Arts, Faculty of
History, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Waite, Peter B.
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
This thesis studies the nature of the ideas on federal government in the Canadian discussion of Confederation, 1864-1867. It is held that a federal state as such was not intended by the Canadian government, nor was it expected by the Canadian people. A federal state may be defined as a system of government wherein central and provincial authority is coordinate and independent, each of whose powers within a given legislative field are plenary. This thesis maintains that such a system of government was not what Canadians intended when they applied the word "federal" to the constitution framed at Quebec in October, 1864. What Canadians wanted was, by and large, a legislative union coupled with local guarantees for local rights and local privileges. Their intention was to form a strong central government and to relegate sectional issues to semi-dependent sectional institutions. Thus all the elements of strength in the existing legislative union were to be preserved, while the problems which had weakened the union would be removed by being taken up in the elasticity of of a "federal" system. In their consideration of a new constitution, Canadians turned instinctively to their own past experience in an essentially British system of government. The idea of legislative union remained predominant in the minds of Canadians. Quite simply, they preferred to walk in old paths as long as possible. Canadian ideas regarding federalism clearly reveal the limitations imposed by the Canadian political inheritance. The example of American federalism only reinforced Canadian prejudice. The effect of American ideas was largely to make Canadians cling the more uncritically to their own traditions of government. They saw in the United States disruptive forces clearly manifest in the Civil War. Federalism, they reasoned, was therefore dangerously centrifugal in its implications. Thus they sought rather to avoid federalism than to follow it. Canadians tended to follow the old way as much as possible. Undoubtedly the French required concessions and guarantees, but they were given no more than would be necessary to carry the project in Lower Canada. The intention of the Canadian cabinet reflects the basic feelings and the basic limitations of Canadians on the subject of federal government. This thesis attempts to show in detail the ideas regarding federalism which lay behind the policy of the Canadian government, to show by reference to contemporary opinion how deeply Confederation was rooted in Canadian experience and in British political tradition.
IDEAS REGARDING FEDERALISM IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA, 1861; - 1867. by Peter B. Waite. A thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the department of History. University of British Columbia September, 1950. ABSTRACT Z-This thesis studies the nature of the ideas on federal government in the Canadian discussion of Confederation, 1864-1867. It i s held that a federal state as such was not intended by the Canadian government, nor was i t expected by the Canadian people. A federal state may be defined as a system of government wherein central and provincial authority i s co-ordinate and independent, each of whose powers within a given legislative f i e l d are plenary. This thesis maintains that such a system of government was not what Canadians intended when they applied the word "federal" to the constitution framed at Quebec in October, 1861;. What Canadians wanted was, by and large, a legislative union coupled with local guarantees for local rights and local privileges. Their intention was to form a strong central government and to relegate sectional issues to semi-dependent sectional institutions. Thus a l l the elements of strength i n the existing legislative union were to be preserved, while the problems which had weak-ened the union would be removed by being taken up i n the el a s t i c i t y of of a "federal" system. In their consideration of a new constitution, Canadians turned i n -stinctive!^ to their own past experience i n an essentially British system of government. The idea of legislative union remained predominant i n the minds of Canadians. Quite simply, they preferred to walk i n old paths as long as possible. Canadian ideas regarding federalism clearly reveal the limitations imposed by the Canadian p o l i t i c a l inheritance. The example of American federalism only reinforced Canadian prej-udice. The effect of American ideas was largely to make Canadians cling the more uncritically to their own traditions of government. They saw i n the United States disruptive forces clearly manifest i n the C i v i l War. Federalism, they reasoned, was therefore dangerously centrifugal i n i t s implications. Thus they sought rather to avoid federalism than to follow i t . Canadians tended to follow the old way as much as possible. Un-doubtedly the French required concessions and guarantees, but they were given no more than would be necessary to carry the project i n Lower Canada. The intention of the Canadian cabinet reflects the basic feelings and the basic limitations of Canadians on the subject of federal government. This thesis attempts to show in detail the ideas regarding federalism which lay behind the policy of the Canadian government, to show by reference to con-temporary opinion how deeply Confederation was rooted i n Canadian exper-ience and i n British p o l i t i c a l tradition. CONTENTS Page Chapter I. The general nature of Canadian p o l i t i c a l speculation 1 Chapter I I . The desire of the leaders for strong central govemment-23 Chapter I I I . Ideas i n Canada West regarding federalism U3 Chapter IV. French ideas i n Canada East regarding federalism 81 Chapter V. English ideas in Canada East regarding federalism 121 Chapter VI. Conclusion 151 I feel bound at the outset to repeat the expression of regret... that the designation "Federal" was ever applied to the proposed union—not merely because I think i t a misapplication of terms... but because I fear that the use of this word as descriptive of the intended union i s calculated to direct into a wrong channel the minds of persons who have not carefully considered the terms of ... "The Quebec plan" and mislead them as to the intention of those who prepared that scheme— Viscount Monck to the Earl of Carnarvon, September 7th, 1866 . CHAPTER I THE GENERAL NATURE OF CANADIAN POLITICAL SPECULATION (1) One Saturday late in October, 1864, at a luncheon in Montreal, Thomas D'&rcy MoGee rose to speak. He reviewed the steps taken leading to the Quebec Con-ference and the work of the Conference i t s e l f ; in summing up the accomplishments of the last three weeks, he said: We had acted not i n an empirical s p i r i t . We had consulted the oracles of history and of our race. We strove to build upon an old foundation, not to run up a strong edifice for ourselves, but a piece of solid British Masonry, as solid as the foundation of Eddystone, which would bear the whole force of democratic winds and waves,1 and resist the effect of our corrosive p o l i t i c a l atmosphere, consolidate our interests, and prove the legitimacy of our origin. One may quarrel with McGee*s juxtaposition of empiricism and appeals to history, but in most other respects his speech i s a lucid interpretation of the purpose of the Quebec resolutions. By and large, opinion i n the Province of Canada concurred heartily with the s p i r i t which: animated the Fathers. The people of the Province may have disagreed with some details of the form of government suggested at Quebec, but they gave general approval to the perpetuation of B r i t i s h ideas and the B r i t i s h connection. The corro-sive influence of American republican and democratic ideas would not affect the solid piece of British masonry (3) which McGee believed had been created. To prove the l e g i t -imacy of our originl That cry was from the heart of Canada and indeed of British North America. This desire for the continuation of Br i t i s h institutions and Brit i s h forms of government, for the preservation of the Brit i s h methods of p o l i t i c a l practice, this concept of Br i t i s h legitimacy, was the fundamental assumption of Canadian p o l i t i o a l ideas. P o l i t i c a l discussion as a whole took i t s beginning from the premise of Brit i s h responsible gov-ernment, the Brit i s h Crown, and the British connection. There were r e a l i t i e s imposed by a North American environment and which were bound to make themselves f e l t . But Canadian ideas, i f they did not ignore this environment, tried to exclude i t from legitimate p o l i t i c a l considerations. The federalism characteristic of the United States had been regarded by writers as a type of government indigenous to the North American environment; Canadians tended to ignore the facts of rivers and mountains and forest in their new p o l i t i c a l institutions. The Act of 1867 was suoh that they might rightly claim to have succeeded. If they did succeed, they could hardly expect to perpetuate an exclus-ion of such elemental dimensions. That Canada may be con-2 sidered a federal state today, i s i n part due to environ-ment impinging i t s iron law on the w i l l and the ideas of men. (3) 7 The general nature of Canadian p o l i t i c a l spec-ulation i s characterized by the predominance of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l traditions and the desire to perpetuate those traditions. To some considerable degree this was an un-c r i t i c a l allegiance, reflecting an emotional and i n t e l -lectual commitment above and beyond appeals to reason or practicability. In this sense McGee was right.. It i s i n this sense that Canadian p o l i t i c a l speculation can be considered raised above the level of a practical solution to an urgent problem. In this sense, confederation was not empirical because i t appealed more to emotion than to p o l i t i c a l experience. A shrewd analysis of the history of the union could not have sanctioned some of the features of the Quebec Resolutions or the Br i t i s h North America Act. It was this shrewd analysis which Christopher Dunkin supplied and was precisely the reason he would not support Confederation. 3 There i s a good deal i n the argument that Confederation was a supremely practical approach to a pol-i t i c a l problem. But to emphasize this unduly i s to ignore the fact that men are sometimes more emotional than they are reasonable. Any reader of Bagehotfs English Constitu-tion or Wallaa 1 Human Nature and Politios can hardly f a i l to be aware of the p o l i t i c a l implications of this aspect of human nature. In this respect, the Canadian appeal to their B r i t i s h inheritance at a c r i t i c a l period in Canadian history must be carefully considered. It i s doubtless true (4) to say that his appeal was essentially a matter of the practical. But such an appeal i s overlaid with emotional factors which sometimes tend to ignore practical consider-ations. John A. MacDonald has been considered a practical p o l i t i c i a n . Yet MacDonald again and again appealed to the British institutions in terms which could not be described except as emotional. If he was "a natural empiricist i n action", 4 he was also capable of being quite emotional about his p o l i t i c a l allegiance. Canadian p o l i t i c a l spec-ulation had i t s lofty moments, and those who suggest i t was severely practical neglect the powerful emotions set loose by a v i t a l and far-reaching change in Canadian pol-i t i c a l l i f e . The high-lights in Canadian speculation do not come from a bright intellectualism, or by the judicious and balanced discussion often brought out in the American rat i f i c a t i o n of the Constitution. There i s nothing in Canada to compare with the Federalist. The great moments in Canadian speculation come from appeals to the Canadian inheritance, the long history of their relationship with Britain, and obversely from their fear and distrust of American ideas and American influences. The general level of p o l i t i c a l discussion was, however, basically practical with an emphasis on solutions that would satisfy immediate needs. There was l i t t l e general desire to examine principles. This stems perhaps from the fact that discussion of principles was hardly (5) deemed necessary, or perhaps from what Alexander Brady c a l l s a "British diffidence" in formulating p o l i t i c a l principles at a l l . 5 P o l i t i c s , said^Minerve i n a reflective moment, is not an abstraction; i t i s represented by men, men who leave their mark upon i t not through their principles so much as through their own personal qualities, good or bad, their emotions — even their caprices. Although Canadian opinion on federalism was gen-erally pitched to a practical level, i t varied considerably in intellectual content• In some quarters there was an almost frontier contempt for intellectual discussion. 7 Generally speaking the Conservative journals were the most distinguished intellectually, with the Toronto Leader and the Montreal Gazette setting the pace. The Rouge journals of Canada East were a close second, though with more \ earnestness, more virulence, and a strong didactic flavour. The newspapers were f a i r l y sinoere in their writing, not apparently trying to impress their readers with either their a b i l i t y or their ignorance on intellectual questions. That i s more than can be said for the Confederation debates; there was a rather obvious erudition displayed on occasion by members eager to see their words preserved for posterity. 8 Men like Dunkin and McGee and Dorion were usually above this sort of thing, and MacBonald, Brown, Cartier, Gait were too proud to attempt a display of A" Q intellectuality. Macdonald did mention DeTocqueville * at (6) the Quebec Conference, but i t i s l i k e l y that he knew him more by hearsay than by direct acquaintance. Gartier was more intimately acquainted with literature and history than with p o l i t i c a l theory. 1 0 MoGee was a more enigmatic figure intellectually, but he considered the ideas of John Stuart M i l l , John Locke, exploded and antiquated; 1 1 certainly he was out of sympathy ( i f not out of touch) with contemporary l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l theory in England. Not one of the Fathers of Confederation, says Lionel Groulx, was a doctrinaire, or indeed a truly transcendent s p i r i t . They were, for the most part, men "d'honnete talent". The active discussion of federalism and i t s im-plications for the province of Canada oentred principally 13 in f a l l and winter 1864-1865, with variations according to circumstances. The Rouge papers took i t up with veh-emence again and again after i t became apparent that the defection of New Brunswick was not going to affect the policy of the Canadian government on actively pushing through Confederation. It might be supposed from the magnitude of the subject that Canadians would have been greatly agitated by i t . This indeed may have been the case, but If so, i t was not manifested through the usual means of p o l i t i c a l ex-pression. The fact seems to be that Canadians were almost too self-satisfied with what the Quebec Conference had produced. Canada West often looked no further than the (7) happy fact that representation by population had been con-ceded. Canada East was not quite so sanguine. In any case Canadians could not help noticing that a great calm had descended over the domestic p o l i t i c a l scene. The widespread comment on this calm i s striking to one f i r s t approaching 14 newspaper comment during the confederation period. The explanation i s not hard to seek. It was the coalition. Richard Cartwright remarks how bitter the p o l i t i c s had been prior to coalition, and the strain which i t placed on every-one; then, after this prolonged strain, Canadian p o l i t i c s had reached a quiet harbour• Canadian politicians "enjoyed the quiet amazingly". Moreover, Cartwright adds, having taken in hand a question of the f i r s t magnitude which must greatly affect Canada's whole future, i t had both an elevating and a tranquillizing effect on Canadian p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 1 5 So tranquil was i t that on September 14, 1865 the London Times accused the Canadian public of being completely apathetic to their p o l i t i c a l future. The response from the Canadian "Lfi press was immediate. Most journals admitted that there was now very l i t t l e agitation of the subject; that there was indeed very l i t t l e discussion in the press; the reason for this was wrongly attributed to apathy. The battle for con-federation, said the Montreal Gazette, has been fought and won. What need then of further discussion? 1 7 This was not the case; confederation was touch and go in the winter and (8) spring of 1865-1866; but i t i s an indication of a general confidence on the part of Canadians late in 1865 that the confederation for better or worse was considered over and settled. Canadian discussion of federalism and the con-federation can only be completely understood in the light of a basic desire on the part of Canadians to perpetuate Br i t i s h institutions, a desire overlaid with emotional connotations for both English and French; further, given the B r i t i s h inheritance, Canadians appealed to the practical in their solution of their problems. That the principle of responsible government was a strange partner to the p r i n c i -ple of federalism does not seem to have perplexed the Fathers of Confederation nor Canadians as a whole. Dunkin had a field-day on the possible conflicts of these two principles and was greatly respected for his able presen-tation; but i t seemed to have l i t t l e effeot on Canadians* thinking. The obvious thing to do was to have responsible government; the next thing was to add a very mild admixture of federalism. That i t was a possible conflict of principles deterred the Fathers not a whit• Le Courier du Canada con-sidered that confederation was good or bad depending on the d e t a i l s . ^ 8 Statements such as this clearly indicated fun-damental principles relatively unimportant. Thus Canadian p o l i t i c a l speculation was naturally limited by Canadian p o l i t i c a l tradition. That this t r a d i -'4' (9) tion was inimical to an understanding and an appreciation of federalism i s easily demonstrated. The conditions of res-ponsible government do not normally lend themselves to the division of powers that must occur in a federal state, or to the separation of powers within the central government which often occurs i n a federal state. The methods and practices of responsible government are based on a compre-hensive responsibilty of the executive to the legislature and the people. This i s , i n a large degree, alien to the tradition of the federal state with i t s splintering of responsibility directly based upon the splintering of auth-ority. There was, therefore, an understandable failure adequately to grasp the ideas of federalism. This could have been remedied in part. There was a near-federal system in the cabinet of Canada already; a sympathetic understand-ing of American ideas and practice would have gone a long way to preparing Canadians for the acceptance of a genuine federal system. This sympathetic understanding of American ideas was rare indeed. Alexander Brady once said that the United States was both a model and a warning to Canada. At the time of confederation, American institutions were regarded with almost universal abhorrence. They may have been ex-cellent for their own country at one time — even perhaps at present — but as far as Canada was concerned there was '6 (10) l i t t l e i n the United States which could escape the appalling taint of rationalism, republicanism, democracy, corruption. Imagine, said the Globe. the dignified and learned wearer of the ermine, whose proud distinction i t i s to be inde-pendent of popular prejudice, becoming a "roaring p o l i t i c a l partisan", securing Ms position "by.the grace of the un-i • • -washed multitudes who boast of universal suffrage"! Why i t i s something so abhorrent to our traditions that we cannot think of i t . 1 9 The Globe fs argument was i n respeot of annexation, but i t i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of the deep repugnance of many Canadians to American institutions. This attitude was transferred easily to federal-ism, and was particularly reinforced by Canadian opinion of by the American C i v i l War. There i s nothing more characteristic of Canadian opinion on federalism than the realization that federalism had conspicuously failed i n the United States, and the determination not to import any doctrine which would have similar consequences i n Canada. This attitude did not prevent Canadians from seeing the power and adaptability of the United States in i t s spread across the North American continent. But they reasoned they could do the same under the aegis of responsible, central government, without encumbering themselves with the doctrine of states rights. It was because of states rights the United States was i n the trav a i l of c i v i l war. Macdonald's point of view on this matter i s (11) classic and was repeated with variations by every party except the Rouges. His solution was to transfer the residuum of power from the state to the General Government, and to leave the state with but enough power to legislate 20 for local prejudices. There are a great number of ram-ifications to Mac-Donald's position; not the least of these i s resultant Canadian commitment to a strong central gov-ernment • The obverse of Canadian opinion about the United States was allegiance to the B r i t i s h connection, B r i t i s h tradition and B r i t i s h institutions. In this respect there was more unanimity than on any other issue of Canadian p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The Bri t i s h connection was appealed to by a l l parties, by those opposed to confederation as well as i t s supporters. The French as a whole respeoted England for the preservation of their nationality. Cartier quite frankly said that without B r i t i s h institutions French nationality would have long since perished. 2 1 Confedera-tion, he said, has for i t s root cause our common love for the p o l i t i c a l institutions of England; the purpose of confederation i s to surround those institutions with guarantees for their future preservation. "G'est done pour reserver davantage les biens qui nous unissent a l a metropole, et pour mieux sauve^garder nos institutions que mes compatriotes ont appuye s i oordialement l a confedera-t i o n " . 2 2 The Rouges argued quite readily that the B r i t i s h (12) connection would be threatened by Confederation; that the protection so long accorded to French cultural autonomy was now threatened. Confederation could only atrophy the ties which now hold the French people loyally to B r i t a i n , 2 3 A l l the French ask i s to be allowed to develop peacefully under the Br i t i s h flag i n their own way untrammelled by 24 continual social quarrels with the English. Frenoh opinion as a whole saw i n the Br i t i s h connection a guaran-tee of their rights as a cultural group. Confederation was placed before them by Gartier as a recognition on the part of Britain and of English Canada of their right to their own cultural existence. "La confedOration," saidta» Mlnerve, "serait le coup de graoe donne' a l'oeuvre de Lord Durham..,."25 John A.Macdonald, as earnest a B r i t i s h subject as anyone i n Canada, echoed Gartier*s argument that con-federation was the only way of maintaining>the Br i t i s h connection. Macdonald was not above appealing to prejudice when the occasion arose, but his p o l i t i c a l a g i l i t y could not hide the sincerity of his admiration for Br i t i s h forms of government. MacPonaH's allegiance to the B r i t i s h f l a g and a l l that i t meant was of Immeasurable importance. In Hamilton in October, 1866, before leaving for England with the Canadian delegation, MacDonald concluded a long speech with these ringing words: (13) "But I must not appropriate as an honor to myself the magnificent demonstration in which I have now participated, for that I know i s intended for a l l those men who are going to England to fight your battles and the battles of your children and the children's children, to build for them upon this continent a B r i t i s h nation under the B r i t i s h flag and under B r i t i s h institutions," MacDonald was applauded to the echo. 2 6 The significance of this resounding patriotism i s twofold. First i t reflects the basically colonial condition of English-Canadian society; i t s patriotism, i t s ideas were turned toward i t s primary allegiance, Great Britain. It 27 was, as Creighton suggests, a section of the larger British community, which culturally and s p i r i t u a l l y was a unity in i t s e l f . This does not mean the absence of a Canadian patriotism; but i t was a local patriotism which was confined to local issues. The B r i t i s h connection gave Canadians a broader and a wider f i e l d for their vision. Comparisons are sometimes misleading but perhaps the a t t i -tude of Canadians to the Britain of 1866 was not unlike the present attitude of British Columbians to Canada. The purpose in bringing out antipathy to the United States and loyalty to Britain and her institutions i s not especially to i l l u s t r a t e the social feeling of the period; i t i s to show how such fears and loyalties would affect Canadian p o l i t i c a l ideas, more particularly their ideas on what the federal state should be. In this connec-tion, the great significance of English-Canadian, as well (14) as French-Canadian, loyalty to British institutions i s that i t warped their conceptions of federalism, Canadians were prevented from viewing their p o l i t i c a l problems i n a light favourable to decentralized institutions; further, their p o l i t i c a l traditions made i t extremely d i f f i c u l t for them to understand the true nature of federal government. The very heart of the federal idea l i e s i n the dualism of co-ordinate powers. Canadians nowhere seemed to have grasped this conception. It i s possible of course to form a fed-eral constitution without being aware of the theory behind i t . It could even be said that Canadians have a federal constitution i n spite of themselves. But this i s due rather to subsequent interpretation and development than to an inadvertent stumbling on to a federal system. The most characteristic t r a i t of MacDonald and the Canadian coalition as a whole i s certainly not inadvertence. They knew where they were going and had every intention of arriving there. But when i t came to applying words to their project they adopted as much by design as by conven-ience, the word "federal". It was a very shrewd choice. It allowed French Canadians to look for considerable advantages to their autonomy without committing the gov-ernment definitely as to how far this autonomy would go. In the discussion of confederation there are interesting differences between Government organs in the French language and those in the English as to the relative strength of (15) central and local governments suggested by the Quebec reso-lutions. The word "federal" was also a matter of convenience how else could you describe a legislative union which a l -lowed for local d i s t r i c t governments with local powers of their own? The opposition were well aware that the word "federal" meant different things to different groups. At once they tried to pin the government down on just what was meant by the "well-understood principles of federal govern-ment".28 The definitions of federalism which resulted from Helton's questioning are illuminating. Cartier replied that "the honoured gentleman knew quite well what was meant by the 'principles of Federal Government'. The replies evinced from both Gartier and MacJJonald conceded that the federal principle was based on equality of sectional inter-ests in one branch of the general legislature, and repres-entation by population in the other branch. MacDonald added in respect of the Lower House, that representation by members did not of course commit them to "universal suffrage or anything that would interfere with class interests . . ." In the Legislative Council Tache refused to commit himself on the explanation of the principles of federal government. A l l he would say was that he would stick by the record, and the hon. members should "take out of the words their f a i r 29 and proper meaning". The Government's attitude on fed-eralism was thus an emphasis on the functions of the Central (16) Legislature. Federalism with them was primarily a question then of the constitution of the Upper and the Lower House, especially the former. That this point of view was due to British habits of p o l i t i c a l thinking there can be l i t t l e doubt. Such habits account also for the great importance which the Legislative Council had in the work of the 5G Quebec conference. The Central Legislature was thus con-sidered to be the real heart of the federal scheme. Local governments were conveniences for the absorption and dis-sipation of sectional prejudices. It i s thus understandable why the c r i t i c a l question of the division of powers involved comparatively l i t t l e dis-cussion in Canada. Canadian speculation on federalism took the division of powers as given by the Quebec Resolutions. If the proliferation of thought on the subject be any c r i -terion, the constitution of the legislative council was far more important in the future Canada^ federal state than the division of powers. Where minority rights stood in danger there was considerable disoussion; but such discus-sion was aimed at securing protection in the central legislature for such rights. Everything hinged on this great king-pin: the General Government. The explanation for this attitude on the part of Canadians l i e s in part i n the nature of the Union Government, 1841-1867. It was,.constitutionally, a legislative union. Though there had been many vicissitudes, Canadians as a (17) whole were prepared to pay tribute to the progress the country had made under this system. In certain quarters, notably the Rouges, there was a claim that the Union had not yet lived out i t s usefulness; that with more tolerance and generosity, coupled with a few minor concessions to Canada West, the system could be made to work. Whether this was the case or not, there can be l i t t l e doubt that the system i n use since 1861 had conditioned Canadians to expect a great deal of any new General Legislature. They saw the new central government as but an extension of the men and the p o l i t i c s and the system they had known for so long, with added flourishes from the Maritimes, and an exalted sense of national power. It i s true that the Union government was a fed-eral system as far as i t s operation was concerned. The Briti s h government conceded equal representation from the old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in the Union Act; the line of least resistance was followed, and the effect was rather to federate the Ganadas than to fuse them. x Confederation was an attempt to mitigate the federal character of the union government by enough c o n c e B s i o n s to local legislatures to enable a strong .new central govern-ment to be established. It i s one thing to have sectional prejudices legislated for by small l o c a l governments as in confederation; i t i s quite another to have the whole government union s p l i t on every issue involving l o c a l (18) r a m i f i c a t i o n s . T h e r e i s s o m e g r o u n d f o r s a y i n g t h a t c o n -f e d e r a t i o n m e r e l y r e c o g n i z e d a n e x i s t i n g f e d e r a l c o n d i t i o n i n t h e t w o G a n a d a s . B u t i t d i d s o a s a n a t t e m p t t o b r i n g a n e v e n s t r o n g e r g o v e r n m e n t i n t o b e i n g , b y r e l e g a t i n g s e c -t i o n a l p r e j u d i c e s t o l o c a l b o d i e s * M a c D o n a l d p u t . i t t h i s w a y . We m u s t s t r e n g t h e n t h e G e n e r a l G o v e r n m e n t a n d c o n f e r o n t h e P r o v i n c i a l b o d i e s " o n l y s u c h p o w e r s a s m a y b e r e -q u i r e d f o r l o c a l p u r p o s e s . A l l s e c t i o n a l p r e j u d i c e s a n d i n t e r e s t s c a n b e l e g i s l a t e d f o r b y l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s " . 3 2 T h i s t h e o r y w a s f o r e s h a d o w e d b y L o r d D u r h a m . T h e p r o j e c t f o r l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n w a s b r o u g h t f o r w a r d b y D u r h a m w h e n h e s a w t h a t t h e r e c a l c i t r a n c e a n d b i t t e r n e s s o f L o w e r C a n a d a w a s t o o s t r o n g t o e n a b l e a g o v e r n m e n t t o f u n c t i o n u n d e r a q u a s i - f e d e r a l s y s t e m . T h e F r e n c h w o u l d , h e t h o u g h t , u s e w h a t e v e r p o w e r t h e y h a d t o o b s t r u c t G o v e r n -m e n t r a t h e r t h a n t o f u r t h e r i t . B u t p r i o r t o t h i s c o n -c l u s i o n D u r h a m c o n c e i v e d a k i n d o f f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h w o u l d b o t h c o n c i l i a t e t h e F r e n c h a n d y e t p r o v i d e f o r a s t r o n g c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e i s a r e v e a l i n g p a s s a g e i n t h e r e p o r t w h i c h j u s t a b o u t s u m m a r i z e s w h a t M a q B o n a l d a n d t h e C a n a d i a n g o v e r n m e n t w e r e t r y i n g t o d o : " I t h o u g h t t h a t i t w o u l d b e t h e t e n d e n c y o f a f e d e r a t i o n s a n c t i o n e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d b y a m o n a r c h i c a l g o v e r n m e n t g r a d u a l l y t o b e c o m e a c o m p l e t e l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n ; a n d t h a t t h u s , w h i l e c o n c i l i a t i n g t h e 3french o f L o w e r C a n a d a , b y l e a v i n g t h e m t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e i r o w n P r o v i n c e a n d t h e i r o w n i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , I m i g h t p r o v i d e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f B r i t i s h ( 1 9 ) interests by the general government, and for the gradual transition of the Provinces into an united and homogenous community"• 6 It i s hardly l i k e l y that the Canadian government was con-sciously following Durham, or would have admitted i t i f they had. His name was an anathema to French Canadians; i t would have been fa t a l to unite i t with Confederation. The Rouge opposition used the report largely to show that Durham always had the aneantissement of the French in mind and that Confederation was probably a logical conclusion to his work. They did not apparently use this particular passage; perhaps they had not even read i t . Very few French Canadians had read Durham thoroughly; they usually found the early chapter on Lower Canada more than enough for their sensitive natures to stand. The significance of Durham i n this context i s his reflection that federation sanctioned by monarchical government tends to legislative union. Durham understood the disparagement between the federal principle and the monarchical principle; he under-stood that other things being equal, a p r e r o g a t i v e power would tend to v i t i a t e a federation so much that eventually i t would function as a legislative union. MacJDonald must have thought of this when he voiced his hopes for confed-eration becoming eventually a legislative union. The union of the Canadas i s significant for Canadian federalism in two respects. F i r s t , i t gave Canadians a background i n working together, a conception of a united (20) government, which they carried over into their formulation of confederation. Secondly, i t showed them d i f f i c u l t i e s of a federalized union; how obstruction by one group could v i r t u a l l y stop the constitutional machinery. Therefore they decided to remove sectional prejudices by banishing them to the nether realm of the local governments, and by giving to the central government the high powers whioh i t had had under the union constitution. The predominant characteristic of Canadian ideas on federalism i s that s t r i c t l y speaking they were not ideas on federalism at a l l . Canadian ideas were an inter-pretation of federalism; federalism seen through the eyes of convinced B r i t i s h subjects, of anti-democrats, of men who believed in property and responsible government. Canadians were not seeking a new federal union so much as trying to get r i d of the evils of the union they had. They wanted to make a strong North American country, to elevate their p o l i t i c a l and social l i f e , and to have sec-tional f r i c t i o n cooled by the o i l of sectional concessions. It was hardly l i k e l y that they would probe for just princ-iples; they lacked the revolution which had spurred Americans so nobly to look for theirs. Even i f Canadians had any desire to set up a system of government upon theoretical principles, they might have found i t extremely d i f f i c u l t to set such principles i n a concrete form. In the Bri t i s h tradition they had a rooted aversion to setting ( 2 1 ) principles of government down in writing. A written con-stitution, said the Quebec Chronicle. providing for a l l contingencies "marks revolution, checks progress, and keeps 34 a nation i n the swaddling clothes of i t s birth". Canadians were unable to conceive the dual nature of a federal state. To them sovereignty must reside some-where. If i t did not belong to the central government, i t must belong to the provincial governments. This l a t t e r arrangement must have appeared positively ludicrous. How could you have local sovereign governments acknowledging the Crown and a central government i n between? There i s an underlying Austinian theory in Canadian p o l i t i c a l thought which made i t impossible for Canadians to understand just what federalism really did involve. The amusing debate on the "well-understood principles of federal government" i s a case i n point. Sovereignty must rest somewhere, and the central government was the obvious place. Laski comments that the United States' constitution would have provoked 35 the vehement derision of John Austin. There must have been something like this in Canadian scorn (though on occasion sadness) at the spectacle of the C i v i l War* It was a lesson only too clearly writ; and Canadians condi-tioned as they were needed no second bidding to profit by 36 such a lesson. The general nature and background of Canadian ideas on federalism predisposed them to frame a oonstitu-(22) tion which was not i n the s t r i c t sense of the word, federal. Their own experience, their dislike of United States i n s t i -tutions and ideas, the B r i t i s h tradition in their p o l i t i c a l l i f e , oombined to produce a p o l i t i c a l state of mind which was i n essence inimical to federal institutions. The implications of this attitude follow in sub-sequent chapters. There was variation i n opinion of course; there was opposition where the government moved too ruth-lessly and too quickly; there i s much to suggest that English Canadians were too sanguine about the success of Confederation; but in a l l the party and regional divisions of opinion, Canadian p o l i t i c a l thought was strongly con-ditioned by their experiences i n British p o l i t i c a l t r a d i -tions and institutions, and this experience inevitably affected their ideas about the nature of the federal state. Notes 1. This speech was on Saturday, Oct. 29th, l861j, and was reported i n the Globe the following Monday. Thisftparticular phrase was report-ed by the Globe as, "would bear the tempst and the waves", but the report is otherwise the same was that i n /McGee, T.D./ Speeches and Addresses chiefly ihn the subject of British American union. London, Chapman, 1865. P« HO. The general tenor of the Globe's editorials makes i t unlikely that there was any significance i n the change/ 2. It may be as well to define what a federal state i s . In this definit-ion I concur which K. C. Whearis theory expounded i n Federal Govern- ment, London, Oxford University Press, 19h7. A federal state i s that state whose general and provincial governments are independent of each other, each within a given sphere of legislative power. That i s , the powers given to each are plenary. Needless to say, "federalism" as used i n the t i t l e of this thesis need not refer specifically to this definition. In this more general sense i t pertains to the general division of central and local powers in a national state. It i s , i n this sense, a matter of convenience rath-er than logic. See also Chapter VI. 3. See Chapter V. k- Macdermot, T.W.L. "The p o l i t i c a l ideas of John A. Macdonald" i n the Canadian Historical Review(CHR) E Vol. XIV.3(Sept. 1933) p. 26U . 5. Brady, A. Democracy in the dominions University of Toronto Press, 19U7. p. 6I|. 6. Montreal, La Minerve mercredi, 15 fev., 1865. There is also an illumin-ating dissenting opinion i n the l i b e r a l opposition paper, the Montreal Herald, Thurs., March 15, 1866:"We know that constitutional questions of this short excite very l i t t l e popular interest; but there ought to be some men connected with our p o l i t i c s who are able to understand that i n order to have good results, we must act i n accordance with sound principles." 7. There i s a good example of this i n the Ottawa Tine s Wed., March 21, ±§1866. "Mr. John Stuart M i l l has recently given to the worslld a very learned examination of Sir William Hamilton's theory of ethics, which has much criticism and gobemoucherie andngst the Logicians, Metaphysic-ians and Vulgaricians of the physical and metaphysical world." There follows a ribald poem on a similar theme. 8. The confederation debates were the f i r s t debates on a major issue i n the Province of Canada, which were f u l l y reported. See Perrault's speechj Canada, Province of, Legislature. Parliamentary debates on the subject of the confederation of the British North American proviic es Quebec, Hunter Rose, 1965. pp. 59U-620. Also McGivern's speech, pp. U67-U72. 9. Pope, Sir J. Confederation; being a series of hitherto unpublished documents. Toronto, Carswell, 1895- P» 86. (Mon. Oct. 2i|th, 186U.) - i i -10. Cooper, J.I. "The p o l i t i c a l ideas of Geocge Etienne Cartier" CHR XXIII. # 3 .(March.19U2) p. 29h. 11. The precise phrasing rests on rather shaky authority, although the con-text i s not out of keeping with McGee's thought. The phrasing i s taken from a letter to the Editor, printed i n the Monreal Gazette for Thurs., Nov. 15, 1866 and signed, "M.P.P." This letter was considered by the Montreal Herald F r i . Nov. 16, 1866, to have te en from McGee. 12. Groulx, L. La confe'deration canadienne Montreal, Devoir, 1918. p. $9. 13. Gerin, E. i n La foyer canadienne /fev. 1866 ?/:"Ces evenements se passaient / the Quebec and the Charlottetown conferences/ dans l'au-tomme de l861i, en septembre et en octobre. C'est alors qjie la question de 1'union flderale fut chaudement discutee dans l a presse et dans les assemblers publiques...." 111. Quebec, Le Canadien Vendredi, 16 juin, 1865 is a typical example:, "D'un bout a 1'autre de l a province 1'opinion publique est plongee dans un repos profond." See also infra, note 15. 15. Cartwright, R.J. Reminscences Toronto, Briggs, 1912. p. I 4 O . Cf. also with the Quebec Morning Chronicle Tuesday May 29, 1866;" Never, per-haps, i n the history of the country, did an approaching session of Parliament cause so l i t t l e speculation.... .Not a breath of partisan-ship ruff He s the calm Burface of Canad'in p o l i t i c s . The s p i r i t of con-tention is dead, or at least i n a state of suspgnded animation.... Party ensigns have gxmm gone down, overshadowed by the magnitude and importance of the project to unite and consolidate the British CD lon-ies on this continent." Note the use of the word "consolidate". It is significant that this word was frequently used to describe confedera-tion. 16. The Canadian press was rather sensitive to criticism from Britain. It was rather a stab i n the back to be c r i t i c i z e d by the Mother Country. Criticism from the HXS American press howelsret aroused Canadian fight-- ing instincts and was f a i r game. •> 17. Montreal, Gazette F r i . , Oct. 6, 1865- Sec also Chapter V. The excep-tion to his attitude was taken by the St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch, which said: "There can be no doubt a great deal of apathy exists on the ques- tion of Confederation on the part of the people of Canada, notwith-standing that every means have been resorted to, to bias their minds i n i t s favour." Thurs., Oct. $, 1865. The Weekly Dispatch was ultra conser-vat ive. 18. Quebec, Le Courrier du Canada, lundi, 12 sept., 186U. 19. Globe, F r i . , May 19m,1865. 