Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Harper, Bruce Alan
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
The abuse of narcotic drugs is an international problem in almost every respect, and as such requires international solutions. This thesis deals with both these questions. Since the last century, when the Sino-Indian opium trade thrived, the international trade in drugs has been of concern to the international community. After an introduction to the various types of narcotics and their properties, the history of drugs is reviewed, specifically with an eye to determining the factors which led to the creation of the international anti-narcotics movement. The international conferences on this subject, beginning with the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the Hague Opium Conferences several years later, were plagued with difficulties and conflicting objectives among the participants. The narcotics diplomacy which preceded the Second World War paved the way for current international action, but it also illustrated the problems inherent in international regulation. The modern drug problem, chiefly the abuse of heroin, is studiad and seen to be even more global than was the pre-World War II narcotics trade. The involvement of a greater number of states, both directly and indirectly, in the illicit drug traffic has been a stimulus to more vigorous international controls, but at the same time it has proved more difficult to enforce existing agreements throughout the international system. To an extent these difficulties can be attributed to the nature of the problem itself, as well as to conditions existing in a number of states, but essentially it would seem that the illicit narcotics trade continues to flourish because of the nature of the international system in which it operates. Thus a paradox can be seen the drug problem cannot be solved on a purely national level and hence international solutions must be adopted, but these solutions are also fated to face obstacles from the very start.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL by BRUCE ALAN HARPER B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1976 Eruce A l a n Harper, 1976 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a , I ag r ee t h a t t he L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depar tment o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 ABSTRACT The abuse of n a r c o t i c drugs i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem i n almost every respect, and as such requires i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s . This thesis deals with both these questions. Since the l a s t century, when the Sino-Indian opium trade th r i v e d , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade i n drugs has been of concern to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. A f t e r an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the various types of narcotics and t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , the h i s t o r y of drugs i s reviewed, s p e c i f i c a l l y with an eye to determining the factors which led to the creation of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n t i - n a r c o t i c s movement. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences on t h i s subject, beginning with the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the Hague Opium Conferences several years l a t e r , were plagued with d i f f i c u l t i e s and c o n f l i c t i n g objectives among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The narcotics diplomacy which preceded the Second World War paved the way f o r current i n t e r n a t i o n a l action, but i t also i l l u s t r a t e d the problems inherent i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . The modern drug problem, c h i e f l y the abuse of heroin, i s studiad and seen to be even more g l o b a l than was the pre-World War II n a r c o t i c s trade. The involvement of a greater number of st a t e s , both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , i n the i l l i c i t drug t r a f f i c has been a stimulus to more vigorous i n t e r n a t i o n a l controls, but at the same time i t has proved more d i f f i c u l t to enforce e x i s t i n g agreements throughout the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. To an extent these d i f f i c u l t i e s can be a t t r i b u t e d i i to the nature of the problem i t s e l f , as w e l l as to conditions e x i s t i n g i n a number of stat e s , but e s s e n t i a l l y i t would seem that the i l l i c i t n a rcotics trade continues to f l o u r i s h because of the nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n which i t operates. Thus a paradox can be seen the drug problem cannot be solved on a purely n a t i o n a l l e v e l and hence i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s must be adopted, but these s o l u t i o n s are also fated to face obstacles from the very s t a r t . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v i i i I. DRUGS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE . . 1 Drugs 1 Cooaine . 2 Marijuana 3 Opium 3 Opiate Use i n the Nineteenth Century. . . . 5 The Sino-Indian Opium Trade 5 Opiate Use in the United States 7 Heroin 8 The Manufacture of Heroin 8 The American Reaction to Drug Abuse . . . . 11 Addiction as a Crime , 11 Addiction as an International Problem . . 13 I I . INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 15 The Origins of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Movement . 15 The Situation in the Far East 16 The Shanghai Opium Commission . . . . . . 19 The Hague Opium Conferences 22 Narcotics—a Worldwide Problem 22 The Results of the Hague Conference . . . 25 The Implementation of Consensus 27 The Postwar Situation 27 Failure in Geneva 29 i v The 1931 Limitation Conference 32 Unsolved Problems 33 I I I . HEROIN DEMAND AND SUPPLY SINCE 37 WORLD WAR I I 37 The Global Drug Epidemic. . >• 37 Heroin Use in the United States . . . . . 38 Heroin Use in other Countries 44 The World's Opium Production. . . . . . . . . 48 Licit Production 48 I l l i c i t Production . . . 54 Heroin T r a f f i c k i n g 58 The Turkey-France-United States Network . 63 The Southeast Asia Network. 81 The Middle East-South Asia Network. . . . . 86 IV. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 90 The Machinery of Inte r n a t i o n a l Control. . . 90 The International Regime 92 The International Narcotics Control Board Board 95 The Commission on Narcotic Drugs . . . . 96 The World Health Organization . . . . . . 97 The Suppression of Heroin T r a f f i c k i n g . . . 97 Corruption 99 Bureaucratic Confusion. 103 The P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Narcotics T r a f f i c k i n g 106 Government Support of Traffickers . . . . 107 Terrorists as Smugglers 116 Strategic Implications . . . 117 The Turkish Opium Ban 121 V. CONCLUSION . . . 126 v APPENDIX 1 The Resolutions adopted by the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909 132 APPENDIX 2 Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Foreign Agents on Board, August ZI, 1972 . . . . 133 APPENDIX 3 A Hypothesis on American Involvement in Heroin T r a f f i c k i n g 135 NOTES 1 36 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . 148 v i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 1. Key Customs Workload and Manpower > 77 2. Organizational Structure, of the Inter-n a t i o n a l Drug Control Machinery, 1 9 7 2 . . . . . . . 93 3. Key Drug Control Organs and t h e i r Predecessors 94 LIST OF TABLES 1. Heroin-related deaths i n New York C i t y , 1950-1969 ( a l l ages) 4 3 2. Heroin-related deaths i n New York C i t y , 1960-1969 (teenagers) 43 3. World ( l i c i t ) production of Dependence-Producing Drugs 49 4. World L i c i t Production of Opium, by Country . 51 5. World L i c i t Opium Exports, by Country 52 6. Indian Opium Export P r i c e s . . . . . 53 7. Estimated I l l i c i t Opium output, by Major Producers - 1971 55 8. P r i c e to farmer f o r Raw Opium, 1969,, 5o 9. Relative returns on crops i n Turkey . 57 10. Opium/Heroin p r i c e increases i n T r a f f i c k i n g Networks 61 11. Annual Consumption of i l l i c i t opium and opiates and sources of supply . 62 v i i Preface The t i t l e of t h i s paper i s somewhat deceptive, f o r i t i s not clear that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c i s i n f a c t c o n t r o l l e d . The e s s e n t i a l purpose of t h i s paper i s to demonstrate that n a r c o t i c s abuse i s fundamentally an i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem,.and to explore the successes and f a i l u r e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community's attempts to deal with i t . The many ra m i f i c a t i o n s of the heroin trade, which i s the main object of t h i s study, s t r a i n the a n a l y t i c a l framework of t h i s paper somewhat, but the f a s c i n a t i n g nature of the t o p i c would seem to make t h i s i n e v i t a b l e . For the convenience of the reader, there are f i v e parts to t h i s study. The i n i t i a l p o r t i o n deals with the h i s t o r y of drugs, and i s intended to f u r n i s h a background to the nar c o t i c s problems of t h i s century. The second part of the paper examines the achievements of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l movement before the Second World War, with a view to e l u c i d a t i n g the nature of the obstacles which s t i l l block the path to f u l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation. In the t h i r d s e c t i o n , the modern heroin problem i s set forth.. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l aspects of the heroin trade make i t a problem not e a s i l y s u s c e p t i b l e to purely n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s . The penultimate s e c t i o n investigates the control of the heroin trade, as w e l l as the factors which make i t d i f f i c u l t to destroy the v i i i t r a f f i c k i n g networks which transport the n a r c o t i c . The f i f t h part of the paper i s the conclusion. As w i l l be seen, a d i s c u s s i o n of heroin t r a f f i c k i n g leads i n t o a vast number of areas, underlying the f a c t that narcotics c o n t r o l i s a highly p o l i t i c a l i s s u e , both domestically and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . ix I. DRUGS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Drugs V i r t u a l l y any discu s s i o n of drugs becomes c o n t r o v e r s i a l almost by d e f i n i t i o n , f o r even when s o c i e t i e s have reached a consensus as to what constitutes drug abuse, there i s often, l i t t l e agreement on how to deal with i t . When there are basic differences within nations on the question of drugs, i t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g that a v a r i e t y of ap-proaches concerning t h e i r c o n t r o l have been adopted by d i f f e r e n t -national governments. The disparate perspectives and p o l i c i e s which, ch a r a c t e r i z e both the n a t i o n a l arid i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s to grapple with the drug issue s h a l l be a recur r i n g theme of t h i s paper. The term "drug" i s used widely and l o o s e l y by many authors on the subject. This frequent use of the word has perhaps made i t s d e f i n i t i o n rather vague. One standard reference work o f f e r s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n : A drug i s any substance that a f f e c t s l i v i n g matter....usually, a substance used i n tr e a t i n g i l l n e s s or r e l i e v i n g pain.''' I t i s th i s second, q u a l i f y i n g portion of the d e f i n i t i o n which d i s t i n -guishes drugs from a wide range of other substances, inc l u d i n g a l l foods. Within the category of drugs i t i s also necessary to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between r e l a t i v e l y harmless drugs such as a s p i r i n and more dangerous drugs such as heroin. The. term " n a r c o t i c s " i s used f o r t h i s second, often i l l e g a l , c l a s s of drugs. An. acceptable d e f i n i t i o n of narcotics- is.: A c l a s s of p a i n - k i l l i n g drugs made from opium; also includes c e r t a i n manufactured drugs that have, opiumr^like effects.2 2 A century ago opium i t s e l f was the subject of concern, but the focus of regulatory e f f o r t s has since s h i f t e d to the manufactured d e r i v a t i v e s of opium: morphine, codeine, and heroin. Morphine i s an e f f e c t i v e p a i n - k i l l e r , while codeine i s valuable as a cough-suppressant. In most countries heroin i s considered to have no medical value,^ but i t i s made from the same raw material as the other opium d e r i v a t i v e s , a f a c t which has always complicated the e f f o r t s to s t r i k e at heroin manufacture by di s r u p t i n g the production of raw opium. Heroin i s the p r i n c i p a l , but not the only, n a r c o t i c drug. The l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n of " n a r c o t i c " may- not be the same as the medical d e f i n i t i o n , and generally the former i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s broader, i n c l u d i n g substances which, s t r i c t l y speaking, are not n a r c o t i c . In most countries there are curr e n t l y considered to he four categories of n a r c o t i c s : opium (and i t s d e r i v a t i v e s ) , cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic drugs.^ The £i.rst three substances o r i g i n a t e i n pla n t s , while syntheti.cs; are manufactured chemically. Throughout t h i s paper heroin w i l l be the object of study-, but f i r s t i t i s worth examining the other two nat u r a l n a r c o t i c substances. Cocaine Cocaine i s derived from the leaves of the coca plant (Srythboxyton coca)Most of the cocaine which reaches the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a f f i c k i n g networks o r i g i n a t e s i n Peru or B o l i v i a . Natives of those and other L a t i n American countries chew the coca-leaves i n order to ingest the drug, but consumers i n other regions of the world generally inhale the re f i n e d drug. Cocaine i s a stimulant, and can cause v i o l e n t behaviour. Cocaine i s ps y c h o l o g i c a l l y , but not p h y s i c a l l y , a d d i c t i v e . ^ 3 Marijuana While there has been general agreement on the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of both heroin and cocaine, the same cannot be said f o r the marijuana-hashish family of n a r c o t i c s . ^ In the past ten or f i f t e e n years marijuana has been accepted by an i n c r e a s i n g l y large segment of many Western s o c i e t i e s as normal, and enforcement of marijuana laws has often been deemphasized by a governments. The d i f f e r e n c e between "hard" and " s o f t " drugs was not recognized by o f f i c i a l s two decades ago, as the following statement by Harry J . Anslinger, former head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, demonstrates: ...marijuana i s only and always a scourge which undermines i t s victims and degrades them mentally, morally, and p h y s i c a l l y . Medical experts agree on the complete u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the e f f e c t of marijuana on d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s . A small dose taken by one subject may bring about intense i n t o x i c a t i o n , raving f i t s , c r i m i n a l a s s a u l t s . . . . In the e a r l i e s t stages of i n t o x i c a t i o n the w i l l power i s destroyed and i n h i b i t i o n s and r e s t r a i n t s are released; the moral barricades are broken down and often debauchery and s e x u a l i t y r e s u l t s . . . . Constant use produces an i n c a p a c i t y for work and a d i s o r i e n t a t i o n of purpose. The drug has- a corroding e f f e c t on the body and on the mind, weakening the e n t i r e p h y s i c a l system and often leading to i n s a n i t y a f t e r prolonged use." The f a c t that t h i s assessment seems so h y s t e r i c a l today i s a good i n d i c a t i o n as to how much at t i t u d e s towards marijuana have changed. The drug c u r r e n t l y seems to be i n a t w i l i g h t zone between l e g a l i t y and i l l e -g a l i t y , and research as to the true e f f e c t s of marijuana use i s s t i l l going on. C e r t a i n l y the main emphasis of i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l has not been dire c t e d against marijuana, but rather against the opiates, cocaine, and to a l e s s e r extent hashish. Opium With the possible exception of a l c o h o l , no drug has played as 4 s i g n i f i c a n t a r o l e i n human h i s t o r y as has opium. Opium i s derived from the j u i c e of the opium poppy (Papaver sornniferum), and i t s medicinal properties were f i r s t uncovered by the Sumerians. By 1550 B.C. t h i s knowledge had spread from Babylonia to Egypt, and Homer mentions the drug i n the Iliad.^ Opium was embraced by physicians because of i t s apparent e f f e c t against a l l manner of ailments. Doses of opium r a r e l y cured the patient (an objective that was often beyond the a b i l i t i e s of even the most talented p r a c t i t i o n e r ) , but i t d i d have the e f f e c t of a l l e v i a t i n g the victim's s u f f e r i n g . As long as sickness could not be prevented, i t was at l e a s t made more pleasant. The twin properties of e l i m i n a t i n g pain and inducing euphoria ensured that opium use would be widespread. Because of r e l i g i o u s p r o h i b i t i o n s against a l c o h o l , opium became very widely grown and used i n India, as was discovered b/y European explorers i n the sixteenth century.1 ! From here, the drug spread to China, i n part through the 12 e f f o r t s of Portugese traders. I t i s the habit-forming properties of the opiates which make them both so s o c i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e and commercially valuable. As use continues over a period of time, ever-increasing q u a n t i t i e s of the drug are required to produce the euphoria sought by the addict. The growing tolerance of the addict's system for the drug also creates the need for a continuing supply i f a chemical imbalance, i s to be avoided. Abrupt termination of 13 the habit r e s u l t s i n severe withdrawal symptoms—and sometimes death. Complex medical and moral questions are r a i s e d i f i t i s proposed that the addict should be deprived of his d a i l y drug requirements, as w i l l be seen l a t e r . 1 4 5 I t i s evident that opiates are ex c e l l e n t commercial products, f o r most consumers are addicts, who thus provide a r e l i a b l e and sta b l e market. Addicts are often driven to a n t i - s o c i a l and cri m i n a l acts i n order to secure money to meet t h e i r need f o r drugs, and thus the cost of add i c t i o n i s borne not only by the addict himself, but by the e n t i r e s o c i e t y . As a consequence of t h i s , governments cannot remain i n d i f f e r e n t to the problem of a d d i c t i o n , quite apart from moral considerations, f o r the addict becomes an unproductive and p o t e n t i a l l y c r i m i n a l member of s o c i e t y . These observations are v a l i d whether the drug i n question i s opium, morphine, or heroin, and whether we are speaking of China, Europe, or North America. Opiate Use i n the Nineteenth Century The Sino-Indian Opium Trade While s o c i e t i e s have had to confront the problems of drug use for many years, the trade i n opium only became an i n t e r n a t i o n a l question with the establishment of B r i t i s h power i n India i n the f i n a l t h i r d of the eighteenth century. The B r i t i s h objective i n stimulating the sale of Indian opium to China was quite simple—what was desired was a dependable source of tax revenue. By e s t a b l i s h i n g an opium concession (and l a t e r a government monoply), the B r i t i s h were able to make t h e i r Indian colony p r o f i t a b l e . The opium trade, mainly with China, furnished about one-seventh of the t o t a l revenue of B r i t i s h India. J The emergence of opium as an item of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce had ram i f i c a t i o n s which went w e l l beyond the impact on the Indian budget. Commercial t i e s had been established between China and Europe at an early date, and many European explorations had as th e i r goal the discovery of 6 a d i r e c t sea route to China. When t h i s d i r e c t route was f i n a l l y estab-l i s h e d i t was an improvement over the i n d i r e c t trade through Moslem middlemen which had previously dominated Sino-European commerce, but the Europeans were s t i l l faced with a d i f f i c u l t problem. There was much the Europeans wanted from the Chinese, but l i t t l e the Chinese wanted i n return. Thus wealthy Europeans were forced to pay i n s i l v e r f o r the Chinese luxury goods they desired. This unhealthy balance of trade d i d not meet with the approval of contemporary European economists, but there seemed to be no a l t e r n a t i v e as long as Europeans wished to 16 purchase Chinese goods. Opium provided an answer to t h i s problem. Opium could be traded f o r Chinese goods i n the place of s i l v e r , and thus i n the nineteenth century the opium trade became the source of economic as w e l l as s o c i a l problems f o r the Chinese. Opium smoking had been p r o h i b i t e d i n 1729, and i n 1800 the smoking, c u l t i v a t i o n , and importation of opium was s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r b i d d e n . ^ Since the B r i t i s h not only permitted but encouraged t h i s commerce, the r e s u l t was the Opium War of 1839-1842. The B r i t i s h v i c t o r y assured them of the r i g h t to trade f r e e l y , even though t h i s meant an important l i m i t a t i o n on Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese defeat marked a s i g n i f i c a n t new phase of the European encroachment upon Chinese indpendence, but the increasing use of opium i t s e l f (which was greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by the e l i m i n a t i o n of a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s a f t e r the Opium War) was also an important part of the European ascendancy i n China. The trade grew so r a p i d l y that by the 1880s opium was the the most important item being imported i n t o C h i n a . ^ The spread of the habit was so extensive that, i t was estimated, i n 1906 7 there were 13,460,000 opium smokers i n China out of a population of about 400,000,000— about three and one-half percent of the t o t a l 19 population and twenty-seven percent of the adult males. Opiate Use in the United States Throughout the nineteenth century n a r c o t i c addiction was also on the r i s e i n the United States. Opium smoking never became popular (except i n the Chinese communities), but the drug was r e g u l a r l y prescribed by doctors, and was an ingredient i n many popular patent medicines. By the turn of the century addiction was widespread, and drug use was so prevalent i n the United States that addiction became known to Europeans 20 as the "American Disease." i n contrast to China, a d d i c t i o n i n the United States centered almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the manufactured d e r i v a t i v e s morphine and cocaine, and on opium-based patent medicines. These l a t t e r remedies contributed g r e a t l y to the spread of addiction by v i r t u e of the f a c t that i n many cases the p u b l i c was not aware of the n a r c o t i c content of the "cures." Even when t h i s knowledge was a v a i l a b l e , consumption of the product was often unaffected, f o r there was l i t t l e i n the p u b l i c consciousness to i n h i b i t drug use. Coca-Cola, f o r example, contained 21 cocaine u n t i l 1903. The steady r i s e of narcotics consumption i n the United States s t i r r e d l i t t l e p u b l i c awareness or concern u n t i l the f i r s t decade of t h i s century, when a wave of reformism swept over American p o l i t i c s . This movement was a major f a c t o r i n f o s t e r i n g the development of both p u b l i c and o f f i c i a l consciousness of drug abuse. This development coincided with the discovery and spread of a new opiate d e r i v a t i v e which 8 held out even greater p o t e n t i a l for abuse—heroin. Heroin Heroin was f i r s t synthesized by the English researcher C.R. Wright i n 1874, but he discontinued h i s experiments when he found that dogs under the influence of the drug had adverse reactions. In the 1890s German s c i e n t i s t s connected with the Bayer chemical concern in v e s t i g a t e d the substance further and concluded that i t would be e f f e c t i v e i n 22 r e l i e v i n g r e s p i r a t o r y ailments. Heroin was also considered to be a 23 promising cure f o r opium addiction. Medical experts were e n t h u s i a s t i c about the discovery of a supposedly non—addictive miracle cure, and Bayer's aggressive i n t e r n a t i o n a l a d v e r t i s i n g campaign made heroin one of the most popular patent medicines. 2^ I t soon became evident that the preliminary fin d i n g s of the Bayer chemists were wrong, however; heroin was indeed a d d i c t i v e , and a growing number of addicts, e s p e c i a l l y i n the United States, were using the drug. In less than three decades heroin became the p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r i n American drug abuse, and i n 1924 Congress unanimously voted to outlaw the manufacture and importation of u • 25 heroin. The Manufacture of Heroin The manufacture of heroin from raw opium involves two chemical processes. The f i r s t i s f a i r l y simple and has as i t s objective the e x t r a c t i o n of morphine base from the crude opium. Refinement of t h i s morphine base i n t o heroin i s more complex, and requires an expert chemist. The e s s e n t i a l ingredient of heroin i s morphine, which i s the a c t i v e ingredient of opium, which i n turn comes from the opium poppy. The 9 yearly crop i s sown at the end of summer, and a few months l a t e r the poppies are ready f o r harvesting. Each poppy has a b r i l l i a n t flower, which contains a seed pod about the s i z e of an egg. This pod i s s l i t by the farmer to release a milky sap—opium. When the opium has oozed out and congealed on the surface of the seed pod., i t i s c o l l e c t e d and 26 stored i n a viscous mass. In t h i s form the opium can be stored for s e v e r a l y e a r s , ^ hut i t i s not easy to transport. For t h i s reason the opium i s usually converted to morphine base as close to the poppy f i e l d s as i s f e a s i b l e . The e x t r a c t i o n of morphine from the opium i s not a complicated operation. The opium i s d i s s o l v e d i n hot water, and lime f e r t i l i z e r i s added to p r e c i p i t a t e the organic waste. This leaves the morphine suspended near the surface, whereupon i t i s f i l t e r e d and heated i n a second container. Ammonia i s added, causing the morphine to s o l i d i f y , a f t e r which a second f i l t r a t i o n y i e l d s the white morphine base, which i s packaged i n cakes or b r i c k s . The morphine base weighs only one-tenth 28 of what the raw opium weighed. The actual morphine content of the base v a r i e s from about 50 percent i n Southeast A s i a to 70 percent or 29 higher i n Turkish base. This d i f f e r e n c e i s due to the superior morphine content of Turkish opium; the r e f i n i n g techniques are v i r t u a l l y i n d e n t i c a l throughout the world. The second stage, refinement of the morphine base i n t o heroin, i s both more d i f f i c u l t and more dangerous than the preparation of the morphine base i t s e l f , and considerable expertise i s required by the "heroin chemists." Chemically heroin i s diacetylmorphine~-^a morphine molecule bonded with two a c e t i c a c i d molecules. Heroin, l i k e a s p i r i n , i s j u s t a 10 30 brand name selected by Bayer to i d e n t i f y the drug. To manufacture ten k i l o s of heroin the chemist heats ten k i l o s of morphine base and ten k i l o s of a c e t i c anhydride together. Both the timing and temperature must be c a r e f u l l y watched i n order to avoid chemical d e s t r u c t i o n of the morphine. When the chemical bonding i s complete the diacetylmorphine i s treated with water and chloroform to p r e c i p i t a t e i m p u r i t i e s . The so l u t i o n i s then drained i n t o another f l a s k and sodium carbonate i s added to cause the crude heroin to s o l i d i f y . A suction pump i s used to f i l t e r the heroin out of t h i s s o l u t i o n . The heroin i s further p u r i f i e d by the addi t i o n of alcohol and activated charcoal, a f t e r which 31 the mixture i s heated. Purple, or smoking heroin, commonly known as No. 3 heroin, i s purple or brown i n colour and i s made from crude heroin combined with strychnine and c a f f e i n e , as w e l l as barbitone. I t i s used fo r smoking and i s found p r i m a r i l y i n Southeast A s i a . The f i n a l p u r i t y 32 of No. 3 heroin i s usu a l l y about 15 percent. To produce the higher q u a l i t y No. 4 heroin used by Western addicts a f i n a l step i s required. The heroin i s dissolved i n alcohol, and ether and h y d r o c h l o r i c acid are added. This causes the formation of ti n y white f l a k e s , which are c a r e f u l l y f i l t e r e d and d r i e d . In i t s ultimate form the No. 4 heroin resembles soap, e i t h e r as flake s or powder. Depending upon the s k i l l of the chemist and the c a l i b e r of h i s equipment 33 the heroin w i l l be from 80 to 99 percent pure. One kilogram of morphine base w i l l convert i n t o s l i g h t l y more than one kilogram of heroin, the gain i n weight being due to the addi t i o n of chemicals. Ten k i l o s of good Turkish opium xtfill thus y i e l d about one k i l o of high grade heroin. Indian, Persian, and Southeast Asian opium 11 i s l e s s potent and more i s required to make a k i l o of heroin. While the morphine content of the drug increases as i t goes through the various r e f i n i n g processes, j u s t the opposite occurs as the nearly pure No. 4 heroin moves down the i l l i c i t d i s t r i b u t i o n network. The heroin i s adulterated time and again u n t i l i t i s r e t a i l e d to the consumer-34 addict, by which time i t may have a p u r i t y of less than 5 percent. The heroin also becomes more valuable as i t moves through each stage of 35 the network, since the e n t i r e operation i s i l l e g a l and thus r i s k y . The American Reaction to Drug Abuse Addiction as a Crime The r e a l i z a t i o n that the United States had a serious drug problem, and the increasing popularity of the new drug heroin led to considerable discussion among p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s i n the f i r s t two decades of t h i s century. The debate over a n t i - n a r c o t i c s l e g i s l a t i o n revolved not around the existence 36 of the problem, but rather on how to handle i t . P r o f e s s i o n a l opinion and the p u b l i c mood both c a l l e d f o r a c t i o n , but the question was which prof e s s i o n a l s should be c a l l e d upon to deal with the addicts: law enforcement o f f i c e r s or medical experts? One point was evident from the s t a r t ; unlike the debate over l i q u o r , the users of n a r c o t i c s would not be party to the discussions. A number of doctors argued that addicts were i l l , and that any abrupt cut-of f of drugs would not only cause great hardships among addicts, but would force them to obtain drugs i l l e g a l l y . I f q u a l i f i e d physicians were allowed to dispense the drugs to addicts, no black market need spring up, and the addicts could be treated according to the best theories. There 12 were two main counter-arguments. The overprescribing of a d d i c t i v e drugs by physicians was one of the causes of the problem, and thus turning matters over to the medical profession might only make things worse. Secondly, the best method of "curing" a d d i c t i o n was not known, and no 37 one could say with c e r t a i n t y that there was any cure. The only guarantee that the addict would cease h i s use of the drug lay i n preventing hi s access to i t , and i t was j u s t t h i s that advocates of the enforcement approach suggested. The l o g i c of the reformers who pressed for a t o t a l ban on n a r c o t i c s use was bolstered by the popular image of the addict. Several forms of drug abuse were c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d with various r a c i a l and c u l t u r a l subgroups. An e a r l y example of t h i s was the a s s o c i a t i o n of opium-smoking with the Chinese immigrants on the West Coast—an ass o c i a t i o n which was 38 v a l i d , f o r t h i s h a bit never caught on with whites. It was no coincidence that the f i r s t n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g a drug was the Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, for i t was c l e a r that this ban would only a f f e c t 39 the Chinese users. Equally compelling was the argument that cocaine was a v i c e p e c u l i a r to blacks, even though there was no proof of t h i s a s s e r t i o n . The state and l o c a l regulations passed against cocaine i n the southern United States before the f i r s t World War r e f l e c t e d the fear that cocaine use would cause Negroes to forget t h e i r place. These, regulations were part of a l a r g e r pattern of segregationist l e g i s l a t i o n , and by stimulating such fears a n t i - n a r c o t i c s groups were able to gain support f o r t h e i r c a u s e . ^ In s i m i l a r fashion heroin use was considered to be confined to j u v e n i l e delinquents. These p u b l i c b e l i e f s about narcotics 13 remained unchanged despite information to the contrary, such as a Federal government report published i n 1919 which concluded that addiction 41 cut across r a c x a l and economic b a r r i e r s . The future d i r e c t i o n of American drug p o l i c i e s was resolved i n the decade 1914-1924 i n favour of those pressing f o r severe r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of n a r c o t i c s . In 1914 the Harrison Act was passed, which, f o r C o n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons, u t i l i z e d the Federal powers of taxation and t a r i f f s to regulate transactions i n v o l v i n g n a r c o t i c s . I t was not immediately c l e a r to what extent the Act would r e s t r i c t the dispensation of drugs by physicians, but a f t e r a number of Supreme Court r u l i n g s i n favour of enforcement agencies the l e g a l supply of n a r c o t i c s d r i e d up. The Congressional ban on heroin i n 1924 merely r a t i f i e d the Court r u l i n g s : the sale and use of n a r c o t i c s was a crime, and would come under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the p o l i c e rather than the medical p r o f e s s i o n . ^ 2 Addiction as an International Problem The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of n a r c o t i c s use with, various m i n o r i t y groups r e f l e c t e d the vague American b e l i e f that the high rate of a d d i c t i o n was not caused by i n t r i n s i c flaws i n American s o c i e t y , but rather by circumstances beyond American c o n t r o l . The reformers who l e d the^ drive to outlaw drug use i n the United States were also a c t i v e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l anti-opium movement. Once the United States had acted against drug addiction at home, they argued, the problem would be solved provided f o r e i g n governments did the same. Since no opium was grown i n the United States, t h i s was a convincing argument.^ 14 The s h i f t towards narcotics p r o h i b i t i o n i n the United States thus had a heavy impact on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s movement. Because i t had the worst addiction problem of any Western nation, as w e l l as being an important power i n i t s own r i g h t , the United States has played the most s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e throughout t h i s century i n pressing f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of n a r c o t i c s . The consensus reached i n the United States that drug abuse i s best combated by s t r i c t p r o h i b i t i o n at home and i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation abroad has been the key determinant i n American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h i s area since before World War I. And u n l i k e i t s s h o r t - l i v e d brother, l i q u o r P r o h i b i t i o n , the p r o h i b i t i o n of n a r c o t i c s has remained i n e f f e c t , p r i m a r i l y because p u b l i c and e s p e c i a l l y o f f i c i a l opinion has generally- supported i t . 15 I I . INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Origins of the Int e r n a t i o n a l Movement Prominent Americans concerned with the narcotics problem were convinced that stringent domestic l e g i s l a t i o n alone could not solve the United States drug problem. Often proponents of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l approach considered domestic l e g i s l a t i o n to have a greater e f f e c t as a demonstration of American good f a i t h to other countries than i n i t s 44 own r i g h t . The anti-narcotics- movement also tended to a t t r a c t dedicated, i d e a l i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l s who concentrated t h e i r energies almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the na r c o t i c s i s s u e . