Arts, Faculty of
Library, Archival and Information Studies (SLAIS), School of
DSpace
UBCV
MacNeil, Heather Marie
Master of Archival Studies - MAS
University of British Columbia
The right to privacy is the right of individuals to determine, within reasonable limits, the extent to which they are known to others. Over the last twenty years the enormous increase in the amount of personal information on citizens maintained in government record-keeping systems has led to increasing public concern for information privacy. Computer technology has contributed to the collection, preservation and use of massive bodies of highly detailed personal information documenting individual characteristics as well as a broad range of social transactions. Automated record-keeping systems permit the linking of personal information from a wide variety of government data banks, a capability which, civil libertarians fear, is vulnerable to abuse. The social contract underlying relations between citizens and the state requires that individuals surrender some measure of privacy in return for physical and social protection. But how far does that contract extend? Does the social contract which, implicitly, governs the collection of personal information in the interests of administering various social benefits, also entitle archivists, as the official keepers of government records, to permit subsequent uses of that information once its administrative usefulness has been exhausted? Social researchers, including social historians, take an affirmative position, arguing that the closure of records containing personal information is a violation of the principle of freedom of enquiry or the scholar's right to pursue and to communicate knowledge in the interest of a greater societal good. The question is, does freedom of enquiry possess the same moral value as the right to privacy? In situations where the two values conflict, where does the archivist's moral duty lie? The thesis will address these questions by examining the ethical justifications for and against research uses of personal information and the social role the archivist plays in mediating the competing moral claims for privacy and access. The thesis concludes that, in a democratic society, the right to privacy supersedes the scholar's freedom of enquiry. In situations where the two values conflict, archivists, as the public trustees of the record, must act on behalf of that public to ensure that the right to privacy is not violated.
IN SEARCH OF THE COMMON GOOD: THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSING PERSONAL INFORMATION HELD IN PUBLIC ARCHIVES By HEATHER MARIE MACNEIL M.A., Simon^Fraser U n i v e r s i t y , 1985 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARCHIVAL STUDIES i n THE FACULTY OF ARTS Administered by School of L i b r a r y , A r c h i v a l and Information Studies and Department of H i s t o r y We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AUGUST 1987 © Heather Marie MacNeil In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of SCHOOL OF LIBRARY, ARCHIVAL AND INFORMATION STUDIES The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) ABSTRACT The r i g h t to p r i v a c y i s the r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l s t o determine, within reasonable l i m i t s , the extent to which they are known to o t h e r s . Over the l a s t twenty years the enormous i n c r e a s e in the amount of pe r s o n a l information on c i t i z e n s maintained i n goyernment record-keeping systems has l e d to i n c r e a s i n g p u b l i c concern f o r i n f o r m a t i o n privacy. Computer technology has"contributed to the c o l l e c t i o n , p r e s e r v a t i o n and use of massive bodies of h i g h l y " d e t a i l e d personal information documenting i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as well as a broad range of s o c i a l transactions. Automated record-keeping systems permit the l i n k i n g of p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n from a wide v a r i e t y of government data banks, a c a p a b i l i t y which, c i v i l l i b e r t a r i a n s fear, i s vulnerable to abuse. The s o c i a l c o n t r a c t underlying r e l a t i o n s between c i t i z e n s and the state requires that i n d i v i d u a l s surrender some measure of p r i v a c y in return for physical and s o c i a l protection. But how far does that contract extend? Does the s o c i a l contract which, i m p l i c i t l y , governs the c o l l e c t i o n of personal information in the int e r e s t s of administering various s o c i a l benefits, also e n t i t l e a r c h i v i s t s , as the o f f i c i a l keepers of government records, to p e r m i t s u b s e q u e n t u s e s of t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n once i t s administrative usefulness has been exhausted? Social researchers, i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s , take an aff i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n , arguing that the closure of records i i containing personal information i s a v i o l a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of freedom of enquiry or the scholar's r i g h t to pursue and to communicate knowledge in the interest of a greater s o c i e t a l good. The question i s , does freedom of enquiry possess the same moral value as the r i g h t to p r i v a c y ? In s i t u a t i o n s where the two values c o n f l i c t , where does the a r c h i v i s t ' s moral duty l i e ? The t h e s i s w i l l address these questions by examining the e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r and a g a i n s t r e s e a r c h uses of p e r s o n a l information and the s o c i a l role the a r c h i v i s t plays in mediating the competing moral claims for privacy and access. The t h e s i s concludes t h a t , i n a democratic society, the right to privacy supersedes the scholar's freedom of enquiry. In s i t u a t i o n s where the two values c o n f l i c t , a r c h i v i s t s , as the public trustees of the record, must act on behalf of that public to ensure that the right to privacy i s not v i o l a t e d . TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i CHAPTER I PRIVACY AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH: MAPPING THE MORAL TERRITORY 1 CHAPTER II THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY AS CONCEPT AND RIGHT 14 CHAPTER III HISTORY FROM THE BOTTOM UP: TRENDS IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH SINCE WORLD WAR II 60 CHAPTER IV PRIVACY DILEMMAS IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH 87 CHAPTER V NEGOTIATING FOR THE COMMON GOOD: THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF ARCHIVISTS 117 CONCLUSION 159 BIBLIOGRAPHY 164 iv I PRIVACY AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH: MAPPING THE MORAL TERRITORY His mind of man, a secret makes I meet him with a st a r t He c a r r i e s a circumference In which I have no part. Emily Dickinson In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published "The Right to Privacy" in the Harvard Law Review. In i t , they argued the case for the recognition of a general right to privacy based on the p r i n c i p l e of " i n v i o l a t e p e r s o n a l i t y . " 1 The r i g h t to privacy was intended to protect i n d i v i d u a l s against u n j u s t i f i a b l e exposure of t h e i r p r i v a t e a f f a i r s without t h e i r consent, an exposure which, Warren and Brandeis b e l i e v e d , "subjected [an individual] to mental pain and d i s t r e s s , far greater than could be i n f l i c t e d by mere bodily agony." 2 The l e g a l system that has evolved from that recognition, however, has tended to focus on property r i g h t s , r e l a t i n g to such is s u e s as t h e f t , trespass, c o p y r i g h t and s q u a t t e r s ' r i g h t s . With the e x c e p t i o n of defamation laws, i n j u r y to p e r s o n a l i t y has l a r g e l y escaped comprehensive l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n . If a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of privacy escapes us, i t i s s t i l l possible to i d e n t i f y the underlying notions of privacy. 1 Defence agai n s t i n t r u s i o n — i n t o one's home or personal l i f e — i s one such n o t i o n ; another i s defence a g a i n s t s u r v e i l l a n c e . A t h i r d n o t i o n , and the one most p e r t i n e n t to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i s p r i v a c y of i n f o r m a t i o n . In The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a c y , James Rule argues t h a t , i n the l a s t twenty years, concerns over p r i v a c y have mainly to do w i t h i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y by those at the centers of power: " t h a t i s , they r e s u l t from the demands f o r p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n by p o w e r f u l but more or l e s s d i s t a n t s o c i a l e n t i t i e s , " 3 governments, f o r example. In a 1978 r e p o r t on p r i v a c y , the A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission d e f i n e d the concept of inf o r m a t i o n p r i v a c y as: ....the need f o r proper respect f o r the autonomy of the i n d i v i d u a l . To deny the i n d i v i d u a l the a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l , to an a p p r o p r i a t e e x t e n t , h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s i n the community i s t o compromise h i s autonomy. In the context of personal i n f o r m a t i o n , the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c l a i m to p r i v a c y i s t h e r e f o r e a c l a i m to c o n t r o l , to an a p p r o p r i a t e e x t e n t , the way that others i n the community per c e i v e him. The way that personal i n f o r m a t i o n about i n d i v i d u a l s i s c o l l e c t e d , used and d i s c l o s e d i s a matter f o r p r i v a c y c o n c e r n . 4 One m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the t h r e a t to i n f o r m a t i o n p r i v a c y i s the benign s u r v e i l l a n c e power a f f o r d e d by the maintenance of personal records by government i n s t i t u t i o n s and agencies. Record-keeping has been, f o r c e n t u r i e s , a t o o l of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and i t s primary purpose has always been to provide a mechanism f o r the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of i n d i v i d u a l behaviour. The r i s e of the modern w e l f a r e s t a t e i n the 1930s brought w i t h i t an enormous increase i n the amount of personal i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e 2 in public record-keeping systems. As society became increasingly urban and anonymous, and as computer technologies began to take hold, record keeping systems expanded in t h e i r capacity to store personal information. Perhaps the most fundamental a s p e c t of the computer r e v o l u t i o n i n v o l v e s changes in the form and n a t u r e of the i n f o r m a t i o n recorded. Information that was once recorded in conventional written or printed form i s increasingly recorded in machine-readable form. Computer technology has contributed to the c o l l e c t i o n , preservation and use of massive bodies of highly d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n such as t h a t d e s c r i b i n g i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , recording human transactions, or documenting the elements of s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l processes. The technological c a p a b i l i t y to store an enormous amount of information 'about i n d i v i d u a l members of society in computerized data banks could, p o t e n t i a l l y , make communications about private t h i n g s l e s s c o n f i d e n t i a l . Once information i s stored in a data bank, control over access i s immediately attenuated. Moreover, argues Jean Tener in " A c c e s s i b i l i t y and Archives:" T e c h n i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n enables 'the c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e s s i n g and storage of large bodies of data' from which ' h i g h l y d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s w o u l d r e v e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and permit the drawing of i n f e r e n c e s about people not possible before the computer. 5 Technological developments such as t h i s pose a p o t e n t i a l l y serious threat to the right to privacy. 3 The r i g h t to p r i v a c y i s g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a prima f a c i e r a t h e r than an a b s o l u t e r i g h t ; the s u b j e c t of c u r r e n t debates on the i s s u e of p r i v a c y i s the extent of the r i g h t to p r i v a c y , that i s , the extent to which people a r e , or sh o u l d be, e n t i t l e d t o c h o o s e t h a t s t a t e i n some p a r t of t h e i r l i v e s when there are ot h e r s who c l a i m to be e n t i t l e d t o prevent them from e x e r c i s i n g t h a t c h o i c e . The r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o c o n t r o l a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n about themselves cannot be c o n s i d e r e d an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t because, the argument goes, i n some cases i t may not be i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t h a t they should c o n t r o l i t . Proponents of t h i s p o s i t i o n maintain t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e s t h a t the community should know as much as p o s s i b l e about every i n d i v i d u a l so as to be a b l e to conduct i t s a f f a i r s more e f f i c i e n t l y f o r the b e n e f i t of a l l , i n c l u d i n g the i n d i v i d u a l . Throughout h i s t o r y some measure of p r i v a c y has been t r a d e d f o r p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l p r o t e c t i o n under the terms of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t u n d e r l y i n g r e l a t i o n s between c i t i z e n s and government. T h i s s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i s the p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a s i s of the s t a t e , and i s d e f i n e d by J.W. Gough as "a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , to e x p l a i n the nature and l i m i t s of the duty of a l l e g i a n c e owed by s u b j e c t s t o the s t a t e , and of the r i g h t on the p a r t of the s t a t e or i t s government to c o n t r o l the l i v e s of i t s c i t i z e n s . " 6 Based on the f a c t t h a t "every c i v i l i z e d community, p e r h a p s any r e a l community r e q u i r e s , i n order t h a t i t may e x i s t at a l l , a mutual r e c o g n i t i o n of r i g h t s on the pa r t of i t s members, which i s a 4 t a c i t c o n t r a c t , " 7 s o c i a l contract theory s p e c i f i e s the p r i v i l e g e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s foregone by c i t i z e n s and placed in t r u s t with the governing agency and the benefits c i t i z e n s receive in return, for example, good government, pr o t e c t i o n from e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , and a guarantee of selected i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , rights that can only be relinquished with the consent of the i n d i v i d u a l . In the interest of the s o c i a l contract, c i t i z e n s are obliged to surrender a c e r t a i n amount of t h e i r privacy. The government's r i g h t to c o l l e c t and s t o r e information about c i t i z e n s i s not, however, an unlimited one. This right does not, for example, permit the government to disseminate personal information to t h i r d p a r t i e s f o r u n s p e c i f i e d purposes. The d i s c l o s u r e of p e r s o n a l information to t h i r d p a r t i e s i s contrary to the basic p r i n c i p l e that i n d i v i d u a l s should be able to determine f o r themselves when, how and to what extent information about them i s communicated to others. I n d i v i d u a l s have l i t t l e c o n t r o l over whether or not t h e i r privacy i s invaded by the government since they are o f t e n d e n i e d b e n e f i t s and s e r v i c e s i f p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s not provided. For the government then, to disseminate or permit others access to that information for use in u n s p e c i f i e d ways i s a serious threat to i n d i v i d u a l privacy. Even i f nothing i n t r i n s i c a l l y private or improperly derogatory i s s t o r e d i n a data bank, there remains some concern that the c o m b i n a t i o n of v a s t q u a n t i t i e s of o s t e n s i b l y i n n o c u o u s information on c i t i z e n s currently held in data banks, and the 5 t e c h n o l o g i c a l c a p a c i t y that exists for data bank l i n k i n g w i l l r esult in a less spontaneous and, ultimately, less free society. Over the past decade, in response to public concerns over a d m i n i s t r a t i v e abuses of personal i n f o r m a t i o n , most western c o u n t r i e s have developed data protection laws which attempt to define, l e g i s l a t i v e l y , categories of private l i f e as they relate to record-keeping p r a c t i c e s . In Obstacles to the Access, Use and Transfer of Information in Archives, Michel Duchein outlines the main c a t e g o r i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n p r o t e c t e d by most p r i v a c y l e g i s l a t i o n . These include: c i v i l status and f i l i a t i o n ; health; wealth and income; penal and criminal proceedings; p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y ; p o l i t i c a l , philosophical and r e l i g i o u s opinions; basic s t a t i s t i c a l documents; po l i c e documents; and information obtained on promise of secrecy.8 In Canada, data protection i s enshrined in the j o i n t Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act.9 The Canadian Privacy Act i n c o r p o r a t e s the c a t e g o r i e s of p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n o u t l i n e d above, and has added, "any i d e n t i f y i n g number, symbol or other p a r t i c u l a r to an i n d i v i d u a l . " 1 0 The p r i n c i p l e underlying data protection l e g i s l a t i o n i s that the p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n d i v i d u a l s must d i s c l o s e to the government in connection with any of our transactions with the government should be held to a t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p and should create a duty of n o n - d i s c l o s u r e . The c o l l e c t i o n of personal i n f o r m a t i o n about p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s by the government i s , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , prohibited where indivi d u a l s do not have the right 6 of access to that information, lack opportunity to rebut data that might be p r e j u d i c i a l and have no oppo r t u n i t y to e x e r c i s e control over i t s dissemination. The development of data protection l e g i s l a t i o n i s a matter of some concern within the research community because of the c o n s t r a i n t s such l e g i s l a t i o n c o u l d , p o t e n t i a l l y , place on re s e a r c h . Herbert Kelman argues that a s k i n g r e s e a r c h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y s o c i a l r e searchers to leave c e r t a i n regions of privacy untouched would hamper research severely: a b l a n k e t p r o h i b i t i o n of r e s e a r c h t h a t might c o n c e i v a b l y touch on such areas [ones t h a t would v i o l a t e p r i v a t e space]--which would i n c l u d e , among others, the t o p i c s of sex, personal h e a l t h , death, r e l i g i o n , e t h n i c i t y , p o l i t i c s , money, and parent-child r e l a t i o n s — would d e s t r o y or t r i v i a l i z e s o c i a l r e s e a r c h . 1 1 Historians such as Reg Whittaker defend research uses of personal information on the grounds that the researcher's intention i s not to expose a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l to p u b l i c s c r u t i n y but to reveal the app l i c a t i o n of government po l i c y in a p a r t i c u l a r time p e r i o d . W h i t t a k e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e i s not enough acknowledgement of the s c h o l a r l y r e s e a r c h p r o c e s s i n the government's h a n d l i n g of r e s e a r c h r e q u e s t s f o r p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . 1 2 In making t h e i r c l a i m f o r access to records c o n t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n , h i s t o r i a n s invoke the p r i n c i p l e of s c i e n t i f i c or academic freedom, that i s , the scholar's freedom 7 (some would say right) to pursue and to communicate knowledge. To the extent that privacy r e s t r i c t i o n s would make some studies impossible to perform, they argue, those r e s t r i c t i o n s i n f r i n g e on the s c h o l a r ' s r i g h t to i l l u m i n a t e unknown regions of human understanding. It i s important, however, to d i s t i n g u i s h from the outset between the p r i n c i p l e of academic freedom and the p r i n c i p l e of the r i g h t to know as l e g i s l a t i v e l y d e f i n e d in freedom of information laws. Freedom of i n f o r m a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the p u b l i c ' s " r i g h t to know." Based on the p r i n c i p l e that "a democracy works best when the people have a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n that the s e c u r i t y of the nation p e r m i t s , " 1 3 freedom of information means that the c i t i z e n who pays the taxes which fin a n c e the ga t h e r i n g of government information has the right to s c r u t i n i z e that i n f o r m a t i o n . The r i g h t to know i s l i n k e d , h i s t o r i c a l l y , with the emergence of the p r i n c i p l e of in d i v i d u a l natural r i g h t s — V o l t a i r e claimed, on behalf of natural freedom, the ri g h t of c r i t i c i s m and, therefore, of knowledge— and with the r e - b i r t h of the concept of democracy, according to which s o v e r e i g n t y d e r i v e s from the people, and the people, consequently, have the right to control the action of the leaders they have chosen to govern them under the terms of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . 1 4 The acceptance of the people's right to rule, f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d by Enlightenment thinkers and enshrined in both the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the C i t i z e n (1789) 8 and the American B i l l of Rights (1791), implied the state's o b l i g a t i o n to make available the records of i t s own a c t i v i t i e s in the interest of keeping government v i s i b l e and responsible. In Democracy i n America , A l e x i s de T o c q u e v i l i e defended the p r i n c i p l e of the right to know on the grounds that, "when the right of every c i t i z e n to a share in the government of society i s acknowledged, everyone must be presumed to to be able to choose between the v a r i o u s opinions of h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s and to a p p r e c i a t e the d i f f e r e n t f a c t s from which i n f e r e n c e s may be drawn." 1 5 H i s t o r i c a l l y and ph i l o s o p h i c a l l y then, the right to know i s j u s t i f i e d in terms of the requirements of c i t i z e n s h i p and p o l i t i c a l action: "vindicating the 'people's right to know,' does not r e q u i r e that a l l s p e c i a l i z e d , p r i v a t e , and r e l a t i v e l y i n a c c e s s i b l e information be 'made p u b l i c ' It demands, rather, that the public have access to those facts necessary for public judgement about public things ... n l6 Freedom of enquiry in the pursuit of knowledge i s a value in i t s own r i g h t . It i s not, however, i d e n t i c a l with the public right to know as we have come to understand that term. The s o c i a l c o n t r a c t implies an obligation on the part of c i t i z e n s to surrender some degree of privacy in the interests of the common good. But how much ought we to surrender? Does the s o c i a l contract, under which we give the government permission to know us in various private ways, also e n t i t l e a r c h i v i s t s , as the 9 o f f i c i a l keepers of government records, to permit subsequent uses of that i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the purposes of r e s e a r c h once i t s administrative usefulness, that i s , i t s o r i g i n a l intention, has been exhausted? In i t s formal d e f i n i t i o n of an a r c h i v i s t , the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s maintains that a r c h i v i s t s "share a unifying b e l i e f in the value of h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s . " 1 7 A c r u c i a l part of the ar c h i v a l mandate, i t i s widely argued, i s to promote access to records to the f u l l e s t extent. The Association of Canadian A r c h i v i s t s has warned that l a r g e - s c a l e c l o s u r e s of personal records would cause a serious d e t e r i o r a t i o n of publications on the development of Canadian society. For example, the production of scholarly works currently being written on the settlement of the West, the depression, World War I I , immigration and ethnic communities, which rel y h e a v i l y on c o r r e s p o n d e n c e from and c o n c e r n i n g i n d i v i d u a l s would be s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d and the a b i l i t y to increase our knowledge in understanding our Canadian culture would be seriously impaired.^8 The e t h i c a l dilemma posed by researchers' claims for access to records c o n t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l information a r i s e s out of the c o n f l i c t between the competing values of autonomy and s o c i a l enquiry, values which, Edward S h i l s believes, are both rooted in the i n d i v i d u a l i s t premises of modern l i b e r a l society: The respect for privacy rests on the appreciation of human digni t y , with i t s high evaluation of i n d i v i d u a l self-determination, free from the bonds of prejudice, passion and s u p e r s t i t i o n . In t h i s , the respect for human d i g n i t y and i n d i v i d u a l i t y shares an h i s t o r i c a l comradeship with the freedom of s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y , which i s e q u a l l y p r e c i o u s to modern l i b e r a l i s m . The 10 t e n s i o n between these v a l u e s , so e s s e n t i a l to each other i n so many profoundly important ways, i s one ofthe antinomies of modern liberalism.19 The question i s , does freedom of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry possess the same moral value as the r i g h t to privacy? In situations where the two values c o n f l i c t , where does the a r c h i v i s t ' s moral duty l i e ? What c r i t e r i a should be a p p l i e d i n determining "reasonable" access? These questions w i l l be examined in the next four chapters with reference to the evolution of the concept and right of privacy; trends in s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l research that threaten the right to privacy; the e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for and against research uses of personal information; and, f i n a l l y , the role of the a r c h i v i s t in mediating the competing moral claims for privacy and access. 11 CHAPTER I ENDNOTES 1. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to P r i v a c y , " Harvard Law Review 4 .5 (1890) 193-220, reprinted in P h i l o s o p h i c a l Dimensions of P r i v a c y , ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 82. 2. Warren and Brandeis 77. 3. James Rule, Douglas McAdam, Linda Stearns, David Uglow, The P o l i t i c s of Privacy: Planning for Personal Data Systems as Powerful Technologies (New York: E l s e v i e r , 1980) 23. 4. [Australian] Law Reform Commission Report No. 22 Privacy V o l . 2, c i t e d in G. F i n l a y , " P r o t e c t i o n of P r i v a c y and the Government Archives Organisation," paper presented at the XXIIIrd Internation Conference of the Round Table on A r c h i v e s , A u s t i n Texas, 24-28 October 1985. 5. Jean Tener, " A c c e s s i b i l i t y and Archives," Archivaria 6 (Summer 1978): 28. 6. J.W. Gough, The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957) 244. 7. R.L. Nettleship, c i t e d in Gough 245. 8. Michel Duchein, Obstacles to the Access, Use and Transfer of Information from A r c h i v e s : A RAMP Study with g u i d e l i n e s (Paris: Unesco, 1983) 20-22. 9. S.C. 1980-83, c. I l l , Schedules I and I I . 10. For a l l the categories of personal information covered u n d e r t h e l e g i s l a t i o n , see s e c t i o n 3 of t h e P r i v a c y Act. 11. Herbert Kelman, "Research, Behavioural," Encyclopedia of Bioethics (New York: MacMillan Co., 1978) 4: 1470-81. 12. Reg Whittaker, "Access to Information: The Historian's Perspective," paper presented at the Toronto Area A r c h i v i s t s Group Access to Information Forum, 15 November 1986. 12 13. Memorandum of the U.S. Attorney General, 1967, c i t e d in Duchein, Obstacles 11. 14. Duchein 3. 15. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1945) 1: 190. 16. P e t e r Dennis Bathory and Wilson Carey McWilliams, " P o l i t i c a l Theory and the People's Right to Know," Government Secrecy i n Democracies, ed. Itzhak Galnoor (New York: New York University Press, 1977) 8. 17. " A r c h i v i s t : A D e f i n i t i o n , " S.A.A. Newsletter (January 1984). 18. "Submission of the Canadian Association of A r c h i v i s t s to the Parliamentary Committee on J u s t i c e and Legal A f f a i r s with Respect to B i l l C43," n.d. 12. 19. Edward S h i l s , "Social Inquiry and the Autonomy of the Individual," S o c i a l Research Ethics, ed. Martin Bulmer (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982) 130. 13 II THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY AS CONCEPT AND RIGHT Each person, withdrawn into himself, behaves as though he i s a stranger to the destiny of a l l the others. His children and his good friends c o n s t i t u t e f o r him the whole of the human s p e c i e s . As for his transactions with fellow c i t i z e n s , he may mix among them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but does not f e e l them; he e x i s t s only in himself and for himself alone. And i f on these terms there remains in his mind a sense of family, there no longer remains a sense of society. Alexis de Tocqueville When de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America in 1835 his deepest reservations concerning the American p o l i t i c a l system were d i r e c t e d at the c e n t r a l i z i n g and conformist tendencies of government bureaucracy and the attenuating e f f e c t such tendencies c o u l d have on the e m o t i o n a l and p e r s o n a l f o u n d a t i o n s of c i t i z e n s h i p , i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and, ultimately, t h e i r e f f e c t on the p u b l i c ' s a b i l i t y t o d e f e n d i t s p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . He predicted that American democracy would ine v i t a b l y be constrained by what he c a l l e d "the tyranny of the majority," the desire to l e v e l things down to a common standard. Out of m a j o r i t a r i a n oppression would emerge a power that, de Tocqueville warned: ...does not destroy, but prevents existence ...does not t y r a n n i z e but ...compresses, enervates, extinguishes and stupefies a people, t i l l each nation i s reduced to nothing b e t t e r than a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the government i s the shepherd. 1 14 Tocqueville's nightmare v i s i o n of a t o t a l l y conformist society in which no public exists in any meaningful sense comes dist u r b i n g l y close to the si t u a t i o n we f i n d ourselves in as we near the end of the twentieth century. The roots of the nightmare can be traced to the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of what used to be known as the public sphere and the absorption of the t r a d i t i o n a l private sphere into what we c a l l today mass society. In c l a s s i c a l Greek thought, the d i v i s i o n between public and private--between a c t i v i t i e s related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of l i f e — s t o o d as a self-evident and axiomatic assumption. 2 The public sphere was the realm of common p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which d i r e c t e d i t s e l f toward the p u b l i c welfare; the private sphere was synonymous with the household or family realm and i t revolved around the fundamental maintenance of l i f e - - f o o d , c l o t h i n g and s h e l t e r . Today the d i s t i n c t i o n between the private and the public, once considered e s s e n t i a l , no longer corresponds to the re l a t i o n s h i p between the in d i v i d u a l and the state. Michel Foucault has traced the beginnings of the change to a conceptual s h i f t in p o l i t i c a l thinking that occurred during the Renaissance. I t was around t h i s time, according to Foucault, that the household and i t s method of organization came under the scrutiny of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s and t r e a t i s e writers who found in i t both a useful metaphor and an adaptable model for a new form of p o l i t i c a l power: the state. New l i n k s between the s t a t e — which formed i t s e l f around the great t e r r i t o r i a l monarchies that arose in Europe from the fragments of f e u d a l e s t a t e s — and the individual—whose s p i r i t u a l welfare became a p o l i t i c a l issue in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation—gave r i s e to a new type of p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . 3 Around the middle of the s i x t e e n t h century, a series of t r e a t i s e s on the " a r t of government" began to appear. Such t r e a t i s e s introduced, for the f i r s t time, d e t a i l e d analyses on the most e f f i c i e n t means of i n t r o d u c i n g government, meaning economy and order, from the state at the top down through a l l aspects of s o c i a l l i f e . The t r e a t i s e s referred d i r e c t l y to the " g o v e r n i n g of a household, s o u l s , c h i l d r e n , a p r o v i n c e , a convent, a r e l i g i o u s o r d e r , or a f a m i l y , " and p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n extended to embrace v i r t u a l l y every aspect of human a c t i v i t y , "from the smallest s t i r r i n g s of the soul to the largest m i l i t a r y manoeuvers of the army." 4 Each a c t i v i t y was s c r u t i n i z e d in order to determine the most economical method by which i t could be c a r r i e d out. "The art of government," Foucault argues, [was] concerned with how to introduce economy that i s the correct manner of managing i n d i v i d u a l s , goods and wealth w i t h i n the f a m i l y , ...how to introduce t h i s meticulous attention of the father towards his family, into the management of the s t a t e . 5 Within t h i s new paradigm of p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g , a complex r e l a t i o n s h i p of men and things was given p r i o r i t y , a r e l a t i o n s h i p in which: 16 the things which the government [was] to be concerned about are men, but men in the i r r e l a t i o n s , t h e i r l i n k s , t h e i r i m b r i c a t i o n with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the t e r r i t o r y w i t h i t s s p e c i f i c q u a l i t i e s , c l i m a t e , i r r i g a t i o n , ...men in the i r r e l a t i o n to other kinds of things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.; l a s t l y , men in t h e i r r e l a t i o n to that other kind of thi n g s which are a c c i d e n t s and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc.6 These academic t r e a t i s e s on the art of government can be linked to the r i s e and growth of c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e apparatuses from the middle of the sixteenth century on. By the seventeenth century, t h i s new p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y had given b i r t h to " s t a t i s t i c s " , the science of the state, which measured "'the d i f f e r e n t elements, dimensions and facto r s of the state's power.'"7 As the l i f e process of the p o p u l a t i o n i t s e l f became a c e n t r a l concern of the s t a t e , a new regime of power--what Foucault has termed "bio-power"--was i n s t i t u t e d . Bio-power "brought l i f e and i t s mechanisms i n t o the realm of e x p l i c i t c a l c u l a t i o n s and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human l i f e . " 8 i n the middle to late eighteenth century, bio-power fused around two d i s t i n c t p o l e s : the human sp e c i e s and the human body. According to Foucault, "for the f i r s t time i n h i s t o r y , s c i e n t i f i c c a t e g o r i e s ( s p e c i e s , population, f e r t i l i t y , and so f o r t h ) , rather than j u r i d i c a l ones, became the object of systematic, sustained p o l i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n and intervention." At the same time, the human body began to be 17 approached "as an object to be manipulated and controlled."9 Around t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a t ion of the body emerged a new " d i s c i p l i n a r y technology," a set of procedures that were directed toward the molding of "a docile body that may be subjected, used, t r a n s f o r m e d and improved. " l u" Adopted i n a v a r i e t y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l settings—workshops, schools, prisons and hospitals for example—this d i s c i p l i n a r y technology used d r i l l s , physical t r a i n i n g , the standardizing of actions over time and the control of physical space to accomplish i t s ends. The "Panopticon," conceived by Jeremy Bentham in 1791 as the model for a " s c i e n t i f i c " prison i s a s i g n i f i c a n t manifestation of d i s c i p l i n a r y technology as theory and praxis. In D i s c i p l i n e and Punish: The B i r t h of the Prison, Foucault describes the p r i n c i p l e on which the Panopticon was based: . . . a t the p e r i p h e r y , an annular b u i l d i n g ; at the c e n t r e , a tower; t h i s tower i s p i e r c e d w i t h wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the p e r i p h e r i c b u i l d i n g i s d i v i d e d i n t o c e l l s , each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the l i g h t to cross the c e l l from one end to the o t h e r . A l l t h a t i s needed, then, i s to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up i n each c e l l a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the e f f e c t of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out p r e c i s e l y against the l i g h t , the small captive shadows in the c e l l s of the p e r i p h e r y . ...Each i n d i v i d u a l , in h i s place, i s securely confined to a c e l l from which he i s seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He i s seen, but he does not see; he i s the o b j e c t of information, never a subject in communication. 