Science, Faculty of
Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES), Institute for
DSpace
UBCV
Soldal, Sveinar Lunde
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
Norway and Alberta, a Canadian province, are united by significant economic reliance on their respective fossil fuel industries, and a commitment to sustaining fossil fuel production in a world facing increasingly stronger decarbonization pressures. Yet, their policies for renewable electricity development diverge sharply: Norway has subsidized an offshore wind industry characterized by high costs and poor profitability outlooks, while Alberta has introduced restrictive regulations on a rapidly growing wind and solar sector that has generated jobs, investments and economic growth. This thesis examines how electoral and fossil fuel industry interests, policymakers’ ideas, and the influence of higher-level political institutions have helped drive these diverging policy trajectories. The findings suggest that the difference reflects a fundamental difference in decarbonization pressures, creating contexts that are more and less conducive to renewable electricity development. Norway’s stronger pressures, shaped by electoral interests and integration with EU climate policy have spurred large-scale electrification, requiring increased electricity production to meet rising demand. In this context, strong public opposition to onshore wind and the potential for offshore wind to provide transition pathways for Norway’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry situate the technology as the most feasible way to advance Norway’s interests and policy goals. In contrast, Alberta faces weaker decarbonization pressures, evidenced by widespread scepticism towards anthropogenic climate change and the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism which insulates Alberta from federal and international emission targets. In turn, the election of a right-wing government with limited transition aspirations and a strong commitment to maintaining natural gas as the primary source of electricity generation has reinforced local electoral pressures, culminating in restrictive regulations on renewable electricity development. While Norway attempts to leverage offshore wind to protect national interests and achieve multiple policy objectives simultaneously, Alberta’s weaker decarbonization pressures limit the role and significance of renewables.
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLITICS IN FOSSIL FUEL-PRODUCING JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NORWAY AND ALBERTA by Sveinar Lunde Soldal B.A., The University of Edinburgh, 2023 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Resources, Environment and Sustainability) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) October 2025 © Sveinar Lunde Soldal, 2025 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled: Renewable Energy Politics in Fossil Fuel-Producing Jurisdictions: A Comparative Study of Norway and Alberta submitted by Sveinar Lunde Soldal in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Resources, Environment and Sustainability Examining Committee: Kathryn Harrison, Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC Supervisor Philippe Le Billon, Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Milind Kandlikar, Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, UBC Additional Examiner iii Abstract Norway and Alberta, a Canadian province, are united by significant economic reliance on their respective fossil fuel industries, and a commitment to sustaining fossil fuel production in a world facing increasingly stronger decarbonization pressures. Yet, their policies for renewable electricity development diverge sharply: Norway has subsidized an offshore wind industry characterized by high costs and poor profitability outlooks, while Alberta has introduced restrictive regulations on a rapidly growing wind and solar sector that has generated jobs, investments and economic growth. This thesis examines how electoral and fossil fuel industry interests, policymakers’ ideas, and the influence of higher-level political institutions have helped drive these diverging policy trajectories. The findings suggest that the difference reflects a fundamental difference in decarbonization pressures, creating contexts that are more and less conducive to renewable electricity development. Norway’s stronger pressures, shaped by electoral interests and integration with EU climate policy have spurred large-scale electrification, requiring increased electricity production to meet rising demand. In this context, strong public opposition to onshore wind and the potential for offshore wind to provide transition pathways for Norway’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry situate the technology as the most feasible way to advance Norway’s interests and policy goals. In contrast, Alberta faces weaker decarbonization pressures, evidenced by widespread scepticism towards anthropogenic climate change and the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism which insulates Alberta from federal and international emission targets. In turn, the election of a right-wing government with limited transition aspirations and a iv strong commitment to maintaining natural gas as the primary source of electricity generation has reinforced local electoral pressures, culminating in restrictive regulations on renewable electricity development. While Norway attempts to leverage offshore wind to protect national interests and achieve multiple policy objectives simultaneously, Alberta’s weaker decarbonization pressures limit the role and significance of renewables. v Lay Summary Norway and Alberta, a Canadian province, are two large producers and exporters of fossil fuels that aim to sustain production despite growing global pressures to cut emissions. Yet their approaches to renewable energy differ sharply. Norway is subsidizing costly offshore wind projects, while Alberta has imposed new restrictions on a booming wind and solar sector. This thesis investigates the role of electoral interests, policymaker ideas and political institutions to understand why the policy outcomes differ. It finds that the difference reflects Norway’s stronger pressures to reduce emissions, driven by electoral dynamics and integration with EU climate policy. In contrast, Albera’s weaker electoral pressures, and its insulation from federal and international climate targets limits the significance and incentives for expanding renewable electricity production. vi Preface This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Sveinar Lunde Soldal. The research question was defined by Sveinar along with his supervisor Dr. Kathryn Harrison. The use of Generative AI in this thesis was limited to the use of ChatGPT-5 for assistance with grammar, clarity, and paragraph structure, and for creating the visuals included in the thesis, as cited. The study has been approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board under the ID: H25-00133. vii Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary .................................................................................................................................v Preface ........................................................................................................................................... vi Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ vii List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ ix List of Figures .................................................................................................................................x Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xi Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: The Complexity of Policymaking: Ideas, Interests and Institutions .....................6 2.1 Electoral Interests............................................................................................................ 6 2.1.1 Public Opinion ........................................................................................................ 7 2.1.2 Industry Interests .................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Policymaker Ideas ......................................................................................................... 12 2.3 Political Institutions ...................................................................................................... 14 2.3.1 Norway and the European Union ......................................................................... 14 2.3.2 Alberta and the Canadian Federal Government .................................................. 16 Chapter 3: Hypotheses ................................................................................................................18 3.1 Interests ......................................................................................................................... 18 3.2 Ideas .............................................................................................................................. 18 3.3 Institutions..................................................................................................................... 19 viii Chapter 4: Research Design ........................................................................................................20 4.1 Data Collection ............................................................................................................. 20 Chapter 5: Results........................................................................................................................22 5.1 Norway: The Subsidization of Offshore Wind ............................................................. 22 5.1.1 Electoral Interests ................................................................................................. 22 5.1.2 Fossil Fuel Interests .............................................................................................. 26 5.1.3 Policymaker Ideas ................................................................................................. 31 5.1.4 Political Institutions .............................................................................................. 32 5.2 Alberta: Restricting Renewable Electricity Development ............................................ 35 5.2.1 Electoral Interests ................................................................................................. 36 5.2.2 Fossil Fuel Interests .............................................................................................. 41 5.2.3 Policymaker Ideas ................................................................................................. 44 5.2.4 Political Institutions .............................................................................................. 48 Chapter 6: Discussion ..................................................................................................................52 6.1 Electoral Interests.......................................................................................................... 52 6.2 Policymaker Ideas ......................................................................................................... 54 6.3 Political Institutions ...................................................................................................... 55 Chapter 7: Conclusion .................................................................................................................58 References .....................................................................................................................................60 ix List of Tables Table 1. Norway and Alberta fossil fuel indicators ........................................................................ 4 Table 2. Summary of causal factors Norway ................................................................................ 35 Table 3. Summary of causal factors Alberta ................................................................................. 51 Table 4. Comparison of causal factors: Norway and Alberta ....................................................... 57 x List of Figures Figure 1. Cumulative installed wind and solar capacity in Alberta (2018-2024) ......................... 37 xi Acknowledgements Writing this master’s thesis has been a strange experience, feeling both immensely significant and incredibly trivial at the same time. On the one hand, it has been an all-consuming and intellectually demanding process that has occupied my thoughts for over a year—a symbol of my coming-of-age as a researcher, and a constant source of both excitement and frustration. On the other hand, it is at the end of the day merely a bunch of text in a digital document that only a few people will ever read, despite the hundreds of hours I have invested in it. It is a bit of a paradox in that sense. Nonetheless, as I sit here towards the end of an enriching, though also tedious, research journey, I cannot help but feel deeply thankful for the experience, but more importantly, to the people who have supported me along the way, both academically and emotionally. Firstly, I owe a big thank you to my supervisor Dr. Kathryn Harrison for providing mentorship, thorough feedback on drafts and helping me understand, navigate and unpack the complex world of politics. I am also grateful to my committee member Dr. Philippe Le Billon for providing enthusiasm and insightful feedback throughout the research process. Additionally, I also want to thank Dr. Elin Lerum Boasson, Chris Bataille and Drew Anderson for offering their time and expertise at various stages of this project. My gratitude also extends to the IRES and Green College communities, the former for providing a welcoming and inspiring learning environment, and the latter for being my home for most of my time here in Vancouver and which has introduced me to so many people from different cultures and academic disciplines. With that in mind, I want to specifically thank all my friends and close ones here in Canada, including my partner Svetlana. Living far from home can be challenging. While exploring a new place, meeting new people, and gaining new experiences is exhilarating, the xii sense of longing is inescapable and has occasionally made me blind to all the wonderful things around me. Over the past few weeks, I have been reminded how lucky I am to have so many fantastic, warm and weird people around me, making the hard times easier and the good times better. Finally, I want to thank my parents, who have supported me from across the pond. Their influence is inescapable: they have shaped my worldview, my outlook on life, and my morals. I am eternally grateful to both of them for giving me the right tools to navigate a complex, and at times, difficult world; for encouraging risk, experimentation, curiosity and self-expression; and for being a constant anchor, offering unwavering love and support when needed. It is the best thing any kid could wish for. . xiii Dedication Til Onkel Ola. En superhelt for både barn og voksne. