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Horner, Andrew Philip
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
This essay presents an analysis of two eighteenth-century controversies on liberty and necessity of the will . The first debate between Anthony Collins and Samuel Clarke took place in the early part of the century, and that between Richard Price and Joseph Priestley in the second half. The bulk of the essay relates to Clarke and Collins. In Chapter One I introduce the question of liberty and necessity in the context of a challenge to traditional theism through the work of Thomas Hobbes; Hobbes' compatibilist arguments were later adapted by Collins. In Chapter Two I consider Clarke's rationalist theology and his arguments for libertarianism presented in reaction to Hobbes in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (based on his 1704 Boyle Lecture series), and in Chapter Three the influence of John Locke on Collins' compatibilist position. Chapter Four is an examination of the texts of the debate itself , in the 'Dodwell' pamphlets published between 1707 and 1709, in Collins' A Philosophical Inquiry- Concerning Human Liberty (1717), and in Clarke's Remarks (1718) on Collin\s' book. I draw out evidence from the texts to show that, though nominally a general survey of the arguments, Collins wrote his Philosophical Inquiry with Clarke specifically in mind. In Chapter Five I turn to the later controversy between Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, considering Price's A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758, revised 1769), Priestley's reply in The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777), and finally the correspondence between them, published as A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity (1778). Price and Priestley were followers of Clarke and Collins respectively, and adapt many of their arguments. I argue that it is Priestley who develops the debate by incorporating Hume's reworking of causation in his Treatise (1739-40) and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1st edition 1748), a conception which is rejected by Price. I conclude, however, that it is Price, in his development of Clarke's arguments, who comes closest of the four to a satisfactory position.
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LIBERTY AND NECESSITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN: The Clarke-Collins and Price-Priestley Controversies by ANDREW PHILIP HORNER M.A., University of Cambridge, 1994 B.A., The Open University, 1996 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1997 (c) Andrew P h i l i p Horner, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date / At^rUST (W7 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT This essay presents an analysis of two eighteenth-century controversies on l i b e r t y and necessity of the w i l l . The f i r s t debate between Anthony C o l l i n s and Samuel Clarke took place i n the early part of the century, and that between Richard Price and Joseph P r i e s t l e y i n the second h a l f . The bulk of the essay relates to Clarke and C o l l i n s . In Chapter One I introduce the question of l i b e r t y and necessity i n the context of a challenge to t r a d i t i o n a l theism through the work of Thomas Hobbes; Hobbes' compatibilist arguments were l a t e r adapted by C o l l i n s . In Chapter Two I consider Clarke's r a t i o n a l i s t theology and h i s arguments fo r l i b e r t a r i a n i s m presented i n reaction to Hobbes i n A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (based on his 1704 Boyle Lecture s e r i e s ) , and i n Chapter Three the influence of John Locke on C o l l i n s ' compatibilist p o s i t i o n . Chapter Four i s an examination of the texts of the debate i t s e l f , i n the 'Dodwell' pamphlets published between 1707 and 1709, i n C o l l i n s ' A Philosophical Inquiry-Concerning Human Liberty (1717), and i n Clarke's Remarks (1718) on C o l l i n s ' book. I draw out evidence from the texts to show that, though nominally a general survey of the arguments, C o l l i n s wrote his Philosophical Inquiry with Clarke s p e c i f i c a l l y i n mind. i i In Chapter Five I turn to the l a t e r controversy between Richard Price and Joseph P r i e s t l e y , considering Price's A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758, revised 1769), P r i e s t l e y ' s reply i n The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777), and f i n a l l y the correspondence between them, published as A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity (1778). Price and P r i e s t l e y were followers of Clarke and C o l l i n s respectively, and adapt many of t h e i r arguments. I argue that i t i s P r i e s t l e y who develops the debate by incorporating Hume's re-working of causation i n h i s Treatise (1739-40) and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1st e d i t i o n 1748), a conception which i s rejected by Price. I conclude, however, that i t i s Price, i n his development of Clarke's arguments, who comes close s t of the four to a s a t i s f a c t o r y p o s i t i o n . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Acknowledgements v i A Note Concerning Inclusive Language v i i CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The B r i t i s h Enlightenment 1 1.2 Liberty and Necessity 2 1.3 Hobbes 3 1.4 Hobbes' Relation to Clarke and C o l l i n s 7 CHAPTER TWO: CLARKE'S RATIONALIST THEOLOGY 10 2.1 Clarke on "The Being and Attributes of God" 10 2.2 The F i r s t Cause and the Origin of Motion 12 2.3 The Origin of Intelligence 15 2.4 Liberty and Immaterialism 15 2.5 Physical E f f i c i e n t s and Moral Necessity 19 2.6 Divine Prescience 21 2.7 Liberty as a Perfection 22 2.8 Clarke and Leibniz 23 CHAPTER THREE: COLLINS AND LOCKE 30 CHAPTER FOUR: THE CLARKE-COLLINS CONTROVERSY 39 4.1 The 'Dodwell' Correspondence 39 4.2 C o l l i n s ' Philosophical Inquiry and Clarke's Remarks .. 43 4.3 Arguments from Experience 46 4.4 Causation 56 4.5 The Imperfection of Liberty 62 4.6 The Perfection of Necessity 67 4.7 Divine Prescience 69 4.8 From the Nature of Rewards and Punishments 71 4.9 From the Nature of Morality 72 4.10 C o l l i n s ' Conclusions 73 4.11 Clarke's Conclusions 77 4.12 An Assessment 78 i v CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRICE-PRIESTLEY CONTROVERSY 81 5.1 Price's Review of Morals 81 5.2 P r i e s t l e y ' s The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity .. 85 5.3 Causation and the Influence of Hume 87 5.4 The Causes of V o l i t i o n 92 5.5 The Agent's Consciousness of Liberty 96 5.6 Further Debate on Causation 99 5.7 The 'Balance' Analogy 101 5.8 Conclusions on Causation 105 5.9 Moral Arguments 107 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 109 BIBLIOGRAPHY 114 APPENDIX A: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 117 A . l Anthony C o l l i n s 117 A.2 Samuel Clarke 120 A.3 Richard Price 124 A.4 Joseph P r i e s t l e y 127 APPENDIX B: PLATO'S PROTAGORAS 132 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge to my debt of gratitude to Jim Dybikowski, my thesis supervisor, f o r introducing me to the work of the four authors considered i n t h i s essay, and f o r his guidance and many help f u l comments during the preparation of t h i s work. I wish also to thank Paul Russell for agreeing to act as second marker immediately upon his return from sabbatical, and for his constructive c r i t i c i s m of the second d r a f t . F i n a l l y , my year of study on t h i s Master of Arts degree programme at U.B.C. would not have been possible without the f i n a n c i a l support of a Rotary Foundation Ambassadorial Scholarship and the personal support of the Rotary Clubs of Cheadle (Greater Manchester, England) and Vancouver Sunrise ( B r i t i s h Columbia, Canada). v i A NOTE CONCERNING INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE In common with convention of the period, 'man' i s used to denote the species homo sapiens, or an a r b i t r a r y member thereof, and the masculine pronoun i s used throughout the primary texts examined i n t h i s essay. In order to avoid excessive clumsiness i n moving between quotation, paraphrase and commentary, I generally follow these conventions, though use more c l e a r l y neutral terms when appropriate. The arguments, however, are nowhere gender-specific. v i i CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 The B r i t i s h Enlightenment The eighteenth-century Enlightenment brought dramatic developments i n s c i e n t i f i c , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l and philosophical thought i n B r i t a i n as elsewhere. The century which saw the French Revolution and the American War of Independence, also saw a much quieter, but related, revolution i n i n t e l l e c t u a l culture, as the established churches of Europe began to lose t h e i r g r i p on patterns of thought and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . The chief figures i n the developments i n B r i t i s h Philosophy i n the Enlightenment period (to cast t h i s wider than the century i t s e l f ) were Hobbes, Locke, Hume and M i l l . The chief figures do not stand alone, however, for they were products of t h e i r time, both influencing and influenced by t h e i r less well-remembered contemporaries. This essay w i l l examine one aspect of the work of four of these i n f l u e n t i a l though now larg e l y forgotten writers: they are Anthony C o l l i n s , Samuel Clarke, Richard Price, and Joseph P r i e s t l e y . Anthony C o l l i n s and Samuel Clarke wrote i n the early part of the century, Richard Price and Joseph P r i e s t l e y i n the second h a l f . C o l l i n s and Clarke were products of the established colleges, Price and P r i e s t l e y of the new Dissenting Academies; 1 a l l were remarkable polymaths, and Price and P r i e s t l e y i n pa r t i c u l a r made contributions much wider than the f i e l d s of moral theory and metaphysics. (The eventful l i v e s of these four writers are most i n t e r e s t i n g quite apart from t h e i r authorship of the texts considered i n t h i s essay; a b r i e f biographical sketch of each i s given i n Appendix A.) 1.2 Liberty and Necessity In t h i s essay I w i l l expound and compare the two disputes that C o l l i n s and Clarke, and l a t e r Price and P r i e s t l e y pursued i n r e l a t i o n to l i b e r t y and necessity of w i l l . The l a t t e r debate i s a close development of the former: Price and P r i e s t l e y were strongly influenced by t h e i r predecessors. The debates exemplify the contrast between the two main philosophical t r a d i t i o n s of the time: Clarke and Price were r a t i o n a l i s t i n outlook, C o l l i n s and P r i e s t l e y l a r g e l y (though not e n t i r e l y ) e m p i r i c i s t . The format of the discussion to follow may be b r i e f l y summarized. In 1704 Clarke delivered a series of lectures, subsequently re-written as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, i n which he set out to es t a b l i s h a r a t i o n a l i s t theology, including a proof of libertarianism, i n reaction to Hobbes among others; t h i s w i l l be the subject of Chapter Two. In 1717 C o l l i n s published A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, nominally a general survey of arguments concerning l i b e r t y , but from the structure of the book 2 i t appears that C o l l i n s 7 intention was s p e c i f i c a l l y to address Clarke; indeed C o l l i n s and Clarke had had an e a r l i e r debate i n the form of a series of pamphlets, which had included among i t s issues the question of l i b e r t y and necessity. Clarke published Remarks on C o l l i n s 7 book appended to a separate correspondence between himself and Leibniz. C o l l i n s 7 compatibilist position i s strongly influenced by both Locke and Hobbes. The r e l a t i o n of Hobbes to both Clarke and C o l l i n s w i l l be examined i n the remainder of t h i s chapter, and the influence of Locke on C o l l i n s i n Chapter Three. The arguments between C o l l i n s and Clarke are discussed i n Chapter Four. Price and P r i e s t l e y published a correspondence of t h e i r own i n 1778, which discussed very s i m i l a r themes. Each acknowledges a debt to t h e i r predecessors: Price was a follower of Clarke, and P r i e s t l e y of C o l l i n s . I t w i l l be argued i n the examination of t h i s correspondence i n Chapter Five, however, that P r i e s t l e y advances the debate by adopting Hume7s re-working of causation, a conception which Price does not accept. 1.3 Hobbes The chief figure i n the background to the Clarke-Collins controversy i s Thomas Hobbes. In his short t r e a t i s e "Of Liberty and Necessity" written i n 1646 or 16521, Hobbes presented a 1 The date i s given as 1646 i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n , published i n 1654, and as 1652 i n subsequent editions. 3 compatibilist conception which C o l l i n s adapts and which Clarke r e j e c t s . I t i s part of Hobbes' project to show inconsistencies (at best) i n theism, s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the questions of divine judgement and prescience. Clarke's project, by contrast, i s to provide a coherent 'proof of theism from f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s , and C o l l i n s ' project i s to counter Clarke. Hobbes' stance on l i b e r t y and necessity i s s l i g h t l y ambiguous. On the one hand, his e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e r t y i s s i m p l i s t i c : "Liberty i s the absence of a l l the impediments to action that are not contained i n the nature and i n t r i n s i c a l q u a l i t y of the agent" (Hobbes2, p.273). Under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , even possession of a w i l l i s not a condition of l i b e r t y ; Hobbes' i l l u s t r a t i o n , indeed, i s of water f a l l i n g i n a channel (p.273/). On the other hand, he defines a 'free agent' as one "that can do if he will, and forbear if he will" (p.275). Taken together t h i s enhances the concept of freedom to include the p o s s i b i l i t y of alter n a t i v e courses of action not excluded by external constraints. This i s l a t e r developed by Locke, C o l l i n s and Hume (see Chapter Three). This i s not to say, however, that any given choice of action i s not determined by causes p r i o r to that choice; Hobbes argues for such necessitarianism on the basis of a strong 2 Thomas Hobbes (ed. William Molesworth), The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. i v , London: John Bonn, 1840 (reprinted S c i e n t i a Verlag Aalen, Germany, 1966). 4 concept of causation: That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action...is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one i s determined to be such as i t i s by a l i k e concourse of former causes, may well be c a l l e d . . .the decree of God. (p.246) Thus action i s consequent upon v o l i t i o n , which i s i n turn determined "inasmuch as the w i l l i t s e l f , and each propension of a man during h i s deliberation, i s as much necessitated, and depends on a s u f f i c i e n t cause, as anything else whatsoever" (p.247). A ' s u f f i c i e n t cause', that i s , a cause "to which nothing i s wanting that i s needful to produce the effect" (p.274) i s also a 'necessary cause', i . e . when the cause i s found to be extant, the e f f e c t must immediately and necessarily follow. The argument for t h i s i s straightforward enough: i f the e f f e c t does not occur, then a necessary aspect of the cause must have been missing - i n which case the putative cause was not ' s u f f i c i e n t ' ; i f a cause i s ' s u f f i c i e n t ' , therefore, i t i s impossible that the e f f e c t does not follow; therefore the cause i s necessary. 3 3 I t i s apparent that the term 'necessary cause' i s analogous to the modern term ' s u f f i c i e n t condition', as opposed to 'necessary condition': i n Hobbes' (and C o l l i n s ' ) terminology, i f C i s the 'necessary cause' of E, then C -> E; t h i s does not imply E -> C, the formal expression for 'C i s a necessary condition of E'. 5 Everything that i s , i s therefore part of a complex causal pattern, "an innumerable number of [causal] chains, joined together, not i n a l l parts, but i n the f i r s t l i n k God Almighty" (pp.246f), i . e . a prime mover or free f i r s t cause. 4 That we have w i l l and that we can do as we w i l l are therefore necessary, but so also the v o l i t i o n s of that w i l l are necessarily what they are: [It] i s no more necessary that f i r e should burn, than that a man or other creature, whose limbs are moved by fancy, should have election, that i s liberty, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though i t be not i n his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his election and will. (p.247) Hobbes, as we can see, gives an argument f o r the deterministic basis of compatibilism, based on an a priori causal argument. The argument structure i s c l o s e l y followed by C o l l i n s (see Section 4.4). In Hobbes' view, hi s compatibilist account of l i b e r t y i s p e r f e c t l y s u f f i c i e n t , "for i t cannot be conceived that there i s any l i b e r t y greater, than for a man to do what he w i l l " (p.263). This assessment would be echoed by C o l l i n s i n the c l o s i n g words of his Philosophical Inquiry: "...can any other liberty be conceived b e n e f i c i a l to [man]? Had he t h i s power or liberty i n a l l things, he would be omnipotent!" ( C o l l i n s , p.80). 4 Hobbes does not e x p l i c i t l y argue for a f i r s t cause, or against an i n f i n i t e regress, i n Of Liberty and Necessity. He does say elsewhere that 'motion' i s the "one universal cause", confirming his p h y s i c a l i s t doctrine. (English Works, Vol. i , London: John Bohn, 1839, p.69; quoted i n O'Higgins, Determinism and Freewill, p.8) 6 1.4 Hobbes7 Relation to Clarke and C o l l i n s Hobbes was always widely considered to be an atheist writer, for a l l h i s dressing up of his arguments i n d o c t r i n a l terminology, and his work on l i b e r t y and necessity i s a part of that undermining of theism. Clarke aimed to provide a defence of theism i n response to Hobbes and other freethinkers. C o l l i n s , on the other hand, i s generally considered to be a d e i s t (though t h i s i s controversial; see Appendix A.l) and adapts Hobbes7 arguments i n response to Clarke. To see something of t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n , we may consider b r i e f l y Hobbes 7 arguments on the concepts of divine judgement and prescience i n his t r e a t i s e . On divine judgement, Hobbes answers an objection to necessitarianism that i f a l l actions are necessitated by a causal chain reaching back to God, then divine judgement would be reward or punishment of actions which not only could not have been avoided, but which would have been performed with the permission of God. Hobbes7 answer i s to claim that although "a man that s h a l l command a thing openly, and p l o t s e c r e t l y the hindrance of the same, [acts unjustly] i f he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing i t " (p.249), God 7s actions, rewards and punishments are necessarily just: God has i n f i n i t e power, and "Power irresistible justifies all actions really and properly" (p.250). The reader i s l e f t to r e f l e c t on the i r o n i c juxtaposition of contradictory concepts of j u s t i c e . 7 This i s just what Clarke wants to avoid i n arguing for his strong concept of agency: the p r i n c i p l e of action must be i n the agent i n the form of a 'self-moving power' (see Section 2.4) i n order for absolute j u s t i c e to be possible; l i b e r t y i s therefore a necessary condition of morality. C o l l i n s does not address divine j u s t i c e , but only human j u s t i c e ; on human j u s t i c e he follows Hobbes i n arguing that j u s t i c e i s consistent with compatibilism, for j u s t i c e depends only on actions being the re s u l t of an act of w i l l that i s not under external compulsion (see Sections 4.8-4.10; cf. Hobbes, pp.252.fT). Hobbes' discussion of divine prescience i n t e r e s t i n g l y provides both C o l l i n s ' attack and Clarke's defence of the doctrine. Hobbes points out an inconsistency between l i b e r t y and divine prescience, namely that God could not foreknow events which might never happen (p.278); t h i s i s taken up by C o l l i n s (see Section 4.7). However Hobbes also notes that foreknowledge i n i t s e l f could not contribute to causation: [T]hat the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be t r u l y said, seeing foreknowledge i s knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on i t . (p.246) This argument i s adapted by Clarke i n h i s defence of the consistency of l i b e r t y and divine prescience (see Section 2.6). Hobbes' p h y s i c a l i s t philosophy undermines most aspects of t r a d i t i o n a l theism, with the possible exception of an i n i t i a l 8 creative act: divine omniscience, the independence of the soul from the body, and divine judgement. Clarke set out to counter t h i s , but to argue his case on the basis of the same strong concept of causation. His attempt to do so i s the subject of the next chapter. 9 CHAPTER TWO CLARKE'S RATIONALIST THEOLOGY 2.1 Clarke on "The Being and Attributes of God" If Hobbes' philosophy i s the background, the foundational text for both the Clarke-Collins and P r i c e - P r i e s t l e y controversies i s Clarke's work A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. The reasons f o r t h i s are f o u r - f o l d . F i r s t , C o l l i n s appears to base the structure of h i s Philosophical Inquiry on Clarke's text. He does not use Clarke's format, but many of the arguments that C o l l i n s addresses are used by Clarke. Further, i n supporting his own arguments fo r necessity, C o l l i n s uses p r i n c i p l e s adopted by Clarke to prove l i b e r t y . C o l l i n s makes e x p l i c i t reference to Clarke only once, however: t h i s reference to an extract from Clarke's fourth e d i t i o n (1716) regarding 'moral necessity' takes his words completely out of context, twisting the quotation to claim support f o r C o l l i n s ' own p o s i t i o n . I t seems to have been t h i s (perhaps mischievous?) misusage that i n v i t e d Clarke's stinging response i n his Remarks on C o l l i n s ' book. Secondly, Clarke's Remarks on C o l l i n s are s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e p e t i t i o n and development of his arguments i n Being and Attributes. T h i r d l y there i s the r e l a t i o n to Hobbes just discussed: Clarke i s e x p l i c i t l y opposed to Hobbes i n t h i s text, whereas C o l l i n s incorporates Hobbes' arguments into his own 10 work. Lastly, i n t h e i r debate Price and P r i e s t l e y use and adapt the arguments of Clarke and C o l l i n s respectively. Clarke's text i s based on his 1704 Boyle Lectures. Robert Boyle had founded the lecture series i n the 1690s with the intention that eminent lecturers would defend natural and revealed r e l i g i o n against the freethinkers; Clarke's p a r t i c u l a r targets i n t h i s f i r s t series were "Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza, and t h e i r Followers" (Wor/cs,ii,p.521). The work as published i s not the text but the "substance" of the eight lectures, re-arranged into a serie s of twelve propositions to prove the existence and nature of God "from the most uncontestable P r i n c i p l e s of Right Reason" (p.524); maybe Clarke chose t h i s format to accentuate his attack on Spinoza, though the propositions are not presented with anything l i k e the same s t r i c t n e s s of form that Spinoza used. I intend i n t h i s chapter to consider those parts of the work which connect with the l a t e r debate with C o l l i n s . Clarke's strategy i n overview i s as follows: F i r s t he aims to es t a b l i s h that there must be a divine f i r s t cause, because otherwise there could not be a material universe containing motion. Secondly, the f i r s t cause must be i n t e l l i g e n t f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e to ex i s t i n the world; the i n t e l l i g e n t f i r s t cause or God must be free, and other i n t e l l i g e n c e s must be of immaterial substance. Thirdly, God's l i b e r t y may be communicated to created beings i n the form 11 of a self-moving power; that such a power i s communicated i s established by experience. F i n a l l y Clarke wants to show that human l i b e r t y i s consistent with divine prescience, and that l i b e r t y i s a necessary condition of morality for both God and man. With t h i s overview i n mind, we s h a l l look at Clarke's arguments for these points i n more d e t a i l . 2.2 The F i r s t Cause and the Origin of Motion Clarke's f i r s t proposition i s that "Something has existed from all Eternity", which i s proved on the basis that otherwise the things which now e x i s t must have been produced from nothing: i t i s contradictory "to say that a Thing i s produced, and yet that there i s no Cause at a l l of that production" ( i b i d . ) . The claim of a contradiction i s a true one, but Clarke i s g u i l t y of a s l e i g h t of hand i n asserting at the outset that the manner of existence must be from production. This relates to his strong concept of causation: "Whatever e x i s t s , has a cause" (ibid.), either i n i t s own nature (the thing i s sel f - e x i s t e n t ) or an external cause which "must, at lea s t i n the Order of Nature and Causality, have existed before i t " (ibid.). I have here toned down Clarke's phrasing: f o r 'external cause' he has "the W i l l of some Other Being" (ijbid.), thereby introducing further assumptions unwarranted at t h i s stage. 12 Clarke argues that the material world cannot be s e l f -existent: For absolute Necessity of Existing, and a P o s s i b i l i t y of not Existing, being contradictory Idea's; ' t i s manifest the Material World cannot Exist Necessarily, i f without a Contradiction we can conceive i t either Wot to Be, or to be i n any respect otherwise than i t Now i s . Than which, nothing i s more easy. (pp.53Of) In Clarke's view i t i s "absurd" to suggest that either the matter of the world or i t s motion are necessary. If motion i s necessary " i t follows that i t must be a Contradiction i n Terms to suppose any matter to be at Rest." I t i s also an "express Contradiction" to assert that matter i s necessary, "though not necessary to be every where"; the existence of a vacuum (Clarke's proof of t h i s being from the i d e a l i t y of Newtonian physics) shows that " ' t i s evidently more than possible for Matter not to Be" (pp.531Jf). Newtonian mechanics i s an important influence on Clarke's philosophy: references to motion and i t s o r i g i n occur throughout his work.1 His argument, of course, assumes an absolute space, without which the supposed contradictions of there being no "rest" and of necessary matter being not everywhere, are meaningless. However, i f matter and motion are not necessary and both are observed, a power of beginning both must be i n God as the F i r s t Cause and may be, Clarke w i l l argue, communicable by God to man. This i s his fundamental argument against the denial of l i b e r t y from the 1 See Appendix A.2 f o r notes on Clarke's early work r e l a t i n g to Newton. 