Science, Faculty of
Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES), Institute for
DSpace
UBCV
Rossa-Roccor, Verena
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
Background: A growing number of academics advocate for political action on climate change. Very little is known about their strategic capacity or how they experience this role. There is also a paucity of training opportunities for academics who want to become more effective activists. This dissertation (i) presents a theory-substantive conceptual framework for change making strategies and tactics, (ii) fills the knowledge gap on strategies and experiences of academic advocates, and (iii) fills the training gap by providing a strategy workshop for academics. Methodology: A conceptual framework of practice-relevant insights on effective change making strategies was developed using a multidisciplinary body of literature. The experiences and skills of academic advocates were assessed in an interview-based narrative study design which included 17 academics from Canada, the US, and the UK. Data was analysed with a thematic coding approach within an interpretive description framework. The workshop focuses on power navigation strategies, integrating findings from the literature and the interviews. Results and discussion: I developed four archetypes based on participants’ knowledge mobilization (KMb) tactics: the advisor, the advocate, the activist, and the insider. These archetypes are fluid categories along two axes: (i) where participants exert their influence - inside vs. outside of the policy community - and (ii) how they approach their KMb activities from “power navigator” to “information provider”. The former engages in the realities of politics inside the policy community (e.g., civil servant, partisan activities, or lobbying) or as an outsider via tactics such as social movements or civil disobedience. The latter aims to maintain the status of an “objective” advisor via tactics such as acting as an expert witness or public intellectual. The choice of strategy for most participants is intuitive, depends largely on one’s concept of what is right or wrong (“identity”), and is based on implicit theories of change grounded in beliefs and assumptions rather than an empirical evidence base. Systemic realities such as lack of incentives or resources prohibit the academic advocate from applying literature-based strategic insights to their own work. This dissertation seeks to remedy these challenges by providing a workshop that considers these constraints.
ACADEMICS AS ACTIVISTS: EXPLORING AND BUILDING POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION CAPACITIES TO INFLUENCE CLIMATE POLICY by Verena Rossa-Roccor MD, Universität Tübingen, 2012 MSc, The University of British Columbia, 2019 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Resources, Environment and Sustainability) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) May 2025 © Verena Rossa-Roccor, 2025 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled: Academics as activists: exploring and building political knowledge mobilization capacities to influence climate policy submitted by Verena Rossa-Roccor in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Resources, Environment and Sustainability Examining Committee: Dr. Paul Kershaw, Associate Professor, School of Population and Public Health, UBC Co-Supervisor Dr. David R. Boyd, Associate Professor, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability and School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, UBC Co-Supervisor Dr. Veena Sriram, Assistant Professor, School of Population and Public Health and School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Dr. M. V. Ramana, Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, UBC University Examiner Dr. Terre Satterfield, Professor, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, UBC University Examiner Dr. Paul Cairney, Professor, Division of History, Heritage, and Politics, University of Stirling External Examiner Additional Supervisory Committee Members: Dr. Amanda Giang, Assistant Professor, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability and Department of Mechanical Engineering, UBC Supervisory Committee Member iii Abstract Background: A growing number of academics advocate for political action on climate change. Very little is known about their strategic capacity or how they experience this role. There is also a paucity of training opportunities for academics who want to become more effective activists. This dissertation (i) presents a theory-substantive conceptual framework for change making strategies and tactics, (ii) fills the knowledge gap on strategies and experiences of academic advocates, and (iii) fills the training gap by providing a strategy workshop for academics. Methodology: A conceptual framework of practice-relevant insights on effective change making strategies was developed using a multidisciplinary body of literature. The experiences and skills of academic advocates were assessed in an interview-based narrative study design which included 17 academics from Canada, the US, and the UK. Data was analysed with a thematic coding approach within an interpretive description framework. The workshop focuses on power navigation strategies, integrating findings from the literature and the interviews. Results and discussion: I developed four archetypes based on participants’ knowledge mobilization (KMb) tactics: the advisor, the advocate, the activist, and the insider. These archetypes are fluid categories along two axes: (i) where participants exert their influence - inside vs. outside of the policy community - and (ii) how they approach their KMb activities from “power navigator” to “information provider”. The former engages in the realities of politics inside the policy community (e.g., civil servant, partisan activities, or lobbying) or as an outsider via tactics such as social movements or civil disobedience. The latter aims to maintain the status of an “objective” advisor via tactics such as acting as an expert witness or public intellectual. The choice of strategy for most participants is intuitive, depends largely on one’s concept of what is right or wrong (“identity”), and is based on implicit theories of change grounded in beliefs and assumptions rather than an empirical evidence base. Systemic realities such as lack of incentives or resources prohibit the academic advocate from applying literature-based strategic insights to their own work. This dissertation seeks to remedy these challenges by providing a workshop that considers these constraints. iv Lay Summary The decisions and policies put in place by most governments regarding the climate crisis do not go far enough. A growing number of academics, based on the scientific evidence about the impacts of climate change, feel the need to act and influence policy decisions. This research explores what these “academic advocates” do to influence climate-related policies and how they experience these activities. It also provides a framework that describes what academics should do to be more effective as change makers. This study observes that there are skills gaps among the participants because their approach to activism is often intuitive and guided by beliefs rather than an understanding of the evidence on effective change making. This dissertation also contains a practice-relevant chapter in the form of a workshop. The goal is for the academic advocates to develop a skill set in activism and ultimately become more impactful change makers. v Preface I conceived and designed the research reported in this dissertation. This work was not part of an existing program of research. I conducted all components of the research personally. My co-supervisors and members of the committee made important contributions through discussing ideas and providing feedback, particularly with regard to study conceptualization, participant sampling, overall methodology, analysis, and interpretation. My co-supervisor Dr. Kershaw was also involved in coding decisions during interview analysis and provided guidance on the pedagogy for the workshop component. Generative artificial intelligence (AI) was not used for any aspects of the work in this dissertation. The study was conducted under UBC BREB ethics approval H21-03150. Versions of this work, particularly the theory substantive Chapter 2 which describes a conceptual framework of change making tactics, have been published here: Rossa-Roccor, V., Giang, A., & Kershaw, P. (2021). Framing climate change as a human health issue: enough to tip the scale in climate policy? The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(8), e553-e559. My contribution to this article includes leading conceptualization, literature review and synthesis, development of argument, and manuscript drafting and editing as first author. Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming common anxieties in knowledge translation: advice for scholarly issue advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. My contribution to this publication as co-first author includes conceptualization, literature review and synthesis, framework generation, and drafting and editing of manuscript. vi Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ iii Lay Summary ................................................................................................................................................ iv Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ ix List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................ x List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................... xii Dedication ...................................................................................................................................................xiii 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Organization of the dissertation ................................................................................................... 3 1.3 Dissertation context ...................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.1 Points of departure and purpose ............................................................................................ 4 1.3.2 Personal position and reflections ............................................................................................ 8 1.3.3 Research questions and workshop objective ........................................................................ 10 1.4 Useful definitions ........................................................................................................................ 10 1.4.1 Policy and policy change ....................................................................................................... 10 1.4.2 Strategies, tactics, tools ........................................................................................................ 11 1.4.3 Activism and advocacy .......................................................................................................... 12 1.4.4 Scientist, scholar, researcher, academic ............................................................................... 13 1.4.5 Terms referring to different concepts of evidence-to-action activities ................................ 13 2 A theory and literature-informed conceptual framework of change making strategies ................... 17 2.1 Research question 1 .................................................................................................................... 17 2.2 Shortcomings: Knowledge mobilization ..................................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Evidence-based policymaking, linear models of research utilization, and the Policy Cycle . 18 2.2.2 Information deficit, rational decision-making, and power neutral tools of knowledge mobilization ........................................................................................................................................ 19 2.2.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 22 2.3 Answers: Policymaking theories and research utilization in policy and politics (thinking like a political scientist) .................................................................................................................................... 24 vii 2.4 Actions: Tactics to navigate and build power ............................................................................. 29 2.4.1 Think and act like a movement or lobbyist ........................................................................... 31 2.4.2 Think and act like a marketer ................................................................................................ 37 2.4.3 Legal tactics ........................................................................................................................... 39 2.5 The importance of context ......................................................................................................... 41 2.6 Conclusions and synthesis of the literature into a conceptual framework ................................ 42 3 Learning from academic advocates .................................................................................................... 47 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 47 3.2 Background ................................................................................................................................. 48 3.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 50 3.3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................... 50 3.3.2 Epistemology ......................................................................................................................... 51 3.3.3 Research design..................................................................................................................... 51 3.3.4 Guiding propositions ............................................................................................................. 52 3.3.5 Sampling, inclusion criteria, saturation ................................................................................. 