Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Simpson, Robert Vernon
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
The aim of this thesis is to show that, although the various phases of the membership controversy are fundamentally a part of the overall Soviet -Western crisis, the immediate reason for their development stems not only from the dominant position that the United States occupies internationally but as well from the extreme overbalance of representation in the United Nations in favour of the Americas. This situation, not the free use of the veto by the Soviet Union, is mainly responsible for the stalemate in the admission of new members. The Soviet Union has felt compelled to use its veto lavishly in an effort to protect and strengthen its minority role in the United Nations. It is because the USSR regards the veto in this light that any suggestion to abolish it as far as admission of new members is concerned is completely impractical. The issue would not be of primary import if the Western States had used their preponderant voting power responsibly and the practice of bloc voting had not become such a prominent feature of the United Nations. But these developments which are partially attributable to the existing state of international tension have made the membership composition of the United Nations a matter of great concern, especially to the USSR. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Article 4 has received little more than lip service. Both the Soviet and Western blocs have set up a standard of admission for their own candidates which differs substantially from that applied to candidates of the other. This has left each side open to charges of discrimination and neither has been slow in pointing out the iniquities of the other's obstinacy. In the eyes of the Secretary General of the United Nations, who is well qualified to judge, all the disappointed applicants would qualify if the standard set by Article 4 was administered reasonably. In harmony with this view the USSR has offered what seems to be the only fair compromise, that it will vote for the Western candidates if the Western states will vote for the Soviet candidates. The stalemate is perpetuated because the Western bloc unwisely chooses to regard this offer to compromise as a 'horse trade' or 'blackmail.' A new twist to the membership controversy has been supplied by the fact that there are two claimants to the seat held in the name of China. This is not a question of admitting a new state but merely one of representation. The difficulty in the case of China is that the de facto government, which should logically occupy the seat, is in conflict with: the military forces of the United Nations, which in the view of the majority disqualifies that government from taking its rightful place. This representation question must eventually be resolved in favour of the Central People's Government or the United Nations will place itself in the position of denying representation to the 450 million people of China, the majority of whom seem to support the Peking Government.
a f t frx THE HISTORY OF THE MEMBERSHIP CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED NATIONS by ROBERT'VERNON SIMPSON A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS We accept this thesis as conforming to the in the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE /Members of the Department of THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1951 Abstract of The History of the Membership Controversy in the United Nations by R.Vo Simpson. The aim of this thesis is to show that,although the various phases of the membership controversy are fundamentally a part of the overall Soviet -Western crisis, the immediate reason for their development stems not only from the dominant position that the United States occupies internationally but as well from the extreme overbalance of representation in the United Nations in favour of the Americas. This situation,not the free use of the veto by the Soviet Union,is mainly responsible for the stalemate in the admission of new members. The Soviet Union has felt compelled to use its veto lavishly in an effort to protect and strengthen its minority role in the United Nations. It is because the USSR regards the veto in this light that any suggestion to abolish i t as far as admission of new members is concerned is completely impractical. The issue would not be of primary import i f the Western States had used their preponderant voting power responsibly and the practice of bloc voting had not become such a prominent feature of the United Nations. But these developments which are partially attributable to the existing state of international tension have made the membership composition of the United Nations a matter of great concern, especially to the USSR. In these circumstances i t is not surprising that Article 4 has received l i t t l e more than lip service. Both the Soviet and Western blocs have set up a standard of admission for their own candidates which differs substant-ially from that applied to candidates of the other. This has left each side open to charges of discrimination and neither has been slow in pointing out 1 2 the iniquities of the other's obstinacy. In the eyes of the Secretary General of the United Nations, who is well qualified to judge, a l l the disappointed applicants would qualify i f the standard set by Article 4 was administered reasonably. In harmonyywith this view the USSR has offered what seems to be the only fair compromise, that i t will vote for the Western candidates i f the Western states will vote for the Soviet candidates. The stalemate is perpetuated because the Western bloc unwisely chooses to regard this offer to compromise as a 'horse trade' or 'blackmail.' A new twist to the membership controversy has been supplied by the fact that there are two claimants to the seat held in the name of China. This is not a question of admitting a new state but merely one of representa-tion. The difficulty in the case of China is that the de facto government, which should logically occupy the seat, is in conflict with: the military forces of the United Nations, which in the view of the majority disqualifies that government from taking its rightful place. This representation question must eventually be resolved in favour of the Central People's Government or the United Nations will place itself in the position of denying representa-tion to the 450 million people of China, the majority of whom seem to support the Peking Government. The History of the Membership Controversy in the United Nations Chapter I The Membership Problem II Developments leading up to the San Francisco Conference III The San Francisco Conference A. Special Cases of Original Membership i . Argentina i i . Byelorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR i i i . Poland iv. Denmark B. Consideration of Dumbarton Oaks Membership Proposals i . Admission i i . Withdrawal, Suspension and Expulsion i i i . Spain and Ex-enemy states C. Comparison with Membership Provisions of the League IV Rules of Admission V Developments During 1946 VI Developments During 194-7 VII Developments During 1943 -Opinion of the International Court of Justice VIII Developments During 1949 IX Recent Developments -Problem of Chinese Representation X Conclusions The History of the Membership Controversy in the United Nations. CHAPTER I. The Membership Problem As the most dreadful conflict in the annals of mankind's many wars dragged out its last sanguinary days, the representatives of the •we«=4» bv victorious powers gathered in San Francisco to found a new international organization pledged to the preservation of peace. From this conference emerged the Charter of the United Nations, expressing man's revulsion against war, his faith in fundamental human rights, his desire for inter-national order and justice, and his craving for freedom and a better l i f e . Unfortunately, neither men nor nations are capable of even an approach to perfection. High resolves hopefully conceived in moments of idealistic exhilaration often fade into disillusion/and bitterness when subjected to the chilling realism of conflicting interests and ambitions. Because of fear, suspicion, and cultivated hate, the hopes of war weary peoples for a better and less hazardous l i f e have devolved into a state of growing despair where peace seems but an idyllic dream. It is a strange and tragic paradox to see the states of the world girding their peoples for war, when the common deBire of all those people is peace. Intrinsic in this concept of peace, however, are the principles suggested in the preamble to the United 1 2 Nations Charter, which mean more than the mere absence of hostilities* These principles, as a positive approach to peace, are the common product of diverse ways of l i f e and systems of government,and their interpretation and application must take f u l l account of this origin* The imposition by a numerically strong group of states in the United Nations of their conception of these principles as a standard, which must be accepted by the minority, is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and dangerous to the peace of the world. It is too often forgotten that the nations did not sign away their sovereignty to a democratic superstate at San Francisco in 19^5* The United Nations is not a superstate, nor is i t democratic, nor is i t communistic or capitalistic in structure* It is a purely functional organization whose primary objective is the maintenance of peace* For this purpose i t was to be open to a l l "peace loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter." ** It was not foreseen at the San Francisco Con-ference that the apparently straightforward definition of the terms of admission to membership would become the focal point of an acrimonious dispute, but in fact the elements of dissension were all in existence before the conference adjourned. The membership question in any international organization is of funda-mental importance because the views of members are reflected in voting., and votes are the means of deciding on policy and action. At Yalta, Stalin said, "We are accused of attaching great importance to the procedure 'how to vote.' n 2 We are guilty. We attach great importance to the question of voting." * 1. United Nations Charter, Article IV. 2. Byrnes, J.F., Speaking Frankly, Harper Bros., New York, 19**1» P» 37* 3 Because of the direct affinity between voting and membership this Russian concern over voting carried over to the question of admitting new members. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were as urgently interested in this matter asAthe Soviet Union. They were confident that they could exert sufficient influence in a world wide organization to protect their vital interests. It is unfortunate that more attention was not given to a echeme of representation in the General Assembly other than that of one state, one vote. To command the maximum of respect, the membership composition of the United Nations should roughly reflect the existing distribution of world power. The General Assembly as constituted at present does not truly mirror world opinion because i t is heavily weighted in favour of the Americas. A further element of unreality and dissension is introduced by the refusal to seat the de facto government of China. The fictitiously one sided composition of the United Nations derogates from its moral influence and immeasurably weakens the organization. John Foster Dulles subscribed to this view when he wrotet "...the United Nations will beet serve the cause of peace i f its assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parte which we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that a l l nations should be members without attempting to appraise closely those which are 'good1 and those which are 'bad'. Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership of.the United Nations." 3» At the time of the San Francisco Conference approximately one ninth of the world's population was under communist rule. This situation was reflected almost exactly in the projected General Assembly. Since then, however, great changes have altered this conformity. About one third of the earth'8 people now live under communist type governments, but they are represented in the General Assembly by only one tenth of the total votes. mill" i •• i - . - - • •-• _ 5. Dulles, J.F., War or Peace, Macmillan, New York, 195°» P» 4 The communist states are quite understandably hostile to this fictitious representation of world opinion which makes them appear to be obstruction-ists backed only by an infinitesimal proportion of the world's people. Added reason for their resentment is supplied by the excessive use of the overwhelming majority of votes which the United States commands almost at will. The United States habitually resortB to steamroller tactics in the General Assembly which give i t majority votes, impressive in numbers but failing to draw respect because they do not reflect reality. Demands directed at the Soviet Union, such as that of Edwardo A. Matienzo of Bolivia that "The minority ... must bow before the decisions of the majority." ^ are fatuous in an assembly where votes bear no relation to population, where the.vote of Iceland's 10QP00 people counts the same as the vote of India's 360,000,000. Small nations undoubtedly have rights that must be respected but surely one of those rights is not that of an equal voice with a great power. The United States, through its influence on the votes of many small states, has dominated the United Nations from the outset.While continuing to pay lip service to the principle of great power unity, Which was and s t i l l is a prerequisite to the effective functioning of the United Nations, the American government has in recent years sought ways of circumventing the need for unanimity among those powers. This tactic is the outcome of the apparent difficulty of reaching agreement on certain issues. The stalemate is in part attributable to Russian intransigBnce but i t arises also from the tendency of the United States to regard the United Nations largely as a supplement to American foreign policy. Since containment of communism is the primary motivation of that foreign policy i t is inevitable that the 4. United Nations Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 11, Dec.l, 1?49. p.650. 5 United Nations be shaken by internal convulsions. The United States must be made aware of the fact that the United Nations does not exist merely to help i t implement its foreign policy. The purpose of the United Nations is to maintain peace, and peace must be based on a world wide conception of justice, not solely on an American version. John Foster Dulles frankly recognized the situation when he wrotet "...the American people would never accept the kind of peace that depended upon enforcement by a Communist dominated world police state. Also we had better assume that the Communists would not accept a peace that depended on enforcement by a world police state which we dominated. They would hate and fight our kind of world organization just as much as we would hate and fight subjection to their will." 5» Conflicts of interest and clashes of ideals were inevitable phenomena of the war's aftermath. Supporters of status quo ante bellum conditions, frightened by the great social and political upheavals arising out of the discontent, confusion, hunger, fear, bitterness and displacement of millions of people, have struggled frantically to decelerate the whirl of dynamic development from fear that i t would completely shatter the old social order. The nations of the Americas, spared the violence of war and its consequent dislocations, and by nature poor observers of happenings beyond their hemi-sphere, are perplexed and unable to appreciate the immensity or real sig-nificance of the transitions taking place in Asia and Europe. The natural reaction to a change which creates something new, strange, and vaguely threatening is suspicion which quickly causes fear and enmity. These emotions have combined with the traditional hostility of the Americas to alien political ideas, to create a rigid, uncompromising attitude of con-servatism in international affairs. Unfortunately the governments of North and South America, who are mentally the most deplorably equiped to formulate 5. Dulles, War or Peace, p. 186. 6 reasonable international policies have obtained, through their numbers and the economic power of the United States, a virtual stranglehold on the United Nations and its policies. The Latin American countries, who are not of outstanding natural sig-nificance in international politics, possess over one third of the votes in the General Assembly. The important voioes of Europe and Asia, rich in experience and political wisdom, are drowned out by the self laudatory, hypocritically pious expressions of the Americas. This distorted represent-ation of power factors has created a tendency for the United Nations to appear more and more as a weapon of the anti-communist powers against the spread of communism. Such a role is a negation of the United Nations raison d'etre and may transform i t into a twentieth century Holy Alliance, itself a menace to the peace which i t is pledged to preserve. No organiza-tion can function fairly or effectively when a permanent preponderance of power is virtually guaranteed to a selfish clique. The USSR has been confronted with the fact that only non-communist states can get sufficient votes to be admitted to the United Nations. It has consequently felt that i t must use the veto to prevent the disproportionate influence of the United States in the General Assembly from becoming even more exaggerated. Nine states have been able, for various reasons, to secure at least momentary approval of al l the disputants and thus run the gantlet of admission. But beyond these exceptions the Security Council reached an impasse on the admission of new members, the USSR vetoed the Western nominees, and the Western bloc voted down the nominees of the Soviet Union. S.K. Tsarapltin, representative of the USSR on the Security Council, epitomized the situation when he stated that the question of admission of new members reflects "a.8 in a mirror" the present situation in international 7 relations. Secretary-General Trygve Lie's hope that the process of admission would become a "dignified and solemn act" broke up on the rocks of Soviet -Western discord. Trygve Lie has been a constant advocate of universality and has con-tinually sought to reconcile the differences between the major powers by urging negotiation in the spirit of the Charter. To the closing session of the 19^7 General. Assembly, he said: "It cannot be repeated too often that the United Nations was founded on the assumption that the major powers would be in substantial agreement with one another. It is clear for a l l the world to seetthat oUr organiza-tion can accomplish its tasks, as laid down by the Charter, only i f the great powers, and consequently the other nations included in our membership, can work together with reasonable degree of harmony." 6. Harmonious co-operation, however, is not possible in an atmosphere of invective and animosity. The tactful negotiating and conciliating aspects of diplomacy have been rejected in favour of sabre rattling tactics. Ad-amant, unreasonable, uncompromising, anti-communism clashes in a test of strength at every opportunity with the vigorous polemics of a resentful and assertive communism. A French observer commented lucidly on the alarming spectacles "As soon as a question is raised, ... an oratorical tournament begins, and one often has the impression that the matter is being discussed less for its own merits, than because of the occasion i t offers to the two opposed ideologies to combat each other on new ground* In other words, what seems to have disappeared at Lake Success is the spirit of negotiation." 7» The head on clashes over admission of new members are not only part of the whole ideological contest, but are one of the factors which have con-tributed to a large part of its bitterness. This has been especially true in the cases of Argentina, Spain, the ex-enemy states, and China. The dif-6. U.N. Bulletin, Vol. I l l , No. 24, Dec. 9 , 1947, p.760. Notion* 7. Fouques, Dupare, J. A European Point of View on the United StoAoo, Inter-national Conciliation, Sept. 1948, New York, p. 456. 8 ferences over the admission question can only be reconciled by a concilia-tory attitude on both sides, and their solution could do much to alleviate the existing tension. The resolution of the dispute would be quite possible i f the western states would rid their mind of the dangerous fallacy that any negotiation or compromise is appeasement. This myopic Munich complex prevents them from distinguishing between situations different in nature and circumstances. The conditions of admission to membership in the United Nations,as laid down in the Charter, are quite broad and unrestrictive* Article 4 reads: "1, Membership in the United Nations is open to a l l other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations, "2, The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommenda-tion of the Security Council," °* Membership is not guaranteed to any nation as of right because the decision on applications is left to the "judgement of the Organization." 9* This was a natural consequence of the rejection at San Francisco of the principle of universality. This doctrine, vigorously upheld by most Latin American states, was shelved "...after some discussion, because the feel-ing of the majority was that we first of a l l must have a very solid and safe organization, where only United Nations knowing each other could be relied upon," At the time, agreement on a 'tendency' to universality seemed a satisfactory solution to the issue. Much argument has since arisen 8. U B N , Charter, Article IV. 9, U.N. Charter, Article IV. 10. United Nations Conference on International Organization (referred to hereafter as U.N.C.I.O.) Doc. 1167 1/10 June 23, 19^ 5, Verbatim Minutes of third meeting of Commission I, June 19» 19^5*t P»7» 9 over what was meant by a 'tendency1 to universality. It is obvious that the decision against universality created a con-dition in which the term "peace-loving states", as used in Article IV, would have political connotations. It has been suggested that the best definition of a 'peace-loving' state was, one that had declared war on one or more axis powers. The meaning of these words has been the subject of much speculation and controversy. Jean Francois Pouliot was prompted to state in the Canadian House of Commons that the 'peace-loving' states were, "...those which are armed to the teeth to prevent, perhaps, the war loving nations from ruling the world." 12. It should not be surprising therefore, that political motives have influenced the votes of the great powers on admission of new members. Even the lesser states have cast aside their.'lofty idealism in cases of direct national interest. Syria, for example, a great advocate of complete un-iversality, was not willing to let this advocacy stand in the way of voting against Israel's admission. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948, denied the validity of political considerations in questions of admission. Howerer, the verdict was far from unanimous and in any case is somewhat inconsequential because a state cannot be compelled to divulge the real reasons for its vote for or against a certain state. Of seventeen states whose applications were discussed in the Security Council in 19^7* in only one case - that of Albania - were the 'peace -loving1 qualities of the state a real issue of discussion. The other 11. Goodrich, L.M. and Hanbro, E. Charter of the United Nations; commentary and documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1940, p. 80. 12. Canada, Debates. House of Commons, 6th Session 19th Parliament, Kings Printer, Ottawa, 1945, p.92. ; 15. U.N. Bulletin, Vol. IV., No. 2, June 15, 1948, p.492. 14. Humber, P.O., Admission to the United Nations,British Year Book of Inter-national Law, Oxford Univ. Press, Toronto, 1947» p.lGJ. 10 factors that entered into consideration confirm the p o l i t i c a l nature of the decisions. A partial l i s t indicates the wide variety of factors in-fluencing the outcomes of votes on membership applications. 1. The existence, or non existence, of diplomatic relations with states members of the United Nations. 2. The fullness of the applicants independence. J. The applicant 1s conduct in the matter of human rights. A . The nature of the p o l i t i c a l regime in the state in question. 5. The stability or legality of i t s government. 6. The applicant's treatment of refugees during and after the war. 7. The conduct of the state during the war. 8. The question of respect for international obligations. 9* The existence, or non existence, of peace treaties. Most, but not a l l , of these could conceivably be legitimate grounds for discussion under paragraph one of Article IV, but i t i s clear that adherence to the Charter was not foremost in the minds of the members of the Security Council. P o l i t i c a l considerations have not had the same predominance in General Assembly discussions mainly for two reasons. F i r s t , because the great powers are the most prone to consider matters p o l i t i c a l l y and their voices are only a few among many in the larger body, and second, because the sen-timent of the General Assembly has been to have as wide a membership as possible and their scrutiny of applications has therefore not been quite as c r i t i c a l . The General Assembly has assumed the role of watchdog of the Charter and has fulminated repeatedly against the Security Council's failure to restrict i t s e l f to consideration of a state's e l i g i b i l i t y under the terms of A r t i c l e IV. Particular h o s t i l i t y has been focused on the USSR because 11 of its apparently free use of the veto. This has been denounced as a violation of the spirit of the Charter. From a strictly legal point of view the protestations of the General Assembly are well founded, backed as they are by the advisory opinion which the International Court of Justice handed down in 19^8. However the situation whioh has led to the rejection of so many applicant states is not legal but political in nature. The way out of the impasse must therefore come through political agreement not legalistic argument. Since the frequency of Soviet vetoes has been one of the major fuels feeding the dispute over admission, an investigation of the reasons for the Soviet attitude is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of the problem. The policy of the Soviet Union on the question of membership has the superficial appearance of being exasperatingly obstructionist. But a close and dispassionate scrutiny reveals a comprehensible, rational and relatively consistent logic behind i t . The reasonable basis for their attitude has been overlooked, partly because of the bluntness of Russian diplomacy and the excessively vituperative presentation of their case, but more because of the virulent antipathy to communism in the American states, and the justifiable apprehension, not so much of communism as of Russian imperialism, in the countries geographically close to the Soviet Union. From the beginning of the discussions among the Big Three wartime allies preparatory to the formation of a new international organization, the USSR was confronted with a serious difficulty. It was obvious that Soviet interests would receive scant consideration in a world assembly al-most wholly composed of states, which in the past had at best been suspicious and at worst were openly hostile to the USSR. Despite the Soviet Union's 12 magnificent effort in the allied cause, many of these states s t i l l per-sisted in snubbing the USSR diplomatically. The membership composition of the proposed assembly was consequently of extreme significance to the Soviet Union. This matter came to the fore in the disagreement that arose at Dumbarton Oaks over which states were to be original members of the pro-jected international body. The issue was not settled to Russia's satisfaction either there or subsequently at Yalta, when the Ukrainian S.S.R. a n d Byelorussian S.S.R. were promised representation. The Soviets 8imply feared, justifiablyy as i t has turned out, that any proposition sponsored by them would almost automatically be voted down. It was to counteract the possibility of being overwhelmed in the assembly that the Soviet Union originally envisioned i t as a relatively unimportant attachment to the Security Council. As i t became evident that this was not to be the case the USSR was compelled in self defence to seek as strong a position in the General Assembly as the adverse circumstances would permit. The USSR apparently hoped to obtain admission for as many communist or otherwise friendly s t a t e B as possible, while using the veto to exclude those who were likely to follow anti-communist policies. This explanation would account for the initial Soviet opposition to en bloc admission as proposed by the United States in 1946. The reversal of Soviet policy on admission by the espousal of the en bloc admission idea came when the Soviet Union realized that her nominees could not get sufficient votes to be admitted individually. This Soviet proposal appealed to many states because i t offered the chance of a great step toward universality. The United States meanwhile, had also reversed its policy. In 1946 the en bloc admission of states had been regarded as,"... the fair and wise way to apply 15. Hull, Cordell, Memoirs. Macmillan, New York, 1948, Vol . 1 1 , p.1678. 13 the Charter provisions as to membership." 1°* In 1949 a similar Soviet proposal met with denunciation as "horse trading" and as a "... crude attempt to bring about the admission of five more Soviet satellites ..." 17* The USSR replied with charges thatanrude, blatant, and flagrant policy of dis-i ft crimination" was being practised through the "concealed veto" of ab-stention. The ebullient invective of both sides provides newspaper reporters with tid bits of sensationalism, raises the temperature of the council chambers several degrees, and gives added l i f e to the embers of Russian-American mutual distrust, but polemics will never replace reason as a means for the settlement of disagreements. There has been a growing demand in the General Assembly for the aboli-tion of the veto on admission of new members. The United States has en-couraged this movement as a means of putting the pressure of public opinion on the Soviet Union. Though no one can challenge the right of a permanent member of the Security Council to seek to strengthen its arguments by ob-taining the moral backing of the General Assembly, American action in this instance was i l l advised. It only served further to convince the USSR of the subservience of the General Assembly to American wishes and contributed nothing to a solution of the difficulties. The United States has expected the Soviet Union to use restraint in applying the veto but has been obviously unwilling to exercise the same restraint in using its easily obtained majority in the General Assembly. As long as the disproportionate influence of the United States continues to 16. International Relations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cam-bridge, No. 1, 1947, p. 105. 17. Canada and the United Nations, 1949, Conference Series No. 1, 1949. Dept. of External Affairs, Kings Printer, Ottawa, 195°» P«79» 18. U.N. Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 2, July 15, 1949, p.90. 14 dominate the United Nations, any relaxation of the veto could never be assented to by the USSR* The removal of the veto on admission would mean that the real decision would be made in the General Assembly, not as at present in the Security Council. The western bloc could lose nothing by such a change, whereas the Soviet Union would lose its only guarantee ag-ainst further swamping. The general attitude of the Big Five powers on the veto in relation to admission are as follows: Nationalist China is willing to enter a gentlemen's agreement to abstain from use of the veto on admission of new members. France recognizes the right to use the veto on admission questions but believes i t must be applied in good faith and with good reason. The United Kingdom agrees not to use i t to block the admission of any state. The United States agrees not to use i t against any state which is sup-ported by seven members of the Security Council or is approved by the General Assembly. The USSR upholds the view that "all peace loving states which accept the obligations of the Charter can be admitted. Therefore any proposal (such as elimination of the veto) which would give"preference to some states and dis-criminate against others must be opposed." ^* The states which have been refused admission to the United Nations are no more guilty of flagrant violations of the Charter than many states al-ready within the organization. It is hypocritical to condemn non-member:: states for violations of human rights while condoning far more outrageous 19. U.N. Bulletin, Vol. VI., No. 1, Jan. 1, 1949, p.l4 15 actions by states who are members. Nor is the claim of incomplete independ-ence justifiable when states in similar situations were admitted as original one go«5 members. It becomes clear as 3 ^- down the l i s t of reasons for rejecting states, that what has kept these applicants out is not so much failings on their part, as internal rivalries in the Security Council. The definitive consideration for admission of a state should be simply whether the maintenance of peace, which is the primary objective of the United Nations, is more effectively assured by accepting or rejecting the applicant. This should override a l l other matters. Denial of membership to a state which meets al l reasonable qualifications creates dissatisfaction and contributes to a condition in which there is danger of the formation of a counter-alliance and even armed oonflict. The United Nations as an organization must not become inextricably allied to one side in the present ideological conflict for then i t would no longer be furthering its avowed aims. It is only of value as long as i t can serve the ends of peace in a world which recognizes military might as the basis of international relations. Until we have a more perfect world i t is foolhardy to recognize shadow governments and exclude others for the one and only reason that they have communist type governments. The United Nations must give a l l peoples everywhere the right to raise their voices in its councils. A situation in which governments representing only 29 per cent 20 of the world18 people * and holding almost 75 P e r cent of the votes in the General Assembly can, in the name of world opinion, condemn a state as an aggressor almost solely at the demand of one great power, is a farcioal type of international justice. The membership composition of the United Nations must be brought into 2 0 . Calculated on basis of population figures in The Statesman's Year Book, 1950. 16 line with political reality or the United Nations will become an object of scorn and derision to a great part of the world. It may be that no government can truly represent the illiterate and non-political peoples of the world, in particular the masses of Iridia ar Ghina, but for the present at least the governments possessing de facto control in such states must be regarded as representatives of those peoples. Criticism of the United Nations has in the past been regarded as almost blasphemy, but constructive, factual analysis and criticism is needed to make the organization a living organism devoted to peace. CHAPTER II. Developments Leading Up To The San Francisco Conference It is impossible to appreciate the present dispute over admission of new members to the United Nations in its proper perspective, without look-ing at the events preceding the San Francisco Conference. In this gestation period the present difficulties were foreshadowed, for even at that time there were substantial differences over membership. Then, however, the divergence of opinions did not seem ov.erly important because there was com-plete agreement on the eventual inclusion of a l l peace-loving states. It was only when the political connotations of the term 'peace-loving states' became dear that the differences of opinion evolved into a dispute. The various declarations that emerged from the wartime meetings of the big three powers, together with the behind the scenes accounts, leave l i t t l e doubt but that the three powers intended the future United Nations to be as nearly universal as possible. There were certain states which a l l three agreed must be excluded, at least until those states had forsaken facism and cleared their tarnished reputations. The states barred were, Germany, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Argentina. Beyond these cases there does not seem to have been any important mental reservation on the part of any of the three powers about the universality of the proposed 17 18 organization. A possible exception to this statement arises from Russia's misgivings about those states which refused to have diplomatic relations with her, but this did not create complications t i l l later. The first official pronouncement envisioning the establishment of a universal organization to maintain peace issued from the Moscow Conference on November 1, 19^5* Point four of the Moscow Declaration stated: "That they (the United States, United Kingdom, USSR and China) recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of a l l peace-loving States and open to membership by a l l such States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." 1« Exactly one month later, December 1, 1945» the Teheran Declaration was released over the signatures of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. This statement contained the following paragraph: "We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of a l l nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and in-tolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations." ^. This statement would seem to reject the principle of universality by making the organization a 'family of Democratic Nations.1 But the word 'Democratic' obviously was intended to be construed in the very broad sense that any state opposing fascism was ipso facto democratic. Nothing else could have been meant in view of the existing character of several govern-ments who were among the United Nations fighting fascism and nazism. More-overeat this stage the future peacetime United Nations existed only in the nebulous realm of half formed ideas. Roosevelt at Teheran conceived of the organization as something substantially different from that which finally 1. United Nations Documents, 1941-45, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1946, p.13* 2. The United Nations in the Making, Basic Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1945, p.18. 