Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Stewart, David Kenney
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
That leaders are important in Canadian party politics is almost axiomatic: they are the prime electoral resource, the ultimate policy authority and the focus of media attention. Yet little is known of what divides provincial parties when they choose a new master. The politics of provincial leadership conventions lie in uncharted waters. This thesis focuses on provincial parties, exploring support patterns at Maritime leadership conventions. The study draws primarily on data provided by unpublished surveys of delegates to Liberal and Progressive Conservative leadership conventions in the three Maritime provinces. These nine conventions took place between 1971 and 1986 and the delegate survey responses report the behaviour and attitudes of over 3100 party activists. The analysis develops provincial, partisan and secular comparisons. A framework for analysing delegate support patterns is derived from the literature on national conventions and Maritime politics. Application of this framework to the nine conventions reveals a recurring theme. Candidate support is best understood in a 'friends and neighbours' framework. Friends and neighbours refers first, to a non-factional geographic pattern of support. Simply put, delegates tend to support the local candidate, a neighbour. The second element of friends and neighbours support relates to ethno-religious ties. Candidates receive disproportionate support from delegates who are 'friends' in terms of shared religious or ethnic background. Friends and neighbours divisions were more important than attitude, age, gender or differences in social status: they were present throughout the period in each province and both parties. The importance of place and religion/ethnicity provide empirical evidence of Maritime traditionalism. The support patterns would be well understood by 19th century politicians and show no sign of dissipating. Attempts to link these patterns to age or level of education were unsuccessful. Virtually all delegates were influenced by the ties of 'friendship' or 'neighbourhood'. The major exceptions were ex officio delegates. These party professionals acting in a brokerage role were relatively immune from the friends and neighbours pull. By mitigating such divisions, ex officio delegates made substantial contributions to party unity. This thesis reveals a coherent and consistent pattern of intra party divisions in the region. It confirms the strength of traditionalism in the Maritimes and highlights an important manifestation of this traditionalism: ethno religious solidarity undercut by localism and mitigated by brokerage politics. Such findings are in sharp contrast to assertions that Maritime politics is changing.
THE TRADITIONS CONTINUE: LEADERSHIP CHOICES AT MARITIME LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONVENTIONS by DAVID KENNEY STEWART A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1990 ® David Kenney Stewart, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date lHA DE-6 (2/88) i i i Abstract That leaders are important i n Canadian party p o l i t i c s i s almost axiomatic: they are the prime e l e c t o r a l resource, the ultimate p o l i c y authority and the focus of media attention. Yet l i t t l e i s known of what divides p r o v i n c i a l parties when they choose a new master. The p o l i t i c s of p r o v i n c i a l leadership conventions l i e in uncharted waters. This thesis focuses on p r o v i n c i a l parties, exploring support patterns at Maritime leadership conventions. The study draws primarily on data provided by unpublished surveys of delegates to L i b e r a l and Progressive Conservative leadership conventions i n the three Maritime provinces. These nine conventions took place between 1971 and 1986 and the delegate survey responses report the behaviour and attitudes of over 3100 party a c t i v i s t s . The analysis develops p r o v i n c i a l , partisan and secular comparisons. A framework for analysing delegate support patterns i s derived from the l i t e r a t u r e on national conventions and Maritime p o l i t i c s . Application of t h i s framework to the nine conventions reveals a recurring theme. Candidate support i s best understood i n a 'friends and neighbours' framework. Friends and neighbours refers f i r s t , to a non-factional geographic pattern of support. Simply put, delegates tend to support the l o c a l candidate, a neighbour. The second element of friends and neighbours support relates to ethno-r e l i g i o u s t i e s . Candidates receive disproportionate support from delegates who are 'friends' i n terms of shared r e l i g i o u s or ethnic background. Friends and neighbours di v i s i o n s were more important than attitude, age, gender or differences i n s o c i a l status: they were present throughout the period i n each province and both p a r t i e s . The importance of place and r e l i g i o n / e t h n i c i t y provide empirical evidence of Maritime tr a d i t i o n a l i s m . The support patterns would be well understood by 19th century p o l i t i c i a n s and show no sign of d i s s i p a t i n g . Attempts to l i n k these patterns to age or l e v e l of education were unsuccessful. V i r t u a l l y a l l delegates were influenced by the t i e s of 'friendship' or 'neighbourhood'. The major exceptions were ex o f f i c i o delegates. These party professionals acting i n a brokerage role were r e l a t i v e l y immune from the friends and neighbours p u l l . By mitigating such d i v i s i o n s , ex o f f i c i o delegates made substantial contributions to party unity. This thesis reveals a coherent and consistent pattern of i n t r a party d i v i s i o n s i n the region. It confirms the strength of t r a d i t i o n a l i s m i n the Maritimes and highlights an important manifestation of t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l i s m : ethno r e l i g i o u s s o l i d a r i t y undercut by localism and mitigated by brokerage p o l i t i c s . Such findings are i n sharp contrast to assertions that Maritime p o l i t i c s i s changing. i v Acknowledgements I must begin by thanking Marsh Conley and Agar Adamson for making available the data sets on which t h i s thesis i s based. It was very generous and I am deeply g r a t e f u l . I would also l i k e to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the Doctoral Fellowship which supported me for most of the period when the thesis was written. Thanks are due Richard Johnston and Donald Blake for t h e i r support and t h e i r advice which made the thesis much better than i t would otherwise have been. My colleagues i n the Graduate Programme at U.B.C. provided a most congenial environment to work i n and two of them, Jim Bruton and Jim Fergusson were very hel p f u l i n providing advice and c r i t i s m . F i n a l l y , the largest debt of gratitude i s owed to my advisor Ken Carty. My work has benefitted greatly from his insight and advice. His assistance however, went far beyond those parameters and I am profoundly g r a t e f u l . No one could ask for a better advisor. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i i Acknowledgements i v L i s t of Tables v Chapter 1 Maritime P o l i t i c s and Leadership Selection 1 Leadership and Conventions i n Canada 3 The Maritime Leadership Studies 8 Plan of the Study 15 Chapter 2 Patterns of Delegate Support: A Framework for Analysis 19 Region 23 Religion 28 Eth n i c i t y 31 Social Status 33 I n s t i t u t i o n a l Divisions 35 Community Size 39 Attitudes 41 Framework 45 Chapter 3 Maritime Convention Delegates: A P r o f i l e 48 Chapter 4 Prince Edward Island: Divisions at Commuter Conventions 63 Convention Context 68 Geographic Divisions 78 Social Groups 86 Attitudes 106 Discussion I l l Chapter 5 Nova Scotia Conventions: Divisions i n the 'Modern' Maritimes 121 Convention Context 125 Geographic Divisions 131 Social Groups 138 Attitudes 163 v i Discussion 171 Chapter 6 New Brunswick L i b e r a l s : Divisions in a Bipolar Province 182 Convention Context 186 Geographic Divisions 192 Social Groups 200 Attitudes 222 Discussion 228 Chapter 7 Maritime Conventions: The P o l i t i c s of 'Friends and Neighbours 237 Friends 241 Neighbours 250 Friends or Neighbours 25 6 E l i t e s at Maritime Conventions 261 A t t i t u d i n a l Divisions 264 Rural Dominace 266 The Traditions Continue 270 Chapter 8 Friend and Neighbours: Defense and Explanation ... 274 Bibliography 305 v i i L i s t of Tables Table 1-1 Response Rate 12 Table 1-2 Comparison of Reported and Actual Voting... 14 Table 3-1 Selected Delegate Characteristics by Convention 62 Table 4-1 Vote by County (PEI) 81 Table 4-2 Vote by Community Size i n Queens County ... 85 Table 4-3 Vote by Delegate Type (PEI) 88 Table 4-4 Vote by Age (PEI) 8 9 Table 4-5 Vote by Religion (PEI) 92 Table 4-6 Vote by Income (PEI) 93 Table 4-7 Vote by Education (PEI) 93 Table 4-8 Vote by Social Class (PEI) 94 Table 4-9 Cramer's V (PEI) 95 Table 4-10 Index of Religious E f f e c t by Education and Age (PEI) 99 Table 4-11 Vote by Delegate Type Controlling for Religion (PEI) 101 Table 4-12 Index of Neighbourhood Effect by Education and Age (PEI) 106 Table 4-13 Policy Consensus (PEI) 110 Table 4-14 Multiple Regression: Social and Geographic Factors (PEI) 120 Table 5-1 Vote by Region (N.S.) 135 Table 5-2 Vote by Community Size (Halifax area) 137 Table 5-3 Vote by Delegate Type (N.S.) 140 Table 5-4 Vote by Age (N.S.) 141 Table 5-5 Vote by Religion (N.S.) 144 v i i i Table 5-6 Vote by Class, Education and Income(N.S.) .. 147 Table 5-7 Vote by Social Insider Scale (N.S.) 148 Table 5-8 Index of Religious Support by Education and Age (N.S.) 151 Table 5-9 Vote by Delegate Type Controlling for Religion (N.S.) 155 Table 5-10 Cramer's V (N.S.) 156 Table 5-11 Index of Neighbourhood E f f e c t by Education and Age (N.S.) 162 Table 5-12 Policy Consensus (N.S.) 168 Table 5-13 Multiple Regression: Social and Geographic Factors (N.S.) 180,181 Table 6-1 Vote by Region (N.B.) 194 Table 6-2 Vote by area of the province (N.B.) 196 Table 6-3 Vote by Community Size (N.B.) 198 Table 6-4 Vote by Et h n i c i t y (N.B.) 203 Table 6-5 Vote by Language (N.B.) 203 Table 6-6 Vote by Delegate Type (N.B.) 205 Table 6-7 Vote by Gender (N.B.) 207 Table 6-8 Vote by Education (N.B.) 208 Table 6-9 Cramer's V (N.B.) 209 Table 6-10 Index of Ethnic Support by Education and Age (N.B.) 212 Table 6-11 Vote by Delegate Type Controlling for Language (N.B.) 213 Table 6-12 Index of Neighbourhood Eff e c t by Education and Age (N.B.) 218 Table 6-13 Policy Consensus (N.B.) 224 Table 6-14 Multiple Regression: Social and Geographic Table 7-1 Index of F r i e n d s and Neighbours Support 1 Chapter 1 Maritime P o l i t i c s and Leadership S e l e c t i o n Few observers of Maritime p o l i t i c s are unaware of the t r a d i t i o n a l nature of p o l i t i c s i n the r e g i o n . Maritime p o l i t i c s takes place i n the context of a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e with a t r a d i t i o n a l p a r t y system i n which there are few i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s between the major p a r t i e s and where the p a r t y leaders dominate the p o l i t i c a l process. The t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s r e v e a l e d by the l i n g e r i n g impact of r e l i g i o n , the r e l a t i v e e x c l u s i o n of women from prominent p o l i t i c a l r o l e s , low degrees of p o l i t i c a l t r u s t and e f f i c a c y and the p e r s i s t e n c e of patronage. The t r a d i t i o n a l party system i s evidenced by the dominance of L i b e r a l s and Conservatives, the s t r e n g t h and t e n a c i t y of party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the absence of i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s and, concomitantly, by the p e r s i s t e n c e of p r i m o r d i a l t i e s of r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r i n g p o l i t i c a l management. Such management in c l u d e s t i c k e t b a l a n c i n g on PEI, e l i t e e t h n i c accommodation i n New Brunswick and r e l i g i o u s a l t e r n a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p i n Nova S c o t i a . The dominant p o s i t i o n of the p a r t y leader provides strong evidence of both the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and party system. As Adamson put i t "the p o s i t i o n of the p a r t y leader i s more pronounced i n A t l a n t i c Canada than i n other p r o v i n c e s " (1987: 222). This argument i s b o l s t e r e d by Aucoin's c l a i m t h a t i n Nova S c o t i a "the p a r t y leader tends to p e r s o n i f y the p a r t y f o r the e l e c t o r a t e " (1972: 27) and Aunger's contention t h a t i n New Brunswick " a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n each p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i s c e n t r a l i z e d i n the parliamentary leader. I t i s he who has the f i n a l word i n the determination of p o l i c y and the s e l e c t i o n of candidates" (1981: 162) . Very few d i s c u s s i o n s of Maritime p o l i t i c s , i t s t r a d i t i o n a l i s m and the s p e c i a l r o l e of leaders are based on systematic e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , p a r t l y because there are few e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s of the r e g i o n a v a i l a b l e . This t h e s i s begins to remedy t h i s d e f i c i e n c y . I t examines Maritime p o l i t i c s by studying p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as they are i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r most important f u n c t i o n : l e a d e r s h i p s e l e c t i o n . Leadership conventions are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Canadian p o l i t i c s and t h i s t h e s i s argues t h a t Maritime l e a d e r s h i p conventions are best understood i n the context of ' f r i e n d s and neighbours' p o l i t i c s . Leadership choice at these gatherings i s i n f l u e n c e d h e a v i l y by l o c a l i s m . Delegates g i v e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support to a candidate from t h e i r own area. They a l s o provide r e l a t i v e l y high l e v e l s of support t o candidates who share t h e i r r e l i g i o u s or e t h n i c background. The support p a t t e r n s are c o n s i s t e n t across p a r t i s a n and p r o v i n c i a l l i n e s and among v i r t u a l l y a l l delegate groups. The brokerage p o l i t i c s of ' e x - o f f i c i o ' delegates however, somewhat counterbalances these tendencies. The convention support p a t t e r n s provide strong e m p i r i c a l evidence of the t r a d i t i o n a l i s m of Maritime p o l i t i c s and stand i n sharp c o n t r a s t to claims t h a t Maritime p o l i t i c s i s changing. 3 L e a d e r s h i p a n d C o n v e n t i o n s i n C a n a d a T h a t l e a d e r s h i p i s i m p o r t a n t i n t h e C a n a d i a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m a p p r o a c h e s g o s p e l . S t u d i e s o f v o t i n g c h o i c e , i n f l u e n c e i n p a r l i a m e n t , p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e , p o l i c y m a k i n g a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g — n o t t o m e n t i o n t h e m e d i a — a l l p o i n t t o t h e c o n t i n u e d , i f n o t i n c r e a s i n g , i m p o r t a n c e o f l e a d e r s . G o l d f a r b a n d A x w o r t h y a r g u e t h a t "When C a n a d i a n s t h i n k a b o u t p o l i t i c s , . l e a d e r s h i p d o m i n a t e s t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e s . F o r most C a n a d i a n s t h e l e a d e r i s t h e p a r t y " ( 1 9 8 8 : i x ) . S i m i l a r l y , F l o r a M a c d o n a l d w a r n s t h a t p a r t i e s a r e b e i n g r e d u c e d t o v e h i c l e s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f l e a d e r s . The p r o c e s s o f s e l e c t i n g a l e a d e r u s e d t o be a c c o m p a n i e d b y p a r t y d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t h e f u t u r e p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n o f t h e p a r t y . T h i s i s no l o n g e r t h e c a s e . The L i b e r a l s a n d C o n s e r v a t i v e s h a v e e x p l i c i t l y s e p a r a t e d p o l i c y a n d l e a d e r s h i p c o n v e n t i o n s a n d now, a s C a r t y p u t i t , " p a r t i e s c h o o s e l e a d e r s i n t h e hope t h a t t h e y w i l l g i v e t h e m new p o l i c i e s a n d a new p e r s o n a " ( 1 9 8 8 : 7 3 , 7 4 ) . T h i s i s n o t j u s t a C a n a d i a n t r e n d . I n 1 9 7 1 Ranney n o t e d t h a t a " p a r t y ' s k e y a c t i v i t y i s ... s e l e c t i n g c a n d i d a t e s a n d n o m i n a t i n g f o r p u b l i c o f f i c e " ( 3 1 7 ) . I n d e e d , one may s p e c u l a t e on w h e t h e r i t makes s e n s e t o t h i n k o f p a r t i e s a s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e i r l e a d e r s . I n C o u r t n e y ' s w o r d s " p a r t i e s i n C a n a d a h a v e become t h e i r l e a d e r s ' w r i t l a r g e ' h a v i n g t a k e n o n, a s i t w e re t h e p e r s o n a l i t y o f t h e i r l e a d e r s " ( 1 9 8 8 : 2 0 1 ) . G o l d f a r b a n d A x w o r t h y o f f e r some r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f l e a d e r s . "Any l e a d e r o f a modern p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i s i n a commanding p o s i t i o n . As t h e c h i e f c o m m u n i c a t o r o f t h e p a r t y i n an e l e c t r o n i c a g e , t h e l e a d e r becomes t h e f o c u s o f u n r i v a l l e d 4 attention. This single minded concentration on personality gives a successful leader maximum leverage to define the agenda and set the course" (1988: 3) . S i n c l a i r Stevens made the same point, arguing "Although a leader i s by no means the sole element i n a party's e l e c t o r a l success or f a i l u r e , i n the age of media-dominated p o l i t i c s he or she has come to be an important component" (1984: 117). Moreover, Mackenzie King silenced caucus c r i t i c i s m by noting that he did not owe his p o s i t i o n to them but to the wider party. His se l e c t i o n by convention gave him extra authority over the caucus (Lederle, 1947: 8 6). More recently John Turner was able to remain as leader despite the h o s t i l i t y of a good portion of his caucus. The choice of a leader i s obviously very important both for a party and the p o l i t y : not only i s the leader i n a p o s i t i o n of dominance but who i s chosen may also have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the subsequent p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n or health of the country/province and the party. For instance, the se l e c t i o n of Pierre Trudeau over Robert Winters i n 1968 had profound implications for the d i r e c t i o n of the country over the subsequent twenty year period. Si m i l a r l y , i n 1984, choosing John Turner rather than Jean Chretien may have had major e l e c t o r a l consequences for the L i b e r a l party. As a f i n a l example, the choice of Frank M i l l e r as leader of the Ontario Conservatives i n 1985 may have been responsible for the demise of one of the longest p o l i t i c a l dynasties i n Canadian history. What divides p o l i t i c a l p arties when they make these important 5 choices thus becomes an important and i n t e r e s t i n g question for p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . Leadership conventions provide an opportunity to observe p o t e n t i a l leaders as they attempt to b u i l d c o a l i t i o n s . A convention also, as Carty put i t , "opens a window into a party to reveal i t s inner structure and dynamics" (1988b: 84) providing an opportunity to observe what divides a party when i t makes i t s most important decision. Jewell and Olson i n t h e i r study of American state p o l i t i c s argue that "Few parties are homogeneous and monolithic. Rather they contain many d i f f e r e n t elements, each being a p o t e n t i a l source of controversy, of disagreement and of opposition to the other...we want to know the pattern of c o n f l i c t within a p o l i t i c a l party" (1982: 52) . In Canada, leadership conventions provide the opportunity to observe these patterns of c o n f l i c t and allow one to determine the degree to which p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are f a c t i o n a l i z e d . For instance, one could discover whether the pattern of intraparty competition i s one of enduring factions or, i f instead, "Factions may be no more than a campaign group created for and dissolved a f t e r the candidacy of a single person for a single o f f i c e " (Jewell and Olson, 1982: 5). Sullivan, Pressman and Anderton make a s i m i l a r point when they note " P o l i t i c a l p arties are not monolithic i n t h e i r views or demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the study of conventions can reveal the evolving structure of cleavages within the party" (1976: 3). Krause and Leduc have made t h i s point i n a Canadian context, at least i n reference to the L i b e r a l s and Conservatives. In t h e i r words: "As broadly based parties of the p o l i t i c a l centre, 6 both the Li b e r a l s and Conservatives might be expected to exhibit a number of i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s within the party... It i s predictable therefore that such d i v i s i o n s or cleavages, p a r t i c u l a r l y those which are most enduring over time w i l l surface i n contests for the leadership of the party" (1979: 115,116). Looking at these d i v i s i o n s then should reveal much about i n t e r n a l party p o l i t i c s . Moreover, conventions may provide a window into the wider world of p r o v i n c i a l or national p o l i t i c s . As Krause and Leduc explain "Canadian party conventions with t h e i r modern technology to accentuate candidate appeals, issues and or ideology and regional and sec t i o n a l cleavages have come to resemble mini elections, contested i n the same manner as other elections but involving a much smaller intraparty electorate" (1979: 102). They go on to suggest that " c l e a r l y the d i v i s i o n of a party by factors such as East and West, French and English, l e f t and righ t , o ld and young, i s an important part of the f a b r i c of Canadian party p o l i t i c s , and cannot be neglected i n any analysis of voting behaviour" (1979: 116) . In essence, what i s important i n the wider p o l i t y i s l i k e l y to be important at conventions. As well, Winn and McMenemy have suggested that "Each party tends to possess a c t i v i s t s among these groups from which i t draws voting strength. This s i m i l a r i t y between electors and a c t i v i s t s tends to be true for r e l i g i o n , language and region, but not very true i n the case of s o c i a l c l a s s " (1976: 156). Thus studying convention delegates should provide insight into the broader nature of party support bases. Since conventions determine the pool from which voters choose 7 t h e i r leaders they are an important part of p o l i t i c s i n Canada. Analyzing delegate behaviour at these gatherings can shed l i g h t on the nature of p o l i t i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r parts of the country: for the purposes of t h i s study, the Maritimes. The process of selecting a leader bring a c t i v i s t s together and forces each participant to choose from among contending aspirants. An empirical account of delegate support w i l l provide insight into the nature of di v i s i o n s both within the party and the wider p o l i t i c a l system. The question of leadership selection and conventions i n Canada has attracted an increasing degree of academic attention. What was a new f i e l d twenty years ago now encompasses a considerable body of knowledge. Research has raised and dealt with questions regarding delegate selection, status and position; i n i t i a l choice and transfer of support; candidate motivations and career patterns; the influence of speeches, ideology, age, gender, regionalism and the media; the impact of the actual rules and the problem of financing. Today Canadian p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have a good deal of information on leadership conventions at t h e i r f i n g e r t i p s . Indeed, Clarkson i n a paper written i n 1976, wondered whether given the work by Courtney, Smiley and Leduc, further research would be "of any in t e r e s t " (1976: 1) . Regardless of his musings, Clarkson went on with his study of the 1976 Ontario L i b e r a l leadership convention. Clarkson's speculation and his study, point out that while much has been done regarding federal leadership conventions, p r o v i n c i a l conventions have received nowhere near the same degree of interest or 8 research. Courtney, i n one of the early analyses of conventions, e x p l i c i t l y avoided p r o v i n c i a l conventions maintaining that "the s e l e c t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l party leaders deserve nothing less than separate and complete studies" (1973: x i i ) . Few have followed through on t h i s . As Gibbins and Hunziker note " p r o v i n c i a l leadership conventions have been ignored despite t h e i r greater frequency, t h e i r growing size and complexity and t h e i r growing importance to p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l l i f e " (1986:4). The importance of leadership conventions i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i s beyond dispute. Victory i n a leadership convention i s a necessary, and occasionally s u f f i c i e n t , condition for becoming premier: conventions determine the pool from which p r o v i n c i a l electorates must draw t h e i r premier. 1 In some instances conventions are more "competitive than e l e c t i o n s " (Mintz, 1983: 19) i n that leadership of a p a r t i c u l a r party may be tantamount to government o f f i c e . The Maritime Leadership Studies Nine Maritime leadership conventions provide the focus of t h i s study. Examination i s l i m i t e d to the L i b e r a l s and Conservatives. Bluntly, the NDP are marginal to Maritime p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n New Brunswick and PEI. Adding NDP conventions to the analysis would 1 The P a r t i Quebecois was the f i r s t party to abandon conventions as the means to select t h e i r leader. They have twice held an a l l member vote to choose a leader. Recently, they were joined by the Ontario Conservatives who chose t h e i r new leader i n a s i m i l a r fashion. Nonetheless, conventions remain the dominant mode of leadership selection i n Canada. needlessly complicate comparisons. 2 The data sets to be examined were c o l l e c t e d under the auspices of the A t l a n t i c Canada Project at Acadia University. Delegates to the 1971 Nova Scotia P.C, 1976 PEI P.C, 1978 PEI L i b e r a l , 1980 Nova Scotia L i b e r a l , 1981 PEI L i b e r a l , 1981 PEI P.C, 1982 New Brunswick L i b e r a l , 1985 New Brunswick L i b e r a l , and 1986 Nova Scotia L i b e r a l conventions were surveyed. Every contested convention between 1971 and 1987 (with the exception of the 1978 New Brunswick L i b e r a l convention) i s part of t h i s r i c h data set. The nine conventions include both par t i e s i n Nova Scotia and PEI and with the exception of the Nova Scotian Tories, each party i s examined twice. Different p a r t i e s can therefore be compared while changes can also be noted i n the same party from one convention to the next. It should also be possible to t e l l whether same patterns p e r s i s t over time throughout the Maritimes. Variations on one basic survey were used i n each instance with the r e s u l t that the nine data sets contain v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l information. Each survey asked questions r e l a t i n g to personal background, party involvement, convention behaviour, personal decision making, attitudes and candidate appraisals. The nine data sets present a unique opportunity to examine p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes over a number of years. Studying these data sets w i l l contribute to a better understanding of p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes, w i l l enable observers to look for evidence of 2 Even without t h i s substantive objection, data existfs for only one NDP convention which would make cross provi-n'cial comparisons impossible. 10 t r a d i t i o n and conservatism, assess the degree of change over the period and determine whether the pattern of Maritime p o l i t i c s i s "being subtly eroded by the processes of change" (Bellamy, 1976: 3). It should also add to knowledge of par t i e s and i n t e r n a l party dynamics. F i n a l l y , i t w i l l help to advance comprehension of the uniquely Canadian phenomenon of leadership conventions by systematically observing i t i n a cross p r o v i n c i a l comparison. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the study w i l l provide a basis for comparisons with conventions i n other provinces, allow for contrasts to be drawn between p r o v i n c i a l and federal a c t i v i s t s . It w i l l map the a t t i t u d i n a l makeup of several Maritime p a r t i e s . Inferences about the broader support bases of Maritime par t i e s can be made and question raised regarding the representative nature of conventions i n the Maritimes. As well, the relevance of various cleavages i n Maritime p o l i t i c s may be challenged or provided with empirical support. Most importantly i t w i l l lay a foundation for further study into the p o l i t i c a l worlds of the Maritimes, an area that has rather lacked for academic attention. Any secondary examination has c e r t a i n inherent problems. One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i s the lack of control over the questions asked, t h e i r wording, t h e i r order or the possible responses. The questions were asked for d i f f e r e n t reasons and may not measure a p a r t i c u l a r variable i n the manner best suited for t h i s study. For instance, the grouping of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into regions i s not c a r r i e d out i n a way that would most f a c i l i t a t e t h i s study. (The method used was to group c o l l e c t i o n s of counties. For the purposes of t h i s study, t r e a t i n g each county separately would have been better.) S i m i l a r l y , the measurement of community size at the 1980 Nova Scotia L i b e r a l convention makes i t impossible to examine the c i t y of Halifax on i t s own. The measurement of attitudes i s also problematic. Different questions were used at d i f f e r e n t conventions r e s t r i c t i n g comparability. As well, there was no attempt to measure attitudes i n such a way as to allow for easy scale construction. Any treatment of a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s must be understood i n l i g h t of t h i s problem. There i s also no control over the sampling method. Two d i f f e r e n t methods were used to c o l l e c t the data. In some cases the entire population was sampled. That i s , every delegate to a given convention was sent a survey shortly a f t e r the convention. In the other cases, random sampling was used. Using a l i s t of delegates to the conventions, a random l i s t of delegates was generated and surveyed. The actual number of surveys sent varied depending on funding and i n t e r e s t . The smallest sample chosen comprised 20% of the delegate body. The smallest samples were drawn from PEI conventions with the re s u l t that the number of respondents from the four Island conventions were much lower than i n Nova Scotia or New Brunswick. The various parties were extremely co-operative i n making delegate l i s t s available and the candidates were h e l p f u l i n convincing delegates to return the surveys. Each mailed survey was accompanied by a l e t t e r signed by a l l of the candidates urging the re c i p i e n t to take the time to complete and return i t . This advice 12 undoubtedly boosted the response rate which generally was around 40%. This compares quite favourably with the response rate for recent surveys of the 198 6 B.C. Social Credit convention and the 1985 Alberta Tory convention. (See Blake, Carty and Erickson, 1988: 514) . There i s also a sharp contrast i n the reaction of Social Credit party o f f i c i a l s i n B.C. who reacted to the study of t h e i r convention by discouraging delegate responses. Table 1-1 Response Rate Total Delegates Surveys Sent Surveys Returned Response Rate 1971 N.S. P .C. 736 736 405 55% 1976 PEI P.C. 1026 500 142 28% 1978 PEI L i b e r a l 1345 480 163 34% 1980 N.S. L i b e r a l 914 914 437 47% 1981 PEI L i b e r a l 1387 375 168 45% 1981 PEI P.C. 1448 600 203 34% 1982 N.B. L i b e r a l 2603 867 366 42% 1985 N.B. L i b e r a l 2748 550 274 50% 1986 N.S. L i b e r a l 1803 1803 941 52% It impossible to determine p r e c i s e l y how representative respondents are of the delegate population. However, there i s one key t e s t that offers f a i r l y s o l i d evidence as to the representativeness of the sample: a comparison of the reported voting behaviour of the delegates with the actual voting at the conventions. As Table 1-2 indicates, the percentages are extremely s i m i l a r . The maximum deviation i s ten points, with the 1985 New Brunswick L i b e r a l sample. Support for one of the two candidates i s overestimated by that margin and the other candidate's support appears much weaker than i t was i n r e a l i t y . At none of the other conventions was the deviation greater than 5%. There i s thus cause for optimism that the respondents are quite t y p i c a l of the o v e r a l l delegate body. As with a l l convention studies, there i s some worry that non respondents may f a l l disproportionately into a s p e c i f i c subgroup. The r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e status of convention delegates might be due to the greater propensity of lower status delegates to throw a survey out. However, the expenses inherent i n convention attendance l i k e l y makes them a preserve of the r e l a t i v e l y affluent and there i s no reason to f e e l the candidates' urging of compliance would f a l l more receptively on higher status delegates. At any rate, the comparability of the reported and actual voting makes i t u n l i k e l y that a p a r t i c u l a r subgroup i s systematically underrepresented. One can approach the survey data with a sense of confidence that the respondents provide a good sample of the conventions. 14 Table 1-2 Comparison of Reported and Actual Vote Convention Candidate Actual Reported Difference NS P.C. Buchanan 33% 33% — 1971 Doucet 38% 39% + 1 Thor n h i l l 29% 27% -2 PEI P.C. Lee 43% 43% — 1976 A. MacLean 57% 57% — PEI L i b e r a l Campbell 72% 71% -1 1978 M i t c h e l l 28% 29% + 1 NS L i b e r a l Cameron 37% 40% +3 1980 Maclnnis 14% 14% — V.MacLean 27% 29% +2 Mooney 21% 17% -4 PEI L i b e r a l Clement 35% 32% -3 1981 Ghiz 65% 68% + 3 PEI P.C. Binns 16% 14% -2 1981 Clark 24% 25% + 1 D r i s c o l l 20% 17% -3 Lee 40% 44% + 4 NB L i b e r a l Day 31% 27% -4 1982 Frenette 12% 11% -1 Maher 6% 5% -1 Young 51% 56% +5 NB L i b e r a l Frenette 31% 21% -10 1985 McKenna 69% 79% + 10 NS L i b e r a l Cowan 40% 38% -2 1986 V.MacLean 60% 62% +2 The r e l a t i v e l y low number of respondents from the four Island conventions i s cause for some concern. The value of Chi Square, 15 perhaps the best test of s i g n i f i c a n c e for nominal variables, i s heavily dependent on the sample s i z e . For instance, doubling the number of cases with no change i n proportions would have a major e f f e c t on Chi Square. Thus the small number of cases from PEI make Chi Square t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e quite onerous. With t h i s i n mind, the ap p l i c a t i o n of s i g n i f i c a n c e tests to the Island data w i l l be less stringent than the normal .05. Observations w i l l be reported with, of course, the caveat that conclusions can only be offered t e n t a t i v e l y . S t i l l , the surveys represent unique opportunities to examine p o l i t i c a l events that w i l l never be repeated. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of even possible patterns i s therefore important. As Bibby noted i n somewhat si m i l a r circumstances "general trends and tendencies are worth observing. P r a c t i c a l or substantive s i g n i f i c a n c e overrules s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e when the findings are consistent with other data sources" (1987: 8). Plan of the Study An examination of conventions and delegate support patterns i s a huge undertaking. Fortunately previous research helps to focus attention on cer t a i n variables. The l i t e r a t u r e on conventions, r e a l l y national conventions, i d e n t i f i e s a number of variables associated with voting. As well, the l i t e r a t u r e on the A t l a n t i c region provides an entry into Maritime p o l i t i c s and points out p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l areas for inves t i g a t i o n i n an examination of delegate support patterns i n the region. The next chapter w i l l u t i l i z e these bodies of l i t e r a t u r e to e s t a b l i s h a framework for the analysis of the various conventions. Once the variables to be used i n t h i s assessment of convention behaviour have been outlined, the thesis w i l l s h i f t to a d i r e c t examination of the conventions. Chapter 3 w i l l p r o f i l e the convention delegates. Certain patterns of delegate support are obviously dependent on the presence of d i f f e r e n t subgroups. If, for example, Maritime delegates are a l l middle aged, u n i v e r s i t y educated, Protestant male professionals l i v i n g i n the region's major c i t i e s , then d i v i s i o n s on the basis of age, education, r e l i g i o n , gender, occupation and community siz e are by d e f i n i t i o n impossible. A p r o f i l e indicates both the kind of d i v i s i o n s that are possible as well as whether Maritime delegates are "the sort of middle-aged, well educated, r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t i n d i v i d u a l [s] normally seen at party conventions i n Canada" (Blake, Carty and Erickson, 1988: 517). With t h i s p r o f i l e i t w i l l also be possible to trace the representation of various groups over time and assess the 'representativeness' of Maritime conventions. As well, inferences can be made regarding the s o c i a l groups from which the parties derive t h e i r strength (see Winn and McMenemy, 1976: 152-164). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 w i l l be devoted to an examination of conventions i n each province. Each chapter w i l l begin by o u t l i n i n g some of the d i s t i n c t features of p o l i t i c s i n the p a r t i c u l a r province and w i l l then move to an overview of the context i n which the various conventions were held and a discussion of each campaign. The bulk of these chapters w i l l be given over to an empirical analysis of support patterns along the l i n e s to be outlined i n chapter 2. As Johnston said of national conventions "Ideological a f f i n i t y , s o c i a l group membership and geographic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n come r e a d i l y to mind as c r i t e r i a that might govern i n d i v i d u a l ' s choices. But the empirical status of these c r i t e r i a i s a matter of controversy" (1988: 204). These chapters should clear up some of t h i s controversy as i t relates to the Maritimes. It i s important to keep i n mind that the purpose of these examinations i s not to explain the outcome of i n d i v i d u a l conventions or to account for the voting decision of each delegate. Instead, the search i s for broad patterns of delegate support which w i l l reveal something about Maritime p o l i t i c s , the various pa r t i e s , and leadership conventions as such. Following the treatment of the i n d i v i d u a l provinces the three provinces w i l l be linked and a discussion of whether the support patterns and the conventions more broadly r e f l e c t an o v e r a l l Maritime s t y l e of p o l i t i c s or i f the p r o v i n c i a l patterns are too divergent to suggest a regional pattern w i l l be undertaken. It w i l l be clear that the p r o v i n c i a l patterns can be linked and that they demonstrate a kind of 'friends and neighbours' p o l i t i c s which off e r s l i t t l e support to those who suggest Maritime p o l i t i c s i s changing. In the f i n a l chapter there w i l l be some speculation on what the Maritime conventions indicate about conventions i n general, but the primary focus w i l l be on 'friends and neighbours' p o l i t i c s and what accounts for t h i s pattern of p o l i t i c a l behaviour. Maritime p o l i t i c s may continue to be marked by t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s , but t h i s i s not necessarily a negative feature and i s quite consistent 18 with the nature of Maritime society. The Maritimes, i n e f f e c t , constitute within Canada a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l society, d i f f e r e n t but not i n f e r i o r to that found elsewhere i n the country. Maritime p o l i t i c s w i l l be shown to r e f l e c t s t a b i l i t y and continuity and those who eagerly s i f t the grains of regional p o l i t i c s for evidence of modernization are destined for disappointment. 19 Chapter 2 Patterns of Delegate Support: A Framework for Analysis " I don't care who does the electin g , so long as I can do the nominating." With these words one of the denizens of the infamous American 'boss system' highlighted one of the key elements i n North. American party p o l i t i c s : the relegation of the c i t i z e n voter to s e l e c t i n g from among candidates anointed by a p a r t i c u l a r party. Primary reforms i n America have involved many voters i n the leadership s e l e c t i o n process but i n Canada most p a r t i e s choose t h e i r leaders at conventions composed of one or two thousand party a c t i v i s t s . Most voters remain outside of the leadership s e l e c t i o n process. The impact of t h i s may be substantial since, as the l i t e r a t u r e on Canadian p o l i t i c s unambiguously points out, the p o l i t i c a l process i s dominated by party leaders. Voters do not have a say i n who the leaders are, they merely get to select which of the party leaders they most want to lead t h e i r country or province. Perhaps one should say which leader they are most w i l l i n g to accept given the al t e r n a t i v e s . Given the importance of leadership s e l e c t i o n i t i s not sur p r i s i n g that the attempt to discover patterns of delegate support has occupied p o l i t i c a l analysts since the f i r s t federal leadership convention was held i n 1919. However, references to such patterns i n the p o l i t i c a l science l i t e r a t u r e are infrequent and somewhat haphazard. That i s , such references are often asides i n 20 studies of a more general nature. U n t i l recently, the major exception was an a r t i c l e by Krause and Leduc on voting behaviour and e l e c t o r a l strategies at the 1976 Conservative convention. Krause and Leduc suggest that: " i f a useful analogue to the p o l i t i c a l behaviour of convention delegates i s to be found, i t i s more l i k e l y to be i n the area of mass p o l i t i c a l behaviour and elections, for Canadian party conventions... have come to resemble mini-elections, contested i n the same manner as other elections but involving a much smaller intraparty electorate" (1979:102). In short, they concluded that leadership conventions resemble mass elections and that studies of conventions should focus on many of the same variab l e s . More recently, George P e r l i n ' s Party Democracy i n Canada provided the most systematic i n v e s t i g a t i o n of convention behaviour ever presented. Drawing on surveys of delegates to the national conventions of 1983 and 1984, a number of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s pursued a research agenda that not only discussed the more normative aspects of leadership s e l e c t i o n but also looked e x p l i c i t l y at the impact of such variables as ideology, region, insider/outsider, class, gender and age. Their research constitutes a considerable advancement i n the understanding of i n t r a party d i v i s i o n s and one that helps inform the approach of t h i s t h e s i s . In t h i s chapter, a review w i l l be undertaken of the l i t e r a t u r e on voting at leadership conventions i n Canada. The purpose i s to outline the variables which must be investigated i n a convention study. As well, the importance of such variables i n the l i t e r a t u r e on Maritime p o l i t i c s w i l l be examined. This w i l l 21 provide a framework for deciding which variables should be examined i n an attempt to discern patterns of delegate support at Maritime conventions. Moreover, the review w i l l generate expectations as to the pote n t i a l impact various variables might have on delegate voting. In keeping with the l i t e r a t u r e on general voting behaviour, 1 studies of leadership conventions have focused attention on region, r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y . From the beginning, conventions, and parties, were divided by these matters. In 1919, when Mackenzie King was selected over William Fie l d i n g , rumours abounded of an ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and regional s p l i t i n t h e i r support bases. King, i t was said, was favoured by Roman Catholics, Francophones and Quebecers, groups which to a large extent overlapped. Fielding's a f f i l i a t i o n with the Union government l e f t him unpopular with the 'Laurier Lib e r a l s ' who were predominantly French, Roman Catholics from Quebec (Courtney, 1973: 63-72) . However, the Quebec delegation did not have a candidate of t h e i r own i n terms of the ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s described. The reason for t h i s , Lederle suggests, i s because they r e a l i z e d that the new leader must be an English Protestant, that i t was an English Protestant's 'turn' (1947: 90). Ward, i n writing on the 1958 Pearson/Martin convention affirms the importance of an English Protestant and French Catholic alternation with the additional 1 See for example Clark et a l . 1980, A l f o r d 1962, Schwartz 1962 and 1970, Meisel 1956, 1962 and 1972. 22 insight that the French Catholic i s to be from Quebec. In his assessment, t h i s alternation had as i t s e f f e c t that "anyone l i k e Mr. Martin, a Catholic from English speaking Canada would be permanently d i s q u a l i f i e d from the L i b e r a l leadership" (1958: 10). Subsequent analysis by Regenstrief, i n 1968, suggested that t h i s rule of alt e r n a t i o n was not accepted by the majority of L i b e r a l delegates (1969:120). The early Conservative conventions were not subject to the same degree of attention perhaps because they were neither f i r s t , nor i n power. It i s clear, though, that the Conservatives d i d not rotate t h e i r leadership by e t h n i c i t y , r e l i g i o n , or region. This has not prevented speculation on the importance of e t h n i c i t y and region at Tory conventions. With t h i s i n mind, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note that only one Francophone has ever contested a Conservative convention. In a s i m i l a r vein, the mispronunciation of John Diefenbaker's name during the wartime Bracken convention combined with the antipathy to Diefenbaker shown by the Quebec delegation i n 1956 point out that such t r a d i t i o n a l variables were not i n s i g n i f i c a n t at Conservative gatherings (Diefenbaker 1975: 252, 278-279). The 1956 Conservative and 1958 L i b e r a l conventions mark an important boundary for p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . A l l analyses of these conventions, and those preceding them, were based on personal observations, i n s i d e r information, or interviews with notables. Each subsequent federal convention has been studied using the behavioral t o o l of survey research. The pre-survey analyses 23 indicated that students of p o l i t i c s — i f they were to understand delegate voting behaviour—would do well to examine ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and regional variables. The influence of these variables was confirmed by P e r l i n i n studies of the 1967 and 1976 Conservative conventions. In analyzing s o c i a l cleavages and delegate voting choice, he discovered that province of o r i g i n was most strongly associated with voting decisions followed by ethnic and r e l i g i o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (1980: 143). Region: References to the impact of regionalism on voting patterns abound i n the leadership l i t e r a t u r e . However, there has been no study aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y at t h i s phenomenon and the references usually come in the middle of a work with another focus. Nonetheless, i t i s possible to c u l l from the l i t e r a t u r e two features of the regional factor. F i r s t , a candidate may be what i n the American l i t e r a t u r e i s known as a ' f a v o r i t e son.' This i s a candidate with no prospect of v i c t o r y who s t i l l a t t r a c t s disproportionate support from his home region. MacEachen i n 1968 and Nowlan in 197 6 provide the best examples of t h i s phenomenon, with Wilson and Crombie i n 1983 f a l l i n g into t h i s category as well (Martin, Gregg and P e r l i n , 1983: 145-146; Leduc, 1971: 100). Second i s the more general regional e f f e c t . A l l candidates tend to do better with voters from t h e i r home region. In the 1967 convention, P e r l i n discovered that the three most successful candidates d i d best among the delegates from t h e i r home regions leading him to conclude that "regional t i e s were c l e a r l y a s i g n i f i c a n t factor i n delegate voting behaviour" (1980: 140). S i m i l a r l y , Leduc found i n 1968 that candidates "drew t h e i r support rather unevenly from among the delegates of the ten provinces" (1971: 111). This was confirmed by March, who noted that Trudeau received a preponderance of his support from Quebec, and Wearing, who indicated that Winters had a high l e v e l of Maritime support (March, 1976: 5; Wearing, 1968: 9). This trend continued i n 1976 where Krause and Leduc determined that seven of the candidates received more than h a l f of t h e i r votes from t h e i r home region (1979: 119). F i n a l l y , i n 1983 and 1984, Courtney and P e r l i n found "that among the demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of delegates, region remains the most important factor associated with t h e i r Voting choice" (1988: 138). It i s clear, then, that regionalism influences delegate voting at national leadership conventions. This i s not su r p r i s i n g given the s i g n i f i c a n c e of regionalism i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . It i s not cl e a r that t h i s should also be true of Maritime p o l i t i c s although, i n the only study available of a Maritime convention, Adamson refers to rumours of a s p l i t along 'regional' l i n e s (1972: 2) . Blake, i n his analysis of regionalism and voting patterns, helps make t h i s understandable. He suggests that there are: "two p r i n c i p a l manifestations of regionalism i n Canadian voting behaviour: the h i s t o r i c a l association of p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s with 25 c e r t a i n regions, and the variations from region to region often noted i n the party support propensities of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups" (1972: 59). Using Blake's f i r s t manifestation of regionalism, i t i s apparent that regionalism i s also a factor i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . A perusal of p r o v i n c i a l voting returns since World War II makes clear that d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s are stronger i n d i f f e r e n t areas of each province. This i s most s t r i k i n g i n New Brunswick where the Li b e r a l s dominate i n the North and the Tories i n the South, (Fitzpatrick, 1978: 121) but i t i s also evident i n the regional support for the CCF/NDP on Cape Breton Island, the Li b e r a l s i n southwestern Nova Scotia and the Conservatives along the North Shore (Adamson,and Stewart, 1985: 322; Camp, 1979: 112). While regional patterns are less d i s t i n c t on Prince Edward Island, the staunch maintenance of rough county e q u a l i t y 2 — w h i c h makes the Island l e g i s l a t u r e a mockery of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n — indicates the continued strength of regional boundaries. It i s impossible to determine whether Blake's second manifestation of regionalism can be found i n the Maritimes. Aucoin remarked on Nova Scotia i n 1972 that no survey research "has ever been conducted by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s or others respecting p r o v i n c i a l voting behaviour" (1972: 25). His comments, as they 2 After a f i e r c e b a t t l e over r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the middle of the s i x t i e s the composition of the Island l e g i s l a t u r e was modified by increasing the number of members from Queens county from 10 to 12 while the other two counties kept 10 members each. Queens county has about half of the Island's population while Prince county contains another 35%. Members from Kings county r e s i s t e d a l l attempts to reduce the number of members from that county. r e l a t e to p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , remain true of Nova Scotia and are equally v a l i d i n reference to the other Maritime provinces. Thus regional v a r i a t i o n s i n the partisan support patterns of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups remain a question yet to be asked. Nonetheless, there i s one feature of Maritime society and p o l i t i c s that suggests a strong p o s s i b i l i t y of 'regional' d i v i s i o n s : localism. The l i t e r a t u r e on PEI makes cle a r that p a r t i c u l a r l y close t i e s exist between p o l i t i c i a n s and voters. With such a small population candidates possess substantial acquaintances among the voters and, i f elected, cannot take for granted the w i l l of t h e i r constituents. Thus, e l e c t i o n contests are said to be highly l o c a l i z e d (MacKinnon, 1978: 237). S i m i l a r l y , i n New Brunswick, F i t z p a t r i c k has pointed out the parochialism of l o c a l constituencies and indicated that candidates who were 'outsiders' would be u n l i k e l y to win (1978: 124) . F i n a l l y , Beck has argued that Nova Scotian constituencies are reserved for l o c a l men and that an outsider would l i k e l y be regarded as a 'carpetbagger' (1978: 197) . What t h i s suggests i s a pervasive localism to Maritime p o l i t i c s . Observers who stress the s i m i l a r i t i e s within the Maritimes often miss the sense of belonging that i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant. An outsider can be someone who was not born i n a p a r t i c u l a r community (Bruce, 1988: 62, 63). Outsiders, s u p e r f i c i a l f r i e n d l i n e s s notwithstanding, are often regarded with suspicion. Moreover, p o l i t i c s within each province has r e f l e c t e d and enhanced an intense i n t e r n a l competition. As Bruce has pointed out, areas 27 were often competing for such goods as wharves and breakwaters and competitions were thus zero sum. Local p o l i t i c i a n s were expected to d e l i v e r the goods (1988: 35). . This localism, indulged i n a r e l a t i v e l y r u r a l s e t t i n g and within a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l culture that contains few i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s , suggests a p o s s i b i l i t y for a 'friends and neighbours' kind of regionalism. Friends and neighbours was the term used by V.O. Key to describe patterns of l o c a l i s t i c support he discovered i n his analysis of southern p o l i t i c s (1949) . Key found that gubernatorial candidates i n southern Democratic primaries c o l l e c t e d huge votes i n t h e i r l o c a l areas, votes that declined as the distance from t h e i r l o c a l area increased. He referred to t h i s rather p e j o r a t i v e l y as a s t y l e of p o l i t i c s based on i r r e l e v a n c i e s and concluded "The chances are that the friends and neighbours appeal can assume overriding importance only i n an immature p o l i t i c s i n which issues are either nonexistent or blurred" (1949: 110) . Wilson, i n a recent a r t i c l e on Maritime regionalism, e x p l i c i t l y tarred the region with the phrase " p o l i t i c a l immaturity" (1989: 376) and, as w i l l become apparent, at Maritime leadership conventions issues are eith e r nonexistent or blurred. Indeed, the word immature i s one that c a l l s to mind the l a b e l of ' p r e i n d u s t r i a l ' often placed on Maritime p o l i t i c s (Wilson, 1974: 451). The friends and neighbours e f f e c t has been found i n a number of non-southern settings including Ireland, New Zealand and New England. A l l of these settings are f a i r l y t r a d i t i o n a l and 28 r e l a t i v e l y r u r a l . Moreover, the e f f e c t was displayed i n situations outside the realm of i n t e r party competition. Maritime conventions, obviously, are outside the realm of i n t e r party competition and are set i n p o l i t i e s that are f a i r l y t r a d i t i o n a l and r e l a t i v e l y r u r a l . Given the strength of localism and the suspicion of outsiders, one should not be surprised to discover that a friends and neighbours d i v i s i o n i s a large part of the story at Maritime conventions. Religion: The impact of r e l i g i o n at national leadership conventions has received s u r p r i s i n g l i t t l e attention, notwithstanding i t s high c o r r e l a t i o n with broader partisan choice and i t s i n i t i a l r o le i n the L i b e r a l a l t e r n a t i o n process. It may be that modernization theory which posits a decline i n the p o l i t i c a l importance of r e l i g i o n as a society 'develops' (Wilson, 1974: 474; Agnew, 1987: 3) leads analysts to i n f e r that i t would be of l i t t l e relevance at a r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e gathering such as a convention. This i s not supported by research. 3 The L i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of alternating leaders by r e l i g i o n may have passed with the sel e c t i o n of Turner, but there i s no evidence that r e l i g i o n i s inc i d e n t a l to delegate voting behaviour. Indeed, at the 1976 Conservative convention, P e r l i n found an a l b e i t weak association of the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n with vote (1980: 143). Party Democracy i n Canada directed no s p e c i f i c attention to 3 For a s i m i l a r discussion of the attitudes held by many researchers regarding the p o l i t i c a l relevance of r e l i g i o n i n the United States see Fowler, 1985. 29 r e l i g i o n although Johnston, i n his discussion of the f i n a l choice at each convention, indicated a s l i g h t tendency for Catholics to prefer Chretien i n 1984 and avoid Crosbie i n 1983. S t i l l , he cautions us to remember that there i s a "high degree of i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n " among such attributes as Catholicism, French ancestry and Quebec residency making i t necessary to interpret any r e l i g i o u s influence cautiously (1988: 223). While l i t t l e attention i s given r e l i g i o n i n national leadership conventions, much i s warranted i n a study of Maritime conventions. The Maritimes has been described as Canada's 'Bible Belt' and r e l i g i o n and Maritime p o l i t i c s have always had an intimate re l a t i o n s h i p . In Wilson's study of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l cultures he c l a s s i f i e d the A t l a n t i c party systems as mainly Type I systems i n which r e l i g i o n i s one of the main cleavages and found that " r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n appears to have a considerable impact" (1974: 478). Similarly, Adamson and Stewart, writing i n 1985, re l u c t a n t l y indicate that r e l i g i o n has a " l i n g e r i n g impact" (327). Chandler and Chandler, i n one of the few works to test relations between party preference and r e l i g i o n , found that every Maritime party did better among one r e l i g i o u s group than the other (1979: 47-68) . Maritime conventions themselves have not been free of r e l i g i o u s s t r i f e . The Nova Scotia Liberals alternate t h e i r leaders along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s and at one point t h i s practise helped s p l i t the party (Adamson, 1982: 5). This practise was vigorously challenged i n the well reported 1954 convention. The 1954 30 convention p i t t e d acting Premier Harold Connolly, a Catholic, against four Protestant contenders. In Camp's words: On the f i r s t b a l l o t , Connolly was within 58 votes of winning a majority, and on the second he was only 41 votes short. Henry Hicks was a distant t h i r d , then only a poor second. But the resolve to deny Connolly the leadership grew among the delegates l i k e a physical presence, and as candidates were eliminated b a l l o t a f t e r b a l l o t , t h e i r support went to Hicks. In the growing tension, tempers were lo s t and hard words exchanged among the L i b e r a l brethren. No longer was leadership the central issue of the convention. Instead, i t was the matter of r e l i g i o n (1979: 151) . Yet i n spite of such strong indications of the impact of r e l i g i o n on Maritime p o l i t i c s , a perception i s emerging that such matters are of declining s i g n i f i c a n c e . Adamson and Stewart used the phrase ' li n g e r i n g ' to describe the contemporary p o l i t i c a l influence of r e l i g i o n and Adamson, i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d " A t l a n t i c Canada: Modernization i n a T r a d i t i o n a l Climate", has argued that as the region has modernized—a trend indicated by economic growth, urbanization, and stronger support for the NDP— r e l i g i o n has declined i n p o l i t i c a l relevance (1987: 222). The decline may not be as sharp i n New Brunswick or PEI but i n Nova Scotia, where modernization i s most advanced, i t i s noteworthy. As he concluded "At one time r e l i g i o n played an important role i n Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s also, but now modernization seems to have taken precedence and r e l i g i o n i s no longer an important determinant i n the recruitment and selection of candidates" (Adamson, 1987: 222). Others have also advanced the notion that p o l i t i c s i n the region 31 i s changing. Bellamy claimed that the uniqueness of the Maritimes was "being subtly eroded by the processes of change"(1976: 3) and Conley and Smith have argued that Maritime p o l i t i c s i s " c l e a r l y changing" (1985: 245) . While i t i s not clear what exactly change e n t a i l s , i t seems l i k e l y that those who sense i t believe i t w i l l erode the t r a d i t i o n a l s t y l e of p o l i t i c s of which r e l i g i o n i s an important part. Uncertainty thus surrounds questions dealing with the importance of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . Certainly i t was important i n the past but does i t remain so? Is i t of diminished or diminishing importance? Is i t weaker i n Nova Scotia than i n New Brunswick or the Island? While the influence of r e l i g i o n may have 'mellowed' somewhat, there i s l i t t l e empirical evidence that i t has of yet disappeared. This study provides a rare opportunity to gather evidence on t h i s issue. At present, i n the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary one should expect r e l i g i o n to be an important source of di v i s i o n s at Maritime conventions. E t h n i c i t y : Once more a variable correlated highly with voting i n national elections has received l i t t l e attention i n convention studies. The most impressive indicator of i t s prominence i s the continued L i b e r a l alternation of leadership between Anglophones and Francophones. However as noted e a r l i e r , Regenstrief has shown that Liberals are not wildly enamoured of t h i s alternation. Nonetheless, the ethnic factor not only affects who i s chosen, but also apparently how delegates vote. March, i n his study 32 of the 1968 L i b e r a l convention, found that on the f i r s t b a l l o t "While Trudeau attracted only 24.5% of the English delegates, he attracted 42.1% of the French delegates" with no other candidate getting even o n e - f i f t h of the French support (1976: 5). That e t h n i c i t y i s also a factor at Conservative conventions i s again suggested by P e r l i n who found an association between e t h n i c i t y and voting i n 1976 (1980: 143) . S t i l l , Courtney and P e r l i n found no s i g n i f i c a n t evidence of an association between e t h n i c i t y and voting at either the 1983 or 1984 national conventions. While Johnston also indicated only a sporadic and unsystematic ethnic ef f e c t he cautioned that t h i s may have been due to the peculiar structure of the competition. Most notably the fact that i t was not an auspicious time for Chretien to r a l l y French support (1988: 220). Eth n i c i t y , then, may remain important at national conventions. It might be expected that e t h n i c i t y would not be important i n the Maritimes where the French/English dichotomy does not have the same si g n i f i c a n c e . Obviously, New Brunswick i s the exception. As Dyck explains regarding the New Brunswick p o l i t i c a l s i tuation, "ethnic p o l i t i c s have been f a i r l y prominent" (1986: 140). Simil a r l y , Aunger, i n the introduction to his comparison of Ulster and New Brunswick, declared that "Since the turn of the century, the L i b e r a l s have appeared as the party of the French, and the Conservatives as the party of the English" (1981: 22). Indeed, he goes on to suggest that within the Li b e r a l i t s e l f "The increasingly prominent role played by Acadians i n p o l i t i c s since the el e c t i o n of Louis Robichaud i n 1960 makes the establishment of a t r a d i t i o n of 33 a l t e r n a t i o n between English and French leaders extremely probable" (1981: 157). The 1985 se l e c t i o n of Frank McKenna to succeed Doug Young seems to indicate that t h i s alternation i s more an example of academics making patterns of coincidence than an i n v i o l a t e L i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n . The Conservatives have also attempted to come to terms with the b i l i n g u a l nature of the province by maintaining—as much as p o s s i b l e — an ethnic balance i n t h e i r cabinets, supporting o f f i c i a l b i l i n g u a l i s m and refusing to give voice to the vociferous anti-French biases of a minority of New Brunswick Anglophones (Aunger, 1981: 145, 155). S t i l l , they have yet to select a Francophone leader or make l a s t i n g inroads into the Francophone vote. The Francophone minorities i n Nova Scotia and on Prince Edward Island do not approach the s i g n i f i c a n t proportion that Acadians represent i n New Brunswick. However, they constitute over 10% of each population and possess deep roots (Bellamy, 1976: 12). In Nova Scotia, Chandler and Chandler found that the L i b e r a l s were stronger with the non-'British' voters and that the reverse was true of the Island (1979: 49). Nonetheless, l i t t l e evidence exists to suggest that ethnic d i v i s i o n s are e s p e c i a l l y s a l i e n t i n either province and i t would be sur p r i s i n g to f i n d e t h n i c i t y an important source of d i v i s i o n at conventions. In contrast, one would expect i t to be very i n f l u e n t i a l i n New Brunswick. So c i a l Status: Attempts have also been made to analyze the impact of s o c i a l 34 status or economic variables on leadership choice. Yet the general conclusion i s that t h i s d i v i s i o n i s of l i m i t e d value i n accounting for d i f f e r e n t leadership choices. There i s no evidence that s o c i a l c l a s s — o r the indicators that have been used to measure i t : income, occupation, education and s e l f p e r c e p t i o n — i s r e a l l y useful i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g candidate choice. This lack of evidence should not be s u r p r i s i n g . As Mintz has pointed out "the mounting costs of attending a leadership convention reinforces the p l u t o c r a t i c nature of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s " (1983: 20). Indeed, every convention analyst would agree with the description of convention delegates which suggests that "By any standard they constitute a socio-economic e l i t e " (Carty, 1988: 60). In short, part of the reason why class differences do not appear at conventions i s because the lower or working classes are not represented at these e l i t e gatherings. However, Stewart, i n an analysis of the 1984 L i b e r a l convention, d i d discover that working class delegates were s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y to support Chretien and the l e v e l of support for Turner increased with class p o s i t i o n (1988: 161). T r a d i t i o n a l l y , s o c i a l class has been of l i t t l e value i n understanding Maritime p o l i t i c s . As Wilson has argued "It i s quite clear...that in...the A t l a n t i c provinces... s o c i a l class has v i r t u a l l y nothing to do with variations i n partisanship" (1974: 478) . As well, the Chandlers, i n attempting to assess the influence of income and occupation, concluded that "In none of the A t l a n t i c provinces i s either of these d i v i s i o n s h e l p f u l i n 35 explaining party p o l i t i c s . . . a d d i t i o n a l l y subjective class i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e l l s us nothing about p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s i n the A t l a n t i c provinces" (1979: 42) . Yet before s o c i a l class i s dismissed as i r r e l e v a n t to a study of voting patterns at Maritime conventions, one should note that p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes i s c a r r i e d on at a more personal l e v e l . As well, the distance and costs involved i n attending a convention are much lower than they would be at national conventions. Average c i t i z e n s then, may be more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a Maritime convention. It i s therefore possible for economically based d i v i s i o n s to e x i s t . Nonetheless, many such d i v i s i o n s would be almost astonishing. I n s t i t u t i o n a l D i v i s i o n s : Investigations of convention voting have also pointed out the p o t e n t i a l impact of what can be termed ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l ' d i v i s i o n s . At most modern conventions cert a i n groups have some form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y enshrined. Usually there are three of these groups, based on age, gender or delegate type. In terms of delegate type, there are b a s i c a l l y two kinds of delegates. In Woolstencroft's formulation, there are delegates "who are such because of o f f i c e or p o s i t i o n ; and those who have been elected" (1986:4). The common perception i s that delegates to conventions are chosen democratically at constituency meetings, but t h i s i s only p a r t i a l l y true. At the 1983 Tory convention, 47% of the delegates were ' e x - o f f i c i o ' or non-elected. The same i s true of 46% of the 1984 L i b e r a l delegates (Carty, 1988:84). The n o n - e l e c t e d d e l e g a t e s may be MPs, Senators, P r i v y C o u n c i l l o r s , MLAs, p a r l i a m e n t a r y candidates, members of the p a r t y e x e c u t i v e , or, i n the case of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , 'delegates at l a r g e ' — d e l e g a t e s s e l e c t e d by each p r o v i n c i a l e x e c u t i v e ("Making the T r a i n s Run on Time", 1983: 4) There have long been s u s p i c i o n s t h a t n o n - e l e c t e d d e l e g a t e s vote d i f f e r e n t l y than t h e i r more d e m o c r a t i c a l l y s e l e c t e d b r e t h r e n . Diefenbaker, i n 1967, attempted to a b o l i s h the 'at l a r g e ' category because of the o p p o r t u n i t y t h i s p r e s e n t e d t o h i s opponents who were i n charge of most p r o v i n c i a l e x e c u t i v e s . There was l i t t l e chance t h a t the e x e c u t i v e s would be a p p o i n t i n g d e l e g a t e s sympathetic to a Diefenbaker candidacy ( P e r l i n , 1980: 87). In 1983, C r o s b i e and Mulroney demonstrated how t h i s category c o u l d be manipulated by e n s u r i n g 'at l a r g e ' p o s i t i o n s from t h e i r home p r o v i n c e s were f i l l e d s o l e l y with d e l e g a t e s s u p p o r t i n g them (Martin, Gregg and P e r l i n , 1983: 81,109). The most s t r i k i n g account of d i f f e r e n t i a l v o t i n g by the d e l e g a t e types o c c u r r e d at the 1970 Quebec L i b e r a l c onvention. Brown, Chodos and Murphy suggest t h a t Claude Wagner was q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l i n a c q u i r i n g the support of e l e c t e d d e l e g a t e s . In t h e i r words "He went i n t o the convention with a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of the d e l e g a t e s e l e c t e d by the r i d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s . He had i t sewn up" (1976: 80). As i s w e l l known, however, i t was Robert Bourassa who emerged v i c t o r i o u s from t h a t convention. Brown et a l . maintain t h a t Wagner was unpopular with the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y and, as a r e s u l t , the 1000 ex o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s d e f e a t (1976: 80) . 