53 3.3.6 Data collection ...................................................................................................................... 55 3.3.7 Data analysis.......................................................................................................................... 55 3.3.8 Ethics ..................................................................................................................................... 60 3.4 Results ......................................................................................................................................... 60 3.4.1 Participants ........................................................................................................................... 60 3.4.2 A conceptual journey of the academic advocate .................................................................. 61 3.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 108 3.5.1 Discussion of results ............................................................................................................ 109 3.5.2 Limitations and remedies .................................................................................................... 123 3.6 Summary and future directions ................................................................................................ 127 4 A workshop for academic advocates ................................................................................................ 133 4.1 Motivation for this workshop ................................................................................................... 133 4.2 Operationalizing the evidence base .......................................................................................... 134 4.2.1 STEP 1: Think like a political scientist, lobbyist, movement, and marketer ........................ 134 4.2.2 STEP 2: Pick a strategic target ............................................................................................. 134 4.2.3 STEP 3: Track down who has the power ............................................................................. 135 4.2.4 STEP 4: Revisit and amend your strategic target given the identified power structures ... 136 4.2.5 STEP 5: Develop a theory of change.................................................................................... 136 viii 4.2.6 STEP 6: Choose your tactics and tools to build power ........................................................ 136 4.2.7 STEP 7: Enhance your strategic capacity by attracting skilled people ................................ 137 4.2.8 STEP 8: Be ready to time your efforts right ......................................................................... 137 4.2.9 STEP 9: Be aware of the challenges..................................................................................... 138 4.3 Workshop outline ..................................................................................................................... 139 4.3.1 Overview of the workshop .................................................................................................. 139 4.3.2 Modules and workshop slides ............................................................................................. 140 4.3.3 Critical reflections ............................................................................................................... 207 5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 209 References ................................................................................................................................................ 221 Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 238 Appendix A: Summaries of Policy Theories .......................................................................................... 238 Appendix B: Recruitment emails ........................................................................................................... 244 Appendix C: Consent information ......................................................................................................... 247 Appendix D: Interview guide ................................................................................................................. 249 Appendix E: Study protocol................................................................................................................... 253 ix List of Tables Table 2.1 Brief summaries of theories of the policymaking process .......................................................... 27 Table 3.1 Criteria of evaluation ................................................................................................................... 59 Table 3.2 Definitions of themes and codes and how they correspond to the research questions ............ 74 Table 3.3 Strategies and corresponding tactics and archetypes ................................................................ 77 Table 3.4 Number of mentions of barriers and facilitators to activism ...................................................... 89 x List of Figures Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework connecting information provider and power navigator tactics and archetypes as applied within and outside of the policymaking community .............................................. 43 Figure 3.1 Thematic map of the conceptual journey of an academic advocate ......................................... 62 xi List of Abbreviations ACF: Advocacy Coalition Framework DOI: Diffusion of Innovation EBPM: Evidence-based policymaking GHG: Greenhouse gas emissions IAD: Institutional Analysis and Development Framework KMb: Knowledge mobilization MSA: Multiple Streams Approach NPF: Narrative Policy Framework PAR: Participatory Action Research PET: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory PFT: Policy Feedback Theory SCTP: Social Construction of Target Populations ToC: Theory of Change xii Acknowledgements A project like this is never realized in isolation. I could not have done it without the help of and support by numerous people to whom I am immensely grateful. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, mentor, and role model, Dr. Paul Kershaw. He not only motivated me to take on this somewhat unusual topic for my PhD, but he also guided me unfailingly throughout the entirety of my degree. He continuously pushed me to be better, to think more deeply, to be more pragmatic, and to keep the big picture in mind. He never, ever ceased to be in my corner and for that I am forever grateful. Dr. David R. Boyd agreed to take me on as my co-supervisor in a time of change and new orientation during the course of my PhD. He believed in me and this project, sent messages of support and motivation, and introduced me to the world of law and litigation. He is an exceptional role model for integrity, optimism, and hope and I am so very grateful to have had him on my team. Dr. Amand Giang and Dr. Veena Sriram tirelessly provided answers to my numerous questions and continued to direct my attention to my “blind spots”. They both are superb role models for women in academia and were an absolute pleasure to have on my supervisory committee. Despite the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and my subsequent relocation, the community at the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability was always close to my heart. Thank you to all the staff, faculty, and students who made this possible. I am particularly grateful for the valuable input and thought-provoking conversations with my colleagues and peers PJ Rayner, Javiera Pumarino, Heather Palis, Kate Wahl, and Madison Stevens. My data analysis would have been infinitely more complicated without the skills and support of Stéphanie Black. Thank you all for sharing your insights and wisdom with me. This work would not have been possible without the financial support of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Doctoral Award. Thank you to the taxpayers of Canada who make research funding like this possible. I would also like to thank the Public Scholars Initiative and Dr. Susan Porter for her vision to reimagine the PhD. Without this program, I probably would not have been brave enough to submit this dissertation in the way it stands now. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Serbulent Turan for his support. Serbulent’s emails always brightened my day, and I appreciate his unwavering dedication to us students. Ultimately, life happens outside of the walls of academia. Thank you to my wonderful friends who have not just always reminded me of that but have also provided the village that made it all possible: Robyn J Kenyon, Fatima Jamalova and Farzian Aminuddin, Claire Zukin, Kerry Neil, Sarah Koch, Stéphanie Black and Mike Hillman, Anita Schmalor and Brent Stewart, Kelsey Klaver, Angie Woo, and Henriette and Vincent Chu. And finally, my life wouldn’t nearly be as full and joyful without my family. To my parents, my siblings and their families, and most of all to Raphael, Josephine, Samuel, Loreley, and Baloo: I love you all so very much. Without you, none of this would have been possible. xiii Dedication To all the activists who risk everything to make our world a better place 1 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign slogan "Drill, Baby, Drill" has become synonymous with his plan to reverse climate policies in the US, the world’s second-largest greenhouse gas emitter (Tollefson, 2025). On January 20, 2025, he declared a “national energy emergency” (The White House, 2025). This executive order focuses on promoting and expediting the development of the oil and gas sector and deliberately excludes wind and solar from the definition of “energy”. Five days later, Trump ordered the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to review and remove content related to climate change from its public websites (Canon, 2025; Steakin, 2025). The trend away from climate crisis awareness and climate-friendly policies in favour of political gain is also evident in Canada. The next federal election has been framed as a “carbon tax election” (Heffernan, 2025). The Conservative Party of Canada, the predicted winner of this election, has centred their campaign around their slogan “Axe the Tax”, stirring up anger against the carbon price (Conservative Party of Canada, 2025). This attracts voters away from the evidence about the risks of climate change. It also disregards the evidence that the price on pollution contributes very little to inflation (Zimonjic, 2024) or the financial burden of the individual (Dahlby et al., n.d.). In the face of such developments, there has been a growing recognition among the scientific community that the barriers to more effective climate-related policies are not purely due to a lack of evidence, information, or expertise among decision makers but are indeed mostly political and economic (including an interaction between the two) (Basseches et al., 2022; Watts et al., 2015; World Bank Group, 2023b). Political barriers can include many factors like party governance and institutional arrangements, interest group and conservative opposition and countermovement, or public opinion and the (lack of) political cover it may provide through public discourse or influence on legislative and executive agendas (Basseches et al., 2022). Economic barriers range from household-level concerns about the growing costs due to carbon pricing (World Bank Group, 2023a), to industrial competitiveness, to the complex interactions and contradictions between “capitalism as a social system and the demands of decarbonizing the global economy” (Paterson & P-Laberge, 2018). With this recognition comes a partial paradigm shift among scientists. A growing number of academics are willing to engage in climate change advocacy and activism (Cologna et al., 2021; J. F. Green, 2020; Grossman, 2024; Tormos-Aponte et al., 2023). However, activism and advocacy in the 2 policy arena among academics still seem to be more of an exception than the rule, particularly in fields that adhere to a more positivist paradigm. Therefore, many budding academic advocates may not have a mentor or role model in their own networks. The literature on advice for academic advocates shows that there is still a paucity of applicable, helpful guidance that goes beyond generic statements. Learning from the experiences of academic colleagues who already engage in advocacy and activism can help save resources, avoid pitfalls, and potentially improve impact, especially if this expertise is informed by empirical evidence (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). This dissertation is a first stop on the budding academic advocate’s journey who wants to learn from the empirical literature and from more experienced colleagues. I begin by presenting a conceptual framework on change making strategies and tactics that I developed based on the multidisciplinary literature on effective change making. The literature base that guided this work includes concepts and theories of the policymaking process, research utilization in policy decisions literature, knowledge mobilization (KMb) and implementation science, moral psychology frameworks, marketing frameworks, social movement scholarship, and community organizing approaches. In alignment with a pragmatist epistemology and objective, the focus of this work lies on the strategies, tactics, and tools employed to create change. I use the term pragmatist here with respect to two related concepts: I refer to the broader concept of pragmatic epistemology as the paradigm guiding my research methodology. The pragmatist paradigm allows for research to focus on the consequences of the research, and the research questions themselves rather than adhering to rigid methodologies. This allows for more flexibility in the use of quantitative or qualitative methods, or a mix of the two, depending on what is best suited to answer the research questions and practical issues at hand (Morgan, 2014). I also use the term “pragmatic” in a broader sense of the term throughout this dissertation when I mean to say “practical” or even “realistic”. By contrast, I do not mean the philosophical school of thought of pragmatism shaped by Dewey when I use the term in this dissertation (Legg & Hookway, 2024). Within the pragmatist paradigm, I compare and contrast the literature with the findings from my study exploring the strategies, tactics, and tools employed by academic advocates, and uncover the factors that contribute to the choice of these strategies. I also highlight barriers and risks inherent to this work and explore participants’ strategies when navigating these challenges. Using the data from the interviews, this comparison allows me to come to conclusions about knowledge and skills gaps among academic advocates, and to reflect on reasons for these gaps (contribution to knowledge, see Chapter 3). 