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction Climate change mitigation requires a transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. Although many countries have made progress in reducing their reliance on fossil fuels, the global energy supply mix remains heavily dominated by fossil fuels. As of 2024, fossil fuels account for approximately 84% of total energy supply, with renewables accounting for 11% (The Energy Institute, 2025). Moreover, fossil fuel production continues largely unabated, with producers showing little willingness to phase out their respective industries (Harrison & Bang, 2022; Janzwood & Harrison, 2023; Le Billon & Kristoffersen, 2020). Fossil fuel-producing jurisdictions offer a particularly interesting lens for studying energy transitions and renewable energy. On one hand, these jurisdictions are shaped by strong vested interests in continued fossil fuel production. On the other hand, they are forced to contend with increasing decarbonization pressures, complicating continued commitments to non-abated fossil fuel production. Norway and Alberta, a Canadian province, are both large producers and exporters of fossil fuels. Both jurisdictions are fully committed to continuing fossil fuel production (Gill, 2025; Harrison & Bang, 2022; Solgård & Holter, 2025), and share a similar level of economic dependency on the petroleum industry (see Error! Reference source not found.). Despite a similar reliance on fossil fuel exports, recent policy developments suggest that Norway and Alberta are adopting widely different approaches to renewable electricity development. 2 Norway has adopted an ambitious offshore wind strategy, setting a goal to allocate1 30 GW of offshore wind by 2040 and providing significant subsidies to several large-scale projects. In 2024, the government entered into a contract for the development of a bottom-fixed offshore wind project in Sørlige Nordsjø with the consortium Ventyr SN II AS, valued at up to NOK 23 billion (3.2 billion CAD) (Ministry of Energy, 2024). Moreover, the government has allocated 35 billion NOK (4.9 billion CAD) for two floating offshore wind projects in the Utsira Nord area, although the auction for the development contract has yet to take place as of time of writing (Ministry of Energy, 2025). Despite high development costs, uncertain profitability outlooks and political opposition towards the announced support mechanisms, the government has stood firm (Finanspolitiskutvalg, 2025; Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2024). Norway’s decision to introduce large-scale support schemes for electricity production marks a sharp departure from the country’s longstanding technology-neutral, and cost-effective approach to electricity generation (Boasson, 2020; Boasson & Jevnaker, 2022; Dahl, 2021; Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014). In contrast, on August 3, 2023, the government of Alberta unexpectedly imposed a seven-month pause on renewable electricity approvals. This decision followed a period of rapid growth of the renewable energy sector, which had attracted 4-5 billion (CAD) in investments, created nearly 5,500 jobs since 2019, generated significant revenue for municipalities, and contributed to reduce emissions from Alberta’s fossil fuel-dominated electricity sector (Business Renewables Centre Canada, 2024; Government of Alberta, 2023b). The pause marked a departure from Alberta’s, and particularly the governing Conservative Party’s, long-standing commitment to a 1 Meaning that the government hope to allocate development contracts worth 40 GW by 2040. It does not mean that Norway will have 40 GW of capacity by 2040. 3 free-market approach to electricity generation (K. Fellows, 2023; Government of Alberta, 2025b). In the aftermath, the province introduced the Electric Energy Land Use and Visual Assessment Regulation, which has limited the conditions under which renewable projects can proceed. Although the exact impact of the regulations is difficult to determine, one recent analysis found that project cancellations outnumbered new proposals, indicating a decline in investor confidence in Alberta’s renewable energy sector (Noel et al., 2025). This study seeks to address why two fossil fuel producing jurisdictions have adopted such different policies for renewable electricity development, answering the following research question: What factors explain Norway’s greater policy support for renewable electricity production compared to Alberta? 4 Table 1. Norway and Alberta fossil fuel indicators Norway Alberta Population 5.5 million 4.4 million Land mass 385 207 km² 661 848 km² Daily production (oil) 1.77 million barrels 3.8 million barrels Daily production (natural gas) 362 million standard cubic metres 309 million standard cubic metres Relative revenue from petroleum industry 32% of state revenue 27% of provincial revenue Petroleum industry’s contribution to GDP 31% 25%a Contribution of petroleum industry to total employmentb 7.5% 9.6% Renewable electricity policy State-subsidized offshore wind Restrictive regulations on wind and solar development. Note. Oil and gas-related indicators are based on 2024 data where available. In some cases, 2023 data have been used. Sources used: Canada Energy Regulator, 2025; CAPP, 2025; Menon Economics, 2025; Norsk Petroleum, 2025a, 2025; Statistics Canada, 2025; Treasury Board and Finance, 2025. aAlso includes contributions from the mining and quarrying sector due to lack of disaggregated data. However, the contribution is marginal. bIncludes direct and indirect employment. The aim of this study is to enhance our understanding of the decision-making processes that underpin renewable electricity policymaking in fossil fuel-exporting jurisdictions. These jurisdictions face distinct challenges, including the difficult task of balancing fossil fuel production with increasing decarbonization pressures from global energy transition demands and 5 national emission-reduction efforts. Comparing a state with a province may seem like an odd choice but is justified by the nature of Canadian federalism which offers provinces full jurisdiction over key policy areas such as fossil fuel production and electricity policy. The study finds that the difference reflects fundamental differences in decarbonization pressures, creating contexts that are more and less conducive to renewable electricity development. 6 Chapter 2: The Complexity of Policymaking: Ideas, Interests and Institutions In political science and comparative politics, it is common to analyse policy change as the outcome of one or more of three distinct, yet interplaying components: interests, ideas and institutions (III) (Hay, 2004; Kern, 2011; Scott, 2008). This framework is useful as it can help remove the tunnel vision that can emerge when using a single, parsimonious theory (Heclo, 2018). This can be advantageous in political science research where explanations are multicausal. Similarly to Harrison and Sundstrom (2010), this study will analyse these three components from the perspective of the policymaker. 2.1 Electoral Interests A key feature of democratic governments is that policymakers must stay responsive to their electorate. Following other scholars, this study operationalizes “interests” as policymakers’ self-interested goal of re-election (Harrison & Bang, 2022; Harrison & Leach, 2025). Relevant interests include not only the general electorate, but also public and private interest groups, such as NGOs and industry associations, which can shape public opinion, fund political campaigns, and exert electoral leverage as significant providers of employment and economic growth. If an interests-based explanation holds, the observed difference in support for renewable electricity development can be understood as the result of different interest group and electoral pressures. 7 2.1.1 Public Opinion In the context of policymaker support for renewable electricity development, the role of the electorate is important to consider. One of the main rationales for introducing renewables is their potential to drive down emissions, and it can be assumed that policymakers facing greater public pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are more likely to prioritize the expansion of renewable electricity. In turn, studies show that attitudes toward climate change can influence acceptance towards renewable energy projects and energy transition measures (Liebe & Dobers, 2019; Swofford & Slattery, 2010; Thomas et al., 2022). At the same time, support for renewables often extends beyond climate concerns. Economic benefits, such as lower electricity prices or job creation, tend to motivate public support for renewables more than emissions reductions (Patel and Parkins, 2023). While few factors drive opposition to renewables, scepticism toward climate change and strong confidence in the continued viability of the fossil fuel industry are notable predictors (Thomas et al., 2022). Additionally, one of the primary barriers to renewable electricity development is local opposition (Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Stokes, 2013, 2016; Thomas et al., 2022). Residents may oppose projects due to land-use concerns, such as landscape degradation, noise pollution, or other environmental impacts, especially since wind and solar typically require more land than conventional coal or natural gas plants to produce the same amount of energy (Stokes, 2020). Furthermore, the not-in-my backyard phenomenon often underpin local opposition, with people supporting renewables in principle but resist projects located near their own homes or communities (Liebe & Dobers, 2019). Local opposition can place elected officials in challenging positions as advancing energy transition or emission-8 reduction efforts called for by many voters frequently requires land-use changes and new infrastructure that some communities find unacceptable (Delcayre & Bourdin, 2025). 2.1.2 Industry Interests The literature exploring the determinants of renewable energy development and policy highlights the central role of the economic interests of firms and industries. Norway and Alberta’s policy differences may stem from differing industry objectives or the varying influence of their respective industry interest groups. Lyon and Yin (2010) found that the adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is influenced by the relative strength of organized renewable energy interests and opposing natural gas producers. These findings were further supported by Jenner et al. (2012), emphasizing that supporting renewable groups boost, while opposing natural gas groups block, renewable electricity development. Gallagher (2013) found that governments may pursue supportive policies not merely to benefit individual firms, but to catalyse broader gains such as economic growth, employment, export competitiveness, or regional development. Two illustrative cases are Germany and Denmark, two leaders in renewable energy, which have positioned their renewable industries as key pillars of national export and/or industrialization strategies. The fossil fuel industry is central to both Norway and Alberta’s economies. One way of understanding how the fossil fuel industry may influence policymakers is by conceptualizing it as an embedded political and economic interest, with state and industry interests largely indistinguishable. Transition theory generally portrays the fossil fuel and renewables industry as at odds, with renewables displacing focus on, and threatening, the incumbent fossil fuel regime (Baker et al., 2014; Biresselioglu et al., 2024; Breetz et al., 2018; Fattouh et al., 2019). Stokes 9 (2020), highlights how fossil fuel companies and fossil fuel-dependent electric utilities have played a key role in spreading climate denial, influencing energy policy and thwarting efforts to expand clean electricity development. Lyon and Yin (2010) found that the presence of a large fossil fuel production industry does not influence support for renewables. However, as noted above, having a high share of natural gas in electricity generation has a negative impact. This presumably reflects concerns that renewables could displace natural gas, provoking resistance from natural gas-powered utilities. Similarly, in a review study, Wang et al. (2023) identified a high percentage of fossil fuels in a country’s energy consumption mix as a significant inhibitor for renewable energy development. However, findings are mixed with Schaffer and Bernauer (2014) finding that a higher share of fossil fuels in the national energy supply (for consumption) has no correlation with a jurisdictions’ willingness to implement supportive renewable electricity policies. While Norway and Alberta both have strong fossil fuel sectors, the two jurisdictions have widely different electricity mixes. Norway has a largely decarbonized electricity system, with 98% of onshore electricity production coming from renewable sources: 88% from hydropower, 11% from onshore wind, and the remainder from a small amount of solar and thermal generation (Energifakta Norge, 2025). In contrast, Alberta’s electricity supply has historically been dominated by fossil fuels, relying first on coal before transitioning primarily to natural gas, with coal fully phased out through provincial government policy in 2024 (Canada Energy Regulator, 2024; Noel & Jeyakumar, 2023). In 2022, 61% of electricity production came from natural gas, with 19% coming from coal and 15% from wind and solar (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2025). Alberta’s reliance on natural gas may generate pushback from natural gas-powered utilities. 