Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Abedi-Djourabtchi, Amir-Hassan
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
This thesis analyzes Germany's policy towards European integration by examining both its motivations for participating in the process of European integration and its limits of acceptance of further integration. It concentrates on the early 1950s and on the years following the end of the partition of Germany — two critical junctures when the Federal Republic of Germany has had to make decisions of general principle about its future role in Europe. Germany is of special interest because it is a rather distinctive case: very pro-integrationist despite being large and increasingly powerful. Support for European unification has been a fundamental assumption of German political behaviour from the earliest days of the Federal Republic. In the period 1949-1957, however, Germany's position towards European integration was more fluid. Germany's main motivations for participating in the process of European integration were initially moral rehabilitation and the regaining of sovereignty. Another important motivation has been the creation of internal and external stability. Regional integration has been regarded as the most appropriate strategy for achieving these aims. Yet there are certain areas where Bonn has been less willing to make compromises. Since the 1950s one of Germany's foremost limits of acceptance of integration has been to not foreclose the possibility of German reunification. Since 1990, when reunification was finally achieved. Germany's limits of acceptance are centred on three principles: free trade, monetary stability, and subsidiarity/federalism. These principles have been essential for the successful political and economic development of the Federal Republic. Germany, therefore, wants to see them firmly established in the European Union.The Federal Republic's distinctiveness can be explained by its historical experience. West Germany's political and economic structure was created in the early 1950s. These formative years also saw the Federal Republic's integration into the West and participation in the process of European unification. West Germany's successful economic and political development was therefore seen as being a result of these two interconnected processes. Germany's disastrous prewar history combined with more than forty successful years in an interlocking network of international institutions has minimized the importance of classic state-sovereignty for the Federal Republic.
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POWERFUL BUT INTEGRATIONIST: GERMAN BEHAVIOUR REGARDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION by AMIR-HASSAN ABEDI-DJOURABTCHI M.A., Universitat Hannover, 1992 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1995 © Amir-Hassan Abedi-Djourabtchi, 1995 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ?0H I \CAL SC I ENCE The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date SETTBMBER 0?. \??S DE-6 (2/88) 11 ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes Germany's p o l i c y towards European integration by examining both i t s motivations for p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the process of European integration and i t s l i m i t s of acceptance of further integration. It concentrates on the early 1950s and on the years following the end of the p a r t i t i o n of Germany — two c r i t i c a l junctures when the Federal Republic of Germany has had to make decisions of general p r i n c i p l e about i t s future role in Europe. Germany i s of special i n t e r e s t because i t i s a rather d i s t i n c t i v e case: very pro-integrationist despite being large and increasingly powerful. Support for European u n i f i c a t i o n has been a fundamental assumption of German p o l i t i c a l behaviour from the e a r l i e s t days of the Federal Republic. In the period 1949 -1957, however, Germany's pos i t i o n towards European integration was more f l u i d . Germany's main motivations for p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the process of European integration were i n i t i a l l y moral r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and the regaining of sovereignty. Another important motivation has been the creation of internal and external s t a b i l i t y . Regional integration has been regarded as the most appropriate strategy for achieving these aims. Yet there are c e r t a i n areas where Bonn has been less w i l l i n g to make compromises. Since the 1950s one of Germany's foremost l i m i t s of acceptance of integration has been to not foreclose the p o s s i b i l i t y of German r e u n i f i c a t i o n . Since 1990, when r e u n i f i c a t i o n was f i n a l l y achieved. Germany's l i m i t s of acceptance are centred on three p r i n c i p l e s : free trade, monetary s t a b i l i t y , and s u b s i d i a r i t y / f e d e r a l ism. These p r i n c i p l e s have been essential for the successful p o l i t i c a l and economic development of the Federal Republic. Germany, therefore, wants to see them fi r m l y established i n the European Union. The Federal Republic's d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s can be explained by i t s h i s t o r i c a l experience. West Germany's p o l i t i c a l and economic structure was created i n the early 1950s. These formative years also saw the Federal Republic's integration into the West and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European u n i f i c a t i o n . West Germany's successful economic and p o l i t i c a l development was therefore seen as being a result of these two interconnected processes. Germany's disastrous prewar history combined with more than f o r t y successful years i n an i n t e r l o c k i n g network of international i n s t i t u t i o n s has minimized the importance of c l a s s i c state-sovereignty for the Federal Republic. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v Acknowledgement v i Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter Two: WHAT IS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ALL ABOUT ? 16 2.1 The h i s t o r i c a l development of the European Communities 16 2.2 The main i n s t i t u t i o n s of the European Union 26 Chapter Three: GERMANY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE 1950S 33 3.1 Germany's European p o l i c y under Chancellor Adenauer 33 3.2 Opposition to Adenauer's European p o l i c y 42 Chapter Four: REUNITED GERMANY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 58 4.1 German r e u n i f i c a t i o n i n the context of European integration 58 4.2 The Maastricht Treaty and i t s aftermath 70 Chapter Five: CONCLUSION 90 Bibliography 106 LIST OF TABLES v Page Table 1: EU-Membership - Date of Accession 23 Table 2: Council of Ministers - Voting A l l o c a t i o n 28 Table 3: The European Parliament, 1958-1995 30 Table 4: Germany's export quota, 1910-1980 87 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i For his u n f a i l i n g encouragement, his constructive c r i t i c i s m , his patience and concern, my warm thanks go to my supervisor, Professor Alan S i a r o f f , who spared no e f f o r t s to guide me u n t i l the f i n a l completion of t h i s thesis. Thanks also go to Professor Mark Zacher, my second reader, for his helpful comments. I would also l i k e to thank my f r i e n d Tolga Otkun for his invaluable help during my research i n Hanover, Germany. Throughout my graduate studies the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science provided me with teaching assistentships, and I g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge t h i s support. I would l i k e to expand a special thanks to my fellow students, who made my year at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia a very i n t e r e s t i n g one indeed. F i n a l l y , my deepest appreciation goes to my parents, Dr. Mirza and Anvar Abedi, to whom I owe everything. 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION The German Basic Law ('Grundgesetz') was o f f i c i a l l y -proclaimed on May 23, 1949. Four years a f t e r the end of the Second World War, t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l document marked the beginning of a new Germany that was r e s t r i c t e d to the Western zones of occupation. Owing to Germany's history, the Basic Law recognized the importance of international organizations for security, German r e u n i f i c a t i o n , and economic development. Its preamble stipulated that the Federal Republic of Germany should preserve peace i n the world as an equal member of a u n i f i e d Europe and complete the r e u n i f i c a t i o n and secure the freedom of Germany through self-determination. 1 European integration, r e u n i f i c a t i o n , and the restoration of Germany's sovereignty were the three main objectives of the foreign p o l i c y of the Federal Republic of Germany. The divided Germany and i t s future role i n Europe constituted the so-called 'German question'. For more than f o r t y years t h i s 'German question' was i n a strange state of suspense which was not only characterized by the p a r t i t i o n of Germany but also by the d i v i s i o n of Europe. For a long time the general view was that the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany could only be achieved at the end of a process i n which a l l of Europe would gradually grow together. However, the ra d i c a l change that brought about the f a l l of the communist regime i n East Germany i n 1989/90 and led to the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany on October 3, 1990 reversed t h i s u^ndeszentrale fur politische Bildung, Grundgesetz far die Bnndesrepublik Dentschland: Textausqabe, (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung, June 1993), 11. 2 chronological sequence. Since r e u n i f i c a t i o n has turned the new Germany into a potential premier power i n the centre of the continent, the Federal Republic has to define i t s future international role even as i t tackles the domestic problems of u n i f i c a t i o n . Of special importance i s , thereby, i t s role i n Europe, because Europe has always been, and w i l l most l i k e l y continue to be, the focal point of Germany's foreign p o l i c y . This thesis t r i e s to analyze Germany's p o l i c y towards European integration. Germany i s of special interest because i t i s a rather d i s t i n c t i v e case. It appears to be much more in t e g r a t i o n i s t than the other two powerful members of the European Union, B r i t a i n and France. This thesis analyzes the German case by examining on the one hand i t s motivations for p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the process of European integration and on the other hand i t s l i m i t s of acceptance of further integration. It w i l l , thereby, concentrate on the early 1950s and on the years following the end of the p a r t i t i o n of Germany. The main reason for concentrating on these two time periods i s that they are the two c r i t i c a l junctures i n which the Federal Republic has had to make decisions of general p r i n c i p l e about i t s future role i n Europe. The international system was undergoing far-reaching changes both aft e r World War II and af t e r the end of the Cold War. These two time periods represent the beginning and the end of the Cold War and a world order that was based on b i - p o l a r i t y . Moreover, these two time periods show the importance, one might even say c e n t r a l i t y , of Germany for the process of European integration. The development of the process of European 3 integration both i n i t s i n i t i a l phase i n the early 1950s and during the negotiations that led to the Treaty on European Union was always c l o s e l y connected to the fact that Germany's p o s i t i o n in Europe seemed to be i n a state of f l u x . Between the mid 1950s and 1989 the 'German question' was not to the fore, because i t appeared to be neutralized through the seemingly i r r e v e r s i b l e p a r t i t i o n of the country. But, a f t e r the end of World War II up to the mid 1950s - one might only think of the Stalin-note of 19522 - as well as a f t e r 1989 the 'German question' has been on top of the agenda i n Europe. This revived old fears of German hegemony among i t s European neighbours. These fears derive mainly from the h i s t o r i c a l experiences these countries had with Germany's European p o l i c y between 1870 and 1945. The p o s s i b i l i t y that Germany might return to these e a r l i e r patterns of i t s foreign p o l i c y seemed to be a l l the more l i k e l y with a possible r e u n i f i c a t i o n of the country. E s p e c i a l l y France has been worried about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d r i f t of the Federal Republic to the East and a new German nationalism i n the West. Each time these fears reemerged they resulted i n an acceleration of the process of European integration. The future role of Germany w i l l be of special s i g n i f i c a n c e to Europe. In many respects 1990, as previously 1949, represented a new beginning for the Federal Republic. As a res u l t of the decomposition of communism i n Eastern Europe, reunited Germany i s once again situated i n the centre of an continent that t r i e s to overcome i t s d i v i s i o n . It, therefore, 20n March 10, 1952 the Soviet Union published a note in which it proposed the reunification of Germany under the condition that the country would be neutralized and that all occupation forces would be withdrawn. 4 f e e l s a very pressing need to devote attention and resources to the reconstruction of the former East Germany and to a s s i s t the states of Eastern Europe. This on the other hand l e f t Germany's neighbours wondering whether the Bonn government w i l l continue with i t s orie n t a t i o n towards the West and European integration or whether i t w i l l look to the East once more, now from a pos i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic supremacy. According to several worst case scenarios the u n i f i e d Germans, suddenly comprising 80 m i l l i o n people i n a single country, would t r y to dominate Europe. They would use t h e i r central location and power to take advantage of Eastern Europe's weaknesses; or they would play East and West off against each other; or they might even foster a p r i v i l e g e d r e l a t i o n s h i p with Russia to the disadvantage of the West. So the 'German question', which u n t i l 1990 had been the problem of German p a r t i t i o n , has reappeared i n a new and t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t form. Before we turn to analyzing the German case, though, a more general look at the reasons as to why states might pa r t i c i p a t e i n a process of regional integration and at t h e i r l i m i t s of acceptance of integration seems to be i n order. The following overview i s , however, not intended to be exhaustive, rather i t t r i e s to introduce the reader to some of the points made by l i b e r a l s / f u n c t i o n a l i s t s and r e a l i s t s / i n t e r -governmental i s t s . The l i b e r a l or f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory and the r e a l i s t or intergovernmentalist theory each put forward various possible motivations for states to engage i n regional integration and various l i m i t s to the acceptance of integration. F i r s t of a l l , both schools of thought agree that 5 international co-operation i s possible, but they have d i f f e r i n g views concerning the ease and l i k e l i h o o d with which t h i s i s to occur. R e a l i s t s view international co-operation as more d i f f i c u l t to achieve, harder to maintain, and more r e l i a n t on state power than do l i b e r a l s . This i s due to the fact that according to the r e a l i s t image nation-states are the most powerful actors i n the international arena. States are constantly s t r i v i n g to maintain and enhance t h e i r power r e l a t i v e to one another. Governments of nation-states are not, from t h i s perspective, expected to do things that would go d i r e c t l y against the national i n t e r e s t . One of the central theses of li b e r a l i s m , on the other hand, stresses the gradual transformation of international r e l a t i o n s . According to that point of view the establishment of conditions of j u s t i c e , prosperity, and peace, w i l l ultimately lead to the achievement of greater human freedom. Since the growth of international co-operation i s e s s e n t i a l to the r e a l i z a t i o n of that ultimate goal, l i b e r a l s believe that mutualities of interest and noncoercive bargaining w i l l become evermore prominent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of international l i f e . 3 Liberals and r e a l i s t s b a s i c a l l y agree that both national security and economic welfare are important, but they d i f f e r i n the r e l a t i v e emphasis they lay on these aims. Whereas r e a l i s t s maintain that nation-states are concerned f i r s t and foremost with the former, l i b e r a l s point out that economic welfare and 3David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and Borld Politics," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 7; and Hark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 108-109. 6 international commerce i s much more important to modern democratic states than m i l i t a r y power. They argue that for governments to r e t a i n t h e i r legitimacy economic success i s of fundamental importance. The general desire for greater economic welfare among the people of modern democratic states therefore leads to the development of common interests and consequently to a p o l i c y that supports mutually b e n e f i c i a l commerce and c o l l e c t i v e security. The process of modernization, e s p e c i a l l y i n the realm of science and technology, has s i g n i f i c a n t l y expanded the opportunities for mutual benefits through economic exchanges. Increasing economic exchanges lead to growing interdependence which motivates states to seek international co-operation and co-ordination to manage flows of goods, services, and factors of production more e f f e c t i v e l y than would be possible through u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s . Modern economies of scale also create strong incentives for states to co-ordinate t h e i r p o l i c i e s i n creating larger markets, because states which want to provide t h e i r c i t i z e n s with the same l e v e l of welfare as other i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states are increasingly pressured to be part of a larger market.4 Liberals maintain that as a r e s u l t of increasing interdependence states recognize the necessity to harmonize t h e i r p o l i c i e s i n order to guarantee the continued supply of public goods for which the state i s domestically responsible, such as socio-economic equality, macroeconomic s t a b i l i t y and regulatory protection. This i s of special importance where economic interdependence l i n k s j u r i s d i c t i o n s since c o n f l i c t i n g national "Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies 31, 4 (December 1993): 485; and Zacher and Matthew, 123-125. 7 p o l i c i e s may undermine each other's effectiveness. Moreover, i n order to ensure economic welfare, governments w i l l also be motivated to pursue international co-operation for the purpose of c o n t r o l l i n g the adverse e f f e c t s of interdependence. 5 Some l i b e r a l s assert that when decision makers r e a l i z e the e f f e c t s of interdependence they w i l l accept the uselessness of u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s i n the international p o l i t i c a l arena, and t h i s ultimately leads to an increase i n common values, b e l i e f s , and i n t e r e s t s . In order to f a c i l i t a t e commerce and the welfare of th e i r c i t i z e n s d i f f e r e n t states w i l l accept c e r t a i n common rights and obligations and f i n a l l y begin to integrate by set t i n g up common rules and formal i n s t i t u t i o n s . 6 Another possible motivation for integration put forward by the l i b e r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t school of thought stresses the fact that states have a mutual interest i n creating common i n s t i t u t i o n s , because these i n s t i t u t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e co-operation by enhancing the qual i t y of information as well as reducing uncertainty and transaction costs - the costs of i d e n t i f y i n g issues, negotiating bargains, codifying agreements, and monitoring and enforcing compliance - among partners. 7 In the f u n c t i o n a l i s t conception of the integration process states i n i t i a l l y adopt strategies of action which converge i n the establishment of permanent regional i n s t i t u t i o n s for the purpose of attaining c e r t a i n common objectives. The 5Geoffrey Garrett, 'International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market," International Organization 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 538-540; and Moravcsik, 485-486. 6Moravcsik, 484; and Zacher and Matthew, 131, 133-134. 7Zacher and Matthew, 125-126, 135-136. 8 achievement of these objectives i s made d i f f i c u l t by the presence of c e r t a i n tensions. Even where regional integration r e s u l t s i n mutually b e n e f i c i a l outcomes, governments often have d i s s i m i l a r preferences concerning the a l l o c a t i o n of the benefits, leading to controversy over the precise terms of co-operation. States and domestic groups that are disadvantaged by t h i s kind of co-operation are l i k e l y to oppose i t even where integration has generated net gains for society as a whole. Further integration i s only possible where governments can c o l l e c t i v e l y overcome such opposition. Liberals, therefore, maintain that regional integration works best where the opportunity for a l l to gain without harming anyone i s greatest. 8 In contrast to the l i b e r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory, the realist/intergovernmentalist theory seeks to analyze regional integration as the re s u l t of strategies followed by nation-states acting r a t i o n a l l y on the basis of t h e i r preferences and power. According to that view, national governments accept the establishment of common i n s t i t u t i o n s only insofar as they enhance the autonomy of national p o l i t i c a l leaders v i s - a - v i s p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c groups within t h e i r domestic p o l i t y or i f they strengthen, rather than weaken, t h e i r control over the domestic sphere, thereby enabling them to reach goals otherwise unachievable. Decisions to p a r t i c i p a t e i n regional integration are, therefore, seen as being the re s u l t of conscious calculations to f i n d a balance between stronger domestic control, on the one hand, and acceptable l e v e l s of p o l i t i c a l r i s k "Moravcsik, 486-487; and Philippe C. Schiitter, 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," International Organization 24, 4 (Autumn 1970): 839-840. 9 concerning the possible loss of sovereignty on the other. 9 Other r e a l i s t explanations as to why states might be motivated to engage i n integration refer to the external security environment - European integration, for example, has been viewed as lar g e l y r e s u l t i n g from the bi-polar world order and the Cold War - or put forward the 'concept of balancing"; according to that concept the renaissance to the European Community i n the early 1980s can be attributed to the r i s i n g challenge of Japan. Closely connected to the l a t t e r concept i s the 'binding thesis', which t r i e s to explain, why 'weaker' countries may seek the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of co-operative t i e s with 'stronger' partners - EMU, for example, i s seen as an attempt to reduce German domination of European monetary a f f a i r s by binding i t into an arrangement that provides for a single currency. 1 0 Realists, unlike l i b e r a l s , put much more emphasis on the l i m i t s of acceptance of integration than on the possible motivations for integration. This can be explained by a key r e a l i s t assumption, namely, that international anarchy, often defined i n terms of the absence of government, shapes the 'substantive r a t i o n a l i t y ' of states. The r e a l i s t point of view asserts that i n s t i t u t i o n s are of l i t t l e importance to states. Nation-states tend to be s c e p t i c a l about co-operation out of a fear of becoming dependent on t h e i r partners. This i s further 'Moravcsik, 496, 507. "Joseph H. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institntionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,' in Heoiealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 329-335; and Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC,' Millennium 20, 1 (Spring 1991): 17. 10 supported by a conception of the nation that places value on autonomy, independence and the preservation of sovereignty. 