3 Finally, I integrate the theory-substantive insights from the literature and the study findings in a workshop for academic advocates and activists. The workshop provides the audience with an actionable field guide and activities to help them navigate the real-world complexity of policymaking by sharing lessons from those who have walked this path before. The workshop is designed for the particular challenges of an academic advocate highlighting insights from participant experiences (contribution to practice, see Chapter 4). By integrating a workshop as a main chapter, this dissertation departs from a conventional form. I developed this workshop in my role as awardee of the University of British Columbia’s Public Scholars Initiative (PSI) which “reimagines PhD pathways that legitimize and integrate broader conceptions of scholarship and scholarly products within the core of doctoral education and dissertation research” (Public Scholars Initiative, n.d.). This program supports “doctoral students whose research extends beyond the academy, and beyond traditional disciplinary approaches, to have a tangible impact for the public good” (Public Scholars Initiative, n.d.). 1.2 Organization of the dissertation This dissertation contains five chapters. In this first chapter, I situate my dissertation within the larger context of the persisting evidence-to-climate policy gap. My specific focus is on academics in Canada, the US, and the UK as climate advocates and activists who seek to narrow this gap. I reflect on my own positionality as a pragmatist and activist and describe the purpose and guiding questions of the study. Chapter 2 is a theory substantive synthesis of a multidisciplinary literature which I integrate into a conceptual framework. This framework reflects practice-relevant learnings regarding the policy process and effective change making therein. Broadly speaking, I compare two bodies of literature on: i. idealistic ideas of evidence-based policymaking and related KMb tools that aim to improve science communication ii. the realities of the policymaking arena and corresponding strategies to enhance the use of evidence in policy decisions beyond the KMb literature This literature and theory-informed framework serves as the conceptual basis for Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 consists of a qualitative interview study with 17 academic advocates in Canada, the US, and the UK. In this chapter, I describe and interpret the KMb actions and experiences of academic advocates. I also interpret the data with attention to existing skills and knowledge gaps among academic advocates and the reasons for their existence in the context of Chapter 2. Chapter 4 applies the generated 4 knowledge as a workshop that merges findings from Chapters 2 and 3 in an actionable field guide. And finally, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with critical reflections on the implications of the findings. 1.3 Dissertation context 1.3.1 Points of departure and purpose Climate change affects virtually every aspect of life and has been called the biggest threat to human wellbeing of our times (Costello et al., 2009, 2023; Watts et al., 2018; World Health Organization, 2023). It drives human displacement, economic disruption, and political polarization (Costello et al., 2023). It drives vector-borne disease transmission for illnesses such as dengue, malaria and cholera (Barrett et al., 2015; Watts et al., 2018); it adversely affects access to food and clean water (McMichael, 2017; Yusa et al., 2015); it has been linked to adverse mental health outcomes (Hayes et al., 2018); and it disproportionally affects vulnerable, marginalized populations (Levy & Patz, 2015), thereby exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequities and poverty (Boyd, 2019). Because of these complex interactions, the mitigation of climate change also provides an immense opportunity to achieve co-benefits for human and planetary health, and society at large (Hancock, 2018; Watts et al., 2015, 2018; World Health Organization, 2023). Despite this opportunity, most climate-related policies worldwide do not currently reflect the scale and urgency of necessary action suggested by the evidence (United Nations Environment Programme, 2024; Watts et al., 2015). Climate change is a so-called “super-wicked” policy problem (Levin et al., 2012). The term describes policy issues that are characterized by enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, conflicting stakeholder interests, lack of institutional frameworks and governance, inequitable distribution of responsibility and burden, and urgency (Levin et al., 2012; Rittel & Webber, 1973). This perfect storm of challenges lessens the effect of simplistic, technocratic, and straight-forward policy solutions and opens the doors to diverging ideologies, contention, and competing interests. There is also a temporal challenge that complicates the synchronisation of policy and climate change. As opposed to the common practice of political institutions to act on immediate interests (Levin et al., 2012), climate change requires us to “impose costs on the short term for the realization of benefits many decades and sometimes centuries later” (Lazarus, 2008) – something that policy makers who operate in short election cycles are reluctant to do. Finally, the climate change movement has been faced with a very powerful countermovement whose influence on public opinion and politicians has been immense. The fossil fuel, petrochemical, and 5 other energy-intensive industries, right wing political parties, and affiliated organizations have been very successful in dispersing doubt about the issue, leveraging the inherent uncertainties in climate science and thereby promoting climate change denial (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2003; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). More recent tactics include supporting legislation that targets climate protestors and promoting climate anxiety (Nosek, 2020). Still today, some degree of climate contrarianism persists (Crowe, 2019) and may indeed be growing as a result of a shift towards right-wing populist governments in many countries (Watmough, 2023). Many people do not understand climate change as an urgent issue but rather see it as an abstract, environmental issue that hardly impacts their everyday lives (McGrath, 2019). Conversely, they perceive climate policies as an immediate threat to their living standard and wealth. This framing has intentionally been created and promoted by very powerful players. Scientific evidence alone pales against such messaging (Heffernan, 2025; Timperley, 2020). These factors make climate change policy particularly complex and thus an intriguing study focus on the evidence-to-policy gap. Overcoming this gap will require more than conventional KMb tactics. Some countries and jurisdictions have indeed achieved substantial reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For instance, the UK made a legal commitment to reach net zero by 2050 and in 2024 achieved a 53% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990 (Climate Change Committee, 2024; Lamb et al., 2022; Wilson & Staffell, 2018). Commitments to eliminating coal as a source of energy by 2030 are also widespread (Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2025). However, many of the current and possibly future policy choices surrounding climate change mitigation still stand in direct contrast to more than five decades of climate change research and warnings by scientists (Costello et al., 2023). Progress in climate-friendly policies is also under threat, for example, the US government under President Donald Trump is expected to stall federal initiatives to reduce emissions or investment in clean energy while instead focusing on deregulation of industry and supporting fossil fuels (DeConcini et al., 2024). In fact, during the first two weeks of his presidency, Trump has already signed an executive order on the national energy emergency and has withdrawn from the Paris climate agreement (Daly & Borenstein, 2025; The White House, 2025). The number of academics answering the call to action is surging as scientists get increasingly anxious and want to see action aligned with the evidence on the climate crisis (Grossman, 2024; Tormos-Aponte & Frickel, 2023). These academics view themselves as part of an engaged citizenry whose responsibility it is to speak up (Capstick et al., 2022). The purpose of this dissertation is not to engage in the normative argument about whether or not it is appropriate for scientists to engage in 6 political activism. I concede that this is a valid discussion and that both proponents and opponents to academic advocacy and activism raise important points. However, I believe there is no objectively true answer as to whether or not scientists should engage in political activism in general. The answer will rather depend on personal value systems and norms. Some authors argue that entanglement with politics threatens science’s credibility. They worry that potentially harmful forms of collaborations between academia and industry or government might allow science to be instrumentalized for commercial political gain (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). Others purport that scientists should remain outside the political sphere, as what Pielke calls “honest brokers” (Lackey, 2007; Pielke, 2007). This separatist model of science is in line with the ideal of the value-free scientist. In its present form, this ideal accepts that science is influenced by societal and ethical values, however, it postulates that “the value judgements internal to science, involving the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results at the heart of the research process, are to be as free as humanly possible of all social and ethical values” (p.45) (Douglas, 2009). Under this premise, science exists largely separate from society and tends to draw in people “whose love of knowledge and its pursuit are sufficient to justify their research work” (p. 154) (L. W. Green et al., 2009). The main perceived responsibility of the academic in terms of sharing their knowledge is thus mostly met by conventional end-of-grant KMb activities such as publishing in the peer-reviewed literature. Publications remain one of the most widely used factors to judge the productivity, merit (both in terms of receiving research funding but also in terms of career advancement), and reputation of an academic researcher (Cooper et al., 2018; Haynes et al., 2011; Hering, 2016; Sá et al., 2011). Activities that may be described as advocacy (activities that mix evidence with commentary and argument and accept other types of evidence besides research) are often perceived as potentially threatening to the integrity of science (Haynes et al., 2011). In fact, some researchers are highly critical of advocacy activities among their peers (Haynes et al., 2011). This stems from the fear of not being perceived as objective since objectivity is equated with credibility and trustworthiness (Douglas, 2009). Others concede that advocacy is a responsibility of the scientist, but it is to be conducted in a way that prohibits the scientist from making policy recommendations and cautions them to clearly define their role as provider of scientific information (Lackey, 2007; Pielke, 2007). Prominent examples such as Michael E. Mann, Katharine Hayhoe, Naomi Oreskes, James Hansen, or Peter Kalmus have pushed scientists’ contributions to climate activism into the mainstream media (Hanson, 2022). There is also growing acceptance of the role of universities and academia in 7 contributing to the public good beyond knowledge generation (for example, The University of British Columbia, 2023). Funders are creating streams that prioritize knowledge implementation strategies that go beyond the conventional end-of-grant distribution of knowledge (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 2022). Some scientists organize in movements such as Scientist Rebellion (Scientist Rebellion, 2025) or Scientists 4 Future (Scientists 4 Future, n.d.) and become more outspoken about their activism efforts, calling on others to join them (Bassett, 2020; Capstick et al., 2022; J. F. Green, 2020). From the viewpoint of social movement scholarship and community organizing, it is essential for movements not only to have strategic leadership capacity, but also to unite a diverse set of actors and representatives from different populations in order to achieve social transformation (Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Ganz, 2004, 2006). Scientists and academics can play an important and strategically advantageous role in these movements, particularly because they remain among the most trusted members of society (Capstick et al., 2022; Clemence, 2019; Watts et al., 2015). This is even more relevant in the current political climate in which governments in some regions of the world, including the United States, seek to silence scholars, researchers, and experts who work on issues that are not in line with the dominant ideology. With US Vice President J.D. Vance calling professors “the enemy”, the public trust in scientists, academia, and science as a whole is at risk to be increasingly undermined (Quinn, 2025). Once one decides to take on the role of an academic advocate or activist, one is faced with the challenge that the skill set of an advocate or activist is typically different from that of a researcher or teacher. For example, as researchers, many individuals are trained to write for other