curtailed. At the same time Frederick's position im-proved, with the accession of his admirer, Peter III to the Russian throne, and. he became more demanding of his a l l i e s . There i s no doubt, however, that the later neg-otiations under Bute, were carried on without the slightest regard for England's a l l i e s . Rose, J.Holland, "Frederick the Great and England" E.H.R.. Ap r i l , 1914, pp.257-75. 189. successes throughout 1761. Early in the year standstill agree-ments had been reached, whereby the status quo as of May 1st.* for Europe, July 1st. for America and September 1st. for Asia was agreed upon as the basis for f i n a l discussions. In the summer, however, B r i t i s h victories changed the situation mat-e r i a l l y and P i t t insisted that the dates be changed to July 1 s t . , September 1 s t . , and November 1st . respectively. The chief point of disagreement among the Cabinet at this time was the determination of P i t t to eject the French forever from the fisheries of Newfoundland. His insistence on this point brought a s p l i t i n the Cabinet. The majority followed Bed-ford's plan of permitting the French to retain the rights, while Bute proposed that the abrogation of the fishery rights be bargained for, but not be made a sine qua non of peace (168). In the meanwhile, Choiseul was playing for time. Throughout the summer his demands became progressively s t i f f e r , u n t i l the negotiations were broken off early i n September and the envoys recalled. With the approach of autumn the chances of a B r i t i s h descent on the French coast became much less, and i n addition, Choiseul was bargaining with the Anglophobe Charles III of Spain to bring his country into war on the side of France. On August l|?th, I76I, the so-called Family Compact with Spain was signed secretly at Versailles, and the Spanish attitude towards Great Britain became progressively more hostile. (168) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.84. 190 P i t t seems to have learned about the negotiations with Spain, even before the Compact was signed, but he kept them a secret from the Cabinet u n t i l after the rejection of the French terms i n July, 1761. These terms had Included some demands on behalf of Spain ( I 6 9 - ) . P i t t then realized that war with Spain was inevitable and urged the prompt seizure of the Span-ish, treasure fleet,.then at sea, so as,to cripple Spanish a b i l -i t y to make war. The conquest of Panama and the Philippines was also planned for. The Cabinet, however, already attempt-ing to make peace with one enemy, were not prepared to attack another, and closed their ears.to reliable reports of Spanish mobilization. They declared that Brit a i n was not in a position to conduct such a war at such a time and seriously doubted that Spain had hostile intentions. In the face of such unanimity Pi t t could do nothing but wait and hope that action would be taken before i t was too late. Public opinion, weary of war, seemed to support the Cabinet. Decisions were postponed u n t i l the return of the negotiators to their respective capitals. The old Whigs desired the retention of P i t t i n the Cabinet, but Bute had come to the conclusion that he could now do without him, and the King supported this view. On October 2nd. P i t t met the Cabinet for the last time, and after once more being refused his declaration of war, made his resignation speech. (169) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.104. 191. Without having ever asked one single employ-ment i n my l i f e , I was called by my Sovereign and by the Voice of the People to assist the State when others had abdicated the service of i t . That be-ing so no one can be surprised that I w i l l go on no longer since my advice i s not taken. Being re-sponsible I w i l l direct, and w i l l be responsible for nothing that I do not direct. (170) He was answered by Granville who stated that had P i t t not re-signed, the Ministry would have been forced to, and that the rule of the majority had prevailed ( 171) . The f a l l of the great Minister had, i n fact, frightened his timid colleagues, and for a few days they doubted the wisdom of having forced the issue. Horace Walpole also voiced this opinions I foresee nothing but confusion. Nor shall we have a war the less: i f Spain bullied while Mr. P i t t was minister, I don't believe she w i l l trem-ble more at his successors.... It required a l l his daring to retrieve our affairs.... Next to pitying our country and ourselves, I feel for the young King. It is hard to have so bright a dawn so soon overcast! I fear he i s going to taste as bitter a cup as ever his grandfather swallowed! (172) (170) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.112. His brother-in-law, Earl Temple, resigned the Privy Seal at the same time. (171) Ibid., p.113. Cf. report i n the Annual register. 1761, p.46. A strenuous defence was made on the part of the re-maining Ministers. "Was i t ever heard," said they, "that a sovereign has beenncensured for listening to the whole body of his Council i n preference to the particular opinions of a single man? On the contrary, this uncon-trolled sway of a single Minister has been often thought dangerous, and often odious i n our free constitution; and i s the more justly to be disliked, as perhaps incon-sistent with the true s p i r i t , either of absolute monarchy, or of limited government. Let the merit of this Minister be what i t w i l l , shall his Majesty be forced to accept him on any terms?" (172) Walpole, Letters. Vol. V., p.124. 192 One person, however, was not dismayed. Bute was glad to he r i d of his vigorous colleague, but once r i d of him he had to ensure that he would not be dangerous i n opposition. At f i r s t , the King tried to persuade P i t t to accept a peerage, or an appointment to some lucrative sinecure, the governorship of Canada being suggested. These were refused, but on being further pressed, he accepted a peerage for his wife and a pension of £3,000 for himself. Although P i t t regarded these honours as nothing more than was due England's most successful war minister, the world at large, egged on by the army of pamphleteers i n the pay of Bute, jumped to the worst conclusions and assumed that i n accepting the King 1s bounty he was selling himself to the Court. Horace Walpole's comment i s typical: He insisted on a war with Spain, was re-sisted, and last Monday resigned. The City breathed vengeance on his opposers, the Council quaked, and the Lord knows what would have happened; but yesterday, which was only Friday, as this giant was stalking to seize the Tower of London, he stumbled over a silver penny, picked i t up, carried i t home to Lady Hester and they are now as quiet, good sort of people, as my Lord and Lady Bath... (173) The appearance of venality was heightened by Bute's action of announcing Pitt's resignation, his acceptance of the reward and a cheering Item of good news on the Spanish (173) Walpole, Letters. Vol. V., p ,131. 193. c r i s i s , within a few paragraphs of one another i n the Gazette, (174). The announcement of a pension i n the Gazette was un-precedented, but received the King's sanction. The Court, i n fact, very nearly achieved i t s purpose. For a week Pitt's name was a byword for corrupt sycophancy and his wife was re-ferred to as "Lady Cheat'em". P i t t found i t necessary to de-fend his good name i n the City, where hitherto he had received the most enthusiastic support, and from which the power to make 'his war' had largely been derived. On October 15th, he wrote a letter of explanation to his supporter and friend, Alderman William Beckford. Most gracious public marks of his Majesty's approbation of my services followed "my resignation. They were unmerited and unsolicited; and I shall ever be proud to have received them from the best of Sovereigns. I w i l l now, only add, my dear s i r , that I have explained these matters only for the honour of truth, not i n any view to court return of confidence from any man, who, with a credulity as weak as i t i s injurious, has thought f i t hastily to"withdraw his good opinion from one who has served his country with f i d e l i t y and success... (175) (174) If after this the late Minister should choose to enter into opposition, he must go into i t loaded and oppressed with the imputation of the blackest ingrat-itude; i f on the other hand, he should retire from business, or should concur i n support of that admin-istration which he had l e f t , because he disapproved of i t s measures, his acquiescence would be attributed by the multitude to a bargain for his foresaking the public, and that the t i t l e and his pension were the considerations. Annual register. 176l, p.45. (175) Chatham Correspondence. II, 158, cited i n Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.120. 194 I t r e q u i r e d o n l y t h i s p e r s o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n t o r e s t o r e P i t t i n the a f f e c t i o n s o f t h e C i t y , as Bute f o u n d out t o h i s c o s t , when he was mobbed on the n e x t L o r d Mayor's Day; a c e l e -b r a t i o n w h i c h was c o n v e r t e d i n t o a t r i u m p h f o r P i t t . There was no doubt, however, i n t h e minds o f t h e p o l i t i c a l l y - a c t i v e c l a s s e s , t h a t P i t t ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s was t e m p o r a r i l y d e s t r o y e d . H i s e x a g g e r a t e d d e f e r e n c e t o t h e K i n g , the r e s u l t o f a s e m i -m y s t i c a l r e v e r e n c e f o r t h e r o y a l p e r s o n and o f f i c e , c r e a t e d a bad i m p r e s s i o n among t h o s e who had seen him as t h e champion o f t h e p e o p l e . A s u s p i c i o n l i n g e r e d t h a t he had been bought by t h e C o u r t , and i t was not a l l a y e d by s e e i n g h i s c o n t i n u e d a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h L o r d B u t e . B u t e , had i n d e e d a c c o m p l i s h e d a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d . P i t t c o u l d n o t s t r i k e e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t any r e a s o n a b l e peace t h a t t h e C o u r t might p r o p o s e , and t h e f i e l d was c l e a r f o r t h a t r e f o r m a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s w h i c h was so dear t o t h e h e a r t s o f t h e K i n g and h i s F a v o u r i t e . C e r t a i n l y , t h e p o l i t i c a l scene was n o t i n v i t i n g . The c o n v e n t i o n a l p a r t y c a t e g o r i e s were a l r e a d y b e i n g c o n f u s e d by t h e d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e normal exchange o f p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e s . Here are no Whigs and T o r i e s , h a r m l e s s p e o p l e , t h a t a r e c o n t e n t w i t h w o r r y i n g one ano t h e r f o r a hundred and f i f t y y e a r s t o g e t h e r . The new p a r t i e s a r e , I w i l l and You s h a l l n o t ; and t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s do not admit o f d e l a y . (176) (176) W a l p o l e , L e t t e r s . V o l . V., p.139 195. The f i r s t problem, however, was to replace the two re-tired Ministers. On this subject the r i f t s i n the remaining Cabinet became apparent. Bute proposed Henry Fox as Secretary of State i n succession to P i t t , The older Whigs, led by New-castle, remembering from past ministries Fox's domineering tr a i t s and desiring more restful colleagues, proposed George Grenville, who had not followed his family into opposition (177). Bute then proposed Grenville for the Exchequer (178), but Grenville himself refused and remained Treasurer of the Navy. Bute then offered the vacant secretaryship to the Earl of Egremont, who with Grenville, henceforth became Bute's staunchest ally i n the Cabinet. Fox continued at the Pay Office, which he was reluctant to quit without adequate com-pensation. Newcastle held on to office, s t i l l afraid to give i t up. Grenville, fearful of his forceful relative, was also jealous of the growing power of Fox i n the House of Commons. Thus three cowards, Newcastle, Bute and Grenville succeeded (177) The Grenville family included Earl Temple, his brothers, George and James, and his sisters, Lady Chatham and Lady Egremont. Thus, faction p o l i t i c s between 1760 and 1770 had for them something of the appearance of a family quarrel. (178) Lord Barrington was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, but he was a placeman of Newcastle's (holding office i n the successive ministries of Newcastle, Bute, Rockingham, Chatham, Grafton and North) and was perfectly willing to give up any office i f compensated sufficiently. He had succeeded the able and influential Henry Legge, who had been dismissed at the behest of Bute i n January, 1761, the f i r s t of the Whig martyrs. Lecky, A history of England i n the eighteenth century. Vol. I l l , p.184. to the heritage of P i t t . The character of Bute was an important determinant i n the fate of the reconstructed Ministry. Always upon s t i l t s , he had an extraordinary appearance of wisdom, both i n his look and manner of speaking; for whether the subjects were ser-ious or t r i f l i n g , he was equally pompous, slow and sententious. (179) He was an upright man of marked f i d e l i t y , ambitious for his master's welfare and not for his own aggrandizement. He was hated as a Scotsman, and such nationalistic loathing was i n -creased by his other qualities and by his actions i n support of the Court faction. While craving power, he disclaimed a l l thought of i t , and he seems to have had a curious ambition for martyrdom, as was shown i n the last moving scene of this f a i t h f u l retainer's resignation. His p o l i t i c a l actions were disturbing, but ineffectual, although they were sufficient to upset and confuse the anxious Duke of Newcastle. War and peace were s t i l l the'chief points of controversy between them. For years Newcastle had preached peace i n the Cabinet and had been effectively suppressed by P i t t . George III and Bute were equally eager for peace, but they realized the need for gradual restriction of the war before peace nego-tiations could be effective. Here they differed with the old Duke, for while he ( s t i l l l i v i n g i n the age of Marlborough) (179) Ruville, A. von, William P i t t . Vol. II, p.-31?. 197. would r e s t r i c t operations to the German theatre, George I I I hated the German War and a l l things German, because h i s grand-father had preferred them. Bute, having no personal prefer-ences, and s l i g h t l y more wisdom than either the King or New-ca s t l e , r e a l i z e d that both the country gentry and the C i t y merchants opposed the German war, and that the younger gener-ation as a whole preferred the Empire to Europe. Bute managed to have the annual subsidy to Frederick the Great voted down i n February 1762, but the war overseas seemed to continue with-out appreciable diminution. This was the chief obstruction i n the way of peace. The war machine created by P i t t , despite the l i m i t a t i o n s placed on i t by the Cabinet, seemed to be incapable of functioning badly. On January 4th, 1762, the war with Spain that P i t t had foreseen, was declared, but t h i s seemed only to serve as a further outlet f o r B r i t i s h prowess. Despite the fact that the treasure f l e e t had reached Spain, B r i t a i n ' s forces were successful i n conquering both the Phi l i p p i n e s and Cuba. In the West Indies, Martinique was conquered i n February. Even i n Europe B r i t i s h fortunes seemed to be i n the ascendant, and French forces were driven back out of Hanover and Hesse. To heap Ossa on Pelion, a l l these v i c t o r i e s were attr i b u t e d to the sound judgement of P i t t . Newcastle wrote of Bute's seeming reluctance to end the war: Tho' i t may.be r i g h t , to have, at present, an appearance of carrying on the war with vigour, yet - i f we think to outwar Mr. P i t t , we s h a l l f i n d ourselves greatly disappointed. But i f our 198. real view i s peace, a l l our measures should tend to that object, which certainly was not Mr. Pi t t ' s . Thus, and by that only, shall we get the better of Mr. P i t t , and serve and please the publick. (180) The reference to the threat of Pi t t was well-taken. Al-though pledged to loyalty to the king, P i t t returned to the attack i n January, 1762, i n defence of the subsidy to Prussia. The Duke of Bedford, on February 5th, submitted a motion to have a l l the troops brought back from Germany, and a further one to the effect that the conflict with Spain made the whole war indefensible. Of this speech, Walpole declared that: "He might as well have termed i t an exhortation to Spain not to dread our arms" (181). Shelburne, s t i l l a disciple of Bute, defended Bedford's motion, although Bute himself was embarrassed by i t and engineered i t s defeat since he realized that the mom-ent was not opportune to propose disarmament. He had, however, determined to give up the German war entirely, despite the pro-tests of the Whig lords. Newcastle would have carried on total war rather than give up Germany, but he lacked the services of P i t t for the operation. By this time he was hardly consulted on the war, and he had already lost the key of the royal patronage closet (182). (180) Add. MSS. 32929: f l 9 0 , Cited by Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.356. (181) Waloole, Memoirs of the reign of George I I I T Vol. I, p.107. (182) The Duke complained that the only method he had of do-ing business with the King was by message to Lord Bute through the Duke of Devonshire, an. embarrassing situation for a prime minister. Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.137, note 199. The death of the Tsarina Elizabeth freed Frederick of two en-emies, Russia and Sweden, and made B r i t i s h withdrawal even more feasible, Newcastle realized that he must now resign, but wished to remain i n semi-opposition. His friends, however, principally the Earl of Hardwicke and the Duke of Devonshire, refused the part as impractical. Although he continually pleaded with Bute for some expression of desire for him to re-main, i f not from the King, at least from Bute, the latter re-fused to give i t . Once Pi t t was gone, the u t i l i t y of Newcastle to Bute was at an end. The old Duke f i n a l l y screwed up his courage sufficiently to submit his resignation on May 23rd, and after three agonizing days i n which he hoped to be persuaded to withdraw i t , i t became f i n a l . An era of p o l i t i c s was ended i n a p o l i t i c a l squabble, in which comedy was mixed with pathos. Newcastle wrote pathetically of his reception by the Kings The King did not drop one word of concern on my leaving him, nor even made me a polite compliment - after near f i f t y years service and devotion to the interest of his Royal Family. I w i l l say nothing more of myself; but that I believe never any man was so dismiss*d; but a l l this puts me now i n the right. (183) (183) To Rockingham, Add. MSS. 32938, f f 262-4, cited by Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.376 Cf. also Walpole•s comment: . The Duke of Newcastle resigned this morning1 Finding, at last,-to his great surprise that he had not as much power under this King as under his great-grandfather and grandfather, he i s retired,-meditating, I suppose, a plan for being Prime Minister again under this King's son.... People think that a l i t t l e more than the want of power had been necessary to make him take this re-solution, and that a l l kind of disgusts have been given to convince him of how unwelcome his company was.... Letters. Vol. V., p.208. 200. Bute now succeeded t o the Treasury, and h i s place as Secretary was taken by George G r e n v i l l e , almost the only man of any r e a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y s t i l l i n the Government. Lord B a r r i n g t o n l e f t o f f i c e w i t h Newcastle and h i s place as Chancellor of the Exchequer was taken by S i r F r a n c i s Dashwood, a notorious rake, whose sole experience of f i n a n c e , i t was s a i d , was i n the computation of t a v e r n b i l l s . H i s f i r s t bud-get was greeted w i t h r o a r s of laughter from the House of Com-mons. The M i n i s t r y , i n f a c t was almost devoid of a b i l i t y . When a Lord of the Treasury i s not master of h i s province, i t s u f f i c e s i f the Chancellor of the Exchequer i s a man of business, and capable of conduc-t i n g the revenue.... But i n the new d i s p e n s a t i o n i t was d i f f i c u l t t o determine which was the worst s u i t e d t o h i s o f f i c e , the m i n i s t e r or h i s s u b s t i -t u t e . While the former shrouded h i s ignorance from vu l g a r eyes, and dropped but now and then from a cloud an or a c u l a r sentence; the deputy, w i t h the fam-i l i a r i t y and phrase of f i s h - w i f e , introduced the humours of Wapping behind the v e i l of the Treasury. (184) The M i n i s t r y was f u r t h e r weakened by a Cabinet c r i s i s e a r l y i n August. The Duke of Bedford had been appointed t o go to France to s i g n the d e f i n i t i v e t r e a t y of peace, the terms of which, w h i l e they were l e s s than those demanded by P i t t at the height of h i s power, were yet s u f f i c i e n t l y v i c t o r i o u s t o be accepted by the people. Bedford's appointment, since he was a notorious p a c i f i s t , aroused a storm of i n d i g n a t i o n . The a t t e n t i o n of the p u b l i c was, however, soon d i s t r a c t e d by the (184) Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . I , p.135. 201. news of the capture of Havana on August 12th. Bute was quite prepared to accept the original terms of the treaty without demanding compensation for the new conquest but a revolt i n the Cabinet forced a change in policy. George Grenville and Lord Egremont refused to consent to the surrender of Havana and the former was demoted from the Secretaryship to the Ad-miralty. The Earl of Halifax succeeded to the vacant Secretary-ship and Henry Fox was at last brought into the Cabinet as Leader of the Commons, with orders to make sure that the treaty of peace was successfully passed. It was none too soon. The Ministry was i n a greatly weakened condition and P i t t was recovering some of his pres-tige (185). In addition he showed some signs of forgiving Newcastle for his apostacy. It was Fox's f i r s t duty i n his new role to approach Newcastle through the Duke of Cumberland, i n order to endeavour to obtain his support for the peace. Newcastle, however, deeply resented his treatment at the hands of the King and Bute and refused to be converted (186). On November 3rd, 1762, the Preliminary Articles of Peace were signed at Paris. After such a war It would have been hard to make a peace which did not leave England i n a better posi-tion than before the war. It was not, however, commensurate (185) Lord Bute's situation i s unpleasant: misfortunes would remind us of Mr. Pitt's glory; advantages w i l l s t i f f e n us against accepting even such a peace as he rejected... Walpole, Letters. Vol. V., p.218. (186) Albemarle, Earl of, Memoirs of the Marauess of Rocking-ham. Vol. I., pp.118, 129, 131. 202. with the unprecedented victories won by B r i t i s h arms. Canada, Senegal, St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica and the Grenadines were added to the B r i t i s h Empire. Minorca was regained i n return for Belleisle and the "fortifications of Dunkirk were to be abolished. Yet, by his precipitancy, Bute was forced to give up St. Lucia, Goree and Guadeloupe at once and Martinique as soon as i t was conquered. In addition the French fishing rights off Newfoundland were guaranteed and St. Pierre and Miquelon were given to them as depots for their fleets. In India France recovered a l l those posts she had held i n 1749. Such a peace required a l l Foxis consummate powers of management to push i t through the Commons. Fox believed that the peace could gain a majority i n the House i f the proper measures were taken and, since Bute was absolutely incapable of p o l i t i c a l management, the former was given a free hand. It had required a great deal of persuasion to gain the King's acceptance of Fox, for he had always been taught to abhor him, and he clung tenaciously to such advice. His letter to Bute, i n October, 1763 reveals this state of mind. I have one principle firmly rooted i n my mind from the many seasonable lessons I have received from my dear friend, never to trust a man void of principle, i f any man ever deserved that character 'ti s Mr. Fox; the seeing him at the head of the House of Commons was very unpleasant to me: but I consented to i t , as that was the only means of getting my dear friend to proceed this winter i n the Treasury. (I87) (I87) Bute MSS. cited by Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution, p.408. A last and unsuccessful attempt was made to gain New-castle and then the work of proscription and organization be-gan. Fox was eminently suited to carry the work out success-f u l l y , and the result was the greatest mass conversion of a legislature since Pride's Purge. No cupidity was l e f t untempted, no fear or foible unplayed upon, no stone unturned beneath which one of the creeping things of pol i t i c s might change to be lying. Every office-holder in Parliament was given to understand that his place depended on his vote; and every office-seeker got a promise that, when the battle was won, he should have his share i n the spoils, and should step into some post of dignity and emolu-ment from which an honester man than himself had been expelled. Money flowed like water; and any honourable gentleman who was too proud to pocket a bank-note had almost unlimited choice as to the form of bargain under which he preferred to s e l l himself. (188) Because of the refusal of the Whig lords to co-operate Fox determined that they must be punished and their p o l i t i c a l influence diminished. Their influence, when united, however, was very great, even greater than that of P i t t . The power of that gentleman was vast and natural, but i t was in a great deal personal and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted i n the country. For, with a great deal less popularity, they possessed a far more natural and fixed i n -fluence. Long possession of government; most pro-perty, obligations of favours given and received (things at that time supposed of some force). (189) (188) Trevelyan, G.O., The early history of Charles James Fox, p.27. (189) Burke, Works. Vol. II, p.318. 204. The f i r s t to f a l l was the Duke of Devonshire, who was dismissed from his office of Lord Chamberlain. In the follow-ing weeks the whole Whig system of preferment and place, labor-iously built up during the forty-five years of Whig power, was thoroughly demolished. The Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire and the Marquess of Rockingham were deprived of their county lord-lieutenancies, but the persecution of minor office hold-ers was a new, and to most, an undesirable feature of the change. Every one who belonged to the beaten party was sacri-ficed without mercy. A l l public officers who were unlucky enough to have no p o l i t i c a l connections fared as badly as the population of d i s t r i c t s which returned opposition Members. Clerks, messengers, excisemen, coast-guardsmen and pensioners were turned out in droves because they had no vote or because they had supported a Member who voted against the Government. An inquisition was held into the antecedents of everyone who subsisted on public money. Walpole even records the case of a housekeeper of one of the government offices who, although she was a relative of Lady Bute, was dismissed because she bore the hated Whig name of Cavendish (190). On December 9th, the vote i n favour of the peace showed how well Fox had done his work. Three hundred and eighty-four voted i n favour of the peace i n the Commons while only sixty-five, led by P i t t , were possessed of, or could exercise, (190) Walpole, Memoirs of the reign of George III. Vol. I, p.188, note. 205. sufficient independence to vote against i t . (191). The extent of Fox's success may be judged by the fact that from the time of the resignation of the Duke of Newcastle i n 1762 to the f a l l of Lord North i n 1782, no measure of major importance desired by the Court Party, ever wanted for a majority i n i t s passage through the House of Commons. Ministers came and went, but they did so at the sole behest of the Monarch and the legis-lature was reduced In power to the level of a debating society. •Fox claimed his reward, but even in this Bute demon-strated his inate pettiness. Fox had bargained on being granted an earldom but the King and his Favourite f e l t that so disreputable a servant must be content with the lesser dig-nity of a barony. Fox c r a f t i l y retained the Pay Office as part of his conditions of employment, but he f e l t that he had been mistreated. The fury of the mob at the news of the peace and the methods used to have i t approved was vented on Lord Bute. His unpopularity was widespread and amazed even himself, who had courted i t . Two of his letters to Sir James Lowther, his son-in-law, il l u s t r a t e this bewilderment. The Peace i s at last sign'd, and such a one as this nation never saw before; but war seems to be declared at home with the utmost virulence; I am the mark for the party watch word, but the whole is a reality aim'd at the King himself, whose l i b -erty i s to be now decided on, liberty that his poor-est subject enjoys, of choosing his own menial (191) Williams, The l i f e of William P i t t . Vol. II, p.148. 206 servants; the happy conclusion of the Peace has however drawn the teeth of faction, but they have made themselves desperate, and must persist i n presumptuous f o l l y . (192) and again: ...tearing from me any merit I can acquire; which to say the truth (as things are situated) i s small enough; i n short, i n the midst of triumph, any good act I am able to do, is so traduc'd, so many infamous falsehoods published concerning things I never thought of, such inveteracy i n the enemy, such lukewarmness (to give i t no harsher name) such impracticability, such insatiable dis-positions i n those soi-disant friends; that i f I had but 50 1. per annum, I would retire on bread and water, and think i t luxury, compar'd with what I suffer. (193) The stage was set and Bute was prepared for the martyr-dom he had dreamed of. It was not to be the result of the peace, however. Although the nation as a whole disapproved of i t , i t affected too few directly to become a burning p o l i t i c a l issue. It f e l l to his Chancellor of the Exchequer, the worthy Dashwood, to provide him with the excuse for p o l i t i c a l immola-tion. On March 4th, 1763 a new excise tax on a l l cider brewed for home consumption was levied; excise officers were given permission "to enter and search private houses for contraband cider and a l l offences were to be tried by commissioners of excise instead of by a jury. This was the normal procedure i n the administration of excise i n the Empire, but Englishmen (192) Hist. MSS. Comm.. Rept.13, App., pt.7, "Earl of Lons dale" p.131. (193) Ibid., p.132. 207. resented i t s application at home. Nor did they acknowledge the necessity for the tax. Glorious wars usually have a price, but the countrymen of William P i t t were inclined to disregard the cost while the war was on, and resent i t when the b i l l had to be paid. The excise tax was a useful source of revenues, and although i t was being used to relieve the already overburdened payers of the land tax, i t was not unduly heavy. It was the supposed threat to liberty implied i n the right of search by officers, and the fact that William P i t t was the chief representative of the cider counties i n Par-liament, that led to the great agitation against the excise. The most important result of this agitation, apart from the abolition of the excise, was that George Grenville, later i n the year, sought i n the colonies for the needed revenue which he did not dare to secure from the Mother country. In the cider counties they dressed up a f i g -ure i n Scotch plaid, with a blue riband, to re-present the Favourite, and this figure seemed to lead by the nose an ass crowned royally. At the same time they voted instructions to their Members to try to obtain a repeal of the Act. The circum-stances of the Act being passed under so unpopular an Administration was most unfortunate. It had taken thirty years to open the eyes of mankind to the benefits of excise; the only, at least the best, method of improving the revenue without im-posing new burdens. Being started at so ungracious a moment, the old prejudices were industriously revived. (194) (194) Walpole, Memoirs of the reign of George III. Vol. I, p.222. 208 The last point was certainly a significant one, for the dis-turbances that followed were merely an example to the American colonists to resist excise taxes with even greater effect. It was from the mob of London, however, that Bute had the most to fear, since i t was once more being urged on by the matchless eloquence of P i t t , returned to the favour of the public. Although l i t t l e could be done, beyond registering a protest, i n the House of Commons, and while the House of Lords was restricted i n i t s debating scope by the fact that the measure was a money b i l l , much could be done to organize protest i n the nation. Petitions poured i n from the counties, to be rejected by Grenville on the ground that petitions against money b i l l s were not constitutional. The mobs i n London pelted Bute wherever he went, and he believed his l i f e to be i n dan-' ger. The measure easily passeddthrough Parliament, but the Favourite had had enough. On April 8th, 1763» o v e r the pro-test of the King, he resigned his Seals of office, and was succeeded, after a short interval of negotiation with the opposition, by his ablest lieutenant, George Grenville. The intriguer who had seemed so powerful, had fallen, not through the efforts of the Opposition, but through his own poltroonery. It i s not surprising that Walpole assumes a note of contempt for the Opposition when he writes: . It i s plain that i f Mr. P i t t had headed the opposition sooner, or that the opposition had had any brains without him,.this event would have happened earlier. A single fortnight of clamour 209 . and debate on the cider tax... adopted into petitions from the City, frightened this mighty favourite out of a l l his power and plans. (195) In the years to come, successive ministries were to suspect the influence of the Earl of Bute behind each exercise of the prerogative by the King. After his f a l l , however, and certainly after 1765, Bute's influence waned and gradually disappeared. His pupil had learned his lessons well and no longer needed the teacher. (195) Walpole, Letters. Vol. V., p.305. ' S 1 0 . Chapter IV. The Royal Prerogative The p o l i t i c a l parties of the country had been torn into those pieces out of which, in the next seven years, were to be fashioned the foundation of the two great p o l i t i c a l parties of the nineteenth century, and the p o l i t i c a l organization which was to revive the royal power to a level with that of the later Stuarts. These changes, however, owed the major share in their development, not to Bute, but to his pupil, the King. George I l l ' s character, his actions and his choice of instru-ments for his policies were certainly major determinants i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the two following decades, and he was able, partly as a result of outside circumstances, to increase the royal powers i n regard to policy-making to such a degree that they were not seriously reduced, even i n an age of dynamic change, for nearly seventy years. Inheritor of the habitual quarrels between the generations of the House of Brunswick-Luneburg, George III had the misfortune not to develop his own prejudices, but to inherit those of his father. George I had quarrelled with the Electress Sophia, George II with George I, and Frederick, Prince of Wales with George II. Each of the heirs in turn had built up a shadow court around him against the day of his accession, when the policies would be completely changed. The foolish pretensions of Frederick, however, were p r e m a t u r e l y c u t s h o r t w i t h h i s d e a t h i n 1751, and h i s " C o u r t " a t L e i c e s t e r House, made up l a r g e l y o f d i s a f f e c t e d placemen of t h e Whig regime, had t o l o o k elsewhere f o r a champion. They found him i n t h e most u n p r o m i s i n g p e r s o n o f George, now P r i n c e o f Wales. As f a r as can be d e t e r m i n e d , i t i s r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t George, up t o t h e moment t h a t h i s f a t h e r d i e d , had been g e n e r a l l y n e g l e c t e d by h i s p a r e n t s and t h e i r a s s o c i a t e s . H i s mother, a p r i n c e s s o f Saxe-Gotha, had the r a t h e r narrow, m y s t i c a l , and a r b i t r a r y v i e w s o f r o y a l t y and i t s p r e r o g a t i v e s , l o n g c u r r e n t i n p e t t y German c o u r t s . Her o u t l o o k was com-p l e t e l y a l i e n t o the E n g l i s h c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e power o f monarchy as a p i o u s f r a u d , and her i n f l u e n c e on h e r son's l a t e r a c t i v i t i e s was always s u s p e c t . . Even as l a t e as 1770, W a l pole r e c o r d s t h a t : L o r d Chatham some days ago d e c l a r e d t o t h e L o r d s t h a t t h e r e i s a s e c r e t i n f l u e n c e (meaning t h e P r i n c e s s ) more mi g h t y t h a n M a j e s t y i t s e l f , and w h i c h had b e t r a y e d o r c l o g g e d e v e r y s u c c e e d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ... I n consequence o f t h i s denun-c i a t i o n , p a p e r s , t o w h i c h t h e N o r t h B r i t o n were m i l k and honey, have been p u b l i s h e d i n terms t o o g r o s s to r e p e a t . The W h i s p e r e r and t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y Spy a r e t h e i r t i t l e s . E v e r y b l a n k w a l l a t t h i s end o f t h e town i s s c r i b b l e d w i t h the words, 'Impeach t h e K i n g ' s Mother' and, i n t r u t h , I t h i n k - h e r p e r s o n i n danger ( 1 9 6 ) . I t i s a l w a y s d i f f i c u l t t o d etermine t h e e x a c t e x t e n t o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f one p e r s o n on a n o t h e r and t h e v e r y com-p l e x p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between mother and son a r e n o t (196) W a l p o l e , L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p.369 2 1 2 . the legitimate f i e l d of study for the historian. Certainly the influence of the Princess was considerable during the King's childhood, but this power was shared to a great degree by her Favourite and his, Lord Bute. She was responsible for the Earl's introduction into the royal household, and for two decades thereafter, the mobs of England, with a sounder instinct perhaps than the politicians, continually associated the Favourite and the Princess with the less desirable features of the royal influence. The influence of the Princess, however, has been over-emphasized. It was not the only factor directing the King's conduct, nor even the paramount one. The old fable of the Princess's admonition to her son: "George, be a king!" has been too often the sole basis of explanation for the profound p o l i t i c a l changes in the f i r s t two decades of the reign of George III. Undoubtedly the young prince was continually reminded by his preceptors of the high station to which fate had predestined him - but what heir to a throne i s not? It i s part of the education of princes and could equally be argued as a causative factor in the conduct of George VI as i n that of George III. A much more compelling reason for his conduct, at least i n i t s i n i t i a l stages, was the atmosphere of dynastic opposition in which he was brought up, both his mother and Lord Bute confirming him in his hatred of the old King, his grandfather. This might have had no more serious effect on the government of England than the previous dynastic r i v a l r i e s had had, i f i t had not been, that the new heir hever achieved mental maturity. He was encouraged to hate before he could think, and a cleavage developed in his feelings which made him see himself surrounded by devils and angels. A l l the devils were at St. James's and a l l the angels at Leicester House; and the boy, a neurotic from early adolescence, concentrated a l l the bitterness and hatred of which he was capable on his predecessor, while his unbalanced affections went out without reserve to Lord Bute, who became to him the incarnation of the paternal s p i r i t . A letter to Bute, dated June 31st (sic), 1756, reveals this quality of hysterical affection, as well as a lack of maturity and a defective education. It i s very true that Ministers have done every-thing that they can to* provoke me, that they have call'd me a harmless boy, and have not even deign'd to give me an answer when I so earnestly wish to see.my friend about me. They have also threatened my Mother i n a cruel manner (which I w i l l neither forget nor forgive to the day of my death) beSause she i s so good as to come forward and preserve her son, from the many snares that surround him. My Friend i s also attacked i n the most cruel and horrid manner, not for anything he has done against them, but because he i s my Friend, and wants to see me come to throne with honour and not with disgrace, and because he i s , a friend to the bless'd liber t i e s of his country and not to arbitrary notions. I look upon myself as engag'd in honour and justice to defend these my two Friends.as long as I draw breath. I do therefore here i n the presence of Our Almighty Lord promiss (sic) that I w i l l ever remember the insults done to my Mother, and never w i l l forgive any-one who shall offer to speak disrespectfully of her. I do i n the same solemn manner declare that I w i l l defend my Friend and w i l l never use evasive answers, but w i l l always t e l l him what i s said against him, and w i l l more and more show the world the great friendship I have for him, and a l l the malice that can be invented 214. against him shall only bind me the stronger to him ... I w i l l take upon me the man in everything, and w i l l not show that indifference which I have as yet too often done. As I have chosen the vigorous part, I w i l l throw off that indolence which i f I don't soon get the better of w i l l be my ruin ... (197). His letters are f u l l of this consciousness of his own shortcomings. A basically sensitive person, he was brought under abnormal conditions and subjected to an incessant barrage of moralistic advice from people with far stronger wills than his. His obstinacy was probably encouraged by continued reminders, of his high destiny. He was basically childist and backward mentally, but he had been robbed of childhood. He was taught to reject and abhor the normal pleasures of youth, so that his l i f e became a long purgation of the sins which he f e l t himself capable of committing at any moment. Conflicts built up within him rendered him help-less, and he would sink, on occasion, into complete mental indolence. He was eveh deficient i n many of the ordinary accom-plishments of a ruler. His indolence and his defective education resulted in a complete lack of any cultural accom-plishments. His knowledge of the world was almost non-existent. Although an Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, he would not v i s i t his German domains. He was ten years on the throne before he even visited the coast of his maritime kingdom (198). Though realizing his limitations, he sought (197) Add. MSS. 32958, f f . 220-221, cited by Namier, England i n the age of the American revolution, pp. 96-97 (198) On the 21st of Ap r i l (1770), the young Prince of t o achieve great t h i n g s , and w i t h f a i l u r e , sought compensation i n d i s s i m u l a t i o n . H i s consciousness of g u i l t caused him t o be f i r m l y con-vinced o f the p e r f i d y of other men, w i t h the exception of Bute. Almost everyone t o him was immoral, corrupt and un-f a i t h f u l . - The great l e a d e r s of the age were e s p e c i a l l y suspect, not only because of t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to h i s incapable f a v o u r i t e , but because he was always jealous of t h e i r t r a n s -cendant g i f t s ; g i f t s which h i s own warped ambitions yearned to possess. Thus P i t t , Fox, Legge, Hardwicke, and Devonshire were a l l p r o s c r i b e d i n the unbalanced mind of the boy l o n g before he came to the throne, not because of what they had done, but because of what they were. The l a c k of development i n h i s own mind and the warnings of h i s pompous teacher com-bined to render him a dangerously unbalanced person, e s p e c i a l l y dangerous as the King of Great B r i t a i n , l ong before the f i n a l darkness of i n s a n i t y c losed over him. George was not, however, e n t i r e l y d e f i c i e n t i n the q u a l i t i e s necessary i n a k i n g . He had abundant courage, as h i s constant changing of M i n i s t e r s f o r h i s own purposes (though o f t e n at the r i s k o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s ) showed. When h i s i n t e r e s t s were threatened he could act w i t h a speed, (198) cont'd. Wales, and h i s brother, the Bishop of Osnabruck, were allowed under the conduct of t h e i r new governor, Lord Holder-nesse, to go to Gravesend, and see the men-of-war and East Indiamen l y i n g t h e re. There was nothing remarkable i n t h i s ; but i t was so that the Ki n g h i m s e l f , the sovereign of an i s l a n d and o f a maritime power, had never seen the sea, nor ever been t h i r t y m i l e s fjDom London at the age of t h i r t y - f o u r ; so great was h i s indolence, and the r e s t r a i n t i n which h i s mother had kept him!" Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I , Vol.IV, p.317. £16. courage and cunning t h a t amazed h i s opponents, as, f o r example, int the c r i s i s t h a t p r e c i p i t a t e d the appointment of Lord North i n 1770. H i s f a i t h i n the e s s e n t i a l righteousness of h i s cause enabled him to undertake unsavoury measures and employ e q u a l l y unsavoury servants which even Newcastle, i n the f u l l f l o w e r i n g of Whig c o r r u p t i o n , would have h e s i t a t e d to do. He had the great advantage over h i s enemies th a t he knew e x a c t l y what he wanted, w h i l e they were u s u a l l y d i v i d e d as to the degree of power which should be accorded t o him. He never scrupled to exert h i s a u t h o r i t y and the nation's money to f o s t e r d i s s e n s i o n among them, to break up a l l i a n c e s and t o destroy ancient f r i e n d s h i p s to gain h i s ends. He could even charm h i s opponents i f there was no other way of de f e a t i n g them. Lord Rockingham declared that the King was never so pleasant to him as when he was contemplating h i s d i s m i s s a l (199). Horace Walpole says of George: As f a r as could be disc e r n e d of the King's n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n i t was humane and benevolent. I f f l o w i n g courtesy to a l l men was the h a b i t of h i s d i s -s i m u l a t i o n , at l e a s t i t was so s u i t e d to h i s temper th a t no gust or passi o n , no words of b i t t e r n e s s , were ever known t o break from him. He accepted s e r v i c e s w i t h grace and appearance o f f e e l i n g ; and i f he f o r g o t them w i t h u n r e s t r a i n e d f e l i c i t y , yet he neve* marked h i s d i s -pleasure w i t h harshness. S i l e n c e served him to bear w i t h unwelcome m i n i s t e r s , or t o part w i t h them. H i s c h i l d h o o d was t i n c t u r e d w i t h obstinacy; i t was adopted a t the beginning of h i s r e i g n and c a l l e d firmness, but d i d mot prove to be h i s complexion. I n t r u t h , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o draw h i s character i n p o s i t i v e c o l o u r s . He (199) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquess of Rockingham, V o l . I , p. 217. had n e i t h e r passions nor a c t i v i t y (200). From the outset he seems to have had a c e r t a i n p o p u l a r i t y , both by reason of h i s B r i t i s h b i r t h ahd from the fact that he was young and had a l l the p r i v a t e v i r t u e s ; a welcome change f o r a people who had come to a s s o c i a t e the monarchy w i t h superannuated Germans of u n c e r t a i n h e a l t h and even more un-c e r t a i n morals. Fox d e c l a r e s t h a t George was never popular l201), but t h i s may be taken as an exaggeration i n s p i r e d by l a t er g r i evane es. The K i n g was not, as he has so o f t e n been p i c t u r e d , an autocrat by nature. He had nothing of the German outlook and sympathies of h i s grandfather or great-grandfather, and h i s ideas were s o l i d l y grounded i n the s o i l of England. I n the Tudor Age he would probably have been p i c t u r e d as the com-p l e t e P a t r i o t King. Even i n h i s l a t e r years, when h i s mis-takes and s t u p i d i t i e s had passed i n t o h i s t o r y , and B r i t a i n was faced w i t h the c r i s i s of the French R e v o l u t i o n , the people r a l l i e d around him as the symbol of a l l t h a t was E n g l i s h , both good and bad. Nor was he c o n s c i o u s l y prone to v i o l a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n . He was f i l l e d w i t h p l a t i t u d e s about the s a n c t i t y of the R e v o l u t i o n Settlement and l i b e r t y , and was (200) Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . 1 , p.17. Cf. Junius: I t i s the misfortune of your l i f e , and o r i g i n a l l y the cause of every reproach and d i s t r e s s , which has attended your government, t h a t you should never have been acquainted w i t h the language of t r u t h , u n t i l you heard i t i n the com-p l a i n t s of your people. Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius. V o l . I I , p.64. (201) L i f e and l e t t e r s of Lady Sarah Lennox, p.76 218. honestly convinced t h a t he was p r e s e r v i n g i t from the encroachments of t h e corrupt Whig o l i g a r c h s . Nor, i t must be ad_nitted, d i d he wander f a r from the bounds set on h i s power by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The l e g a l f i c t i o n of the king' s power had not been f o r m a l l y l i m i t e d , and even the i d e a of cabinet government had been the work of one f a c t i o n . By 1760, n e i t h e r time nor the i n t e r n a l harmony w i t h i n the n a t i o n had been s u f f i c i e n t to giv e i t u n i v e r s a l acceptance. The K i n g never attempted t o reverse the d e c i s i o n of 1688, but merely to change the developments subsequent t o t h a t date, i n short t o a b o l i s h cabinet government. I n a d d i t i o n , the work of two great p u b l i c i s t s had r e v i v e d the ide a of the f u n c t i o n of monarchy as the p r o t e c t o r of the r i g h t s of the people, a proper repre-s e n t a t i o n of t h e o l d Tudor concept of the "King i n Parliament." I n p o l i t i c a l philosophy, Lord Bolingbroke had sketched a p a t t e r n of the " P a t r i o t K i n g , " and i n law Lord M a n s f i e l d had demonstrated that many of the o l d Whig aphorisms on the " r i g h t s of the people" were based not i n law, or even i n custom, as had been h i t h e r t o supposed, but i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s on the amount of f o r c e that the Whig o l i g a r c h s could command. Cabinet government, c e r t a i n l y , was not yet a s a n c t i f i e d i n s t i t u t i o n . For a-century Bolingbroke's philosophy was r e j e c t e d as the yearnings of an a r b i t r a r i l y - m i n d e d o l d man f o r an era long past. I n the nineteenth century, a romantic i n t e r e s t i n the J a c o b i t e cause and Mr. D i s r a e l i ' s search f o r a foundation on which to d e i f y the monarchy of h i s generation, r e s u s c i t a t e d Bolingbroke, even t o the p o i n t of h i s being considered one of the great p o l i t i c a l philosophers of a l l time. He was n e i t h e r of these. Nor d i d h i s P a t r i o t King form the working manual f o r George I I I . I n connection w i t h the p o l i c i e s of George I I I , Bolingbroke i s s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i n that he helped to found a school o f thought which was prepared t o acquiesce i n the increased p r e r o g a t i v e , powers, and because the character and a c t i o n s of George I I I f o l l o w e d w i t h amazing exactness, the patterns which Bolingbroke drew. Compare, f o r i n s t a n c e , George I l l ' s b e l i e f s i n regard to the l i m i t a t i o n s on the monarchy, w i t h those declared by Bolingbroke, i n these passages: My aim i s ^ t p f i x t h i s p r i n c i p l e ; t h a t l i m i t a t i o n s on a crown ought t o be c a r r i e d as f a r as i t i s necessary to secure the l i b e r t i e s of a people; and t h a t a l l such l i m i t a t i o n s may s u b s i s t , without weakening or endanger-i n g the monarchy (£02). Or on the abandonment of M i n i s t e r s : Some of them perhaps w i l l be abandoned by him; not to p a r t y f u r y , but t o n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e ; not t o sate p r i v a t e resentments and to serve p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , but to make s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r wrongs done t o t h e i r country, and t o stand as examples of t e r r o r to f u t u r e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s (203). Such a d o c t r i n e was bound t o thr e a t e n parliamentary c o n t r o l of p o l i c y through the cabinet system. (£0£) Bolingbroke, Works. V o l . I l l , p.54. (203) I b i d . , p.78. 220. Or again, on the uses of d i s s i m u l a t i o n : D i s s i m u l a t i o n i s a s h i e l d , as secrecy i s armour; and i t i s no more p o s s i b l e to preserve secrecy i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s without some degree of d i s s i m u l a t i o n , than i t i s to succeed i n i t without secrecy (204). The comparison becomes almost uncanny when both B o l i n g -broke and.the King d i s c u s s the accession to the throne and the treatment of e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . George I I I , i n a l e t t e r to Bute f o l l o w i n g the Peace of P a r i s , o u t l i n e s h i s p o l i c y i n respect t o p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s . Now I come to the part of my dear f r i e n d ' s l e t t e r that gives me the greatest concern, as i t over-turns a l l the thoughts t h a t have kept up my s p i r i t s i n these bad times; I own I had f l a t t e r e d myself when Peace was once e s t a b l i s h e d that my dear f r i e n d would have a s s i s t e d me i n purging out c o r r u p t i o n , and i n those measures t h a t no man but he t h a t has the Pr i n c e ' s r e a l a f f e c t i o n can go through; then when we were both dead our memories would have been respected and esteemed to the end of time, now what s h a l l we be able t o say t h a t Peace i s concluded, and my dear f r i e n d becoming a C o u r t i e r , f o r I f e a r man-k i n d w i l l say so, the M i n i s t r y remains composed of the most abandoned men t h a t ever held those o f f i c e s ; thus i n s t e a d of reformation, the M i n i s t e r s being v i c i o u s t h i s country w i l l grow, i f p o s s i b l e worse; l e t me at t a c k the i r r e l i g i o u s , the covetous, & etc. as much as I please, that w i l l be of no e f f e c t f o r the M i n i s t e r s being of t h a t stamp, men w i t h reason t h i n k they may advance to the highest p i t c h of t h e i r ambition through every infamous way t h a t t h e i r own black hearts or the r a s c a l i t y of t h e i r s u p e r i o r s can point out (205) . . Bolingbroke wrote, of the monarch's f i r s t a c t i o n on ascending the throne: (204) Bolingbroke, Works. V o l . I l l , p.81 (205) Add. MSS. 32970, f f 226-227, c i t e d by Namier, England i n the age of the American r e v o l u t i o n , p.483. 221. F i r s t then, he must begin to govern as soon as he begins t o r e i g n . For the very f i r s t steps he makes i n government w i l l g ive the f i r s t impression, as i t were the presage of h i s r e i g n ; and may be of great importance i n many other r e s p e c t s besides t h a t of o p i n i o n and r e p u t a t i o n . H i s f i r s t care w i l l be, no doubt, to purge h i s c o u r t , and to c a l l i n t o the a o l m i n i s t r a t i o n such men as he can assure h i m s e l f w i l l serve on the same p r i n c i p l e s on which he intends to govern (206). Yet the choice of such men must not be on p a r t y l i n e s . Bolingbroke q u i t e r i g h t l y condemned the dangers of the p a r t y system as he saw them; but w h i l e the p o l i t i c a l philosophers of a l a t e r age, the Shelburnes and Burkes, urged p u r i f i c a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s withim the g u a r d - r a i l s of the p a r t y s t r u c t u r e , Bolingbroke could recommend o n l y a step backward t o the personal r u l e r such as had e x i s t e d i n the time of W i l l i a m I I I . Thus, he urges a " M i n i s t r y of the T a l e n t s " f o r the King's guidance, but o n l y of t a l e n t s i n harmony w i t h the purposes of the King. He may favour one p a r t y and discourage another, upon occasions wherein the s t a t e of h i s kingdom makes such a temporary measure necessary; but he w i l l espouse none ... (207) By comparison, t h e l e t t e r of George I I I to P i t t , of J u l y 29th, 1766, c r e a t i n g him an E a r l , and c a l l i n g on him to form a M i n i s t r y , not o n l y p l a y s on P i t t ' s known weakness f o r non-par t y government, but i s a l s o an honest expression of George's own aim i n p o l i t i c s . (206) Bolingbroke, Works, V o l . I l l , p.77 (207) Bolingbroke, o p . c i t . , p.90. 222. ... I know the E a r l of Chatham w i l l z e a l o u s l y give h i s a i d towards d e s t r o y i n g a l l p a r t y d i s -t i n c t i o n s , and r e s t o r i n g t h a t s u b o r d i n a t i o n to Government, which can alone preserve t h a t i n e s t i m -a ble b l e s s i n g , L i b e r t y , from degenerating i n t o L i c e n t i o u s n e s s (208). The other f i g u r e of the f i r s t rank who supported George's claims was the greatest of a l l E n g l i s h j u r i s t s , Lord M a n s f i e l d . The extent of h i s i n f l u e n c e on the K i n g i s even harder t o measure than t h a t of Bolingbroke. Although he had been Lord Chief J u s t i c e since 1756, h i s o f f i c i a l , seemingly non-partisan p o s i t i o n , was no i n d i c a t i o n of h i s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . He was never an a d m i n i s t r a t o r , but was an u n o f f i c i a l Cabinet M i n i s t e r i n almost a l l the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s from the time o f h i s appointment to the Bench u n t i l h i s death. E a r l y i n North's regime he d i d a c t as Speaker of the House of Lords i n the absence of a Lord C h a n c e l l o r , but he r e p e a t e d l y d e c l i n e d the d i g n i t y of the Woolsack. He was always a power at Court, though the extent of h i s i n f l u e n c e was probably exaggerated by the popular s c r i b b l e r s and d i s g r u n t l e d placemen o f the time. As a Scot, the r e l a t i v e of J a c o b i t e s ( h i s brother had been p r o s c r i b e d i n 1746), and a c l o s e personal adherent of the K i n g , he was predisposed to the support of increased r o y a l powers. As the greatest lawyer of the age, he n a t u r a l l y looked to the law t o support h i s b e l i e f s and found there adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the f r e e r e x e r c i s e of the pre-r o g a t i v e . H i s support of t a x a t i o n of America and the (208) Chatham Correspondence, c i t e d i n Mumby, E., George I I I and the American r e v o l u t i o n , p.155. 223. imprisojiment of Wilkes were both l a i d f i r m l y on a l e g a l b a s i s . Junius saw him as the dark and secret power of the c l o s e t , the subverter of the common law (209), but f a r from having subverted i t , he reformed and c o d i f i e d the common law to make i t a p p l i c a b l e to modern c o n d i t i o n s . He was a great o r a t o r w i t h great powers of co n c e n t r a t i o n and e r u d i t i o n . I t was s a i d that M a n s f i e l d ' s mere statement was equal to anyone e l s e ' s argument (210). He was the one r i v a l to P i t t as an ora t o r (209) I see through your whole l i f e , one uniform p l a n t o enlarge the Crown, at the expense of the l i b e r t y of the sub j e c t . To t h i s o b j e c t , your thoughts, words and a c t i o n s have been c o n s t a n t l y d i r e c t e d . I n contempt or ignorance of the common law of England, you have made i t your study to introduce i n t o the c o u r t , where you p r e s i d e , maxims of jurisprudence unknown to Englishmen. The Roman code, the law of n a t i o n s , and the o p i n i o n of f o r e i g n c i v i l i a n s , are your p e r p e t u a l theme; - but whoever heard you mention Magna Charta or the B i l l of Ri g h t s w i t h approbation or respect? By such treacherous a r t s , the noble s i m p l i c i t y and f r e e s p i r i t of our Saxon laws were f i r s t corrupted ... I s h a l l not attempt to r e f u t e a d o c t r i n e , which , i f . i t was not meant f o r law, c a r r i e s falsehood and a b s u r d i t y upon t h e face of i t ; but, i f i t was meant f o r a d e c l a r a -t i o n of your p o l i t i c a l creed, i s c l e a r and c o n s i s t e n t . Under an a r b i t r a r y government, a l l ranks and d i s t i n c t i o n s are confounded. The honour of a nobleman i s no more considered than the r e p u t a t i o n of a peasant, f o r w i t h d i f f e r e h t l i v e r i e s , t h e y are e q u a l l y s l a v e s . Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius. V o l . I I , pp.162-164. (210) T u r b e r v i l l e , The House of l o r d s i n the eighteenth century, p.299. 224. among the l e a d e r s of the day, and they remained a n t i p a t h e t i c throughout t h e i r careers (211). As i n the case of Bolingbroke, h i s p r e s t i g e had f a r more i n f l u e n c e upon p u b l i c o p i n i o n than upon the King's a c t i o n s . The K i n g r e v i v e d r o y a l powers which had l a i n dormant w i t h i n the framework of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but the f a c t t h a t M a n s f i e l d gave the weight of h i s p r e s t i g e as a j u r i s t t o them, helped t o make them t e m p o r a r i l y acceptable. I n the House of Lords, there was no lawyer who could approach him i n f o r e n s i c powers. Camden, the l e g a l champion of the popular p a r t y , was c o n t i n u a l l y defeated i n h i s attempts to convince the House of the uncon-s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the King's measures. Yet the f i n a l defeat of p r e r o g a t i v e l e f t M a n s f i e l d u n a f f e c t e d i n p r e s t i g e and seemingly unmoved emotionally. Under the younger P i t t he continued t o act as the u n o f f i c i a l guide to the M i n i s t r y on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions, and i n t e r p r e t e d the new p r a c t i c e s i n the same c o l d l i g h t of j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n , as he had done the o l d . Other supporters of the K i n g were not of t h i s h i g h c a l i b r e . The l a r l of Bute has a l r e a d y been discussed; others, however, w h i l e not so n o t o r i o u s , had perhaps as great a share (211) As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s a n t i p a t h y between the two great l e a d e r s and how i t was kept a l i v e , Walpole records the f o l l o w i n g s t o r y from the days of the P i t t - N e w c a s t l e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n : "On one o c c a s i o n , when the Cabinet was asked by P i t t to decide upon an unpopular e x p e d i t i o n , which P i t t favoured, the Cabinet being e q u a l l y d i v i d e d and M a n s f i e l d not having spoken, P i t t adjourned the debate, d e c l a r i n g the vote favour-a b l e , and t h a t : 'The Chief J u s t i c e of England has no o p i n i o n t o give i n t h i s matter.'" Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George III» V o l I , p.64. i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of r o y a l p o l i c y i n t o l e g i s l a t i v e terms, and w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of i t . These people may be d i v i d e d i n t o three groups. The f i r s t , and l e a s t i m p l i c a t e d , was that l a r g e and competent body of sen i o r c i v i l servants upon whom the burden r e s t e d f o r c a r r y i n g out the measures of the Court Party. The p r a c t i c e of the age, i n p e r m i t t i n g c i v i l servants to s i t as Members of Parliament, not only gave them an i n c e n t i v e f o r c o r r u p t i o n , but a l s o rendered them l i a b l e t o accusations of nepotism by t h e i r f e l l o w Members. In t h i s group were such men as Robert Wood, the very able Under S e c r e t a r y of State,, remembered c h i e f l y f o r h i s a r r e s t of Wilkes; Jeremiah Dyson, perhaps the a b l e s t l e g i s l a t i v e draftsman i n the House of Commons of the time; and Charles Jenkinson who, as a reward f o r h i s very r e a l s e r v i c e s to the na t i o n , was l a t e r created E a r l o f L i v e r p o o l . The second group c o n s i s t e d of broken p o l i t i c i a n s of the l a s t r e i g n , and Whigs who had o u t l i n e d t h e i r u s e f u l n e s s , or who had diverged from the p a r t y p o l i c y . They were the c h i e f supporters o f the non-partisan aspect of the King's new p o l i c y s i n c e they l a c k e d e i t h e r the a b i l i t y or the c o n g e n i a l i t y to be su c c e s s f u l under the p a r t y system. They i n c l u d e d most of the Bedford F a c t i o n , such as the E a r l of Sandwich, Welbore E l l i s Richard Rigby and E a r l Nugent. Their c h i e f purpose i n p o l i t i c was the securing of l u c r a t i v e sinecures f o r themselves and t h e i r connections, and t h e i r v e n a l i t y was a scandal even i n that very venal age. The group a l s o numbered i n i t s ranks such boon companions of the l a t e P r i n c e of Wales as Bubb 236. Dodington, created Lord Melcombe i n the new r e i g n , and S i r F r a n c i s Dashwood, created Lord Despenser. F i n a l l y , i t i n -cluded the most notorious and hated, and a l s o the most un-f o r t u n a t e of the King's F r i e n d s , Lord George S a c k v i l l e . Lord George, who was l a t e r to l o s e the American War under the s t y l e of Lord George Germaine, was c e r t a i n l y the v i c t i m of an over-emphasized and unnecessary u n p o p u l a r i t y , f o l l o w i n g h i s disobedience at the B a t t l e of Minden. The K i n g , ever sympathetic to f a i l u r e s under h i s grandfather's r e i g n , pro-mised to r e h a b i l i t a t e the character of the u n s u c c e s s f u l general. Lord George, however, seems to have earned h i s pardon, f o r he was kept w a i t i n g f o r f i v e y ears, u n t i l the r o y a l patronage was accorded him. A l e t t e r from Bute to S i r Henry E r s k i n e of A p r i l 8 t h 1763, i l l u s t r a t e s the quandary that the King was i n concerning the pardon, and Lord George's impatience w i t h the delay. I t i s a l s o i n d i c a t i v e of the very s l i m t i e s w i t h which the f r i e n d s of the K i n g were bound to him. I have had a l o n g conversation w i t h the K i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t , when a f t e r u r g i n g h i s merit and h i s a b i l i t i e s , h i s hard usage, ever censured by h i s Majesty h i m s e l f , the great use he would be a t t h i s c r i t i c a l j u ncture, the K i n g admitted a l l to be t r u e , and even added th a t he f l a t t e r e d himself w i t h hopes of shewing him a t t h i s p e r i o d strong marks of h i s favour; but though the time was come, i t was attended w i t h too many untoward circumstances f o r him t o venture t o take a step that to h i s know-ledge would r e v o l t numbers about him ... And now l e t Lord George s e r i o u s l y r e f l e c t on t h i s , and on the part you t e l l me he meditates i f not humoured at present. What, j o i n the g r e a t e s t enemy ever man had, who aimed a t no l e s s than h i s blood, because the most benign of p r i n c e s cannot do f o r him now even what the p r i n c e h i m s e l f wishes?" (212) The t h i r d group, which functioned l a r g e l y under Lord Bute's l e a d e r s h i p , c o n s i s t e d of o l d sentimental T o r i e s , w i t h opinions of h i g h a n t i q u i t y and a m y s t i c a l reverence f o r the monarch, and of Scotsmen a t t r a c t e d by the prominence of t h e i r countryman. I n g e n e r a l , t h i s group a t t r a c t e d the keenest and most a b i d i n g hatred of the people of any of the supporters of the K i n g . For example, Junius, i n h i s l e t t e r t o George I I I , i n 1769, d e c l a r e s : You are not, however, d e s t i t u t e of every appearance of support: You have a l l the J a c o b i t e s , Non-jurors, Roman C a t h o l i c s and Tories of t h i s country, and a l l Scotland without exception. Considering from what f a m i l y you are descended, the choice of your f r i e n d s has been s i n g u l a r l y d i r e c t e d ; and t r u l y , S i r , i f you had not l o s t the Whig i n t e r e s t of England, I should admire your d e x t e r i t y i n t u r n i n g the hearts of your enemies ... You w i l l not accept the uniform experience of your ancestors; and when once a man i s determined t o believe, the very a b s u r d i t y of the d o c t r i n e confirms him i n h i s f a i t h . A bigoted understanding can draw a proof of attachment to the House of Hanover from a notorious z e a l f o r the house of S t u a r t , and f i n d an earnest of f u t u r e l o y a l t y i n former r e b e l l i o n s (213). Old T o r i e s , such as the E a r l of Westmoreland, who had not been to Court s i n c e the death of Anne, attended George's cornnation. The a c t i v e cause of J a c o b i t i s m , however, was dying f a s t before the accession, w i t h the f a i l u r e of the " F o r t y - F i v e " and the subsequent degeneration of the House of (212) Great B r i t a i n , H i s t o r i c a l manuscripts commission, Rept. 15, App., pt.33, " S t o p f o r d - S a c k v i l l e " , V o l . I,p.58. (213) Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius. V o l . I I , pp.77-78 228. S t u a r t . The new favour shown to T o r i e s and to Soots i n the new r e i g n was a major cause, r a t h e r than an i n c i d e n t a l e f f e c t of t h e i r new l o y a l t y to the House of Hanover. The T o r i e s , ghosts from a by-gone age, were not much regarded, but n a t i o n a l p r e j u d i c e , s t i l l remembering the f r i g h t of f i f -teen years before, when the Pretender's army had held Derby, . v i l i f i e d the S c o t t i s h n a t i o n , and the King's sympathy f o r i t . George's d e c l a r a t i o n i n h i s f i r s t speech from the throne, t h a t " I g l o r y i n the name of B r i t a i n " (214) was u n i v e r s a l l y be-l i e v e d to be a d e c l a r a t i o n i n favour of the Scots and to have been i n s p i r e d by the new S c o t t i s h F a v o u r i t e . Junius made pointed reference to i t some years l a t e r . When you a f f e c t e d l y renounced the name of Englishman, b e l i e v e me, S i r , you were persuaded to pay a "very i l l - j u d g e d compliment to one part of your s u b j e c t s , at the expense of another. While the n a t i v e s of Scotland, are not i n a c t u a l r e b e l l i o n , they are undoubtedly e n t i t l e d to p r o t e c t i o n ; nor do I mean to condemn the p o l i c y of g i v i n g some encourage-ment to the n o v e l t y of t h e i r a f f e c t i o n s f o r the House of Hanover But h i t h e r t o they have no c l a i m to your favour. To honour them w i t h a determined pre-d i l e c t i o n and confidence, i n e x c l u s i o n of your E n g l i s h s u b j e c t s , who placed your f a m i l y , and, i n s p i t e of treachery and r e b e l l i o n , have supported i t on the throne, i s a mistake too gross, even f o r the unsuspecting g e n e r o s i t y of youth. (215) There was, however, i n f l u e n t i a l support f o r the new f a v o u r i n g of T o r i e s , from the U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, ever a hot-bed of Toryism, and from the few p o l i t i c i a n s of the day (214) This was f i r s t , and i n c o r r e c t l y quoted as " I g l o r y i n the.name of B r i t o n . " Mumby, George- I I I and the American r e v o l u t i o n , p.3. (215) Woodfall, L e t t e r s of J u n i u s , pp.67-68. who d i d not support the p a r t y system, c h i e f among these being P i t t . The countenance shown to the T o r i e s , and t o t h e i r c i t a d e l , the U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, was a t f i r s t supposed by those who stood a t a d i s t a n c e from the p e n e t r a l i a , the measure of Mr. P i t t , as consonant to h i s known d e s i r e of u n i t i n g - t h a t was breaking - a l l p a r t i e s . But T o r i e s , who were q u a l i f i e d f o r nothing above a s e c r e t , could not keep even t h a t . They came to Court, i t i s true,.but they came w i t h a l l t h e i r own p r e j u d i c e s . They abjured t h e i r ancient master, but r e t a i n e d t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s ; and seemed to have exchanged nothing but t h e i r badge, the White Rose, f o r the White Horse. P r e r o g a t i v e became a fash i o n a b l e word; and the language of the times was a l t e r e d before the F a v o u r i t e dared to make any v a r i a t i o n i n the M i n i s t r y (216). The reference t o P i t t i l l u s t r a t e s one of the paramount problems of the Whig o p p o s i t i o n i n the f i r s t decade of George I l l ' s r e i g n . The o p p o s i t i o n t o the p a r t y system was not r e s t r i c t e d to the K i n g , but was a widespread b e l i e f , growing out of the long Whig domination and i t s attendant abuses. I n P i t t ' s case, t h i s b e l i e f was l i n k e d w i t h the d e s i r e of one who has a l r e a d y dominated h i s own p a r t y to dominate a l l p a r t i e s . The p l a n o f a t r u l y n a t i o n a l government, "measures, not men," as he was l a t e r to c h a r a c t e r i z e i t him-s e l f , dominated the p o l i t i c a l p e r i p a t a t i o n s of t h e Great Commoner from h i s f a l l from power u n t i l 1769. He had, i n f a c t , l a i d the b a s i s f o r h i s non-partisan p o l i c y i n the previous decade, when, as the opponent of New-c a s t l e , he had been the e r s t w h i l e champion of the P r i n c e of (216) Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . I , p.13. Wales f a c t i o n a t L e i c e s t e r House. Newcastle, i n preparing the way f o r the new K i n g , had been f o r c e d to i n c l u d e the champion of L e i c e s t e r House i n h i s government i n 1757, and the P i t t - N e w c a s t l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was formed to win the war, w i t h the i n i t i a l support of Lord Bute. The s u c c e s s f u l war m i n i s t e r , however, as h i s success grew, was d i s t r u s t e d by L e i c e s t e r House as a p o s s i b l e r i v a l to the E a r l of Bute i n the hearts of the populace. A s p i r i t of revenge grew up i n the f e e b l e mind of the p r i n c e , which r e q u i r e d o n l y oppor-t u n i t y to make i t s e l f f e l t . I suppose you agree w i t h me, wrote George to Bute i n 1758, t h a t as Mr. P. does not now chuse to communicate what i s intended to be done, but d e f e r s i t t i l l executed, he might save himself sending at a l l , as I should hear only a few days l a t e r , as w e l l as other people, what measures have been taken. Indeed, my dearest f r i e n d , he t r e a t s both you and me w i t h no more regard than he would do a p a r c e l of c h i l d r e n , he seems to f o r g e t t h a t the day w i l l come when he must expect to be t r e a t e d according t o h i s deserts (217). As e a r l y as 1756, Bute had intended t o assume the Treasury i n the new r e i g n , w i t h P i t t as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . With P i t t estranged and the country at war, he h e s i t a t e d . George t h e r e f o r e determined to c a r r y on w i t h the o l d M i n i s t r y u n t i l a favourable o p p o r t u n i t y was presented to r e p l a c e i t w i t h Bute. Neg o t i a t i o n s w i t h P i t t f a i l e d t o draw him away from Newcastle, so i t was found necessary to begin those n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Fox which were to r e s u l t i n the c r e a t i o n (217) Add. MSS. 32899, f f . 204-205, c i t e d by Namier, England i n the age of the American r e v o l u t i o n , p.109. 2 3 1 . of an e f f i c i e n t parliamentary instrument to do the King's w i l l . The d e c l i n e of J a c o b i t i s m i n the Tory P a r t y was not n e a r l y so important as the d e s i r e to d i s m i s s h i s predecessor's servants, i n moving George I I I to c a l l those i n Opposition i n t o o f f i c e . H i s advantages, i n s o f a r as personal p r e s t i g e was concerned, were from the outset f a r greater than those of h i s two predecessors. He was young and he had no competing h e i r , though the Duke of Cumberland was a r a t h e r inadequate r a l l y i n g p o i n t f o r d i s a f f e c t e d Whigs* Since the Whigs had r e l i e d upon George I I f o r a l l r o y a l patronage, a l l the hopes, not o n l y of preferment, but of a c t u a l power, on the p a r t of the d i s -a f f e c t e d elements, r e s t e d w i t h L e i c e s t e r House.' Yet th e r e seems to have been no r e a l l y well-thought-out p l a n of campaign. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , as i n t h e cases of Walpole and the Pelhams, almost as permanent as the r e i g n , that t h e r e was l i t t l e s p e c u l a t i o n as t o the f u t u r e prime • m i n i s t e r , or even as to the f u t u r e o f the o f f i c e i t s e l f . C e r t a i n l y , much of the a r t i c u l a t e p o r t i o n of the n a t i o n seems to have been opposed to the c o n t i n u a t i o n of cabinet and p a r t y government and were i n c l i n e d to seek a r e t u r n t o the more elementary concept of the benevolent k i n g , p r o t e c t -i n g a h e l p l e s s people from a tyranny of Parliament. The King alone might stand above p a r t y s t r i f e . I n a d d i t i o n , the change of r e i g n s meant a change i n o f f i c e s . The duty of the King t o accept and continue the m i n i s t e r s of h i s predecessor 232. was not admitted i n 1760. A c t u a l l y , the succession, when i t came, was not w e l -comed at L e i c e s t e r House. The burden of the war and the t r o u b l e of n e g o t i a t i n g the peace was foreseen as e a r l y as 1758 (218), and the hope was expressed t h a t the o l d King might s u r v i v e the war. These f e a r s were proven a l l too t r u e . Bute's career was wrecked on the peace n e g o t i a t i o n s , and i t was s e v e r a l years before h i s p u p i l , working by h i m s e l f , was able t o w i e l d the instrument which had been created f o r him w i t h s u f f i c i e n t s k i l l to enforce h i s w i l l i n v a r i a b l y . The f u n c t i o n of the K i n g as a c o n t r o l l e r of e l e c t i o n s was c e r t a i n l y not w i t h o u t sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l precedent. George I I had taken a s u p e r v i s o r y i n t e r e s t i n e l e c t i o n s , probably much more s t r o n g l y than was r e a l i z e d , s i n c e Mew-c a s t l e was very cautious about p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t anything l e s s than excessive i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e Crown. On one occasion the K i n g even presumed to oppose P i t t i n the p l e n i -tude of h i s powers, and i n the argument that f o l l o w e d (over a candidate f o r a government borough), won h i s p o i n t (219). Thus, the crown which George I I I assumed i n 1760 was much more than the p o l i t i c a l cypher i t has o f t e n been p i c t u r e d . The d i f f e r e n c e i n the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of the two monarchs was merely one of emphasis, not of type. No r e a l i n n o v a t i o n (218) Namier, England i n the age of the American r e v o l u t i o n . p. 67. (219) I b i d . , p.127. 233. was made. The Whigs considered the King's i n t e r f e r e n c e , w h i l e i t operated i n t h e i r favour, as p e r f e c t l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . They had created the Hanoverian monarchy of Great B r i t a i n , and they should reap the b e n e f i t . Even i n the new r e i g n , only a small f a c t i o n of the Whigs cont i n u o u s l y opposed the monarchial pretensions, f o r the h a b i t of b a r g a i n i n g w i t h the dominant power and the acceptance of i n t e r f e r e n c e by the Crown had grown too strong t o be overcome by scruples f o r the vague g e n e r a l i -z a t i o n (as i t then was) of popular sovereignty. Although the K i n g resented the l i m i t a t i o n s which cabinet government placed on h i s power, he was not unmindful of the duty which he owed h i s M i n i s t e r s , to support them whenever p o s s i b l e . I n some cases, when the p o l i c y of the M i n i s t r y was that of the K i n g , there was even c o r d i a l i t y i n the support. The K i n g gave u n l i m i t e d confidence t o both Bute and G r e n v i l l e , o n l y to be disappointed when the l a t t e r , j e a l o u s of the i n f l u e n c e of Bute, l o u d l y d i s c l a i m e d h i s master and took h i s ambitions to what he thought was a more p r o f i t a b l e camp. Despite h i s awkward manner, h i s i n s i s t e n c e on f o r m a l i t y (220), and h i s d i s l i k e of Whiggery, George I I I gave at l e a s t h a l f -hearted support t o the Rockingham Government. That M i n i s t r y , however, d e s p i t e Burke's panegyric on i t , was f o r c e d to admit (220) He was a c c e s s i b l e to none of h i s Court but a t s t a t e hours of business and ceremony; nor was any man but the F a v o u r i t e , and the creatures w i t h whom he had garrisoned the palace, allowed t o converse w i t h the K i n g . A f f e c t i o n had no share i n t h i s management. Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . I , p.13. 234. i t s l a c k of popular support, and c o n t i n u a l l y pleaded f o r r e -enforcement. George was the model of t a c t amid the seemingly endless vagaries of the Chatham-Grafton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F i n a l l y , he supported North w i t h greater l o y a l t y than any Hanoverian had shown to a prime m i n i s t e r . H i s i n g r a t i t u d e to those servants no longer of use to him i s another matter. The choice i n 1760 l a y between a thorough reform of the whole p o l i t i c a l system, or r o y a l p a r t i s a n s h i p i n the system as i t was. Newcastle and h i s f r i e n d s were opposed t o the f i r s t , w h i l e P i t t opposed the second. Both p o l i c i e s were e v e n t u a l l y t r i e d . 2 3 5 . Chapter V. The Popular Power The most e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n t o the r o y a l ambitions i n the f i r s t decade of the r e i g n , came, not from the broken p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s or t h e i r l e a d e r s , but from an element of growing p o l i t i c a l power i n the n a t i o n , the merchants and L i v e r i e d Companies of the C i t y , and t h e i r c r e a t u r e s , the mob of London. The prominence of the commercial community i n the l i f e of the n a t i o n has already been discussed. The c o n t i n u a l subservience of the l e g i s l a t u r e t o the wishes and needs o f the t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s was s t i l l c o n t i n u i n g , though i t was t o be r e p l a c e d , w i t h i n the decade, w i t h an equal concern f o r the b e n e f i t of the r i s i n g i n d u s t r i a l f a c t o r i n the'economy of B r i t a i n . The new i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n economic matters, a r i s i n g i n p a r t from the expansion of B r i t a i n t o a world t r a d i n g n a t i o n , i n part from the i n t e l l e c t u a l expansion o f the seventeenth century, would not t o l e r a t e , by 1760, the obsolete c o n t r o l s of the m e r c a n t i l i s t system. The economically powerful c l a s s e s demanded economic freedom, and as a means to secure that freedom, p o l i t i c a l power as w e l l . The use of the mob as the means of expression f o r a c l a s s which was s e r i o u s l y under-represented i n the unreformed House of Commons, was an extremely easy and e f f e c t i v e method of g a i n i n g a t t e n t i o n . The p o l i c e f o r c e o f the me t r o p o l i s was almost non-existent, and though the eighteenth century was an era of extreme l e g a l i s m , the enforcement of law, w i t h 256. honourable exceptions, was very i n e f f i c i e n t . Thus London could be given up t o the r i o t e r s completely, i f the mob was of one mind f o r the reason of the r i o t . The Middlesex e l e c t i o n r i o t s of 1768 and 1769, and the much more s e r i o u s Gordon R i o t s of 1780, were the most f l a g r a n t examples of the l a c k of con-t r o l over a populace which was coming t o p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l awareness of i t s powers. I t was not only i n r i o t i n g t h a t the c i t i z e n s of London were able to make t h e i r i n f l u e n c e f e l t . Under the l e a d e r s h i p of i t s Aldermen, a remarkable group i n c l u d i n g such names as Beckford, T r e c o t h i c k , B u l l , Crosby and O l i v i e r , the me r c a n t i l e i n t e r e s t was ab l e t o preserve and r e - a s s e r t many of the funda-mental r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l i m p l i e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Most important, through the mouth of John Wi l k e s , i t was able , to s t a t e and e s t a b l i s h the r i g h t s of freedom of the press, parliamentary p r i v i l e g e , the freedom of the e l e c t o r a t e to choose the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i t wished, and t o r e - e s t a b l i s h beyond a l l t h r e a t of subversion, the r i g h t of habeas corpus. Before and during the Seven Years* War, the avowed champion of the C i t y had been P i t t . H i s l o s s of p r e s t i g e , through h i s retirement from o f f i c e w i t h a pension, h i s i n t r a c t -a b l e , haughty d i s p o s i t i o n , and h i s p u r s u i t of that p o l i t i c a l w i l l o' the wisp, a non-partisan government, l o s t him much of the support of the merchant community. The populace soon found another l e a d e r , however; one a f t e r i t s own h e a r t , i n the unprepossessing person of John Wi l k e s , Member f o r A y l e s -bury and e d i t o r of the l a t e s t i n s c u r r i l o u s j o u r n a l s , the North B r i t o n . Though unimposing i n appearance, u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n , and l a c k i n g i n e i t h e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y or moral c h a r a c t e r , Wilkes was w e l l - f i t t e d to be the leader of the r a b b l e . The son of a s u c c e s s f u l brewer, he was, above a l l e l s e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the p r e j u d i c e s and i n t e r e s t s of h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s of the c a p i t a l . Though a poor p u b l i c speaker, he was b r i l l i a n t i n p r i v a t e conversation; (221) h i s t a l e n t s as a w r i t e r were paramount. I t was a complete l a c k of i n h i b i t i o n s , however, which gave him the advantage i n opposing the govern-ment. J u n i u s , i n h i s L e t t e r to George I I I , p o i n t s t h i s out as the c h i e f reason f o r the p o p u l a r i t y of Wilkes w i t h the E n g l i s h n a t i o n . The n a t i v e s of t h a t country, are as much d i s -t i n g u i s h e d by a p e c u l i a r character, as by your Majesty's favour. L i k e another chosen people, they have been conducted i n t o the land of p l e n t y , where they f i n d themselves e f f e c t u a l l y marked, and d i v i d e d from mankind. There i s h a r d l y a p e r i o d at which the most i r r e g u l a r character may not be redeemed. The mistakes of one sex f i n d a r e t r e a t i n p a t r i o t i s m ; those of the other i n devotion. Mr. Wilkes brought w i t h him i n t o p o l i t i c s the same l i b e r a l sentiments, by which h i s p r i v a t e conduct had been d i r e c t e d , and seemed to t h i n k , t h a t , as there are few excesses i n which an E n g l i s h gentleman may not be permitted t o in d u l g e , the same l a t i t u d e was allowed him i n the choice of h i s p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , and i n the s p i r i t of m a i a t a i n i n g them (222). (221) This hero i s as bad a man as ever hero was, abominable i n p r i v a t e l i f e , d u l l i n Parliament, but, they say, very e n t e r t a i n i n g i n a room, and c e r t a i n l y no bad w r i t e r , besides having had the honour of c o n t r i b u t i n g a great d e a l t o Lord Bute's d o w n f a l l . Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.315. (222) Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius. V o l . I I , p.70. 238. I t i s probable t h a t i f Wilkes had been l e s s of a p r o f l i g a t e he might have missed h i s p o p u l a r i t y , s i n c e h i s i l l -repute as a rake and a s c o f f e r tempted h i s enemies t o use methods against him which they would have h e s i t a t e d to use ag a i n s t a more respected adversary. Yet t h i s very l a c k of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y ensured that he would never be able to e s t a b l i s h h i mself permanently as a power i n the p o l i t i c a l world. Once the s p e c i f i c i s s u e s upon which he was able t o a g i t a t e the people of London t o r i o t had been s e t t l e d , he disappeared i n t o d i s t i n g u i s h e d o b s c u r i t y . During the war he had been an extreme Whig and an ardent f o l l o w e r of P i t t . When tha t statesman f e l l from power, Wilkes s u f f e r e d w i t h him, s i n c e E a r l Temple, the patron of Wilkes, was deprived of h i s Lord Lieutenancy of Bucking- \ hamshire, having f i r s t been ordered to deprive Wilkes of h i s l i e u t e n a n t - c o l o n e l c y i n the Buckinghamshire M i l i t i a . Wilkes ^ began the North B r i t o n during the regime of Bute, as an organ \ of a t t a c k on the King's P a r t y , and i n the 45th number of t h i s 1 paper ( A p r i l 23rd, 1763), he addressed a v i o l e n t a t t a c k on the King's speech a t p r o r o g a t i o n of A p r i l 19th, d e s c r i b i n g i t as "the most abandoned in s t a n c e of m i n i s t e r i a l e f f r o n t e r y not t o be p a r a l l e l e d i n the annals of t h i s country." (223) I t was the opening gun i n a campaign which, before i t was (223) He has made our Sovereign d e c l a r e , "My expecta-t i o n s have been f u l l y answered by the happy e f f e c t s which "the s e v e r a l a l l i e s have d e r i v e d from t h i s s a l u t a r y measure of the d e f i n i t i v e t r e a t y . The powers at war w i t h my good brother, the K i n g of P r u s s i a , have been induced to agree 839. f i n i s h e d , n e a r l y f i f t e e n years l a t e r , was to see the pre-r o g a t i v e power of the government c o n s i d e r a b l y reduced, the l i b e r t y of the press given a s u b s t a n t i a l guarantee, and the freedom of the e l e c t o r a t e to choose whom they wished t o represent them, a l l s a f e l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e of England. The immediate r e a c t i o n of the Government was to i s s u e a general warrant f o r the a r r e s t of the "authors, p r i n t e r s and pu b l i s h e r s of a s e d i t i o u s and treasonable- paper e n t i t l e d the North B r i t o n , No. 45" (224), and to b r i n g them before the S e c r e t a r i e s of St a t e f o r examination. The use of general warrants was one of those s u r v i v a l s i n the E n g l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n which continue o n l y because they are not a c t i v e l y o f f e n s i v e (223) cont'd. to such terms of accomodation as th a t great P r i n c e has approved, and the success which has attended my n e g o t i a t i o n has n e c e s s a r i l y and immediately d i f f u s e d the b l e s s i n g s of peace through every part of Europe." The infamous f a l l a c y of t h i s whole sentence i s apparent to a l l mankind ... No advantage of any k i n d has accrued to that magnanimous P r i n c e from our n e g o t i a t i o n ; he was basely deserted by the S c o t t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r of England. From the North B r i t o n , No. 45. .cited by Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . I , pp.217-218, (224) Warrant f o r the a r r e s t of John Wilkes: These are I n h i s Majesty's name to a u t h o r i z e and r e q u i r e you ( t a k i n g a constable t o your a s s i s t a n c e ) to make s t r i c t and d i l i g e n t search f o r the authors, p r i n t e r s and p u b l i s h e r s of a s e d i t i o u s and treasonable paper e n t i t l e d the North B r i t i n No. XLX, Saturday, A p r i l 23rd, 1763, p r i n t e d f o r G. K e a r s l e y i n Ludgate S t r e e t , London, and them or any of them having found to apprehend and s e i z e together w i t h t h e i r papers, and to b r i n g them i n safe custody before me (Lord H a l i f a x ) to be examined concerning the premises and f u r t h e r d e a l t w i t h according to law ... Annual r e g i s t e r , 1763, p.136. 240. to a s u f f i c i e n t p r o p o r t i o n of the nation.- Such warrants were c e r t a i n l y a u s e f u l method i n time of emergency f o r r e t a i n i n g u n d e s i r a b l e s , as P i t t demonstrated d u r i n g the Seven Years' War i n the d e t e n t i o n of those suspected of spying f o r the French. Lord H a l i f a x , the p r i n c i p l e mover i n the indictment, argued, not unsoundly, that the i n s u l t t o the King's Govern-ment and h i s Majesty's person c o n s t i t u t e d a treasonable l i b e l and s u f f i c i e n t cause to invoke emergency powers. A f t e r a short f a r c i c a l i n t e r l u d e , i n which Wilkes abused the King's Messengers sent to a r r e s t him and thoroughly embarrassed the two S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e , he was imprisoned i n the Tower on A p r i l 30th, 1763, i n s p i t e of h i s parliamentary p r i v i l e g e of immunity from a r r e s t on other than major crimes (225). H i s abuse of the Government i n g e n e r a l , and Bute i n p a r t i c u l a r , made him the hero of the hour. Lord Temple and the Duke of Grafton,among other a r i s t o c r a t i c supporters, were refused admittance to him. I t must not, however, be supposed that he was a lone champion of l i b e r t y . The p u b l i c a t i o n of No. 45 of the North B r i t o n , w h i l e done on Wilkes* own i n i t i a t i v e , was probably i n s p i r e d by the r e s e n t f u l ambition of Temple i n an attempt t o d i s c r e d i t the M i n i s t r y . Wilkes was by no means an u n w i l l i n g instrument, but he was not the (225) Quennell, P e t e r , Four p o r t r a i t s , pp.202-204. o n l y c o n s p i r a t o r (226). This was proven when Temple a p p l i e d f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i n the Court of Common P l e a s , and the case was then f i x e d f o r May 3rd, The case came before Lord Chief J u s t i c e P r a t t , a f r i e n d of P i t t and Temple, and a sympathizer of Wil k e s . On May 6th he d e l i v e r e d h i s judgment, when Wilkes's r e l e a s e was ordered on the ground that s e d i t i o u s l i b e l d i d not f a l l w i t h i n the offences of treason, f e l o n y or breach of the peace, f o r which alone Members of Parliament could then be deprived of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e (227). The whole t r i a l had been a triumph f o r Wilkes. With Westminster H a i l packed w i t h h i s supporters, he complained that he had been t r e a t e d "worse than any r e b e l Scot, a remark that was h a i l e d w i t h loud shouts of approval by the crowd. He continued: (226) Hardwicke's son, Lord Royston, i n a l e t t e r to Dr. Burch, quotes the s t o r y t h a t : Lord H a l i f a x asked Wilkes i f he was at the dinners (among the o p p o s i t i o n i n c e l e b r a t i o n of the case), and that the l a t t e r r e p l i e d t h a t he d i d not s i t down to t a b l e , but o n l y blew on the c o a l s . Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . I , p.168. (227) P r a t t s t a t e d t h a t Wilkes was " e n t i t l e d t o h i s p r i v i l e g e as a Member of Parliament, because, although that p r i v i l e g e does not hold a g a i n s t a breach of the peace, i t does against what only tends t o a breach of the peace." Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . 1 p.167. Cf. Annual R e g i s t e r , 1763, p.145. 242. I have many humble thanks to return for the immediate order you were pleased to issue, to give me an opportunity of laying my grievances before you. They are of a kind hitherto unparalleled in this free country, and I trust the consequences w i l l teach ministers of Scottish and arbitrary principles, that the liberty of an Englishman is not to be sported away with impunity, in this cruel and despotic manner (228). The judgment had further held that general warrants - that Isy warrants issued by the Secretary of State to seize a person, not named therein, charged with being concerned in a specified case - were i l l e g a l , oppressive and unconstitutional. Nor was this the end of Wilkes's triumph. After his arrest, the agents of the Secretary of State, under the orders of Robert Wood, the Under Secretary, had broken into Wilkes's house and seized a l l his papers, both public and private. Wilkes was avenged later in the year when he was awarded £1,000 in damages. After six years' delay - due to his approaching outlawry - Wilkes was awarded a further £4,000 in similar proceedings brought against Lord Halifax for the il legal seizure of his person. Wilkes was now the most talked-of man in the country, but his position was not as comfortable as the acclaim of the populace might have indicated. The whole machinery of Govern-ment, under the inspiration of the mortification and hatred (228) Annual register. 1763, p.136 243. of the K i n g , was p i t t e d against him. He could not be sure of the support of h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c f r i e n d s of the moment, and the excesses of h i s p l e b e i a n supporters were l i k e l y to a l i e n a t e p u b l i c o p i n i o n from. him. The triumph of the Opposition, you may be sure, i s great ... I t has given so much t o Mr. Wilkes and the warmest of h i s f r i e n d s , t h a t I t h i n k t h e i r i n d i s c r e t i o n and indecency w i l l r e v o l t the gravest of t h e i r w e l l - w i s h e r s (229). Among the l a t t e r was P i t t , who resented the s l i g h t i n g references to the S c o t t i s h race, and the a t t a c k upon the K i n g , and refused t o a s s o c i a t e himself w i t h one whom he had come to consider as d i s r e p u t a b l e , s e d i t i o u s scoundrel, whatever Wilkes's p o l i t i c a l sympathies might be. Wilkes was t o r e t u r n t h i s d i s l i k e w i t h i n t e r e s t i n the years to come. I n the i n t e r v a l between h i s r e l e a s e and the f o l l o w i n g s e s s i o n of Parliament i n November, Wilkes occupied h i s time w i t h r e - i s s u i n g a l l the North B r i t o n s and p r i v a t e l y p r i n t i n g twelve copies of the indecent Essay on woman, a parody on Pope's Essay on man. I t was certaint that the m i n i s t e r i a l p a r t y would renew the contest at the opening of Parliament, and i n view of t h i s , the p u b l i c a t i o n of the North B r i t o n s was a needless and provocative gesture. The p u b l i c a t i o n of the Essay on woman was t o be h i s undoing, s i n c e government spies b r i b e d workmen i n Wilkes's p r i n t i n g o f f i c e and obtained a copy of the Essay on woman. Armed w i t h t h i s , the govern-ment, i n the person of Wilkes's o l d boon companion, the E a r l (229) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.322 244. of Sandwich, now Se c r e t a r y of State (230), was prepared t o d i s c r e d i t the popular i d o l . On November 15th, 1763, Parliament reassembled. I n the Commons, Wilkes was determined to r a i s e the question of par-liamentary p r i v i l e g e , and acc o r d i n g to the r u l e s of the House, h i s grievance should have been d e a l t w i t h f i r s t . G r e n v i l l e , however, brought a message from the Kin g requesting t h a t the Commons de a l w i t h the case of No. 45 of the North B r i t o n . Obedient to the c a l l of t h e i r l e a d e r , the government supporters gave precedence to G r e n v i l l e 1 s motion and a f u l l - d r e s s debate began on a motion by Lord. North, s t i g m a t i z i n g the o f f e n s i v e number as a " f a l s e , scandalous and s e d i t i o u s l i b e l , " tending "to e x c i t e t o t r a i t o r o u s i n s u r r e c t i o n s a g a i n s t H i s Majesty's Government".(231) Despite the vigorous support of P i t t f o r the i n t e r e s t s of parliamentary p r i v i l e g e , the vote on the motion was passed 273 t o 111 (232). I n the Upper House, meanwhile, an uproarious f a r c e was being enacted. Sandwich, as the most notorious debauchee of the age, as w e l l as Secretary of S t a t e , was reading the (230) Sandwich succeeded Egremont as Secr e t a r y f o r the Southern Department on the l e t t e r ' s death i n September, 1763. (231) Qnennell, P e t e r , Four p o r t r a i t s , p.208. (232) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.389. 245. Essay on woman f o r the e d i f i c a t i o n of the assembled Peers, and f o r t h a t of Bishop Warburton i n p a r t i c u l a r , to whom the obscene annotation of the work had been s c u r r i l o u s l y a t t r i b u t e d . Sandwich c e r t a i n l y seems to have done h i s m a t e r i a l c r e d i t , pausing at i n t e r v a l s to r e g i s t e r d i s g u s t and astonishment, but con t i n u i n g to read w i t h gusto. Walpole describes the scene: Lord Sandwich l a i d before the House the most blasphemous and indecent poem tha t was ever com-posed, c a l l e d An essay on woman, w i t h notes by Dr. Warburton. I w i l l t e l l you none of the p a r t i c u l a r s : they were so exceedingly bad, that Lord L y t t l e t o n begged the r e a d i n g might be stopped. The House was amazed; nobody ventured even to ask a question; so i t was e a s i l y voted everything you please, and a breach of p r i v i l e g e i n t o the bargain ... Lord Sandwich moved to vote Wilkes the author; but t h i s Lord M a n s f i e l d stopped, a d v e r t i z i n g the House t h a t i t was necessary f i r s t to hear what Wilkes could say i n h i s defence. (233) Temple demanded an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the means by which the evidence had been obtained, but M a n s f i e l d pointed out t h a t coming by evidence i l l e g a l l y does not make the e v i d -ence i l l e g a l . A p r o t e s t was drawn up by the Opposition Peers which declared that l i b e l was not in c l u d e d i n t h e more a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of breach of the peace (234), and (233) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.387. Sandwich's apostacy was never f o r g i v e n by the E n g l i s h people, who are u s u a l l y contemptuous o f t r a i t o r s . During the next performance o f the Beggar's opera, when Macheath reached the l i n e : "That Jemmy Twitcher should peach I own s u r p r i s e s me," the whole t h e a t r e was suddenly overcome by a tempest of amusement and Lord Sandwich remained "Jemmy Twitcher" tothe end of h i s l i f e . Quennell, Four p o r t r a i t s , p.210. (234) T u r b e r v i l l e , The house of l o r d s i n the eighteenth century, p.319. 246. t h a t , moreover, the House was being c a l l e d upon to s a n c t i o n the d e c i s i o n of the Commons without p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n . The misfortunes of Wilkes were not ended, however. The f o l l o w i n g morning he was wounded i n a duel w i t h Samuel M a r t i n , a government supporter. The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s case i n both Houses had t h e r e f o r e to be postponed, u n t i l he had recovered, but Wilkes seems t o have had enough of such rough handling. On Christmas Eve, 1763, he eluded the govern-ment agents watching h i s house and s l i p p e d across to France. Mr. Wilkes had i m i t a t e d some of the great men of a n t i q u i t y by going i n t o v o l u n t a r y e x i l e : i t was h i s only way of d e f e a t i n g both h i s c r e d i t o r s and h i s persecutors. Whatever h i s f r i e n d s , i f he has any, give out of h i s r e t u r n soon, I w i l l answer f o r i t , t hat i t w i l l be a lon g time before t h a t soon comes. (235) I n the meantime the o f f e n d i n g copy of the North B r i t o n was ordered burned by the p u b l i c hangman, an event which was the cause f o r much r i o t i n g i n favour of Wilkes (236). E a r l y (235) C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s . V o l . I I , p.330. (236) The North B r i t o n was ordered to be burned by the hangman at Cheapside on Saturday l a s t . The mob rose; the greatest mob, says Mr. S h e r i f f B l u n t , t h a t he has known i n f o r t y years. They were armed w i t h t h a t most b o o r l y instrument, the mud out of the kennels: They h i s s e d i n the most murderous manner; broke Mr. S h e r i f f Harley's coach-glass i n the most frangent manner ... and o b l i g e d the hangman to burn the paper w i t h a l i n k , though faggots were prepared to execute i t i n a more solemn manner. Numbers o f gentlemen from windows and b a l c o n i e s , encouraged the mob, who i n almost an hour and a h a l f , were so u n d u t i f u l to the M i n i s t r y , as to r e t i r e without doing any m i s c h i e f . Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.407 247. i n the new year, moreover, Parliament s e t t l e d down to consider the l e g a l i t y of i t s a c t i o n . On January 16th Parliament met to consider the charges of breach of p r i v i l e g e against Wilkes to be greeted by a note from the errant Member, w i t h the a f f i d a v i t s of two French p h y s i c i a n s t h a t he was too i l l t o come over t o England. On January 20th, a sentence of outlawry was proclaimed a g a i n s t him f o r h i s non-appearance t o answer the charge of breach of p r i v i l e g e , and he was ex p e l l e d from the House of Commons. In the meantime a r e s o l u t i o n by S i r W i l l i a m Meredith condemning the i l l e g a l i t y of general warrants was being de-bated i n the Commons. The Government was condemned f o r the delay i n g i v i n g a d e c i s i o n on t h i s subject u n t i l the episode of the Essay on woman had destroyed a l l chance of an i m p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i t (237). The debate continued u n t i l February 17th, and the Government f a r e d very badly i n the c l o s i n g days o f the contest, s i n c e P i t t had u n i t e d w i t h the Old Whigs f o r the occasion. The Government saved i t s e l f from defeat only by c a r r y i n g a motion f o r postponing the question f o r f o u r months. We spent two or three hours on c o r r e c t i o n s of, and a d d i t i o n s t o , the question of pronouncing the warrant i l l e g a l , t i l l the M i n i s t r y had con-t r a c t e d i t t o f i t scarce anything but the i n d i v i d u a l case of Wilkes. P i t t not opposing the amendments because Charles Yorke gave i n t o them; f o r i t i s (237) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1764, p.21. I n a d d i t i o n , the f i x i n g of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Essay on woman on Wilkes was t e c h n i c a l l y i n a c c u r a t e , s i n c e Wilkes had merely p r i n t e d twelve copies f o r p r i v a t e c i r c u l a t i o n , whereas the Government had made the work p u b l i c . 248. wonderful what deference i s paid by both s i d e s to t h a t house. The debate began by Norton's moving to adjourn the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the-great question f o r four months, and h o l d i n g out a promise of a b i l l , which n e i t h e r they mean, nor, f o r my p a r t , should I l i k e : I would not giv e p r e r o g a t i v e so much as a d e f i n i t i o n . . . t h i n k how our ears must have t i n g l e d , when he t o l d us, that should we pass the r e s o l u t i o n , and he were a judge, he would mind i t no more than the r e s o l u t i o n of a drunken p o r t e r ! (238) The n o t i c e f o r postponement was c a r r i e d by 232 to 218. The M i n i s t r y had been t e m p o r a r i l y s u c c e s s f u l i n g e t t i n g r i d of Wilkes and i n s i d e - t r a c k i n g the i s s u e s r a i s e d i n Par-liament by h i s a r r e s t , but s t i l l i n g the r a g i n g tumult among the supporters of Wilkes i n the me t r o p o l i s was not so easy, nor could the M i n i s t r y recover i t s own or the King's p o p u l a r i t y . Walpole records the gather i n g of the storm. Notwithstanding Lord Sandwich's masked b a t t e r y , the t i d e runs v i o l e n t l y f o r , W i l k e s , and I dp not f i n d people i n general so i n c l i n e d to excuse h i s Lordship as I was. One hears nothing but s t o r i e s of the l a t t e r ' s i mpiety, and of the concert he was i n w i t h Wilkes on t h a t subject (239). The K i n g was net immune from the u n p o p u l a r i t y o f h i s govern-ment, the people r i g h t l y c o n c e i v i n g t h a t George was i n com-p l e t e harmony w i t h the M i n i s t e r s on the su b j e c t . The l a s t time the Ki n g was a t Drury Lane, the p l a y given o u t . f o r the next n i g h t was A l l i n the wrong: the g a l l e r i e s clapped, and then c r i e d out, 'Let us be a l l i n the r i g h t ! Wilkes and L i b e r t y ! ' When the K i n g comes to a t h e a t r e , or (238) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . : V I , p.9. (239) I b i d . , V o l . V, pi389. goes out, or goes to the House, there i s not a s i n g l e applause; t o the Queen there i s a l i t t l e : i n s h o rt, Louis l e bien-aime i s not French at present f o r King George. [240) The s t r u g g l e was over f o r the time being, but many of the Whig supporters had been w i l l i n g t o abandon Wi l k e s , t h e i r most r e l i a b l e supporter, and they were t o pay the p r i c e of t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n c e to h i s f a t e i n the f u t u r e . I n the meantime, the government wrung, a few more drops from the v i a l of p u b l i c discontent by d i s m i s s i n g from t h e i r m i l i t a r y appointments a l l those o f f i c e r s who were a l s o Opposition Members and had voted against the Government on the subject of general warrants. This brought t o the a c t i v e support of the Opposition such accomplished speakers as C o l o n e l Barre and General Conway, but i t had l i t t l e other e f f e c t than to i n c r e a s e the Government's alr e a d y overwhelming load of u n p o p u l a r i t y . The p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t Wilkes would be f o r g o t t e n d i d not take i n t o account e i t h e r the man's p e r s i s t e n c e i n h a r r y i n g the Government, nor the support which he continued to enjoy among c e r t a i n of the Opposition l e a d e r s . For a time he remained on the Continent, passing h i s time i n amorous i n t r i g u e and l i v i n g f a i r l y comfortably on a pension of £1,000 per year provided by h i s f r i e n d s among the Rockingham Whigs. I n 1765, however, he made a p p l i c a t i o n to Lord Rockingham, the new prime m i n i s t e r , t o be permitted to r e t u r n to England. He was ref u s e d , but he (240) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.421 250. renewed the a p p l i c a t i o n to Rockingham's successor, the Duke of Grafton, once an ardent W i l k i t e . To add to the advantages which Wilkes might expect i n England, e a r l y i n 1766, the Rockingham Government had passed a r e s o l u t i o n f i n a l l y a s s e r t -i n g the i l l e g a l i t y o f general warrants. I n May, 1766, he returned to England, but, f i n d i n g the times u n p r o p i t i o u s , was forced to r e t u r n to P a r i s . I n November of the same year he returned again, w i t h no b e t t e r r e s u l t s . H i s l e t t e r of appeal to Grafton on t h i s occasion i s burdened w i t h exaggerated expressions of l o y a l t y to the K i n g . Though I have been cut off. from the body of h i s Majesty's subjects by a c r u e l and u n j u s t p r o s c r i p t i o n , I have never e n t e r t a i n e d an i d e a i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the duty of a good s u b j e c t . My heart s t i l l r e t a i n s a l l i t s former warmth f o r the d i g n i t y of England, and g l o r y of i t s Sovereign... I now hope that the r i g o u r of an unmerited e x i l e i s past, and t h a t I may be allowed t o continue i n the land among t h e . f r i e n d s of l i b e r t y . I wish my Lord, t o owe t h i s t o the mercy of my. P r i n c e ... I f l a t t e r myself t h a t my conduct w i l l j u s t i f y your Grace's i n t e r c e d i n g w i t h a P r i n c e who i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a compassionate tenderness to a l l h i s s u b j e c t s (241). Wilkes d i d f l a t t e r h i m s e l f , f o r Grafton showed the l e t t e r the K i n g , who made no comment on i t , and to Chatham, the r e a l head of t h e ' M i n i s t r y , who advised Grafton t o take no n o t i c e o f the l e t t e r . I n a l l the d e a l i n g s of the various governments of George I I I w i t h W i l k e s , t h i s was almost the only wise measure taken. I t would have saved the Government a great d e a l of t r o u b l e i f i t had adopted a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e when, two years l a t e r , Wilkes returned, f u l l of thoughts of (241) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1766, p.182 vengeance on the m i n i s t e r s who had r e j e c t e d him, and declared himself as a candidate f o r the C i t y of London i n the gene r a l e l e c t i o n of 1768. He was d a r i n g the a u t h o r i t i e s to do t h e i r worst. He d i d , however, t r y t o strengthen h i s p o s i t i o n by a l e t t e r to the K i n g expressing z e a l and attachment t o h i s Majesty, and complaining of the conduct o f the m i n i s t e r s . S i r e : I beg to throw myself at your Majesty's f e e t , and t o s u p p l i c a t e t h a t mercy and clemency which shine w i t h such l u s t r e among your many p r i n c e l y v i r t u e s . Some former m i n i s t e r s , whom your Majesty, i n condescension t o the wishes of your people, thought proper to remove, employed every wicked and d e c e i t f u l a r t t o oppress your s u b j e c t s , and t o revenge t h e i r own p e r s o n a l cause on me, whom they imagined to be the p r i n c i p a l author of b r i n g i n g to the p u b l i c view t h e i r ignorance, i n s u f f i c i e n c y and treac h e r y to your Majesty and the n a t i o n (S4E). Wilkes was un s u c c e s s f u l i n h i s attempt t o get e l e c t e d i n London, but at a b y - e l e 6 t i o n i n the county of Middlesex on March 28th, 1768, he was e l e c t e d by a margin of more than 400 votes (243). The wise p o l i c y a t t h i s juncture would have been to continue t o ignore him, o r to advise a r o y a l pardon, thereby muzzling him e f f e c t u a l l y . Chatham, however, had a l r e a d y begun to take refuge i n i n a c t i o n and Grafton, under pressure from the Bedford f a c t i o n which now dominated h i s Cabinet, w h i l e not t a k i n g a c t i o n t o r e s t r a i n Wilkes i n h i s demagoguery, yet declared that o p p o s i t i o n to Wilkes would be o f f i c i a l government p o l i c y . On A p r i l 20th, t r u e to h i s promise made on h i s nomination f o r Middlesex, he surrendered (242) C i t e d by Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Juni u s . Vol.11, p.86. (243) See Annual r e g i s t e r . 1768, p.83, f o r an account of the r i o t i n g a t the e l e c t i o n . to h i s outlawry a t the Court of King's Bench, amid w i l d demonstrations i n h i s favour. Here, however, the ponderous machinery o f the law, so o f t e n used by the Government to j u s t i f y i t s unpopular a c t i o n s , f a i l e d . Would you not t h i n k t h a t on so common an event as outlawry and surrender, i t must be as w e l l known i n Westminster H a l l what i s to be done, as a schoolboy knows he i s t o be whipt i f he p l a y t r u a n t ? No such matter! A l l the great lawyers i n England are now d i s p u t i n g i n barbarous L a t i n and h a l f E n g l i s h whether 'Wilkes' i s 'Wilkes', whether he can surrender himself, when he does surrender, w i t h twenty more questions e q u a l l y absurd, w i t h which they have puzzled themselves, and, by consequence, a l l England, and, by con-sequence, a l l Europe ... Wilkes appeared according to promise. The Attorney-General moves to commit him. Lord M a n s f i e l d and the Judges of the King's B e n c h - t e l l him that the capias ut legatum should have been taken out, and, not having been, there i s no such person as Mr. Wilkes before them; nay, t h a t there was no such person, f o r , Mr. Wilkes heing an outlaw, an ut l e g a t u s does not e x i s t i n the eye of the law. However t h i s n o n e n t i t y made a l o n g speech, and abused the C h i e f J u s t i c e to h i s face (244). Wilkes went f r e e amid the acclaims of the mob which had assembled o u t s i d e the Court. Not only were the Courts i n a quandary over the s i t u a t i o n , but the House of Commons, i n Camden's words, could h a r d l y expel "a member, e i t h e r as an outlaw or a c o n v i c t , while the s u i t i s pending, wherein he may t u r n out a t l a s t to be n e i t h e r the one or the other ..." (245) (244) Walpole, L e t t e r s , V o l . V I I , p.184. (245) C i t e d by Mumby, George I I I and the American r e v o l u t i o n , pp. 230-231. £53. The mob c o n t r o l of London was assuming an alarming as-pect. A s t r i k e of coal-heavers added to the number a v a i l a b l e f o r the r i o t i n g . The coal-heavers j o i n e d W i l k e s , opposed him, or continued to d i s r u p t the waterfront as t h e mood s u i t e d them. I n May they were j o i n e d by l a r g e numbers of unemployed seamen who were p e t i t i o n i n g Parliament f o r an i n c r e a s e i n wages, and were prepared to l o o t and r i o t , ad i n t e r i m . On A p r i l £7th, Wilkes was committed to King's Bench p r i s o n on the former charge of s e d i t i o u s l i b e l , the machinery o f the law being now once more i n working order. The mob, however, i n t e r -f e r e d and rescued him, though he l a t e r surrendered v o l u n t a r i l y , as i f t o show the a u t h o r i t i e s who was the r e a l master of London. On the 10th of May the mob assembled i n S t . George's F i e l d s near King's Bench p r i s o n , demanded the r e l e a s e o f Wilkes, and was f i r e d on by the soldiery.: One person was k i l l e d , the s o l d i e r who f i r e d and h i s o f f i c e r were t r i e d and a c q u i t t e d , and the mob returned t o the charge; but the s i t u a t i o n was becoming s e r i o u s . For more than two hundred and n i n e t y days d u r i n g 1768, the mob were e f f e c t i v e masters of London (£46). The remissness of the Government i n not supply-i n g adequate p o l i c i n g of the c i t y brought on s e v e r a l o t h e r tumults and d i s o r d e r s . The enemies of the a a m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not h e s i t a t e to a t t r i b u t e t h i s r e l a x a t i o n of c i v i l a u t h o r i t y t o design r a t h e r than t o n e g l e c t ; and t h a t these d i s o r d e r s (£46) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1768, p.157. 254. were permitted and even encouraged, i n order to j u s t i f y a frequent and severe use of t h e m i l i t a r y power (247). A new and ominous atmosphere was growing up, t h e r i o t s ceasing to have the b o i s t e r o u s , h o l i d a y aspect t h a t they had had o r i g i n a l l y . As worthless a f e l l o w a s Wilkes i s , the r i g o u r s e x e r c i s e d towards him have r a i s e d a new s p i r i t that w i l l r e q u i r e s t i l l w iser heads to a l l a y . Men have again turned s e r i o u s l y to the study of those c o n t r o v e r s i e s that a g i t a t e d t h i s country an hundred years ago; and i n s t e a d of di p p i n g i n Roman and Greek h i s t o r i e s f o r flowers to decorate speeches of f a l s e p a t r i o t i s m , p r i n -c i p l e s are r e v i v e d t h a t have taken deeper r o o t ; and I wish we do not see q u a r r e l s of a graver, complexion than the d i r t y squabbles f o r places and p r o f i t . P e r s e c u t i o n f o r p o l i t i c s has j u s t the same i s s u e as f o r r e l i g i o n ; i t spreads the oppressed d o c t r i n e ; and though I t h i n k Wilkes as bad a man as i f he were a s a i n t , he w i l l every day get d i s c i p l e s t h a t w i l l p r o f i t of h i s martyr-dom (248). The mob, disregarded f o r n e a r l y a century as a f a c t o r i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of t h e n a t i o n , had now to be reckoned, a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , as an equal of the Crown and the unreformed Parliament. Wilkes a p a r t , the r i o t was a power which could not be bought. I t must be crushed or p l a c a t e d , and the Government was not prepared t o undertake the crush i n g . I n the meantime, Wilkes had been f r e e d from h i s outlawry on a t e c h n i c a l i t y and was sentenced, on June 18th, 1768, f o r the o l d offences of the North B r i t o n and the Essay on woman, to serve terms amounting to twenty-two months' imprisonment (247) Annual r e g i s t e r , 1769, p.60 (248) Walpole, L e t t e r s , V o l . V I I , p.253. 255. and to i n c u r f i n a n c i a l p e n a l t i e s t o t a l l i n g a thousand pounds. The imprisonment was not arduous, nor d i d i t prevent Wilkes from t a k i n g part i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The f e e l i n g of the crowd a t t h i s time, and of many more r e s p o n s i b l e people as w e l l , was d e f i n i t e l y i n o p p o s i t i o n to the r e p r e s s i v e , a l b e i t necessary, measures of the Government during the r i o t s . W i l kes, even from p r i s o n , was prepared to take advantage of t h i s f e e l i n g . I n the s p r i n g of 1768, Lord Weymouth, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , had q u i t e p r o p e r l y sent a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r to the v a r i o u s magistrates o f London and Middlesex, s t a t i n g t h a t i n the present d i s r u p t e d s t a t e of the c i t y , they should not h e s i t a t e t o c a l l upon the a u t h o r i t i e s f o r troops to a s s i s t i n the r e p r e s s i o n of r i o t s . The l e t t e r was not beyond the nor-mal p r a c t i c e of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n such s i t u a t i o n s and would c e r t a i n l y have prevented much se r i o u s t r o u b l e i f i t s recommendations had been fo l l o w e d more s t r i c t l y . On December 10th, 1768, t h i s l e t t e r was published i n the S t . James's C h r o n i c l e . w i t h accompanying notes by W i l k e s , r e f e r r i n g to the l e t t e r as "a h e l l i s h p r o j e c t brooded over by some - i n f e r n a l s p i r i t s without one moment's remorse" (249). I t was not, however, the answer of the righteous p a t r i o t to the. bloody t y r a n t , but merely one more challenge t o the Government by the popular demagogue. Un f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e Government saw f i t (249) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1769, p.66 256. to accept the challenge. Wilkes's f r e s h offence was immediately voted a s e d i t i o u s l i b e l , and he was summoned before the House of Commons on January 27th, 1769, to answer the offence. There, he declared t h a t , "Whenever a S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e s h a l l dare to w r i t e so bloody a s c r o l l , I w i l l through l i f e dare to w r i t e such pre-f a t o r y remarks, as w e l l as to make my appeal t o the n a t i o n on the occasion." (250) He was thereupon e x p e l l e d from the House, to be r e - e l e c t e d i n February, March and A p r i l , 1769, each time w i t h huge m a j o r i t i e s , and supported by wholesale r i o t i n g , the e l e c t i o n being declared v o i d by the House of Commons i n each case. Such expu l s i o n s , however, presented the Government w i t h a s e r i o u s problem. The l i b e l on Lord Weymouth, concerned the House of Lords, as George G r e n v i l l e pointed out. I n a d d i t i o n , the charges were not made se p a r a t e l y , but i n c l u d e d i n one r e s o l u t i o n , and imprisonment was not a d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r membership i n the House of Commons. The House had the a l t e r -n a t i v e s of r e - i s s u i n g e l e c t i o n warrants a f t e r e x p e l l i n g W i lkes, hoping that the e l e c t o r s would choose someone e l s e ; of r e f u s i n g to i s s u e new warrants, thus l e a v i n g the county unrepresented f o r the r e s t of the term of Parliament; or of accepting the candidate w i t h the l e s s e r number of votes as the s i t t i n g Member. Only the f i r s t could be argued as s t r i c t l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , however. (250) Annual r e g i s t e r , 1769, 2 5 . 7 . A f u r t h e r paradox arose from the f a c t t h a t the House could not permit Wilkes to take h i s seat i n the same s e s s i o n i n which he was e x p e l l e d , so t h a t , however much they might wish to end the controversy g r a c e f u l l y (and t h i s d e s i r e was wanting i n any case), they could not do so, so long as he continued to be r e - e l e c t e d and r e - e x p e l l e d d u r i n g the same sess i o n s . The s t r u g g l e was t a k i n g on the appearance of a contest between the f i v e hundred and f i f t y Members of the House of Commons and the el e c t o r a t e , of Middlesex, soon to be expanded to i n c l u d e the e l e c t o r a t e of most of England. The r i g h t of t h e e l e c t o r s to r e - e l e c t Wilkes could not be contro-verted; n e i t h e r could t h a t of the House to expel him; so that i t seemed as though there, would be an i n f i n i t e s uccession of r e - e l e c t i o n s and expulsions. The lu d i c r o u s n e s s of the s i t u a t i o n was i m p a i r i n g the d i g n i t y of the House, to preserve which they now resorted to i l l e g a l i t y i n a most f l a g r a n t form. The f o u r t h candidate a g a i n s t Wilkes, i n the A p r i l by-e l e c t i o n , was a C o l o n e l L u t t r e l l , a man of stronger metal than h i s predecessors, not f r i g h t e n e d by the mob, and r e c e i v -i n g f u l l Court support. I n t h i s e l e c t i o n , though L u t t r e l l l o s t by 296 votes to 1143 f o r Wilkes (251), he was declared e l e c t e d by the House of Commons, on Wilkes's f o u r t h expulsion on A p r i l 14th. When t h i s a c t i o n was p e t i t i o n e d a g a i n s t , the d e c l a r a t i o n was r e i t e r a t e d . Though no court could c a l l the House to account, there was no doubt th a t the a c t i o n was (251) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1769, p. 68. without precedent i n B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development (252). The House acted i n a j u d i c i a l c a p a c i t y to e v i c t W i l k e s , which was l e g i t i m a t e , but i t could not act at the same time as a l e g i s l a t i v e body i n r e c o g n i z i n g L u t t r e l l as the Member, and i t could not make l e g i s l a t i o n alone but only i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Lords and the Crown. The c h i e f opponent of the Government was George Gren-0 v i l l e , f i g h t i n g f o r the supremacy of the law r a t h e r than f o r the freedom of Wilkes to take h i s seat. The measure of the s u p e r i o r i t y of G r e n v i l l e as a p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n was t h a t he had to overcome a long-standing a n t i p a t h y to Wilkes an a person to undertake the s t r u g g l e . The common b a t t l e i n defence of the c o n s t i t u t i o n had the e f f e c t of drawing the v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s of the o p p o s i t i o n together. The Government, a l r e a d y weakened by i t s mistakes i n other f i e l d s , found i t s e l f i n a very precarious p o s i t i o n . Instead o f a n n i h i l a t i n g Wilkes by buying or n e g l e c t i n g him, h i s enemies have pushed the court on a s e r i e s of measures th a t have made him e x c e s s i v e l y important; and now every step they take must serve to inc r e a s e h i s f a c t i o n , and make themselves more unpopular ... We are t i r e d of being i n a s i t u a t i o n to give the law to Europe, and now cannot give i t w i t h s a f e t y to the mob -f o r g i v i n g i t , when they are not disposed to r e c e i v e i t , i s of a l l experiments the most dangerous; and whatever may be the consequence i n the end, (252) The o p p o s i t i o n declared t h a t : " ... the house of commons was not a s e l f - c o n s t i t u t e d power, a c t i n g by an inherent r i g h t ; but an e l e c t e d body, r e s t r a i n e d w i t h i n the l i m i t s of a delegated a u t h o r i t y ; hence they could not dispute the r i g h t of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s without sapping the foundation of t h e i r own e x i s t e n c e . " Annual R e g i s t e r . 1769, seldom f a i l s t o f a l l on the heads of those who undertake i t ... I f p r i n c e s or m i n i s t e r s con-s i d e r e d , that, despair makes men f e a r l e s s , i n s t e a d of making them cowards, s u r e l y they would abandon such a f r u i t l e s s p o l i c y . (253) There was c e r t a i n l y a great chance f o r success f o r the Opposition. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was a l r e a d y t o t t e r i n g and such pamphleteers as Junius were s t r i k i n g t e l l i n g blows a t the characters of t h e m i n i s t e r s , and even of the Kin g . At t h i s time the pamphlet war reached a new l e v e l of v i r u l e n c e . ... the l i c e n t i o u s n e s s of abuse surpasses a l l example. The most savage massacre of p r i v a t e characters passes f o r spor t ; but we have l a t e l y had an a t t a c k made on the K i n g h i m s e l f , exceeding the North B r i t o n . Such a paper has been p r i n t e d by the famous Junius, whoever he i s , that i t would scarce have been w r i t t e n before Charles I was i n Carisbrook C a s t l e . (254) Junius was c e r t a i n l y the best known, as w e l l as the a b l e s t of the pamphleteers. Some of h i s p o p u l a r i t y , no doubt arose out of the mystery of h i s i d e n t i t y , which has never been c o n c l u s i v e l y solved, though the weight of evidence seems to favour P h i l i p F r a n c i s , an o f f i c i a l i n the Treasury, but no f r i e n d of the Government. H i s a t t a c k s on Grafton, l a r g e l y unmerited, have perpetuated that statesman's shortcomings, both p o l i t i c a l and moral, f o r succeeding generations. H i s d e s c r i p t i o n of Grafton's r e l a t i o n t o Chatham i n the admini-s t r a t i o n of 1766, i s c l a s s i c . (253) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p.269. (254) I b i d . , p.345. £60. F o r a s h o r t t i m e h i s s u b m i s s i o n t o L o r d Chatham was u n l i m i t e d . He c o u l d not answer a p r i v a t e l e t t e r w i t h o u t L o r d Chatham's p e r m i s s i o n . I presume he was t h e n l e a r n i n g h i s t r a d e , f o r he soon s e t up f o r h i m s e l f . U n t i l he d e c l a r e d him-s e l f t h e M i n i s t e r , h i s c h a r a c t e r had been but l i t t l e u n d e r s t o o d . From t h a t moment, a system o f c o n d u c t , d i r e c t e d by p a s s i o n and c a p r i c e , not o n l y reminds us t h a t he i s a young man, but a young man w i t h o u t s o l i d i t y o r judgment. (255) Or t h e s n e e r s o f J u n i u s a t t h e Duke's i m m o r a l i t y , as b e i n g h e r e d i t a r y , though i t was as much t h e r e s u l t o f weakness as were' t h e b l u n d e r s i n h i s m i n i s t e r i a l c a r e e r . The c h a r a c t e r o f t h e r e p u t e d a n c e s t o r s o f some men, has made i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e i r d escendants t o be v i c i o u s i n t h e extreme, w i t h o u t b e i n g d e g e n e r a t e . Those of your Grace*, f o r i n s t a n c e , l e f t no d i s t r e s s i n g examples o f v i r t u e , even t o t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e p o s t e r i t y , and you may l o o k back w i t h p l e a s u r e t o an i l l u s t r i o u s p e d i g r e e , i n w h i c h h e r a l d r y has not l e f t a s i n g l e good q u a l i t y upon r e c o r d t o i n s u l t o r u p b r a i d you. (256) (* The Duke o f G r a f t o n was t h e g r e a t - g r a n d s o n o f an i l l e g i t i m a t e son o f C h a r l e s I I . ) The d e s c r i p t i o n s o f o t h e r statesmen were a l m o s t as v i t r i o l i c . Chatham, f o r i n s t a n c e , i s seen a s " ... a l u n a t i c b r a n d i s h i n g a c r u t c h , or b a w l i n g t h r o u g h a g r a t e , or w r i t i n g w i t h d e s p e r a t e c h a r c o a l a l e t t e r t o N o r t h A m e r i c a . " (257) Or Camden: Your n e x t f i g u r e must b e a r t h e p o r t and h a b i t o f a j u d g e , The laws, o f E n g l a n d under h i s f e e t , and b e f o r e h i s d i s t o r t e d v i s i o n a dagger, w h i c h he c a l l s the l a w o f n a t u r e , and w h i c h (255) (256) (257) W o o d f a l l , L e t t e r s o f J u n i u s . V o l . I l l , p.167. Op. c i t . , V o l . I, p.141. Op. c i t . , V o l . I I , p.474. 