37 Stewart found a s i m i l a r trend i n his study of the 1984 L i b e r a l convention. Although Turner ultimately won majorities from delegates of both 'types' Jean Chretien attracted s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher l e v e l s of support from the elected delegates (1988: 153). Obviously then, delegate status i s a variable that must be examined i n order to understand delegate support patterns. The L i b e r a l and Conservative par t i e s i n the Maritimes have the same kind of ex o f f i c i o positions as the federal p a r t i e s . As well, Adamson and Stewart have pointed out that the "position of the party leader and other senior members of the party i s more pronounced i n A t l a n t i c Canada" (1985: 328). It may be that t h i s 'pronounced p o s i t i o n ' makes t h e i r voting e i t h e r unique or means that t h e i r influence i s so great that a l l delegates follow t h e i r lead. In any case, i t i s quite possible for d i v i s i o n s of t h i s type to ex i s t at Maritime conventions. One might expect age d i v i s i o n s to be important at leadership conventions. Afte r a l l , the youth are guaranteed a s p e c i f i c number of positions i n each constituency delegation while u n i v e r s i t y clubs are also e n t i t l e d to send delegates ("Making the Trains Run on Time", 1983: 4). As well, Krause and Leduc argue that the d i v i s i o n of a party by "old and young i s an important part of the f a b r i c of Canadian party p o l i t i c s and cannot be neglected i n any analysis of convention behaviour"(1979: 116). Indeed, t h e i r analysis of delegate voting i n 197 6 revealed that on average delegates supporting Clark were younger than those backing Wagner. Interestingly, a study of the 1983 Conservative convention by 38 Martin, Gregg and P e r l i n discovered an age cleavage i n Brian Mulroney's support. Of the approximately 450 votes that Mulroney received outside Quebec, about 47% were cast by youth delegates-almost h a l f . Since the youth accounted for only a t h i r d of a l l delegates to the leadership convention, Mulroney enjoyed considerably more success with them than he d i d with the seniors (1983: 88). P e r l i n followed up t h i s f inding with a more academic s t u d y — t h i s time with Desjardins and Sutherland. This analysis confirmed the e a r l i e r f i n d i n g and also determined that, i n 1984, Turner was less successful with the younger delegates (1988: 198) . Age differences, then, are not i r r e l e v a n t i n an analysis of delegate voting. There has been l i t t l e discussion of the impact of age on p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes. Studies of the 1970 Nova Scotian e l e c t i o n by Adamson and Aucoin are the only exceptions. Adamson maintains that when the voting age was lowered to 19 for the 1970 el e c t i o n "The Lib e r a l s courted and won the new voters, while the Conservatives paid l i t t l e attention to them" (1972: 3). Aucoin supports t h i s contention and goes even farther claiming that the Li b e r a l s were much more successful with voters under twenty-five (1972: 32) . Age has not been found to correlate highly with voting elsewhere i n the Maritimes and i t s long term e f f e c t i n Nova Scotia would seem to be minimal. One might, however, expect age to be more important at conventions. The youth are an important subgroup at conventions with t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y enshrined. It could well be that t h i s factor might f a c i l i t a t e greater bloc 39 voting amongst the younger delegates. Women, l i k e the youth and e x - o f f i c i o delegates, are ensured of a minimum l e v e l of representation at conventions. Somewhat su r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s p o t e n t i a l gender gap has not attracted much attention i n convention studies. Brodie's e x p l i c i t examination of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a gender gap at the national conventions of 1983 and 1984 stands out as the sole example. Her analysis suggested that women at both conventions were less supportive of the eventual winner but that'women did not vote as a bloc (1988: 186) . Any difference i n voting between men and women i n the Maritimes has gone unremarked. Adamson and Stewart note that "The region has been p a r t i c u l a r l y slow to accept women i n p o l i t i c s " (1985: 327), but do not suggest that the sexes d i f f e r i n voting behaviour. Surprisingly, while the Chandlers' study finds l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n of a gender gap on Prince Edward Island, t h e i r figures indicate that the Conservatives are more popular among men than with women i n the other two provinces. Indeed, i n Nova Scotia the majority of women prefer the Lib e r a l s , while a slim p l u r a l i t y of men favour the Tories (1979: 51,52). Admittedly, the subset on which the Chandler study bases i t s Maritime figures i s dangerously small. Nonetheless, the implication e x i s t s that women may have somewhat d i f f e r e n t partisan preferences than men. It would therefore be useful to examine the gender gap at Maritime conventions. Nonetheless, i t would be rather s u r p r i s i n g to discover d i v i s i o n s i n t h i s area. Community Size: 40 Another variable which has received somewhat cursory treatment i n convention studies i s community s i z e . P e r l i n , i n examining the 1967 Tory convention, made reference to an association between community size and voting, but he concluded that i t was very weak (1980: 143). Except for t h i s reference, the convention l i t e r a t u r e has been larg e l y s i l e n t on the possible influence of the community size variable. With i t s geographic element i t warrants treatment along with the regional variable. Urban/rural differences have not been absent from Maritime p o l i t i c s . Aucoin's study of the 1970 Nova Scotian e l e c t i o n l e d him to stress "the gains made by the L i b e r a l s i n the Halifax-Dartmouth metropolitan constituencies" (1972: 30). He commented on the mood of change i n the more urban areas and noted the importance of the housing i s s u e — a subject of l i t t l e concern i n the more r u r a l sections of the province. More recently, the New Democrats have increased t h e i r support i n metro Halifax at a time when t h e i r support i n the more r u r a l areas of the province has been, at best, i n a holding pattern. Indeed i n 1984 the Liberals temporarily became the ' t h i r d ' party i n metro Halifax while t h e i r support i n the rest of the province enabled them to remain the o f f i c i a l opposition. This was not the f i r s t time the L i b e r a l s suffered from an urban/ r u r a l problem. Following the resignation of Henry H i c k s — t h e v i c t o r i n the b i t t e r 1954 r e l i g i o u s s t r u g g l e — a s leader, the Liberals. 1957 convention was decided by just eleven votes and was marked by "another s p l i t on the question of leadership, t h i s time an urban- r u r a l d i v i s i o n " (Aucoin, 1972: 27; see also Wearing, 1981: 93). It i s clear that the urban/rural d i v i s i o n represents a p o t e n t i a l voting cleavage, at least i n Nova Scotia. In the other two provinces no urban/rural cleavages have become apparent; p e r h a p s because of t h e pre-eminence of the r e g i o n a l - r e l i g i o u s - e t h n i c d i v i s i o n i n New Brunswick and the overwhelming r u r a l nature of the Island. Attitudes: The possible influence of a t t i t u d i n a l differences on voting has also been investigated at conventions. Convention analysts seem p o s i t i v e l y eager to map the impact of attitudes or ideology on convention voting. There almost seems to be a normative bias that these are the d i v i s i o n s which should matter and studies which found delegate choice at conventions to represent i d e o l o g i c a l factions within a party would create a sensation. Competition at leadership conventions has generally not been viewed as an 'engagement of p r i n c i p l e s . ' Indeed, Smiley i n an early discussion of conventions argued that convention rules, and the consequent necessity of creating a c o a l i t i o n of support would prevent candidates from issuing i d e o l o g i c a l appeals (1968: 378,386,396). It was therefore not su r p r i s i n g that P e r l i n found l i t t l e evidence of an i d e o l o g i c a l cleavage at the 1967 and 1976 Conservative national conventions (1980: 174). Further, Gibbins and Hunzinger i n t h e i r study of delegate voting i n Alberta, argued that p o l i c y preferences had no s i g n i f i c a n t impact on delegate voting behaviour (1986: 14). There i s thus some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for downplaying the impact of a t t i t u d i n a l differences on delegate voting. Yet contrary evidence i s emerging. In t h e i r study of the 197 6 P.C. convention Krause and Leduc found that 4 0% of the delegates claimed i d e o l o g i c a l l a b e l l i n g as important i n t h e i r voting choices (1979: 120). Clark was able to win a fourth b a l l o t v i c t o r y p a r t l y because he won "impressive majorities among those delegates c l a s s i f y i n g themselves to the l e f t - c e n t r e of the party" (Krause and Leduc, 1979: 127). However, he also fought the more right wing Wagner to a v i r t u a l stand o f f among delegates who placed themselves on the right of the party. Johnston, i n his examination of the f i n a l choices at the 1983 and 1984 conventions, also found important a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s . In his assessment of the r e l a t i v e weight of s o c i a l group, geographic and a t t i t u d i n a l variables he provided strong evidence that voting was i d e o l o g i c a l l y based. As he concluded "At t h e i r respective conventions each party was divided l e f t and r i g h t " (1988: 218). In terms of i d e o l o g i c a l s e l f placement, delegates who put themselves on the right of t h e i r party were more supportive of Mulroney i n 1983 and of Turner i n 1984. Moreover, voting d i v i s i o n s could be seen when delegate opinions on continentalism were taken into account. B r i e f l y , delegates who were pro c o n t i n e n t a l i s t favoured Clark or Turner. Indeed, within the Conservative party, attitudes on b i l i n g u a l i s m were also d i v i s i v e while among Liber a l s , the more p r o v i n c i a l i s t delegates were p a r t i c u l a r l y supportive of Turner (Johnston, 1988: 216,217). It i s evident that the most 43 recent national conventions have been marked by a t t i t u d i n a l l y based voting d i v i s i o n s . S t i l l , one would not expect such d i v i s i o n s to be important i n the Maritimes. No controversy marks the place of i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . If there i s one thing on which the Maritime l i t e r a t u r e i s united, i t i s on the irrelevance of ideology to p o l i t i c s i n the region. Dyck states that "one would look i n vain for any consistent i d e o l o g i c a l differences between the L i b e r a l s and Conservatives" (1986: 167) while Wearing maintains that "Neither ideology nor major p o l i c y questions have much to do with party l i n e s — t h e l a s t big issue to divide L i b e r a l s and Conservatives was that of entering Confederation over a hundred years ago" (1981: 89) . S i m i l a r l y , the three major studies of Maritime p o l i t i c s — B e c k ' s The Government of Nova Scotia, MacKinnon's The Government of Prince Edward Island, and Thorburn's P o l i t i c s i n New Brunswick— a l l reach the conclusion that p a r t i e s do not d i f f e r i d e o l o g i c a l l y nor can differences i n voting choice be established on that basis. One looks i n vain for an i n d i c a t i o n that ideology i s important i n the Maritimes. One would c e r t a i n l y not expect i t to be important at leadership conventions. P o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s i n the Maritimes are matters of "men not measures" (Simpson, 1988: 172). This b r i e f review and discussion of the attention variables r e l a t i n g to delegate voting have received i n the l i t e r a t u r e on leadership conventions and Maritime p o l i t i c s h i g h l i g h t s the categories and variables which w i l l provide the framework for analyzing i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s at Maritime conventions. The review i s i n s t r u c t i v e on two other counts. F i r s t , i t points out the f a i l u r e of previous convention studies to systematically investigate the nature of convention d i v i s i o n s . Aside from Johnston's "The F i n a l Choice", convention studies have usually focused on one or two variables. Almost i n e v i t a b l y they found the variables on which they focused to be important and made l i t t l e attempt to assess t h i s importance i n r e l a t i v e terms. Second, the review indicates the paucity of empirical information available on Maritime p o l i t i c s . The subsequent chapters of t h i s thesis w i l l attempt to move forward on both fronts. A number of variables whose influence on delegate voting must be examined have been i d e n t i f i e d and discussed. As Johnston pointed out "Ideological a f f i n i t y , s o c i a l group and geographic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n come re a d i l y to mind as c r i t e r i a that might govern i n d i v i d u a l s ' choices. But the empirical status of these c r i t e r i a i s a matter of controversy" (1988: 204). In the remainder of t h i s thesis the empirical status of these c r i t e r i a as they r e l a t e to Maritime conventions w i l l be investigated i n order to develop a better understanding of i n t e r n a l party d i v i s i o n s and Maritime p o l i t i c s . While conventions provide a 'window' into the parties, i t i s important to look c a r e f u l l y through that window rather than gaze aimlessly. To t h i s end the focus w i l l be on the following areas: 45 1/ Geographic a: Region b: Community size 2/Social Groups T r a d i t i o n a l : a: Religion b: E t h n i c i t y I n s t i t u t i o n a l : a: Delegate type b: Age c: Gender Social Status a: Education b: Income c: Class 3/ A t t i t u d i n a l These three categories of variables w i l l be investigated i n a systematic attempt to assess the degree to which Maritime parties were divided on t h e i r various dimensions. The review c a r r i e d out i n t h i s chapter generates cert a i n expectations as to the p o t e n t i a l impact of these variables at Maritime conventions. The expectation i s that the major sources of d i v i s i o n within the p a r t i e s can be understood i n terms of friends and neighbours and ethno-religious 46 support. Such patterns of support, i f they can be discerned, w i l l point to the continuing importance of ' t r a d i t i o n ' i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . Of the less t r a d i t i o n a l variables, delegate type could be important anywhere while the more e x p l i c i t l y class related variables should be meaningless at a l l conventions. Age, sex and community size may have a s l i g h t impact i n Nova Scotia, but t h e i r influence i n the other provinces should be extremely li m i t e d . The v a l i d i t y of these expectations can be determined i n the following chapters. The s e l e c t i o n of variables for analysis i s scarcely c o n t r o v e r s i a l . In fact the l i t e r a t u r e on state p a r t i e s i n America suggests looking at s i m i l a r variables. As Jewell and Olson point out "There are several common bases for the formation of f a c t i o n a l groups within parties...An urban versus r u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s important i n many states and i s often superimposed upon the regional d i v i s i o n . . . Ethnic and demographic differences among a state population are frequently the basis of factionalism within p a r t i e s . " As well, they go on to mention ideology, generational and economic based groups as possible sources of d i v i s i o n (1982: 52-55) . By concentrating on the variables i n t h i s framework i t should be possible to i s o l a t e the nature of factions i n Maritime parties and determine i f i n fact "Factions may be no more than a campaign group created for and dissolved a f t e r the candidacy of a single person for a single o f f i c e " (Jewell and Olson, 1982: 52). Are Maritime parties f a c t i o n a l i z e d , are there recurring sources of d i v i s i o n , are Li b e r a l s d i f f e r e n t from Tories, has there been change over time, are some of the questions for which t h i s analysis should provide answers. Before addressing these questions d i r e c t l y , i t i s necessary to i d e n t i f y the delegates. The next chapter w i l l provide a p r o f i l e of the delegates. 48 Chapter 3 Maritime Convention Delegates: A P r o f i l e In the past many studies of convention delegates have drawn attention to the personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these i n d i v i d u a l s . Delegates have been p r o f i l e d i n terms of t h e i r s o c i a l and economic background and t h e i r regional 'representativeness.' Such p r o f i l e s , i m p l i c i t l y at least, carry with them a concern over whether the delegates are 'representative.' That i s , whether the delegates i n some way r e f l e c t the society for which they are t r y i n g to select a leader. In fact, the l i t e r a t u r e on leadership conventions i s quite d i r e c t i n i t s assessment of the representativeness of convention delegates i n socio economic terms. The delegates who perform the c r u c i a l job of leadership s e l e c t i o n are, as Courtney explained i n his c l a s s i c The Selection of National Party Leaders, "not a true cross section of Canadian society" (1973: 119). Lele, P e r l i n and Thorburn i n t h e i r study of the 1967 and 1968 national conventions indicate the nature of t h i s 'non-representativeness'. As they put i t "delegates to the two conventions were predominantly representative of the most p r i v i l e g e d groups i n Canadian society" and "were drawn from a s t r i k i n g l y narrow socio-economic base" (1971:205,206). The e l i t e background of the delegates was not just a phenomenon of the 1960s. F r i z z e l l and McPhail, with the benefit of the 197 6 national P.C. convention, repeated the Lele, P e r l i n and Thorburn charge that " a l l delegates come from a remarkably narrow socio economic base" (1979: 20). Sim i l a r l y , Courtney and P e r l i n i n 49 an examination of the national conventions of 1983 and 1984 concluded "In t h e i r socio economic status delegates are manifestly unrepresentative" (1988: 128). Brodie indicated that the nature of t h i s non-representativeness relates to income, education and gender (1988: 177,178) while P e r l i n , Sutherland and Desjardins point out that i n age "people under 30 were somewhat underrepresented among L i b e r a l delegates and somewhat overrepresented among Conservative delegates. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n both pa r t i e s , the number of delegates over 60 was underrepresented" (1988: 192). Delegates to national conventions are mainly male, middle aged, r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t and well educated. However, as Courtney and P e r l i n also note "On other demographic d i v i s i o n s the delegates are more or less representative of d i s t i n c t i v e regional c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " (1988: 128) . Presumably t h i s would include such features as language, e t h n i c i t y , r e l i g i o n and possibly community s i z e . Evidence of the background of p r o v i n c i a l delegates i s less overwhelming, but points i n the same d i r e c t i o n . Blake, Carty and Erickson i n a study of the 198 6 B.C. Social Credit convention pointed out that "The average delegate was the sort of middle aged, well educated, r e l a t i v e l y affluent i n d i v i d u a l usually seen at party conventions i n Canada" (1988: 517). Adamson, i n discussing the 1971 Nova Scotia P.C. convention, also notes that delegates "were middle aged and overwhelmingly male Protestants of Anglo Saxon o r i g i n with a moderately high l e v e l of education and at least by Nova Scotian standards well to do" (1972: 10). 50 The Protestant dominance of the 1971 N.S. P.C. convention suggests a somewhat d i f f e r e n t kind of gathering than one finds n a t i o n a l l y . At national conventions delegates represent the provinces and founding ethnic groups quite adequately: indeed conventions were p a r t i a l l y created for that purpose (Courtney, 1986: 94). The f a i l u r e of cer t a i n parts of the electorate to return MPs of a p a r t i c u l a r party was not regarded as s u f f i c i e n t reason for denying such groups the opportunity to p a r t i c i p a t e i n leadership s e l e c t i o n . As Courtney explains That the L i b e r a l Parliamentary membership i n 1919 was drawn overwhelmingly from the province of Quebec and that the Conservative caucus i n 1927 was composed almost e n t i r e l y of MPs from Ontario, B r i t i s h Columbia and Nova Scotia distressed the p o l i t i c i a n s of the day. Understandably they were attracted to an i n s t i t u t i o n which overcame t h e i r representational concerns by ensuring an equal number of pa r t i c i p a n t s from every constituency i n the country (1986: 94). Thus by holding conventions, and organizing conventions around constituencies, p a r t i e s did not have to fear that p a r t i c u l a r regions would be excluded from the leadership s e l e c t i o n process. Indeed, research by Courtney indicates that regional exclusion was not the only concern i n 1919. Laurier f e l t i t important that he be succeeded by a Protestant and the general b e l i e f was that an English speaking Protestant leader was e s s e n t i a l for the e l e c t o r a l health of the L i b e r a l party (Courtney, 1973: 63; Lederle, 1947: 90) . A caucus dominated not only by Quebec but also by French Catholics was not regarded as the appropriate body for s e l e c t i n g such a leader. Far better a national convention which drew 51 delegates from a l l over the country and, with constituencies as the basic unit, would c e r t a i n l y bring a majority of English Protestants. The Nova Scotian convention i n 1971 was also organized around constituencies, as indeed are a l l Nova Scotian and New Brunswick conventions. (Conventions on PEI use p o l l s as the basic unit.) Yet Catholics, i n spite of t h e i r importance i n Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s , were decidedly underrepresented. Catholics generally did not favour the Conservatives and the Conservatives apparently made l i t t l e e f f o r t to include Catholics at t h e i r leadership convention. Perhaps Maritime conventions, or p r o v i n c i a l conventions i n general, are not expected to f u l f i l such a representative function. It i s useful at t h i s point to p r o f i l e Maritime convention delegates. Do they 'represent' t h e i r s o c i e t i e s ? How? Are they from the same r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e sub stratum of the population as national delegates? Two contrary answers have some face v a l i d i t y . F i r s t , given the cadre nature of Maritime par t i e s and t h e i r dominance by the leadership, delegates are l i k e l y to be of r e l a t i v e l y high status. Second, given that the costs i n time, distance and money to attend a Maritime convention are not overly onerous, delegates are l i k e l y to be of lower status than delegates elsewhere. The geographic compactness of the three provinces makes attendance at a convention r e l a t i v e l y easy and i n e x p e n s i v e — p a r t i c u l a r l y on PEI where delegates anywhere i n the province can commute d a i l y to a convention. Examining the education and income of the delegates provides 52 a mixed message. The educational attainments of the delegates are impressive. Delegates to Island conventions were, however, considerably less educated than those i n the other provinces. The percentage of delegates holding u n i v e r s i t y degrees i n Nova Scotia or New Brunswick ranged from a low of 41% (P.C. N.S. 1971) to a high of 53% (N.S. Li b e r a l s 1980 and 1986). In the general population only 7% of Nova Scotians and 6% of New Brunswickers were educated as highly. 1 On PEI, the percentage of delegates with u n i v e r s i t y degrees was s u b s t a n t i a l l y lower with a range of only 23% to 27%. S t i l l , since only 6% of Islanders have such degrees the delegates were, r e l a t i v e to t h e i r society, well educated. Family income provides a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e . Again, Island delegates were less affluent than t h e i r mainland counterparts but t h i s time t h e i r reported incomes c l o s e l y mirrored the family incomes of Islanders i n general. S p e c i f i c a l l y , as a group, Island delegates were no wealthier than most Islanders. The Nova Scotian P.C. convention of 1971 reveals a most su r p r i s i n g contrast. The delegates, on average, are a c t u a l l y poorer than the general population. For instance, while 13% of the delegates reported family incomes i n excess of $20,000, S t a t i s t i c s Canada figures for 1971 indicate that 31% of Nova Scotian families had incomes i n excess of that amount. In spite of t h e i r educational attainments, these delegates were not by Nova Scotian standards well to do. Nor were Island delegates r e l a t i v e l y well to do. 1 Data on the p r o v i n c i a l populations i s drawn from eit h e r the 1971 or 1981 Canadian Census. The remaining conventions reveal the expected pattern of affluence. In New Brunswick i n 1982, 46% of the delegates had family incomes of over $30,000 while 50% of the 1985 delegates were i n that category. The corresponding figure for the population was only 19%. S i m i l a r l y , 61% of the delegates at the 1980 N.S. convention reported family incomes of over $20,000 while just 43% of Nova Scotian families were that a f f l u e n t . F i n a l l y , i n 1986, 40% of the N.S. L i b e r a l delegates had incomes of over $40,000 while a mere 13% of the population had incomes over $35,000. The examination of the family income figures provides something of a surprise. F i r s t , Island delegates were no richer than Islanders i n general. Second, delegates to the Nova Scotian Conservative convention i n 1971 were on balance poorer than the t o t a l Nova Scotian population. Findings of t h i s nature have not been reported elsewhere i n the country. Despite t h e i r high l e v e l s of education, delegates to Maritime conventions are not quite the same kind of affluent i n d i v i d u a l s found at most conventions. There are also i n t r a regional differences. Island delegates are much closer to t h e i r fellow residents i n education and income than those i n New Brunswick and Nova S c o t i a — 1971 notwithstanding. The small s i z e of the Island both i n terms of population and geography probably accounts for t h i s . With a r e l a t i v e l y t i n y population and distances that allow commuting, Island conventions appear much more accessible to the average c i t i z e n . Overrepresentation of one r e l i g i o u s group, as Adamson found with Protestants at the N.S. P.C. 1971 convention, i s the norm at Maritime conventions. Either Protestants or Catholics are overrepresented. Rarely are the groups present at conventions i n percentages resembling the p r o v i n c i a l populations. Only once, at the Island Conservative convention of 1981, were Protestants and Catholics present i n t h e i r actual population shares (47% C a t h o l i c ) . (It should also be noted that contrary to B.C. where Blake, Carty and Erickson found the p l u r a l i t y of delegates would not designate any r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n , v i r t u a l l y every Maritime delegate made such a designation) (1988: 517). In 1976 at the other Island Conservative convention the percentage of Catholics dropped to 40% while at the two L i b e r a l conventions i t was only 36%. With the well known preference of Island Catholics for the Conservatives the 47% at the 1981 convention i s hardly shocking. The r e l a t i v e absence of Catholics i n 197 6 i s more s t r i k i n g and may have been due to bad weather which kept many delegates away from the Charlottetown convention (Charlottetown Guardian, November 6 1981: 1). Catholics were also underrepresented at the 1971 N.S. Conservative gathering where they made up just 24% of the delegate t o t a l compared to 36% of the population. Again given the h i s t o r i c preference of Catholics for Lib e r a l s t h i s r e l a t i v e absence i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand. Indeed, at the two L i b e r a l conventions Catholics were s l i g h t l y overrepresented: about 45% of the delegates were Catholic. In New Brunswick where Catholics constitute a p r o v i n c i a l majority (54%) and prefer the Lib e r a l s one might expect the two L i b e r a l conventions to be heavily Catholic. This i s the case with 55 Catholics making up 60% of the 1982 convention and 66% i n 1985. These conventions are also noteworthy for the strong I r i s h presence. Only about 7% of New Brunswickers are of I r i s h descent but almost a quarter of L i b e r a l delegates claimed I r i s h ancestry. The major New Brunswick minority, the French, with 31% of the delegate t o t a l at both conventions only s l i g h t l y outnumber the I r i s h . The New Brunswick L i b e r a l party seems to be made up of three s i g n i f i c a n t groups, French, I r i s h Catholics, and B r i t i s h Protestants. The strong presence of the I r i s h can also be seen i n the leaders chosen: three of the l a s t four leaders were of I r i s h descent. The Maritime parties i n convention, rather than brokering the supposedly strong r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s , disproportionately a t t r a c t delegates from the r e l i g i o u s group which supports them most strongly i n e l e c t i o n s . This lends support to the contention of Winn and McMenemy that "the c u l t u r a l backgrounds of party a c t i v i s t s r e f l e c t the p a r t i c u l a r e l e c t o r a l support of the p a r t i e s . . . Each party tends to possess a c t i v i s t s among those groups from which i t draws voting strength" (1976: 152,156). At Maritime conventions t h i s also describes delegates. It i s also useful to assess the urban/rural breakdown of the convention delegates. The three Maritime provinces are the most r u r a l i n the country and one might expect a substantial number of delegates to come from r u r a l areas. On PEI, the majority of the population (64%) l i v e s i n r u r a l communities of fewer than a thousand residents. At the two Conservative conventions delegates from these areas made up 61% and 63% of the t o t a l . Rural Islanders were also i n the majority at the L i b e r a l conventions with 55% and 59%. Rural delegates were i n the majority at a l l conventions but the r u r a l character of the Island was scarcely exaggerated. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick r u r a l delegates were not nearly as numerous as one might expect given the r u r a l nature of those provinces. New Brunswick has been described as a ' r u r a l enclave' and almost h a l f (47%) of New Brunswickers l i v e i n areas of under 1000. In spite of t h i s , less than 20% of the delegates came from those communities. In Nova Scotia, 45% of the population can be designated as r u r a l but of the delegates only 26% i n 1986, 27% i n 1980 and 38% i n 1971 could be so designated. Rural areas were consistently underrepresented, but again a L i b e r a l Conservative difference was noticeable with the Conservative convention containing a considerably higher proportion of r u r a l delegates. The r e l a t i v e l y small proportion of r u r a l delegates may be due to the manner i n which delegates are chosen. Selection meetings are more l i k e l y to be held i n the major centre of each constituency, a fact that might i n h i b i t p a r t i c i p a t i o n by r u r a l c i t i z e n s who would have to t r a v e l longer distances. On PEI where the p o l l rather than the constituency i s the basic unit t h i s problem would be less i n t r a c t a b l e . In contrast to the r u r a l sections of the provinces, the major urban areas have t h e i r f a i r share of convention delegates. Indeed, given the overrepresentation of the smaller counties i n the 57 le g i s l a t u r e s , i t i s surprising that the major urban areas are so well represented. It i s the r u r a l areas that are underrepresented at conventions: the reverse of the case i n l e g i s l a t u r e s . On PEI the conventions are much closer to representation by population than the l e g i s l a t u r e . With p o l l s rather than constituencies forming the basic unit, Queens county—which includes Charlottetown—with almost half the population has about half, and sometimes more, of the delegates. In the l e g i s l a t u r e i t has only 38% of the seats. On PEI 13% of the population l i v e s i n Charlottetown (over 10,000) and from 12% to 19% of the convention delegates were from that c i t y . In New Brunswick 19% of the population l i v e s i n a c i t y of over 50,000 people (Moncton and Saint John) while 18% and 24% of the delegates resided there. F i n a l l y , 14% of Nova Scotians l i v e i n the c i t y of Halifax (over 100, 000) as did 16% of the 1971 delegates and 13% of those i n 1986. (Due to coding categories data are unavailable for 1980) . In both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick then, i t i s the small and large towns that provide the bulk of convention goers. On other dimensions Maritime delegates resemble delegates elsewhere i n Canada. F i r s t , Maritime conventions are male dominated. While women make up a s l i g h t majority i n each province, t h e i r share of the delegate t o t a l reached i t s zenith at only 43% of the 1986 Nova Scotian L i b e r a l convention. At most conventions women made up between a t h i r d and a quarter of the delegate body. Women were s l i g h t l y less evident at Island conventions where they never reached the one-third l e v e l and saw t h e i r representation drop 58 as low as 23% at the 1981 L i b e r a l convention. In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia there i s a hint of a secular trend to female representation. As indicated above, t h e i r largest share was i n the most recent convention while the nadir of t h e i r representation was 24% i n 1971. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s that the Conservative party i s less concerned with female representation. As la t e as 1981 there was some reluctance i n Conservative ranks to have women as p r o v i n c i a l candidates (Adamson and Stewart, 1985: 327). Given t h i s reluctance perhaps the difference i s one of party rather than time. Second, Maritime delegates are r e l a t i v e l y middle aged. In a l l three provinces almost two f i f t h s of the population over 15 i s under 30 while one f i f t h i s over 60. At none of the nine conventions d i d the percentage of delegates under 30 reach 30% and usually i t was less than a quarter. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick those over 60 were almost as numerous at conventions as they are i n the population. At Island conventions those over 60 were s l i g h t l y overrepresented comprising about a quarter of each gathering. In the population at large those between 30 and 60 made up a maximum of 44% of any p r o v i n c i a l t o t a l . At conventions, over h a l f of the delegates were i n t h i s age group and i n eight of nine conventions they made up over 58% of the delegate t o t a l . F i n a l l y , delegates to Maritime conventions possessed strong party t i e s . Unfortunately the data on party background i s not the same for each convention but the picture that emerges i s of delegates who have been party workers for some years. On PEI between 64% and 74% of the delegates belonged to t h e i r party for over ten years. In New Brunswick, 73% of the delegates at each convention admitted working for the Lib e r a l s before the preceding p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n while over h a l f had been delegates to the previous convention (including 77% i n 1982). Nova Scotian delegates likewise revealed a strong pattern of party t i e s . In 1971, over three-quarters of the delegates claimed party memberships of more then ten years. As well, 80% of the 1980 delegates and 81% of those i n 198 6 had worked for the Lib e r a l s i n the l a s t p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . Maritime delegates as a group possess roots i n t h e i r p a r t i e s . Few, i f any, were instant Tories or G r i t s and newcomers were a d i s t i n c t minority. The percentage of delegates who., were e x - o f f i c i o — p r e s e n t because of the party or public p o s i t i o n h e l d — v a r i e d from convention to convention i n part due to the s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t categories used. At a l l conventions MPs, MLAs and Senators, nominated or defeated candidates and members of the executives both federal and p r o v i n c i a l were accorded delegate status automatically. The v a r i a t i o n involved representing members of women's and youth executives, commissions and delegates-at-large. E x - o f f i c i o delegates were most numerous at the Island Conservative convention of 197 6 where they made up 4 6% of the t o t a l . Usually t h e i r share was between 25% and 35% and the huge percentage i n 197 6 may have been due to the bad weather. The fewest e x - o f f i c i o delegates were at the 1980 N.S. L i b e r a l convention where they made up only 18% of the t o t a l . The percentage of e x - o f f i c i o delegates was much increased i n 198 6 when the Li b e r a l s extended 60 e x - o f f i c i o status to members of the women's commission. Nonetheless, at every convention e x - o f f i c i o delegates formed only a minority. This overview of the status of convention delegates i n the Maritimes suggests that they resemble delegates elsewhere i n terms of age, gender and party experience. Party conventions i n the Maritimes are primarily the preserve of male party regulars between 30 and 60. Within the Maritimes, Island delegates are d i s t i n c t . They were less educated, less affluent, r e l a t i v e l y old, generally from r u r a l communities and overwhelmingly male. This description applies to the delegates at each convention on the Island regardless of party or competitive s i t u a t i o n . The only partisan difference that stood out on PEI was the large number of Catholics at the 1981 Tory convention. In Nova Scotia, s t r i k i n g differences e x i s t between Conservative and L i b e r a l delegates. Conservative delegates were r e l a t i v e l y less educated, considerably poorer, more l i k e l y to be men, much more l i k e l y to l i v e i n r u r a l areas and fa r more l i k e l y to be Protestant. The Conservatives r e f l e c t e d more accurately the r u r a l nature of the province and the income and educational attainments of Nova Scotians. As a party, i t thus seems more i n touch with the oft stated conservative and t r a d i t i o n a l nature of Nova Scotian society. The L i b e r a l party appears e x p l i c i t l y as the party of integration, as the party that seeks to include women and to accommodate Catholics. Delegates to the New Brunswick L i b e r a l convention resemble other delegates i n t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y high status. They also evince the Catholic base of the party. Protestants were a d i s t i n c t minority at both L i b e r a l gatherings. 2 Moreover, the ethnic background of the delegates suggests the t r i p a r t i t e nature of the L i b e r a l core of a c t i v i s t s . E s s e n t i a l l y , L i b e r a l delegates were French Catholics, B r i t i s h Protestants or I r i s h Catholics. I r i s h Catholics were greatly overrepresented at both conventions. It i s extremely u n l i k e l y that they would be present i n such numbers at a Conservative convention. With just 7% of the population, I r i s h Catholics accounted for a quarter of the delegate positions at the expense of both French Catholics and B r i t i s h Protestants. In a very r e a l sense the New Brunswick L i b e r a l party is. the party of the I r i s h . F i n a l l y , i t i s clear that Maritime conventions as a rule are not f u l l y representative of t h e i r s o c i e t i e s . B a s i c a l l y , delegates did not mirror c i t i z e n s . Aside from region, Maritime conventions did not f u l f i l the same representational function as national conventions. Maritime delegates provide a p o r t r a i t of party a c t i v i s t s not of the province. Each party convention seems to overrepresent s o c i e t a l groups from which the party draws i t s support. The constituency basis of the conventions does not ensure that a l l p o l i t i c a l l y s a l i e n t groups receive a proportionate voice i n leadership s e l e c t i o n . Conventions are a gathering of the 2 One can only speculate as to whether Conservative conventions would be as Protestant as L i b e r a l conventions are Catholic. Given the pattern of representation at Maritime conventions and the r e a l i t i e s of New Brunswick p o l i t i c s , i t seems l i k e l y that a majority of Tory delegates would be Protestant. 62 f a i t h f u l not an o p p o r t u n i t y t o broaden the f a c e of the p a r t y . In t h i s v e i n the conventions bear more s i m i l a r i t y t o n a t i o n a l NDP conventions than t o those of the f e d e r a l c o u s i n s . I t i s a l s o obvious t h a t the conventions, at l e a s t t o a degree, p r e s e n t something of a v a r i e d f a c e . They are not e x c l u s i v e l y the p r e s e r v e of educated, male, middle-aged p a r t y r e g u l a r s nor do they r e p r e s e n t o n l y one r e l i g i o u s or e t h n i c group. The makeup of the conventions i n d i c a t e t h a t d i v i s i o n s along the l i n e s o u t l i n e d i n chapter two cannot be r u l e d out a p r i o r i . The p o t e n t i a l f o r v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s on any of these v a r i a b l e s e x i s t s , the e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y w i l l be p r e s e n t e d i n the next few c h a p t e r s . Table 3-1 S e l e c t e d Delegate C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by Convention# NS PC 71 PEI PC 76 PEI LIB 78 NS LIB 80 PEI LIB 81 PEI PC 81 NB LIB 82 NB LIB 85 NS LIB 86 U n i v e r s i t y Degree 41 27 23 55 24 24 45 47 53 C a t h o l i c 24 40 36 45 36 47 62 66 45 R u r a l 38 63 59 27 55 61 17 18 26 Urban 16 19 15 — 19 12 24 18 13 Female 24 27 28 34 23 32 32 37 38 Under 30 23 22 23 23 13 17 16 21 28 Over 60 17 25 18 16 27 25 19 15 14 E x - o f f i c i o 31 47 43 21 37 38 25 21 30 # The numbers i n the b o x e s . r e f e r t o the percentage of d e l e g a t e s having the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d e s c r i b e d . Most are s e l f e xplanatory, however r u r a l r e f e r s t o d e l e g a t e s l i v i n g i n communities of under 1000 people. Urban i s d i f f e r e n t f o r each p r o v i n c e : PEI over 10,000, NS over 100,000, NB over 50,000. 63 Chapter 4 P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d : D i v i s i o n s at Commuter Conventions P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d provides the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r the a n a l y s i s of p a r t y d i v i s i o n s as manifested at Maritime l e a d e r s h i p conventions. Studies of l e a d e r s h i p conventions at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l are ra r e and l i t t l e work has been done on PEI. In t h i s chapter an attempt w i l l be made to d i s c o v e r whether there are pa t t e r n s t o delegate v o t i n g at I s l a n d conventions and to t r a c e any such p a t t e r n s i n the support of the va r i o u s candidates. The b a s i c argument i s t h a t I s l a n d , and Maritime, conventions can best be understood i n a ' f r i e n d s and neighbours' framework. Such v o t i n g has been found p r e v i o u s l y i n l a r g e l y r u r a l p o l i t i e s w i t h few i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s . Maritime p o l i t i c s c e r t a i n l y f i t i n t o that category. In t h i s framework, support f o r candidates i s based among vot e r s from t h e i r home area; t h e i r f r i e n d s and neighbours. Moreover, there i s a tendency f o r delegates t o support a candidate who shares the same r e l i g i o u s background. I n t r o d u c t i o n D e s c r i p t i o n s of Maritime p o l i t i c s r a r e l y d i s c u s s the d i f f e r e n c e s which e x i s t among the three p r o v i n c e s . Rather, emphasis i s p l a c e d on the r e g i o n a l nature of p o l i t i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s A s Adamson and Stewart p o i n t out "the par t y p o l i t i c s of Nova S c o t i a , New Brunswick, P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d , and even Newfoundland continue to be s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r . Underlying t h i s p a r t i s a n s i m i l a r i t y i s a manifestly regional p o l i t i c a l culture" (1985: 319). Few dispute the contention that p o l i t i c s i n the region are t r a d i t i o n a l , that economic and class d i v i s i o n s are of l i t t l e importance, that r e l i g i o n has a ' l i n g e r i n g impact', that party leaders have a preeminent role, that party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n begins early and l a s t s a l i f e t i m e and that l i t t l e i n the way of ideology or p o l i c y differences separate the two main p a r t i e s . Such descriptions apply to a l l three provinces. PEI, however, has a number of unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Much of the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s l i e s i n i t s s i z e . With fewer than 125,000 residents the Island i s small even by Maritime standards. The r e s u l t of t h i s i s p o l i t i c a l figures who possess a closer and more di r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p with voters. P o l i t i c s i s quite informal, candidates have a substantial acquaintance among voters and there i s a large degree of public i n t e r e s t and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n party organizations (MacKinnon, 1978: 228). The Island i s also less urbanized than i t s Maritime neighbours. Indeed, PEI i s the only province i n Canada where less than hal f (36%) of the population i s urban (Dyck, 1986: 571). The concerns of r u r a l Islanders are thus of utmost importance to vote seeking p o l i t i c i a n s and Charlottetown, the only c i t y , does not receive the same attention as does Halifax i n Nova Scotia or Fredericton, Saint John and Moncton i n New Brunswick. The Island cannot be divided into regions as e a s i l y as New Brunswick or Nova Scotia. While the North/South d i v i s i o n i n New Brunswick and the Cape Breton/Mainland s p l i t i n Nova Scotia are 65 r e a d i l y apparent to even the casual observer, r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n s on PEI are l e s s obvious. Dyck has gone so f a r as to declare the province "too small t o have s i g n i f i c a n t geographic or r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n s " (1986: 80) Yet he al s o r e f e r r e d t o the three h i s t o r i c counties of Kings, P r i n c e and Queens and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats among these counties i n d i c a t e s the importance of these boundaries. Indeed, R u s s e l l - C l a r k ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the t e n a c i t y with which Kings county MLAs r e s i s t e d a proposed reduction i n t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n 1966 p o i n t s to the sacred nature of rough county e q u a l i t y (1973: 3 1 1 ). Queens county w i t h almost h a l f the p o p u l a t i o n has only 12 of the 32 seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , while Kings with l e s s than h a l f the population of Pri n c e has the same number of MLAs (10) . R e l i g i o n i s of surpassing importance on PEI. MacKinnon has argued that "the I s l a n d has four p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s : L i b e r a l , Conservative, C a t h o l i c and P r o t e s t a n t " (1978: 2 3 7 ) . 'Turns' are taken i n government appointments and the two p a r t i e s take p a r t i c u l a r care to balance t h e i r t i c k e t s r e l i g i o u s l y . Rarely, i f ever, do a Protestan t and a C a t h o l i c d i r e c t l y compete f o r a p r o v i n c i a l seat. This evasion of r e l i g i o u s competition i s aided by the p e c u l i a r nature of I s l a n d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . There are only 16 r i d i n g s , each with two seats, one f o r an Assemblyman and the other f o r a C o u n c i l l o r . The only d i f f e r e n c e between the seats i s i n nomenclature. Each member i s e l e c t e d by separate b a l l o t making i t impossible f o r any I s l a n d e r to use h i s / h e r two votes to 'plump' f o r a p a r t i c u l a r candidate. With the p a r t i e s t a k i n g care t o nominate, say two Catholics for the Councillor seat and two Protestants for the Assembly seat, i t i s also impossible for a Catholic voter to select only Catholic candidates or Protestants to vote only for Protestants. The persistence of t h i s trend could be seen c l e a r l y i n 1982 when newly selected L i b e r a l leader Joe Ghiz ran i n the Sixth Queens Assemblyman seat against Conservative cabinet minister Barry C l a r k — t h e runner up at the 1981 Tory leadership convention—rather than against a less prominent Conservative member for the Councillor seat. Both Clark and Ghiz were Protestant while the other member was a Catholic (Adamson, 1983: 2) . Russell-Clark suggests that such machinations "place r e l i g i o n i n a very central and dominant role i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e " (1973: 300) while Dyck argues that i t renders r e l i g i o n p o l i t i c a l l y innocuous (1986:95). The r e l i g i o u s composition of PEI i s the most evenly divided i n the country. Protestants make up a bare majority of 50.5% to 46.6% for the Catholics. Unlike most of the country, on PEI i t i s the Conservatives who bear a Catholic t i n t and the Li b e r a l s who are more Protestant, a tendency that dates back to the L i b e r a l championing of the Protestant side i n 1870 during the ubiquitous r e l i g i o u s schools question (MacKinnon, 1951: 247). This association has continued with the Liberals not choosing a Catholic leader u n t i l 1978. As recently as 1983 Adamson referre d to the preference of Catholics for Conservatives (1983: 2). Examinations of survey d a t a — a p r o v i n c i a l subsection of the famous national e l e c t i o n s t u d i e s — i n d i c a t e that the Liberals are more Protestant 67 than the Conservatives both i n terms of voters and i d e n t i f i e r s (Jenson, 1976: 123; Chandler and Chandler, 1979: 48; Kornberg, 1982: 154). Two f i n a l s t r i k i n g aspects of Island p o l i t i c s should also be pointed out. F i r s t , the Island i s a wasteland for t h i r d p a r t i e s . Although t h i r d parties have not been t e r r i b l y successful i n New Brunswick or Nova Scotia, t h e i r f a i l u r e on PEI has been absolute. No t h i r d party candidate has ever been elected and only two independents have sat i n the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e since Confederation. As well, the p r o v i n c i a l share of the vote for t h i r d p a r t i e s has never exceeded 6% while the federal vote has not been over 8% since the Progressive b l i p of 1921. Part of the explanation for the t h i r d party f a i l u r e may rest i n the l a s t unique feature of Island p o l i t i c s , the alignment trend. Generally the Island has elected a p r o v i n c i a l government of the same partisan s t r i p e as the federal government, a tendency based on the desire for 'friends at court' (Stewart: 1986) . P r i o r to 1986 one could usually predict the partisan s t r i p e of the Island government by noting which party was i n o f f i c e f e d e r a l l y . It i s evident then that while Island p o l i t i c s f i t well into the l i t e r a t u r e on the Maritime region, differences e x i s t and these differences are not without relevance to t h i s study. The small physical size of the Island makes i t possible for delegates to attend the conventions without the necessity of spending a few days away from home. Delegates can t r a v e l i n to Charlottetown for the convention and return home at night. This a b i l i t y to t r a v e l i n for 68 the day to the convention has occasionally had major ramifications. In 1976, for instance, bad weather on the day of voting kept almost a t h i r d of the e l i g i b l e delegates away. The small population also means that a disproportionately high number of delegates can be involved i n the process. With conventions r e g i s t e r i n g almost 1500 delegates t h i s means than one voter i n 23 i s a c t u a l l y a delegate to one convention or the other. When alternates, families and delegate s e l e c t i o n meetings are considered, the number of people involved i n some way i s amazingly high. As well, given the close r e l a t i o n s h i p between voters and p o l i t i c i a n s i t i s necessary for leadership candidates to be r e l a t i v e l y well known and the l i k e l i h o o d of t h e i r being acquainted with many delegates p r i o r to the convention i s strong. F i n a l l y , a leadership convention may be the only p o l i t i c a l contest on the Island free of r e l i g i o u s balancing. That i s , with no t r a d i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s turns i n party leadership, candidates of both f a i t h s may face each other and the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l i g i o u s l y based voting presents i t s e l f . Convention Context The conventions to be examined i n t h i s study cover a period of PEI p o l i t i c s from 1976 to 1981. It was a period that began with the L i b e r a l s dominating the p r o v i n c i a l scene. The Li b e r a l s , under Alex Campbell, defeated the Conservative government of Walter Shaw in the e l e c t i o n of 1966 and went on to record further v i c t o r i e s i n 1970 and 1974. As the next e l e c t i o n drew closer Campbell seemed assured of making history by becoming the f i r s t Island premier to win four successive ele c t i o n s . In the ten years following Campbell's f i r s t v i c t o r y , the Conservatives had a new leader for each defeat. Their l a s t premier, the e l d e r l y Shaw, r e t i r e d shortly a f t e r the 1966 lo s s . He was permanently replaced i n 1968 by the mayor of Summerside, George Key, who proved unable to win even his own seat i n the 1970 el e c t i o n . In 1973, the party turned to a federal MP to improve i t s fortunes. Melvin MacQuaid was acclaimed leader, but was unable to return the Conservatives to power i n 1974. Indeed, under his leadership the party won only six of 32 seats. He soon resigned to accept a j u d i c i a l appointment. The f i r s t convention to be examined here was held to replace him. It was the t h i r d Tory convention i n less than eight years. Two candidates emerged to contest the leadership. The f i r s t was the most prominent Conservative on the I s l a n d — J . Angus MacLean. MacLean had an extensive background i n Island p o l i t i c s . A war hero and farmer, MacLean, 64, was a s i t t i n g MP with 25 years of parliamentary experience. During the Diefenbaker years i n o f f i c e he served as the Island representative i n the federal cabinet, holding the F i s h e r i e s p o r t f o l i o . MacLean was from Bel l e River i n r u r a l Queens county and was a Presbyterian. The other candidate was much less experienced. Jim Lee, 39, had held e l e c t i v e o f f i c e for less than a year. He was f i r s t elected i n a 1975 by-election i n 5th Queens. His previous p o l i t i c a l 70 background consisted of many years as a party organizer including a s t i n t as p r o v i n c i a l d i r e c t o r of the party. Lee was a r e a l t e r from the Charlottetown suburb of Parkdale and a Catholic. Although both candidates stressed the reorganization of the party as t h e i r top p r i o r i t y they waged very d i f f e r e n t campaigns. Indeed MacLean hardly campaigned at a l l . He stressed his experience, his understanding of the r u r a l way of l i f e and his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with agriculture and the f i s h e r i e s . He eschewed advertising and adopted a very low key s t y l e . In contrast, Lee campaigned vociferously a l l over the Island and bought large ads i n the Charlottetown and Summerside papers. Nothing i n the way of actual p o l i c y disagreements marked the campaign (Halifax Chronicle Herald, September 27 1976: 1,2). Lee was not expected to defeat MacLean and he d i d not. On a rainy Saturday that kept almost a t h i r d of the e l i g i b l e delegates away, MacLean won by a margin of 589 to 437. Lee l a t e r indicated that his campaign was designed more to r a i s e his p r o f i l e than to defeat MacLean. MacLean proved a more successful leader than his immediate predecessors. In the 1978 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n his Conservatives dramatically increased t h e i r vote and came within two seats of forming the government. A L i b e r a l leadership convention followed within s ix months of the e l e c t i o n . Alex Campbell began his tenure as premier with a narrow 17-15 v i c t o r y i n the 1966 e l e c t i o n and aft e r two massive v i c t o r i e s again found himself facing an almost evenly divided l e g i s l a t u r e (17-15) 71 and a popular Conservative leader. Campbell was surprised by the closeness of the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t and, given the s i t u a t i o n facing him, had l i t t l e desire to carry on as premier. He had expected a comfortable margin allowing him to step down g r a c e f u l l y i n two or three years. Obviously, t h i s was no longer a l i k e l y scenario and i n a very controversial move Campbell announced his resignation as leader,premier and MLA just a few weeks af t e r the 1978 e l e c t i o n (Halifax Chronicle Herald, September 14 1978: 5) . A few months l a t e r the federal Liberals rewarded the former premier with a j u d i c i a l appointment. Under the circumstances the L i b e r a l caucus selected a cabinet minister to serve as 'interim premier'. They chose Bennett Campbell—no r e l a t i o n to the previous premier. Bennett Campbell became one of the two candidates at the 197 8 convention. Campbell, 35, was a former high school teacher from Cardigan i n Kings county. F i r s t elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1970 Campbell was a p o l i t i c a l veteran with several cabinet p o r t f o l i o s on his resume. A Catholic, he had the announced support of seven of his fellow cabinet ministers. The other candidate, Gerard M i t c h e l l , was something of an outsider. M i t c h e l l , 35, had never stood for public o f f i c e . His p o l i t i c a l experience consisted of a term as President of the Young L i b e r a l Association of PEI and a los i n g attempt to gain a federal nomination. M i t c h e l l was a lawyer and a former Justice of the p r o v i n c i a l court. He was a Catholic from Charlottetown with no announced support from caucus. 