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Boston, Alexander Holtby
Master of Arts - MA
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I plan to examine and defend Strawson's argument in "Freedom and Resentment" against various criticisms from Downie, Russell, Ayer, Watson, and Nagel. Strawson holds that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible, exploring people's feelings and attitudes to make the case that people neither can nor should give up reactive attitudes, whether or not determinism is true. I will use Wolf and Dennett to supplement Strawson's argument, and examine Bennett's paper to see whether certain modifications of Strawson's view are necessary. Using character improvement as its foundation, I will offer an account of responsibility compatible with Strawson's argument and thus with determinism. I will rely on Dennett's concept of the ability to act and Taylor's idea of reflective identification with one's actions to construct my account.
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AN ANALYSIS OF STRAWSON'S DEFENCE OF MORAL PRACTICES AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF DETERMINISM by ALEXANDER HOLTBY BOSTON B.A.(Hon), The University of Saskatchewan, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in The Faculty of Graduate Studies Department of Philosophy We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1995 (c) Alexander Holtby Boston, 1995 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) 11 I plan to examine and defend Strawson's argument i n "Freedom and Resentment" against various c r i t i c i s m s from Downie, Russell, Ayer, Watson, and Nagel. Strawson holds that moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and determinism are compatible, exploring people's fee l i n g s and attitudes to make the case that people neither can nor should give up reactive attitudes, whether or not determinism i s true. I w i l l use Wolf and Dennett to supplement Strawson's argument, and examine Bennett's paper to see whether c e r t a i n modifications of Strawson's view are necessary. Using character improvement as i t s foundation, I w i l l o f f e r an account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y compatible with Strawson's argument and thus with determinism. I w i l l r e l y on Dennett's concept of the a b i l i t y to act and Taylor's idea of r e f l e c t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with one's actions to construct my account. I l l TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i i i Acknowledgement v Chapter I: Introduction 1 Chapter I I : Strawson's Argument i) The Basic Dispute 5 i i ) Personal Reactive Attitudes 8 i i i ) The Moral Reactive Attitudes 14 iv) The Threat of Science 19 Chapter I I I : I n i t i a l Objections i) R.S. Downie's Objections 25 i i ) Paul Russell's Objections 28 Chapter IV: Replies to the I n i t i a l Objections i) A Defence of the Voluntary Objective Attitude 35 i i ) Strawson's R a t i o n a l i s t i c and N a t u r a l i s t i c Strategies 43 i i i ) A Token-Naturalistic Defence of Self-Reactive Attitudes 45 iv) A Token-Naturalistic Defence of the Other Reactive Attitudes 50 v) A Defence of our R a t i o n a l i t y 56 Chapter V: Ayer's Cri t i q u e i) P r e d i c t a b i l i t y and Determinism 66 i i ) Science and the Objective Attitude 70 i i i ) The A p p l i c a b i l i t y of Desert 73 Chapter VI: Watson's P a r t i a l D e f i n i t i o n of Res p o n s i b i l i t y i) The Global Excuses Taken I n d i v i d u a l l y 78 i i ) The Unfortunate Childhood 85 i i ) L i v i n g Counterexamples: Ein s t e i n , Gandhi, and King 88 Chapter VII: Bennett's Attempt to Define R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i) Minor Additions to Strawson's Theory . 99 i i ) The D i f f i c u l t y of Defining the Reactive Attitudes 101 i i i ) The Objective Attitude and Te l e o l o g i c a l Inquiry 104 iv) Interpersonal Relations and the Reactive Attitudes 107 Chapter VIII: On "Moral Luck" i v i) Variable Consequences and Moral Tests 113 i i ) Character, Attitudes and Contra-Causal Freedom 119 i i i ) Christian-Kantian Thought 124 Chapter IX: Responsibility i) Reactive Attitudes and R e f l e c t i o n 130 i i ) The Basis of our Excuses 132 i i i ) Why we want Responsibility 138 iv) Minor Objections 139 v) On Freedom 141 Chapter X: Conclusion 149 Bibliography 152 V I would l i k e to thank Dr. E a r l Winkler, whose c r i t i c i s m and encouragement helped me to t r y harder. In addition, I am gr a t e f u l to Dr. Catherine Talmage for her assistance. I am also indebted to I r i s Winston, Stewart Boston and David W. New, whose e d i t i n g s k i l l s helped to make t h i s thesis readable. I gave a t a l k formed from part of chapter IV at a Philosophy Department Graduate Student Colloquium at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia on Dec. 5, 1994, and am g r a t e f u l to those who attended, p a r t i c u l a r l y Paul Russell, Adam Constabaris, Richard Johns, Michael Fleming and Alan Richardson, f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l comments. 1 Chapter I: Introduction For centuries, philosophers have pondered the problem of free w i l l . Most people do not worry about t h i s problem. They simply hold themselves and others responsible for actions that according to common sense are f r e e l y chosen. Yet some people believe that free w i l l i s an i l l u s i o n , and that, since moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y depends upon free w i l l , i t too i s an i l l u s i o n . They assert that f o r any supposedly free action there are causes, which have other causes, and so on. This chain of causation extends backward beyond the b i r t h of the agent, placing these early causes well beyond her contro l . Because of t h e i r b e l i e f i n such a causal chain, these people are determinists. They are also incompatibilists, since they believe that t h i s causal chain makes free w i l l and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y impossible. Other people think that free w i l l e x i s t s . They hold that human beings can make choices which are not wholly determined by any temporally extended causal chain. These people are indeterminists because they deny unbroken causal continuity i n the f i e l d of human action. Yet they do not consider human choices to be random. These people are also incompatibilists because they too believe that causal continuity makes morality impossible. Because of t h e i r b e l i e f i n some form of contra-causal free w i l l they are l i b e r t a r i a n s . A t h i r d group opposes the incompatibilism of both the previous groups. They are compatibilists, and they believe that 2 free w i l l , or at le a s t moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i s compatible with causal explanation of human action. Usually, compatibilists argue for the s o c i a l usefulness of holding people morally responsible. Incompatibilists f i n d t h i s u t i l i t a r i a n account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to be unsatisfying. P.F. Strawson defends a compatibilist p o s i t i o n i n h i s paper "Freedom and Resentment."1 His approach, however, i s d i f f e r e n t from that of most other compatibilists. Strawson r e f r a i n s from any d i r e c t discussion of the thesis of causal determinism. Instead, he begins with an account of c e r t a i n emotional attitudes, c a l l e d reactive attitudes, which people are prone to take i n reaction to the actions or attitudes of others. He then investigates whether the legitimacy of these reactive attitudes, which express feelings associated with holding people responsible, are threatened i n any way by the possible t r u t h of determinism. He argues that t h e i r legitimacy remains i n t a c t and then extends t h i s argument to include the s p e c i f i c a l l y moral reactive attitudes. I believe that Strawson's account provides a solu t i o n to the problem of moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n a determined world. This problem i s the major component of the more general issue of free w i l l and determinism. I w i l l elaborate Strawson's approach i n chapter I I . In chapters III-V I w i l l r a i s e and address various c r i t i c i s m s of Strawson's compatibilist view. These c r i t i c i s m s usually come in two forms. The f i r s t form of c r i t i c i s m i s that Strawson f a i l s to 3 show adequately that reactive attitudes would p e r s i s t i f b e l i e f i n determinism became widespread. The second i s that reactive attitudes are i r r a t i o n a l i f determinism i s true. I believe that Strawson's p o s i t i o n can be defended against both c r i t i c i s m s . In chapters VT-VTII I w i l l examine possible consequences of Strawsonian compatibilism. I w i l l also investigate various attempts to define r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i s o l a t i n g a few elements which should be excluded from i t s d e f i n i t i o n . In chapter IX, I w i l l give my own d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and show how i t f i t s within Strawson's view. Like Strawson's account of reactive attitudes, my d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s compatible with determinism. Strawson's a r t i c l e i s worth reading f o r anyone who believes i n determinism and yet thinks moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s something more than an i l l u s o r y device to control people's behaviour within society. Strawson helps to a l l e v i a t e concerns which compatibilists might have about the apparent i r r a t i o n a l i t y of holding such seemingly disparate views. 4 1. Strawson, P.F. "Freedom and Resentment" i n Studies i n the Philosophy of Thought and Action: 1968 B r i t i s h Academy Lectures. P.F. Strawson, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 71-96. 5 Chapter I I : Strawson's Argument i) The Basic Dispute P. F. Strawson s t a r t s by confessing ignorance about what determinism i s . 1 I o f f e r the following d e f i n i t i o n f o r the reader. Without going into e x p l i c i t d e t a i l , one desc r i p t i o n of determinism i s that every event, including every human action, i s caused by other events, which i n turn are caused by others, and so on. The chain of causation extends backwards u n t i l the beginning of time ( i f there i s one) or i n d e f i n i t e l y ( i f there i s not). Strawson does not require an e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n of determinism. Since one can portray determinism roughly, Strawson notes that, i f a coherent and true thesis of determinism exi s t s , then, according to i t s d e f i n i t i o n of determinism, all human behaviour i s determined. 2 Many people claim to know what determinism i s , and Strawson examines t h e i r p r i n c i p l e arguments. He b r i e f l y mentions the "genuine moral sceptics," who hold that, whether or not determinism i s true, concepts such as moral blame, moral g u i l t and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are confused and thus inapplicable. But Strawson mainly concerns himself with a debate between the "optimists," who hold that these concepts and t h e i r associated practices, such as punishment and moral condemnation, have a place i n a determined world, and the "pessimists," who hold that determinism renders moral concepts inapplicable, and the practices associated with them u n j u s t i f i e d . 3 The labels "optimist" and "pessimist" are Strawson's. 6 S c i e n t i s t s are adept at finding causes for events, making some form of determinism p l a u s i b l e . 4 Yet, most people would regard the loss of our moral concepts and practices as undesirable. Strawson therefore c a l l s those who believe determinism to be incompatible with applicable moral concepts pessimistic, and those who hold the opposite view op t i m i s t i c . The better to analyze the debate between these views, Strawson renders the optimist's viewpoint formally: "(1) the facts as we know them do not show determinism to be f a l s e ; (2) the facts as we know them supply an adequate basis for the concepts and practices which the pessimist f e e l s to be imperilled by the p o s s i b i l i t y of determinism's t r u t h . " 5 The optimist supposes that moral concepts and practices are v a l i d i n a wholly determined world. She notes how powerfully punishment, moral condemnation and approval can regulate the behaviour of an i n d i v i d u a l i n s o c i a l l y desirable ways. Moritz Schlick, f o r example, supports t h i s view: "Punishment i s an educative measure, and as such i s a means to the formation of motives, which are i n part to prevent the wrongdoer from repeating the act (reformation) and i n part to prevent others from committing a si m i l a r act ( i m i t a t i o n ) . " 6 Thus, the optimist holds that moral concepts are v a l i d because they help to control people's behaviour for the benefit of society. But Strawson's pessimist says that the optimist's account i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to ground the morality of these pr a c t i c e s . For punishment to be just and not merely useful, for condemnation to be moral and not merely b e n e f i c i a l , people must have moral g u i l t . 7 This requires moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which requires freedom, which i n turn requires that determinism be f a l s e . The optimist responds that freedom and determinism are s t i l l compatible, i f one defines freedom negatively. The optimist notes that negative freedom requires the absence of c e r t a i n external and in t e r n a l conditions, such as compulsion by others, physical r e s t r a i n t s , and insanity. I t also requires the absence of various forms of ignorance or accidents with respect to the agent. For example, i f Jane imagines a piece of paper to be some rubbish and tosses out a friend's winning l o t t e r y t i c k e t , she i s excused from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because of her ignorance. In the presence of such ignorance, punishment or condemnation cannot be expected to have any desirable e f f e c t on the regulation of Jane's behaviour. 7 To be held responsible, she must be free of a l l of the above conditions. But to the pessimist, t h i s form of freedom i s not enough. In addition to the absence of ce r t a i n excusing conditions, freedom requires a genuine i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the w i l l with the act. 8 The optimist allows for t h i s , and says that a person can have reasons for acting, decide to act because of these reasons, and do just as she wants to do. She thus i d e n t i f i e s her w i l l with the act. This i s part of the facts as we know them, and s t i l l allows for the p o s s i b i l i t y of determinism. 9 The optimist can even allow the p o s s i b i l i t y that the agent could have performed a d i f f e r e n t action - provided she had so w i l l e d . 1 0 But given a l l causal antecedents exactly as they were - which include everything about her 8 background, make-up and p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n - the optimist would hold that the agent could not have w i l l e d other than she d i d . 1 1 The pessimist r e p l i e s that, for those cases i n which negative freedom i s present, the only j u s t i f i c a t i o n the optimist gives for moral practices i s t h e i r e f f i c a c y i n regulating behaviour. This seems to most people to be an i n s u f f i c i e n t basis f o r moral p r a c t i c e s . 1 2 There i s more to morality than the manipulation of others f o r s o c i a l purposes. The pessimist requires that the agent somehow could have acted d i f f e r e n t l y i n her actual s i t u a t i o n , exactly as she was and exactly as i t was. So, as the debate now stands, we can side e i t h e r with the optimist, who says that most people simply must revise t h e i r understanding of the basis of moral practices, or with the pessimist. I f the l a t t e r , we must either, l i k e the sceptics, give up any attempts to j u s t i f y moral practice, or else t r y to formulate a kind of contra-causal freedom that requires the f a l s i t y of determinism. This sort of freedom i s d i f f i c u l t to define coherently, e s p e c i a l l y since one wants i t to be not just a d e s c r i p t i o n of random events but a basis f o r morality. 1 3 i i ) Personal Reactive Attitudes A l l of t h i s i s f a m i l i a r . What Strawson does i s not. He gives the optimist another view of the foundation of moral practices - a view consistent with determinism, but s a t i s f y i n g the pessimist's demand to j u s t i f y moral concepts as more than devices of s o c i a l regulation. 9 Yet, Strawson does not discuss moral practices immediately. He f i r s t speaks of "the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal f e e l i n g s and reactions depend upon, or involve, our b e l i e f s about these attitudes and inte n t i o n s . " 1 4 To use a v a r i a t i o n of Strawson's example, although the physical pain i s s i m i l a r whether Albert steps on Susan's hand accidentally, or with malicious intent, Susan w i l l f e e l "a kind and degree of resentment" i n the l a t t e r case absent from the former. 1 5 Even when no s p e c i f i c harm i s done, a person w i l l t y p i c a l l y f e e l resentment towards another's display of h o s t i l i t y , as when someone i s rude or i n s u l t i n g . We demand some form of goodwill or consideration i n our interactions with others. The form t h i s demand takes w i l l vary with the re l a t i o n s h i p , as w i l l the kind and degree of our feelings towards those who show or f a i l to show goodwill. 1 6 Reactive attitudes are reactions toward the attitudes and intentions of others or ourselves. To understand reactive attitudes better, Strawson focuses on resentment. Resentment i s a personal reactive attitude, that i s , a reaction to the attitudes of others towards oneself. Because i t i s personal, i t i s not i n the same category as moral indignation or g u i l t . Yet, Strawson f e e l s that by examining t h i s cousin of the moral reactive attitudes, we w i l l make better i n i t i a l progress, since the f i e l d of personal reactive attitudes, unlike that of moral reactive attitudes, i s uncluttered with moral t h e o r i e s . 1 7 10 Strawson examines the situations i n which we f e e l resentment, and the sp e c i a l considerations which l i m i t or cancel t h i s f e e l i n g . He divides these considerations into two broad categories. F i r s t , there are such excuses as accident or ignorance, which s t i l l permit us to view the antagonist f u l l y as an agent. These considerations remove or l i m i t feelings of resentment towards an agent; we see the agent as wholly or p a r t i a l l y excused f o r the injury she caused. Yet although these excuses may r e s t r a i n our resentment towards the agent i n t h i s case, we s t i l l may f e e l reactive attitudes towards the agent i n general. Thus, such considerations "...do not suggest that the agent i s i n any way an inappropriate object of that kind of demand f o r goodwill or regard which i s r e f l e c t e d i n our ordinary reactive attitudes. They suggest instead that the fac t of injury was not i n t h i s case incompatible with that demand's being f u l f i l l e d , that the f a c t of injury was quite consistent with the agent's attitude and intentions being j u s t what we demand they should be." 1 8 On the other hand, Strawson's second category contains excuses that cause us to view the agent i n a new l i g h t . Strawson subdivides these excuses into two groups: those which excuse short-term conditions, and those which excuse long-term, even l i f e l o n g , conditions. An example of the f i r s t sort i s a man under an excessive amount of stress, of whom one could say, "He was not himself" i f he should commit an injury while stressed. Our resentment against the injury he causes i s li m i t e d . We usually do not have to encounter the person when he i s under so much stress, and thus we " s h a l l not f e e l resentment against the man he 11 i s for the action done by the man he i s not." 1 9 This excuse w i l l be examined i n chapter VI. The second sort of circumstance i s important for Strawson's argument. The excuses found within t h i s group d i s q u a l i f y a person from being viewed as a responsible agent. They protect c e r t a i n people, such as small children and the insane, from blame. When t h i s sort of excuse i s made for someone, we are asked to suspend i n d e f i n i t e l y a l l reactive attitudes towards her, including resentment. Instead, we revert to what Strawson c a l l s the "objective a t t i t u d e . " 2 0 For instance, when Mary takes the objective attitude towards Jane, Jane i s seen not as a complete person, but to some extent as an object. Although Mary might f e e l emotions such as p i t y or fear towards Jane, Mary w i l l f e e l neither resentment nor any other reactive at t i t u d e . Mary could consider Jane to be an "object of s o c i a l p o l i c y , " or "a subject for...treatment," but could not be involved i n a f u l l y human re l a t i o n s h i p with her. 2 1 The objective a t t i t u d e "...cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to f e e l r e c i p r o c a l l y , for each other. I f your attitude towards someone i s wholly objective, then though you may f i g h t him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may t a l k to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel, or to reason, with him." 2 2 Strawson notes that, i n addition to cases i n which we na t u r a l l y take the objective attitude, we can v o l u n t a r i l y take i t towards normal people. We can use h i s resource, as Strawson puts 12 i t , to r e l i e v e the pressures of personal involvement, or as an aid to government or i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y . When we so t r e a t responsible agents, however, we are never e n t i r e l y successful, nor can we r e t a i n the attitude for long. 2 3 Since we can choose to take either the objective or the reactive attitudes towards normal people, can or should a b e l i e f i n determinism cause us to give up our personal reactive attitudes? This i s the c r u c i a l question that Strawson answers next. He looks f i r s t at the cases i n which reactive attitudes are lim i t e d or eliminated, s t a r t i n g with the agent whose capacity for normal interpersonal r e l a t i o n s i s not i n general lim i t e d , someone who acted through ignorance, accident, or other exceptional circumstance. Strawson notes that a b e l i e f i n determinism does not explain the l i m i t a t i o n of resentment i n t h i s sort of case. For, obviously, determinism does not e n t a i l that a l l the i n j u r i e s that agents generate f a l l into t h i s category. People could s t i l l bear malice. Total lack of malevolence "would not be a consequence of the reign of universal determinism, but of the reign of universal goodwill." 2 4 The second case of taking the objective attitude applies when the other i s seen not to be a responsible agent at a l l . For instance, she may be a c h i l d , or have a severe psychological abnormality. Strawson notes that i t cannot be a r e s u l t of determinism that we are a l l constantly under abnormal stresses, that we are a l l psychologically abnormal to the point of incapacity, or that we are a l l c h i l d r e n . 2 5 13 F i n a l l y , Strawson looks at the cases i n which we v o l u n t a r i l y adopt the objective attitude towards normal people. I f determinism i s true, can or should we take the objective attitude towards others at a l l times? In answer to whether we could, Strawson notes that although i t i s not l o g i c a l l y inconsistent to suppose t h i s , i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y inconceivable that we be able to give up our reactive attitudes permanently. Even a widespread b e l i e f i n determinism would not be enough to overcome our strong commitment to the ordinary interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s that make human society human.26 In addition, Strawson notes that when we do take the objective attitude towards someone, whether abnormal or normal, i t i s not because of some b e l i e f i n determinism. We always have other reasons, as l i s t e d above. Determinism, which a f f e c t s a l l people i f i t a f f e c t s any, does not provide a reason f o r taking the objective attitude towards p a r t i c u l a r people. 2 7 A f t e r saying that human beings almost c e r t a i n l y cannot take the objective attitude towards a l l people a l l the time, Strawson t r i e s to answer the question of whether, i f determinism holds, we r a t i o n a l l y should take the objective attitude towards everyone. At t h i s point, Strawson posits f i r s t that our commitment to interpersonal attitudes i s part of the general framework of human l i f e . Although we can judge p a r t i c u l a r cases within i t , we cannot assess t h i s entire framework as r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . 2 8 Consequently, whereas we can decide on the r a t i o n a l i t y of resenting a p a r t i c u l a r person for a p a r t i c u l a r action, we cannot 14 judge i f the general d i s p o s i t i o n to f e e l resentment and other reactive attitudes i s r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . This d i s p o s i t i o n i s something we are simply given with human l i f e as we know i t . Second, Strawson states that even i f we could step outside ourselves and judge whether or not interpersonal reactive attitudes as a whole are r a t i o n a l , such a judgement would have to be based, not on the truth or f a l s i t y of determinism, but on instrumental reasoning concerning the enrichment or impoverishment of human l i f e . 2 9 i i i ) The Moral Reactive Attitudes Strawson shows that our personal reactive attitudes, such as resentment, are independent of considerations of determinism and that we would not necessarily be more r a t i o n a l to allow i t s truth to a f f e c t them. He then turns to the moral reactive attitudes. These are often f e l t on behalf of a t h i r d party but can be f e l t on one's own behalf, considering oneself as a member of the moral community. For instance, although John may resent B i l l ' s punching him i n the nose, he would not resent B i l l ' s punching a t o t a l stranger. Rather, he would be morally indignant with B i l l for punching the stranger. Nevertheless, John could simultaneously f e e l resentment for B i l l ' s punching him and moral indignation that B i l l would punch anyone. Strawson c a l l s the category of reactive attitudes that includes moral indignation the vicari o u s analogues of personal reactive a t t i t u d e s . 3 0 I w i l l c a l l these the vicarious reactive attitudes for the sake of convenience. 15 Strawson also mentions a t h i r d type of reactive attitude, c a l l e d the s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes. G u i l t , shame, and some forms of pride f a l l into t h i s category, f o r they are a l l attitudes associated with the demands one makes of oneself towards others 3 1 (and occasionally towards oneself). Although s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes are also moral reactive attitudes, Strawson focuses upon the vic a r i o u s reactive a t t i t u d e s . 3 2 The three types of reactive attitudes - personal, vicarious and s e l f - r e a c t i v e - are, i f not e s s e n t i a l l y connected, at least humanly linked. Strawson has d i f f i c u l t y imagining a person having one or two types of these attitudes without the other(s). T h e o r e t i c a l l y there could be moral s o l i p s i s t s 3 3 who have no vicario u s reactive attitudes, or some strange form of saints with no personal reactive attitudes. Perhaps there are some psychopaths with only personal reactive attitudes, and only some of those. Yet these indiv i d u a l s are "f a r below or f a r above the l e v e l of our common humanity" and thus out of Strawson's scope. 3 4 Next, Strawson looks at the excuses we make f o r people i n connection with the vicarious reactive attitudes. Like the personal reactive attitudes, t h e i r vicarious analogues involve a demand f o r some kind of regard from the person towards whom they are directed, although t h i s regard i s t y p i c a l l y demanded on behalf of another instead of oneself. S i m i l a r l y , the two types of excuses that wholly or p a r t i a l l y i n h i b i t resentment and other personal reactive attitudes also wholly or p a r t i a l l y i n h i b i t the vica r i o u s reactive attitudes, and i n the same way. One minor 16 difference Strawson notes i s that, since we are not as personally involved, when we excuse a person because she i s not f u l l y an agent, we put more emphasis on her lacking moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 3 5 Furthermore, we can v o l u n t a r i l y adopt the objective attitude i n moral cases, j u s t as we can i n the personal cases. Yet, the motives to do so are fewer, since i n moral cases, as opposed to personal cases, we lack the st r a i n s of personal involvement from which we need to seek r e l i e f . 3 6 Strawson draws further p a r a l l e l s . As with the personal reactive attitudes, when we suspend our moral reactive attitudes we never do so because of a b e l i e f that the action i n question i s determined. We cannot conclude from determinism that everyone i s always ignorant of the consequences of her actions, or always acts accidentally, or i s psychologically abnormal, or i s a c h i l d , or i s incapable of g u i l t . 3 7 In addition, Strawson notes that since the personal and moral reactive attitudes are very much interconnected i n human society, the f a i l u r e of personal reactive attitudes to decay despite b e l i e f i n determinism suggests that moral reactive attitudes would also survive. That i s , we are probably as incapable of l i v i n g without moral reactive attitudes as we are personal reactive attitudes, regardless of b e l i e f i n determinism. As to whether i t i s more r a t i o n a l to adopt the objective attitude i n moral cases, Strawson submits that, j u s t as with personal reactive attitudes, moral reactive attitudes as a whole cannot be brought up for r a t i o n a l review. Furthermore, i f we 17 could somehow choose whether or not to have them, our c r i t e r i a used would again be pragmatic and instrumental and have nothing to do with determinism. 3 8 To show further that the objective attitude i s unrelated to determinism, Strawson uses examples of a c h i l d and a p s y c h i a t r i c patient. In these cases, the parent or p s y c h i a t r i s t takes not a wholly but a p a r t i a l l y objective attitude, which shades into normal reactive attitudes as the c h i l d grows or the patient heals. The p a r t i a l l y objective attitudes i n these two cases have nothing to do with determinism. 3 9 I f determinism does or should have an e f f e c t on our taking the objective attitude, i t would require us to take i t , not p a r t i a l l y or towards a few people, but f u l l y and towards everyone. F i n a l l y , Strawson returns to the dispute between the optimist and the pessimist. The pessimist i s unhappy with the optimist's view, which holds that morality makes sense under determinism s o l e l y because of the desirable s o c i a l consequences of regulating behaviour. Strawson sees a reason for t h i s unhappiness. In keeping with t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of morality, the optimist seems to suggest an o b j e c t i v i t y of attitude towards a l l people at a l l times. People are regarded as subjects f o r control and treatment. But the optimist, by taking (or rather, by implicating) the objective attitude even towards actions that meet the conditions of negative freedom, ignores the moral dimension i t s e l f , namely the moral emotions and a t t i t u d e s . 