expert audiences but may have less experience writing for the general public or engaging with media. Outside of fields that hold a more critical view of academic activities and have introduced and embraced participatory, action-oriented research frameworks, there is generally little incentive to adapt strategies such as collective action or lobbying. Originally developed within the health sciences, implementation science and adjacent fields attempt to evaluate specific KMb efforts to produce generalizable advice for scientists who aim to influence policy and practice (Bauer et al., 2015). Due to the complexity of the science-to-policy interface and variable contextual factors, particularly for super-wicked policy problems like climate change, no empirical evidence for such generalizable strategies exists (Levin et al., 2012; Oliver & Cairney, 2019) or can exist, as I will argue in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the advice on how to increase one’s policy impact and engage effectively tends to be “inevitably bland and generic” (p. 2) (Oliver & Cairney, 8 2019), often reflecting a lack of understanding of a vast body of knowledge on the complex nature of policymaking and evidence use (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). These assertions are mostly based on reviews of the literature on knowledge production and use. What is mostly missing from this particular literature are the voices of academic advocates, sharing how they aim to bring about political change, their experiences, and the risks and benefits that come with this work – and an analysis of if and how this differs from advice in the literature. Chapter 3 will contain a more in-depth summary of existing research on academic advocates beyond the field of KMb. Academics new to activism rarely have the time to immerse themselves in the theoretical body of work on policy and political change-making. Nor do they necessarily have access to more experienced academic advocates who can provide guidance and thus tend to embark on their journey unequipped for the task at hand. This can lead to “enormous frustration, duplicated and wasted effort. Even more damagingly, researchers produce poor policy recommendations or naively engage in political debates with no thought about the possible costs and consequences for themselves, the wider sector, or publics” (Oliver & Boaz, 2019; Oliver & Cairney, 2019). Many academic advocates have every intention to contribute to change. Providing them with a time-saving way to gain the skills necessary by including an empirical evidence base on academic advocates’ experiences and literature-based change making strategies, is the main objective of this dissertation. 1.3.2 Personal position and reflections I have always been interested in the lived experiences of people and in the way they perceive and navigate the world. I do not believe that everything in the social context can be measured, nor do I believe that there is an absolute truth to how people see or experience the world. On the other hand, I do believe that phenomena of the natural world, for example, can be measured with the objective to uncover an inherent truth. I am trained as a psychiatrist and psychotherapist which is a field where human interaction and personal experiences and values are inextricably linked to the way we engage with each other. I bring with me several years of experience as an observer of behaviour and group dynamics, as an active listener, and interviewer. Conversely, in my public health research work, I have mostly applied quantitative methods to conduct epidemiological inquiries. I therefore neither fully subscribe to a positivist nor a constructivist paradigm but rather identify as a pragmatist. 9 Rehman and Alharthi (2016) write that “a paradigm is a basic belief system and theoretical framework with assumptions about ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods. In other words, it is our way of understanding the reality of the world and studying it” (p. 3). The assumption that researchers are unbiased instruments (epistemology of the positivist paradigm) who set out to uncover the one truth (ontology of the positivist approach) seems insufficient to me when I consider insights from different fields such as moral psychology and political science and think back on my own experience as a mental health clinician. I aimed to build the bridge between my personal values and worldview and my research design in order to keep things “plumb” (Chenail, 1997). My underlying paradigm, my research questions, and my methodology evolve around a common theme. When it comes to defining within which paradigm I see my research evolve, there were initially a lot of question marks. Here is a quote from my research journey journal in which I reflect upon my answers to Chenail’s “Seven C’s” (Chenail, 2000): “Life experiences have certainly contributed to the development of my paradigm. I have always been politically active, and my entire high school curriculum was centered around social sciences and languages. What has driven me was always the wish to change things, not just understand them. But, as I said, there is no such thing as an unbiased researcher, therefore, I need to be aware of my own bias as well. There is a fine line in my work between research and activism…where do I fall? What is my research? And why do I do research if I really want to be an activist?” This paragraph reflects my affinity to a pragmatic paradigm. As such, I think the appropriate approach depends on the questions we are trying to answer. I also believe that a theory is only worth something when it directly contributes to social progress (Legg & Hookway, 2021). My pragmatic stance is also reflected in my goal for my PhD work to contribute to KMb practice rather than theory. I approach this research as someone who identifies as an activist herself. My normative stance is such that I believe academics have a responsibility to act not only in accordance with their own research findings but also to advocate on behalf of them. As I first conceptualized this study, I realized that this stance was influencing the way I approached my research; I held judgments over what was good or bad in terms of researchers’ engagement with KMb which inhibited me from listening to their stories with a fully open mind. However, taking eight months away from my research during my second maternity leave helped me both sharpen my focus as well as soften my judgment. As this research stands now, I no longer try to find justifications for why researchers should engage in political KMb tactics, I leave this discussion to others. I simply depart from the point that, yes, there is a 10 growing number of academics out there who feel this responsibility themselves and who already engage in political activism. They are both my study subjects and my audience. 1.3.3 Research questions and workshop objective The questions guiding this research have evolved over time, reflecting new insights and understandings as I collected and analyzed the data. Research question 1 will be addressed in Chapter 2 (development of conceptual framework based on theory and literature synthesis). Research questions 2 through 5 will be addressed in Chapter 3 (interview-based study). In line with the research methodology, the underlying paradigm, as well as the objectives of this work, the overarching questions are as follows: 1. What practice-relevant learnings for academic advocates can be generated from a multidisciplinary literature on effective policy and political change making? 2. How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? 3. What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? 4. Which factors explain their choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? 5. What gaps in their strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist? The objective of the workshop (Chapter 4) is to operationalize the advice and learnings that came out of answering research question 1 into several steps. This serves as a field guide for the academic advocate under consideration of insights generated through answering research questions 2 – 5. 1.4 Useful definitions What follows are definitions of terms used throughout this dissertation. These terms do not have unanimously agreed-upon and commonly known definitions but rather often mean different things to different individuals. I therefore deemed it important to make transparent how I conceptualize and understand these terms. 1.4.1 Policy and policy change In general, I am interested in the effect of evidence on policy-level change. This is in contrast to a focus often found in knowledge translation work that evolves around changes in clinical or 11 organizational practices, or even on the behaviour of individuals. Policy can be conceptualized in many different ways. There is no single agreed-upon definition that captures all aspects of policy (Colebatch, 2009). Policy can describe a set of normal practices within an organization, or it can describe complex constructs like government processes (Colebatch, 2009). I subscribe to the more pragmatic definition of policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (p. 15) (Jenkins, 1978). It follows that by policy change, I mean changes (or lack thereof) in those respective decisions made (and actions taken) by political actors. I include all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) in this understanding. The branch through which policy change is sought will highly depend on the issue and context at hand. Conceptually, I focus on the moments in which policy takes shape on the political agenda and is formulated and developed rather than on the phase and ways in which it is implemented or evaluated. This focus stems from the fact that most academic advocates that I have encountered, and certainly those who have participated in this study, are primarily engaged at the agenda setting and formulation stage of the policy process. That is not to say that I understand the policymaking process as a linear, chronological event (see Section 2.2 for criticism of the Policy Cycle model). I rather see this as a theoretical concept that can be helpful in defining a point in the process in which outside engagement happens: a moment when a policy idea first enters the public and/or policy sphere and when this idea takes on a more concrete shape (i.e., formulation of actual policies to realize this idea). Once the policy is “accepted” by those who have the power to do so, the policy is then implemented (i.e., a policy is being put into action after it has been adopted, meaning resources are allocated, targets defined, and roles are assigned), reinforced and ultimately evaluated. The latter stages arguably happen more within the policy community and take on more technocratic (or bureaucratic) nuances that may invite policy advisory as a form of academic engagement. Most academics remain “outsiders” to the policy community, meaning they usually do not occupy positions of power within the policy community. For outside pressure, the phase of agenda setting and policy formulation is seen to be the most effective stage to exert influence (Amenta et al., 2010; Della Porta & Diani, 2020). 1.4.2 Strategies, tactics, tools When talking about policy-level change in the policy and KMb literatures, the terms “strategy”, “tactics”, and “tools” often get used interchangeably, yet they have important distinctions. The conceptualization that I found most helpful stems from the marketing and business development 12 literature (for example, Drummond et al., 2020). Herein, the concepts exist in an integrated three-layer construct: Strategy is the overarching approach, tactics are the ways in which the strategy is implemented, and the tools are what is used to get it done. As an example: the strategy is to build political counterpower to industry influence; the tactic is organizing a grassroots movement; the tools are everything from (social) media marketing to building relationships. This distinction is important because the literature on effective advocacy shows that a strategically integrated and diversified application of tactics and tools improves efficacy (Dablander et al., 2024; Ganz, 2004; Kershaw et al., 2017). Conversely, academic advocates often tend to focus their efforts on the tools and tactics level, which risks underemphasizing the value of an overarching strategy. For my conceptualization of strategy in particular, I refer to Marshall Ganz’s definition: “Strategy is to turn what you have (evidence, people, resources) into what you need (power) to get what you want (policy change)” (Ganz, 2006). This makes explicit that I think about politics and policy in terms of power – who has it, what do they want, and how do I turn what I have into what they want (more on this in Chapters 2 and 3). 1.4.3 Activism and advocacy Literature that looks at policy-level change making from the perspective of an engaged citizenry often refers to the terms “activism” and “advocacy”. Gardner et al. (2021) define advocacy as “publicly adopting a position and working to promote it, for example through lobbying, campaigning and engaging and organising the public…within the system and through the proper channels” and activism as “a subset of advocacy that uses more direct forms of action to influence policy, such as protest and non-violent civil disobedience” where one operates outside of the system (Gardner et al., 2021). In academia in particular, the term activist often carries negative connotations. The image is that of an angry radical participating in a protest loudly proclaiming the mantra of the movement. Many academics shy away from calling themselves activists, indeed most of my study participants do not use the term to describe themselves. They prefer the term advocate or choose not to label their KMb efforts at all. They want to avoid being perceived as biased, radical, extreme, and ultimately want to avoid loss of credibility and reputation. In my work, I use the two terms “advocate” and “activist” to describe two distinct approaches to KMb. The former describes someone who is facing an audience outside of the policy making community as an information provider. The latter is someone who acts as a power navigator outside of the policy making community. For simplicity, I chose to use the term “advocate” as an umbrella term for my participants throughout this dissertation even though some of them would cross 13 into what Gardner et al. define as “activist”. Even though I choose the term “advocate” meaning someone who “works within the system” (Gardner et al., 2021), I would like to acknowledge that my participants indeed engage in KMb strategies that are outside of the cultural norm of their academic community. This highlights one main inclusion criterion of my study which was that the potential participants conduct KMb efforts that push or even transgress the boundaries of what would be considered “honest brokering” (Pielke, 2007). 