19 emerged. ?* The structure of the United Nations did not begin to take on a recognizable shape until the separate drafts of the United Kingdom, United States, and USSR were merged into one at Dumbarton Oaks between August and October 1944. Chapter III of the "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization" states simply: "Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l peace-loving states." 4» This reads like a clear and unmistakeable definition of qualifications for membership but it is not to be taken too literally. It expresses an ideal rather than an immediate expectation. The noncommital generalization hides the fact that there was a disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over who were to be the original members. This was tem-porarily settled at Yalta but i t flared up again at San Francisco when the two powers divided over the admission of Argentina. Such differences as there were among the Big Three at this time were the natural result of each having its own interests to protect and its own ideas to expound. The divergent opinions were not irreconcilable because all three worked in the spirit of compromise. Later i t was alleged by many myopic individuals that compromise was something evil, and the spirit of cooperation perished. Every reasonable person recognizee that peaceful conduct of international relations is possible only i f holders of divergent views are willing to make mutual concessions. Former American Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius noted: "Compromise, when reached honorably and in a spirit of honesty by a l l J. Sherwood, R.E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, Harper and Bros., New York, 1948, pp. 785 and 789-90. 4. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.Ill, p.5; Doc. 1 3/1, p.J. 20 concerned, ie the only fair and rational way of reaching a reasonable agree-ment between two differing points of view. We should not be led by our dislike and rightful rejection of appeasement in the Munich sense into an irrational and untenable refusal to compromise.". 5« The formation of the United Nations was possible only because the major powers accepted this intelligent attitude. As H.V. Evatt stated toward the close of the San Francisco Conference, "... the Charter is not quite what any of us wished i t to be. In some respects, i t is the result of a struggle between opposing views." ^ * Those opposing views were forged into the Charter through the almost interminable give and take discussions of Dum-barton Oaks, Yalta, and finally San Francisco. Many i l l informed persons have concluded that the western states made al l the concessions while the Russians stubbornly upheld a take i t or leave i t aloofness. This view is utterly misleading. The Soviet Union accepted many things desired by the other powers, Including some of a fundamental nature. One of these concessions forced a basic change in the Russian con-ception of the role of the General Assembly and had a definite influence on the future attitude of the Soviets to the admission of new members. Hull observed in his Memoirs that: "The tentative drafts which the British and Russians had given us in advance of the conference (Dumbarton Oaks) seemed to assign a relatively unimportant role to the Assembly, in contrast to our position that the Assembly, comprising a l l member states, should be given real functions. This was especially true of the Soviet proposals. In the first few days of discussion the British and the Russians substantially accepted our viewpoint." 7» The acceptance of the American view enabled the General Assembly to assume a position of importance entirely unexpected by the Soviets, and as 5. Stettinius, E.R. Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians, Doubleday, New York, 19^9$ P»6. (Referred to hereafter as "Stettinius, RooseveltlJ) 6. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.6, p.211j Doc. 1187 1/13, June 24, 1945, Verbatim Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Commission I, p.10. 7. Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Macmillan, New York, 1948, Vol.11, p.1677.(Referred to hereafter as "Memoirs") 21 a consequence Increased the urgency of their obtaining more adequate rep-resentation of their interest through the admission of friendly states. One of the major disagreements between the United States and the USSR at Dumbarton Oaks was over the question of which states were to be the in-i t i a l members of the organization. They agreed that the members should be the United Nations and associated nations, but they differed in their in-terpretations of this expression. The United States meant that the members should be a l l the signatories to the United Nations Declaration of 1942, plus Q eight other states. who were aiding the allies but had not declared war against the Axis. The Russians said the members should be the twenty-six original signatories to the United Nations Declaration, plus the 'associated nations', who were defined as the subsequent signers of the Declaration. The USSR did not wish to include the eight states mentioned by the United p. States. * This disagreement was left unsettled until the Yalta Conference. In the middle of the discussion on original membership, Gromyko sud-denly proposed that the sixteen Republics of the USSR be made foundation members of the United Nations. This proposal completely astonished the British and American delegates and was strongly opposed by them. Finally, at Stettinius' request, Gromyko withdraw the suggestion stating that "...he had raised the point merely to advise us (the Americans) and the British that his government had the matter in mind.8 ^* The United States did not favour multiple membership because, as Hull said "...we ... felt that our influence would enable us at a l l times to assert ourselves." ^* Russia was interested in plural membership specific-8. Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Iceland and Egypt. 9. Hull, Memoirs, p. 1679 • 10. Ibid, p. 1629. 11. Ibid, p. 1680 22 ally because she was not confident that her influence could be effective in the General Assembly* At Dumbarton Oaks the United States raised the question of giving Brazil a permanent seat* Roosevelt and Hull both believed this should be done because of, "Brazil's size, population, and resources, along with her prospect of a great future and the outstanding assistance she had rendered her sister United Nations." '.The British and the Russians emphatically and with good reason opposed this view. Latin America was already over-represented and there were other states whose future was just as promising and whose war effort far exceeded that of Brazil. Fortunately the United States declined to press the proposal and i t was dropped until the Latin Republics themselves raised i t , or one similar to i t , at San Francisco. During October, 1944, Roosevelt's personal representative at the Vatican, Myron Taylor, had an audience with Pope Pius XII during which the question of Vatican membership in the proposed United Nations was raised by the Pope. This possibility was referred to the State Department, who studied and then rejected i t . Hull stated the reasons "While recognizing the world wide and beneficent influence of the Vatican, we concluded that Vatican City was too small to be able to under-take the responsibilities, such as participation in measures of force to preserve or restore the peace, which every member of the United Nations had to incur." *-3« , The issue of Vatican membership did not come up officially at any international conference but i t received considerable treatment in the Canadian House of Commons during the discussion on the San Francisco Con-ference. French Canadian members of parliament were highly critical of the 14 Canadian government for not urging the inclusion of the Vatican. * 12. Ibid, p. 1678 13. Hull. Memoirs, p. 1712 14. Canada, House of Commons Debates. 6th Session 19th Parliament,1945, pp 268-9. 25 However, the Soviet Union would never have consented to admitting the Vatican because of the virulent Catholic hostility to commununism and its reflection in the non-recognition of Russia policies of several predominantly Catholic states. The inclusion of territorially minute states, such as the Vatican, San Marino or Liechtenstein, was discouraged by the League of Nations and this practise was not unreasonably adopted by the United Nations. The problems dealing with membership and voting procedure in the organization left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks, were finally resolved by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta. The difference in interpretation that had forestalled agreement on which states were to become initial members was dispelled by a compromise. Roosevelt agreed that only those states which declared war should receive invitations, but he received Stalin's and Churchill's approval to setting March 1, as a time limit for adherenoe 15. to the United Nations Declaration. This permitted the Americans to suggest to the six Latin states that they had previously counseled to stay out of the war, that now was the time to forsake neutrality and obtain membership in the United Nations. Britain also welcomed the opportunity this compromise offered of letting Egypt and Turkey receive invitations. Only Iceland of the eight states mentionned by the United States at Dum-barton Oaks failed to declare war, and was therefore not accepted as an original member. At Yalta, Molotov also announced that the USSR would not demand member-ship for a l l sixteen Soviet Republics, but would like to see at least two, 16. or possibly three Republics as original members. He explained that by 15. See Appendix for l i s t of Signatories to the U.N. Declaration and Dates of Adherence. 16. Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. 24 the eonetitutional changes of February 1944 the Soviet Republics had been granted control of their own foreign p o l i c y . T h e three Republics for which membership was requested were, moreover, heavily populated, and had born the greatest sacrifices of the war. Roosevelt was at first reluctant to accept multiple Russian membership, but after private conversations with Stalin he was inclined to think that the proposal was not outrageous. Stet-tinius hints at possible additional motives behind the Russian request, when he asserts that Stalin told Roosevelt that he "felt his position in the Ukraine was difficult and insecure. A vote for the Ukraine was essential, 18 the Marshal?had declared, for Soviet unity." * Stalin also appeared to feel that he needed the three votes to secure the acquiescence of his government to participation in the United Nations. Roosevelt refused to accede to Stalin's suggestion that the Ukraine and Byelorussia sign the United Nations Declaration at Yalta and thereby be assured of seats at the forthcoming Conference. The American view was that the question of additional votes for the USSR was one that the United Nations as a whole should decide, but the United States was willing to support the request of the USSR for membership for the two Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. In an exchange of letters with Churchill and Stalin, Roosevelt received assurances that they would support a similar American request for three votes. Roosevelt himself, did not want the extra votes but he felt they might be necessary to appease American opinion, or more especially Senatorial opinion. 17. Aufricht, H., Principles and Pgactioee of Recognition by International Organizations, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 4J, 1949, p. 695. 18. Stettinius, Roosevelt, p. 187 2 5 It was evident at Yalta that the Soviet Union was disinclined to accept states as members in the United Nations that refused to have dip-lomatic relations with her. Byrnes' shorthand notes contain the following statement of Stalins 1: U I have a l i s t of the states that declared war on Germany. It means that they become future members of the Assembly. Among those states are ten which have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union ... We are to meet with them to build up international security. How is i t possible to build up international security with states that have no diplomatic relations with us at a l l t " ^* This matter was one which caused considerable concern to the Russians. They were scarcely placated by Roosevelt's reply that some states, "just had not got around to i t , " and others were prevented from doing so by the 2 0 influence of the Oatholic Church. * Though Stalin did not insist that action be taken to remedy this undesirable state of affairs, i t is certain that the ten nations were accepted reluctantly, and only because they had shared in the war effort. There is a certain degree of justification in this attitude of the Soviets. A state which has for many years been treated as a pariah, is very likely to be extremely sensitive and resentful of anything implying that i t is not a worthy member of the world community. Especially is this so in the case of the Soviet Union, which undoubtedly is convinced that its war agaut0& ^ Q Q S J S K S tremendous sacrifices of manpower and wealth in the nmusiai ufl i.\\v Unit ad MMatta removed a l l reasonable grounds on which any state could shun i t diplomatically. Therefore, any state continuing to do so was obviously motivated by unreasonable grounds of prejudice and hostility. Soviet co-operation with such states in a world assembly would definitely be difficult, because i t is virtually certain that they would judge anything 1 9 . Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 5 8 . 2 0 . Stettinius, Roosevelt, p. I98 26 concerning the Soviet Union, not on ite merits, but on their preconceived animosity to the USSR. Diplomatic recognition is consequently of con-siderably greater import to the USSR than to the long established western states. One of the major items of contention that was settled at Yalta was the scope of the great power veto that was to exist in the Seourity Council. The voting formula finally approved was that drawn up by the American State Department. There can be absolutely no doubt that this formula intentionally included admission of new members under the veto. Secretary of State Stettinius' statement to the three leaders at Yalta explaining the effect of the American proposal on voting placed admission of new members at the head of the l i s t of cases in which the veto would apply. The first portion of his statement reads as follows: "Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of a l l the permanent members: I Recommendations to the General Assembly on 1. Admission of new members; 2. Suspension of a member; g. 3. Expulsion of a member;" * At San Francisco, attempts were made to hedge the powers of the Security Council in admitting members, and thus remove this act from the realm of the veto. But both an Egyptian amendment, that would have given the Gen-eral Assembly the initiative in admitting new members, and an Australian amendment, that would have restricted Security Council concurrence on 22. admission to the ex-enemy states and Spain, were defeated. The conclusion is potent. The admission of new members was clearly meant to be an appropriate subject for the veto. This fact is of primary importance because the United States subsequently claimed that the veto 21. Ibid, p, 183 22. U.N.C.I.O. Vol.8, p.296. 27 was never intended to apply to admission of new members. ?* One of the final acts of the Yalta Conference was to approve the seat at San Francisco. France was invited to join with the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, and China, as a sponsoring power, but declined because i t had not been present at the preliminary discussions. Invitations to the San Francisco Conference were sent by the United States, on behalf of the four sponsoring powers, to forty-two nations who had declared war on the enemies of the United Nations. All the states at war with Germany or Japan were not invited. Poland, for special reasons which will be explained later, was not included in the l i s t , nor were the former allies of Germany— Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and Finland -who had now declared war on the side of the United Nations. Four delegations were later accepted and seated by the assembled conference. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Argentina, and Denmark, brought the total aumber of states represented at San Francisco to fifty. 2J. Speech of Herschel Johnson in the Security Council on Aug.21, 1947. 24. See Appendix for text of the invitation. text of the invitation 24. to be sent to those states qualifying for a CHAPTER III, SECTION A. The San Francisco Conference A. Special Cases of Original Membership. The United Nations Conference on International Organization convened in San Francisco on April 25, 19^ 5, with the representatives of forty six nations present* The task of building an international structure that would guarantee security and establish a lasting peace was a great one, but both the delegates and the peoples of the world knew that the cost of failure would be almost too immense to contemplate. President Truman in his opening address stated the issue in stark terms: "If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace." The pervading atmosphere of the Conference was one of conciliation, co-operation, and agreement, but i t was not entirely untouched by discord. The rivalry was not only among the major powers but also existed between them as a group, and the small and middle powers. This situation, though unavoidable, indicated a potential danger to the organization. The success of the United Nations was predicated on the ability of the 1. UNeiO, Vol. 1, p. 114; Doc. 8, G/5, April 25, 1945, p.4. 28 29 great powers to resolve their differences and work together in close co-operation in the interests of peace* The unanimity principle, or veto, was insurance against major decisions being taken when a l l five great powers did not concur because action lacking the sanction of one or more great powers would have inherent in i t the danger of a major conflict. It does not appear to have been realized that inaction could also lead to conflict i f some permanent members believed their vital interests were in danger. To the small powers this looked like a great power dictatorship. They found considerable sympathy for their views among the Americans who are usually more at ease in a large assemblage than in the exclusive gatherings of the great powers. The American attitude was in direct contrast to that of the Russians who preferred the more select group, for in i t they were more capable of exerting their influence. The USSR was moreover somewhat contemptuous of the pretensions of the lesser powers. At Yalta Stalin had asserted that, "He was prepared ... to join with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers, but he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgement of the small powers." 2* The United States had l i t t l e to fear from the judgement of the small powers and placed considerable value on their good will, more, perhaps, than that placed on Soviet friendship. This predisposition to favour the weaker states, especially the Latin American Republics, led the United what some authorities rtyarcl OS States into Aa deplorable diplomatic blunder at the very outset of the Con-ference. The South Americans demanded the admission of Argentina to the conference and the United States tactlessly bowed to the pressure in the interests of the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. Its preservation 2. Stettinius, Roosevelt, p. 112 5 0 however, was at the expense of a deep r i f t in Soviet-American solidarity. The disastrous American action was the first public breach in the cooperation of the major powers and Molotov argued on this ground in opposing an immediate vote on Argentina's admission. He declaimed: "... this would be the first case in which an invitation to a country to participate in the conference was not issued with the concurrence of the four sponsoring Governments.* 3« The significance of this development will be more clearly seen i f we momentarily digress to survey the situation in Argentina which had made i t an international outcasts. Throughout the war Argentina had been a hornet's nest of Axis activity and despite strong American pressure and rather mild British censure no real attempt had been made by the Argentine government to rectify this flagrant pro-Axis violation of neutrality. Finally, in January 1944 the government of President Ramirez had unwillingly broken off relations with Japan and Germany to offset the opprobrium that i t was drawing on itself. The possibility that this act might be followed by a declaration of war led to the overthrow of Ramirez in February by the Farrell-Peron clique, which favored the strong pro-Nazi elements in Argentina. This new regime refused to implement the break in relations with the Axis, so both the United States and Great Britain withheld recognition. The pro-fascist attitude of Farrell's government is typified by the following quote from La Fronda, a government supported newspaper: "It is most comforting that a l l the peoples of the Continent are closely grouped under the brilliant leadership of Hitler, who has been supematurally transformed by developments into ... more than an intrepid defender of Germany, he is the defender of Europe." 4. 3 . U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 5 , p. 5 7 9 ; Doc. 41 Ex/2 April 3 0 , 1 9 4 5 , p . 5 . 4 . Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XI, July 5 0 , 1 9 4 4 , p. 1 0 9 . 31 Farrell's dictatorship emulated all the evil teachings of its Nazi idol; persecution of Jews, rigid control of the press and education, ruthless suppression of a l l opposition, destruction of c i v i l liberties, and glorification of might. ^' President Roosevelt condemned the fascist proclivities of Argentina in a statement on September 29, 1944. He said in part: "This situation (in Argentina) presents the extraordinary paradox of the growth of Nazi-Fascist influence and the increasing application of Nazi-Fascist methods in a country of this hemisphere, at the very time that those forces of oppression and aggression are drawing even closer to the hour of defeat and judgement in Europe and elsewhere in the World." 6* Spruille Braden, United States ambassador in Argentina at the time of the San Francisco Conference, stated on his return to the United States in 1946: "The Argentine regime is just as Fascist as any which existed in Germany and Japan." 1* The philosophy of Juan Peron, the strong man of the Argentine regime, testifies to the scarcely admirable 'peace-loving' qualifications of Argentina for membership in the United Nations. In June 1944, he said in a speech, that "War is an inevitable social phenomenon." * Moreover, he adhered to the Hitlerian dogma that in war man reaches his apotheosis. Such a philosophy is the direct antithesis of everything that the United Nations stands for, consequently Argentina's adherence to the Charter must at best be hypocritical. Argentina was not unaware that the collapse of Germany would leave her ideologically stranded, she therefore willingly seized the opportunity of a i i . , • • — — 5» Speech of Helen Gahagen Douglas, 79th CongreeB 2nd Session, pp. A669-A 675. 6. Rosenman, S.I., (Comp.) Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harper and Bros., New York, Vol.1944-45,1950, pp. 298-9. 7. Congressional Record, 79th Congress 2nd Session, p. A 6 7 L 8. Ibid, p. A 669. ?2 whitewash offered by the Chapultepee Conference. On March 27, 1945> she accepted the invitation to adhere to the Act of Chapultepee and in the same proclamation met the other demand of her sister Republics by declaring war on Japan, and reluctantly also on Germany "in view of the fact that the latter is an ally of Japan." ^* The reversal of policy was only superficial for Argentina remained an avowedly Fascist state and refused to implement the pledges she had given with appropriate action. In spite of Argentina's blatant perfidy she had undergone a mysterious transfiguration in the eyes of Latin America and become a respectable, democratically inclined member of the peace-loving world community. Ezequiel Padilla of Mexico defended Argentina before the Fifth Plenary Session at San Francisco with semantics and fantasy. An exerpt from this amazing speech reads: "While Argentina has been branded a Fascist nation, we must bear in mind that here a distinction must be made between the nation and her govern-ment. Argentina is a nation of democratic traditions ... While it is true that the Government accidentally divorced itself from the sentiments of her people, i t would not be fair to punish the people for an accidental separation of the Government from those deep-rooted sentiments of her Nation." 10. Another South American, Dr. Gallagher of Peru, enunciated a doctrine that virtually conferred on the American Republics the right to determine the conditions on which states would be admitted. This startling pronounce-ment was in these words: "At the Mexico City Conference everyone had regretted very much that Argentina was not present, and a unanimous accord had then been taken as to the steps that Argentina should take in order to gain the right of admission to the Conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. The Argentine 9. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. X l l , April 8, 1945, pp. 612-5. 10. U.N.C.I.O., Vol 1, p. 352; Doc. 42 P/10, May 1, 1945, p.9» 33 Government had faithfully fulfilled those steps and conseqoently had gained the right of admission to the San Francisco Conference." Because of their numerical voting strength and the promise of support drawn from the United States as the quid pro quo for their assent to original membership for the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the Latin American Republics were able to force the issue of Argentine membership on the Conference. American concurrence in this i l l conceived action was in open contravention 12. of Roosevelt's explicit exclusion of Argentina at Yalta. For the reason that the question of Argentina's admission to San Fran-cisco became closely involved with that of the Ukraine and Byelorussia i t is necessary to comment on the situation in regard to the two Russian Republics. At a meeting of the Heads of Delegations on April 27, Molotov proposed that the Ukraine and Byelorussia be admitted to original membership in the proposed organization. Stettinius endorsed the Soviet proposal and stated the American reasons: "in reaching this agreement President Roosevelt had felt, and the United States s t i l l felt, that the importance of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics in the Soviet Union and the sufferings which they had undergone in the war, as well as their contribution to the war, fully justified their admission to the organization." 13* The Soviet request was unanimously assented to, but Molotov then requested that the two Republics be permitted to participate in the San Francisco Conference. At this point Dr. Lleras Camargo of Colombia moved and the Committee agreed that this question be referred to the Executive Committee for further study. In the Executive Committee meeting Senor 11. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.5, P. 164; Doc. 4j D.C. /ll ( 2 ) (Corrigendum) May 18, 1945, p.6. 12. Stettinius, Roosevelt, pp. 199-200. 1J. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 5," p. 91} Doc. 30. D.C. /5 (1), April 27, 1945, p. 11. 34 Padilla of Mexico tried to lump the admission of Argentina and the two Soviet Republics together in a single motion. This move indicates that i t was not further study that the Latin American states had desired, but an opportunity to obtain a seat for Argentina. The attempt was a failure and the Ukraine and Byelorussia were recommended alone. Though the question of admitting Argentina first officially appeared before the Conference on April JO, i t had been the subject of a secret meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four on April 28, at which the 14 Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Chile and Mexico were also present. * At this session Stettinius apparently tried to back out of the commitment to support Argentina which the United States had made at Mexico City. The Latin Americans, however, were intractable, they refused to accept the Ukraine and Byelorussia at San Francisco unless Argentina was also invited. The irresolute Americans finally gave in, preferring to incur Soviet dis-pleasure rather than risk a diminution of their influence in South America. The USSR was vehemently opposed at this meeting to admitting Argentina and excluding Poland. They carried the battle through the meetings of the Executive Committee, • where they lost a nine to three vote, the Steering Committee, where the vote was twenty-nine to six, and finally to the Fifth Plenary Session, a l l of which met on April 5 0 . At the Plenary Session Molotov challenged the seating of pro-Nazi Argentina when an ally, Poland, was excluded. His case was good except for two things, f i r s t , the Polish Government had n6t been reconstituted according to the Yalta agreement, and second, he misrepresented the facts in stating, "the question of in-viting Argentina to this Conference ... had never been discussed previously 14. Welles, S., Where Are We Heading, Harper and Bros., New York, 1946, p. 211. 35 by representatives of the four sponsoring powers." *^ Despite this'it was generally agreed, outside Latin American circles, that his appeal for postponement on consideration of Argentina was, to use the words of Paul Henri Spaak "... fundamentally a reasonable and legitimate request." The United States was too impatient to brook any delay and demanded an immediate decision which they easily won by a vote of thirty-one to four. The American victory was not a glorious one. It elicited a storm of criticism from al l over the United States and received a decidedly unfavor-able reaction in most other countries. An editorial in the Washington Post of May 1, 1945» charged that "... what has happened about Argentina has pre-judiced our relations at this Conference with Soviet Russia." Walter Lippman observed that the vote showed up a great weakness of the organiza-tion, namely, that nearly half the votes were possessed by American states and they used their power irresponsibly. Cordell Hull records in his Memoirs: "To Secretary Stittinius over the telephone I spoke as strongly as I could against admitting Argentina to the San Francisco Conference." *9» Sumner Wells noted the most tragic, far reaching effect: "... The unskillful handling of the incident by the American delegation led to the immediate crystallization within the Conference of two blocs, one composed of the Soviet Union and its handful of satellites, and the other consisting of the large group of Western states, led by Great Britain and the United States."- 2 0* Neither Secretary of State Stettinius' later assertion "...that the . vote of the United States in favour of seating Argentina did.not constitute 15. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 1, p. 345; Doc. 42 P/10, April JO, 1945» p.2. 16. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 1, p. 354} Doc. 42 P/10, April 30, 1945, p . l l . 17. Congressional Record, 79th Congress 1st Session, p. A 2046. 18. Ibid, p. A 2046. 19. p. 1722. 20. Welles, Where Are We Heading, p.42. 56 a blanket endorsement of the policies of the Argentine Government," nor Ambassador Harriman1s weak justification of the American action to 22 Stalin, * was able to counteract the i l l effects of precipitate and inept American diplomacy. This incident left a rankling animosity and increased suspicion in the memory of the Russians. When the United States later voted against Communist states which were no worse in their conduct than Argentina, the Russians could logically conclude that the United States preferred associa-tion with fascism to communism and was therefore hostile to the USSR. There was scarcely any other act that the United States could have committed at that time which would have so thoroughly undermined the future relations between the two powers. It was now abundantly clear that the Soviet Union had only her veto power in the Security Council to protect herself against headstrong action by the United States. In the previous chapter i t was noted that for special reasons Poland did not receive an invitation to the San Francisco Conference. This was a regretable occurrence but l i t t l e else could be done for there was no Polish Government that was acceptable to both the USSR and the Western States. Wartime developments had created a situation in which there were two governments claiming to represent Poland, one backed by the USSR and the other by the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom since 19^3 had vainly sought to reconcile the Polish Government in London with the USSR. The most formidable obstacle to agreement was the London Poles' reluctance to accept the Russian claim to the Curzon Line as the eastern 21. Department of State, Bulletin. Vol. X l l , June 3, 19^5, p. 1007. 22. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.61 37 boundary of Poland. The Poles were averse to disgorging the territory they had seized from the USSR when i t was in its war weakened infancy. The Russians were equally determined to regain the disputed area and since they had, by 1944, de facto control of i t , they were unlikely to give i t up. Their claim was moreover far stronger morally than Polands. Prime Minister Churchill openly supported the Russian position. He told the House of Commons on February 27, 1945» v. n I have never concealed from the House that, personally, I think the Russian claim is just and right." * Premier Mikolajezyk of the London Poles carried on intermittent neg-otiations with Moscow but he and his colleagues were conservative and anti-Russian so agreement was virtually impossible. Shortly after the Red Army crossed the BUg River in Poland a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was set up at Lublin. It was formed by the Polish National Committee of Liberation which was composed of Poles who had gone to Russia and fought alongside the Red Army. This Lublin Government, as i t came to be called, was recognized by the Soviet Union as the real government of Poland. It was an accepted "fact that the Polish Government in London represented chiefly the landed class of Poland who were bitterly anti-Soviet, but the British and American Governments were not fully convinced that the Lublin Government was any more representative of the Polish people. The Polish question was a prominent item of discussion at Yalta but no immediate solution was found. The Crimea Declaration stated that the three powers would be willing to recognize a new Polish Government established on a ' 24. broader democratic basis, but i t was no easy task getting the three big 25. Great Britain, Commons Debates, Vol. 408, Feb.27, p.127$. 24. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. X l l , February 18, 1945, p.215. 38 powers and the various Polish factions to agree on a mutually satisfactory solution. Churchill indicated a certain degree of displeasure with the London Poles in lamenting to the Commons that: "... there would have been no Lublin Committee or Lublin Provisional Government in Poland i f the Polish Government in London had accepted our faithful counsel... They would have entered into Poland as its active Government, with the liberating armies of Russia." It became increasingly evident that the Lublin Government was winning out in the struggle for recognition and would dominate any coalition which might be formed. At the time that the invitations to San Francisco were sent out the Crimea decision on Poland had not been implemented and the London Government was s t i l l vigorously asserting itself. It vainly protested against the refusal to admit i t as the representative of Poland at San Francisco in a note to the sponsoring powers on March 12. The communication stated in part: "... the Polish Government as the sole legal and independent repreeent-ative-of the Polish state, emphatically insists on its indisputable right to take part in the world security conference and solemnly protests against its omission from invitations to the San Francisco Conference." 26. As i f there were not enough claimants to the role of representative of Poland, the Polish-Amerioans set up a group with the length^y and in-comprehensible name, "Coordinating Committee of American Polish Association in the East," and requested that i t be permitted to send observers to San 27 Francisco as representatives of Poland. The United States for obvious reasons had to turn down this remarkable request. 25. Great Britain, Commons Debates, Vol. 4 o 8 , Feb. 27, p.1282. 26. Congressional Record, 79th Congress 1st Session, p. A 1355* 27. Ibid, p. A I355. 39 At the Conference, on April 27, Jan Masaryk, supported by Molotov, proposed that the Provisional Government of Poland be invited to the Con-ference, Stettinius and Eden both refused to entertain the suggestion until a new Polish Government had been formed in accordance with the Crimea , . . 