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , these i d e a l i s t s were often at odds wit h the p r o f e s s i o n a l diplomats, f o r the l a t t e r had to consider a f a r wider range of i n t e r e s t s before committing t h e i r states to action on the na r c o t i c s question. For a v a r i e t y of reasons, American p o l i c y was i n the hands of the i d e a l i s t s to a much greater extent than was the case i n the European countries. Indignation at the opium v i c e was not i n i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e to propel the United States i n t o a p o s i t i o n of leadership i n the f i e l d of narcotics c o n t r o l . A f t e r a l l , i t had only been a few decades e a r l i e r that the slave trade had been a major moral i s s u e , and i t had been Great B r i t a i n which had taken the lead i n the face of American i n d i f f e r e n c e or h o s t i l i t y . The basis of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l movement against the opium trade lay i n p o l i t i c a l developments i n the Far East. 16 The Situation in the Far East The situation i n China had changed somewhat since the British victory in the Opium War of 1839 had assured the continued importation of foreign opium into China. Imports had peaked around 1880 at about 6,500 tons each year, but by 1905 this had dropped by half. This was not due to a drop in consumption, but rather to the increased opium production of China herself, which exceeded 22,000 tons by the turn 45 of the century. The fact that China was the world's largest opium producer ruled out any attempts to cu r t a i l the trade between China and India, for l i t t l e moral pressure could be brought to bear against the British to make the financial sacrifice connected with the abandonment of the Indian opium revenues i f this would leave the state of affairs in China more or less unchanged. A report by a royal commission published in 1895 concluded that the use of opium was a traditional and well-entrenched social habit which was not injurious to Orientals in many instances. It was not the case that opium use was harmful and e v i l i n Asia as i t was in " c i v i l i z e d " countries, and thus i t was hardly logical to stop the profitable production of opium in India to satisfy the misguided morality of anti-opium crusaders who did not perceive the issue 46 in the proper perspective. The o f f i c i a l position of the British government, as stated in the 1895 report, was that opium use was acceptable i n India and China on both economic and moral grounds. This opinion was held even though the Chinese themselves viewed opium, and the Indian trade, as a grave problem. Such a pronouncement would be inconceivable now, for the international community would consider active support of the narcotics t r a f f i c to be reprehensible. 17 I t i s e a s i l y forgotten that less than a century ago almost a l l countries agreed that the production, transportation and consumption of opium was of i n t e r e s t to governments only i n so f a r as revenues were concerned. This detached a t t i t u d e had to be changed before e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l action could be taken, and i t i s i n t h i s area that the a n t i - n a r c o t i c s movement had i t s main success. The reform movement which began i n China a f t e r the Japanese v i c t o r y i n the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 had as one of i t s main 47 goals the e l i m i n a t i o n of the opium habit. While many of the p o l i t i c a l objectives of the reformers were not achieved u n t i l a f t e r the Revolution of 1911 which deposed the Manchus, the anti—opium campaign was s u r p r i s i n g l y 48 e f f e c t i v e . At the same time as the Chinese were acting against opium abuse, B r i t i s h p o l i c y was undergoing a s i g n i f i c a n t change. The e l e c t i o n of a L i b e r a l government i n 1906 marked a complete r e v e r s a l of the B r i t i s h stance on the Sino-Indian opium trade, and i n 1907 the B r i t i s h and the Chinese signed the Ten Year Agreement. Under i t s provisions the amount of opium exported from India was to be reduced by one-tenth each year, so that i n ten years the trade would have ceased altogether. Three years a f t e r the signing the agreement would be renewed for the remaining seven years i f the Chinese anti-opium campaign were proving e f f e c t i v e . 4 ^ To a large extent the American image of the Chinese opium problem was gained through the reports of American missionaries i n China, a number 50 of whom were themselves active i n the anti-opium movement. Their representations of the e v i l s of opium were i n harmony with the views of many government and business leaders, who f e l t that a united, strong and 18 free China would be an excellent market for American goods. The American support for the Chinese anti-opium efforts was but a part of the more comprehensive United States trade policy towards China. Despite the interest of a variety of American groups in the Chinese situation, however, i t is doubtful that the United States would have become actively involved in the opium question had i t not been for the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the ensuing acquisition of the Philippine Islands. In 1843 the Spanish had implemented a policy of auctioning the right to s e l l opium to merchants who were then at liberty to s e l l the drug to the Chinese consumers on the islands. Sales to Filipinos were banned, but the Spanish had not considered i t practical to try to eradicate the habit among the Chinese. The system worked f a i r l y well, for addiction was confined to the Chinese population, smuggling was negligible, ar.d the colonial administration collected about $600,000 each year in r e v e n u e s . V a r i a t i o n s of this system, including direct government monoplies, were in effect throughout most of the European possessions i n Southeast Asia. The United States, as a new, and in their own minds a different, colonial power, was reluctant to adopt such a scheme. The Spanish policy was abolished, but as there was l i t t l e to put i n i t s place, a committee was formed and dispatched to the various Southeast Asian territories to investigate the methods of dealing with opium use. The Opium Committee inquiry was conducted in the latter half of 1903, and in i t s report the British, French and Dutch systems were rejected. The regulations in these regions: ...do not pretend to be laws for the protection of the people against a vice, but rather commercial regulations guarding a branch of commerce. 19 The committee drew a sharp contrast between t h i s state of a f f a i r s and the commendable Japanese e f f o r t s i n Formosa to eliminate a serious opium problem by a s t r i c t government monopoly, the r e g i s t r a t i o n of users, and anti-opium i n s t r u c t i o n i n the schools.-*3 The committee recommended s i m i l a r measures f o r the P h i l i p p i n e s , and i n 1905 the United States Congress passed a law p r o h i b i t i n g the importation, s a l e , and use of opium i n the P h i l i p p i n e s except f o r medical purposes. The law went in t o e f f e c t a f t e r a three-year preparatory p e r i o d . ^ 4 The Shanghai Opium Commission The d i r e c t involvement which the United States now had i n the Far Eastern opium problem, coupled w i t h the developments i n B r i t a i n and China mentioned above, prompted the United States to c a l l f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting on the subject. During 1907 a number of nations were contacted, and i t was agreed that the International Opium Commission 55 would meet i n Shanghai i n .1909. A l l the major powers attended, but the Commission was not a l l that the United States had hoped f o r , since representatives were not able to make commitments on behalf of t h e i r respective n a t i o n a l governments, as would have been the case had a f u l l conference been c a l l e d . The Commission encountered se v e r a l other d i f f i c u l t i e s . Turkey refused to p a r t i c i p a t e , and P e r s i a sent only an i l l — p r e p a r e d commercial delegate at the l a s t m i n u t e . B o t h these countries were important opium producers. Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t was the B r i t i s h r e f u s a l to discuss the Sino-Opium trade, on the grounds that t h i s question had been resolved by the Ten Year Agreement, and thus was not a legitimate subject f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l meeting.-''' 20 The Shanghai Opium Commission was the f i r s t t r u l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l attempt to deal with the opium problem, and even though dis c u s s i o n of the Sino-Indian opium trade was precluded there were many basic issues to be examined. The core of the matter was the American contention that any use of opium, other than f o r medical purposes, was i l l e g i t i m a t e , and should be p r o h i b i t e d . The Americans maintained that the p r i n c i p a l obstacle to a s o l u t i o n of the opium problem was the r e l i a n c e by the c o l o n i a l powers on opium f o r revenue purposes. The United States submitted eight proposals f o r discussion, i n the hope that they would be unanimously accepted, thus creating norms which could serve as the basis f o r concerted action at a l a t e r conference. 58 The f i r s t American proposal c a l l e d f o r a "uniform e f f o r t " by the nations represented to l i m i t the use of opium and i t s d e r i v a t i v e s to medical purposes only. The B r i t i s h objected to t h i s on the grounds that opium use i n India was common as a household remedy, and hence 59 r e g u l a t i o n was wiser and more p r a c t i c a l than p r o h i b i t i o n . The second American proposal condemned the dependence of c e r t a i n governments on opium—based revenues, and urged that t h i s dependence be ended q u i c k l y so as to f a c i l i t a t e the p r o h i b i t i o n of opium outlined i n the f i r s t proposal. In the face of B r i t i s h objections t h i s proposal was withdrawn. The next three American proposals met with few objections, as they concerned the cat e g o r i z a t i o n of prepared opium and opium d e r i v a t i v e s , as w e l l as the duty of states to prevent opium exports to countries which p r o h i b i t e d i t s u s e . ^ The l a s t three proposals, however, were much more c o n t r o v e r s i a l , and met with strong B r i t i s h o b j e c t i o n s . The s i x t h American r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d f o r increased inter-governmental 21 cooperation i n order to help each state eliminate i t s own opium problem. The B r i t i s h were not prepared to support t h i s p r i n c i p l e , which they saw as being outside the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission, e s p e c i a l l y since i t implied a B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n to help the Chinese i n t h e i r f i g h t against opium.^ The seventh r e s o l u t i o n simply c a l l e d f o r the holding of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference to formulate a treaty on narcotics c o n t r o l , but t h i s was also withdrawn when i t was argued that such a s p e c i f i c recommendation to the governments concerned would be inappro-. , 62 p r i a t e . The greatest f u r o r was r a i s e d by the l a s t American proposal, which read i n part: ...every nation which e f f e c t i v e l y p r o h i b i t s the production of opium and i t s d e r i v a t i v e s i n the country, except f o r medical purposes, should be free to p r o h i b i t the importation into i t s t e r r i t o r i e s of opium or i t s d e r i v a t i v e s , except f o r medical p u r p o s e s . ^ This was squarely aimed at the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, and as pointed out above the B r i t i s h were adamant i n t h e i r r e f u s a l to discuss the subject. The B r i t i s h were s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to keep the Sino-Indian opium trade out of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum, but only at the cost of strengthening the American prejudice against the B r i t i s h . on the opium question. In the opinion of the American delegation, the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n on t h i s matter proved that the Ten Year Agreement was: "too weak to stand c r i t i c i s m . " ^ 4 Both Great B r i t a i n and China presented proposals to the Commission as w e l l , and the re s o l u t i o n s which were f i n a l l y adopted unanimously by the delegates were something of an amalgam of a l l these proposals. Unanimity was d e l i b e r a t e l y sought by the p a r t i c i p a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y the 22 American delegation, as a basis f or further i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n , and thus the outcome of the Commission r e f l e c t e d a compromise between the American and Chinese p o s i t i o n and that of the European c o l o n i a l powers, l e d by Great B r i t a i n . The p r i n c i p l e s that the non-medical use of opium was i l l e g i t i m a t e , and that each state had an o b l i g a t i o n to ban opium exports to states which prohib i t e d i t s use, were i n large part accepted. The f a i l u r e of the Commission to deal with the Sino-Indian opium trade was not as s i g n i f i c a n t as the f a c t that a consensus was beginning to take shape, based p r i m a r i l y on the American view of the n a r c o t i c s problem. The Hague Opium Conferences Narcotics—a Worldwide Problem In order to formalize the non-binding recommendations of the Shanghai Opium Commission, the United States began to press f o r a conference soon a f t e r the Commission ended, but not a l l the countries involved were as eager as the United States. Great B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d that the scope of the proposed conference be widened so as to include the manufactured drugs morphine and cocaine. The a d d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h condition, that each p a r t i c i p a t i n g state complete research i n t o these substances, delayed the s t a r t of the conference u n t i l a f t e r the May, 66 1911 renewal of the Ten Year Agreement. While B r i t i s h hesitancy revolved around the matter of timing, Germany, as the world's leading manufacturer of drugs, was opposed to the conference on p r i n c i p l e . Pressured by chemical concerns such as Bayer, Germany pursued a p o l i c y 67 of obstructionism both before and during the conference. 23 The consideration of manufactured drugs, as w e l l as opium, made i t c l e a r that the proposed conference would deal with a l l aspects of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l drug problem, not j u s t those connected with the Far East, as had been the case i n Shanghai. The very f a c t that the Hague had been selected as the s i t e f o r the conference underlined t h i s point. Despite the i n d i f f e r e n c e of a number of s t a t e s , and the h o s t i l i t y of s e v e r a l others, notably Germany, the Hague Opium Conference convened on December 1, 1911. The f i n a l text of the Convention contained f i v e Chapters, each 69 dealing with a separate aspect of the world drug problem. Chapter I ( A r t i c l e s 1-5) concerned i t s e l f with raw opium. The c r u c i a l A r t i c l e was the t h i r d , which pledged each power to "prevent the export of raw opium to countries which s h a l l have prohibi t e d i t s entry." This was an important step forward, but the production of raw opium was l e f t uncontrolled, and i n the future t h i s would become an i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t . ^ Chapter II ( A r t i c l e s 6-8) c a l l e d f o r the gradual suppression of the trade i n prepared opium, but as no time l i m i t was set f o r the achievement of t h i s goal, the effectiveness of this Chapter was doubtful. Such a weakening of key a r t i c l e s was necessitated by the need to obtain a broad consensus. This was true to an even greater degree with respect to Chapter I I I ( A r t i c l e s 9-14), which dealt with cocaine and the various opium d e r i v a t i v e s . The B r i t i s h had been concerned with the issue of manufactured drugs w e l l before the conference began, and had come armed with a serie s of strong proposals to r e s t r i c t t h e i r production. I t was i n 24 j u s t t h i s area that German intransigence was centered, however, and a f t e r a week's deadlock the B r i t i s h were forced to agree to the i n s e r t i o n of the q u a l i f y i n g phrase "the contracting p a r t i e s s h a l l use t h e i r best endeavors to take..." the measures indicated i n the Convention. This l e f t a large loophole, f o r i t was d i f f i c u l t to demonstrate that a given country was not doing i t s best to carry out the provisions of the Convention, even i f i t seemed that such were the c a s e . ^ In support of t h e i r p o s i t i o n the German delegates made several arguments. They c i t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by a f e d e r a l s t a t e i n signing a convention which might i n f r i n g e on state autonomy. They also pointed out that Germany her s e l f had an e f f e c t i v e system of domestic c o n t r o l , and that other countries should protect themselves i n a s i m i l a r manner. F i n a l l y , the Germans stressed that to 72 be e f f e c t i v e any convention would have to be adhered to by a l l s t a t e s . •Chapter IV ( A r t i c l e s 15-19) concerned the s i t u a t i o n i n China, and i t s adoption was a v i c t o r y f o r the Chinese delegation. This Chapter c a l l e d f o r the cessation of opium imports to China with the exception of the imports provided f o r by the Ten Year Agreement. Thus other nations were prevented from t r y i n g to secure a s i m i l a r exemption for t h e i r opium. Chapter V ( A r t i c l e s 20 and 21) c a l l e d f o r each s t a t e to "examine the p o s s i b i l i t y " of making possession of n a r c o t i c s an offense. The i n c l u s i o n of t h i s concept implied an acceptance of the American idea that the possession of i l l e g a l drugs was evidence demonstrating g u i l t . The f a c t that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community t e n t a t i v e l y accepted t h i s l e g a l 73 p r i n c i p l e before i t was passed into law by the United States Congress i l l u s t r a t e s the importance that the American a n t i - n a r c o t i c reformers 25 placed on i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation. The second part of Chapter V, A r t i c l e 21, provided f o r the exchange of s t a t i s t i c s , information, and the texts of laws and regulations among the contracting powers. This was also based on an American proposal, and as an ad hoc measure foreshadowed the systematic exchange of information which would become common l a t e r o n . ^ This p r o v i s i o n was adopted without much controversy. The same cannot be s a i d f o r Chapter VI ( A r t i c l e s 22-25), which dealt with how the Convention should be brought i n t o f o r c e . The Germans, 0 with French support, continued to demand that a l l states must adhere to the Convention before i t came into f o r c e . There was some v a l i d i t y i n t h i s , f o r se v e r a l important states had not attended the conference; these being Turkey (opium), Switzerland (manufactured drugs), Peru, and B o l i v i a (coca l e a v e s ) . ^ On the other hand, waiting u n t i l a l l t h i r t y -four sovereign states had signed the Convention would gr e a t l y delay i t s implementation. An American attempt to s p l i t Chapter I I I away from the the r e s t of the Convention was opposed by the B r i t i s h , who pointed out that they had agreed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Conference with the understanding 76 that manufactured drugs would be considered on the same basis as opium. The deadlock was broken by the adoption of a compromise scheme, contained i n Chapter VI. Provisions were made for powers not i n attendance to si g n the Convention, and i f a l l states had not adhered to the Convention by December 31, 1912, the Netherlands agreed to c a l l a second conference to consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of bringing the Convention i n t o e f f e c t without the unanimity desired by the Germans. With t h i s the Hague Conference ended. The Results of the Hague Conference Was the Conference a success? Few states could be s a t i s f i e d with 26 every a r t i c l e , but t h i s was only n a t u r a l . In many respects the Convention went beyond the resolutions of the Shanghai Opium Commission, e s p e c i a l l y i n recognizing the g l o b a l nature of the narcotics problem. One of the major issues of the future, the co n t r o l of manufactured drugs, was r a i s e d but not s o l v e d . ^ There were also defects i n the Convention, however. The measures which n a t i o n a l governments were c a l l e d upon to implement were not made s p e c i f i c , and thus i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these a r t i c l e s was l e f t to the governments themselves. The regulations suggested by the Convention were a l l i n the n a t i o n a l rather than the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p h e r e . ^ The most serious flaw was the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Convention might never come i n t o e f f e c t at a l l . When the Netherlands c a l l e d the Second Hague Conference on J u l y 1, 1913, twelve powers had not signed the Convention, and of these Turkey, Greece and Switzerland had i n d i c a t e d 79 that they would not s i g n . The only r e s u l t of the Second Conference was a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r increased pressure on non-signatories, and an agreement to meet the following year. When the Third Hague Conference convened on June 15, 1914, only Serbia and Turkey had f a i l e d to e i t h e r sign or profess a 80 w i l l i n g n e s s to do so. Eight powers had also r a t i f i e d the Convention. The Americans and B r i t i s h argued that the implementation of the Convention should not be thwarted by a handful of sta t e s , but Germany, supported by France and Russia, held to i t s o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . Eventually a compromise was agreed upon, whereby the Convention would operate among the r a t i f y i n g states only.*** The p a i n f u l l y slow implementation of the Hague Convention, as w e l l 27 as the outright r e f u s a l of Turkey to sign, made i t clear that a t r u l y e f f e c t i v e , u n i v e r s a l agreement on the c o n t r o l of narcotics was f a r i n the future. Even so, the Convention embodied a number of p r i n c i p l e s which form the basis f o r the current i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulatory regime, and thus represented an important step forward. The pledge by the signatories to p r o h i b i t opium exports (Chapter I ) , as w e l l as undertake measures against the trade i n prepared opium (Chapter II) and manufactured drugs (Chapter III) i n d i c a t e d that a consensus was forming among the world's powers i n the f i e l d of n a rcotics c o n t r o l . What was required In the future was the establishment of i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies to b r i n g these ideas into p r a c t i c e . The Implementation of Consensus A f t e r the F i r s t World War the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l movement thus advanced i n t o a new stage. The Hague Convention furnished a l e g a l basis f o r f u r t h e r a n t i - n a r c o t i c s agreements, but i t was only through these subsequent agreements that a system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l controls could be created to a c t u a l l y deal with the problems. Once thi s machinery was i n place the most important question would s t i l l remain unanswered: would i t work? The Postwar Situation There were several major p o l i t i c a l developments, both i n Europe and the Far East, which a f f e c t e d the a n t i - n a r c o t i c s movement. Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t of these was the formation of the League of Nations, which was given the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of supervising the Hague Convention, under A r t i c l e 23c of the League Covenant. This gave r i s e to problems 28 for the United States strongly supported the Hague Convention, but wished to have nothing to do with the League. As a r e s u l t , American involvement i n the League-sponsored conferences was h e s i t a n t 82 and at times h o s t i l e . While the involvement of the League i n the narcotics c o n t r o l movement was something of a mixed b l e s s i n g , there could be no doubt that the opium problem i n China had worsened i n the decade following the Shanghai d e l i b e r a t i o n s . The Chinese Revolution i n .191.1 had l e d to the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of China i n t o a number of warring provinces, and t h i s was accompanied by a resurgence of opium c u l t i v a t i o n throughout the country. The t o t a l opium production of China never reached the astronomical l e v e l s of the turn of the century, but i t was high enough to reverse the e f f e c t s of the 1906 anti-opium campaign. I t was evident that any e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l action i n the Far East would be impossible u n t i l China was r e u n i f i e d under an e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n a l government. O J The drug trade i t s e l f was undergoing a s i g n i f i c a n t change at t h i s time. Increasingly, manufactured drugs (morphine, heroin, and cocaine) were repla c i n g the more expensive and b u l k i e r opium. The s h i f t to 84 heroin was worldwide, a f f e c t i n g both the United States and China, 85 where heroin was sold as an anti-opium remedy. These manufactured . drugs were produced quite l e g a l l y and i n qu a n t i t i e s f a r i n excess of the l i c i t demand with the r e s u l t that much of the production was diverted i n t o the i l l i c i t market. The United States was well aware of t h i s c r u c i a l aspect of the narcotics problem, and together with i t s growing awareness of i t s own drug problem t h i s r e s u l t e d i n a s h i f t 29 of p r i o r i t i e s ; the opium problem i n the Far East was now considered secondary to the goals of reducing the rate of addiction i n the United States and elim i n a t i n g the involvement of American nationals i n the 87 i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . This change i n outlook represented a r e a l i s t i c view that the world narcotics issue was multifaceted, but unfortunately the United States did not go one step further and conclude that some parts of the drug problem could be dealt with more e f f e c t i v e l y than others. The American in s i s t e n c e on sweeping solutions instead of piecemeal advances e f f e c t i v e l y paralyzed the i n t e r n a t i o n a l movement throughout the 1920s. Failure in Geneva The American suspicion of the League stemmed not only from the general anti-League, i s o l a t i o n i s t mood i n the United States, but also from the way the League undertook to discharge i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c o n t r o l of drugs. The body i n charge of t h i s task was the Opium Advisory Committee, which o r i g i n a l l y had eight members: China, France, Great B r i t a i n , Netherlands, India, Japan, Portugal, and Siam. Each of the European members possessed colonies i n which there was a government monopoly. The c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s which t h i s caused did not escape the not i c e of observers, and i t accounted f o r the nickname the committee 88 was g i v e n — " t h e o l d Opium Bloc." In November 1924 the Council of the League of Nations decided to convene two conferences; one to deal with the subject of smoking opium i n the Far East, and the other to deal with more general questions i n v o l v i n g the drug problem. The s i t e f o r these conferences was Geneva. The 30 United States did not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the f i r s t conference, which was confined to those states possessing t e r r i t o r i e s i n Asi a i n which the use of opium was permitted.^9 The American p o s i t i o n at the Second Geneva Opium Conference (1925) was that a comprehensive program was needed to solve the na r c o t i c s problem, and to t h i s end the United States proposed u n i v e r s a l acceptance of the i l l e g i t i m a c y of non-medical or n o n - s c i e n t i f i c drug use, the l i m i t a t i o n of manufacture, and most importantly, the c o n t r o l of raw 90 opium production. The e n t i r e American package was too r a d i c a l to have a chance of acceptance. The idea of r e s t r i c t i n g opium production so as to leave no surplus f o r i l l i c i t use was rejected by most opium-producing s t a t e s , f o r t h i s would have reduced t h e i r revenues considerably. Similar objections were r a i s e d by manufacturing states when t h e i r i n t e r e s t s were threatened. The United States also strove to e s t a b l i s h a d e f i n i t e timetable f o r e l i m i n a t i n g the t r a f f i c i n opium, but India, backed by seve r a l European s t a t e s , opposed t h i s proposal on the. grounds that i t had been discussed at the F i r s t Geneva Conference several months previous (without r e s u l t ) . I t was also f e l t that the chaotic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n China made the establishment of a timetable i m p r a c t i c a l . Compromise proved impossible. The American delegation was headed by Representative Stephen G. Porter, Chairman of the House Foreign A f f a i r s Committee. Porter was vehemently opposed to the League of Nations, but had developed an i n t e r e s t i n the narcotics question and thus had joined the State Department and the ariti-narcotics groups i n pressing 91 for i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n trols. He had no i n t e n t i o n of weakening the 31 American proposals j u s t to reach an agreement. In t h i s he was supported by the i n s t r u c t i o n s from Congress which accompanied the appropriation funding the American delegation, f o r the delegation was forbidden to 92 sign any agreement which did not f u l l y embody the American viewpoint. There was no s p i r i t of compromise on e i t h e r side i n any case; at one point near the end of the conference the head of the B r i t i s h delegation asserted that the per c a p i t a opium consumption i n the United States exceeded that of India, which Porter denounced as "a v i l e slander upon the American people." Porter himself strongly implied that the B r i t i s h were v i o l a t i n g the Hague Convention f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n . ^ i t was i n t h i s s p i r i t that the United States delegation withdrew from the Conference on February 6, 1925, c i t i n g the f u t i l i t y of f u r t h e r discussions as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s d r a s t i c a c t i o n . The conference continued, even though i t was obvious that no t r u l y e f f e c t i v e measures could be taken without the cooperation of the United States, which was both an important consumer and manufacturer of drugs. The most s i g n i f i c a n t accomplishment of the Second Conference was the establishment of the Permanent Central (Opium) Board (PCB), a non-governmental body of experts entrusted with the supervision of 94 the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l system. A l l i n a l l the conference was a f a i l u r e , e s p e c i a l l y since the B r i t i s h and Americans were i n v i r t u a l agreement on the subject of l i m i t i n g the manufacture of drugs. I t was only the American i n s i s t e n c e on t r y i n g to devise a completely comprehensive agreement that prevented compromise. I t required a c o o l i n g - o f f period of s e v e r a l years before the United States rejoined 95 the i n t e r n a t i o n a l movement. 32 The 1931 Limitation Conference By 1930 opinion i n both the United States and the League states, notably Great Britain, was leaning towards a reconciliation, and the acrimony i n Geneva five years earlier was seen as an unpleasant incident best forgotten. Although the United States had refused to sign the 96 Geneva Convention, i t had been complying with many of i t s a r t i c l e s . Since the controversy at the Second Geneva Conference had centered on questions related to opium, i t was apparent that a conference dealing only with the issue of manufactured drugs would have every chance of success, and the Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of 97 Narcotic Drugs accordingly convened in Geneva on May 27, 1931. A quota system was advocated by the British government, but eventually the conference adopted a more flexible scheme. Each state was called upon to submit an annual estimate of i t s legitimate drug needs, which would then be examined by a supervisory body. This body would comment on the estimates made, as well as furnish estimates on behalf of states which failed to do so themselves. The quantities manufactured by each state were to be limited to the amount called for by the estimates, with imports, exports, and confiscations taken into account. Under this system the production of heroin would be greatly restricted. By comparing import and export figures, i t could be determined whether a state was building up a surplus of narcotics. The relatively small number of manufacturing countries ensured that these regulations could be brought into force quickly and effectively. 98 The Convention came into effect on July 9, 1933. This system of q< controls is essentially the same as that in force at the present time. ' 33 The success of the L i m i t a t i o n Conference contrasts sharply with the breakup of the Second Opium Conference s i x years e a r l i e r . The e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two meetings was that the L i m i t a t i o n Conference was considering only one aspect of the n a r c o t i c s problem, and thus there were r e a l chances f o r an agreement. As a r e s u l t , a more o p t i m i s t i c and c o n c i l i a t o r y atmosphere p r e v a i l e d , and compromises were more e a s i l y reached. The L i m i t a t i o n Convention was s u c c e s s f u l i n i t s goal of reducing the d i v e r s i o n of l e g a l l y produced drugs i n t o the i l l i c i t market, but t h i s did not lead to a corresponding reduction i n the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c , f o r as we s h a l l see clandestine f a c t o r i e s were ui - • ^ • _u , 1 0 0 able to maintain the supply. Unsolved Problems Several major problems remained unsolved, despite the success of the L i m i t a t i o n Conference. A d e f i n i t e plan did not e x i s t f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n of the opium trade i n the Far East, and matters had advanced l i t t l e since the Hague Convention, which c a l l e d f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n 101 of the trade, but set no time l i m i t . More serious than t h i s , however, were the questions of the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c , and the l i m i t a t i o n of raw opium production. Neither of these problems has been solved at the present time, and the i n e f f e c t i v e attempts at t h e i r s o l u t i o n i n the 1930s serve to i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered. In November, 1931, a conference was held i n Bangkok to discuss the suppression of opium smoking. There was l i t t l e hope of any e f f e c t i v e agreement, f o r China did not even p a r t i c i p a t e , and the United States only p a r t i c i p a t e d as an observer. The product of the conference was merely 34 a r e i t e r a t i o n of the Hague p r i n c i p l e of suppression without a set time . . 