261. marshals him the way t o the murder of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . (258) The l e t t e r s began i n 1768, and under v a r i o u s pseudonyms con-tinued r e g u l a r l y u n t i l the middle of 1771, when they became more i n t e r m i t t e n t , ceasing a l t o g e t h e r e a r l y i n 1772. Other pamphleteers were e q u a l l y a c t i v e , though not n e a r l y so popular, so knowledgeable, nor so v i t r i o l i c . W i l k e s , h i m s e l f , was not behindhand i n a g i t a t i o n , a s s i s t i n g i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of a p e t i t i o n to the K i n g , which the King ignored. Burke's p r e d i c t i o n of the n a t i o n w a r r i n g w i t h the Commons was to be too a c c u r a t e l y f u l f i l l e d . I n the counties and boroughs a movement began to send i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the various Members, t o support Wilkes and the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The Court i n s p i r e d counter-addresses, though these were n a t u r a l l y suspect as being the r e s u l t of b r i b e r y . As a matter of f a c t , the a u t h e n t i c i t y of the addresses on e i t h e r s i d e , other than those from London i t s e l f (where the e l e c t o r s were too numerous to b r i b e e f f e c t i v e l y ) , i s very much open to sus-p i c i o n . Walpole's statement t h a t the Opposition's support i n the country was n e g l i g i b l e (259), i s a r e s u l t of i n s u f f i c i e n t knowledge and p r e j u d i c e , and c e r t a i n l y h i s l e t t e r to Horace Mann of December 31st seems to i n d i c a t e that there was cause f o r alarm, and t h a t r e v o l u t i o n seemed pending. (258) Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius, V o l . I I , p.471 (259) "The greater part of England, a l l Scotland to a man, and Wales, were agai n s t them." Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I , V ol.IV, p.28 262. Opposition t h r e a t e n s , grave men shake t h e i r heads; many fancy they f e a r , and many do f e a r . The best observers see no a t t e n t i o n , no system, and t r u l y very slender a b i l i t i e s i n the opposite s c a l e l (260) I t seemed as though the days of Charles I I had come again, w i t h the country d i v i d e d between p e t i t i o n e r s and abhorers. P e t i t i o n s poured i n on the M i n i s t r y as soon as the s e s s i o n ended; the most v i o l e n t , coming from the L i v e r y of London, c a l l i n g upon t h e K i n g to d i s s o l v e the e r r i n g Parliament. M i n i s t e r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were sent to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e counties to keep them from submitting p e t i t i o n s , Richard Rigby going t o Essex, the Townshends and Walpoles t o N o r f o l k , and the Duke of Bedford to Devonshire (261). Twelve co u n t i e s , i n a l l , p r o t ested a g a i n s t the Government's a c t i o n . The f a c t i o n s of Opposition i n Parliament were more u n i t e d than ever before i n the l a s t decade. More important than a l l t h i s , Lord Chatham had returned t o a c t i v e p o l i t i c s a t the end of 1769, purged by h i s i l l n e s s of a l l p o l i t i c a l ambition and prepared to smash the Government i n the i n t e r e s t s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . On January 27th, 1770, p a r t l y as a r e s u l t of the hammer blows from the popular power, the decadent Grafton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f e l l , and i t seemed as though the Court p a r t y had f a l l e n w i t h i t . (260) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p.345 (261) The o l d Duke of Bedford, when he v i s i t e d Devonshire, was set upon by mobs at Exeter and Honiton, and h i s m i s s i o n was a f a i l u r e . Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . V o l . I l l , p. 252. Then, as the storms seemed to overwhelm t h e s h i p of s t a t e , the calm guidance of the new l e a d e r , Lord North, steered i t i n t o a calm p o l i t i c a l backwater. Though d i s t u r -bances i n the c i t y were to continue f o r s e v e r a l years more, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the a r r e s t of Lord Mayor Crosby i n 1771, the e f f e c t i v e power of the mob, as the a r b i t e r of the p o l i t i c a l d e s t i n y of the n a t i o n , was ended. The Court had won from the depths of d e s p a i r , w i t h no apparent hope of s u r v i v a l as a p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n , i t had won so completely that i t was not s e r i o u s l y challenged f o r ten years. As f o r Wilkes, the prominence he had sought i n v a i n i n Parliament awaited him i n the C i t y . I n 1769, w h i l e he was s t i l l i n p r i s o n , he had been e l e c t e d an Alderman. I n 1774, on h i s t h i r d attempt, he was e l e c t e d Lord Mayor; he became Chamberlain, and i n t h a t l u c r a t i v e o f f i c e became a f r i e n d of the K i n g whom he had so o f t e n thwarted; he was placed i n a f f l u e n t circumstances by h i s many o f f i c e s and he r e t i r e d from p o l i t i c a l warfare i n t h e prime of l i f e . As i f to f i l l out h i s v i c t o r y , i n 1775 he was at l e n g t h returned to Parliament, the ban on h i s membership having been l i f t e d i n 1774. He d i s -appeared i n t o d i g n i f i e d o b s c u r i t y , passing the r e s t of h i s l i f e i n support of the Government, and ... never r a i s e d h i s v o i c e f o r reform or peace, or t o m i t i g a t e the h o s t i l i t y of our Court to the country that had a f f o r d e d him s h e l t e r i n h i s banishment; nor even q u i t t e d the standard of , P i t t when i t marshalled i t s f o l l o w e r s t o a s s a u l t s on the c o n s t i t u t i o n compared w i t h which a l l he had ever imputed aga i n s t Bute sank i n t o mere i n s i g -n i f i c a n c e . (263) ' (262) Murray, Burke, p.147 264. I n e v i t a b l y a comparison i s made between the Wilkes a g i t a t i o n s and the contemporary unrest i n America. The con-n e c t i o n i s very tenuous. At no time d i d Wilkes appear as the defender of the r i g h t s of the c o l o n i s t s , He had, i n f a c t , the t y p i c a l p r e j u d i c e s of the E n g l i s h p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n against the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims of the Americans. Nor was the p a r t y supporting Wilkes i d e n t i c a l w i t h that s u p p o r t i n g the claims of the c o l o n i s t s . Burke and Chatham both abhorred Wilkes p e r s o n a l l y , and n e i t h e r supported the cause of the e l e c t o r s of Middlesex w i t h any enthusiasm. S i m i l a r l y , such American a r i s t o c r a t s as John Adams had the gre a t e s t contempt f o r Wilkes. The foundations of the two causes a l s o v a r i e d . At no time d i d Wilkes urge anything which was outside the framework of the E n g l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n . Nor were h i s demands out of harmony w i t h the moderate t r a d i t i o n s of E n g l i s h r a d i c a l i s m . American r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , on the other hand, soon ceased to appeal t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n and looked to a G-runderichte? t o gain t h e i r • p o i n t . There was no r e a l break w i t h the past i n England; there was a d e f i n i t e break w i t h the past i n America. I t i s hard t o assess the importance of Wilkes as a defender of popular l i b e r t i e s . How much he was a t o o l o f such p o l i t i c i a n s as Temple, and how much a f r e e agent, w i l l probably never be determined. I n a d d i t i o n , h i s enthusiasm f o r the popular cause was always open t o doubt. The achievements of the a g i t a t i o n s of which he was the o s t e n s i b l e l e a d e r , are c l e a r , however. I n an era when the s p i r i t o f parliamentary o p p o s i t i o n had almost d i e d out, there remained i n t h i s a g i t a t i o n a rock upon which the storms of p r e r o g a t i v e power broke i n v a i n . General warrants, a s u r v i v a l from Tudor times, were f i n a l l y r e j e c t e d . Freedom of the p r e s s , though i t was not achieved at once, r e c e i v e d enormous encouragement. Par-liamentary p r i v i l e g e , though f l a g r a n t l y v i o l a t e d i n the case of Wilkes, was much more c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d and protected i n the f u t u r e . The r i g h t of the e l e c t o r s to choose t h e i r repre-s e n t a t i v e s was not s e r i o u s l y c a l l e d i n question again,and a war between Parliament and the country was averted. Behind a l l these p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s , there was an economic cause as w e l l . The commercial c l a s s e s of the c a p i t a l , i n t h e i r campaign f o r economic freedom, attempted to t r a n s l a t e t h e i r new a f f l u e n c e i n t o p o l i t i c a l power. For a moment i t seemed as i f the attempt would be s u c c e s s f u l . For a moment, a l s o , i t seemed as i f even the p r o l e t a r i a t of London was becoming a p o l i t i c a l power. Yet the movement d i d not r e s t upon a s o l i d foundation of p o l i t i c a l sense. I t was premature, and once c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s were s e t t l e d , the i n f l u e n c e of these r i s i n g c l a s s e s faded w i t h t h e i r champion i n t o the p o l i t i c a l limbo. I n the country a t l a r g e , however, t h i s i n f l u e n c e , based upon the more secure rock of l o c a l government, was beginning to r e g u l a t e the economic l i f e of the n a t i o n , and i n the next century was to s e i z e c o n t r o l of the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the n a t i o n as. w e l l . Chapter VI. T r a n s i t i o n i n P a r t i e s ... disconnexion and confusion, i n o f f i c e s , i n p a r t i e s , i n f a m i l i e s , i n parliament, i n the n a t i o n , p r e v a i l beyond the d i s o r d e r s of any former time; these are f a c t s u n i v e r s a l l y admitted and lamented. (263) We must r e t u r n now to the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s among the v a r i o u s parliamentary f a c t i o n s , as they developed a f t e r the f a l l of Lord Bute from power, i n the s p r i n g of 1763. Out of these s t r u g g l e s , i n the f o l l o w i n g seven years, were to come the beginnings of the two major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s of the nineteenth century, and a t h i r d group, l a b e l l e d f o r con-venience, the "King's F r i e n d s , " but, as we have seen, based' on a f a r more complex philosophy and of much more v a r i e d per-sonnel than could be a t t r i b u t e d to mere f r i e n d s h i p f o r the monarch. I t was the r o l e of t h i s t h i r d group, im f a c t , t o d i s r u p t and destroy p a r t y a l l e g i a n c e s such as had been known i n the former r e i g n . F a r from e r a d i c a t i n g p a r t y , however, the d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e of t h i s group was to i n s p i r e the formation of the f i r s t r e a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n E n g l i s h p o l i t i c s . These p a r t i e s were to be bound together, not by t i e s of personal f r i e n d s h i p , nor by hopes of plunder, but by a strong core of p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e and by a permanent p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n which remained i n o p e r a t i o n whether the p a r t y was i n power or i n o p p o s i t i o n . (263) Burke, Thoughts on the present d i s c o n t e n t s , Works, V o l . I I , p.220. The immediate successor of Bute i n the l e a d e r s h i p of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was G-eorge G r e n v i l l e , the a b l e s t of h i s l i e u t e n a n t s . Macaulay, w i t h the Whig- L i b e r a l p r e j u d i c e s con-ce r n i n g the American R e v o l u t i o n and i t s antecedents, has r e f e r r e d to t h i s government as "the worst a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that has governed England s i n c e the R e v o l u t i o n , " but from the f a l l of P i t t i n 1761 u n t i l the appointment of North i n 1770, i n s o f a r as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y i s concerned, i t was c e r -t a i n l y the a b l e s t , i f not the most s u c c e s s f u l of the E n g l i s h governments; and, from the iss u e s i t was c a l l e d upon t o fac e , i t was probably the most important. The character of i t s l e a d e r and a b l e s t member was c e r -t a i n l y a major f a c t o r i n both i t s success and f a i l u r e s . As Mahon has s a i d , G r e n v i l l e was an e x c e l l e n t Speaker s p o i l e d (264). During the l a r g e s t part of a l i f e t i m e spent under the p o l i -t i c a l domination of h i s brother Temple and h i s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w , P i t t , he had a s p i r e d to the Speaker's c h a i r , and would pro-bably have a t t a i n e d i t , had not the u n s e t t l e d s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s consequent on the f a l l of P i t t and Newcastle i n s p i r e d him to take counsel of h i s own ambitions, r a l l y to Bute, and succeed to t h a t leader's r a t h e r uneasy i n h e r i t a n c e . H i s was a temperament w i t h more grasp of l e g a l precedent than l e g a l p r i n c i p l e , though he was f a r more at home i n e i t h e r than most of h i s opponents. He had a high sense o f duty, and h i s p o l i t i c a l l i f e was a model of honesty and a s s i d u i t y to business. L i k e h i s two d i s t i n g u i s h e d r e l a t i v e s , he was (264) Lord Mahon, H i s t o r y of England i n the eighteenth century, V o l . V, p.51. possessed o f a narrow and p e r t i n a c i o u s p r i d e and a l a c k o f t a c t which gained him many unmerited enemies. He was querulous, long-winded and s e l f - r i g h t e o u s , and George I l l ' s c l a s s i c remark t h a t : "When he has wearied me f o r two hours, he looks a t h i s watch t o see i f he may not t i r e me f o r an hour more," (865) i n d i c a t e s t h a t he d i d not d i s g u i s e h i s d e f e c t s , even i n the presence o f r o y a l t y . He nursed a grudge a g a i n s t h i s r e l a t i v e s f o r h i s l o n g o b s c u r i t y , and w h i l e he was i n o f f i c e c l a s h e d b i t t e r l y w i t h them. L a t e r , a f t e r h i s f a l l from power he h e l d s i m i l a r a n t i p a t h i e s f o r Bute and the K i n g . An economist, he f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the nation-icould not support the war or the empire as i t was then c o n s t i t u t e d , and planned wise and sweeping reforms i n t h e i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e . He c e r t a i n l y had the a c t i v e support o f the House of Commons throughout h i s M i n i s t r y , as much because of h i s great p a r l i a m e n t a r y g i f t s as because he had the b e n e f i t o f t h r o y a l patronage system; i n f a c t , P i t t c o n s i d e r e d him the best p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n i n t h e House (866). Burke's panegyric on him, i n t h e Speech on American t a x a t i o n , p r o b a b l y comes ne a r e s t t o deter m i n i n g h i s t r u e motive i n p o l i t i c s . Undoubtedly Mr. G r e n v i l l e was a f i r s t r a t e f i g u r e i n t h e country. With a masculine' understanding, a st o u t and r e s o l u t e h e a r t , he had (865) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis o f Rockingham. V o l . I , p.67. (866) I b i d . , p.66. See a l s o : Namier, England i n the age of the American r e v o l u t i o n , p.345, e t . seq. an a p p l i c a t i o n , u n d i s s i p a t e d and unwearied. He took p u b l i c k business, not as a duty which, he was to f u l f i l , but as a pleasure he was t o enjoy; and he seemed to have no d e l i g h t out of the House, except i n such t h i n g s as some way r e l a t e d t o the business t h a t was t o be done w i t h i n i t . (267) I n i t i a l l y , he laboured under the disadvantage of having to a d m inister the h e r i t a g e of the p o l i t i c a l l y defunct Lord Bute, whose ghost continued to hover a t h i s elbow. I n a d d i t i o n , he d i d not succeed to the unchallenged power which he had hoped f o r , but had to share i t as p a r t of a t r i u m -v i r a t e w i t h the two i n f l u e n t i a l S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e , the E a r l s of H a l i f a x and Egremont. Ne i t h e r had the a b i l i t y of G r e n v i l l e , . although both held more p o l i t i c a l power. The death of Egremont i n September, 1763, and the subsequent e l l i p s e of H a l i f a x because of h i s u n p o p u l a r i t y i n the Wilkes drama, l e f t the stage c l e a r f o r G r e n v i l l e , although he was fo r c e d to adopt the Bedford f a c t i o n almost wholesale to keep h i s government a l i v e , and was saddled w i t h t h i s a l l i a n c e f o r n e a r l y f i v e years t h e r e a f t e r . The Bedford f a c t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y worthy of c l o s e r a t t e n t i o n than has h i t h e r t o been p a i d to i t . Despite the f a c t that i t s p r e s t i g e as a p a r t y was jeopardized by i t s r a p a c i t y f o r o f f i c e and the s p o i l s of o f f i c e , i t represented one of the most v i t a l f a c t o r s i n a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , - the centre p a r t y . I n a l l the combinations of f a c t i o n s that were to be made and attempted i n the f o l l o w i n g decade, the Bedford (267) Burke, Works. V o l . I I , pp.388-389. 270. p a r t y was almost always the concomitant which made.the union p o s s i b l e . Undoubtedly i t s members were o f f i c e - s e e k e r s ; the Duchess of Bedford yearned to be M i s t r e s s of the Robes t o the Queen; Rigby and Sandwich were the most unblushing of p l a c e -men, and even the i n s i g n i f i c a n t E a r l Gower had a l i f e - l o n g ambition to be Lord P r e s i d e n t . However, other p a r t i e s a l s o had t h e i r place-seekers. I t was the success of the Bedford f a c t i o n i n gai n i n g and r e t a i n i n g o f f i c e throughout so many of the turns of the p o l i t i c a l wheel that rendered them open to the s u s p i c i o n of l a c k i n g p o l i t i c a l p r o b i t y , and t h i s very success grew out of t h e i r p o s i t i o n as the centre p a r t y . The Duke of Bedford's ambition had lo n g been to r e - u n i t e the seg-ments of the Whig P a r t y under h i s l e a d e r s h i p , and to t h i s end, when h i s p a r t y assumed o f f i c e i n September, 1765, he advised the King to open n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P i t t , - o f f e r i n g to act as go-between. H i s s e r v i c e s were r e j e c t e d , s i n c e Bute d i s t r u s t e d him, and the task of making the contact was assigned to the E a r l of Shelburne. G r e n v i l l e ' s p o s i t i o n i n the M i n i s t r y i n i t s f i r s t months was by no means secure. Forced t o share power w i t h H a l i f a x and Egremont, he had a l s o resented v o c a l l y and p u b l i c l y the King's continued f r i e n d s h i p and c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h Lord Bute. I n a d d i t i o n he had a l i e n a t e d Lord Holland by h i s o p p o s i t i o n to that p o l i t i c i a n ' s methods i n purging the Commons. Thus, when G r e n v i l l e achieved high o f f i c e , he was almost i s o l a t e d . Even f i v e years l a t e r , w i t h the wealth and p r e s t i g e of h i s brother supporting him, h i s personal f o l l o w i n g i n the 271. Commons d i d not number more than a dozen (268). Such i s o l a t i o n hardened him, and h i s f e a r of high o f f i c e changed to a demand from the r e l u c t a n t K i n g f o r the f u l l powers of a prime m i n i s t e r . He f e l t a sense of a m i s s i o n to preserve the Crown, but t h i s meant to him p r e s e r v a t i o n from such men as Bute, as w e l l as from Whigs of the Newcastle-Devonshire s c h o o l . The ac c u s a t i o n that he basely deserted Bute a f t e r the l a t t e r had r a i s e d him to high o f f i c e i s nonsense. G r e n v i l l e became F i r s t Lord of the Treasury i n A p r i l , 1763, because he was m a n i f e s t l y the best person f o r the post, and h i s s o - c a l l e d t r e a c h e r y a g a i n s t Bute was merely the p e r f e c t l y c o r r e c t and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e s t to the King t h a t there cannot be two sets of r o y a l a d v i s e r s . (268) F o i l i n g , The second Tory p a r t y , 1714-1832, p.92. Note a l s o the contemporary comment on the weakness of the G r e n v i l l e f a c t i o n : Whence, s a i d the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y , i s de r i v e d the power of these new m i n i s t e r s ? Not from t h e i r overbear-i n g weight of property i n the kingdom; not from t h e i r great parliamentary i n t e r e s t , or t h e i r s u p e r i o r p a r l i a -mentary t a l e n t s ... What then was the end of t h e i r appointment? This c l e a r l y , and nothing e l s e ; t h a t having no s o l i d ground of power i n themselves, they might act as the passive instruments of that m i n i s t e r , who, from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of h i s own personal s a f e t y and q u i e t , without abandoning h i s ambitious p r o j e c t s , has thought proper to conceal h i s operations than r e t i r e from a c t i o n . Annual r e g i s t e r . 1763, pp.40.41 272. The death of Egremont not only r e s u l t e d i n the i n c l u s i o n of the Bedford p a r t y i n the M i n i s t r y (269), but a l s o i n s p i r e d n e g o t i a t i o n s among the Opposition f a c t i o n s and between them and the K i n g , f o r the replacement of the m a n i f e s t l y weakened Government. Bute's n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P i t t had been going on f o r some time and the l a t t e r , on the death of Egremont, was sent f o r by the K i n g , w i t h the purpose of suggesting a m i n i s t r y . P i t t had a l r e a d y conducted n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Old Whigs under Newcastle and had disagreed on such v i t a l t o p i c s as the Northern A l l i a n c e , and the i n c l u s i o n of the makers of the Peace of P a r i s i n t h e Cabinet, and was i n no mood to accept any but the purest of w a r - p a t r i o t Whigs. The o s t e n s i b l e reason f o r the f a i l u r e of the n e g p t i a t i o n s was the r e f u s a l of P i t t t o accept G r e n v i l l e , and of the K i n g t o accept Temple i n the M i n i s t r y , but the u n f o r g i v i n g s p i r i t of the Great Commoner on the one hand, and the f e a r s of Lord Bute as to a p o s s i b l e r i v a l on the other, were probably the r e a l reason. I n any event, G r e n v i l l e was f o r c e d to accept the a l l i a n c e of the Bedfords and found h i m s e l f i n c r e a s i n g l y . u n d e r (269) Sandwich became Secr e t a r y of S t a t e f o r the Southern Department, Rigby, Vice-Treasurer f o r I r e l a n d , and the Duke of Bedford became Lord P r e s i d e n t i n September, 1763. Shelburne resigned from the Board of Trade soon a f t e r , so t h a t o n l y three r e a l "King's F r i e n d s " remained i n the Cabinet, Lords Egmont, H i l l s b o r o u g h , and Northington, a l l men of minor a b i l i t i e s . the n e c e s s i t y of sharing the r e a l power w i t h them. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s s e t t l e d : the o p p o s i t i o n does not come i n : and the o l d m i n i s t e r s have resumed t h e i r f u n c t i o n s . The Duke of Bedford, who had formerly advised t o i n v i t e Mr. P i t t to Court, f i n d i n g himself omitted i n Mr. P i t t ' s l i s t , i s c o r d i a l l y u n i t e d , nay, i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h the adminis-t r a t i o n ; he has k i s s e d hands f o r the President of the C o u n c i l ... Many reasons are given, hut the o n l y one t h a t people choose to take i s , t h a t , t h i n k i n g Mr. P i t t must he m i n i s t e r , and . f i n d i n g himself t o l e r a b l y obnoxious to him, he i s seeking to make h i s peace at any r a t e . (270) However much G r e n v i l l e may have d i s l i k e d sharing power w i t h i i e d f o r d , he found him a l o y a l and u s e f u l a l l y , i n a time of c r i s i s . The M i n i s t r y was most unfortunate i n the f a c t that i t s measures, s i n c e both the a r r e s t and expulsion of Wilkes and the passage of the Stamp Act r a i s e d a storm o f popular, and o f t e n u n t h i n k i n g , p r o t e s t . C e r t a i n l y the d i s m i s s a l of army o f f i c e r s f o r t h e i r vote against general warrants was u n j u s t i f i e d , and i t was t h i s measure, more than any other, which served to u n i t e the o p p o s i t i o n and re-open n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P i t t , i n the s p r i n g of 1765. The c h i e f grievance of the Government, meanwhile, had been w i t h the continued i n f l u e n c e , or supposed i n f l u e n c e , of Lord Bute w i t h the King. There was complete u n i t y w i t h i n the Cabinet on t h i s i s s u e . (270) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V, p.371. 274. L i k e G r e n v i l l e , the Duke s t i p u l a t e d f o r t h a t which the K i n g himself proposed, namely, the e x c l u s i o n of Lord Bute from n i s presence, and from any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s . And the f a v o u r i t e himself wrote to the K i n g , s t a t i n g t h a t f o r h i s Majesty's s e r v i c e as w e l l as f o r hiH own ease, he was resolved to remain at h i s house the ensuing w i n t e r . (271) The t h r e a t was ephemeral, s i n c e from the d i s m i s s a l of Bute u n t i l h i s f i n a l e c l i p s e i n 1765, h i s i n f l u e n c e was growing s t e a d i l y weaker. The K i n g was coming more and more to imagine that he could be h i s own prime m i n i s t e r . P o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , however, observing t h a t Bute was s t i l l welcome at the Court, drew i t s own c o n c l u s i o n s . Lord Bute's f r i e n d s say 'that he has no wish but f o r the ease and honour of h i s Majesty's government; t h a t he does not d e s i r e to see the M i n i s t e r s e i t h e r dismissed or d i s t r e s s e d , nor has he any degree of connexion w i t h those now i n o p p o s i t i o n , and consequently can have no p l a n f o r b r i n g i n g men i n t o power w i t h whom, he has n e i t h e r f r i e n d s h i p or communication ... ' Yet h i s frequent i n t e r v i e w s w i t h the K i n g , h i s constant attendance when i n town at C a r l e t o n House, must give r i s e to many conjectures, and those who have been educated i n Court i n t r i g u e s cannot suppose such p r i v a t e conversations can t u r n upon any other than the most i n t e r e s t i n g p u b l i c s u b j e c t s . (272) Bedford's enmity f o r Bute was g r e a t l y increased by the rough handling which he experienced during the S p i t a l f i e l d s (271) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, Vo l . 1 , p.176. Bedford and Bute had o r i g i n a l l y q u a r r e l l e d when Bedford was the p l e n i p o t e n t i a r y f o r the Peace i n 1762, and had opposed Bute's p o l i c y of l i m i t e d war f o r p o p u l a r i t y , i n favour of peace a t any p r i c e . (272) Great B r i t a i n , H i s t o r i c a l manuscripts commission, Rept. 15, App., P t . 33, " S t o p f o r d - S a c k v i l l e " , V o l . 1, p.62. L e t t e r from Lord George S a c k v i l l e to Charles Townshend, Summer of 1764. £75. weavers' r i o t s . Bedford, as a convinced f r e e - t r a d e r , voted against a p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f on imported s i l k s i n the s p r i n g of 1765. The mob a s s a u l t e d h i s c a r r i a g e and l a t e r stormed h i s house, i t s excesses having to be r e s t r a i n e d by troops. Bedford openly accused Bute of i n c i t i n g the mob and openly abused him t o the King's f a c e . The King was c e r t a i n l y weary o f the demands of the M i n i s t r y and was i n search of an a l t e r n a t i v e . One f u r t h e r event brought him to the f i n a l break. I n March, 1765, the King became i l l , s u f f e r i n g from the f i r s t a t t a c k of that i n s a n i t y which i n l a t e r years was to become i n c u r a b l e . On h i s recovery i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t some p r o v i s i o n should be made f o r a regency i n case of a long i l l n e s s . A c c o r d i n g l y , on A p r i l £4th, a Regency B i l l was proposed i n the speech from the throne. I t was introduced i n the Lords on A p r i l 29th, and by i t s terms the K i n g was given the r i g h t to name the Queen "or any other member of t h e Royal Family u s u a l l y r e s i d e n t i n England" as regent. The wording was made pur-posely vague, f o r the M i n i s t r y was anxious to exclude the Princess-Dowager from the Regency, because of her connection w i t h Lord Bute. At t h i s j u n c t u r e , however, Temple se i z e d the opportunity to embarrass the Government and questioned the vagueness of the phraseology. When the b i l l was moved i n t o committee, the^Duke of Richmond, f o r the Whigs, moved an amendment t o . the e f f e c t t h a t e l i g i b i l i t y f o r the Regency should i n c l u d e the Queen, the Princess-Dowager and a l l descendants of George 276. I I r e s i d e n t i n England. The Government a t t h i s p o i n t , not having the consummate l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t s of M a n s f i e l d a v a i l a b l e - t o them, was confused over t h i s amendment, though i t f i n a l l y r e j e c t e d i t . Next day, however, Lord H a l i f a x announced that he would accept the amendment i f the Princess-Dowager's name was omitted. Sandwich and H a l i f a x had already persuaded the Ki n g that such omission was necessary, i f the b i l l was to pass the House of Commons, or, indeed, i f the M i n i s t r y was to r e t a i n the support of the Commons at a l l . Hence, when H a l i f a x announced h i s acceptance of the amendment he a l s o s t a t e d t h a t the omission of the P r i n c e s s ' s name was by t h e King's request. When the b i l l came before the House of Commons, however, an amendment to i n s e r t the P r i n c e s s ' s name was passed 167 to 37! The S e c r e t a r i e s of State then had the supreme m o r t i f i c a t i o n of having, to urge the acceptance of the measure, thus amended, i n the House of Lords. When the d e t a i l s of the a f f r o n t were f u l l y revealed to the K i n g , he was moret determined than ever to get r i d of the G r e n v i l l e M i n i s t r y . One remedy i s obvious, and at which, a f t e r such i n s u l t s and provocations, were I Lord Bute, I should not s t i c k ; I would d e l i v e r myself up, bound hand and f o o t , t o Mr. P i t t ... (273) I t was to P i t t , i n poin t of f a c t , t h a t the Ki n g turned, u s i n g the Duke of Cumberland as go-between. I t was hoped that through the agency of Cumberland, P i t t might be induced (273) Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V I , p.229. to patch up h i s q u a r r e l w i t h the Rockiagham Whigs and le a d an u n i t e d Whig Government. I t can be judged from these proposals t h a t George was desperate to get r i d of h i s Government. New-c a s t l e was w i l l i n g t o j o i n , though Rockingham demurred, not wishing to be dominated by P i t t i n the le a d e r s h i p o f the Government. I t was, however, from P i t t that the c h i e f o b j e c t i o n s came. The main p o i n t s f o r d i s c u s s i o n were the r e -instatement of those o f f i c e r s who had been dismissed because of t h e i r parliamentary votes; the c r e a t i o n of a northern a l l i a n c e against the Family Compact; the condemnation of general warrants; the e l e v a t i o n of Ch i e f J u s t i c e P r a t t to the peerage, and the r e p e a l of the c i d e r tax. When the con-d i t i o n s were communicated to the Ki n g , there was much tempo-r i z i n g , s ince George I I I e v i d e n t l y hoped to r e p l a c e G r e n v i l l e and Bedford by a M i n i s t r y which would c a r r y weight w i t h t h e country, and yet not commit himself to a se r i o u s change of p o l i c y . He was opposed to the Northern A l l i a n c e , and wished that e i t h e r the E a r l of Northumberland or Lord Egmont might be prime m i n i s t e r r a t h e r than P i t t ' s nominee, E a r l Temple. Cumberland was thereupon commissioned to see P i t t a t h i s home and t r y the e f f e c t s of personal persuasion. P i t t ' s r e a c t i o n to the r o y a l proposals i s probably best t o l d i n Cumberland's own words. P i t t , as was u s u a l when he d i d not t r u s t h i s audience, was ambiguous and f u l l of verbiage. ... he had s t i l l vigour and strength of mind t o undertake business, i f he saw p r o b a b i l i t y of success; t h a t , as to f o r e i g n a f f a i r s (which he began with) he was a f r a i d t h a t h i s personal ideas 278. were so much, d i s l i k e d at Court; he would even own that perhaps nine men i n ten i n the kingdom were against him i n opinion,and t h e r e f o r e i t rendered him, i f not t o t a l l y improper to enter i n t o h i s Majesty's C o u n c i l , a t l e a s t i t would i n c a p a c i t a t e him from a c t i n g i n the intended sphere of S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , as, i n honour, he never could set h i s hand to what was d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite to h i s o p i n i o n . That i n any other s i t u a t i o n , he would gi v e h i s negative o r . s i n g l e v o i c e i n C o u n c i l without f u r t h e r consequence a t t e n d i n g thereon; t h a t , without f o r e i g n a f f a i r s were a l t e r e d , he could see hut l i t t l e hopes that other t h i n g s , e q u a l l y necessary, would f o l l o w ... (274) On the same day (May 12th), that Cumberland was i n t e r -viewing P i t t , the K i n g t o l d G r e n v i l l e t h a t he hoped never to see h i s f a c e i n the C l o s e t again, but the next day was forced to accept him back on h i s own terms. The King i n d i c a t e d p l a i n l y , however, that he would take the f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y to get r i d of the M i n i s t r y (275). The Government, however, used t h i s r e p r i e v e to triumph u n m e r c i f u l l y over the King. The S p i t a l f i e l d s r i o t s seemed to n e c e s s i t a t e the appointment of a m i l i t a r y commander. The K i n g proposed the Duke of Cumberland who c a u t i o u s l y d e c l i n e d , but the Government declared t h a t the (274) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . I , p.202. (275) On the 18th of May ? Mr. G r e n v i l l e waited upon the K i n g w i t h the speech which was to c l o s e the s e s s i o n . "There i s no hurry," s a i d the King; " I w i l l have the Parliament adjourned, not prorogued."- - "Has your Majesty any thoughts of making a change i n your A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ? " inquired- G r e n v i l l e . - " C e r t a i n l y , " was the r e p l y , " I can-not bear i t as i t i s . " -- " I hope your Majesty w i l l not order me to c u t my own t h r o a t ? " - "Then," s a i d the K i n g , "who must adjourn the P a r l i a m e n t ? " - "Whoever," r e p l i e d the M i n i s t e r , "your Majesty s h a l l appoint my successor." I b i d . , p.203. appointment of Cumberland would be dangerous i n a f r e e country. F o r t u n a t e l y , the r i o t s abated before a d e c i s i o n had t o be made. F o l l o w i n g t h i s q u a r r e l , the Government presented the King w i t h an ultimatum of terms which must be complied w i t h i f the M i n i s t r y was to continue i n o f f i c e . The terms were outrageous, even c o n s i d e r i n g the provocation which G r e n v i l l e had been under. On Wednesday, the M i n i s t e r s d i c t a t e d t h e i r terms; you w i l l not expect moderation, and accor-d i n g l y there was not a g r a i n : they demanded a l o y a l promise of never c o n s u l t i n g Lord Bute; secondly, the d i s m i s s i o n of Mr. Makinsy (Mackenzie) from the d i r e c t i o n of Scotland; t h i r d l y , and l a s t l y , f o r they could go no f u r t h e r , the crown i t s e l f - or, i n t h e i r words, the immediate * nomination of Lord Granby to be Captain-General. You may f i g u r e the King's i n d i g n a t i o n - f o r h i m s e l f , f o r h i s f a v o u r i t e , f o r h i s uncle. (276)• In a d d i t i o n to these demands, t h e Government s u c c e s s f u l l y i n s i s t e d on the removal of Lord Holland from the Pay O f f i c e , which was thereupon given t o Charles Townshend. The K i n g choked on the demands, but submitted t o them, at the same time re-opening n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P i t t , w i t h whom he was now prepared to bargain at almost any p r i c e , to be r i d of the odious c o a l i t i o n . He was f o r c e d to submit to one more h u m i l i a t i o n , however. He continued to show marked favour to the Duke of Cumberland (276) Walpole. L e t t e r s . V o l . VI, p.244. 280. and even to the Cavendishes (277). The Government r e t a l i a t e d on June 12th, when the Duke of Bedford, accompanied by Sand-wich, G r e n v i l l e and H a l i f a x , presented,a remonstrance to the King. Bedford, i n an hour of querulous and impertinent i n t e r r o g a t i o n , sealed the f a t e of the M i n i s t r y . According to h i s own account he asked the King: ... leave to r e c a p i t u l a t e to him what had passed between him and h i s M i n i s t e r s from the time he avowed the design of changing h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to t h e i r being c a l l e d back again by him to resume t h e i r f u n c t i o n s . Whether h i s countenance and support had not been pro-mised them? Whether t h i s promise, had been kept? but, on the co n t r a r y , whether a l l those who are our most b i t t e r enemies had not been countenanced by him i n p u b l i c ? and whether.we and our f r i e n d s had not met w i t h a treatment d i r e c t l y opposite t o t h i s ? ... Having r e c e i v e d no s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to any of these questions, nor indeed any other but that Lord Bute was not at a l l consulted, and that he had never done me any i l l offices w i t h h i s Majesty, I proceeded to beseech himto permit h i s a u t hority-and h i s favour and countenance to go together; and i f the l a s t can't be given to h i s present M i n i s t e r s , t o t r a n s f e r t o others t h a t a u t h o r i t y , which must be u s e l e s s i n t h e i r hands," unless strengthened by the former. (278) When i t i s remembered t h a t t h i s statement was made i n an age when the King's r i g h t to choose h i s own a d v i s e r s (subject to acceptance by the House of Commons), was acknow-ledged, i t i s no wonder th a t the K i n g almost " s u f f o c a t e d w i t h i n d i g n a t i o n . " (279) (277) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . 1 , p.212. (278) Bedford Correspondence, c i t e d by Mumby, George III and the American r e v o l u t i o n , pp.108-109 (279) Albemarle, l o c . c i t . He took Bedford at h i s word, however, and opened negotiations, w i t h P i t t . In. two meetings, on the 19th and 22nd of June, he came to a complete agreement on a l l matters of p o l i c y w i t h the Great Commoner. The Kin g was even w i l l i n g to accept Temple as. F i r s t Lord of the Treasury, although the l a t t e r ' s sympathy w i t h h i s brother G r e n v i l l e made him an und e s i r a b l e cabinet m i n i s t e r . P i t t f e l t the need f o r a r e l i a b l e colleague i n the Lords and Temple had resigned w i t h him i n 1761, but the u n c e r t a i n G r e n v i l l e temperament now as s e r t e d i t s e l f . U n a t t r a c t i v e p e r s o n a l l y , proud, o s t e n t a t i o u s , i n s o l e n t , and ambitious, Lord Temple, l i k e h i s b r o t h e r , had resented the dominance of P i t t , and wished now t o p l a y the r o l e of the in d i s p e n s a b l e l e a d e r . He had d i v i d e d w i t h P i t t over the -taxation of the c o l o n i e s , and he was c e r t a i n l y sus-p i c i o u s of the l a t t e r ' s continued communications w i t h Lord Bute (280). I n a d d i t i o n , he had managed a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h h i s brother, G r e n v i l l e . A l l of these f a c t o r s , and p r i n c i p a l l y the f i r s t and the l a s t , c o n t r i b u t e d to h i s r e f u s a l to take o f f i c e a t th a t time, h i s expl a n a t i o n being that h i s reasons were of too p r i v a t e and personal a nature to d i v u l g e . The l a s t hope of an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n which he could have an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r e s t was l o s t to the King, and he turned i n desperation to the Rockingham Whigs. ... defeated i n h i s own wish f o r a v e i l e d Bute r e s t o r a t i o n , prevented by Temple from Using P i t t , and for c e d t o make good h i s word that ' t h i s (280) Imlach, "Lord Temple and the M i n i s t r y of 1765," E.H.R.. A p r i l , 1915, p.520. country i s not at the low ebb tha t no adminis-t r a t i o n can be formed without the G r e n v i l l e f a m i l y , ' ... never was there a l e s s w i l l i n g a c t ; 'necessity, not choice has made me take s e v e r a l steps that cut Me to the S o u l . , , f (281) By 1765 s e v e r a l f a i r l y w e l l - d e f i n e d f a c t i o n s had been developed out of the r u i n of the o l d Whig P a r t y . The Bed-fo r d s have been discussed already. I n the vaguely defined party, known now as the "King's F r i e n d s , " were numbered such op p o r t u n i s t s as Lords H i l l s b o r o u g h , Egmont, and Northington, and c i v i l servants l i k e Dyson, E l l i s and Jenkinson. I n a d d i t i o n there was a l e g a l contingent, represented notably by M a n s f i e l d and Thurlow, and soon to be j o i n e d by Alexander Wedderburn. I n a d d i t i o n there were a few i n t e l l e c t u a l T o r i e s l i k e Blackstone (author of the famous Commentaries). and Lord North, nominally a supporter of P i t t , but a c t u a l l y h o l d i n g to the precepts of Bolingbroke i n the matter of the r o y a l pre-r o g a t i v e . In the o p p o s i t i o n , the opinions h e l d by the va r i o u s s e c t i o n s depended upon the date a t which they made t h e i r stand against the power of the Court, or were r e j e c t e d from the patronage system. Thus, the G r e n v i l l e f a c t i o n , the sma l l e s t and most r e c e n t l y out o f o f f i c e , was the most v i r u l e n t opponent of the Court, and at the same time the l e a s t able t o make e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n * I t s e r s t w h i l e a l l i e s , the Bedfords, because of t h e i r f u n c t i o n as a centre p a r t y , were never vigorous i n o p p o s i t i o n , and were soon b a r g a i n i n g t h e i r way (281) Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . Vol.11, p. 122. 283. back i n t o o f f i c e . The f o l l o w e r s of P i t t , a handful of West Country gentry and a few r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the London mer-c a n t i l e i n t e r e s t , were implacable foes of the recent p o l i c y i n regard to America, and of general warrants, but were w i l l i n g to n e g o t i a t e w i t h the Court P a r t y under c e r t a i n . t e r m s . The weakness of t h i s f a c t i o n was that i t s whole s t r e n g t h l a y i n the p r e s t i g e and f o r e n s i c s k i l l of P i t t , and without them, i t was l i k e l y to s p l i t between the "King's F r i e n d s " and the main Whig body. Before a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s l a t t e r p a r t y i s entered upon, two f i g u r e s who, by reason of t h e i r p e c u l i a r characters and c l a i m s , dwelt o u t s i d e the main framework of f a c t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , should be noted. These were Charles Town-shend and Charles Yorke. Both were nominally Whigs, and both d i v i d e d t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e u n e a s i l y between the camps of Rocking-ham and P i t t . Here the resemblance ends. Townshend, the most b r i l l i a n t man of h i s or any age, was the a t t r a c t i v e and i r r e s p o n s i b l e weathercock of E n g l i s h p o l i t i c s , d e s e r t i n g P i t t f o r G r e n v i l l e i n 1765 to o b t a i n the Paymaster-Generalship, cooperating w i t h Rockingham, although he had the greatest contempt f o r that l e a d e r , and f i n a l l y s u b v e r t i n g the p o l i c i e s o f the Chatham M i n i s t r y , i n order to be i n a p o s i t i o n to l e a d i t s successor. He s t a t e d f r a n k l y t h a t as a younger son he would have to look out f o r h i s own i n t e r e s t s (282), and, (282) He t o l d the Duke of Devonshire u n b l u s h i n g l y 'that he was a younger brother, and i f nothing was to be made out o f o p p o s i t i o n or no a c t i v e measures pursued he would ... consider himself at l i b e r t y to take what part 284. although l a c k i n g i n method, he adhered to t h i s purpose w i t h some degree of success. H i s consummate debating s k i l l and considerable general p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t s were always i n demand, which helps to e x p l a i n h i s continued acceptance by a l l f a c t i o n s , d e s p i t e h i s untrustworthiness (283). The case of Yorke i s completely d i f f e r e n t . His was a s t o r y of l e g i t i m a t e ambition u n f a i r l y thwarted. He had been Attorney-G-eneral under Newcastle, and had been promised the Woolsack by both Newcastle and P i t t , and l a t e r by Rockingham. He had gone out of o f f i c e i n 1762, w i t h the reasonable hope (282) cont'd. would be most convenient to him. W i l l i a m s , L i f e o f P i t t . V o l . I I , p.155. (283) I n t r u t h , S i r , he was the d e l i g h t and ornament of t h i s house and the charm of every p r i v a t e s o c i e t y which he honoured w i t h h i s presence ... I f he had not so great a stock, as some have had who f l o u r i s h e d f o r m e r l y , of knowledge long treasured up, he knew b e t t e r by f a r , t h a n any man I ever was acquainted w i t h , how to b r i n g together w i t h i n a short time, a l l that was necessary to e s t a b l i s h , to i l l u s t r a t e and to decorate that s i d e of the question he supported ... He h i t the house j u s t between wind and water. - And not being t r o u b l e d w i t h too anxious a z e a l f o r amy matter i n question, he was never more t e d i o u s , or more earnest, than the pre-conceived o p i n i o n s , and present temper of h i s hearers r e q u i r e d ; to whom he was always i n p e r f e c t union. He conformed e x a c t l y to the temper of the house; and he seemed to guide because he was always sure to f o l l o w i t . Burke, Works. V o l . I I , pp. 422-423. As to h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r trimming, C h e s t e r f i e l d comments: "We hear the Right Honourable C h a r l e s Townshend i s indisposed at h i s house i n O x f o r d s h i r e , of a p a i n i n h i s s i d e ; but i t i s not s a i d i n which side. T" C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s . V o l . I I , p.842. 885. that h i s promotion would not he too long delayed when the Whigs once more a t t a i n e d o f f i c e . He returned to the Attorney-Generalship under G r e n v i l l e , but the debauched person of Northington was s t i l l f i r m l y planted upon the Woolsack, as i t had been s i n c e 1757. When Rockingham came.to power, he might have expected promotion, but Northington was r e t a i n e d to please the King; w i t h the accession of Chatham, Camden had to be accommodated. A l l p a r t i e s acknowledged the paramount claims of Yorke, yet d i d nothing to secure them. F i n a l l y , i n 1770, when hope had almost d i e d , he was asked to succeed Camden i n o f f i c e . I t was a poisoned c h a l i c e he was handed, however. The Grafton M i n i s t r y was dying; Yorke might g i v e i t s t r e n g t h , but he would have to desert h i s p a r t y , the Rockingham Whigs, to do i t . A f t e r three days of persuasion and t h r e a t s on the p a r t of the K i n g , he accepted. Three days l a t e r he was dead, probably a s u i c i d e from remorse (284). The Rockingham Whigs, who succeeded to o f f i c e on the 10th of J u l y , 1765, were as yet the successors and s u r v i v o r s of the Old Whigs of the days of Walpole and Pelham. S t i l l under the i n f l u e n c e of the o l d Duke of Newcastle, who was Lord P r i v y S e a l i n the new M i n i s t r y , they l i v e d c o n s t a n t l y i n the past, wedded to the s a n c t i t y of the settlement of 1688 and a l l i t s c o r o l l a r i e s e s t a b l i s h e d under the f i r s t two Hanoverian monarchs. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the great Whig leaders (884) For a f u l l account of t h i s unhappy episode, see W i l l i a m s , B a s i l , "The e c l i p s e of the Yorkes," Trans-a c t i o n s of the Royal h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y , 3rd S e r i e s , V o l . I I , 1908. p.137. 286. were n e a r l y a l l dead by 1765,and t h e i r successors were l a c k -i n g i n both experience and t a l e n t . The par t y a s s i d u o u s l y challenged the Government on unpopular i s s u e s , such as the c i d e r tax and general warrants, but d e s p i t e i t s a c t i v i t y , by the time i t took o f f i c e , i t was weaker than i t had ever been before. The party lacked a p l a t f o r m and a philosophy to cement i t together, i t la c k e d l e a d e r s , i t lacked P i t t , but most of a l l i t lacked o f f i c e , the one necessary concomitant to p a r t y u n i t y i n the mid-eighteenth century. They were the only r e a l champions of the p a r t y system i n the decade, and t h e r e f o r e i n c u r r e d the undying enmity of both the King and Chatham, the two i n d i v i d u a l s upon whom t h e i r f u t u r e s t r e n g t h r e l i e d . They were, moreover, a party without a r e a l purpose. Newcastle's philosophy can be summed up i n the phrase: "Employment f o r f r i e n d s to the Government," i n other words, jobs f o r h i s f r i e n d s ; Rockingham lacked any r e a l d e s i r e to be a p a r t y leader and undertook h i s o f f i c e out of a sense of duty. Others were reformed T o r i e s , d i s g r u n t l e d o f f i c e - h o l d e r s or rabble-rousers. I t r e q u i r e d a u n i t i n g f o r c e , a p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n and dogma, to make i t a p o l i t i c a l power. I t was to gaioi these from the work of Rockingham's s e c r e t a r y , an Irishman named Edmund Burke. Although Burke's party p h i l o s o p h i e s do not take f u l l e f f e c t i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the n a t i o n u n t i l the end of the eighteenth century, they were a powerful i n f l u e n c e i n maintaining an e f f e c t i v e core of o p p o s i t i o n i n the Rocking-ham f a c t i o n , and ensuring t h a t i t remained the one powerful o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y from 1766, when i t l o s t o f f i c e , u n t i l 1782, when i t regained i t . I n h i s w r i t i n g s one can see the framework of t h e modern p o l i t i c a l p a r t y t a k i n g shape, although Burke himself d i d not f u l l y r e a l i z e the i m p l i c a t i o n s or pur-poses of h i s c r e a t i o n . P a r t y i s a body of men u n i t e d , f o r promot-i n g by t h e i r j o i n t endeavours the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , upon some p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e i n which they are a l l agreed. For my p a r t , I f i n d i t impossible t o conceive, that any one b e l i e v e s i n h i s own p o l i t i c k s , or t h i n k s them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced t o p r a c t i c e . I t i s the business of the s p e c u l a t i v e philosopher to mark the proper ends of Government. I t i s the business of the p o l i t i c i a n , who i s the philosopher i n a c t i o n , t o f i n d out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them w i t h e f f e c t . (285) He i s a l s o very d e f i n i t e as t o the n e c e s s i t y of p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y . When people desert t h e i r connections, the d e s e r t i o n i s a manifest f a c t , lupon which a d i r e c t simple i s s u e l i e s , t r i a b l e by p l a i n men. Vifhether a measure of government be r i g h t or wrong i s no matter of f a c t , but a mere a f f a i r of o p i n i o n , on which men may, as they do, dispute andwrangle w i t h -out end. But whether the i n d i v i d u a l t h i n k s the measure wrong or r i g h t , i s p o i n t s t i l l a greater distance, from the reach of a l l human d e c i s i o n . I t i s t h e r e f o r e very convenient to p o l i t i c i a n s , not to put the judgement of t h e i r conduct on overt a c t s , cognizable i n any o r d i n a r y c o u r t , but upon such matter as can be t r i a b l e only i n t h a t secret t r i b u n a l ... I b e l i e v e the reader would wish to f i n d no substance i n a d o c t r i n e which has a tend-ency to destroy a l l t e s t of character as deduced from conduct. (286) On the other hand he condemns those combinations which (285) Burke, Works. V o l . I I , p.335 (286) I b i d p. 338. 288. are made, not on the a s s o c i a t i o n of. people of l i k e mind, but upon p r i n c i p l e s . He deprecated Chatham's ide a of a "Govern-ment of Talents": Of t h i s stamp i s the cant of Not men, but measures; a s o r t of charm, by which many people get loose from every honourable engagement.(287). and he i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s c o r n f u l of the independent p o l i t i c i a n , f o r the Rockingham P a r t y had s u f f e r e d much at the hands of Chatham, Shelburne and G r e n v i l l e , who belonged to no par t y . That man who before he comes i n t o power has -no f r i e n d s , or who coming i n t o power i s o b l i g e d to desert h i s f r i e n d s , or who l o s i n g i t has no f r i e n d s to sympathize w i t h him; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial i n t e r e s t , but whose whole importance has begun w i t h h i s o f f i c e , and i s sure to end w i t h i t ; i s a person who ought never t o be s u f f e r e d by a con-t r o l l i n g parliament to continue I n any of those s i t u a t i o n s which confer the lead and d i r e c t i o n of a l l our p u b l i c k a f f a i r s ; because such a man has no connexion w i t h the i n t e r e s t of the people. (288) Here,in f a c t , l a y the f a l l a c y i n h i s theory o f par t y , f o r the landed gentry f o r whom he was the spokesman were not the people of England, however much they might presume to represent them on the b a s i s of an e c c e n t r i c f r a n c h i s e . I t was Burke's achievement t h a t he o u t l i n e d the e s s e n t i a l framework of the p a r t y s t r u c t u r e , but i t was l e f t to the Chathamites, and p r i n c i p a l l y Shelburne, to f i l l i n the d e t a i l s , and b r i n g the p a r t y system i n t o harmony w i t h the n a t i o n . Burke saw par t y as a means of pr e s e r v i n g the Whig p a r t y of 1688; Shelburne saw i t as a means of c r e a t i n g a Tory p a r t y (287) Burke., Works. V o l . I I , p. 337. (288) I b i d . , p.265. i n 1780. P e r s o n a l l y , ..Burke was not an able or even a mediocre p o l i t i c i a n . He lacked i n f l u e n c e , i t i s t r u e , but even more he lacked a d m i n i s t r a t i v e experience, a b i l i t y and judgment. H i s a s s o c i a t e s have o f t e n been condemned f o r not g i v i n g him Cabinet o f f i c e i n the s h o r t - l i v e d M i n i s t r y of 1782, but he l a c k e d even the experience of the Younger P i t t at the time. Walpole's judgment of him i s probably j u s t when he s t a t e s t h a t : Having come too l a t e i n t o p u b l i c l i f e , and being too conceited to study men whom he thought h i s i n f e r i o r s i n a b i l i t y , he proved a v e r y i n d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c i a n ... (such men) apply t h e i r knowledge to obj e c t s to which i t does not belong, and t h i n k i t i s as easy to govern men, when they r i s e above them, as they found when themselves were lower and l e d t h e i r s u p e r i o r s by f l a t t e r y . (289) U n f o r t u n a t e l y other members of the pa r t y were much •less g i f t e d . T h e i r leader, the young second Marquis of Rockingham, was no p o l i t i c i a n , although a charming p e r s o n a l i t y and a devotee of the t u r f . He was unable, through shyness, to make comprehensible speeches i n Parliament (290), so that the a c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p of the Government passed i n t o the hands of the Duke of Grafton, young, inexperienced and i n d e c i s i v e , and unhappy i n h i s a l l e g i a n c e , s i n c e he was at (289) Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I . Vol.11, p.194. (290) Though jealous of h i s p o s i t i o n , he was no leader and was shy of h i s own v o i c e . Conscious of t h i s d e f e c t , he once apologized to the House f o r h i s s i l e n c e , 'owning i t was from a n a t u r a l i n f i r m i t y proceeding from h i s h i g h respect f o r t h e i r lordships'. W i l l i a m s , L i f e of P i t t . V o l . I I , p.185. 290. heart a P i t t i t e . I n the Commons, the unhappy f i g u r e of General Conway attempted to dominate the scene, w h i l e h i s cousin Horace Walpole and Charles Townshend each played upon h i s s e n s i b i l i t i e s and tempted him to q u i t the Rockinghams f o r P i t t . Two men of a b i l i t y were i n c l u d e d , but t h e i r scope f o r a c t i o n was n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d . W i l l i a m Dowdeswell, as a former Tory and a commoner, lacked i n f l u e n c e , although he was an e x c e l l e n t Chancellor of the Exchequer; w h i l e the Duke of Newcastle, borne down w i t h years and a n x i e t i e s , could not r e a l i z e t h a t h i s days of power were over, and attempted to dominate the Cabinet. Any use h i s wide experience might have been i n g u i d i n g the M i n i s t r y was n u l l i f i e d by h i s s e n i l e d i s -appointment , at not being permitted to r u l e . L i t t l e d i d I t h i n k t h a t these young men, and p a r t i c u l a r l y my Lord Rockingham, would take any one m a t e r i a l step i n government ... without p r e v i o u s l y c o n s u l t i n g me or knowing my thoughts, and that they would not do, i f they e i t h e r had that regard f o r my o p i n i o n , which, from v a n i t y , I may t h i n k they should have, or i n t h e i r s i t u a t i o n thought they wanted my a s s i s t a n c e ... Would you imagine that a f t e r t h i s my Lord Rockingham has scarce once spoken to me ... about any measure to be taken by the Treasury? (291) F i n a l l y , the greatest weakness of the M i n i s t r y was i t s t o t a l dependence on P i t t f o r i n s p i r a t i o n , although i t had f a i l e d to g a i n h i s accession t o i t s ranks; h i s abhorrence (291) Newcastle, Duke o f , A n a r r a t i v e of the changes i n the m i n i s t r y , 1765-67, p. 275. Walpole notes t h a t : "The Duke of Newcastle i s busy i n r e s t o r i n g c l e r k s and t i d e - w a i t e r s , i n o f f e r i n g everybody everything, and i n p a t r o n i z i n g the c l e r g y again; not yet cured by t h e i r behaviour of l o v i n g to make bishops." Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . VI, p.275. 291. of the p a r t y system, h i s advocacy of measures, not men, and the resentment of Burke and Rockingham f o r h i s overbearing a i r s of s u p e r i o r i t y and dominance had prevented t h i s (292). I n Charles Townshend's c y n i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n of the Government as "a L u t e s t r i n g M i n i s t r y , f i t o n l y f o r the summer," (293), there was much t r u t h . Seldom has a government entered o f f i c e c o n t a i n i n g as many men so imbued w i t h a sense of t h e i r own moral r e c t i t u d e as d i d the Rockingham A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A l l the unpopular measures of the G r e n v i l l e M i n i s t r y were now to be c o r r e c t e d , and the Government, i t s supporters b e l i e v e d , would be remem-bered as the most popular i n the nation's h i s t o r y . Yet good i n t e n t i o n s were no s u b s t i t u t e f o r a b i l i t y , and the Rockingham Whigs, of a l l f a c t i o n s , were the most l a c k i n g i n a b i l i t y and experience. The Government lacked a P i t t , but i t a l s o l acked even the more modest t a l e n t s o f a G r e n v i l l e , a Bedford, or a Shelburne. F i n a l l y , of a l l the f a c t i o n s , they were b a s i c a l l y the most obnoxious to the K i n g , and when he had recovered s u f f i c i e n t l y from the nausea engendered by the G r e n v i l l e s , the Royal borough-monger turned h i s government out of o f f i c e w i t h (292) C h e s t e r f i e l d wrote: Here i s a new p o l i t i c a l arch almost b u i l t , but of m a t e r i a l s of so d i f f e r e n t a nature, and without any key-stone, t h a t i t does not, i n my o p i n i o n , i n d i c a t e e i t h e r s t r e n g t h or d u r a t i o n . I t w i l l c e r t a i n l y r e q u i r e r e p a i r s , and a key-stone-, next w i n t e r ; and that key-stone w i l l and must n e c e s s a r i l y be Mr. P i t t . C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s . V o l . I I , p. 340. (293) I b i d . , p. 341. 292. a l i g h t - h e a r t e d n e s s and a f i n a l i t y which ensured t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e c l i p s e f o r a generation. To please the landed i n t e r e s t s , they repealed the c i d e r tax; t o humour the London manufacturers, they placed pro-t e c t i v e t a r i f f s on f o r e i g n t e x t i l e s ; to p l a c a t e the p a r t y and the n a t i o n , they declared against general warrants. Trouble began only when.they ceased to destroy the work of the o l d Government, and began to c r e a t e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of America. Their f l i r t a t i o n s w i t h P i t t were a r e v e l a t i o n of t h e i r weakness. The promotion of P r a t t to a peerage, the proposed a l l i a n c e w i t h F r e d e r i c k the Great, and the s e v e r a l attempts at remodelling the Cabinet were a l l done t o l u r e the great man, who, standing on the r o t t e n s t r u c t u r e of h i s " p r i n c i p l e s , " refused to be l u r e d . As f a r as l e g i s l a t i o n was concerned, the Government was extremely a c t i v e a l t h o u g h not very s u c c e s s f u l . An act to create f r e e p o r t s i n Jamaica and Dominica foreshadowed f r e e trade by eighty years. I t was to P i t t , however, that they had to t u r n f o r the i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e i r most prominent measure, the r e p e a l of the Stamp Act. Although they were r e l u c t a n t to be f o r c e d , hoping to gain, the g o o d w i l l of the Bedford f a c t i o n , the Government consented to the r e p e a l , but i n s i s t e d on a D e c l a r a t o r y A c t as w e l l . P i t t condemned the l a t t e r , but i n view of the current c o n d i t i o n of E n g l i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n concerning the c o l o n i e s , i t would have been almost 295. impossible to gain acceptance of re p e a l without i t . C e r t a i n l y i t was necessary to gain even the passive acceptance of the King. He had consented i n i t i a l l y to r e p e a l , but i t was soon found that he was a d v i s i n g the Court P a r t y against v o t i n g f o r r e p e a l . Lord Strange, one of the placemen who opposed the r e p e a l of the Stamp Act, having occasion to go i n to the King , on some a f f a i r of h i s o f f i c e , t h e Duchy of Lancaster, the Kin g s a i d he heard i t was reported that he (the King) was f o r r e p e a l of that Act. Lord Strange r e p l i e d , t hat i d e a d i d not only p r e v a i l , but that h i s Majesty's M i n i s t e r s d i d a l l ini t h e i r power to . encourage that b e l i e f ; and that t h e i r great m a j o r i t y had been e n t i r e l y owing to t h e i r having made use of h i s Majesty's name. Lord Strange no sooner l e f t the c l o s e t than he made f u l l use of the a u t h o r i t y he had r e c e i v e d , and trumpeted a l l . over the town the conversation he had had w i t h the King. (294). George l a t e r declared t h a t he had been i n favour of m o d i f i c a t -i o n of the Stamp A c t , and t h a t he p r e f e r r e d r e p e a l o n l y to v i o l e n t enforcement, but the mi s c h i e f was done, and a M i n i s t r y already without support i n the country at l a r g e (295), received a f u r t h e r blow t o i t s p r e s t i g e . I t was i n t h i s debate t h a t Bute appeared f o r the l a s t time as a p o l i t i c a l power. I t was h i s d i r e c t i o n of the Court Party t h a t secured the r e p e a l of the Stamp Act, but t h i s was only because the King p r e f e r r e d to go on w i t h the Rockinghams, rather than r i s k the G r e n v i l l e - B e d f o r d combination again. (294) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . I , p.500. (295) The support i n the country as a wholewas t r i f l i n g , d e s p i t e Burke's c l a i m i n A short account of a short a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , that "They were supported by the con-fidence of the n a t i o n . " Burke, Works. V o l . I I , p.6. 