1 1 Another d i s t i n c t i o n between the l i b e r a l and the r e a l i s t point of view i s that whereas l i b e r a l s are more concerned with absolute gains from international co-operation, r e a l i s t s stress r e l a t i v e gains as being more important for the explanation of state's actions. According to r e a l i s t s , the p o s s i b i l i t y of a gap in gains i s a serious obstacle to integration. States are apprehensive of co-operation, because other countries might become more domineering or p o t e n t i a l l y more powerful through the achievement of disproportionate gains. Moreover, even i f a state i s r e l a t i v e l y c e r t a i n that a partner w i l l not use gaps i n gains against i t i n the present or i n the foreseeable future, i t may s t i l l worry about such gaps because i t cannot rest assured that new leaders or a new government i n the more distant future might use gaps i n gains against i t . Therefore, states have to be viewed as, what Grieco has termed, 'defensive p o s i t i o n a l i s t s ' , which are "interested i n achieving and maintaining r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s s u f f i c i e n t to remain secure and independent i n the sel f - h e l p context of international anarchy. " 1 2 Realists also maintain that l i b e r a l s v a s t l y overestimate the willingness of nation-states to give up parts of t h e i r sovereignty i n favour of supranational bodies. Nation-states would give up sovereignty only i n areas which Stanley Hoffmann termed 'low p o l i t i e s ' . These include the economic and welfare "Baldwin, 14; and Grieco, 329. 12Baldwin, 6; and Grieco, 303. 11 issues that were the s t a r t i n g point of European integration. In these 'low p o l i t i c s ' areas integration might occur, but as soon as the attempt would be made to extend integration from 'low p o l i t i e s ' into the f i e l d of 'high p o l i t i e s ' , i . e . the areas associated with national security and prestige, such as foreign policy, defence, and monetary policy, integration would be impossible. 1 3 Moreover, Hoffmann asserts that there i s a lack of any appreciation of nationalism i n the l i b e r a l school of thought, but he believes that nationalism plays an important role e s p e c i a l l y where integration t r i e s to pass from 'low p o l i t i c s ' to 'high p o l i t i c s ' . Hoffmann proposes a threefold d i s t i n c t i o n of nationalism i n order to better understand the e f f e c t i t has on a nation's attitude towards regional integration. 'National consciousness 1, his f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n , i s described as a 'feeling', "a sense of cohesion and di s t i n c t i v e n e s s " which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s groups from one another, but does not necessarily i n h i b i t s a c r i f i c e s of sovereignty. 1 4 The second d i s t i n c t i o n he makes refers to the 'national s i t u a t i o n ' of a country, that i s , a 'condition' which i s made up of internal features of a country and i t s p o s i t i o n i n the world. This 'condition' can either promote or impede a nation's willingness to pursue regional integration. Unlike the f i r s t two factors, 'nationalism', Hoffmann's t h i r d d i s t i n c t i o n , i s an obstacle to supranational "Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete? France, European Integration, and the Fate of the Nation-State," reprinted in The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994, Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 79, 84, 91, 96; and Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 8. "Hoffmann, 75. 12 u n i f i c a t i o n , because i t has the preservation of the nation as i t s highest good. 1 5 R e a l i s t s stress the survival of the nation-state, because they view i t as being preserved by "the r e s i l i e n c e of national p o l i t i c a l systems, by the i n t e r a c t i o n between separate nations and a single international system, and by leaders who believe i n the primacy of 'high p o l i t i c s ' over managerial p o l i t i c s and i n the primacy of the nation." 1 6 In summary, one can say that the main differences between l i b e r a l i s m and realism s t a r t with the central theses of these two schools of thought. Li b e r a l international theory stresses the fact that the process of modernization and, stemming from t h i s , growing interdependence promote increasing international co-operation and, thereby, the spread of democratic values. This development gradually transforms international r e l a t i o n s such that they promote greater human freedom by e s t a b l i s h i n g conditions of peace, prosperity, and j u s t i c e , ultimately leading to the development of common values and b e l i e f s among nations. The r e a l i s t image on the other hand puts much more emphasis on the nation-state, which i s regarded as the most powerful actor i n the international arena. Since, according to the r e a l i s t view, t h i s arena i s characterized by international anarchy and states are constantly s t r i v i n g to maintain and enhance t h e i r power r e l a t i v e to one another, nation-states tend to be s c e p t i c a l about co-operation out of a fear of becoming dependent on t h e i r 15Hoffiann, 75-76. 16Hoffpiann, 96, 13 partners. They, therefore, do not tend to attach great importance to international i n s t i t u t i o n s , and t h e i r behaviour towards regional integration i s determined by t h e i r national i n t e r e s t . Following from these respective i n i t i a l assumptions are the motivations and l i m i t s of acceptance of integration which both schools of thought put forward. Although both r e a l i s t s and l i b e r a l s agree that international co-operation i s possible, they have d i f f e r i n g views concerning the ease and l i k e l i h o o d with which t h i s occurs. As we stressed e a r l i e r , since r e a l i s t s put more emphasis on the nation-state they view international co-operation as more d i f f i c u l t to achieve, harder to maintain, and more r e l i a n t on state power than do l i b e r a l s . L i b e r a l s do not deny the important role the nation-state plays i n international r e l a t i o n s , but they maintain that as a r e s u l t of increasing interdependence states recognize the necessity of harmonizing t h e i r p o l i c i e s i n order to manage flows of goods, services, and factors of production more e f f e c t i v e l y than would be possible through u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s . Thus, l i b e r a l s attach great importance to economic welfare and international commerce. While r e a l i s t s acknowledge the importance of these factors, they regard national security as the most important motivation for states' actions. Realists, therefore, assert that nation-states accept the establishment of common i n s t i t u t i o n s only (a) insofar as they enhance national p o l i t i c a l leaders' control over the domestic sphere, or (b) as a resu l t of the external security environment. Liberals, however, maintain that since common i n s t i t u t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e co-operation by enhancing the qu a l i t y of information 14 as well as reducing uncertainty and transaction costs among members, states have a mutual interest i n creating these organizations. Turning to the l i m i t s of acceptance of integration, the l i b e r a l school of thought points to the p r o b a b i l i t y that states and domestic groups which are disadvantaged by regional integrative arrangements are l i k e l y to oppose them. Therefore, l i b e r a l s assert that co-operation i s most l i k e l y where the opportunity for a l l to gain without harming anyone i s greatest. Realists on the other hand do not support the view that absolute gains guarantee the success of regional integration. They rather stress that gaps i n gains can become a serious obstacle to integration. Furthermore, r e a l i s t s mention the existence of nationalism as another factor that tends to prevent international and regional co-operation. F i n a l l y , r e a l i s t s maintain that integration i s impossible i n areas associated with national security and prestige, so-called 'high p o l i t i c s ' areas. In i t s attempt to explore Germany's commitment to and p o l i c y towards European u n i f i c a t i o n , t h i s thesis w i l l , f i r s t , give an overview over the main developments of European integration from the Schuman Plan up to the Maastricht Treaty and provide information about the p r i n c i p a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the European Union. The t h i r d chapter w i l l then examine the Federal Republic of Germany's response to the f i r s t i n i t i a t i v e s that were aimed at European integration and i t s p o l i c y i n the i n i t i a l stages of the development of the European Communities i n the 1950s. The fourth chapter w i l l take a look at reunited Germany's policy towards the Maastricht negotiations and the European 15 Union. The f i f t h chapter w i l l , f i n a l l y , draw the conclusions, and put forward the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Germany's European pol i c y . CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ALL ABOUT ? 16 2 . 1 The historical development of the European Communities After the end of World War II many d i f f e r e n t plans for a future architecture of the wartorn European continent emerged. The massive destruction and misery caused by the war engendered an increase i n support for European integration i n the early postwar years. European unity was widely regarded as the only way out of the constant succession of wars which were seen as a res u l t of an international order that was made up of antagonistic nation-states. Consequently, a series of i n i t i a t i v e s was taken to follow these f e d e r a l i s t objectives. The f i r s t i n i t i a t i v e toward European integration came i n 1948 when a Congress of Europe, a gathering of about six hundred i n f l u e n t i a l Europeans, proposed to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the ideal of European unity by e s t a b l i s h i n g an international organization with a parliamentary body. This organization was to have dealt with p r a c t i c a l problems of recovery faced by West European governments and would have a supranational structure. But, i n the following negotiations the B r i t i s h and Scandinavians, who were opposed to any supranational features, managed to water down the i n i t i a l proposal and transformed the ensuing Council of Europe to being simply an intergovernmental body. Another proposal that was aimed at bringing Europeans together was made by US Secretary of State George Marshall, who offered substantial American aid for the rebuilding of the continent on condition that the receiving countries would co-operate with each other i n the use of the funds which the US government would make avai l a b l e . This 17 i n i t i a t i v e ultimately led to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). But, as the Council of Europe the OEEC was an intergovernmental organization that represented only governments and had no elected or consultative body. 1 7 The f i r s t i n i t i a t i v e that went beyond the creation of an intergovernmental organization and met some of the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t objectives was, however, made by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman on May 9, 1950. It was his proposal that was the real originator of integration i n Europe. He proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which would remove the coal and s t e e l industries of i t s participants from f u l l national control to place them under a single, supranational authority. France was thereby driven by i t s fear of German r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . International arrangements for regulating the production and marketing of these two key sectors of i n d u s t r i a l production looked l i k e an e f f e c t i v e check on Germany's war-making p o t e n t i a l . This plan had been worked out by the then d i r e c t o r of the French Modernization Plan, Jean Monnet, who was convinced that a future severe depression i n the European coal and steel industries due to unregulated overproduction could only be avoided i f the regulative capacities of the producing countries with respect to these s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i a l sectors were pooled into a community. The following year, on A p r i l 18, 1951, Belgium, France, Germany, It a l y , Luxembourg and the Netherlands "William Hicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the Hew European Commnnity (Hew York and London: Harvester Hheatsheaf, 1994), 9-12. 18 signed the Treaty of Paris which brought the ECSC into being. 1 8 With the increasing fear of a p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y threat from the Soviet Union and under the pressure of early defeats i n the Korean War, American demands for West German rearmament increased. The French Prime Minister Rene Pleven, r e a l i z i n g that a r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the Eastern neighbour could no longer be prevented, proposed i n October 1950 the creation of an integrated European army under supranational c o n t r o l . This, he hoped, would make the r a i s i n g of a national German army unnecessary. He managed to gain the support of the member states of the ECSC for his plan and on May 27, 1952, a treaty e s t a b l i s h i n g the European Defence Community (EDC) was f i n a l l y signed. 1 9 Monnet, who was again involved i n drawing up t h i s plan, saw the EDC as well as the ECSC not as the end, but as the beginning of a development that would eventually lead to a European federation. His attempt to l i n k these single-purpose organizations to the goal of an eventual multi-purpose organization of the same members becomes apparent i n A r t i c l e 38 of the EDC treaty, which c a l l e d upon the member states to draft a separate treaty on a supranational European P o l i t i c a l Community (EPC). The draft treaty for the EPC drawn up by a 'constitutional committee' consisting of an enlarged ECSC Common Assembly provided for a p o l i t i c a l community that would apart from Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Dnion? An Introduction to the Eoropean Community (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 21-25; and Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 2d ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-4. 19Dinan, 26-28. 19 EDC and ECSC also encompass a common foreign, economic, and monetary p o l i c y . But, the far reaching proposals of the 'constitutional committee 1 were toned down at several intergovernmental meetings i n late 1953 and early 1954 and, f i n a l l y , came to a sudden halt when the French National Assembly f a i l e d to r a t i f y the EDC treaty. The common fear of sharing sovereignty over national defence p o l i c y and of German rearmament united G a u l l i s t s and Communists i n t h e i r vote against the treaty. 2 0 The f a i l u r e of EDC and EPC l e f t the members of the ECSC uncertain about how to proceed with the construction of a u n i f i e d Europe. At a meeting i n Messina i n June 1955, the governments of the Six set up a committee under the chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to examine future options for European integration. The governments of the Benelux countries and Germany pressed forward with the economic content of integration. The Spaak-committee submitted i t s report i n May 1956. It proposed an Atomic Energy Community, structured along the l i n e s of the coal and steel community, and a common market (Economic Community). The reaction to the proposals was generally p o s i t i v e , and a f t e r two years of intense deliberations, the six ECSC members agreed to create i n three successive four-year stages a common market for i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l products. They also agreed to coordinate s o c i a l p o l i c y and to create an Atomic Community. The understanding was that there would ultimately be a single administrative body for the then 20Dinan, 28; and Nicoll and Salmon, 13-15. 20 three Communities. On March 25, 1957, f i n a l l y , the t r e a t i e s establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (Euratom) were signed at Rome.21 In order to work out a plan that would supplement the common market with p o l i t i c a l co-operation and lay the foundations for a progressively developing union, the Six decided i n February 1961 to set up a committee under the chairmanship of the French representative C h r i s t i a n Fouchet. But, the two drafts which Fouchet presented to the committee did not meet with the approval of the other members. It were e s p e c i a l l y the Benelux countries which opposed the Fouchet Plan. They feared that i t would not lead to more European integration, but rather by c a l l i n g into question the e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s undermine the achievements that were already made. Attempts to reach a f i n a l agreement between the main adversaries, France and the Benelux countries, f a i l e d i n A p r i l 1962.22 However, t h i s p o l i t i c a l setback did not hamper the economic development of the EEC. A common a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y was introduced i n 1962. It was based upon three guiding p r i n c i p l e s , f i r s t , common prices, second, common financing ( i . e . , an a g r i c u l t u r a l budget), and t h i r d . Community preference over imports. Most trade b a r r i e r s between the six member states were, consequently, removed by 1966. Progress was also made i n abolishing customs duties i n intra-Community trade. Increasing trade led to a strong upswing i n the economy of the six EEC 21George, 4-5; and Nicoll and Salmon, 15-19. 22Nicoll and Salmon, 29-31. 21 member countries. This made B r i t a i n , which had previously declined a l l i n v i t a t i o n s to j o i n the European Communities and unsuccessfully proposed a European i n d u s t r i a l free trade area instead, reverse i t s p o s i t i o n . Moreover, B r i t a i n r e a l i z e d that i t would be increasingly affected by the new developments on the Continent and that i t had to be involved i n the movement towards European integration. Therefore, i n July 1961 the B r i t i s h government announced i t s decision to apply for EEC membership. However, i n 1963 while B r i t a i n ' s entry negotiations were well under way French President Charles de Gaulle rejected London's applicat i o n . De Gaulle j u s t i f i e d h i s decision by pointing out that in his opinion B r i t a i n was not jet ready for membership. Its main orien t a t i o n was insular and directed towards the United States of America, as well as to the members of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. Apart from that de Gaulle feared that B r i t i s h membership i n the EEC would threaten the French leadership r o l e . 2 3 In 1965, the German President of the EEC-Commission, Walter H a l l s t e i n , presented to the Council of Ministers a plan that would r e s u l t i n a greater transfer of revenues from the member governments to the EEC, thereby enabling a strengthening of the organization's economic impact. De Gaulle objected to H a l l s t e i n ' s plan and boycotted Community meetings for what turned out to be a period of six months, from July 1965 to January 1966. Ultimately H a l l s t e i n and the governments of the other f i v e countries, which had i n i t i a l l y supported him i n his attempt, had 23Dinan, 48-54; and George, 10-11. 22 to withdraw the budget expansion proposal and concede to France informally, and contrary to the s p i r i t of supranationalism, that the rule of majority voting i n a large number of Council decisions, which was to come into e f f e c t on January 1, 1966, would not be applied. This meant that when a member government considered the v i t a l i nterests of i t s country to be at odds with a given proposal to be voted on i n the Council, i t could i n s i s t on the unanimity rule and thereby exercise a veto. As a re s u l t of t h i s so-called 'Luxembourg compromise' of February 1966, the normal procedure became a search for unanimity achieved through the Council negotiating intergovernmentally to amend Commission proposals. 2 4 Despite the 1965 c r i s i s and the disruption caused by i t , the Communities continued to operate and develop. In July 1967, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures of the three Communities were reorganized. The High Authority of the ECSC and the two Commissions of Euratom and the EEC were merged into one u n i f i e d Commission. Although four major organs - the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice - were now operating the three Communities, each one was s t i l l continuing to function under i t s own constituent treaty. One year l a t e r , i n 1968, the EEC made a big step towards the completion of the common market. Almost eighteen months ahead of schedule the remaining clauses that were dealing with customs duties i n the commercial sector were removed and common 24George, 11-12; and Nicoll and Salmon, 33-35. 23 external t a r i f f s were introduced. 2 5 The movement towards an enlargement of the Communities gained new momentum after de Gaulle's departure from the French presidency i n 1969. The General had twice ( i n 1963 and 1967) vetoed B r i t i s h applications to j o i n the six founding members. A new round of entry negotiations with B r i t a i n , Denmark, Ireland and Norway began i n June 1970. After two years of intense bargaining the accession t r e a t i e s were signed, and on January 1, 1973 the f i r s t expansion of the Communities took e f f e c t . Norway, however, did not j o i n the other three new members because the consultative referendum i n that country went against membership. The Norwegian voters also turned down Oslo's second attempt to j o i n what i s now known as the European Union (EU) i n 1994. The Table 1: EU-Membership - Date of Accession Members of the EU Date of Accession Belgium 1952/1958 France 1952/1958 Germany 1952/1958 I t a l y 1952/1958 Luxembourg 1952/1958 Netherlands 1952/1958 Denmark 1973 Ireland 1973 United Kingdom 1973 Greece 1981 Portugal 1986 Spain 1986 Austria 1995 Finland 1995 Sweden 1995 Source: Mario von Baratta, ed., Per Fischer Beltalmanach'95: Zahlen, Paten, Fakten (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 855-856. i n i t i a l extension of the Communities was l a t e r followed by three further enlargements which increased the membership of the EU to 5Dinan, 63-64. 24 now f i f t e e n members (see Table l ) . 2 6 On a meeting i n Paris i n December 1974, the heads of state and government made two important i n s t i t u t i o n a l decisions. F i r s t , they decided that they would meet regularly i n the future and that these meetings would be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as the European Council. Second, they agreed on universal d i r e c t elections to the European Parliament. This decision paved the way for the f i r s t d i r e c t l y elected European Parliament i n 1979. The same year, 1979, saw another important development. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing had launched an i n i t i a t i v e that was aimed at ensuring Community-wide exchange rate s t a b i l i t y through a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime. Their proposal led to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), which took e f f e c t i n March 1979. The new exchange rate mechanism used a p a r i t y g r i d and a divergence indicator based on the European Currency Unit (ECU). The EMS was open only to members of the European Communities (EC), but no one was obliged to p a r t i c i p a t e . Except for B r i t a i n a l l EC member countries decided to j o i n the EMS.27 After almost twenty years of a rather intergovernmental approach to European integration, the idea of supranationalism gained new momentum in the 1980s. In 1981 a j o i n t German-Italian proposal (the Genscher-Colombo i n i t i a t i v e ) c a l l e d for the adoption of an Act of European Union i n an attempt to extend European integration more into the p o l i t i c a l sphere. As a res u l t 26Nicoll and Salmon, 36-39. "Nicoll and Salmon, 41, 152-154. 25 of that i n i t i a t i v e the European Council on i t s meeting i n Stuttgart i n 1983 passed the Solemn Declaration of European Union, i n which the EC member states proclaimed t h e i r intention to i n t e n s i f y t h e i r co-operation i n the areas of foreign policy, economic and monetary policy, internal security and c u l t u r a l p o l i c y . One year l a t e r i n Fontainebleau, the Council set up two committees to work out reports on the future of the EC. The Commission under i t s president, Jacques Delors, put forward i t s own so-called 'White Paper 1, which i t presented to the European Council meeting i n Milan i n June 1985. It proposed to complete the common market by the end of 1992 and provided s p e c i f i c recommendations and a detailed timetable to ensure the success of the plan. Upon receipt of the 'White Paper' and the reports of the two committees the Council decided to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to discuss amending the three i n i t i a l t r e a t i e s of the Communities. This decision was made against the opposition of B r i t a i n , Denmark and Greece. For the f i r s t time the Council had outvoted members i n order to reach an agreement.28 The result of the 1985 IGC i n Luxembourg was the Single European Act (SEA) which was signed on February 17, 1986. The member countries committed themselves to the achievement of the objectives that were set out i n the Commission's 'White Paper'. Apart from that, the SEA extended the scope of majority voting within the Council of Ministers. It thereby r e s t r i c t e d the requirement for unanimous agreement to se n s i t i v e issues such as Dinan, 136-143. 