4 0 "A thoroughgoing o b j e c t i v i t y of attitude, excluding as i t does the moral reactive attitudes, 18 excludes at the same time e s s e n t i a l elements i n the concepts of moral condemnation and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 4 1 Moreover, when we p a r t i a l l y withdraw our goodwill, which we usually do when we f e e l negative reactive attitudes, we do not exclude the offender from our moral community, as we would i f we took the objective attitude. On the contrary, we continue to view her as a member of the moral community, only as a v i o l a t o r of that community's rules. This presents a basis for punishing offenders. Although we may hope that such punishment has a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t i n preventing future transgressions, i t i s the withdrawal of goodwill entailed by our reactive attitudes, and not the u t i l i t y of punishment, that i s es s e n t i a l to understanding the morality of punishment. 4 2 Thus, to apply moral concepts and j u s t i f y moral practices, we must examine the "web of attitudes and feel i n g s which form an es s e n t i a l part of the moral l i f e as we know i t , and which are quite opposed to o b j e c t i v i t y of a t t i t u d e . " 4 3 The optimist should modify her reasons for permitting morality i n a determined world. In turn, the pessimist should concede that both the personal and the moral reactive attitudes are compatible with determinism, and, therefore, that morality i s compatible with determinism. Strawson's argument bridges the gap between the optimist and the pessimist. 4 4 Even the moral sceptic, whom Strawson excludes from h i s main argument, can benefit from i t . The sceptic sees that the "one-eyed u t i l i t a r i a n i s m " of the optimist i s inadequate to explain what 19 people mean by morality, and yet that the pessimist's descriptions of counter-causal freedom seem u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , and d i f f i c u l t to r e l a t e to morality. Thus, to the sceptic, moral concepts are inherently confused. But Strawson's moral reactive attitudes provide an i n t e l l i g i b l e basis for moral concepts and practices that covers a l l that people mean by morality. Thus, the sceptic may comfortably give up scepticism as r e a d i l y as the pessimist may give up pessimism. 4 5 iv) The Threat of Science After presenting h i s argument, Strawson answers some objections to i t from the s c i e n t i f i c quarter - or, at least, from philosophers with pessimistic interpretations of s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s . F i r s t , d i f f e r e n t human s o c i e t i e s have d i f f e r e n t expressions of human reactive attitudes. A joke i n one culture might be a h o r r i b l e i n s u l t i n another. Thus some might object that i t i s ethnocentric to say that a l l s o c i e t i e s have reactive attitudes. S t i l l , there i s no human society that completely lacks a l l forms of reactive attitudes. Such a society might not even be i n t e l l i g i b l e to us. Thus, Strawson can i n s i s t that reactive attitudes are basic to human so c i e t y . 4 6 Second, i t i s perhaps true that some manifestations of our reactive attitudes are symptoms of our unconscious u n f u l f i l l e d desires, or of other unconscious processes, and so are untrustworthy as moral guides. Strawson answers that our reactive a t t i t u d e s ' having causes does not in v a l i d a t e t h e i r 20 appropriateness. 4 7 To point out that diamonds are merely compressed coal does not make them less b e a u t i f u l to look at. Furthermore, I would add that i t seems u n l i k e l y that a l l our reactive attitudes have unconscious rather than conscious causes. Therefore, many of our reactive attitudes are untouched by t h i s objection. The t h i r d objection arises from how s c i e n t i s t s study humanity. They can detach themselves from t h e i r subjects, and the s c i e n t i f i c method has led to the modification of some aspects of our reactive attitudes. S c i e n t i s t s discovered, for example, that diseases have a b i o l o g i c a l o r i g i n and not a divine one, and are, therefore, not divine punishments for e v i l deeds. Some believe that such discoveries w i l l eventually destroy our reactive attitudes. S t i l l , philosophers must take a l l f a c t s into account. The s c i e n t i f i c observer i s also human, and thus i s not completely separate from her reactive attitudes. Strawson thinks i t extremely u n l i k e l y that "our progressively greater understanding of c e r t a i n aspects of ourselves w i l l lead to the t o t a l disappearance of those aspects." 4 8 He does allow that i t i s not e n t i r e l y inconceivable, however. To conclude, Strawson agrees with the optimist that moral concepts are applicable and moral practices are j u s t i f i a b l e , even i f determinism holds. Nevertheless, although these moral practices help to regulate the beifaviour of offenders, and although i f c e r t a i n moral practices are i n e f f e c t i v e , we may modify those practices, the optimist should keep i n mind that these 21 practices are expressions of our moral attitudes, indeed of our humanity i t s e l f , and not mere regulatory devices. "Our practices do not merely e x p l o i t our natures, they express them".49 I t i s only by understanding t h i s that we can understand why our moral practices are e f f e c t i v e . When we look at the system of reactive attitudes from which these moral concepts and practices originate, we can understand why our moral concepts have meaning beyond pragmatic usefulness, and why our moral practices are both j u s t i f i e d and e f f e c t i v e . 5 0 22 1. Strawson, P.F. "Freedom and Resentment" i n Studies i n the Philosophy of Thought and Action; 1968 B r i t i s h Academy Lectures. P.F. Strawson, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 71. 2. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 80. 3. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 71. 4. I w i l l ignore possible random events on the quantum l e v e l . 5. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 72. 6. Schlick, Moritz, "When i s a Man Responsible?" i n Free W i l l and Determinism. Bernard Berofsky, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 60. E a r l i e r printed i n Problems of Ethics. David Rynin, trans. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), as chapter VII, 143-158. 7. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 72-3. 8. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 73. Strawson a c t u a l l y phrases i t as "a genuinely free i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the w i l l with the act", but I do not wish to use the word "freedom" i n the d e f i n i t i o n of freedom and omit the word. 9. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 73. 10. G.E. Moore, Ethics. (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), chapter 6, 212. 11. Schlick, 62. 12. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 74. 13. The f i r s t of these views i s known as s o f t determinism, and i s held by Schlick, Hobbes, Hume and others. The second of these views i s known as hard determinism, and i s held by Paul Edwards, Schopenhauer, Freud and others. The l a s t of these views i s known as li b e r t a r i a n i s m , and i s held by CA. Campbell, Roderick Chisholm, and others. "Hard and Soft Determinism" by Paul Edwards, New York University, has more detailed comparison of the two types of determinism. His paper was apparently given at the 1957 American Philosophical Association meeting. Unfortunately, no further information about where the paper was printed, i f anywhere, i s currently a v a i l a b l e . 14. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 75. 15. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 75. 16. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 76. 23 17. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 75. 18. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 77-8. 19. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 78. 20. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 81. 21. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 79. Of course, one might be rel a t e d to the person i n question without having the sort of r e l a t i o n s h i p that Strawson describes. For instance, one might have a daughter whose mental deterioration i s such that she cannot be considered a responsible agent, and one cannot be involved i n a c e r t a i n type of r e l a t i o n s h i p with her, since that type of re l a t i o n s h i p would require one to have reactive attitudes towards her. I believe that Strawson c a l l s t h i s type of r e l a t i o n s h i p a human r e l a t i o n s h i p because only humans are capable of i t , although not a l l humans are. 22 . Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 79. 23 . Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 80. 24. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 81. 25. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 81. 26. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 82. 27. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 83. 28. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 84. 29. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 84. Strawson adds i n the footnote on t h i s page that i n a sense we would be more r a t i o n a l creatures i f we were guided s o l e l y by the objective attitude, but that " i t would not necessarily be r a t i o n a l to choose to be more purely r a t i o n a l than we are". But i n "P. F. Strawson Replies", Philosophical Subjects. Zak van Straaten, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 261, he makes clear that he meant r a t i o n a l i n two d i f f e r e n t ways i n that sentence. That i s , i t would not necessarily be i n our r a t i o n a l (pragmatic) interests to choose to be more purely r a t i o n a l (emotionless, or r a t i o c i n a t i v e ) than we are. 30. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 85. 31. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 86. 32. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 89. Although Strawson does not include s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes within moral reactive attitudes i n h i s o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e (See Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 93), he does do so i n a l a t e r a r t i c l e ("P.F. Strawson Replies", 24 266) . 33. Solipsism i s the view that the only thing one can be sure of i s one's own existence. Thus a s o l i p s i s t holds that the r e s t of the world i s i l l u s o r y . A moral s o l i p s i s t , therefore, holds that she alone i s e n t i t l e d to resent how others t r e a t her and that she alone i s e n t i t l e d to f e e l g u i l t at how she treats others. She f e e l s no moral indignation at how others t r e a t others, since i f the action does not s p e c i f i c a l l y involve her i n some way, i t i s not r e a l to her. 34. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 86. 35. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 88. 36. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 88. 37. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 88. 38. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 89. 39. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 90-1. 40. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 91-2. 41. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 92. 42. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 93. 43. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 93-4. 44. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 94. 45. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 95. 46. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment 95-1 One could put a number of psychopaths on an otherwise unpopulated i s l a n d and observe what they did, and t h i s would be a society of a sort. I doubt that such a society would be recognizably human, or that i t would l a s t f o r long. 47. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 96. 48. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 96. 49. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 96. 50. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 96. 25 Chapter I I I : I n i t i a l Objections Strawson does not concern himself with an exact d e f i n i t i o n of determinism, and argues that whether determinism i s true or f a l s e i s not relevant to morality. Strawson examines the excuses that cause us to disengage our reactive attitudes i n c e r t a i n cases or towards c e r t a i n people. He shows that an all-encompassing the s i s such as determinism gives us no reason to take the objective attitude towards everyone. This i s because our entire emotional framework cannot come up for r a t i o n a l review. Thus, i t cannot be judged i r r a t i o n a l . Furthermore, even i f we had such a reason, we would be unable to give up our reactive attitudes completely. Thus we neither can nor should give them up in toto, even i f determinism i s true. Strawson faces heavy c r i t i c i s m from R.S. Downie and Paul Russell. He dismisses too quickly, according to Downie, the importance of the metaphysical question of whether or not determinism i s true. According to Russell, Strawson f a i l s to argue successfully that, i f determinism i s true, we cannot or should not overcome our tendency to hold reactive attitudes. i) R.S. Downie's Objections Downie looks at the excuses that i n h i b i t reactive attitudes, s p e c i f i c a l l y the excuses that cause us to take the objective attitude, and believes that they have a common element. " I t i s tempting to say that what promotes the objective attitudes i s the b e l i e f that the operation of these factors renders the behaviour 26 open to s u f f i c i e n t explanation i n causal terms." 1 Strawson t a l k s of r e s o r t i n g to the objective attitude when one considers a person to be a subject for treatment and control, and t h i s seems relevant to Downie's proposal: control and treatment are not useful unless they have a causal e f f e c t . 2 Since to think of something i n causal terms i s by some d e f i n i t i o n s of determinism to place i t within a determined system, Downie believes that Strawson u n f a i r l y undermines the pessimist's p o s i t i o n . When Strawson says that we can v o l u n t a r i l y take the objective attitude towards normal people, he implies that we can explain normal behaviour i n causal terms, just as we can that of abnormal people. He further implies, therefore, that a l l people are determined. Thus Strawson no longer merely argues that determinism might be true; rather, he already assumes determinism's truth i n a premise of h i s compatibilist argument. Downie objects to t h i s sneaking i n of determinism. He thinks that i t implies that the reactive attitudes are reducible to the objective a t t i t u d e . That i s , one can always ignore the agency of a person, and the reasons or intentions she gives f o r her actions, and instead take the objective attitude to determine the " r e a l " cause. Furthermore, Downie holds that the objective and reactive attitudes are not simultaneously j u s t i f i a b l e . I f someone's actions are explicable i n causal terms, i t i s appropriate to take the objective a t t i t u d e . I t i s therefore inappropriate to take the reactive attitudes. I f we can take the objective attitude towards anyone at a l l , then everyone's actions 2 7 are explainable i n causal terms; so, i t i s inappropriate to take the reactive attitudes towards anyone. I f Downie i s correct, then determinism, i f true, a f f e c t s the appropriateness, or r a t i o n a l i t y , of taking the reactive a t t i t u d e s . 3 What i s appropriate i s not always possible, however, and Downie allows that Strawson may be r i g h t to say that i t i s impossible for human beings to do without reactive attitudes. Downie even agrees that, i f we had the choice, i t might not be desirable to give up the reactive attitudes. Nevertheless, Downie holds that despite what i t may be r a t i o n a l to do, the metaphysical point of what i s r a t i o n a l to oelieve i f determinism i s true i s important. 4 I f Strawson assumes determinism and r e l i e s on t h i s assumption i n h i s compatibilist argument, then the metaphysical point i s not argued, but, rather, s e t t l e d a r b i t r a r i l y . 5 In defence of the l i b e r t a r i a n viewpoint, Downie gives an al t e r n a t i v e description of Strawson's cases of v o l u n t a r i l y taking the objective attitude. Downie holds that Strawson uses the word "objective" ambiguously. When he uses i t to describe involuntary adoption of the objective attitude, i t seems to mean the severing of our human relationships with that attitude's object. Yet, i n voluntary cases, we do not take the objective attitude, but rather a cool reactive attitude. This attitude i s impartial and detached, but regards i t s object as a f u l l y responsible human being; thus, i t i s a reactive attitude, a l b e i t at the cool end of the emotional s c a l e . 6 A judge deciding a court case takes t h i s a t t i t u d e ; to take the objective attitude would be morally 28 objectionable. 7 Thus, Downie explains our occasional voluntary detachment from people without assuming the t r u t h of determinism, as he believes Strawson does. Strawson apparently f a i l s to answer the pessimist. Downie's account of voluntary detachment does not imply determinism, as Strawson's apparently does. Therefore, Downie holds that Strawson has i n s u f f i c i e n t l y argued for the r a t i o n a l i t y of b e l i e v i n g that we are morally responsible beings, i f determinism holds. Nevertheless, Downie allows that, from a pragmatic point of view, i t i s r a t i o n a l for us to act as morally responsible beings, whether determinism i s true or not. i i ) Paul Russell's Objections Paul Russell y i e l d s much less to Strawson. He believes that Strawson f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h that i t i s r a t i o n a l , even i f determinism i s true, to act as i f we are morally responsible beings. He also believes that Strawson f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of abandoning the reactive attitudes. Russell divides Strawson's arguments into the r a t i o n a l i s t i c and the n a t u r a l i s t i c . The r a t i o n a l i s t i c argument i s meant to answer the pessimist's complaint that determinism's t r u t h i s incompatible with morality, and, thus, gives us reason to r e j e c t the reactive attitudes. The n a t u r a l i s t i c argument i s meant to show that, even i f we had a reason to r e j e c t the reactive attitudes, we are unable to do so. Russell believes that Strawson's arguments i n t e r f e r e with one 29 another. Since the n a t u r a l i s t i c argument holds that no amount of evidence for our moral incapacity can enable us to r e j e c t our reactive attitudes, the r a t i o n a l i s t i c argument, which asserts that we are not morally incapacitated, seems superfluous. 8 This i s a minor point, however, and Russell finds larger problems within each of the two arguments. Strawson declares i n h i s n a t u r a l i s t i c argument that we are unable to eliminate our reactive attitudes. Russell believes that t h i s i s because these attitudes, l i k e fear, are emotional reactions. Whereas instances of these emotional reactions may be inappropriate, anyone who claims that the d i s p o s i t i o n to have an emotion i s i t s e l f inappropriate attempts to judge an emotional framework externally, an attempt at which people are doomed to f a i l . People can only make in t e r n a l judgements of the times when a c e r t a i n emotion i s unsuitable. Therefore, we are psychologically stuck with emotions such as fear and the reactive attitudes. Russell believes that t h i s argument i s an instance of type-naturalism, which asserts that we cannot give up our capacity to f e e l emotions. The argument counters a type-pessimist, who holds that the general b e l i e f i n determinism and i t s consequences would cause us to lose our reactive attitudes. A pessimist of another sort, however, accepts the type-naturalist's claims. She agrees that we cannot give up our s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to resentment and gratitude any more than we can give up our s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to fear. Nonetheless, she notes that we are able to judge and give up an 30 emotion i n p a r t i c u l a r instances when we r e a l i z e that i t i s inappropriate. She concludes that we are also able to give up every instance of a reactive attitude towards every person, should we discover that a l l human beings are parts of a determined world. This i s the argument of the token-pessimist. I f we became immune (or better s t i l l , r e a l i z e d that we had always been immune) to a l l dangers, we would cease to f e e l instances of fear, although r e t a i n i n g the capacity for i t . So, too, we could give up a l l instances of resentment, gratitude, or any other reactive attitude i f we discovered determinism to be true. We would r e t a i n the capacity for such emotions, but they would never be used. 9 Russell believes that there are counterarguments to the token-pessimist. The f i r s t points out that i n numerous instances, emotions are warranted. This i s true of fear. Yet, i t i s not true of the reactive attitudes, i f determinism's t r u t h morally incapacitates everyone. The other counterargument, the token-n a t u r a l i s t ' s , i s that no argument of the pessimist could cause us to give up instances of f e e l i n g any of our emotions or, at least, the emotions that the token-naturalist wishes to defend. This argument does not seem persuasive enough to defend the necessity of our f e e l i n g fear. Russell maintains that he can conceive a s i t u a t i o n i n which we would f e e l no more fear. By analogy, Russell argues that i f the token-pessimist i s correct, then a general b e l i e f i n determinism would cause us to stop f e e l i n g any reactive attitudes; everyone would count as a case of moral incapacity, which requires resort to the objective a t t i t u d e . 1 0 31 Thus, type-naturalism does not address the token-pessimist's concerns, and token-naturalism i s not convincing. Russell next c r i t i c i z e s Strawson's r a t i o n a l i s t i c argument. Russell believes that t h i s argument, i f sound, adequately defends our r e t a i n i n g the reactive attitudes. The argument purports to show that i t i s a mistake to hold that determinism e n t a i l s that everyone i s morally incapacitated. The argument i n s i s t s that those cases i n which we i n v o l u n t a r i l y take the objective attitude have nothing to do with the implications of determinism. Strawson states that we must resort to the objective attitude when "...the agent i s seen as excluded from ordinary adult r e l a t i o n s h i p s by deep-rooted psychological abnormality - or simply by being a c h i l d . But i t cannot be a consequence of any t h e s i s which i s not i t s e l f s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y that abnormality i s the universal condition." 1 1 Russell examines those cases i n which, because we do not consider a person to be an agent, we excuse her of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Strawson's argument i s that psychological abnormality cannot by d e f i n i t i o n be true of everyone; yet i f determinism's t r u t h were the reason for t h i s abnormality, then the abnormal would be universal and we would have a l o g i c a l contradiction. Russell points out that i t i s not because psychological abnormality i s abnormal that we r e j e c t the psychologically abnormal as agents. Rather, i t i s because the abnormality i s some form of incapacity, which merely happens to be abnormal. I t i s conceivable that most or a l l people could become morally incapacitated, such as from a 32 widespread mental i l l n e s s ; t h i s would make moral incapacity normal. Strawson's contention that the notion of widespread abnormality i s incoherent does not address the p o s s i b i l i t y of widespread incapacity. 1 2 The token-pessimist argues that, i f determinism holds, moral incapacity i s unive r s a l . Thus, i f Strawson means that i t i s incoherent to say that an abnormality i s normal, then the token-pessimist w i l l agree, but the incapacity she i s t a l k i n g about, i f i t ex i s t s , i s no abnormality. I f , on the other hand, Strawson i s merely s t a t i n g that we do not i n common practice draw the l i n e between agency and nonagency such that i t w i l l exclude everyone from agency, then the token-pessimist w i l l reply that t h i s i s because most people believe i n free w i l l . They either r e j e c t determinism or f a i l to see that i t s consequences preclude free w i l l ' s p o s s i b i l i t y . The token-pessimist believes that the l i n e would be redrawn to exclude a l l people from agency i f enough people both believed i n determinism and r e a l i z e d i t s consequences. The token-pessimist seems to be unchallenged. Strawson's r a t i o n a l i s t i c argument i s unconvincing, and h i s n a t u r a l i s t i c argument does not apply to her. Determinism might e n t a i l that a l l people are incapacitated, and people might give up t h e i r reactive attitudes because of a b e l i e f i n determinism. Furthermore, Russell believes that Strawson's argument that human beings cannot r a t i o n a l l y suppress t h e i r emotions even when they r e a l i z e the facts i s disturbing. Russell thinks that Strawson's n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy 33 "casts doubt upon our a b i l i t y or capacity to curb or control our emotional l i f e according to the dictates of reason...[The strategy] i n v i t e s us to accept or reconcile ourselves to reactive attitudes...even i n circumstances when we have reason to repudiate them."13 Strawson holds that i f we were able to judge our reactive attitudes as a whole, we would consider whether they enriched or impoverished our l i v e s , as opposed to worrying over determinism. 1 4 Russell opposes the optimist's b e l i e f that, i f determinism e n t a i l s complete moral incapacity, i t would be more enriching to hold reactive attitudes towards people than to l i v e i n accordance with the f a c t s . 1 5 Russell holds that i t i s possible to have good reasons to give up the reactive attitudes. A token-pessimist values l i v i n g i n accordance with the facts, and she believes that determinism e n t a i l s moral incapacity for a l l . Since Strawson's arguments do not convince her, she argues that, i f determinism holds, we can and r a t i o n a l l y should give up our moral reactive attitudes altogether. Downie and Russell seem to show that Strawson's argument has f a i l e d i n i t s compatibilist aims. The schism between the pessimist and the optimist has opened up once more. Fortunately, i t can be repaired. 34 1. Downie, R.S., "Objective and Reactive Attitudes" i n Analysis vol.27 no.2 (new series no.116), Dec, 1966, 34. 2. Downie, 33-4. 3. Downie, 34-5. 4. Downie, 36. 5. Downie, 36. 6. Downie, 37. 7. Downie, 38. 8. Russell, Paul, "Strawson's Way of Naturalizing R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " i n Ethics 102, Jan., 1992, 91. 9. Russell, 294. 10. Russell, 294-5. 11. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 81. 12. Russell, 299. 13. Russell, 297. 14. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 84. 15. Russell, 300, footnote 15. 35 Chapter IV: Replies to the I n i t i a l Objections 1 i) A Defence of the Voluntary Objective Attitude I f i r s t address the concerns of R.S. Downie, who believes that Strawson has i m p l i c i t l y assumed determinism. According to Downie, the a b i l i t y to explain behaviour i n causal terms i s an e s s e n t i a l prerequisite for the objective a t t i t u d e . I f i t i s possible to take the objective attitude v o l u n t a r i l y towards anyone at a l l , everyone's behaviour becomes causally explicable. We must look c l o s e l y at t h i s l i n e of reasoning. When we t r y to control or t r e a t those toward whom we take the objective attitude, we make predictions about how they w i l l react, basing our guesses on our knowledge of a person, of people relevantly l i k e them, or even of people i n general. Sometimes the objects of our attitude w i l l f o i l our guesses, acting unpredictably and inexplicably. We are by no means as accurate i n our predictions of human action as i n our calculations of the p o s i t i o n of an o r b i t i n g comet. More importantly, determinism does not have to be true i n order for predictions to be useful. I f determinism i s f a l s e , and people enjoy contra-causal freedom, i t i s s t i l l possible to predict t h e i r actions roughly. Libertarianism does not e n t a i l that people's actions are t o t a l l y unpredictable. For instance, i f someone chooses chocolate ice cream over v a n i l l a one hundred times i n a row, one may be able to guess f a i r l y accurately that she w i l l choose s i m i l a r l y the next time. This guess could be wrong. Nevertheless, we do not become 36 more accurate predictors i f determinism holds. Even should determinism be true, the causes of our actions are diverse and complex. The best we can do i s make educated guesses, or, for large groups, s t a t i s t i c a l analyses. Too many factors can a f f e c t a person's actions to allow completely accurate predictions, given the l i m i t a t i o n s of the human mind and, indeed, of any computer made of matter. Nevertheless, we make reasonably accurate predictions whether we l i v e i n a deterministic or indeterministic world. When Strawson introduces the voluntary objective attitude, he i s not assuming determinism. 