1.4.4 Scientist, scholar, researcher, academic The definition of these terms is mostly relevant for the understanding of the inclusion criteria in this study. I use these terms interchangeably in this dissertation. What I mean to describe is an individual or a group of individuals who have postsecondary training in any field (but focus their advocacy on climate change and related issues) and whose profession remains either within the academic community or closely adjacent to it. The main point is that I write this dissertation for and about individuals who subscribe to the norms of the academy in terms of their mandate in knowledge generation and mobilization but who intentionally choose to push the traditional boundaries of these norms or even transgress them. 1.4.5 Terms referring to different concepts of evidence-to-action activities As is often the case with multidisciplinary fields such as KMb, there can be confusion about the terminology and concepts. For example, McKibbon et al. (2010) identified 100 different terms used to describe KMb in the health sciences alone. The following is a brief overview of the most commonly described concepts (sometimes referred to as ‘processes’, ‘theories’, or even ‘paradigms’), the way in which they differ from each other, and the disciplines within which these terms are predominantly used. Further, these terms are often used interchangeably. However, they all describe how “knowledge in some form (ideas, innovation, skills, policy) moves in some direction (laterally, hierarchically, spreads, or exchanges) among various stakeholders (knowledge producers, end users, or intermediaries) and contexts (national, community, or organizational) to achieve some outcomes (intended benefits, unanticipated outcomes, or hijacked effects)” (p. 7) (Ottoson, 2009). This overview is important because it already alludes to some of the assumptions about how change is made, which will be discussed in more detail in the following Chapters. The first two terms – diffusion and dissemination – are generally the concepts under which much of traditional academia’s efforts such as publication in academic journals, presentations at conferences, or other end-of-grant KMb activities fall: 14 i. Diffusion: First developed in sociology and communication, this term describes the “process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among certain members of a social system (Rogers, 2010), i.e., the uncontrolled, natural spread of information (L. W. Green et al., 2009; Ottoson, 2009). ii. Dissemination: “Conscious efforts to spread new knowledge, ideas, policies, and practices to specific target audiences or to a public at large” (p. 152) (L. W. Green et al., 2009). This includes strategies such as mass communication, health education of the individual, or continuing education of the professional. The following terms centre the actions of the researcher in the evidence-to-action activities: iii. Knowledge translation: With roots in linguistics and communication, this is now the most commonly used term in the health sciences and a dominant term in Canada. It refers to processes driven by actions of the researcher but acknowledges that these actions take place within a complex system of knowledge users. The most widely-used definition of knowledge translation was developed by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), has subsequently been adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO), and states: “Knowledge translation is defined as a dynamic and iterative process that includes synthesis, dissemination, exchange and ethically-sound application of knowledge to improve the health [of Canadians], provide more effective health services and products and strengthen the health care system. This process takes place within a complex system of interactions between researchers and knowledge users which may vary in intensity, complexity and level of engagement depending on the nature of the research and the findings as well as the needs of the particular knowledge user” (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 2012). iv. Knowledge mobilization: This term is predominantly used in the social sciences and humanities. The focus lies on social innovation, public policy, and professional practice as its outcomes (Phipps et al., 2019) and is embedded in organizations and communities (Bennet & Bennet, 2015). Similar to knowledge translation, it understands actions of the researcher as the central driver of change. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) defines KMb as “the reciprocal and complementary flow and uptake of research knowledge between researchers, knowledge brokers and knowledge users—both within and beyond academia—in such a way that may benefit users and create positive impacts within Canada and/or internationally, and, ultimately, has the potential to enhance the profile, reach and impact of 15 social sciences and humanities research” (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 2012). v. Knowledge transfer: A commonly used term in science and technology. The UK Office for Technology Transfer, for example, defines knowledge transfer as follows: “Knowledge transfer is about transferring good ideas, research results, and skills between universities, other research organisations, business, and the wider community to enable innovative new products and services to be developed” (Government Office for Technology Transfer, 2025). This concept is often criticized for being seemingly unidirectional from knowledge producer to stakeholder, although others do interpret this concept to be a two-way process (Graham et al., 2006). Conceptualizations of evidence-to-action activities that centre a bilateral co-production, exchange, or collaboration between researchers and knowledge users are described by terms such as vi. Knowledge exchange which sees knowledge producers and users engaged throughout the entire process of knowledge creation to application and acknowledges the role of industry or practitioner knowledge (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). It also assumes that “researchers and decision makers are normally separate groups with distinct cultures and perspectives on research and knowledge, with neither group fully appreciating the other’s world” (p. 17) (Graham et al., 2006). vii. Integrated knowledge translation or knowledge co-production: This term encompasses approaches that involve the knowledge user (e.g., an organization, a decision maker, an interest group) early in the research process with the goal to co-produce knowledge that will be useful to and feasibly applicable by the knowledge user. Depending on the field and overarching research paradigm within which this approach is implemented, knowledge co-production is also called “integrated knowledge translation” (in the health sciences (Gagliardi et al., 2016)) or “participatory action research” (PAR) in fields that embrace a more critical tradition. PAR is often used in contexts of social injustices and with marginalized populations and is meant to empower and support the knowledge users in their anti-oppressive work with the goal to change power relations (Topp et al., 2021). This may happen in policy contexts and beyond (L. Brown & Strega, 2015). While these concepts seem like more promising approaches to bridging the evidence-to-policy gap, they are not without limitations which will be discussed in Chapter 2. 16 Finally, there are terms that centre the evaluation of adoption of evidence into practice and policy and the processes by which this adoption happens: viii. Knowledge utilization: This term is often used in program evaluation theories (Ottoson, 2009). Research within this concept is concerned with the degree to which organizational and individual adoption of ideas takes place (L. W. Green et al., 2009). ix. Implementation: This is typically concerned with the “effective application of knowledge” (L. W. Green et al., 2009). This term has roots in political science and public administration where it means the implementation of policy programs (Ottoson, 2009). In these fields, policy implementation studies focus on questions around the “gap between a policy and its outcomes”(Cairney, 2024). By contrast, the field of implementation science is focused on understanding and addressing the gap between research evidence and its application in practice (Cairney, 2024). Implementation science has increasingly been occupied by the health field and is primarily concerned with achieving evidence-based practices in clinical settings, defined as “the scientific study of methods to promote the systematic uptake of research findings and other evidence-based practices into routine practice to improve the quality and effectiveness of health services and care” (Bauer et al., 2015; Eccles & Mittman, 2006). In this work, I predominantly use the term knowledge mobilization (KMb) as it encompasses most closely the actions I am interested in, namely how academics can mobilize their evidence into policy action through advocacy and activism efforts. 17 2 A theory and literature-informed conceptual framework of change making strategies 2.1 Research question 1 This chapter provides answers to research question 1: What practice-relevant learnings for academic advocates can be generated from a multidisciplinary literature on effective policy and political change making? Generally speaking, I compare and contrast two schools of thought on the role of scientific evidence in the policy arena that differ significantly in their underlying theories of change and assumptions. First, I briefly summarize and interpret the knowledge mobilization (KMb) literature and highlight the shortcomings in this work in light of the realities of the policymaking process and its political underpinnings (Section 2.2 Shortcomings). I then use the literature on evidence use in policy and policy theories to address these shortcomings (Section 2.3 Answers) and go on to interpret and summarize what this means for effective change making strategies of real-life academic advocates (Section 2.4 Actions). My analysis of this literature serves as base for a conceptual framework within which I analyse the qualitative data in Chapter 3, and as the knowledge base for Chapter 4 (in conjunction with insights that follow from Chapter 3). 2.2 Shortcomings: Knowledge mobilization When analyzed on a meta-level, one will find that much of the literature on KMb is based on certain assumptions (that are not always made explicit) about how policy decisions are made and how the difficulties of the evidence-to-policy process can be overcome (Cairney et al., 2023; Driscoll et al., 2021; Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; LaRocca et al., 2012; Oliver & Cairney, 2019). Interestingly, even though many scholars in the field are fully aware of the complexity in the policy realm and even concede that evidence alone is often insufficient to drive policy change, there is still a tendency to fall back onto these assumptions. Policymaking is treated as a “black box” and scholars focus on “what they need from policymakers…few engage meaningfully with policy theories to describe how policymaking actually works” (Cairney et al., 2023). In the following, I reflect on these assumptions and the corresponding strategies (or more adequately speaking, tools) that are discussed and evaluated in the KMb literature and conclude with a summary of the shortcomings of this approach. 