102 l i m i t . In e f f e c t , opium smoking was recognized by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community as a f a c t of l i f e which would r e s i s t c o r r e c t i v e measures u n t i l fundamental p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic changes took place i n A s i a . I t was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r that even the most ingenious and st r i n g e n t schemes f o r r e s t r i c t i n g narcotics use would have a doubtful e f f e c t i f smuggling remained uncontrolled. I t had been a consistent argument of the European powers with government monopolies i n t h e i r Asian colonies that p r o h i b i t i o n was unworkable because of smuggling, and thus i t was f o r the best i f the government sold the opium i t s e l f . To deal with t h i s problem, the Conference f o r the Suppression of the I l l i c i t T r a f f i c i n Dangerous Drugs convened i n Geneva during the summer of 1936. The r e s u l t i n g convention c a l l e d f o r the severe punishment of those involved i n t r a f f i c k i n g , and the e x t r a d i t i o n of offenders was provided f o r , i n order to make i t as d i f f i c u l t as possible f o r t r a f f i c k e r s to f i n d safe havens or escape punishment. F i n a l l y , the exchange of information on the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c among p o l i c e and customs o f f i c i a l s 103 was f a c i l i t a t e d . The eff e c t i v e n e s s of these measures was s l i g h t , and i n any case the advent of the Second World War disrupted both the i n t e r n a t i o n a l anti-drug movement and the t r a f f i c k e r s themselves The question of the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c produced a conference ( a l b e i t an i n e f f e c t i v e one), but the de l i b e r a t i o n s on l i m i t i n g opium production f a i l e d to get off the ground at a l l . In some ways the proposals f o r r e s t r i c t i n g opium production to the l e v e l s required by l i c i t usage resembled the l i m i t a t i o n of manufactured drugs, but a closer examination 35 reveals great differences between the two concepts. The major manufacturers of n a r c o t i c s , such as Germany and the United States, were hig h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s t a t e s , with a capacity to adjust to even large reductions i n drug output without undue economic s t r a i n . The reason f o r t h i s was that the r e l a t i v e l y small number of s k i l l e d workers displaced could be relocated or r e t r a i n e d , f o r many of the educational and t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s , as w e l l as the f a c i l i t i e s , needed for the manufacture of drugs can be used f o r other, economically valuable, purposes. In contrast, the major producers of opium during the interwar period (China, India, the Soviet Union, P e r s i a , Turkey, and Yugoslavia; the l a t t e r three being the p r i n c i p a l exporting states) were generally a g r i c u l t u r a l s t a t e s , often with unstable governments. Only a government i n f i r m c o n t r o l of a country would be able to implement the measures necessary to bring about a reduction of poppy c u l t i v a t i o n . Even i f agreement could be reached on what qua n t i t i e s of opium were to be produced i n which countries, the b a s i c a l l y unpredictable nature of farming (due to weather and other factors beyond human control) would complicate the a p p l i c a t i o n of controls considerably. In a d d i t i o n to these very r e a l problems, there remains the e f f e c t that such r e s t r i c t i o n s would have on the peasant farmers involved. Unlike the urban chemist or technician who processes the opium, the farmer i s i n t i m a t e l y involved with his crop. E n t i r e v i l l a g e s and d i s t r i c t s have t h e i r s o c i a l and economic structures based on the opium crop, and i t i s no easy task to induce, or even force, t r a d i t i o n a l l y conservative peasants to engage i n a new l i v e l i h o o d f or abstract reasons linked to s o c i a l problems thousands of miles away. For these reasons, any 36 attempt to implement a program of poppy s u b s t i t u t i o n or eradication i s 106 l i k e l y to nave serious p o l i t i c a l consequences. These d i f f i c u l t i e s prevented any r e a l progress towards the r e s t r i c t i o n of opium production. The world p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s which resu l t e d i n the Second World War caused a suspension of the e f f o r t s to strengthen the i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of n a r c o t i c s , and thus the war marks the end of a d i s t i n c t h i s t o r i c a l phase of these a c t i v i t i e s . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l community had not solved a l l the problems set before i t , but this should not obscure the progress which was made. Beginning with the Shanghai Commission of 1909, an i n c r e a s i n g l y widespread i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus developed. The 1912 Hague Convention, as well as the l a t e r Geneva agreements, incorporated the e a r l i e r n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l i d e a l s i n t o l e g a l l y binding conventions. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l measures recounted above served to transform the n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c , but not to abolish i t . At the beginning of the twentieth century the trade i n n a r c o t i c s was c a r r i e d on f a i r l y openly, and governments were only involved f o r the purposes of revenue. By 1939 the narcotics t r a f f i c had taken on many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s now associated with i t , f o r v i r t u a l l y a l l phases of the t r a f f i c had become i l l i c i t . I f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of n a r c o t i c s were to have a r e a l impact on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of drugs, these covert t r a f f i c k i n g networks would have to be disrupted, and i t was to t h i s task that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l narcotics c o n t r o l movement turned following the Second World War. 37 I I I . HEROIN DEMAND AND SUPPLY SINCE WORLD WAR II The Global Drug Epidemic The evolution of the i l l i c i t drug t r a f f i c during the past s e v e r a l decades has been influenced by a great many f a c t o r s , but the most s i g n i f i c a n t (and l e a s t contentious, for a u t h o r i t i e s on nar c o t i c s seldom seem to agree on any aspect of the problem) has been the world-wide increase i n n a r c o t i c s use. I t i s true that opiate consumption i s today at a lower l e v e l than was the case during the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s century, but t h i s i s due s o l e l y to the e l i m i n a t i o n of opium and heroin consumption 108 on the Chinese mainland. In most other nations narcotics use, and e s p e c i a l l y heroin addiction, has spread greatly since 1945. Not only has the United States experienced an alarming r i s e i n addiction, but a number of other countries have developed heroin and re l a t e d drug problems where none had previously existed. In the past the t r a f f i c i n n a r c o t i c s was considered to be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem because drug shipments often crossed i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundaries and thus could not be e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d by a s i n g l e s t a t e . The spread of drug abuse has added a new dimension to the problem, f o r nations previously involved i n the narcotics t r a f f i c only i n the p e r i p h e r a l sense of being producing, processing, or t r a n s i t areas for n a r c o t i c s destined for the United States have found that they also have a drug a d d i c t i o n problem. The expansion of nar c o t i c s use, both i n the United States and 33 other countries, has been most pronounced since the ea r l y 1960s, when the most recent heroin epidemic began. The use of the term "epidemic" i s appropriate i n v i r t u a l l y every sense, f o r heroin addiction tends 109 to spread i n exactly the same manner as do many diseases. These r e l a t i v e l y recent developments should be not be overemphasized at the expense of neglecting important trends which occurred e a r l i e r , however. The focus of t h i s paper i s on opiate, and to a le s s e r extent cocaine, abuse, but these substances obviously are not the only ones a v a i l a b l e to the drug user. Amphetamines and barbituates, as an example, are also abused extensively, often through t h e i r o v e r p r e s c r i p t i o n by physicians.**^ A l c o h o l , although l e g a l , i s the most widely abused drug of a l l . By l i m i t i n g the discussion to heroin the matter i s s i m p l i f i e d , as i t i s not necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between l i c i t and i l l i c i t use. In most countries (the p r i n c i p a l exception being Great B r i t a i n , where heroin has a l i m i t e d medical usage) heroin i s an i l l e g a l substance, and any t r a f f i c k i n g i n i t i s a c r i m i n a l act. Heroin represents the cutting edge of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s issue, since i t one of the most powerful, dangerous, and sought-after drugs. I t s addictive nature guarantees a r e l a t i v e l y s table market, which has made f o r the emergence of t r a f f i c k i n g organizations and networks operating on a long-term b a s i s . Before turning to these organizations and the networks they c o n t r o l , we s h a l l f i r s t examine the increases i n narcotics use which have stimulated t h e i r growth. Heroin Use in the United States A f t e r World War II the narcotics trade i n the United States 39 was i n poor shape by almost any standard. Not only had the c o n t r o l l i n g organizations been s e r i o u s l y disrupted by government prosecution before the war,^' but the s e c u r i t y measures put in t o e f f e c t during the war had made smuggling extremely d i f f i c u l t . This problem was compounded by the wartime shipping shortages which d r a s t i c a l l y reduced the options 112 open to even the most imaginative smuggler. The heroin shortage which developed i n the United States caused a drop i n the p u r i t y of s t r e e t ( r e t a i l e d ) heroin from about 28 percent i n 1938 to l e s s than 3 percent i n 1941. The forced withdrawal of many addicts reduced the addict population to about twenty-thousand by the time the war ended— 113 an unprecedentedly low f i g u r e . One author commented: In f a c t , as the war drew to a close, there was every reason to bel i e v e that the scourge of heroin had f i n a l l y been purged from the United States. Heroin supplies were, nonexistent, i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l syndicates were i n dis a r r a y , and the addict population was reduced to manageable proportions f o r the f i r s t time i n h a l f a century. H4 This a c t u a l l y seems to be an overstatement of the case. What had r e a l l y reduced heroin addiction during the war years was the sharp drop i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and communication and the rigorous border and port inspections. Both these f a c t o r s served to cut the United States o f f from the European and Asian sources of supply, but both were temporary conditions. With the resumption of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and the recovery of the world economy a f t e r the war i t became increasingly-d i f f i c u l t to keep heroin out of the country. How American a u t h o r i t i e s could have taken advantage of the postwar s i t u a t i o n i s not c l e a r . The main problem encountered i n estimating the prevalence of addiction i n a society which p r o h i b i t s n a r c o t i c s use i s that no accurate 40 method of counting the addicts e x i s t s . O f f i c i a l figures are at best c a r e f u l estimates, and at worst del i b e r a t e attempts to mislead l e g i s l a t o r s and the p u b l i c . The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)**^ estimated that the number of heroin addicts i n the United States was about 200,000 in 1914, declined to around 20,000 i n 1945, rose to about 60,000 i n 116 the e a r l y f i f t i e s , and then gradually declined. The accuracy of these estimates can be questioned, since they suggest: ...without making any allowance f o r the appearance of new addicts, that about 42,000 addicts vanished between 1914 and 1925, about 96,000 between 1925 and 1935, and approximately 42,000 between 1935 and 1945....However, i t i s w e l l known that between 1915 and 1945 the average age of known addicts declined considerably, and t h i s demonstrates that we must assume a constant stream of new addicts being addicted each year • • • • The o f f i c i a l tendency to underestimate the extent of heroin use did not disappear with the onset of the heroin epidemic of the 1960s. As l a t e as 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) recorded some 68,088 "active n a r c o t i c a d d i c t s " — a n increase of only 118 4,077 from the previous year. However, the same government p u b l i c a t i o n conceded that: The heroin abuse problem had been increasing since World War I I and i t continues to increase. Perhaps the most r e a l i s t i c estimate of the number of opiate addicts i n the country i s between 100,000 and 200,000. 1 1 9 More recent BNDD estimates c i t e higher f i g u r e s . One BNDD s t a t i s t i c i a n , Dr. Joseph Greenwood, estimated that i n 1968 there were a c t u a l l y 315,000 120 addicts, and i n an A p r i l 3, 1972 interview Myles J . Amrbose, head of the J u s t i c e Department's O f f i c e f o r Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (DALE), stated: ...we had the tremendous explosion of drug abuse of the 1960s, commencing around 1962-63....The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs....said that they estimate now the figu r e to be 560,000 addicts.*21 41 Many d i f f e r e n t s t a t i s t i c a l methods have been used t o d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n t of the problem, b u t a l l o b s e r v e r s agree t h a t h e r o i n a d d i c t i o n began t o r i s e r a p i d l y by the l a t e 1960s. The o u t b u r s t of a d d i c t i o n which h i t the U n i t e d S t a t e s had a number of h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t consequences, i n c l u d i n g the s t i m u l a t i o n o f a number of d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s by the 122 American government aimed a t c u r b i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c . Many of the American p r o p o s a l s , such as the ban on T u r k i s h opium p r o d u c t i o n , r e p r e s e n t o l d wine i n new b o t t l e s , as we s h a l l s e e . A p a r t from t h e o f f i c i a l , governmental r e s p o n s e s t o the h e r o i n e p i d e m i c , t h e growth i n demand has had an i m p o r t a n t e f f e c t on the s t r u c t u r e and w o r k i n g s o f t h e t r a f f i c k i n g networks. Of c o u r s e t r a f f i c k i n g i n n a r c o t i c s has always been p r o f i t a b l e , f o r o t h e r w i s e smuggling would n o t take p l a c e . The h e r o i n t r a d e i s a b u s i n e s s , and those i n v o l v e d i n i t have as t h e i r o b j e c t i v e the m a x i m i z i n g o f p r o f i t s , as do most b u s i n e s s e s . 1 ^ The r a p i d e x p a n s i o n o f demand has caused a c o r r e s p o n d i n g growth i n t h e scope and c o m p l e x i t y o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a f f i c k i n g networks. In p a r t t h i s growth has t a k e n the form of the e x p a n s i o n o f groups a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d i n t h e t r a d e , b u t many new groups have a l s o become i n v o l v e d as p r o f i t s (and o p p o r t u n i t i e s ) r o s e . I n some r e s p e c t s the c u r r e n t networks resemble those o f a decade o r two ago, b u t t h e r e a r e a l s o i m p o r t a n t new f e a t u r e s , i n p a r t due t o the r i s i n g demand. I t goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t t h i s t r e n d has c o m p l i c a t e d the t a s k of enforcement o f f i c i a l s . ^ 4 An adequate d i s c u s s i o n of the American h e r o i n e p i d e m i c l i e s o u t s i d e the scope of t h i s p a p e r , and g i v e n the c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t one i s tempted t o say o u t s i d e t h e scope of any s i n g l e p a p e r . The main causes seem t o be more r e l a t e d t o s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l 42 factors than with the a v a i l a b i l i t y of heroin i t s e l f . P r i o r to the s t a r t of the epidemic, heroin use was a s o c i a l problem which did not p a r t i c u l a r l y concern the average, white, middle class American. In New York C i t y , a f t e r the Second World War, for example: ...many of the addicts appeared to be musicians, odd-balls, homosexuals,, and others outside society's mainstream... .But soon the problem spread and the statistics....make i t clear that what p o l i t i c i a n s are now discovering as an epidemic has been with us f o r quite some time. 1' 1 , 0 Included i n those groups "outside society's mainstream" were r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y blacks. As long as heroin addiction was a problem found only i n the urban ghettos, the s i t u a t i o n was r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e , but when addiction spread to the white suburbs drug c o n t r o l became a burning issue at a l l l e v e l s of government. The drug subculture which characterized the s i x t i e s , as w e l l as the lowering of r a c i a l b a r r i e r s , . c o n t r i b u t e d to the increase i n heroin use. Besides an increase i n the o v e r a l l number of addicts, the heroin epidemic was marked by a drop i n the average age of addicts. One i n d i c a t i o n of addiction prevalence i s the frequency of heroin-r e l a t e d deaths. These two trends are c l e a r l y shown i n the fi g u r e s f o r New York C i t y , which has s t e a d i l y contained about ha l f of the addicts i n the United States (see table 1 and table 2). Assuming that heroin use i s pr o p o r t i o n a l to the frequency of heroin-related deaths, these fi g u r e s show that heroin use by teenagers has r i s e n even more r a p i d l y than o v e r a l l heroin use. I t i s t h i s f a c t , perhaps more than any other, which has caused so much alarm. Heroin use i n the United States continued to r i s e u n t i l about 1973 1?7 or 19 74, when i t s t a b i l i z e d at anywhere from 500,000 to 700,000 addicts. 43 TABLE 1 HEROIN-RELATED DEATHS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1950-1969 (ALL AGES) 1950-54 465 1955-59 611 1960-64 1.299 1965-69 2,935 SOURCE: New York Times-t February 1, 1970, IV p. 6:4. TABLE 2 HEROIN-RELATED DEATHS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1960-1969 (TEENAGERS) 15 and A l l under teens 1960 0 15 1964 0 38 1967 0 79 1969 20 224 SOURCE: New York Timess February 1, 1970, IV p. 6:4. During the past few years a "polydrug" problem has developed, f o r drug users are i n c r e a s i n g l y w i l l i n g to take almost any combination of drugs i n order to get high. This phenomenon has included a return to alcohol use by the young, as w e l l as an upsurge i n the use of cocaine, amphetamin 128 and barbituates. The f i r s t Drug Abuse Conference, held i n Chicago i n the spring of 1974, recommended increased a t t e n t i o n to multidrug use, i f this could be achieved without neglect of the heroin problem. ' In part this trend towards multidrug use seems to have been caused by the heroin 44 shortage which took place i n the United States i n 1973 arid 1974, i J U for heroin use has been on the r i s e since t h i s l a t t e r year. The National I n s t i t u t e on Drug Abuse and Alcoholism estimated i n 1976 that about 400,000 persons were d a i l y users of heroin i n the United States, and that t h i s f i g u r e , while short of the 1971 high of between 500,000 and 600,000, i s . . 131 r i s x n g . Heroin Use in other Countries The upsurge i n heroin addiction of the l a s t decade has not been confined to the United States. A number of other countries have experienced drug epidemics much l i k e that which took place i n the United States, 132 although on a smaller s c a l e . This " h o r i z o n t a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n " has underscored the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nature of the narcotics problem. The lesser s i z e of these epidemics does not i n d i c a t e a l e s s e r problem, f o r the impact of an increase i n addiction corresponds to the r e l a t i v e increase i n the number of addicts rather than the absolute increase. The outbreak of an epidemic of heroin use i n a country with no experience with the problem i s l i k e l y to create a high degree of p u b l i c apprehension, i n part because of the novelty of the s i t u a t i o n , and i n part because of the fear that the epidemic w i l l continue to spread without l i m i t . A s i m i l a r pattern of response could be observed i n the United States. The problem of heroin addiction was a f a m i l i a r one, and as long as i t only a f f e c t e d c e r t a i n segments of soci e t y i t could be t o l e r a t e d . As soon as addiction spread to previously unaffected socio-economic groups, 133 emergency measures were considered appropriate. A nation with very few addicts reaches t h i s "panic threshold" 45 much sooner than did the United States. In an epidemic, the f a c t that heroin addiction appears to spread without l i m i t i s of more p o l i t i c a l consequence than whether i t a c t u a l l y does. Few governments can aff o r d to remain i n a c t i v e and allow an epidemic to run i t s course, and as a r e s u l t a comparatively small increase i s s u f f i c i e n t to t r i g g e r p o l i c y changes. One of the most c a r e f u l l y studied outbreaks of ad d i c t i o n took place i n the United Kingdom. Since the B r i t i s h have taken a medical 134 approach to the heroin problem, as opposed to the enforcement-oriented approach of the United States, the increase i n the B r i t i s h addict population was c l o s e l y watched to see i f i t meant the f a i l u r e of the B r i t i s h method. Under t h i s system addicts are re g i s t e r e d , and thus r e l i a b l e data i s e a s i l y obtained, i n contrast to most other countries. In 1936 there were only 616 addicts, ninety percent of whom were addicted to morphine. Half of the addicts were women, and 147 were doctors. Most had acquired the habit during medical treatment for something e l s e . 1 By 1953 most of the 290 known addicts were "therapeutic addicts", i n that t h e i r habits stemmed from such causes. More important, from the viewpoint of addiction c o n t r o l , was the number of non-therapeutic a d d i c t s — t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s who had acquired the drug habit on t h e i r own, usually from f r i e n d s . By 1959 there were only 47 such addicts, but t h i s t o t a l began to r i s e s t e a d i l y : to 329 i n 1964, 509 i n 1965, and 800 i n 1966, of whom 300 were under twenty~five years of age. Once i t had begun, the epidemic was stimulated by the fact that almost a l l the new addicts were young males who had st a r t e d using heroin because, of contact with other addicts, and who were i n turn 46 i n f e c t i n g others. In 1968 the B r i t i s h government introduced a system of c l i n i c s , which may have been responsible for the peaking of the 137 epidemic i n 1969 at 2,881 addicts. During t h i s same period France, which has long occupied a p o s i t i o n of importance i n the smuggling routes to the United States, began to acquire a s i g n i f i c a n t domestic drug problem. According to testimony before a United States Senate committee: The French woke up to the danger s h o r t l y a f t e r we (the U.S.) did, when there were a number of heroin overdose deaths involving the the c h i l d r e n of prominent f a m i l i e s , and when seve r a l surveys e s t a b l i s h e d that France was beginning to have a serious addiction problem, with p o s s i b i l y as many as 25,000 (addicts) by the l a t t e r part of 1971. 1 5 9 This increase i n addiction was thought by American o f f i c i a l s to be the major stimulant to increased French cooperation with United States 140 e f f o r t s against the t r a f f i c k i n g networks. Great B r i t a i n and France were not the only western European countries to experience r i s i n g drug use. The phenomenon was widespread and a f f e c t e d almost every s t a t e , often with i n t e r e s t i n g n a t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s . Sweden, f o r example, has had v i r t u a l l y no heroin problem, but has had to confront an epidemic of intravenous amphetamine use. By 1970 141 there were between 10,000 and 12,000 ps y c h o l o g i c a l l y addicted users. The increased rate of addiction has been accompanied by a re l a t e d r i s e i n drug-associated crime: i n 1965 one out of every f i v e Swedish males arrested were drug abusers, but t h i s rose to one i n four i n 1966, and one i n three i n 1967. The addict population doubled every 30 months with the exception of the period 1965-1967, when l e g a l p r e s c r i p t i o n was t r i e d and 142 the doubling time was shortened to 12 months. 47 In Northern Ireland the social and p o l i t i c a l dislocation which began in 1969 contributed greatly to increased drug use. The number of known drug users jumped from 480 in 1969 to 8,000 in 1973, and an estimated $20 million worth of smuggling was taking place, despite attempts by both Protestant and Roman Catholic militants to stamp out drug use in areas under their control. The tendency towards increasing drug abuse has not been limited to North America and Western Europe, but has been seen in the Soviet Union as well. The f i r s t such indication came in 1970, when the Soviet humour magazine Krokodil published a story which made the point that the shortage of consumer goods in the Soviet Union was leading youth 144 to both alcohol and marijuana. Two years later the U.S.S.R. intro-duced stringent new drug laws, which demonstrated that the government was concerned about narcotic abuse. Under the terms of this law "addicts are obliged to seek voluntary treatment" and courts are authorized " . . . i f necessary, to commit addicts to rehabilitation centres for one or two years and for a year longer i f the addict is uncooperative." 1 4"' Outside observers considered the problem to be most serious in the south, where both opium and hemp are grown. The major source of drugs for addicts appeared to be the diversion of narcotics from medical applicatioi The secretive nature of Soviet society makes i t d i f f i c u l t to determine the true extent of drug abuse there, but from these few items i t can be inferred that the problem i s growing. According to reliable, unofficial reports, i n 1972 a group of s c i e n t i f i c workers iras discovered making i l l e g a l drugs, including LSD, at the Moscow Institute for Natural Compounds. This incident was not made public within the Soviet Union. 1 4^ 48 This was not an i s o l a t e d o c c u r r e n c e — s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s had been caught making heroin at a pharmaceutical laboratory at Pyatigorsk i n the North Caucasus about two years e a r l i e r , and an August 6, 1972 report appeared i n the Soviet press t e l l i n g of the execution of a t r a f f i c k e r f o r the murder of a would-be-informer. 1 4 8 i n 1 9 7 4 Soviet drug laws were again 149 tightened, and i n that same year Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s p u b l i c i z e d the arre s t and 4-year imprisonment of a Moscow youth f o r peddling hashish, i n an apparent e f f o r t to warn away other youths from drugs. ^ ® The Soviet Union i s not connected to the narcotics t r a f f i c k i n g networks, but the presence of drug abuse i n even a Communist state demonstrates that t h i s problem a f f e c t s many d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s i n many parts of the world, and thus i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n the truest sense of the word. The f a c t that a large number of states face s i m i l a r domestic problems tends to motivate these states towards cooperation, but of greater importance i s the f a c t that the very nature of the i l l i c i t drug trade makes an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n the only f e a s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . The World's Opium Production The essence of the g l o b a l trade i n i l l i c i t drugs i s the transportation of the n a r c o t i c from i t s point of o r i g i n to i t s point of s a l e . In the case of heroin, the raw m a t e r i a l required i s opium, and any study of the smuggling networks used to supply the countless addicts throughout the world must begin with an examination of the world's production of opium. Licit Production As pointed out e a r l i e r , opiates have a number of l e g i t i m a t e , medical 49 and s c i e n t i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n s , and as a r e s u l t s u b s t a n t i a l q uantities of opium are produced l e g a l l y . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of l i c i t production outlined above*"** has had an important impact on the quantities of drugs produced, e s p e c i a l l y i n the area of manufacture, as shown by Table 3. TABLE 3 WORLD (LICIT) PRODUCTION OF DEPENDENCE-PRODUCING DRUGS 1909 1934 1959 1970 6,800 1,000 1,200 Poppy straw (tons) . . . - 12,600 a 31,300 ? 26,800 108,200 177,000 ? 1,100 80 100 ? 17,200 98,000 169,000 Ethylmorphine (bionine) (kg) - 1,700 8,200 9,200 - 14,200 14,800 Coca leaves (tons) . . . • • ? 11,300 18,600 Cocaine (kg) ? 3,400 900 1,900 SOURCES: 1909 opium f i g u r e : I n t ernational Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909. 1934 opium f i g u r e : a n a l y t i c a l study by the League Opium Advisory Committee (C.305.M 203. 1937 XI). A l l other f i g u r e s : PCB/INCB s t a t i s t i c s . ^ h e s e fi g u r e s r e f e r to the volume of poppy straw used i n the manufacture of morphine. This table o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n K. Bruun, L. Pan, and I. Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club, (Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1975) p< 23, table 1.2. There have been s e v e r a l important changes during t h i s century, as shown by Table 3. L i c i t opium production, as w e l l as heroin and cocaine manufacture, has f a l l e n sharply since the mid-1930s. This has occurred despite the steady r i s e i n demand f o r medicinal drugs such as morphine and 50 152 codeine (which i s made from morphine). I t i s clear from these figures that only a part of the heroin and cocaine production of the pre-World War II period was absorbed by the l i c i t market. Opium i s produced f o r both the l i c i t and the i l l i c i t markets; i n 1971 the former accounted f o r about 1,500 tons of opium, the l a t t e r 153 another 1,000. By i t s nature, data on l i c i t production i s more e a s i l y obtained than i s data on i l l i c i t production. Figures are submitted to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board by producing countries, and these figures give a f a i r l y accurate p i c t u r e of l i c i t production. (See TABLE 4). The o v e r a l l l i c i t production of opium has r i s e n since the mid-1960s, p r i n c i p a l l y because of increased production i n India and the resumption of production by Iran a f t e r a fourteen-year ban which 155 ended i n 1969. The Peoples' Republic of China was estimated to have produced some 100 tons of opium per year f o r medical purposes, but neither t h i s nor North Vietnamese production i s included i n the table. About ninety percent of l i c i t production i s used to manufacture morphine, 157 most of which i s converted to codeine. The use of poppy straw as an alternate source of raw material for morphine manufacture has increased with time, but i n 1971 s i x t y - f i v e percent of l i c i t morphine production 158 s t i l l depended on raw opium harvested i n the t r a d i t i o n a l manner. Pharmaceutical firms i n North America and Western Europe purchase most of the l i c i t opium which reaches the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. Table 5 l i s t s the q u a n t i t i e s of opium exported by the most important exporting s t a t e s . As can be seen, India dominates the l i c i t opium market, with Turkey being the other major exporter. Table 5 does not show the e f f e c t s of e i t h e r the l i f t i n g of the Iranian ban on production (1969) or the r i ~J x TABLE 4 WORLD LICIT PRODUCTION OF OPIUM, BY COUNTRY (METRIC TONS) Crop Y e a r a T o t a l b India Turkey USSR Iran Other 1 1950 739 179 147 86 307 21 1951 832 410 284 94 21 23 1952 849 272 370 104 83 19 1953 1,007 489 255 92 145 26 1954 609 341 56 103 92 18 1955 660 281 176 109 61 33 1956 643 270 220 105 — 48 1957 589 377 40 147 24 1958 775 511 144 93 — 27 1959 909 593 149 132 — 35 1960 1,253 711 323 169 • — 50 1961 1,037 709 157 120 — 51 1962 1,203 755 284 148 _ 15 1963 993 538 263 172 _ 20 1964 787 501 73 188 — 25 1965 754 486 77 177 _ 14 1966 671 339 126 201 _ 5 1967 662 368 104 181 8 1968 815 585 111 116 _ 3 1969 . 1,219 868 117 217 8 9 1970 1,157 794 51 227 78 7 1971 1,449+ 943 150 200 156 N.A. SOURCE: Data f o r 1950-1969 are from I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board reports: data f o r 1970-1971 are estimated. Data f o r India, Turkey, and Iran r e f e r to opium containing ten percent moisture. The USSR and most other countries have not provided information to the United Nations on the moisture content of t h e i r opium. aEnding July 30 of the stated year. ^Because of rounding, components may not add to the t o t a l s shown. c I n c l u d i n g Yugoslavia (40 tons, reduced to 1 ton i n 1970), Japan (4 tons or l e s s annually), Pakistan (12 tons annually), B u l g a r i a (7 tons i n 1952, reduced to l i t t l e or none i n recent years). Data on l i c i t production i n China and North Vietnam are not a v a i l a b l e . This table o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n R. Blum et aly Drug Dealers— Taking Action3 (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973) Chapter 4, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Opiate T r a f f i c " p. 66. 52 TABLE 5 WORLD LICIT OPIUM EXPORTS, BY COUNTRY (METRIC TONS) Calendar Year T o t a l India Turkey Iran Others 1950 755 234 265 246 10 1951 810 358 173 267 12 1952 537 163 167 200 7 1953 393 168 169 41 15 1954 540 263 211 56 10 1955 600 199 296 100 5 1956 668 266 274 106 22 1957 652 361 205 71 15 1958 800 493 207 98 2 1959 767 593 170 - 4 1960 733 626 103 - 4 1961 725 658 64 - 3 1962 530 375 116 - 39 1963 619 472 147 - -1964 663 473 190 - -1965 683 426 257 - — 1966 834 531 303 - -1967 573 419 151 - 3 1968 647 532 111 - 4 1969 721 602 118 - 1 1970 885 808 77 — — SOURCE: Data f o r 1950-1969 are from In t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board reports; data f o r 1970 are estimated. This table o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n R. Blum et al, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973) Chapter 4, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Opiate T r a f f i c " p. 67. Turkish ban which began i n 1973 but was discontinued soon afterwards. The increase i n world l i c i t production seen i n table 4 has not had the e f f e c t of depressing world p r i c e s , i n f a c t j u s t the opposite has occurred. (See table 6). A number of fa c t o r s account f o r t h i s , such as Turkish 53 attempts to maximize p r o f i t s immediately before they suspended production, India's near-monopoly p o s i t i o n , the general pattern of world i n f l a t i o n , 1 flr\ and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s to eliminate poppy production. Much of the opium produced but not exported i s dispensed to addicts i n maintenance programs, but these programs often f a i l to meet the needs of addicts because the p r i c e of the l e g a l opium i s above that of the black market. TABLE 6 INDIAN OPIUM EXPORT PRICES Crop Y e a r 3 US $ per kg Crop Y e a r 3 US $ per kg 1952 . . . 15.50 1963 . . . 13.95 1953 ; . . 13.00 1964 . . . 13.00 1954 . . . 12.60 1965 . . . 13.00 1955;. . . 12.40 1966 . . . 12.00 1956 . . . 12.10 1967 . . . 11.50 1957 . . . 12.40 1968 . . . 11.75 1958 . . . 14.10 1969 . . . 13.50 1959 . . . 14.80 1970 . . . 15.00 1960 . . . 15.50 1971 . . . 18.00 1961 . . . 15.50 1972 . . . 24.00 1962 . . . 15.50 SOURCE: R. Blum et al, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973) Chapter 4, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Opiate T r a f f i c " p. 68. NOTE: With ten percent morphine content. aEnding June 30 of stated year. In the past the connection between the l i c i t and i l l i c i t markets was much closer than i t i s now. The div e r s i o n of l i c i t l y produced d e r i v a t i v e s i n t o the i l l i c i t market has been e f f e c t i v e l y stopped by 161 the measures contained i n the 1931 L i m i t a t i o n Convention. The i n t e r a c t i o n between the two markets i s i n d i r e c t , an example being that an increase i n the p r i c e of l i c i t opium w i l l tend to lead towards a corresponding r i s e i n the i l l i c i t p r i c e , so that farmers w i l l not s e l l a l l t h e i r opium on the l i c i t market. The f a c t that the same raw material i s used f o r the manufacture of both heroin and morphine means there w i l l always be a c e r t a i n interdependence between the l i c i t and i l l i c i t markets, but the l a t t e r i s not merely an offshoot of the former. In terms of s i z e the i l l i c i t production of opium i s near that of l i c i t opium, and i n p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l terms i t i s f a r more important. I t i s t h i s p a r a l l e l system of production, manufacture, transportation, and d i s t r i b u t i o n which l i e s at the core of the world's drug problem. I l l i c i t Production Information and s t a t i s t i c s on th i s c r u c i a l aspect of the world n a r c o t i c s problem are d i f f i c u l t to come by, since by d e f i n i t i o n the subject i s i l l e g a l . We therefore f i n d ourselves confronted with the 162 same problem that arose i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of addict populations, but on an even larger s c a l e . Table 7 gives an approximate breakdown of i l l i c i t production by country f o r 1971. These fi g u r e s are rough estimates, and n a t u r a l l y output from each country, v a r i e s from year to year as growing conditions and p r i c e s change, as i n the case of the l i c i t market. The p r i c e that the farmer receives f o r h i s opium i s generally a function of supply and demand. The i l l i c i t p r i c e i s always higher than the l i c i t p r i c e , f o r the farmer i s taking some r i s k i n s e l l i n g 55 TABLE 7 ESTIMATED ILLICIT OPIUM OUTPUT, BY MAJOR PRODUCERS - 1971 Country Metric Tons Ind i a 100 Afghanistan . . . 