28. decision. There was no one who would deny that Poland had a right to be at the Conference but the difficulties over representatives were insurmountable. To take note of the situation and to express the feelings of the assembled states a resolution was passed: "The Governments of the United Nations express to the people of Poland their.sympathy and their admiration. They hope that the constitution of a Polish Government recognized as such by the sponsoring nations will make i t possible for Polish delegates to come and take part as soon as possible in the work of the Conference." "* Molotov, however, refused to let the matter drop. He brought i t up in connection with Argentina, and referred at every opportunity to the absence of Poland. Finally at the Eleventh meeting of the Steering Committee on June 23, Stettinius announced that a Polish Government had been formed which met the requirements of the Yalta powers. Since the new government could not be established in time to take part in the Conference, i t was agreed that a place be reserved for Poland's signature on the Charter as an original member. At the fifth meeting of the Executive Committee on June 5, a letter from Mr. Morgenstierne, Chairman of the Norwegian delegation, was read. It requested that consideration be given to an invitation to Denmark. The letter explained that Denmark had been unable to resist the German invasion but had carried on underground resistance during the four years of occupation. 28. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 5, p.98; Doc. 30 DC/5 (1)» April 27, 19*5, p.15. 29. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 5, p.96j Doc. 50 DC/5 U ) » April 27, 19^5, p.16. 40 A free Danish Government had now been formed and i t desired membership for Denmark in the United Nations* There was no opposition to the proposal and a motion by Lord Halifax that Denmark be invited was passed unanimously. Since June 5 was Danish Constitution Day the invitation was immediately forwarded. The seating of Denmark brought the number of states represented at San Francisco to fifty, and with Poland they made up the fifty-one original signatories to the Charter. CHAPTER III. SECTION B. Formulation of the Membership Provisions of the Charter. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals on membership were simple and terse. Chapter III reads: "Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l peaoe loving states." 1* Chapter V, Section B Paragraph 2 added the provision: "The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization upon recommendation of the Security Council." • Consideration of Chapter III of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was assigned to Committee 2 of Commission I. It had in addition to the text of Chapter III amendments from sixteen ^'countries to provide a basis for its work. In the committee discussions i t was soon evident that the members did not wish to accept the membership Chapter as i t stood. The term 'peace loving' appeared too vague and some distinction between original and new 1. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.Ill, p.4j Doc. 1 G 1, p.e. 2. Ibid, p. 5; p.4 5. Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, The Philippines, Uruguay, SU Venezuela. See Appendix for texts of Amendments Proposed. 41 42 members seemed essential* There was no real difficulty over defining in i t i a l members* "There was, however, a substantial difference of opinion on the principles which should be followed in admitting other states to member-ship. 0 * Some Latin American states championed complete universality and others made slight reservations, whereas several European states wanted definite criteria laid down for membership. The idea of universality was discussed but not seriously entertained as an immediate possibility. There was however, fairly general support for this principle as an eventual ob-jective. At the second meeting of committee 1/2 Australia submitted an amend-ment to get around the uncertain meaning of the phrase •peace loving nations. It was worded as follows: "Membership of the United Nations shall be open to any state which accepts the obligations of this Charter and which is admitted to membership in accordance with the Charter." 5» Norway also submitted an amendment- which was almost of the same sub-stance but i t made an interesting distinction between a peace loving state and the reliability of its government's intentions. Neither of these amend-ments was extensively supported. The delegate from the Netherlands, at the third meeting of committee 1/2, advanced two criteria which he believed should be established for admission of new members; 1.) political institutions which ensure that the state is the servant of its citizens and 2.) observance by the state of 6. the inviolability of international obligations. France shared the view of the Netherlands that there should be specific rules governing admission of new members "... in order to guarantee the existence of certain common 4. Canada, Report on the U.N. Conference on International Organization , Department of External Affairs, Conference Series, 1°45» No.2. 1:6:1:8:1:8:s M:1?.-^-^!^ ^"W-foJ-iJ^pfti-4$ ideals and a community of political principles shared by members of the organization ..." *^ France then went even further with an amendment that added after the words 'peace loving states' in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the following: "which give proof of i t by their institutions, their international be-havior and the effective guarantees which they furnish that they will respect their international obligations. Participation in the organization implies obligations which are incompatible with the status of neutrality." 8. The French, as ever, desired clarity and logic in the terms of admission, with no provision for conscientious objectors to the use of force. This latter sentiment undoubtedly arose from the League's experience with the conditional membership of perpetually neutral Switzerland. The proposed French amendment on neutrality was turned over to committee 1/1 for con-sideration. They decided that the obligations of the Charter were suf-ficiently binding to remove the need for any such specific prohibition of neutrality. Because of the diversity of views on the subject, a drafting subcom-mittee was set up by committee 1/2 to consider amendments and suggestions on membership. It was instructed especially to consider three main questions; "(1.) universality (2.) the definition of "peace-loving" and (5.) the dif-ference between "state and government" or "nation and state?" In the subcommittee Uruguay was the leading proponent of universality, asserting the extreme view that membership should be obligatory on a l l com-munities. To a greater or lesser degree Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Bolivia also propounded the doctrine that every state by the very fact of being one should automatically be a member of the United Nations. Other 7* Loc Cit. 8. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 5, p.585; Doc. 2 G/7/ (o), p.l. 9. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 7, p.25; Doc. 242 l / 2 / l l , May 11, 194^. p.2. 44 delegations would only commit themselves to universality as an ideal to which i t was not necessary to adhere unswervingly. The term 'peace loving states,' though admittedly inadequate, was retained because i t "reflects the ideal which animates the creators of 10 the Charter." * It was not deemed sufficient for a state to declare itself peace loving, two things must be proved, that i t is ready to accept and f u l f i l its obligations, and that i t is able to carry them out. For this purpose i t was felt that the qualifications of a candidate would re-ceive more satisfactory consideration i f left to the judgement of the Organization rather than i f a set of specific conditions were to be estab-lished. The term was therefore evidently meant to be a flexible criterion. The subcommittee does not seem to have greatly concerned itself over the use of the word 'state', though i t was certainly not a satisfactory expression to some of the delegations. By implication i t seems to have been used in a rather restrictive sense since the rapporteur records that there were objections raised by those favoring "the future incorporation of other communities." ^* The text finally arrived at by the subcommittee and submitted to the sixth meeting of committee 1/2 differed substantially from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It differentiated between those who would be members at the outset and those who would later acquire membership. The reasons for this, ae later stated by the rapporteur of committee 1/2, were that before new members could be admitted the Organization had to exist and this im-plied the existence of original members, moreover, the distinction calmed the fears of certain participants in the deliberations that they might 10. Ibid. p.209j Doc.1074 1/2/76, June 18, 1945, p.5. 11. Ibid, p.288; p.2. 45 be denied membership since they were not strictly speaking states. There was no discrimination intended in the provision that original members participate in the Organization as of right while the participation of 12 future members is dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The following is the text on membership at this stage of its develop-ment: "Members of the Organization are the signatories of the Charter whose ratification has become effective in accordance with Chapter XI. "Membership of the Organization is open to a l l peace-loving states which, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and ready to.accept and carry out the obligations contained in the Charter." The Coordination Committee suggested and Committee 1/2 adopted some changes in this wording of Chapter III in the interests of clarification. The f i r s t five words of paragraph one were replaced by the phrase "The 14. initial members of the Organization shall be ..." *» and the words in paragraph two after 1 peace-loving states which,1 were changed to read: "...accept the obligations contained in the Charter and which, in the judge-ment of the Organization, are able and ready to carry them out." 15* This amended text was the one which finally appeared in the report of the rapporteur of, Committee 1/2. This report records that: "The unanimous opinion of the Committee was that adherence to the principles of the Charter and complete acceptance of the obligations aris-ing therefrom were essential conditions to participation by States in the Organization." A further paragraph of this report is of the utmost importance for i t unequivocably shows that the qualifications specifically mentioned in Article 4 of the Charter were not intended to be either restrictive or 12. Loc. cit. 15. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 7» P . ? 6 - 7 J Doc. 514 1/2/17 May 15, 1945, p. 1-2 1 4 . Ibid, p.122; Doc. 606 1/2/45, May 26, 1945, p.5. 15.. Ibid. p,l87; Doc.797 1/2/58, June 6, 1945, p.l. 16. {bid, p.526; Dpc.1178 I/2/76 (2), June 24, 194*5, p.5. 46 or exhaustive. To quote from the rapporteur's report: " i t was clearly stated that the admission of a new member would be subject to study, but the Committee did not feel i t should recommend the enumeration of the elements which were to be taken into consideration. It considered the difficulties which would arise in evaluating the political institutions of States and feared that the mention in the Charter of a study of such a nature would be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, or i f preferred, of non-interference. This does not imply, however, that in passing upon the admission of a new member, considerations of a l l kinds cannot be brought into account.8 17. From this statement i t is evident that political factors were definitely expected to enter into decisions on new members. It is equally evident that there was no idea of attempting to delimit the range or basis of the deliber-ations on admission. The significance of this fact is in no. way diminished by the subsequent decision of the International Court of Justice that the criteria of membership stated in paragraph one of Article 4 were "not merely ... the necessary conditions, but also ... the conditions which 18 suffice," * since the Court refused to consider the intentions of the founders of the United Nations in making its decision. While Committee 1/2 was discussing the conditions under which states might become members of the United Nations, Committee I l / l was responsible for consideration of the procedure by which new members would be admitted. Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals formed the basis for the talks on procedure. ^» Amendments to this paragraph were 20 submitted by eight states. * Discussion in Committee I l / l centred chiefly around an Australian amendment that would have enabled the General Assembly alone to admit new members, except in the cases of the ex-enemy states or their supporters, when a recommendation would be required from the Security Council. This 17« Loc cit. 18. International Organization, 1948, p. 570. 19. See above p. 11, for text. .. „ 20. Australia, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay and See appendix for texts of Amendments. Venezuela. 47 procedure was intended as a compromise between the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which required Security Council recommendations on a l l applicant states, and the views of those states who wished the General Assembly to have sole authority in admission of new members* However Australia's amendment, along with the others proposed, was rejected since i t was widely felt that "... the purpose of the Charter is primarily to provide security against a repetition of the present war and that, therefore, the Security Counoil should assume the ini t i a l responsibility of suggesting new part-icipating states.'1 21 • After being subject to scrutiny by the Coordination Committee and the Advisory Committee of Jurists the text of the paragraph on admission pro-cedure was altered for technical reasons that in no way altered the intent. The admission of any new members was to be "... effected by a decision of oo the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." . In the opinion of the Committee of Jurists the General Assembly had to the right by this text to eitherAaccept or reject a Security Council recom-mendation for admission of a new member. It was similarly free to accept or reject a negative recommendation, though i t is not made clear just what the rejection of a negative recommendation implied. There is, however, l i t t l e room for the belief, in the light of the Committee discussions, that the General Assembly could in such a circumstance proceed on its own initia-tive to admit an applicant state. The practice later adopted by the General Assembly of returning the applications of rejected states to the Security Council for reconsideration appears to be the only interpretation that could possibly be countenanced by the Great Powers. In submitting the texts passed by the Technical Committees to the Coordination Committee the Secretariat included the paragraph on procedure, 21. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 8, p.408; Doc.57° H/l/26, May 25, 1945, p.2, 22. Charter, CH. II, Art. 4, Para. 2. 48 which had been in Chapter V of Dumbarton Oaks, under the membership chapter. This was done in line with a suggestion that all membership provisions should appear in one chapter for greater clarity. The Coordination Committee grouped Chapters I and II together into a single Chapter thus moving the statements on membership up to Chapter II. In the final draft of the Charter there are four articles in the membership chapter. Article 5 defines the original members as those who,having participated in the San Francisco Conference or having previously signed the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign and ratify the Chartere Article 4, which was to become one of the most controversial qssassfcs in the whole Charter, states that the United Nations is open to a l l peace lov-ing states accepting, and in the judgement of the Organization being able and willing to carry out,the obligations of the Charter. Article 5 provides for the suspension of a member against which pre-ventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council, and also makes provision for reinstatement. Article 6 states that a member may be expelled for persistent violation of the principles of the Charter. ^ * In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals provision was made for suspension and expulsion but no mention was made of withdrawal. Committee 1/2, which was to deal with suspension and expulsion, on its own initiative included the related question of withdrawal on its agenda. These questions were turned over to the subcommittee on membership where the matter of withdrawal was first to be considered. The subcommittee concluded that "the'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals deliberately omitted provisions 25. See Appendix for texts. 49 for withdrawal in order to avoid the weakness of the League Covenant which oh had permitted withdrawal." ' This conclusion is reinforced by the commentary of the British Foreign Office 4n Dumbarton Oaks which asserts that "States would have no right of withdrawing voluntarily; the intention is that membership of the Organ-25 ization shall be permanent." The United States on the other hand held to the view that the omission of mention of withdrawal "was to permit the consideration of each proposed case of withdrawal in the light of the cir-cumstances existing at the time." ^ * The subcommittee accepted the British view and as a consequence were 27. "strongly of the opinion that withdrawal should be impossible." In the fu l l committee discussion Uruguay urged that withdrawal be ex-pressly prohibited in the Charter. Since i t was felt that such action should not be taken without further discussion a special subcommittee was set up to report on withdrawal along with the questions of expulsion and suspension* In the meeting of this subcommittee Uruguay, true to her advocacy of universality, argued that prohibition of withdrawal should be included in the Charter but her contentions were not very convincing to states who re-fused to accept the premise of complete universality. A telling argument against Uruguay's assertions was that i f the Charter prohibited withdrawal sanctions would have to be provided for use against nations who attempted to withdraw. If such were to be the case many states might find ratifica-tion of the Charter difficult. There was considerable variety of opinion on the issue of withdrawal, 24. U.N.C.I.O., Vol 7, P.57) Doc. ? l 4 , 1/2/17, May 15, 1945, p.2. 25. Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Cmd. 6571, 1944. 26. U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 7, P.73i Doc 501, 1/2/20, May 2J, 1945, p.l. 27. IMd, P.37S Doc.214, 1/2/17, May 15, 1945, p.2. 5 0 some delegates believing i t would weaken the permanent character of the Organization i f withdrawal was provided for, others claiming that since membership was voluntary, termination of membership must also be. S t i l l others pointed out that a state might use the threat of withdrawal to gain concessions to its viewpoint. The weight of opinion finally came to rest on the side of those opposed to mention of withdrawal in the Charter. As an alternative to inclusion in the Charter a statement of views on the question was drawn up and unanimously accepted by the subcommittee. In this i t was agreed that withdrawal would not be provided for, nor would i t be expected i f the Organization was successful in its aims, but i f the Organization could not maintain peace, or could do so only at the expense of law and justice, then such action would be permissable. The Committee 28 further declined to formally forbid withdrawals. The settlement of the contentions issue was only temporary. When i t became certain in the discussions on amendments to the Charter that the veto was to be retained in a l l cases, and that every state would be bound by an amendment passed and ratified by a two thirds majority, some countries insisted that provision should be made for withdrawal of a state which could not accept an amendment. The discussion on withdrawal was consequently re-opened. After almost interminable wrangling a vote was finally taken on the simple question of whether or not withdrawal would be mentioned in the Charter. The vote showed that the majority favored omitting i t . The Com-mittee therefore approved the following commentary on withdrawal that super-ceded the one previously passed by the subcommittee. "The Committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express 2 8 . U.N.C.I.O., Vol .7 , PP .86-7; Doc. 5 2 9 1 / 2 / 5 5 , May 2 J , 1 9 4 5 , p p . 2 - 5 . 51 provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, i t is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization. "It is obvious, however, that withdrawals or some other forms of dis-solution of the Organization would become inevitable i f , deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice. "Nor would i t be the purpose of the Organization to compel a member to remain in the Organization i f its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which i t has not concurred and which i t finds itself unable to accept, or i f an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly or in a general conference fails to secure the ratification necessary to bring such amendment into effect. " i t is for these considerations that the Committee has decided to abstain from recommending insertion in the Charter of a formal clause spec-ifically forbidding or permitting withdrawal." 29• The refusal to inolude a right of withdrawal in the Charter may lessen the facility with which a state can withdraw, but i t does not deprive i t of the right. Louis S. St. Laurent ably expressed the situation to the House of Commons in stating: "Of course i t is true that there is a right of withdrawal as an in-cident of sovereignty; but those who signed the Charter should, I think, realize that i f they withdraw they must be prepared to say either that they no longer have faith in the remaining members of the organization or that they are so selfish as not to be prepared themselves to take their share in maintaining better conditions for a l l . To self-respecting nations that should be a pretty stern check on the exercise of the sovereign right of withdrawal." ^0' Though i t is surely better to have a state within the confines of United Nations obligations, i t is false to assume that by granting the right to withdraw a "recalcitrant nation ... can put itself beyond the pale of the law." ^1» This view ignores the fact that the United Nations is 29. Ibid, p. 267; Doc 1086, 1/2/77, June 19, 19^5, p.6. 50. Canada, Debates. Commons, 1st Session 2Dth Parliament, p. 153?» 19^5. 51. S.H. Knowles, Canada, Debates. Commons, 6th Session 19th Parliament, I945, p.210. 52 not the ultimate embodiment of a l l international law. A non-member state can s t i l l be called to answer for its misdemeanors so long as the states upholding justice and law as represented by the United Nations possess the power and will to enforce international law. Coincident with the discussions on withdrawal were the prolonged and highly contentious deliberations on the dual questions of expulsion and suspension. These matters were examined by the same subcommittee that dealt with withdrawal. It was clear that the two provisions implied a different degree of censure on an obnoxious state. Suspension meant that a state temporarily lost its right of membership while its obligations to the Organization re-mained intact; expulsion on the other hand meant a complete severance both in rights and obligations from the Organization. The exiled state, however, would not be freed from a l l international obligations since i t would be in the same category as those states who had remained outside the United Nations. Pew states objected to suspension while several opposed expulsion on grounds that "suspension was preferable in each of the contingencies 32. mentioned." * The subcommittee finally voted 6 to 5 to exclude any pro-vision for expulsion. They then approved by a vote of 8 to 2 a new draft of a paragraph on suspension to supplant the one in paragraph 3 of Section B Chapter V. Committee 1/2 attempted to reverse the decision of the subcommittee on expulsion, voting 19 to 16-to retain a reference to i t in the Charter. The chairman, however, ruled that a two thirds majority was required to sustain the original provision for expulsion in Dumbarton Oaks "therefore the Com-mittee had rejected the idea of expulsion in the Charter." 55« The delegate 22. Canada, Report of the U.N.Conference on International Organization, p.20. 25. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.7, p.ll4; Doc.604 1/2/42, May 26, 1945, p.2. 53 of the Soviet Union challenged the Chairman's ruling contending that the sub-committees decision had not had the required two thirds majority either. The disagreement was carried to the Steering Committee which recommended that Committee 1/2 reconsider the previous decision. This the Committee did. After considerable controversy i t reversed its previous decision by defeating a Belgian motion to omit reference to expulsion from the Charter. However a favorable two thirds majority was s t i l l required to retain the provision in the Charter. This was obtained at a later meeting when a l l but three opponents of expulsion abstained in order to permit a decision and end the protracted dispute'. The USSR was technically justified in objecting to the original ruling of the chairman, and in doing so probably reflected the wishes of the other great powers. The permanent members of the Security Council had no appre-hensions on expulsion since their veto power protected them from ever being the object of its use. The foremost opponents of expulsion were those who looked with favour on the universality idea and objected on principle to any proposition likely to weaken i t . In spite of the final inclusion of the provision in the Charter there was no real measure of agreement among the delegates. The question of suspension did not rouse any tempest of controversy since i t was generally felt that some method of indicating strong dis-pleasure with a state was necessary. During the time when i t seemed that expulsion was not to be mentionedlin the Charter, suspension was intended to apply either to states against which enforcement action was being taken, or those which violated the principles of the Charter H i n a grave and persistent fashion." After the reversal in the init i a l stand on expulsion of Committee 1/2, the conditions under which suspension would apply were 54 reduced to the single case in which a state was the object of preventive or enforcement action by the Security Council, The primary aim of this suspension provision is to prevent obstruction in the Organization by a state guilty of a threat to, or breach of, the peace. It would obviously be impossible to apply the suspension or ex-pulsion articles to the permanent members of the Security Council because they would be entitled to veto the action. It does not take great pres-cience to see that i f such action were deemed essential peace could hardly be preserved and the United Nations would cease to function in its intended role as protector of the peace. The powers of the Security Council and General Assembly in suspension or expulsion are permissive rather than mandatory, thus leaving a way open to amicable settlement with an offending state. If suspension is invoked against a member the Security Council can on its own initiative reinstate the suspended member? The object of this procedure is to facilitate re-instatement in the event that suspension brought about the desired changes in the transgressing state's policy. Ati.the third meeting of Commission I on June 15, Mr. Quintanella of Mexico presented a resolution designed to exolude from membership "defeated Axis governments or the governments imposed in any manner by the military forces of the Axis." This resolution though couched in braod terms was specifically directed at Franco's government in Spain. Quintanella supported his resolution with a stirring speech in which he denounced Franco for the aid and sympathy he had extended to the enemies of the United Nations in return for the support they had given him. He expressed the view that "... the military help given Franco by Mussolini's legions and by 54. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.6, p.124; D00.II67 1/10, June 25, 1945, p.17 55 Hitler's air power is the main reason why the Republic of Spain is not represented here today.11 55» France, Australia, Belgium, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the United States, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Chile, a l l spoke enthusiastically in support of Mexico's interpretive commentary on membership. The resolution which passed by acclamation reads as follows: "It is the understanding of the delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III cannot be applied to those states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the coun-tries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power." ' 6 . It should be noted that this statement does not condemn the people of the erring states but confines the interdiction to the pro-fascist governments of those states. Only Franco's government survived the col-lapse of the Axis system so that for al l practical purposes this prohibition of membership applies only to Spain. At the Potsdam Conference the Big Three supplemented this interdict with their personal condemnation of Franco. They declared: "The three governments feel bound however to make i t clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership." 57* While the Charter was being formulated a state of war s t i l l existed between the United"Nations and the Axis powers. To meet this special sit-uation, provision was made in Articles 52» 106, and 107 for transitional security arrangements to prevent a recurrence of the threat from the Axis until the Security Council had gathered sufficient strength under Article 43 agreements to assume responsibility for security. In this interim 25. Ibid, p.125; p.18 56. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.1, p.615; Doc.1210, P/20, June 27,1945, p.4. 57. Dept.-of State, Bulletin. Vol.XIII, Aug.5, 1945, p.160. • 56 period action could be taken against an ex-ememy state independently of Security Council control by the five great powers, but only i f they could agree to act?in concert. This special security regime could be terminated at any time by the Security Council with the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members. According to Bentwich and Martin this period "... must come to an end at the latest when the enemy state concerned is admitted to membership of the United Nations." This interpretation would seem to be valid since once a state is admitted to the United Nations its rights and liabilities become identical with those of other members. It waB apparent that l i t t l e could be done to clarify the somewhat anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland, until peace treaties were concluded with those states. This question came under consideration at the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three during July and August, 1945. At this meeting the contention of the Soviet Union that a l l the ex-enemy states should be treated as a group was resisted by the United States, who because of communist activity in Eastern Europe desired that they should be considered separately on their individual merits. Though a definitive agreement on this matter could not be reached, the separate men-tion of Italy in the Conference communique seems to indicate that i t at least would receive individual treatment. In connection with Italy the report stated: "The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian government will make i t possible for the three governments to f u l f i l l their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations." The other four states were grouped together for mention of similar treatment. The inconclusive state of the Potsdam agreement in this matter left the door open for a vexatious dispute when the ex-enemy states actually 58. -Bentwich N. and Martin,A., Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations . Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1250. p.il4, ._ 59. Dept. of State. Bulletin, Vol.XIIIVAufe,5,' 1945,' P.159» applied for membership. CHAPTER III. SECTION G. Comparison Between the Membership Provieione of the Covenant And the Charter. It has been said that the provisons of membership in the United Nations Charter are no more inherently restrictive than those of the League Coven-ant. While i t may be true that this was the intention of the founders there are two provisions which appear to negate this object. Whereas the Covenant provided for admission after a favorable two-thirds vote in the Assembly, the Charter requires the special two-thirds majority in both the Security Council and the General Assembly and in addition gives the five permanent members of the Seourity Council a veto over admission. Placing admission under the veto definitely recognized i t as a significant political act and created the possibility, which was realized, that political consid-erations would govern the admission of new members. The second difference in provisions lies in the fact that the League was open to "any fully self-2 governing State, Dominion or Colony," * while the Charter refers only to •states.' 5« i n praotice the word has been applied relatively strictly 1. Goodrich, LnM. and Hambro, E. Charter of the United Nations, Commentary & Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 19^0, p.25. 2. Covenant, Art. 1, Para..2. 3* Charter, Art. 4, Para. 1. 58 59 chiefly because Russia sets high standards for the nominees of the Western States and they reciprocate with similar standards for Soviet nominees, though each is willing to overlook deficiencies in the statehood of its own favorites. The original members of the League were named in two separate lists in the Annex to the Covenant. The first l i s t was that of signatories of the Treaty of Peace, the second enumerated the other states invited to 4 5. accede. m Forty-five states were named in the League lists but three > # of them never accepted membership by ratification of the peace treaty so that original League membership totaled only forty-two states. The United Nations had an original membership of fifty-one, made up of those states at San Francisco plus the signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942. The requirements for membership in the League were; 1.) the applicant must have the capacity for governing itself 2.) i t must have the sincere intention of observing its international obligations, and 5») i t was bound to accept the regulations of the League in such matters as military, naval, and air forces and armaments. There was also the special requirement for certain states adopted by the First Assembly: "In the event of Albania, the Baltic and Caucasian States being ad-mitted into the League, the Assembly requests that they should take the necessary measures to enforce the principle of the minorities treaties, and that they should arrange with the Council the details required to carry this object into effect." 6* In the cases of Albania, Latvia, Eethonia, and Lithuania these minority declarations constituted a prerequisite to membership. Ethiopia was also 4. See Appendix for l i s t s . 5* United States, Hedjaz, and Ecuador. 6. Aufricht, H., Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organizations, American Journal of International Law, Vol.fa7^J"1949, p.681. MB 60 required to sign a declaration giving special undertakings. The theoretical conditions for membership in the United Nations.as stated in the Charter and enumerated by the International Court of Justice, are: the applicant must 1.) be a state, 2.) be peace loving, J.) accept the obligations of the Charter, 4.) be able to carry out these obligations, and 5») be willing to do so. In actual fact,however, these conditions are merely window dressing, the one real condition is that a state be simultane-ously in the good graces of the Soviet Union and the Western bloc. The question is frequently raised as to whether admission to an inter-national organization,such as the League or the United Nations,implies recognition by the other member states. League practice seems to have been that,on admitting a new member,it "recognized this state and its government not only as a League Member but as a state and government." ^* This,however, did not imply that each individual member thereby recognized or was bound to recognize every other member. It was also an established doctrine that a state need not be recognized de jure before i t could be admitted to the League. Admission to membership in the United Nations similarly does not sig-8. nify recognition by members individually. Norway proposed an amendment at San Francisco which would have given the Organization the power of recommend-ing collective recognition and collective withdrawal of recognition. Since the amendment was not adopted,it can be inferred that the intention of the founders was not to interpret admission as equivalent to collective recog-nition except for the purposes of membership in the Organization. The Charter and the Covenant differ substantially in provisions for 7. Ibid, p.680. 8. U.N.C.I.O., Vol.8, p. 5l4j Doc.298, II/1/12, May 15, 19^5, p.7. 61 withdrawal, suspension and expulsion. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Covenant permitted a state to withdraw after two years notice of its in-tention. The Charter makes no provision for withdrawal but there was an understanding at San Francisco that failure to forbid withdrawal in the Charter meant that i t was given tacit concent. It was expected that a state would resort to i t only in very extreme circumstances. The Covenant provided for outright expulsion of an offending state but the Charter divides recalcitrant states into two categories. If a state was the object of preventive or enforcement action by the Security Council i t could be suspended from its rights and privileges as a member. If the wCkS violation of the principles of the Charter m a persistent the state could then be expelled. Suspension is a more enlightened provision than expulsion for,while i t deprives a state of its privileges in the organization,it does not release i t from obligations concomitant with membership. In this re-spect at least the Charter is an improvement over' the Covenant. A further difference between the League and the United Nations arises in the application of these penalty provisions; for,whereas the League could enforce expulsion indiscriminately, the United Nations could not suspend or expel any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council because of their veto power. During the lifetime of the League twenty-one states were admitted,, but, since there was a fairly heavy turnover seventeen states either withdrawing or being expelled, 'the total membership never exceeded fiftyrseven states. . 