13 necessity of a regressing chain of causes. As noted above, Clarke's argument i s founded on a strong concept of causation: the material world i s either 'necessary' or caused by an external cause. This does not allow for a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y : that the material world i s uncaused, purely contingent and not produced by anything. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a purely contingent world does not f a l l f o u l of Clarke's argument against 'absolute necessity of e x i s t i n g ' . His p r i n c i p l e that 'whatever e x i s t s , has a cause' i s , therefore, neither s e l f -evident nor well-supported. I t i s unfortunate f o r Clarke that t h i s i s the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of h i s f i r s t proposition. He expects i t to be common ground with his opponents, however, for he claims that the proposition that 'something has existed from a l l e t e r n i t y ' " i s so evident and Undeniable... that no Atheist i n any Age has ever presumed to assert the contrary" (ijbid.). I t i s notable that Locke uses the same argument that "Non-e n t i t y cannot produce any r e a l Being" i n h i s discussion 'Of our knowledge of the Existence of a God' i n h i s Essay (IV,x,3 2). He does not, however, argue that motion cannot be necessary, but that " incogi tat ive Matter and Motion...could never produce thought" (10). This i s also taken up by Clarke. 2 References to Locke's Essay w i l l be i n the form (Book, Chapter, Paragraph), or i n the form (Paragraph only) where from the same chapter as the immediately preceding reference. The e d i t i o n used i s : John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1693], Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995 14 2.3 The Origin of Intelligence Intelligence, Clarke argues, cannot be bestowed by an u n i n t e l l i g e n t cause ("unintelligent figure and motion"), because "nothing can ever give to another any Perfection which i t hath not," else the perfection i s caused by nothing (p.544). This i s a p r i n c i p l e used extensively by Clarke, sometimes expressed i n the form: "Nothing can possibly be the Cause of an Effect more considerable than itself" (Works,iv,p.723). If t h i s questionable p r i n c i p l e i s granted, the argument works only i f i t i s shown that i n t e l l i g e n c e i s a "real d i s t i n c t Quality," and not a property of matter. Clarke has a simple, perhaps s i m p l i s t i c , argument to support t h i s condition: for t h i s p l a i n Reason; because Intelligence i s not Figure, and Consciousness i s not Motion. For whatever-can a r i s e from, or be compounded of any Things; i s s t i l l only those very Things, of which i t was compounded, (p.545) Thus whatever combinations of matter are envisaged, they are s t i l l only matter and motion. The f i r s t cause must therefore be an i n t e l l i g e n t being i n 'the necessity of i t s own nature'. 2.4 Liberty and Immaterialism Clarke argues that the i n t e l l i g e n c e of God e n t a i l s that God has l i b e r t y , and does not act from necessity. This introduces hi s strong concept of l i b e r t y , which w i l l be a theme throughout the controversies to follow: Intelligence without Liberty... i s r e a l l y . . . no 15 Intelligence at a l l . I t i s indeed a Consciousness, but i t i s merely a Passive One; a Consciousness, not of Acting, but purely of being Acted upon. Without Liberty, nothing can i n any t o l e r a b l e Propriety of Speech, be said to be an Agent, or Cause of any thing. For to Act necessarily, i s r e a l l y and properly not to Act at a l l , but only to be acted upon. (p.548) This i s the basis of Clarke's f i r s t argument against Spinoza's conception of God as a necessary agent. He supports i t with a second argument from the premise that i t i s "evidently most f a l s e and absurd" (p.549) that nothing i n the world could possibly have been otherwise than i t i s ; so absurd, indeed, that of i t s e l f i t immediately, and upon the f i r s t hearing, s u f f i c i e n t l y confutes any P r i n c i p l e of which i t i s a Consequence. For, a l l things i n the World appear p l a i n l y to be the most Arbitrary [contingent] that can be imagined; and to be wholly the E f f e c t s , not of Necessity, but of Wisdom and Choice, (p.550) I t therefore follows "that the Supreme Cause i s not a mere necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice" (p.549). Clarke o f f e r s further d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m of Spinoza's own arguments for necessity; however, since the S p i n o z i s t i c scheme i s adopted by none of the disputants i n the two controversies to be examined, we need not consider the d e t a i l s . I t i s common ground between Clarke and C o l l i n s , Price and P r i e s t l e y , that God or the F i r s t Cause i s free; Clarke and Price argue that l i b e r t y i s "a Power capable of being communicated to Created Beings" (p.553), whereas C o l l i n s and P r i e s t l e y do not. With regard to immaterialism, Clarke has already argued 16 that thought i s incompatible with matter alone, and he therefore argues for thinking, immaterial substance. The argument i s that i f there can be immaterial substances, then " ' t i s most reasonable to believe, that such Substances as are indued with Consciousness and Thought...are those Immaterial Substances" (p.555). His argument that immaterial substances may e x i s t i s by contradiction of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of such substances: the i m p o s s i b i l i t y could only follow from a claim that because we have no ideas of something, i t cannot e x i s t - which i s absurd. The argument, i n sum, i s not wholly s a t i s f y i n g but neither i s i t wholly inadequate: there i s thought; thought cannot a r i s e from material substance; immaterial substance i s not impossible; therefore thought must ar i s e from immaterial substance. When C o l l i n s attacked Clarke on t h i s issue i n t h e i r f i r s t series of exchanges, he chose to argue that i t i s not impossible that thought i s an e f f e c t of matter. Clarke's argument f o r l i b e r t y of the w i l l follows a s i m i l a r pattern, and i s dependent on there being a power of beginning motion i n man. A power of beginning motion i s possible, because i t i s i n God. I t i s possible for God to communicate that power to man, "Because no Powers are Impossible to be Communicated, but only those which imply Self-existence and absolute independency" (p.558); t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s established on the basis that i t i s "no Contradiction". This establishing only the barest of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Clarke argues for supporting evidence. 17 He takes i t as indubitable that we have a power of perception, "Unless Perception be Nothing else, but a mere Passive Reception of Impulse; which I suppose i t i s as c l e a r that i t i s not, as that a Triangle i s not a Sound, or that a Globe i s not a Colour" ( i b i d . ) . If i t i s indubitable that we have this power, a power which must have been communicated from the F i r s t Cause (whereby a l l power has i t s o r i g i n ) , the communication of a power of s e l f -motion may be s i m i l a r l y conceived, and confidently established by experience: .. .1 suppose no considering Man can doubt, but that he a c t u a l l y has also a Power of Self-Motion. For the Arguments drawn from continual Experience and Observation, to prove that we have such a Power, are so strong; that nothing less than a s t r i c t Demonstration that the thing i s absolutely impossible, and that i t implies an express contradiction, can make us i n the least doubt that we have i t not. (ijbid.) This argument from experience i s the p i v o t a l point which turns a weak a priori argument into a strong claim. I t i s perhaps no accident that C o l l i n s , as we s h a l l see, chose to open his Philosophical Inquiry with arguments from experience against l i b e r t y . These are Clarke's basic arguments for thinking, immaterial substance and free, self-moving w i l l . There are, however, some other points which are important to the debate which follows: the d i s t i n c t i o n between moral motives and physical e f f i c i e n t s ; divine prescience; and l i b e r t y as a perfection. 18 2.5 Physical E f f i c i e n t s and Moral Necessity In considering the r e l a t i o n between w i l l and judgement, Clarke introduces a further d i s t i n c t i o n c r u c i a l to the controversies, e s p e c i a l l y i n regard to the debate on causation. The context i s Clarke's opposition to the view ( l a t e r adopted by C o l l i n s and Pri e s t l e y ) that the w i l l i s determined by 'the l a s t judgement of the understanding'. Clarke suggests two possible interpretations: f i r s t , that the l a s t judgement of the understanding i s (as the determination to choose) the same as the v o l i t i o n ; second, i f the judgement and v o l i t i o n are distinguished, then the Act of Volition, or rather the Beginning of Action, consequent upon the last Judgment of the Understanding, i s not determined or caused by that l a s t Judgment, as by the physical Efficient, but only as the Moral Motive, (p.565) The physical e f f i c i e n t , that which immediately causes motion, i s the power of self-motion which Clarke takes himself to have established. The preceding judgement, on the other hand, i s "merely a Moral Motive, upon which the physical Efficient or motive Power begin to Act" (ibid.). A f a i l u r e properly to d i s t i n g u i s h moral motives from physical e f f i c i e n t s , Clarke suggests, leads to confusion with regard to 'moral necessity': the term i s used by Clarke to describe the certainty with which i t may be taken that action follows judgement, "that i s , no Necessity at all, i n the Sense 19 wherein the Opposers of Liberty understand Necessity." Indeed, according to Clarke, t h i s necessity i s consistent with "the most perfect Natural Liberty." His i l l u s t r a t i o n i s worth quoting i n part, f o r t h i s i s the quotation used, or rather misused, by C o l l i n s to suggest that Clarke supports C o l l i n s ' version of necessitarianism: A Man i n t i r e l y free from a l l Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, judges i t unreasonable f o r him to Hurt or Destroy himself; And, being under no Temptation or External Violence, he cannot possibly act contrary to t h i s Judgment; not because he wants a Natural or Physical Power so to do, but because ' t i s absurd and mischievous, and morally impossible, for him to Choose to do i t . (ibid.; cf. C o l l i n s , pp.76f) C o l l i n s uses the term 'moral necessity' i n a d i f f e r e n t way, to describe his conception that the w i l l i s i n truth determined by moral motives (see Chapter Three and Section 4.2). The same point i s l a t e r argued (from a d i f f e r e n t perspective on causation) by P r i e s t i e y . Clarke and Price, on the other hand, maintain that any postulated causal scheme must include a physical e f f i c i e n t capable of causing action; t h i s cannot be attributed to motives, but i s provided by the self-moving power. F i n a l l y i n t h i s section, Clarke suggests that questions of whether an agent i s at l i b e r t y to w i l l or not to w i l l (questions subsequently addressed by C o l l i n s ) are based on confused notions of l i b e r t y and agency: the agent does not choose to will, but chooses whether to act. Liberty, indeed, i s the same with agency: 20 For a Free Agent may be, and indeed e s s e n t i a l l y every Free Agent must be, necessarily Free; that i s , has i t not i n h i s Power, not to be Free. (p.566) God i s free i n his own nature; man i s free by appointment of God. 2.6 Divine Prescience Due to the dominance of r e l i g i o n i n eighteenth-century culture, the argument from divine prescience i s given a prominence i n these debates which would not be expected i n a modern discussion of free w i l l . Clarke's argument here i s based upon the idea that any argument that divine prescience of events renders those events necessary, depends on two inferences: that foreknowledge implies certainty, and that certainty implies necessity. Clarke's strategy i s to suggest (a) that events are not made i n t r i n s i c a l l y more ce r t a i n for being foreknown, and (b) that certainty does not imply necessity. The second argument i s the c r u c i a l one f o r Clarke's purposes. The argument appears to be that i f someone knows x then necessarily x i s true; t h i s does not imply, as the necessitarian would have to i n f e r , that x i s necessarily true. Knowledge changes nothing i n the causal structure: "The bare Fore-sight of a free Action jbefore i t is done, i s nothing d i f f e r e n t (to any purpose i n the present Question,) from a simple Knowledge of i t , when it is done" (p.567). A l l that can a l t e r the certainty with which something i s known i s the 21 perceptiveness of the observer, God being the most perceptive of a l l . We s h a l l meet C o l l i n s ' c r i t i c i s m of t h i s i n Section 4.7. I t i s worth noting, however, that Clarke has the good sense to suggest that, i f well-founded, an inconsistency between l i b e r t y and divine prescience would pray against divine prescience rather than l i b e r t y . 2.7 Liberty as a Perfection Clarke argues (from God's i n f i n i t e knowledge of the r e l a t i o n s , i . e . f i t n e s s or unfitness, of things; the d e t a i l s are not important) that God i s a p e r f e c t l y moral being, acting always yet f r e e l y f o r the best: "'tis...no Diminution eit h e r of Power or Liberty, to have such a Perfect and Unalterable Rectitude of W i l l , as never Possibly to Choose to do any thing inconsistent with that Rectitude" (p.575). From t h i s i t follows, claims Clarke, that l i b e r t y , being " i n the highest and completest degree, i n God himself," i s a perfection. Liberty, indeed, i s an e s s e n t i a l element of the moral ideas of goodness, truth, j u s t i c e , etc. He further argues that to claim that l i b e r t y i s an imperfection on the grounds that freedom makes one capable of causing misery as well as happiness, i s mistaken: " i f we speak properly, ' t i s hot Liberty that exposes us to Misery, but only the Abuse of Liberty" (iibid.). If l i b e r t y i s an imperfection, then "a Stone i s a more excellent and Perfect Creature than 22 Man.11 Again, we s h a l l meet C o l l i n s ' arguments on the point i n Chapter Four. 2.8 Clarke and Leibniz Being and Attributes introduces most of the issues which C o l l i n s addresses i n his Philosophical Inquiry. At the time that C o l l i n s would have been writing his book, Clarke was engaged i n a separate correspondence with Leibniz. Clarke was preparing t h i s correspondence for publication when C o l l i n s ' book was published early i n 1717; Clarke's quickly-written Remarks on C o l l i n s (together with an exchange of l e t t e r s on l i b e r t y and necessity between Clarke and "A Gentleman from Cambridge") were published i n the same volume as the Leibniz correspondence but with separate pagination (Alexander 3, p.2). I t i s therefore worth b r i e f l y considering some aspects of the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence for purposes of context. The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence was wide-ranging i n i t s subject matter, concerning primarily questions of the nature of space and time and Newtonian p r i n c i p l e s , but including some debate on f r e e - w i l l . The correspondence was occasioned by Caroline, Princess of Wales (wife of the l a t e r George I I ) , long 3 H.G. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester: Manchester u n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956 23 an acquaintance of Leibniz. Caroline wished to see Leibniz's Theodicy translated into English, and Clarke was suggested to her as a potential t r a n s l a t o r . She passed to him the contents of a l e t t e r dated November 1715 i n which Leibniz had c r i t i c i z e d the apparent tendency of English thought - e s p e c i a l l y that of Locke and Newton - to undermine natural r e l i g i o n . Though Clarke declined to translate the Theodicy (being too much opposed to Leibniz's opinions), he sent to Caroline a response to Leibniz's remarks; an exchange of papers ensued, with Caroline acting as conduit. She herself took i n t e r e s t i n the issues and was impressed by the work of both men, though favoured Leibniz, as shown by these extracts from l e t t e r s which she wrote to him: Send me, please, your opinion on Dr. Clarke's works which I think have considerable merit although not comparable with the Theodicy. (26 November 1715) Last Saturday I had the Abbe Conti and Mr. Clarke with me from 6 t i l l 10 o'clock. I should have l i k e d you there to support me. Mr Clarke's knowledge and his cl e a r way of reasoning have almost converted me to believing i n the vacuum. (24 A p r i l 1716) I read with pleasure the r e p l i e s which you have made to Mr. Clarke. I do not know i f he w i l l be able to reply to them. Clarke i s a man of the greatest v i v a c i t y and of an eloquence which i s , i n my opinion, unequalled. (31 August 1716) (Alexander, pp. 190,194,196f) The cause of the dispute was Leibniz's r e j e c t i o n of Newton's claim that God must intervene i n the universe to correct the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n o r b i t s that would occur from the g r a v i t a t i o n a l action of the planets on each other. (That these would cancel out over time was not proved u n t i l a f t e r Newton's 24 death.) Leibniz thought t h i s an unacceptable imputation of God's power, that "He had not, i t seems, s u f f i c i e n t foresight to make i t a perpetual motion" (p.11); rather, Leibniz's conception was of a 'pre-established harmony' i n creation, of both material bodies and souls. Part of t h i s conception i s an ingenious, i f odd way of meeting the standard objection to dualism - that the mutual influence of minds and bodies cannot be explained - by claiming that the mechanical operations of the body and the immaterial operations of the soul are causally separate but harmonized by God: [T]he soul does not disturb the laws of the body, nor the body those of the soul;...the soul and body do only agree together; the one acting f r e e l y , according to the rules of f i n a l causes; and the other acting mechanically, according to the laws of e f f i c i e n t causes. But t h i s does not derogate from the l i b e r t y of our souls... For every agent which acts according to f i n a l causes, i s free, though i t happens to agree with an agent acting only by e f f i c i e n t causes without knowledge, or mechanically; because God, foreseeing what the free cause would do, did from the beginning regulate the machine i n such a manner, that i t cannot f a i l to agree with that free cause. (L.V.92;pp.85f4) Clarke rejects t h i s as a "perpetual miracle" which reduces a l l to necessity. His contention i s f o r f a i r l y standard dualism, where the soul and body in t e r a c t , the soul being the p r i n c i p l e of action. For Leibniz, w i l l must be motivated; for Clarke, being 4 References to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence w i l l be by author ' s i n i t i a l , paper number, and paragraph number; together with the page reference i n Alexander. 25 moved by motives i s p a s s i v i t y , not action. As we s h a l l see, i n t h i s Leibniz i s close to Locke and C o l l i n s ; indeed Leibniz had prepared (though not published) a commentary on Locke's Essay, which - though c r i t i c a l of much of Locke's philosophy - i s broadly sympathetic to his discussion of l i b e r t y and necessity. 5 Leibniz draws d i s t i n c t i o n s between absolute necessity, hypothetical necessity, and moral necessity. Absolute necessity refers to such things as essences and mathematical truths, i . e . that which could not be otherwise without contradiction. Hypothetical necessity refers to contingent events, and follows from God's pre-ordination. Pre-ordination i s , i n Leibniz's view, compatible with l i b e r t y : i n choosing the best of a l l possible worlds, God actualized the free natures of the creatures he saw i n his ideas, thereby making a l l events cer t a i n and determined without derogating l i b e r t y . Moral necessity i s that whereby "a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest i n c l i n a t i o n " (L.V.4; p.56). This d i f f e r s from absolute necessity, because an al t e r n a t i v e action i s i n i t s e l f no contradiction; thus, i n Leibniz's term, motive " i n c l i n e s without [absolutely] necessitating" (L.V.8;p.57). This i s a consequence of his ' p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason', namely "that nothing happens without a s u f f i c i e n t reason, why i t should be so rather than 5 G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, t r . and ed. Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.169-212 26 otherwise" (L.Ill.2;p.25); the s u f f i c i e n t reason includes a l l conditions of each event i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r i t y , including the motives present i n the mind. Leibniz's conception i s a form of compatibilism: 'free' agents act i n a way that i s determined by God's ordering of 'the best of a l l possible worlds', and i s always i n accordance with the strongest motive. Leibniz's d i s t i n c t i o n between absolute, hypothetical and moral necessity i s unacceptable to Clarke: "Necessity, i n philosophical questions, always s i g n i f i e s absolute necessity... Hypothetical necessity, and moral necessity, are only f i g u r a t i v e ways of speaking, and i n philosophical s t r i c t n e s s of speaking, are no necessity at a l l " (C.V;p.99 6). In the case of 'moral necessity' i n p a r t i c u l a r he simply refuses to accept Leibniz's d e f i n i t i o n of terms, preferring his own character-related d e f i n i t i o n (see Section 2.5); t h i s w i l l also be an issue i n the dispute with C o l l i n s . He denies also the metaphysical framework of pre-established harmony between soul and body - t h i s being simply i n c r e d i b l e . Clarke astutely observes that Leibniz's 'pre-established harmony' c a r r i e s the danger of leading to a p h y s i c a l i s t notion that soul " i s merely a f i c t i o n and a dream": 6 In his f i r s t four papers Clarke answers Leibniz paragraph by numbered paragraph. In the f i f t h paper he ceases to do t h i s and instead summarizes sections, dispensing with paragraph numbers. 27 Besides: what d i f f i c u l t y i s there avoided, by so strange an hypothesis? This only; that i t cannot be conceived ( i t seems) how immaterial substance should act upon matter. But i s God not an immaterial substance? And does not he act upon matter? (C.V;pp.ll6f) He goes on to suggest that conceiving how the immaterial soul a f f e c t s the body i s no more d i f f i c u l t (or no easier) than conceiving how physical forces operate, or how l i g h t i s r e f l e c t e d from material objects. The debate reached an impasse. In a l e t t e r to Caroline accompanying part of his f i f t h paper i n August 1716, Leibniz had written: This reply i s very f u l l since I wanted to explain everything completely and to see whether there i s any hope of making Mr. Clarke see reason. For i f he f a l l s back on repeating himself, there w i l l be nothing to be done with him and one w i l l have to t r y p o l i t e l y to come to a close, (p.196) And on 11 September 1716: If he continues to dispute my great p r i n c i p l e [of s u f f i c i e n t reason], and i f he s t i l l claims that something can happen by a mere will of God without any motive, he w i l l have to be l e f t to his opinion or rather to his obstinacy, (p.197) Clarke was indeed l e f t to his obstinacy: his f i f t h reply was sent by Caroline to Leibniz on 29 October 1716; Leibniz died on 14 November. Clarke makes two s p e c i f i c references to Leibniz's papers i n 28 his Remarks on C o l l i n s ; these w i l l be discussed at the relevant point i n the comparison of C o l l i n s ' and Clarke's books i n Chapter Four. In order to complete the background to the debate, we turn now to C o l l i n s and the influence of Locke on his writing. 29 CHAPTER THREE COLLINS AND LOCKE Whereas Clarke approaches the question of l i b e r t y and necessity from the position of a r a t i o n a l i s t theologian, C o l l i n s ' approach i s to combine the empiricism of Locke with the r a t i o n a l i s t arguments of Hobbes. We have met Hobbes' discussion i n Chapter One; the aim of t h i s chapter i s therefore to set C o l l i n s ' thought within the context of Locke's work. There was a close personal r e l a t i o n s h i p between C o l l i n s and Locke (see Appendix A . l ) , given which i t i s perhaps unsurprising that Locke's writings on l i b e r t y and necessity are a major influence on C o l l i n s ' own work. Locke's discussion on the topic i s to be found i n Book II of h i s Essay, i n Chapter x x i : "Of Power". 