2 People are, at best, only p a r t i a l l y successful i n explaining another's behaviour. And i f determinism i s f a l s e , we can s t i l l guess someone's l i k e l y actions i n a given s i t u a t i o n . To avoid the supposedly deterministic implications of Strawson's objective attitude, Downie introduces the cool reactive a t t i t u d e . With t h i s attitude a judge can control h i s passions and decide a divorce case i n a disi n t e r e s t e d fashion, while s t i l l considering the people involved to be free and responsible. I agree that people can take a cool reactive a t t i t u d e . I think that Strawson would allow the introduction of cooler and hotter reactive attitudes as a gauge of emotional involvement. Nevertheless, i n addition to cases of the cool reactive sort, cases that f i t the voluntary objective model remain. For instance, a p o l i t i c i a n can choose to forget about t r e a t i n g people as people f o r a moment i n order to consider whether a new law 37 w i l l control crime, or increase her popularity. She thus considers how the law w i l l motivate and influence people. She contemplates people's possible actions. She does not concern her s e l f with t h e i r feelings except insofar as they w i l l a f f e c t her constituents' actions. Another example i s someone who uses pick-up l i n e s i n bars i n order to get dates. Here, the only e f f e c t considered i s how to influence others with c e r t a i n s t i m u l i to a t t a i n desired ends. When taking the objective attitude, we consider a person's deliberations and decisions to act to be unimportant, except instrumentally; we focus on how to make her behave as we desire. For predic t i o n and control purposes, i t i s ir r e l e v a n t whether the responses are generated by people or by objects. This indicates the voluntary objective attitude rather than the cool reactive attitude. Therefore, while Downie's cool reactive attitude adds an in t e r e s t i n g new perspective on reactive attitudes, i t does not replace voluntary cases of the objective atti t u d e . Since the objective attitude i s not t i e d to determinism, the voluntary objective attitude now be l i e s Downie's view that taking the objective attitude renders the reactive attitudes inappropriate. One can switch between the voluntary objective attitude and the reactive attitudes towards normal people, depending on one's focus. The two types of att i t u d e have d i f f e r e n t purposes, but to adopt one does not make i t wrong to take the other. F i n a l l y , Downie believes that, no matter what i s possible for 38 people, or even what i t i s pragmatically r a t i o n a l f o r people to do, what we r a t i o n a l l y believe concerning metaphysical f a c t i s s t i l l important. Determinism's possible t r u t h i s more relevant than Strawson thinks. We can examine these issues i n two ways. Either determinism should r a t i o n a l l y have some e f f e c t on why we consider people free and responsible beings, or i t should not. Strawson believes the l a t t e r . He holds that the framework of our reactive attitudes i s not up for external r a t i o n a l review. I f no reason e x i s t s for determinism to a f f e c t how we consider ourselves, then the question of determinism becomes purely i n t e l l e c t u a l . On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , our moral concepts and practices, and our b e l i e f s about ourselves as morally responsible beings, are not affected, nor should they be. Let us assume, however, that determinism necessitates that we are other than free and responsible beings. In t h i s case, whatever u t i l i t a r i a n reasons we possess to r e t a i n our reactive attitudes, we are not l i v i n g i n accordance with the metaphysical f a c t s . Because of t h i s , we seem to have a reason to change our attitudes towards ourselves. Thus, people are i n some sense not e n t i r e l y r a t i o n a l i f they believe i n determinism and yet maintain reactive attitudes towards themselves. This seems to be Downie's concern. Susan Wolf addresses t h i s concern i n "The Importance of Free W i l l " . 3 Wolf agrees that i f determinism both i s true and provides a metaphysical reason to give up our reactive attitudes, f a i l i n g 39 to do so w i l l leave unrealized the value of l i v i n g i n accordance with the f a c t s . Wolf holds, however, that even i f determinism holds and implies that we are unfree and unresponsible, we have "no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings" 4 (emphasis hers). Thus, we leave no value unrealized i n r e t a i n i n g our reactive attitudes. Nothing i s l o s t . Wolf considers a v a r i e t y of cases. F i r s t , she looks at a drug addict who cannot stop taking a drug. To avoid c i r c u l a r i t y , we assume i n t h i s case that most people are free and responsible beings, whether t h i s requires indeterminism or not. The addict may be content i n h i s addiction, or he may t r y everything i n h i s power to stop taking the drug. He i s not free to r e s i s t taking the drug. Both we and the addict himself, however, consider him to be free and responsible i n h i s attitudes. Perhaps he approves of h i s drug taking and wishes to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t . On the other hand, he may be an unwilling addict who f e e l s compelled to take the drug and, therefore, accepts no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for taking i t . Whatever attitude he takes, we would consider him to be free and responsible at least i n making the claim that he does or does not wish to take the drug and i n accepting or r e j e c t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for taking i t . This i s what i t means to say that he asserts h i s freedom as an attitude-taker by adopting an a t t i t u d e towards hi s drug-taking, though he i s unfree as a drug-taker . 5 On the other hand, i f determinism i s true, and i f t h i s e n t a i l s that we are a l l unfree and unresponsible, then Wolf 40 postulates that we should consider ourselves to be l i k e robots. We would lack control over not only each of our actions but also each of our apparent choices. I f so, the pessimist argues, we should, to be r a t i o n a l , take the objective attitude towards everyone, including ourselves. But doing t h i s w i l l not help us r e a l i z e the value of l i v i n g i n accordance with metaphysical f a c t . This i s because " i n taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not free or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings" 6 (emphasis hers). In taking an attitude, a person affirms that she i s free and responsible, at l e a s t with respect to attitude-taking, even as she declares that she i s not. In making a judgment, she declares that her judgement matters, and that she i s responsible f o r the judgement. In e f f e c t , she separates o f f a part of herself, which remains free and responsible, and then disclaims r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the r e s t . By saying, "I am not responsible for any of my actions," she presupposes the existence of an " I " who i s divorced from her actions, yet responsible for denying r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r those actions. Determinism may e n t a i l that nobody i s at a l l free and responsible. Yet, i n implying that we are not responsible beings, i t also implies that we are not responsible even insofar as we are attitude-takers. Therefore, we are no more r a t i o n a l to take one sort of attitude towards ourselves than another. Both contradict the idea that we are completely unfree and unresponsible. 7 We have a t h i r d choice besides taking the objective attitude 41 towards everyone and holding the reactive attitudes: we might cease to have any attitudes at a l l . We would make no judgements about anyone's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or lack thereof. Thus, we would not af f i r m our freedom or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by making judgements. Of course, f o r us to do t h i s i s as impossible as i t i s to take the objective attitude at a l l times, but the issue we must decide here i s whether i t i s r a t i o n a l for us to give up a l l our attitudes, reactive and objective. If we d i d surrender a l l our attitudes, we would have to change how we perceive ourselves dramatically. Obviously, we would have to give up notions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and desert. We would also have to give up ideas of what ought to be, since t h i s would lead to what ought to be done (by oneself or others), which would i n turn lead to the notion of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We would stop thinking of some things as being better than others i n any normal sense. Values would be no more than desires. "We would lose our ide a l s , our senses of s e l f , and...our status as persons." 8 Even given these i l l consequences, do we have any reason to l i v e i n accordance with the facts? Wolf thinks not, even a f t e r she takes into account that people often wish to l i v e , not i n a world of comforting i l l u s i o n s , but i n the "Real World." 9 We seem to have only two reasons to l i v e i n accordance with the f a c t s . F i r s t , we possess a desire to "get things r i g h t . " Yet, i f we give up taking any attitude towards anything, we also give up such value-concepts as r i g h t and wrong. By doing t h i s , we leave ourselves no r i g h t way to l i v e . We remain with our value 42 of getting things r i g h t unrealized, because the abandonment of our attitudes e n t a i l s the abandonment of t h i s value. 1 0 Our second reason to l i v e i n accordance with metaphysical f a c t i s that we "want ourselves to matter i n the r i g h t sort of way, to make the r i g h t sort of difference to the world and the beings who do matter and to whom we might matter." 1 1 But i f determinism i s true and e n t a i l s that we are not free and responsible beings, then i t s e f f e c t s are universal. By abandoning a l l attitudes towards everyone, we eliminate a l l values. The r e s u l t of t h i s i s that no beings would matter, and so, we could not "make the r i g h t sort of difference" to any "beings who do matter and to whom we might matter." Thus, we cannot r e a l i z e the goal of mattering by giving up a l l attitudes. By these arguments Wolf shows that we have no reason to give up a l l of our at t i t u d e s . 1 2 Wolf counters Downie's argument that metaphysical facts concerning determinism can provide any reason to give up our reactive attitudes. She shows that determinism r a t i o n a l l y should not a f f e c t our conception of ourselves as free and responsible beings. The truth or f a l s i t y of determinism once more remains a matter of mere i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e r e s t ; i t has no e f f e c t upon the r a t i o n a l i t y of moral practices and concepts. This answers the l a s t of Downie's objections. Thus, although we can adopt the voluntary objective attitude towards others without presupposing determinism, we would not be more r a t i o n a l to give up the reactive attitudes, even i f determinism i s true. 43 i i ) Strawson's R a t i o n a l i s t i c and N a t u r a l i s t i c Strategies Russell's objections are harder to answer. To begin with, there i s an apparent c o n f l i c t between Strawson's r a t i o n a l i s t i c and n a t u r a l i s t i c strategies. The r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy argues that determinism f a i l s to e n t a i l moral incapacity. I t shows that determinism i s wholly unrelated to our reasons fo r giving up our reactive a t t i t u d e s . 1 3 The n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy, on the other hand, argues that i t i s psychologically impossible f o r us to give up a l l reactive attitudes "even i f some general t r u t h were a t h e o r e t i c a l ground for i t " . 1 4 Since Strawson's r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy argues that determinism provides no reason f o r us to give up our reactive attitudes, does he undercut h i s own n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy? Does the r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy imply that we can give up our reactive attitudes i f determinism provides a t h e o r e t i c a l ground to do so? I think not. F i r s t , the r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy maintains only that determinism has nothing to do with the excuses that cause us to give up our reactive attitudes i n v o l u n t a r i l y . I t says nothing about our v o l u n t a r i l y giving up these attitudes i f we f e e l that determinism warrants i t . By showing that, when we excuse people of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action, we do not use determinism as a basis f o r the excuse, Strawson simply disconnects determinism from our actual practice and i t s grounds. If he f a i l s to do t h i s , then h i s n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy becomes more d i f f i c u l t . I t would be harder f o r him to argue that people are incapable of giving up the reactive attitudes altogether i f an excuse that currently 44 causes us to give up our reactive attitudes had determinism as i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t would s t i l l be possible to accept the n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy. This strategy argues against our giving up the reactive attitudes completely, rather than only when we face one of the common excuses people use. But i f such an excuse i s motivated by determinism, then, given determinism's u n i v e r s a l i t y , we seem a r b i t r a r i l y to excuse some people but not others. I t makes the n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy more compelling i f determinism i s independent of any such excuses. This r e s t r i c t s any force determinism possibly has to cases i n which we v o l u n t a r i l y give up the reactive attitudes or to some excuse never before used. We can hold the objective attitude towards normal people f o r a short time only. Strawson's n a t u r a l i s t i c argument therefore becomes more believable. We can more e a s i l y believe i t to be psychologically inconceivable due to a b e l i e f i n determinism that we can permanently give up our reactive attitudes, since our voluntary attempts to give them up are of such short duration, and a l l known excuses that cause us to give them up are unrelated to determinism. The n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy does not require the r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy to succeed, but the l a t t e r helps to make the more controversial n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy more credible. Therefore, f a r from the r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy implying that the n a t u r a l i s t i c strategy i s somehow flawed, I believe that the former helps support the l a t t e r . 4 5 i i i ) A Token-Naturalistic Defence of Self-Reactive Attitudes A more serious threat to Strawson's argument i s Russell's account of token-pessimism. Russell's token-pessimism i s compatible with type-naturalism. Token-naturalism states that we cannot permanently give up a l l instances of c e r t a i n emotions, such as the reactive attitudes, even i f determinism gives us a reason to do so. Russell disagrees with the token-naturalist and believes that we can give up a l l instances of the reactive attitudes. In response, I w i l l show that token-naturalism i s true with respect to the reactive attitudes. F i r s t , we must review the l e v e l s of token-pessimism. At the l e v e l of events a token-pessimist says that a person i s free and responsible except i n respect to a l l her actions. Such a proposed agent seems very strange. She has free w i l l , but t h i s w i l l i s not a causal factor i n any of her actions. I t would be trapped inside her. She would be a puppet on s t r i n g s , unable to a f f e c t what her body does i n any way. This disconnection between one's w i l l and one's actions i s highly implausible, but at l e a s t does not require a person to take the objective attitude towards h e r s e l f . The token-pessimist would continually excuse a l l such people of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for harmful actions, just as we occasionally excuse people because of accident or ignorance. Yet Russell does not argue that a b e l i e f i n determinism w i l l make us see every harmful action as an accident, or the r e s u l t of coercion by another agent, or the r e s u l t of ignorance, etc. To paraphrase Strawson, t h i s would not r e s u l t from a b e l i e f i n determinism, but from universal 46 goodwill towards others. 1 5 Rather than argue at t h i s l e v e l , Russell places the tokens of token-pessimism at the l e v e l of people: "[The token-pessimist] claims only that we can and must cease to entertain reactive attitudes toward any and a l l in d i v i d u a l s who are morally incapacitated [ i f determinism i s t r u e ] . " 1 6 According to the token-pessimist, we must r e t a i n the p o t e n t i a l f o r having reactive attitudes, but we can and should cease ever to hold these a t t i t u d e s 1 7 once we r e a l i z e that everyone i s morally incapacitated. By f i r s t looking at the personal reactive attitude of resentment, Strawson i n d i r e c t l y argues against our a b i l i t y to give up our moral reactive attitudes. I too w i l l i n d i r e c t l y argue that we cannot cease e n t i r e l y to engage our moral reactive attitudes. I w i l l s t a r t by examining the s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitude of g u i l t . 1 8 We sometimes excuse ourselves from f e e l i n g g u i l t for an action despite the harm i t did. The f i r s t type of excuse, including ignorance, coercion, and accident, allows us to r e t a i n our status as free and responsible beings. The second group of excuses consists of global excuses and i s more d i f f i c u l t to apply to oneself. We may excuse ourselves g l o b a l l y f o r c e r t a i n actions i f we acted while s u f f e r i n g a short-term psychological i l l n e s s , or while under severe stress. Determinism, however, supposedly e n t a i l s a more permanent excusing condition: i f i t necessitates that we are morally incapacitated, i t proves that we are always so. Thus, according to token-pessimism, although r e t a i n i n g the 47 p o t e n t i a l to f e e l g u i l t , a determinist would cease forever to hold that s e l f - r e a c t i v e emotion. Since the s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes apply only to whoever has them, a token-pessimist holds that g u i l t has only one token, the s e l f . The token-pessimist maintains that a person who believes determinism i s true and e n t a i l s her own moral incapacity retains the p o t e n t i a l to f e e l g u i l t . Nonetheless, such a person can cease altogether to entertain feelings of g u i l t towards herself, since she believes herself to be unresponsible. Thus, she "can and must" excuse from g u i l t the only person towards whom she could f e e l g u i l t y , namely he r s e l f . Wolf has shown that there i s no reason for us to take the objective attitude towards ourselves. Yet, whether we have reasons for i t or not, can we do so? Wolf's argument does not show i t any less r a t i o n a l for us to take the objective attitude towards ourselves, only that i t i s not more r a t i o n a l . Certainly, one can say, "I am not free or responsible, and therefore, while capable of g u i l t , I w i l l now stop f e e l i n g g u i l t y . " Nonetheless, a c t u a l l y ceasing to entertain notions of g u i l t - that i s , ceasing to have a conscience - i s more problematic. F i r s t of a l l , entertaining notions of g u i l t i s d i f f e r e n t from entertaining a proposition. Since g u i l t i s an emotion, i f someone entertains a notion of g u i l t , then she already f e e l s g u i l t ; t h i s f e e l i n g w i l l go away only i f she can convince h e r s e l f that she i s not responsible for whatever injury she f e e l s g u i l t over. 1 9 So the question i s whether anyone can, through a b e l i e f i n 48 determinism, consider herself no longer responsible for anything, and, thus, altogether avoid feelings of g u i l t . The question i s whether anyone can cease to f e e l g u i l t y . There seem to be two p o s s i b i l i t i e s . A determinist might f a i l , despite her attempts, to suppress the g u i l t she f e e l s over her misdeeds. On the other hand, she might suc c e s s f u l l y prevent herself from ever f e e l i n g g u i l t . In scenario A, upon f e e l i n g g u i l t , she pauses to r e f l e c t that she has nothing to f e e l g u i l t y over, since she i s not a responsible being. She attempts to suppress her conscience. One can a l l a y f e e l i n g s of g u i l t i n s p e c i f i c cases. For example, a person can r e a l i z e that she i s not responsible f o r a harmful action because of ignorance of i t s harmful r e s u l t s . Since the action i s not a consequence of any malevolent attitudes towards another, she has no reason to f e e l g u i l t y for i t . Yet, she cannot so e a s i l y a l l a y her feelings of g u i l t by t e l l i n g herself that she i s not a responsible agent. Lacking empirical data about how successfully people a l l a y f e e l i n g s of g u i l t , I must p i t my i n t u i t i o n against Paul Russell's. An example w i l l help c l a r i f y why I think that f e e l i n g s of g u i l t are more r e s i l i e n t than Russell supposes. Imagine that John Smith delays buying a new battery for h i s smoke detector for months, since he always f e e l s too busy. A f i r e burns h i s house down and k i l l s h i s wife and children. John f e e l s g u i l t over h i s negligence. His determinist brother, Peter, t r i e s to convince John that nobody i s responsible for the deaths of h i s wife and children. I believe that John w i l l continue to f e e l g u i l t y even 49 i f he believes i n determinism. He may, by holding the objective attitude towards himself for a short time, make himself believe that nobody i s responsible for h i s actions. Nonetheless, t h i s b e l i e f i s soon overcome by returning feelings of g u i l t ; thus, he s t i l l believes himself to be responsible for the deaths of his wife and children. G u i l t may be temporarily suppressed by a b r i l l i a n t argument showing that nobody i s responsible f o r anything that she does, yet, i t returns "as soon as the argument i s over." 2 0 Our conscience i s part of our commitment to considering ourselves to be members of the moral community. I f our conscience cannot be permanently suppressed, then we have not succeeded i n exempting ourselves from the pool of responsible agents. Thus, the above example helps show that token-naturalism i s an e f f e c t i v e answer to the token-pessimist. 2 1 I f , nonetheless, a person permanently conquers her g u i l t , we have scenario B. Here, by eliminating any tendencies within her s e l f to f e e l g u i l t , she has eliminated her conscience. People without conscience do ex i s t , such as psychopaths. 2 2 Certain conditions may even cause people to be without conscience, such as p a r t i c u l a r l y deprived childhoods. Certainly, such f o l k never entertain notions of g u i l t , and, thus, have no conscience; they can, at best, debate the r a t i o n a l i t y of having g u i l t . These people lack conscience, however, for reasons independent of any b e l i e f s i n determinism. Furthermore, they not only lack instances of g u i l t , but also, unlike normal human beings, lack tendencies 50 to have g u i l t ; they lack g u i l t as a type-emotion. Thus we have no reason to believe that those of us who have g u i l t as a type-emotion can eliminate a l l tokens of g u i l t through a b e l i e f i n determinism. I think that the only way to eliminate one's conscience, or fe e l i n g s of g u i l t , i s to silence one's conscience permanently. Whoever does t h i s , however, succeeds i n removing her d i s p o s i t i o n to f e e l g u i l t . I f she succeeds i n t h i s , she does what the type-n a t u r a l i s t s deem impossible. Strawson's t y p e - n a t u r a l i s t i c argument shows that no t h e o r e t i c a l considerations can cause people to remove completely t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n to f e e l g u i l t ; thus, scenario B i s impossible. This, along with consideration of scenario A, shows that token-naturalism holds with respect to g u i l t and other s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes. iv) A Token-Naturalistic Defence of the Other Reactive Attitudes Next we must determine whether our i n a b i l i t y to eliminate our s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes extends to other reactive attitudes, such as resentment and moral indignation, which have more than one object. Some people, such as small children and the insane, do not count as responsible agents. We can eliminate these people from consideration as p o t e n t i a l objects of our reactive attitudes. We are able to r e t a i n our capacity for resentment, moral indignation, and other reactive attitudes i n general without f e e l i n g any resentment, moral indignation, etc., towards these people i n p a r t i c u l a r , even when they commit harmful actions. For 51 such people we do not often experience troubles with reactive f e e l i n g s being suppressed and l a t e r returning to us. We can and do permanently suppress a l l reactive attitudes towards them. Can we do the same for a l l people, eliminating a l l instances of our personal and vicarious reactive attitudes upon beli e v i n g determinism to be true? We should remember that, although we permanently suppress our reactive attitudes towards some people, we r e t a i n the capacity for reactive attitudes towards normal people. More accurately, we hold these attitudes i n reserve for people whom we consider morally capable. But i t seems that determinism, i f i t has any ef f e c t upon our behaviour at a l l , eliminates a l l people from consideration as moral agents. Nobody for whom to r e t a i n these reactive attitudes remains. Thus, we would need a r a d i c a l change from our current pattern of excusing some people and not others. Human beings wish to be r a t i o n a l . Russell's argument l i k e l y springs from the b e l i e f that people can control t h e i r emotions r a t i o n a l l y when having them would be inappropriate. Yet, part of the drive to be r a t i o n a l i s a desire f o r consistency. Humans must express g u i l t when they have knowingly committed a wrong action. They see themselves as responsible even i f t h i s c o n f l i c t s with t h e i r b e l i e f i n determinism. This being so, i t i s d i f f i c u l t for them to see other people as not responsible beings, unless there i s a relevant difference between others and themselves. Determinism f a i l s to provide us with such a relevant difference. In "Freedom and Resentment" Strawson points out the close 52 connection among the three types of reactive attitudes. He shows how d i f f i c u l t i t i s to imagine anyone e s s e n t i a l l y human who has one or two types of reactive attitudes without the r e s t . To paraphrase Strawson, a change i n our s o c i a l world that leaves us exposed to the s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes, but not at a l l to t h e i r personal or vicarious analogues, i s harder to envisage than the decay of a l l the reactive attitudes together. 2 3 Russell goes to extremes to give an example of a s i t u a t i o n i n which everyone or almost everyone i s morally incapacitated: he postulates a rampant brain-disease. 2 4 A group of such beings i s conceivable; one could put some morally incapacitated people together and observe t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s . Such a group, however, i s not a recognizably human society. We must stretch our imaginations further to picture a society whose members r e t a i n only t h e i r s e l f - r e a c t i v e a t t itudes. This society of moral s o l i p s i s t s , each of whom sees herself as the only responsible being, i s even less conceivable than the other, and i s also unrecognizable as a human society. Therefore, i f one retains her s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes, i t seems p r a c t i c a l l y inconceivable that she w i l l not r e t a i n her personal and vicarious reactive attitudes. Thus, since a normal person cannot stop f e e l i n g g u i l t y for her own actions, then, so long as she believes that another person i s relevantly s i m i l a r to hers e l f she w i l l react with resentment and moral indignation to those of the other. One can believe oneself the only free and responsible being. There are some people who hold that a l l others except themselves 53 are robots, j u s t as some hold that everyone but themselves i s unreal. Those who hold these views, however, do not hold them because of a b e l i e f i n determinism. As Russell's example shows, one could hold the personal and vicariou s reactive attitudes i n abeyance, i f everyone else succumbed to a morally incapacitating mental i l l n e s s . This i l l n e s s constitutes a relevant difference between oneself and others that determinism does not imply. We can see how mental i l l n e s s e s a f f e c t a person's a b i l i t y to make a r e a l i s t i c assessment of her s i t u a t i o n , and to make e f f e c t i v e judgements and choices. We can see why she i s missing the a b i l i t y to be part of a moral community, or, as Strawson would say, to p a r t i c i p a t e i n ordinary interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We also f i n d differences between those whom we excuse from moral agency and normal people. This holds even i n cases of i r r a t i o n a l resentment against objects and natural events, such as the weather. People i n modern society tend to personify such natural events, but do not seriously consider a cloud to be a moral agent. Upon r e f l e c t i o n , we suppress resentment against the weather, transforming i t into mere f r u s t r a t i o n . We do not blame a cloud for r a i n i n g as we would a person man for s p i t t i n g at us. Determinism i s d i f f e r e n t . I f i t i s true, nothing escapes i t s e f f e c t s . I f a b e l i e f i n determinism can cause someone to give up her reactive attitudes towards everyone, including those whom she considers r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r to h e r s e l f , then she should be able to r e l y on the same b e l i e f to give up her s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes. Since she cannot do the 54 l a t t e r , i t follows that nobody can give up a l l reactive attitudes. If we wish to be consistent we must hold that there are many people, both known to us and unknown, who l i k e ourselves are responsible agents and worthy r e c i p i e n t s of our reactive attitudes. This desire to be consistent seems to neutralize our desire to be r a t i o n a l , i f the l a t t e r requires us to give up a l l expressions of our reactive attitudes. Thus, our instances of resentment, moral indignation, and other reactive attitudes are as much a necessary part of our l i v e s as are those of g u i l t . Yet what about Russell's analogous token-pessimistic approach to fear? He maintains that, i f placed permanently i n circumstances i n which fear i s inappropriate, then, while r e t a i n i n g our capacity for fear, we w i l l f e e l no fear of anything i n p a r t i c u l a r . I suppose that a person can believe she i s invulnerable, and thus not fear for her l i f e . Perhaps her b e l i e f could be strengthened i f she survived s i t u a t i o n s commonly thought to be l e t h a l , l i k e an explosion from an atomic bomb or a h a i l of b u l l e t s . Yet I think that she would express her fear i n other ways. She would no longer fear for her l i f e , but might dread other things, such as s u f f e r i n g public embarrassment, or losing a contest, or being alone. And i f even the grounds for these concerns are eliminated and she i s l e f t with absolutely nothing to fear, then instances of i r r a t i o n a l fear might s t i l l surface, perhaps i n the form of phobias. Whether or not a person can become t o t a l l y f e a r l e s s , I think 55 that fear i s s u f f i c i e n t l y unlike the reactive attitudes that the analogy does not hold with respect to token-naturalism. F i r s t , one can express fear towards many things other than people, since fear i s not t i e d to interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . More importantly, our reactive attitudes, unlike fear, are associated with seeing ourselves and others i n a ce r t a i n way. I t i s not merely because reactive attitudes are emotions that r a t i o n a l considerations cannot eliminate them. I t i s because they are an e s s e n t i a l part of our interpersonal r e l a t i o n s , which we cannot give up so long as we l i v e i n a society. People cannot begin to deem themselves permanently nonresponsible beings, because they cannot stop expressing t h e i r s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes. S i m i l a r l y , people who have s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes w i l l be unable to stop having reactive attitudes towards those whom they see to be relevantly s i m i l a r to themselves. Thus, as long as people i n t e r a c t with each other, i t seems p r a c t i c a l l y inconceivable that they w i l l cease having reactive attitudes. Of course, many global excuses we make for other people are matters of degree, thus allowing the others to f e e l some measure of g u i l t f o r t h e i r actions and us to f e e l some resentment, though i n a reduced form. We r e t a i n the reactive attitudes, but minimally, because of our b e l i e f s about other people. An example i s our li m i t e d reactive attitudes towards an eleven-year-old. To some extent she can be treated as an adult, but i n some situ a t i o n s she must s t i l l be seen as an object to be manipulated. Of course, determinism works d i f f e r e n t l y . If i t s t r u t h requires us to stop 56 engaging our reactive attitudes, then t h i s r e s t r a i n t should be absolute. Nevertheless, some pessimists propose a weaker form of pessimism, i n which our reactive attitudes are increasingly reduced as we come closer to r e a l i z i n g a r a t i o n a l i d e a l . Thus, while John Smith w i l l not overcome h i s g u i l t over the deaths of his r e l a t i v e s , he may overcome g u i l t f o r minor harmful actions. I have avoided using examples of minor g u i l t because of humankind's a b i l i t y to r a t i o n a l i z e excuses for s p e c i f i c actions. People can also ignore t h e i r emotions, keeping them on an unconscious l e v e l . Thus a person may f a i l to r e a l i z e how much she resents a roommate's sloppy habits u n t i l she notices the tooth-grinding and headaches which accompany cleaning up a f t e r that roommate. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the resentment may b u i l d up u n t i l she loses her temper. In any case, I do not believe that one can reduce the reactive attitudes beyond a ce r t a i n point. One can curb one's tendencies to overreact to someone's harmful actions, but i t seems that no normal person can reduce the strength of her reactive attitudes beyond a ce r t a i n l e v e l . One might learn not to go into a rage at having one's property stolen, but would s t i l l f e e l a considerable degree of resentment towards the t h i e f . v) A Defence of our Rat i o n a l i t y This r a i s e s a concern of Russell's that, i f we cannot give up a l l instances of our reactive attitudes, then we are lim i t e d i n "our a b i l i t y or capacity to curb or control our emotional l i f e 57 according to the dictates of reason." 2 5 This i s rather disturbing. A f t e r a l l , i f we were so constituted that we saw ghosts, despite arguments to show i t i r r a t i o n a l to believe i n t h e i r existence, i t would be d i s t r e s s i n g that we were constituted to be so i r r a t i o n a l . Or consider the p r i n c i p l e of induction, which holds that future occurrences of an event type, other things being equal, w i l l be f a i r l y s i m i l a r to past occurrences. I f someone proved that our reliance on induction was i r r a t i o n a l , then we would be both wasting a l o t of time and money i n s c i e n t i f i c studies and f a l s e l y r e l y i n g on induction i n everyday l i f e . Let us look at these two examples more c l o s e l y . Seeing ghosts does not seem to matter so much to our concepts of ourselves as r a t i o n a l beings i f we know that they do not ex i s t . We w i l l simply ignore them, walk through them, and otherwise t r e a t them as an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n . I f we were unable to do t h i s , then that would indeed be disturbing, but human beings seem capable of making such adjustments. S i m i l a r l y , i f the b e l i e f i n the existence of ghosts were raised to the l e v e l of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h , impervious to r a t i o n a l arguments, then the i n a b i l i t y to doubt the b e l i e f would be disturbing. I t i s , i n fact, disturbing that so many people of so many d i f f e r i n g r e l i g i o n s are convinced that t h e i r s i s the lone true one, and are immune to r a t i o n a l arguments to the contrary. Fortunately, some people are persuaded by these r a t i o n a l arguments. Nobody, however, could be persuaded by r a t i o n a l arguments to 58 give up t h e i r reactive attitudes e n t i r e l y . Yet given how much a part of our l i v e s these reactive attitudes are, t h i s i s not as disturbing as would be our persistence i n seeing ghosts together with the i n a b i l i t y to compensate for them. Our reactive attitudes are a basic part of any human society. They colour our interactions with each other i n a multitude of subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Therefore, i t i s not unduly disturbing that we cannot so greatly a l t e r the f a b r i c of our l i v e s , even i f some believe i t r a t i o n a l to do so. The example of induction i s closer to how our reactive attitudes a c t u a l l y s i t with us. We cannot give up using induction to predict future events. I t i s very l i k e l y hard-wired within us as an evolutionary s u r v i v a l t r a i t to be able to predict what i s hazardous to our s u r v i v a l and what i s not, based upon past experience. In modern science, we sometimes come across cases l i k e quantum physics, i n which exact predictions are impossible. Moreover, some of our predictions i n everyday l i f e and i n science turn out to be f a l s e , requiring us to make new ones, hopefully based upon better inductive reasoning. I f i t were somehow shown to us that induction i t s e l f i s i r r a t i o n a l , however, we would continue to make predictions. Is t h i s disturbing? Perhaps i t i s to those who wish humans to be completely r a t i o n a l beings. S t i l l , I believe that people are r a t i o n a l enough for almost a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes. I t i s i r r a t i o n a l to expect a creature with a f i n i t e brain to be t o t a l l y r a t i o n a l , able to take a l l possible factors into account, 2 6 including i t s own decision mechanism. This i s 59 e s p e c i a l l y true with respect to such general and all- p e r v a s i v e elements of l i f e as reactive attitudes and induction. Therefore, I do not think that we should be too disturbed by our i n a b i l i t y to give up our reactive attitudes. Russell makes another comparison 2 7 i n order to point out the disturbing nature of Strawson's n a t u r a l i s t i c argument. He likens us to a group of nonresponsible agents f a l s e l y entertaining the idea that they are responsible. I f we are i n the same s i t u a t i o n as these nonresponsible beings, i s that not disturbing? I think that i t i s , and just as we can never be e n t i r e l y c e r t a i n that we are not dreaming, so we can never be e n t i r e l y c e r t a i n that we are not s u f f e r i n g under a massive delusion. Upon examination, however, t h i s scenario seems u n l i k e l y . To t e s t Russell's example, we need to f i n d a group of nonresponsible agents capable of del i b e r a t i o n . Young children are not capable, nor are those s u f f e r i n g from severe stress. As for full-blown psychopaths, they may be able to deliberate over some Schlickian sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Even so, they cannot take serio u s l y the sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t i e d to the reactive attitudes: they lack the very attitudes that make up a normal person's concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Perhaps people s u f f e r i n g under a psychotic delusion consider themselves responsible f o r actions i n t h e i r dream-worlds. Are we also a l l su f f e r i n g under a psychotic delusion of being free and responsible beings? I cannot prove that we are not, any more than I can prove that you are not dreaming now. Yet i f we are deluded, we are at lea s t sharing the 60 delusion, and not i n separate dream-worlds with separate r u l e s . Given that our moral s o c i e t i e s function well enough with the idea that we are responsible beings, i t i s safe to assume that the delusion, i f i t ex i s t s , i s harmless. In addition, we are disturbed by the psychotic, not because she considers h e r s e l f a responsible being, but because the things f o r which she considers h e r s e l f responsible have l i t t l e or no r e l a t i o n to anyone else's r e a l i t y . She f a i l s to in t e r a c t with people i n the sense we want for us to consider people responsible. Normal people have personal interactions with each other, and we assume that, to a considerable degree, we share a common view of r e a l i t y . F i n a l l y , we hope the psychotic can be cured and become a member of our human society. Yet i f we a l l undertook some extreme treatment to remove our capacity for reactive attitudes, there would be no human society l e f t to j o i n . Thus, i f the b e l i e f that we are a l l responsible beings i s a delusion, i t i s one necessary to our functioning as human beings, and, as Wolf has argued, not one that i t i s r a t i o n a l to abandon. I think that i t i s important for people to be able to control t h e i r emotions i n s p e c i f i c instances. But I do not think i t a disaste r for human r a t i o n a l i t y i f we are unable to cease e n t i r e l y to express our reactive attitudes, even i f some permanent universal global excuse gives us reason to. Humans are not e n t i r e l y r a t i o n a l . We are subject to emotions. While we can control them, we w i l l never be r i d of them e n t i r e l y . In any case, since Wolf has shown that we have no reason to 61 consider everyone to be without freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , our i n a b i l i t y to give up holding our reactive attitudes i s not a threat to our d i g n i t y as r a t i o n a l people. Thus, those who f i n d i t disturbing that we are not able to give up our reactive attitudes, even i f i t i s r a t i o n a l to do so, can take some comfort i n our having no reason to give them up. This i s good for us, since Wolf also shows that we have good p r a c t i c a l reasons to r e t a i n them. If we took the objective attitude towards everyone, we would be i n a cold world of human i s o l a t i o n i n which such important facets of society as friendship and love are d r a s t i c a l l y reduced i n meaning. We would a l l become human calc u l a t o r s that lacked many human feelings and that were unable to r e l a t e meaningfully to anyone. Worse s t i l l , i f we gave up taking attitudes e n t i r e l y , we would lose our sense of ourselves as persons, and a l l of our values. 2 8 "A world without reactive attitudes would be a t r a g i c world of human i s o l a t i o n ; a world without reactive attitudes or the objective a t t i t u d e would be a bleak, blank world of human brutes." 2 9 Strawson's argument has some imperfections, however. Russell c o r r e c t l y states that the r a t i o n a l i s t i c strategy i s flawed with respect to global excuses, since Strawson confuses moral incapacity with mere abnormality. From examining the cases of moral incapacity, however, I think i t has been shown above that no e f f e c t i v e global excuse can be universal and permanent, since i t cannot permanently include the s e l f . Therefore, while we may be determined, and while determinism may e n t a i l that we are a l l 62 "unfree and unresponsible", we cannot give t h i s as an excuse for people's actions. Neither i s i t r a t i o n a l for us to give such an excuse, either pragmatically or i n the sense of what i t i s r a t i o n a l to believe i n the privacy of one's own study, as Downie wants to suggest. 3 0 Therefore, the flaw i n Strawson's r a t i o n a l i s t i c argument i s not a serious one, and the objections r a i s e d so f a r to h i s general argument have been answered. 63 1. I gave a t a l k formed from part of t h i s chapter at a Philosophy Department Graduate Student Colloquium at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia on Dec. 5, 1994, and am g r a t e f u l to those who attended, p a r t i c u l a r l y Paul Russell, Adam Constabaris, Richard Johns, Michael Fleming and Alan Richardson, f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l comments. 2. I t sometimes seems that Strawson i s sympathetic to determinism, e s p e c i a l l y when he mentions the incoherence of contra-causal freedom. However, he takes pains to remain neutral when discussing determinism, claiming not to know what i t i s (Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 71, 95). 3. Wolf, Susan, "The Importance of Free W i l l " i n Mind 1981 vol.XC, 386-405. This question i s also addressed i n a s i m i l a r fashion i n J.E. Llewelyn's "The Inconceivability of Pessimistic Determinism" i n Analysis vol.27, no.2 (new series no. 116), D e c , 1966, 39-44, but I believe that Wolf's answer to the problem i s more complete. 4. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 394. 5. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 394-5. The example of the w i l l i n g and unwilling drug addicts i s from Harry G. Frankfurt's "Freedom of the W i l l and the Concept of a Person" i n Journal of Philosophy, v o l . l x v i i i , No.l (Jan. 1971), 5-20, reprinted i n Free W i l l . Gary Watson, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) , 81-95. When r e f e r r i n g to page numbers of Frankfurt's a r t i c l e I w i l l be r e f e r r i n g to the l a t t e r version. 6. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 399. 7. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 398-9. 8. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 400. 9. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 401. 10. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 401-2. 11. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 402. 12. Wolf, "The Importance of Free W i l l " , 402. 13. Strawson, "P.F. Strawson Replies", 263, and Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment, 83. 14. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 82. 15. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 81. 16. Russell, "Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility", 296. 64 17. Russell sometimes argues that the token-pessimist's viewpoint i s that people are able to cease e n t i r e l y to experience an emotion, such as fear or a reactive attitude, while s t i l l being "prone or l i a b l e to [ i t ] " (294), and sometimes seems to argue that the token-pessimist declares that we cannot "reasonably or appropriately entertain or engage these attitudes" (296). The l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seems to be an attack upon the r a t i o n a l i t y of holding the reactive attitudes. I t i s , I think, answered by Wolf. The former i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I hope to answer i n the following pages. 18. Galen Strawson independently stresses the importance of the s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes i n "On 'Freedom and Resentment'" i n Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 67-101, o r i g i n a l l y i n Galen Strawson, Freedom and B e l i e f . (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 19. We can make an exception for psychopaths, who are incapable of g u i l t but are r a t i o n a l enough to ask the question "Why should I f e e l g u i l t y about my actions?" Since psychopaths are incapable of f e e l i n g g u i l t , however, or of understanding what g u i l t f e e l s l i k e , I think that t h e i r attempts to entertain the notion of g u i l t are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those of most people. For psychopaths, to entertain a notion of g u i l t i s the same as to entertain the t r u t h of a proposition. I f Russell means that normal people "can and must" cease to entertain a notion of g u i l t i n t h i s sense, then he i s arguing for the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of holding the reactive attitudes, not for our a b i l i t y to cease to hold these attitudes. 20. Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck" i n Free W i l l . Gary Watson ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 182. 21. Galen Strawson describes the possible use of Buddhist meditations to experience the lack of freedom that i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t determinism e n t a i l s , i n "On 'Freedom and Resentment'", 98-100. Wolf shows that there i s no r a t i o n a l reason to do t h i s , and I think that most people's desires to r e t a i n t h e i r sense of i d e n t i t y provides a powerful reason to r e f r a i n from these meditations. Moreover, although I do not wish to begin a d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m of the Buddhist r e l i g i o n i n t h i s thesis, I think that such a practice cannot be e n t i r e l y successful. I agree with Galen Strawson that the pr a c t i c e , to the extent that i t succeeds, w i l l make people inhuman, though not necessarily inhumane. The meditations seem by t h e i r nature to be s o l i t a r y and thus require that one severely l i m i t personal interactions with others. Furthermore, insofar as the achievement of a p a r t i a l objective attitude i s possible, i t takes years of pra c t i c e ; one's s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes cannot be reduced by an " e f f o r t l e s s , r a t i o n a l l y motivated, s e l f - d i r e c t e d i n t e l l e c t u a l f i a t " (98). Thus, a b e l i e f i n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t determinism alone w i l l not s u f f i c e . 65 22. For a de t a i l e d examination of psychopaths, see Robert D . Hare's Without Conscience; The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York: Pocket Books, 1993). 23. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 89. 24. Russell, 299. 25. Russell, 297. 26. The frame problem shows the d i f f i c u l t y of designing a machine to be even as e f f e c t i v e as a human being, much less t o t a l l y r a t i o n a l within a li m i t e d time frame, among other l i m i t a t i o n s . See Daniel Dennett's "Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of A l " , ch.2 of The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem i n A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e . Zenon W. Pylyshyn, ed. (Norwood: ABLEX Publishing Corporation, 1987). 27. Paul Russell was responsible for the suggestion of seeing ghosts and of the de l i b e r a t i n g nonresponsible agents. Induction i s referred to i n Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 94, note 1, but was also mentioned i n conversation with Richard Johns. 28. Wolf, 390-1, 400-1. 29. Wolf, 400-1. 30. Downie, 36. 66 Chapter V: Ayer's C r i t i q u e i) P r e d i c t a b i l i t y and Determinism I w i l l consider one of Strawson's c r i t i c s i n more depth. A.J. Ayer holds a view s i m i l a r to Downie's. Both declare that the objective attitude has more i n common with determinism than Strawson admits, and that there are reasons to believe that reactive attitudes are inappropriate. Yet, Ayer's c r i t i c i s m d i f f e r s from Downie's because Ayer believes i t possible to give up the reactive attitudes. By examining Ayer's essay "Free W i l l and R a t i o n a l i t y " 1 I w i l l bring Strawson's views of reactive attitudes into sharper focus. Strawson's states that we can sustain the objective attitude towards another only when we have sp e c i a l reason to do so. This reason derives from viewing an agent as being i n some way abnormal, and so not a member of the moral community.2 In l i g h t of Russell's comments i n the l a s t chapter, i t i s better to say that we see the agent's moral capacity as relevantly d i f f e r e n t from our own. Thus, she i s an inappropriate object for our reactive a t titudes. Since i n a l l known s o c i e t i e s t h i s relevant difference concerns abnormality, I w i l l not dwell on t h i s point. In any case, Ayer acknowledges the force of our global excuses i n current p r a c t i c e . He holds, however, that our a b i l i t y to take the objective attitude for these reasons does not show that we cannot take a sustained objective attitude for other reasons, despite Strawson's assertion that people cannot give up t h e i r reactive a t t i t u d e s . 3 67 Ayer allows that as s o c i e t i e s now stand, i t i s probably impossible for us to give up our reactive attitudes merely because of b e l i e f i n a general thesis concerning human behaviour, such as determinism. He admits that the determinists of his acquaintance experience reactive attitudes as strongly as other people. 4 S t i l l , no s c i e n t i s t s have studied what would happen i f determinism were well-known. Alternative conjectures to Strawson's account may be p r a c t i c a l l y conceivable. I f any are, then Strawson's assertion may be f a l s e . Ayer attempts to lay the groundwork for such an al t e r n a t i v e , by showing that the content of determinism i s important to the theory's influence on human behaviour. Ayer s e l e c t s two points about determinism that he considers to be s i g n i f i c a n t . F i r s t , i f determinism i s not vacuous, i t must state that human action i s subject to manageable laws. By manageable, Ayer means that we should be able to use generalizations of human behaviour to explain and predict accurately, or, with strong p r o b a b i l i t y , "every facet of human behaviour". 5 This makes determinism a strong thesis, and many professed determinists are not determinists i n t h i s sense. Nevertheless, Ayer finds no a priori reason to r e j e c t t h i s version of determinism. 6 Ayer's second point i s that determinism requires a person to be unable to act otherwise than she does. He maintains that t h i s i n a b i l i t y i s proportional to how well we can predict or explain actions accurately, or with a high degree of p r o b a b i l i t y , given "a set of p a r t i c u l a r facts and a set of well-established 68 hypotheses which together e n t a i l or at le a s t make i t highly probable" 7 that the person act as she did. This r e l a t e s a b i l i t y to do otherwise to the state of knowledge of the observer. Ayer postulates that we can consider a person able to have acted otherwise only as long as nobody can provide the r e q u i s i t e set of fact s and hypotheses. 8 With a strategy s i m i l a r to Downie's, Ayer attempts to connect determinism to the objective attitude using p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . Employing these relationships, he states that taking the objective attitude i s not primarily dependent upon Strawson's global excuses, but upon the a b i l i t y to predict someone's actions exactly and, thus, show that she could not have done otherwise. 9 Ayer's determinism, i f true, requires that such predictions can be made. Despite h i s aims, Ayer f a i l s to t i e h i s high standards of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y to the objective attitude. F i r s t , nobody has the s c i e n t i f i c knowledge that Ayer's determinism requires i n order to predict accurately what people w i l l do. When we take the objective attitude towards people, we are not situated to make exact s c i e n t i f i c predictions based on an array of facts and we l l -established hypotheses. Rather, we make general, f a l l i b l e predictions of behaviour. Ayer describes our a b i l i t y to predict the actions of members of our moral community as follows: "They are statements of tendency which are not thought to be s u f f i c i e n t l y strong or far-reaching to make the actions which they govern unavoidable". 1 0 Yet, the same desc r i p t i o n applies to attempts to predict the actions of nonagents. 6 9 In reply to Ayer, Strawson mentions that we do not use s c i e n t i f i c laws when we take the objective att i t u d e . He adds that the vague laws of human nature we have apply to a l l people equally, regardless of our attitude towards them.11 When we take the objective attitude, we usually focus on determining what causes are l i k e l y to produce c e r t a i n e f f e c t s ; that i s our usual reaction to complex objects. We do not gain with t h i s focus, however, the a b i l i t y to predict behaviour with increased accuracy. In f a c t , we can have more trouble predicting a lu n a t i c ' s actions than those of a sane person. Nor do we employ a prediction process q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t with nonagents than with normal people, contra Ayer 1 2. When a p s y c h i a t r i s t t r eats a patient, she has no table of s c i e n t i f i c laws from which to judge which s t i m u l i w i l l e l i c i t which responses. Rather, she judges from experience the treatments most l i k e l y to be e f f e c t i v e . When the p s y c h i a t r i s t v i s i t s her parents, she may s i m i l a r l y judge from experience the g i f t s l i k e l y to please them. The difference here i s that she cares about more than possible responses to possible s t i m u l i ; she cares about how her parents f e e l about her and, to a lesser extent, how they f e e l about others. I f her parents insulted her, she would be shocked and r e s e n t f u l ; i f her patient insulted her, she might be shocked, but probably not r e s e n t f u l . In both cases she would t r y to f i n d out why the i n s u l t s occurred and how they could be stopped, but i n neither case would she use the kind of s c i e n t i f i c laws Ayer demands. 70 Ayer recognizes that determinists do not have the r e q u i s i t e hypotheses to predict people's actions. He believes that t h i s lack of a working theory of human physiology and psychology alone allows them to have reactive attitudes and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . By Ayer's own observer-oriented d e f i n i t i o n of "could have done otherwise" contemporary determinists can thus say that normal people could have acted i n another way.13 Yet, Ayer must hold that people to whom we take the objective attitude are so simple that we can use current s c i e n t i f i c knowledge to accurately predict t h e i r actions. We have no evidence for t h i s , or for thinking that an immature or damaged mind i s so easy to analyze and predict. Even i f i t i s so, Ayer f a i l s to explain why, i f i t requires such extensive knowledge, we are b r i e f l y able to take the objective attitude towards normal people. i i ) Science and the Objective Attitude Ayer has not s u f f i c i e n t l y argued that to adopt an objective attitude requires us to know the causal nature of others i n great d e t a i l . Yet he thinks we might discover a theory one day that enables us to analyze the causal patterns of everyone. I f so, we might have to give up our reactive attitudes. Therefore, I w i l l consider Ayer's account of how his version of determinism can come into general knowledge. Ayer begins by pondering what would happen i f "the r e q u i s i t e p h y s i o l o g i c a l or psycho-physical theories were developed and we could use them i n everyday l i f e to make mainly accurate 71 p r e d i c t i o n s " . 1 4 Given i t s record people tend to be o p t i m i s t i c about what science w i l l one day be capable of. After a l l , science has allowed discoveries that seemed impossible a century e a r l i e r . Can we be sure science w i l l never develop the theories Ayer describes? Strawson thinks we can. Reactive attitudes are adopted i n a v a r i e t y of situations, some of which are very complex. Moreover, the attitudes themselves are sometimes quite subtle. I t would be "a p r a c t i c a l absurdity" 1 5 to imagine anyone est a b l i s h i n g the useable, accurate laws that Ayer wants. These laws must correlate a l l of the s u b t l e t i e s of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between our thoughts, feelings, and actions with a causal system of physical brain-states, or whatever other exact s c i e n t i f i c terms one wishes to use. Strawson holds that t h i s i s too much to expect, even of science. 1 6 This i s an empirical statement; i t may be proved f a l s e . S t i l l , I think i t i s a reasonable assumption. As Daniel Dennett notes, many chaotic systems i n nature, such as the path of a planet i n a chaotic o r b i t , or even the path of a p i n b a l l a f t e r h i t t i n g more than twenty posts i n a few seconds, are absolutely unpredictable to us. 1 7 The workings of the human mind, being even more complex, must also remain unpredictable. Also, a person's knowledge of the laws purporting to describe her own behaviour might modify that behaviour, making pr e d i c t i o n p r o h i b i t i v e l y d i f f i c u l t . Therefore, I think Strawson c o r r e c t l y supposes Ayer's example to be p r a c t i c a l l y inconceivable. Ayer admits that i t may be too f a n c i f u l . 1 8 His second example 72 i s more believable. Ayer proposes that s c i e n t i s t s might develop a theory of conditioning "to the point where i t became possible to implant desires and b e l i e f s and t r a i t s of character i n human beings, to an extent that i t could be deduced, at l e a s t i n f a i r l y general terms, how any person who had been treated i n t h i s way would most probably behave i n a given s i t u a t i o n " . 1 9 Ayer believes that, i f t h i s conditioning was practised on us, and i f everyone was given s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of the conditioning process to predict or explain "almost everything that anybody said or did", then we would forego our reactive a t t i t u d e s . 2 0 Currently we can condition people to a degree. Brainwashing and advertising are both testaments to how well a conditioner can influence people to think and act as she wishes. Given how complex the human mind i s , though, i t i s very u n l i k e l y that such techniques can control everything that a person says or does. People face a much lower l e v e l of conditioning from advertisers and brainwashers, although the l a t t e r have considerable power to influence one's thoughts. Ayer's conditioning i s absolute, c o n t r o l l i n g every single aspect of a person's l i f e . I f anyone develops t h i s form of conditioning, I think that the human mind's complexities would be l o s t . Strawson shares t h i s view, holding that, i f Ayer's conditioning were practiced, "the patterns of human behaviour would be s i m p l i f i e d out of a l l recognition". 2 1 Dennett describes the required process of conditioning as crude and presumably "powerful enough to override [a person's] d e l i c a t e , information-73 gathering, information-assessing, normal ways of coming to have b e l i e f s and de s i r e s " . 2 2 Ayer's conditioning process would, as Ayer predicts, make us give up our reactive attitudes. But no recognizably human society w i l l remain i n which to adopt reactive attitudes or have the personal interactions that are t i e d to them. Although our reactive attitudes are an es s e n t i a l part of us, they must be nurtured i n a human society. I f that human society i s abolished by Ayer's conditioning, then the reactive attitudes w i l l l i k e l y be abolished with them. Thus, Ayer's example reveals the importance of human society to the reactive attitudes, but i t f a i l s to show that the former can ex i s t without the l a t t e r . i i i ) The A p p l i c a b i l i t y of Desert In the l a s t chapter we saw that Wolf has shown that even i f we could dispense with our reactive attitudes, there are powerful reasons to r e t a i n them. Nevertheless, Ayer proposes a sense of r a t i o n a l i t y according to which determinists are i r r a t i o n a l to hold the b e l i e f s i n human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to which the reactive attitudes lead. Strawson maintains that no general theory can make us lose our reactive attitudes. Ayer interprets t h i s to mean that "no thesi s which applies to human conduct indis c r i m i n a t e l y can pose such a threat". 