20. There are a great number of illustrations of Macdonald's attitude on this point. One of the most interesting is the discussion at Quebec when Macdonald introduced the resolution calling for a federal union under the Crown of Great Britain. See Pope, J. Conf. Documents pp. 54-55. . - i i i -21. Boyd, J . S ir George Etienne Cartier, Bart. Toronto, MacMillan, 1917. P. 357. 22. Speech given at Cornwall, C.W. May 1 s t , 1866. im Discours ed. J . Tasse, Montreal, Senecal, 1893• P« 4 8 1 . 23. Montreal, L 1Union Nationale lundi, 6 fev. , 1865. Report of the meeting of the meeting of L 'Inst i tut Canadien for the previous Monday. Resolution: "Qu'un semblable projet, s ' i l e ta i t adopte n'aurait d'autre resultat que d ' a f f a ib l i r les l iens qui attachent l e Bas-Canada a. l a Grande-Bretagne en creant dans 1'esprit de ses habitants de justes alarmes sur l a conserv-ation de tout ce qui est cher a. un peuple loyal et capable d'appre'cier les droits d'un sujet anglais ." 2J|. Ibid, samedi, 3 sept., I86I4.. " . . . c e que nous desirons, c'est de continuer de grandir et de nous developper sous l a protection du drapeau Anglais, dans etre arretes d ans ce developpement par les di f f icul tes et s crises sociales que tout systeme de confederation produira infa i l l ib lement . " 25. La Minerve sam., 23 j u i l l e t , I86I4.. 26. Dinner toot place Monday, Oct. 29, 1866. Reported i n the Montreal Gazette on Friday Nov. 2, I 9 6 6 . 27. Creighton, D.G. "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians" CHR XXIX. #. 1. (March, 19fi8) p. 13 . 2 8 . The phrase was used i n Macdonald's explanations to the House on June 22, 1864. Mr. Brown kd asked what remedy Macdonald and Gait had. "Mr. Mac-donald and Mr. Gait replied that their remedy was a federal union of a l l the Br i t i sh North American Provinces,—local matters being committed to local bodies, and matters common to a l l to a general legis lature, const-ituted on the well-understood principles of federal government." This debate was reported i n the Globe, Thurs. June 23, I f 6 4 . "Mr. Holton wished to know what was meant by the expression, 'according to the well-understood principles of Federal Government.' Was i t meant that i n a Federal Legislature there sishould be representation according to numbers ? Mr. Cartier said the hon. gentleman knew quite well what was w ant by the 'principles of Federal Government' and so did his colleague Mr. Dorion.. . .The details had not been arranged but he conceived that the principle of federation involved equality i n one branch and that both population and terr i tory should be taken into account i n the o&her branch. Mr. Dprion ...Was the House to understand that, as i n the United States, there, was to be equality i n one branch, and representation according to population i n the other ? Atty.Gen. Macdonald. Yes.^ (Cheers) Mr. Dorion said that acceding to the explanation of the Attorjmey Gener-a l East i n one branch there would be equality of representation and i n the other representation according to population and terr i tory . Mr. Cartier said that he had already stated his opinion of what was i n -volved i n the federal pr inc ip le . Mr. Dorion x/Thus ijower Canada having larger teeritcry and less popula-tion than Upper Canada would have equal representation?/ - i v -28. (cont'd)."Mr. Gait: No, no. Atty. Gen. Macdonald said Mr. Der ion, surely, did not need to be infor-med! what the 'well-understood principles of federal government' were. They were exemplified on this continent,and included—equality i n the upper branch of the legislature and/the lower branch representation based upon population. (Loud cheers) /What the Atty. Gen. East meant added Macdonald, was to make clear his opposition to universal suff-rage./ " 29. Reported i n the Globe for Firday/ June 2[|, I86I4.. This took#place i n the House on the 23rd. 30. Six days, from Oct. 13th to Oct. 19th, were devoted to the discuss-ion of the upper chamber, i t s constitution, distribution of members, and the method of their appointment. 31. Lucas, C.P. Lord Durham's report of the affairs of British North Amer- ica Oxford, Clarendon, 1912. ( 3 Vols.) i . 288-289. See also Turcotte, L.-P. Le Canada sous 1'Union Quebed, Canadien, l 8 ? l i "La constitution de I8I4O avait un caractere f e'deral...." p. 3I1I. 32. Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc, p. 55. 33- Lucas, C.P. op. c i t . i i . 305. 3h. Quebec Morning Chronicle Mon., Oct. 17, 186U. The Chronicle was argu-ing, for a legislative union. 35. Laski, H . J . Studies i n the problem of sovereignty New Haven, Yale Un-iversity Press, 1917. p. 267. 36. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that it was the C i v i l War alone which discourgged Canadians from adopting a more decentralized constitution. Such an example as the C i v i l War did give the movement toward centralization i n Canada considerable popular support; but the general frame of confederation existed already i n the confidential despatch of Cartier, Ross and Ga]_t to Bulwer-Lytton, Oct. 25th, frftgfy? 1858. See Chapter V. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Question of federation of the British Provinces of North America. HMSO. Nov. If5 8 . Also i n Skelton, P.P. The l i f e and times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1920. pp. 239-2UU. (23) CHAPTER II THE DESIRE OF THE LEADERS FOR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (24) It was only by the "concurrence of most prop-itious circumstances", said George Brown before the Housej 1 "that this movement could have been accomplished". More than once in the course of the debates on Confederation were members moved to reflect, like Brutus, that there was a tide i n the affairs of men which taken at the flood led on to fortune. Canadians f e l t the flood of the tide and in the fullness of this elemental c a l l launched their ship. "We were taught," said McGee, "that the days of the colon-i a l comedy of government were over and gone, and that p o l i t i c s had become stern, and almost tragic for the New g World". Canadians saw four new nations in North America, three nations to the south, and one, they hoped, of their own. There was a feeling in Canada that the New World was in the throes of transition to a new age, stern and strong; a great new empire i n Mexico under Maximilian; a new slave-owning southern confederacy; a new and truculent North; surely the destiny of Bri t i s h North America was as obvious as i t was inevitable: union or oblivion. The age of now an age of militarism i s beginning i n the history of the people of the New World. 3 The impression was wide-spread that a great dividing line had been reached; that Canadians must leave behind the "paltry littleness of isolation", and that they must direct their attention seriously to the building of a great nation. peaceful colonisation i s over, said LsftRevue Canadienne; (25) These sentiments might have been no more than interesting evidence of popular feeling had i t not been that the government had taken in hand a measure to build a great nation. The result was that the events outside Canada strengthened enormously the hand of the Government. The government was not always judicious; being predomin-ately conservative i t could have easily alienated support from Canada West even over an issue that would give "rep. by pop.1* to an avid electorate. But events tended to force the public to the conclusion that i t was a case either of confederation or annexation. Even as i t was the government alienated support both in Canada East and West on i t s policy of ignorning the electorate on such a major issue as confederation, and i n bringing in what many considered to be a retrograde measure - the appointive Upper Chamber. Events, i n most eases outside Canada, allowed the government to proceed f u l l steam with a measure and a method which ordinarily would have been subjected to considerable criticism, i f not amendment. Confederation was, says one student, "largely a by-product 5 of catastrophic events foreign to Bri t i s h America". It would be d i f f i c u l t to deny the weight of such a thesis; i t i s however misleading. If events affected the fact of the confederation i n the Maritimes, they tended in Canada to affect i t s form. (26) There i s nothing more instructive in this regard than to watch the effect of the Fenian invasion on the moderate Rouges. An organ such as L'Ordre was strongly-affected and the Fenian invasions produced a conspicuous change i n i t s attitude. The opposition of L'Ordre to confederation was based on a sincere regard for French-Canadian autonomy, rather than a doctrinaire liberalism which characterized i t s confrere, Le^ays. But l i k e Lefcays i t had not been above advocating annexation to the United States as an alternative to Confederation. After the Fenian invasion at Ridgeway, the tone of L'Ordre toward the Government softened considerably; i t s shrillness was lost and i t assumed a position of continued suspicion of 6 the United States after June, 1866. This example i s an Indication of what must have been happening to opposition to confederation in Canada, not only as a result of the Fenian invasions, but also of the general truculence of the United States. Nor did the " l i t t l e Englandism" of the Manchester Sohool and the London Times encourage Canadians in the belief that England would be a better proteotor of their rights and privileges than a Confederation. A l l these events combined to pro-duce a state of mind which would acquiesce i n a measure 7 that might normally have called forth disapproval. In 1866 the country was indeed almost on a war footing. The writ of habeas corpus was suspended; there were m i l i t i a (27) musters and troop movements; there were Invasions, and rumours of invasions whioh gave the press l i t t l e else to talk about• The Quebec Morning Chronicle analysed this state of mind a few days after the Niagara invasion. "Fenianism continues to be the absorping topic of the day. Nothing else Is heard on any side. In the hotels, in the streets, on the public promenades, groupjaifsicl of persons may be seen seriously disoussing the situation". 0 Such a condition of public opinion must have had considerable influence in crystallizing an alternative already before the public: confederation or annexation. Canadian opinion on federation. F i r s t , the general nature of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l inheritance; secondly the impact of events in the world outside Canada. In respeot of Canadian ideas about federalism both these factors tended toward the same end. In normal times Canadians would have been predisposed to a reasonably strong central government in a federal system; in the series of chronic crises with 9 the United States which began about 1861, they were nat-urally ready to accept a stronger measure. the Canadian government i t s e l f . Was that policy a general reflection of Canadian ideas on federalism? The answer i s yes and no. In the f i r s t place i t i s d i f f i c u l t to get judicious opinions on confederation, for i t was presented as a complete measure to be passed as i t stood or not at a l l . There are then two main factors which conditioned This introduces the question of the policy of (28) This limited both comment and improvement. Generally speaking, Canadian opinion favoured the government measure, though there were dissentient voices in respect of the appointive legislative council. There was more opposition to government methods. The failure to appeal to the people aroused considerable conservative opposition. The apparent coercion of the Maritime provinces aroused fears in Quebec as to government policy after Confederation had passed. The policy of the Canadian government was that of strong conservatism. The government was sometimes ruthless, sometimes canny, sometimes dilatory; but always i t was conservative. Its conservatism was due as much to Cartier and Brown as to MacDbnald. MacDonald himself could only follow his conservative instincts as long as he carried his colleagues with him. This maxim applies generally to a l l cabinet government but i t bears with peculiar force on the coalition of 1864. To begin with i t was a coalition. That meant concessions. More impor-tant, Brown and Cartier both carried with them the majority of their respective sections. That meant they could practically dictate how far MacDonald could go. The interaction of these three men i s fascinating, and of considerable significance. Cartwright's Reminiscences throw many interesting lights on this subject; his work in fact provides some of the most absorbing reading that (39) on© can find on the confederation period. Behind i t a l l l i e the circumstances and the causes of the coalition. It i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that the coalition was formed under any other circumstances than that of ab-solute p o l i t i c a l necessity. One cannot read the history of the period and escape the conclusion that some consti-tutional remedy was imperative. There i s a prevalent custom among writers on this period to disparage Goldwin i Smith's dictum that the real father of confederation was deadlock. This compound of cynicism and realism comes closer to the truth than perhaps any other generalization. That confederation came when i t did i s undoubtedly due to p o l i t i c a l exigencies of the most pressing kind in the Province of Canada. 1 0 Gait's plan for confederation in 1858 could only have passed under the greatest d i f f i c u l t i e s I The Globe dismissed i t at the time as "half smoke, half air The p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the two Ganadas in 1858, though apparent, had not yet come to a head. There are indeed other arguments as to why confederation f a i l e d i n 1858 and succeeded in 1864; but the constitutional d i f -f i c u l t i e s in Canada i n 1864 were such as to sweep away the mass of popular inertia which normally accompanies a change of such vast proportions. We can probably take i t for granted, said the Quebec Mercury in March 1864, that the existing constitutional arrangements of the province cannot last much longer. "They were confessedly perilous (30) In 1859; and assuredly time has not mitigated their danger, nor rendered more safe the policy of indefinite delay". About two weeks later Sandfield Macdonald revealed that there had been informal negotiations with Tache over a possible coalition. Cartier would have nothing to do with i t at this time and the project f a i l e d . Right to the end Macdonald opposed any solution. The day of the defeat of the Tachekaodonald ministry, June 14th, the Journals l i s t Macdonald*s name as one of the three dissenting opinions 13 on Brown's constitutional committee. Cartier had by this time realized that the situation could hardly go on much longer. In the negotiations for a coalition which followed the defeat of the government the night of the 14th, Cartier informed Macdonald in no uncertain terms that he would either have to accept Brown's suggestion or lose his (Cartier's) support. At this threat, Macdonald reluotantly agreed. presence of Brown was of the utmost importance, but his action seriously compromised the position of the Lower Canada l i b e r a l s . These had been far more willing to make they were thrown now into opposition. Brown himself was largely vindicated by his own party, but Cartier took con siderable risks, and was never wholly rewarded for the risks he ran. Macdonald alone stood to gain the most and Thus began a most curious association. The concessions to Upper Canada than had the Bll»s, and yet (31) in fact did so. His new-found strength in Canada West was most satisfying, Of the two leaders of u£cx and L>C?Trespectively, Cartier i s perhaps the most significant i n affecting the nature of the Canadian federal state. Brown carried Upper Canada pretty solidly behind him on the "rep, by pop," theme. Even his defection i n 1865 did l i t t l e to shake Upper Canada's support of a measure which would give them in essence their long desired goal, Cartier however had no such support, French Canada had everything to lose and l i t t l e to gain by support of confederation. It stood to lose the strong position i t held i n United Canada and to gain only the status of a local government i n an English-dominated confederation. Confederation was forced on Frenoh Canada by dire necessity, and i t i s to Cartier's credit that he was able to concede as much as he did to the central government in the face of known opposition at home. At the same time the extent of centralization was quite clearly dictated by Cartier. Macdonald and Brown and Gait a l l wanted a considerable measure of centralization. It was Cartier and French Canada that were the measure of how far the process of centralization could go. Without Cartier, no measure could have been possible. There i s l i t t l e disagreement on the opinion of Morlson that Cartier 15 was the "accepted leader of French opinion". (33) Cartier's p o l i t i c a l ideas and opinions are thus of considerable- significance. Confederation might have been stronger as far as his personal opinion was concerned, but he recognized that he was in dangerous position; he could not go too f a r . Nevertheless, Cartier*s ideas gave him a desire to see a healthy measure of central govern-ment with enough guarantees to French Canada to enable her to preserve her cultural autonomy. In addition, of course, he had to be sure that he could carry the main body of Bleu opinion in Lower Canada. His main support i n this regard was clearly the Church. The Church was looking for religious guarantees and protection for her system of education; but she was prepared to sanction a measure of conservatism, of order, of authoritarianism even, once the required guarantees were given. These guarantees are what Cartier insisted on, and what he got. Cartier was a staunch conservative, and • having received the guarantees he desired he was prepared to acquiesce in a measure which gave considerable power 16 to the central administration. He was "intensely B r i t i s h " himself; and he once desoribed his countrymen as "English-17 men speaking Frenoh". This predisposed him to accept a measure as far removed from a decentralized federation as his position as leader of French Canada would allow him. 4 Brown, too, had deep conservative, leanings. It might be said that he was a conservative by instinct, a (33) l i b e r a l by profession. If. the leading causes of his agit-ation are removed he becomes a conservative. Confederation conceded "rep. by pop."; the implication naturally follows that George Brown would have been content with a conserva-tive w f r e > » This i s to some extent true but the matter was more complex. Brown was forced to work with Macdonald whom he disliked personally; and Brown himself was a most d i f -f i c u l t man to work with? and did not get along with some of the other members of the Cabinet, notably Gait. In this regard the rapprochement with Cartier was the real t i e which held Brown i n the Cabinet. True he was held there by the policy of the government, but unless he became part of the team he was doomed eventually to leave-. There was considerable similarity between Brown and Cartier i n temperament; moreover each was the dominant p o l i t i c a l figure in their respective parts of the province; a rapprochement between them was fraught with the utmost danger to the Upper Canada conservatives. This contingency frightened Macdonald and he was at considerable pains to avert i t . That he did so was due as much to Brown's im-petuosity as to his own astuteness, though there i s l i t t l e doubt Macdonald was playing a very canny game, Macdonald emerges as the dominant p o l i t i c a l figure only by force of his own personality. Had Cartier and Brown come to a p o l i t i c a l as well as a personal (34) rapprochement. there i s l i t t l e doubt that the days of Macdonald»s p o l i t i c a l future would have been numbered. The significance of Macdonald in this context i s quite important; the Canadian federal system was undoubtedly based more on his active participation than on that of anyone else. If i t was foreshadowed by Gait i n 1858, i t was implemented by Macdonald in a practical way i n 1864. It i s curious indeed that Cartier, who had been instru-mental in introducing the question i n 1858, took such a small active part i n introducing the concrete terms of confederation at the Conference. The answer i s that Cartier did not have the grasp of p o l i t i c a l realties that Macdonald had. Cartier was more visionary and had the defects of such a characteristic: he found i t d i f -f i c u l t to transform his ideas to concrete institutions. This was indeed Macdonald*s function and he performed i t ably. Brown had helped to bring the constitutional pro-blem into the immediate forefront of Canadian af f a i r s , but Brown did not have the constructive turn of mind required, by a problem such as confederation. George Sheppard*s opinion of Brown i s instructive. "Take him onto the ground of abuses, financial blunders and wrongs, sectionalism, and so forth; and he i s the strongest public man in Canada . . . But off this ground he i s an ordinary man. He has never studied p o l i t i c a l principles, and knows nothing of constitutional questions save such (35) as have arisen from time to time i n Canada. He i s a vig -orous colonial p o l i t i c i a n - no less and certainly no more".' In 1865 Brown became the dominant figure in the House, due to the continued absences of Macdonald. In time he might have been able to bring the same constructive a b i l i t y as Macdonald to bear on p o l i t i c a l problems. Macdonald himself could have been described i n terms very close to those which Sheppard used to describe Brown. Brown's trouble was that he had been in opposition for so long he was unable to use his very real talent to advantage in a project such as confederation. Macdonald had had a long apprenticeship in administration; Brown's appren-ticeship had been i n agitation. It i s no discredit to Cartier or Brown to say that Macdonald emerged as the man who really influenced Confederation. Confederation was possible only through Brown and Cartier and Macdonald would have been the last person to deny i t . But when i t came to the question of concrete r e a l i t i e s Macdonald, who knew what he wanted, who had a shrewd idea of how far he could go, was bound to take an assertive place at the Conference table at Quebec. And the minutes and proceedings of the Conference reflect his dominance. Macdonald's desire for a legislative union of 2Q a l l B r i t i s h North America i s well known. It was only with the utmost reluctance that he would consent to a ( 3 6 ) resolution suggesting federal union as the remedy for the p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Province. Once having taken such a project in hand Macdonald became increasingly aware of the p o l i t i c a l value of the word "federal". Under i t s protection he could proceed with a measure which in many respects would bear the impress of Ms ideas on leg-i s l a t i v e union. He made oratorical gestures to the 21 excellence of the American constitution, but as far as Canada was concerned the less concessions that were made to local government, the better. Macdonald was too astute not to realize that there would have to be concessions and in some cases considerable concessions. Had Macdonald been anything less than practical in this respect he would have sanctioned a much stronger measure. His caution i s well illustrated in his consideration of the problem of minorities. He saw the central government as the protector of minorities and he was quite right i n the light of the p o l i t i c a l problems of the time. Both the Catholics of Upper Canada, and the English Protestants of Lower Canada looked to the Central Government for protec-tion of their r i g h t s . 2 2 But at the same time he was careful not to arouse antagonism in other groups by too strong a measure of centralization. "The people of every section," he said at the Conference on October 11th, "must feel that they are protected, and by no constraining of the central authority should such guarantees be over-ridden". 2 3 (37) This i s just about as far as Macdonald would go in his poliey of decentralization. He did not intend to cover the whole f i e l d of government in the Quebec resol-utions, nor did he want to. He wished nothing stated unless i t had to be, nothing specific unless there was a plain necessity to specify. He wanted as small a con-cession to the federal idea as possible; equally he wanted as small a concession to written constitutions as possible. He wanted the principles of the Br i t i s h Con-stitution kept continually to the forefront, with a minimum amount of commitments in writing. Our constitu-tion, he said, "should be a mere skeleton and framework that would not bind us down. We have now a l l the elas-t i c i t y which has kept England together". With Macdonald vi r t u a l l y leading the Conference at Quebec, i t i s l i t t l e wonder that the Br i t i s h North America Act included a central veto over provincial leg-islation, central appointment of the chief provincial executive, central appointment of senators, central appoint-ment of judges. There i s even a suggestion that the financial arrangements were aimed at making the Provinces dependent on Federal authority. 2 4 Macdonald was thus quite unsympathetic to fed-eral government. He did not believe that the B r i t i s h North American environment necessarily implied a federal state. He was induced to accept federation only by pol-(38) i t i e a l necessity, and was resolved to have as l i t t l e to do with i t as possible. The "mere framework of a system", "elasticity", "responsible government", these were the ideas of Macdonald on federalism. The contrast i s obvious. He was not prepared to disregard the electorate; but he believed, and with some just i f i c a t i o n , that the word "federal" could cover a multitude of sins. For the French especially, the word "federal" would be the sweet nectar which would conceal the bitter draught of legislative union, or something very close to legislative union. Cartier was not unaware of what was in the back of Macdonaldfs mind; but he was naturally conservative, and strongly British , and he was perhaps not averse to having the French electorate believe that confederation was more federalized than i t actually was or was intended to be. There are instructive differences i n this respect between Cartier Ts own personal views and O R Jthose of .his paper, La Minerve. The policy of the Canadian government might have come to naught had i t met any real opposition from the Maritime leaders. But the Maritime leaders were relatively unopposed to a project of legislative union. In fact most of them relinquished i t with obvious signs of regret; they reluctantly recognized that Lower Canada would almost certainly have to be granted special rights and privileges which would, technically, make a l e g i s l a -( 3 9 ) tive union impossible* It i s a mistake to assume that because the Maritimes came reluctantly into confederation they were necessarily opposed to legislative union. This may have been true, yet i t may not. The opinions of the Maritime leaders at Quebec certainly tended towards legis-lative union. 2 6 It i s not improbable that Maritime people were opposed more to the fact of confederation than any lack of guarantees to local governments in the confederation project i t s e l f . Whatever public opinion in the Maritimes, their leaders offered no objections to Macdonald*s conception of the high functions of the central 27 government i n the confederation. There was on the whole surprisingly l i t t l e disagreement at Quebec on the general nature of the new government. It i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to establish just what the background of Maritime policy was, lacking access to the Ministerial and opposition 28 papers; but at Quebec i t offered no real opposition to the centralizing policy of the Canadian Government. The influence of Monck and Carnarvon on the measure for the union of Br i t i s h North America i s less tangible. It perhaps was merely a rubber stamping of the proceedings at Quebec and later at the Westminster Palace Hotel. There i s some reason to believe that i t was not. Monck was appealed to by William MacDougall i n terms suggesting that he could exert some considerable influence of imperial p o l i c y . 2 9 Undoubtedly Monck did a (40) good deal to carry confederation as a p o l i t i c a l measure. But he was hardly a significant figure i n Canadian fed-eralism except i n the negative sense of the famous lines of Bagehot*s: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn. Monck was not a b r i l l i a n t man, but he had an observant eye, and a l i k i n g for the conservative party. He and Macdonald got along very well. Monck shared Macdonaldfs views as to the proposed confed-eration. The substance of Monck*s opinion i s in a long 30 confidential despatch to Carnarvon, dated September 7, 1866. This despatch i s invaluable, not so much, for what i t re-fle c t s of Monck*s own views, as for Monck*s keen analysis of the purpose of the leaders of Confederation-: **• . . i t w i l l I think be apparent that the intention of the framers of the Quebec plan was to constitute a strong central authority -the power of which should be supreme and per-vading throughout the Union with Prov. bodies of a completely subordinate and municipal character for the administration of purely local a f f a i r s . **I think i t i s also equally apparent that so far from the word "Federal" being an apt desig-nation of such a form of govt i t s general meaning conveys an idea the direct contrary of that whioh 3, I have shown to be the intent of the Quebec plan.** In this conclusion Lord Monck and Goldwin Smith were In complete agreement. Goldwin Smith stated that the inten-tion of the Quebec Conference was to create a kingdom, not 32 a federation. Lord Monck however approved of this pol-icy; Goldwin Smith did not. (41) The British government and i t s o f f i c i a l s were not i n the least interested i n a federal government for Bri t i s h North America. Like the Canadian government they had l i t t l e sympathy with this strange alliance of the Bri t i s h Crown and federalism. Carnarvon followed Cardwell 33 in this respect. Monck aided and abetted as well as he could the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the union of British North America; there i s l i t t l e doubt that he and Macdonald and Carnarvon proved to be a most harmonious l i t t l e group. The purpose of the Canadian government was to secure a strong central government. That they succeeded in doing so was i n the f i r s t instance due to the character of the men i n the Cabinet, and their relation to each other. Of these men, Macdonald, Cartier, Brown, and Gait, stand out clearly as guiding decisively the course of the project of British North America union. Cartier and Brown, by virtue of their relation to their respective sections, were the sine qua non in any sweeping measure such as confederation. Macdonald, not necessarily indis-pensable p o l i t i c a l l y , kept his place by the sheer power of his personality and his adroit handling of the men i n the Cabinet. He was moreover a singularly able man when i t came to constructive p o l i t i c a l institutions, a man who knew what he wanted and how he was going to get i t . ( 4 8 ) The policy of .the Canadian Government was reinforced by the policy of the Maritime leaders at Quebec; i t was singularly encouraged by the active help of Lord Monck and the Br i t i s h government. It i s l i t t l e wonder therefore that they succeeded in carrying their plan without too much d i f f i c u l t y . The main point i s of course that neither the Canadian government, nor the Maritime leaders, nor the British o f f i c i a l s , had any desire whatever to introduce federal government i n Bri t i s h North America. They wanted enough of the trimmings of federal government to satisfy the legitimate desires of Lower Canada; any-thing further-was only a matter of"inconvenience and danger. Notes 1. Conf. Debates p. 114, Column 2.(114.2) This was Brown's opening speech and took place on Wed. Feb 8, 1865. 2. In reply to the Speech from the Throne, Thurs. Nov. L4, 1867. Toronto, Leader Mon. Nov. 18, 1867. 3. La revue canadienne /March 1865/ P- 158 :"...Ia guerre entre les Etats du Nord et du Sud de l a republique voisine a f a i t entrer l a politique Internationale du continent americain dans les voies nouvelles. L'ere de l a colonisation pacifique est finie et i a l 'ere militaire commence pour l'histoire des peuples du Nouveau-Monde." 4. Toronto Leader Mon. March 25, 1867. 5. Gould, E.C. United States and Canadian confederation Essay submitted for the A l l Souls Historical Essay Prize, 1934. Typescript at the Univ-ersity of Toronto Library. 6. See Chapter IV. 7. Stacey, C P. "Fenianism and the rise of national feeling i n Canada at the time of confederation" CHR XII. #3 (Sept. 1931) P- 238. 8. Quebec Morning Chronicle Thurs. June 7th, 1866. 9. CP. Stacey says, "between 1815 and 1871 war between Canada and the United Slates was always possible and often probable," and that a i the height of this danger came between 1861 and 1871, which Stacey described as a "decade of chronic c r i s i s " . Lecture on "Canadian-American military relations, 1815-1871", University of Toronto, March 1950. 10. P. H. Moore speaking of his constituents, " They saidj 'The government of the country has come to a dead-lock; we have seen one strong party pitted against another strong party; we have seen two or three govern-ments forrred that were unable to pass a single important measure, and some change is therefore absolutely necessary.' " Moore was a l i f e member of the Legislative Council, and his residence was i n the tcwn of Philipsburg, C.E., i n the border region of the eastern townships. Conf. Debates p. 326.1. Cartwright, R.J. Reminiscences p. 38 :"...his supporters /Brown's/ were right i n considering the existing state of things as intoler-able. " 11. Globe Feb. /9 ?/, 1859. Cited i n Skelton, O.D. Gait p. 254. 12. febafeeFrl. April 1, 1864. 13. The motion for this committee was introduced by Brown on March 14th, 1864, seconded by Scoble. "That a Si&ect Committee of twenty Members be appointed to enquire and report on the important aibjects embrac-ed i n the said Despatch /Cartier, Gait and Ross to Bulwer-Lytton/ and the best means of remedying the evils therein set forth; with power to send for persons, papers and records, and to report from time to time; and that the said Committee shall consist of the following Mem-bers, of whom seven shall form a quorum, v i z : Honorable Messieurs - i i -13. (cont'd) "Cameron, Cartier, Cauchon, Messrs. Chapais and Dickson, Honor-able Mr. Attorney General Dorion, Mr. Dunkin, Honorable Messrs. Foley, Gait and Holton, Mr. Joly, Honorable Messrs. Macdonald (Kingston), Attor-ney General J.S. Macdonald, McDougallx and McGee, Messrs. McKellar, Scoble and Street, Honorable Mr. Turcotteg, and the Mover."Canada, Legislative Assembly, Journals, 1861;. pp.90-91. The debate on the motion was adjourned at this time, and re-opened on the 19th of May when i t was passed by a vote of 59-U8. Dorion then intreto-duced an amendemeht to the motion which had the effect of giving Upper Can-ada a numerical majority of one i n the Legislative Assembly. This was def-eated 7U-32. pp. 223-226. The Committee held 8 meetings and reported on June lU th as follows: "...the Committee have held eight meetings, and h&ave endeavored to find some solution for existing d i f f i c u l t i e s l i k e l y to receive the assent of both sections of the Province. A strong feeling was found to exist among the members of the Committee i n favor of changes i n the direction of a Federative system applied either to Canada alone, or to the whole British Noth American Provinces, and such progress has been made as'to warrant the Committee in recommending that the subject be again referred to a Committ-ee A£ the next Session of Parliament." The Committee differed as to the adoption of this report, the three dissenting voices being J.A. Macdonald, Sandfield Macdonald, and Scoble. The opposition of J.A. Macdonald and Sandfield Macdonald to the federal system i s known; Scoble's opposition is d i f f i c u l t to understand since he voted for confederation i n March, 1865. It i s a l l the more i n -explicable since Scoble seconded the motion of March. lUth,i*C4. Ii;. This i s Cartwright's statement, Reminscences, p.65. Neither Boyd, the leading biographer of Cartier, nor Sir Joseph Pope mention this, but i t seems not unlikely i n view of Macdonald's well-known dislike for any kind of federation. The usual explanation of Macdonald's change of heart i s that Macdonald was so cautious a p o l i t i c i a n that he did not wish to comm-i t himself u n t i l he was absolutely sure i t was the only way out. It is pos-sible, therefore, that i n the few hours between the bringing down of the report of Brown's committee and the actual defeat of the governnent, Mac-donald was convinced that things could go on no longer as they had been. But Cartwright's interpretation of events carries more wej|jfcjjr, and I would be inclined to agree with i t , without disparaging Macdonald's a b i l -i t y to realize the inevitable. 15. Morison, J.L. "Parties and p o l i t i c s , 18UO-1867" i n United Canada W.L. Grant, ed., p. 82. Vol. V. of Canada and i t s Provinces Shortt, A. &. Doughty, A.G. (eds.) Toronto, Glasgow Brook, 191k» 16. Bracq, J.C. The evolution of French Canada New York, MacMillan, 1921;. p. 113. " 17. Loc.cit. 18. "Leaving the /clergy/ reserves out of the question, George Brown i s eminently conservative i n his s p i r i t . His leading principle...is to re-concile progress with preservation, change with s t a b i l i t y . Coburg Star, 1853- Cited with approval by Lewis, J. George Brown London, Oxford, 1926. p. 73. (Makers of Canada Series, W.L. Grant, ed.) - i i i -19. Sheppard to Clarke, July 5, 1859- Clarke Papers Cited also i n Brown, G.W. "The Grit prty and the great Reform convention of 1859" CHR XVI. # 3«(Sept. 1935) p. 21$. Sheppard was an editorial writer for the Globe at the time; he was widely read i n p o l i t i c a l theory and i n history, and had been educated in England. 20. Macdonald«s desire for legislative union reflects his profound alleg-iance to British institutions. To him, responsible government, legis-lative union, and conservatism were a l l part of the same cloth. See Macdonald's own statement, Conf. Debates p. 29.1. 21. "It is now the fashion to enlarge on the defects of the Constitution of the United States, but I am not one of those who look upon i t as a failur e , (hearm, hear) I think and believe that i t i s one of the most s k i l l f u l works which human intelligence ever created; i t i s one of the most perfeg£ragrganizations that ever governed a free people. To say that i t has p^a defects i& but to say that i t is not the work of Omniscience, but of human in t e l l e c t s . " Conf. Debates p. 32.2. 22. See Chapters III and IV respectively. 2 3 . Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc, p. 5 5 • 2ii. Cartwrgght suggests this. "...I think that some of the leaders con-sidered that the Provinces would be mudi less disposed to dispute Federal authority i f the bulk of their revenue came from that source — i n which they were very much mistaken. Had more time be en given the matter might have been better arranged...." Reminiscences p. 16. 25. See Chapter IV. 26. Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc. p. 59. Mr. Fisher (N.B.)"I should have preferred legislative union i f i t were feasible." p. 61. Mr. Whelan (P.E.I.)"There i s an apprehension abroad i n the Lower Provinces that Canada desires to swamp and extinguish their provincial character. Such ought not to be objected to. It i s desirable that our mere provincia 1 character be lost and that we should form one great country." p. 8U. Mr. Tupper (N.S.) "If i t were not for the peculiar condit-ion of Lower Canada, and that the Lower Provinces have not municipal systems such as Upper Canada, I should join for a Legislative Union instead of a Federal." p. 87. Mr. Henry (N.S.) "We should not define powers of General Leg-islature. I would ask Lower Canada not to fight foi?a xae[ shad-ow. Give a clause to give general powers (except such as given to Local Legislatures) to Federal Legislature. Anything beyond that is hampering the case with d i f f i c u l t i e s . If we are to have Confederation l e t us have one on the principle s suggested by Attorjmey-General Macdonald. " /Macdonald, A.A ./"Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1861*." Doughtyxi A.G. ed. CHR I. # 1. (March 1920) p.30. p. 30. Mr. McCully(N.S.) spoke on Legislative union which he said was the prevalent view i n his province. The principal opposition to this attitude on legislative union was by - i v -26. (cont'd) Chandler (N.B. ) and Coles (P.E.I.). 27. "...withpie exception of Prince Edward Island, there seemed no more tendency among the maritime delegates, even including those of Newfound-land, to seek to strengthen the local government at the expense of the new federal government, than there was among the Canadians." Whitelaw, ff.M. The Maritimes and Canada before conf ederation,Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1934. p. 253. 28. Notably Tupper's British Colonist (Halifax); Tilley's Morning News (Saint John); Whelan's Examiner (Charlottetown); McCully's Chronicle (Halifax); Pope's Isalander(Charlottetown.) 29. McDougall to Monck, Jan. 27, 1867• Bellemare Papers, Canadian Archives. McDougall wrote sugge st ing that ^ Carnarvon be stiffened "against any possibility of his yielding to Tmpper's wish for a fixed upper House. See Chapter I I I . for further details on this letter. Monck was not the only one who influenced Carnarvon. Macdonald, so to speak, had got there f i r s t . There is a revealing letter to Mac-donald which Carnarvon wrote March 6, 1867: "I can only be very grate-f u l to the o f f i c i a l duties which have given me the oppurtunity mf mak-ing an acquaintance with you and have changed p o l i t i c a l into personal relations of so pleasant a kind....I hope/? much/ that when the sea i s between us we shall not wholly lose sight of each other. You have made my work so easy for me that I shall always look back with pleasure upon i t . . . . " Macdonald Papers, Vol. 51, 1863-1874. Correspondence. 30. This despatch i s erroneously marked i n the letterbooks as Sept. 7, I867. Much of this despatch is also given by 1/hitelaw, W.M."Lord Monck and the Canadian Constitution" CHR XXI. # 3 (Sept. 1940) See however G 12, Vol. 71. "Confidential Despatches" for the f u l l text. 31. Ibid. 32. Smith, G. "The proposed constitution for British North America" i n MacMillan's Magazine, March, 1865. P. 408: "The fact, however, seems to be,that they intend to create not a federation, but a kingdom, and prac-t i c a l l y extinguish the independent existence of the several provinces... They hope, no doubt, that course of time w i l l practically decided the ambiguity i n favour of the incorporating union." 