1* 18 The P a n o p t i c o n i s a u s e f u l metaphor f o r the b e h a v i o u r i s t s e n s i b i l i t y that permeated the Age of Reason. I t s e s s e n t i a l p o i n t , e x p r e s s e d a r c h i t e c t u r a l l y , was to e f f e c t a r a d i c a l separation between the observer and the observed and to render the l a t t e r permanently v i s i b l e through i t s schema of generalized s u r v e i l l a n c e . The gradual extension of the mechanisms of d i s c i p l i n e embodied i n panopticism—where the powerless are exposed and power l i e s in the r e l e n t l e s s i n v i s i b l e gaze which s t u d i e s them--is only the most v i s i b l e aspect of various more profound processes that spread throughout the s o c i a l body in the seventeenth and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , processes that a l t e r e d forever the.relationship between the private and the p u b l i c . Hannah Arendt has argued that the emergence of s o c i e t y — t h e elevation of the concerns, a c t i v i t i e s and organizational devices of the household to the public sphere—occurred at the expense of the p r i v a t e sphere to which such a c t i v i t i e s had h i t h e r t o belonged. From the middle of the s i x t e e n t h century on, the t r a d i t i o n a l family unit declined as i t gradually became absorbed i n t o corresponding s o c i a l g r o u p s . 1 2 And a s society grew and began to assume the contours of a gigantic household, a super-human f a m i l y 1 3 whose everyday a f f a i r s were administered by the state, i t began, increasingly, to expect from the members of t h i s new "family" a c e r t a i n kind of behaviour. It embodied that expectation in a wide range of codes and conventions that sought to "normalize" i t s members, to make them behave. "Whether the 19 framework happens to be actual rank in the h a l f - f e u d a l society of the eighteenth century, [or] t i t l e in the c l a s s society of the n i n e t e e n t h , " such codes and conventions "always equate the i n d i v i d u a l with h i s rank w i t h i n the s o c i a l framework. What matters i s [the] equation with s o c i a l s t a t u s . " 1 4 This same expectation of conformity to c l e a r - c u t codes of behaviour i s apparent in the evolution of the modern science of economics whose b i r t h coincided with the r i s e of society. Armed with i t s foremost technical t o o l , s t a t i s t i c s , economics became the perfect embodiment of the philosophical p r i n c i p l e s of the Age of Reason. According to Arendt, "economics ...could achieve a s c i e n t i f i c character only when men had become s o c i a l beings and unanimously followed c e r t a i n patterns of behaviour, so that those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be a s o c i a l or abnormal."15 The r i s e of society and the entrenchment of state power that accompanied i t changed irrevocably the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and the state and, in the process, blurred forever the old borderlines between public and p r i v a t e . In ancient f e e l i n g , the p r i v a t i v e t r a i t of privacy was emphasized, i t meant l i t e r a l l y a state of being deprived of something. A r i s t o t l e i n s i s t e d that a man who l i v e d only a private l i f e could not be considered f u l l y human. But around the time of the Enlightenment, the t r a d i t i o n a l function of the p r i v a t e — t h e physical maintenance of family l i f e , was transformed. P r i v a c y became synonymous with what we c a l l today, the "sphere of intimacy." Its decisive function, according to the f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e e x p l o r e r of intimacy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was to s h e l t e r the i n t e r i o r r e g i o n s of human consiousness, which u n t i l then had needed no special protection, from the oppressive intrusion of society, "the modern ind i v i d u a l and his endless c o n f l i c t s , his i n a b i l i t y either to be at home in society or to l i v e outside i t altogether, his ever-changing moods and the r a d i c a l subjectivism of his emotional l i f e was born in t h i s r e b e l l i o n of the heart."16 The r e b e l l i o n against society was d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t the l e v e l l i n g demands of the state, and against society's demand that i t s members behave as one enormous family possessing only one opinion and one i n t e r e s t ; a form of domination characterized by Arendt as, "the rule by N o b o d y , " 1 7 i n w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t i s r e p l a c e d by p u r e administration. If the thrust of society in e a r l i e r centuries was directed at devouring the o l d realms of the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , the tendency of mass society in t h i s century has been to devour the more r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d sphere of intimacy. Aided by the enormous growth of technology, the same society which created the modern demand for privacy has also created the means to make i t s elimination a f a i r l y simple matter. Some h i s t o r i a n s have argued that we experience greater p r i v a c y than d i d previous generations. 1** The weakening of community bonds and moral norms, the anonymity of urban l i f e , and 21 the i n c r e a s e d c u l t u r a l emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l aspiration and achievement are c i t e d frequently as factors that have enhanced i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 1 9 But, as Arthur Schaefer argues, the s o c i a l impact of these f a c t o r s has not been so profound as that caused by such countervailing h i s t o r i c a l trends as the higher population density of urban environments; business factors, such as the widespread use of c r e d i t with the resultant need for c r e d i t ratings; and, perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the t e c h n o l o g i c a l breakthroughs in computerization and monitoring, which permit extensive government and business s u r v e i l l a n c e of private a f f a i r s and communication. Today, information about a l l major personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s -- v i t a l s t a t i s t i c s , s o c i a l and geographic m o b i l i t y , wealth, income, education, p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s — c a n be e a s i l y stored, organized and disseminated in machine-readable form. One re s u l t of t h i s , according to Arthur Schaefer, has been that otherwise h a r m l e s s (because s c a t t e r e d ) data can be transformed i n t o p o t e n t i a l l y harmful dossiers: Advanced technology has made extensive surveillance r e l a t i v e l y easy and inexpensive. At the same time, the i n c r e a s i n g l y b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (a f e a t u r e shared by governments and m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s ) has made e x t e n s i v e s u r v e i l l a n c e and m o n i t o r i n g of i n d i v i d u a l s seem inevitable and desirable, at least to those whose power and other interests are enhanced by the result.20 A 1972 Report of the Department of Communications/Department of J u s t i c e , P r i v a c y and Computers, concluded that "more personal 22 i n f o r m a t i o n i s being c o l l e c t e d than most Canadians probably suspect, and i s made avail a b l e to a larger number of users than i s probably supposed." 2 1 The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t e x t i n which documentation i s co l l e c t e d , stored and disseminated by large s o c i a l organizations, p a r t i c u l a r l y governments, i s at the heart of debates concerning p o t e n t i a l l y invasive uses of personal information. Such debates take as t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t a number of f a c t u a l premises concerning the process of information c o l l e c t i o n , including: that information i s supplied by individ u a l s about themselves or others to government agencies for a s p e c i f i c purpose, for example, to obt a i n a pension or to seek employment; that record-keeping systems are oft e n arranged, maintained and made a c c e s s i b l e a c c o r d i n g to personal i d e n t i f i e r s (usually a Social Insurance Number); that references and c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s can be made to i d e n t i f i a b l e people in other records maintained by agencies; that personal information gathered i s usually organized and stored in a form which can be used subsequently by others; that the use of c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s of info r m a t i o n f o r secondary purposes i s con s i d e r e d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t a b l e , for example, in dealing with v i o l a t i o n s of the law; and, f i n a l l y , that the information that can be d e r i v e d from a body of da t a c o n t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l information i s not n e c e s s a r i l y exhausted at the time of i t s o r i g i n a l u s e . 2 2 Today, various data banks can be linked that w i l l allow bank 23 records, c r e d i t card f i l e s , tax payment information and much more to be assembled into one large electronic dossier. "Computer m a t c h i n g " i n v o l v e s a p a r t i c u l a r type of r e c o r d l i n k a g e or matching of p e r s o n a l d a t a . I t has been d e f i n e d as "the comparison of d i f f e r e n t l i s t s or f i l e s to determine whether i d e n t i c a l , s i m i l a r , or c o n f l i c t i n g information appears in them. Comparisons can be made by matching names, s o c i a l s e c u r i t y numbers, addresses, or other personal i d e n t i f i e r s . " 2 3 Computer matching has been used to detect unreported income, unreported a s s e t s , d u p l i c a t e b e n e f i t s , i n c o r r e c t personal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers, overpayments, i n e l i g i b l e r e c i p i e n t s , i n a p p r o p r i a t e entitlements to benefits, and service providers b i l l i n g twice for the same a c t i v i t y . A s p e c i a l survey by the Treasury Board S e c r e t a r i a t in 1984-85 revealed that a considerable amount of computer matching i s c a r r i e d out by government institutions.24 53 separate computer matching programs were discovered in some of the larger departments and agencies; and the practice i s almost c e r t a i n l y more widespread than the 53 programs documented by the Treasury Board s i n c e only 12 departments were included in the survey. Computer matching programs are regularly defended on the grounds on t h e i r effectiveness and e f f i c i e n c y . At present, the Canadian Privacy A c t 2 5 does not deal with computer matching in e x p l i c i t terms although i t does e s t a b l i s h in s e c t i o n 7(a) the basic p r i n c i p l e that personal information should only be used f o r 24 the purpose for which i t was c o l l e c t e d , or for a use consistent with that purpose. S i n c e computer matching i n v o l v e s the comparison of personal i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes, the practice c l e a r l y contravenes t h i s provision of the Act. Federal Privacy Commissioner John Grace has argued that o n l y an u n a c c e p t a b l y broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the words "consistent use" could be used to j u s t i f y computer matching as i t is currently understood: ...computer-matching turns the t r a d i t i o n a l presumption of i n n o c e n c e i n t o a p r e s u m p t i o n of g u i l t . ..In matching, even where there i s no indicati o n of wrong-doing, i n d i v i d u a l s are subject to high t e c h n o l o g y search and seizure. Once the p r i n c i p l e of matching i s accepted, a s o c i a l force of unyielding and p e r v a s i v e magnitude i s put in place.26 Whether the intention that feeds the p r a c t i c e i s innocent or malign, the fact that information c o l l e c t e d for one purpose can be used for another—can be used, in fa c t , to compile dossiers on private c i t i z e n s — i s a serious problem because the protection of personal information i s one of the few defences the i n d i v i d u a l has against government abuse. In Canada, much of the concern over computer matching, or dossier building has focused on the increasing and multiple uses of the S o c i a l Insurance Number. The S o c i a l Insurance Number (SIN) i s the most common personal i d e n t i f i e r in use in Canada. It was developed in the early 1960s in response to the need for n u m e r i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s as a means of f a c i l i t a t i n g the e f f i c i e n t use of mainframe computers; that 25 t e c h n o l o g i c a l imperative continues to d r i v e i t s use. SINs were introduced f o r purposes of f e d e r a l unemployment i n s u r a n c e and pension plans i n 1964, but no c o n t r o l s were placed on a d d i t i o n a l uses of t h i s new numbering system. In 1981, i n response t o burgeoning uses of the SIN, the f i r s t P r i v a c y Commissioner Inger Hansen recommended the c r e a t i o n of a new c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e "against the p r i v a c y of another" i n order to r e g u l a t e i t s u s e 2 7 but her recommendation f e l l on deaf e a r s . In 1985-86, the P r i v a c y C o m m i s s i o n e r heard from more than 100 i n d i v i d u a l s complaining about some o r g a n i z a t i o n s ' use of s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e numbers or seeking c l a r i f i c a t i o n about the requirement to provide a SIN.28 Today, almost every t r a n s a c t i o n between c i t i z e n s and s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s — they c o u l d be g o v e r n m e n t a l , e d u c a t i o n a l or b u s i n e s s — r e q u i r e s the i n c l u s i o n of the SIN as an e s s e n t i a l and f o r m a l element i n t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n . In the R e p o r t of t h e Standing Committee on J u s t i c e and S o l i c i t o r General reviewing the Access to Information Act and the P r i v a c y A c t , the Committee members c i t e a number of agencies who abuse the SIN, i n c l u d i n g : c e r t a i n p o l i c e departments who r e q u i r e a SIN from persons c a l l i n g t h e i r emergency number; some f u n e r a l homes who r e q u i r e the deceased's number t o o b t a i n a b u r i a l p e r m i t from m u n i c i p a l a u t h o r i t i e s ; insurance companies who r e g u l a r l y ask p o l i c y holders to d i v u l g e t h e i r SINs when making p o l i c y c l a i m s ; and c r e d i t bureaus, who use the SIN as a primary means of l i n k i n g pieces of 26 information about a s p e c i f i c person.29 Grace maintains that, "uncontrolled and general use of the SIN e s t a b l i s h e s a de f a c t o n a t i o n a l i d e n t i f i e r with a l l i t s ominous and de-humanizing i m p l i c a t i o n s . " 3 0 The practice makes i t much easier to compile a wide range of information about c i t i z e n s from d i s p a r a t e s o u r c e s . C i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e c o u l d , p o t e n t i a l l y , be put together on i n d i v i d u a l s , traces could be kept of t h e i r reading or educational i n t e r e s t s , on v i r t u a l l y every aspect of t h e i r l i v e s . If we consider the broad range of government programs and the broad range of a c t i v i t y in the private sector a f f e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s , i t becomes c l e a r that the documentary world concerning us i s very extensive. The g a t h e r i n g of d a t a by l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s a s o u r c e of uneasiness because i t constitutes a form of surveillance, a kind of technological voyeurism against which, unless i t i s checked, we, as c i t i z e n s , are, l a r g e l y , defenceless. Moreover, there i s a c o n c e r n t h a t l a r g e i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s , governments for example, w i l l use the information in ways that were not intended, or consented to, at the time of c o l l e c t i o n . S o c i o l o g i s t James R u l e s u g g e s t s t h a t much of the organizational interest in the private l i v e s of i n d i v i d u a l s i s generated by the d e s i r e to c o n t r o l deviant behaviour, through c r e d i t systems that attempt to minimize the number of poor c r e d i t r i s k s ; and by "the [need]...to document and d e f i n e . . . f i n e -g r a i n e d bureaucratic o b l i g a t i o n s . " 3 1 The enormous quantity of 27 personal documentation required for medical insurance or welfare benefits, for example, serves mainly to e s t a b l i s h e l i g i b i l i t y for those services. Moreover, Rule points out: P e ople . . . p r o t e s t what t h e y c o n s i d e r " u n f a i r s u r v e i l l a n c e " — o f t e n in the same breath with which they demand more vigorous s u r v e i l l a n c e f o r purposes which they support. Nearly a l l people can point to some form of surveillance with which they are unhappy, e i t h e r because they disapprove of the ends at which i t i s directed, or because i t i s i n e f f i c i e n t in the pursuit of these ends. But most people remain quick to demand surveillance, whenever i t seems to promise e f f e c t i v e pursuit of ends which they deem desirable. Public and private bureaucracies are usually only too w i l l i n g to accommodate these demands. 3 2 C l e a r l y , p u b l i c demand for e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t tax evaders, dangerous d r i v e r s , or welfare frauds i s at least p a r t l y responsible for the growth of s u r v e i l l a n c e . Social uncertainties make systematic monitoring and control possible; and so long as the e f f i c i e n c y c r i t e r i o n remains i n e f f e c t t o j u s t i f y s u r v e i l l a n c e , the pressures a g a i n s t personal p r i v a c y w i l l , i n e v i t a b l y , increase. There i s no natural l i m i t to the growth of surveillance and no area of an individual's l i f e too private to a t t r a c t bureaucratic surveillance. People dis c l o s e a l l manner of deeply sensitive information to medical personnel as one of the costs of modern medical care; they may reveal equally s e n s i t i v e information to insurance companies when f i l i n g a c l a i m . 3 3 The r e s u l t i s that as c o r r e l a t i o n s are established between p a r t i c u l a r kinds of data, o f f e r i n g new p o s s i b i l i t i e s for various kinds of s o c i a l c o n t r o l , the demands for more personal data i n e v i t a b l y 28 follow.34 A l l o f t h e s e d e v e 1 o p m e n t s - - s o c i a 1, e c o n o m i c a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l — have g e n e r a t e d w e l l - f o u n d e d f e a r s a b o u t t h e a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s t o p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s e f f e c t i v e l y against unwarranted i n t r u s i o n s i n t o t h e i r p r i v a t e a f f a i r s . Such i n t r u s i o n s have not gone unchallenged and over the l a s t twenty years cracks i n the c u l t u r a l hegemony have begun to appear. S i n c e the l a t e 1960s, what the philosopher Theodor Adorno once r e f e r r e d to as the "administered world" has become a battleground f o r s o c i a l s t r u g g l e . Against the pervasive sense of personal i s o l a t i o n and p a s s i v i t y , of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s that were a l o o f , enigmatic and unwieldy, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c demand of the v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l and student movents that took shape during the s i x t i e s was for greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n t r o l i n a l l phases of c o l l e c t i v e l i f e . Animated by the same c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t drove the freedom of i n f o r m a t i o n movement, c i t i z e n s began to speak a l s o not o n l y of t h e i r need f o r p r i v a c y but of t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t t o i t . Today, most western c o u n t r i e s have a d o p t e d some f o r m o f d a t a p r o t e c t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n i n acknowledgement of the p r i n c i p l e of the r i g h t to p r i v a c y . But, while the p r i n c i p l e of a " r i g h t to p r i v a c y , " i s r e l a t i v e l y easy t o d e f e n d , the i s s u e of p r i v a c y p r o t e c t i o n remains a problem b e c a u s e t h e c o n c e p t i t s e l f r e s i s t s c o h e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n . What c o n s t i t u t e s an unwarranted i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y ? How do we d e f i n e p r i v a t e a f f a i r s ? 29 The obstacles to defining privacy, as summarized in the the Younger Committee Report 3 5, are two-fold: f i r s t , many of the things we f e e l the need to preserve, from the p r y i n g eyes of others are f e e l i n g s , b e l i e f s , or matters of conduct that are e s s e n t i a l l y i r r a t i o n a l ; and second, the scope of p r i v a c y i s determined largely by the standards and mores of a given society and these standards are subject to constant change. The Younger Committee Report concluded that "the concept of privacy cannot be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e f i n e d , " c i t i n g , in support, the e q u a l l y p e s s i m i s t i c conclusions reached by an e a r l i e r B r i t i s h Justice Committee on Privacy which were: ..... that no purpose would be served by our making yet another attempt at d e v e l o p i n g an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y rigorous analysis ...At any given time, there w i l l be ce r t a i n things which almost everyone w i l l agree ought to be part of the "private" area which people should be allowed to preserve from the i n t r u s i o n of o t h e r s , s u b j e c t o n l y to the o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t of the community as a whole where t h i s p l a i n l y outweighs the private r i g h t . Surrounding t h i s area there w i l l always be a "grey area" on which opinions w i l l d i f f e r , and the extent of t h i s grey area, as also that of the central one, i s bound to vary from time to time. 3^ C l e a r l y , the range of privacy concerns i s remarkably wide and diverse, a fact that has led some c r i t i c s to assume a morally sk e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n with respect to i t s v a l u e . 3 7 Privacy debates revolve around two issues concerning the r e d u c i b i l i t y of privacy to other interests or r i g h t s , commonly termed the "coherence" and "d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s " issues. F i r s t , i s there something fundamental, integrated and unique about the concerns commonly grouped under 30 the heading "privacy issues" or are those concerns only randomly associated? Second, i s there something morally d i s t i n c t i v e about p r i v a c y or can p r i v a c y claims be defended by the same moral p r i n c i p l e s on which we base our defence of other values? The most concise d e f i n i t i o n of privacy i s "the right to be l e t alone,"38 ac c o r d i n g to which p r i v a c y i s synonymous with "negative l i b e r t y " . The equation has some v a l i d i t y s i n c e the standard cases of "invasion of privacy" commonly take the form of coercive intrusions upon the in d i v i d u a l and relate to such issues as t h e f t , trespass, copyright and defamation of character. Such a d e f i n i t i o n i s f l a w e d , however, inasmuch as i t l a c k s the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s necessary for the phrase to be useful in more than a conclusory sense. "The r i g h t to be l e t alone" covers almost any conceivable complaint a c i t i z e n could make and a great many examples of not l e t t i n g people alone cannot r e a d i l y be d e s c r i b e d as i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y . In some instances the negative l i b e r t y attaching to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n may even c o n f l i c t with the right to privacy.39 The d e f i n i t i o n i s , at the same time, too narrow since i t i s possible to v i o l a t e a person's privacy without any c o e r c i o n or i n t e r f e r e n c e with freedom of action. Surveillance of various kinds can take place without our knowledge — w i r e t a p p i n g or computer-matching are j u s t two examples; and in each case we suffer a loss of privacy, notwithstanding the fact that we are not coerced and our freedom of action, thought, and expression 31 has not been interfered with. A r e l a t e d theory of p r i v a c y , f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis i n 1890 s t r e s s e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between respect for privacy and respect for i n d i v i d u a l dignity generally. Privacy i t s e l f i s not defined; rather i t i s connected with other values, including the right to be l e t alone and the respect due an individual's " i n v i o l a t e i n d i v i d u a l personality." 40 According to t h i s theory privacy i s connected in a s p e c i f i c and profound way with the r e c o g n i t i o n of human moral cha r a c t e r ; " i n v i o l a t e p e r s o n a l i t y " embraces i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y and dignit y , personal uniqueness, and personal autonomy. Edward Bloustein has suggested that the coherence of privacy l i e s in the fact that a l l invasions of privacy are v i o l a t i o n s of human d i g n i t y . 4 1 There are, however, v i o l a t i o n s of human dignity and personality that have nothing to do with privacy: having to stand in l i n e at a foodbank, for example, i s a serious affront to human dig n i t y but i t has nothing to do with privacy. The right to make personal decisions without interference by the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t e s yet another v a r i a t i o n on the theme of p r i v a c y as the r i g h t to be l e t a l o n e . 4 2 j n such cases, the concept of p r i v a c y i s extended to p r o t e c t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i b e r t y of actions and autonomy from state regulation of certa i n intimate aspects of t h e i r l i f e . The f i r s t problem with t h i s concept of p r i v a c y i s that the t y p i c a l privacy claim i s not a claim for non-interference by the state, but, rather, a claim for 32 state interference in the form of l e g a l protection against other i n d i v i d u a l s . 4 3 Secondly, i t excludes a l l claims that have nothing to do with h i g h l y p e r s o n a l d e c i s i o n s , such as an i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to be "on f i l e " in a c entral data bank. Third l y , to define privacy as non-interference with private a c t i o n s i s to r e s t r i c t the context in which we can speak about important issues r e l a t i n g to state interference with i n d i v i d u a l action, issues that may be more e f f e c t i v e l y addressed under the umbrella concept of " l i b e r t y of a c t i o n . " 4 4 The most popular approach to defining privacy currently i s one which t a k e s " i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l " r a t h e r than non-i n t e r f e r e n c e as i t s e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Alan Westin's d e f i n i t i o n of privacy as "the claim of i n d i v i d u a l s , groups, or i n s t i t u t i o n s to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them i s communicated to o t h e r s " 4 5 i s the most frequently c i t e d in t h i s regard and i t s i n f l u e n c e on the study of privacy has been enormous. 4^ Other proponents of the c o n t r o l type d e f i n i t i o n i n c l u d e Richard Parker, who d e f i n e s p r i v a c y as c o n t r o l over who senses u s ; 4 7 Charles F r i e d , who d e f i n e s i t as "the c o n t r o l we have over i n f o r m a t i o n about ourselves;" 4** and Arthur M i l l e r , who i d e n t i f i e s privacy as "the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y to control the c i r c u l a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g to him." 4^ The advantage of the control type d e f i n i t i o n of privacy i s that i t i d e n t i f i e s c l e a r l y the i n t e r e s t i n v o l v e d when people r e s i s t surveillance or monitoring of t h e i r a f f a i r s , 33 that i n t e r e s t being the d e s i r e of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups to disclose what they are doing on t h e i r own terms and to whom they choose.50 There are, nevertheless, serious l i m i t a t i o n s to t h i s concept of privacy. According to one sense of the d e f i n i t i o n , the "weak sense" d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l , a voluntary disclosure does not i n v o l v e l o s s of p r i v a c y because such a d i s c l o s u r e would be considered an exercise of c o n t r o l , rather than a loss of it.51 Control over the decision to d i s c l o s e information, r a t h e r than c o n t r o l over the amount of information others a c t u a l l y have i s emphasized i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n . The o t h e r , " s t r o n g sense" d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l sees v o l u n t a r y disclosure as a loss of c o n t r o l because the person who d i s c l o s e s l o s e s the power to prevent others from further disseminating the information. The weak sense d e f i n i t i o n of control i s not s u f f i c i e n t as a description of privacy because individuals can have control over whether to disclose personal information and yet not control the information and access others have to them through other means. The strong sense d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l , on the other hand, claims too much because i t may indicate a loss of privacy when there is. only a threat of such l o s s . Moreover, to equate privacy with the r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l s to c o n t r o l the flow of information about themselves does not e s t a b l i s h whether they are in fact known by others (through other means).. A more s e r i o u s concern with c o n t r o l d e f i n i t i o n s of p r i v a c y i s that c o n t r o l s i t u a t e s the 34 essence of privacy in the a b i l i t y to choose i t and see that the choice i s respected; the power of choice i s emphasized rather than the way in which such power should be exercised, thereby preempting questions concerning when and why losses of p r i v a c y are undesirable. There are losses of privacy that have nothing to do with losses of control and the reasons we value privacy may have nothing to do with whether an i n d i v i d u a l has in fact chosen i t . If privacy i s defined as a form of control i t prohibits us from c r i t i c i z i n g how that c o n t r o l — t o choose privacy or not to choose i t — i s exercised.52 Ruth Garvin has suggested t h a t , rather than attempt to define privacy i t s e l f , i t may be more useful to define the loss of p r i v a c y . 5 3 A loss of privacy, Garvin argues, occurs as others obtain information about us, pay attention to us, or gain access to us. Our concerns regarding loss of privacy translate into the most useful d e f i n i t i o n of i t , that i s , "the extent to which we are known to others; the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention; and the extent to which others have physical access to u s . " 5 4 Garvin's neutral concept of privacy enables us to i d e n t i f y losses of privacy d i s t i n c t l y and coherently because i t suggests a complex of three independent and i r r e d u c i b l e elements: secrecy, anonymity, and s o l i t u d e . Although each element can function independently within i t s own self-contained area of privacy concern, the concept coheres because a l l three elements are part of the same notion of a c c e s s i b i l i t y . 5 5 35 The concern for secrecy, or the amount of information known about an i n d i v i d u a l , relates to information gathering practices, c o v e r i n g s i t u a t i o n s ignored by t r a d i t i o n a l interpretations of "invasion of privacy": i n t r u s i o n , trespass and f a l s i f i c a t i o n . The concern f o r anonymity, or the attention paid to an i n d i v i d u a l , r e f e r s to l o s s e s of p r i v a c y that r e s u l t when we become the s u b j e c t of o t h e r s ' a t t e n t i o n , e i t h e r by d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t observation. The t h i r d element in Garvin's p r i v a c y concept, concern f o r s o l i t u d e , r e l a t e s to physical access; the concern embodied here i s not that more information has been obtained, nor that more attention has been drawn to us but that our " s p a t i a l aloneness" has been encroached on.56 The neutral concept of privacy, as expressed i n the three elements of i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g , a t t e n t i o n , and p h y s i c a l a c c e s s , c o v e r s such t y p i c a l i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y as the c o l l e c t i o n , storage, and computerization of information; the dissemination of i n f o r m a t i o n about i n d i v i d u a l s ; i n t r u d i n g or e n t e r i n g private places, eavesdropping, wiretapping, reading of l e t t e r s , required t e s t i n g of individuals and forced disclosure of information. Though the contexts d i f f e r widely, the reasons for which we claim privacy in each of these s i t u a t i o n s are s i m i l a r ; those reasons are connected to the p o s i t i v e functions privacy has in our l i v e s : the p r o m o t i o n of l i b e r t y , autonomy, human r e l a t i o n s , and the maintenance of a f r e e s o c i e t y . P r i v a c y appears to be a c u l t u r a l value in a l l known human communities 36 although the forms i t assumes vary w i d e l y . 5 7 In establishing t h e i r case for the recognition of a general r i g h t to p r i v a c y , Warren and Brandeis argued that "the i n t e n s i t y and complexity of l i f e ...have rendered necessary some retreat from the world ...so that s o l i t u d e and p r i v a c y have become more e s s e n t i a l to the i n d i v i d u a l . " 5 8 The need to protect privacy i s rooted in our notion of the i n d i v i d u a l and the requirements of selfhood and, in our concept of a democratic s o c i e t y ; i f we want a s o c i e t y that w i l l not hinder the individual attainment of the above mentioned goals, s o c i e t y has to be l i b e r a l and p l u r a l i s t i c . Arthur Schaefer traces the case for assigning a high value to p r i v a c y to the u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s f i r s t espoused by John Stuart M i l l in On Liberty; As M i l l p o i n t s out, there i s a c l o s e c o r r e l a t i o n between the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a protected zone of privacy and the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y f r e e l y to develop his i n d i v i d u a l i t y and c r e a t i v i t y . In a s o c i e t y which i s frequently intolerant of or h o s t i l e to non-conformity, freedom from constant surveillance i s an important pre-c o n d i t i o n f o r the development of independent and c r i t i c a l l y - m i n d e d i n d i v i d u a l s . D i v e r s i t y and non-conformity w i l l , in t u r n , promote the v i t a l i t y and progress of society and contribute thereby to long-run u t i l i t y . 5 9 The i m p o r t a n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l u t i l i t y of p r i v a c y as a, "protected zone" has been e x p l o r e d by a number of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , a l l of whom agree t h a t p r i v a c y i s a d e e p l y experienced need and that the consequences of denying t h i s need are p r o f o u n d . E r v i n g Goffman's a n a l y s i s of such " t o t a l 37 i n s t i t u t i o n s " as p r i s o n s and mental i n s t i t u t i o n s confirms the importance of privacy for the development and p r e s e r v a t i o n of personal i d e n t i t y by il l u m i n a t i n g the e f f e c t s of i t s negation: ...beginning with admission a kind of contaminative exposure occurs. On the outside, the i n d i v i d u a l can hold objects of s e l f - f e e l i n g - - s u c h as h i s body, h i s immediate a c t i o n s , h i s t h o u g h t s and some of h i s p o s s e s s i o n s - - c 1 e a r of c o n t a c t w i t h a l i e n and contaminating things. But in t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s these t e r r i t o r i e s of s e l f are v i o l a t e d ; the boundary that the i n d i v i d u a l places between his being and the environment i s invaded and the embodiments of s e l f profaned.&® A number of p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments concerning the value of p r i v a c y c o n t e n d t h a t p r i v a c y , by l i m i t i n g a c c e s s to an i n d i v i d u a l , creates the necessary context for other a c t i v i t i e s that we c o n s i d e r e s s e n t i a l . J e f f r e y Reiman, for example, believes that privacy enables the development of i n d i v i d u a l i t y by a l l o w i n g i n d i v i d u a l s to d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e i r own thoughts and f e e l i n g s , and those of others.61 i n r e l a t e d arguments, Charles F r i e d and James Rachels argue^2 that privacy provides the necessary context f o r the development of t r u s t , l o v e and friendship because, " i f we cannot control who has access to us, sometimes i n c l u d i n g and sometimes e x c l u d i n g people, then we cannot control the patterns of behaviour we need to adopt ...or the kinds of r e l a t i o n s with other people that we w i l l have."63 P r i v a c y i s a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the c r e a t i o n and maintenance of d i f f e r e n t kinds of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , because, "we act d i f f e r e n t l y i f we believe we are being observed. If we 38 can never be sure whether or not we are being watched and l i s t e n e d to, a l l our a c t i o n s w i l l be a l t e r e d and our v e r y character w i l l change."64 Privacy serves many diverse values, including freedom from censure and r i d i c u l e and the p r o m o t i o n of mental h e a l t h , autonomy, and human growth. Privacy also permits the relaxation and intimacy e s s e n t i a l to many kinds of human re l a t i o n s h i p s . In promoting these v a l u e s , p r i v a c y f u n c t i o n s i n s p e c i f i c ways. F i r s t , i t i n s u l a t e s us from the d i s t r a c t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t s of s o c i a l l i f e . The need to be free from d i s t r a c t i o n s and to have the opportunity to concentrate in solitude i s present and p r e s s i n g i n a wide range of human a c t i v i t i e s , among them learning, writing and most other forms of c r e a t i v i t y . In a d d i t i o n to p r o v i d i n g t h a t n e c e s s a r y freedom and opportunity, privacy protects us against r i d i c u l e and censure in the e a r l y stages of groping and experimentation.65 i n the absence of privacy we would be less l i k e l y to take r i s k s since any f a i l u r e s would be public ones and f i e l d s of enquiry would sh r i n k to the p r e d i c t a b l e and the known. In The Intruders, Edward. Long decries, the decline in spontaneity w i t h i n s o c i e t y that has already resulted from the erosion of privacy: "because of t h i s d i l i g e n t accumulation of facts about each of us, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to speak or act today without wondering i f the words or actions w i l l reappear 'on the record'."66 Sidney Jourard^ 7 has linked privacy with mental health by arguing that the pressures to conform to society's expectations can lead to mental i l l n e s s for some i n d i v i d u a l s . By providing a shelter to secret thoughts or a c t s of disobedience, p r i v a c y eases the s t r a i n of public obedience. Second, privacy promotes l i b e r t y of action by shielding an indivi d u a l ' s conduct from others' knowledge of that conduct. In so doing, privacy functions as a safeguard against interference, pressures to conform and other forms of h o s t i l e reaction. This promotion of l i b e r t y of a c t i o n l i n k s privacy to a variety of r e l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s , foremost among them, autonomy and meaningful human r e l a t i o n s . Moral autonomy i s "the r e f l e c t i v e and c r i t i c a l acceptance of s o c i a l norms, with obedience based on an independent moral e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i r worth."68 Even in so c i e t i e s that pride themselves on the i r openness and tolerance, indiv i d u a l s or groups who behave in a manner that deviates from ce r t a i n norms are subject to h o s t i l e treatment. For t h i s reason p r i v a c y i s needed to enable an i n d i v i d u a l , or a group, to deliberate and e s t a b l i s h t h e i r opinions without interference or c o e r c i o n from a p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e p u b l i c . P r i v a c y a l s o functions to promote l i b e r t y in ways that allow us to form and maintain d i f f e r e n t kinds of human attachments; i t enables us to e d i t and present our d i f f e r e n t s e l v e s to the w o r l d . T h i s function i s c r u c i a l because we project our ide n t i t y through these various selves and i t i s through such images of s e l f that human re l a t i o n s are created and maintained.69 4 0 P r i v a c y i s d e r i v e d from l i b e r t y in that we tend to allow privacy to the extent that the l i b e r t y i t promotes i s considered desirable. As the above analysis suggests, learning, p r a c t i s i n g and creating require privacy, as do certa i n forms of relaxation and intimacy. The l i b e r t y promoted by privacy i s required, too, in contexts in which we believe we should have few or no norms; for example, contexts in which freedom of expression and r a c i a l tolerance are involved. Because the e x i s t e n c e of freedom of expression or a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws does not guarantee that i n d i v i d u a l s or groups w i l l not be subject to p r e j u d i c e or pressures to conform, respect for privacy i s a way of enforcing tolerance of others. The f a c t i s , that although laws can be del i b e r a t e l y and consciously changed, morality cannot. The right to privacy i s accepted as a necessary compromise between the ideals of s o c i a l harmony and the l i m i t s of human nature. 