394. Many of the "King's F r i e n d s " however, voted w i t h Bedford and G r e n v i l l e on the measure, and Bute was being courted by both Bedford and P i t t . I t was P i t t , i n f a c t , who was to decide the f a t e of the M i n i s t r y , as h i s t a c i t support had thus f a r enabled i t to c a r r y out i t s program. Since December, 1765, Newcastle had urged the i n c l u s i o n of P i t t i n the M i n i s t r y , unaware t h a t h i s own presence t h e r e i n was one of the c h i e f reasons f o r P i t t ' s r e f u s a l . I t was the r e p e a l of the Stamp A c t , however, t h a t removed the c h i e f o b s t a c l e to P i t t ' s i n c l u s i o n , since i t determined the K i n g t o send f o r him a t a l l c o s t s . I n A p r i l , 1766, the Duke of Grafton resigned, hoping to p r e c i p i t a t e a m i n i s t e r i a l c r i s i s which would f o r c e the i n c l u s i o n of P i t t (296). Rockingham, however, had grown stubborn w i t h a d v e r s i t y , and o v e r l o o k i n g h i s dependence on the Court f o r s u r v i v a l , began to assume a more independent a t t i t u d e . The K i n g , a l r e a d y rebuffed by P i t t three times, was not prepared t o n e g o t i a t e u n t i l he was sure of the r e s u l t . As a temporary measure, the Duke of - Richmond was appointed to succeed Grafton as S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r the Southern Department. (296) When the Duke of Grafton q u i t t e d the s e a l s , he gave t h a t very reason f o r i t , i n a speech i n the House of Lords; he declared t h a t he had no o b j e c t i o n t o the persons or to the measures of the present M i n i s t e r s ; but that he thought they wanted stren g t h and e f f i c i e n c y t o c a r r y on proper measures w i t h success; and that he knew but one man (meaning, as you w i l l e a s i l y suppose, Mr. P i t t ) ; who could give them that s t r e n g t h and s o l i d i t y ; t h a t , under t h i s person, he should be w i l l i n g to serve i n any c a p a c i t y , not o n l y as a General O f f i c e r , but as a pioneer; and would take up a spade and a mattock .. C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s . V o l . I I , p.349. 295. The c r e d i t f o r r e p e a l ahad a l l gone t o P i t t , and the idea of a non-partisan m i n i s t r y n a t u r a l l y appealed to the King. The f a l l of the M i n i s t r y was now d a i l y expected. I t was sa i d of them that: "They were dead, and only l y i n g i n s t a t e ; and that Charles Townshend (who never spoke f o r them) was one of the mutes." (297) Rockingham had offended the K i n g i n the d e c l a r a t i o n by the Commons of the i l l e g a l i t y of general warrants, and by h i s f a i l u r e to o b t a i n a parliamentary a l l o w -ance f o r the King's younger brothers (298). When i n June, Rockingham requested t h a t some peers might be created as a proof of the King's confidence, George r e p l i e d : As to the Peerage, I thought I had yesterday, as w e l l as on many former occasions, expressed an i n t e n t i o n of not, at l e a s t f o r the present, i n c r e a s -i n g the Peerage, and remain e n t i r e l y now of t h a t o p i n i o n . (299) E a r l y i n J u l y , Lord Northington resigned as Lord C h a n c e l l o r , a f t e r q u a r r e l l i n g w i t h h i s c o l l e a g u e s , although he probably hoped to f a c i l i t a t e the r e s i g n a t i o n of . the Government. The K i n g advised Rockingham t o put the Great S e a l i n t o commission, and immediately sent f o r P i t t . From the beginning of the n e g o t i a t i o n s there was the pe r e n n i a l t r o u b l e w i t h Temple's s e n s i b i l i t i e s . He had refused (297) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, V o l . I , p.311. (298) Walpole, L e t t e r s , V o l . V I I , p.5. (299) Albemarle, o p . c i t , , p. 347. 296. to become F i r s t Lord f o r P i t t , and, i n f a c t , h i s sympathies were now almost e n t i r e l y w i t h h i s brother G r e n v i l l e . On P i t t ' s r e f u s a l to i n c l u d e the l a t t e r i n the Cabinet, Temple broke o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s (300), and h i s place was taken by the Duke of Grafton. P i t t , h i m s e l f , i n s i s t e d on t a k i n g the P r i v y S e a l , probably i n order to ensure t h a t Newcastle was removed from o f f i c e , s i n c e the Duke had held that o f f i c e . Thus, on J u l y 12th, 1766, the Rockingham M i n i s t r y , borne down by the weight of i t s good i n t e n t i o n s , was dismissed, and was succeeded by the Chatham-Grafton A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The basic p l a n of the Chatham M i n i s t r y of 1766 was to have been m u l t i - p a r t i s a n , f o l l o w i n g the purposes of both P i t t and the K i n g , f o r the e r a d i c a t i o n of a l l f a c t i o n i n p o l i t i c s . A "Government of t h e T a l e n t s " i s always a chimera yearned a f t e r by s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y l e a d e r s , but i t seldom appeals to the e l e c t o r a t e or t o the l e g i s l a t u r e . I t s elements do not u s u a l l y co-operate w e l l , or i f they do, the r e g u l a r p a r t y s t r u c t u r e s are threatened, and p o l i t i c a l l i f e may be d i s r u p t e d f o r a generation u n t i l new o r g a n i z a t i o n s can be b u i l t up. This Government was more than u s u a l l y weakened by the confusion i n i t s purposes from the outset. P i t t saw i t as an instrument f o r the r e v i v a l of popular government, and the g l o r i e s of h i s war m i n i s t r y ; '-the-King hoped i t would become a new and more (300) Temple declared t h a t : " I should r e f u s e to go i n l i k e a c h i l d to come out l i k e a f o o l , " i n a statement to h i s s i s t e r , Lady Chatham, which was f u l l of r e v e l a t i o n s of h i s j e a l o u s y of P i t t ' s power. From the moment of t h i s r e f u s a l he becomes a p o l i t i c a l n onentity. W i l l i a m s , L i f e of P i t t , V o l . I I , p.209. powerful Court party. The slogan of "Measures, not men," l o s t a l l meaning as soon as the divergent b e l i e f s of the Govern-ment's various members had to be r e c o n c i l e d . . I t was o r i g i n a l l y intended t h a t the M i n i s t r y should have a Whig b a s i s , w i t h P i t t ' s f o l l o w e r s and the Rockinghams assuming the c h i e f posts. This plan was c r i p p l e d almost from the outset by P i t t ' s r e f u s a l to accept Rockingham h i m s e l f , and by Rockingham's r e f u s a l to serve i n any c a p a c i t y but that of Prime M i n i s t e r . Each element had a d i f f e r e n t purpose i n assum-i n g o f f i c e . Conway, the Duke of P o r t l a n d , S i r W i l l i a m Meredith, Lord Granby, and Charles Townshend, r e p r e s e n t i n g the Rockinghams, wished a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the previous adminis-t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c i e s . Northington and B a r r i n g t o n , r e p r e s e n t i n g the K i n g , wished f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h Bute. P i t t , G rafton, Camden and Shelburne r e j e c t e d a l l thought of f u r t h e r a l l i a n c e s , and centred t h e i r i n t e r e s t on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Burke's d e s c r i p -t i o n of the M i n i s t r y (from which he had been excluded, much to h i s c h a g r i n ) , i s c l a s s i c : He (Chatham) made an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , so checkered and speckled; he put together a piece of j o i n e r y , so c r o s s l y indented and w h i m s i c a l l y d o v e - t a i l e d ; a cabinet so v a r i o u s l y i n l a i d ; such a piece of d i v e r s i f i e d Mosaick; such a t e s s e l a t e d pavement without cement; here a b i t of black stone, and there a b i t of white; p a t r i o t s and c o u r t i e r s , king's f r i e n d s and r e p u b l i c a n s ; whigs and t o r i e s ; treacherous f r i e n d s and open einemies: That i t was indeed a c u r i o u s show; but u t t e r l y unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand on. (301) (301) Burke, Works. V o l . I I , p.421. The c h i e f weakness of the Government, however, was i t s absolute dependence f o r existence on the p r e s t i g e and a b i l i t i e s of i t s leader. The a b i l i t i e s were s t i l l paramount, but the p r e s t i g e was s e r i o u s l y damaged by P i t t ' s acceptance o f a peerage, as E a r l of Chatham. Not only d i d t h i s l e a v e the l e a d e r s h i p of the Commons i n the hands of the i n d e c i s i v e Conway and the i r r e s p o n s i b l e and unwanted Townshend (302), but P i t t ' s p o p u l a r i t y w i t h the country was not forthcoming to Chatham. A storm of abuse and lampoons, p a r t l y i n s p i r e d by the now-resentful Temple, greeted the prime m i n i s t e r ' s e l e -v a t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c : Advertizement: 'Lost or M i s l a i d : Two ounces and a h a l f of P o p u l a r i t y wrapp'd up i n an ol d C i t y address. Whoever has found the same and w i l l b r i n g i t to Ephraim Dingle Dangle,.at the luminated House near North End s h a l l be rewarded w i t h an Old Black Mask, a p a i r of Old Crutches and the Shoe part of an Old Jack Boot.' (303) Lord C h e s t e r f i e l d , no enemy of P i t t , pointed out the l i m i t a t i o n s to be experienced by the prime m i n i s t e r i n the House of Lords. The joke i s here, that he has had a f a l l u p s t a i r s , and has done himself so much h u r t , t h a t he w i l l never be able t o stand upon h i s legs again. Everybody i s puzzled how to account f o r t h i s step; though i t would not be the f i r s t time t h a t great a b i l i t i e s have been duped by low cunning. But, be i t what i t w i l l , he i s now, c e r t a i n l y , only E a r l of Chatham; and no longer Mr. P i t t i n any respect whatever. To withdraw, i n the f u l l n e s s of h i s power, and i n the utmost g r a t i f i c a t i o n of h i s ambition, from the House of Commons (which procured him h i s power, and which alone could ensure i t to him), and to go i n t o t h a t H o s p i t a l o f Incu r a b l e s , the House of Lords, i s a measure so unaccountable (302) Townsnend was accepted i n t o the Cabinet o n l y on the urg i n g of Grafton t h a t the Government needed support i n the Commons. P i t t was opposed to h i s i n c l u s i o n . W i l l i a m s , L i f e of P i t t . V o l . I I , p.216. (303) I b i d . , p. 213, note. that nothing hut proof p o s i t i v e could have made me b e l i e v e i t ; but t r u e i t i s . (304) A c t u a l l y , P i t t had p e r f e c t l y v a l i d reasons f o r t a k i n g a peerage. H i s h e a l t h , long the l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i n the fortunes of the o p p o s i t i o n , was not good, and the s t r a i n of l e a d i n g the House of Commons would probably be too much f o r him. I n a d d i t i o n , he expected that the c h i e f o p p o s i t i o n to hi s Government would come i n the House of Lords, since the a b l e s t leaders of the Opposi t i o n were there and the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s had been d e a l t w i t h there i n the recent m i n i s t r i e s . There i s no doubt, however, that the. peerage was a mistake. He never gained ascendancy i n the Lords, h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c tone and t h e a t r i c a l mannerisms being resented there. The Commons was l e f t f r e e of h i s dominating p e r s o n a l i t y and Charles Townshend was a b l e to d i s p l a y h i s vigorous and unstable p e r s o n a l i t y without hindrance. The C i t y , h i t h e r t o P i t t ' s great source of s t r e n g t h , was l o s t to Chatham, and became part o f the G r e n v i l l e preserves. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was designed to demonstrate the f u t i l i t y o f t h e pa r t y system. Un f o r t u n a t e l y i t d i d more. I t demonstrated the f u t i l i t y of E n g l i s h p o l i t i c s of the time, p a r t i s a n or otherwise. The M i n i s t r y i n c l u d e d many hold-overs from the Gren-v i l l e and Rockingham a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , who, although they welcomed o f f i c e , were yet bound to f o l l o w t h e i r leaders on (304) C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s . V o l . I I , p.352. 300. certain, questions. Nothing had "been done to p l a c a t e those l e a d e r s , and w i t h Rockingham e s p e c i a l l y , Chatham's d i c t a t o r i a l tone made any cooperation almost impossible. The most important o f f i c e i n the new Government, the S e c r e t a r y s h i p of S t a t e f o r the Southern Department, was given to the a b l e Shelburne, w h i l e Camden a t t a i n e d the Woolsack, despite the claims of the p e r e n n i a l candidate, Yorke. Northing-ton, weighed down w i t h the burden of h i s i n i q u i t i e s , and un-popular w i t h the Whigs i n the Cabinet, was yet necessary as a channel of communication w i t h the K i n g , and was r e t a i n e d as Lord P r e s i d e n t . Lord Egmont remained u n w i l l i n g l y at the Admiralty, w h i l e Charles Townshend was dragged from the l u c r a t i v e Pay O f f i c e , t o become Chancellor of the.Exchequer. The Commons was l e f t to the f e e b l e l e a d e r s h i p of the upright Conway, and, deep i n the subordinate ranks of the M i n i s t r y , as President of the Board of Trade, stood the r a t h e r ominous f i g u r e of Lord North. At the beginning, however, the chances of success f o r the Government seemed considerable. The c h i e f p o i n t s at i s s u e between the v a r i o u s p a r t i e s seemed to have been s e t t l e d . The Stamp Act had been repealed; the l i b e r t y of the subject had been v i n d i c a t e d by the recent r e s o l u t i o n against general warrants;, even the Peace of P a r i s could not now be upset, w h i l e the growing stren g t h of the Bourbon Family Compact presented an almost unanswerable argument f o r P i t t ' s ob-s e s s i o n , the Northern A l l i a n c e . On the other hand, some 301. issues had a r i s e n f o r the settlement of which the Government might reasonably expect the cooperation of a l l good c i t i z e n s . The a f f a i r s of the East I n d i a Company had to be regulated and t h e i r r i g h t s i n conquered t e r r i t o r y determined. The Government of Canada and the t r o u b l e s i n America s t i l l remained u n s e t t l e d . At home, bad harvests had caused d i s -t r e s s and general r e s t l e s s n e s s . Chatham hoped th a t he would be a b l e t o form another broad-bottomed a d m i n i s t r a t i o n adminis-t r a t i o n such as had brought p r o s p e r i t y to the country under the Pelhams. Chatham's i n t r a n s i g e n t temper was c e r t a i n l y the l e a s t of the assets of the Government. The contact w i t h the Rockingham Whigs, to be maintained through Grafton and Con-way, was very soon threatened by the Great Commoner's i n s u l t i n g remarks and a t t i t u d e s . H i s proposal f o r the Northern a l l i a n c e broke down over the r e f u s a l of t h e once-b i t t e n and now twice-shy F r e d e r i c k to have anything t o do w i t h an E n g l i s h a l l i a n c e . I n the winter of 1766, an embargo was l a i d on the export of corn, i n order to make up f o r the d e p l e t i o n of domestic s u p p l i e s by the bad harvests. Here, too, the Government was unfortunate. The emergency demanded speedy a c t i o n , and the embargo was l a i d by an Orde r - i n -C o u n c i l , but i n the f o l l o w i n g debates on an indemnity b i l l to g i v e p r o t e c t i o n i n respect of the i l l e g a l i t y of the a c t i o n , the Government came out very badly (305). • (305) The debate revealed the paradox of M a n s f i e l d , Temple a n d . L y t t l e t o n appearing as champions of l i b e r t y , w h i l e Camden defended the embargo, saying " i t was but a tyranny o f f o r t y days." Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I , Vol.11, p.372. 302. I t was i n November, 1766, however, w i t h the d i s m i s s a l of the E a r l of Edgecumbe from h i s Court employments, t h a t the Government made i t s f i r s t major and i r r e p a r a b l e blunder. Edgecumbe was a c l o s e f r i e n d of both Rockingham and Conway, and h i s d i s m i s s a l and the r a i s i n g of the E a r l of Northumber-land to a dukedom, f a t a l l y estranged the Rockingham Whigs i n the Cabinet. The Duke of P o r t l a n d , the E a r l of Bessborough, Admirals Saunders and Keppel, and S i r W i l l i a m Meredith resigned, the l i a i s o n w i t h the Rockingham f a c t i o n was shattered, and although Conway continued i r r e s o l u t e l y i n o f f i c e , h i s l o y a l t y was o n l y a mere phantom of departed f r i e n d s h i p (306). The M i n i s t r y was undeniably moving towards the Court p a r t y . Approaches were made to the Bedford f a c t i o n , but t h e demand on the part of Bedford f o r s e v e r a l of t h e c h i e f o f f i c e s f o r h i s supporters q u i c k l y caused the King and h i s M i n i s t e r t o r e c o l l e o t t h e i r abhorrence of p a r t y government and break o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s . F o i l e d of t h i s support, the Government then turned t o a non-partisan p a r t y i n the King's own image, and many of Lord Bute's f o l l o w e r s , among them the eminent Dash-wood, were promoted to p l a c e s . (306) The wound r a n k l e d so deeply i n Mr. Conway's bosom, that he dropped a l l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h Lord Chatham; and though continued to conduct the King's business i n the House of Commons, he would neither-r e c e i v e nor pay any deference t o the M i n i s t e r ' s o rders, a c t i n g f o r or against as he approved or d i s l i k e d h i s measures. Walpole, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I , V o l . I I , p. 273. 303. m I n t h e s u c c e e d i n g s e s s i o n , a t t h e end o f 1766, t h e f i a s c o o f t h e E a s t I n d i a Company e n q u i r y r e v e a l e d t h e weak-ness o f t h e Government t o t h e f u l l . Chatham had o u t l i n e d t h e main p r o v i s i o n s o f h i s p l a n o f r e f o r m , w h i c h c o n s i s t e d p r i n c i p a l l y i n the e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e Company's r u l i n g r i g h t s . The p l a n was s u p p o r t e d by b o t h S h e l b u r n e and G r a f t o n , but i n t h e v i t a l a r e a o f t h e House o f Commons, bo t h l e a d e r s , Conway and Townshend, condemned i t i n the C a b i n e t as b e i n g a g r o s s i n v a s i o n o f t h e r i g h t s o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , and Chatham h i m s e l f j e o p a r d i z e d t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e p l a n by r e f u s i n g t o f o r m u l a t e d e t a i l s f o r i t . A t C h r i s t m a s , 1766, he went down t o B a t h f o r a c u r e f o r h i s gout, l e a v i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e hands o f G r a f t o n but under t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f Townshend. The r e f o r m of t h e E a s t I n d i a Company wa.s m i s h a n d l e d i n t h e prime m i n i s t e r ' s absence and t h e Company was p e r m i t t e d t o n e g o t i a t e , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t i t s t a v e d o f f government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n d e f i n i t e l y . The s e c o n d 7 a t t e m p t by Townshend t o f o r m u l a t e government p o l i c y was al m o s t e q u a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . He proposed t h e con-t i n u a t i o n o f the l a n d t a x a t t h e w a r t i m e r a t e o f f o u r s h i l l i n g s , h a v i n g f i r s t b o a s t e d t h a t he c o u l d g a i n revenue f r o m A m e r i c a . H i s m o t i o n f o r c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e t a x was amended by Dowdes-w e l l f o r t h e Whigs, and a r e d u c t i o n t o t h r e e s h i l l i n g s was e f f e c t e d o v e r t h e p r o t e s t s o f t h e Government. The s e c u r i t y o f t h e M i n i s t r y w i t h e i t h e r t h e C o u r t o r t h e c o u n t r y was not su c h as t o enable them t o d i s r e g a r d such a d e f e a t . The East I n d i a Company debacle, meanwhile, had brought Chatham up from Bath, t h r e a t e n i n g t o dismiss Townshend and r e p l a c e him w i t h North. Such a p l a n , however, although i t would have b e n e f i t t e d the Government, was rendered impossible by the r e f u s a l of North to accept o f f i c e , and Townshend continued to defy h i s l e a d e r s . The days of Chatham's p o l i t i c a l power were numbered i n any case. I n the s p r i n g of 1767, he r e t i r e d i n t o melancholic i m b e c i l i t y , r e f u s i n g to conduct business, although r e t a i n i n g the s e a l s of o f f i c e , w h i l e f o r two years h i s government and the nation's p r e s t i g e c o l l a p s e d around him. I t i s s u r p r i s i n g how l a r g e a part of the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of England at t h i s period centred around the personal h e a l t h and f a m i l y feuds of t h i s one man. Whether one s i c k man d i d or d i d not f e e l a twinge i n h i s f o o t at Hayes, - whether th a t • s i c k man would or would not shake hands w i t h h i s brother from Stowe or h i s brother from Wotton, -such are the t o p i c s which we have here to t r e a t as the most important S t a t e a f f a i r s ! (307) C e r t a i n l y P i t t ' s temper, h i s p r i d e and h i s c a p a c i t y to nurse h i s wrongs were prime f a c t o r s i n the d i s r u p t i o n and d e c l i n e of E n g l i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . H i s consummate p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t s might, i f co-ordinated w i t h one of the f a c t i o n s of the p e r i o d , have produced order out of chaos and checked the King's d i s a s t r o u s plans. Instead, w i t h an i n f l a t e d o p i n i o n of h i s own c a p a b i l i t i e s , an o b s t i n a t e (307) Mahon, H i s t o r y of England i n the eighteenth century, V o l . V, p. 309. contempt f o r the a b i l i t i e s of others and a high conscious-ness of h i s own righteousness, he p r e f e r r e d to watch the r u i n of h i s country from h i s e x c l u s i v e Olympus. His l a t e r years were not, however, without t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to E n g l i s h s t a t e c r a f t . I n the group of p o l i t i c i a n s which he gathered about him, and which were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an extreme independence of a c t i o n , were to be found some of the keenest p o l i t i c a l minds of the day. Out of t h i s group was to come the foundation, not o n l y of the nineteenth century Tory P a r t y , but the l a r g e s t p a r t of B r i t i s h nineteenth century l i b e r a l i s m . The E n g l i s h p u b l i c as yet lacked any coherent body of p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e . The Whigs and f o l l o w e r s of G r e n v i l l e had no l a r g e views and were incapable of sustained e f f o r t s on d e f i n i t e p r i n c i p l e s . The Bedford f a c t i o n , by i t s nature, could not produce statesmen, - merely a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . Attached to the o l d s h i b b o l e t h s of f a c t i o n , these p o l i t i c i a n s were b l i n d to the need of new and d r a s t i c methods to meet the new c o n d i t i o n s . Even f a c t i o n a l l o y a l t y , t o which Burke clung w i t h such p a t h e t i c confidence, was not proof against the temptations of o f f i c e and the d e s t r u c t i v e e f f e c t s of r o y a l e l e c t i o n e e r i n g . I t r e q u i r e d a completely new body o f p h i l o -sophy, not merely the d e f i n i t i o n of p a r t y which Burke had formulated, to reform the p o l i t i c a l system. This was to come from a most unexpected quarter, - the o l d High Tory s e c t i o n of the f o l l o w e r s of Chatham. Although t h i s movement was guided and encouraged by Chatham, and was e v e n t u a l l y adopted 306. wholesale by h i s son, the r e a l , author and moving s p i r i t of i t was the E a r l of Shelburne. Shelburne r e c e i v e d much contemporary abuse and h i s r e p u t a t i o n i s l a r g e l y a posthumous one. To George I I I he was the " J e s u i t of Berkeley Square," and to Henry Fox, a "per-f i d i o u s and infamous l i a r , " and to Horace Walpole, a "pedant i n v i l l a i n y . " (308) Yet D i s r a e l i declared him to be the a b l e s t m i n i s t e r of eighteenth century England. To understand Mr. P i t t , one must under-stand one of the suppressed characters of E n g l i s h h i s t o r y , and that i s Lord Shelburne ... from the sc a t t e r e d t r a i t s some idea may be formed of the a b l e s t and most accomplished m i n i s t e r of the eighteenth century ... Lord Shelburne seems to have been of a reserved and somewhat a s t u t e d i s -p o s i t i o n : deep and a d r o i t , he was however brave and f i r m . H i s knowledge was extensive and even profound ... He maintained the most extensive correspondence of any p u b l i c man of h i s time. The e a r l i e s t and most au t h e n t i c i n f o r m a t i o n reached him from a l l courts and quarters of Europe; and i t was a common phrase that the m i n i s t e r of the day sent to him o f t e n f o r the important i n f o r -mation which the Cabinet could not i t s e l f command. Lord Shelburne was the f i r s t great m i n i s t e r who comprehended the r i s i n g importance of the middle c l a s s , and foresaw i n i t s f u t u r e power a bulwark f o r t h e throne against 'the Great R e v o l u t i o n f a m i l i e s . ' (309) He was, i n the Chatham t r a d i t i o n , a great i m p e r i a l i s t , but (308) Junius s a i d of him: "There i s s t i l l a young man, my.Lord, who I t h i n k w i l l make a c a p i t a l f i g u r e i n the piece. His f e a t u r e s are too h a p p i l y marked to be mistaken. A s i n g l e l i n e of h i s face w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to giv e us the h e i r apparent of Loyola and a l l the C o l l e g e . A l i t t l e more of the d e v i l , my Lord, i f you please, about the eyebrows; t h a t ' s enough; a p e r f e c t Malagrida I p r o t e s t ! So much f o r h i s person; and as f o r h i s mind, a b l i n k i n g b u l l d o g placed near him, w i l l form a very n a t u r a l type f o r a l l h i s good q u a l i t i e s . " Woodfall, L e t t e r s of Junius. V o l . I I , p.472. (309) D i s r a e l i , S y b i l . V o l . 14, p. 22. he understood f a r b e t t e r than Chatham the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e of the possession of the empire. I t was he who, w h i l e at the Board of Trade i n the Bute regime, began th a t r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n and reform of the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e described i n the second chapter of t h i s t h e s i s . He was an able f i n a n -c i e r , i n an age which was not conspicuous f o r f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y or p r o b i t y among the r u l i n g c l a s s e s . I n a time of n a t i o n a l and personal extravagance, he was able to l i v e i n comfort on one-fourth of the income which he drew from h i s estates (310). With Chatham and an enlightened few, he declared against the f o l l y of endeavouring to coerce America, although he, i n contrast to Chatham, was c a r e f u l to ground h i s case on p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . He was f a r ahead of h i s contemporaries i n supporting parliamentary reform, f r e e - t r a d e , and r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a n c e , and the scope of h i s knowledge was immense. His f r i e n d s i n c l u d e d Bentham, P r i c e , P r i e s t l y , R o m i l l y , M o r e l l e t and Mirabeau. As a debater he was l i t t l e i n f e r i o r to M a n s f i e l d or Chatham. Much of the contemporary hatred and s u s p i c i o n of him arose from h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . He began h i s p o l i t i c a l l i f e under Bute, a s s o c i a t e d himself w i t h Fox, G r e n v i l l e and Sand-wich, and f i n a l l y went over to P i t t . He q u a r r e l l e d w i t h H a l i f a x , Fox, and Egremont, and i n the Cabinet o f 1767, w i t h Grafton. He was l i t e r to q u a r r e l w i t h Charles James Fox and Rockingham, and destroy the M i n i s t r y of 1788. H i s l a c k of t a c t and obsequiousness were p r o v e r b i a l , and h i s s u p e r c i l i o u s contempt f o r the men (and t h i s i n c l u d e d the m a j o r i t y ) whom he (310) Trevelyan, E a r l y l i f e of Charles James Fox, p.138. 308. considered h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f e r i o r s , rankled i n the minds of n e a r l y a l l the p o l i t i c a l l eaders of the day (311). Yet he was a l o y a l colleague of Chatham and almost t he o n l y able and d i s i n t e r e s t e d person i n the Chatham-Grafton A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Among the Chathamites who were i n o p p o s i t i o n to b u i l d the framework of the p o l i t i c s of the next age, were such f i g u r e s as Camden, Barre, C a l c r a f t and Dunning, and w i t h them were a s s o c i a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . o f the merchant C i t y i n t e r e s t , which had never q u i t e deserted Chatham, such as Serjeant Glynn, and Aldermen Townshend, Demptster, and Beckford. Measures supporting and f a v o u r i n g f r e e t r a d e , r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n , i m p e r i a l reform, the beginnings of a s o c i a l s e c u r i t y program, mid d l e - c l a s s democracy and parliamentary reform, were planned by them. These men were to a greater extent p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n s , however, than were Burke and h i s Whig reformers. Although both aimed at change, i t was i n opposite d i r e c t i o n s . (311) While s t i l l a youth, he o c c a s i o n a l l y put enough r e s t r a i n t upon h i m s e l f to preserve an outward show of respect f o r some powerful and eminent s t a t e s -men who was o l d enough to be h i s f a t h e r ; but there was no reverence i n h i s composition, and i n h i s secret thoughts he had l e s s mercy f o r h i s patrons than a reasonably good-natured p o l i t i c i a n bestows on h i s adversaries ... A man who l i v e d so much i n the world as Lord Shelburne could not conceal from the world so marked a fe a t u r e of h i s d i s p o s i t i o n ; and h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r i n c u r a b l e treachery, f o r which nothing t h a t he a c t u a l l y d i d , when judged by the standard of h i s age, w i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y account, was p r i n c i p a l l y due to the consciousness from which h i s p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t e s could not f r e e themselves t h a t , however f a i r he might speak to them to t h e i r f a c e s , a t the bottom of h i s s o u l he regarded them as one l e s s honest and l e s s capable than the other. Trevelyan, E a r l y l i f e of Charles James Fox, p. 131. 309. The Rockingham Whigs d i d not "break w i t h the common parent body so completely. Newcastle, u n t i l h i s death i n 1768, was a f o l l o w e r of Rockingham, and P o r t l a n d , Rockingham and R i c h -mond were a l l landed magnates of the t r a d i t i o n a l Whig type. Undoubtedly they were -free from c o r r u p t i o n i n o p p o s i t i o n , but i t was-from n e c e s s i t y , not choice. Burke himself could not. see beyond the p r i v i l e g e s of these o l i g a r c h s ; he could not f e e l the present. Hence h i s philosophy, a d m i t t e d l y s u i t e d to the r e a c t i o n a r y England of the era from 1793 t o 1830, was i t s e l f a voice from the past, the r e v o l u t i o n of 1688, i n c a r -nate. The Chathamites, on the other hand, are the d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l ancestors of the nineteenth century reformers. Despite such embryo plans of reform, however, the immediate problems of the M i n i s t r y i n 1767 remained to be s e t t l e d . The d r i v i n g of the many-yoked oxen and asses of the Chatham-Grafton Government r e q u i r e d a steady hand and almost superhuman powers of r e c o n c i l i n g c o n f l i c t i n g opposites (31£). A government, however, whose most b r i l l i a n t ornament presents government p o l i c y i n "Champagne" speeches, and whose leader, r e t i r e s i n t o melancholic i m b e c i l i t y , cannot be expected to d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h s e r i o u s c r i s e s . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was (31£) Conway and Shelburne agreed on America but nothing e l s e . Granby voted a g a i n s t the repeal of the Stamp Act and f o r the. c i d e r t a x , as had Lord North. Townshend had supported the Stamp Act but a l s o i t s r e p e a l . Egmont opposed P i t t ' s p l a n f o r a Northern a l l i a n c e and was soon re p l a c e d by Admiral Saunders, a Rockingham Whig. Winstanley, Lord Chatham and the Whig o p p o s i t i o n , p. 81. 310. without l e a d e r s , without u n i t y and without a p o l i c y , and, d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t i t was without an e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n (313), i t g r a d u a l l y d i s i n t e g r a t e d , i t s r u i n s b lending imper-c e p t i b l y i n t o the Grafton and then i n t o the North adminis-t r a t i o n s . The Government had a new leader now: For even then, S i r , even before t h i s s p l e n d i d orb was e n t i r e l y s e t , and w h i l e the western h o r i z o n was i n a b laze w i t h h i s descend-i n g g l o r y ; on the opposite quarter of the heavens arose another luminary, and, f o r h i s hour, became l o r d of the ascendant. (314) and Charles Townshend essayed to enter the f i e l d of c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s . On January 26th, 1767, a f t e r d e s t r o y i n g Chatham's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and f i c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l t a x a t i o n , he pledged h i m s e l f , without p r i o r c onsul-t a t i o n w i t h h i s colleagues, t o e x t r a c t a s u b s t a n t i a l revenue from the c o l o n i e s . The c o l o n i s t s had proclaimed, through the v o i c e of P i t t , the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of i n t e r n a l t a x a t i o n . The taxes would t h e r e f o r e be e x t e r n a l . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of Townshend's Revenue Act l a y i n the f a c t t h a t , baulked of t h e i r p s e u d o - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argument against t a x a t i o n , the c o l o n i s t s (313) The d i v i s i o n s of the M i n i s t r y a l s o had the r e s u l t of c r e a t i n g d i v i s i o n s among the o p p o s i t i o n f a c t i o n s . Among the Bedfords, Gower and the Duchess of Bedford wanted to adhere to the M i n i s t r y , and Rigby favoured an a l l i a n c e w i t h the G r e n v i l l e a . Bute's f o l l o w e r s were a l s o d i v i d e d , Jenkinson dreading a juncture w i t h Temple, whi l e Wedderburn, E l l i o t and Dyson favoured the G r e n v i l l e s . F o i l i n g , The second Tory party. 1714-1832, p. 91. (314) Burke, Works, V o l . I I , p. 422. 311. were then pre-disposed to independence as the on l y ' a l t e r -n a t i v e . To the taxes they would not submit. Money, as w e l l as l i b e r t y , was a prime mover w i t h the Fathers of the Rev o l u t i o n . On A p r i l 14th, the M i n i s t r y was almost defeated on a Whig motion to drop the East I n d i a Company i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and was only saved from f u r t h e r "threats by a motion t o adjourn. The s p l i t i n the Government ranks was even more apparent, and i t was not long before a r e s o l u t i o n by Alderman Beckford, r e p r e s e n t i n g Chatham's plan f o r the East I n d i a Company, was d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d w i t h the connivance of Conway and Towns-hend (315). Grafton's dilemma was represented by an almost impossible choice between l o y a l t y t o Chatham, whom he b e l i e v e d i n , but who was now i n c a p a c i t a t e d ; and Townshend and the u n i t y of government on which both Chatham and the K i n g had set t h e i r hopes. (315) Charles Townshend's t e r g i v e r s a t i o n s appear to have been the r e s u l t of p r i v a t e jobbing. He had d e a l t l a r g e l y i n I n d i a stock, c r i e d up-the Company's r i g h t to r a i s e t h a t stock, has s o l d out most advanr-tageously, and now c r i e s i t down ... I n t r u t h i t i s a very South Sea year - at l e a s t o n e - t h i r d of t h e House of Commons i s dipped i n t h i s t r a f f i c ; and sto c k - j o b b i n g now makes p a t r i o t s , as everything e l s e has done. Walpole, L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p. 97. Townshend had no high conception of S t a t e p o l i c y and was supremely i n d i f f e r e n t to the question of r i g h t as between Crown and Company: ;but h i s responsiveness to popular f e e l i n g taught him t h a t the public^expected something out.of the Bengal revenues, and he proceeded to obta i n i t i n the manner l e a s t d i s -agreeable to h i s f r i e n d s i n Leadenhall S t r e e t . W i l l i a m s , L i f e of P i t t . V o l . I I , p. 234. 31£. At t h i s time, as i f t o plague the Government f u r t h e r , America forced i t s e l f on the a t t e n t i o n of the M i n i s t e r s , w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n to the Mutiny Act i n New York and the Indemnity B i l l i n Massachusetts. Surrender upon one p o i n t , i t was f e l t , would l e a d to surrender on a l l , and yet the a l t e r n a t i v e would he r e v o l u t i o n brought on by r e p r e s s i o n . The Cabinet attempted to mix c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h c o e r c i o n , but lacked the f i n e s s e f o r such an o p e r a t i o n , and Townshend lacked the consistency. There was, however, almost unanimous support f o r a f i r m e r stand against the encroachments of the c o l o n i s t s . Even,Shel-burne and Chatham were favourable. Only Conway, plagued as ever by his_shadow a l l e g i a n c e to Rockingham, demurred. On such i s s u e s , i t seemed t h a t the Government would c o l l a p s e almost immediately. The o p p o s i t i o n , however, f a i l e d to u n i t e , Rockingham v o t i n g w i t h the Government agai n s t Bedford's want of confidence motion concerning Massachusetts. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , a u n i t e d a t t a c k was begun on the Government. I t was something new i n p o l i t i c s t o attempt to defeat a Government by d e p r i v i n g i t of parliamentary support, r a t h e r than by i n t r i g u e s i n the c l o s e t ; probably too new, i n f a c t , f o r the attempt f a i l e d . The Court was against them and the Court r e t a i n e d "tight hold o n . i t s ' p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a j o r i t y and i t s patronage system. The Rockingham Whigs, as ever, were a f r a i d to compromise t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s on America at the behest of Bedford, and the sad example of Conway remained as a warn-i n g to a l l Whigs who would t h i n k of compromise agai n s t t h e i r leader's orders. The Opposition u n i t e d against the 313. r e s o l u t i o n condemning the a c t i o n of the assembly of New York, but i t was an insecure union, based on a t r i c k of words, s i n c e the Whigs were d i v i d e d at opposite poles. By e a r l y summer of 1767, the M i n i s t r y ' s f a t e was hang-i n g i n the balance. Townshend's Revenue Acts had been passed, but only a f t e r much q u a r r e l l i n g i n the Cabinet, i n c l u d i n g a t h r e a t of r e s i g n a t i o n from Townshend hi m s e l f . Shelburne, the only r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Chatham i n the Cabinet, had ceased to attend meetings, and Camden fo l l o w e d s u i t . I t was evident t h a t some guidance from the nominal head of the M i n i s t r y , Lord Chatham, was necessary. Chatham was f i n a l l y persuaded to overcome h i s abhorrence of business s u f f i c i e n t l y to r e c e i v e Grafton, but could only persuade the l a t t e r not to r e s i g n , and refused to g i v e any more concrete advice. Thus the f a r c e continued, w i t h Grafton, Camden and Northington warming the place of command f o r Chatham, w h i l e Townshend was a law unto h i m s e l f , Shelburne i n s u l l e n r e t i r e m e n t , Conway doubtful i n h i s a l l e g i a n c e , and Chatham sunk i n i n s a n i t y . One new element was introduced, however, At the end of the s e s s i o n , Grafton and Northington agreed on the n e c e s s i t y of seeking an a l l i a n c e w i t h one of the major o p p o s i t i o n groups and determined to ask Chatham h i s o p i n i o n on the s u b j e c t . Chatham, however, was a broken reed, and the King himself had to s a n c t i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Bedford f a c t i o n . The o f f e r i n c l u d e d the G r e n v i l l e s but s t i p u l a t e d t h a t Grafton must remain prime m i n i s t e r . Temple demanded equal a u t h o r i t y w i t h Grafton (as he had demanded i t w i t h Chatham). Bargaining was t h e n begun w i t h t h e Rockinghams, and terms were compared. N e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e Whigs, i f s u c c e s s f u l , would have had t h e advantage o f s e c u r i n g Conway i n o f f i c e , e i t h e r w i t h h i s f r i e n d s , o r because he might be p i q u e d by t h e i r r e f u s a l . The c h i e f p o i n t o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , however, was t h e r o y a l d e s i r e t o e x c l u d e t h e G r e n v i l l e s . G r a f t o n was even w i l l i n g t o t u r n o ver t h e T r e a s u r y t o Rockingham, a l t h o u g h t h e K i n g would not s a n c t i o n t h e o f f e r . Rockingham doubted h i s a b i l i t y t o woo t h e B e d f o r d s away f r o m t h e G r e n v i l l e s , and was not c e r t a i n of t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e Government's o f f e r i n any case. There was c e r t a i n l y a r e a l i z a t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e Whigs t h a t t h e G r e n v i l l e s had been p r o s c r i b e d t o r e n d e r an u n i t e d o p p o s i t i o n i m p o s s i b l e (316). G r e n v i l l e was w i l l i n g t o s u p p o r t a M i n i s t r y , w i t h Rockingham a t t h e head, b u t o n l y on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t i t c a r r i e d o ut h i s c o e r c i v e c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . The moderate s u c c e s s o f t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s w a s b l a s t e d , however, when G r a f t o n d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e K i n g ' s o f f e r extended o n l y t o Rockingham and,to a v e r y l i m i t e d e x t e n t , t o B e d f o r d , George III<',s purpose had been t o r e - e n f o r c e t h e M i n i s t r y , not t o r e p l a c e i t . The t h r e a t t o t h e M i n i s t r y c o n t i n u e d , however; Conway s t i l l t h r e a t e n e d r e s i g n a t i o n and Grafton, was s t i l l uneasy i n h i s i n h e r i t a n c e . Rockingham was p e r m i t t e d t o f o r m u l a t e h i s p r o p o s a l s i n t h e hope t h a t when i t came t o d e t a i l s , t h e O p p o s i t i o n would s p l i t a g a i n i n t o i t s f a c t i o n s . T h i s was, i n (316) A l b e m a r l e , Memoirs o f t h e Marquia o f Rockingham, V o l . 1 1 , p. 65. 315. f a c t , what happened. G r e n v i l l e demanded a f i r m e r p o l i c y w i t h , t h e c o l o n i e s , and t h e u n e q u i v o c a l a s s e r t i o n o f B r i t i s h s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r them. Rockingham i n d i g n a n t l y r e f u s e d . I n a d d i t i o n , B e d f o r d o b j e c t e d t o t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f Conway as l e a d e r o f t h e Commons. The K i n g then o f f e r e d Rockingham t h e T r e a s u r y w i t h o u t h i s a l l i e s , b u t t h e l a t t e r r e f u s e d t o d e s e r t h i s " p r i n c i p l e s " and was, i n any c a s e , d i s t r u s t f u l o f b e i n g dependent on r o y a l f a v o u r ( 3 1 7 ) . Conway, h o v e r i n g on t h e b r i n k o f r e t i r e m e n t , now f e l t t h a t t h e f a t e o f t h e Government hung on h i s d e c i s i o n and de t e r m i n e d , u n w i l l i n g l y , t o s t a y i n o f f i c e . Much of t h e c r e d i t f o r t h e R o y a l v i c t o r y must go t o Rockingham, f o r he would n ot p r e s s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h any o f t h e p a r t i e s v e r y f a r . I n genera l , . h o w e v e r , t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n f o r t h e t r i u m p h o f t h e C o u r t was t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i t i n g t h e o p p o s i t i o n f o r any-t h i n g but d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m o f t h e Government. I t was a d i v i s i o n over p r i n c i p l e s , not p l a c e s , and as such, h a r d e r t o r e p a i r ( 3 1 8 ) . Rockingham now c o n c e i v e d t h e d u t y o f h i s p a r t y to be o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e a m b i t i o n s o f G r e n v i l l e , as i t had once been o p p o s i t i o n t o the a m b i t i o n s o f L o r d B u t e , a l t h o u g h he t r i e d t o keep t h e way open f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . N e w c a s t l e con-t i n u e d t o u r g e ©n t h e Whigs t h e n e c e s s i t y o f a u n i o n w i t h t h e (317) A l b e m a r l e , Memoirs o f t h e M a r q u i s o f Rockingham, V o l . I I , p.81. (318) By t h e s p r i n g o f 1767, t h e p a r t y s t r e n g t h s i n - t h e House o f Commons were a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e s e : Whigs (Rockingham), 101; T o r i e s , 91; B e d f o r d and G r e n v i l l e f a c t i o n s , 54; and Government, 232, o f w h i c h 40 were f o l l o w e r s o f L o r d Bute. F e i l i n g , The s eoond Tory p a r t y , 1714-1832, p. 92. 316. B e d f o r d s , - a w i s e p o l i c y , but i n N e w c a s t l e ' s c a s e , d i c t a t e d by a d e s i r e f o r o f f i c e . There was no doubt, i n any c a s e , o f t h e C o u r t ' s v i c t o r y . G r a f t o n and t h e K i n g , t h r o u g h c a u t i o n , p a t i e n c e and t h e b l u n d e r s of t h e i r opponents, had t r i u m p h e d . The use made o f t h e v i c t o r y , however, was mat t o m e r i t t h e s u c c e s s . Meanwhile t h e Government had g a i n e d by t h e d e a t h o f Townshend e a r l y i n September, 1767. That r e s t l e s s s p i r i t would d i s t u r b m i n i s t e r i a l c o u n s e l s no l o n g e r , and t h e Exchequer was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e competent hands o f L o r d N o r t h . The l a t t e r ' s l a c k o f r e s o l u t i o n was a p o s i t i v e advantage i n such a mixed government, and h i s l o y a l t y and s t r o n g d e b a t -i n g powers were g r e a t l y needed t o meet t h e c a r a c o l i n g d i a -l e c t i c s o f B u r k e , G r e n v i l l e and B a r r e . The m e e t i n g o f P a r l i a m e n t i n November r e v e a l e d t h e weakness o f t h e O p p o s i t i o n . G r e n v i l l e denounced Rockingham and a l l h i s s u p p o r t e r s on t h e i s s u e o f c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h t h e c o l o n i e s . B e d f o r d , i n t h e meanwhile, had p r o b a b l y r e v e a l e d t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s between h i m s e l f and Rockingham t o G r e n v i l l e . As a r e s u l t , Rockingham found h i m s e l f i n complete i s o l a t i o n , and renounced a l l f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e B e d f o r d f a c t i o n . B e d f o r d was not p r e p a r e d t o adhere t o any l o s t causes and, t r u e t o h i s t r i m m i n g i n s t i n c t s , began o v e r t u r e s t o t h e Govern-ment. By mid-December i t was d e c i d e d t h a t E a r l Gower would succeed N o r t h i n g t o n as L o r d P r e s i d e n t , Weymouth would assume Conway's S e c r e t a r y s h i p ( a l t h o u g h Conway would c o n t i n u e as l e a d e r of the-Commons), H i l l s b o r o u g h would assume t h e new S e c r e t a r y s h i p o f S t a t e f o r t h e C o l o n i e s (which had a l r e a d y been r e f u s e d by S h e l b u r n e ) , and Sandwich was g i v e n t h e minor p o s i t i o n o f P o s t m a s t e r - G e n e r a l . From t h e moment t h a t Chatham w i t h d r e w t o h i s house i n Hampstead, t h e y o u t h f u l G r a f t o n was p l a y i n g t h e game o f p o l i t i c s w i t h the d i c e l o a d e d a g a i n s t him. H a v i n g , f r o m the o u t s e t , assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s beyond h i s c a p a c i t y , he was com p e l l e d t o ta k e complete conmiand a f t e r Chatham's i l l n e s s . Y e t he c o u l d n o t s e t about a r r a n g i n g a f f a i r s i n h i s own way, f o r Chatham s t i l l c l u n g s t u b b o r n l y t o o f f i c e ( o r r a t h e r , the K i n g c l u n g s t u b b o r n l y t o Chatham), and G r a f t o n c o u l d not t a k e s t e p s o f w h i c h a revived-Chatham, o r a s t i l l - a c t i v e S h e l b u r n e , might c o m p l e t e l y d i s a p p r o v e . Only because o f h i s l o y a l t y t o the K i n g and t o Chatham was G r a f t o n i n d u c e d t o remai n i n o f f i c e ; and w i t h t h e r e v i v a l o f p a r t y government on t h e a c c e s s i o n o f the B e d f o r d s , t h e second o f t h e s e l o y a l t i e s was s t r a i n e d t o t h e b r e a k i n g p o i n t . The s u r r e n d e r was f a r t o o complete f o r Chatham t o have approved. I t was t h e i n c l u s i o n o f a complete p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n o f a few i n d i v i d u a l s . Soon t h e s t r e n g t h of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n was f e l t t o t h e f u l l a s , under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f Weymouth and Sandwich, the B e d f o r d s encroached p r o g r e s s i v e l y on t h e s p o i l s o f t h e patronage system, w h i l e t h e Duke of G r a f t o n d r i f t e d , , happy i n the f a l s e s e c u r i t y o f t h e m a j o r i t y b r o u g h t him by h i s s h i f t y a l l i e s . Y e t h i s c o l l e a g u e s showed l i t t l e i n c l i n a t i o n t o oppose such encroachment. S h e l b u r n e was i n d i f f e r e n t t o G r a f t o n ' s 318. f a t e , Camden u n c e r t a i n i n h i s a l l e g i a n c e , and Conway s t i l l y e a r n i n g f o r - t h e g r e e n e r p a s t u r e s o f Rockingham Whiggery ( 3 1 9 ) . N o r t h had a c t u a l l y shown h i m s e l f a w i l l i n g c o l l e a g u e o f t h e B e d f o r d s , but N o r t h was t o show h i m s e l f a w i l l i n g c o l l e a g u e o f a l m o s t any p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r who c o u l d g a i n t h e K i n g ' s con-f i d e n c e . G r a f t o n had undermined t h e b a s i s o f h i s own a u t h o r i t y , s i n c e t h e new m i n i s t e r s , e x p e r t placemen as t h e y were, were f a r more l i k e l y t o g a i n and r e t a i n t h e K i n g ' s c o n f i d e n c e t h a n he was. Sandwich, though t h e l e a s t p r e p o s s e s s i n g o f them, was y e t a c a p a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t o r , when he c a r e d t o e x e r c i s e h i s t a l e n t s , w h i c h was not o f t e n . L o r d Weymouth l i v e d i n t h e u l t i m a t e s t a g e s o f debauchery, p o s s e s s i n g good b r a i n s , but f i n d i n g i t r e s t f u l not to use them. Gower was an a m i a b l e m e d i o c r i t y , w h i l e H i l l s b o r o u g h was, on t h e K i n g ' s a d m i s s i o n , c o m p l e t e l y l a c k i n g i n judgment. They a l l had one t h i n g i n common, however; an i n v e t e r a t e d e s i r e t o s t a y i n o f f i c e , and a p e r f e c t w i l l i n g n e s s t o do e x a c t l y what t h e y were t o l d by t h e K i n g . I n f a c t , t h e r e a l b e n e f i c i a r y f r o m t h e r e - e n f o r c e ment was t h e K i n g . The s u r r e n d e r o f t h e B e d f o r d s had more t h a n (319) J u n i u s , i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e Govern-ment a t t h i s t i m e w r o t e : Your p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r , my L o r d , i s a young Duke, mounted upon a l o f t y phaeton; h i s head grows g i d d y : h i s h o r s e s c a r r y him v i o l e n t l y down a p r e c i p i c e , and a b l o o d y c a r c a s e , t h e f a t a l emblem of B r i t a n n i a , l i e s mangled under h i s w heels. By t h e s i d e o f t h i s f u r i o u s c h a r i o t e e r s i t s c a u t i o n w i t h o u t f o r e s i g h t * , a m o t l e y t h i n g , h a l f m i l i t a r y , s c a r c e c i v i l . He t o o would g u i d e , b u t , l e t who w i l l d r i v e , i s d e t e r m i n e d t o have a s e a t i n t h e c a r r i a g e . I f i t be p o s s i b l e , my L o r d , g i v e him t o us i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f an 319. compensated him f o r t h e l o s s o f Chatham. The f o r t u n e s o f t h e Rockingham Whigs, meanwhile, had r e a c h e d t h e i r l o w e s t ebb, a l t h o u g h Rockingham and Burke endeavoured t o h o l d t h e p a r t y t o g e t h e r on t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h e r e b y p a v i n g t h e way f o r a genuine r e v i v a l o f p a r t y government i n 1782. The r e n e w a l o f the E a s t I n d i a Company agreement i n t h e w i n t e r o f 1767-68 gave them an o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e c l a r e t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , but v e r y l i t t l e more, f o r t h e i r s t r e n g t h had f a l l e n t o n e g l i g i b l e p r o p o r t i o n s . I n t h e N u l l u m Tempus c o n t r o v e r s y t h e y were more f o r -t u n a t e . S i r James Lowther, Bute's s o n - i n - l a w , t h r o u g h t h e f a v o u r o f t h e T r e a s u r y , had g a i n e d c o n t r o l o f Inglewood F o r e s t and i t s v o t i n g f r e e h o l d e r s . I t had been p a r t o f t h e r o y a l domain but had been i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f the Dukes o f P o r t l a n d f o r many y e a r s . The o l d adage o f n u l l u m tempus o c c u r r i t r e g i s t i l l h e l d good i n law; and i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e Duke o f P o r t l a n d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e a r e a had been f o r m a l l y g r a n t e d t o h i s a n c e s t o r s by t h e Crown, s i n c e i t was n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e c o n t i n u o u s p o s s e s s i o n f o r two,hundred y e a r s t o b a r crown c l a i m s . I t was c l e a r , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t however w e l l - s u p p o r t e d by l a w i t may have been, t h e r e a l purpose o f t h e a t t a c k was t o p e n a l i z e P o r t l a n d f o r h i s Whig l o y a l t i e s . Landowners a l l o ver t h e c o u n t r y , not i n t h e h i g h e s t c r e d i t w i t h t h e C o u r t , began t o f e a r f o r t h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e i r t i t l e deeds. (319) c o n t ' d . . o f an.-orator e a t i n g t h e end o f a p e r i o d , w h i c h may b e g i n w i t h " I d i d not say, I would not p l e d g e m y s e l f " - t h e r e s t he e a t s . " ( * Conway) • W o o d f a l l , L e t t e r s of J u n i u s , V o l . I I , p.471. 3£Q. The a g i t a t i o n v a l u e o f t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y f o r t h e Rockinghams was immense. As u s u a l , however, Rockingham's hopes were h i g h e r t h a n t h e chances o f s u c c e s s . An attempt was made t o e n l i s t t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e l a n d e d i n t e r e s t g e n e r a l l y by r e v i v i n g an a c t o f t h e r e i g n o f James I, " f o r the q u i e t i n g o f t h e minds o f t h o s e who p o s s e s s e d crown l a n d s . " The m o t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d u n o b t r u s i v e l y . A u n i o n o f R o c k i n g -hams and G r e n v i l l e s , i n c l u d i n g some o f t h e g r e a t e s t d e b a t e r s i n e i t h e r House, was formed. Y e t t h e y were b e a t e n by twenty v o t e s . I t was an i n d i c a t i o n o f the t e r r i b l e weakness o f t h e Government, even w i t h r e - e n f o r c e m e n t . The c e l e b r a t i o n among t h e O p p o s i t i o n was, however, premature, f o r the c o u n t r y a t l a r g e was not w i t h them, as t h e e l e c t i o n o f 1768 seemed t o p r o v e . I n t h e - e l e c t i o n o f 1768 t h e b u y i n g and s e l l i n g o f s e a t s was e s p e c i a l l y f l a g r a n t . The mayor and t h e c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e C i t y o f O x f o r d demanded £7,500. f r o m t h e s i t t i n g . Members t o d i s c h a r g e t h e C i t y ' s d e b t s , and t h e Shoreham " C h r i s t i a n C l u b " o f f e r e d t h e l o c a l s e a t i n P a r l i a m e n t t o the h i g h e s t b i d d e r . The nouveaux r i c h e s f r o m I n d i a , t h e s o - c a l l e d "nabobs," however, were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r much o f t h e i n c r e a s e d c o r r u p t i o n , w h i c h had changed not so much i n t y p e o r q u a l i t y as i n q u a n t i t y . The E a r l o f C h e s t e r f i e l d , f o r i n s t a n c e , b i d d i n g f o r a s e a t f o r h i s son, found t h e p r i c e s " h a d gone up t o an i m p o s s i b l e l e v e l . ... I spoke t o a b o r o u g h - j o b b e r , and o f f e r M f i v e - a n d - t w e n t y hundred pounds f o r a s e c u r e s e a t i n P a r l i a m e n t ; but he l a u g h e d a t my o f f e r , and s a i d , t h a t t h e r e was no 'such t h i n g as a borough t o be had now; f o r t h a t t h e r i c h E a s t and West I n d i a n s had s e c u r e d them a l l , a t t h e r a t e of t h r e e thousand pounds a t l e a s t ; but many a t f o u r thousand; and two o r t h r e e t h a t he knew a t f i v e thousand. (320) C e r t a i n l y , t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h i s new c l a s s were w i d e -s p r e a d and gave t h e Government a much worse r e p u t a t i o n than perhaps i t d e s e r v e d . To s t a t e t h a t t h e C o u r t won t h e e l e c t i o n by c o r r u p t means i s t o o v e r l o o k t h e c o r r u p t a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e Whig l e a d e r s . The Duke o f N e w c a s t l e succeeded i n r e t u r n i n g t w e n t y members p e r s o n a l l y , and a s s i s t i n g t h e r e t u r n o f many more ( 3 2 1 ) . I n t i m i d a t i o n , , b r i b e r y , t r e a t i n g and p a t r o n a g e , i n s h o r t , a l l t h e c u r r e n t m achinery o f e l e c t i o n e e r i n g , was used i n t h e name o f Rockingham and p o l i t i c a l p u r i t y . The d i f f e r -ence between t h e O p p o s i t i o n and t h e Government was one o f degree, not p r i n c i p l e . Where the .former counted i t s s e a t s i n t e n s and i t s b r i b e s i n t h o u s a n d s , t h e l a t t e r counted them i n hundreds and t e n s o f thousands r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n t h e c o n t e s t between P o r t l a n d and Lowther, t h e f o r m e r was found t o have (320) C h e s t e r f i e l d , L e t t e r s , V o l . I I , p.366: - P i t t , i n condemning t h i s new c l a s s , p o i n t e d out t h e i r l a c k o f background i n t h e c o u n t r y : "Without c o n n e c t i o n s , w i t h o u t any n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e s o i l , t h e i m p o r t e r s o f f o r e i g n g o l d have found t h e i r way i n t o P a r l i a m e n t by s u c h a t o r r e n t of c o r r u p t i o n as no p r i v a t e f o r t u n e c o u l d r e s i s t . " T r e v e l y a n , E a r l y l i f e o f C h a r l e s James Fox, p. 125. See a l s o , Namier, S t r u c t u r e o f p o l i t i c s a t t h e a c c e s s i o n . o f George I I I , V o l . I , pp.209-210. (321) Namier, E n g l a n d i n t h e age o f t h e A m e r i c a n r e v o l u t i o n , p. 91. 322. s pent £40,000. i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t h i s i n t e r e s t ( 3 2 2 ) . Rockingham, N e w c a s t l e and P o r t l a n d c o u l d c o n g r a t u l a t e them-s e l v e s on h a v i n g h e l d t h e i r own and n o t h i n g more. The sub-s t a n t i a l Government m a j o r i t i e s remained. The a f f e c t i o n s o f the c o u n t r y a t t h i s t i m e l a y w i t h t h e o p p o s i t i o n , c e r t a i n l y , but not w i t h Rockingham. The i d o l o f t h e p e o p l e was John W i l k e s , now r e t u r n e d f r o m e x i l e . W h i l e t h e f a r c e o f W i l k e s ' s e l e c t i o n and h i s t r i a l and c o m m i t t a l f o r l i b e l was b e i n g p l a y e d o u t , t h e Government was s u f f e r i n g f r om t h e r e s u l t s o f i t s m i s t a k e s abroad. L o s s o f B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e t h r o u g h t h e Cor s i c a n . and F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s e p i s o d e s ( 3 2 3 ) , r e v o l u t i o n t h r e a t e n e d i n t h e c o l o n i e s f r o m t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e Revenue A c t s , t h e f a l l o f s t o c k s and t h e d e c l i n e o f t r a d e , were a l l l a i d a t t h e door o f t h e Government. G r a f t o n , a t t h i s j u n c t u r e , d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a s a c r i f i c e was (322) W i n s t a n l e y , L o r d Chatham and t h e Whig o p p o s i t i o n , p.217. (323) Of t h e F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s c r i s i s ( w h i c h was s e t t l e d i n 1770), w i t h no g r e a t c r e d i t t o B r i t a i n ) , W a l p o l e w r o t e : . , " S e e i n g such a c c o u n t s o f p r e s s - g a n g s i n the p a p e r s , and such f a l l i n g o f s t o c k s , you w i l l wonder t h a t i n my l a s t I d i d not d r o p a m i l i t a r y s y l l a b l e . A l a s ! when I had a c i v i l war a l l o v e r my own p e r s o n , you must not wonder, u n p a t r i o t i c as i t was, t h a t I f o r g o t my c o u n t r y ... I d i d not even know w i t h whom we were g o i n g t o war; and.now t h a t I know w i t h whom,I d o n o t know t h a t we a r e g o i n g t o war. E n g l a n d t h a t l i v e s i n the n o r t h o f Europe, and S p a i n t h a t d w e l l s i n t h e s o u t h , a r e vehemently a n g r y about a m o r s e l o f r o c k t h a t l i e s some-where a t the v e r y bottom o f A m e r i c a , - f o r modern n a t i o n s a r e t o o n e i g h b o u r l y t o q u a r r e l about a n y t h i n g t h a t l i e s so near t o them as i n t h e same q u a r t e r o f t h e g l o b e . " W a l p o l e , L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p. 411. 323. n e c e s s a r y t o l i g h t e n t h e l o a d of d i s s e n s i o n w i t h i n t h e Govern-ment, and t h a t s a c r i f i c e was L o r d S h e l b u r n e , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r t h e S o u t h e r n Department. A t t h i s p o i n t , however, t h e l o n g - f o r g o t t e n l e a d e r o f th e Government made h i m s e l f h e a r d . B i t t e r l y r e s e n t i n g t h e a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e B e d f o r d s , the c o l o n i a l and f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s o f t h e .Government a n d . i t s t r e a t m e n t o f W i l k e s , Chatham d e c l a r e d t h a t G r a f t o n had b e t r a y e d h i s t r u s t . F a c e d now w i t h the l o s s o f t h e o n l y member o f t h e Government whom he .could t r u s t , Chatham r e s i g n e d , f o l l o w e d by S h e l b u r n e ( 3 2 4 ) . The l o s s o f t h e s e l e a d e r s was d e c i s i v e . H e n c e f o r t h t h e B e d f o r d f a c t i o n dominated t h e C a b i n e t . No e x p l a n a t i o n c o u l d d i s g u i s e t h e f a c t t h a t Chatham had disowned h i s own c r e a t u r e s . G r a f t o n and Camden b o t h t o y e d w i t h the i d e a o f r e s i g n a t i o n , b u t n e i t h e r f e l t t h a t he c o u l d d e s e r t what he saw as a government i n danger. The danger, had t h e y known i t , was p a s t . The enemy had won. They c o n t i n u e d on,. G r a f t o n becoming h e l p l e s s l y i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e B e d f o r d s , Camden.lapsing i n t o p o w e r l e s s s i l e n c e . Debates became l e s s i m p o r t a n t , the Government was s e c u r e , and p o l i t i -c a l l i f e m i ght have become e x c e e d i n g l y d u l l , b ut f o r t h e (324) "To the K i n g , I am t o l d , L o r d Chatham p l e a d e d want o f h e a l t h and d e s p a i r o f i t : b ut t o t h e Duke o f G r a f t o n he complained o f t h e t r e a t m e n t o f S i r J e f f e r y Amherst, and t h e i n t e n d e d r e m o v a l o f L o r d Shelburne.,-t h e l a s t , an unw i s e measure o f t h e l a s t a c c e s s i o n t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I do not see why want o f h e a l t h s h o u l d have d i c t a t e d t h i s s t e p more j u s t now t h a n a t any moment f o r t h i s l a s t y e a r . I t b e i n g t i m e s t o o a t the eve,of t h e P a r l i a m e n t has.a s u s p i c i o u s l o o k . " W a l p o l e , L e t t e r s . Y o l . V I I , p.232. 