2 3 Ayer also interprets a person who holds the objective attitude as one who responds to or judges human behaviour merely "from the point of view of i t s causes and e f f e c t s " . 2 4 Thus, Ayer holds that Strawson thinks i t p r a c t i c a l l y 74 inconceivable f o r us always to judge human behaviour merely i n causal terms. This i s close to saying that i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y inconceivable for us to respond to each other as i f determinism were true, even i f i t i s . Yet to respond so may be r a t i o n a l . Ayer declares that i n our reactive attitudes "there i s a t a c i t or e x p l i c i t reference to the concept of desert". 2 5 Ayer t i e s t h i s concept to a b e l i e f that the object of one's reactive attitudes could have done otherwise. 2 6 Ayer believes that desert and, hence, the basis f o r the reactive attitudes, i s threatened by determinism. Determinism holds that, given a l l causal antecedents exactly as they are, nobody can act otherwise than she does. 2 7 Yet Ayer believes that a contra-causal a b i l i t y to do otherwise i s required by the concept of desert. This concept thus has no application i f determinism i s true. Since Ayer believes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to be founded on desert, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l also be an empty concept. And, i f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has no application, then we are i r r a t i o n a l to hold the reactive attitudes, which commit us to a b e l i e f i n the general r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of people for t h e i r a c t i o n s . 2 8 This argument resembles Downie's, which was raised i n chapter III and answered i n chapter IV. There Wolf showed that i t i s no more i r r a t i o n a l for us to keep our reactive attitudes than to give them up. Of course, a being without reactive attitudes may have no reason to adopt them, except the instrumental concerns which Strawson describes. Yet, since we already have and cannot excise our reactive attitudes, we are not i n such a being's place. Thus, 75 we are not i r r a t i o n a l to consider people generally responsible, whether they have contra-causal freedom or not. I f Ayer's d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s empty, then we should f i n d one that i s more serviceable. Ayer r a i s e s an important concern, however. He t r i e s to produce a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which i s more than a c o r r e l a t i o n with our reactive attitudes. His d e f i n i t i o n i s flawed since i t r e l i e s on a concept of desert that i s empty i f determinism holds. Nonetheless, we probably would be better o f f i f we had a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . People can be uninformed of the facts and, thus, hold reactive attitudes i n s i t u a t i o n s for which they are inappropriate. We could use d e f i n i t i o n to help c l a r i f y when the reactive attitudes are and are not s u i t a b l e . On the other hand, perhaps we do not need a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A s u f f i c i e n t l y well-informed person w i l l have reactive attitudes i n a l l the r i g h t s i t u a t i o n s and no others. Thus, we should be able to correlate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with the grounds of these reactive attitudes. Unfortunately, i t we can not safe l y r e l y on always having the relevant f a c t s . Furthermore, we sometimes encounter cases i n which people disagree on whether the reactive attitudes or the objective attitude i s appropriate. In the next chapter Gary Watson gives an example of one p a r t i c u l a r l y controversial case. I f we had a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , we could use i t to help resolve such cases. 76 1. A.J. Ayer, "Free W i l l and Rat i o n a l i t y " , i n Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. Zak Van Straaten, ed. , (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 1-13. 2. Ayer, "Free-will and Ration a l i t y " , 4. 3. Ayer, 4. 4. Ayer, 5. 5. Ayer, 6. 6. Ayer, 6. 7. Ayer, 6. 8. Ayer, 7. 9. Ayer, 7. 10. Ayer, 7. 11. Strawson, "P.F. Strawson Replies", i n Philosophical Subjects. 262-3. 12. Ayer, 7. 13. Ayer, 8-9. 14. Ayer, 9. 15. Strawson, P. F. Strawson Replies", 264. 16. Strawson, "P. F. Replies", 264. 17. Dennett, Elbow Room. 152. M. Berry o r i g i n a l l y used the p i n b a l l example i n "Breaking the Paradigms of C l a s s i c a l Physics from Within" i n Proceedings of the Cerisy Symposium ("Logos et Theorie des Catastrophes"). J . P e t i t i o t , ed. (1983). 18. Ayer, 9. 19. Ayer, 9. 20. Ayer, 10. 21. Strawson, "Replies", 264. 22. Dennett, Elbow Room. 34. 23. Ayer, "Free-will and Ration a l i t y " , 3. 77 2 4. Ayer, 3. 2 5. Ayer, 3. 26. Ayer allows (Ayer, 6) that t h i s sometimes indicates that we believe a person able to have altered h i s behaviour at an e a r l i e r time, even i f he could not have acted otherwise at the time of h i s blameable action. This l e t s us blame drunken dr i v e r s who k i l l people i n an accident. 2 7. Ayer, 3. 28. Ayer, 11-12. 78 Chapter VI: Watson's P a r t i a l D e f i n i t i o n of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i) Global Excuses Taken Individually In t h i s chapter I reveal the c l a r i f y i n g power of a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but I w i l l not attempt to define i t yet. F i r s t , I must consider whether defining r e s p o n s i b i l i t y undermines Strawson's argument. Strawson does not believe i t important to f i n d a s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n of the reactive a t t i t u d e s . 1 In "Responsibility and the Limits of E v i l : Variations on a Strawsonian Theme"2, Gary Watson argues that, according to the Strawsonian model, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y cannot be defined independently from our reactive attitudes. Strawson holds that our reactive attitudes are immune to t o t a l elimination by mere t h e o r e t i c a l considerations. Watson concludes from t h i s that reactive attitudes alone form the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Theoretical d e f i n i t i o n s have no place. Thus, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s as much a brute f a c t as the reactive attitudes themselves; any attempt to define r e s p o n s i b i l i t y independently of reactive attitudes w i l l , according to Watson, miss t h i s v i t a l point. " I t i s not that we hold people responsible because they are responsible; rather the idea (our idea) that we are responsible i s to be understood by the practice, which i t s e l f i s not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another" 3 (emphasis h i s ) . Strawson holds that the reactive attitudes are basic to our nature. "[They] are p r e c i s e l y the correlates of the moral demand in the case where the moral demand i s f e l t to be disregarded. The making of the demand is the proneness to such a t t i t u d e s " 4 79 (emphasis h i s ) . This does not mean, however, that he must hold that a separate propositional d e f i n i t i o n or analysis of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s impossible. Just as a baseball player can catch a b a l l without doing a complex physics equation to ascertain the b a l l ' s l o cation and v e l o c i t y , so we can use our reactive attitudes to hold people responsible without having a propositional d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Nevertheless, we can search for t h e o r e t i c a l equations or d e f i n i t i o n s i n both cases. To say that we might f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Strawson's framework of reactive attitudes i s one thing. Showing the need for such a d e f i n i t i o n i s quite another. I w i l l not define r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s chapter. I believe, however, that Watson shows how a d e f i n i t i o n can help c l a r i f y cases i n which the s u i t a b i l i t y of the reactive attitudes i s i n question. Watson notes that children, psychotics, and others who are excused from being objects of our ( f u l l ) reactive attitudes can s t i l l show h o s t i l e attitudes towards us. Our reactive attitudes are thus "s e n s i t i v e not only to the q u a l i t y of others' w i l l s , but depend as well upon a background of b e l i e f s about the objects of those a t t i t u d e s " . 5 Watson c l a r i f i e s some of these b e l i e f s by inves t i g a t i n g why our reactive attitudes are reduced or negated by global excuses. According to Watson, "many of the exempting conditions involve explanations of why the in d i v i d u a l s display q u a l i t i e s to which the reactive attitudes are otherwise s e n s i t i v e " 6 (emphasis his) and, therefore, why i n these cases reactive attitudes are inappropriate, even i f an injury has 80 occurred. By examining Watson's findings I w i l l show what some of the conditions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are. Watson looks f i r s t at children. He believes that adults have moral understanding, which children have to learn. They discover how others are hurt, both p h y s i c a l l y and psychologically, and "the various subtle ways i n which that may be done". 7 They also learn what i s expected of them as adults, namely, a reasonable regard for others. Since t h i s learning process i s gradual, our reactive attitudes to a c h i l d w i l l be less i n h i b i t e d as the c h i l d grows older and, presumably, has greater moral understanding. Of course, other things besides moral understanding are necessary parts of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Nevertheless, moral understanding seems to be one of i t s preconditions. There are others. Some global excuses apply to people under temporary but extremely severe stress; such people are said to be "not themselves". We require people to "be themselves" when acting i f they are to be appropriate r e c i p i e n t s of the reactive attitudes. Watson suggests that the reactive attitudes are rel a t e d to moral demands that we make of one another. I f we address a moral demand to a person who has acted while under stress, however, we address the true moral s e l f , who has the proper attitude towards people even though she was not i n cont r o l . I t i s as i f the moral s e l f was overwhelmed by a second s e l f who co n t r o l l e d the person's actions while the person was under stress. When the period of stress i s over, the second s e l f f l e e s , leaving 81 us with the "innocent" primary s e l f . Furthermore, the second s e l f would seem more worthy of the objective than of the reactive attitudes, since a person while under stress acts i n a manner that i s not wholly sane. "Insofar as resentment i s a form of reproach addressed to an agent, such an attitude loses much of i t s point here...because [the true s e l f ] repudiates such conduct as w e l l " . 8 Watson follows Jonathan Bennett's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of reactive attitudes as a form of moral address. I w i l l examine t h i s i n the next chapter. Strawson says that the infrequency of the s t r e s s f u l periods allows the reduction of our reactive attitudes. "We normally deal with [the agent] under normal stresses; so we s h a l l not f e e l towards him, when he acts as he does under abnormal stresses, as we should have f e l t towards him had he acted as he did under normal stresses." 9 I f a person were frequently to act as i f under stress, we would l i k e l y increase our reactive attitudes towards her, p a r t l y because we would blame her moral s e l f f o r not being able to deal with the stresses. Sometimes people are overwhelmed by the s t r e s s f u l situations they encounter. We expect them to deal with these sit u a t i o n s eventually, however, and to p a r t i c i p a t e once more i n the moral community as f u l l agents. On the other hand, i f someone suffers a series of severe stresses, she might go insane. She then f a l l into a more permanent exempting category. Watson raises some problems related to thinking of someone as not being he r s e l f . One problem i s how to a r t i c u l a t e what a 82 moral s e l f i s . This w i l l be easier once a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s found. Another problem i s that we usually consider the person to be one being, instead of d i v i d i n g her into a moral s e l f and a stressed s e l f . Thus, we may prefer to see responses under stress as " r e f l e c t i o n s of our moral selves -namely r e f l e c t i o n s of the moral s e l f under s t r e s s " . 1 0 However we look at stress, we require the agent to have a c e r t a i n degree of control over her actions, choices, and character f o r reactive attitudes towards her to be appropriate. This i s true whether she loses control to "another s e l f " or simply loses c o n t r o l . Whatever s e l f - c o n t r o l i s , i t i s exhibited by and expected of most adults. Perhaps we i n h i b i t the reactive attitudes i n cases of stress because we recognize that people are imperfect; they can be overwhelmed by great shocks, such as a divorce or the death of a loved one, and lose t h e i r s e l f - c o n t r o l . They may thus f a i l to give the consideration for others that we otherwise require. So i t appears that we l i m i t reactive attitudes i n these cases because we know that severe traumas can overwhelm people's s e l f - c o n t r o l . There must s t i l l be s o c i e t a l consensus of what counts as a s u f f i c i e n t l y traumatic shock, and t h i s may vary among s o c i e t i e s . Furthermore, defining s e l f - c o n t r o l exactly may be d i f f i c u l t . Nevertheless, s e l f - c o n t r o l of some sort i s another general component of an account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Some cases not analyzed by Watson are worth examining. The psychopath 1 1, i n the extreme a being incapable of f e e l i n g g u i l t , i s a complex case. At f i r s t , the reason we abandon reactive 83 attitudes towards her seems the same as for doing so towards children. Both psychopaths and children lack moral understanding. An added complication i n the case of psychopaths, however, i s that they are as i n t e l l i g e n t as normal people. They can understand society's laws, can learn which actions are acceptable and seem to be i n control of themselves. They do not understand why harmful actions are wrong, but they can at l e a s t r e a l i z e that such actions are c a l l e d wrong. While they have no moral sense, they are often able to act as i f they do. When a psychopath commits a p a r t i c u l a r l y h o r r i b l e crime i t gets even more complicated. Our reactive attitudes come into play, and although some people may disengage t h e i r reactive attitudes when they learn that the criminal i s a psychopath, others may continue to blame her. Watson notes that a person p l a i n l y less e a s i l y disengages reactive attitudes when "the knife i s at one's own throat", 1 2 but we can also f e e l moral indignation when a psychopath harms someone whom we do not know. These reactive attitudes may disappear when we r e a l i z e that the wrongdoer i s a psychopath, or they may not. Is t h i s a sign that people as a whole have more s o c i a l evolving to do? Perhaps, but t h i s lack of s o c i a l evolution has an explanation. Psychopaths are quite adept at mimicking humans who have a moral sense. While t e s t s 1 3 have been developed that can determine whether someone i s a psychopath or not (and some people are apparently able to recognize a c e r t a i n coldness i n a psychopath's eyes) i n ordinary l i f e people are e a s i l y fooled by psychopaths. Thus, with respect 84 to psychopaths, our reactive attitudes are not always accurate. Psychopaths can t r i c k us into b e l i e v i n g that they are part of our moral community; we then react to them as such when they act wrongly. Another reason why we do not as r e a d i l y adopt the objective attitude i s that i t often deals with treatment and control, but there i s no known method of succe s s f u l l y t r e a t i n g a psychopath. Over the centuries, people have d i f f e r e d i n opinion over whether psychopaths are mad, and not part of our moral community, or e v i l , and a part of i t . 1 4 Since i n the extreme psychopaths are not prone to g u i l t or moral indignation, Strawson would probably judge them as mad, and would exclude them from consideration as responsible agents. Another case of exemption i s that of psychotics 1 5. Psychotics are trapped i n t h e i r own fantasies, and cannot i n t e r a c t with the r e a l world. One reason for disengaging our reactive attitudes towards them may be that they lack moral understanding. More importantly, they lack a general understanding of what goes on around them. A person believing she i s i n ancient Rome may act l i k e a good Roman c i t i z e n , and, thus, have a moral sense that i s appropriate to her concept of Roman society but inappropriate i n a modern society. Interacting with her as a member of our moral community would be d i f f i c u l t or impossible. More suitable, i t seems, are treatment and control, the hallmarks of the objective a t t i t u d e . 85 i i ) The Unfortunate Childhood A f i n a l category to investigate concerns the e f f e c t s of a p e c u l i a r l y unfortunate childhood. Robert Harris i s referr e d to by Watson as an example. Harris's case demonstrates why a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may be useful. Harris was thoroughly v i c i o u s , c r u e l and e v i l . He k i l l e d two teenagers and then, laughing, ate t h e i r hamburgers. He claimed to have chosen "the road to h e l l . " 1 6 Thus, he seems a perfect candidate for the reactive attitudes. On the other hand, Robert Harris was c e r t a i n l y unfortunate i n h i s formative circumstances. He was beaten by both h i s parents and was never shown any a f f e c t i o n . As a youth, he was raped repeatedly i n a federal detention centre. This physical and mental abuse seems to explain how Harris became a monster. 1 7 Although, as Watson points out, we continue to adopt reactive attitudes towards him, we can now see Harris as a v i c t i m as well as a v i l l a i n . Watson believes that t r y i n g to see him both ways leads to an incoherent viewpoint. 1 8 Does Harris count as a moral agent, or should h i s abusive childhood exempt him from our reactive attitudes? We may need to modify Strawson's viewpoint to accommodate people l i k e Harris. I think, however, that Harris i s a candidate for the reactive attitudes, even i f he rejected the values of h i s moral community. Extreme e v i l , as Watson says, cannot be i t s own excuse. 1 9 Yet, we also see Harris as a victim. This can be explained as an e f f e c t of f e e l i n g reactive attitudes towards a l l 8 6 those who had abused him throughout h i s childhood. We see how Harris became the way he was, and can even p i t y him. S t i l l , we refuse to excuse him of h i s crimes. Our moral indignation, i n t h i s case, overrules our p i t y . As Watson notes, Harris's case may exemplify one form of moral luck. The problem of moral luck points out that, among other things, many of our character t r a i t s are the r e s u l t of formative circumstances over which we had no c o n t r o l . Could we have avoided becoming as e v i l as Harris i f we had had a childhood as bad as his? I w i l l address the problem of moral luck i n a l a t e r chapter. As a b r i e f answer, people have survived worse childhoods than Harris's without becoming moral monsters, which at l e a s t shows that a h o r r i b l e childhood does not automatically make one a nonresponsible agent. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Harris i s not excused from the reactive attitudes, even though he had " p e c u l i a r l y unfortunate formative circumstances". 2 0 Strawson l i s t s t h i s exempting condition among the possible excuses that p a r t i a l l y or wholly disengage our reactive attitudes. This condition i s troublesome because i t s meaning i s ambivalent. Does " p e c u l i a r l y unfortunate" mean extremely unfortunate i n formative circumstances, making Harris's case one that should disengage our reactive attitudes, or does i t mean that the formative circumstances are unfortunate i n a peculiar way? Certainly, i f the formative circumstances lead the person to lack moral understanding (unlike Harris, who seems to have understood that what he did was e v i l , claimed to have 87 chosen to be e v i l 2 1 , and was, i n the end, capable of g u i l t 2 2 ) , then we do not consider her to be a moral agent. But many sorts of unfortunate upbringing do not i n v i t e the reduction of our reactive attitudes, although they may invoke our sympathy, and cause us to adopt reactive attitudes towards those responsible f o r abusing them. The Harris case i s an example of our r e t a i n i n g our reactive attitudes despite our knowledge of a h o r r i b l e childhood. Therefore, contra Strawson, I do not believe that p e c u l i a r l y unfortunate formative circumstances do or should cause us always to repress our reactive attitudes. When we do abandon them due to someone having l i v e d through such unfortunate circumstances, i t i s because the circumstances caused the person to f a l l into another exempting category. They may, for example, cause someone to become psychotic. The above cases provide rough elements that help to form a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . They may help decide when reactive attitudes are either appropriate or not. This sort of i n t e r n a l c r i t i q u e of the reactive attitudes i s compatible with Strawson's th e s i s : " I t i s , of course, frequently i n order to declare that some instance of an emotional reaction i s inappropriate or even i r r a t i o n a l . " 2 3 "We can see where the l i m i t s of our proneness to [reactive] attitudes tend to f a l l , we can understand why they tend to f a l l where they do and we can f i n d room for the idea of c r i t i c i s m , of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s and inappropriateness, i n p a r t i c u l a r cases." 2 4 After examining the Harris case we can modify Strawson's l i s t of exempting conditions. By examining these conditions i n the 88 above cases, we gained a p a r t i a l account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . While being a c h i l d or a psychotic or a psychopath or temporarily under stress remain as excusing conditions, not a l l forms of unfortunate formative circumstances constitute legitimate excuses. The unfortunate formative circumstances must lead the person either to have a l i m i t e d moral understanding, or else to f a i l to f u l f i l another condition of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t i s l i k e l y that a more complete account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be even more useful i n deciding when the reactive attitudes are inappropriate. Of course, these attitudes should not be overruled by an abstract d e f i n i t i o n . I f such a d e f i n i t i o n c o n f l i c t s with our reactive attitudes, then either an explanation for each type of c o n f l i c t i s necessary or the d e f i n i t i o n w i l l be judged wrong and a new one w i l l replace i t . Assuming that a good d e f i n i t i o n or analysis of basic conditions i s found, i t w i l l help to c l a r i f y the i n t e r n a l c r i t i c i s m s that we make concerning to whom we should apply our reactive attitudes, without c r i t i c i z i n g the reactive attitudes as a whole. i i i ) L i v i n g Counterexamples: Einstein, Gandhi, and King Watson has other concerns besides f i n d i n g an account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The words and actions of some people do not seem to f i t Strawson's theory. Albert Einstein, being a determinist (and having a sense of humour) declared that he d i d not hold himself or others to be responsible beings. Furthermore, he asserted that he was able to distance himself from a l l other 8 9 people. He seems to imply that he has adopted the objective attitude towards everyone. "Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also i n accordance with inner necessity...This r e a l i z a t i o n m e r c i f u l l y mitigates the e a s i l y paralysing sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and prevents use from taking ourselves and other people a l l too seriously...[With respect to society, family and friends] I have never l o s t a sense of distance and a need for s o l i t u d e " . 2 5 I f E i n s t e i n i s accurate i n h i s assertions, then either he i s not a normal human being or Strawson's theory i s f a l s e . I think, however, that E i n s t e i n i s not quite accurate i n h i s assertions about himself. I believe that he did not take himself or others "too s e r i o u s l y " . Yet, Einstein's feelings merely mitigated, or reduced, h i s sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A b e l i e f i n determinism, i f i t has any e f f e c t on our feelings of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , requires us to negate them completely. I believe that the answer l i e s i n Einstein's emphasis on humour being given i t s due. I can only speculate on why E i n s t e i n refused to take people seriously, but I have shown i n e a r l i e r chapters that one cannot simply negate one's sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by an act of w i l l . Perhaps E i n s t e i n i s compensating for people's tendencies to overreact to some situations, e s p e c i a l l y to "offences" that are more breaches of etiquette than intentions to harm others. I f so, i t explains why h i s sense of people's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was mitigated, instead of e n t i r e l y removed. Many people have claimed that, i f determinism i s true, then people are not r e a l l y responsible for what they do. E i n s t e i n might upon hearing t h i s 90 claim have thought that t h i s i s why he did not take people seriously. Perhaps s i m i l a r reasons hold f o r others who claim that, because determinism i s true, they w i l l not hold people to be responsible beings. In any case, i f some sort of " f a l s e consciousness" does not operate i n these s i t u a t i o n s , then Strawson's essay needs to be reexamined. Strawson declares that we cannot give up our sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which i s the expression of our reactive attitudes. He i s wrong, however, i f people can wholly give up such attitudes by an act of w i l l . Einstein's claim that he never belonged to h i s friends or society with h i s whole heart, and that he sought solitude, i s not necessarily an example of the objective a t t i t u d e . I t i s possible to wish at times to be alone, or to keep l a r g e l y to oneself, without giving up one's reactive attitudes. Someone l e f t alone on an i s l a n d from early childhood may not have any reactive attitudes. Yet people l i k e E i n s t e i n who are raised i n society w i l l s t i l l adopt these attitudes. Watson has other concerns. Should i t be an i d e a l of ours to give up the negative elements of our reactive attitudes, such as resentment and aggression, even i f i t seems p r a c t i c a l l y impossible? Many people hold universal goodwill towards others to be an i d e a l for humankind, even i f t h i s i s seldom i f ever practiced. Do we have to give up our interpersonal interactions to r e a l i z e such an ideal? Watson believes that Strawson says as much i n h i s own view of punishment. Strawson holds that our negative reactions to others are c l o s e l y t i e d to our reactive 91 attitudes. "Indignation, disapprobation, l i k e resentment, tend to i n h i b i t or at least to l i m i t our goodwill towards the object of these attitudes...the preparedness to acquiesce i n that i n f l i c t i o n of s u f f e r i n g on the offender which i s an e s s e n t i a l part of punishment i s a l l of a piece with t h i s whole range of attitudes. " ? 6 Retributive elements seem to be t i e d too c l o s e l y to our reactive attitudes for us to hold the l a t t e r while maintaining universal goodwill. Yet, some people, such as Martin Luther King and Gandhi, seemed to have no i l l f e elings towards anyone, even the people whom they held responsible for various wrongs. 2 7 We might speculate that these people are f o r g i v i n g of a l l actions. In Watson's description of King, Gandhi and Einstein, they show a s i m i l a r lack of i l l w i l l towards others. Yet, King and Gandhi seem to have retained the reactive attitudes of resentment and moral indignation. King and Gandhi did more than state that c e r t a i n people were responsible for c e r t a i n crimes; they made moral demands that the wrongs be righted. As E i n s t e i n states h i s case, there seems to be no demand addressed to people i n such a manner. Thus, h i s case might be considered closer to universal forgiveness. This view i s problematic. Ei n s t e i n claimed that people were not ultimately responsible for t h e i r actions. Yet, to forgive i s s t i l l to hold people responsible. We grant forgiveness because the people we forgive express regret over attitudes which led to the wrong action, and they make a commitment not to have such unacceptable attitudes i n the future. 