'Power' i s that which enables change: active power i s the a b i l i t y to a f f e c t change, passive power the a b i l i t y to be changed. The source of our clearest idea of active power i s r e f l e c t i o n on the experience that we can move our bodies, apparently by mere thought: This at l e a s t I think evident, that we f i n d i n ourselves a power to begin or forbear, to continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as i t were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a p a r t i c u l a r action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider i t , or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to i t s r e s t , and vice versa, i n any p a r t i c u l a r instance, i s that which we c a l l "the w i l l . " The actual exercise of that 30 power, by d i r e c t i n g any p a r t i c u l a r action or i t s forbearance, i s that which we c a l l " v o l i t i o n " or " w i l l i n g . " (II,xxi,5) I have quoted Locke at length here, as i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to compare C o l l i n s ' version of the d e f i n i t i o n of w i l l , to see just how c l o s e l y he follows Locke's language: I t i s a matter of d a i l y experience, that we begin, or forbear, continue or end, several actions barely by a thought, or preference of the mind, ordering the doing or not doing, the continuing or ending, [of] such and such actions. Thus, before we think or deliberate on any subject, as before we get on horseback, we do prefer those things to anything else i n competition with them. In l i k e manner, i f we forbear, these actions, when any of them are offered to our thoughts: or i f we continue to proceed i n any one of these actions once begun: or i f at any time we make an end of prosecuting them; we do forbear, or continue, or end them on our preference of the forbearance to the doing of them, of the continuing of them to the ending them, and of the ending to the continuing them. This power of the man thus to order the beginning or forbearance, the continuing, or ending, of any action, i s c a l l e d the will, and the actual exercise thereof, willing. ( C o l l i n s , p.25) C o l l i n s ' passage reads as a paraphrase of Locke, with some additional commentary; there i s no e x p l i c i t reference to Locke's passage, but C o l l i n s probably expected that i t would be f a m i l i a r to his readers. The profound influence of Locke's philosophy on C o l l i n s ' work i s abundantly cl e a r , but C o l l i n s does not u n c r i t i c a l l y accept a l l of Locke's discussion on l i b e r t y and necessity. In t h i s section I s h a l l therefore consider to what extent Locke's arguments are adopted and to what extent adapted by C o l l i n s . 31 Locke's delineation of the operations of the mind i s i n terms of 'powers' rather than ' f a c u l t i e s ' . His complaint against describing 'the understanding' and 'the w i l l ' as ' f a c u l t i e s ' i s that they lead to the supposition of "some r e a l beings i n the soul, that performed those actions of understanding and v o l i t i o n " (II,xxi,6). This supposition i n turn leads to confused questions of the d i f f e r i n g scopes of action of d i s t i n c t agents i n the mind. Locke has no complaint, however, with the language of statements and questions such as that "the w i l l i s the commanding and superior f a c u l t y of the soul; that i t i s or i s not free; that i t determines the i n f e r i o r f a c u l t i e s ; that i t follows the dictates of the understanding, &c" (6), provided that the meaning i s understood as related to the p r i o r i t y of powers exercised by the mind as a whole. For Locke, 'the understanding' i s the power of perception, and the exercise of that power leads to 'acts' of the understanding: (a) perception of ideas; and (b) judgement, or the "perception of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement" of ideas (5). 1 As we s h a l l see, t h i s description of perception and judgement i n terms of 'acts' i s adopted by C o l l i n s , and i s c r i t i c i z e d by Clarke. As already noted, the exercise of the power to order action i s ' w i l l i n g ' ; the ideas of l i b e r t y and necessity a r i s e from the extent of t h i s power: 1 The t h i r d category of perception described by Locke, namely "The perception of the s i g n i f i c a t i o n of signs", i s not relevant to t h i s discussion. 32 [S]o f ar as a man has a power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or d i r e c t i o n of his own mind, so f a r i s a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally i n a man's power, wherever doing i t or not doing i t w i l l not equally follow upon the preference of his mind d i r e c t i n g i t , there he i s not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. (8) Therefore an action being voluntary i s a necessary though not s u f f i c i e n t condition of l i b e r t y . I t i s not s u f f i c i e n t because i t i s possible to conceive of a s i t u a t i o n where a voluntary action i s constrained by external factors. Locke gives an example of a man waking to f i n d that he has been locked i n a room with someone with whom he actually wishes to stay and converse. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the man's staying i s voluntary, though " i t i s evident he i s not at l i b e r t y not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone" (10). Liberty as the power to act according to preference where alternatives are available, i s a development of the weak concept of freedom allowed by Hobbes, and i s what Hume was l a t e r to c a l l "hypothetical l i b e r t y " (EHU732). Two points ari s e here, which are important for the Clarke-C o l l i n s debate. F i r s t , Locke appears to be equating v o l i t i o n and preference; t h i s i s adopted by C o l l i n s and c r i t i c i z e d by Clarke. Locke, however, l a t e r notes the inadequacy of t h i s equation, and warns the reader to r e f l e c t on his own experience i n order that the expressions may be d i s t i n c t l y understood: Chapter Five, n.5 33 "Preferring," which seems best to express the act of v o l i t i o n , does i t not pr e c i s e l y . For though a man would prefer f l y i n g to walking, yet who can say he ever w i l l s i t ? V o l i t i o n , i t i s p l a i n , i s an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion i t takes i t s e l f to have over any part of the man, by employing i t i n or withholding i t from any p a r t i c u l a r action. (15) Secondly, Locke considers that his formulation of the concepts of ' w i l l ' , ' v o l i t i o n ' and ' l i b e r t y ' renders u n i n t e l l i g i b l e the question of whether the w i l l i s free. ' W i l l ' i s the power exercised i n v o l i t i o n ; ' l i b e r t y ' i s the power to act according to preference; to ask whether the w i l l has l i b e r t y i s therefore "to ask whether one power has another power" (16), which i s a category mistake. The common confusion, according to Locke, i s to consider the w i l l as an homuncular facu l t y ; on the contrary, he wants to emphasize that " i t i s the mind that operates and exerts these powers; i t i s the man that does the action, i t i s the agent that has the power, or i s able to do" (19). The c u r i o s i t y of t h i s argument i s i t s absence from C o l l i n s ' work: given the influence of Locke's work on C o l l i n s and the close adoption of his language, i t i s perhaps surprising that C o l l i n s doesn't re f e r at a l l to t h i s argument.3 The reason may be that he considered i t to be a d i s t r a c t i o n from the main C o l l i n s quotes a related passage from Locke ( C o l l i n s , p.28; cf Locke, II.xxi.25), that to ask whether one i s at l i b e r t y to choose between alternatives " i s to ask whether a man can w i l l what he w i l l s , or be pleased with what he i s pleased with", which i s absurd. C o l l i n s ' point i s that w i l l i s judgement of what i s best for the agent, and judgement i s necessitated by circumstance (see Section 4.3); Locke's argument from the d e f i n i t i o n of powers i s d i f f e r e n t . 34 issue, namely the question of whether the w i l l i s determined. With the above argument, Locke e f f e c t i v e l y by-passes the issue of whether or not there i s a self-determining f a c u l t y of w i l l ; i m p l i c i t l y deciding i n favour of a form of necessitarianism, he moves to an empirical examination of what that form might be. C o l l i n s , however, seems to be more interested i n disproving, rather than circumventing the self-determining w i l l postulated by those he wants to oppose, s p e c i f i c a l l y Clarke. For Locke, the w i l l - being a power of the mind - i s determined by the mind, so the question of what determines the w i l l becomes, "What moves the mind i n each p a r t i c u l a r instance to determine i t s general power of d i r e c t i n g to t h i s or that p a r t i c u l a r motion or re s t ? " (29). His answer i s a form of hedonism, analyzed i n terms of 'desire' as "an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good" (31): the 'absent good' for someone f e e l i n g pain, for example, i s the ease of that pain, and the subsequent desire i s desire for that ease. Locke's view i s that uneasiness i s the prime cause of v o l i t i o n : contentment causes only r e s t ; the greatest good i s rejected as motivation also, for Locke's empirical judgement i s that an i n t e l l e c t u a l assessment of what ought to be the case w i l l always be overridden by a f e l t uneasiness: " I t i s better to marry than to burn," says St. Paul; where we may see what i t i s that c h i e f l y drives a man into the enjoyments of a conjugal l i f e . A l i t t l e burning f e l t pushes us more powerfully than greater 35 pleasures i n prospect draw or a l l u r e . (34)* Something i s 'good' or ' e v i l ' according to i t s propensity to produce pleasure or pain i n us; t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s another adopted by C o l l i n s . That which i s 'good', says Locke, i s not always desired, and so need not move the w i l l . However, contemplation of a 'good' may r a i s e i n the mind some desire, "which, then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness, stands upon f a i r terms with the res t to be s a t i s f i e d , and so, according to i t s greatness and pressure, comes i n i t s turn to determine the w i l l " (45). The 'greatness and pressure' of competing uneasinesses i s important for Locke's analysis, and leads to a further argument rejected by C o l l i n s . The greatest and most pressing uneasiness, according to Locke, generally determines the w i l l - but not always (47). Experience shows that the mind has a power to suspend the s a t i s f a c t i o n of any of i t s desires. We may therefore evaluate the competing desires and act according to the one favoured: "This seems to me the source of a l l l i b e r t y ; i n t h i s seems to consist that which i s (as I think improperly) c a l l e d 'free-w i l l ' " (ijbid.). Here Locke i s using the term ' l i b e r t y ' d i f f e r e n t l y from before: his primary d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e r t y i s as the freedom of having available a l t e r n a t i v e s ; the usage here i s 4 This i s a contender for the best joke i n the Essay - which doesn't say much for the r e s t . 36 the closest he allows to the l i b e r t a r i a n concept of l i b e r t y as the freedom of the mind to determine choice independently of motive. C o l l i n s denies that a power to suspend the execution of desires implies l i b e r t y , f o r he considers t h i s suspension to be a suspension of w i l l . Given that i t i s the ordering of consideration of ideas (see Locke's d e f i n i t i o n of ' w i l l ' , above), t h i s 'suspension of w i l l ' i s i t s e l f an act of w i l l ; as such i t i s immediate and i n accordance with the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e . We s h a l l see that the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e i s central to C o l l i n s ' arguments, though i t i s less extensively developed than i n Locke; there i s nothing i n C o l l i n s to compare with Locke's analysis of 'uneasiness'. I t i s worth noting f i n a l l y Locke's formulation of the determination of the w i l l i n g of the mind by judgement, i n order to bring out the difference i n terminology which we s h a l l f i n d i n C o l l i n s : [W]ere we determined by any thing but the l a s t r e s u l t of our own minds judging of the good or e v i l of any action, we were not free; the very end of our freedom being, that we may obtain the good we choose. And therefore every man i s put under a necessity by his constitution, as an i n t e l l i g e n t being, to be determined i n w i l l i n g , by h i s own thought and judgement, what i s best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which i s want of l i b e r t y . And to deny that a man's w i l l , i n every determination, follows his own judgement, i s to say, that a man w i l l s and acts f o r an end that he would not have, at the time that he w i l l 37 and acts for i t . (48) This i s i n essence the p o s i t i o n that C o l l i n s adopts, and that Clarke / opposes. C o l l i n s , however, retains (at least i m p l i c i t l y ) the more t r a d i t i o n a l formulation of the w i l l as a separate faculty, which i s either at l i b e r t y or under necessity. That "every man i s put under necessity by h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n " i s just what C o l l i n s means by affirming 'moral necessity' and that man i s a 'necessary agent', and by denying ' l i b e r t y ' and that man i s a 'free agent'. C o l l i n s i s perhaps driven to these d i s t i n c t i o n s from Locke by his apparent aim of combining Locke's a posteriori hedonistic determinism with Hobbes' a priori causal determinism. The background complete, I s h a l l now turn to the d e t a i l s of the Clarke-Collins controversy. 38 CHAPTER FOUR THE CLARKE-COLLINS CONTROVERSY 4.1 The 'Dodwell' Correspondence The f i r s t s eries of exchanges between Clarke and C o l l i n s began i n 1707 with the publication by Clarke of A Letter to Mr. Dodwell i n which he c r i t i c i z e d a book i n which Henry Dodwell had suggested that the soul i s naturally mortal and has immortality conferred upon i t during the r i t e of Baptism. Clarke argued that t h i s i s the top of a slippery slope leading to the denial of an soul independent of the body, which notion he had already opposed i n Being and Attributes. C o l l i n s published an open l e t t e r i n response, challenging Clarke's thesis that "the same substance cannot be both S o l i d and have the Power of Thinking" (p.750 1). One of Clarke's arguments for t h i s d u a l i s t position i s that consciousness, as an i n d i v i d u a l , i n d i v i s i b l e power, cannot be a property of matter, which i s d i v i s i b l e ; i f consciousness inhered i n matter, then each part or atom would be an i n d i v i d u a l consciousness. C o l l i n s ' response i s that i t i s possible to conceive of powers or properties which belong to a system but not i t s parts; he instances the power of a rose to cause the sensation of sweetness, the power of a clock to keep time, and the property of roundness of a c i r c u l a r object whose 1 Clarke's pamphlet against Dodwell, together with C o l l i n s ' four pamphlets of Reflections and Clarke's four Defences, are reprinted i n Clarke's Works, v o l . i i i ; the page references given i n t h i s section are to t h i s volume. 39 parts are not c i r c u l a r . The thesis which he aims to defend i s a d e l i b e r a t e l y weak one: i f i n d i v i d u a l powers are possible i n compound systems, then thinking may be a property of matter. Clarke accused C o l l i n s of f a l l a c i o u s reasoning, and the argument continued through pamphlets published over a period of two years. The d e t a i l s are not important to t h i s discussion: the debate i s highly r e p e t i t i v e and generally t u r g i d . The 'Dodwell' correspondence i s , however, of h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t , for i t helped to e s t a b l i s h the disputants' place i n the history of eighteenth-century thought. The debate was much discussed and quoted by other writers, including Price and P r i e s t l e y , and i t i s possible to trace influences of the debate i n Hume's Treatise.2 There are also some l i t e r a r y points worth bringing out. The f i r s t i s that C o l l i n s published his works anonymously, whereas Clarke's authorship i s i d e n t i f i e d throughout. Nevertheless, Clarke was well aware against whom he was writing: i n the f i n a l paper he points out a contradiction (regarding the succession of thoughts i n God) between C o l l i n s ' fourth 'Dodwell' pamphlet and h i s Essay Concerning the Use of Reason (1707, 2nd e d i t i o n 1709) with the words, "This D i f f i c u l t y you must by no means pass over u n s a t i s f i e d ; because the Author of the Essay here c i t e d , i s believed to be a Person, whose Reasoning you 2 For discussion on these points see John Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain, pp.39-45, and Paul Russell, "Hume's Treatise and the Clarke-Collins Controversy", Hume Studies, Vol.xxi, No.l, A p r i l 1995, pp.95-115 40 cannot s l i g h t " (p.893). The second point i s that the pamphlets reveal a use of i r o n i c wit by C o l l i n s also; where Clarke's s t y l e i s arrogant and his irony combative, C o l l i n s i s self-confident and more p l a y f u l . Two f i n e examples of the l a t t e r r e l a t e to the Boyle Lectures. The f i r s t , used to introduce a discussion of the existence of God: Since, on the occasion of the Boylean Lecture, the Existence of God i s often made a Question (which otherwise would be with few any Question at a l l ) . . . (p.883) The second example, l a t e r i n the same discussion, sees C o l l i n s suggesting that "the great Labour [of establishing] an Idea of Creation ex nihilo, must make i t more pardonable i n me...if I omit for the present so useful a Design, or should leave i t e n t i r e l y to some of those Gentlemen that are appointed to preach at the lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle" (p.884). The question of l i b e r t y and necessity arises only l a t e i n the 'Dodwell' correspondence, when C o l l i n s ends his t h i r d pamphlet with the observation that Clarke "has not drawn up one Proposition to show that h i s Argument i s of any use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion" (p.821); Clarke's response to t h i s taunt i s to claim that i t i s the denial of dualism which undermines r e l i g i o n by undermining l i b e r t y and hence morality. The substance of the ensuing arguments we either have met or 41 w i l l meet elsewhere, but there are two points to note here. F i r s t , the arguments between Clarke and C o l l i n s concerning l i b e r t y and necessity f i r s t occur within a debate on a form of materialism, i . e . the question of whether matter can think or whether there must be a separate immaterial thinking substance, but i n the immediate context of a discussion of theism. Secondly, the main themes of the controversy to follow are established i n t h i s debate, eight years before C o l l i n s ' Philosophical Inquiry. The version of compatibilism which C o l l i n s expounds i n his Philosophical Inquiry i s i n evidence i n hi s fourth 'Dodwell' pamphlet, i n which he describes the only coherent notion of l i b e r t y as "a Power to do as we will, and forbear as we will", but the w i l l i s i t s e l f determined by motives: [F]or whenever I prefer one thing to another, i t i s always on some Motives or Causes; and I f i n d that I cannot but prefer what I do prefer, t i l l d i f f e r e n t Motives or Causes produce another Preference, Choice, or W i l l . . . (p.872) This i s again the 'hypothetical l i b e r t y ' of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. I t i s the weak concept which Clarke argued against i n his defence of theism i n Being and Attributes, and the role of li b e r t a r i a n i s m i n that defence i s again apparent here. Clarke's f i n a l reply includes again the argument that r e l i g i o n supposes a "future State of Rewards and Punishments" (p.905), and that God, being p e r f e c t l y just, cannot judge a man for necessary 42 actions "any more than a Man can be angry with his Clock for going wrong": T i l l you can give a clear Answer to t h i s Argument, you stand obliged by Promise to allow that man is no more a Subject of Religion, than a Clock... Though, I hope, you w i l l be better than your Word; and own rather, that there i s no such thing as Necessity, (p.906) C o l l i n s wrote no immediate reply, but included sections on the 'nature of rewards and punishments' and the 'nature of morality' i n h i s Philosophical Inquiry (see Sections 4.8 - 4.10, below). 4.2 C o l l i n s ' Philosophical Inquiry and Clarke's Remarks The question of l i b e r t y and necessity had played a substantial though secondary role i n Clarke's Being and Attributes and i n the 'Dodwell' correspondence. I t comes to the fore i n the texts which are the focus of t h i s chapter: C o l l i n s ' short book A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, and Clarke's Remarks upon t h i s book.3 C o l l i n s ' book i s i n the form of a survey of arguments concerning freedom of the w i l l , and a resolution of each i n favour of necessity. Clarke's response was no doubt motivated by C o l l i n s ' i m p l i c i t references to, and e x p l i c i t misrepresentation of, h i s arguments i n Being and Attributes. 3 The editions referred to i n t h i s discussion are: Anthony C o l l i n s , A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, Birmingham: Joseph Priestley/Thomas Pearson, 1790; and Samuel Clarke, "Remarks, upon a book e n t i t l e d . . . " , Works, v o l . i v , pp.719-735. Unless otherwise i d e n t i f i e d , page references to Clarke and C o l l i n s i n the remainder of t h i s chapter are to these texts. 43 The main thread of C o l l i n s ' book i s an argument for the form of compatibilism i d e n t i f i e d above. In the Preface he follows Locke and Hobbes in "contend[ing] for liberty, as i t s i g n i f i e s , a power in man, to do as he wills or pleases" ( p . x v i i ) , i . e . hypothetical l i b e r t y or ' l i b e r t y ' as having a l t e r n a t i v e s . In the body of the text, however, ' l i b e r t y ' refers to the l i b e r t a r i a n concept which C o l l i n s r e j e c t s , namely that the w i l l i s a free faculty of the mind, able to choose independently of motive. To t h i s C o l l i n s contrasts and argues for 'moral necessity', "meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses" ( p . x v i i i ) . Necessity, therefore, i s i n t e r n a l to the mind. C o l l i n s does reveal an underlying b e l i e f i n physical necessity l a t e i n the book, though i n the Preface denies that man i s subject to a 'physical' or 'mechanical' necessity such as i s i n clocks and watches. C o l l i n s sets out his version of the question of l i b e r t y and necessity i n his Introduction: man i s a necessary agent i f a l l h i s actions are determined by p r i o r causes i n such a way that the actions could not be otherwise; he i s a free agent i f he i s not so determined, but i s able to perform d i f f e r e n t actions under pre c i s e l y the same causes and circumstances. His argument that man i s a 'necessary agent' acting under 'moral necessity' proceeds i n three main stages v i a s i x arguments: 44 (A) Arguments from experience are considered to show that we have no reason to believe that we have l i b e r t y of w i l l , and indeed reason to support necessity. This i s the section which most c l e a r l y shows the influence of Locke. (B) There i s the central metaphysical argument for necessity on the basis of theories of causation derived from Hobbes. This i s perhaps the core of the book, though one of the shortest sections. (C) I t i s shown from arguments concerning ( i ) whether l i b e r t y i s a perfection or imperfection, and ( i i ) divine prescience, that i t i s necessity rather than l i b e r t y that i s consistent with r e l i g i o n ; and from arguments concerning ( i i i ) the j u s t i c e of rewards and punishments, and (iv) moral understanding i t s e l f , that l i b e r t y i s indeed harmful to morality. The argument i n each case follows a broadly s i m i l a r pattern: the question i s set out and previous positions examined, followed by C o l l i n s ' own argument supported by a u t h o r i t i e s . In considering the d e t a i l s we s h a l l see that C o l l i n s uses four basic argument types: (a) formalization of his analysis of experience; (b) p o s i t i v e , d i r e c t argument from f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s , or from p r i n c i p l e s previously established, or from p r i n c i p l e s accepted by h i s opponents; (c) argument from 45 authority; and (d) demonstration of inconsistencies i n his opponents' positions. C o l l i n s ' arguments for necessity are c r i t i c i z e d by Clarke i n his Remarks on the Philosophical Inquiry, which remarks are e s s e n t i a l l y elaboration of his e a r l i e r arguments i n Being and Attributes. There, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , Clarke argued a priori for the p o s s i b i l i t y of a self-moving power endowed by God upon man, which p o s s i b i l i t y i s confirmed by experience. Further, t h i s strong concept of agency i n man i s a necessary condition of morality. Clarke aims to defend these concepts against C o l l i n s ' denial of the arguments for l i b e r t y from experience and his advocacy of an adequate conception of morality based on a weaker concept of agency, namely action i n accordance with w i l l . Whereas i n Being and Attributes Clarke was committed to a priori argument, here his project i s less p o s i t i v e , the focus being to destroy C o l l i n s ' arguments. I now turn to the d e t a i l s of the arguments, taking each section of C o l l i n s ' book i n turn, alongside Clarke's c r i t i c i s m s . 4.3 Arguments from Experience C o l l i n s has two reasons f o r beginning with arguments from experience: f i r s t , that since the question of whether we are free or necessitated i s a question of what we do, an analysis of experience i s sensible; secondly, that experience i s "urged with 46 great triumph" by the l i b e r t a r i a n s he wants to oppose; as seen i n Section 2.4, the argument from experience i s c r u c i a l to Clarke's argument for the l i b e r t a r i a n p o s i t i o n . Whether because of the importance which C o l l i n s attaches to the argument, or to display his prodigious reading on the subject, t h i s f i r s t argument takes up almost half of the book. He begins by noting that various philosophers and theologians from the ancients to his contemporaries have given d e f i n i t i o n s of l i b e r t y which are consistent with necessity; these are generally variations on (Cicero) "a power to do as we will," or (Alexander of Aphrodisias) "a power... to chuse and do what is the most eligible to our reason" (p.10/). As already noted, i t w i l l be C o l l i n s ' case that w i l l i s consequent upon judgement, which i s i t s e l f determined, but that as long as we are free to do as we w i l l then that i s a p e r f e c t l y adequate conception of freedom. He w i t t i l y suggests that those authors (e.g. Erasmus, Archbishop King) who claim l i b e r t y from experience, yet observe that the question of l i b e r t y and necessity i s philo s o p h i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t , contradict themselves: But how can a l l t h i s happen i n a p l a i n matter of f a c t , supposed to be experienced by every body? What d i f f i c u l t y can there be i n s t a t i n g a p l a i n matter of fa c t , and describing what every body feels? What need of so much Philosophy?" (p.15) F i n a l l y he c i t e s other writers (including C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s ) , "and those the most discerning" (p.21), who either see themselves as necessitated, or see that experience cannot decide 47 the question one way or the other. Having surveyed the l i t e r a t u r e i n t h i s manner, C o l l i n s turns to his own analysis of experience and i n p a r t i c u l a r four 'actions' which he takes to be relevant: (1) Perception of Ideas, (2) Judging of Perceptions, (3) W i l l i n g , and (4) Doing as we w i l l . One of Clarke's complaints against C o l l i n s i s that his characterization of action i s flawed, that ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of perception) that which i s e n t i r e l y passive cannot be termed an 'action': perception i s not something one can s t r i c t l y do. I t i s a true point but somewhat fatuous, for perception of ideas i s a moment of experience which i s relevant to the question, and i n ordinary language i s something we 'do' as subjects. However Clarke believes that his point i s not merely semantic, and that C o l l i n s ' confusion between active and passive moments leads him to errors i n h i s argument. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to r e c a l l i n t h i s context that Clarke had used the power of perception i n Being and Attributes i n h i s argument for a power of self-motion; there he had implied that perception i s not e n t i r e l y passive, being other than "a mere Passive Reception of Impulse" (see Section 2.4 above). The section on Perception of Ideas reveals C o l l i n s ' debt to Locke's formulation of the categories of ideas as either sensation or r e f l e c t i o n : we necessarily and i n v o l u n t a r i l y receive sensation, and we necessarily and i n v o l u n t a r i l y are 48 conscious that we think when we do think. Any l i b e r t a r i a n i s u n l i k e l y to dispute t h i s much, though C o l l i n s continues with a highly questionable proposition: And as we necessarily receive ideas, so each idea i s necessarily what i s i n our mind: for i t i s not possible to make any thing d i f f e r e n t from i t s e l f . This f i r s t action, the reader w i l l see, i s the foundation and cause of a l l the other i n t e l l i g e n t actions of man, and makes them also necessary, (p.22) If by 'the reader w i l l see', C o l l i n s intends ' i t w i l l be shown', then that i s f a i r enough at t h i s stage; but i f he intends ' i t i s self-evident', then he i s overstating h i s case. That perception of ideas influences i n t e l l i g e n t actions i s unquestionable, but that i t i s the cause of all such actions i s just the question at issue: Clarke denies that perception of ideas can be a cause of anything, but i s only a 'moral motive'. The argument r e l a t i n g to the second action - judging of perceptions - i s s i m i l a r i n nature: every proposition f a l l s into one of s i x categories ("self-evident, or evident from proof, or probable, or improbable, or doubtful, or f a l s e " (p.23)), and we judge which exactly according as the proposition appears to us, i n a manner analogous to judging an appearance to be of one colour rather than another. Again, Clarke's only response to t h i s point i s to assert that to describe t h i s as a necessary action i s absurd (p.727), not because i t i s not necessary but because i t i s not action. Clarke's concepts of action and 49 freedom are i d e n t i c a l , and stated i n terms of 'beginning motion', i . e . without external cause; 'necessary action' i s , for him, a contradiction i n terms. Had C o l l i n s , however, merely used d i f f e r e n t terminology - say 'moment' f o r 'action' - there would s t i l l be no dispute thus f a r . Clarke's s i m i l a r assessment of 'perception of ideas' and 'judgement of perceptions' i s that they are both passive moments. C o l l i n s ' t h i r d action i s ' w i l l i n g ' , the d e f i n i t i o n of which we met i n r e l a t i o n to Locke's Essay i n the previous chapter: I t i s a matter of d a i l y experience, that we begin, or forbear, continue or end, several actions barely by a thought, or preference of the mind, ordering the doing or not doing, the continuing or ending, [of] such and such actions... This power of the man thus to order the beginning or forbearance, the continuance, or ending, of any action, i s c a l l e d the will, and the actual exercise thereof, willing, (p.25) There i s question of interpretation i n the d e f i n i t i o n which Clarke exploits, namely the r e l a t i o n between w i l l and preference: does the w i l l act i n accordance with and consequent upon preference, or i s w i l l i d e n t i f i e d with preference? That C o l l i n s intends the l a t t e r i s suggested by the following a few pages l a t e r : W i l l i n g or preferring i s the same with respect to good and e v i l , that judging i s with respect to truth or falsehood. I t i s judging, that one thing i s , upon the whole, better than another, or not so bad as another, (p.28) Clarke accuses C o l l i n s of confusing the term ' w i l l i n g ' to mean 50 sometimes (as i n the l a t t e r quote) "the last Perception or Approbation of the Understanding", which i s a passive moment, and sometimes (as i n the former d e f i n i t i o n ) the "first Exertion of the Self-moving or Active Faculty" (p.727). Is the accusation of confusion well-founded? In the f i r s t place i t should be noted that these are not C o l l i n s ' terms but Clarke's, terms that Clarke used i n h i s analysis of v o l i t i o n i n Being and Attributes (see Section 2.5). C o l l i n s could respond that there i s no confusion, that the power to order action just is the judgement. (This, indeed, was one of the interpretations of v o l i t i o n offered by Clarke i n Being and Attributes.) Judgement i s ess e n t i a l to C o l l i n s ' concept of w i l l , f o r he accepts hedonism as a motivating force: To suppose a sensible being capable of w i l l i n g or preferring ( c a l l i t as you please) misery, and refusing good, i s to deny i t to be r e a l l y sensible; for every man, while he has h i s senses, aims at pleasure and happiness, and avoids pain and misery; and t h i s i n w i l l i n g actions, which are supposed to be attended with the most t e r r i b l e consequences, (p.29) I t i s notable that there i s no further argument f o r psychological hedonism; i t may be that C o l l i n s considers i t to be self-evident. The most he does i s to support h i s point with au t h o r i t i e s , including Plato's Protagoras on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of knowingly choosing the greater of two e v i l s . This i s a questionable authority on which to base an argument for hedonism, for Plato's flawed argument i s that if hedonism holds, 51 then the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing the greater e v i l follows (see Appendix B for notes on Plato's t e x t ) . Unfortunately f o r C o l l i n s , the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e i s one upon which much of his subsequent p o s i t i v e argument depends. There must be an underlying assumption here that the hedonistic impulse i s both what orders the judgement and what provides the causal l i n k between judgement and physical action, but there i s no further consideration of the mechanism. Clarke i s vigorously opposed to t h i s , f o r his i s a strong conception of agency, and he denies that anything passive can be the cause of anything active; i n p a r t i c u l a r , judgement "can no more possibly be the e f f i c i e n t Cause of Action, than Rest can be the Cause of Motion" (p.723). I f , Clarke claims, C o l l i n s i s r e a l l y arguing that human action i s the r e s u l t of mechanistic, material impulses, then the question of the o r i g i n a l cause of motion remains; t h i s must lead either to a f i r s t mover or to an impossible i n f i n i t e regress. Clarke argues instead for a free, substantial self-moving principle - endowed by God upon man -which i s the physical or e f f i c i e n t cause of action. He doesn't e x p l i c i t l y state that t h i s i s the d e f i n i t i o n of will, but does say that "actually exerting the Self-moving Faculty" i s what we mean by 'doing as we w i l l ' - the only one of C o l l i n s ' four 'actions' properly so described. As we saw i n Chapter Two, Clarke prefers to t a l k of 'action' and the 'self-motive f a c u l t y ' , and leaves the d e f i n i t i o n of w i l l d e l i b e r a t e l y open. 52 C o l l i n s poses three questions regarding l i b e r t y of the w i l l which follow from h i s d e f i n i t i o n : (a) are we at l i b e r t y to w i l l or not to w i l l ? , a c o r o l l a r y (b) can we suspend w i l l i n g ? , and (c) can we w i l l one or other of two or more objects? C o l l i n s ' answer i s to deny l i b e r t y i n each case: i f an action i s proposed - say 'walking' - we must have some immediate preference: whether to act, or not to act, or to defer the choice. To defer choice (suspend w i l l i n g ) i t s e l f i s an act of w i l l , which i s therefore immediate and i n accordance with the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e . In w i l l i n g or choosing between discernable objects, the same necessitated judgement applies: "we must w i l l or prefer as things seem to us, unless we can lye to ourselves, and to think that to be the worst, which we think best" (p.28). As to whether we are at l i b e r t y to choose between i n d i f f e r e n t objects, C o l l i n s remarks that cases where the choice i s between t r u l y i n d i s c e r n i b l e objects are so rare that such l i b e r t y i s hardly worth having. He could plausibly l e t the discussion r e s t there, but he i s keen to destroy the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i b e r t y wherever he finds i t . He therefore proposes the further argument that the circumstances i n which the choice i s made can never be the same twice, and that " A l l the various modifications of the man, h i s opinions, prejudices, temper, habit and circumstances, are to be taken i n and considered as causes of election no less than the objects without us among which we chuse" (p.32). Even the s l i g h t e s t difference i n circumstance enters the causal chain to combine with the r e s t to produce the e f f e c t ; since 'everything 53 that has a beginning has a cause' (a p r i n c i p l e common to both C o l l i n s and Clarke) we know that i f d i f f e r e n t choices were made, there must be a difference i n the causal circumstances even i f we cannot discern i t . In terms of the categories of argument i d e n t i f i e d above, the argument against l i b e r t y of choice i n the case of discernable objects rests on the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e , established only on a questionable argument from authority; the argument for necessity i n the case of i n d i s c e r n i b l e objects, on the other hand, i s from a p r i n c i p l e shared with h i s opponents but yet to be p o s i t i v e l y established. Clarke's response i s again to claim that C o l l i n s ' arguments are grounded i n h i s confusion over w i l l i n g : i f w i l l i n g i s equated with judgement then these questions do indeed i n v i t e C o l l i n s ' answers, but i f w i l l i n g i s equated with exerting the self-moving f a c u l t y then, by d e f i n i t i o n , the answer to each question i s i n favour of l i b e r t y . In Being and Attributes, Clarke's open concept of ' w i l l ' enabled him to claim that these questions are merely meaningless. The main issue, therefore, i s which of C o l l i n s ' or Clarke's concepts of w i l l i s the more plausible, and t h i s we must consider i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r arguments concerning causation. Before doing so, however, i t i s worth pausing b r i e f l y to look at C o l l i n s ' l a s t item i n his survey of experience, namely that i f l i b e r t a r i a n s (he c i t e s Bramhall as an example) suppose 54 that animals and children are necessitated, how can they claim that adult human beings have free w i l l ? There are many p a r a l l e l s between, say, ovine and human choices (sources of food, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for young, response to danger, e t c . ) ; the differences are i n the extent of the respective powers available to sheep and human beings, the seemingly s p e c i f i c a l l y human regard given to absent things and future events, and that humans are "also subject to more vain fears, more mistakes and wrong actions, and i n f i n i t e l y more absurdities i n notions" (p.38). These differences, however, cannot be the source of l i b e r t y . In the case of children the problem for the l i b e r t a r i a n i s more acute, f o r he must explain at what age, and how, children become free, and what actions show them to be free. Clarke's response to t h i s n i c e l y witty point i s the most straightforward: he doesn't attempt to explain l i b e r t y i n r e l a t i o n to self-consciousness, but simply denies that animals and children are i n fact necessitated, whatever other l i b e r t a r i a n s have said. Every action - whether of animals, children or adult human beings - i s free, because i t arises from the self-moving p r i n c i p l e . The difference i s i n moral c a p a b i l i t y : adult human beings have moral sense, animals do not, and children as they develop become "not more free, but more moral agents" (p.729). I t can be seen that, i n seeking only to e s t a b l i s h an inconsistency i n his opponents' positions, C o l l i n s has here l e f t himself open to a very simple reply. Since t h i s i s 55 something of an aside, i t i s of no r e a l consequence to C o l l i n s ' main thread of argument; i t s chief i n t e r e s t i s that i t shows Clarke to be a more sophisticated l i b e r t a r i a n than some of his predecessors. We may note also that though Clarke has l i b e r t y as a necessary condition of morality, i t i s not a s u f f i c i e n t condition: i n h i s conception some form of additional moral capacity i s required. 4 For C o l l i n s , by contrast, moral sense i s grounded i n hedonism and l i b e r t y i s neither a necessary nor a s u f f i c i e n t condition (see Section 4.9). 4•4 Causation Given the c e n t r a l i t y of cause and e f f e c t seen already i n C o l l i n s ' arguments, the section which deals e x p l i c i t l y with causal theory (Second Argument taken from the Impossibility of Liberty, pp.39-42) i s astonishingly b r i e f . Less than four pages long, half of i t i s theory, and half a suggestion that to assert l i b e r t y i s a t h e i s t i c a l , claiming i n support as eminent an authority as St Paul. The causal argument i s as follows: (PI) A l l actions have a beginning (P2) Whatever has a beginning has a cause (P3) Every cause i s a necessary cause Clarke's primary discussion of morality i s to be found i n the second series of Boyle Lectures, published as The Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion (Works, i i , pp.579-733). There he characterizes moral sense as perception of the 'fitness or unfitness' of the eternal r e l a t i o n s of things; these r e l a t i o n s make i t ' f i t and reasonable' to act morally. Analogously to mathematical understanding, t h i s perceptiveness of r e l a t i o n s may increase with increasing r a t i o n a l i t y , but may be subject to perversion and error. 56 Therefore, a l l actions have necessary causes Therefore man i s a necessary agent. C o l l i n s produces an argument i n support of each of (P2) and (P3). The f i r s t of these i s decidedly odd: If any thing can have a beginning which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And i f nothing can produce something, then the world might have had a beginning without a cause: which i s not only an absurdity commonly charged upon Atheists, but i s a r e a l absurdity i n i t s e l f , (p.39) There are several points to make about t h i s argument. F i r s t , the p r i n c i p l e i s not disputed by Clarke, as previously stated; his sole comment on (P2) i s that n / T i s true" (p.729). C o l l i n s ' argument for the p r i n c i p l e i s indeed very s i m i l a r to that put forward by Clarke at the s t a r t of Being and Attributes (see Section 2.2), including the i m p l i c i t assumption that the mode of existence of the world i s from production. Secondly, C o l l i n s ' argument i s consistent with deism. As previously stated, C o l l i n s i s generally associated with the d e i s t movement, whatever the precise nature of his b e l i e f s , and t h i s i s evidence i n support of that t h e s i s . The i m p l i c i t f i r s t p r i n c i p l e appears to be that the mere p o s s i b i l i t y of an uncaused universe i s so absurd that there can be no such thing as an uncaused event. Thirdly, a more d i a l e c t i c a l approach might be that C o l l i n s , while not personally b e l i e v i n g i n a deity, i s arguing that uncaused events are inconsistent with theism, 57 thereby presenting problems for h i s opponents. Lastly, whatever the merits of the argument, there i s a question of why i t i s included at a l l . One p o s s i b i l i t y i s that C o l l i n s included i t for completeness, to support his premises by t h e i s t i c or d e i s t i c f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . Another p o s s i b i l i t y suggested by William Rowe i s an expectation on C o l l i n s ' part that l i b e r t a r i a n s w i l l hold that actions or v o l i t i o n s are or may be uncaused (Rowe5, pp.3Off), the assumption being that uncaused events leave open the p o s s i b i l i t y of free w i l l . The implication of C o l l i n s ' argument i s that i f there can be no p o s s i b i l i t y of uncaused events, t h i s l i n e i s not open to l i b e r t a r i a n s . Some, even many, l i b e r t a r i a n s may want to take t h i s l i n e , but not a l l - and, as seen, c e r t a i n l y not Clarke. Rowe's suggestion would have p l a u s i b i l i t y i f C o l l i n s ' project was to provide an argument fo r necessity against all-comers, but given the closeness of the arguments to Being and Attributes throughout C o l l i n s ' book (arguments from experience, divine prescience, l i b e r t y as a perfection or imperfection) and the his t o r y of the 'Dodwell' correspondence, there i s reason to think that he was r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y to Clarke. If t h i s i s indeed the case, i t i s more l i k e l y that he i s here attempting to demonstrate necessity on the basis of Clarke's f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . 5 William Rowe, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991 58 The argument for (P3) i s that a given cause must be 'suited to' i t s e f f e c t , i . e . "have r e l a t i o n to some p a r t i c u l a r case and not to others"; again the reductio ad absurdum i s that i f t h i s were not the case i t i s possible that the ordered universe might have been produced by chance: For i n arguing against the Epicurean system of chance, do we not say (and that j u s t l y ) that i t i s impossible for chance ever to have produced an orderly system of things, as not being a cause suited to the e f f e c t ; and that an orderly system of things which had a beginning, must have had an i n t e l l i g e n t agent for i t s cause, as being the only proper cause to that e f f e c t ? (p.40) This may be another reference to Being and Attributes, namely Proposition VIII: that "the Self-Existent and O r i g i n a l Cause of a l l things, must be an I n t e l l i g e n t Being" (Works, i i , p.543; see Section 2.3). If C o l l i n s i s indeed r e f e r r i n g to Clarke here, i t may be another case of del i b e r a t e l y attempting to use Clarke's own p r i n c i p l e s to prove necessity. C o l l i n s ' basic argument here, derived from that of Hobbes met i n Section 1.3, i s that a given cause i s suited to a given e f f e c t , and i s no cause to other e f f e c t s to which i t i s not suited; a cause not suited i s no cause, therefore a cause suited to the e f f e c t i s a necessary cause (p.40). In other words, once the p a r t i c u l a r causal chain i s found to be extant, the e f f e c t must immediately and necessarily follow. Clarke believes that C o l l i n s ' argument i s f a l l a c i o u s , due 59 to a begging of the question against a self-moving power. He accepts C o l l i n s ' analysis of necessary causes as f a r as i t goes, "But t h i s i s saying nothing more, than that a thing must needs be, when i t i s supposed that it is. Which i s nothing to the Question about Liberty and Necessity" (p.729). Presumably he means by t h i s that if something i s i d e n t i f i e d as the cause of an e f f e c t , then i t i s necessarily the cause; t h i s says nothing, however, about the precise nature of the cause. A l l C o l l i n s can consistently claim on t h i s argument i s that if the l a s t judgement of the understanding causes actions, then i t necessarily causes those actions; however, i f the self-moving f a c u l t y causes actions, then i t necessarily causes those actions. In using t h i s argument to support his case that man i s a necessary agent, that under a given set of conditions a person has not the power to make d i f f e r e n t choices, C o l l i n s i s assuming, not proving, that man does not have a self-moving fac u l t y . Clarke does, however, go i n for a b i t of o v e r k i l l at t h i s point, i n claiming that C o l l i n s ' argument i s universal i n allowing no self-moving power at a l l , not even i n the deity -something Clarke argued i n Being and Attributes to be inconsistent with a universe containing motion. This i s a misrepresentation of C o l l i n s , for while the form of the argument i s indeed universal, C o l l i n s appears i m p l i c i t l t to allow s e l f -motion to an i n t e l l i g e n t F i r s t Cause or deity. Clarke has two arguments at work here against C o l l i n s . One 60 i s the weak argument, simply that C o l l i n s has not proved his case, and depending on where one sees the balance of proof to l i e that may be p e r f e c t l y s u f f i c i e n t . The stronger argument i s that C o l l i n s ' causal chain can't work, because i t depends on something passive (the judgement or preference) causing something active (the action performed as a r e s u l t ) . Clarke gives no argument to support t h i s , beyond an assertion of the maxim c i t e d i n Section 2.3 above: "Nothing can possibly be the Cause of an Effect more considerable than itself" (p.723). This again does not appear to be self-evident, but without i t Clarke has no strong argument for the self-moving cause. F i n a l l y on causation, Clarke makes the f i r s t of two references i n his Remarks on C o l l i n s to his correspondence with Leibniz, possibly included to j u s t i f y publishing the two works i n the same volume. The reference i s to Epicureanism: [C o l l i n s ] contends that 'Liberty stands, and can only be grounded, on the absurd Principles of Epicurean Atheism.' Mr. Leibnitz has done the same..." (p.730). Epicurus claimed the existence of an 'atomic swerve', an uncaused i r r e g u l a r i t y i n atomic motion which accounted f o r observed indeterminacy, including free w i l l . Leibniz's point i s analogical, that i f God's w i l l were without motive, then i t would be as b l i n d as Epicurean chance, and "A God who should act by such a w i l l , would be a God only i n name" (L.IV.18; Alexander,p.39); i t would contradict Leibniz's p r i n c i p l e of 61 s u f f i c i e n t reason. C o l l i n s ' point i s d i f f e r e n t , being that everything - including acts of w i l l , God's excepted - must have a (necessary) cause; consequently there can be no free human w i l l . Leibniz's ' p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason' and C o l l i n s ' causal argument are not equivalent, but Clarke i s opposed to both i n his insistence on a self-motive p r i n c i p l e of action i n both God and man. 4.5 The Imperfection of Liberty In the t h i r d argument, C o l l i n s seeks to disprove a l i b e r t a r i a n proposition that l i b e r t y i s more perfect than necessity. There are two possible reasons for a determinist to want to do t h i s , one theological and one more 'psychological'. The theological reason i s i n two parts: f i r s t , that i f l i b e r t y i s no perfection, there i s no reason to suppose that God would endow i t upon created beings; secondly (a stronger t h e s i s ) , i f l i b e r t y i s an imperfection and necessity a perfection, then God must be necessitated i n action also; t h i s i s just what Clarke opposed i n Being and Attributes. The 'psychological' reason i s that i f necessity rather than l i b e r t y makes man more perfect, then there i s less motivation to want to pursue li b e r t a r i a n i s m . Less reason, though not no reason - for l i b e r t y of w i l l could be seen as desirable i n i t s e l f , independent of i t s e f f e c t on man's 'perfection'. These observations do not r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to C o l l i n s ' text, 62 for he does not describe a wider project for t h i s argument, but states h i s intention only "to disprove a l l pretences" f o r l i b e r t y as a perfection. The argument proceeds i n two stages: (a) f i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s ' of l i b e r t y are attributed to e a r l i e r authors, and C o l l i n s deduces that the l i b e r t y described i n each case would be an imperfection; (b) a more pos i t i v e argument that necessity i s a perfection. There i s no need to consider the arguments concerning the f i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s ' i n any d e t a i l . C o l l i n s c i t e s d e f i n i t i o n s from Le Clerc, Cheyne and Archbishop King, but, f i r s t , i t i s not c l e a r that the quotations were intended as d e f i n i t i o n s of l i b e r t y by the authors concerned, and secondly Clarke o f f e r s no defence of the ' d e f i n i t i o n s ' of l i b e r t y , but r e j e c t s each as r i d i c u l o u s . 