100 Turkey . . . . . 35 to 80 Pakistan. . . . . 20 to 160 Burma, Thailand, and Laos . . 700 Mexico 10 to 20 Other 3 20 to 50 T o t a l 990 to l,210 b SOURCE: R. Blum et al, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973) Chapter 4, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Opiate T r a f f i c " p. 69. a Mainly Eastern Europe. ** A d d i t i o n a l amounts probably are produced i n L a t i n America, North A f r i c a , and the Far East. outside l e g a l channels. Table 8 gives the fig u r e s f o r the various i l l i c i t opium producing regions of the world. In India and e s p e c i a l l y i n Turkey i l l i c i t production arises as a r e s u l t of the d i v e r s i o n of raw opium from l e g a l production. The higher p r i c e paid by smugglers r e s u l t s i n up to two-thirds of the Turkish opium harvest being sold on the i l l i c i t market, although there are in d i c a t i o n s that s t r i c t e r controls since the Turkish resumption of c u l t i v a t i o n may have temporarily r e s t r i c t e d t h i s p r a c t i c e . i t i s d i f f i c u l t to enforce a government monopoly, one major reason being that the v i c i s s i t u d e s of crop y i e l d s make i t v i r t u a l l y impossible to prove what the y i e l d of a given f i e l d should be, and therefore a farmer can report a smaller harvest than was 5b TABLE 8 PRICES TO FARMER FOR RAW OPIUM, 1969 Producing . Country U.S. D o l l a r s per Kilogram Turkey: L i c i t 11.00 25.00 I l l i c i t Pakistan: L i c i t 10.00 12.00-15.00 I l l i c i t I ndia: L i c i t . . . . Burma/Laos: I l l i c i t . Iran: L i c i t . . . . Thailand 10.00 12.00 10.80 12.00 SOURCE: L. Simmons and A. Said, eds., Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy: the International Connection, (Beverly H i l l s , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974) p. 41. a c t u a l l y brought i n , and s e l l the d i f f e r e n c e i l l e g a l l y . An increase i n the l i c i t p r i c e i s not an e f f e c t i v e measure, f o r the p r o f i t s i n the heroin trade are so vast that the t r a f f i c k e r s can increase t h e i r p r i c e , i f necessary. Most i l l i c i t production comes from poppies which are grown and harvested i l l e g a l l y , rather than from the d i v e r s i o n from l i c i t poppy c u l t i v a t i o n . Such production can only take place i f the responsible n a t i o n a l government i s unable to c o n t r o l opium production, or i f the a u t h o r i t i e s are involved i n the i l l i c i t trade themselves. The l a r g e s t centre of i l l i c i t production i s the "Golden T r i a n g l e " region of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. The p o l i t i c a l l y unstable s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s area has led to the development of an opium-dependent economy with the capacity to supply the heroin needs of the e n t i r e world i f t h i s were 164 found to be necessary (and p r o f i t a b l e ) . The i l l i c i t production i n 57 South A s i a and other regions stems i n part from the lack of government co n t r o l over these areas, and i n part from the corruption of o f f i c i a l s . 1 ' Despite the fac t that the opium poppy i t s e l f can grow on almost any continent, there are a r e l a t i v e l y small number of countries involved i n opium production. The reason f o r t h i s i s that p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic conditions are the e s s e n t i a l ones i n determining whether the poppy w i l l be grown, e s p e c i a l l y i f production would be i l l i c i t . The c u l t i v a t i o n and harvesting of the opium poppy requires a labour-i n t e n s i v e , r u r a l economy, but the returns f o r opium are higher than almost any other crop, as shown by table 9. TABLE 9 RELATIVE RETURNS ON CROPS IN TURKEY Gross Returns Gross Returns Crop Per Acre Per Hectare Opium 160-200 387-488 Wheat 29 70 Barley 27 65 Sunflower 59 140 A l f a l f a 73 174 Sugar Beets . . . . . 142 341 SOURCE: L. Simmons and A. Said, eds., Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy: the International Connection, (Beverly H i l l s , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974) p. 9. The poppy i s so l u c r a t i v e when compared to crops that could be grown instead that only government subsidized crops are more a t t r a c t i v e to the farmer. In most cases the economic importance of opium production i s confined to r e l a t i v e l y small regions of the producing s t a t e , however. 58 In Turkey, f o r example, l e g a l exports of opium and opium-related products (gum, seed, and straw) were valued at $3,860,000 (US) i n 1969, and $3,500,000 (US) a year l a t e r . Even i f one adds i n the s u b s t a n t i a l revenues from the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c , the t o t a l i s s t i l l only a f r a c t i o n 166 of Turkey's t o t a l export earnings of $534 m i l l i o n . Even at the l o c a l l e v e l opium i s not the only crop r a i s e d , f o r despite i t s cash value i t cannot be used by the farmer to feed himself and h i s family, and as a r e s u l t opium f i e l d s are usually small and scattered. This presents yet another obstacle to the e l i m i n a t i o n of poppy c u l t i v a t i o n . Heroin T r a f f i c k i n g Heroin t r a f f i c k i n g , as pointed out e a r l i e r , ^ 7 i s a business much l i k e any other. The goal of the t r a f f i c k e r i s to transform the raw opium i n t o heroin, transport i t to the consumer-addict, and d i s t r i b u t e i t f o r a p r o f i t . Heroin t r a f f i c k i n g requires both c a p i t a l and the managerial s k i l l to use i t . The i l l e g a l nature of the t r a f f i c puts added demands on those involved i n i t , and i n the context of the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c c a p i t a l often must be i n the form of r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e cash, while managerial and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s c o n s i s t of the knowledge, s k i l l , r e l i a b i l i t y , and reputation of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the smuggling r i n g . The s t r u c t u r e of the heroin trade i s s i m i l a r i n a l l parts of the world, even though a great v a r i e t y of organizations, groups, and i n d i v i d u a l s are involved i n the t r a f f i c . Pressure from p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s throughout the world has meant that t r a f f i c k e r s are forced to function i n s i m i l a r environments regardless of the scene of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . The heroin D9 trade i s not c o n t r o l l e d by any s i n g l e organization, one reason being that such a large organization would be too vulnerable to enforcement a c t i v i t i e s , Instead the t r a f f i c k i n g i s often done by groups so small and s h o r t - l i v e d that one would h e s i t a t e to c a l l them "organizations." These groups are set up i n a manner quite s i m i l a r to espionage and t e r r o r i s t groups, which also face the problem of maintaining t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y and f u n c t i o n a l c a p a b l i t i e s i n the face of coercive pressure from p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s . I t i s no accident that clandestine p o l i t i c a l groups them-selves are found to u t i l i z e t h e i r s p e c i a l talents to t r a f f i c i n heroin 168 from time to time. The major d i f f e r e n c e between these groups and the f u l l - t i m e t r a f f i c k e r s i s that of m o t i v a t i o n — t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a f f i c k e r i s concerned only with making money, and i s usually quite unconcerned with p o l i t i c s except i n so f a r as i t a f f e c t s h i s business. Since a number of d i f f e r e n t groups and organizations are involved i n heroin t r a f f i c k i n g , with each c o n t r o l l i n g a d i f f e r e n t part of the smuggling chain, i t i s common to speak of t r a f f i c k i n g "networks," as t h i s accurately conveys the p i c t u r e of a s e r i e s of l o o s e l y connected operations which, taken together, succeed i n moving the n a r c o t i c s from the point of production to the consumer. Those involved i n these networks are c o n s p i r a t o r i a l and s e c r e t i v e by nature, although important organizations can be extremely powerful and i n f l u e n t i a l . I t seems to be something of a paradox that the power wielded by even small states i s s everal orders of magnitude greater than that of even the l a r g e s t c r i m i n a l organizations, but these organizations and t h e i r associates continue to operate without serious d i s r u p t i o n . This s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s 60 only because the overwhelming power of the state i s not applied, e i t h e r because of respect f o r the r i g h t s of suspects or the corruption of o f f i c i a l s , or because n a t i o n a l governments themselves are involved i n the drug t r a f f i c . These f a c t o r s w i l l be examined i n greater d e t a i l l a t e r i n t h i s paper. One of the root causes of the persistence of the i l l i c i t drug t r a f f i c i s the enormity of the p r o f i t s to be made i n i t . This i s shown i n table 10. These f i g u r e s , l i k e almost a l l those connected with the heroin trade, are subject to considerable f l u c t u a t i o n s . Crop f a i l u r e s or seizures of i l l i c i t shipments by p o l i c e can cause short-term p r i c e increases, j u s t as a sudden i n f l u x of heroin to a c i t y can cause a s w i f t drop i n the s t r e e t ( r e t a i l ) p r i c e . P r i c e s are a l s o a f f e c t e d by long-term f a c t o r s , such as increased demand due to an increase i n a d d i c t i o n r a t e s , s t r i c t e r enforcement on a continued b a s i s , or reduced supplies because of n a t i o n a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l action against producing regions. I t i s apparent that the p r o f i t margin of heroin t r a f f i c k i n g i s so large as to protect those involved against these p r i c e changes, which must be considered as the occupational hazards of the trade. Table 10 also reveals that the United States has retained i t s r o l e as the prime market f o r h e r o i n i n the world, f o r the p r i c e of a k i l o of heroin i n the United States i s the highest i n the world. This approximately corresponds to the greater r i s k of smuggling heroin i n t o the United States, both because of more stringent enforcement e f f o r t s and the longer distances which the heroin must t r a v e l . The complexity of the t r a f f i c k i n g networks i s i n large part determined by the proximity of addict to source. ' The r e t a i l p r i c e 61 TABLE 10 OPIUM/HEROIN PRICE INCREASES IN TRAFFICKING NETWORKS (•per kilo) Turkey-France-U.S. P r i c e to Farmer i n Turkey . . . . . . . . $22 Wholesale P r i c e i n M a r s e i l l e ( a f t e r conversion to h e r o i n ) . . . . . 500 Wholesale P r i c e i n New York 2,200 R e t a i l P r i c e i n New York 22,000 Middle East-South A s i a P r i c e to Farmer i n Afghanistan or Pakistan $15 Border P r i c e i n Iran 100 Wholesale P r i c e i n Teheran ( a f t e r conversion to heroin) 260 R e t a i l P r i c e i n Teheran 1,300 Southeast Asia P r i c e to Farmer i n Golden T r i a n g l e . . . . $17 Wholesale P r i c e i n Hong Kong (a f t e r conversion to h e r o i n ) . . . . . 230 R e t a i l P r i c e i n Hong Kong 1,000 SOURCE: L. Simmons and A. Said, eds., Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy: the International Connection, (Beverly H i l l s , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974) p. 9. of heroin i n South A s i a , and to an extent i n Southeast A s i a , i s not great enough to stimulate t r a f f i c k i n g from d i s t a n t sources of the drug. Thus the t r a f f i c k i n g patterns i n these areas are f a i r l y simple. In contrast, the p r i c e of heroin i n the United States i s high enough to support the most complex and tortuous smuggling routes. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between supply and demand i n the heroin trade i s such that i t i s p o s s i b l e to subdivide the g l o b a l system into several r e g i o n a l subsystems. Table 11 gives a rough p i c t u r e of the i l l i c i t market as i t e x i s t s today. Several comments can be made about the figures i n t h i s table. The number of TABLE 11 ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF ILLICIT OPIUM AND OPIATES AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY Metric Tons of Raw O-pium Users and Domestic A d d i c t s 3 I l l i c i t Net I l l i c i t (thousands) Supplies Imports 350 b 250 Afghanistan/Pakistan. . 100-150 75-100 b 250-300 175-200 b Thailand 250 175 b 500 350 b 150 _ _ _ 105 Singapore/Malaysia. . . 40 _ _ _ 30 100 _ _ _ 40 75 _ _ _ 30 Other 0. . 100 b 70 SOURCE: U.S. Congressional Record (1971: S8688). a I n c l u d i n g heroin and morphine addicts whose consumption i s converted to units of raw opium.equivalent. ^ N e g l i g i b l e . c I n c l u d i n g Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, the P h i l i p p i n e s , Taiwan, Macao, North A f r i c a , and the Near East. This table o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n L. Simmons and A. Said, eds., Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy: the International Connection, (Beverly H i l l s , Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974) p. 42. addicts i n North America i s obviously many times that given i n the tab l e , and the a c t u a l heroin requirements of the United States alone are somewhere between 10 and 20 metric t o n s . 1 7 0 The figures are u s e f u l , however, f o r they give a rough i n d i c a t i o n of the world's addict population, as w e l l as showing which regions are the chief importers of opiates. Much of the 63 world's i l l i c i t opium i s consumed near the areas of production, and consequently does not reach the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. T r a d i t i o n a l l y there have been three major t r a f f i c k i n g networks. These are: l)Turkey-France-United States network; 2)Southeast A s i a network; and 3)Middle East-South A s i a network. In the past s e v e r a l years t h i s i d e a l i z e d d i v i s i o n of the world heroin trade has changed somewhat, as new groups began to t r a f f i c , new routes were developed, and i n c r e a s i n g l y diverse sources of heroin were found f o r the United States market. These recent developments are important and w i l l be noted, but i t i s s t i l l a n a l y t i c a l l y convenient to consider each of these networks i n turn. The Turkey-France-United States Network I t i s upon t h i s network that much of the popular image of heroin smuggling i s based. 1'' 1 B r i e f l y , opium i s purchased by smugglers i n Turkey-and converted to morphine, transported to southern France, r e f i n e d i n t o heroin, and f i n a l l y smuggled into the United States. Estimates from the United States Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) stated that i n the past about 80% of the heroin entering 172 the United States was of Turkish o r i g i n , although t h i s percentage 173 has dropped i n recent years. The development of the heroin trade between Turkey- and the United States i s perhaps best understood from a h i s t o r i c a l perspective. The 174 implementation of the Harrison Act following World War I created the need f o r a black market i n heroin, but i t remained open as to who would organize and c o n t r o l the p o t e n t i a l l y l u c r a t i v e heroin trade. Because of 64 i t s t r a d i t i o n s which p r o h i b i t e d involvement i n e i t h e r p r o s t i t u t i o n or n a r c o t i c s , the American Mafia i n i t i a l l y l e f t the heroin business to New York's Jewish gangsters, such as "Legs" Diamond, "Dutch" Schultz, and Meyer Lansky. The Mafia remained content with i t s p r o f i t a b l e 175 domination of the bootleg l i q u o r industry. This s i t u a t i o n was al t e r e d by the f r a t r i c i d a l gang wars which shook the Mafia i n 1930 and 1931, and led to the elim i n a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l Mafia leaders. The younger mafiosi, l e d by Charles "Lucky" Luciano, were not bound by the t r a d i t i o n s of t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s , 1 7 6 and with the end of P r o h i b i t i o n imminent, Luciano decided to take the Mafia i n t o the heroin and p r o s t i t u t i o n rackets. Luciano forged an a l l i a n c e with the New York Jewish mobs, reorganized the American Mafia i n t o the f e d e r a l - s t y l e crime c a r t e l which i t remains today, and established h i s hold on New York's p r o f i t a b l e p r o s t i t u t i o n racket. He also pioneered the idea of addicting h i s p r o s t i t u t e s to heroin, i n order to keep them d o c i l e and i n need of money to support t h e i r h a b i t . In 1936 Luciano was i n d i c t e d on s i x t y -two counts of forced p r o s t i t u t i o n , and was given a t h i r t y - t o f i f t y -year sentence. S u f f i c i e n t evidence had also been gathered to i n d i c t Luciano f o r heroin t r a f f i c k i n g , but t h i s idea was dropped i n favour of the forced p r o s t i t u t i o n charges, which were calculated to create greater 1.1- <- 1 7 ? p u b l i c outrage. Luciano's imprisonment was a heavy blow to the heroin trade, since he had been the p r i n c i p a l organizer of the trade and had had the authority to implement h i s ideas. The outbreak of the Second World War f u r t h e r • - i j ,. ... 178 c r i p p l e d smuggling operations, but immediately a f t e r the war Luciano 65 was released from prison and deported to I t a l y i n return for h i s assistance 179 to the American i n t e l l i g e n c e e f f o r t during the war. With the help of over one hundred other mafiosi s i m i l a r l y deported, Luciano proceeded 180 to b u i l d a highly e f f i c i e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l narcotics syndicate. For more than a decade this syndicate smuggled morphine base from Turkey, through Europe, and i n t o the United States without s u f f e r i n g e i t h e r a 181 major a r r e s t or s e i z u r e . I n i t i a l l y Luciano's syndicate had r e l i e d upon d i v e r t i n g l e g a l l y produced heroin from a respected I t a l i a n pharmaceutical f i r m , and i n the four-year period 11946-1950 at l e a s t 700 kilograms of heroin were funneled i n t o the i l l i c i t market i n t h i s manner.. Investigations by the 182 United States FBN induced a crackdown by I t a l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s , but by t h i s time Luciano had established a s e r i e s of clandestine l a b o r a t o r i e s i n S i c i l y and M a r s e i l l e s . These were supplied by morphine base from Turkey, which at that time was transported to S i c i l y and France through Beirut. This part of the smuggling network was c o n t r o l l e d by Sami E l Khoury, who maintained h i s high s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and the safety of h i s t r a f f i c k i n g operations with the help of corrupt Lebanese o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g the d i r e c t o r s of Beirut a i r p o r t , Lebanese customs, the Lebanese narcotics p o l i c e , and the head of the antisubversive s e c t i o n of the 183 Lebanese p o l i c e . J D i s t r i b u t i o n of the heroin i n the United States was handled by Meyer Lansky. The only major change i n the syndicate's operations during the 1950s was the transfer of the heroin l a b o r a t o r i e s to M a r s e i l l e s , f o r the Italian-based operations were plagued by a s e r i e s of arrests and interceptions i n the early f i f t i e s . 1 8 4 ^ e a ± \ ± a n c e between Luciano's syndicate and the Corsican gangs of M a r s e i l l e s has 66 remained an e s s e n t i a l feature of the world heroin t r a f f i c k i n g scene. Despite the f a c t that the Turkey-France-United States network has tended away from the straightforward system established a f t e r the Second World War, many features of the network have remained the same, and i t i s u s e f u l to f o l l o w the route that the drugs take. This w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g enforcement o f f i c i a l s i n both t h i s s p e c i f i c case and generally. As stated above, s u b s t a n t i a l portions of the Turkish opium crop are diverted to the i l l i c i t market. Each v i l l a g e or region has a c o l l e c t o r , who purchases the raw opium from the farmers. A former opium transporter was asked by American reporters why farmers didn't report these i l l e g a l dealings. A f t e r securing the windows, he r e p l i e d : We had a farmer here who got i n t o a grudge f i g h t with h i s neighbor. The neighbor was a transporter f o r the l o c a l c o l l e c t o r . The farmer t o l d the p o l i c e , and they arrested the transporter with 300 k i l o s of (opium) gum i n the f a l s e bottom of h i s truck. The next morning the c o l l e c t o r ' s men shot the informer dead. Then, when h i s family t r i e d to get revenge, s i x of them were k i l l e d . They (the l o c a l c o l l e c t o r s ) are powerful men i n our communities. They can exert tremendous economic and p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . I t i s n ' t wise to cross them. They are not a f r a i d to k i l l . Nothing happens to them. • L O J The subject of t h i s interview understandably declined to name any c o l l e c t o r s or v e r i f y any names obtained elsewhere. 1 8^ These opium c o l l e c t o r s are often prominent c i t i z e n s i n t h e i r communities, and the fear of r e p r i s a l i s u s u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t to s i l e n c e any would-be-informers. When t h i s f a i l s , the c h r o n i c a l l y underpaid l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s can be bribed. One Istanbul smuggler summed up the s i t u a t i o n : If you know the name of someone b i g ( i n the narcotics business) you can go i n t o a v i l l a g e and w i t h i n f i v e minutes they can produce 100 k i l o s of opium f o r s a l e . But the p o l i c e never f i n d anything. 67 If they did, a l i t t l e b ribe would be paid, and the p o l i c e would say that they found nothing. That's how i t works down there. I t must also be kept i n mind that most farmers have no objections to p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the i l l i c i t trade, since the c o l l e c t o r s o f f e r higher p r i c e s than the government, and the extra money i s much needed. Once the opium i s acquired by the c o l l e c t o r s , i t i s transformed i n t o morphine base as r a p i d l y as possible at a makeshift laboratory, 188 since the base i s much more e a s i l y transported than i s the opium gum. The morphine base i s then transported by donkey, b u f f a l o c a r t , or truck to one of the towns i n A n a t o l i a to await i n q u i r i e s from one of 189 Istanbul's n a r c o t i c s merchants. This i l l u s t r a t e s one important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the drug t r a d e — a great many transactions are set up when the buyer contacts the supplier and negotiates a deal. Arrangements are made i n advance only i n the l a r g e s t deals. Further, these negotiations are often c a r r i e d out by i n d i v i d u a l s who are not known to one another except through an intermediary known and trusted by both. In t h i s way p o l i c e i n f i l t r a t i o n i s made more d i f f i c u l t . The large Istanbul smugglers occupy a p o s i t i o n of great importance i n the heroin network, f o r they are the only ones capable of moving the accumulated morphine base out of Turkey onto the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. They are the only ones who have contacts both i n s i d e Turkey, to buy the base, and i n France, to s e l l i t . They are commonly r e f e r r e d to as patrons, a term which accurately r e f l e c t s t h e i r supervisory and p r o t e c t i v e functions. These patrons are respected and wealthy members of the Turkish upper clas s e s , and l e g i t i m a t e l y own enterprises such as h o t e l s , nightclubs, and property, most of which was paid f o r by p r o f i t s from 68 t h e i r i l l i c i t n a r c o t i c s d e a l i n g s . Most of the T u r k i s h p a t r o n s have never been i n p r i s o n , and they mix e a s i l y w i t h members of the T u r k i s h e s t a b l i s h m e n t , s u c h as b u s i n e s s , s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and governmental l e a d e r s . I n number t h e r e a r e about f i f t y , w i t h some b e i n g more i n f l u e n t i a l 190 and i m p o r t a n t t h a n o t h e r s . The smuggling of morphine base out of T u r k e y i s not c a r r i e d out i n a p r e d e t e r m i n e d , s y s t e m a t i c manner, n o r i s t h e r e a s i n g l e p a t r o n who c o n t r o l s t h e t r a f f i c . Each shipment of base i s n e g o t i a t e d by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a s i n g l e p a t r o n and the C o r s i c a n t r a f f i c k e r s i n M a r s e i l l e s who w i l l r e c e i v e the shipment. The p r i c e i s d e t e r m i n e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of s u p p l y and demand, t h e p u r i t y o f the b a s e i t s e l f , and t h e d i s t a n c e t h e shipment must be smuggled. The F r e n c h t r a f f i c k e r s pay on d e l i v e r y , so t h a t i f a shipment i s i n t e r c e p t e d , i t i s t h e p a t r o n who must absorb the l o s s . Each shipment thus i n v o l v e s a c e r t a i n r i s k , and s e v e r a l p a t r o n s may o c c a s i o n a l l y combine to f i n a n c e an u n u s u a l l y l a r g e shipment. A p a t r o n resembles a s t o c k market i n v e s t o r , f o r he i s under no o b l i g a t i o n , f o r m a l or o t h e r w i s e , t o p r o v i d e base to a customer, and he may choose w h i c h d e a l s t o a c c e p t and w h i c h t o d e c l i n e . I t i s an i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , of c o u r s e , t h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n a r e p u t a t i o n f o r r e l i a b i l i t y i s t o the p a t r o n ' s b e n e f i t , f o r he w i l l t h e n p a r t i c i p a t e 191 i n b i g g e r , and more p r o f i t a b l e , d e a l s . The d e c e n t r a l i z e d and c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d p a t r o n s y s t e m makes s m u g g l i n g out o f Turkey v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o s t o p . Enforcement o f f i c i a l s cannot c r i p p l e t h e network i n one blow, because the p a t r o n s o p e r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y and i f one were f o r c e d t o suspend o p e r a t i o n s , t h e o t h e r s would be u n a f f e c t e d . 69 If a smuggler working for one of the patrons is arrested, the profits involved in the trade are so great that someone else can always be 192 found to take his place. The patrons themselves are insured against harassment by their high-level connections, and in case of need a payment to the right o f f i c i a l i s usually sufficient. Actual interception of the smuggled morphine base is also infrequent. In the 1950s much of the base was brought across the Turkish-Syrian border and transported to Beirut, where i t was taken by sea to either Italy or France. As the network developed, i t became more common to transport the base by land through Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and then through either Italy or West Germany to France. On the return t r i p the smugglers often bring arms, cigarettes, and other i l l e g a l goods from Western Europe to Turkey. Smuggling by land is greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by the provisions of the Transports Intemationaux Routiere (TIR) agreement, which i s accepted by almost a l l European countries. Because their cargo is sealed at the point of origin, trucks carrying the TIR sign are usually not subject to customs inspections at border crossings. This agreement has stimulated international commerce and transit, but the limitation 193 on border inspections has given smugglers virtually a free hand. The morphine base i t s e l f i s an insoluble powder which i s very easy to conceal. The vehicles used by smugglers often have several false compartments or hollowed-out areas which serve as ideal hiding places for the base. The volume of t r a f f i c i s such that customs o f f i c i a l s can only make thorough searches when warned in advance of a drug shipment, 70 but the resources to acquire such i n t e l l i g e n c e are also lacking i n most cases. The Austrian narcotics c o n t r o l o f f i c e , f o r example, i s only authorized to pay informers i n drug cases a maximum of $20, hardly a s u f f i c i e n t sum to compensate an informer f o r the r i s k of death he would run by revealing the d e t a i l s of a shipment! 1 9^ Once i t has passed through the Balkans, the base i s shipped through e i t h e r I t a l y or Germany. In recent years Munich has become the most widely used s t o c k p i l i n g point, f o r several reasons. The most important i s that there are about 600,000 Turkish contract workers i n West Germany, where they help a l l e v i a t e the German labour shortage while supplementing t h e i r f a m i l i e s ' income. This large Turkish community acts as both a cover f o r smugglers and a convenient source of raw r e c r u i t s , since most of the workers return to Turkey f o r vacations 195 at l e a s t once a year. The ethnic character of the smuggling rings makes i n f i l t r a t i o n by the p o l i c e extremely d i f f i c u l t , as i s the case 196 so often i n n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g . Munich i s also conveniently located, being connected to France by superhighways. I t i s a cosmopolitan c i t y with an underworld s u f f i c i e n t l y s o phisticated to p a r t i c i p a t e i n 197 the drug trade. Since smuggling through the Balkans, i n t o Munich, and then i n t o France has proven v i r t u a l l y unstoppable, t h i s route has become the most widely used. P o l i t i c a l considerations have also rendered some of the older routes i m p r a c t i c a l . The smuggling network through S y r i a and Lebanon was l i t t l e used even before the current Lebanese c i v i l war broke out. Turkish government suspicion that Syrian-trained left-wing /1 Turkish t e r r o r i s t s were being i n f i l t r a t e d across the Turkish-Syrian border led to an increase i n border p a t r o l s i n the l a t e 1960s, which added s u b s t a n t i a l l y to the r i s k s of crossing the border. Lebanese middlemen and o f f i c i a l s were also taking a larger percentage of the p r o f i t s than the Istanbul patrons cared to give. ^ 8 ^ combination of higher r i s k s and reduced p r o f i t s leaves an unfavourable impression on any businessman, and n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s are c e r t a i n l y no exception. Morphine base i s s t i l l smuggled out of Turkey by ship, f o r t h i s avoids customs inspections once at sea, and large q u a n t i t i e s of base can be hidden i n any number of ingenious places: some patrons even own 199 ships o u t f i t t e d with s p e c i a l l y designed hidden compartments. The r e l a t i v e l y small number of ships involved i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, as compared to cars and trucks, gives customs o f f i c i a l s fewer objects of search, however, and ships t r a v e l i n g d i r e c t l y between Turkish and French ports are given s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n by French customs o f f i c i a l s . The r i s k of seizure can be reduced i n s e v e r a l ways: the base can be put i n waterproof containers and dumped overboard with marker buoys attached, to be recovered by French motor launches employed by the smugglers; or the contraband can be transferred to a non-Turkish ship on the high seas, thus avoiding the intensive search reserved f o r Turkish v e s s e l s . Small boats also make frequent runs across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and Rumania, whereupon the base j o i n s the flow of the land route. Of a l l the p o s s i b l e smuggling routes, i t i s only the a i r route which has been e f f e c t i v e l y closed to t r a f f i c k e r s , since p r i v a t e plane use i s r e s t r i c t e d by the Turkish government, and a n t i - h i j a c k i n g searches have discouraged smuggling on commercial f l i g h t s . 72 Once the morphine base has been s u c c e s s f u l l y transported to France, the Turkish patrons receive payment and no longer carry any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the safety of the drugs. The centre of the heroin industry i n France i s M a r s e i l l e s , a c i t y i d e a l l y suited f o r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , e s p e c i a l l y smuggling. I t i s France's large s t seaport, and i s dominated by one of the most e f f i c i e n t and powerful c r i m i n a l networks i n the w o r l d — a l o o s e l y organized underworld known to the French simply as the "milieu." At the core of the milieu are the Corsicans, who make up a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of M a r s e i l l e s ' population. The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Corsicans i s t h e i r l o y a l t y to one another; ethnic s o l i d a r i t y i s so strong that i t i s almost impossible to f i n d a Corsican who w i l l inform on a fe l l o w Corsican. This l o y a l t y has developed as a r e s u l t of the d i r e poverty i n Cors i c a i t s e l f , which forced mass emigration to France over the years. The only way the Corsicans could survive i n the outside world was to s t i c k together, and when many of the immigrants turned to c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s , t h i s s o l i d a r i t y made them very s u c c e s s f u l . The M a r s e i l l e s underworld i s organized into a number of " t i g h t l y structured clans, a l l of which recognize a common hierarchy of power 201 and p r e s t i g e . " The s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Corsicans and the S i c i l i a n s have prompted speculation as to whether there i s a Corsican equivalent to the S i c i l i a n Mafia. The reluctance of members of the Corsican underworld to inform, and the r e l a t i v e absence of organized gang wars among the Corsican syndicates has fueled t h i s speculation. The whole notion of a superpowerful c r i m i n a l organization which controls much of the world's i l l i c i t n a r c o t i c s trade i s an i n t r i g u i n g one, and has been propounded i n some sections of the popular press, as the following excerpt from Time magazine shows: The Union Corse, an organization that o r i g i n a t e d i n the parched h i l l s of Corsica but i s today centered i n M a r s e i l l e s , r u l e s more i n f a c t than even James Bond imagined i n f i c t i o n . I t dominates the worldwide t r a f f i c k i n g i n n a r c o t i c s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r controls the supply and processing of heroin flowing into the U.S. from France, South America, and Southeast A s i a . Though i t i s r e l a t i v e l y weak i n the U.S., the Union Corse i s f a r more powerful than the Mafia i n many parts of the world. As an organization, the Union Corse i s more t i g h t l y k n i t and more se c r e t i v e than i t s S i c i l i a n counterpart.... 