3 2 4 . M i d d l e s e x e l e c t i o n . I t was f i t t i n g t h a t , when s t a t e c r a f t had re a c h e d so l o w a l e v e l , one o f t h e persons c h i e f l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n , t h e Duke o f N e w c a s t l e , d i e d , on November 1 7 t h , 1768. The O p p o s i t i o n was not i n much b e t t e r s i t u a t i o n t h a n th e Government. P o l i c y on t h e W i l k e s c a s e w a i t e d upon Govern-ment a c t i o n and t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e c o l o n i e s was l a r g e l y i g n o r e d , a l t h o u g h t h e l e s s c o n t e n t i o u s s u b j e c t s o f t h e N u l l u m Tempus b i l l and t h e a d d r e s s on t h e Government's f o r e i g n p o l i c y were t a k e n up. N e i t h e r s i d e seemed p r e p a r e d t o t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e on t h e c o n t e n t i o u s q u e s t i o n s , and each s i d e l o o k e d t o i t s d o u b t f u l elements - t h e Government t o the C h a t h a m i t e s , t h e O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e G r e n v i l l e s - b e f o r e c o m m i t t i n g i t s e l f . M ost i m p o r t a n t , a l l a w a i t e d t h e r e t u r n o f Chatham t o t h e a r e n a , and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f h i s p o l i c y . I n t h e new s e s s i o n , i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1769, t h e c o l o n i e s were s t i g m a t i z e d a s " r e b e l l i o u s " by t h e Government, and an amendment by t h e O p p o s i t i o n t o d e l e t e t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n was abandoned. The g e n e r a l t e n o r of the d i s c u s s i o n s was s e t . The O p p o s i t i o n g a i n e d o n l y one minor v i c t o r y i n t h e s e s s i o n , i n u n s e a t i n g S i r James Lowther, b u t h e r e t h e M i n i s t r y s u p p o r t e d t h e a c t i o n . A w i s e use of t h e Government s t r e n g t h a t t h i s t i m e might have q u e l l e d t h e u n r e s t i n t h e n a t i o n and t h e empire; but as f a r as t h e empire was concerned, l i t t l e was attempted,and even l e s s succeeded. O n l y Chatham and Camden were i n f a v o u r o f the r e p e a l of t h e D e c l a r a t o r y A c t , and i t was d o u b t f u l i f even r e p e a l c o u l d l i m i t t h e t e n d e n c i e s o f o f t h e c o l o n i s t s . C e r t a i n l y t h e Government was committed t o h a l f measures, the r e s u l t o f w h i c h was t o p l e a s e few a t home and no one o v e r s e a s . C o n c i l i a t i o n , i n any c a s e , was d i f f i c u l t f o r a Government surrounded by t h e hungry w o l v e s o f O p p o s i t i o n , and i n danger o f b e i n g pounced upon once d e f i n i t e a c t i o n r e v e a l e d c h i n k s i n the armour o f i t s u n i t y . F o r Grafton,- p o l i t i c a l l i f e had r e a c h e d i t s n a d i r . H i s Government was a r r a i g n e d on b o t h i t s d o m e s t i c and f o r e i g n , p o l i c i e s ; , h i s o r i g i n a l f r i e n d s , t h e Rockingham Whigs, were now h i s b i t t e r e s t enemies; Chatham, f o r whose sake he had borne t h e b r u n t o f t h e s e a f f l i c t i o n s , was i n open h o s t i l i t y ; Camden was u n r e l i a b l e , Gower and Weymouth beyond h i s c o n t r o l ; t h e K i n g was p r e p a r e d t o charge him w i t h d e s e r t i o n i f he r e s i g n e d ; and h i s own a c t i o n s were s u b j e c t e d t o a b a r r a g e o f c r i t i c i s m by t h e p a m p hleteers ( 3 2 5 ) , He was doomed t o d r e a r y (325) J u n i u s s a i d o f h i s conduct o f a f f a i r s a t t h i s t i m e : " B e f o r e you were p l a c e d a t t h e head o f a f f a i r s , i t had been a maxim o f t h e E n g l i s h government, not un-w i l l i n g l y a d m i t t e d by t h e p e o p l e , t h a t e v e r y u n g r a c i o u s o r s e v e r e e x e r t i o n o f t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s h o u l d be p l a c e d t o t h e account o f t h e M i n i s t e r ; but t h a t whenever an a c t o f g r a c e o r b e n e v o l e n c e was t o be p e r f o r m e d , t h e whole m e r i t o f i t s h o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d . t o the S o v e r e i g n h i m s e l f . I t was a w i s e d o c t r i n e , my L o r d , and e q u a l l y advantageous t o t h e K i n g and t o h i s s u b j e c t s ; f o r whole i t p r e s e r v e d t h a t s u s p i c i o u s a t t e n t i o n , w i t h w h i c h p e o p l e ought always t o examine t h e conduct of m i n i s t e r s , i t tended a t t h e same t i m e r a t h e r t o i n c r e a s e t h a n t o d i m i n i s h t h e i r attachment t o t h e p e r s o n o f t h e i r S o v e r e i g n . I f t h e r e be n o t a f a t a l i t y a t t e n d i n g every measure you a r e concerned i n , by what t r e a c h e r y , o r by what excess o f f o l l y has i t happened, t h a t t h e s e un-g r a c i o u s a c t s , w h i c h have d i s t i n g u i s h e d your a d m i n i s -t r a t i o n , and w h i c h I doubt not were e n t i r e l y y o u r own, s h o u l d c a r r y w i t h them a s t r o n g appearance o f p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t , and even o f p e r s o n a l enmity i n a q u a r t e r , i s o l a t i o n i n a Government w h i c h he c o u l d not c o n t r o l and w h i c h would not. c o n t r o l i t s e l f . W earied of h i s h o p e l e s s p o s i t i o n , he d e t e r m i n e d t o r a i s e an i s s u e w h i c h would s p l i t t h e Govern-ment and break t h e impasse. On May 1 s t , 1769,. he proposed t h a t t h e Revenue A c t s be t o t a l l y r e p e a l e d . He was s u p p o r t e d by Camden, Conway and Granby. Gower, Weymouth, R o c h f o r d (32.6), N o r t h and H i l l s b o r o u g h v o t e d i t down, i n s i s t i n g t h a t a t l e a s t t h e t a x on t e a s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d . Hawke, t h e F i r s t L o r d o f t h e A d m i r a l t y , and a s u p p o r t e r o f c o n c i l i a t i o n , was a b s e n t . By such narrow margins a r e g r e a t events c o n t r o l l e d ! There f o l l o w e d , d u r i n g t h e summer, t h e l o n g c o n t r o v e r s y over t h e e x p u l s i o n o f W i l k e s and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f M i d d l e -sex. The demands f r o m t h e c o u n t i e s f o r d i s s o l u t i o n d u r i n g the autumn s e s s i o n and t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e O p p o s i t i o n b r o u g h t about a u n i o n o f G r e n v i l l e s and Rockinghams, ag r e e d on f o r c i n g d i s s o l u t i o n . Such a u n i o n was n e c e s s a r y , and c e r t a i n l y seemed about t o succeed, when t h e r e a p p e a r a n c e o f L o r d Chatham changed the s i t u a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y ( 3 2 7 ) . (325) c o n t ' d . . where no such i n t e r e s t o r enmity can be supposed t o e x i s t , w i t h o u t t h e h i g h e s t i n j u s t i c e and-the h i g h e s t d i s h o n o u r ? " W o o d f a l l , L e t t e r s o f J u n i u s . Y o l . I , pp. 106-107. (326) V i s c o u n t R o c h f o r d succeeded t o t h e P r i v y S e a l on t h e - r e s i g n a t i o n o f Chatham i n O c t o b e r , 1768. (327) He h i m s e l f , i n p r o p r i a p e r s o n a , and not i n a s t r a i t , w a i s t c o a t , walked, i n t o t h e K i n g ' s l e v e e t h i s m orning, and was i n t h e c l o s e t t wenty m i n u t e s a f t e r t h e l e v e e ... The deuce i s i n i t i f t h i s i s not news. Whether he i s t o be K i n g , M i n i s t e r , L o r d Mayor o r Alderman, I do not know; nor a word more t h a n I have t o l d you. W a l p o l e , L e t t e r s . V o l . V I I , p. 306. Remembering when t h e appearance o f W i l l i a m P i t t a t C o u r t meant t h e f a l l o f t h e M i n i s t r y , p o l i t i c i a n s c i r c u l a t e d w i l d r e p o r t s o f impending changes. I t was apparent t h a t o ver t h e E a s t I n d i a Company i s s u e and t h e W i l k e s a f f a i r , he was h o s t i l e t o t h e Government and would p r o b a b l y go i n t o o p p o s i t i o n . W i t h Chatham a t t h e head o f t h e now-strengthened o p p o s i t i o n , t h e p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e o f t h e C o u r t P a r t y and o f B e d f o r d and G r a f t o n would be i n j e o p a r d y . The Rockinghams, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , h a d almost as much t o f e a r f r o m Chatham's i n v e t e r a t e o p p o s i t i o n t o p a r t y p o l i t i c s . He might f a t a l l y a l i e n a t e t h e now f r i e n d l y G r e n v i l l e s f r o m t h e Rockingham Whigs. T h i s c a l c u l a t i o n d i d not t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e f a m i l y r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n t h e G r e n v i l l e c l a n i n t h e p r e v i o u s autumn, nor of Chatham's changed a t t i t u d e t o p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t was a new Chatham, purged o f a m b i t i o n by h i s i l l n e s s , and now a s e l f l e s s p a t r i o t , who re a p p e a r e d t o l e a d t h e p e o p l e o f t h e n a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o u r t . The a l l i a n c e w h i c h was formed was n o t , however, b i n d -i n g upon a l l q u e s t i o n s . The G r e n v i l l e s ' a t t i t u d e on A m e r i c a was n o t a c c e p t a b l e t o Rockingham and B u r k e , and t h e whole q u e s t i o n had t o be l e f t out o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n f a c t , o n l y on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e M i d d l e s e x e l e c t i o n s and g e n e r a l o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Government c o u l d agreement be g a i n e d . That the o l d a n i m o s i t i e s were not f o r g o t t e n appears t o have been t h e f a u l t o f Burke and Rockingham, who s t i l l remembered t h e s l i g h t s t h e y had r e c e i v e d a t t h e hands o f t h e G r e a t Commoner. Chatham e x p r e s s l y a d v o c a t e d a b i n d i n g a l l i a n c e w i t h Rockingham, 328. f o r "he, and he a l o n e , has a k n o t of s p o t l e s s f r i e n d s such as ought t o govern t h i s kingdom" ( 3 2 8 ) . I n t h e meantime, G r a f t o n , Camden and Granby were t h r e a t e n i n g t o l e a v e t h e M i n i s t r y i n w h i c h t h e y were now no l o n g e r more t h a n c i p h e r s . They had not been c a p a b l e o f r e s i g n i n g w h i l e i t was h o n o u r a b l e t o do so, but were now i n s u b v e r s i v e and a p o l o g e t i c communication w i t h Chatham, i n an attempt t o o v e r t h r o w t h e Government. T h i s was t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n when t h e "Horned C a t t l e " s e s s i o n began on January 9 t h , 1770 ( 3 2 9 ) . Chatham sounded t h e n ote o f t h e s e l f l e s s p a t r i o t i n h i s d e n u n c i a t i o n o f the p e r s e c u t i o n o f W i l k e s . He moved an amendment t o t h e a d d r e s s t o the t h r o n e , t o t h i s e f f e c t , w h i c h , t h o u g h ^ i t : f a i l e d t o p a s s , brought i n t o t h e f o r e g r o u n d t h e one s u b j e c t upon w h i c h th e O p p o s i t i o n was i n agreement. Camden, f i n d -i n g h i s v o i c e a t ' l a s t , e x p r e s s e d s u p p o r t f o r t h e amendment (328) A l b e m a r l e , Memoirs o f t h e M a r q u i s o f Rockingham, V o l . I I , pp. 141-142, 143-44. (329) The s e s s i o n r e c e i v e d t h i s name because t h e -Government, d e s i r o u s o f a v o i d i n g c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s , had f e a t u r e d as t h e c h i e f t o p i c o f t h e Speech f r o m the Throne, a d i s t e m p e r t h a t was r a g i n g among horned c a t t l e . I t was s a i d t h a t t h e K i n g spoke l i k e "a r u i n e d g r a z i e r . " The Duke o f G r a f t o n and Lord., G r o s v e n o r , whose m a t r i m o n i a l t r o u b l e s w e r e - p u b l i c p r o p e r t y , were i r o n i c a l l y complimented on t h e K i n g ' s f e e l i n g a l l u s i o n t o t h e i r c a s e . W i l l i a m s , L i f e o f P i t t . V o l . I I , p.258. 389. and r e s i g n e d ( 3 3 0 ) . I t was a m o r t a l blow t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A s e a r c h was i m m e d i a t e l y begun f o r a new L o r d C h a n c e l l o r . George I I I , never w a n t i n g i n courage and energy i n a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , persuaded C h a r l e s Yorke t o a c c e p t t h e Great S e a l . T h i s e x p e d i e n t was a l s o doomed, however, f o r t h r e e days a f t e r h i s a p o s t a c y , t h e u n f o r t u n a t e Yorke d i e d . O n l y one f u r t h e r blow was needed t o t o p p l e t h e a d m i n i -s t r a t i o n , and t h i s was f o r t h c o m i n g i n Chatham's g r e a t speech on t h e M i d d l e s e x e l e c t i o n p e t i t i o n s on J a n u a r y 22nd, 1770. R i s i n g f r o m the p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e g e n e r a l , he proceeded i n d e f i a n c e o f h i s c l a s s and t i m e t o e n l a r g e upon the c o r r u p t and u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f P a r l i a m e n t as t h e r o o t e v i l f r o m w h i c h a l l o t h e r s had sprung. A s i a t i c w e a l t h , he argued, had brought i n i t s t r a i n A s i a t i c methods o f government, w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t thought " t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be permanent r e l a t i o n between t h e c o n s t i t u e n t and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body o f t h e p e o p l e , " i t had become i m p o s s i b l e f o r any c a n d i d man,to a f f i r m that- "as t h e house o f Commons i s now formed, t h a t r e l a t i o n i s i n any degree p r e s e r v e d . " My L o r d s , f i v e hundred gentlemen a r e not t e n m i l l i o n s ; and i f we must have a c o n t e n t i o n , l e t us take c a r e t o have t h e E n g l i s h n a t i o n on our s i d e ... I f t h e y d e s e r t t h e i r cause t h e y d e s e r v e t o be s l a v e s . (331) (350) Camden d e l a y e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n u n t i l a s u c c e s s o r c o u l d be a p p o i n t e d , e n a b l i n g t h e Government t o weather th e s t o r m t e m p o r a r i l y . Chatham c r i t i c i s e d him f o r " d r a g g i n g t h e Great S e a l ... a t t h e h e e l s o f a - d e s p e r a t e m i n i s t e r . " W i l l i a m s , L i f e o f P i t t , V o l . I I , p.262. (331) I b i d . , p. 261. 330. That day, out o f t h e ashes of the M i d d l e s e x e l e c t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y , p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e f o r m r o s e p h o e n i x - l i k e . The spar k was c a r r i e d t h r o u g h the g e n e r a t i o n s o f E n g l i s h p o l i t i c s ; by S h e l b u r n e t o Chatham's son; f r o m P i t t t o hiss many d i s -c i p l e s - Canning, H u s k i s s o n , Melbourne, Grey.,., and t h e c r e a t o r s of t h e Gr e a t Reform B i l l . The g r e a t e s t p o l i t i c a l i s s u e o f n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y B r i t a i n was born. G r a f t o n f i n a l l y r e s i g n e d on J a n u a r y 2 7 t h . Had George I I I p o s s e s s e d as. much p a t r i o t i s m - a s n a t i v e c u n n i n g , he would, a t t h i s p o i n t have c a l l e d f o r a m i n i s t r y w i t h p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . The O p p o s i t i o n was u n i t e d and re a d y ; t h e Commons was q u i e s -c e n t ; t h e system o f r o y a l government was d i s c r e d i t e d i n p o p u l a r eyes. Y et he c o u l d not overcome h i s a n t i p a t h y t o Rockingham and Chatham. He went i n s e a r c h of a man, br a v e or f o o l i s h enough.to t a k e up G r a f t o n ' s burden. The a p p e a l was t y p i c a l l y f e r v e n t ; t h e r e p l y was t y p i c a l l y good-natured; and a t t h e e l e v e n t h hour L o r d N o r t h assumed o f f i c e t o save h i s monarch, t o e s t a b l i s h t h e power o f the Crown a t a h i g h l e v e l f o r h a l f a . c e n t u r y t o come, t o d e s t r o y h i m s e l f and t o come near t o d e s t r o y i n g h i s c o u n t r y . Never b e f o r e o r a f t e r i n h i s r e i g n d i d George I I I have a prime m i n i s t e r so f i t t e d i n eve r y way f o r t h e work he was i n t e n d e d t o a c c o m p l i s h , o r so i n harmony w i t h t h e R o y a l p o l i c i e s ; and f o r t w e l v e t u r b u l e n t y e a r s , N o r t h was t o con-t i n u e i n o f f i c e , s e r v i n g h i s r o y a l m a s t e r o n l y t o o f a i t h f u l l y . A l t h o u g h young, he was w i s e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e of a d i l i g e n t s u b o r d i n a t e ; a s t e a d y advocate o f T o r y p r i n c i p l e s ; 331. h a v i n g a m a s t e r y o f t h e House o f Commons seldom e q u a l l e d ; courageous, i n d u s t r i o u s , t a c t f u l and k i n d l y ; he had a l l t h e q u a l i t i e s t o make him a g r e a t m i n i s t e r i n a p e a c e f u l age ( 3 3 2 ) . (332) N o r t h h i m s e l f , i n a r e m a r k a b l e speech, acknow-l e d g e d t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f h i s b e l i e f s . Under an A d m i n i s t r a t i o n whose p r i n c i p l e s I approved ( P i t t - N e w c a s t l e ) , t e n y e a r s ago I a c c e p t e d a s m a l l o f f i c e , and was c o n t e n t e d w i t h i t ; t h o s e w i t h whom I s e r v e d know I n e v e r m o l e s t e d them on my own a c c o u n t . I had formed p r i n c i p l e s f r o m w h i c h I n e v e r d e v i a t e d , T p r i n c i p l e s not a t a l l c a l c u l a t e d f o r an a m b i t i o u s man ... A s t e a d y manly r e s i s t e n c e o f t h e i m p a t i e n c e o f t h o s e who wanted t o ease t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e burdens l e f t by t h e war, put t h e c o u n t r y a t l e n g t h i n t o a s i t u a t i o n t o meet o t h e r wars. Upon t h i s system I have ever been a g a i n s t p o p u l a r measures. I s u p p o r t e d t h e C y d e r - t a x w i t h a v i e w t o t h e ease o f t h e - p e o p l e , and I a f t e r w a r d s opposed th e r e p e a l o f t h e t a x - a v o t e w h i c h I never r e p e n t e d . I n 1765, I was f o r t h e American Stamp A c t ; t h e p r o p r i e t y . o f p a s s i n g w h i c h I took v e r y much upon t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e r i g h t h o n o u r a b l e g e n t l e -man; and when, i n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r , a b i l l was brought i n f o r t h e r e p e a l o f the A c t , I d i r e c t l y opposed i t ; f o r I saw t h e danger o f r e p e a l . And when, a g a i n , i n t h e y e a r 1767, i t was thought n e c e s s a r y t o r e l i e v e t h e p e o p l e f r o m t h e p r e s s u r e o f t a x a t i o n , by l e s s e n i n g t h e revenue t o t h e e x t e n t o f h a l f a m i l l i o n , I was a g a i n s t t h e measure a l s o . Then appeared on t h e p u b l i c stage a s t r a n g e phenomena - an i n d i v i d u a l grown, by t h e p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e t i m e s , t o be a man o f consequence. I moved the e x p u l s i o n o f Mr. W i l k e s . E v e r y subsequent p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t t h a t man I have s u p p o r t e d ; and I w i l l a g a i n v o t e f o r h i s e x p u l s i o n ; i f he a g a i n a t t e m p t s t o t a k e h i s s e a t i n t h i s House. I n a l l my memory, t h e r e f o r e , I do not r e c o l l e c t a s i n g l e p o p u l a r measure I ever v o t e d f o r - no, not even the N u l l u m Tempus B i l l . - I was a g a i n s t d e c l a r i n g t h e l a w i n t h e case o f g e n e r a l w a r r a n t s . I s t a t e t h i s t o prove t h a t I am not an a m b i t i o u s man. Men may be p o p u l a r w i t h o u t b e i n g a m b i t i o u s ; but t h e r e i s r a r e l y an a m b i t i o u s man who doe's not t r y t o be p o p u l a r . C a v e n d i s h Debates, V o l . I , p.298; c i t e d by W a l p o l e , Memoirs o f t h e r e i g n o f George I I I , V o l . I l l , , pp.229-230, n o t e . 332. Yet h i s times were t o o much f o r him. . The age o f Chatham and Temple, o f G r e n v i l l e and G r a f t o n and Townshend was en d i n g . A new age i n w h i c h t h e g r e a t names were t o "be N o r t h , Wedderburn, Thurlow, Fox and S h e l b u r n e was b e g i n n i n g . The l o n g time o f t r a n s i t i o n was ov e r ; t h e s t a g e was s e t and t h e a c t o r s i n p l a c e ; the t r a g e d y o f B r i t i s h d e f e a t was about t o b e g i n . A t t h e moment o f supreme c r i s i s , i n March 1778,. Governor Thomas H u t c h i n s o n , a . l o y a l i s t r e f u g e e i n England,. wrote i n d e s p a i r : " I t ' s c e r t a i n t h e p o l i t i c a l c l o c k s t a n d s s t i l l . " He was wrong; t h e p o l i t i c a l c l o c k o f Great B r i t a i n was t i c k i n g t h e seconds and s t r i k i n g the h o u r s , as i t always does, no s l o w e r and no q u i c k e r ; i t was a c l o c k , and not a seismograph. (333) The f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e d e c l i n e i n E n g l i s h p u b l i c l i f e between 1760 and 1770 was, as we have, seen, t h e o b s o l e s c e n c e o f t h e R e v o l u t i o n S e t t l e -ment. The l a c k o f i s s u e s upon w h i c h t o base a p a r t y system was a d i r e c t o u tgrowth o f t h e d e s i r e f o r t r a n q u i l l i t y i n the n a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e a c t u a l governmental m a c h i n e r y of t h e R e v o l u t i o n S e t t l e m e n t was s a n c t i f i e d . P a r l i a m e n t remained unreformed, l o c a l government c o n t i n u e d t o outweigh the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , and governmental economic p o l i c y was more s u i t e d t o the l a t e r m i d d l e ages t h a n t o t h e eve o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n ; a l l because t h e s p i r i t o f 1688 s t i l l r u l e d . Nor was i t o n l y i n ' s p i r i t t h a t the e r a o f W i l l i a m I I I s u r v i v e d . There was a p e r s o n a l l i n k w i t h t h e R e v o l u t i o n (333) Namier, E n g l a n d i n the age o f t h e American . r e v o l u t i o n , p. 46. 333. t h r o u g h the s u r v i v a l o f t h e p o l i t i c i a n s o f an e a r l i e r age. C a r t e r e t , N e w c a s t l e and P u l t e n e y , a l t h o u g h t h e y had not made t h e R e v o l u t i o n , had "been c o l l e a g u e s o f M a r l b o r o u g h , S u n d e r l a n d and G-odolphin, who had. When t h i s l o n g domi-n a t i o n was f i n a l l y b roken by the d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e e l d e r g e n e r a t i o n between 1760 and 1770, a gap was l e f t i n - p o l i t i c a l l i f e w h i c h was not a d e q u a t e l y f i l l e d by such n o n e n t i t i e s as Rockingham and Conway. The l o n g c o n t i n u i t y i n p o l i t i c s had o t h e r e f f e c t s . P o l i t i c a l l i f e , l a c k i n g i s s u e s upon w h i c h t o base p a r t i e s , s p l i t i n t o f a c t i o n s based upon s p o i l s . The c o r r u p t i o n o f p o l i t i c s i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t o r subsequent i m i t a t i o n . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s c o r r u p t i o n and t h e l a c k of o r g a n i z e d p a r t i e s , t h e m a c h i n e r y o f p o l i t i c s was not so s o l i d l y based t h a t i t c o u l d s u r v i v e a l l t h r e a t s t o i t s t r a n q u i l o p e r a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h t h e R e v o l u t i o n S e t t l e m e n t was f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments subsequent t o i t had n o t y e t been a c c e p t e d as f i n a l . The i n s t i t u t i o n s o f c a b i n e t and prime m i n i s t e r were s t i l l t o o new t o be h a b i t u a l . The l i m i t a t i o n s on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g f u n c t i o n o f t h e monarch were not y e t p a r t o f t h e normal o r g a n i z a t i o n o f th e E n g l i s h s t a t e . Many p o l i t i c i a n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e out o f f a v o u r w i t h t h e government, even r e s e n t e d t h e s e changes and t h e y were r e s e n t e d u n i v e r s a l l y by t h e House of Hanover. The f i r s t two monarchs o f t h a t d y n a s t y , however, had l a c k e d 334. e i t h e r t h e i n t e r e s t or the d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o r e - a s s e r t t h e s t i l l p o w e r f u l r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . George I I I l a c k e d n e i t h e r i n t e r e s t nor d e t e r m i n a t i o n , but o n l y m o d e r a t i o n . I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , when t h i s doubt as t o t h e permanence o f t h e c a b i n e t i s t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , t h a t h i s a t t empt t o r e - a s s e r t t h e p r e r o g a t i v e power o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g met w i t h immediate and w i d e s p r e a d s u c c e s s . The p h y s i c a l , f i n a n c i a l and s p i r i t u a l d r a i n o f t h e Seven Y e a r s ' War was a l s o a f a c t o r i n the d e c l i n e . - P i t t was r e j e c t e d i n f a v o u r o f l e s s a m b i t i o u s , i f l e s s a b l e , l e a d e r s . The a p a t h y i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e was r e f l e c t e d i n the n a t i o n ' s i n a b i l i t y t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e g r e a t new i m p e r i a l problems and t h e new demands o f t h e economic r e v o l u t i o n upon t h e m a c h i n e r y o f government. I t must not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t i t was an exhausted n a t i o n which l o s t t h e T h i r t e e n C o l o n i e s and w h i c h a c c e p t e d the e a r l y abuses of t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . The n a t i o n needed t r a n q u i l l i t y and had to f a c e u n p r e -cedented problems i n the empire and i n her economy. She was a l s o f a c e d w i t h major t r a n s i t i o n s i n p a r t y and c l a s s a t home. The f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s of t h e f u t u r e were l a i d i n the r u i n s o f t h e Whig system. O p p o s i t i o n t o p r e r o g a t i v e , as i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a g a i n c r e a t e d i s s u e s upon w h i c h p a r t i e s c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . I n a d d i t i o n , the economic r e v o l u t i o n was g i v i n g new impor-t a n c e t o h i t h e r t o s u b o r d i n a t e c l a s s e s , and t h e b r i e f d i s -r u p t i v e i n t e r v a l o f t h e W i l k e s a g i t a t i o n s was an augury o f f u t u r e changes i n p o l i t i c a l power. I n summary: t h e mac h i n e r y o f t h e E n g l i s h s t a t e was o b s o l e t e i n 1760. I t needed t o be c o m p l e t e l y o v e r h a u l e d and modernized. An e r a o f s e c u r i t y and peace was r e q u i r e d i f t h e s e r e f o r m s were t o be s u c c e s s f u l l y u n d e r t a k e n . - Such an e r a was not f o r t h c o m i n g . I n s t e a d , t h e empire p r e s e n t e d u n u s u a l problems r e q u i r i n g immediate s o l u t i o n s , and t h e te m p o r a r y r e v i v a l o f t h e p r e r o g a t i v e power, c o u p l e d w i t h t h e r i s e o f new p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and c l a s s e s , demanded a h i g h degree o f p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y i n t h e n a t i o n . I n b o t h t h e s e f i e l d s t h e n a t i o n f a i l e d t o meet t h e c h a l l e n g e and l a p s e d i n t o an e r a of d e c l i n e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e dawn of t h e i n d u s t r i a l age made a w i s e and v i g o r o u s economic p o l i c y on th e p a r t of t h e Government e s s e n t i a l . The magnitude o f t h i s l a s t problem, and t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e n a t i o n to meet i t between 1760 and 1770, w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g and f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s . 336 PART C: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION. The domestic economy of Britain i n 1760, l i k e her p o l i t i c a l organiza-tion, was~ln a state of transition. It had not yet, however, reached that stage when the more far-reaching and dynamic factors were to plunge her into the most violent era of change in her history. Nor, on the other hand, was the period prior to 1760, one of stagnation. New inventions and discoveries did not galvanize her industries into a great surge of activity. Rather, there were evidences of a gradual expanding of l i f e , which could not develop sufficiently under the old arrangements. The wealth of the continent and lands overseas was being poured through the funnel of English commerce into the English national resevoir. This trade demanded an ever-increasing flow of English manufactures. The old systems of agriculture, communication and transport, industrial and o f f i c i a l economic policy were no longer adequate to meet the demands of this new activity. The latter part of the eighteenth century, therefore, was a period of transition i n which the national economy adapted i t s e l f to meet new requirements. In the transition the l i f e of the nation was profoundly disrupted and a price was paid i n human suffering for the prosperity of industrialism. . In this section, i t i s not proposed to deal with the whole vast f i e l d of the English economic revolution, but mere-l y with those aspects which were in their nature, directly disruptive i n the public l i f e of the nation. 337. Chapter V.H The Revolution i n Agriculture and Transportation . The change through gradual progress within than revolution, which characterized the transition, i s probably best exemplified i n the agricul-tural system in England, i n the years immediately preceding and following I76O. By that date, the old type of husbandry was s t i l l predominant, but the foundations of change had been l a i d . The necessity of producing food more efficiently and on a larger scale than ever before, was drawing the wealth of commerce into the land and making England the granary of Europe. Before 1760, the population grew so slowly that, without any real increase in farming s k i l l , and with the new volume of capital made available, the nation could s t i l l have produced agricultural surpluses (33U). Yet even without the pressure of population to force development, progress was being made, and far-reaching improvements i n the cultivation of arable land had already been tested or ini t i a t e d by men l i k e Jethro T u l l and Viscount Towns-hend. In the progress of scie n t i f i c farming, Tu l l i s one of the most remark-able pioneers. His method of d r i l l i n g wheat and roots i n rows was not gen-erally adopted u n t i l many years after his death, but the main principles which he l a i d down i n his Horse-hoeing husbandry (1733) proved to be the principles upon which was based the agricultural revolution i n t i l l a g e . His chief claim to distinction i s that he sought, the f i r s t of his class, to discover sci e n t i f i c reasons for observed results. In this he was a true heir of the Age of Enlightenment. A shortage of seed determined him to find a new method of sowing and led to the invention of his seed d r i l l . He devel-oped selection cleaning and grading of seed, and demonstrated the value of (33U) Ernie, Lord, English farming, past and present, p. 1U8. 338. thin sowing in rows rather than broadcast. He believed that breaking up the earth prevented the contraction of the area from which the crops fed. This resulted i n the thorough weeding of the land and extended the range from which the roots of the plants drew their food supply, but the reasons for the practice rather than the practice was what survived of Tull's work. His thinly-sown rows fai l e d to mature, and his chief legacies to his success-ors were the principles of clean farming, economy of seed, d r i l l i n g , and vigorous cultivation. His principles were not immediately adopted by the majority of farmers, but many of the most influential landlords took them up* In this connection, i t was fortunate that farming and the outdoor, simple l i f e was becoming fashionable with the men of the Augustan Age. Thus, such notables as Lord Halifax i n Oxfordshire, Lord Ducie i n Gloucestershire, and Lord Cathcart i n Scotland adopted many of the "Tullian improvements". Tull's most impor-tant disciple, however, from the point of view of future progress, was Charles, second Viscount Townshend. Retiring from p o l i t i c s i n 1730, Townshend devoted the last eight years of his l i f e to the care of his estates at Raynham i n Norfolk. His land consisted largely of rush-grown marsh and sand dunes. He therefore revived the ancient custom of marling the sandy s o i l , a practice which was to make Norfolk the model for agriculture i n England. Arthur Young, i n 176% pays tribute to the effectiveness of the measure. A l l the country from Holkam to Houghton was a wild sheep walk before the s p i r i t of improvement sei zed the inhabitants and this glorious s p i r i t has wrought amazing effects; for i n -stead of boundless wilds, and uncultivated wastes, inhabited by scarce any thing but sheep; the country i s a l l cut into en-closures, cultivated i n a most husbandlike manner, richly man-ured, well-peopled, and yielding an hundred times the produce that i t did i n i t s former state, lhat has wrought these vast improvements i s the marling; for under the whole country run veins of a very rich soapy kind, which they dig up and spread upon old sheep-walks, and then by means of enclosing they throw these N 339. farms into a regular course of crops, and gain immensely by., the improvement. (335) Townshend used the marie for two purposes - to consolidate' the light s o i l and to assist i n that pulverization of the s o i l before planting that Tu l l had recommended. Also following Tull's lines, he d r i l l e d and horse-hoed his turnips instead of sowing them broadcast. In addition he was the i n -i t i a t o r , though not the inventor, of the Norfolk, or four-course system of cropping i n which roots, cereals and a r t i f i c i a l grasses (now being intro-duced into England) were alternated. The use of grasses eliminated the unprofitable fallow, hitherto necessary to revive the exhausted land. Now a profitable crop of fodder could be used for this revival. Furthermore, Townshend specialized i n the growing of turnips, which were especially easy to raise i n the light s o i l of Norfolk, provided good f e r t i l i z e r , and fed livestock both summer and winter. (336) These new discoveries did not immediately take effect with the farmers of even the l o c a l i t i e s i n which they were made", and many of them had to be rediscovered at least once in the succeeding decades, but they created a sufficient impression to encourage further innovations and importation of improvanents from other countries. The adoption of a r t i f i c i a l grasses has been referred to. The transfer of garden crops such as turnips and cabbages to the f i e l d was also begun, and potatoes, already widely cultivated i n Ireland, were grown as a source of cheap food for the labouring poor. New (335) Young, Tour of the southern counties of England, pp. 21-22. (336) The culture of turnips i s here carried on in a most extensive manner; Norfolk being more famous for this vegetable than any other county i n the kingdom...the use to which they apply their vast fields of turnips, i s the feeding their flocks, and expending the surplus i n fatting Scotch cattle, which they do in several methods; by stall-feeding - i n binns (sic) i n their farmyards - i n pasture fields - and la s t l y , hurdle them on the turnips as they grow, i n the same manner as they do the sheep. By s t a l l -feeding they make the crop go much the furthest. Ibid, pp. 25-26. 3Uo. machinery, following on the d r i l l s of T u l l , was developed, with lighter ploughs (especially the patent plough, introduced i n 1730), and a new type of scythe for mowing. The Dutch fanning m i l l was being adopted i n place of the old f l a i l for threshing the grain. New manures were adopted, with rags, bones, refuse of fu l l i n g mills, ashes, soot, seaweed and o i l cake a l l being tried. The drainage of low-lying areas, a practice neglected since Roman times, was taken i n hand on a considerable scale by 1770. The mixture of soils, particularly i n the case of marling, had some popularity. Barnyard manure was applied continuously, but the innovation of stall-feeding, while i t saved crops, lessened the available amount of manure, and was only slowly adopted to any degree after 1760. (337) I f any permanent advance i n the science of agriculture was to be made, the livestock of the nation must be improved. Wool was s t i l l the chief source of profit to the English farmer, and the carcass of the sheep was sacrificed to the fleece. Cattle were valued for their milking or draught capacity, not for their early maturity or fattening properties. Similarly with horses, though racing and hunting had revived the thoroughbred strain, the work-horses were a sorry l o t . Because of the poor roads horses needed to be wiry and were therefore useless for heavy draught. The draught ani-mal most widely used was the ox, the draught animal of static societies. The chief d i f f i c u l t y i n development, hitherto, had been the poor feeding, but the growing of a r t i f i c i a l grasses made an increase i n the size of the livestock possible and paved the way for the work of Robert Bakewell. (337). In some counties, as, for instance, Buckinghamshire, open-f i e l d farmers hired sheep, with or without a shepherd, for folding on their arable land. The flocks, hired from Bagshot Heath, were fed, partly on the commons, partly on the arable fallows, where they were folded every night from April to October. No money was passed. The flock-master was paid by the feedj the farmer by the folding. The one made his profit by the wool, the other by the manure. Ernie, English farming, past and present, p. 77. 3U1. When Bakewell began his experiments at Dishley i n the 1750's, cross-ing was understood to mean the mixture of two alien breeds, one of which was relatively inferior. Bakewell adopted a different principle, since he regarded the method as adulteration of stock rather than improvement. He bred in-and-in, using not only animals of the same breed and line of descent, but of the same family. As a result, he united the finest speci-mens of the better breeds which he had selected for the possession of points which he wished to reproduce and strengthen. In the case of sheep, he crossed the old Leceister and old Warwickshire breeds, to produce the new Leceistershire breed, notable for their compact forms, small bone, fattening properties and early maturity. He was less successful with cattle and failed entirely with horses,, but the principle of in-breeding for the best qualities was established. Breeders everywhere followed his example. Some idea of the effect of the new practices may be gathered from a compari-son of the weights of sheep and cattle sold at Smithfield Market i n 1710 and 1795. In 1710, the average weight for beeves was 370 lbs, for calves 50 lbs, for sheep 28 lbs, and for lambs 18 lbs. In 1795. beeves had risen i n average weight to 800 lbs, calves to II48 lbs, sheep to 80 lbs, and lambs to 50 lbs. (338) The l i s t of pioneers i n English agriculture would not be complete without the inclusion of the name of Arthur Young. Though he was a failure at practical farming, he was responsible, more than anyone else, for the spread of knowledge of agricultural improvements. Commencing in the 1760's, he wrote a long series of epistolary accounts of his "tours" about the country, observing a l l types of agricultural technique i n practice and re-porting on the usefulness thereof. Possessed of a vigorous and pungent style and a talent for observation, he was one of the most-widely read authors of his time - the invaluable publicist of the agricultural revolution. (338) Ernie, English farming, past and present, p. 188. The'need of such publicity was ail-too apparent. During the f i r s t half of the eighteenth century many advances had been made i n theory, and some put into practice, but the progress was s t i l l confined to l o c a l i t i e s and often to individuals. The old practices of three-crop rotation, heavy broadcast seeding, soil-mining and out-breeding of livestock s t i l l domin-ated the vast majority of English farms. Such counties, as Hertfordshire, Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk and Leceistershire were exceptions i n which a r e l -atively high standard of farming was established. Hertfordshire had good roads, a high proportion of arable s o i l and was near the capital. There was a development of dairy-farming to supply London, and the use of manure and root crops made the growth of better crops much easier. In addition, the relatively large area of newly-enclosed land made the establishment of the open-field system practically impossible. In Essex and Suffolk, the nearness to the capital's industrial area, the use of water transport and the development of draught horses were a l l significant factors. These were also almost the only counties i n England i n which the relatively cheap source of meat, pork, was raised on any large scale. (339). Norfolk and Leceistershire benefitted from the human factor, since their industrious populations and the lead given them by the work of Townshend and Bakewell were used to advantage. A l l these improvements, however, had been carried out by the wealthier -land-owners, gentleman-farmers l i k e T u l l and Townshend. (3U0). To enable (339) Young, Tour through the southern counties of England, pp. 291-292. (3I4O) They who suppose any improvement originally owing to common farmers are somewhat mistaken. A l l the well-known capital strokes of husbandry are traced accurately to gentlemen: from wheneecomes the intro-duction of tumeps (sic) i n England? But from T u l l . Who introduced clover? But S i r Richard Weston. Marling i n Norfolk i s owing to Lord Townshend and Mr. Allen. In a word the most noted improvements were devised and f i r s t practiced by gentlemen; common husbandmen i n a long period of years, imi-tated the method in proportion to the success, and so by slow degrees i t becomes general. Ibid., pp. ix-x. 3U3. common farmers to develop anything l i k e the invention or the enterprise of the pioneers, the conditions of land tenure and economic organization of agriculture needed to be altered radically. This process was already i n f u l l tide, with the substitution of the enclosed capitalist farming for the old open-field, strip-farming system. In the second half of the eighteenth century this change was to be accelerated a hundredfold, partly by the rise of the price of corn, partly by the pressure of a growing population, and partly by the improved technique i n agriculture. (3Ul). The movement had been going on for centuries before 1760, and was really a manifestation of that individualism which had developed during the Renaissance and the commercial revolution. The new commercially - minded gentry of England grew restive under the restrictions of the backward communities, a general intellectual activity manifested i t s e l f throughout the nation, and there was a universal desire to cast off the old system. The agrarian disruption attendent upon the dispoiling of the monasteries helped the movement enormously. The recipients of sequestered lands were able, i f only temporarily, to organize farming on a ca p i t a l i s t i c basis, and their example was followed wherever possible i n the two succeeding centuries. The change was, i n fact, the effect, while s t i l l the accompani-ment, of the new technique. Without substitution of the separate occupation for the ancient system of common cultivation i n village units, this new technique was impossible to put into practice. Efficient farming cannot be carried on i n a system where each man1s land i s impossibly split into widely-separated and minute strips; nor can i t be carried on where each reactionary peasant has an equal voice i n the planning and administration thereof. Yet i n carrying out the necessary changes, rural society was (3J4I) According to Toynbee, 33h,91h acres were enclosed between 1710 and 1760, while nearly 7,000,000 were enclosed between 1760 and I8i;3. To.ynbee, Arnold, The industrial revolution, p. 38. 3hh. convulsed and i t s general conditions disrupted. The d r i f t of the peasant from the s o i l and the elimination of the commoners and the open-field farm-ers was the price the nation paid for the supply of bread and meat to an increasing industrial population. The old agricultural organization had three prominent features. The f i r s t was the so-called "waste-land", which might be forest, stoney ground or marsh, though often i t was cultivated i f reclaimed. Arthur Young cal -culated i n 1768 that fifteen million out of thirty-four million acres i n England was s t i l l waste land (3U2). The second feature was the open-field in which the land was divided into three fields of good, medium and poor land, and further sub-divided into strips which were assigned to the village farmers for cultivation. In order that no farmer should have an undue advantage, the strips were parcelled out equally i n the good and poor s o i l so that the holdings of each man were not consolidated and the separate strips were too small to farm efficiently. AH peasants were bound to f o l -low the customary system of t i l l a g e , A l l s o i l had to be treated alike and a l l crops had to be sown and reaped at the same time. No winter crops could be grown so long as the arable land was subject to pasture rights from August to February. Drainage was primitive and wasted more larid than i t saved. The ploughed area was much too large and much of i t should have been used for pasture. Footpaths, made necessary by the division into strips, cris-crossed the land and wasted acreage. In the actual farming, one strip was l e f t fallow each year; on the other two wheat and barley were grown, and sometimes oats or tares. It was substantially the agrarian sys-tem of the middle ages s t i l l flourishing i n the eighteenth century. A mod-ern authority has given a v i v i d picture of the open-field system. The cultivated fields were generally foul, i f not from the fault of the occupier, from the slovenliness of his neighbours; (3U2) Young, Farmer's letters, p. h» 3U5. the turf-baulks harboured twitch; the triennial fallows l e f t their heritage of crops of docks and thistles. The unsheltered hedgeless open-fields were hurtful to the livestock, though the absence of hedges was not without i t s advantages to the corn. The farm buildings were gathered together i n the village, often a mile or more from the land. As each man's strips lay-scattered over each of the open-fields, he wasted his day i n vi s i t i n g the different parcels of his holding, and his expenses of manuring, reaping carting and horse-keeping were enormously increased...Vexatious rights interfered with proper cultivation. One man might have the right to turn his plough on another 1s strip, and the victim must wait his neighbour's pleasure or risk damage to his sown crops. (3h3) The third feature of the old system was the common f i e l d . This was held i n common by a l l the peasantry i n the village and was used for pasture. Naturally, since i t was not the charge of any individual and the village was not under the pressing necessity to co-operate, the land was neglected. Even i n good seasons, there was barely enough grass to keep the cattle and sheep alive. When the weather was cold or wet, the grass was late and scanty, and much of the livestock died for want of food. Such cattle were naturally miserable specimens. Timothy Nourse's description of them i s noteworthy. And as the men, so are the cattle, that are bred upon such commons, being a starved, scabby, and rascally race. Their sheep are poor, tattered and poisoned with rot. Their cattle and colts are dwarfed and ragged: for l i t t l e beggarly Stone-colts, running promiscuously amongst the herd, beget a miser-able, shotten and bastardly breed....Nor are commons only i n -jurious to horses, but also cattle, the increase of such places being nothing but a sort of starved, tod-bellied runts, neither f i t for dairy nor the yoke. (3hk) Furthermore, though most of the commoners were restricted as to the number of their stock, a few, sometimes including the lord of the nearby manor, could turn out as many cattle as they wished and might even pasture those of strangers for a fee. Such inequalities naturally operated against the poorer commoners. If the commons were thus thrown open, every man who held other pastures saved them u n t i l the last moment, ordinarily feeding his (3U3) Ernie, English farming, p. 155. (3hh) Nourse, T, Campania f e l i x , pp. .98-99, cited by Moffit, Louis, England on the eve of ttie~lndUstri.al revolution, p. 30. 31*6.. livestock on the common. Once the old local Courts Baron had disappeared, the small commoner had no reddress against his neighbour who pastured more than custom permitted. In addition to the evils inherent i n the communal system, the various methods of land tenure operated against the weaker tenants. The increase in population had long ago replaced feudal services, including tithes (3U5), with money rents i n return for land, but the form of tenure was much as i t had been in the middle ages. There was, however, a tendency to' concentrate a l l rights i n a parcel of land i n a single owner - usually through the methods of fee simple or a freehold after a certain number of years. The old system of copyhold (the payment of a fine on renewal or inheritance) was an obstacle to such consolidation and attempts were made, wherever possible to convert these into leaseholds for a number of years. This change tended to turn the landlord into the absolute owner. By 1760, copyholds were rap-idly disappearing. The new leaseholds, however, were f u l l of drawbacks for the tenant. Though the right of inheritance for a certain number of l i v e s or years was specified in the t i t l e , there was no guarantee of tenure for the tenant, nor of profit for the landlord. Fines were often raised against a renewal of tenure and the tenant, uncertain of renewal, often mined the land i n the last few years of tenancy, ruining i t for succeeding tenants. Even when a tenant farmer possessed both enterprise and capital, such systems of land-tenure discouraged improvement, and the covenants i n some leases, designed to preserve the f e r t i l i t y of the land, were also limitations on progressive methods. (3U5) The Church s t i l l levied i t s tithe, but many were now compounded for money. The money tithe was more r i g i d throughout economic fluctuations and was therefore more unpopular with tithe owners. Many were acquired from the clergy and were bought and sold as investments. The old tithe i n kind, however, was a hinderance to agricultural progress since i t ate up surpluses which might have been used for improvement. Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 3^ » 3U7. The concentration on leasehold tenancy also tended to increase the size of the farms. Between 1720 and 1785 consolidation of leases was f a t a l to the small owner, and there was also much termination of laases and buy-ing out of small freeholders. By 1755, farms as large as 3,000 acres were to be found i n Norfolk, though Arthur Young noted that these were the ex-ception, rather than the r u l e . ...the greatest part of the kingdom i s divided into small farms; f o r these under 300 acres (including the most waste and barren s o i l ) cannot be thought large i n any county. The tour extends twice through the large one of Northumberland which contains few farms that are small, and some so great as 6,000 acres, several of which class are included i n the average; the generality, therefore, must be of very moderate size f o r the medium of the whole to be no more than 287 acres. ('3U6). There had been, moreover, a close connection between the small hold-ings and the domestic system of industry. As t h i s l a t t e r developed, rents increased. Gradually, i n the early part of the eighteenth century, the weavers and c l o t h i e r s of the northern counties were driven into the country d i s t r i c t s by the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the town corporations and the increased cost of l i v i n g . On the land, the worker was able to. supplement h i s earn-ings during slack times by farming. The r i s e i n rents and the gradual consolidation of holdings i n the second half of the century, however, was a major contributing factor i n destroying domestic system and driving the worker back on the town and the factory system. The waste under the o l d system of agriculture was excessive, but so long as farming remained unprogressive and the population stationary, the economic loss to the nation was unimportant. With the improvement of methods and increase of resources f o r farming, and with the demand f o r food threatening to increase above the supply, the need f o r change became imper-ative. In the second ha l f of the eighteenth century, there was a general upsurge i n the number of enclosures. Between 1U55 and 1637, 2.1 per cent (3h6) Young, Northern tour, Vol. IV, Letter 36, c i t e d by M o f f i t , op. c i t . , p. 51. 3kQ. . of the area of England was enclosed, while i n the eighteenth and early nine-teenth centuries, nearly 20 per cent was enclosed (3U7)• The reasons for this increase varied with the different l o c a l i t i e s . In the border counties, in the north and west, there was generally a preponderance of forest or unbroken land. ?ilhere this was encroached upon, i t was generally farmed by individuals with considerable amounts of capital and the old system never really took root. In addition, the uncertainties of border warfare had pre-vented communal villages from growing up to any marked degree. Where i n -dustrial areas grew up, there was also a rapid breakdown of the open-field system, since the need for supplying those areas with food on an unpreceden-ted scale transcended any rights of the communes. Furthermore, the revolution i n stock-breeding demanded larger areas for grazing. This has often been cited as the chief reason for enclosure, especially i n the case of sheep-raising. Actually the wool trade was res-ponsible for much of the early enclosure, but by the eighteenth century i t had declined to a minor factor. Of greater significance was the fact that the eighteenth century saw an unprecedented demand for corn for export. The corn-growing areas of the East, Northeast and Midlands were those most widely affected by the enclosures after 1760. With the rise i n prices of corn, soon after the accession of George III, the drive to place farming on a ca p i t a l i s t i c basis was quickened. Finally, the broadening outlook among the more intelligent classes came into sharp conflict with the old restricted and localized views of the commoners, as i t was coming into conflict with the old economic system i n a l l i t s aspects. So long as the commons remained they represented i n the short term the fixed obsession of the English peas-antry with the past. The villagers could look no further than the bounds of the common and developments in agriculture were impossible. (3U7) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 55. 3U9. What i s loosely c a l l e d the enclosure movement was actually three close-l y related processes: the reclamation and appropriation of wastelands, the break-up of the open-fields, and the appropriation of the commons. They were brought about i n a number of ways. The common f i e l d s were often ex-tinguished by the l e g a l uniting of various r i g h t s , by the severing of rights from the tenancy to which they were attached, by disuse, or by destruction of the produce for which the right was held. Often the enclosure was not the arbitrary act of a single landlord but the consolidation of various claims by consent, a f t e r which the land was redistributed on a more e f f i c i e n t basis. In respect to the open-field, approvement was often practiced, where-by the landlord gained the right to make what use he wished of the land of indigent tenants, provided commons rights were preserved. Agreements were also made f o r cash payments. The most spectacular of the enclosures, how-ever, were made by Acts of Parliament, both private and general. Private acts began to be i n s t i t u t e d systematically i n the reign of Anne, but had been passed at i n t e r v a l s since Tudor times. From 1702 u n t i l 1800, these acts operated as a generally-recognized system, and thereafter they were passed under a General Enclosure Act. From 1702 to 1760, 200 of these acts were passed, of which 130 concerned open-fields, and 70 waste or commons. In 1760 the nation was on the eve of a great wave of enclosures, i n which 2,000 acts were passed up to 1800, and ten times as much land enclosed as hitherto. (3U8). In these operations, the small owner or leaseholder was at a t e r r i b l e disadvantage. Throughout the process, two interests were primarily protected, those of the l o r d of the manor and of the tithe-holder. The large land-owner might be able to influence Parliament, and he could, i n any case (3U8) Toynbee, The i n d u s t r i a l revolution, p. 28. 350. retain a lawyer to present his case. The small farmer often could do neither. (3U9) The arguments for and against the enclosure movement have continued up to the present day. Certainly some of the results of the change were a i horrible price to pay for efficiency. Though the acts often contained safe-guards against injustice, the old system was far too widespread to prevent i t s destruction resulting i n a mass displacement of population. On the purely economic side, the movement was a distinct benefit. l e t , though agriculturists scarcely looked beyond the economic waste of the open-fields (350), and social reformers condemned the human wastage i n the system, the social evils of i t s cure were soon to become apparent. Few realized the f u l l consequences of the change, or appreciated the strength of the upsurge i n capitalist farming. In human misery alone, the cost was enormous, as the rural social structure was dislocated, the cottars and squatters, on the common driven.from the land and the number of charges on the parish rates enormously increased. (3U9) He could not read or write and he could not afford to get a lawyer to speak for him. About his rights he knew l i t t l e except that as long as he could remember he had kept a cow, driven geese across the waste, pulled his.fuel out of the brushwood and cut his turf from the : common and that -his father had done a l l these things before him. Even i f he succeeded i n making out his claim, he would often receive his compensation i n the form of a small plot of land which he had to s e l l because he could not afford to fence i t . Hammond, J.J. and B., The rise of modern industry, p. 87. (350) The common plea i n favour of downs and sheep-walks, i s the produce of wool; but the most exact calculations that can be made plainly prove the vast superiority of arable farms, with a proper proportion of grasses; nor does the rent of any tract of land, i n the employment of manufactures, by a hundred degrees equal the population tending the plough. What an amazing improvement i t would be, to cut this vast plain (Salisbury) into farms, by enclosures of quick hedges, regularily planted with such trees as best suited the s o i l . A very different aspect the country would present from what i t does at present, without a hedge, tree or hut; and inhabited only by a few shepherds and their flocks. Young, Southern tour, p. 202. 351. The benefits of the new system were not universal, moreover. In many places the farmers on the enclosures continued the same inefficient methods of farming and in some cases the landlord bound them to the old ways. Individual responsibility helped good farmers to progress, but rendered bad farmers helpless. Where the village commune had been able, under good leadership, to co-operate effectively many of the old practices had been extremely beneficial. ( 3 5 l ) . The destruction of the old relationships between master and man was one of the chief costs of the change. Landlords as they prospered drew away from their tenants, and farmers, i n turn, ceased to work with their labourers. The labourer's lot was made much worse. He f e l t most of the burden of high prices while his wages were steadily f a l l i n g , and he had not the security of a plot of land. The result was the disappearance of two classes, the agricultural labourer and the small yeoman. With this disappearance began the decline of the highly specialized industry of British agriculture. (352). A most important aspect of any industry i s i t s marketing organization, and i n the case of agriculture, this was of special importance i n the lives of the people, and serves to i l l u s t r a t e the changes i n marketing i n general i n the period under discussion. The chief phenomenon of eighteenth century marketing was the rise of the middleman. Before 1660, his activities had been banned by legislation, but gradually his usefulness came to be real-ized. (353). The activities of such men were necessary i f the trade economy (351) Ernie, English farming, p. 199. (352) Toynbee, The industrial revolution, p. 92. (353) Sir Josiah Child i n I69I4., defends the middleman; condemning: Our Law against engrossing Corn and other Commodities, there being no Persons more beneficial to a Trade i n a Nation, than Engrossers, which w i l l be worthy Employment for our present Usurers, and under them truly useful to their Country. Child, A new discourse on trade, p. 72. 352.. was to function e f f i c i e n t l y . Their influence varied with different i n -dustries. In the sale of perishable foods, speed of turnover was required and the middleman was almost completely eliminated. In the c a t t l e trade, h i s status varied. Graziers had been responsible f o r fattening beasts and bought from farmers to s e l l to butchers. They employed drovers to drive the c a t t l e to market and eventually these began to s e l l to the but-chers. Gradually the structure grew with jobbers and salesmen intervening between drover and butcher. Stock yards grew up i n the market towns, c u l -minating i n the huge livestock market i n Smithfield, with i t s complex or- . ganization of buyers and s e l l e r s . Despite the change of functions and the development of stock-breeding, the prices of meat throughout the eighteenth century remained remarkably steady. The organization of the marketing system and the fact that meat was a r e l a t i v e l y perishable item prevented manipulations of price through hoarding, so that normal seasonal and c y c l i c a l fluctuations were the only serious l i m i t a t i o n on free marketing.(35U)• In the dairy industry and the woollens, marketing and prices tended to r e f l e c t much the same trends. The wool trade was subject to severe export r e s t r i c t i o n s under the mercantilist system, and i t gradually de-clined as the pasturing for wool was discouraged i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the century i n favour of the c u l t i v a t i o n of corn. Once the i n d u s t r i a l revo-l u t i o n began to affect the manufacture of woollens i n Yorkshire, moreover, the balance swung i n favour of the import of raw wool and home production was further discouraged. The chief interest i n markets and prices i n the eighteenth century, (35U) In 176U, the middlemen were accused of r a i s i n g prices, how-ever. The arguments of a higher demand i n London, the premature slaughter of hogs leading to. a shortage i n 1762, the poor weather and the scarcity of fodder i n 1762 were a l l rejected, and the combinations among buyers of livestock to raise the price was judged to be the r e a l reason, despite the obvious i n f l a t i o n a r y tendencies following the war. Annual re g i s t e r , 176U, p. 68. 353. however, concerned the corn trade. Here the function of the middleman was best developed and the abuses of price-fixing and hoarding most widely sus-pected and practiced. Licensing of middlemen was adopted as early as the fifteenth century, but the system broke down, and by the middle of the eighteenth century the number of corn factors was out of a l l proportion to the trade involved. The demands of l o c a l markets were often at the root of legislation against middlemen. By 1760 the metropolitan market's ascend-ency had been so established, however, that only where a real surplus was proven were buyers from a distance permitted to operate. The Corn Exchange was built by the corn factores, and they held the control of the trade com-pletely i n their hands. They were actually a stabilizing i n the market, despite the objections of the uninformed. The era before 1760, was one of steadily increasing profit i n any case, since the population did not increase fast enough to deplete the surpluses of com, and the payment of bounties and shortages abroad encouraged i t s export. The resentment manifested for the middleman in the grain trade was not confined to the factor. Millers who dealt directly with both producer and consumer, were the object of dangerous food riots i n the 1750's and 1760's. Even as late as 1772, i t i s noted that: About eleven o'clock at night, a mob assembled at Chelms-ford, armed with bludgeons, and next day went i n a body to v i s i t the mills i n that neighbourhood, from whence they took great quantities of wheat and wheat flour. At Witham and Sudbury, upon the same road, they stopt the cars laden with meat for the London markets, and exposed i t to sale at three-pence per pound; the wheat they seize, they s e l l at k s. a bushel, and give the money to the owners. (355). By 1772, however, a secondary post-war depression following the Seven Years' War was i n f u l l tide, and the resentment against middlemen was also linked to the economic cycle. Rural middlemen, such as mealmen and flour-men were unpopular as well as their more notorious brethern i n the c i t i e s . (355) Annual register, 1772, p. 91. 35U. Adulteration of flour by Manchester mealraen caused food riots which lasted, for a fortnight i n 1758 (356), and the general flavour of popular lawless resentment against depression, was accurately reflected throughout the nation. Malting also expanded as the increase i n the consumption of alcb- -holic liquors i n the eighteenth century expanded the size and scope of the market. Brewers, inn-keepers and bakers became engrossers of grain and owners of r e t a i l businesses, i l l u s t r a t i n g the expansion of the functions of the middleman in both directions i n the trade structure. It was the beginning of the consolidation of industry on a vertical plane which has continued down to the present day. The surplus grain had three main markets: the industrial non-self-sufficing areas, the urban area of London, and the foreign market. Before 1760 there was l i t t l e local exclusion of corn-growing except i n the textile areas of Yorkshire and Lancashire. Hence, the land was usually over-pro-ductive in respect to the needs of the nation as a whole. In the industrial areas, however, the land was not productive and supplies from other areas, i n that era of uncertain transportation, were not always adequate. In addition, London was both the largest consumer and the largest exporter of corn, and drained most of the surrounding area to the extent that she hand-led about two-fifths of the total production. (357). The foreign market was the most significant, i n that i t controlled a l l the others through i t s dependence on the English Corn Laws. Charles II had imposed duties on the importation of corn which decreased as the dom-estic price increased. These were repealed, however, i n I689 i n favour of a more flexible method of controlling price. The new regulations declared that when wheat prices were at or under forty-eight shillings a quarter, (356) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 81. (357) Ibid., p. 86. 