2 8 This points towards another reason 92 that none of the three examples f i t the model of universal forgiveness. The people Einstein, Gandhi and King are supposedly f o r g i v i n g are not necessarily sorry for what they have done, nor do they forswear future wrong actions. Thus, forgiveness i s inappropriate i n these cases. We must f i n d another description f o r Einstein's statements and King's and Gandhi's actions. To address the case of E i n s t e i n f i r s t , we should examine the requirements of a doctrine of universal goodwill. E i n s t e i n mentioned a conceptual i s o l a t i o n from the r e s t of society, and i t may be thought that i s o l a t i o n helped him to take people less seriously. I t i s not obvious, however, that one has to be i s o l a t e d , e i t h e r p h y s i c a l l y or conceptually, i n order to f e e l universal goodwill. In fact, goodwill to others borne i n i s o l a t i o n misses the point. Universal goodwill towards others i s an i d e a l that i s sought i n s o c i e t i e s , not i n i s o l a t i o n . I t i s supposed to help people l i v e i n harmony, not i n seclusion. I t i s the perceived lack of goodwill towards others which t r i g g e r s our reactive attitudes. Therefore, i s o l a t i o n does not seem a necessary or desirable part of the i d e a l of universal goodwill. In any case, i f we are able to give up our negative reactive attitudes through i s o l a t i o n , we w i l l also lose the p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes, such as gratitude and some kinds of friendship and love, through the same i s o l a t i o n . The loss of our interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s a heavy pr i c e to pay to r e a l i z e the i d e a l of goodwill towards a l l . I think, however, that we need not i s o l a t e ourselves i n order to f e e l a large amount of goodwill 93 towards others. And, unless we practice such d r a s t i c measures as t o t a l i s o l a t i o n , I know of no means by which we can give up our reactive attitudes as a whole. Yet perhaps people can give up t h e i r wish to harm others while r e t a i n i n g t h e i r reactive attitudes. Are King and Gandhi such people? I think not. While they did not advocate violence, t h e i r actions indicate that they did approve of wrongdoers s u f f e r i n g moral censure and public disdain. Therefore, they may have d i f f e r e d with others only i n the type of punishment deemed appropriate, not the wish to punish. Society seems to be slowly evolving i n the d i r e c t i o n of reducing punishment. In western s o c i e t i e s extreme physical torture i s no longer viewed as acceptable punishment. But a wish to reduce overreaction to harmful attitudes does not e n t a i l a wish to cease punishing wrongdoers. We may merely be seeking a proper l e v e l of punishment. Let us assume that there are people even more free of a wish to punish than Gandhi and King. These people w i l l have no wish to harm anyone. Could they s t i l l r e t a i n reactive attitudes, while having no wish to punish wrongdoers? Strawson says that reactive attitudes such as moral indignation and resentment only tend to i n h i b i t our goodwill towards the person to whom we f e e l such attitudes. This leaves open the u n l i k e l y p o s s i b i l i t y of f e e l i n g resentment and moral indignation towards another without the accompanying wish for the other to be punished. 2 9 And i f the wish to punish i s not necessary to the reactive attitudes, then the 94 "preparedness to acquiesce i n that i n f l i c t i o n of s u f f e r i n g on the offender" i s also unnecessary. I t i s very easy f o r people to want others to suffer for what they have done. This wish might be basic. I t might also come from a combination of a wish fo r others to r e a l i z e that what they have done i s wrong, together with a b e l i e f that they may learn that t h e i r actions are wrong i f they both are the objects of moral indignation and are punished. I t i s , however, at lea s t conceivable that one could hold people responsible f o r t h e i r actions, but merely desire that the wrongs be righted, or at lea s t for the wrongs to stop, rather than want to cause the wrongdoers to suffer as well. I t seems odd to use words l i k e "resentment" and "indignation" and yet hold that they do not e n t a i l that others undergo some negative experience. I believe that many people think these emotions contain a wish to harm others because the emotions are frequently accompanied by such a wish. We are not saints, and when someone does wrong we usually f e e l not only the reactive attitudes, but the hot form of these attitudes. The l a t t e r consists of seeing the offender as an enemy to ourselves and the re s t of society, to be dealt with mercilessly. I f we were a l l t o t a l l y benevolent we might have no wish to punish people whom we held responsible for crimes, but simply wish them to r i g h t the wrongs they have committed. But, i f we were a l l t o t a l l y benevolent, then nobody would show improper attitudes towards anyone i n the f i r s t place. A t o t a l l y benevolent society would have no need f o r punishment, which, i n actual s o c i e t i e s , i s the 95 expression of our reactive attitudes. While i t may be an i d e a l to be l i k e Gandhi or King, i t may not be an i d e a l to be t o t a l l y benevolent i n the above manner. If we had no desire to make offenders suffer, we would have no desire to make them f e e l g u i l t , as t h i s i s a form of s u f f e r i n g . We would only r e t a i n a desire for reparations. Yet moral indignation and resentment, so denuded of a desire even to have offenders suff e r g u i l t , become objective attitudes. A t o t a l l y benevolent being desires offenders to make reparations i n the way you or I desire a rainstorm to cease. Blame i s not involved i n eith e r case, but the offender i s now treated as one would t r e a t a nonagent. An agent almost always wishes to be treated as an agent more strongly that she wishes to avoid punishment. The desirable t r a i t of benevolence becomes undesirable when taken to too f a r an extreme. Total benevolence i s thus a f a l s e i d e a l . We want to show goodwill to others, and should s t r i v e to avoid punishing wrongdoers more than i s necessary f o r t h e i r reformation, or to repay society for t h e i r wrongs. Yet, punishing agents who do wrong shows more respect for them than does t r e a t i n g them as nonagents. One can love one's neighbour and s t i l l wish her to f e e l g u i l t for the wrongs she has done. Therefore, i t i s not universal goodwill that people seek, but a wish to remember the humanity of everyone, including wrongdoers. This wish leads us to want to r e f r a i n from punishing anyone unduly, but not to the abolishment of a desire for offenders to s u f f e r some form of punishment, even i f i t i s only g u i l t . What we should count as due 96 punishment i s the subject of much debate, and i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . But t o t a l benevolence i s incompatible with our moral s e n s i b i l i t i e s , and i s not the i d e a l f o r humanity that some think i t to be. While a community should have compassion, i t must also have a respect for persons. In examining Watson's a r t i c l e , I have responded to some apparent examples of people who have given up the reactive attitudes, or some r e t r i b u t i v e elements associated with these attitudes. I have also shown how a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y might c l a r i f y when the reactive attitudes are and are not appropriate. I believe that Watson has put forward the beginnings of a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , namely that moral understanding and some form of s e l f - c o n t r o l are required of responsible beings. Jonathan Bennett also attempts to define r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or the Strawsonian model, and I w i l l explore t h i s attempt i n the next chapter. 97 1. Strawson "Replies", 266. 2. Watson, Gary, "Responsibility and the Limits of E v i l : Variations on a Strawsonian Theme" i n Responsibility. Character and the Emotions. Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 256-86. 3. Watson, 258. 4. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 92-3. 5. Watson, 263. 6. Watson, 263. 7. Watson, 264. 8. Watson, 266. 9. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 79. 10. Watson, 266. 11. Psychopathy i s a matter of degree. I am here concerned with full-blown psychopaths. The following remarks w i l l only apply to p a r t i a l psychopaths insofar as they are psychopathic. 12. Watson, 277. 13. Robert D. Hare mentions such a t e s t i n Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of Psychopaths Among Us. (New York: Pocket Books, 1993), 34. The t e s t i s r e l i a b l e , according to Hare, but requires the cooperation of the one being tested. 14. See Hare's Without Conscience for an excellent introduction into the nature of psychopaths and the hist o r y of how s o c i e t i e s have t r i e d to cope with them. 15. I r e f e r to full-blown psychotics. To the extent that p a r t i a l l y psychotic people are sane, we can use the reactive attitudes towards them. 16. Miles Corwin, "Icy K i l l e r ' s L i f e Steeped i n Violence," Los Angeles Times f May 16, 1982. Copyright, 1982, Los Angeles Times. Reprinted i n Watson, 269-70. 17. Miles Corwin, op. c i t . Reprinted i n Watson, 273-4. 18. Watson, 275. 19. Watson, 271. 98 20. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 79. 21. Watson, "Responsibility and the Limits of E v i l " , 270. 22. Los Angeles Times f A p r i l 22, 1992, A l , 10. Reprinted i n Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. 40-41. 23. Strawson, "Replies", 265. 24. Strawson "Replies", 265. 25. Albert E i n s t e i n , Ideas and Opinions. Crown Publishers, 1982, 8-9, i n Watson, 284. 26. Strawson, 92-3. 27. Lawrence Stern, "Freedom, Blame and Moral Community," Journal of Philosophy. February 14, 1974. Referred to i n Watson, 286. 28. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 76. 29. Perhaps a t o t a l l y benevolent being could also f e e l a form of g u i l t that includes the wish to make reparations f o r a wrong, without f e e l i n g that she should s u f f e r for her actions. G u i l t may not be possible without f e e l i n g bad, and hence s u f f e r i n g . Yet one can s u f f e r without wishing further harm upon oneself. Thus a t o t a l l y benevolent being might suffer g u i l t but only f e e l the wish to make reparations, not the wish to be punished. 9 9 Chapter VII: Bennett's Attempt to Define R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i) Minor Additions to Strawson's Theory Unlike many other c r i t i c s whom I examine, Jonathan Bennett agrees with most of Strawson's proposal. In "Accountability" 1 Bennett points out some in t e r e s t i n g facts about reactive a t t i t u d e s . F i r s t , he agrees that we can sometimes v o l u n t a r i l y hold the objective attitude towards normal people. This means that a person can, at le a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y , choose not to blame someone for an action. This may be psychologically impossible, depending upon the p o t e n t i a l blamer and upon the wrong that i s done. But Bennett uses the p o s s i b i l i t y of withholding blame to help define blameworthiness. According to him, for a person to be blameworthy means only that i t i s not wrong to blame her, not that i t i s wrong not to blame her. Blame i s not obligatory, but i s permissible. Of course, as we can hold the objective attitude f o r only a short time towards normal people, we cannot stop blaming others for wrong actions i n general. Nonetheless, since we are not obliged to f e e l reactive attitudes, they are more than mere recognitions of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness i n others; they also express one's "emotional make-up".2 Some people cannot o f f i c i a l l y withhold blame i n t h i s manner. Judges, for instance, must ensure that the law applies and i s seen to apply equally. A judge's reasons are based upon an objective, instrumental model of what i s best for society, however, rather than upon her reactive attitudes. 100 Yet i t seems there are also cases i n which someone i s culpable i f she f a i l s to respond r e a c t i v e l y towards a normal person. I f a parent's young c h i l d i s beaten by b u l l i e s , i t may be a deficiency not to f e e l indignation on behalf of her c h i l d . This i s because she f a i l s to show the proper attitude of concern and protectiveness towards her c h i l d , with consequent e f f e c t s on the l a t t e r ' s security needs. This may indicate that one can more j u s t i f i a b l y forego resentment than moral indignation. S t i l l , when one has no extraneous reasons that a f f e c t the s u i t a b i l i t y of resentment (or another reactive attitude) appropriateness alone does not e n t a i l that one should be r e s e n t f u l . There are many instances where one can properly choose not to blame another. As with hatred, sometimes i t i s psychologically h e a l t h i e r for a person to r e f r a i n from resenting another (to the extent that t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ) , even i f she i s e n t i t l e d to her resentment. Bennett also contributes to Strawson's argument when he l i s t s new types of reactive attitudes. Bennett mentions that a person can be "morally indignant over someone else's attitudes to natural beauty". 3 Although t h i s indignation i s more properly aesthetic than moral, i t i s a reactive attitude of sorts. This leads to new p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Reactive attitudes do not have to be reactions to someone's attitudes towards a person, but could be reactions to her attitudes towards a work of art, or natural beauty, or non-agents such as the lower animals. This provides a possible basis for allowing animals some moral consideration, although I w i l l not discuss i n t h i s thesis whether or not we are indignant at the 101 abuse of animals due to a v i o l a t i o n of our moral values. In addition, Bennett mentions a s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitude that i s not a reaction towards what someone has done to others, but rather towards what she has done to h e r s e l f . For instance, Bennett suggests that someone might reproach he r s e l f f o r having behaved f o o l i s h l y . 4 She may f e e l an intense form of shame, and she w i l l consider herself responsible for what she did. Yet she might f e e l no g u i l t over what she has done, although she might i f she also offended others. These new examples c i t e d by Bennett are at the edges of what might be considered reactive a t t i t u d e s . 5 They mainly f a l l outside the scope of morality. Yet, they are s t i l l concerned with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . They have access to many of the same excusing conditions, and face the same prima facie threat from determinism. They are also supported against such a threat because of t h e i r being, l i k e the other reactive attitudes, a natural part of our l i v e s . i i ) The D i f f i c u l t y of Defining the Reactive Attitudes Bennett thinks i t important to examine the reactive at t i t u d e s ; a d e f i n i t i o n of these attitudes could lead to a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , or accountability. He holds that someone i s accountable for an action " i f a blame- or praise-r e l a t e d response to the action would not be inappropriate." 6 This leaves open the question of what these blame- or praise-related responses, known as reactive attitudes, are. Therefore, Bennett 102 attempts to define reactive attitudes. While I hope to define r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by other means, i t i s s t i l l worth exploring how far Bennett progresses with his attempt. Unfortunately, Bennett has d i f f i c u l t y defining the reactive attitudes. He f i r s t t r i e s to see i f attitude means manner of regarding, but f a i l s to f i n d any psychological or conceptual manner associated with, and only with, reactive attitudes. On the psychological side, Bennett's only candidate i s to regard something heatedly, i n d i c a t i n g a reactive attitude, or coolly, i n d i c a t i n g an objective attitude. This form of coolness should not be confused with the cool reactive attitudes mentioned i n e a r l i e r chapters. In any case, Bennett recognizes that psychological coolness can apply to reactive a t t i t u d e s . One can have psychologically i c y contempt. Ad d i t i o n a l l y , one can have a hot objective attitude, such as burning c u r i o s i t y . Thus, Bennett does not f i n d the psychological manner of regarding to be a good d e f i n i t i o n of the reactive a t t i t u d e s . 7 As for a conceptual manner, Bennett conceives of two candidates. F i r s t , conceptual manner can merely involve bringing i n the concepts of "person, action, and intention". Yet these concepts also belong to the objective a t t i t u d e . For example, one may surmise that the reason someone runs from a snake i s that she i s scared of i t , and, thus, wishes to escape. 8 On the other hand, one can hold that conceptual manner means viewing someone as an unanalyzed whole. S t i l l , t h i s sort of viewing also can be found unaccompanied by reactive a t t i t u d e s . 9 103 Bennett then investigates whether to hold a reactive attitude i s to regard a person as a ce r t a i n thing. This d e f i n i t i o n requires that reactive attitudes e s s e n t i a l l y involve having b e l i e f s about another person. The b e l i e f s would almost always have to be true since they supposedly define reactive attitudes. These b e l i e f s would be facts pertaining to t h e i r objects. But with t h i s account Bennett would have to define reactive attitudes only as fa c t s , or at least what are thought to be f a c t s , about other people. This d e f i n i t i o n ignores the "emotional" component of reactive attitudes that c r u c i a l l y distinguishes them from the objective a t t i t u d e . 1 0 More promisingly, Bennett t r i e s to define a reactive attitude as "a posture of the mind which i s apt for inter-action of a certain kind".11 He thinks that he can define reactive attitudes i f he can specify the kind of interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p of which they are elements. This approach seems promising, but the problem i s only pushed one step back. He must now f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n now for the exact kind of interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s f o r which reactive attitudes are appropriate. For instance, a p s y c h i a t r i s t and a patient have some sort of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p , but the attitude involved i n the treatment i s not reactive. Bennett despairs of finding "some unarbitrary and uncircular constraint(s) on what i s to count as a kind [of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p ] " for the purpose of defining reactive a t t i t u d e s . 1 2 Fortunately, we do not need a to f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n for reactive attitudes i n order to f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n of 104 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , although I defer the l a t t e r d e f i n i t i o n to chapter IX. Bennett successfully l i n k s reactive attitudes to i n t e r -personal re l a t i o n s h i p s of a ce r t a i n kind. This proves useful for Bennett's l a t e r proposals. i i i ) The Objective Attitude and T e l e o l o g i c a l Inquiry Before looking at the l i n k between reactive attitudes and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , however, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to look at Bennett's characterization of the objective a t t i t u d e . Bennett hopes that t h i s w i l l both shed l i g h t on reactive attitudes and explain the source and strength of the tension between the two types of attitu d e . He acknowledges that the attitudes can be mixed, such as when one i s dealing with a growing c h i l d . Yet he maintains that a thoroughly objective' attitude i s incompatible with the reactive attitudes; one cannot hold the former and the l a t t e r simultaneously. Of course, contra Bennett, we may be unable to take a thoroughly objective attitude towards normal people; Strawson takes t h i s view. 1 3 S t i l l , Bennett believes that one can temporarily cast out one's reactive attitudes by taking up an objective a t t i t u d e . 1 4 Certainly upon taking the l a t t e r one must almost e n t i r e l y suppress the former. Thus, the tension between the two sorts of attitude i s strong. Bennett supposes that the source of the c o n f l i c t might be due to "the l i m i t s on how much mental var i e t y one can manage at a single time", or that "reactive attitudes e s s e n t i a l l y prepare for personal i n t e r a c t i o n while the objective attitude prepares for 105 inquiry, these two sorts of activity being somehow incompatible" 1 5 (emphasis h i s ) . I believe that the tension might be conceptual. Just as one may have trouble conceiving a horse to be a l l white and a l l black at the same time, so one may have trouble conceiving a person to be both responsible and not responsible, or both an object to be handled and a person with whom to have a human re l a t i o n s h i p . In the case of a r e a l horse, however, we can f i n d out what colour i t a c t u a l l y i s , while i n the case of our attitudes towards an agent, we can hold the objective attitude v o l u n t a r i l y towards an agent for whom we can also adopt the reactive attitudes. We can thus switch conceptions and temporarily choose to view someone as not responsible whom we would otherwise see as responsible. Therefore, the tension between attitudes may be more subtle than i s that between conceptions. I t i s enough to accept that a strong tension exists between the reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Bennett defines the l a t t e r as an atti t u d e of inquiry: "To adopt the objective attitude towards something i s to inquire into how i t i s structured and/or how i t functions." 1 6 He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with those sorts of objective attitude that generate t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry, or inquiry towards an end, and not mere t h e o r e t i c a l i n q u i r y . 1 7 He also holds that reactive attitudes never generate t e l e o l o g i c a l i n q u i r i e s , and proposes a property of reactive attitudes, i f not a d e f i n i t i o n . "The atti t u d e of x towards y i s reactive if and only if i t i s a pro or con attitude which could not explain x's engaging i n t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry into 106 how y works" 1 8 (emphasis Bennett's) . We w i l l not f i n d t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry i n a l l cases pertaining to the objective attitude, as sometimes people adopt the attitude when they seek t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge only. Nevertheless, Bennett believes that within the realm of pro and con attitudes, t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the objective a t t i t u d e . 1 9 Bennett suggests a t h i r d type of att i t u d e which i s neither reactive nor objective. "What I propose i s t h i s : i f x's attitude to y does generate t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry, to that extent i t i s objective; i f i t could not do so, i t i s reactive; i f i t could but does not, i t i s neither" 2 0 (emphasis Bennett's) . As an example of t h i s t h i r d type of attitude, Bennett proposes a passerby being disgusted by a beggar and hurrying away from her. Bennett does not think that the attitude of disgust i s reactive, since " i t i s too close to what [one] might f e e l about a dead animal i n the gutter". 2 1 Bennett also maintains that i t i s not objective, since i t apparently does not generate t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry, although, i f the passerby had stayed to study the beggar i n order to help her, then t h i s inquiry could have been motivated by the passerby's disgust. I disagree with Bennett on there being a t h i r d sort of attitud e . I think that the attitude of disgust i n the above example i s objective. Furthermore, I believe that, although inquiry i s often associated with the objective attitudes, we can also make t e l e o l o g i c a l i n q u i r i e s that have t h e i r source i n the 107 reactive attitudes. For instance, I can be g r a t e f u l to someone for doing a good deed for me and then t r y to discover what would be an appropriate g i f t for my benefactor. Bennett redefines what counts as a t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry i n order to disallow t h i s sort of case, but I believe that the d i s t i n c t i o n he makes i s an ad hoc r e p a i r . He holds that t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry "seeks truths which can be applied i n the pursuit of ends which are viewed as desirable either inherently or as means to some subsequent inherent good." 2 2 Yet, my example seems to be a matter of t e l e o l o g i c a l inquiry, contra Bennett. 2 3 More importantly, I regard the objective attitude to be more e s s e n t i a l l y concerned with t r e a t i n g something as merely an object and not as a person, or subject, than with i n q u i r i e s . I believe that the reactive and objective attitudes are complementary; I wish to avoid postulating a t h i r d type of attitude i f an a l t e r n a t i v e explanation requires only two. I think that i t i s plausible to view the above case of disgust as an example of having an objective attitude towards someone, since the beggar i s treated as an object. Therefore, I r e j e c t Bennett's proposal of a t h i r d sort of a t t i t u d e . iv) Interpersonal Relations and the Reactive Attitudes Bennett i s more successful when he examines the l i n k between interpersonal r e l a t i o n s and reactive attitudes. He notes that Strawson's account seems inadequate to explain the r e l a t i o n between reactive attitudes and some interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . As Bennett sees i t , on Strawson's o r i g i n a l account one must have 108 interpersonal r e l a t i o n s before one can have reactive a t t i t u d e s . 2 4 Unfortunately, t h i s i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to explain the reactive attitudes one can f e e l towards a stranger who does something minor to one, good or bad. The action i s immediate, and does not require a previous interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p i n order to be meaningful. The interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p the action generates, i f any, appears to be too meagre to give r i s e to reactive attitudes; i t i s not what we mean by the web of interpersonal r e l a t i o n s of which people are a part, and which we would regret losing, i f reactive attitudes were absent from humanity. Bennett surmises that interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s have a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t connection to reactive attitudes than Strawson outlines: "What should be emphasized, I suggest, i s not the re l a t i o n s within which reactive attitudes a r i s e , but rather the re l a t i o n s towards which they point" 2 5 (emphasis Bennett's). Thus, one uses the reactive attitudes to create or attempt to create an interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f i t does not e x i s t already between the person who holds the reactive attitude and the one who i s i t s object. As a caveat, I believe that a person must be part of a network of interpersonal relationships before such reactive attitudes can be learned. Thus, a c h i l d r a i sed i n the wild cannot immediately have reactive attitudes merely by t r y i n g to create interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . She must r e l y on others to create interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s with her f i r s t , and, thus, give her a sense of being part of a moral community. In general, however, I believe that Bennett gives a good account of how our reactive 109 attitudes work. In some cases, a person may f a i l to create an interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p , as when someone i n i t i a l l y resents being pushed, but then r e a l i z e s that the person doing the pushing i s having a psychotic episode or i s , i n some other way, excused from being responsible for what appears to be an expression of a harmful a t t i t u d e . 2 6 Bennett's explanation of the reactive attitudes thus seems to f i t i n with Strawson's account of excuses, and proves useful i n resolving some puzzles. We f i n d some of these puzzles when we examine the s e l f -r eactive and vicarious reactive attitudes. In both cases, e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , i t i s hard to see exactly how the interpersonal r e l a t i o n s are set up. I f Arnold i s indignant because of Betty's treatment of Carol, then who has the interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p that leads to the moral indignation, Arnold and Betty or Betty and Carol? Yet, i f the reactive attitudes create an interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p , we can answer t h i s question. Arnold i s indignant, and, therefore, a c t u a l l y or imaginatively creates a re l a t i o n s h i p between himself and Betty, the person he blames. He thus makes what Betty does to Carol h i s business, even i f he had never before had anything to do with either woman. In the s e l f - r e a c t i v e case, one imaginatively forms a r e l a t i o n s h i p between one's present s e l f and a past s e l f . 2 7 This way of understanding reactive attitudes as creating the grounds for addressing the wrongdoer (or rightdoer, as the case may be) i s adopted by Watson i n "Responsibility and the Limits of E v i l . " 2 8 110 He sees Bennett's account as a useful way of looking at reactive attitudes. Watson uses i t to examine the underlying grounds for the effectiveness of the excuses that disengage the reactive attitudes. Thus Bennett, with h i s account of the l i n k between reactive attitudes and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , may i n d i r e c t l y help to form a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Bennett's account works for the p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes, such as pride, gratitude, and moral appreciation, as well as the negative ones. In each case, one can think of these reactive attitudes as s e t t i n g the stage for an interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f one does not already e x i s t . 2 9 I t does Bennett c r e d i t that his account can adequately interpret both the p o s i t i v e and the negative reactive attitudes. Bennett provides a h e l p f u l examination of the t h e o r e t i c a l l y nonimperative nature of blame, and of various types of reactive attitudes not considered by Strawson. He also presents a useful way of looking at the l i n k between reactive attitudes and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . Nevertheless, he f a i l s to f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n for the reactive attitudes. As the reactive attitudes seems to be linked to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n some way, t h i s indicates that i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to formulate i t s d e f i n i t i o n . I l l 1. Bennett, Jonathan, "Accountability" i n Philosophical Subjects. 14-47. 2. Bennett, 24. 3. Bennett, 45. 4. Bennett, 46. 5. Strawson notes that there are some behaviours that are not attitudes towards people and yet may receive reactive attitudes as a response i n h i s "Replies", 266. 6. Bennett, 39. 7. Bennett, 32. 8. Bennett, "Accountability", 32-3. 9. Bennett, "Accountability", 33. 10. Bennett, 33-4. 11. Bennett, 34. 12. Bennett, 36. 13. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 80. 14. Bennett, 39. 15. Bennett, 40. 16. Bennett, 21. 17. Some cases of reactive attitudes spark t h e o r e t i c a l inquiry. For instance, one could be gr a t e f u l for an unexpected inheritance, and through inquiry, f i n d out that one received i t due to a resemblance to the benefactor's l a t e husband. E a r l Winkler provided t h i s example. 18. Bennett, 38. 19. Bennett, 3 6-7. 20. Bennett, 38. 21. Bennett, "Accountability", 38. Note that t h i s form of disgust i s d i f f e r e n t from the moral disgust we would f e e l towards a moral reprobate. I t i s unfortunate that the same word describes two separate emotions. 112 22. Bennett, 37. 23. Bennett, 37. One could argue that helping one's benefactors, when f e a s i b l e , might be an inherent good, though a supererogatory one. This i s not to say that i t could not c o n f l i c t with other inherent goods. 24. Bennett, 42. 2 5. Bennett, 43. 26. As described below, the r e l a t i o n s h i p that i s created can be hypothetical. I f one l a t e r finds out that people laughed at one's being pushed, then resentment would create a hypothetical r e l a t i o n s h i p with them, even i f one never met them. 27. Bennett, 44. 