10 In contrast to resistance from the incumbent fossil fuel industry, another body of literature show how these incumbents can actively drive innovation in renewable energy (Pinkse & Van Den Buuse, 2012; Steen & Weaver, 2017), showcasing a more nuanced and symbiotic relationship between renewable and fossil fuel industries. Furthermore, previous research shows that Norway’s oil and gas industry has been investing into offshore wind, especially during periods of low oil prices (G. H. Hansen & Steen, 2011; Normann, 2015). Moreover, offshore wind, and particularly floating installations, are seen as an opportunity to leverage existing expertise and technological capabilities from the offshore oil and gas industry in a new and adjacent market (Dahl, 2021; G. H. Hansen & Steen, 2015; Mäkitie et al., 2018, 2019). In Alberta, these linkages appear absent, perhaps reflecting a lack of technological overlap between the industries. The fossil fuel sector’s long-term economic trajectory may also shape renewable energy policy. Blankenship et al. (2024) found that reserve depletion posed a greater threat in petrostates that successfully managed to reduce their dependence on fossil fuel exports. This suggests that a country’s willingness to support a new energy-related industry may hinge on the geological longevity of their respective fossil fuel industries. Norway and Alberta differ sharply in this regard. An estimated 56% of the recoverable oil and gas resources on the Norwegian continental shelf has already been produced2 (Norwegian Petroleum, 2024), with production expected to half between 2025 and 2050 as reserves deplete (Norwegian Offshore Directorate, 2022). In contrast, the Albertan oil sands, spanning 142,200 km² in the Northern Alberta region, hold an estimated 164 billion barrels of oil. This makes it the third largest oil reserve in the world after Venezuela 2 Of what is left, around 60% is estimated to be natural gas. 11 and Saudi Arabia, and 20 times greater than Norway’s remaining combined oil and gas reserves. However, the longevity of the oil and gas industry also depends on its ability to remain competitive as global demand declines. Oil and gas extraction in Alberta is a capital and emission intensive process, leading some studies to predict that Canadian oil, which primarily comes from the Alberta oil sands, will face early and deep production cuts in response to reduced global fossil fuel consumption (McGlade & Ekins, 2014; Welsby et al., 2021). In contrast, Fellows (2023) notes that existing oil sands projects can sustain production for decades at low marginal costs, though this analysis does not account for the potential impact of rising carbon prices. Overall, it is unclear whether Norway faces stronger incentives to diversify away from oil and gas compared to Alberta. Norwegian oil and gas production is cheaper, and the industry is actively trying to reduce extraction emissions by drawing clean electricity from the onshore grid to power operations. Beyond these oil and gas related considerations, geographic endowments like wind density or solar radiation can shape the feasibility and profitability of projects, in turn influencing private sector pressure for renewable electricity development. Jenner et al. (2012) and Lyon and Yin (2010) find that policy support for renewables is higher in jurisdictions with stronger geographic potential. In contrast, Carley (2009) found that jurisdictions with moderate potential adopt policies more aggressively than those with strong potential, suggesting that factors beyond resource endowments are important to consider. From the perspective of the renewable industry, both Norway and Alberta seem well positioned to benefit from renewable electricity development. Norway has a long coastline with high offshore wind speeds while 12 Southern Alberta is well positioned for both wind and solar energy.3 The strong winds coming off the foothills of the Canadian Rockies in the southwest, combined with the region’s abundance of sunny days, give Alberta some of the strongest renewable energy resources in Canada. However, the overall cost picture seemingly favors Alberta, as offshore wind in Norway is far more expensive to develop compared to Alberta’s onshore wind and solar, which have achieved record-low production costs, even undercutting those of natural gas produced electricity (Clean Energy Canada, 2023). In contrast, Norway’s offshore wind sites are located far away from major load centres, requiring substantial investments in transmission and incurring higher system losses (Norden, 2014), while the country’s deep waters largely preclude the use of cheaper bottom-fixed turbines. Instead, floating installations are necessary, a less mature technology associated with significantly higher costs (NVE, 2024). This contrast deepens the puzzle: while renewables in Alberta have proven cost-competitive even without subsidies, Norway has opted to subsidize a far more expensive technology, suggesting that factors beyond market viability underpin the policy divergence. 2.2 Policymaker Ideas The ‘Ideas’ component of the three Is framework refers to knowledge or beliefs that shape how policymakers interpret reality and envision the future. A policymaker’s worldview may influence how problems are defined, and which solutions are seen as acceptable or plausible (Kern & Markard, 2016). There is a theoretical debate around whether ideas exist as a distinctive component, or whether it is better conceptualized as a rationalization of interests (Fischer, 2003; 3 See: Global Wind Atlas and Global Solar Atlas. 13 Price, 2006). This study will not contribute to this theoretical debate and will adopt the view that policymakers’ own ideas can matter as they help navigate situations of deep uncertainty—such as the unprecedented challenge of deliberately steering entire energy systems towards low-carbon modes of production and consumption. This study follows Harrison and Sundstrom (2010) in defining ideas as policymaker’s personal commitments or preferences. Policymakers’ ideas can be influential in shaping public opinion and framing policy debates. Some scholars argue that politics is, to a large extent, a contest over power that unfolds through competing narratives (Fischer, 2003; Kern, 2011). However, as noted by Harrison and Leach (2025) it can be difficult to separate the ideas of policymakers from the ideas of their voters, as voters tend to vote for policymakers who share their worldview. Consequently, they argue that the influence of policymakers’ own ideas becomes especially convincing when governments pursue policies that carry electoral risks, suggesting motivations beyond simple voter alignment. One way in which policymaker ideas might manifest is through partisan ideology. While partisan ideology can reflect voter interest, political parties may also have defining characteristics that exist independently from voters. The governing party’s ideology can shape public policy, including the nature and stringency of energy and environmental policies (Abban & Hasan, 2021; Cadoret & Padovano, 2016). Lyon and Yin (2010) finds that political ideology is one of the central drivers behind a country’s adoption of pro-renewable policies. One common finding is that left and centrist governing parties promote renewable energy investment and policies more than right-of-centre ones (Abban & Hasan, 2021; Lyon & Yin, 2010; Nicolini & Tavoni, 2017). This is generally attributed to left-wing parties being more environmentally conscious than right-wing parties, and more preoccupied with emission reduction efforts (Abban & Hasan, 2021). At the same time, left-wing parties tend to favor regulation of the energy 14 market, while right-wing parties are more active in deregulating energy markets (Potrafke, 2010). Research also shows that right-wing populist parties are more prone to oppose ambitious climate policies (Huber et al., 2021). However, Bourcet (2020) found no consensus in the literature on how political ideology affects renewable energy deployment, though deployment differs whether governments choose to support renewable energy through policy and investment. Differing government ideologies could be a factor in explaining the difference between Norway and Alberta, given the fact that Norway was governed by a Centre-Left coalition at the time of the policy developments, while Alberta was governed by a Conservative government. At the same time, Alberta’s regulatory approach contrasts with the typical right-wing preference for deregulation, suggesting only partial explanatory power. 2.3 Political Institutions Neo-institutional approaches to politics examine how political opportunities constrain or enable political action (Kern, 2011; Schmidt, 2022). Institutions can be described as the formal and informal rules, norms, laws, precedents and organizational factors that structure political behavior (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007; Scharpf, 2018). However, this study will focus more specifically on the demands and limits placed on policymakers and governments by higher-level governments: the European Union in Norway’s case and the Canadian federal government in Alberta. 2.3.1 Norway and the European Union Norway is not an EU member but participates in the European internal market through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, which extends the EUs single market to 15 European Free Trade Association states. EEA membership means that Norway is aligned with a lot of EU legislation. Whether a specific directive, or regulation applies to EEA states depends on interpretations of the original 1994 agreement document, a process managed by the EEA Joint Committee. If deemed relevant, the regulation is incorporated into the EEA agreement and subsequently transposed into Norwegian law. During the original EEA negotiations, Norway sought to exclude policy areas where the EU had different traditions and economic interests. At that time, the EU lacked a common climate policy and limited involvement with energy affairs. However, as the EU gradually developed common frameworks for renewables, energy efficiency and carbon pricing, Norwegian politicians accepted their inclusion despite their original position that energy matters should be exempt from the agreement (S. T. Hansen & Moe, 2022). This precedent has since constrained Norway’s ability to reject new EU climate and energy directives without jeopardizing the entire EEA agreement (Boasson, 2025). Under the current institutional setup, Norway aligns its policies with most of EU’s energy and climate directives and regulations, despite having limited influence over their design (Szulecki, 2023). Despite this integration, it is unclear whether EU influence directly shaped Norway’s decision to subsidize offshore wind. Schaffer and Bernauer (2014) found that EU membership strongly correlates with a country’s adoption of pro-renewable policies, such as a Renewable Portfolio Standard4. Similarly, Gullberg and Bang (2015) argue that Norway’s decision to join a Swedish green certificate scheme5 in 2012 was driven by the binding national target (67.5% renewables) established under the EU’s 2009 Renewables Directive. In contrast, detailed process 4 A policy that requires electricity providers to produce or procure a specific percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. 5 This was Norway’s only support mechanism for renewables before it announced large-scale subsidies to offshore wind development. 16 tracing by Boasson (2020) found that the policy developments largely reflected the preference of key domestic actors, especially the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the state-owned electricity company Statkraft, indicating that domestic rather than EU-level politics were decisive. 2.3.2 Alberta and the Canadian Federal Government Canada’s constitution created an especially decentralized federation, granting significant power to provincial governments. In this study, this balance of power is important in two ways. Firstly, Alberta, which produces 84% of Canada’s crude oil and 64% of its natural gas (Canada Energy Regulator, 2024), has full authority over their natural resources, including oil, gas and coal, by virtue of provincial ownership of so-called Crown Lands. Secondly, provinces have default regulatory authority over private matters within their borders, including electricity management. Moreover, resistance to federal intervention is deeply ingrained into Alberta’s political culture, rooted in a sense of Western alienation where the federal government prioritizes the interests of the eastern provinces (Craigie, 2012; Tupper & Gibbins, 1992). The province also has strong pro-fossil fuel norms and will vigorously defend the interests of its oil and gas industry, its economic lifeblood, from federal interference (Carter, 2020). Furthermore, political parties have in the past situated opposition to the federal government as a central element of their election platform (Craigie, 2012). In contrast to provincial control of fossil fuel production, the federal government holds authority over “interprovincial works”, including pipelines and transmission lines, and international trade. The Constitution, written in 1867, does not explicitly assign environmental or climate responsibilities to either level of governance, resulting in shared—but sometimes 17 contested—jurisdiction. Although the federal government has historically deferred to provincial autonomy, Harrison (2023) explains that following the election of Justin Trudeau in 2015, Canada’s federal government adopted a more assertive approach to climate policy. This led, among other things, to the introduction of a pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change and the implementation of nationwide carbon pricing. A further consequence of Canadian federalism is that Alberta is not directly accountable to international agreements such as the Paris Agreement. The federal government does not possess the power to direct provinces to implement international treaties in areas of provincial jurisdiction, although the federal government has previously used its other powers, including criminal law authority, to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (Harrison, 2023). Alberta has openly criticized Canada’s 2030 Paris targets as arbitrary and economically disruptive and has not set any targets itself. Federal climate pressures are therefore likely to have limited influence on the Alberta government’s own decarbonization efforts. 18 Chapter 3: Hypotheses The foregoing discussion suggests four hypotheses, derived from the interests, ideas and institutions framework, that may help explain the policy divergence between Norway and Alberta. 3.1 Interests 1. Jurisdictions with greater public pressure for climate action and/or renewable electricity will be more likely to support renewable electricity. 