2*^ 2 The reference to James Bond i s r e v e a l i n g , f o r i t was Ian Fleming's d e s c r i p t i o n of a meeting between Bond and the supposed head of the "Union Corse" which has probably done the most to create the myth of the organization. In a c t u a l f a c t i t i s u n l i k e l y that such an organization e x i s t s . In testimony before a Senate subcommittee t h i s point was made: There are some who believe that there i s an organization c a l l e d the Union Corse, or the "Corsican Union," which t i e s the e n t i r e Corsican c r i m i n a l underworld together, i n the manner of the Mafia. The majority of the French and American narcotics agents, however, b e l i e v e that, instead of one big syndicate, the Corsicans operate through a f a i r l y large number of small and intermediate syndicates. On one point there i s complete agreement: there i s a tremendous sense of ethnic and f a m i l i a l s o l i d a r i t y among the Corsicans, and the Corsican c r i m i n a l , when he i s apprehended, i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t to break down and f a r ^ess prone to " s i n g " about h i s confederates than are the M a f i o s i . The f a c t that v i o l e n c e among the Corsican c r i m i n a l groups i s le s s frequent than that betwe en the Mafia " f a m i l i e s " does not mean that the milieu i s more structured than the Mafia: quite the opposite i s the case. The Mafia needs formal patterns of authority to keep i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l violence under c o n t r o l , but no o v e r a l l c o n t r o l l i n g body e x i s t s f o r the Corsican syndicates. The leaders of the biggest clans are able, by v i r t u e of t h e i r p r e s t i g e and a u t h o r i t y , to impose 74 on/ d i s c i p l i n e and mediate vendettas i n v o l v i n g l e s s e r groups. Another major d i f f e r e n c e between the Corsican syndicates and the Mafia i s the type of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s i n which they are involved. The Mafia, e s p e c i a l l y i n the United States, divides " t e r r i t o r y " among bosses, who then enrich themselves using every conceivable r a c k e t — p r o s t i t u t i o n , gambling, n a r c o t i c s , p r o t e c t i o n , etc. Mafia f a m i l i e s are thus large, because many of these a c t i v i t i e s require s i z a b l e amounts of manpower. In contrast, the Corsican syndicates have mastered more r e f i n e d c r i m i n a l techniques, s p e c i a l i z i n g i n heroin manufacturing, i n t e r n a t i o n a l smuggling, a r t t h e f t s , and c o u n t e r f e i t i n g . A number of Corsican gangsters have established themselves on other continents, 205 from where they help coordinate complex smuggling operations. These d i f f e r e n c e s between the Corsican syndicates and the Mafia have been a major f a c t o r i n the long-standing and s u c c e s s f u l a l l i a n c e between the two. The Corsican syndicates process the morphine base which a r r i v e s from Turkey, and smuggle into the United States, where i t i s d i s t r i b u t e d by the Mafia, although other groups have become in c r e a s i n g l y important since the early 1960s, when the top leaders of the American Mafia apparently decided to get out of much of the r i s k y 206 heroin business. Opinions d i f f e r on t h i s , however, and there are i n d i c a t i o n s that the Mafia has remained as at l e a s t a banker of the 207 heroin trade, and possibly a wholesaler as w e l l . One other f a c t o r which has given the Corsican syndicates such power i n M a r s e i l l e s has been t h e i r intimate involvement with the French government and i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies, which w i l l be examined i n d e t a i l 20 8 l a t e r i n t h i s paper. These syndicates are perhaps the most important 75 organizations i n the world heroin trade. The laboratories they operate were described to a United States Senate committee: ....the M a r s e i l l e s area l a b o r a t o r i e s usually were operated by three or four i n d i v i d u a l s , i n c l u d i n g a husband and wife "caretaker" team who l i v e d i n the v i l l a s f o r cover purposes. In each case the l a b o r a t o r i e s occupied only a few rooms i n the v i l l a and operated i n an inconspicuous manner. The operators often used b o t t l e d gas and bypassed the commercial e l e c t r i c meter to hide the unusual q u a n t i t i e s of gas and e l e c t r i c i t y needed i n the conversion process. These la b o r a t o r i e s apparently operated mainly on a commission b a s i s , charging s e v e r a l hundred d o l l a r s f o r each kilogram of morphine base converted i n t o heroin. Other l a b o r a t o r i e s , however, have a l s o purchased t h e i r own morphine base supplies and have sold the heroin d i r e c t l y to heroin t r a f f i c k e r s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , l a b o r a t o r i e s have produced an average of about 20 kilograms of heroin per week. They us u a l l y remain i n operation u n t i l an e n t i r e batch of morphine base has been processed. I f there are no further orders or i f the laboratory i s "hot," i t i s then shut down, dismantled, meticulously cleaned and moved to another l o c a t i o n . S k i l l and knowledge are e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s of a good heroin 210 "chemist," but the l a b o r a t o r i e s themselves are often simple and thus are e a s i l y concealed and moved. In theory the dozen or so heroin labs i n and around M a r s e i l l e s c o n s t i t u t e a bottleneck i n the e n t i r e network, but i n p r a c t i c e they are d i f f i c u l t to f i n d , harder to r a i d , and v i r t u a l l y impossible to eliminate. United States o f f i c i a l s have tended to put a heavy emphasis on c l o s i n g down the heroin labs, but o f f i c i a l s , aware of the ease with which new labs can be set up, have 211 been more s k e p t i c a l . Great care i s taken i n bringing the base to the labs; u s u a l l y an incoming shipment i s stored i n another l o c a t i o n to avoid p o s s i b l e p o l i c e s u r v e i l l a n c e before being taken to the l a b . Another problem faced by narcotics agents i s that much of the l o c a l p o l i c e force has been i n f i l t r a t e d or bribed by the syndicates, and thus any information given to the p o l i c e i s quickly known throughout the milieu. In short, even i f heroin labs can be found and shut 76 down, they are e a s i l y replaced, and therefore i t i s impossible to stop the flow of heroin at t h i s point. Once processed, the heroin i s smuggled in t o the United States by a wide v a r i e t y of routes, and an even wider v a r i e t y of methods. In the past the d i r e c t route from France to the United States, and e s p e c i a l l y New York, was used extensively, but as enforcement increased t r a f f i c k e r s developed more complex routes which included Canada, Mexico, 213 and L a t i n America. The advantages of the d i r e c t route are f a i r l y obvious: there are no intermediate t r a n s i t points and, perhaps more 214 importantly, no middlemen to deal with. The r i s k of seizure increases with the number of countries t r a n s i t e d , and the r i s k of i n f i l t r a t i o n by n a r c o t i c s agents or b e t r a y a l by other t r a f f i c k e r s i s heightened i f the shipment must pass through many hands. These disadvantages are balanced by the more rigorous enforcement e f f o r t s on the East Coast of the United States. Only a small percentage of the i l l i c i t heroin entering the United States i s intercepted, despite the f a c t that the United States Customs Service i s one of the best-trained and l e a s t corrupt i n the world. The main obstacle i n the path of Customs o f f i c i a l s i s the sheer volume of t r a f f i c entering the United States (see Figure 1). The various duties of the Customs Service have increased several times since 1950, but the resources of the Service have grown at a much slower r a t e . I l l i c i t drug seizures have increased each year from about 1965 u n t i l r e c e n t l y , 2 ^ but observers do not agree on what t h i s means. Some have considered that the increased seizures mean that enforcement e f f o r t s are working, but i t i s also p o s s i b l e that more heroin i s intercepted simply because 77 o LO LU > uu < cn LU CD < n: o UL o LU CD < H Z LU O cr LU 400 350 300 2^0 200 150 100 50 0 - 2 5 KEY CUSTOMS WORKLOAD AND MANPOWER i I I i L i. i • u u ..J J L - L J — L J U I ,I i t i . 1—,, t 1950 1955 1930 1965 1970 F I S C A L Y E A R Figure 1. Key Customs Workload and Manpower SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the J u d i c i a r y , Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other I n t e r n a l Security Laws, World Drug Traffic and:Its Impact on U.S. Security, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972), pt. 4, p. 180. 78 216 more i s smuggled. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to judge the e f f e c t of seizures because there i s no r e a l way of t e l l i n g how much heroin a c t u a l l y gets through. I t may w e l l be, as one author has s a i d , that only a dock s t r i k e , . . 217 can cause a heroin panic. The t r a f f i c through L a t i n America has become in c r e a s i n g l y important i n recent years. Many L a t i n American c i t i e s have been involved i n the t r a f f i c , i n c l u d i n g : Panama; Curacao; Santiago ( C h i l e ) ; Asuncion (Paraguay); Buenos A i r e s ; Sao Paulo; and Bogota (Columbia). In the e a r l y seventies about t h i r t y to t h i r t y - f i v e percent of the heroin entering the United 218 States passed through these t r a n s i t p o ints. The " L a t i n American connection," as i t has been c a l l e d , has existed since the 1950s, when i t was established by August Ricord and Joe O r s i n i , who were Corsican gangsters forced to f l e e France because of c o l l a b o r a t i o n with the Germans i n the war. Ricord dominated the L a t i n American t r a f f i c u n t i l h i s a r r e s t 219 i n 1972, which forced a reorganization of the t r a f f i c . The same t r a f f i c k e r s often deal i n cocaine as w e l l as heroin. A l l of the cocaine consumed i n the United States o r i g i n a t e s i n L a t i n America, e s p e c i a l l y Peru and B o l i v i a . The great increase i n demand i n the United States over the past few years has caused the p r i c e of coca leaves to jump by 1500% i n two years: $4 a bale i n 1973 to $60 -a. bale i n 1975. A k i l o of cocaine s e l l s f o r between $4,000 and $8,500 i n L a t i n America, but i s worth $75,000 to $100,000 on the s t r e e t s of New York C i t y . Since 1964 coca l e a f production i n Peru has increased at the rate of twenty percent each year, and i n 1974 20 m i l l i o n k i l o s were produced, of which only 4 m i l l i o n were l e g a l l y exported or used l o c a l l y by Indians f o r chewing. As i s often the case, the smugglers work "both sides of the s t r e e t , " 79 moving items such as arms, cigarettes, and electronic parts from the 222 United States back to Latin America on the return t r i p . Heroin trafficking networks, especially the Turkish-French-United States network, are loosely structured webs of contacts, involving a large number of individuals who are insulated from one another where possible. Because of this the arrest of a courier w i l l often f a i l to disclose the identity of those employing him, or that of his next contact along the smuggling t r a i l . The network has developed the capacity to move narcotics from Turkey to the United States over a wide variety of routes, but each shipment is a discrete business venture, and is planned carefully in view of factors such as the risk of seizure on certain routes and the demand for the drugs in the United States. The high-level traffickers thus have a great degree of f l e x i b i l i t y in choosing smuggling routes: a successful route can be used repeatedly, or can be deemphasized i f enforcement officers are thought to be suspicious. When these options are s k i l l f u l l y u t i l i z e d , seizures by Customs or narcotics agents become a matter of luck or intelligence from informants— unless "amateur" smugglers are dabbling i n the drug trade in the hope of making a quick p r o f i t . The mass arrest of an entire trafficking ring i s usually a result of tedious and lengthy undercover work, and i t has proved impossible to significantly reduce the overall flow of heroin in this manner. Once the heroin reaches the United States, i t moves down the distribution chain. Each time the heroin i s resold i t i s adulterated, so that by the time i t reaches the addict i t s purity w i l l be less than ten percent. At each level those involved take their cut of the profits, 80 and n a t u r a l l y i t i s the larger dealers, who handle bigger volumes, who make the greatest p r o f i t s . Often s t r e e t pushers are addicts themselves who supply other users i n order to maintain t h e i r own habit. At no other point i n the e n t i r e t r a f f i c k i n g network can anyone else be found who uses the n a r c o t i c s , with the exception of the farmers who grow the opium. In the past Italian-American criminals c o n t r o l l e d the f i n a n c i n g , importation and d i s t r i b u t i o n of heroin i n the United States, but the Mafia's withdrawal from some of the more r i s k y aspects of the t r a f f i c 223 has opened the way to other ethnic groups. Cubans have become hea v i l y involved i n both heroin and cocaine t r a f f i c k i n g . The Cuban re v o l u t i o n dispersed the Cuban underworld throughout the western hemisphere, and many of these refugees have maintained t h e i r contacts with one 2 2 A another, forming the n u c l e i of t r a f f i c k i n g r i n g s . These t r a f f i c k e r s receive t h e i r supplies of heroin from the Corsican producers. At the lower l e v e l s of the drug trade i n the United States other minority groups, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans, c o n t r o l much of the d i s t r i b u t i o n chain. These groups have worked t h e i r way up, so to speak beginning as s t r e e t pushers and gradually e s t a b l i s h i n g themselves at higher l e v e l s . Because of t h e i r intimate knowledge of the urban ghettos, which consume much of the heroin, established t r a f f i c k e r s f i n d i t convenient to do business with these r e l a t i v e l y new dealers. At t h i s l e v e l the n a r c o t i c s trade i s much more f r a c t i o n a l i z e d and disorganized than i n Turkey or France, and i t i s here that most drug-related murders take place, as low-level dealers jockey f o r p o s i t i o n , attempt to cheat one another, or try to take over someone else's business. Despite t h i s 81 seemingly constant turmoil, o u t l e t s f o r heroin can always be found. The Southeast Asia Network The second major opiate t r a f f i c k i n g network i s s i t u a t e d i n Southeast A s i a . The "Golden T r i a n g l e " region of Burma, Thailand, and Laos produced 225 about 700 tons of i l l i c i t opium i n 1971, although some have put t h i s 226 f i g u r e as high as 1,000 tons. About 400 tons of t h i s are consumed by the h i l l t r i b e s who produce i t , but a p r i c e increase can induce some of 227 t h i s onto the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. I t was only i n the l a t e 1960s that Southeast Asian heroin began to f i n d i t s way to the United States. In 1968 Santo T r a f f i c a n t e , J r . , the Mafia c h i e f t a n of F l o r i d a and a close associate of both Luciano and Meyer Lansky, traveled to Saigon, Hong Kong, and Singapore to negotiate n a r c o t i c s purchases from Southeast Asian 228 t r a f f i c k e r s . This v i s i t was part of the trend towards an i n t e g r a t i o n of the Southeast Asian network, which was i n the past a r e g i o n a l system, with the more established Turkish-French-American network. The r e s u l t has been a t r u l y g l o b a l heroin t r a f f i c k i n g network—a development which has only increased the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by enforcement agencies everywhere. The production and transportation of opium i n the t r i - b o r d e r region are dominated by a number of independent p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s , each with c o n t r o l of vaguely defined areas of opium producing land. These groups include both Communist and anti-Communist r e b e l forces i n the Shan states of Burma, as w e l l as remnants of Chinese N a t i o n a l i s t forces 229 pushed out of China i n 1949. Because of the lack of n a t i o n a l governmental authority i n these regions, the production, c o l l e c t i o n , and transportation 82 of opium were c a r r i e d out more or le s s openly u n t i l about 1971, when American pressure forced tne n a r c o t i c s dealers to operate with some 230 d i s c r e t i o n . At t h i s point i n the t r a f f i c k i n g network brute force i s a s a t i s f a c t o r y s u b s t i t u t e f o r s t e a l t h , f o r the opium i s moved from the h i l l y centres of production to the south i n large, heavily guarded caravans. Eventually the opium i s smuggled in t o Bangkok by a wide v a r i e t y of methods, a l l of which are aided by the i n e f f i c i e n c y and 231 c o r r u p t i b i l i t y of the Thai p o l i c e and government o f f i c i a l s . Before the end of the Vietnam war n a r c o t i c s were also shipped through Vientiane to Saigon. From Bangkok the opium or morphine base i s transported to a v a r i e t y of l o c a t i o n s . Some of the n a r c o t i c s remain i n Thailand to supply the approximately 150,000 users, most of whom smoke No. 3 heroin. Most of the rest i s shipped to e i t h e r Singapore or Hong Kong. About 30 tons of raw opium are consumed i n Singapore and Malaysia, while Hong Kong was estimated to import about 10 tons of morphine basa and 50 tons of raw opium each per year, but t h i s l a t t e r estimate seems low i n view of Hong Kong's importance as a centre f o r heroin processing.^32 Hong Kong i s the centre of the Asian drug trade, and i n t h i s respect, as i n several others, the B r i t i s h colony resembles M a r s e i l l e s . The c r i m i n a l syndicates who dominate the heroin t r a f f i c k i n g i n Europe and the Western Hemisphere are Corsican and S i c i l i a n ; i n A s i a they are ethnic Chinese, and almost e x c l u s i v e l y made up of members of the ohiu ohau d i a l e c t g r o u p . T h e current structure of the Asian heroin t r a f f i c k i n g network has been determined by events which took place over a period of decades, and a review of these developments w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e 83 the close connection between p o l i t i c s and the narcotics t r a f f i c . The syndicates now operating out of Hong Kong had t h e i r o r i g i n s i n Shanghai i n the nineteenth century, when the chili chau were used by B r i t i s h opium merchants as operators and protectors of t h e i r opium d e n s . 2 ^ The B r i t i s h withdrawal from the opium dens a f t e r the F i r s t World War l e f t the chiu chau without sponsorship, j u s t at the moment they were confronted by notorious Green Gang, which operated out of Shanghai's French concession. A s e r i e s of b i t t e r gang wars f o r . c o n t r o l over the c i t y ' s i l l i c i t drug t r a f f i c r e s u l t e d f i r s t i n chaos, then i n the formation of a " c a r t e l " under a young Green Gang leader, Tu 235 Yueh-sheng. Tu became known as "The Opium King," and began the importation of massive quantities of heroin into China from European and Japanese pharmaceutical firms. Over 10 tons of these "antiopium 236 p i l l s " were imported each year from 1923 onwards. The magnitude of these shipments was i n large part responsible f o r the success of 237 the 1931 L i m i t a t i o n Conference i n Geneva. Tu's organization responded to the r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on surplus l i c i t manufacture by purchasing Chinese opium and r e f i n i n g i t i n t o heroin i n Shanghai i n order to supply both a growing domestic market and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. As i n the case of the M a r s e i l l e s syndicates, Tu and the Green Gang a l l i e d themselves with the right-wing p o l i t i c i a n s against Communist labor unions, thus gaining the gratitude of Chiang Kai-shek's N a t i o n a l i s t 238 government. The Japanese occupation of Shanghai forced many of Shanghai's gangsters to relocate i n Chungking during World War I I , but the course of the c i v i l war which followed the Japanese surrender 84 made i t clear that Shanghai was no longer a su i t a b l e base of operation, since most of the gangsters had taken part i n the 1927 massacre of 239 Shanghai's Communists. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , most of Shanghai's underworld emigrated to Hong Kong, where the l o c a l branches of both the Green Gang and the chiu oh.au syndicates f i r s t welcomed t h e i r Shanghai bosses, and then used t h e i r knowledge of the Hong Kong under-world to usurp the authority of the newcomers. The narcotics c a r t e l established by Tu Yueh-sheng broke up at t h i s time, and Tu's death i n 1951 made renewed struggles between the two groups i n e v i t a b l e . The Green Gang was unable to r e t a i n the dominance i t had exercised over the Shanghai n a r c o t i c s trade, since t h e i r r i v a l s had strong l o c a l i connections with chiu chau s t r e e t gangs and p o l i c e o f f i c i a l s , as w e l l as with the eight percent of the colony's population belonging to t h e i r d i a l e c t group. By u t i l i z i n g t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s , the chiu chau avoided s t r e e t f i g h t s and instead fed information to p o l i c e , with the r e s u l t that by the mid-1950s the once-powerful Green Gang was 240 shattered beyond r e p a i r by p o l i c e r a i d s , a r r e s t s , and deportations. A f t e r the e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e i r competition i n the heroin manufacturing business, the chiu chau took c o n t r o l of the opium t r a f f i c out of Bangkok, which was f a c i l i t a t e d by the f a c t that most of Bangkok's commerce was c o n t r o l l e d by chiu chau merchants. This l e f t only the r e t a i l d i s t r i b u t i o n of narcotics i n Hong Kong outside of chiu chau c o n t r o l . The prospects f o r ousting the Cantonese Triad s o c i e t i e s from t h e i r p o s i t i o n of strength i n t h i s most l u c r a t i v e sector of the narcotics trade appeared remote, since the Cantonese made up over eighty percent 85 of the population, and their criminal organizations were larger and more powerful. However, these groups were outlawed by the Hong Kong police following three days of rioting in October, 1956, thus removing another enemy of the chiu chau syndicates. When the police launched a drive against street pushers and small opium dens in the mid-1960s, the syndicates were able to complete their monopoly of the drug trade by opening more eff i c i e n t and better protected heroin "supermarkets."2^* At the present time, the chiu chau syndicates have a firm grip on the Southeast Asian narcotics trade, supervising a l l stages of the network, with the exception of the actual production of the raw opium. Virtually nothing is known of the structure of the chiu chau syndicates, in contrast to the information which has been uncovered about the S i c i l i a n Mafia and the Corsican syndicates. Given the high level of cooperation and coordination among chiu chau traffickers, i t i s l i k e l y that there exists some kind of unified syndicate, but the absence of facts makes i t impossible to determine how formal such an organization might be. It i s also unclear as to how much heroin i s being smuggled out of Hong Kong onto the international market. Most of Hong Kong's addicts use No. 3, or smoking, heroin, but substantial amounts of No. 4 heroin are produced i n Hong Kong for export. In 1969, a ring of Australian traffickers was broken up after operating for a year smuggling heroin to the United States via London, and three years later another ring involving Filipinos was uncovered. Both rings were financed and directed chiu chau based in Hong Kong, and the latter ring alone 86 s u c c e s s f u l l y brought about 1,000 k i l o s of heroin i n t o the United States 243 i n one-year period. Since t h i s would account f o r about ten percent of the American heroin consumption during that period, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept F3N estimates that only f i v e percent of the heroin reaching 244 the United States was coming from Southeast A s i a at the time. S i m i l a r l y suspect i s a United States Cabinet Committee conclusion that; "Perhaps because t h e i r d i v e r s i f i e d a c t i v i t i e s i n Hong Kong are s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o f i t a b l e , the major dealers there have never shown much i n t e r e s t i n a c t i v e l y developing markets abroad f o r No. 4 heroin." 245 The end of the Indochina war has seen an increase i n Thailand's importance as a production and d i s t r i b u t i o n centre f o r the Southeast Asian drug trade. With Vietnam no longer a v a i l a b l e as a t r a n s i t area, new routes to the United States have been developed. Much of the opium and heroin moves through Thailand i n t o Malaysia and Singapore, while the r e s t t r a v e l s the established routes to Hong Kong. Apart from the e f f e c t on smuggling routes, the p o l i t i c a l developments i n Indochina have had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the heroin trade: United States o f f i c i a l s reported that i n 1975 a bumper crop of opium was harvested i n the Golden T r i a n g l e , and more high-grade heroin was coming out of 246 the h i l l regions than ever before. The Middle East-South Asia Network The t h i r d major t r a f f i c k i n g network involves South A s i a , with Iran as the p r i n c i p a l consuming nation, Iran has a long h i s t o r y of opiate abuse, and i n 1955 approximately 7.5% of a population of 20 m i l l i o n was thought to use opium.^47 i n that year, the government 87 i n s t i t u t e d a ban on the production and consumption of opium, which resulted i n a decline i n addiction, so that today there are 300,000 to 350,000 opium users i n Iran, of whom about one-third are r e g i s t e r e d with the government. Throughout the period of p r o h i b i t i o n users i n Iran turned to the i l l i c i t market for t h e i r drugs. O f f i c i a l Iranian estimates put narcotics consumption i n 1972 at 350 tons, of which re g i s t e r e d addicts consumed 155 tons, and non-registered addicts 180 tons. The resumption of opium c u l t i v a t i o n i n 1969 and the dispensation of drugs to re g i s t e r e d addicts f a i l e d to eliminate the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c i nto Iran. In contrast to most countries, opium smoking i s the main 248 form of abuse i n Iran, although heroin use i s on the upswing. Most of the i l l i c i t opium entering Iran i s grown i n Afghanistan. Compared to the other two t r a f f i c k i n g networks, the South Asian system i s exceedingly simple. L o c a l Afghan merchants and businessmen often act as intermediaries between the opium growers and the smugglers. The actua l smuggling i s c a r r i e d out by the nomadic t r i b e s who dwell along the Iranian-Afghan border. The rugged nature of the t e r r a i n and the length of the border makes smuggling very d i f f i c u l t to stop. Since Iran i n t e n s i f i e d i t s anti-drug e f f o r t s i n 1969 (inclu d i n g imposition of the death penalty f o r smuggling), the smuggling caravans have avoided the main border-crossings, and have also been larger and more heavily armed.249 Smaller amounts of opium are. smuggled from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and some Indian opium i s also diverted i n t o the i l l i c i t market, despite f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e controls by the Indian government. In many cases, e s p e c i a l l y 88 i n Afghanistan, l o c a l o f f i c i a l s are involved i n the t r a f f i c k i n g , but there 250 i s l i t t l e to i n d i c a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by top government o f f i c i a l s . There i s also no i n d i c a t i o n that i n t e r n a t i o n a l d r u g - t r a f f i c k i n g syndicates are operating i n t h i s area, f o r the Afghan and P a k i s t a n i opium has a lower morphine content than e i t h e r Turkish or Southeast Asian opium, and i s thus l e s s s u i t a b l e f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. Therefore the South Asian network i s almost purely r e g i o n a l , but i f i l l i c i t opium supplies from other parts of the world should become more d i f f i c u l t to procure, s u b s t a n t i a l q u a n t i t i e s of opium are a v a i l a b l e i n South A s i a . The area 251 i s of much greater importance i n the world hashish t r a f f i c , and presumably the t r a f f i c k i n g network which moves th i s drug i n t o Europe i s capable of transporting heroin as w e l l i f the s i t u a t i o n were to c a l l . 252 fo r i t . Apart from these three t r a f f i c k i n g networks, smaller q u a n t i t i e s of opium are produced and processed into heroin i n other areas of the 253 world. The most important of these centres of production i s Mexico, since v i r t u a l l y a l l of i t s opium i s r e f i n e d i n t o heroin and smuggled i n t o the United States. Mexico's importance as a source of heroin has grown i n recent years, both because of i t s s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n along the L a t i n American t r a f f i c k i n g routes and increasing enforcement a c t i v i t i e s 254 against French sources. I t was reported recently that 90% of the heroin seized by American p o l i c e i n the f i r s t h a l f of 1975 was of the d i s t i n c t i v e Mexican "brown" (because of impurtities) v a r i e t y , as compared to 40% i n 1972, 63% i n 1973, and 76% i n 1974. 2 5 5 I t i s rather doubtful that 90% of the heroin consumed by American addicts originates i n Mexico, 89 though, since the approximately 15 tons of opium produced each year i n that country^56 w o u i c i only y i e l d enough heroin to meet a small f r a c t i o n of that used by the United States. The Mexican heroin i s moved i n t o the United States along the same routes traveled by heroin from outside sources, cocaine, and marijuana. The world n a r c o t i c s problem, and e s p e c i a l l y the heroin problem, which i s serving as the f o c a l point i n t h i s paper, can be seen from the above disc u s s i o n to be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n every sense. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d more than a handful of states which are not involved as e i t h e r producing, consuming, or t r a n s i t states i n the heroin trade. The drug problem i s not new, as was shown i n the f i r s t two parts of t h i s paper. What i s new i s the expanded nature of the problem, and i n the next part of t h i s paper we s h a l l examine the steps taken by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i n the l i g h t of these developments, and the degree of success or f a i l u r e these e f f o r t s have encountered. 90 IV. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Machinery of In t e r n a t i o n a l Control As the reader w i l l r e c a l l , a f a i r l y large number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 257 conventions and agreements were concluded before World War I I . The disagreements encountered at the various conferences were important i n that they demonstrated how progress i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l depended on the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the diverse i n t e r e s t s of the most important st a t e s . This holds true today as w e l l . As f a r as the actu a l content of the conventions i s concerned, the stated goals of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community have become wider and more e x p l i c i t over time: the 1912 Hague Convention was: "Determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived....(therefrom)...,"258 w h e r e a s a recent agreement, the 1961 Single Convention stated that: "The P a r t i e s , concerned with the health and welfare of mankind.... recognizing that addiction to n a r c o t i c drugs constitutes a serious e v i l f o r the i n d i v i d u a l and i s fraught with s o c i a l and economic dangers to mankind...." 2-* 9 In the f i f t y - y e a r period following the Hague Conference, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community concluded that n a r c o t i c s abuse had ra m i f i c a t i o n s which went beyond the use of the drugs themselves. Apart from r e f l e c t i n g , and to an extent molding, the atti t u d e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, the various conventions contributed to the st r u c t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l . The 1925 convention 2*^ 91 established a system to regulate the international drug trade, for exports were only permitted with the approval of the importing state. 261 The 1931 convention brought into existence the system of estimates, which restricted manufacture to the previously stated, legitimate needs 262 of importing states. Several other international agreements have been concluded since the Second World War. In 1948, a treaty was concluded which brought a number of hitherto uncontrolled synthetic narcotics under international jurisdiction. A 1953 treaty provided for restrictions on l i c i t production of opium. The most important agreement was the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which was established O A T in March, 1961 and came into force on December 13, 1964. The purpose of the Single Convention, as the name implies, was to incorporate the essential features of a l l the preceding treaties, thus rendering them void. Each party to the Single Convention has undertaken the following obligations, which represent the culmination of the international narcotics control movement begun some f i f t y years earlier: a) establishing or adjusting national legislation to conform to the convention; b) maintaining a system of licenses (for manufacturers, wholesalers, and others), permits and prescriptions (for dispensing of1 drugs), record-keeping, reports, controls and inspections; c) establishing estimates of national requirements of drugs, trans-mitting them to INCB (International Narcotics Control Board), and enforcing the established estimates; d) maintaining a system of export and import authorizations and import certificates; e) maintaining stat i s t i c s and other documentation, and transmitting them, respectively, to the INCB and the secretary-general; f) coordinating preventive and repressive actions against i l l i c i t t r a f f i c and arranging for treatment of addicts; g) cooperating with other nations and the international agencies in counteracting the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c and in extradition and other questions relating to the punishment of offences.264 92 The only other agreements to be reached since the Single Convention have been the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the 1972 p r o t o c o l amending the Single Convention. The main impact of these agreements has been procedural, such as bringing new substances under i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . The c o n t r o l mechanism as established i n 1961 265 remains i n t a c t . The International Regime Implementation of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime i s c a r r i e d out p r i m a r i l y through n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ; i n t h i s respect narcotics c o n t r o l d i f f e r s l i t t l e from most other i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulatory e f f o r t s . Nations are always r e l u c t a n t to surrender any of t h e i r sovereignty, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the s e n s i t i v e matter of law enforcement. Thus there are well-defined areas i n which the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l mechanism operates: a) p l a c i n g new drugs under con t r o l or a l t e r i n g the regimes of c o n t r o l ; b) documentation and evaluation of the operations of the c o n t r o l system; c) e s t a b l i s h i n g (by INCB) of drug-need estimates f o r d i f f e r e n t countries and supervising the working of the c o n t r o l system; d) employing sanctions, ranging from c r i t i c i s m to the imposition of an embargo, against countries i n breach of t r e a t y proyision,s; e) t e c h n i c a l assistance; f) inducing changes i n the system of c o n t r o l , ranging from recom-mendations to the elaboration of new t r e a t i e s . 2 ^ Although the functions of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies concerned with na r c o t i c s c o n t r o l are mainly of an information-gathering and advisory nature, they are not without importance. There are a large number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies which deal with the drug problem, simply because narcotics abuse has widespread i m p l i c a t i o n s , but there are a r e l a t i v e l y small number of bodies which deal p r i n c i p a l l y with t h i s t o p i c . Figure 2 i l l u s t r a t e s these bodies and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to Organizational Structure of the International Drug Control Machinery, 1972 United Nation! (UN) General Assembly Economic and Social Council (ECOSOO Secretary-General -i UN Fund For Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAO UNFDAC Secretariat UNESCO, ILO. FAO 10 other divisions 4 other sections •Prior to reorganization Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the International Drug Control Machinery, 1972 of C r ^ ^ ^ s ^ X ^ ! ' G™* U™'* <**. « * ! « « . . University 94 one another. The United Nations has o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for narcotics c o n t r o l , a function i t i n h e r i t e d from the League of Nations. Figure 3 l i s t s the main drug c o n t r o l agencies and t h e i r predecessors. P o l i t i c a l bodies League of Nations Advisory Committee on T r a f f i c i n Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (1921-40) United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1946-) Expert Bodies League of Nations and United Nations PCB Permanent Central Opium (or Narcotics) Board (1929-67) DSB Drug Supervisory Body (1933-67) INCB I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board (1968-) Health bodies League of Nations P r o v i s i o n a l Health Committee (1921-23) Health Committee (1924-45) World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee on Habit Forming Drugs (1949) Expert Committee on Drugs L i a b l e to produce Addiction (1950-55) Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs (1956-64) Expert Committee on Dependence-Producing Drugs (1965-67) Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (1968-) Secretariats Opium T r a f f i c Section.of the League UN D i v i s i o n of Narcotic Drugs INCB S e c r e t a r i a t WHO Drug Dependence Unit, now Drug Dependence and Alcoholism Figure 3. Key Drug Control Organs and Their Predecessors SOURCE: K. Bruun, L Pan, and I. Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club, (Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1975) p. 58, Figure 4.2. 