7^ Privacy i s also required in contexts in which there i s no c l e a r consensus as to the d e s i r a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n norms. 7 1 Homosexual r e l a t i o n s between consenting adults i s s t i l l i l l e g a l i n some American s t a t e s ; the f a c t that the law i s rar e l y , i f ever, enforced i s an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the p r i v a c y of such relationships i s permitted to protect the par t i c i p a n t s from le g a l s a n c t i o n s . 7 2 Privacy i s also allowed to promote the l i b e r t y of i n d i v i d u a l s to withhold i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e i r past in the i n t e r e s t of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n or to p r o t e c t themselves a g a i n s t discrimination of various kinds. Privacy functions in both these 41 case to ease tensions between personal preferences and s o c i a l norms by s u s p e n d i n g the enforcement of c e r t a i n m o r a l l y questionable standards. C l e a r l y , p r i v a c y i s necessary to enable i n d i v i d u a l s to maintain t h e i r mental h e a l t h and autonomy and to d e v e l o p meaningful human r e l a t i o n s . In promoting such goals, privacy also promotes a more p l u r a l i s t i c and tolerant society. And, to the e x t e n t t h a t p r i v a c y i s important fo r autonomy, i t i s important for democracy because the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r m a j o r i t y rule and the right to vote rests on the assumption that c i t i z e n s should p a r t i c i p a t e in p o l i t i c a l decisions by forming judgements and e s t a b l i s h i n g c h o i c e s . If c i t i z e n s are to exercise t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y to the f u l l e s t extent, they must have the right to keep p r i v a t e t h e i r votes, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l discussions, and t h e i r associations. The same democratic p r i n c i p l e holds true for groups. If they are to p r o t e c t t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l i f e , i d e o l o g i c a l protest movements, unions and a v a r i e t y of other groups and movements a l l require what Arthur Schaefer c a l l s "a kind of n u t r i t i v e p r i v a c y " with re s p e c t to t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , "...unless i n d i v i d u a l s and groups have wide scope to formulate and test t h e i r ideas without int r u s i v e surveillance by governments, the p o l i c e or the general p u b l i c , an e s s e n t i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n for an e f f e c t i v e d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y w i l l be d estroyed." 7 3 A c e r t a i n sphere of privacy has had l e g a l protection from 42 the e a r l i e s t t i m e s . Anglo-Saxon law and German t r i b a l law pr o t e c t e d the p r i v a c y that attached to every freeman's d w e l l i n g , and o f f e r e d compensation f o r damage to property, i n s u l t i n g word, and the mere act of i n t r u s i o n . A d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s i n the form of r e s t r i c t i o n s on the power of government o f f i c i a l s to s e a r c h , d e t a i n or e n t e r , s t r i c t norms of c o n f i d e n c e , and p r o h i b i t i o n of eavesdropping emerged l a t e r . 7 4 The t r a d i t i o n of l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n , however, i s i n a d e q u a t e when i t comes t o addressing the modern concern with l o s s e s of p r i v a c y . According to G a r v i n , the l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y i s inadequate, "not b e c a u s e t h e l e v e l of p r i v a c y i t once s e c u r e d i s no l o n g e r s u f f i c i e n t , but because that l e v e l can no longer be s e c u r e d . " 7 5 Advances i n the t e c h n o l o g y of s u r v e i l l a n c e , r e c o r d i n g , s t o r a g e , and r e t r i e v a l of i n f o r m a t i o n have made i t e i t h e r impossible or extremely c o s t l y f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o p r o t e c t the same l e v e l of p r i v a c y that was once enjoyed. The increase i n the number of people whose p r o f e s s i o n i t i s to observe and report on p e o p l e ' s a c t i v i t i e s , the i n t e n s i f i e d a c t i v i t y i n s e a r c h of p u b l i s h a b l e information and the changes i n the equipment t h a t e n a b l e s such e n t e r p r i s e s make i t more l i k e l y that events and informati o n w i l l be recorded and pub l i s h e d i n some form. A 1986 co n s u l t a n t ' s Report to the Orga n i z a t i o n f o r Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Committee f o r Information, Computer and Communications P o l i c y i d e n t i f i e d s i g n i f i c a n t problems f o r data p r o t e c t i o n i n the development of the f o l l o w i n g forms of new 43 t e c h n o l o g y : e x p e r t systems used on p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n data bases; o p t i c a l c haracter r e c o g n i t i o n methods of c o m p u t e r i z i n g manual r e c o r d s ; d i s t r i b u t e d d a t a p r o c e s s i n g and ad hoc data communication; two-way e l e c t r o n i c s e r v i c e s ; and e l e c t r o n i c m a i l . Other emerging t h r e a t s to i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y are transborder data flows and v a s t l y increased numbers of microcomputers maintaining undeclared c o l l e c t i o n s of personal i n f o r m a t i o n . 7 6 T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y i s e n s h r i n e d i n Canadian Law i n the form of the P r i v a c y Act. The main goal of the Act, a r t i c u l a t e d i n s e c t i o n 2, i s to "protect the p r i v a c y of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h respect to personal information about themselves h e l d by a government i n s t i t u t i o n ...". The P r i v a c y Act i s , i n f a c t , a d a t a - p r o t e c t i o n s t a t u t e i n the sense that i t deals w i t h the t h r e a t s posed to i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y by the c o l l e c t i o n , use, storage, and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of personal data. At the core of the l e g i s l a t i o n , incorporated i n s e c t i o n s 4 t o 9, i s the s t a n d a r d code of " f a i r information p r a c t i c e s . " Under s e c t i o n 4 of the Act, the heads of government i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d t o have procedures i n place to ensure that personal information which i s c o l l e c t e d " r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y to an operating program or a c t i v i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n . " Government i n s t i t u t i o n s are r e q u i r e d to c o l l e c t personal data d i r e c t l y from the i n d i v i d u a l s c o n c e r n e d , wherever p o s s i b l e , and to inform them of the purposes of data c o l l e c t i o n . Such information must be kept as a c c u r a t e , u p - t o -date, and complete as p o s s i b l e . Subject to v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s , 44 i n f o r m a t i o n may o n l y be used f o r the purpose f o r which i t was c o l l e c t e d or f o r a c o n s i s t e n t use. P e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n may not be d i s c l o s e d w i t h o u t the consent of the i n d i v i d u a l . The l a s t p r i n c i p l e i s q u a l i f i e d somewhat by s e c t i o n 8(2), which d e s c r i b e s t h i r t e e n purposes f o r which p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n may be d i s c l o s e d to t h i r d p a r t i e s . I n M a r c h 1987 t h e S t a n d i n g C o m m i t t e e on J u s t i c e and S o l i c i t o r General on the Review of the Access to Information Act and t h e P r i v a c y A c t p u b l i s h e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e p o r t on the p r o v i s i o n s and o p e r a t i o n s of the f e d e r a l access and p r i v a c y a c t s . The Committee found the P r i v a c y Act wanting i n s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s . The A c t ' s o v e r s i g h t of computer matching programs, the problems with the " c o n s i s t e n t use" p r o v i s i o n i n the Act and the misuses of t h e S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e Number have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . A f u r t h e r l i m i t a t i o n i n h e r e s i n t h e c o n c e p t of exempt banks. S e c t i o n 18 of the A c t a u t h o r i z e s t h e G o v e r n o r i n C o u n c i l t o e s t a b l i s h p e r s o n a l data banks to which i n d i v i d u a l s cannot o b t a i n access under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h i s s e c t i o n s t i p u l a t e s t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n banks i n q u e s t i o n " c o n t a i n f i l e s a l l of which c o n s i s t predominantly of p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n " c o n c e r n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , n a t i o n a l defence, and law enforcement and i n v e s t i g a t i o n as d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n s 21 a n d 22 o f t h e P r i v a c y A c t . I n d i v i d u a l s who apply f o r a c c e s s to an exempt bank are n e i t h e r given d e n i a l nor c o n f i r m a t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e of i n f o r m a t i o n about them. 7 7 The Canadian P o l i c e Information Centre, one of the 45 most sensitive data bases maintained by the government, does not f a l l within the mandate of the Act. It i s operated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as a c e n t r a l i z e d automated index to l o c a l p o l i c e records, at the expense of the f e d e r a l government on behalf of police forces across Canada. The Act does not mention the need to maintain adequate security for personal information. In November 1986, an employee of Revenue Canada, Taxation removed 2,000 microfiche records from a locked reading room in the Toronto D i s t r i c t Taxation O f f i c e . These records contained the name, address, S o c i a l Insurance Number, an employment code, l a s t tax f i l i n g year, and name of spouse of 16 m i l l i o n i n d i v i d u a l taxpayers. 7 8 The records were quickly recovered but the incident demonstrated a s i g n i f i c a n t problem with c u r r e n t s e c u r i t y procedures and i n t e n s i f i e d the concerns of the general public. As i t stands currently, the Privacy Act does not provide for c i v i l remedies for wrongful c o l l e c t i o n , use, and d i s c l o s u r e of personal information; nor do Canadians have an established right to sue the federal government for invasion of t h e i r privacy since the t o r t of invasion of privacy does not ex i s t at the federal l e v e l . 7 9 There i s , moreover; no e x p l i c i t right to privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the i n c l u s i o n was proposed but defeated by a vote of fourteen to ten. The absence of a common-law and/or Charter based right to personal privacy in i Canada i s a s i g n i f i c a n t impediment to the p r o t e c t i o n of 46 i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . The Standing Committee noted that, although Canada played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n d r a f t i n g the 1984 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, and committed i t s e l f "to encourage private sector c o r p o r a t i o n s t o d e v e l o p and implement v o l u n t a r y p r i v a c y protection codes ...no v i s i b l e e f f o r t has been made to discharge t h i s o b l i g a t i o n . " 8 0 Perhaps the most glaring omission in the Canadian Privacy Act, and one that i s endemic in privacy l e g i s l a t i o n generally, i s the absence of a d e f i n i t i o n of privacy. Section 3 of the Act includes a d e f i n i t i o n of the meaning of "personal i n f o r m a t i o n " and a lengthy l i s t of what constitutes personal information for purposes of the l e g i s l a t i o n ; but nowhere does i t define the term "privacy." The f o r e g o i n g makes c l e a r that the l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n of privacy does not always r e f l e c t , adequately, the importance of p r i v a c y . In some i n s t a n c e s , l i m i t s of the law in protecting privacy are necessary and stem from the law's commitment to i n t e r e s t s that sometimes r e q u i r e l o s s e s of p r i v a c y , such as freedom of expression and the needs of law enforcement. There are, however, subtler obstacles to the protection of privacy that need to be c r i t i c a l l y examined. To begin with, our privacy can be invaded without our being aware of i t , s i n c e i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know, f o r example, i f others are reading our dossier. This absence of awareness i s a 47 s e r i o u s problem in a l e g a l system that r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y on complaints i n i t i a t e d by victims. As Ruth Garvin points out, "the problem may be aggravated by the fact that a major invader of privacy i s the government, whose i n t e r e s t i n exposing i t s own misconduct i s always uncertain."81 There are cases in which victims learn that t h e i r privacy has been invaded because the information that has been acquired about them i s used in a public t r i a l ; the case of Daniel E l l s b e r g i s a notable example.82 i n most s i t u a t i o n s , however, there i s no need to use the information p u b l i c l y , and v i c t i m s w i l l not be able to complain about the i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y simply out of ignorance t h a t such an invasion has occurred. The absence of complaints i s , therefore, no i n d i c a t i o n that invasions of privacy do not exist or do not have u n d e s i r a b l e consequences. In f a c t , Ruth Garvin argues, "because deterrence depends at least p a r t l y on the p r o b a b i l i t y of d e t e c t i o n , t h e s e problems of awareness may encourage such invasions."83 Even in those cases where invasion of privacy can be proved, fo r example, i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y through p u b l i c a t i o n , l e g a l proceedings are lengthy, c o s t l y and, more importantly, involve a d d i t i o n a l losses of p r i v a c y . P r i v a c y i s important in those areas in which we want a refuge from pressures to conform, where we seek freedom from the i n h i b i t i n g e f f e c t s of s o c i a l l i f e . Invasions of privacy are h u r t f u l because they expose us; they may cause us to l o s e s e l f - r e s p e c t , t r u s t , and, in the end, our 48 c a p a c i t y to have meaningful r e l a t i o n s with others. The law, as one of the most p u b l i c mechanisms s o c i e t y has d e v e l o p e d , i s completely out of place i n most of the contexts i n which p r i v a c y i s deemed v a l u a b l e : " f o r the genuine v i c t i m of a l o s s of p r i v a c y , damages and even i n j u n c t i o n s are remedies of despair."84 Garvin b e l i e v e s that what c u r r e n t l y p r o t e c t s p r i v a c y i s not t h e d i f f i c u l t y of i n v a d i n g i t , but the l a c k of motive and i n t e r e s t of o t h e r s t o do so.85 The p r o t e c t i o n our r e l a t i v e anonymity al l o w s us i s q u i c k l y l o s t , however, the moment someone does become i n t e r e s t e d , s i n c e i n f o r m a t i o n about us can be obtained from a h o s t of d a t a banks. And, i f our p r i v a c y i s i n v a d e d , i t can be invaded today i n more s e r i o u s and more permanent ways than ever b e f o r e . We have an o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t p r i v a c y r i g h t s i f we want a s o c i e t y that i s committed to promoting the goals of a democratic s o c i e t y . We have a p a r t i c u l a r o b l i g a t i o n t o a l e r t those whose occupations i n v o l v e systematic breaches of o t h e r s ' p r i v a c y , among them, j o u r n a l i s t s , s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and, more r e c e n t l y , h i s t o r i a n s — t o the f a c t t h a t , although some inv a s i o n s of p r i v a c y a r e i n e v i t a b l e , a c a v a l i e r a t t i t u d e toward such l o s s e s "may c o r r u p t the i n v a d e r as w e l l as harm the v i c t i m . "86 i n recent years, the research community has been forced to re-examine some of i t s research p r a c t i c e s i n the face of growing p u b l i c concern over p o t e n t i a l invasions of i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . The n a t u r e of r e s e a r c h m e t h o d o l o g i e s g e n e r a l l y and s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l research 49 s p e c i f i c a l l y , and the reasons these have become a matter concern in privacy debates w i l l be explored in the next chapter 50 CHAPTER II ENDNOTES 1. A l e x i s de T o c q u e v i l l e , Democracy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage, 1945) 1: 337. 2. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) 24. 3. Miche l F o u c a u l t , "On Governmentality," quoted in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) 14-15. 4. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 15. 5. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 15. 6. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 16. 7. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 16. 8. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 17. 9. Foucault, "On Governmentality" 17. 10. Michel. Foucault, D i s c i p l i n e and Punish: The Bi r t h of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 198. 11. Foucault, D i s c i p l i n e and Punish 200. 12. Arendt, The Human Condition 38-40. 13. According to Arendt, "the s c i e n t i f i c thought t h a t corresponds to t h i s development i s . . . ' n a t i o n a l economy' or 'so c i a l economy' or Volkswirtschaft, a l l of which indicate a kind of ' c o l l e c t i v e h o u s e k e e p i n g ' ; the c o l l e c t i v e of f a m i l i e s economically organized i n t o the f a c s i m i l e of one super-human family i s what we c a l l ' s o c i e t y , ' and i t s p o l i t i c a l form of 51 organization i s c a l l e d 'nation.' Arendt, The Human Condition 28-29. 14. Arendt 41. 15. Arendt 42. 16. In Arendt 39. According to Arendt, the authenticity of Rousseau's discovery i s apparent in the flowering of poetry and music, as well as the r i s e of the novel, from the middle of the eighteenth century on. In Home; A Short History of an Idea, W i t o l d R y b c z y n s k i p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h e h i s t o r i c a l transformation of privacy into a protected realm of intimacy when he describes the concept of privacy as one of the g r e a t a r c h i t e c t u r a l d i s c o v e r i e s of the bourgeois age. See Rybczynski, Home; A Short History of An Idea (New York: Viking Penguin, 1986) 26-28, 77, 107-108, 221-222. 17. Arendt warns t h a t , " t h i s nobody, t h i s assumed one interest of society as a whole ...does not cease to r u l e f or having l o s t i t s p e r s o n a l i t y . As we know from the most s o c i a l form of government, that i s , from bureaucracy ...the r u l e by nobody i s not necessarily no-rule, i t may indeed, under cert a i n circumstances, even turn out to be one of i t s c r u e l l e s t and most tyrannical versions." The Human Condition 40. 18. See, f o r example, D a v i d H. F l a h e r t y , P r i v a c y in C o l o n i a l New England ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : University of V i r g i n i a Press, 1972). 19. See A r t h u r S c h a e f e r , " P r i v a c y : A P h i l o s o p h i c a l Overview," Aspects of Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M. Sharp, ed. Dale Gibson (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 2; and Ferdinand Schoeman, " P r i v a c y : P h i l o s o p h i c a l Dimensions of the L i t e r a t u r e , " Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 1-2. 20. Arthur Schaefer 2. 21. Quoted in Schaefer 3-4. 22. See G. Fi n l a y , "Protection of Privacy and the Government A r c h i v e s O r g a n i s a t i o n , " paper p r e s e n t e d at the X X I I I r d International Conference of the Round Table on Archives, Austin, Texas, 24-28 Oct. 1985. 2 3. Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud and Mismanagement i n Government Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental A f f a i r s , United States Senate, 97th 52 Congress, 2nd Session , 15-16 December 1982 (Washington D.C: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1983) 1-2. 24. Treasury Board Canada, Report on Data Matching, May 3, 1985, Report presented in Hearings before the Standing Committee on Ju s t i c e and S o l i c i t o r General on the Review of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. 25. S.C. 1980-83, c. I l l , Schedule I I . 26. Annual Report P r i v a c y Commissioner 1985-86 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1986) 7. 27. Report of the P r i v a c y Commissioner on the Use of the S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e Numbers in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Ju s t i c e , 1981). 28. Annual Report Privacy Commissioner 1985-86 8. 29. Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know and the Right to P r i v a c y , Report of the Standing Committee on J u s t i c e and S o l i c i t o r General on the Review of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act (Ottawa: the Queen's Prin t e r , 1987) 45. 30. Annual Report Privacy Commissioner 1985-86 8-9. 31. James Rule, The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a c y (New York: New American Library, 1980) 133. 32. Rule 135-136. 33. Rule 136. 34. Rule 136. 35. R e p o r t of t h e Committee on P r i v a c y , under the Chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger (London: Her Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 1972). 36. B r i t i s h S e c t i o n of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s , " P r i v a c y and the Law," r e f e r r e d to in Report of the Committee on Privacy 17-18. 37. Some p h i l o s o p h e r s assume a morally sk e p t i c a l position with respect to the value of p r i v a c y on the grounds that i t cannot meet the c r i t e r i a of di s t i n c t i v e n e s s and coherence. These "reductionist" c r i t i c s maintain that "the right to privacy" i s a c a t c h - a l l phrase d i s g u i s i n g a c l u s t e r of independent r i g h t s , lacking a common foundation. Judith J a r v i s Thomson, for example, 53 argues that privacy i s e n t i r e l y derivative in i t s importance and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t f a i l s to c o n s t i t u t e a s i g n i f i c a n t moral category i n i t s own right because what needs to be said about privacy can be best expressed without refe r e n c e to p r i v a c y at a l l , using notions such as property r i g h t s , and the rights an i n d i v i d u a l has over his or her own person. See J u d i t h J a r v i s Thomson, "The Right to Privacy," Philosophy and Public A f f a i r s 4 .4 (Summer 1975): 295-314. In a similar v e i n , c r i t i c s such as W i l l i a m Prosser and Frederick Davis argue that our interest in privacy, as a r t i c u l a t e d in t o r t law, can be reduced to interests of "reputation, emotional t r a n q u i l i t y , and proprietary gain, none of which suggest a d i s t i n c t i v e interest in privacy." See William L. P r o s s e r , " P r i v a c y [a l e g a l a n a l y s i s ] , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Dimensions of P r i v a c y , ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 104-155; and Frederick Davis, "What do we mean by "right to privacy?" South Dakota Law Review 4 (1959): 1-24. 38. The phrase i s often a t t r i b u t e d , i n c o r r e c t l y , to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis whose a r t i c l e , "The Right to Privacy," in the Harvard Law Review (1890) i s considered the seminal a r t i c l e on privacy. fn fact, Warren and Brandeis never equated the right to privacy with the right to be l e t alone; the a r t i c l e i m p l i e d that the r i g h t to p r i v a c y i s "a s p e c i a l case of the l a t t e r . " The notion of a r i g h t "to be l e t alone" was f i r s t advanced in Thomas M. Cooley, "The right to be l e t alone," Torts 29 (2nd ed. 1888). 39. H.J. McCloskey argues that i t may be necessary, in order to protect an i n d i v i d u a l ' s right to privacy, to i n t e r f e r e with the l i b e r t y of others to spy upon that person, or to publish information about that person. See "Privacy and the Right to Privacy," Philosophy 55 (1980): 17-38. 40. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to P r i v a c y , " Harvard Law Review 4 .5 (1890) 193-220, reprinted in P h i l o s o p h i c a T Dimensions of Privacy 75-103. 41. Edward J . Bloustein refutes the r e d u c t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n taken by William Prosser (see note 36) by arguing that the values at stake in privacy incursions "are fundamental human values of a s o r t more e x a l t e d and more coherent than those proposed by Prosser". Moreover, Bloustein maintains that there i s something d i s t i n c t i v e about privacy, " i n the sense that we cannot eliminate mention of i t in discussing c e r t a i n cases without loss of moral v i s i o n . " See "Privacy as an aspect of human di g n i t y : an answer to Dean Prosser," Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 156-202. Stanley Benn argues that there are reasonable grounds for o b j e c t i n g to privacy even when the information acquired i s not, 54 misused. Even when no e x t r i n s i c harm comes to the person as a r e s u l t of l o s i n g h is or her privacy, that person has a prima f a c i e r i g h t not to be sp i e d upon or watched without t h e i r knowledge or consent because, Benn maintains, "humans are s e l f -c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s and to mo n i t o r t h e i r c o n d u c t w i t h o u t a u t h o r i z a t i o n i s to show a less than proper respect for the i r privacy." See "Privacy, freedom and respect for persons," Nomos XI11: P r i v a c y , ed. J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 1-26. 42. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the right to privacy has been applied in at least two U.S. Supreme Court decisions which have determined that, for the purposes of American law, the right to p r i v a c y i n c l u d e s the r i g h t of a m a r r i e d c o u p l e t o use contraceptives (Griswold vs. Connecticut (1965) 85 S. Ct. 1678); and the right of a woman to have an abortion p r i o r to the seventh month of pregnancy, with the approval of a doctor (Roe vs. Wade (1973) 410 U. S. 113 (U.S.S.C.)). 43. Ruth Garvin, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law," Yale Law Journal 89 .3 (January 1980): 438. 44. Garvin 439. 45. Alan West i n , Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) 7. 46. The Standing Committee on Just i c e and S o l i c i t o r General which recently completed i t s review of the Canadian Access and Privacy Act has recommended that t h i s d e f i n i t i o n be incorporated into the Privacy Act. See Open and Shut 57 (rec. 5.24). 47. Richard Parker, "A D e f i n i t i o n of Privacy," Rutgers Law Review 27 (1974): 275-296. 48. C h a r l e s F r i e d , An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) 140. 49. A r t h u r M i l l e r , The A s s a u l t on P r i v a c y (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press") 1971) 25. 50. Schaefer, "Privacy: A Philosophical Overview" 9. 51. Edward S h i l s defines privacy in a way that r e i n f o r c e s t h i s n o t i o n : " p r i v a c y e x i s t s where the persons whose actions engender or become the objects of information retain possession of that i n f o r m a t i o n , and any flow outward of that information from the persons to whom i t refers (and who share i t where more than one person i s involved) occurs on the i n i t i a t i v e of i t s 55 p o s s e s s o r s . " See "Privacy: Its Constitution and V i c i s s i t u d e s , " Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 282. 52. For a more detailed analysis of the "weak" and "strong" sense d e f i n i t i o n s of c o n t r o l , see Garvin, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" 426-428. 53. Garvin, "Privacy and the l i m i t s of the Law" 421-471. 54. Garvin 423. 55. Garvin 434. 56. Garvin 433. 57. See, f o r example, Alan Westin, "The o r i g i n s of modern claims to p r i v a c y , " Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 56-74; John M. Roberts and Thomas Gregor, " P r i v a c y : A C u l t u r a l View" Privacy, Nomos XIII 199-225; and Barrington Moore J r . , Privacy; Studies i n Social and C u l t u r a l History (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984). 58. Warren and B r a n d e i s , "The R i g h t t o P r i v a c y , " Philosophical Dimensions 77. 59. Schaefer, "Privacy: A Philosophical Overview" 15. 60. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Doubleday, 1968) 23. 61. J e f f r e y Reiman, ^ P r i v a c y , Intimacy, and Personhood," Philosophy and Public A f f a i r s 26 .6 (1977): 31-36. 62. See Charles F r i e d , " P r i v a c y , " Yale Law Journal 77 (1968): 484-485; Frie d , Anatomy of Values 138; and James Rachels, "Why Privacy i s Important," Philosophy and Public A f f a i r s 4 .4 (Summer 1975): 323-333. 63. Rachels 331. 64. Hubert Humphrey, foreword, The Intruders: The Invasion of P r i v a c y by Government and Industry, by Edward V. Long (New. York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) v i i i . 65. Garvin 448. 56 66. Edward V. Long, The Intruders 55. 67. Sidney Jourard, "Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 307-318, esp. 307, 309-311. 68. Garvin 449. 69. A number of privacy c r i t i c s object to t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of privacy, among them, Richard Wasserstrom and Richard Posner. Wasserstrom and Posner argue that we either act authentically or inauthentically as we present ourselves in a various c o n t e x t s . If we do not reveal a l l of what we are to those who have reason to interact with us, we are being p a r t i a l l y deceptive; therefore, our wish to present d i f f e r e n t versions of ourself in d i f f e r e n t contexts cannot be supported e t h i c a l l y or l e g a l l y . Wasserstrom and Posner take the position that those who defend privacy f a i l to give s u f f i c i e n t weight to the s o c i a l l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y demoralizing aspects of a society in which respect for privacy i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . Wasserstrom, for example, suggests that "not revealing information about oneself may be morally equivalent to deception and thus improper." See Richard Wasserstrom, "Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions," Philosophical Law: Authority, Equality, Adjudication, Privacy, ed. Richard Bronough (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) 148-166; and Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Theory of Privacy," Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 333-345. However, as Ferdinand Schoeman makes c l e a r , "the notion of the s e l f as an i n t e g r a t e d substratum t h a t e x p l a i n s the consistency of human a c t i v i t i e s in divers [ s i c ] contexts has come under attach from several t h e o r e t i c a l quarters." Schoeman c i t e s the psychologist Walter Mischel who has argued that one of the primary reasons we have for p o s i t i n g the s e l f - - t h e supposed c o n s i s t e n c y i n behaviour r e g a r d l e s s of context — i s not w e l l founded in p r a c t i c e ; and the s o c i a l analyst Erving Goffman, who maintains that there i s no "core person" underlying the various "context-dependent p e r s o n a l i t i e s " we occupy i n l i f e . See "Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions," Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 26-31. Ruth Garvin puts the matter simply: "we always give only p a r t i a l descriptions of ourselves and no one expects anything else. The question i s not whether we should e d i t , but how and. by whom the e d i t i n g should be done." "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" 454. 70. Garvin 452. 71. Garvin provides an i n s i g h t f u l analysis of the problems inherent in t h i s defence of p r i v a c y . Garvin wonders whether privacy should be allowed to function in a way that perpetuates 57 the very problems i t helps to ease: "when privacy l e t s people act p r i v a t e l y in ways that would have unpleasant consequences i f done in public, t h i s may obscure the urgency of the need to question the p u b l i c r e g u l a t i o n i t s e l f . I f p e o p l e can keep t h e i r independent judgements known only to a group of like-minded i n d i v i d u a l s , there i s no need to deal with the problem of regulating h o s t i l e reactions by others." In the end, although she acknowledges that privacy might, in such s i t u a t i o n s , reduce our incentive to deal with our problems, she defends i t s use on the grounds that we are l i m i t e d in our capacity to change p o s i t i v e morality and, therefore, to a f f e c t s o c i a l pressures to conform: When t h i s i s the case, the absence of privacy may mean t o t a l destruction of the l i v e s of i n d i v i d u a l s condemned by norms with only questionable benefit to society. If the chance to achieve change in a p a r t i c u l a r case i s small, i t seems heartless and naive to argue a g a i n s t the use of privacy. Although le g a l and s o c i a l changes are u n l i k e l y u n t i l i n d i v i d u a l s are w i l l i n g to put themselves on the l i n e , t h i s course of action should not be forced on anyone . . . i f an i n d i v i d u a l prefers to present a public conformity rather than unconventional autonomy, that i s his choice. The least society can do in such cases i s respect such a choice. See "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" 452-454. 72. Garvin 452. 73. Schaefer, "Privacy: A Philosophical Overview" 14. 74. Garvin 464. 75. Garvin 465. 76. In his annual report, the Privacy Commissioner expressed his concern that, "the personal computer's a b i l i t y to develop i t s own records systems and share in f o r m a t i o n without leaving an a u d i t t r a i l r a i s e s new and f a r - r e a c h i n g t h r e a t s to p r i v a c y p r o t e c t i o n ...Anyone with a personal computer on a desk i s the master of a machine with the storage c a p a c i t y of many f i l i n g c a b i n e t s , with the p o t e n t i a l for l i n k i n g up with other s i m i l a r computers and, even, access to c e n t r a l i z e d record systems." See Annual Report Privacy Commissioner 1985-86 7. 77. U n t i l 1986 there were 20 exempt data banks. The exempt s t a t u s on 15 of those banks has s i n c e been revoked. The remaining f i v e exempt banks are: (1) National Defence. M i l i t a r y 58 P o l i c e I n v e s t i g a t i o n Case F i l e s ; (2) N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e . Communications, Security Establishment, Security and Intelligence I n v e s t i g a t i o n F i l e s ; (3) P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . S e c u r i t y and Intelligence Information F i l e s ; (4) Revenue Canada. Tax Evasion Cases; (5) Royal Canadian Mounted P o l i c e . Criminal Intelligence Operational Records. See Annual Report Privacy Commissioner 1986-87 24-25. The Standing Committee on Justice and the S o l i c i t o r General has recommended that "the concept of exempt banks be removed from the Privacy Act by repealing sections 18 and 36, since there i s no compelling need to retain such a concept in l i g h t of the other strong exemptions on disclosure that exist in the l e g i s l a t i o n . See Open and Shut 46-49 (rec. 5.11). 78. Open and Shut 59. 79. The Standing Committee c i t e s several examples of the kinds of problems that a r i s e under the Privacy Act that currently lack a l e g a l remedy. In one example, " f i l e s from Employment and Immigration Canada were found in an a l l e y behind i t s l o c a l o f f i c e i n W innipeg; they c o n t a i n e d p e r s o n a l data on i n d i v i d u a l s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in v a r i o u s programs. The P r i v a c y Commissioner 'concluded that the EIC o f f i c e was negligent in handling the out-of-date f i l e s by not p r o p e r l y s u p e r v i s i n g or i n s t r u c t i n g the cleaner about the d i s p o s a l . ' If individuals had suffered damages as a r e s u l t of such negligence, they should have had a statutory cause of action." Further disturbing examples of census forms, tax forms and government personnel f i l e s going a s t r a y through government carelessness, are c i t e d by the Privacy Commissioner in his Annual Report 1986-87 8-19. The Standing Committee has recommended that monetary damages be provided to data subjects for " i d e n t i f i a b l e harm" r e s u l t i n g from government breaches of privacy r i g h t s . See Open and Shut 50 (recs. 5.13 and 5.14). 