26 taxation, the dismantling of borders and workers' r i g h t s . The SEA also extended the powers of the European Parliament by devising a 'co-operation procedure' between Parliament and the Council which allowed the Parliament a second hearing i n ce r t a i n matters and granted i t the right to decide over the entry of new member states into the EC. But, the new procedure stopped short of giving the European Parliament real co-decision powers i n the l e g i s l a t i v e process. The authority of the Community was expanded into more areas such as energy, environment, monetary and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s as well as research and technology. The member countries, thereby, agreed that p r i o r i t y should be given to strengthening the economic and s o c i a l cohesion of the EC. The SEA also contained separate treaty provisions on p o l i t i c a l co-operation, which for the f i r s t time c o d i f i e d the e x i s t i n g practices of foreign p o l i c y co-operation and set up a permanent sec r e t a r i a t i n Brussels. 2 9 The SEA s i g n i f i c a n t l y strengthened the supranational elements of the EC. But, there was s t i l l a considerable way to go before the EC could be transformed into a European union. Further progress towards monetary and p o l i t i c a l union was made i n the years following the SEA, e s p e c i a l l y at the Maastricht summit in December 1991. These developments w i l l be dealt with, i n greater d e t a i l , i n other parts of t h i s t h e s i s . 2.2 The main institutions of the European Union The European Union (EU), as the EC i s known since the 29George, 17; and Nicoll and Salmon, 48-52. 27 Maastricht Treaty has come into force, has f i v e main i n s t i t u t i o n s : the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justi c e . While the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice represent the supranational element of the EU, the Council of Ministers and the European Council are the intergovernmental bodies of the Union. Decisions of general p r i n c i p l e about the future development of the EU are made by the European Council. It brings together the heads of state and government of the now f i f t e e n member countries of the EU, and meets at least twice a year. The European Council can take formal decisions only when i t has previously received a Commission proposal and the required opinion of the European Parliament. Although the foreign ministers normally attend the meetings of t h e i r heads of state or government, they are not a part of the European Council. They rather belong to the Council of Ministers, which i s s t i l l the most powerful body of the EU. The Council of Ministers might be termed the l e g i s l a t i v e body of the EU. It i s organized according to p o r t f o l i o and i t s members are ministers, who act as representatives of t h e i r governments. Since the Council often meets i n d i f f e r e n t compositions, according to the subject i t i s dealing with at the time, i t s d a i l y work i s prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which consists of o f f i c i a l s who are delegated by the f i f t e e n member states. The Council of Ministers i s the main decision-making body of the Union. But, as a general rule, i t can take decisions only on Commission proposals. Voting takes place according to complex 28 rules which s t i p u l a t e that unanimity i s necessary to decide over new p o l i c i e s , or i f the Council wants to change a Commission proposal without the l a t t e r ' s agreement. A simple majority of votes i s s u f f i c i e n t when the Council i s dealing with procedural questions, and a q u a l i f i e d majority i s necessary for matters that deal with e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s . A q u a l i f i e d majority i s made up of roughly seventy per cent of the votes of the member countries, weighted by siz e (see Table 2). Since January 1, 1995 the q u a l i f i e d majority i s 62 out of 87 votes. Whereas abstentions count as votes against i n q u a l i f i e d majority voting, they do not prevent decisions that need unanimity. 3 0 Table 2: Council of Ministers - Voting Allocations Country 1958-72 1973-80 1981-5 1986-94 1995 Onwards Per mi Austria - . _ _ 4 0.50 Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 0.50 Denmark - 3 3 3 3 0.58 Finland - - - - 3 0.59 France 4 10 10 10 10 0.17 Germany 4 10 10 10 10 0.12 Greece - - 5 5 5 0.48 Ireland - 3 3 3 3 0.83 Italy 4 10 10 10 10 0.17 Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 5.00 Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 0.33 Portugal - - - 5 5 0.53 Spain - - - 8 8 0.20 Sweden - - - - 4 0.45 United Kingdom - 10 10 10 10 0.17 Total votes 17 58 63 76 87 0.23 Qualified majority 12 41 45 54 62 Sources: Economist (London), October 22nd 1994, 20; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitunq, December 31, 1994, 4; and Edward Nevin, The Economics of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 34 (Table 4.1). As Table 2 shows, the voting a l l o c a t i o n for Germany does 30Dinan, 229-255; and Nicoll and Salmon, 67-74. not match with i t s actual weight i n terms of population. This becomes obvious i f one compares the weight of the ten German votes per m i l l i o n population (0.12) with the weight of the ten French, B r i t i s h , and I t a l i a n (0.17) votes. In order to get the same weight, Germany should have had fourteen votes instead of ten. The main reason for t h i s imbalance i s the fact that Germany's votes were not increased a f t e r r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The most important of the supranational bodies of the EU i s the Commission. It i s sometimes c a l l e d the 'government' of the EU and could be termed the executive body of the EU, because i t implements EU p o l i c y by carrying out the resolutions of the Council of Ministers to which i t also proposes new l e g i s l a t i o n . Apart from that, the Commission i s responsible for managing the budget of the EU. The current Commission consists of twenty Commissioners: two each from B r i t a i n , France, Germany, I t a l y and Spain, and one each from the other member countries. The Commissioners are nominated by t h e i r respective governments and serve a f i v e year term. The Commission president i s appointed through a c o l l e c t i v e agreement of the governments. The Commission as a whole i s subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament, which can also at any time force the Commission to resign as a body by passing a vote of no confidence with a two-thirds majority. 3 1 The European Parliament i s the best example for the 'democratic d e f i c i t ' of the EU. Although i t i s the only body of the Union that i s d i r e c t l y accountable to the people of the 31Dinan, 199-227; and Nicoll and Salmon, 61-67. 30 member countries, i t i s s t i l l lacking substantial powers. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has made some progress since i t has been elected d i r e c t l y for the f i r s t time i n 1979. These so-called 'European elections' take place every f i v e years. Since Austria, Finland and Sweden have joined the EU, the European Parliament comprises of 626 MEPs. A s p e c i f i e d number of MEPs are, thereby, elected i n each member country (see Table 3). Table 3: The European Parliament, 1958-1995 Country T o t a l number of MEPs per m i l l i o n per m i l l i o n p o pulation, population, 1958-72 1973-8 1979-80 1981-5 1986-92 1992-95 1995 on 1989 1995 Austria - - - - - - 21 - 2.6 Belgium 14 14 24 24 24 25 25 2.4 2.5 Denmark - 10 16 16 16 16 16 3.1 3.1 Finland - - - - - - 16 - 3.1 France 36 36 81 81 81 87 87 1.4 1.5 Germany 36 36 81 81 81 99 99 1.3 1.2 Greece - - - 24 24 25 25 2.4 2.4 Ireland - 10 15 15 15 15 15 4.2 4.2 Italy 36 36 81 81 81 87 87 1.4 1.5 Luxembourg 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 16.2 16.2 Netherlands 14 14 25 25 25 31 31 1.7 2.0 Portugal - - - - 24 25 25 2.3 2.7 Spain - - - 60 64 64 1.5 1.6 Sweden - - - - - - 22 - 2.5 United Kingdom - 36 81 81 81 87 87 1.4 1.5 Total MEPs 142 198 410 434 518 567 626 1.6 1.7 Sources: Nevin, 48 (Table 5.1); Das Parlament (Bonn), January 6, 1995, 11. As Table 3 shows, i n contrast to the a l l o c a t i o n of votes in the Council, German r e u n i f i c a t i o n resulted i n a s i g n i f i c a n t increase of MEPs allocated to Germany and other member states. Nevertheless, Germany's r a t i o of MEPs per m i l l i o n population has s l i g h t l y deteriorated. Concerning Germany's share of t o t a l MEPs in per cent, the development was as follows: 1989: 15.6% of a l l MEPs were from Germany, 1992: 17.5%, 1995: 15.8%. If one takes into consideration that Germans make up 22.0% of the EU's t o t a l 31 population, the number of German MEPs i s , compared to the other large EU-members, s t i l l too small: France (1995: 15.5% of the EU population, 13.9% of MEPs), United Kingdom (1995: 15.7% - 13.9%), and I t a l y (1995: 15.6% - 13.9%). The European Parliament exercises some control over the Commission. Apart from i t s right to force the Commission as a body to resign, the most powerful tool of Parliament i s , thereby, i t s exclusive authority to grant a discharge of the general budget. But, the l e g i s l a t i v e powers of Parliament are despite of recent improvements s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d . For example, the European Parliament has no right whatsoever to i n i t i a t e l e g i s l a t i o n , i t can only ask the Commission to submit c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e proposals. After the Commission has submitted a proposal. Parliament can exert some influence by f a l l i n g back upon three l e g i s l a t i v e procedures: consultation, co-operation, and co-decision. Co-decision grants the European Parliament only a limited right of re j e c t i o n rather than a p o s i t i v e right of aproval. By rej e c t i n g draft l e g i s l a t i o n , Parliament can ask for a t h i r d reading and the establishment of a c o n c i l i a t i o n committee in which Parliament and the Council, with the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Commission, attempt to reach agreement on draft l e g i s l a t i o n . If t h i s f a i l s , Parliament can reject the draft l e g i s l a t i o n by an absolute majority. The European Parliament i s also co-equal with the Council concerning EU-enlargement and association with t h i r d countries. Every accession and association agreement the EU reaches has to be approved by an absolute majority of MEPs.32 3 2 D i n a n , 257-292; and N i c o l l and Salmon, 79-93. 32 The j u d i c i a l body of the European Union i s the European Court of Justice which might be termed the 'guardian of the t r e a t i e s ' . The three o r i g i n a l t r e a t i e s , the t r e a t i e s of accession, the d i f f e r e n t treaty amendments, and the laws made by EU-institutions are the main sources of European Union law. The Court of Justice i s responsible for a l l cases that f a l l into the competence of the European Union. I t , thereby, serves as a European c o n s t i t u t i o n a l court, as well as an administrative court, a c i v i l court, and a court of a r b i t r a t i o n . Moreover, the Council, the Commission or a member country may ask the Court of Justice for an opinion on whether an international agreement that the Union would l i k e to conclude i s compatible with EU law. Among the numerous other i n s t i t u t i o n s of the EU, the most important are the Court of Auditors, which examines the Union's f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s , the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. The l a t t e r two are advisory bodies. The Economic and Social Committee advises the Council and the Commission on s o c i a l and economic issues, and the Committee of the Regions has to be consulted by the Council and the Commission where s p e c i f i c regional interests are involved. 3 3 3 3 D i n a n , 295-316; and H i c o l l and Salmon, 93-99, 108-110. 33 CHAPTER THREE: GERMANY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE 1950S 3.1 Germany's European policy under Chancellor Adenauer Germany's defeat i n World War II and the collapse of the n a t i o n a l - s o c i a l i s t ideology, which had led the country into war, defeat, and destruction, resulted i n the almost t o t a l d i s c r e d i t of any form of nationalism. Germany's unconditional surrender to the a l l i e d forces and the t o t a l i t y of the defeat prevented any potential r e v i v a l of conspiracy theories which had seriously undermined the country's f i r s t democracy i n the interwar years. An analogy put forward by Stanley Hoffmann describes Germany's postwar s i t u a t i o n very well: The defeated nations - Germany i n p a r t i c u l a r - were i n the p o s i t i o n of patients on whom d r a s t i c surgery has been performed and who l i e prostrate, dependent for t h e i r every movement on surgeons and nurses. Even i f one had wanted to restore the nation to the pinnacle of values and objectives, one could not have done so except with the help and consent of one's guardians - and they were un l i k e l y to support such a drive. In other words, the sit u a t i o n set s t r i c t l i m i t s on the p o s s i b i l i t y of any kind of nationalism, expansive or i n s u l a t i n g . 3 4 Germany i n 1945 was not only p h y s i c a l l y and morally degraded, i t was also t o t a l l y stripped of sovereignty. Even i n 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, the new West German state was granted only a limited measure of sovereignty. P o l i t i c a l and economic relations with other countries were controlled by the A l l i e d High Commission, which had the power to supervise and even regulate domestic economic and p o l i t i c a l developments. The German government's authority over domestic and e s p e c i a l l y foreign p o l i c y was, as a resu l t , "Hoffmann, 77-78. 34 only limited. Restoring sovereignty and the right to pursue i t s own foreign p o l i c y therefore became the primary goal of the f i r s t postwar government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer wanted the new democratic Germany to be included as an equal and respected partner i n a West European community. In h i s view such a p o l i c y would ultimately r e e s t a b l i s h Germany's c r e d i b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y i n international p o l i t i c s . He strongly believed that the moral, p o l i t i c a l , and economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Germany was only possible i f the Federal Republic would become a part of the Western world and share the values of the Western democracies. This would, i n his opinion, not only strengthen democracy but also the national security of the Federal Republic with regard to the expansionist p o l i c i e s of the Soviet Union. 3 5 The continued occupation status delayed the establishment of a Foreign Ministry u n t i l 1951, and the appointment of a Foreign Minister u n t i l 1955, the year i n which the Federal Republic of Germany attained formal sovereignty. It was, therefore, the Chancellor who shaped foreign p o l i c y i n the early years of the new state. The primacy of Adenauer, and his personal b e l i e f s , i n determining the basis and strategies of West Germany's foreign p o l i c y was reinforced by the fact that he had set up his own Foreign Po l i c y Bureau and, as Federal Chancellor, had p r i v i l e g e d access to the A l l i e d high commissioners, with whom he often discussed foreign p o l i c y matters without informing the 3 5Simon Bulmer and W i l l i a m Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1987), 5; and Timothy Garton-Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), 20; and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign P o l i c y 1949-1963: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), 49-50. 35 rest of his cabinet. 3 6 Adenauer acknowledged the l i m i t s that were e x p l i c i t l y and i m p l i c i t l y placed upon the Federal Republic by the A l l i e s , and which influenced the country's a b i l i t y to conduct an independent or f l e x i b l e foreign p o l i c y . He, therefore, saw no al t e r n a t i v e to a p o l i c y that would develop a close alignment with the Western powers and integrate the Federal Republic into a supranational West European community, because only t h i s , he believed, would make i t possible for the A l l i e s to restore Germany's sovereignty. Moreover, i t would be the only way to ensure the future security and equality of the Federal Republic. 3 7 But, Adenauer did not only pursue t h i s p o l i c y out of pure necessity, rather i t r e f l e c t e d his own b e l i e f s . He was an a n t i -communist to the core and convinced that Soviet hegemony, unless counterbalanced by the United States and a u n i f i e d Western Europe, would extend over the whole continent. As a f a i t h f u l Catholic and 'Rhinelander', he thought that only a Germany which was securely t i e d to the c u l t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s , and p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s and values of Western Europe would not be i n danger of returning to a d i c t a t o r i a l regime. These aims required a fundamental and l a s t i n g rapprochement with France, and Adenauer was w i l l i n g to make concrete concessions to the French i n order to gain t h e i r trust and goodwill. In March 1950 he even suggested that France and Germany should be completely united. 3 6 W i 1 l i a m E. Paterson, 'The Chancellor and Foreign P o l i c y , ' i n Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German C h a n c e l l o r s h i p , ed. Stephen Padgett (London: Hurst k Company, 1994), 128-131. 3 7Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign P o l i c y (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989), 4-6. 36 beginning with a customs union and customs parliament. 3 8 Consequently, the German government's response to an i n v i t a t i o n to j o i n the Council of Europe as an associate member in 1950 was favourable. However, i t was obvious that Bonn would not be s a t i s f i e d with t h i s status. The federal government was eventually able to achieve f u l l membership i n the Council i n 1951. Bonn had i n i t i a l l y hoped that the Council of Europe would serve as a s t a r t i n g point f o r further integration, and would ultimately lead to a European federation. The German government believed that s t a b i l i t y and peace i n the region could only be maintained i n a fe d e r a l l y organized, united Europe. This supranational approach to European integration becomes obvious i n a memorandum of May 7, 1950 i n which the federal government gave reasons for i t s acceptance of the i n v i t a t i o n to j o i n the Council of Europe: Der Zusammenschlup Europas auf foderativer Grundlage i s t im Interesse a l l e r europaischer Lander, insbesondere auch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, notwendig. Der Europarat i s t der Anfang eines solchen Zusammenschlusses. Die Bundesregierung muP die Einladung aus t i e f e r Uberzeugung, dap nur auf diesem Wege Europa und der Friede gesichert werden konnen, annehmen.39 Bonn's support for a European union that would be organized along federal l i n e s can not only be explained by the fact that West Germany had less sovereignty to lose than the other member states, but also by the country's f a m i l i a r i t y at " C h r i s t i a n Hacke, Weltmacht wider Mi H e n : Die A n s s e n p o l i t i k der Bnndesrepnblik Deutschland, 2d ed. (Frankfurt/Hain k B e r l i n : V e r l a g D l l s t e i n , 1993), 47-53; and Paterson, 142; and Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad Adenauer und Europa: Die g e i s t i g e n Grundlaaen der westeuropaischen I n t e g r a t i o n s p o l i t i k des e r s t e n Bonner Bundeskanzlers (Bonn: Europa Union V e r l a g , 1976), 141-205; and F. Roy W i l l i s , "Germany, France, and Europe," i n West German Foreign P o l i c y : 1949-1979, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 96. " c i t e d i n Herbert Muller-Roschach, Die deutsche E n r o p a p o l i t i k 1949-1977: Eine p o l i t i s c h e Chronik (Bonn: Europa Union V e r l a g , 1980), 14. 37 home with federal p o l i t i c a l structures. The federal order stipulated by the Basic Law was not just the result of A l l i e d pressures - France advocated strong decentralization i n order to weaken Germany whereas the United States promoted federalism as a means to strengthen and s t a b i l i z e the new democracy - but also the re s u l t of a long h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n . It was only i n the years between 1933 and 1945 that Germany was strongly c e n t r a l i z e d . Moreover, a federal structure was one of the prerequisites for the achievement of a u n i f i e d German state. Since German p o l i t i c a l development was characterized by the d i v i s i o n and subdivision of sovereignties within the confines of what was often loosely termed the German lands, the accomplishment of the national u n i f i c a t i o n of 1871 came about only through the recognition of these p e c u l i a r i t i e s of Germany's past. The Basic Law, therefore, provided the constituent states of the Federal Republic, which were set up before 1949, with broad areas of competence, such as education, c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s , and regional economic development. 4 0 Much more important for the development of the process of European integration than the Council of Europe was the Schuman Plan of May 9, 1950. Although Adenauer was only informed of the French Foreign Minister's plan the very day of i t s public announcement, he e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y embraced the idea. For him, the ECSC offered the opportunity not only to change economic conditions, but also open the road towards a fundamental r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with France i n the context of a West European 4 0Edwina S. Campbell, Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign P o l i c y (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense P u b l i s h e r s , 1989), 10-11. community. Moreover, for the Federal Republic the ECSC meant the a b o l i t i o n of the International Ruhr Authority 4 1 and represented a s i g n i f i c a n t step towards the restoration of German sovereignty since an international organization i n which Germany would p a r t i c i p a t e as an equal would take the place of A l l i e d c o n t r o l . 4 2 Concerning the Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community (EDC), Chancellor Adenauer, who had f i r s t demanded a national army for Germany, soon followed the American government's l i n e and supported the EDC plan. His main goal was thereby the a b o l i t i o n of the Occupation Statute for which he saw a r e a l i s t i c chance. Bonn vehemently opposed repeated French attempts to l i m i t the siz e of German units, to leave the Germans as the only troops not commanded by t h e i r o f f i c e r s , and to ban them from French t e r r i t o r y . Accordingly, the German delegations which were to negotiate the ECSC and the EDC t r e a t i e s received s t r i c t orders not to accept any possible discrimination of Germany and to i n s i s t on f u l l e quality. 4 3 The fact that Adenauer supported the plans of Schuman and Pleven as a foundation for a future European federation on the one hand and as a means of extending the sovereignty of the Federal Republic on the other did not seem contradictory to him. Apart from his deep personal conviction that only further 4 1 T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ruhr A u t h o r i t y had been created by the A l l i e d occupation powers as a means to c o n t r o l the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Ruhr's c o a l , coke and s t e e l . The United States, B r i t a i n , France, the Benelux c o u n t r i e s , and Germany were represented on the A u t h o r i t y , with Germany's votes being cast by the occupying powers. 4 2Werner J . F e l d , Best Germany and the European Community: Changing I n t e r e s t s and Competing P o l i c y Obje c t i v e s (New York: Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1981), 32-33; and Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton, The Foreign P o l i c i e s of Germany, France, and B r i t a i n (Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1980), 31-32; and Muller-Roschach, 16-18; and W i l l i s , 96-97. 4 3Muller-Roschach, 25-26; and W i l l i s , 98. 39 European integration would once and for a l l prevent another war in Europe, he regarded equality rather than independence as the primary payoff for Germany. Adenauer saw no problem i n giving up gains i n sovereignty by j o i n i n g the new integrative European organizations as long as i t resulted i n gains i n equality. Giving up newly earned rights and p r i v i l e g e s enabled the Federal Republic to put forward i t s demands for p o l i t i c a l and legal equality i n the name of European integration, rather than i n the name of a d i s c r e d i t e d German nationalism. Moreover, the government i n Bonn knew that France and the other Western powers were fa r more w i l l i n g to make concessions regarding the a b o l i t i o n of the Occupation Statute, i f they could be sure that the restored elements of sovereignty would s t i l l be subject to some kind of international s u r v e i l l a n c e . 