95 Although most of the agencies concerned with n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l have changed t h e i r names one or more times (the best example being the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence—see Figure 3), such renaming or reorganization often has l i t t l e e f f e c t on a body's composition and operation, because many of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the agencies remain the same. 2^ As the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l system currently operates, the United Nations General Assembly has the power to make important d e c i s i o n s i n the n a r c o t i c s f i e l d , but these actions are almost always based upon recommendations by the Economic and S o c i a l Council (ECOSOC). Since ECOSOC has many r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s besides narcotics c o n t r o l , i t i n 263 turn r e l i e s on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The three p r i n c i p a l agencies involved i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l are the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and the World Health Organization. The International Narcotics Control Board The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) main function i s to compile s t a t i s t i c a l data submitted by n a t i o n a l governments i n accordance with the 1961 Single Convention on Na r c o t i c Drugs. Each year the Board publishes an annual report, as w e l l as three, separate, s t a t i s t i c a l documents. These are e n t i t l e d : "Estimate of World Requirements of Narcotic Drugs and Estimates of World Production of Opium" (the main v e h i c l e of the estimate system, which, l i m i t s l i c i t production to the l e v e l s required by l e g i t i m a t e consumption); " S t a t i s t i c s on Narcotic Drugs" (which gives nine tables d e t a i l i n g the l i c i t trade i n drugs, as 96 well as giving information on seizures of i l l i c i t drugs); and "Comparative Statement of Estimates and St a t i s t i c s " (in which the rigour with which each country has stayed within i t s own estimates is examined). The effectiveness of the estimate system depends upon the accuracy of the reports submitted by each national government, for although the INCB is empowered to question the content and completeness of submissions, i t does no information gathering on i t s own. The Board also makes estimates for states who f a i l to do so; in 1935 the Board established estimates for 48 countries and received them from 123; i n 1972 the figures were 14 and 174 (each state is required to make 10 returns per year). The three s t a t i s t i c a l reports are published as supplements to the basic annual report of the INCB, which is more subjective and comments on both the efficacy of the system of returns and, more recently, 269 the world drug scene as a whole. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs In contrast to the INCB, the Commission cn Narcotic Drugs is primarily a p o l i t i c a l body. Under the League, when i t was known as the Opium Advisory Committee, i t directed the international control movement.270 Originally this body had eight members, which was increased to fifteen. The expansion of the United Nations has led to a corresponding expansion of the Commission to the present size of thirty members. The Commission is assisted i n i t s work by the Division of Narcotic Drugs, which investigates many aspects of the drug trade and publishes the "Bulletin on Narcotic Drugs," which consists of information about international control efforts, as well as s c i e n t i f i c 97 submissions i Both of these organs are dominated by the Western s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y the United States, which r e f l e c t s both the pattern of i n t e r n a t i o n a l power and the degrees of i n t e r e s t shown i n na r c o t i c s 271 c o n t r o l by the various countries i n the world. The World Health Organization The primary concern of the World Health Organization (WHO) i s the r e g u l a t i o n of the l i c i t drug trade, e s p e c i a l l y the t e s t i n g of new drugs to determine t h e i r safety. The narcotics question absorbs only a minor part of WHO's energies. WHO, n a t u r a l l y enough, looks e x c l u s i v e l y at the medical aspects of the drug problem, and enforcement matters are outside i t s competence. WHO experts keep i n touch with both the INCB and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (see Figure 2), and 272 make recommendations to these bodies. The Suppression of Heroin T r a f f i c k i n g The machinery f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of the n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c which has evolved over the past seventy years has probably reached as e f f e c t i v e a l e v e l as possib l e , given the de s i r e of each state to preserve i t s own sovereignty. The estimates system has curbed the d i v e r s i o n of l i c i t l y produced narcotics i n t o the i l l i c i t market, but m u l t i l a t e r a l agreements themselves cannot be e f f e c t i v e against t r a f f i c k e r s , f o r t h e i r a r r e s t and the dest r u c t i o n of the t r a f f i c k i n g networks can only be accomplished by p o l i c e actions which n a t i o n a l governments alone can undertake. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency most c l o s e l y connected to these e f f o r t s i s the In t e r n a t i o n a l Criminal P o l i c e Organization (INTERPOL), which has no f i e l d agents and merely 98 conveys information about i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n crimes of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 273 nature to i n t e r e s t e d governments. The f a c t that no intergovernmental organizations possess enforcement powers underscores the point that i n the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system the nation-state has a monopoly of the l e g i t i m a t e use of f o r c e . Even small states have the resources to deal with t r a f f i c k i n g i f they r e a l l y wanted to, and i t follows that s u b s t a n t i a l i l l i c i t t r a f f i c survives only because a number of n a t i o n a l governments condone i t , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y . There are s e v e r a l obstacles to the e f f e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a l power against the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . Corruption at the lower l e v e l s of a governments may impede the sincere anti-drug e f f o r t s of higher o f f i c i a l s . I f corruption i s widespread, the s i n c e r i t y of these e f f o r t s i s i t s e l f brought i n t o question. Corruption, often at high l e v e l s , i s to be found i n almost a l l poorer countries, although i t i s not a malaise confined s o l e l y to them. The second f a c t o r hampering rigourous enforcement of a n t i - n a r c o t i c s laws i s bureaucratic confusion and the lack of. cooperation between a n t i -drug agencies. At times there i s also discord between na r c o t i c s enforcement agencies and organizations i n somewhat r e l a t e d f i e l d s , such as i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies. The t h i r d , and perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t , obstacle f a c i n g enforcement o f f i c i a l s i s the involvement of n a t i o n a l governments i n t r a f f i c k i n g . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade i n n a r c o t i c s i s an economic en t e r p r i s e , but a h i g h l y p o l i t i c a l one as w e l l . Not only can governmental a u t h o r i t i e s become corrupted and p a r t i c i p a t e i n n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g , e i t h e r p a s s i v e l y by ignoring smugglers, or a c t i v e l y by smuggling themselves, 99 but governments themselves can condone t r a f f i c k i n g as serving the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . When governments f i n d i t expedient to lend a measure of support to n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s , the enforcement aspect of the problem i s almost wholely overshadowed by the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i -cations. Once na r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g i s p o l i t i c i z e d i n t h i s manner, there can be l i t t l e hope f o r an improvement i n the s i t u a t i o n u n t i l the underlying p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s are a l t e r e d . Corruption I t i s d i f f i c u l t to know where to begin a d i s c u s s i o n of corruption, simply because i t i s so widespread that i t i s v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l . P o l i c e and customs o f f i c i a l s i n most underdeveloped countries are poorly t r a i n e d , and even more poorly paid. At the same time, narcotics t r a f f i c k e r s make enormous p r o f i t s , and are w i l l i n g and able to pay p o l i c e f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e s . Corruption i s a way of l i f e i n many countries, and i t i s not seen as immoral to accept br i b e s , since such payments are common and represent a necessary supplement to an o f f i c i a l ' s income. When corruption i s rampant at a l l l e v e l s of the bureaucracy, bribes from n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s are nothing out of the ordinary, except that payments from smugglers are usually larger than those from ordinary t r a v e l e r s . I t i s p o s s i b l e to c i t e an unlimited number of examples of corruption 274 i n the l e s s developed countries, and i n most cases i t would be noteworthy only to mention the discovery of a completely honest o f f i c i a l . Payments are often made to higher o f f i c i a l s on a regular b a s i s , i n order to ensure the unhampered movement of drug shipments, while bribes 1UU are only paid to lower-ranked personnel when necessary—when a shipment i s a c t u a l l y uncovered or a t r a f f i c k e r arrested. This system of evading p o l i c e i n t e r f e r e n c e functions e f f e c t i v e l y i n both Turkey and Southeast 275 A s i a , but i t i s not confined to producing areas. I t i s l i k e l y that i n any country through which heroin or other drugs are shipped, enforce-ment o f f i c i a l s on many l e v e l s w i l l be paid o f f by the t r a f f i c k e r s . If arrangments of t h i s nature cannot be made, there are always more cooperative p o l i c e to be found i n other countries. Corruption also extends to the j u d i c i a l systems of many l e s s developed s t a t e s . In Columbia, f o r example, judges compete f o r the p r i v i l e g e of t r y i n g cases i n v o l v i n g drug t r a f f i c k e r s because of the 276 large payoffs they w i l l r e c e i v e . Any p o s i t i o n i n the governing structure i s usually seen as an opportunity to enrich oneself, and when the na r c o t i c s trade i s i n the p i c t u r e there are many such prospects. One author assessed the s i t u a t i o n i n Southeast A s i a as follows: The Thai government i s he a v i l y implicated i n the opium t r a f f i c . Every important t r a f f i c k e r i n Thailand has an "advisor" In the narc o t i c s p o l i c e , and most would never think of moving a major drug shipment without f i r s t checking with the p o l i c e to make sure that there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of seizure or a r r e s t . U.S. n a r c o t i c s agents serving i n Thailand have learned that any information they give the Thai p o l i c e force i s turned over to the syndicates i n a matter of hours. Moreover, o f f i c i a l s i n the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics f e e l that corruption i s not j u s t a matter of i n d i v i d u a l wrongdoing, and claim to have evidence that i n d i c a t e s that corruption goes to the very top of Thailand's current m i l i t a r y government. In South Vietnam almost every powerful p o l i t i c a l leader i s somewhat implicated i n the s a l e of heroin to American s o l d i e r s , and many are working c l o s e l y with Corsican syndicates to ship large q u a n t i t i e s of na r c o t i c s to the United States and Europe. The Laotian e l i t e are a c t i v e l y involved i n the manufacture and export of heroin, and resident Corsican smugglers are treated l i k e honored f o r e i g n d i g n i t a r i e s The end of the Indochina war altered the st r u c t u r e of the heroin 101 278 trade i n Southeast A s i a , but i n general the above assessment holds true today. The pro-American governments i n Vietnam and Laos may have been extreme examples, but the same type of corruption i s found i n many other s t a t e s . L a t i n American d i c t a t o r s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y acquired personal fortunes while i n o f f i c e , one reason being the unstable nature of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . When a coup might force a leader into e x i l e , i t i s only l o g i c a l to make provisions which w i l l ensure that that e x i l e w i l l be comfortable. This mentality may have contributed to the widespread corruption i n Vietnam, where almost every top o f f i c i a l i n the government t r i e d to amass money outside of the country to be used i f and when the Communists took over. Corruption often extends to the very top l e v e l s of governments. For example, i n December, 1974, Luis Rivadeneira, a L a t i n American smuggler, was arrested i n Ecuador with two k i l o s of cocaine. Ecuador's Minis t e r of Government, Admiral Poveda, the head of a l l the law enforcement agencies i n that country, 279 interceded on h i s behalf, and a l l charges were qui c k l y dropped. Half of the 200 active drug t r a f f i c k e r s operating out of Columbia have been i n d i c t e d i n the United States, but none has. been ex t r a d i t e d , and 280 the t r a f f i c continues unabated. Similar s i t u a t i o n s e x i s t i n many other countries. The f a c t that corruption i s so widespread and accepted i n the le s s developed states should not leave the impression that o f f i c i a l s i n developed states are immune from the lure of b r i b e s . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a r c o t i c s i s greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by the corruption of p o l i c e , and i n t h i s regard the New York P o l i c e Department has s p e c i a l problems, New York C i t y being the centre of heroin consumption i n the world. The 102 most bla t a n t example of corruption i n that c i t y was the r e v e l a t i o n that approximately twenty percent of the heroin and cocaine seized 281 by p o l i c e between 1961 and 1972 had been s t o l e n , and lengthy i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of the thefts (which t o t a l e d some $70 m i l l i o n ) began 2 82 i n mid-1973. In comparison to p o l i c e i n underdeveloped countries, however, the customs o f f i c i a l s and enforcement agents.in North America and Western Europe are e f f i c i e n t and dedicated, and not e a s i l y bribed. Bribery i s viewed as somewhat immoral and at odds with the r o l e of p u b l i c servant, and thus corruption i s an i n d i v i d u a l , s e c r e t i v e a f f a i r , rather than the open, almost i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r a c t i c e common to poorer countries. A major cause of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s the higher s a l a r i e s paid to western o f f i c i a l s , which makes the acceptance of bribes l e s s o b l i g a t o r y . Without the services rendered by the many corrupt o f f i c i a l s i n t h e i r employ, i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s would face a much more d i f f i c u l t task. I t i s worth bearing t h i s i s mind when dis c u s s i n g wide-ranging i n t e r n a t i o n a l schemes for ending the i l l i c i t trade i n n a r c o t i c s . No matter how l o g i c a l and impressive a plan might be, i t cannot be c a r r i e d out properly i f the o f f i c i a l s on the spot are paid off by t r a f f i c k e r s . The corruption of o f f i c i a l s i s not absolutely e s s e n t i a l to the a c t i v i t i e s of t r a f f i c k e r s , nor would the e l i m i n a t i o n of corruption ( i f that could be accomplished) n e c e s s a r i l y b r i n g about an end to the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . I t would be more accurate to say that b r i b e r y , corruption, and, i f necessary, i n t i m i d a t i o n are the l u b r i c a n t s which ensure the smooth and continuous functioning of the machinery of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c . 103 Bureaucratic Confusion Apart from luck, i n t e l l i g e n c e i s the most c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n preventing narcotics smuggling. Customs and enforcement o f f i c i a l s f i n d themselves overworked at almost every point, and faced with an ever-growing volume of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and commerce to supervise. Only a f r a c t i o n of the goods crossing i n t e r n a t i o n a l borders can be thoroughly searched, and a u t h o r i t i e s are consequently forced to l i m i t t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s to cases where d e f i n i t e knowledge of a n a r c o t i c s shipment has been obtained. B a s i c a l l y , two avenues are open to n a r c o t i c s agents t r y i n g to secure such i n t e l l i g e n c e . For reasons of h i s own, an informer may a l e r t a u t h o r i t i e s to the d e t a i l s of an incoming shipment, i n c l u d i n g the names of other t r a f f i c k e r s . More often, n a r c o t i c s agents are forced to i n f i l t r a t e t r a f f i c k i n g rings by posing as smugglers and making purchases of n a r c o t i c s i n i n c r e a s i n g l y amounts. An element of r i s k i s connected with both methods, since the accepted penalty f o r informers and spies i s death, and those involved i n the narcotics t r a f f i c have no i n h i b i t i o n s i n carrying i t out. Law enforcement operations against drug t r a f f i c k i n g rings are major undertakings, which must be c a r e f u l l y planned and convincingly executed. The s u r v e i l l a n c e of suspects involves long and o f t e n f r u i t l e s s hours of boring work, and convincing t r a f f i c k e r s that an undercover agent i s a c t u a l l y a fellow t r a f f i c k e r i s both time-consuming and dangerous. Much of the work of a u t h o r i t i e s i s d i r e c t e d towards the painstaking accumulation of i n t e l l i g e n c e on t r a f f i c k i n g routes and 104 those using them, and such an endeavor would be greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by a close coordination of a c t i v i t i e s by the various agencies working against the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . In r e a l i t y , there i s seldom such cooperation, and c e r t a i n l y not on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . As f a r as the ra p i d , systematic exchange of routine information i s concerned, the p o l i c e forces and na r c o t i c s agencies of the world are not integrated to the extent of t h e i r trans-n a t i o n a l r i v a l s , the t r a f f i c k i n g rings and i n t e r n a t i o n a l drug syndicates. This i s only n a t u r a l , f o r the infringements upon n a t i o n a l sovereignty implied by f u l l cooperation among n a t i o n a l law enforcement agencies are considerable, and more than the current i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s l i k e l y to accept i n the foreseeable future. Interagency cooperation on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l has been one of the main themes of American drug p o l i c y over the past f i v e years, and the p r i n c i p a l means of f a c i l i t a t i n g cooperation has been the posting of narcotics agents i n for e i g n countries, as w e l l as the corresponding assignment of fo r e i g n agents to the United States. An example of t h i s was the exchange of 284 personnel between the BNDD and the French J u d i c i a r y P o l i c e i n 1971. In mid-1972, approximately one out of every ten BNDD agents was posted 285 outside the United States. A s i m i l a r lack of cooperation i s often evident between agencies within a nation. There are a number of Federal agencies i n the United States concerned with n a r c o t i c s enforcement, such as the Customs Service, the Treasury department, the J u s t i c e department, and so on. In ad d i t i o n , state and l o c a l p o l i c e forces are also involved i n the enforcement of nar c o t i c s laws. This d i f f u s i o n of powers i s t y p i c a l 105 of a modern, bureaucratic state, and many countries spread the respon-s i b i l i t y for narcotics enforcement around to several agencies. This leads to problems, however. With only a limited amount of resources available for law enforcement, each department exhibits the natural bureaucratic tendency to preserve and expand i t s e l f at the expense of r i v a l groups—which can result in an overall drop in efficiency because of f r i c t i o n between agencies. This can become serious i f more than one agency i s working on a single case, and v i t a l information is not shared. Conflict also develops between Federal and local authorities. Federal agents may consider local police as provincial and amateurish, while local police in turn resent the "intrusion" of Federal narcotics agents. The different operational procedures of Federal and local o f f i c i a l s may also lead to f r i c t i o n . In practice these problems are often avoided because those involved are personally acquainted with one another and have some respect for each other's a b i l i t i e s . It i s d i f f i c u l t to say i n advance whether the f r i c t i o n between enforcement agencies w i l l be serious enough to affect actual operations, for much depends on the personalities of those involved, as well as the nature of the case. Conflict i s sometimes more pronounced between narcotics agencies and intelligence agencies. Both operate in much the same environment, but often their objectives are in opposition. Traffickers are sometimes 286 assisted or employed by intelligence agencies, and thus different branches of a government can be working at cross-purposes. It was 106 recently revealed that the American Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, i n v i o l a t i o n of i t s charter, i n f i l t r a t e d the BNDD on then Attorney General John M i t c h e l l ' s autho r i z a t ion, supposedly to help eliminate corruption. The program l a s t e d from 1971 to 1973, when i t was discon-tinued a f t e r the BNDD was absorbed by the new Drug Enforcement Adminis-t r a t i o n . Many observers were concerned that the CIA agreed so r e a d i l y to the scheme, f e a r i n g that the CIA had as i t s true objective the 287 attainment of a secret hold over the drug agency. This has been the most graphic example of inter-agency disharmony yet to, surface. The only b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the lack of cooperation between enforcement agencies, of course, are the drug t r a f f i c k e r s themselves. The P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Narcotics T r a f f i c k i n g 288 As pointed out above, there are a number of s i m i l a r i t i e s between n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g and i n t e l l i g e n c e or espionage a c t i v i t i e s . Criminal' organizations have developed many of the same c a p a b i l i t i e s possessed by n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies, even though t h e i r objectives are quite d i f f e r e n t , and n a r c o t i c s syndicates are not under n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . In view of t h i s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that these organizations have cooperated with some frequency. This i s one aspect of the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of the na r c o t i c s t r a f f i c . Nongovernmental p o l i t i c a l groups, e s p e c i a l l y t e r r o r i s t organizations, also must acquire the capacity f o r covert a c t i o n , and are able to use th i s c a p a b i l i t y to t r a f f i c i n n a r c o t i c s . In t h i s case, t r a f f i c k i n g again becomes an almost completely p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . A nation may d e l i b e r a t e l y encourage narcotics use, even to the 107 extent of manufacturing the drugs, i n another country, with the obj e c t i v e of d e b i l i t a t i n g the target country. When th i s stage i s reached, the t r a f f i c k i n g i s secondary to the s t r a t e g i c and diplomatic i m p l i c a t i o n s of such s t r a t e g i c warfare. That drug abuse can have d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y implications was shown by the heroin epidemic among the American troops i n Vietnam. In surveying the d i f f e r e n t facets of p o l i t i c i z e d t r a f f i c k i n g , i t should be remembered that n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g also has many less d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . Government Support of T r a f f i c k e r s Even when i t i s not n a t i o n a l p o l i c y to support n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g per se3 governments can f i n d themselves a l l i e d with t r a f f i c k e r s i n a v a r i e t y of ways. The Green Gang waged counterrevolutionary t e r r o r i n 289 Shanghai on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek, and i n M a r s e i l l e s the Corsican syndicates supported F a s c i s t demonstrators i n t h e i r struggles with 290 l e f t i s t s before World War I I . In both cases, the gangsters were rewarded by the governments involved, and allowed to conduct t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s without molestation. The r o l e of c r i m i n a l organizations as the n a t u r a l counterweight to left-wing, mass organizations i s not confined to these two notable examples from the interwar years. The United States u t i l i z e d both the Mafia i n I t a l y and the Corsican syndicates 291 i n M a r s e i l l e s to break s t r i k e s and weaken Communist support. The involvement of the CIA with groups who were, among other things, t r a f f i c k i n g heroin was a portent of things to come. This same pattern of support for c r i m i n a l groups i n return f o r anti-Communist assistance has marked the n a r c o t i c s trade i n Indochina 108 since World War I I . The French m i l i t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies were a c t i v e l y involved i n the opium trade during the F i r s t Indochina war, both with the obj e c t i v e of obtaining much-needed funds and securing the a l l e g i a n c e of minority groups such as h i l l tribesmen. Most of the opium was consumed i n Indochina, although some of i t reached the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. The French also supported the Binh Xuyen r i v e r p i r a t e s , who c o n t r o l l e d most of the c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s In and around Saigon by 1954. The Binh Xuyen was able to secure the c i t y from V i e t Minh t e r r o r by operating a vast network of spies and i n f o r m e r s — a l l paid at the expense of the areas c o n t r o l l e d by the gang. the Binh Xuyen c o n t r o l of Saigon, as w e l l as the French influence i n South Vietnam, was destroyed by the American-backed forces of Prime Mi n i s t e r Ngo Dinh Diem i n savage f i g h t i n g during A p r i l , 1955, and f o r a short time the a l l i a n c e of anti-Communists and n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s 292 came to an end. As the struggle between the various American-supported regimes and the Communists i n t e n s i f i e d i n South Vietnam and Lacs, the United States found i t s e l f i n a p o s i t i o n quite analogous to that of the French a decade e a r l i e r . As McCoy points out: Given the s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s between the French and American war machines, i t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g that the broad o u t l i n e s of "Operation X" (the secret French operation which c o n t r o l l e d the v. opium trade i n the e a r l y 1950s) reemerged a f t e r U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n . As the CIA became involved i n Laos i n the early 1960s i t became aware of the truth of Colonel Tringuier's axiom, "To have the Meo, one must buy t h e i r opium." At a time when there was no ground or a i r transport to and from the mountains of Laos except CIA. a i r c r a f t , opium continued to flow out of the v i l l a g e s of Lacs to t r a n s i t points such as Long Tieng. There, government a i r forces, t h i s time Vietnamese and Lao instead of French, transported n a r c o t i c s to Saigon, where p a r t i e s associated with Vietnamese p o l i t i c a l 109 leaders were involved i n domestic distribution and arranged for export to Europe through Corsican syndicates... the U.S. Embassy, as. part of i t s unqualified support of the Thieu-Ky regime, looked the other way when presented with evidence that members of that regime were involved in the GI heroin t r a f f i c . While American complicity i s certainly much less conscious and overt than that of the French a decade earlier... the consequences were far more 293 serious."-"' The American involvement i n the Indochina narcotics trade was the subject of considerable public discussion several years ago, and 294 further elaboration on the subject i s outside the scope of this paper. It i s worth noting that American support for those involved i n the narcotics t r a f f i c was not confined to Vietnam and Laos. A substantial portion of the opium output of the turbulent Burmese Shan States i s controlled by the remnant of the Koumintang armies driven out of China in 1949. Funded by the CIA as the nucleus of a projected Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland, these irregular forces were later used for intelligence-gathering raids into Yunnan. American support made the Kuomintang troops one of the most powerful armed groups in Burma, and soon this irregular army dominated much of the Burmese opium production, which i t expanded for the sake of revenues. In 1972 these 295 forces controlled about one-third of the world's i l l i c i t opium supply. When v i t a l national interests are judged to be involved, events have demonstrated that cooperation with heroin traffickers i s an acceptable policy. In most cases intelligence agencies take charge of such cooperation, for open dealings with drug traffickers would be very bad public relations. At times the relationship between the two can become so close that the two tend to become indistinguishable, as in the example of the French Secret Service—Service de Documentation 110 Extevieure et du Contre-Espionage (SDECE). In A p r i l , 1971, Roger Delouette was arrested i n the United States f o r smuggling heroin. Delouette was a low-ranking agent with SDECE, and he claimed that he was only following orders from h i s s u p e r i o r s . After o f f i c i a l French denials the matter more or less ended, but subsequently evidence emerged which indi c a t e d that Michel Debre, the State M i n i s t e r f o r Defence i n the G a u l l i s t government, had intervened on Delouette's behalf some three years e a r l i e r by awarding him back pay and f i n d i n g him a new assignment, both without the knowledge of Delouette's immediate superiors i n SDECE. According to Delouette, t h i s "new assignment" involved both c o u n t e r f e i t i n g and heroin smuggling. French o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g Debre, take the opposite view and claim that Delouette was operating completely on h i s own.296 The Delouette case had i t s o r i g i n s i n the turmoil of French p o l i t i c s i n the l a t e 1950s and early 1960s. De Gaulle was attempting to consolidate h i s newly-formed F i f t h Republic and deal with the explosive A l g e r i a n question, while at the same time the Secret Army Organization (OAS) was attempting to k i l l him and topple h i s government. For counter-terror operations the G a u l l i s t s turned to, among others, the French underworld. Delouette was apparently an agent turned smuggler who found himself i n an exposed p o s i t i o n as a r e s u l t of a power struggle between h a r d - l i n e G a u l l i s t s and the supporters of the new French President, Pompidou, who was attempting to gain a measure of c o n t r o l over the various French i n t e l l i g e n c e services.^97 He was not the only example of a French agent engaging i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s , others being: I l l Michael Victor Mertz: Mertz was a hero i n the Resistance and was awarded several honours by the French government. A f t e r the war he worked f o r French i n t e l l i g e n c e , and by 1960 he was also smuggling M a r s e i l l e s heroin i n t o the United States, even though he remain i n SDECE. This a c t i v i t y was interrupted i n 1961 by a SDECE assignment to penetrate the OAS and obtain information about planned t e r r o r i s t missions. Mertz discovered that a bombing attack was to be made on President de Gaulle, and using the d e t a i l s he uncovered, i t was arranged to allow the attack, without any actu a l danger to de Gaulle's l i f e . The operation was su c c e s s f u l ; p u b l i c opinion swung i n favour of the G a u l l i s t s , the p l o t t e r s were arrested, and the French government r e l o -cated Mertz and h i s family i n Canada, where he revived the North American end of h i s heroin syndicate. By the end of 1968 the Mertz r i n g had brought nearly h a l f a b i l l i o n d o l l a r s worth of heroin i n t o the United States, depsite s e v e r a l a r r e s t s by French p o l i c e (usually on the basis of information provided by American a u t h o r i t i e s ) . Those arrested were us u a l l y released pending t r i a l , as was Mertz himself i n 1969. When the Delouette case broke i n 1971, the French government f i n a l l y t r i e d Mertz and he received a f i v e -year sentence f o r t r a f f i c k i n g , but eight months l a t e r he was again - 298 f r e e . Ange Simonpieri: Simonpieri was born i n Cor s i c a , and was a minor f i g u r e i n the M a r s e i l l e s underworld before he was r e c r u i t e d i n t o the SDECE counterterror squad i n 1960. He served f i r s t i n A l g e r i a , then i n P a r i s , where he s p e c i a l i z e d i n the i n t e r r o g a t i o n of OAS suspects. A f t e r 1963 he as s i s t e d G a u l l i s t p o l i t i c i a n s i n t h e i r e l e c t i o n e e r i n g , as 112 w e l l as returning to h i s e a r l i e r vocation as a heroin t r a f f i c k e r . By 1970 enough evidence had been gathered to c a l l f o r Simonpieri's a r r e s t , but health reasons and o f f i c i a l foot-dragging delayed any a c t i o n u n t i l 1971, when the p u b l i c i t y from the Delouette a f f a i r and American pressure about the r o l e of SDECE i n the heroin trade induced the French government to t r y Simonpieri and sentence him to a f i v e - y e a r term i n a pri s o n h o s p i t a l . 2 " Joseph Attia: A t t i a was a notorious c r i m i n a l i n France u n t i l , h i s death i n 1972, but he was also a top assassin f o r SDECE. During World War II he saved the l i f e of a French o f f i c e r , Colonel Jacques Beaumont, who l a t e r became a top SDECE o f f i c e r . Beaumont also t e s t i f i e d on behalf of A t t i a at the l a t t e r ' s robbery and murder t r i a l i n 1953, where he was found g u i l t y of only a minor charge. A f t e r t h i s he was employed by SDECE on a number of missions, despite his habit of o c c a s i o n a l l y absconding with SDECE funds f o r Spanish vacations instead of carrying out h i s assignments. A t t i a was part of the counterterror campaign against the OAS both i n A l g e r i a and P a r i s , where the nightclub he opened served as a clearing-house f o r heroin deals. According to American n a r c o t i c s agents, A t t i a also provided f i n a n c i a l backing f o r many of these shipments. During the 1960s, A t t i a was i n and out of French j a i l s , mostly on e x t o r t i o n charges, but t h i s d i d not end his usefulness to SDECE. In 1963 SDECE operatives kidnaped Colonel Argoud, an OAS leader, from h i s Munich ho t e l room, and Argoud t e s t i f i e d that A t t i a was one of h i s abductors, although A t t i a was supposed to have been i n a French p r i s o n 1 1 3 at the time. A t t i a was also i n d i r e c t l y involved i n the murder of the Moroccan l e f t i s t Ben Barka i n 1965, which was c a r r i e d out by SDECE at the request of the pro-French General Oufkir, advisor to the Moroccan king. Several of A t t i a ' s lieutenants enticed Barka to P a r i s under pretext, abducted him, and then murdered him. A t t i a was released from p r i s o n i n 1968, and he c a r r i e d on s e v e r a l minor c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s before h i s death i n 1972 of cancer. On the night he died, both his apartment and h i s Paris nightclub were b u r g l a r i z e d , presumably by SDECE, to remove any p o t e n t i a l l y embarassing documents or memoirs. Christian David: David was r e c r u i t e d i n t o the SDECE counterterror operation i n the early 1960s a f t e r h i s escape from a French p r i s o n . Later he was used on small missions by SDECE i n A f r i c a u n t i l he was r e c a l l e d to P a r i s i n 1965 to help carry out the Ben Barka a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Several months l a t e r he k i l l e d a French policeman i n v e s t i g a t i n g the case, escaped a nation-wide manhunt with the help of the French under-world, and went to South America with the assistance of one of M a r s e i l l e s ' biggest heroin bosses. David promptly joined a heroin r i n g smuggling drugs i n t o the United States, and was arrested b y . B r a z i l i a n p o l i c e i n 1972. Under t o r t u r e , he confessed a l l , i n c l u d i n g h i s r o l e i n the Ben Barka murder, and was deported to the United States, where he i s c u r r e n t l y serving a long p r i s o n term f o r t r a f f i c k i n g . 