80. Open and Shut 73. 81. Garvin 457. 82. The break-in of E l l s b e r g ' s p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s o f f i c e was revealed during the Watergate hearings. See New York Times 28 A p r i l 1973: 1. 83. Garvin 458. 84. Garvin 458. 85. Garvin 469. 86. Garvin 470. 59 I l l HISTORY FROM THE BOTTOM UP TRENDS IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH SINCE WORLD WAR II Les documents, i l faut les s o l l i c i t e r . Marc Bloch The reasons for the comparative prominence of the issues of p r i v a c y and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y i n debates about s o c i a l research generally and, increasingly, about contemporary s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l research s p e c i f i c a l l y , are related to the sources and methods of such research. Increasingly, s o c i a l researchers are drawn to s t u d i e s of human behaviour and history that intrude into those areas generally defined under the heading "private l i f e . " The inquiry into new, hitherto undocumented areas of human experience and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n has had a profound influence on public archives; during the 1970s the numbers of academic users o'f a r c h i v e s i n c r e a s e d d r a m a t i c a l l y . 1 Much of the new s o c i a l r e s e a r ch focuses on the " n o n - e l i t e s " of s o c i e t y , c r e a t i n g enormous demands on a r c h i v a l resources in terms of the variety and quantity of source material required by researchers. It has a l s o r a i s e d some t r o u b l i n g e t h i c a l dilemmas with respect to i n d i v i d u a l privacy. More and more res e a r c h e r s are demanding access to records c o n t a i n i n g ' personal information of varying degrees of s e n s i t i v i t y ; and questions a r i s e about the conditions, 60 i f any, under which access to a l l or some of these records i s morally j u s t i f i a b l e . Before examining the moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for and against access, however, we need to explore the s h i f t i n g environment in which h i s t o r i c a l research has been c a r r i e d out s i n c e the end of the Second World War and the impact that s h i f t i n g environment has had on archives. In a s t a t i s t i c a l study of 11 countries, c a r r i e d out for the 9th International Congress on Archives i n 1980, Michael Roper attempted to trace the epistemological evolution of his t o r y in r e l a t i o n to a r c h i v e s 2 , by i d e n t i f y i n g the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of current h i s t o r i c a l research that have impinged d i r e c t l y on the demand fo r access to a r c h i v e s . In the United Kingdom, the numbers of those engaged in academic history more than doubled between 1961 and 1976.3 As the number of academic researchers has increased, so too has the d i v e r s i t y of research i n t e r e s t s . According to Roper, "the three w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d branches of h i s t o r i c a l e n q u i r y — p o l i t i c a l (or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ) history, l e g a l h i story, and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l h i s t o r y have been joined by m i l i t a r y history (no longer the r e s t r i c t e d preserve of r e t i r e d generals and admirals), international h i s t o r y , and economic history, from which s o c i a l history has developed more recently as a separate branch." 4 The s h i f t in interest to new branches of history has been accompanied by an enormous growth i n the study of contemporary h i s t o r y , d e a l i n g with the twentieth century and p a r t i c u l a r l y the decades afte r World War 1.5 61 Economic and s o c i a l h i s t o r y have spawned numerous sub-d i s c i p l i n e s , among them, business h i s t o r y , labour h i s t o r y , women's history, each with d i s t i n c t i n t e r e s t s , methodologies and journals. In Canada, the Soc i a l Sciences and Humanities Research C o u n c i l s p e c i f i c a l l y encourages m i s s i o n - o r i e n t e d research in areas of interest to s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s - - p o p u l a t i o n aging, the family and the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of children, and women in the labour force.6 In addition, Roper points out, scholars from other academic d i s c i p l i n e s have immersed themselves in the h i s t o r i c a l aspects of the i r subjects and have become h i s t o r i c a l geographers, historians of education, h i s t o r i a n s of scien c e , technology and medicine, h i s t o r i a n s of ideas, and h i s t o r i a n s of the a r t s , and so on. Others are using h i s t o r i c a l sources to enrich the study of th e i r p a r t i c u l a r d i s c i p l i n e s : . . . a r c h a e o l o g i s t s ... and e s p e c i a l l y marine and i n d u s t r i a l archaelogists, are using h i s t o r i c a l sources to a s s i s t them both in i d e n t i f y i n g s i t e s of pot e n t i a l interest and in the interp r e t a t i o n and restoration of t h e i r d i s c o v e r i e s , while l i n g u i s t s are turning ...to h i s t o r i c a l sources ... to un d e r s t a n d more of the development of language and d i a l e c t . Rather d i f f e r e n t again are the " a p p l i e d h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s " of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , which have been defined as "explorations of the past undertaken with the e x p l i c i t purpose of advancing s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c enquiries" and in which h i s t o r i c a l data are used to test hypotheses of general a p p l i c a t i o n . 7 The " c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n " that has occurred between history and other d i s c i p l i n e s has led to his t o r i a n s adopting research techniques and approaches developed by other d i s c i p l i n e s , 62 p a r t i c u l a r l y economics and s o c i a l science; and adapting them for h i s t o r i c a l purposes. Among the techniques adopted by historians are the techniques of psychoanalysis, which have been used to wri t e p s y c h o - h i s t o r i e s of i n d i v i d u a l s or groups, and the interviewing techniques of the s o c i a l sciences, which, aided by the development of the .portable tape recorder, have l e d to the development of or a l h i s t o r y . According to a recent survey by the Organization of American Historians, the fastest growing f i e l d of h i s t o r i c a l research i s the "new" s o c i a l h i s t o r y . 8 Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t impetus to the development of the new s o c i a l history has come from the quantitative research methods and s t a t i s t i c a l sampling techniques of economists and s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , involving the a n a l y s i s of huge quantities of economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l data from the recent past. In the mid-1960s p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s developed q u a n t i t a t i v e methods f o r a n a l y z i n g and r e c o r d i n g numerous variables such as opinion p o l l s and voting behaviour. At i t s s i m p l e s t l e v e l , q u a n t i t a t i v e research i s the counting and comparing of that which can be counted and compared. 9 Implicit i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s the measurement of phenomena—directly or i n d i r e c t l y observable—to which numbers are assigned according to sp e c i f i e d rules. The data base of numeric documentation thus created can be subjected to computerized s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s . S o c i o l o g i s t s , as we l l as h i s t o r i a n s , soon began to use economic, p o l i t i c a l science, and other techniques for "recording. 63 s t o r i n g and t a b u l a t i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e data about i n d i v i d u a l s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , events and goods to t e s t e a r l i e r hypotheses and develop new i n s i g h t s . n l 0 Gradually, the practice of quantitative history aligned i t s e l f with the i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y s o c i a l science h i s t o r y . As characterized by Charles D o l l a r , the s o c i a l science h i s t o r i a n uses numeric documentation (usually machine readable) to investigate a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l problem or question. That h i s t o r i c a l question i s then "treated as part of a s o c i a l system encompassing l e g a l , s o c i a l , economic, and s o c i a l psychological r e l a t i o n s h i p s , to name only a few. A s o c i a l systems approach permits both macro and micro l e v e l analysis, and the a d d i t i o n a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of p o s s i b l e p e r s p e c t i v e s from a v a r i e t y of d i s c i p l i n e s . " 1 1 S o c i a l s c i e n c e h i s t o r i a n s f o r m a l i z e t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o a statement of assumptions and a set of procedures to follow in t e s t i n g one or more hypotheses. When the f i r s t studies of geographic and s o c i a l m o b i l i t y based on manuscript census returns, c i t y d i r e c t o r i e s and parish registers appeared in the l a t e s i x t i e s and early seventies, they were proclaimed as representatives of the "new s o c i a l h i s t o r y . " Reviewers suggested that q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s "would lend a healthy depth and precision to more t r a d i t i o n a l l y based enquiries into the l i v e s of the l a b o u r i n g and ' u n l e t t e r e d ' during the nineteenth c e n t u r y . " 1 2 The so-called "new" s o c i a l history owes much to the " t o t a l h i s t o r y " concept of the French Annales school with i t s balanced 64 emphasis on s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , c u l t u r a l values and p h y s i c a l envi ronment. 13 The Annales movement was launched in 1929 with the founding of the j o u r n a l Annales d ' h i s t o i r e economique et s o c i a l e , by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. R e j e c t i n g the dominant p a t t e r n of n i n e t e e n t h century h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g associated with the German " s c i e n t i f i c " school, which centered on the study of e l i t e s governing the n a t i o n - s t a t e s , Annales scholars i n s i s t e d on a "broadened and deepened h i s t o r y , " one which went below p o l i t i c s to the fundamental causes of s t a b i l i t y and c h a n g e . I 4 By r e j e c t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r y , Annales scholars rejected, too, the "narrow documentary base" on which that history was built.15 The Annales methodology favoured s t r u c t u r a l analyses of the economic and m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of past s o c i e t i e s . As Tom Nesmith has observed, "the ambition to master a wider range of sources l e d followers of Bloch and Febvre to r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r research methods using technology and quantitative procedures."16 Annales scholars c o l l e c t e d and analyzed large quantities of data from a wide range of s o u r c e s — a r c h i t e c t u r a l remains, land records, b i r t h , marriage and death r e g i s t e r s , tax records, wills,, account books, marriage settlements to name only a few—spanning generations and even c e n t u r i e s . From t h i s g r e a t l y expanded d o c u m e n t a r y b a s e , A n n a l e s h i s t o r i a n s assembled the "parahistoric languages" of demography, technology,'money, towns,, that had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been kept separate from each other and 65 consigned to the margins of history 1 7 From these parahistoric languages there emerged a broad p i c t u r e of s o c i e t y "from the bottom up", a picture that emphasized the l i v i n g conditions and c o l l e c t i v e mentality of the majority. The Annales approach has exercised a profound influence on the "new" h i s t o r y s i n c e the end of the Second World War. Demography, which deals with the l i f e conditions of communities of p e o p l e as r e v e a l e d i n s t a t i s t i c s of b i r t h s , deaths and diseases, has become a c e n t r a l frame of refere n c e f o r s o c i a l h i s t o r y . Under the i n f l u e n c e of the demographic view of s o c i e t y , h i s t o r y , as the r e c o r d of growth, c o n f l i c t and destruction, and the powerful actions of certa i n men, has given way to history as the record of the expression of demographically s i g n i f i c a n t p r e f e r e n c e s , and the pro c e s s e s of choice and preference. According to David Gagan, s o c i a l history treats society as a "constantly changing archive of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e experience awaiting both empirical investigation and t h e o r e t i c a l speculation aimed at describing the h i s t o r i c a l meaning of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . " 1 8 The focus of i t s concern i s the constituent elements of society: c l a s s , gender, f a m i l y , l o c a l or r e g i o n a l communities, and occupational, ethnic, and age groups. Over the l a s t f i f t e e n years, s o c i a l history has examined the sources and consequences of s o c i a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y in a wide variety of s o c i a l groups, among them, women, c h i l d r e n , adolescents and the e l d e r l y ; voluntary 66 a s s o c i a t i o n s ; p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s ; p r o f e s s i o n a l and v o c a t i o n a l g r o u p s ; c r o w d s and movements; s o c i a l c l a s s e s ; and l o c a l populations.19 The new s o c i a l h i s t o r y p r o v i d e s a s t r a t i g r a p h i c 2 0 p e r s p e c t i v e on s o c i e t y , a p e r s p e c t i v e b u i l t l a r g e l y from q u a n t i f i e d data upon a base of demographic i n f o r m a t i o n . Census enumerations and p a r i s h r e g i s t e r s have, f o r the most p a r t , p r o v i d e d the backbone of demographic s t u d i e s ; b u t , as Andre LaRose's annual b i b l i o g r a p h y of h i s t o r i c a l demography makes c l e a r , a v a r i e t y of other evidence i s a l s o a v a i l a b l e , l a r g e l y i n t h e f o r m of r o u t i n e l y g e n e r a t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d s : a s s e s s m e n t r o l l s , l a n d r e c o r d s , m i l i t a r y r e c o r d s , m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t s , school records, h o s p i t a l r e c o r d s , c r i m i n a l r e c o r d s , bank records, s h i p s ' nominal r o l l s , and the records of benevolent a s s o c i a t i o n s . 2 1 The general ambition of h i s t o r i c a l demography has been to l i n k evidence from a v a r i e t y of sources i n order to d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n demographic behaviour. One approach i n v o l v e s l o c a l m i c r o s t u d i e s of a c i t y , county, or township and the use of q u a n t i t a t i v e methods to a s s i s t i n the c o n t r o l and a n a l y s i s of the i n f o r m a t i o n . In Canada,, the most a m b i t i o u s work i n t h i s a r e a of s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h i s being undertaken at the U n i v e r s i t e de Montreal, where s c h o l a r s i n the Programme de Recherche en Demographie H i s t o r i q u e have been attempting to r e c o n s t r u c t the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of Quebec from 1608 to 1850. R e l y i n g p r i m a r i l y on p a r i s h r e g i s t e r s and nominal 67 census d a t a , the p r o j e c t aims at producing, e v e n t u a l l y , a demographic biography of every i n d i v i d u a l "qui ont mis l e p i e d sur l a t e r r i t o i r e quebecois" up to the mid-l9th c e n t u r y . 2 2 A s i m i l a r p r o j e c t i s underway at the U n i v e r s i t e de Quebec at Chicoutimi. Since 1972, a team of demographers has been engaged in b u i l d ing a comprehensive data bank of the population of the Saguenay-Lake St. John area from 1838 up to 1931. 2 3 More recently s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s have discovered the family "as the lowest common denominator of demographic and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l analysis, in e f f e c t , a laboratory for the study of the processes of s o c i a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y in larger p o p u l a t i o n s . " 2 4 This demographic and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l approach to family history aims at exposing the r e a l i t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l experience at various stages in the l i f e c y cle. By tracing i n d i v i d u a l s through, f o r example, parish r e g i s t e r s , census returns, b i r t h , death and marriage r e g i s t e r s , assessment and other p r o p e r t y r e c o r d s , r e s e a r c h e r s can " r e c o n s t i t u t e " the family process in s p e c i f i c communities. 2^ The perspective promoted by t h i s record l i n k i n g technique i s a lon g i t u d i n a l one. Historians active in the f i e l d have generated a complex picture of the e f f e c t s of s o c i a l change on the structure, function and culture of family l i f e , of the adaptive s t r a t e g i e s employed, h i s t o r i c a l l y , by f a m i l i e s to promote continuity in the face of change, of the cycle of family l i f e and of l i f e - s t y l e s within the family. The ce n t r a l concern of these studies i s , i n David Gagan's e s t i m a t i o n "the l a r g e r 68 framework of l o c a l , r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l economics which determined the nature of economic opportunity in the past and, therefore, the sources and timing of s o c i a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y which i s r e v e a l e d , at the microcosmic l e v e l of f a m i l y l i f e , as a process of adaptation to quantum s h i f t s in the material bases of l i f e . " 2 6 Another d i m e n s i o n of f a m i l y - c e n t e r e d s o c i a l h i s t o r y i s revealed in the recent r e - v i s i o n i n g of women's his t o r y . The "new" women's history attempts to document the hitherto hidden areas of l i f e in which women have, t r a d i t i o n a l l y , been a c t i v e , and to e x p l o r e the p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t have assumed fam i l y functions, among them, prisons, hospitals, schools, and p u b l i c and p r i v a t e welfare o r g a n i z a t i o n s . C a r r o l l Smith Rosenberg observes t h a t s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s and h i s t o r i a n s of women e s p e c i a l l y , f o c u s t h e i r c o n c e r n on " p r i v a t e p l a c e s : the household, the f a m i l y , the bed, the n u r s e r y , and k i n s h i p systems." 2 7 Demographic sources are e s s e n t i a l to such studies, as Eva Moseley makes c l e a r : Census and other s t a t i s t i c a l data can help delineate the l i v e s of such women: the proportion of females to males and the female m o r t a l i t y rate for various age groups; the numbers who married, divorced, were widowed or deserted, and at what ages; the number of children per mother and t h e i r m o r t a l i t y ; how many women were employed, in what kinds of jobs, for how much pay—and so f o r t h . Company personnel records, reform s c h o o l , prison, court, h o s p i t a l , and morgue records, when they e x i s t and a r e a v a i l a b l e , w i l l a l l y i e l d u s e f u l information.28 Susan Laskin, Beth Light and Alison Prentice have made extensive 69 use also of the manuscript census in th e i r study of the history of teaching as a "woman's" occupation in the nineteenth century. The census r e t u r n s allowed them to examine such variables as r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n and e t h n i c i t y , the household and m a r i t a l status, and the age as well as gender of i n d i v i d u a l teachers over time. The returns also permitted them to study the teachers in the i r f a m i l i a l groupings and r e s i d e n t i a l s e t t i n g s . 2 9 In an attempt to "illuminat[e] the texture of l i f e among the 'submerged' four-tenths"30 Q f society, s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s are turning also to case f i l e s generated by public and philanthropic s o c i a l w e l f a r e i n s t i t u t i o n s as a v a l u a b l e s o u r c e of d o c u m e n t a t i o n . Such case f i l e s c o n t a i n h i g h l y d e t a i l e d information on persons, groups, and i n s t i t u t i o n s , rarely recorded e l s e w h e r e , and a r e c o n s i d e r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l i n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g l i f e h i s t o r i e s and i d e n t i f y i n g and explaining s o c i a l processes; an approach to s o c i a l h i s t o r y known as prosopography or c o l l e c t i v e biography, which stresses interest group dynamics.31 joy Parr's study of the orphaned, deserted and dependent children who emigrated to Canada in the late nineteenth and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , Labourin-q C h i l d r e n ; B r i t i s h Immigrant Apprentices to Canada, 1869-1924 i s a good example of the prosopographic approach. Drawing on information gleaned large l y from case f i l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those preserved on former wards of Dr. Barnardo's Homes, the B r i t i s h agency that dominated the. j u v e n i l e immigration programme in the late nineteenth and 70 early twentieth century, Parr has constructed a highly detailed picture of the material conditions of l i f e among the children who were the object of one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t reform movements of that period. H i s t o r i a n s and a r c h i v i s t s a l i k e view the case f i l e s of public and p r i v a t e welfare agencies as a v a l u a b l e source of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r documenting a s t r a t u m of s o c i e t y which t r a d i t i o n a l l y has been poorly represented in written sources. According to R. Joseph Anderson: The h i s t o r i c a l value of these records r e s u l t s from the fact that the case method, as employed in contemporary p u b l i c w e l f a r e systems, has remained e s s e n t i a l l y i n v e s t i g a t o r y s i n c e i t s o r i g i n among t h e l a t e nineteenth-century charity organization s o c i e t i e s . The s o c i e t i e s ' " f r i e n d l y v i s i t o r s " sought to diagnose and t r e a t poverty as a character defect rather than as a s o c i a l problem, and t h i s approach led to the creation of i n d i v i d u a l i z e d p r o f i l e s of r e c i p i e n t s , which documented the i r habits, attitudes, and l i f e s t y l e s as w e l l as t h e i r economic needs ...and, u n t i l the early 1970s, they continued to combine normative judgements and objective information.32 Public and private welfare case f i l e s contain a wide range of q u a n t i t a t i v e and a n e c d o t a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the p e r s o n a l adjustment, family dynamics and s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i n g of welfare c l i e n t s ; moreover, sinc e " p u b l i c welfare agencies frequently serve as r e f e r r a l sources and focal contacts for other s e r v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ...[the] records often contain information from schools, c l i n i c s , r e h a b i l i t a t i o n programs, private c h a r i t i e s , and other community agencies.33 The s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n ' s quest for new sources and for large 71 amounts of r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t q u a n t i f i a b l e d a t a has been f a c i l i t a t e d by the v a s t l y expanded documentary base of l a t e t w e n t i e t h century s o c i e t y . D i r e c t and i n d i r e c t government involvement in the d a i l y l i v e s of non-elites has expanded greatly i n t h i s h a l f - c e n t u r y with the growth of regulatory and s o c i a l welfare programs. One result of t h i s i s that the major source of documentation of non-elite groups probably e x i s t s in governmental data bases and case f i l e s . More than 80 per cent of government records c o n s i s t of case f i l e s of various kinds; over the l a s t decade, most of these f i l e s have been computerized f o r more e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n s . 3 4 Government data f i l e s are generally composed of one or more of three broad types of information: demographic i n f o r m a t i o n , such as age, sex, marital status, and place of residence; socio-economic information, such as occupation, education, and income; and a t t i t u d e s and opinions.35 These data f i l e s can be linked, one with another, creating a wealth of material for s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l research. As i n c r e a s i n g emphasis i s p l a c e d upon q u a n t i t a t i v e , s t a t i s t i c a l analyses of d e t a i l e d source m a t e r i a l s , documenting i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and a c t i v i t i e s , s o c i a l and governmental processes, and economic t r a n s a c t i o n s , s o c i a l r e s e a r c h e r s are p l a y i n g a more a c t i v e r o l e as consumers of o f f i c i a l data gathering systems.36 There i s a st e a d i l y growing demand on the detailed machine-readable records now being created 72 i n r a p i d l y expanding volume. At the same time, the more contemporary o r i e n t e d research of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s in other d i s c i p l i n e s also places increased value on the machine-readable records created by governmental organizations. The growth in demographic studies has led, p a r t i c u l a r l y , to an increased demand for qu a n t i f i a b l e micro-level data in machine-readable form since the informational value of machine readable records i s proportional to t h e i r l e v e l of aggregation. According to Charles D o l l a r : summary i n f o r m a t i o n a t the county l e v e l i s more valuable than summary information at the state l e v e l . But t h i s county l e v e l information i s less valuable than information on i n d i v i d u a l persons, p l a c e s or th i n g s because summarized data cannot be disaggregated. In contrast, one can always summarize or aggregate the i n d i v i d u a l information to the desired summary l e v e l . Consequently, i n d i v i d u a l data or unaggregated micro-l e v e l i n f o r m a t i o n has the g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r s t a t i s t i c a l manipulation. 3 7 Q u a n t i t a t i v e research a l s o r e q u i r e s that the p o t e n t i a l f o r l i n k i n g , comparing, or adding the f i l e to another f i l e e x i s t s . Usually, records arranged at the lowest unit have c o n s i d e r a b l e l i n k a g e p o t e n t i a l . Common a t t r i b u t e s such as geographic loc a t i o n , occupation, age, and sex permit the linkage of a f i l e with groups possessing similar a t t r i b u t e s . Personal i d e n t i f i e r s such as name and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y number p e r m i t even more sophisticated data linkage. But, w h i l e d e t a i l e d r e c o r d s c r e a t e d by governmental organizations have undoubted research value and w i l l increasingly 73 come into the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a r c h i v i s t s , many of those records a l s o p r e s e n t major t h r e a t s to the p r i v a c y of c o u n t l e s s i n d i v i d u a l s . Tax records and records of p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e payments contain d e t a i l e d intimate and se n s i t i v e information that j e o p a r d i z e s i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . Legal requirements governing the management of and access to such records at present are both unclear and confused; information bearing upon techniques for providing security for c o l l e c t i o n s of s e n s i t i v e machine-readable records i s not now widely a v a i l a b l e ; and procedures for providing l e g i t i m a t e access to elements of i n f o r m a t i o n contained in such records without compromising in d i v i d u a l privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y are not well-developed or understood. The fundamental e t h i c a l issues with respect to research uses of personal information are t i e d c l o s e l y to s o c i a l expectations about the perso n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d to government and, s p e c i f i c a l l y , the nature of the c o n t r a c t struck between the government and an i n d i v i d u a l at the time of the o r i g i n a l information c o l l e c t i o n . C l e a r l y , the public considers privacy a right which the government i s , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , obliged to protect.. The carrying out of that o b l i g a t i o n i s , however, compromised by a number of administrative obstacles. In the information gathering process, references to privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y are generally vague. The implication i s that any personal information supplied to government w i l l be made 74 a v a i l a b l e only to a l i m i t e d number of people on a "need to know" b a s i s . Once i n f o r m a t i o n e x i s t s i n r e c o r d form, however, p a r t i c u l a r l y in machine-readable form, any control mechanisms that may be placed on disclosure are immediately attenuated, g i v e n the enormous p o t e n t i a l of l i n k i n g data, p a r t i c u l a r l y demographic and s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d a t a , t h r o u g h p e r s o n a l i d e n t i f i e r s . In c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s between the government and an i n d i v i d u a l , there i s an e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n k i n d s of information w i l l be s t r i c t l y safeguarded, but how t h i s i s to be done i s often not formally prescribed, c r e a t i n g problems at a l a t e r date i n d e a l i n g w i t h the i n f o r m a t i o n so g a t h e r e d . Frequently, no formal provision i s made for the ultimate removal of embargoes pl a c e d on use. Individuals who provide sensitive information on the promise of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , for example, are not informed that the promise expires a f t e r a certain period of t i m e — t e n , twenty, or f i f t y years, as the case may be. The i s s u e of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a p a r t i c u l a r species of the larger issue of privacy. Whereas privacy i s the s o c i a l expectation that i n d i v i d u a l s have a right to determine, to a reasonable degree, the extent to which they are known to others, are the subject of others' attention and other's physical access to them, c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y refers to the s p e c i f i c " s t a t u s accorded to data or information indicating that i t i s sensitive for some reason, [and] therefore needs to be protected against 75 t h e f t or improper use and must be d i s s e m i n a t e d o n l y to indivi d u a l s or organizations authorized ...to have i t . " 1 Personal case f i l e s are, perhaps, the most prevalent type of c o n f i d e n t i a l documentation. According to V i r g i n i a Stewart: the case r e c o r d may i n c l u d e age, sex, r e l i g i o u s p r e f e r e n c e , m e d i c a l h i s t o r y , l e g a l and f i n a n c i a l status, marriage, family and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and residence and employment patterns, a l l of which may be supplemented by t e s t r e s u l t s , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , d iagnoses, and n o t a t i o n s of courses of therapy or i n t e r v e n t i o n . 2 An American survey undertaken i n 1973 found that case record series occurred in a wide range of c o l l e c t i o n s , including records of p u b l i c and priva t e welfare agencies; c l i n i c s , hospitals and p u b l i c h e a l t h agencies; j u v e n i l e homes and r e s i d e n t i a l and s p e c i a l s c h o o l s ; adoption agencies; and labour union grievance and compensation boards. 3 Peter G i l l i s has i d e n t i f i e d similar c o l l e c t i o n s of p e r s o n a l , i n v e s t i g a t o r y and report case f i l e s created by the numerous departments and agencies of the Canadian government, i n c l u d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n case f i l e s , c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n case f i l e s , Unemployment Insurance benefit case f i l e s , , d e p o r t a t i o n case f i l e s and " s p e c i a l " case f i l e s . 4 Whatever the impetus behind t h e i r creation, i t i s clear that "the concept of privacy i s a v i t a l part of the administrative context i n which such i n f o r m a t i o n i s s o l i c i t e d . . . I n d i v i d u a l s , corporations, organizations, and groups are discussed and expose themselves in these f i l e s in a very intimate and usually frank manner."5 76-And y e t , i n b o t h Canada and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y p r o v i s i o n s with respect to p u b l i c w e l f a r e r e c o r d s v a r y w i d e l y from one j u r i s d i c t i o n to the n e x t . 4 3 L e g i s l a t i v e mandates on access and privacy ex i s t at the federal l e v e l i n Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s through freedom of information and privacy laws. Authority on access to records i s not, however, c l e a r l y mandated in l e g i s l a t i o n at the state or p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . In the United States, a broad privacy law i s lacking in two-thirds of the states; in Canada, nine provinces out of ten have yet to pass privacy l e g i s l a t i o n . 4 4 In addition, statutes governing a c e r t a i n category of records, f o r example, mental h e a l t h records, may address the administrative needs of agencies but f a i l to c l a r i f y the conditions of use for records transferred to public a r c h i v e s . 4 ^ In her 1982 survey of s t a t e a r c h i v a l p o l i c y g o v e r n i n g personal privacy and access to Health and S o c i a l Services records for s o c i a l research, A l i c e Robbin found that Health and S o c i a l S e r v i c e records "revealed v a r y i n g degrees of i n c o n s i s t e n c y , ambiguity, and c o n f l i c t in the f i f t y state codes." 4 6 In Canada, at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , provisions for c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y are i n si m i l a r disarray. In some j u r i s d i c t i o n s , Ontario's Ministry of Community and Social Services for example, no o v e r a l l w r i t t e n p o l i c y covers p r i v a c y or c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of records, with the exception of the oath of secrecy administered by the province to a l l new employees. Personnel t r a i n i n g emphasizes neither privacy 77 nor c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and i n c l u d e s no education about c l i e n t information r i g h t s . 4 7 The a m b i g u i t y t h a t s u r r o u n d s p u b l i c p o l i c y on c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y provisions i s exacerbated by a lack of awareness, on the part of a r c h i v i s t s , that such ambiguity e x i s t s . A l i c e Robbin found that, in the United States, almost t h r e e - q u a r t e r s (72%) of the a r c h i v i s t s surveyed, "said there were no c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t e laws, i n c l u d i n g c o u r t or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r s , on disseminating or l i m i t i n g access to H&SS records administered by the a r c h i v e s . " 4 8 i n Canada, at the f e d e r a l l e v e l , although "case f i l e s e r i e s ...are o f f e r e d up for d i s p o s a l under the records management program with great r e g u l a r i t y , there i s in the end no agreement on how such material w i l l be made ava i l a b l e to the public as an a r c h i v a l s o u r c e . " 4 9 The e t h i c a l conundrum provoked by researcher demands for access to case records i s a r t i c u l a t e d succinctly by h i s t o r i a n Joy Parr: An agency which opens case records to researchers p l a c e s i n the p u b l i c domain i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t i n d i v i d u a l s who never chose to enter p u b l i c l i f e . Boards of d i r e c t o r s necessarily undertake t h i s decision without the consent of the parties d i r e c t l y concerned: th e i r former c l i e n t s , families of c l i e n t s or members of a d o p t i v e and f o s t e r h o u s e h o l d s . They surrender information provided in confidence or under duress, an a c t i o n which c h a l l e n g e s d i r e c t l y the e t h i c s of the helping professions.50 In c e r t a i n a r e a s of government, such as s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , corrections, and law enforcement, there are strong reservations 78 about allowing individuals access to the i r own records because of the s e n s i t i v e nature of the information contained in the f i l e . The current bias in record-keeping practice within these agencies i s in favour of non-disclosure. Should researchers have access to r e c o r d s that c o n t a i n s e n s i t i v e information concerning a c l i e n t ' s character, morality, physical and mental c o n d i t i o n -information that may be subjective, biased, or i n c o r r e c t — when the c l i e n t s themselves were never permitted access to t h a t information? For a government agency to disseminate or permit others access to such information for use in unspecified ways i s a s e r i o u s breach of p r i v a c y ethics, regardless of whether the intended use i s for administrative or research purposes. C l e a r l y , when i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s s u p p l y p e r s o n a l information to the government, whether i t i s of a r o u t i n e or sens i t i v e nature, they are not thinking of i t s implications for po s t e r i t y . The ethics of s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l research as i t relates to the preservation of personal information for a wide variety of research uses, i s not widely d i s c u s s e d in the p u b l i c arena, primarily because the public i s unaware, for the most part, that such information i s transferred to an archives and made available for research. It i s d i f f i c u l t for c i t i z e n s to make any coherent assessment as to whether research uses of personal information constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy since they have no way of knowing the s i z e of the data base from which such information can, p o t e n t i a l l y be drawn, or the variety of sources 79 contained i n i t . M i c r o - l e v e l data s u b j e c t s the i n t e r a c t i o n between an i n d i v i d u a l and a government agency to the maximum degree of exposure possible in records. The p o t e n t i a l for data l i n k i n g can turn d i s p a r a t e p i e c e s of a p p a r e n t l y innocuous information about an information into a comprehensive biography, making Arthur M i l l e r ' s "womb to tomb dossier" a r e a l i t y . E t h i c a l dilemmas notwithstanding, most hi s t o r i a n s believe t h a t , while the p r e s e r v a t i o n of records c o n t a i n i n g personal information presents serious problems to a r c h i v i s t s with respect to privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , the preservation of such records i s a p r o f e s s i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t h a t should be accepted when possible. From the h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h e r ' s vantage p o i n t the ind i v i d u a l ' s right to privacy "must be balanced by the c o l l e c t i v e need to u n d e r s t a n d s o c i e t y and s o c i e t y ' s n e e d s . " 5 1 To a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, a r c h i v i s t s concur with that r a t i o n a l e . When i t d r a f t e d i t s Model Archives Law i n 1972, The International Council of Archives recognized the c o n f l i c t of values between access and privacy but i t concluded that "the p r i n c i p l e of free access ...should no longer have to be s a c r i f i c e d every time i t clashes ...with the privacy of i n d i v i d u a l s . " 5 2 Peter G i l l i s has argued that in debates concerning the l e g i t i m a c y of access to case f i l e s , "the position must never be abandoned that t h i s type of f i l e has a r i c h p o t e n t i a l for research purposes": 8 0 W h i l e s u c h d o c u m e n t a t i o n i s of a p r i v a t e and co n f i d e n t i a l nature at the time of i t s creation and for a considerable period thereafter, i t becomes, at some point in time, an important research a i d f o r s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , h i s t o r i a n s , and genealogists. The danger is always there that such information w i l l be released too soon and render great damage to those individuals or o r g a n i z a t i o n s mentioned on the f i l e , but p u b l i c records a r c h i v i s t s must be in the forefront of those who advocate that t h i s i s a legitimate r i s k which must be faced ... 