6 There are, however, two points worth noting regarding Clarke's approach i n the related section of his Remarks. The f i r s t i s that t h i s section includes the second reference to the Leibniz correspondence. C o l l i n s ' fourth d e f i n i t i o n , with no s p e c i f i e d c i t a t i o n , i s one met e a r l i e r i n the section on Experience: "a power to will or chuse at the same time any one out of two or more indifferent things" (p.46). His argument here i s almost t r i t e . If two objects are i n d i s c e r n i b l e , 6 On t h i s point see: James O'Higgins, Determinism and Freewill, pp.34ff 63 then either (a) they are t r u l y i n d i f f e r e n t , i n which case the power to choose i s no perfection because i t i s hardly worth having; or (b) the objects d i f f e r but our powers of discernment are inadequate to d i f f e r e n t i a t e them, which implies an imperfection of judgement i n us. Clarke ignores the second point, but says that the f i r s t -that there i s no 'benefit' a r i s i n g from the choice - " i s the same Argument, by which Mr Leibnitz proved that i t i s impossible for God ever to have created any two Pieces of Matter exactly alike, because, whatever Situation he placed them i n , there could be no Benefit i n t h e i r not being transposed" (p.731). I f i n d t h i s to be the most curious of a l l Clarke's Remarks: the most obvious response to C o l l i n s i s that his point i s t r i v i a l , but i t seems that Clarke i s attempting to suggest that C o l l i n s ' moral argument i s absurd by comparing i t to a metaphysical argument which Clarke evidently considers to be absurd. The relevant argument from Leibniz i s against i n d i s c e r n i b l e s , and i s a consequence of his p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason: God cannot create two i n d i s c e r n i b l e r e a l objects, because to order one rather than the other i n a p a r t i c u l a r way would be without benefit and therefore without reason. Leibniz admits indi s c e r n i b l e s to be conceivable, but denies that they can be consistent with divine wisdom. Clarke's response to t h i s was that the only argument Leibniz can have i s 64 against s u f f i c i e n t reason for placing, rather than creating objects; to claim that i t would be impossible that i t should be wise i n God to create any number of i n d i s c e r n i b l e objects i s to beg the question against wisdom, i n assuming that God f i r s t creates and l a t e r places objects. I t i s a good argument on the part of Clarke here, but i r r e l e v a n t to h i s argument against C o l l i n s ; the f a l s e comparison does nothing to enhance Clarke's c r i t i c i s m , and i f anything detracts from i t . 7 The second point i s that Clarke uses a misrepresentation of C o l l i n s i n bolstering his argument. C o l l i n s presented an argument against King's formulation of l i b e r t y of indifference, namely "a faculty, which being indifferent to objects, and over-ruling our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, chuses arbitrarily among objects; and renders the object chosen agreeable, only because it has chosen it" (p.47). C o l l i n s believes that his former arguments (from hedonism and causal necessity) s u f f i c i e n t l y show t h i s version of l i b e r t y of indifference to be f a l s e , but continues to show that i t would give r i s e to imperfection. Clarke uses a part-quotation from t h i s section of C o l l i n s ' argument - " I t i s not i s [man's] power to be i n d i f f e r e n t to what causes pleasure and pain" (p.48) - i n the context of c r i t i c i z i n g an e a r l i e r section i n C o l l i n s , on l i b e r t y as "a power to will 7 See e.g. L.IV.1-5, CIV.1-6; Alexander pp.36Jf, 45f. 65 evil (knowing i t to be e v i l ) as well as good" (p.45). Clarke's words are: He supposes that a Power [a Physical Power] of choosing Evil as Evil, implies being.. ."indifferent to what causes Pleasure or Pain;"... Which i s supposing that whatever Things are naturally possible for a Man to do, he has an egual Inclination to do. (p.730) This i s to commit the double f a u l t of taking C o l l i n s out of context twice i n one sentence to 'prove' a point: (a) King's formulation of the l i b e r t y of indifference i s inconsistent with choosing e v i l as e v i l , so that the two arguments could not go together; and (b) C o l l i n s i s denying the indifference to pleasure and pain anyway. Given that i t was C o l l i n s ' misquotation of Clarke on 'moral necessity' which occasioned Clarke's Remarks, i t does Clarke no c r e d i t to resort to the same t a c t i c , e s p e c i a l l y when he has quite s u f f i c i e n t ammunition against many of C o l l i n s ' other arguments. These sections on d e f i n i t i o n s of l i b e r t y tend to stand apart from the r e s t of the debate between Clarke and C o l l i n s , fo r C o l l i n s i s attacking 'straw men'. O'Higgins notes that King's discussion of l i b e r t y of indifference, for example, lacked consistency and departed s i g n i f i c a n t l y from other supporters of the p o s i t i o n (0'Higgins(2), pp.17-19,35); given t h i s , i t i s perhaps a surprise that Clarke takes the arguments serious l y at a l l . Usually sympathetic to C o l l i n s , O'Higgins concludes that, "This section of C o l l i n s work [on the f i v e 66 ' d e f i n i t i o n s ' ] i s not his most successful" (ibid., p.35); i t i s not Clarke's most successful either. 4.6 The Perfection of Necessity More s i g n i f i c a n t for our purposes i s the second part of the discussion, i n which C o l l i n s presents more p o s i t i v e arguments to show that necessity i s i n i t s e l f a perfection. These f a l l into two parts: those r e l a t i n g to God, and those r e l a t i n g to man. The premise of the former i s that God i s necessarily perfect: necessarily so because i f i t i s possible for something to be imperfect, then i t i s of i t s e l f imperfect. God therefore necessarily knows a l l truth, i s necessarily happy, and i s necessarily determined to w i l l what i s best. The only a l t e r n a t i v e to necessarily determined w i l l would be ' i n d i f f e r e n t ' w i l l , which would be inconsistent with wisdom and goodness. He supports t h i s with the theological argument from Burnet, Bishop of Winchester, that as God's acts are e s s e n t i a l and therefore necessary, "then the transient must be so likewise, as being the certain effects of his immanent acts: and a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things: and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature" (p.53). Clarke dismisses these arguments as "Proving nothing, but only shewing the pernicious E f f e c t s of Scholastick Jargon"; i n doing so he repeats his e a r l i e r conclusion that there can be no physical causal connection between judgement and action, even i n God: 67 God judges what i s r i g h t , and approves what i s good, by a physical Necessity of Nature; i n which physical Necessity, a l l Notion of Action i s necessarily excluded: But doing what i s good, i s wholly owing to an Active P r i n c i p l e , i n which i s essentially included the notion of Liberty. (p.731) The arguments concerning the perfection of necessity i n man are to a large extent r e p e t i t i o n of arguments given i n showing l i b e r t y to be an imperfection. The basic argument i s that conviction i s a perfection, consequent upon judgement determined by reasons and v o l i t i o n s determined by what seems good; l i b e r t y , on the other hand, implies indifference to reason, pleasure and pain, etc. Clarke's responses are also generally r e p e t i t i o u s . There i s , however, one point at which a possible ambiguity i n C o l l i n s ' wording leaves him open to a new attack: i f man were not necessarily determined, "He might r e j e c t what appears to be true to him, assent to what seems absurd to him, avoid what he sees to be good, and chuse what he sees to be e v i l " (p.55). He seems to be suggesting i n the f i r s t two phrases that l i b e r t y implies not only power to act against the judgement of reason, but to power to reverse the judgement i t s e l f . This, Clarke argues, i s a r e s u l t of C o l l i n s ' confused notion of action to include 'perception of ideas' and 'judgement of perceptions'; Clarke has agreed a l l along that these moments are necessitated i n themselves, and v o l i t i o n has no p o s s i b i l i t y of e f f e c t on them. 68 4.7 Divine Prescience In t h i s b r i e f section, C o l l i n s again hopes to demonstrate an inconsistency i n h i s opponents' po s i t i o n , namely that l i b e r t y of w i l l i s inconsistent with divine prescience. His statement that inconsistency i s a l l that he intends to prove by t h i s p a r t i c u l a r argument (p.59) indicates that he i s not committing himself to the doctrine of divine prescience i n any way. The argument i s as follows: the doctrine of divine prescience presumes a fixed order of future events; God could not know, but only guess at events which are not ce r t a i n , for certainty i s a condition of knowledge. Any event which i s cer t a i n depends on either God's decree or i t s own chain of causes (or both). Each option implies necessity: that an a l l -powerful being should decree something which does not then necessarily happen i s a contradiction; and i t i s contradictory that a chain of s u f f i c i e n t causes should not necessarily produce i t s e f f e c t . Clarke's response to t h i s argument i s to assert that C o l l i n s i s confused i n his language concerning divine prescience, and to expand on the d i s t i n c t i o n s introduced i n Being and Attributes (see Section 2.6 above). Clarke distinguishes between three sorts of 'knowledge' which are ascribed to humans and can be d i f f e r e n t l y extrapolated i n applying to God: 69 (a) firm b e l i e f on the basis of unquestioned evidence, such as when someone who has never been to France 'knows' that there i s such a place as Paris. Since t h i s by d e f i n i t i o n implies f i n i t e presence, t h i s s o r t of knowledge cannot apply to God. (b) Knowledge of necessary truths (e.g. of mathematics), which i s found i n perfection i n God. (c) 'Right and good judging', as when someone 'knows' that another w i l l act i n a c e r t a i n way i n a given s i t u a t i o n , a judgement based on the other's character. This form of 'knowledge', judging the e f f e c t s of free causes, " i s , i n God, just as much more extensive and more infallible than i n Man, as the Divine Nature and Understanding i s superior to ours" (p.733). As argued i n Being and Attributes, knowledge implies only truth, not necessary trut h ; i t cannot therefore follow that God's 'right and good judging' makes necessary that which i s based on free causes. Clarke i s , of course, assuming free causes as a premise. This i s not question-begging, however, because C o l l i n s ' argument i s only that l i b e r t y and divine prescience cannot be made consistent; Clarke, on the contrary, thinks t h i s possible. He claims that C o l l i n s would have to show that foreknowledge makes that which would otherwise have been free become necessary. 70 Clarke's argument, i n sum, i s that necessity would not follow from omniscience. However, Clarke's pos i t i v e argument for omniscience, depending as i t does on the somewhat strange notion of ' i n f i n i t e l y perfect judgement' which always foresees the action of every free cause, i s of i t s e l f less than convincing. 4.8 From the Nature of Rewards and Punishments For the penultimate section C o l l i n s returns to an e a r l i e r theme: " I f man were not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation f o r rewards and punishments, which are the essential supports of society" (p. 60). The argument i s that pleasure and pain either necessarily determine the w i l l or are no causes of the determination of the w i l l ; i f the l a t t e r , rewards and punishments would be useless, as they could provide no motive. He anticipates a potential objection - that people do i n fa c t act against the motivating factor of punishment - by suggesting that these people i m p l i c i t l y judge the pleasure to be gained from i l l e g a l action to outweigh the r i s k of punishment, thus respecting his wider hedonism. This argument r e c a l l s premise (P3) i n the causal argument (Section 4.4, above): that every cause i s a necessary cause. Since the hedonistic judgement i s considered to be a cause of action, i t must eithe r be a necessary cause or i t i s no cause at a l l . C o l l i n s ' proposition i s a strong one: that rewards and 71 punishments can be j u s t i f i e d only on the grounds of necessity; i f free w i l l i s postulated, then punishment i s u n j u s t i f i e d . This i s again to assume that hedonistic judgement i s always the s u f f i c i e n t cause of v o l i t i o n , which has not been convincingly supported by C o l l i n s . Since Clarke has shown C o l l i n s ' causal argument fo r necessity to be question-begging against a s e l f -moving power i n man, he need do no more here than argue that a mind possessing a self-moving power may have regard to reasons i n choosing how to act; using the terminology from Being and Attributes (Section 2.5), the self-moving power would be the 'physical e f f i c i e n t ' , and pleasure and pain the 'moral motives'. This he does merely by suggesting that i t i s absurd to suppose the contrary. 4.9 From the Nature of Morality C o l l i n s ' l a s t argument i s very s i m i l a r to the one above; so s i m i l a r indeed that Clarke dismisses i t i n one sentence: "This Argument i s merely to make up the Number, being the very same with the foregoing" (p.733). Though i t i s true that nothing new i s added by C o l l i n s i n t h i s section, i t provides s t i l l further evidence of his hedonism. He defines his moral concepts as follows: Morality or v i r t u e , consists i n such actions as are i n t h e i r own nature, and upon the whole, pleasant; and immorality or v i c e , consists i n such actions as are i n t h e i r own nature, and upon the whole, painful... [A] man must be the more moral, the more he understands or i s duly sensible, what actions give pleasure and what pain. (p.62) This d e f i n i t i o n i s accompanied by a reference to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, i n which good and e v i l are s i m i l a r l y defined i n terms of increasing or diminishing pleasure or pain (Book I I , Chapter xx). I t i s notable that C o l l i n s ' d e f i n i t i o n seems to imply u t i l i t a r i a n i s m : presumably 'upon the whole' refers to the e f f e c t of an action upon a l l concerned, not simply the agent. 4.10 C o l l i n s ' conclusions The s i x arguments discussed above are taken by C o l l i n s to have proved that man i s a necessary agent. He then moves to address further hypothetical objections to t h i s proposition and to demonstrate that the objections are not well-founded. The f i r s t two objections are related to punishment, namely that i t would be (a) unjust and (b) useless to punish offenders for t h e i r crimes i f those crimes are necessitated. C o l l i n s ' argument i n the f i r s t case i s that the concept of free agency i s not used i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of punishments, so the objection against necessity i s at best an irrelevance. Punishment i s used either to remove dangerous persons from society, as analogously are "furious madmen" and "men infected with the plague", and i n t h i s free agency i s not offered as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; or i t i s used as deterrence, i n which case " i t i s s u f f i c i e n t that they were voluntary agents, or had the w i l l to do the crime f o r which they s u f f e r " (p.64), for the w i l l only i s considered i n making 73 judgements of g u i l t . C o l l i n s considers some categories of criminal agency - for example, what would now be termed as action under 'diminished r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' - as 'involuntary'; i n t h i s case punishment would not be j u s t i f i e d by deterrence, though may be j u s t i f i e d by need for public safety. C o l l i n s has three answers to the second objection, that i t would be useless to punish necessary agents. F i r s t , the threat of punishment enters the causal chain of judgements which determines the w i l l , and ac t u a l l y punishing offenders makes the threat more r e a l to others. Secondly, i t would be useless to deter unless men were necessary agents, otherwise " i f men were free, or i n d i f f e r e n t to pleasure and pain, pain would be no motive to cause men to observe the law" (p.67). Thirdly, punishment of 'necessary agents' other than adult human beings i s commonplace, i n t r a i n i n g dogs, horses, and children. We have met the second and t h i r d of these points and contrary arguments e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter. Clarke's complaint against the essence of C o l l i n s ' arguments from punishment i s that no matter what p o l i t i c a l advantages are to be gained from punishing 'necessary agents', there can be no personal j u s t i c e . Clarke repeats h i s point from his fourth 'Dodwell' pamphlet, that j u s t i c e i n an absolute sense - paradigmatically God's ju s t i c e - depends on free agency; i f there i s no free agency God could never i n f l i c t punishment, "because i t must necessarily be 74 always unjust. And thus t h i s Author's Opinion absolutely takes away a l l Foundation of Religion" (p.734). That he takes away ' a l l foundation' of ce r t a i n forms of r e l i g i o n might not give C o l l i n s too much cause for concern: though he has addressed Clarke's challenge at the end of the 'Dodwell' debate to make necessity consistent with morality and the nature of rewards and punishments, he has done t h i s i n a way which does not depend on revealed r e l i g i o n . There i s a common theme also to the t h i r d and f i f t h hypothetical objections considered by C o l l i n s : that reasoning with, praising, or blaming a necessary agent could have no e f f e c t ; and that i f a person knows that he acts necessarily, then there i s no basis for personal conscience. C o l l i n s ' answer to the former i s i d e n t i c a l to one of the arguments against 'useless' punishment, namely that a free w i l l could not be influenced i n these ways. He notes also the t r a d i t i o n i n c l a s s i c a l l i t e r a t u r e of pr a i s i n g the actions of heroes whose actions are directed by the gods. C o l l i n s ' analysis of conscience i s that i t i s "a man's own opinion of his actions with r e l a t i o n to some r u l e " (p.72). In acting against conscience, reluctance i s not s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the action, but afterwards "by the absence of the pleasure of the s i n , and by finding himself obnoxious to shame, or by believing himself l i a b l e to punishment, he may really 75 accuse himself...because of the consequences that attend i t " (ibid). This appears to be a de l i b e r a t e l y weak analysis of moral sense: the most that C o l l i n s i s claiming i s that to excuse one's behaviour on the grounds of necessity would be disingenuous. In answering the fourth and s i x t h hypothetical objections, C o l l i n s introduces something new to the discussion i n t h i s book: a suggestion of physical necessity. The objections are: that i f events are necessary then the period of everyone's l i f e i s fixed, and avoidance of harm or use of medicine are useless for they could change nothing; and that i t would be as contradictory for apparently contingent events (e.g. the death of J u l i u s Caesar i n the Senate) not to happen, as i t would be for two and two to make s i x . On the f i r s t point, C o l l i n s says that " i f the period of human l i f e be fix e d (as I contend i t i s ) i t cannot but happen at the time fixed" (p.71), and that the various acts of care or violence enter into the causal chain which f i x e s that period. The parenthetical statement 'as I contend i t i s ' i s revealing, for i t suggests a stronger form of determinism than C o l l i n s has been advocating throughout the bulk of h i s argument. The main l i n e of argument has been f o r a form of psychological determinism, that judgement i n accordance with hedonism causes action. I f here he means that the period of human l i f e i s fix e d i n the sense of being ( i n p r i n c i p l e ) predictable from knowledge 76 of physical causes, then he contradicts h i s own assertion i n the Preface that "I deny man to be subject to such necessity as i s in clocks, watches, and other such beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity" ( p . x v i i i ) . I f , on the other hand, he means only that given the judgements that were made and causes that applied i n the course of a l i f e , the period could not have been d i f f e r e n t , then to say that the period i s fix e d i s to say nothing. This i s the import of h i s example of Caesar: [Wjhoever does conceive [Caesar's] death possible any where else, supposes other circumstances preceding his death than did precede his death. Whereas, l e t them suppose a l l the same circumstances to come to pass that did precede his death; and then i t w i l l be impossible to conceive ( i f they think ju s t l y ) h i s death could have come to pass any where else, as they conceive i t impossible for two and two to make s i x . (p.73) 4.11 Clarke's conclusions Clarke declines to address these l a t t e r arguments ("...because answering Objections of his own r a i s i n g . . . i s nothing to the purpose" (p.734)) and instead sums up his own case: either man has or has not a self-moving f a c u l t y . If he has, then he i s a free agent. If not, then every motion must be e x t r i n s i c a l l y caused, either by (a) motive or reason, or (b) some insensible matter or other substance or being. If the cause i s motive Or reason, then either motive must have substance or that which i s insubstantial can put a body into motion - both of which he takes to be absurd. I f the cause i s insensible 77 substance, then the motion of that substance must be caused by another, and so on, leading to a regress which must either be i n f i n i t e or end i n a free cause. I f i n f i n i t e , then there i s the contradiction of e f f e c t s without cause and motion without a mover, or the contradiction of motion necessary i n i t s e l f . If the regress ends i n a free cause, on the other hand, "then Liberty i s a possible thing: And then Man possibly may have Liberty: And i f he may possibly have i t , then Experience w i l l prove that he probably, nay, certainly has i t " (ibid). F i n a l l y Clarke summarizes h i s moral argument. Necessity implies that "there i s nothing intrinsically good or evil, there i s nothing personally just or unjust...Religion there can be none, without a moral Difference of Things: A moral Difference of Things there cannot be, where there i s no Place f o r Action: And Action there can be none, without Liberty" (p.735). He closes with some ad hominem comments against C o l l i n s : "Too great an Assurance i n Arguments of t h i s Nature,.. .Rejoicing i n the Strength of them, and taking Pleasure i n the carrying of such a Cause; i s what a Good Mind can never be capable of" (ibid). 4.12 An Assessment C o l l i n s was most unimpressed with Clarke's book. In l e t t e r s to Desmaizeaux he wrote: You make a r i g h t judgement of Dr Cs book. I t i s very peevish and haughty; and f u l l of misrepresentations from one end to the other; and t r i f l i n g about matters 78 that tend not to c l e a r the t r u t h . . . (5 May 1717)* [W]hat he says i n the close of h i s Remarks shows that he w i l l act the bigot to serve h i s purposes... (17 June 1718 ) 9 While i t seems that C o l l i n s had drafted a response to Clarke by 1720, i t was never published and the manuscript was l o s t a f t e r C o l l i n s ' death; the controversy rests here, therefore. What are we to make of i t ? Clarke's negative arguments against C o l l i n s - i . e . those which aim to show that C o l l i n s has not proved h i s case against free w i l l - are sound, for, as seen above, C o l l i n s ' causal argument against free w i l l i s question-begging, and h i s argument for the hedonistic p r i n c i p l e - on which much of his subsequent case rests - i s not well supported. On the other hand, Clarke's p o s i t i v e arguments for free w i l l are not convincing either: his argument that C o l l i n s ' system can't work i s based on questionable p r i n c i p l e s of causation, and his f i n a l conclusion i s rather weak: that l i b e r t y i n man i s 'possible', which p o s s i b i l i t y i s made 'certain' by experience. This i s the strongest conclusion that Clarke can reach on the basis of h i s arguments, but i t f a l l s foul of C o l l i n s ' better arguments against knowledge of l i b e r t y from experience, which at t h e i r weakest show that experience can t e l l us nothing one way or the 8 B r i t i s h Library, Add. MSS. 4282/129-30 9 B r i t i s h Library, Add. MSS. 4282/149-50 79 other about l i b e r t y . What Clarke i s c l e a r l y lacking i s a theory of how the s e l f -moving power he postulates i s supposed to operate. C o l l i n s was aware of t h i s shortcoming, as i s shown by t h i s further extract of h is l e t t e r of 5 May 1717 to Desmaizeaux: Your advice i n r e l a t i o n to Authors who have maintain'd the soul to have i n i t a p r i n c i p l e of action &c, i s very just. I had been searching before upon that head; but what I have found and the use I s h a l l make of i t , I reserve for our conversation together. I w i l l only observe to you, that the Action, according to Dr C, i s ever concomitant with, & consequent to the w i l l ; and that there must be a determination of the motive Power i n Man to the action or motion, otherwise the motive power by being equally disposed to a l l actions or motions can begin none, and i s l i k e a body at r e s t incapable of beginning a p a r t i c u l a r motion, (op. c i t . ) If Clarke were to make his argument persuasive, he would need to provide a theory of agency, and t h i s he c l e a r l y f a i l s to do. 80 CHAPTER FIVE THE PRICE—PRIESTLEY CONTROVERSY 5.1 Price's Review of Morals Richard Price f i r s t published A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals i n 1758; subsequent editions appeared i n 1769 and 1787 (the l a t t e r omitting the words 'and D i f f i c u l t i e s ' from the t i t l e ) . His discussion of free w i l l contained within the book i s therefore found within the broader context of eth i c s . The discussion was c r i t i c i z e d by Joseph P r i e s t l e y i n his 1777 publication, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated - an appendix to his p r i n c i p l e work, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit.^ Price's l i b e r t a r i a n i s m follows upon h i s theory of v i r t u e . He i d e n t i f i e s two categories of vi r t u e under which an action may be characterized: 'abstract v i r t u e ' , the moral status of the action considered i n i t s e l f , independent of the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of the agent; and ' p r a c t i c a l v i r t u e ' , which i s related to the agent's motivations and b e l i e f s . An action may have a d i f f e r e n t moral status according to which category i s under consideration: 1 The ed i t i o n of Price's work avail a b l e f o r the preparation of t h i s study was a reproduction of the Third E d i t i o n : D. Daiches Raphael (ed.), Price/s Review of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948. Given the dates of publication of the various works, P r i e s t l e y must have been responding to either the F i r s t or more probably the Second E d i t i o n . However comparison of P r i e s t l e y ' s quotations and Price's l a t e r version suggests that any a l t e r a t i o n i n the relevant sections between the edi t i o n used by P r i e s t l e y and Third Edition was minor. 