10. Forty-five members remained at the time the League was dissolved in 1945. The United Nations, starting with fifty-one members1has risen steadily in 9. See Appendix for l i s t . 10. See Appendix for l i s t . 62 numbers up to the present sixty. There have been no expulsions, suspen-sions or withdrawals. A greater loyalty to the United Nations among its members appears to exist than was present among the states in the League. This is an encourag-ing indication that the international idea has become more firmly entrenched. There is also the likelihood that i t represents a wider acceptance of the collectivist maxim that security is enhanced by cohesiveness. CHAPTER IV Rules of Admission. One of the final acts of the San Francisco Conference was to set up a Preparatory Commission whose duty was to prepare the agenda for the first part of the First Session of the General Assembly, and to draw up a set of provisional rules of procedure for the Security Council and the general Assembly. This Commission submitted a report including three rules on admission procedure for the Security Council and four complementary rules for the General Assembly based in Article 4 of the Charter. The rules for the Security Council were laid down in Chapter X of the 'Provisional Rules of Procedure for the Security Council.' Under these rules a state desiring membership in the United Nations had to submit to the Secretary-General an application accompanied by a declaration of readiness to accept the obligations of the Charter. The Secretary-General then had to place the application before the Security Council which was to decide whether the applicant was peace loving and able and willing to carry out the Charter requirements. If the Security Council decision was in the affirmative the Secretary-General was then to place their recommendation before the General Assembly. 63 64 The General Assembly was co*±y entitled to be informed of a new applica-tion^if the applicant state requested i t . A recommendation from the Sec-urity Council was to be acted on by consideration of the eligibility of the applicant state, followed by a decision requiring a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting for affirmation. Membership for an applicant became effective on the date on which an instrument of adherence to the 2 Charter was deposited with the Secretary-General. At its forty-second meeting on May 17» 1946, the Security Council adopted the Provisional Rules of Procedure with only Australia dissenting on Chapter X. Australia challenged the procedure established by the Provisional Rules,contending that the General Assembly had primary and final responsibil-ity in the admission process and therefore should have the i n i t i a l power of decision. The Security Council should base its recommendation solely on whether the applicant state was able and willing to carry out its obligations under those sections of the Charter within the competence of the Security Council. Australia was obviously trying to obtain through procedural means what they had failed to gain by constitutional amendment at San Francisco, that is, a restriction on the use of the veto on admission.~ At San Fran-cisco they had tried to limit the scope of the veto to the applications of ex-enemy states. They now hoped to gain a similar objective by narrowly limiting the range of Security Council discussion on membership applications. The move was manifestly contrary to the intent of the Charter and was there-fore summarily rejected. In the second 1946 session a portion of the General Assembly's dis-satisfaction with the Security Council for its failure to recommend certain 2. See Appendix for twxt of General Assembly Rules. 65 applications was directed at the existing rules of procedure. Australia led the attack on the rules with the intention of establishing General Assembly supremacy in the matter of admission. Argentina joined in the fray with the embryo of its theory, later.fully developed, that the General Assembly could admit states j s r e g a r d l e B s of the Security Council's recom-mendation. The Argentine contention was so clearly contrary to the Charter that i t failed to eli c i t any notable support, though an Argentine resolution, implying that the General Assembly held final authority on admission,was passed by an impressive majority. The First Committee of the General Assembly eventually decided that changes in the rules of procedure on admission were desirable and on November 12 passed a modified version of an Australian resolution by a vote of 27 to 9 with 6 abstentions. The'resolution stated: "The General Assembly requests the Security Council to appoint a com-mittee to confer with a committee on procedures of the General Assembly with a view to preparing rules governing the admission of new Members which will be acceptable both to the General Assembly and to the Security Coun-c i l . " ?• The Security Council, with placatory intentions,accepted the General Assembly's request on November 29 when i t appointed China, Brazil, and Poland as a Subcommittee of the Committee of Experts, to confer with the General Assembly's committee. The suggestion had the unanimous backing of the Security Council members but the power of the Subcommittee was restrict-ed to merely listening to suggestions. It could not accept proposals. The General Assembly followed up this compliance with its request by appointing an ad hoc Subcommittee composed of Australia, Cuba, India, Nor-way and the USSR. J. number, P.D., Admission to the United Nations, British Year Book of International Law, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 19^7. 66 Joint meetings of the two committees were held during June, 1947 and several significant conclusions were reached in these conferences. The Committees agreed that the General Assembly was not entitled under Artic l e 4(2) of the Charter to admit new members except on an affirmative recom-mendation of the Security Council. They further took the position, over the protests of Cuba and Australia, that: "(a) The Committee could not suggest any procedural rules which would have the effect of defining or limiting powers of jurisdiction of the Security Council in relation to the admission of new members, and (b) The Security Council was entitled to consider each application before the Assembly did." 4. These limitations completely squelched the hopes of the unorthodox interpreters of the Ch arter, namely, Australia and Argentina. Though amend-ments to the rules of procedure were proposed, the supremacy of the Security Council in the machinery of admission remained. The main features of the limited changes as far as the General Assembly was concerned were that; 1) a state's application was to contain a formal dec-laration of acceptance of the obligations in the Charter, 2) the General Assembly, or i f i t was not in session the individual members, were now to be informed automatically of any new applications received, 3) the previous practice by which the Assembly could return applications to the Security Council for reconsideration was to be formalized and, 4)the membership of a successful applicant was now to become effective immediately after the 5 General Assembly's decision. The new rules were adopted by the General Assembly on November 21, 1947 ^ without any notable objection and went into effect on January 1, 1948. Even the USSR who had reserved i t s position i n the Committee voted in 4. Canada at the United Nations. 1947, Conference Series 1947 No. 1, Kings Printer, Ottawa, 1948. * 5. See Appendix for text of new rules. 6. Verbatim Record of Plenary Meetings, Second Session of the General Assembly, 1947, p.1271. 67 the affirmative. The Security Council on August 27 accepted the Committee's suggestion that a complete record of its discussions be sent to the General Assembly with any recommendations, and also agreed to send a report i f no recommenda-tion was forthcoming. The Council, however, declined to approve a change in its Rule 60 which would have meant i t should "consider" rather than "decide" whether an applicant state was peace loving and able to meet the Charter 7. obligations. Even at this stage'Australia continued its doggedly persistent struggle to circumvent the veto. Through four resolutions,Australia sought to on-to able the General Assembly hs first^receive and review applications and to then^forward them to the Security Council which was to restrict its dis-cussions to the specific points in Article 4 of the Charter. All four resolutions were defeated with both the USSR and the United States opposing them. The changes in the rules chiefly served to formalize what had already become accepted practices. There was no possibility, such as Australia apparently envisioned, of breaking the deadlock between the Soviet and Anglo-American blocs merely through changes in procedure. It was clear from the outset that any alterations that might be made would be of such a neutral character that a l l the major participants would find them acceptable. Despite the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom were anxious to curb the Soviet Union's excessive use of the veto on admission, they were aware that more than a juggling of the rules was necessary to eliminate the existing differences. Consequently,there existed an unwilling-7. See Appendix for text of New Rules. 8. Security Council, Official Records, (Referred to Hereafter as S.C.O.R.) 2nd Year, No. 85, p.2263-4. 68 ness to compel changes that could have no positive value and whioh might contribute needlessly to a further deterioration in relations. The Security Counoil as a body was,moreover,wary of any suggestion that would imply a i* derogation of its prerogatives in favour of the General Assembly. In July 1943 the Report of the 'Interim Committee of the General Assembly on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council' expressed the hopeless suggestion that a state should be recommended by the vote of any seven members of the Security Council. " Many states supported this recommendation simply as a protest against the use of the veto on admission knowing full well that i t could not be implemented. The net effect was to add one more protest to the ever lengthening l i s t and to make the USSR more stubbornly deteimined than ever to hang onto its veto. 9» Report of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly on the Problem ofVoting in the Security Council, Printed in International Organization, V o l . I l l , 1 9 4 0 , p.192. CHAPTER V. Developmenta During 1946. The first session of the United Nations General Assembly which met in London on January 10, 1946, was not disturbed by any eruption over member-ship, since only Albania had signified its intention of applying and the Security Council had postponed discussion on i t until further applications were received. At its forty-second meeting on May 17, 1946 the Security Council set up a Committee on the Admission of New Members. This Committee began consid-eration of membership applications on July J l and held fourteen meetings between then and August 20. A preliminary application from Albania was received by the Secretary-General on December 20, 1945, and her final application,signed by Enver Hoxha, was delivered on January 25, 1946. Some doubt existed about Albania so a questionnaire was sent to the Albanian Government. The second state to apply was the Mongolian People's Republic whose application came on June 24, 1946, in a telegram from Mr. GhoJJibalsan, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Because of the general lack of knowledge concerning the Mongolian People's Republic a questionnaire was 7 0 also eent to i t . On June 26 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transjordan, Mr. M. Shurayki, applied by letter on behalf of Transjordan. A question-naire was again dispatched because there was considerable doubt as to what relationship existed between Transjordan and the United Kingdom. Another application was received on July 2 from Afghanistan signed by the Prime Minister Shah Mahmond. These were the applications on hand when the Member-ship Committee of the Security Council began its considerations. Siam had also applied on May 20 but the application was withdrawn and resubmitted later. During August,five applications were received, from Ireland, Port-ugal, and Iceland on August 2, Siam on August 5, and Sweden on August 9* On August 5 the Greek Government submitted to the Committee a memo-randum on Albania which charged, among other things, that; Albania had . fur declared war on Greece on October 28, 1940; sssd the state of war s t i l l ex-1M feat istedj^she had aided Italy in her invasion of Greece; and^she was carrying out a "ruthless policy" of persecution and denationalization in Northern Epirue. The memorandum concluded that: "in the view of the Greek government the foregoing clearly points out that the time has not come for Albania to enter the United Nations, She does not qualify as a peace-loving nation..." and her application should be postponed until such time as Greek territorial claims "received due oon-sideration." Alexei N. Kraeilnikov, the representative of the USSR defended Albania against the Greek charges. He claimed that the state of war had been de-clared by the puppet government established by Italy and was not recognized by the present government. Moreover the Albanian resistance movement had built up a good war record against the fascists and Albania had been lib-erated by the efforts of its own people and they "...deserved by their 1. U.N.B., Vol. 1, No. 3, Aug. 19, 1946, p.2 71 record to be among the family of the United Nations." He also asserted -that the territorial claims of Greece had "no connection with the legal and 2 moral right of Albania to be admitted to the United Nations." * There was further discussion but i t was felt that no decision could be reached on the main question of whether Albania furnished the necessary guarantees of being peace loving or was able and willing to comply with the hud fc«en Charter until further information ws» received from the Albanian represent-ative in New York. •that In reply to the questionnaire the Albanian government stated nit did not consider itself at war with Greece since the declaration of war by the Italian controlled government was illegitimate. It also asserted that Albanians had carried on resistance during the Italian occupation. The Greek charge that Albania was a menace to Balkan peace was termed "utterly ridiculous." More difficult to justify was the unilateral abrogation of certain pre-war treaties and the firing by shore batteries on two British warships on May 15, 1946. In the former case Albania stated that she recognized a l l treaties prior to 1939 "which do not impair the independence of Albania." *^ This answer failed to placate the United States and caused a sharp exchange of words between the Soviet and American representatives. Neither did Albania'e explanation of the naval incident satisfy the United Kingdom. Albania claimed that only warning shots were fired 'across the bow' after signals to identify were ignored and in any case they had im-mediately expressed regret to Britain. The United Kingdom representative replied that the British ships were flying their flags throughout the incident, no signals had been received and the warning shots had been un-conventional, that i s , they were fired astern. The United Kingdom doubts . U.N.B. Vol 1, No.3, Aug.19,1946, p.4: See also S.O.O.R. No.4.Aug.28, . U.N.B.,Vol 1, No.5, Sept.2, 1946, p.3. 9 , P P * ~^ 72 regarding Albania "concerned the question of whether Albania had a normal 4. conception of its duties in international relations." The Committee's report summarized the chief attitudes on Albania as follows; Poland and the USSR supported i t , France expressed sympathy, and the United States and the United Kingdom reserved their position beoause of doubts about Albania's desire to respect international obligations. The next state considered by the Committee was the Mongolian People's Republic. The delegate of China said in regard to Mongolia* "The Mongolian People's Republic was until only a few months ago a part of China, known as Outer Mongolia, Her independence is granted by China. Because of this fact China would be the first nation to welcome her into the United Nations, "While we sincerely desire her entry into the organization the Chinese delegation feels that a delay of the consideration of the question for a year or so may be advisable. Until now, she has exchanged no envoys with any nation except perhaps the Soviet Union, This may be an indication that she is not yet ready to take her place as a member of the world community."5» This statement by the Chinese delegate was the first instance in which the absence of diplomatic relations was advanced in connection with the admission of a state. Whatever the validity of the argument its later use by the Soviet Union seems less reprehensible in the light of this statement. In spite of this statement China favored the admission of the Mongolian 6. People's Republic. In supporting the application of the Mongolian People's Republic the Soviet representatives asserted that Mongolia had suffered from Japanese aggression and had been of great assistance to the Red Army against Japan. It had declared war on Japan on August 10, 1945. He added that the Chinese Government observer had been completely satisfied with the character of the Mongolian plebiscite on independence and subsequently recognized Mongolia's • • . u -4. I M d , p.4. 5. U.N.B., Vol. 1, No.3, Aug.19, 1946, p.5. 6. S.C.O.R., No. 5 , 36th Meeting, August 29, 1946, p.89. 73 independence o n January 12, 1946. The United States reserved its position, stressing the need for further information,since on the information available the ability of the Mongolian Government to observe the Charter was not conclusively established. The United Kingdom and Egypt also declared themselves to have open minds on the question. A subcommittee was therefore asked to draw up a l i s t of questions for submission to the Mongolian Government. A reply was eventually obtained after some difficulty and the application was discussed i n the Security Council along with the others on August 29. Sir Alexander Oadogan at this time suggested that the absence of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and states other than Russia and China "show that they have not yet gained experience in international affairs sufficiently to equip them to play a proper part in the international work of the United Nations." *^ The United Kingdom of a l l states should not have raised t h i B question.since in 1919 the British Dominions had been admitted to the League of Nations before they had established relations abroad,and although the situations are not exactly comparable they are sufficiently similar to say that there was a precedent that should have been considered. The application of Afghanistan which was next to be considered met with l i t t l e difficulty. Its scrupulous observance of neutrality during the war had earned i t much respect. This point and Afghanistan's manifest desire and ability to work out problems, independently and along friendly and equitable lines were stressed by the American representative as evidence of its suitability for membership in the United Nations. It was therefore recommended to the Security Council by the Membership Committee without opposition. 7. S.C.O.R., No. 5, 56th Meeting, Aug.29, 1946', p.90. 74 Transjordan's application had a somewhat difficult time in the Com-mittee because there was some doubt about TransJordan'8 independence from Britain. The United Kingdom admitted that i t contributed funds to the Transjordan Treasury but i t was stated that the financial assistance was restricted to reimbursement of expenses in connection with Transjordan's armed forces under the alliance with Britain which Transjordan would not normally bear. Under these circumstances Transjordan's independence was obviously in doubt. Australia asked for further information on the financial and milit-ary independence of Transjordan. Egypt supported Transjordan but felt that the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty should be examined to bring i t into conformity with the Charter. The United States reserved its position. Later there was criticism of Britain in the American Senate for seeking the admission of 8. Transjordan'which was termed subservient to Britain. Poland questionned Transjordan's independence and expressed doubts about the conformity of the treaty with the Charter. Poland also suggested the possibility that a hasty decision might complicate the Palestine situation. The USSR was flatly opposed because Transjordan did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR. Transjordan provided the necessary answers to her questionners and the Committee concluded that sufficient evidence existed on'which to base a decision so the application was turned over to the Security Council. Ireland's application was strongly supported by everyone except the USSR who was opposed because Ireland refused to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the application was forwarded to the Security Council for a final decision. 8. Congressional Records, 80th Congress,- 2nd Session, p. 2451. 75 Portugal was supported by the United Kingdom because of their tradit-ional friendship which dated back to the fourteenth century. Britain em-phasized Portugal's long reputation as a peace loving state and commended the service she had rendered the Allies during the war by placing the val-uable Azores at the disposal of the British and Americans despite her neu-trality. Prance favored Portugal because of her humane treatment of French refugees in wartime. Poland had strong doubts because Portugal was ideolog-ically close to Spain and she charged Portugal with harboring German war criminals and German assets. The Soviet Union was again opposed on the grounds of no diplomatic relations. The basis for a decision existed so the matter was handed over to the Security Council. Iceland was.warmly supported by the United States and the United King-dom because i t was indubitably a peace loving state and had rendered valuable service to the Allies in the war on the North Atlantic sea lanes. The application was passed on unopposed. The question of Siam's application was complicated by the fact that a de. facto state of war existed with France because of border incidents con-nected with Siamese aggression in 1940 against Indo-China. Franc§d.4id not want a vote on Siam until the matter was settled. Siam confirmed, the facts of the case in a letter to the Secretary-General and stated that negotiations though underway were being delayed by border incidents. The Netherlands and Australia felt some weight should be attached to the existing state of war. The United Kingdom supported the application in accord with the peace treaty signed with Siam earlier in 19^6. The United States and China also con-sidered Siam as qualified for membership. Opposition, however, came from the USSR for the reason that no diplomatic relations existed between the two countries. The application was passed along to the Security Council 76 since several members felt that enough evidence existed for a decision. Sweden's long record of peaceful relations with other countries and the help she had given refugees during the war forestalled any opposition to her application and i t was sent to the Security Council with complete approbation. The report of the Membership Committee was subject to a reservation by Australia and a statement by the Mexican delegation. The position of Aus-tralia was rather interesting though legally its case was very weak. Australian opposition arose "from a real difference in viewpoint re-garding the structure of the whole Organization and a difference in viewpoint regarding the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.8 ^* Paul Hasluck, the Australian delegate, contended that ad-mission was a corporate act of the whole organization, therefore, applica-tions should first be dealt with in the General Assembly as i t was the more representative body and the only one that could make final decisions on admissions. The Security Council,he claimed,had no general powers on admission except where i t was a question of security; hence the General Assembly was not bound to accept or reject new members in accordance with the recommendation of the Security Council. He tried to have action de-ferred until the General Assembly could examine the Rules of Procedure, but his proposal was defeated by a vote of ten to one. In protest Australia abstained from voting in the Security Council on a l l the membership applica-tions. Australia's argument cannot stand up since the Charter clearly states that admission "will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon 9« International Organization, Vol. 1, February, 19^7, p.90n. 77 10. the recommendation of the Security Council." Mexico voted for a l l the applicants and her statement is self explana-tory. "in accordance with the principle of universality which Mexico has al-ways advocated, the Mexican delegation is in favor of the admission of a l l the applicant states where i t is not proved that the applicant does not ful-f i l l the requirements of the Charter." H» The Security Council took up the report of the Membership Committee on August 28 and 29. Herschel Johnson (United States) opened the discussion 12. with a proposal for the blanket admission of a l l eight 'applicants. His statement included a very significant sentence: "If there were among the present applicants an entity that was not a State, in the international sense, or one that lacked the governmental powers or material means of carrying out the obligations of the Charter, we would not make this proposal." Gromyko rejected this proposal stating: "I cannot agree that we should adopt resolutions for the wholesale admission to the Organization of a l l countries who have applied for member-ship... we are bound to discuss each concrete application separately ..." Australia and the United Kingdom were also adamantly in opposition to the American suggestion so Johnson 'regretfully 1 withdrew i t and the applica-tions were treated individually. In the light of Johnson's statement the subsequent American votes against Albania and the Mongolian Republic were obviously not dictated by consideration for the Charter. The United States certainly had no serious objections to these two states or i t would not have included them in its proposal for blanket admission. Its votes therefore appear as puerile man-ifestations of resentment against the Soviet vetoes of Ireland, Transjordan, 10. Charter, Chapter II, Carticle 4, Paragraph 2. 11. U.N.B., Vol.1, No. 5, Sept.2, 1946, p.J. 12. Siam not included since i t had requested a postponement on consideration of its application. 1*3. S.C.O.R., No. 4, 54th Meeting, Aug.28, 1946, p.92. 14. Ibid, 55th Meeting, p.47. 78 and Portugal* The arguments in the Security Council on the various applications were very similar to those in the Committee. Iceland, Sweden and Afghanistan were a l l recommended to the General Assembly by a vote of 10 - 0. Grmyko vetoed the applications of Ireland, Portugal and Transjordan, explaining in 15 relation to Transjordan! n... the Soviet Government cannot consider at the present time, after the conclusion of the war, a country which does not have normal relations with the Soviet Union satisfies the requirements demanded of countries applying for admission to the United Nations.11 ^* Albania received five affirmative and three negative votes with three abstaining, hence i t failed to qualify. The Mongolian People's Republic f e l l one vote short of the seven necessary for approval, thus saving the United States from incurring the stigma of applying the veto, which they apparently intended to use i f necessary. The case of Siam remains to be considered. Siam's application had been discussed in the Committee but on August 28 Siam requested that considera-tion of its application be adjourned until its dispute with France was settled. The request was granted and nothing further was done until Prince Wan Waithayakon informed the Secretary-General on November 28 that a settlement with France had been embodied in a treaty. Siam dispelled Soviet objections by offering to open diplomatic relations with the USSR and its application was consequently approved by the Security Council on 19. December 12. The Soviet Union was strongly criticized in both the Security Council 15. The same reasoning applied to a l l three states. 16. S.C.O.R., No. 5, 56th Meeting, Aug. 29, 1946, p.90. 17. See appendix for table of voting: Q / * O S.C.O.R., No.*Jj f>/»- C8 18. S.C.O.R., No. 4, 54th Meeting, p . 4 l . 19. Ibid, No. 25, 85rd Meeting, Dec.12, 1945, p.561-2. 79 and the General Assembly for its stand on the question of diplomatic re-lations. The justification of the USSR's attitude has been discussed pre-20. viously but there is an overt inconsistency in the Soviet Union's position that was pointed out by^rodi^r of France. He observed that the USSR had no right to expect other states to accept the Mongolian People's 17 \ Republic which maintained diplomatic relations with no one but the Soviet Union, i f the Soviet Union refused to accept states which did not have 21. diplomatic intercourse with her. * The point is reasonable but i t made no impression and had no effect on the outcome. Australia raised a debatable question when its representative claimed in censuring the USSR that* "When any member of the Security Council exercises his vote, that vote is not exercised solely on behalf of the Government which he represents. It is exercised on behalf of the Members of the United Nations." 22. This argument might hold to a certain extent for non-permanent members of the Security Council since they are elected by the whole membership and in a sense are delegates of the General Assembly. The special voting pri-vileges of the five permanent members are however, concomitants of their positions as great powers, and great powers who are in full possession of their sovereignty can scarcely be expected to guide their actions by other than their own interests. The second part of the first session of the General Assembly which con-vened in New York on October 25 had two questions to consider in relation to membership; 1.) should i t concur in the Security Council's recommendation of Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden, and 2.) what should i t do, i f anything, about the other states? There was no difficulty on the first point. The 20. See above Chapter II pp.l'L,!';,1^.25, 21. S.C.O.R., No. 5, 56th Meeting, p.95. 22. Ibid, p.94 80 First (Political) Committee on November 2 and the General Assembly a week later "... unanimously and with virtually no debate, decided that Afghanis-tan Iceland and Sweden should be admitted to the United Nations." 25«gi a m was also unanimously approved on the last day of the session. There was a considerable degree of doubt about what could be done in the other cases. Widespread criticism of the Security Council was voiced in the Political Committee but i t was mostly directed at the USSR who had. in the eyes of many,violated the spirit of the Charter, ffromyko finally adversaries replied to his Jbesaasttaass that the most important factor in admission of new members was "the applicants contribution to the cause of the United Nations in their fight against fascism and for freedom, independence and 24 civilization." * He contended with some slight justification that Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic had been treated differently from the other applicants and condemned Portugal for maintaining friendly relations with Franco. As usual he elicited some understanding and even sympathy for the Soviet's case but failed to gain any real support. There was no formal censure of the Soviet Union for its use of the veto but "a series of speeches were delivered which made clear the opinion of the great majority of the members of the Committee." Meanwhile a subcommittee had merged separate resolutions from Panama, Egypt and the Philippines into a single one which recommended reconsideration by the Security Council of the five rejected states "on their respective merits as . M 26. measured by the yardstick of the Charter in accordance with Article 4.«• Australia tried to have a resolution passed which embodied its unortho-23. Canada, The United Nations, 1946, Department of External Affairs,Ottawa, 24. International Organization, Vol. 1, Feb. 1947, p.51. 1946. 25. The United Nations, 1946, p.48. 26. International Relations, No. 1, 1947, p.110. 81 dox views on the process of admission but the five great powers a l l opposed it s more extreme implications. The resolution as f i n a l l y passed only called for a joint Security Council-General Assembly Committee to coordinate the rules on admission. There was a great deal of discussion in the Security Council over or not' whether^to accept the General Assembly resolution on reconsideration of rejected applicants. Some^membere f e l t that the General Assembly had over-stepped i t s authority in the matter but they f i n a l l y accepted i t and turned i t over to the Membership Committee asserting at the same time that they were not legally bound to do so. The four states that succeeded in obtaining membership during 1946 were a l l of a very neutral character, the five who failed were mainly defeated by internal riv a l r i e s in the Security Council. The arguments offered by the United States for i t s opposition to the Mongolian People's Republic and Albania appeared very weak after i t had in-cluded them in i t s proposal for en masse admission. The Soviet Union pro-bably had some reason for vetoing Transjordan in the face of the opposition to the Mongolian People's Republic, whose position vis-a-vis Russia was similar to Transjordan's relations with the United Kingdom. No such just-i f i c a t i o n existed for the vetoes on Ireland and Portugal and both should have been admitted. France alone of the great powers seems to have acted in accordance with the s p i r i t of the Charter and the general feeling in favour of univers-a l i t y . She voted for a l l the applicant states since there was no outstand-ing reason why any of them should be shut out. The f i r s t phase of the membership stalemate ended with neither the Soviet Union, the United States nor the United Kingdom in a morally defens-82 ible position. However, for propaganda purposes the Soviet Union was the loser through its appearance as the great obstructionist. One factor was clear, the membership conditions laid down in the Charter were destined to be secondary considerations in discussions on membership applications. CHAPTER VI Developments During 1947» During 1947 eight more states applied for membership in the United Nations but only two, Pakistan and Yemen, were accepted. The others joined the five holdovers from 1946 to make a total of eleven outstanding applica-tions at the end of the year. The Security Council had the General Assembly's resolution of 19 November 1946 calling for re-examination of rejected applicants in addition to the new applications to consider. This was done in nine meetings of the Committee on admission of New Members between July 15 and August 15 and in six meetings of the Security Council from August 18 to October 1. * A further source of acrimonius dispute between the Soviet and Western States was injected into the deliberations by the presence of the ex-enemy states among the new applicants. The atmosphere in the Security Council and later in the General Assembly when the second session convened on September 16 was in sharp contrast to that of San Francisco and the Assembly's first session. Cordiality and cooperation had been replaced by invective and con-stant wrangling. If agreement had been difficult before, i t was now on 1. S.C.O.R., Second Year, Numbers78,81,85,90,91,92. 1947. 83 84 the verge of becoming impossible. Re-examination of previously rejected applicants was undertaken by the Membership Committee before any new applications came up for discussion. With some slight exceptions the attitudes and decisions remained the same as in the previous year. Albania, as before, was supported by Poland and the Soviet Union but this small and turbulent country had become involved in another incident over mine laying in the Corfu Channel thus further injuring its chances of admission. This difficulty was partially removed by Albania's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the case but its contumacious conduct in the Greek incident was linked with the previous year's reasons for disapproval to cause once again the defeat of the appli-cation. Even France, who had initially favored Albania, withdrew its support 2. because of the Corfu Channel incident. Much of the support given to the Mongolian People's Republic in 1946 had melted away when its application was reviewed. China charged that the Mongolian People's Republic was not a peace loving state because on 5 June 1947 i t had staged an armed invasion of Sinkiang province. An armed clash had occurred some 100 kilometres on the Chinese side of the border. The Soviet delegate delivered countercharges that the area in question was Mongolian, that Chinese troops "... had fortified Mongolian territory, captured and tortured Mongolian border guards, and that the whole incident was being used by the Chinese to divert attention from General Wedemeyer's fact-finding mission." The Chinese representative labelled the Soviet charges as "Outer Mongolian lies." 2. S.C.O.R., Second Year, No. 78, p.2037. 3. International Organization, Vol. II, 1948, p.92. 