5 3 But i s such a position e t h i c a l l y valid? The moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for and against access to i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e records for s o c i a l research w i l l be the subject of the next chapter. 81 CHAPTER III ENDNOTES 1. The Public Archives of Canada documented a 71 percent growth in the number of academic users between 1971 and 1976; The Archives generales du Royaume and Archives de l' E t a t of Belgium documented a 39 percent increase over the same period. In Spain, the growth, in the period 1957-75 was 757 percent; in the United Kingdom, between 1962-78, the growth documented was 558 percent. At the U.S. N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , non-genealogist r e s e a r c h e r s represented 43 percent of a l l research conducted in 1976. See Michael Roper, "The Academic Use of A r c h i v e s , " International C o u n c i l on A r c h i v e s , volume XXIX; P r o c e e d i n g s of the International Congress on Archives London, 15-19 September, 1980 (Munchen, New York, London, P a r i s : K.G. Saur, 1982) 42-43, table 3. 2. Geo f f r e y Barraclough has compiled a d e t a i l e d survey as part of the study conducted for Unesco on the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s e n t i t l e d Main t r e n d s of r e s e a r c h i n the s o c i a l and human s c i e n c e s , " p a r t 2: a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l s c i e n c e s , a e t h e t i c s and the science of a r t , leg a l - s c i e n c e , philosophy (Paris: Unesco, 1978); c i t e d in Michel Duchein, Obstacles to the Access, Use and T r a n s f e r of Information from Archives: A Ramp study (Paris: Unesco, 1983) 8. 3. Roper, "The Academic Use of Archives" 27. 4. Roper, "The Academic Use of Archives," 27. According to Roper's survey, in 1977 the Public Archives of Canada reported 31.8 percent of academic use of i t s a r c h i v e s was r e l a t e d to s o c i a l h i s t o r y , and 12.9 percent was related to economic history, compared to 26.0 percent for p o l i t i c a l h istory and 1.8 percent for r e l i g i o u s h i s t o r y . At the Public Record O f f i c e , 21.8 percent of documents consulted in 1977-78 related to economic and s o c i a l h i s t o r y as compared with 13.8 percent in 1962-64. 5. In 1971, the entries in H i s t o r i c a l Abstracts dealing with pre-1914 h i s t o r y numbered 3303 as compared to 3103 e n t r i e s dealing with post-1914 his t o r y ; in 1976, there were 4100 entries dealing with pre-1914 h i s t o r y and 4994 e n t r i e s d e a l i n g with post-1914 h i s t o r y . See Roper, "Academic Use" 40, table 1. 6. David Gagan and H.E. Turner, "Social History in Canada: A Report on the 'State of the Art'," Archivaria 14 (Summer 1982): 28. 82 7. Roper 28. For a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the expansion of c l i e n t e l e of a r c h i v e s , see Ivan B o r s a , "The Expanding A r c h i v a l C l i e n t e l e in the Post-World War II Period," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Council on Archives, volume XXVI: Proceedings of the 8th I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress on A r c h i v e s Washington, 27 September - 1 October 1976 (Munchen, New York, London, ParTiT K.G. Saur, 1979) 119-126. 8. Dale C. Mayer, "The New S o c i a l History: Implications for A r c h i v i s t s , " American A r c h i v i s t 48 .4 ( F a l l 1985): 388. 9. Charles M. Dollar, "Quantitative History and Archives," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Council on Archives, volume XXIX: Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress on Archives London 15-19 September, 1980 (Munchen, New York, London, Paris: K.G. Saur, 1982) 46. 10. Meyer F i s h b e i n , Guidelines for Administering Machine- Readable A r c h i v e s , prepared f o r the Committee on Automation, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u n c i l on A r c h i v e s , Washington, D.C, November 1980 5-6. 11. Dollar, "Quantitative History and Archives" 47. 12. G.J. Parr, "Case Records as Sources for S o c i a l History," Archivaria 4 (Summer 1977) 122. 13. For a d e t a i l e d analysis of the Annales school and i t s influence, see Traian Stoianovich, French H i s t o r i c a l Method: The Annales Paradadiqm (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 1976). 14. Marc Bloch, quoted by Tom Nesmith in "Le Roy Ladurie's 'Total History' and Archives," Archivaria 12 (Summer 1981): 128. 15. Nesmith, "Le Roy L a d u r i e ' s ' T o t a l H i s t o r y ' and Archives," 128. 16. Nesmith 128. 17. Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday L i f e : The L i m i t s of the P o s s i b l e . C i v i l i z a t i o n and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century Volume 1, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) 27. 18. Gagan and Turner, "Social History in Canada" 27. 19. Gagan and Turner 27. 83 20. Le Roy L a d u r i e , quoted by Tom Nesmith in "Le Roy Ladurie's 'Total History' and Archives" 129. 21. L i s t e d in Chad G a f f i e l d , "Theory and Method in Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Demography," Archivaria 14 (Summer 1982): 129. 22. Gagan and Turner 36. 23. Gagan and Turner 36. 24. Gagan and Turner 30. 25. G a f f i e l d , "Theory and Method" 125. 26. Gagan and Turner 32. 27. C a r r o l l Smith-Rosenberg, "The New Woman and the New History," Feminist Studies 3 .1-2 (1976): 185. 28. Eva S. Moseley, "Sources for the 'New Women's History'," American A r c h i v i s t 43 .2 (Spring 1980): 182 29. Susan Laskin, Beth Light and Alison Prentice, "Studying the H i s t o r y of Occupation: Q u a n t i t a t i v e Sources on Canadian Teachers in the Nineteenth Century," A r c h i v a r i a 14 (Summer 1982): 77. 30. G.J. Parr, "Case Records" 122. 31. Gagan and Turner 27-28. 32. R. Joseph Anderson, " P u b l i c Welfare Case Records: A Study of A r c h i v a l P r a c t i c e s , American A r c h i v i s t 43 .2 (Spring 1980): 165. 33. Anderson 169. 34. Meyer H. Fishbein, "The 'T r a d i t i o n a l ' A r c h i v i s t and the Appraisal of Machine-Readable Records," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine- Readable Records: Proceedings of the Conference on A r c h i v a l Management of Machine-Readable Records, February 7-10, 1979f Ann Arbor, Michigan, ed. Carolyn L. Geda, Erik W. Austin, Francis X.. Blouin, J r . (Chicago: Society of American A r c h i v i s t s , 1980) 60. 35. Harold Naugler, The A r c h i v a l A p p r a i s a l of Machine- Readable records: a RAMP study with guidelines (Paris: UNESCO, 1984) 84. 84 36. G. M a r t i n o t t i , "Data Proc e s s i n g , Government, and the P u b l i c : R e f l e c t i o n s on the I t a l i a n case," International Social Science Journal 30 .1 (1978): 149. 37. Charles M. D o l l a r , "Machine-Readable Records of the F e d e r a l Government and the National ARchives," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records: Proceedings of the Conference on A r c h i v a l Management of Machine-Readable Records, February 7-10, 1979 , Ann A r b o r , Michigan" ( C h i c a g o : S o c i e t y of Amer ican A r c h i v i s t s , 1980) 83. 38. Introduction, Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade, ed. Lance J . Hoffman (New York: Academic Press, 1980) 11. 39. V i r g i n i a Stewart, "Problems of C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y in the Administration of Personal Case Records," American A r c h i v i s t 37 (1974): 387. 40. Stewart 391. 41. Peter G i l l i s , "The Case F i l e : Problems of Acquis i t i o n and Access from the Federal Perspective," Archivaria 6 (Summer 1978): 32-39. 42. G i l l i s 38. 43. The l i t e r a t u r e on l e g i s l a t i o n governing c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y in public welfare case f i l e s in the United States has grown since the p u b l i c a t i o n of V i r g i n i a Stewart's ground-breaking a r t i c l e , "Problems of C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y in the Administration of Personal Case Records," American A r c h i v i s t 37 (1974): 387-97. Since that time, the issue has been addressed in a number of a r t i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g R. Joseph Anderson, "Public Welfare Case Records: A Study of Archival Practices," American A r c h i v i s t 43 .2 (Spring 1980): 169-79; Ronald M. BaumanrT) "The Administration of Access to Confidential Records in State Archives: Common Practices and the Need f o r a Model Law," American A r c h i v i s t 49 .4 ( F a l l 1986): 349-70; David Klassen, "The Provenance of So c i a l Work Case R e c o r d s : I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r A r c h i v a l A p p r a i s a l and Access," Provenance 1 .1 (Spring 1983): 5-39; A l i c e Robbin, "State Archives and Issues of Personal Privacy: P o l i c i e s and Practices," American A r c h i v i s t 49 .2 (Spring 1986): 163-75. In Canada, the l i t e r a t u r e on public welfare case f i l e s i s not as well-developed. The two a r t i c l e s that have become standard reading on the subject are: G.J. Parr, "Case Records as Sources f o r S o c i a l H i s t o r y , " A r c h i v a r i a 4 (Summer 1979): 122-36; and Peter G i l l i s , "The Case F i l e : Problems of Ac q u i s i t i o n and Access from the Federal Perspective," Archivaria 6 (Summer 1978): 32-39. 85 44. Quebec i s the only province with comprehensive privacy l e g i s l a t i o n . In Manitoba and On t a r i o p r i v a c y l e g i s l a t i o n currently e x i s t s in b i l l form. 45. Ronald Baumann, "The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Access to Confidential Records in State Archives: Common Practices and the Need for a Model Law," American A r c h i v i s t 49 .4 ( F a l l 1986): 355. 46. A l i c e Robbin, "State A r c h i v e s and Issues of Personal P r i v a c y : P o l i c i e s and P r a c t i c e s , " American A r c h i v i s t 49 .2 (Spring 1986): 167. 47. A related issue i s accountability for records which has not yet been r e s o l v e d i n the development of s o c i a l s e r v i c e privacy p o l i c y in Ontario. Directors of some in d i v i d u a l agencies contractually funded by the Ministry i n s i s t that the agency owns the records and therefore has sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of i t s r e c o r d s d e s p i t e the d i f f i c u l t y of establishing l e g a l ownership of information. M u n i c i p a l i t i e s also claim record ownership rights over General Welfare A s s i s t a n c e records. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h i r d party reports, such as medical or psychological assessments contained in s o c i a l service record systems i s a l s o open to q u e s t i o n . See Chapter 8 of Michael Brown, Brenda B i l l i n g s l e y and Rebecca Shamai, Privacy and Personal Data Protection: A Report on Personal Record-Keeping by the M i n i s t r i e s and Agencies of the Ontario Government, prepared for the Commission on Freedom of Information and I n d i v i d u a l Privacy, March 1980. 48. Robbin, "State Archives" 167. 49. G i l l i s 35. 50. Parr, "Case Records" 135. 51. A l l a n Bogue, "Data Dilemmas: Quantitative History and the Social Science History Association," S o c i a l Science History 3 .3-4 (October 1979): 212. 52. Quoted i n Jean Tener, " A c c e s s i b i l i t y and Archives," Archivaria 6 (Summer 1978): 18. 53.. G i l l i s 38. 86 IV PRIVACY DILEMMAS IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH The t o i l , nay the most e x c i t i n g t o i l of h i s t o r i a n s i s to make dumb things speak. Lucien Febvre E a r l y i n 1986, 15,000 Swedes who were b o r n i n 1953 discovered that every aspect of t h e i r l i v e s had been under the microscope s i n c e the day they were born as a r e s u l t of a secret s o c i o l o g i c a l s t udy. Newspapers d i s c l o s e d 1 that researchers at Stockholm U n i v e r s i t y had been amassing computerized f i l e s on a l l 15, 000 people born i n Stockholm i n 1953 as part of a p r o j e c t c a l l e d " M e t r o p o l i t " . T h e r e a r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100,000 com p u t e r r e g i s t e r s c o n t a i n i n g data about i n d i v i d u a l s i n Sweden. More than 600 were set up by the government and cover e v e r y t h i n g from education, h e a l t h , s o c i a l problems and absences from work, to taxes, rents and m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . Using information s u p p l i e d by v i r t u a l l y a l l p u b l i c bodies, i n c l u d i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l data from p o l i c e and h e a l t h a u t h o r i t i e s , the researchers put together encyclopaedic f i l e s which i n c l u d e d t h e s u b j e c t s ' s c h o o l r e c o r d , s e x u a l p roblems, performance at work, f a m i l y t i e s , income and crimes.. The purpose of the r e s e a r c h , a c c o r d i n g t o a member of t h e M e t r o p o l i t p r o j e c t was, apparently, "to see how th i n g s are f o r people i n l i f e . " Carl-Gunnar Janson, a S o c i o l o g y p r o f e s s o r at 87 Stockholm U n i v e r s i t y and the leader of the Metropolit project, defended the research on the grounds that " i t would be grotesque i f those interviewed were able to rob me of material which I have been working with for more than 20 years. The idea that they can own the information about themselves i s f a n t a s t i c . " That same week, the Swedish Data Inspection Board, whose job i s to p r o t e c t Swedes against abuse of data held about them in government computers reported that s c i e n t i s t s at the Karolinska I n s t i t u t e had assembled a f i l e on women who had le g a l abortions between 1966 and 1974. The i n s t i t u t e used the f i l e in a study of the l i n k s between abortion and cancer. None of the women were t o l d t h e i r names were on the i n s t i t u t e ' s computers. These incidents, are p a r t i c u l a r l y worthy of note since they took place in the country whose data protection laws are considered the most stringent in the world. When E m i l e Durkheim p u b l i s h e d The Elementary Forms of Religious L i f e he looked forward to the time when science would take over the s u b j e c t s t h a t r e l i g i o n and p h i l o s o p h y had t r a d i t i o n a l l y sought to ex p l a i n — n a t u r e , humankind and s o c i e t y . Science, he proclaimed, would "set aside the v e i l with which mythological imagination had covered [these subjects] for them to appear as they r e a l l y a r e . " 2 The i l l u s i o n t h a t s o c i a l transparency i s achievable has driven the s o c i a l sciences ever s i n c e . Many s o c i a l b enefits have derived from the pursuit of that i l l u s i o n ; but there have a l s o been c o s t s . The steady 88 erosion of i n d i v i d u a l privacy i s by no means the least of those costs. In 1977, representatives from the research communities of f i v e c o u n t r i e s met in B e l l a g i o to d i s c u s s ways of improving access to census data and s i m i l a r government a r c h i v e s . The part i c i p a n t s reached a consensus on a number of key issues, among them: that there are v a l i d and s o c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f i e l d s of research for which access to microdata i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e ; that there are legitimate research uses which require the u t i l i z a t i o n of i d e n t i f i a b l e data w i t h i n the framework of c o n c e r n f o r c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ; and t h a t some r e s e a r c h and s t a t i s t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s require the l i n k i n g of i n d i v i d u a l data f o r research and s t a t i s t i c a l purposes. 3 A key concept enshrined in the Bellagio P r i n c i p l e s i s that of "functional separation." It was f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d in 1976 by the American P r i v a c y P r o t e c t i o n Study Commission, which recommended that to protect the i n d i v i d u a l from inadvertent exposure to an administrative action as a consequence of supplying information for a research or a s t a t i s t i c a l purpose, and to protect the continued a v a i l a b i l i t y of research and s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s which are important for the common welfare, there must be a c l e a r f u n c t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n between r e s e a r c h and s t a t i s t i c a l uses and a l l other uses ...The p r i n c i p l e must be e s t a b l i s h e d that i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d f o r research or s t a t i s t i c a l purposes may enter i n t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and p o l i c y decision making only in aggregate or anonymous form. 4 The p r i n c i p l e of functional separation attempts to e s t a b l i s h a 89 c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes: for example, to make d e c i s i o n s on judgements about a p a r t i c u l a r i d e n t i f i a b l e i n d i v i d u a l ; and i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d f o r research p u r p o s e s , i n which the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i d e n t i t y i s i n c i d e n t a l and the f u n c t i o n of the information i s not t i e d to decisions about the i n d i v i d u a l . Researchers frequently invoke t h i s p r i n c i p l e in defence of access to p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . The reason f o r c o l l e c t i n g information, the argument goes, i s not that researchers wish to know who the i n d i v i d u a l i s , in the ordinary sense of "to know." Nor are they o r d i n a r i l y interested in d i s c l o s i n g the information they c o l l e c t about an i n d i v i d u a l ; they merely want a simple, dependable way of matching a piece of information c o l l e c t e d on one occasion with a piece of information c o l l e c t e d about the same i n d i v i d u a l on a d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n . Any dependable matching method would be e q u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e to t h e researcher: a unique a l i a s , or an a r b i t r a r y s e r i a l number. While the p r i n c i p l e i s an important one, i t flounders on two f a l s e assumptions. The p r i n c i p l e assumes that researchers w i l l be capable of protecting the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of t h e i r research f i l e s a g a i n s t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e abuses when t h i s i s not the case. A number of recent court cases involving the subpoena of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ' r e s e a rch notes has demonstrated just how f r a g i l e promises of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y can be.5 Social researchers do not enjoy the same broad t e s t i m o n i a l p r i v i l e g e of l a w y e r s and 90 p h y s i c i a n s . Threats to c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y from courts and other governmental bodies that can issue subpoenas f o r information about individuals from the records of studies designed for other purposes has become a matter of growing concern w i t h i n the research community. The second f a l s e assumption i m p l i c i t in the p r i n c i p l e of f u n c t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n i s the assessment of r i s k to r e c o r d subjects. Researchers assume that public concern over invasions of p r i v a c y i s based on a fear of the p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l consequences of disc l o s u r e . If individuals are assured that the infor m a t i o n they d i s c l o s e w i l l not be used a g a i n s t them, rese a r c h e r s reason, th e i r privacy concerns w i l l be a l l e v i a t e d . T h i s c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t p e r s p e c t i v e i s l i m i t e d because i t diminishes the moral s i g n i f i c a n c e of the invasive action i t s e l f and the cumulative e f f e c t of such i n v a s i o n s , not o n l y on i n d i v i d u a l s , who may never know that t h e i r privacy has been invaded, but on the society as a whole. If there i s a general f e e l i n g w i t h i n s o c i e t y t h a t the r i g h t to p r i v a c y i s not respected, or that promises of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y w i l l not be honoured, interpersonal trust w i l l , i n e v i t a b l y , break down. The range of s o c i a l r e s e a r c h i s enormous, and i t s methodologies diverse. For the purposes of t h i s enquiry, s o c i a l research r e f e r s to any d e l i b e r a t e attempt to gather data on individu a l s and groups through such systematic means as i n d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n and secondary a n a l y s i s . The f o c u s here i s on 91 unobtrusive data c o l l e c t i o n methods through the gathering of infor m a t i o n about people from governmental a r c h i v e s . The ques t i o n t h i s kind of s o c i a l research r a i s e s i s whether the purposes for which researchers pursue th e i r studies lend special l e g i t i m a c y to sometimes q u e s t i o n a b l e methodology. Should o r d i n a r y moral r e s t r a i n t s be o v e r r i d d e n f o r the sake of "academic" or " s c i e n t i f i c " inquiry? The rationale for research serves p a r t l y to answer, partly to d e f l e c t that q u e s t i o n . Though fewer now b e l i e v e in the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g "true knowledge" than i n Durkheim's time, most w i l l argue that research may at least push back the boundaries of ignorance and f e l t chaos. 6 T r a d i t i o n a l arguments in support of research—invoking the pursuit of knowledge, the freedom of i n q u i r y , and the b e n e f i t s of research--have been extended by some to j u s t i f y s t u d i e s t h a t a r e i n v a s i v e of i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y . John Robertson observes that some s o c i a l sc i e n t i s t s , q u e s t i o n the v e r y l e g i t i m a c y of any government r e g u l a t i o n of s o c i a l r e s e a r c h . In t h e i r view s c i e n t i s t s have a right to plan and conduct research as they see f i t , subject only to judgements of the i r peers based on canons of s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y . This r i g h t , they assert, i s inherent in the role of s c i e n t i s t and in d o c t r i n e s of academic freedom and i s protected by the free speech clause of the F i r s t Amendment.7 Freedom of academic or s c i e n t i f i c inquiry i s a value expressed both in i t s own right and in opposition to control or regulation of s c i e n t i f i c enterprise on the grounds that, "a society which 92 l i m i t s the academics' area of inquiry and expression i s hurting i t s e l f by reducing i t s p o t e n t i a l for k n o w l e d g e 8 Sociologist Norman Denzen takes the p o s i t i o n that no research method can be defined in an a p r i o r i fashion as unethical.^ The t r a d i t i o n of the autonomy of the researcher i s supported by theories concerning the process of s c i e n t i f i c discovery, and the conditions that are required to foster i t . In The Structure of S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn introduced the notion that s c i e n c e advances by means of "paradigm s h i f t s " , in which the b e l i e f s , values and techniques shared by the members of a given s c i e n t i f i c community are c h a l l e n g e d by the d i s c o v e r y (or cumulative d i s c o v e r i e s ) of anomolies wi t h i n the e s t a b l i s h e d framework of theory. According to Kuhn, the " f a i l u r e of e x i s t i n g rules i s the prelude to a search for new ones." 1 0 Old paradigms are not, however, e a s i l y surrendered. Paradigm s h i f t s can only occur in a n u t r i t i v e environment that allows for repeated t r i a l and error, permits s c i e n t i s t s the freedom to pursue hunches and undefined l i n e s of i n q u i r y without formalizing the hypotheses guiding t h e i r research and encourages s c i e n t i s t s to c o n s i d e r a l t e r n a t i v e s to established i d e a s . 1 1 The concern that constraints placed on research w i l l hobble o p p o r t u n i t i e s to produce new s c i e n t i f i c ideas and s t i f l e s c i e n t i f i c i n novation i s the b a s i s on which s c i e n t i s t s have argued for the freedom of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry, expressed as "the freedom to pursue and d e v e l o p any i s s u e t h a t seems of 93 i n t e l l e c t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , r e l y i n g s o l e l y on the evaluation of other s c i e n t i s t s to determine which new ideas w i l l be accepted as u s e f u l a f t e r they have been f u l l y developed and compared with data from r e s e a r c h . " 1 2 T 0 the extent that r e s t r i c t i o n s on r e search methodology would make some s t u d i e s i m p o s s i b l e to perform, s c i e n t i s t s have argued that those r e s t r i c t i o n s would infringe on the s c i e n t i s t ' s right to illuminate s t i l l mysterious regions of human understanding. The t r a d i t i o n a l arguments in favour of researcher autonomy— invoking the p u r s u i t of knowledge and freedom of s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y - - t a k e for granted the researcher's right to pursue and communicate knowledge, a right that i s taken to outweigh moral considerations. Over the past twenty years, that assumption has l o s t considerable ground, larg e l y as a result of the increasingly i n v a s i v e p r a c t i c e s of s o c i a l r e s e a r c h . The p r i n c i p l e behind unrestricted freedom of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry i s based on the value that knowledge i s better than ignorance, and that a s c i e n t i f i c end j u s t i f i e s any means. C r i t i c s of " u n r e s t r a i n e d " research argue that s c i e n t i f i c freedom, i s not an absolute r i g h t , but rather an i n s t i t u t i o n a l norm which must be weighed against other norms to f i n d the balance most conducive to promoting s o c i a l w e l f a r e . 1 3 S o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n research i s a necessary cor r e c t i v e to u n r e s t r i c t e d freedom of i n q u i r y . In 1975, the American Association for the Advancement of Science's Committee on S c i e n t i f i c Freedom and Responsibility suggested that freedom 94 and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are inseparable and they recommended that the s c i e n t i f i c community recognize the p r i n c i p l e that freedom i s an acquired and not an inalienable r i g h t . 1 4 In addition to the value of s c i e n t i f i c freedom, another e t h i c a l argument commonly invoked in j u s t i f y i n g s o c i a l research i s the u t i l i t a r i a n appeal to the b e n e f i c i a l consequences that d e r i v e from r e s e a r c h . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s argument, the professional obligation to advance human understanding i s taken to include a p o s i t i v e moral duty to provide s o c i a l benefits. The p r i n c i p l e of beneficience i s used to ascertain classes of actions that are morally permissible to achieve b e n e f i c i a l ends. E t h i c a l dilemmas are resolved by balancing the r i s k of harm to subjects against the p o t e n t i a l benefits of research. The r i s k - b e n e f i t model i s inadequate on a number of counts. The f i r s t problem concerns the issue of whether i t i s appropriate to j u s t i f y s o c i a l research in terms of the s o c i a l , b e n e f i t s i t promises to produce. The r i s k - b e n e f i t model i s drawn from bio-medical research in which s p e c i f i c improvements in h e a l t h care d e l i v e r y or cost r e d u c t i o n s can be c i t e d as important s o c i a l b e n e f i t s . It i s not r e a l l y p o s s i b l e to invoke comparable b e n e f i t s in performing r i s k - b e n e f i t assessments in the s o c i a l sciences, since considerable s o c i a l research aims p r i m a r i l y at the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge, and only secondarily, i f at a l l , at the b e n e f i c i a l applications which may r e s u l t from that knowledge. The d e f i n i t i o n of " s o c i a l b e n e f i t s " i s also problematic. 95 The same u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l a t i o n s that j u s t i f y epidemiological r e s e a r c h , f o r example, might seem to j u s t i f y o t h e r , l e s s a c c e p t a b l e , i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y . Highly objectionable police inv e s t i g a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s , f o r example, co u l d be j u s t i f i e d in terms of the fundamental s o c i a l benefit of national security. Moreover, to permit any i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y on r i s k - b e n e f i t grounds might contribute to a callous attitude toward invasions of c i t i z e n p r i v a c y g e n e r a l l y . To regard such in v a s i o n s as j u s t i f i a b l e c o u l d pave the way f o r r o u t i n e l y c ondoning u n j u s t i f i a b l e privacy v i o l a t i o n s . Even i f research r e s u l t s e n t a i l s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i a l b e n e f i t s , the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g negative consequences of the methods employed may outweigh those benefits and so render the study morally u n j u s t i f i a b l e . A number of p h i l o s o p h e r s , among them Alasdair Macintyre, take the e t h i c a l p o sition that "a project whose benefits c l e a r l y outweighed i t s r i s k s might nevertheless be morally impermissible i f the r i s k s are unjustly borne by economically disadvantaged members of s o c i e t y . " 1 5 The p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e i s invoked as a protection against "group r i s k " , the r i s k that the interests of c o l l e c t i v i t i e s might suffer some future setback as a result of research study. In Ethics in Social Research, Robert Bower and P r i s c i l l a de Gasparis argue that, "the standard use in quantitative s o c i a l research (even that which i s not focused on p a r t i c u l a r groups) of group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - - a g e , sex, race, m a r i t a l s t a t u s , income, and so on—as explanatory variables i s 9 6 apt to lead to the presentation of research r e s u l t s in ways that a r e i d e a l l y s u i t e d to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s and the drawing of comparisons that may seem invidious with respect to one group or favorable for another." 1 6 Minority group members and people at lower socio-economic lev e l s in society (the favourite subjects of s o c i a l analysis, including s o c i a l h i s t o r y ) are p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e to t h i s kind of s o c i a l i n j u r y . Another d i f f i c u l t y posed by ri s k - b e n e f i t analysis i s that of finding a common standard in terms of which to compare harmful and b e n e f i c i a l consequences. Risk-benefit analyses are useful guides to a n t i c i p a t e d conduct only i f they are performed in advance of the r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The u n c e r t a i n t y of r i s k s and b e n e f i t s i s i m p l i c i t i n Kuhn' s description of the nature of s c i e n t i f i c discovery, according to which the r i s k s of s o c i a l r e s e a r c h a r e o f t e n not o n l y i n c a l c u l a b l e , but often emerge acc i d e n t a l l y in the course of the work and are i d e n t i f i e d a f t e r the f a c t as " u n a n t i c i p a t e d consequences." S o c i a l researchers, such as Joan Casse l l argue that the advance assessment of r i s k s and b e n e f i t s r e q u i r e s p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t cannot r e l i a b l y be made i n the unstable environment of s o c i a l r e s e a r c h . 1 7 One can i d e n t i f y and describe, at least in speculative terms, the benefits that may result from research, just as one may i d e n t i f y many of the r i s k s that record subjects may experience. But such r i s k s and benefits currently 97 r e s i s t quantitative analysis. The judgements about r i s k s that can be made ahead of time tend to be e i t h e r based upon untested assumptions about re c o r d s u b j e c t s ' f e e l i n g s on the matter or based upon the researcher's own sense of right and wrong. ' The assessment of r i s k s and b e n e f i t s i s i n e v i t a b l e in e t h i c a l evaluation of of research procedures. In most s o c i a l r e s e a r c h however the assessment of both harms and benefits i s li m i t e d by a lack of knowledge on which to base judgements. The notion of harm i m p l i e s an e v a l u a t i v e framework for assessing damages to i n d i v i d u a l s and to s o c i a l groups and e n t a i l s fundamental assumptions about the nature of persons and society, about the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e conditions c o n s t i t u t i n g well-being, or i t s absence, about what i s most and least valued by persons, groups, p r o f e s s i o n s , and governments, and about the s p e c i f i c impact of s o c i a l research on these c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 1 8 However much may be assumed about what harms and what b e n e f i t s the s u b j e c t s and p o t e n t i a l s u b j e c t s would themselves see as important to them, very l i t t l e i s a c t u a l l y known about such matters, because most of the factors that must be considered are intangible and subjective. The question, Tom Beauchamp suggests, i s , " s h o u l d t h e t e r m [harm] be r e s t r i c t e d to p h y s i c a l consequences that are damaging and i r r e v e r s i b l e , or should i t also embrace impermanent and less dramatic psychological effects? Legal e f f e c t s ? Economic e f f e c t s ? " 1 ^ C l e a r l y , we have a moral obligation to avoid a c t i o n s that 98 reduce o t h e r s ' w e l l - b e i n g or that i n h i b i t t h e i r freedom to f u l f i l l t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . That obligation i s enshrined in various p r i n c i p l e s , for example, the p r i n c i p l e of autonomy. To demonstrate empirically that the v i o l a t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e has n e g a t i v e consequences f o r human f u l f i l l m e n t i s , however, enormously d i f f i c u l t sometimes because the predicted consequences are often due to the cumulative e f f e c t of v i o l a t i o n s of the p r i n c i p l e . In c a l c u l a t i n g the e f f e c t s of breaking a promise of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , for example, we need to take into account not only the harm caused to the i n d i v i d u a l whose confidence has been v i o l a t e d , but the l a r g e r e f f e c t of the broken promise in undermining interpersonal trust in society. The accumulation of promise-breaking may damage an individual's self-esteem; but i t may also lower the l e v e l of trust and undermine the i n t e g r i t y of the rule of promise-keeping which i s e s s e n t i a l to harmonious and e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l interaction. 2 0 Donald Warwick argues that, in defending th e i r research claims, s o c i a l researchers: t y p i c a l l y do not consider the cumulative harms of t h e i r research on the larger society though they w i l l often c i t e the cumulative b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s of increased knowledge. Those who take a d i f f e r e n t view of human nature, of the persistence of ruptured trust . . . w i l l come to other conclusions.21 Because the consequences of such v i o l a t i o n s are d i f f i c u l t to prove or disprove empirically, Herbert Kelman has suggested that a more e f f e c t i v e approach to the moral evaluation of research i s a rights-based analysis, an analysis based on a description of 99 the action, rather than on the prediction of i t s consequences. 2 2 The c r i t e r i o n for moral evaluation should be "consistency with human d i g n i t y , " a p r i n c i p l e d e r i v i n g from Kant's categorical imperative to, "act so that i n your own person as w e l l as ...every other you are t r e a t i n g mankind ...as an end, never merely as a means." 2 3 The imperative obtains even in the absence of v i o l a t i o n s . While respect for human d i g n i t y i s rooted i n p r i n c i p l e s demanding f u l f i l l m e n t of human p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , i t can be treated as though i t were an end in i t s e l f in moral d e c i s i o n making because the p r i n c i p l e holds whether or not i t s acceptance or v i o l a t i o n has demonstrable consequences for s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t . Kelman distinguishes two components — i d e n t i t y and community--which serve as conditions of d i g n i t y : i d e n t i t y r e f e r s to our c a p a c i t y to take autonomous a c t i o n , to d i s t i n g u i s h ourselves from others, to l i v e our l i v e s on the basis of our own goals and values; community refers to our inclusion in an interconnected network of i n d i v i d u a l s who care f o r each other and protect each other's i n t e r e s t s . 