28. Watson, 264-75. 29. Interestingly, reactive attitudes, or a lack thereof, can themselves be reacted to. A lack of gratitude on one person's part may lead to resentment on another's. 113 Chapter VIII: On "Moral Luck" i) Variable Consequences and Moral Tests I wish to examine the i n t u i t i o n s behind the idea that i t would be i r r a t i o n a l to praise or blame people i f determinism were true. I w i l l not argue against these i n t u i t i o n s here, as I believe that Strawson and Wolf have adequately shown that i t i s not i r r a t i o n a l to hold the reactive attitudes, regardless of the v a l i d i t y of determinism. By inspecting these i n t u i t i o n s i n d e t a i l , however, I may be able to f i n d out why they seem a t t r a c t i v e . I also hope to explain why c e r t a i n things should be excluded from a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . n The i n t u i t i o n s i n question are c l e a r l y expressed i n Thomas Nagel's "Moral Luck". 1 Nagel divides them into four basic types, each of which seems persuasive. Together, they appear to leave the moral s e l f with nothing to do, and, i n a sense, nothing to be. The f i r s t category of moral luck deals with how the r e s u l t s of one's plans are affected by external circumstances. Nagel examines the case of negligence, exemplified by a drunken dr i v e r who swerves on to a sidewalk. We consider him a more blameworthy agent i f he h i t s and k i l l s a c h i l d than i f he merely drives on to an empty sidewalk. Yet, whether or not the c h i l d i s there i s beyond the driver's control. On the heroic side, we praise a fireman who saves a c h i l d from a burning b u i l d i n g more than we do one who t r i e s but f a i l s . 2 In addition to cases l i k e these, Nagel looks at decisions made under uncertainty. "Someone who launches a v i o l e n t 114 revolution against an authoritarian regime knows that i f he f a i l s he w i l l be responsible for much su f f e r i n g that i s i n vain, but i f he succeeds he w i l l be j u s t i f i e d by the outcome."3 Also, people can know i n advance that whether they w i l l be held mildly or greatly culpable for an action, or even whether they w i l l be praised or blamed for i t , w i l l depend on many external factors beyond t h e i r c o n t r o l . Moral agents are subject to variatio n s of blame and praise based upon the r e s u l t s of actions, many aspects of which are beyond an agent's control. Although t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t about moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that deserves more discussion, i t i s not relevant to my thes i s . Unlike some other forms of moral luck that Nagel discusses, t h i s one does not support an i n t u i t i o n that people are not responsible agents at a l l . Whether a drunken dri v e r i s responsible for manslaughter or not, he i s s t i l l responsible for d r i v i n g while impaired. On the other hand, t h i s type of moral luck i l l u s t r a t e s how we t r e a t responsible agents d i f f e r e n t l y , depending upon the outcome of t h e i r plans and desires. This seems to be unfai r . We judge the intention of an agent who attempts an action or makes a decision under uncertainty; yet, i f the consequences of her action are variable and can be affected by external factors beyond her control, why do we also judge her for these consequences? This sort of judgement i s apparently part of human nature; people blame a criminal less for an attempted murder than f o r a successful one. Yet i s human judgement r a t i o n a l i n these cases? 115 Wolf's and Strawson's defences of the r a t i o n a l i t y of taking reactive attitudes do not s e t t l e t h i s question, since we continue to hold the actor to be a responsible agent. Thus, the question of whether we would be more r a t i o n a l i f we d i d not judge r e s u l t s , but only intentions, i s an open one. I t i s possible to point to some considerations that support the r a t i o n a l i t y of judging people on the basis, not only of t h e i r attitudes, but also the actions r e s u l t i n g from them. F i r s t , there are l e g a l problems, such as how to punish the drunken d r i v e r i n the above case. Should we l e t someone g u i l t y of manslaughter o f f with a fine? Surely not. Yet i t also seems impractical and unjust to give everyone found g u i l t y of drunken d r i v i n g a sentence equivalent to that for manslaughter. 4 P r a c t i c a l matters aside, people apparently must accept that each action they choose contains an element of r i s k . Thus, a person who chooses to drive while drunk runs the r i s k of getting caught, or of seriously harming herself or others, but decides to take that r i s k . Therefore, i f she does get apprehended for impaired d r i v i n g , she simply gambled and l o s t , and, thus, has no reason not to be punished for her action. 5 I f she k i l l s someone while d r i v i n g impaired, then she has also l o s t her gamble, and can be blamed f o r taking such a huge r i s k with other people's l i v e s . Yet, i f she does not k i l l someone, then, although the i n i t i a l r i s k i s the same, she has won the gamble. She i s s t i l l to blame for drunken d r i v i n g , but i s not g u i l t y of manslaughter. Daniel Dennett employs a sports metaphor to portray a 116 counterintuition to the apparent unfairness of blaming someone for the r e s u l t s of her actions. In basketball, we do not discount a shot merely because i t was lucky, or allow a shot that barely missed to count for points. Yet, external factors beyond the control of the shooter may have affected the shot, such as how she caught the b a l l j ust before she shot, or that a key defensive player was i n an accident and so could not play i n that game. Luck i s simply part of the game, as i t i s a part of l i f e ; we do not consider disallowing lucky shots i n the game.6 Should we disallow unlucky r e s u l t s i n l i f e ? Perhaps, i f the r e s u l t s were unforeseeable, but one of a number of foreseeable possible outcomes occurs, then i t seems f a i r to hold someone responsible for choosing a path that could lead to that outcome, among others, even i f the person does not want that p a r t i c u l a r outcome. Dennett believes that, given that we are f i n i t e beings who have to make decisions within a lim i t e d period of time, we are e n t i t l e d to be somewhat a r b i t r a r y i n our manner of holding others responsible, i n order to promote wiser r i s k - t a k i n g strategies, usually strategies that minimize the r i s k to others. 7 This provides an objective reason to take c e r t a i n reactive attitudes, which appears to undermine Strawson's account of the framework of the reactive attitudes as not needing a defence against external c r i t i c i s m . Yet, Strawson does hold that, given that we are responsible beings, u t i l i t a r i a n considerations i n moral condemnation and l e g a l punishment s t i l l have a r o l e to play. 8 In any case, our concern to reduce dangerous r i s k - t a k i n g strategies 117 does not inv a l i d a t e the reactive attitudes that motivate our punishing people for the harmful r e s u l t s of such r i s k - t a k i n g . Therefore, blaming a person for the r e s u l t s of her actions, as well as f o r her attitudes towards other people as expressed i n those actions, appears compatible with Strawson's viewpoint. Nevertheless, t h i s compatibility rests upon our r e f r a i n i n g from blaming people merely for the r e s u l t s of t h e i r actions. We must also take into account t h e i r intentions. Thus we excuse agents from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or unforeseen accidents. We do not blame someone who pushes another i n a crowd s o l e l y as a r e s u l t of being suddenly j o s t l e d h erself. This points to one factor that should not be i n a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We should hold people responsible for foreseeable e f f e c t s of t h e i r choices. Yet we should not require that only people able to predict the exact r e s u l t s of t h e i r actions are to be considered responsible agents. This w i l l modify some views of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We thus sometimes hold people responsible for the r e s u l t s of t h e i r actions, even when they did not desire those p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s . We hold them responsible so long as those r e s u l t s were foreseeable as possible outcomes of her actions. Therefore, to be responsible, an agent requires only a general knowledge of the possible foreseeable r e s u l t s of her choices. By investigating the above form of moral luck we discovered some important facts about the nature of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and of our reactive attitudes. The next form of moral luck seems to 118 undermine the r a t i o n a l i t y of reactive attitudes more seriously. This type of moral luck i s exemplified by the Nazi concentration camp guard who would have led a quiet l i f e i n Argentina i f he had l e f t Germany for business reasons i n 1930, or by the c i t i z e n of Argentina who a c t u a l l y led a quiet l i f e but would have become a Nazi guard i f he had l e f t for Germany i n 1930. There are c e r t a i n moral t e s t s that some people face. They pass or f a i l these t e s t s , and we praise or blame them accordingly. On the other hand, there are other people who never face these moral t e s t s . I f they had, then they would be candidates f o r praise or blame fo r how they reacted. As i t stands, although they are s t i l l moral agents, they have a d i f f e r e n t moral record because they have not faced that p a r t i c u l a r moral t e s t . Furthermore, i t seems a matter of luck whether they have to face that t e s t within t h e i r l i f e t i m e s or not. 9 This form of luck, l i k e the f i r s t one, does not deny that there are responsible moral agents. I t does show that blaming or p r a i s i n g an agent depends, at least p a r t l y , upon t e s t s that she either does or does not face and whether or not she faces them i s con t r o l l e d by factors external to her. "A person can only be responsible for what he does; but what he does r e s u l t s from a great deal that he does not do". 1 0 I think that a defence can be made of the r a t i o n a l i t y of our reactive attitudes i n t h i s case. Although our reactive attitudes are p r i m a r i l y reactions to others' attitudes, we cannot always e a s i l y determine what those attitudes are. When someone faces a 119 moral t e s t and acts well or badly, we can examine her action and conclude what her attitude must be. But when a person does not face such a moral te s t , we have no means of knowing what her attitude would have been. Since we do not have enough data to judge what her attitude would be i n such a s i t u a t i o n , we do not see her as e s p e c i a l l y heroic or v i l l a i n o u s . Rather, we render a f a i r l y neutral judgement of her, at lea s t i n respect to t e s t s that she has not faced. I t i s not i r r a t i o n a l f o r us to withhold judgements when ignorant of data e s s e n t i a l to making those judgements. Once a person passes or f a i l s a moral t e s t , then our reactive attitudes come into play. This reveals another element to omit from a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We should not require an agent to know exactly what moral t e s t s she w i l l face. Certainly she should not have to face a t r y i n g moral t e s t i n order f o r us to consider her a responsible agent. i i ) Character, Attitudes and Contra-Causal Freedom Although we cannot know what te s t s we w i l l face, we can, i n general, prepare to meet them by t r y i n g to be good people, that i s , to have the proper attitudes towards others. This inculc ation of good character w i l l help us pass the moral t e s t s we might face. On the other hand, there are those who argue that nobody i s responsible for her own character. These people argue that we are victims of moral luck i n character formation. This t h i r d sort of moral luck, 1 1 unlike the previous sorts, i s an attack on a 120 person's being a responsible agent. We have seen one example of i t i n the case of the murderer Robert Harris, as described by Watson i n chapter VI. Harris's character seems to have been formed through h i s being abused by h i s parents and by h i s fellow inmates. Furthermore, we, as observers of Harris's history, cannot be e n t i r e l y c e r t a i n that we would not have become as c r u e l , v i c i o u s and cold-blooded as he, i f we had had the same upbringing. "The f a c t that my p o t e n t i a l for e v i l has not been nearly so f u l l y actualized i s , for a l l I know, something for which I cannot take credit...only those who have survived circumstances such as those that ravaged Harris are i n a good p o s i t i o n to know what they would have done." 1 2 This example combines two forms of moral luck: that involved with having to face a moral t e s t and that involved i n the formation of one's character. The l a t t e r i s more appropriate, l i k e l y to make one wonder about Harris's bad luck, however, since h i s unfortunate formative circumstances began when he was very young, before he could have been considered a moral agent at a l l . My answer to the problem of luck a f f e c t i n g the formation of one's character i s s i m i l a r to the answer to the problem of luck involved i n what te s t s one w i l l face i n l i f e . We do not know how we would have acted had we had the upbringing Harris had. We know that some people with just as h o r r i b l e an upbringing grow up to be moral adults. We also know that Harris turned out to be e v i l , and we can judge him for h i s e v i l actions because of t h i s . Ferdinand Schoeman s i m i l a r l y points out that a disproportionate number of people who grow up i n poorer 121 neighbourhoods w i l l turn to criminal a c t i v i t y . An accident of t h e i r place of b i r t h seems to have been a factor i n t h e i r becoming cr i m i n a l s . 1 3 The same reply can be made i n t h i s case as to the case of Robert Harris. We deplore l i v i n g conditions that can influence one to become a criminal, and as a society we should do everything we can to provide people with decent environments to grow up i n . S t i l l , we hold people responsible for t h e i r actions, whatever upbringing they may have had. We know that some people transcend unfortunate backgrounds and become good c i t i z e n s . We hold the same requirement of character formation and s e l f -evaluation f o r people with these backgrounds as for people with more fortunate ones. There are c e r t a i n attitudes towards others, such as a r e l a t i v e l y stable benevolence, that we as members of a moral community simply require of each other. Thus, although as a society we are obliged to impart a moral education to our c i t i z e n s , they are s t i l l faced with the requirement to be good on t h e i r own. Therefore, we blame them for wrong actions that r e s u l t from malevolent attitudes. We also judge people for these attitudes themselves, even i f the attitudes are not manifested i n actions. Nagel gives the example of the man who cannot help f e e l i n g envious of others, although he does not reveal t h i s to others or do anything to impugn t h e i r success. 1 4 Whether or not i t i s i r r a t i o n a l to judge someone for attitudes that she may not have had any control i n developing i s , I think, answered by the following. We are a l l , to some extent, 122 subject to the whims of fate i n the attitudes that are impressed upon us when we are very young. Yet humans beings can and do r e f l e c t upon the appropriateness of t h e i r own a ttitudes. Thus, we are capable of modifying our attitudes to a great degree. For example, a c h i l d growing up i n a r a c i s t household both can and i s expected to r e f l e c t upon her r a c i s t attitudes and thus overcome her racism, even i f t h i s i s more d i f f i c u l t f o r her than for someone who grew up i n a more l i b e r a l household. By the time we are adults, we should be able to judge those attitudes we hold that are morally repugnant and work to reduce them. Thus, we are responsible agents whom people count on to be good and to show the proper attitudes towards others. Charles Taylor makes the point that, once we are adults, our character formation i s our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "Because t h i s s e l f - r e s o l u t i o n i s something we do, when we do i t , we can be c a l l e d responsible for ourselves; and because i t i s within l i m i t s always up to us to do i t , even when we don't...we can be c a l l e d responsible...for ourselves whether we undertake t h i s r a d i c a l evaluation or not." 1 5 Dennett makes a s i m i l a r point i n chapter 4 of Elbow Room.16 Therefore, another f a c t about a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s that i t should not require us to meet the impossible condition of creating ourselves from scratch. Nevertheless, i t may require us, to a considerable degree, to be able to modify ourselves progressively to become agents of better and better moral character. Harry Frankfurt r a i s e s another issue concerning the reformation of one's character. 1 7 He stresses that people are 123 responsible only for those actions that are w i l l e d by them. Furthermore, they are responsible only for the w i l l that moves them to actions, i f i t i n turn i s a w i l l that they desire. They must i d e n t i f y with the w i l l as " t h e i r own"; they must not have the w i l l that moves them to action be a w i l l that they disapprove of, from a higher l e v e l of judgement. Frankfurt gives the example of an unwilling drug addict, whose desire to take the drug w i l l cause her to take i t . She wishes that t h i s desire did not move her to action, but, rather, that her desire to be free of the drug (which she i d e n t i f i e s as more her own desire) prevailed and caused her to r e f r a i n from taking the drug. I sympathize with the view that addictions of t h i s sort can be treated as a sickness and, thus, as out of the control of the agent. Nevertheless, people who commit a n t i s o c i a l actions, such as s t e a l i n g or k i l l i n g , i n order to feed t h e i r drug habits, are not, thereby, either l e g a l l y or morally excused from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s t e a l i n g or k i l l i n g , regardless of whether they i d e n t i f y with t h e i r desire to feed t h e i r addiction or not. I t may be that a person i s now so f a r gone i n her addiction that she can no longer stop herself from taking the drug, even i f she underwent the best drug r e h a b i l i t a t i o n treatments. Perhaps then we would not consider her responsible f o r taking the drug. Yet, i f t h i s i s so, I do not see how she would become more or less responsible for drug-taking merely by being happy or unhappy about being a drug addict. Her higher-level desire not to want the drug might show that her wish to reform her habits i s a sign of good 124 character. S t i l l , t h i s does not make her less responsible for taking the drug. Therefore, I think that an agent's wish to distance h e r s e l f from c e r t a i n of her desires makes her no less responsible for the actions that r e s u l t from those desires, although her wish to reform her moral character i s i t s e l f praiseworthy, and, thus, makes her o v e r a l l a better person than someone who does not t r y to reform her character. I think that a s i g n i f i c a n t point we can glean from Frankfurt i s that moral agents, and only moral agents, are capable of evaluating t h e i r own moral characters i n t h i s way, whether they do so or not. Yet, i f determinism i s true, then some people are determined to succeed i n the reformation of t h e i r characters, whereas others are determined to f a i l . Thus we turn to the fourth type of moral luck, which i s the o r i g i n a l doctrine of determinism raised i n chapter I I . Of the four types of moral luck, i t seems to be the most threatening to people's sense of being responsible agents. I have already addressed the concerns raised by t h i s form of moral luck, however, and I w i l l not recount them here. I w i l l simply note that a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y cannot require one to have contra-causal freedom, since determinism neither can nor should a f f e c t our holding people responsible. i i i ) Christian-Kantian Thought Although the four forms of moral luck that Nagel describes have been shown not to be a threat to an agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , they c e r t a i n l y seem i n t u i t i v e l y convincing upon f i r s t glance. Why 125 does the doctrine of moral luck so e a s i l y influence us to believe that nobody i s responsible? Jonathan Bennett proposes one f a i r l y convincing answer. Bennett describes the S p i n o z i s t i c view, which i s the attempt to j u s t i f y taking the objective attitude towards everyone a l l of the time. He states that the S p i n o z i s t i c view draws support from what he c a l l s Christian-Kantian thought. This thought maintains that moral worth cannot depend upon natural advantage. The basis of t h i s view i s that God or Nature created people with the a b i l i t y to transcend t h e i r natural causal h i s t o r y ; thus, we can choose to be good or e v i l , regardless of t h e i r empirical conditioning. Otherwise, i t seems unfair for a God to create our natural circumstances, create us within the context of the natural realm, and then blame us when we act as we are empirically conditioned to a c t . 1 8 Christian-Kantian thought has a l o t of support i n our culture, but i t requires of each of us the seemingly impossible condition of being able to create from scratch one's enti r e moral character. As Bernard Williams says, "No human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which i s relevant to degrees of moral esteem can escape being an empirical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , subject to empirical conditions, psychological history, and i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a t i o n " . 1 919. Bennett, 26. 2 0 The popularity of Christian-Kantian thought has consequences. People are capable of suspending the reactive attitudes towards responsible agents for a short time. This c a p a b i l i t y , combined 126 with how Christian-Kantian thought makes people f e e l that they, i n some sense, should exercise i t , leads them to believe that Spinozism i s r a t i o n a l l y required. Bennett characterizes t h e i r s i t u a t i o n as follows: the temporary taking of the objective a t t i t u d e leads to a momentary evaporation of the reactive emotions. People then compare t h i s evaporation with other s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e i r emotions have been disengaged, such as when they were at f i r s t a f r a i d of something harmless, but then saw that there was no reason to fear. They may then f a l s e l y conclude, because for a b r i e f time they no longer f e e l the reactive attitudes, that Christian-Kantian thought has provided a counter-argument to the r a t i o n a l i t y of these attitudes. Furthermore, they are not, i n general, used to seeing blame and praise as reactive emotional attitudes so much as i n t e l l e c t u a l operations. Most people are not Strawsonian t h e o r i s t s , and "when they are swayed by Spinozism don't think of blameworthiness, etc., i n terms of feelings at a l l , and so they w i l l tend to construe t h e i r loss of indignation, etc., as the loss of the judgement that the subject i s "to blame"; and when a judgment i s sent packing by an i n t e l l e c t u a l operation one natur a l l y thinks that i t has been refuted or at l e a s t d i s c r e d i t e d " 2 1 (emphasis his) . Thus, people think that the reactive attitudes are d i s q u a l i f i e d when they are r e a l l y only temporarily d i s p e l l e d . 2 2 This may help to explain why Nagel's examples of moral luck seem at f i r s t to be so persuasive. Overall, Nagel's a r t i c l e provides some insig h t s into the nature of our reactive attitudes. Although I think that the 127 defence of our being, on the whole, responsible creatures can withstand h i s assault, he does show how complex our reactive attitudes can be. For instance, we take the externally conditioned r e s u l t s of actions into account when judging someone's atti t u d e towards others. Also, by examining these forms of moral luck we have uncovered some things that are not part of a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We should not require human beings to do any of the following: 1) be able to predict the r e s u l t s of t h e i r actions exactly, 2) know what moral t e s t s they w i l l face, 3) be able to create t h e i r own characters from nothing (although they should be able to modify the character they happen to have), and 4) have contra-causal freedom. S t i l l , these negative conditions leave open the question of what does go into a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t i s to t h i s that I now turn. 128 1. Nagel, "Moral Luck", i n Free W i l l . Gary Watson, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 174-86. 2. Nagel, 175, 178. 3. Nagel, 179. 4. Michael Feld takes a very d i f f e r e n t point of view i n h i s unpublished paper "The Drunkenness Defense", delivered at The University of B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1995. 5. See Dennett, Elbow Room. 162, for a further exploration of t h i s aspect of moral luck. 6. Dennett, 94. 7. Dennett, 164-5. 8. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", 96. 9. Nagel, 175, 182. 10. Nagel, 182. 11. Nagel, 181. This form of luck i s a c t u a l l y mentioned before that of the moral t e s t s a person faces, but I f e l t i t more appropriate to a l t e r t h e i r places i n order to show the types of moral luck i n increasing order of the scope of t h e i r attacks upon a person's sense of being a responsible agent. 12. Watson, 276-7. 13. Schoeman, Ferdinand "Introduction" i n Responsibility. Character, and the Emotions. 7, e s p e c i a l l y footnote 10. 14. Nagel, 181. 15. Taylor, Charles, "Responsibility for S e l f " i n Free W i l l . 126. 16. Dennett, 97-8. 17. Frankfurt, Harry G., "Freedom of the W i l l and the Concept of a Person" i n Free W i l l . 81-95. 18. In fact, Bennett holds that Christian-Kantian thought i s l o g i c a l l y u n s a t i s f i a b l e , since i t requires us to be " "free" or "autonomous" or "self-made" i n a sense i n which i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible to be free or autonomous or self-made." Bennett, 24-5. 19. 129 Bernard Williams, "Morality and the Emotions", reprinted i n h i s Problems of the Self (Cambridge, 1973), 207-229. 21. Bennett, 28. 22. Bennett, 28-9. 130 Chapter IX: Responsibility i) Reactive Attitudes and Reflection Any d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y congruent with Strawson's views should take into account our reactive attitudes. As we cannot dispose of these attitudes, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to examine what they cause us to do. For example, one of the major e f f e c t s of g u i l t i s to persuade us to make reparations for our misdeeds. More generally, the reactive attitudes dispose us to reform our character, or that of others. Reactive attitudes thus motivate us to improve our character. We cannot help having t h i s motive, since we cannot help being creatures with reactive attitudes; yet, we also have moral reasons to improve our own and others' character. Although they d i f f e r on many points, most moral theories agree that i t i s generally a good thing to improve one's own moral character, or to a s s i s t i n improving that of others. 1 Thus, the reactive attitudes influence us to do something that i s considered morally good. Another morally s i g n i f i c a n t natural f a c t about us i s that we are capable of r e f l e c t i n g upon our own dis p o s i t i o n s and character - how we tend to act i n ce r t a i n situations, or which r i s k - t a k i n g strategies we take. An example of the l a t t e r i s the degree of attention we pay to the road while d r i v i n g , usually less on an empty highway than on a crowded c i t y s t r e e t . Moreover, t h i s capacity f o r s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s very highly developed. We can represent our r e f l e c t i o n s to ourselves using language, either i n speech or i n thought. Our s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e a b i l i t y has been 131 examined by Taylor 2, but i s more c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e d i n Dennett's Elbow Room.3 Dennett points out that our brains approximate the behaviour of perfect r a t i o n a l w i l l s . Although we are not p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l creatures, taking every s i g n i f i c a n t modification of our environment into account, our brains "are cunningly designed to be not i n f i n i t e l y but i n d e f i n i t e l y s e n s i t i v e to meaningful changes." 