4 4 The German federal elections of 1953 impressively reaffirmed Adenauer and his p o l i c y . His party, the C h r i s t i a n Democratic Union (CDU), won 45.2 percent of the vote, a gain of 14.2 percentage points over 1949. The p o l i t i c a l l y strengthened Chancellor soon had to turn h i s attention to unresolved problems. A major obstacle to the Franco-German rapprochement was the Saar question. It had overshadowed a l l negotiations since 1949. The problem was that France t r i e d to l e g a l i z e the de-facto union of the Saar and French economies. The government i n Bonn strongly rejected French attempts to give the Saar p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Adenauer openly declared that the Saar was r i g h t f u l l y German t e r r i t o r y , but at the same time he did not want to jeopardize the 4 4 H a n r i e d e r aad, Autoit, 27*29. 40 prospects for a long-lasting friendship with France. The Chancellor, therefore, proposed to place the Saar under the supervision of a European organization. In October 1954, the government i n Paris f i n a l l y agreed to a 'Europeanization' of the Saar a f t e r i t had rea l i z e d that the support for i t s p o l i c y was diminishing, even within the Western A l l i a n c e . But, i n the following referendum the voters i n the Saar overwhelmingly rejected the 'Europeanization' of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and indicated t h e i r desire to be a part of Germany. Consequently, on January 1, 1957 German p o l i t i c a l sovereignty over the Saar was restored. 4 5 In 1954 the l i m i t s of French support for European integration were revealed by the French National Assembly's refusal to r a t i f y the European Defence Community Treaty. The common fear of sharing sovereignty over national defence p o l i c y and of German rearmament that united G a u l l i s t s and Communists i n th e i r vote against the treaty i r o n i c a l l y strengthened the German claim to membership i n NATO on a national basis. Bonn was quick to point out that the German side had f u l f i l l e d a l l i t s commitments to the EDC. Soon thereafter the Bonn government took the opportunity offered by B r i t i s h Prime Minister Anthony Eden to jo i n the members of the Brussels Pact ( B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y , and the Benelux countries) i n the Western European Union (WEU). The United States and B r i t a i n strongly supported the rearmament of Germany. The French government r e a l i z e d that as a resu l t of the economic and m i l i t a r y weakness of t h e i r country i t could not 4 5 H a n r i e d e r (1967), 61-66; and Paterson, 143; and W i l l i s , 96. 41 afford to further i s o l a t e i t s e l f . In May 1955 France acquiesced to German membership i n NATO. With the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the so-c a l l e d Paris t r e a t i e s i n 1955 West Germany attained formal sovereignty. Nevertheless, the A l l i e s retained some rights regarding both B e r l i n as a whole and Germany as a whole. Adenauer appointed Heinrich von Brentano to be the f i r s t Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. But, von Brentano became no more than an administrator and executor of Adenauer's foreign p o l i c y . 4 6 The benefits to Germany of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n European integration were a central element i n Adenauer's foreign p o l i c y . As has been explained e a r l i e r , his concept of European integration rested on a Franco-German a l l i a n c e . The strong commitment of the Bonn government to European integration meant that i t was normally i n the p o s i t i o n of endeavouring to persuade a more reluctant France. The need to make concessions to win French support became a high p r i o r i t y i n the negotiations over the common market. After the f a i l u r e of the attempts at creating a European P o l i t i c a l and Defence Community i n 1954, Germany and the Benelux countries were the most active proponents of extending the process of European integration into the economic realm by creating a common market. The Bonn government came to the conclusion that since an a b o l i t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l borders i n the near future seemed no longer r e a l i s t i c , the establishment of an economic community would be a l o g i c a l extension of the already e x i s t i n g ECSC. It hoped that such a community would help 4 6Hacke, 82; and Muller-Roschach, 43-48. 42 to overcome the d i v i s i v e impact of national borders on economic prosperity. 4 7 The Chancellor r e a l i z e d that without German concessions the weak French government would have d i f f i c u l t i e s i n taking France into the European Economic Community (EEC). Moreover, he was convinced that i t was an attitude of 'quid pro quo* that had proved the deathblow to Franco-German rapprochement i n the 1920s. Consequently, Germany agreed to French demands for an inclu s i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e i n the proposed common market and to an associate status for overseas t e r r i t o r i e s . Furthermore, a j o i n t development fund was to be established to help finance investments i n these t e r r i t o r i e s . Germany was even w i l l i n g to make higher f i n a n c i a l contributions. In return the Federal Republic was able to gain the concession that trade between the two German states would not be impeded by the common market's external trade b a r r i e r which made East Germany a de facto associate member of the Community. Germany's f l e x i b i l i t y , therefore, played an important role i n bringing the lengthy deliberations on the creation of the EEC and Euratom to a successful conclusion i n 1957.48 3.2 Opposition to Adenauer's European policy The main goals of the new West German state besides moral r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , regaining sovereignty, and gaining equal status among the family of nations, were economic recovery and German 4 7 M u l l e r - R o s c h a c h , 53-57. ""Campbell, 58-60; and Hanrieder and Auton, 32-33; and Muller-Roschach, 58-63. 43 r e u n i f i c a t i o n . While these foreign p o l i c y goals were not contested, domestic c o n f l i c t s over the proper order of p r i o r i t y and the implementation of these goals ensued between the main p o l i t i c a l parties and even inside the government. The question as to how to pursue a p o l i c y of integration into a West European community and simultaneously advance the cause of German r e u n i f i c a t i o n and West German economic recovery soon became the centre of the debate. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y the strongest resistance to Chancellor Adenauer's p o l i c y came from the p r i n c i p a l opposition party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and i t s leader, Kurt Schumacher. Up u n t i l his death i n 1952, t h i s fervent a n t i -communist, n a t i o n a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t p o l i t i c i a n strongly influenced the p o l i c y of the SPD. The p r i o r i t i e s set i n the foreign p o l i c y program of the SPD were almost exactly reverse of Adenauer's. The Social Democrats saw themselves as the only party that t r u l y looked a f t e r the German national i n t e r e s t . Although the SPD had no p r i n c i p l e objections to the Chancellor's p o l i c y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with the West, i t saw German r e u n i f i c a t i o n as the most important goal. The Social Democrats feared that the commitments r e s u l t i n g from Adenauer's policy, such as membership i n the Western a l l i a n c e and rearmament, would be detrimental to the cause of German unity. 4 9 Two main reasons for the SPD's opposition to the government's European p o l i c y and i t s emphasis on r e u n i f i c a t i o n have to be mentioned. F i r s t , there was a deep apprehension about 4 9Gordon D. Drnimond, The S o c i a l Democrats i n Opposition, 1949-1960: The Case against Rearmament (Norman, Oklahoma: U n i v e r s i t y of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 12-25; and Hacke, 34-47; and Hanrieder (1989), 338. 44 the prospect of a West European community with strongly Catholic and conservative tendencies. This resulted, not least, from the s o c i a l democratic ideas for a new socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l order i n postwar Germany and Europe. These ideas were Marxist-reformist and had strong antibourgeois and a n t i c l e r i c a l overtones. Since the SPD's s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and economic values were closer to the ones that were put into e f f e c t i n the protestant countries of Scandinavia and B r i t a i n , which had been s i g n i f i c a n t l y influenced by t h e i r Social Democratic/Labour parties, i t had l i t t l e hope that such an economic and p o l i t i c a l socialism would prosper i n a Western European union shaped by conservative Catholic Europeanists, l i k e Adenauer, Schuman, and de Gasperi. According to Schumacher, t h i s new Western Europe would rather be dominated by the four Ks - 1Kapitalismus 1, 1 K l e r i k a l i s m u s 1 , 'Konservatismus', and ' K a r t e l l e ' . 5 0 The second reason for the SPD's strong commitment to r e u n i f i c a t i o n was the fact that the party had been considerably weakened by the d i v i s i o n of Germany. The SPD was cut o f f from those areas of the country where i t had enjoyed strong support during the Weimar Republic. It found i t s e l f i n a rump state with a small Catholic majority, which favoured the CDU. Thus, r e u n i f i c a t i o n seemed essential not only for establishing the p o l i t i c a l order the Social Democrats wished to foster i n Germany, but also for s o l i d i f y i n g and extending the party's power base. It i s therefore not surprising that the SPD was much more w i l l i n g than the government to test Soviet proposals for a u n i f i e d 5 0Druminond, 25-33; and Hanrieder (1967), 100; and W i l l i s , 97. 45 neutral Germany. It frequently accused the Adenauer government of l e t t i n g pass by opportunities for p r o f i t a b l e negotiations, such as the Stalin-note of 1952. The Social Democrats argued that Germany's d i v i s i o n could only be overcome i f the two parts of the country loosened t h e i r t i e s to the superpowers. This would require not only abstention from p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y association with the West, but also a more open p o l i c y towards the East bloc. This view also explains the SPD's opposition to rearmament and membership i n the EDC and NATO. In the opinion of the Social Democrats, the Western A l l i e s should be responsible for the Federal Republic's defence since they were s t i l l occupying the country. Only the restoration of sovereignty would warrant rearmament. This subject was one of the major points of disagreement between the government and the SPD. While Adenauer rejected n e u t r a l i t y outright, the Social Democrats found i t acceptable i f i t were accompanied by a genuinely democratic domestic p o l i t i c a l order. 5 1 In contrast to the Social Democrats, Adenauer believed that only integration into the West would give the Federal Republic the opportunity to regain i t s sovereignty. Integration into the West on the other hand would necessarily reinforce the p a r t i t i o n of Germany. Adenauer was therefore ready to subordinate the goal of r e u n i f i c a t i o n to the achievement of sovereignty and equality for the Western part of the nation. Furthermore, his p o l i c y was determined to the r e a l i z a t i o n of r e u n i f i c a t i o n i n the long run. It was based on two assumptions, "George, 65-67; and Hanrieder (1967), 102; and W i l l i a m E. Paterson, The SPD and European I n t e g r a t i o n (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1974), 71-88. 46 f i r s t , that the keys to the solution of the German question lay in the United States and i n the Soviet Union, and, second, that the balance of power between the two blocs would in e v i t a b l y s h i f t in favour of the Western side, which would make i t possible for the West to negotiate with the East on the basis of strength, thus forcing Moscow to accept German r e u n i f i c a t i o n on Western terms. Nevertheless, when negotiating the various t r e a t i e s concerning European integration Adenauer made sure that the German question would be l e f t open i n terms of international law. He was not w i l l i n g to accept any clause that would formally recognize the existence of two German states. 5 2 The postwar p o l i c y of the SPD on European integration was characterized by a number of phases. In the early years of the new West German state the SPD opposed various attempts at European integration. The Social Democrats fought membership i n the ECSC, the EDC, and NATO, and accused Adenauer of being a w i l l i n g instrument of the Western A l l i e s . Later, the SPD only re l u c t a n t l y and with grave reservations acquiesced i n plans for the European Common Market. Although the Social Democrats did not oppose European integration as such, t h e i r objections to the Schuman Plan were d r a s t i c and led to some of the most intense p o l i t i c a l debates i n the 'Bundestag'. The SPD argued that the ECSC would become a conservative regional a l l i a n c e that would only perpetuate capitalism. It objected to French attempts to admit the Saar to the ECSC as an autonomous e n t i t y . In general, 5 2Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "West German Foreign P o l i c y , 1949-1979: Necessity and Choices," i n West German Foreign P o l i c y : 1949-1979, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 18-19; and Volker R i t t b e r g e r , "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine Weltmacht? AuBenpolitik nach v i e r z i g Jahren," Aus P o l i t i k nnd Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e B 4-5/90 (January 19, 1990): 4-5. 47 the Social Democrats attacked the Schuman Plan as an international conspiracy aimed at impeding r e u n i f i c a t i o n and r e s t r i c t i n g Germany's a b i l i t y to compete with France on world markets. 5 3 Between 1952 and 1955 the SPD gradually moved away from i t s extreme opposition against Adenauer's European p o l i c y . Kurt Schumacher, the f i r s t postwar leader, died i n 1952. His successor as party leader, E r i c h Ollenhauer, was not as uncompromising and i n f l e x i b l e as Schumacher. The SPD's attachment to s o c i a l i s t goals began to weaken i n the face of the economic miracle ('Wirtschaftswunder') which the voters attributed to the 'social market economy' and the CDU. Moreover, s o c i a l i s t terminology was more and more associated with the much d i s l i k e d communist regime i n East Germany. In 1954 the SPD no longer objected to the transfer of economic authority to international agencies but stressed instead that such a transfer ought to be accomplished i n a democratic-parliamentary manner. The SPD now c a l l e d for extended economic planning, supranationally co-ordinated economic p o l i c i e s , and countercyclical measures and investments. By 1955 the SPD proclaimed that what Europe needed was a consistent supranational p o l i c y on investment, modernization, and f u l l employment which i n t h e i r opinion had not been pursued s u f f i c i e n t l y by the ECSC au t h o r i t i e s . 5 4 " R u d o l f Hrbek, Die SPD - Deutschland und Europa: Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zna V e r h a l t n i s von De u t s c h l a n d - P o l i t i k und B e s t - I n t e g r a t i o n [1945-1957] (Bonn: Europa Union V e r l a g , 1972), 102-126; and H f i l l e r -Roschach, 27-29; and Paterson (1974), 49-66. 5 4Bulmer and Paterson, 135; and Hanrieder (1989), 341-342. 48 In part, the SPD's vqlte-face can be explained by the fact that the Saar dispute, which had figured prominently i n previous objections to the Schuman Plan, was now b a s i c a l l y s e t t l e d by the pro-German p l e b i s c i t e . Also, the SPD feared that with a t o t a l l y negative attitude i t would be impossible for Social Democrats ever to gain influence on the ECSC, thus allowing i n d u s t r i a l interests to take control of the Community. Another important factor that made the SPD change i t s attitude toward the European p o l i c y of the government was the fact that the choice of security, recovery, and democratic freedoms on the one hand, or r e u n i f i c a t i o n on the other ceased to be a sa l i e n t issue a f t e r the decision of general p r i n c i p l e that had been made by the Adenauer government was confirmed by the voters i n the 1953 ele c t i o n s . Also i t was now becoming obvious that German u n i f i c a t i o n on terms other than those proposed by Moscow was not l i k e l y , and those very terms were not acceptable to the voters. This made i t possible for the SPD to free i t s e l f from i t s preoccupation with r e u n i f i c a t i o n and assess foreign p o l i c y issues on t h e i r own merit and with more detachment. Thus, p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n at home and changes abroad had l e t the SPD to reverse i t s e l f on a major foreign p o l i c y issue. 5 5 The Social Democrat's new attitude towards West European integration became apparent i n t h e i r support for the Spaak-proposals i n 1956. The separation of defence from the agenda of European integration a f t e r the collapse of the plans for the EDC made i t obviously easier for the SPD to support integration. The " H a n r i e d e r (1967), 199-203; and Paterson (1974), 115-136. 49 movement for f u l l economic integration was now welcomed; however, one precondition was democratic control over the regional i n s t i t u t i o n s . Hence, there was basic support for the establishment of the EEC and Euratom, but, the SPD t i e d i t s approval of the t r e a t i e s of Rome to c e r t a i n conditions. It supported these new Communities only on the assumption that they would not make the achievement of German unity more d i f f i c u l t . Other conditions were that the i n c l u s i o n of overseas t e r r i t o r i e s of other member states would not burden Germany with 'colonial' p o l i c y , that the border between the two German states would not become a customs border deepening the d i v i s i o n between the two parts of the nation, that membership i n the Communities would be open to a l l European countries, and that Euratom would serve exclusively the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These four conditions were generally f u l f i l l e d by the t r e a t i e s and ensuing events, because the Bonn government, which agreed with the SPD on the importance of these issues, took them into account while negotiating the EEC and Euratom t r e a t i e s , and was f i n a l l y able to obtain some concessions. On July 5, 1957, therefore, the 'Bundestag' approved the Treaties of Rome with the votes of the SPD members, and, f i n a l l y , on July 19, 1957 the 'Bundesrat' unanimously r a t i f i e d both t r e a t i e s . 5 6 Both the SPD and the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) supported the idea of closer European co-operation, but shared the same ideol o g i c a l reservations about the Schuman and Pleven Plans. Regarding the ECSC the DGB was e s p e c i a l l y 5 6 F e l d , 39; and Muller-Roschach, 56-70. 50 concerned about the prospect of greater unemployment as a r e s u l t of the Community's a n t i t r u s t provisions. It was feared that the noncompetitive, high prices for coal would drop and thereby lead to the closure of marginal mines and a general erosion of wage le v e l s . Like the SPD, the DGB l a t e r changed i t s p o l i c y towards the process of European integration. For example, i t was i n favour of creating an economic community and an atomic energy community. But, the trade union federation demanded to be consulted by the government and treated as an active participant in the decision-making process, i n order to balance the i n f l u e n t i a l role of big business and industry i n the governmental policy, and i n i t i a t e an adequate welfare p o l i c y on the European l e v e l . 5 7 German industry i t s e l f was also not very enthusiastic about the Schuman Plan. Like the trade union federation heavy industry was opposed to the ECSC's a n t i t r u s t provisions. Moreover, although i t did not p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e the International Ruhr Authority, i t feared that the ECSC was a French scheme designed to promote Paris' own economic i n t e r e s t s . The steel industry, for example, suspected that France would c u r t a i l German steel production and at the same time seek access to the German market for i t s own surplus s t e e l . Another concern, which was e s p e c i a l l y voiced by the export-oriented segments of German industry and business, referred to the ' d i r i g i s t e ' nature of the ECSC treaty. This worry was shared by the German Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard. He was the only member of cabinet who 5 7 F e l d , 30, 38-39. 51 openly opposed Adenauer's p o l i c y regarding the Schuman Plan. 5 8 The differences between Adenauer and Erhard resulted from two d i f f e r e n t views of what would be the best s e t t i n g for the Federal Republic's future economic and p o l i t i c a l development. Erhard mistrusted the influence of p o l i t i c s on the economic process and was happy to open the German economy to the influence of global markets. Adenauer's readiness to subordinate the p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty to the p r i n c i p l e of equality pushed him almost i n e v i t a b l y towards West European integration. Erhard's readiness to renounce national economic autonomy pushed him towards economic globalism and away from economic regionalism, which he d i s l i k e d not only because of i t s limi t e d s i z e but because of i t s potential for the p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n of economic and monetary p o l i c i e s . 5 9 Erhard and his supporters i n industry and business f e l t a growing sense of urgency i n reaching for secure access to global markets and averting the pressures for regional economic integration. Erhard and many German manufacturers feared that a European economic community would harm the Federal Republic's export trade with countries outside of such a community. German industry would have preferred a worldwide elimination of t a r i f f b a r r i e r s to a geographically limited common market. The German and European proponents of West European economic integration were pressing hard f o r the establishment of the EEC and the German Minister of Economics was determined to open the German 5 8 F e l d , 29-30, 36; and George, 66-67. 5 9George, 66-67; and Hanrieder (1989), 243-245; and Geoffrey Pridham, C h r i s t i a n Democracy i n Western Germany: The CDD/CSD i n Government and Opposition, 1945-1976 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 85. 52 economy to the world market before i t would be enveloped by the re s t r a i n t s of West European economic integration. 6 0 Erhard's problem, though, was that i n the early 1950s he had no strong p o l i t i c a l base i n his party, the Ch r i s t i a n Democratic Union (CDU), which at that time was dominated by Adenauer. The CDU was organizationally weak and only committed to Chancellor Adenauer's success. The party played a subordinate role to both the government and Chancellor and was often p o l i t i c a l l y indistinguishable from them. The CDU was often depicted as the party of the government rather than governing party, or described as an association for the e l e c t i o n of the Chancellor ('Kanzlerwahlverein'). What was mostly underlined, though, was i t s p o l i t i c a l and psychological dependence on the figure of Adenauer. It was therefore not surp r i s i n g that the Chancellor was able to use his authority as party leader to overrule the objections of the Minister of Economics. But when the EEC and Euratom t r e a t i e s were negotiated Erhard's influence i n the party had grown, and his concerns were r e f l e c t e d i n the German negotiating p o s i t i o n . Furthermore, Erhard 1s commitment to free-trade and free-market p r i n c i p l e s continued to influence the Federal Republic's p o s i t i o n on common Community p o l i c i e s i n the future. 6 1 Erhard could also r e l y on the support of the CDU's c o a l i t i o n partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), to promote his economic p r i n c i p l e s . The FDP favoured a wider framework for 6 0 F e l d , 37-38; and Hanrieder (1989), 243-245. "George, 67-68; and P r i d h a i , 55-56, 85. 