2. Jurisdictions heavily reliant on oil and gas production are more likely to support renewable electricity production if it serves the interests of the oil and gas industry. I expect that policy developments in both Norway and Alberta have been shaped by the costs and benefits to their respective fossil fuel industries. In Norway, technological overlaps between the offshore wind and oil and gas service industry create potential synergies. In Alberta, renewable expansion risks displacing natural gas used for electricity generation without major symbiotic/mutual gains, generating resistance from incumbent natural gas generating utilities. 3.2 Ideas 3. Right-wing politicians will be more ideologically resistant to climate action and renewable electricity development. I expect Alberta’s Conservative government to be more ideologically opposed to climate action and renewable electricity development compared to Norway’s Labour-Centre government coalition. 19 3.3 Institutions 4. Jurisdictions with greater external pressure on climate action will be more likely to support renewable electricity. Both jurisdictions are facing decarbonization pressures, Norway from the EU and Alberta from the Canadian federal government. Norway’s participation in the EEA agreement creates strong decarbonization pressures, creating incentives to expand renewable electricity. In Alberta, disdain for federal interference may foster strategic resistance to federal climate policies, while the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism limits federal leverage over provincial climate action. The lack of binding international obligations may further allow Alberta to forgo specific emissions targets, reducing the incentives for renewable electricity development. 20 Chapter 4: Research Design This study focuses on two fossil fuel-producing jurisdictions that diverge in their political approach to renewable electricity development. Comparisons are a powerful tool in political science, enabling researchers to identify patterns, processes and regularities across cases (Ragin, 2014). By examining two cases, this study preserves the depth of detailed analysis while also leveraging the ability to draw more reliable and transferable generalizations. 4.1 Data Collection This research project employs process tracing, a qualitative method used in political science to examine how explanatory factors produce policy outcomes (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Undertaking process tracing means merging the roles of a historian and a detective by identifying the temporal unfolding of multiple causal factors that together generate an outcome. While process tracing systematically analyses diagnostic evidence against research questions and hypotheses, the search for empirical information also progresses in an inductive fashion, as important causal factors may emerge throughout the data collection process (ibid.). This approach is well-suited for complex political phenomena, where outcomes typically result from a set of interacting causes, rather than a single explanatory factor (Collier, 2011). This study draws on a combination of previous literature, document analysis, and semi-structured interviews in an examination of the different factors that shaped policy outcomes in Norway and Alberta. Relevant documents have been identified through keyword searches and include parliamentary records, NGO and government reports and press releases, and newspaper articles. The search was intentionally broad, spanning back to 2016, but with particular attention 21 to the years leading up to the policy changes. The semi-structured interviews complemented the document analysis by filling gaps, clarifying aspects of the causal processes that were not readily apparent from written sources, and triangulating key findings. Interviews were especially valuable in the Alberta case, where the policy developments emerged unexpectedly and with little prior discussion. The study has been approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board under the ID: H25-00133. A total of ten interviews were conducted between May and August 2025: six in Alberta and four in Norway. Three interviewees represented renewable energy interest groups, while the remaining seven were current or former public servants working in government or regulatory roles. All interviewees were given the option to keep their identity confidential, an option exercised by seven of the ten interviewees, with one interviewee only allowing information to be used as background for the research project. While additional interviews would have been preferable, recruitment was complicated by the controversial nature of Alberta’s policy developments, with many research subjects declining interviews. In Norway, policy decisions could more easily be analysed through secondary information, with interviews particularly helpful in triangulating findings. 22 Chapter 5: Results 5.1 Norway: The Subsidization of Offshore Wind Norway’s large-scale subsidization of offshore wind marks a stark departure from its previously modest financial support for renewable energy (Boasson, 2020). Norway’s historical electricity surplus, providing clean electricity at low prices for both industry and consumers, has provided little incentive to expand electricity production (Dahl et al., 2022; Ministry of Energy, 2021; Moe et al., 2021). However, rising electrification efforts have created a need to expand domestic production to meet growing demand (Energikommisjonen, 2023; Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2020). In this context, offshore wind emerged as the most viable option for expansion, given significant public opposition to onshore wind and the industry’s synergies with Norway’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industries, which are seeking new business opportunities amidst declining oil and gas production. 5.1.1 Electoral Interests Climate Change Concern. A strong majority of the Norwegian population believe in anthropogenic climate change, with this view remaining stable over time. In 2023, 70% of the population considered humans primarily responsible for climate change, while 24% believed climate change is unrelated to human activity (Gregersen, 2023). Belief in anthropogenic climate change is closely linked with party affiliation, with right-leaning voters generally less likely to attribute climate change to human activity. However, among the traditionally dominant parties, the Labour Party and the Conservatives, most voters accept the scientific consensus (78% and 68%, respectively). The most climate-sceptical constituency is found within the right-wing 23 Progress Party, where only 32% of voters believe humans are the primary cause (ibid.). Despite this, climate scepticism is much more prevalent in Norway compared to their European neighbors. An EU-sponsored study found that 61% of Norwegians believe climate change is caused by human activity, compared to an average of 74% across six European countries (Peritia, 2023).6 Nonetheless, public support for climate action is strong. As of 2024, 72% of the population considers it important for Norway to reduce emissions, and 27% of voters ranked climate and the environment among their top three concerns before the 2025 election (Analyse & Tall, 2025; Innbyggerundersøkelsen 2024, 2024). These attitudes align with Norway’s ambitious climate targets, which currently aims to reduce emissions by at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030, and 90-95% by 2050.7 Offshore Wind vs. Onshore Wind. Support for renewable electricity in Norway varies by technology, with much stronger public backing for offshore wind compared to the more cost-effective onshore wind. Earlier projections identified onshore wind, solar power and hydroelectric efficiency improvements as important sources of increased electricity supply (Ministry of Energy, 2021). However, onshore wind development has faced significant public, municipal, and Indigenous opposition, culminating in the Fosen conflict, where the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that a major wind project violated the Sámi people’s rights to practice reindeer herding. Consequently, no new onshore wind projects have been approved since 2019, and future development prospects remain uncertain due to the scarcity of suitable land that does 6 The discrepancy between the national and EU studies likely reflects differences in question wording. Yet, the key takeaway is that a strong majority of Norwegians believe in anthropogenic climate change. 7 In June 2025, Norway submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, committing to reducing emissions by at least 70-75% by 2035. 24 not conflict with local or Indigenous interests (Cheng, 2023; S. T. Hansen & Moe, 2022; Moe et al., 2022; Skjærseth & Rosendal, 2023). Meanwhile, analyses by the national electricity operator (NVE) have consistently projected steadily growing electricity demands (NVE, 2017, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023). In 2021, it was projected that southern Norway could face a power deficit as early as 2026, driven by surging demand from new large-scale consumers such as data centres and hydrogen production, alongside increased demand from the oil and gas industry (Statnett, 2021). Simultaneously, electricity prices rose sharply, peaking during the European energy crisis, further underscoring the need for additional electricity production. In contrast to onshore wind, offshore wind—particularly floating offshore wind—enjoys broad public support across both coastal and inland populations (Nytte, 2024). By 2024, a majority of Norwegians opposed new onshore wind development, while offshore wind still enjoyed majority backing at 62%, although that support has declined from 76% in 2019 (Gregersen et al., 2024). Another study found that 55% of Norwegians support offshore wind development, with 31% opposed, and 52% believe the state should provide financial support, with 30% against (Verian, 2025). Reflecting this, offshore wind retains broad political backing across Norway, with the exception of the far-left Red Party, which opposes all development on environmental grounds (Rødts stortingsgruppe, 2021). Offshore wind has distinct land-use implications from onshore wind, as it is located further away from populated areas and largely out of sight. Nonetheless, some concerns remain, including impacts on maritime traffic, defence, local ecosystems, and especially, the fishing industry (Interview, Senior public servant in the Ministry of Climate and Environment). While the Sørlige Nordsjø II and Utsira Nord projects are sited in areas of relatively low conflict 25 (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2012), it is not unlikely that public opposition may rise as new sites are proposed and developed. Interviewees suggested that public opposition to onshore wind has been a key driver to Norway’s offshore wind subsidization. The increasing need for electricity, amidst increasing electrification efforts, combined with the strong electoral pushback against onshore wind has helped position offshore wind as the main candidate for large-scale renewable expansion (Interviews, renewable interest group employee; senior public servant in Ministry of Climate and the Environment). Electricity Exports. Another important electoral consideration is the growing public scepticism toward greater integration with the European electricity grid, with concerns that increased interconnections and exports could undermine energy sovereignty and raise domestic electricity prices (Aasen et al., 2022; S. T. Hansen & Moe, 2022; Moe et al., 2021). Public support for offshore wind declines if project development involves increasing exports to Europe (Nytte, 2024). This opposition has influenced the Labour-Centre Party coalition that governed during Norway’s decision to subsidize offshore wind, with cooperation on offshore wind development contingent on a commitment that no new interconnections to continental Europe would be built (Arbeiderpartiet & Senterpartiet, 2021; Norwegian Government, 2022). The original siting of Sørlige Nordsjø II, selected under the previous Conservative government, was based on plans to include a hybrid export cable, justifying its location between the Norwegian mainland and the European sub-continent (Interview, renewable interest group employee). However, shifting government priorities have meant that the project will supply electricity solely to the Norwegian mainland, resulting in high transmission costs without the 26 access to higher European prices.8 Public and political scepticism towards electricity exports has eroded profitability and likely increased the need for subsidies, as early government reports suggested that fixed-bottom offshore wind could be developed without subsidies (Ministry of Energy, 2021). However, the impact remains uncertain, as global offshore wind development costs have since risen (Interview, renewable interest group employee), and floating offshore wind has long been recognized as requiring subsidies (Ministry of Energy, 2021). Nevertheless, the debate over electricity exports illustrates a government willing to pursue its political objective of developing offshore wind, despite electoral dynamics that have challenged the economic viability of the industry. 