2 4 I d e n t i t y i s here equated with i n d i v i d u a l freedom and community with i n d i v i d u a l j u s t i c e . In Kelman's view, r i g h t s to s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t and dignity are s o c i a l l y accepted and enforced p r o t e c t i v e d e v i c e s , which assure people access to certa i n benefits, defense a g a i n s t c e r t a i n harms, and c o n t i n u e d a b i l i t y to safeguard, t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , pursue t h e i r g o a l s and express and develop themselves. The value of right s i s that they reduce the dependence of an indiv i d u a l ' s (or 100 group's) well-being on others'calculations in p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of what i s best fo r t h a t i n d i v i d u a l (or group) and for society at large. They represent, in p r i n c i p l e , non-contingent entitlements to c e r t a i n resources and opportunities.25 Rights are not, however, absolute and judgements have to be made about competing r i g h t s . In weighing competing ri g h t s , one of the considerations i s the r e l a t i v e cost of v i o l a t i n g one as compared to the other, including the r e l a t i v e s o c i a l cost entailed by the reduced i n t e g r i t y of whichever right i s v i o l a t e d . The c r u c i a l point in a rights-based analysis i s that, although the o r i g i n of such righ t s i s ultimately rooted in harm-benefit considerations, these r i g h t s become " f u n c t i o n a l l y autonomous ...That i s , the right has moral force regardless of whether, in any given case, i t can be demonstrated that i t s v i o l a t i o n would cause harm." 2 6 M a i n t a i n i n g the i n t e g r i t y of r i g h t s i s i t s e l f an important consideration in e t h i c a l decision making because of the long-term systematic consequences of t h e i r v i o l a t i o n . We take or avoid ce r t a i n actions, defined by general moral p r i n c i p l e s , not only to avoid causing harm, but to conform to, and maintain the i n t e g r i t y of, a r i g h t . For that reason, Kelman argues, " i t i s enough to say that the right i s being v i o l a t e d ; there i s no need to prove that i t s v i o l a t i o n causes measurable harm." 2 7 Invasions of privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y can be viewed, in t h e i r own r i g h t , as harms of a s p e c i a l type; or they can be viewed as conditions that subject people to the p o s s i b i l i t y of harm. In research involving secondary uses of government data, 101 invasions of privacy occur to the extent that record subjects are unable to control the amount of information about themselves they w i l l d i s c l o s e and the subsequent uses to which that information w i l l be put. V i o l a t i o n s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y constitute a sub-class of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y and they occ u r s p e c i f i c a l l y when information about a record subject i s * disseminated to audiences for whom i t was not intended, breaking a promise that was made to that i n d i v i d u a l , either e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , at the time the information was c o l l e c t e d . Invasion of p r i v a c y cannot be described as a harm in the obvious sense of a l a s t i n g injury or measurable damage to the research subjects. It can however be subsumed under the category of harms that Alasdair Maclntyre designates "moral wrongs", acts that subject people to the experience of being morally wronged, whether or not t h e i r i n t e r e s t s are damaged in s p e c i f i a b l e ways. 2 8 In terms of Kelman's analysis, invasion of privacy, by v i o l a t i n g people's autonomy, i s inconsistent with respect for t h e i r d i g n i t y and therefore a presumptive, or prima facie cause of harm. When we speak of the invasion of privacy as a moral wrong, we are p o s t u l a t i n g a c o r r e l a t i v e r i g h t — t h e right to p r i v a c y — that i s being v i o l a t e d . In t h i s sense too i t can be viewed as a harm i n i t s own r i g h t . P r i v a c y p r o v i d e s people with some protection against harmful or unpleasant experiences, a g a i n s t t h r e a t s to the i n t e g r i t y and autonomy of the s e l f , a g a i n s t embarrassment or lowered self-esteem. Invasions of privacy not 102 o n l y s u b j e c t i n d i v i d u a l s to the p o s s i b i l i t y of harm; they i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of harm because they d e p r i v e the in d i v i d u a l of protection against it.29 The s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l analysis of government data containing p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n b r i n g s to the foreground a number of s p e c i f i c concerns about invasion of privacy. The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of t h i s kind of research i s that the data consist of information obtained from or about i n d i v i d u a l s on an e a r l i e r o c c a ssion and f o r a d i f f e r e n t purpose. The f i r s t concern i s whether we can assume t a c i t c o n s e n t , on the p a r t of the in d i v i d u a l who o r i g i n a l l y supplied the data, to subsequent uses of that data. The f a i l u r e to obtain consent f o r a c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t use of the data than the one o r i g i n a l l y agreed to presents an e t h i c a l problem at the l e v e l of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Researchers working with data c o l l e c t e d by others do not have a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p with the record subjects, but in accepting personal data, they have an obligation to honour the o r i g i n a l contract under which the i n f o r m a t i o n was c o l l e c t e d ; f a i l u r e to do so shows a lack of respect for the private rights of record subjects.30 At the l e v e l of wider s o c i a l values, the major issue raised by research based on secondary a n a l y s i s of government data c o n t a i n i n g personal information i s the r e d u c t i o n of p r i v a t e space. The practice of opening i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e records to r e s e a r c h , thereby widening the a v a i l a b i l i t y of personal 103 i n f o r m a t i o n , may weaken the b o u n d a r i e s t h a t s o c i e t y t r i e s to s u s t a i n between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c domains because i t s u p p o r t s and r e i n f o r c e s the sense people already have that personal data revealed i n a r e s t r i c t e d context w i l l , sooner or l a t e r , become p u b l i c l y known. Moreover, research that reduces the l e v e l of p r i v a c y i n s o c i e t y may cause d i f f u s e harm independent of i t s e f f e c t on i n d i v i d u a l r e c o r d s u b j e c t s or the groups from which they are drawn, by c r e a t i n g an atmosphere of s u r v e i l l a n c e that i s d e l e t e r i o u s to the maintenance of p u b l i c t r u s t i n s o c i e t y . Taken together w i t h the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of data banks and other records maintained on i n d i v i d u a l s , s o c i a l science research may r e i n f o r c e the tendency of people to l i v e " f o r the r e c o r d . " The p r i n c i p l e s of. p r i v a c y and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y are d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t r e c o r d subjects against the p o s s i b i l i t y of harm caused by unforseeable as w e l l as foreseeable f u t u r e circumstances. As Kelman has argued e a r l i e r : I f t h e y [ p r i v a c y and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ] were made c o n d i t i o n a l on c a l c u l a t i o n of the magnitude of harm a n t i c i p a t e d [by d i s c l o s u r e ] they would l o s e much of t h e i r p r o t e c t i v e v a l u e . . . . . I t i s presumed t h a t any v i o l a t i o n [of the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y ] i s d a m a g i n g — i f not i n the short run, then i n the long run; i f not to the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l i n v o l v e d , then to the l a r g e r s o c i e t y (by w e a k e n i n g an i m p o r t a n t p r o t e c t i v e mechanism).31 R i g h t s a r e our most demanding moral r u l e s . According to Terry P i n k a r d , "the c i t i z e n who bears a r i g h t does not h o l d a p r i v i l e g e and i s not s u b j e c t t o the c h a r i t y or p r o f e s s i o n a l e t i q u e t t e of a n o t h e r . " 3 2 Pinkard argues that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n : 104 for s o c i a l science research must be judged within a framework of moral reasoning that focuses on p r i n c i p l e s that are shared between people and to which we can imagine people contractually agreeing. The idea of hypothetical agreement between consenting pa r t i e s rests on the p r i n c i p l e of respect for persons.33 The c o l l e c t i o n of personal i n f o r m a t i o n by governments presents a c r i t i c a l dilemma with respect to c o n f l i c t i n g r i g h t s — i n d i v i d u a l rights versus the rights of government. It q u a l i f i e s as a moral dilemma, however, only because we accept, a l b e i t in varying degrees, that the government possesses c e r t a i n r i g h t s that may, in p a r t i c u l a r cases, l e g i t i m a t e l y override the rights of i n d i v i d u a l s . The s o c i a l c o n t r a c t that e x i s t s between a government and i t s c i t i z e n s gives the government the right to c o l l e c t c e r t a i n types of p o t e n t i a l l y embarrassing i n f o r m a t i o n such as the information gathered in the census or that required by i n t e r n a l revenue agencies. No general contractual agreement ex i s t s between the research community and the p u b l i c at l a r g e ; in the absence of such a c o n t r a c t , s o c i a l r e s e a r c h e r s have no moral r i g h t to t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s corresponding to the r i g h t s of government. Researchers can argue that t h e i r studies w i l l y i e l d substantial s o c i a l benefits- and should be supported. But they cannot v a l i d l y argue that research studies should be supported even in the face of t h e i r v i o l a t i n g * i n d i v i d u a l rights to privacy. In Taking Rights. Seriously, Ronald Dworkin observes that 105 The dominant idea of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s the idea of a c o l l e c t i v e goal of the community as a whole ... I n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a re p o l i t i c a l trumps h e l d by i n d i v i d u a l s . Individuals have r i g h t s when, fo r some r e a s o n , a c o l l e c t i v e g o a l i s not a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r denying them what they wish, as i n d i v i d u a l s , to have, or to do, or not a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n for imposing some l o s s or i n j u r y upon them.34 A c c o r d i n g to t h i s argument, r i g h t s "trump" u t i l i t y , and, t h e r e f o r e , they trump the needs and i n t e r e s t s of s o c i a l researchers.35 R e s t r i c t i o n s are p e r v a s i v e in our s o c i e t y but there are cogent e t h i c a l r e a s o n s f o r them. In the same way t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence hamper pol i c e work or l i m i t a t i o n s on the use of c o n f i d e n t i a l i n formation hamper banks, the a p p l i c a t i o n of strong e t h i c a l standards for s o c i a l r esearch w i l l , u n d o u b t e d l y , hamper, and, p e r h a p s , r e n d e r impossible c l e a r l y v a l u a b l e r e s e a r c h . Such a consequence i s unfortunate; but, i t i s not on that account unjust.36 i t i s worth remembering here that the p r i n c i p l e on which Nazi medical "research" was defended at the Nuremberg t r i a l s — t h a t the welfare of the community overrides the welfare of the i n d i v i d u a l — w a s r e j e c t e d . 3 7 A l t h o u g h harm-benefit assessments w i l l probably always remain part of the process of e t h i c a l review of research, a number of commentators have argued that i t i s better to put more emphasis on informed consent p r o c e d u r e s which s t r e s s the decision-making r i g h t s of the s u b j e c t , than on harm-benefit 106 c a l c u l a t i o n s which place more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the researcher. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for s o c i a l research i s not an issue i f the informed consent of record subjects i s obtained because consent s a t i s f i e s the moral r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the d e f i n i t i o n of consent i s also ri d d l e d with e t h i c a l ambiguities. Any probe into an i n d i v i d u a l ' s personal behaviour or h i s t o r y can be j u s t i f i e d by r e s e a r c h e r s i f the s u b j e c t ' s consent has been ob t a i n e d . But what c o n s t i t u t e s "informed" or "implied" consent? Was the consent f r e e l y given? How was i t given? Were record subjects aware of a l l the p o t e n t i a l uses of the information when they gave consent? The notion of implied consent i s based on the assumption that the context i n which data i s o r i g i n a l l y c o l l e c t e d can i n d i c a t e a p e r s o n ' s i m p l i c i t or i n f o r m a l c o n s e n t to the d i s c l o s u r e of p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . I t can be argued that individuals are, or should be, aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y that p e r s o n a l information they provide to h o s p i t a l s , s c h o o l s , or agencies may be used for subsequent s t a t i s t i c a l analyses, since such analyses are routinely performed and often reported in the press. Such an awareness i s sometimes taken to imply consent to subsequent uses of personal data supplied to government agencies. However, c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y government s e r v i c e s , require that individuals provide what i s often extremely personal information about themselves. Since they must d i s c l o s e that i n f o r m a t i o n i n order to receive benefits, for example, medical 107 coverage, w e l f a r e , unemployment insura n c e , t h e r e i s some q u e s t i o n as to whether such d i s c l o s u r e can be taken as " i m p l i e d consent" to any use of t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n ; c e r t a i n l y i t has not been gi v e n f r e e l y which i s what consent i m p l i e s . Researchers o b j e c t to the i m p o s i t i o n of consent requirements because of the burden they p l a c e on r e s e a r c h a c t i v i t i e s . P a u l Davidson Reynolds argues: i n many cases i t i s e i t h e r i m p o s s i b l e or i m p r a c t i c a b l e to o b t a i n t h e i n f o r m e d c o n s e n t of p a r t i c i p a n t s who p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n f o r a r c h i v a l r e c o r d s . The . . . p a r t i c i p a n t s may have moved to an unknown l o c a t i o n , or t h e number of p a r t i c i p a n t s may be so great as to p r e c l u d e c o n t a c t with a l l of them. 3" Respect f o r the r i g h t s of r e c o r d s s u b j e c t s which i s t y p i c a l l y demonstrated by seeking informed consent, Reynolds suggests, can i n s t e a d be demonstrated through measures taken to p r o t e c t s u b j e c t a n o n y m i t y . I n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e r e s e a r c h l i t e r a t u r e , a s u b s t a n t i a l body of l i t e r a t u r e has developed d e t a i l i n g v a r i o u s techniques f o r p r o t e c t i n g s u b j e c t anonymity; f o r example, through the m a n i p u l a t i o n of d a t a f i l e s t o p r e v e n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of r e c o r d s u b j e c t s ; t h r o u g h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n or s e p a r a t i o n of i d e n t i f i e r s f r o m t h e raw d a t a ; t h r o u g h random s a m p l i n g p r o c e d u r e s ; t h r o u g h e t h i c a l r e v i e w b o a r d s t h a t e n s u r e t h a t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y s a f e g u a r d s a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s ; and through data a g g r e g a t i o n . 3 9 While there i s no c l e a r consensus w i t h i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e r e s e a r c h community r e g a r d i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e means f o r p r o t e c t i n g 108 subject privacy, there i s a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d w i l l , enshrined i n e t h i c a l codes and g u i d e l i n e s , as w e l l as p r o c e d u r a l safeguards, to demonstrate a commitment toward maintaining the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of personal information used in research. The Bellagio Conference reinforced the need for professional codes of ethics in the following P r i n c i p l e : P r o f e s s i o n a l or n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s should have codes of ethics for t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e s concerning the u t i l i z a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l d a t a f o r r e s e a r c h and s t a t i s t i c a l purposes. Such e t h i c a l codes s h o u l d f u r n i s h mutually agreeable standards of behaviour governing r e l a t i o n s between p r o v i d e r s and users of governmental data. 4^ Since the l a t e 1960s, funding bodies for s o c i a l research have, i n c r e a s i n g l y , demanded t h a t r e s e a r c h e r s u n d e r t a k e f o r m a l procedures to protect the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of research subjects. In response, s o c i a l science associations have become involved in developing codes of ethics for s o c i a l research that incorporate s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n s with respect to the r i g h t s of research subjects. In 1977, the Canada Council's Consultative Group on Ethics published a set of p r i n c i p l e s and guidelines for research in the humanities and s o c i a l sciences. Among i t s discoveries, the group included the following observation: I t i s w e l l known that psychological experimentation, s o c i o l o g i c a l s u r v e y , e d u c a t i o n a l t e s t i n g and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n a l l i n v o l v e e t h i c a l i s s u e s , but i t i s l e s s w e l l r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the . . . l i n g u i s t , d e m o g r a p h e r , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t . . . h i s t o r i a n , biographer and archaeologist also gather data through d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t contact with people 109 The Consultative Group c r i t i c i z e d the f a i l u r e of e x i s t i n g e t h i c a l codes to a d d r e s s the s u b j e c t of s e c o n d a r y uses of d a t a . Concluding that i t i s not the d i s c i p l i n e that determines the presence or absence of e t h i c a l considerations, "but whether or not the methodology employed res u l t s in the research having a d i r e c t impact on p e o p l e " the C o n s u l t a t i v e Group pro p o s e d p r i n c i p l e s and g u i d e l i n e s t h a t were "intended to provide d i r e c t i o n on e t h i c a l issues involved in the documentary research pursued by h i s t o r i a n s and biographers." 4 2 Despite t h i s prodding, the need for a s p e c i f i c commitment to e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s that demonstrate a concern for i n d i v i d u a l rights has remained largel y , unexplored as a substantive issue in the h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h community. The major h i s t o r i c a l associations in the United States and Canada have not yet adopted formal codes of e t h i c s . 4 3 The h i s t o r i c a l profession has tended to defend research a c c e s s to r e c o r d s c o n t a i n i n g p e r s o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the t r a d i t i o n a l grounds of freedom of inquiry; privacy i s viewed generally as a non-absolute right that must be b a l a n c e d w i t h the s c h o l a r ' s " r i g h t to know." 4 4 Canadian h i s t o r i a n Robert Craig Brown, for example, argues that: At bottom, the manic pursuit in government agencies and u n i v e r s i t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r c o d e s , g u i d e s , regulations and bureaucratic impediments i s a disavowal of trust in the i n t e g r i t y of the researcher and h i s or her research. ....What i s needed, P r o f e s s o r [Robert] Graham concluded in 1971, " i s a reaffirmation of the p r i n c i p l e that as far as the world of scholarship i s concerned, the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s served by p r o t e c t i n g to the greatest possible extent the freedom of the scholar, 110 provided that i t i s coupled with a sober sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 4 5 T h i s p o i n t of view, p r e d i c a t e d on an a r i s t o c r a t i c ideal of scholarly research in the pursuit of knowledge, p e r s i s t s as the moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n behind h i s t o r i a n s ' demands for greater access to government records containing personal information. The moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n for research on the grounds of society's c o l l e c t i v e need to understand i t s e l f betrays, o c c a s i o n a l l y , a dangerously c a v a l i e r a t t i t u d e toward i n d i v i d u a l rights to privacy. Allan Bogue, former president of the S o c i a l Science History Association i n the United S t a t e s , for example, nsee[s] no great threat in f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h government." 4^ Arguing that data under extreme c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r e s t r i c t i o n s may be as useless as data destroyed, Bogue urges a r c h i v i s t s not to abet or c o n t r i b u t e to what he terms the "hysteria over privacy." Instead: we must prevent r e s t r i c t i o n s in mindless ways or the res u l t w i l l be the destruction of data of h i s t o r i c a l consequence or r e s t r i c t e d access for r i d i c u l o u s l y long periods of time. The p o s i t i o n that we should c l o s e records to p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l s i s much l e s s in the interests of the h i s t o r i c a l researcher and the p u b l i c than i s the p r i n c i p l e that there should be appropriate penalties for the misuse of information d e r i v e d from personal r e c o r d s . . . 4 7 Such a solution, which focuses on the measurable consequences of a p a r t i c u l a r invasion of privacy, rather than the d i f f u s e harm caused by invasive acts generally, i s not only a remedy of despair; i t i s a denial of the f u l l moral s i g n i f i c a n c e of privacy 111 invasion. David F l a h e r t y maintains that the reason historians as a group, unlike s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , "have not confronted c e r t a i n basic e t h i c a l issues of data use"4** i s rooted in the t r a d i t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n of h i s t o r i a n s toward past g e n e r a t i o n s . S i n c e h i s t o r i a n s are, i n c r e a s i n g l y , w r i t i n g about l i v i n g persons, e n t e r i n g i n t o c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , such as those of o r a l h i s t o r i a n s , engaging in research s i m i l a r to that of some s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and facing s i m i l a r l y sensitive issues concerning the use of personal i n f o r m a t i o n , the absence of a c l e a r l y stated commitment to the p r i n c i p l e s of privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y in the pursuit of research i s a glaring omission that i s untenable given the escalating public concern over invasions of privacy. Higher standards for h i s t o r i c a l research need to be set out of concern for the i n t e g r i t y of research i t s e l f , as much as for the i n d i v i d u a l s whose l i v e s i t t o u c h e s . P r i n c i p l e s and guidelines are needed to ensure that v i o l a t i o n s of p r i v a c y are minimized and, wherever possible, eliminated. As keepers of the record, a r c h i v i s t s are obligated to assume some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for mediating the competing claims for research access on the one hand,' and ind i v i d u a l privacy on the other. The question that remains i s how a r c h i v i s t s are to achieve an equitable balance between privacy and research access. What measures can a r c h i v i s t s take that w i l l responsibly enhance, rather than destroy public trust? 112 CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES 1. Calgary Herald 13 February 1986: A22; Globe and Mail 11 February 1986: A21; Winnipeg Free Press 11 February 1986: 16. 2. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious L i f e , t r a n s . Joseph Ward SwaTn (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915) 429. 3. The eighteen Bellagio P r i n c i p l e s are outlined in David H. Flaherty, "The Bellagio Conference on Privacy, C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and the use of Governmental Microdata," Secondary Analysis: New D i r e c t i o n s f o r Program Evaluation, ed. Robert F. Boruch (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1978) 19-30. 4. Personal Privacy in an Information Society: Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Washington, D.C: Government Pri n t i n g O f f i c e , 1977) 573. 5. P r o s e c u t o r s , grand j u r i e s , l e g i s l a t i v e bodies, c i v i l l i t i g a n t s , and administrative agencies a l l can use t h e i r subpoena powers to compel disclosure of c o n f i d e n t i a l research information. The t h r e a t of a subpoena has been used f o r harassment and i n t i m i d a t i o n by law enforcement o f f i c i a l s seeking s e n s i t i v e r esearch i n f o r m a t i o n . For example, a 1973 survey of drug treatment c e n t e r s found that almost o n e - t h i r d of the centers responding to the survey reported at l e a s t one instance of d i f f i c u l t y in p r o t e c t i n g the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of their records. The most f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d d i f f i c u l t y concerned requests f o r information from the p o l i c e ; almost 10 percent of the centers had a c t u a l l y been threatened with a subpoena. Robert F. Boruch and Joe S. C e c i l have i d e n t i f i e d numerous examples where the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of r e s e a r c h n o t e s has been t h r e a t e n e d by subpoena. See Boruch and C e c i l , Assuring the C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of S o c i a l Research Data (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979). 6. S i s s e l a Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Vintage Books, 1983) 235. 7. John A. Robertson, "The S o c i a l S c i e n t i s t ' s Right to Research and the IRB System," E t h i c a l Issues in Social Science Research, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Ruth R. Faden, R. Jay Wallace, J r . , LeRoy W a l t e r s ( B a l t i m o r e and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) 356. 113 8. W. Spinrad, quoted in Robert T. Bower and P r i s c i l l a de Gasparis, Ethics in Social Research: Protecting the Interests of Human Subjects (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978) 46. 9. See "On the Ethics of Disguised Observation: an exchange between Norman Denzen and Kai Erikson," S o c i a l Research Ethics, ed. Martin Bulmer (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982) 143. 10. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) 68. 11. See Paul Davidson Reynolds, E t h i c a l Dilemmas and Social Science Research (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, Inc., 1979) 228-229. 12. Reynolds 230. 13. See, for example, N. Peterson, "Forbidden Knowledge," The S o c i a l Contexts of Research, ed. S.Z. Nagi and R.G. Corwin (New York: John Wiley, 1972) 289-322. 14. Q u o t e d i n J . E d s a l l , " S c i e n t i f i c Freedom and Re s p o n s i b i l i t y , " Science 188 (1975): 687-93. 15. Alasdair Macintyre, "Risk, Harm, and Benefit Assessments as Instruments of Moral Evaluation," E t h i c a l Issues in So c i a l Science Research, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp et a l 181. 16. Bower and de Gasparis, Ethics in Social Research 29. 17. Joan C a s s e l l , "Does Risk-Benefit Analysis Apply to Moral Evaluation of So c i a l Research," E t h i c a l Issues in Social Science Research 144-162. 18. Donald P. Warwick, "Types of Harm in Social Research," E t h i c a l Issues in Social Science Research 103. 19. Tom Beauchamp, introduction, E t h i c a l Issues in So c i a l Science Research 24. 20. Herbert C. Kelman, " E t h i c a l Issues in Di f f e r e n t Social Science Methods," E t h i c a l Issues in Social Science Research 42. 21. Warwick, "Types of Harm" 103.. 22. Kelman 42. 114 23. Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental P r i n c i p l e s of the M e t a p h y s i c s of E t h i c s , t r a n s . 0~. Manthey-Zorn (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938) 47. 24. Kelman 43. 25. Kelman 45. 26. Kelman 89. 27. Kelman 46. 28. Maclntyre, "Risk, Harm, and Benefit Assessments" 177. 29. Kelman 48. 30. Kelman 82. 31. Kelman 89. 32. Terry Pinkard, "Invasions of Privacy in Social Science Research," E t h i c a l Issues in S o c i a l Science Research 267. 33. Pinkard 270. 34. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights S e r i o u s l y (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978) x i . 35. John A. Robertson and E.L. Patullo argue that there may be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds under the f i r s t amendment to perform research but as Terry Pinkard makes c l e a r , there are no moral or l e g a l grounds whatever that would support a r i g h t to perform research s u f f i c i e n t to o v e r r i d e i n d i v i d u a l rights to privacy. See Robertson, "The S o c i a l S c i e n t i s t ' s Right to Research and the IRB System," E t h i c a l Issues in Social Science Research 356-372; and E.L. PatulloT "Modesty i s the Best P o l i c y : the Federal Role i n S o c i a l Research," E t h i c a l Issues in S o c i a l Science Research 373-390. 36. Pinkard 272. 37. The p r e c i s e phrase was, "the welfare of the species overrides the welfare of the p a r t i c u l a r man." Quoted in Bower and de Gasparis, Ethics in Social Research 4. 38. Reynolds, E t h i c a l Dilemmas 216. 115 3 9 . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , R i c h a r d I . H o f f e r b e r t , " C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , P r i v a c y and S o c i a l Data A r c h i v e s : S p e c i a l Problems f o r P o l i c y A n a l y s i s , " A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records, pp. 224-227 ; Robert F. Boruch and Joe S~. Cec i 1, Solutions to E t h i c a l and Legal Problems in Social Research (New York: Academic Press, 1983); Boruch and C e c i l , Assuring the C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of Social Research Data (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979); David H. Flaherty, Privacy and Government Data Banks: An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Perspective" (London: Mansell, 1979). 40. Flaherty, "The Bellagio Conference" 26. 41. Canada C o u n c i l , C o n s u l t a t i v e Group on Et h i c s , Ethics (Ottawa: The Canada Council, 1977) 5. 42. Canada Council, Ethics 5. 43. According to Joan Hoff-Wilson, "Neither the Organization of American Historians, nor the American H i s t o r i c a l Association has adopted any e t h i c a l g u i d e l i n e s beyond endorsing the 1966 Statement on Professional Ethics approved by the council of the American Association of University Professors. The questions of research and access are not s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed i n the AAUP s t a t e m e n t . " " A c c e s s t o R e s t r i c t e d C o l l e c t i o n s : t h e R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of P r o f e s s i o n a l H i s t o r i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , " American A r c h i v i s t 46 .4 ( F a l l 1983): 442. 44. See, f o r example, A l l a n Bogue, "Data Dilemmas: Quantitative History and the Social Science History Association," Social Science History 3 .3-4 (October 1979): 212. 45. Robert C r a i g Brown, "Government and H i s t o r i a n : A Perspective on B i l l C-43," Archivaria 13 (Winter 1981-82): 123. 46. Allan G. Bogue, " H i s t o r i c a l Research and State Archival Data," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records 26. 47. Bogue, "Data Dilemmas" 213-14. 48. David H. F l a h e r t y , " P r i v a c y and C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y : The R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of H i s t o r i a n s , " Reviews in American History 8 (September 1980): 419. 116 V NEGOTIATING FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: ARCHIVISTS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY Archives are not drawn up in the interest of or for the information of Po s t e r i t y . S i r H i l a r y Jenkinson In "Privacy L e g i s l a t i o n : Implications for Archives," Judith Rowe suggests that a r c h i v i s t s are "uniquely q u a l i f i e d to play the role of 'honest broker' between today's c i t i z e n s and tomorrow's researchers." 1 A 1982 survey of f i f t y state archives, conducted by A l i c e Robbin, of the p u b l i c p o l i c y issues of p r i v a c y , and access to r e s t r i c t e d records f o r s o c i a l research, indicates, however, that the r e a l i t y i s otherwise. 2 The results of her survey bore out an e a r l i e r assertion, made by Margaret Hedstrom in the pages of Midwestern A r c h i v i s t , that the clear lack of standards and mechanisms for rec o n c i l i n g competing i n t e r e s t s of p r i v a c y and a c c e s s w i t h i n government b u r e a u c r a c i e s made a r c h i v i s t s reluctant to "become involved in determining [how to regulate] personal information because they viewed th e i r role as ambiguous."3 Reluctant or not, a r c h i v i s t s are assuming the role of mediators of the flow of information between agencies, users, and, increasingly, technology. According to A l i c e Robbin, " i t i s 117 therefore c r i t i c a l that guidelines be established for the types of i n f o r m a t i o n t h e [ a r c h i v e s ] w i l l a c c e p t , f o r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the a r c h i v i s t in protecting t h i s information, for administrative procedures to protect and c o n t r o l the flow, a c c e s s , and d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e data, and f o r t e c h n i c a l procedures to ensure nondisclosure of c o n f i d e n t i a l information." 4 In t h i s chapter, we w i l l examine the ways i n which a r c h i v i s t s have attempted to n e g o t i a t e claims f o r p r i v a c y and research access within the new information environment. Within the international a r c h i v a l community, there have been continuing e f f o r t s to standardize access regulations that balance the competing claims for access and i n d i v i d u a l privacy. A common r e s t r i c t i o n which a l l o w s f o r the r e t e n t i o n and e v e n t u a l disclosure of i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e records i s the closure of f i l e s for a s p e c i f i e d time p e r i o d . At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a considerable number of countries accepted the p r i n c i p l e that public documents might be made a v a i l a b l e on the expiry of a set time-limit, which would vary according to the categories of document. The passage of time p r i n c i p l e "assumes t h a t the reasons f o r or appropriateness of denying access diminish over time." 5 A r c h i v i s t s c i t e t h i s p r i n c i p l e when arguing that time r e s t r i c t i o n s must be placed on any exemptions which apply to the r e l e a s e of records and i t i s recognized in the Privacy Act's provision that personal records cease to be private twenty years aft e r the record subject's death. 118 The system of c l o s e d periods was born in an era when the notion of documentary accountability was, perhaps, clearer than i t i s now. In the nineteenth century, the state had not yet assumed s i g n i f i c a n t regulatory and s o c i a l service functions. The concept of a public document was more clear-cut because the power of the state to administer the l i v e s of ordinary c i t i z e n s was not nearly so great as i t i s now and the amount of sensitive personal information that could, l e g a l l y and t e c h n i c a l l y , be c o l l e c t e d about individual c i t i z e n s was f a i r l y l i m i t e d . The system of c l o s e d p e r i o d s a l s o grew out of an h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l framework very d i f f e r e n t from the present one. The s c h o l a r l y approach to h i s t o r i c a l records was f i l t e r e d through the lens of nineteenth century " s c i e n t i f i c " history which tended to project an e l i t i s t v i s i o n of the causes u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change. The sources of documentation on the past to which historians turned were those documenting the events of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , warfare and diplomacy and the careers of great statesmen. The p r i n c i p l e t h a t such r e c o r d s s h o u l d e v e n t u a l l y be open fo r research was l e s s problematic because these were public records documenting a c t i v i t i e s for which the s t a t e was c l e a r l y accountable to history and, perhaps, because the need to protect the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of c e r t a i n records was based more on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of national security than on the issue of personal privacy; a consideration for which the passage of time provided an acceptable antidote. 119 Today, the emphasis of history has s h i f t e d dramatically and the concept of a "public" document i s no longer so c l e a r - c u t . Changing perceptions regarding the role government should play in the l i v e s of private c i t i z e n s , coupled with improvements in the t e c h n i c a l means to c o l l e c t , s t o r e and manipulate data has resulted in some erosion of the system of closed periods both as a p r i n c i p l e and technique f o r n e g o t i a t i n g access to personal information. The p r i n c i p l e i s undermined by the s p e c u l a t i v e nature of i t s basic assumption, that i s , that the s e n s i t i v i t y of any information w i l l diminish with the passage of time. But how long i s long enough? The s e n s i t i v i t y of c e r t a i n government records may be reduced in the eyes of the creating agency aft e r a cer t a i n period of time because the repercussions disclosure w i l l have on the agency have been s u f f i c i e n t l y minimized with the passage of time. On the other hand, i n d i v i d u a l s whose most p a i n f u l or p r i v a t e l i f e experience i s documented in c e r t a i n records—mental health f i l e s or criminal case f i l e s for example— might argue that, for them, the s e n s i t i v i t y of such records does not diminish s i g n i f i c a n t l y over time. While i t i s assumed generally that the right to privacy ends with death, the legitimacy of that assumption has been challenged by some p h i l o s o p h e r s who argue t h a t p e o p l e ' s n o t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s can extend beyond t h e i r p h y s i c a l l i m i t s . This "extension of s e l f " i s a complex phenomenon—is information about an i n d i v i d u a l ' s f a m i l y , i n f o r m a t i o n about that i n d i v i d u a l ? 