72 As one would expect, the campaign featured Campbell stre s s i n g h i s experience while M i t c h e l l emphasized the need to r e b u i l d the party, something he as an outsider was better positioned to do (Halifax Chronicle Herald, December 9 1978: 2). Campbell ran a low key campaign with l i t t l e t r a v e l l i n g around the province. He was able, as interim premier, to employ a 'Rose Garden' strategy using his o f f i c e to command attention and taking advantage of two t e l e v i s e d F i r s t Ministers' Conferences. His campaign focused on the need to spread industry throughout the province and develop a small town society. M i t c h e l l campaigned vigorously attacking the government as out of touch with the grass roots of the party and condemning the decision of so many cabinet ministers to support Campbell. M i t c h e l l presented himself as one of the 'foot s o l d i e r s ' of the party and described his philosophy of government as 'the least government i s the best government' (Halifax Chronicle Herald, December 11 1978: 2). His candidacy suffered from his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with Charlottetown business i n t e r e s t s and the re s u l t s of the convention were predictably one-sided: Campbell won an easy 963-382 v i c t o r y . In 1981 both parties chose new leaders and i n a larger sense Island p o l i t i c s also changed as a new generation of leaders took over. The period of change began i n February when the Island representative i n the federal cabinet, Dan MacDonald, died. On March 3, Bennett Campbell resigned as L i b e r a l and opposition leader to contest the federal by-election held to replace MacDonald. He undoubtedly expected to be appointed to the federal cabinet i f he 73 won and his v i c t o r y was followed by such an appointment. His three years as L i b e r a l leader had not been markedly successful. Serving as premier i n the evenly divided l e g i s l a t u r e of 1978/79 proved d i f f i c u l t and less than three months af t e r his s e l e c t i o n he asked the Lieutenant Governor to c a l l an e l e c t i o n . His Li b e r a l s were badly beaten i n t h i s e l e c t i o n with MacLean's Tories winning 21 seats and t h e i r largest share of the popular vote since before World War I. MacLean was 67 when he became premier and i t was widely speculated that he would serve only one term. MacLean confirmed t h i s speculation i n August of 1981 when he announced that he would r e t i r e before the end. of the year, having served as premier for only two and a h a l f years and as Tory leader for just f i v e . Thus, by the end of the summer of 1981, both par t i e s were engaged i n the process of leadership s e l e c t i o n with simultaneous campaigns being waged. The Li b e r a l s were the f i r s t to choose with t h e i r convention scheduled for October 24. Again only two candidates were i n the race. The f i r s t candidate, interim party leader G i l b e r t Clements, was alone i n the race for two months u n t i l Joe Ghiz entered i n the l a t e stages. The contrast between the two candidates was strong. Clements was much older, 53 to Ghiz's 36. Clements was much more experienced with ten years of l e g i s l a t i v e experience. He had held a number of cabinet positions before becoming, by caucus choice, interim leader, a p o s i t i o n i n which he apparently acquitted himself quite well (Adamson, 1983). Ghiz was not an MLA although he had often worked on L i b e r a l campaigns and u n t i l his entry into the campaign was President of the p r o v i n c i a l party. Clements was from Kings county, born and r a i s e d i n Montague while Ghiz was from Charlottetown and i n Island terms a ' c i t y boy' (Atlantic Insight, December 1981: 20). Ghiz had more formal education than Clements. Ghiz was a lawyer who held a Master of Law degree from Harvard while Clements was a businessman who had never attended u n i v e r s i t y and claimed his only education i n "the problems of PEI" (Charlottetown Guardian, October 21 1981: 3). Clements was also a t y p i c a l Islander of Anglo Saxon descent while Ghiz was of Lebanese background. Both candidates were Protestant. The candidates ran very d i f f e r e n t campaigns but both emphasized s t y l e rather than p o l i c y . Clements presented himself as the archetypical Islander stressing his Island roots and explaining that Island p o l i t i c s were d i f f e r e n t from p o l i t i c s elsewhere i n Canada (Charlottetown Guardian, October 21 1981: 3). He took advantage of his l e g i s l a t i v e seat to display his experience and his 'preparedness' for the leadership. In essence, his campaign focused on experience, continuity, the value of a l e g i s l a t i v e seat and the virtues of a complete Island background; a l l of which he could o f f e r and Ghiz could not. Ghiz campaigned on the need for r e a l change "to r e v i t a l i z e the party and a t t r a c t new candidates" (Charlottetown Guardian, October 24 1981: 3). He t r i e d to play down his education and c i t y background saying "I've picked l o t s of potatoes and attended l o t s 75 of barn dances" as well as claiming to have eaten many undersized lobsters (Atlantic Insight, December 1981: 20). As the convention delegates gathered the race appeared very close but the speeches seemed to provide Ghiz with a l i f t . He compared himself to Angus MacLean i n his lack of a l e g i s l a t i v e seat and delivered what was considered an excellent speech. As Adamson explained, Ghiz "perhaps won the convention because of his o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l s ; c e r t a i n l y they did not hinder him" (1983: 5,6). The convention res u l t was somewhat unexpected as Ghiz won by a huge margin. Ghiz took 905 votes to just 482 for Clements. The re s u l t s were described as an "apparent slap i n the face" for Clements and supposedly came from a l l parts of the Island (Halifax Chronicle Herald, October 26 1981: 1,2). The Conservative convention was more hotly contested, perhaps because the pr i z e for the v i c t o r was the premier's o f f i c e and almost h a l f a term of o f f i c e . Four candidates, a l l of them cabinet ministers, sought t h i s p r i z e . MacLean's challenger of 1976, Jim Lee, again sought the leadership t h i s time as the most experienced candidate. The other three candidates were elected for the f i r s t time i n 1978. Fred D r i s c o l l , 49, was the oldest candidate. He was Minister of Education and represented the r i d i n g of 3rd Queens. He was born i n Mount Hebert, just east of Charlottetown, and l i v e d i n a Charlottetown suburb. He was a former history professor at UPEI. Barry Clark, 33, was the only Protestant i n the race. He was not only Minister of Energy but was a Protestant clergyman i n 76 Charlottetown. Clark represented the r i d i n g of 6th Queens. The f i n a l candidate, Pat Binns, 33, was something of a r a r i t y i n Island p o l i t i c s . Binns was born i n Saskatchewan and came to the Island only a f t e r he married an Island woman he met at u n i v e r s i t y . He s e t t l e d i n Murray Harbour i n Kings county where, before he became Minister of F i s h e r i e s , he worked as a community planner and farmer. The campaign was quite long and well described by the Charlottetown Guardian as "remarkably free of issues. Candidates have preferred to meet delegates p r i v a t e l y without news media coverage and to send out t h e i r message i n the mail" (November 7 1981: 3). S t i l l , the media provided hints of p o t e n t i a l voting d i v i s i o n s . The Charlottetown paper pointed out that D r i s c o l l had strong regional support i n Queens while Clark and Binns "are popular i n the eastern part of the province [Kings county]" (Guardian, November 7 1981: 1). Attention was also given to the r e l i g i o n of the four candidates. As the Guardian pondered "Jim Lee, Pat Binns and Fred D r i s c o l l are a l l Roman Catholics and i f any s p l i t occurs on the basis of r e l i g i o n these three could f i n d themselves sharing the Catholic vote. Barry Clark, an ordained Protestant Minister, would be expected to capture most of the Protestant vote i n such a s p l i t . Some say r e l i g i o n i s no longer an important factor i n a leadership r'ace or even i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . Others say t h i s i s wishful thinking" (November 7 1981: 1). At the convention Clark apparently 'shone' i n the speeches and his candidacy was thus boosted (Charlottetown Guardian, November 9 1981: 4). The resu l t s of the f i r s t b a l l o t placed Lee out i n front with 581 votes to 348 for Clark, 282 for D r i s c o l l and 237 for Binns. Binns was forced o f f the b a l l o t and attempted to move his support to D r i s c o l l . This proved unsuccessful and D r i s c o l l ' s vote ac t u a l l y declined to 261 on the second b a l l o t ; well behind both Clark at 453 and Lee with 665. The f i n a l b a l l o t saw Lee win with 737 to 577 for Clark. J o u r n a l i s t i c coverage of the voting focused on the impact of Clark's speech and d i d not follow up the po t e n t i a l regional and r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . However, as w i l l be shown, these d i v i s i o n s were rather s t r i k i n g at t h i s as well as other conventions. The delegates to these conventions share many c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s with delegates to conventions previously studied i n Canada. That i s , they are a rather e l i t e group with more education and more prestigious occupations than t h e i r fellow c i t i z e n s . Although they r e f l e c t the province's population i n terms of county, community size and ethnic o r i g i n , neither women nor Catholics were present i n the numbers t h e i r share of the general population suggests they warrant. The 1981 Conservative convention was the exception with Catholics accounting for 47% of the delegate t o t a l . It may have been the bad weather of 197 6 that held the Catholic percentage to 40. In general, delegates to these conventions appear very s i m i l a r to convention goers elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that despite the ' e l i t e ' t i n t , delegates to the Island conventions are somewhat poorer, less educated and older than delegates to other Maritime conventions. Given the li m i t e d population of the Island, 78 and the low costs associated with attending a convention there, t h i s i s not overly s u r p r i s i n g . Before proceeding with a discussion of voting d i v i s i o n s i t i s necessary to note some of the unique categories that must be used to examine geographic d i v i s i o n s on the Island. The relevant categories for the geographic variables on PEI are quite s p e c i f i c to t h i s province. Region i s defined as county with the corresponding d i v i s i o n s into Kings, Prince and Queens. On PEI, a p o t e n t i a l urban/rural vote cleavage cannot be assessed using the most common categories. There are few metropolitan areas and, indeed, the Island i s r u r a l i n a way l i k e no other province. S t a t i s t i c s Canada's d e f i n i t i o n of r u r a l as a community of less than a thousand residents f i t s most of the province. The d i v i s i o n s of the larger centres must be modified, given that no c i t y has a population i n excess of twenty thousand and only one, Charlottetown, has over ten thousand. The categories for community size, then, w i l l be less than a thousand, between a thousand and ten thousand, and over ten thousand. Geographic Divisions Media coverage of the four conventions raised the p o s s i b i l i t y of regional d i v i s i o n s at only one—the 1981 Conservative. Indeed, the media e x p l i c i t l y denied the p o s s i b i l i t y of regional voting at the L i b e r a l convention of 1981 by claiming that Ghiz's v i c t o r y was province wide. Their 1981 'Tory' contention appears more v a l i d . It was suggested that Binns and Clark had extensive support i n Kings 79 county while D r i s c o l l ' s support was from Queens county. This appears l a r g e l y accurate. Analysis of the f i r s t b a l l o t r e s u l t s make clea r that support for the l a s t place Binns was concentrated among his friends and neighbours from Kings from whom he received a p l u r a l i t y . Unfortunately for his candidacy t h i s represented 64% of his strength and he was unable to win even 10% vote shares from delegates outside the region. Support for D r i s c o l l displayed a s i m i l a r pattern. Seventy-one percent of his support came from Queens county and he f i n i s h e d second to Lee i n that region. D r i s c o l l ' s vote share did not exceed 10% elsewhere. Clark a c t u a l l y did not a t t r a c t noteworthy support i n Kings but both he and Lee had broadly based support. (See Table 4:1 for regional results.) Subsequent b a l l o t s did not show s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s , but i t i s useful to note the regional nature of the vote. On the second b a l l o t , with the mandatory exclusion of Binns, Lee won a p l u r a l i t y of votes from each region. Despite an endorsement from Binns, D r i s c o l l p o l l e d the fewest votes from Kings d e l e g a t e s — a l b e i t s u b s t a n t i a l l y more than on the f i r s t b a l l o t . He suffered vote slippage i n support from delegates i n other regions and f e l l s l i g h t l y behind Clark i n Queens. The f i n a l b a l l o t displayed no sign of a regional cleavage. Only two candidates from greater Charlottetown remained and Lee won comfortable majorities from delegates i n each region. At the L i b e r a l convention of 1981, contrary to media assertions, (Halifax Chronicle Herald, October 26 1981: 1,2) Ghiz did not win a province wide v i c t o r y . His huge margin disguised a 80 regional anomaly. Actually, Clements won a majority of the votes cast by his friends and neighbours from Kings county. Indeed, almost a t h i r d of the votes he received came from t h i s , the Island's smallest region. Ghiz, of course, won the two larger regions handily. A somewhat si m i l a r pattern was apparent i n 1978. Campbell's overwhelming v i c t o r y was not quite as a l l encompassing as his huge margin of v i c t o r y might suggest. Although Campbell won majority support i n each region, the magnitude of his v i c t o r y was lar g e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the 85% of the vote he received from delegates representing Kings and Prince. M i t c h e l l made a r e l a t i v e l y strong showing with delegates from his home county of Queens. Forty-four percent of those delegates voted for him providing over h a l f of his t o t a l support. Only the 1976 Conservative convention f a i l e d to demonstrate a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n between region and voting and i t may be the exception that proves the r u l e . Both candidates—Lee and MacLean—were from Queens and thus shared friends and neighbours. Actually, t h i s conforms to one element of friends and neighbours voting found by Tatolovich i n his study of voting i n M i s s i s s i p p i . According to his analysis such support patterns are "more frequent when candidates do not reside i n the same approximate geographical area of the state" (1975: 809). This was true of Lee and MacLean and support for each candidate, then, was reasonably constant i n each region. 81 Table 4-1 Vote by County* Kings Queens P r i n c e 1978 Campbell 84%* 56% 87% M i t c h e l l 16 44* 13 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.000 n=38 n=80 n=38 1981 L i b e r a l Clements 55%* 31% .20% Ghiz 45 69* 80 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.000 n=31 n=75 n=59 1981 P.C. Binns 40%* 5% 9% C l a r k 20 24* 29 D r i s c o l l 7 28* 10 Lee 33 43* 52 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.000 n=45 n=86 n=68 An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s each candidate's home county. Nonetheless, when community s i z e was c o n s i d e r e d the p a t t e r n s of support f o r Lee and MacLean began t o d i v e r g e . Lee's candidacy was r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g i n the more urban s e c t i o n s of the p r o v i n c e while MacLean's s t r e n g t h l a y predominantly with d e l e g a t e s from r u r a l a reas. S i m i l a r ' d i v i s i o n s c o u l d be seen at the 1978 L i b e r a l c o nvention. Delegates from Charlottetown (community over 10,000) voted much d i f f e r e n t l y than others at t h a t convention. M i t c h e l l was able t o win an o u t r i g h t m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by de l e g a t e s from the c a p i t a l , but took l e s s than 30% of the votes c a s t by other d e l e g a t e s . Almost 30% of h i s t o t a l support came from the c i t y , as 82 compared t o l e s s than 10% of Campbell's. M i t c h e l l ' s base was c l e a r l y i n h i s Charlottetown home. Again at the 1981 L i b e r a l convention, the r e l a t i v e l y weak showing made by Ghiz i n Queens county d i s g u i s e d the h i g h l e v e l of support p r o v i d e d by d e l e g a t e s from Charlottetown. E i g h t y one percent of the de l e g a t e s from t h i s h i s home town vote d f o r him. T h i s support c o n t r a s t s f a v o u r a b l y with h i s r e g i o n a l support from Queens of on l y 69%. Examination of the community s i z e v a r i a b l e at the 1981 P.C. convention g r e a t l y enhances understanding of the geographic d i v i s i o n . I t was e v i d e n t t h a t Lee drew p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more support from urban I s l a n d e r s . N e a r l y h a l f of h i s support came from d e l e g a t e s r e p r e s e n t i n g urban areas while the other candidates had l e s s than a q u a r t e r of t h e i r support so based. C l a r k ' s s t r e n g t h was 83% r u r a l and he ranked no h i g h e r than t h i r d i n support from urban based d e l e g a t e s . I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t , while D r i s c o l l f i n i s h e d second i n support from Charlottetown, i t was a very d i s t a n t second making i t obvious t h a t h i s Queens county support was l a r g e l y from r u r a l d e l e g a t e s . The second b a l l o t showed an even more pronounced u r b a n / r u r a l d i v i s i o n . Lee won huge m a j o r i t i e s from urban d e l e g a t e s , but h i s r e l a t i v e weakness among r u r a l d e l e g a t e s f o r c e d another b a l l o t . C l a r k ' s base remained r u r a l and he a t t r a c t e d the l e a s t support from Charlottetown d e l e g a t e s . The f i n a l b a l l o t c o n t i n u e d the t r e n d . Lee took over t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the votes c a s t by urban d e l e g a t e s and was p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l i n Charlottetown where he won 82% of 83 the v o t e . C l a r k was c o m p e t i t i v e only among r u r a l d e l e g a t e s who gave him 44% of t h e i r votes f o r 77% of h i s support. T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the e f f e c t of geographic v a r i a b l e s on del e g a t e v o t i n g suggests t h a t geographic v o t i n g cleavages are pr e s e n t at I s l a n d conventions and t h a t such d i v i s i o n s f i t i n t o a f r i e n d s and neighbours framework. I t i s p o s s i b l e t o probe deeper i n t o the nature of the geographic d i v i s i o n by examining the i n t e r a c t i o n of the two v a r i a b l e s . In 1976/ the apparent support f o r Lee from urban d e l e g a t e s was l i m i t e d t o Queens county and even t h e r e MacLean was supported by more Charlottetown d e l e g a t e s . No r e g i o n a l t r e n d was apparent because Lee's candidacy was as weak i n r u r a l Queens as i t was i n the other r e g i o n s . Lee's base l a y i n the non-Charlottetown urban areas of Queens where d e l e g a t e s a c t u a l l y supported him over MacLean. Not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h i s was the area i n which Lee l i v e d . As w e l l , the h i g h e s t l e v e l of support f o r MacLean was p r o v i d e d by de l e g a t e s from r u r a l Queens, the area which c o n t a i n s h i s home 'town' of B e l l e R i v e r . F r i e n d s and neighbours support can thus be seen even f o r Lee and MacLean. (See Table 4-2 f o r community s i z e r e s u l t s f o r Queens county.) I t a l s o becomes obvious t h a t the s t r o n g showing of M i t c h e l l i n Queens at the 1978 L i b e r a l convention was produced by h i s de l e g a t e support from Charlottetown. I t was not i n d i c a t i v e of a wider u r b a n / r u r a l s p l i t s i n c e Campbell l i t e r a l l y r o u t e d him among de l e g a t e s from urban areas of other r e g i o n s . M i t c h e l l d i d be s t i n Queens county, but was r e a l l y p opular only with urban d e l e g a t e s 84 who, l i k e he, l i v e d i n Charlottetown. At the 1981 L i b e r a l convention Clements' s t r e n g t h was d i s t r i b u t e d evenly between the r u r a l and urban areas of h i s home r e g i o n . As w e l l , he drew d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from d e l e g a t e s i n r u r a l Queens. With other d e l e g a t e s h i s candidacy was very weak. Ghiz d i d p o o r l y i n a l l of Kings, r e l a t i v e l y p o o r l y i n r u r a l Queens, but e x c e e d i n g l y w e l l i n r u r a l P r i n c e . The h i g h e s t l e v e l of support g i v e n Ghiz came from h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours i n Charl o t t e t o w n . Ghiz's only s t r o n g support from r u r a l d e l e g a t e s was i n P r i n c e c o u n t y — the area most removed from Clements' home base The i n t e r a c t i o n of the two geographic v a r i a b l e s a l s o e l u c i d a t e s the nature of each candidate's base at the 1981 Co n s e r v a t i v e convention. Binns d i d w e l l with d e l e g a t e s from a l l p a r t s o f Kings, but not with d e l e g a t e s from any other geographic area. Lee's s t r e n g t h was g r e a t e s t i n the urban areas of P r i n c e and Queens where de l e g a t e s gave him easy m a j o r i t i e s . Delegates from r u r a l Queens a c t u a l l y gave D r i s c o l l and C l a r k more votes than Lee. On the second b a l l o t , Lee's s t r e n g t h broadened. A s i d e from the de l e g a t e s from r u r a l Queens—who s p l i t t h e i r support t h r e e w ays—Lee won p l u r a l i t i e s from every area. The f i n a l b a l l o t gave Lee m a j o r i t i e s from d e l e g a t e s i n a l l areas of each r e g i o n . C l a r k ' s o n l y r e s p e c t a b l e showing came from d e l e g a t e s i n r u r a l Queens. 85 Table 4-2 Vote by Community Size i n Queens County Over 10,000 1000-10,000 Less than 1000 1976 Lee 48% 57%* 33% MacLean 52 43 67* Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.01 n=42 n=13 n=20 1978 Campbell 48% 50% 63% M i t c h e l l 52* 50 38 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.01 n=40 n=16 n=23 1981 L i b e r a l Clements 19% 29% 42% Ghiz 81* 71 58 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.01 n=31 n=17 n=2 6 1981 P.C. Binns 5% 6% Clark 16* 6% 36 D r i s c o l l 21 22 33* Lee 58 72* 25 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.01 n=48 n=18 n=19 An asterisk indicates the home area of a candidate. It i s evident that the geographic voting d i v i s i o n s indicate a strong pattern of friends and neighbours voting. Examining region and community size simultaneously indicates the ubiquitous nature of t h i s phenomenon. In 197 6 when Lee and MacLean were from the same region and no obvious friends and neighbours support appeared, some actually existed. Each candidate attracted his highest l e v e l of support with delegates from his home part of Queens c o u n t y — i n the 86 case of MacLean r u r a l Queens and for Lee suburban Charlottetown. Similarly, Ghiz—whose support o v e r a l l i n Queens county did not stand o u t — received a higher proportion of support from Charlottetown delegates than he did from other delegates. Friends and neighbours support was strong and consistent. Social Groups To begin the analysis of s o c i a l group variables i t i s useful to s t a r t with i n s t i t u t i o n a l groups. The media coverage offered no indi c a t i o n of di v i s i o n s on the basis of age or gender but the fact that the two L i b e r a l conventions involved candidates who had been designated as interim leaders—and i n 1978 Premier—suggests a possible d i v i s i o n between the brass and the grass. The party establishment may have acted to endorse the decision made by the caucus. Indeed, the voting of e x - o f f i c i o delegates d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from that of the regular delegates. Although, i n 1978, both delegate groups gave majority support to Campbell, his share of the e x - o f f i c i o vote was a massive 88%. F u l l y 39% of his support came from these delegates while the corresponding figure for M i t c h e l l was only 13%. Not surprisingly, the e x - o f f i c i o delegates were strongly behind the acting Premier. (See Table 4-3). More surprising was the 1981 r e s u l t : L i b e r a l e x - o f f i c i o delegates were not behind Clements i n spite of the fact that he was interim leader. Support for Ghiz was much higher among ex-o f f i c i o delegates and f u l l y 42% of his strength came from that group, compared to only 24% of Clements' support. Obviously, the 87 p o s i t i o n of i n t e r i m l e a d e r d i d not a i d Clements. In s t a r k c o n t r a s t t o 1978/ e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s l e d other d e l e g a t e s i n o v e r t u r n i n g the caucus c h o i c e . Of course the s i t u a t i o n was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The caucus c h o i c e was not the a c t i n g Premier and the p a r t y was out of power. As i n 1965, when Ale x Campbell was chosen l e a d e r , the L i b e r a l p a r t y i n o p p o s i t i o n opted f o r a younger more dynamic l e a d e r t o r e t u r n them t o power. T h i s p r o v i d e s an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r a s t - t o the C o n s e r v a t i v e s i n 1976 who chose an o l d e r , t r a d i t i o n a l man i n hopes of e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y . Perhaps t h i s r e v e a l s something about the i n s t i n c t i v e r e a c t i o n s of each p a r t y . I t appears t h a t the* r e f l e x i v e response of the T o r i e s i n o p p o s i t i o n i s t o choose an o l d e r and e x p e r i e n c e d candidate f o r t h e i r l e a d e r , a c h o i c e they repeated i n 1988. 1 In c o n t r a s t , the L i b e r a l s i n o p p o s i t i o n seem t o p r e f e r younger and 'newer' l e a d e r s . T h i s h i n t s of t h a t r a r e s t of Maritime phenomena—a d i f f e r e n c e between the p a r t i e s . 1 In 1988 the T o r i e s s e l e c t e d an experienced f e d e r a l MP, Mel Gass as t h e i r new l e a d e r . L i k e MacLean b e f o r e him, Gass d e f e a t e d a much younger and l e s s e x p e r i e n c e d c h a l l e n g e r . 88 Table 4-3 Vote by Delegate Type 1978 Regular E x - O f f i c i o Campbell 62% 88% M i t c h e l l 38 12 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05. n=93 n=42 1981 L i b e r a l Clements 38% 21% Ghiz 62 79 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05. n=99 n=56 the p a r t y or p u b l i c p o s i t i o n s they h o l d . Regular r e f e r s t o a l l other d e l e g a t e s . N e i t h e r o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e conventions p r o v i d e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s . Nonetheless, a c l e a r p a t t e r n c o u l d be observed. In each case, the winning candidate a t t r a c t e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s and a much hig h e r p r o p o r t i o n of h i s support came from these d e l e g a t e s . The impact of age was more r e s t r a i n e d . S t i l l , an age cleavage can be noted at the 1978 L i b e r a l convention where support f o r M i t c h e l l d e c l i n e d as the age of de l e g a t e s i n c r e a s e d . (See Table 4-4). An i d e n t i c a l , but s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t , r e l a t i o n s h i p can a l s o be seen at the C o n s e r v a t i v e convention of 1976. Lee won a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by de l e g a t e s under 30, but l e s s than a t h i r d of those c a s t by the over 60 group. Correspondingly, MacLean's vote share i n c r e a s e d with the age of the d e l e g a t e s . 89 Table 4-4 Vote by Age 1976 Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Lee 53% 42% 32% MacLean 47 58 68 n=32 n=66 n=31 1978 Campbell 57% 72% 86% M i t c h e l l 43 28 14 Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05. n=37 n=98 n=28 The f i n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i s gender but i t i s very c l e a r t h a t gender has l i t t l e impact on v o t i n g at any of the conventions. Male and female d e l e g a t e s supported candidates i n roughly the same p r o p o r t i o n s at each convention. I f a p o l i t i c a l gender gap e x i s t s , i t was not r e f l e c t e d i n d e l e g a t e v o t i n g behaviour. T h i s review of the v o t i n g by i n s t i t u t i o n a l groups suggests a r e l a t i o n between v o t i n g and del e g a t e type at the two L i b e r a l conventions and between age and v o t i n g i n 1978. Of course i t i s with the more t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s where s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s are expected. E t h n i c d i v i s i o n s were not very important: they were s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y at the 1976 Co n s e r v a t i v e convention. Although the n o n - B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s comprised over 10% of the t o t a l d e l e g a t e p o p u l a t i o n at each convention, i t was only at the 1976 g a t h e r i n g t h a t they seemed t o vote as a group. Lee was able t o win over 75% of the votes c a s t by n o n - B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s . These d e l e g a t e s made up 90 23% of Lee's t o t a l support while forming only 13% of the convention t o t a l . MacLean, o b v i o u s l y , d i d much b e t t e r among de l e g a t e s of B r i t i s h o r i g i n . A l l t h i n g s b e i n g equal, d e l e g a t e s of n o n - B r i t i s h descent were 38% more l i k e l y t o support Lee. (See Table 4-14). In the f o u r conventions t h e r e was only one candidate whose p e r s o n a l a n c e s t r y was n o n - B r i t i s h — G h i z . Yet at the 1981 L i b e r a l c onvention he was no more s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g support from t h i s d e l e g a t e group than he was from the B r i t i s h . E t h n i c d i v i s i o n s then, do not appear t o be an e x p r e s s i o n of group or m i n o r i t y s o l i d a r i t y . Or at l e a s t Acadians do not c o n s i d e r a P r o t e s t a n t of Lebanese descent i n such terms. The major t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i s r e l i g i o n and i t i s with t h i s v a r i a b l e , g i v e n the I s l a n d ' s h i s t o r y , t h a t one might expect to f i n d major v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s . One may r e c a l l , f o r i n s t a n c e , the Charlottetown Guardian's s p e c u l a t i o n on the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n at the 1981 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e l i g i o u s cleavage i s one of the most i n t e r e s t i n g and c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s i n the area of Maritime p o l i t i c s . The evidence p r o v i d e d here w i l l do l i t t l e t o ease the c o n t r o v e r s y . The Guardian's s p e c u l a t i o n was w e l l founded. A s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o n and v o t i n g was e v i d e n t on a l l t h r e e b a l l o t s . (See Table 4-5). On the f i r s t b a l l o t , C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s supported, i n descending o r d e r : Lee, D r i s c o l l , Binns and C l a r k ; while P r o t e s t a n t s opted f o r : Lee, C l a r k and a t h i r d p l a c e t i e between Binns and D r i s c o l l . Over h a l f the support f o r Lee, Binns and D r i s c o l l came from t h e i r f e l l o w C a t h o l i c s . In c o n t r a s t , 91 Protestants accounted for 74% of Clark's support. To further i l l u s t r a t e the d i v i s i o n , Lee took over half the Catholic vote, but only 38% of Protestant votes. The trend continued on the second b a l l o t with D r i s c o l l outpolling Clark among Catholics, Lee winning 60% of the Catholic vote and a v i r t u a l dead heat between Lee and Clark i n the contest for Protestant votes. Only on the f i n a l b a l l o t was Lee able to win an outright majority from both r e l i g i o u s groups. However, his 52% share of the Protestant vote paled i n comparison to the support given him by over three-quarters of the Catholics. It i s clear that a strong tendency exists for delegates to support a candidate from t h e i r own r e l i g i o u s group. On the f i n a l b a l l o t , the r e l a t i v e disdain of Protestants for Lee can be seen i n the fact that his support from Protestants was 25 points lower than his Catholic support. Although i t escaped media attention, a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l i g i o u s s p l i t was also present i n 1976. At that convention Lee won an absolute majority of the votes cast by Catholic delegates. Yet he was able to win only a t h i r d of the Protestant vote and thus l o s t the convention by a sizable margin. The r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and vote seems clear and unmistakable. 92 Table 4-5 Vote by R e l i g i o n 1976 P r o t e s t a n t C a t h o l i c Lee 33% 57% MacLean 67* 43 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.000. n=78 n=51 1981 Binns 13% 15% C l a r k 35 (49%)* 14 (24%) D r i s c o l l 13 21 Lee 38 (51) 50 (76) Chi Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.000. n=105 n=94 An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s the c a n d i d a t e i s P r o t e s t a n t T The P r o t e s t a n t / C a t h o l i c dichotomy had l i t t l e impact on v o t i n g at e i t h e r of the L i b e r a l c onventions. In 1978, two C a t h o l i c candidates c o n f r o n t e d each other, while two P r o t e s t a n t s c o n t e s t e d the 1981 convention. At both conventions, C a t h o l i c s and P r o t e s t a n t s supported the candidates i n v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s . T h i s was not the case at the C o n s e r v a t i v e conventions. At these conventions t h e r e was a s t r i k i n g tendency f o r C a t h o l i c s t o vote d i f f e r e n t l y than P r o t e s t a n t s . The f i n a l s o c i a l groups t o be examined are those t h a t have something of an economic base. There i s l i t t l e reason t o expect d i v i s i o n s on these v a r i a b l e s . I f c o n t r o v e r s y e x i s t s as t o the r o l e of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime p o l i t i c s , no such debate marks the q u e s t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l c l a s s cleavage. The answer i s unambiguously n e g a t i v e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e something of a s u r p r i s e t o observe 93 v o t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s on the b a s i s of income and e d u c a t i o n . (See Tables 4-6 and 4-7) . At the 197 6 convention, Lee was ab l e t o secure m a j o r i t y support from d e l e g a t e s i n the h i g h e s t income b r a c k e t . S i m i l a r l y , i n 1978, much h i g h e r l e v e l s of support f o r M i t c h e l l were found among the w e a l t h i e s t d e l e g a t e s and those with u n i v e r s i t y degrees. Table 4-6 Vote by Income 1976 High Medium Low Lee 54% 30% 35% MacLean 46 70 65 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05. n=57 n=43 n=23 Table 4-7 Vote by Educat i o n 1978 U n i v e r s i t y Degree High School Graduate Less than High School Campbell 47% 59% 53% M i t c h e l l 53 41 . 47 Ch i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05. n=37 n=86 n=39 Occupation i s the other v a r i a b l e g e n e r a l l y used t o assess c l a s s c l e a v a g e s . Using the c a t e g o r i e s Stewart used i n h i s study o f the l a s t n a t i o n a l conventions a ' c l a s s ' s p l i t was again e v i d e n t at the 1978 c o n v e n t i o n — a n d only at t h a t c o n v e n t i o n . 2 A d i s t i n c t 2 The c l a s s p o s i t i o n was determined i n a manner q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h a t used by Stewart (1988: 170). P r o f e s s i o n a l s , members of the c l e r g y and p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s people were a l l c o n s i d e r e d upper middle 94 p a t t e r n i s e v i d e n t w i t h M i t c h e l l ' s support i n c r e a s i n g with c l a s s p o s i t i o n . (See Table 4-8). S u r p r i s i n g l y , one must t e n t a t i v e l y conclude t h a t a c l a s s d i v i s i o n a f f e c t e d v o t i n g i n 1978. Table 4-8 Vote by C l a s s 1978 Upper Middle Middle Working Campbell 52% 77% 89% M i t c h e l l 48 23 11 C h i Square s i g n i f i c a n t <.05 n=46 n=96 n=9 The s i g n i f i c a n c e of s o c i a l c l a s s v a r i a b l e s p r e s e n t something of an ex p l a n a t o r y dilemma. Cleavages of t h i s type were not expected and t h e i r s t r o n g presence i n 1978 r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about t h a t convention. However, as w i l l be shown l a t e r , the importance of these d i v i s i o n s d i s s i p a t e when they are examined i n tandem wi t h geography. I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t t o Stewart's 1984 f i n d i n g t h a t a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n a t i o n a l L i b e r a l c onvention would have enhanced C h r e t i e n ' s chance of v i c t o r y , a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e convention i n 1978 would l i k e l y have widened Campbell's winning margin. T h i s examination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l groups and d e l e g a t e v o t i n g i n d i c a t e s t h a t the s t r o n g e s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s were c l a s s . Delegates who were farmers, fishermen, s a l e s p e o p l e , commercial managers, or s e l f employed were t r e a t e d as middle c l a s s w h i l e t r a d e s p e o p l e and l a b o u r e r s were p l a c e d i n the working c l a s s . Some occupations d e f i e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . I f a delegate c l a i m e d t o be a student, a housewife, r e t i r e d , unemployed or other, t h e i r income and e d u c a t i o n l e v e l was summed. Delegates who scored 5 or 6 were put i n with the upper middle c l a s s , those s c o r i n g 3 or 4 i n t o the middle with the remainder a s s i g n e d t o the working c l a s s . 95 found with r e l i g i o n , but that delegate type and even class d i v i s i o n s were also of some import. (See Table 4-9). Examining the relationships between the various group variables should help to illuminate the nature of the s o c i a l group cleavages. Table 4-9 Cramer's V 1976 P.C. 1978 Lib e r a l 1981 Lib e r a l 1981 P.C. (1) 1981 P.C. (2) 1981 P.C. (3) Region —* .32 .26 .32 — — Urban — .23 -- .25 .26 .25 Eth n i c i t y .26 — -- — — — Religion .23 -- . 25 . 26 .25 Age — . 20 — — — — Gender — — — — — Delegate Type — .26 . 17 — — — Education — .23 — -- -- --Income . 2 3 — — .13 — — Class — .2 ' / — — — — *Cramer's V i s reported only for variables associated with voting at the .05 l e v e l or better. It i s useful to begin with an examination of the ethnic cleavage i d e n t i f i e d at the 1976 convention. It i s d i f f i c u l t to argue that ethnic d i v i s i o n s are t e r r i b l y relevant i n Island p o l i t i c s . Instead, the ethnic d i v i s i o n probably replicates the r e l i g i o u s one. It seems l i k e l y that the bulk of the non-British delegates were Catholics and t h e i r support might be better understood i n that context. This explanation appears b a s i c a l l y sound. The majority of 96 n o n - B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s were indeed C a t h o l i c and they d i d vote overwhelmingly f o r Lee. No such c l e a r p a t t e r n c o u l d be d i s c e r n e d from the s m a l l number of n o n - B r i t i s h P r o t e s t a n t s . Moreover, MacLean's huge share of the B r i t i s h vote can be a t t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y t o h i s broad base among P r o t e s t a n t s . Lee was q u i t e c o m p e t i t i v e i n the quest f o r votes from B r i t i s h C a t h o l i c s . The ' l i n g e r i n g impact' of r e l i g i o n m e r i t s f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n (Adamson and Stewart, 1985: 327). The impression l e f t by the l i t e r a t u r e on Maritime p o l i t i c s i s t h a t Maritime p o l i t i c s are changing and the importance of r e l i g i o n i s i n d e c l i n e . Yet the evidence from the two Tory conventions suggests otherwise. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s evidence does not c o n t r a d i c t arguments as to the d e c l i n e of r e l i g i o n and might a c t u a l l y s t rengthen them. The observed r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s c o u l d have been produced by p a r t i c u l a r groups and a change i n the prominence of r e l i g i o n might be d e t e c t e d when c e r t a i n groups are i s o l a t e d . Which groups would be most l i k e l y t o r e f l e c t the changing nature of Maritime p o l i t i c s ? F i r s t , the young; those d e l e g a t e s whose involvement i n p o l i t i c s i s most r e c e n t . L i p s e t , i n a n a l y z i n g mid 20th century American v o t i n g found "that younger C a t h o l i c s were more l i k e l y t o vote Republican than t h e i r e l d e r s , while younger P r o t e s t a n t s were more prone t o be Democratic than o l d e r ones. These d i f f e r e n c e s might r e f l e c t sheer r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t t r a d i t i o n but more probably are the r e s u l t of the experiences of d i f f e r e n t g e n e r a t i o n s " (1981: 281,282). In essence, younger v o t e r s who e n t e r e d the p o l i t i c a l 97 system i n a p e r i o d when r e l i g i o n was l e s s important were more l i k e l y t o abandon r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g p a t t e r n s . In h i s study of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and p r a c t i s e i n Canada, Bibby found t h a t Canadians born i n 1930 or e a r l i e r are s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y than others t o a s s e r t p o s i t i v e b e l i e f i n God, the d i v i n i t y of Jesus. They are a l s o f a r more i n c l i n e d t o pray p r i v a t e l y , t o c l a i m t o have experi e n c e d God... And these o l d e r Canadians are c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i k e l y than other Canadians t o p r o f e s s C h r i s t i a n commitment r a t h e r than non-commitment (1987: .95). Given t h i s evidence, one c o u l d h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t the rumoured d e c l i n e of r e l i g i o n might r e s u l t i n no observable r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s among de l e g a t e s under 30. The importance of r e l i g i o n , then, might r e s t on the behaviour of o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Second, l e v e l of e d u c a t i o n should be examined. Again L i p s e t has argued t h a t "Education presumably broaden's man's outlook, enables him t o understand the need f o r norms of t o l e r a n c e . . . and i n c r e a s e s h i s c a p a c i t y t o make r a t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l c h o i c e s " (1981: 39) . Once more, Bibby found " t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n the l e v e l of e d u c a t i o n tends t o be a s s o c i a t e d with modest decreases i n every age group i n b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s r e g a r d i n g God, the d i v i n i t y of Jesus and p r a y e r " (1987: 98). Thus, one can hypothesize t h a t a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n w i l l not be e v i d e n t among the b e t t e r educated d e l e g a t e s . I t i s p o s s i b l e then, t h a t the r e l i g i o u s cleavage c o u l d d i s a p p e a r when these c a t e g o r i e s are i s o l a t e d . The hypotheses r e g a r d i n g age and e d u c a t i o n must be l a r g e l y r e j e c t e d . (See Table 4-10). At the 1976 convention the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n remained e v i d e n t f o r a l l age groups, but, admittedly, was 98 s i g n i f i c a n t only f o r those over 60. 3 S i m i l a r l y , the d i v i s i o n was c o n s i s t e n t a c r o s s a l l e d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l s - a l t h o u g h never s i g n i f i c a n t . The i n f e r e n c e drawn, i n the l i g h t of the s m a l l number of respondents i n each c o n t r o l group, i s t h a t the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n was a d d i t i v e . MacLean o u t p o l l e d Lee among P r o t e s t a n t s under 30 or with u n i v e r s i t y degrees. He never won m a j o r i t i e s from C a t h o l i c s w i t h those a t t r i b u t e s . 4 The 1981 convention y i e l d e d s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . Examining v o t i n g on the f i r s t and l a s t b a l l o t s p r o v i d e s some evidence t h a t the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i s c r o s s g e n e r a t i o n a l . On the f i r s t b a l l o t , the t r e n d was omnipresent, i f not s i g n i f i c a n t save i n the over 60 category. The f i n a l b a l l o t showed the r e l i g i o u s cleavage t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y p r e s e n t f o r a l l age groups. E d u c a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s were l i k e w i s e of l i m i t e d u t i l i t y i n m i t i g a t i n g the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . The p a t t e r n of a hi g h e r degree of C a t h o l i c support f o r Lee and P r o t e s t a n t s f o r C l a r k h e l d f o r a l l e d u c a t i o n a l groups, but was s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y f o r de l e g a t e s without u n i v e r s i t y degrees. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of these c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s does not j u s t i f y d i s m i s s i n g the r e l i g i o u s cleavage as m i s l e a d i n g . While the cleavage was not s i g n i f i c a n t i n a l l c o n t r o l cases, the d i r e c t i o n was never 3 As argued i n the f i r s t chapter, the s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s m a l l c o n t r o l groups, w i l l be p l a y e d down f o r the I s l a n d conventions. 4 One should a l s o note t h a t even Lee's m a j o r i t y from the most a f f l u e n t d e l e g a t e s b e t r a y e d a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . Seventy per cent of h i g h income C a t h o l i c s supported Lee compared t o j u s t 4 6% of h i g h income P r o t e s t a n t s . But f o r the huge support g i v e n Lee by a f f l u e n t C a t h o l i c s , the income v a r i a b l e would not have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with vote. 99 v i o l a t e d . P r o t e s t a n t s and C a t h o l i c s voted d i f f e r e n t l y ; age and e d u c a t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . Table 4-10 Index of R e l i g i o u s E f f e c t by E d u c a t i o n and Age* EDUCATION AGE Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Lee -26 -24 -20 -25 -20 -35 MacLean +26 +24 +20 +25 +20 +35 Binns -11 +3 0 -1 -11 -7 Clark +48 ( + 42) +22 (+28) +3 ( + 9) + 19 (+24) + 16 ( + 19) +35 ( + 34) D r i s c o l l -19 -5 -7 -1 -11 -7 Lee -18 (-42) -20 (-28) +3 (-9) -24 (-24) -1 (-19) -32 (-34) *The R e l i g i o u s Index i s c a l c u l a t e d by s u b t r a c t i n g the percentage of C a t h o l i c support from the percentage of P r o t e s t a n t support. A n e g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t the candidate d i d b e t t e r with C a t h o l i c s than with P r o t e s t a n t s . The numbers i n b r a c k e t s are the f i g u r e s from the f i n a l b a l l o t . The names of P r o t e s t a n t candidates are i n i t a l i c s . I f any other group were t o be immune from the r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g p a t t e r n , one would expect i t to be the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t while the d e l e g a t e type cleavage was not s i g n i f i c a n t at the C o n s e r v a t i v e conventions, t h e r e was a s l i g h t tendency f o r e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s t o d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y favour the winners. The s t r e n g t h of t h i s r e l a t i o n can be t e s t e d by u s i n g r e l i g i o n as a c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e . Do e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s show the same r e l i g i o u s cleavage as the convention as a whole? The answer f o r 197 6 i s no, they do not. While the r e s u l t s were not s i g n i f i c a n t , 55% of the C a t h o l i c e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s favoured MacLean i n v i o l a t i o n of the o v e r a l l r e l i g i o u s cleavage. In c o n t r a s t / Lee c a r r i e d almost t w o - t h i r d s of .the votes c a s t by other C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s . S t i l l / P r o t e s t a n t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s gave Lee the lowest l e v e l of support he r e c e i v e d , only 23%. H i s share of the P r o t e s t a n t c o n s t i t u e n c y vote was a more r e s p e c t a b l e 36%. The e f f e c t i n 1981 was even more noteworthy. Once more, although the r e s u l t s were not s i g n i f i c a n t , on the f i r s t b a l l o t P r o t e s t a n t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s gave Lee a s t r o n g p l u r a l i t y (48%) of t h e i r support while t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s favoured C l a r k . Among C a t h o l i c s Lee's support was r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t . The f i n a l b a l l o t showed the same s o r t o f r e l a t i o n . Lee o u t p o l l e d C l a r k among P r o t e s t a n t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s , but the remaining P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s d e l i v e r e d a s l i m m a j o r i t y o f t h e i r votes t o C l a r k . 5 The i n t r o d u c t i o n o f r e l i g i o n as a c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e suggests t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f del e g a t e type are more important than they i n i t i a l l y appeared. In 1976, when C a t h o l i c s were l a r g e l y opposed t o MacLean, e x - o f f i c i o C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s a c t u a l l y favoured him. As w e l l , i n 1981, while c o n s t i t u e n c y P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s p r e f e r r e d C l a r k , t h e i r e x - o f f i c i o c o u n t e r p a r t s opted f o r Lee by a s i z a b l e margin. The e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s then, seem r e l a t i v e l y immune from the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . T h e i r immunity makes i t s s t r e n g t h among the other d e l e g a t e s even more s t r i k i n g . Perhaps e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s p l a y a more c o n s c i o u s l y "brokerage" (See Stewart, 1988) r o l e than the other d e l e g a t e s . These p a r t y p r o f e s s i o n a l s who are i n a 5 C l a r k took 41% of the votes c a s t by e x - o f f i c i o P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s but had the support of 51% of other P r o t e s t a n t s . 101 p o s i t i o n to understand the importance of r e l i g i o n may act to lessen d i v i s i o n s on that basis and save the party the embarrassment a public d i v i s i o n of t h i s nature would create. 6 Table 4-11 Vote by Delegate Type Controlling for Religion PROTESTANT CATHOLIC Regular E x - o f f i c i o Regular E x - o f f i c i o 1976 P.C. Lee 36% 23% 64% 45% MacLean 64 77 36 55 n=44 n=30 n=25 n=22 1981 P.C. Clark 51% 41% 23% 20% Lee 49 59 77 80 n=61 n=60 n=2 9 n=30 Analysis of the l a s t s o c i a l group d i v i s i o n , the 1978 class cleavage, can be enhanced by dispensing with the rather a r t i f i c i a l separation between the geographic and s o c i a l group variables. It w i l l also allow for an assessment of the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the friends and neighbours e f f e c t . For example, the surprising pattern of well educated and upper class support for M i t c h e l l could merely indicate the residence of many of those delegates i n the Queens/Charlottetown area. Indeed, Mitchell's support among the upper middle class delegates was predominantly based i n Queens. Seventy-seven percent 6 The lack of significance i n the control groups for r e l i g i o n , age, education and, for that matter, delegate type might seem disturbing. However, when a l l four of these variables are used i n the same multiple regression equation, the size of the c o e f f i c i e n t for r e l i g i o n was highest and i t was s i g n i f i c a n t at better than the .05 l e v e l . 102 of h i s upper middle c l a s s support came from t h a t r e g i o n . In both P r i n c e and Kings, Campbell took comfortable m a j o r i t i e s o f the upper middle c l a s s v ote. When community s i z e e n t e r s the p i c t u r e the geographic s p e c i f i c i t y o f the c l a s s d i v i s i o n becomes apparent. Forty-one percent of M i t c h e l l ' s upper middle c l a s s support came from Charlottetown alone and only t h e r e was he ab l e t o o u t p o l l Campbell. Nonetheless, even i n Charlottetown, Campbell o u t p o l l e d M i t c h e l l i n a l l o t h e r c l a s s c a t e g o r i e s . M i t c h e l l ' s r e a l f r i e n d s and neighbours are o b v i o u s l y r e l a t i v e l y h i g h s t a t u s d e l e g a t e s . A s i m i l a r t r e n d was apparent f o r the e d u c a t i o n a l cleavage. Only i n Queens county d i d u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s favour M i t c h e l l . Outside of Queens M i t c h e l l ' s support even among the u n i v e r s i t y educated was b a r e l y 40%. The c l a s s and e d u c a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s o f 197 8 are thus q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h f r i e n d s and neighbours p o l i t i c s . Much of M i t c h e l l ' s support from upper middle c l a s s or u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s i n e f f e c t came from h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours i n Queens county. (Table 4-12 summarizes the 'neighbourhood' e f f e c t f o r e d u c a t i o n a l and age groups). The impact of the r e g i o n a l v a r i a b l e i n t h i s area l e a d s t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i t on i t s own m e r i t s . Examination of the g e o g r a p h i c a l v a r i a b l e s r e v e a l e d a s t r o n g f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t but Key d e s c r i b e d t h i s k i n d of v o t i n g i n d i s p a r a g i n g tones and, as wi t h r e l i g i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s cleavage c o u l d be produced by p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups: namely the aged and the p o o r l y educated. As was the case with r e l i g i o n , f r i e n d s and neighbours 103 support transcends e d u c a t i o n a l and g e n e r a t i o n a l l i n e s . The 1978 p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s e d support f o r M i t c h e l l i n Queens h e l d a c r o s s a l l e d u c a t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s . Nor d i d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of age c o n t r o l s e l i m i n a t e the t r e n d . Indeed the r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a l l d e l e g a t e s under 60. The r e g i o n a l v o t i n g d i v i s i o n c o u l d be observed i n each of the c o n t r o l groups. Of course, t h e r e i s another important c o n t r o l : d e l e g a t e type. C o n s i d e r a t i o n of d e l e g a t e type m o d i f i e s the f r i e n d s and neighbours p a t t e r n w i t h r e g i o n a l e f f e c t s d i s a p p e a r i n g among e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . Campbell won massive m a j o r i t i e s of the e x - o f f i c i o vote i n each r e g i o n i n c l u d i n g Queens. E x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s from t h a t r e g i o n were not at a l l s u p p o r t i v e of M i t c h e l l ' s candidacy. M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m t h a t the 'establishment' was out of touch with the g r a s s r o o t s was not one l i k e l y t o endear him t o e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . Moreover, these d e l e g a t e s l i k e l y f e l t t h a t r e p u d i a t i o n by the convention of the a c t i n g Premier was not something the p u b l i c would p e r c e i v e p o s i t i v e l y . E x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s probably r e a l i z e d t h a t the p a r t y ' s tough p o s i t i o n i n an almost evenly d i v i d e d l e g i s l a t u r e would make the s e l e c t i o n of a non MLA as l e a d e r and premier somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c . F r i e n d s and neighbours support at the 1981 L i b e r a l convention was not q u i t e as u b i q u i t o u s . The r e g i o n a l t r e n d i n 1981 was m a j o r i t y support f o r Clements i n Kings but t h a t county's young d e l e g a t e s and those w i t h u n i v e r s i t y degrees, d i d not support Clements. The m a j o r i t y of these d e l e g a t e s voted f o r Ghiz over Clements while Kings' d e l e g a t e s of other ages and e d u c a t i o n a l 104 attainments were s o l i d l y behind the l o c a l c a n d i d a t e . 7 Clements was a l s o u n s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g the support of e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s from Kings. Ghiz took t w o - t h i r d s of the e x - o f f i c i o vote from Kings. Clements' f r i e n d s and neighbours support came from p a r t i c u l a r groups. I t was not u n i v e r s a l . I t remains t o examine the nature of the r e g i o n a l cleavage at the 1981 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention. There the tendency was p l u r a l i t y support f o r Binns i n Kings and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support f o r D r i s c o l l i n Queens. These t e n d e n c i e s were c o n s i s t e n t a c r o s s a l l l e v e l s of ed u c a t i o n and the . r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n was a c t u a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t among u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s . The p a t t e r n was not q u i t e as c o n s i s t e n t with age. The bulk of the d e l e g a t e s , those between 30 and 60, f i t the p a t t e r n p e r f e c t l y and s i g n i f i c a n t l y . For the o l d e r and younger del e g a t e s the p a t t e r n was l e s s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . Lee was very popular w i t h o l d e r d e l e g a t e s and won a m a j o r i t y o f the over 60 vote i n a l l c o u n t i e s . Nonetheless, Binns' only support among e l d e r l y d e l e g a t e s came from Kings while h a l f of D r i s c o l l ' s e l d e r l y s upporters were from Queens. Among the younger del e g a t e s no c l e a r p a t t e r n emerges although once more, the bulk of Binns' youth support was from Kings d e l e g a t e s . Regardless of t h e s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s , i t i s apparent t h a t the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t does not owe i t s e x i s t e n c e s o l e l y t o o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . E s s e n t i a l l y , the r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n c o n t i n u e d t o h o l d across 7 The number of Kings county d e l e g a t e s under 30 or with u n i v e r s i t y degrees was extremely low. In f a c t they are not r e p o r t e d i n Table 4-12 because the t o t a l number was under f i v e . 105 the dimensions of ed u c a t i o n and age. However, the r e l i g i o u s cleavage cut across r e g i o n a l boundaries. C l a r k ' s support was i n v a r i a b l y s t r o n g e r w i t h P r o t e s t a n t s i n each r e g i o n while D r i s c o l l ' s support i n Queen's was f a r s t r o n g e r among C a t h o l i c s and the same was t r u e of Binn's Kings support. Of course, g i v e n the overwhelming P r o t e s t a n t nature of C l a r k ' s support such f i n d i n g s were i n e v i t a b l e . P r o t e s t a n t s , even i n the b a i l i w i c k s of Binns and D r i s c o l l , were more s u p p o r t i v e of C l a r k . Support f o r C l a r k from h i s P r o t e s t a n t ' f r i e n d s ' cut i n t o the neighbourhood e f f e c t f o r both D r i s c o l l and Binns. Delegate type c o n s i d e r a t i o n s only s l i g h t l y m o d i f i e d the r e g i o n a l t r e n d . For Binns and D r i s c o l l , the r e g i o n a l e f f e c t remains s t r o n g . Each d i d best i n h i s home r e g i o n and the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s a c t u a l l y a f f o r d e d them h i g h e r l e v e l s o f support than the c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s . The s t r u c t u r e of co m p e t i t i o n l i k e l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s l o y a l t y . With the f i r s t b a l l o t vote u n l i k e l y t o be d e c i s i v e e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s c o u l d g i v e one vote t o the l o c a l candidate and s t i l l p l a y a r o l e i n the u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n . 106 Table 4-12# Index of Neighbourhood E f f e c t by E d u c a t i o n and Age* EDUCATION AGE Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Lee — +21 — — + 40 — MacLean +13 +11 +3 + 10 +4 +29 Campbell + 19 +12* +7 +29* + 6* + 18 M i t c h e l l — +24 +28 +54 + 11 +21 Clements +37* +25* — — +24* +32 Ghiz — +17 + 6 — + 10 + 14 Binns + 19* +25* +26 +26 +32* 0 C l a r k ( — ) -11* (-21*) -10 (-9) (--) -2 (-5) ( —) D r i s c o l l +21* +5* + 14 -2 + 17* +3 Lee (--) +45* (+36*) +23 ( + 19) (--) + 18 ( + 13) (--) #The Neighbourhood Index i s c a l c u l a t e d by s u b t r a c t i n g each c a n d i d a t e s ' o v e r a l l share of the vote from the percentage of support g i v e n him by d e l e g a t e s from h i s home area. For Clements, Campbell and Binns, Kings i s the home area. For M i t c h e l l , Ghiz and C l a r k Queen county over 10,000 i s c o n s i d e r e d home. For Lee i t i s Queens county between 1000-and 10,000 while f o r MacLean and D r i s c o l l i t i s Queens county under 1000. A n e g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t the candidate d i d b e t t e r o v e r a l l than he d i d w i t h h i s neighbours. A p o s i t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s support from h i s home area exceeds h i s o v e r a l l support. The numbers i n b r a c k e t s are the f i g u r e s from the f i n a l b a l l o t . An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t the v a l u e of c h i square f o r the geographic d i v i s i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . I f t h e r e were fewer than f i v e cases i n a category the c a l c u l a t i o n was not made. A t t i t u d e s The f i n a l element i n the framework developed f o r a n a l y z i n g d e l e g a t e support was a t t i t u d e . Any attempt t o assess the s a l i e n c e of a p o s s i b l e a t t i t u d i n a l cleavage r e q u i r e s one major assumption, namely, t h a t a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s a c t u a l l y e x i s t at the 107 conventions i n question. Applying a consensus index 8 to the four conventions indicates that of possible scores from 0 to 50 (perfect consensus), the average consensus scores ranged from an average of 24.3 to 30.8. It was therefore quite possible for a t t i t u d i n a l differences to a f f e c t voting. Examining the conventions on a case by case basis provided v i r t u a l l y no i n d i c a t i o n that a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s structured the vote i n any fundamental way. At the 197 6 convention, only two variables (out of seventeen) were s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting. These variables attempted to measure opinions regarding Maritime Union and whether the party hierarchy was out of touch with the grass roots. Lee received majority support from delegates agreeing that Maritime union was a good idea and v i r t u a l l y s p l i t the vote of delegates who f e l t the party hierarchy was out of touch. In 1978 delegates voting for M i t c h e l l and Campbell also d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y on only two a t t i t u d i n a l questions. The s p l i t s occurred on issues which were quite time s p e c i f i c . Delegates were asked whether money spent on the Queen Elizabeth Hospital was a needless expense and whether i t was necessary for a leader to have l e g i s l a t i v e experience. Delegates holding the minority 8 The consensus index i s taken from Blake, Carty and Erickson "Social Credit Leadership Selection i n B.C." (1988: 519-520). B a s i c a l l y , a score i s arrived at by subtracting from the percentage who agree with a p a r t i c u l a r statement the absolute value of 50. If 100% or 0% agree with the statement, the score i s 50-perfect consensus. I f 50% agree, the score i s 0 i n d i c a t i n g an evenly divided opinion s p l i t or no consensus. The higher the score the closer opinions are to perfect consensus. 108 p o s i t i o n that the hosp i t a l spending was needless voted overwhelmingly for Campbell. Of course the ho s p i t a l was i n Charlottetown and for that reason alone Charlottetown delegates might favour such spending. These delegates, M i t c h e l l ' s friends and neighbours, were his staunchest supporters anyway. Most delegates declined to venture an opinion as to whether a leader needed l e g i s l a t i v e experience. Of those who d i d respond, delegates who f e l t such experience was necessary voted almost e x c l u s i v e l y f or Campbell while the few i n disagreement, supported the non-experienced M i t c h e l l . The 1981 L i b e r a l convention showed an association between vote and attitude on three issues. The r e l a t i o n s evident are somewhat unexpected. Clements, the older and more t r a d i t i o n a l candidate, d i d proportionately better among delegates who f e l t women had an inadequate voice i n party matters, who believed that tourism was more important to PEI than farming and f i s h i n g , or who did not agree that governments spend too much on s o c i a l welfare. A l l of these positions were held by less than a t h i r d of the delegates and, i n the case of the tourism question a minority of just 6%. Examination of the 1981 three b a l l o t Conservative convention reveals even less i n the way of an a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n . The f i n a l b a l l o t had no s i g n i f i c a n t a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s ! The only a t t i t u d i n a l variable associated with voting on the two e a r l i e r b a l l o t s questioned whether women had an adequate voice i n the 109 P o l i c y Consensus Table 4-13 Percent i n Agreement and Consensus Index 1976 1 978 %agree C.I . %agree C.I . 1/More power f o r the p r o v i n c e s + 65 1 5 50 0 2 / S p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r Quebec 15 35 31 19 3/Favour u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t to s t r i k e 40 10 20 30 4/Farmers have too much p o l i t i c a l say 64 14 78 28 5/Too much spent on s o c i a l w e l f a r e 86 36 73 23 6/Right to f o r e i g h c a p i t a l 86 36 89 39 7/Government must h e l p h e l p l e s s 91 41 — — 8/Pay welfa r e o n l y to needy 99 49 70 20 9/Government should i n t e r f e r e l e s s with business 83 23 16 34 10/Party h i e r a r c h y out of touch 6 2* 12 83 33 11/More f e d e r a l money for poor p r o v i n c e s 95 45 93 43 12/Wealthy have too much p o l i t i c a l say 82 . 32 — — 13/Favor Maritime union 34 * 1 6 — — 14/Central Canada has too much p o l i t i c a l say 87 37 — — 15/Too much spent on Q.E. h o s p i t a l — — 6G* 10 16/Tourism more important than farming or f i s h i n g — — 22* 28 17/The poor have too much p o l i t i c a l say 1 2 38 — — 18/More f e d e r a l money f o r a l l p r o v i n c e s 76 26 — — 1981 P.C. 1981 L i b e r a l %agree C.I . %agree C.I l/More power f o r the p r o v i n c e s + 83 33 33 1 7 2 / S p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r Quebec 35 15 24 26 3/Support government nucl e a r power stand 83 33 1 3 37 4/Convention best way to choose l e a d e r s 94 44 89 39 5/Too much spent on s o c i a l w e l f a r e 71 21 68 * 18 6/Right to f o r e i g h c a p i t a l 87 37 64 1 4 7/Government must h e l p h e l p l e s s 97 47 93 43 8/Pay w e l f a r e only to needy 99 49 97 47 9/Government should take over Maritime E l e c t r i c 51 1 43 7 10/Women have adequate v o i c e i n p a r t y 78 28 67 * 1 7 11/More f e d e r a l money fo r poor p r o v i n c e s 96 46 88 38 1 2 / A l l p a r t y members should e l e c t l e a d e r 40 1 0 31 19 13/Favor Maritime union 50 0 34 1 6 14/Cavendish Farms should be al l o w e d more land 9 41 1 3 37 15/Support goverment on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l stand 92 42 60 10 16/Tourism more important than farming or f i s h i n g 5 45 6* 44 17/Confederation good t h i n g f o r I s l a n d 80 30 90 40 +Not a l l a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s are r e p o r t e d . * S i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with vote. I l l p a r t y . Only a m i n o r i t y of the d e l e g a t e s f e l t t h i s was the case. Among t h i s m i n o r i t y the l i k e l i h o o d of a Lee vote was much reduced. D r i s c o l l won a p l u r a l i t y of support from these ' m i n o r i t y ' d e l e g a t e s and i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t t h i s v a r i a b l e ceased t o be s i g n i f i c a n t when D r i s c o l l was removed from the b a l l o t . O b v i o u s l y then, t h i s s e a r c h f o r an a s s o c i a t i o n between a t t i t u d e s and d e l e g a t e v o t i n g y i e l d e d mainly n e g a t i v e r e s u l t s . B a s i c a l l y , an a t t i t u d i n a l cleavage d i d not e x i s t or at l e a s t the a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s asked d i d not t a p i n t o any e x i s t i n g c leavage. On on l y nine of the 102 a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s was t h e r e a s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n with v o t i n g . These q u e s t i o n s , measuring o p i n i o n s on Maritime union, g r a s s r o o t s i s o l a t i o n , the c o s t of h o s p i t a l r e p a i r s , the importance of l e g i s l a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , the adequacy of women's v o i c e i n p a r t y matters, the importance of t o u r i s m and whether governments spend too much on s o c i a l w e l f a r e , do not j u s t i f y the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t an a t t i t u d i n a l c leavage was important at any of the conventions. While t h e r e was o f t e n s u b s t a n t i a l disagreement among the d e l e g a t e s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e e vidence t o suggest t h a t such disagreements impact, i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way, with t h e i r v o t i n g d e c i s i o n s . The c h o i c e i s c l e a r l y one of men not measures. D i s c u s s i o n There i s ample evidence to support the e x i s t e n c e o f a f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g p a t t e r n . Most candidates were backed l o y a l l y by d e l e g a t e s from t h e i r home area. Other d i v i s i o n s however, were 112 a l s o n o t a b l e . P a r t i c u l a r l y n o t a b l e was a r e l i g i o u s cleavage with P r o t e s t a n t and C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s almost i n v a r i a b l y f a v o u r i n g a co-r e l i g i o n i s t . D i v i s i o n s on the b a s i s of d e l e g a t e type were a l s o s t r i k i n g . E x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s always supported the winner i n l a r g e r measure than the s e l e c t e d d e l e g a t e s , a 'brass versus the g r a s s ' cleavage as t h i s has been s t y l e d elsewhere. These d i v i s i o n s were e v i d e n t i n every a p p l i c a b l e case. The r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n s p r o v i d e s t r o n g support f o r the argument t h a t Maritime conventions are marked by a f r i e n d s and neighbours p a t t e r n of v o t i n g . The conventions r e f l e c t a p a t t e r n of ' n a t i v e ' or ' f a v o r i t e son' support. In keeping w i t h the f i n d i n g s n a t i o n a l l y : "a s t r o n g tendency e x i s t s f o r d e l e g a t e s t o support c a n d i d a t e s of t h e i r own r e g i o n when the o p p o r t u n i t y t o do so e x i s t s " (Krause and Leduc, 1979: 119). The absence of a r e g i o n a l cleavage i n 1976, or on the f i n a l two b a l l o t s of the 1981 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention, does not weaken t h i s argument. Indeed, support f o r Lee and MacLean i n 197 6 and Lee i n 1981 was h i g h e s t among t h e i r f r i e n d s and neighbours: t h e i r f r i e n d s and neighbours support simply came from d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the same r e g i o n . Leaving t h i s a s i d e , i n every case where ca n d i d a t e s from d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s f a c e d o f f , each d i d b e t t e r among h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours. However, on l y f i v e o f the ten cand i d a t e s a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d t h e i r h i g h e s t l e v e l o f support from t h e i r home r e g i o n . M u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t support from t h e i r home r e g i o n was the s t r o n g e s t f a c t o r i n support f o r a l l of these c a n d i d a t e s . (See Table 4-14). MacLean, Campbell, Ghiz, C l a r k and Lee a l l r e c e i v e d t h e i r s t r o n g e s t support from a r e g i o n which d i d not c o n t a i n t h e i r home. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , none of the can d i d a t e s whose b e s t r e s u l t was 'at home' went on t o v i c t o r y . Only C l a r k i n the oth e r group f a i l e d t o win and he, at l e a s t , came second i n a f o u r man f i e l d . A c t u a l l y , t h i s tends t o support one of the hypotheses of f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g , namely t h a t i t i s s t r o n g e r among weaker ca n d i d a t e s ( T a t a l o v i c h , 1975: 809). Such c a n d i d a t e s c o u l d f i t i n t o the Crombie/Wilson p a t t e r n of 1983 when, a p p a r e n t l y , c a n d i d a c i e s were completely r e g i o n a l and a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t was made t o save the ' l o c a l boys' from h u m i l i a t i o n . However, when Charlottetown was se p a r a t e d from the r e s t of Queens county the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t assumed almost u n i v e r s a l p r o p o r t i o n s . The f i v e c a n d i d a t e s who d i d not r e c e i v e t h e i r h i g h e s t l e v e l o f support from t h e i r home r e g i o n were a l l from Queens county. D i v i d i n g up Queens county r e v e a l s t h a t C h a r l o t t e t o w n area c a n d i d a t e s Ghiz and Lee, had t h e i r s t r o n g e s t support from the c i t y , but not from the r e g i o n . S i m i l a r l y , f r i e n d s and neighbours support f o r MacLean and D r i s c o l l i n the r u r a l p a r t s o f Queens county was strengthened by the removal of C h a r l o t t e t o w n . I s o l a t i n g C h a r l o t t e t o w n g r e a t l y enhances a p p r e c i a t i o n of the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . Such i n t r a r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n has a l s o been found at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . March, i n h i s study of the 1968 n a t i o n a l L i b e r a l convention found t h a t : "when s e v e r a l or more ' n a t i v e sons' run i n the same p r o v i n c e , we are d e a l i n g with ' r e g i o n a l / u r b a n sons'" (1976: 8). T h i s a l s o seems t o be t r u e w i t h i n a p r o v i n c e . 