355. a bounty of five shillings a quarter was to be allowed on every quarter of home-grown wheat exported and importation of foreign grain was forbidden. Importation might be permitted, however, when prices rose above forty-eight shillings. The value of the legislation i s open to serious doubt. Pros-perity generally seems to have been unaffected by i t , but i t did, except in the last few years of i t s operation, tend to modify the great fluctua-tions i n price. (358). Since England was, up to 1770, almost entirely de-pendent upon home-grown supplies, prices of corn were extremely sensitive to fluctuations i n harvests. Average harvests provided sufficient bread, but the margin was often narrow. Even the slightest fa l l i n g - o f f i n y i e l d was unnaturally reflected i n phenomenal increases i n price. Similarly, even the prospect of surplus served to drive prices ridiculously low. Any hope of importing foreign corn at reasonable prices during a time of national shortage, however, overlooked the homogeniety of the corn-growing area of Europe. A harvest failure usually hit a l l areas simultan-eously, and foreign corn with the cost of shipment added, even in times of shortage, was usually more expensive than the home-grown product. The con-sumers, therefore, suffered very l i t t l e from the heavy duty on imports of corn. The laws on bounty, liberty of export and restriction on import were / continuously operative, however, The era between 1700 and 1765 was one of rapid increase of surpluses. Wheat export increased ij.16 per cent, barley 281 per cent and malt 317 per cent. (359). In that time, prices showed a f a l l of 1 6 per cent. In nine years ( I 6 9 8 , 1699, 1700, 1709, 1710, 1 7 I 4 I , 1757, 1758, and 1759) the bounty on the export of corn was prohibited. It w i l l be noted that a l l these were years of p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s and some of (358) Lipson, The economic history of England, Vol. II, p. U58. (359) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 88. 356. actual war. In addition, i n 17Ul, 1757 and 1758 corn was admitted duty-free. (360). Up to 1765 the market was remarkable for low prices, a large export trade i n home-grown corn, and the undoubted prosperity of the labouring classes. (361). By contrast, the period after 1765 was notable for high prices, a growing importation of foreign corn, and great misery among the wage-earning population. The average price of wheat before 1765 practically trebled by the end of the century. The rise i n prices was attributed var-iously to the manipulations of corn factors, the growth of population, the increased cost of capitalist farming under the newly-consolidated system, the depreciation of currency, unfavourable seasons and the economic drain of the Seven Years' War. Probably the most effective reasons were the un-favourable seasons and the strain of the war. Certainly the price of corn was an important p o l i t i c a l determinant. The coal-heavers, seamen, weavers and miscellaneous paupers which formed the bulk of the mobs i n these years, and under the leadership of Wilkes terrorized the capital, had very often at the basis of their grievances, the high price of food. In addition, as we shall see, the Government was very reluctant to impose further burdens of taxation on the land and fearing to tax the mercantile interests, was driven to a variety of ineffective expedients, the most notable of which were the Cider Tax, the national lotteries, the Stamp Act and the Revenue Act. (360) Ernie, English farming, p. 261. (361) With the exception of the years i n which deficient harvests oc-cured, the period was generally a prosperous one for the labouring classes in England. The level of prices was low and steady. As compared with the average price of wheat i n the seventeenth century, the f i r s t sixty-five of the eighteenth century show a f a l l of sixteen percent, and i t s relative cheapness was accompanied by a rise of the same percentage i n the wages of the agricultural labourer. It seems probable that the reign of George II was the nearest approach to the Golden Age of the labouring classes. Ibid. p. 262. 357. In the administration of the Com Laws, the varying interests of the producer and consumer clashed, with the producer generally benefitting, since the protection of the com trade was believed by the Government to be i n the national interest. (362). The laws were framed for the benefit of the producers to relieve them from the pressure of accumulated stock, and so that they might, i n the form of the land tax, bear their share i n the increased public burdens. One further reason for the continuance of the benefits to agriculture was s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l . Whig politicians found i t cheaper to bribe the Tory squires into submission to the "Court Party", than to be forever under the necessity of ferreting out Jacobite plots. It was hoped, from the consumers' point of view, that the bounty would stimulate the production of home-grown grain and so provide a constant sup-ply of com and stabilize prices at a lower average. In the years of scar-city, as we have seen, the bounty had l i t t l e direct effect. In the years of abundance the bounty may have stimulated production to prevent a f a l l i n prices, and this was agreed to be a sufficient compensation to producers. In addition, since the bounty was paid without regard to the quality of the grain exported, i t was believed that English consumers benefitted from having the superior qualities retained for home consumption. Against such a benefit, however, may be measured the interference with natural cheapness in years of abundance and the loss of six million pounds, which was the b i l l that had to be paid out of general taxation for bounties to the producers (362) Producers' strengths pulled one way and consumers' necessity the other. For wheat was a necessity of the poor, and agriculture was the symbol of productive strength at home. Cotton and wool were also objects of national concern; but cotton was an upstart, and more wool meant more sheep and more sheep had hitherto meant fewer husbandmen. By contrast, the smiling wheat fields with their human labour always on or about them were a precious boon for which England l i k e other wheat-raising nations thanked Divine Providence, and therefore she took such measures as she could to keep them smiling. Fay, C.R., "The signifigance of the com laws i n English history", Economic history review, Vol. I, p. h3* 358. up to the year 1765. (363). A nation which was thus expanding i t s economy required a unity of a l l l o c a l i t i e s , both as to economic and social, and such unity could only be achieved with an efficient communication system. The English communication system in the middle of the eighteenth century was very bad. With the ex-ception of a few miles of canal i n the making, and a few river estuaries of very limited navigability, the roads were the chief means of transpor-tation. The dependence on roads as a unifying factor i s best illustrated by the role of itinerate pedlar. The arrival of the pedlar was s t i l l eagerly expected i n country villages, where he did not appear only as the philosoph-i c a l enthusiast of the poet's license. Rather he was the m i l l -iner of rural beauties, the arbiter of fashion to village bucks,' the newsagent of the alehouse p o l i t i c i a n , the retailer of the most recent gossip, the vendor of smuggled tea, the purveyor of the latest amorous ditty. He was typical of the times when villages were isolated, self-sufficing, dependent on his summer and winter circuits for their .knowledge of the world beyond the parish boundaries. (36U). The roads, i n fact, were as bad as possible. No really systematic mending or replacement had been attempted since the Romans had l e f t the country, and even the Roman roads were beginning to wear down after four-teen centuries. In many cases the Roman roads were ignored altogether for the muddy tracks which, as G.K. Chesterton has pointed out, were twisted across the face of the countryside by the devious English genius. Most of these so-called roads, especially i n the north, were impassable forcarriages, except i n extremely dry summers. Pack-horse and post-horse were the usual means of conveyance. A contemporary description of Lancashire roads, i l l u s -trates the primitiveness of communication. (363) Ernie, English farming, p. 260. (36U) Ibid., p. 28U. 359. For many ages, and to the middle of this (eighteenth) cen-tury, a causeway about 2 feet wide paved with round pebbles was a l l that man or horse could tread on, practically, i n the winter season both i n Lancashire and Cheshire. This causeway was guarded by posts at a proper distance to keep carts off i t , and the open part of the road was generally impossible i n the winter for mire and ruts. (365). Or Arthur Young's expletives on the roads of Essex:: Of a l l the cursed roads that ever disgraced this kingdom, in the very ages of barbarism, none ever equalled that from Billericay to the King's Head at Tilbury. It i s for near 12 miles so narrow, that a mouse cannot pass by any carriage; I saw a fellow creep under his wagon to assist me to l i f t , i f possible, my chaise over a hedge. The rutts (sic) are of incredible depth — and a pavement of diamonds might as well be bought for as a quarter. The trees everywhere over-grow the road, so that i t i s t o t a l l y impervious to the sun, except at a few places: And to add to a l l the infamous circumstances, which occur to plague a traveller, I must not forget the eternally meeting with the chalk-waggons; themselves frequently stuck fast, t i l l a collection of them are i n the same situation, that twenty or thirty horses may be tacked to each, to draw them out one by one. (366). In many cases, where the drainage was poor and the mud deep, only horsemen could make their way. The usual "roads" were strips of mud bor-dered by a narrow pebbled "pack and prime" way. Pack trains moved along this as did pedestrians. The width of the roads varied from four to four-teen yards, though there were eight or nine, with a four foot 'jpack and prime" way. (367) Ferrys were used for crossing streams, for i t was not u n t i l 1770 that the bridge-building era began. Drainage varied i n quality, but even where i t was good, the unmetaled tracks soon broke down under the strain of having to support the migrating herds of cattle which were driven to London market. (368) (365) Lancashire and Cheshire antiquarian society, vol. IX, p. 107 cited by Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, pp. 97-98. (366) Young, Southern tour, p. 88. (367) Moffit, Op. c i t . , p. 98. (368) Already i n the middle of the eighteenth century i t was estimated that 1|0,000 Highland cattle annually tramped their way to the meadows of Nor-folk, there to be fattened and sent off i n weekly droves throughout the win-ter, to walk to the London market....Altogether, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century, something l i k e a hundred thousand head of cattle and three-quarters of a million sheep found their way to Smithfield annually... by whose feet the highways leading to the Metropolis must have been kept con-stantly in a state or mud that we find i t d i f f i c u l t nowadays to imagine, lebb, Sydney and Beatrice, English local government, The king's highway, pp. 67-68. 360. Gradually such tracks widened as vehicles deviated to avoid the ruts of their predecessors. Isolation of villages from one another was often com-plete and the pos s i b i l i t i e s of unity on a national scale for progressive change were almost non-existent. The responsibility for the upkeep of the roads was that of the parish, and was supposed to be enforced by the justices of the peace at the quarter sessions. Where the hopelessly inefficient system of parish administration was held responsible, however, l i t t l e permanent improvement could be effect-ed. The parishes were often too poor to support the roads or too content in isolation to care i f they were supported. The responsible officers, the parish constable or the surveyor, appointed for only a year at a time by their fellow-ratepayers, had no idea of road-engineering and were i n -clined to relieve their fellows of the statutory labour on the roads for a small monetary consideration. The roads grew worse instead of better with every advance of industry. As the strain of supporting roads grew too great for the separate parishes, Parliament began in the seventeenth century to grant concessions to corporations for turnpiking large sections of the road, that i s , pro-viding for the upkeep through t o l l s . These had developed to a considerable degree i n the south of the country before 1700, but i t was not un t i l after 17^0 that the north and west received their benefit. The turnpikes were operated by trusts set up by private acts of Parliament, and charged with constructing and maintaining a definite piece of road. The usual method was for the trust to raise a loan for the cost of construction and pay the interest on i t by collecting t o l l s . Since the i n i t i a l outlay was high, improvement in roads and maintenance usually took some years to make i t s e l f f e l t . Certainly there was a general improvement over conditions under parish authority. The method put private enterprise and public direction i n much the same relation as that established by the chartered company i n 361. foreign trade, with the difference that the turnpike trusts were not sub-ject to parliamentary" control to the same extent, and were, i n fact, sub-ordinated to the parish authorities - vri.th much the same disadvantages to the public service as had been apparent under the old system. The d i s t r i c t s for which the trusts were set up were often much too small to be useful. Thus the road from Shrewsbury to Bangor (eighty-five miles) was under six trusts, most of them deep i n debt, too poor to pay for skilled labour and too jealous to co-operate with one another. (369). The main thoroughfares, instead of being systematically dealt with, were l e f t by Parliament to the palsied hand of local authority. Here the trusts i n many cases gradually came to dominate local government and free themselves from i t s restrictions. The old inefficient system of statutory labour was employed, and the local inhabitants often compounded with the trusts to ev-ade their just contributions of money and labour for the roads. The result was an amazing patchwork in place of proper highways. The trusts were very unpopular locally for two reasons. The f i r s t was the old localized resentment against contact with "foreign ideas and people of the rest of the kingdom, and fear that the building of good roads would mean the end of local prosperity. Arthur Young observed this resentment, and was inclined to support i t . I found a l l the sensible people attributed the dearness of their country to the turnpike roads; and reason speaks the truth of their opinion. I can imagine many tracts of country, and there are certainly such i n the kingdom, wherein provisions cannot be dear. The inhabitants of those tracts, are i n the right to keep their secret; make but a turnpike road through their country, and a l l the cheapness vanishes at once. (370). There was also much active resentment i n the form of riots and the destruction of toll-gates. Where the road had always been free, the peas-(369) Ernie, English farming, p. 28I4. (370) Young, Southern tour, pp. 317-318. 362. antry resented having to detour their cattle through the bogged bye-ways or pay the ruinous t o l l s of the turnpike. They could not understand the reason for the obstruction, nor that i t was progress i n a most beneficial form, according to the lights of the enlightened oligarchs at Westminster. From the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, the annals of the times are f i l l e d with accounts of turnpike riots, espec-i a l l y i n the north of England. The multiplication of these trusts, though i t often defeated i t s own purpose, i s the strongest evidence of the grow-ing awareness of the need to improve the mads, however. Between I 7 6 O and 177U, no less than 1|52 turnpike acts were passed, and this number was con-siderably increased i n the following decades (371) The trusts were usually created for twenty-one years at a time, but gradually renewal came to be practically automatic. After I76O also, there was a definite improvement both i n road engin-eering and i n the construction of conveyances for the new roads. Here and there some local genius l i k e "Blind Jack" Metcalf of Knaresborough was a l -ready constructing properly metaled all-weather roads. Metcalf built his f i r s t road i n 1765, and gradually he was able to improve the road system of Yorkshire, anticipating the work of Macadam and Telford by half a century. Special conveyances were also being developed. The "land carriage" for perishable and luxury products, l i k e f i s h , game and butter, had been con-structed, and special types of fast carriage horses were being bred to pu l l them. Coaches and carriages, which hitherto had been sturdily, not to say crudely, constructed to withstand the wear and tear of the roads, were now being built for the comfort of the passengers, and the use of steel springs in them was developing. The construction of great commercial passenger coaches was also undertaken and travel throughout the kingdom, other than (371) Hammond, The rise of modern industry, p. 2 8 i | . 363. by water, was, for the f i r s t time, feasible. A craze for travelling devel-oped, of which Arthur Young's "Tours" and the journey of Boswell and John-son through the Hebredies are two of the more famous illust r a t i o n s . The effect of this travel was remarkable. For the f i r s t time the whole island became a social unit. The movement of people, long restricted by the lack of roads, began, with great migrations from the less productive areas of the kingdom to the new industrial and urban ones. Arthur Young notes this new trend with disapproval, i n 1769. To find fault with good roads, or any such public convenience in this age, would have the appearance of paradox and absurdity; but i t i s nevertheless a fact that giving the power of expeditious travelling, depopulates the kingdom. Young men and women i n the country villages, f i x their eye on London, as the last stage of their hope; they enter into service i n the country for l i t t l e but to raise money enough to go to London, which was no such easy matter when a stage-coach was four or five days creeping an hun-dred miles; the fare and the expenses ran high. But nowl A country fellow, one hundred miles from London, jumps to a coach box i n the morning, and for eight or ten shillings gets to town by night; which makes a material difference; besides rendering the going up and coming down so easy, that the numbers who have seen London are increased to tenfold, and of course ten times the boasts are sounded in the ears of country fools, to induce them to quit their healthy clean fields, for a region of di r t , stink and noise. (372). If the improvement of the roads was taken alone, as an isolated factor, the result i n the disruption of the lives of the people would have been profound. The human quality of curiosity by i t s e l f would have sent many out to see the world. It was not an isolated factor, however; i t was combined with the very great developments i n agriculture which i n turn resulted i n the displacement of large numbers of people; and by the growth of industry which was prepared to absorb this dr i f t i n g population into i t s huge frame-work. In the f i r s t decade of the reign of George III this process was i n i t s f i r s t stages, but i t had already advanced sufficiently to change the l i f e of the people out of a l l recognition, and the adaption of government policy to these new conditions was to be the work of the following three-(372) Young, Farmer's letters, p. 30H. 36U. quarters of a century. The implications of change, in fact, were in the nature of a challenge to the older organization of England i n a l l i t s aspects, and hence tended to be a weakening element i n a time of national emergency. 365 Chapter VIII The Revolution i n Industry. The chief economic phenomenon of the eighteenth century -was the amaz-ing upsurge in the development of industry, which has been called the i n -dustrial revolution. With the opening of the eighteenth century, England began to develop her productive capacity. Agriculture, by the adoption of new technical methods, and a new economic organization, was rapidly i n -creasing the food supply of the nation. In industry, there was f i r s t the localizing of staple industries i n the provinces and then growth of the industries, aided by a benevolent attitude on the part of the government and by a r i g i d l y protective t a r i f f . Before the industrial revolution be-gan, mines, blast furnaces and smelting houses were a l l organized on a cap i t a l i s t i c basis. The gathering together of workmen under one roof, the hall-mark of the capitalistic-factory system, was present only i n a few industries where non-human power was used, and even there i t 7ras not on a capit a l i s t i c basis, but merely adopted to save time and trouble i n the distribution and collection of material. Mining was the industry nearest to being organized on a ca p i t a l i s t i c basis. In coal mining, the need for centralizing labour and the high-cost basis of operation had already reduced the miners to the level of labourers. Much the same was true of the copper and iron mines, though lead and .tin mining were on a freer basis. Other industries on a semi-capitalistic basis included the calicos-printing works of London, the blast furnaces, the great silk m i l l at Derby, and some iron works, notably those at Birm-ingham and Falkirk. In places where non-human power was used, such as com mills, f u l l i n g mills, swivel looms for cotton fabrics and water mills < for power generally, the capitalist organization had been adopted without 366. the accompanying factory organization or division of labour. Apart from these, industry i n the middle of the eighteenth century was organized on a domestic basis. Certainly that type of system had i t s advantages. There was household unity; the workman was his own master and the superintendent of his family and apprentices. There was supposed to be healthier atmosphere for work than in the city, and a greater pride of the craftsman i n the work. A l l factors of production were centred i n the workman. Thus the social unity of the employer and employee was preserved. Only the material for manufac-ture and the marketing of the product were out of his hands. In addition, the peasant-manufacturer usually held a few acres of land, which i n slack seasons provided him with a livelihood and kept him from idleness. Gradually, however, the functions were changing. Such development was not clear-cut, and often the old existed side by side with the new i n the same industry. Various operations were taken over by the merchant who supplied the materials of the industry and marketing the product, as the demand and markets widened. There also developed a tendency to divide labour in the actual process of manufacture. Such division had long been advocated, as tending to increase efficiency of production. S i r William Petty, at the end of the seventeenth century, declared: Cloth must be cheaper made when one cards, another spins, another weaves, another draws, another dresses, another presses and packs, than when a l l operations above-mentioned were clumsily performed by the same hand. (373). Or again: In the making of a watch, i f one man w i l l make the wheels, another the spring, another shall engrave the d i a l plate, and another shall make the cases, then the watch w i l l be better and cheaper. (37U). (373) Petty, Economic writings, (Hull ed.), Vol. I, p. 260. (37U) Ibid., Vol II,.p. U73. 367. Adam Smith's example of the pin manufacture i s classic i n this regard. (375) The reason why the division of labour was not carried out to a greater ex-tent, was, as Adam Smith pointed out, that the limitation of the markets and the poor means of communication made i t uneconomic. In industry, too, as i n agriculture, the middleman developed as the process of manufacturing and marketing became more complex. The'control of circulating capital i n the form of materials, was almost entirely monopol-ized by them, and, as the worker became increasingly divorced from the land, his dependence on the middleman grew. Eventually even the fixed capital of machinery and location were taken from the worker, and the factory system was developed. The intervention of the middleman between the producer of raw material and the worker (and this was particularly true i n the silk industry) devel-oped the phenomenon of commercial-capital i n industry and the challenge to the worker's independence became even greater. Workers i n one process ten-ded to become employers.of those i n another, as for instance, the woollen weavers employing a number of spinners each. Over each of these sub-employ-ers, however, there was usually a middleman, on whose goodwill rested the prosperity of the industry, and who often took unfair advantage of his position. (376) (375) Smith, Wealth of nations, Vol. I, pp. 7-8. (376) The position of the manual worker under the domestic system was often superior to that of the small producer who enjoyed a nominal independ-ence and eked out a miserable pittance by the sweated labour of his family and himself. The "garret masters" i n the metal trades, for example, were worse off than the employees of the larger producers, since they were at the mercy of the middleman who sold them the raw material on credit and bought the finished product at their own price...in the tex t i l e and metal trades the scales were definitely weighted i n favour of the "great dealers" long before the introduction of machinery. Lipson, E., The economic his- tory of England, II, p. 6. 368. In the woollen industry, the stapler middleman developed because the manufacturer needed different types of fleece for different cloths. Fleece was packed together i n bails by the primary producer, without any regard for quality, and i t was the original employment of the stapler to sort and grade the wool, and s e l l i t to different manufacturers. From this point he began f i r s t to encroach on a l l stages of the purchase of raw material, and then through his control over the producer, on a l l the stages of marketing the finished product. His control of the material i n the woollen industry was aided by the fact that the .entire wool-clip was ready for sale within a few weeks, and the individual farmers could not afford to hold the raw wool u n t i l i t was needed. Thus the large-capital middleman with a warehouse assumed responsibility for selling the raw material. In the case of the linen and cotton industries the raw material came from abroad at great ex-pense, and only the merchant with large amounts of ready circulating capital could afford to ship i t i n . The commercial structure of the nation.was, in any case, already c a p i t a l i s t i c , and thus, on the financial side, the cotton and linen industries were primarily c a p i t a l i s t i c from the start. (377) Certainly there were some exceptions to this trend. Some industries were far more independent as to raw material, the West Yorkshire woollen industry for example. Here production was for many years largely for local consumption and the local markets traded i n special grades of the raw mater-i a l . Wool was often produced by the manufacturer-shepherd, but where i t was not, a system of "putting out" of material to be worked was developed, . (377) i n Lancashire we can trace step by step, the growth of the cap-i t a l i s t employer. At f i r s t we see, as i n Yorkshire, the weaver furnishing himself with warp and weft, which he worked up i n his own house and brought himself to market. By degrees he found i t d i f f i c u l t to get yarn from the spinners; so the merchants at Manchester gave him linen warp and raw cotton, and the weaver became dependent on them. Finally the merchant would get together thirty or forty looms in a town. This was the nearest approach to the capitalist system before the great mechanical inventions. Toynbee, Industrial revolution, p. S>H. 369. and the middleman or clothier did not encroach on any of the other processes of production. Where an ancient s k i l l survived, as i n some of the metal trades, the independence of the worker was also maintained long after the majority of industries had come under the capitalist economic organization. The development of even the most elementary machinery also required the use of large amounts of capital, but at f i r s t the control rested i n the hands of the master workman, who might employ f i r s t , his family, and then outside workmen in his shop. Weavers, notably, were conducting this form of enterprise, though there was no large use of outside circulating capital as yet. Merchants and traders assisted, by subsidizing the master workman where the more complicated looms had to be set up. Much of the machinery was of local manufacture, but where such improvements as draw-boys, flying shuttles or Dutch looms had to be installed, the cost was too high for the local manufacturer to meet. The essentials of the factory system were present i n varying degrees i n many industries in 1760. In the textile i n -dustry employer1s capital embodied not only the circulating capital of materials, but also i n many cases, the fixed capital of plant and machines. In some individual plants, moreover, there was a gathering of work people under one roof for a l l operations, for the sake of convenience. The unit of production for the domestic system was usually the cottage, with a loom-shop or spinning-shop attached. There was a definite link be-tween the t e x t i l e workers i n domestic industry and agriculture, especially among the yeomanry. Industry for some was merely a part-time r e l i e f from farming, and this class was relatively prosperous at a l l times. (378). The smaller yeomanry and cottagers relied primarily on industry and there was a (378) In view of the prevailing cheapness of meat, bread, butter, cheese and beer before the industrial revolution, and of the fact that many silk weavers vrere able to combine their handicraft with agricultural pur-suits, the lowness of wages must not lead us to take a gloomy view of the welfare of the workers. Indeed, the wages themselves are l i t t l e beloYf the normal English standard. Hertz, "The English silk industry i n the eighteenth century". E.H.R., pp. 726-27. 370. third class who were entirely dependent, as labourers, on industry and pos-sessed no land at a l l . As the enclosure movement developed, this last clasps increased rapidly. Only about ten percent of farmers in 1760 were depend-ent on agriculture alone. ( 3 7 9 ) . In the towns there was, of course, no connection with the land, industrial discipline was much more formal, and labourers worked by the day or the piece, though they s t i l l worked i n their own houses. The master workman not only controlled his fixed capital to some ex-tent, but was also the manager and foreman of his "plant". In the textile trade, he was included i n the general category of "clothier", though this t i t l e came increasingly to be applied to the middleman only. In this cat-egory there were three classes by 1760. The small independent clothier was confined to his own household, where a l l processes of manufacture were carried out, and the marketing was done at the local f a i r s . Out of the proceeds, any work which needed to be done outside the household was paid for, A second class, included those who employed several units of produc-tion i n the immediate lo c a l i t y . The third class, the big clothiers, anti-cipated the factory system by gathering large numbers of workmen together i n one organization, but retained the domestic system, in that the workers remained at home. It required only the widespread use of machinery to con-vert the third type of organization into the factory system. In 1760, the only machinery in widespread use was the spinning wheel. As the industries came more and more to be represented by the larger unit, and the small pro-ducer disappeared, the economic structure of industry was imperceptably converted into the factory system. The workman was gradually becoming the servant of the merchant-capitalist; soon he was to become the servant of the machine-owning capitalist. (38O) . (379) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 205>. o (380) Lipson, Economic history of England, Vol. II, p. 8. 371. In the towns, this change was complicated by the breakdown of the med-ieval guilds and the struggle of the small producer to maintain himself, f i r s t i n the guild, and later i n the equally regulated structure controlled by the government. The decline.of the guilds came with the expansion: of commerce. Both agriculture and industry had been regulated originally by associations of producers. These had varied i n character with the industry and place, and were even totally absent i n some industries. As they declined, struggles took place within them between different interests which changed the character of the guilds completely. The most important struggle was that between the small masters and the commercial capitalists which began in the late middle ages. The small masters tried to keep the guilds i n a form favourable to their own independ-ence; the commercial capitalists often evaded the control of the guilds by setting up outside the incorporated towns (to which the guilds were al l i e d ) , i n places where i t was d i f f i c u l t to enforce guild regulations. There was also another method open to them; they could capture the guild themselves, and turn the machinery to their own uses. The need for credit of the small producer helped to undermine his independence, and to weaken him i n his struggle with the power of the larger producer, on whom he was forced more and more to rely. By the end of the seventeenth century the medieval crafts-man had s p l i t up into several other persons: the large merchant, the shop-keeper, the merchant employer, the large master, the small master and the journeyman. Thus the guild declined and was gradually replaced as a regu-lating agency by the state. ( 3 8 l ) . The regulations survived, however, and were administered by the state, or delegated to the local justices of the peace to administer. Most res-trictions i n the clothing industry remained in force u n t i l 1765. The wool-len industry, for instance, was regulated by many laws. Some aimed at (38I) Hammond, The rise of modern industry, p. 99. 372. protecting the interests of the towns in which industries were established, others at protecting the interests of the branch of industry or craft, s t i l l others at promoting the good conduct of the industry. During the last half of the eighteenth century there was a constant struggle between masters and men over these laws. Between 1728 and 1765 there was a long struggle i n Gloucestershire over their enforcement. The small workmen, who supported the regulations as their only protection, were f i n a l l y de-feated and the laws were repealed. It now needed only the expansion of industry on a major scale to regularize this defeat into the laissez-faire doctrines of the early nineteenth century. "The insensible progress of society," wrote S i r Frederick Eden, i n 1797, "has reduced charter rights to a state of i n -activity; and both private and national interests have super-ceded the necessity of having recourse to antiquated customs". (382). On the eve of the industrial revolution, therefore, the organization of industry was partly c a p i t a l i s t i c and partly domestic. In connection with the supply of raw materials and ownership of circulating capital the control of this economic function had passed to the merchant employers on the one hand or to the masters of one or two processes on the other. Fixed capital remained largely i n the hands of the craftsman. Master workmen were managers on a ca p i t a l i s t i c basis, and though this was unecon-omical and inefficient, i t helped to preserve the small unit long after the factory system was established. To complete the transition to the factory-capitalist system, i t now required only technical changes i n the means of production i t s e l f , p r i n c i -pally i n the development of machinery. In this change, the chief require-ment was power. Watt's invention of the separate condenser i n 1769 was the greatest single advance made i n this regard, but the fact that Newcomen's engine had been functioning i n many industries for half a century made (382) Eden, The state of the poor, Vol. I, pp. U36-U37. 373. possible a l l ]ater development. Newcomen's engine, since i t s efficiency was very small, was not easily applicable to rotary machinery, and was res-tricted to the drainage of mines. In any case the need for adequate power had to be met before other mechanical inventions could be u t i l i z e d , and i t was only i n the late 1770's that Watt's engines were harnessed to factory machinery. (383). In 1760, mining was organized on a largely c a p i t a l i s t i c basis. The exceptions to this were i n the relatively primitive workings of the lead mines of Derbyshire and the t i n mines of Cornwall, where mineral rights could be obtained and worked on an individual basis. Hand power was large-l y used here and the smelting was also primitive, though the use of coal was more widespread than i n the more highly-skilled and better developed iron industry. In iron mining the large scale of production and high cost of organization rendered capitalism a necessity. By 17U0 there were, i n the nation, fifty-nine blast furnaces with an output of 17 ,350 tons of pig iron annually. (38U). This was considerably below the total output of such nations as Sweden, Russia and Spain, but the dependence upon charcoal as a smelting fuel limited the output of England, with her less extensive for-ests. Notable among the smelting works were the Carron Works at Falkirk and the Soho Works at Birmingham, of which Mathew Boulton, Watt's partner, was the manager. Actually, surprisingly l i t t l e iron was used i n industry generally. The high cost of smelting with charcoal limited i t s popularity, but even where attempts to use coal were partially successful, only a few farm implements were shod with the metal and such machinery as was used i n the textile industry was usually made of wood. In 1735, however, Abraham Darby succeeded i n making coke from coal and i n developing a more powerful type of blast furnace. In I7I4O Benjamin Huntsman developed crucible steel, (383) Hammond, Rise of modem industry, p. 122. (38U) Toynbee, Industrial revolution, p. 25. 37U. thereby ensuring the prominance of the Sheffield cutlery trade. In 1766 the Cranages produced a reverberating furnace i n which coal could be used for smelting, and the manufacture of bar iron, hitherto impossible i n the smaller furnaces, was now undertaken. The result was that the hardware trade, which had been exposed to d i f f i c u l t i e s from the scarcity of fuel, migrated from i t s centres i n Sus-sex and moved north to the coal areas. A further development was that England, from being a major importer of pig iron, soon began to produce a surplus for export. As the industry made i t s home i n the coal fi e l d s of the Midlands, Yorkshire and Derbyshire, i t was easy to combine furnace, forge and m i l l i n a single establishment, which had not hitherto been the case. Thus the iron industry, already developed on a cap i t a l i s t i c basis, was to continue i t s concentration with increased momentum. In coal mining the coal rights as late as the eighteenth century were included i n most copyholds. Thus the ownership of coal rights, while not universally common to the small landowner, was much more widespread than mineral rights i n other aspects of mining. In the case of the larger land-owners, the ultimate ownership rested with them, a form of absentee control which had produced abuses even as early as the eighteenth century. Most of the coal was mined from surface outcroppings, or from bell-shaped p i t s . Gunpowder was used for blasting, but the primitive type of tunnelling and the softness of the surface s o i l limited i t s use. The chief problems were drainage and fire-damp. Fire-damp was tested for with candles and burned out or blown out by ventilation, but most methods of limiting this hazard were unsatisfactory and dangerous. (385). Those mines below the level of (38$) Bishop Pococke, i n 1751, describes the ventilation system of a Lancashire mine: "The foul a i r i s very common i n these pits, and i n order to carry i t off they enclose a shaft and place three or four wooden pipes in i t about four inches square, which are carried up to the surface, and a l l the foul a i r going into this shaft i s conveyed up the pipes, to which there are small funnels at the top, about two inches i n diameter, by which one may perceive the a i r comes upj on them they lay a plate of iron, with holes made through i t : i f they put a candle to i t or any flame, the ai r takes f i r e and continues burning." Pococke, Travels through England, Camden Society, Vol. I, pp. 16-17. 375. free drainage required to be pumped, and i t was here that Thomas Newcomen's crude steam engine was f i r s t employed. By 1729, i t was i n general use throughout the country. In addition, wooden railways using horse power were widely used for transporting ore, especially where the roads were i n a primitive condition. Cast-iron r a i l s were experimented with i n 1757, but were rejected as too b r i t t l e , and were not used again u n t i l the 1790's, after the great developments i n iron smelting had been accomplished. Improvements i n the pottery industry had been going since the late seventeenth century. The area of the Five Towns i n Staffordshire had special advantages i n coal and clay. The clay especially was important, since i t was found to possess a l l those qualities found i n the high-grade pottery clays of Samos and Etruria. In addition the population of the area was largely one of enfranchised copyholders who could function as small manufacturers. Lead was available for glazing and markets were not far distant. The conversion of the pottery industry into a highly specialized process was not due, moreover, to some great invention or to the applica-tion of mechanical power. It was the result of a long series of improve-ments i n the methods of manufacture and distribution. Certainly the devel-opment of tea-drinking was a major factor i n this change. The contribu-tions of the Dutchmen, the Elers, i n the late seventeenth century gave new l i f e to the art and at the beginning of the eighteenth century i t possessed a l l the conditions necessary for progress. In the glazing process the uses of salt, f l i n t and lead were a l l dis-covered early i n the eighteenth century. The use of f l i n t was especially valuable, but i t exacted a price i n the decline of the health of the work-ers from attacks of the deadly potter's rot, a form of s i l i c o s i s . By 1730 the potter's wheel was being replaced by the mould and the decorating of pottery was progressing. Rederich and Jones in 172U developed porphiry pottery through the use of the new glazes, but the potteries were again i n 376. a state of stagnation when Josiah Wedgewood began his career of innovation in the 175>0's. In addition to agitating for better roads and improved marketing f a c i l i t i e s , he introduced new patterns and techniques into the industry. He became famous i n 1761 for his cream-coloured "Queen's Ware". In addition he delighted the taste of his own and succeeding generations with his jasper ware, i n which he imitated models from Greece and Rome, pressing white figures on a coloured background. Soon even the poorest in England were eating from the Vfedgewood earthenware and a revolution i n the art of li v i n g was accomplished. Certainly the development of the potteries was not as disruptive as that i n other industries. This was probably attributable to the fact that mechanical power played almost no part i n the change, so that skilled work-men, despite the fact that they often worked under the most appalling health conditions, were yet not displaced by the machine, and the feeling of industrial insecurity, the most significant price paid for industrial-ization, was not present i n this industry. (386). It was in the textile industry that the most drastic technological changes were made, and here i t was also, that the disruptive effect was greatest. The application of machinery to the textile industry was the most famous, as i t was the most far-reaching, of any of the mechanical applications of the eighteenth century. The revolution i n the cotton i n -dustry, for example was primarily due to a remarkable series of inventions.. i n the later years of the eighteenth century. The cotton had formerly been prepared by hand, was carded on winders, spun on the old fashioned spinning-wheel and woven on the hand loom. In the technological progress of the various processes, weaving, up to 1761|,: was usually i n advance of the others. Thus there was always a shortage of spinners to keep up with the production of the weavers, a fact of great significance i n the develop-(386) Hammond, The rise of modern industry, p. 173. 377. ment o f management, since one weaver might employ a dozen spinners. I n 176ij., however, Hargreaves invented h i s spinning-jenny and f o r a time s p i n -ning advanced w h i l e weaving lagged, u n t i l the development o f Cartwright's power loom i n 1785 r e s t o r e d the balance. Spinning had progressed very slowly t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y . The Jersey and Saxony wheels, which appeared at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had merely been v a r i a n t s o f the o l d spinning-wheel, and an attempt to dev-elop r o l l e r s p i n n i n g , by Y i / y a t t and Paul i n 1738, f a i l e d because cotton f i b r e s were not strong enough to withstand the s t r a i n s imposed by the crude machinery. A s u c c e s s f u l carding machine was developed by Paul i n 17U8, but as w i t h a l l machinery, i t s adoption was very slow i n a system which l a c k e d ready c a p i t a l . At the beginning of the century the Dutch had i n t r o d u c e d swivel-weaving f o r s e v e r a l narrow f a b r i c s at once, but each f a b r i c had t o have i t s separate s h u t t l e and the r e v e r s i n g of these was a slow process. I n 1733, however, the f l y i n g s h u t t l e was developed by John Kay, by which the weaver p u l l e d a s t r i n g which operated hammers knocking the s h u t t l e through the f a b r i c without having to reverse i t o r throw i t by hand. T h i s was not adopted immediately i n the cotton i n d u s t r y because o f the already serious l a g of spinning technique, but i n the woollen i n d u s t r y i t had an immediate and remarkable success. Kay's son, Robert invented the drop-box which enabled s e v e r a l colours of thread to be used at the same time. A l l these i n v e n t i o n s n a t u r a l l y i n v o l v e d a great expense and some c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y , though i n the case of the spinning-jenny the u n i t o f produc-t i o n remained the worker's home f o r s e v e r a l generations a f t e r i t s i n v e n -t i o n . The i n v e n t i o n which f o r c e d the f a c t o r y system on the i n d u s t r y , how-ever, was Arkwright's water-frame, developed i n 1768. Here, at l a s t , the n e c e s s i t y f o r water power f o r c e d the concentration of i n d u s t r y i n " m i l l s " . The i n v e n t i o n s changed not merely the power, but the c h a r a c t e r o f the i n d u s t r y . Before the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , spinning was the employment o f 378. women and weaving that o f men. With the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f machinery, women and c h i l d r e n were capable o f tending the new machines and the s k i l l o f the craftsman was completely discounted. Another problem i n d i r e c t l y connected w i t h machine power was the f e a r o f f o r e i g n competition and the r e l i a n c e on f o r e i g n sources f o r m a t e r i a l . U n t i l w e l l a f t e r 1760, cotton f a b r i c had to be strengthened by l i n e n threads, l e s t the crude machinery t e a r i t to p i e c e s . T h i s i n v o l v e d the i m p o r t a t i o n of I r i s h l i n e n and the consequent appeals from the S c o t t i s h and Lancashire l i n e n i n d u s t r i e s to cease the i m p o r t a t i o n . More se r i o u s was the importa-t i o n o f f o r e i g n c a l i c o which r e s u l t e d i n the a l l i a n c e o f the cotton and l i n e n i n d u s t r i e s to demand government p r o t e c t i o n against such i m p o r t a t i o n . At the beginning o f the eighteenth century i t was becoming a ser i o u s t h r e a t to domestic producers and i n 1721 the use of c a l i c o e s was p r o h i b i t e d e n t i r e -l y . A f t e r 1760 the p r i n t i n g o f c a l i c o e s was r e v i v e d i n Lancashire, Sussex,, and Surrey, w i t h the i n v e n t i o n o f the f l a t press and c y l i n d r i c a l p r i n t i n g . The woollen i n d u s t r y was much slower to change from the domestic sys-tem. Spinning was u s u a l l y done w i t h a wool-wheel, and the p r o p o r t i o n o f spinners to weavers here was u s u a l l y about ten to one. The process o f weaving, however, was f a r more p r i m i t i v e than i n the cotton i n d u s t r y , so t h a t spinners could keep pace w i t h the weaving much more e a s i l y . I n weaving the varying o f the s i z e o f the c l o t h remained a problem to the end o f the cen-t u r y . Probably the c h i e f reason f o r the f a i l u r e t o adopt machinery was that the woollen i n d u s t r y was s t i l l c l o s e l y t i e d to a g r i c u l t u r e , and had not developed the c a p i t a l i s t economic s t r u c t u r e to the same degree as had cott o n . The f i n a l stages o f the woollen pro d u c t i o n , those o f f u l l i n g and s t r e t c h i n g , were c a r r i e d on i n . " m i l l s " organized on a c a p i t a l i s t b a s i s , though here the n e c e s s i t y o f depending upon o u t s i d e sources o f m a t e r i a l had brought the change. The l i n e n i n d u s t r y , as has been shown, s u f f e r e d from f o r e i g n competi-379-tion. The industry was of recent creation i n any case, since i t was only in the late seventeenth century that i t was undertaken on a large scale and under government encouragement. (387). Because mercantilist doctrine considered that self-sufficiency required the development of the manufac-turer, the industry grew up without being subject to the restrictions of guilds and producers associations and even employed foreigners. A group of chartered companies was formed to promote the manufacture, but i t never rivalled the Irish or foreign industries. Another problem was that of bleaching, for the poor quality of English flax made the rather primitive process more awkward than i t might otherwise have been. The industry con-tinued, throughout the eighteenth century, to operate much as i t had done from the beginning, that i s , capitalist as to finance and domestic as to the organization of the workers. Moreover, i t gained a measure of state protection, since linen when exported paid no duty, but received a bounty. In 1756 the duties on imported yarn were removed in the interests of linen manufacturers, amidst the protests of such producing l o c a l i t i e s as Glasgow, Paisley and Preston, who declared that the measure would ruin domestic spinners. The growth of the silk industry from the beginning of the eighteenth century was attributed to the production of French silkg, but more impor-tant, perhaps, was the stimulus of the immigration of alien silk workers, particularly the Huguenots who settled in Spitalfields. They introduced or developed the making, dressing and lustrating of the fine products known as celamodes, lustrings and renforces. The modern factory system had i t s beginnings in the s i l k industry with the work of Thomas Lambe, who introduced the art of making fine silks by water-powered machinery in 1718. The organizine silk thus produced was finer than any produced hith-erto i n England, and raised a considerable amount of opposition among the (387) Lipson, Economic history of England, Vol. II, p. 10°. 380. London weavers. I t was f o r t h i s reason, therefore, that the chief factory for the new process was established i n Derby, though the c i t i z e n s of that c i t y objected, stating that the erection of a m i l l i n t h e i r midst would cause an increased burden on the poor rates. (388) By 1765 there were seven such m i l l s i n the county employing p r i n c i p a l l y women and children. According to the statement of a s i l k thrower i n 1765, he employed 1500 at a time (only 100 were men) - 500 i n London, I4.OO i n Dorset, U00 i n Cheshire, and 200 i n Gloucestershire. At Macclesfield seven firms engaged between them 2k70 men, women and children (the largest of them 720); and a London firm 800. On the weaving side two partners maintained 100 looms... (389). This indicates the large scale of the industry, and the dependence of the worker on the employer. Even where he was not under the control of the factory, the high cost of foreign s i l k s which were needed to augment the native ones was ruinously high. Turkish s i l k s were good only for damasks and stockings and the better Chinese and Bengal s i l k s had to pay heavy duties. (390). The French were the greatest competitors to the B r i t i s h producers. After 1765 there was a t o t a l prohibition of imports of French s i l k , but there was s t i l l considerable smuggling. Protectionism, insofar as the home industry was concerned, became predominant as a result of the d i s -trust of France a r i s i n g out of the Seven Years' War. The fact that the home industry was organized on a factory basis, however, had much more to do with such l e g i s l a t i o n . The f i r s t beginnings of i n d u s t r i a l unionism were making t h e i r appearance among the s i l k workers, and the absolute de-pendence of the workers on the employer made them p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to foreign competition. As a r e s u l t , the S p i t a l f i e l d s r i o t s of 1765, (388) Lipson, Economic history of England, Vol. I I , p. 103. (389) I b i d . , p. 10U. (390) M o f f i t , England on the eve of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution, p. 210. 381. which preceded and accompanied the e x c l u s i o n l e g i s l a t i o n were a f i r s t v i o -l e n t demonstration of the new desperate str e n g t h of the i n d u s t r i a l workers under the modern i n d u s t r i a l system. The s i l k i n d u s t r y was t h e r e f o r e pro-t e c t e d and maintained at enormous expense because i t was considered to be an e x o t i c i n d u s t r y necessary to the maintenance o f B r i t i s h s e l f - s u f f i c -iency and because i n the absence o f an adequate p o l i c e f o r c e , the l e g i s -l a t o r s were more than u s u a l l y s e n s i t i v e to the pressure o f o p i n i o n from the r i o t o u s s i l k workers. Once power machinery was harnessed to the i n -dustry i t out-produced a l l others i n q u a n t i t y , but i t d i d not survive the i n t r o d u c t i o n of f r e e t r a d e . (391). A f u r t h e r source of d i s r u p t i o n i n i n d u s t r y was the f a c t t h a t i t was f o r c e d , i n many cases, through circumstances of raw m a t e r i a l communica-t i o n s o r markets to move from i t s ancient l o c a t i o n s t o ones more conven-i e n t f o r i t p r o s p e r i t y . There was not, however, a great movement of ac-t u a l i n d u s t r i e s , but r a t h e r a movement o f p o p u l a t i o n to follo7v the r i s e of new i n d u s t r i e s i n l o c a l i t i e s from those i n which i n d u s t r y already f l o u r -i s h e d . The o n l y i n d u s t r y which was r e a l l y mobile was the i r o n i n d u s t r y , and here the c o n d i t i o n s f o r movement had e x i s t e d long before the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . The dependence of i r o n works, whether furnaces o r f o r g e s , on woodlands l e d to m i g r a t i o n from Sussex long before the era of the great i n v e n t i o n s . I r o n works and c h a r c o a l burning were intro d u c e d i n Wales, the Midlands and South Y o r k s h i r e before the use o f c o a l was widespread, and d i s t r i c t a f t e r d i s t r i c t was s t r i p p e d o f i t s t r e e s to provide c h a r c o a l . L a t e r the tendency of i n d u s t r y to d i s p e r s e i n search o f f r e s h woods was counteracted to some extent by the tendency which brought f o r g e s , s l i t t i n g m i l l s and r o l l i n g m i l l s to the c o a l d i s t r i c t s . These forges and m i l l s s u p p l i e d raw m a t e r i a l f o r the smith's i n d u s t r i e s , and the smith's indus-t r i e s depended on c o a l , and f l o u r i s h e d i n d i s t r i c t s where c o a l abounded. (391) H e r t z , G., "The E n g l i s h s i l k i n d u s t r y i n the eighteenth century," E.H.R., October, 1909, p. 711. 382. Consequently there was an early development of iron works around the metal trade d i s t r i c t s of Birmingham and Sheffield, as well as i n the northeast • of England. (392). In addition, the iron workers were a markedly mobile class, and the price of movement i n terms of social disruption, was negli-gible. In general, the transfer of industry was of enormous benefit to some lo c a l i t i e s . Lancashire was notable among these areas. Textiles, coal, and iron industries developed around Manchester; there were potteries around Liverpool, and glass, paper-making and chemical industries i n the Mersey Valley. In addition, the woollen industry of the West Riding of Yorkshire was closely joined to the markets of Lancashire. The population of the area reflected the growth - Liverpool increased thirty-four per cent between 1700 and 1760, while the population of the whole county doub-led. (393). In the distribution of industry throughout the country the change can best be illustrated by reference to the mineral and textile trades. The coal trade had developed much as i t i s at present. Cumberland sent most of i t s coal to Ireland, while that of Durham and Northumberland sup-plied the east coast and London, being shipped from Newcastle, South Shields and Sunderland. Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire and Worcester-shire as well as Lancashire and Cheshire furnished coal for the inland d i s t r i c t s . South Wales supplied the cloth-manufacturing areas of the southwest. As new areas were opened up, trade went to them, but i t did not desert the old areas as long as the coal lasted. The textile industry was widespread and yet more permanent. The wool-len trade, since i t s supply of raw materials could be taken from the agri-cultural areas, would ordinarily have moved very l i t t l e . Thus, the demands (392) Hammond, The rise of modern industry, p. 13U. (393) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, P. lUO. 383. of markets were the chief determinants of migration i n the woollen industry. Norwhich, the worsted centre of the nation for centuries, began to decline after 1763 because war and poverty had limited i t s continental market. Similarly, the west country declined to the extent that i t produced only the finer woollens, because i t s original overseas markets now preferred the cheaper produce of Yorkshire. (3°U). In Yfkh and 1765 there were peti-tions presented to Parliament from the older areas, complaining of this new ascendancy. The expansion of the woollen industry was about thirty per cent between 1700 and 1760, and most of this was i n Yorkshire. The increased use of cottons also marked the northward movement, since the cotton industry stationary i n Lancashire for two centuries, was now devel-oping with the use of power machinery. Even with the northward movement, the metropolis of London grew at an amazing rate. The trade of the nation was s t i l l under the influence of the London market. More than one-tenth of the population lived i n this area which produced no food of i t s own, and as a consuming and collecting centre i t was of enormous importance. In addition i t s wealth was out of a l l pro-portion to i t s population. (395). Other urban areas were beginning to assert their independence, however. Liverpool was always free from the tutelage of the capital, and between (39k) Cunningham, William, Growth of British industry and commerce, Vol. II, p. 503. (395) As to the wealth of the metropolis, i t was asserted at this period that the county of Middlesex paid more taxes to the government than any other ten shires. This was not surprising when one realizes that i t was the heart of the financial, industrial and commercial as well as the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of empire. Here was the Bank of England, the headquarters of the great trading companies, Blackwell Hall, the chief mart for woollen cloth i n the world, with innumerable other important business establishments; here also the Thames at a l l times swarmed with ships and small craft of every and description, for two-thirds of Eng-land 1 s foreign trade was concentrated at this point. Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 38. 381u 1685 and 1760 had i n c r e a s e d t e n times. Manchester had i n c r e a s e d f i v e times i n the same p e r i o d , Birmingham seven times, S h e f f i e l d s i x , Nottingham twice and B r i s t o l t h r e e . (396). The process was to continue w i t h even g r e a t e r impetus i n the nineteenth century. The p o p u l a t i o n of the n a t i o n was 5,13U,5l6 i n 1700 and i n c r e a s e d to 6,039,68U by 1750, an i n c r e a s e o f 905,168, o f which Y o r k s h i r e and Lancashire provided n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d . Lan-c a s h i r e i n c r e a s e d by 78 per cent, the West R i d i n g o f Y o r k s h i r e by 52 per cent and Durham by Ul per cent i n the same p e r i o d . (397). I n 1700, a f t e r the London area, the west country was the most populous area. Not one o f the twelve most populous counties was n o r t h of the Trent. By 1750, how-ever, Lancashire was t h i r d a f t e r Middlesex and Surrey i n d e n s i t y o f popula-t i o n , w h i l e West Y o r k s h i r e and Durham were h i g h on the l i s t . The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n accentuated t h i s change which was already i n progress. I r o n and c o a l had already moved n o r t h , t e x t i l e s were there a l r e a d y , p r o f i t i n g from the low cost of l i v i n g and great wool producing areas. I t was r e a l l y o n l y an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of f a c t o r s already present. The economy was f u r t h e r d i s r u p t e d by the f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the world economic s t r u c t u r e r e s u l t i n g from wars, famines and other untoward events. England's commerce i n becoming world-wide, found i t s e l f exposed t o the v i c i s s i t u d e s of a world economy and the course o f her economic l i f e was profoundly d i s t u r b e d by occurances remote from her t e r r i t o r y . Wars a f f e c t -ed E n g l i s h trade i n two ways. They i n f l a t e d c e r t a i n branches o f i n d u s t r y , such as i r o n and s h i p b u i l d i n g , so that a c o n c l u s i o n of the war brought a depression of such trades - t h i s happened f o l l o w i n g the Spanish Succession and Swedish Wars. The second e f f e c t was t h a t war put a s t r a i n on the s o l -vency of the c o n t i n e n t a l f i n a n c i a l houses, upon which B r i t a i n was dependent i u n t i l a f t e r the elose o f the American War i n I783, and l i m i t e d the a b i l i t y (396) Toynbee, The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , p. 11. (397) I b i d . , p. 8. 385. o f E n g l i s h i n d u s t r y to s e l l on the Continent. This was the case, as we have seen, w i t h the Norwieh worsted i n d u s t r y i n the second p a r t of the eighteenth century. I n the eighteenth century there were b a r e l y two de-cades without a war, and the a l t e r n a t e i n f l a t i o n and d e c l i n e o f i n d u s t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1760, was extremely d i s t u r b i n g to the economy o f the nation. In, 1?U2, f o r example, when England was at war w i t h Spain, the c l o t h i n g towns ordered t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Parliament to give s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n to the woollen i n d u s t r y , "the decay of which i s so s e n s i b l y f e l t i n these p a r t s by the s t a r v i n g c o n d i t i o n s to which many thousands of h i s majesty's subjects are reduced". (398). At the c l o s e o f the Seven Years' War t h e r e was primary depression caused by the f a i l u r e o f the Amsterdam banking f i r m o f de N e u f v i l l e , which had backed F r e d e r i c k the Great. As a r e s u l t of t h i s and the general over-expansion of c r e d i t , eighteen of the great banks o f Amsterdam c o l l a p s e d , and the e f f e c t s were f e l t i n a severe f i n a n c i a l de-p r e s s i o n i n London, Hamburg and Stockholm. T h i s depression, at i t s most severe i n 1763, was an important determinant i n the attempts o f the B r i t i s h Government t o f i n d a l t e r n a t i v e sources o f revenue, even to the extent of imposing an e x c i s e tax at home, and the Sugar and Stamp Acts on the Amer-i c a n c o l o n i e s . Other, and deeper causes of the depression were the des-t r u c t i o n of the c a r r y i n g trade through war and high insurance r a t e s , and the i n f l a t i o n o f currency, which r e s u l t e d i n a r i s e i n p r i c e s and an ad-vance i n wage l e v e l s . A second depression came i n 1772-73* hut t h i s one had i t s o r i g i n i n London, and a f f e c t e d a l l the markets of Europe. Gambling i n East I n d i a Company stock, and e s p e c i a l l y the p r a c t i c e o f " s p l i t t i n g " the stock to gain votes i n the Court of P r o p r i e t o r s , r e s u l t e d i n a r a p i d d e c l i n e i n i t s value from 1766 on. There was a r e c k l e s s r e - d i s c o u n t i n g o f East I n d i a Company notes i n the E n g l i s h banks and e a r l y i n 1772 the Bank of England (398) H i s t o r i c a l MSS.