Parfit's use of the Buddhist view on personal identity
department or school: Arts, Faculty of
department or school: Philosophy, Department of
data provider: DSpace
degree campus: UBCV
creator: Samarasinghe, Aruni
issued: 2010-09-16T19:48:38Z
issued: 1989
related degree: Master of Arts - MA
degree grantor: University of British Columbia
description: The fundamental questions raised in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons are 'what persons are?' and 'how they continue to exist?'. In discussing the concept of a person, Parfit considers these three questions: (1) What is the nature of a person? (2) What makes a person at two different times one and the same person? and (3) What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time? Parfit then distinguishes these two views about the nature of a person. * That persons are separately existing entities distinct from brains and bodies and their experiences. They continue to exist, although we know of their continuity because of thoughts, sensations and experiences that they have. * That persons are not separetely existing entities, distinct from our brains and bodies. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists in the existence of his brain and body, and the thinking of his thoughts, and the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and mental events. Parfit has not gone into a detailed discussion about the Buddhist view. My concern is that Parfit draws out of context from Buddhism and claims that the above second view to which according to him the Buddha would have agreed is true. Parfit's belief is that this is the truth about ourselves. But, coming to this view, Buddhism has considered not just the missing personal identity view. Buddhism talks about the 'being'. "All living beings are mortal and all forms are to disappear". Buddhism has an ontological view which grasps not only human beings but all other living beings in terms of impermanancy. It is the second, Reductionist view, that Parfit finds liberating and consoling which makes him less concerned about his own future, and his own death, and more concern about others. Here, the difference between the Buddha and Parfit is in what they do with the philosophical proposition once they arrive at it. For Buddha, realisation of this true belief is the starting …
aggregated CHO: https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/28488
note: PARFIT'S USE OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW ON PERSONAL IDENTITY By ARUNI SAMARASINGHE B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f K e l a n i y a , 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (D e p a r t m e n t o f P h i l o s o p h y ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA JULY 1989 © A r u n i S a m a r a s i n g h e , 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Philosophy The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 12th J u l y 1989 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d i n Derek P a r f i t ' s R e a s o n s a n d P e r s o n s a r e 'what p e r s o n s a r e ? ' and 'how t h e y c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t ? ' . I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f a p e r s o n , P a r f i t c o n s i d e r s t h e s e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s : (1) What i s t h e n a t u r e o f a p e r s o n ? (2) What makes a p e r s o n a t two d i f f e r e n t t i m e s one and t h e same p e r s o n ? and (3) What i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f e a c h p e r s o n o v e r t i m e ? P a r f i t t h e n d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s e two v i e w s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f a p e r s o n . * T h a t p e r s o n s a r e s e p a r a t e l y e x i s t i n g e n t i t i e s d i s t i n c t f r o m b r …
has type: Thesis/Dissertation
is shown at: 10.14288/1.0097891
language: eng
degree discipline: Philosophy
provider: Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
publisher: University of British Columbia
rights: For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
scholar level: Graduate
type: Text
identifier URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/28488