53 European economic and p o l i t i c a l co-operation and r e u n i f i c a t i o n was generally higher on i t s l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s than i t was on Adenauer's. This was due to the fact that i n the early years of the Federal Republic, i t was the 'national' and not the ' l i b e r a l ' f a c t i o n that had the strongest impact on the party's foreign p o l i c y agenda. But the FDP's emphasis on Germany's national int e r e s t posed no serious obstacles to i t s support of Adenauer's negotiations with the Western powers concerning rearmament for sovereignty. The FDP, therefore, supported plans for a European Defence Community, because i t believed that membership i n the EDC and rearmament would symbolize Germany's return as an equal partner into the European state system. 6 2 The party's stand on the ECSC was more ambiguous and not as p o s i t i v e as i t was on the EDC. Since the Free Democrats strongly i d e n t i f i e d themselves with the concerns of industry, they were c r i t i c a l of the vigorous a n t i - t r u s t provisions of the ECSC treaty. But, at the same time, they claimed that the Coal and Steel Community was not a s u f f i c i e n t step towards true European unity. Many 'nati o n a l i s t s ' i n the FDP saw the treaty as a French attempt to acquire new markets for excess French steel production. In the end, however, the FDP supported the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the treaty, mostly, for the same reason i t supported the EDC treaty, namely, the opportunity i t gave to Germany to regain equality among the European nations. 6 3 6 B u l i e r and Paterson, 132; and Fel d , 34; and Jorg Michael Gutscher, Die Entwicklong der FDP von ihren Anfangen b i s 1961, r e v i s e d e d i t i o n (Konigstein/Ts.: V e r l a g Anton Hain, 1984), 113-114; and Hanrieder (1967), 134. " F e l d , 31; and Hanrieder (1967), 117-118. 54 The FDP's opposition to the European p o l i c y of Adenauer became more pronounced a f t e r i t had l e f t the governing c o a l i t i o n in February 1956. The leader of the party, Thomas Dehler, belonged to the stronger 'national' wing of the party and stressed German r e u n i f i c a t i o n as the most important goal of the party. Under h i s leadership the FDP became the only major party in the 'Bundestag' that opposed the Treaties of Rome. The party based i t s opposition on three main sets of objections. The f i r s t concern was that the West European Community might deepen the d i v i s i o n of Germany by creating a t a r i f f along the inner-German border. Moreover, the Free Democrats were outspoken c r i t i c s of French p o l i c y and Adenauer's attempts to create a Franco-German a l l i a n c e . Many party members feared that i f the Federal Republic had to seek the consent of the Community members for German re u n i f i c a t i o n , i t might well become dependent on the acquiescence of France. The t h i r d set of objections was based on economic grounds and resembled those voiced by Erhard. The party d i s l i k e d the ' d i r i g i s t e ' o r i e n t a t i o n of the ECSC and wanted i t avoided i n the new Communities. It preferred a broad free trade area to an integrated Common Market. On the other hand, i t was not opposed to a u n i f i e d market i n Western Europe as long as i t was based on the free interplay of economic forces. 6 4 The c o n f l i c t between the proponents of global free-trade and Chancellor Adenauer did not rest on t o t a l l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e b e l i e f s , though. Both Adenauer and Erhard, for example, agreed on pursuing a strategy of export-led growth i n order to rebuild 6 4 B u l i e r and Paterson, 132-133; and F e l d , 38-40; and Gutscher, 114-116; and Muller-Roschach, 67-68. 55 Germany's postwar economy. Moreover, domestically the concept of a 'social market economy', which emphasized an economic l i b e r a l i s m that would be cushioned by an active s o c i a l policy, was undisputed within the governing c o a l i t i o n . There was also general agreement on the achievement of monetary s t a b i l i t y as a necessary prerequisite for the German economy to be successful i n the long run. Especially, i f one wanted to l i b e r a l i z e internal and external trade; because uninflated price l e v e l s would help to make German exports highly competitive. Another reason was, of course, the negative experience with the hype r i n f l a t i o n of the early 1920s. The c o n f l i c t between Adenauer and Erhard and the other proponents of global free-trade rather r e f l e c t e d a difference i n p r i o r i t i e s . The German Chancellor rejected t r a d i t i o n a l economic protectionism as a c o r o l l a r y to p o l i t i c a l nationalism. Like Erhard, Adenauer, therefore, was determined to l i b e r a l i z e domestic and international trade, but he maintained that Germany's economy above a l l needed a s o l i d national and international p o l i t i c a l framework, which the integration of the Federal Republic into a stable European Community would provide. He regarded t h i s as being e s p e c i a l l y important because a successful German economic performance would c e r t a i n l y be perceived as a threat by other countries unless they could be sure of the Federal Republic's commitment to international co-operation. 6 5 Adenauer's p o l i c y started to pay o f f a f t e r a r e l a t i v e l y short time. Public opinion i n the Federal Republic increasingly 6 5Bulmer and Paterson, 7, 12-13; and Hanrieder (1980), 17-18; and Hanrieder and Anton, 30-31. 56 supported German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration. While i n 1951, 'only' 42 percent of West Germans welcomed the Schuman Plan, the support for ECSC membership rose to 52 percent i n 1955, 70 percent i n 1956, and 78 percent i n 1957. Moreover, i n the 1957 general elections, Adenauer managed to win 50.2 percent of the popular vote for the CDU/CSU and, thereby, an absolute majority of seats for his party i n the 'Bundestag' - a unique event i n the hi s t o r y of the Federal Republic. 6 6 Membership i n the European Communities also greatly benefitted West Germany's economic recovery, and the benefits of easier access to European markets did not come at the expense of German trade interests outside Europe. The Federal Republic's share of world exports rose from 3.6 percent i n 1950 to 11 percent i n 1960. More important i n the period from the signing of the Rome Treaties i n 1957 to 1964, exports to EEC member states showed an average annual increase of about 19.4 percent, whereas exports to other countries i n the same period rose by 'only' 7 percent annually. These economic benefits as well as the p o l i t i c a l advantages of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration, such as the regaining of sovereignty and equal status within the international community, f a c i l i t a t e d the development of a general domestic consensus regarding Germany's European p o l i c y . Since the 1960s, therefore, membership i n the European Communities has been supported by a l l major parties as " F e l d , 83-88. well as industry and trade unions. 6 7 6 7 F e l d , 41-44; and Eiil J . Kirchner, "The Federal Republic of Germany i n the European Community,' i n The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty, ed. Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989), 426-427. 58 CHAPTER FOUR: REUNITED GERMANY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 4.1 German reunification in the context of European integration The road to Germany's r e u n i f i c a t i o n was a rare sequence of events that generated a dynamic of i t s own. It was neither predicted nor predictable. It seemed as though the p r i n c i p a l actors were surprised at almost every turn; p a i n f u l l y designed strategies had to be frequently changed. The p r i n c i p a l actors t r i e d desperately to adapt t h e i r plans to the fast pace of events. In contrast to the d i v i s i o n s of the cold-war era, r e u n i f i c a t i o n depended on concurrent i n t e r a c t i v e revolutionary change i n the rela t i o n s between the two German states and i n Germany's international context. The whole process was started by the democratic revolution i n the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which ultimately led to the f a l l of the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems of East Germany.68 It was i n November 1989 when r e u n i f i c a t i o n suddenly began to appear on the p o l i t i c a l agenda. The placards i n the East German protest demonstrations changed t h e i r slogans from "We are the people" to "We are one people." (West) German flags began to appear, then to dominate the 'Montagsdemonstration' i n Leipzig and other c i t i e s . In the Federal Republic, u n i f i c a t i o n rose to the top of the p o l i t i c a l agenda. Internationally, the 'German question' was s t i l l not o f f i c i a l l y regarded as a sa l i e n t issue, but u n o f f i c i a l l y i t began to be discussed as a possible and even Catherine McArdle K e l l e h e r , "The New Germany: An Overview," i n The New Germany and the New Enrope, ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1992), 12. 59 frightening r e a l i t y . 6 9 The f i r s t o f f i c i a l declaration came from Chancellor Helmut Kohl. On November 28, 1989 without consulting the Western a l l i e s , he presented his 10-Point Plan to the 'Bundestag'. What he outlined was the creation of a confederation between the two parts of the nation, which afte r a lengthy process would eventually lead to a German federation. But, he had to adapt his plan due to the events that unfolded i n the next weeks. There was a continuing stream of East Germans entering the Federal Republic, which put increasing pressure on West Germany's resources and public services. Reunification was no longer a matter of choice, but a p o l i t i c a l and economic necessity. In order to s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n i n the v i r t u a l l y bankrupt GDR, the government i n Bonn decided on February 7, 1990 to accelerate the process of u n i f i c a t i o n and o f f e r East Germany a monetary and economic union. A free-standing German Democratic Republic was, consequently, no longer a r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e when the monetary and economic union between the two German states came into force on July 1, 1990.70 Many European governments appeared to be ambivalent about the prospect of German u n i f i c a t i o n . Some feared a renewed German desire for hegemony i n Europe as a whole, and e s p e c i a l l y within the European Community. Even before r e u n i f i c a t i o n , the two Germanies had ascended to positions of considerable influence within t h e i r respective economic and m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s . Stable 6 9 M c A r d l e R e l l e h e r , 16. 7 0 M c A r d l e R e l l e h e r , 16-17; and Harald M a i l e r , 'German Foreign P o l i c y a f t e r U n i f i c a t i o n , " i n The Hew Germany and the Hew Europe, ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1992), 127. 60 economic and p o l i t i c a l relationships had been established with a l l i e s and trading partners, and, while these were not always harmonious, the overarching frameworks within which the two German states operated helped to secure co-operation and s t a b i l i t y . It were not merely memories of the past, therefore, which raised anxieties about the emergence of the new Germany. The p o s s i b i l i t y that the established pattern of European relations would be fundamentally changed by u n i f i c a t i o n and that Europe's general equilibrium could be threatened by the creation of a German 'superstate' made many profoundly nervous. 7 1 P o l i t i c a l anxiousness has been most noticeable i n France and B r i t a i n , the two West European powers that had special r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e i r status as two of the four powers with rights and obligations towards B e r l i n and Germany as a whole. In the United Kingdom, the Chequers Conference i n March 1990 and the Ridley a f f a i r i n July 1990 not only caused the government i n London some embarrassment, but also led to tensions in Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . On March 24, 1990, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher i n v i t e d s i x B r i t i s h and American scholars to discuss the implications of German unity. The note of the discussion, which had been leaked to the press, l i s t e d a series of uncomplimentary features of the German character and came to the conclusion that the o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of Germany supporting the European integration process might well be a t a c t i c designed to deceive other member states: "the idea that Germany seriou s l y 7 1Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German U n i f i c a t i o n f o r Western Europe," i n The New Germany and the New Enrope, ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1992), 251-252; and David Spence, "The European Community and German U n i f i c a t i o n , " German P o l i t i c s 1, 3 (December 1992): 136. 61 believed i n European federalism as an a l t e r n a t i v e to nationalism was not wholly convincing, giving that the structure of the EC tended to favour German dominance."72 B r i t i s h feelings were highlighted further with the Ridley a f f a i r . B r i t i s h Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley, one of the closest advisers to Prime Minister Thatcher for over ten years, f o r c e f u l l y expressed his opposition to German economic and f i n a n c i a l dominance i n the process of European u n i f i c a t i o n i n an interview with the weekly 'The Spectator'. He stated that he regarded plans for a European economic and monetary union (EMU), which was pressed forward at the Hanover summit i n 1988 by the President of the Commission of the European Communities, Jacques Delors, French President Francois Mitterrand, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, as a German scheme designed to take over the whole of Europe and he likened giving parts of B r i t i s h sovereignty to a European Community agency to giving i t to Adolf H i t l e r . B r i t a i n , he f e l t , needed to maintain the balance of power i n Europe now more than ever. Shortly a f t e r making these remarks, Ridley was forced to resign. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s lapse lay i n the widespread assumption that Nicholas Ridley was speaking for Mrs. Thatcher h e r s e l f . 7 3 In France, President Mitterrand t r i e d i n vain to slow down or even prevent a possible r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany. He 7 2 q u o t e d i n Spence, 137; J u l i a n B a l l a r d , "Die b r i t i s c h e Haltung zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung," i n Wiedervereinigung i n B i t t e l e u r o p a : AuBen- nnd Innenansichten zur s t a a t l i c h e n E i n h e i t Deutschlands, ed. Josef Becker (Munich: V e r l a g Ernst Voegel, 1992), 37; and Renata F r i t s c h - B o u r n a z e l , "Die Einigung Deutschlands aus der S i c h t der Nachbarlander," i n Die Vereinignng Deutschlands i n europaischer Perspektive, ed. Wolfgang Heisenberg (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesel1scfaaft, 1992), 72-73; and Le Gloannec, 252. 1 3 B u l l a r d , 37; and Dinan, 159; and F r i t s c h - B o u r n a z e l , 72; and Spence, 139. 62 paid hasty v i s i t s to Poland i n November 1989, where he upheld Poland's p o s i t i o n on the 'Oder-Neipe' border, to the German Democratic Republic i n December 1989, i n order to support the existence of a separate East German state, and to the Soviet Union i n the same month, where he made ambiguous statements about France's attitude towards rapid German u n i f i c a t i o n . The French government's greatest fear has always been that a u n i f i e d Germany might increasingly turn eastward and concentrate on i t s former sphere of influence i n Central and Eastern Europe, thereby dominating the whole continent. 7 4 But soon, both the United Kingdom and France had to re a l i z e that a r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany was inevitable. The f i r s t free general elections i n East Germany i n March 1990 had ended with a decisive v i c t o r y for those parties that c a l l e d for an immediate u n i f i c a t i o n of both German states. B r i t a i n and France, therefore, began to concentrate on developing strategies to constrain the power of a u n i f i e d Germany. Their strategies were diam e t r i c a l l y opposed to each other, though. The government in London c a l l e d for less European integration, because i t strongly believed that a fe d e r a l l y organized European union would without doubt be dominated by Germany. It rather sought reassurance within NATO, which i t saw as a way of constraining Germany and enhancing B r i t a i n ' s status. France, on the other hand, looked to the EC to play t h i s r o l e . I t , therefore, favoured further integration, because a European union would 7 4 L e Gloannec, 252; and Georges-Henri Sontou, "Deutsche E i n h e i t - Europaische Einigung: Franzosische Perspektiven," i n Wiedervereinigung i n H i t t e l e n r o p a : AuBen- nnd Innenansichten zur s t a a t l i c h e n E i n h e i t Deutschlands, ed. Josef Becker (Munich: V e r l a g Ernst Vogel, 1992), 6-7; and Spence, 139. 6 3 l i m i t rather than increase Germany's r o l e . 7 5 This viewpoint was, obviously, shared by the Commission of the European Communities. President Delors showed consistent support for the u n i f i c a t i o n process and c o r r e c t l y predicted a very fast integration of East Germany into the Federal Republic. He was one of the f i r s t European p o l i t i c i a n s who recognized the opportunity that German u n i f i c a t i o n provided as a catalyst for the next phase of e f f o r t s to increase the pace of European integration. He s k i l f u l l y used the worries of many EC member states about the challenges an enlarged Germany posed for the Community as well as for the balance of economic and p o l i t i c a l power between i t s members to speed up progress on economic, monetary, and p o l i t i c a l union. Delors, thus, ensured the Community's c e n t r a l i t y i n the events that unfolded. 7 6 President Mitterrand forged a l i n k between his antipathy towards German u n i f i c a t i o n and his a f f i n i t y for European integration. The fact that the French government held the presidency of the Council during the second half of 1989 was an important reason to play a more constructive role i n the whole process, and t r y to achieve as much progress as was possible to further French European-policy goals. France viewed EMU as a means to replace the power of the 'Bundesbank' with the pooled power of a European central bank. If the French government had 7 5 L e Gloannec, 252-253; and C a r l - C h r i s t o p h Schweitzer, "The EPC, the East and the German question,' i n The Federal Republic of Germany and EC Membership Evaluated, ed. C a r l - C h r i s t o p h Schweitzer and Detlev Rarsten (London: P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1990), 111-120. 7 6 P e t e r Ludlow, 'Die deutsch-deutschen Verhandlungen und d i e 'Zwei-Plus-Vier'-Gesprache,' i n Die Vereinignnq Dentschlands i n europaischer Perspektive, ed. Wolfgang Heisenberg (Baden-Baden: Nomos V e r l a g s g e s e l l s c h a f t , 1992, 23-24; and Paterson, 153. 64 t r i e d to obstruct German u n i f i c a t i o n at the Strasbourg summit, which was scheduled for December 1989, i t would have destroyed the l a t e s t i n i t i a t i v e for EMU and damaged European integration. It , therefore, took advantage of the widespread view that German r e u n i f i c a t i o n implied a need to accelerate European Union, to s e t t l e a s t a r t i n g date for negotiations. 7 7 The Strasbourg meeting of the European Council on December 8-9, 1989 e x p l i c i t l y dealt with the linkage between German u n i f i c a t i o n and deeper p o l i t i c a l integration and between EMU and a European P o l i t i c a l Union (EPU). But, i t was overshadowed by Chancellor Kohl's 10-Point Plan with which he had surprised everyone. Kohl referred to the worries of his European partners by pointing at h i s government's commitment to a deepening of European integration. He emphasized that the future of Germany must be f i t t e d into the future of Europe as a whole, and that h i s u n i f i c a t i o n p o l i c y was aimed at creating a European Germany, not a German Europe. One of Chancellor Kohl's fundamental convictions has always been that the deepening of European integration i s the mission of his generation, which could not safel y be entrusted to a successor generation. 7 8 But, despite h i s dedication to European integration. Chancellor Kohl was s t i l l reluctant to commit Germany to a schedule for European economic and monetary union. Nevertheless, he was prepared to trade his acceptance of the French plans for EMU along with the recognition of the 'Oder-Neipe' border, for EC "Ludlow, 24-25; and Spence, 139-141. 7 8 D i n a n , 162-163; and Paterson, 154; and Spence, 141. 65 endorsement of German unity. After t h i s 'bargain' the European Council supported the "German right of self-determination 'within the framework of East-West dialogue and co-operation' and i n lockstep with EC integration." 7 9 The Franco-German bargain manifested i t s e l f immediately i n a decision at Strasbourg to hold an EC summit i n December 1990 in order to revise the o r i g i n a l Rome t r e a t i e s that set up the Common Market i n 1957. Whereas i n 1985, the European Council president c a l l e d for a vote to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) that l a t e r culminated i n the Single European Act, i n 1989 the president simply declared that a majority existed to hold a new IGC. This l e f t the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who had made no secret of her opposition to an economic, monetary, and p o l i t i c a l union, i s o l a t e d i n the Community. She had proposed an immediate widening of the EC, instead. Less than a year l a t e r , Thatcher was ousted from her o f f i c e and replaced by John Major. 8 0 The developments of 1989/90 made i t seem possible that, f i n a l l y , the 'German problem' could be resolved. In 1965 President de Gaulle had characterized the 'German problem' as "indeed the European problem, of the German anguish" created by i t s own uncertainty about i t s boundaries, i t s unity, i t s p o l i t i c a l system, i t s international role, so that the more i t s destiny remains undetermined, the more disturbing i t always appears to the whole continent. 8 1 7 9 P e t e r H. Merkl, German U n i f i c a t i o n i n the European Context ( U n i v e r s i t y Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), 386-387. 8 0 D i n a n , 163-164; and Herkl, 386-387. 8 l q u o t e d i n Hoffmann, 253. 6 6 Since Adenauer the German approach to a resolution of that problem has been b a s i c a l l y the same. In February 1990 Foreign Minister Genscher rei t e r a t e d what every German government has regarded as the basis of i t s p o l i c y : The p o l i c y of the Federal Republic of Germany has, i n keeping with the precepts of our Constitution, been a pol i c y of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ever since the founding of our state. To serve world peace, to be an equal partner i n a united Europe, and to preserve t h e i r national and p o l i t i c a l unity - that i s the mandate which the German people have been given by t h e i r Constitution. This includes the determination to firm l y l i n k the destiny of Germany to that of Europe. The Germans w i l l not follow a separate path. Nor w i l l they pursue a separate course of ne u t r a l i t y ; t h i s would give r i s e to new in s e c u r i t y and i n s t a b i l i t y i n Central Europe. 8 2 These fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of Germany's European p o l i c y are undisputed. Furthermore, there has been a long-standing commitment to the idea of West European integration i n German domestic p o l i t i c s . A l l major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP) and trade unions as well as business and industry generally agree that Germany should continue to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n the process of European integration. Even the Greens, who are very c r i t i c a l of what i n t h e i r opinion i s an overly bureaucratic and undemocratic structure of the European Communities, support European integration and further deepening and widening of the EC.83 In July 1995 the leader of the Greens i n the 'Bundestag', 8 2 H a n s - D i e t r i c h Genscher, "German r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a peacefu l order i n Europe," i n Germany and Europe i n T r a n s i t i o n , ed. Adam Daniel R o t f e l d and Walther S t u t z l e (Solna, Sweden and Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991), 22. " K a r l Kaiser, "Das V e r e i n i g t e Deutschland i n der I n t e m a t i o n a l e n P o l i t i k , " i n Dentschlands nene A n f i e n p o l i t i k : Band 1: Grnndlagen, ed. K a r l K a i s e r and Hanns W. Maull (Munich: R. Oldenbourg V e r l a g , 1994), 4-5; and Heinz-Werner Heyer, "Europaische I n t e g r a t i o n : Ende der N a c h k r i e g s z e i t Oder Ruckkehr nach gestern?," Aus P o l i t i k and Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e B 1/93 (January 1, 1993): 17-22; and Hans Peter S t i h l , "Chance Europa: Die europaische Einigung aus S i c h t der deutschen W i r t s c h a f t , " Aus P o l i t i k und Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e B 1/93 (January 1, 1993): 23-33; and John T. Hoolley, "Linking P o l i t i c a l and Monetary Union: The Maastricht Agenda and German Domestic Politics,° i n The P o l i t i c a l Economy of European Monetary U n i f i c a t i o n , ed. Barry Eichengreen and 67 Joschka Fischer, underlined the fact that a l l democratic parties agree on the central tenets of Germany's foreign p o l i c y : Ich bin der Meinung i n der AuBenpolitik sind weite T e i l e der demokratischen Linken wie auch der demokratischen Rechten i n zentralen Grundannahmen e i g e n t l i c h einer Meinung...die auBenpolitischen Saulen - Westbindung a l s Atlantismus und europ^ische Integration; "Europa zuerst" und damit die Vertiefung und Erweiterung der Europaischen Union; positives VerhSltnis zu Rupland; iiberragende Bedeutung der z i v i l e n Komponente unserer P o l i t i k nach aupen wie nach innen -, a l l das sind Dinge, die mit unterschiedlicher Gewichtung so etwas wie ein Fundament deutscher S e l b s t d e f i n i t i o n und damit deutscher AuPenpolitik d a r s t e l l e n . 