3 0 * Andre Labay: Labay was not a h i r e d k i l l e r l i k e A t t i a and David, but was employed by SDECE as a confidence man. In A l g e r i a he i n f i l t r a t e d the OAS, and l a t e r he established a s e r i e s of fronts f o r SDECE operation and communication centres i n various countries. On October 5, 197.1, Labay 114 entered the BNDD o f f i c e i n P a r i s and proposed that American a u t h o r i t i e s a s s i s t him i n transporting a 100-Jcilo shipment of heroin to the United States. In return, n a r c o t i c s agents could follow him on the next shipment and ar r e s t the e n t i r e r i n g . The BNDD n o t i f i e d French a u t h o r i t i e s and Labay was arrested on the following day with h i s 100 k i l o s . Enforcement o f f i c e r s concluded that Labay's o f f e r stemmed from h i s f e a r that s e v e r a l members of the r i n g had already been arrested and he would be implicated, but another view i s that the exposure of the Delouette case had severed any Labay-SDECE connections, which had the 302 e f f e c t of puttin g everyone on h i s own resources. Another important organization i n France, besides the o f f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e agency SDECE, i s the Service d'Action Civique (SAC). The SAC charter states that the goal of the organization i s simply to bring together supporters of General de Gaulle, but there i s more involved than t h i s . SAC members serve as bodyguards and enforcers for G a u l l i s t candidates, and i n return are granted a degree of pr o t e c t i o n from p o l i c e . SAC was o r i g i n a l l y set up i n 1958 to c r y s t a l l i z e support fo r de Gaulle. Many of those who joined were underworld f i g u r e s , i n c l u d i n g a number of heroin t r a f f i c k e r s , such as David, Simonpierri, and Labay. T o t a l membership i s about 15,000. SAC i s part " p a r a l l e l p o l i c e f o r c e , " part p o l i t i c a l organization, and i n part j u s t a formal-i z a t i o n of the network of f r i e n d s h i p s , debts, and favours-due which s t i l l permeates the French government, i n t e l l i g e n c e community, and u n d e r w o r l d . 5 This f a i r l y d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 115 the French government and underworld f i g u r e s makes i t clear that SDECE has to some extent been involved i n heroin smuggling, and that without doubt the prosecution of drug offenders has often been d e l i b e r a t e l y delayed by the French government because of connections between the accused t r a f f i c k e r s and high o f f i c i a l s i n the government or i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies. Without the chance a r r e s t of Delouette most of what i s now known would have remained secret. According to a top European lawyer, the French reluctance to prosecute known t r a f f i c k e r s ", 8.put on record the breakdown of the French p o l i c e system with regard to c e r t a i n • ^ ..304 persons i n France. This type of government involvement i s a great hindrance to the e f f e c t i v e enforcement of na r c o t i c s laws. The detection and a r r e s t of t r a f f i c k e r s i s rendered more d i f f i c u l t , but t h i s i s l e s s important than the f a c t that the responsible n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s protect the t r a f f i c k e r rather than punish him. In a system of sovereign states the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community must r e l y on the enforcement of n a t i o n a l laws, f o r there i s no i n t e r n a t i o n a l authority which can t r y and punish i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l s such as na r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k e r s . I f t h i s o b l i g a t i o n i s not met, there i s no l e g a l recourse p o s s i b l e against the i n d i v i d u a l offender—measures can only be contemplated against the st a t e i t s e l f . Sanctions w i l l seldom be imposed, f o r i t i s recognized that n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s a more important concern than n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l . It i s impossible to determine how many states are involved i n the na r c o t i c s t r a f f i c through t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies, f o r a l l these operations are covert and are r a r e l y exposed. Given the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment, such involvement i s l i k e l y to continue unabated. T e r r o r i s t s as Smugglers It is also difficult to determine how many clandestine political groups are involved in the narcotics traffic. Terrorist organizations have the same capability as narcotics syndicates and intelligence agencies in that they can operate covertly in the face of pressure from hostile authorities. One author points out: Liberation movements, by and large, do have a regular under-ground network operation that provides them with weapons and through which other information and materials are passed on. To engage in narcotic(s) trade would not require any change in organization. Given the facts that narcotics trafficking is highly profitable, revolutionary movements are often short of funds, and moral considerations 306 are easily subordinated to the goals of the movement, i t is not surprising that several instances of trafficking by extremist groups have been found. Testimony before a United States Congressional Committee revealed that members of Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Front' were operating extensive narcotics smuggling rings in Germany, which, were connected to regular criminal networks in Europe. The profits from this trafficking were presumably used to finance guerrilla 307 activities against Israel. Black September, another Palestinian terrorist organization, is active in smuggling hashish into Europe, and half-kilo bags of the drug are decorated with a picture of a fedayeen with a submachine gun. These operations are facilitated by the readiness of a number of Arab states to issue passports to the smugglers.^08 There are also indications that left-wing Italian groups 309 have been involved in narcotics trafficking. It is to be expected that this trend towards the increasing involvement of clandestine p o l i t i c a l groups i n the i l l i c i t drug t r a f f i c w i l l continue, for i t i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d a better way to finance revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s . These groups are dedicated and s k i l l f u l , but they are not " c r i m i n a l " i n the usual sense of the word, and thus they confront p o l i c e with new problems. T e r r o r i s t s are not known to n a r c o t i c s p o l i c e , as are p r o f e s s i o n a l smugglers, and extra e f f o r t i s required to detect and i n f i l t r a t e t e r r o r i s t smuggling r i n g s . Strategic Implications Nations generally do not require the revenues associated with d i r e c t involvement i n n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g ; i t i s more common that c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s and i n t e r e s t groups, such as poppy farmers, b e n e f i t from u n o f f i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . However, the d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s of widespread n a r c o t i c s use make drug t r a f f i c k i n g a potent s t r a t e g i c weapon. Opium use was a major f a c t o r i n weakening China during the nineteenth century, although the B r i t i s h were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the Indian budget, rather than on the e f f e c t s t h e i r opium exports 310 were having on China. I t i s more d i f f i c u l t to f i n d examples where one nation has d e l i b e r a t e l y sought to increase a d d i c t i o n i n another country by t r a f f i c k i n g i n narcotics with the o b j e c t i v e of d i s r u p t i n g the s o c i a l s tructure of the target s t a t e f o r p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y advantage. The best, and the only documented., example of such n a t i o n a l involvement i n n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g was the Japanese p o l i c y towards China i n the 1930s and e a r l y 1940s. As a preparation f o r war and a means of r e s o l v i n g the c o n f l i c t once i t had begun, the Japanese m i l i t a r y 1 1 8 and occupying a u t h o r i t i e s a c t i v e l y encouraged the production and con-sumption of opium and heroin by Chinese. These e f f o r t s were su c c e s s f u l i n reversing the e f f e c t s of the N a t i o n a l i s t government's anti-opium 311 campaign which had commenced several years before the Japanese in v a s i o n . The image of a state flooding an enemy country with drugs i s an i n t r i g u i n g one, appealing as i t does to one's sense of the dramatic. I t i s a l s o comforting to the " v i c t i m " nation, f o r a n a r c o t i c s problem can be blamed on the c o n s p i r a t o r i a l machinations of a fo r e i g n power, rather than on s o c i a l , economic, or enforcement shortcomings at home. In t h i s v e i n the head of the United States Federal Bureau of Narcotics ( l a t e r the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs), Harry Anslinger, took the p o s i t i o n that Communist China was responsible f o r the drug problem i n the United States. In h i s 1961 book The Murderers, he wrote: One primary o u t l e t f o r the Red Chinese t r a f f i c has been Hong Kong. Heroin made i n Chinese f a c t o r i e s out of poppies grown i n China i s smuggled i n t o Hong Kong and onto f r e i g h t e r s and planes to Malaya, Macao, the P h i l i p p i n e s , the Hawaiian Islands, the United States, or, going the other d i r e c t i o n , India, Egypt, A f r i c a , and Europe. ^ A prime "target area" i n the United States was C a l i f o r n i a . . . Taiwanese o f f i c i a l s , n a t u r a l l y enough, supported Anslinger's views, and continued to make accusations against the Peoples' Republic 313 of China a f t e r h i s retirement i n the 1960s. Charges of Chinese Communist complicity i n the narcotics t r a f f i c have come from other, 314 disparate sources, i n c l u d i n g Alabama Governor George Wallace and 315 the Soviet Union. Most experts agree these charges have only one thing i n common: they are f a l s e . The Peoples' Republic of China i s no longer an important factor i n the g l o b a l heroin system as e i t h e r a 119 producer or a consumer. The most outstanding example of the d i r e c t m i l i t a r y e f f e c t of nar c o t i c s addiction i s to be found i n the GI heroin epidemic which occurred i n 1970 and 1971 among American troops i n Vietnam. There are many s t a t i s t i c s on the epidemic, and a l l show a sudden and explosive increase i n addiction s t a r t i n g i n the middle of 1970. Drug, a r r e s t s rose dramatically: from 47 i n 1965, to 452 i n 1966, 1,390 i n 1967, 3,460 i n 1968, 8,446 i n 1969, and over 11,000 i n 1 9 7 0 . 3 1 7 103 GIs died of heroin overdosas i n 1970, for a quarterly average of 26, but i n the f i r s t three months of 1971 there were 35 such deaths. The usual estimate was that 10-15% of United States m i l i t a r y personnel were addicted, but some o f f i c i a l s put the f i g u r e even higher, and i n 318 some units h a l f the s o l d i e r s were addicted to heroin. Everyone agreed that the problem was c r i t i c a l . One Congressional expert, Representative Robert H. Steele (Rep., Conn.), put the problem i n perspective by noting that "...the s o l d i e r going to Vietnam runs a 319 f a r greater r i s k of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty." The importance of the epidemic l i e s i n both i t s causes and i t s consequences. There are seve r a l explanations as to why the epidemic of heroin use broke out when i t d i d . I t was widely held at the time that the root cause was the boredom and low morale of the American troops i n Vietnam—one Army p s y c h i a t r i s t compared l i f e i n Vietnam to 320 that i n c i t y ghettos. Others, such as McCoy, point out that morale was low f o r seve r a l years before the epidemic, and the most important factor was the sales campaign i n Vietnam i t s e l f . He concluded: 120 ....the simple f a c t i s that there would have been no epidemic without t h i s well-organized, comprehensive sales campaign. The r e a l root of the problem... (lay) .. .with those Vj^namese o f f i c i a l s who organized and protected the heroin t r a f f i c . " The epidemic i t s e l f was triggered by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of master chemists from Hong Kong to the Golden T r i a n g l e , which created the c a p a b i l i t y of 322 manufacturing very pure No. 4 heroin Once the product was a v a i l a b l e , i t could be moved in t o Vietnam through established smuggling channels. The view has also been advanced that the epidemic was not simply an economic undertaking by the Chinese syndicates, but rather was Communist-inspired. General Lewis Walt t e s t i f i e d before a Senate subcommittee that the p r i c e charged for the heroin was too small to make any r e a l p r o f i t s f o r the wholesalers, and that a higher p r i c e could e a s i l y have been obtained. The idea of the Communists was to spread heroin use as r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e , to demoralize American troops i n the short run and weaken American society i n the long run, and hopefully to increase pressures f o r an American withdrawal. Walt claimed that t h i s opinion was supported by evidence from Vietcong defectors and the b e l i e f s of a "number of senior Western o f f i c i a l s who follow the world drug s i t u a t i o n c l o s e l y , " but he was forced to conclude that: Hard evidence i s hard to come by....If they (the Communists) played any r o l e at a l l , i t would have been f a r , f a r back on the other side of the Cambodian or Laotian f r o n t i e r , operating through a handful of p r i n c i p a l s who could not c l e a r l y be tagged as Vietcong. i J A l l t h i s leaves the Vietnam heroin epidemic something of a mystery. I t i s c l e a r that Communist involvement did not extend so f a r as to 32 A include North Vietnamese production of the opium and heroin i t s e l f , 121 but i t i s impossible to a s c e r t a i n , u n t i l f u r t h e r evidence i s a v a i l a b l e , whether the Communists played any r o l e at a l l . Regardless of the cause of the epidemic, i t i s cl e a r that i t s ultimate e f f e c t was to convince many Americans that a t o t a l American withdrawal from Indochina was the only s o l u t i o n to the problem of heroin use i n the m i l i t a r y . The heroin epidemic i s reported to have d i r e c t l y i nfluenced the Nixon Administration's d e c i s i o n to increase the r a t e of American withdrawal i n 1 971. 3 2 5 When drug t r a f f i c k i n g i s p o l i t i c i z e d i n any of the ways o u t l i n e d above, the operations of n a r c o t i c s enforcement agencies cannot help but be gravely impaired. At t h i s point e f f e c t i v e enforcement i s no longer j u s t a question of more agents or more e f f i c i e n t u t i l i z a t i o n of resources; rather fundamental p o l i t i c a l f a c t o rs must be a l t e r e d before the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c can be halte d . Without these p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic developments the flow of heroin w i l l continue. The Turkish Opium Ban The complex nature of the world's t r a f f i c k i n g networks, and the corresponding d i f f i c u l t y i n reducing the t r a f f i c , has sparked renewed i n t e r e s t i n the American proposal to l i m i t raw opium production, which o O £ was f i r s t made f i f t y years ago at the Second Geneva Opium Conference. This concept i s a t t r a c t i v e f o r i t s s i m p l i c i t y : without opium there can be no heroin, and without heroin the na r c o t i c s problem i s eliminated. In p r a c t i c e , of course, the r e s t r i c t i o n of opium production i s anything but s i m p l e . 3 2 7 The United States f a i l e d i n i t s attempt to gain acceptance of a u n i v e r s a l system of r e s t r i c t i o n , but i n 1972 was succe s s f u l i n 122 pressuring Turkey i n t o a t o t a l ban on poppy c u l t i v a t i o n . This b i l a t e r a l agreement i s worth examining, both f o r i t s own sake, and as a p o s s i b l e example f o r other producing st a t e s . The agreement was concluded on June 30, 1971, and under i t s terms a l l opium-growing i n Turkey was banned, with the l a s t l e g a l crop being harvested i n 1972. The United States was to provide $35 m i l l i o n to the Turkish government, to be used to compensate the 328 farmers f o r l o s s of revenues, and to f i n d a l t e r n a t e crops. Problems began to a r i s e immediately a f t e r the ban came in t o e f f e c t . No s u i t a b l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r opium could be found, and an American study to f i n d such a crop began only a f t e r the ban i t s e l f was brought i n t o 329 e f f e c t . Turkish o f f i c i a l s complained that the money pledged by the United States was i n s u f f i c i e n t , and that $400 m i l l i o n would be a 330 more r e a l i s t i c f i g u r e . The cessation of Turkish production also 331 caused a shortage of l i c i t opium on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l market. A f t e r two years, the Turkish government decided to resume poppy c u l t i v a t i o n , c i t i n g the f o l l o w i n g reasons: a) In time, the p l i g h t and poverty of 1,500,000 people d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the ban gained a new dimension and the e f f o r t s made i n order to solve the problems r e l a t e d to the p r o h i b i t i o n did not succeed. Consequently, economic chaos i n the region and s o c i a l unrest among the people reached a l e v e l that no democratically elected government could ignore any longer. b) While the ban gave the wrong impression to the world p u b l i c opinion that a l l opium poppy growers i n Turkey had been involved i n i l l i c i t t r a f f i c and the Turkish Government had been unable to c o n t r o l i t , other countries tended to increase t h e i r production to meet the growing need f o r opium and opium a l k a l o i d s i n the world market. c) A serious shortage of opium to be used for pharmaceutical purposes has been f e l t a l l over the world. Yet the kind of opium produced i n Turkey i s of highest q u a l i t y as f a r as the medical and s c i e n t i f i c use i s concerned. 123 d) The suppression of poppy c u l t i v a t i o n resulted i n an annual l o s s of 500 m i l l i o n TL. f o r the Turkish economy. e) The external assistance to compensate the c u l t i v a t o r s and to ensure i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l development of the region remained highly i n s u f f i c i e n t . f) I t was proved only a f t e r the ban that the c u l t i v a t i o n of s u b s t i t u t e crops was p r a c t i c a l l y impossible because of the poor character of the s o i l as w e l l as the adverse c l i m a t i c conditions p r e v a i l i n g i n the region.332 This i s the o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Turkish government, and there i s some tr u t h i n i t . The f a i l u r e of the Turkish ban emphasized se v e r a l p o i n t s . Any such program i n the future must be well-researched and prepared, and the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l consequences of a ban must be c a r e f u l l y considered. R e s t r i c t i o n s should also be applied to a l l producing countries, to prevent states from taking advantage of a reduction i n a competitor's production. This type of u n i v e r s a l agreement would seem to be f u r t h e r away from r e a l i t y now than was the case i n Geneva f i v e decades ago. The question remains as to whether b i l a t e r a l agreements of the United States-Turkey v a r i e t y , for a l l t h e i r flaws, a c t u a l l y have an e f f e c t on the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . The answer would seem to be yes. During the period when the Turkish ban was i n e f f e c t , heroin became more d i f f i c u l t to obtain i n the United States, e s p e c i a l l y on the east coast. French heroin was r e t a i l i n g at 15% p u r i t y i n 1971, but the combined e f f e c t s of the Turkish ban, increased enforcement by French p o l i c e , and the breakup of the " L a t i n American Connection" caused a drop i n p u r i t y to " 333 2%. During t h i s same period the number of addicts i n the United States also d r o p p e d . 3 3 4 One report stated that, of heroin discovered by p o l i c e i n the f i r s t h a l f of 1975, only 2% was French connection heroin, as 124 compared to 44% i n 1972. 3 3 5 The eli m i n a t i o n of the Turkish source of opium would not put the French t r a f f i c k e r s out of business, of course, f o r opium can be brought into the t r a f f i c k i n g network from other areas of the world. Despite the f a c t that Turkey has resumed poppy c u l t i v a t i o n , i t i s an encouraging sign that the ban. had an e f f e c t on the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c . It also seems possible that the new c o n t r o l measures taken by the Turkish government, i n cooperation with the United Nations Fund f o r Drug Abuse Controli may be s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the d i v e r s i o n of opium into the i l l i c i t market. The key to t h i s new method i s the p r o h i b i t i o n of seed pod 3 36 lancing (to release the opium from the poppy) and i t s replacement by poppy straw harvesting, i n which the e n t i r e plant -is processed i n t o morphine. In t h i s manner a l l the poppies planted are channeled into the l i c i t market, and the farmer has no opportunity to d i v e r t some of 337 hi s opium to the smugglers. The Turkish government has also increased the l i c i t p r i c e paid to farmers, and American and United Nations o f f i c i a l s have both expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with the precautions taken by the Turkish government. In 1975 100,000 farmers were licensed to c u l t i v a t e 339 the poppy, but t h i s year twice that number have received l i c e n s e s . Only time w i l l t e l l whether these c o n t r o l e f f o r t s w i l l prove s u f f i c i e n t to prevent d i v e r s i o n i n t o the i l l i c i t market, f o r t r a f f i c k e r s seem to be waiting f o r a r e l a x a t i o n of the controls at present. The e f f e c t s of the ban and i t s aftermath i n d i c a t e that, f o r a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved, the l i m i t a t i o n of opium production to the amount required by legi t i m a t e world usage i s a f e a s i b l e option which must be explored i n 125 the future. 126 V. CONCLUSION Narcotics t r a f f i c k i n g i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem i n every respect, and i t s e l i m i n a t i o n thus requires i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l movement has existed for seventy years, numerous t r e a t i e s and agreements have bean signed, and an elaborate mechanism of c o n t r o l has been established, yet heroin use continues i n many countries at near-record l e v e l s . At f i r s t glance, i t would seem that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community has f a i l e d completely i n i t s e f f o r t s to solve the problem of narcotics abuse. I t would be i r r e s p o n s i b l e to abandon the attempts at i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l without suggesting v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . Frustrated observers have recommended that the United States and other countries adopt 340 the type of heroin maintenance scheme used i n Great B r i t a i n . In e f f e c t , t h i s would mean the l e g a l i z a t i o n of heroin. Once, add i c t i o n ceased to be a c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , addicts would not be forced to s t e a l to support t h e i r h a b i t s , f o r the p r i c e of heroin would drop d r a s t i c a l l y , or could be administered free by the s t a t e . This i s also the idea behind methadone maintenance as p r a c t i c e d i n the United States, but i t i s naive to suppose that l e g a l i z e d heroin i s a magical s o l u t i o n to the dilemma posed by drugs. A proper discussion of this proposal f involves research i n t o the motives of drug addicts; motives which vary with the i n d i v i d u a l concerned. I t i s not c e r t a i n whether c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s are predisposed to heroin addiction, or whether the determining 127 factors are s o c i a l and economic. Heroin maintenance r a i s e s two questions. W i l l heroin use spread i f heroin i s dispensed l e g a l l y ? The epidemic nature of heroin addiction makes t h i s a strong p o s s i b i l i t y , and the Swedish experience with l e g a l i z e d amphetamines 3^ r a i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that l e g a l i z a t i o n would stimulate heroin use. The second question i s whether a country such as the United States can t o l e r a t e an addict population of nearly h a l f a m i l l i o n , even i f no increase took place a f t e r the implementation of a maintenance program. Great B r i t a i n , i t must be remembered, has an addict population of l e s s than three thousand. In short, heroin maintenance i s an acceptable a l t e r n a t i v e f o r Great B r i t a i n , but t h i s does not make i t a u n i v e r s a l s o l u t i o n . The complexity of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l drug problem i s so great that there can be no s i n g l e s o l u t i o n . I t may be that the ultimate answer l i e s i n e l i m i n a t i n g the poverty and a l i e n a t i o n i n Western s o c i e t i e s that leads to drug abuse, but t h i s goal i s a distant one at best. Treatment f o r addicts on an i n d i v i d u a l basis i s a necessary part of any anti-drug program, as i s education i n schools as to the dangers of drug use. These measures have been i n e f f e c t i v e , however, as long as drugs are r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . The use of drugs such as heroin may be symptomatic of personal or s o c i a l problems, but once an i n d i v i d u a l i s addicted the n a r c o t i c s h a b i t i t s e l f becomes the cause f o r concern. A number of i n t e r e s t i n g analyses of heroin systems are a v a i l a b l e , a n d a wide v a r i e t y of domestic responses to heroin addiction can be considered. Regardless of the avenue of approach, the reduction of the supply of i l l i c i t heroin can only help reduce addiction and i t s spread. 128 And therefore we are led back to the enforcement s o l u t i o n to heroin a d d i c t i o n . Drug abuse cannot be eliminated simply by j a i l i n g pushers, much less addicts, but i f p o l i c e repression i s combined with i n t e l l i g e n t s o c i a l and medical p o l i c i e s , progress can be made against the heroin plague. Once the importance of adequate enforcement of narcotics laws.is acknowledged, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of nar-co t i c s i s placed i n the proper s e t t i n g , f o r only through i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation can t h i s , or any other, i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem be d e a l t with. This paper has discussed both the narcotics t r a f f i c and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l attempts to c u r t a i l i t . To what extent have these measures succeeded, and why have f a i l u r e s occurred? The successes of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l narcotics c o n t r o l movement should not be underestimated. One hundred years ago most governments considered the opium trade to be only one more source of revenue, and any r e g u l a t i o n was for the purpose of increasing government income. The acceptance of the American p r i n c i p l e that only the medical and s c i e n t i f i c usage of opium and i t s d e r i v a t i v e s was l e g i t i m a t e has been the basis f o r a l l subsequent co n t r o l e f f o r t s . Subsequent acceptance of p r i n c i p l e s such as the o b l i g a t i o n of ieach state to ban opium exports to states p r o h i b i t i n g i t s use, or that the possession of i l l i c i t drugs implied g u i l t , l e d to the creation of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus on the narcotics problem. From t h i s consensus stemmed the system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l controls.. International bodies were empowered to make estimates of drug needs for s t a t e s , and the d i v e r s i o n of l i c i t l y produced drugs into the i l l i c i t 129 market was stopped. However, i t has proved d i f f i c u l t to make progress beyond t h i s point. There are a number of reasons f o r the f a i l u r e to h a l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g . Some of these are connected to the nature of the problem i t s e l f . Poppy f i e l d s are often scattered and i n i n a c c e s s i b l e l o c a t i o n s , and are thus d i f f i c u l t to detect, much less eradicate. Heroin i s so potent, that r e l a t i v e l y small quantities are worth a great deal, and thus smugglers can transport shipments with ease. The consumer-addicts are d i f f i c u l t to t r e a t , and no agreement has been reached by experts on the most e f f e c t i v e approach, to addiction, with the r e s u l t that the demand f o r heroin and other drugs cannot be quickly reduced. More important than these factors are the s o c i a l , economic, and e s p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l constraints on e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n . On the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , corruption i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t obstacle. The. actua l implementation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements depends on n a t i o n a l p o l i c e forces, but i n many cases n a t i o n a l p o l i c e cannot operate against t r a f f i c k e r s . In many s t a t e s , narcotics c o n t r o l i s of l e s s importance than a number of other goals, and thus i t n a t u r a l l y has a lower p r i o r i t y . The most outstanding example of such a c o n f l i c t i s the clash between the requirements of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and drug enforcement, i n which the former almost always wins out. This leads into the t h i r d category of the impediments to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l — t h e current nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. National s e c u r i t y must be emphasized because of the power-conscious nature of the system. As a r e s u l t , governments f i n d themselves a l l i e d with drug t r a f f i c k e r s , or even t r a f f i c k i n g themselves. Cooperation between 130 anti-drug agencies on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l i s wanting, i n large part because of the tendency of each state to safeguard i t s own sovereignty. I n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies have been confined to information-gathering r o l e s f o r t h i s same reason, with a resultant loss of e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Other developments since the Second World War have increased the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g enforcement o f f i c i a l s . The growth of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce has increased the opportunities a v a i l a b l e to smugglers, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements that fo i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, such as the TIR, have also f a c i l i t a t e d n a r c o tics smuggling. In the Th i r d World, the uneven spread of Western affluence has made bureaucrats and p o l i c e o f f i c i a l s more vulnerable to corruption than ever, to the b e n e f i t of t r a f f i c k e r s . Even the development of nuclear weapons has had an impact on n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c k i n g , f o r the nuclear stalement has led to a greater emphasis on covert struggles f o r power and influence, and i n t h i s arena drug t r a f f i c k e r s are valuable a l l i e s . A l l these f a c t o r s , as w e l l as the general d r i f t towards hedonism which some a t t r i b u t e to western s o c i e t i e s , have stimulated the i l l i c i t t r a f f i c i n na r c o t i c s and made solutions more d i f f i c u l t . In retrospect, n a r c o t i c s abuse i s the i d e a l problem f o r the twentieth century. A nation can only solve i t s drug problem i f i t i s w i l l i n g to take draconian measures, as was the case i n Communist China. Even here, these steps were, aimed at more fundamental p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l problems, and drug abuse was eliminated en passant* For countries unwilling to take such measures, i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation i s the only a l t e r n a t i v e . The n a r c o t i c s trade i s so bound up with the e s s e n t i a l features of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system that i t i s u n l i k e l y that i t can be completely eliminated u n t i l 131 the system i t s e l f has changed. In the short term, the international community can only continue to implement limited, incremental solutions to the problem. Increasingly close and effective cooperation between police forces, the eradication of i l l i c i t opium production, technical advances in enforcement procedures, and efforts to isolate traffickers from their p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s are a l l worthwhile steps which should help to slow the flow of heroin. A reduction in the volume of narcotics reaching developed states would f a c i l i t a t e the control of heroin use, perhaps allowing domsestic programs to make an impression on addiction rates. The complete elimination of narcotics abuse must await the solution of the social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic problems which encourage i l l i c i t production and stimulate consumption. r 132 APPENDIX 1 The Resolutions adopted by the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909 In Resolution 1 the Commission gave warm and emphatic r e c o g n i t i o n to the s i n c e r i t y of the Chinese government and people i n t h e i r a n t i -opium campaign and to the progress which they had already made. Resolution 2 c a l l e d on each government concerned to take measures " f o r the gradual suppression of the p r a c t i c e of opium smoking i n i t s own t e r r i t o r i e s and possessions, with due regard to the varying c i r -cumstances of each country concerned." Resolution 3 expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of each of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g government's re-examining i t s system of reg u l a t i o n i n l i g h t of the near unanimous agreement that the use of opium f o r other than medical purposes should be pro h i b i t e d or c a r e f u l l y regulated. Resolution 4 stressed the duty of each country to prevent the export of opium and i t s various products to countries which p r o h i b i t t h e i r entry. Resolution 5 c a l l e d f o r d r a s t i c measures by a l l governments i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and possessions to co n t r o l the manufacture, s a l e , and d i s t r i b u t i o n of morphine and other opium d e r i v a t i v e s so as to c u r t a i l the grave and growing danger caused by- these products. Resolution 6 expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y - of each government's con-^ ducting an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the s c i e n t i f i c aspects of antiopium remedies and of "the properties and effects- of opium and i t s products." Resolution 7 c a l l e d on governments which had not done so to take steps to close as soon as possible the opium divans i n t h e i r concessions and settlements i n China. Resolution 8 recommended negotiations between China and the governments concerned f o r the adoption of " e f f e c t i v e and prompt measures" fo r the p r o h i b i t i o n of the trade i n and manufacture of anti-opium remedies i n the fo r e i g n concessions and settlements i n China. The f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n urged the governments concerned to apply t h e i r pharmacy laws to t h e i r subjects i n the consular d i s t r i c t s , concessions, and settlements i n China. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 76^-77, ( C i t i n g the Report of the Shanghai Opiim Commission, p. 84.) 133 APPENDIX 2 Bureau of Nax-coti.es and Dangerous Drugs, Foreign Agents on Board, August SI, 1972 Agents on Location Board Mexico C i t y Regional O f f i c e : Mexico C i t y 8 Guadalajara 3 Hermosillo . . . . . 2 Monterrey _2_ T o t a l 15 Buenos Aires Regional O f f i c e : Panama C i t y , Panama 0 Caracas, Venezuela 1 Asuncion, Paraguay 2 Buenos A i r e s , Argentina. . 