85 The area in question is so remote and devoid of means of communication that i t is virtually impossible to know whose version of the incident to believe. The clash was obviously of no great importance because China made no formal charges in the Security Council against Mongolia. There may also be some significance in the fact that between late 1946 and early 1947 the general policy of the Chinese Nationalists became more bitterly anti-Com-munist as the palliative effects of the Cino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Friend-ship of August, 1945, which had guaranteed Mongolia's independence, began to wane. The animosity of the Chinese Nationalists towards the.USSR grew more and more vehement as i t became obvious that they could not crush the Chinese Communists. It seems likely that these factors a l l contributed to the change in China's attitude to the Mongolian People's Republic. The United States and the United Kingdom s t i l l asserted they did not know enough about the Mongolian People's Republic to give i t their support. It therefore met an even more resounding defeat than i t had in its first attempt to gain entry into the United Nations. Transjordan, Iceland, and Portugal were a l l vetoed again because they did not maintain diplomatic relations with the USSR. Gromyko this time however, laid greater stress on the unreality of Transjordan's independence and the failure of Ireland to cooperate with the Allies during the war. The following applications for membership were received by the United Nations in 1947* Hungary, April 22; Italy, May 7» Austria, July 2; Roumania, July 10; Yemen, July 2 1 ; Bulgaria, July 26; Pakistan, August 15; and Finland, September 19* At the Security Council meeting on August 18 the applications of Yemen 4. S.C.O.R., No. 78, p.2039. 5. See'Appendix for Tables of Votes. 86 and Pakistan were unanimously approved. Yemen1s bid for membership had pre-viously been exhaustively discussed in committee but Pakistan's application 6. was handled directly by the Security Council. There were no difficulties over the small Arab state Yemen but Pakistan's application, though not opposed, caused considerable speculation of a legal kind. On 15 August 1947» the Indian Independence Act had come into effect, creating two independent Dominions, India and Pakistan,where only India had existed before. This confronted the United Nations with a problem because Pakistan contended that at partition i t was automatically a member of the United Nations. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan later stated Pakistan's case as follows: "Pakistan, as a part of India participated in the San Francisco Con-ference in 19^5 and became a signatory to the United Nations Charter. There-fore, Pakistan is not a new Member of the United Nations, but a co-successor to a Member State which was one of the founders of the Organization." 7« Pakistan felt that the two states should be treated equally, either both recognized as members or both compelled to seek new membership. The contention was however, not pushed strongly. The argument was somewhat academic for the situation had been foreseen and provided for by an arrangement in August 1947 between India and Pak-istan. This agreement provided that: "(l) Membership of a l l international organizations together with the rights.and obligations attaching to such membership, will devolve solely upon the Dominion of India.•• "(2) The Dominion of Pakistan will take such steps as may be necessary to apply for membership of such international organizations as i t chooses to join." 8 # Dr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, drew up 6. S.C.O.R., No. 78, pp. 2052-5 7. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly. Verbatim Record, Vol.1,19^7,p"517» 8. Laing, L.H., Admission of Indian States to the United Nations. American Journal of International Law, Vol.43, p.l47. 87 a legal opinion intended for the Secretariat's guidance but i t was accepted. generally as the most valid interpretation of the case* He stated that the problem was analogous to the situation arising "when part of one existing state breaks away and becomes a new state. By this theory. India's status in international affairs remains as i s . Pakistan is therefore regarded as having broken off and become a new state and as such must seek admission, to o the United Nations pursuant to the provisions of Article IV. There was never any question of not accepting Pakistan but the situation was carried to the Sixth (Legal) Committee for a clarification in future cases. The Committee's opinion was that "... a state which is a Member of the United Nations does not cease to be a Member from the mere fact that its constitution or frontiers have been modified.u The extinction of a state as a legal personality must be shown before its rights and obligations cease to exist. Moreover when a new state is formed - no matter what its territory or population or whether i t was part of another member'or not -that state cannot claim the status of member unless formally admitted. Be-yond these qualifications each case should be judged on its merits. ^ * The General Assembly on September 30 voted unanimously to accept the recommendation of the Security Council on Yemen. Pakistan was admitted by a vote of 53 to 1, the one negative vote being that of Afghanistan who was 12 having a boundary dispute with Pakistan. The delegate from Afghanistan later changed his vote in view of the progress made in negotiation of the differences. In the Security Council discussions on the applications of the ex-enemy 9 . Ibid, pp. 145-6 10. Official Records, Sixth (Legal) Committee, Second Session, General Assembly, 1947, P.38. 11. Loc cit.* * 12. Verbatim Records. General Assembly, Second Session, Vol.,I, p .516. 88 states and Austria, disagreement arose over the question of the Council's competence to act before the peace treaties with these countries were rat-ified. The Soviet Union, and less emphatically the United Kingdom and France, indicated they were unwilling to reach a final decision until after the ratification of the peace treaties. The American delegate haughtily dismissed Soviet protestations and insisted that an immediate vote be taken on ef),§h individual application. This impetuous demand was contrary to the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement which had said in regard to these states thatt "The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic govern-ments, in these states will also enable the three governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations." 1,3 • There was no pressing reason for haste and i t was certainly obvious that no positive results would be achieved by an immediate vote, but the JoiHMinMas ineptness of headstrong American diplomacy, i f such i t can be called, forced the issue to a vote. In the event, only the United States and Syria voted on the applications of Bulgaria and Hungary, and even the United States abstained on Roumania leaving Syria as the lone voter. How-ever on Italy and Austria the majority were willing to approve their applica-tions conditionally, leaving i t up to the General Assembly to decide on the time of admission. This manoevre,obviously designed to circumvent Russian opposition,was stalled by Soviet vetoes on the two applications. Following the rejection of the ea-enemy states and Austria, Herschel Johnson of the United States introduced a resolution ostensibly to try to break the deadlock. This resolution asked the General Assembly to consider all the applications on which no agreement had been reached by the Security Council,and provided that the Council would admit those states receiving a 1 3 . Department of State, Bulletin. XIII, August 2 , 1 9 4 5 . 89 two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Johnson commented in offering this resolution: "I submit that, in drafting the Charter of the United Nations, i t was never.intended that one state should have the power to keep out of the Organization, for reasons not contained in the Charter, states which, in the judgement of most Members are qualified for membership,... "... My Government, while i t opposes certain applications, and will continue to oppose them, is ready and willing to rely on the judgement of the fifty-five Members of this Organization for a just and wise decision." This resolution illustrated a surprising disregard for the fundamentals of a situation. In introducing i t the United States was either naive or interested in the propaganda possibilities that a Soviet rejection would have in the General Assembly. This latter interpretation is similar to the reaction of Katz-Suchy of Poland who believed that the American aim was "... to cause another veto and make big headlines in the Press about the USSR veto, or, as the United States Press likes to call i t , 'the Red veto.' The United States must have been aware that there was utterly no pos-sibility of the Soviet Union accepting the resolution because the General Assembly would certainly accept those states favored by the United States and just as certainly reject the Soviet sponsored applicants. The resolu-tion was equivalent to asking the Russians to give up their veto on admis-sion, a suggestion that automatically antagonizes the Soviet Union for, to use the words of American Senator Glen Taylor, "... we have an overwhelming control of the United Nations and the veto is the only weapon the Russians have." Johnson's claim that i t was never intended that one state should be able to use its veto on admission of new members for reasons not stated in 14. S.C.O.R., No. 81, 190th Meeting, 21 Aug.1947, p.2133. 15. Ibid, p.2126. 16. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p.2450. 90 the Charter was mere idle rhetoric. It has been shown previously that the veto was intended to apply to admission of new members.*''* Moreover the vagueness of the qualifications for admission combined with the rejection of universality at San Francisco clearly indicate that political considera-tions were expected to enter into the decisions on new members. By refusing to recognize this overt fact the United States may appear ingenuous in its conception of the United Nations but i t is an attitude that contributes to dissension not .cooperation. The United States would be well advised to take the words that General George C. Marshall directed at Russia in the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, as applying equally to the United States. General Marshall said: "We were always fully aware that the successful operation of the rule of unanimity would require the exercise of restraint by the permanent mem-bers..." 18» Restraint implies not only a cautious use of the veto but also conduct designed to promote harmony rather than intentional provocation. The United States takes pride in the fact that i t has never used a veto but there is no reason for pride in its policy of repeatedly forcing issues to a vote know-ing fu l l well that the USSR will be compelled to use its veto in self def-ence. Discrediting the USSR for its free use of the veto is no great ac-complishment and an intelligent understanding of world affairs would dictate avoidance of such tactics because they create unnecessary dangers to the peace of the world. At the 204th Security Council meeting on September 25 the United States requested that Italy's application be reconsidered. Since the peace treaties with the ex-enemy states had now a l l been ratified, Modzewelski of Poland 17.. See Above, Chap. II, pp. 1^17,18. 21,27 18. Verbatim Record. General Assembly, Second Session, 1947, p.24. 91 introduced a resolution to admit these states as a group pointing out that they had effectively "washed out any guilt they may have had in their part-icipation in the war on the side of the Axis." Gromyko endorsed this proposal in the words: "We are ready to agree to the admission of Italy to the United Nations, but only on the condition that a l l other countries which are in the same position - namely Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and Finland - are also admitted." 2 0» The Soviet stand was based on the Potsdam Agreement which Gromyko maintained provided for similar treatment for a l l these states. The reaction was violent. Sir Alexander 0adogan labelled the action as an attempted "horse trade;" Colonel Hodgson of Australia added that i t "savoured of blackmail}" and the American, Belgian and French representatives claimed that the Polish proposal would be a departure from the Charter. The American delegate for some inexplicable reason denied that the United States 21 had ever previously made a similar proposal for en bloc admission, when in fact the United States in 1946 had propounded the view that wholesale ad-22 mission was the "fair and wise" way of applying the Charter. On October 1, after a long and bitter procedural wrangle the Polish resolution was disposed of by a Belgian amendment to hold "a separate and final vote on each application." In the subsequent voting Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria failed because the majority of the Council abstained and Italy 23. and Finland were rejected by Soviet vetoes. The removal of the technical objections to Italy, Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria should have been followed by their admission to the United Nations. 19* International Organization, Vol .11, 1948, p. 93* 20. S.C.O.R., No. 90, 204th Meeting, 25 Sept.1947, p.24l4. 21. U.N.B., Vol. I l l , No. 15, October 7, 1947. 22. See above, Chap. 6, pTf 25. S.C.O.R., N0. 92, 206th Meeting, 1 Oct. 1947, pp.2475-6, See Appendix for Tal|e of Votes. 92 None of them could be excluded justifiably as non peace loving states since they had a l l suffered enough in the previous few years to have quenched any thirst they may have had for warlike adventures. It was unreasonable to deny membership to Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria on the grounds that they were violating human rights and could not therefore honestly subscribe to the Charter when many member states were no more meticulous in their re-spect for human dignity. Nor was i t politic to single out Italy from the ex-enemy states and assert over and over, as did the Anglo-American bloc, that "Italy is in a special position among the ex-enemy applicants for M24 membership, in view of its long and honourable record of co-belligerency. The delegates of the Soviet Union did not challenge this fact, neither did they impugn Italy 1s sovereignty. The Soviet Union had actually been the first country to accord Italy full recognition. To the USSR the question was not one of qualifications for membership but one of politics. The Soviet representatives were convinced that Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were opposed by the United States and the United Kingdom primarily because they had communist dominated governments. Consequently they felt justified in using the threat of vetoes on Italy and Finland as a bargaining weapon. The Soviet representative sounded a word of warning that might well have been given serious thought in Western circles. He said: "Some people might not like the internal order of some of these coun-tries, but one cannot be sure that everybody likes everything that is taking place in Italy. Even countries which are Members of the United Nations differ greatly as far as their internal order is concerned. But I think i t is obvious to what conclusion we may come i f we are guided by this con-sideration." 2 5 . 2 4 . S.C.O.R., No. 8 1 , p . 2 1 2 3 . 2 5 . S.C.O.R., N-. 9 1 , p . 2 4 4 3 . 0 93 The implication is that the United Nations was not intended to be an association of democratic states but American and British policies were con-sciously or otherwise attempting to forge i t into such an institution* Such a thing i t never could be and s t i l l survive for its original purpose because the Soviet Union would never sincerely cooperate in an unrepresentative body that was ideologically hostile. The United States and the United Kingdom were the foremost opponents of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Roumania. France supported Roumania and Hungary on the basis of two considerations, har desire for universality of member-ship and because "Europe is very inadequately represented in relation to the 26 position which she occupies in the general equilibrium of the world." * Bulgaria, however, had incurred French wrath through the execution of the leader of the Parliamentary opposition, Nicolai Petkov. American representative Herschel Johnson, speaking in regard to Bul-garia declared* "... in order to prevent the imposition of ... a police State on the people of Bulgaria, my Government has vainly endeavoured over the past three years to assist them in attaining at least a modicum of representative government." 27» The statement could apply equally to Hungary and Roumania. It should therefore be clear that the United States in claiming the right under the peace treaties to intervene in these Eastern European countries forfeited any right to object to similar Russian interference which was naturally far more effective because of geographical proximity. It is not surprising that there were violations of human rights in these countries which had so recently overthrown fascist or nazi governments. There were many persons who deserved harsh punishment and as is usual in 26. S.C.O.R., No, 9 0 , p.2424. 27. S.C.O.R., No. 9 2 , p.2452. 94 revolutionary situations there were undoubtedly excesses. It seems quite certain that American charges of disregard of c i v i l liberties and to a lesser extent unfair electoral practices were played up more than the actual situation merited. The candidates favored in the elections by the United States, such as Maniu in Roumania, were quite often people with unsavory pro Nasi backgrounds who were themselves not above indulging in electoral trick-ery. It is nontheless true that the Communists were also willing to use former Nazi supporters where i t served their ends. Howard Smith,the chief of the.news staff of the Columbia Broadcasting System.who observed the Hungarian elections reported that the American government portrayed isolated incidents as being typical of the whole election thus grossly exaggerating the situation. There was undoubtedly some coercion but elections in some American communities are usually no more free. The people of Eastern Europe do not like being under close supervision from the Soviet Union any more than they would like to be dominated by the United-States. They are however aware that many, long needed reforms did not come until the Red Army drove out the former ruling classes. Russia's friend-ship is consequently relied on as a safeguard against the return of those elements. The United States is distrusted because of the open support given by i t to the conservatives who wish to reestablish the old regime. Paradoxically the continuous East - West tension creates an atmosphere in Eastern Europe which tends to further reduce existing freedoms in those places. The exclusion of these states from the United Nations forces a gradual cultural and economic estrangement from the West which is obviously contrary to the interests of the Western states. Nothing would be lost by 28. See Polanyi, I., The Issues in Hungary, World Affairs, Stevens and Sons, London, 1949, Vol.5. 95 admitting them to the United Nations for there are already far more un-righteous states within the Organization. There is also the possibility that these states would be more amenable inside than outside the organiza-tion. Austria which is not regarded as an ex-enemy state is in a different position from these states. Morally there is justification for admitting Austria but there has been no treaty re-establishing i t as a sovereign state and i t is therefore s t i l l under military occupation. The question of who is responsible for blocking a treaty with Austria is irrelevant for pur— poses of membership in the United Nations. The obstacle to admission is that Austria is not a fully soverign state while i t is under foreign mil-itary occupation and cannot act independently in international affairs. Until its anomalous position is cleared up Austria cannot reasonably qualify for membership. The Australian resolution on Austria that the Security Council voted on, which recommended that Austria be admitted "at such time-and under such 20. conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate " * was no more than an artful attempt to get around the veto. It is virtually certain that the General Assembly would have admitted Austria immediately. The inaction of the Security Council but more especially the vetoes of the USSR again let loose a torrent of criticism in the Political Committee of the General Assembly. Numerous resolutions were introduced with the debate.centering around the use of the veto and the attaching of conditions to votes by the Soviet Union. The applications of individual states were also exhaustively discussed. Sweden proposed that the principle of universality be adopted but this 29. S.C.O.R., No. 81, p.2150 96 move did not meet with approval. Argentina^with ita=uaxaA contempt for con-stitutional provisions,proposed that the General Assembly ignore the veto and admit a l l those states who had received seven votes in the Security Council.^* H.V. Evatt later condemned the Argentine proposal in the follow-ing terms: "Despite arguments by the Argentine delegation to the contrary, such action.would have been a clear violation of Article 4 of the Charter, which requi'es the Security Council first to recommend an applicants admission. .131. Canada proposed that the five permanent members of the Security Council 32. relinquish their veto on admission of new members. * Four of them agreed but the Soviet Union quite naturally refused to waive its veto privilege. After much heated discussion the Committee adopted eight resolutions and the Plenary Session of the General Assembly concurred in their adoption by large majorities. The following is the substance of the eight resolutions. (1) A Polish resolution recommending that the permanent members of the Security Council consult together and try to reach an agreement on member-ship. (2) A Belgian resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the Inter-national Court of Justice as to whether members of the Security Council might attach conditions other than those in Article 4 to their votes on admission. (3) Three joint Argentine, Australian, Brazilian and Chilean resolutions stating that Eire, Portugal and Finland are peace loving s t a t e B and are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. The Security Council is therefore requested to reconsider them in the light of this de-50. Official Records, First Committee, General Assembly,Second Session,1947,p.238* 21. Evatt, H.V., The 3?ask of Nations, Duell Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1949,p.20. 32. Canada at the United Nations, 1947, pp.217-19. 97 termination by the General Assembly. (4) Two joint resolutions presenting the same case with regard to the applications of Transjordan and Italy and requesting their reconsideration before the end-of the present session of the General Assembly. (5) A United States resolution B t a t i n g that Austria is peace loving within the meaning of Article 4 and requesting the Security Council to re-33* consider i t in the light of the Assembly's opinion. These resolutions were passed over vigorous resistance from the Soviet bloc. Gromyko warned the General Assembly that the Soviet Union would not change its position. He added that "the reference of these questions to the Security Council signifies only a political demonstration which is utterly • i n 54. meaningless.1" India also opposed the resolutions because i t considered no good pur-pose was served by needlessly evincing hostility to the USSR. The truculent attitude of the General Assembly would only further prejudice the chances 35» of the applicant states. The General Assembly though rejecting this counsel of reason was pessimistic about the chances for the success of its action. The Canadian delegate expressed this mood in saying: u... we may be certain that no matter how impressive a majority may be recorded here in the Assembly, some or a l l of the applicants we may favour will continue to be vetoed in t h e Security Council.n 3G« The referral of the question of conditional admission to the Inter-national Court of Justice raised two significant issues; 1.) whether the Court was competent to interpret the Charter; and 2.) whether i t was proper to refer what was essentially a political question to a judicial body. 33* Canada at the United Nations, 1947, p.70s See Verbatim Records, General Assembly, 1947, p.1078-80 for Record of Votes. 34. U.N.B., Vol. I l l , No.22, Nov.25, 1947, p.686. 35* Official Records, First Committee, General Assembly, 1947, pp.3^5-4. 36. Canada at the United Nations, 1947, p.218. 98 The first question was not a source of much disagreement for very few states held that the Charter was beyond the purview of the Court. The second was of a more dubious character and many states though voting for the resolution had some qualms concerning the correctness of the action. India, who abstained, suggested a cogent argument against the move in assert-ing that "the right use of discretionary authority by a state can never be 37 the subject of judicial decision." * Despite many doubts as to the worthiness of the course the indignant General Assembly was determined to bring as great a weight of opinion on the Soviet Union as possible, hoping rather than expecting i t might result in a changed attitude. With such a purpose in mind a favorable decision by the International Court of Justice would be an extremely helpful weapon. A moment's sober rumination on the part of the member states might have sug-gested the likelihood that the methods chosen would only irritate the USSR and make i t more recalcitrant. Since the Soviet's attitude was the key to the whole controversy a more conciliatory approach might have achieved more positive results. A great power cannot be made repentant through the con-demnation of large numbers of small states even when those small states are led by other major powers. The USSR was reading more into the Potsdam Agreement than actually was there, in its claim that the three powers had agreed to admit the ex-enemy states together. It is quite true that at Potsdam the USSR had wanted them a l l to be considered as a group but the United States had refused because of its objections to communist domination of Bulgaria, Hungary and • 58. Roumania. 37* Liang, Yuen-Li, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 1949, p.291. 38. Leahy, W.D., I Was There. McGraw H i l l , New York, 1950, p.404. 99 There is no ethical justification for Russia's veto of Italy and Fin-land since she admits they qualified under Article 4 but the action may be condoned on political grounds. It is logical to expect that the USSR would oppose admission of states such as Italy, whose foreign policy generally followed the lead of the United States, when the United States was similarly blocking admission of al l Communist states. This indicates the crux of the problem, applicant states were being judged not on their respective merits under Article 4 but on the degree to which they might be expected to act independently in the General Assembly. Thus to a certain extent the dispute over admission of new members is a by product of the un-fortunate development of bloc voting in the General Assembly. ^ * 39. Padelford, N.J., The Use of the Veto. International Organization, Vol.2, 1948, p.240. CHAPTER VII Developments During 1948. In a letter to Secretary-General Trygve Lie early in 1948 0 So Nyun, the Burmese ambassador to the United States,made formal application for admission to the United Nations on behalf of Burma. The Secretary General was informed that by an Act of the parliament of the United Kingdom sov-ereignty had passed from the British Crown to the Burmese people on 4 Jan-uary 1948. Burma was now willing to accept and able to carry out the ob-ligations of the Charter. The application was referred to the Committee on Admission of New Mem-bers of the Security Council where i t was considered on March 29. There was no real difference of opinion on Burma so the support i t received came from both the Soviet and Western blocs. Burma's war record was referred to by the representative of China with the explanation that "after mistakes at the initial stage ... she threw her weight on the righteous side." *^ The representative of the Argentine abstained on the vote in committee because of lack of instructions from his government but the vote in the Security Council was unanimous in favor of admitting Burma. * The General Assembly 1. Laing, L.H., Admission of Indian States, p.l49. 2. S.CO.R.,Third Year, No. 54, 10 April 1948, p.5. 100 101 on April 19 unanimously concurred in the recommendation and Burma became the fifty-eighth member of the United Nations. In line with the General Assembly request of November 17, 19^ 7 a meet-ing of the Big Five was held on April 7 to seek a solution of their differ-ences over admission. At this meeting Gromyko offered a trade - the USSR would drop its opposition to the states favored by the United States and the United Kingdom i f they would support the Soviet sponsored applicants. The suggestion was not outrageous since i t did offer a way out of the member-ship impasse and would thus have removed one source of East - West tension. The elimination of points of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western countries should be an aim of Western diplomacy. Acceptance of the Soviet offer would have removed an outstanding issue of dissension without creating any noticeable disadvantages for the Western states. It is not very likely that a friendly reception to the Soviet Union's suggestion would have immediately altered the USSR's generally intransigent policy but i t is unreasonable to condemn an adversary as uncooperative when your own policy iB to summarily reject and denounce any and a l l of his attempts at compromise. If only for this reason the proposal was worthy of better treatment than outright rejection. The attitude that the United States, took to the same proposal in the Security Council as expressed by Warren Austin in the words, "... an attempt at bargaining was surely beneath the dignity of the Council" was more petulent than statesmanlike. Diplomacy is to a great extent the art of bargaining and i f i t is rejected as a means of conciliating differences in international relations because i t is 'beneath the dignity' of a state there is but one alternative, and that is war. 3. Ibid, p.7. 102 The disquieting atmosphere of the Big Five Meeting which carried over into the Security Council was momentarily dispelled by the Council's whole-hearted approbation of Burma's application but i t reappeared almost immed-iately in connection with reconsideration of Italy. This was the third time that Italy's request for membership had been before the Council and it was a foregone conclusion that its fate would be unaltered. It is con-sequently difficult to escape the conclusion that Gromyko was stating a fact when he charged that the United States and France had forced recon-sideration of Italy to call forth a Soviet veto which could be used for 4. propaganda purposes by the United States in the Italian elections. Since eaet of these elections were fcygiwly a contest between the United States and the tnQlventb&l USSR for andcoapaa^ b position in Italy,Gromyko for purposes of counter-v propaganda emphasized strongly that the Soviet Union wanted Italy in the United Nations but could not vote affirmatively until the other members agreed to similar votes for Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Gromyko's charge that the United States had ulterior motives in demanding reconsideration of Italy is borne out by the theatrical emphasis that Austin placed on the USSR's continued frustration of the will of the majority and his allusion that "a formula which would permit the voice of Italy and of certain other states to be heard in the General Assembly of the United Nations can and should be found." ^* The stalemate was so obvious that only Italy's application was voted 6. on, the others being postponed indefinitely. There could scarcely be a more transparent display of the interrelation-ship between power politics and the admission of new members than was man-4. S.C.O.R., No. 54, pp.10-11. 5* Ibid, p.17. 6. S.C.O.R., No. 55, 10 April 1948, p.J. 103 ifested in this episode over Italy. Every member of the Security Council regarded Italy as fulfilling the conditions of Article 4 and thus eligible for membership yet Italy had to remain outside the Organization because her application was only a pawn in the larger game being played by the United States and the Soviet Union. On 25 May 1948 Ceylon, who had become an independent member of the Commonwealth by virttie of the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, submitted an application for membership in the United Nations. Ceylon received in i t i a l consideration at a meeting of the Membership Committee on June 29 where she was supported by every member except the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR,. who reserved their right to participate in the discussion in the Security Council. On July 14 a surprise meeting of the Committee was called by Galagan (Ukraine) at which Moliakov the Soviet representative suggested postponement of consideration of Ceylon pending receipt of more information to establish conclusively its position as a sovereign and independent state. The Soviet attempt .to delay the proceedings was overridden and the application sent to the Security Council. In the meantime Ceylon had supplied more data but the Soviet Union s t i l l wanted further delay "until such time as ful l information on the status of the Government of Ceylon and on its constitution as well as suf-ficient proof that Ceylon is a sovereign and independent state has been 11 7. received from the Government of Ceylon." Manuilsky (Ukraine) declared hie belief that Ceylon's independence was fictitious and charged that the United Kingdom "has repeatedly tried to secure the admission to the United Nations, as independent States, of ter-8. ritories which do not possess either independence or national sovereignty." * • • t * 7.. S.C.O.R., No.105, 18 August 1948, p.4. 8.. Ibid, p.4. . > < 104 Sir Alexander Oadogan indignantly replied that Ceylon had provided a l l the necessary information and stated that "he was beginning to suspect that the Ukrainian delegate had not read the documentation.B Malik (USSR) again asserted that the information was misleading point-ing to the so called fact that the "British Governor General in Ceylon re-„ 10, tains fu l l and unlimited powers," as proof that Ceylon was s t i l l a British colony. With disingenuous piety he later added: "The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and its peoples welcome and would.welcome the independence of any colonial people now under foreign domination. But the USSR and its peoples are by no means prepared to give their blessing to sham independence..." H« Despite vigorous protests against the blatantly political character of 12. its opposition the Soviet Union vetoed the application of Ceylon. The character of the Soviet opposition to Ceylon visibly demonstrated their reluctance to recognize, or inability to understand the workings of British constitutional procedure and the reality of the independence of the states within the Commonwealth. More incongruous was the spectacle of the Ukraine, whose own independence amounts to no more than local autonomy, challenging the right of Ceylon to membership on the grounds that i t was not free and independent. While i t is true that the original grant of autonomy to Ceylon was not complete i t was only a matter of months before the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, assented to on December 10, granted "that full degree of self-government within the British Commonwealth of Nations which the term "Dom-inion status' is-generally understood to imply." *^ *' At the time of its application Ceylon was just as independent as Canada or the other Common-wealth nations but the outward forms of the constitution, as in other 9. Ibid, p.6. I O . I D T O T . P . 1 2 , li.Ibid. p.lj 12. see Appendix. 13. United Kingdom, Debates,Commons. Vol.4^8,Column 2016. 105 members of the Commonwealth, give the appearance of a continued subordina-tion to the United Kingdom through the Governor General. The Soviet Union was thus able to use this as a spurious reason for denying membership to Ceylon. The authentic foundation for Soviet opposition may be suggested by the internal political situation in Ceylon. There is a sizeable Communist min-ority in existence but i t is almost completely dominated by Trotskyists who reject the Stalinist form of communism. The government moreover is not passively indifferent to communism, i t is virulently anti-communist and is firmly entrenched in power. In the light of the Soviet practice of vetoing any state likely to vote against i t on important issues the following explanation of the Soviet veto suggested in an article in Pacific Affairs would seem to be valid. "Having achieved independence quietly, peacefully and by persuasion, Ceylon has no quarrel with the United Kingdom. Though on some issues i t would be found voting with India, Pakistan, and Burma against the Western powers, on world issues i t would vote with those powers against the Soviet Union." 14. Though from the Soviet Union's point of view i t may not seem reprehen-sible to block admission of states likely to increase the majority against i t in the General Assembly i t can scarcely expect to obtain a redress of the balance unless i t shows more sincerity in its own approach to the problem. Opposition to states such as Ceylon to which no reasonable ob-jection can be raised only serves to antagonize the Western states and con-vince them that the Soviet Union has ulterior objectives in a l l its pol-icies. It was previously mentionned that the General Assembly passed a resolu-tion on 17 November 1947 requesting an advisory opinion from the International 14. Jennings, W.I., The Dominion of Ceylon, Pacific Affairs, Vol.22. 106 Court of Justice on the following question: "is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a state to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article? In particular, can such a Member while i t recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other states be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State?" 