33• Cardwell and Monck must have agreed pretty well on this subject. There i s a copy of a despatch, Cardwell to Monck, Dec. 3, 1864, i n the Macdonald Papces Vol. $0, that is worth quoting! "The point of principal importance to the practical well working of the scheme is the accurate determination of the limits between the auth-ority of the Central and that of the Local Legislatures i n their r e l -ation to eactjother. It has not been faaxxtefca possible to exclude from the resolutions some provisions which appear to be lees consistent than might, perhaps, have been desired with the simplicity and unity of the system. But upon £he whole i t appears to Her Majesty's Government that precautions have been taken, which are obviously intended to se-cure to the Central Government the means of effective action through-out the several Provinces,—and to guard against those evils which -V-3 3 . (cont'd) "must inevitably arise, i f any doubt were permitted to exist as to the respective limits of Central and Local authority. They are glad to observe that, although large powers of legislation are intended to be vested i n local bodies, yet the principle of central control has been steadily kept i n view. The importance of t h i s principle cannot be overrated. Its maintenance i s essential the practical efficiency of the system, and to i t s harmonious operation bmth i n the general government, and i n the governments of the several Provinces." This despatch gives more succinctly than any paraphrase* the a t t i -tude of the British government towards federalism. (43) CHAPTER 111 IDEAS IN CANADA WEST REGARDING FEDERALISM (44) In Canada the reaetion to the plan of Confed-eration was mixed. As a whole i t was regarded with benevolence. Canada West saw i t as the achievement of an end long sought: nrep. by pop." Lower Canada viewed i t with more mixed feelings, but generally as end to end sectional d i f f i c u l t i e s by aoknowliadging the rightful claim of French Canadians to their own institutions. Within these two areas of opinion there was considerable variation. There was reaction against the supposed "fed-eral" union by those who wanted a complete legislative union, notably the Protestants of Lower Canada, and the Catholics of Upper Canada. Some groups wanted a larger measure of federal union, especially the Rouges, but with Tory and Reform dissentients from a l l over the prov-ince as well. The middle ground was taken by the French Bleus, the Brown Reformers, and the Macdonald tory Con-servatives. This group was prepared to follow the government f a i r l y u n c r i t i c a l l y . A more c r i t i c a l middle ground was taken by the l i b e r a l Conservatives of Upper Canada, who opposed government methods more than they c r i t i c i z e d government policy. In Canada West i t was not the Reformers who took the l i b e r a l point of view on confederation. The Reformers were behind confederation almost to a man, and saw no nec-essity for any such measure as an appeal to the people, advocated by the l i b e r a l Conservatives. Whltelaw's state-(45) ment that Conservatives tended to favour legislative union while Reformers leaned toward a looser federal type i s i n -correct on certain c r i t i o a l points. 1 The "conservative" dominance at the Quebec Conference, so effective i n secur-ing a strong central government, was based on the alliance of groups forming the coalition. It included the Lower Canada English Conservatives, the French Bleus, the Macdonald tory Conservatives, and the Brown Reformers. This i s not to say that other groups did not support confederation. - They did; but with reservations. This i s especially characteristic of the l i b e r a l Conservatives. In the last analysis the reservations were not usually sufficient to prevent such groups from giving confedera-tion their support. In some cases i t was only given under the pressure of outside events. In others, more extreme cases, i t was never given at a l l . Canada West has always been considered the solid block of opinion behind Confederation. The coalition united Macdonald and Brown in p o l i t i c a l harness; i t followed that Upper Canada was therefore one p o l i t i c a l l y . This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the pur-pose of the coalition was to give Upper Canada that which i t had so long sought: "rep. by pop." This simple, rational interpretation of events i s to a large extent borne out by the vote on Confederation i t s e l f . Only 7 out of a total of 65 members from Canada West voted against (46) the motion Friday, March 10, 1865, Paul Cornell states that the coalition was supported by a l l the Conservatives and four-fifths of the Reformers •2», Unfortunately this interpretation i s not en-t i r e l y true, and i s certainly misleading when the general opinions on federalism are considered. In the f i r s t place the coalition was not supported by a l l the Conservatives, nor was the support that i t did have given u n c r i t i c a l l y . After the formation of the coalition, the Upper Canada Conservatives were in a rather anomalous position. They had been contending against reformers in a bitter struggle for the past ten years or more. Some of them were opposed to "rep. by pop.", some of them opposed to George Brown; most of them used to getting scant courtesy from their reform brethren, and giving l i t t l e i n return. Suddenly this war was ended. The Reformers had gained their long-sought end and the Conservatives had to swallow their pride and accept the situation as best they could. It was not too d i f f i c u l t for many of them; "rep. by pop." was a tempting prize; i t was worth swallowing the indig-nity of coalition to obtain. But the general effect of the coalition on the Upper Canada Conservatives was to detach them from close allegiance to Macdonald, and to set them free i n a kind of happy world where they could c r i t i o i z e i f they chose. The Conservatives knew f u l l well that the disciplined Reform group were behind Confedera-(47) tion; therefore they simply relaxed and took a good long look at the new Constitution, The Conservative opinions are therefore more judicious and not without shrewd c r i t -icisms of points which appeared to them peculiar or even retrogressive. They were often more democratic than the Reformers, perhaps because i t cost them nothing, perhaps because of a sincere desire not to be rushed into anything which had already the earmarks of considerable precipitancy. The Reform party after coalition was f i l l e d with exuberance. There i s very l i t t l e evidence to indicate that Brown did not carry a l l his supporters with him. They were quite ready to admit that Brown had done the right thing i n order to secure "rep. by pop." The Reform group, so vigorously behind the new constitution, were necessarily rather uncritical i n their acceptance of i t . They were opposed to postponement, to modifications, to anything that might detract from their immediate goal. It i s d i f f i c u l t to explain the Reform opposition to appeal to the people on any other ground. They probably f e l t i t might be made an excuse for the postponing of Confederation. There was an additional group of Reformers, the Sandfield Macdonald " t a i l " as i t was called, which did oppose con-federation. The country was not ready for i t , they said; i t could get along pretty well in the future, given a l i t t l e more forbearance on the part of i t s p o l i t i c a l par-(48) t i e s . This group was the only strongly dissentient group, among Reformers u n t i l the great s p l i t of June 1867. Nor were there any significant regional divisions of opinion in Canada West. There was no real centre of opposition such as were the eastern counties in Canada East. There i s some suggestion that the central counties of Canada West offered some opposition; this i s also re-inforced slightly by a more obvious localization of opposition in members of the Legislative Council. But there Is l i t t l e which can be taken as concrete suggestions of regional opposition. There was of course the old con-f l i c t between London and Toronto, born out of the ri v a l r y for the old capital of Upper Canada. There was some fear among the citizens of Ottawa that confederation might be a deep dark plot to move the capital back to Montreal or 4 Kingston. But regionalism in Canada West did not provide any real focus for opinion on the. federal state. -Apart from p o l i t i c a l alignments, the principal influence affecting ideas on federalism in the province 5 was religious belief and i t s concomitant, national origins. Religious belief usually tended to follow certain prescribed p o l i t i c a l outlines, but in some cases i t sought out a line for itself^and followed i t . This i s especially character-i s t i c of the Irish Catholics. The Irish Catholios in Canada East and Canada West show very well the peculiar nature of the attitudes of minority groups. In Canada (49) ~7-West the Irish Catholics put their trust i n the central government of Confederation, A strong union government was the protector of their religious rights and their educational freedom. They were convinced that the Central government would concede far more to them than could ever he expected from any local government. Consequently they were opposed to any decentralized system of federalism, and i n fact warmly supported arguments for legislative 6 union. The general p o l i t i c a l allegiance of religious groups was principally along lines suggested by the nature of their sect. Thus the Church of England, medium and high church, tended to be Conservative. So too did the Presbyterians of the Established Church of Scotland. On the other hand, low Church of England, Free Church of Scotland, and the Methodists and Baptists tended i n the 7 direction of reform. Catholics were s p l i t . Some sup-ported S. MacDonald. Others, notably the Irish Catholics, found themselves looking rather to MoGee than to S. Mac-donald. It i s l i k e l y that they found the c a l l of Irish vs. Scot, Conservative vs. Liberal, stronger than any other feeling. It i s d i f f i c u l t to measure the strength of re-ligious convictions and how far these affected group ideas on the future British American federal state. The Irish (50) Catholics, and perhaps Catholics generally in the upper section of the Province, had a definite policy i n rfigard to Confederation. In most cases however, religious be-l i e f s were concealed by the prevalent use of party labels and party differences which sprang easily Into being on every contentious issue. * The-Conservatives were- somewhat restless i n the coalition with Brown. They were not necessarily opposed to "rep • by pop."; but they were not -prepared to accept i t u n c r i t i c a l l y . They were not prepared to accept i t re-gardless of the institutions which accompanied i t . Some Conservative opinion refused to concede any degree of federalism at a l l . If i t could not get legislative union i t was not interested in a compromise with federalism. This position was taken by M. C. Q Cameron who carried i t a l'outrance and voted against the Confederation resolutions. A good number of others such as J. H. Cameron were prepared to vote for Confed-eration; but they made i t clear they did so under pressure of circumstances which, they f e l t , made i t impossible for them to do otherwise. The position of such a group i s instructive, for i t illustrates how hard the ideal of legislative union died. In the face of a ministerial policy which conceded as l i t t l e as i t could to the federal principle, Conservatives were s t i l l prepared- to do battle (51) for the perpetuation of what they conceived to he thor-oughly Bri t i s h institutions. They wanted neither truck nor trade with federalism. The position of this group rested on the assumption that federalism only meant a con-tinuance of sectional d i f f i c u l t i e s , 9 They thought i t a mistake to recognize sectional differences; i t was taking the line of least resistance to give in to them. Such a method was hound in the nature of things to make matters worse rather than better. Every argument advanced for federal union applied doubly to legislative union; the latter i s moreover better suited for the aims and purposes of a British people. 1 0 J, H. Cameron, member for Peel, was not so extreme as his namesake. Cameron was a strong Conservative and commanded considerable support. He was a great a l l y of Dr. Strachan, and was Grand Master of the Orange Order for Bri t i s h North America. It was he who kept the Orange Order from breaking away from Macdonald and the Conservative alliance with the French. J . H. Cameron had been suggested for the leadership of the Conservative party by Sir Allan McNab in 1855. 1 1 His opinion therefore probably represents the great rank and f i l e of the Orange Order. Cameron ad-mitted that confederation was a desirable measure; i f i t was not as desirable as a legislative union one should not insist on the impossible. You should, he said, "endeavour to obtain that which you can f a i r l y reach, and by and by (58) you may get that which, at a far distance, seems impossible. (Hear. Hear.) I believe the Confederation of the colonies 12 w i l l lead hereafter to a legislative union." Cameron went on to suggest, however, that one means of ensuring such a desirable eventuality was to give: concurrent j u r i s -diction on such local powers as property and c i v i l rights, public lands, to the Central Government as well as the local governments. Thus, he said, "when a l l those smaller stars f a l l from the firmament", the General Gov-ernment w i l l possess a l l the necessary powers for effec-tive legislative union. If Macdonald was sympathetic with this point of view, he was less so with the motion which Cameron placed on the floor of the House. Cameron pro-posed a general election to ascertain and confirm opinion on confederation. Cameron's motion reflects indeed the opinion of a loose section of the Conservatives of Upper 13 Canada, although his motion went down to defeat 8 4 - 3 5 . The reason for conservative concern i n this matter was principally to secure delay. The government had not been slow i n applying themselves to the measure. Barely nine months transpired between the f a l l of the Conservative government in June 1864 and the passing of the Confederation resolutions i n March 1865. Some con-servatives f e l t that haste could achieve nothing and could endanger the whole project. (53) The government contended that no appeal was nec-essary. Thet people had given their f u l l approval of the measure; delay served no useful purpose, and threatening events from the South made i t decidely unwise. The real reason behind the government's position was probably a 14 sound instinct to l e t sleeping dogs l i e . There was some danger that an appeal to the country would awaken the Quebec electorate from their comfortable allegiance to Gartier. Western Canada was certainly behind confederation. Nothing was to be gained by the turmoil of a general elec-tion. Such an election might destroy the conservative "set" to the constitution. The New Brunswick election had also given the government reason to believe that an appeal to the people of Canada could hardly strengthen their position, and might conceivably weaken i t . In addition there was the constitutional argument against an appeal to the people. Cameron had suggested late in 1864 that such an appeal should be made. The Montreal Gazette took pains to answer It on November 2, 1864. The argument of the Gazette was based on the del-egate vs. representative controversy, shrewdly calculated to appeal to Canadian opinion biased against the American view. The people's representatives, said the Gazette, are not delegates, "but are, i n fact the people i n their pol-i t i c a l capacity - - - i t i s passing strange how a p o l i t i c -ian so intensely Br i t i s h (Jr. H. Cameron] can talk as i f (54) 7 constitutional changes i n Canada, fcr Britain, must hare the sanction of . . . a popular vote after the style of 15 our democratic neighbours"• The Globe quoted this argument with great approval and threw in the *added warn-ing that Canadians must be on their guard against such "dreadful American heresies" about, which "we are so often warned now-a-days".16 The Toronto Leader replied that i t was no argument at a l l to say i t was un-British to appeal to the people. British practice could not hold for such a drastic circum-17 stance as this. Not that we want anything l i k e a Con-stitutional convention. We are quite satisfied, i t said, with the Parliamentary method. But Parliament should not make sweeping constitutional charges which the electorate had not indicated as desirable before the members were 18 elected. The Leader was characteristic of a generous section of Conservative opinion. It was not i l l i b e r a l , but i t was not democratic. It had an elevated sense of public liberty, and resented despotism of any kind. The Leader was more judicious than the Globe and more ably written. Its sense of libe r t y was especially aroused over the Government's vigorous methods in the House. On March 4th after observing the results of the New Brunswick elections, the Leader pointed out that though the people are not opposed to confederation, they are thoroughly (55) opposed to the "high-handed way i n which i t i s attempted to be carried • • • " Maritime dissent, the Leader added a week later, has certainly been aggravated by the a t t i -tude of the Canadian government. This i s doubtless of "a foretaste of the despotic temper l i k e l y to bear sway in the Confederate government". T n e Leader was not averse to a continuance of the old union and believed that "rep. by pop." could now EG be carried. The old union had i t s advantages, and the Leader did not consider i t necessarily worn out. A l i t t l e mutual forbearance and i t could be made to work; the real d i f f i c u l t i e s have been immensely exaggerated by the s t r i f e of party. The Leader did not emphasize the fact, but "rep. by pop." was the sine qua non of such a continuance. Yet, i t was f u l l y aware that French Canada would only concede such an measure under great pressure. The reason perhaps for i t s sanguine attitude was hints thrown out by the Rouge press. In December 1864 the Rouges suggested that rather than have confederation French Canada might be prepared to accept " l a modification de nos rapports avec cette (Upper Canada] province, tout en oonservant 1'union". 2 2 At any rate the Leader was interested in the continuance of legislative union; at the time Confederation in New Brunswick seemed to have fa i l e d . It would not accept federation of the Ganadas alone, and oontinuance of the Union was the only alternative. (56) It might be expected from the general tenor of the Leader's thought on legislative union that i t would have concurred generally i n the Quebec resolutions. It did, but with reservations. Like most TJ.C. conservative** opinion, the Leader was not enthusiastic over federation, conceiving that i t perpetuated differences instead of re-moving them. In Canada there was a "States rights" party already, and one that would certainly be jealous of any federal authority encroaching on the l o c a l . Evidences of 23 this were already apparent in August, 1864. But i f there i s to be a federation, letr.lt not be based on the principle that federalism i s but a disguise for central-ization. There i s a fear evidenced i n the Leader of unoheeked power, the idea that a l l power corrupts. "It i s the nature of a l l such unchecked power to run r i o t and 24-become despotic". It had admitted i n September 1864 that l o c a l governments should be severely limited; i t also admitted that the central government should have consider-able legislative freedom; 2 5 but fear was gradually aroused by the actions of the coalition. The opinions which the Leader had on federalism in September 1864 gradually s h i f t . By March 1865 i t was sure that the design of Canadian con-federation was clearly inimical to any independence on the part of the local government. The Leader i s not yet opposed to this trend irrevocably; but i t does at least attempt to make clear where the policy of the Ministry i s ftio<k<L. (57) But one general tendency i s too obvious to escape the attention of any observing person* There i s an evident design to b e l i t t l e the local governments as much as possible, to make them, even i n their own spheres, subordinate to the federal authority. It only remains to make the local machinery as feeble as possible; and we shall be surprised i f i t does not turn out that this i s the meaning of "the simple and inexpensive local governments" of which we hear so much. A single Chamber, without anything i n the semblance of a responsible Administration, a sort of overgrown Municipal Council, w i l l be the least formidable l o c a l machinery that could be established. It could never successfully contest power, i n case of any dispute about jurisdiction, with the federal authority; and wherever such questions arose the latter might promise i t s e l f an easy victory.26 There i s here something very close to a true conception of the nature of the federal state. "Even in their own spheres" suggests that local governments should be considered as independent within their own legislative f i e l d . The prospect of contesting power with the central authority i s envisaged. In short, there i s something approaching an understanding of what the federal state should be. This was a reaction against a strong-coalition policy of pushing through confeder-ation. It suggests that Macdonald was right at Quebec when he suggested caution on strong centralisation measures. The Leader objected, as did other Conserva-tives to the"monstrous haste" manifested by the Canadian government, to the refusal to allow amendments; i t was therefore gratified that defeat in New Brunswick promised (58) to delay the project, and that the Quebec resolutions had not been hurriedly pushed into Imperial l e g i s l a t i o n . 2 7 -Brown's secession from the ministry_the follow-ing December, and events from outside effectively preven-ted the Leader from pursuing very strongly i t s opposition course. Brown's active opposition to the ministry was only on relatively minor issues. He s t i l l supported con-federation. But i t tended to bring the Leader more closely back to the Conservative fold, and in September 1867 the editor, James Beatiy, ran as a Conservative i n Toronto East. There i s l i t t l e doubt that the Leader was behind confederation, but i t was prepared to be c r i t i c a l and confederation was ably c r i t i c i z e d . The Leader i l l u s -trates perhaps a kind of regard for lib e r t y characteristic of DeTocqueville, whom i t quoted on several occasions. If i t was conservative, i t was liberal-conservative in the best sense of the word. The Leader and the Globe both carried with them a considerable following in smaller journals across Canada West. A paper such as the Kingston Daily Mews would quote extracts from the Leader. More often i t would write editorials echoing the editorial policy of the larger paper. How far the metropolitan ( i f one may use the word) press differed from the rural press on major issue such as confederation i s d i f f i c u l t to say. (59) T The small journals had their opinions. Their editorials were often on a par with those of the Globe, and i n some cases as good as those of the Leader. But there i s not much differentiation in opinion, 2 9 The editorials, written looally, seem to embody ideas which, i f not im-ported from the larger journals, at least tend to reflect their general policy, seen through the glasses of local issues. The Leader and the Globe were recognized as the two giants of Canada West; not other papers in the Province had their c i r c u l a t i o n , 2 9 and undoubtedly they exerted considerable influence. If the Leader*s policy on confederation may be considered l i b e r a l conservatism, the Globe's policy was conservative reformism. The Leader suspected the policy of small inexpensive local governments; the Globe had, vi r t u a l l y initiated i t • The Leader wanted an appeal to the people; the Globe said such an appeal was a waste of time and money. The explanation of such a juxtaposition of p o l i t i c a l ideas l i e s not only i n the semi-detached nature of Conservative opinion i n Canada West; i t l i e s in the determination of Reformers to hang on to "rep. by pop." Now that i t was conceded, they would secure, i f they could, either Confederation of the B r i t i s h North 30 America or a federation of the Canadas. George Brown made this quite clear in his great opening speech before (60) the House on February 8, 1865, The events of the past months, he said, can never be obliterated. The solemn admission of men of a l l parties cannot be erased. Any-one who opposes Confederation must not forget that there can never be any return to the status quo ante. No one should oppose Confederation who cannot produce a better scheme, a scheme acceptable to French as well as English Canada. Everyone who raises his voice in h o s t i l i t y to this measure must bear i n mind " a l l the perilous conse-31 quences of i t s rejection • . ."OJ" Brown was not mincing his words; his whole speech was irradiated with a pro-digious sense of power.3 2 There was a deep satisfaction with what had been secured at Quebec; there was the sug-gestion of a formidable opposition i f confederation were in any way compromised. The Reform position was clear enough. They had secured admission by the Conservative ministry and especially of French Canada that Vep. by pop. was a just and acceptable p o l i t i c a l contention; i t remained only to see that such a principle was embodied in the new constitution. This accounts for Brown's policy of con-servatism in the coalition. Not a l l reformers agreed 33 with Brown, but most of them were disposed to be pleased with what they had secured and not to question too far (61) t h e i r good fortune. Brown's p o l i c y on federalism was curious. The union, he said, at the Quebec Conference, must be a federal union, not a l e g i s l a t i v e one. 3 4 Brown meant t h i s ; he knew from h i s past experience, as w e l l as from h i s contact with C a r t i e r , that the c o n s t i t u t i o n would have to be f e d e r a l to be acceptable to French Canada. He himself had long been an advocate of f e d e r a l union i n order to secure "rep. by pop." But he had not a clear-cut doctrine about federalism and t h i s lack was manifest despite h i s obvious earnestness on the question. His insistence on federal union was not because he wanted federalism so much, but simply to carry through an honest bargain with the French Canadians. Our union, he said, w i l l be federal because only on«those conditions would Lower Canada have conceded representation by population. For t h i s concession, we s h a l l give Lower Canada equality i n the Upper House. "On no other condition could we have advanced a s t e p " . 3 5 Here perhaps i s e l i c i t e d the meaning of federalism f o r most English Canadians: rep-resentation by population i n the Lower House; represen-t a t i o n by t e r r i t o r y i n the Upper. Here i s the same conception of federalism that was revealed i n the debate over the "well understood p r i n c i p l e s of f e d e r a l govern-ment". Brown was quite sincere i n b e l i e v i n g he was advocating federal government. The f a c t that l o c a l con-(62) stitutions should he modelled on municipal institutions did not affect the issue as far as Brown was concerned. He was prepared quite cheerfully to ins i s t on "federals government on the one hand, and demand local , municipal, non-responsible institutions on the other. Federation i s but an extension of our p o l i t i c a l system, said the Globe, and i t " i s sustained by precisely the same reasoning as are municipal i n s t i t u t i o n s " . 3 6 This was too much for the Montreal True Witness. It gave a brief lesson to the Globe on the subject of federation. Federal union, said the True Witness, "differs from a Legislative union, not in degree but i n kind". There i s a formal and an essen-t i a l difference between them. 3 7 This was a lesson which Canadians, certainly English Canadians, never learned. To them federal union was but an extension in certain res-pects of legislative union. To George Brown, you hardly needed local institutions at a l l . To have a federal system i t was not necessary to have two sets of govern-ments: a l l you needed was the proper division of representation in the central legislature. Brown thus saw Confederation as one government rather than two. Confederation, said Brown, i s nothing less than a bold scheme "to gather a l l these countries (of B.N.A.) into one - to organize them a l l under one government, with the protection of the B r i t i s h flag . • ." 3 Q (63) Brown's project in local governments had the aim of being inexpensive, and only semi-responsible to the people. There would be a legislature elected for three years with an executive^, not responsible to the legislature ybut in some way responsible to the elector-ate. This was suggested during the debate on Macdonald's b i l l for local governments. Macdonald interjected iron-i c a l l y , "Would you have a president too?" Brown stoutly denied being favourable to such a system. His conception of local government was, he said, not unlike the system of County Councils in Great Britain.°* Brown's conception of federal government must therefore be acknowledged to be closely resembling leg-isl a t i v e union. He would not have agreed perhaps with this statement; but there i s l i t t l e doubt that federal-ism as he conceived i t did not in any sense include the idea of co-ordinate powers i n a single state. Brown usually praised the e l a s t i c i t y of American federalism i n allowing for sectional disagreement. But at the same time, federalism applied to Canada s t i l l meant an attempt to centralize. "It i s unphilosophical," said the Globe in a moment of reflection, "that the part should be deemed greater than the whole • • . m 4 1 Such statements suggest that Brown meant the Canadian federal state to be one; the provinces would not be co-ordinate parts, but would be sections of an integrated unity. (64) 7 Other reformers were quite clear that the Quebec resolutions did not suggest a federal state, " i f we are notigoing to have a legislative union i n name", said Col. Rankin, "we shall have something very closely 4,? resembling i t " . It i s perhaps d i f f i c u l t to justify Brown's conception of a federalism-with his demand for a nom-inative Upper House. Assuming that the Upper House i s the principal instrument through which the nation was to be federalized, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that Brown could have been prevented from advocating an elective Upper House. Brown had, however, always opposed the elective Upper House, It seemed to him, inconsistent with the methods of the B r i t i s h parliamentary system. When i t came to confederation, Brown could not but feel the pull of long-held beliefs; at the Conference he agreed to a return to the nominated Legislative Council. Macdonald said later, "I do not think there was a dissen-43 ting voice on the nominative principle in the Upper House". This was not true. The nominative principle aroused the opposition of Brown's Reform colleagues i n the Cabinet, William McDougall and Oliver Mowat. McDougall wrote in his personal copy of the Confederatiiuw Debates» opposite Macdonald*s words: " . . . I moved and Mr. Mowat seconded a motion for the elective principle. About l/3rd the delegates voted for the proposition -(65) Brown arguing and voting against i t " . McDougall hoped that some revision might be made at the London Conference when the fixed membership of the Upper House would almost certainly come up for r e v i s i o n . 4 5 McDougall did not secure the introduction of the elective principle. With Brown's help and that of New Brunswick he managed to get the fixed limit on the membership of the Upper House revised. There i s some doubt that Brown's policy on the nominative Upper House was the policy of the Reform party. McDougall claimed i t was not. The truth of the matter i s probably that McDougall was right. Reformers would probably have preferred an elective Upper House. 4 6 But the lack of reform opposition on any large scale suggests they did not lose much sleep over the nomin-ative principle. Some conservatives considered i t a retrograde measure, a step backwards in p o l i t i c a l evolution; most Reformers probably did not care. The Upper House and i t s constitution was more the concern of Lower Canada who would look there for guarantees and protection against the English majority i n the Lower House• Brown carried Reformers with him on almost every move right up u n t i l June 1867. He continued to support Confederation although out of the Cabinet, and the fact that McDougall and Howland47 were s t i l l in the 48 Cabinet guaranteed continued Reform support. In June (66) Of 1867, however, Brown's opposition f i n a l l y broke through his long support of the ministry and i t s project. There had been carping criticism in the Globe for some months, although nothing fundamental. Brown f e l t the time had come, now that confederation was assured, to begin a new party platform in opposition to the present government. He called a Reform convention for June 27, the basis of whioh was the cry, "No coalition." It was a grievous ta c t i c a l error. The Reform ranks s p l i t . Brown came off a weak second; the major part of the reform party continued in strong support of McDougall and Howland; Brown was l e f t holding the short end of the anti-ministerial group. Said the OBhawa : Vindicator: " . . . the convention of 1859 fought for a principle, while that of 1867 fought for power . . . » *anti-coalition may be the decision of the convention, 4 9 but i t v/as not the decision of the people". Brown thus projected the reform leadership to McDougall and Howland. Since the latter were connected with the Con-servatives, i t meant that the most of Reform party would continue with the coalition as long as McDougall and Howland were satisfied with what MacDonald had to offer. In August Brown ran for election as an anti-coalitionist in South Ontario constituency against the si t t i n g member, Thomas Gibbs. Gibbs was a local reform-i s t with Conservative sympathies, and who had aroused (67) the opposition of the local reform paper in August, 1864, for such sympathies. But i n August 1867 the Oshawa Yindioator swung behind Gibbs against Brown; Brown was defeated 1889 - 1£18. The incident shows the effect of Brown's policy on Reform sympathies. Gibbs was undoubt-edly a strong local man, but he had once had strong local opposition. The Vindicator had supported Brown's project for inexpensive local governments; i t had supported Brown's policy rather than Gibbs since 1864. Brown was thus opposed by those who had usually supported him. The Vindicator i s but an example of what happened right across Canada West (Ontario) i n the summer of 1867. In the Leader for the early days of July are pages of extracts from Reform journals who had broken away from Brown. In this context there i s perhaps some justification for Morison's remark that "Brown had a d i f f i c u l t game to play, and he played i t badly". 5 0 In trying to form a strong opposition to Macdonald he moved too soon. He was too eager to bring the old vigour of the Reform party to bear against the Conservatives, and to displace them from power. On the cry of "no coalition" the Reform party went down to utter defeat in Ontario. 5 1 As i n his resignation from the ministry in December 1865, Brown was too impulsive. One mistake need not have con-demned him to p o l i t i c a l oblivion; indeed i t did not. But the second move, an attempt to throw Canada West against (68) the ministry begun three days before Confederation was due to go into effect, was a l l but f a t a l . It resolved the question of "no coalition" quickly into "anti-union". And "anti-union" was an extremely bad issue on which to appeal to Canada West i n the summer of 1867. In confederation, said Cartwright, Brown, Cartier and Gait took a l l the risks and Macdonald got a l l the glory. Brown, who risked perhaps more than anyone, came crashing down with a suddenness equal to the risks he ran. Brown's failure was due as much to his own im-pulsiveness as to Macdonald's astuteness. It was tragic that Brown's great gesture of statesmanship in June 1864 should have ended so sadly in June 1867. 5 2 As i f to sound the f i n a l note of irony, Sand-f i e l d Macdonald was given the leadership of the union party in the local government of Ontario. Brown, who had led Canada West through so many vicissitudes, was eclipsed in his own section by a man whom he had long-disliked and often opposed; a man who was a Catholic and with the invidious record of having passed a Separate School law in the teeth of an Upper Canadian majority, a man who, above a l l , had opposed confederation since i t was f i r s t brought into active p o l i t i c s by the reform convention of 1859. Sandfield Macdonald and his career il l u s t r a t e s (69) t h e p e c u l i a r d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e m o d e r a t e L i b e r a l s o f U p p e r C a n a d a . T h e y w e r e l i b e r a l s r a t h e r t h a n r e f o r m e r s ; t h e y h a d a i m e d a t t o l e r a n c e , a t m o r e e q u i t a b l e s c h o o l l a w s ; t h e y h a d a t r a d i t i o n t o t r y i n g t o g e t a l o n g w i t h F r e n c h m o d e r a t e s ; t h e y s a w t h e p r e s e n t u n i o n a s a d e q u a t e f o r p r e s e n t n e e d s a n d c h a n g e o n l y a c a u s e o f g r e a t d i s -r u p t i o n ; t h e y w e r e c o n t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o , a n d b e l i e v e d - t h a t m o r e g e n e r o s i t y o n e v e r y o n e ' s p a r t w o u l d p r e v e n t f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s g e n e r o u s p o l i c y m e t w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e o p p o s i t i o n , a n d S a n d f i e l d M a c d o n a l d ' s c a r e e r e p i t o m i z e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e m o d e r a t e c a u g h t b e t w e e n t w o e x t r e m e s . T h i s d i f f i c u l t y w a s t h e m o r e p r e s s i n g b e c a u s e S a n d f i e l d M a c d o n a l d * s p r i n c i p l e o f d o u b l e m a j o r i t y , a m e a n b e t w e e n t h e t w o o p p o s i t e s , w a s n e v e r r e a l l y t r i e d . T h e d o u b l e m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e m a y n o t h a v e b e e n c a p a b l e o f s u s t a i n i n g t h e p r e s s u r e w h i c h i t w a s o a l l e d u p o n t o b e a r . I n d e e d i t f a i l e d o n t h e f i r s t s e r i o u s t e s t . 5 3 B u t S a n d f i e l d M a c d o n a l d d i d n o t r e s i g n w h e n i t d i d f a i l . H e s t o o d c o n d e m n e d o n h i s o w n g r o u n d . T h e d o u b l e m a j o r i t y s y s t e m w a s a n a d m i s s i o n i n p r a c t i c e w h a t t h e U p p e r C a n a d a l i b e r a l s c o u l d n o t b r i n g t h e m s e l v e s t o c o n c e d e i n p r i n c i p l e . I t w a s i n e f f e c t a f e d e r a l i z a t i o n o f a s o r t , b u t w i t h o u t d i s c r i m -i n a t i o n a s t o w h a t c o u l d b e a l o c a l q u e s t i o n a n d w h a t c o u l d n o t . I t w a s n o t o n l y d i f f i c u l t t o a p p l y , i t w a s (70) d i f f i c u l t to stick to«. Sandfield could not bring him-self to resign over i t s defeat i n 1863. The position of the Upper Canada liberals was unstable and uncertain. Most of them tended to be in opposition to confederation, largely on the ground of trying to make the existing union work. Sandfield Macdonald and Holton, a Lower Canada Liberal, agreed that confederation was too drastic a step i n Canada's constitutional evolution. However, Holton's consistency and vigour^ contrasts rather sharply with Sandfield Macdonald*s expediency and shallowness of purpose. Sandfield Macdonald*s opposition was weak and uncertain and he lost support from his followers who opposed con-federation more vigorously, and also from those who decided confederation was the answer to existing d i f -f i c u l t i e s . The Liberals who opposed confederation did so on the ground that the Union oould s t i l l work given more tolerance and less virulence of party s p i r i t . Their allegiance was to the Union which had accomplished so much i n the past, and whioh they believed, had not yet outlived i t s usefulness. They looked i n fact to the Union at the time of Baldwin and La Fontaine and wished the return of what might be called (in the language of one Liberal's metaphor) Canada*s youth. 5 4 They were aware of existing d i f f i c u l t i e s . Sandfield*s attempt (71) to form a coalition in March 1864 was a recognition that some solution was neoessary. 5 5 But coalition was hardly an adequate solution, and nothing else seemed to be sug-gested* The double majority principle was moribund and Sandfield really had no other solution. Some Liberals and Liberal journals thought things through and decided that confederation was the only solution to Canada*s d i f f i c u l t i e s . The most noted was the London Free Press, whose editor had long been a friend of Sandfield Macdonald*s. The Free Press f o l -lowed pretty generally the tone of the Liberal-Conserva-tive Press, especially the Toronto Leader, and offered considerable opposition to the government on i t s failure to appeal to the people. It agreed with the Leader that federation, not legislative union, was the only kind of union suitable for B r i t i s h North America. 5 7 The main thread which united a l l Upper Canada Liberals was the opposition to government failure to appeal to the country. This did arouse strong complaint of high-handed methods. The Ottawa Union quoted with obvious delight the strong line taken by the Hamilton Times. If, said the Times, the people's "direct decision on the confederation question i s unnecessary, we know of no question that has arisen i n the past, we can imagine none in the future of sufficient importance to just i f y an appeal to them. The polling booths there-(72) after may as well be turned into pig-pens, and the voters 1 5 8 l i s t s cut up into pipe-lighters". This homespun senti-ment was characteristic of both Liberal and l i b e r a l -Conservative views of government policy in the upper section of the provinces of Canada. But on the question of the nature of federal government the liberals seemed to have no policy or principle worthy of the name. Opposed to confederation or not, they seemed to lack the honest approach to the problems of their time which characterized much of liberal-Conservative thought on confederation. They recognized that the union was i n d i f f i c u l t i e s ; but that recognition only meant some so l -ution within the simple bounds of the existing framework; coalition or a double majority system. If Sandfield 5 9 Macdonald was heir to the Baldwin tradition, he was conspicuously less progressive than Ms able predecessor. The Liberal party i n Canada West at the time of confed-eration was by no means what i t had been under Baldwin; but i t was hampered seriously by a leader who was unable to rise to the occasion, and who, in the end, accepted a premiership under the patronage of a man who was. Sandfield Macdonald was a Catholic and might have been expected to appeal to this large minority i n Upper Canada. The reason he failed to do so was perhaps because of Ms personality, perhaps because of Ms policy. 60 The greater part of the Catholic minority were Irish (73) who could not find i n Macdonald's Highland Scotch Cathol-icism the appeal that a man of their own race, such as McGee, had. Especially interesting, however, i s the Catholic policy on federal government. Sandfield never made i t clear just what his policy on federal government was; but the double majority principle would hardly con-cur with Upper Canadian Catholic policy on federalism. 