•Commission, Somerset, p. 12U. 386. began restricting discount. Scottish firms ceased payment later in the year and the Bank of Ayr failed entirely. A financial panic was only averted by the issue of credit by the Bank of England late i n 1773. It was concerning the results of this depression that John Wesley wrote i n 1775. I aver, that i n every part of England where I have been (and I have been East, West, North and South within these two years) trade i n general i s exceedingly decayed, and thousands of people are quite unemployed. Some I know have perished from want of bread; other, I have seen creeping up and down lik e walking shadows. I except three or four manufacturing towns which have suffered less than the others. I aver that the people in general a l l over the nation are so far from being well satisfied that they are far more deeply dissatis-f i e d than they appear to have been a year or two before the Great Rebellion, and far more dangerously dissatisfied. (399). Apart from wars and t a r i f f s the influence of the trade cycle was also realized. The glut of goods resulting from sudden or unusual demands was always a problem. The prices i n the country rose with shortages and an expansion of industry to meet the demand usually l e f t the small producer, especially i n the textile trade, with unsaleable surpluses and debts. Hands had to be l a i d off, with no real alternative occupation, want and misery were widespread, and the burden on the poor rates increased enor-mously. Society was bewildered by this alternation between boom and depression, but under the mercantilist system an attempt was made to mitigate the ex-tremes of the fluctuation by government action, as i n the case of the Corn Laws. With the breakdown of mercantilism, however, there was formulated a new body of economic doctrine which rejected government interference i n the economy and which looked to increased production and wealth to elimin-ate the fluctuations of the economic cycle. The f i r s t unconscious begin-nings of the doctrine of laissez-faire were making their appearance. (399) Historical MSS. Commission, Dartmouth, Vol. I l l , p. 220. 387 Chapter IX %he R e v o l u t i o n i n Economic Philosophy and the S o c i a l Schism I n t h i s age of progress when, throughout the n a t i o n , the c a p i t a l i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n of i n d u s t r y was making poss-i b l e production f o r the mass, and energy and b r a i n s were de-voted to meeting the needs of the average consumer, i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t a fundamental change i n the outlook of the com-munity toward economic matters should come about. I t was a change t h a t was long overdue. I t was i n f a c t a f u r t h e r i n -stalment of t h a t r e b e l l i o n i n the cause of i n d i v i d u a l i s m which had begun w i t h the Renaissance. Then the r e b e l l i o n had been against the r e s t r i c t i o n s on n a t i o n a l and i n d i v i d u a l l i f e l a i d upon them by the custom of the middle ages. The r e s t r i c t i o n s on economic l i f e , however, had remained, t o be administered by the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e which the r e b e l l i o n had helped to c r e a t e . By the middle of the eighteenth century these r e -s t r i c t i o n s were f a r out of harmony w i t h the d e s i r e s of the r e -sponsible part of the p o p u l a t i o n . The r e s t r a i n t s of custom, t r a d i t i o n and r e l i g i o n had never been so weak over the c l a s s e s which h e l d power as i n the middle years of the eighteenth century. The g u i l d s were gone, and t h e i r r u l e of custom d i s c r e d i t e d ; the Church of the eighteenth century no longer concerned i t s e l f w i t h e t h i c a l concepts a p p l i e d t o economics, but was merely a very w o r l d l y and godless part of the c i v i l order. Wealth was seen as the 388. sovereign good f o r s o c i e t y and the i n d i v i d u a l . I t was, i n f a c t , the i n d i v i d u a l who now counted f o r most. L i b e r a l i s m i n the eighteenth century was a crusade f o r the i n d i v i d u a l and regarded s o c i e t y as e x i s t i n g t o p r o t e c t the r i g h t s t h a t man, according to Locke, was supposed to have brought w i t h him i n -to s o c i e t y . S o c i e t y was not regarded as a corporate community whose members served d i f f e r e n t purposes, but stood i n some r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one another. The b a s i c f a u l t of the new be-l i e f s was t h a t they f o r g o t that man, though d r i v e n by ambition and the l u s t f o r wealth, i s a l s o a s o c i a l animal. M e r c a n t i l i s t d o c t r i n e lauded n a t i o n a l wealth. The form of economic goods, not t h e i r i n t r i n s i c value i n the competi-t i v e market, was of prime importance. . The labour of the work-e r , and e s p e c i a l l y how i t was a p p l i e d , was seen as of supreme importance t o the n a t i o n . The s o c i a l and economic welf a r e of the worker was of secondary importance, but the duty of the government t o labour was recognized, a l b e i t inadequately, through such agencies as the Poor Law, the S t a t u t e of Appren-t i c e s and the Settlement Laws. Yet under the new d o c t r i n e , such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were h a r d l y taken i n t o account. Cheap labour, and cheap labour alone, was now the c h i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The adjustments made i n two r e l a t e d f i e l d s of economic a c t i v i t y serve to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s change i n economic p h i l o s -ophy. These are the f i e l d s of r e g u l a t i o n of production gener-a l l y , and of the r e g u l a t i o n of wages i n p a r t i c u l a r . The ec-onomic a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e were not confined s o l e l y t o the 389. broader concepts of m e r c a n t i l i s m , but embraced the sphere o f production by p r e s c r i b i n g the processes of manufacture. The minutest r u l e s were made concerning the nature of the mater-i a l s , the mechanical appliances and the form of the f i n i s h e d product. Yet the very m u l t i p l i c i t y of the r u l e s defeated t h e i r purpose. There was c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r much of the r e -g u l a t i o n , since there were d e f i n i t e abuses among manufacturers as t o production, but the complexity of the r e g u l a t i n g machin-ery, by the middle of the eighteenth century, d i d not admit of extensive reform. There remained the a l t e r n a t i v e of com-p l e t e a b o l i t i o n . As has been shown, the o l d g u i l d r e s t r i c t i o n s were already dying out. I t remained only t o e r a d i c a t e the h e i r s of the g u i l d s , the s t a t e r e g u l a t o r s of production. I n the eighteenth century the c h i e f s t r u g g l e i n t h i s connection was between the workman f o r the r e v i v a l of customs and laws and the employers who wished t o be f r e e of such laws. The em-plo y e r s were f o r unchecked e n t e r p r i s e , the employees, and i n some cases the sm a l l masters, f o r r e s t o r i n g or p u t t i n g i n t o p r a c t i c e r e g u l a t i o n s that had been imposed f i r s t by the g u i l d s and then by the s t a t e . The woollen manufacture was the c h i e f i n d u s t r y a f f e c t e d , although every branch o f i n d u s t r y had, i n one degree or anoth-e r , been brought under s t a t e r e s t r i c t i o n . I n the woollen manu-f a c t u r e , acts governing q u a l i t y , a standard of measures, and s t r e t c h i n g of c l o t h were i n s t i t u t e d i n the s i x t e e n t h century. 390. Search r e g u l a t i o n s were introduced, not only t o safeguard the consumer, but a l s o to ensure t h a t the customs was not defraud-ed i n p l a c i n g a l e v y on exports. C o n t r o l was o r i g i n a l l y exer-c i s e d through aulnagers, or s t a t e o f f i c i a l s appointed f o r the purpose of r e g u l a t i o n . G r a d u a l l y , however, the o f f i c e became a sinecure and the d u t i e s were deputed t o corrupt u n d e r l i n g s . S i r J o s i a h C h i l d , as e a r l y as the l a t e seventeenth century, condemned the system. And i n England the attempts which our f o r e -f a t h e r s made f o r r e g u l a t i n g o f Manufactures, when l e f t t o the execution of some p a r t i c u l a r person, i n a short time r e s o l v e d but i n t o a Tax upon the Commodity, without respect t o the goodness t h e r e -o f ; as most n o t o r i o u s l y appears i n the business of AULNAGE, which doubtless our Predecessors intended f o r a s c r u t i n y .into the goodness of the Commodity, and to tha t purpose a S e a l was invented, as a s i g n a l t h a t the Commodity was made according t o the S t a t -u t e s , which S e a l s , i t i s s a i d , may now be bought by thousands, and put upon what the buyers please. (400) Under the S t u a r t s the system developed i n t o s u p e r v i -s i o n by corp o r a t i o n s and monopolies. Many o f the aulnagers' f u n c t i o n s were taken over by the searchers, who were t o i n -spect and s e a l the c l o t h . By the e a r l y eighteenth century the o b l i g a t i o n was a l s o placed upon f u l l e r s t o measure and stamp the c l o t h brought to t h e i r m i l l s . Yet g r a d u a l l y , as w i t h most other r e g u l a t i o n s of l o c a l government which had l o s t t h e i r purpose, the p r a c t i c e was being neglected. A f t e r 1 6 8 8 , most of the r e s t r i c t i o n s on prod u c t i o n were taken o f f . (400) C h i l d , A new discourse on tr a d e , pp.2-3. 391 The p o l i c y of s t a n d a r d i z i n g i n d u s t r y was already being severe-l y c r i t i c i z e d , e s p e c i a l l y by the merchants (401). I n the c o t t o n i n d u s t r y , r e g u l a t i o n manifested i t s e l f , not i n the c o n t r o l of wages or of the q u a l i t y of the work, but i n the p r o t e c t i o n of the i n d u s t r y as a whole, as w i t h the act of 1721, which p r o h i b i t e d the use of c a l i c o e s . Here the': borough r e s t r i c t i o n s were a b l i g h t t o the producers. C h i l d , i n 1694, demanded: A more easie ( s i c . ) and f r e e admission of i n h a b i t a n t s , Merchants and A r t i f i c e r s , t o be Burgesses of our C i t i e s and Boroughs.' and a l s o not to hinder any man from having as many Servants as he can, nor Looms, working Tooles, and e t c . (402) I n 1738 and 1765, Parliament p r o g r e s s i v e l y abandoned the system of s t a t u t o r y dimensions and the attempt to standardize the i n -dustry. I t was impossible to manufacture c l o t h s according to s t a t u t o r y dimensions, when the t a s t e of f o r e i g n buyers de-manded a wide v a r i e t y of m a t e r i a l s . The r e g u l a t i o n s against s t r e t c h i n g c l o t h were no longer considered necessary because (401) A l l our laws t h a t o b l i g e our people to the making of s t r o n g , s u b s t a n t i a l (and, as we c a l l i t , l o y a l ) c l o t h o f a c e r t a i n l e n g t h , breadth and weight, i f they were duly put i n t o execution would, i n my o p i n i o n , do more hurt than good because the humours and f a s h i o n s of the world change, and at some time, i n some places (as now i n most), s l i g h t , cheap,, l i g h t c l o t h w i l l s e l l more p l e n t i f u l l y and b e t t e r than that which i s h e a v i e r , stronger and twice wrought.... I conclude a l l our laws l i m i t i n g the number of looms, num-bers and k i n d of servants, and times of working, t o be c e r -t a i n l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o the c l o t h i n g trade of the kingdom i n general. C h i l d , A new discourse on t r a d e . p p . l 5 9 - l 6 l . (402) I b i d . , p. I 6 9 392. i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t the manufacturer (and here the i d e n t i f i -c a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t became apparent) was the one most i n t e r e s t e d i n maintaining the cred-i t of h i s s c l o t h . The argument was that though the s t a t e con-t r o l of i n d u s t r y was u s e f u l i n the past, competition might now be t r u s t e d to remedy the abuses. "The i n t e r e s t of the s e l l e r i s s u f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y to the buyer f o r f a i r dealing": was now the current maxim (403). The fundamental f e a t u r e of c a p i t a l i s m i s the wage sys-tem, whereby the worker s e l l s , not the product of h i s labour, but the labour i t s e l f . T h i s phenomenon d i d not a r i s e w i t h the i n v e n t i o n of machinery, however, but was present long before the eighteenth century. The c o n f l i c t between c a p i t a l and labour throughout the eighteenth century was fought over the issues of low wages and unemployment. The hours of labour, though l o n g , were not i n i t i a l l y a source of grievance against employers, since there was already an acceptance of long hours under the domestic system. Nor were the c o n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c -u l a r l y as to unemployment, harsh as compared to the o l d sys-tem (404). I n the s i x t e e n t h , seventeenth and eighteenth c e n t u r i e s the s t a t e assumed the f u n c t i o n of maintaining the standard of (403) L i p s o n , Economic h i s t o r y of England. V o l . I l l , p.327. (404) I n small towns and country v i l l a g e s , the wages of the journeymen t a y l o r s f r e q u e n t l y scarce equal those of a com-mon labourer; but i n London they are o f t e n many weeks without employment, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the summer. Smith, Wealth of Nations. V o l . I , p.158. l i v i n g of the working community. I t would not admit the c l a i m of the wage-earners to determine the c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r l a b -our, but on the other side i t assumed the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of securing t o every manya j u s t remuneration f o r h i s work. This system was operated through the S t a t u t e of A r t i f i c e r s of 1563, by which the l o c a l j u s t i c e s o f the peace through annual "asses-ments", f i x e d the wages. I n a d d i t i o n , from 1593 on there was an attempt to set a minimum wage, e s p e c i a l l y i n the woollen i n d u s t r y (405). By the eighteenth century, however, the system was not i n general o p e r a t i o n . I t had d i e d out i n such c a p i t a l i s t i c -ally-dominated i n d u s t r i e s as the woollens of Yfest Y o r k s h i r e and the west country and s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n was needed to e s t a b l i s h i t i n the t a i l o r i n g i n d u s t r y i n 1721 and i n the s i l k i n d u s t r y i n 1773. By t h i s time the a t t e n t i o n of the j u s t i c e s was devoted to s e t t i n g l i m i t s t o a g r i c u l t u r a l change r a t h e r than to the developments of Industry. By 1724, a parliament-ary committee was unanimously recommending t h a t the system be replaced and Henry F i e l d i n g , i n 1751, declared t h a t the law had gone i n t o neglect and disuse (406). Thus, throughout the f i r s t decade of the r e i g n of George I I I , the S t a t u t e was ap-p l i e d only i n some d i s t r i c t s , and there not i n a r e g u l a r p a t t e r n . (405) L i p s o n , Economic h i s t o r y of England. V o l . I l l , p.254. (406) c i t e d by L i p s o n , op. c i t . . p.264. 394 The h i s t o r y of wage r e g u l a t i o n , l i k e t h a t of the r e g u l -a t i o n of production, a l s o demonstrates the c l e a r connection be-tween the f a l l of the absolute monarchy and the r i s e of c a p i -t a l i s m . The i n d u s t r i a l l e g i s l a t i o n of the s i x t e e n t h century was allowed t o f a l l i n t o disuse and spasmodic attempts t o r e -v i v e i t only served to emphasize the c o n t r a s t between the o l d order and the new. The. whole i n d u s t r i a l outlook of the e i g h t -eenth century was permeated by a growing economic i n d i v i d u a l -ism which r e s i s t e d or ignored the attempts t o l i m i t the com-p l e t e freedom of a c t i o n which i t claimed. The success of Adam Smith as an economic p u b l i c i s t was l a r g e l y due t o the f a c t t h a t he gave expres s i o n to ideas which had long been i m p l i e d i n the methods and a c t i o n s of the leaders of i n d u s t r y . The example of the G l o u c e s t e r s h i r e weavers has already been c i t e d as a case where the new power of the employer de-feate d that of the worker and the E l i z a b e t h a n Poor Law com-bined. The c l o t h i e r s presented an eloquent p l e a f o r the r i g h t of freedom of c o n t r a c t . They declared t h a t the system of assessments was not workable (which was p a r t l y t r u e ) because i t was not p o s s i b l e to set e q u i t a b l e r a t e s beforehand. I t was f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t r a i s i n g the wages would r e s t r a i n i n -dustry and t h e r e f o r e p r e j u d i c e t r a d e , and the p o l i t i c a l argu-ment was put forward that a v i c t o r y f o r the workers would en-courage r e b e l l i o n and s t r i k e s . The f e a r of a combination among workmen was very great, and c e r t a i n l y helped t o i n s p i r e 395. unions of producers. Adam Smith declared thats Masters are always and everywhere i n a s o r t of t a c i t , but constant and uniform combination, not t o r a i s e the wages of labour above t h e i r a c t u a l r a t e s . To v i o l a t e t h i s combination i s everywhere a most unpopular a c t i o n , and a s o r t of reproach t o .a master among h i s neighbours and equals.... Masters too sometimes enter i n t o p a r t i c u l a r combinations t o s i n k the wages of labour even below t h i s r a t e . These are a l -ways conducted w i t h the utmost s i l e n c e and secrecy, t i l l the moment of execution, and when the workmen y i e l d , as they sometimes do, without r e s i s t a n c e , though s e v e r a l l y f e l t by them, they are never heard of by other people. (407) I n d e s c r i b i n g the corresponding movement among the work-e r s , however, t h i s prophet of l a i s s e z - f a i r e r e v e a l s where the sympathies of the new economists l a y i n wage d i s p u t e s . Such c o n d i t i o n s , however, are f r e q u e n t l y r e -s i s t e d by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of t h i s k i n d , combine of t h e i r own accord to r a i s e , the p r i c e of t h e i r labour. Their u s u a l pretences are, sometimes the high p r i c e of p r o v i s i o n s ; some-times the great p r o f i t which t h e i r masters make by t h e i r own work. But whether t h e i r combinations be o f f e n s i v e or defensive, they are always abundantly heard o f . I n order t o b r i n g the point t o a speedy d e c i s i o n , they have always recourse t o the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking v i o l e n c e and outrage. They are desperate, and act w i t h the f o l l y and extravagance of desperate men, who must e i t h e r starve or f r i g h t e n t h e i r masters i n t o im-mediate compliance w i t h t h e i r demands. (408) (407) (4'08) Smith, Wealth of n a t i o n s . V o l . I , p.101. Loc. c i t . 396. The triumph of the employers i n the G l o u c e s t e r s h i r e case i n 1757 marked the ending of the wage assessment system, despite the f a c t t h a t as l a t e as 1773» Parliament, under the threat of r i o t s i n London, passed an act granting the s t a t e r e g u l a -t i o n of wages to the silk-weavers. There was a l s o a supple-mentary f i x i n g of wages i n the case of the coal-heavers i n 1770. Such expedients, however, cannot d i s g u i s e the f a c t t h a t there was a d r i f t toward l a i s s e z - f a i r e i n government economic p o l i c y . The c h i e f argument against the r e g u l a t i o n of wages was coming t o be the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the trade and p r i c e s t r u c t u r e s which such c o n t r o l i m p l i e d . The b a s i s on which r e g u l a t i o n should be governed was al s o i n v o l v e d , and the ques-t i o n of whether the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t was best served by hig h -er or lower wages was discussed. The theory was already held t h a t wages should be c o n t r o l l e d by the laws of supply and de-mand, a c a u t i o u s l y economic method, i f not notably humanitar-i a n (409). As to the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the p r i c e of labour, (409) Equal q u a n t i t i e s of labour, at a l l times and p l a c e s , may be s a i d to be of equal value to the labourer. I n h i s ord i n a r y s t a t e of h e a l t h , s t r e n g t h and s p i r i t s ; i n the ordina r y degree of h i s s k i l l and d e x t e r i t y , he must always l a y down the same p o r t i o n of ease, h i s l i b e r t y , and h i s happiness. The p r i c e which he pays must always be the same, whatever be the q u a l i t y of goods he r e c e i v e s i n r e -t u r n f o r i t . Of these, indeed, i t may sometimes purchase a g r e a t e r , and sometimes a l e s s e r q u a n t i t y ; but i t i s t h e i r value which v a r i e s , not t h a t of the labour which purchases them. At a l l times and places t h a t i s dear which i s d i f -f i c u l t t o come a t , or which i t c o s t s much labour to ac-q u i r e ; and that cheap which i s t o be had e a s i l y , or w i t h very l i t t l e labour; Smith, Wealth of n a t i o n s ? V o l . I , p.48. 397 the more f a r - s e e i n g p u b l i c i s t s , such as C h i l d , Defoe and Burke, were already arguing f o r the economy of h i g h wages (410). Ge n e r a l l y the s t a t e c o n t r o l d i d p r o t e c t the weak from undue oppression and d i d permit the r a i s i n g of wages, though the process was so slow and cumbersome as to amount almost to a veto. The e f f o r t under the o l d system to r e l a t e wages to the p r i c e of p r o v i s i o n s broke down e a r l y i n the eighteenth century, however. The expedient of economists and o f f i c i a l s a l i k e then, was t o support the o l d p r i c e s , whatever the p r i c e o f labour might be. S i r W i l l i a m P e t t y , and many of h i s contem-p o r a r i e s , i n defence of the newer system, argued that wages di d not f a l l when food was p l e n t i f u l , , b u t r a t h e r the reverse (411). The argument assumed t h a t the poor worked only f o r the bare n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e and i m p l i e d a s t a t i c s o c i e t y . I t i s not to be wondered at that the b a s i c changes which were needed were not u n i v e r s a l l y welcomed! These changes i n philosophy had an important i n f l u e n c e on the p u b l i c l i f e of the times. The Whig P a r t y , dominated by the great l a n d l o r d s , was i n i t i a l l y arid p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d (410) Wherever wages are high u n i v e r s a l l y throughout the whole World, i t i s an i n f a l l i b l e evidence of the Riches of t h a t Country* and wherever Wages f o r labour run low, i t i s a proof of the poverty of the p l a c e . C h i l d , A new discourse on t r a d e , p . x i . (411) I t i s observed by c l o t h i e r s and others who employ great of poor people, that when corn i s extremely p l e n t i -f u l , t hat the labour of the poor i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y dear. And scarce t o be had at a l l , so l i c e n t i o u s are they who labour only t o eat, or r a t h e r t o d r i n k . P e t t y , Economic w r i t i n g s . V o l . I . , p.274. 398. i n the changes i n a g r i c u l t u r e . Nor was the E n g l i s h farmer merely protected i n the home market but, by g i v i n g a bounty on the export of corn, the government aided the landed gentry to bear the c h i e f burden of n a t i o n a l t a x a t i o n . As w i t h most aspects of economic l i f e , the government p o l i c y of t a x a t i o n was h o p e l e s s l y out of date. The r e l i a n c e upon the l a n d t a x as the p r i n c i p l e source of revenue stemmed from the Middle Ages though i t was, i n the middle of the eighteenth century, enjoying a renewed p o p u l a r i t y i n the w r i t i n g s of the Bhysio-c r a t i c economists (412). Yet there was no doubt that i t was now inadequate as a source of revenue, and the continued r e -l i a n c e upon i t meant undue d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n favour of the l i g h t l y taxed mercantile c l a s s . T a x a t i o n of t h i s l a t t e r c l a s s , i n f a c t , w i t h the breakdown of the merc a n t i l e system, was sub-j e c t t o confusion and i n d e c i s i o n , i n which taxes were evaded or avoided w i t h remarkable ease. I t was only w i t h the f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n of the Seven Years' War t h a t the need f o r change was made apparent to the government. Not only was the landed i n t e r e s t growing r e s t i v e (412) The adoption by the P h y s i o c r a t s of the i d e a t h a t land was the s o l e taxable economic f a c t o r owed much t o the Anglomania that was sweeping French i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s i n the middle years of the eighteenth century. Frenchmen were i n v i t e d t o admire a l l E n g l i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s without reserve. E n g l i s h government f i n a n c e , compared to t h a t of the French government, was amazingly e f f i c i e n t . The E n g l i s h government s t i l l r e l i e d l a r g e l y upon the a n t i -quated land t a x . Therefore the P h y s i o c r a t s jumped t o a simple, l o g i c a l , but wrong c o n c l u s i o n . 399 under a system which, wh i l e i t gave some p r i v i l e g e s , demanded i n r e t u r n , most of the taxes, but the unusual needs of war had found the revenues wholly inadequate. Taxation of the t r a d i n g c l a s s e s was r e s t r i c t e d to the a r c h a i c system of cus-toms and t a r i f f s . Repeated loans were negotiated on a most expensive p l a n , and nepotism was r i f e i n these n e g o t i a t i o n s ;. (413). I t i s not to be wondered th a t the n a t i o n a l debt mount-ed by n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d during the Seven Years' War (414). I n times of emergency, and l a t e r at any time when the Government wished to r a i s e a d d i t i o n a l revenue p a i n l e s s l y , the expedient of l o t t e r i e s was r e s o r t e d t o . Two l o t t e r i e s , launched i n I763, as part of Dashwood's Budget f o r that year, y i e l d e d £350,000 each, and some were even more p r o f i t a b l e . T h i s budget was famous f o r the subterfuges r e s o r t e d t o to avoid having to im-pose new taxes and yet give the impression of complete bank-rupt c y necessary to secure a peace w i t h France. Thus £2,000,000 (413) Lord North's method of n e g o t i a t i n g a l o a n was t y p i c a l of the f i n a n c i a l methods of the p e r i o d . "His custom was to arrange the p r i c e of i s s u e w i t h a few f r i e n d s i n the C i t y , and there t o a l l o t the s c r i p w e l l below th a t f i g u r e to h i s p o l i t i c a l supporters: who were thus able t o s e l l at a handsome p r o f i t . I n these circumstances I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , t h a t when he l e f t o f f i c e the National. Debt amounted to £245,466,855? and i f t h i s f i g u r e should appear a mere t r i f l e t o the reader l i v i n g i n t h i s democratic age, the l a t t e r must remember th a t i t was only w i t h the great-est d i f f i c u l t y that the country could r a i s e £25,000,000 i n revenue...by 1 7 8 I the s t a t e of the p u b l i c c r e d i t was such t h a t the Government had t o a l l o t £150 of stock i n 5 per cents and £25 i n 4 per cents f o r every £100 borrowed. Thus a l o a n of £12,000,000 cost the n a t i o n £1,000,000." P e t r i e , S i r C h a r l e s , The f o u r Georges, p.127. (414) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham. V o l . I . , p.42. 400. was borrowed from the Sinking Fund; £1,800,000 was issued i n Exchequer b i l l s ; £2,800,000 was borrowed on annuities and two lotteries of £350,000 each were launched; - a total of £7,300,000 - while about half this amount was secured from taxation, In-cluding the unpopular Cider Tax (415). Another financial dodge was to place a price on the re-newal of the charters of commercial concerns. Thus the East India Company was taxed i n 1767, 1769 and 1773, under agree-ments which brought not only disaster to the Company, but a depression to the nation. Even the Bank of England was not immune from such extortion. -As the Bank contract was to be revised, the treasury availed i t s e l f very prudently of so fav-ourable an opportunity, and stipulated this body should take a million (exchequer) b i l l s for two years at an interest reduced by one-fourth, and at the same time, should pay a fine on this re-newal of one hundred thousand pounds. (416) Such, financing helps to explain the preoccupation of governments i n the f i r s t decade of the reign of George III with the problem of gaining revenue from the colonies. After a long war, abounding i n needless and destructive expense, and the almost equally disastrous regime of Dashwood, George Grenville was faced with a serious def i c i t and increased drains on the exchequer. The colonies were prosperous, justice seemed to demand that they pay a part of the expense of the (415) Annual register. 1763> P»33« (416) „ Annual register, 1764, p.30. 401. common war, and n e c e s s i t y drove G r e n v i l l e t o i n s t i t u t e the Stamp Tax. I n the case of the Revenue A c t , apart from the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s of Charles Townshend 1s f i n a n c i a l methods, the ne c e s s i t y of r e l i e v i n g the landed gentry of some of the f i n -a n c i a l burden demanded new sources of revenue. The recon-s t r u c t i o n and r e v i v a l of the customs and e x c i s e system does not seem to have occurred to government l e a d e r s , but the d i f -f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d were probably too great f o r governments r e s t i n g on very u n c e r t a i n foundations. When the rec o n s t r u c -t i o n was accomplished a f t e r the American War, i t taxed even the genius of the Younger P i t t . These apparently d i s a s t r o u s f i n a n c i a l methods a l s o had a p o l i t i c a l purpose. I f the country p a r t y of the T-ory sq u i r e s were t o continue to pay the taxes they must be c o n t i n u a l l y p l a c a t e d . I f the t r a d i n g c l a s s e s could not be taxed, the con-sumers, both at home and i n the c o l o n i e s , might. Yet such p r i n c i p l e s of t a x a t i o n could not be continued f o r long. No longer could the huge f i e l d of t a x a t i o n afforded by i n d u s t r y be ignored. Nor could the wealth of the new clas s e s . . As e a r l y as 1758, long before the Younger P i t t i n s t i t u t e d h i s f i n a n c i a l reforms, proposals were being made t o impose an income t a x on the merchants of the C i t y (417). I t was to the great change i n c l a s s e s r a t h e r than i n the workings of government f i n a n c e , however, that the new (417) Namier, England i n the age of the American r e v o l u t i o n ^ P.127. 402. d o c t r i n e s of l a i s s e z - f a i r e c a p i t a l i s m owed t h e i r t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . The r a d i c a l movement of the e i g h t -eenth century gained c o n s i d e r a b l y from the great increase i n p o p u l a t i o n i n the unrepresented towns during the p e r i o d . The anomalous nature of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I n Parliament was accen-tuated and the need f o r a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats emphasized. F a c t o r i e s might develop, machinery and steam power might be used, the p o p u l a t i o n of the n a t i o n might have crowded i n t o the northern c o u n t i e s , but p o l i t i c a l l y the n a t i o n seemed to have r e c e i v e d the f i n a l R e v e l a t i o n of Truth i n 1688. Time stood s t i l l at Westminster. Yet, i n f a i r n e s s t o the defenders of the R e v o l u t i o n Settlement, there was very l i t t l e demand from the new areas f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . In the new i n d u s t r i a l towns themselves, no de-mand f o r parliamentary r e p r e s e n t a t i o n seems t o have been made during the e a r l y p a r t of the r e i g n of George I I I . I n parliamentary speeches and i n pam-p h l e t s the opponents of reform emphasized the apathy of the populous towns on t h i s s u b j e c t . An attempt by some of the i n h a b i t a n t s t o make Manchester a borough i n I763 met w i t h very l i t t l e support. (418) The leaders of the new p r o g r e s s i v e movement, however, were q u i t e aware of the usefulness of the new c l a s s e s . Through-out the decade the sense of the growing power of the new c l a s s e s i s never out of the c a l c u l a t i o n s of the popular l e a d e r s . (418) Whale, Gwen, "The i n f l u e n c e of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u -t i o n on the demand f o r parliamentary reform", Transactions of the r o y a l h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y , 4 t h s e r i e s , v o l . V., p.112, 4 0 3 Chatham appealed t o the "voice of the people" and f o r p a r l i a -mentary reform i n 1 7 7 0 w i t h the power of the C i t y at h i s back. Wilkes declared h i m s e l f the champion of "the l i b e r t y of a l l the middling and i n f e r i o r s o r t of people", and demonstrated t h a t while mobs might be u s e f u l to overawe the government, h i s power was a l s o s o l i d l y based among the m e r c a n t i l e i n t e r e s t s of London. Most of the references t o the r i s e of the unrepresented c l a s s e s i n the eighteenth century d e a l w i t h the r e s u l t s of the t r a d i n g development r a t h e r than w i t h the changes brought about by the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . The claims of the merchants, i n v e s t o r s , and p r o f e s s i o n a l c l a s s were being considered, r a t h -er than those of the manufacturers and small bourgeosie. Yet i n the case of manufacturers the need was not so p r e s s i n g . During the eighteenth century, as we have seen, they dominated t h a t strange amalgam of medieval p r i v i l e g e s , decayed p a r i s h c o u n c i l s , j u s t i c e s of the peace and l o c a l magnates -which served as l o c a l government f o r England. The c e n t r a l government was unable or u n w i l l i n g t o cope w i t h the new problems of the i n -d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . Thus, apart from the o c c a s i o n a l p e t i t i o n to parliament, the needs of the new c a p i t a l i s t were met by h i s dominance of the l o c a l i t y , and he d e s i r e d only t h a t government would remain weak and p a s s i v e . Once the c e n t r a l government became convinced of the need f o r reform, the manufacturer de-manded n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , but f o r most of the eighteenth cen-t u r y , he 'was content w i t h power on the smaller stage. 404. The adoption of the l a i s s e z - f a i r e p o l i c y by l o c a l gov-ernment was n a t u r a l l y a s i g n a l f o r great unrest among the work-i n g c l a s s , as the r i o t s of the 1760's i n London p a r t l y demon-s t r a t e d . No one as yet envisaged the enfranchisement of the la b o u r e r , however. Yet when the government abandoned the s a f e -guards of i t s p a t e r n a l system and l e f t a l l men t o s h i f t f o r themselves, new needs were made apparent t o some c l a s s e s . C h i e f among these needs was p o l i t i c a l power f o r p r o t e c t i o n against the economic a p p e t i t i e s of the u n r e s t r i c t e d p r o f i t system. Thus the i d e a of Rousseau, t h a t the f r a n c h i s e was a p r o t e c t i o n r a t h e r than"an acknowledgment of c a p a c i t y , was foreshadowed by n e a r l y a decade i n the d i s r u p t i v e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t of l a i s s e z - f a i r e (419). Reform through p o l i t i c a l acts was to be the work of the nineteenth century. The work of the e a r l y Hanoverian epoch had been the establishment of the r u l e of law. I n the e i g h t -eenth century parliamentary p o l i t i c s and the s o c i a l l i f e of the community were dominated b y . l e g a l i s m t o a d i s a s t r o u s ex-t e n t . Eighteenth century Anglo-Saxons thought t h a t the law could cure a l l e v i l s , whether i n t e r n a t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l , econ-omic or s o c i a l . The supremacy of the law was e s t a b l i s h e d by the beginning of the century, but as w i t h many hallowed E n g l i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t was allowed t o become arc h a i c through a d e s i r e t o preserve c o n t i n u i t y . Law must always be c o n s e r v a t i v e , i n (419) Whale, Royal h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y , p.121. 405 any case, but E n g l i s h law, because i t had su r v i v e d the seven-teen t h century c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e s , was held sacrosanct. Old forms and o l d punishments were preserved because i t was thought e a s i e r and more t r a n q u i l t o work through the e x i s t i n g machinery r a t h e r than make a break w i t h the past. The anomalous c o n d i t i o n of the penal laws, and t h e i r cumbersome a p p l i c a t i o n gave good lawyers every chance of secur-i n g t h e i r c l i e n t s from c o n v i c t i o n . F a l s e witnesses could be bought cheaply at Westminster H a l l , where they d a i l y walked up and .down w i t h straw i n t h e i r shoes to denote t h e i r p r o f e s s -i o n (420). I f the crime were, not too s e r i o u s , " b e n e f i t of c l e r g y " , a medieval s u r v i v a l , might be allowed, and f o r those who were l i t e r a t e a burned hand might be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r hang-i n g . A study of the records of the time r e v e a l s the s e v e r i t y of the punishments, e s p e c i a l l y where t h e f t or damage of pro-perty was concerned. The Annual r e g i s t e r f o r .those years has many such n o t i c e s as: Ended the sessions at the Old B a i l e y , when Robert T i l l i n g , f o r robbing the house of Mr. L l o y d , h i s master, r e c e i v e d sentence of death. (421) Or again: Ended the sessions at the Old B a i l e y , when seven f o r foot-pad r o b b e r i e s ; two f o r sheep-stealing; and a boy aged f i f t e e n against whom there were four c a p i t a l charges f o r shop l i f t i n g , r e c e i v e d sentence (420) Paston, George, S i d e l i g h t s on the Georgian p e r i o d , p.105. (421) Annual r e g i s t e r . 176l,.p.96. 4 0 6 . of death; and twenty-three to he transported f o r seven years. Of those sentenced to die, f i v e were soon executed, among whom was the hoy of f i f t e e n . (422) And t h i s was the age of Reynolds, Garrick, Chippendale and Lord C h e s t e r f i e l d ! Such severity did not guarantee observance of the law, however. Rather, i t encouraged evasion of the law. Ju r i e s , faced with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of condemning a man to death for a r e l a t i v e l y t r i v i a l offence would often prefer to acquit him. The lucky felons might be acquitted as many as four times, and continue to commit crimes, confident i n the assurance that the law was choking i t s e l f by i t s r i g i d i t y . Perhaps the system would have undergone a gradual and peaceful change i n the l a t e r years of the eighteenth century, had not the problems created by the new i n d u s t r i a l age demand-ed, more than ever, a ru l e of law. As with other aspects of government, the law was not prepared to meet the challenge of the i n d u s t r i a l age (423). New felonie s were added, the forms and personnel of the law were increased, but reform of the whole structure, and of the frame of mind which lay behind i t s application, came only gradually, and only after much unnecess-ary misery and i n j u s t i c e had been caused. The r e s u l t of (422) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1763, p.77. (423) The English Bar was not e n t i r e l y unaware of the short-comings of the law. Lord Mansfield devoted over h a l f of a' long l i f e to modernizing the common law and bringing i t into l i n e with e x i s t i n g conditions. But Mansfield was an exception. 407. attempting t o apply the o l d machinery was that the chaos of the d i s r u p t e d era was deepened. Such archaism was p a s s i v e l y encouraged by c o n s e r v a t i v e s , who hated the i d e a of change i n i t s e l f , and a c t i v e l y encouraged by i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , who saw i n the obsolete, c l a s s - c o n s c i o u s law an admirable weapon f o r securing t h e i r property and p r o t e c t -i n g t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l d i s c i p l i n e . The eighteenth century, has been s t i g m a t i z e d as undemocratic, and i t was so, not because the p r o l e t a r i a t l acked the parliamentary f r a n c h i s e , but be-cause the law, the b a s i c guarantor of freedom, was not a v a i l -able to a l l on equal terms. S e d i t i o n , and worse, was t o l e r -ated from the powerful a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c i a n s , as a study of the career of Charles James Fox makes evident, but the r e a l l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e s e d i t i o n i n the eyes of the law was that prac-t i s e d by the labourer against h i s employer. The d i v i s i o n between master and man had been long de-v e l o p i n g before i t s f u l l impact was r e a l i z e d by the s o c i e t y of mid-eighteenth century B r i t a i n . Under the domestic system there ?/as l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the employed labour-er and the master. S o c i a l l y they were on a l e v e l , as the journeymen u s u a l l y came from a neighbour's home or from that of a f r i e n d . Economically, the journeyman, i f he wished might be as w e l l o f f as h i s master, or at l e a s t as independent. With the growth of the c a p i t a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n , however, a sharper l i n e was drawn between employers and employed, and the d i s t i n c t i o n was both economic and s o c i a l . The employer became 408. a merchant-manufacturer; the wage-earner became a labo u r e r . Apprenticeship l o s t i t s l e g a l guarantees i n the eighteenth century, and w i t h them, i t s s o c i a l p r e s t i g e . Under the medi-e v a l system, the apprentice r e s i d e d w i t h the master, who was res p o n s i b l e f o r t r a i n i n g him i n h i s c r a f t and the s o c i a l and moral v i r t u e s . I n the eighteenth century the p r a c t i c e grew up of paying wages f o r a p p r e n t i c e s h i p , i n l i e u of board and lodging (424). Employer and employee already d i v i d e d by the b a r r i e r s of wealth and s o c i a l s t a t u s , were to have t h e i r r e l a t i o n s s t i l l f u r t h e r marred by chronic d i s p u t e s over wages. As e a r l y as 1757 > Dean Tucker was moved to w r i t e : As the master i s placed so hi g h above the con-d i t i o n of the journeyman, both t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s approach much nearer to t h a t of the p l a n t e r and the slave i n our American c o l o n i e s than might be expected i n such a country as England. The master i s tempted by h i s s i t u a t i o n t o be proud and over-b e a r i n g , t o consider h i s people as the scum of the ea r t h whom he has a r i g h t t o squeeze whenever he can. The journeymen are e q u a l l y tempted to get as much wages and t o do as l i t t l e f o r i t as they poss-i b l y can and t o look upon t h e i r master as t h e i r common enemy w i t h whom no f a i t h i s to be kept, (425) The d i r e c t r e s u l t of such a d i v i s i o n was, of course, the r i s e of the trade unions,' and t h e i r counterpart, the producers a s s o c i a t i o n s . The l a t t e r have been discussed elsewhere, but (424) L i p s o n , Economic h i s t o r y of England. V o l . I I , p.42, (425) Tucker, I n s t r u c t i o n s (1757)> P«25, c i t e d by L i p s o n , op, c i t . . p.55. 4 0 9 the functioning of the former i s important, since the a t t i -tude of the ruling part of the community toward them was a gauge of the degree to which the new economic philosophy was being adopted. Unionism began before the great economic change, prob-ably i n the later years of the seventeenth century (426). In the early years of the eighteenth century, complaints about combinations among workers were being made i n Parliament, and petitions and counter-petitions revealed the existence of jour-neymen's associations i n most of the skilled trades. The sig-nificance of these associations i n this earlier era, insofar as the o f f i c i a l viewpoint was concerned, was that their exist-ence tended to jeopardize the state control of wages and work-ing conditions. It was not u n t i l much later that the struggle was begun between the worker and the great employer, with the state entirely outside the quarrel.' These records of combinations were accompanied by a steady increase i n the number of acts of Parliament condemning combinations, culminating in the great Act of 1799* Thus, i n 1761, for example, the Annual register records that: An order of council was issued to suppress the unlawful combination lately formed by the journey-men cabinet-makers, and to enjoin a l l magistrates to prosecute the masters of public houses where such journeymen shall resort. The journeymen, on the other hand, charge the masters with entering into a combination, every whit as dangerous and blameable... (427) (426) Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, The history of trade unionism, p.21, (427) Annual register. 1761, p.175. 410. And again i n 1765* At the sessions t e n journeymen t a i l o r s were t r i e d , on an indictment f o r c o n s p i r i n g together to r a i s e wages, and l e s s e n hours of work, s e t t l e d by an order of the sessions pursuant to an Act of parliament f o r that purpose. (428) Such combinations u s u a l l y began as s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but soon adopted d i s c u s s i o n of labour problems as t h e i r main purpose. The f i r s t of them grew up among such hand c r a f t s as the p r i n t e r s , as e a r l y as 1666 and the feltmakers and h a t t e r s i n I667. I t w i l l be n o t i c e d t h a t the" o r g a n i z a t i o n s were made up of journeymen and t h a t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , though o f t e n d i r -ected against the c o n d i t i o n s f i x e d upon them by the s t a t e , were i n c r e a s i n g l y d i r e c t e d against the masters of the l i v e r i e d companies and g u i l d s , who were coming more and more t o assume the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the modern employer. Cause of growth of unionism v a r i e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n -d u s t r i e s . I n the t a i l o r i n g trade the d i v i s i o n of labour and the r i s e of unionism were caused p a r t l y by the higher cost of production. The i n c r e a s i n g l u x u r y of c l o t h i n g made t a i l o r i n g by the small producer an i m p o s s i b i l i t y , and he was g r a d u a l l y pushed out of business or became the u n s k i l l e d labourer of h i s more s u c c e s s f u l competitor. Much the same c o n d i t i o n s obtained i n the S p i t a l f i e l d s s i l k i n d u s t r y and among the gold b e a t e r s , where the hi g h cost of raw m a t e r i a l created a subordinate l a b o u r i n g c l a s s , u n i t e d against t h e i r masters. Unionism was (428) Annual r e g i s t e r . 1765> P»79. 411. slow i n developing i n those areas where the o l d independent c r a f t s s urvived l o n g e s t . Thus, i n the West Y o r k s h i r e woollen i n d u s t r y i t was not u n t i l the end of the eighteenth century that there was any great support of combinations. I n other cases, such as that of the wool-combers, the machine t h r e a t t o an ancient c r a f t brought u n i t y . Long before the i n t r o d u c -t i o n of machinery, the wool-combers had he l d the masters i n awe of them (429). I n the h o s i e r y i n d u s t r y , the use of the stocking-frame i n the seventeenth century had created a c a p i -t a l i s t and a la b o u r i n g c l a s s . With the f i n a l breakdown of the apprenticeship system i n 1753 > the use of the p a r i s h poor as u n s k i l l e d labour became widespread i n the i n d u s t r y . Hence combinations grew up, not against masters, but i n a l l i a n c e w i t h them against the l i m i t a t i o n s of the o l d i n d u s t r y . A s i m i l a r a l l i a n c e occurred i n the c u t l e r y i n d u s t r y of S h e f f i e l d . I t was the greatest t h r e a t to unionism i n the eighteenth cen-t u r y that there were u s u a l l y l a r g e numbers of the p a r i s h poor who could be d r a f t e d i n t o i n d u s t r y , and t h e r e f o r e s u c c e s s f u l s t r i k e s were i m p o s s i b l e . (429) The wool-combers i n p a r t i c u l a r had a strong organiza-t i o n that was almost n a t i o n a l i n i t s scope. I t was i n existence f o r some years before 1741, when i t i s described by a pamphleteer. I t had e v i d e n t l y begun as a f r i e n d l y s o c i e t y , the members paying 2d. t o 3d. per week and r e -c e i v i n g b e n e f i t s when s i c k or unemployed. Gra d u a l l y the union began to d i c t a t e to the masters and boycott those who would not agree t o t h e i r terms. When a member was out of employment he was given a t r a v e l l i n g t i c k e t , and money to enable him t o seek employment elsewhere. M o f f i t , England on the ever of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , p.268. 412. The f a c t o r y system, of course, f a c i l i t a t e d the formation of unions. The massing together of workers i n one b u i l d i n g was an i n c e n t i v e to combination. The accompanying phenomenon of the r i s e of the c a p i t a l i s t - i n d u s t r i a l i s t was even more im-p o r t a n t , since i t accentuated the c l a s s d i v i s i o n s of the indus-t r i a l h e i r i a r c h y . I n f a c t , only where the worker ceased to be concerned w i t h the competitive processes of buying and s e l l -i n g were permanent a s s o c i a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d (430). T h i s was not the only b a s i s f o r unionism under the new system, however. There had always been a c e r t a i n number of u n s k i l l e d or semi-s k i l l e d workers outside the g u i l d system, or who were migratory. This number increased r a p i d l y as the eighteenth century ad-vanced and the e f f e c t s of the enclosure movement and the mach-ine age began to be f e l t . From these new c l a s s e s were to come the foundation of the trade unions of the n i n e t e e n t h century, but i n the eighteenth the leaders were s t i l l too l a c k i n g i n s k i l l t o make the o r g a n i z a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e . The e s s e n t i a l s of trade unionism were already i n being i n the f i r s t decade of the r e i g n of George I I I . There was an endeavour to improve the p o s i t i o n of the workers by c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and a c o l l e c t i o n of funds to be used f o r s t r i k e pay, p i c k e t t i n g , and t h r e a t s t o employers were used. One d i s s i m -i l a r i t y w i t h the present i s n o t i c e a b l e . The workers had not yet reached the stage where they d e a l t l i w i t h the employers as a whole, but a s t r i k e a f f e c t e d only those masters who refused (430) - Webb, H i s t o r y of trade unionism, p.41. 413. t o accede to t h e i r demands. The great change i n the processes and markets of indus-t r y seemed to demand a sweeping away of a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on the employment of labour, and the p l a c i n g of a l l wage-earners under the law of the " n a t u r a l wage". The s k i l l e d t r ades of the woollen i n d u s t r y , as we have seen, were the f i r s t t o come under the new system. I n 1757 the Woollen Weavers Act of 1756 was repealed at the i n s i s t e n c e of the employers. The l a t t e r were s u c c e s s f u l i n removing the c o n t r o l of wages from the hands of l o c a l government, and thus l e t down the b a r r i e r s to u n r e s t r i c t -ed competition f o r cheaper labour. As the century advanced, i n d u s t r y a f t e r i n d u s t r y succumbed to the l o g i c of p r o f i t , l o s t i t s government p r o t e c t i o n , and was r i d d e n w i t h the most a p p a l l -i n g labour c o n d i t i o n s . The change was not one of unbroken pro-gress toward l a i s s e z - f a i r e , however. I n the case of the S p i t a l -f i e l d weavers, the system of government r e g u l a t i o n was r e v e r t e d to between 1766 and 1773> and a s i m i l a r e x c e p t i o n was made i n the case of the c o a l heavers. On the p r o t e c t i v e s i d e , more-over, i t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e f o r the workers t o g a i n p r o t e c t i o n through parliamentary p e t i t i o n , but Parliament became i n c r e a s -i n g l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the i n t e r e s t s of the great employers. I n any case the machinery of p e t i t i o n was so cumbersome as t o be almost u s e l e s s . The new c o n d i t i o n s created by t h i s freedom of the em-ployers were the n a t u r a l r e s u l t of too much freedom without r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but they a l s o owed much to the precedents of 414. the domestic system and to t h e - b r u t a l i t y of the age. A gen-e r a t i o n which saw nothing wrong i n hanging c h i l d r e n f o r t h e f t could h a r d l y be expected to worry i t s e l f over the misery of a few thousand d i s p l a c e d farm labourers and a r t i s a n s , or over the f a c t that c h i l d r e n of s i x were expected to work f o u r t e e n hours a day i n the new f a c t o r i e s . Probably the greatest p r i c e p a i d f o r the b e n e f i t s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was i n the profound d i s r u p t i o n i n the minds and l i v e s of the men, women and c h i l d -re n who were swallowed up by the new f a c t o r y system. No economist of the day, i n e s t i m a t i n g the gains and l o s s e s of f a c t o r y employment, ever a l -lowed f o r the s t r a i n and v i o l e n c e t h a t a man suf-f e r e d i n h i s f e e l i n g s when he passed from a l i f e i n which he could smoke or eat, d i g or sleep as he pleased, to one i n which somebody turned the key on him, and f o r f o u r t e e n hours he d i d not even have the r i g h t t o w h i s t l e . I t was l i k e e n t e r i n g the a i r l e s s and l a u g h t e r l e s s l i f e of a p r i s o n . (431) The greatest concern of the worker i n the e a r l y f a c t o r y age was not w i t h whether the f a c t o r y was h e a l t h i e r than the dom-e s t i c workshop, nor even w i t h whether he was b e t t e r o f f econ-o m i c a l l y . There was, i n f a c t , a preoccupation w i t h making profound s p i r i t u a l readjustments, which were e s p e c i a l l y d i f -f i c u l t f o r those men and women who had never known v a r i e t y or change i n t h e i r e a r l i e r l i v e s . This f a c t o r was of the utmost s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the great unrest i n the l i f e of the n a t i o n i n the e a r l y decades of the r e i g n of George I I I . (431) Hammond, J.L., & B., The town l a b o u r e r , p.21. 415. With t h i s s p i r i t u a l upheaval, poverty acquired a new and more h i t t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e . C i v i l i z a t i o n began to be based upon wealth and poverty excluded the poor from the sources of happiness and s e l f - r e s p e c t . The new system o f f e r e d only one i n c e n t i v e , the hope of becoming r i c h . T h i s c o n t r a s t of r i c h and poor now dominated the s o c i a l l i f e of the n a t i o n as i t had never done before. The greater the wealth of the time, the more evident the power of man, the greater and more b i t i n g the sense of r i g h t and oppression i n the cl a s s e s t h a t were excluded from any share i n i t s enjoyment. I n t h i s sense the triumphs of the I n -d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n brought a new b i t t e r n e s s i n t o the l i f e and mind of the working c l a s s e s . T h i s was not a p r i m i t i v e people absorbed i n the s t r u g g l e f o r food and c l o t h i n g , j u s t able to maintain i t s e l f . I t was a prosperous people whose standard of values l e f t out of account the needs of the imagination. (432) Very few of the e v i l s of the f a c t o r y system, however, were new i n k i n d . The hours were long i n the domestic indus-t r y and the pay was poor. C h i l d r e n worked from an e a r l y age, there was overcrowding, and both workshop and home were made l e s s enjoyable by the i n c l u s i o n of the two under one r o o f . Even i n the worst cases, however, the domestic workman was, i n most cases, h i s own master. He worked long hours, but they were h i s own. H i s w i f e and c h i l d r e n worked, but under h i s d i r e c t i o n without i n t e r f e r e n c e by an a l i e n a u t h o r i t y . The for c e s which r u l e d him d i d not yet overshadow every a c t i o n (432) Hammond, "The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n and d i s c o n t e n t " , Economic h i s t o r y review, V o l . I I , p.226. 416. of his daily l i f e , and were s t i l l outside the normal f i e l d of his existence. With the new factory system, l i f e changed. Hours of labour, which might vary from nine to sixteen, were fixed by factory discipline and the wear and strain of the monotonous, specialized unskilled labour. Certainly the hours were long, especially for apprentices. An apprentice, applying for his freedom from a London founder i n 1764, was confronted with the accusation that he had: "refused to work longer than from six in the morning u n t i l eight O'clock i n the evening; whereas he ought to have worked u n t i l nine o'clock." The court de-cided that the hours were to be from six to eight. (433) Again, i n 1764, the London tailors had their hours set at what was soon to be considered hours for slave labour. At the adjourned sessions of the peace for the city of London, at the Guildhall, the court was pleased to order that journeymen tailors shall be allowed 2s. 7d. half-penny per day the whole year, and their hours of work to be from six in the morning to eight at night. (434) Nor was the situation concerning child labour radically worse under the factory system, at least at f i r s t sight. There i s plenty of evidence to show that child labour had been a common feature of industry for centuries before the rise of the machine age. Actually the slowness with which (433) Lipson, Economic history of England. Vol. II, p.58. (434) Annual register. 1764, p.47. 415?: the e v i l s of c h i l d labour were m i t i g a t e d i s an i n d i c a t i o n of the i n s e n s i t i v e n e s s of the p u b l i c , born of c e n t u r i e s of h a b i t . There were, however, some important d i f f e r e n c e s under the f a c t o r y system. The u n i t of i n d u s t r y under the domestic sys-tem was the f a m i l y ; under the f a c t o r y system i t was the i n d i -v i d u a l . The d i f f e r e n c e affected-not only the earning power of the f a m i l y , but a l s o the p o s i t i o n of the c h i l d . Under the o l d order the f a m i l y worked under the same ro o f ; under the f a c t o r y system the members of. the f a m i l y were dispersed and the c h i l d -r e n came under the c o n t r o l of str a n g e r s . How f a r the change was d e t r i m e n t a l to the c h i l d r e n depended upon the regard par-ents had f o r the welfar e of t h e i r c h i l d r e n . Some parents avoided i n f l i c t i n g exhausting t o i l and the e v i l s were m i t i g a t -ed. A l l too o f t e n , however, the parents, e s p e c i a l l y where they were dominated by the c a p i t a l i s t middlemen, were fo r c e d t o d r i v e t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o exhaustion. I n t h i s b r u t a l age c h i l d r e n were not-always t r e a t e d humanely by t h e i r parents, in^any case) Where t h i s s i t u a t i o n obtained, the change t o the f a c t o r y system was o f t e n a change f o r the b e t t e r f o r the c h i l d r e n . The new st r u g g l e between the c a p i t a l and labour was al s o i n s p i r i n g extreme opinions as to the usefulness of labour and i t s share i n the new s o c i e t y . No longer was the "honest a r t i s a n " considered a partner of h i s employer, but was now looked upon as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to the s o c i a l order. Arthur Young's d e s c r i p t i o n of the northern miners i n 1771, f o r example, 418. shows how f a r the d i v i s i o n between the various classes of society had progressed at that date. In general, I might almost say u n i v e r s a l l y , a most tunultuous sturdy set of people, greatly impatient of control, very insolent, and much void of common industry. Thos employed i n the lead mines of Craven and i n c o l l e r i e s can scarcely, by any means, be kept to the perform-ance of a regular business; upon the least d i s -gust they quit t h e i r service and try another. No bribes can tempt them to any industry a f t e r the f i r s t performance of t h e i r stated work, which leaves them h a l f the day for Idleness or r i o t i n g at the alehouse. (435) The working classes were regarded as persons incapable of p r o f i t t i n g by l e i s u r e and f i t only for factory d i s c i p l i n e . In f a c t , the favourite argument for long hours of work was that workmen spent t h e i r l e i s u r e i n drinking and other pro-f l i g a c y , and t h i s argument was also extended to j u s t i f y low wages. I t i s l i t t l e wonder that the general standard of l i v -ing of the people declined, when t h i s philosophy was applied. We have seen that i n the f i r s t h a l f of the century, the gen-e r a l price l e v e l remained low, but that thereafter i t rose r a p i d l y . The d r i f t from the land added to the expense of l i v i n g . Bishop Pococke, i n 1751, noted the extremely simple (435) Young. Northern tour, I I , pp.261-262, c i t e d by Lipson, Economic h i s t o r y of England. Vol. I I , p.123. 4 1 9 f a r e of the people of Lancashire (436). The comparison of the dress of urban and r u r a l groups i n the eighteenth century a l s o demonstrated the problem of the more complex mode of l i v i n g . I n the new i n d u s t r i a l areas of the midlands, the labourer u s u a l l y purchased h i s c l o t h i n g from the shopkeeper. I n the m e t r o p o l i s , according to Eden, the c h i e f source of workers' c l o t h i n g was second-hand dealers (437). I n the North, on the other hand, i n areas s t i l l r u r a l , a l l c l o t h i n g except hats and shoes was of home manufacture. The dependence of the i n d u s t r i a l worker on outside sources of supply grew out of h i s increased s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and h i s r i g o r -ous working c o n d i t i o n s . U n s k i l l e d workmen, employed at mach-ine tending f o r f o u r t e e n hours a day, d i d not have the l e i s u r e or the s k i l l f o r hand c r a f t s . Where the whole f a m i l y was em-ployed i n the f a c t o r y , not only was i t dependent on outside sources f o r c l o t h i n g , but f o r food as w e l l . The d i e t of the labourer d e c l i n e d from the r e l a t i v e l y w ell-balanced one of the farmer-manufacturer, to the bread and cheese which formed the s t a p l e a r t i c l e of food f o r the f a c t o r y f a m i l y . I t i s (436) ' . . . I sent my horses from Buttock of Pendle by a boy about t h i r t e e n ; he was a p r e t t y handy youth; and g i v i n g him of the p r o v i s i o n s I had brought, he came and sat down by me on the s e t t l e . He t o l d me t h a t oat-cake and b u t t e r m i l k was the common food, that on a f e s t i v a l day they had a piece of meat and a rye-pudding; t h a t h i s f a t h e r p a i d s i x pounds a year, kept a horse, three cows, and f o r t y sheep; t h a t h i s f a t h e r and he wove woollen both f o r t h e i r c l o t h i n g and to s e l l . . . Pococke, T r a v e l s through England, Camden S o c i e t y , V o l . I , pp.2033204. (437) Eden, S i r F r e d e r i c k , The s t a t e of the poor. (1797)> V o l . I , p.554. 4 2 0 . hardly surprising, under the circumstances, that the art of cooking almost disappeared among the women of the factory lab-our class. With urbanization i t became more d i f f i c u l t to li v e sim-ply, though Arthur Young and many of his school accused the labourer of profligacy. Such people quite ignored the fact that prices had risen by one-third, or that the changes in the economic structure of the country, of which they were warm ad-vocates, were bringing misery as well as progress. "I have great reason to assert," wrote Young in 1769, "that I experimentally know, our poor i n no part of England, would have cause to com-plain of high prices of provisions, were they to be persuaded to use less expensive, though not less wholesome and nutricious food; and the same time totally to desist from that pernicious prac-tice, the drinking of tea. (438) Riots against high prices were naturally condemned as threats to the security of the new social order. Here again, accord-ing to Young, i t was only the disorderly and idle elements of the population which undertook such forms of protest (439). (438) Young, Arthur, Farmer's letters, pp.207-208. (439) It has always been my opinion, and experience confirms i t ; that sober and industrious workmen-, of any sort, never r i o t . In a l l occupations, there w i l l be idle, drunken, un-settled and disorderly persons; a few of these getting to-gether, and talking over the dearness of provisions (which presently becomes a cant among them) inflame each other, and a l l of their own stamp; they know a riot i s their best diversion: to s t r o l l in a^party about the country, entering and drinking at free cost, and having no work to do but mis-chief, suits such geniuses to a hair: and one riot is no sooner kicked up, than the news occasions many others. Young, Southern tour, p.331. 