15* The referral of this question to the International Court of Justice arose from the General Assembly's indignation over the failure of the Security Council to recommend several applicants for membership but more especially from the Soviet Union's refusal to permit Italian entry unless the other ex-enemy states were simultaneously admitted. Before oral hearings on the case began the Court had received written observations from fifteen states on the question. The first question was answered negatively by twelve of these states, a l l of which assearted that the terms of Article 4 were clear and definitive.On the other hand the USSR, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia expressed opinions that emphasized the political nature of the questions and contested the competence of the Court to in-16. terpret the Charter. Dr. Ivan Kemo, Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations opened the public hearings with an outline of the develop-ments in the membership problem leading up to its referral to the Court.^* He was followed by the representatives of five governments who verbally presented the contentions of these states. 15. International Court of Justice, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948, Pleadings, Oral Arguments Doc-uments, p.9» (Referred to hereafter as I.C.J. 1948.) 16. I.C.J. 1948, pp.14-33. 17. Ibid, pp.42-58. 107 Dr. Manfred Lachs (Roland) claimed that the questions before the Court were not legal within the meaning of Article 96 of the Charter but were based on political considerations upon which the Court could not pass 18 judgement* Milan Bartos (Yugoslavia) contended that a court decision on a political question would endanger the fundamental structure of the United 19, Nations. Vladimir Vochoo (Czechoslovakia) though challenging the Court's competence urged that i f an opinion should be given i t should be wide enough 20 • , to facilitate a political solution of the problem, Georges Scelle (France) ( 21. and Georges Kaekenbeeck (Belgium) on the contrary upheld the Court's com-petence. Scelle advanced the view that: 1.) a member of the United Nations is obliged to vote against a candidate that in its judgement does not meet the Charter requirements; 2.) a member is entitled to use discretion in making its decision and need not be bound by the express conditions of the Charter; and 30 discretion did not mean arbitrariness and attaching con-00 ditions to a vote was arbitrary and therefore illegal. • On 28 May 1948 the Court by a 9 to 6 vote handed down its opinion that a member of the United Nations "is not juridically entitled to make its con-sent to the admission dependent-on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article (4); "and that, in particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while i t recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional con-dition that other etatfes be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State." In reaching this decision the Court confined its purview to the question of whether or not the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 are exhaustive in character. In this light the question is purely legal and thus 18. Ibid, pp 99-112. 19. Ibid, pp. 79-91 20. Ibid, pp.113-18 21*. Ibid, pp 91^ -8 22'. Ibid-, pp-. 59-79 25. International Organization, Vol.2, 1948, pp.572~3» 108 within the competence of the Oourt. As was stated in the opinion: "The gourt cannot attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites i t to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request..." None of the dissenting judges contradicted the majority opinion on the Court1 8 competence to interpret the Charter, even Krylov andloricio only adduced the argument that this particular question should have been turned down because of its political nature, consequently the Court's competence in this field would seem to be established. The Court also dispelled the belief that i t could not deal with abstract questions, dismissing i t as "devoid of any justification." On the substance of the request before i t the Court decided that the actual vote of a member was not the point at issue but rather "the state-ments made by a Member concerning the vote i t proposes to give." 2^*This implies that a member could arrive at its decision on an applicant through considerations extraneous to Article 4 so long as the overt justification of its vote was in compliance with the terms of Article 4. In the view of the principle dissenting judges "Such a result would not conduce to that frank exchange of views which is an.essential condition of the healthy functioning of an international organization." 2 ° # It would, moreover, "involve the risk of undermining that respect for good faith which must govern the discharge of the oblig-ations contained in the Charter." In the opinion of the majority the text of Article 4 was sufficiently clear to dispense with resort to the preparatory work. The conditions required under Article 4 are five in number and they must be regarded as the necessary and sufficient qualifications for admission. In the judge-ment of the organization, or in the final analysis the members, an applicant 24. Ibid, p.569. 25. Loc cit. 26. Dissenting Opinion, see British.Yearbook of.International Law,1947,p.ll4 27. Loc cit. 109 must: "(1) be a state; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of the Charter; (4) be able to carry out these obligations; (5) be willing to do so.a 28. The Court concluded "that these conditions constitute an exhaustive enumeration and are not merely stated by way of guidance or example."29. On the other hand the Court indicated that a member has considerable discretionary leeway within the bounds of the enumerated conditions. In this respect i t was said: " i t does not, however, follow from the exhaustive character of para-graph. 1 of Article 4 that an appreciation is precluded of such circumstances of fact as would enable the existence of the requisite conditions to be verified. "Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which i t is.possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Article. The taking into account of such factors is im-plied in the very wide and very elastic nature of the prescribed conditions; no relevant political factor - that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission - is excluded." 50. On the basis of the Court's reasoning the answer to the first part of the General Assembly's request for an opinion was obviously in the negative. From this i t followed that the second question must also receive a negative response since Article 4 necessarily implied "that every application should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits..." Two judges, Alvarez and Azevedo, though concurring in the majority opinion appended separate reasons for their verdict. Judge Alvarez felt the Court should go beyond a strict clarification of the Charter and take al l relevant factors, including the political aspect of the question, into 28. International Organization, 1948, p.570. 29. Loc cit. 30. Ibid, p.571 31. Ibid, p.572 c 110 account. On this basis he asserted that any state ful f i l l i n g the required conditions had a right to be admitted to the organization. Judge Azevedo urged that the Court should ignore the disputes giving rise to any particular question and limit itself to a purely theoretical study of the matter. There were three separate dissenting opinions, the principal one being signed by Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair and Read. Judges Krylov and "Loricic though concurring in this opinion adduced an additional contention. The dissenting judges found that the text of Article 4 was not clear, hence they had recourse to the preparatory work on the Charter. They also approached the question in a different manner than the majority, consider-ing i t to be evident that i t was the vote itself not the statements of a member that was in question. Contrary to the majority they took the more practical view that no differentiation could be made between the reasons proffered by a member for its vote, and whatever other unexpressed reasons may have dictated its vote.fllearly a member could not be compelled to div-ulge its real reasons but i t should at least be permitted and encouraged to do so rather than be forced to resort to insincerity and subterfuge. These judges furthermore found that the conditions indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 were essential but not necessarily sufficient. Their answer was couched in the following termst "A Member of the United Nations which is called upon in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a state which possesses the qualifications specified in paragraph 1 of that Article, is participating in a political decision and is therefore legally.entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on any political considera-tions which seem to i t to be relevant. In the exercise of this power the Member is legally bound to have regard to the principle of good faith, to give effect to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and to act in such a manner as not to involve any breach of the Charter." 3 2» 22. British Year Book of International Law, 1947, p.115, also I.C.J. 1948, p.86. I l l As a consequence of this reasoning they replied in the affirmative to both questions* , •'? In the opinions of Judges Krylov and Zoricic. the Court,though acting within its competence, should have refused to answer the question because of its manifest political character. Krylov stated: "Though impersonal in' form, i t is a question designed to censure the reasons given by a permanent Member of the Security Council." 35. Judge Xoricic added: "The weakness of the majority Opinion - as the dissenting judges pointed out -.is that i t refers not to the vote but to the arguments addisSased in favour of the vote. It inevitably leads to the conclusionthat a Member can in fact vote as he pleases i f he is careful not to reveal his motives."3^. An interesting sidelight to the decision is provided by the positions of the various judges on the question. Though they are chosen as individ-uals and not as representatives of their countries i t seems significant that only two of the judges, de Visscher (Belgiam) and Klaestad (Norway), supporting the majority opinion were Europeans while Read (Canada) was the only non-European with the minority, the others being McNair (United King-dom), Basdevant (France), Krylov (USSR), Winiarski (Poland), and*Zorioic (Yugoslavia). Five of the majority, Guerrero (Salvador), Alvarea (Chile), Alfaro (Mexico), Azevedo (Brazil), and Hackworth (United States), were from the western hemisphere, the other two being Badawi Pasha (Egypt), and Hell Mo (China). It may be making too much of this particular distribution of opinion but the European judges seemed to recognize more willingly the political complexities of the case and desired to leave a wider range for a political settlement. On the other hand the American judges showed a tendency to 33* British Yearbook of International Law, 1947, p.H5» 34. Loc c i t . 112 idealism, expressing themselves on the basis of what should be rather than on the grounds of what political reality dictates. To this extent at least the judges reflect the outlook of their particular, continents on international affairs. At the third session of the General Assembly which convened on 21 September 1948 at the Palais de Ohaillot in Paris the entire question of admission of new members was reviewed. Pour documents formed the basis of the lengthy discussion in the ad loc Political Committee; (1) a report of the Security Council notifying the General Assembly of Italy's rejection and the indefinite postponement of others; (2) a similar report noting Ceylon's rejection; (3) an Argentine proposal that the General Assembly admit a l l states that had received seven votes in the Security Council; 55. and (4) the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. In the ad hoc Committees discussion Vishinsky presented an extensive survey of the views of the Soviet Union on admission of new members. Since his statement is of considerable significance, especially in regard to the Court's decision, a short summary is called for. He pointed out the following matters: the General Assembly could only, act to admit a state on a positive recommendation from the Security Council; the decisions of the Council on this question are obviously substantive; the advisory opinion of the Court was not a majority opinion because two of the majority had submitted individual concurring opinions hence only seven members had agreed with the opinion handed down; and the conditions of Article 4 were not exhaustive or exclusive but only basic. Vishinsky then stated five conclusions of the Soviet delegation which openly flouted the Court's opinion: (1) decisions on admission should be guided by Article 4(1) 25* Summary Records: Ad Hoc Political Committee 1948, Third Session,General Assembly, p.53» 113 which establishes the legal basis for admission; (2) since the decision was political a member could make its agreement conditional on any political consideration; (3) conditions of Article 4 did not exclude taking account of political factors; (4) a member is free to make its own decision and its motives cannot be questionned; (5) the same approach should be taken to the simultaneous admission of several states of equal qualifications and this is not contrary to the Charter. Vishinsky1s conclusion from these considerations was that the Court's opinion could not be considered a proper " 56. directive to the Security Council. It is clear from Vishinky's contentions that the USSR intended to ig-nore the opinion of the Court, such an intention being quite consistent with its oft asserted claim that that membership question is political and Should be solved by political means. In the face of this adament stand the United States proposed two steps for the General Assembly: (1) that i t take note of the advisory opinion and express the view that the Court's conclus-ions should be applied in membership discussions; and (2) that i t reaffirm its request for reconsideration of the vetoed states. 57 • It is impossible to see what the United States hoped to attain through these proposals. Since neither could be regarded as an attempt to dissolve the impasse they had at best a very doubtful propaganda value. Persistent in which noayetPon of /orintipU It involved on el introduction of proposalsy(which are known beforehand to be completely un-acceptable to the USSR achieves no good purpose and in fact has a decidedly harmful effect in that i t repeatedly demonstrates visibly what the Russians call the 'mechanical majority' of the United States. Fortunately neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were so 36. Ibid, pp.65-74 57. Ibid, p.77. 114 exasperated with the Soviet Union as to embrace the provocative and uncon-stitutional suggestion of the Argentine that a l l states which had received seven votes in the Security Council be admitted. Their opposition to this dangerous proposal,which might well have wrecked the United Nations i f passed, helped to force its withdrawal. France^though i t condemned the linking of applicants together for purposes of admission,refused to support any resolution approving an? the Court's opinion. It felt that a member possessed discretionary powers on 28. admission to be exercised in the interests of the organization. The Committee finally condensed the feelings of the majority into ten draft resolutions to be recommended to the General Assembly's plenary session. The first was of a general nature asking the Security Council to reconsider a l l twelve states that had failed to obtain recommendations in the light of the principle of universality. The passage of this resolution indicates a significant development in the temper of the members since only one year before a similar resolution was turned down. The second resolution asked each member to actiin accordance with the advisory opinion handed down by the Court. The third requested re-examination of Finland and Italy in the light of the Court's decision. Six further resolutions dealt separately with the applications of Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Transjordan and Ceylon. Reconsideration of Ceylon in particular was desired "at the earliest possible moment.11 The tenth resolution reaffirmed faith in Austria as a peace loving nation within the meaning of Article 4 and again asked for re-consideration. The General Assembly took up and approved a l l ten resolutions on December o. 28. Ibid, pp.116-7 29* Official Records, General Assembly, Third Session, 1948, pp 800-1. 115 On December 15 the Security Council complied with the General Assembly request to give early consideration to Ceylon's application. The Soviet Union proposed postponement until all twelve outstanding applications were 40. reviewed and when this move failed Ceylon was vetoed. * The action of the Soviet Union was clearly intended to uphold its bargaining power by keeping as many western sponsored states on the l i s t as possible, the hope being that eventually the western bloc would admit the Soviet's candidates in order to obtain seats for its own. The veto showed again what should have by this time been obvious— that the USSR regarded the General Assembly's bombardment of resolutions as idle political demonstrations. The overwhelming western majority aiming at censure rather than solution ignored the hard fact that international problems seldom i f ever dissolve in the face of a mere majority. Also in December the Security Council began deliberation on the applict tion of the newly formed state of Israel. Probably the most astounding thing in connection with this application was that both the United States and the USSR were vigorously supporting Israel against the wishes of the United Kingdom and France who wanted the matter to be postponed. Two resolutions calling for a postponement of the decision on Israel and one suggesting referrSl to the International Court of Justice were defeated. However, when the application was put to a vote i t received only five 41 affirmative votes thus failing to pass. Five states abstained, not be-cause they objected to eventual membership for Israel, but because they felt more time was needed to consider the situation existing in Palestine. This reflected the tone of the debate which had centred around "the wisdom 40. S.C.O.R., 3rd Year, No. 129, 15 Dec. 1948, p.p.28-29. 41. Belgium, Canada, China, France and the United Kingdom. 116 of voting to recommend admission of Israel during the negotiations for settlement of the Palestine question and in the absence of compliance with 42. the previous resolutions of the Security Council." C.P.Mayhew, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained the British attitude on Israel to the House of Commons in the following terms: "His Majesty's Government do not wish to exclude the possibility of Jewish entry into-the United Nations at some stage, but they regard the present application as premature and hard to accept in view of the fact that the future of Palestine is s t i l l being discussed by the Assembly and that no frontiers have yet been drawn in Palestine." 45V The positions of the powers on the application of Israel portrayed in stark relief the background of power politics against which membership applications have been considered. United Kingdom policy sought to retain the friendship of the Arab states by not displaying too great haste to recognize the appearance of a Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world. In the view of the United Kingdom: "Why should there be such haste when for two or three years established, recognized Governments and countries had been barred admission." 44. On the other hand the United States and the USSR were more concerned with winning the friendship of a potentially influential state in the strategically vital Middle East. Their anxiety to cultivate good relations led them to overlook the niceties of Israel's qualifications whereas in other cases they had been over-meticulous in examination of a candidate suitability. In the case of Israel strict adherence to the Charter would have required a go slow policy on admission. 42. International Organization 1949, p.2°2. 45. United Kingdom, Debates, Vol.459, p.8. 44. U.N.B., Vol.VI, No.2, Jan.15, 1949, p.71. 117 CHAPTER VIII Development-? During 1949 In March 19^9 the application of Israel which had previously been re-jected came up for reconsideration in the Security Council. In the dis-cussion frequent reference was made to the improved situation in Palestine, the general feeling being that there was no prominent reason for further delay on admission. The United Kingdom alone of the Great Powers was s t i l l unwilling to support Israel because of the uncertainty of Israel's attitude to Jerusalem and the lack of Jewish assurances that they would accept their obligations to Arab refugees. However, in accordance with its declared policy of not blocking a candidate for admission which had the support of the majority, the United Kingdom announced that i t would abstain from the vote.** The Council thereupon acted to recommend Israel by a vote of nine for, one against, and one abstaining. Israel's application ran into difficulty in the General Assembly where questions were raised regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem, the future of Palestine refugees, the boundaries of Israel, and the efforts made by the Government of Israel to apprehend the assassins of Count Bernadotte. 1. S.C.O.R., No.17, 4 March, 1949, Pp.2-"5. 2. See Appendix for Table. 118 Despite the controversy Israel eventually received the necessary two thirds majority. The recommendation of Israel by the Security Council with one perman-ent member abstaining is of some significance. It can now be assumed that the practice of not counting a great power's abstention as a veto, which had grown up in relation to other substantive matters, applies to decisions on membership applications. The Charter actually states that substantive decisions in the Security Council require the concurring votes of the permanent members. If this restrictive wording is eased as apparently i t has been by a liberal interpretation, the functioning of the Security Council is made somewhat easier. An important thing to note in connection with this matter is that the USSR concursed in the free interpretation but they refuse to count absence from a meeting as abstention. The Republic of Korea submitted an application for membership to the Secretary General on 19 January 1949. ^* The Security Council over Soviet objections referred the matter to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. There the Soviet Union opposed consideration of this application since in their view the government of the Republic of Korea was a reactionary American puppet regime established through false elections. The Soviet representative contended that the legitimate government of Korea was that of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in Pyong-Yang. The representative of the United States answeeed that the Republic of Korea had been set up by the General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1948. Its government had cooperated with the United Nations and shown by its conduct that i t could accept the obligations of United Nations member-3. S.C.O.R., 4th Year, Supplement for February 1949, p.5 4. S.C.O.R., 4th Year, Supplement for April 1949, p.2. 119 ship. The vote taken following the discussion showed that eight states favored the applicant, two were against i t and one state (Cuba) was absent for the vote. * On the same day that the Republic of Korea's application was received by the Security Council the representative of the USSR requested the Council to consider the application for membership from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States strongly opposed considera-tion of this application since the Government of the Republic of Korea was the one recognized by the United Nations. The Soviet Union contended that the General Assembly resolution recognizing South Korea was illegally adopted under pressure from the. Anglo-American bloc ^*and the real legitimate government was that of North Korea. In spite of the arguments of the Soviet delegate the Security Council declined to refer the application of the People's Republic of Korea to the membership 8ommittee by a vote of eight to two. ^ * On April 8 the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members, on Korea was discussed by the Security Council. There was no change in the attitudes of the various members with the consequence that the application was vetoed by the USSR. * At this same meeting the application of Nepal was referred to the Membership Committee. The somewhat hypocritical nature of American and British objections to the applicant states of Eastern Europe is shown by the support given to the Republic of Korea. They had objected to Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria because of violations of human rights and by the terms of the 5» Ibid, pp.3^ • 6. S.C.O.R., 4th Year, No. 12, 4p9th Meeting, pp.18-19. 7. S.C.O.R., 4th Year, No. 12, pp.14-15. 8. See Appendix for Table of Vote. 120 peace treaties they were technically justified in doing so, yet they failed to protest against the vicious practices of Syngman Rhee in South Korea. The Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea tends to gloss over the evils of Rhee'e government but even so the evidence provided in-dicates that human rights were grossly violated under the oppressive police Q regime of Syngman Rhee. Neither the British nor the Americans can appear sincere when they attempt to obtain membership for states, no matter how iniquitous or corrupt their governments may be, so long as they are pro-Western, while they assume a lofty moral attitude of disapproval where communist governments are concerned. On the other hand the arrogant attitude of the Soviet Union that only the governments established under its aegis are democratic can scarcely be called a contributing factor to understanding between the East and the West. The Soviet Union naively expected the other members of the Security Council to accept its account of the situation in Korea as being the factual one yet they were unwilling that the United Nations itself be permitted to observe the situation in North Korea. Admittedly almost any United Nations Commission that did visit North Korea would have a majority of members with preconceived ideas based on dislike i f not hostility but the members of the United Nations are at least entitled to be sceptical when they receive nothing but vituperation and adamant opposition to any attempt to obtain the truth. It is probably true that the South Korean government was as much under the influence of the United States as the North Korean was under that of 9» See: Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea., Vol. 1, Official Records General Assembly, 4th Session, Supplement N . 9 (A/936) pp.7,15,23,25,26,28,29,33. 121 Russia but its claim to international recognition was immeasurably stronger than that of the Pyong-Yang regime. For these reasons its application was bound to be the object of Russian vituperation. It was, moreover, quite evident that Syngman Rhee1s government was unpopular and unstable. Because of the confused and turbulent state of Korea a more farsighted policy would have been to postpone consideration of its application until a relatively stable situation had been established. Before proceeding to discuss the lengthly review of the outstanding applications in the Security Council a brief mention must be made of the one other application that was received by the United Nations in 1 ° 4 ° . 0 ° April 8 the application of Nepal was referred to the Membership Committee, where Nepal's qualifications were subjected to scrutiny and additional in-formation was sought from the state. When this was received the Security Council took up the report of the Membership Committee on the application. No member of the Security Council challenged the qualifications of Nepal as measured by Article 4 but at the stage the membership controversy had reached Article 4 was only receiving lip service. The whole question had evolved into a test of endurance between the Soviet and Anglo-American blocs. Tsarapkin made the Soviet position abundantly clear with the state-ment that: "The Soviet Union does not oppose the admission of Nepal to membership in the United Nations, but i t cannot vote for Nepal as i t would be unfair to admit that country alone while systematically refusing the admission of a number of other States, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic and Roumania, which fully satisfy a l l the requirements of the Charter." 1 0* In answer to this statement of policy the representative of the United Kingdom said: 10. S.C.O.R., No. 29, 7 September 1949, p.10. 122 "It ia a perfectly understandable policy, although we may disagree with i t . My delegation and my Government do disagree with i t . . . " He then pointed out the inconsistency of the Soviet Union's policy: "What I do not understand is how, within a few weeks after enunciating that policy, we find the representative of the USSR voting for the admission of Israel (414th meeting) without stipulating any conditions about the other applicants." 1 2 , It is almost impossible to ferret out the secret reasons which really account for the votes of a state, especially in the case of the Soviet Union. Superficially the basis of the apparent inconsistency pointed out by the delegate of the United Kingdom seems to be that the Soviet Union is willing to admit states which are likely to follow policies not too much at variance with Soviet interests, or at least not servile to the United States or the United Kingdom, and which may therefore frequently be found in the same voting column with the USSR. Nepal through its long association with the British did not in the Soviet view have the necessary independence of outlook so i t was vetoed. The actual result of the vote was nine in favor to two against. On 16 June at the 427th meeting of the Security Council a debate began on the whole question of admission as well as on the specific issue of the waiting applicants. The debate resolved from the outset into a series of polemical tirades with neither side interested in understanding the other's point of view. It continued through nine meetings until finally terminated on September 13 with no achievement in the way of new members to show for the lengthy storm of verbiage. It is necessary to mention only very briefly the positions taken by the various combatants. Mr. Arce (Argentina) opened the discussion with a 11. Ibid, p.ll 12. Loc cit. 13. See Appendix. 125 lengthy peroration in defence of Argentina's theory that any seven votes irregardless of the concurrence of the permanent members constituted a favor-able recommendation by the Security Council. He further asserted that a recommendation need not be favorable before the General Assembly could act 14 to admit a state; * In spite of the fact that the legal reasoning of Argentina'8 argument was not widely acceptable the motivation of i t elicited considerable sympathy. Tingfll F. Tsiang put China on record as favoring the elimination of the veto in connection with admission but until such time as i t was abol-15. ished China reserved the right to use i t . * Wise counsel was contained in Mahmoud Fawzi Bey's (Egypt) expression of hope that: "...a change of attitude and the consequent admission - the non-dis-criminatory admission - of a l l worthy applicants to membership in the United Nations, would serve as a substantial contribution toward the accomplishment of a less strained, a more hopeful and a more constructive international atmosphere." 16. The American representative refused to agree with Argentina's views on admission but was nevertheless dissatisfied with Soviet obstruction. The promise was made that the United States would not block any state re-ceiving seven votes but Article 4 was to be strictly adhered to. All applicants other than Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic were acceptable to the United States. Tsarapkin, who spoke immediately following Austin, charged the United States with "carrying out a policy of discrimination against some countries and favouritism towards others." The USSR desired an immediate solution to the membership question .and therefore offered a resolution providing for 14. S.C.O.R., No.50, 16 June 1949, pp 10-29. 15. S.C.O.R., No.51, pp.2-5 16. Ibid. p .5» 17. Ibid, pp 5-8 18. TFKT, p .8 . 124 the simultaneous admission of the twelve outstanding applicants. The about turn was now complete, the USSR by this resolution came over to the view ex-pressed by the United States at the time when the first membership applica-tions were being discussed. The tragedy was that the United States had ab-andoned that position and now filled the role initially played by the USSR as the critic of simultaneous admission on the grounds that i t was contrary to the Charter. If the issues were not so serious the antics would appear almost like a.comic opera. Mr. Chaxsvel (France) refused to accept either the American or the Sov-Union iet view in toto. He agreed with the 8ovietAthat the question was political and therefore too much weight should not be given the Court's 1948 opinion but he sided with the United States on the issue of simultaneous admission. 19. Universality was he believed the object at which to aim. Canada expressed the view that i t would be guided by Article 4 and the 20 subsequent recommendations of the General Assembly. * Mr. Tarasenko (Ukraine) claimed that the four permanent members, other than the USSR used a 'hidden veto' by abstaining and thus prevening Soviet proposals from obtaining the necessary majority. He stressed that the Soviet en bloc resolution had been put forward as a compromise to break the 21. impasse on admission and as such the Ukraine supported i t . Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that the views of the United Kingdom were unchanged, i t could neither accept the Soviet 'horse trade' nor the arguments 22 of the Argentine. * It is unfortunate that the United States and the United Kingdom did not — ^ • • . 1 » 19. S.C.O.R., No. 31, pp.12-12. 20. S.C.O.R., No. 21, P»15. 21. Ibid, pp.15-17. 22..S.C.O.R., No. 22, 24 June 1949, pp 2-4. 125 regard the Soviet proposal as an attempt at a compromise but rather as a sordid trade. However even as a trade there was much to be said for i t . The debate eventually degenerated into an almost interminable proced-ural wrangle over which resolution should be voted on f i r s t . It was event-ually decided to vote on the seven Argentine resolutions dealing with in-dividual states and then on the Soviet proposal for simultaneous admission. The result was,never in doubt, the voting showed that for the most part the USSR and the Ukraine were,standing alone against the rest of the Council. The report of the Security Council's deliberations that went to the General Assembly lamentably showed that no progress had been made in further-ing the applications of the thirteen candidates for admission. The question was taken up by the ad ipc Political Committee on 31 Oct^ ober 1949. The Committee approved nine draft resolutions submitted by Australia requesting reconsideration of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Transjordan, Korea, Portugal and Nepal., "in the light of the determin-ation of the Assembly that,in its judgement, the States concerned fulfilled the necessary requirements and should therefore be admitted to membership 23. in the United Nations." Some states felt this continual impotent reiteration of views was damaging to the General Assembly's prestige but the dissatisfaction was sufficient to eliminate any real opposition to a different and more concil-iatory course of action. Two further draft resolutions were agreed toj one requested the great powers to refrain from using the veto and the other requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following questions 23. Official Records. General Assembly, Fourth Session, Annex 19^9, P»30, See pp.21-34 for texts of resolutions. 126 "Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate f a i l i n g to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent member upon a resolution so to recommend?" Another draft resolution submitted by the USSR requesting reconsidera-tion of a l l thirteen outstanding applicants "taking into consideration the general feeling in favour of the admission of a l l the above thirteen states," was defeated by 30 votes to 9 with 16 abstentions. On NDvember 22 the General Assembly adopted the eleven draft resolutions approved by the ad hoc P o l i t i c a l Committee. The General Assembly was actually in the disconcerting position of being indignant at the Soviet Union but unable to do anything about i t ex-cept talk and pass resolutions. The steady barrage of resolutions request-ing reconsideration of certain applicants was absurdly useless. The attitude of the Soviet Union was abundantly clear and the compromise they offered was not outrageous as evidenced by the large minority that refused to vote against the Soviet draft resolution. The persistent invocation of A r t i c l e 4, especially by the United States, in tones of piety and respect,though superficially ingenuous, could lead to the collapse of the United Nations because of the rigid, unyielding, narrowness of that view. No good purpose is served by holding prolonged debates whose outcome is always the same since every state stands uncompromisingly on i t s stated position. It would be better to avoid discussions such as this in order to build up a more harmonius atmosphere where questions can be considered reasonably. As the year 1949 was drawing to a close a new form of the membership dispute was foreshadowed when China raised charges against the Soviet Union 24. ' Ibid, p.34. 25. Loc .cit. 127 for aiding and abetting the overthrow of the Nationalist Government. In early 195° the question of who should occupy China's place in the United Nations became a'vital issue. CHAPTER IX Recent Developments On November^22, 19^9 the General Assembly had requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on its competence to admit a state to membership without a prior recommendation from the Security en Council. The question was answered*3 March 1950 when an opinion was handed down by a vote of 12 to 2 in which i t was stated "that the admission of a state to Membership in the United Nations cannot be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommenda-tion for admission." This holds good whether the candidate failed to obtain the requisite majority or whether a permanent member cast a negative vote. This advisory opinion was the second one given by the Court on the subject of the admission of states to the United Nations. The first dealt with the conditions of admission whereas the most recent one defines the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the admission procedure. In answering the question as i t did the Court deliv-ered a death blow to the monotonously propounded theories on admission of Argentina. It was now legally confirmed that to be admitted to membership 1. U.N.B., Vol. VIII, No. 7, April 1, 1950, p.307. 