81 Price's example i s of a magistrate deciding a case erroneously, but nevertheless conscientiously and consistent with the best evidence available to him at the time: his action i s r i g h t from the ' p r a c t i c a l ' point of view, though wrong i n 'abstract'. " [ P ] r a c t i c a l v i r t u e " , claims Price, "supposes Liberty" (Raphael, p.181). His concept of l i b e r t y i s i n essence that of Clarke: the p r i n c i p l e of action. The liberty I here mean i s the same with the power of acting and determining... As far as i t i s true of a being that he acts, so far he must himself be the cause of the action, and therefore not necessarily determined to act. (ibid.) Price's case i s that the agent i s the ' e f f i c i e n t cause' of his actions, and his argument i s an appeal to a sense of absurdity that the cause or 'determiner' can be anything other than the s e l f , e.g. the motive. This 'sense' i s given emphasis i n the text: In short; who must not feel the absurdity of saying my v o l i t i o n s are produced by a foreign cause, that i s , are not mine; I determine voluntarily, and yet necessarily? (p.182) There i s also an appeal to ordinary language, as Price notes two uses of the term 'action': to mean the intention or v o l i t i o n , and the actual event or e f f e c t of that v o l i t i o n . These two would always coincide for an omniscient, omnipresent being, but not always for f i n i t e beings. I t i s the v o l i t i o n or determination that decides p r a c t i c a l v i r t u e : "Our own determinations alone 82 are, most properly, our actions. These alone we have absolute power over, and are responsible f o r " (p.185). The c o r o l l a r y i s that to act virtuously requires a virtuous intention. Price has an i n t e r n a l i s t concept of motivation, believing i t to be "extremely evident" that motivation i s inseparable from the apprehension of moral r i g h t and wrong (p.186). He i s led to a Kantian notion of moral action: "To act virtuously i s to obey or follow reason" (p.189); instinctive benevolence i s no p r i n c i p l e of v i r t u e , nor are any actions flowing merely from i t virtuous. As fa r as t h i s influences, so f a r something else than reason and goodness influences, and so much I think i s to be subtracted from the moral worth of any action or character, (p.191) Price has a discussion of 'moral necessity' as "the necessity which i s said to diminish the merit of good actions" (p.210). He echoes Clarke i n h i s disjunctive d e f i n i t i o n of 'moral necessity' as that which arises from the influence of motives and affections on the mind; or that certainty of determining one way, which may take place upon the supposition of c e r t a i n views, circumstances, and p r i n c i p l e s of an agent. (ibid.) The two parts of the d e f i n i t i o n appear to have d i f f e r e n t references: the l a t t e r i s a certainty of judgement on the part of the observer that the observed agent w i l l act i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner; the former seems to imply c a u s a l i t y i n the agent. This c a u s a l i t y i s denied by Price, however. He speaks not of cause, 83 but the influence of conscience or, conversely, abandonment and moral impotence. A workable concept of l i b e r t y must be consistent with the most predictable behaviour or "steadiness of character and conduct": The greatest influence of motives that can r a t i o n a l l y be conceived, or which i t i s possible f o r any one to maintain, without running into the palpable and intolera b l e absurdity of making these physical efficients and agents, can i n no way a f f e c t l i b e r t y , (p.211) He d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between motives as causes of action, and motives as "the occasions of our putting ourselves into motion"; a person may follow his judgement, but "the motives can have no concern i n e f f e c t i n g h i s determination" (p.l83n). Price appeals again to what he believes to be common sense: [W]hatever to the contrary persons may say, i t i s impossible for them i n earnest to think they have no active, self-moving powers, and are not the cause of their own v o l i t i o n s , or not to ascribe to themselves, what they must be conscious that they think and do. (p.182) Each of these points we have met i n Clarke, i n his Being and Attributes, or i n his Remarks on C o l l i n s . We do not see here, however, the same l e v e l of quotation or paraphrasing that we saw i n r e l a t i n g C o l l i n s to Locke, for example. Though Price does r e t a i n much of Clarke's terminology, he adapts Clarke's concepts into h i s own framework of e t h i c a l theory, from the o r i g i n a l context of a wider r a t i o n a l i s t theology. There are also great differences i n s t y l e between the two writers, from 84 Clarke's rather s t i l t e d and arrogant language to Price's clearer prose with much better use of emphasis to c l a r i f y the arguments. This i n summary, therefore, i s Price's position: a free w i l l , a power of action or a self-moving power within the mind, i s : (a) a necessary condition of p r a c t i c a l (as opposed to abstract) moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; (b) the ' e f f i c i e n t cause' of action, which (c) i s occasioned by motives. F i n a l l y , (d) alter n a t i v e schemes of necessity are palpably absurd. As C o l l i n s opposed Clarke's formulation of these points, so Pr i e s t l e y attacked Price i n sections V and VI of The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated. Before considering P r i e s t l e y ' s arguments i n r e l a t i o n to Price, however, we must place them i n the context of the book - s p e c i f i c a l l y P r i e s t l e y ' s arguments from causation and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to Hume. 5.2 P r i e s t l e y ' s The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Whereas Price presents his l i b e r t a r i a n i s m i n r e l a t i o n to his moral theory, P r i e s t l e y ' s necessitarianism i s presented i n r e l a t i o n to materialism: "every thing belonging to the doctrine of materialism i s , i n fac t , an argument for the doctrine of necessity" ( P r i e s t l e y 2 , pp.xixf). P r i e s t l e y acknowledges i n the Preface to his debt to C o l l i n s , whose Philosophical Inquiry 2 Joseph P r i e s t l e y , The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, London: J.Johnson, 1777 85 f i r s t converted him to necessitarianism. This t r e a t i s e i s concise and methodical, and i s , i n my opinion, s u f f i c i e n t to give i n t i r e s a t i s f a c t i o n to every unprejudiced person. I wish t h i s small t r a c t was reprinted, and more generally known and read. 3 I t w i l l , however, remain, and do the greatest honour to the author's memory, when a l l the quibbling answers to i t s h a l l be forgotten, (p.xxx) P r i e s t l e y claims that as a youth he had maintained the doctrine of l i b e r t y i n a correspondence, though he had denied his correspondent's request for permission to publish the material. 4 P r i e s t l e y ' s arguments are divided into twelve sections, which can be considered under four themes:-(a) Sections I-III: Causal arguments - the 'State of the Question', causation, divine prescience (b) Sections IV-V: Psychological arguments - the nature of w i l l and 'consciousness of l i b e r t y ' (c) Sections VI-IX: Moral arguments - l i b e r t y as a moral condition and the e f f e c t of necessity (d) Sections X-XII: Doctrinal Arguments - God as author of s i n , s c r i p t u r e , C a l v i n i s t predestination 3 Recall that P r i e s t l e y himself reprinted C o l l i n s ' book i n 1790. 4 In t h i s volume the correspondent i s unnamed, though i n his Memoirs P r i e s t l e y i d e n t i f i e s him as Peter Annet. Annet was the inventor of a form of shorthand, and P r i e s t l e y , s t i l l at grammar school, wrote to him i n i t i a l l y to propose some improvements; the correspondence widened to include philosophical issues. (See Jack Lindsey (ed.), The Autobiography of Joseph Priestley, pp.70jf.) 86 I do not intend to address the d o c t r i n a l arguments at a l l , and w i l l discuss divine prescience only i n passing. Following C o l l i n s , P r i e s t l e y allows l i b e r t y i f interpreted as the power to do as one w i l l s , but denies that the w i l l i s i t s e l f at l i b e r t y to choose: he i s to argue f o r "some fixed law of nature respecting the will...so that every v o l i t i o n , or choice, i s constantly regulated, and determined, by what precedes i t " (pp.7f). This he w i l l seek to prove by considering cause and e f f e c t . 5.3 Causation and the Influence of Hume Pri e s t l e y ' s chapter on cause and e f f e c t i s more extensive than that of C o l l i n s , and shows the f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n of argument. C o l l i n s ' argument was an adaptation of Hobbes; Pr i e s t l e y ' s argument contains echoes of Hume's analysis of necessity: [A] cause cannot be defined to be any thing but such previous circumstances as are constantly followed by a certain effect; the constancy of the r e s u l t making us to conclude that there must be a sufficient reason i n the nature of things why i t should be produced i n those circumstances, (p.11) Hume's argument on l i b e r t y and necessity derives from h i s r a d i c a l re-working of cause and e f f e c t , which rel a t e s necessity to the observed constant conjunction of phenomena. This i s emphasized i n the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by the order of the arguments i n the book: 'Of Liberty and Necessity' 87 immediately follows the section on cause and e f f e c t , i t s e l f e n t i t l e d 'Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion'. P r i e s t l e y was f a m i l i a r with t h i s work: he makes two d i r e c t quotations from the Enquiry (though has the t i t l e as Philosophical Essays) during the course of his book, i n r e l a t i o n to rewards and punishments and God as the author of s i n (pp.90-1,118-9; cf EHU76,785). Hume's argument i s summarized early i n Section VIII: knowledge of 'real existences' i s obtainable only through memory and the senses, therefore Our idea...of necessity and causation arises e n t i r e l y from the uniformity observable i n the operations of nature, where si m i l a r objects are constantly conjoined, and the mind i s determined by custom to i n f e r the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of s i m i l a r objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or connexion. (EHU64) Since we happily ascribe necessity to the r e l a t i o n s of matter i n t h i s way, so "whatever i s i n t h i s respect on the same footing with matter, must be acknowledg'd to be necessary" (T400). What i s therefore required, according to Hume, i s an examination of mental phenomena i n order to discover what may concur with t h i s notion of necessity. The study of history, for example, reveals 5 I follow the convention of making reference to the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by the i n t i a l s EHU followed by the paragraph number, and to the Treatise by the i n i t i a l T followed by the page number, i n the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions (OUP: Enquiries, 1975; Treatise, 1978) 88 "the constant and universal p r i n c i p l e s of human nature". We are so confident of these p r i n c i p l e s that Should a t r a v e l l e r , returning from a f a r country, bring us an account of men...who were e n t i r e l y divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public s p i r i t ; we should immediately from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a l i a r . . . 6 (EHU65) Through everyday encounters we learn to i n f e r people's " i n c l i n a t i o n s and motives, from t h e i r actions, expressions, and even gestures", and to predict t h e i r actions from assessment of t h e i r characters. Hume's analysis allows for variations - even s i g n i f i c a n t variations - i n the observed r e g u l a r i t y , and therefore for the apparently capricious nature of human action: Below [constant and invariable conjunction] there are many i n f e r i o r degrees of evidence and pr o b a b i l i t y , nor does one single contrariety of experiment e n t i r e l y destroy a l l our reasoning. The mind ballances the contrary experiments, and deducting the i n f e r i o r from the superior, proceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence which remains... [S]upposing that the...contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and concealed causes, we conclude, that the chance or indifference l i e s only i n our judgement on account of our imperfect knowledge, not i n the things themselves, which are i n every case equally necessary, tho' the appearance not equally constant or c e r t a i n . (T403f) There i s just a hint of the t r a d i t i o n a l treatment of cause here, but Hume seems to be implying the constant conjunction i s so regularly observed, that where i t i s not observed we may i n f e r or conclude that he had been to Canada. 89 that t h i s i s a f a u l t of our perception, not i t s absence. In both the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume o f f e r s multiple hypothetical situations to demonstrate t h i s 'necessity' of r e l a t i o n of "motives, i n c l i n a t i o n s , and circumstances" to actions, and concludes that by ' l i b e r t y ' "we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determination of the will" (EHU73), the same weak concept supported by Hobbes, Locke and C o l l i n s . P r i e s t l e y likewise i n f e r s necessity from constant conjunction, and also that these maxims are universal: i f there are laws of nature ordering the mind (and the implication i s that there i s evidence for such laws), then no p a r t i c u l a r determination of the mind could have been otherwise than i t was, without postulating either a change i n circumstances or an ef f e c t without a cause; "The application of the term voluntary to mental determinations cannot possibly make the lea s t difference i n t h i s case" (p.14). The s i m i l a r i t y of P r i e s t l e y and Hume i n t h i s section i s not surpri s i n g : P r i e s t l e y t e l l s h is readers i n the Preface that "They w i l l also f i n d some things very well written on [ l i b e r t y and necessity] by Mr. Hume" amongst others (p.xxi). Though t h i s re-casting of cause and e f f e c t i s a departure from the a priori arguments i n C o l l i n s , P r i e s t l e y does bring i n one of C o l l i n s ' arguments on causation, namely that i f one uncaused event i s 90 postulated, then a l l events may be uncaused, "which e n t i r e l y takes away the only argument for the being of a God" (p.15). I have previously commented on the oddity of t h i s argument (see section 4.4). In P r i e s t l e y ' s case, however, there i s l i t t l e reason to suppose anything but s i n c e r i t y i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i s t i c argument: hi s commitment to C h r i s t i a n i t y appears to be firm, i f unorthodox. Thus P r i e s t l e y combines an empirical explanation of our knowledge of cause and e f f e c t with a t h e i s t i c a priori argument to support a p r i n c i p l e of universal causation. The r e s u l t i s that actions may be both voluntary and necessitated: i n making a choice, a person "follows the laws of his own nature" (p.17). P r i e s t l e y derides those who d i s t i n g u i s h between the observed certainty of the influence of motives and the necessity associated with physical causes: [T]his i s a d i s t i n c t i o n merely verJbal. For the only reason that we can have to believe i n any cause, and that i t acts necessarily, i s that i t acts certainly, or invariably, (p.18) 'Any cause' here must be taken to mean 'any p a r t i c u l a r cause': i f the a priori argument has established that there must be a cause for every event, observation of certainty establishes what cause applies to what e f f e c t . Some form of psychological investigation i s therefore required to e s t a b l i s h the nature of causation of the w i l l ; t h i s P r i e s t l e y o f f e r s i n Section IV: "Of the cause of V o l i t i o n , and the nature of w i l l " , and V: "Of the 91 supposed Consciousness of l i b e r t y , and the use of the term Agent". 5.4 The Causes of V o l i t i o n C o l l i n s ' discussion of the nature of the cause of v o l i t i o n was b r i e f , being e f f e c t i v e l y a poorly-supported statement of the 'truth' of psychological hedonism. P r i e s t l e y ' s argument i s more extensive, though h i s analysis leads to a s i m i l a r conclusion: that v o l i t i o n i s akin to judgement or association of ideas, and i s subsequent to desire. P r i e s t l e y begins by noting that i n a proper investigation, the philosopher considers appearances and accounts for them by no more causes than necessary - as gravity i s used consistently to account for both f a l l i n g objects and the motion of the planets, so the same approach should be used to consider the rule and causes of v o l i t i o n . Two circumstances, says P r i e s t l e y , are evidently concerned i n choice: predisposition towards given objects, and the current view of the objects to which the choice r e l a t e s . P r i e s t l e y gives an example: given a choice between an apple and a peach, i f I have a p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r apples and a d i s l i k e for peaches, then I w i l l always choose the apple. This, he claims, i s as necessary as any other cause and e f f e c t s i t u a t i o n . As a philosopher, therefore, I ought to acquiesce i n t h i s , and consider motives as the proper causes of v o l i t i o n s and actions. And the more I examine my own 92 action, or those of others, the more reason I see to be s a t i s f i e d that a l l v o l i t i o n s and actions are preceded by corresponding motives, (p.28) The paradigm case i s that of 'regular d e l i b e r a t i o n ' i n which each motive i s weighed i n the mind, and a judgement i s made according to the strongest or best motive; from habit the process may be abbreviated, as when a geometrical proposition i s accepted due to us remembering that we once saw a proof. Besides, since every deliberate choice i s regulated by motives, we ought, as philosophers, to take i t for granted that every choice i s made i n the same manner, and i s subject to the same rules, and therefore determined by motives... (p.29) The reason P r i e s t l e y gives for t h i s move i s that whether a choice i s made with or without deliberation, i t i s s t i l l a choice; a deliberated choice allows us better to r e f l e c t on the process by which choices are made, but there i s no reason to suppose that the mechanism d i f f e r s from case to case. Further evidence c i t e d i s that "opposite motives, as causes of love and hatred, are known to balance one another, exactly l i k e weights i n opposite scales" (p.30). P r i e s t l e y challenges what he sees as an inconsistency, or at l e a s t an instance of i m p l a u s i b i l i t y , i n l i b e r t a r i a n i s m : i t cannot be denied that motives have "some re a l influence upon the mind" (p.31) without contradicting experience; how then can i t reasonably be claimed that the nature of the w i l l allows f o r action upon i t both by motives and by something bearing no r e l a t i o n to motive? (This i s not s t r i c t l y the l i b e r t a r i a n ' s case, which i s that the w i l l may act independently of being acted upon.) Each other faculty operates uniformly i n a given mode (the passions under stimulus, the memory by retention of impressions, the judgement by comparison ideas), but the w i l l i s supposed to be sometimes influenced, sometimes self-determined. Self-determination, says P r i e s t l e y , i s merely a term with no proper conception of how i t operates. He further contends that w i l l i s analogous to judgement (which was C o l l i n s ' p o s i t i o n ) : the former relates to action and the l a t t e r to opinion or fa c t , but otherwise they are the same; a self-determining w i l l would therefore suggest a self-determining judgement, which i s absurd i n i t s uselessness. This leads P r i e s t l e y to a more general point, adopted from Hartley, namely that the w i l l , as with a l l other f a c u l t i e s of the mind, i s "a p a r t i c u l a r case of the general property of association of ideas, which i s necessarily of a mechanical nature" (pp.34f). His argument for t h i s i s as follows. The mind i s i n d i f f e r e n t to a l l objects u n t i l they become associated with pleasure or pain, when they become wither pleasing or displeasing, i . e . objects of love or hate. I t i s uni v e r s a l l y admitted, claims P r i e s t l e y , that "the view of a favourite object, of an apple to a c h i l d , f or instance, i s immediately followed by an attempt to seize i t " (p.37), and t h i s constant conjunction of circumstances i s s u f f i c i e n t to esta b l i s h 94 necessity. I t i s also s u f f i c i e n t to account for the passions: constant f r u s t r a t i o n of attempts to seize the favourite object w i l l lead to 'despair'; more moderate states of expectation are variously 'hope' or 'fear': To t h i s state of mind, v i z . within the extreme l i m i t s of hope and fear, we apply the term desire; and i t i s i n t h i s state, which i s of some continuance, that we d i s t i n c t l y perceive that a f f e c t i o n of the mind to which we give the name of wishing, or willing. (p.39f) ' V o l i t i o n ' i s , for P r i e s t l e y , a s p e c i a l case: not the r e s u l t of a simple desire but the resolution of "suspense between de s i r i n g and not desiring an object" (p.40). Thus a 'proper v o l i t i o n ' , the r e s u l t of deliberation, " i s not less mechanical, and dependent upon ideas, and on the state of mind, than the others." To summarize, then, P r i e s t l e y ' s argument from causation: (a) everything must have a cause, else God's existence cannot be proved (from C o l l i n s ) , (b) P a r t i c u l a r causes are discovered by observation of constant conjunction, which i s a l l that i s required to e s t a b l i s h knowledge of necessity (from Hume), (c) Motives are commonly discoverable for given choices; by extrapolation, every choice i s made i n accordance with the strongest motive or desire, (d) 'Self-determined w i l l ' i s an empty term without a proper concept, (e) Motive or desire i s grounded i n the association of ideas of objects with ideas of pleasure and pain. 95 This completes the background to P r i e s t l e y ' s f i r s t e x p l i c i t c r i t i c i s m of Price, namely the arguments on the 'supposed consciousness of l i b e r t y and the use of the term Agent'. Once we have examined t h i s next section, we s h a l l be i n a position to consider the continuation of the debate through the relevant correspondence between P r i e s t l e y and Price, and the r e l a t i v e strength of the various causal/psychological arguments. 5.5 The Agent's Consciousness of Liberty In Section V P r i e s t l e y sets out to undermine Price's arguments that i t i s impossible earnestly to consider oneself to have no active self-moving powers, and that there can be no physical connection between judgement and actions: motives cannot be agents, but may be "the occasions of our putting ourselves into motion" (P r i e s t l e y , quoting Price, p.45). P r i e s t l e y i n his gentlemanly manner acknowledges the c l a r i t y of Price's argument, but considers i t to be f a l l a c i o u s through ambiguity of terms. I do not think that t h i s objection to the doctrine of necessity can be expressed i n a stronger or better manner, and I have purposely made t h i s [lengthy] quotation, i n order to meet the d i f f i c u l t y i n i t s greatest force; being confident, that, when the ideas are attended to, i t w i l l appear that the writer i s , i n fact, a necessarian, (p.46) When a person i s i n the position of making a choice, P r i e s t l e y argues, a l l that he can be conscious of i s choosing without constraint (or declining to make a choice) according to his preference. There i s , however, always a reason f o r the 96 choice - a reason, as previously argued, grounded i n the person's predispositions and present view of the relevant objects. S i m i l a r l y , t h i s i s a l l we can observe with respect to other's choices. We may speculate about the motive, but w i l l always assume a dominant motive to be present. P r i e s t l e y continues from t h i s basis to argue that there i s no more than a verbal d i s t i n c t i o n between ascribing the causal agency or determining power to the motive and ascribing i t to the mind: whichever mode of as c r i p t i o n i s used, i t i s s t i l l the presence of a motive i n a mind which brings about the cause of action. His case i s that the agency he has described i s s u f f i c i e n t to account f o r human v o l i t i o n and action, and to esta b l i s h "every just rule of l i f e , respecting the regulation of the w i l l and the conduct", which would have "no propriety or use at a l l on any other hypothesis" (p.51). From t h i s p o s i t i o n , P r i e s t l e y counters Price's challenge that to consider motives as the causes of action i s absurd. P r i e s t l e y ' s response i s on the basis of common language: the very language which Price has claimed to be absurd ("our in c l i n a t i o n s act upon us and compel us" - ibid.), P r i e s t l e y suggests to be i n a c t u a l i t y the common description of conduct, "and therefore must have a foundation i n the common apprehension of mankind" (p.52). P r i e s t l e y believes Price's d i s t i n c t i o n between the motive being the cause of action and being the 97 occasion by which the s e l f causes action, also to be merely verbal: i f Price i s admitting a certainty of r e l a t i o n between motive and action, then he i s consistent with P r i e s t l e y ' s d e f i n i t i o n of necessity. P r i e s t l e y ' s a lternative to Price's concept of agency i s that - given the dual cause of v o l i t i o n , namely the predisposition of mind and the present view of the objects of choice -i t i s the latter that i s generally, and i n a more especial sense, c a l l e d the motive, and compared to the impeller (to use Dr. Price's language) while the i n c l i n a t i o n , or d i s p o s i t i o n , of the mind, i s only considered as a circumstance which gives the motive an opportunity of acting upon i t , or impelling i t , and producing i t s proper e f f e c t . In t h i s I appeal, as before, to the common sense of mankind, (p.53) The issue between Price and P r i e s t l e y i n r e l a t i o n to the causal argument i s now established. For Price, the cause of an action has to be something of which i t i s conceivable that i t could be the ' e f f i c i e n t cause' of motion; t h i s cannot be the motive, which has no 'being', but must be the s e l f . I m p l i c i t l y the s e l f can override the motive, and i s therefore free. For P r i e s t l e y , t h i s claim regarding ' e f f i c i e n t cause' i s mistaken: the cause i s the presence of a motive i n the mind. Empirically, choice always follows motive; the motive i s therefore the cause and the s e l f i s the agent by which the motive causes action. The issue i s therefore very s i m i l a r to that between Clarke 98 and C o l l i n s . Price's position i s , as noted, an interpretation of Clarke. P r i e s t l e y has arrived at C o l l i n s ' 'necessary agent', though by a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t route: whereas C o l l i n s ' argument from causation was a priori with an assumption of the truth of psychological hedonism, P r i e s t l e y ' s argument i s a combination of one of C o l l i n s ' a priori arguments and a Humean analysis of causation. P r i e s t l e y , therefore, o f f e r s a more sophisticated development of C o l l i n s . 