5.1.2 Fossil Fuel Interests The role of fossil fuel interests is relevant to Norway’s policy developments in two ways. One is the oil and gas sector’s increasing use of electricity to decarbonize production. The other is the industrial overlap between Norway’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry, and the offshore wind sector. Electrification. The last decade has seen a large-scale electrification of Norway’s oil and gas production, which accounts for around 25% of Norway’s GHG emissions (Norsk Petroleum, 2024). Electrification involves replacing natural gas-powered turbines that powers operations on offshore platforms with clean electricity from the onshore grid through underwater transmission cables (Ministry of Energy, 2021). Norway’s first offshore electrification project took place in 1996, but such initiatives were long considered too costly and complex. Rising domestic and 8 Although exports might be feasible in the future, as part of the second phase of Sørlige Nordsjø II. 27 European carbon prices, coupled with inexpensive domestic electricity, have made electrification economically viable for many oil and gas fields. Cutting emissions from the oil and gas sector has also been important for policymakers to legitimize the sector (Interview, Senior public servant Ministry of Climate and the Environment). Under the 2021–2030 Climate Plan, the Norwegian government aims to cut emissions from the oil and gas sector by 50%. As of 2025, 14 of 38 oil and gas fields are fully or partially electrified, raising the sector’s electricity use from 1.1 TWh in 1996 to 7 TWh in 2015 and 11.5 TWh in 2024 (Norsk Klimastiftelse, 2025). The sector now accounts for 8.3% of Norway’s total electricity consumption (SSB, 2025). If all planned electrification efforts go ahead, the sector is expected to reduce their emissions by 47% by 2030, just shy of the 50% goal (Offshore Norge, 2025). The next significant step is electrifying the onshore9 Snøhvit LNG processing plant, which will require another 3.6 TWh annually. Overall, demand from the sector is projected to peak at around 18TWh in 2030, down 30% from 2022 estimates (Norsk Klimastiftelse, 2025; NTB, 2024a; Øystese, 2023). Most larger offshore installations are already connected to the onshore electricity grid, and the country is largely past the phase of major oil and gas electrification efforts (Viseth, 2024, 2025). Future oil and gas developments will likely occur in the remote Barents Sea, where high transmission costs may challenge the economic viability of electrification efforts. Oil and gas electrification projects are controversial, as they raise prices for onshore consumers and require substantial grid upgrades (NTB, 2024b; Oljedirektoratet, 2020). Limited grid capacity also means that oil and gas electrification may displace other green industries. 9 Technically located on an island. 28 Currently, public opinion is more opposed than supportive of expanding electricity production to electrify the oil and gas sector (Kallbekken et al., 2025). In the past, the government sought to have the petroleum sector cover their own electricity needs by supplying platforms directly with electricity from offshore wind (Interview, renewable interest group employee). In 2021, the government stated that electrification of the continental shelf should, as far as possible, be powered by offshore wind or other renewable electricity produced on the Norwegian continental shelf (Arbeiderpartiet & Senterpartiet, 2021). In contrast to making the industry pay, the government has previously supported Equinor’s floating offshore wind farm, Hywind Tampen, with a 2.3 billion NOK grant to promote floating offshore wind technology, while supplying electricity to two offshore oil and gas fields (Equinor, 2019; NTB, 2019; Nytte, 2024). However, the oil and gas industry has largely continued to source electricity from the onshore grid, which remains the less costly option. All relevant electrification projects now have guaranteed electricity supply, reflecting a high government prioritization of the sector’s demands (Andersen, 2025; KonKraft, 2025). An additional challenge is that offshore wind energy’s intermittency does not align with the oil and gas platform’s need for a stable, continuous supply of electricity (Ministry of Energy, 2021; Interview, renewable interest group employee). Supplying platforms directly from offshore wind played only a minor role in the decision to subsidize Sørlige Nordsjø II and Utsira Nord. During the pre-qualification phase for the Sørlige Nordsjø II, the potential to supply electricity to the Ekofisk and Eldfisk oil fields was highlighted as a favourable qualitative criterion (Ministry of Energy, 2023). Following the auction, the Ministry of Energy asked the developer Ventyr to explore this possibility together with ConocoPhillips, operator of Ekofisk (Andersen, 2024). However, the proposal was deemed too costly and abandoned (Amdal, 2025). 29 In sum, Norway’s offshore wind expansion can be seen partly as a response to increasing electricity demand from the oil and gas sector. However, interviewees underline that the need for more electricity extends far beyond the oil and gas sector’s demands; reflecting Norway’s broader decarbonization and transition agenda (Interviews, Renewable interest group employee; Senior public servant in Ministry of Climate and Environment). Industrial Overlaps. The strong industrial overlap between offshore wind and the oil and gas support industry has been an important factor in Norway’s subsidization of offshore wind. Policymakers consistently frame offshore wind not only as a source of new electricity but also as an industrial adventure that builds on Norway’s established offshore expertise, shipbuilding, and supply-chain industries (Klima og- Miljødepartementet, 2021; Ministry of Finance, 2021; Norwegian Government, 2022). Central to this vision is the idea that workers who in the future might lose their jobs in the oil and gas sector can continue working with similar technologies in the offshore wind sector (Interview, Renewable interest group employee). This industrial synergy is particularly emphasized for floating offshore wind, a less mature technology, where Norway has the potential to become a global leader in innovation and manufacturing. Policymakers have also stressed the importance of establishing a domestic offshore wind market to capitalize on Norway’s competitive advantages and secure a leading position in global supply chains (Dahl et al., 2022). The high degree of technological transferability is underscored by Norway’s extensive experience constructing large-scale floating installations and subsea structures, although the smaller scale and nature of mass production in offshore wind differ from those in the oil and gas industry. One respondent noted a common industry tendency to claim around 60% transferability between the sectors (Interview, renewable interest group employee). Early evidence of this overlap is reflected in Ventyr SN II AS, the 30 developer of Sørlige Nordsjø II, awarding a contract with the Norwegian shipbuilding company Worley Rosenberg for the development of the project’s offshore substation, illustrating the industrial linkages between Norway’s oil and gas support industry and the emerging offshore wind sector (Worley, 2025). Importantly, politicians have long recognized the synergies between offshore and oil and gas, yet this recognition did not previously trigger a state-supported strategy until Norway faced a need for additional electricity production. However, the decision to subsidize an inherently expensive source of electricity has revealed disagreements between the government and the public service. In March 2025, Norway’s fiscal policy commission, mandated to provide professional assessments and advice on long-term economic sustainability, recommended pausing offshore wind development, arguing that the state is ill-suited to pick market winners and that supporting unprofitable electricity production is unwise (Finanspolitiskutvalg, 2025).10 This position aligns with Norway’s historically deregulated approach to electricity generation. In response, the Minister of Finance highlighted that while these arguments may hold academic merit, they may not be politically feasible (Finansdepartementet, 2025). Norway’s willingness to look past cost-effectiveness in pursuing offshore wind development suggests that the technology aligns well with a range of national interests. The Minister of Energy has consistently framed offshore wind as a “kinder-surprise”, offering multiple benefits at once: new renewable electricity, emission reductions through the displacement of fossil fuel use, and industrial opportunities for the oil and gas supply and 10 They also suggested discontinuing the CO2-compensation scheme and the support for battery technology and development. 31 shipbuilding industry (Olje-og energidepartementet, 2022). In this way, offshore wind advances several national priorities simultaneously, industrial renewal, climate commitments and energy security, demonstrating how economic concerns have been outweighed by the political and strategic appeal of pursuing multiple goals simultaneously. As Moe et al. (2022) observe, offshore wind seems to bring industrial politics, climate politics and energy politics together. 5.1.3 Policymaker Ideas As previously mentioned, offshore wind development in Norway is not a partisan idea but enjoys broad support across the political spectrum. However, while most parties endorse offshore wind in principle, they diverge over the use of state funding, reflecting different transition aspirations. As cost estimates for offshore wind have risen, the government’s financial support has grown with it (Andersen & Viseth, 2023), prompting growing scepticism from the right, including the Conservative Party and the Progress Party (Høyre, 2023, Interview, renewable interest group employee). The Conservative party previously opened the Sørlige Nordsjø II and Utsira Nord sea basins for offshore wind development in 2020, when they were the governing party. Moreover, the Labour-Centre Party government’s goal of allocating 30GW of offshore wind capacity by 2040 is primarily championed by the Labour Party and not equally embraced across the political spectrum. Since 30 GW of offshore wind would represent a 75% increase in domestic electricity production capacity, far exceeding Norway’s foreseeable demand, the target is best understood as rooted in the government’s transition aspiration and renewing Norway’s status as an energy nation (Interview, renewable interest group employee). These transition aspirations are at least partly motivated by expectations that new green industries will emerge and drive-up future electricity demand, making the rationale for increased 32 generation somewhat contingent. Should this industrial expansion fail to materialize, the justification for a large-scale electricity supply growth would weaken correspondingly. Pro-transition parties, including both Labour and the Conservatives, see the need for new electricity capacity as self-evident, warning that insufficient generation risks future shortfalls. By contrast, parties less preoccupied with transition goals, such as the right-wing Progress Party, do not perceive this need to the same extent (Interview, senior public servant in Ministry of Climate and Environment), illustrating how party priorities shape perceptions of electricity demand and policy needs. Despite increasing opposition from the right regarding the escalating public support mechanisms for offshore wind, it is not clear whether the situation would be different under a right-wing government. In practice, Norway’s two major parties, Labour and the Conservatives, share a common commitment to energy transition goals and the country’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry. Thus, despite rhetorical differences, both parties often converge on energy and industrial policy (Interview, senior public servant). 5.1.4 Political Institutions EU influence may be important both in terms of emission reduction pressures, and policy diffusion, as Norway’s policy developments have coincided with growing European ambitions for offshore wind. However, the decision to introduce subsidies appear to have been driven primarily by domestic rather than European dynamics, although European integration helps create a policy environment more conducive to offshore wind expansion. Norway’s integration with EU on climate policy generates sustained decarbonization pressures. Norway joined the EU Emissions Trading System in 2008, with the scheme covering 33 about 85% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions, including most land-based industry sectors, the oil and gas industry, and aviation (Energifakta Norge, 2023). Under current policy, the EU aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, 90% by 2040, and reach net zero by 2050 (European Commission, 2025).11 Norway is broadly aligned with these targets, having entered into an agreement to participate in EU climate legislation for the 2021–2030 period. Norway’s 2021–2030 Climate Plan further underscores the growing interconnectedness between Norwegian and EU climate policy. The plan also highlights the potential of having to make deeper emissions cuts than those presented in the white paper should EU tighten its rules. In turn, the plan stresses the importance of planning for current EU legislation, while simultaneously maintaining a higher level of domestic ambition (Klima og- Miljødepartementet, 2021). While EU decarbonization pressure cannot directly explain Norway’s decision to subsidize offshore wind, it provides an institutional context in which such policies become more plausible. For instance, the large-scale electrification of the Norwegian oil and gas sector followed a significant spike in the European carbon price. One respondent suggested that state-supported offshore wind projects are difficult to justify unless framed as part of a coherent domestic and European climate policy (Interview, senior public servant in Ministry of Climate and Environment). Nevertheless, it remains difficult to disentangle the extent to which Norway’s transition ambitions are driven by European influence or policymaker’s transition ambitions based on pressures from their own voters. For example, Norway’s introduction of a national 11 During the summer, Norway submitted an increased emission targets to the United Nations under Nationally Determined Contribution, committing also to a 70-75% reduction by 2035. 