18 2.2.1 Evidence-based policymaking, linear models of research utilization, and the Policy Cycle Since the rise of the idea of evidence-based practice in medicine in the 1980s and the subsequent expansion into social policy since the early 2000s, evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) has only grown in popularity (Baron, 2018). EBPM postulates the process by which a “policy problem is defined, and research evidence is used to fill an identified knowledge gap, thereby solving the problem” (p. 305) (Black, 2001; Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). This process is presumed to lead to the formulation and implementation of policies that “work”, that are unbiased and free of inherent injustices, and do not disproportionately reflect the interests of the business and government sectors over those of civil society (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). EBPM serves as an agreed-upon point of departure for most of KMb literature and is rarely critically reflected on therein (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). Beyond the KMb literature, EBPM is not without criticism. According to critics, EBPM overrepresents the role that science can, and possibly should, play in sociopolitical issues (Hammersley, 2013; Schwandt, 2000). It is too focused on “what works” and not enough concerned with what is appropriate, ethical, and desirable (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). What seems to be mostly absent from the discussion is that there are other adequate governance principles that are valuable, e.g., consensus building, public value, or pragmatism (Cairney, 2014a). While the hope is that EBPM would supersede the “corrupting nature of politics” (Parkhurst, 2017), the policy process is rarely just a question of technical decision-making but is usually a competition among different interests and values (Weiss, 1979). Not to mention that scientific evidence in and of itself is “often ambiguous, incomplete, partisan, and open to interpretation” (p.507) (Greenhalgh & Wieringa, 2011) as it is a product of prevailing social, cultural, political, and economic forces (Giardina & Newman, 2020). This may not be true for all forms of evidence, but there are few areas where scientific evidence is unequivocally clear, consensus has been reached, and there is little variability in terms of its applicability and its unintended consequences. Within the framework of EBPM, KMb then largely adheres to linear models from evidence generation to policy decisions that are in line with the first two models of Carol H. Weiss’ seminal work on research utilization in policy. Weiss states that while these two models (the knowledge-driven model and the problem-solving model) represent the most common idea of how evidence informs policy, these “kinds of expectations are wildly optimistic” (p. 34) (Weiss, 1986). Weiss actually formulated five more models of research utilization which depict the process of evidence use in policy more realistically (more on that below in Section 2.3). Yet the two linear models of research utilization still guide the thinking among many scholars. In their understanding of the policymaking process, these scholars subscribe to 19 the Policy Cycle which has dominated – and continues to do so – the understanding of the policy process outside of the field of political science for over 60 years (Cairney, 2013). The Policy Cycle provides an overview of different stages in the policy process from agenda setting, to policy formulation, to adoption, to implementation, to evaluation, and maintenance. It presents these stages in a relatively linear fashion and is therefore an intuitive, easy-to-understand entry point to the world of policy. In much of the KMb literature and indeed among many scientists, it is assumed that at each stage in the Policy Cycle, evidence can simply be injected and help shape decision-making (see for example, Connors, 2016). Among political theorists, however, the Policy Cycle is not seen as an adequate description of the policy process (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). To them, the Policy Cycle is too simplistic, lacks causal links and the analysis of interactions between the stages (Cairney, 2016; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). It further neglects to depict the multiple layers of government and non-government players and suffers from a top-down bias (it assumes a core group of policy makers – independent from outside influence – at the centre of the decision-making process). 2.2.2 Information deficit, rational decision-making, and power neutral tools of knowledge mobilization Guided by the assumptions of linear processes describing how policy is made and how evidence is used therein, the bulk of the KMb literature then succumbs to the information deficit model (Suldovsky, 2016, 2017). This model assumes that the reason for insufficient use of evidence in political decision-making is a lack of information about and/or understanding of the issue (Boswell & Smith, 2017; Suldovsky, 2016). The assumption is that, if provided with the right information, policy makers would make rational decisions based on all available information (Cairney, 2016). If they fail to make a decision (or the “right”, i.e., evidence-based decision), this is due to uncertainty in the information or because the information was not presented in a way that was understandable to the audience. These assumptions explain why the majority of research on KMb focuses on establishing a generalizable evidence base for effective KMb tools. Given that the bulk of the research in the field of KMb can still be found in the health sciences, the dominant paradigm assumes that “understanding social phenomena is primarily a problem of objective measurement and that there are best methods of acquiring this knowledge (for example, the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ used in evidence-based medicine)…positivist research views methods – particularly the controlled experiment, the randomized trial, and the standardized and validated questionnaire – as the cornerstone of quality” (p.306) (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). Still, scholars in this field do not assume that science speaks for itself. 20 They are fully aware that a passive diffusion of knowledge rarely happens but rather that the evidence needs to be actively pushed into the policy realm to find a sympathetic ear. The empirical literature on evidence use in policy as well as that from policy studies is often neglected in this scholarly field and much of the focus lies on describing barriers or facilitators to evidence use; assessing unintegrated tactics and tools such as science communication techniques, round tables, policy briefs, research-practice partnerships, or knowledge brokers, just to name a few; and giving relatively common sense advice such as ‘do high quality research’ or ‘be accessible to policy makers’ (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). The most frequently addressed topic among practice-relevant aspects of KMb focuses on the identification of barriers and facilitators to evidence mobilization and use in policy (Golhasany & Harvey, 2023; Greenhalgh, 2017; Innvaer et al., 2002; Mitton et al., 2007; Oliver et al., 2014). In general, most studies concur on the following findings: The most frequently identified facilitators to successful evidence-to-policy transfer are personal contact and trustful relationships between researchers and policy makers; timely relevance of the evidence; inclusion of decision makers in research planning and design stages; clear summaries of high-quality research that ideally include effectiveness data and contain policy recommendations for action; and presence of government structure that values research (Bowen et al., 2005; Golhasany & Harvey, 2023; Greenhalgh, 2017; Innvaer et al., 2002; Mitton et al., 2007; Oliver et al., 2014). In turn, the most prevalent barriers are mutual mistrust; lack of personal contact between researchers and policy makers; lack of timeliness or shifting timescales or relevance of the research; financial/budgetary constraints; policy makers’ own experiential knowledge of local contexts; power struggles; researcher incentive system at universities (Fraser, 2004; Golhasany & Harvey, 2023; Greenhalgh, 2017; Mitton et al., 2007; Oliver et al., 2014). Interestingly, these findings remain consistent over the past two decades, arguably pointing at little progress in overcoming the barriers or leveraging the facilitators. As some authors have argued, an exploration of all other factors that influence policy, processes by which evidence influences policy, and the impact it has, should complement this research in order for it to be useful to KMb practice (Greenhalgh, 2017; Oliver et al., 2014; Oliver & Cairney, 2019) – a call I respond to in Section 2.3. Moreover, there are several systematic reviews that have tried to identify generalizable advice on effective tools, but the results remain inconclusive, perhaps even sobering. In 2007, Mitton et al. conducted the first systematic literature review of KMb tools in health policy and identified these eight tools: face-to-face exchange; education sessions for decision makers; networks and communities of practice; facilitated meetings between decision makers and researchers; interactive, multidisciplinary 21 workshops; capacity building within health services; web-based information and electronic communications; and steering committees. The authors could not conclude a definitive, generalizable set of recommendations in terms of the most effective tools. They state that “there is actually very little evidence that can adequately inform what KMb strategies work in what contexts” (p. 756) (Mitton et al., 2007). In 2017, Sarkies et al. came to a similar conclusion after they reviewed the effectiveness of KMb tools such as knowledge brokerage, targeted messaging, database access, policy briefs, workshops, digital materials, fellowship programs, literature reviews, consortium, certificate course, policy dialogue, and multifaceted strategies. The authors conclude that a paucity of evidence on the effectiveness of KMb tools continues to exist and suggest more experimental studies (such as RCTs) and research on health and organizational outcome measures be conducted in order to rigour of this field and ultimately to allow a meta-analysis of which KMb strategies are most effective and in what context (Sarkies et al., 2017). Contandriopoulus et al. explicitly focus their review on collective level interventions, i.e., interventions aimed at organizational, or policy level decision-making as opposed to autonomous individuals such as practitioners. Contrary to the approach taken by many authors in this field, they argue that these two concepts are inherently different in the way they need to be understood when mobilizing knowledge into action. Therefore, one needs to apply and evaluate strategies that differ significantly from those that have shown promise to change individual level behaviour. The first contradiction to assumptions in the mainstream KMb literature that they found was that scientific evidence is not seen as more or less valuable by decision makers than other types of information such as tacit knowledge and experience. Moreover, the value of scientific evidence as perceived by decision makers is relatively independent of its internal validity. This contrasts with other KMb literature which emphasizes the importance of communicating only such scientifically “sound” evidence. Contandriopoulus et al. therefore argue that “developing scientifically sound advice and then designing knowledge exchange interventions to translate that advice into practices at the collective level are two different processes” (p. 459) (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). The way the scientific evidence is rhetorically presented is thus key for it to shape political agenda setting – an idea that is slowly being adapted by the mainstream KMb literature as reflected by growing research on science communication and storytelling techniques. While still operating under the information deficit model, there are indeed more recent and sophisticated approaches to KMb tools, see for example, Crow & Jones (2018) on 22 narratives and storytelling, Fafard & Hoffman (2020) on building a deeper understanding of the policy context and environment, or Graham et al. (2018) on integrated knowledge translation models. The authors conclude that, given the significance of the mentioned contextual factors, “the quest for context-independent evidence on the efficacy of knowledge exchange strategies is probably doomed” (p. 468) (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). They further conclude that their review does not support mainstream KMb advice on linear processes that come mostly from the knowledge-producing side and rather advise to begin each KMb intervention with a thorough analysis of the specific context, especially when facing polarized issues. Finally, Oliver and Cairney’s conclusions from their 2019 review of advice on effective KMb efforts are sobering. This review expands across a wide range of fields beyond the health sciences and still they write that “taken at face value, much of this advice [referring to advice on effective KMb strategies in the policy sphere] is common sense, perhaps because it is inevitably bland and generic” (p.2) (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). They found eight key themes in the “how to influence policy” literature: (i) do high quality research, (ii) communicate well and make your research relevant and readable, (iii) understand policy processes, policymaking context, and key actors, (iv) be accessible to policy makers and engage routinely, flexibly, and humbly, (v) decide if you want to be an issue advocate or honest broker (referring to Pielke’s personas of science advocates (Pielke, 2007), (vi) build relationships and ground rules with policy makers, (vii) be entrepreneurial or find someone who is, and (viii) reflect continuously on whether you should engage, do you want to, and is it working? (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). They reflect that this advice stems largely from non-empirical publications such as blogs, letters, or editorials across a vast number of fields from gerontology to economics and has essentially remained the same for 80 years. Much of this advice seeks to help overcome previously and continuously identified barriers “assuming rather than demonstrating that their simple advice will help ease the flow of evidence into policy” (p. 3) (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). They then go on to suggest that what is lacking from the underlying assumptions that guide this “rather vague and broad” advice (p. 4) is a thorough understanding of the policy process and the broader considerations of the contexts such as the roles of scientists and policy makers in society – uncertainties that the policy literature discussed subsequently addresses. 