6 1 The fact i s that the Catholic minority in Upper Canada saw eye to eye with the Protestant minority in Lower Canada as far as federal government was concerned. Their policy was quite simple: they did not want federal government at a l l . Federal government gave power to the local section; this section, in the case of Upper Canada^ was strongly Protestant. Hence to the Catholic minority, federal government was bad, and the less decentralization the better. This i s quite clearly enunciated by the Toronto .Canadian Freeman. Confederation should, i t said, "approach as nearly as possible to the character of a legislative union". For two reasons: f i r s t , i t i s a more solid foundation for future greatness; second, because i t i s a "greater pledge and surer guaranty for an the rights of minorities". It i s hardly necessary to say that the Catholic group, especially the Irish Catholics, gave strong support to Macdonald and the Conservatives. Macdonald, a Scotch Protestant, they looked to as well as to McGee (74) for the guarantee of their own rights in the new Canadian federal state. Macdonald*s strong statements on the pro-tection of minority rights hy the central government gave the Catholics of Canada West great encouragement.. Not unnaturally, therefore, they preferred legislative union, with i t s strong central government in the new Canadian constitution. McGee, speaking in London (C.W.) in Sept-ember 1866, must have warmed their hearts with his s t i r r i n g words of the strong beneficient central power. "The minorities east and west haVe really nothing to fear . • •; the strong arm and the long arm of the Confederate power w i l l be extended over them a l l , and woe be to the wretch on whom that arm shall have to descend in anger . . . localism must be taught to know 6 i t s proper place; sectionalism must be subordinate. . . . " The Bishop-of Toronto echoed these words in his appeal to a l l Upper Canadian Catholics in July 1867. Although there are some reformers amongst us, he said, the "great major-i t y are conservatives and have always supported the 64 Conservative government". There i s l i t t l e to suggest that the local government of Ontario alone would have been any protec-tion for minority rights by Ontario Catholics. The view that Canadian federalism was designed to protect minori-ties i s open to grave mis-interpretation. It was only designed to protect one group: the French Canadians. (75 ) Whether the French Canadians are a minority or not depends on the frame of reference used. In any case, none of the sectional minority groups regarded federal union as any-thing but a source of great danger to their rights and privileges. The Catholics of Canada West are the classic example. They had no commercial axe to grind as did the English Protestants of Canada East; with the'Catholics of Canada West i t was a question of legislative union and protection or federal union and sectional intolerance» And their choice was almost unanimous: conservatism, legislative union, protection, privileges, and largeness of vision; a l l these they saw in the policy of the Canadian government on federalism. On a broad -survey i t can be said that there was no source of strong opposition in Canada West to Confederation. This might be attributed to the fact that there was no real idea of just what kind of a measure Confederation was. This i s not a l i k e l y inter-pretation. P o l i t i c a l groups in Canada West not only knew what kind of a measure they were getting, but by and large were strongly in favour of i t . There was l i t t l e ignorance on what Confederation meant: any ignorance displayed was on what federalism meant. The two were often juxtaposed in Canada West. Confederation meant strength, union, and a great new nationality; federalism meant sectionalism, disunion, s t r i f e , and a (76) sp l i t t i n g up into component groups. The support of the Reform party was indispens-able to the success of confederation. The Reform party might have forced the government to concede a great deal more to localism had they so desired. But the Reform party was far from preaching such a doctrine. Although representation by population was the great sectional issue, i t s achievement projected a cessation of sectional s t r i f e , at least as far as Reformers were concerned. In other words, the Reformers were seeking to end sectional discord rather than perpetuate i t . This was admittedly bound to work in their favour, and is indeed the reason why i t so b i t t e r l y opposed by French Canada; but the fact remains that Reformers sought an end which was a con-comitant of legislative union, not of federal. Representation by population i s a basic tenet of any true national state. In the nature of things, the Reformers were i n this sense committed to a united government. But the end they sought could only be obtained by concessions to French Canada. They had long realized this, and i t lay at the basis of their demand for federal government. Thus federal government was a means of securing what they so earnestly desired: an equitable distribution of representation. This accounts for Brown's curious theory of (77) federal government. He had agitated the subject for ten years: he might be presumed to have formed some theory about i t . But this theory shows a strange weakness on the very point which i s the most fundamental: the rel a -tions between two co-ordinate powers, central and regional, and the division of powers between them. Brown's theory gave only the most rudimentary powers to local i n -stitutions and gave them no plenary power whatsoever. On the other hand the central power was given strength and more strength, with even the abolishing of an elective principle in the regional representation of the Upper House. Brown's theory of federal government was merely a system for perpetuating the union government; i t would give to Upper Canada "rep. by p o p . w w h i l e making enough concessions to French Canada to enable such an unpalatable measure to be accepted. It cannot be denied that there were some root causes in Upper Canada which tended i n the other direction. There was a general desire to be in control of one's own affairs without interference or hindrance from French Canada. But this desire did not necessarily breach the argument and favour of local institutions, since rep. by pop• would give Upper Canada legislative dominance over the French anyway. There was moreover l i t t l e of the ar-gument for federal institutions which are a commonplace today. It seems natural enough at the present time to (78) regard Ontario as ceasing at the Ottawa River, where a different culture and atmosphere in re a l i t y does begin. But such an argument found l i t t l e place in Canada West 1864-1867. The province of Canada was united by many ties , the St. Lawrence, the Grand Trunk, and intimate p o l i t i c a l and commercial relations of the past genera-tion. The introduction of modern communications had only drawn the Province more closely together. The federal system was therefore not entirely compatible with Upper Canadian views of their p o l i t i c a l or commercial future. It was, on occasion, looked upon as a f a i r system, allowing for sectional rights and sectional privileges. There i s even a remark in the Oshawa Vindicator which suggests that the system of legislative union i s after a l l , only applicable to Great 6 5 Britain. But such remarks as those of the Vindicator fift were few and far between. The remarkable thing i s that the argument was resorted to so l i t t l e . It can only suggest that federal government was not then regarded as necessarily applicable to North American countries, and perhaps not even desirable. Whether this i s the case or not i s a most interesting question. Modern Canada cer-tainly regards federalism as a national way of l i f e . But the fact i s that i t was not always so regarded, and especially was this true i n Canada West at the time when federalism was under discussion. (79) Opposition to Confederation existed in Canada West but i t was the kind of opposition which could not. carry i t s policy very f a r . The Liberals and Conservatives did consider the subject of federal government; they did suggest that the central government was being given a dangerous amount of power. But confederation was after a l l a Conservative measure. Some of the Conservatives of a more l i b e r a l trend of mind did c r i t i c a l l y examine i t ; they joined with Liberals in strongly suggesting the government make a constitutional appeal to the people. But the nature of their opposition, though not fundamen-t a l l y benign, could not be carried very far in the face of the extraordinary pressure of events below the border. If the liberal-Conservatives were disposed to be c r i t i c a l , they were not c r i t i c a l for long after the Fenian invasion. The one minority group which could have made trouble were the Catholics. Had they opposed Confedera-tion for any reason, the French Bleus would, have found i t d i f f i c u l t to support Confederation. The whole project would indeed have been quite impossible. But the Catholics and especially the Irish Catholics were f u l l y behind the policy of the government as long as i t did not concede too much to a sectionalism which might threaten Catholic rights. In this respect the Irish Catholics and the Protestant Reformers were unintentionally at one. They both wanted a strong central government; the Irish (80) because i t would give them protection, the reformers because, with rep. by pop., i t would give them more control of their own a f f a i r s . Both could have been right perhaps, though Brown changed his tune after July 1, 1867. Brown's conversion to provincialism began under the aus-pices of his opposition to Macdonald in 1867 after Confed-eration had begun. The Catholics continued to look to the Central government for support. The interplay of ideas and parties in Canada West on the subject of Confederation reflects the per-petuation of the idea of legislative union. Federalism may have been a necessity, a convenience or a luxury; but Canada West understood federalism as but a convenience, a system not of principles or of co-ordinate powers, but of practical u t i l i t y , a system to be added to existing institutions in order to lighten the heavy load of sectional differences they were obliged to carry. Fed-eralism was but a convenient means of giving to existing p o l i t i c a l institutions the e l a s t i c i t y necessary for them to function in the complex social and religious frame-work of the Province of Canada. /fa Notes 1. Whitelaw, W.M. "reconstructing the Quebec Conference" CHR XIX. # 2 (June 1938) p. 133. 2. Cornell, P.G. "The alignment of p o l i t i c a l groups i n the United Province of Canada, I85l*-l861*." CHR XXX. # 1. (March 191*9) p. 1*2. 3 . See Appendices 1 and 2 . 1*. Ottawa, The Union Tues. Nov. 29, 1861*, said that a vote for confederat-ion would be a vote against one's own city. 5 . The population of Canada West by origins:(Census of 1861) Native(non-French) 869,592 " (French) 3 3 , 287 Ireland 191,231 England 111*, 290 Scotland 98 ,792 Total population: 1 , 396 ,091 . United States 50,758 Germany & Holland 22 ,906 Maritime Provinces 7,597 The population of Canada West by religious belief: Church of England 311,565 Free Church of Scotland 11*3,01*3] Estab.Church of Scotland 108 ,963> Presbyterians 303 , 381* United Presbyterians 51 ,3781 Wesleyan Methodists 218,1*27] Episcopalian Methodists 7 1 , 6 l 5 J Methodists 290,01*2 Roman Catholic 258,11*1 Baptists 61,559 6 . The Irisfii Catholics of Canada East vigourously opposed legislative union. See Chapter IV. 7. Leader, Thurs. Nov. 3 , 1861*. In Canada West, said the Leader, the Free Church of Scotland i s strongest i n i t s p o l i t i c a l instincts, " . . . i t i s an undoubted fact that our most extreme politicians are to be found i n that church." The Presbyterians are "almost exclusively Conservative". The Church of England "leans toward Conservatism", but i t s clergy exer-cise less p o l i t i c a l influence than that of any other denomination. McGee has an interesting analysis of public opinion, which he classifies into "Monarchical" or "Democratical". In the former he includ-es most French Canadians, Old Country men, Canadians of British origin, the Church of Rome and the Church of England, generally j the Auld Kirk; the Free Kirk i s divided; the m i l i t i a , the professions, and the "people of property". In the latter, McGee includes a minority of French Canad-ians—very small; a majority of/Americans l i v i n g i n Canada; the dissent-ing or elective Churches—and the London Times. See/McGee, T.D./ The crown and the confederation, a series of three letters addressed anony-mously to John A. Macdonald by "A Backwoodsman". Montreal', 107 611,1861*. p. 18 . McGee proved to be a very erudite"backwoodsman" 1 8 . After the coalition, M.C.. Cameron refused to give up his seat i n North Ontario to Wm. McDougall, and i n the by-election ran as opposition and was re-elected. McDougall was forced to run again i n North Lanark. Cam-- i i -8. (cont'd)eron was supported by the Leader on the ground that McDougall and Brown did not wanfe the union of British North America, but only H± the Province of Canada made federal. Like most of tie Conservatives, the Leader had l i t t l e sympathy with the latter project. M.C. Cameron had originally been a Reformer, but he had deserted the Reform pa rty on the confederation issue on the ground that the federal system would weaken British North America rather than strengthen i t . See the Leader, Friday, July 29, 1864. 9. St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch Thurs. Aug. 18, 1864. "...federation w i l l tend to perpetuate, rather than to remove, the sectional differences which are said to be the cause of existing d i f f i c u l t i e s . " 10. M.C. Cameron i n the House, on seconding J.H. Cameron's motion for an appeal to the people on the confederation issue, Mon. March 13, 1865. Conf. Debates, p. 976.2 11. There was a curious l i t t l e group formed i n 1866, with J.H. Cameron as a kind of unacknowledged president. The group consisted of Cameron, Gait, Hoi ton, Cartwright, Abbott, Sandfield. Macdonald, Irvine, and MacPherson. These men dined regularly at the Rideau Club i n Ottawa djtr-ing the session. Everything that was said was on the understanding that i t was not to be repeated elsewhere. This agreement, says Cartwright, was "very honorably kept". It is testimony not only to J.H. Cameron's personal ascendancy, but also to a sharp drop i n the asperity of party p o l i t i c s , that men such as Cameron, Cartwright, Holton, S.Macdonald, could s i t around a dinner table amicably during parliamentary sessions for a period of ten years. (Until Cameron's death i n I 8 7 6 ) See Cart-wright, R.J. Reminiscences pp.30-31. 12. Conf. Debates p. 963.L. 13. Ibid. p. 1020. The Legislative Council defeated a similar measure 31-19. Ibid.p. 361. I i i . The public was undoubtedly caught by surprise i n June 1864. Dent uses the word "electrified". Cartwright says, "...I must admit that i t was a leap i n the dark, and we certainly had not popular mandate behind us." However he goes on to say that the people "acquiesced". "At any rate, two or three years elapsed i n which they could have manifested their opposition, but there was no sign of dissent from any considerable sec-tion af i n Ontario of Quebec." Reminiscences p. 38. There i s some suggestion that public opinion had not caught up to government policy by the end of June 1864. However the public may have been surprised i n June, but i t came very quickly to grasp the general nature of the confederation project. There was hardly anything else, i n the newspapers from July to November, 1864. 15. Montreal Gazette Wed. Nov. 2, 1864. 16. Globe Sat. Nov. 5, 1864. 17. Leader Wed. Nov. 16, 1864. 18. Leader Tues. Nov. 22, 1864. - i i i -19. Leader Sat. March 1*, 1865. 20. Leader Thurs. April 6, 1065. 21. Leader Mon. Feb. 27, 1865. 22. Montreal, L'Ordre lun. 12 dec, 1861*. 23. The Leader refers of course to the French. Wed. Aug. 3, 1861*. 21*. Leader Mon. Oct. 3, 1861*. 25. Leader Tues. Sept. 27, 1861*. 26. Leader Thurs. March 2, 1865. 27. Leader Mon. April 3, 1865. 28. Cf. however the statement of David Reesor, member of the Legislative Council for King's Division. '.'The country has heard only one side of the Question, (hear.) They had.the great daily newspapers, the chief organs of public opinion of both p o l i t i c a l prties, a l l on their side, and there.was only a small portion of the country press, and that not widely circulated that gave the opposite side of the question." Conf. Debates, p. 163.2. There i s an implied contrast between city and rural papers on the confederation issue, which I have not been able to j u s t i f y . Reesor doubtless meant that "there was only a small portion of the country press"opposed to confederation. 29. The newspaper circulation for dailies ran from about 800 for a pap-er such as the Kingston British Whig to about 1*000 or 5000 for a paper such as the Hamilton Times, or the London Free Press. The circulation of the Globe was claimed to be i n the neighborhood of 26,000, the Leader about 22,000. 30. The Quebec BaxxpcMgggaagcDaily Mercury for August 17, 1861* comments on the peculiar nomenclature developing i n Canada, and compares i t with the United States. In Canada, "federation" meant usually the federation of the two Canadas. "Confederation" meant the federation of British North America. A "federalist" i n Canada, says the Mercury, means ore who favours decentralized institutions. A "centralist" usually favours 1B gislative union. 31. Conf. Debates p. 87.1. 32. A remarkable tribute to Brown's speech appeared a few days later i n the Rouge paper, L 1Union Nationale, lun. 13 fev., 1865. This speech was, said L'UHIon, the vbest of any of the ministers.^"Si nous etions haut-canadien, nous eleverions une statue de bronze a ce aie-doufeable p o l i t i c i e n . " 33. Notably Wm. McDougall. - i v -34. Conf. Doc, p. 59 35. Conf. Debates p. 88. 36. Globe Sat. Oct 15, 1864. 37. Montreal, True Witness and Catholic Chronicle F r i . Oct 28, 1864. 38. Conf. Debates p. 86.1 39. Globe F r i . August 3, iH^. (Reporting debates of the House for August 2nd.) There were some reform dissentients on this point. The Newmarket Era, a reform paper which followed Brown right through his anti-coali-tion manoeuvres i n 1867, said of this plan: "We need hardly t e l l you, readers, that we dislike the Government scheme for Upper Canada; and the more people examine i t , the more strongly w i l l become popular f e e l -ing against i t . . . . i t looks like a huge County Council without even a responsible executive,—and purposes giving us a form of Local Govern-ment even more democratic than is enjoyed by the neighboring state of New York...." Brown's scheme not was a "Government scheme", and the Era's apprehension of a non-responsible executive was not j u s t i f i e d . Newmarket Era F r i . July 5, 1866. 40. The C i v i l War i n the United States, sgid the Globe, was "quite unconnec-ted with the federal character of i t s government." Globe Mon. Aug. 1, 1864. Brown was one of the few Canadians who did not adduce the C i v i l War to the f i n a l and utter breakdown of federalism. 41. Globe Mon. Aug. 1, 1864. 42. Conf. Debates p. 918.1. Rankin was a reformist, member for Essex. 43. Ibid. p. 35.2. Cf. however Tache's explanations, which give more details on why the eledtive principle was dropped at Quebec. He admits that seme were "anxious to retain the elective principle." Ibid. p. 240.2. 44. McDougall's copy of the Confederation Debates is i n the Archives section of the University of Toronto Library. 45. MacDougall to Monck, Jan. 27, 1867. Bellemare Papers, Archives of Canada MacDougall notes the objection^he had always taken to the fixed limit of the number of members of the upper chamber. "Indeed," he writes, "I told the Conference at Quebec, and Mr. Brown and Muaratt concurred that believing the Imerial Parliament would never s t u l t i f y i t s e l f by enact-ing so absurd a constitution. I yielded to the majority then reserving my right to object and discuss the point at every favorable oppurtunity af terwards.... It has been no secret to our colleagues that...we did not as indistiduals, nor as exponents of the Liberal /Reform/ party of Upper Canada believe that an Upper House appointed for l i f e , and fixed as to number, would work satisfactorily." On this question, the London Conference nearly s p l i t , according to MacDougall. Upper Canada and New Brunswick were opposed to the fixed upper chamber, while Lower Canada and Nova Scotia(the latter by a bare majority of i t s delegates) voted for i t . Both Nova Scotia and Lower Can-ada looked to a fixed upper chamber as a protection against being swam-- V -45. (cont'd) ped by Upper Canada. The letter i s written i n MacDougall's appalling handwriting and is marked "Strictly confidential"-. It i s signed "W.M." 46. Burwell, a reform member from East ElgjLn argued for an elective Upper House on the ground that i t would be the closest approach to the House of Lords. Conf. Debates pp. 14.46-7. 47. Howland replaced Mowat who was appointed to the Bench i n November, 1864. Cartwright comments that Brown could hardly afford to lose such an able colleague, and that the loss l e f t Brown dangerously isold£ed. Reminscences p. 4 l . 48. Brown at f i r s t had been more popular with the Conservatives than eitfar of his collagues. Montreal Gazette, Sat. June 25, 1864." " We have i n him then a guarantee that i n any oo nstitutional change s about to be worked out, British institutions w i l l serve, wherever practicable, as the model. We shall have a minimum of American dem-ocracy infused: with Mr. Hoiton or Mr. Dorion or Mr. MacDougall we might have had more than we cared for." Brown however found i t d i f f i c u l t to get along with Macfllonald, and MacDougall by contrast seemed to te able to. The positions of Brown and MacDougall were thus due to change as tine went on. Both MacDougall and Howland gradually lost their reform complexion under Macdonald, although they made no direct break with the Reform p x f c j c party. 49. Oshawa Vindicator Wed. July3, 1867. Even Brown's old friend, Eger-ton Ryerson disagreed with his course. See Ryerson, /A.E./ The new Canadian dominion; the dangers and duties of the people Toronto Lovell, 1867. : 50. Morison, J.L. "Parties and p o l i t i c s , 1864-1867" p.63. 51. Brown and th? anti-coalition reformers lost the election 67-II. (There were four independents elected as well.) 52. Brown was finally appointed to the Senate by the Mackenzie govern-ment, December, 1873. 53. R.W. Scott's amendment to the Upper Canada Separate Schools Act had been brought forward i n I863, and i t passed over the opposition of a great majority of the Upper Canadian members. 54. Joseph Rymal, member for South Wentworth, a Liberal. He saw Canada in 1850 as tge envy of a l l . "I would compare the^ position of Canada at that time—and I think I may without impropriety—to that of a young man of eighteen or twenty, handsome i n figure, with a good constitution, of robust strength, and under the care of a tender and loving parent ( as I presume England is to Canada), and this parent has committed the health of this lovely child of h i s — t h i s lovely youbh—to the care of a family physician, who, however, has trans-ferred him from time to time to the care of other physicians of d i f -ferent schools. Some of them were allopaths, some were homoeopaths, some were hydropaths—but they a l l bled (laughter )p-they a l l b l i s -51*. (cont'd) "tered—they a l l sweated. (Continued laughter).Under such treatment this lovely youth became pale and sickly." Rymal carries this amusing metaphor on for another column or so . Conf. Debates p.935.1. 55« See Supra, p. 56. Miss Helen McMann of Queen's University i s doing her M.A. Thesis on Sandfield Macdonald, and I am indebted to her for Sandfield *s p o l i t i c -a l views, and for information of his attempts to form a coalition i n March, 1861*. The Quebec Mercury was leased by Sandfield Macdonald, and many of his views are therein expressed, u n t i l the termination of the lease on April 6, 1861*. Sandfield Macdonald's friend, Josiah Blackburn, took leave of absence from the London Free Press i n order to help Mac-donald on the Mercury, having l e f t his brother in charge of the Free Press. 57. This stand of the London Free Press Mon. Oct. 17, 1861*, was perhaps in regard to i t s near neighbour, the St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch which was strongly for legislative union. 58. Ottawa, The Union Thurs. Nov. 21*, 1861*, quoting the Hamilton Times probably of Nov. 21st or Nov. 22nd. The Union was sympathetic to Sand-f i e l d Macdonald and opposed confederation on the ground that i t was a costly expedient and one which provided no real remedy for existing d i f -f i c u l t i e s . The Hamilton Times was however a liberal-Conservative paper more along $he lines of the Toronto Leader. 59. The thesis of Miss Helen McMann. 60. Some 18$ of the sqag population of Canada West was Roman Catholic accor-ding to the census of 1861. Those of Irish origin i n that section of the province numbered about 11* % of the total population. It seems l i k e -l y that preponderant majority of the Irish belonged to the Catholic group. It i s interesting to note that the city of Toronto had i n 1861 a population of just under 1*5,000, of whom 12,000 were of Irish origin. 61. Toronto, Canadian Freeman, implied that Sandfield Macdonald did not have i t s whole-hearted support; they were however glad to have him as head of the Ontario government, since he was a Catholic. Thurs. July 18, 1867. But only a few weeks prior to this, the Canadian Freeman had objected that Sandfield Macdonald was not the type of man on whom to rely for relgious protection, presumably be cause of his l i b e r a l le atjings. 62. Canadian Freeman, Thurs. Dec. 15, 1861*. 63. Speech took place on Thurs. Sept. 20th, 1866, and was'reported i n the Canadian Freeman for Thurs. Sept. 27, 1866. 61*. Joseph Lynch, Bishop of Toronto, to R.P. Jamot, dated from St. Cathar-ines July 8, I867. Re-translated from the French translation of Le Jour- nal de Quebec lundi, 15 j u i l l e t , I867. 65. "No system of Government could be fairer, or could be better calculated to give satisfaction to a l l parties interested, than the federal system. In speaking thus we do not wish to be understood as advocating the adop-- v i i -6$. (cont'd) "tidn of the details of federation as i t has been carried out i n the neighboring Union, for we believe that si. though the system i n vogue in the United States does i n f i n i t e credit to the men who f i r s t bro't i t into being, yet time has shown wherein i t may be improved upon ....But of the two systems of Government, the ^Legislative and the Federal, there is no doubt whatever i n our mind as to which would be found to work satisfactorily, and which would tend to produce discord and discontent in, at least, some sections of the contemplated union. The legislative union works very well in. England, with Parliament ass-embled under the eye of Her Majesty, and representing so small a terr-itory. But with such diverse interests as would bs brought together i n a British American union extending eventually over the whole of Brit-ish North America, a system of Government more like that under which the United States have grown to such vast proportions, i s what i s plain-l y required i n order to do justice to the varied and widely separated interests involved." Oshawa Vindicator Wed., Aug. 31, 186U. 66. The above quotation i s one that might have been expected from num-erous sources i n the province of Canada. I have quoted i t at length because i t is the only example I have seen. There are probably others, but they must be remarkably few. It i s significant that the . above argument, so obvious to present-day Canadians, was used so l i t t l e 186U-1867. (81) CHAPTER IV FRENCH IDEAS IN CANADA EAST REGARDING FEDERALISM (82) L'e'tranger volt d'un o e i l d'envie Du Saint-Laurent le majestueux cours; A son aspect le Canadien s'eerie: 0 Canada! mon pays! mes amours.1 The deep and abiding patriotism of French Canadians is the f i r s t and the primary consideration in any analysis of their ideas. The love of their land, and the close web of social and cultural institutions that such a love implied, was the very Ark of the Covenant. The French Canadians saw every issue in the golden light of their nationality; they could see i t in no other fashion, and they would judge i t only as they saw i t to be. In French Canadian discussion of federal govern-ment there i s , not unnaturally, a sense that the issue i s important and v i t a l . Nothing else can esplain the long and bitter opposition of the Rouges than their utter con-viction that here was a threat to French institutions to be opposed quite a* l'outrance. The v i t a l i t y of the issue produced a c r i t i c a l and a sincere journalism, which i s notably more vigorous than most of the journalism of Upper Canada. This stems directly from the fact that as far as confederation was comcerned French Canadians were on the defensive. The result was the production of a v i r i l e and able literature directed at preserving what had already been secured, to surrendering as l i t t l e as possible. (83) The Tory Conservatives of Upper Canada were thus not the only ones in the province of Canada reluctant to give up the Union. The French Gandians were just as re-luctant, i f not more so. The kinship of the two groups in the Macdonald-Cartier and Macdonald-Tache governments was a natural combination of the elements of conservation: conservation of the Union. This applied not only to the general rightist tone of their p o l i t i c a l ideas, but to con-sevation of the Union as well. The great strength of the Bleus lay in this double appeal: the appeal of a benefi-cent, ri g h t i s t p o l i t i c a l regime; and the appeal of a party which sternly resisted any attempt to change the consti-tutional arrangements of the Union. The French had secured a good deal through the Union government; they were at least equal to the English in p o l i t i c a l power; they were untrammelled by any great interference from English Canada. They were, i n short, quite content with the status quo. The English Conservatives were i n a much weaker position. In Upper Canada they were weak for the very reasons which made the Bleu party strong: they were trying to maintain the status quo. The election of 1863 had resulted in a notice-able tightening up of regional opinion, not only in Canada West, but in Canada East as well. The Reformers (84) won ten new seats; the Bleus won f i v e . The trend was obvious and dangerous: the polarizing of sectional opin-ion. There i s l i t t l e doubt that this election provided the stimulus which made a l l p o l i t i c a l parties look for g some new solution. Sandfield Macdonald in March 1864 had tried unsuccessfully. Brown, i n a better strategic position i n June, tried and succeeded. Clearly the i n i t i a t i v e lay with Canada West. The French stood united on the ground of the status quo: only the utmost exigency would have moved them from i t . This exigency came with the defeat of the Conservative government; even then i t was Brown who approached Cartier, not vice versa. The policy of the Bleus on confederation must be considered i n this l i g h t . They had everything to lose and federalism to gain. They stood to lose equality with Canada West i n United Canada and gain only the dubious status of a local government i n an essentially English confederation. They were venturing away from their com-fortable home onto the strange, uncertain, windy groud of "rep, by pop." They had to be very sure that the new home to be built there would be as safe and snug for their national family as the old one had been. They were on the defensive, and their policy has a l l the earmarks of such a condition. They had to ask for French support on the ground that conditions not merely warranted, but ( 8 5 ) necessitated change. They had to show that the changes suggested were the best possible, and that they secured for the French a l l the guarantees they could reasonably expect. It was a very d i f f i c u l t position for the Bleus, and they performed their task most ably. It i s under-standable, however, that-Bleu ministers might say one thing speaking semi-privately, and yet say another through the editorial pages of ministerial newspapers. Thus Cartier knew pretty well what kind of a project of Con-federation would be; but he explained i t i n La Minerve with a much greater emphasis on i t s decentralized character than was warranted by his knowledge. , The Rouges, on the face of i t , had a very strong position. French Canada wanted to keep the status quo. Cartier and the Bleus had consented to change. The course of the Rouges was easy. A l l they had to say was that the changes were bad, and turn the Bleus quite neatly out of office when they appealed to the people. They could then make excellent terms with George Brown. There were some d i f f i c u l t i e s however in this pleasant course of affairs for the Rouges. Cartier and the Bleus avoided an appeal to the people. The govern-ment resisted this demand in the face of unusual pressure from Upper Canada. The main ground for this resistance was the apprehension that the passions of a general election might cause the French Canadian support of the (86) Bleus to waver* The Rouges themselves were uncertain about an appeal to the people. The Church was at this point an unknown factor, but might conceivably follow Cartier and the government* Moreover the past record of the Rouges was not such that they could appeal unblemished to the people. The alliance of Brown and Cartier put the Rouges in an awkward position, and in some respects a most unfair one* They had been willing to make some concession to Upper Canada's constitutional grievances* In 1858 Dorion had suggested that the Rouges were ready to consider some remedy for constitutional d i f f i c u l t i e s . 3 Doubtless they saw this as a means to power i f they could persuade their compatriots to accept concessions to Upper Canada. But Brown, after the Short Administration of J u l y 1858, moved away from Dorion and forced him to a l l y himself with Sandfield Macdonald who had considerably less support from Upper Canada. - Mori son b i t t e r l y oondemns Brown for his policy after 1858, and for his coalition with Cartier in 1864. "It i s not too much to say that he (BrownJ not only made common action between Upper Canadian and Lower Canadian radicalism impossible, but that he assisted to destroy Dorion fs power as a leader of the 4 French, . • ." Brown's self-sacrifice in 1864 hardly warrants such criticism, but i t i s undoubtedly true that his action made the course of the Rouges very d i f f i c u l t . (87) After the coalition Dorion was placed i n the peculiar pos-i t i o n of being in opposition to something he had previously favoured; his only possible a l l y in Upper Canada was a l l i e d with Cartier. Rather pathetically Le Pays had said on June 16: "Nous ne sommes pas prets a. croire que M. Brown abondonne ses amis pour un areopage d'intriguants politlques 5 qu'il a toujours vaillament et s i efficacement combattus...." When i t became painfully obvious that Brown had abandoned his friends, the Rouges nobly refrained from indulging in angry criticism of their former colleague.. There is some force i n Skelton's contention that the French Canadians would accept a measure from Cartier and the Bleus that they would not have accepted from the a. Rouges. The Rouges were suspect because of their tradition of co-operation with Brown and the other Upper Canadians. In that sense l i e s the weight of Morison's argument that 7 Brown helped to destroy French liberalism. It i s clear at any rate that the Rouges were not in the strong position they might have appeared to be. Their opposition to con-federation was sincere and forthright; but their argument was to some extent vitiated by their past reoord. It was s t i l l encumbent on the Bleus to show that constitutional changes were necessary and that they con-tained adequate safeguards for-French Canadian cultural autonomy. In this effort they were greatly aided by the menace of the United States. French Canadians realized (88) that i f constitutional changes were perhaps desirable be-cause of d i f f i c u l t i e s with Upper Canada, they were made necessary by a general truculence below the border. In French Canada the issue of confederation or annexation 8 was given great prominence, and the Ministerial papers were certainly interested in maintaining and stimulating such an issue. La Revue Canadienne. a moderate indepen-v dent monthly magazine, saw the issue as many Upper Canadian publications saw i t , that the time had come when some great new step would have to be taken in Canadian p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . It i s no use blinding ourselves, said La Revue, changes are now necessary. We can no longer 9 remain in colonial obscurity. The ideal of a great new country, an ideal which permeated a l l the province, was appealing i n a peculiar way to French Canadians. It captured their imagination and made them forgive, as the English Canadians forgave, many apparent faults i n the constitutional structure of the new country. The French differed from the English about a new nationality; naturally they wanted to keep their own; but the scope of the project caught their at-tention the more easily because i t was a great measure of self-defence against "le gouffre et le neant de l a republique voisine". Despite the factors which influenced French Canadians in favour of the ministerial project there (89) remains the fundamental opposition of most French Canadians to "rep. by pop." Rightly or wrongly, they saw'rep. by pop as the aneantissement of their culture, and the fact that George Brown was backing Upper Canadian agitation on the issue did not help to allay their apprehensions. Brown was right when he said i t must be a federal union, not a legislative one. If, said le Journal de Quebec, a legis-lative union had been possible, that i s i f i t could be so constructed as to provide a l l the protection necessary for French institutions, there i s no doubt that i t would be preferable. 1 0 But without such guarantees, no union was possible. Equal representation of the two sections was a matter of l i f e and death, said Le Journal. We w i l l be generous, tolerant, just, "mais nous serons!" 1 1 This s p i r i t was the basis of French Canadian interpretation of confederation. It is why they looked at confederation as a source of guarantees for their nationality. Necessarily they were driven to examine the powers given to .the local governments, for such powers represented the autonomy which the French could expect. What was given to the local governments would in effect be what was given to French autonomy. Naturally the French were concerned with autonomy, but curiously they were -comparatively unconcerned about the division of powers. Yet the division of powers lay at the heart of the French future in North America. Considering the importance of (90) such a question i t i s not a l i t t l e odd that the discussion 12 of this problem was so limited. But the French were con-cerned not with what they might have been given, but what they had been given. They were concerned with what the local powers meant, not what they should be. Their argu-ment was concerned with reflections on. a datum. Was confederation or was i t not the proper safeguard for their autonomy? The ministerialists said i t was, the Rouges said i t was not. The divisions between the Bleus and the Rouges on Confederation were thus considerably sharper than divisions,in Upper Canada. The French middle party, between the Bleus and the Rouges, broke up i n 1863, going mostly to the Bleus. This sharp distinction between par-ties tended to make dispute bitter, and the four years, 1864-7, contain some sharp accusations. The Rouges labelled Cartier and the Bleus "traitres"; Dorion et cie. were referred to comtemptuously by ministerial papers as "annexionistes". The Rouges themselves s p l i t in June 1867. The Church had come out for Confederation and a segment could not agree with Rouge opposition to the Church. This opposition was carried by Dorion to the f u l l limit of his powers - which were considerable. This s p l i t was contem-poraneous with that of the Reformers over coalition, and represented an even more v i t a l issue. The moderate Rouges, (91) had however, shown their position during the Fenian invas-ions, which had considerably reduced their opposition to Confederation. Their breaking away from Dorion and the main body of Rouge opinion in June 1867 was not entirely unexpected. The Church for a long time remained neutral on Confederation, despite the efforts of both sides to draw her into the struggle. There i s some suspicion that the parish clergy in the Montreal area and in some of the eastern counties were opposed to confederation, though by no means following the Rouges through a l l their l i b e r a l motions. However, the Bleus had strong Ghruch connections]-the Rouges were not i n particularly good favour, and events forced the Rouges into an opposition such that there was no possibility of their securing church support. The Church's neutrality was thus perceptibly weakened in the face of Rouge sentiments. It i s not unlikely, too, that when Cartier visited the Pope Pius IX i n March 1867, he sug-gested that some stand by the Canadian bishops would be very desirable. The regional opposition to confederation tended to be concentrated in the eastern counties with extensions into the Montreal area, and other extensions into one or 14 two counties north of the r i v e r . The concentration of opposition in the Eastern townships was probably due to the prevalence of Erench l i b e r a l sentiment among the more (92) settled sections of Quebee-. The proximity to the United States does not appear to have affected opinion a great deal one way or the other. It i s curious, perhaps that the Rouges who were strong i n the eastern counties, should have been on occasion annexationist in tone, but other counties equally close did not reflect this tone. More-over, Dorion was member for Hochelaga, part of Montreal Island, and his brother, Eric Dorion, was member for 15 Drummond and Athabaska, a county in the north centre of the eastern townships. Brome, a county on the border, elected Dunkin who was of the Conservative opposition, rather"than a Rouge. The counties near the border of Upper Canada were divided in their opposition, most of their representatives voting for Confederation. Thus, acquaintance and familiarity with the English does not seem to have affected attitudes to any noticeable extent. Such influences are in the nature of things intangible, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to find them reflected in anything like a regional analysis. A l l three constituencies of the city of Montreal and most of the counties near Upper Canada supported Confederation, while some of the eastern counties did not. In short, i t - i s d i f f i c u l t to make much out of the regional opposition to Confederation beyond the salient fact that i t was centred i n the more settled counties of the south and east. Doubtless l i b e r a l French opinion found some kind of sympathy i n those areas, where (93) the Church might he losing the dominance i t had i n fron-t i e r counties. The Leader's observation that Lower Canada would form the "states-rights" party in confederation i s sub-IS stantially correct. French-Canadians saw confederation as a step in the dark. To concede "rep. by pop." meant for them enormous sacrifice, and such a sacrifice must be met by a y i i d pro quo in local autonomy. Sir Etienne Tache' reveals something of this feeling in a le t t e r early in July, 1864. Is a plan of confederation, he asked, possible without sacrificing Lower Canada? "C'est ce qu' f a i t voir; pour moi, c'est une grande affaire et tenant l a clef de l a boutique, je pourrai toujours l a fermer s i je m'aperc.ois qu'on ne peut y rien faire de bon • . ." 