5 Lima, Peru 2 Quito, Ecuador 2 Rio de Janeiro, B r a z i l 0 Bogota, Columbia 1 B r a s i l i a , B r a z i l 1 La Paz, B o l i v i a _0 T o t a l _14 Ankara Regional O f f i c e : Ankara, Turkey „ . . 4 Instanbul, Turkey 2 Izmir, Turkey 2 Be i r u t , Lebanon 2 Kabul, Afghanistan 1 Tehran, Iran . . . . . 2 Islamabad, Pakistan 0 New D e l h i , India _0 T o t a l JL3 Bangkok Regional O f f i c e : Bangkok, Thailand 8 Chiang Mai, Thailand 2 Vientiane, Laos 2 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia . . , 1 Singapore 2 Saigon, Vietnam. _3 T o t a l 18 134 Agents on Location Board Manila Regional O f f i c e : Tokyo, Japan 3 Hong Kong 2 Manila, P.I 3 Seoul, Korea 0 Okinawa _1 T o t a l 9. P a r i s Regional O f f i c e : London, England 1 P a r i s , France. . 7 M a r s e i l l e s , France . 3 Madrid, Spain 2 Barcelona, Spain 2 Rabat, Morocco 1 Bonn, Germany 1 Frankfurt, Germany 2 Munich, Germany 2 Milan, I t a l y 2 Rome, I t a l y 3 Brussels, Belgium _1 T o t a l . o . 27 Canada: Montreal 2 Vancouver _1 T o t a l 1 Grand t o t a l (of a t o t a l of 1,121 agents) SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the J u d i c i a r y , Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the In t e r n a l Security Act and other In t e r n a l Security Laws, World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U.S. Security. 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972) pt. 6, pp. 279-80. 135 No..6-N...I>, l»M <>»>»'« Slt«lll>U UPON A O i O ^ N T l C H E K 0 5 N t A ^ T D W Y / y"iT W W T tse ROM »*• .Her. c BET we FtBtivi\| GIVE US A 0 M i K E W A K p FttfA i • — - — •" *^'-j'-^ ry*'-;>'-Tvc^ (HERE AH AIRPLANE') \|N1»M«EA P 1 C K U ? / / (H:5.AjRfeficE < £ ^ x i ? & > FORGET WE EVER SAW\ \ TWS PA«TICtA>R PiscetJ <•>«» # ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ = | * « ^ " \1 /TA WHOLES \ \ met (. ' •» - • / . / - , ^ >ir GST T H E * — ! S/viVERNMESTT IS INVOLVED' • 4 ! HW6 CAM PO — j^ » 0 FROiTBAUS DlWlTME5S/^ J6. "VMS FIRST you wr of KERe, i 6uE5>f jou * | , — vvrikur A TRIM „ HAP T& 03M€ EW* HEBE AMP ST1C< - ! . v • '2i4 j S V APPENDIX 3 4 Hypothesis on American Involvement in Heroin Trafficking 136 Notes 1. Charles W. Gorodetzky and Samuel T. C h r i s t i a n , Ifhat you should know about DRUGS (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1970), pp. 5-6, 104. 2. I b i d . , p. 109. In t h i s paper the terms drugs and n a r c o t i c s w i l l be used interchangeably. 3. B r i t a i n being the p r i n c i p a l exception. 4. Charles Siragusa, The Trail of the Poppy (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1966), p. x i i . 5. Harry J . Anslinger and W. F. Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953), p. 16. 6. Paul Rosenberg, "The Abuses of Stimulants and Depressants," i n Types of Dxnxg Abusers and Their Abuses, eds. John G. C u l l and Richard E. Hardy ( S p r i n g f i e l d , 111.: Charles C. Thomas Pub., 1974), pp. 126-28. 7. The r e s i n from the Indian hemp plant (Cannabis sativa) i s called, hashish, the leaves marijuana. The former i s s e v e r a l times more powerful than the l a t t e r . Sidney Cohen, The Drug Dilemma. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 49-50. 8. One of the most recent proposals to t h i s e f f e c t was made by a White House study group i n v e s t i g a t i n g the p r i o r i t i e s of United States drug enforcement: see New York Times, September 17, 1975, p. 59. 9. Anslinger and Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics, pp. 20-22, 10. I b i d . , p. 1. 11. I b i d . , p. 2. 12. Leonard P. Adams I I , "China: The H i s t o r i c a l S e t t i n g of Asia's P r o f i t a b l e Plague," i n A l f r e d W. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 36S. 13. "The p h y s i c a l signs of abstinence consist of yawning, l a c r i m i n a t i o n , sneezing, p e r s p i r a t i o n , rapid breathing, d i l a t e d p u p i l s , elevated temperature and blood pressure, l o s s of appetite, vomiting, d i a r r h e a , and insomnia. In a d d i t i o n , during withdrawal, addicts complain of such symptoms as muscular aches and pains, nausea, cramps, nervousness and r e s t l e s s n e s s . " C l i f t o n K„ Himmelsbach, "Opiate A d d i c t i o n , " i n C u l l and Hardy, Types of Drug Abusers asid Their Abuses, p. 23. 14. See below, p. 11-12. 15. Adams, "China: The H i s t o r i c a l Setting of Asia's P r o f i t a b l e Plague," i n McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 366. 16. I b i d . , p. 367. 17. I b i d . , pp. 367-68. 18. David E. Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1934), p. 260, c i t e d by Arnold H. T a y l o r , American Diplomacy and. the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939 (Durham, N.C.: Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), p. 5. 137 19. Report of the International Opium Commission;, Shanghai, China, Feb. 1 to Feb. 26, 1909, V o l . I I : Reports of the Delegates (Shanghai: North-China Da i l y News and Herald, Ltd., 1909), p. 48, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , 1900-1939, p. 6. Cite d below as Report of Shanghai Opium Commission followed by the volume number. 20. See David F. Musto, The American Disease (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973). 21. I b i d . , pp. 1-3. 22. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 3-4. 23. Newsday (Staff and E d i t o r s ) , The Heroin Trail (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 75. 24. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 4. 25. I b i d . , p. 5. Also, see below, p. 13. 26. I b i d . , pp. 9-12. 27. A l v i n Moscow, Merchants of Heroin (New York: D i a l Press Inc., 1968), p. 27. 28. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 12. 29. Cabinet Committee, "World Opium Survey," (excerpts), i n Richard Blum, et al, Drug Dealers—Taking Action (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 73. Cited below as Blum, Drug Dealers— Taking Action. 30. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 4. 31. I b i d . , pp. 12-13. 32. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 73. 33. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 13. 34. The p u r i t y of the average f i x has tended to drop with time. Before World War II addicts could buy hs r o i n that was almost 30% pure i n the.United States. See below, p. 39. 35. See below, p. 61. 36. Although by the turn of the century the rate of ad d i c t i o n i n the United States had begun to drop. Musto, The American Disease, p. 3. 37. I b i d . , pp. 69-90. 38. I b i d . , pp. 3-4. 39. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939, pp. 126-29. 40. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 6-8. 41. U.S. Sp e c i a l N a r c o t i c Committee, T r a f f i c in Narcotic Drugs. Report of Special Committee of Investigation Appointed March 25, 1918 by the Secretary of the Treasury, Jane 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1919), pp. 19-27, c i t e d by Taylor,. American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , 1900-1939, p. 124. 42. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 69-90. 43. K a t t e l Bruun, Lynn Pan, and Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 133. Cited below as Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club. 44. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 24-53. 138 45. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 369. 46. Owen, B r i t i s h Opium Policy in China and India, pp. 318-19, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , 1900-1939, p. 24. 47. Mary C. Wright, Introduction to China in Revolution: The F i r s t Phase 1900-1911, ed., Mary C. Wright (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), c i t e d by Adams, "China: The H i s t o r i c a l Setting of Asia's P r o f i t a b l e Plague," i n McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 372. 48. Alexander Hosie, On the Trail of the Opium Poppy. (London: •George P h i l i p and Son, 1914), esp. v o l . 2, app. pp. 232 f f . , c i t e d by i b i d . 49. For the text' of the Agreement see John V.A. Murray (comp. and ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919 (2 v o l s . ; New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1921), I pp. 865-66, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , 1900-1939, p. 23. 50. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939, pp. 25-30. 51. I b i d . , p. 32. 52. P h i l i p p i n e Commission, Opium Investigation Committee, Use of Opium and T r a f f i c Therein, Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting the Report of the Committee Appointed by the P h i l i p p i n e Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein...., 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Doc. 265 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1906), p. 49, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , p. 41. 53. I b i d . , pp. 24-28. 54. I b i d . , p. 54. 55. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , pp. 47-52. 56. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 35-37. 57. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , pp. 64-65. 58. D e t a i l s of the American proposals are to be found i n the Report of Shanghai Opium Commission, I, pp. 44-48, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 67. 59. This was the view taken by the B r i t i s h royal commission i n 1894. See above p. 16 . 60. Report of Shanghai Opium Commission, I, pp. 51-52, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics T r a f f i c , p. 68. 61. I b i d . , pp. 52-53, c i t e d by i b i d . , p. 69. 62. Ibid... 63. I b i d . , p. 48, c i t e d by i b i d . , p. 69. 64. "Report to the Department of State by the American Delegation to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Opium Commission at Shanghai," C o n f i d e n t i a l , March 1, 1909, SDR 774/606, pp. 35-38, Brent Papers, Box 37, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 72. 65. For the nine re s o l u t i o n s adopted at Shanghai see appendix 1. 139 66. See above, p. 17. The B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n , of course, was to delay the proposed conference u n t i l the agreement with China was con-firmed. In t h i s way the Sino-Indian opium trade would not be discussed at the conference. Af t e r t h i s goal had been accomplished, the B r i t i s h were more amenable to the American i n i t i a t i v e s . Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 11-12. 67. I b i d . , p. 12. 68. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 83. 69. For the text of the Hague Convention see The International Opium Convention, 1912, and Subsequent Relative Papers, (London: His Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , London, 1921). 70. See below, p. 30. 71. For the discussions on t h i s Chapter see International Opium Conference, The Hague, Dec. 1, 1911-Jan. 23, 1912, Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) (The Hague: National P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1912), pp„ 36-38, 44-46, 48-51, 76-78, 118-121. Cited by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics, Traffic, pp. 101-03. Cited below as F i r s t Hague Opium Conference, Minutes. 72. I b i d . 73. See above, pp. 11-13-74. See below, pp. 90-97. 75. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 106. 76. F i r s t Hague Opium Conference, Minutes, pp. 132-36, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 107. 77. See below, pp. 32-33. 78. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 12. 79. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 111. 80. I b i d . , p. 114. 81. I b i d . , pp. 118-19. 82. See below, pp. 29-30. 83. Adams, "China: The H i s t o r i c a l Setting of Asia's P r o f i t a b l e Plague," i n McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 376-77. 84. See above, pp. 11-13. 85. Adams, "China: The H i s t o r i c a l Setting of Asia's P r o f i t a b l e Plague," i n McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 377. Also, see below, p. 83, 86. See below, table 3, p. 49. 87. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 153. 88. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 13. 89. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 172. 90. I b i d . , pp. 159-60. 91. I b i d . , pp. 157-58. 92. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , Hearings... on H.J. Resolution 195, The Traffic in Habit Forming Drugs, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924 (Washington, D.C: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1924), c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 179. 93. League of Nations, Records of the Second Opium Conference, V o l . I.: Plenary Meetings: Text of the Debates, C. 760 M. 26Q. 1924 XI; (Geneva, 1925 p. 148, 162, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 193. 140 94. See below, p. 95. 95. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, pp. 210-32. 96. I b i d . 97. League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, May 27th to July 13th, 1931, V o l . I: Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates, C. 509. M214. 1931.XI (Geneva, 1931), c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, pp. 233-67. 98. I b i d . 99. See below, pp. 90-97. 100. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 15. 101. See above, p. 23. 102. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, pp. 276-80. 103. League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Suppression of the I l l i c i t Traffic in Dangerous Drugs...Text of the Debates, C 341. M.216.1936.XI (Geneva, 1936), pp. 216-20, c i t e d by Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 294. 104. See below, pp. 38-39. 105. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 301 106. These general observations apply both to the period under disc u s s i o n and the present. See below, pp. 121-25 f o r an i l l u s t r a t i o n of these problems i n the Turkish context. 107. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, pp. 306-15, 321-26. 108. See below, pp. 118-19. 109. See below, pp. 42-43. 110. As was the case with opium e a r l i e r ; see above, p. 7, 12. 111. See below, p. 64. 112. U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, "History of Narcot i c A d d i c t i o n i n the United States," i n Senate Committee on Government Operations, Organized Crime and I l l i c i t Traffic in Narcotics, 88th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1964, pt. 3, p. 771, c i t e d by McCoy, P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 5-6. 113. I b i d . 114. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 6. 115. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was o r i g i n a l l y part c f the P r o h i b i t i o n bureau, but became a separate organization i n 1930. Later i t became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which was i n turn incorporated i n t o the Drug Enforcement Agency i n 1973. 116. Richard Ashley, Heroin—the Myth and the Facts (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 39. Cited below as Ashley, Heroin. 117. A l f r e d R. Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law (New York; Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 105-06, c i t e d by Ashley, Heroin, p. 39. 118. A Federal Source Book: Answers to the Most Frequently Asked Questions about Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1971), p. 22, c i t e d by Ashley, Heroin, p. 41. 119. I b i d . 120. Ashley, Heroin, p. 41. This estimate was only mads p u b l i c i n l a t e 1971. 121. U.S. News and World Report, A p r i l 3, 1972. 141 122. For example, the American-Turkish agreement to ban Turkish poppy c u l t i v a t i o n . See below, pp. 121-25. 123. For an i n t e r e s t i n g , although opaque, economic an a l y s i s of the heroin trade see Simon Rottenberg, "The Clandestine D i s t r i b u t i o n of Herein, I t s Discovery.and Suppression," Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy 76 (January-February 1968): 78-90. 124. See below, pp. 58-90. 125. Although t h i s view i s open to question. See the Vietnam heroin epidemic, below, pp. 119-21. 126. New York Times, February 1, 1970, IV p. 6. 127. New York Times, December 14, 1972, p. 40; June 29, 1973, p. 28; September 12, 1973, p. 20. 128. I b i d . , February 9, 1975, p. 16. 129. I b i d . , A p r i l 2, 1974, p. 25. 130. See below, p. 123. 131. New York Times, March 18, 1976, p. 29. 132. To use a term borrowed from the study of nuclear weapons: " v e r t i c a l " p r o l i f e r a t i o n r e f e r s to an increase w i t h i n a country; " h o r i z o n t a l " p r o l i f e r a t i o n to the spread to other countries i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 133. See above, p. 42. 134. See Horace F. Judson, Heroin Addiction in Britain (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). 135. Horace F. Judson, "A Reporter at large: the B r i t i s h and heroin," New, Yorker, September 24 and October 1, 1973, p. 94. 136. I b i d . , pp. 98-103. 137. I b i d . , p. 92. 138. See below, pp. 63-8.1. 139. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the J u d i c i a r y , Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the In t e r n a l Security Act and other I n t e r n a l Security Laws, World Drug Traffic av.d. Its Impact on U.S. Security, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972), pt. 4, p. .141. Cited below as World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U.S. Security. 140. I b i d . , pp. 140-42. 141. New York Times, A p r i l 10, 1970, p. 41. 142. I b i d . 143. I b i d . , August 12, 1973, p. 3. During the four-year period 1969^ 1973 8 pushers were k i l l e d by m i l i t a n t s . Jack S c u l l y , the head of U l s t e r ' s 13-man drug squad summed up the s i t u a t i o n : "I don't want to sound alarmist, but we have a r e a l problem on our hands." 144. I b i d . , December 20, 1970, p. 2. Alcoholism has long been a major s o c i a l problem i n the Soviet Union. 145. I b i d . , September 13, 1972, p. 4. How obligatory treatment can be "voluntary" i s one of the f i n e r points of Soviet j u s t i c e . 146. I b i d . 147. I b i d . , November 13, 1972, p. 4. 148. I b i d . 149. I b i d . , May 27, 1974, p. 2. 150. I b i d . , December 28, 1974, p. 5. 142 151. See above, pp. 32-33. 152. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 80-81. 153. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p.. 63. 154. See below, pp. 95-96. 155. See below, pp. 86-87. 156. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 61. 157. See below, p. 124. 158. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, pp. 64-65. 159. See below, pp. 121-25. 160. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 65. 161. See above, pp. 32-33. 162. See above, pp. 38-48. 163. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 2. Also, see balow, p. 124. 164. For a more extensive discussion of the Golden T r i a n g l e , see below, pp. 81-82. 165. See below, pp. 86-88, 99-103. 166. S. Halpern, The International Narcotics Trade and Its Relation to the United States, Report of Special Study Mission, House Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , Pursuant to House Res. 109 (Washington, D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1971) , p. 60, c i t e d by Luiz R.S. Simmons and Abdul A. Said, "The P o l i t i c s of Addiction," i n Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy: the International Connection,, eds., Luiz R.S. Simmons and Abdul A. Said (Beverly H i l l s : Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1974), p. 10* Cited below as Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy. 167. See above, p. 41. 168. See below, pp. 116-17. 169. See below, pp. 97-121. 170. The lower f i g u r e i s given by Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. IQ; the higher f i g u r e by Ashley, Heroin, p. 23. These f i g u r e are f o r 1972. 171. For instance, Robin Moore, The French Connection: The World's. Most Crucial Narcotics Investigation (Bantam, 1970), and the f i l m of the same name. 172. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. .133; Ashley, Heroin, p. 17. 173. See below, pp. 123-24. 174. See above, p. 13. 175. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government -Operations, Organized Crime and I l l i c i t Traffic in Narcotics, 88th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 1964, pt. 4, p. 913, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 19. 176. New York Times, A p r i l 11, 1971, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s : of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 18. 177. H. Anslinger, The Protectors (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Co., 1964), p. 74, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 19. 178. See above, p. 39. 179. Norman Lewis, The Honored Society. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 18, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 24. 143 180. Siragusa, The Trail of the Poppy, pp. 180-81, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 24. 181. I b i d . , pp. 83, 89, c i t e d by i b i d . 182. I b i d . 183. O f f i c i a l correspondence of Michael G. P i c i n i , FBN, to agent Dennis Doyle, August, 1963, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 24. 184. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Organized Crime and I l l i c i t Traffic in Narcotics, pt. 4, p. 891, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 27. 185. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, pp. 10-11. 186. I b i d . 187. I b i d . , p . 12. 188. See above, p. 9. 189. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 24. 190. I b i d . , pp. 26-27. 191. I b i d . , pp. 26-29. 192. I b i d . , p. 29. 193. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 134; also Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 42. 194. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 44. 195. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 138. 196. I b i d . 197. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 45. 198. I b i d . , p. 48. ' 199. I b i d . , p. 49. 200. I b i d . , pp. 49-50. 201. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 31. 202. Time, September 4, 1972, p. 14. 203. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 140. 204. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Organized Crime and I l l i c i t Traffic in Narcotics, pt. 4, pp. 873-85, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 31-32. 205. I b i d . 206. Ashley, Heroin, p. 20. 207. I b i d . , pp. 20-21. 208. See below, pp. 109-15. 209. Cabinet Committee, "World Opium Survey," (Washington D.C: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972), p. 22, c i t e d by Luis R„S. Simmons and Abdul A, Said, "The P o l i t i c s of Addiction," i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy, pp. 14-15. 210. See above, pp. 8-10. 211. A Nice p o l i c e commissioner, Jean-Pierre Sanguy, remarked: "They (the heroin labs) are only kitchens, any cook can put one up." Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 78. 212. A United States narcotics agent was assigned to uncover the l o c a t i o n of heroin labs i n M a r s e i l l e s i n the l a t e 1950s, but a f t e r he t o l d the. l o c a l p o l i c e h i s information the labs disappeared before they could be raided. He l a t e r returned with a f a l s e passport and i d e n t i t y , discovered s e v e r a l more l a b s — a n d blew them up. I b i d . , p. 90. 144 213. Simmons and Said, "The P o l i t i c s of Addiction," i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy, p. 15. 214. I b i d . 215. World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 6, pp. 292-97. The U.S. Customs Service reported a 32.6% decline i n drug seizures i n New York C i t y i n 1975 as compared to 1974: New York Times, August 1, 1975, p. 31. 216. Ashley, Heroin, pp. 22-23. 217. Ibid.' 218. World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 146. 219. Newsday, Heroin Trail, pp. 152-57. 220. New York Times, A p r i l 21, 1975, p. 1. 221. I b i d . 222. World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 147. 223. See above, p. 74. 224. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 85. 225. I b i d . , p. 86; also World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impact on U. S. Security, pt. 1, p. 13. 226. Halpern, The International Narcotics Trade and I t s Relation to the United States, p. 26, c i t e d by Simmons and Said, "The P o l i t i c s of Addiction, " i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , an.d Diplomacy, p. 15; also McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 9. 227. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 86. 228. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 57. 229. I b i d . , pp. 242-353. 230. Blum, Drug Dealer—Taking Action, p. 89. 231. See below, pp. 99-101. ~ 232. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, pp. 87-88. 233. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 224. 234. I b i d . 235. Y.C. Wang, "Tu Yueh-sheng (1881-1951): A Tentative P o l i t i c a l Biography," Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 3 (May,=1967): 435, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 225. 236. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 225. 237. See above, pp. 32-33. 238. Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. (Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1951), pp. 135-45, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 226-27. 239. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 227-28. 240. I b i d . , pp. 228-29. 241. I b i d . , pp. 229-32. 242. I b i d . , p. 233. 243. I b i d . 244. I b i d . , p. 239. 245. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, pp. 90-91. 246. New York Times, J u l y 20, 1975, p. .16. 247. Hamid Mowlana, "The P o l i t i c s of Opium i n Iran: A S o c i a l - P s y c h o l o g i c a l Interface," i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy, pp. 162-63. 248. I b i d . , pp. 162-64. 145 249. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 92. 250. I b i d . 251. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 2. . 252. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 94. 253. See above, p. 55. 254. New York Times, A p r i l 21, 1975, p. 1. 255. I b i d . , October 28, 1975, p. 9. 256. I b i d . , A p r i l 21, 1975, p. 1. 257. See above, pp. 15-36. 258. Preamble, Hague Convention, 1912, c i t e d by Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 38. 259. Preamble, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, c i t e d by Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p, 39. 260. See above, pp. 29-31. 261. See above, pp. 32-33. 262. This analysis i s from Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 45. 263. I b i d . , pp. 18-19, 45. 264. E/CN. 7/484/Rev. 1, 1966, c i t e d by Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 45. 265. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 20-21. 266. I b i d . , p. 46. 267. I b i d . , pp. 122-28. 268. I b i d . , p. 54. A study has shown that only two percent of ECOSOC's se s s i o n a l time i s concerned with the drug problem; Jasper Woodcock, "Administrative Considerations," i n R.H. Blum, D. Bovet, and J . Moore eds., Controlling Drugs: An International Handbook for Drug Classification (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1974), c i t e d by Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 54. 269. Bruun, The Gentlmen's Club, pp. 75-86. 270. See above, p. 29. 271. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 87-102, 113-32. 272. I b i d . , pp. 66-74. 273. A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of INTERPOL i s to be found i n Michael Fooner, Interpol: the inside story of the international crime-fighting organization (Chicago, H. Regnery Co, 1973) 274. Several of these are given below, but i t would f u t i l e to provide extensive documentation of t h i s type of corruption. 275. For a more d e t a i l e d examination of t h i s t o p i c see McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast, f o r conditions there, and Newsday, The Heroin Trail, f o r Europe. 276. New York Times, A p r i l 21, 1975, p. 1. 277. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 359. 278. See above, p. 86. 279. New York Times, A p r i l 21, 1975, p. 1. Poveda explained that Rivadeneira was a close r e l a t i v e of one of h i s f r i e n d s . 280. I b i d . , A p r i l 24, 1975, p. 1. 281. I b i d . , February 1, 1973, p. 1. 282. I b i d . , August 15, 1973, p. 1. I r o n i c a l l y , the thefts included the heroin confiscated i n the famous "French Connection" case of the ea r l y 1960s; I b i d . , December 15, 1972, p. 1. 283. See above, pp. 76-77. 146 284. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security,. pt. 6, p. 260. Also, see New York Times, February 27, 1971, p. 3. 285. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 6, pp. 278-80. See appendix 2 f o r a d e t a i l e d l i s t i n g of BNDD agents abroad. 286. See below, pp. 107-15. 287. New York Times, July 11, 1975, p. 1. 288. See above, p. 59. 289. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 227. Also, see above, p. 83. 290. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 30. 291. I b i d . , pp. 20-23, 37-47. 292. I b i d . , pp. 90-126. 293. I b i d . , p. 152. 294. The i n t e r e s t e d reader i s advised to consult McCoy's exce l l e n t study The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, upon which much of the preceding has been based. a more d e t a i l e d account of t h i s case. 295. I b i d . » PP- 126-35. 296. Newsday, The Heroin 297. I b i d . , PP« 99-109, 298. I b i d . , PP- 111-19. 299. I b i d . , P- 119. 300. I b i d . , PP. 122-26. 301. I b i d . , PP- 124-26. 302. I b i d . , PP. 126-28. 303. I b i d . > PP- 128-31. 304. I b i d . > P- 121. 305. Chain Even -Zohar, " .gs i n I s r a e l : A Study of P o l i t i c a l Implications f o r Society and Foreign P o l i c y , " i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy, p. 208. 306. I b i d . 307. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 138. 308. J . L a f f i n , Fedayeen: The Arab-Isreali Dilemma (London: Cassel, 1973), pp. 149-50, c i t e d by Chain Even-Zohar, "Drugs i n I s r a e l : A Study of P o l i t i c a l Implications f o r Society and Foreign P o l i c y , " i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s and Diplomacy, p. 208. 309. World Drug Traffic-and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 4, p. 136. 310. See above, pp. 5-7. 311. See Frederick T. M e r r i l l , Japan and. the Opium Menace (New York; I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i a t , I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations; and the Foreign P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n , 1942) 312. Harry J . Anslinger, The Murderers (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Cudahy, 1961), p. 230, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 146. 313. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 146. 314. New York Times, September 24, 1971, p. 34. 315. I b i d . , November 18, 1974, p. 15. For a convenient, although somewhat h y s t e r i c a l , summary of the charges against China, see P a t r i c i a Young, The Death Peddlers. (Canada, 1973). 316. McCoy, P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, pp. 145-48; Simmons and Said, "The P o l i t i c s of Addiction," i n Simmons and Said, Drugs, P o l i t i c s , and Diplomacy, pp.21-22. 147 317. U.S. News and World. Report, January 18, 1971, p. 37. 318. New York Times, May 16, 1971, p. 1. 319. I b i d . , June 7, 1971, p. 6. 320. I b i d . , May 16, 1971, p. 1. 321. McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 183. 322. I b i d , p. 181. 323. World Drug T r a f f i c and Its Impacts on U.S. Security, pt. 1, pp. 54-58. 324. "The Drug Abuse Problem i n Vietnam," Report of the O f f i c e of the Provost Marshal, U.S. M i l i t a r y Assistance Command Vietnam (Saigon, 1971), p. 4, c i t e d by McCoy, The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia, p. 183. 325. New York Times, June 7, 1971, p. 6. 326. See above, p. 30. 327. -See above, pp. 34-36. 328. Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 3. 329. I b i d . , pp. 16-17. 330.. I b i d . , p. 3. 331. New York Times, May 23, 1973, p. 11. 332. Facts on Turkish Poppy (Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara(?), 1975) pp\ 9-10. 333. New York Times, A p r i l 23, 1975, p. 51. 334. Ibid.:, March 18, 1976, p. 29 335. I b i d . , October 28, 1975, p. 9. 336. See above, p. 9. 337. Facts on Turkish Poppy, pp. 15-16. 338. New York Times, October 28, 1975, p. 8. 339. Vancouver Province (AP) August 3, 1976, p. 32. 340. Judson, Heroin Addiction in B r i t a i n . 341. See above, p. 46. 342. G i l b e r t Levin, Edward B. Roberts, and Gary B. Hirsch, The Persistent Poppy: A Computer-aided search for Heroin Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: B a l l i n g e r Publishing Co., 1975); and Paul H. Blachly, Seduction: A Conceptual Model in the Drug Dependencies and Other Contagious I l l s ( S p r i n g f i e l d , 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970) are two of the more i n t e r e s t i n g works on t h i s subject. 148 Selected Bibliography Anslinger, Harry J . , and Tompkins, W. F. The Traffic in Narcotics. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953. Anslinger, Harry J . The Murderers. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Cudahy, 1961. . The Protectors. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Co., 1964. Ashley, Richard. Heroin—the Myth and the Facts. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Blachly, Paul. H. Seduction: A Conceptual Model in the Drug Dependencies and Other Contagious I l l s . S p r i n g f i e l d , 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970. Blum, Richard, et al. Drug Dealers—Taking Action. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973. Bruun, K a t t e l , Pan, Lynn, and Rexed, Ingemar. The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1975. Cohen, Sidney. The Drug Dilemma. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969. C u l l , John G. and Hardy, Richard E., eds. Types of Drug Abusers and Their Abuses. S p r i n g f i e l d , 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1974. Facts on Turkish Poppy. D i r e c t o r a t e General of Press and Information, Ankara, 1975. A Federal Source Book: Answers to the Most Frequently Asked Questions about Drug Abuse. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1971. Fooner, Michael. Interpol: the inside story of the international crime-fighting organization. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1973. Gorodetzky, Charles W. and C h r i s t i a n , Samuel T. What you should know about DRUGS. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1970. Halpern, S. The International Narcotics Trade and Its Relation to the United States. Report of Special Study Mission, House Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , Pursuant to House Res. 109. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1971. 149 Hosie, Alexander. On the Trail of the Opium Poppy. London: George P h i l i p and Son. 1914. Isaacs, Harold. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1951. Judson, Horace F. "A Reporter at large: the B r i t i s h and heroin," New Yorker, September 24 and October 1, 1973. . Heroin Addiction in Britain. New York: Harcourt Brace • Jovanovich, 1973. Levin, G i l b e r t , Roberts, Edward B., and Hirsch, Gary B. The Persistent Poppy: A Computer-aided search for Heroin Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: B a l l i n g e r Publishing Co., 1975. Lewis, Norman. The Honored Society. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964. .Lindesmith, A l f r e d R. The Addict and the Law. New York: Vintage Books, 1965. McCoy, A l f r e d W. The P o l i t i c s of Heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. M e r r i l l , Frederick T. Japan and the Opium Menace. New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i a t , I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations; and the Foreign P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n , 1942. Moore, Robin. The French Connection: The World's Most Crucial Narcotics Investigation. Bantam, 1970. Moscow, A l v i n . Merchants of Heroin. New York: D i a l Press Inc., 1968. Musto, David .Fo.The American Disease. New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973. Newsday (Staff and Editors) The Heroin Trail. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974. Owen, David E. British Opium Policy in China and India. New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1934. R.ottenberg, Simon. "The Clandestine D i s t r i b u t i o n of Heroin, I t s Discovery and Suppression," Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy 76 (January-February 1968): 78-90. Siragusa, Charles. The Trail of the Poppy. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1966. 150 Taylor, Arnold H. American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939. Durham, N.C.: Duke Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the J u d i c i a r y , Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Int e r n a l Security Act and other I n t e r n a l Security Laws. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security. 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972. Wang, Y. C. "Tu Yueh-sheng (1881-1951): A Tentative P o l i t i c a l Biography," Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 3 (May, 1967). Wright, Mary C. Introduction to China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1911. ed., Wright, Mary C. New Haven, Conn.: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. Young, P a t r i c i a . The Death Peddlers. Canada, 1973.
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