34 carbon tax in 1991 preceded EEA integration, showing Norway’s long-standing commitment to emission reductions. Norway faces no binding EU mandates compelling it to expand renewable electricity production. The EUs third iteration of its Renewable Energy Directive (RED) sets a 2030 target of 42.5% renewables as a share of total consumption. At the time of writing, Norway is still debating whether to join the second iteration of RED, introduced by the EU in December 2018, which sets a 32% target. Regardless, these directives have little practical significance for Norway, as the country’s renewable share far exceeds the 42.5% benchmark. Although EU renewable directives are largely irrelevant, Norway’s decision to subsidize offshore wind coincided with rising EU ambitions. On November 19, 2020, the EU published its offshore wind strategy as part of its European Green Deal, raising its 2030 offshore wind capacity target from 12 GW in 2030 to 60GW, and setting a long-term target of 300 GW by 2050 (Wilson, 2020). These goals were further strengthened in January 2023 to 111 GW by 2030 and 317 GW by 2050 (Widuto, 2020). As an EEA country, Norway is excluded from these commitments, although the country later signed the Ostend Declaration in April 2023, a collaboration between nine North Sea countries with the goal of developing 120 GW of offshore wind capacity in the basin by 2030 and at least 300 GW by 2050 (Government of Netherlands, 2023). Norwegian political discourse occasionally reflects a “we cannot fall behind” sentiment, linked to offshore wind developments in neighboring countries and the perceived need to accelerate progress to remain at the forefront of offshore wind technology development. While European progress and international competition may have influenced Norway’s willingness to subsidize the sector, respondents generally viewed Norwegian and European offshore wind developments as parallel, with the subsidy decision driven primarily by domestic interests 35 (Interviews, renewable interest group employee; senior public servant in Ministry of Climate and Environment; two public servants from the Ministry of Energy’s offshore wind section). Table 2. Summary of causal factors Norway Mechanism Electoral Interests Strong public opposition to onshore wind positions offshore wind as the more politically viable option for expanding electricity capacity. Public and political scepticism towards increased interconnections with the European electricity market reduces export potential, lowering profitability and increasing reliance on state subsidies. Industrial overlaps between offshore wind and the oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry provides a pathway for industrial transition amidst declining oil and gas production. The oil and gas industry’s increased reliance on electricity is also relevant, but less so. Policymaker Ideas High transition ambitions among mainstream parties reinforces the perceived need for more electricity. Political Institutions Integration with EU climate policy generates sustained decarbonization pressures. Rising EU offshore wind ambitions and developments may reinforce domestic offshore wind ambition. 5.2 Alberta: Restricting Renewable Electricity Development In recent years Alberta has taken several steps to regulate and restrict its rapidly growing renewables sector, including limiting where projects can be developed. This process began with the announcement of a seven-month pause on all renewable project approvals on 3 August 2023. 36 Following the pause, the government introduced the Electric Energy Land Use and Visual Assessment Regulation for wind and solar projects. The regulations restrict development on prime agricultural land, establishes buffer zones to protect scenic views from wind turbines, and imposed reclamation security requirements to ensure funds are available for decommissioning (Electric Energy Land Use and Visual Assessment Regulation, 2024). Evidence suggests that Alberta’s regulatory developments were driven by local opposition to project development in rural Southern Alberta. The UCP government, with strong rural roots, appears to have responded to these concentrated concerns, although the pace of largely deregulated development may have warranted regulatory adjustments in any case. At the same time, the electoral risks associated with restricting renewables, combined with a high prevalence of renewable-sceptic discourse, suggest that policymakers’ own preferences also shaped these decisions. 5.2.1 Electoral Interests Climate Change Concern. The Albertan population exhibits relatively low belief in anthropogenic climate change. The 2018 Canadian Climate Opinion map found that only 42% of Albertans believed that the Earth is warming partly or mostly due to human activity (compared to the national average of 60%), while 54% disagreed with the statement (Mildenberger et al., 2019). More recent data continues to show widespread scepticism, albeit slightly reduced with 47% viewing climate change as either an unproven theory or primarily the result of natural cycles, while 49% attribute it mainly to human activities (Angus Reid Institute, 2025). This lower climate concern translates into weaker electoral incentives for policymakers to prioritize GHG reductions, thereby diminishing the electoral case for expanding renewable electricity generation. 37 Public Support for Renewable Electricity. Leading up to the 2023 renewables pause, Alberta experienced a significant expansion of renewable electricity development, driven largely by policies introduced under the previous National Democratic Party government (2015-2019) and declining global prices for renewable technologies (Dion et al., 2024). Furthermore, Alberta’s deregulated and privatized market proved to be highly conducive to private investment in renewables (ibid.). Between 2018 and 2023, installed wind capacity grew from 1445 MW to 4481 MW, while solar increased from 15 MW to 1650 MW (AESO, 2021, 2025). In 2022, Alberta accounted for more than 75% of Canada’s wind and solar development, increasing to 92% in 2023 (Canadian Renewable Energy Association, 2023; Government of Canada, 2023a). Figure 1. Cumulative installed wind and solar capacity in Alberta (2018-2024) Note. Data retrieved from AESOs Annual Market Statistics Reports. Visuals created by ChatGPT-5. 38 Despite these growth opportunities, the largely unregulated expansion of projects has generated growing discontent in rural Southern Alberta, where development is concentrated (Anderson, 2024a, 2024b, several interviews). Concerns are diverse and include wind and solar infrastructure displacing high-value agricultural land; visual and/or noise impacts from wind turbines, solar farms, and transmission lines; uncertainty over land reclamation processes after project decommissioning; and affordability concerns from overbuilt transmission lines that are publicly financed by ratepayers (Government of Alberta, 2023; several interviews). Some of these issues were exacerbated by perceptions that developers were unresponsive to local concerns, further complicated by a high rate of ownership transfers that inhibited relationship building between local communities and developers (Interview, Jason Schneider12). Public opposition to renewable electricity development is primarily a Southern Alberta phenomenon and is not necessarily shared across the general population. While no government polling was conducted in the lead-up to the pause, independent polling reflected this sentiment. One 2023 poll suggested strong support for renewables: 75% of Albertans supported more renewable projects in their communities, and 70% wanted the provincial government to do more to promote emissions-free energy like wind and solar.13 Nonetheless, support for renewables can coexist with calls for stricter regulation. One poll reported that 65% of Albertans opposed the government’s policy, with opposition stronger in urban areas though most rural respondents also opposed it (Leger, 2023). Similarly, another poll found that 58% opposed the pause, with 35% 12 Jason Schneider is a Board Member in Rural Municipalities Alberta (an association that represents the interests of rural municipalities) and the Councillor of the Vulcan Country government (municipality in Southern Alberta). 13 Although polling results were published by a renewable interest group, the polling was done by the independent pollster, Janet Brown Opinion Research. 39 supportive (Business Renewables Centre, 2023).14 Conversely, a third poll suggested that the majority were in favour, with 47% viewing the pause as a good/very good idea, as opposed to 40% believing it to be a bad/very bad idea (Angus Reid Institute, 2023). Differences in timing and question framing likely explain the discrepancies in polling results, with the final poll conducted later, possibly reflecting the consolidation of political narratives. Nonetheless, the polling studies suggest, at best, lukewarm or ambiguous support for the pause. All six interview respondents identified rural constituents’ concerns as central to the policy developments.15 However, the interests of rural residents are diverse, reflecting the uneven distribution of costs and benefits surrounding renewable electricity development. In Alberta’s deregulated market, renewable project developers negotiate land-leasing deals directly with private landowners. Hence, some landowners benefit financially and support projects, while others, who experience visual or noise impacts without compensation, are more likely to oppose development (Interview, Grant Sprague16; Government of Alberta official, AUC employee17). Rural municipalities (local governments) represent another important group. While municipalities largely represent the interests of rural voters, they have been particularly vocal about land reclamation following project decommissioning, as they bear responsibility for cleanup if companies go bankrupt. This concern reflects historical experiences in the oil and gas sector, where abandoned wells and pipelines left lasting scars on landscapes, and imposed clean- 14 Same as footnote 13. 15 Three respondents worked in a public servant capacity, one worked for a rural municipalities interest group/association, one worked for a clean energy think tank and the final respondent worked for a renewable interest group. 16 Sprague was the Deputy Minister of Energy between 2013 to 2016 and May 2019 to June 2023. 17 AUC is an independent quasi-judicial regulatory agency in Alberta that regulates utilities, including renewable electricity project approvals. 40 up costs for municipalities (Interviews, Jason Schneider; Government of Alberta official). Simultaneously, municipalities in Southern Alberta have become increasingly reliant on renewable energy as a source of revenue, in many cases surpassing oil and gas as the top contributor to municipal budgets (Wang and Noel, 2023). As such, municipalities tend to be broadly pro-development, provided regulatory improvements can ensure long-term accountability (Interview, Jason Schneider). Government’s Electoral Roots. Evidence suggests that the government’s electoral roots may have heightened the sensitivity to the aforementioned concerns. On October 6, 2022, 10 months before the renewables pause, Danielle Smith succeeded Jason Kenney as leader of the United Conservative Party (UCP) and Premier of Alberta. She subsequently won the May 2023 provincial election. Kenney and Smith came from different factions within the UCP, a party formed in July 2017 through a merger of the Progressive Conservatives and the Wildrose Party. While Kenney led the Progressive Conservatives, Smith originally belonged to the Wildrose Party, which she led from 2009 to 2014 before joining the governing Progressive Conservatives. The Wildrose Party has traditionally drawn strong rural support from Southern Alberta, as seen in the 2012 and 2015 elections when it ran independently.18 The current government includes many former Wildrose Party members, Danielle Smith included. A current Government of Alberta official emphasized the importance of the UCP government’s Wildrose roots, noting that the party’s strong rural base has shaped political processes around renewables. Previous Deputy Minister of Energy, Grant Sprague, echoed this sentiment, highlighting additional partisan characteristics, including a pronounced “listen to your 18 See 2012 and 2015 electoral maps. 41 neighbours” mentality rooted in the party’s grassroots origins and contributing to a tendency of treating concentrated complaints as indicative of broader public concern: “I’m oversimplifying, but sometimes it seems like three people phoned you, and therefore you think we have an emergency. There are five million people in the province, so let’s keep some balance” (Interview, Grant Sprague). However, another respondent downplayed the role of the party’s electoral roots: This is my personal view (…), but I think this government is just as happy to ignore rural Alberta as it is to ignore anyone else. I do not feel that this government has listened to Rural Alberta any better than other governments (…). I think they had no choice. This problem (unregulated renewable electricity development) was ballooning so fast that [the government] had to step in and do something (Interview, Jason Schneider). This perspective frames Alberta’s policy developments as a necessary and unavoidable regulatory calibration rather than a result of the UCP government’s electoral roots. 5.2.2 Fossil Fuel Interests Restricting renewable electricity development could, in theory, benefit the fossil fuel industry in two ways: by protecting natural gas generators/utilities, and by allowing producers to maintain market share through the natural gas purchased by utilities for electricity generation. However, the study found little to no evidence that the 2023 renewables pause, and subsequent regulations, were intended to strategically protect these interests. The 2024 Electric Energy Land Use and Visual Assessment Regulations, introduced after the pause, targets wind and solar projects exclusively. It restricts development on prime agricultural land, establishes buffer zones to protect scenic views (viewscapes) from wind 42 turbines, and enforces reclamation security requirements to ensure funds are available for decommissioning (Electric Energy Land Use and Visual Assessment Regulation, 2024). These regulations do not apply to natural gas power plants, despite findings that reclamation risks are lower for renewables than for oil and gas. The AUC, which regulates Alberta’s utilities, also suggested that if the government were to pursue “no-go” zones to preserve scenic areas, the restrictions should be industry-agnostic and apply to all forms of development (Alberta Utilities Commission, 2024). The renewable industry has repeatedly asked whether similar standards will apply to thermal or gas generators, but the government has indicated no intention to do so (Interview, employee of a Canadian renewable interest group). While this exemption could strategically protect incumbent gas generators, it may also reflect legitimate concerns, as visual impacts are generally greater for renewables than for natural gas facilities. Restricting renewables could also help protect the market share of natural gas producers. Alberta’s natural gas sector consists largely of small, distributed producers, who have historically formed an influential part of the UCP’s support base and advocate for minimal oil and gas regulations (Interview, Clean energy think tank electricity analyst). Additionally, these producers have seen their market shrink, partly due to the US shale gas revolution which has reducing export opportunities. Alberta currently consumes roughly 49% of its provincial natural gas production (Government of Alberta, 2025a), making the provincial market highly important to producers. While a substantial share is used by oil sands operators for extraction, approximately 13% of domestic consumption comes from utility-based electricity production (Statistics Canada, 43 2024).19 Consequently, Alberta’s policy choices may reflect attempts to protect a portion of the provincial natural gas market, which could be displaced by the increase in renewable electricity production. Nevertheless, the study found no evidence that the pause and regulations were deliberate attempts to protect the market share of natural gas generators or fossil fuel producers. Public servants were not aware of any industry efforts to limit renewable electricity development (Interview, Government of Alberta official; Grant Sprague). The government has, however, pursued other measures that clearly benefit natural gas generators, such as awarding contracts to older, inefficient coal-to-gas plants to help them remain operational, effectively subsidizing the facilities. Lobbyist records show that major generators, including TransAlta and Heartland, lobbied for these contracts (Anderson, 2024d). However, protecting natural gas generation also partly reflects regulatory advice as AESO, the electric systems operator, previously advised that retiring legacy generators could threaten grid reliability by removing an important source of baseload electricity production (Alberta Energy System Operator, 2022, 2023). Hence, while Alberta will continue to defend the interests of its fossil fuel industry,20 and although the incentives seem to be aligned, the restrictions on renewables appear primarily driven by localized electoral pressures, as opposed to industry interests. 