1 7 There i s hesitancy here, and uncertainty, attributable in part to not knowing what confederation would be, to a sense venturing into unknown territory, where every footstep must be measured, every precaution taken i f disaster i s to be prevented. The ministerial papers, i n this state of un-certainty leaned strongly to federalism. Prior to the Quebec Conference, they took a strong line of de-central-ism. Not quite knowing the measure that would be brought from the Conference, they tended generally i n the direc-tion of strong local government.. Confederation, said La Minerve. means a league of independent states in order ( 9 4 ) to discuss and regulate i n a kind of congress, certain points of general interest* Lower Canada w i l l thus have i t s own government with powers extending over a l l objects which come in the normal run of things, that i s l i f e , l i berty and the prosperity of i t s oitizens. Lower Canada w i l l be master i n i t s own house in every respect of social, c i v i l and religious l i f e * Confederation would, in fact, be not unlike the United States Constitution, with the singular difference that would have monarchical institutions, while they have republican* This line taken by La Minerve was undoubtedly that intended by Cartier for reasons not wholly derived from French-Canadian uncertainty. Cartier may have had some uncertainties, but he must have had a general idea of what kind of measure would come from the Quebec Con-ference. Where he and Taehe were uncertain was as to how French Canada would take such a measure. In the interval between June and October, the French minister-i a l papers were forced to take a wider line on federal-ism than they actually believed possible of attainment. They were.forced to reassure their compatriots that there was no danger of their conceding "rep. by pop." without commensurate guarantees. To argue in_favour of a decentralized federalism was an excellent way of reassuring the French public* The French ministers were forced to argue thus for another reason: they must not (95) allow English, opinion to develop too far the idea of leg-i s l a t i v e union. They must place the issue before the Canadian public so that there would be no possibility of the English denying adequate concessions to French auton-omy. They must educate opinion to expect guarantees; thus Macdonald and Gait would be forced to concede adequate safeguards in order to carry French Canada with them, Cartier had had to force his views on a reluctant Macdonald, to say nothing of Gait and Brown; that i t was a federal system at a l l was undoubtedly due to Cartier*s pressure. The appeal to decentralized institutions by La Minerve was patently additional security in the face of possible Cabinet recalcitrance on federal government. La Minerve was, moreover, forced to take action by the Montreal Gazette and other English minis-t e r i a l papers which took the legislative union l i n e . The Gazette quoted the Toronto Globe*s prediction that the forthcoming conference at Charlottetown would result i n a legislative union. This, said the Gazette, i s the opinion not only of leading men in the Maritimes, but i s also the decided tendency of public opinion in Canada, An absolute complete legislative union i s perhaps impos-sible; but i f we reap the instruction from our neighbours to the south, Canadians and Maritimes alike " w i l l infuse as l i t t l e of the federal principle into their union • , . as w i l l suffice to meet the absolute necessities of the ( 9 6 ) case." Such a line was calculated to appeal to English opinion in Lower Canada; hut i t was not li a b l e to do any-thing to soothe French opinion, and was quite l i k e l y to arouse fear and desperation on their part about their fate i n confederation. La Minerve replied a few days later that the Gazette was certainly wrong i f i t thought public opinion in Lower Canada was favourable to legislative union. French Canadians w i l l always oppose such a measure to the bitter end, for they see i n legislative union the obliteration of their nationality. What we want, said La Minerve, i s "une confederation dans laquelle l e principe federal serait applique dans toute son e'tendue. • • which w i l l leave only general questions to the central legislature. The central power w i l l be sovereign, undoubtedly, but i t w i l l have jurisdiction only on certain general question "bien determinee" by the constitution. The local legislatures w i l l , on the other hand, be indepen-dent of each other and have control over a l l their own O A particular interests. La Minerve went to some pains, not long afterward, to point out that the Gazette did not represent ministerial policy, and in fact was precisely p-i |i<k-> contrary to i t . But Minerve was exaggerating. The Gazette fs conception of the new constitution was very close to ministerial policy - the policy of the English-Canadian ministers. The policy of La Minerve was farther off the track than that of the Gazette. Doubtless Cartier (97) knew i t . But i t served a useful purpose. , By the middle of October La Minerve was begin-ning to introduce the qualifications to i t s earlier stand. In a federal constitution, i t said, there are two dangers, not one. There i s admittedly the danger of too much power i n the central government! but there i s also however the danger of too l i t t l e power. Too much power leads to the sacrificing of minority interests; too l i t t l e power leads to anarchy. The English Canadians want the f i r s t ; the French Canadians want the second. What w i l l be nec-essary, said La Minerve, w i l l be a compromise.22 It was a clever argument, and helped to bring La Minerve back from the extreme federal position. Confederation would thus be a compromise. A compromise could be a federal constitution, but i t was more l i k e l y to be a legislative union with local guarantees. When the constitution was f i n a l l y made known this i s precisely what the opposition maintained. Dorion wrote angrily, MCe n'est done pas une confeder-ation qui nous est proposed, mais tout simplement une Union Legislative deguise'e sous le nom de confederation . . . 1 , 2 3 La Minerve replied simply that such ideas were very strange coming from a man who had advocated confed-eration himself i n 1858. The change in tone i n the ministerial French press continued. La Minerve had argued in October that (98) United States institutions were based on the sovereign rights of the individual state against the central power. It suggested in January 1865 that any appeal to this PA. theory was fallacious. * It discussed French Canadian rights not on the basis of local governments but on that of their power in the central legislature under the sys-tem of responsible government.25 As the f i n a l point i t raised for the f i r s t time the argument of confederation or annexation. These changes in argument are the natural result of an earlier policy of concessions to ideas on decentralized government. There^retrenchment from the earlier position. Confederation was now a compromise between English and French views. Under responsible gov-ernment there would be guarantees for the French i n the central as well as the local legislature; Confederation was now the only alternative to annexation. These argu-ments indicate that the Bleus had shifted their ground toward legislative union. The reason for their shift was simple: the Quebec Conference. They could hardly maintain their arguments of August and September in the face of the 72 resolutions. The Bleu press admitted that Confederation was not the best possible constitution, but the best that could be had. Confederation as adopted at Quebec was not, said Le Courrier du Canada, " l a meilleure des choses possibles dans le meilleur des mondes possibles; mais, (99) dans notre opinion, l a moins mauvaise des choses dans un fort mauvais monde."26 This frankness on the part of the French ministers was i n part dictated by necessity. The resolutions were there for anyone to read. Their theory of federalism had to be i n f a i r accord with project of Confederation as i t stood. There was a further reason for ministerial frankness on Confederation. They could afford to be frank. The period of uncertainty was over; the Rouges had not secured any strong support i n their opposition 27 to confederation. For the moment, at least, French majority opinion s t i l l followed the traditional Bleu lead. One contemporary suggested that a good means by which to judge the advantages of confederation was to take a good look at the men who opposed i t . Can anyone hesitate between Mr. Dorion and Mr. Cartier, between the Rouges and the Conservatives? A l l "honnetes gens" of whatever party w i l l vote for Mr. Cartier. The direct examination of the Quebec Resolu-tions and what they meant was made by one of the leading ministerial papers i n December 1865 and January 1865. A series of twenty-one articles entitled "La Confederation" began i n Le Courrier du Canada Monday, December 5, 1864, and continued u n t i l Wednesday, January 25, 1865. This series was probably written by Sir Etienne Tache, and represents one of the very few satisfactory comtemporary (100) attempts to analyse the nature of the government suggested i n the Quebec Resolutions. The general tone of the a r t i -cles follows closely the more r e a l i s t i c attitude on the part of the Bleus after October 1864. "La Confederation" recognized that the constitution was not perfect. It was a compromise between French and English, between federal union and legislative union. That the constitution appeared to be weighted more in the direction of the English preference for legislative union was not due to any lack of strength on the part of the French ministers; i t was due to the pressure of events. In the face of pressure from below the border, w legislative union was naturally looked to for defence and internal strength. The constitution was a compromise between the strength of a legislative union and the protection for sectional inter-ests found in a federal union. Thus i t bears the mark of a mixture between English and American institutions. In Confederation we have, said Le Courrier. a mixture of responsible government and the federal system. x Charac-t e r i s t i c a l l y , Le Courrier was at pains to show that Confederation did not copy the errors i n the American constitution in this mixture. In fact, i t said, the d i f -ference between our constitution and the American rea l l y i s quite considerable. Confederation rests on constitu-tional government, with i t s three branches, the governor, the senate and the House of Commons. In these bodies (101) resides, "sans restriction, l e principe de souverainete . • ." The American constitution on the other hand i s based on a republican regime, on a congress whose powers are defined by a written constitution, and on a judiciary to interpret those powers. The comparison i s suggestive of what lay in the mind of the Canadian Fathers of Confederation. Confed-eration was not considered by Le Courrier to be fundamen-t a l l y based on a written constitution. The difference -between Confederation and the American constitution i n one respect at least lay in the fact that the latter had a written constitution. The implication i s clear. Le Courrier considered that Confederation was based p r i n c i -pally on the unwritten constitution, or the Bri t i s h traditions and methods of responsible government. That there would be written guarantees at a l l , was due to the nature of the imported doctrine of federalism. The federal system i s revealed by Le Courrier as an essential concession to French-Canadian participa-tion i n Confederation. It i s not possible to argue behind the fundamental fact that guarantees were necessary for French-Canadian support, and that French Canadians saw in the federal system the only means of securing those guarantees. None the less, Le Courrier i s unique i n i t s analysis, for i t emphasized, as no one had yet done in Canada, the point at the heart of the federal system: (102) "Le point le plus important, nous pourrions dire le seul important du projet de constitution est sans contredit eelui qui touche a. l a definition des attributionsrespec-tives du gouvernement federal et des gouvernements locaux. > 32 C'est l a l a clef, l a base de l a constitution". This statement i s vi r t u a l l y unique in Canadian writing on con-federation. Le Courrier i s emphasizing the fact that French Canada w i l l be better off because the things that matter to her w i l l be outside the legislative competence of the central government, i.e. in the local legislature. This point i s implicit in French recognition and support of a federal system. But i t ,is curious why i t was so l i t t l e emphasized. The Rouges argued that French Canada was not given enough protection for her local institutions:; that the word "federal" was but an excuse for an essential-l y centralized system. Undoubtedly they recognized a strong central government when they saw one. But they were not really concerned with the question of a federal system. They were concerned with French-Canadian autonomy, and with opposing the new system as a threat to that autonomy. Rightly or wrongly they preferred to continue with the old system rather than venture into the new one. The assump-tion i s that they saw more protection for French Canada i n a modified version of legislative union than in the federal system proposed by the Quebec resolutions. If Confederation represented new and greater concessions to (103) French. Canadian autonomy, the Rouges should not have opposed i t . The probability i s that the Rouges feared the strength of the new central government. The fact that Confederation purported to be a federal system did not prevent them from wishing to remain in the framework of the old Union. It was d i f f i c u l t for the Rouges, and a l l Canadians, to realize the separateness of a local legislature i n a federal system. Canadians continually failed to grasp the fact that the local powers given to local governments were outside the control of the central government. If French Canadians wanted the federal sys-tem as a protection for their cultural autonomy, they did not wholly understand what i t was they wanted. And their understanding was not made any easier by the fact that the Canadian cabinet did not want to concede too much to a federal system. The net restult was to prevent the development of French Canadian ideas on federal government. The Courrier*s statement that the division of powers i s the key to the constitution i s unique in the discussion of Confederation. The Rouges were probably right when they said the system proposed was not intended to be a fed-eral system; but their analysis does not 3how them to be wholly aware of the division of powers that had been secured• The point i s that a federal system was not i n -(104) tended at Quebec, and French Canadian discussion as a whole reflects the limitation of such a frame of mind. This does not mean that they would not have preferred more guarantees. They were afraid that they had not been given adequate enough guarantees. But they did not con-nect these directly with the division of powers. They wanted more local autonomy, but they did not know the institutions through which more autonomy might be secured. The obvious place was the division of powers. To French-Canadians i t was often a question of sovereignty. Should the central government be sovereign? Reluctantly the majority admitted that i t should. If the central govern-ment was sovereign could the local governments be sover-eign? Apparently not. Dorion suggested that the role of a state i n the United States might be preferable to that of a province i n Confederation. The reason was simple. A state was sovereign, while in Canada the I'll. Atoolul*""* J[ central government was sovereign. A T h i s apparent dicho-tomy, in federalism, and the concomitant of federalism, the division of powers, was not understood. In short, federalism and the division of powers were understood in French Canada as a system of guarantees conceded by a central power to local rights: no less, and certainly l i t t l e more. The resolution between the central and the local in Canada, said Le Courrier, was to leave the "gouvernements locaux des garanties suffisantes pour les ( 1 0 5 ) *proteger contra touts tentative impietement de l a part du gouvernement central, et e l l e donne au gouvernement central une somme de pouvoirs suffisante pour l u i per-mettre de t r a v a i l l e r , sans etre gene, au bienetre materiel et l'agrandissement des differents etats de l a confederation pris colleetivement et separement". ° Le Courrier however was unique in Canada for i t s consideration of the principal problem i n federal government. There were indeed glimmerings of a concep-tion of co-ordinate authority. Le Courrier pointed out that the role of the central government is like that of an intendant Hde grande maison" whose authority over the chief general questions i s undoubted and unquestioned, but who has no authority over the l i f e of the individual family. The idea that local governments were wholly independent in their own sphere i s clearly implied. Le Courrier did not pursue the matter further and the idea reamined only i n germ i n fundi thought u n t i l the growth of the provincial rights theory after 1873, and judicial 34 interpretation beginning with Hodge v. the Queen. Le Journal de Quebec followed the example of Le Courrier and printed a series called "le projet de constitution de l a convention de Quebec". These articles did not display the grasp of p o l i t i c a l theory which was 35 so unusual in Le Courrier; i t i s a pity that Cauchon's work was reprinted and that Tache's work was not. (106) Cauchon was concerned principally with justifying his opposition to confederation in 1858. 3 6 Cauchon got into a curious argument with Le Pays and i t s editor, A. A. Dorion. Dorion had advocated some concession to Upper Canada's demands i n 1858, whereas Cauchon had opposed any change from the legislative union. In 1864 the tables were turned. Cauchon was arguing for confedera-tion and Dorion wished to keep the present union. Cauchon definitely had the advantage in strategic position and made the most of i t .JU Journal and^Pays 3 7 paired off for the purpose and spent a good part of three years arguing with each other on the subject of confederation. UPays referred to Cauchon contemptuously as a "converti", and Cauchon replied that he was proud of the name.38 Cauchon was himself a rather unusual character, and was famous in the House for his bird c a l l s . 3 9 The bird, i t i s said, chirped merrily a l l through the late sittings of the House, and proved to be most enter-taining to the Gallery. The confederation debates closed with the notes of the famous bird accompanying the f i n a l recalcitrant speeches of some of the French members between four and five i n the morning. Le Journal de Quebec. Cauchon1s paper, was typical of a considerable section of French bleu opinion in respect of a general sympathy for the British con-nection. They saw the Brit i s h connection as the (106) guarantee of French rights in the past; in the future the Briti s h connection would be as counsellor and a guide u n t i l the new nation was ready to take her place among 40 the nations. Such remarks were symptomatic of a gen-uine desire to revere what had been, i n the long run since 1774, a generous policy. Brown, in a rare moment of enthusiasm for the French people under B r i t i s h rule, said that confederation was formed to remedy evils "complained of - by the vanquished? No, s i r - but com-plained of by the conquerors'! (Cheers by the French 41 Canadians.)" Brown praised B r i t i s h generosity warmly and was just as warmly supported by his French colleagues. Coupled with this regard for what Br i t i s h mod-eration had done for French Canada, was an understanding of the nature and responsibilities of constitutional government. Le Journal c r i t i c i z e d some of the opposition to confederation on the ground that such opposition followed ideas too r i g i d l y . This, said Le Journal, was too reminiscent of old Franoe.. In Canada under consti-tutional government, ideas and principles must on occasion be sacrificed to practical means and practical measures. Under constitutional government one cannot carry one's ideas too far. The French, especially the French Conservatives, had absorbed some things of Brit i s h traditions and methods of p o l i t i c a l practice; they had come gradually to the British view that in constitutional (107) government expediency i t s e l f may become a p o l i t i c a l principle. , The Journal raised the question in c r i t i c i s i n g the resignation of two of the editors of Le Courrier de St. Hyacinths. The two collaborators, Honore Mercier and Paul de Cazes, had withdrawn from the paper, in opposition to the government, on an issue known in Lower Canada as "l'arbitrage imperial". The issue was concerned with the pressure brought by the imperial government on the maritimes. Such pressure aroused fear in Lower Canada that in London the Quebec resolutions would be changed to suit the wishes of possibly the British government, Upper Canada, or the Maritimes. In other words., the French were afraid of changes which could compromise their pos-i t i o n . The Journal answered that there was -no such danger, but if? i t s sanguine attitude was in a sense justified by subsequent events, i t was no answer to a worried section of conservative opinion. The letter which Mercier and De Cazes published i s distinguished for i t s moderate tone. The authors state they s t i l l wish to remain conservatives; but they feel their party leaders have allowed themselves to be drawn too far into intrigue, both by the Canadian and the Imperial government. They have forgotten their AO duties as chiefs and members of their own nationality. Such opposition was undoubtedly dangerous and (108) had i t gone very far might have seriously threatened confederation. Had i t joined the liberal-conservative opposition to government policy in Upper Canada i t might have had grave consequences. As i t was i t became clear to Cartier that he could not allow any revision of the Quebec resolutions in London. Le Canadien of Quebec, an old, established Bleu paper, resolutely opposed the government on the issue "^arbitrage imperial". In 1865 i t had condemned the Rouges for their factions opposition to Confedera-43 tion; a year later Le Canadien i t s e l f was in opposition, i f not to Confederation, at least to the methods used to secure i t s adoption. It was afraid that changes i n the Quebec resolutions would be made to allow them to be carried in the Maritimes. It was especially incensed because the Canadian Government had insisted on carrying the Quebec Resolutions without amendment.44 It could see great danger in the London Convention, which would be directly under the influence of the colonial office and deciding questions without any kind of appeal from those decisions. 4 5 Finally, after a change in editorship in 46 September, Le Canadien came out against confederation i t s e l f . Like Mercier and De Cazes, Francois Evanturel, proprietor of Le Canadien. s t i l l remained essentially conservative. Opposition to confederation was, he said, (109) not really a question of parties at a l l , but "une lutte 4 . 7 exclusivement nationale". Le Canadian did not oppose the principle of confederation; i t opposed the particular 48 project of Quebec Resolutions. In doing so i t repudia-ted i t s earlier support. Le Canadian's opposition to the methods by which Confederation was carried was f i n a l l y translated into opposition to the project i t s e l f . In the end, such Bleu opposition flagged and failed before Church support of Confederation. The Church proved to be the deciding factor. A l l five Catholic bishops issued pastoral letters in June and July, 1867 which advocated support of the established authority. The Bishops of Rimouski, Trois-Rivier*% Quebec and St. Hyacinthe were warm in their approval of Confederation. 4 9 The l e t t e r of the Bishop of Montreal, Ignace Bourget, was a model of gentle resignation worthy of Marcus Aurelius. 5 0 The support of the Church was of great impor-tance. Cartier's v i s i t to the Pope i s probably a good indication of Cartier*s feeling on the matter. The Confederation Resolutions were passed i n 1865 by a majority of 31-22 among the French Canadian members, but since that time there had been increased opposition. Some of the Bleus who had previously voted for the measure now opposed i t . Yet confederation was carried in the f a l l elections of 1867, 65-12. The explanation ( n o ) l i e s to a considerable extent in the tremendous weight of Church support thrown into the scales, just a month or two before the crucial elections. Undoubtedly the truculent attitude of the United States crystallized the issue of confederation or annexation; but Church support was also of extreme importance. The two were connected of course. The threatening gestures from south of the border made the Church uneasy, and certainly predisposed i t to bear with the strong policy of the Canadian gov-ernment. The Roman Catholic Church had already contri-buted conspicuous services to the Bleu cause. Cartier had not been ungrateful and the alliance was indeed well cemented by 1864. But in i t s firm stand on Confederation, 51 -coming when i t did, the Church rendered i t s greatest service to the cause of the French Bleus. Though the Bleu cause was in a sense weak strategically, the Rouges helped to make their path somewhat easier. The Rouge position i s i n some ways a tragic one* The movements as a whole might have suc-ceeded i n establishing French-Canadian liberalism on a sound foundation. But the Rouges were cheated out of an alliance in 1864 which might have been the road to power and perhaps prestige. They had been cheated out of a chance to run the country in 1858. And in the confederation issue, they carried their long bitter opposition to the Bleus to an equally bitter end. The ( I l l ) quarrel with Bishop Bourget in 1869 began the last act of the tragedy. The tragedy of the Rouges opened in 1858 with the failure of the short administration; i t ended on a rainy November day in 1875 with Guiford's burial in a cemetery at Cote des flfeiges. The Rouges were divided into two sections by events. There were the moderates who were in continuous touch with the Church, and refused to disobey the mande-ments of June 1867. There were the Rouges themselves, not necessarily extreme, but committed to the f u l l limit of their l i b e r a l ideas. They would offer opposition to the Church i f the Church should oppose a course they considered correct. The great proportion of the Rouges were committed to the full-blooded policy often charac-t e r i s t i c of French liberalism. It was not only over the question of the Church that the Rouges differed. A moderate Rouge paper, such as L'Ordre. was significantly affected by Fenian invasions; Le Pays, the paper of A. A. Dorion, was not especially affected. The Rouges up to June of 1866 remained almost as one in their policy on confederation. They opposed i t b i t t e r l y . Their bitterness was perhaps not quite in keeping with their earlier willingness for concessions to Upper Canada. Skelton suggests they were forced into taking a stronger stand against confederation than they really f e l t . 5 3 This may be true, but the opposition of (112) the Rouges was not especially stringent in the early months of the coalition. But i t developed rapidly, and i t did so in ways which suggest that Dorion could not have been any-thing but sincere i n his opposition. It i s hardly l i k e l y he would have carried the Rouges into bitter opposition against the Church in August and September 1867 without just cause. Dorion was not the type of man to attempt a display of something he did not f e e l . Whatever his faults, he was rarely guilty of a fault characteristic of more than one Canadian po l i t i c i a n : expediency. Expediency may be a virtue; in politicians i t i s often l i a b l e to be a fault. In fact he clung to his principles after i t was clear that consistency was very dangerous to himself and to his party. And, the main body of the Rouges followed their leader. Those that did not were moderates who could not oppose the Church. The attitude of the Rouges on confederation was mainly that i t was premature. They were prepared to con-sider some measure for the alleviation of sectional d i f f i c u l t i e s in the province of Canada. Their collabora-tion with Brown in 1858 had sought (and may have reached) an agreement on this matter. But confederation they saw as an attempt to have the sectional issue swallowed up in the grand plan for a union of B r i t i s h North America. By this means French Canada and her particular problems would be given second place to considerations of overall (113) importance. Such a method was replete with dangers for French Canada, and Dorion was not convinced that Cartier was wholly aware of the danger. Cartier*s known pre-disposition to the strong paternal hand in government blinded him to certain grave dangers to French Canada in such a system. Cartier undoubtedly insisted on guarantees for French Canada; but he failed to see the possible sources of danger in a strong government. Dorion realized that such a government would be a strong central govern-ment. Cartier's blind eye prevented him from seeing clearly the necessary connection between a strong govern-ment and a strong centralism. Not unnaturally, the Rouges took the r e a l i s t i c view that Confederation, as i t stood in the Quebec resol-utions, was nothing much more than the bitter medicine of legislative union disguised by the honey of guarantees for local rights. "I am opposed to the scheme of Confed-54 eration", said J*. B. E. Dorion in the House, "because 55 the f i r s t resolution i s nonsense and repugnant to truth; i t i s not a Federal union which i s offered to us, but a Legislative union i n disguise. Federalism i s completely eliminated- from this scheme, which centers everything i n the General Government". This introduced the Rouge definition of what a Federal state should be, and patently what confederation was not. "Federalism means", continued J". B. E. Dorion, "the union of certain states in everything (114) that immediately concerns them, but submitting to the General Government questions of peace, of war, of foreign relations, foreign trade, customs and postal service. Is that what i s proposed to us? Not at a l l . In the scheme we are now examining a l l i s strength and power in the Federal (central) Government; a l l i s weakness, insignif-icance, annihilation in the Local Government I " 5 6 The Rouge definition was very close to the powers conceded by the United States constitution to the central govern-ment of the United States. And from this conception of what the federal state should be, stems Rouge support of that horreur-1 1annexion. Rouge advocacy of annexation may have stemmed from their democratic ideas. Certainly J. B. E. Dorion and the history of L'Avenir indicated the two were virt u a l l y connected. 5 7 But L'Avenir had failed and i t s place was taken by Le Defrioheur which was much less pro-American. In the opposition to confederation, how-ever, Rouge sympathy with American ideas flared up again, this time on the issue of federalism. We do not hesitate to say, L'Ordre suggested, that from any point of view, our institutions, language and laws w i l l be better protected in the American system than in the projected system of Confederation. 5 8 In Canada control would be lost of French laws and institutions; in the United s 5 9 States French Canada would be "un etat soWverain". (115) L 1Ordre 1 a argument was simply that i n the United States the i n d i v i d u a l states were sovereign: i n Canada the dominance of the c e n t r a l government was such that no sovereign powers of any kind could he conceived to belong to the l o c a l governments. The annexation argument was not strongly urged by the Rouges. There were numerous references to i t , but i t was urged with a touch of d i f f i d e n c e , or as a gesture of l a s t r e s o r t . Dorion's paper Le Pays was not too strongly convinced that such a claim was practicable or u s e f u l . 6 0 But t h e i r general conception of federalism was based on the p r i n c i p l e of a sovereign province with a devolutionary central government. The nature of t h i s argument was more concerned with i n t e r p r e t a t i n g the balance of French power i n the proposed c e n t r a l govern-ment, than i n discussing the d i v i s i o n of powers, or suggesting powers f o r the l o c a l government. B r i t i s h experience crept into the Rouge point of view. They were unable to r e a l l y comprehend the devolutionary nature of the federal state. Their advocacy of a federalism sim-i l a r to the United States was the r e s u l t of a search f o r argument rather than a conscientious approval of a system of federal government. The Rouges were looking f o r guarantees f o r French Canada, not n e c e s s a r i l y f o r federal government• This explains the Rouge preference f o r contin-(116) uanoe of the Union rather than advocacy of a more devo-lutionary federal state. They suggested both; but federalism was urged as argument rather than as a possible solution. To retain the legislative union was the general aim of the Rouges, and they urged i t as the obvious alter-native to confederation. Nearly a l l the public meetings fin which the Rouges stirred up over the issue included a resolution stating the great desirability of preserving the Union. Sectional d i f f i c u l t i e s they said were only the pretext for organic changes. There was really no need for change; the d i f f i c u l t i e s between Upper and Lower Canada were "susceptible dfcne solution equitable", without resorting to a means as extreme and as dangerous as Confederation. Dorion maintained that the system of double majority could s t i l l be worked by giving guarantees 63 to Upper Canada or perhaps one or two more members for good measure. It seems l i k e l y that many French-Canadians when brought face to face with constitutional changes wished heartily they had conceded something to Upper Canada's demands before the movement had gone to the lengths i t had. Such concessions might have been possible; they might have worked, and they might not; but many French Canadians were not particularly happy with the prospect before them in the winter of 1864-65. The amenability of several public meetings.to concessions to Upper (117) Canada's demands suggests French dislike of the vast changes which were now unrolled before their eyes. But the attempt to keep the Union fail e d , and the Rouges could only see Confederation as an e v i l with unimagined consequences for the French nationality. It i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine the bitterness of the Rouge press; they saw " l a langue francaise noye'e, l a religion persecuted, l a nationalite submergee, l a race franco-canadienne befoulee et maltraitee, ses droits ravis, ses libertes foule'es aux pieds . , , « 6 4 The impact of the Fenian invasions on this state of mind was curious. At f i r s t the Rouges suspected that the Fenian alarms were l i t t l e more than ministerial exaggeration for the purpose of gaining support for con-federation. 6 5 After Ridgeway the s p l i t in the Rouges became evident. L'Ordre apologized for having suspected the ministry of exploiting French Canadian fears;<Le Pays continued on i t s patch without being especially perturbed, inclined to be sceptical of the extent and the power of the Fenian menace. The tone of L'Ordre changed almost overnight to a militant patriotism, 6 6 but Le Pays re-mained about the same. The Fenian invasions did not at once obliterate the opposition of the moderate Rouges, but the shrillness was gone. When the British North America Act was given royal assent at the end of Maroh 1867, L'Ordre was quite philosophical; the task of the (118) opposition was now over; having nobly f u l f i l l e d i t s duty, i t was now necessary to accept' n l e f a i t accompli". 6 7 When Dorion and Le Pays, L'Union Nationale continued their opposition to confederation, when they denounced the clergy for exerting undue influence on the elec-tions, L'Ordre sternly disowned such action. It could only see great danger in such a course, and added that unless Le Pays repudiated i t s stand, the Rouge party would s p l i t between moderates and extremists. 6 8 At the same time L'Union Nationale spoke of the "trahison A Q de L'ordre" and Dorion continued to issue bitte r editorials in Le Pays. 7 0 The result of Dorion*s opposition to the Church was to strengthen the hand of the Bleus, as i t had never been strengthened before. It i s not too much to say that without the threats from the United States, without the bitter opposition of unrepentant liberals like the Rouges, without the support of the Church which resulted from both factors, the Bleus would never have carried confederation. To the issue of confedera-tion i t s e l f was added a number of objectionable features in government policy. Both aroused considerable oppos-it i o n among French-Canadians. But with the extremism of Dorion, French-Canadians were given very l i t t l e real choice. There was no longer any middle ground. There were disgruntled Bleus, such as Francois Evanturel, (119) e d i t o r o f Le Canadien; t h e r e were moderate Rouges such as i n d i c a t e d by t h e i r paper, L'Ordre, but these c o u l d not r e a l l y amalgamate and c e r t a i n l y formed no centre p a r t y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o C o n f e d e r a t i o n . F r e n c h Canadians d i d not t h e r e f o r e withdraw from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e t o the B l e u s , although they may have had some c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o v o c a t i o n f o r doing s o. French-Canadian i d e a s about f e d e r a l i s m , when s i f t e d through the v i c i s s i t u d e s of sharp p a r t y s t r u g g l e , were l i m i t e d by the same o r g a n i c d e f e c t s as the i d e a s of Canada West. They knew r e s p o n s i b l e government and the methods of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e . They were used to l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n . The r e s u l t was to l i m i t t h e i r i d e a s about f e d e r a l government. They had exceeding good reasons f o r wanting the f e d e r a l system. I t was the s i n e qua non of a North American u n i o n . But the f e d e r a l system was o n l y a means of s e c u r i n g guarantees f o r t h e i r c u l t u r a l autonomy. They d i d not want the f e d e r a l system as such; they wanted the f e d e r a l system as a guarantee o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l s u r -v i v a l i n an E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g North American u n i o n . T h i s e x p l a i n s the n e g l i g i b l e d i s c u s s i o n o f the d i v i s i o n of powers. They were concerned not e s p e c i a l l y w i t h what the d i v i s i o n was; th e y were concerned w i t h what i t meant i n terms of guarantees. "Rep. by pop." was such a t h r e a t t h a t n o t h i n g but a f e d e r a l system was capable o f a l l a y i n g (120) t h e i r f e a r s . The f a c t t h a t t h i s f e d e r a l system was v e r y c l o s e t o a l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n alarmed many French-Canad-i a n s . But the word " f e d e r a l " had a touch of magic i n i t , w h i l e French confidence i n C a r t i e r and the support of the Church* soothed the f e a r s of the m a j o r i t y , and Con-f e d e r a t i o n passed. , The Rouges saw what C o n f e d e r a t i o n was and fought b i t t e r l y a g a i n s t i t . There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h e y were s i n c e r e i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . They saw Confed-e r a t i o n as a d i s g u i s e d l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n which C a r t i e r had accepted i n h i s b l i n d n e s s to the e v i l s of s t r o n g government. I f t h e r e were guarantees, they were not, i n the o p i n i o n o f the Rouges, s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent them from b e i n g o v e r r u l e d by the c e n t r a l government. In the l a s t a n a l y s i s French-Canadian i d e a s on f e d e r a l i s m c o n d i t i o n e d by the same f a c t o r s t h a t had c o n d i t i o n e d Upper Canadian i d e a s . They had every reason t o be v i t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n f e d e r a l government; but w i t h one s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n they f a i l e d t o penet r a t e beyond the c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n caused by t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s of government i n Canada. F e d e r a l government was something the French had yet t o l e a r n . French i d e a s on f e d e r a l i s m came a f t e r C o n f e d e r a t i o n , r a t h e r than b e f o r e i t . Notes 1. Part of the f i r s t stanza of C a r t i e r ' s "0 Canada, Mon Pays, Mes Amours" w r i t t e n i n ^ l 8 3 7 . In Dis c o u r s de S i r Georges Car- t i e r e d i t e d by J . Tasse. Montreal, Senecal, 1893. ( i n t r o -duction) The f u l l t e x t of t h i s poem i s i n Boyd, J . Car-t i e r pp. 383-4. In the l a t t e r , however, there i s an exclama-t i o n p o i n t a f t e r "amours" at the end of every stanza. The c i t a t i o n i n the P i scour s uses the f u l l stop. 2. C o r n e l l , P'.'G" " P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n Cara-da" p. 41 3. The question of a l l e v i a t i o n of the s e c t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s between Canada East and West should be considered, Dorion s a i d i n 1858. "Le gouvernement s ' e t a i t engage a l a resoud-re d'une maniere acceptable aux deux s e c t i o n s de l a prov-i n c e . " Montreal. Le Pays mardi 19 j u i l l e t , 1864. Dorion's w i l l i n g n e s s to makeconcessions i n 1858 was based on the i d e a that i f "rep. by pop." was not c o n s i d e r e d tan, i t wouE come later/on, and then without guarantees f i r Lower , Canada. 4. Morison, J.L. " P a r t i e s and p o l i t i c s , 1840-1867" p. 83. 5. Le Pays samedi 16 j u i n , 1864. 6. Skelton, 0. D. a ,Gait p. 364 7. There were other f a c t o r s which were perhaps s t r o n g e r than Brown's p l a y e d the r o l e of the P i e d P i p e r . Rouge a n ; t i - c l e r -i c a l i s m and sympathy w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the end weak-ened t h e i r case f a t a l l y . To be a n t i - c l e r i c a l and democratic AJrtlrjb same time tended to put the Rouges i n t o the limbo of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m as f a r as many French-Canadians were v concerned. 6. 011 awa. aLe Can a da samedi 22 dec., 1866. (Quoting i t s ov.n i s s u e of 21 d e c , 1865 which was u n a v a i l a b l e ) : "Deux i d l e s sont en guerre permanente au m i l i e u de nous, l ' i d e e demo-c r a t i q u e avancee ou republicamne et l ' i d e e l i b e r a l e - c o n s e r -v a t r i c e ou m o n a r e h i q u e - c o n s t i t u t i o n e l l e . La premiere nous mene a 1'annexion, c ' e s t - a - d i r e a 1'aneantissement n a t i o n a l par Ie n i v e l l e m e n t de nos ire t u t i o n s autonomiques; 1'autre va nous donner l a Confederation, sauvegarde de not r e auton-omic l o c a l e et rempart contre 1'envahissement d i r e r e p u b l i -camtme." 9 * L a revue canadienne, J a n v i e r , 1865. "Les Evenements du mois" p. 53. " I I ne f a u t pas aveug l e r : des changements c o n s t i t u -i o n e i l s ^ s o n t n e c e s s a i r e s a u j o u r d ' h u i . . . . I I e st i n u t i l e de songer a r e v e n i r au fonctionnement pur et simple de 1'Union II .... ^ I b i d , f e v r i e r , 1865. " C o n s i d e r a t i o n s sur le s nouveaux changements c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y de l'amerique b r i t a n n i q u e du nord." par Joseph Royale. pp.116-117. "Sans c o n f e d e r a t i o n l e s p r o v i n c e s deviendront, l o r s qu'aura sonne pour l'heure - i i -9. (cont'd) de 1'independance, autant des petites souverainetes sujettes a. toutes inconvejLents et a. toutes les vicissitudes physiques et morales des petits peuples....le moment grave, decisif, et solennel est arrive pour elles /les Provinces/ de'savoir s i , heureuses et satisfaites de leur obscurite coloniale, elles n'aspirent vaguement a 1'independance que pour s'en all e r disparaitre plus surement...avec leur histoire et leurs traditions dans le gouffre et le neant de l a prepublique voisine ou bien s i elles vont se lever fierement et jeter dans l e monde l a prem-iere et eclatante declaration de leur v i t a l i t e et de leur avenir." 10. Le Journal de Quebec jeudi 22 d e c , 1864. "Si 1'Union une avait ete pos-sible, c 'est-a-dire s i nous y eussions trouve toute l a protection que nous demdandons pour nos institutions, et s i soutes les autres provinces .. .y avaient consentir, nous avouons, sans hesiter, que nous eussions jgqan penche de preference Brers cette forme <x> nstitutionelle, car plus un peuple a de coahesion, plus ses elements s'harmonisent et s'unifent, plus i l est sur de vivre, de prosperer et de grandir." 11. Cauchon, J. L'Union des provinces de l'Ame'rique britannique du nord (Ex-t r a i t du Journal de Quebec") Quebec, Cote, 1865. P« 7. 12. The significant exception to these general r e m a r k s was a series of ar-tic l e s i n Le Courrier du Canada i n Decemeber, 1864 and January, 1865, entitled "La Conf^deration" This series is perhaps the x x w g t w exception that could be made to the generalization-that Canadians did not really understand federalism as such, but only understood i t as a p o l i t i c a l convenience within the existing system of legislative union. The articles of Le Courrier du Canada form a significant contribution to Canadian li&erature on the subject of federal government. 