128 129 a state required a positive recommendation from the Security Council before the General Assembly could act to admit i t . The Court again unanimously dismissed the arguments that i t was not competent to interpret the Charter pointing to its advisory opinion of 28 May 1948 as a precedent. The Court found the meaning of the text suf-ficiently clear to dispense with resort to the preparatory work on the Charter. This has special significance since part of the argument support-ing the request for an opinion was based on statements made at the San Francisco Conference. It was stated that the General Assembly and the Security Council are both principal organs and neither is therefore subordinate to the other. Each has fields of primary responsibility but in some matters there is joint responsibility. This is the case in regard to admission, expulsion, or suspension of members. The General Assembly could not on its own in-itiative admit an applicant without depriving the Security Council of an important power entrusted to i t under the Charter. The dissenting Judges Azevedo and Alvarez considered that the question of the 'right of veto' was the core of the issue. Judge Alvarez felt that in the light of the new international law the General Assembly might de-termine whether the 'right of veto' had been abused and i f i t had then the 2. applicant could be admitted without a Security Council recommendation. Judge Azevedo reached the conclusion that the veto did not apply to a recommendation for the admission of a state to membership. The General Assembly could therefore admit any state that received seven votes in the Security Council. Neither of the dissenting judges attributed any great weight to the intentions of the drafters but suggested that interpretations 2. U.N.B., Vol VIII, No. 7, p.310 130 should be guided by the "future requirements of the international commun-The Court's decision could hardly have been other than what i t was, but i t was a worthwhile opinion in that i t cleared up many contentions the exposition of which had wasted many hours of the Council's and Assembly's time. The two opinions on membership taken together clearly indicate the technical conditions which a state must f u l f i l l and the procedure i t must follow i f i t desires membership in the United Nations. Until I9A9 the membership controversy was entirely concerned with the admission of new members. Towards the end of that year a new problem loomed on the horizon as the Chinese Nationalist Government's authority, crumbled before the victorious march of the Chinese Red Armies. The Gov-ernment of the People's Republic of China proclaimed itself to be the leg-itimate government of China in the autumn of 1949 and quickly repudiated the legal states of the delegation sent to the fourth session of the Gen-eral Assembly by the Chinese Nationalist Government. This move posed a definite problem for the United Nations but i t was temporarily sidestepped by continuing to accept as valid the credentials of the Nationalist delegates despite the vigorous protests of the Soviet Representative. The only similar case to the present one had occurred when the commun-ist coup set up a new government in Czechoslovakia. At that time the rep-resentatives of the new government were granted the right to take Czecho-slovakia' s seat since they were in obvious control of the country. The changeover in China had not been as rapid but one fact stands out -the only effective authority on the mainland of China was the Central People's Government in Peking. It had won control through a long hard 3» Loc cit. 131 struggle against what were originally far superior Nationalist forces. As the-bitter c i v i l war had dragged on the strength of the corrupt and reaction-ary Nationalist regime had melted away while the ranks of the Communist forces had swelled. Granted the Communists seized power by violence but after a l l there was no other way of displacing a reactionary and unpopular dictatorship. Politics in China were based on force, no party could ex-pect to form a government except through the backing of its own army. This led to the expression that where ballot boxes do not exist people will vote with their feet, referring of course to the mass desertions from Chiang Kai-Shek's armies in favour of those of Mao Tse-tung. This new government was perfectly justified in expecting the world to recognize the fait accompli. On 8 January 1950 the Secretary General received the following com-munication from Cho»*-En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the new Chinese Gov-ernment: "This is to inform you that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China holds as illegal the presence of the delegates of the.Chinese Kuomintang reactionary remnant clique in the Security Council of the United Nations. The position of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is that the said delegates be expelled from the Security Council. It is hoped that this position be adopted and action be taken accordingly." »^ Jakov Malik proclaimed the-support of the USSR for the new Government of China and added the threat "that should the Security Council f a i l to take appropriate measures for the exclusion from its membership of the representative of the Kuomin-tang group, the delegation of the USSR will not participate in the work of the Security Council as long as the representative of the Kuomintang is not excluded from that body." The Council refused to concur immediately so a few minutes later Malik left the Council Chamber. However he returned for the next meeting which 4 . S.C.O.R., Fifth Year, No. 1, 10 Jan. 1950, p .2 . 5. Loc cit.' 132 was to begin discussion on the draft resolution introduced by the USSR designed to exclude the representative of Nationalist China from the Coun-c i l . It i s interesting to note, as pointed out by Mr. Bebler of Yugoslavia, that five members of the Security Council recognized the Nationalist Gov-ernment and the other five recognized the new government. This would seem to scatter the assertions of some delegates that the demand of the new Chinese Government to be seated was premature. It could scarcely be called premature when the new government was in d_e facto control of the entire mainland of the country and half the members of the Security Council, ex-clusive of course of the Nationalist Chinese themselves, recognized the new Government. In the discussion on the Soviet draft resolution the main arguments in favour of i t were: the new government has de facto control of the mainland of China; the Nationalist Government oan at most represent only Formosa; the new government is the product of a popular revolution; there is a general trend among states to recognize the new government; while i t is kept out the people of China are unrepresented. The mmm\*F&m&. argument adduced against the resolution was that of the United States who simply stated that they s t i l l recognized the Nationalist Government as the legal government of China. The United Kingdom, despite the fact that they rec-ognized the Peking Government contested the resolution as premature. In 6 the voting, however, the resolution was defeated 6 to 3 with 2 abstentions. The Soviet representative then stated that the USSR was leaving the Security Council chamber and would not return un t i l the representative of 7. the Kuomintang had been expelled. 6. S.C.O.R., Fi f t h Year, No. 3, 13 Jan. 1950, p .9. The United States,how-, ever, had^pledged i t s e l f not to veto the seating of the Peking Government i f the majority voted in favour of i t . 7. Ibid, p.10 13? In view of the serious difficulties raised by the question of China's representation in the United Nations, Secretary General Trygve Lie prepared a memorandum on the legal aspects' of representation which he made public on March 8. In his memorandum Lie seeks to establish clearly the difference between recognition by Member states and representation in the United Nations. His argument is: "Legally, recognition is a unilateral act which a country may grant or withhold at will. It is regarded as essentially a political decision... "But while recognition by states is an individual act, Membership and representation in the United Nations are collective acts. The latter i t would appear, cannot be made to depend on prior recognition." °* It is implied in the decision of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948 that lack of diplomatic relations cannot be advanced as a reason for withholding membership. This would apply equally to the case where i t is a question of which government represents a state since a government must be able and willing to carry out the obligations commensurate with membership in the United Nations and as Lie's memorandum states: "The obligations of membership can be carried out only by governments which.in fact possess the power to do so... In essence, this means an in-quiry as to whether the new government exercises effective authority with-in the territory of the state and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population." °* If the government was found to f u l f i l l these necessary conditions then it should be accorded the right to represent the state in the United Nations even though individual members might refuse for reasons of national policy to grant i t recognition. This memorandum of Trygve Lie's drew a vigorous formal protest from Dr. T.F. Tsiang of Nationalist China. He charged that the memorandum was an attack on China's struggle for freedom and against communism and challenged 8. U.N.B., Vol. VIII, No. 7, 1 April 1950, p.311. 9* Loc c i t . 1 3 4 the stability of the Communist Government in China, labelling i t as a 'puppet regime'. Dr. Tsiang addsd a personal protest against Lie's inter-vention in the question. The Secretary General commented in reply "that he was working for a solution based on the collective interests of the United Nations as a whole rather than on the interests of individual Mem-ber s.11 On August 1, Jakov Malik reentered the Council Chamber as the represent-ative of the Soviet'Union despite the fact that the representative of the Nationalist Government s t i l l occupied China's place at the Council table. During the prolonged absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council the Korean conflict had broken out and Soviet-Western tension had soared to new heights. In a dispute over the Security Council agenda the United States bluntly refused to recognize a Soviet contention that the questions of the Korean conflict and the representation of China were in-separably linked. The United States demanded that discussion on the Korean affair take precedence over consideration of Chinese representation. The United Kingdom contended that the Soviet Union was trying to link the questions of Korea and Chinese representation together in order to put pressure oh the members to accept the representatives of the Chinese Com-munist Government. A motion to consider recognition of the Central People's Government as the representative of China failed to obtain a place on the agenda when only five statfes ^ 'supported i t . The fifth session of the General Assembly which met in the autumn of I95O w a B greatly concerned about the question of Chinese representation. Sir Benegal Rau raised the issue on the first day of the fifth session by 10. Ibid, p.312. 11 . India, Norway, USSR, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. 135 introducing a draft resolution to the effect that the Central People's Government should represent China. The dispute was bitter and not by any means strictly on the basis of Communist versus non-Communist states. Dean Acheson asked the Assembly to immediately vote down this resolution and get on with its other work. Sir Benegal Rau ably expounded the case of those favoring the seating of representatives of the new Chinese Govern-ment . He argued that to the best of India's knowledge and information i t was "a sound and stable government" and further added that "It seemed self evident that the Central Government of the People's' Republic was the only Government that could discharge China's duties and obligations under the Charter. It was illogical and inconsistent to demand fulfillment of obligations while denying the rights.". ' There was evident confusion in the minds of some delegates, such as P.C. Spender of Australia, who seemed to regard the question as one of ad-mitting a new member state to the United Nations, whereas there was really no doubt about China's membership, the issue was simply which of two govern-ments was to represent China. Lester Pearson of Canada submitted a draft resolution which proposed that a special committee be established to con-sider the question of Chinese representation and make recommendations* This proposal was eventually adopted. Vyshinsky then gave vent to exasperation and impatience by declaring that "the USSR considered the decision adopted by the Assembly as incorrect and illegal." It is understandable that the USSR should be displeased by what has a l l the appearances of being merely a stalling device. That however does not excuse its practice which has become increasingly common of branding a resolution which is adopted over Soviet opposition as illegal. There is moreover good reason for establishing a special committee to study such an 12. U.N.B., Vol. IX, No. 7, 1 6ct. 1950, p.285, 15. Ibid, p.287. 136 important question as Chinese representation as long as i t is done in good faith and not as a device to postpone a distasteful decision in the hope that something will happen in the meantime to eradicate the need for.dis-placing the Nationalist representatives. The voting on the Indian resolution to admit the Central People's Government holds considerable significance in regard to the whole membership question. The vote was: For 16, Against 33, Abstaining 10. The fir s t thing to note is that no state in the western hemisphere voted for the resolution while 18 of the 33 negative votes were those of American states. Only three European states, Greece, Luxembourg and Belgium, voted against the resolution. But the most interesting thing to note is that only two of the eight states which had been admitted since 1946 voted with the American bloc. ^^*This fact lends weight to the thesis that the Soviet Union has been willing to vote for the admission of states likely to act independently of the United States. Further evidence in this line is provided by a glance at the composition of the vote on the immensely important resolution which branded China as an aggressor. It is well known that the United States used its influence to the limit and exerted tremendous pressure on the member states to obtain their backing on that resolution, yet six of the nine states admitted since 1946 either abstained or voted against the res-olution. Thus i t appears that the USSR has been relatively shrewd in judging the future tendencies of the states which i t has approved for admission. The General Assembly went beyond the particular case of representation of China in discussing a Cuban resolution dealing with general question of representation of a state. The conclusion was finally reached that: 14. U.N.B.,. Vol* IX, No. 7, p.285. 157 "The General Assembly or its Interim Committee should decide 'in the light.of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,' any controversy about the representation of a Member state in the United.Nations." 15» It was the belief that the Assembly as the organ where a l l members had a voice was the best qualified to determine a matter such as this which affected the functioning of the Organization as a whole. It was not inten-ded, however, that an Assembly decision should affect the direct relations of individual member states with the state or government concerned. The Cuban draft resolution listed certain criteria for ascertaining the worth of a government's claim to represent a state. These were: "effective authority over the national territory; general consent of the population; ability and willingness to carry out the purposes of the Charter and to observe and f u l f i l l the international obligations ,of a state and finally respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." Mr."Liu Chieh of China, to whom the question was of especially vital concern, denied that a distinction could be made between recognition of a new regime by the United Nations and recognition by individual member states. He contended that i f the policies of a new regime seemed contrary to the Charter i t should under no circumstances be admitted. Recognition, he urged, should be eschewed as long as an existing government continued to offer resistance. He further argued that the test of effective authority should not be regarded as decisive. This line of argument was obviously advanced to bolster the shaky position of the Nationalist Government in the United Nations. It is man-ifestly absurd for the United Nations to continue to accept representatives of a government, i f that government no longer exercises any authority in the state i t purports to represent. It is therefore logical that the test 15. U.N.B., Vol. IX, No. 12, 15 Dec. 1950, p.734. 16. Loc cit. 138 of effective control should be definitive since only a government actually possessing power is able to carry out the obligations of the United Nations on behalf of that state. Hfhether or not a new government is Communist should not enter into consideration for the United Nations is not an in-strument for the suppression of communism. It is an organization to bring the great conflicting ideologies of our day into constant association and thus enable them to seek a means whereby they can avoid a rupture of the peace. An amendment introduced by Uruguay,though well founded mo rally,could i f adopted have led to very serious problems. It was an attempt to prevent recognition of governments established through the illegal intervention of another state, or in other words 'indirect aggression1. The utter impossib-i l i t y of defining this term makes any suggestion based on i t impractical since the deciding factor would almost invariably be a decision based on political reasons. For example, the United States with its present political attitude would never admit that a communist government, could be established without Russian intervention or at least intrigue. It would also be reason-able to add 'or vice versa' to this statement. Sir Frank Soskice of the United Kingdom advanced the common sense view that: "Legally there could not be two governments in one country and recogni-tion meant that some governmental organ was accepted as wielding authority in fact... The criterion of effective control was objective and coherent. • 17. Other standards such as respect for human rights, willingness to f u l f i l l obligations or consent of the people governed, would only raise sharp dif-ferences of opinion and cause endless controversy. It was illogical for the United Nations having granted membership to prevent the government which 17. U.N.B., Vol. IX, No. 12, 15 Dec. 1950, p.735. 1 59 in fact controlled that state from representing i t . Earnest Gross of the United States rightly stated that i t was impossible to predetermine conditions for every case but raised another point which is at best controversial, that is, he implied that i f two regimes claimed rec-18 ognition and one upheld the United Nations and "the other defied i t " *the one upholding the United Nations would be preferable even though it had no power. This is impractical idealism. The weakness of the argument becomes self-evident i f a hypothetical case is taken in which say three or four of the leading powers in the United Nations had their 'good', or pro-United Nations governments overthrown by 'bad', or anti-United Nations governments. If the United Nations then refused to seat representatives of the new gov-ernments and retained the old ones i t is obvious that its prestige and power would almost certainly collapse. Clearly the United Nations,if i t is to f u l f i l l its purpose,must face reality boldly and accept real not shadow governments. The General Assembly eventually chose to consider each situation as i t arose. This^by far the soundest manner of dealing with such problems. The membership of the:United Nations reached the figure of 60 on Sept-ember 28, 1950 when the General Assembly welcomed L.N. Palar as represent-ative of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia. He expressed the gratitude of the seventy million people of Indonesia to the Security Coun-c i l who had "submerged their differences" to support the applica/tion of . his country. In the Security Council only China had failed to support the application and that was because Indonesia had recognized the Peking Gov-19» eminent but China declined to block the admission.by a veto. The same 18. He was obviously making reference to the Central Peoples Government of China. 19. U.N.B., Vol.IX,.No...8, Dec. 15, .1950,,p.574.. 140 reason that led Ghina to abstain undoubtedly had something to do with the USSR18 decision to give its approval to the application. On the question of the other long standing applications the General Assembly contented itself with recalling the 1949 Resolution, noting that none of the applicants had yet been recommended, and requested the Seourity Council to keep them under consideration. A provocative proposal by El Salvador that the vetoed states be invited to send observers to the Assembly "in order to express their views and furnish information whenever consulted 20 by the delegation of any Member state, u * was rejected. The membership question remained-exactly where i t had been for the past several years with' no new prospect of solution in sight. Up to this point l i t t l e mention has been made of the question of Spanish membership in the United Nations mainly because no application has ever been made by the Spanish Government. It will be recalled that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution which though worded in general terms was aimed specifically at the exclusion of Franco Spain from the United Nations. This resolution was reaffirmed by the Big Three declaration at Potsdam "that they for their part would not favor any application for member-ship put forward by the present Spanish Government, which having been founded with the support of the Axis powers does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership." 21. The first part of the f i r s t session of the General Assembly endorsed these two statements and recommended that members of the United Nations govern their relations with Spain in accordance with the spirit of these statements* 20. U.N.B., Vol. X, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1951. 21. Dept. of State, Bulletin. XIII, p.160. 141 On 4 March 1946 France, the United States, and theUnited Kingdom issued a joint declaration on Spain which stated that they "had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain" but they hoped that "leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may soon find means to bring about 22. a peaceful withdrawal of Franco." 'This timidly idealistic statement amoun-ted to an acceptance of the reactionary chuch-state dictatorship which had been imposed on the people of Spain and for which the three countries had been partly responsible through the criminal farce of non-intervention in the thirties. Strong action against Franco was desired by many states, particularly Poland and the USSR, whose lands had suffered from the depredations of Spanish "volunteers" fighting under Hitler. But the thought of intervention was abhorrent to the United States on the feeble ground that i t might re-vive the c i v i l war in Spain. There could have been no civ i l war with the overwhelming might that the United Nations had at its disposal and Franco could easily have been expelled. However the United States demanded a oourse which in effect protected Franco. Because of the resentment of the USSR to this nefarious policy Sumner Welles could state "in 1946 the policy pur-sued by the United States toward Spain was responsible for the creation of 23. wholly unnecessary threats to world peace." The General Assembly finally passed a resolution that shelved the issue by simply barring Franco Spain from membership in "international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations"' and promising action in the future i f Franco was s t i l l in power, but for the present only recommending the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers. 22. Canada, The United Nations, 1946, Dept. of External Affairs Conference ' * Series, 1946 No. 3,' Ottawa, p.51. 23.' Welles, S., Where Are We-Heading, 'Harper & Bros., New York, 1946,p.355. 24. Canada, The United Nations, 1946, p.53 142 This resolution remained as a general guide to members in their rela-tions with Spain until 195° when,at the instigation of several Latin Ameri-can states,all but the condemnation of Franco was rescinded. This left Spain free to apply for entry into international agencies related to the United Nations.: The new conciliatory policy towards Franco is in part the result of the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance against the spread of commun-ism. The military stategists of the North Atlantio countries apparently regard the cooperation of Spain as a highly desirable factor in their mili-tary planning. Such gains as this may offer, however, would seem to be more than offset by the deleterious effect on public opinion and the consequent scepticism regarding the motives of the Western democracies. It is an easy matter to doubt the sincerity of the members of the United Nations who de-precate the so called People's Democracies of Eastern Europe as police regimes and deny them membership in the United Nations, at the same time as they are attempting to curry favour with a fascist government that only a few years ago was openly assisting the terroristic Nazi war machine against the United Nations. The suspicions of the USSR will not be allayed by statements justify-ing the new policy towards Spain such as the following: "From the start the United States has had serious doubts about the wisdom and efficacy of the 1946 resolution, and our present^ therefore,gc does not represent a change in our past attitude toward these matters." The United Nations had its origins in the great popular struggle against the barbarity of fascism and nazism. The war was won because the masses of the people abhorred the brutality of the nazi-fascist systems sufficiently to put forth a supreme effort that the world might be freed of this menace. 25. Sparkman, J.J., U.S. Supports Membership for Spain, Dept.of State, -Bulletin, No. 1 3 , 1950. 143 For an unexplained reason, probably the fear that communism might take hold in the Iberian Peninsula, the task was stopped short of completion and Franco was left to enjoy the fruits of his evilly attained position. For the United Nations now to seek a rapprochement with such a government is unthinkable if- the Charter is s t i l l to mean anything. Spain must remain an outcasts from theUnited Nations for as long as Franco or his Falange re-main in control of the government. • A large part of the United Nation's influence is derived from its moral power and the appeal of its principles to peace loving people everywhere. The member states who support a policy of conciliation with Franco Spain are betraying the Charter and damaging the prestige of the United Nations for the sake of gaining an ally of dubious value in a policy of containment of communism which itself has no place in the United Nations, CHAPTER X Conclusions The membership crisis in the United Nations is only one facet of the power struggle that plagues contemporary international politics. Two great concentrations of power emerged from the global conflict against what they both regarded as a menace to their security. When the common danger was gone old suspicions and fears which had temporarily been relegated to the background reappeared. This had not been unexpected and one reason for the formation of the United Nations was to prevent misunderstanding and rivalry from leading to another great world conflict. Of the two great states that formed the cores of the power concentra-tions in the post-war world by far the most formidable was the United States. Never in history had one state possessed such tremendous political and economic force, yet that state was clutched by a fear almost amounting to a panic. The basis of this apprehension was the phenomenal spread of a poli-tico-economic doctrine that aimed at the destruction of the capitalist philosophy on which the American economic system is based. It was easy to translate this threat to capitalism into a threat to the whole so called American way of l i f e . Americans, and others of like minds, could not 144 145 believe that peoples of their own free will would choose an economic system alien to the one that had been so bountiful to North America. It was as a consequence natural for them to believe that the growth of this rival theory of economics and government must be receiving its impetus from the machina-tions of some foreign power and that power could only be the Soviet Union which was the stronghold of communism. This belief received apparent confirmation in the aggressive post war policies of the USSR who, distrusting the intentions of a l l other countries, sought to protect its war ravaged borderlands with a cordon of reliable allies. In Russian eyes to be reliable the allies must have governments patterned after that of the USSR and sympathetic to its policies. The pov-erty, turmoil and dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe were such that l i t t l e pressure was needed to obtain the desired results. It is almost certain that even without the urging of the USSR some sort of revolution would have occurred in most of these countries. The same thing can be said even more positively of the Far East. The tremendous upsurge of nationalism among the exploited peoples of the East was not instigated by the Soviet Union but it was not slow to grasp the opportunity to train leaders for the nationalist movements. The revolutions had their basis in the economic, social and political systems which denied to the slowly awakening masses the things which they had a right to claim. However the presence of Soviet trained leaders was enough to convince the United States that the Soviet Union was the cause of the disturbances. The result of this turbulent state of affairs which threatened the established interests of the Western States was the development of the idea that i f the Soviet Union could be curbed then the world might return to normalcy. This myopic view especially took hold in the United States and 146 resulted in a policy of intransigent opposition to the spread of communism and its concomitant Russian influence. The basis for the present day 'cold war' is found in this policy. There is a fundamental difference between the view of the world's i l l s taken by Americans and that of Europeans. Americans fear communism first and foremost and through that fear are apprehensive of the USSR which they regard as its source, while Europeans generally distrust the ambitions of Russia more than they fear communism as a doctrine. This is reflected in the now famous words of Paul Henri Spaak who clearly pointed out one motiva-tion of the policies of Western European states without mentionning commun-ism* He declared: "The Soviet delegate need not look for complicated explanations of our policy. I will t e l l him what is the basis of our policy - in terms, perhaps slightly cruel, but the ones a representative of a small nation uses: Do you know what is the basis of our policy? It is fear of you, fear of your government, fear of your policy." * The states of Western Europe live in dread of Russia but having suf-fered the agonies of total war they cling desperately to the hope of#peace and security offered by the United Nations. However they are torn between two courses: they must have the support of the United States i f they are to remain outside the Soviet orbit, yet they are dismayed by headstrong American policies that seem to be leading to a clash with the Soviet Union. As the tension has mounted they have been forced unwillingly into more un-qualified support of the United States. In resisting this tendency in the United Nations they have been handicapped by the fact that Europe is insuf-ficiently represented whereas the Americas are over-represented by a large and cohesive bloc of votes. This fact is of primary importance for it is chiefly through the United Nations that other states can hope to exert a 1. Canada at the United Nations, 1948, Conference Series, 1948, No. 1, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, p.16. 1 4 7 moderating influence on American policy. By thus easing the anti-communist pressure there is hope of a less intransigent attitude on the part of the USSR. It was chiefly if* the hope of developing a counterbalance to the voting power of the Americas that originally led France to espouse the cause of universality in membership. Though more recently the deterioration intthe international picture and exasperation with the activities of the communist states has forced some modification of France's views. This suggests another factor that has prevented the decisions on ap-plications for membership from being a true reflection of the wishes of individual members. Because of international tension and the demands of power politics, bloc voting has become too common in membership, as well as in other, questions. It is difficult for a state to act on its own indep-endent judgement of the merits of a particular candidate i f it is being subjedted to demands for eonfounity. In the early stages of the admission question there appeared to be some individualism in the decisions, whereas at present in the Security Council a vote on membership is almost invariably decided by nine against two. This is also a reflection of the disappearance of the spirit of compromise. Against the background of Soviet-Western rivalry the membership question is very clearly silhouetted. The Western states refuse to vote for candid-ates supported by the USSR and the USSR vetoes a l l states which i t regards as satellites of either the United States or the United Kingdom. There are at present fourteen states being kept out by one or the other of these two policies. In the opinion of Trygve Lie they should a l l be admitted because "the applicants can in any event reasonably be considered as meeting the 148 requirements of membership." * Both the Western States and the USSR have two standards of admission, a lax one for the candidates they favour and a stringent one for those that the other favours. The USSR vehemently defends the complete independence of the Eastern European states and the Mongolian People's Republic while sneer-ing at the independence of Ceylon and Transjordan. The United States and its supporters on the other hand are willing to overlook the lack of a peace treaty with Austria, the iniquities of the South Korean Government, and the aacpaefeBBfer independence of Transjordan at the same time as they denounce the failure to respect human rights in Eastern Europe and scoff at the in-dependence of the Mongolian People's Republic. Neither side is acting in good faith or in the spirit of the Charter. Abolition of the veto on admission, though desirable, is impractical as long as the principle of one state, one vote is the basis of representa-tion in the General Assembly. The use of the veto on admission has caused much bitter criticism and recrimination. There is some justification in the use of i t by the USSR to prevent an even greater disbalance in membership developing but i f the Soviet Union had avoided using i t there is a l i k e l i -hood that admission of the Communist states would have taken place. In the recent Soviet attitude i t appears to be justified since they are seek-ing a political solution to. the problem through en bloc admission. At the moment this seems to be the only fair basis on which a solution can be achieved. The more lenient interpretation of Article 4 would be justified in present circumstances. The.reason for the American and British refusal to consider the Soviet proposal is quite evident and i t is by no means laudable. They are quite 2 . International Organization, N o v . 1 9 4 9 , Vol. I l l , No.4, p » 7 5 8 . 