19 This percentage is not readily accessible but has been calculated using Statistics Canada numbers. Around 23% of Alberta’s natural gas consumption comes from electricity generation. Of that 23%, 56% is converted into electricity by utilities (23*0.56=13%), while the remaining 44% is converted into electricity by industry, likely primarily through co-generation facilities in the oilsands which could not be expected to be displaced by renewable generation. 20 The government has also vigilantly defended natural gas generation in the face of federal climate policies which will be discussed later. 44 Finally, the study found limited evidence of renewable electricity expansion serving oil and gas interests. One respondent suggested this is partly because Alberta has not prioritized federal emissions targets, in addition to practical constraints, such as oil sand’s producers need for continuous electricity and the high transmission costs of delivering electricity from southern renewable sites to northern production sites (Interview, Grant Sprague). Electrifying the oil sands would be technologically challenging as two-thirds of production relies on steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD), which is designed to use natural gas (Bataille et al., 2015). Although still technologically feasible, electrification of the oil sands would be extremely energy intensive. One respondent noted that creating the steam needed for current oil sands production would require roughly ten times Alberta’s current wind capacity (Interview, Clean energy think tank electricity analyst). Hybrid approaches combining electricity and gas is possible, but current incentives are weak. With the average carbon price around $40 per ton, it is likely cheaper for operators to delay emission reductions than to invest in electrification. 5.2.3 Policymaker Ideas Adopting a temporal lens helps illuminate how shifting government ideologies and policymaker preferences have shaped Alberta’s renewable electricity policies. In 2015, the surprise election of a New Democratic Party (NDP) majority under Premier Rachel Notley ended 44 years of Progressive Conservative rule. The NDP strengthened climate ambitions, releasing a Climate Leadership Plan that committed to phasing out coal and producing 30% of electricity from renewables by 2030. The government also implemented the Renewable Electricity Program (REP), a market-based mechanism for stimulating investments in renewables and a key factor in the following renewables boom (Hastings-Simon et al., 2022). The REP offered a 20-year price 45 guarantee for producers, marking a significant departure from Alberta’s fully deregulated electricity market, and reflecting the Notley government’s strong commitment to renewables and emission reductions. Following the 2019 election of a United Conservative Party (UCP) majority under Jason Kenney, Alberta returned to a deregulated approach to electricity generation (Interview, Grant Sprague). Kenney quickly terminated the REP, framing it as an unnecessary subsidy, abandoning the 30% target set by the previous government and asserting that Alberta’s renewable share should be decided by the market (Pike, 2019). Yet, renewable development continued grow, validating the government’s decision to end the REP. Favourable market conditions and the REP’s record-low prices had demonstrated the profitability of wind and solar. Furthermore, Alberta’s market design proved highly conducive to private investment, enabling private development contracts that mirrored the government-backed guarantees under the REP (Dion et al., 2024). This created a booming renewable sector, establishing Alberta as Canada’s leading province for renewable investments and development. Respondents assert that Alberta’s rise in renewable deployment has occurred without the development of necessary supporting infrastructure, creating grid congestion and exacerbating challenges associated with transitioning the province’s electricity system (Interviews: Clean energy think tank electricity analyst; renewable interest group employee).Transitioning to a grid with more intermittent sources of electricity comes with challenges, something the NDP government sought to address through a transitioning to a capacity market that would compensate dispatchable generators, like natural gas plants, for supporting the grid during periods of low renewable output. This approach, endorsed by the Alberta Electric System Operator, was intended to ensure reliability while integrating renewables. Energy storage and 46 demand-side management were also considered critical. However, the UCP under Kenney quickly abandoned this proposal, favouring the existing deregulated structure (Giovannetti, 2019). These developments reflect differing views on optimal grid management: the NDP considered decarbonization as compatible with reliability when supported by appropriate policy and flexibility mechanisms, while the UCP government under Kenney saw market forces as the best way to ensure desirable outcomes. Under Danielle Smith, grid reliability and affordability have increasingly been equated with continued reliance on natural gas generation. Parliamentary discourse and public statements shows an intensification of renewable-sceptic rhetoric, with renewables increasingly portrayed as “unreliable” and “intermittent”, while natural gas is described as “clean” and “reliable” (Alberta Hansard, 2023; French, 2023, 2024). At the Rural Municipalities of Alberta Convention in March 2023 Smith declared: "We are a natural gas province. And we will continue to build natural gas power plants, because that is what makes sense in Alberta" (French, 2023). Moreover, some of Smith’s closest advisors have made critical comments about renewables, citing both aesthetic and land-use impacts (Braid, 2023b). During Alberta’s January 2024 grid emergency, Smith blamed renewables for generating almost no power, calling them unreliable, although evidence showed that natural gas plant outages were the primary cause (Beer, 2024). It is difficult to assess definitively whether this rhetoric reflects a fundamental scepticism of renewables as a source of electricity generation compared to natural gas. Respondents were divided: NGO and interest group representatives tended to perceive an ideological bias against renewables, influencing the government’s decision to impose regulatory restrictions, whereas public servants maintained that the government takes no particular stance and is instead 47 responding to electoral pressures from key constituencies. Nonetheless, the narrative that renewables are uniquely risky or unreliable has helped legitimize the renewables pause. However, evidence suggests that the Smith government actively sought to construct a rationale for the renewables pause, possibly to help deflect potential electoral backlash from a controversial policy, underscoring the potential centrality of policymaker ideas in the decision-making process. The 2023 renewables pause surprised both the public and the renewable industry, as it was announced without prior discussion or consultation, including during the provincial election held a couple of months prior (Jones & Graney, 2023). Smith originally attributed the pause to requests from two regulatory bodies: the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), which manages the province’s electricity grid, and the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC), which oversees utilities and approves new renewable projects. She claimed that both agencies had requested a pause, citing two letters sent to the government that addressed regulatory challenges arising from the rapid growth in renewable electricity projects (Bennett, 2023). Smith also asserted that Rural Municipalities Alberta (RMA) 21 had requested the pause. However, these claims do not withstand scrutiny: the RMA denied its involvement (Graney, 2023), and neither of the regulatory letters called for a pause (AESO, 2023; AUC, 2023). The AESO letter stated it would “support the AUC in its implementation of a government-directed temporary pause”, while the AUC letter only highlighted concerns about the potential impact of power plants on high-value agricultural land and the absence of mandatory reclamation security. In addition, the online publication The Narwhal found evidence of the government having floated the idea of a pause prior to receiving the letters from the two regulators 21 An independent association that voices the interests of rural municipalities. 48 (Anderson, 2024b). When confronted with the possibility of a pause, the CEO of AESO warned that it could “undermine investor confidence and throw the [renewable] industry into a tailspin” (Anderson, 2024a), signaling regulatory pushback against a government-initiated policy. Although AESO ultimately chose to support the government, the CEO emphasized in an internal email to the board that the organization could not cite reliability or integration issues as justification, as that would be inaccurate (Anderson, 2024c). This casts doubt on the government’s claim that addressing reliability challenges from a changing supply mix was central to the decision to pause renewable electricity project approvals (Government of Alberta, 2023c). In sum, there is strong evidence that the government assumed some electoral risk in implementing the renewables pause. However, it remains unclear whether this decision was driven primarily by a commitment to parts of their electoral base, or by their own scepticism and/or dislike of renewables. 5.2.4 Political Institutions Federal climate policies provided a constant backdrop to Alberta’s restrictive regulations on renewable electricity development. In the 2021 re-election campaign of the Liberal party under Justin Trudeau, the party promised to introduce a Clean Electricity Standard to achieve a net-zero electricity system by 2035, alongside a cap on oil and gas emissions (Liberal Party of Canada, 2021). These measures were later incorporated into the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan, outlining Canada’s strategy to meet national GHG reduction targets. Alberta policymakers, however, strongly opposed the strengthening of federal climate policies. Although the Clean Electricity Regulations were softened before adoption, dropping the 49 2035 timeline, the original draft regulations would have severely undermined the viability of natural gas generation. Cogeneration plants in the oil sands, and combined-cycle natural gas plants would require carbon capture or risk closure, while simple cycle (peaker) plants would face a 450-hour/year operating limit (Government of Canada, 2023b). Premier Danielle Smith centred her bid for UCP leadership, and premiership, on defending Alberta’s energy interests against federal overreach (Herring, 2022; Premier of Alberta, 2022). Under Smith’s leadership, opposition to the federal government has become more aggressive, exemplified by the introduction of the Alberta Sovereignty Act, which provides a process for the Government of Alberta to suspend provincial enforcement of federal legislation it considers harmful to Albertans.22 The Act drew criticism from former Premier and UCP leader, Jason Kenney, who warned it would turn Alberta into a “banana republic”, subsequently resigning his seat as MLA, highlighting the divide between the new and the old UCP (Bellefontaine, 2022; CBC, 2022). Premier Smith has framed federal climate policies, particularly the Clean Electricity Regulations, as a reason for pausing renewable electricity projects. Smith argued that the proposed regulations would hinder the development of backup generation, such as natural gas, in turn threatening grid stability due to the intermittent property of renewables (Drinkwater, 2023). While these statements likely served a political purpose, allowing Smith to position herself as tough on “harmful” federal policies, respondents believed that the government’s actual motivations for the pause were largely unrelated to federal regulations.23 In sum, although Alberta will continue to express dissatisfaction with federal policies they deem threatening to 22 The Act has been labelled by legal experts as unconstitutional, and the actual efficacy of the policy is questionable. 