2.2.3 Conclusion The KMb literature operates within an EBPM ideal and from an information deficit assumption. The practice-relevant learnings derived from this literature, i.e. responses to research question one, can 23 be summarized as: conduct high-quality, relevant research and then summarize and communicate it well to decision makers with whom you need to build relationships. There is little mention of power and political realities beyond a lamentation of the same and advice thus focuses mostly on tactics and tools to overcome the assumed information deficit. This body of literature focuses heavily on power-neutral or power-agnostic tactics and tools such as science communication, knowledge brokerage, media work, storytelling, or integrated knowledge translation. Some authors argue that the evidence-to-policy process needs to be understood from both sides – knowledge producer and user. The latter is still largely underrepresented in the KMb literature. As Oliver et al. write: “Studies in this area continue to be mainly written by and for researchers, with a lack of attention given to the policy process or policymakers’ priorities. Most studies asked researchers about their perspectives… Involving policymakers in designing and writing a study which looks at these issues in conjunction with barriers and facilitators may be fruitful. Until then, it is hard to defend academics from the charge of misunderstanding policy priorities or processes – a charge first made explicit over 20 years ago” (Oliver et al., 2014). As suggested by Cairney and other authors, bridging KMb scholarship to policy and political science would help add the perspective of the policy maker to this literature (Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; Kershaw et al., 2017; Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024; Kickbusch, 2013; Oliver & Cairney, 2019). The research on barriers and facilitators to evidence-based policy decisions is but a first step in this direction. These findings remain consistent over the past two decades, arguably pointing at little progress in overcoming the barriers or leveraging the facilitators. As some authors have argued, an exploration of all other factors that influence policy in a particular context, processes by which evidence influences policy, and the impact it has, should complement this research in order for it to be useful to KMb practice (Greenhalgh, 2017; Oliver et al., 2014; Oliver & Boaz, 2019). However, as it currently stands, the KMb literature mostly ignores insights from political science about the political complexities of the policy arena and how to interact with them, although there are calls to incorporate these insights moving forward (Cairney, 2015, 2016; Kickbusch, 2013; Oliver & Cairney, 2019; Raphael, 2015). This is important because tactics and tools discussed in KMb and adjacent fields will have little effect if not integrated into an overarching strategy that not only acknowledges but navigates these political realities (Cairney, 2014a, 2014b; Ganz, 2004; Kershaw et al., 2017; Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). While this is known amongst political scientists, social movement scholars, and other professions such as community organizers, there seems to be a persistent 24 knowledge gap and lack of incentives for implementation of known strategies among academic advocates (more on this in Chapter 3). By ignoring these realities, academic advocates’ actions will fall short of reaching the desired impact. A first important step for the academic advocate is thus understanding and acknowledging which issues and which kind of information decision makers prioritize, why they do so, and what other factors and players are important and can thus develop alternative strategies of acting on behalf of the evidence accordingly. Or, as Weiss put it: “there has been much glib rhetoric about the vast benefits that [social] science can offer if only policy makers paid attention. Perhaps it is time for [social] scientists to pay attention to the imperatives of policymaking systems and consider soberly what they can do” (p. 40) (Weiss, 1986). The insights around evidence use in policy decisions as well as policy theories follow in the next sections. 2.3 Answers: Policymaking theories and research utilization in policy and politics (thinking like a political scientist) Political scientist and public policy scholar Paul Cairney states: “…if you want to inject more science into policymaking, you need to know the science of policymaking” (p. ix) (Cairney, 2014a). In this section, I therefore offer theories of the policy process as an expansion, if not contradiction, to the EBPM ideal and the information deficit that underlies much of the KMb literature described in Section 2.2. I show that policy theories converge around the insights that “evidence competes with, and/or is interpreted through, value-driven institutions, institutional momentum, and powerful interest groups” (p. 9) (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). This is particularly true for super-wicked policy issues such as climate change. Broadly speaking, the body of literature reviewed in this section accepts and integrates the complexities created by power and political dynamics. Practice-relevant learnings thus evolve around tactics that are power building and navigating, both on the inside and outside of the policy community. In this and the following sections, I use the mnemonic devices of “think (and act) like (i) a political scientist, (ii) a lobbyist or movement, and like a marketer to represent the three stages of strategy and tactic development necessary for greater impact. Thinking like a political scientist forms the basis of a complex understanding of the policy making process. This first step is informed by policy theories. Thinking and acting like a lobbyist or movement then represents the next step of thinking strategically about how to approach the issue at hand: navigating and building power on the outside of the policy making community (movement, interest group); or on the inside (lobbyist, elected official, member of an advocacy coalition, etc.). These insights are motivated by the literature on social 25 movement scholarship, community organizing, lobbying, and advocacy coalitions. Finally, think and act like a marketer then sums up the necessary tactics and tools that one can employ as a movement or lobbyist and takes into account insights around human decision-making from marketing, moral psychology and some KMb scholarship. A myriad of theories about the policy making process exists. They all describe, to a degree, different aspects of the policy process in a complex policymaking environment out of the full knowledge and control or actors. However, there are six key elements that policy scholars across theories deem essential to explain how and why policy choices are made: actors making choices (e.g., interest groups) who are influenced by institutions (rules, norms, practices, and relationships); networks or subsystems (relationships between actors); ideas or beliefs (worldviews, beliefs, knowledge, shared definitions, solutions within groups); policy context (e.g., cultural context or public opinion); and events (routine such as elections or unanticipated such as natural disasters) (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). These elements already point at a much more complex understanding than the Policy Cycle described in Section 2.2. In Appendix A, I briefly summarize theories that are characterized by a relative consensus on their usefulness to explain some or all of these key elements of policy change. I offer here a table with very short summaries as a quick reference for the reader: Policy theory Summary Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) Policy change is a result of interactions among various coalitions of actors who share common beliefs and work together to influence policy outcomes within a specific subsystem. Through strategic negotiation and adjustments to external events, these coalitions can exert significant influence. Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) Policy change is a process where new ideas, practices, or technologies spread among stakeholders and institutions through communication channels over time. This diffusion is influenced by factors such as the perceived benefits of the innovation, the social networks among adopters, and the characteristics of the innovation itself. Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) Emphasizes the interactions among individuals, institutions, and the contextual factors that influence decision-making processes. Policy 26 Policy theory Summary outcomes are shaped by the rules and norms established within institutions, how stakeholders perceive these rules, and the strategies they employ to navigate and alter institutional arrangements over time. Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) Policy change is seen as the convergence of three streams: problems, policies, and politics. When these align at a critical moment (“policy windows”), the opportunity for significant policy change is there. The windows open for example due to external events or the active engagement of key political actors (“policy entrepreneurs”). Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) Emphasizes the role of storytelling and narratives in shaping public discourse, influencing stakeholder perceptions, and guiding policy decisions. Narratives drive the change or stability in policies based on the stories that resonate with key audiences. Policy Feedback Theory (PFT) Highlights how the effects of implemented policies—through institutional adaptations, mobilization of stakeholders, or changes in public opinion—can generate pressures for either the maintenance or modification of those policies over time. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) Policy change consists of extended periods of stability characterized by incremental adjustments, and brief episodes of rapid change often sparked by crises or shifts in public attention. This framework highlights how existing policies can create barriers to change, which can suddenly be overcome when new information or political dynamics disrupt the status quo. Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) Highlights how the perceptions and narratives around specific groups influence policy attitudes and decisions. By categorizing populations as deserving or undeserving, policymakers can shape the framing of issues, which in turn affects the allocation of resources, the design of programs, and the likelihood of policy adoption in favor of or against those groups. 27 Table 2.1 Brief summaries of theories of the policymaking process These theories primarily aim to describe the policy making process. My interpretations of how to then effectively engage in a system described by these theories brings me back to a key insight that they all have in common: they neither conceptualize scientific evidence as the central driver to policy choice and change – thereby countering the EBPM ideal – nor do they assume an information deficit among the decision makers to be the main issue that needs to be overcome when one seeks to move evidence into policy action. The policy realm is rather described as a highly context-specific, contested, and polarized environment in which different forms of information and evidence compete with each other and in which powerful interests and interest groups play a critical role (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Raphael, 2015; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). While evidence is indeed injected in many stages and subsystems of the policy process, its interpretation and application are more often than not politicized and serve as rational justification of decisions that are made based in part on other factors (Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Raphael, 2015; Sabatier, 1988; Weiss, 1986). As Sabatier states: “understanding the policy process requires knowledge of the goals and perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues over periods of a decade or more while most of these actors are actively seeking to propagate their specific ‘spin’ on events” (p. 4) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The body of research that concerns itself with research utilization in policy decisions more specifically aligns with these insights from the policy theories. For example, Weiss’ political model recognizes the presence of competing interests and inherent value systems that are not likely to be swayed by research evidence – much like the Advocacy Coalition Framework describes as well. In this case, research tends to be instrumentalized to either support one’s existing position or to diffuse that of the opposition. Scientists themselves usually feel contempt for the seemingly “illegitimate attempt” (p. 36); but Weiss argues that this is an important way of research utilization and is only illegitimate if the evidence is distorted and misinterpreted. Indeed, via this kind of pathway, research is more likely to impact the policy outcome because it is used by stakeholders who are willing to implement it (Weiss, 1979). Weiss proposes four more models of research utilization in policy decisions, all of which dispute the assumption that scientific evidence is a key driver in decision-making that is taken and used by decision makers as intended by researchers (i.e., in an objective, non-politicized manner). Rather, these models suggest that research itself rather than research findings are instrumentalized for political gain. For example, government may use ongoing research as a tactic to delay action – “we are waiting until the research is completed” (p. 37) (tactical model); or that the role of the scientist is but one among 28 many stakeholders (akin to the MSA’s policy entrepreneurs) but they seldomly “have conclusions available that bear directly and explicitly on the issue at hand” (interactive model) (p. 35) (Weiss, 1986); or that evidence finds its way into policy via “permeation” through ways of what one might call common knowledge among informed publics (enlightenment model). Interestingly, the latter model suggests that by being supported by the public, research can actually overcome values and beliefs that are held by the decision makers. However, this model also gives way to “bad science” (p. 39), i.e., inadequate, partial, oversimplified, or simply wrong interpretations of the issue. Weiss’ final model sees research as entangled with and influenced by policy just as it is influenced by other cultural currents. Weiss concludes her summary of research utilization by recommending to “overcome the disenchantment with the usefulness of [social] science research” and calls for more empirical research on the policy process (which indeed has followed since). More recent publications on research utilization in policy certainly follow Weiss’ advice and present new ways of thinking about the processes by which policy makers use evidence. For example, Head et al. observe that individual-level factors such as science-related skills, sufficient time to seek out scientific evidence, or