114 F r i e n d s and neighbours support i s not simply county based. Severe r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n s are not needed to c r e a t e a c l i m a t e f o r r e g i o n a l v o t i n g i n d i c a t i n g t h a t such support i s w e l l c aptured by the term ' f r i e n d s and neighbours'. For i n s t a n c e , one does not see enduring r e g i o n a l f a c t i o n s at I s l a n d conventions. I t makes no sense t o t h i n k of a Kings county b l o c or a Charlottetown b l o c . Such b l o c s emerged on l y when a candidate from the area was on the b a l l o t . While some may q u e s t i o n the r e l e v a n c e of r e g i o n s to I s l a n d p o l i t i c s , the e x i s t e n c e and importance of f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g i s beyond c o n t e n t i o n . Moreover, t h i s cleavage does not appear t o be a r t i f i c i a l l y c r e a t e d by any p a r t i c u l a r group. I t was p r e s e n t i n both p a r t i e s , i n and out of power. As w e l l , the r e g i o n a l v o t i n g p a t t e r n p e r s i s t e d across v i r t u a l l y the f u l l spectrum of age and e d u c a t i o n . I f f o r Clements i t was weaker among younger or u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s , f o r M i t c h e l l the r e v e r s e was t r u e . F r i e n d s and neighbours support was, however, m i t i g a t e d by the r e l i g i o u s c leavage. The presence of t h i s s o r t of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n at I s l a n d conventions r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about the rumoured d e c l i n e i n the importance of r e l i g i o n i n the Maritimes. I f r e l i g i o n remains important among a r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e group l i k e d e l e g a t e s , i t seems reasonable t o assume t h a t i t i s a l s o important elsewhere. Of course I s l a n d L i b e r a l s c o u l d p o i n t out t h a t r e l i g i o n was not r e l a t e d t o v o t i n g at e i t h e r of t h e i r conventions. A p a r t i s a n d i v i s i o n i s s u p e r f i c i a l l y v i s i b l e : the r e l i g i o u s cleavage i s c l e a r l y p r e s e n t at the C o n s e r v a t i v e conventions, but makes no i m p r i n t at e i t h e r of the L i b e r a l g a t h e r i n g s . 115 No h i s t o r i c a l reason or contemporary r a t i o n a l e suggests t h a t r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s are p e c u l i a r t o the C o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y or t h a t the L i b e r a l s remain r i g h t e o u s l y f r e e of such c o n f l i c t . While the Co n s e r v a t i v e s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y a t t r a c t e d more C a t h o l i c support and produced a number of C a t h o l i c l e a d e r s , the L i b e r a l s have a l s o p l a y e d the t i c k e t b a l a n c i n g game. A more p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the absence of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s at L i b e r a l conventions l i e s i n the nature of the co m p e t i t i o n at those g a t h e r i n g s : the candidates at the L i b e r a l conventions shared the same r e l i g i o u s background. 9 At both C o n s e r v a t i v e conventions, however, a P r o t e s t a n t f a c e d a C a t h o l i c or i n 1981, t h r e e C a t h o l i c c o m p e t i t o r s . One c o u l d reasonably conclude t h a t while P r o t e s t a n t and C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s may not have d i f f e r e n t candidate or p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s as such, they are more l i k e l y t o support a candidate of t h e i r own f a i t h , i f the o p p o r t u n i t y t o so e x i s t s . A p a t t e r n of support from r e l i g i o u s ' f r i e n d s ' then was i n evidence. A f e a r t h a t the same tendency e x i s t s i n the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n has caused I s l a n d p a r t i e s t o take e v a s i v e a c t i o n . The importance of r e l i g i o n i s a t t e s t e d t o by MacKinnon who argues " i t might w e l l be s a i d t h a t the I s l a n d has f o u r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s : L i b e r a l , C o n s e r v a t i v e , C a t h o l i c and P r o t e s t a n t " (1978: 237). Dyck suggests t h a t the p a r t i e s d e a l with t h i s by b a l a n c i n g t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s . " P a r t i e s take such p a i n s t o balance t h e i r t i c k e t s 9 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t the f i r s t C a t h o l i c L i b e r a l t o serve as Premier (Bennett Campbell) was put i n t o o f f i c e by the caucus p r i o r t o a convention and at the subsequent convention was c h a l l e n g e d o n l y by another C a t h o l i c . 116 between P r o t e s t a n t s and Roman C a t h o l i c s t h a t r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n i s not a sound p r e d i c t o r of p a r t y p r e f e r e n c e s " (1986: 95) . The evidence from the I s l a n d conventions suggests t h a t the p a r t i e s are wise t o take such p r e c a u t i o n s . The l a c k o f a broader r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g cleavage may owe t o such b a l a n c i n g . The convention evidence a l s o suggests t h a t such v o t i n g i s an e x p r e s s i o n of group l o y a l t y or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , r a t h e r than a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f ov e r t r e l i g i o u s p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s . C l a r k was the only candidate f o r whom no geographic f r i e n d s and neighbours support was e v i d e n t . R e l i g i o n was the s t r o n g e s t f a c t o r i n support f o r him. His support from P r o t e s t a n t s p a r t l y , but only p a r t l y , cut i n t o the f r i e n d s and neighbours support f o r both Binns and D r i s c o l l . Perhaps support f o r C l a r k s h o u l d be understood as t h a t of h i s r e l i g i o u s ' f r i e n d s . ' His answer t o the b i b l i c a l q u e s t i o n 'who i s my neighbour' might very w e l l have been 'my f e l l o w P r o t e s t a n t s ' . 1 0 Observers should a l s o remember t h a t the r e l i g i o u s cleavage was not c r e a t e d by a p a r t i c u l a r age, e d u c a t i o n a l or, f o r t h a t matter, c l a s s or income group. 1 1 The r e l i g i o u s cleavage was, i f anything, a d d i t i v e . The ' l i n g e r i n g impact' of r e l i g i o n appears q u i t e s u b s t a n t i a l . I t i s f a s c i n a t i n g t o note t h a t the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n d i d 1 0 The f a c t t h a t C l a r k was a P r o t e s t a n t m i n i s t e r might have made C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l u c t a n t t o support him. C l a r k was the f i r s t clergyman ever e l e c t e d t o the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . A c t u a l l y , another clergyman e n t e r e d the l e g i s l a t u r e at the same time as C l a r k . 1 1 The r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g d i v i s i o n was c o n s i s t e n t a c r o s s a l l income and c l a s s l e v e l s . 117 not a f f e c t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s t o the same degree. In both 1981 and 1976 e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were more l i k e l y t o v i o l a t e the r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g p a t t e r n than were t h e i r p o l l s e l e c t e d c o u n t e r p a r t s . I t may be t h a t such d e l e g a t e s , i n l i g h t of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s which c r e a t e a need t o balance t i c k e t s p r o v i n c i a l l y , d e l i b e r a t e l y sought to moderate the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . I t may a l s o be t r u e t h a t without a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n the d e l e g a t e type cleavage would have been even more s t r i k i n g , as i t was at the two L i b e r a l c onventions. At those conventions the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s d i d not f o l l o w the f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g p a t t e r n d i s p l a y e d by the delegate body as a whole. When c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s were p r o v i d i n g the 'home town' candidates Clements and M i t c h e l l with m a j o r i t y support, e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were l a r g e l y behind Ghiz and Campbell. Only at the 1981 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention d i d the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s d i s p l a y a p a t t e r n of f r i e n d s and neighbours support f o r D r i s c o l l and Binns. Even t h i s may have been due t o t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t subsequent b a l l o t s would enable them t o move to Lee. The Crombie example of 1983 when O n t a r i o A t t o r n e y General Roy McMurtry asked f o r "one vote f o r David" may be i l l u m i n a t i n g i n t h i s r e g a r d (Martin, Gregg and P e r l i n , 1983: 145,146). There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t a delegate type v o t i n g cleavage e x i s t e d , or t h a t the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were s u c c e s s f u l i n having t h e i r p r e f e r r e d candidates e l e c t e d . In l i g h t of t h i s , some observers may share the p e r s p e c t i v e of Mintz who, i n h i s study of n a t i o n a l conventions, concluded t h a t "the s u b s t a n t i a l number of 118 ' e x - o f f i c i o ' delegates...needs t o be r e c o n s i d e r e d " (1983:20). I t sho u l d be s t r e s s e d , however, t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n at the I s l a n d conventions was only one of degree. There was not an example s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the 1970 Quebec L i b e r a l convention where e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s , through overwhelming group s o l i d a r i t y , were able t o o v e r t u r n the p r e f e r e n c e of most c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s f o r another c a n d i d a t e . While t h i s was not the case at the I s l a n d conventions, the a c t u a l impact of e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s on the other d e l e g a t e s remains unassessed and p o s s i b l y u n a s s e s s a b l e . I t c o u l d be t h a t support from e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s c r e a t e s an aura of i n v i n c i b i l i t y which i n c i t e s a bandwagon e f f e c t . At the very l e a s t , when most prominent p a r t y members are behind one candidate other p a r t y members are l i k e l y t o t h i n k very hard b e f o r e s u p p o r t i n g someone e l s e . One c o n c l u s i o n i s c l e a r ; observers who p o i n t t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of a ' b r a s s / g r a s s ' s p l i t have s o l i d evidence t o support them. At the very l e a s t , on the I s l a n d , no candidate not favoured by the 'brass' was able t o win. The e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s i n v a r i a b l y supported the winning candidate and other cleavages had but l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h i s support: such d e l e g a t e s were r e l a t i v e l y immune from the r e l i g i o u s and f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g t h a t marked the conventions i n g e n e r a l . They seem t o be i n f l u e n c e d by somewhat d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s . Geographic or r e l i g i o u s l o y a l t y i s not r e a l l y what moves them. T h e i r behaviour a c t u a l l y masks or m o d i f i e s the s t r e n g t h of such t e n d e n c i e s . T h i s examination of l e a d e r s h i p conventions on PEI makes c l e a r 119 t h a t v o t i n g cleavages e x i s t e d at I s l a n d conventions. Moreover, the d i v i s i o n s support the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s remain dominant i n Maritime p o l i t i c s w i t h the most important d i v i s i o n s based on f r i e n d s and neighbours or r e l i g i o n . Indeed i t i s p o s s i b l e t o b e g i n t o formulate the argument t h a t i n the Maritimes i f neighbours r e l a t e s t o geographic p r o x i m i t y , f r i e n d s may c a r r y an a s c r i p t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Geography and r e l i g i o n may p o s s i b l y be l i n k e d i n t h i s k i n d of common framework. 120 Table 4-14 1 2 M u l t i p l e R e g r e s s i o n : S o c i a l and Geographic F a c t o r s Mac-Lean Camp-b e l l Ghiz Binns C l a r k D r i s -c o l l Lee Lee (3) E l i t e .19 .30* .14 .04 -.10 .01 .07 .02 Queens -.11 -.33* -.10 — -.04 .26* -.22* -.10 B r i t i s h .26 — -.02 -.01 .07 .03 .05 .01 P r o t . .14 .04 -.14 -.03 .31* -.05 -.22* -.31* C o l l e g e .31* -.16 .20* .15 .02 .05 -.23 -.15 Youth -.28 -.14 .01 -.06 — -.02 .08 -.01 Urban -.06 -.09 .15 -.17 -.02 -.09 .28 .27 Male .05 .08 -.12 R i c h .27* -.08 .04 .02 -.12 .05 .05 .07 Kings — -.11 .40* .26* -.07 -.06 -.12 — Con-s t a n t .31 .83 .93 .07 .30 .07 .56 .77 r sq. .24 .26 .17 .16 .13 .15 .12 .13 1 2 The v a r i a b l e s were e i t h e r nominal or o r d i n a l , t h e r e f o r e dummy v a r i a b l e s were c o n s t r u c t e d . The dependent v a r i a b l e was always vo t e . A score of one was g i v e n i f a vote was f o r the candidate named, 0 otherwise. Some of the independent v a r i a b l e s are s e l f e x p l a n a t o r y of the r e s t , r i c h r e f e r s t o h i g h income, P r o t . r e f e r s t o P r o t e s t a n t , urban r e f e r s t o a community of over 10,000, e l i t e r e f e r s t o e x - o f f i c i o d elegate and youth means under 30. Again a score of one was g i v e n i f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c named was possessed, 0 otherwise. Queens and Kings r e f e r t o the c o u n t i e s , i f a delegate was from the county named a score of one was given, otherwise 0. The e x c e p t i o n was 197 6 when Queens r e f e r r e d t o communities i n Queens county of between 1000 and 10,000. The r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s are uns t a n d a r d i z e d and only those with an * are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . 121 Chapter 5 Nova Scotia Conventions: Divisions i n the 'Modern' Maritimes Intra party d i v i s i o n s at leadership conventions i n Nova Scotia w i l l be the focus of t h i s chapter and w i l l be probed by studying the most recent Conservative convention (1971) and the two l a s t L i b e r a l conventions (1980,1986). It w i l l become clear that Nova Scotian conventions must be understood i n a friends and neighbours framework i n which the most important i n t e r n a l party d i v i s i o n s are based on geography and r e l i g i o n . Introduction The party p o l i t i c s of Nova Scotia resemble those of the other Maritime provinces. Like New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia i s said to be leader dominated, to have a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l culture, pragmatic parties competing s o l e l y for power, no p o l i t i c a l l y s a l i e n t class cleavages, a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i n voting, and a t h i r d party wasteland. Actually, the nature of the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n resembles New Brunswick more than Prince Edward Island. As i n New Brunswick, L i b e r a l s benefit from greater Catholic support. Chandler and Chandler's figures indicate that a higher proportion of Catholics prefer the Lib e r a l s while Aucoin and Camp have both pointed out the h i s t o r i c a l preference of Catholics for Lib e r a l s (Chandler and Chandler, 1979: 47; Aucoin, 1972: 26; Camp, 1979: 112). Indeed, 122 since 1930, the L i b e r a l party has e x p l i c i t l y attempted to alternate i t s leadership between Catholics and Protestants (Adamson, 1982: 5) . In contrast, the Conservatives have only once been led by a Catholic and he was chosen by the Lieutenant Governor rather than the party i t s e l f . 1 Despite the obvious s i m i l a r i t i e s Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s d i f f e r somewhat from p o l i t i c s i n the rest of the Maritimes. It i s the subject of leadership that p a r t i c u l a r l y sets the province apart. Leaders i n the other provinces have not been credited with the same degree of dominance. Adamson and Stewart claim that "the p o s i t i o n of the party leader...is more pronounced i n A t l a n t i c Canada than i s the case i n the rest of the country" (1985: 328) . Yet t h e i r evidence i s drawn largely from Nova Scotia. Aucoin pointed out that in Nova Scotia "the party leader tends to personify the party for the electorate" (1972:27). This leader dominance has been attributed by Beck to a lack of i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which has forced the voter " a l l the more to emphasize the leader" (1978: 200) . Indeed, Camp in Gentlemen, Players and P o l i t i c i a n s succinctly confirmed t h i s and stressed the nature of the dominance. "In Nova Scotia p o l i t i c i a n s are either looked up to or looked down upon...The quality of the c h i e f t a i n matters a good deal to Nova Scotians. . . In Nova Scotia people wanted to be led by a man they could look up to, who had about him the mystique and the manner of 1 The one Catholic Conservative premier was John Thompson who went on to become the only post confederation premier to serve as Prime Minister. Thompson served as premier for only 54 days (Beck, 1988: 166) . 123 the c h i e f t a i n " (1979: 213) . No such descriptions or assessments have been made of leadership i n New Brunswick or the Island. The leader dominance can also be seen i n the long tenure of successful leaders such as F i e l d i n g (12 years) , Murray (27 years), Macdonald (19 years), S t a n f i e l d (19 years) and Buchanan (19 years). Turnovers i n government usually r e s u l t , not from the defeat of a previously elected premier, but from unsuccessful transfers of power within the governing party. Such unsuccessful transfers occasioned defeats i n 1925, 1933, 1956 and 1970. Indeed, there i s only one example of a previously elected premier being defeated i n t h i s century (Regan i n 1978) . There i s no doubt that incumbent premiers are d i f f i c u l t to defeat, a tendency showing not only the dominant role of the leader, but also the e s s e n t i a l conservatism of the voters. P r i o r to 1956 Nova Scotia was described, c o r r e c t l y , as a L i b e r a l dominated province but subsequently the p o l i t i c a l landscape changed dramatically. The Conservatives have since won eight of ten elections and outpolled every other party on nine occasions. Only i n Ontario has one party been as dominant during the same period. This i s not to say that the Liberals are i n s i g n i f i c a n t , generally they have had some expectation of success. Nonetheless, Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s i s marked by the dominance of the Conservative party, a dominance unmatched i n the rest of the Maritimes. Nova Scotia's d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s can also be seen i n the r e l a t i v e strength of a t h i r d party. While for_ observers from outside the Maritimes, Nova Scotia may appear inhospitable to 124 t h i r d p a r t i e s , i n Maritime terms i t i s a v i r t u a l paradise. CCF MLAs were s i t t i n g i n the Nova Scotian l e g i s l a t u r e 43 years before the i n i t i a l NDP v i c t o r y i n New Brunswick while success on PEI has yet to come. Since 1974 the NDP has garnered about 15% of the vote i n each p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n and has successfully elected members since 1970. Again a pattern of 'success' unmatched i n eith e r New Brunswick or Prince Edward Island. Part of the explanation for the t h i r d party success rests i n Nova Scotia's d i v i s i o n into two regions: Cape Breton and the Mainland. Cape Breton island, or rather Cape Breton county, i s the most i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and unionized i n the province and p r i o r to 1981, i t was t h i s county that elected a l l the CCF/NDP MLAs. Cape Breton has a d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t y and even tends to vote somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . For instance, i n 1978 when the Buchanan Tories were f i r s t elected they did not win any of Cape Breton's eleven r i d i n g s . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e i r 1988 v i c t o r y they won only one. The p e c u l i a r i t y of Cape Breton can also be seen i n the perception that a leader cannot contest an i s l a n d constituency and expect to be vi c t o r i o u s province wide (Kavanagh, 1988: 63). F i n a l l y , Nova Scotia d i f f e r s from New Brunswick and PEI in i t s r e l a t i v e 'modernity.' As Bellamy explains The s o c i e t i e s of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and PEI possess varying rates of economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l development. Nova Scotia i s probably the most advanced i n these respects with a large urban centre, Halifax, and a higher rate of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n than other parts of the region. In s o c i a l terms, Nova Scotia emulates mass so c i e t i e s elsewhere i n North America (1976: 11). In keeping with the modernity thrust, Adamson has argued that 125 r e l i g i o n i s less important i n Nova Scotia and i t i s obvious that the province i s less r u r a l than i t s neighbours. It remains to be seen whether such differences indicate a d i f f e r e n t s t y l e of p o l i t i c s for Nova Scotia. Convention Context A l l three Nova Scotian conventions occurred while the party was i n opposition. In each case, an e l e c t i o n defeat p r e c i p i t a t e d the resignation of the party leader which necessitated the c a l l i n g of a leadership convention. The concern of the party i n convention then, was the s e l e c t i o n of a leader who could return the party to power rather than one who could maintain power.2 The 1971 Progressive Conservative convention, followed the defeat of the party i n the 1970 e l e c t i o n a f t e r fourteen years i n o f f i c e . The premier, G.I. Smith, had been acclaimed leader i n 1967 a f t e r Robert Stanfield's successful campaign for the leadership of the federal party. Although the L i b e r a l s i n 1970 won only a minority government, Smith was i n poor health and d i d not wish to continue as leader. The leadership contest attracted a good deal of attention. Three r e l a t i v e l y well known and young candidates sought the leadership making i t the most competitive i n Tory p r o v i n c i a l 2 The difference i n competitive s i t u a t i o n could be s i g n i f i c a n t . When a party i s i n o f f i c e i t may be more conservative i n i t s leadership, not wanting to 'rock the boat' as i t were. The fact that Smith i n 1967 was not challenged points to t h i s . The choice of P.E.I. Li b e r a l s i s also i n s t r u c t i v e on t h i s count. In 197 8 when the party was ensconced i n power an outsider was beaten d e c i s i v e l y by a long time cabinet minister. In 1981, when the party was out of power, a long time cabinet minister was beaten d e c i s i v e l y by an outsider. 126 h i s t o r y . Gerald Doucet,33, a lawyer, MLA from Richmond, Cape Breton and seven year veteran of the cabinet was perceived to be the front runner and attracted numerous caucus endorsements (Halifax Chronicle Herald, March 8 1971: 1) . Doucet was an Acadian and a Roman Catholic. Another former cabinet minister, John Buchanan, 39, was regarded as his main competitor. A Cape Breton born lawyer, Buchanan was a Protestant who l i v e d i n Halifax and represented one of i t s r i d i n g s . He was f i r s t elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1967 and appointed to the cabinet i n 1969. The f i n a l candidate, Roland T h o r n h i l l , 38, was something of an outsider and viewed as a 'dark horse.' Born i n Newfoundland, Thornhill's family had moved to Dartmouth when he was quite young. T h o r n h i l l had never sought p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e , but was the mayor of Dartmouth. He was a businessman and a Protestant. L i t t l e i n the way of p o l i c y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d the three candidates. A l l agreed that the party had to be reorganized, youth involved and the Regan government quickly defeated. The only discordant note was Thornhill's claim that his lack of p o l i t i c a l experience was an asset i n that he was u n s u l l i e d by the 1970 defeat. In l i g h t of the wide spread p o l i c y agreement, the Halifax Chronicle Herald was moved to lament: " I t appears that the impression of the candidates rather than his p o l i c i e s , w i l l be a determining factor i n how delegates mark t h e i r b a l l o t s " (March 3 1971: 1). Each candidate pursued a s i m i l a r strategy, t r a v e l l i n g around the province to address "nominating meetings and gatherings of 127 constituency associations" (Halifax Chronicle Herald, March 3 1971: 2) . There were no a l l candidate p o l i c y debates and only as the convention began i n Halifax were the three to appear on the same stage. The convention lasted two b a l l o t s . On the f i r s t , Doucet j u s t i f i e d his front runner status by f i n i s h i n g f i r s t with 282 votes, f o r t y more than Buchanan and seventy ahead of a s u r p r i s i n g l y strong T h o r n h i l l . Forced o f f the second b a l l o t , T h o r n h i l l declared his support for Buchanan who went on to defeat Doucet 391-34 6. Doucet's supporters were somewhat embittered by the defeat and a t t r i b u t e d i t to an urban/rural or Cape Breton/Mainland s p l i t (Kavanagh, 1988: 50-51) . The candidates denied such a s p l i t and the Chronicle Herald assigned the issue to "the l e v e l of academic irrelevance" (March 8 1971: 1). The L i b e r a l convention of 1980 was c a l l e d when Gerald Regan announced that he was going to run f e d e r a l l y i n the e l e c t i o n of that year. Regan, a two-term premier, was defeated by Buchanan's Conservatives i n the 1978 e l e c t i o n . He made clear then that he would not again seek p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e and the federal e l e c t i o n was an opportunity of which he took advantage, rather than the cause of his resignation. Four candidates sought the leadership. The perceived front runner was A.M.(Sandy) Cameron. Cameron, 42, a businessman and the only Protestant i n the race was from Sherbrooke i n Guysborough county. He was elected MLA for Guysborough i n a 1973 by-election and subsequently appointed to the cabinet where he served u n t i l 128 the L i b e r a l defeat i n 1978. Cameron was thought to be the choice of the party establishment (Beck, 1988: 353). Fraser Mooney, 53, of Yarmouth was the most p o l i t i c a l l y experienced of the candidates. A pharmacist, he was f i r s t elected i n the L i b e r a l v i c t o r y of 1970 and served i n the cabinet throughout the Regan era. The l a s t caucus candidate was Vince MacLean, a 36 year old teacher. MacLean, from Sydney, was elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1974. He served as Speaker of the House and also spent two years i n cabinet. The f i n a l candidate, Ken Maclnnis, 37, of Halifax had never run for public o f f i c e . He was a lawyer whose p o l i t i c a l experience consisted of two years as s p e c i a l advisor to Deputy Prime Minister A l l a n MacEachen. With one exception, the candidates were not divided on p o l i c y and the campaign was not marked by p o l i c y concerns. The exception concerned ownership of offshore mineral r i g h t s . The three former cabinet ministers supported a deal negotiated with the federal government ceding ownership claims for royalty payments (Halifax Chronicle Herald, May 27 1980: 1,2,6). Maclnnis disagreed with t h i s and maintained that Nova Scotia should own i t s offshore resources. The question of p o l i t i c a l experience was debated with Maclnnis portraying himself as the newcomer who could r e v i t a l i z e the party while Mooney stressed his cabinet experience and years of party service. Cameron and MacLean attempted to project quite d i f f e r e n t images. Both emphasized t h e i r a b i l i t y to lead the party back to power, but while Cameron was low key i n the S t a n f i e l d t r a d i t i o n , MacLean described himself as a dynamic leader and " p o l i t i c a l scrapper" (Halifax Chronicle Herald, June 12 1980: 7; see also 129 Kavanagh, 1988: 63) . The f i r s t b a l l o t l e f t Cameron well out i n front. With 340 votes he was well ahead of MacLean at 244, Mooney, 192 and Maclnnis, 138. Despite Maclnnis's support for MacLean the second b a l l o t brought no diminution of Cameron's lead. He climbed to 412 while MacLean rose to 317 and Mooney held r e l a t i v e l y steady at 187. Mooney refused to endorse eit h e r candidate, but the bulk of his support went to Cameron who won a comfortable 558-356 v i c t o r y on the t h i r d b a l l o t . The Chronicle Herald f e l t Cameron was a compromise middle of the road candidate, but noted his establishment support and pointed out the impact of r e l i g i o n . The paper referre d to the past L i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of alt e r n a t i n g Catholic and Protestant leaders and suggested that "one of the factors preventing Fraser Mooney, a Catholic from p u b l i c l y s i d i n g with Vince MacLean also a Catholic... was the r e l i g i o u s factor" (June 12 1980: 7). Subsequent academic research by Adamson also indicated the influence of r e l i g i o n . Adamson found that one of the reasons interim L i b e r a l leader William G i l l i s had not sought to make his p o s i t i o n permanent was his b e l i e f that i t was a Protestant's turn (1982: 5). Cameron's tenure as L i b e r a l leader was markedly unsuccessful. He became only the second L i b e r a l leader i n p r o v i n c i a l h i s t o r y not to serve as premier and led the party to a l l time popular vote lows i n the elections of 1981 and 1984. In the 1984 e l e c t i o n the Lib e r a l s were reduced to six seats; none of which belonged to Cameron. As a resu l t of t h i s f a i l u r e Cameron resigned and a 130 convention was c a l l e d for 1986. Vince MacLean, his resume updated as Opposition leader i n the House, made his second t r y for the leadership. He was challenged by only one other candidate. Jim Cowan, 43, was a Halifax lawyer who had never held public o f f i c e . A Protestant, he was President of the p r o v i n c i a l party u n t i l he resigned to contest the leadership. One cannot claim that the two candidates d i f f e r e d i n terms of p o l i c y . Both condemned the economic shortcomings of the Buchanan government and made education and care for the aged t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s . The one area of difference emphasized was p o l i t i c a l experience. MacLean stressed his resume and urged delegates to pick a leader with experience, comparing the alt e r n a t i v e to buying a car without looking under the hood (Halifax Chronicle Herald, February 13 1986: 8). Cowan argued that i t was clear Nova Scotians wanted a change and that the Liberals could best provide t h i s with a leader who was t r u l y new. The campaigns betrayed a s l i g h t regional bias. MacLean boasted of his Cape Breton base and claimed that Cowan had almost no i s l a n d support. In response, Cowan suggested that recent L i b e r a l f a i l u r e s i n metro Halifax indicated the necessity of choosing someone from that r e g i o n — h i m — a s leader. He went on claim that he had the support of two-thirds of the metro Halifax delegates (Halifax Chronicle Herald, February 3 1986: 21; February 6 1986:3; see also Kavanagh, 1988: 137-139). MacLean's strategy was rather new to Nova Scotia. Emphasis was placed on delegate selection meetings. Rather than convincing elected delegates to vote for him, 131 MacLean attempted to elect delegates who were predisposed to support him (Halifax Chronicle Herald, February 24 1986: 16). The convention ended up being one-sided. MacLean's second t r y for the leadership was successful as he outpolled Cowan 1082 to 721. Post convention analysis by the media claimed that while MacLean's support was strongest on Cape Breton, his was a 'province wide' v i c t o r y (Halifax Chronicle Herald, February 24 1986: 16). This overview of the three Nova Scotian conventions suggests that none of them were understood at the time as i d e o l o g i c a l battlegrounds and the few delegate cleavages which might have existed were more l i k e l y to be based on geography or group differences. Geographic Divisions J o u r n a l i s t i c coverage of the three Nova Scotian conventions raised the spectre of geographic s p l i t s at two of them. In 1971, rumours c i r c u l a t e d that Buchanan's vi c t o r y owed to an urban/rural or an ant i Cape Breton voting s p l i t . Both candidates at the 198 6 convention claimed extensive home region support i n Cape Breton and metro Halifax respectively. One then may expect to f i n d s i g n i f i c a n t associations between area of residence and voting. An examination of the regional variable makes clear i t s impact on the three conventions. The regional variable displayed a more consistent association with voting than any other var i a b l e : s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s between voting and region were found on every convention b a l l o t . There i s general agreement on what region means in Nova Scotia. As noted e a r l i e r , the most obvious d i v i s i o n i s that 132 between Cape Breton and the mainland. However, the mainland i s a l s o s u b d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e r e g i o n s . These are metro H a l i f a x , A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y , South Shore, E a s t e r n Mainland and North Shore. 3 As Table 5-1 makes c l e a r , the r e g i o n a l v o t i n g p a t t e r n s were q u i t e s t r i k i n g . In 1971 i t was Doucet's support from Cape Breton t h a t c r e a t e d h i s f i r s t b a l l o t l e a d . He took 72% of the Cape Breton v o t e s , but was unable t o achieve even a 4 0% share of the vote i n any mainland r e g i o n . Buchanan's Cape Breton o r i g i n s were of l i t t l e v a l u e as o n l y 9% of Cape Bretoners supported him. T h o r n h i l l ' s best showing came i n metro H a l i f a x where he won h i s o n l y p l u r a l i t y , a l b e i t i n a t i g h t t h r e e way race. The o n l y o t h e r r e g i o n i n which Doucet l e d was the North Shore and Buchanan won the o t h e r t h r e e r e g i o n s w i t h over 40% of the vote. The second b a l l o t r e s u l t s were v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l . Doucet i n c r e a s e d h i s m a j o r i t y share of the Cape Breton vote t o 81% and e s s e n t i a l l y s p l i t the North Shore vote with Buchanan. Buchanan won the remaining r e g i o n s with m a j o r i t i e s of not l e s s than 54%. The tendency of Cape Breton d e l e g a t e s to p r o v i d e overwhelming support t o the l o c a l c andidate was again e v i d e n t i n 1980. MacLean took 73% of the Cape Breton votes f o r f u l l y 52% of h i s t o t a l vote count. L o c a l c a n d i d a t e support c o u l d a l s o be seen i n the r e g i o n a l 3 The r e g i o n s are amalgams of v a r i o u s c o u n t i e s . The surveys combined the c o u n t i e s i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: V a l l e y (Hants to C l a r e ) , South Shore (Yarmouth t o Lunenburg), Metro H a l i f a x , E a s t e r n Mainland ( H a l i f a x E a s t e r n Shore, Guysborough, A n t i g o n i s h , P i c t o u ) , North Shore (Cumberland, C o l c h e s t e r ) , Cape Breton (Cape Breton, Richmond, Inverness, V i c t o r i a ) . F o r a l a r g e l y s i m i l a r d i s c u s s i o n of Nova S c o t i a ' s r e g i o n s see Dyck, 1986: 183. 133 voting for Mooney. Mooney actually outpolled MacLean among mainland delegates and was p a r t i c u l a r l y strong on the South Shore where he won 53% of the vote. Indeed, t h i s accounted for 41% of his t o t a l . While Maclnnis was unable to carry any region his best showing was i n metro Halifax where he f i n i s h e d second with 24% of the vote. This support from the c a p i t a l region comprised 44% of his p r o v i n c i a l t o t a l . Support for Cameron was the most balanced. He won p l u r a l i t i e s i n four regions and was second to Mooney on the South Shore and MacLean on Cape Breton. His strongest showings were i n the Eastern Mainland and North Shore where he c a r r i e d over 70% of the votes for almost half (46%) of his t o t a l . Of course his home town of Sherbrooke was located i n the Eastern Mainland. The regional trend was no weaker on the second b a l l o t . Mooney continued to carry the South Shore, but his mainland support as a whole dropped behind that of MacLean. MacLean marginally increased his support from Cape Breton, but even the endorsement of Maclnnis did l i t t l e to help him i n metro Halifax where Cameron won over half the vote. Cameron increased his vote share i n each region and came very close to a second b a l l o t v i c t o r y . Only Cape Breton's support for MacLean prevented that v i c t o r y as Cameron won 57% of the mainland votes. Cape Breton remained l o y a l to MacLean on the t h i r d b a l l o t . His 75% share of the vote there exceeded by 40 points his best mainland showing. Cameron won each mainland region by a minimum of 30 points. His share of the mainland vote was an impressive 72%. The 198 6 convention d i f f e r s from the other two i n that at 134 t h i s convention the candidate from Cape Breton won. T h i s does not mean t h a t h i s Cape Breton support d i d not stand out. Cape Bretoners accounted f o r b a r e l y a f i f t h of the convention but they p r o v i d e d 35% of MacLean's support. In c o n t r a s t , l e s s than 2% of Cowan's support came from Cape Breton. MacLean's pre c o n v e n t i o n c l a i m t h a t Cowan l a c k e d i s l a n d support was not i d l e b o a s t i n g . Cowan r e c e i v e d o n l y 4% of the Cape Breton v o t e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Cowan, h i s c l a i m of t w o - t h i r d s of the metro H a l i f a x vote was l e s s a c c u r a t e . A c t u a l l y , h i s support i n t h a t r e g i o n o n l y reached 43%, h i s weakest mainland showing. Cowan c a r r i e d only one r e g i o n , the North Shore, but h i s mainland support was a r e s p e c t a b l e 48%. I t was the b l o c vote of Cape Breton t h a t made the convention a r o u t . 135 Table 5-1" V o t i n g by Region 1971 P.C. Anna-p o l i s V a l l e y South Shore H a l i f a x Metro North Shore E a s t e r n Main-l a n d Cape Breton Buch-anan 41 (62) 40 (64) 33 (56) 35 (49) 42 (54) 9 (19) Doucet 29 (38) 33 (36) 33 (44) 37 (51) 37 (46) 72 (81) Thorn-h i l l 30 ~ 27 ~ 35 — 28 — 20 — 19 — n=75 n=60 n=89 n=59 n=51 n=68 1980 L i b e r a l Cameron 35 (70) 26 (75) 39 (65) 76 (79) 73 (80) 14 (25) Mac-l n n i s 20 ~ 9 ~ 24 ~ 9 — 2 -- 9 __ MacLean 18 (30) 12 (25) 21 (35) 9 (21) 23 (20) 73 (75) Mooney 26 — 53 — 17 — 5 ~ 0 ~ 2 — n=74 n=57 n=109 n=60 n=45 n=90 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 44 48 43 59 46 4 MacLean 56 52 57 41 54 96 n=144 n=124 n=234 n=104 n=102 n=192 Expanding the a n a l y s i s t o community s i z e enhances understanding of the geographic e f f e c t on v o t i n g . Indeed, the community s i z e v a r i a b l e was i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g i n many cases. To begin, the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Buchanan's 1971 v i c t o r y was t h a t of urban over r u r a l must be r e j e c t e d . While the 4 Unless otherwise s p e c i f i e d , the value of c h i square f o r a l l the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . T h i s a l s o a p p l i e s t o the t a b l e s i n the New Brunswick chapter. F i g u r e s i n b r a c k e t s are from the f i n a l b a l l o t . 136 second b a l l o t showed v i r t u a l l y no relationship between voting and the size of a delegate's home community, the f i r s t indicated that i n the c i t y of Halifax (community over 100,000) Doucet actually attracted more support than either Buchanan or T h o r n h i l l . Indeed, in the next largest category, communities between 10,000 and 100,000, Doucet again outpolled Buchanan; although Thornhill won a p l u r a l i t y of the votes. This category included Thornhill's home town of Dartmouth and the Cape Breton c i t y of Sydney. Buchanan's best showing was among the r u r a l delegates. The data do not lend support to the contention that Buchanan's vict o r y was that of urban over r u r a l : i f anything the reverse was the case. The results from 1986 lend credence to Cowan's claim that his candidacy was popular i n the Halifax area. Cowan won over half the votes of delegates l i v i n g i n a community of over 100,000 people, but nowhere else could he gain a majority. A relationship between community size and voting was also observed on the second and t h i r d b a l l o t s of the 1980 convention. Unfortunately, the categories of community size used i n the survey of that convention make i t impossible to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between delegates l i v i n g i n a c i t y of over 100, 000 or a town of 20, 000. However, delegates representing the r u r a l areas of Nova Scotia--population of under 1000--were the staunchest supporters of Cameron. On the f i n a l b a l l o t he took 73% of t h e i r votes. There can be no doubt that a relationship exists between community size and voting. At each of the conventions delegates from the r u r a l areas were the strongest backers of the v i c t o r s . 137 U n l i k e P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d , no candidate c o u l d win j u s t by a t t r a c t i n g the votes of the r u r a l d e l e g a t e s but d e l e g a t e s from r u r a l and urban Nova S c o t i a do vote somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . The r e s u l t s from the two geographic v a r i a b l e s p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . Cameron, Mooney, Doucet, T h o r n h i l l , MacLean (twice) and Maclnnis a l l had t h e i r h i g h e s t l e v e l s of support from t h e i r f r i e n d s and neighbours i n t h e i r home r e g i o n s . Moreover, although Cowan proved unable t o win h i s home r e g i o n , he nonetheless c a r r i e d a m a j o r i t y of the H a l i f a x c i t y v o te. Support f o r him i n the c i t y simply d i d not spread t o the r e s t of the r e g i o n . A somewhat s i m i l a r tendency was observed at the 1971 convention. As was d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , Doucet won a p l u r a l i t y of the vote i n the c i t y of H a l i f a x , but T h o r n h i l l c a r r i e d the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n . Examining the vote of the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n broken down by community s i z e (Table 5-2) helps c l e a r up t h i s p u z z l e . Table 5-2 Vote by Community S i z e (Metro H a l i f a x ) 1971 P.C. Under 1000 1000-100,000 Over 100,000 Buchanan 40% 14% 38% Doucet 40 5 41 T h o r n h i l l 20 81 21 n=5 n=21 n=63 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 44% 34% 52% MacLean 56 67 48 n=8 n=93 n=109 138 T h o r n h i l l ' s o v e r a l l r e g i o n a l margin of v i c t o r y was c r e a t e d by d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from d e l e g a t e s l i v i n g i n communities of between 10,000 and 100,000. He won 84% of the votes from d e l e g a t e s i n t h i s category, most of whom presumably l i v e d i n Dartmouth. Indeed, when the v o t i n g of Dartmouth 5 d e l e g a t e s was compared with the r e s t of the d e l e g a t e s , T h o r n h i l l ' s home area support was a s t o u n d i n g l y h i g h . A l l t h i n g s b e i n g equal, d e l e g a t e s from Dartmouth were 60% more l i k e l y t o vote f o r T h o r n h i l l . (See Table 5-13). In essence, of a l l the candidates at the t h r e e conventions, only Buchanan f a i l e d t o b e n e f i t from support from h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours. S o c i a l Groups Media coverage of the t h r e e conventions suggested l i t t l e i n the way of group based v o t i n g c l e a v a g e s . The one e x c e p t i o n was the 1980 convention where rumours of a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n and an e s t a b l i s h m e n t versus g r a s s r o o t s s p l i t e x c i t e d the commentators. I n f e r e n t i a l evidence of an establishment cleavage at the other conventions can a l s o be gleaned from suggestions t h a t one candidate had the m a j o r i t y of caucus support. References to the s a l i e n c e of other group cleavages were absent. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d v a r i a b l e s of d e l e g a t e type, age 5 To do t h i s we simply looked at the s e c t i o n of the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n with a p o p u l a t i o n between 10,000 and 100,000. S t r i c t l y speaking, t h i s i n c l u d e s p l a c e s l i k e Bedford and Cole Harbour as w e l l as Dartmouth. Nonetheless, the b u l k of t h i s p o p u l a t i o n group i s probably from Dartmouth and i f they are not i t s h o u l d weaken r a t h e r than strengthen the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . 139 and sex provide the s t a r t i n g point for the analysis. Based on the media coverage s i g n i f i c a n t d i v i s i o n s on the delegate type cleavage might be expected, but l i t t l e on the other two variables. Delegates come to a convention i n either of two ways. They can be chosen by constituencies or they can be delegates by virt u e of the positions they hold. In 1980 i t was suggested that Cameron had the support of the party establishment, e s s e n t i a l l y the e x - o f f i c i o delegates. As well, i n both 1971 and 1986, one candidate was said to be the caucus favourite. Therefore, ample reasons exist to expect a voting d i v i s i o n on t h i s dimension. Despite t h i s , s i g n i f i c a n t results were found only for the two f i n a l b a l l o t s i n 1980. E x - o f f i c i o delegates displayed a marked preference for Cameron. The other conventions did not have such an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s p l i t despite the rumoured caucus preference for a p a r t i c u l a r candidate. However, while the results are not s i g n i f i c a n t , convention winners invariably received a higher proportion of votes cast by e x - o f f i c i o delegates. The higher share ranged from 5.6% to 15.2%. It thus seems legitimate to conclude that e x - o f f i c i o delegates were more l i k e l y to support the winner than were constituency delegates. Nonetheless, only the 1980 L i b e r a l convention displayed a brass versus the grass s p l i t . (See Table 5-3). Perhaps not coincidentally, t h i s convention was also marked by discussions on the r e l i g i o u s alternation of leadership. Given the h i s t o r i c problems i n that party created by r e l i g i o u s c o n f l i c t over leadership selection, the ex o f f i c i o delegates may have deliberately sought to modify voting along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s . 140 Table 5-3 Vote by Delegate Type SECOND BALLOT THIRD BALLOT 1980 L i b e r a l E x - o f f i c i o Regular E x - o f f i c i o Regular Cameron 63% 48% 73% 60% MacLean 28 36 27 40 Mooney 10 17 — — n=83 n=337 n=81 n=333 Delegate type i s by no means the only i n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a b l e . C o n s t i t u e n c i e s were a l s o r e q u i r e d t o p r o v i d e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o young p a r t y members. Indeed, as Table 5-4 shows, s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between age and v o t i n g e x i s t e d at each convention. The f i r s t b a l l o t i n 1971 saw Doucet achieve h i s h i g h e s t l e v e l of support from d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y and h i s lowest l e v e l from d e l e g a t e s over s i x t y . For both Buchanan and T h o r n h i l l the r e v e r s e was the case. T h i s tendency i n t e n s i f i e d on the f i n a l b a l l o t . Doucet won 60% of the 'youth' vote, but took only 4 9% of the votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s between t h i r t y and s i x t y and a meagre 35% of the vote from the over s i x t y group. Age was a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g on the two f i n a l b a l l o t s i n 1980. E s s e n t i a l l y , the l e v e l of support f o r Cameron i n c r e a s e d with the age of the d e l e g a t e s . On the second b a l l o t , Cameron and MacLean v i r t u a l l y s p l i t the 'youth' vote while Cameron won hardy m a j o r i t i e s from the o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Cameron won m a j o r i t i e s from every age group on the l a s t b a l l o t , but h i s share remained h i g h e s t with the o l d e s t d e l e g a t e s and lowest with the de l e g a t e s under t h i r t y . R e gression a n a l y s i s showed t h a t d e l e g a t e s 141 under 30 were 10% l e s s l i k e l y t o vote f o r Cameron. MacLean's r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g showing among the younger de l e g a t e s d i d not p e r s i s t at the 198 6 convention. Indeed, d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y were l e a s t l i k e l y t o support him. Cowan's support reached i t s z e n i t h of 47% with the youth and d i d not exceed 35% f o r the other age groups. Table 5-4 Vote by Age 1971 P.C. Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Buchanan 26% (40%) 34% (51%) 37% (65%) Doucet 55 (60) 37 (49) 29 (35) T h o r n h i l l 19 •28 34 n=91 n=243 n=68 1980 L i b e r a l SECOND AND (THIRD) BALLOTS Cameron 44% (54%) 49% (62%) 62% (79%) MacLean 43 (47) 35 (38) 20 (22) Mooney 13 16 18 n=99 n=256 n=65 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 47% 35% 32% MacLean 53 65 68 n=250 n=532 n=121 Evidence from a l l t h r e e conventions suggests t h a t age i s r e l a t e d t o v o t i n g . Young dele g a t e s vote somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y than do o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . T h i s cannot be a t t r i b u t e d s o l e l y t o the r e l a t i v e ages of the c a n d i d a t e s . For example, i n 1986 the o l d e r Cowan d i d b e s t with the younger d e l e g a t e s . The f i n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i s gender. At most 142 conventions r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of women was demanded from each c o n s t i t u e n c y . However, t h e r e were no gender gaps i n v o t i n g at e i t h e r of the L i b e r a l conventions. Women and men voted i n roughly i d e n t i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s f o r the v a r i o u s c a n d i d a t e s . 6 I t i s wit h the t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s t h a t one would expect the s t r o n g e s t v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s . E t h n i c d i v i s i o n s have been of major importance i n Canadian p o l i t i c s , but the re l e v a n c e of such d i v i s i o n s t o Nova S c o t i a n l e a d e r s h i p conventions i s d o u b t f u l . Acadians make up l e s s than t e n percent of the p r o v i n c i a l p o p u l a t i o n . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , no s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n s were found between e t h n i c i t y and v o t i n g . Of the e i g h t c a n d i d a t e s , o n l y Doucet was of n o n - B r i t i s h stock and s i n c e only s i x percent of the 1971 d e l e g a t e s were Acadian, h i s a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t t h i s advantage was l i m i t e d . Nonetheless, Doucet d i d win 48% of the vote from d e l e g a t e s o f French o r i g i n on the f i r s t b a l l o t and 67% on the l a s t . The number of French d e l e g a t e s was j u s t too sm a l l f o r t h i s t o be of r e a l importance. In c o n t r a s t r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s have h i s t o r i c a l l y been p o l i t i c a l l y important i n Nova S c o t i a . The 1954 Nova S c o t i a L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p convention e x p e r i e n c e d a major r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n (see Chapter 2 or Camp, 1979: 1 5 1 f f ) . Indeed, media s p e c u l a t i o n suggested t h a t r e l i g i o n was of some import at the 1980 convention. As i t t u r n s out, P r o t e s t a n t s and C a t h o l i c s d i f f e r e d 6 While s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s cannot be ob t a i n e d f o r the 1971 convention, one should note i n p a s s i n g t h a t Buchanan's candidacy was more popul a r with women. On the second b a l l o t , Doucet edged Buchanan i n male support while 59% of the women backed Buchanan. 143 s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e i r v o t i n g at each convention and on every b a l l o t . The evidence p r e s e n t e d i n Table 5-5 suggests a s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o n and v o t i n g p r e f e r e n c e . The f i r s t b a l l o t of the 1971 convention l e f t Doucet w i t h 57% of the votes c a s t by C a t h o l i c s , but t r a i l i n g both Buchanan and T h o r n h i l l i n P r o t e s t a n t support. The second b a l l o t accentuated the s p l i t . Doucet took t w o - t h i r d s of the C a t h o l i c vote, while Buchanan was supported by 57% of the P r o t e s t a n t s . The i n i t i a l i m p ression i s t h a t under r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of C a t h o l i c s (37% of the p o p u l a t i o n t o 25% of the convention) may have c o s t Doucet the l e a d e r s h i p . However, i f more C a t h o l i c s had been present i t would have been a very d i f f e r e n t p a r t y , more l i k e the L i b e r a l s . C a t h o l i c s made up at l e a s t 45% of the d e l e g a t e t o t a l at the two L i b e r a l conventions and h i s t o r i c a l l y have p l a y e d a more prominent r o l e i n t h a t p a r t y . The rumours s u g g e s t i n g a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i n 1980 were very w e l l founded. On the f i r s t b a l l o t , Cameron won over h a l f the P r o t e s t a n t vote, but was o u t p o l l e d by MacLean by a margin of 41% t o 26% among C a t h o l i c s . Seventy percent of Cameron's supp o r t e r s were P r o t e s t a n t , while 63% of MacLean's were C a t h o l i c . T h i s s p l i t p e r s i s t e d on the second b a l l o t . Cameron's share of the P r o t e s t a n t vote climbed to 60% while MacLean's C a t h o l i c support rose t o 47%. The l a r g e number of C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s made a t h i r d b a l l o t n ecessary. Cameron's 62% of the t h i r d b a l l o t vote came from winning 71% of the P r o t e s t a n t vote and j u s t over h a l f of the C a t h o l i c vote. The importance of the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i s c l e a r . I f o nly P r o t e s t a n t s voted, Cameron would have won a f i r s t b a l l o t 144 v i c t o r y . I f only C a t h o l i c s voted, MacLean might have won.7 A r e l i g i o u s s p l i t was again e v i d e n t i n 1986, although i t was not as s t a r k as at the other conventions. MacLean was ab l e t o win m a j o r i t y support from both r e l i g i o u s groups, but h i s share of the C a t h o l i c vote was 20 p o i n t s h i g h e r than h i s share o f the P r o t e s t a n t v o t e . Cowan was f a r more s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g support from P r o t e s t a n t s . Table 5-5 V o t i n g by R e l i g i o n 1971 P.C. P r o t e s t a n t Roman C a t h o l i c Buchanan 37% (58%) 20% (33%) Doucet 33 (42) 57 (67) T h o r n h i l l 30 — 22 — n=288 n=98 1980 L i b e r a l Cameron 50% (71%) 26% (50%) Maclnnis 13 — 14 — MacLean 20 (29) 41 (50%) Mooney 17 — 18 — n=231 n=187 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 45% 26% MacLean 55 74 n=477 n=377 There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t a l l th r e e conventions were 7 One c o u l d argue t h a t MacLean might have won because he l e d i n C a t h o l i c support on the f i r s t two b a l l o t s . I f the convention had u n f o l d e d i n t h a t f a s h i o n , the e x p e c t a t i o n s and impact of momentum would probably have been s u f f i c i e n t f o r MacLean t o win. 145 a f f e c t e d by a r e l i g i o u s l y based v o t i n g cleavage. C a t h o l i c s and P r o t e s t a n t s vote d i f f e r e n t l y , even at l e a d e r s h i p conventions. Indeed, the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n was as n o t a b l e at the C o n s e r v a t i v e convention as i t was at the L i b e r a l g a t h e r i n g s . Rumours r e g a r d i n g the p o l i t i c a l demise of r e l i g i o n i n Nova S c o t i a appear exaggerated. The f i n a l s o c i a l groups t o be examined, wi t h l i t t l e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r r e l e v a n c e , are more ec o n o m i c a l l y based. As expected an examination of the economic c a t e g o r i e s of income, e d u c a t i o n and c l a s s o f f e r s l i t t l e evidence of a c o n s i s t e n t s t a t u s gap i n d e l e g a t e v o t i n g . Income l e v e l was a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g at two of the conventions. (See Table 5-6). On the f i r s t b a l l o t i n 1980, Cameron was o u t p o l l e d by MacLean among de l e g a t e s at the h i g h e s t income l e v e l . Subsequent b a l l o t s saw Cameron c o r r e c t t h i s t r e n d . In 1986, Cowan won 49% of the votes c a s t by the w e a l t h i e s t d e l e g a t e s , but was not n e a r l y as s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g support from t h e i r l e s s a f f l u e n t c o l l e a g u e s . L e v e l of e d u c a t i o n was even l e s s d i s c r i m i n a t i n g . Only on the f i n a l b a l l o t i n 1971 c o u l d an e d u c a t i o n gap be d i s c e r n e d . There, Doucet won 58% of the u n i v e r s i t y educated votes, while Buchanan was g i v e n m a j o r i t y support by l e s s educated d e l e g a t e s . (See Table 5-6). C l a s s , or o c c u p a t i o n a l s t a t u s , was a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g only on the second b a l l o t of the 1971 convention (Table 5-6). Again, Doucet won 56% of the upper middle c l a s s vote, a share t h a t d e c l i n e d with c l a s s l e v e l . The economic v a r i a b l e s , then, appeared t o exert an i n f l u e n c e 146 mainly at the 1971 convention. Delegates who c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 'higher s t a t u s ' , t h a t i s upper middle c l a s s or u n i v e r s i t y educated, p r e f e r r e d Doucet over Buchanan. The other d e l e g a t e s d i d not. I t i s something of a s u r p r i s e t o d i s c o v e r t h a t economic v a r i a b l e s may have been important at even one of the conventions. I t may be t h a t such a p r e f e r e n c e i s r e l a t e d t o the more expected r e g i o n a l or r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l be examined l a t e r i n the chapter. 147 Table 5-6 Vote by C l a s s , E d u c a t i o n and Income C l a s s Upper Middle Middle Working 1971 P.C. (2nd) Buchanan 44% 56% 62% Doucet 56 44 38 n=174 n=176 n=25 1971 P.C. (2nd) E d u c a t i o n U n i v e r s i t y Degree High School Graduate Less than High School Buchanan 42% 59% 53% Doucet 57 42 47 n=165 n=176 n=57 1980 L i b e r a l (1st) Income Low Medium High Cameron 46% 43% 29% Maclnnis 12 14 12 MacLean 33 29 31 Mooney 10 15 28 n=52 n=283 n=93 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 42% 34% 49% MacLean 58 66 51 n=86 n=626 n=164 Only i n Nova S c o t i a does i t make much sense t o c o n s t r u c t a s o c i a l ' i n s i d e r ' s c a l e s i m i l a r t o t h a t used by Stewart i n h i s study of the 1983 and 1984 n a t i o n a l conventions. In the Nova S c o t i a n convention context, an ' i n s i d e r ' i s d e f i n e d as a r e l a t i v e l y wealthy, u n i v e r s i t y educated, upper middle c l a s s d e l e g a t e l i v i n g i n a community of over 50,000 i n the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n (see 148 Stewart, 1988b: 161,162). An ' o u t s i d e r ' has none of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Thus a composite s o c i a l i n s i d e r s c a l e r a n g i n g from '0 ' ( o u t s i d e r ) t o '5' ( i n s i d e r ) can be c r e a t e d . T h i s s c a l e was not a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g at the 1971 convention. In 1980, i t was s i g n i f i c a n t only on the f i r s t b a l l o t and t h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e was l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o v a r i a t i o n s i n support f o r M a c l n n i s . Only at the 1986 convention was a c l e a r p a t t e r n e v i d e n t . (See Table 5-7). Cowan took 57% of the votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s s c o r i n g '5' and 42% of the vote from d e l e g a t e s s c o r i n g '4'. Delegates at lower l e v e l s never gave him even a 40% vote share. Obviously, t h i s r e f l e c t s i n p a r t support from h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours i n H a l i f a x . The h i g h l e v e l of support he won from the ' s o c i a l i n s i d e r s ' h e l p s e x p l a i n h i s mistaken b e l i e f t h a t he had almost t w o - t h i r d s of the H a l i f a x area v o t e . Perhaps the context i n which he moved was composed mainly of these s o c i a l i n s i d e r s and thus gave Cowan a mistaken i d e a of h i s g e n e r a l p o p u l a r i t y . C e r t a i n l y , as Kavanagh i n d i c a t e s , MacLean was not regarded f a v o u r a b l y i n c e r t a i n L i b e r a l c i r c l e s i n H a l i f a x (1988: 137). MacLean's o v e r a l l support suggests t h a t these ' c i r c l e s ' are somewhat out of touch with grass r o o t s L i b e r a l s i n the r e s t of the p r o v i n c e . 149 Table 5-7 Vote by Social Insider Scale (Ascending) 1 2 3 4 5 Cowan 39% 38% 27% 43% 57% MacLean 61 62 73 57 43 n=112 n=447 n=159 n=143 n=42 This examination of the relationship between delegate voting and s o c i a l groups reveals that r e l i g i o n i s associated most strongly with voting and t h i s quite consistently. Aside from the reference to Mooney not supporting a fellow Catholic i n 1980, the j o u r n a l i s t i c coverage was s i l e n t as to the existence of r e l i g i o n as a source of voting d i v i s i o n s . Indeed, much of the contemporary l i t e r a t u r e on Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s refers to the declining p o l i t i c a l relevance of r e l i g i o n . This i s not supported by the evidence presented here. Once more, however, the 'l i n g e r i n g impact' of r e l i g i o n could rest on the behaviour of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups. One could hypothesize, as i n the l a s t chapter, that r e l i g i o n ' s decline i s most pronounced among the young or the highly educated. The influence of r e l i g i o n could be due to the minority status of these delegates at Nova Scotian conventions. Broadly speaking, however, educational controls did not remove r e l i g i o n as an important source of cleavage at the three conventions. While s i g n i f i c a n t r esults could not be obtained for each category, the tendency of Protestants to disproportionately 150 support P r o t e s t a n t s and C a t h o l i c s , C a t h o l i c s was widespread. 8 The r e l i g i o u s cleavage was s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at each convention even f o r u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s . R e l i g i o n as a source of cleavage, then, as evidenced by Table 5-8, was not a p p r e c i a b l y weaker among these r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e d e l e g a t e s . The impact of age on r e l i g i o n i s somewhat harder t o d e s c r i b e . In 1971, Doucet won a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y r e g a r d l e s s o f r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n . Yet h i s share of the C a t h o l i c youth vote was much h i g h e r than h i s share of the P r o t e s t a n t youth vote. Cameron, i n 1980, i n v a r i a b l y won more support from P r o t e s t a n t s than C a t h o l i c s and on the f i n a l b a l l o t took 61% of the vote from P r o t e s t a n t s under 30. In c o n t r a s t , on the two f i n a l b a l l o t s MacLean won a m a j o r i t y of the votes c a s t by young C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s , but not from o l d e r C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s . Thus, c o n t r a r y t o e x p e c t a t i o n s , i t was the o l d e r C a t h o l i c s who d i d not adhere t o the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . At the 1986 convention, Cowan's support from youth d e l e g a t e s was p r i m a r i l y P r o t e s t a n t . He a c t u a l l y won a m a j o r i t y of the P r o t e s t a n t youth vote but garnered only a t h i r d of the C a t h o l i c youth v o t e . Cowan's r e l a t i v e p o p u l a r i t y with young d e l e g a t e s d i d not c r o s s the r e l i g i o u s d i v i d e . Even e l d e r l y P r o t e s t a n t s were more s u p p o r t i v e than young C a t h o l i c s . 8 When the race was down t o j u s t two men the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n was c o n s i s t e n t across a l l l e v e l s of ed u c a t i o n . 151 Table 5-8 Index of R e l i g i o u s Support by Educat i o n and Age# EDUCATION AGE Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Buchanan +25 (+29) + 14 (+10) +15* (+34)* +8 ( + 8) + 18* (+27)* +24 (+37)* Doucet -27 (-29) -13 (-10) -30* (-34)* -13 (-8) -24* (-27)* -34 (-37)* Thornhill +2 -1 +16* +5 + 6* + 10 Cameron +37 (+46) +37* (+27)* +15* (+17)* + 16 ( + 14) +26* (+22)* +21 (+20) Maclnnis -20 -13* + 6* -1 -1* -4 MacLean -31 (-46) -22* (-27)* -20* (-17)* -19 (-14) -21* (-22)* -20 (-20) Mooney + 14 -2 -1* +4 -5 +3 Cowan + 19* +28 +14* +22 + 16 +32 MacLean -19* -28 -14* -22 -16 -32 from P r o t e s t a n t support. A ne g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t a candidate had a h i g h e r percentage of support from C a t h o l i c s while a p o s i t i v e number means t h a t the l e v e l of P r o t e s t a n t support was h i g h e r . F i g u r e s i n b r a c k e t s are f i n a l b a l l o t r e s u l t s . An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t c h i square f o r r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s was s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . P r o t e s t a n t candidates are i n i t a l i c s . The importance of the r e l i g i o u s cleavage, then, i s s c a r c e l y d i m i n i s h e d by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of age or e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s . In essence, P r o t e s t a n t s and C a t h o l i c s vote d i f f e r e n t l y r e g a r d l e s s of age or e d u c a t i o n . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t such c a t e g o r i e s are unimportant. Rather, t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i s , at l e a s t , m i t i g a t e d by the r e l i g i o u s v a r i a b l e . S u r p r i s i n g l y , the importance of age was i n i t i a l l y q u i t e s t r i k i n g . Age was s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g at each 152 convention and the value of Cramer's V (see Table 5-10) was higher with age than i t was with any other group variable save r e l i g i o n . Its i n t e r a c t i o n with r e l i g i o n makes clearer the nature of t h i s generation gap. In 1971, the impact of r e l i g i o n was most subdued among the younger delegates. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Doucet was preferred over the other candidates regardless of r e l i g i o n . However, the age ef f e c t was most pronounced among Protestants: young Catholic delegates were no more supportive of Doucet than were t h e i r elders. E s s e n t i a l l y , the age d i v i s i o n was an inte r n a l Protestant d i v i s i o n . Catholics, regardless of age, were s o l i d l y behind Doucet. The introduction of a r e l i g i o u s control i n 1980 reduced the impact of age. The proportion i n which Protestants and Catholics voted for candidates was v i r t u a l l y unaffected by age. However, on the f i n a l b a l l o t , while a l l Protestants gave Cameron majority support, his share rose from 61% of the under t h i r t y vote to 70% from delegates between t h i r t y and sixty to 85% from delegates over s i x t y . Even among Catholics, his highest l e v e l of support comes from the older delegates. Religion notwithstanding, Cameron's candidacy was strongest among the older delegates. At the 198 6 convention even r e l i g i o u s controls could not remove the significance of the age cleavage. However, among Protestants only the youth provided Cowan with majority support. Similarly, the proportion of support for MacLean increased with the age of Catholic delegates. Cowan's candidacy was strongest with the youth of both r e l i g i o u s groups, a l b e i t much stronger among Protestants. 