4 We can correct our occasional f a i l u r e to take s i g n i f i c a n t f a cts into account through further s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n . Unfortunately, we cannot continue the process of r e f l e c t i o n forever - eventually we have to act 5 - yet, we can continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . We cut o f f the r e f l e c t i o n process when we f e e l that we have thought about something enough. Our capacity for s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s l i k e the a b i l i t y of birds to f l y . Neither i s negated by determinism. Furthermore, the general a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t upon our own character, and upon the actions which tend to spring from i t , i s what allows us to be responsible agents. When t h i s a b i l i t y i s absent, so i s moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For various reasons, psychopaths, children, and psychotics do not ( f u l l y ) have t h i s a b i l i t y , and so are not ( f u l l y ) responsible. Recognizing t h i s , we do not hold them (f u l l y ) responsible for t h e i r misdeeds. Of course, we are subject to f a c t u a l errors about who has the a b i l i t y of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . In the past women, and people of c e r t a i n races, were sometimes considered not ( f u l l y ) capable of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , nor thus of moral improvement. They were treated as less than f u l l y responsible beings. On the other hand, some 132 lu n a t i c s were thought more capable of r e f l e c t i o n than they were, and thus were treated as more responsible. When we discover such fa c t u a l errors, we correct them and proceed to f e e l reactive attitudes towards these people to a more appropriate degree. Most adults are considered moral agents, responsible f o r t h e i r character and through i t t h e i r actions. We have the capacity to improve our character through s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , and to have t h i s capacity i s to be a responsible being. Thus, since most humans have such a capacity, they are responsible beings. i i ) The Basis of our Excuses S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s not the only general capacity that humans have. Most also have the general capacity to do a number of tasks, from kicking a soccer b a l l to cooking a five-course meal. This i s because humans have the general capacity to learn, and unless they are p h y s i c a l l y or mentally incapacitated, can learn to do a wide var i e t y of physical and mental tasks. People also have the general capacity to be good. That i s , most people can learn the minimum moral requirements put on them by society, and can meet those requirements, i n the sense that anyone with at least one arm can throw a baseball. This general sense of a b i l i t y i s not what we usually mean when we say that someone i s able, for instance, to play hockey. Here we think of the hockey player as having mastered a number of s k i l l s . When we say that she i s able to score a goal when she i s 20 metres from the net we mean that she succeeds i n scoring goals 133 at that distance, either a l l of the time, or most of the time, or s i g n i f i c a n t l y more often than someone untrained i n the s k i l l . We do not say that she has the a b i l i t y to score a 20 metre goal i f she succeeds only one time i n a thousand. We require of people a l e v e l of success, varying with each s k i l l , before we w i l l say that they have mastered that s k i l l , and are able to do the task associated with i t . People can improve t h e i r s k i l l s by i n c u l c a t i n g good habits and removing bad ones. Our hockey player may have learned to grip her s t i c k c o r r e c t l y and not to blink when she shoots. While there i s always room for improvement, a person w i l l reach a point when she has learned enough good habits and eliminated enough bad ones that we consider her able to do a task, such as play professional hockey. To d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s sense of a b i l i t y from the sense of general capacity outlined e a r l i e r , I w i l l r e f e r to the l a t t e r as a general capacity, and the former as performance-ability. There i s a t h i r d sense of a b i l i t y , which I w i l l c a l l micro-a b i l i t y , which might be used to describe whether a person, given her exact physical micro-state and that of her environment at time t, w i l l succeed or f a i l at task x. We do not use p r o b a b i l i t y to describe a person's m i c r o - a b i l i t y to do task x, since i f she succeeds her chance of success i s 1, and i f she f a i l s her chance of success i s 0. Incompatibilists seem to focus on micro-a b i l i t i e s . They think that t a l k of performance-abilities ignores too many environmental factors to be relevant to a discussion of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Conversely, m i c r o - a b i l i t i e s seem to be useless 134 when describing human performance-abilities. The person and the environment w i l l never repeat t h e i r exact physical micro-state. Furthermore, we w i l l never even be able to describe such a micro-state well enough always to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from those of the same person and her environment at a d i f f e r e n t time t ' when her attempt has a d i f f e r e n t outcome than at time t . In fact, the attempt at time t might be the one time i n a thousand that an u n s k i l l e d person succeeds at task x, or that a s k i l l e d person f a i l s . Thus, we cannot use m i c r o - a b i l i t i e s to describe whether a person i s s k i l l e d at a task or not. Moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s linked to the f i r s t two sorts of a b i l i t i e s . Most adults have the general capacity to be good. They are aware of what w i l l help or harm others, and they are ph y s i c a l l y capable of being h e l p f u l . In addition, due to t h e i r general capacity of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , most people have the performance-ability to be good. Unlike with other performance-a b i l i t i e s , people are expected to exercise the performance-ability to be good at a l l times. F a i l i n g to exercise t h i s performance-a b i l i t y thus i s i t s e l f a sign of a low performance-ability to be good. Sometimes one's performance-ability f a l l s below a generally accepted l e v e l . This i s because a person has not acquired enough good habits of character, and has retained too many bad ones. Thus, they are not p r o f i c i e n t enough at being good to be considered people of good character. Here too, we do not consider m i c r o - a b i l i t i e s when we judge a person's moral worth. We consider some r i s k - t a k i n g strategies 135 to be morally acceptable, even i f they do not pay o f f i n a p a r t i c u l a r instance, and others to be unacceptable, even i f they do. I f a ca r e f u l driver h i t s a c h i l d who runs i n front of her, then, i f she took every reasonable precaution, she i s s t i l l allowed to drive. A drunken driver, even i f she h i t s nobody, i s s t i l l considered unsafe. I t i s important to note how much emphasis we put on our moral habits and how they a f f e c t our performance-ability to be good. 6 They form a part of our character, which our reactive attitudes influence us to improve. Sometimes we cannot, as f a r as we can see, s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve a habit or strategy of action to avoid tragedies such as the ca r e f u l d r i v e r ' s , described above. In these cases we hold nobody responsible for bad r e s u l t s ; they are written of f as accidents. The i n a b i l i t y to improve one's habits (not because of some i n c a p a b i l i t y but because there are none better to be found) allows us to excuse accidents, some cases of ignorance and some forms of coercion. We also excuse events that the agent cannot avert, regardless of which strategy she employs, or what habits she has. For example, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r rushes to save a baby i n a basket hanging by a fraying rope over a one hundred metre drop. The rope breaks before she can get to i t , as she knew that i t almost c e r t a i n l y would. She should not be considered responsible f o r the baby's death, because she could have done nothing to save the baby. Indeed, the o f f i c e r t r i e d the best strategy available, even though i t s chance of success was minimal. In general, a person i s not considered responsible f o r accidents, 136 etc., when her character cannot be improved upon to enhance her chances of avoiding s i m i l a r unfortunate happenstances i n the future, or at l e a s t not without disproportionate s a c r i f i c e of other important dispositions and goods. Yet we do not excuse a l l cases of ignorance and coercion. We expect a person to be reasonably aware of her surroundings and to take suitable precautions. To avoid unnecessary ignorance, she should gather enough information to act appropriately i n most si t u a t i o n s . We expect a c e r t a i n l e v e l of knowledge of her. This l e v e l may vary with the r o l e she assumes. For instance, we expect a doctor to know more about what to do i f someone i s choking than i s a layman, and as a doctor she w i l l more l i k e l y be held responsible i f the choker dies because of her ignorance. S i m i l a r l y , we expect a person to avoid s i t u a t i o n s i n which she w i l l f a i r l y l i k e l y be coerced; we demand that she take reasonable (though not excessive) precautions. Moreover, we also hold her responsible i f the coercion i s minor and her action very harmful. In these instances, a person can modify her character, including her information-gathering strategies, to become better able to deal with the world, and less l i k e l y to be a threat to herself or others. That i s why we hold her responsible. Character improvement may also explain why we excuse cases of temporary stress. During these periods, a person abandons her fine-tuned character t r a i t s and r i s k - t a k i n g strategies for cruder ones, because more of her brain i s occupied with dealing with the stress. This may explain why people under stress often make 137 stupid mistakes. The a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t i s one of the f i r s t f i n e -tuned a b i l i t i e s that a stressed person abandons. Thus we wait for the short period of stress to pass before we consider her to be once more responsible. I f the periods of stress are longer or more frequent, then we blame the person for not developing a character i n her less troubled periods that can better deal with stress, and thus sooner re-engage her more competent character t r a i t s . 7 On the other hand, some people have gone insane a f t e r s u f f e r i n g severe disasters. This shows that, i f the periods of stress are severe enough and long enough, we recognize that the person i s insane. She i s no longer a responsible being, since she ceases to have the capacity of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n at a l l . The manner i n which we say that people are responsible for s p e c i f i c actions may seem ar b i t r a r y , e s p e c i a l l y since i t i s motivated by reactive attitudes that we cannot help but f e e l . I t makes sense, given reactive attitudes, not to think of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action as something we simply happen to have. Rather, we should think of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as something we either take f o r ourselves or impose upon others, f o r the purpose of improving character. 8 We thus see taking and imposing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as natural facts of our behaviour: they are the expressions of our reactive attitudes. I t does not seem i r r a t i o n a l to take or ascribe r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , since our desire to improve character i s based upon our reactive attitudes, and we have shown i n chapter IV that they are not i r r a t i o n a l to hold. Moreover, since i t i s considered a morally good thing f o r a person 138 to improve her own or another's character, we should consider taking and imposing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y also to be morally good. Of course, t h i s applies only when to take or impose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l improve a person's character so as to decrease the chance of her performing s i m i l a r wrong actions i n the future. i i i ) Why We Want Responsibility Why do we want r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ? Because we have reactive attitudes, p a r t i c u l a r l y s e l f - r e a c t i v e attitudes, which make us want to improve our character. By taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for our actions, we acknowledge that one of our actions, or thoughts, i s bad and shows us that we have a character flaw within ourselves. We also pledge to s t r i v e to improve our character so that, i n the future, we w i l l not perform relevantly (or sometimes roughly) s i m i l a r actions i n relevantly (or sometimes roughly) s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s . 9 This only makes sense f o r actions that we f e e l occurred because of f a u l t y character. I f we t r i e d to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for other events, such as a lunar e c l i p s e , there would be no p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant character flaw to correct. We take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y only for events i n which our r i s k - t a k i n g and information-gathering strategies, our values, our habits - i n short, our character - play a r o l e . Further, we take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for such events only i f the r o l e that our character plays i s a general one, l i k e l y to be repeated. Although I may, i n t r y i n g to help someone, inadvertently harm her due to unforeseeable circumstances, i t i s s t i l l a good character t r a i t 139 to help people i n general; we may not need any self - m o d i f i c a t i o n . As for us imposing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon others, I believe that Watson's description of reactive attitudes as moral address, summarized i n chapter VI, i s s i g n i f i c a n t . The imposition of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon others i s the process of our addressing them, and demanding that they reform t h e i r character. 1 0 Sometimes our moral address i s hypothetical; we may become indignant towards a di c t a t o r whom we w i l l never meet. In these cases i t may seem that our reactive attitudes do not f u l f i l t h e i r function of attempting to improve another's moral character. Yet even here we may with our reactive attitudes s t i l l have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t upon people whom we do encounter. We a l l act as role-models f o r one another, and by f e e l i n g and expressing our moral indignation at an absent party's e v i l actions we l e t those around us know that we consider such actions reprehensible, and a sign of bad character. Thus, we are not i r r a t i o n a l to ascribe r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to people whom we w i l l never meet. Respo n s i b i l i t y for actions reduces to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a character that r e s u l t s i n such actions. I t would be better i f we had a method of judging someone's character d i r e c t l y , perhaps by reading t h e i r minds, but alas, we are not telepathic, and the best way we can judge someone's character i s through t h e i r actions. iv) Minor Objections Some people may f e e l that my d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s inadequate. For instance, I have concentrated upon negative 140 reactive attitudes, such as g u i l t , resentment, and moral indignation. What about p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes, such as gratitude and moral praise? They c e r t a i n l y cannot act to correct a defect i n character: do they have another purpose? I think that the p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes serve to r e i n f o r c e a good character, one that tends to r e s u l t i n proper actions. These are neither as strong nor as well-defined as negative reactive attitudes. We usually do not praise people merely for doing what i s proper, since that i s expected of them. We reserve p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes for those instances i n which people act above and beyond the c a l l of duty, or at least beyond our expectations. P o s i t i v e reactive attitudes may not require us to be saints, but they do work to reinforce s a i n t l y behaviour should i t occur. We are usually more concerned with negative reactive attitudes; we worry more about the dangers of bad character t r a i t s than of merely mediocre ones. Yet the p o s i t i v e reactive attitudes s t i l l play a r o l e . Sometimes people act better than we expect that they should; sometimes they act worse. The reactive attitudes influence us to avoid bad character t r a i t s while maintaining good ones. Some people also object to the idea that a l l of one's actions are a r e s u l t of her character. 1 1 They might argue that I am ignoring spontaneous acts, such as tossing someone o f f a c l i f f on a momentary whim. I think such acts, when they are harmful, can s t i l l be linked to a character flaw. In the above case, t h i s flaw i s to behave with too much spontaneity i n an inappropriate 141 s i t u a t i o n . Nobody should be the sort of person who throws people o f f c l i f f s on whims, or harms people on whims i n roughly s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s , such as running them over i n one's car. v) On Freedom F i n a l l y , people might object that, although I discuss moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and reactive attitudes, I overlook the concept of freedom. I focus mainly on r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , not freedom, because I believe that the age-old problem of freedom and determinism i s mainly about whether or not we can be morally responsible i n a determined world. Nevertheless, I w i l l say a few words about what freedom i s , and whether i t i s compatible with determinism. I have mentioned that people have the a b i l i t y to do c e r t a i n tasks. In l i f e , we perceive opportunities to bring our a b i l i t i e s into play, to have a e f f e c t upon our environment, or at least, as far as we can see, to increase the chance of doing so. We f e e l that we can act to make a difference to what happens, preferably a b e n e f i c i a l one. The awareness of these chances to use our a b i l i t i e s i s our freedom of perceived opportunity. 1 2 For example, a hockey player might see an opportunity to move closer to the net i n order to exercise her a b i l i t y to score a one meter goal. On the other hand, she might miss an opportunity to score i f she does not notice i t . A spectator might notice such a missed opportunity, and she might be able to show the player that she missed a chance to score. A person might also believe that she sees an opportunity 142 where there are none. For instance, she might buy a t i c k e t from a crooked l o t t e r y operation. She w i l l believe that she has an opportunity to win, but a l l she has i s a f a l s e opportunity. How can we t e l l when an opportunity i s real? Ultimately we cannot, since that would require an understanding of the micro-states of our environment. While we can usually apprehend most environmental factors that provide or deny opportunities to act, we cannot possibly notice a l l of them. The best we can do i s f i r s t , to s t r i v e to become more aware of our environment so that we can perceive as many opportunities to use our performance-a b i l i t i e s as possible, and second, to inform each other of relevant factors that the other person does not notice. S t i l l , some opportunities w i l l be missed. If nobody can see, for instance, any opening for a hockey player to score a goal (the defence might be too good) then we would say that she has no opportunity. Perhaps by some strange combination of events she might have scored. She might have h i t the puck at the c e i l i n g of the stadium, at which point i t would have rebounded o f f of a thrown beer can to f l y into the net j u s t when the goalie a c c i d e n t a l l y t r i p s . Nobody would suspect t h i s opportunity, since nobody could have foreseen i t . Thus the freedom of perceived opportunity, or freedom of opportunity f o r short, i s subjective, or at l e a s t intersubjective, and we can increase t h i s freedom as more opportunities are noticed. When we take opportunities, we f r e e l y choose to do so. This freedom of choice i s a person's a b i l i t y to act as she wishes, out 143 of her perceived options. Freedom of choice i s innate, not only to human beings, but to many lower animals - f o r example, a wolf chooses which deer i n a herd to attack. This freedom i s unaffected by determinism. And since we have demonstrated that we are responsible creatures without recourse to freedom of choice, we do not have to worry about one standard objection to compatibilism. As noted i n chapter I I , inc o m p a t i b i l i s t s have argued that being able to act i n accordance with one's w i l l , i f the w i l l i t s e l f i s determined, i s i n s u f f i c i e n t f or moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But incompatibilists argue only that freedom of choice does not guarantee morality, not that we do not have the capacity to choose i n accordance with our w i l l s . We have t h i s a b i l i t y , j u s t as we have the a b i l i t y of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n that makes us responsible creatures. The two a b i l i t i e s are separate. Freedom of choice i s also separate from the pr a c t i c e of taking or assigning r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s p e c i f i c actions, although t h i s l a t t e r p r a c t i c e does require freedom of choice. A f t e r a l l , one's w i l l i s a part of one's character, and i t i s the connection between character and action that forms the basis of our assigning r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for actions. People desire both freedom of choice and freedom of opportunity. A person's sense of power over the environment w i l l increase i f she sees a number of opportunities to a f f e c t i t , using a number of her a b i l i t i e s . I f she sees no chance to do something that she desires, she suffers a lack of freedom of opportunity. She may s t i l l choose among her available options, exercising her 144 freedom of choice, but w i l l not think t h i s as desirable as perceiving r e a l opportunities to f u l f i l her currently thwarted wishes. On the other hand, a person i s less l i k e l y to be concerned with the lack of freedom of choice, for she can lose her freedom of choice i n only a few cases. She might lose a l l her desires, such as when she i s deeply asleep, and thus have no w i l l f or actions to be congruent with; or else her actions might somehow be e n t i r e l y disconnected from her w i l l , as with someone undergoing an e p i l e p t i c seizure. To lack freedom of choice usually serves as an excuse from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action. Since people desire to be responsible beings, they desire freedom of choice. Nevertheless, as has been shown, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y consists of more than mere freedom of choice; i t i s a judgement of one's character, and of the choices that character leads her to make. Determinism l i m i t s neither the freedom of choice nor that of opportunity. Even i f determinism i s true, our de l i b e r a t i n g process i s s t i l l causally p r i o r to our actions. We can predict how our actions, and t h e i r e f f e c t s upon the environment, would be d i f f e r e n t i f we had made d i f f e r e n t choices, and how our choice would be d i f f e r e n t , had we d i f f e r e n t characters. Our choices determine our actions. Since we f e e l that our choices are determined by our character and thus are our own, we f e e l the same way about our actions. This explains why freedom of choice i s important to us, and why determinism i s not a threat to i t . As for freedom of opportunity, we do not require determinism to be 145 f a l s e i n order to perceive the ways i n which we can use our performance-abilities. We can be determined to notice opportunities and s t i l l r e t a i n our freedom of opportunity. We might also be denied opportunities by other people, but determinism does not deny us opportunities i n t h i s manner. Thus, our freedom i s not r e s t r i c t e d by determinism, but by ignorance and coercion. I have argued that freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are a l i k e i n being unaffected by determinism. Yet the r e l a t i o n s h i p between freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s looser than some have supposed. We are responsible beings because we have the general a b i l i t y to r e f l e c t upon our character, which i s no more t i e d to freedom or determinism than i s a bird's general a b i l i t y to f l y . Our a b i l i t y to perform s p e c i f i c actions, such as scoring a goal, or d r i v i n g safely, i s more c l o s e l y linked to freedom of opportunity, since i t i s the l a t t e r that allows us to use our a b i l i t i e s . To have opportunities and to see them, we need to be free of coercion and ignorance. We cannot score i n hockey i f we are blocked by too many opposing players, or i f we do not know where the net i s . Yet we also need s p e c i f i c performance-abilities, such as the a b i l i t y to score i n hockey. Otherwise, an opportunity to score w i l l be wasted on us. Although we usually have freedom of choice, and do not have to worry about preserving i t , we are expected as human beings to acquire and maintain a c e r t a i n l e v e l of freedom of opportunity. Sometimes, ignorance and coercion do not excuse our mistakes. In 146 these cases we should have taken steps to become aware of opportunities to avoid r e s t r i c t i v e s i t u a t i o n s , and to develop enough knowledge to see appropriate opportunities. Thus, we are responsible for keeping ourselves f a i r l y free. There are overriding circumstances that can prevent us from maintaining our freedom, but i n general we are expected to sustain i t at a c e r t a i n l e v e l . We value our freedom of opportunity. S t i l l , as opposed to the common view that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y requires freedom, the converse seems true. Our l e v e l of freedom can increase or decrease, but i s separate from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We need only the general a b i l i t y to modify our character, not freedom of opportunity, i n order to consider ourselves f u l l y responsible beings. To be responsible fo r s p e c i f i c actions we do need freedom of choice, but we can e a s i l y meet the l a t t e r condition. But we do not need freedom of opportunity i n order to be considered responsible people that can l e g i t i m a t e l y be praised or blamed for t h e i r actions. Rather, we have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to develop characters that can maintain freedom of opportunity; a lack of t h i s freedom w i l l only serve as an excuse up to a point. At bottom i t i s character, not freedom of opportunity, that matters. Strawson's account of compatibilism allows f o r our being responsible agents, and responsible moreover for some actions but not for everything we do. His account i s also consistent with our desire, a r i s i n g from our reactive attitudes, to improve our character, and that one way to improve our character i s to 147 increase our freedom of opportunity. The means by which we f u l f i l our desire to improve our character i s through taking and ascribing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The better our character i s , the more l i k e l y that we w i l l have the proper desires and thus exercise our freedom of choice to perform the proper actions. A l l of t h i s i s compatible with determinism. Thus, Strawson's account has led the way to a useful explanation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and freedom which i s unaffected by determinism. 148 1. For a d i f f e r e n t view that also t i e s moral fee l i n g s to a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , see R. Jay Wallace, Re s p o n s i b i l i t y and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) . 2. Taylor, "Responsibility for S e l f " i n Free W i l l . 3. Dennett, Elbow Room, es p e c i a l l y chapter 2. 4. Dennett, Elbow Room. 29. 5. Dennett, Elbow Room. 70. 6. Of course, chapter VIII shows that we sometimes also take into account the r e s u l t s of these strategies. Thus, we blame a drunk dr i v e r who h i t s a c h i l d more than one who does not. But we blame both more than we do a sober driver who takes a l l suitable precautions but accidentally h i t s a c h i l d anyhow. 7. This may explain why Strawson r e l i e s upon the infrequency of periods of stress to excuse people of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r them. See "Freedom and Resentment", 79. 8. Dennett, Elbow Room. 143-4. 9. Relevantly s i m i l a r actions or situations are those between which there are no detectable relevant differences. Roughly s i m i l a r actions or situ a t i o n s are those i n which there are some detectable relevant differences, but the differences are minor enough that the strategy applicable to the main s i t u a t i o n or action should apply to the roughly s i m i l a r ones as well, and not merely the relevantly s i m i l a r ones. Thus, i f i t i s wrong to s t e a l bread one time, i t i s not only wrong to s t e a l bread i n general; i t i s probably wrong to st e a l anything i n general. 10. As Bennett notes, t h i s i s where we create an interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p with the other, i f one does not yet e x i s t . See chapter VII. 11. See Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. 123. 12. Dennett, Elbow Room. 115-22. 149 Chapter X: Conclusion In t h i s thesis I have attempted to defend compatibilism. To t h i s end I have use Strawson's fresh account of compatibilism d e t a i l e d i n "Freedom and Resentment". I had three main objectives. F i r s t , to explain Strawson's account. Second, to defend both the necessity and the r a t i o n a l i t y of our holding reactive attitudes towards ourselves and others, even i f determinism i s true. F i n a l l y , to o f f e r an account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that gives the reactive attitudes a central r o l e . Hopefully, I have provided i n my d e f i n i t i o n a rough i n d i c a t i o n of why most people are responsible beings, why such r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s desirable, and why people are considered responsible for some events and not for others. 1 There are s t i l l questions to explore. I have l e f t open how much leeway we should give agents when we judge the extent of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action, or determine whether or not they are f u l l y responsible agents at a l l . For instance, I have not said how much ignorance of the consequences of an action we allow a person before we s t a r t blaming her. Nor have I attempted to f i x the age of majority i n order to resolve i t s v a r i a t i o n among d i f f e r e n t cultures. In these cases and many others there may be an optimum amount of leeway that would both seem i n t u i t i v e l y p l a u s i b l e and benefit a society most. I have, however, decided such issues to be beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . Strawson's account of compatibilism i s a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to the general issue of free w i l l and determinism. 150 I t provides the key to solving the centuries-old problem of how to give an account of moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n a possibly determined world. 151 1. There remains the in t e r e s t i n g question of how humans came to develop reactive attitudes i n the f i r s t place. For an enlightening discussion of one possible source of our reactive attitudes, see J.L. Mackie's "Morality and the Retributive Emotions" i n Persons and Values. Joan Mackie and Penelope Mackie, eds., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) . 152 Bibliography Ayer, A.J. "Free W i l l and Ra t i o n a l i t y " i n Philosophical Subjects. Zak van Straaten, ed. 1-13. Bennett, Jonathan. "Accountability" i n Philosophical Subjects. Zak van Straaten, ed. 14-47. Berry, M. "Breaking the Paradigms of C l a s s i c a l Physics from Within" i n Proceedings of the Cerisy Symposium ("Logos et Theories des Catastrophes"). J . P e t i t o t , ed. Corwin, Miles. "Icy K i l l e r ' s L i f e Steeped i n Violence". Los Angeles Times. May 16, 1982. Copyright, 1982. Los Angeles Times. Reprinted i n Watson, "Responsibility and the Limits of E v i l " . 269-70. Reprinted i n Perspectives on Moral Res p o n s i b i l i t y . Fischer and Ravizza, eds. 40-1. Dennett, Daniel C. "Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI". Chapter 2 i n The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem i n A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e . Zenon W. Pylyshyn, ed. O r i g i n a l l y i n Minds. 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Thesis/Dissertation
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Philosophy
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An analysis of Strawson’s defence of moral practices against the claims of determinism
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