120 Stanley Benn argues that, in cases involving disclosures about parents, children or s i b l i n g s , the "extension of s e l f " may be based on a fee l i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the other person. 6 The extension of s e l f argument i s accepted i m p l i c i t l y in most o l d laws governing a c c e s s to a r c h i v e s which i n c l u d e provisions to protect "family honour"; many of these provisions continue to e x i s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y in archive l e g i s l a t i o n in Latin America. According to Michel Duchein, " i n many countries, the law expressly states that the notion of protecting private l i f e includes not only l i v i n g persons but also the memory of the dead and t h e i r f a m i l i e s " 7 : The negative consequences of revealing an i l l e g i t i m a t e b i r t h , for example, may a f f e c t the descendants of a f a m i l y s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s l a t e r . Likewise, the disclosure of an impropriety committed in the past can be seriously damaging to the perpetrator's descendants and family even long aft e r his death.8 The p r i n c i p l e i s invoked in France through the withholding of information about hereditary diseases for 150 years. The notion of "family honour" c l e a r l y i s open to abuse and could be used in an a r b i t r a r y manner as a pretext for refusing a c c e s s to c e r t a i n documents r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r d a t e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e d e m o n s t r a t e d p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s interpretation of the right to privacy in ce r t a i n c a s e s — c l a i m s of i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y have been made on such grounds, f o r example, in cases where the "victim" never chose to enter public l i f e — 9 undermines the e f f i c a c y of the passage of time p r i n c i p l e . 121 If i t i s to e f f e c t i v e l y protect the privacy of both individuals and their families, i t must impose a p r o h i b i t i v e l y long period of closure; at the same time, there i s the danger that the p r i n c i p l e could be wielded in such a way that i t prevents legitimate access to records. The issue of how long i s long enough plagues, not only the p r i n c i p l e of closed periods, but i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n as well. Although the international a r c h i v a l community, through the International Congress on Archives and n a t i o n a l p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , has confirmed the p r i n c i p l e of s p e c i f i e d time r e s t r i c t i o n s , i t s position as to what constitutes an acceptable period of closure remains vague. At a recent I.C.A. roundtable on access to information and privacy, delegates agreed "that a well proportioned balance between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to information on the other, w i l l lead to the release of a l l r e s t r i c t e d material at the conclusion of whatever period of closure may be necessary."10 When the Council of the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s announced i t s own code for access i n 1973, i t too confirmed the p r i n c i p l e of s p e c i f i e d time r e s t r i c t i o n s but i t f a i l e d to make any recommendations concerning the desirable duration of r e s t r i c t e d access.H Access g u i d e l i n e s that have attempted to e s t a b l i s h more s p e c i f i c time l i m i t s have not met with much success. At the 1968 Madrid Congress, the International Council on Archives urged a closed period of no longer than t h i r t y years for both private and 122 p u b l i c r e c o r d s . In 1972, under the auspices of UNESCO, the I.C.A. published a draft law on production and right of access, the i n t e n t i o n of which was to bring a r c h i v a l l e g i s l a t i o n "into l i n e with the p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l and technical exigencies of modern development." 1 2 Under the UNESCO/I.C.A. draft law, transfer to an archives would be synonymous with free access. The general time l i m i t prescribed was twenty-five years; records containing information that might v i o l a t e either personal privacy or state secrets would be closed for f i f t y years "after the conclusion of the matter to which they r e f e r . " The authors of the d r a f t law acknowledged that such a l i b e r a l access p o l i c y would be in c o n f l i c t with privacy values. Nevertheless, they defended i t on the grounds that "the p r i n c i p l e i of free access ...should no longer have to be s a c r i f i c e d every time i t cl a s h e s ...with the privacy of i n d i v i d u a l s . " 1 3 Given t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i a l nature, the I.C.A. recommendations have not been generally accepted by the ar c h i v a l community. 1 4 In actual i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e , the d u r a t i o n of c l o s e d p e r i o d s v a r i e s g r e a t l y . Kathy Roe Coker, who reviewed a r c h i v a l p o l i c y at the state l e v e l with respect to access to c o n f i d e n t i a l records, d i s c o v e r e d that periods of closed access ranged in length from twenty-five years to the death of the record subject.15 Closed periods have eroded pa r t l y because, with the passage of freedom of information l e g i s l a t i o n , the imaginative distance separating "current" from " h i s t o r i c a l " records has been eclipsed 123 inasmuch as the Act comes into e f f e c t at the moment the documents are created; and par t l y because of the increasing interest shown by researchers in contemporary history and the ensuing pressure to reduce c l o s e d periods on access f o r those c a t e g o r i e s of records, including those containing personal information, which are exempt from access under freedom of information laws. The breakdown of the 100 year rule which t r a d i t i o n a l l y defined the hi s t o r i a n s ' time frame for enquiry has r e s u l t e d in a greated demand for r e l a t i v e l y recent documents. Historians maintain that closed periods of 30 years or more do not f a c i l i t a t e a c r i t i q u e of current government practice; i t permits that c r i t i c i s m only in retrospect. Lengthy time r e s t r i c t i o n s are, therefore, considered unacceptable to hi s t o r i a n s since they would severely r e s t r i c t the research done on contemporary s o c i a l issues.16 Whether in the case of documents c l a s s i f i e d on the grounds of protection of privacy, or documents which have not reached the t i m e - l i m i t f o r f r e e a c c e s s , laws and r e g u l a t i o n s almost i n v a r i a b l y make p r o v i s i o n f o r s p e c i a l permission. If such a p o s s i b i l i t y did not e x i s t , so the argument goes, whole classes of a r c h i v a l documents would remain d e f i n i t i v e l y inaccessible for h i s t o r i c a l research. The I.C.A. has endorsed the p r i n c i p l e of s p e c i a l c l e a r a n c e procedures on the grounds that they are e s s e n t i a l f o r documents closed for extended periods of t i m e . 1 7 The p r i n c i p l e i s m a n i f e s t e d t h r o u g h a v a r i e t y of a c c e s s procedures, i n c l u d i n g s c r e e n i n g , d i s c r e t i o n a r y disclosure and 124 contractual agreements. The s c r e e n i n g of res e a r c h e r s on the b a s i s of research credentials or the nature and value of the proposed research project i s one method of r e s t r i c t i n g access to, as well as the use of, s e n s i t i v e personal r e c o r d s . In the United S t a t e s , s e v e r a l s t a t e a r c h i v e s have set as a condition of access to c o n f i d e n t i a l government case f i l e s "the d e m o n s t r a t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e purpose by the r e s e a r c h e r , " which the a r c h i v i s t ascertains through i n i t i a l screening interviews and consultations with the source agency. 1 8 S c r e e n i n g procedures imply that there i s a l e g i t i m a t e d i s t i n c t i o n between serious and non-serious research and that the a r c h i v i s t has a right to make judgements as to who can use the information under the a r c h i v e s ' c o n t r o l as well as how that information can be used. Helen Yoxall defines the e t h i c a l issue thus: "although . . . a r c h i v i s t s may p r i v a t e l y make ...judgements about researchers' characters and motives, can they act in t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y manner, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the r e p o s i t o r y i s a publicly-funded one?" 1 9 The application of an i n t e l l e c t u a l means test for access to records containing personal information i s an e l i t i s t p o l i c y that i s incompatible with the democratic s p i r i t of arc h i v a l p r i n c i p l e s that have been developed sin c e 1945. The I.C.A. dra f t law on production and right of access encourages access without d i s t i n c t i o n made between users^O a n d the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s ' 1973 statement on access recommended that 125 a r e p o s i t o r y "should not grant p r i v i l e g e d or exclusive use of materials to any person or persons." 21 Jean Tener has argued f o r c e f u l l y that access should be regarded as something which cannot be d i v i d e d i n t o open categories for " s c h o l a r s " and c l o s e d c a t e g o r i e s f o r " s e n s a t i o n a l w r i t e r s , " or a v a i l a b l e to those with a "genuine" interest and unavailable to those who lack an a p p r o p r i a t e " a p p r e c i a t i o n . " A c c e s s s h o u l d be i n d i v i s i b l e . 2 2 That the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of "legitimate" h i s t o r i c a l research as the e x c l u s i v e domain of the s c h o l a r i s l o s i n g ground i s evident in a recent court decision in the Netherlands in r e l a t i o n to a refusal to grant access to archives to a j o u r n a l i s t . The judge decided in favour of the j o u r n a l i s t , concluding that, "the d i v i d i n g l i n e between s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h and n o n - s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h cannot be determined s o l e l y by the nature of the publication for which the r e s u l t of t h i s research i s intended. It i s therefore preferable to rule that, for serious h i s t o r i c a l research, a departure may in p r i n c i p l e be made from l e g i s l a t i o n currently in force regarding the secrecy of archives."23 In some government j u r i s d i c t i o n s , competing claims f o r access and privacy are mediated by way of l e g i s l a t e d access. The Public Archives of Canada employs the p r i n c i p l e of discretionary disclosure established in section 8 of the Privacy Act which i s a provision permitting c o n t r o l l e d access to government information that has been transferred to the Public Archives of Canada for a r c h i v a l or h i s t o r i c a l purposes. Subsection 8(3) permits the 126 d i s c r e t i o n a r y d i s c l o s u r e of personal information by the Public Archives; i t states that: Subject to any act of Parliament, personal information under the control of the Public Archives that has been t r a n s f e r r e d to the P u b l i c A r c h i v e s by a government i n s t i t u t i o n for a r c h i v a l or h i s t o r i c a l purposes may be d i s c l o s e d i n accordance with the regulations to any person or body for research or s t a t i s t i c a l purposes. 2 4 The conditions for disclosure of a r c h i v a l or h i s t o r i c a l personal information for research or s t a t i s t i c a l purposes are set out in Section 6 of the Privacy Regulations. Disclosure i s permissible i f the information i s of such a nature that disclosure would not c o n s t i t u t e an unwarranted i n v a s i o n of the p r i v a c y of the indi v i d u a l to whom the information pertains; or, one hundred and ten years have elapsed following the b i r t h of the ind i v i d u a l to whom the information pertains; or, in cases where the information was obtained through the taking of a census or survey, ninety-two years have elapsed following the taking of the census or survey containing the information. 2^ Discretion to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between those types of personal information which would c o n s t i t u t e an unwarranted i n v a s i o n of privacy i s given to the Dominion A r c h i v i s t . Unwarranted invasion of privacy i s described as "a si t u a t i o n in which the disclosure of personal information would c l e a r l y r e s u l t in harm or injury to the i n d i v i d u a l to whom i t p e r t a i n s " 2 6 (emphasis mine). Injury i s interpreted in the Regulations as any harm or embarrassment which w i l l have d i r e c t negative e f f e c t s on an i n d i v i d u a l ' s career, 127 reputation, f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n , health or w e l l - b e i n g . 2 7 Four i n t e r r e l a t e d f a c t o r s are taken i n t o account in the in v a s i o n of p r i v a c y t e s t and include: the expectations of the in d i v i d u a l ; the s e n s i t i v i t y of the information r e l a t i v e to i t s con t e n t s and currency (the passage of time p r i n c i p l e ) ; the pr o b a b i l i t y of injury; and the context of the f i l e . 2 8 Each of these c r i t e r i a for tes t i n g invasion of p r i v a c y i s problematic for e t h i c a l reasons that have been discussed in the l a s t c h a p t e r . F i r s t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e expec t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s with respect to the c o n f i d e n t i a l nature of the information they have provided to a government agency since provisions for c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y are notoriously vague in many government agencies. In applying the invasion of privacy test here, the a r c h i v i s t i s instructed by the guidelines to ask the following question: "Was the information compiled or obtained under guarantees which preclude some or a l l types of disclosures ...or ...can the i n f o r m a t i o n be c o n s i d e r e d to have been u n s o l i c i t e d or g i v e n f r e e l y or v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h l i t t l e e x pectation of being maintained in t o t a l c o n f i d e n c e ? " ^ i t i s quite possible for an ind i v i d u a l to have a reasonable expectation of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y with respect to the contents of a case f i l e and yet no formal guarantees may exist for i t s protection. The second c r i t e r i o n , s e n s i t i v i t y of the information, may be d i f f i c u l t to. e s t a b l i s h since computer matching techniques have b l u r r e d , to some e x t e n t , the d i s t i n c t i o n s between h i g h l y 128 sensitive personal information and f a i r l y innocuous information. The t h i r d c r i t e r i o n , that the personal information must be assessed in r e l a t i o n to the e n t i r e f i l e "to determine that disclosure of the information does not form part of a c r u c i a l segment of a larger picture that could reasonably be expected to be i n j u r i o u s to the i n d i v i d u a l , " - ^ only takes into account the contents of a f i l e on an i n d i v i d u a l ; i t does not (and cannot) a d d r e s s the t o t a l c o n t e x t of i n f o r m a t i o n known about an i n d i v i d u a l in various government data bases in assessing whether the disclosure of personal information w i l l be injurious to the i n d i v i d u a l . F i n a l l y , a l l of these c r i t e r i a hinge on the evaluation of measurable i n j u r y . I t has been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a p u r e l y consequent i a l i s t a n a l y s i s i s a faulty yardstick with which to measure harm. Because the injury must be measurable, v i s a v i s career, reputation or f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n , i t does not take into account the d i f f u s e harm, not only to the i n d i v i d u a l , but to the s o c i e t y as a whole, which r e s u l t s from the accumulation of invasions of privacy. The p r i n c i p l e of the r i g h t to p r i v a c y obtains even in the absence of "measurable" harm. The Privacy Regulations also permit disclosure to personal information for research purposes under paragraph 8(2)(j) of the Privacy Act. Under t h i s clause, personal information under the control of a government i n s t i t u t i o n may be disclosed for research purposes i f the head of the government i n s t i t u t i o n i s s a t i s f i e d 129 that the research cannot reasonably be accomplished unless the information i s provided in i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e form; and i f the researcher provides a written statement that no subsequent disclosure of the information w i l l be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to i d e n t i f y the ind i v i d u a l to whom i t rel a t e s . This clause may be invoked by a researcher who wants access to extensive s e r i e s of records that c o n t a i n personal information and that are systematically organized or retrieved by the name of an indi v i d u a l or by an i d e n t i f y i n g number, symbol or other p a r t i c u l a r assigned to an i n d i v i d u a l . Examples of records that f a l l into t h i s category are case f i l e s such as Unemployment Insurance Commission b e n e f i t c l a i m s f i l e s , c i v i l s e r v i c e personnel records and p i l o t s ' f i l e s . 3 1 The approach to access here i s a contractual one. According to the P u b l i c A r c h i v e s ' Guidelines for Disclosure of Personal Information, the purpose of th i s clause i s to provide an avenue for research and s t a t i s t i c a l analysis involving personal information, e s p e c i a l l y in me d i c i n e and the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , w h i l e making researchers formally accountable for the protection of ind i v i d u a l privacy when they are allowed access to such i n f o r m a t i o n . 3 2 C o n t r a c t u a l agreements between researchers and government a r c h i v e s a r e commonly us e d to e n f o r c e s t a n d a r d s o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y f or c l a s s e s of records containing sensitive' personal information. In 1974, V i r g i n i a Stewart a r t i c u l a t e d the need f o r a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r i e s to develop p o l i c y "covering 130 a c q u i s i t i o n , c u s t o d y , and a c c e s s to case recor d s " from a t h e o r e t i c a l and l e g a l p e r s p e c t i v e ; 3 3 and she described the p o l i c y on access that the Manuscript S e c t i o n of the U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Library had developed in order to deal with c o n f i d e n t i a l public welfare case f i l e s . The p o l i c y incorporates the following conditions for access: Any person w i s h i n g to use case records must make a p p l i c a t i o n , i d e n t i f y i n g h i m s e l f and s t a t i n g h i s research purpose. In t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n he w i l l agree to maintain the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of the s u b j e c t s and a l l persons mentioned in case records. The application w i l l be reviewed by the Manuscript L i b r a r i a n ...who w i l l i n f o r m t h e a p p l i c a n t of the r e s t r i c t i o n s applicable to the c o l l e c t i o n requested. A l l r e s e a r c h n o t e s are s u b j e c t to review by the Manuscript L i b r a r i a n for compliance with the applicable r e s t r i c t i o n s . A copy of any publication r e s u l t i n g from the research s h a l l be p r o v i d e d by the user to the M a n u s c r i p t S e c t i o n . 3 4 The researcher also agrees to "hold harmless and indemnify" the archives against any loss or damage a r i s i n g out of use of the records. The contractual l e t t e r of agreement between the archives and the researcher adopted by Michigan State Archives in 1978 obliges researchers to accept conditions on access that are v a r i a t i o n s on the theme developed by Stewart. The l e t t e r of agreement was d e v e l o p e d to p e r m i t research use of mental h e a l t h records acquired from a state hospital for the c r i m i n a l l y insane. Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s of the agreement, r e s e a r c h e r s must keep c o n f i d e n t i a l any i d e n t i f i a b l e personal information about the 131 record subject; allow prepared writings based on t h e i r research to be reviewed by the state archives before dissemination; to pay damages of one thousand d o l l a r s for v i o l a t i n g provisions of the agreement; and to indemnify and hold harmless the state and i t s agencies for any costs or damages which may accrue from the use of the records.35 Most r e s p o s i t o r i e s make access to c e r t a i n sensitive materials subject to one or more of the conditions on use just d e s c r i b e d . 3 6 Defenders of c o n t r a c t u a l agreements argue that contracted access i s an e f f e c t i v e way of s e n s i t i z i n g the research community to the need to protect personal privacy. A s i g n i f i c a n t drawback to t h i s technique i s that i t requires a r c h i v i s t s to intercede in the research process in a manner many might fi n d r e pellent. The vetting of publications and the scrutiny of research notes i s a practice r i g h t l y abhorred by many a r c h i v i s t s because, they argue, i t sets up the a r c h i v i s t as the f i n a l a r b i t e r of what studies may be published: "too much discretionary power presents the danger that the a r c h i v i s t w i l l become policeman and c e n s o r . " 3 7 The p o s i t i o n taken by Helen Y o x a l l , t h a t " i f the d a t a i s too s e n s i t i v e to allow the researcher to use i t in the way he/she sees f i t , then i t i s r e a l l y too s e n s i t i v e to be seen in the f i r s t p l a c e " 3 8 i s one that deserves serious consideration. Aside from the e t h i c a l dilemma posed by reviewing research notes and vetting publications, there i s some concern that the deterrence b u i l t i n t o c o n t r a c t e d access, by way of f i n a n c i a l 132 p e n a l t i e s , may not be a s u f f i c i e n t l y strong guarantee that privacy rights w i l l be protected by the researcher. The issue i s not so much whether researchers can be trusted to uphold th e i r contract; i t i s more a question of whether researchers w i l l , in every case, be able to uphold t h e i r contract, in the event that t h e i r research notes are subpoenaed. Under most circumstances research records may be obtained for evidence by subpoena, given adequate le g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , whether or not the researcher has promised to maintain the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of those records. The issue of legal protection of research records i s complex, but the balance between values of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and public access to information seems heavily weighted toward the l a t t e r in disputes i n v o l v i n g c r i m i n a l actions.39 The f a c t that the archives i s indemnified and, t h e r e f o r e cannot be h e l d accountable as a general p u b l i s h e r 4 ^ o f f e r s small consolation to the individual whose privacy i s v i o l a t e d or to the a r c h i v e s whose r e p u t a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y suffer in the event a breach of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y does occur. The q u e s t i o n t h a t remains i s whether such a system of p a t e r n a l i s t i c checks and balances addresses the real issue behind the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a c y — the r i g h t of the i n d i v i d u a l to a reasonable degree of secrecy and anonymity. We have alread y e s t a b l i s h e d that the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e context in which cert a i n kinds of records are cr e a t e d destroys any i l l u s i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l c o n c e r n e d c o n s e n t e d " f r e e l y " to the o r i g i n a l 133 d i s c l o s u r e of the i n f o r m a t i o n l e t a l o n e i t s subsequent dissemination. C l e a r l y a system of access based on c l o s e d p e r i o d s , p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s or r e s e a r c h e r s ' guarantees of anonymity cannot disp e l the e t h i c a l ambiguities with respect to personal privacy that surround a great many government records when they come into the custody of the a r c h i v e s . R e s t r i c t i n g access to so-called "serious researchers" or placing conditions on use begs the question of whether those records should be seen at a l l . Rather than attempt to control the post-disclosure use of personal information, a r c h i v i s t s working in s o c i a l science data a r c h i v e s 4 * and machine-readable d i v i s i o n s of government archives have concluded that i t may be more appropriate to simply reduce d i r e c t research access to such information. Given the power of computers to m a n i p u l a t e data e l e m e n t s i n i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e records, they reason, the only e t h i c a l and p r a c t i c a l way to resol v e the p r i v a c y dilemma i s to t r e a t a l l personal information contained in records as c o n f i d e n t i a l and to release f i l e s only when individuals cannot be i d e n t i f i e d . 4 2 In t h i s approach, the repository maintains two data f i l e s — one containing the raw data and the other containing the data in a public use or disclosure free format. Personal information i s processed so that the s p e c i f i c individuals to whom i t relates cannot be i d e n t i f i e d and thus the information can be released for general research use. For t r a d i t i o n a l paper records, i t i s 134 possible to remove or block out i d e n t i f i e r s contained in textual case f i l e s 4 3 . w i t h m a c h i n e - r e a d a b l e re c o r d s , there are, primarily, two approaches which can be taken with respect to data anonymization. The f i r s t i s by completely removing various pieces of information from the f i l e , that i s , deleting v a r i a b l e s . The second approach i s by aggregating the information contained in one or more v a r i a b l e s in such a way as to e l i m i n a t e the i d e n t i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by submerging them in successively broader c a t e g o r i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n . V a r i o u s d a t a can be suppressed and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s can be c o l l a p s e d to l i m i t the d e t a i l of small samples and prevent the disclosure of i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t i e s by way of cross c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Harold Naugler suggests that, "where possible, aggregation should be the desired means to anonymize a data f i l e " , because: Removing information from a f i l e always represents an a b s o l u t e i n f o r m a t i o n l o s s . Whatever amount of knowledge about the study group was contained in a d e l e t e d v a r i a b l e i s completely u n a v a i l a b l e to the researcher, and s i n c e the information c o l l e c t e d f o r inclusion in a data f i l e generally has a s p e c i f i c , and i m p o r t a n t p urpose, i t s e l i m i n a t i o n a f f e c t s t h e usefulness of the other data. S i m i l a r l y , aggregation r e p r e s e n t s i n f o r m a t i o n l o s s but u s u a l l y not as completely as does del e t i o n . The e f f e c t of aggregation is to reduce the degree of s p e c i f i c i t y of the data. As a v a r i a b l e i s successively aggregated, fewer research questions can be addressed and fewer problems can be a n a l y s e d . 4 4 A substantial body of l i t e r a t u r e has been developed by government census bureaus and s o c i a l science data archives which describes a v a r i e t y of methods for anonymizing data and for ensuring that 135 users of aggregated data cannot i d e n t i f y record s u b j e c t s . 4 5 Anonymization procedures are time consuming and expensive. Moreover, many types of resear c h , e s p e c i a l l y many types of h i s t o r i c a l research, require the use of i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e records. 4^ From the researcher's point of view, anonymizing or aggregating data involves "the suppression and ultimate l o s s " of raw or micro-level data that scholars want "preserved in usable and accessible form" 4 7 for long i t u d i n a l research, which tracks an indi v i d u a l or group of individuals over time, and c o r r e l a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h , w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an i n d i v i d u a l , usually by l i n k i n g information held in separate records systems. 4 8 S o c i a l s c i e n c e h i s t o r i a n A l l a n Bogue o b j e c t s to the aggregation of micro-level data on the grounds that, "once the basic individual unit of data i s gone and we are forced to depend upon an agency aggregative summary, or one done by an e a r l i e r s c h o l a r , we can n e v e r a g a i n r e c a p t u r e t h e i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s for c e r t a i n . " 4 9 S i m i l a r l y , in a 1978 b r i e f to the federal government, the Canadian Association of U n i v e r s i t y Teachers (CAUT) i n d i c a t e d that both the CAUT and the Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Association share the view that: Certain kinds of research necessitate access to micro-data at an i d e n t i f i a b l e i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , although the f i n a l r e s u l t of a rese a r c h e r ' s work might be of an anonymous or s t a t i s t i c a l nature. The p u b l i c a t i o n of aggregated information from census and other surveys i s not s u f f i c i e n t as i t cannot take into consideration a l l of the concerns of scholars. 5 u" 136 Undoubtedly, procedures designed to protect c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y w i l l r e s u l t in some reduction in the quantity and qu a l i t y of the data available for general use; i t w i l l not, however, destroy the net value of the data. As Richard Hoffebert maintains: The price paid now in caution, procedural development, and perhaps data imprecision i s low compared to the costs to research targets that might flow from breaches of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . And the s t r i c t u r e s which might be placed by poorly informed and i n s e n s i t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e or bureaucratic a u t h o r i t i e s , in the event of r e a l or c o n t r i v e d scandal, are f a r worse in th e i r potential i n c a r n a t i o n s than those which might be r a t i o n a l l y placed by ourselves upon our own research a c t i v i t i e s . 5 1 Although h i s t o r i a n s l i k e l y w i l l continue to urge a r c h i v i s t s to preserve a l l the records that w i l l be needed by s o c i a l history,52 and to lobby government agencies on t h e i r behalf for more l i b e r a l access to records containing personal information, t o t a l access to a l l records i s an impossible expectation and a s i g n i f i c a n t change in t h i s state of a f f a i r s seems unl i k e l y in the near future since requirements of personal privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y w i l l continue to p r e v a i l in greater or lesser degree. Even i f the s i t u a t i o n were to change, the question remains whether a r c h i v i s t s have a duty, as some h i s t o r i a n s (and many a r c h i v i s t s ) seem to suggest, to encourage government agencies to loosen p r i v a c y r e s t r i c t i o n s for the benefit of the research community. In his "Moral Defence of Archives," S i r H i l a r y Jenkinson warned a r c h i v i s t s to guard a g a i n s t "haste i n d e a l i n g with Archives due to anxiety to make them available for use."53 Such haste, in Jenkinson's estimation, c o n s t i t u t e d a form of moral 137 n e g l i g e n c e ; a p o i n t S.N. P r a s a d makes c l e a r i n "The L i b e r a l i s a t i o n of Access and Use": the ultimate allegiance of the a r c h i v i s t . . . i s neither to the exi s t i n g administration, nor to the scholars of today. H i s a l l e g i a n c e i s to the records and to documentation, which he holds in sacred trust for the generations to come . . . P r e s e r v a t i o n of records must take p r i o r i t y over u t i l i s a t i o n . Undue pressure from researchers might endanger documentation i t s e l f in various ways. 5 4 When the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s drafted i t s D e f i n i t i o n of an A r c h i v i s t in 1984, i t rei t e r a t e d Jenkinson's 1922 d e f i n i t i o n of the a r c h i v i s t as "a kind of Public T r u s t e e . " 5 5 The S.A.A. d e f i n i t i o n stated, "the a r c h i v i s t i s the trustee of the present and the past for future generations ...a steadfast keeper of the records held in t r u s t . "5*> The a r c h i v i s t , Jenkinson maintained, back in 1922, should "provide to the best of his a b i l i t y for the needs of historians and other research workers." But t h i s he considered a secondary duty, subject to the discharge of the a r c h i v i s t ' s primary duty, that i s , "to take a l l possible precautions for the safeguarding of h i s Archives and for t h e i r e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s ; " 5 7 and he warned that, "the position of primary and secondary duties must not be reversed'." 5 8 Margaret Cross Norton, one of the most a r t i c u l a t e and comprehensive explorers of the ideas u n d e r l y i n g a r c h i v e s , has argued c o n v i n c i n g l y that the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e in the care of public records i s , that under a democratic form of government, 138 the people are sovereign: ...that i s , the records of the government belong to the people and the o f f i c i a l who c r e a t e s , f i l e s , and services the records i s merely acting as custodian for the people . . . o f f i c i a l s do not own the records which they c r e a t e , but merely act as custodians of the records on behalf of the people.59 As custodians of the record, our a r c h i v a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s follow, not only from our obligations to the research community, but, more importantly, from our o b l i g a t i o n s to the p u b l i c at large. That we have forgotten, to some extent, t h i s larger sense of obligation, i s in part a consequence of what Hugh Taylor has c a l l e d the " h i s t o r i c a l shunt" of archives.60 Taylor argues that, in t h e i r o r i g i n a l function, governmental archives were records of business t r a n s a c t i o n s made and preserved because such records might la t e r be required as evidence in lawsuits involving those transactions. In England during the Middle Ages the keepers of the record remained at the heart of the administration; and the legal value of the material ensured i t s own s u r v i v a l long a f t e r the administration of n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s had passed i n t o other hands.61 The French Revolution altered profoundly the perception of records as the evidences of the o f f i c e s of o r i g i n : At one stroke, the creation of the Archives Nationale sundered the ancient records from t h e i r roots [in t h e i r o f f i c e s of o r i g i n ] , placed them in common archives, and i n , e f f e c t l a b e l l e d them " h i s t o r i c a l . " The modern a r c h i v i s t was born and the h i s t o r i c a l archives emerged e s s e n t i a l l y as a r e p o s i t o r y of raw m a t e r i a l f o r the h i s t o r i a n who, using von Ranke's model as a prototype, would mine t h e i r r i c h v e i n s o f d o c u m e n t a r y evidence...62 139 The legitimacy of t h i s " h i s t o r i c a l shunt" of archives i s being re-examined in the face of access and privacy debates which focus on current access and not on long term preservation and access. These debates have un d e r l i n e d the need fo r a r c h i v i s t s to r e -assert t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l role as public trustees. Ruth Simmons believes, "the time i s over for ad hoc decisions on access, both for the protection of the repository and for the protection of p r i v a c y r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s a r c h i v i s t s are e t h i c a l l y and l e g a l l y bound to uphold." 6 3 One issue within the c o n s t e l l a t i o n of p r i v a c y debates to which a r c h i v i s t s w i l l need to pay close attention i s the issue of e t h i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n . In a number of western c o u n t r i e s , a d i s c u s s i o n about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of d e s t r o y i n g s e n s i t i v e personal information—information r e l a t i n g primarily to criminal o f f e n c e s — f o r the protection of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y has been in p r o g r e s s f o r the l a s t few y e a r s . 6 4 The issue of e t h i c a l destruction has emerged in response to the j u s t i f i a b l e fear that computerized personal data r e g i s t e r s might encroach upon the i n t e g r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l . To some extent, e t h i c a l destruction i s already being c a r r i e d out. In Sweden, for example, the r e g i s t e r of s e r i o u s c r i m i n a l s i s , f o r humanitarian reasons, r e g u l a r l y purged of a l l information r e l a t i n g to criminals who have d i e d , passed t h e i r e i g h t i e t h b i r t h d a y , or remained unconvicted during the l a s t 10 years (the Swedish Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s s t i l l keeps magnetic tapes of the contents of the 140 register for the most recent y e a r s ) . 