153 R e l i g i o n and age were the o n l y group v a r i a b l e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g at each convention and r e l i g i o n was o b v i o u s l y more important. Other v a r i a b l e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g at no more than two conventions and d i d not undercut the p a t t e r n of r e l i g i o u s support. Somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , economic groups d i s p l a y e d an a s s o c i a t i o n with v o t i n g i n both 1971 and 1986. In 1971, the tendency was f o r u n i v e r s i t y educated and upper middle c l a s s d e l e g a t e s t o support Doucet. I t appears t h a t the e d u c a t i o n a l s p l i t was l a r g e l y due t o the v o t i n g of C a t h o l i c s . Buchanan's m a j o r i t y support from P r o t e s t a n t s i n c l u d e d m a j o r i t y support (53%) from u n i v e r s i t y educated P r o t e s t a n t s . In c o n t r a s t , 80% of the u n i v e r s i t y educated C a t h o l i c s backed Doucet. The e d u c a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n was l a r g e l y c r e a t e d by the mass support f o r Doucet from u n i v e r s i t y educated C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s . One i s u n l i k e l y t o f i n d a sharper r e j e c t i o n of the n o t i o n t h a t r e l i g i o u s l y based v o t i n g d e c l i n e s w i t h e d u c a t i o n . The c l a s s d i v i s i o n was a l s o i n f l u e n c e d by r e l i g i o n . As with education, Buchanan's P r o t e s t a n t support was c o n s i s t e n t a c r o s s c l a s s l i n e s and Doucet's m a j o r i t y from upper middle c l a s s d e l e g a t e s was due l a r g e l y t o the 79% support g i v e n him by upper middle c l a s s C a t h o l i c s . In essence, the economic d i v i s i o n s d i s c o v e r e d i n 1971 owe l a r g e l y to the overwhelming support f o r Doucet p r o v i d e d by h i g h s t a t u s C a t h o l i c s . Income l e v e l was the economic v a r i a b l e most s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g at the 1986 convention. The d i r e c t i o n of the 154 association was disproportionate support for Cowan among the 'wealthy.' This association remained noteworthy despite the introduction of r e l i g i o u s controls. Cowan won a slim majority of the votes cast by affluent Protestants and also took 4 6% of the votes from affluent Catholics. Less wealthy Catholics gave him no more than 30% support. The more affluent delegates, regardless of r e l i g i o n were more l i k e l y to support Cowan. Before leaving r e l i g i o n , the impact of delegate type must be assessed. Based on the PEI findings, one might expect e x - o f f i c i o delegates to be immune from the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . As noted e a r l i e r , the delegate type variable was i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t only at the 1980 convention. B r i e f l y recapitulated, the tendency was for Cameron to receive proportionately more support from e x - o f f i c i o delegates than he did from the constituency delegates. The relevant question thus becomes whether e x - o f f i c i o Catholics were as supportive of MacLean as the constituency delegates. They were not. The significance of Cameron's e x - o f f i c i o support owed largely to his support from e x - o f f i c i o Catholics. (See Table 5-9). On the f i r s t b a l l o t Cameron won a p l u r a l i t y of 43% from Catholic e x - o f f i c i o delegates while MacLean was the clear choice of Catholic constituency delegates. The remaining b a l l o t s saw MacLean outpoll Cameron among Catholic constituency delegates but not among t h e i r e x - o f f i c i o brethren. While results for the f i n a l two b a l l o t s were not s i g n i f i c a n t , i t seems clear that the general weakness Cameron had i n at t r a c t i n g Catholic support did not apply to e x - o f f i c i o delegates. These delegates were probably more 155 cognizant o f the p a r t y t r a d i t i o n t h a t i t was a P r o t e s t a n t ' s t u r n and a c t e d t o ensure such an outcome. As w e l l , they may have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a P r o t e s t a n t v i c t o r y would p r e s e r v e f u t u r e C a t h o l i c c l a i m s on the l e a d e r s h i p . F i n a l l y , e x - o f f i c i o C a t h o l i c s might have remembered the debacle t h a t f o l l o w e d the 1954 convention and worked t o ensure i t was not repeated i n 1980. Table 5-9 Vote by Delegate Type by R e l i g i o n Regular Delegate E x - o f f i c i o Delegate 1971 P.C. P r o t e s t a n t C a t h o l i c P r o t e s t a n t C a t h o l i c Buchanan 58% 32% 64% 35% Doucet 42 68 36 66 n=172 n=56 n=8 9 n=2 9 1980 L i b e r a l (1st) Cameron 50% 24% 50% 43% Maclnnis 13 14 14 21 MacLean 19 42 21 32 Mooney 18 21 15 4 n=175 n=156 n=52 n=28 (3rd) Cameron 71% 49% 77% 62% MacLean 30 51 24 38 n=166 n=155 n=51 n=26 1986 L i b e r a l Cowan 45% 29% 44% 21% MacLean 55 71 56 79 n=350 n=273 n=118 n=98 Chi Square i s s i g n i f i c a n t only f o r the f i n a l b a l l o t i n 1980. 156 At the other conventions d i s t i n c t i o n s of d e l e g a t e type d i d l i t t l e t o m i t i g a t e the r e l i g i o u s cleavage. In both 1971 and 1986, P r o t e s t a n t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s v o t e d more l i k e t h e i r f e l l o w P r o t e s t a n t s than t h e i r f e l l o w e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . V o t i n g by e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s evidenced j u s t as s t r o n g a r e l i g i o u s cleavage as d i d the v o t i n g of c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s . Of course, at n e i t h e r of these conventions were brokerage concerns as e x p l i c i t . Table 5-10 Cramer's V 1971 1st P.C. 2nd 1980 1st L i b e r a l 2nd 3rd 1986 L i b e r a l Region .23 .30 .40 .43 .41 .37 Urban .17 * — — — .14 E t h n i c i t y — — — — — — R e l i g i o n .22 .22 .27 .25 .22 .19 Age .13 .16 — .11 .16 .12 Gender — — — — — — Delegate Type — — — .12 .10 — E d u c a t i o n — .15 — — — — Income — — .13 — — — C l a s s — .13 — — — — Thus f a r the d i s c u s s i o n of group d i v i s i o n s has excluded geographic f a c t o r s . However, i n order t o understand more f u l l y the d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the p a r t i e s , i t i s necessary t o analyze the r e l a t i o n s h i p between group v a r i a b l e s and geographic v a r i a b l e s . As Table 5-10 showed, the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s with vote were i n v a r i a b l y r e g i o n a l . The n o t i o n of r e g i o n at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l i s somewhat p r o b l e m a t i c . Few observers c l a i m t h a t Nova S c o t i a n 157 p o l i t i c s i s r i v e n with s e c t i o n a l i s m . Instead of r e g i o n per se be i n g important, one may be s e e i n g a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the 'composition effect'(Agnew, 1987: 96). T h i s means, as Agnew e x p l a i n s , "Geography i s epiphenomenal, i t i s merely the aggregate product of ' i n d i v i d u a l ' a t t r i b u t e s t h a t j u s t happen t o covary with l o c a t i o n " (1987: 4 ). Conceived i n t h i s way, f r i e n d s and neighbours support might simply be a product of d i f f e r i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f the r e l i g i o u s and age groups e a r l i e r found t o be important. The impact of r e l i g i o n at the 1971 convention does not suggest a composition e f f e c t . The r e g i o n a l cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r both r e l i g i o u s groups on the f i n a l b a l l o t and f o r C a t h o l i c s on the f i r s t . T h i s does not mean t h a t r e l i g i o n was unimportant. In every r e g i o n but one (Annapolis V a l l e y ) 9 Doucet r e c e i v e d more support from C a t h o l i c s than he d i d from P r o t e s t a n t s . The r e v e r s e was t r u e f o r Buchanan. I t should a l s o be s t r e s s e d t h a t e x c l u d i n g Cape Breton, the only r e g i o n i n which a m a j o r i t y of the d e l e g a t e s were C a t h o l i c , does not remove the s i g n i f i c a n c e of r e l i g i o n . Even when c o n s i d e r a t i o n was l i m i t e d t o mainland d e l e g a t e s , P r o t e s t a n t s gave m a j o r i t y support t o Buchanan and C a t h o l i c s p r e f e r r e d Doucet. The problem f o r Doucet was t h a t so few of the mainland d e l e g a t e s were i n f a c t C a t h o l i c . Doucet's s t r o n g showing among C a t h o l i c s cannot simply be a t t r i b u t e d t o the r e l i g i o u s composition of Cape Breton. The same p a t t e r n was l a r g e l y e v i d e n t i n 1980. Regiona l 9 I t w i l l be argued l a t e r t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r support f o r Buchanan from A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y d e l e g a t e s as a v a r i a n t of f r i e n d s and neighbours support. 158 d i v i s i o n s remained s t r i k i n g (and s i g n i f i c a n t ) even when c o n s i d e r a t i o n was l i m i t e d t o a s i n g l e r e l i g i o u s group. The r e g i o n a l cleavage was not a product of d i f f e r i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C a t h o l i c s and P r o t e s t a n t s i n d i f f e r e n t areas. Nonetheless, i n each r e g i o n support was h i g h e r f o r Cameron among P r o t e s t a n t s and f o r MacLean among C a t h o l i c s . The only e x c e p t i o n s t o t h i s t r e n d o c c u r r e d on the f i n a l b a l l o t when C a t h o l i c s from the An n a p o l i s V a l l e y and South Shore supported Cameron even more s t r o n g l y than t h e i r P r o t e s t a n t neighbours. Of course these d e l e g a t e s were the s t r o n g e s t Mooney supporters at the convention and may have shared t h e i r c a n d i d a t e ' s supposed r e l u c t a n c e t o support the C a t h o l i c MacLean (see H a l i f a x C h r o n i c l e Herald, June 12 1980: 7 ) . The r e s u l t s from the 1986 convention do not i n d i c a t e a composition e f f e c t e i t h e r . The r e g i o n a l cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r both r e l i g i o u s groups. Once more the e x c l u s i o n of predominantly C a t h o l i c Cape Breton d i d not e l i m i n a t e the r e l i g i o u s c leavage. Mainland d e l e g a t e s who were a l s o C a t h o l i c were extremely s u p p o r t i v e of MacLean while P r o t e s t a n t s were as l i k e l y t o support Cowan as they were MacLean. On Cape Breton, Cowan's candidacy was on l y m a r g i n a l l y s t r o n g e r among P r o t e s t a n t s . The i n t e r a c t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s and r e g i o n a l v a r i a b l e s at the t h r e e conventions serves t o u n d e r l i n e the independent impact of r e g i o n . I t i s c l e a r t h a t the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t d i m i n i s h e s the p a t t e r n of r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g . S t i l l , one cannot d i s m i s s r e l i g i o n as an a r t i f a c t of r e g i o n . G e n e r a l l y , the tendency of P r o t e s t a n t s t o g i v e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support t o P r o t e s t a n t s and 159 C a t h o l i c s t o C a t h o l i c s was p r e s e n t . I f only C a t h o l i c s voted, Doucet would have been chosen l e a d e r i n 1971 and MacLean might have won i n 1980. I f onl y P r o t e s t a n t s voted, Cowan would have had a r e s p e c t a b l e 45% of the vote i n 1986. Indeed, he took almost h a l f of the votes c a s t by mainland P r o t e s t a n t s . R e l i g i o n , then, was by no means i n c i d e n t a l . The i n t e r a c t i o n of age and r e g i o n i n 1971 r e v e a l s much of the convention dynamic. Only f o r de l e g a t e s between t h i r t y and s i x t y , the bulk of convention goers, was r e g i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t e . Even on the mainland most d e l e g a t e s under 30 p r e f e r r e d Doucet. Most o l d e r d e l e g a t e s , • except i n Cape Breton, voted f o r Buchanan. Age d i v i s i o n s were l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t i n 1980. Region was s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g among a l l age groups on a l l t h r e e b a l l o t s . R e g i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s were u n m i t i g a t e d by age. In 1986, as i n 1980, the r e g i o n a l cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a l l age groups. U n l i k e 1980, however, t h i s appears t o mask a s t r o n g age e f f e c t . Examination of each r e g i o n showed t h a t d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y gave Cowan a m a j o r i t y everywhere save Cape Breton. In Cape Breton, MacLean's impressive showing was unmarred by meagre support from the youth. As Cowan's overwhelming defeat i n d i c a t e s , youth support does not compensate f o r weakness with o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Candidates i n Nova S c o t i a d i d not b u i l d winning c o a l i t i o n s on the backs of the young d e l e g a t e s . The young dele g a t e s seem t o have an almost mischievous impact at the t h r e e conventions. Regional c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h i g h l i g h t the nature of the age 160 cleavage at the t h r e e conventions. In 1986, although Cowan was p r e f e r r e d by Mainland youth, h i s youth support c o u l d not p e n e t r a t e Cape Breton. MacLean's p r o p o r t i o n a t e weakness among young d e l e g a t e s i n 1986 stands i n c o n t r a s t t o h i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g youth support i n 1980. Perhaps h i s 1980 youth support i s b e t t e r understood as weakness among the over s i x t y d e l e g a t e s . On the f i n a l b a l l o t , h i s share of the over s i x t y vote reached a mainland h i g h of 27% i n metro H a l i f a x and only exceeded 10% i n one other r e g i o n . Cameron's support from the aged l a r g e l y f a i l e d t o spread to Cape Breton. Age seemed most important i n 1971 where the f i n a l b a l l o t saw Doucet c a r r y a m a j o r i t y of the youth vote everywhere but the A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y . However, on l y i n Cape Breton, was h i s youth support exceeded by support from o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Of course, on t h i s b a l l o t t h e r e was no f r i e n d s and neighbours support to c o u n t e r a c t the r e c a l c i t r a n c e of younger d e l e g a t e s t o vote f o r Buchanan. 1 0 Cape Breton stands alone i n the c o n s i s t e n c y of i t s v o t i n g p a t t e r n . On every b a l l o t at each convention, the Cape Breton candidate won a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by i s l a n d d e l e g a t e s r e g a r d l e s s of age or even r e l i g i o n . Other r e g i o n s were a l s o l o y a l . For i n s t a n c e , Mooney and Cameron won p l u r a l i t i e s from a l l ages and r e l i g i o u s groups i n t h e i r home r e g i o n s . However, i n 1971, T h o r n h i l l ' s p l u r a l i t y i n metro H a l i f a x masked m a j o r i t y support f o r Doucet from the youth and p l u r a l i t y support from C a t h o l i c s . The f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t , then, can be l i m i t e d . However, i f 1 0 Again, Buchanan's Annap o l i s V a l l e y support may be t r e a t e d as a v a r i a n t of ' f r i e n d s and neighbours.' The youth of t h i s r e g i o n were more s u p p o r t i v e of Buchanan than of Doucet. H a l i f a x proper i s e l i m i n a t e d from c o n s i d e r a t i o n , T h o r n h i l l was able t o o u t p o l l Doucet even among the youth and C a t h o l i c s . The other s i g n i f i c a n t group v a r i a b l e s — e d u c a t i o n and c l a s s i n 1971, income and s o c i a l i n s i d e r i n 1986, and del e g a t e type i n 1 9 8 0 — modify the r e g i o n a l t r e n d s s l i g h t l y . Doucet c a r r i e d Cape Breton r e g a r d l e s s of ed u c a t i o n or c l a s s l e v e l . On the mainland he was o u t p o l l e d by Buchanan among the upper middle c l a s s , but c a r r i e d the u n i v e r s i t y educated vote i n almost every r e g i o n . (Of course, as was shown e a r l i e r , t h i s was due l a r g e l y t o h i s support from C a t h o l i c s . ) Cowan won a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by the w e a l t h i e s t mainlanders, but had almost no support from wealthy Cape Breton d e l e g a t e s . ' S o c i a l i n s i d e r s ' i n Cape Breton d i d not support him, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h i s s t r e n g t h on t h i s v a r i a b l e was l a r g e l y r e g i o n a l . 162 Table 5-11 Index of Neighbourhood Support by Educat i o n and Age# EDUCATION AGE Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Buchanan +3 (+31)* +31* (+24)* -9 (-5) + 14 ( + 14) +2* (+17)* + 14 ( + 17) Doucet +35 (+26) * +29* (+32)* +34 (+34)* +33 (+23) +32* (+38)* +33 (+45) T h o r n h i l l — +48* + 62* -9 + 67* — Cameron (--) +33* (+15)* +31* (+21)* +24* (+2*) +31* (+15)* + 47* (+13)* Maclnnis — +18* +3* + 9* + 11* + 3* MacLean +54* (+45)* +42* (+39) * +46* (+38)* +35* ( + 46) * +55* ( + 36) * +27* (+26) * Mooney — +35* +41* +33* +29* +71* Cowan -16 -9 +21* + 30* + 11* -28 MacLean +28* +35* +37* +35* + 34* +32* cand i d a t e s ' o v e r a l l share o f the vote from the percentage o f support g i v e n him by de l e g a t e s from h i s home area. The home area f o r Doucet and MacLean i s Cape Breton, f o r Cameron E a s t e r n Mainland, Mooney South Shore, Maclnnis H a l i f a x Metro. Cowan's i s c o n s i d e r e d H a l i f a x Metro over 100, 000, T h o r n h i l l ' s Metro H a l i f a x 1000-100,000. F i n a l l y the An n a p o l i s V a l l e y i s t r e a t e d as Buchanan's home area. A ne g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t the candidate d i d b e t t e r o v e r a l l than he d i d with h i s neighbours. A p o s i t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s support from h i s home area exceeds h i s o v e r a l l support. The numbers i n b r a c k e t s are the f i g u r e s from the f i n a l b a l l o t . An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t the value of c h i square f o r the geographic d i v i s i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . Delegate type d i d not e l i m i n a t e the r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n of South Shore support f o r Mooney on the f i r s t two b a l l o t s nor the l o y a l t y of Cape Bretoners f o r MacLean. Even though Cameron d i d much b e t t e r with Cape Breton e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s than he d i d with c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s he was s t i l l unable t o win a m a j o r i t y . 163 E x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were a l s o s u s c e p t i b l e t o the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . At the other conventions d e l e g a t e type had l e s s impact on the r e g i o n a l cleavage. The r e g i o n a l cleavage remained s i g n i f i c a n t and the p a t t e r n s were v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l f o r both types of d e l e g a t e s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o maintain, then, t h a t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were l e s s a f f e c t e d by the f r i e n d s and neighbours p u l l than t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y b r e t h r e n . A t t i t u d e s The very e x i s t e n c e of an a t t i t u d i n a l cleavage depends on the presence of a c t u a l disagreement. I f the d e l e g a t e s are i n g e n e r a l agreement then an a t t i t u d i n a l l y based v o t i n g cleavage i s i m p o s s i b l e . As Table 5-12 shows, such agreement d i d not e x i s t at any of the Nova S c o t i a n conventions. A consensus index i n d i c a t e s the degree of disagreement among the d e l e g a t e s . On a range of 0 to 50 ( p e r f e c t consensus) the t h r e e conventions r e c o r d average scores of j u s t 21.6, 25.7 and 16.0. Using Whitehorn's 30% l e v e l t o i n d i c a t e low consensus, (1988: 289) 14 of 30 i s s u e s i n 1971, 6 of 16 i n 1980, and 12 of 18 i n 1986 had m i n o r i t y views t h a t d i v i d e d the p a r t y . There was then ample p o s s i b i l i t y of an a t t i t u d i n a l c l eavage. Whether these d i f f e r e n c e s were u t i l i z e d by the candidates i s another matter. The convention campaigns suggest not. G e n e r a l l y , the candidates waged s i m i l a r campaigns more no t a b l e f o r wide spread p o l i c y agreement than f o r disagreements. Delegates, then c o u l d not p i c k up on c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i s s u e p o s i t i o n s on the p a r t of the 164 c a n d i d a t e s . However, Adamson has shown t h a t i n 1971, somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , an a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n c o u l d be observed. Indeed, on the f i r s t b a l l o t e i g h t of the t h i r t y a t t i t u d i n a l v a r i a b l e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g while t h i s was the case f o r nine v a r i a b l e s on the second. The disagreement appeared p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t on i s s u e s t h a t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d F r e n c h / E n g l i s h . On the f i r s t b a l l o t , d e l e g a t e s who d i d not agree t h a t Quebec should have s p e c i a l • r e c o g n i t i o n i n C o n f e d e r a t i o n , who f e l t no s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n should be p a i d t o Quebec and who b e l i e v e d t h a t French Canadians should have no s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s gave the p l u r a l i t y of t h e i r support t o Buchanan. Those who h e l d opposing views and who agreed t h a t i t was a l l r i g h t t o speak t o Anglo p r o v i n c i a l governments i n French d e l i v e r e d s i z a b l e p l u r a l i t i e s t o Doucet. T h i s t r e n d c o n t i n u e d on the second b a l l o t with the p l u r a l i t i e s hardening i n t o m a j o r i t i e s . In each case, most d e l e g a t e s h e l d the p o s i t i o n from which Buchanan drew more support. C e r t a i n other areas of disagreement c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n a l i b e r a l versus c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n t e x t . On the f i r s t b a l l o t , Buchanan won p l u r a l i t i e s from d e l e g a t e s a g r e e i n g t h a t employers have the r i g h t t o seek s t r i k e i n j u n c t i o n s , t h a t government spends too much on s o c i a l w e l f a r e , and t h a t government should i n t e r f e r e l e s s with b u s i n e s s . Doucet took a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s with opposing views. The f i n a l b a l l o t saw Buchanan's p l u r a l i t i e s become m a j o r i t i e s . The only other v a r i a b l e s a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g i n a 165 s i g n i f i c a n t way d e a l t with the i d e a of Maritime union. On the f i r s t b a l l o t , Buchanan won a 46% p l u r a l i t y from d e l e g a t e s who d i d not want Nova S c o t i a t o en t e r i n t o formal economic c o o p e r a t i o n with the othe r Maritime p r o v i n c e s . Doucet took a p l u r a l i t y of 40% from d e l e g a t e s d e s i r o u s of such c o o p e r a t i o n . The f i n a l b a l l o t saw Buchanan win a m a j o r i t y from d e l e g a t e s who b e l i e v e d t h a t Nova S c o t i a should e n t e r no k i n d of Maritime union, while Doucet won a m a j o r i t y from those h o l d i n g d i v e r g e n t o p i n i o n s . Perhaps then, Buchanan's v i c t o r y over Doucet was, at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , a v i c t o r y f o r the ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' wing of the p a r t y . I t c e r t a i n l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the m a j o r i t y of Nova S c o t i a n C o n s e r v a t i v e s h e l d r a t h e r ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' views. The 1980 L i b e r a l convention was not marked by as much a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , as i n 1971, t h e r e was disagreement over the p l a c e of Quebec i n c o n f e d e r a t i o n . The f i n a l two b a l l o t s showed a c l e a r p r e f e r e n c e f o r Cameron from d e l e g a t e s who d i d not f e e l t h a t Quebec should have s p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n . In a s l i g h t l y c o n t r a r y v e i n , Cameron's support was s t r o n g e r among de l e g a t e s who d i d not agree t h a t government spends too much on s o c i a l w e l f a r e . MacLean d i d much b e t t e r with d e l e g a t e s who f e l t too much was spent. T h i s v a r i a b l e was only a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g on the f i r s t b a l l o t . The remaining i s s u e s which d i s p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n with vote were r e l a t e d t o i n t e r n a l p a r t y matters. S p e c i f i c a l l y , d e l e g a t e s who b e l i e v e d t h a t p a r t y l e a d e r s had been r e s p o n s i v e t o the wishes of the p a r t y membership voted 166 d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y f o r Cameron on a l l t h r e e b a l l o t s . MacLean was much more s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g the support of d e l e g a t e s who were l e s s impressed with the responsiveness of the p a r t y l e a d e r s . T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g when one r e c a l l s t h a t Cameron had the overwhelming support of the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s and was c o n s i d e r e d the 'establishment' candidate. The other i n t e r n a l v a r i a b l e attempted t o measure whether de l e g a t e s b e l i e v e d the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y had l o s t c o n t a c t w i t h the 'grass r o o t s . ' T h i s mainly a f f e c t e d the l e v e l s of support f o r the minor c a n d i d a t e s . Obviously, a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s had very l i t t l e impact on v o t i n g at the 1980 convention. No c l e a r p a t t e r n seemed t o separate supporters of one candidate from those of another. At the very l e a s t , the v a r i a b l e s used i n the 1980 survey do not p r o v i d e evidence of an a t t i t u d i n a l v o t i n g cleavage. The impact of a t t i t u d e s on v o t i n g i n 198 6 was a l s o minimal. S i x v a r i a b l e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g , but i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o read much i n these d i f f e r e n c e s . One of the i s s u e s l i k e l y measured a r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n . The m a j o r i t y of d e l e g a t e s b e l i e v e d t h a t the SYSCO coke ovens should be c l o s e d . MacLean r e c e i v e d 72% support from those who d i s a g r e e d , but o n l y 59% from those h o l d i n g the m a j o r i t y d i s p o s i t i o n . With the ovens i n Cape Breton and most v a l u a b l e t o t h a t r e g i o n ' s economy, t h i s d i v i s i o n l i k e l y r e f l e c t e d MacLean's s t r o n g i s l a n d base. MacLean a t t r a c t e d s l i g h t l y more support from d e l e g a t e s who wanted the p r o v i n c i a l government to have more power than he d i d from those i n 167 disagreement (66% versus 57%) and d i d p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y b e t t e r among de l e g a t e s who agreed t h a t a convention was the best way to choose a l e a d e r , who f e l t t h a t youth had an adequate v o i c e i n the p a r t y , who d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t a l l p a r t y members should vote f o r the le a d e r , and who supported the f i r i n g of C o n s e r v a t i v e appointees f o l l o w i n g a L i b e r a l v i c t o r y . A l l of these d i f f e r e n c e s were simply of degree: MacLean won m a j o r i t y support from d e l e g a t e s r e g a r d l e s s of the p o s i t i o n they h e l d on any of the v a r i a b l e s measured. The C o n s e r v a t i v e convention stands out as the only convention where a t t i t u d i n a l disagreements appear r e l a t e d t o v o t i n g i n any coherent f a s h i o n . L i b e r a l disagreements were based l a r g e l y on 168 Table 5-12 P o l i c y Consensus: Percent i n Agreement and Consensus Index 1 971 1980 1986 %agree C.I . %agree C .1 . %agree C .1 1/More power f o r the p r o v i n c e s + 64 1 4 29 21 43* 7 2 / S p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r Quebec 23* 27 43* 7 26 24 3/Favour u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t to s t r i k e 26 24 36 1 4 — — 4/Employers have r i g h t to seek s t r i k e i n j u n -c t i o n s 65* 1 5 — — — — 5/Too much spent on s o c i a l w e l f a r e 60* 10 59* 9 46 4 6/Right to f o r e i g h c a p i t a l 73 23 82 32 — — 7/Government must h e l p h e l p l e s s 93 43 93 43 — — 8/Pay w e l f a r e only to needy 95 45 95 45 — — 9/Government should i n t e r f e r e l e s s with business 59* 9 — — — --10/Offshore a j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — — 86 36 — — 11/More f e d e r a l money for poor p r o v i n c e s 94 44 83 33 — — 12/N.S. should c o n t r o l O f f s h o r e 90 40 1 4 36 — — 13/Favor Maritime union 10 40 29 21 26 24 14/SYSCO ovens should remain open — -- — — 30* 20 15/Negotiate f r e e r t r a de with U.S. — — — — 35 1 5 16/Reduce U.S. c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e 58 8 — — — — 17/No f i r i n g of Tory 50* appointees — — — — 0 18/Pay no a t t e n t i o n to Quebec demands 48* 2 — — — — 19/No s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s f o r Francophones 76* 26 — — — — — 20/Use f r e n c h to d e a l with p r o v i n c i a l governments 35* 15 — — — — 21/N.S. c o n t r o l e n v i r o n -mental l e g i s l a t i o n 60 10 — — — — + Not a l l a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s are r e p o r t e d . * S i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g . 169 i n t e r n a l p a r t y matters and do not l e n d themselves to g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . 1 1 The g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the importance of a t t i t u d e s at L i b e r a l conventions i s very low, but t h a t v o t i n g at the C o n s e r v a t i v e convention might have had an a t t i t u d i n a l b ase. 1 2 However, these a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s may simply r e p l i c a t e the e a r l i e r d i v i s i o n s based on f r i e n d s and neighbours, r e l i g i o n or age. Indeed, Doucet's Acadian a n c e s t r y might have sp u r r e d some de l e g a t e s who d i d not l i k e him to take an anti-Quebec or an a n t i - F r e n c h p o s i t i o n . One must remember t h a t t h i s convention took p l a c e a f t e r the hero of Nova S c o t i a n C o n s e r v a t i v e s (Robert S t a n f i e l d ) had been t h r a s h e d i n a f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n by a French Quebecois, i n a c l i m a t e of growing 'French' power and i n the aftermath of the F.L.Q. c r i s i s . T h i s was not a time i n which Nova S c o t i a n C o n s e r v a t i v e s were l i k e l y t o be s u p p o r t i v e of French r i g h t s . Doucet's candidacy may have p r o v i d e d them with a t a r g e t f o r t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n . Or o p p o s i t i o n t o Doucet may i t s e l f have prompted d e l e g a t e s t o take such p o s i t i o n s . A c t u a l l y , s i g n i f i c a n t a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s e x i s t e d between C a t h o l i c s and P r o t e s t a n t s . C a t h o l i c s were more l i k e l y t o b e l i e v e 1 1 One must again keep i n mind t h a t the a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s d i f f e r e d from one convention t o the other and were not s e l e c t e d t o map i n t e r n a l i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s . They are p r e s e n t e d merely t o show the degree t o which d e l e g a t e s who supported d i f f e r e n t c andidates h e l d d i f f e r e n t o p i n i o n s on the i s s u e s measured. 1 2 I t a l s o suggests t h a t f u t u r e s t u d i e s of Maritime l e a d e r s h i p conventions might probe a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s more deeply. The i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d n a t i o n a l l y and at conventions i n B.C. and A l b e r t a i s much r i c h e r than the Maritime data. A deeper probe of a t t i t u d e s might a l s o p r o v i d e e m p i r i c a l support f o r the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t between the C o n s e r v a t i v e s and the L i b e r a l s i n the r e g i o n . Or i t might not! 170 t h a t Quebec should have s p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n and t h a t i t i s p e r m i s s a b l e to address E n g l i s h p r o v i n c i a l governments i n French. They were l e s s l i k e l y t o agree t h a t no s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n should be p a i d t o Quebec or t h a t Francophones should have no s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s . T h i s p r o v i d e s some evidence t h a t the a t t i t u d i n a l v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s d i d r e p l i c a t e the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . The s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n of such o p i n i o n s with v o t i n g may owe t o the presence of a C a t h o l i c c a n d i d a t e . Without such a candidate the d i f f e r e n c e s i n o p i n i o n between the r e l i g i o u s groups might not have r e s u l t e d i n d i f f e r e n t v o t i n g p a t t e r n s . I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t young d e l e g a t e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y t o take pro-Quebec/French p o s i t i o n s than were o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Once again then, t h e r e was a c o i n c i d e n c e between membership i n a group more l i k e l y t o support Doucet and i s s u e p o s i t i o n s . Moreover, s i g n i f i c a n t a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s were found between Cape Bretoners and mainlanders on the q u e s t i o n of whether governments spend too much on s o c i a l w e l f a r e and whether governments should i n t e r f e r e l e s s with b u s i n e s s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , d e l e g a t e s from government dependent Cape Breton were l e s s w i l l i n g t o c r i t i c i z e government spending or r e g u l a t i o n . Again, the a s s o c i a t i o n of these a t t i t u d e s with v o t i n g r e p l i c a t e s the f r i e n d s and neighbours support f o r Doucet. Support f o r him from these d e l e g a t e s then, may r e p r e s e n t f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g more than a t t i t u d i n a l agreement. Indeed, when examination of the s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e s was l i m i t e d t o d e l e g a t e s who were e i t h e r from Cape Breton or were C a t h o l i c s , m a j o r i t y support f o r Doucet was 171 pre s e n t without e x c e p t i o n . Regardless of a t t i t u d e , d e l e g a t e s who were C a t h o l i c s and/or Cape Bretoners d e l i v e r e d a m a j o r i t y of votes t o Doucet. S i m i l a r l y , when onl y P r o t e s t a n t mainlanders over 30 were consi d e r e d , the p a t t e r n of m a j o r i t y support f o r Buchanan was p r a c t i c a l l y u n i v e r s a l . Only on one i s s u e d i d he f a i l t o r e c e i v e h a l f the votes from both s i d e s and t h a t f a i l u r e was by the slimmest of p o s s i b l e margins. Given the l a c k of p o l i c y disagreement i n the campaign and the t r a d i t i o n a l l a c k of i d e o l o g y i n Nova S c o t i a n p o l i t i c s , i t thus seems reasonable t o conclude t h a t the a t t i t u d i n a l disagreement at the 1971 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention i s best understood i n the context of the r e l i g i o u s and f r i e n d s and neighbours v o t i n g t h a t marked t h a t convention. D i s c u s s i o n T h i s examination of delegate support p a t t e r n s l e a v e s l i t t l e doubt t h a t f r i e n d s and neighbours support and r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s were more s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d t o v o t i n g than were any other v a r i a b l e s . M u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s t h a t the s t r o n g e s t f a c t o r s i n the support of almost a l l candidates were r e g i o n a l and t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s e x i s t e d on the f i n a l b a l l o t of each convention. I t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t r e g i o n was preeminent and much support e x i s t s f o r c o n s i d e r i n g Nova S c o t i a n conventions i n a f r i e n d s and neighbours context. The nature of the r e g i o n a l cleavage o b v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t was ' f a v o u r i t e son' support. Candidates drew best from t h e i r home r e g i o n s . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of Cape Breton. On the 172 second b a l l o t i n 1971, Doucet won 81% of the Cape Breton vote. On the t h i r d b a l l o t i n 1980, MacLean won 75% and i n 1986 he won 96% of the i s l a n d v o t e s . Indeed, m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t Cape Breton r e s i d e n c y was the major f a c t o r i n support f o r each of the Cape Breton c a n d i d a t e s . Cape Bretoners were extremely s u p p o r t i v e of t h e i r l o c a l c a n d i d a t e s . T h i s tendency was by no means r e s t r i c t e d t o Cape Breton. Mainland candidates g e n e r a l l y a t t r a c t e d t h e i r h i g h e s t l e v e l of support from t h e i r home r e g i o n s as w e l l . In 1971, T h o r n h i l l ' s only r e g i o n a l p l u r a l i t y came from metro H a l i f a x . In 1980, Maclnnis d i d best i n the c a p i t a l r e g i o n , while Mooney won a m a j o r i t y only i n h i s home r e g i o n o f the South Shore. M u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s t h a t 'home area' was the major f a c t o r i n support f o r each of these c a n d i d a t e s . Even Cameron, on the f i n a l two b a l l o t s , had h i s h i g h e s t support from the E a s t e r n Mainland d e l e g a t e s . Buchanan and Cowan were- the only candidates f o r whom pronounced f r i e n d s and neighbours support was not r e a d i l y apparent. For Cowan, h i s l a c k of support i n the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n d i s g u i s e d support i n the c i t y of H a l i f a x i t s e l f . Cowan a c t u a l l y won 52% of the votes c a s t by de l e g a t e s l i v i n g i n the c i t y of H a l i f a x (over 100,000). H i s f r i e n d s and neighbours support simply d i d not spread t o Dartmouth or the suburbs. F r i e n d s and neighbours support f o r T h o r n h i l l was a l s o strengthened when the c i t y of H a l i f a x was separated from the metro H a l i f a x r e g i o n . He won 84% of the vote from the p a r t of the r e g i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d Dartmouth, but was not as popular among deleg a t e s from H a l i f a x 173 i t s e l f . Buchanan stands alone i n not e x p e r i e n c i n g f r i e n d s and neighbours support. He had the l e a s t support both i n h i s r e g i o n of b i r t h , Cape Breton, and h i s r e g i o n of r e s i d e n c e , metro H a l i f a x . He compensated f o r t h i s by winning v i r t u a l l y everywhere e l s e . His l a c k of f r i e n d s and neighbours support may be a t t r i b u t e d t o the presence of other r e g i o n a l candidates whose cla i m s on r e g i o n a l l o y a l t i e s were s t r o n g e r than h i s . On the p o s i t i v e s i d e , Buchanan's l a c k of e x p l i c i t f r i e n d s and neighbours support enabled him t o c l a i m t i e s t o v a r i o u s other r e g i o n s , c l a i m s t h a t the other candidates c o u l d not v a l i d l y make. I f the n o t i o n of f r i e n d s and neighbours i s t r e a t e d more b r o a d l y then i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h some such support f o r Buchanan. One aspect of Key's treatment of f r i e n d s and neighbours emphasized the importance of past or f a m i l i a l t i e s . I f t h i s i s a p p l i e d i n 1971 then perhaps some form of f r i e n d s and neighbours support was present f o r Buchanan. His s t r o n g e s t r e g i o n s were the A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y and the South Shore, r e g i o n s t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y meet at Digby. As a student Buchanan worked i n Digby, h i s wife was from the area and h i s e l d e s t son was born t h e r e (Kavanagh, 1988: 135). His support t h e r e then, c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a k i n d of f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t ( f o r a s i m i l a r treatment of f r i e n d s and neighbours see Parker, 1982: 259). Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o serves t o make more comprehensible Buchanan's support from C a t h o l i c d e l e g a t e s i n t h a t area of the p r o v i n c e . The f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t s p i l l e d i n t o adjacent 174 r e g i o n s . Thornhill,Mooney and Maclnnis a l l had t h e i r s t r o n g e s t support i n t h e i r home r e g i o n while t h e i r second best showing came from the adjacent A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y . Cameron's base extended along the Northumberland S t r a i t from the E a s t e r n Mainland t o the North Shore and MacLean, on the f i r s t b a l l o t , d i d h i s mainland b e s t i n the E a s t e r n Mainland. Delegates, when the o p p o r t u n i t y t o do so e x i s t s , are l i k e l y t o support a candidate from t h e i r home r e g i o n . They are a l s o q u i t e l i k e l y t o support a candidate from an adjacent r e g i o n . Candidates do b e s t with d e l e g a t e s who, i n geographic terms, can be c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r f r i e n d s and neighbours. There i s , however a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t conventions i n Nova S c o t i a are i n f l u e n c e d by r e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n s which t r a n s c e n d f r i e n d s and neighbours support. R e g i o n a l d i v i s i o n s i n mainland Nova S c o t i a c e r t a i n l y suggest f r i e n d s and neighbours support. Few mainland r e g i o n s p r o v i d e d e x c e p t i o n a l v o t i n g p i c t u r e s except when a candidate from the area was on the b a l l o t . But i t i s not as c l e a r t h a t Cape Breton can be understood i n q u i t e the same f a s h i o n . The a b i l i t y t o determine whether Cape Breton support r e p r e s e n t s s e c t i o n a l i s m as opposed t o f r i e n d s and neighbours p o l i t i c s i s hampered by the presence of a Cape Breton candidate on every b a l l o t . The unique p a t t e r n o f Cape Breton v o t i n g may re p r e s e n t a r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e of p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e r e g a r d l e s s of the s t r u c t u r e of the c o m p e t i t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t y h e l d by Cape Bretoners and the r e l a t i v e economic d e p r i v a t i o n of t h a t r e g i o n o f f e r s some support f o r t h i s s u g g e s t i o n . A convention without a 175 Cape Breton candidate would be necessary to f u l l y answer t h i s type of question. The d i v i s i o n between Cape Breton and the mainland has h i s t o r i c a l resonance and actually had an impact on a national convention. The selection of Mackenzie King, the longest serving Prime Minister i n Canadian history, may be attributable to a Cape Breton / Mainland d i v i s i o n . Two Nova Scotians contested the 1919 L i b e r a l leadership: W.S. F i e l d i n g from the mainland and D.D. McKenzie from Cape Breton. Regenstrief has referred to the question of personal animosity between [Fielding] and McKenzie who was from Cape Breton Island and therefore antipathetic to a mainlander. Cape Bretoners' s t i l l r e c a l l that McKenzie resented Fielding's p o s i t i o n of prominence under Laurier....The convention was his chance to get even. When he withdrew afte r the second b a l l o t he instructed his supporters to vote for King (1963: 343). Since McKenzie had 153 votes on the f i r s t b a l l o t and only 20 people would have had to change t h e i r vote to elect F i e l d i n g over King, t h i s i n t r a p r o v i n c i a l s p l i t was probably quite s i g n i f i c a n t . Returning to recent conventions, other d i v i s i o n s were also important; p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l i g i o n . Invariably, Protestant delegates offered disproportionate support to the candidacies of Buchanan, Thorn h i l l , Cameron, and Cowan. Each Protestant candidate received more support from Protestants than Catholics. Catholic delegates gave disproportionate support to the Catholic candidates Doucet, Maclnnis, MacLean and Mooney. Religion remains important i n Nova Scotian p o l i t i c s . Candidates did best with delegates who i n 176 r e l i g i o u s t e r m s m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r ' f r i e n d s ' . 1 3 The r e l i g i o u s v o t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s were h i d d e n i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n t o t a l s . Buchanan's n a r r o w v i c t o r y i n 1971 c o n c e a l e d t h e f a c t t h a t he c o u l d w i n o n l y a t h i r d o f t h e C a t h o l i c v o t e . S i m i l a r l y , t h e c o n v i n c i n g v i c t o r i e s o f Cameron and MacLean s u p p r e s s e d t h e s t r o n g showings made by MacLean (1980) and Cowan among t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s . T h i s p a t t e r n o f s u p p o r t f o r a c o - r e l i g i o n i s t , however, was m o d i f i e d by f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s s u p p o r t . C a n d i d a t e s , i n c a r r y i n g t h e i r home r e g i o n s , u s u a l l y c a r r i e d t h e v o t e f r o m b o t h r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s . F o r i n s t a n c e , Cape B r e t o n c a n d i d a t e s D o u c e t and MacLean, won m a j o r i t i e s f r o m b o t h C a t h o l i c and P r o t e s t a n t i s l a n d e r s . As w e l l , Mooney and Cameron were a b l e t o win s u p p o r t f r o m b o t h r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s i n t h e i r home r e g i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t , T h o r n h i l l ' s f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s s u p p o r t came m a i n l y f r o m t h e v o t e s o f h i s f e l l o w P r o t e s t a n t s . Indeed, e v e n i n t h e c a s e s i n w h i c h c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e d home r e g i o n s u p p o r t f r o m b o t h r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s , t h e i r l e v e l o f s u p p o r t was a l w a y s h i g h e r among d e l e g a t e s o f t h e i r own r e l i g i o n . I n e s s e n c e , w h i l e d e l e g a t e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f r e l i g i o n , t e n d e d t o s u p p o r t l o c a l c a n d i d a t e s , t h e y s u p p o r t e d most s t r o n g l y a ' n e i g h b o u r ' who was i n a n o t h e r s e n s e a r e l i g i o u s ' f r i e n d . ' The i m p o r t a n c e o f r e l i g i o n c a n be f u r t h e r s e e n by e x a m i n i n g age, t h e o n l y o t h e r v a r i a b l e c o n s i s t e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t l o s i n g c a n d i d a t e s D o u c e t , MacLean and 1 3 When t h i s i s added t o t h e e v i d e n c e f r o m P E I , t h e n o t i o n t h a t g e o g r a p h y and r e l i g i o n may be l i n k e d i n a common f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s framework i s l e n t f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h . Cowan achieved t h e i r h i g h e s t l e v e l s of support from d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y — w i t h Doucet a c t u a l l y winning a m a j o r i t y from t h a t group. However/ only Doucet was able t o win m a j o r i t y youth support from both r e l i g i o u s groups and even he a t t r a c t e d a h i g h e r l e v e l o f support from young C a t h o l i c s . MacLean was able t o win m a j o r i t y support from young C a t h o l i c s on the two f i n a l b a l l o t s i n 1980 and Cowan r e c e i v e d the bul k of votes c a s t by young P r o t e s t a n t s i n 1986. N e i t h e r were s u c c e s s f u l i n g a i n i n g youth votes from d e l e g a t e s i n the other r e l i g i o u s group. The evidence from Nova S c o t i a n l e a d e r s h i p conventions p r o v i d e s s t r i k i n g evidence of the importance of t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . The t r a d i t i o n a l cleavages of r e g i o n and r e l i g i o n were e v i d e n t at a l l of the Nova S c o t i a n conventions and t h e r e were no p a r t i s a n d i f f e r e n c e s ; each p a r t y convention s u f f e r e d the same d i v i s i o n s . Other v a r i a b l e s t h a t appeared important were a c t u a l l y secondary t o e i t h e r or both of the t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . With few ex c e p t i o n s , d e l e g a t e s d i v i d e d on the b a s i s of r e g i o n and r e l i g i o n r e g a r d l e s s of s i m i l a r i t i e s i n age, education, c l a s s , or income. The t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s e x e r t e d a s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e even among r e l a t i v e l y h i g h s t a t u s Nova S c o t i a n s . S u r p r i s i n g l y , e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s , except i n 1980, were as a f f e c t e d by the r e g i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s cleavages as the c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s . The uniqueness of 1980 may owe t o a r e a l i z a t i o n on the p a r t of C a t h o l i c e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s t h a t i f Cameron d i d not win, arguments t h a t i t was a C a t h o l i c ' s t u r n would never again be as p e r s u a s i v e . At the other conventions c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h i s i l k 178 were unnecessary. I t appears t h a t the d e l e g a t e s l e a s t s u s c e p t i b l e t o the r e l i g i o u s and r e g i o n a l v o t i n g t r e n d s were the young d e l e g a t e s . They were more l i k e l y t o vote i n v i o l a t i o n of these tr e n d s than other d e l e g a t e s . Even t h e i r immunity was only r e l a t i v e and r e g i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s remained r e a d i l y apparent. Other v a r i a b l e s had almost no a s s o c i a t i o n with v o t i n g . Gender and e t h n i c i t y had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the v o t i n g of d e l e g a t e s . Nor were e i t h e r of the L i b e r a l conventions marked by a t t i t u d i n a l v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s . The C o n s e r v a t i v e convention of 1971, however, d i d d i s p l a y an i n t e r e s t i n g a t t i t u d i n a l l y based v o t i n g d i v i s i o n . The P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y of Nova S c o t i a appeared more c o n s e r v a t i v e than p r o g r e s s i v e . The bulk of d e l e g a t e s h e l d r a t h e r c o n s e r v a t i v e views on the r o l e of government and the p l a c e of Quebec, and Francophones i n g e n e r a l , i n the country. Buchanan's candidacy was very p o p u l a r with d e l e g a t e s h o l d i n g these views, but he was unable t o win m a j o r i t y support from the d e l e g a t e s h o l d i n g c o n t r a r y p o s i t i o n s . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t the 1971 convention was i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i v i d e d . I t i s not c l e a r whether the i s s u e s on which s i g n i f i c a n t v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s c o u l d be found were even s a l i e n t , a lthough one must concede t h a t such p o t e n t i a l d i d e x i s t . At any r a t e , d e l e g a t e s c o u l d not p i c k up on e x p l i c i t i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n a l s from the candidates and the a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s t h a t d i d e x i s t were s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d with d i v i s i o n s on the b a s i s of r e g i o n and r e l i g i o n . T h i s a n a l y s i s of convention v o t i n g i n Nova S c o t i a f i n d s 179 region and r e l i g i o n to be the most important sources of voting d i v i s i o n s . The demise of r e l i g i o n i n the province has been greatly exaggerated. At Nova Scotian conventions, where a candidate i s from and the nature of his r e l i g i o u s background, are very important considerations. Nova Scotian conventions f i t very well into a friends and neighbours framework and the pattern of support at these conventions closely resemble that seen at conventions on PEI. A regional s t y l e of p o l i t i c s i s emerging. 180 Table 5-13 M u l t i p l e R e g r e s s i o n : S o c i a l and Geographic F a c t o r s Buchanan Doucet T h o r n h i l l Buchanan (2) Cowan Dartmouth -.25* -.35* .60* .34 — Cape Breton -.28* .32* -.04 -.31* -.37* Urban .06 .01 -.07 .02 .06 E x - o f f i c i o .02 .01 -.03 .02 .01 Under 30 -.02 .20* -.18* -.12 .09* Male -.05 .09 -.04 -.07 .05 B r i t i s h .09 .08 -.18 -.03 — P r o t e s t a n t .03 -.15* .12 .14* .09* C o l l e g e -.08 .02 -.06 -.09 -.01 Wealthy -.03 .02 .01 — . 11* Constant .34 .27 .38 .66 .31 r sq. .10 .18 .16 .16 .17 181 Table 5-13b H M u l t i p l e R egression Continued Cameron Maclnnis MacLean Mooney Cameron (3) E a s t e r n Mainland .20* -.15 .08 -.13* .11 South Shore -.23* -.08 -.08 .39* .11 Cape Breton -.29* -.03 .49* -.16* -.41* H a l i f a x Metro -.05 .11* -.01 -.05 .00 E x - o f f i c i o .04 .05 -.01 -.08 .02 Under 30 -.06 .01 .02 .03 -.10 male .00 .03 -.06 .02 .03 B r i t i s h .06 -.02 .05 -.08 -.17 P r o t e s t a n t .16* .00 -.11* -.06 .13* C o l l e g e -.01 -.04 .03 .02 — Wealthy -.12 -.07 .08 .11* -.05 Constant .36 .23 .09 .31 .82 r sq. .19 .06 .24 .22 .21 1 4 As with P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d the independent v a r i a b l e s are dummy v a r i a b l e s s c o r e d 1 i f they have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c named, 0 otherwise. They are l a r g e l y s e l f e x p l a n a t o r y . The geographic v a r i a b l e s r e f e r t o the area of the p r o v i n c e named, while urban r e f e r s t o over 100,000. An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t the c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . 182 Chapter 6 New Brunswick L i b e r a l s : D i v i s i o n s i n a B i p o l a r P r o v i n c e The examination of conventions i n i n d i v i d u a l Maritime p r o v i n c e s concludes by examining d e l e g a t e v o t i n g behaviour at the two most re c e n t L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p conventions i n New Brunswick. T h i s p r o v i d e s , f o r the f i r s t time, i n s i g h t i n t o the support c o a l i t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p candidates i n t h a t p r o v i n c e and h i g h l i g h t s the v a r i a b l e s most c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with d e l e g a t e v o t i n g . Moreover, i t allows f o r an assessment of the v a l i d i t y of the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Maritime l e a d e r s h i p conventions p r o v i d e evidence of the s t r e n g t h of t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and are best understood i n a ' f r i e n d s and neighbours' framework. That i s , t h a t support f o r l e a d e r s h i p candidates i s s t r o n g e s t among del e g a t e s who are from t h e i r home area and/or with whom they share t r a d i t i o n a l a s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y . As i n Nova S c o t i a and PEI t r a d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s continue to be important and c l a i m s t h a t Maritime p o l i t i c s i s 'modernizing' f i n d l i t t l e support at the most important p a r t y f u n c t i o n . I n t r o d u c t i o n To even the c a s u a l observer the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h New Brunswick from i t s Maritime neighbours are s t r i k i n g . F i r s t , New Brunswick does not have an obvious ' c e n t r e ' . With i t s p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l i n F r e d e r i c t o n , i t s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n 183 centre i n Moncton and i t s communications and commercial centre i n Saint John, i t s urban population i s d i f f u s e d i n a way foreign to Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. In short, no c i t y dominates New Brunswick i n the way Halifax dominates Nova Scotia or Charlottetown, PEI. Nor i s any New Brunswick c i t y resented the way those c i t i e s are i n t h e i r provinces. While noteworthy, t h i s difference pales i n comparison to the more obvious s o c i a l uniqueness of New Brunswick. It i s the composition of i t s population that t r u l y sets New Brunswick apart from i t s neighbours. New Brunswick has a sizable minority language group and i s the only b i l i n g u a l province i n the country. Thirty-seven percent of New Brunswickers are of Acadian o r i g i n . As well, i n spite of i t s B r i t i s h majority, New Brunswick shares with Quebec the d i s t i n c t i o n of a Catholic majority (54%) (Dyck, 1986: 572) . To further compound matters, t h i s e t h n i c a l l y and r e l i g i o u s l y divided province i s also divided geographically and p o l i t i c a l l y . Acadians and B r i t i s h C a t h o l i c s — m a i n l y I r i s h — t e n d to l i v e i n the northern part of the province and vote L i b e r a l . B r i t i s h Protestants predominate i n the south and are generally Conservative. The Conservative party has had only one Catholic leader and nary an Acadian. Dalton Camp's description of p r o v i n c i a l Tories i n the 1950s "few were Roman Catholic, fewer s t i l l were French speaking" (1979: 32) remains l a r g e l y true today. In contrast, since 1930, the Liberals have often been led by C a t h o l i c s — i n d e e d they have not had a Protestant leader since 1957— and have developed a t r a d i t i o n of a l t e r n a t i n g t h e i r 184 leadership between an Acadian and an Anglophone. An examination of post war e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s make clear the extent of New Brunswick's d i v i s i o n . The L i b e r a l s have won 79% of the seats i n the Acadian/Catholic north but only 37% of the southern l a r g e l y B r i t i s h Protestant seats. The Tories have never won more northern seats than the L i b e r a l s while the L i b e r a l s have outpolled the Tories i n the south just twice. The small amount of survey evidence available indicates the extent of the d i v i s i o n at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . Fifty-two percent of B r i t i s h New Brunswickers i d e n t i f y with the Conservatives (48% with the Liberals) while 81% of the Acadians i d e n t i f y themselves as L i b e r a l s (Chandler and Chandler, 1979: 48). The r e l i g i o u s figures show even more p o l a r i z a t i o n . Most Catholics (79%) prefer the Li b e r a l s and most Protestants (64%) prefer the Tories (Chandler and Chandler, 1979: 48). In a bi p o l a r province with a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l culture, l i t t l e class based voting, no s i g n i f i c a n t t h i r d p a r t i e s and no apparent i d e o l o g i c a l differences between the major par t i e s , (Dyck, 1986: 167) one might expect e l e c t i o n campaigns to be marked by ethnic and r e l i g i o u s questions. This has not, at least recently, been the case. 1 Both parties believe they need support from both sides of the divide to win an e l e c t i o n and therefore reach out to both communities (Aunger, 1981: 153). Indeed, Ha t f i e l d ' s courting 1 E a r l i e r t h i s century r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s were d i r e c t l y involved i n a number of elec t i o n s . The most notorious example of t h i s was the infamous campaign slogan "Vote for the King and Against the Pope." 185 of the Acadian vote was p a r t i a l l y responsible for his debacle i n the south i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n (Starr, 1987: 250,252). As well, both parties have attempted to d e p o l i t i c i z e ethnic and r e l i g i o u s issues by taking similar positions on an issue such as bilingualism and by invariably selecting candidates "who r e f l e c t the ethno-religious character of the constituency i n which they run" (Aunger, 1981: 145). The p o l i t i c a l salience of et h n i c i t y and r e l i g i o n , then, neither depends on, nor i s fed by, partisan debate. Given t h i s attempt to manage the bipolar d i v i s i o n there are r e l a t i v e l y few occasions when p o l i t i c i a n s from across the divide confront each other d i r e c t l y . A leadership convention with i t s str u c t u r a l commitment to providing representation from a l l areas of the province provides one of the rare occasions i n which such confrontation may emerge. Since 1968 f i v e leadership conventions have been held i n New Brunswick, four of them by the L i b e r a l s . 2 In each case the party was i n opposition and was t r y i n g to select a leader who could lead i t back to power by defeating Richard H a t f i e l d , the most e l e c t o r a l l y successful Tory leader i n p r o v i n c i a l h i s t o r y . 3 Surveys were conducted of the two most recent L i b e r a l 2 The only Conservative convention since 1968 was held i n November of 1989 and selected Fredericton lawyer Barbara Baird-F i l l i t e r as leader. No data from that convention were available for t h i s study. 3 No other Conservative premier of New Brunswick ever won four elections and no other premier could match Hatfield's years i n o f f i c e . 186 conventions, 1982 and 1985, and they w i l l be the focus of t h i s chapter. These conventions were, unfortunately, the least competitive ever held by the L i b e r a l s : both were decided on the f i r s t b a l l o t and were contested by only four and two candidates respectively. A l l other L i b e r a l conventions had been multi b a l l o t a f f a i r s involving at least f i v e candidates and were marked by the spectacle of candidates attempting to d e l i v e r t h e i r votes to someone else. In contrast, the two l a t e s t conventions were somewhat subdued. Convention Context The 1982 convention was necessitated by the resignation of Joe Daigle—who had come within two seats of toppling the H a t f i e l d government—as leader. Following the 1978 e l e c t i o n loss Daigle was required to face a leadership review vote at a p r o v i n c i a l convention. Such a convention was held early i n 1981 and Daigle received the support of 69% of the delegates. With t h i s support he decided to carry on as leader. A few months l a t e r however, at a caucus meeting i n November of 1981 Daigle was t o l d by 23 of the 27 L i b e r a l MLAs that they " f e l t the L i b e r a l s could not win under [him]"(Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 1 1982: 3). Daigle resigned immediately and the underlying issue of the ensuing leadership campaign became his treatment by the caucus. The following day the caucus chose Doug Young, MLA for Tracadie, as interim leader and the day a f t e r that Young announced his candidacy for the leadership. He was joined i n the race by fellow MLAs Ray Frenette of Moncton and Alan Maher of Dalhousie as 187 well as by Joe Day, a lawyer from Saint John. Young, the clear front runner, had t r i e d previously to win the leadership. He f i n i s h e d t h i r d at the 197 8 convention where he f i n i s h e d t h i r d and, i r o n i c a l l y , on the l a s t b a l l o t threw his support to Daigle. Young was 43, a lawyer, born and educated i n New Brunswick. He was f i r s t elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1978 and was a Roman Catholic. Eventually, 21 of the 26 L i b e r a l MLAs supported him (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 2 1982: 3). Joe Day was soon pegged as the strongest of the other candidates. As the A t l a n t i c Insight put i t "Day, 37, a b i l i n g u a l Saint John lawyer, though not an MLA entered the campaign pledging never to put the pursuit of power before p r i n c i p l e " (April 1982: 20). This was aimed at Young whose campaign emphasized "the main thing i s to win" (Halifax Chronicle Herald, March 1 1982: 1). Day had never held public o f f i c e although he was twice a federal candidate. He was the only candidate from a part of the province where the L i b e r a l s were not strong and the lone Protestant i n the race. His sole caucus supporter was Saint John MLA Shirley Dysart, one of the three MLAs l o y a l to Daigle and one of two L i b e r a l MLAs from New Brunswick's largest c i t y . Another Daigle l o y a l i s t was Alan Maher, 45, of Dalhousie. Maher was a funeral d i r e c t o r who had f i r s t been elected p r o v i n c i a l l y i n 1978. P r i o r to his p r o v i n c i a l v i c t o r y he served six years as mayor of his home town of Dalhousie. He styled himself as the conscience of the party, t h e — a s his campaign slogan read—'Responsible Choice' (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 6 188 1982: 3). Maher had no caucus support and was the only candidate who could not speak French. The f i n a l candidate, Ray Frenette of Moncton, was the oldest at 47 and the most p o l i t i c a l l y experienced. He was elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1974 following an active career i n Moncton municipal p o l i t i c s . Frenette was a former r e a l estate executive and the only Acadian candidate for the leadership. He emphasized his experience and t r i e d to present himself as the compromise candidate. Only one caucus member, another Moncton MLA, supported him. The four candidates toured the province together attending eight a l l candidate debates. It became apparent at these meetings that l i t t l e i n the way of p o l i c y differences divided the candidates but that "Daigle, or rather the manner of his resignation continues to be a major issue i n the leadership race" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 12 1982: 2). The candidates had d i f f e r e n t positions on that issue. Young who was rumoured to be the ' ri n g leader' i n the dumping of Joe Daigle did not apologize for his stand and argued "There has been a t r a d i t i o n i n the L i b e r a l party that no leader has led the party into an e l e c t i o n and l o s t and then remained; as leader" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 1 1982: 3). Frenette defended his p o s i t i o n of opposition to Daigle but maintained that i t was time "to s t a r t looking to the future and forget about the past" (Moncton Times Transcript, February 18 1982: 3). Maher s k i r t e d the issue while invariably pointing out that he himself had supported Daigle. 