13. Not the least of these ties was the fact that Hector Langevin's brother was the Bishmp of Rimouski. 14. See appendices 1 and 2. 15. Jean-Baptiste Eric Dorion was also editor of Le Defricheur. He died i n 1866, and was succeeded i n that capacity by Wilfird Laurier, then a mod-erate Rouge, although somewhat more moderate than J.B.E. Dorion. Laurier was elected member for Drummond and Arthabarska i n 1871, which seat J.B.E. Dorion had held at the time of his death. 16. Leader, Wed. Aug. 31, 1864. 17. Tache to Quesnel, 9 j u i l l e t , 1864. Cited i n Tache, L. "Sir. E P. Tache et l a confe'deration canadienne" Revue de l'Universite d 1 Ottawa $me anne'e 1935. P. 244 n. : 18. Montreal, La Minerve samedi 16 j u i l l e t , 1864. 19. Montreal Gazette Wed. Aug. 24, 1864. 20. La Minerve mardi 30 aout, 1864. La Minerve believed that the American C i v i l War was caused by too much, power i n the central government rather than too l i t t l e . - i i i -21. La Minerve mardi 6 sept., 1861;. 22. La Minerve samedi 15 Oct., 1861;. 23. Public letter of A.A. Dorion to the electors of the county of Hochelaga dated Nov. 7 5 1861;. Reprinted i n %a Minerve ven. 11 nov., 1861;. 2h. La Minerve sam. Ik Jan., 1865. 25. Ibid. 26. Quebec, Le Courrier du Canada ven. 2k mars, 1865. 27. Groulx', L. La confederation canadienne p. 198. 28. B , Alphonse Contre Poison Montreal, Senecal, 1867. p. 1*9. Though this work was published 2-g- years after 186U, i t does reflect Bleu op-inion contemporaneous with the winter of 186U-1865. 29. I have not been able to established Tache's authorship of these a r t i c -les 00nclusively. Le Courrier du Canada was said to be "l'organe du chef du cabinet, M. Tache' et l'organe du clerge", according to Le Defri- cheur 21 j u i l l e t , 1861;. Le Courrier said that i t was not especially either of these points of view, although i t added that i t supported their principles, (lundi 25 j u i l l e t , 1861;.) Tache''however resided i n Quebec and Le Courrier represented generally his point of view. The author of the articles was i l l during thecourse of their publication, and Tache at the time was not well. A further point i s that the author of these articles was almost certainly at the Quebec Conference. However, Hector Langevin was i t the Conference, and also resided i n Quebec city, and was furthermore an able writer. The possibility ex-ists that Langevin did write the articles or that he might have collab-orated with Tache on them. 30. The St. Albans raid i n September 1861; resulted i n a wave of anti-Canad-ian feeling i n the United States, led vociferously by the New York Her- ald. This feeling was greatly aggravated when the Confederate prisoners were discharged on technical grounds by Coursol, a judge of magistrate's court i n Montreal. 31. Le Courrier du Canada mer. l U dec, 1861;. ("La Confederation) 32. Le Courrier du Canada lun. 26 dec, 1861;. ("La Conf^deration) #3. Ibid. 31;. See Chapter VI. 35. Joseph Edward Cauchon was editor of Le Journal de Quebec Also M.P.P. for the county of Mont^morency. Mayor of Quebec City, 1865-1867. J.C. Dent notes that Cauchon's work was very influential i n securing or helping to secure Frenh-Canadian support of GOnfederatLon. Dent, J.C. The l a s t forty years Toronto, Virtue, 1881. (2 Vols.) ii.l;i ; 8 n . - i v -3 6 . Cauchon, J . E . Etude sur 1'union projetee des provinces brittanmques Quebec, Cote, 1^58. Cauchon was opposed to a plan of federation i n 1858 on the ground that French Canada would only have one voice i n six i n such a union, whereas i n the existing union of the Canadas she had one voice i n two. Moreover, "C'est 1 'unite seul, l ' i n i t i a t i v e et l a resis-tance seules dans 1 'unite, qui nous sauverait dans l ' avenir des griffes de 1 ' a i g l e . . . . " p . 9 . 3 7 . This was characteristic of a number of French and English papers i n Lower Canada. La Minerve usually opposed 1'Qrdre. Le Canadien (independent con-servative was opposed to 1'Union Nationale, an extreme rouge paper. The Gazette often fought the Herald(liberal) and sometimes the Witness (pro-testant independent) Ee Courrier du Canada did not choose any paper es-pecia l ly but took occasional jabs at the Montreal True Witness, an Irish Catholic paper strongly opposed to confederation. 3 8 . Le Journal de Quebec jeudi 27 j u i l l e t , 1865. 3 9 . Oshawa Vindicator Wed. March 15, 1865. hO. Le Journal de Quebec lundi 22 mai, 1865. Tache on one occasion, i n a burst of after dinner e b u i l l i t i o n , said that Canada was "indebted to Lord Durham for the l ibert ies we now en joy . . . . " Reported by the Toronto Globe Mon. Oct. 17, 186L;, from a dime r by the Quebec Board of Trade, Saturday Oct. 15, I86I4. Tache was probably referring to the grant of responsible government rather than to French l iber t ies which Durham might be thought to have conceded. Ul. Conf. Debates p. 85.2. Le Canadien was probably referring to these sympa-thetic words of Brown when i t sa id : "II /Brown^ a parle en homme d'Etat, qui relegue dans 1'ombre tous les souvenirs i r r i tants du passe', pour ne songer qu'a l ' aveni r de l a conf e'deration canadienne... .En l'e'coutant, i l etait impossible de ne pas se la i s ser entraxner a EHixcroii^avec l u i a ces perspectives grandioses." ven. 10 fev. , 1865. U2. Public le t ter of Paul de Cazes and Honore'' Mercier, reprinted i n Le Journal de Quebec, mardi 29 mai, 1866. "Les chefs du part i conservateur ont trop compte, dans ces derniers temps, sur leur propre forige, et pas assez sur leurs devoirs comme chefs et comme membres d'une nataonalite q u ' i l importe de ne pas la isser per ir ; pour faire triompher un projet qui est devenu leur reve habituel, i l s paraissent disposes a. tout s ac r i f i c i e r . 1'ambition plutot que le patriotisme nous semble devenue le guide au moyen duquel i l s voudraient traverser les ±M. dLfficultes du moment." This l e t ter was just a few days before the Niagara invasion by the Fen-ians. This invasion was therefore not inoppurtune i n mitigating the Effec-tiveness of such conservative opposition. Mercier later moved farther l e f t , andfhis leaving Le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe may have been partly due to a change i n p o l i t i c a l bel ief , besides simply opposition to the Bleu pol icy . 1*3. Quebec, Le Canadien ven.28 a v r i l , 1865. "Certes le jugement de l ' h i s t o i r e devra etre sevre sur le compte de ces ambitieux / les Rouges/ qui n'ont pas he site' a tout entreprendre pour renverse fltn gouvernement national qui pro-mettrait de fermer l ' e r e de nos discords, pour ce seul motif, qu ' i l s n'en fesaient pas par t ie . " 4 4 . Le Canadien ven. 4 mai, 1866. US- Le Canadien ven. 18 mai, 1866."Au debut de cette discussion, nous dis-ions que le gouvernement canadien etait le principal auteur de l a p o l i -tique que l'on s'efforcait de f a i r e pre'valoir dans ]e s provinces mari-tine s en y exercant une pression extraordinaire, ejs qui avait pour but 1'arbitrage imperial. Nous accusions nos ministres de nous trahir et de vouloir mettre les droits du Bas-Canada a l a merci d'une convention sie-gant a Londres, delibeant sous 1'influence du bureau coloniale et decid-ant sans appel." The imperfect tense is used because Le Canadien is giv-ing a resume of i t s position to date. 46. Hector Fabre had been the editor, with Francois Evanturel, conservative member for Quebec county, as proprietor. After Fabre relinquished his post i n Sept. 1866, the editorship was taken over by Evanturel. Le Can- adien lundi 3 sept., 1866. 47. Le Canadien ven. 26 dec, 1866. 48. Le Canadien ven. 2° mars, 1867• 49. A good example is the pastoral letter of Mgr. l'Bveque des Trois Riv-ieres, Thomas /Cook/, dated 8 juin, I867. The letters were expected to be read on two successive Sundays from the pu$f»its within the diocese. The text of this letter i s printed in f u l l i n l'Echo du cabinet de lec- ture paroissial Neuvieme Annee, 1867, and occupies 6 pages of close print. Only an extract can be quoted. "Vous n'ignorez pas, N.T .C .F./Notre Tres Chers Freres/ quelle fut l a vivacite des debats sur ce projet /confe'de'ration/ dans l a Chambre d'As-semble'e. La grande majorite' des deputes l e regardait comme l a s e u l e planche de salut que l a Providence o f f r a i t a notre nationalite, tandis que l a mi^orite' l e repoussait de toutes ses forces, sans avoir toute-fois de plan bien arrete a mettre a l a placem, pour arracher l e pays de 1'impasse ou i l se trouvait. Un certain nombre de membres de cette min-orite laissaient entrevoir assez clairement que 1'annexion du Canada aux Etats-Unis etait bien l a condition indispensable au saMt de notre nation. Quelques-uns auraient prefere laisser les choses comme elles etaient, ou amener tout ou plus quelques modifications a l a constitu-tion, qui n'auraient f a i t que re'culer pour quelques temps l a crise en 1'aggravant. Pour toute homme tarit s oit peu observateur, i l etai t e'vid-ent qu'a. peu pres tous reconnassaient la necessite d'un changement de constitution, et que le luttie veritable etait entre confederation et 1'annexion, c'esi^-a-dire, qu ' i l agissait de decider s i 3e Canada allai t se preparer a dev/iir un grand Etat prospere et Libre... JOU bien s i re-noncant a l a vie de peuple libre e£ maitre chez l u i , i l a l l a i t pour tou-jours enchainer son avenir au sort d'une republique qui* n'a encore vecu qu'a peu pres l'age d'un homme. ... "Mais c'est avec peine que nous avons vu l a violence avec laquelle quelques-uns de nos compatriotes se sont elewes contre le projet de confe'de'ration; nonjqu'il ne fut permis de le discuter dans le temps; mais i l est toujours reprehensible de manquer de moderation....Nous avons surtout regrette' les efforts qui oni/e'te f a i t s pour jeter 1 'alarme^parmi vous, lorsque l'on a cherche' a. vous fiaire croire que ce projet n'etait rien moins qu'une trahison.... "Oh I comme nous serions hettfteux, N.T.C.F., s i dans cette circonstance qui s'y prete s i bien, nous voyions les hommes de tous les partis se r a l l i e r sincerement et marcher comme un seul homme sous le meme drapeau - v i -1*9. (cont'd) pour tr a v a i l l e r avec l a me me ardeur a promouvoir l a prosper-it e et assurer le bonheur de notre commune patrie." 50. Pastoral le t t e r from l'Eve'que de Montre'al, Ignace /Bourget/ printed i n l'Ordre lundi 29 j u i l l e t , 1867. "...Votez pour celui qui, dans votre ame et conscience, vous parait qualified pour soutenir les intergfes de l a Religion et de l a Patrie. ... "L'Eglise s 'y soumit / Union of 181*0/ et precha a ses enfants 1 • obe-issance a 1 1 autorite* ^ constituee. Aujourd'hui, elle accepte sans replique le Gouvernement federal parce que qu'il e'mane de l a meme autorite." 51. The Church maintained a non-committal attitude toward confederation un-t i l June, 1867. There is some doubt whether their opinion would have been more effective made known i n 1865 or i n I867. Coming i n June and July, I867, however, such opinion could hardly halp but affect the elec-tions i n August considerably. 52. Represented by 1 'Ordre; "L 'Ordre a pour but de re'concilier l e liberalisme avec l e catholicisme, et de demonstrer que 1'alliance de ces deux Ele-ments est non-seulement possible, mais qu'elle existe reellement en Canada." Le Pays, jeudi, 30 nov., 1865. 53. Skelton, O.D. Gait p. 368. 51*. J .B.E.Dorion was the brother of A.A. (Antoine Aime ) Dorion, was affec-tionately known as "L'enfant terrible". See Conf. Debates p. 858. 55. The f i r s t resolution of the Quebec resolutions states: "The best interests and present and future prosperity of British North America w i l l be prom-oted by a Federal Union under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such union can be effected on principles just to the several Provinces." 56. Conf. Debates p. 858.1. 57. Ibid. 58. L'Ordre ven. 9 juin, 1865. 59. L'Ordre lundi, 12 juin, 1865. 60. Cf. Conf. Debates pp 870-1. J.B.E. Dorion argued that the French i n Louisiana were better off than Lower Canada i n Confederation; that ann-exation would be really better for Lower Canada; but, at the same time, insisting that he was not advocating annexation to the United States, nor do the people desire i t . 61. Le Pays mardi 27 dec, 1861* cites report of a meeting of the electors of the county of St. Jean, at the city h a l l i n St. Jean (on the Richi-laeeu River), on Dec. 20th, at which the following resolutions were pas-sed.* . "Resolu: Que l a confederation projetee des provinces britannques h'est ni neces-saire^ni desirable Que le nouveau projet de confederation est d'autant plus alarmant qu'on semble valoir l'emporter d'assaut et sans.un appel au peuple, et - v i i -61. (cont'd) "sans qu'il soit pourvu a ce que l a majorite' de chaque pro-vince puisse se prononcer separement au l i e u i de l a majorite' collective des deux provinces du Canada.X - Que les gouvernements locaux...ne seraient que siraulacres de gouverne-ments incapables de prote'ger leur autonomie, leurs institutO ions nationales et religieuses.... Que nous devons etre, au reste, prets a accorder au Haut-Canada toutes les reclamations legitimes qu'il espere <ibtenir au moyen de l a representation base'e sur l a population et qu'il ne peut justement re^clamer d'avantage.... Que le systeme propose* aurait I'avantage de ne pas augmenter des defens-es de remedier aux griefs actuels et de ne faire a l a consti-tution que les changements necessites par les circonstances au l i e u de nous l i v r e r aux hasards d'un avenir inconnu.... " Le Pays, jeudi 2° dec, l86l/notes that similar meetings were called for the counties of Charably, Jacques Cartier, Vercheres; i n subsequent issu-es i t ne ntions meetings i n Drummond, Rouville, Hochelaga, Maskinonge, Beauharnois, Bagot, St. Hyacinthe, Berthier, RichtLieu, Joliette, Vau-dreuil. See fippendix 1. 62. L'Anion Nationale lundi 6 fev. i860, reported a meeting of l'Institut Canadien on January 30, 1865. "Resolu: Qu'un semblable projet, s '11 e t a i t adopte n'aurait d'autre resul-tat que d'a f f a i b l i r les liens qui attachent l e Bas-Canada a l a Grande-Bretagne en cre*ant dans 1'esprit de ses habitants de juste alarmes sur le conservation de tout ce qui est cher a un peuple loyal et capable d'appre'cier les droits d'un sujet anglais.... Que les di f f i c u l t e s sectionelles qui on servi de pretexte a des changements organiques dans les institutions pol-itiques du Haut et du Bas-Canada, sont suscept-ibles d'une solution equitable, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'avoir recours d un moyen dispendieux et aussi extreme que celui d'une conf e*cieration.... 63. Le Pays mardi 27 d e c , 1861*. 61;. Le Pays jeudi 3 aout, 1865. 65. Le Pays samedti 2k mars, 1866. Cartier, said Le Pays, i s deliberately exaggerating the Fenian danger. "Son interet exige que l a peur redouble que 1'on mette tout espoir dans l a confederation comme dans une barque de salut." 66. L'Ordre mere 6 juin, 1866. "Les e'venements qui fondent sur notre pauvre Canada depuis quelquesJours, sont l o i n d'etre rassurants; 1'en-terprise Fenienne a laquelle on croyait ne pas devoir attacher d'abord Sxune/grande importance menace de grossir. Deja plusiers milles hommes ont envahi nos immenses fronti^res...." This was followed by a poem writtenxfaffiaia for the occasion entit-led, "Aux militairs de l a campagne", of which three stanzas follow: - v i i i -6 6 . (cont'd) "Mais aujourd'hui les crisde 'sang I' de'guerre I' Ont retenti sous l a voute des cieux. A votre pere, a votre tendre mere, A vos amis faites done vos adieux.... JLassez et fleurs et jardins et chaumieres; Au bout du champ 1'instrument des labours Sera tranquille I ...Ecoutez...Aux frontieres De tous cotes on vous c r i e : 'Au secours'.' En avant, coureageux soldats, Volez au triomphe, a l a gloire '. Dans tous vos chaleureux combats Remportez une eclatante victoire '.'. " Shippee's interpretation of the Rouge reaction to the Fenians is rath-er different than the one maintained here. He suggests the thesis ad-vanced by the Gazette on March Ik, 1866, that the Rouges were sympa-thetic to Fenianism although pretending to detest i t . From the Gaz-ette 's statement, Shippee draws the conclusion that "the Rouge fac-tion i n Lower Canada, long discontented with existing conditions, harbored designs lookidg^toward co-operation with the Fenians." If 1'Ordre represents Rouge opinion, as Mr. Shippee says i t does, I would seriously question his whole argument as far as the moderate Rouges are concerned. In respect of A.A. Dorion and Le Pays, the matter i s not quite so clear. But Dorion was less annexationist than 1 'Ordre; and, being French-Canadian, he could hardly see i n the Fenians much comfort for French-Canadian nati. onaliiy. I believe Mr. Shippee has accepted the conservative interpretat-ion of the Gazette at i t s face value, since he cites no other author-i t y for his argument. See Shippee, L.B. Canadian-American relations, 18I|.9-187U New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939. (relations of Canada and the Uni-ted States) p.221 and p . x221n. 67. 1'Ordre mere. 27mars, 1867. 6 8 . 1'Ordre lundi lo-sept., I867 6 9 . 1'Union Nationale jeudi 3 Oct., I867. 70. Le Pays sam. 21 sept., I 8 6 7 . Le Pays distinguishes the rights of the clergy as citizens and as officers of the church. It has no quarrel with the action of the clergy i n their former capacity; but i t strong-ly objects to the clergy using their position i n the church for essen-t i a l l y temporal matters. "Au moment ou a l l a i t s'engager l a lutte electoralea, aux dates success-ives du 8, du 12, du 13, du 18 juin, les Eveques de Trois Rivftires, de Quebec, de Rimouski, et de St. Hyacinths, publiaient chacun une lett r e pastorale a. propos des elections qui a l l a i t bientot commencer. Exprimee en terms differentes, l'ide'e dominante dans ces quatre documents, est l a meme_. On y vante l'acte de l a co nfe'deration, comme une ouevre a. peu pres parfaite et necessitee par les circonstances, on y exalte le pat-riotisme, les vues elevees de ses auteurs, on les recommande avec leurs partisans aux electeurs, comme les seuls dignes de leurs suff-- i x -70. (cont'd)"rages;—ceux qui n'acceptent de bonne grace l e renversement de nos institutions ne peuvent conduire qu'a l'anarchie, a la trahis- on, a l a xrevolte et a. tous les maux qui en sont l a suite. "Et tout cela, pour quelle raison ? Parce que c 'est une LOI, adopt-ee par les autorites constituees '. 1" Le Pays jeudi 26 sept., 18*$?. "...om abuse de l a chaire et du confes-sional pour faire croire au peuple qu'il etait tenu, de par ses devoirs religieux, d'accepter, de sanctionner l a tyrannie et 1'oppression...." See note h9 for the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Three Rivers, Dorion does not nention the pastoral le t t e r of the Bishop of Montreal which came out i n July, probably because Bishop Bourget did not suggest directly the p o l i t i c a l party for which to vote, leaving the decision up to the consciences of the individuals concerned.(See note $o). Bourget's diocese also included the county for which Dorion was a member—Hoche-laga. (121) CHAPTER V ENGLISH IDEAS IN CANADA EAST REGARDING FEDERALISM (122) Joseph Cau^on once said that a French-Canadian editor spent the best part of his time translating. That was the reason, he added, why so many French papers only appeared twice or three times a week. A French editor translates- "peniblement et longuement", and has l i t t l e time l e f t ot devote to the immense work of a daily. It i s an interesting comment on the English dominance of the Province. Nowhere perhaps was this dominance cherished more than in the hearts of the English of Lower Canada. They had been the commercial and financial leaders of the Province almost since the conquest. They were at the centre of the Province geographically and economically. And they did not wish to see the Province s p l i t by a federal union. They wished to see British North America united in a legislative union, with themselves, the dominant commercial group, at the centre. Montreal had been the centre of the Canada Land Co., which had exten-sive holdings west of Hamilton to Lake Huron, and had acquired scattered holdings in Crown Reserves in just about every county i n Upper Canada.2 Montreal had been the centre for the operations of Gzowski and Co., who had been the contractors for the Toronto-Sarnia section of the Grand Trunk. Montreal had been the focus of the whole Canadian canal system. These "had beens" in 1864 s t i l l l e f t Montreal with great commercial and financial (123) interests in Canada West. The influence of commercial interests on confederation was considerable. The prin c i -pal significance in the present context was that they affected the ideas of the English in Lower Canada on . federal government. The commercial class of Lower Canada strongly favoured legislative union. 3 The English in Lower Canada were more fervent in their desire for legislative union than merely com-mercial connections with the Western section would imply. The vigour of the English belief in legislative union came from a variety of sources not specifically connected with their commercial interests. Most important of a l l perhaps was the plain fact that they would be a minority i n a French-speaking province. Not only would they be a linguistic minority, but even more decidedly a religious minority. The French-speaking population outnumbered English-speaking by over three to one. But Catholics outnumbered the Protestants by over six to one. 4 Not unnaturally the English commercial class, largely Protes-tants, looked with considerable anxiety at a project which might have the result of putting them i n a very serious minority in the religious sense as well as threatening their commercial dominance. The effect of religious belief on ideas about federal government was considerable. In this respect, religious belief was of (124) more v i t a l importance than language. English-speaking Catholics were at one with the French i n opposing leg-isl a t i v e union. In Lower Canada the issue on Confedera-tion was drawn between Catholic and Protestant, rather than between English and French. Thus ideas about federalism among the English-speaking of Lower Canada break sharply into two sections. The Protestants formed about two-thirds this group; the Catholics one-third. The great weight of commercial and financial strength lay with the English Protestants. They gave the tone to what i s usually known as the English minority. They were mostly of English or Scot-t i s h origin and had acquired a dominant control in the business l i f e of the Province. They desired legislative union largely because they were Protestants i n a Catholic world. Federal government was anathema to them. It meant French p o l i t i c a l dominance on their home ground. It meant that they would be at the mercy of an alien religion and an alien language. Federal government also meant the introduction of American ideas, the decentralised system of govern-ment, the pandering to popular influence, even perhaps universal suffrage. The Lower Canadian English-speaking Protestants wanted legislative union, Bri t i s h traditions of p o l i t i c a l practice, conservatism. Faced with the re a l i t i e s of 1864 they were prepared to make certain (125) concessions to the federal principle; but no more than was absolutely required by French Canada, and perhaps less i f i t could be managed by p o l i t i c a l pressure. The other section of English-speaking opinion was the Catholic group. This group took a; line on federal government very close to that of the French-Canadians. They were in closer touch with English opinion i n both sections of the Province however than the French, and i t led them to fear that guarantees for the Catholics in Lower Canada would be a l l too few. They were i n close sympathy with the French, and tried to interpret English opinion on occasion for them. Nominally they were repre-sented in the Cabinet by McGee, but they disagreed with him over federal government, and found him on occasion much too monarchist for their taste. McGee did secure concessions for the Catholics, but they were more often of value for the Catholic minority in Upper Canada. Hence, though McGee was elected for Montreal West, he really represented Upper Canadian Irish opinion rather than lower. He secured his Lower Canadian support through sheer personal attractiveness and on his past record, rather than through his policy on confederation. Beside the two main divisions of English-speaking opinion there were a number of curious elements which combined to form the Liberals of Lower Canada. Led by Luther Holton, they represented a l l shades of religious (126) views, and carried their Liberal principles into practice by associating closely with the Rouges. Dorion and Holton were p o l i t i c a l l y inseparable. Like Dorion the Liberals maintained that confederation was premature; but they did not stress the aspect which Dorion stressed: that confed-eration was l i t t l e more than legislative union in disguise Some of the liberals, together with Christopher Dunkin, an independent Conservative, ware prepared to give Upper Canada "rep. by pop I i f Confederation were dropped.5 It i s d i f f i c u l t to penetrate the point of view of the Lower Canada Liberals. They seem to have been more concerned with offering opposition to the government in office than in advocating any particular issue or point of view. Holton had been associated with Gait when Gait was in opposition in the ' f i f t i e s . Unlike Gait, he did not change p o l i t i c a l colour with maturity, or on the invitation of John A. Macdonald. He was a friend of several of the leading conservatives. The Liberals prob-ably opposed Confederation on the grounds simply that i t was hasty government measure, and one designed to give the Conservatives a new lease on l i f e . But to most English-speaking residents of Lower Canada confederation was a step dictated by events. It was a project in which they were: not unwilling to share provided that i t could be effected with a minimum of con-cession to the odious system in operation below the border (127) nConfederationl" said the Morning Chronicle; "Have we not seen enough of federations with their cumbrous machinery of government, well enough in f a i r weather but breaking up with the least strain, • • ? Shall we not draw wisdom from the errors of others? Must we steer our bark on that rock on which the neighbouring . . . union has s p l i t ? • • • Never was there such an opportunity as now for the birth of a nation. The main problems of government have been solved for us. The problem of a Federal Union has been worked out - a fa i l u r e . The problem of a Legislative union has been worked out - a success."7 The success to which the Chronicle was referring was not the Union of the Canadas, but the union of England and Scotland. This was an analogy which had considerable currency in Lower Canada, especially among those with preferences for a legislative union. They pointed out, as did the Chronicle, that Scotland s t i l l had her own religion, and many of her own laws. If she had had her own language, said the Chronicle, she would s t i l l have had that too. The analogy in Canada implied a principle not unlike Sandfield Macdonald's system of a double majority, applied to the Lower Canada French alone, in a legislative union of Br i t i s h North America. This system would be of universe advantage over a federation - i t would avoid a l l the cumbrous machinery of "clerks and petty place-men" nec-essary to federation. (1E8) The Gazette, more judiciously, took a similar line on the desirability of legislative union. It ad-mitted that such talk had already excited some alarm among the French papers, but reasserted i t s position that i f there was to be a union at a l l , i t must be strong and one l i k e l y to l a s t . There can be no mean between forces: either they are centripetal tending to consoli-dation, or they are centrifugal tending to separation. We a l l know, continued the Gazette, that history teems with the conflict of powers i n federations. Let us not have a repetition of that conflict in the new union. Like many a newspaper i n the good land of Canada, the Gazette, could not believe that there was any mean between power at the centre and power at the circumference. When the wheel starts to move the power has to go somewhere. Either i t tends to f l y off - to be restrained only by the weak and tenuous bonds of the federal system; or i t tends to the weight at the centre - local power holding i t s e l f only far enough aloof to keep i t s identity. Put in this way the Canadian solution i s almost self-evident: keep the weight of power in the centre. If one adds the influence of B r i t i s h traditions and methods, the influence of a C i v i l War which had been raging almost four years, the Canadian solution seems not only self-evident but justified by circumstances. To Canadians i t seemed, as the Chronicle suggested, that their p o l i t i c a l problems (129) had been solved for them. It i s too much to expect that in the course of three weeks anything but the practical p o l i t i c a l line of compromise and least resistance was followed. However, the Gazette was quite prepared to admit limited guarantees for French Canada. It even suggested certain very limited "plenary" powers for local govern-ments. This daring suggestion was somewhat qualified by the admission that the central government should have some right to interfere - though purely i n the case of local disputes. But the Gazette l i k e most other ministerial papers in English was clearly not interested in federal government or anything resembling i t . The French would have guarantees of course; that need was unanimously recognized; but no more than were sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case. 1 0 What we want, said the Gazette, i s either a legislative union with a recognition of federal rights, or i f that i s not possible, a federal union with the powers of local legislation very d i s t i n c t l y defined and very s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . 1 1 The Gazette, in keeping with the practical line taken by the ministry in the formation of a constitution, followed the old English method of arguing on practical -grounds rather than floating off into the stern and l o f t y realm of principle. It was quite ready to believe that Confederation was the best scheme possible under the (130) circumstances: the Gazette considered that the highest recommendation. Those who opposed i t on a p r i o r i grounds were simply being unrealistic. "If the new constitution only proves to be a practical success" said the Gazette, "we shall easily forgive i t for being a theoretical 12 fa i l u r e " . Whatever may be said of the constitution as a success or fa i l u r e , at least the Gazette got pretty well what i t wanted i n the Quebec resolutions and the Bri t i s h North America Act. But i t continued to maintain that the one thing which any federal system had to dread 13 was the predominance of sectional over national feeling. The pronounced opinion of the Conservative Protestant press i n Lower Canada could be compared only with the equally pronounced opinion of the Toronto Globe. Both wanted strong central government; both wanted a very limited and a very s t r i c t l y defined local system of power. The Globe and the Gazette usually saw eye to eye on the subject of federal government. As the Globe was c r i t i c i z e d by the Leader, so was the Gazette by La Minerve. The Gazette and the Chronicle took exception on occasion to the Leader * s point of view; 1 4 both were inclined to be more careful dealing with La Minerve. The Gazette's general tone was often quite close to that of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, McGee usually pub-lished letters to the public through the pages of the Gazette, and i t s strong conservatism doubtless appealed to him. The Gazette was i n addition ably written -(131) perhaps the best outside of the Toronto Leader. McGee could have used the pages of a local Catholic journal, The True Witness, 1 5 But he was poles apart from the True Witness on federalism; he was closer to the Toronto Canadian Freeman, the Upper Canadian Irish counterpart of the True Witness, McGee i s a fascinating figure, but an elusive one. His words and ideas were like a golden aureole about the solid features of the Quebec resolutions, i l -luminating them and reflecting upon them the gracious light of a new nationality. What McGee really thought and believed i s hidden beneath his oratory. The leading ideas are f a i r l y clear. He was a convinced monarchist. He believed in the aristocracy of talent and wealth, he believed in liberty without believing in democracy. He was close to De Tocqueville in some respects, but with a greater f l a i r for feeling and with a less keen analytical sense as a result. McGee on federal government i s a curious combination. He knew what federal government was, but he faced the d i f f i c u l t y of having to disassociate i t from Republicanism and from democracy. It i s not true historically, he said, that Republicanism i s the comple-ment of Federalism. Federalism i s "a-political co-partnership" which has been formed by many different groups i n various periods of human h i s t o r y . 1 6 At the same time, McGee took care to point out the virtues of the (132) m o n a r c h i c a l and the r e s p o n s i b l e form of government and c i t e d John Adams i n support of h i s argument. McGee never r e a l l y r e s o l v e d the problem of monarchy and f e d e r a l i s m ; p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s o l u t i o n s were not h i s f o r t e . F e d e r a t i o n he d e f i n e d as "a p o l i t i c a l co-p a r t n e r s h i p " . T h i s i s a good d e f i n i t i o n on the f a c e o f i t . But he a p p l i e d the f e d e r a l i d e a i n a number of c u r i o u s i n s t a n c e s . The p r i n c i p l e o f F e d e r a t i o n , he s a i d i n the debates on C o n f e d e r a t i o n , i s a generous p r i n c i p l e ; i t g i v e s men l o c a l d u t i e s , y e t w i t h "a h e a l t h y sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and comprehension". I t i s a p r i n c i p l e f a v o u r a b l e to l i b e r t y . I t g i v e s l o c a l a f f a i r s t o l o c a l b o d i e s , and g e n e r a l matters t o a c e n t r a l government. I t i s t h i s wise system which i s a p p l i e d i n v a r y i n g degrees i n almost every c o u n t r y . Spain i s a c o n f e d e r a t i o n . So i s the B r i t i s h I s l e s . 1 7 McGee had come from a " p o l i t i c a l c o - p a r t n e r -s h i p " t o a u n i t a r y s t a t e , i n th r e e easy p o l i t i c a l l e s s o n s . The f a c t remains t h a t he understood the nature of f e d e r a l government; but he found i t much e a s i e r t o take i t as the le a v e n i n the lump of l e g i s l a t i v e union, than t o c a r r y on the analogy of the c o - p a r t n e r s h i p . McGee was i n f a c t f o l l o w i n g the l i n e t h a t n e a r l y a l l o t h e r Canadians took: f e d e r a l i s m as a f u n c t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n . He d i d not make c l e a r how a p o l i t i c a l c o - p a r t n e r s h i p would (133) f u n c t i o n i n a monarchical system. He d i d not conceive of the Crown d i s t r i b u t i n g i t s s o v e r e i g n power through two s e t s of i n s t i t u t i o n s , one n a t i o n a l and the o t h e r p r o v i n -c i a l . 1 8 The reason he d i d not was perhaps the f a c t t h a t the t h e o r y was not easy t o gr a s p . The t h e o r y o f a f e d e r a l system under a monarchy was evolved a f t e r r a t h e r than be f o r e such a system had been e s t a b l i s h e d . McGee thus f o l l o w e d the l i n e o f l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e . He adapted h i s p e r f e c t l y good t h e o r y of f e d e r a l i s m t o f i t the Canadian system, and j u s t about argued f e d e r a l i s m out of e x i s t e n c e . At l e a s t , he argued i t on such a ground as t o l e a v e grave doubts as to whether he r e a l l y d i d b e l i e v e Canada had a f e d e r a l system. He s t a t e s nowhere h i s b e l i e f that Canada had such a system. One can o n l y sus-pect t h a t McGee fs n a t u r a l d e s i r e f o r o r d e r , c i v i l obedience and monarchy, got the b e t t e r o f h i s t h e o r y about f e d e r a l i s m . In o t h e r words he was caught up i n the same s t a t e of mind as most other Canadians, and found h i m s e l f v e r y q u i c k l y f o r l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n w i t h l o c a l guarantees. In Lower Canada G a i t as much as McGee e p i t o -mized the g e n e r a l s et of E n g l i s h o p i n i o n . G a i t was not u n l i k e McGee i n some r e s p e c t s . He was a man of v i s i o n ; l i k e McGee he had taken up F e d e r a t i o n l o n g b e f o r e Macdonald and the C o n s e r v a t i v e s had seen f i t t o grasp the n e t t l e . G a i t combined h i s v i s i o n w i t h a shrewd and (134) able knowledge of p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . H i s p l a n o f f e d e r a l u n i o n o f 1858 foreshadowed, w i t h unusual p r e s c i e n c the r e s o l u t i o n s a t Quebec s i x y e a r s l a t e r . So c l o s e l y d i d the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s f o l l o w G a i t ' s p l a n t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e not to suspect t h a t i n the Cabinet meetings between June and October 1864, the Canadian m i n i s t e r s took up G a i t ' s p l a n i n d e t a i l , making o n l y such adjustments as were suggested o r made n e c e s s a r y by the experience o f s i x y e a r s . The s i x y e a r s were crowded; w i t h the d i f f i c u l t domestic problem i n Canada, the r e c u r r e n t c r i s e s between B r i t a i n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s the C i v i l War to the south, i t was l i k e l y t h a t changes would be made i n G a i t ' s scheme of 1858. The changes were made: p r i n c i p a l l y a nominative Upper House, i n s t e a d of G a i t ' s e l e c t i v e one; and the a s s i g n i n g the r e s i d u a l power t o the c e n t r a l government which G a i t had l e f t an open qu e s t i o n i n 1858. G a i t h i m s e l f s a i d i n 1858 t h a t he hoped the suggested p l a n would combine the s t r e n g t h o f l e g i s -l a t i v e union w i t h the b e n e f i t s of l o c a l government of 19 matters of l o c a l i n t e r e s t . I f t h a t was t r u e i n 1858, i t was c e r t a i n l y a l l the more so i n the r e s o l u t i o n s o f 1864. He had not d e f i n e d the l o c a l powers i n 1858, n o r had he attempted t o suggest any c o n t r o l by the c e n t r a l government over l o c a l l e g i s l a t i o n through the veto power. These were r a m i f i c a t i o n s worked out i n 1864, p r o b a b l y by Macdonald. (135) The Canadian delegation'went t o C h a r l o t t e t o w n and Quebec w i t h a d e f i n i t e p l a n a l r e a d y i n mind. The s u c c e s s i v e i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e s o l u t i o n s by Brown, Mac-donald, Mowat and G a i t , shows the Canadian d e l e g a t i o n to have come to g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s about the n a t u r e of u n i o n b e f o r e i t ever came t o the Conference t a b l e . By and l a r g e the c o n c l u s i o n s t o which they had come were those o f G a i t ' s p r o p o s a l of 1858. The p l a n of s u b s i d i e s t o l o c a l governments was s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t o f G a i t . He had conceived i t w i t h the i d e a of making t h e . l o c a l l e g -i s l a t u r e s dependent on the p r e s e r v a t i o n of c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . I t was not u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s motive a c t u a t e d acceptance of the p l a n i n 1 8 6 4 . 2 0 G a l V s g r e a t s i g n i f i -cance i n t h i s context was t h a t he was j u s t about the o n l y p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e i n Canada who had g i v e n any c o n s i d -e r a t i o n t o the p r e c i s e nature of a u n i o n government f o r B r i t i s h North America, p r i o r t o 1864; and the p r o p o s a l which came from Quebec i n the c l o s i n g weeks o f October o f t h a t year show s t r o n g l y the commanding i n f l u e n c e of the thought he had g i v e n the s u b j e c t of c o n f e d e r a t i o n . G a i t , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a c o n s i d e r a b l e s e c t i o n of E n g l i s h P r o t e s t a n t o p i n i o n i n Canada E a s t , was the l e a d i n g t h e o r i s t behind the f o r m a t i o n of the Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n . I f McGee gave the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t s aura of p o e t r y and h i s t o r y , G a i t f a s t e n e d i t f i r m l y t o the ground o f p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . H i s p o s i t i o n was perhaps comparable (136) with that of Alexander H a m i l t o n e a c h was a financier, each was concerned with keeping a strong central govern-ment in control of a f f a i r s . However, Gait dominated the form of the Canadian constitution more than Hamilton did the American. Gait had few r i v a l s : Hamilton had several. , The conclusion is that the Canadian constitution represented the thought of the leading figure among the English Protestants of Lower Canada. Doubtless i t con-ceded more to local institutions than the Montreal Gazette would have preferred. Gait himself showed an awareness of the local problem which was perhaps unusual among his fellow English. But behind him stood the general opinion of English Lower Canada; i f he was prepared to be more li b e r a l than most of his supporters on the question of local government, he could hardly oppose the general trend po of opinion. f c His thought on the constitution i s unusually significant; but i t i s not surprising that the Constitution emphasized the central power, knowing the inclinations of the men who supported i t s leading theorist. The English minority in Lower Canada of Protestant faith generally welcomed the text and tenor of the new constitution. If anything they would have pre-ferred less concession to local institutions but as a whole they were satisfied. J . H. Pope reported to his constituents in December 1864 that having local legislatures 23 at a l l was the real weakness of the Confederation proposals. (137) At any rate they assumed, as did the Toronto?Globe, that in any conflict between local and central authority, the central authority would have the upper hand through un-questioned use of the veto power. 2 4 The attitude of the Lower Canadian Protestants was very much the same as that of the Upper Canadian Catholic. Both saw in tne central government a protector and a guarantor of their rights and privileges; both saw in the local government a possible source of tyranny and injustice. In Upper Canada the Catholics feared-George Brown and the Orange Order. In Lower Canada the Protes-25 tants feared the French. Both minorities looked to a strong central government as the source of their cultural and religious autonomy, and eschewed any notion of strong power i n local hands. However, the Lower Canada Catholic position was just the reverse. Like the French, the English-speaking Catholics wanted strong local control of affairs The contrast i n attitude between the Irish of Toronto and the Irish of Montreal i s both amusing and instructive They were completely juxtaposed• Where the Irish of Toronto praised and supported Macdonald and his whole point of view on the strong central government, the Irish of Montreal abhored the ministerial project. , The policy of the Montreal True Witness on fed-eralism was what the French policy might have been and ( 1 3 8 ) was not. The True Witness did not look so much to guar-antees as to the project i t s e l f . It argued that confed-eration was not a federation at a l l ; in i t s very nature i t could not he a federation. And i t therefore opposed the measure root and branch. - The True Witness was an able exponent of i t s point of view. It was perhaps the most significant oppos-it i o n paper in the Province as far an analysis of federal government was concerned. The basis of i t s argument was i t s conception of the relation of Lower to Upper Canada. The two Ganadas stand to each as the South to the North. The differences between the two lay deep in their aspir-ations and outlook. Canada East wanted her institutions and her religion. Canada West wanted Anglo-Saxon and Protestant ascendancy. 