8 4 The question that a r i s e s i s , why did the Federal Republic decide to continue i t s active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration? What were the motivations for Germany's decision? One possible answer has been put forward by Chancellor Kohl i n a speech on December 5, 1989. He, thereby, pointed to the common values and b e l i e f s , such as freedom, democracy, and the preservation of human rights, that connect Germany with i t s neighbours to the West. Kohl stressed that the decision of general p r i n c i p l e to integrate into the West, which the Federal Republic made i n the early 1950s, i s , therefore, i r r e v e r s i b l e : Die Entscheidung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, s i c h unwiderruflich an den Westen zu binden, entsprach nicht taktischem Kalkiil, sondern war Ausdruck einer bewupten Wertentscheidung. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland entschied s i c h fur eine moglichst enge Bindung an die westlichen Demokratien, weil s i e dort ihren geistigen und p o l i t i s c h e n Standort sah. Diese Entscheidung steht heute wie kiinftig nicht zur Disposition, s i e i s t , wie ich wiederholt betont habe, T e i l der Staatsraison der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Mit der westlichen Gemeinschaft verbinden uns daher nicht Z u f a l l O d e r Zwang, sondern die feste Uberzeugung, d a p F r e i h e i t , Demokratie J e f f r e y Frieden (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 77. 8 4 J o s c h k a F i s c h e r , "Fur neue Abenteuer f e h l t h o f f e n t l i c h d i e Behrheit," i n t e r v i e w by Theo Sower, Die Z e i t (Hamburg), J u l y 21, 1995. 68 und Verwirklichung der Menschenrechte entscheidende Grundlage fur unsere eigene p o l i t i s c h e Ordnung sin d . 8 5 Chancellor Kohl has always been a dedicated supporter of European integration. In his speech to the f i r s t all-German 'Bundestag' on January 31, 1991, he summarized his fundamental p o l i t i c a l conviction with the following statement: "Deutschland i s t unser Vaterland, Europa unsere Zukunft." Nevertheless, there i s more to Chancellor Kohl's 1Europeanism' than pure idealism. Membership i n the European Community was, apart from the genuine commitment of a l l postwar governments to the concept of European integration, also seen as a way to widen the bounds of West German sovereignty. I r o n i c a l l y , surrendering elements of sovereignty to the EC was the only way for Bonn to regain f u l l sovereignty and convince i t s Western a l l i e s that Germany could again be trusted. This pattern was also used during the r e u n i f i c a t i o n process, when Chancellor Kohl had to reassure his partners that a u n i f i e d Germany would remain as committed to European integration as ever. 8 6 Germany has learned the lesson from the experiences i t has made i n the l a s t 120 years, namely that an i s o l a t i o n of the country has to be avoided at any cost. This has been of special importance to Bonn and i t s neighbours, because an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y i s o l a t e d Germany i n the centre of Europe would endanger p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n the region. The German government has always been 8 5 H e i n r i c h Seewald (ed.), Helmut Kohl: Dentschlands Zukunft i n Europa: Reden und Be i t r a g e des Bnndeskanzlers (Herford: V e r l a g Busse + Seewald, 1990), 145-146. 8 6Ausw§rtiges Amt (ed.), Deutsche AuBenpolitik 1990/91: Anf dem Beg zn e i n e r Enropaischen Friedensordnnng (Munich: V e r l a g Bonn A k t u e l l , 1991), 326; and Timothy Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," Foreign A f f a i r s 73, 4 (July/August 1994): 71; and C a r l Cavanagh Hodge, "The Federal Republic and the Future of Europe: A Reassessment," German P o l i t i c s 1, 2 (August 1992): 235. worried that i f the achievements of the l a s t f o r t y years of European integration would be abandoned, the continent would f a l l back to old patterns of foreign-policy making based on national interests and c o n f l i c t s . But, maintaining good r e l a t i o n s with i t s neighbours required that those countries would f e e l secure and never again fear a return of German 'Machtpolitik 1. P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n regional integration seemed the most appropriate means of achieving t h i s goal. European integration and the EC represented for Bonn a framework within which good neighbouring relations could emerge and develop. This gave Germany the opportunity to pursue i t s interests i n the f i e l d of foreign p o l i c y from within the EC, by influencing and persuading other member countries of the value of c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s . Due to the s e n s i t i v i t i e s of Germany's neighbours t h i s approach promised to be more successful than one i n which Bonn would t r y to act u n i l a t e r a l l y . 8 7 The process of European integration helped to develop a f e e l i n g of mutual trust among the countries of Western Europe, which advanced the generation of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y within the EC. This i n turn f a c i l i t a t e d international exchange i n every realm, e s p e c i a l l y i n the economic f i e l d . The promotion of the s o c i a l and economic well-being of i t s c i t i z e n s has been another important motivation for Germany's commitment to the process of European integration. The continuation of that process i s v i t a l for the future development of the German economy. European 8 7 A r n u l f Baring, "Hie neu i s t unsere Lage? Deutschland a l s R e g i o n a l i a c h t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l e P o l i t i k 50, 4 ( A p r i l 1995): 13; and Rudolf Hrbek, 'Germany's r e l a t i o n s with the Best,' i n The Federal Republic of Germany and EC Membership Evaluated, ed. C a r l - C h r i s t o p h Schweitzer and Detlev Rarsten (London: P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1990), 122-123. 70 economic u n i f i c a t i o n has contributed d e c i s i v e l y to German job creation, economic growth, and the achievement of a considerably high l e v e l of prosperity, and thereby supported the country's internal s t a b i l i t y . Moreover, a withdrawal from the EC would be very c o s t l y for the Federal Republic, because interdependence between member countries has grown su b s t a n t i a l l y over the l a s t f o r t y years. A l l i n a l l the EC seemed to o f f e r the Federal Republic an optimal framework for securing economic prosperity and the liberal-democratic order, as well as for preventing a relapse into the old n a t i o n a l i s t habits that had caused Germany so much damage.88 4 . 2 The Maastricht Treaty and i t s aftermath In A p r i l 1990 Kohl and Mitterrand submitted a j o i n t proposal to the then president of the European Council, I r i s h Prime Minister Charles Haughey, on opening a second track i n the European integration process. The proposal put forward bold steps not only towards European economic and monetary union, but also towards a p o l i t i c a l union. Both goals would be advanced simultaneously at two intergovernmental conferences. The twelve member states represented at the two IGCs, which opened i n Rome in December 1990, concluded t h e i r bargaining one year l a t e r a f t e r intensive negotiations at the summit meeting i n Maastricht. 8 9 Germany went into the negotiations with a cl e a r 8 8 B a r i n g , 13; and C h r i s t i a n Hacke, "Deutschland und die neue Weltordnung: Zwischen i n n e n p o l i t i s c h e r Bberforderung und auBenpolitischen K r i s e n , " Ans P o l i t i k und Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e B46/92 (November 6, 1992): 11; and Hrbek, 122-123; and W i l f r i e d von Bredow and Thomas Jager, Neue deutsche A u B e n p o l i t i k : Nationale Interessen i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l e n Beziehnnqen (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1993), 219-223. 8 9 D i n a n , 165-169. 71 commitment to EMU and EPU. But, unlike many other member countries, Bonn recommended a close linkage between these two aspects of a future European union. Chancellor Kohl even threatened to veto any agreement on EMU without an adequate agreement on p o l i t i c a l union. The high importance that the German government attached to a p a r a l l e l approach can be explained by the experience i t had gained from the economic and monetary union with East Germany. It seemed obvious to the government i n Bonn that a common monetary policy, i n order to function properly, would need a common economic policy, because i f economic developments i n even a single member country would d i f f e r considerably from the developments i n the other member countries, negative consequences f o r the common currency would be inevitable. A common economic p o l i c y i n turn would necessitate closer l i n k s i n the form of a comprehensive p o l i t i c a l union. Furthermore, r e f e r r i n g to a future expansion of the EC, Bonn held the opinion that the l i k e l y d i v e r s i t y of interests and opinions once eighteen or more countries were p a r t i c i p a t i n g would almost c e r t a i n l y shatter the Community, unless there was a high l e v e l of regulation of the important p o l i t i c a l issues. 9 0 In 1989, the governments of the EC member states had b a s i c a l l y agreed to take a three-stage approach to EMU. The f i r s t stage, which c a l l e d for a greater co-ordination of member countries' macroeconomic p o l i c i e s , the establishment of free c a p i t a l movement, and membership of a l l EC currencies i n the 9 0Hans Arnold, "Die Europaische Union zwischen M a a s t r i c h t und M a a s t r i c h t - R e v i s i o n , " Aus P o l i t i k und Z e i t g e s c h i c h t e B3-4/95 (January 13, 1995); and Dinan, 169; and C a r l F. Lankowski, " I n t r o d u c t i o n : Genany and the European Community: The Issues and the Stakes," i n Germany and the European Community: Beyond Hegemony and Containment?, ed. C a r l F. Lankowski (New York: S t . Martin's Press, 1993), 9; and Muller, 160. 72 European Monetary System, was launched on July 1, 1990. The second stage, which came into e f f e c t on January 1, 1994, established the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor of the future European Central Bank (ECB). This Committee of Central Bank Governors prepares the t h i r d , and f i n a l , stage of EMU. By the end of 1996, the EC governments are to decide by a q u a l i f i e d majority vote whether a majority of member states i s ready for currency union. Should the ver d i c t be posi t i v e , the currency union could be introduced from the beginning of 1997. If the verdict i s negative, member states that are ready have to decide whether i t i s appropriate for the Community to enter the t h i r d stage, and i f so, set a date for the beginning of the t h i r d stage, i . e . , the introduction of a single currency. If by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning of the t h i r d stage has not been set, the t h i r d stage w i l l s t a r t on January 1, 1999.91 Regarding the negotiations on EMU, the German government indicated that i t might be w i l l i n g to make far-reaching concessions. In order to convince i t s partners that the reunited Germany was not w i l l i n g to act s o l e l y i n i t s own interest and was t r u l y committed to European integration, Bonn was prepared to surrender the deutsche mark and, thereby, give up control over European monetary policy, which i t presently possessed i n the European Monetary System (EMS). But, t h i s issue was highly contentious. E s p e c i a l l y the 'Bundesbank' and i t s president, Karl-Otto P6hl, had reservations about EMU. Pohl, supported by the Ministry of Finance, showed persistent resistance towards the 9 1 D i n a n , 158-182; and N i c o l l and Salmon, 154-159. 73 government's p o l i c y and eventually resigned before the Maastricht Treaty was signed. In spite of the growing c r i t i c i s m , the government stuck to i t s decision. But, Bonn formulated three conditions which took into account most of the 'Bundesbank's' recommendations. In order to ensure that the new European currency would be as stable as the German mark, Germany i n s i s t e d on a European central bank that would be as independent from p o l i t i c a l control as the 'Bundesbank'. The charter of the new central bank would have to accord high p r i o r i t y to price s t a b i l i t y ; and only the countries that meet tough c r i t e r i a for budgetary d i s c i p l i n e would be allowed to proceed to the t h i r d and f i n a l stage of EMU. Finance Minister Theo Waigel summarized the German view of EMU by s t a t i n g : "[Germany] w i l l bring the German currency order to Europe." 9 2 Member states would have to f u l f i l l the following 'convergence c r i t e r i a ' i n order to enter the f i n a l stage of EMU: - government d e f i c i t spending s h a l l not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices, - government debt s h a l l not exceed 60 percent of GDP at market prices, - i n f l a t i o n for a country over one year before examination s h a l l not exceed by more than 1.5 percent that of, at most, the three best performing EU members i n terms of price s t a b i l i t y , - a country must be a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) "q u o t e d i n Muller, 160; and S i i o n J. B u l i e r , "Germany and European I n t e g r a t i o n : Toward Economic and P o l i t i c a l Dominance?," i n Germany and the European Community: Beyond Hegemony and Containment?, ed. C a r l F. Lankowski (New York: S t . Martin's Press, 1993), 91-92; and Andreas Falke, "An Unwelcome Enlargement? The European Community and German U n i f i c a t i o n , " i n German U n i f i c a t i o n : Process and Outcomes, ed. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 185-186; and Dinan, 179. 74 of the European Monetary System (EMS) and must not have any devaluations within the narrow band of the ERM i n the two preceding years, and, - i n the preceding year, a member state s h a l l have had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percent that of, at most, the three best performing members i n terms of price s t a b i l i t y . 9 3 However, the Maastricht agreement l e f t a few loopholes concerning the application of these 'convergence c r i t e r i a ' for admission of member states to the t h i r d stage of EMU. The f i n a l decision over the admission of countries to the t h i r d stage of EMU w i l l be made under q u a l i f i e d majority voting. Furthermore, the decision whether to admit member states or not does not necessarily have to be based on the f u l f i l l m e n t of the c r i t e r i a , but on whether the countries i n question have made good f a i t h e f f o r t s to meet the 'convergence c r i t e r i a ' . 9 4 The far-reaching agreement on EMU did not, i n the end, meet the high expectations of the 'Bundesbank'. The outcome was c r i t i c i z e d because the admission rules, which were believed to be not stringent enough, would not ensure the recreation of the German model at the European l e v e l . The 'Bundesbank' based i t s opposition to the agreement reached at Maastricht on three points. F i r s t , the ambiguity of the Treaty with regard to the body that would ultimately determine exchange rate policy, namely either the Council or the future European Central Bank. Second, " G e o f f r e y G a r r e t t , "The P o l i t i c s of M a a s t r i c h t , " i n The P o l i t i c a l Economy of European Monetary u n i f i c a t i o n , ed. Barry Eichengreen and J e f f r y Frieden (Boulder, Colorado: westview Press, 1994), 50-51. 9 4 G a r r e t t , 50. 75 decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank would be made by simple majority, with each national member having one vote. This voting system would allow for the p o s s i b i l i t y that members who are interested i n looser monetary p o l i c i e s would outvote advocates of t i g h t monetary p o l i c i e s . F i n a l l y , t h i r d , the sanctions against i n d i v i d u a l governments f r e e - r i d i n g on the monetary union as a whole by running large national d e f i c i t s were deemed to be not strong enough.95 But, the government i n Bonn accepted t h i s suboptimal outcome because i t gave p r i o r i t y to a successful conclusion of the Maastricht negotiations and, thereby, the advancement of the process of European integration. This was due to the fact that i t wanted to reassure i t s partners that a reu n i f i e d Germany would remain firmly anchored i n the West. This, Bonn believed, would make i t easier for the Western powers to support the rapid u n i f i c a t i o n of the two German states. Moreover, EMU was considered necessary to further penetrate EC markets and give boost to exports. But, the Maastricht Treaty did not get the domestic support the government had hoped f o r . It was e s p e c i a l l y the prospect of losing the mark which sparked widespread opposition to the f i n a l stage of EMU. In response to the increasing c r i t i c i s m the government agreed not to move to the t h i r d stage of EMU and the single currency unless i t got the approval of a two-thirds majority of both Chambers of Parliament. Apart from that Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel stressed that Germany would only p a r t i c i p a t e i n the creation of a " G a r r e t t , 52-53, 62. 76 common currency, i f that currency promises to be as stable as the mark.96 Regarding a future European p o l i t i c a l order the Bonn government s t r i v e d for a f e d e r a l l y organized union. It also pressed for further steps towards supranational as opposed to intergovernmental decision-making. This issue was seen i n connection with the 'democratic d e f i c i t ' of the EC which Germany wanted to r e c t i f y . The Chancellor made movement on t h i s matter and urged h i s European partners to increase the strength of EC i n s t i t u t i o n s and make them democratically accountable. The Kohl government, thereby, attached special importance to the -d i r e c t l y elected - European Parliament. In t h e i r view, t h i s should become more powerful and play a greater l e g i s l a t i v e role, i. e . , i t should have the same powers as the Council. The German proposal also provided for a right of i n i t i a t i v e and parliamentary involvement i n the appointment of the Commission and i t s president. Following i t s own in t e r e s t s at the same time, the German government pressed for eighteen additional German seats to represent the eastern part of the u n i f i e d country. The greater influence German parliamentarians would have on the European Parliament made i t much easier for Bonn to give up some of the powers of the Council. Apart from that, Germany was w i l l i n g to extend q u a l i f i e d majority voting i n the Council to most areas of business, including foreign p o l i c y and security, i n 9 6 P e r F i s c h e r , "Wider d i e neue Europa-Wehleidigkeit der Deutschen," Enropa-Archiv 47, 7 ( A p r i l 10, 1992): 188; and G a r r e t t (1994), 57-59; and Klaus K i n k e l , "Rede von BundesauBenminister Klaus Kinkel zur deutschen AuBenpolitik i n e i n e r neuen Weltlage, gehalten vor der Deutschen G e s e l l s c h a f t f u r Auswirtige P o l i t i k e.V. (DGAP) a i 24. August 1994 i n Bonn ( g e k u r z t ) , " Enropa-Archiv 49, 18 (September 25, 1994): (Dokumente)D 541; and Der Spiegel (Hamburg), J u l y 11, 1994, 18; and Per Spiegel (Hamburg), March 27, 1995, 24. order to make i t more e f f i c i e n t . Bonn, thereby, argued that majority decisions would encourage the willingness to reach compromise, whereas having a right of veto would promote national egoism. 9 7 The German government also c a l l e d for a common inter n a l security p o l i c y i n such areas as immigration and asylum, organized crime, terrorism, drug t r a f f i c k i n g and the environment. Concerning economic p o l i c i e s , Germany strongly believed i n non interventionism, and promoted the German model of a 'social market economy'. The German approach to the granting of more competencies to a future European union was greatly influenced by the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y . This p r i n c i p l e maintains that higher l e v e l s of government should be allowed to deal only with issues which cannot be handled at a lower l e v e l . The adherence to t h i s p r i n c i p l e can be explained by the way Germany's federal system i s organized. Germany's Basic Law st i p u l a t e s that governmental powers and executive functions s h a l l be exercised and discharged by the federal states as fa r as the Constitution does not otherwise prescribe or permit. It should therefore not be su r p r i s i n g that i t were e s p e c i a l l y the German states ('Lander') that pushed hardest for the introduction of the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y into the EC, and for the creation of new European i n s t i t u t i o n s representing the states or regions. 9 8 9 7 D i n a n , 169-170; and N i c o l l and Salmon, 228; and Rudolf S e i t e r s , 'Belches Europa wollen wir?' F r a n k f u r t e r Allgemeine Zeitnnq, A p r i l 28, 1995, 8. 9 8 N i c o l l and Salmon, 228; and Muller, 160; and Angelika Poth-Hoegele and Bolfgang Renzsch, 'German Lander and European I n t e g r a t i o n : The Pledge f o r a 'Europe of Regions',' i n The Nation-State versus C o n t i n e n t a l I n t e g r a t i o n : Canada i n North America - Germany i n Europe, ed. L e s l i e A. Pal and Rainer-Olaf Schultze (Bochum: U n i v e r s i t i t s v e r l a g Brockmeyer, 1991), 194-196. 78 It was mainly due to German pressure that the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y was f i n a l l y enshrined i n the Maastricht Treaty and that the Committee of the Regions was established as an o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n of the European Union. Bonn constantly stressed i t s commitment to the decentralizing p r i n c i p l e of su b s i d i a r i t y , and that i t pursued a federal, not a unitary Europe." Foreign Minister Kinkel pointed out that t h i s has always been an important matter of concern for Germany: S c h l i e p i i c h i s t es ein besonderes deutsches Anliegen, das Demokratiedefizit und Angste vor Zentralismus und Biirgerferne abzubauen ... Wir wollen eine konsequente Anwendung des Su b s i d i a r i t a t s p r i n z i p s , urn die Arbeit der Union auf die wahrhaft groBen, iibergreifenden Aufgaben zu konzentrieren, die die Mitgliedsstaaten einzeln nicht bewSltigen konnen. 1 0 0 Although generally cautious about a European defence ide n t i t y , the Bonn government supported French i n i t i a t i v e s for a common foreign and security p o l i c y (CFSP). It did t h i s not only to calm French worries about an unrestrained u n i f i e d Germany, but also because of i t s own commitment to mult i l a t e r a l i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y i n security and foreign p o l i c i e s . Bonn advocated a motion that t r i e d to reconcile 1 A t l a n t i c i s t 1 and 1Europeanist 1 positions by proposing the development of the Western European Union (WEU) into the defence component of a future union. The European defence p o l i c y would, thereby, complement NATO, which Germany s t i l l views as the basis of Europe's s e c u r i t y . 1 0 1 "Spence, 137; and Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (ed.), Europa von A-Z: Taschenbnch der europaischen I n t e g r a t i o n , 3d ed., (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1994), 148-149. 1 0 0 K l a u s K i n k e l , "Deutschland i n Europa: Zu den Z i e l e n der deutschen P r a s i d e n t s c h a f t i n der Europaischen Union," Enropa-Archiv 49, 12 (June 25, 1994): 341. 1 0 1 D i n a n , 177; and Muller, 160. 79 Despite the numerous and close contacts at a l l l e v e l s between the German and French governments during the negotiations, the two countries had several differences of view. The government i n Paris was very much interested i n EMU, but i t had reservations about many aspects of EPU. With regards to EMU, France, unlike Germany, did not place great importance on tough convergence c r i t e r i a and on the independence of a European central bank. The French government also rejected non intervention!sm and pushed hard f o r an aggressive Community i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y . On EPU, France had a rather ambiguous po s i t i o n . While promoting EPU as a means of tying the reunited Germany closer to the EC, France sought a stronger European Council and opposed giving the European Parliament any more power. Moreover, France d i f f e r e d from Germany i n that i t d i d not support a unitary treaty structure, as proposed by the Dutch. 