189 Day met the issue head on. "In a scarcely v e i l e d reference to the resignation, Mr. Day said that t r u s t , l o y a l t y and democracy were the p r i n c i p l e s of the L i b e r a l party" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 1 1982: 3) . As well, he talked about "respect for decisions of the rank and f i l e for without i t there i s no party" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 12 1982: 2) . Day also indicated that i f he had been a member of caucus he would not have accepted the interim leadership and then run for leader. It was cl e a r that Day was " r e l y i n g on a n t i caucus sentiment over the Daigle a f f a i r to win the leadership" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, February 27 1982: 3) . Doug Young won a narrow f i r s t b a l l o t v i c t o r y at the convention held i n Fredericton i n February, 1982. Young took 1324 of the 2603 votes cast, 19 more than he needed. Day was second with 811 while Frenette, who expected more than 500, received only 308 and Maher t r a i l e d with 160. While the customary pleas for party l o y a l t y and unity were made, unity appeared u n l i k e l y . The Day camp did not applaud Young as he spoke and although Day made a c o n c i l i a t o r y speech, he l e f t immediately following i t pointedly missing a scheduled meeting with Young. The wife of one of the l o s i n g candidates reportedly said of Young "I hope he gets exactly what he gave Joe Daigle" (Atlantic Insight, A p r i l 1982: 20). An angry Maher supporter compared the convention to a rape "The r a p i s t enjoyed i t but the v i c t i m didn't" (Atlantic Insight, A p r i l 1982: 20). Frenette, already positioning himself for another leadership 190 tr y , viewed his defeat as evidence that the party wanted an Anglophone as leader. He saw the t r a d i t i o n of a l t e r n a t i o n as upheld and claimed to respect that t r a d i t i o n (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, March 1 1982: 3). Rumours of a North/South s p l i t followed the convention with A t l a n t i c Insight i n d i c a t i n g that Young was not popular " i n the South where aversion to Young, as manifested by the 811 votes for runner up Day i s f e l t most deeply" (April 1982: 20) . Young's tenure as leader lasted for less than a year. He resigned following a massive Conservative v i c t o r y i n 1982, a v i c t o r y l a r g e l y a ttributed to Young and the poor image he was perceived to project (Starr, 1987: 156,157). The party caucus selected Ray Frenette as interim leader and he "seemed a sure bet to win the leadership convention planned for May, 1985" (Atlantic Insight, February 1986: 32). Indeed, Frenette's candidacy was i n i t i a l l y supported by Frank McKenna who eventually became the only other candidate. McKenna explains his decision to challenge Frenette by arguing that the p o l i t i c a l climate of the day made i t u n l i k e l y that Frenette could have won an e l e c t i o n . French/English problems were becoming more s a l i e n t with an English backlash against the measures taken by the H a t f i e l d government to enhance the status of French i n the province. In spite of Hatfield's personal problems the L i b e r a l s l o s t two 1984 by-elections and i t seemed that Frenette's chance of winning the next e l e c t i o n was not promising. As McKenna put i t "It was bad timing for Ray. There was a 191 tremendous ant i French f e e l i n g i n New Brunswick at the time...and unfortunately he became a vic t i m of i t " (Atlantic Insight, February 1986: 32). No other candidate came forward to challenge Frenette and McKenna asked to be released from his commitment of support to run himself. McKenna d i d not have a great deal of p o l i t i c a l experience. He was f i r s t elected to the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1982 bucking the p r o v i n c i a l t i d e and winning a narrow v i c t o r y i n the Chatham constituency. A lawyer, McKenna was born i n Kings County, near Saint John, but spent his professional career i n Chatham. Re l a t i v e l y young at 35, McKenna was a Catholic l i k e Frenette. As i n many conventions, the issue emphasized by both candidates was experience. McKenna "presented himself as a new refreshing face" while Frenette's campaign "stress[ed] his experience and s t a b i l i t y " (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, A p r i l 4 1985: 5). The candidates did not appear to d i f f e r on p o l i c y matters and both emphasized party unity maintaining that the main goal was to win the next e l e c t i o n . Both candidates had support from the party caucus with six MLAs backing McKenna and four behind Frenette. The only source of controversy i n the campaign was a CBC p o l l of convention delegates which suggested that McKenna was supported by 41% of the delegates, Frenette by only 24% with 35% undecided (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, A p r i l 26 1985: 1) . Frenette was enraged by the p o l l , claiming that i t had been improperly c a r r i e d out and that he would withdraw i f the figures were correct. He l a t e r explained that his response to the p o l l was necessary "to stop the 192 erosion within our camp" (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, May 1 1985: 1). At any rate, he remained i n the race while the CBC stood by i t s p o l l r e s u l t . Going into the Moncton convention i t was evident that McKenna had a comfortable lead. Somewhat su r p r i s i n g l y , Frenette used his convention speech to launch a personal attack on McKenna claiming that he could not defeat H a t f i e l d and arguing that the party "should also drop the idea that a francophone could not win the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n " (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, May 6 1985: 1). Frenette's speech was described as a calculated r i s k and drew boos from the McKenna supporters. It i s u n l i k e l y that Frenette was helped much by his speech. McKenna won a massive v i c t o r y garnering 1901 votes to only 847 for Frenette. Unlike 1982, l i t t l e bitterness was evident and Frenette appeared sincere i n his declaration of support for McKenna. The media coverage provided no i n d i c a t i o n that the convention was marked by any group based voting d i v i s i o n s . Geographic Divisions The examination of delegate voting begins by looking at possible geographic d i v i s i o n s to determine whether 'friends and neighbours' support patterns marked the two conventions. Given the regional d i v i s i o n s within the province such re s u l t s would not be su r p r i s i n g . J o u r n a l i s t i c coverage of the 1982 convention suggested that a north/south s p l i t was i n evidence and indicated that support for 193 Day was much s t r o n g e r i n the south. As Table 6-1 shows, t h i s was q u i t e c o r r e c t . Day won 41% of the votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s from the southern p a r t of the p r o v i n c e o n l y s l i g h t l y fewer than Young who won 42%. The n o r t h was a d i f f e r e n t s t o r y . Young won an amazing 81% of the vote while Maher, the weakest candidate p r o v i n c e wide, was second with 11%. Day won only 4% of votes c a s t by n o r t h e r n d e l e g a t e s and F r e n e t t e took j u s t 3%. The percentage of each candidate's support from the n o r t h i s i n s t r u c t i v e . Seventy-four percent of Maher's support came from t h i s p a r t of the p r o v i n c e as d i d 52% of Young's. The corres p o n d i n g f i g u r e s f o r F r e n e t t e and Day were 11% and 5%. N e i t h e r of them was s t r o n g i n the North. Obviously, the southern r e s u l t s stood i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t . Day had 95% of h i s support i n the south while 8 9% of F r e n e t t e ' s was l o c a t e d t h e r e . In s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t southern d e l e g a t e s made up 64% of the convention t o t a l , l e s s than h a l f of Young's support came from the r e g i o n as d i d a mere 26% of Maher's. I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t the two candidates from the n o r t h r e c e i v e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from n o r t h e r n d e l e g a t e s while the two candidates from the South r e c e i v e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from Southern d e l e g a t e s . 194 Table 6-1 Vote by Region 1982 North South Day 4% 41% F r e n e t t e 3 15 Maher 11 2 Young 81 42 n=123 n=220 The p r o v i n c e can be d i v i d e d i n t o s m a l l e r r e g i o n s t o p r o v i d e a b e t t e r p i c t u r e of each candidate's support from h i s a c t u a l f r i e n d s and neighbours. E s s e n t i a l l y , the p r o v i n c e can be d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e r e g i o n s , two i n the n o r t h and t h r e e i n the south. The t h r e e southern r e g i o n s are based around the major c i t i e s of New Brunswick: S a i n t John, Moncton and F r e d e r i c t o n . 4 One no r t h e r n r e g i o n i s the n o r t h west c o n t a i n i n g the c o u n t i e s of Restigouche, Madawaska, and V i c t o r i a while the other runs along the North Shore. I t c o n t a i n s the c o u n t i e s of G l o u c e s t e r , Northumberland and Kent. When de l e g a t e v o t i n g i s viewed i n t h i s manner a pronounced f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t i s e v i d e n t . Young won p l u r a l i t i e s i n every r e g i o n but one: S a i n t John. In t h i s r e g i o n , which i n c l u d e d Joe Day's home, 55% of the deleg a t e s voted f o r Day. T h i s g r e a t l y exceeded h i s showing i n even the other southern r e g i o n s which gave 4 The re g i o n s were, f o r the purposes of the survey, combined i n the f o l l o w i n g way: S a i n t John (counties of S a i n t John, C h a r l o t t e and K i n g s ) , Moncton (Westmorland, A l b e r t and p a r t of Kent), F r e d e r i c t o n ( C a r l e t o n , York, Sunbury, Queens), North West (Restigouche, Madawaska and V i c t o r i a ) and the North Shore (Gloucester, Northumberland and the r e s t of Kent) . T h i s i s not perhaps the bes t way to combine these c o u n t i e s , but again, t h a t i s one of the problems of secondary a n a l y s i s . 195 him d e l e g a t e shares of 37% and 31%. S i m i l a r f r i e n d s and neighbours support can be seen f o r F r e n e t t e . His best showing came from the Moncton area d e l e g a t e s who gave him 29% of t h e i r votes making up almost t h r e e - f i f t h s of h i s t o t a l support. However, even i n h i s home re g i o n , F r e n e t t e c o u l d not f i n i s h h i g h e r than t h i r d . Maher's s t r o n g e s t showing a l s o came from h i s home r e g i o n . Delegates from the Restigouche, Madawaska, V i c t o r i a area which c o n t a i n e d h i s home town of Dalhousie, gave him 15% of the vote. The other Northern r e g i o n gave him 9% while h i s best showing i n any Southern r e g i o n was a p a l t r y 3% from the S a i n t John area. Only Young had h i s bes t showing o u t s i d e h i s home r e g i o n as he won the r e s t of the votes from the Restigouche r e g i o n . Delegates from h i s home r e g i o n of G l o u c e s t e r , Northumberland, Kent were by no means d i s l o y a l p r o v i d i n g him with 79% of t h e i r v o t e s . A pronounced f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t was i n evidence at t h i s c onvention. Each candidate a t t r a c t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r l e v e l s of support i n t h e i r home r e g i o n . (See Table 6-2). Among 'home town' dele g a t e s each candidate exceeded h i s share o f the t o t a l vote by a comfortable margin: Maher 10 by p o i n t s , F r e n e t t e by 18, Young by 23, and Day by 28. Moreover, t h e i r next s t r o n g e s t r e s u l t s i n v a r i a b l y came from an adjacent r e g i o n . Each candidate d e r i v e d an unmistakable b e n e f i t from the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . 196 Table 6-25 Vote by Area of P r o v i n c e 1982 Restigche Madawaska V i c t o r i a G l u c s t e r Nthumber - l a n d Kent A l b e r t Westmrland Kent St John Kings C h r l t t e York Sunbury Queens C a r l t o n Day — 7% 31% 55%* 37% F r e n e t t e — - 9 29* 6 11 Maher 15%* 6 1 3 3 Young 85 79* 39 36 50 *=home area n=52 n=71 n=75 n=76 n=69 T h i s does not appear t o have been the case i n 1985. The 1985 convention was marked by no n o r t h / s o u t h d i v i s i o n . McKenna won 81%. of the Northern v o t e — n o more than Young—but a l s o c a r r i e d 78% of the votes c a s t by southern d e l e g a t e s . T h i s i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t F r e n e t t e ' s home was i n the south. McKenna's overwhelming v i c t o r y was not m i t i g a t e d by a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g showing f o r F r e n e t t e i n any of the f i v e r e g i o n s . F r e n e t t e d i d not make a s t r o n g showing even among h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours from the Moncton area. His support t h e r e was lower than i n 1982 and p r o v i d e d j u s t 20% of h i s t o t a l . McKenna, the southern born n o r t h e r n r e s i d e n t , won everywhere. His margins ranged from a low of 73% from the S a i n t John area i n which he was born to a h i g h of 87% from the Restigouche, Madawaska, V i c t o r i a area. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n 5 As can be seen, these are l a r g e l y groupings of c o u n t i e s . On the survey d e l e g a t e s from Kent c o u l d choose e i t h e r the Northumberland area or the Moncton area. Westmorland c o n t a i n s Moncton, York c o n t a i n s F r e d e r i c t o n and St. John, S a i n t John. As was the case with th o i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s i n Nova S c o t i a , c h i square i s s i g n i f i c a n t u n l e s s otherwise noted. 197 a f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t at t h i s c onvention. In both 1982 and 1985 an urban r u r a l d i v i s i o n i n v o t i n g was s i g n i f i c a n t and p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r i n s i g h t i n t o the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . (See Table 6-3). In 1982, Young's support was g r e a t e s t i n the r u r a l areas of the p r o v i n c e . He won 60% of the votes from d e l e g a t e s l i v i n g i n areas with fewer than a thousand r e s i d e n t s and 68% from d e l e g a t e s from areas of l e s s than 15,000. However, d e l e g a t e s l i v i n g i n areas of over 50,000 r e s i d e n t s f a i l e d t o g i v e him a p l u r a l i t y and h i s 28% vote share t r a i l e d both Day and F r e n e t t e . I t may be t h a t t h i s was a product of the e a r l i e r r e g i o n a l s p l i t . Only two c i t i e s i n New Brunswick have more than 50,000 r e s i d e n t s : Moncton and S a i n t John. Since the Moncton area was most s u p p o r t i v e of F r e n e t t e and S a i n t John of Day, i t may be t h a t the community s i z e v a r i a b l e i s simply p r o v i d i n g f u r t h e r evidence of the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . 198 Table 6-3 Vote by Community Size 1982 Over 50,000 15,000 -50,000 1000 -15,000 Under 1000 Day 39% 19% 22% 31% F r e n e t t e 29 19 4 5 Maher 5 6 7 3 Young 28 56 68 60 n=83 n=32 n=167 n=58 1985 F r e n e t t e 35% 10% 23% 6% McKenna 65 90 77 94 n=18 n=29 n=144 n=4 8 Such an explanation can also be offered for 1985. It i s clear that McKenna was very popular i n r u r a l New Brunswick. Ninety-four percent of the delegates l i v i n g i n communities of less than a thousand residents voted for him. Conversely, his worst showing was from Moncton and Saint John (over 50,000) whose delegates gave him a r e l a t i v e l y low 65%. The urban support for Frenette raises the p o s s i b i l i t y that Frenette drew substantial friends and neighbours support from the c i t y of Moncton which f a i l e d to be r e f l e c t e d by the regional variable because of a poor showing i n the rest of the region. Indeed, a separate examination of each region showed that Frenette's weakness i n the r u r a l areas was province wide, although he did best i n the Moncton region with 14%. In communities between 1000 and 50,000 there was no noticeable support for Frenette i n the Moncton region. But i n the over 50,000 category, he took 39% of the Moncton vote and 32% from S a i n t John. His support then, was g r e a t e s t i n h i s home town, but was a l s o d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y h i g h i n S a i n t John. His support e v i n c e s a c e r t a i n f r i e n d s and neighbours t i n t . What support F r e n e t t e had i n h i s home r e g i o n owed t o h i s s t r e n g t h i n the c i t y of Moncton i t s e l f . In the r e s t of the r e g i o n he d i d not garner even 15% of the vote. H is only other s t r o n g showing i n the p r o v i n c e was i n urban S a i n t John. Outside of these two c i t i e s , he was unable t o a t t r a c t 30% of the vote. F r e n e t t e ' s support from the c i t y of Moncton was onl y m a r g i n a l l y h i g h e r i n 1982. However, i n 1982, the 44% of the vote he won i n Moncton c o n s t i t u t e d a p l u r a l i t y . Delegates from o u t s i d e the c i t y of Moncton p r e f e r r e d both Day and Young. Again, F r e n e t t e ' s f r i e n d s and neighbours were l a r g e l y from h i s home c i t y of Moncton. The support f o r Young i n r u r a l New Brunswick was s t r i k i n g . With the e x c e p t i o n of the York-Sunbury r e g i o n , h i s support was always s t r o n g e s t among de l e g a t e s from the s m a l l e s t communities. He was not n e a r l y as popular i n urban New Brunswick. Young c a r r i e d j u s t one of the major urban c e n t r e s , F r e d e r i c t o n , and even t h e r e he won only a p l u r a l i t y of 40%, s l i g h t l y below h i s share of the t o t a l southern v o t e . Day's support was c e n t r e d i n h i s home c i t y of S a i n t John. In no other p a r t of the p r o v i n c e d i d he win an o u t r i g h t m a j o r i t y . He won p l u r a l i t i e s i n the l e s s populous areas of the S a i n t John r e g i o n but c o u l d not command the l e v e l of support he had i n the c i t y . Grouping the p r o v i n c e i n t o regional/community s i z e c a t e g o r i e s 200 h i g h l i g h t s the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . I f the f i v e r e g i o n s are s u b d i v i d e d by community s i z e one i s l e f t w ith 17 sub r e g i o n a l groupings. Young secured o u t r i g h t m a j o r i t i e s from t e n of these groupings. Only the t h r e e urban S a i n t John c a t e g o r i e s r e t u r n e d m a j o r i t i e s a g a i n s t him while the r u r a l p a r t s of the York r e g i o n and Moncton proper p r o v i d e d p l u r a l i t i e s t o other c a n d i d a t e s . For both Day and F r e n e t t e , t h e i r support peaked i n t h e i r home towns and g r a d u a l l y d e c l i n e d as d i s t a n c e from t h e i r home i n c r e a s e d . A s i m i l a r geographic grouping i n 1985 g i v e s McKenna a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t i e s i n a l l cases. Never d i d h i s vote share drop below 60% and only t w i c e — i n the c i t i e s of S a i n t John and M o n c t o n — d i d he r e c e i v e l e s s than 70% of the vote. The 39% of the vote won by F r e n e t t e i n Moncton, only s l i g h t l y l e s s than he won i n 1982 when he won a p l u r a l i t y , suggests t h a t even i n 1985, i n the face of a McKenna l a n d s l i d e , F r e n e t t e b e n e f i t t e d from the u b i q u i t o u s f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . S o c i a l Groups The s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n i n New Brunswick i s not only geographic but has e t h n i c and r e l i g i o u s elements. The n o r t h i s predominantly French and almost e x c l u s i v e l y C a t h o l i c while the south i s predominantly E n g l i s h and P r o t e s t a n t . New Brunswick i s e s s e n t i a l l y d i v i d e d between those of B r i t i s h o r i g i n and those of French o r i g i n with those of B r i t i s h descent accounting f o r about 60% of the p o p u l a t i o n . The b i c u l t u r a l nature of the p r o v i n c e was r e f l e c t e d q u i t e w e l l at both conventions with those of French 201 o r i g i n making up at l e a s t a t h i r d of the d e l e g a t e t o t a l . In each of the conventions the competing candidates r e p r e s e n t e d both e t h n i c groups. I t was not t h e r e f o r e s u r p r i s i n g t o d i s c o v e r s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between v o t i n g and e t h n i c o r i g i n . (See Table 6-4). Somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , i n 1982, t h i s d i v i s i o n d i d not favour F r e n e t t e — t h e lone Francophone. Seventy percent of F r e n e t t e ' s support came from B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s with both Young and Day a t t r a c t i n g more Acadian support. 6 Young dominated the French vote winning 72% with no other candidate exceeding 13%. The B r i t i s h vote was more evenly divided.Young s t i l l won more votes than any other candidate but h i s share dropped 25 p o i n t s t o 47%. Day was a much st r o n g e r second with 36% and f u l l y 84% of h i s support came from these d e l e g a t e s . In c o n t r a s t , B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s p r o v i d e d o n l y 56% of Young's support and j u s t 65% of Maher's. F r e n e t t e ' s r e l a t i v e weakness among French d e l e g a t e s d i s a p p e a r e d i n 1985. While B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s were p r o v i d i n g McKenna with 87% of t h e i r votes, F r e n e t t e garnered almost a t h i r d of the French v o t e . Over h a l f h i s support came from Acadian d e l e g a t e s . In 6 The terminology used here i s not as c l e a r as i t might be. I t would be c l e a r e r i f the phrase E n g l i s h speaking c o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r B r i t i s h . However, the survey i n 1982 d i d not ask a language q u e s t i o n and the 1985 survey r e v e a l e d t h a t not a l l E n g l i s h speaking d e l e g a t e s were of B r i t i s h descent. A number of New Brunswickers of French o r i g i n a l s o c l a i m E n g l i s h as t h e i r mother tongue. Acadian i s the a p p e l l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y g i v e n t o M a r i t i m e r s of French o r i g i n . T e c h n i c a l l y , i t does not i n c l u d e Francophones whose f a m i l y o r i g i n was from Quebec. French Canadians i n Madawaska, f o r example, are not r e a l l y Acadian. Nonetheless, i n keeping with the common understanding of the term, i t w i l l be a p p l i e d t o a l l New Brunswickers of French o r i g i n . 202 1985 i t was a l s o p o s s i b l e t o analyze d e l e g a t e s by t h e i r mother tongue. (See Table 6 - 5 ) . T h i s confirms the s t r o n g showing f o r F r e n e t t e among Francophones. His l e v e l of support among Francophones was twice as h i g h as h i s Anglophone support. Only 27% of the d e l e g a t e s were Francophones yet they p r o v i d e d 43% of F r e n e t t e ' s v o t e s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t the e t h n i c d i v i s i o n s cannot be a t t r i b u t e d s o l e l y t o e t h n o - l i n g u i s t i c s o l i d a r i t y . The 1982 r e s u l t s b e l i e any such s u g g e s t i o n . The e x p l a n a t i o n i s more c o n t e x t u a l . In 1 9 8 2 , by t r a d i t i o n , i t was the t u r n of an Anglophone t o l e a d the p a r t y and Acadian d e l e g a t e s may have been p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r r i g h t t o c l a i m the l e a d e r s h i p the next time by not backing F r e n e t t e (see Aunger, 1 9 8 1 : 157) . 7 However, i n 1985 when i t was the t u r n of a Francophone to l e a d the p a r t y but the atmosphere supposedly p r e c l u d e d the s e l e c t i o n of an Acadian, Francophone d e l e g a t e s were more s u p p o r t i v e of F r e n e t t e . Of course French d e l e g a t e s , most of whom were from the north, may simply have been more r e c e p t i v e t o the candidacy of a f l u e n t l y b i l i n g u a l n o r t h e r n e r l i k e Young than they were t o a t r a n s p l a n t e d southerner l i k e McKenna who spoke on l y tiroken French. 7 The p o i n t here i s q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h a t r a i s e d by Johnston i n 1988 when he suggested t h a t C h r e t i e n "may have p i c k e d the wrong time t o r a l l y d e l e g a t e s w i t h i n h i s home p r o v i n c e . The next L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p convention, at which Quebec and francophone d e l e g a t e s w i l l presumably seek t o a s s e r t the a l t e r n a t i o n r u l e . . . may e x h i b i t sharp r e g i o n a l l i n g u i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s i n the c h o i c e of l e a d e r " (215) . 203 able 6-48 Vo.. by E t h n i c i t y 1982 B r i t i s h French B r i t i s h I r i s h Day 36% 13% 37% 34% F r e n e t t e 12 10 13 11 Maher 5 6 6 5 Young 47 72 45 51 n=211 n=109 n=128 n=83 1985 F r e n e t t e 13% 32% 13% 14% McKenna 87 68 87 86 n=166 n=81 n=93 n=73 Table 6-5 Vote by Language 1985 E n g l i s h French F r e n e t t e 16% 33% McKenna 84 67 n=197 n=73 U n l i k e the r e s t of Canada, i n New Brunswick a B r i t i s h m a j o r i t y does not t r a n s l a t e i n t o a P r o t e s t a n t m a j o r i t y . I t i s the o n l y p r o v i n c e other than Quebec i n which a m a j o r i t y of the c i t i z e n s are C a t h o l i c . T h i s has not stopped P r o t e s t a n t s , who are i n the m a j o r i t y i n the more populous south, from dominating p r o v i n c i a l 8 The B r i t i s h I r i s h c o n t r a s t i s made p o s s i b l e by removing the I r i s h from the o v e r a l l B r i t i s h group. Adding the I r i s h and B r i t i s h f i g u r e s on the l e f t s i d e of the t a b l e w i l l g i v e the same number as the B r i t i s h category on the r i g h t s i d e . The r e s u l t s are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r both the French B r i t i s h dichotomy and the B r i t i s h , I r i s h and French d i v i s i o n . p o l i t i c s . P r o t e s t a n t s however, tend to be C o n s e r v a t i v e and were very much a m i n o r i t y at the L i b e r a l conventions. Although P r o t e s t a n t s make up almost 45% of the p r o v i n c i a l p o p u l a t i o n , they accounted f o r only 32% of the d e l e g a t e t o t a l i n 1982 and j u s t 30% i n 1985. D e s p i t e c o n s t i t u t i n g a m a j o r i t y i n every Southern county except Westmorland, on l y i n the York area d e l e g a t i o n were they a m a j o r i t y at the L i b e r a l conventions. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e r e was o n l y one P r o t e s t a n t c a n d i d a t e . Given New Brunswick h i s t o r y and the r e s u l t s i n Nova S c o t i a and P r i n c e Edward I s l a n d , a s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and v o t i n g was expected; at l e a s t i n 1982. No such a s s o c i a t i o n was e v i d e n t . F i f t y - t h r e e percent of the P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s supported Young and j u s t 39& voted f o r Day. While Day took an even s m a l l e r share of the C a t h o l i c vote, the d i f f e r e n c e was not s i g n i f i c a n t . In 1985, with no P r o t e s t a n t i n the race, 85% of the P r o t e s t a n t s voted f o r McKenna as d i d 78% of the C a t h o l i c s . R e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s , then, bore v i r t u a l l y no r e l a t i o n t o v o t i n g at e i t h e r of the L i b e r a l l e a d e r s h i p conventions i n New Brunswick. Other cleavages of p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e at l e a d e r s h i p conventions are d e f i n e d by convention r u l e s . A c e r t a i n number of d e l e g a t e s from each c o n s t i t u e n c y must be under 30, a c e r t a i n number must be women and some people become de l e g a t e s by v i r t u e of the p a r t y or p u b l i c o f f i c e they h o l d . Such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s meant t o ensure e x p r e s s i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r viewpoints such groups supposedly b r i n g . Indeed, v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s on some of these dimensions were ev i d e n t at the New Brunswick conventions. 205 However, none of these d i v i s i o n s were s i g n i f i c a n t at both. A g e n e r a t i o n gap s c a r c e l y a f f e c t e d v o t i n g at e i t h e r c o nvention. Admittedly, i n 1982, youth d e l e g a t e s d i d not j o i n t h e i r e l d e r s i n p r o v i d i n g Young with m a j o r i t y support, but even the youth gave him a 49% p l u r a l i t y . In 1985, age d i f f e r e n c e s were not even t h a t n o t a b l e . Youth d e l e g a t e s were no s t r o n g e r i n t h e i r support f o r McKenna than were o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . No s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s c o u l d be found i n examining the del e g a t e type v a r i a b l e e i t h e r . In 1982, the percentage of ex-o f f i c i o and c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s v o t i n g f o r each candidate d i v e r g e d by a maximum of only 1.6%. The overwhelming caucus support f o r Young d i d not i n f e c t the other e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . While s t i l l not s i g n i f i c a n t , the 1985 p a t t e r n was more skewed. McKenna, of course, won m a j o r i t y support from both groups. Nonetheless, while e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s gave him 87% support, h i s support from the c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s was t e n p o i n t s lower. Although McKenna c e r t a i n l y d i d not owe h i s v i c t o r y t o e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s they were c l e a r l y h i s staunchest s u p p o r t e r s . Table 6-6 Vote by Delegate Type 1985 Co n s t i t u e n c y E x - o f f i c i o F r e n e t t e 23% 13% McKenna 77 87 Value of C h i Square not s i g n i f i c a n t n=216 n=4 6 Somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y , a gender gap c o u l d be d i s c e r n e d at the 1982 convention. Women and men d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e i r support of the v a r i o u s c a n d i d a t e s . (See Table 6-7). The d i r e c t i o n of the gap favoured Young who was more popul a r with the more numerous male d e l e g a t e s . He won 61% of the male vote but only 4 6% of women del e g a t e s voted f o r him. The other candidates drew a hi g h e r p r o p o r t i o n of support from women than they d i d from men. No such gender gap was ev i d e n t i n 1985. Men and women voted i n v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s f o r McKenna. Table 6-7 Vote by Gender 1982 Male Female Day 25% 31% F r e n e t t e 10 13 Maher 3 11 Young 61 46 n=236 n=105 I t seems t h a t these i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d groups had only a minor impact on the outcome of the conventions. The age of deleg a t e s had l i t t l e impact on v o t i n g at e i t h e r convention. However, i n 1985 e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s may have been l e s s s u p p o r t i v e of F r e n e t t e than were c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s while i n 1982 women were l e s s s u p p o r t i v e of Young than men. The former f i n d i n g i s more e x p l i c a b l e . The e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s might have been more aware t h a t the t i m i n g was wrong f o r a Francophone l e a d e r . These p r o f e s s i o n a l s might have r e a l i z e d t h a t the purpose of a l t e r n a t i o n was t o win e l e c t i o n s and ensure Acadian support f o r the L i b e r a l s . The p r o s p e c t of an Acadian l e a d e r hanging as an a l b a t r o s s around the neck of the p a r t y was not one they would view w i t h p l e a s u r e . I f Acadians i n s i s t e d on t h e i r ' t u r n ' i t c o u l d w e l l have a l i e n a t e d the B r i t i s h m a j o r i t y on whose acquiesence f u t u r e Acadian candidates would depend. Pragmatic p a r t y p r o f e s s i o n a l s were u n l i k e l y t o s t i c k t o a l o s t cause. The gender gap of 1982 seems i n e x p l i c a b l e . Nothing i n the l e a d e r s h i p campaign suggests a reason f o r the female non Young m a j o r i t y . The f i n a l group d i v i s i o n s r e q u i r i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n at l e a d e r s h i p conventions are economic, s p e c i f i c a l l y : c l a s s , income and e d u c a t i o n . As at most conventions, New Brunswick d e l e g a t e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t t e r educated, had h i g h e r incomes and h e l d h i g h e r s t a t u s p o s i t i o n s than most of t h e i r f e l l o w c i t i z e n s . Nonetheless, not every d e l e g a t e had a h i g h income, a u n i v e r s i t y degree or was upper middle c l a s s . V o t i n g d i v i s i o n s c o u l d have o c c u r r e d on these dimensions. In 1985 the answer t o such q u e s t i o n s i s r e l a t i v e l y simple. No v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s were apparent on any dimension of income, c l a s s or e d u c a t i o n . R i c h and poor, u n i v e r s i t y educated and h i g h s c h o o l drop out, upper middle and working c l a s s a l l supported McKenna i n roughly the same degree. There were no c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s i n v o t i n g . The f i n d i n g s f o r 1982 are not as c l e a r c u t . As Table 6-8 shows, u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s l i k e l y t o vote f o r Young than were l e s s educated d e l e g a t e s . Young won 73% of the votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s who had not completed h i g h s c h o o l , compared t o 4 9% from both h i g h s c h o o l graduates and those with u n i v e r s i t y degrees. Conversely, the l e v e l of support f o r Day 208 i n c r e a s e d with the e d u c a t i o n of the d e l e g a t e . Table 6-8 Vote by E d u c a t i o n 1982 U n i v e r s i t y Degree High School Graduate Less than High School Day 34% 29% 16% F r e n e t t e 11 14 9 Maher 6 8 6 Young 49 49 73 n=156 n=89 n=99 D i f f e r e n c e s i n income or c l a s s p o s i t i o n bore l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o v o t i n g at e i t h e r c onvention. In summary, economic d i v i s i o n s were of no importance at the 1985 convention and only e d u c a t i o n had a marginal r e l a t i o n s h i p with v o t i n g i n 1982. At both conventions, the more e x p l i c i t l y s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s had a g r e a t e r impact on v o t i n g than the economic ones. As Table 6-9 makes ev i d e n t , the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s between v o t i n g and s o c i a l groups were found among the t r a d i t i o n a l e t h n i c and l i n g u i s t i c groups. One must be c a u t i o u s i n a s s e r t i n g the importance of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t may be t h a t such r e l a t i o n s h i p s were produced by the behaviour of p a r t i c u l a r economic, age or d e l e g a t e type groups. 9 V a r i a b l e s which d i d not e x h i b i t a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h v o t i n g may i n f a c t be important when t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n with the more s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s i s examined. In essence, the q u e s t i o n which must be answered i s 9 The argument here i s the same as t h a t r a i s e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . Namely t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s remain important because of the behaviour of o l d e r or p o o r l y educated d e l e g a t e s . 209 whether the e t h n o - l i n j u i s t i c a s s o c i a t i o n with v o t i n g remains s t r o n g when c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s are i n t r o d u c e d . Table 6-9 Cramer's V 1982 L i b e r a l 1985 L i b e r a l Region .49 * P r o v i n c i a l Area .34 — Urban/ R u r a l .24 .23 E t h n i c i t y .26 .22 Language NA .18 R e l i g i o n — — Age — — Sex .18 — Delegate Type — . — E d u c a t i o n .16 — Income — — C l a s s — — * Cramer's V i s p r o v i d e d only when the r e l a t i o n s h i p with vote i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . A c o n v i n c i n g argument c o u l d be made t h a t e t h n i c v o t i n g d i v i s i o n s s hould only be found among c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s , with e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s beyond such t r a d i t i o n a l concerns. Indeed, i n both 1982 and 1985, the ethno l i n g u i s t i c cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y among c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s . However, i n 1982 while the r e s u l t s f o r e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were not s i g n i f i c a n t they were noteworthy. Seventy-four percent of the French e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s supported Young as compared t o only 4 9% of the B r i t i s h e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . Conversely, Day was supported by a t h i r d of 210 the B r i t i s h e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s but by only one of 19 French ex-o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . Even the v o t i n g of e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s then, was not immune from the i n f l u e n c e of e t h n i c i t y . Such i n f l u e n c e does not appear i n 1985. Although s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s cannot be obtained, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o note t h a t a l l French speaking e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s voted f o r McKenna r a t h e r than F r e n e t t e . T h i s stands i n c o n t r a s t t o the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e and s i g n i f i c a n t support g i v e n F r e n e t t e by Francophone c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s . In 1985 the Francophone ex o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were immune from the e t h n i c v o t i n g which marked the convention as a whole. Age might a l s o have an e f f e c t on the e t h n i c v o t i n g p a t t e r n . In keeping with the modernization t h e s i s i t c o u l d be argued t h a t the e t h n i c v o t i n g i s l a r g e l y an a r t i f a c t of the votes c a s t by e l d e r l y d e l e g a t e s and t h a t an e t h n i c d i v i s i o n should not e x i s t among younger d e l e g a t e s . Contrary t o such an argument, i n both 1982 and 1985 s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s were found f o r d e l e g a t e s between 30 and 60, while they c o u l d not be found f o r o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Delegates over 60, r e g a r d l e s s of e t h n i c i t y gave m a j o r i t y support t o Young i n 1982 (although h i s share of the French vote was 22 p o i n t s higher.) As w e l l , the r e s u l t s from the d e l e g a t e s under 30 may have missed s i g n i f i c a n c e only because of the low number of cases. Youth d e l e g a t e s of B r i t i s h descent p r e f e r r e d Day to Young while those of French o r i g i n gave Young over h a l f of t h e i r v o t e s . A p o t e n t i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t age cleavage may have been a v e r t e d by the support of 211 young French d e l e g a t e s f o r Young. In 1985 the e t h n i c cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r d e l e g a t e s under t h i r t y . F r e n e t t e garnered 40% of the votes c a s t by the under t h i r t y French d e l e g a t e s but on l y 10% of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g B r i t i s h v ote. Age c o n t r o l s , t h e n , do not e l i m i n a t e the e t h n i c v o t i n g p a t t e r n and t h a t p a t t e r n was not produced by the l i n g e r i n g t r a d i t i o n a l i s m of o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Contrary t o e x p e c t a t i o n s , e t h n i c v o t i n g was l e s s pronounced among the o l d e s t delegates.(Indeed, i n 1982, B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s over 60 were more s u p p o r t i v e of Young than t h e i r younger c o l l e a g u e s while McKenna's g r e a t e s t French support i n 1985 came from the o l d e r French delegates.) C l e a r l y , the e t h n i c v o t i n g p a t t e r n was not an a r t i f a c t c r e a t e d by the v o t i n g behaviour of o l d e r d e l e g a t e s . Another p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the e t h n i c d i v i s i o n s i s a l s o o f f e r e d by the modernization t h e s i s . Such d i v i s i o n s may be r e l a t e d t o e d u c a t i o n with b e t t e r educated d e l e g a t e s not i n f l u e n c e d by t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s l i k e e t h n i c i t y . T h i s was not the case. V o t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between Francophones and Anglophones were s i g n i f i c a n t among the u n i v e r s i t y educated. U n i v e r s i t y educated Francophones were more l i k e l y t o support F r e n e t t e than were those with l e s s e d u c a t i o n . Once more, while F r e n e t t e d i d be s t among w e l l educated Francophones, h i s support was c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h e r with Francophones than i t was with Anglophones r e g a r d l e s s of e d u c a t i o n . The impact of the e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i s only s l i g h t l y l e s s c l e a r i n 1982. E t h n i c i t y was s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g f o r both h i g h s c h o o l drop outs and u n i v e r s i t y graduates. 212 Regardless of the l e v e l of education, Young won at l e a s t t h r e e - f i f t h s of the French vote but c o u l d not get m a j o r i t y support from B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s who had graduated from h i g h s c h o o l . B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s who f a i l e d t o complete h i g h s c h o o l gave him m a j o r i t y support, a l b e i t at a lower l e v e l than t h a t g i v e n by French d e l e g a t e s with a s i m i l a r e d u c a t i o n . Table 6-10 Index of E t h n i c Support by E d u c a t i o n and Age# EDUCATION AGE Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Day + 16* +21 +24* + 17 +25* +19 Frenette +5* -7 -6* -3 + 4* + 1 Maher +4* +2 +4* -9 + 1* +2 Young -25* -16 -22* -5 -30* -22 Frenette -16 -5 -30* -30* -15* -20 McKenna + 16 +5 +30* +30* + 15* +20 # The E t h n i c Index i s c a l c u l a t e d by s u b t r a c t i n g French support from B r i t i s h support. A n e g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t a candidate had a h i g h e r percentage of support from d e l e g a t e s of French descent while a p o s i t i v e number means t h a t the l e v e l of B r i t i s h support was h i g h e r . An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t c h i square was s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . French candidates are i n i t a l i c s . The use of e d u c a t i o n a l and age c o n t r o l s i n an e l a b o r a t i o n model d i d not e l i m i n a t e the p a t t e r n of e t h n i c v o t i n g at e i t h e r convention. Confounding e x p e c t a t i o n s , t h i s v o t i n g was a c t u a l l y s t r o n g e r among more h i g h l y educated d e l e g a t e s and no examples can be found of Anglophone or B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s b e i n g more l i k e l y t o vote f o r F r e n e t t e than Francophones or of B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s being 213 more l i k e l y t o vote f o r Young than were the French. E t h n i c v o t i n g cut a c r o s s e d u c a t i o n a l and g e n e r a t i o n a l l i n e s . The c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s used here do not g r e a t l y weaken the p a t t e r n of e t h n i c v o t i n g . 1 0 French and E n g l i s h d e l e g a t e s vote somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y r e g a r d l e s s of e d u c a t i o n age and, t o a l a r g e extent, d e l e g a t e type. The e x c e p t i o n may prove the r u l e . In 1985, Francophone e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s were l e s s s u p p o r t i v e of F r e n e t t e than were Anglophone d e l e g a t e s . As argued e a r l i e r , perhaps these p a r t y p r o f e s s i o n a l s , with t h e i r understanding of the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e , r e c o g n i z e d both the hopeless nature of F r e n e t t e ' s candidacy and knew i n any event, a F r e n e t t e v i c t o r y would be P y r r h i c f o r the p a r t y . C o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s who had f a i t h f u l l y supported an Anglophone i n 1982 were not as understanding i n 1985. Whatever the reason the e t h n i c p a t t e r n h e l d g e n e r a l l y and i n 1985 i t s s t r e n g t h was a c t u a l l y somewhat masked by the support of ex-o f f i c i o Francophone d e l e g a t e s f o r McKenna. Table 6-11 Vote by Delegate Type c o n t r o l l i n g f o r Language E n g l i s h Speaking French Speaking 1985 Regular E x - o f f i c i o Regular E x - o f f i c i o F r e n e t t e 17% 16% 37% — McKenna 83 84 63 100% C h i square not s i g n i f i c a n t n=153 n=38 n=63 n=8 1 0 Income and c l a s s c o n t r o l s were a l s o run. As with education, the 1985 e t h n i c d i v i s i o n was s t a r k e s t among r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t or upper middle c l a s s d e l e g a t e s . In 1982, the p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s e d support f o r Young from Acadians cut across c l a s s and income l i n e s . 214 The i n f l u e n c e of e t h n i c i t y can a l s o be seen when the s i g n i f i c a n t gender gap of 1982—men were more s u p p o r t i v e of Y o u n g — i s c l o s e l y examined. The gender gap was r a t h e r unexpected and i t i s p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d by the e t h n i c d i v i s i o n . Female d e l e g a t e s were l a r g e l y B r i t i s h and by v i r t u e of t h a t f a c t o r l e s s l i k e l y t o vote f o r Young. 1 1 Indeed, when B r i t i s h and French d e l e g a t e s were examined s e p a r a t e l y gender was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g . Young's l e v e l of support was a c t u a l l y h i g h e r with Acadian women than i t was with B r i t i s h men. The evidence suggests t h a t e t h n i c i t y g r e a t l y m i t i g a t e s the impact of gender. Examination of the b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s between s o c i a l group membership (Table 6-9) and v o t i n g a l s o r e v e a l e d t h a t education, i n 1982, was s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s own r i g h t . As with gender, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of e d u c a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s d i s a p p e a r e d when B r i t i s h and French d e l e g a t e s were examined s e p a r a t e l y . An assessment of the impact of s o c i a l cleavages on d e l e g a t e v o t i n g confirms the preeminence of the geographic f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t . No s o c i a l cleavages were as s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v o t i n g as the geographic v a r i a b l e s . G e n e r a l l y , geographic d i v i s i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d i n the same t r a d i t i o n a l l i g h t as r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y . With modernization, geographic e f f e c t s are expected t o d e c l i n e . I t i s thus important t o determine whether f r i e n d s and neighbours support cuts across e d u c a t i o n a l l i n e s . 1 1 E i g h t y percent of the female d e l e g a t e s were of B r i t i s h o r i g i n while only 60% of the males were B r i t i s h . 215 The i n t r o d u c t i o n of e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s d i d not modify the f r i e n d s and neighbours e f f e c t noted i n 1982. T h i s cleavage remained s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a l l c a t e g o r i e s of e d u c a t i o n . The omnipresence of the n o r t h / s o u t h s p l i t i s s t r i k i n g . Day had v i r t u a l l y no n o r t h e r n support even from u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s who were s u p p o r t i v e of him on a p r o v i n c e wide b a s i s . S i m i l a r l y , n o r t h e r n support f o r F r e n e t t e was n e g l i g i b l e . Young's support i n the south d i d not approach h i s n o r t h e r n support r e g a r d l e s s of e d u c a t i o n . His support among u n i v e r s i t y educated n o r t h e r n e r s was much hi g h e r than h i s support from u n i v e r s i t y educated d e l e g a t e s i n the south. Maher's support i n the n o r t h r e p r e s e n t e d almost t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of h i s t o t a l vote with over h a l f of t h i s coming from h i s home r e g i o n of Madawaska, Restigouche and V i c t o r i a — t h e s m a l l e s t i n the p r o v i n c e . However, t h i s f r i e n d s and neighbours support d i d not come from a l l groups i n h i s home r e g i o n . A l l of h i s supporters had graduated from h i g h s c h o o l and most had u n i v e r s i t y degrees. Looking at the r e g i o n s i n d i v i d u a l l y , only i n the Madawaska r e g i o n was e d u c a t i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g . Young took a l l the votes from d e l e g a t e s who had not completed h i g h s c h o o l while Maher's support i n c r e a s e d with e d u c a t i o n . O v e r a l l , the f r i e n d s and neighbours p a t t e r n i n 1982 was a wide spread phenomenon which cut completely a c r o s s e d u c a t i o n a l l i n e s . 1 2 The f r i e n d s and neighbours tendency was s t r o n g r e g a r d l e s s 1 2 In f a c t , v o t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s among the f i v e r e g i o n s a l s o remained s i g n i f i c a n t across a l l income and c l a s s l e v e l s . 216 of a d e l e g a t e ' s e d u c a t i o n . Only Maher's f r i e n d s and neighbours came from a p a r t i c u l a r e d u c a t i o n a l group. The community s i z e v a r i a b l e a l s o remained s i g n i f i c a n t a c r o s s a l l l e v e l s of e d u c a t i o n . Delegates from Moncton and S a i n t John who d i d not f i n i s h h i g h s c h o o l d i d not vote i n the m a j o r i t y f o r Young. Young's support i n the two l a r g e s t c i t i e s i n New Brunswick never reached the m a j o r i t y l e v e l . Only r a r e l y d i d he f a i l t o achieve m a j o r i t y support from d e l e g a t e s from the l e s s populous areas. Support f o r Day and F r e n e t t e c o n s t i t u t e d an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y of the votes c a s t by dele g a t e s from Moncton and S a i n t John e d u c a t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . The a s s o c i a t i o n between community s i z e and v o t i n g at the 1985 convention was i n f l u e n c e d t o a g r e a t e r degree by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of an e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . S i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n s were l i m i t e d t o those who d i d not f i n i s h h i g h s c h o o l . P o o r l y educated d e l e g a t e s from Moncton and S a i n t John d e l i v e r e d the m a j o r i t y of t h e i r votes t o F r e n e t t e but other urban d e l e g a t e s were not as generous. T h i s i s not to say t h a t such d e l e g a t e s were no more l i k e l y t o vote f o r F r e n e t t e than were s i m i l a r l y educated d e l e g a t e s i n the r e s t o f the p r o v i n c e . The r e v e r s e was t r u e . With only one ex c e p t i o n , F r e n e t t e ' s h i g h e s t l e v e l of support came from del e g a t e s from Moncton or S a i n t John r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r l e v e l of e d u c a t i o n . Indeed, h i s support from these d e l e g a t e s was, on average, 20 p o i n t s h i g h e r than h i s next h i g h e s t support. One should not underestimate the broad nature of t h i s f a c t o r . Of p o t e n t i a l l y more i n t e r e s t than the impact of an 217 educational control on the geographic variables i s the interaction of more s o c i a l variables. Age, sex, 1 3 o r i g i n , r e l i g i o n and delegate type could a l l have greatly affected the precise nature of the geographic cleavage. Was the friends and neighbours ef f e c t consistent among a l l these groups or did i t owe to the s o c i a l composition of the various delegations? It appears that t h i s e f f e c t was consistent i n 1982. The regional d i s t r i b u t i o n of the vote was s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t across a l l categories of age, sex, o r i g i n , r e l i g i o n and delegate type. This i s most s t r i k i n g i n reference to the e x - o f f i c i o delegates. Even the party professionals were not immune from the tendency to support the l o c a l candidate. In north/south contrast, while Young won 81% of the northern e x - o f f i c i o vote, he could carry only 43% from the south, barely ahead of Day at 40%. S t i l l , i t was t h i s narrow margin that provided Young's bare southern p l u r a l i t y . Day actually s l i g h t l y outpolled Young among southern constituency delegates. 1 3 Gender i s considered here because of i t s b i v a r i a t e association with vote. 218 Table 6-12 Index of Neighbourhood Support by Educat i o n and Age# Less than High School High School U n i v e r -s i t y Degree Under 30 30-60 Over 60 Day + 6* +25* +36* +30* +30* +17* F r e n e t t e +19* +18* + 18* -11* +28* +4* Maher -6* +11* +22* + 18* + 11* -6* Young +37* -3* +21* -1* +26* +31* F r e n e t t e — — +29 +36 + 11 -1 McKenna +5 -6 -3 +21 -6 -4 #The Neighbourhood Index i s c a l c u l a t e d by s u b t r a c t i n g each ca n d i d a t e s ' o v e r a l l share of the vote from the percentage of support g i v e n him by deleg a t e s from h i s home area. Day's home area was the S a i n t John r e g i o n , Maher's Madawaska, Young's and McKenna's Northumberland while F r e n e t t e ' s was t r e a t e d as Westmorland over 50,000—Moncton i t s e l f . A ne g a t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t the candidate d i d b e t t e r o v e r a l l than he d i d with h i s neighbours. A p o s i t i v e number i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s support from h i s home area exceeds h i s o v e r a l l support. The numbers i n b r a c k e t s are the f i g u r e s from the f i n a l b a l l o t . An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s t h a t the value of c h i square f o r the geographic d i v i s i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . Women and men, P r o t e s t a n t and C a t h o l i c , young and o l d , French and E n g l i s h a l l demonstrated a r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n i n t h e i r v o t i n g . T h i s i s not to say t h a t the s o c i a l v a r i a b l e s which d i s p l a y e d a s t r o n g b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p with v o t i n g had t h e i r i n f l u e n c e completely submerged by the f r i e n d s and neighbours t r e n d . For i n s t a n c e , the gender gap i n support f o r Young was ev i d e n t even i n the n o r t h . While he c a r r i e d 66% of the votes c a s t by female d e l e g a t e s t h i s was much lower than the 86% support g i v e n him by no r t h e r n males. S i m i l a r l y , support from southern women at 38% lagged behind t h a t of Southern men (45%) and was lower than t h a t 219 given Day. Nonetheless, even the ethnic cleavage was somewhat weakened by the friends and neighbours e f f e c t . In the north the gap between Young's support from B r i t i s h and French was only nine points and i n the south i t was just f i v e . Day's southern support was 16 points higher among B r i t i s h delegates while Frenette's was 14 points higher among the French. Half of Maher's Northern support came from delegates of B r i t i s h o r i g i n although they made up only a t h i r d of the region's delegation. In contrast, ethnic voting overwhelmed any p o t e n t i a l regional cleavage i n 1985. In the north, Frenette had v i r t u a l l y no Anglophone support (5%) but won 29% of the Francophone vote. In the south, the cleavage was just as notable although support for Frenette was generally higher with even B r i t i s h delegates giving him 16% while Francophones gave him 40%. McKenna's support i n Frenette's home town of Moncton came completely from English speaking delegates. Francophone delegates from Moncton remained l o y a l to Frenette: a l l of them voted for him. English Monctonians were no more supportive than English speaking southerners generally, giving Frenette only 15% of t h e i r votes. This trend can also be seen for the delegate type variable. Frenette won 24% of the constituency vote i n the North, but could not win a single vote from e x - o f f i c i o northern delegates. In contrast, his southern support was as strong, or as weak, among ex-o f f i c i o delegates as i t was among constituency delegates. Turning to community size, the s o c i a l controls i n 1982 220 resulted i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s for age being found only with delegates between 30 and 60 although Young's support among urban delegates was even lower for the young and old. The urban/rural s p l i t was evident and s i g n i f i c a n t for both ethnic groups. Even among French delegates, Young p o l l e d fewer votes i n Moncton and Saint John than Frenette and Day. Frenette won a p l u r a l i t y of 44% in what might have been a combination of the friends and neighbour e f f e c t with ethnic l o y a l t y . The urban di s t i n c t i v e n e s s was also s i g n i f i c a n t for both r e l i g i o u s groups. For delegate type, the urban deviation was s i g n i f i c a n t only for constituency delegates. Day won 41% to 29% for Frenette and only 25% for Young. The d i r e c t i o n was similar, although not s i g n i f i c a n t among e x - o f f i c i o delegates as well. Day again won a p l u r a l i t y of 36% i n Moncton and Saint John while Young won majorities elsewhere. It seems j u s t i f i e d to conclude that the r e l a t i v e disdain shown for Young by delegates from Moncton and Saint John was not l i m i t e d to any s o c i a l group. No group from those c i t i e s delivered a p l u r a l i t y of t h e i r votes to Young and many ranked him t h i r d . Day and Frenette did well among a l l of t h e i r friends and neighbours. The 1985 trend of increased support for Frenette i n Moncton and Saint John was less general. Delegates under 30 and those over 60, even i n those c i t i e s were overwhelmingly supportive of McKenna. Only among delegates between 30 and 60 was there s i g n i f i c a n t and disproportionate support for Frenette. The urban deviation was not s i g n i f i c a n t for Protestants either. Protestants from Moncton and 221 Saint John gave McKenna 75% of t h e i r votes. However, s i g n i f i c a n t l y more Catholics i n those c i t i e s voted for Frenette (44%). (Most of them were also French.) B r i t i s h delegates i n the c i t i e s were more supportive of Frenette than were those from more r u r a l areas, but even there his support was only a non s i g n i f i c a n t 21%. S t r i k i n g l y , and s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a l l the delegates of French descent i n Moncton and Saint John voted for Frenette compared to only 25% i n the rest of the province. His friends and neighbours support i n Moncton, then came lar g e l y from his fellow Acadians. In terms of delegate type, the urban r u r a l d i v i s i o n was also s i g n i f i c a n t for only one group, the constituency delegates. In Moncton and Saint John, Frenette won 36% of the vote from constituency delegates compared to a high of 20% elsewhere. Frenette's support among e x - o f f i c i o delegates generally was so weak that winning a t h i r d of the urban e x - o f f i c i o vote and only 6% elsewhere was not enough to make the re s u l t s s i g n i f i c a n t . To put the general weakness of Frenette's e x - o f f i c i o support i n context: four of the six e x - o f f i c i o delegates who reported voting for Frenette were from Moncton or Saint John. The tendency of increased support for Frenette i n c i t i e s of over 50,000 was o v e r a l l quite broad. Never did he receive a higher proportion of votes from other delegates than he did from delegates from Moncton or Saint John. This was true regardless of the s o c i a l group to which the delegates belonged. However, even i n those c i t i e s , only delegates of French descent or Francophones gave him 222 at least h a l f of t h e i r votes. Only i n a convention of French delegates from New Brunswick's two largest c i t i e s could Frenette have won. Attitudes It remains to examine the impact of a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s on voting. As i n the other provinces the existence of a p o t e n t i a l a t t i t u d i n a l cleavage depends on the presence of actual disagreement among the delegates. As Table 6-13 makes clear, there i s ample evidence of delegate disagreement at both New Brunswick conventions. The consensus index shows the average score of agreement to be just 18.1 i n 1982 and 16.0 i n 1985. As well, i f Whitehorn's designation of low i n t e r n a l consensus (30% or more holding the minority disposition) i s used, f u l l y 12/18 a t t i t u d i n a l variables i n 1982 and 11/18 i n 1985 reveal t h i s r e l a t i v e lack of consensus. It was thus quite possible for an a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n to have affected the voting. An examination of the a t t i t u d i n a l variables for 1985 suggests that such d i v i s i o n s did not e x i s t . None of the a t t i t u d i n a l variables were s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting. However, i n 1982, i t appears that a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s were rel a t e d to voting, at least to a degree. Supporters of Maher and Frenette were much more w i l l i n g to f i r e Tory government appointees and were joined by Day supporters i n a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of support for tampering with the convention as the system for choosing a leader. Day also d i d better 223 among delegates w i l l i n g to spray New Brunswick forests for spruce budworm and with those who agreed that Maritime Union was a good idea. In each case these were minority di s p o s i t i o n s and i t would be d i f f i c u l t to maintain that such d i v i s i o n s represent deep p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s within the party. The issue most strongly associated with voting was, as media coverage of the campaign suggested, the treatment of Joe Daigle. The Cramer's V measure of association between t h i s variable and voting choice was a very high .62. When delegates were asked whether they f e l t the handling of the Joe Daigle a f f a i r had s p l i t the party, most disagreed. Yet the minority who agreed voted l a r g e l y against Young. Day won a majority of the votes cast by delegates holding t h i s p o s i t i o n and even Frenette outpolled Young. Over h a l f the support for the three l o s i n g candidates came from delegates with t h i s minority d i s p o s i t i o n . In contrast, only 10% of Young's support came from these delegates. Young d i d much better with delegates who d i d not f e e l the party had been s p l i t . He won 77% of t h e i r votes and no other candidate received even a 10% 224 Table 6-13 P o l i c y Consensus: Percent i n Agreement and Consensus Index 1982 1985 1/More power f o r the %agree C.I . %agree C.I . pr o v i n c e s + 26 24 39 1 1 2 / S p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n for Quebec 29 21 30 20 3/Support b u i l d i n g Nuclear power p l a n t s 35 15 27 23 4/Convention system best way to choose l e a d e r s 77 27 74 24 5/Too much spent on s o c i a l w e l f a r e 60 1 0 54 4 6/Right to f o r e i g h c a p i t a l 69 19 75 25 7/Government must h e l p h e l p l e s s 90 40 88 38 8/Pay we l f a r e only to needy 94 44 95 45 9/Women have adequate v o i c e i n p a r t y 59 9 63 1 3 1O/Youth have adequate v o i c e i n p a r t y 54 4 — — 11/More f e d e r a l money for poor p r o v i n c e s 82 32 91 4 12/Joe D a i g l e a f f a i r * s p l i t p a r t y 33 1 7 — — 13/Favor Maritime union 37* 1 3 34 1 6 14/A11 p a r t y members should e l e c t leader 31 * 19 43 7 15/Executive should have more p o l i c y c o n t r o l 36 1 4 40 1 0 16/No expansion of p r o v i n c i a l b i l i n g u a l i s m 37 1 3 52 2 17/No f i r i n g of Tory appointees 55 * 5 51 1 18/Support d e c i s i o n to spray f o r e s t s 39 1 1 52 2 19/Parti Acadien no t h r e a t 51 1 52 3 +Not a l l a t t i t u d i n a l q u e s t i o n s are r e p o r t e d . * S i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t e . 225 share. Obviously then, t h i s issue affected delegate voting. Indeed, the strength of t h i s issue raises questions as to the impact these opinions may have had on the other d i v i s i o n s among delegates. If Day, as the Fredericton Daily Gleaner suggested, (February 23 1982: 3) based his campaign on the disenchantment he f e l t the Daigle coup engendered, he made an egregious t a c t i c a l error. Two-thirds of the convention delegates d i d not agree with the assessment that the Daigle a f f a i r had s p l i t the party. Divisions on t h i s issue c l e a r l y favoured Young. The l e v e l of disagreement was highest among those who were the staunchest supporters of Young. For instance, i n the north 83% disagreed, i n the south only 54% did so.. . Forty-three percent of the B r i t i s h delegates believed the party had been s p l i t , compared to just 22% of French delegates. Almost half (48%) of the women f e l t the party had been s p l i t , but only 30% of the men agreed. F i n a l l y , while 54% of the delegates from Moncton and Saint John f e l t that a s p l i t had occurred, less than a t h i r d of the other delegates agreed. Despite the d i f f e r e n t positions on the issue held by various groups, i t remained s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting for north and south, a l l regions, communities of a l l sizes, both ethnic groups, a l l le v e l s of education and both genders. Even delegates who on the basis of other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were l i k e l y to support Young, such as northerners, people from r u r a l areas, people of French descent, people who did not f i n i s h high school and men, did not give him majority support i f they f e l t the Daigle a f f a i r had s p l i t the party. 226 Only i n the Saint John region, c a r r i e d by Day, did a majority (54%) of the delegates agree that the issue had s p l i t the party. Day won 80% of the votes cast by these delegates. However, even i n the Saint John area, two third s of the delegates who did not believe the party had been s p l i t voted for Young. Young never f a i l e d to achieve p l u r a l i t y support from delegates who d i d not f e e l a s p l i t had occurred and only once, among delegates from Moncton and Saint John, did he f a i l to win an outright majority. Maher's northern support came l a r g e l y from delegates b e l i e v i n g the party had been s p l i t . Indeed, among these delegates he won his only p l u r a l i t y . Day remained weaker i n the north than Maher among those delegates. Outside the north, even Young attracted more support than Maher from delegates b e l i e v i n g the party had been s p l i t . Frenette's support i n his home region varied from 36% of those i n agreement to 24% of those who disagreed. However, i n only one region was t h i s 24% support exceeded even among those who thought the party had been s p l i t . S i m i l a r l y , the 23% support Day won from Saint John area dissenters was the highest l e v e l of support he could win from delegates holding that opinion. The regional and North/South voting d i v i s i o n s remained s i g n i f i c a n t regardless of the opinions delegates held on the Joe Daigle a f f a i r . As noted, Frenette's greatest support came from delegates from the Moncton area regardless of t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the Daigle matter. The same was true of Maher's support i n Restigouche, Madawaska, V i c t o r i a and Day's from the Saint John area. As well, Day won 65% of the votes from Southern delegates who 227 thought the party had been s p l i t , but only 17% from Northerners of the same opinion. Young won 87% from Northerners who disagreed compared to 70% i n the South. The friends and neighbours e f f e c t was not eliminated by opinions on the Daigle a f f a i r . Regardless of community size, delegates who agreed the Daigle matter had s p l i t the party voted for Day over Young and those who disagreed preferred Young. However, among those who disagreed, s i g n i f i c a n t l y fewer delegates from Moncton and Saint John supported Young. His share dropped from 88% of those l i v i n g i n communities of less than a thousand to 82% from delegates l i v i n g i n communities of under 50, 000 to just 48% from delegates i n Moncton and Saint John. F i n a l l y , while the ethnic variable was not s i g n i f i c a n t given s i m i l a r opinions on the Daigle issue, the d i v i s i o n was noteworthy. Among those i n agreement Day won 62% of the B r i t i s h vote while his corresponding share of the French vote was just 42%. Young's support from those who disagreed dropped from 84% of the French to 73% of the B r i t i s h . Attitudes on the Daigle issue were most successful i n eliminating the gender gap. Day won 57% of the male vote among those who agreed the matter had s p l i t the party and a v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l 58% from the women. Simil a r l y , the minuscule 10% he took from men who disagreed actually exceeded the 8% support he won from women of that opinion. It appears that the gender gap may have been due to the greater l i k e l i h o o d of women to believe that the Daigle a f f a i r had s p l i t the party. The other d i v i s i o n s which affected voting cannot be dismissed as e a s i l y . 228 Discussion The analysis presented i n t h i s chapter provides substantial evidence for the basic argument of t h i s t h e s i s . The major cleavages d i v i d i n g the delegates exemplify the friends and neighbours e f f e c t and are mainly t r a d i t i o n a l . A friends and neighbours e f f e c t can be seen at both conventions while the e t h n o - l i n g u i s t i c d i v i s i o n exerted a greater influence on voting than any other s o c i a l group varia b l e . However, i n 1982, an issue difference was found to have a major e f f e c t on delegate voting. The absence of any s i g n i f i c a n c e for the r e l i g i o u s variable i s rather s t r i k i n g . In both Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, whenever a Protestant faced a Catholic the tendency was for both Catholic and Protestant delegates to disproportionately support t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t . This did not occur at the New Brunswick convention i n 1982 i n spite of the fact that the l i t e r a t u r e places more emphasis on r e l i g i o n i n New Brunswick than i t does i n the other Maritime provinces. This i s even more s u r p r i s i n g given that support for the two main candidates betrayed a strong regional dimension. Young's support came disproportionately from the Catholic North while Day's was i n the Protestant South. Investigation showed r e l i g i o n to be of v i r t u a l l y no importance. When each region was examined separately, Young's support among Protestants was invariably higher than i t was with Catholics. Even i n two of the Southern regions, Day received more support from Catholics than he did from his fellow Protestants. 