2 6 Between these views there was no real compatibility. There was no system which could provide the e l a s t i c i t y for such divergences of outlook. Federal g o v e r n m e n t in the United States, under auspices certainly more favourable than in Canada, had fa i l e d to preserve i t s union. How, therefore, could Canada preserve a union with such internal divergences evident already? The Cessation of sectional differences from a federal union? asked the True Witness "Are men mad or do they believe their listeners to be fools that they assail our ears with such trash." 2 7 We are secessionists at heart, continued the True Witness; not that we do not detest (139) slavery, but we are opposed heart and soul to the princ-iple of centralisation, and believe-that "States-rights" holds the only security for us. Through the summer of 1864 the True Witness continued i t s examination of the problem. On the assump-tion that union between the Canadas was no longer possible i t pressed not for federation so much as repeal of the union altogether. It proposed that Lower Canada revert to a single colony under the great federation of Empire. In this attitude i t may have been influenced by Joseph Howe. It i s more l i k e l y that i t was the natural conclus-ion of i t s line of thought. From this position, the True Witness went on to show the status of a new government between the colony and the Mother Country would be ridiculous and intolerable. It would mean that any colonial confederation would draw powers from those now belonging to the Imperial government, and from powers belonging to the existing colonies. There was i n fact nothing for a colonial federal government to do. A l l the functions of a legitimate federal government are now handled by Great Britain. If such a government were established i t would be bound to "encroach upon the j legitimate functions either of the Imperial or of the 28 Provincial Government". The question arises, what was a federal govern-ment? This i s the kernfll of the problem. A federal (140) c o l o n i a l government was i m p o s s i b l e , tne True Witness s a i d , f o r obvious f u n c t i o n a l r easons. But i t was a l s o i m p o s s i -b l e from the nature of the f e d e r a l i d e a . A f e d e r a l u n i o n d e r i v e s i t s power from an agglomeration o f s e v e r a l s t a t e s o r p r o v i n c e s . Power d e v o l v e s upward. Thus i n a f e d e r a l system, reasoned the True Witness, a l l power remains i n -herent i n the l o c a l government. The power o f the c e n t r a l government i s d e r i v e d or d e l e g a t e d . What i s b e i n g prepared f o r us by the M i n i s t r y i s c e r t a i n l y n o t h i n g of P Q the s o r t . I t i s " U n i f i c a t i o n not F e d e r a t i o n n a v t h a t w i l l be brought b e f o r e the Canadian l e g i s l a t u r e . Not u n n a t u r a l l y the True Witness o b j e c t e d when the Globe -Suggested t h a t f e d e r a t i o n was but a m u n i c i p a l e x t e n s i o n w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system. The Globe's s u g g e s t i o n was the most n a t u r a l one i n the w o r l d and the reason why the True Witness i n s i s t e d on d i s s o l u -t i o n o f the Union f i r s t , t h e n f e d e r a t i o n . The True Witness i n s i s t e d the P r o v i n c e of Lower Canada must be r e s t o r e d to i t s o r i g i n a l s t a t u s . Then and o n l y then c o u l d a f e d e r a t i o n be formed. Then and o n l y then would a f e d e r a l government f o r B r i t i s h N orth America be a genuine-l y d e l e g a t e d government. T h i s suggests the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the e x i s t i n g Union government. The e x t e n s i o n o f the Union government a f t e r 1867 was not a p r o v i n c i a l government but i n r e a l i t y a n a t i o n a l one. In e f f e c t the e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e (141) u n i o n was c o n t i n u e d and broadened w i t h i n c r e a s e d compe-tence f o r the r e s t o f B r i t i s h North America, The o l d p r o v i n c e s of Upper and Lower Canada were re-formed, so t o speak, beneath t h i s government. The True Witness argued t h a t u n l e s s the u n i o n government were f i r s t d i s s o l v e d , no t r u e f e d e r a t i o n c o u l d be formed. The True Witness was undoubtedly r i g h t . Had the u n i o n government been d i s s o l v e d and Upper and Lower Canada l e f t t o b a r g a i n w i t h the M a r i t i m e s , the r e s u l t a n t u n i o n would l i k e l y have been c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t . Each p r o v i n c e of the Canadas would then have f e l t the f u l l s t r e n g t h of a p l e n t i t u d e of power, which they would have been r e l u c t a n t t o s u r r e n d e r . The r e s u l t would have been not u n l i k e the C o n f e d e r a t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1777 or perhaps analogous t o the American C o n s t i t u t i o n . John A. Macdonald and the Cabinet were p r o b a b l y not unaware o f t h i s problem. The p r o j e c t f o r l o c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r the Canadas was g i v e n no m i n i s t e r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r i t was apparent t h a t C o n f e d e r a t i o n was a c c e p t a b l e t o the M a r i t i m e s government. No l o c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d u n t i l i t was r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t C o n f e d e r a t i o n was l i k e l y to come i n t o e f f e c t . I t was the Union government which suggested and l e a d the p r o j e c t f o r c o n f e d e r a t i o n . I t was i n e f f e c t t o the Union government to which the new power o f a confed-(142) e r a t i o n of B r i t i s h North America was g i v e n . Macdonald and the Canadian c a b i n e t were simply g i v e n Maritime mem-ber s , e n l a r g e d f u n c t i o n s and a great new scope f o r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t s . Such i s not a l e g a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C o n f e d e r a t i o n . But i t i s what happened, even though the t h e o r y behind events was c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t . L i k e Le C o u r r i e r du Canada on the n a t u r e o f f e d e r a l government, the True Witness on c o l o n i a l f e d e r a l -ism r e p r e s e n t s an i s o l a t e d study. In the case o f the True Witness, i t was based on r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f a m i n o r i t y d i s s e n t i e n t p o s i t i o n , and brought out as a r e s u l t of c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a m i n o r i t y problem. That i t was a s t u t e and p e n e t r a t i n g cannot be denied. But i t was i s o l a t e d ; and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t both i n i t s i s o l a t i o n and bjr i t s i s o l a t i o n . A few months a f t e r the Quebec conference r e s o -l u t i o n s had been r e p o r t e d the True Witness changed i t s tune. On A p r i l 14, 1865, i t a s s e r t e d t h a t i t had not pronounced on the i s s u e of C o n f e d e r a t i o n i t s e l f - b u t had-opposed the p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s of t h e ' U n i o n . 3 0 T h i s was q u i t e wrong. The change of h e a r t can perhaps be e x p l a i n e d . Lee had surrendered but f i v e days b e f o r e ; the True Witness had b e l i e v e d t h a t the o n l y safe f u t u r e f o r Canada l a y i n a balance o f power between a Northern Union and a Southern confederacy. Now the f u t u r e l a y darkened w i t h the heavy c l o u d of a g r i m l y v i c t o r i o u s North; and the True Witness (143) turn e d almost i n s t i n c t i v e l y to Union o f B r i t i s h North America. Where i t had once opposed the whole i d e a on p r i n c i p l e , i t now opposed i t on the d e t a i l s a l o n e . T h i s may not he the whole e x p l a n a t i o n , hut i t i s a l i k e l y s u r -mise. Once a g a i n the impact o f events below the border seems to have had the e f f e c t of weakening and s t u l t i f y i n g o p p o s i t i o n i n Canada. The p o s i t i o n of the True Witness i n d e a l i n g w i t h the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and the problems of a c o l o n i a l f e d e r a t i o n , c l o s e l y resembles the l o n g , c a r e f u l , c r i t i c a l speech o f C h r i s t o p h e r Dunkin. Dunkin was an independent C o n s e r v a t i v e , member f o r Brome county, near the U n i t e d S t a t e s b o r d e r . He s i d e d w i t h the Lower Canada L i b e r a l s on c o n f e d e r a t i o n , but went f a r beyond t h e i r r a t h e r f e e b l e o p p o s i t i o n . On Monday n i g h t , February 27, 1865, and the f o l l o w i n g Tuesday n i g h t , he d e l i v e r e d a c r i t i c i s m o f the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s which dwarfs any o t h e r i n the debates f o r sheer a b i l i t y and p e n e t r a t i o n . I t was comprehensive, i t was e x h a u s t i v e ; and i t showed C o n f e d e r a t i o n to be a p p a r e n t l y a shambling mass o f compromise and o f r u l e - o f -thumb methods. Dunkin d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t i n seventeen days " t h i r t y - t h r e e gentlemen" c o u l d produce a C o n s t i t u t i o n which was a happy and j u d i c i o u s combination of the b e s t i n the B r i t i s h system and the best i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s 32 system. In f a c t he maintained t h a t l e g i s l a t i v e u nion and f e d e r a l i s m were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and q u i t e imcompatible. (144) Moreover, f a r from talcing the b e s t i n each, he maintained the worst had been taken from each, and these t o g e t h e r w i t h c o n c e s s i o n s to Lower Canada and compromises t o other s e c t i o n s , produced an* i n d e s c r i b a b l e j u m b l e . 3 3 H i s speech was p r i n c i p a l l y concerned i n p o i n t -i n g out j u s t what these compromises and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s were. In doing so, he prophesied, w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s c i e n c e , problems of the Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n which 34 have a r i s e n s i n c e 1867. The p o i n t was t h a t he c o u l d n o t b e l i e v e the h a s t e w i t h which c o n f e d e r a t i o n had been sug-gested, n e g o t i a t e d , brought b e f o r e the House, was i n the s l i g h t e s t j u s t i f i e d e i t h e r by the p r o j e c t i t s e l f o r by 35 the circumstances a t the time. Nothing good c o u l d come from such h a s t e , and much indeed t h a t was a n y t h i n g but good. Beneath t h i s g r e a t body of c r i t i c i s m was Dunkin's own b e l i e f and p o l i c y . He was not g r e a t l y i n t e r e s t e d i n a f e d e r a l government at a l l . The E n g l i s h system of r e s p o n s i -b l e government was to him the best system, and he h e l d to a maintenance of the e x i s t i n g u n i o n on t h a t ground. But, at the same time he knew the American c o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s background more thoroughly perhaps than any o t h e r of h i s contemporaries, and he was not i n the l e a s t d i sposed to disparage the work of 1787. By and l a r g e i t was by com-p a r i s o n w i t h the American c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t he made h i s most t e l l i n g p o i n t s a g a i n s t Canadian c o n f e d e r a t i o n . He chose h i s comparison w e l l . The harmony and balance o f (145) the American system c o n t r a s t e d s h a r p l y w i t h the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s , and showed the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s i n a most awkward and bumbling l i g h t . I t was i n a sense an u n f a i r comparison; the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s assumed the B r i t i s h system of government a t l e a s t as much as t h e y o v e r t l y mentioned the f e d e r a l system. C o n f e d e r a t i o n was a B r i t i s h system of govern-ment, en g r a f t e d w i t h f e d e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r the sake of p e r p e t u a t i n g the i n h e r i t a n c e of a s i g n i f i c a n t m i n o r i t y . I t was a compromise. I t was a compromise l a r g e l y f o r the sake of French Canada. Dunkin wanted no such compromise. He wanted a c l o s e r u n i o n o f the Canadas, not a more a t t e n -uated one. Had he been l e s s c l e a r an a n a l y s t , he might have been l e d to b e l i e v e h i s o b j e c t was accomplished. There was c e r t a i n l y a good d e a l i n the Quebec r e s o l u t i o n s which suggested t h a t a c l o s e r union was d e s i r e d . But Dunkin saw i n s t e a d the d i r e c t i o n of the new system. He saw t h a t l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , once c r e a t e d , would q u i t e c o n c e i v a b l y extend the system beyond what was intended at Quebec. P r o v i n c i a l governments would n a t u r a l l y tend to a m p l i f y r a t h e r than d i m i n i s h t h e i r power. In such c i r -cumstances he con s i d e r e d the compromises, the l o o s e n e s s , the c a r e l e s s wording of some o f the resolutions, the speed of t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n , to be dangerous f o r the f u t u r e , when the s t r a i n and s t r e s s of p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e and c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s would t h r e a t e n t o wreck the l o o s e l y - f r a m e d c o n s t i -(146) t u t i o n . Dunkin was too sharp an a n a l y s t t o have much con-f i d e n c e i n the f o r c e of c e n t r a l i s i n g t e n d e c i e s which studded the r e s o l u t i o n s . He c o u l d not b e l i e v e as some o t h e r s d i d t h a t the l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s would g r a d u a l l y tend t o w i t h e r away, l e a v i n g a l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n . Thus, though he wished a c l o s e r union o f the Canadas, he d i d not see C o n f e d e r a t i o n , f o r a l l i t s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , as the means to such a u n i o n . C o n f e d e r a t i o n was a compromise, and i t d i d not take Dunkin l o n g to show up many of i t s i n c o n g r u i t i e s . He f o l l o w e d the despatch o f C a r d w e l l to Monck 3 6 i n c r i t -i c i s i n g the f i x e d l i m i t of the l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l ; he 31 f o l l o w e d the c r i t i c i s m of t h e London. Times and the Edinburgh R e v i e w 3 8 injrespect of the wording o f the r e s -o l u t i o n s of the d i v i s i o n of powers. He c r i t i c i z e d the power o f d i s a l l o w a n c e . I t was, he s a i d , s u g g e s t i v e of the o n l y u n i f o r m i t y i n the whole system: the complete l a c k o f l o c a l autonomy. But t o h i s mind, t h i n g s should be what they are s t a t e d t o be. I f Canada was to have a f e d e r a l system, i t should be a f e d e r a l system, not a mere d i s p l a y o f words to cover another i n t e n t . Dunkin's c r i t i c i s m caused C a r t i e r to remark t h a t the power o f d i s a l l o w a n c e would presumably o n l y be e x e r c i s e d i n case of "unjust o r unwise l e g i s l a t i o n " . Dunking promptly r e p l i e d : " I f the law presumes anything o f the s o r t , 3 9 the law's a f o o l - a n a t u r a l f o o l ! " T h i s r e p l y ended (147) Mr, Cartier*s interruptions for the reminder of the evening. Dunkin*s speech was praised generously by sev-eral Upper Canadian papers for at least i t s candour and i t s c l a r i t y . The St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch considered i t the ablest of a l l the speeches delivered during the 40 41 debate; the Oshawa Vindicator said the same. The Montreal Gazette however c r i t i c i z e d the speech with re-gard to several heresies which Dunkin had delivered against the B r i t i s h constitution. It i s an amusing reflection on the Gazette's pro-British attitude that i t accounted i t a heresy to rank the .United States Senate as the best deliverative body i n the world. Heresy or not, Dunkin*s speech was probably the most powerful attack the new constitution sustained during the period of i t s incubation, 1864-1867. After i t was over, the remainder of the speeches seemed to contemporaries anti-climatic. Comments began to appear not long afterward suggesting the Debate had just about talked i t s e l f out. ° Dunkin's attack was conspicuous among a number of rather weak opposition speeches. No other opposition speaker had the grasp and the insight into constitutional problems and background of Dunkin. The Liberals, Holton and Huntingdon, did l i t t l e more than suggest there was too much haste. But none of the opposition, Dunkin included, seemed to have much to suggest as a substitute. Most of (148) the opposition wanted a continuance of the status quo. Yet Brown had noted that a return to the old state of things before coalition was quite impossible. The Reform party had come too far on the way to "rep. by pop."., for there to be any turning back. The opposition which Dunkin offered was therefore merely criticism. He had nothing to substitute for the measure he so ably ridiculed. Thus his work was mainly that of pointing out to the government the problems which forced them, and to perhaps render them less sanguine of the perfection of the reso-lutions which they had framed at Quebec. English-speaking opinion in Canada East was thus s p l i t neatly into two sections; for and against Confederation. The English Protestants gave a rather uncritical allegiance to the project. They wanted a leg-islative union i f possible, but realized that there might have to be some concessions to French Canada. The English Catholics; together with some Protestant liberals and independents were entirely opposed to confederation. The English Protestants were supporters not just of Gait's 1858 plan of federation, but for a l l the central-ising tendencies which Macdonald or Gait wanted to add to the plan i n 1864. The Catholics wanted the status quo, i f possible; but i f there was to be a new constitution, they insisted that i t be rooted in the sovereignty of the individual province. The federal government i n their eyes (149) must be a d e l e g a t e d government. In the end, o p p o s i t i o n f a i l e d . I t f a i l e d because i t had n o t h i n g p r a c t i c a l t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r the p l a n o f c o n f e d e r a t i o n but a r e t u r n to the s t a t u s quo. Such a r e t u r n would have provoked a near r e v o l u t i o n i n Upper Canada. The o p p o s i t i o n f a i l e d because i t had no c o n s t r u c t i v e p l a n ; i t had o n l y c r i t i c i s m . I t f a i l e d because i t c o u l d garner no s o l i d support f o r an essen-t i a l l y n e g a t i v e p o l i c y i n a d i f f i c u l t and t r o u b l e d time. The C a t h o l i c o p p o s i t i o n i n Lower Canada was weakened by such circumstances, and i t s p o l i c y rendered much l e s s t o l e r a b l e by the I r i s h i n v a s i o n of Canada from the U n i t e d S t a t e s . When the Church gave i t s o r d e r s i n June 1867, the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g C a t h o l i c o p p o s i t i o n of Canada E a s t q u i e t l y bowed i t s head t o the i n e v i t a b l e . C o n f e d e r a t i o n as a whole shows the impress o f the i d e a s o f the P r o t e s t a n t s of Lower Canada. Powerful e c o n o m i c a l l y t h e y tended a l s o t o be powerful p o l i t i c a l l y . They had the s a t i s f a c t i o n of s e e i n g the p l a n o f t h e i r C a binet r e p r e s e n t a t i v e adopted a t Quebec w i t h s u r p r i s i n g -l y l i t t l e change. A s t r a t e g i c group p o l i t i c a l l y , they made the most of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . A c o n s e r v a t i v e group, they made the most of the t a c t i c a l e r r o r s of Brown. They wanted l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n but knew t h a t i t would not s a t i s f y the French; t h e y got a unio n which d i d s a t i s f y the French, and one which might almost have been c a l l e d (150) a legislative union. They were satisfied in 1867; they had preserved strong central government, and Cartier 44 had not been unprepared to make concessions. While Gait had not been able to secure them a l l the minority guarantees of education which they might have liked, they felt fairly secure, confident that the strong arm of the central power would be ready to rescue them in any local difficulty. Notes 1. Le Journal de Quebec samedi 30 a v r i l , 1861;, on announcing i t s change from a tri-weekly to a da i ly . 2. See map i n Skelton, O.D. Gait opp. p. 16. 3 . Creighton, D.G. "Br i t i sh North America at confederation" i n Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial relations Appendix 2, p. 53~T i | . Population of Lower Canada by origins : (1861 census) Native French 81f7,320 " non-Frencbll67,578 Ireland 50,192 United States 13,61;! (English speaking: 267,000 app.) Scotland 13,160 (French speaking: 81;8,000 app.) England 13,139 Population of Lower Canada by religious b e l i e f : ( l 8 6 l census) Church of Rome 9k 2, 7 21; Church of England 63,322 Est.Church of Scotl 'd 23,688 Free Church of " 11;, 770 United Presbyterians 5*11*9 (Protestant 150,000 app.) Wesleyan Methodists 25,879 (Roman Catholic 9^3,000 app.) Other Methodists 2,537 Baptists 7,751 Congregationalists U,927 2nd Adventists 2,305 5. Reported i n the Globe Tues. Nov. 29, 1861;, without confirmation. It i s quite probablg, however, i n view of Dunkin's well-known desire to keep the legis lat ive union. 6. Macdonald to Gait, Nov. 2, -J.867. Dated from Toronto. . " . . . Y o u c a l l yourself a Rouge. There may have been at one time a reddish tinge about you, but I could observe i t becoming by degrees fainter. In fact you are l ike Byron's Dying Dolphin, exhibiting a series of colours— 'the last s t i l l loveliest '—and that las t i s 'true blue ' , being the co l -our I affect. "Seriously you would make a decent Conservative, i f you gave your own judgement a f a i r chance and cut loose from Holton and Dorion and those other beggars. So pray do become true blue at once: i t i s a good standing colour and bears washing." i n Skelton, O.D. op .c i t . p.229-230. This i s an interesting example of Macdonald's methods. 7. Quebec, Morning Chronicle Mon. Oct. 17, 1861;. Quoting a "recent writer" who I have been unable to trace. 8. Note the reaction of La Minerve. See Chapter IV. 9. Morning Chronicle Mon. Oct. 17, I86J4. 10. Gazette Thurs. Sept. 8, 1861;. The Gazette was concerned over the differ-ence of opinion i n two professedly ministerial papers, one English, and the other French.(La Minerve) The Gazette said that we "are willing that on certain reserved questions, the local governments should have plenary power, subject only to the right of the federal governnent, recognized by - i i -10. (cont'd) "La Minerve, to intervene i n our local contests when they trouble public peace. 11. Gazette F r i . Sept. 9, 186U. The following e d i t o r i a l provides a good ex-ample of a mature Canadian judgment of the C i v i l War. "The Southerners claim with good show of reason that the separate States being sovereign and independant they have a right to secede. After a careful study of the history of their constitution, we agree with them i n opinion. But while we agree with them i n opinion, we also believe that i t was a great mistake i n the founders of the constitution—an i n -herent weakness i n that instrument, that the States retained any such power. The greatest men,-such as Hamilton, sarcforesaw the danger, and protested eloquently against i t i n the Federalist—but as a matter of fact, their warnings were not sufficiently heeded^ and either through the acceptance of a form of words i n two different senses by different States, or by some shuffling evasion or mental reservation, a constitu-tion was adopted which f a i r l y admitted of two interpretations. The Vir-ginia and Kentucky resolutions show meaning that the South entertained of the proper constitutional powers of a federal government. The trouble has arisen now out of t h i s — t h a t the federal government and congress have claimed an exercise of power, not over the states or their intern-a l government, but over the territories held i n common, and over the commerce of the whole country, which the South? restates believed to be opposed to their interests, and such an infringement of their rights as to justify their secession....Therefore we desire to limit the powers of the local and separate provincial legislatures, i f they are to be established, very s t r i c t l y and e x p l i c i t l y . Therefore we advocate so. earnestly either a legislative union with a constitutional recognition of a federal principle, i f possible; or, i f not, federal union with the powers of local legislation very d i s t i n c t l y defined and very s t r i c t -ly limited. Between these two forms of government there would be but l i t t l e difference—except this, that the latter would be somewhat more expensive and involve a larger measure of direct taxation than the former. See also the statements of John Rose, member for Montreal Centre, Conf. Debates, p. 1*01*.2. 12. Gazette Yfed. May 1, 1867. 13. Gazette F r i . June 7, 1867. Iii. The Conservatives of Canada East found i t very d i f f i c u l t to sympathize with the c r i t i c a l and detached opinion opinion of the liberal-Conserv-atives of Canada West. In the Conservative line i n Canada East there is much that resembles the attitude of the Globe . The Morning Chronicle objected to the fact that the Toronto Leader had not buried the hatchet along with everyone else. "Our,contemporary may not find the new combin-ation to his taste..../but/ If we are never to le£ 'byegore s be bye-gone s' when are we to have peace ? ...Enough of personality—enough of recriminations—let us away with theme, and i n place of narrow-minded partisanship, of vituperation and s c u r r i l i t y , find a nobler exercise of our energies and our intelligence i n a broad and common patriotism. The country needs peace and honest efforts. Why may i t not have them ?" .Morning Chronicle Mon. June 27, l86lu - i i i -15. The actual name of this journal i s the True Witness and Catholic Chron- icle . Not to be confused with the Montreal Witness, a Protestant inde-perdent journal. 16. Speech at Cookshire, Compton Co., Canada East, Dec. 22, I86I4. Given at a dinner i n honour of the member for Compton, J . H. Pope. In Speeches and Addresses, chiefly on the subject of British-American union. London Chapman, 1665. P» 128.Also reported i n the Globe Dec. 29, 1864, which had quoted the report of the Richmond guardian. 17. Conf. Debates p. 145.2. 18. Cartier, Ross and Gait to Bulwer-Lytton, Oct. 25, 1858. (Confidential) See Chapter I, n. 36. 19. Ibid. 20. Cartwright suggests this. See Chapter II, n. 24. 21. John A. Macdonald has been compared with Hamilton; but I might venture to suggest that i f any comparisons are to be made, the comparison of Gait with Hamilton closer.Macdonald lacked the vision of Gait, and lacked Gait's p o l i t i c a l courage i n putting such visions into concrete terms before they had been taken up publicly. Macdonald was a conserv-ative and an able leader. He might i n some respects be compared with Washington. 22. Gait's speech to his constituents i s reported i n f u l l i n the Glcb e Mon. Nov. 28, 1864. It took twelve columns of small print to reprod-uce the speech. Gait said that though the term "federation" was used, i t must not be supposed that the present union was "intended to imit-ate the Federal Union which we had seen existing in.the United States." Gait said that the Conference had considered what type of government would be adopted, but there were no differences of opinion on the re-solve to follow British principles. "They a l l preferred that system which' they had enjoyed for the last eighteen years....They were unan-imously of the opinion that this system was more l i k e l y to operate for the benefit of the people than any attempt to introduce the fjtmer-ican system of government." As to the form of the general government, Gait said "that form was copied almost l i t e r a l l y from the system exist-ing i n the several Provinces." Gait's speech took place on Wed. Nov. 23, 1864. 23. Pope was speaking at the same dinner as McGee on Dec. 22, 1864. See note 16. 24. Globe Sat. Dec. 31, 1864. 25. James O'Balloran, member for Mississquoi:"The reason why so large a por-tion of the people of Lower Canada of French origin w i l l not consent to a legislative union i s the very reason that makes i t desirable to the English speaking population of Lower Canada. We are i n favor <£ a leg-i s l a t i v e union. We desire that Canada should be a united people, ignor-ing sectionalism, and basing our institutions upon one broad principle of Canadian nationality, which shall blend a l l races, and i n tins o b l i t -- i v -25. (cont'd) "erate a l l accidental distinctions of language, religion, or origin." Conf. Debates p. 793.2. O'Halloran, despite his name, did not represent Irish opinion, but rather English Protestant. 26. Montreal, True Witness Friday June 24, 1864. This "whole scheme /of con-federation/ i s humbug, and is merely the gilding with which i t i s pro-posed to cover the bitter p i l l of Representation by population...." The best so lution, thought the True Witness, would be simply to repeal the legislative union. "This solution would i n f l i c t no wrong, no i n -justice upon either; i t would leave both free and independent, but i t would not satisfy the Protestant Reform party of which the real object i s the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant ascendancy." 27. True Witness F r i . July 1, 1864. "In short, to dispose of the whole question as to the efficacy of Federal Union to promote concord, we have but to ask ourselves—what are the Southerners fighting for ? ... We r e p l y — t o throw off a yoke which long years of bitter experience has proved to be too grievous to be borne; a yoke, alas 1 which some amongst us i t seems are intent on imposing on Canada. We are, and we are not ashamed to own i t , Secessionists at heart, sympathizers with the South; not because we do not detest slavery—but because heart and soul we uphold the principle of S&ate-Rights agaisnst Federal Sovereign-ty, or i n other words, Centralisation." v 28. True Witness F r i . Sept. 23, 1864. 29. True Witness F r i . Aug. 19, 1864. 30. True Witness F r i . April 14, 1865. 31. True Witness F r i . March 3, 1865. The position of the §outte rn States, said the True Witness, enlists the sympathies of a l l Canadians. Not only i s the cause of true liberty being fought, but more important, Canadians' own "welfare is involved i n the struggle;...the future of Canada is being determined not on the floor of the Provincial Parlia-ment, but i n Virginia and the Carolinas...." The True Witness went on to argue that only by a southern Victory could a North American balance of power beaachieved i n which Canada could feel secure. 32. Conf. Debates p. 489.2. Dent states that Dunkin's speech occupied two days and two nights. Dent, J.C. The l a s t forty years i i . 4 4 9 - This i s i n -correct according to the Journals. Journal s, 1865, ~PP. 157 and 161. 33. Conf. Debates p. 501.2. 34. Notably his warning of the great d i f f i c u l t i e s i n forming a cabinet for the new government. He argued that the Legislative Council cuuld hardly be considered a true federalizing agent, and that perforce the Cabinet would have to do such work. See Conf. Debates pp.497.2- 500.1. 35. This statement provoked the remark from McGee: "If 'twere done, 'twere well 'rctwere done quickly." McGee must have realized as soon as.he said this that the allusion was unfortunate. Dunkin replied that McGee was too good a scholar not to know that the allusion was to sone thing very bad. "The hon. gentleman is welcome to a l l he can make out of his quo--V-35- (cont'd) "tation...." Ibid. p. U86. T1E words of McGee are slightly mis-quoted from Act. I. Scene VII of Macbeth. 3 6 . See Chapter II, note 3 3 . 37. London Times Tues. Dec. 13, 186U. "It i s exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to con-strue these provisions. First, general powers of legislation are given i n the widest terms to the General Parliament; then a power i s given especially to make laws on thirty-seven subjects, one of those being a l l matters of a general character not exclusively reserved to the local legislatures. /Resolution 29, subsection 37./ Nothing i s exdusively reserved to the local legislatures....In the same way, what are matters of a private and local nature not assigned to the Gneral Parliament ? /Resolution U3, subsection 1$./ Dunkin quotes some interesting passages from the same issue, Conf. Debates p. 506.2. 38. Edinburgh Review (Jan. 1865) CXXI. # 21*7. "The British American Feder-ation" Dunkin refers especially to criticism of the looseness of the wording of some of the clauses, which criticism was contained i n a footnote on p. 187 of the January issue. 39. Conf. Debates p. 502.1. Slightly misquoting Dickens' Mr. Bumble, i n Chapter VI of Oliver Twist.The actual words are, "The law i s a ass, an i d i o t . . . . " hp* St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch Thurs. May 18, 1865. 1+1. Oshawa Vindicator Wed. March 8 th , 1865. 1*2. See Skelton's remarks on this speech i n his Gait p. 375. Also Gray, J.H. Confederation Toronto,Copp, 1872. pp. £8X270-272. ii3» Quebec, Morning Chronicle Mon. March 6th, 1865. There i s an interest-ing comment on the last few days of the confederation debate. "The Confederation discussion i s growing wofully / s i c / stale; not a new idea js to be coined and hononable gentlemen are doomed to talk to the clock and empty benches of the Legislative Chambers.... In truth the question of Union of the Provinces, upon the grounds upon which i t has been discussed is worn threadbare, and no one cares to l i s t e n to ffain repetitions, worse and worse, presented as each fresh speaker brings the dead carcase of a worn-out argument to f i l l up the leaden periods he i s endeavoring to make acceptable to ah unwilling and wearied audience." hh* There were several references i n the contemporaryE press suggesting that Cartier wanted a two-chamber local legislature for Lower Canada because of the English minority. The assumption was that there would be some amel-ioration of French dominance in the local legislature by± concessions to an English minority representation i n the upper chamber of the local legislature. Cartier's contemporaries were unwilling to accept his ex-planation that the two-chamber lo c a l government was simply because of tradition. (151) CHAPTER YI CONCLUSION (15S) The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of f e d e r a l i s m i s the r e -l a t i o n between the c e n t r a l and the r e g i o n a l governments. In a f e d e r a l s t a t e , t h i s r e l a t i o n should be e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t o f e q u a l i t y ; i f t h e r e i s any o t h e r r e l a t i o n a f e d -e r a l s t a t e cannot r e a l l y be s a i d t o e x i s t . The C e n t r a l and r e g i o n a l governments are simply equals, o f which the c e n t r a l government i s but the primus i n t e r p a r e s . The q u e s t i o n of the r e s i d u a l powers, w h i l e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t , does not a f f e c t fundamentally t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p of e q u a l t o e q u a l . L e t the r e s i d u a l powers be where they may, the fundamental c r i t e r i o n o f f e d e r a l i s m should be simply t h a t the c e n t r a l and the r e g i o n a l governments be e q u a l , t h a t i s equal i n the sense o f b e i n g s o v e r e i g n i n t h e i r own sphere. In a f e d e r a l s t a t e , t h e r e should never be s u b o r d i n a t i o n of one government to another. The q u e s t i o n o f whether the c e n t r a l o r the r e g i o n a l governments are subordinate does not e x i s t . They are both s o v e r e i g n , ergo, n e i t h e r i s s u b o r d i n a t e . The word " f e d e r a l i s m " t h u s d e f i n e d i s r e a s o n -a b l y p r e c i s e . I t can i n essence mean o n l y one t h i n g . F e d e r a l i s m may take a v a r i e t y o f forms; the emphasis g i v e n t o the r e g i o n a l governments i n one country may v a r y from the emphasis g i v e n t o them i n another; but the i n n e r r e l a t i o n between the c e n t r a l and r e g i o n a l w i l l be the same. (153) There may e x i s t forms of government i n which the powers of the c e n t r a l government are d e l e g a t e d and s u b o r d i n a t e . There may e x i s t forms of government i n which the powers of the r e g i o n a l governments are d e l e g a -t e d and s u b o r d i n a t e . But these forms o f government are not f e d e r a l as the term has been' d e f i n e d . They may be c a l l e d " f e d e r a l " , o r one of the v a r i a t i o n s of the word, but they are not t r u l y f e d e r a l s t a t e s . The q u e s t i o n t h e r e f o r e a r i s e s , i s Canada a f e d e r a l s t a t e ? The answer must be t h a t i t undoubtedly i s . But what Canada i s , and what i t was intended to be, are not the same t h i n g . Q u i t e simply the Quebec R e s o l -u t i o n s were not intended to g i v e Canada a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . The purpose of the r e s o l u t i o n s was to make l o c a l governments e s s e n t i a l l y subordinate t o the c e n t r a l power. Canadian f e d e r a l i s m i s the r e s u l t of an h i s t o r i c a l process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The B r i t i s h North America A c t d i d not of i t s e l f C.M*X\. a f e d e r a l system. T h i s i s what K. C. Whease meant when he s a i d t h a t : "Canada has not a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , i t has a f e d e r a l government." 1 I t was not a f e d e r a l system t h a t the Can-adian l e a d e r s had i n mind. George Brown had used the word " f e d e r a l " i n a l l s i n c e r i t y to mean a " f e d e r a l " system i n the c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t u r e a l o n e . Macdonald had an i d e a o f what i t meant, but saw the word " f e d e r a l " a convenient d i s g u i s e f o r l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n . C a r t i e r saw (154) i t s imply as guarantees f o r French Canada. G a i t saw i t as the i n e v i t a b l e compromise between French and E n g l i s h Canada, 2 and was not above wanting to pre s e r v e E n g l i s h c o n t r o l at the c e n t r e i f p o s s i b l e . I t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t s i n c e the Canadian l e a d e r s d i d not know what f e d e r -a l i s m was, they c o u l d h a r d l y be expected t o i n s t i t u t e a f e d e r a l system. T h i s o f course i s p r e c i s e l y the p o i n t . They d i d not r e a l l y understand f e d e r a l i s m . Judging from the C i v i l War i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s they d i d not see any-v i r t u e i n f e d e r a l i s m . I t s e l a s t i c i t y might be u s e f u l -but o n l y as p a r t o f a s t r o n g system o f c e n t r a l government. They sought t o continue the e x i s t i n g system as f a r as p o s s i b l e , making such concessions as were n e c e s s a r y t o l o c a l government. Many and v a r i e d have been the m i s i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n s t h a t have f o l l o w e d from the use of the word " f e d e r a l w by the Canadian c a b i n e t to d e s c r i b e the consti-t u t i o n o f 1867. "The o b j e c t o f the a c t , " s a i d L o r d Watson i n 1892," was n e i t h e r to weld the p r o v i n c e s i n t o one, nor t o subordinate p r o v i n c i a l governments t o a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , but t o c r e a t e a f e d e r a l government i n which they should a l l be r e p r e s e n t e d , e n t r u s t e d w i t h the e x c l u s i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a f f a i r s i n which they had a common i n t e r e s t , each p r o v i n c e r e t a i n i n g i t s i n -dependence and autonomy". 3 The d e v i a t i o n from the conc e p t i o n o f f e d e r a l i s m i n Canada 1864-1867 i s ob v i o u s . (155) JLs f a r as Canadians were concerned the o b j e c t of the Act was to weld the p r o v i n c e s i n t o one n a t i o n , by s u b o r d i n a -t i n g the l o c a l governments t o c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . Had the P r i v y C o u n c i l admitted the Quebec R e s o l u t i o n s as evidence of the i n t e n t i o n s of the F a t h e r s , 4 they might have seen t h i s more c l e a r l y . In the Quebec R e s o l u t i o n s the p r o v i n -c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s are not g i v e n an " e x c l u s i v e " power. They were no t even " p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s " , they were " l o c a l " . Indeed the m u n i c i p a l analogy runs r i g h t through 5 Canadian i d e a s on f e d e r a l government. Doubtless the Quebec R e s o l u t i o n s cannot s u s t a i n c l o s e a n a l y s i s ; they were indeed l o o s e l y framed. But i f the wording cannot be r e l i e d upon f o r l e g a l argument, i t may a t l e a s t be taken as some evidence o f i n t e n t i o n . Yet the P r i v y C o u n c i l took i t s own l i n e on what the i n t e n t i o n s of the F a t h e r s were. There i s some s u s p i c i o n t h a t the word " f e d e r a l " was accepted by the P r i v y C o u n c i l as meaning e s s e n t i a l l y what ifc meant i n p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , q u i t e without r e g a r d f o r the Canadians 1 c o n c e p t i o n o f the meaning of the word. The m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Canadian f e d e r a l i s m by the P r i v y C o u n c i l and by o t h e r s was rendered the more p l a u s i b l e by the growth of a p r o v i n c i a l r i g h t s movement a f t e r 1867, e s p e c i a l l y i n the 1880's. T h i s movement was evidence t h a t , d e s p i t e i n t e n t i o n , Canada was becoming a f e d e r a l s t a t e . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of l o c a l governments i n (156) 1867 o n l y began the development of a f u l l - f l e d g e d t h e o r y of f e d e r a l government, C h r i s t o p h e r Dunkin had suggested t h a t t h i s would happen. He b e l i e v e d t h a t i f a f e d e r a l system were t o be i n a u g u r a t e d i t should be g i v e n much more s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; once l o c a l governments were formed the growth o f f e d e r a l i s m was almost i n e v i t a b l e ; t h e n the confused r e l a t i o n s between c e n t r a l and l o c a l governments which he saw i n the Quebec R e s o l u t i o n s would become i m p o s s i b l e . The Canadian m i n i s t r y , i n Dunkin's eyes, were simply d e c e i v i n g themselves i f they b e l i e v e d t h a t they had overcome s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . L o c a l gov-ernments would be the n u c l e i around which s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s would c r y s t a l i z e , Dunkin's p o i n t was t h a t sooner o r l a t e r f e d e r a l government would come, and when i t d i d the system formed a t Quebec would not be able t o take the s t r a i n . T h i s a n a l y s i s i s sound. Dunkin simply argued t h a t there was no p o i n t i n t r y i n g to get two t h i n g s at once. You c o u l d not have l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n and f e d e r a l u n i o n a t the same time - a t l e a s t not i n Canada, w i t h s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s l y i n g h a l f dormant, simply w a i t i n g t o be f o s t e r e d . The argument of Dunkin's was not heeded, because perhaps the c o n s t i t u t i o n formed i n 1867 had to be what i t was. I t was a compromise, a compromise between the E n g l i s h d e s i r e f o r l e g i s l a t i v e u n i o n , and the French d e s i r e f o r f e d e r a l u n i o n . A f e d e r a l system (157) could not have passed even i f i t had been proposed; nor was a legislative union possible. The natural result was to keep as much of the old system of legislative union as possible, and to introduce only as much of the new system of federalism as would satisfy the French. The Rowell- Sirois Commission l e f t the question of the intentions of the Fathers an open one. It sug-gested there were arguments on both sides, that no f i n a l historical interpretation was perhaps possible. Yet i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that the intentions of the Fathers can be i n doubt. Certainly the intentions of the Canadian cabinet can hardly remain an open question. Their intentions are reflected in the public press which supported them and supported their arguments. What the Canadian cabinet thought about federal government i s reflected i n the pages of the Toronto Globe, Montreal La Minerve and the Montreal Gazette. What the Canadian people thought, for and against the issue of confedera-tion i s reflected in other journals, English and French. The f i n a l historical interpretation of the intentions of the framers of the Quebec Resolutions cannot be established conclusively from an analysis of contemporary opinion in the province of Canada alone. It i s a larger historical problem than just the idea re-garding federalism i n the Province of Canada, 1864-1867. But i t is not too' much to suggest that the intentions of (158) the Canadian c a b i n e t dominated the Quebec Conference and the r e s o l u t i o n s t h a t the Conference produced. What the i n t e n t i o n s of the Canadian c a b i n e t were i n r e s p e c t of f e d e r a l government, and what the Canadian people thought of those i n t e n t i o n s , has been the s u b j e c t of t h i s t h e s i s . T h e i r i n t e n t i o n was t o preserve the s t r e n g t h o f l e g i s l a t i v e union w h i l e con-c e d i n g t o l o c a l governments those elements which caused s e c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . The l o c a l governments were intended to be l o c a l governments. The i n t e n t i o n of the r e s o l u -t i o n s was c l e a r t o both s i d e s on the c o n f e d e r a t i o n q u e s t i o n . The i n t e n t i o n t o form a s t r o n g c e n t r a l gov-ernment w i t h l o c a l guarantees may have been applauded o r opposed; but the i n t e n t i o n i t s e l f was not s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n e d . C o n f e d e r a t i o n was"recognized f o r what i t was. Canadians knew a t l e a s t the g e n e r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Quebec R e s o l u t i o n s , whether they supported them o r n o t . C o l o n e l Rankin, i n s u p p o r t i n g the R e s o l u t i o n s , s a i d t h a t i f C o n f e d e r a t i o n was not a l e g i s l a t i v e union i n name, i t was at l e a s t something v e r y c l o s e l y r e -1 sembling i t . E r i c D o r i o n i n opposing the measure s a i d t h a t c o n f e d e r a t i o n was simply a l e g i s l a t i v e union i n o d i s g u i s e , and to c a l l i t a f e d e r a l union was nonsense. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of these remarks l i e s not o n l y i n the r e s p e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s of the groups Rankin and Dorion r e p r e s e n t e d ; i t l i e s i n the g e n e r a l r e c o g n i t i o n by both (159) men t h a t ' C o n f e d e r a t i o n was l i t t l e more than a m o d i f i e d l e g i s l a t i v e union, c o n v e n i e n t l y l a b e l l e d " f e d e r a l " . T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n pervaded Canadian id e a s on the s u b j e c t of c o n f e d e r a t i o n , and i t was indeed an a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n of the a t t i t u d e and purpose of the Canadian Government. F i n a l l y , f o r Canadians i t was a q u e s t i o n of e x p e r i e n c e . L i k e the C o n s e r v a t i v e s of the American R e v o l u t i o n , ^ they wanted the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y of the B r i t i s h system, w i t h any l o c a l govern-ment s u b s e r v i e n t t o the c e n t r a l . The words o f L o r d Bryce, a p p l i e d to the F a t h e r s of the American c o n s t i t u t i o n , f i t e q u a l l y w e l l the F a t h e r s of the Canadian. "They p r e f e r r e d to walk i n o l d paths, t o f o l l o w the methods (A which experience had t e s t e d " . The o l d path f o r Canadians was the Union of 1840, the methods t e s t e d by experience were those o f r e s p o n s i b l e government. Beneath the sense of a new n a t i o n a l i t y l a y t h i s c e n t r a l i n f l u e n c e of past experience i n B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t was not the North American environment, i t was not i d e a s of American f e d e r a l i s m t h a t a f f e c t e d fundamentally the Canadian c o n c e p t i o n of C o n f e d e r a t i o n ; i t was Canadian experience, Canadian i d e a l s , and the l o n g and hallowed h i s t o r y o f the B r i t i s h c o n n e c t i o n . Notes 1. Wheare, K.G. Federal Government p. 21. 2. Gait maintained that "property and c i v i l rights" was only given to the loca l legislatures as a guarantee for French cultural autonomy. See Creighton, D.G. "British North America at confederation "p. 58. Lower notes that "property and c i v i l rights" wass used i n the old French meaning of personal property and individual and fanily rights connec-ted with such property. Lower, A.R.M. Colony to Nation Toronto, Long-mans, 1947. P« 331. See also Report of Royal Commission on Dominion- Provincial Relations pp.34-35* (Vol. %.) 3 . Lord Watson i n "Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick" /1892/ A.C. 437. p . . 4 l 8 of the judgment. Cam-eron, E.R. The Canadian constitution as interpreted by the Judicial Com- mittee of the Privy Council...Winnipeg, Butterworth, 1915. P 442. i i . Lord Sankey i n "Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada and others" /1930/ A.C. 12i|..p. 25 of the judgment. Plaxton, C P. Canad- ian constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1930-1939 Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939". P« 136. Lord Sankey was sympathetic to the large view of the powers <£ the central govern-ment, but implied that the duty of the .Privy ^Council was to interpret what was said, not what was intended. Presumably the Quebec Resolutions are therefore inadmissable as evidence of i^ention. 5. Creighton refers to the analogy of the old Colonial system as that which lay behind the idea of confederation. This i s a suggestive line of thought. But the continued use of municipal terms by Canadians writing and speaking of Confederation suggests that they thought of i t i n terra of local government rather than of the Colonial system. Local govern-ments were more apt to be compared to local county or municipal i n s t i t -utions than with the colonial status of Canada i n relation to Great Brit-ain. Canadians viewed the relation of the union government of the prov-ince of Canada to local county and municipal institutions as reasonably analagous to the relation of the new Federal governne nt to the new local legislatures. The old Colonial system was a l i t t l e too far i n the past for Canadians tos look readily to i t for ideas on confederation. It was freely admitted i n the confederation debates that Canada had become v i r -tually self-governing i n her internal a f f a i r s . See however Creighton, D.G. Dominion of the Horth Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1944. pp.304-311. 6. Report on Dominion-Provincial relations i . p. 36. 7. Conf. Debates p. 918.1. 8. Ibid. p. 858.1. 8. "In a general way the Conservatives knew what kind of a governne nt they wanted. They wanie d a centralized government that would take the place of the British government....mere local authority should be subservient to the supreme decision of Congress." Jensen, M. "The articles of con-federation: a re-interpretation." Pacific Historical Review V x . # 2 (June 1937) P. 130. -10. Bryce, J. The American Commonwealth New York, MacMillan, 19 l5 . (5th Ed.) 2 Vols, i , 34. A P P E N D I X 1. Regional opposition to Confederation, Legislative Assembly. OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA WEST, MARCH, 1665.1 Baaed on the division on MacDonald'a main motion, Conrad. Debates p. 962.2. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY VtftMxto M hi 'Nil Conservative opposition, usually meaning opposition to the federal system. lA1 A* NO *.H>M<L Liberal or Reform opposition. Liberal op-gosition was usually that the scheme of onfederation was premature, Reform op-position that Confederation was too ex-pensive a price to pay for"rep. by pop1. OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA EAST, MARCH, 1665.(Basec^^the division ofi Macdonai^j-Jt lain motion, Confed. Debates v^T^zTzT LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY Conservative opposition to the federal sys tem: usually English Conservatives wanting legislative union. Bleu opposition to strong central governmc-Rouge opposition or English l i b e r a l oppos-it ion. W. c I-A P P E N D I X 2. Regional opposition to confederation, Legislative Council OPPOSITION TO CON FEDERATION IN CANADA WEST, FEBRUARY, 1865.(Based on the dlvisionon Tache's main motion, ConfecU, Debates p. 346.2. Legislative Council. Elected Members •ft Conservative opposition Reform opposition Conservative opposition of a Life Member of the„Legislative Council, place of residence indicated. Reform opposition of a Life Mshax Member of the Legislative Council place of residence indicated. OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA EAST, FEBRUARY, 1865.(Based on the division on Tache's main motion, Confed. Debates p. 346.2. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ELECTED rvIEMBERS Conservative opposition ". . Rouge or Liberal opposition Conservative opposition of l i f e member L C> Rouge opposition of l i f e member. W t U l R/6To tvi Iff / A P P E N D I X 3-Serial and Newspaper Bibliography. I American newspapers 1821-1936 New York, Wilson, 1937. Ed. W. Gregory The Canada directory for 1857-1858 (Corrected to Nov. 1857.) Montreal Lovell, 1857. Les journe'es de presse francaise a Quebec Quebec, Le Sol e i l , 1935. Locke, G. H. & Wallace, W. S. A joint catalogue of the periodicals and seriaiits in the libraries of the city of Toronto Toronto, King's Printer, 193U. Mitchell's Canadian gazeteer and business directory for 186U-5 Toronto, Chewett, 186k. Pettengill's newpaper directory and advertiser's handbook for 1877 New York, Pettengill, 1877. Tetu, H. Historique des journaax de Quebec Quebec, Brousseau, 1873 "Les journaux publies dans l e Bas-Canada 176i;-l81j.O" Bulletin des recher- ches historiques XXXVIII. # 8. (Aug..1932.) pp.U72-Q. Miller, H. 0. "The history of the newspaper press i n London, 1830-1875" Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Recordd XXXII.1937* pp.llk-139. Talman, J . J . "The newspaper press of Canada West, 1850-1860" Transactions Royal Society of Canada (RSC) Section 2. Vol. XXXIII. Series 3. (May 1939) PP. 11*9-171;. This i s by far the best article on the newspaper press, and i t i s a pity that there i s nothing comparable for the news-paper press of xCanada East. Tod, D. D. & Cordingly, A. # "A bibliography of Canadian l i t e r a r y period-i c a l s , 1789-1900" Transactions RSC. Section 2. Vol. XXVI. Series 3. (1932) pp. 87-96. Wallace, W.S. "The perdiodical literature of Upper Canada" CHR XII. # 1. (March 1931). pp.U-22. This covers the period prior to l 8 h l , but i s useful for background. Newspapers i n the Province of Canada Daily Tri-weekly Bi-weekly Weekly 1857 20 20 13 153 1864 19 1877(Ont. & P.Q.) 32 10 6 264 Total 206 198 312 Atuthority for 1857: The Canada directory for 1857-1858 (corrected to Nov. 1857) Montreal, Lovell, 1857-Authority for 1864: Mitchell's Canadian Gazeteer and business direct-ory for 1864-5 Toronto, Chewett, 1864. Atuthority for 1877: Pettengill's newspaper directory and advertiser's handbook for 1877 New York, Pettengill, 1877-Town & name o f J o u r n a l . . P o l . ^ p a r t y . P o l i t i c a l l e s s e e , Owner or p u b l i s h e r • F i l e s a v a i l a b l e a t . 1864-1867. B a r r i e Examiner Weekxly C o n s e r v a t i v e A r c h i v e s of Ontario > - i S c a t t e r e d c o p i e (More than 10) B a r r i e , n o r t h e r n Advaj i c e M Reform •- it J Few c o p i e s (Less than 10.) G a i t Reporter II Independent J a f f r a y Bros. W June-Dee.,1$67. K i n g s t o n , D a i l y Hews 2-weekly l i b - c o n s e r v . J . Rowlands Queens U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y Complete London Free Press D a i l y L i b e r a l J.& S.Blackburn U. of Western O n t . L i b r a r y ti Montreal, Gazette n C o n s e r v a t i v e Lo«$we & Chamber-l i n L i b r a r y of Parliament 11 Montreal H e r a l d II L i b e r a l E.G. Penny tt H Montreal,La Minerve tt B l e u C a r t i e r it tt Montreal, L'Ordre 3-weekly Mod.Rouge Li n g u e t & L a P l a n t e " II M o n t r e a l , Le Pays n Rouge A. A. Do r i o n it H Montreal,True Witness Weekly L i b e r a l -Rouge J . G i l l i e s A r c h i v e s o f Ontario II Montreal,L'Union Nat-i o n a l e D a i l y Rouge M.Lanetot L i b r a r y of Parliament tl 5t 3 Town & name of J o u r n a l . , , P o l . p a r t y , P o l i t i c a l l e s s e e , •owner or p u b l i s h e r . F i l e s a v a i l a b l e a t 1 8 6 4 - 1 8 6 7 . Montreal Witness 2-weekly Independent l i b e r a l John D o u g a l l Queens Univ. L i b r a r y Complete Newmarket E r a Weekly Reform A r c h i v e s of Onta r i o it Niagara M a i l n II it S c a t t e r e d c o p i e s . Oshawa V i n d i c a t o r II II Times P u b l i s h i n g , O s h -awa , Ont. Complete Ottawa, Le Canada 3-weekly B l e u Duversna£ F r e r e s L i b r a r y o f Parliament ScattBBed C o p i e s . Ottawa Times D a i l y C o n s e r v a t i v e R. Davis n Complete from Jan. 1866. Ottawa,The Union D a i l y Independent re f o r m II Issued July, 1 8 6 4 to O o t . , 1 8 6 5 . Quebec, Le Canadien 3-weekly Independent b l e u F. E v a a t u r e l n Complete Quebec,Morning Chron-i c l e D a i l y C o n s e r v a t i v e J . J . Foot n it Quebec, Le J o u r n a l de Quebec D a i l y B l e u J.E. Cauchon i l n Quebec D a i l y Mercury ti L i b e r a l S. MacDonaId it n S t . C atharines Const-i t u t i o n a l Weekly Reform A r c h i v e s o f Ontario S c a t t e r e d c o p i e s . c P o l i t i c a l l e s s e e , Town & name o f J o u r n a l . . P o l , p a r t y .owner or p u b l i s h e r . F i l e s a v a i l a b l e a t . 1864.-1867 S t . C a t h a r i n e s J o u r n a l D a i l y L i b . c o n s e r v . A r c h i v e s of O n t a r i o Few c o p i e s St. Thomas, Weekly D i s -patch Weekly Co n s e r v a t i v e Univ. of Western Ont L i b r a r y Complete S a r n i a Observer it Reform A r c h i v e s of Ontario Few c o p i e s Toronto, B r i t i s h Con-s t i t u t i o n 11 Independent re f o r m (Orange Order) it 11 Toronto, Canadian Free-man 11 C o n s e r v a t i v e ( I r i s h C a t h o l i c ) ti 18b4-J> S c a t t . c o p i e s 1866-7 Complete Toronto, Globe D a i l y Reform G. Brown L e g i s l a t i v e l i b r a r y , , O n t a r i o Complete Toronto, Leader 11 L i b . c o n s e r v . J . Beaty 11 11 London, England Times n (Read o n l y i n p a r t ; Nov. and D e c , 1 8 6 4 and Sept it . 1865.) Name .Purpose . I s s u e d ( r e a d 1863-7 o n l y ) . Where a v a i l a b l e B r i t i s h American Magazine "devoted to l i t e r a t u r e , s c i e n c e and a r t " Monthly. May 1 8 6 3 - A p r i l 1864. M o n t r e a l ( ? ) U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto L i b . Canadian q u a r t e r -l y review " n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and l i -t e r a t u r e " Quart. Jan. 1 8 6 4-April 1866 Hamilton Toronto Ref. L i b r a r y L'Echo de l a France Republishes e x t r a c t s from French p e r i o d i c a l s i n Europe M o n t r e a l Month. Dee . l 8 6 5-Dec. 186?. 11 4f L'Eoho du c a b i n e t de l e c t u r e ... Aimed to appeal to French c a t h o l i c f a m i l i e s . M o n t r e a l Month. Jan . l 8 5?-Dee. 1873 U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto L i b . Le f o y e r canadien S t o r i e s & a r t i c l e s but l i t t l comment on events. e Month. Jan.1863-Dec.1866 n New dominion L i t e r a r y magazine. Rather j u v e n i l e w r i t i n g Month. 1867-187? M o n t r e a l L e g i s l a t i v e l i b r a r y , O n t a r i o La F e u i l l e t o n P u b l i c a t i o n of F r e n c h s t o r i e s Month. Oct.1865-Sept.1867 M o n t r e a l Toronto Ref. L i b r a r y La revue canad-ienne Of B l e u sympathies, but w i t h a n a l y s e s o f a f a i r l y o b j e c t -i v e tone.The best o f the ser Monxth.Jan . l864-.Deo.l?22 M o n t r e a l i a l s . L e g i s l a t i v e l i b r a r y , O n t a r i o La Semaine O f f e r s news comment on s i g -n i f i c a n t r e l i g i o u s events. Month. Jan.l864-.Dec. 1864 Toronto Ref. L i b r a r y Saturday reader Weekly f a m i l y magazine. L i t -t l e or not comment on events Weekly.Sept.1865-Aug.186?. L e g i s l a t i v e l i b r a r y , O n t a r i o Les s o i r e e s can-adienne s " r e c u e i l de l i t t e r a t u r e n a t -i o n a l e " Month. Jan.1861-Deif .1865. U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto L i b . 5 Significant newspapers not included i n research Brantford Expositor Daily Guelph Mercury Weekly Hamilton Spectator Daily Hamilton Times Daily Kingston, British Whig Daily Montreal/?/, Le Defricheur ? Le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe ? Le Journal de St. Hyacinthe ? Reform Files no longer extant ? " Reform " Lib.-Cons. " iWmgfcReform " Rouge " Bleu Files available at the Legis-lative Library, Province of Quebec. Rouge Files no longer extant. A P P E N D I X h. Bibliography Bibliography I. Primary Sources (a) Manuscripts (b) Printed sources Collections of documents O f f i c i a l Unofficial I I . Secondary Sources (a) Books (b) Articles I I I . Bibliographical aids. I. Primary Sources (a) Manuscripts. Canada, Province of. Governor General. Desptaches received from the Secretary of State for the Col- onies . G.l. Vol. 1^9. January-May, lQ6k 160. June-December, 186U 161. January-May, 1865 162. June-December, 1865 163. January-May, 1866. 16U. June-August, 1866 165. September-December, 1866 166. January-April, 1867 167. May-August, 1867. Canada, Province of. Governor General. Letterbooks of despatches to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. G. 12. Vol . 69 . 106U-1865 70. I866-I867 71. Confidential despatches. Canada. Archives. Macdonald papers V0I.I46. Quebec conference ii7« London conference k8. B.N .A. Act drafts U9. " 50. Despatches. Minutes of Council 51. Correspondance, 1863-187U5 received 52. Miscellaneous printed material 55. Constitutional questions, 1860-1873-(b) Printed sources. Collections of documents. Keith, A.B. (ed.) Selected speeches and documents on British colonial policy 1763-1917. London, Oxford University Press, 19U8. (World's Classics) (b) Printed sources. Collections of documents (cont'd). Kennedy, W.P.M. (ed.) Statutes, treatises and documents of the Canad- ian constitution, 1713-1929. Toronto, Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1930. Pope, Sir J. Confederation; being a series of hitherto unpublished documents bearing on the British North America Act. Toronto, Carswell, 1895. Pope, Sir J. Correspondance of Sir John Macdonald. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1921. Tasse', J. (ed.) Discours /de Sir G.E. Cartier/ Montreal, Senecal,l893« (b) Printed sources. O f f i c i a l . Canada, Province of. Bureau of Agriculture and Statistics. Census of the Canadas, 1860-1861. Quebec, Foote, 1863. (2 Vols.) .Legislative Council. Journals. 1864-1866 inc. •Legislative Assembly. Journals. 1864-1866 inc. •Legislature. Parliamentary debates on the sub- ject of the confederation of the British North American provinces. Quebec, Hunter Rose, 1865. •Legislature. Sessional Papers. 1864-1866 inc. .Governor General. Despatches from Her Majesty's Secretary for the Colonies and other documents relating to the Union of the British North Amer- ican colonies... King's Printer, 1859. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Question of federation of the British provinces i n America. Colonial Office, November, T S F S : ~ . Colonial Office. Correspondance relative to a meeting at Quebec of delegates appointed to discuss the proposed union... London, HMSO, 1865. . Colonial Office. British North American provinces. Cor- respondance respecting the proposed union... Lon-don, HMSO, 1«67. •Parliament. Debates on the Confederation b i l l . . . /Lon-don, HMSO, 1867/ (b) Printed sources. Unofficial. B , Alphonse. Contre Poison; l a confederation c'est l a salut du Bas-Canada. Montreal, Senecal, 1867. (Archives of Canada # 3923.) This short pamphlet is anti-Rouge, and i s designed to r a l l y the French to the side of the Bleus, and away from Rouge anti-clericalism. /Blachford, F.R./ Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford, under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1860-1871. London, Murray, 1896. Blachford refers i n 186k to confederation, tak-ing the view that i t was necessary to balance the nec-essity for strong central governnent with the necess-i t y of protection for French-Canadian rights. Cartwright, Sir R.J. Reminiscences. Toronto Briggs, 1912. A fascinating and useful work. Cartwright's reflections an men and issues at the time of confederation throws the de-l i g h t f u l light of personal familiarity upon the scene. Cauchon, J.E. Etude sur 1'union projetee des provinces brittaniques. Quebec, Cote, 1858. This work condemns confederation and supports continuance of the legislative union. Cauchon, J./E./ L'Union des provinces de l'amerique brittanique du nord This work was claimed by Dent to be very influential i n affecting French-Canadian opinion favourably to-ward confederation. It i s partly concerned, of course, i n justifying Cauchon's change of heart from his op-position to confederation i n lf58.0au«W f - s Cherrier, C.S., Laberge, C. & Clerk, G.E. Discours sur l a confederation Montreal, Lanctot, 1865. (Archives of Canada # 322U) Representative of the views of the Rouges of L'Union Nationale. The work was printed by the 1'Union Nat- ionale pTess. /Durham/ Lord Durham's report on the affairs of British North America C. P» Lucas (ed.) 3 Vols. Vol. i . Introduction. Vol. i i . The report. Vol.iii.Appendices. Oxford, Clar-endon Press, 1912. Gooch, J. Manual or explanatory development of the act for the union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, i n one domin- ion under the name of Canada. Ottawa, Desbarats, 1867-Annoitated comment on the B.N .A. Act. Gray, J . H. Confederatlon; or the p o l i t i c a l and parliamentary history of Canada from the Conference at Quebec i n October* Itibh to the admission of British Columbia i n July, 10YX. Toronto, Coppm, 1«72. (b) Printed sources. Unofficial(cont'd). Hamilton, P.S. Union of the colonies of British North America Montreal, Lovell, 1864. Reprint of 3 papers on the subject publish-ed between 1854 and 1861, i n which the author argues for legislative union and advocates an hereditary viceroy. /Macdonald, A .A.//Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1864/ CHR, Vol. I . # 1 (March 1920) pp. 26-47. A.G. Doughty, Ed. Macdonald was a Reform delegate to the conference from P.E.I. /MacDougall, Wm/ /Notes/ i n his copy of the Confederation Debates. In the Archives section of the University of Toronto Lib-rary. /McGee, T.D./ The Crown and the confederation; Three letters to the Hon. John Alexander Macdonald by "A Backwoodsman" Mon-treal, Lovell, 1864. ' ,McGee, T.D. The Irish position i n British and republican North Amer- ic a . Montreal, Longmoore, 1866. McGee shows the Canad-ian Irish i n bit t e r opposition to the Fenians. McGee, T.D. The mental outfit of the raw Dominion, n.p., n.p., n.d. (Reprinted from the Montreal Gazette, Nov. 5, 1867.) McGee, T.D. Notes on federal governments, past and present; Montreal, Dawson, l 8 6 5 . McGee, T.D. The present American revolution; the internal co ndition of the American democracy considered i n a lett e r. . . (To Charles Gavan Duffy) London, Hardwicke, 186U. McGee, T .D. Speeches and addresses, chiefly on the subject of British American union. London, Chapman, lB^T. Morris, A. Nova Britannia Montreal, Lovell, 1858. Originally an add-ress before the Mercantile Library Association of Mon-treal. Gives the history and the industrial and economic potentialities of N.S., Nfld., N.B., Canada, Rupert's Land, and Vancouver's Island. Ryerson, A.E. The new Canadian dominion; the dqagers and duties of the people i n regard to their government. Toronto, Lovell, 1867. A plea for an abolition of party s p i r i t i n the new Canada. /Smith, Goldwin/ The proposed constitution for British North America London, MacMillan, 1865. Reprinted from MacMillan's Magazine, March, 1865. pp .406-4l6. Thompson, T.P. The future government of Canada St. Catharines, Leav-enworth, 1864. An argument for a republican legislative union of British North America, mn opposition to McGee's monarchical union. (b) Printed sources.Unofficial(cont'd). /Tickle, P. I./ The future of British America Toronto, Backas, 1865. (Archives of Canada, # 3225) Opposition to the weakness of a federation. Suggests "consolidation" rather than federation. Anything less than "consolidation" means an-nexation to the United States. Todd, A. Brief suggestions i n regard to the formation of lo c a l govern-ments for Upper and Lower Canada...Ottawa, Desbarats, 1866 Advocates a system not unlike that suggested by George Brown, based on the British Municipal Corporations Act of 1835- Todd was parliamentary librarian, was a noted authQ ority on constitutional matters and on parliamentary pro -cedure. Watkin, S i r . E. W. Canada and the United Stages. Recollections 1851- 1886. London, Ward, /1687/ Whelan, Edward. The union of the British provinces. Charlottetown, Haz-ard, 1865. An account of the conferences and reports of the delegates. -iHHHS- Edinburgh Review. "Report of the resolutions adopted at a conference of delegates..." Short t i t l e , "The British American federation" CXXI. # 2l*7. (Jan. 1865.) pp.181-199. I I . Secondary Sources (a) Books. Angus, H. F. (ed.) Canada and bar great neighbour (Introduction by R. M. Maclver) Toronto, Ryerson, 1938. (Relations of Canada and the United States) Useful as a modern account of a long process of Canadian reactions to the United States. The analysis of Canaian opinion helps i n suggesting p o s s i b i l i t i e s prior to 1867. Bagehot, W. The English con&itution (1867) London, Oxford University Press, 19k9» (World's Classics) Biggar, C.Rjj. A biographical sketch of Sir Oliver Mowat TorontonWar-. wick, 1905. ( 2 Vols.) Bourinot, J.G. Federal government i n Canada Baltimore, Murray, 1889. (John Hopkins University studies i n Historical and Polit-i c a l Science) Bourinot's work i s a descriptive treatise an early forerunnar of Dawson's Government of Canada. How-ever i t shows the early trends of interpretation of the Canadian system. Bourinot introduces comftrisons with the United States showing"the strong resemblances" . It i s possible that this kind of interpretation intrdduced the long history of comparable studies of the Canadian and American constitutions. Boyd, J. Sir Georges Etinne Cartier, Bart. Toronto,MacMillan, 19lU. Bracq, J . C . The evolution of French Canada New York, MacMillan, 192U. Useful for the connected background picture i t gives of French Canada. In particular, Cartier i s regarded as the logical successor of La Fontaine. Brady, A. Democracy.in the dominions University of Toronto Press, 19U7. Brady, A. Thomas D'Arcy Magee Toronto, MacMillan, 1925. Bryce, James The American commonwealth New York, MacMillan, 1915. (5th Edition) (2 Vols.) Bryce, James Modern Democracies New York, MacMillan, 1921. (2 Vols.) Cameron, E. R. The Canadian constitution as interpreted by the Judic- i a l Committee of the Privy Council... Vol. i.,Winni-peg, Butterworth, 1915. Vol. i i , Toronto, Carswell, 1930. Canada. Parliament. Senate. Report...relating to the enactment of the British North America Act, 1867, any lack of consonance between i t s terms and j u d i c i a l construction of them... /O'Connor Report/ Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939. (a) Books .(cont'd) Colquhoun, A.H.U. The fathers of confederation, a chronicle of the birth of the dominion Toronto, Glasgow Brook, 1916. A survey, with interesting excursions into newspaper opinion. It is not fundamentally biographical, however, as the t i t l e might imply. David, L.O. L'Union des deux Cafaadas l8It l - l867 Montreal, Senecal, 1898. David was one of the editors of L'Union Nationale (186U-1867) which should make this work.of some interest. But David's writing of I898 is much softened from the asper-i t y of the issues of I86U-I867. Dent, J . C. The l a s t forty years; Canada since the union of 181+1. Tor-onto, Virtue, /1881/ ( 2 Vols.) The best history of the union of the Canadas, 18U1-1867. It i s well-written and preserves a nice balance between detail and perspective. DeTocqueville, A. Democracy i n America (l83i>-l8UO) Ed. H.S. Commager. Translated by H. Reeve. London, Oxford University Pres§, 19U6. (World's Classics). Egerton, H .E. Federations and unions within the British Empire Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911. Gould, E.C. United States and Canadian confederation. Essay submitted for the A l l Souls Historical Essay Prize, 1934. The thesis of this work i s that confederation was largely a product of events outside British North America. Groulx, L. La confecle'ration canadienne, ses origines Montreal, Devoir, " 1918. Groulx has a good survey of the early ideas of confederation. Also suggests that the Westminster conf-erence was highly dangerous for French-Canadians, and that Cartier had to threaten withdrawal i n order to bring Macdonald to agree to a federal union. Hamilton, A., Jay, J., Madison, J. The federalist (1787-1788) London, Dent, 19U8. (Everyman's Library) Hammond, M.O. Confederation and i t s leaders Toronto McClelland, 1917. Contains information which is exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to procure anywhere else. Notably, information about Dor-ion and Dunkin, including a picture of the la t t e r . . Keith, A.B. Responsible government i n the dominions Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928. 2nd Ed. ( 2 Vols.) Keith seems to agree with Lord Watson that the British North America Act was intend-ed to be the charter of a true federal state. Kennedy, W.P.M. The constitution of Canada 153U-1937 London, Oxford Uni-versity Press, /1938/ .2nd Ed. . (a) Books(cont'd). Laski, H . J . Studies i n the problem of sovereignty New Haven, Yale Univ-ersity Press, 1917. Especially Appendix A,"Sovereignty and federalism"pp.267-276. Lefroy, A.H. F. Canada's federal system; being a treatise on Canadian cons titutional law. •. Toronto,Car swell, 1913. Lewis, J. George Brown London, Oxford, 1926. (Makers of Canada series, W.L. Grant, Ed.) A sympthetic and earnest account of Brown's l i f e i n Canada, especially dealing with his rela-tion to party l i f e . Mackenzie, A. The l i f e and speeches of Hon. George Brown Toronto, Globe Printing, ItiV'd'. This work i s fckrgely the speeches of George Brown. Its value therefore tends to be proportionate only to the dis-tance one is from the f i l e s of the Globe. MacPherson, J . P. Life of the right hon. Sir John A. Macdonald Saint John, Earle, 1091. (2 Vols.) Useful for long extracts of speeches and of documents, but seems to consist of l i t t l e else, barring a few connective sentences. Martin, C.B. British polidsy i n Canadian confederation n.p, n.p., 1932. Reprinted from CHR, March, 1932. / M i l l , J.S./ "On Liberty" and "Considerations on representative govern- ment. R.B.MacCallum (ed.) Oxford, Blackwell, 19U7. Munro, W.B. American influences on Canadian government Toronto, Mac-Millan, 1929.(The Marfleet lectures, 1929) This carries to the nth degree the comparison of the Canad-ian and American constitutions. Alexander Hamilton is re-ferred to as the "grandfather of the Canadian constitution" Creighton, i n "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians", reacts violently to Munro's interpretation of confederation. Plaxton, C.P. Canadian constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1930-1939. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939. Poley, A.P. The federal systems of the United States and the British Empire, their origin, nature and development. London, Pitman, 1913. A rather factual survey, not too strong i n i t s comparative treatment of federal systems, and i s clearly surpassed by Brady's Democracy i n the dominions. Pope, Sir J. Memoirs of the right honourable Sir John Alexander Macdon-ald K. C. B. (1»9U) Toronto, Musson, /19hk?/ ( 1 Vol.) (a) Books (cont'd) Royal Commission of Dominion-Provincial relations. Report. Book.I. Canada, 1867-1939. Book IJ. Recommendations. Ottawa,/King's Printer ?/ ±22£xl9U0. Royale, J . Histoire du Canada; 18 1^ a 1867. Montreal, Beauchemin, 1909. Sellar, R. George Brown and confedetation Toronto, Br i t n e l l , 1917. A pamphlet, with an anti-catholic, anti-conservative inter-pretation. Brown l e f t the Cabinet i n Dec. 1865 because of the"jobbery"of Langevin and Cartier, which Macdonald appar-ently would not r e c t i f y . L B Shippee,/Canadian-American relations l8U9-l87lt. New Haven, Yale Univ-ersity Press, 1939. (Relations of Canada and the United States) A factual account, very helpful for the details and attitudes i n Canadian-American d i f f i c u l t i e s I86O-I867 . See however note 66 , Chapter IV, of this thesis. Skelton, Isabel The l i f e of Thomas D'Arcy McGee Gatfdenvale, Garden City Press, 1925. This is the most comprehensive work on McGee, but like so many similar biographies, i t i s often content with an extract from a speech, when a short sentence would be to more advantage. This has, however, made the book a good source for material on McGee. Skelton, O.D. Life and letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier New York, Century, 1922. ( 2 Vols.) Vol. 1. for Laurier's relation with the Roufejes and l ' l i i s t i t u t Canadien, and for his connection with Eric Dorion and le Defricheur. Skelton, O.D. The l i f e and times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1920. A fine biography, and of considerable value as a general survey of the period. Smith, H.A. Federalism i n North America, a comparative study of i n s t i t - utions i n the United States and Canada. Boston, Chipman, 1923. Trotter, R. G. Canadian federation Toronto, Dent, 192k• Written partly under the influence of W..B. Munro, and overestimates, I bel-ieve, the influence of American ideas on confederation. The book is a fine study of the financial and railway background of confederation, and i n this respect i t stands almost alone. ffiucker, G.N. The Canadian commercial revolution 18U5-1851 New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936. /Tupper, C./ P o l i t i c a l reminscences London, Constable, 19lh- Ed. W*A. Harkin. Turcotte, L.-P. Le Canada sous 1'union 18U1-1867 Quebec, Canadien,1871. This i s the best French history of the union. Dent also praises the work highly, see his Vol.ii.559. (a) Books (cont'd). Wheare, K. C. Federal government New York, Oxford University Press, 19U7• The best comparative study of federal government,*!***, which this writer found/very helpful. Whitelaw, WM. The Maritimes and Canada before confederation Toronto, Ryerson, 193U- Detailed treatment of the Quebec confer-ence, the most detailed, i n fact, of any work on confeder-ation. Very helpful confirming Maritime acquiescence i n the Canadian policy of a strong central government. Wrong, G. M. et al The federation of Canada Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1917. Young, James. Public men and public l i f e i n Canada; being recolfe ctiofts of Parliament and the press. Toronto Briggs, 1902. '(b) Articles, Bailey, A,G."Railways and the confederation issue i n New Brunswick, .1863-1865." CHR Vol. XXI. # U.(Dec. 19U0) pp.367-383-"western extension"was the most potent factor i n defeat-ing confederation i n New Brunswick i n 1865; that i s , i t was preferred to the Intercolonial. Blegen, T.C. "A plan for the union of British North America and the United States, 1866" Mississippi Valley Historical Re-view, IV. # h. (March 1918) pp. U70-U83. Borden. R. L. "Constitutional development from cession to confederation" in Canadian constitutional studies, pp. 11-51+. University of Toronto Press, 1921. (Marfleet lectures) Brown, G. ¥f."The Grit party and the great Reform convention of 1859." . CHR XVI. # 3 . (Sept. 1935) pp. 21+5-265. Burpee, L. J . "Joseph Howe and the anti-confederation league" i n Transactions, RSC. Series J>. Vol. X. (1917) Se c t . i i . pp. 1+09-1+73. Very useful bibliography pp. 1+16-1+22. Careless, J.M.S."The Toronto Globe and agrarian radicalism, 1850-1867" CHR.XXIX. # 1. (March I9I+8) pp. 11+-39. Criticizes the usual radtcal-agrarian interpretation of the Globe, showing that i t s policy was rather that of the English liberalism of Cobden, Bright and others. One should be careful however to distinguish the Globe's policy from i t s manner of presentation. (b) Articles (cont'd). Caron, A. "Notre constitution natiibnale" Partie documentaire i n Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa £me annee (1935) pp.2?5-27oT A treatise on the p o l i t i c a l theory of federalism i n Can-ada, with emphasis on the power at the centre-. Cooper, J . I. "The p o l i t i c a l ideas of George Etienne Cartier" CHR XXIII. # 3. (March, 191*2) pp.286-291*. Cornell, P. G. "The alignment of p o l i t i c a l groups i n the united prov-ince of Canada, I851*- l86k." CHR XXX. # 1. (March, 191*9) pp. 22-U6. Criffighton, D. G."British North America at confederation" i n Royal Com- mission on Dominion-Provincial relations. Appendix 2. Creighton surveys the economic and social background of confederation and concludes that Canadians wanted and needed strong central government. Creighton, D. G. "Economic nationalism and confederation" Canadian His-t o r i c a l Association Annual Report (CHAAR) 191*2. pp. Uh~ 5 _ Creighton, D. G. "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians" CHR. XXIX. # 1 (March 19U8) pp.1-13. Creighton gets into a vehement digression against the soOcalled American influences i n Canadian history of the nineteenth cen-tury. Gray, V.E. "The O'Connor report on the British North America Act" i n Canadian Bar Review XVII JT.p. 3 0 9 C W o ^ . tT3l) The d i f f i c u l t i e s of historical interpretation of the Quebec Conference. Jensen, M. "The articles of confederation: a re-interpretation" Pacific Historical Review .VI. # 2. (June 1937) PP.120-1H2I An attempt to show the articles of confederation as the triumph of the more radical forces i n the American Revolution, as opposed to the Conservatives, who wanted a more centralized form of government. Kennedy, W.P.M. "The nature of Canadian federalism" CHR II. # 2. (June 1921) pp. 106-125. Kennedy does not examine particularly the intention of confederation. He concludes that the "true federal idea" i s " c l e a r l y manifest i n Canadian government'.' Note however he uses the word"government" not "constitution." Landon, F. "The American c i v i l war and Canadian confederation" i n Tran- sactions, RSC. Series 3. Vol. XXI. Section 2. pp.55-62. (1927) Landon says that the great silent majority of Canadians hoped that the North would win. (b)Articles(cont'd). Landon, F. "Canadian opinion of southern secession, 1860-61" CHR. I. # 3.(sept. 1920) pp.255-266. Illustrating the general Northern slant of Canadian opin-ion, 1860-1865. McArthur, D. "Confederation, an economic movement" Journal of the Canad- ian Banker's Association, 1927. MacDermot, T.W.L. "The p o l i t i c a l ideas of John A. Macdonald" CHR .XIV # 3 (Sept. 1933) PP. 2U7-26U. MacDermott, T.W.L. "John A. Macdonald—his biographies and biographers" CHAAR .(1931) PP. 77-8U. Mclnnis, E. "Two North American federations: a comparison" i n Essays i n Canadian history presented to George Mackinnon Wrong, R. Flenley (ed) Toronto, 1939. pp. 9k- 118. Perrault, J.-E. "La confederation canadienne, est-elle nee viable ?" Revue Universite d'Ottawa 5me annee.(1935) pp.8-25. , A plea for a more tolerant attitude i n Canada, between provinces. Rogers, N. McL. "Federal influences on the Canadian cabin?t" Canadian Bar Review XI. # 2. (Feb. 1933) pp. 103-121. Rogers, N. McL. "The p o l i t i c a l principles of federalism" In Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science I. # 3. (Aug. 1935) PP. 337-3U7. Emphasizes the necessity of determining the true nature of federalism i n order that the true nature of i t s econ-omic duties may be c l a r i f i e d . Sauve, A. "La confederation caradienrB " Revue Universite d'Ottawa 2me annee (1932) pp. 11-21. About the same general view as Perrault's article above. Scott, F .R. "The development of Canadian federalism" Canadian P o l i t i c a l _ Science Association Annual Meeting Ottawa, 1931 PP.231-wr. Scott, F.R. " P o l i t i c a l nationalism and confederation" Canadian Journal - of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science VIII. # 3. (Aug. 19U2) P P . 386-U15. ; Smith, J . P. "American republican leadership and the movement for the annexation of Canada i n the ei&hteen-sixties" CHAAR (1935) PP. 67-75. Stacey, C.P. "British military policy i n Canada i n the era of confed-.eration" CHAAR(193U) pp.20-29. (b) Articles(cont'd) Stacey, C.P."Fenianism and the rise of national feeling i n Canada at the time of confederation" CHR. XII. # 3 . (Sept. 1931.) Tache, L. "Sir JE.-P. Tache et la confederation canadienne" Revue Univer- 8ite" d'Ottawa 5me annee, (1935) PP. 231-255. Talman, J .J. "A Canadian view of parties and issues on the eve of the c i v i l war" Journal of Southern History V. # 2 . (May,1939) pp. 21+5-253. Trotter, R.G. "Some American influences upon the Canadian federation movement" CHR. V. # 3 . (Sept. 1921+) pp. 213-227. Trotter suggests .a number of influences only one of which was i n any sense positive, i.e. the United States, being a federal system i n a large country provided an obvious example. Underhill, F.H. "Canada's relations with the Empire as seen by the Toronto Globe 1857-1867" CHR. X. # 2 . (June 1929) pp. 106-128. An account of the active interest taken by the Globe i n English affairs and of the English attitudes to Canadian affairs. Whitelaw, W. M. "American influence on British federal systems" i n The Constitution Re-considered ed. Conyers Read. New York, Columbia University Press, 1938. pp. 297-311+. Whitelaw takes the view that the chief American influence on the formation of Canadian confederation was a negative one, i.e. that Canadians reacted against American ideas. Notes that the Australians vrhen forumlating their constit-ution did not consider that Canada had a federal system at a l l . Whitelaw, W.M. "Reconstructing the Quebec Conference" CHR XlX. # 2. (June 1938) pp. 123-2137. I I I . Bibliographical aids Canada. Archives. Catalogue des brochures aux archives publiques du Canada, 1U93-1877. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1931. Canada. Archives. A guide to the documents i n the manuscript room at the Public Archives of Canada. D.W.Parker, Ed. Ottawa, Government Printing Office, 191U. Haight, W. R. Canadian catalogue of books. Toronto, Haight, I896. Higgins, M. V. A bibliography of Canadian bibliographies Montreal, n.p., 1930. Ontario. Legislative Library. Catalogue of books. Toronto, King's Printer, 1913. Queens University. Douglas Library. Canadiana 1698-1900 Kingston, n.p., 1932. Staton, F.M. & Tremaine, M. (Toronto Public Library) A bibliography of Canadiana Toronto, Public Library, /c 1935/ Trotter, R. G. The bibliography of Canadian constitutional history n.p., n.p., 1928.
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History
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Ideas regarding federalism in the province of Canada, 1864-1867
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