149 aware that the admission of these states would not significantly reduce the proportion of votes that they can rely on in big issues. What they object to is that to increase the number of communist states in the United Nations is in their view simply to augment the possibilities for obstruction by the Soviet Union and thus make i t less possible to accomplish anything. It would seem that the aim, particularly of the United States, is to keep the opposition in the United Nations as impotent as possible. There is a pathetic refusal to recognize that much of the existing opposition is the direct'result of their own narrow refusal to recognize the virtue of any-one's viewpoint but their own. This same attitude has been in the back-ground of the refusal to seat the Peking Government of China. As one re-porter has said i t would only mean that "a-friendly vote would be supplanted by an enemy one." *^ The use of the word 'enemy' indicates a frame of mind that is incom-patible with harmony in the United Nations. In its overwrought state of tension the United States has been gripped by the dangerous fallacy that a l l Soviet opposition is based on enmity. This hysterical mania has tragi-cally been carried to the point of distrusting friendly states and even the American people themselves. If among the nations friendly to the United States dissent is regarded as disloyalty,and among the American people, crit-icism or disagreement is condemned as being pro-Russian or even treasonable, where thentt is the hope for peace? The United Nations must supply a moderating and pacifying influence but i t cannot do so unless i t represents more closely the realities of the distribution of world power. As i t exists at present the United Nations is too much under the control of the United States to be an effeotive weapon 3. China and the U.N., Commonweal, Oct.6, 1950* 150 for peace. If the members of the United Nations are willing to take any reasonable step to save the world from a catastrophic war, one thing they could do immediately is to admit the countries whose applications have for so long been held up by petty rivalries in the Security Council. This is not a cure-all but the more universal the membership the less influence will be wielded by the usually irresponsible states of Latin America and the more chance the real voice of world opinion will have to make its mark on the discussions of the United Nations. The communist states have as much right as anyone else to be heard and to press for the adoption of their views in the United Nations. They represent a point of view that has an immense following throughout the globe and i t cannot be dispensed with by ignoring i t or trying to stifle 4. i t . There are no irreconcilable differences that could not be settled with patience and good will on both sides and reality dictates that we must seek a solution. There would be no real victor in any global war that might be fought. It is foolish to perpetuate sources of dispute, such as the membership question, which are continual contributors to i l l will and irritation. The solution offered by the Soviet Union irrespective of its motives, is a reasonable basis for an agreement to end the impasse on admission. There remains the question of who is to represent China in the organ-ization. This issue has been complicated by Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict but a solution is not hopeless. There seems to be a grow-ing desire among the members of the United Nations for a political settle-ment of the conflict. If such is the desire it would be immensely f a c i l i -4. Unless of Course the Real Aim of the USSR is World Domination but this Does Not Appear Likely. 151 tated i f the Peking Government were granted the right to take China's seat in the United Nations. It is unreasonable to demand respect for obliga-tions and simultaneously to deny the concomitant rights. The seating of the representatives of Peking would of course raise political as well as legal difficulties since Chinese forces are in conflict with the troops of the United Nations and China has been branded the aggres-sor. There are however excellent reasons to believe that China acted from defensive motives and i f such were the case the condemnation was unjust and should be rectified. The United Nations was created primarily to maintain peace, not to wage war and i f the maintenance of peace is better guaranteed by the presenoe of the Central People's Government representatives in the United Nations then they should be accepted. Their presence would eliminate the present difficulties that are encountered in making contact with the Peking Government and would consequently make the exchange of views much more rapid-and with less danger of misunderstanding. The resolution of the membership difficulties of the United Nations dittifafc-. would help to reduce, though it would not ddaBsdass the troubles that beset the world," That can only happen when cooperation replaces intransigence, reason triumphs over fear, and justice banishes prejudice. These are lofty goals but an approximation to them would be enough to establish peace. APPENDIX APPENDIX I Original Signatories to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 19*+2. The United States ©f America The United Kingdom of Great Br i ta in and Northern Ireland The Union of Soviet Social is t Republics China Australia Belgium Canada Costa Rica Cuba Czechoslovakia Dominican Republic E l Salvador Greece Guatamala H a i t i Honduras India Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Norway Panama Poland South Africa Yugoslavia Later Adherents to the Declaration Mexico, June 5, 19*+2 The Philippines, June 10, 19^2 Ethiopia, July 28, 19k2 Iraq, January 16, 19H-3 B r a z i l , February 8, 19-+3 Iran, September 10, 19-+3 Colombia, December 22, 19-+3 Liber ia , February 26, 19-*+^ France, December 26, 19Mf Ecuador, February 7, 19-+5 Peru, February 11, 19hp Chile , February 12, 19H-5 Paraguay, February 12, 19^5 Venezuela, February 16, 19H-5 Uruguay, February 23, 19*4-5 Turkey, February 2*f, 19^-5 Egypt, February 27, 19^5 Saudi Arabia, March 1, 19^5 Original Members of the League of Nations Belgium Bol iv ia B r a z i l B r i t i s h Empire Canada Australia South Africa New Zealand India China Cuba France Greece Guatamala H a i t i Honduras Italy Japan Liberia Nicaragua Panama Peru Poland Portugal Roumania Yugoslavia Siam Czechoslovakia Uruguay States Invited to Accede to the Covenant Argentine Republic Chile Colombia Denmark Netherlands Norway Paraguay Persia Salvador Spain Sweden Switzerland Venezuela States Admitted to Membership Afghanistan Germany Albania 1« Hungary Austria Iraq Bulgaria Ir ish Free State Costa Rica Latvia Dominican Republic Lithuania Ecuador Luxembourg Egypt Mexico Estonia Turkey Ethiopia USSR Finland Withdrawals and Expulsion from Membership in the League B r a z i l Nicaragua Chile Paraguay Costa Rica Peru Germany Roumania Guatamala Salvador Honduras Spain Hungary USSR Italy Venezuela Japan 1. The German Government informed the League on March 18, 1938, that Austria ceased to be a member owing to the joining of Austria to the Reich. Members S t i l l in the League Afghanistan Albania Argentina Austral ia Belgium Bol iv ia Bulgaria Canada China Colombia Cuba •-, Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt Eire Estonia Ethiopia Finland. France •L* Greece H a i t i India of Nations as of June* 26, 19*+5 Iran Iraq Latvia Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Panama Poland Portugal South Afr ica Sweden Switzerland Thailand Turkey United Kingdom Uruguay Yugoslavia 1. Admiral Darlan sent a telegram of withdrawal on A p r i l 19, 19*fl« General de Gaulle on A p r i l 16, 19^3, in a telegram to the Secretary-General declared that the not i f icat ion " made under foreign pressure can have no effect and that consequently France continues to be a member of the League." APPENDIX II Text of the Invitation to the San Francisco Conference The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of i t s e l f and the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Br i ta in and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Social ist Republics, and the Republic of China, invites the Govern-ment (name of Government inserted here) to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on A p r i l 25, 19^5» at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. The above named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: C. VOTING 1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should bd made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on a l l other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting. Further information as to arrangements w i l l be trans-mitted subsequently. In the event that the Government of (name of Government invited was inserted here) desires in advance ©f the Conference to present views or comments con-cerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America w i l l be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments, APPENDIX III Amendments Submitted on Chapter III (Membership) AUSTRALIA 1. Membership of the United Nations s h a l l be open to any-state which accepts the obligations of this Charter and which i s admitted to membership i n accordance with the Charter. BOLIVIA 1. Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l sovereign states. States Which are not at the moment members of the Organization shal l be able to enter i t by means of a formal undertaking to respect the principles , purposes, and duties contained in the Charter, to repudiate the use of force as an instrument of national pol icy, and t© comply with the special conditions set by the Organization for their admission. BRAZIL 1. The International Organization shall be composed of a l l sovereign.states that now exist ©r which in the future may exist under their own independent conditions of l i f e . 2. No state may be expelled from the Organization or voluntari ly withdraw from i t . CHILE 1. Membership should be open to a l l states that love peace and the democratic system. COSTA RICA The establishment of this Organization on a universal basis of such a kind that every state, by reason of i t s being a state, would be a member of i t , must be considered a f i n a l objective tather than a rea l i ty which can be achieved immed-iate ly . Only on this basis can the community of a l l peoples be established, with an appropriate structure and with means of controlling the infractions of the norms accepted by a l l which may be committed by i t s members. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC That the general character of the Organization be expressed in the most specif ic manner, and that for this purpose a l l states be invited to participate in the estab-lishment and functioning of the Organization, except for a special system that would temporarily apply to present enemy states. ECUADOR 1. The members of the Organization are those states which have subscribed without any reservation the present Charter and have subsequently r a t i f i e d i t . A l l the present sovereign states of the world or those which may subsequently become so, shal l have the power to apply for admission as members of the Organization and shall be admitted i n effect i f they possess the qualifications and f i l l the requirements which shall be determined i n due course by a vote of two thirds of the General Assembly. 2. No member state shal l be expelled from the Organization or may voluntarily withdraw therefrom. EGYPT The tendency should be to make the Organization include i n due time a l l the members of the community of nations. This aim cannot materialize at present, but i t would be suitable to avoid a l l provisions referring to a l imitat ion i n membership for the future, as well as any disposition aiming at expulsion of members. FRANCE 1. Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l peace-loving states which give proof of i t by their inst i tutions, their international behavior, and the effective guarantees which they furnifth that they w i l l respect their international obligations. . Participation in the Organization implies obligations which are incompatible with the status of neutrality. GUATAMALA This"Delegation thinks that the Organization contemplated would stand on a firmer basis i f i t were given absolute universality* in such wise that every state should by the very fact of i t s being such be included as a member. The Organization would thereby embrace the whole international community. MEXICO 1. Membership of the Organisation should be open to a l l peace-loving states and the tendency should be to make the Organization, i n due course, include a l l the members of the community of nations, without any state being lawfully entitled to remain outside the Organization. NETHERLANDS 1. Membership of the Organisation should be open to a l l peace-loving states which may be expected on account of their institutions and by their international behaviour fa i thful ly to observe and carry out international commitments. NORWAY 1. Membership of the Organization should be open to a l l peace-loving states whose governments can be re l i ed upon to work i n harmony with the purposes and principles of the Organization. PHILLIPPINE COMMONWEALTH The members of the Organization should be: 1. The or ig inal signatories to this Charter; 2. Any other peace-loving and law-biding nation which may hereafter be admitted in accordance with the provisions of this Charter. URUGUAY 1. A l l the nations participating in the Conference of San Francisco shal l be permanent members of the Organisation; they shal l undertake to be supporters of world peace, in internal systems of law and freedom which implement justice. 2. The universality and permanence of the Organization prevent withdrawal from i t , and require that i t be considered as being integrated by the other nations, whose status as members shal l be held suspended u n t i l the Assembly considers that they are in a position to act within the Organization. VENEZUELA The draft does not c lar i fy nor determine the concept of a state, nor does i t speak of dominions, colonies, etc. A certain number of semi-independent nations w i l l certainly try to enter the institution^ for which reason i t i s to be foreseen that the controversy w i l l be renewed, in virtue of the p o l i t i c a l interests at stake. The determination whether a nation i s or i s not a state in the sense of the draft, i f the indeterminate form therein adopted subsists, must be the duty of the Assembly, expressly. Amendments Submitted on Chapter V. Section B. Paragraph 2. AUSTRALIA 2. The General Assembly may admit new members to the United Nations; provided that the General Assembly shal l not, without the recommendation of the* Security Council, admit to membership a state which,' at any time since- September 1, 1939, has been at war with any member of the United Nations. ECUADOR 2, The General Assembly shal l determine, at a time which i t may consider proper, the qualifications and conditions to be required of sovereign states which are not members of the Organization for admission to membership, and i t i s empowered to pass on such admissions, requiring i n either case a majority of two thirds of the votes of the Assembly. EGYPT 2. The General Assembly shal l be empowered, after taking the advice of the Security Council, to admit new members to the Organization. MEXICO 2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization on i t s own in i t ia t ive or upon recommendation of the Security Council, although in the f i r s t of these two cases the Security Council should, during the f i r s t eight years of the l i f e of the Organization, have the right to veto the admission of a new member by the unanimous vote of i t s semi-permanent members. NEW ZEALAND 2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization. PARAGUAY The Assembly, i n whieh representatives of a l l peace-loving nations of the world may have seats, is not competent even to admit to Its membership another nation without the recommendation of the Council. This unbalance of powers could be corrected in such a way as to satisfy the feelings and the authority of the nations represented in the Assembly with the preferential status accorded to the Council, as follows: (a) The General Assembly must be the highest authority of the Association and, therefore, i t s competence must not be l imited by reason of the nature of the questions. URUGUAY 2. The General Assembly shal l be empowered to admit new members to the Organization upon recommendation of the Security Council and to promote such recommendations. VENEZUELA The Assembly is deprived of any in i t ia t ive for admitting new members and, apparently, i t would have lef t only the power to veto the proposal of a new member recommended by that body. The tradit ional and invariable rule i n this kind of organization has been that the admission of members belongs exclusively to the deliberative body or General Assembly and this Is natural and log ica l . This was done in the League of Nations. The suppression of the in i t ia t ive of the Assembly and i t s subordination to the recommendation of the Security Council seems, consequently, an unnecessary or unsuitable mutilation of the powers of the former. APPENDIX IV CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHAPTER II / MEMBERSHIP Article 3 The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 19^2, sign the present Charter and r a t i f y i t in accordance with Article 110. Article h 1. Membership i n the United Nations i s open to a l l other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present eharter, and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations w i l l be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Article 5 A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. .The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council. Article 6 A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the pfinciples contained i n the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. APPENDIX V Provisional Rules of Procedure for the Security Council X Admission of New Members of the United Nations Rule 2£ Any state which desires to become a Member of the United Nations shal l submit an application to the Secretary-General. This application shal l be accompanied by a declaration of i t s readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. The application for membership in the United Nations shal l be placed by the Secretary-General before the Security Council, whieh s h a l l decide whether in i t s judgement the applicant i s a peace-loving state and i s able and wi l l ing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Should the Security Council decide to recommend the applicant state for membership in the United Nations, this recommendation shal l be placed before the General Assembly by the Secretary-General. Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General Assembly XVII Admission of Sew Members to the United Nations Rule 10^ Any state which desires to become a Member of the United Nations snai l submit an application to the Secretary-General. This application shal l be accompanied by a declaration of i t s readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. Rule 105 If the applicant state so requests, the Secretary-General shall. inform the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations i f the General Assembly i s not in session, of the application. Rule 106 If the Security Council recommends the applicant state for membership, the General Assembly shal l consider whether the applicant i s a peace-loving state and i s able and wi l l ing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and shal l decide, by a two thirds majority of the members present and voting, upon i t s application for membership. Rule 26 Rule Rule 107 The Secretary-General shal l inform the applicant state of the decision of the General Assembly i f the application is approved, membership w i l l become effective on the date on which the applicant state presents to the Secretary-General an instrument of adherence. Provisional Rules of Procedure Adopted on the Admission of New Members. November 21, 19-^ 7 General Assembly New Rule 113 Any state which desires to become a Member of the United Nations shal l submit an application to the Secretary-General. This application shal l contain a declaration, made in a formal instrument, that i t accepts the obligations contained in the Charter. New Rule l l h The Secretary-General shal l send for information a copy of the application to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations i f the General Assembly i s not in session. New Rule 116 If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, the General Assembly may, after f u l l consideration of the special report of the Security Council, send back the application to the Security Council, together with a f u l l re -cord of the discussion in the Assembly, for further consider-ation and recommendation or report. New Rule 117 The Secretary-General shal l inform the applicant state of the decision of the General Assembly. If the application is approved, membership w i l l beeome effective on the date on which the General Assembly takes i t s decision on the applica-t ion. New Rules of Procedure Adopted by the Security Council New Rule 58 Any State which desires to become a Member of the United Nations s h a l l submit an application to the Secretary-General. This a p p l i c a t i o n s h a l l contain a declaration that i t w i l l accept the obligations contained i n the Charter. Rule 21 The Secretary-General s h a l l immediately place the applica-t i o n for membership before the representatives on the Security Council. Unless the Security Council decides otherwise, the gpplicat i o n s h a l l be referred by the President to a committee of the Security Council upon which each member of the Security Council s h a l l be represented. The committee s h a l l examine any appl i c a t i o n referred to i t and report i t s conclusions thereon to the Council not les s than t h i r t y - f i v e days i n advance of a regular session of the General Assembly or, i f a s p e c i a l session of the General Assembly i s c a l l e d , not les s than fourteen days i n advance of such session. New Rule 60 The Security Council s h a l l decide whether i n Its judgement the applicant i s a peace-loving Sfrate and i s able and w i l l i n g to carry out the obligations contained i n the Charter, and accordingly whether to recommend the a ; j l i c a n t State for member-ship. I f the Security Council recommends the applicant State for membership, i t a h a l l forward to the General Assembly the recommendation with a complete record of the discussion. If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State.for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, i t s h a l l submit a s p e c i a l report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion. In order to ensure the consideration at the next session of the General Assembly following the receipt of the application, the Security Council s h a l l make i t s recommendation not less than twenty-five days i n advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, nor less than four days i n advance of a special session. iM s p e c i a l circumstances, the Security Council may decide to make a recommendation to the General Assembly concerning an appl i c a t i o n for membership subsequent to the expiration of the time l i m i t s set f o r t h i n the preceding paragraph. APPENDIX VI Record of Voting on Admission of New Members i n the Security Council ALBANIA F i r s t Vote - August 29, 19-+6 FOR: (5) B r a z i l , France, Mexico, Poland, USSR* AGAINST: (3) Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States ABSTAINING: (3) A u s t r a l i a , China, Egypt Second Vote - August 18, 19-+7 FOR: (3) Poland, Syria, USSR AGAINST: (*f) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, United Kingdom, United States ABSTAINING: («•+) B r a z i l , China, Colombia, France Third Vote - September 15* 19-+9 FOR: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Canada ABSTAINING: (8) Argentina, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, . Norway, United Kingdom, United States MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC . F i r s t Vote - August 29% 19-+6 FOR: (6) B r a z i l , China, France, Mexico, Poland - . USSR AGAINST: (3) Netherlands, United Kingdom, United Sfcates ABSTAINING: (2) Egypt, A u s t r a l i a ge6ond Vote - August 18. 19*f7 FOR: (3) Poland, Syria, USSR AGAINST: (3) China, United Kingdom, United States ABSTAINING: (5) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , Colombia . France Third Vote - September 15% 19-+9 FOR: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (2) Canada, China ABSTAINING: (7) Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway . UNited Kingdom, United States TRANSJORDAN F i r s t Vote - August 29« 19^6 FOR: (8) B r a z i l , China, Egypt, France, Mexico Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Poland ABSTAINING: (1) A u s t r a l i a Second Vote - August 18. 19^7 FOR: (9) Austral ia , Belgium. B r a z i l , China, @olombia France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (1) USSR ABSTAINING: (1) Poland Third Vote - September 13. l9*f9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt . France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR IRELAND F i r s t Vote - August 29.19^6 FOR: (9) B r a z i l , China, Egypt, France, Mexico Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom United States AGAINST: (1) USSR ABSTAINING: (1) Au s t r a l i a Second. Vote - August 18. 19^7 FOR: (9) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, - Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom United States AGAINST: (1) USSR ABSTAINING: (1) Poland Third Vote - September 13, 19*4-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR PORTUGAL F i r s t Vote - August 29, 19*4-6. FOR: (8) B r a z i l , China, Egypt, France, Mexico Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Poland ABSTAINING: (1) Aust r a l i a Second Vote - August 18, 19*4-7 FOR: (9) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, Colombia France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Poland Third Vote - September 13, 19*4-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR AFGHANISTAN Recommended August 29, 19*4-6 FOR: (10) ABSTAINING: (1) Aus t r a l i a ICELAND Recommended August 29, 19*4-6 FOR: (10) ABSTAINING: (1) A u s t r a l i a SWEDES! Recommended August 29, 19*4-6 FOR: (10) ABSTAINING: (1)- A u s t r a l i a SIAM Unanimously Recommended December 12, 19*4-6 YEMEN Unanimously Recommended August, 18, 19*4-7 PAKISTAN Unanimously Recommended August 18, 191+7 HUNGARY F i r s t Vote - August 21. 19-4-7 FOR: (1) Syria AGAINST: (1) United States ABSTAINING: (9) Austral ia, Belgium, B r a z i l , China, Colombia, France, Poland, United Kingdom USSR Second Vote - October 1. 19^7 FOR: (5) Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, USSR ABSTAINING: (6) Austral ia , Belgium, B r a z i l , China .. , United Kingdom, United States Third Vote - September 15% 19-+9 FOR: (3) Egypt, USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Canada ABSTAINING: (7) Argentina, China, Cuba, France,Norway, United Kingdom, United States ROUMANIA F i r s t Vote - August 21. 19-+7 FOR: (1) Syria AGAINST: (0) ABSTAINING: (10) Austral ia , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, . Colombia, France, Poland, United Kingdom United States, USSR Second Vote - October 1. 19-H-7 FOR: (M-) China, Colombia, France, Syria AGAINST: (0) „ ^ a ABSTAINING: (7) Austral ia , Belgium, B r a z i l , Poland, USSR* . . United Kingdom, United States Third Vote - September 15. 19-M-9 FOR: (30> Egypt, USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Canada ABSTAINING: (7) Argentina, Cuba, China, France, Norway, . . . . - - United Kingdom, United States 1.Poland and the USSR abstained because Hungary not recommended. BULGARIA F i r s t Vote - August 21, 19*4-7 FOR: (1) Syria AGAINST: (1) United States ABSTAINING: (9) Au s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, Colombia, France, Poland, United Kingdom, USSR Second Vote - October 1, 19*4-7 FOR: (1) Syria AGAINST: (3) Belgium, France, United Kingdom ABSTAINING: (?) A u s t r a l i a , Brazil,China,- Colombia Poland, United States, USSR^ Third Vote - September 15, 19*4-9 FOR: (3) Egypt, USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Canada ABSTAINING: (7) Argentina, China, Cuba, France, Norway, . . United Kingdom, United States ITALY F i r s t Vote - August 21. 19*4-7 FOR: (9) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, . Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom United States AGAINST: (1) USSR ABSTAINING: (1) Poland Second Vote - October 1.19*4-7 FOR: (9) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China,Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, UNited States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Poland Third Vote - A p r i l 10. 19*43 FOR: (9) Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR Fourth Vote - September 13. 19*4-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt,France. Norway, United Kingdom, United States 2. See Note on Previous Page AUSTRIA F i r s t Vote - August 21. 19-M-7 FOR: (8) A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, Colombia, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (1) "USSR ABSTAINING: (2) France, Poland Second Vote - September 13% 19-+9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt . France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR FINLAND F i r s t Vote - October 1. 19-4-7 FOR: (9) Au s t r a l i a , Belgium, B r a z i l , China, - Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States ASA INST: (2) USSR, Poland Second Vote - September 13. 194-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR BURMA Recommended A p r i l 10, 19^ 8 FOR: (10) ABSTAINING: (1) Argentina CEYLON F i r s t Vote - August 18. 19-+8 FOR: (9) Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR CEYLON Second Vote - December. 15* 19^Q FOR: (9) Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR,,Ukrainian SSR Third Vote - September 13. 19*4-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR People's DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA Vote on February 16. 19*4-9 FOR: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (8) Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States ABSTAINING: (1) Argentina Israel F i r s t Vote - December 17. 19*4-8 FOR: (5) Argentina, Colombia, United States, USSR Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Syria ABSTAINING: (5) Belgium, Canada, China, France, United Kingdom Second Vote - March *f, 19*4-9 Recommended FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, France Norway, United States, USSR, Ukrainian SSR AGAINST: (1) Egypt ABSTAINING: (1) United Kingdom REPUBLIC OF KOREA Vote A p r i l 8. 19*4-9 FOR: (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR NEPAL Vote September 7.19-+9 POR: x (9) Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States AGAINST: (2) USSR, Ukrainian SSR INDONESIA Recommended September 26,1950 FOR: (10) Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, United Kingdom, United States USSR, Yugoslavia ABSTAINIBG: (1) China BIBLIOGRAPHY Documents: United Nations Conference on International Organization (Documents) United Nations Information Organization, New York 1945, Vols. 1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,14,15. , United Nations Documents 1941-45, Royal Institute of . International Affairs, London, 1946, The United Nations in the Making, Basic Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, .1945 Goodrich L.M., & Carrol M.J, Documents on American Foreign Relations 1944-45, World Peace Foundation, Vol.VII, 1947-Dennett R. & Turner, R.K., Documents on American Foreign .Relations 1947. World Peace Foundation Vol. IX 1949. International Court of Justice, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations 1948, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Annual Reports of the Secretary-General for the years 1946 (Doc A/65 Supplement 1 First Session); 1947 (Doc A/515 Sup-plement 1, Second Session); 1948 (Doc A/565 Supplement 1 Third Session) 1949 (A/950 Supplement, Fourth Session) Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, Vols.I & II - General Assembly Official Records, 4th Session, Sup-plement No. 9 (A/936), Lake Success, 1949. Security Council, Official Records of Proceedings, From 1946 to 1950. General Assembly, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Second, Third and Fourth Sessions. (1947, 1948 and 1949). Official Summaries of Meetings of First (Political) Committee 1946, 47 and Ad Hoc Political Committee - 1948 & 1949. Official Records Sixth (Legal) Committee, Second Session of the General Assembly 1947. Government Publications Canada: Debates, House of Commons, Sixth Session, Nineteenth Parliament I945 and First Session, Twentieth Parliament 1945, Debates, Senate, Sixth Session Nineteenth Parliament 1945» First Session Twentieth Parliament 1945, 1 2 Report on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Conference Series 19*45 N o * 2, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1945. Report on the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Conference Series No, 1, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1946. The United Nations 1946, Conference Series 1946 No. 5 Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1946. Canada at the United Nations 1947, Conference Series 1947 No. .1, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1948. Canada and the United Nations 1948, Conference Series 1948 No. 1, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1949. Canada and the United Nations 1949, Conference Series 1949 No. 1, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1950. External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin of the Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, from Jan. }., 1949 up to date. United Kingdom: Debates, House of Commons, Vols. 409, 409, 410, 413, 427, 438, 439, 440, 459, 461, 463. Debates, House of Lords, Vol 135 Tenth Session Thirty-Seventh Parliament: Vol.137 First Session Thirty-eighth Parliament. A Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Se««i.6571. 1944. United States: Congressional Record. From 79th Congress 1st Session 1945 to 8lst Congress 2nd Session 1950. - United States Participation in the United Nations, Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1949; Dept. of State Publication 3765. Department of State Bulletin, Division of Research & Pub-lication. Issues used: From Feb.13, 1945 to Nov.13, 1950. Books. Arne, Sigrid, U.N. Primer, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1948. Bentwich N. & Martin, A., Commentary on-the Charter of the U.N. Routledge & Kegan Paul London 1950. Byrnes, J.F. Speaking Frankly Harper & Bros., New York, 1947. 3 Dulles, J.F., War or Peace, Macmillan, New York 195°' Evatt, H.V., The Task of Nations, Duell Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1949. Goodrich, L.M., & Hambro-, E., Charter of the U.N. Commentary & Docs., World Peace Foundation. Boston, 1940. Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Macmillan, New York, 1948, Vol.11. Leahy, W.D., I Was There, McGraw H i l l , New York, 1950' Roeenman, S.I. (comp) Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harper & Bros. New York, 1944-45, Vol. 1950' Sherwood, R.E., Roosevelt & Hopkins, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1948. Stettinius, E.R. Jr., Roosevelt & the Russians, Doubleday, New York, 1949. Welles, Sumner, Where are We Heading, Harper and Bros., New York, 1946. Periodicals Anonymous, China and the U.N., Commonweal, October 6, 1950. Anonymous, U.N. Nears Decision on China, Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXIX., No.45, Sept. 29, 1950. Anonymous, Fluding Meadows and Peking, Economist, Vol.157, October 1, 1940. Anonymous, Russia, China and U.N.O., Economist, Vol 158, March 18, 1950. Anonymous, Will U.N. Members Follow U.S. on China Policy, Foreign Policy Bulletin,Vol.XXX, No.16, Jan.26/51. Aufricht, H, Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organizations, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 4?, 1949. Bailey!*: S.D. The Path to Self-Government in Ceylon, World Affairs, Stevens &, Sons, London, Vol.5, 1949. Davis, M.W. United Nations Charter, Development & Text, International Conciliation, No, 413, September 1945* -del Vayo, J. Alvarez, - The Vote on China, Nation, Sept.50, 1950 4 del Vayo, J. Alvarez, - Mao's Counter Proposal, Nation January 25, 1951 del Vayo, J. Alvarez, - Return to Diplomacy, Nation February J, 1951 Dennett, R., Politics in the Security Council, International Organization Vol 3, .1949. "~ Dulles, A.W. and Lamb, B.P., The United Nations, Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association., No. 59, Sept.-Oct. 1946. Eagleton, C, Covenant of the League of Nations and Charter of the United Nations, Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, Aug. .19,1945. Editorial, Veto, Forum, Vol.107, Jan.1947. Editorial, Procedure for Peace, New Republic Vol.115, October 28, 1946. Editorial, United Nations Membership Dispute, New Republic Vol.115, Sept.2, 1946. FouqWes - Duparc, Jacques, A Buopean Point of View on the United Nations, International Conciliation, No.445, Sept.1948. Fraser, Blair, Steam Roller at San Francisco, Macleans, V0I58, June 1,1945. Hamilton, T.J., & Dean V.M. Report on the United Nations, Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, No. 75 May - June, 1949* Hull, C. & Stettinius, E.R., Statements by Sec, of State Hull & Under Sec. of State Stettinius, International Conciliation, No.405, Nov., 1944. Humber, P.O., Admission to the United Nations;, Br. Yearbook of International Law, Oxford University Press, Toronto 1947* Jennings, W.I., The Dominion of Ceylon Pacific Affairs, Vol22, Mar.1949, Jessup, P.C., The Chinese Situation in the United Nations, Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol.21, Dec.12, 1949. Kelsen, H. Membership in the United Nations.Columbia Law Review, Vol.46, May 1946. Klooz, M.S., The Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Admission of MembBrs. American Journal of International Law, Vol.43, 1949. Laing, L.H., Admission of Indian states to the United Nations, American Journal of International Law, Vol.43, 1949. • ~~~~~ Liang, Yuen-li Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 1949. 5 Marshall, G.C., Abuse of the right of unanimity, Vital Speeches, Vol, XIII, Padelford, N.J,, The Use of the Veto, International Organization, Vol,2, 1948. Polanyi, I., The Issues in Hungary, World Affaire, Stevens & Son London, 1949, Vol.3. Potter, P.B., The United Nations Charter and the Covenant of the League of Nations, American Journal .of International .Law, Vol.39, July, I945. Riggs, F.W., United Nations Record Mirrors Fundamental Split on China, Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol.XXX, No. IJ, Feb.2,1951. Sparkman, J.J., United States Supports Resolution for Spain's Membership in the U.N., Dept. of State Bulletin, Nov.13, 1950. Of the following periodicals the latter two are invaluable sources of information, factual details and articles on membership may be found in almost every issue. International Relations, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, No. l.,1947. International Organization, World Peace Foundation, Vols,I,II,III,IV, ~ '. ~Tl947,48,49,50) United Nations Bulletin, Dept. of Public Information, from Vol.1, No. 1, Aug.5, 1946 up to date. This-bibliography though fairly extensive is not intended as a complete l i s t of references on the topic,.it includes only those works actually consulted..
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The history of the membership controversy in the United Nations
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