229 I n c l u d e d i n t h i s was h i s home r e g i o n of S a i n t John i n which only 38% o f the P r o t e s t a n t s v o t e d f o r him, compared t o 65% of C a t h o l i c s . In the onl y r e g i o n with a P r o t e s t a n t m a j o r i t y , the York area, the C a t h o l i c Young won a p l u r a l i t y o n l y because of h i s m a j o r i t y support from P r o t e s t a n t s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t r e l i g i o n d i d not have the a n t i c i p a t e d e f f e c t on d e l e g a t e v o t i n g . E x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s r e v e a l something of the nature of the New Brunswick L i b e r a l p a r t y . While the south may be mainly P r o t e s t a n t i n terms of i t s c i t i z e n s and i t s e l e c t o r a t e , L i b e r a l d e l e g a t e s from the south were as l i k e l y t o be C a t h o l i c as they were P r o t e s t a n t . P r o t e s t a n t s were a d i s t i n c t m i n o r i t y at both conventions and d i d not even c o n s t i t u t e a m a j o r i t y of the southern d e l e g a t i o n . I f conventions are supposed t o compensate f o r e l e c t o r a l weakness among p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l groups, these conventions f a i l b a d l y . Group based v o t i n g among P r o t e s t a n t s c o u l d engender group based C a t h o l i c v o t i n g and make i t as u n l i k e l y f o r a P r o t e s t a n t t o l e a d the L i b e r a l s as i t has been f o r a C a t h o l i c t o l e a d the C o n s e r v a t i v e s . 1 4 P a r t of the reason f o r the i n s i g n i f i c a n c e o f r e l i g i o n may a l s o l i e i n the s a l i e n c e of l i n g u i s t i c d i s p u t e s i n New Brunswick and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e of e t h n i c i t y i n v o t i n g at the two L i b e r a l conventions. E t h n i c i t y seems t o overwhelm r e l i g i o n . T h i s cannot be seen as r e a d i l y among P r o t e s t a n t s f o r the simple reason t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s were of 1 4 Only one C a t h o l i c has ever been chosen as the C o n s e r v a t i v e l e a d e r i n New Brunswick: C h a r l e s Van Home i n 1967. 230 B r i t i s h o r i g i n . When one speaks of Protestants, one i s also speaking of B r i t i s h delegates. The reverse i s not true of Catholics. The Catholics were evenly divided between those of French descent and those of B r i t i s h , mainly I r i s h , descent. In 1982, the ethnic cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t because of the way Catholics divided t h e i r votes. Young won 72% of the votes cast by French Catholics, but only 48% of the Protestant vote. Conversely, Day won 35% of the Protestant vote, but only 13% of the French Catholic vote. Each of the candidates, however, received v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l l e v e l s of support from both Protestants and B r i t i s h Catholics. The largest deviation was 3.1% i n support for Maher. Protestants voted s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t l y from French Catholics; but so did B r i t i s h Catholics. Any r e l i g i o u s difference was submerged by the s i m i l a r voting patterns of Protestants and B r i t i s h Catholics. The r e l i g i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n between these groups was i r r e l e v a n t to t h e i r voting. The same trend was apparent i n 1985. The ethnic cleavage owed to Catholic voting d i v i s i o n s . B r i t i s h Catholics again voted l i k e Protestants with a deviation of just 1.9%. Frenette won 32% of the French Catholic vote, 14% of the Protestant vote and 12% of the B r i t i s h Catholic vote. The voting of L i b e r a l delegates i n New Brunswick suggests that they i d e n t i f y more with t h e i r ethnic group than with t h e i r r e l i g i o u s group. Certainly the voting behaviour of B r i t i s h Catholics more cl o s e l y resembles that of Protestants than i t does that of French Catholics. In spite of the importance of the ethnic cleavage, i t appears 231 less important than the friends and neighbours e f f e c t , at least insofar as they can be separated. The friends and neighbours e f f e c t i n 1982 was strong and obvious. Each of the four candidates exceeded t h e i r percentage of the t o t a l p r o v i n c i a l vote i n t h e i r home region. That i s , while Day received 27% of the votes cast at the convention, 55% of the delegates from the Saint John region voted for him. Sim i l a r l y , Frenette took 11% of the t o t a l vote, but won 29% of the Moncton area vote. Even Maher's 15% support i n his home region was higher than his t o t a l vote of 6%. F i n a l l y , Young who won a convention majority of 56% obtained 79% of the votes cast by delegates from his home region. In 1985 i t was impossible to f i n d a friends and neighbours e f f e c t for McKenna. In part t h i s was due to his almost universal appeal. P r a c t i c a l l y a l l the delegates from his home region would have had to vote for him to make the difference notable. It may also be due to the d i f f i c u l t y i n assigning McKenna a home region. He was born i n the Saint John area but spent his professional career and was r a i s i n g his family i n the Northumberland region. It was impossible for either region to claim him as a true native son and indeed perhaps no delegates thought of him i n that way. A l i m i t e d friends and neighbours e f f e c t can be seen i n Frenette's support. While, admittedly, he won just 21% of the votes cast by Moncton area delegates his support i n the c i t y i t s e l f was almost twice that at 39%. No other region or c i t y gave him more than 32% of t h e i r vote. When 1982 and 1985 are compared i t i s apparent that 232 F r e n e t t e ' s b a s e o f f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s s u p p o r t was much n a r r o w e r a t t h e l a t t e r c o n v e n t i o n . I n 1982, h i s s h a r e o f t h e M o n c t o n a r e a v o t e was 18 p o i n t s h i g h e r t h a n h i s s h a r e o f t h e t o t a l v o t e . However, i n 1985, t h e two f i g u r e s d i f f e r e d by o n l y 0.5%. Y e t h i s v o t e f r o m t h e c i t y o f Moncton i n 1982 was 44% a n d r e m a i n e d a t a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h 39% i n 1985. The i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s e f f e c t c a n be s e e n i n i t s i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e e t h n i c d i v i s i o n . I n 1982, F r e n e t t e ' s s u p p o r t i n t h e Moncton a r e a d i d n o t d i s p l a y t h e B r i t i s h t i n t o f h i s g e n e r a l s u p p o r t . H i s s u p p o r t f r o m M o n c t o n a r e a F r e n c h d e l e g a t e s was a c t u a l l y g r e a t e r t h a n h i s B r i t i s h s u p p o r t . S i m i l a r l y , t h e 47% o f t h e B r i t i s h v o t e won by Young i n g e n e r a l was g r e a t l y e x c e e d e d by t h e 74% he won f r o m B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s a l o n g t h e N o r t h S h o r e . E v e n t h e u n i l i n g u a l Maher h a d more f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s v o t e s f r o m F r e n c h d e l e g a t e s t h a n he d i d f r o m t h e B r i t i s h . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o make s u c h a c o m p a r i s o n f o r Day s i n c e o n l y one d e l e g a t e f r o m t h e S a i n t J o h n a r e a was o f F r e n c h o r i g i n — t h a t d e l e g a t e v o t e d f o r him. The f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s e f f e c t was c o n s i s t e n t f o r b o t h g e n d e r s , b o t h d e l e g a t e t y p e s , d e l e g a t e s o f a l l ages and, e x c e p t f o r Maher, a l l e c o n o m i c g r o u p s . The f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s e f f e c t f o r F r e n e t t e i n 1985 was more l i m i t e d . I t came m a i n l y f r o m F r a n c o p h o n e s , c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l e g a t e s o r l o w e r s t a t u s B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s . Not a l l g r o u p s o f M o n c t o n d e l e g a t e s were d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y s u p p o r t i v e o f F r e n e t t e . Few o f h i s ^ f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s were h i g h s t a t u s B r i t i s h d e l e g a t e s o r e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s o f e i t h e r e t h n i c g r o u p . 233 One issue seemed to play an important role i n the 1982 decision. There was an extremely high c o r r e l a t i o n between opinions on the treatment of Daigle and voting. Day supposedly based his campaign on winning the support of delegates who d i d not agree with the treatment of Joe Daigle. He was eminently successful i n that quest winning 58% of the votes cast by those delegates. However, he won just 10% of the votes cast by delegates who d i d not agree that the caucus revolt had s p l i t the party and, unfortunately for Day, 64% of the delegates held that opinion. This overwhelmed the support Day received from his friends and neighbours and B r i t i s h delegates. Day's home region support came la r g e l y from delegates who agreed with him on the Daigle issue. He won 80% of t h e i r votes compared to only 23% of the votes of delegates on the other side of the issue. Further, Day won more votes than Young from the minority of North Shore delegates who believed the party had been s p l i t . French voters who agreed with Day on the Daigle issue also gave him a p l u r a l i t y of 43%. Attitudes on the Daigle issue seem to q u a l i f y the impact of e t h n i c i t y and the friends and neighbours e f f e c t . It i s impossible to d e f i n i t i v e l y assess the substantive impact of the Daigle issue. F i r s t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine whether delegates who believed the party had been s p l i t voted for Day because of that opinion, or whether they held that opinion because they supported Day and accepted his analysis. I f the l a t t e r i s true, and i t may well be, then the d i v i s i o n of opinion on the Daigle issue i s less important. Second, region remained 234 s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting regardless of the opinion delegates held on the Daigle issue. Young's weakest support came from the home regions of Day and Frenette even when consideration i s l i m i t e d to delegates who did not believe the party had been s p l i t . Moreover, Day and Frenette achieved t h e i r highest p r o v i n c i a l vote shares from delegates on both sides of the issue i n t h e i r home regions. As well, the 25% support Young won from North Shore delegates who disagreed with him on the Daigle issue exceeded his support from those i n a l l three Southern regions who disagreed with him. It seems that a friends and neighbours e f f e c t i s evident regardless of the opinion delegates held on the Daigle issue. The f i n a l drawback was the actual wording of the question. Delegates were simply asked whether they f e l t the Daigle a f f a i r had s p l i t the party. Surely, delegates who supported the coup's ringleader would be v i r t u a l l y unanimous i n t h e i r dismissal of such a charge. Ethnic o r i g i n was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting when the Daigle issue was brought into consideration. However, i t should be stressed that Day's support from delegates who agreed with him on the issue was 20 points higher with the B r i t i s h . S i m i l a r l y , Young's support with delegates on his side of the issue was eleven points lower among the B r i t i s h . It seems that while the Daigle issue was important at the convention, one should not i n f e r that attitudes on that issue rendered other cleavages unimportant or even i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 5 Where a delegate was from and which 1 5 The bitterness that surrounded the 1982 outcome must also be kept i n mind. After a b i t t e r defeat, delegates who supported a convention loser are probably more i n c l i n e d to agree that something 235 ethnic group he or she belonged to were very important considerations at the New Brunswick L i b e r a l convention. Attempts to l i m i t t h i s phenomenon to p a r t i c u l a r groups were large l y unsuccessful. Almost invariably, candidates could count on a great deal of support from t h e i r friends and neighbours. In t h i s , they resembled t h e i r fellow candidates i n Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. has s p l i t the party. In contrast, delegates who supported the winner l i k e l y want to downplay any notion of a s p l i t . 236 Table 6-14 1 6 M u l t i p l e R e g r e s s i o n : S o c i a l and Geographic F a c t o r s Day F r e n e t t e Maher Young McKenna P r o t e s t a n t -.08 .00 -.01 .07 -.02 Westmorland -.09 .11 .00 .01 — Under 30 .16* -.11 .00 -.05 .02 C o l l e g e .09 -.02 .00 -.09 -.07 Male .06 -.07 -.12* .11 .04 E x - o f f i c i o -.10 .02 -.01 ,08 -.07 St. John .19* -.11 -.01 -.07 — Restigouche -.37* -.09 .19* .27* — Wealthy -.11 -.02 .07* .06 -.08 Urban .01 .19*- .02 -.23* -.22* Upper C l a s s .01 .01 .03 .04 NA French speaking — — — — -.10 B r i t i s h .02 -.00 .06 -.08 .22* Northumb-e r l a n d -.31* -.04 .13* .22* — Constant .33 .16 -.01 .52 .75 R Square .24 .18 .13 .22 .14 1 6 Once more, the r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s are based on dummy v a r i a b l e a n a l y s i s . The meaning of the independent v a r i a b l e s i s q u i t e c l e a r , although urban r e f e r s t o over 50,000. An a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s the c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l or b e t t e r . 237 Chapter 7 Maritime Conventions: The P o l i t i c s of 'Friends and Neighbours' The analysis of party d i v i s i o n s at leadership conventions i n the three Maritime provinces provides a strong i n d i c a t i o n of a regional s t y l e of p o l i t i c s as well as the st y l e of p o l i t i c s i n the region. In essence, the d i v i s i o n s found i n one province can also be seen i n the other two. Moreover, the partisan s t r i p e of a p a r t i c u l a r convention does not have much of a di s t i n g u i s h i n g e f f e c t . The same d i v i s i o n s e x i s t regardless of province or party. The f i r s t s i m i l a r i t y that can be seen relates to the context in which conventions are held. Seven of the nine conventions were held when the party was out of o f f i c e . The p a r t i c u l a r circumstances surrounding the two conventions held while i n o f f i c e suggest that opposition i s the natural habitat of Maritime conventions. In 1978, the Island L i b e r a l s were forced into a convention when a su r p r i s i n g l y close e l e c t i o n — w h i c h saw the government's majority plummet from 20 to 2 — led the premier to abandon e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s and accept an appointment to the bench. The other i n o f f i c e transfer was caused by events previous to t h i s . In 1976 Island Conservatives, having l o s t three consecutive elections, turned to the most prominent of t h e i r number, J. Angus MacLean, to lead them out of the opposition wilderness. MacLean, a veteran of World War II and the Diefenbaker cabinet, was nearing seventy and made clear that he would serve only one term as premier. He kept 238 his word and i n 1981 the Conservative government faced a leadership convention. Premiers, i n general, do not appear eager to cast off the burdens of t h e i r o f f i c e . The remaining conventions occurred i n opposition and generally followed an e l e c t i o n defeat which indicated the resignation of the previous leader might be a wise vote maximizing move. The concern was to return the party to i t s r i g h t f u l place on the government benches and the candidates were r e l a t i v e l y young men who argued over who could e f f e c t t h i s r e storation most quickly. Only one candidate eschewed the debate as to whether he could return the party to power most quickly. In 1982, Joe Day attempted to win the New Brunswick L i b e r a l leadership by promising never to put the pursuit of power before p r i n c i p l e s . Day, of course, did not win and i t seems u n l i k e l y that any Maritime leadership campaign which did not e x p l i c i t l y emphasize the party's v i c t o r y would prove successful. More t y p i c a l was the campaign of Ray Frenette i n 1985. In spite of damaging p o l l s and a negative ethnic climate, Frenette d i d not mention the t r a d i t i o n of a l t e r n a t i o n as a reason for supporting him and beg his fellow L i b e r a l s to support him regardless of winnability. Although he suggested that L i b e r a l s drop the idea that an Acadian could not win, his more compelling charge was that his opponent did not have the stature to lead the Liberals to power. Frenette knew better than to argue a case which did show that he was more l i k e l y to lead his party to power. This brings up the second regional s i m i l a r i t y : the type of 239 campaign run by the candidates. No candidate presented his candidacy i n an ide o l o g i c a l l i g h t . Rather, leadership campaigns revolved around the question of p o l i t i c a l experience. The more experienced candidates stressed t h e i r years of preparation, t h e i r t r a i n i n g , t h e i r proven a b i l i t i e s ; those without such experience presented themselves as fresh faces, free from the stigma of defeat or decay and ready to reinvigorate the party. The essence of the debate was which candidate was most l i k e l y to lead the party to vic t o r y i n the next e l e c t i o n . In such campaigns p o l i c y was given rather short s h r i f t . Candidates rarely pointed out areas of disagreement and the campaigns were v i r t u a l l y free of po l i c y debate. Media coverage of the conventions usually included a comment on the lack of p o l i c y disagreements. The leadership choices were 'matters of men not measures.' In summary, most conventions took place i n the context of opposition, with parties seeking a leader to win back power. Campaigns were t r a d i t i o n a l but competition was f i e r c e . The twenty-f i v e candidates were a l l men, mainly Anglo Saxon, well educated with occupations as teachers, lawyers or businessmen. 1 In short the kind of competition one would expect to f i n d i n the Maritimes. Although these s i m i l a r i t i e s i n context and competition provide insight into the nature of parties and p o l i t i c s i n the 1 Ghiz was of Lebanese extraction while Frenette and Doucet were Acadians. The candidates were r e l a t i v e l y young, only one was over 55 and more than half were under 40. Sixteen were Catholics and 18 had l e g i s l a t i v e experience. In terms of occupation, nine were lawyers, three were teachers, there was a farmer, a clergyman, a pharmacist, a history professor while the remainder were small businessmen. 240 region, i t i s the d i v i s i o n s which emerged during voting that o f f e r the most s t r i k i n g evidence of what Maritime p o l i t i c s i s about. B r i e f l y , the major d i v i s i o n s were those based on geography and those based on r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y . Both d i v i s i o n s suggest a p o l i t i c s that remains predominantly t r a d i t i o n a l . Throughout the chapters on each province the geographic basis of support was referre d to as 'friends and neighbours.' However, i t seems possible to integrate the ethno- r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i n the same framework. Geographic d i v i s i o n s can be captured adequately by the word neighbours while ethno r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s can be considered as 'friendship' support. Such a d i s t i n c t i o n does l i t t l e damage to the phrase as intended by Key. For Key, i n the predominantly Protestant American south such d i s t i n c t i o n s were of l i t t l e relevance: supporters who were neighbours were, i n the sense intended here, by d e f i n i t i o n also friends. As he pointed out, t h i s kind of support was most notable i n an area with a homogeneous population. The evidence from Maritime conventions suggests that i t e x i s t s i n 'non-homogeneous' areas as well but that support i s strongest when one i s both a f r i e n d and a neighbour. At Maritime conventions candidate support should be understood i n a 'friends and neighbours' framework. That i s , candidates draw t h e i r support disproportionately from delegates who are t h e i r 'friends' i n an ethnic or r e l i g i o u s sense of shared a s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or 'neighbours' i n the sense of coming from the same geographic area. Even Key abandoned the s t r i c t geographic aspect of friends and neighbours to include past or 241 f a m i l i a l t i e s and Sacks has used i t i n the r e l i g i o u s sense of Protestant support for Protestant candidates i n Donegal county Ireland (1976: 157). In t h i s chapter then, ' f r i e n d ' w i l l indicate shared r e l i g i o u s or ethnic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s while 'neighbour' w i l l connote geographic t i e s . The nature of friends and neighbours support at the various conventions w i l l be summarized with attention also paid to other s i g n i f i c a n t voting d i v i s i o n s . A l l evidence supports the basic contention that d i v i s i o n s at Maritime conventions point out the continued relevance of a t r a d i t i o n a l s t y l e of p o l i t i c s throughout the region. Friends The discussion begins by examining the tendency of conventions to be marked by 'friends' support. A fri e n d , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i s one who shares an a s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y . Given the history of Maritime p o l i t i c s , and the attempts to alternate leadership between Protestants and Catholics (N.S. Liberals) (Adamson, 1982: 5) or ethnic groups (N.B. Liberals) (Aunger, 1981: 157) i t should not be s u r p r i s i n g that such support can be i d e n t i f i e d . However, indications that Maritime p o l i t i c s i s modernizing and r e l i g i o n d e c l i n i n g (see Adamson, 1987: 222 and 1982: 5) make the findings somewhat puzzling. In seven of the nine conventions, s i g n i f i c a n t voting d i v i s i o n s on the basis of r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y could be discerned. Indeed, the associations between these variables and voting were 242 stronger than those found with other socio-economic groups. The conventions at which such d i v i s i o n s could not be found may be the exceptions that prove the rule. Island L i b e r a l conventions were not marked by these d i v i s i o n s . In 1978 two Catholics, Bennett Campbell and Gerard M i t c h e l l , faced each other while i n 1981 two Protestants, Joe Ghiz and G i l b e r t Clements were the only contestants. A l l four candidates attracted v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l l e v e l s of support from both r e l i g i o u s groups. These were the only conventions at which candidates from across the r e l i g i o u s or ethnic divide did not confront each other. American j o u r n a l i s t Theodore White i n The Making of the President 1960 offers one of the better explanations of why r e l i g i o u s voting only emerges when candidates of d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n s confront each other. As he put i t : Catholics, by and large, as well as every group i n the country, Jewish or Protestant, would have a natural g r a v i t a t i o n to a candidate of t h e i r own f a i t h . Between two Protestants, Catholics would vote i m p a r t i a l l y by personality, economic interest, a s p i r a t i o n or t r a d i t i o n , but i f the choice lay between Protestant and Catholic candidates, the kinship issue would c e r t a i n l y be raised and thus cut both ways (1962: 240). That i s to say, while there may be no p o l i c y reasons for p r e f e r r i n g a candidate of one's own f a i t h , the t i e s of kinship lead one to support such a candidate. This i s the kind of t i e which can be captured as 'friends.' At the Island Conservative gatherings a Protestant and one or more Catholics were on the b a l l o t . In 1976, when Catholic Jim Lee faced Protestant Angus MacLean, MacLean won a comfortable majority. However, while MacLean took two-thirds of the Protestant vote, 57% 243 of the C a t h o l i c s supported Lee. S i m i l a r l y , i n 1981, Lee won 50% of the C a t h o l i c f i r s t b a l l o t vote and 76% on the t h i r d . His c o r r e s p o n d i n g share of the P r o t e s t a n t vote was 38% and 51%. More p o i g n a n t l y , h i s main competitor and the o n l y P r o t e s t a n t candidate, B a r r y C l a r k , r e c e i v e d j u s t 14% of the i n i t i a l C a t h o l i c v o t e . T h i s p l a c e d him dead l a s t i n C a t h o l i c support while he had almost as much P r o t e s t a n t support as Lee. On the f i n a l b a l l o t h i s support from P r o t e s t a n t s was 25 p o i n t s h i g h e r than h i s C a t h o l i c share. Indeed, i t appears t h a t the r e l i g i o u s cleavage at these conventions would have been even s t r o n g e r , but f o r the behaviour of the e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s . In 1976, MacLean a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d a m a j o r i t y of the votes c a s t by C a t h o l i c e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s while h i s share o f the r e g u l a r C a t h o l i c vote reached o n l y 36%. F u r t h e r , i n 1981, C l a r k ' s f a i l u r e t o win a m a j o r i t y of the P r o t e s t a n t vote owed l a r g e l y t o the v o t i n g of P r o t e s t a n t e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s 59% of whom supported Lee. C l a r k won a s l i m 51% m a j o r i t y of the r e g u l a r P r o t e s t a n t vote. T h i s k i n d of support from f r i e n d s was by no means l i m i t e d t o PEI. In Nova S c o t i a , r e l i g i o n was s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g on every b a l l o t at each convention. In 1971, C a t h o l i c Gerry Doucet, won a f i r s t b a l l o t m a j o r i t y of the C a t h o l i c vote (57%) and r a i s e d h i s t o t a l t o t w o - t h i r d s on the f i n a l b a l l o t . Among P r o t e s t a n t s , John Buchanan i n i t i a l l y won p l u r a l i t y support and i n c r e a s e d h i s margin to 58% on the second. Since almost t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the C o n s e r v a t i v e d e l e g a t e s were P r o t e s t a n t , Buchanan's v i c t o r y was assured. 244 T h i s tendency c r o s s e d p a r t y l i n e s and a t t r a c t i n g C a t h o l i c support at L i b e r a l conventions o f f e r e d a b e t t e r chance of s u c c e s s . In keeping w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n of C a t h o l i c s with t h a t p a r t y , 45% of the d e l e g a t e s at both conventions were C a t h o l i c . In 1980, P r o t e s t a n t Sandy Cameron was opposed by t h r e e C a t h o l i c s . On the f i r s t b a l l o t Cameron won 50% of the P r o t e s t a n t vote but was o u t p o l l e d by 15 p o i n t s among C a t h o l i c s by V i n c e MacLean. On the f i n a l b a l l o t , Cameron's share of the P r o t e s t a n t vote was 71% while he s p l i t the C a t h o l i c vote almost evenly w i t h MacLean. T h i s even s p l i t owed l a r g e l y t o the same k i n d of e x - o f f i c i o b ehaviour observed on PEI. Cameron won 62% of the e x - o f f i c i o C a t h o l i c vote but was o u t p o l l e d by MacLean among r e g u l a r C a t h o l i c s . But f o r Cameron's support from e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s , the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n would have loomed even l a r g e r . Again i n 1986, a r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n c o u l d be observed although not as s t a r k as at the other conventions. V i n c e MacLean, running f o r the second time, c a r r i e d a m a j o r i t y from both r e l i g i o u s groups. Yet while he won 74% of the C a t h o l i c vote, h i s share of the P r o t e s t a n t vote was only 55%. In 1986, as i n 1971, e x - o f f i c i o d e l e g a t e s voted as r e l i g i o u s l y as t h e i r more d e m o c r a t i c a l l y s e l e c t e d b r e t h r e n . In 1985 i n New Brunswick the l e a d e r s h i p was c o n t e s t e d by two C a t h o l i c s and no r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n was expected or found. However, i n 1982, a P r o t e s t a n t f a c e d t h r e e C a t h o l i c c a n d i d a t e s and somewhat s u r p r i s i n g l y no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s were apparent. I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t P r o t e s t a n t s at New Brunswick L i b e r a l conventions 245 were very much a minority. Like the Catholics at the Nova Scotian P.C. convention, Protestants were badly underrepresented lending credence to the conventional p o r t r a i t of the L i b e r a l party of New Brunswick as a Catholic party. While r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s were unimportant, ethnic d i v i s i o n s i n t h i s b i l i n g u a l province were s i g n i f i c a n t . In 1985, while Frank McKenna was crushing Ray Frenette, an Acadian, by a margin of 87% to 13% among B r i t i s h delegates, Acadians delivered a t h i r d of t h e i r votes to Frenette. This accounted for over h a l f of Frenette's t o t a l support. In 1982, Frenette was also a candidate and again the only Acadian candidate. However, support from his own ethnic group was scarcely notable. Indeed, e t h n i c i t y was s i g n i f i c a n t only because Acadians offered disproportionate support to Doug Young. Young won 72% of the Acadian vote but took only 47% of the B r i t i s h vote. His most serious opponent, Joe Day, took only 13% of the Acadian vote and f u l l y 84% of his support came from B r i t i s h delegates. S t i l l , the Acadian support for Young i n 1982 can be viewed as support from friends. The difference i n context between the two conventions helps make t h i s clearer. In 1982, by the t r a d i t i o n s of the L i b e r a l party i t was the turn of an Anglophone to lead the party. Frenette, i n a post-convention interview, claimed that he had found and respected t h i s t r a d i t i o n (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, March 1 1982: 3). In that convention, i t appears that Acadians plumped for the b i l i n g u a l Catholic from the North rather than an Acadian—who might endanger the alternation t r a d i t i o n — a u n i l i n g u a l 246 Northerner or a Protestant from Saint John. 2 Unfortunately for Frenette i n 1985 when i t was an Acadian's turn, the p o l i t i c a l circumstances were not propitious. Frenette attempted to mobilize support by claiming that the party should drop the idea that i n the climate of language disputes a Francophone could not win the e l e c t i o n (Fredericton Daily Gleaner, May 6 1985: 2). His c a l l resulted i n disproportionate, a l b e i t minority, support from his fellow Acadians. Indeed, his support from Acadians who were regular delegates was even higher. E x - o f f i c i o Francophone delegates, perhaps more cognizant of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s , were not at a l l supportive. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of e t h n i c i t y and the corresponding non-significance of r e l i g i o n points to a key element of the New Brunswick L i b e r a l s : the I r i s h Catholics. At both conventions, those of B r i t i s h o r i g i n could be divided almost evenly into Protestants and I r i s h Catholics. The B r i t i s h Protestants voted s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from French Catholics; but so d i d I r i s h Catholics. In essence the I r i s h Catholics appear to behave more B r i t i s h than Catholic. This may point to the replacement of r e l i g i o u s p o l i t i c s by l i n g u i s t i c p o l i t i c s something hinted at by Forbes when, i n his analysis of the Maritime Rights movement of the 1920s, he wrote "For the English speaking Catholic population of New Brunswick 2 New Brunswick j o u r n a l i s t and h i s t o r i a n Richard Wilbur, writing on the 1985 L i b e r a l convention claimed that the "two previous leaders ... had been Acadians" (1988: 330). While i t i s d i f f i c u l t to think of Doug Young as an Acadian, the reference does lend further support to the argument that Acadian support for Young in 1982 should be understood i n terms of 'friendship'. 247 which was la r g e l y of I r i s h o r i g i n , the gulf of language which separated them from the Acadians was only s l i g h t l y more d i f f i c u l t to bridge than the gulf of r e l i g i o n which separated them from t h e i r Protestant neighbours" (1979: 10). In the 1980s i t appears as i f the language, or at least the ethnic gulf has widened with the e f f e c t of rendering the r e l i g i o u s divide quite bridgeable; at least within the L i b e r a l party. However, i t would s t i l l be rather s u r p r i s i n g to see many I r i s h Catholic New Brunswickers f l o c k i n g to the p r o v i n c i a l Conservatives. 3 The s t r i k i n g and consistent f r i e n d support stands i n contrast to arguments that p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes i s changing or modernizing. Such patterns of support would be well understood by 19th century Maritime p o l i t i c i a n s . Yet i t i s possible that t h i s support may be an a r t i f a c t of the voting of p a r t i c u l a r groups: the persistence of support for r e l i g i o u s or ethnic friends may owe to the votes of delegate groups least susceptible to change or modernization. The d i f f e r e n t voting of e x - o f f i c i o delegates offers some evidence for t h i s argument. To te s t t h i s argument, attempts were made to discover whether delegates who were young (under 30) or un i v e r s i t y educated also supported friends. An examination of the Island conventions 3 It i s not d i f f i c u l t to imagine a scenario i n which r e l i g i o u s differences were important at a L i b e r a l leadership convention i n New Brunswick. If, for instance, the only two contestants at a future convention were a Protestant and an I r i s h Catholic one would not be surprised to see enormous support for the I r i s h Catholic candidate from Acadians. In essence, i f the ethnic cleavage were held constant, r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s would probably again become s a l i e n t . 248 suggests t h a t they d i d . In 1976, Lee never f a i l e d t o win at l e a s t h a l f the C a t h o l i c vote, even i f the d e l e g a t e s were young or had u n i v e r s i t y degrees. Conversely, MacLean won m a j o r i t i e s from P r o t e s t a n t s with those a t t r i b u t e s . Moreover, w h i l e Lee won an o v e r a l l m a j o r i t y of the youth vote s u g g e s t i n g a p o s s i b l e age cleavage, h i s support came from winning 70% of the C a t h o l i c vote and j u s t 46% from young P r o t e s t a n t s . S i m i l a r r e s u l t s were found i n 1981. While Lee won m a j o r i t i e s from d e l e g a t e s under 30 and those w i t h degrees, C l a r k took a m a j o r i t y of votes c a s t by P r o t e s t a n t s under 30 and h i s share of the u n i v e r s i t y vote was n i n e p o i n t s h i g h e r with P r o t e s t a n t s . Such c o n t r o l s do not d i m i n i s h the p a t t e r n of support f o r r e l i g i o u s f r i e n d s i n Nova S c o t i a e i t h e r . In 1971, age and e d u c a t i o n were a s s o c i a t e d with v o t i n g i n t h e i r own r i g h t w i t h those i n the c o n t r o l groups o f f e r i n g m a j o r i t y support t o Doucet. However, on l y among the young d e l e g a t e s was Doucet a b l e t o win a P r o t e s t a n t m a j o r i t y . U n i v e r s i t y educated P r o t e s t a n t s g e n e r a l l y supported Buchanan; C a t h o l i c s d i d not. Support from f r i e n d s remained s t r o n g i n 1980. Cameron i n v a r i a b l y won m a j o r i t i e s from P r o t e s t a n t d e l e g a t e s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r age or e d u c a t i o n . On the f i r s t two b a l l o t s MacLean ran ahead of him among C a t h o l i c s and won d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support on the t h i r d . MacLean's candidacy was i n v a r i a b l y s t r o n g e r among C a t h o l i c s . While the r e l i g i o u s t r e n d was not as s t r i k i n g i n 1986 i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e was widespread. Cowan took 46% of the votes from P r o t e s t a n t s with u n i v e r s i t y degrees while h i s co r r e s p o n d i n g share of the C a t h o l i c vote was j u s t 32%. Moreover, 249 while there was a s i g n i f i c a n t age cleavage with Cowan getting almost h a l f the youth vote, the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n mitigates such support. Cowan won 57% of the Protestant youth vote but MacLean took two-thirds of the Catholic vote. It i s clear that the pattern of support for r e l i g i o u s friends was a v i r t u a l l y universal phenomenon. The control groups i n which i t was absent suggest a possible explanation along the l i n e s of the e x - o f f i c i o d i v i s i o n . In 1980 and 1981, the u n i v e r s i t y educated delegates whether Protestant (81) ' or Catholic (80) provided majority support to a r e l i g i o u s non-friend. It may be that t h i s owes to the voting of e x - o f f i c i o delegates who were i n fact more l i k e l y to hold degrees. In New Brunswick, the support from friends was ethnic rather than r e l i g i o u s but the tendency was also widespread. In both 1982 and 1985 the ethnic d i v i s i o n was s i g n i f i c a n t f or the younger delegates. In 1985, Frenette won 40% of the Acadian youth vote but only 10% of the B r i t i s h vote. Si m i l a r l y , i n 1982, young B r i t i s h delegates preferred Day while over hal f of the young Acadians supported Young. Ethnic friendship was by no means absent among the young. In 1985 i t was also evident among u n i v e r s i t y educated delegates. The ethnic cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t for these delegates and indeed the l e v e l of Acadian support for Frenette increased with education. In 1982 the cleavage was again s i g n i f i c a n t for uni v e r s i t y educated delegates. The uni v e r s i t y educated delegates provide a compelling i l l u s t r a t i o n of the strength of the ethnic 250 divide. Education was i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting with Young doing worst among those with degrees. Yet Young won at least t h r e e - f i f t h s of the Acadian vote, l e v e l of education notwithstanding. In contrast, his support from B r i t i s h delegates who had at least f i n i s h e d high school never reached the majority l e v e l . As well, Young was more popular with men than women. He won 61% of the male vote and just 4 6% from women. However, among Acadian women he was able to win a majority. Once more support from friends i s ubiquitous. Confounding expectations, i t was actu a l l y stronger among the young and more highly educated delegates. Not a single instance can be found i n which Young or Frenette (85) attracted more support from B r i t i s h delegates than they did from Acadians. The same was true of r e l i g i o u s support i n the other provinces. Protestant support for Clark i n 1981 always exceeded his support from Catholics while the reverse was true for Lee i n 197 6 and 1981. In Nova Scotia, Doucet and MacLean (twice) always won higher l e v e l s of support from Catholics. Buchanan, Cameron and Cowan consistently received more support from t h e i r fellow Protestants. Support for r e l i g i o u s or ethnic friends was widespread. It did not owe to the voting of the more t r a d i t i o n a l elements of the pa r t i e s . The decline of r e l i g i o n may have been somewhat exaggerated! Neighbours The associations between r e l i g i o n / e t h n i c i t y and voting were exceeded i n strength only by the p u l l of geography. Conventional 251 wisdom divides New Brunswick north and south and Nova Scotia Cape Breton and Mainland. Although these d i v i s i o n s were important the p u l l of geography at conventions went far beyond those narrow parameters. The geographic d i v i s i o n s r e f l e c t e d the strong bases held by candidates i n t h e i r home areas, from t h e i r neighbours. In most of the conventions the defeats candidates suffered disguised t h e i r popularity with t h e i r neighbours. In the nine conventions, 16 candidates vainly contested the leadership, yet for 15 of these candidates, convention defeat masked the neighbourhood e f f e c t . 4 Further, for 11 of these candidates, support from t h e i r neighbours was not only r e l a t i v e l y strong, but constituted actual p l u r a l i t i e s . Few of them won p l u r a l i t i e s i n other areas. The neighbourhood e f f e c t was by no means l i m i t e d to losing candidates. Seven of the nine convention winners c l e a r l y benefitted from support from neighbours. Only two winning candidates could not be said to have support from neighbours and even that i s overstated. Both ultimately won majority support from t h e i r neighbours, i t was just that they received higher l e v e l s of support elsewhere. These two candidates, Buchanan i n 1971 and McKenna i n 1985, were both hard to place i n terms of home region. Both had a rather equivocal neighbourhood appeal. Both l i v e d i n a region i n which they were not born, displaying a s o c i a l mobility l i k e l y to be regarded with some suspicion i n the Maritimes. McKenna was born i n 4 The exception was Barry Clark at the 1981 Island Tory convention. 252 r u r a l s o u t h e r n New B r u n s w i c k b u t d e c i d e d t o make h i s home and p r a c t i s e law i n t h e N o r t h S h o r e town o f Chatham. W h i l e he won 77% o f t h e v o t e f r o m N o r t h u m b e r l a n d a r e a d e l e g a t e s t h i s was n o t h i g h enough t o be r e m a r k a b l e . H i s o v e r a l l l e v e l o f s u p p o r t was t o o h i g h . S t i l l , t h e 77% o f t h e v o t e he won f r o m t h e N o r t h S h o r e e x c e e d s most o f t h e home c o u n t y v o t e t o t a l s f o u n d by Key i n h i s i n i t i a l d i s c o v e r y o f f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s s u p p o r t i n A l a b a m a (1949: 3 8 ) . Buch a n a n a l s o a b a n d o n e d h i s r e g i o n o f b i r t h . B u c h a n a n was b o r n i n Cape B r e t o n b u t went t o D a l h o u s i e Law S c h o o l , p r a c t i s e d law i n H a l i f a x and r e p r e s e n t e d a H a l i f a x r i d i n g i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . O t h e r c a n d i d a t e s p o s s e s s e d s t r o n g e r t i e s t o e a c h r e g i o n . D o u c e t was b o r n a n d s t i l l m a i n t a i n e d a permanent home i n Cape B r e t o n . Cape B r e t o n e r s r e w a r d e d h i m w i t h m a s s i v e m a j o r i t i e s . T h o r n h i l l l i v e d i n D a r t m o u t h and was mayor o f t h a t c i t y . H i s n e i g h b o u r s gave h i m 84% o f t h e i r v o t e s w h i c h e n a b l e d h i m t o win a r e g i o n a l p l u r a l i t y i n m e t r o H a l i f a x . When t h e n o t i o n o f n e i g h b o u r s was b r o a d e n e d t o i n c l u d e f a m i l i a l t i e s 5 t h e n i t was p o s s i b l e t o d e t e c t some s u c h s u p p o r t f o r B u c h a n a n . He r e c e i v e d s t r o n g s u p p o r t f r o m d e l e g a t e s i n t h e A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y and S o u t h S h o r e — r e g i o n s w h i c h meet a t D i g b y . As n o t e d e a r l i e r , Buchanan, as a s t u d e n t , h a d worked summers i n D i g b y , h i s w i f e was f r o m t h e D i g b y a r e a and h i s e l d e s t s o n was b o r n t h e r e . C e r t a i n l y h i s t i e s t o t h a t p a r t o f t h e p r o v i n c e g r e a t l y e x c e e d e d t h o s e o f t h e o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s . 5 The d i s c u s s i o n o f Buchanan's s u p p o r t f r o m t h e A n n a p o l i s V a l l e y i n c h a p t e r 5 moved a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s . F o r a s i m i l a r t r e a t m e n t o f f r i e n d s and n e i g h b o u r s s e e P a r k e r , 1982: 259. 253 The p a t t e r n o f neighbourhood support then was q u i t e widespread. In Nova S c o t i a every candidate (with the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of Buchanan) r e c e i v e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from h i s neighbours. Cape Bretoners were p a r t i c u l a r l y l o y a l . Cape Breton c a n d i d a t e s Doucet and MacLean always won a com f o r t a b l e m a j o r i t y of the Cape Breton vote. Indeed, i n 1986 MacLean c a r r i e d a phenomenonal 96% of the r e g i o n a l vote. As w e l l , Cameron won h i s l a r g e s t support from h i s neighbours i n the E a s t e r n Mainland and Mooney won h i s only m a j o r i t y from h i s home r e g i o n of the South Shore. T h i s tendency was not l i m i t e d t o r u r a l Nova S c o t i a . In 1971, T h o r n h i l l won h i s only p l u r a l i t y i n metro H a l i f a x and won 84% of the Dartmouth vote. S i m i l a r l y , i n 1980 Maclnnis won h i s l a r g e s t vote share i n metro H a l i f a x and i n 1986 Cowan was ab l e t o win over h a l f of the votes c a s t by d e l e g a t e s from the c i t y of H a l i f a x . I s l a n d c a n didates a l s o r e c e i v e d s t r o n g support from neighbours. MacLean, i n 1976, had h i s h i g h e s t support from d e l e g a t e s who were a l s o from r u r a l Queens county. Lee, from suburban Charlottetown, won h i s only m a j o r i t y from those d e l e g a t e s . Even the massive v i c t o r i e s of Campbell i n 1978 and Ghiz i n 1981 masked m a j o r i t y support f o r M i t c h e l l from h i s f e l l o w C h a r l o t t e t o w n e r s and f o r Clements i n Kings county. F i n a l l y , at the 1981 C o n s e r v a t i v e convention, l a s t p l a c e Binns won a p l u r a l i t y from h i s f e l l o w Kings county d e l e g a t e s , D r i s c o l l made h i s onl y s t r o n g showing i n Queens county and Lee again won d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e support from h i s neighbours. Only C l a r k d i d not r e c e i v e support 254 from his neighbours. This may have been due to the presence of three candidates from Queens county on the b a l l o t . With Lee leading the way and D r i s c o l l ' s only bloc of support i n that county, l i t t l e was l e f t for Clark. Only McKenna did not receive disproportionate support from neighbours i n New Brunswick. Frenette's massive defeat i n 1985 saw him receive over 35% of the vote only from his fellow Moncton delegates who gave him 39%. In 1982, when Frenette did even worse, he won 44% of the Moncton vote for a comfortable p l u r a l i t y . Maher's best showing (15%) also came from his home region while Day's only majority came from the Saint John area where he was born, raised and resided. Obviously, with support for Frenette i n Moncton and Day i n Saint John, the neighbourhood e f f e c t was not merely a r u r a l phenomenon. The ubiquitous nature of the neighbourhood e f f e c t can be seen by introducing the controls used to assess the extent of support for friends. For Key such l o c a l i s t i c support c a r r i e d some rather pejorative connotations, suggestions that t h i s kind of support represents i r r e l e v a n t i f not i r r a t i o n a l considerations (1949: 41,42,110). One might hypothesize then, that t h i s kind of support was at t r i b u t a b l e to the voting of older or lower status delegates. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s hypothesis must be rejected. At each Nova Scotian convention, the neighbourhood e f f e c t remained noteworthy even for delegates who held u n i v e r s i t y degrees. The regional voting patterns were s i g n i f i c a n t at a l l conventions regardless of the education of the delegates. Moreover, the trend was r e l a t i v e l y 255 consistent among the young as well. In both 1980 and 1986, region was s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting for a l l age groups. Only in 1971 were the youth w i l l i n g to support an extra regional candidate—Doucet—when a l o c a l man was on the b a l l o t . This consistency was also found on PEI. For example, support for M i t c h e l l i n 1978 i n the Charlottetown area was a c t u a l l y higher among un i v e r s i t y educated delegates. Indeed, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of education i t s e l f owed largely to Mitchell's Charlottetown support. 6 Only Clements i n 1981 f a i l e d to achieve neighbourly support from the young or u n i v e r s i t y educated. Even Kings delegates with these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s supported Ghiz. (Their number was extremely small.) F i n a l l y , i n New Brunswick i n 1982 the neighbourhood e f f e c t was omnipresent. Region was s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting regardless of the age, education or class status of the delegates! The one candidate who did not a t t r a c t cross spectrum support from his neighbours, Maher, had his support from the higher status delegates. As was the case with support from friends, Young's weakness with female or unive r s i t y educated delegates d i d not a f f e c t his l o c a l support. Frenette's 1985 Moncton support included majority support from delegates under 30 and he s p l i t the l o c a l u n i v e r s i t y educated vote with McKenna. The neighbourhood e f f e c t at Maritime conventions was strong and transcended support from p a r t i c u l a r groups. Generally, i t was 6 In 1978 education was s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting, as was class. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of these variables appears to be due to the high l e v e l of support provided M i t c h e l l by upper middle class and u n i v e r s i t y educated Charlottetowners. 256 as strong among higher status or young delegates as i t was o v e r a l l . Only one candidate, Clark, could have asked i n f r u s t r a t i o n 'who i s my neighbour?' The other candidates could be quite confident that t h e i r neighbours were t h e i r strongest supporters. Maritime p o l i t i c i a n s are not without honour i n t h e i r home towns. Friends or Neighbours The picture of Maritime conventions thus f a r portrays two kinds of support: delegates tended to support candidates who were t h e i r friends or neighbours. It i s not immediately cl e a r how these two patterns of support i n t e r a c t . Does a delegate support a candidate who i s a f r i e n d but not a neighbour or a neighbour who i s not a friend? In spite of p r o v i n c i a l trends leading Protestants to support Protestants and Catholics, Catholics; the neighbourhood e f f e c t remains strong i n Nova Scotia. In 1971, the Catholic t a i n t to support for Doucet did not prevent Cape Breton Protestants from voting for him. On the f i r s t b a l l o t Doucet won 48% of the Cape Breton Protestant vote, 15 points higher than his share of the Protestant vote p r o v i n c i a l l y . On the second b a l l o t he won a comfortable majority from his Protestant neighbours. S i m i l a r l y , i n 1980, 63% of the Cape Breton Protestants voted for MacLean compared to only 20% o v e r a l l . In 1986, MacLean won a phenomenal 90% of that vote, well above his p r o v i n c i a l share of 55%. This trend was not l i m i t e d to Cape Breton. In 1971, both Th o r n h i l l and Buchanan exceeded t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l share of the Catholic vote i n the metro Halifax region. T h o r n h i l l , actually 257 outpolled Doucet with Catholics from Dartmouth.(In keeping with the f a m i l i a l aspects of friends and neighbours support, Buchanan won more Catholic votes than Doucet i n the Annapolis Valley.) In 1980, Cameron won a p l u r a l i t y of 47% from Eastern Mainland Catholics i n spite of his o v e r a l l weakness i n a t t r a c t i n g Catholic support. Mooney, who attracted only 17% of the p r o v i n c i a l Protestant vote, nonetheless won an outright majority i n the South Shore. Even Maclnnis doubled his average Protestant vote i n metro Halifax. F i n a l l y , Cowan won 44% of the Catholic vote i n the c i t y of Halifax, 18 points higher than his p r o v i n c i a l share. The strength of Cowan's candidacy among Protestants i n general was somewhat masked by the staunch support of Cape Breton Protestants for MacLean. Cowan act u a l l y won 4 9.9% of the mainland Protestant vote. In Nova Scotia there was strong support for candidates who were neighbours regardless of whether these neighbours were friends. Nonetheless, Nova Scotian delegates supported most strongly a candidate who was both a f r i e n d and a neighbour. This tendency was only s l i g h t l y less notable on PEI. In 1981, Binns p l u r a l i t y i n Kings came from winning 4 6% of the Catholic and 32% of the Protestant vote; a share of the Protestant vote he could not equal elsewhere. The voting i n Queens county, home to the other three candidates, revealed a d i s t i n c t r e l i g i o u s s p l i t . Clark, the only candidate not to receive neighbourly support, was unable to a t t r a c t Catholic support with Lee taking 56% and D r i s c o l l 36%. However, Clark outpolled both among Protestant delegates i n the region. Clark's only p l u r a l i t y came from friends who were also 258 neighbours but Lee s t i l l won more support from Charlottetown area Protestants. In 1976, MacLean's only Catholic m a j o r i t y — a s i d e from the e x - o f f i c i o delegates—came from his neighbours while Lee again won a majority from Charlottetown area Protestants. As i n Nova Scotia, the neighbourhood e f f e c t remained strong and, with one exception, enabled delegates to win disproportionate support from non-friends. Delegates support most strongly a candidate who i s a f r i e n d and a neighbour. The i n t e r a c t i o n of the neighbour and f r i e n d e f f e c t s i n New Brunswick provides some i n t e r e s t i n g insight into those conventions. In 1982, the regional cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t for both ethnic groups but the ethnic d i v i s i o n was somewhat weakened by the neighbourhood effect.The gap narrowed when north and south were considered separately. Further, Acadians i n Moncton and Saint John were more supportive of Frenette and Day than they were of Young. His ethnic boost was not enough to overwhelm the neighbourhood e f f e c t for the other two candidates. Indeed, among French delegates i n the two c i t i e s , Frenette won a p l u r a l i t y of 44% i n what appears to be a combination of ethnic l o y a l t y and the t r a d i t i o n a l friends and neighbours e f f e c t . In 1985, the tendency of increased support for Frenette i n Moncton d i d not cross ethnic l i n e s . S t r i k i n g l y , a l l the delegates of French descent i n Moncton supported Frenette compared to 25% o v e r a l l and just 21% of B r i t i s h Monctonians. Frenette's neighbourhood support i n Moncton, then, came la r g e l y from his Acadian friends. The r e s u l t s from New Brunswick again indicate that support i s strongest from delegates who are both friends and neighbours. In 1982 Acadian 'friendship' for Young could not penetrate Frenette's Moncton stronghold. There Frenette's neighbours who were also his friends delivered a substantial p l u r a l i t y of t h e i r votes to him. Frenette was less successful i n a t t r a c t i n g B r i t i s h support, a weakness exacerbated i n 1985 when his neighbourhood e f f e c t owed completely to his Acadian support. For Day, the question of friends or neighbours was i r r e l e v a n t . Delegates from the Saint John area were both. F i n a l l y , Maher's neighbourly support i n the North West must be considered. Despite his i n a b i l i t y to speak French Maher managed to at t r a c t 12% of the Acadian vote by f a r his highest share. S i m i l a r l y , Young's support from B r i t i s h delegates i n his home region was a strong 74%, a share exceeded only i n the North West where support for Day and Frenette was nonexistent. 260 Table 7-1 Index of Friends and Neighbours Support Overall Friends Neighbours Neighbours non frnds Friends Neighbrs Lee 43% + 14 + 14 +28 +24 MacLean 57% + 10 + 10 + 1 + 13 Binns 14% + 1 +26 + 18 + 32 Clark 36% + 13 -20 -16 -14 D r i s c o l l 17% + 4 + 16 + 4 + 36 Lee 64% + 12 + 8 -1 + 36 Buchanan 51% + 7 + 11 + 13 + 11 Doucet 49% + 8 +32 + 18 +41 Thornhill 27% +3 +54 +48 + 63 Cameron 62% + 9 + 18 -4 +27 Maclnnis 14% 0 + 10 + 12 + 10 MacLean 38% + 12 +37 +22 + 44 Mooney 18% + 1 +36 +35 +54 Cowan 38% +7 + 14 + 6 +25 MacLean 62% + 12 +34 +28 + 36 Day 27% + 9 +28 NA +28 Frenette 11% -1 + 33 + 19 + 42 Maher 5% 0 + 10 + 7 + 15 Young 56% + 16 +23 + 18 +27 Frenette 21% + 9 + 18 -6 +79 McKenna 79% + 8 -2 -5 + 13 Campbell 71% — + 13 NA NA Mi t c h e l l 29% — +23 NA NA Clements 32% — +23 NA NA Ghiz 68% — + 13 NA NA The boost i s calculated by subtracting ii candidate's o v e r a l l percentage from the percentage won by the group named. A po s i t i v e number indicates the candidate did better with his friends, neighbours etc. 261 E l i t e s at Maritime Conventions At a number of points i n the analysis i t has been cle a r that the behaviour of e x - o f f i c i o delegates has had an impact on the way conventions are understood. While there i s often an i n t e r e s t i n g e f f e c t caused by these delegates i t must be stressed that s i g n i f i c a n t voting d i v i s i o n s on t h i s dimension were only found at three conventions and never was there an occasion when the bloc voting of e x - o f f i c i o delegates overwhelmed the preferences of the constituency or regular delegates. Brown et a l . maintain that Claude Wagner went into the 197 0 Quebec L i b e r a l convention "with a clear majority of the delegates elected by the r i d i n g associations" but was denied v i c t o r y by the voting of e x - o f f i c i o delegates (1976: 80). Nothing of that sort happened at any of these conventions. Nonetheless, at each of the nine conventions the winner attracted a higher proportion of the vote from the brass. Moreover, even when delegate type was not i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated with voting i t s impact was far from marginal. The delegate type cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t at both of the Island L i b e r a l conventions. In 1978, M i t c h e l l won 38% of the rank and f i l e vote but was supported by just 12% of the e x - o f f i c i o delegates. In 1981, Clements also won 38% of the constituency vote while carrying only 21% of the e x - o f f i c i o vote. At both conventions, then, the e x - o f f i c i o delegates served to broaden the v i c t o r y margins of the leading candidates. The e x - o f f i c i o delegates also weakened the strength of the neighbourhood e f f e c t at both conventions. Clements won only a t h i r d of the vote from e x - o f f i c i o 262 delegates who were his neighbours. M i t c h e l l ' s popularity with Charlottetown delegates was l o s t on the e x - o f f i c i o delegates with only 20% of them supporting him. E x - o f f i c i o delegates at these conventions were r e l a t i v e l y immune from the neighbourhood e f f e c t . The only other convention at which the delegate type cleavage was s i g n i f i c a n t was the 1980 Nova Scotia L i b e r a l gathering. On the two f i n a l b a l l o t s of that convention Cameron won huge majorities from e x - o f f i c i o delegates while other candidates drew more support from the rank and f i l e . Indeed, as was shown e a r l i e r , t h i s e x - o f f i c i o support worked to mitigate the strength of the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . Catholic e x - o f f i c i o delegates were not very f r i e n d l y to MacLean providing Cameron with majority support (62%) on the f i n a l b a l l o t . The friendship of e x - o f f i c i o delegates appears tenuous. While no brass v. grass s p l i t was evident at other conventions, e x - o f f i c i o delegates were not without influence. At the Island Conservative conventions the e x - o f f i c i o delegates, as i n Nova Scotia, acted contrary to the r e l i g i o u s pattern. E x - o f f i c i o Catholics i n 1976 supported MacLean while Protestants i n 1981 opted for Lee. The e x - o f f i c i o delegates did not seem to be moved by the kind of friendship support that characterized the behaviour of the other delegates. The brass i n fact served to diminish what remained a strong r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n . The Francophone e x - o f f i c i o delegates in 1985 likewise acted contrary to convention trends. The pattern of higher support for Frenette was absent among these delegates. At the remaining conventions ex- o f f i c i o delegates voted s i m i l a r l y to 263 the rank and f i l e delegates and were as susceptible to the p u l l of friends and neighbours as were the grass. The behaviour of the e x - o f f i c i o delegates at Island conventions suggests s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t motivations than those of the rank and f i l e . The e x - o f f i c i o delegates were free of the influence of friends and neighbours support that so effected the regular delegates. Perhaps these delegates, as party professionals, were acting more i n the long term best i n t e r e s t s of the party than from short term personal l o y a l t i e s . The behaviour of the e x - o f f i c i o delegates i n Nova Scotia i n 1980 and i n New Brunswick i n 1985 i s quite i n t e r e s t i n g . In 1980, by the t r a d i t i o n s of the L i b e r a l party i n Nova Scotia, i t was the turn of a -Protestant to lead the party. E x - o f f i c i o Catholic delegates appeared more cognizant of t h i s than the rank and f i l e and worked to see that the alte r n a t i o n continued. Whether they did t h i s i n the e l e c t o r a l i n t e r e s t s of the party or to preserve future Catholic turns i s not cle a r . In 1985 i n New Brunswick the t r a d i t i o n of ethnic al t e r n a t i o n was dying: an Anglophone was being succeeded by an Anglophone. The selection of an Acadian as leader seemed to be precluded by the harsh l i n g u i s t i c disputes rocking the province at the time. In spite of t h i s a t h i r d of the rank and f i l e Acadians supported Frenette. Very few e x - o f f i c i o Acadians followed t h e i r lead. Perhaps they were more w i l l i n g to see the alt e r n a t i o n ended than to see the party lose another e l e c t i o n . Perhaps they saw Frenette as doomed to defeat and had no wish to go down with him. Perhaps they simply acted to prevent the impression that the 264 B r i t i s h had 'ganged up' on Frenette. Whatever t h e i r motivation i t appears that they acted more i n keeping with 'brokerage' patterns than the other delegates (see Johnston, 1988: 205,206). At most of the conventions the behaviour of the e x - o f f i c i o delegates can be seen i n terms of brokerage p o l i t i c s . The e x - o f f i c i o delegates mitigated p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e s p l i t s between r e l i g i o u s and ethnic groups. In some cases t h e i r votes also mitigated regional d i v i s i o n s . Certainly, t h e i r behaviour never exacerbated such d i v i s i o n s . Such behaviour should not be l o s t on party a c t i v i s t s who wish to eliminate e x - o f f i c i o positions or even conventions themselves. The e x - o f f i c i o delegates probably make a substantial contribution to party unity. A t t i t u d i n a l Divisions? The l i t e r a t u r e on Maritime p o l i t i c s suggests that p o l i c y or opinion differences do not mark i n t e r party p o l i t i c s l e t alone i n t r a party p o l i t i c s . Media coverage of the nine conventions also downplays the role of a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s . The voting of delegates at these conventions lar g e l y supports t h i s argument. While the delegates at many conventions disagreed on a large number of issues there were few voting d i v i s i o n s on the basis of those disagreements. The d i v i s i o n s that did emerge appeared unstructured and i d i o s y n c r a t i c . However, one convention proved an exception to t h i s r u l e . At the 1971 Conservative convention a t t i t u d i n a l d i v i s i o n s appeared to be systematically associated with voting. The majority of delegates who took a hard l i n e on Quebec or French 265 questions supported Buchanan. Those who did not, voted l a r g e l y for Doucet. As well, most delegates who were opposed to any form of Maritime union, f e l t too much was spent on s o c i a l welfare, that government i n t e r f e r e d too much with business, or that employers had the r i g h t to seek s t r i k e injunctions, were for Buchanan. Those who held contrary positions favoured Doucet. It seems clear that t h i s convention, then, was to some degree, riven by a t t i t u d i n a l disagreements and that Buchanan's v i c t o r y was p a r t l y that of conservatives over progressives. Such a fi n d i n g i s su r p r i s i n g . No one has ever suggested that any Maritime convention was marked by i d e o l o g i c a l l y opposed opponents struggling for supremacy and the 1971 campaign c e r t a i n l y gave no such i n d i c a t i o n . It seems more l i k e l y that these opinion d i v i s i o n s represent d i v i s i o n s i n the groups of delegates supporting each candidate. Indeed, further analysis reveals that d i v i s i o n s on these issues were not only strongly associated with voting, but also with age, r e l i g i o n , and residence. Delegates under 30, Catholics and Cape Bretoners were more l i k e l y to take the p o s i t i o n from which Doucet's majority support came. Moreover, when examination i s l i m i t e d to Cape Bretoners or Catholics, one i n v a r i a b l y discovers majority support for Doucet. That i s , regardless of t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the above issues, delegates who were Catholics, Cape Bretoners or both supported Doucet. When examination i s l i m i t e d to Protestant mainlanders over 30, majority support for Buchanan i s almost as widespread.(The majority of delegates from the Annapolis Valley supported Buchanan regardless of t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the 266 issues.) Only on one issue did he f a i l to achieve majority support from both groups and that f a i l u r e was by the slimmest of margins. Whatever a t t i t u d i n a l differences existed, the pattern of friends and neighbours support remained. It seems more l i k e l y that Buchanan won because he was the choice of the older, Protestant, mainlanders who made up the majority of the convention than that his v i c t o r y owed to e x p l i c i t p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s . Rural Dominance? It i s a commonplace observation that i n Nova Scotia the key to winning an e l e c t i o n i s to win i n metro Halifax. A perusal of New Brunswick e l e c t i o n returns makes equally c l e a r the importance of Moncton and Saint John i n deciding elections there. (On PEI Charlottetown i s less i n f l u e n t i a l , i n part because of i t s r e l a t i v e l y small size and i n part because the Island l e g i s l a t u r e i s perhaps the most badly malapportioned i n the country). Parties i n t h e i r campaigns seem to recognize these r e a l i t i e s and concentrate on these areas. Given the importance of these c i t i e s i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s generally, i t comes as something of a surprise to see the l i m i t e d impact they have on conventions. An examination of the 1971 convention shows that while Doucet c a r r i e d the c i t y of Halifax and T h o r n h i l l won the metro region, Buchanan won the convention. Buchanan's support was strongest i n the most r u r a l parts of the province—communities under 1000. The 1980 convention was s i m i l a r i n that Cameron's biggest margin came from the smaller communities. 