Understanding epistemic development : parsing knowledge by epistemic content
department or school: Arts, Faculty of
department or school: Psychology, Department of
data provider: DSpace
degree campus: UBCV
creator: Hallett, Darcy Dwaine
issued: 2009-07-10T22:32:55Z
issued: 2000
related degree: Master of Arts - MA
degree grantor: University of British Columbia
description: Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded a partially converging picture. What is generally agreed is that this epistemic course typically begins with something like a naive realism, according to which knowledge is understood as simply absorbed through the senses, or simply a matter of getting the facts straight. Gradually, people come to question this black-and-white view of the world, sometimes qualifying their belief in right and wrong, sometimes purporting that one cannot be certain about anything. Eventually, though, many or most move toward a more rationalistic stand where, while absolute certainty is seen to be an impossibility, some things can be reasonably thought to be true and some arguments can be said to be better supported than others. Despite broad agreement about this general bill of particulars, what nevertheless remains deeply confusing is just how much radical disagreement actually exists regarding the ages at which this course of epistemic development is said to occur. Some describe this development as an accomplishment of university undergraduates or even older adults while others have found evidence for these same developmental accomplishments during adolescence and even the middle school years. Furthermore, abilities ascribed to 4- or 7-year-old children by certain investigators of children's "theory of mind" bear a striking resemblance to abilities described by classic research in epistemic development. In order to make sense o f this confusion, it is proposed that epistemic development is not a 'one-miracle' affair in which individuals simultaneously come to grips with the prospect of relativity in all possible domains of knowledge. Instead, it is argued to be a process that applies itself progressively to knowledge located further and further along a proposed 'fact of the matter' continuum. By conceiving of differ…
aggregated CHO: https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/10631
extent: 3279689 bytes
format: application/pdf
note: UNDERSTANDING EPISTEMIC DEVELOPMENT: PARSING K N O W L E D G E B Y EPISTEMIC CONTENT by D A R C Y DWAINE H A L L E T T B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1994 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Psychology) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 2000 © Darcy Dwaine Hallett, 2000 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Department of Date DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded a partially converging picture. What is generally agreed is that this epistemic course typically begins with something like a naive realism, according to which knowledge is understood as simply absorbed through the senses, or simply a matter of getting the facts straight. Gradually, people come to question this black-and-white view of the world, sometimes qualifying their belief in right and wrong, sometimes purporting that one cannot be certain about anything. Eventually, though, many or most move toward a more rationalistic stand where, while absolute certainty is seen to be an impossibility, some things can be reasonably thought to be true and some arguments can be said to be better supported than others. Despite broad agreement about t…
has type: Thesis/Dissertation
date issued: 2000-11
is shown at: 10.14288/1.0089543
language: eng
degree discipline: Psychology
provider: Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
publisher: University of British Columbia
rights: For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
scholar level: Graduate
type: Text
identifier URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/10631