23 Three out of six interviewees were asked about a link between federal regulations and the renewable regulations, including two public servants (one sitting and one retired) and one employee in a clean electricity think tank. 50 their own interests, the study found no evidence that the pause was a response to, or a deliberate act of defiance against, federal climate policies. However, Alberta’s strong opposition to federal climate policies highlights the broader challenges of Canadian federalism, showing how provinces can resist national initiatives and remain insulated from both federal and international climate pressures. Federal climate policies, such as the Clean Electricity Regulations and the Oil and Gas Emissions Cap are frequently framed by provincial leaders as “unconstitutional”, on the grounds that federal emission-reduction measures indirectly affect Alberta’s natural resource and electricity sectors, which fall under provincial jurisdiction (Government of Alberta, 2023c). There is also a widespread perception that Canada’s climate commitments under the Paris Agreement are a federal, not provincial, responsibility. This is a bipartisan stance, as both the UCP and NDP acknowledge that Alberta should not be held accountable for meeting unachievable federal targets (Braid, 2023a; CBC, 2023; United Conservative Party of Alberta, 2025). This decentralized federal structure grants provinces significant discretion to deviate from federal climate plans. As mentioned, while there are tools the federal government can use directly, including the use of its criminal law power (Harrison, 2023), the federal government cannot tell provinces to adopt its emission targets. Within this context, Alberta, the most carbon-intensive province in Canada, has exercised its discretion to adopt an aspirational, non-binding target to reach net-zero emission targets by 2050 (Government of Alberta, 2023a). Even under the NDP government’s climate plan, the province would have seen only marginal GHG reductions by 2030 (Government of Alberta, 2018). As one respondent noted: “If they (federal government) want to set targets that actually reflect what's achievable in the province, they should probably talk to the province about that. And they don't” (Interview, Grant Sprague). 51 In sum, federal climate policies were not directly influential in shaping Albert’s decision to pause, and subsequently regulate, the renewable electricity sector. However, Alberta’s institutional context, marked by strong opposition to federal climate policies within a highly decentralized federal system has insulated the province from broader decarbonization pressures, thereby reducing incentives for renewable electricity expansion. Table 3. Summary of causal factors Alberta Mechanism Electoral Interests Localized, rural opposition to rapid and large-scale renewable electricity development in Southern Alberta, potentially amplified by the Smith government’s electoral roots. Policy outcomes aligned with natural gas interests, but developments were not driven by direct industry influence. Policymaker Ideas Implementing a pause on renewables involved some electoral risk for the government. Policymakers consistently frame renewables as “intermittent” and “unreliable” while natural gas generation is depicted as the only feasible pathway to a reliable and stable electricity grid. Political Institutions Federal climate policies elicit pushback rather than compliance. However, regulations emerged independently of these federal measures. The decentralized nature of Canadian federalism means there are no requirements for provinces to set their own GHG targets nor to meet federal targets. 52 Chapter 6: Discussion Following the analysis of policy developments in Norway and Alberta, this section revisits the initial hypotheses to explain the observed divergence in renewable electricity policies. 6.1 Electoral Interests H1: Jurisdictions with greater public pressure for climate action and/or renewable electricity will be more likely to support renewable electricity. Public opinion plays an important role in both case studies. In Norway, the majority of the population believes in anthropogenic climate change, generating stronger electoral pressures for climate action, and consequently, strengthening the case for renewable electricity development. In Alberta, belief in anthropogenic climate change is notably lower, resulting in weaker electoral incentives for climate action and renewable electricity. This difference is consistent with Alberta’s weaker emission targets and decision to regulate renewable electricity development. Both jurisdictions have faced public opposition to renewable projects. In Norway, strong opposition to onshore wind has made offshore wind politically preferable. In Alberta, local, rural opposition to a rapid ramp-up in large-scale wind and solar development appears to have prompted the government to adopt more restrictive regulations. Nevertheless, broader public opinion in Alberta remains generally supportive of wind and solar, and overall public support does not appear any lower than for offshore wind in Norway. Geography also shapes these dynamics. Faced with rising opposition to onshore wind, Norway can pivot to offshore wind, 53 which, although more expensive, avoids many of the common sources of public opposition to onshore wind and, to some extent, solar. By contrast, landlocked Alberta lacks such an alternative, although it seems unlikely that such an option would be exercised had it been available. This study finds partial support for H1. H2: Oil and gas producing jurisdictions are more likely to support renewable electricity if it serves the interests of the oil and gas industry. Norway and Alberta share a commitment to preserving their fossil fuel industries, but the relationship between renewables, and these interests differ substantially. In Norway, rising decarbonization pressures have prompted fossil fuel producers to electrify extraction processes to reduce emissions and maintain social legitimacy. However, Norway’s demand for additional electricity, and the subsequent subsidization of offshore wind, is not driven solely by the oil and gas sector’s needs, but by Norway’s broader electrification efforts, encompassing past, present and future efforts. Moreover, developing offshore wind creates new business opportunities for the oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industries, with employment and experience potentially shifting from one offshore sector to another. Hence, embracing offshore wind helps secure value creation from an economically influential sector, situating it as a strategic asset for the oil and gas industry. In Alberta, renewables offer little strategic value for the oil and gas industry. Electrifying oil sands operations is technically feasible but energy-intensive, and weak carbon pricing provides limited incentives to decarbonize. Furthermore, the geographic distance between renewables and the brunt of oil and gas operations further reduces the potential for industry synergy. Although incentives seemingly align in terms of restricting renewables to protect fossil 54 fuel generators and producers, this factor was not found to be significant in shaping provincial policy. Nonetheless, the study finds strong support for H2. 6.2 Policymaker Ideas H3: Right-wing politicians will be more ideologically resistant to climate action and renewable electricity development. The Alberta case reveals a pronounced renewable sceptic discourse, with the intermittency and unreliability of renewable technologies frequently emphasized by policymakers. Within this framing, renewable electricity is portrayed less as a public good and more as a risk that must be managed, or at worst, avoided. In contrast, natural gas is consistently framed as the cornerstone of the province’s electricity generation. The decision to pause renewable electricity project approvals, despite regulator pushback and potential electoral backlash, demonstrates a willingness to pursue polarizing policies, although it is unclear whether the government acted on localized electoral pressures or their own negative perceptions of renewable technologies. Norway presents a contrasting case. Despite increasing scepticism surrounding subsidizing unprofitable electricity generation, offshore wind retains broad public backing. Additionally, offshore wind serves a range of national objectives, spanning climate, energy and industrial goals, with support for these objectives appearing relatively consistent across the traditionally dominant parties. Taken together, the comparison highlights the centrality of political ideology in shaping renewable electricity policy. However, the differences do not seem to be explained solely by left-right ideological divides, they may also reflect the influence of the two jurisdictions’ electoral systems. Norway’s proportional representation system may reduce 55 political polarization and demand cross-party collaboration, whereas Alberta’s first past-the-post system amplifies partisan divides and encourages sharper distinctions between political parties. The study finds partial support for H3. 6.3 Political Institutions H4: Jurisdictions with greater supranational pressure on climate action will be more likely to support renewable electricity. The role of political institutions in Norway and Alberta highlights a stark contrast in the capacity of higher-level governments to drive policy change. Norway’s integration with the EU, particularly through participation in climate governance structures such as the EU Emissions Trading System create strong and sustained decarbonization pressures. This is illustrated by Norway’s electrification of its oil and gas sector, which has been made economically viable by rising carbon prices. While the exact influence of EU integration is difficult to isolate, given the challenge of disentangling European climate pressures from domestic ones, these institutional ties create accountability mechanisms that reinforce and strengthen climate commitments, fostering a policy environment more supportive of expensive offshore wind development. In contrast, Alberta operates within an institutional context shaped by Canadian federalism, which grants the province substantial autonomy over certain policy areas. Federal climate policies are often viewed by provincial policymakers as illegitimate intrusion into areas of provincial jurisdiction. While distinct provincial economies create diverging provincial interests, the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism solidifies them. This institutional context allows the province to decouple electricity policy from national climate objectives, creating a political space less conducive to renewables. Additionally, it facilitates a more reactive 56 policy environment, where climate ambition and support for renewables depend heavily on the priorities of individual governments, as illustrated by the widely different approaches taken by the NDP and the UCP, and internally between different UCP factions. The study finds strong support for H4: Norway’s integration with the EU creates strong sustained decarbonization pressures that strengthens the need for renewable electricity production, while decentralized federalism limits the influence of federal climate policies and enables Alberta to pursue contrary goals and objectives. This leads to the somewhat paradoxical situation where a sub-national jurisdiction possesses more autonomy over their own climate policy than a nation state. 57 Table 4. Comparison of causal factors: Norway and Alberta Norway Alberta Interests Higher public recognition of anthropogenic climate change. Lower public recognition of anthropogenic climate change. Strong public opposition to onshore wind situates offshore wind, which enjoys higher public support, the more politically viable option for large-scale renewable electricity expansion. Local opposition to wind/solar in rural communities due to rapid, unregulated expansion. Wind/solar retains majority public support province-wide. Offshore wind supports the oil and as industry’s interests, particularly through creating new business opportunities for the supportive supply and shipbuilding industry. Wind and solar offer no clear benefits to the oil and gas industry. Ideas Bipartisan support for offshore wind and transition-related policies. Right-wing government frames renewables as “unreliable” and “intermittent”, emphasizing risks over benefits. Implementation of renewables pause despite regulatory pushback and potential electoral risks. Institutions Integration with EU climate policies creates strong electrification pressures. Decentralized federalism means there is no requirement for provinces to adapt federal emission targets. 58 Chapter 7: Conclusion This study has compared the diverging policies for renewable electricity development in two fossil fuel-producing and exporting jurisdictions: Norway and Alberta. By undertaking a process tracing of both case studies, it has identified the central factors shaping respective policy developments, focusing on the role of electoral and fossil fuel interests, policymaker ideas, and political institutions. Subsequently, it has clarified the factors that help explain why the two case studies diverge. The findings suggest that Norway’s decision to subsidize expensive offshore wind development, and Alberta’s decision to regulate a rapidly expanding renewables sector, reflect fundamental differences in decarbonization pressures. In Norway, strong decarbonization pressures, manifested through strong public belief in anthropogenic climate change, bipartisan support for transition measures, and integration with the EU on climate and energy policy, encourage electrification measures that subsequently strengthen the need for renewable electricity production. In turn, public opposition to onshore wind and the ability of offshore wind to provide transition pathways for Norway’s oil and gas supply and shipbuilding industry, situates the technology as the most effective way of safeguarding a range of national interests and achieving key policy objectives. In Alberta, decarbonization pressures are far weaker, as seen by the weak public belief in anthropogenic climate change, and the decentralized nature of Canadian federalism which insulates the province from federal and international climate pressures. Within this context, the emergence of a right-wing government with limited transition aspirations and a strong commitment to maintaining natural gas as the primary source of electricity generation has further reduced the incentives for deregulated renewable expansion. In essence, while Norway aims to leverage offshore wind to achieve multiple policy objectives 59 simultaneously, Alberta’s lack of decarbonization pressures limits both the role and significance of renewables. 60 References Aasen, M., Klemetsen, M., Steffenak, H. H., Vatn, A., & Reed, E. U. (2022). CICEROs Klimaundersøkelse: Kort oppsummering årene 2018-2022. CICERO. Abban, A. R., & Hasan, M. Z. (2021). 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Harrison, Kathryn, 1958-
Renewable energy politics in fossil fuel-producing jurisdictions: a comparative study of Norway and Alberta
Text