267 This trend was accentuated i n 1986 when Cowan c a r r i e d the c i t y of Halifax but l o s t the convention by a huge margin. The influence of Moncton and Saint John at New Brunswick conventions i s likewise l i m i t e d . This was p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g i n 1982 when Young won p l u r a l i t i e s everywhere but those c i t i e s . Frenette and Day both attracted more support from those delegates than Young. While McKenna's 1985 sweep was not marred by defeat i n any part of the province, Frenette's strongest showing came from Moncton and Saint John delegates. McKenna received an in c r e d i b l e 94% of the vote from the most r u r a l delegates. As i n Nova Scotia, i t i s evident that the general e l e c t i o n importance of the c i t i e s , and perhaps urban concerns, i s not repeated at conventions. A c i t y base does not lead to the leadership and may i n fact be an impediment. On PEI the dominance of the r u r a l areas i s expected since the Island i s the least urbanized province i n the country. Charlottetown decides few e l e c t i o n and few conventions. In 197 6 and 1978 the winning candidates drew more of t h e i r strength from r u r a l Islanders while t h e i r opponents were r e l a t i v e l y strong around Charlottetown. The 1981 conventions were somewhat d i f f e r e n t . At the L i b e r a l convention there was l i t t l e evidence of an urban/rural s p l i t . Ghiz won everywhere although his strongest support came from his Charlottetown neighbours. Ghiz campaigned vociferously to show he was not an urban candidate. As noted i n Chapter 4, the Harvard educated lawyer traversed the Island st r e s s i n g his past attendance at barn dances, his potato picking experiences and his 268 dinners of i l l e g a l undersized lobsters. Such a campaign earned him t h r e e - f i f t h s of the r u r a l vote and a comfortable v i c t o r y . The Conservative convention came down to two Charlottetown area candidates and Lee won everywhere. At Island conventions urban based candidates could win, but not without majority support from r u r a l Islanders. Ghiz's campaign strategy provides the ultimate example of t h i s f a c t . At Maritime conventions i t i s apparent that the road to vic t o r y does not go through the major c i t i e s . Rather the winning path winds through the provinces' secondary roads. The implications of t h i s should not be l o s t on candidates who attempt to win with a c i t y based strategy as Cowan did i n 1986. An urban base i s no asset. As Bellamy explained "The Maritimes are characterized by the existence of small towns, and r u r a l values are of major s i g n i f i c a n c e " (1976: 11). While t h i s may not be the picture portrayed by the regional media, based as they are i n the major c i t i e s , i t appears that i n conventions the major urban areas have l i m i t e d influence. It i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note the difference between the major c i t i e s and t h e i r suburbs. At Nova Scotian conventions the metro Halifax region r e a l l y did not stand out. In both 1971 and 1986, delegates from the c i t y of Halifax preferred a d i f f e r e n t candidate than delegates from Dartmouth or the suburbs. Indeed, i t may be a mistake to think of a metro Halifax region i n p o l i t i c a l terms. Si m i l a r l y , on PEI, Charlottetown delegates often backed a d i f f e r e n t candidate than other Queens county delegates. The extreme 269 to which Ghiz went to demonstrate his s o l i d a r i t y with the r u r a l Island suggests the i s o l a t i o n of Charlottetown i n p o l i t i c a l terms. In New Brunswick i n 1985, support for Frenette peaked i n the c i t i e s of Saint John and Moncton but was scarcely noticeable i n t h e i r suburbs. Again i n 1982, Day and Frenette received t h e i r highest l e v e l s of support i n those c i t i e s but the l e v e l of support dropped o f f i n the suburbs. The i s o l a t i o n of the major c i t i e s may explain the surprise r e s u l t s i n 1982 and 1986. P r i o r to the 1982 convention New Brunswick papers were speculating on the p o s s i b i l i t y and v i a b i l i t y of a 'stop Young' movement. Obviously, Young's f i r s t b a l l o t v i c t o r y rendered such speculation moot. Quite possibly the urban media did not appreciate the strength of Young's candidacy i n the less urban areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the north. Young's r e l a t i v e unpopularity among delegates from Moncton and Saint John may have led the media i n those c i t i e s to project such attitudes, erroneously, on the province as a whole. A s i m i l a r myopia could have affected Cowan in 1986. The fact that most well educated, higher status Haligonians were supporting him l i k e l y gave him, and the Halifax media, an exaggerated view of his popularity. (Perhaps a s i m i l a r misunderstanding led Maclnnis into the 1980 race.) Party a c t i v i s t s i n the major Maritime c i t i e s may be out of touch with p o l i t i c s outside t h e i r immediate e n v i r o n s — i n c l u d i n g t h e i r own suburbs. Halifax i s not Nova Scotia, nor are Moncton and Saint John, New Brunswick. It may be a c i t y based perspective which has engendered the 270 notion that Maritime p o l i t i c s are changing: a notion unsupported by evidence at any leadership convention. The trend to urbanization, and any concomitant p o l i t i c a l changes, have not changed the small town and r u r a l nature of Maritime society. The Maritimes remains a society of small towns and r u r a l values. Attempts to project 'large' c i t y p o l i t i c s on the rest of the region are fraught with danger. The t r a d i t i o n s continue The s t o r i e s of Maritime conventions are based on friends and neighbours p o l i t i c s . Candidate support c o a l i t i o n s are heavily composed of t h e i r friends and neighbours. Such support does not, i n and of i t s e l f , lead to v i c t o r y but no candidate who d i d not ultimately carry his home area and his r e l i g i o u s or ethnic friends was able to win. Where a candidate i s from and the nature of his r e l i g i o u s or ethnic background remain important considerations. Religion and e t h n i c i t y have been important i n Maritime p o l i t i c s since well before Confederation. Patterns of candidate support at these conventions provide l i t t l e evidence that such matters can be dismissed as no longer relevant. If r e l i g i o n , or e t h n i c i t y , i s of diminishing s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the Maritimes, the r e l a t i v e l y e l i t e convention delegates do not appear to be aware of i t . Further, such matters remain important even i f only the behaviour of the younger or the u n i v e r s i t y educated delegates i s examined. Only the neighbourhood e f f e c t systematically undercut friendship support. Candidates could count on a good deal of 271 support from d e l e g a t e s who were neighbours. Even d e l e g a t e s who on the b a s i s of r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y were more l i k e l y t o support another c a n d i d a t e g e n e r a l l y opted f o r the l o c a l 'boy'. Maritime conventions are marked by a p e r v a s i v e l o c a l i s m . I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t such support r e p r e s e n t s a nascent s e c t i o n a l i s m . While the n o r t h / s o u t h d i v i s i o n i n New Brunswick i s important, as i s the Cape Breton/mainland s p l i t i n Nova S c o t i a , few suggest t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s separate the E a s t e r n Mainland from the South Shore or Kings county from P r i n c e county. Rather, the support f o r ca n d i d a t e s i s p e r s o n a l and when no candidate from a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n i s on the b a l l o t d e l e g a t e s from t h a t r e g i o n do not vote d i s t i n c t i v e l y . Some may argue t h a t such support i s based on a d e s i r e f o r patronage and to some extent t h a t i s pr o b a b l y c o r r e c t . However, i t i s a l s o l i k e l y t h a t such support stems from a d e s i r e t o see the p a r t y and p r o v i n c e l e d by one of your own, a k i n d of r e f l e c t e d g l o r y t h a t i s not undercut by i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s . Indeed, as the 1971 convention showed, d e l e g a t e s were l i k e l y t o support a f r i e n d and neighbour no matter what t h e i r p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s or a t t i t u d e s were. As w e l l , d e l e g a t e s c o u l d p u b l i c l y support a l o c a l c andidate and i n the s a n c t i t y of the v o t i n g booth vote t h e i r ' t r u e p r e f e r e n c e . ' That they do not suggests t h a t t h e i r t r u e p r e f e r e n c e i s t o have a neighbour, and probably a f r i e n d , as l e a d e r . One should not underestimate the v a l u e of p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . On PEI i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r p o l i t i c i a n s t o b u i l d up a wide a c q u a i n t a n c e s h i p among the v o t e r s . I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e , and p r o b a b l y necessary, f o r New Brunswick and Nova S c o t i a n 272 p o l i t i c i a n s to know most of the prominent party members i n t h e i r area. Offending l o c a l party members i s generally a good way to lose an e l e c t i o n . A c t i v i s t s want to know and be known by t h e i r p o l i t i c a l f i gures. This personal contact undoubtedly contributes to the neighbourhood e f f e c t . It i s u n l i k e l y that such a degree of personal contact e x i s t s elsewhere i n the country. Maritime conventions r e f l e c t other t r a d i t i o n a l patterns. One example i s the absence of issue based candidacies or campaigns. No candidate attempted to win by mobilizing delegates along i d e o l o g i c a l l i n e s nor would such a strategy be l i k e l y to succeed. Another example i s the dominance of the r u r a l areas. Candidates who did not have majority backing from r u r a l delegates d i d not win; many who lacked majority urban support did. The concerns and preferences of urban delegates are not the deciding factors at Maritime conventions regardless of the trend to urbanization. The behaviour of e x - o f f i c i o delegates also suggests t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . These delegates act almost as 'brokers:' lessening and contradicting p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e s p l i t s on the basis of r e l i g i o n or e t h n i c i t y . It was l i k e l y t h e i r behaviour that enabled one commentator to dismiss rumours of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s i n 1971 as "one of the most imaginative p o l i t i c a l interpretations of the year" (Fraser, 1972: 146). Their presence and a c t i v i t y at the various conventions probably made substantial contributions to the unity and strength of the pa r t i e s . Those who counsel abolishing such positions should be aware that r e l i g i o u s and ethnic d i v i s i o n s would only be strengthened by t h e i r absence. F i n a l l y , Maritime conventions were not free of d i v i s i o n s based on age, gender or status. Although such d i v i s i o n s existed and may have affected the vote t o t a l s of some candidates, t h e i r d i r e c t impact seems li m i t e d . The support by delegates of friends or neighbours cut across the cleavages of age, gender or status: regardless of age, gender or status delegates usually supported a f r i e n d and a neighbour. Maritime conventions r e f l e c t the t r a d i t i o n a l nature of p o l i t i c s i n the region. They provide no evidence of change i n the s t y l e or content of regional p o l i t i c s . Nineteenth century p o l i t i c i a n s would not f e e l out of place at contemporary leadership conventions, media scrums and t e l e v i s i o n cameras notwithstanding. At Maritime conventions, the t r a d i t i o n s continue. 274 Chapter 8 Friends and Neighbours: Defense and Explanation The preceding analysis of delegate voting behaviour paints a picture of friends and neighbours support. The continuing s i g n i f i c a n c e of geographic influences, l e t alone r e l i g i o u s ones, deals a blow to those eager for evidence of 'modernization' i n Maritime p o l i t i c s . It does not indicate a p o l i t y being "subtly eroded by the processes of change" (Bellamy, 1976: 3). The importance of localism and r e l i g i o n / e t h n i c i t y at Maritime conventions, leads to speculation as to whether such primordial' t i e s can be important i n an e l i t e gathering and i r r e l e v a n t elsewhere. The presence of friends and neighbours support i s not something observers of Maritime p o l i t i c s w i l l point to admiringly. Wilson c a l l e d the geographic and r e l i g i o u s influences on Maritime p o l i t i c s ' p r e i n d u s t r i a l ' and the notion that as p o l i t i c s 'develops' t i e s of t h i s type w i l l decline i s deeply ingrained. Agnew explains t h i s point quite succinctly In modernization theories, place i s viewed as s i g n i f i c a n t only i n t r a d i t i o n a l or parochial s o c i e t i e s and not i n modern ones ... as s o c i e t i e s 'modernize' they undergo cer t a i n determinate mutations that create new conditions for p o l i t i c a l l i f e . In p a r t i c u l a r , national functional cleavages (such as class) displace older t e r r i t o r i a l and communal cleavages (such as region and r e l i g i o n ) (1987: 38) . The continued influence of region and r e l i g i o n i n Maritime p o l i t i c s seem to lend support to descriptions of the region as backward or 275 underdeveloped. V.O. Key, the creator of the term friends and neighbours, was quite negative i n his assessment of such support. As he put i t "The chances are that the friends and neighbours appeal can assume overriding importance only i n an immature p o l i t i c s i n which issues are eith e r nonexistent or blurred" (1949: 110) . He went on to describe t h i s kind of voting as based on a "more or less t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t appeal" (1949: 46). This negative assessment of friends and neighbours support would l i k e l y be shared by most observers of Maritime p o l i t i c s . It i s possible, however, to view such support more p o s i t i v e l y . Assessing friends and neighbours support negatively assumes that i t i s an u n r e f l e c t i v e and automatic occurrence. Yet there i s no reason to assume that support from friends and neighbours i s something that every candidate could take for granted. Even Key grudgingly admitted t h i s when he wrote "the harshest c r i t i c i s m that can be made of a p o l i t i c i a n i s that he cannot win i n his own beat or precinct. If his friends and neighbours do not support him, why should those without t h i s advantage tr u s t such a candidate" (1949: 38) . The importance of personal t i e s i n p o l i t i c s was given some philosophical backing by A r i s t o t l e and Rousseau. In The P o l i t i c s A r i s t o t l e explained that " i f the c i t i z e n s of a state are to judge and to d i s t r i b u t e o f f i c e s according to merit, then they must know each other's characters." S i m i l a r l y Rousseau i n the Social Contract highlighted the advantage of personal knowledge and acquaintance 276 when he indicated the danger inherent i n large state p o l i t i c s , noting: "Talent i s buried, v i r t u e unknown and vice unpunished among such a multitude of men who do not know one another." He went on to add i n his description of a people f i t for his L e g i s l a t o r that they must reside i n a state " i n which every member may be known by each other." Personal knowledge and evaluation may be important concerns and friends and neighbours support need not be based on ir r e l e v a n c i e s or indicate an immature p o l i t y . Candidates are best known i n t h e i r l o c a l areas among t h e i r friends and neighbours. Given the small size of Maritime p o l i t i e s , l e t alone the body of party a c t i v i s t s i n a p a r t i c u l a r area, the l i k e l i h o o d that delegates have personal knowledge of the l o c a l candidate i s extremely high. In such a s i t u a t i o n , the i n a b i l i t y of a candidate to carry his friends and neighbours may indeed be cause for concern. Such concerns are not l i m i t e d to Maritime p o l i t i c s . At the 1989 NDP federal leadership convention, a number of B r i t i s h Columbia delegates lobbied against Dave Barrett suggesting his i n a b i l i t y to secure much V i c t o r i a area support should rai s e questions about his q u a l i t i e s of leadership. As A.J. Parker explained i n his study of friends and neighbours voting i n an I r i s h e l e c t i o n "Knowledge of a candidate includes not only knowledge of his existence, but also his q u a l i t i e s , his attitudes and his views, and perhaps even knowing the i n d i v i d u a l personally" (1982: 244). Friends and Neighbours voting then, does not necessarily indicate a 'knee jerk' reaction to the presence of a ' l o c a l boy' on the b a l l o t . 277 Negative evaluations of t h i s type of support must also be tempered by a consideration of the state of leadership conventions in Canada more broadly. One would be hard pressed to f i n d many conventions decided on the basis of a c o l l i s i o n of ideas or even i n s t r u c t i v e issue debates. For that matter, few elections appear won or l o s t on such matters. In both events, emphasis i s placed on the s t y l e and image of the candidates. Maritime p o l i t i c s can only be marginally more g u i l t y of such p o l i t i c a l p ractices and even that charge has yet to be proven conclusively. Actually, s t y l e without substance, may indeed be less e f f e c t i v e i n an environment where a candidate's q u a l i t i e s and attitudes are r e l a t i v e l y well known. Maritime p o l i t i c s are scarcely unique i n playing down the importance of issues. While Nova Scotia premier John Buchanan was widely condemned for his 1984 statement that elections should not be fought on issues, t h i s sentiment was not worlds apart from Premier Vander Zalm's 198 6 claim that the e l e c t i o n issue was leadership. The 1990 Ontario p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n d i d not appear issue driven either. On t h i s basis most p o l i t i e s i n Canada are immature. Indeed, Jewell i n a study of voting i n state primaries in America, concluded that "Voters are more l i k e l y to judge candidates on the basis of t h e i r personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t h e i r experience than on the basis of issues" (1984: 282). The Maritimes i s hardly the only part of North America where elections or conventions are matters of 'men not measures.' Friends and neighbours voting exists at Maritime conventions but i t i s not necessarily a negative aspect of those gatherings. 278 Such a conclusion must be argued rather than assumed. More important than a debate over the v i r t u e s of friends and neighbours voting i s a discussion of what underlies i t and what i t reveals about Maritime p o l i t i c s . The strength of friends and neighbours p o l i t i c s at Maritime conventions, obviously, undercuts arguments of change i n regional p o l i t i c s . It also points to two features of Maritime society whose p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s not given s u f f i c i e n t attention. Namely the r u r a l nature of the region and the place of r e l i g i o n i n the Maritimes. Although most observers have noted that r e l i g i o n i s important i n Maritime p o l i t i c s the general perception i s that i t s importance i s something of an h i s t o r i c a l a r t i f a c t with l i t t l e contemporary resonance. However, the patterns of support at conventions reveal a strong tendency for delegates to disproportionately back, a co-r e l i g i o n i s t . Free from the cues of p o l i t i c a l parties and t h e i r attempts to manage such d i v i s i o n s , delegates were affected by r e l i g i o u s background. This tendency was r a r e l y mitigated by s o c i a l status or education. The importance of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime p o l i t i c s may have been undervalued because the importance of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime society has been underestimated. F i f t y years ago Alberta might have been Canada's Bible Belt but that i s c e r t a i n l y no longer the case. Reginald Bibby, i n a study of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and pr a c t i s e i n Canada, noted that " A t l a n t i c Canada i s the nation's true Bible B e l t " (1987: 108). The l e v e l of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and pr a c t i s e in 279 A t l a n t i c Canada, and u n f o r t u n a t e l y Bibby d i d not d i s t i n g u i s h between the Maritimes and Newfoundland, c o n s i s t e n t l y ranked h i g h e s t i n the country. A t l a n t i c Canadians were w e l l above the n a t i o n a l average on a l l dimensions of f a i t h and p r a c t i s e . O v e r a l l , 44% of Canadians c l a i m e d t o be committed t o C h r i s t i a n i t y but i n A t l a n t i c Canada the percentage soared t o 66. Moreover, over h a l f of A t l a n t i c Canadians were church members and almost h a l f (46%) sent t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o church s c h o o l . The c o r r e s p o n d i n g n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s were 35% and 25%. Many, perhaps most, M a r i t i m e r s continue t o have ex p e r i e n c e s w i t h o r g a n i z e d C h r i s t i a n i t y . I f r e l i g i o n has more than a l i n g e r i n g e f f e c t i n Maritime p o l i t i c s i t i s p r o b a b l y because i t has more than a l i n g e r i n g e f f e c t i n Maritime s o c i e t y . More evidence i s needed b e f o r e one c o u l d conclude t h a t the r e l i g i o u s management engaged i n by Maritime p a r t i e s l a c k s contemporary resonance. C e r t a i n l y c o nvention evidence suggests such management remains q u i t e important. There i s l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s p a t t e r n of r e l i g i o u s support i s g e n e r a l l y p e r c e i v e d n e g a t i v e l y . A r e l i g i o u s t i n t t o v o t i n g c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as an e x p r e s s i o n of b i g o t r y . Again, however, t h i s i s not the only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . As noted i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, support f o r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s can be seen as much as an e x p r e s s i o n of k i n s h i p as of b i g o t r y . As W i c k e l s e i n i n d i c a t e d i n h i s study of John Kennedy and C a t h o l i c support, Kennedy c o u l d "count on the k i n s h i p vote of a l a r g e percentage of C a t h o l i c s " (1963: 229). T h i s support was as much a p o s i t i v e sense of 280 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as an anti Protestant vote. Religious influences i n American p o l i t i c s d i d not end with Kennedy nor are they l i m i t e d to Catholics. John Wilson i n discussing the 1976 P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n argued that "The Carter v i c t o r y was s u b s t a n t i a l l y due to the swing of Protestant voters" (1978: 349). The 'kinship' issue cuts both ways and i t p e r s i s t s . There seems to be a normative judgement among p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s that r e l i g i o u s t i e s should pass away i n terms of p o l i t i c a l influence and i f they p e r s i s t , i t r e f l e c t s a form of bigotry or at least a 'non-modern' society. Robert Fowler i n his 1985 book Religion and P o l i t i c s i n America noted that an inve s t i g a t i o n of the e f f e c t of r e l i g i o n on p o l i t i c s was not e a s i l y understood: "I soon found I was engaged on a journey which was incomprehensible to some and p o s i t i v e l y d i s t a s t e f u l to others" ( i x ) . He goes on to suggest that The leading works of p o l i t i c a l science i n American voting behavior reveal scant attention to r e l i g i o n ... Pa r t l y i t i s a matter of conviction that group (including religious) b e l i e f s or commitments just do not matter much in voting... This i s a strange and unfounded conclusion because students of voting behavior have not made much e f f o r t to test t h i s assertion i n connection with r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s or groups. They would have do to so f i r s t before making such a conclusion l e s t they be accused of merely projecting t h e i r l a r g e l y secular perspectives on to most Americans (1985: 63). Given the data on r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and prac t i s e i n the Maritimes one cannot help wondering whether the perceptions of the decline i n the importance of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime p o l i t i c s stem from a s i m i l a r projection of the secular perspectives of many p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s on to Maritime society. Certainly l i t t l e evidence of t h i s decline 281 can be found at leadership conventions. Fowler's inves t i g a t i o n of the impact of r e l i g i o n on voting i n America found that t h i s influence continued. "It remains true, that a l l things being equal, a Democrat running for dog catcher or president can expect a majority of Catholics to vote for him. He can also expect that i n t h i s choice they w i l l d i f f e r from a majority of Protestants who w i l l vote for the Republican opponent. Despite softening, i n other words, the great r e l i g i o u s divide remains a l i v e i n American voting" (1985: 69). Studies of voting and parties i n American states also reveal an important role for r e l i g i o n . As Jewell and Olson note "No one could undertake to explain Massachusetts p o l i t i c s , without understanding the influence of I r i s h Catholics" (1982: 6). Pearce has also suggested that "For at least a century, r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y have been the v i t a l factor of Rhode Island p o l i t i c s " (1976: 146) and that r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y are important i n other New England states as well (1976: 191, 197, 234). F i n a l l y , Jewell and Olson argue that "In some states ethnic d i f f e r e n c e s — r a c i a l , national or r e l i g i o u s — s e e m to permeate every aspect of p o l i t i c s " (1982: 10). Religion i s not without import i n American p o l i t i c s ! This b r i e f excursion into American p o l i t i c s reveals a number of important features about r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s . F i r s t , that r e l i g i o u s support patterns are as much an expression of kinship as anything else. Second, that r e l i g i o u s influences on p o l i t i c s i n North America are not l i m i t e d to the ' p r e - i n d u s t r i a l ' Maritimes. Third, that the pattern of New England p o l i t i c s does not appear, at 282 least s u p e r f i c i a l l y , r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that of Maritime p o l i t i c s . Fourth, the continuing impact of r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y on American p o l i t i c s and e s p e c i a l l y i n some American states does not lead to pejorative descriptions of t h e i r p o l i t i c s as 'pre-modern' or immature. State p o l i t i c s simply take place i n d i f f e r e n t environments and cultures and i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. The negative normative evaluations and pejorative descriptions of p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes are need reconsideration. A f t e r a l l , few c a l l Massachusetts pre-modern and immature. Comparative research makes clear that r e l i g i o n i s an important source of p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n throughout the western world. P h i l i p E. Converse, i n his essay i n E l e c t o r a l Behavior: A Comparative Handbook, made t h i s point d i r e c t l y . In his words "the general rule seems to be that r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n intrudes on partisan p o l i t i c a l alignments i n unexpectedly powerful degree wherever i t conceivably can" (1974: 734). Si m i l a r l y , L i j p h a r t i n his study of 22 democracies finds that r e l i g i o n i s one of the two most frequent sources of p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n (1984: 132,133). Many party systems i n continental western Europe continue to have important r e l i g i o u s cleavages. Li j p h a r t also argues that while Canadian contemporary p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t i s not r e l i g i o u s i n nature, r e l i g i o n remains "the best predictor of the voters' party choice" (1984: 134). In an e a r l i e r comparison of r e l i g i o u s , l i n g u i s t i c and class voting i n Belgium, Canada, South A f r i c a and Switzerland, L i j p h a r t found Protestant Catholic differences i n Canada to be the greatest source 283 of p a r t y d i v i s i o n and suggested t h a t "such p r i m o r d i a l command l o y a l t i e s can be extremely t e n a c i o u s even i n the modern world" (1979: 453). The a c t u a l impact of r e l i g i o n i n Canada has been p l a y e d down and u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o i s s u e d i v i s i o n s t h a t are no lon g e r r e l e v a n t . T h i s treatment i s not f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . Quebec p r o v i d e s a s h i n i n g example of a p r o v i n c e i n which the m o d e r n i z a t i o n process e l i m i n a t e d r e l i g i o n as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . C o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom holds t h a t the Quiet R e v o l u t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y d e s t r o y e d the p o l i t i c a l r o l e of r e l i g i o n . Gingras and Nevette o f f e r a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e . As they put i t " r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s remain important i n Quebec s o c i e t y . Moreover, the c o e x i s t e n c e of t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s and modern s e c u l a r v a l u e s i n contemporary Quebec c a r r i e s important consequences f o r p o l i t i c a l support" (1987: 244) . They go on to argue t h a t "the c o e x i s t e n c e of r e l i g i o u s and s e c u l a r o r i e n t a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s a very s i g n i f i c a n t cleavage i n Quebec-one which makes the outcome of p o l i t i c a l events ... u n c e r t a i n " (1987: 252). Thirty years a f t e r the Quiet R e v o l u t i o n began, p o l i t i c s i n Canada's second l a r g e s t , and d e f i a n t l y modern, p r o v i n c e remain i n f l u e n c e d by r e l i g i o n . Quebec i s not the only p r o v i n c e i n which r e l i g i o n remains important. A s t r i k i n g example of the p o l i t i c a l power of r e l i g i o n c o u l d be seen i n the 1985 O n t a r i o e l e c t i o n t h a t t o p p l e d a forty-two year o l d Tory dynasty. The O n t a r i o C o n s e r v a t i v e s were h u r t by qu e s t i o n s surrounding the fund i n g of separate C a t h o l i c s c h o o l s . Premier Davis made a commitment t o C a t h o l i c s t o p r o v i d e f u l l 284 funding f o r such schools, a commitment made i n part i n hope of weakening the "Catholic community's h i s t o r i c allegiance to the L i b e r a l s " (Speirs, 1986: 26). As an e l e c t i o n approached, Davis grew reluctant to extend funding but was also wary of "Catholic demonstrators haranguing his party at e l e c t i o n events around the province" (Speirs, 1986: 25). In the end, Davis decided to provide f u l l funding but also decided to step down as Premier. The provision of such funding and the manner i n which i t was announced became an important issue i n the 1985 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . The Anglican Archbishop of Toronto charged "that Davis had behaved l i k e H i t l e r when he announced separate school funding" and many of the Conservative party's core Protestant supporters were alienated by the decision. (Speirs, 1986: 126) The Conservatives, of course, l o s t the 1985 e l e c t i o n and Frank M i l l e r , the premier who presided over the debacle, was convinced that the separate schools issue was a major factor i n his defeat. Religion obviously has p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n Canada even outside of the Maritimes. Indeed Blake, i n his study of voting i n secular B.C. found that the province's "Roman Catholics stand out as d i s t i n c t i v e l y p r o - L i b e r a l " (1985: 147). There i s therefore no a p r i o r i reason why the influence of r e l i g i o n on Maritime p o l i t i c s should decline. Nor i s the Maritimes unique i n i t s 'premodernity'. The r e l i g i o u s background of Maritime candidates i s generally well, known. Knowledge of a candidate's r e l i g i o u s background may provide a form of shared i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , an awareness on the part of delegates that they share, or do not share, a p a r t i c u l a r form of 285 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a ca n d i d a t e . Given the s t r e n g t h of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime s o c i e t y , i t would be s u r p r i s i n g i f i t d i d not a f f e c t v o t i n g . Only i n New Brunswick was a r e l i g i o u s p a t t e r n i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s c e r n and i n t h a t p r o v i n c e another form o f k i n s h i p e x i s t e d : language and e t h n i c i t y . T h i s p r o v i d e s a k i n d of shared i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h a t i s even more obvious than r e l i g i o n . I t i s a l s o an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n about which no doubt r e g a r d i n g p o l i t i c a l s a l i e n c e e x i s t s . S t i l l , a l l t h i n g s b e i n g equal, d e l e g a t e s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y supported t h e i r ' k i n . ' Of course, a l l t h i n g s are seldom e q u a l . In f a c t some i n s i g h t i n t o the nature o f f r i e n d s and neighbours p o l i t i c s i n the Maritimes can be gleaned from the i n t e r a c t i o n of the ' k i n s h i p ' or ' f r i e n d ' f a c t o r w i t h the geographic or neighbourhood e f f e c t . What d i d d e l e g a t e s do when f o r c e d t o choose between f r i e n d s and neighbours? As demonstrated i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, most of the time they backed t h e i r neighbour. T h i s lends support t o the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e l i g i o u s or e t h n i c t i e s r e f l e c t a k i n d of shared i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Delegates look t o i d e n t i f y with a c a n d i d a t e . In the absence of i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f a l l s on geography and/or k i n s h i p . Delegates g e n e r a l l y voted f o r the cand i d a t e from t h e i r area, r e g a r d l e s s of r e l i g i o u s background. The cand i d a t e was l i k e l y w e l l known i n the area and h i g h l y v i s i b l e . Other c a n d i d a t e s would not be as f o r t u n a t e , and the same sense of shared e x p e r i e n c e or h i s t o r y would not e x i s t . In the absence of the i n f l u e n c e of l o c a l i s m , another p o t e n t i a l l i n k seems t o ' k i c k i n ' : the k i n s h i p of r e l i g i o n 286 or e t h n i c i t y . Given the strength of r e l i g i o n i n Maritime society i t s continued p o l i t i c a l relevance i s hardly i n e x p l i c a b l e . Maritime delegates may not fear or even d i s l i k e a candidate from across the r e l i g i o u s or ethnic divide, but they do not know them i n the same way they know candidates from t h e i r own group. When they know the candidate, as a l o c a l , the r e l i g i o u s or ethnic difference i s less important. The dominance of localism i s , i f anything, even more explicable than the r e l i g i o u s influence. In his 'discovery' of friends and neighbours support i n parts of the American South, Key commented on the coincidence of such voting with a p a r t i c u l a r environment. He argued that "the small, r u r a l county with a f a i r l y homogenous population probably offers the most f e r t i l e ground for localism..." and that "City dwellers... tend more than r u r a l people to divide t h e i r votes" (1949: 133). In fact, most examples of friends and neighbours voting have been found i n r e l a t i v e l y small or r u r a l settings: Key, Reynolds and Tatolovich i n the American South; Johnston, Farent and Johnston, Freneta et a l i n New Zealand, and Sacks and Parker i n Ireland. There i s no question that the Maritime s e t t i n g i s also a small and r u r a l one. As McCann put i t "The Maritimes i s a region of small towns" (1987: 11). By the d e f i n i t i o n of S t a t i s t i c s Canada, the three Maritime provinces are the most r u r a l i n the country, but even that does not f u l l y capture the r u r a l nature of the region. Hodge and Quadeen i n t h e i r study of towns and v i l l a g e s i n Canada found that 40% of the 9500 small communities i n Canada were i n the 287 A t l a n t i c region, even though i t has only 11% of the t o t a l population (1983: 20). The major c i t i e s i n the three provinces make up only a small percentage of the t o t a l population. Metro Halifax the largest metropolitan area i n the region has a population of less than 300, 000 and contains less than a t h i r d of the Nova Scotian population. In New Brunswick and PEI no c i t y has even that large a share of the population. The f i r s t post confederation premier of Nova Scotia, William Annand, once commented that the c i t y of Halifax was not the province of Nova Scotia and i n studying the Maritimes today a s i m i l a r perspective must be adopted. One must not assume that the urban areas are as dominant as they seem to be elsewhere i n the country and one must be very wary of any attempt to extrapolate from t h e i r environs to the region as a whole. Contrary to general perception, the urban areas i n the Maritimes are e l e c t o r a l l y secondary actors. 1 P o l i t i c s i n such a r u r a l s e t t i n g has a number of rather s p e c i f i c features. As Hodge and Quadeen indicated " i n the public mind, towns and v i l l a g e s and the countryside have come to be associated with intimate s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and with a more h e a l t h f u l 1 This i s not to say that urban areas are unimportant i n e l e c t i o n s . The urban areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Nova Scotia and New Brunswick contain important swing areas. However, in order for these swing ridings to have an impact, a party must have won a s u f f i c i e n t l y high number of seats i n the rest of the province. As an example, i n the l a s t Nova Scotian election, the Halifax ridings were important because Cape Breton elected mainly L i b e r a l s while the r u r a l mainland generally elected Tories. With such a s p l i t , the Halifax r e s u l t s were c r u c i a l . Nonetheless, only 14 of the province's 52 seats can be found there. 288 way of l i f e " (1983: 131). While the more h e a l t h f u l way of l i f e i s l i k e l y mythical the more intimate s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are p o l i t i c a l l y important. Hodge and Quadeen go on to note three important parts of t h i s s o c i a l intimacy. F i r s t , v i s i b i l i t y : "In small towns and v i l l a g e s about everybody can be seen, on the main street or i n the supermarket: s i m i l a r l y i n a somnolent v i l l a g e street the few comings and goings cannot help being observed. Mutual acquaintances, f a m i l i a r faces and the v i s i b i l i t y of d a i l y routines are staples of l i v i n g i n small communities" (1983: 135). In such small settings p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s are highly v i s i b l e , t h e i r strengths and weaknesses r e l a t i v e l y common knowledge. Residents of small towns and v i l l a g e s are well placed to evaluate such i n d i v i d u a l s . The second feature of l i f e i n small towns i s what they c a l l "an ethos of mutual help" (1983: 136). In essence, not only are in d i v i d u a l s well known but the community values include helping your neighbour, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that could e a s i l y become friends and neighbours voting. The f i n a l feature Hodge and Quadeen define as personalized decision making. In t h e i r words "In small communities, the decision making process i s highly personalized. Important functionaries are personally well known to residents and they are approached on that basis even for routine matters" (1983: 137). In small communities then, e l i t e s benefit both from v i s i b i l i t y and an ethos of mutual help. Moreover, the personalized decision making s t y l e helps assure ordinary c i t i z e n s , or delegates, that they w i l l be able to approach t h e i r neighbour on t h i s basis i n the 289 future. Not only can e l e c t i n g one of your own provide a kind of r e f l e c t e d glory, but the expectation of being able to deal more personally with that i n d i v i d u a l on relevant matters, having a f r i e n d at court, i s also important. If ' t h e i r ' candidate i s v i c t o r i o u s , the scope of issues on which t h i s kind of special access can be used i s broadened. Friends and neighbours support i n the Maritimes must also be understood i n the context of 'a sense of place.' As Wilson observed "there i s i n the Maritime culture a deep sense of place, of belonging of beginnings: c i t i e s and towns are small and many of t h e i r inhabitants are not many steps removed from the country... there i s nothing s u p e r f i c i a l about the Maritimers' common and deep sense of place, his s e n s i t i v i t y to family and l o c a l t r a d i t i o n s " (1989: 375) . Agnew has described sense of place as the "subjective orie n t a t i o n that can be engendered by l i v i n g i n a place. This i s the geosociological d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f or i d e n t i t y produced by a place" (1987: 5,6). Individuals can be quickly i d e n t i f i e d i n terms of t h e i r 'place' or whether they 'belong'. Maritimers have elevated the phrase 'Come from Aways' to a l e v e l of deep s i g n i f i c a n c e , an i n d i c a t i o n that someone does not belong and that newcomers do not f u l l y f i t i n . As Bruce pointed out "Beneath the celebrated f r i e n d l i n e s s of Maritimers, there lurks a bowel-deep suspicion of outsiders" (1988: 62) . S i m i l a r l y , Hodge and Quadeen contend that i n small towns and v i l l a g e s "a noticeable f i s s u r e i n the s o c i a l structure ... runs along the l i n e of old versus new residents ... It i s d i f f i c u l t for newcomers to penetrate such networks, they 290 remain i s o l a t e d " (1983: 133). This may p a r t i a l l y explain the lack of much i n the way of a neighbourhood e f f e c t for eith e r McKenna or Buchanan.2 There i s one other feature that contributes to the strength of localism i n the Maritimes. That i s the competition among various communities. Again as Bruce points out: from province to province, i s l a n d to island, county to county, town to town and from bay to cove and r i v e r to beach, Maritimers have been f i g h t i n g and p l o t t i n g to get the upper hand over one another for a couple of centuries. Down Home communities are often about as co-operative as the Hatfields and McCoys, as harmonious together as a convention of fishwives. Each town has i t s own way of doing things, i t s own s e l f i n t e r e s t , h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n s to protect, and perhaps i t s own grudges to nurse and grievances to cherish (1988: 30) . In a lar g e l y r u r a l society, with a culture that places such meaning on the sense of place, the presence of friends and neighbours voting i s not something that should come as a shock. The decline of t h i s phenomenon i n the region would l i k e l y require rather s i g n i f i c a n t and unforseen changes i n the nature of both Maritime society and culture. The patterns of support at Maritime conventions provide no evidence that regional p o l i t i c s i s changing. Rather they point to the continued existence of a ' d i s t i n c t ' Maritime p o l i t i c a l society. A p o l i t i c a l society marked by the arrangements and d i v i s i o n s one would expect to f i n d i n a region of small towns and v i l l a g e s . The perceptions of change suggest that the small town nature of the 2 McKenna and Buchanan were transients i n the sense of l i v i n g , working, and representing a r i d i n g i n a part of the province where they were not born and raised. 291 Maritimes has not been given the attention i t deserves. 3 Much of the discussion of change i n the region seem to focus on urban areas. As noted i n the f i r s t chapter, Adamson has suggested that the region i s becoming more urban and that support for the NDP i s growing, e s p e c i a l l y i n more urban areas. 4 But these areas are f a r from the Maritime norm! They are also l i k e l y to be the main destination of the few outsiders who come to the Maritimers. It i s thus quite dangerous to extrapolate from such areas to the region i n general. Indications of change seems to r e f l e c t an overconcentration on the urban areas. Looking at the NDP support i n the region also reveals an a t y p i c a l p i c t u r e . The recent growth of the NDP i n Nova Scotia has been p r i m a r i l y i n Halifax and the only non-urban successes the party has had i n the region have been i n Tantramar i n New Brunswick and Kings South i n Nova Scotia. Not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , these r u r a l areas are also home to two u n i v e r s i t i e s — A c a d i a and Mount A l l i s o n . 5 Again, t h i s i s scarcely the Maritime norm. Understanding conventions, and p o l i t i c s , i n the Maritimes requires an emphasis on small towns and v i l l a g e s . As i n 3 The place of r e l i g i o n i n the region's p o l i t i c s i s not explained simply by the small town ambience. Bibby has shown that r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and practise i s not related to community size and others have found r e l i g i o n to be important i n parts of the western world that are far from r u r a l . 4 One must be careful i n asserting that urbanization i s taking place i n the Maritimes. In 1961 the percentage of each province c l a s s i f i e d as urban were 32.4% for PEI, 55.7% for Nova Scotia and 4 9.1% for New Brunswick. Twenty years l a t e r the figures were almost i d e n t i c a l : PEI 36.3%, Nova Scotia 55.7% and New Brunswick 50.7%. 5 NDP support i n the region i s not exactly growing. The l e v e l of NDP support i n the late 1980s i s not appreciably higher than the l e v e l won by the CCF i n the mid 1940s. 292 1867, the c i t y of Halifax i s not the province of Nova Scotia. Nor for that matter, i s Saint John-New Brunswick or Charlottetown-PEI. The window that conventions provide into party p o l i t i c s suggests that old patterns of p o l i t i c a l l i f e and d i v i s i o n s continue. Parties are not i n t e r n a l l y divided i d e o l o g i c a l l y and leadership s e l e c t i o n remains a choice of men not measures. Generation or gender gaps are at best of secondary importance. The basic patterns of support at conventions suggest that what i s important at conventions i s not awfully d i f f e r e n t from what one would expect to be important i n e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s more broadly. The window into the parties reveals a view of regional p o l i t i c s providing p a r t i a l confirmation for the suggestion of Krause and LeDuc that d i v i s i o n s at conventions are s i m i l a r to "the decisions made by voters i n elections and that t h i s analogue i s a useful one for an understanding of convention p o l i t i c s " (1979: 132). To s l i g h t l y turn that around, i t can be argued that the d i v i s i o n s i n conventions are useful for an understanding of e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s , even i f they do not speak d i r e c t l y to voting d i v i s i o n s i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s . Localism i s a recurring theme i n the treatment of Maritime p o l i t i c s . Dyck exemplifies t h i s when he claims there exists "an intense parochialism i n New Brunswick which i s greater than i n neighbouring provinces and which often re s u l t s i n horizons being l i m i t e d to the l o c a l community". He goes on to suggest that i n PEI one finds "a parochialism which borders on the xenophobic" and "Nova Scotians have possessed a parochialism which h i s t o r i c a l l y 293 took the form of a d i s l i k e of outsiders" (1986: 142, 83, 107) . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s take great care to avoid parachuting candidates into constituencies where they have no roots. The convention experience suggests t h i s i s a very wise strategy. Geography may play a minor role i n o v e r a l l voting behaviour for the same reason that the impact of r e l i g i o n i s limited, namely because the parties work to organize i t out of existence. The behaviour of p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s i n managing ethnic and r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s i n the Maritimes does not pump a r t i f i c i a l l i f e into d i v i s i o n s no longer relevant but instead keeps p o t e n t i a l l y d i v i s i v e cleavages from being as s a l i e n t as they might be. The par t i e s , then, are performing an important brokerage r o l e . The brokerage role of Maritime party e l i t e s i s also suggested by the role of e x - o f f i c i o delegates at conventions. In none of the conventions d i d a candidate d i r e c t l y owe his v i c t o r y to t h e i r support, but e x - o f f i c i o delegates were not without influence. They were inv a r i a b l y more supportive of the winner than were constituency or p o l l delegates and i t i s impossible to determine the impact t h e i r support for a p a r t i c u l a r candidate might have had on c a l c u l a t i o n s of winnability. More d i r e c t was t h e i r mitigation of friends and neighbours voting on a number of occasions. The spectacle of prominent party o f f i c i a l s supporting an extra regional candidate or one from across the ethnic or r e l i g i o u s divide undoubtedly blurs the picture we have of these d i v i s i o n s . With prominent Catholics supporting a Protestant candidate, as i n Nova Scotia i n 1980, the l i k e l i h o o d of post convention bitterness on the 294 part of Catholics because t h e i r candidate l o s t was s i g n i f i c a n t l y mitigated. Party e l i t e s probably have very cl e a r memories of the 1954 Nova Scotia L i b e r a l convention where the impression that Protestants had 'ganged ' up on the Catholic candidate played a major role i n the 1956 L i b e r a l defeat. Religious d i v i s i o n s must be played down and e x - o f f i c i o delegates contribute heavily to t h i s muffling. Their behaviour has also aided and abetted the perception that r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s are no longer of much si g n i f i c a n c e i n the Maritimes. With conventions changing, t h i s role may disappear. The Quebec Libe r a l s and B r i t i s h Columbia Social Credit have abolished ex-o f f i c i o representation at t h e i r leadership conventions. There i s now no i n s t i t u t i o n a l e l i t e with d i r e c t partisan concerns beyond the outcome of the leadership b a l l o t i n g exercising much influence at these gatherings. The Ontario Conservatives have gone a step further and allow ordinary party members to choose the leader without recourse to a convention. The a b i l i t y of party e l i t e s to manage or mitigate dissent i s a clear casualty of these changes and may i n the long run contribute to a decline of part i e s along the American l i n e . In discussing national conventions E r i c Mintz once indicated that "the substantial number of ' e x - o f f i c i o ' . . . delegates needs to be reconsidered" (1983: 20). In l i g h t of the role such delegates play at Maritime conventions one might suggest that i t i s the elimination of these positions at conventions that needs to be reconsidered. One other change sweeping the convention process had some 295 e f f e c t on the l a s t convention i n t h i s study. U n t i l recently, the prime element i n leadership campaigns was convincing delegates to support a p a r t i c u l a r candidate. Now the emphasis has s h i f t e d to e l e c t i n g delegates predisposed to support a given candidate. Obviously t h i s has dangerous implications for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . No longer, for instance, need delegates be drawn "from a l i m i t e d pool of the interested, party f a i t h f u l " (Krause and Price, 1984: 3). Instead "Candidates for party leader are encouraged to personally intercede i n constituency l e v e l delegate s e l e c t i o n meetings to enter a convention with an i d e n t i f i a b l e corps of supporters" (Krause and Price, 1984: 3). Inevitably such delegates w i l l be more dedicated to t h e i r candidate and w i l l place less value on the post convention cohesion of the party. As well, these delegates w i l l no longer as f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t the ordinary party workers who w i l l f e e l increasingly l e f t out of the process. It may also encourage organized i n t e r e s t groups to intervene i n the process to t r y and influence the s e l e c t i o n of a candidate most acceptable to t h e i r rather l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t s . The long term interests of the party w i l l presumably s u f f e r and the importance of long term a c t i v i s t s decline. For the most part t h i s trend did not intrude on Maritime conventions. However, i t was of some importance i n the 198 6 L i b e r a l convention and may indicate the beginning of a secular trend. Nonetheless, the involvement of candidates i n delegate selection meetings i n the Maritimes i s u n l i k e l y to go as f a r as i t has n a t i o n a l l y or i n Quebec (Quinn, 1984: 122). 6 The anti-parachuting reaction of ordinary Maritimers w i l l impede the process of stacking. Stacking could rebound to the disadvantage of a candidate i f i t was perceived as interference i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s . The capturing of Maritime parties by p o l i t i c a l outsiders v i a trench warfare i s u n l i k e l y . Maritime parties also seem l i k e l y to r e s i s t a l l member votes, both on t r a d i t i o n a l grounds and because of the p o t e n t i a l havoc i t could wreak on the p a r t i e s . Even the introduction of such a method of leadership s e l e c t i o n would be more l i k e l y to strengthen than weaken friends and neighbours p o l i t i c s . The importance of regional t i e s and the kinship factor would probably be enhanced by a more open pr o c e s s — w i t h p o t e n t i a l l y disastrous consequences. The strength of regional t i e s at Maritime conventions suggests, as noted i n Chapter 4, rethinking the importance of regionalism at national conventions. Rather than providing further evidence of the importance of regionalism i n Canadian p o l i t i c s , regional voting patterns at national conventions may simply involve a favourite or native son e f f e c t . Regional support patterns do not necessarily mean that a convention i s riven by deep regional d i v i s i o n s . The t r a d i t i o n a l i s m of Maritime p o l i t i c s can also be seen i n the role played by female delegates. While women represented an 6 For instance, the 1984 L i b e r a l convention i n Quebec which selected Robert Bourassa, was marked by each of the candidates running slates of committed would be delegates and attempting to 'stack' s e l e c t i o n meetings so t h e i r supporters would be chosen. 297 ever increasing proportion of the delegate body and had some representation mandated by convention rules, t h e i r presence was not p i v o t a l to any candidate's success. Women voted no d i f f e r e n t l y than men and no s i g n i f i c a n t gender gap was apparent. Of course women delegates never had the opportunity to vote for a woman candidate. 7 Perhaps the lack of a gender gap can be explained i n a manner si m i l a r to that used by White i n his discussion of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s i n the 1960 American P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n : namely that while there might be a natural g r a v i t a t i o n to support a candidate of the same gender, i n the absence of such a candidate women "would vote i m p a r t i a l l y by personality, economic i n t e r e s t , i n s t i n c t or t r a d i t i o n " (1962: 240). A f u l l exploration of the role played by women i n conventions must await a female candidacy. One i n t e r e s t i n g object for future study i n Maritime conventions i s the occupational status of women. Roughly h a l f of the female delegates at Maritime conventions claimed housewife as t h e i r occupation. It would be useful to determine whether they voted d i f f e r e n t l y than other women and how t h i s proportion compares with conventions i n other parts of the country. Another group which has had a major impact on national conventions but did not stand out at Maritime conventions were the youth. Their support at Maritime conventions was notable only among los i n g candidates. Frequently the youth disproportionately rejected the eventual winner and never did they make a str a t e g i c 7 On t h i s basis alone, the 1989 New Brunswick convention would have been i n t e r e s t i n g to examine. 298 contribution to a winning c o a l i t i o n . S t i l l , the youth were not free from the p u l l of friends and neighbour p o l i t i c s , providing more evidence of the strength of t r a d i t i o n . The guarantee of youth representation at Maritime conventions serves mainly to make the conventions closer than they would be otherwise and h i g h l i g h t the s l i g h t l y divergent preferences of young and old. If, however, Maritime conventions were more widely contested, a bloc of youth support could be p i v o t a l . A more prominent role for youth not as well versed i n the t r a d i t i o n s of the party and with a past tendency to back the 'wrong' candidates i s not something the p a r t i e s should necessarily welcome. The selections of Buchanan who went on to win four elections and Angus MacLean who ended the Campbell dynasty on PEI indicate that an i n a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t the support of party youth i s scarcely cause for alarm. Parties might do well to reconsider the guarantee of youth representation. The story of Maritime conventions i s not one of an i d e o l o g i c a l c o l l i s i o n of p o l i t i c a l v i s i ons, nor of gender or generation gaps. The story of Maritime conventions i s the obvious influence of friends and neighbours support, of the r e l i g i o u s , ethnic and geographic d i v i s i o n s seen when one peers through the convention window. Maritime parties, competing i n a lar g e l y r u r a l environment, demonstrate the d i v i s i o n s one would expect i n that type of environment. L i t t l e evidence of p o l i t i c a l change i s evident at these conventions. The 1971 Nova Scotia P.C. convention was divided by geography and r e l i g i o n and f i f t e e n years l a t e r a gathering of p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l s revealed s i m i l a r cleavages. Most conventions i n 299 between r e f l e c t e d the same pattern. The r e f l e x i v e behaviour of Maritime convention delegates i s to support a f r i e n d or a neighbour when the opportunity to do so e x i s t s . The fact that such patterns are not as r e a d i l y apparent i n partisan c o n f l i c t i s probably due more to the machinations of the parties than to a changed p o l i t i c a l climate. Urbanization, economic development or a major change i n the pattern of migration into the region might very well change the pattern of Maritime p o l i t i c s but at present, and for the foreseeable future, none of these changes threaten. The Maritimes remains a region of small towns and v i l l a g e s with a very depressing economic future and very l i t t l e in-migration. A sense of place and r e l i g i o n remain important i n the region and they continue to have p o l i t i c a l ramifications. To t h i s point the focus has been on what studies of Maritime conventions reveal about Maritime p o l i t i c s , however, examining these conventions also offers insight into the phenomenon of leadership conventions more broadly. Confirmed, again, i s the e l i t e nature of these gatherings. Even i n a region with a small population, and a r e l a t i v e l y small p r i c e to pay i n transportation and lodging costs, the delegates constitute a socio-economic e l i t e . Maritime delegates are by no means a cross section of Maritime society. Conventions remain the preserve of the educated and af f l u e n t . More equivocal i s the evidence regarding the background of convention winners. Generally convention winners were more 300 experienced than most of t h e i r competitors and the success rate of rank outsiders was l i m i t e d . S t i l l , i n seven of the nine conventions a candidate who had never previously held public o f f i c e sought the leadership and one of these newcomers was a c t u a l l y s u c c e s s f u l — J o e Ghiz. Conventions have opened the door for such candidates but they s t i l l have d i f f i c u l t y winning. Conventions have not completely eliminated experience as an important consideration. Maritime conventions also lend support to the notion that p r o v i n c i a l conventions are somewhat d i f f e r e n t than national conventions. Not since Lester Pearson defeated Paul Martin i n 1958 has a national L i b e r a l or Conservative convention been contested by fewer than f i v e i n d i v i d u a l s . In contrast, none of the Maritime conventions had more than four contestants and f i v e of them were between only two men. Sim i l a r l y , the voting process was very short, six conventions ended on the f i r s t b a l l o t and only two went as far as a t h i r d . P r o v i n c i a l conventions, at least i n the Maritimes, do not a t t r a c t large f i e l d s of candidates nor are they very lengthy a f f a i r s . The shortness of the b a l l o t i n g means that transfers of support are not overly important. In only three conventions did one candidate e x p l i c i t l y endorse another and only once could t h i s endorsement be even s u p e r f i c i a l l y considered successful. In 1971 T h o r n h i l l endorsed Buchanan who overtook Doucet to win on the second b a l l o t . Given the nature of Thornhill's support base however, his endorsement was l i k e l y superfluous, except to Thornhill's future career. The two other endorsements were 301 o b v i o u s l y u s e l e s s . I n 1980 M a c l n n i s e n d o r s e d MacLean a f t e r t h e f i r s t b a l l o t b u t on t h e s e c o n d b a l l o t , MacLean's v o t e i n c r e a s e d by no more t h a n t h a t o f t h e u n e n d o r s e d Cameron. T h i s p a l e s i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e e f f e c t o f t h e r e m a i n i n g e n d o r s e m e n t . I n 1981 a t t h e I s l a n d T o r y c o n v e n t i o n B i n n s d e c l a r e d h i s s u p p o r t f o r D r i s c o l l a f t e r t h e f i r s t b a l l o t . On t h e s e c o n d b a l l o t , few o f B i n n s ' 237 s u p p o r t e r s f o l l o w e d h i s l e a d as D r i s c o l l ' s v o t e t o t a l a c t u a l l y d e c l i n e d by 21. T h e r e were few K i n g makers among l o s i n g c a n d i d a t e s a t M a r i t i m e c o n v e n t i o n s . The a b i l i t y o f c a n d i d a t e s t o t r a n s f e r s u p p o r t was e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . T h i s s t a n d s i n s h a r p c o n t r a s t t o n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s where, as S t e v e n s o b s e r v e d i n 1983, " I t was e s s e n t i a l t o a n t i c i p a t e t o whom t h e weaker c a n d i d a t e s w o u l d t h r o w t h e i r s u p p o r t when t h e y d r o p p e d o u t . T h i s was where v i c t o r y l a y " (1984: 1 2 2 ) . V i c t o r y l a y e l s e w h e r e a t M a r i t i m e c o n v e n t i o n s . What a l s o becomes e v i d e n t i s t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f f i r s t p l a c e a t t h e s e c o n v e n t i o n s . A t o n l y one o f t h e m u l t i p l e b a l l o t c o n v e n t i o n s d i d t h e i n i t i a l f r o n t r u n n e r f a l t e r . The f i r s t b a l l o t r e s u l t s p r o v i d e a f a i r l y a c c u r a t e h a r b i n g e r o f t h e outcome, as i n d e e d t h e y do n a t i o n a l l y — C l a r k and M u l r o n e y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . L o s i n g a t a M a r i t i m e c o n v e n t i o n i s a l s o no b a r r i e r t o a p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e . A l l e l i g i b l e l o s e r s f o u n d t h e i r way i n t o f u t u r e c a b i n e t s and two, J i m Lee and V i n c e MacLean, went on t o w i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p on t h e i r n e x t t r y . As C a r t y f o u n d n a t i o n a l l y , " i t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t r u n n i n g f o r a p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p p a y s , e v e n f o r l o s e r s " (1989: 1 2 5 ) . A l t h o u g h s p e e c h e s , l i k e c a n d i d a t e e n d o r s e m e n t s , p r e o c c u p y 302 media coverage of conventions, t h e i r impact at most conventions appears minimal. At only three conventions were speeches worthy of note i n terms of t h e i r impact. At the 1985 New Brunswick convention, Frenette delivered an attacking speech on McKenna that supposedly had a negative e f f e c t on Frenette's candidacy. However, Frenette l o s t by a huge margin and his speech simply r e f l e c t e d his awareness of how far he was behind. Its impact on the outcome was minimal. S i m i l a r l y at the 1981 Island Conservative convention, Clark supposedly delivered a superb speech which was very well received by the delegates. Even that was not enough for him to defeat Lee. F i n a l l y , at the Island L i b e r a l gathering i n 1981 the contrast between the impressive oratory of Ghiz and the subdued presentation of his opponent was credited with pushing Ghiz towards v i c t o r y . Again, however, i t was a one-sided v i c t o r y that seems, d i f f i c u l t to a t t r i b u t e simply to o r a t o r i c a l a b i l i t y . At none of the other conventions did the speeches a t t r a c t much attention. The obvious conclusion regarding speeches i s that they play a very minor role i n the outcome of a convention. Their importance seems vastly exaggerated by media coverage. A s i m i l a r exaggeration could be seen at the 198 9 federal NDP convention where a very disappointing performance by McLaughlin did l i t t l e to impede her v i c t o r y . The l i m i t e d impact of transfers of support and speeches at Maritime conventions suggests that the actual convention proceedings themselves have a minimal impact on the outcome. The most important aspect of the convention as such i s the f i r s t b a l l o t 303 r e s u l t . I t p r o v i d e s d e l e g a t e s with t h e i r f i r s t c l e a r i d e a of where t h e i r c a n d i d a t e stands and probably determines the e v e n t u a l winner. A d i s a p p o i n t i n g showing on the f i r s t b a l l o t d e s t r o y s a candidates chance of v i c t o r y . T h i s i n d i c a t e s the e f f e c t the c o n v e n t i o n r u l e s can have. I f d e l e g a t e s were t o use a p r e f e r e n t i a l b a l l o t r a t h e r than make up t h e i r minds i n the aftermath of the f i r s t b a l l o t announcement, d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s might o b t a i n . In f a c t , the v o t i n g might be f a r more r a t i o n a l i f such a method were f o l l o w e d . Convention aspects such as exceeding or f a i l i n g t o meet e x p e c t a t i o n s would no l o n g e r have the same impact. Changing c o n v e n t i o n r u l e s c o u l d have a dramatic e f f e c t on the dynamics of such g a t h e r i n g s . T h i s b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of what Maritime conventions r e v e a l of conventions more g e n e r a l l y , again suggests the unimportance of s h o r t term f o r c e s . Delegate behaviour and the conventions are a f f e c t e d q u i t e s t r o n g l y by l o n g term f o r c e s and by f r i e n d s and neighbours p o l i t i c s . A f t e r a l l , one does not d e s e r t a f r i e n d or neighbour because he g i v e s a bad speech or because a l o s i n g c a n d i d a t e endorses someone e l s e . T h i s examination of nine Maritime l e a d e r s h i p conventions p r e s e n t s a p o r t r a i t of support p a t t e r n s r e v e a l i n g a r e g i o n a l s t y l e of p o l i t i c s and p r o v i d i n g s t r o n g evidence of the t r a d i t i o n a l nature of t h a t p o l i t i c s . Support at Maritime conventions can best be understood i n the context of f r i e n d s and neighbours p o l i t i c s : t h e r e i s l i t t l e change throughout the 15 year p e r i o d covered by the study and very l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between the two p a r t i e s . 304 The strength of friends and neighbours support c a l l s into question the perception that Maritime p o l i t i c s i s changing and suggests that not enough emphasis has been placed on the importance of r e l i g i o n and the r u r a l nature of the region. A wider study of Maritime residents i s needed to probe the p o l i t i c a l consequences of these features. As well, given a number of s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Maritimes and New England, a wider comparison of p o l i t i c s i n the A t l a n t i c region would be i n s t r u c t i v e and useful. It would be most unfortunate i f t h i s study, through i t s chronicling of friends and neighbours p o l i t i c s , were to contribute to the school of thought that portrays the Maritimes as a p o l i t y which i s 'backwards' or 'behind the times.' Actually, i t can be argued that friends and neighbours support i s a p o s i t i v e feature of conventions and, at any rate, the Maritimes does not rest i n 'uncertain i s o l a t i o n ' i n these manifestations. Religion and place are p o l i t i c a l l y important elsewhere i n North America, including New England, and show no sign of disappearing as important p o l i t i c a l variables. While Maritime p o l i t i c s must be considered ' t r a d i t i o n a l ^ t h i s does not make i t 'immature' or 'pre-modern.' Any understanding and appreciation of Maritime p o l i t i c s must begin by ending the patronizing tone that flows through most external treatments of the region. 305 Bibliography Adamson, Agar (1987). 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Thesis/Dissertation
Maritime Provinces
eng
Political Science
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The traditions continue : leadership choices at Maritime Liberal and Conservative Party conventions
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