6 ^ The response of the research and a r c h i v a l community to e t h i c a l destruction has been, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , one of anger. In 1983, that anger focused on the Canadian Young Offenders Act which had just been passed by the government. What researchers and a r c h i v i s t s object to was section 45 of the Act, a provision authorizing the destruction of Young Offender f i l e s two to f i v e years af t e r a l l d i s p o s i t i o n s made in respect of the young person have been completed, or upon that person's receiving a pardon. Under 45 (1): a l l records kept pursuant to sections 40 to 43 [ i . e . , case f i l e s , c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y ] and r e c o r d s taken pursuant to section 44 [ i . e . , f i n g e r p r i n t s , photograph] that r e l a t e to the young person in respect of the alleged offence and a l l copies, p r i n t s or negatives of such records s h a l l be destroyed. Sect i o n 45 s t i p u l a t e d that any r e f u s a l or f a i l u r e to destroy these records constituted an offence; the s t i p u l a t i o n a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y to the records maintained under the J u v e n i l e Delinquents Act which had preceded the Young Offenders Act. The Act asserted, in i t s declaration of p r i n c i p l e s , that: in the application of t h i s Act, the rights and freedoms of young persons include a right to the least possible interference with freedom that i s consistent with the p r o t e c t i o n of society, having regard to the needs of young persons and the interests of t h e i r f a m i l i e s . The h i s t o r i c a l community denounced Section 45, describing the measure as "wanton destruction" and "an act of bureaucratic v a n d a l i s m . " 6 6 While h i s t o r i a n s acknowledged the p r i n c i p l e 141 u n d e r l y i n g the d e s t r u c t i o n i t was q u i c k l y set aside on the grounds that such records possessed s i g n i f i c a n t research value and that only "serious researchers" would be allowed access.67 Given that the le g a l v i a b i l i t y of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y i s , at the moment, u n c e r t a i n , the p o s s e s s i o n of " s e r i o u s r e s e a r c h e r " credentials i s que s t i o n a b l e currency f o r n e g o t i a t i n g access. Moreover, as already discussed, the practice of allowing c e r t a i n researchers to see c o n f i d e n t i a l r e c o r d s i s an e l i t i s t and undemocratic p r a c t i c e whose l e g i t i m a c y should be questioned rather than assumed both by a r c h i v i s t s and h i s t o r i a n s . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the argument misses the p o i n t . The practice of maintaining c e r t a i n kinds of derogatory information about i n d i v i d u a l s ignores a fundamental premise of Judaeo-Chri s t i a n culture, that i s , that we possess a capacity for s e l f -r e d e m p t i o n . On t h a t premise, c e r t a i n kinds of derogatory information such as a c r i m i n a l r e c o r d should be allowed to disappear from view a f t e r a certain period of time. In "Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions," Richard Wasserstrom states the case thus: A s o c i e t y that i s concerned to encourage persons to b e l i e v e in the p o s s i b i l i t y of genuine i n d i v i d u a l redemption and t h i s i s concerned not to make the process of redemption unduly onerous or interminable might, therefore, a c t i v e l y discourage the development of i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t impose permanent marks of d i s a p p r o b a t i o n upon any of the i n d i v i d u a l s in the s o c i e t y . One of the t h i n g s ...wrong w i t h H e s t e r Prynne's "A" was that i t was an unremovable s t a i n impressed upon her body. The storage of information about c o n v i c t i o n s in a data bank i s simply a more contemporary method of a f f i x i n g the i n d e l i b l e brand.68 142 In a l e t t e r expressing i t s "deep concern" over the records d i s p o s i t i o n section of the Young Offenders Act, the Association of Canadian A r c h i v i s t s argued a g a i n s t the destruction of the f i l e s on the grounds that "maintaining a record of j u v e n i l e s before the courts i s v i t a l to our h i s t o r i c a l understanding of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between juveniles and Canadian s o c i e t y . " 6 9 while the argument, and the p r i n c i p l e underlying i t , i s a compelling one, the value of h i s t o r i c a l documentation represents only one of a number of values on which moral decision-making u l t i m a t e l y r e s t s . To j u s t i f y the preservation of such records, i t must be demonstrated that the l i b e r t y promoted by h i s t o r i c a l research i s of greater value to the community as a whole than that promoted by the right to privacy governing the f i l e s ' destruction. The philosopher Hans Jonas has argued that only a c t i v i t i e s that are s t r i c t l y necessary for the continued e x i s t e n c e of s o c i e t y can j u s t i f i a b l y extract a s a c r i f i c e in terms of human autonomy such as the right to privacy. If we cast that conclusion in terms of the s o c i a l contract underlying p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t i s clear that such a contract does not e n t a i l a commitment to the continual improvement of the human l o t over and above the basic preservation of s o c i a l order. P a r t i c i p a t i o n in p r o j e c t s aimed at e s s e n t i a l l y meliorative goals i s , therefore, not something that should be expected of c i t i z e n s as a matter of course; i t should be, ra t h e r , a f u l l y v o l u n t a r y matter f o r individuals to decide for themselves. 7^ 143 A r e l a t e d i s s u e , and one that constitutes an increasingly prevalent threat to personal privacy in a free society, i s that of personal information gathered by government agencies that has been obtained through i m p l i e d , a c t u a l or b e l i e v e d t h r e a t of r e t a l i a t i o n . Over the l a s t twenty years legal debates and press campaigns have q u e s t i o n e d the l e g a l i t y of c e r t a i n p o l i c e investigations and certa i n records maintained by the p o l i c e . A 1981 parliamentary inquiry in Canada on the f i l e s of the Royal Canadian Mounted P o l i c e , d i s c o v e r e d that the R.C.M.P. had maintained information prohibited by law on the private l i f e of c i t i z e n s ; these f i l e s were ordered destroyed. The issue surfaced the same year in France with regard to p o l i c e records and the " f i l e s on Jews" that had been set up during the Nazi occupation by the Vichy government. C i t i n g these incidents, Michel Duchein, acknowledges that " a r c h i v i s t s have never looked fondly upon the destruction of documents of any kind." Nevertheless, he argues, "when the question a r i s e s of safeguarding individuals against any ri s k of persecution or i l l e g a l practices, i t i s obviously more desirable to destroy documents than to endanger human l i v e s . " 7 1 In s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g e t h i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n , the moral de f e n c e of p u b l i c a r c h i v e s and, consequently, any d e c i s i o n a r c h i v i s t s take or r a t i f y with respect to records d e s t r u c t i o n must rest, not solely on the grounds of research value, which has always been a changeable c r e a t u r e , but on the p u r s u i t of two fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i s that a r c h i v i s t s 144 preserve records r e l a t i n g to the o r i g i n and administration of public p o l i c y ; the second p r i n c i p l e i s that a r c h i v i s t s preserve records that protect people's r i g h t s . If we wish to argue the case against e t h i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n , the grounds f o r such an argument should d e r i v e from those p r i n c i p l e s . If a case for p r e s e r v a t i o n cannot be made on t h e s e grounds, then t h e humanitarian reasons underlying the -destruction should p r e v a i l . A r c h i v i s t s do have an o b l i g a t i o n to guard a g a i n s t the destruction of records containing personal information merely for reasons of administrative convenience. The obligation to ensure that records destruction i s in the public interest and not simply in the interest of administrative e f f i c i e n c y also emerges, Norton suggests, from our democratic system of government, "that i s , the theory that government records once created may not l e g a l l y be destroyed without authorization from the representatives of the people in general assembly—by that body which a u t h o r i z e d the creation of the records by d i r e c t i o n or by i m p l i c a t i o n . 7 2 "Integral to the notion of proper a r c h i v a l management of records," Ruth Simmons argues, " . . . e s p e c i a l l y those which require decision-making, i s the necessity to demonstrate a p a t t e r n of practice which shows care and concern." 7 3 i f we are to f u l f i l l our obligations to the records and to the public who owns those r e c o r d s , we w i l l need to p l a y a more a c t i v e r o l e i n the establishment of p o l i c i e s governing the c o l l e c t i o n , maintenance and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of perso n a l i n f o r m a t i o n held in government 145 agencies. We need to know how personal information i s co l l e c t e d and for what purpose; and we need to increase our understanding of the environment in which such records are created. Once the information i s c o l l e c t e d , four basic questions need to be addressed. F i r s t , what d e t a i l s are available about the existence of records containing personal information: what kind of information should be c o l l e c t e d about the existence of records and by whom? To whom should such information be made ava i l a b l e , for example, to government agencies, the public, and for what purpose? Secondly, which records are to be kept and f o r how long? Who w i l l decide and how are decisions to be documented, made known and accounted for? Thirdly, when, i f ever, can an embargo on access other than by the provider of the information and by the o r i g i n a l agency be l i f t e d and for what purpose? If i t i s l i f t e d , should i t be l i f t e d in favour of other agencies or parties for management purposes? In favour of the general public? F i n a l l y , where are the records to be kept? In what circumstances are they to be held by a custodial organization? What safeguards exi s t for protecting personal information? How are they assessed and by whom? A f u r t h e r way to demonstrate our care and concern for the i n t e g r i t y of records c o n t a i n i n g personal i n f o r m a t i o n i s to e s t a b l i s h a set of e t h i c a l standards on which to base access decisions. A set of e t h i c a l standards has been proposed by A l i c e Robbin, e n s h r i n i n g the a r c h i v i s t s ' commitment to a number of 146 t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s including: a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to protect the public trust with which personal information has been given; the maintenance of a high standard of professional competence with r e s p e c t to n o n - d i s c l o s u r e of c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n ; s e n s i t i v i t y to the s o c i a l codes and moral expectations of the p u b l i c community w h i c h t h e y s e r v e ; s a f e g u a r d i n g t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n ; e s t a b l i s h i n g and p u b l i c i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r p r o t e c t i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l records; and e s t a b l i s h i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s e c u r i t y measures to prevent access to data processing and storage devices that maintain personal i n f o r m a t i o n . 7 4 Historians such as David Flaherty and Joan Hoff-Wilson have also alerted the h i s t o r i c a l community to the need to "set [ i t s ] own house in order so as to avoid, in p a r t i c u l a r , intervention by federal governments and the c o u r t s . " 7 5 Flaherty points out that: Other d i s c i p l i n e s have to worry about p r a c t i t i o n e r s who are unethical, careless or i n s e n s i t i v e to privacy and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . . . I t can be argued that the h i s t o r i c a l p r o f e s s i o n ...runs major r i s k s to i t s i n t e g r i t y and reputation from the occurrence of even one s i g n i f i c a n t w e ll p u b l i c i z e d breach of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , whether in using information on i n d i v i d u a l s i n the hands of government or in private d e p o s i t o r i e s . 7 6 Detailed and e x p l i c i t codes to protect the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of p e r s o n a l data s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d , F l a h e r t y argues, by professional associations; further, "such codes should be brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of a p p r o p r i a t e c u s t o d i a n s of p e r s o n a l information. Agencies might be j u s t i f i e d in making the existence 147 of an e t h i c a l code a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r access to s e n s i t i v e personal information in their custody." 7 7 As cases are argued, d e c i s i o n s appealed, and p r a c t i c e s implemented, a j u r i s p r u d e n c e of access to records containing personal information w i l l g r a d u a l l y evolve. One method of ensuring that checks and balances respecting access and privacy are established during t h i s process may be through the creation of ethics committees, similar to public documents committees, but on which the interests of a l l the relevant communities would be r e p r e s e n t e d — t h e p u b l i c , r e s e a r c h e r s , a r c h i v i s t s , the c i v i l s ervice. The function of such committees would be to expose governmental information-gathering practices to the clear l i g h t of public scrutiny. Such committees could play an active role in the scheduling and d i s p o s i t i o n of records containing personal information and ensure that access i s being negotiated for the public good and not only for the good of the research community. In a paper presented to the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s in 1982, Gerald Grob observed that: ...the tendency of most scholars has been to make th e i r claim for access take precedence over a l l other r i g h t s , a position that i s both irresponsible and dangerous. A system that r e s t s s o l e l y on good i n t e n t i o n s i s , in e f f e c t , no system; there are few i n d i v i d u a l s who would admit to harboring anything but the best of intentions. Consequently i t i s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t [ h i s t o r i a n s ] recognize that the interests of d i f f e r e n t groups, each with d i f f e r e n t concerns, must be taken into account. 7 8 Appeals of the sort put forward by h i s t o r i a n Robert Craig Brown, that i n c o n f l i c t s between the p r i n c i p l e of respect for privacy 148 and the needs of researchers we should "trust in the i n t e g r i t y of the r e s e a r c h e r " , 7 9 no longer carry the moral force they once did. What i s required instead i s a v a r i e t y of mechanisms that e l i m i n a t e the need f o r con v e n t i o n a l appeals to f a i t h in the researcher's i n t e g r i t y . As "a s t e a d f a s t keeper of the records h e l d in t r u s t , " a r c h i v i s t s are charged with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of protecting the in t e g r i t y of the records for the benefit of the public who owns them. I m p l i c i t i n t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the o b l i g a t i o n to respect and protect the i n t e g r i t y of the various s o c i a l contracts between c i t i z e n s and government to which the r e c o r d s bear witness, an o b l i g a t i o n that e n t a i l s protecting the privacy of record s u b j e c t s . The S o c i e t y of American A r c h i v i s t s has enshrined t h i s obligation in i t s code of ethics for a r c h i v i s t s which maintains that " a r c h i v i s t s r e s p e c t the p r i v a c y of individuals who created or are the subject of records and papers, e s p e c i a l l y those who had no v o i c e i n the d i s p o s i t i o n of materials." One of the g u i d e l i n e s recommended by the Canada Council Consultative Group on E t h i c s i n respect of p r i v a c y i s , "that s i n c e concepts of p r i v a c y vary from c u l t u r e to c u l t u r e , the question of invasion of privacy be looked at from the point of view of t h o s e b e i n g s t u d i e d r a t h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e res e a r c h e r . "80" Given that informed consent i s an u n r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n when d e a l i n g with vast q u a n t i t i e s of a r c h i v a l 149 records, i t i s necessary that a r c h i v i s t s "act independently on behalf of individuals and apply r e s t r i c t i o n s to p r o t e c t t h e i r privacy."SI V i r g i n i a Stewart has argued: the a r c h i v i s t has the immediate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r maintaining r i g o r o u s standards i n the protection of personal privacy on behalf of persons who may be unable to a s s e r t t h e i r r i g h t s - - b e c a u s e they are l e g a l l y incompetent to do so ( c h i l d r e n , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d persons) or because they are unaware that records involving them have been transferred to an archives.82 In any s o c i a l enquiry, p r i v a c y as a matter of p r i n c i p l e i s degraded. Whatever d e c i s i o n we take in determining access to records containing personal information should be based on a thoughtful consideration of the purposes for which records were created and on a clear understanding of the expectations of the i n d i v i d u a l who s u p p l i e d the i n f o r m a t i o n . The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e context of c o l l e c t i o n should a s s e r t some d e c i s i v e power over subsequent uses of that information. In 1927 o f f i c i a l s of Dr. Barnardo's Homes, the j u v e n i l e immigration agency, refused to allow an investigator from the Canadian Council of Child Welfare to examine case f i l e s on the grounds that the records were not, s t r i c t l y speaking, t h e i r s to supply: They are the records of the children rather than the records of the Homes, and they are c e r t a i n l y not records intended for the public. The view taken by Dr. Barnardo's has always been that these u s u a l l y humble members of s o c i e t y are e n t i t l e d to demand that the history of t h e i r childhood should be as much shielded from public c u r i o s i t y as the history of more fortunate children who have been brought up in the p r i v a c y of th e i r parents' homes.83 150 The documentation of the history of what we euphemistically c a l l the "non-elites" in society frequently requires that h i s t o r i a n s s c r u t i n i z e the p r i v a t e l i v e s of c i t i z e n s who are powerless to object. And while t h e i r intentions may be of the purest k i n d — t o expose inequities and so, symbolically redress them—by the very nature of t h e i r endeavour they exploit further the powerlessness of those who become the subject of t h e i r enquiry, by perpetuating an e s s e n t i a l abuse of the right of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s — r e g a r d l e s s of economic or s o c i a l s t a t u s — t o privacy. Privacy invasion i s damaging both to the climate of a free s o c i e t y and to the i n t e g r i t y of the profession that permits i t and, for that reason, the a r c h i v a l b i a s i n i s s u e s concerning personal privacy should be in favour of the record subject rather than the researcher. That the position taken here w i l l impose l i m i t a t i o n s on h i s t o r i c a l enquiry i s unfortunate. But any e t h i c a l stance imposes l i m i t s on one's freedom of movement; that does not mean that the stance i s an unreasonable one. It i s true that we possess a c o l l e c t i v e need to understand ourselves and our s o c i e t y ; but we a l s o need to f e e l c o n f i d e n t that the s o c i a l contract between c i t i z e n s and government, embodied in government records, i s respected. In the interest of numerous c o l l e c t i v e goods, c i t i z e n s give the government permission to know them in a variety of private ways, a permission grounded in public t r u s t . We do not advance the i n t e g r i t y of the a r c h i v a l p r o f e s s i o n by adopting a p a t e r n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e toward documentary material 151 that encroaches on the l i v e s of private c i t i z e n s , an attitude too often based on poorly defended notions concerning the " p u b l i c good." Any d e c i s i o n concerning access to records containing personal information must be guided, not only by the obligation to enhance research but, also, by the obligations that f a l l to us as moral beings. 152 CHAPTER V ENDNOTES 1. J u d i t h Rowe, "Privacy L e g i s l a t i o n : I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r A r c h i v e s , " A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records: Proceedings of the Conference on A r c h i v a l Management of Machine-Readable Records, February 7-10, 1979, Ann Arbor Michigan (Chicago: Society of American A r c h i v i s t s , 1980) 194. 2. For the survey r e s u l t s , see A l i c e Robbin, "State Archives and Issues of Personal Privacy: P o l i c i e s and Practices," American A r c h i v i s t 49 .2 (Spring 1986): 163-75. 3. Margaret L. Hedstrom, "Computers, Privacy, and Research Access to C o n f i d e n t i a l Information," Midwestern A r c h i v i s t 6 .1 (1981): 6. 4. A l i c e Robbin, " E t h i c a l Standards and Data Archives," Secondary Data Analysis: New Directions for Program Evaluation, ed. Robert Boruch (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978) 8~i 5. Brown, "Government and Hi s t o r i a n " 121. 6. S t a n l e y Benn, " P r i v a c y , Freedom, and Respect f o r Persons," Nomos XIII 12-13. 7. Michel Duchein, Obstacles to Access 22. 8. Duchein 21. 9. See, f o r example, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Conn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (parent alleged that h i s r i g h t to p r i v a c y was invaded by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of daughter as victim of rape-murder); C o r l i s s v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434 ( C C D . Mass. 1893), injunction dissolved, 64 F. 280 ( C C D . Mass. 1894) ( p l a i n t i f f s alleged publication of biography and picture of dead husband and father constituted injury to the i r f e e l i n g s ) . Both cases are c i t e d in Garvin, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" 431. See also Flaherty, "Privacy and C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y " 421-22. 10. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Council of Archives at P.A.C," A.C.A. B u l l e t i n 10 .2 (November 1985). 11. Tener 19. 12. Quoted i n Jean Tener, " A c c e s s i b i l i t y and Archives," Archivaria 6 (Summer 1978): 18. 153 13. Quoted in Tener 19. 14. See Tener 19. 15. Kathy Roe Coker, " C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of Records and Access: A Survey of State A r c h i v a l I n s t i t u t i o n s , " Records Management Quarterly 16 (July 1982): 26. 16. Reg Whittaker, "Access to Information: The Historian's Perspective," paper presented at the Toronto Area A r c h i v i s t s Group Access to Information Forum, 15 November 1986. 17. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u n c i l of A r c h i v e s at PAC," A.C.A. B u l l e t i n 10 .2 (November 1985). 18. Anderson, "Public Welfare Case Records" 174. 19. Helen Y o x a l l , "Privacy and Personal Papers," Archives and Manuscripts 12 (May 1984): 42 20. Tener 18. 21. Sue E. Holbert, Archives and Manuscripts: Reference and Access (Chicago: Society of American A r c h i v i s t s , 1977) 9. 22. Tener 26. 23. C i t e d i n Duchein, Obstacles to the Access, Use and T r a n s f e r of I n f o r m a t i o n from A r c h i v e s : A RAMP study with guidelines (Paris: Unesco, 1983) 30. 24. C i t e d in G u i d e l i n e s f o r the d i s c l o s u r e of personal information for h i s t o r i c a l research at the Public Archives of Canada (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada, 1983) 3. 25. Guidelines for Disclosure 3-4. 26. Guidelines for Disclosure 4. 27. Guidelines for Disclosure 6. 28. Guidelines for Disclosure 5-6. 29. Guidelines for Disclosure 5. 30. Guidelines for Disclosure 6. 31. Guidelines for Disclosure 7. 154 32. Guidelines for Disclosure 7. 33. Stewart, "Problems of C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y " 396. 34. Stewart 396. 35. Ronald M. Baumann, "The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Access to Confidential Records in State Archives: Common Practice and the Need for a Model Law," American A r c h i v i s t 49 .4 ( F a l l 1986): 363. 36. See Baumann, " A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Access" 349-70 f o r d e t a i l e d case s t u d i e s of s t a t e a r c h i v e s that have adopted contractual agreements of various kinds as a way of mediating claims for access and privacy. 37. Tener 26. 38. Yoxall, "Privacy and Personal Papers" 42. 39. Henry W. Riecken, " S o l u t i o n s to E t h i c a l and L e g a l Problems in Social Research: An Overview," Solutions to E t h i c a l and Legal Problems in Social Research, ed. Robert Boruch and Joe S. C e c i l (New York: Academic Press, 1983) 8. 40. According to V i r g i n i a Stewart, i n the absence of a written statement by researchers that they w i l l "hold harmless and indemnify" the archives, "a repository furnishing material to a researcher may incur l i a b i l i t y as "general p u b l i s h e r " to l a w s u i t s a r i s i n g from p u b l i s h e d r e s e a r c h . " See "Problems of C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y " 390n. 41. Social science data archives receive data from a v a r i e t y of sources with the s p e c i f i c objective of organizing these data i n t o m a c h i n e - r e a d a b l e form f o r purposes of subsequent r e -dissemination and u t i l i z a t i o n in a variety of research settings. See Joseph Steinberg, "Social Research Use of Archival Records: Procedural Solutions to Privacy Problems," Solutions to E t h i c a l and Legal Problems in Social Research 249-262. 42. See, f o r example, Charles M. D o l l a r , "Machine-Readable Records of the F e d e r a l Government and the National Archives," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records: Proceedings of the Conference on A r c h i v a l Management of Machine-Readable Records, February 7-10, 1979, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Chicago: Society of American A r c h i v i s t s , 1980) 85; and Harold Naugler, "The Machine-Readable Arc h i v e s Program of the P u b l i c Archives of Canada," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records: Proceedings of the Conference on A r c h i v a l Management of Machine-Readable Records, February 7-10, 1979, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Chicago: Society of 155 American A r c h i v i s t s , 1980) 76. 43. The P u b l i c A r c h i v e s of Canada and the Univ e r s i t y of Saskatchewan have developed a procedure in which s e n s i t i v e information i s removed from microfilmed l e g a l records by covering cert a i n frames on the f i l m with l i g h t s e n s i t i v e tape p r i o r to producing duplicate copies of the records. See James M. Whalen, "The Application of S o l i c i t o r - C l i e n t P r i v i l e g e to Government Records," Archivaria 18 (Summer 1984): 148. 44. Harold Naugler, The A r c h i v a l A p p r a i s a l of machine- readable records: A RAMP Study with guidelines (UNESCO: Paris, 1984) 86. 45. See, f o r example, S o l u t i o n s to E t h i c a l and Legal Problems in Social.Research, ed. Boruch and C e c i l ; Assuring the C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of So c i a l Research Data, ed. Boruch and C e c i l y David H. F l a h e r t y , Privacy and Government Data Banks; Paul T. Z e i s s e t , "Census Bureau C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y P r a c t i c e s and T h e i r Implications for A r c h i v i s t s , " in A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records. 46. The a s s e r t i o n that there are legitimate research uses which r e q u i r e the use of i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e data i s enshrined in the Bellagio P r i n c i p l e s . 47. In Tener 29. 48. For a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of l o n g i t u d i n a l and c o r r e l a t i o n a l research, see A s s u r i n g the C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of Social Research Data 30, 47. 49. Bogue, " H i s t o r i c a l Research and State Archival Data," A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records 26. 50. Canadian Association of University Teachers, Freedom of Information: A Brief submitted to the Government of Canada by the Canadian A s s o c i a t i o n of University Teachers (Ottawa: Canadian Association of University Teachers, 1978) 3. 51. Richard I. H o f f e b e r t , " C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , P r i v a c y and Social Data Archives: S p e c i a l Problems f o r P o l i c y A n a l y s i s , " A r c h i v i s t s and Machine-Readable Records 228. 52. See, for example, Bruce Bowden and Roger H a l l , "The Impact of Death: An H i s t o r i c a l and Archival Reconnaisance into V i c t o r i a n Ontario," Archivaria 14 (Summer 1982): 104. 156 53. S i r Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922) 66. 54. S.N. Prasad, "The L i b e r a l i s a t i o n of Access and Use," International Council on Archives volume XXVI. Proceedings of the 8th International Congress on Archives Washington, 27 September-1 October 197 6 (Munchen, New York, London, P a r i s : K.G. Saur, 1979) 143. 55. Jenkinson 39. 56. " A r c h i v i s t : A D e f i n i t i o n , " S.A.A. Newsletter (January 1984). 57. Jenkinson 15. 58. Jenkinson 15. 59. Margaret Cross Norton, Norton on Archives, ed. Thornton M i t c h e l l (Carbondale and E d w a r d s v i 1 l e : Southern I l l i n o i s University Press, 1975) 26, 32. 60. Hugh T a y l o r , "Information Ecology and the Archives of the 1980s," Archivaria 18 (Summer 1984): 25-37. 61. Taylor 26. 62. Taylor 26. 63. Ruth Simmon, "The P u b l i c ' s Right to Know and the Individual's Right to be Private," Provenance 1 .1 (Spring 1983): 3. 64. Ake Kromnow, "The Appraisal of Contemporary Records," International Council on Archives, volume XXVI 52. 65. See Jan Sundin and Ian Winchester, "Towards I n t e l l i g e n t Databases: Or the Database as H i s t o r i c a l A r c h i v i s t , " Archivaria 14 (Summer 1982): 140. 66. See Frank Jones, "Destroying these records i s shameful," Toronto Star 7 October 1985: A15. 67. W i l l i a m Ormsby, A r c h i v i s t of Ontario, c i t e d in Frank Jones, "Destroying these f i l e s i s shameful," Toronto Star 7 October 1985: A15. 157 68. R i c h a r d Wasserstrom, " P r i v a c y : Some Arguments and A s s u m p t i o n s , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Law: A u t h o r i t y , E q u a l i t y ; A d j u d i c a t i o n , P r i v a c y , ed. R i c h a r d Bronaugh (Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press, 1978) 160. 69. Association of Canadian A r c h i v i s t s , l e t t e r to Hon. Mark McGuigan, Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada, 13 March 1984. 70. See Hans J o n a s , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e f l e c t i o n s on E x p e r i m e n t i n g with Human Subjects," Contemporary Issues in B i o e t h i c s , ed. Tom L: Beauchamp and Leroy Walters (Belmont, C a l i f o r n i a : Wadsworth, 1982) 524-532. 71. Duchein 22. 72. Norton 32. 73. Simmons 3. 74. Robbin, " E t h i c a l Standards" 15-17. 75. See Flaherty, "Privacy and C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y " 419-429; Hoff-Wilson, "Access to Restricted C o l l e c t i o n s " 441-447 76. Flaherty 421. , 77. Flaherty 427. 78. Gerald N. Grob, "Ar c h i v i s t s and Historians: Problems of Appraisal," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society of American A r c h i v i s t s , Boston, 20 October 1982. 79. Brown, "Government and Histo r i a n " 123. 80. Canada Council, Ethics 17. 81. Yoxall, "Privacy and Personal Papers" 40-41. 82. Stewart, "Problems of C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y " 398. 83. Parr, "Case Records" 135. 158 CONCLUSION I can imagine rather e a s i l y the day when two men w i l l have no more secrets from one another because they w i l l keep secrets from no one, since the subjective l i f e , just as much as the objective l i f e , w i l l be t o t a l l y offered, given. Jean-Paul Sartre A number of s o c i a l c r i t i c s allege, with some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that we s u f f e r from too much p r i v a c y , that i t has become an unhealthy obsession of modern l i b e r a l society, an i n d i c a t o r of s o c i a l pathology rather than s o c i a l health wherein we "seek more and more privacy, and f e e l more and more alienated when we get i t . " 1 The ex c e s s i v e s t r e s s which l i b e r a l ideology places on privacy and the consequent turning away from the public aspects of l i f e , such c r i t i c s argue, has damaged the tissues of s o c i a l connection and withered public spiritedness. The s o c i e t a l ideal invoked, i m p l i c i t y , in such c r i t i c i s m , i s one of universal transparency. Meister Eckhart " c a l l [ e d ] him a good man who reveals himself to others and in so doing i s of use to them." 2 S i m i l a r l y , S a r t r e h e l d that "transparency must substitute i t s e l f at a l l times for secrecy." 3 He was r e a l i s t i c enough, however, to surmise that such transparency would be achievable only when material want had been eradicated and human rel a t i o n s were no longer fraught with antagonisms. In the world as i t presently e x i s t s , privacy possesses a paradoxical a b i l i t y both to f a c i l i t a t e the development of s o c i a l r elationships and to 159 d i m i n i s h human i n t e r a c t i o n depending on the way i t i s incorporated with other s o c i a l values and embedded i n s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 4 Individuals must be in some intermediate s t a t e — a balance between privacy and i n t e r a c t i o n - - i n order to maintain human r e l a t i o n s , develop t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s and s e n s i b i l i t i e s , create and, ultimately, to survive. Part of the p r i c e we pay for community membership i s the s a c r i f i c e of some degree of privacy, when t h i s i s required either to f u l f i l o u r s e l v e s as s o c i a l beings or to further the public i n t e r e s t . The problem then becomes one of b a l a n c i n g the indivi d u a l ' s claim to privacy against the community's claim to regulate conduct for general good, ag a i n s t the cl a i m of other individuals to exercise t h e i r legitimate rights and against the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own need for p a r t i c i p a t i o n in wider communities. 5 Freedom of enquiry in the p u r s u i t of knowledge i s a c r u c i a l freedom in modern l i b e r a l s o c i e t y but i t i s not a right that possesses a moral stature e q u i v a l e n t to that of p r i v a c y . The d i s t i n c t i o n between a freedom and a r i g h t i s , C h r i s t i a n Bay maintains, e s s e n t i a l : "Right" r e f e r s to a protected freedom. "Human r i g h t " refers to a kind of freedom that can be, and therefore, must be, made available to and protected for a l l the people in a given society. A freedom that cannot be e x t e n d e d t o a l l i s an example of a " s o c i a l privilege"...[and] in a free society a p r i v i l e g e must y i e l d whenever i t demonstrably becomes an obstacle to a f u l l e r protection and expansion of human rights.6 If we are j u s t i f i e d i n imposing a set of c o n s t r a i n t s on research in the i n t e r e s t of privacy, however, i t i s important 160 t h a t we always remain v i g i l a n t a g a i n s t c o r r u p t i o n s of that p r i n c i p l e . A legitimate concern of the research community has been the potential for the misguided use or di r e c t abuse of the p r i n c i p l e s underlying privacy. Researchers such as Robert Boruch and Joe C e c i l argue that, at times, the s h i e l d of privacy i s held up to protect abuses that are in no way personal, " i n the best of these instances, the appeal to p r i n c i p l e i s pious but i r r e l e v a n t --that i s , there i s no real threat to i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y or to c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of records. At worst, the appeal i s corruptive, dedicated not to preserving i n d i v i d u a l privacy but to a s s u r i n g secrecy that runs counter to the public i n t e r e s t . " 7 Claims of privacy are often invoked for practices of large scale c o l l e c t i v e secrecy in the i n t e r e s t s of "national security." But, as the philosopher S i s s e l a Bok makes c l e a r , while "claims for p r i v a c y are often made for such practices, and the metaphors of personal space are stretched to apply to them ...the use of the language of p r i v a c y , with i t s metaphors of personal space, spheres, sanctuaries and boundaries, to personalize c o l l e c t i v e enterprises should not go unchallenged. Such usage ...can . . . d i s t o r t our understanding of the role of these e n t e r p r i s e s . " 8 Our acceptance of l i m i t a t i o n s on the pursuit of knowledge, in the interest of a greater "common good, i s what distinguishes us, f i n a l l y , as moral beings. The second highest stage of moral development, the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg has argued, i s t y p i f i e d by an embrace of "democratic c o n t r a c t , " i n v o l v i n g 161 c o l l e c t i v e discussion and agreement, as the basis of i n d i v i d u a l moral a c t i o n . 9 The commitment to a common humanity, i m p l i c i t in the notion of a democratic c o n t r a c t , and the s e l f - c o n t a i n i n g sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that grows out of i t , are the forces that w i l l guide us through the e t h i c a l dilemmas posed by competing claims for access and privacy. Our success in negotiating those troubled waters w i l l depend on the breadth and depth of our commitment to those forces. 162 CONCLUSION ENDNOTES 1. P h i l i p S l a t e r , The Pursuit of Loneliness (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) 7. 2. Cited in Bok, Secrets 17. 3. Cited in Bok 17. 4. Schaefer, "Privacy: A Philosophical Overview" 19. 5. Schaefer 19. 6. Chr i s t i a n Bay, "Access to P o l i t i c a l Knowledge as a Human Righ t , " Government Secrecy in Democracies, ed. Itzhak Galnoor (New York: New York University Press, 1977) 23. 7. Boruch and C e c i l , Assuring C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y 81. See also Howard Zinn, "Secrecy, Archives, and the Public Interest," Boston University Journal 19 (1971): 37-44. 8. Bok 13-14. 9. The highest stage in Kohlberg's schema i s stage 6 in which the basis of moral action i s found in ind i v i d u a l p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s c i e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to Kohlberg, "as f a r as we can ascertain a l l our stage 6 persons must have been k i l l e d in the 60s l i k e Martin Luther King. Stage 6 remains as a th e o r e t i c a l postulate but not an operational e n t i t y . 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Archival Studies
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In search of the common good : the ethics of disclosing personal information held in public archives
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