1 0 2 During the f i n a l stages of the negotiations, the German government showed a considerable willingness to compromise, not only to give e f f e c t to the Franco-German rela t i o n s h i p but, also, because i t regarded i t far more important to make noticeable progress towards integration than to l e t the summit f a i l by pushing c e r t a i n issues. For example, Germany did not f i g h t for the Dutch proposal although i t resembled German ideas f a r more than the draft treaty presented by Luxembourg. In a speech to the 'Bundestag', Chancellor Kohl explained that his government could not f i g h t for absolutes and that i t would have to s e t t l e for compromises in matters of internal security, s o c i a l policy, Dinan, 171, 178; and N i c o l l and Salmon, 227-228. 80 immigration, and the rights of the European Parliament. 1 0 3 The expansion of the powers of the European Parliament f e l l short of Germany's demands, and a common asylum and immigration p o l i c y was s t i l l far away. Moreover, the German negotiators agreed to postpone a decision on the eighteen extra seats for Eastern Germany i n the European Parliament. The question was, f i n a l l y , resolved at the summit i n Edinburgh i n 1992, when not only Germany but also most other member states were allocated more seats. 1 0 4 The problems that occurred during EU r a t i f i c a t i o n processes are normally associated with Denmark, France, Ireland or the United Kingdom. But, i t was a c t u a l l y the Federal Republic of Germany which was the l a s t country to r a t i f y the Maastricht Treaty. The main challenge to the Treaty came from the 'Bundesrat', the Chamber of the 'Lander'. It threatened to block the German r a t i f i c a t i o n process unless the government increased t h e i r rights of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n EU matters. The 'Lander' argued that since areas of p o l i c y which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 'Lander' w i l l increasingly become matters of EU j u r i s d i c t i o n , they have to be able to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the processes of decision-making and consultation. 1 0 5 A f t e r intensive negotiations between the federal government and the 'Lander', the issue was f i n a l l y resolved. In l 0 3 D i n a n , 178; and M i l l e r , 161. 1 0 4 N i c o l l and Salaon, 227-228; Ma i l e r , 161; and Paterson, 154. 1 0 5 D i n a n , 178-179; and N i c o l l and Salmon, 228. 81 December 1992, the 'Bundestag' and the 'Bundesrat' approved c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes that were aimed at strengthening the r o l e of the 'Lander'. A r t i c l e 23 of the Basic Law, which l e g a l l y paved the way for German unity and which had to be erased a f t e r i t s achievement, was replaced by a new A r t i c l e 23. It allows the representatives of a 'Land' government to exercise the rights of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Council of Ministers when the issues under discussion involve 'Lander' powers. It requires the federal government, i n i t s decisions regarding the a f f a i r s of the EC, to consider the views of the 'Bundesrat' i n cases where the functions involved belong to the federation. Furthermore, when 'Lander' powers are affected, the federal government must under a l l circumstances follow the demands of the 'Bundesrat'. It also grants the federation the right to transfer sovereign rights to the EC, but only with the approval of the ' Bundesrat' . 1 0 6 Closely linked with these changes i n A r t i c l e 23 i s the amended paragraph l a of A r t i c l e 24. This paragraph enables the 'Lander' to transfer, with federal government approval, c e r t a i n autonomous rights to transborder agencies i n order to strengthen co-operation with neighbouring countries i n dealing with common problems, such as police, educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , water and garbage d i s p o s a l . 1 0 7 The l a s t remaining hurdle which the Treaty had to clear in Germany was a legal challenge before the Constitutional Court. 1 0 6 B u n d e s z e n t r a l e f u r p o l i t i s c h e Bildung, 22-23; and Arthur B. Gunlicks, "German Federalism A f t e r U n i f i c a t i o n : The l e g a l / C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Response," P j b l i u s 24, 2 (Spring 1994): 96. 1 0 7 B u n d e s z e n t r a l e f u r p o l i t i s c h e Bildung, 24; and Gunlicks, 96. 82 Whereas C h r i s t i a n Democrats, Free Democrats, and the opposition Social Democrats supported the Treaty, a c o a l i t i o n of extreme right-wing Republicans, environmentalist Greens and a former German senior Commission o f f i c i a l questioned the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Treaty, claiming that Germany gave too many of i t s powers to Brussels. The Constitutional Court rejected complaints against the Treaty. Yet i t emphasized that the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y would have to be s t r i c t l y obeyed during the process of European integration. On October 12, 1993, af t e r the Constitutional Court had o f f i c i a l l y dismissed the complaint, the German government could, f i n a l l y , r a t i f y the Maastricht Treaty. 1 0 8 The developments i n Central and Eastern Europe were another reason for Germany's inter e s t i n bringing the Maastricht Treaty to a successful end. The rapid changes i n the former communist countries threatened to d e s t a b i l i z e the whole Eastern half of the continent. The collapse of communism resulted i n a breakdown of the economic, p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures. Furthermore, national r i v a l r i e s and ethnic tensions increased the p o s s i b i l i t y of large scale armed c o n f l i c t s i n that region. Germany, which i s situated on the ' f r o n t - l i n e ' , i s , thereby, n a t u r a l l y the country that i s affected most strongly by the developments that take place to the east of i t s borders. A s t a b i l i z a t i o n of that part of the world i s therefore i n the special interest of the Federal Republic. Bonn wants to prevent 1 N i c o l l and Salmon, 228-229; and Elke T h i e l , "The European Economic and Monetary Union: Economics and P o l i t i c s , " i n Enrope a f t e r M a a s t r i c h t : American and European P e r s p e c t i v e s , ed. Paul Michael L f l t z e l e r (Providence, Rhode I s l a n d : Berghahn Books, 1994), 131. 83 Central and Eastern Europe from once again returning to the unstable p o l i t i c a l order of the interwar years. Germany's answer to t h i s problem has been twofold: f i r s t , Bonn continues to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n the process of West European integration, and, second, Germany t r i e s to open t h i s process to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 1 0 9 Because of i t s geographical s i t u a t i o n and i t s h i s t o r i c t i e s to the region, Germany f e l t an urgent need to help these countries to overcome t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . It has been the main provider of Western assistance to ex-Communist states, including f i n a n c i a l a i d and the transfer of managerial and technical know-how. Yet economic assistance alone was believed to be i n s u f f i c i e n t . The lack of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y was perceived to be the foremost problem. As the Federal Republic's postwar experience has shown, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration has been the best means of safeguarding and fostering external security, i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y and prosperity. It i s , therefore, the same st r a t e g i c perspective that Germany used for i t s own foreign p o l i c y which stands behind Germany's support for the timely association and eventual EU-membership of the Central and Eastern European countries. 1 1 0 In February 1995 Foreign Minister Kinkel explained how growing interdependence between the members of the European Union 1 0 9 H e l g a Haftendorn, ' G u l l i v e r i n der M i t t e Europas: I n t e r n a t i o n a l e V e r f l e c h t u n g und Nationale Handlungsmoglichkeiten,' i n Deutschlands neue AnBenpolitik: Band 1: Grundlagen, ed. K a r l K a i s e r and Hanns tf. Haull (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 142-143; and Beate Kohler-Koch, 'Deutsche Einigung i a Spannungsfeld i n t e r n a t i o n a l e r Umbruche," P o l i t i s c h e Y i e r t e l i a h r e s s c h r i f t 32, 4 (1991): 612; and von Bredow and Jager, 198, 208. 1 1 0 K o h l e r - K o c h , 612-613; and Eckhard Lubkemeier, The United Germany i n the P o s t - B i p o l a r World (Bonn: F r i e d r i c h - E b e r t - S t i f t u n g , 1993), 29. 84 helped to ensure peace, democracy, and prosperity i n Western Europe, and that an i n c l u s i o n of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be the best way to expand these features into the Eastern part of the continent: Der Schliissel fur ein halbes Jahrhundert des Friedens, der Demokratie und des Wohlstands i n Westeuropa lag i n der gewachsenen Verflechtung der v i t a l e n nationalen Interessen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Union und der Atlantischen A l l i a n z . Verflechtung der v i t a l e n nationalen Interessen, das heipt: die Prosperitat Frankreichs, GroPbritanniens oder der USA i s t entscheidend auch fur unseren eigenen Wohlstand. Die nationale Sicherheit unserer Partner i s t ein zentrales Interesse Deutschlands, und umgekehrt. Fur die Zukunft heipt das: eine auf Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft gegriindete Friedensordnung fur ganz Europa wird nur moglich sein, wenn wir auch die Reformstaaten i n M i t t e l -und Osteuropa i n diese Strategie der Verflechtung der Interessen einbeziehen. 1 1 1 M u l t i l a t e r a l integration i s seen as the best means of ensuring s t a b i l i t y and counteracting the resurgent nationalism i n these countries. The German government's v i t a l interest i n prosperity and s t a b i l i t y i n Central and Eastern Europe, can, thereby, only be r e a l i z e d through the support of the whole European Union, without which Germany would be hopelessly overburdened supporting p o l i t i c a l and economic developments i n Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, Bonn has come to the conclusion that i t cannot choose between integration i n the West and a u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c y towards Central and Eastern Europe, because West European integration i s a basic necessity for coping with the challenges from the East. 1 1 2 J 1 1 K l a u s R i n k e l , "Rede von BundesauBenminister Klaus K i n k e l auf der Munchner Konferenz fiber S i c h e r h e i t s p o l i t i k am 5. Februar 1995/ I n t e r n a t i o n a l e P o l i t i k 50, 4 ( A p r i l 1995): 94. 1 1 2 B u r k h a r d Koch, Germany's New A s s e r t i v e n e s s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : Between R e a l i t y and Misperception (Stanford U n i v e r s i t y : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n , 1992), 12; and K u l l e r , 135. 85 Therefore, Germany, unlike many other EU members, sees no great contradiction between 'deepening' and 'widening' the EU. The German government views 'deepening' and 'widening' as parts of a single process, since the s t r a t e g i c aim i s to preserve s t a b i l i t y and to b u i l d a new and l a s t i n g peace order i n Europe. But, not a l l EU partners see genuine a l t r u i s t i c motives behind Germany's promotion of simultaneously 'deepening' and 'widening' the Union. There are already fears a r i s i n g that Bonn i s attempting to e s t a b l i s h a new 'German bloc' within the European Union, consisting of Austria as well as the Central and East European countries that have been economically and p o l i t i c a l l y closer to Germany than they have to other EU members. Chancellor Kohl has been c r i t i c i z e d for being too vigorous i n expanding the EU i n new d i r e c t i o n s . Germany's attempts to lower trade b a r r i e r s towards the East, for example, provoked many angry reactions from 'Latin' members.113 Chancellor Kohl has been t r y i n g to overcome the fears about a u n i l a t e r a l German p o l i c y towards Central and Eastern Europe by proposing a common 'Ostpolitik' of the EU. Moreover, during the Maastricht negotiations Bonn has acquiesced i n demands of the poorer members of the Union to e s t a b l i s h a Cohesion Fund which would finance projects i n the f i e l d of environment and the construction of major transport networks i n Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. At the Essen summit i n 1994 Germany also agreed to support an i n i t i a t i v e , put forward by France, Spain, and Italy, aimed at helping Morocco, Tunisia, and A l g e r i a with at 1 1 3 K l a u s K i n k e l , "Verantworung, R e a l i s m s , Zukunftssicherung: Deutsche AuBenpolitik i n e i n e r s i c h neu ordnenden Welt," F r a n k f u r t e r A l l g e n e i n e Zeitnnq, March 19, 1993, 8; and Muller, 158; and S i y s e r , 151. 86 least 700 m i l l i o n ecus annually i n return for continued f i n a n c i a l aid for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 1 1 4 The Federal Republic's postwar experience as well as i t s exposed location, the legacy of i t s history and new economic opportunities induce i t to be strongly interested i n an eastward enlargement of the European Union. For these reasons, Germany has been a firm advocate of Western assistance to the countries of the former East bloc. The German government and German business are using t h e i r influence i n Western Europe to promote an expanded East-West trade. In a highly contentious EU debate, Germany has t r i e d to relax EU ba r r i e r s against East European t e x t i l e s , food, and s t e e l . It has also t r i e d to make i t possible for the less-sophisticated economies of the East to trade with the EU by c u r t a i l i n g the application of ce r t a i n EU regulations. 1 1 5 Bonn's a c t i v i t i e s are, thereby, not only a r e s u l t of i t s b e l i e f that Eastern Europe w i l l not be stable unless i t i s prosperous, and that trading with the West i s c r u c i a l to that prosperity, but also due to the economic opportunities that the changes i n t h i s region have offered to German business. For example, Germany i s currently the chief trading partner of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Furthermore, between January and July of 1993 EU trade with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was i n surplus by 1.2 b i l l i o n ecu with the Federal Republic r e g i s t e r i n g h a l f of the surplus. As the world's second largest exporter, Bonn has every inte r e s t i n 1 1 4 S e e w a l d , ed., 169; and The Economist (London), June 17, 1995, 56-57. 1 1 5Lubkemeier, 29-31; and H. R. Smyser, 'Dateline B e r l i n : Germany's Nes V i s i o n , ' Foreign P o l i c y 97 ( S i n t e r 1994-95): 147. 87 keeping the EU's trading practices open and i n pressing the EU to e s t a b l i s h closer t i e s with the countries that have been singled out for membership i n 1993, namely, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the three B a l t i c s t a t e s . 1 1 6 As a country with an export oriented economy, Germany i s dependent on external trade. Table 4 shows that Germany's dependence on exports has r i s e n considerably since the beginning of t h i s century, and e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1949. Table 4: Germany's export quota, 1910-1980 (measured as the share of exports i n p r o p o r t i o n to the net n a t i o n a l product i n market p r i c e s ) year export quota in percent year export quota in percent 1910/13 17.5 1950 9.3 1925/29 14.9 1960 17.2 1930/34 12.0 1970 23.8 1935/38 6.0 1980 26.7 Source: von Bredow and Jager, 181. The European Union has, thereby, become the most important market for German exporters. In 1960, 43.2 percent of the Federal Republic's exports went to the then s i x EC countries, in 1987, 52.7 percent of the exports went to the then already twelve members of the EC, and i n 1990, before German re u n i f i c a t i o n , 54.4 percent of exports went to EC members. In 1992 54.3 percent of German exports went to the members of the European Union, while 27.3 percent of the exports went to other i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries, and 5.6 percent went to the countries of the former East bloc. Moreover, with France, the United 1 1 6 G e o r g e Kolankiewicz, "Consensus and competition i n the eastern enlargement of the European Onion," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 70, 3 (1994): 486, 488-490; and Robert Gerald L i v i n g s t o n , "United Germany: Bigger and Better," Foreign P o l i c y 87 (Summer 1992): 168-169; and Jurgen Notzold, "European Onion and Eastern C e n t r a l Europe: Expectations and O n c e r t a i n t i e s , " A n s s e n p o l i t i k 46, 1 (1995): 14-15. 88 Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium/Luxembourg f i v e of the six largest markets for German products i n 1994 were i n EU member states. The European Union as a destination for exports has also a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on employment i n Germany. Currently one i n every six jobs depends on the EU market. 1 1 7 Germany's export dependence might explain why the Federal Republic has become a strong advocate of free trade not only inside the EU but also g l o b a l l y and opposes any attempt at creating a 'fortress Europe'. The Federal Republic, therefore, opposed France's p r o t e c t i o n i s t stance and pushed i t s Western neighbour- to accept the 1994 Uruguay round GATT agreement. Chancellor Kohl made i t clear that the German government i s not going to support a p o l i c y that results i n the EU sealing i t s e l f o f f from the rest of the world: Eine 'Festung Europa' darf und wird es nicht geben. Die Abschottung Europas nach aupen lage auch mit Sicherheit nicht i n unserem eigenen wohlverstandenen Interesse. Wenn wir uns nach aupen abschotten, werden wir dadurch nicht konkurrenzfahiger, im Gegenteil. Protektionismus darf daher nicht das Signal sein, das vom Binnenmarkt ausgeht . 1 1 8 With these strong p o l i t i c a l and economic interests, i t i s not surprising that Germany i s a strong supporter of further European integration along free market l i n e s . To sum up, one can say that the process of German re u n i f i c a t i o n i n 1989/90, which was a r e s u l t of the revolutionary 1 1 7 R i t t b e r g e r , 12; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Germany's National and European I n t e r e s t s , ' Daedalus 123, 2 (Spring 1994): 100; and Hans-Joachim Seeler, "External trade,' i n The Federal Republic of Germany and EC Membership Evaluated, ed. C a r l - C h r i s t o p h Schweitzer and Detlev Karsten (London: P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1990), 104-105; and Mario von Ba r a t t a , ed., Der F i s c h e r Weltalmanach 1995 ( F r a n k f u r t a.M.: Fi s c h e r Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 1027-1034. Seewald, ed., 153. 89 changes i n Central and Eastern Europe i n general and i n East Germany i n p a r t i c u l a r , led to an acceleration of the process of European integration. Germany's neighbours, e s p e c i a l l y the French, worried about a possible d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of Central Europe. They feared that a u n i f i e d Germany might once again return to a p o l i c y of swinging back and f o r t h between East and West. In order to calm down these fears the German government t r i e d to reassure i t s partners of i t s commitment to remaining f i r m l y integrated i n the West, and supported further steps towards European u n i f i c a t i o n . In order to achieve t h i s aim, Germany was w i l l i n g to make far-reaching compromises during the Maastricht negotiations, such as surrendering the mark for the creation of a European Monetary Union. Germany even accepted a suboptimal outcome i n the f i n a l EMU arrangement, because i t had broader p o l i t i c a l i nterests regarding EC support f o r rapid German u n i f i c a t i o n . Another reason for Bonn's interest i n maintaining the pace of European integration was the fact that the EU market has been essential for Germany's export-dependent economy. Moreover, Germany, as a state that i s situated on the 'front-l i n e ' of Central and Eastern Europe, has every inte r e s t i n preserving s t a b i l i t y i n Western Europe and extenting i t into the Eastern half of the continent. It has therefore been an adament supporter of an Eastern enlargement of the EU. 90 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION Support f o r European u n i f i c a t i o n has been a fundamental assumption of West German p o l i t i c s from the e a r l i e s t days of the Federal Republic. This p r i n c i p l e d commitment to a u n i f i e d Europe has even been l a i d down i n the preamble of Germany's Basic Law. In the period from 1949 to 1957, however, Germany's pos i t i o n towards European integration was more f l u i d than i t was during and a f t e r the process of German r e u n i f i c a t i o n . While i n 1989/90 there was a widespread domestic consensus that a reunited Germany would continue to remain integrated i n the West and be a d r i v i n g force i n pushing forward i n i t i a t i v e s aimed at further European integration, t h i s concept was more contested i n the early years of the Federal Republic. It was then mainly associated with Adenauer who ca r r i e d through with h i s ideas. The successful p o l i t i c a l and economic development of the new state as well as the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the cold war l a t e r convinced h i s adversaries of the merits of that policy, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration ceased to be an important source of partisan d i v i s i o n i n West German p o l i t i c s . This l a i d the foundation for the l a t e r developed domestic consensus regarding Germany's integration into the West and membership i n the European Union. This broad domestic consensus i s one of the reasons why the Federal Republic can be regarded as the most 'European' of the three powerful EU member states, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, whereas i n France and B r i t a i n the major parties often had c o n f l i c t i n g views and sharp inte r n a l d i v i s i o n s 91 regarding t h e i r respective countries' p o l i c y towards European integration. Bonn's behaviour has been much more i n t e g r a t i o n i s t than Paris' or London's. In contrast to these other two member states, Germany supports a l l three aspects of 'deepening' and 'widening' the European Union. F i r s t , i t i s a proponent of 'policy deepening', i . e . , i t i s i n favour of a common foreign and secur i t y policy, i t supports a common p o l i c y towards internal security and immigration, and i t even accepts EMU i n connection with a closer p o l i t i c a l union. Second, the Federal Republic i s also in favour of ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l deepening', which means that i t i s w i l l i n g to surrender more powers to the European Parliament, the Commission, and other supranational EU i n s t i t u t i o n s . Furthermore, with regard to the Council, Bonn has c a l l e d for the introduction of q u a l i f i e d majority voting even i n the area of foreign and security p o l i c y . Germany supports ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l deepening' as a way to overcome the oft-noted 'democratic d e f i c i t ' of the EU. Third, Germany supports a 'widening' of the EU by admitting countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the Union. While i t i s true that Bonn i s ready to make f a r reaching concessions to reach these goals, i t i s also true that Germany has drawn a clear l i n e i n c e r t a i n areas where i t i s less w i l l i n g to make compromises. In the 1950s t h i s applied f i r s t and foremost to the issue of German r e u n i f i c a t i o n , where the government had to face strong domestic opposition to i t s p o l i c y of integration into the West. West German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of West European integration was being c r i t i c i z e d on the grounds of making a u n i f i c a t i o n of the two parts of the nation 92 impossible. Despite the fact that Adenauer gave p r i o r i t y to the Federal Republic's integration into the West, he and his government were not w i l l i n g to accept any clause that would have formally recognized the existence of two German states. Moreover, a l l German governments i n s i s t e d that the external trade b a r r i e r of the EC should not impede trade between the two Germanies, making East Germany a de facto associate member of the Community. In 1989/90 r e u n i f i c a t i o n reappeared on the agenda. Bonn made t h i s issue i t s p r i o r i t y , and any attempt by France or the United Kingdom to veto the u n i f i c a t i o n of the two German states would c e r t a i n l y have jeopardized further progress i n the process of European integration. The p r i n c i p l e of equality