5.6 Further Debate on Causation Price and P r i e s t l e y continued t h e i r debate i n a correspondence, published by P r i e s t l e y i n 1778. The correspondence was edited into sections, so that each s e l f -contained argument from Price i s followed immediately by Pr i e s t l e y ' s response. This makes for a much more readable correspondence than the 'Dodwell' controversy between Clarke and C o l l i n s , as published i n Clarke's Works. There are, of course, two major differences between the two controversies: the Clarke-C o l l i n s controversy was conducted by the publication of pamphlets, and so each work was intended for immediate publication; the P r i c e - P r i e s t l e y correspondence, on the other hand, was prepared by exchange of l e t t e r s between the disputants, but (with the exception of Price's f i r s t communication) always intended for publication i n book form when the correspondence was complete. The Clarke-Collins debate was therefore immediate and public throughout i t s conduct; the 99 P r i c e - P r i e s t l e y debate was more contrived and public only at i t s completion. This no doubt also accounts for the caustic conduct of the debate between Clarke and C o l l i n s (especially on Clarke's s i d e ) , and the much more gentlemanly nature of the Pric e -P r i e s t l y correspondence. Any consideration of politeness, however, did not prevent P r i e s t l e y , as editor, from always giving himself the l a s t word on each t o p i c . Price's substantive reply to P r i e s t l e y ' s c r i t i c i s m s above comes i n his second communication. He proceeds lar g e l y by c l a r i f y i n g his pos i t i o n , and further indebting himself to Clarke. He begins by asserting that a l l animals, being s e l f -moving, have l i b e r t y (as Clarke asserted i n his Remarks on C o l l i n s ; see section 4.3), and that there are no degrees of l i b e r t y : "there i s no medium between acting, and not acting", and "Acting, and being acted upon, are incompatible with one another" (D.P.M.N.7, pp.l35f). Further, there cannot be an i n f i n i t e regress of causes of motion: there must at some point be a f i r s t cause. Price's second argument i s that self-determination i s consistent with acting i n accordance with motives: i t i s s t i l l l i b e r t y . He claims that P r i e s t l e y ' s assertion that s e l f -determination implies an e f f e c t without a cause i s u n j u s t i f i e d : 7 Joseph P r i e s t l e y (ed.), A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, London: J . Johnson, 1778 100 "Does i t follow that because I am myself the cause, there i s no cause?" (p.136). Price agrees that the power to act "can never be exerted without some view or design. Whoever acts, means to do somewhat" (p.137). The difference between his li b e r t a r i a n i s m and determinism i s "the in t o l e r a b l e absurdity of making our reasons and ends i n acting the physical causes or efficients of action". He emphasizes the d i s t i n c t i o n "much i n s i s t e d upon by Dr. Clarke" between the "operation of physical causes, and the influence of moral reasons": physical causes are beings, moral causes are "only the views of beings"; i n the former case the agency rests with another (the purveyor of motives, whether God or - to borrow Sartre's term - 'The Other'), i n the l a t t e r the agent moves himself. So f a r there i s no argument to support the claim. 5.7 The 'Balance' Analogy Price's t h i r d and fourth points form the closest we get to moving the dispute on to common ground: The certainty of event a r i s i n g from the operation of physical causes i s always equal and invariable, but the certainty of event a r i s i n g from moral causes, that i s , from the views and perceptions of beings, admits of an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of degrees; and sometimes passes into probability and contingency, (p.140) The degrees of p r o b a b i l i t y a r i s e when a person i s faced with contrary motives, for example a person with a love of v i r t u e being offered the temptation of v i c e : " I f h i s love of v i r t u e 101 exceeds the influence of passion, there w i l l be a probability of hi s acting virtuously, portioned to the degree i n which the love of v i r t u e p r e v a i l s within him" (p.l40f); even where there i s the highest degree of motivation, leading to certainty that the person w i l l act i n a given way, i t i s always i n his power to act d i f f e r e n t l y : A man at the bottom of St. Paul's will not jump up: A man at the top will not jump down. Both events may be certain. But a man at the bottom cannot jump up: A man at the top can jump down. And i f i n common speech we should say i n the l a t t e r case, that a man at the top cannot jump down, we should speak f i g u r a t i v e l y and improperly; meaning only that he will not. (p.142) 8 I t i s not u n t i l h is 'Additional Observations', composed af t e r the p r i n t i n g of the main correspondence 9, that Price corrects a tendency to res t his argument s o l e l y on the physical e f f i c i e n c y of the cause, and not on the choice i t s e l f . In choosing an action we have a choice of ends, a choice made under the influence of motives. P r i e s t l e y ' s argument i s that a dominant motive i s usually recognizable, and when not recognizable we s t i l l have reason to believe that there must be one undiscerned. Further, we have reason to believe that 8 This brings to mind Sartre's characterization of vertigo i n Being and Nothingness, namely the r e a l i z a t i o n when standing at the edge of a precipice that there i s nothing to stop one f r e e l y choosing to throw oneself over. 9 From Price's l e t t e r of 19 September 1778 (pp.321ff), i t appears that, on seeing the printed proofs of the correspondence, Price reviewed h i s work and wrote 'Additional Observations' which he considered to include new and enlightening material. P r i e s t l e y wrote further 'Replies', and each were included i n the f i n a l p ublication. 102 contrary motives "balance one another, exactly l i k e weights i n opposite scales" (see Section 5.4 above). We have reason to believe these propositions, but are those reasons convincing? P r i e s t l e y ' s a posteriori argument i s open to challenge. I t i s conceivable that a p a r t i c u l a r choice could be made against a l l discernable motivation; a priori t h i s i s possible: i t i s common ground that there must be a cause of a given choice; the dispute i s what constitutes the cause. If t h i s choice i s made, P r i e s t l e y ' s argument would have to be that there must have been some overriding motive of which we were unaware. This, however, i s question-begging: i t rules out the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of counter-example, which renders the investigation meaningless. Further, there i s no evidence given to support the contention that contrary motives balance "exactly as weights i n opposite scales", which assertion does not appear to be s e l f -evident (except on another question-begging assumption), though P r i e s t l e y claims i t to be "known". If h i s argument that the motive i s invariably the cause i s undermined, then the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f r e e l y w i l l i n g mind returns: a mind that can sel e c t i t s own ends, independently of the force of the motives. This analogy of the balance i s discussed i n Price's 'Additional Observations' and i n P r i e s t l e y ' s 'Replies'. Price indeed makes reference to the fourth and f i f t h papers exchanged i n the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence, i n which the same analogy 103 was a point of dispute; Clarke there argued that a balance i s no agent but i s only acted upon, and so cannot be a proper analogy for the mind (Alexander, pp.36, 45, 55XT, 97ff; cf D.P.M.N., pp.350f). Price's contention i s that i t i s possible to conceive of a s i t u a t i o n i n which a person i s presented with equal and opposite motivations, for example temptation by an a t t r a c t i v e proposition which i s morally wrong: he has contrary and balanced motives of g r a t i f i c a t i o n and duty. Price's case i s that we possess "a power to make either of the motives the strongest; that i s , to make either of them the motive that shall p r e v a i l , and on which we shall please to determine" (p.347). This move from the p r i n c i p l e of action to consideration of the choice i t s e l f i s an improvement to Price's argument. He claims further that "we are continually finding ourselves i n these circumstances" of equal and opposite motive. P r i e s t l e y ' s response i s to suggest that t h i s claim i s s i m p l i s t i c . Motives depend for t h e i r force on the receptive state of mind of the agent at the time the choice i s to be made, and t h i s state i s i n constant f l u c t u a t i o n . Analysis of the causes of thought i s therefore impossible i n most cases, and we must respect the complicated nature of our psychology: If i t were possible to make a balance which would support a thousand pounds weight, and yet turn with one thousandth part of a grain, would i t be any wonder that a person should not be able e a s i l y to bring i t to equipoise? But what i s even t h i s to the exquisite structure of the mind? (p.385) 104 This i s c e r t a i n l y an improvement on the mere assertion of the analogy by P r i e s t l e y i n the main correspondence, but i t doesn't remove the objection that the claim that there i s always a dominant motive which decides choice i s question-begging. 5.8 Conclusions on Causation The discussion of the 'balance' analogy i s something of an aside to Price's main l i n e of argument, which i s to o f f e r an alter n a t i v e causal scheme and to suggest that h i s i s the more plausib l e . His t a c t i c i s to claim that even if P r i e s t l e y ' s analysis of motivation always deciding choice i s allowed, i t does not give a plausible account of the mechanism. Price's analysis (following Clarke) emphasizes metaphysical concepts: i t has to be plausible that the postulated cause i s capable of being an e f f i c i e n t cause, and therefore must be a 'being'. P r i e s t l e y ' s analysis (following Hume) emphasizes epistemological concepts: we can reasonably consider only that which can be known about causation, namely observation of constant conjunction; metaphysical claims regarding what may or may not constitute an ' e f f i c i e n t cause' are empty. This divergence underlies P r i e s t l e y ' s response to Price's question quoted above: "Does i t follow that because I am myself the cause, there i s no cause?" P r i e s t l e y responds that i f i t i s perceived that the w i l l i nvariably acts according to motives, then we must conclude that i t could not be otherwise. The entire 105 e f f e c t i s therefore accounted for by the motives, and there i s no need to postulate another cause. "A power manifested by no e f f e c t s , must be considered as merely imaginary, i t being from effects alone that we ar r i v e at the knowledge of causes" (p.147). He agrees that there can be no motion without a s e l f -moving f i r s t cause, but that nothing more can be said; s p e c i f i c a l l y nothing can be said about whether that power i s i n God or communicable to man, as Clarke claimed i n Being and Attributes. "Though the idea be ever so incomprehensible, and confounding to our f a c u l t i e s , we must acquiesce i n i t ; for to stop short of t h i s , or to go beyond i t , i s impossible." The correspondence proceeds l i t t l e further i n r e l a t i o n to causation, and what there i s i s generally r e p e t i t i v e . I t i s worth mentioning b r i e f l y the question of divine prescience, however, for a point of comparison with Clarke-Collins. P r i e s t l e y had given a b r i e f discussion i n Section III of his book, which adds nothing to C o l l i n s beyond some argument from scr i p t u r e . Price, however, declines to repeat Clarke's argument (that God has i n f i n i t e l y perfect judgement, which doesn't necessitate that which i s free) or indeed to o f f e r any argument at a l l : The fore-knowledge of a contingent event carrying the appearance of a contradiction, i s indeed a d i f f i c u l t y ; and I do not pretend to be capable of removing i t . (pp,175f) Cl e a r l y Price was not impressed with Clarke's argument. Whether 106 Price believed i n divine prescience but couldn't j u s t i f y that b e l i e f by reason alone, or whether he i s implying that his b e l i e f i n l i b e r t y e n t a i l s d i s b e l i e f i n that p a r t i c u l a r doctrine (an admirable p o s i t i o n ) , i t i s not possible to say on t h i s evidence. 5.9 Moral Arguments Our consideration of the moral arguments may be b r i e f . F i r s t , f o r the most part they follow, i n a s i m i l a r manner to Clarke-Collins, on the causal arguments, and second, the majority of the discussion leads into the d o c t r i n a l issues of whether God can be considered the author of s i n , which issues are not pertinent to t h i s t h e s i s . 1 0 I t i s worth noting, however, that as P r i e s t l e y follows Hume's conception of causation, so he i s influenced by his approach to moral sentiment. Price's view of morality, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i s based on assessment of p a r t i c u l a r s : what choice was made by a p a r t i c u l a r agent with p a r t i c u l a r motives leading to a p a r t i c u l a r action; t h i s i s what he termed ' p r a c t i c a l v i r t u e ' , which depended on l i b e r t y . P r i e s t l e y , on the other hand, favours Hume's account of moral assessment. As a r u l e , we 1 0 The issues of whether God can be considered the author of s i n i s mentioned i n passing by C o l l i n s i n his survey of the l i t e r a t u r e at the s t a r t of h i s Philosophical Inquiry, with a quote from Bayle: "That the best proofs alledged for l i b e r t y are, that without it man could not sin; and that God would be the auther of evil, as well as good thoughts" ( C o l l i n s , p.19). C o l l i n s does not address the point i n his own consideration of morality, however. 107 t r u s t our a b i l i t y to make moral assessments regarding a person's character. Such assessment i s dependent on consistency of motives: i f there i s no necessity of conduct, no causal influence of motive on w i l l , then we could never be j u s t i f i e d i n assessing character: A good action produced [by a self-determining power, independent of motive] i s no i n d i c a t i o n of a good disposition of mind, i n c l i n e d to y i e l d to the influence of good impressions, and therefore i s nothing on which I can depend for the future. ( P r i e s t l e y , p.82) Moral sentiments, P r i e s t l e y argues, r e f e r to states of mind, not acts of self-motive w i l l , and t h i s i s useful for moral development. Someone who i s ashamed of a past action may think that he could have acted d i f f e r e n t l y , but i f he understood that a vicious action followed unavoidably from "the deplorable state of h i s mind," then t h i s would "operate so as to make him act better, and become better disposed f o r the future" (p.88). P r i e s t l e y also r e j e c t s Price's r a t i o n a l i s t moralism, that to act virtuously i s to follow reason not character (Section 5.1). For P r i e s t l e y i t i s i r r e l e v a n t whether the motive to act a given way i s i n s t i n c t i v e or acquired: "does a course of v i r t u e become less virtuous, i n consequence of being persisted in, and consequently being a more easy and mechanical thing?" (p.69). 108 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION The P r i c e - P r i e s t l e y correspondence i s a close development of the Clarke-Collins debate. Although I have concentrated on the issues of l i b e r t y and necessity, each debate i s within the context of disputes on whether there i s an immaterial, thinking soul or s p i r i t (held by Clarke and P r i c e ) , or whether thinking i s a property of matter (held as possible by C o l l i n s , and as ce r t a i n by P r i e s t l e y ) . Neither C o l l i n s 7 nor P r i e s t l e y ' s arguments, however, are dependent on t h i s form of materialism being true, for the argument for necessity i s independent of the mechanism by which the action of motives i n the mind i s brought about. The debates hinge on the issue of causation, s p e c i f i c a l l y the d i f f e r e n t concepts of causation and action adopted by the four writers. Clarke has a strong a priori concept of causation - whatever begins, has a cause - and a strong concept of agency: to act, to begin motion, i s to be free. C o l l i n s shares Clarke's strong concept of causation, but has a weak concept of agency: to act i s merely to bring something about, perhaps to transfer motion or energy. For Clarke, the causal chain must end with the self-moving power i n man, i f man i s to be an agent. For C o l l i n s , agency i s compatible with being necessitated by causes, and the hedonism adapted from Locke seems to f i t the b i l l . 109 Clarke gets the better of the causal arguments, as he successfully shows that C o l l i n s begs the question against a self-moving power i n man. I t i s also the case that C o l l i n s ' p o s i t i v e arguments fo r hedonistic causes of choice are not well-supported. However Clarke can only show a priori that a s e l f -moving power i n man i s possible, not c e r t a i n . In his argument Clarke very c l e v e r l y avoids the question of a d e f i n i t i o n of ' w i l l ' : he says that exercising the self-moving power i s what i s known as 'doing as we w i l l ' , but that i s as f a r as he goes. In p a r t i c u l a r , the r e l a t i o n of judgement, v o l i t i o n and action i s l e f t d e l i b e r a t e l y vague (Section 2.5). This allows Clarke to present an argument strong on the question of what i t i s to act, to begin motion, but i t has the drawback of leaving his analysis weak on the question of what i t i s to choose. The secondary arguments i n C o l l i n s ' Philosophical Inquiry-provide evidence - and I think good evidence - that he wrote the book primarily against Clarke. The argument from experience, discussed at length by C o l l i n s , i s central to Clarke's own argument for l i b e r t a r i a n i s m i n Being and Attributes. Clarke also discusses divine prescience and ' l i b e r t y as a perfection' i n that work, and C o l l i n s considers these same issues i n h i s book. F i n a l l y he addresses the nature of rewards and punishments and the nature of morality i n response to Clarke's d i r e c t challenge to him i n the l a s t 'Dodwell' pamphlet, though not i n the r e l i g i o u s terms that Clarke sought. 110 I t i s P r i e s t l e y who moves the pivot of the debate by following Hume's re-working of the analysis of cause and e f f e c t , from a metaphysical analysis to an epistemological approach: where constant conjunction of phenomena i s observed, a causal r e l a t i o n may be inferred, but no more may be said. The precise mechanism of a given causal r e l a t i o n i s something which cannot be known and i s therefore i r r e l e v a n t . This approach i s not accepted by Price: he follows Clarke i n the contention that i f something i s postulated as a cause, then i t must be conceivable that i t i s capable of producing the e f f e c t ; t h i s does not apply to motives, which are not 'beings', but merely 'views of beings'. My stronger complaint against P r i e s t l e y i s that the analysis i s set out i n such a way as to make i t l o g i c a l l y i r r e f u t a b l e on i t s own terms. He cogently argues that the cause of choice i s the presence of a motive i n the mind, but decides that i t i s the motive, not the mind, which i s the variable factor: he treats the mind as a 'balance' whose movement i s decided by the r e l a t i v e 'weight' of motives. If evidence were presented to contradict t h i s conception, e.g. examples of actions chosen contrary to a l l i d e n t i f i a b l e motives, then P r i e s t l e y ' s assumption must be that there were un i d e n t i f i e d yet decisive motives at work. The whole argument depends on the truth of the 'balance' analogy, which i s not self-evident, and therefore begs the question. I l l This complaint does not apply to Clarke and Price, who share a r a t i o n a l i s t approach: a weak a priori claim that a s e l f -moving power i n man i s possible, turned on the basis of argument from experience into the strong claim that the power does i n fa c t e x i s t . Clarke's approach i s subject to well-founded c r i t i c i s m from C o l l i n s , that the arguments from experience required by Clarke to e s t a b l i s h h i s position are not decisive. I t i s , I believe, Price who, of the four, comes clos e s t to a s a t i s f a c t o r y analysis of the question. I t i s notable that Price changes h i s analysis of motive between the main correspondence with P r i e s t l e y and his 'Additional Observations' (Section 5.7). In the e a r l i e r papers he, following Clarke, denies that motives can be the cause of anything, and remains wedded to Clarke's discussion of l i b e r t y i n terms of beginning motion, rather than analyzing choice. However he moves towards an analysis of choice i n the 'Additional Observations', where he proposes that when presented with opposing motives, we have the power to decide on which motive to act. This accords well with both P r i e s t l e y ' s analysis that what causes choice i s the presence of motives i n the mind, and with the i n t u i t i o n that a choice i s just that: i n any given s i t u a t i o n , whatever choice i s made could have been made d i f f e r e n t l y . Although t h i s postulation i s introduced by Price i n the context of equal and opposite motives, the implication of 112 the text i s that the postulated power i s equally applicable to overriding otherwise dominant motives: Has a man, urged by contrary i n c l i n a t i o n s , (by passion on one hand and a regard to vi r t u e on the other) no controuling power over his i n c l i n a t i o n s to make one of them over the other, the i n c l i n a t i o n that he w i l l follow[?] Or i s he then impelled by contrary forces, which must be ca r r i e d along by the strongest? If t h i s i s the truth, then there i s no action of the man, when a temptation overcomes him; nor consequently, i f there i s any meaning i n the words, can there be any g u i l t , or i l l - d e s e r t . I i n t r e a t Dr. P r i e s t l e y to remember, that t h i s i s the doctrine, and the only doctrine of necessity that I mean to oppose. (D.M.P.N., pp.347Jf) As P r i e s t l e y advances beyond C o l l i n s on the necessitarian side of the debate, so Price adds materially to Clarke's arguments. However, plausible as i t might seem i n abstract, the power to choose as the power to 'make either of the motives strongest' i s only postulation, and Price gives no consideration to how t h i s power might operate, or i t s r e l a t i o n to the other powers of the mind. As suggested i n r e l a t i o n to Clarke, a proper theory of agency i s needed before the l i b e r t a r i a n can hope convincingly to p r e v a i l over necessitarianism. 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY H.G. Alexander (ed.) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956 David Berman A History of Atheism in Britain: From Hobbes to Russell, London: Croom Helm, 1988 Samuel Clarke The Works, 1738. Reprinted i n 4 volumes, New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1978 Anthony C o l l i n s A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, Birmingham: Joseph Priestley/Thomas Pearson, 1790 E.S. de Beer (ed.) The Correspondence of John Locke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vols v i i (1982) and v i i i (1989) The Dictionary of National Biography (ed. L e s l i e Stephen and Sidney Lee), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963-4 (reprint) Conrad G i l l , History of Birmingham, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, Vol. 1 Thomas Hobbes (ed. William Molesworth) The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. i v , London: John Bohn, 1840 (reprinted Scientia Verlag Aalen, Germany, 1966) 114 David Hume (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch) (1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed., 1978 (2) Enquiries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed., 1975 E.D. James 'Voltaire on Free W i l l ' , Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, No. 249, 1987, pp.1-18 Alan Kidd Manchester, Keele: Ryburn Publishing, 1993 G.W. Leibniz ( t r . and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett) New Essays on Human Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 Jack Lindsey (ed.) Autobiography of Joseph Priestley, Bath: Adams & Dart, 1970 John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995 James O'Higgins, S.J. (1) Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970 (2) Determinism and Freewill, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 Plato ( t r . Jowett/Ostwald, ed. Vlastos) Protagoras, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956 115 Joseph P r i e s t l e y (1) The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, London: J . Johnson, 1777 (2) (ed.) A Free Discussion of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, London: J . Johnson, 1778 D. Daiches Raphael (ed.) Price's Review of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948 William Rowe Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991 Paul Russell (1) "Hume's Treatise and the Clarke-Collins Controversy", Hume Studies, Volume XXI, No.l, A p r i l 1995, pp.95-115 (2) Freedom and Moral Sentiment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 D.0. Thomas (1) Richard Price, C a r d i f f : University of Wales Press, 1976 (2) The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 John W. Yolton Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983 116 APPENDIX A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES A.1 Anthony C o l l i n s Anthony C o l l i n s showed promise from the very s t a r t of his l i f e : i n common with a l l the best people, he was born on the Summer S o l s t i c e ; i n his case the year was 1676, and the place Isleworth, near Hounslow, Middlesex. The son of "a man of good estate", as the Dictionary of National Biography puts i t , his school education was received at Eton. He had the good fortune to attend King's College, Cambridge, though l e f t King's without taking a degree. From 1694 he combined his studies at King's with l e g a l t r a i n i n g at Middle Temple, which he had the good sense to abandon as being too d u l l . He married Martha C h i l d i n 1698; they had four children of whom one son and two daughters survived, but Martha herself was to die early, i n 1703. Shortly before her death C o l l i n s met John Locke, and the two formed a remarkably close friendship during the l a s t two years of Locke's l i f e . C o l l i n s assisted Locke i n many p r a c t i c a l matters, and also sent him comments on his reading. The l e t t e r s between them demonstrate both the depth of af f e c t i o n and Locke's regard for C o l l i n s ' a b i l i t i e s as a c r i t i c : Give me leave to t e l l you: that I am not mistaken i n you, for though you are not a Young Lady a Beauty and a fortune Yet I have more s a t i s f a c t i o n and pleasure i n your friendship than I can hope f o r from those q u a l i f i c a t i o n s only... If I f a l l into the stra i n s of 117 a Lover, i t i s from motives that ar i s e within me, and that are not i n my power to prevent. You must cease to be what you are; nay you must never have been what you have been, to destroy that d i s p o s i t i o n of mind that has so much merit for i t s foundation. ( C o l l i n s to Locke, 30 March 17041) I doe not l i k e [your protestation that] I have given you an argument against presumeing so f a r again upon the l i b e r t y I allow you [to comment on my Essay]. That i s to say you may give me books, you may buy books for me, you may get books bound for me, you may trudg up and down with them on my errant to Ladys, but my book you may not presume to read, use your judgment about, and talke to me f r e e l y of. Though I know noebody that understands i t so well, nor can give me better l i g h t concerning i t . (Locke to C o l l i n s , 3 A p r i l 17042) Locke encouraged C o l l i n s to write, and was a major influence on his thought (see Chapter Three). C o l l i n s was an advocate of free-thinking at a time when the orthodoxy of the established church s t i l l held sway i n almost a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l matters: his early publications (published anonymously) included an Essay on the Use of Reason (1707), regarding evidence from testimony and a Discourse of Freethinking (1713). The breadth of C o l l i n s ' free-thinking approach i s indicated by Priestcraft in Perfection (1710), i n which he presented a challenge to the le g a l authority of a clause i n the twentieth of the Thirty-Nine A r t i c l e s of the Church of England, namely that 'the Church has power to decree r i t e s and ceremonies and authority i n controversies of f a i t h ' , 1 E.S. de Beer (ed.), The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. i i , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, Letter no. 3500 2 ibid., Letter no. 3504 118 claiming that i t had been fraudulently inserted. C o l l i n s ' personal r e l i g i o u s views are open to question: he was a n t i -c l e r i c a l , but not openly a t h e i s t i c a l - though t h i s was a common charge against him. His writings suggest a b e l i e f i n deism - a re j e c t i o n of revealed r e l i g i o n but b e l i e f i n a F i r s t Cause or Prime Mover - though t h i s could have been the nearest safe haven of an atheist: his biographer James O'Higgins believes C o l l i n s to be a deist, whereas David Berman argues that he was an at h e i s t . 3 C o l l i n s ' works to be considered i n t h i s essay are his exchange of pamphlets with Samuel Clarke from 1707 to 1709, and A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1717). C o l l i n s t r a v e l l e d on the continent; his works were i n f l u e n t i a l on the philosophes of the French Enlightenment, and appeared i n several translations and c o l l e c t i o n s . C o l l i n s ' book and Clarke's Remarks on i t were major sources for Vo l t a i r e ' s writing on l i b e r t y and necessity; between 1734 and 1748 V o l t a i r e appears to have moved from support for Clarke's l i b e r t a r i a n i s m to C o l l i n s ' necessitarianism. 4 3 See James O'Higgins S.J., Anthony Collins: The Man and his Works, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970; David Berman, A History of Atheism in Britain, London: Croom Helm, 1988, Chapter 3: 'Anthony C o l l i n s ' Atheology'. 4 On the influence of C o l l i n s and Clarke on V o l t a i r e , see E.D. James, 'Voltaire on Free W i l l ' , Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, No. 249, 1987, pp.1-18. 119 In the l a t e r part of h i s l i f e , C o l l i n s was an active county o f f i c i a l . He was a magistrate, f i r s t i n Middlesex and l a t t e r l y i n Essex. He was a b r i l l i a n t administrator, and i n 1718 became county treasurer of Essex, transforming the finances of the county following a period of lax or corrupt administration. He married for the second time i n 1724, to Elizabeth Wrottesley. He c o l l e c t e d a large personal l i b r a r y , which contained 6,906 items by the time of his death; compare that to Locke's 3,210 and Vo l t a i r e ' s 3,867. C o l l i n s died on 13 December 1729, aged 53 years. His manuscripts were l e f t to his f r i e n d and collaborator Pierre Desmaizeaux, who sold them to C o l l i n s ' widow for f i f t y guineas; Desmaizeaux appears to have repented and attempted to reverse the transaction, but to no a v a i l . C o l l i n s ' l i b r a r y was dispersed and his manuscripts were l o s t . A.2 Samuel Clarke Samuel Clarke was born i n Norwich on the less s i g n i f i c a n t date of 11 October 1675, making him C o l l i n s ' senior by eight months. He was educated at the Norwich free school and Caius College, Cambridge, where he was recognized as an exceptional student. He did take a degree, defending one of the (then unfavoured) Newtonian p r i n c i p l e s i n a f i n a l examination; as C o l l i n s became an intimate of Locke, so Clarke was to become a f r i e n d of Newton, for whom he translated the Opticks into Latin 120 i n 1706. This was Clarke's second s c i e n t i f i c work, for i n 1697 he had prepared a new Lat i n t r a n s l a t i o n of Jacob Rohault's Physics, then the standard Cartesian textbook. Clarke footnoted the work with references to Newton's physics which refuted the main text. Further editions were published i n 1702, 1710 and 1718, and the work was translated into English by Clarke's brother. Clarke's text was s t i l l being used i n Cambridge i n 1730.5 In 1698 Clarke was made Chaplain to the Bishop of Norwich, a post he held f o r twelve years. This period saw the f i r s t of his theological publications, and i n 1704 and 1705 his two series of Boyle Lectures. In 1706, the same year as he published A Letter to Mr Dodwell which led to the f i r s t controversy with C o l l i n s , Clarke was introduced to Queen Anne, who i n 1709 gave him the parish of St James, Westminster. I t seems that a f t e r t h i s preferment Clarke changed h i s method of preaching from extemporization used at Norwich, to c a r e f u l l y prepared texts, many of which were subsequently published. It was at t h i s time that Clarke took the degree of Doctor of D i v i n i t y at Cambridge. He defended a thesis on the propositions that no a r t i c l e of the Chr i s t i a n f a i t h i s contrary 5 See Samuel Clarke, Works, V o l . i , p . i i ; Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, p . x i ; D.N^B., Vol. i v , p.443 121 j to r i g h t reason, and that there can be no r e l i g i o n without the l i b e r t y of human action. The oral examination was conducted by Professor James, Regius Professor of D i v i n i t y , and the defence became famous. A (second-hand) account i s given i n Hoadly's Preface: The Professor himself, who was a Man of Humour as well as Learning, said to him towards the End of the Disputation,.. .P ro fec to , Me probe exacuisti: which I hardly know how to interpret to the English Reader, unless by a phrase of a low kind, In truth You have thoroughly rubb'd me up. Others think that word was Exercuisti. (Works,i,p.vi) 'Nam te probe exercui' ('I have s u f f i c i e n t l y worked you') was James' usual form of dismissal to a candidate; 'Nam me probe e x e r c u i s t i ' ('You have thoroughly worked me') was his way of paying compliment to Clarke. Clarke's publication of The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity (1712) led to a long controversy i n which he was accused of heresy; there was an o f f i c i a l complaint by the lower house of the church's Convocation to the upper house. No action was taken by the bishops, following a statement of orthodox b e l i e f i n which Clarke circumvented the problem, and a promise not to preach any more on the subject. For the remainder of his l i f e Clarke accepted no further preferments which required him again to subscribe to the A r t i c l e s ; the only preferment he took was the mastership of a hospital i n Leicester, "the Method of taking possession of i t , " states Hoadly, "free from some of those 122 circumstances which by Law attend upon most other Preferments" ( p . v i i i ) . His s c i e n t i f i c work continued, with the controversy with Leibniz on the nature of space and time, as well as free w i l l (see Section 2.8), and one of his l a s t works was 'On the Proportion of Force to Veloci t y i n Bodies i n Motion', published i n the Transactions of the Royal Society (1728). In addition to his works on theology, philosophy and science, Clarke published editions of Caesar's Commentaries and of the f i r s t twelve books of Homer's Iliad. Clarke's reputation among his contemporaries was as the primary English philosopher aft e r Locke's death, and his commitment to an a priori philosophy makes him the foremost 'English R a t i o n a l i s t ' of the eighteenth century. A measure of his reputation i s that George Berkeley sent Clarke a f i r s t e d i t ion of his Principles, hoping for Clarke's comments, but Clarke declined; however, at the time that Berkeley was preparing f o r his move to the New World they met twice weekly at Queen Caroline's court. V o l t a i r e was also acquainted with Clarke, and reportedly recorded that Clarke's appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury was prevented by one Bishop GibsOn " t e l l i n g the Queen that Clarke was the most learned and honest man i n a l l her dominions, but had one defect - he was not a c h r i s t i a n " (D.N.B.,iv,p.446). 123 Clarke died on 17 May 1729, seven months before C o l l i n s . He was survived by h i s wife Katherine and f i v e of t h e i r seven children. A.3 Richard Price The son of a C a l v i n i s t minister with the l y r i c a l name of Rice Price, Richard Price was born on 23 February 1723 at Tyn-ton, Llangeinor, Glamorgan. He was educated at various Welsh academies, and from the age of eighteen at the Fund Academy, a non-conformist college i n London led by John Eames, a f r i e n d and follower of Newton. During his teenage years Price had rejected the s t r i c t Calvinism of his father, being more impressed with the more l i b e r a l works of Clarke and Butler. Following the completion of h i s education, Price became chaplain and companion to George S t r e a t f i e l d , a businessman i n Stoke Newington, and worked with various congregations i n north-east London, including Newington Green. In 1756-7 he inherited from S t r e a t f i e l d and an uncle, and i n 1757 was able to marry Sarah Blundell. In 1758 he published h i s primary philosophical work, A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals. That same year he moved to Newington Green, which congregation he was to serve for the remainder of h i s l i f e . Price was better known to his contemporaries as a writer on finance and p o l i t i c s . He had strong mathematical a b i l i t i e s , and 124 was made a Fellow of the Royal Society i n 1765 for mathematical e d i t o r i a l work. He was instrumental i n the early development of a c t u a r i a l science. Many insurance s o c i e t i e s founded during the mid-eighteenth century collapsed due to inadequate c a l c u l a t i o n of r i s k ; Price's work and data research helped to correct t h i s , and he acted as adviser to the founders of what i s now the Equitable L i f e Assurance Society, which successfully developed lif e - i n s u r a n c e . In p o l i t i c s , Price wrote pamphlets on the national debt, and, more dramatically, on c i v i l l i b e r t y and against the war with the American colonies. He was sympathetic to the c o l o n i a l s ' case, and had been an acquaintance of Benjamin Franklin during the l a t t e r ' s residence i n London from 1757 to 1763. Price's basic position was that every community or nation ought to have the r i g h t of self-government. His p o l i t i c a l writings earned him the freedom of the C i t y of London, and i n 1778 the following resolution of the American Congress: That the Honourable Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee and John Adams, Esqrs. or any one of them, be directed forthwith to apply to Dr. Price, and inform him that i t i s the Desire of Congress to consider him as a C i t i z e n of the United States, and to receive his Assistance i n regulating t h e i r Finances. That i f he s h a l l think i t expedient to remove with h i s Family to America and afford such Assistance a generous Provision s h a l l be made f o r requiting his Services, (quoted i n Thomas(1) , pp.79ff) 6 D.O. Thomas, Richard Price, C a r d i f f : University of Wales Press, 1976 125 Due to his age and reluctance to leave his connections i n B r i t a i n , Price declined the i n v i t a t i o n . In 1781 Yale University voted to o f f e r him the honorary degree of LL.D., received at the same time as George Washington. In 1782 Price was offered the post of private secretary to the new Prime Minister, Lord Shelburne, and i s said to have suggested one of the paragraphs included i n that year's King's Speech. Price continued to support reform, and i n 1789 gave a sermon r e f l e c t i n g on the centenary of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, and the American and French Revolutions; the speech i n v i t e d attack from Edmund Burke i n h i s Reflections on the Revolution in France, and Price defended himself i n subsequent printed editions. His text includes a proclamation which i s worth quoting at length, for i t sums up the s p i r i t of the Enlightenment: What an eventful period t h i s i s ! I am thankful that I have l i v e d to i t ; and I could almost say, Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation. I have l i v e d to see a d i f f u s i o n of knowledge, which has undermined superstition and error - I have l i v e d to see the righ t s of men better understood than ever; and nations panting f o r l i b e r t y , which seemed to have l o s t the idea of i t . I have l i v e d to see THIRTY MILLIONS of people, indignant and resolute, spurning at slavery, and demanding l i b e r t y with an i r r e s i s t i b l e voice; t h e i r king led i n triumph, and an a r b i t r a r y monarch surrendering himself to his subjects. After sharing i n the benefits of one Revolution, I have been spared to be a witness to two other Revolutions, both glorious. And now, methinks, I see the ardor for l i b e r t y catching and spreading; a general amendment beginning i n human a f f a i r s ; the dominion of kings changed for the dominion of laws, and the dominion of p r i e s t s 126 giving way to the dominion of reason and conscience. (Thomas(2)7, p.301) Richard Price died on 19 A p r i l 1791. He had survived his wife Sarah by f i v e years; they had no children. His f r i e n d and philosophical disputant Joseph P r i e s t l e y preached his funeral sermon. A.4 Joseph P r i e s t l e y Joseph P r i e s t l e y was born at B i r s t a l Fieldhead, near Leeds, on 13 March 1733. The eldest son of a cloth-dresser, h i s family became large, and at the age of four he was sent to l i v e with his maternal grandfather near Wakefield. He returned to his father's house following his mother's death i n 1740, but i n 1742 was adopted by an aunt, Sarah Keighley. In 1745 he entered Batley grammar school, learning Latin and Greek, and during school holidays studying Hebrew with the l o c a l dissenting minister, to whose school he transferred u n t i l i t s close i n 1749. At that time he showed signs of tuberculosis, and his formal education was suspended. He subsequently recovered, however, and i n 1752 entered a new dissenting academy at Daventry, Northamptonshire, as i t s f i r s t enrolled student. During his studies he met the mechanistic psychology of David ' D.O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price, Oxford: OUP^ 1977 127 Hartley (1705-57), which confirmed for him the view of necessity he had e a r l i e r read i n C o l l i n s : I t was a reference to 'Dr. Hartley's Observations of Man', i n the course of our Lectures, that f i r s t brought me acquainted with that performance, which immediately engaged my closest attention, and produced the greatest, and i n my opinion, the most favourable e f f e c t on my general turn of thinking through l i f e . I t established me i n the b e l i e f of the doctrine of necessity, which I f i r s t learned from C o l l i n s ; i t greatly improved that d i s p o s i t i o n to piety which I brought to the academy and freed i t from .the rigour with which i t had been tinctured. (Memoirs8, p.76) In 1755 he l e f t the academy to become an assistant minister i n Needham Market, Suffolk. He was not a great success as a preacher: an inherited stammer worsened, and he alienated some with h i s Arian views, denying that Christ was divine i n the same manner as God. An attempt to e s t a b l i s h a school f a i l e d as he attracted no pupils. He did manage to open a school of t h i r t y -s i x pupils following his move to Nantwich, Cheshire, i n 1758, and subsequently became a tutor at Warrington Academy i n 1761. He was ordained i n May 1863, and the following month married Mary Wilkinson, then eighteen years old, at Wrexham. In 1764 he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Law from the University of Edinburgh, i n recognition of h i s educational work. It was i n 1766 that P r i e s t l e y was introduced to the Royal Society, where he f i r s t met Richard Price; P r i e s t l e y was elected 8 Jack Lindsey (ed.), Autobiography of Joseph Priestley, Bath: Adams and Dart, 1970 128 a Fellow i n June 1766. He conducted experiments i n e l e c t r i c i t y and i n 1767 deduced the theorem that e l e c t r i c a l force varied proportionally to the inverse square of the distance separating the charges, analogously to the law of g r a v i t a t i o n ; t h i s was v e r i f i e d by others i n 1769. The following years saw works on optics and chemistry; i n 1772 he published a paper on his invention of a r t i f i c i a l l y carbonated water. P r i e s t l e y spent the f i v e years from 1767 based i n Leeds, u n t i l appointed, on Price's recommendation, as l i b r a r i a n to Lord Shelburne i n 1772. I t was while i n t h i s post that P r i e s t l e y wrote and published his main philosophical work, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), which set out his version of materialism, and i t s supplement The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated; both were preceded i n 1775 by his re-publication of Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind. He resigned from Shelburne's service i n 1780 (Shelburne, possibly disapproving of P r i e s t l e y ' s publications, had proposed to transfer him to an I r i s h estate), and moved to Birmingham. There he continued his s c i e n t i f i c and theological research, and was engaged i n several controversies. I t was i n 1790 that P r i e s t l e y re-published C o l l i n s ' Philosophical Inquiry, adding his own Preface. P r i e s t l e y took a minor part i n p o l i t i c s . He was a f r i e n d of Burke u n t i l 1783; he published a number of p o l i t i c a l papers, 129 including an Essay on the First Principles of Government (1774), and preached against the slave trade i n 1778. In 1791 he helped to e s t a b l i s h the Birmingham Constitutional Society; the society was modelled on the Manchester Constitutional Society, a group of middle-class r a d i c a l s founded the previous year to campaign f o r parliamentary reform. In 1789-90 P r i e s t l e y helped organize campaigns for the repeal of laws discriminating against dissenters; he was much caricatured and was denounced to Members of Parliament. P r i e s t l e y ' s reputation worsened due to his public support for the French Revolution, and i n 1791 he was the victim of r i o t i n g i n Birmingham. He and his family escaped injury, but t h e i r house was ransacked and nearly a l l of his books, papers and s c i e n t i f i c instruments were destroyed 9. He moved to London, where he lectured at the New College i n Hackney. He was made a c i t i z e n of France i n September 1792 and was i n v i t e d to be a member of the National Convention, but declined, p r e f e r r i n g to remain i n London at the time. In 1793 P r i e s t l e y ' s sons emigrated to America; P r i e s t l e y and his wife followed i n 1794. They s e t t l e d i n Northumberland, Pennsylvania, i n preference to Philadelphia. He wrote of t h i s decision, Philadelphia was excessively expensive, and [Northumberland] comparatively a cheap place; and my 9 For further d e t a i l s on the Birmingham r i o t s , see Conrad G i l l , History of Birmingham, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, Vol. 1, pp.l41ff. 130 sons s e t t l i n g i n the neighbourhood w i l l be less exposed to temptation, and more l i k e l y to form habits of sobriety and industry. (Memoirs, p.133) He continued his s c i e n t i f i c work and presented papers at the American Philosophical Society, but rejected the presidency of the society. He also rejected a professorship of chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, and i n 1803 the presidency of the u n i v e r s i t y . Predeceased by h i s wife and youngest son, P r i e s t l e y died on 6 February 1804. He was buried i n the quakers' b u r i a l ground i n Northumberland. 131 APPENDIX B PLATO'S PROTAGORAS C o l l i n s ' reference to Protagoras i s as follows: [Plato] asserts that i t i s contrary to the nature of man, to follow evil, as evil, and not to pursue good; and that when a man is compelled to chuse between two evils, you will never find a man who chuses the greatest, if it is in his power to chuse the less ( C o l l i n s , p.30; cf Protagoras 358d) There are two separate issues here. The f i r s t i s that Plato has Socrates base t h i s argument (352a-358d) on the premise of what we might c a l l 'moral hedonism', namely that that which i s good i s that which i s on the whole pleasurable, and that which i s e v i l i s that which i s on the whole p a i n f u l . Questions regarding whether Plato or Socrates a c t u a l l y held t h i s view at that time, or whether the premise i s adopted for the sake of argument, and related contrasts with some of Plato's l a t e r works, are not relevant here. 'Moral hedonism' may be separated from 'psychological hedonism', which i s the point at issue: i s i t true that when a person i s faced with a choice between two painful options, he w i l l always choose the less p a i n f u l , i f i t i s i n his power so to do? Plato has Socrates argue that one who holds that a person may knowingly choose the worse option, must hold that knowledge of the available options "may be over-mastered by anger, or 132 pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear" (352c 1). The only ones of these candidates considered by Plato i n any d e t a i l are pleasure and pain, perhaps because he considers the others to reduce to pleasure or pain; t h i s might have some p l a u s i b i l i t y i n the case of 'love' and 'fear', but 'anger' i s not so obvious a case. Even on i t s own terms the argument i s flawed. Plato's argument i s that to say that "a man does what i s e v i l knowingly" i s the same as to say that "he does what i s pa i n f u l knowingly, and because he i s overcome by pleasure" (355e). In response to the hypothetical point that future pains have less influence on the mind than present pleasures, he says that these ought to be c a r e f u l l y weighed, and "then that course of action should be taken i n which the pa i n f u l i s exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant" (356b). The problem with the argument i s that 'should be taken' does not imply ' w i l l be taken', which i s what i s required to 'prove' that "the statement i s absurd which affirms that a man often does e v i l knowingly when he might abstain, because he i s seduced and overpowered by pleasure" (355a); a l o g i c a l entailment does not imply a causal r e l a t i o n . As Gregory Vlastos suggests i n the introduction to his edi t i o n , there i s no contradiction i n the statement, "I ought to do what i s most pleasant; x i s most 1 The edi t i o n used i s : Plato ( t r . Jowett/Ostwald, ed. Vlastos), Protagorasj Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956 133 pleasant; I s h a l l not do x" (Protagoras, p . x i i i ) . There being no v a l i d argument, the statement quoted by C o l l i n s i s , indeed, assertion on the part of Plato, and C o l l i n s ' argument remains no more than appeal to authority. 134
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Philosophy
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Liberty and necessity in eighteenth-century Britain: the Clarke-Collins and Price-Priestley controversies
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