421. Young wrote w i t h the Wilkes r i o t s i n London I n mind and c e r t a i n l y could not help being p r e j u d i c e d against the mob. He and h i s k i n d , however, do not seem to have seen the deeper economic and s o c i a l causes of the r i o t i n g . "Wilkes and L i b -e r t y " was a u s e f u l r a l l y i n g c r y , but the crowds who shouted i n the wake of Wilkes, or who l a t e r c r i e d "No Popery" i n the Gordon R i o t s were not p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n parliamentary p r i v i l e g e or the r e l i g i o u s t e s t s . T h e i r c h i e f concern was to g a i n the a t t e n t i o n of the government to t h e i r reduced stand-ard of l i v i n g and t o t r y t o recapture, i n a moment of r i o t , the s o c i a l p r e s t i g e which they had l o s t when they l o s t t h e i r land or c r a f t . The c o n t r a s t between the new order and the o l d was heightened by the l a c k of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and s o c i a l a t t r a c t i o n i n the new towns. There was no change of scene or c o l o u r , and no break i n the form or design of t h e i r brooding o u t l i n e s . Everything was uniform, from the long rows of i d e n t i c a l hovels i n which the human c a t t l e of the f a c t o r y e x i s t e d , to the s m o k e - f i l l e d sky overhead. Men and women who passed from the f a c t o r y to t h e i r homes became not l e s s , but more conscious of the burden that the u n i v e r s a l power of i n d u s t r y had l a i d upon every aspect of t h e i r l i v e s . The town was as l i t t l e t h e i r s as the f a c t o r y . Outside the f a c t o r y , as i n s i d e i t , t h e i r f a t e s were decided by an a l i e n c o n t r o l . A f u r t h e r cause of s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n was the f a i l u r e of the government's system of poor r e l i e f . With the new 422. economic changes and the increase of the d e s t i t u t e , the out-worn machinery of the Poor Law and the Settlement Laws was not capable of coping w i t h the g r e a t l y expanded problem. The id e a t h a t government had a duty to p r o t e c t labour had been r e -j e c t e d . The economic changes, which defeated the e f f o r t s of the small producer, a l s o made the advancement of the i n d i v i -d u a l so expensive that t h r i f t was now discounted. L e g a l i z e d * c h a r i t y had been made r i g i d by the Settlement Laws, and was incapable of being expanded. A l l these f a c t o r s served t o i n -crease the numbers of the poor, out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n t o the f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e f o r r e l i e v i n g them. Yet i t must be admitted t h a t the a t t i t u d e of mind i n the n a t i o n had never been s t r o n g l y i n favour of r e l i e v i n g the poor. The s t a t u t e s d e a l i n g w i t h r e l i e f of the poor, from the days of E l i z a b e t h t o those of George I I I had har d l y regarded humanitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The s t a t e d i s l i k e d having t o accept the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n any case. I t was i n i t i a l l y sloughed o f f on t o the p a r i s h c o u n c i l s , and there i t remained f o r two c e n t u r i e s , i n which the parishes soon became us e l e s s as a u n i t of government, and t h e i r v a r i o u s d u t i e s were n e g l e c t -ed. Under such a system the w e a l t h i e r areas r e c e i v e d more than t h e i r f a i r share of the i n d i g e n t . Thus London and Nor-wich, f o r example, were flooded w i t h beggars of a l l s o r t s , and the b a s i s f o r the great urban mobs was.established. The o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e was sharply d i v i d e d as between the aged and impotent, and the able-bodied unemployed. Poverty, i n any case, was considered a moral e v i l , but the h e l p l e s s d i d r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a b l e , i f rudimentary and inade-quate care. The able-bodied, i n the e a r l y s i x t e e n t h century were subjected t o whipping, branding and even death, as deter-ents t o poverty and unemployment. By the l a t e r years of the r e i g n of E l i z a b e t h i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t such methods had f a i l -ed to suppress the p e r s i s t e n t paupers. An attempt was the r e -f o r e made t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e poor r e l i e f and houses of cor-r e c t i o n were set up, the s o - c a l l e d B r i d e w e l l s . Here the i n -mates were whipped, but they were a l s o employed, and an a t -tempt was made t o teach them c r a f t s . By the end of the seven-teen t h century, however, poor a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and l a c k of s u p e r v i s i o n by the c e n t r a l government had permitted the B r i d e -w e l l s to become schools f o r crime and i d l e n e s s . A f t e r the R e s t o r a t i o n , w i t h the great increase of un-employment r e s u l t i n g from the Dutch wars, and the disbandment of Cromwell's army, the main concern of the p a r i s h o f f i c i a l s was to keep vagrants out of t h e i r parishes as much as p o s s i b l e . The migrant p o p u l a t i o n of beggars became a u n i v e r s a l nuisance, where parishes were hard put t o i t to care f o r t h e i r own poor. The system of compulsory poor r a t e s i n s t i t u t e d by the E l i z a -bethan Poor Law of 1601, augmented from time t o time by such r e g u l a t i o n s as the Book of Orders, could not support the added burden. I t was r e a l i z e d that a purely l o c a l s o l u t i o n to the problem was not p o s s i b l e and a change t o a q u a s i - n a t i o n a l scheme was made i n the form of the famous Settlement Laws, 424. b e g i n n i n g i n 1662. S u c c e s s i v e laws from 1662 t o 1712 provided t h a t the j u s t i c e s o f the peace c o u l d e x p e l any vagrant not a n a t i v e o f the p a r i s h , from the- p a r i s h w i t h i n f o r t y days of h i s a r r i v a l . T h i s l e d , not t o the p a r i s h b e i n g able t o care f o r i t s own, but t o the c o n t i n u a l e x p u l s i o n and m i g r a t i o n of an even g r e a t e r number of v a g r a n t s , s i n c e unscrupulous p a r i s h e s s e i z e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to get r i d of many o f t h e i r own charges. Since the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f the vagrant to h i s p a r i s h o f o r i -g i n was made at t h e ' e x p e l l i n g p a r i s h ' s expense, the c o s t o f the system continued h i g h . S i r J o s i a h C h i l d g i v e s a v i v i d d e s c r i p t i o n of p r o c e s s , and i t s e v i l s . As f o r i n s t a n c e , a poor i d l e person, t h a t w i l l not work, or t h a t no Body w i l l Employ i n the Coun-t r y , comes up to London t o set up the t r a d e o f Begging, such a Person probably may Beg up and down the S t r e e t s seven y e a r s , i t may be seven and twenty, b e f o r e any body asketh why she doth so, and i f at l e n g t h she hath i l l hap i n some P a r i s h , to meet w i t h a more v i g i l a n t Beadle than one o f twenty o f them are, a l l he does i s but t o l e a d her the l e n g t h o f f i v e or s i x houses, i n t o another P a r i s h , and then concludes, as h i s Masters the p a r i s h o n e r s do, t h a t he hath done the p a r t o f a most d i l i g e n t Of-f i c e r : but suppose he should go f u r t h e r t o the end of h i s L i n e , which i s t o the end o f the Law; and the p e r f e c t e x e c u t i o n o f h i s O f f i c e , t h a t i s sup-pose he should c a r r y t h i s poor wretch t o a J u s t i c e of the Peace, and he should order the D e l i n q u e n t t o be Whipt, and sent from P a r i s h to P a r i s h , t o the P l a c e o f her B i r t h or l a s t Abode, which not one J u s t i c e o f twenty (through p i t y or other cause) w i l l dp; even t h i s i s a great charge upon the country, and y e t the b u s i n e s s o f the N a t i o n i t s e l f w h o lly undone; f o r no sooner doth the D e l i n q u e n t a r r i v e at the p l a c e a s s i g n e d , but f o r shame or i d l e n e s s she p r e s e n t l y d e s e r t s i t and wanders d i r -e c t l y back, or some other way, hoping f o r b e t t e r f o r t u n e , w h i l s t the P a r i s h t o which she i s sent, 42»5. knowing her a l a z y , and perhaps worse q u a l i t y ' d person, i s as w i l l i n g to he r i d of her, as she i s to he gone from them. (440) As the enclosure movement developed, the d r i f t of pop-u l a t i o n and the number of vagrants increased r a p i d l y . I n places where enclosure was f o l l o w e d by a decrease of the land under the plough, there was l e s s work than before, and even where there was as much, many f a m i l i e s who kept above the sub-s i s t e n c e l e v e l by the help of common r i g h t s , f e l l below i t under the new system and r e q u i r e d p a r t i a l r e l i e f . I n i n d u s t r y , even before the a p p l i c a t i o n of power machinery, displacement was widespread because of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new s k i l l s and techniques. The craftsman became, i f he was l u c k y , a machine tender under the new system. I f he was unlucky, he j o i n e d the swollen ranks of the p a r i s h poor. I n the case of the farmer-manufacturer, the displacement was a double blow, and h i s changes of adapting h i m s e l f t o the new system were u s u a l l y even lower than those of the d i s p l a c e d urban craftsman. The poor r a t e s i n most parishes rose enormously, and the s e l f -s u f f i c i e n c y of the d i s p l a c e d workmen r a p i d l y d e c l i n e d , so that they o f t e n became permanent charges on the p a r i s h . S i r Fred-e r i c k Eden, at the end of the eighteenth century, noted these changes. The r a p i d r i s e of the Poor's R a t e s . . . i s gen-e r a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o the high p r i c e of p r o v i s i o n s ; the smallness of wages, and the p r e v a i l i n g s p i r i t (440) C h i l d , S i r J o s i a h , A new discourse on t r a d e , pp.86-87. 426 among the gentry of landed property i n the neighbourhood, of c o n s o l i d a t i n g small farms; and the consequent depopulation of v i l l a g e s : the e f f e c t s of which i t i s s a i d , o b l i g e s m a l l i n d u s t r i o u s farmers to t u r n l a b o u r e r s , or ser-vants; who, f e e l i n g no opening towards advance-ment, become r e g a r d l e s s o f the f u t u r i t y , spend t h e i r l i t t l e wages as they r e c e i v e them, w i t h -out p r e s e r v i n g a p r o v i s i o n f o r o l d age... (441) There was no doubt th a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n , shocked by the great scope of the poverty and misery bred by the economic change, was sympathetic to a more generous p r o v i s i o n f o r the poor. The work of such men as Jonas Hanway and John Howard was not unsupported, even among the most i n f l u e n t i a l . Unfor-t u n a t e l y the governmental machinery, f o r poor r e l i e f , as w i t h other aspects of economic l i f e , was incapable of d e a l i n g w i t h the new demands made by the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . The f a c t t h a t the need f o r reform was r e a l i z e d i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the great number of stop-gap acts i n the f i r s t h a l f of the e i g h t -eenth century, which reformed minor aspects of the decadent whole. I n 1696 the f i r s t workhouses were e s t a b l i s h e d i n B r i s -t o l , and the i n s t i t u t i o n s spread r a p i d l y throughout the coun-t r y . They n e c e s s i t a t e d an increase i n the poor r a t e s , but made p o s s i b l e a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Where the poor were a l l gathered together they might be r e g u l a t e d and the costs of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y reduced. Some of the workhouses represented a d e f i n i t e advance i n the treatment of the poor. Some, however, where the p a r i s h was poor, or the (441) Eden, S i r F r e d e r i c k , The s t a t e of the poor. V o l . I I , P.147. 427 p a r i s h overseer dishonest, merely increased the misery of the paupers. Other acts were passed to improve a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and l i g h t e n the burden on the r a t e s . I n 1720, an act was passed which prevented men from l e a v i n g t h e i r f a m i l i e s as a charge on the p a r i s h while they went away to work. An act of 1733 placed the housing of the poor under the c o n t r o l of church wardens, a r e f l e c t i o n of the c o n t i n u i n g f a i t h i n the p a r i s h system. Accounts of poor r e l i e f were r e g u l a r i z e d by an act of 1744. This was e s p e c i a l l y necessary, since the overseers of the poor were n o t o r i o u s l y c o r r u p t . No r e a l attempt was made, however, to a l t e r the p a r o c h i a l b a s i s of poor r e l i e f i n order t o meet the new demands of the age. I n 1767, the E a r l of H i l l s b o r o u g h but forward a scheme f o r l o c a l governors of the poor, independent of the p a r i s h and r e s p o n s i b l e t o the n a t i o n a l government. L o c a l governments, however, were s t i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful t o f o r c e r e j e c t i o n of the p l a n , and the n a t i o n a l government, u n w i l l i n g or unable to a l t e r the system, concurred i n the r e j e c t i o n . I t was only very s l o w l y , and as a r e s u l t of the changes and developments f o r c e d on the n a t i o n by the American and French Re v o l u t i o n a r y Wars, that poor r e -l i e f , i n common w i t h other governmental economic and s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , was brought Into l i n e w i t h e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . I n t h e e a r l y years of the r e i g n of George I I I , however, government probably had l e s s regard f o r i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 428. toward the subject than at any time i n the h i s t o r y of England. Faced w i t h new and overwhelming problems, government f i r s t f a i l e d i n i t s attempts t o deal w i t h those problems, and then r e j e c t e d a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r them. Government r e g u l a t i o n of the great changes was e s s e n t i a l , i f the nation.was t o r e -main a s o c i a l u n i t , but government economic machinery i n 1760 was obs o l e t e , and i t was abolished at the i n s i s t e n c e of the new c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . T h i s gap i n government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t o continue f o r a generation, w h i l e the new i n d u s t r i a l i s t s remade the n a t i o n . England was on the eve of a great expansion of resources, numbers, wealth and power. What were the new towns t o be l i k e ? What t h e i r schools, t h e i r p l e a s u r e s , t h e i r houses, t h e i r standards of a good l i f e , t h e i r plans f o r co-operation and f e l l o w s h i p ? What the f a t e of the masses of people who d i d not f e e l or f o r c e t h e i r way through the doors thrown open t o e n t e r p r i s e ? To a l l these questions the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n gave the same answer: "Ask C a p i t a l . " And n e i t h e r c o n s e r v a t i v e nor r a d i c a l , the man defending and the man a t t a c k -i n g bad laws and bad customs, thought the answer wrong. But t h a t answer meant that the age had turned from making a s o c i e t y i n order t o make a system of production. (442) Thus, we have seen that economic,and s o c i a l changes i n mid-eighteenth century England brought w i t h them a t h r e a t t o the s e t t l e d order of E n g l i s h l i f e which, i n the succeeding decades o f the century was t o place extensive l i m i t a t i o n s on (442) Hammond, The r i s e of modern i n d u s t r y , p.217. 429. the power of B r i t i s h governments to lead and regulate the nation. Certainly these changes did not arise exclusively i n the years between 1760 and 1770, nor did they a l l come to fru i t i o n then. It was in this decade, however, that the most significant changes, particularly i n industrial mechanics, were made, and the extent of change between I76O and 1770 i s greater than i n any other decade of the eighteenth century. When George III ascended the throne, the economy of his king-dom was much as i t had been under Queen Anne. In 1770, how-ever, the economic and social l i f e was, i n essentials, much as i t would be i n 1840. The changes in themselves, as in the imperial and pol-i t i c a l spheres, were largely beneficial, but the machinery of government was not in a condition to meet the challenge of great change. The government of England could not deal ef-fectively with the American revolution, and i t lost an em-pire; because i t could not deal with the industrial revolution effectively, the social development of the nation was retarded for a century. Both revolutions were eventually to benefit the nation, yet i n the i n i t i a l decade of chaos, the more un-desirable features of each were most apparent. Out of the mis-ery of the economic revolution was coming the huge productive capacity of Britain, and the new prosperity of the nineteenth century. Yet the f i r s t result was chaos, and a most s i g n i f i -cant factor i n the B r i t i s h retreat. 4 3 0 Conclusion I n t h i s study of the B r i t i s h Retreat I have attempted to give a p i c t u r e of a n a t i o n beginning i t s t r a n s i t i o n from the s t a t u s of a mercantile community to that of an i n d u s t r i a l -i m p e r i a l community. I n t h i s i n i t i a l phase, the change necess-a r i l y i n v o l v e d the d e s t r u c t i o n of the o l d order, and hence d i s l o c a t i o n and d i s r u p t i o n i n the n a t i o n a l l i f e . The E n g l i s h use i n s t i t u t i o n s as long as these can p o s s i b l y be adapted t o changing c o n d i t i o n s , and sometimes longer. The method has i t s advantages. There i s a minimum of breaks w i t h the past. C o n t i n u i t y i n the n a t i o n a l development i s preserved. There are few of the v i o l e n t a l t e r n a t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l pendulum between extremes which have d i s r u p t e d the h i s t o r i e s of con-t i n e n t a l n a t i o n s . The method i s based upon moderation, but there must be moderation i n a l l t h i n g s , even i n the r e t e n t i o n of o l d I n s t i t u t i o n s . I f these i n s t i t u t i o n s f a l l too f a r out of harmony w i t h the times, a v i o l e n t change i s fo r c e d on the. n a t i o n and the pendulum i s set i n motion. The p r i n c i p a l un-d e r l y i n g cause of the d i s r u p t i o n i n the B r i t i s h n a t i o n and Empire between 1760 and 1770 was the f a c t t h a t many of I t s i n s t i t u t i o n s had become obsolete and had to be f o r c i b l y r e -placed. T h i s replacement process i n v o l v e d a r e t r e a t i n most f i e l d s of p u b l i c l i f e from the hig h p o s i t i o n which the n a t i o n had held i n .1760. 431. The E n g l i s h i m p e r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the eighteenth century represented a s u r v i v a l from the middle ages. Mercan-t i l i s m was, i n many of i t s aspects, an extension of the medi-e v a l c o n t r o l of the economic l i f e of the community to the l a r g e r i m p e r i a l f i e l d . The t r a d i n g n a t i o n r e p l a c e d the v i l -lage community as the u n i t of a p p l i c a t i o n , and the n a t i o n a l s t a t e replaced the church as the e n f o r c i n g a u t h o r i t y . The machinery of c o n t r o l , however, was not equal t o the t a s k of extending i t s r e g u l a t i o n s to the even wider f i e l d of the Em-p i r e . The expansion of the comprehensible world and the i n -c r e a s e i n markets and the volume of goods traded, i n s p i r e d a new economic outlook analagous to the contemporary i n t e l l e c -t u a l Renaissance. The economic and i n t e l l e c t u a l r e v o l u t i o n s combined to present the m e r c a n t i l i s t a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e w i t h the s e r i o u s challenge of economic i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Through-out the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth c e n t u r i e s the fundamental antagonism mounted, and i n the middle of the eighteenth cen-t u r y b u r s t f o r t h i n t o a s t r u g g l e i n which the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e over the t r a d i n g economy was r e j e c t e d . I t was not only at the purely economic l e v e l t h a t the m e r c a n t i l i s t system operated, however. Trade, to be success-f u l , r e q u i r e d s e c u r i t y abroad, both as to markets and l i n e s of communication. Thus an overseas empire was developed, f i r s t i n the form of l i t t o r a l t r a d i n g communities, l a t e r spread i n g i n l a n d and c u l m i n a t i n g i n the conquest of Canada and I n d i a i n 1760. M e r c a n t i l i s t c o n t r o l was e x e r c i s e d as r i g i d l y as 432. p o s s i b l e over these i m p e r i a l possessions i n the i n t e r e s t s of i m p e r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the system had begun to break down. Even when the empire was merely a s e r i e s of t r a d i n g ports the attempt t o r u l e i t through a c e n t r a l i z e d a u t h o r i t y met w i t h great d i f f i c u l t i e s . W ith the expansion i n l a n d , the weight of government became un-bearably heavy. S p e c i a l l o c a l c o mplications arose i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of the Empire to f u r t h e r l i m i t the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of mer-c a n t i l i s t r u l e . I n I r e l a n d , r a c i a l a n t i p a t h i e s and a r i g i d adherence to b u r e a u c r a t i c method; and i n I n d i a the r e l i a n c e upon i n d i r e c t r u l e through a chartered company g r e a t l y weak-ened the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e . I n the American c o l o n i e s , the development of l o c a l trade economies i n competition w i t h that of the mother country, and the growth of l o c a l governments c h a l l e n g i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the home government, were the immediate causes of the c o l l a p s e of the m e r c a n t i l i s t system. I n the mother country i t s e l f , the t r a n s i t i o n was l e s s abrupt but even more complete. The R e v o l u t i o n of 1688 had de-stroyed the absolute monarchy, but because the n a t i o n needed t r a n q u i l i t y , the r e v o l u t i o n was enshrined I n the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system. England i n the eighteenth century looked back t o 1688 as t o the date o f the f i n a l change i n her p o l i -t i c a l h i s t o r y . As a r e s u l t , much-needed reforms were n e g l e c t -ed. Parliament e f f e c t i v e l y represented b a r e l y f i v e per cent of the n a t i o n . L o c a l government, from which much of the 433. s t r e n g t h of the R e v o l u t i o n had come, remained much too power-f u l and the c e n t r a l government much too weak. The need f o r t r a n q u i l i t y i n 1688 had a l s o brought a d i s s o l u t i o n of p a r t y d i f f e r e n c e s , and hence a d i s s o l u t i o n of p a r t i e s themselves. The Whig P a r t y o s t e n s i b l y continued as the government par t y throughout the e a r l y eighteenth century, but i t was d i v i d e d i n -to f a c t i o n s based, not on p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , but on r i v a l r i e s f o r place and patronage. The c o r r u p t i o n of p o l i t i c s at t h i s juncture was without precedent i n E n g l i s h h i s t o r y . While o l d i n s t i t u t i o n s s u r v i v e d , new i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d not r e c e i v e complete acceptance. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n the case of the cabinet system. The c o n t r o l by Parliament, through the c a b i n e t , of the p r e r o g a t i v e power of policy-making had developed only i n the r e i g n s of the f i r s t two Hanoverian monarchs. Under George I I I t h i s development was reversed, and the t h e o r e t i c a l powers of the monarchy were e x e r c i s e d to the f u l l . The d e c l i n e of the p a r t y system and the c o r r u p t i o n of p o l i t i c s made t h i s r e v e r s a l p a r t i c u l a r l y easy. The t h r e a t to cabinet government had one b e n e f i c i a l r e -s u l t , however. Out of the r u i n s of the o l d p o l i t i c a l system there arose new p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , based i n i t i a l l y upon the i s s u e s r a i s e d by the r e v i v a l of the r o y a l powers. I n a d d i t i o n , the mercantile and i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s e s , which were to r u l e Eng-la n d i n the n i n e t e e n t h century, were making t h e i r f i r s t b i d f o r power. Other f a c t o r s , such as the exhaustion of the nat-i o n a f t e r the Seven Years' War and the sudden disappearance 434. between I76O and 1770 of the men who had ruled England since the Age of Anne, seemed to increase the disruption and decline i n the public l i f e of the nation. The economic organization in England i n I76O was also in a state of change. The mercantilist system had been dis-credited i n the E n g l i s h nation even before i t lost favour i n the Empire. The rising s p i r i t of individualism was a prin-cipal factor i n bringing about the change, but the chief i n -fluence came from the great economic revolution of the eight-eenth century. I n agriculture, new techniques, inspired partly by the new scientific age, partly by the demands of expanded markets, were applied to farming. These i n turn necessitated a con-solidation of land holdings to make large-scale capitalist farming practicable, and the instrument for such consolidation was found i n the already widespread enclosure movement. The increased productivity of agriculture made new marketing and price systems necessary, and communication was improved to make marketing easier. The principal economic phenomenon of the eighteenth century, however, was the industrial revolution. Since the beginning of the century the old domestic system of Industry had been disintegrating, as the enclosure movement drove the manufacturers from the land and the expanded markets demanded a larger scale of production. I n various industries the chief characteristics of the new industrialism, capitalism and the 435. f a c t o r y system, were being e s t a b l i s h e d . At the same time the o l d u n i f y i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s of the v i l l a g e economy and the g u i l d were breaking down. A f t e r I76O there was a sudden upsurge i n the r a t e of change, as steam power and new machinery were ap-p l i e d to production. The d i s r u p t i o n i n the economy was exten-s i v e and was increased by the m i g r a t i o n of i n d u s t r y northwards, and by the extreme f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the economic c y c l e between 1 7 6 0 and 1 7 7 0 . -Accompanying the change i n i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e there was an important change i n the economic philosophy and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the n a t i o n . The system of government r e g u l a t i o n of the economy which had become very unpopular as e a r l y as 1 7 0 0 , c o l l a p s e d during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. I n place of government s u p e r v i s i o n , the new c a p i t a l i s t and mercantile c l a s s e s dominated the economy i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . The i n f l u e n c e of these new c l a s s e s can be seen i n the government t a x a t i o n p o l i c i e s , which av o i d -ed as much as p o s s i b l e the burdening of i n d u s t r y . I n a d d i t i o n , the beginnings of the campaign f o r parliamentary reform i n the i n t e r e s t s of the new group began at the end of the decade. That i t was not more v i g o r o u s l y prosecuted was due t o the f a c t t h a t c a p i t a l and i n d u s t r y already c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l gov-ernment i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and d i d not immediately see the need of c o n t r o l l i n g the n a t i o n a l government. The law, trade unionism, the f a c t o r y system and the system of poor r e -l i e f a l s o r e f l e c t e d t h i s domination by wealth, which domination, 436. i n a d d i t i o n , was c r e a t i n g a profound s o c i a l schism i n the n a t i o n . I n her empire, i n her p u b l i c l i f e , and i n her economy, B r i t a i n was at a crossroads. I f the t r a n s i t i o n was t o be s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplished, she needed peace, p r o s p e r i t y and order. The decade, however, was one of s t r u g g l e , depression and d i s r u p t i o n . The r e s u l t was a d e c l i n e i n the n a t i o n a l l i f e , a B r i t i s h R e t r e a t . 4 3 7 . B i b l i o g r a p h y Primary Sources Memoirs Lennox, Lady Sarah, L i f e and l e t t e r s , ed. by Countess of I l c h e s t e r and Lord Stavordale, London, John Murray, 1 9 0 2 , i n 2 v o l s , (Contains a u s e f u l memoir by the f i r s t Lord H o l l a n d , and other i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the Court of George I I I . ) Rockingham, Marquis o f , Memoirs, ed. by the E a r l of Aloe-marie, London, Richard B e n t l e y , 1 8 5 3 > in. 2 v o l s . (A c o l l e c t i o n of l e t t e r s and other papers l o o s e l y co-ordin a t e d . Some u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n on the Whig Part y ' s p o l i c i e s and fortunes i n the period.) Walpole, Horace, Memoirs of the r e i g n of George I I I , ( r e - i s s u e ) , ed. by S i r Denis Le Marchant, New York, George Putnam and Sons, 1894, i n 4 v o l s . (A b i a s e d , opinionated, but nevertheless i n f o r m a t i v e h i s t o r y of the times.) O f f i c i a l Records Annual r e g i s t e r . 1 7 5 8 - 1 7 7 3 , London, R. & J . Dodesly. ( A u t h o r i t a t i v e contemporary annals, w i t h some s l i g h t b i a s toward the ?/hig cause.) P r i v a t e Records C h e s t e r f i e l d , E a r l o f , L e t t e r s t o h i s son, ed. by C.T. Carey, London, Wm. Reeves, 1 8 7 5 , i n 2 v o l s . (The famous l e t t e r s give some i n t e r e s t i n g and u s e f u l s i d e l i g h t s on the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the day.) F r a n k l i n , Benjamin, W r i t i n g s , ed. by A.H. Smith, New York, Macmillan Co., 1 9 0 7 , i n 1 0 v o l s . (Contains many of the w r i t i n g s of F r a n k l i n on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Empire before the Revolution.) Great B r i t a i n , H i s t o r i c a l manuscripts commission. f i f t e e n t h r e p o r t , appendix, part 1 , E a r l of Dartmouth V o l . IV, London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , I 8 9 6 . 438 Great B r i t a i n , H i s t o r i c a l manuscripts commission, t h i r t e e n t h r e p o r t , appendix, part 17, E a r l of Lonsdale. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y o f f i c e , 1893. f i f t e e n t h r e p o r t , appendix, p a r t 7, Duke of Somerset. London, H.M, S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , I898. f i f t e e n t h r e p o r t , appendix, part 33, S t o p f o r d - S a c k v i l l e * V o l . I , London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1904. eleventh r e p o r t , appendix, part 4, Marquess Townshend, London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , I887. (The H i s t o r i c a l manuscripts commission p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e the papers of most of the l e a d i n g f a m i l i e s of Great B r i t a i n . The few passages which I have c i t e d were merely items f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n , but there i s suf-f i c i e n t m a t e r i a l i n these volumes to form the b a s i s f o r a great number of s t u d i e s i n E n g l i s h h i s t o r y i n the f u t u r e . The Lonsdale papers were p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l , since they i n c l u d e many of the l e t t e r s of Lord Bute. The S t o p f o r d - S a c k v i l l e papers are almost a com-p l e t e h i s t o r y of the p e r i o d . The other volumes which I have in c l u d e d provided only s p e c i f i c items.) Newcastle, Duke of, A n a r r a t i v e of the changes i n the m i n i s t r y . 1765-1767. Camden S o c i e t y , 4 t h s e r i e s , London, Longmans Green & Co., I898. (A s e r i e s of l e t t e r s by the Duke to a f r i e n d i n the country, d i s c u s s i n g the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n under Rockingham and Chatham. Very r e v e a l i n g both as t o Whig p o l i t i c a l methods and the character of the Duke.) Pococke, R i c h a r d , T r a v e l s through England i n 1750 and 1751. Camden S o c i e t y , 3rd s e r i e s , London, N i c h o l s & Sons, 1888, i n 2 v o l s . (The d i a r y of an I r i s h bishop during h i s t r a v e l s through England. Gives a very u s e f u l p i c t u r e of the economic and s o c i a l l i f e of the times.) Walpole, Horace, L e t t e r s , ed. by Mrs. Paget Toynbee, Oxford, Clarendon P r e s s , 1904, i n 16 v o l s . (Though these are biased i n favour of the p e c u l i a r Walpole brand of Whigism, they nevertheless give perhaps the most comprehensive h i s t o r y of the time.) 439. L i t e r a r y Works and S p e c i a l Studies Andersen, Adam, An h i s t o r i c a l and c h r o n o l o g i c a l deduction, London, J . Walter, 1787-89, i n 4 v o l s . (A d i s s e r t a t i o n on the whole economic s t r u c t u r e of the B r i t i s h n a t i o n and empire. Of l i m i t e d value.) B e a c o n s f i e l d , Benjamin, E a r l o f , S y b i l , i n Works, E a r l ' s e d i t i o n , London & New York, M. Walter Dunne, 1904, V o l . 14. ( D i s r a e l i ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the importance of Shelburne i n E n g l i s h p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y i n the f i r s t chapter of S y b i l i s an e x c e l l e n t a n a l y s i s of the beginnings of the modern party system.) Bolingbroke, Henry, Vi s c o u n t , Works, London, J . Walter, 1754, V o l . I I I . (Contains the P a t r i o t k i n g , and other p o l i t i c a l t r a c t s which had a profound i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the l a t e r eighteenth century.) Burke, Edmund, Works, new e d i t i o n , London, F. & C. R i v i n g -ton, 1803, i n 6 v o l s . ( V o l . I I was e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l , c o n t a i n i n g the most famous of Burke's w r i t i n g s concerning p o l i t i c s and the Umpire.) C h i l d , S i r J o s i a h , A new discourse on t r a d e , London, I694, (A d i s c u s s i o n of the m e r c a n t i l i s t system at i t s apogee. Very u s e f u l and a u t h o r i t a t i v e O Eden, S i r F r e d e r i c k , The s t a t e of the poor, London, J . Davis, 1797, i n 3 v o l s . (A study of the s o c i a l l i f e of the l a t e r eighteenth century, by c o u n t i e s , w i t h emphasis on the r e s u l t s of the economic r e v o l u t i o n . Very u s e f u l . ) J u n i u s , L e t t e r s , ed. by W o o d f a l l , London, F.&C. R i v i n g t o n , 1812, i n 3 v o l s . (The famous l e t t e r s of J u n i u s , c o n s t i t u t i n g the c h i e f pamphlet a t t a c k against the Government.) Mun, Thomas, England's tr e a s u r e by f o r r a i g n t r a d e , 1664, New York, Macmillan Co., 1895. (The most important work on m e r c a n t i l i s t d o c t r i n e . ) P e t t y , S i r W i l l i a m , Economic w r i t i n g s . H u l l ed., Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1899> i n 2 v o l s . ( L a t e r d i s c u s s i o n of m e r c a n t i l i s m ; a standard reference on the subject.) 440. Pownall, Thomas, The administration of the B r i t i s h colonies. London, J. Walter, 1774, i n 2 vols. (An ahle contemporary study of the colonial admin-istration by the most distinguished and successful of the colonial governors.) Smith, Adam, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell, 1784, in 3 vols. (The most famous economic work of the eighteenth century. Some able criticisms of mercantilism.) Steuart, Sir James, Principles of p o l i t i c a l economy. London, A. Millar and T. Cadell, 1767, i n 2 vols. (A study of the mercantilist economy, with suggestions for reform. Very useful source.) Temple, Sir William, Works. London, Clarke, Wotton, etc. 1757. (Temple made some suggestions for reform i n the economy as well as in the governmental structure.) Young, Arthur, A farmer'-s letters to the people of England. London, Nicoll, 1768. (A series of discussions on contemporary agriculture and social conditions. Influential i n spreading the teachings of the agricultural revolution.) , A six weeks' tour through the southern counties of England and Wales. London, Strahan & Nicoll, 1769. (One of the famous "tours". Also a good study of . social and economic conditions.) Secondary Sources General Works Cambridge history of the B r i t i s h Empire, ed.. by J.H. Rose & others, Cambridge, University Press, 1929, Vol. I. (General co-operative history, covering in the f i r s t volume the structure of the old empire. Some ex-tremely good studies of various aspects.) Cambridge modern history, ed. by A.W. Ward & others, Cambridge, University Press, 1909, Vol. VI. (Discussion of the eighteenth century. Of very limited value.) 4 4 1 . C a m p b e l l , L o r d , L i v e s o f t h e c h a n c e l l o r s . London, J o h n Murray, 1 8 6 8 , V o l s . V I & V I I . ( U s e f u l f o r s t u d i e s o f th e l i v e s o f H a r d w i c k e , N o r t h -i n g t o n , Camden and Y o r k e . ) L i v e s o f t h e c h i e f . j u s t i c e s . London, John Murray, 1 8 7 2 , V o l . V. (G i v e s an e x c e l l e n t account o f t h e l i f e o f M a n s f i e l d . ) C o l e , G.D.H. and P o s t g a t e , Raymond, The common p e o p l e . 1 7 6 6 - 1 9 ^ 8 . London, Methuen & Co., 1938. (A h i s t o r y o f th e E n g l i s h p r o l e t a r i a t , w i t h a s o c i a l -i s t b i a s . Of l i m i t e d use.) Cunningham, W i l l i a m , Growth o f E n g l i s h i n d u s t r y and commerce, Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 1 2 , i n 3 v o l s . ( G e n e r a l s t u d y o f the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . Of some v a l u e f o r background m a t e r i a l . ) E r n i e , L o r d , E n g l i s h f a r m i n g , p a s t and p r e s e n t . London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1936. (The b e s t s t a n d a r d s t u d y o f E n g l i s h a g r i c u l t u r e . V e r y u s e f u l . ) F e l l i n g , K e i t h , G . T h e second T o r y p a r t y . 1 7 1 4 - 1 8 ^ 2 , London, M a c m i l l a n Co., 1 9 3 8 . ( C o n t a i n s some u s e f u l m a t e r i a l r e l a t i v e t o the growth o f the p a r t y and c a b i n e t system.) G i p s o n , Lawrence, The B r i t i s h empire b e f o r e t h e A m e r i c a n r e v o l u t i o n , V o l . I , G r e a t B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d . C o l d w e l l , Idaho, C a x t o n P r i n t e r s , 1 9 3 6 . (An e x t r e m e l y u s e f u l s t u d y o f t h e Empire i n 1750.) Hammond, J . L . , & B a r b a r a , The r i s e o f modern i n d u s t r y , New Y o r k , H a r c o u r t B r a c e & Co., 1937. (One o f t h e b e s t modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f th e i n d u s -t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . Some b i a s a g a i n s t t h e l a i s s e z - f a i r e s c h o o l . ) H e c k s c h e r , E l i F., M e r c a n t i l i s m , London, George A l l e n & ' Unwin, 1 9 3 5 > i n 2 v o l s . ' (The p r i n c i p a l modern a u t h o r i t y on m e r c a n t i l i s m . Thorough and comprehensive.) H o r r o c k s , J.W., A s h o r t h i s t o r y o f m e r c a n t i l i s m . London, Methuen & Co., 1 9 2 4 . (Of v e r y l i t t l e use. Too g e n e r a l f o r t h e purposes o f t h i s s t u d y . ) 442 i Hunt, W i l l i a m , H i s t o r y of England. 1760-1801, i n P o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of England s e r i e s , V o l . 10, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. (A general h i s t o r y of the.time. Very u s e f u l f o r reference.) Lecky, W i l l i a m E.H., H i s t o r y of England i n the eighteenth century. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1910, V o l s . I l l , IV, and V. (Standard nineteenth century study of England i n the eighteenth century. Very u s e f u l f o r general back-ground.) . H i s t o r y of I r e l a n d I n the eighteenth century, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1923, V o l . I I . (A general h i s t o r y of I r e l a n d , g e n e r a l l y balanced and . a u t h o r i t a t i v e , but w i t h some a n t i - E n g l i s h b i a s . ) Lipson, Edward, The economic h i s t o r y of England, London, A. & C. B l a c k , 1931, I n 3 v o l s . (The best modern economic h i s t o r y of England. Somewhat biased i n favour of economic determinism, however.) Mahon, Lord. H i s t o r y of England. 1713-1783. London, John Murray, 1854, V o l s . V, V I , and V I I . (A general i n t e r p r e t i v e h i s t o r y of England. Contains some extremely able d i s c u s s i o n s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the times, since Mahon was almost the f i r s t h i s t o r i a n to have f u l l access t o the Chatham Papers.) M o f f i t , L o u i s , England on the eve of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . London, P.S. King & Son, 1925. (A very comprehensive study of the beginnings of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , w i t h emphasis on the changes c a r r i e d out i n the county of Lancashire.) Muir, Ramsay, A short h i s t o r y of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. London, George P h i l l i p & Son, 1927, V o l . I I . (Very general and very l i m i t e d i n i t s treatment of eighteenth century B r i t a i n . ) Paston, George, S i d e l i g h t s on the Georgian p e r i o d , New York, E.P. Dutton, 1903. (A s e r i e s of essays on s o c i a l aspects of eighteenth century England. E s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i n i t s treatment of l e g a l aspects.) P e t r i e , S i r C h a r l e s . The f o u r Georges. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1935^ (A l i m i t e d amount of good general m a t e r i a l on the period.) 443 Robertson, C. Grant, England under the Hanoverians. London, Methuen & Co., 1915, V o l . V I . ~ . ( P r i m a r i l y a p o l i t i c a l general h i s t o r y , ^ w i t h good i n t e r p r e t i v e s t u d i e s of s e v e r a l of the l e a d i n g p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . ) Trevelyan, George M., E n g l i s h s o c i a l h i s t o r y . London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1942. (The best recent s o c i a l h i s t o r y . Very u s e f u l f o r general background.) Usher, A.P., I n d u s t r i a l h i s t o r y of England, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1920. (Very g e n e r a l i z e d economic h i s t o r y , of very l i m i t e d value i n t h i s study.) Webb, Sidney and B e a t r i c e , E n g l i s h l o c a l government. V o l . IV, S t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s , and V o l . V, The king's highway. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1913 and 1922. (Extremely w e l l - w r i t t e n and i n f o r m a t i v e a u t h o r i t y on E n g l i s h s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Some of the conclusions a r r i v e d at by the Webbs:, e s p e c i a l l y as to the e f f e c t s of i n d u s t r i a l i s m , have been challenged by l a t e r research.) . H i s t o r y of trade unionism, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. ( A u t h o r i t a t i v e and thorough study. Very u s e f u l i n t h i s t h e s i s . ) Monographs. Andrews, Charles M., The c o l o n i a l background of the American r e v o l u t i o n , New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1931. (A f a i r l y well-balanced d i s c u s s i o n of the American case. Of some value i n the study, but only as an a d d i t i o n a l reference.) , The c o l o n i a l p eriod of American h i s t o r y , V o l . IV, England's commercial and c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . New Haven, Yal e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1937. (This work gives a very good d i s c u s s i o n of the mercan-t i l i s t system and r e l a t e s i t d i r e c t l y to the movement f o r c o l o n i a l independence.) Adams, Randolph, G., P o l i t i c a l ideas of the American r e v o l u t i o n . New York, F a c s i m i l e L i b r a r y Inc., 1939. (A modern American i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l i s s u es i n , t h e r e v o l u t i o n . Of some l i m i t e d value.) 444. Beer, George L., B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . 1754-1765. New York, Macmillan Co., 1922. (An a u t h o r i t a t i v e and in f o r m a t i v e study of the t r a n s -i t i o n i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l theory.) Buck, P h i l l i p , The p o l i t i c s of m e r c a n t i l i s m . New York, Henry Ho l t & Co., 1942. (A s h o r t , but comprehensive d i s c u s s i o n of the theory of m e r c a n t i l i s m . Invaluable as an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the l a r g e r work of Heckscher.) C l a r k , Dora M., B r i t i s h o p i n i o n of the American r e v o l u t i o n . New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1930. (A c o l l e c t i o n of excerpts from contemporary B r i t i s h newspapers w i t h a commentary. There i s a tendency to give undue weight to Whig press comments.) Coupland, R., The American r e v o l u t i o n and the B r i t i s h empire. London,.Longmans, Green & Co., 1930* (Some very u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n , but the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n attempts to f i n d a d i r e c t causative l i n k between r e v o l u t i o n i n America and unrest i n the r e s t of the Empire. The attempt i s not r e a l l y s u c c e s s f u l . ) Egerton, Hugh E., A short h i s t o r y of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . London, Methuen Co., 1932. (A g e n e r a l i z e d study of p o l i c i e s , of l i t t l e value.) Hammond, J.L., Charles James Fox. London, Methuen Co., 1903, (A s u p e r f i c i a l treatment of the p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n -volved i n mid-eighteenth century England, Of l i t t l e use.) Hammond, J.L. and Barbara, The s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r , 1760-1832, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. (Very u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n of the f a c t o r y system and the d e c l i n e of the c r a f t i n d u s t r i e s . ) , The town l a b o u r e r . 1760-1832. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1936. (An able and in f o r m a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n of the e v i l s of i n d u s t r i a l i s m . ) Hinkhouse, F . J . , The p r e l i m i n a r i e s of the American r e v o l -u t i o n as seen i n the E n g l i s h press. 1763-1775. New York," Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1926. (A companion piece t o Miss C l a r k ' s work* A very w e l l -balanced study of the E n g l i s h press of the time.) 445 Hobhouse, J . C , Fox, London, Constable & Co., 1934. (A conventional biography w i t h very l i t t l e new m a t e r i a l . ) Knorr, K.E., B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l t h e o r i e s . Toronto, Univer-s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1944. (An i n t e r p r e t i v e study of the c o l o n i a l aspect of the m e r c a n t i l i s t system. Very u s e f u l . ) L a s c e l l e s , Edward C P . , L i f e of Charles James Fox, Oxford, U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1936. (A very good d i s c u s s i o n of the p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e s of the time i s given.) Lucas, R e g i n a l d , Lord North, London, Arthur Humphreys, 1913, i n 2 v o l s . (A sympathetic study of North, who i s a most d i f f i c u l t subject f o r the biographer. T h i s work, though i t gives some new and va l u a b l e m a t e r i a l , i s not s u c c e s s f u l i n i t s attempt to r e h a b i l i t a t e the r e p u t a t i o n of North.) H a c l l w a i n , C.H., C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the American r e v o l u t i o n . New York, Macmillan Co., 1923. (One of the f i r s t works t o break away from the conven-t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n . Of some l i m i t e d value.) M i l l e r , J . C , O r i g i n s of the American r e v o l u t i o n , Boston, L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1943. (Informative but the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s coloured by a narrowly American b i a s . ) Mumby, Frank A., George I I I and the American r e v o l u t i o n , Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1923. (A very comprehensive and inf o r m a t i v e study of the times, both i n England and America, through the l e t t e r s of v a r i o u s leaders of the times.) Murray, Robert H., Edmund Burke. Oxford, U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1931. (A modern biography of the great p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n , w i t h some new m a t e r i a l . ) 1 Namier, L.B., England i n the age of the American r e v o l u -t i o n , London, Macmillan Co., 1930. (Probably the most u s e f u l s i n g l e reference used. I n -formativ e , well-balanced and very readable.) , The s t r u c t u r e of p o l i t i c s at the accession of George I I I . London, Macmillan Co., 1929, i n 2 v o l s . (Of more l i m i t e d use than the preceding, but a . p a r t i -c u l a r l y i n t e n s i v e study of the p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n 1760.) 446. Quennell, Peter, Four p o r t r a i t s . London, C o l l i n s , 1945. (A series of four essays on Boswell, Gibbon, Wilkes and Sterns; useful for the in t e r p r e t i v e study of Wilkes.) R u v i l l e , Albert von. William, p i t t . e a r l of Chatham, Lon-don, William Heinmann, 1907, i n 3 v o l s . (Possibly the most authoritative of the biographies of Chatham, f a c t u a l and c a r e f u l , the int e r p r e t i v e q u a l i t i e s are marred by a pre-occupation with any possible contributions Chatham may have made to the advancement of the Teutonic peoples.) Schuyler, Robert L., The f a l l of the old c o l o n i a l system, London & New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. (A new and i n t e r e s t i n g discussion of the decline of the. mercantilist empire, but of . l i t t l e use to t h i s study.) , Parliament and the B r i t i s h empire. New York, Columbia University Press, 1929. (The conclusions arrived at i n t h i s work do.not seem, i n my opinion, to correspond with the facts i n the decline of the old empire. There i s too much emphasis upon the p o l i t i c a l connection between the p o l i t i c a l leaders i n England and those i n America.) Spector, Margaret M., The^American department of the B r i t i s h government. 1768-1782. New York. Columbia University Press, 1940.. (A discussion of the a c t i v i t i e s of the shor t - l i v e d Department.for American A f f a i r s . Some new and use-f u l material included therein.) Toynbee, Arnold, Lectures on the i n d u s t r i a l revolution of the eighteenth century i n England, New York, The Humboldt Publishing Co., 1884. (The most famous study of the new i n d u s t r i a l age and its.advent. Very use f u l , e s p e c i a l l y as to s t a t i s t i c s . ) Trevelyan, S i r George Q.T The early history of Charles James.Fox. New York & London, Harper & Bros., 1902. (The f i r s t volume of the most authoritative biography of Fox. Invaluable for i t s study of the f i r s t Lord Holland.) T u r b e r v i l l e , A.S., The house of lords i n the eighteenth century, Oxford,. Clarendon Press, 1927. (A very useful study of the role of.the Lords i n eighteenth century p o l i t i c s . ) 447 Van Tyne, Claude H., England and America. Cambridge, U n i -v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1927. ( A . s e r i e s of l e c t u r e s , w i t h some good i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but no.new m a t e r i a l . ) W i l l i a m s , B a s i l , C a r t e r e t and Newcastle. Cambridge, U n i -v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1943. (A very u s e f u l study of the c o r r u p t i o n of eighteenth century p o l i t i c s . ) . L i f e of W i l l i a m , P i t t , e a r l of Chatham. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1 9 l 5,.in 2 v o l s . (A standard biography w i t h very v a l u a b l e i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n s . ) The Whig supremacy. 1714-1760, Oxford, Clarendon P r e s s , 1939. ( E x c e l l e n t summary treatment of the e r a of cabinet development.) Winstanley, D.A., Lord Chatham and the Whig o p p o s i t i o n , Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1912. (A thorough and a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of the i n t r i g u e s i n s i d e the Whig P a r t y from the f a l l of Newcastle i n I76O, to the beginning of the American r e v o l u t i o n . Very u s e f u l . ) S p e c i a l Studies i n P e r i o d i c a l P u b l i c a t i o n s A l v o r d , Clarence W., "The genesis of the proclamation of I 7 6 3 " , Michigan pioneer and h i s t o r i c a l c o l l e c t i o n . 1907, XXXVI: pp.21-52. (A study of the problem of a d m i n i s t e r i n g the ,Old Northwest; w r i t t e n from the American p o i n t of view.) Andrews, CM., "Anglo-French commercial r i v a l r y , 1700-1750, the western,phase", American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XX, PP.539-556, 761-790. (A small amount of u s e f u l m a t e r i a l , but very generalized.) Ashton, T.S., "Coal-miners of the eighteenth century", Economic h i s t o r y . V o l . I , pp.307-334. (A study of economic and s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n the c o a l areas of England. Of l i m i t e d use.) Basye, Arthur H., "The s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e f o r the c o l o n i e s , I768-I782", American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXVIII, pp.13-23. (A d i s c u s s i o n of the American department's a c t i v i t i e s , of very l i t t l e value.) 448, B e l l , Herbert C , '.'The West Indian trade before the Amer-i c a n r e v o l u t i o n " , American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . X X I I , pp.272-287. (Informative but l a r g e l y f a c t u a l account of the problems of the West Indian trade.$ Bladen, V.W., "The p o t t e r i e s inv,the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n " Economic h i s t o r y . V o l . I , pp.117-130. ( L a r g e l y f a c t u a l , but u s e f u l m a t e r i a l contained there-i n . ) C a r t e r , Clarence E., "The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the m i l i t a r y o f f i c e i n America", American h i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . X V I I I , pp.475-488. (Gives some i n t e r e s t i n g and new m a t e r i a l on the i n f l u -ence of the army i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s i n the period.) Cule, S.E., "Finance and i n d u s t r y i n the eighteenth cen-t u r y , " Economic h i s t o r y . V o l . XL, pp.367-89. (Some d i s c u s s i o n of the change i n the economic s t r u c -ture of i n d u s t r y . ) Farrand, Max, "The I n d i a n boundary l i n e " , American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . X, pp.782-791. (Very u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n of the problem of governing the i n l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s . ) , "The t a x a t i o n of t e a , 1767-1773", American H i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . I l l , pp.226-269. (Good p o l i t i c a l and s t a t i s t i c a l study of the e f f e c t s of the famous tax on tea.) Fay, C.R., "The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the corn laws i n E n g l i s h h i s t o r y " , Economic h i s t o r y review, Vol.1, pp.314-318. (A general d i s c u s s i o n of the p r i n c i p a l instrument of c o n t r o l over the trade economy of B r i t a i n . Very u s e f u l . ) F o s t e r , W i l l i a m , "The I n d i a board, 1784-1858", Transac-t i o n s of the r o y a l h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y , 3rd s e r i e s , V o l . X I , p.61. (A d e s c r i p t i o n of the Board of C o n t r o l f o r I n d i a , both before and a f t e r the reforms of 1784.) F u s s e l l , G.E., " E n g l i s h countryside and p o p u l a t i o n i n the eighteenth century", Economic geography. V o l . X I I . (A study of s o c i a l changes i n the middle of the e i g h t -eenth century. Of l i m i t e d value.) 449. George, M. Dorothy, "The London coal-heavers", Economic h i s t o r y . V o l . I , pp.229-248. (A study i n the r i s e of m i l i t a n t trade unionism, and the r i o t s i n eighteenth century London.) Greene, E.B., "The A n g l i c a n outlook i n the American c o l -onies i n the e a r l y eighteenth century", American h i s -t o r i c a l review. V o l . XX, pp.64-85. ( U s e f u l f o r i t s study of the a c t i v i t i e s of the S o c i e t y f o r the Propogation of the Gospel i n For e i g n P a r t s . ) G i l h o y , E.W., "Wages i n the eighteenth century", Harvard economic s t u d i e s . 1936. (A s t a t i s t i c a l account of the change i n wages at the beginning of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . ) Hammond, J.L., "The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n and d i s c o n t e n t " , Economic h i s t o r y review, V o l . I I , pp.215-228. (A very u s e f u l and a u t h o r i t a t i v e a r t i c l e concerning the s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n as a r e s u l t of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . ) H e r t z , G.B., "The E n g l i s h s i l k i n d u s t r y i n the eighteenth century", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . X X I I I , p.710. (A study of the e a r l i e s t f a c t o r y system i n England; very u s e f u l . ) Hotblack, Kate, "The peace of P a r i s , 1763", Transactions of the r o y a l h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y . 3rd s e r i e s , V o l . I I , p.235. • . ' ( I n t e r e s t i n g account of the d i p l o m a t i c and p o l i t i c a l background of the peace.) Hughes, Edward, "The E n g l i s h stamp d u t i e s , 1664-1764", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . LVI, p.234. (A d i s c u s s i o n of the E n g l i s h stamp d u t i e s i n comparison w i t h those imposed upon the c o l o n i e s . ) , "North country l i f e i n the eighteenth cen-t u r y " , H i s t o r y . 1940. (A study of the n o r t h country and the impact of the economic r e v o l u t i o n upon i t . ) Humphreys, R.&-., "Lord Shelburne and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , 1766-1768", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . L, P.257. . (An account of the new problems of empire and Sh e l -burne 's attempts t o reform the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Some new m a t e r i a l . ) 450. Humphreys, R.A., "Lord Shelburne and the proclamation of 1763", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XLIX, p.241. (A companion piece to the preceding.) Hunt, W i l l i a m , " P i t t ' s retirement from o f f i c e , 5th October, 1761", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXI, pp.119-132, (A d i s c u s s i o n of the background f o r P i t t ' s r e t i r e m e n t . The m a t e r i a l i s not new and some of the i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n has been challenged by other a u t h o r i t i e s . ) Imlach, G.M.., " E a r l Temple and the m i n i s t r y o f 1765", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l , XXX, p.317, (An i n t e r p r e t i v e study of the i n t r i g u e s l e a d i n g up t o P i t t ' s r e f u s a l t o form a m i n i s t r y i n 1765,) Judges, A.V., "The i d e a of a mercantile s t a t e " , Trans-a c t i o n s of the r o y a l h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y . 4 t h s e r i e s , Vol.. XXI, p.41. (An i n t e r p r e t i v e review of Heckscher's M e r c a n t i l i s m , and very u s e f u l . ) Laprade, W i l l i a m T., "The stamp act i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s " , American h i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . XXXV, pp.735-757. (A study of the p o l i t i c a l , i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Stamp Act, from the American p o i n t of view. Of l i t t l e use.) M a r s h a l l , T.H., "The p o p u l a t i o n problem during the indus-t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n " , Economic h i s t o r y , V o l . I , pp.429-456. • (A s t a t i s t i c a l study of the p o p u l a t i o n movement during the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . Of l i t t l e use f o r t h i s study.) Namier, L.B., "The d i s i n h e r i t a n c e of America", The n a t i o n , ( E n g l i s h ) January 26th, 1929, 'PP.575-577'. 1 (A d i s c u s s i o n of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n the divergence of America from England. Very u s e f u l . ) _, "The c i r c u l a r l e t t e r s , and eighteenth cen-t u r y whip to members of parliament", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i -c a l review. V o l . X L V I I I , p.588. (A c a r e f u l study of the Whig p o l i t i c a l machine i n the eighteenth century.) Qsgoode,* Herbert, "The p r o p r i e t a r y province as a form of c o l o n i a l government", American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . I I , pp.644-664, V o l * I I I , pp.31-55, pp.244-265. (The problems, of c o l o n i a l government are s t u d i e d i n c a r e f u l and i n t e r e s t i n g d e t a i l . ) 4 5 1 . Penson, L.M., "The London West I n d i a n i n t e r e s t i n the eighteenth century", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXXVI, p. 3 7 3 . (The i n f l u e n c e of the London merchants on the mercan-t i l i s t i m p e r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s very w e l l discussed. U s e f u l work.) Rees, J.F., " M e r c a n t i l i s m " , H i s t o r y . V o l . 24. (Also a review of Heckscher's work, and very u s e f u l . ) R i c h a r d s , R.D., "The l o t t e r y i n E n g l i s h government f i n -ance", Monomic_Jiis -t^ r x , January, 1 9 3 4 . (A study of the i r r e g u l a r systems of E n g l i s h govern-ment f i n a n c e . L a r g e l y s t a t i s t i c a l . ) Rose, J . H o l l a n d , " F r e d e r i c k the great and England, 1 7 5 6 -1 7 6 3 " , E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXIX, p p . 7 8 - 9 3 , 2 5 7 ^ 2 7 5 . (A d i s c u s s i o n of the E n g l i s h c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the war on the continent during the Seven Years' War.) S c i s c o , L.D., "The p l a n t a t i o n - t y p e colony", American h i s -t o r i c a l review. V o l . V I I I , p p . 2 6 0 - 2 7 0 . (A study of the l i m i t a t i o n s present i n the o l d smaller p l a n t a t i o n economy of the empire. Of l i m i t e d use.) S c o t t , W.R., "Adam Smith at Downing s t r e e t " , Economic h i s -t o r y review, October, 1 9 3 5 * (Shows the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the new economic p h i l -osophy and the change i n government p o l i c y at the be-ginning of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n . ) Smith, Goldwin, "Burke on p a r t y " , American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . X I , pp.36-41. (An examination of the i n f l u e n c e of Burke on the de-velopment of p o l i t i c a l philosophy, w i t h i l l u s t r a t i o n s from h i s w r i t i n g s . Of l i m i t e d use.) Sumner, W i l l i a m G., "The Spanish d o l l a r and the c o l o n i a l s h i l l i n g " , American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . I l l , p p . 6 0 7 - 0 1 9 . (A very i n t e r e s t i n g and i n f o r m a t i v e study of a l i t t l e -known, but important aspect of the r e l a t i o n s between England and her c o l o n i e s . A complete study of the hard currency problem.) Sutherland, L.S., "Edmund Burke and the f i r s t Rockingham m i n i s t r y " , E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XLVII, p. 4 6 . (A study of the d i s s e n s i o n s i n the new Whig P a r t y ; of l i m i t e d value.) 452. Sutherland, L.S., "Lord Shelburne and the East I n d i a Com-pany p o l i t i c s , 1766-1769", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XLIX, p.450.. (An account of the problems f a c i n g the E n g l i s h r u l e of I n d i a and Shelburne's attempt to reform the admin-i s t r a t i o n . ) , " S i r George Colebrooke's world corner I n alum", Economic h i s t o r y . V o l . I l l , pp.237-258. (Gives a very u s e f u l account of the f l u c t u a t i o n s of the business c y c l e between I76O and 1770.) Temperley, H.W.V., " P i t t ' s retirement from o f f i c e , 5th October, I76I", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXI, PP.327-330. (A c r i t i c i s m of the a r t i c l e by W i l l i a m Hunt on the same subject.) Turner, E.R., "The cabinet i n the eighteenth century", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XXXII, p;192. (An able and i n t e r p r e t i v e study of cabinet development.) , "The E n g l i s h c o a l i n d u s t r y i n the seven* teenth and eighteenth c e n t u r i e s " , American h i s t o r i c a l review, V o l . XXVII, pp.1-23. (A d i s c u s s i o n of the s o c i a l and economic problems i n the c o a l i n d u s t r y created by the economic r e v o l u t i o n : u s e f u l ) Turner, E.R., and Megaro, Gaudens (e d . ) , "The king's c l o s e t i n the eighteenth century", American h i s t o r i c a l review. V o l . XLV, p.76l. (A d i s c u s s i o n of the growth of the conciliabulum.) Whale. Gwen, "The i n f l u e n c e of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , 1760-1790, on the demand f o r parliamentary reform", Transactions of the r o y a l h i s t o r i c a l s o c i e t y . 4th ser-i e s , V o l . V. p.101. (A c a r e f u l i n t e r p r e t i v e study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p be-tween i n d u s t r i a l i s m and the beginnings of nineteenth century l i b e r a l i s m . ) W i l l i a m s , B a s i l , "Chatham and the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the c o l o n i e s i n the i m p e r i a l parliament", E n g l i s h h i s t o r i -c a l review. V o l . 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Thesis/Dissertation
Great Britain
eng
History
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Graduate
The British retreat: 1760-1770
Text