formed another l i m i t of acceptance of integration for West Germany i n the 1950s. Bonn was only w i l l i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the process of European integration i f i t were based on the p r i n c i p l e of equal ri g h t s for every member state. Whenever the Adenauer government entered negotiations with the aim of founding a new European organization, be i t the ECSC, the EDC, or the EEC, i t , therefore, demanded that the Federal Republic be granted f u l l equality. In the i n i t i a l stages of German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration Chancellor Adenauer had to overcome strong opposition i n yet another f i e l d , namely free trade. Since the government had decided to follow a strategy of export-led growth there were widespread concerns, voiced primarily by the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, and members of business and industry, that membership i n the ECSC and l a t e r the EEC would impede German trade with countries outside of 93 these organizations. These fears were overcome once i t became clea r that the benefits of easier access to the member states' markets did not come at the expense of German trade interests outside of the Communities. Nevertheless, Bonn opposed any attempt at creating a 'fortress Europe' and has shown resistance to o v e r t l y ' d i r i g i s t e ' tendencies i n the EC. The more Germany's dependence on exports grew the more important the maintenance of free trade became for Bonn. Reunited Germany i s therefore committed to the achievement of the maximum degree of trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n within the internal market, and between the EU and i t s external trading partners. Closely connected to free trade i s monetary s t a b i l i t y which i s often regarded as the other prerequisite f o r Germany's successful postwar economic development. Since 1949 German governments have made every e f f o r t to sustain low l e v e l s of i n f l a t i o n and keep the mark stable. Bonn's success i n preserving monetary s t a b i l i t y has largely been attributed to the fact that the independent 'Bundesbank' has been able to follow i t s overriding objective of price s t a b i l i t y without any government interference. During the Maastricht negotiations on EMU, Germany therefore i n s i s t e d on an independent European central bank and tough convergence c r i t e r i a , which would have to be met by a l l participants before entering stage three of EMU. Bonn was nevertheless w i l l i n g to make some concessions regarding EMU, but only because i t gave p r i o r i t y to the achievement of German re u n i f i c a t i o n , and, therefore, wanted to obtain the support of the other EC members for that step. But, since the Maastricht agreements concerning EMU became public, Bonn has been facing 94 increasing domestic c r i t i c i s m , which has led the government to harden i t s stance and c l a r i f y i t s p o s i t i o n by emphasizing that i t would base i t s decision to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the f i n a l stage of EMU not on the arranged timetable but on the ful f i l m e n t of the convergence c r i t e r i a . Germany would only accept a single European currency i f i t promises to be as stable as the mark. The Federal Republic's l a s t l i m i t of acceptance of integration concerns the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y . Germany has always s t r i v e d for a f e d e r a l l y organized Europe based on the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y , and not for a unitary, c e n t r a l i z e d Europe. It has therefore t r i e d to prevent as much c e n t r a l i z a t i o n in Brussels as possible. Bonn wants the EU i n s t i t u t i o n s to exercise t h e i r powers only to the extent that the member states are unable, acting separately or i n concert, to achieve s a t i s f a c t o r i l y the same objectives. Germany has been the main proponent of enshrining the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y i n the Maastricht Treaty, and, under the pressure of the 'Lander', of granting the European regions a say i n EU matters. The creation of the Committee of the Regions was seen as a f i r s t step i n that d i r e c t i o n . After examining the Federal Republic's l i m i t s of acceptance of integration, we should now turn to the question of why Germany participated i n the process of European integration. What were the motivations for the decision to j o i n the European Communities, and to remain committed to that process? If we take a look at what Adenauer wanted to achieve for the country by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the i n i t i a l stages of European integration, the f i r s t motivation that comes into mind i s the moral r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 95 of a defeated and ostracized Germany. A true r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the country required above a l l the restoration of t r u s t among i t s neighbours who had suffered from the excesses of the 'Third Reich'. Germany's neighbours understandably wanted to have r e l i a b l e safeguards against a potential future German threat. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European integration and membership i n the evolving European organizations seemed the best way to achieve the goal of creating good re l a t i o n s with the Western neighbours and thereby reducing t h e i r fears and suspicions. Closely connected with t h i s point i s the second motivation, namely the regaining of sovereignty. Adenauer knew that the Western powers would only be w i l l i n g to grant the Federal Republic a l i m i t e d amount of sovereignty i f and when they f e l t that they could again trust the Germans. His strategy and that of every following government was therefore to surrender elements of Germany's newly gained sovereignty to Europe i n order to convince the a l l i e s that the Federal Republic could be trusted with f u l l sovereignty. This p o l i c y was very successful and Chancellor Kohl used the same strategy to achieve German re u n i f i c a t i o n i n 1990. By accelerating the process of European integration and agreeing to a German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n EMU he was able to win the support of the other EC members for Germany's u n i f i c a t i o n . That support helped i n bringing the 'Two-Plus-Four' ta l k s to a successful conclusion, and secured f u l l sovereignty for the u n i f i e d Germany through the 'Treaty on the Final 96 Settlement with respect to Germany 1. 1 1 9 Another very important motivation f o r Germany's active involvement i n the process of European integration are the economic benefits of membership i n the EC. In the e a r l y years of the Federal Republic the main goal was to abolish the r e s t r i c t i o n s that had been imposed upon Germany's postwar economy by the a l l i e d v i c t o r s . By joining the ECSC, the Federal Republic was able to abolish the a c t i v i t i e s of the International Ruhr Authority and thereby put an end to a l l i e d control over Germany's coal and steel industries. Apart from that, the stable framework provided by the l i b e r a l economic 'constitution', the EEC Treaty, and supported by e f f e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s enabled German companies to benefit from the economies of scale which the common market offered. Moreover, the Federal Republic's strategy of export-led growth rested l a r g e l y on the fact that the EC constituted the country's foremost export market. In the realm of foreign policy, Germany t r i e d to r e f r a i n from an assertive, u n i l a t e r a l approach, because of the fears of revanchism which such a p o l i c y would arouse among i t s neighbours. Since the use of t r a d i t i o n a l foreign p o l i c y methods based on the nation state was held to be inappropriate because of the Nazi past, the Federal Republic used membership i n the EC as a means to broaden i t s international r o l e . P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n regional integration seemed to provide the most appropriate framework for calming down the fears of i t s neighbours, and at the same time 1 1 9 P e t e r Ludlow, "Die deutsch-deutschen Verhandlungen und d i e 'Zwei-Plus-Vier'-Gesprache,° i n Die Vereiniqnng Deutschlands i n enropaischer Perspektive, ed. Wolfgang Heisenberg (Baden-Baden: Noios V e r l a g s g e s e l l s c h a f t , 1992), 24-26. 97 d i s c r e t e l y pursuing German foreign p o l i c y goals. After taking a look at these p a r t i c u l a r l y German motivations for p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the process of European integration and l i m i t s of acceptance of integration, we should now t r y to examine how much the more general explanations put forward i n the introductory chapter of t h i s thesis can help to explain Germany's European p o l i c y . We s h a l l thereby begin by re f e r i n g to three of the concepts l i b e r a l s have put forward to explain why states engage i n the process of regional integration, namely, growing interdependence, common values and b e l i e f s , and the information providing and transaction-cost reducing role of common international i n s t i t u t i o n s . We s h a l l then go on to assess the l i b e r a l argument that member states or domestic groups that are disadvantaged by the results of regional integration are l i k e l y to oppose such a process. After that, we s h a l l examine how well r e a l i s t explanations for a state's decision to pa r t i c i p a t e i n the process of regional integration can account for the German case. We s h a l l , thereby, begin with the argument that national p o l i t i c a l leaders are interested i n the establishment of common international i n s t i t u t i o n s as a means to strenthen t h e i r control over the domestic sphere. Second, we s h a l l l l take a look at the impact the external security environment has on a state's decision to engage i n regional integration. F i n a l l y , we s h a l l turn to the l i m i t s of acceptance of integration put forward by the r e a l i s t /intergovernmentalist school of thought: f i r s t , nationalism, which i s mentioned as an obstacle to supranational u n i f i c a t i o n , and second, 'high p o l i t i c s ' areas, such as foreign policy, defence, and monetary 98 policy, i n which integration i s u n l i k e l y to occur. The l i b e r a l or f u n c t i o n a l i s t school of thought has put forward the argument that growing interdependence motivates states to p a r t i c i p a t e i n regional integration. This argument i s generally applicable to the German case. But, the Federal Republic's behaviour with regard to that argument i s rather d i s t i n c t i v e , i n that Bonn has a c t i v e l y sought to increase interdependence between the European states. This was due to the fact that Germany believed that only a mutual functional interconnection between the West European states would be able to provide the new state with the necessary internal and external s t a b i l i t y . Membership i n the EC has ensured prosperity and, thereby, the well-being of the West German population which i n turn s t a b i l i z e d the newly established l i b e r a l democratic order of the country. Moreover, increasing co-operation and integration has made armed c o n f l i c t s between EC/EU member countries rather u n l i k e l y , and has promoted regional security and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . This i n turn has helped Germany to foster a favourable environment i n Western Europe for i t s export industry. Therefore, in contrast to most states, which view the fact that growing interdependence results i n a loss of sovereignty as a negative outcome, the Federal Republic views t h i s as a rather p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of interdependence. Since the new West German state has had only a very l i m i t e d amount of sovereignty to begin with, growing interdependence and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n regional integration has resulted i n more and not less sovereignty and influence for the country. Germany's p o l i t i c a l 'power' r e l i e s on the fac t that i t 99 has become an indispensable part of t h i s interdependent environment. It i s therefore very much interested i n expanding t h i s interdependent environment into the Eastern part of the continent in order to ensure a stable economic and p o l i t i c a l development of the Central and Eastern European countries. Bonn sees t h i s as a necessary step i n order to preserve i t s own prosperity and s t a b i l i t y . Liberals maintain that states often base t h e i r decision to engage i n regional integration on the existence of a set of common values and b e l i e f s . In postwar Germany, the Adenauer government promoted German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of West European integration as a means to anchor Western values, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, i n the West German population. Chancellor Adenauer was convinced that a moral, p o l i t i c a l , and economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the country was only possible i f the Federal Republic would share the values of the Western world. This p o l i c y was very successful. It helped to transform the Federal Republic of Germany into a t r u l y 'Western' country, that i s now tr y i n g to e s t a b l i s h the same values i n the Eastern part of the nation and even across i t s Eastern borders. The fact that according to a f u n c t i o n a l i s t argument states are interested i n creating common i n s t i t u t i o n s , because they reduce transaction costs and provide more and better q u a l i t y information to the members, can c e r t a i n l y explain why any country might be interested i n further integration, but i t does not shed any new l i g h t on the German case. Regarding the l i m i t s of acceptance of integration. 100 l i b e r a l s / f u n c t i o n a l i s t s point to possible d i s s i m i l a r preferences among member states concerning the a l l o c a t i o n of benefits. Member states or domestic groups that are disadvantaged by the results of regional integration are, therefore, l i k e l y to oppose i t . Applied to the German case, we have to say that on the one hand Bonn remains committed to further European integration despite occasional c o n f l i c t s over the a l l o c a t i o n of benefits and es p e c i a l l y over the amount of contributions to the EU budget, because the gains i n p o l i t i c a l , economic, and security terms are considered as greatly outweighing the disadvantages, but on the other hand Germany's l i m i t s of acceptance of integration are influenced by the l e v e l of domestic opposition to c e r t a i n r e s u l t s of EU p o l i c i e s . Examples are the opposition of industry and business to any ' d i r i g i s t e ' tendency i n the EC/EU, the opposition of the 'Bundesbank' to any EMU arrangement that would endanger the s t a b i l i t y of the mark or of the future s i n g l e European currency, and the demands of the 'Lander' to be involved i n EU decision-making and to ensure that Brussels adheres to the p r i n c i p l e of s u b s i d i a r i t y . One of the motivations realists/intergovernmentalists put forward to explain why nation states might be w i l l i n g to engage i n regional integration refers to the autonomy of national p o l i t i c a l leaders. National governments, according to that explanation, accept the establishment of common i n s t i t u t i o n s only insofar as they strengthen the control national p o l i t i c a l leaders have over the domestic sphere, thereby enabling them to reach goals otherwise unachievable. This explanation can only account in part for the German experience. While almost a l l German 101 governments and Chancellors t r i e d to use the EC/EU to increase t h e i r authority v i s - a - v i s domestic groups and, e s p e c i a l l y , the 'Lander', the decentralized structure of the Federal Republic, characterized by a dispersion of power between the d i f f e r e n t t i e r s of government, both v e r t i c a l l y between the federal government and the 'Lander', and h o r i z o n t a l l y among the federal-l e v e l i n s t i t u t i o n s , prevented any attempt at concentrating power in the Chancellor's O f f i c e . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l autonomy of the 'Bundesbank' and the prevalence of c o a l i t i o n governments have been further obstacles i n that regard. Furthermore, when the i n i t i a l decision to engage i n the process of European integration was made, Chancellor Adenauer's control over the domestic sphere was already quite strong. Strengthening the control of national p o l i t i c a l leaders over the domestic sphere has, therefore, not been an important motivation for Germany to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the process of European u n i f i c a t i o n . 1 2 0 Another r e a l i s t explanation puts forward the external security environment as the main reason for regional integration. While the more general statement that European co-operation has been larg e l y the re s u l t of b i - p o l a r i t y refers to a l l founding members of the ECSC and the EC, the fact that the United States of America decided a f t e r World War II that i t could not afford to ignore a weakened Europe had special importance for the future of Germany, the country that was most deeply affected by the ensuing cold war. In order to contain Soviet power, the United States encouraged West European co-operation and integration. The f i r s t 1 2 0 B n l m e r and Paterson, 18. 102 step i n that d i r e c t i o n was the Marshall plan assistance, which was of great importance for the reconstruction of West Germany. As a resu l t of the cold war the United States' thus became interested i n a economically strong and p o l i t i c a l l y stable West German state. American presence i n Western Europe, both p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y , helped to a l l e v i a t e French fears of a resurgent Germany. The p o l i c y of containment and American hegemony i n Western Europe, therefore, supported the economic, p o l i t i c a l , and l a t e r m i l i t a r y r e v i v a l of West Germany.121 The external security environment was an important motivation for Bonn to accelerate the process of European integration in 1989/90. By making concessions during the Maastricht negotiations and thereby ensuring a far-reaching agreement towards European u n i f i c a t i o n , Germany was able to convince i t s partners that i t was s t i l l interested i n maintaining s t a b i l i t y i n Europe and remaining integrated into the West. It also helped to reassure Germany's neighbours that the now bigger Federal Republic would not t r y to re e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a great m i l i t a r y power and return to a p o l i c y of swinging back and fo r t h between East and West.122 Realists claim that the question, why a now reunited and f u l l y sovereign Germany s t i l l remains committed to European 1 2 1 L a n k o s s k i , 2-3; and Joseph S. Nye and Robert 0. Reohane, 'The United States and I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe a f t e r the Cold War," i n A f t e r the Cold War: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s and State S t r a t e g i e s i n Europe, 1989-1991, ed. Robert 0. Reohane and Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), 104. 1 2 2 J e f f r e y J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany i n a Post-Cold War Europe,' i n A f t e r the Cold Bar: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s and State S t r a t e g i e s i n Europe, 1989-1991, ed. Robert 0. Reohane and Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), 31-33. 103 integration, can be answered by the 'concept of balancing' and the 'binding t h e s i s ' . According to these concepts Germany may accept binding, because i t believes that although the strengthening of EU i n s t i t u t i o n s may reduce i t s influence to some extend, i t would not prevent the country from defending i t s important interests i n Europe. Another possible reason i s Japan's growing economic power. In order to develop a more e f f e c t i v e balancing c o a l i t i o n against Japan, Bonn might be ready to accept l i m i t a t i o n s on i t s influence i n Europe. F i n a l l y , according to these concepts, Germany has accepted binding i n the issue area of monetary union, because i t feared that i t s European partners might turn inward and return to more p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i f there would not have been any further progress made towards European union. Nevertheless, these two concepts are not very well suited to account for Germany's distinctiveness, although they might be useful i n explaining the behaviour of Germany' s partners. 1 2 3 Turning to l i m i t s of acceptance of integration put forward by the realist/intergovernmentalist school of thought, Hoffmann mentions 'nationalism' as one of the main obstacles to supranational u n i f i c a t i o n . This obstacle has been eliminated i n postwar Germany. As has been explained e a r l i e r , Germany's defeat i n World War II and the collapse of the Nazi ideology, which had led the country into war, defeat, and destruction, resulted i n a complete d i s c r e d i t of nationalism. Even today, f i f t y years a f t e r the end of World War II, there i s s t i l l no sign of a resurgent 1 2 3 G r i e c o , 338. 104 nationalism i n Germany. We should now turn to a l i m i t of acceptance of integration that i s central to the r e a l i s t view. Hoffmann maintains that nation-states would give up sovereignty only i n 'low p o l i t i c s ' areas, which include the economic and welfare issues that were at the s t a r t i n g point of European integration. But, integration would be impossible i n 'high p o l i t i c s ' areas, such as foreign p o l i c y , defence, and monetary p o l i c y . States are, according to Hoffmann, generally unwilling to give up sovereignty in p o l i c y areas that are associated with national security and prestige out of a fear of becoming dependent on t h e i r partners. We can use Hoffmann's concept to answer the question why Germany seems to be a rather d i s t i n c t i v e case when compared to the United Kingdom or France. In order to explain the German case, though, we have to make ce r t a i n adjustments to t h i s concept. We, therefore, propose a 'modified r e a l i s t ' view to account for Germany's l i m i t s of acceptance of integration. F i r s t , the 'high p o l i t i c s 1 areas Hoffmann mentions do not exactly cover the German 'high p o l i t i c s ' areas. There are three 'principles' on which Germany's negotiating stance i s tougher than on other issues; they are free trade, monetary s t a b i l i t y , and subsidiarity/federalism. These three 'principles' are regarded to have been essential for the successful p o l i t i c a l and economic development of the Federal Republic. Bonn, therefore, wants to see these 'principles' f i r m l y established i n the European Union. Second, Germany i s , nevertheless, w i l l i n g to give up sovereignty i n these 'high p o l i t i c s ' areas, but only i f 105 the new European i n s t i t u t i o n s and regulations resemble the German i n s t i t u t i o n a l and administrative structure. The reason for that i s that the Federal Republic wants to extend frameworks that have proven economically e f f e c t i v e and p o l i t i c a l l y accountable i n dealing with problems at the domestic l e v e l , to the l e v e l of the EU. We, therefore, have to turn to a h i s t o r i c a l explanation of the Federal Republic's d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s . West Germany's p o l i t i c a l and economic structure was created i n the e a r l y 1950s. These formative years also saw the Federal Republic's integration into the West and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the process of European u n i f i c a t i o n . West Germany's successful economic and p o l i t i c a l development was therefore seen as a r e s u l t of these two interconnected processes. Moreover, Germany's disastrous prewar hist o r y combined with more than f o r t y successful years i n an in t e r l o c k i n g network of international i n s t i t u t i o n s led the Federal Republic away from t r a d i t i o n a l conceptions of the importance of state-sovereignty. It i s therefore not surprising that Germany attributes a higher p r i o r i t y to m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m and supranationalism than the United Kingdom or France. This might also explain why the Federal Republic i s more interested i n absolute gains, and does not view gaps i n gains as a serious obstacle for integration. As Foreign Minister Kinkel has pointed out, the well-being of France, the United Kingdom, or the United States i s c r u c i a l f o r Germany's own well-being. 1 2 4 1 2 4 A n d e r s o n and Goodman, 62; and Bulmer and Paterson, 8; and K i n k e l (1995), 94. 106 BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Jeffrey, and John B. Goodman. Mars or Minerva? A United Germany i n a Post-Cold War Europe. 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Powerful but integrationist : German behaviour regarding European integration
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