relationships and access to scientists are important but do not suffice to increase research use in policy. Organizational structures such as a culture of value of scientific evidence, financial restraints, or political priorities supersede the individuals’ characteristics (Head, 2014). Landry et al. found that “users’ adaptation of research, users’ acquisition efforts, links between researchers and users, and users’ organizational contexts are good predictors of the uptake of research by government officials (Landry et al., 2003). And Parkhurst examines a myriad of ways in which politics and policy are entangled and how this entanglement shapes the use of research in policy in the ways evidence is created (designing a study in a way to advance a desired outcome), selected (cherry-picking data to justify own viewpoint), or (incorrectly) interpreted (Parkhurst, 2017), or who created and provided it (Sriram et al., 2018). Once one goes beyond acknowledging these insights and rather embraces these realities, one begins to think like a political scientist. And as a political scientist, one appreciates the particular challenge that makes real-world public policy processes complex: their relationship with political power (Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; Raphael, 2015). Much like underlying ideologies held by political actors, politics and power dynamics are key in shaping decision-making processes (Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; Raphael, 2015). In fact, some schools of thought in political science (such as Feminist and Marxist) use power as the very definition of politics: “Politics is the process through which desired outcomes are 29 achieved in the production, distribution, and use of scarce resources in all areas of social existence” (p. 190) (Bambra et al., 2005; Raphael, 2015). Policies are thereby often the result of the interest of particular groups rather than objective outcomes based on the best available knowledge (Cáceres et al., 2016). Or, as Cairney put it more bluntly: “politics is about exercising power to win disputes, from visible acts to win ‘key choices’, to less visible acts to keep issues off agendas and reinforce the attitudes and behaviours that systematically benefit some groups at the expense of others. To deny this link between science, politics and power – in the name of ‘science’ – is (i) silly, and (ii) not scientific, since there is a wealth of policy science out there which highlights this relationship” (Cairney, 2017). The analysis of power becomes particularly important in issues that “deal with control and distribution of economic resources where we can expect that competing societal interests would be more likely to manifest opposition…” (p. 381) (Raphael, 2015). Climate-related policies are prime examples for such issues. There is ample evidence for the influence of powerful special or vested interests in climate change policy and for very intentional efforts to undermine public support for climate policies (Gardner et al., 2021; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). 2.4 Actions: Tactics to navigate and build power As many colleagues have stated, the usual advice for KMb efforts does not seem to suffice and KMb approaches would be well-served if they better accounted for the complex political realities of policymaking (Fafard & Hoffman, 2020; Oliver & Cairney, 2019; Raphael, 2015). The theories of the policymaking process upon which this section is based consider power from different viewpoints. In my interpretation, this illuminates several levers through which one can engage with the system. I therefore extrapolate learnings from several different theories of the policy process in terms of the points of insertion that they describe rather than focus on one single theory in depth. The Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) centres the role of policy entrepreneurs who are a “distinct class of political actors” who possess a set of attributes (such as ambition, credibility, or sociability) and skills (such as strategic thinking, negotiating, or networking) in order to promote policy innovations through power navigation (Mintrom, 2019). Policy entrepreneurs “could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return” (Kingdon & Thurber, 2011). Policy entrepreneurs may engage with advocacy coalitions which The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) emphasizes as groups who come together over shared beliefs and values. In the conceptualization of the 30 ACF, policy innovation is a result of power struggles between coalitions, usually on the inside of the policy making community, The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) conceptualizes policy monopolies held by powerful groups that surge during spurts of rapid change that interrupt longer periods of incremental change. Policy entrepreneurs are well-connected with powerful groups and are ready to provide and lobby for solutions once these moments of rapid change occur. This then allows for conclusions about tactics necessary to engage with these power dynamics: Under the premise of the MSA, tactics of the policy entrepreneur on the inside should target the problem definition and development of policy options through tactics of manipulation or framing of the political stream. However, this could also be achieved via pressure from the outside through collective action using media advocacy, protests, or civil disobedience The timing of these efforts is crucial, and successful policy entrepreneurs (defined as “the agents for policy change who possess the knowledge, power, tenacity and luck to be able to exploit key opportunities” (Cairney, 2021) will be well prepared to leverage the open windows by responding to events well, by having solutions at hand, ready to work existing networks and coalitions, or “surfing the waves”, as Kingdon describes it (Cairney, 2021). The PET describes that change happens when proponents of change (e.g., interest groups, social movements) mobilize and help push a policy system out of its subsystem and onto the agenda of macro-level decision-making ranks. Under the ACF, coalition building and mobilizing becomes a particularly important strategy. Weible and Ingold (2018) describe advocacy coalitions as “groups of people, and usually their organisational affiliation, who form informal alliances on policy issues. The glue binding these coalitions together are beliefs and ideological viewpoints on how the world should be structured and policies should be shaped. People in coalitions coordinate their political behaviours, such as planning a social media campaign, organising protests, or lobbying government officials.” (Weible & Ingold, 2018) Advocacy coalitions differ from interest groups in that they involve a wide variety of actors such as elected or administrative government officials, scientists, consultants, for profit and non-profit groups, and members of the media who convene around shared beliefs and values. Interest groups are usually a more formal way of organizing individuals around a shared goal and led by an organization (Wright, 2000). Advocacy coalitions further differ from social movements in that they usually evolve around policy issues that have already been established on the policy agenda (for example through social movements) and are most often comprised of policy actors rather than the general public (Weible & Ingold). As such, advocacy coalitions can be powerful groups pushing for policy change inside of the policy arena. 31 Policy change can also be achieved from the outside of the policy making community through social movements or forming interest groups that directly lobby decision makers. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) provides a specific tactic that is helpful in framing issues, in the manipulation and persuasion of decision makers, or in changing public opinion by highlighting the importance of narratives. Narratives are also powerful in the understanding of the Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) as they contribute to the picture that is painted of target populations. These social constructions can be changed from within the groups, for example through social movements using media advocacy, and from within government through changes in government or the pressure of competing political parties. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) acknowledges that people can build self-governance even within institutional settings, but they need “norms of reciprocity, trust, experience, and adequate information to make it happen” (Heikkila & Andersson, 2021) – an observation that invites tactics of relationship and trust building such as lobbying and networking. The following observations serve as a summary of how the policymaking literature offers high level observations about strategies, tactics, and tools to inform effective KMb activities. In Chapter 4, I will then further develop and operationalize these three mnemonic devices (“think and act like…”) described below into an actionable step-by-step guide. These insights have been peer-reviewed and published by Paul Kershaw and me in Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming Common Anxieties in Knowledge Translation: Advice for Scholarly Issue Advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. In this paper, we write that “the literature…can be summarized as follows: think and act like a marketer, movement, and lobbyist. If one does all of this, they will think more like a political scientist” (p. 2) (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). 2.4.1 Think and act like a movement or lobbyist Thinking like a political scientist is the first crucial step as it allows for the budding academic advocate to appreciate the complexity of the policy making process and points towards levers of change making. Now, , they may be convinced of the necessity to move on from tactics of knowledge dissemination and distribution and start to “think and act like movements and/or lobbyists” –mnemonic devices that Paul Kershaw and I offer. These tactics respond in particular to the observation in the political science literature that policymaking is ultimately a process of politics and power (Raphael, 2015) and that a strategy that allows one to build power will ultimately have a greater chance at being successful than one that rests on “honest brokering” (Pielke, 2007) scientific evidence. 32 2.4.1.1 Outside pressure Tactics and tools that aim to build power on the outside of the policy community seek to wield influence through “mobilizing [not just informing] citizens to pressure public officials” (Kollman, 1998) (p. 3). They are most akin to social movement or interest group activities and less frequently associated with the private sector. The engagement of the interest group happens with the public rather than with the policy makers themselves through, for example, press releases, public campaigns, petitions, or organization of protest events (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Furthermore, outside tactics have the goal to steer public opinion in and of itself by “changing how selected constituents consider and respond to policy issues” (p.8) (Kollman, 1998). I briefly review social movements and civil resistance as these are the two most prominent tactics of the outside track. It is worth noting that social movements can use tactics of civil resistance among other tools, meaning social movements and civil resistance are not mutually exclusive or competing tactics but rather feed into each other. 2.4.1.1.1 Social movements Social movements refer to activities that involve “collective actors that are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents, are linked by dense informal networks, and share a distinct collective identity” (p. 20) (Della Porta & Diani, 2020). In other words, social movements are not sufficiently explained by the action of individual organizations (e.g., activities of the Sierra Club are not the sole characterisation of the environmental movement) or interest groups, no matter how influential. They are further more than a sum of protest events and are instead characterized by collective identity and action aiming to bring about political and societal change by altering “power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained action” (Amenta et al., 2010; Cairney et al., 2016; Daniel & Neubert, 2019; Della Porta & Diani, 2020). Hypotheses on the causal pathway by which social movements exert influence are based on different theories. One is the economic theory of democracy: “electoral competition frequently forces elected officials to enact policies constituent with public opinion” (p. 384) (Burstein & Linton, 2002). Influencing, mobilizing, and sustaining public opinion is therefore key in achieving political will and policy change (Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Kershaw et al., 2017). The particular role of social movements herein is the “importation and proliferation of new issues into public debate” and thus shaping cultural norms as reflected in public opinion (p. 232) (Della Porta & Diani, 2020). Other scholars argue that shaping public opinion is but one factor that explains a movement’s impact and attribute the success of a social movement on its ability to mobilize mass support (Amenta et al., 2010). Several factors are key to 33 developing this ability. Among these are the strategic capacity of leadership (including intrinsic motivation, salient knowledge, innovative thinking, framing), the movement’s ability to mobilize resources, and the political context within which the movements emerge (Amenta et al., 2010; Daniel & Neubert, 2019; Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Ganz, 2004). Finally, proponents of political mediation models believe that a movement needs “help or complementary action from like-minded state actors”, i.e., a champion within the policy community who views the movements’ goals as beneficial to their own (Amenta et al., 2010). There are many historical examples of social movements that ultimately brought about great shifts not only in policy decisions but in society-at-large (Tilly & Wood, 2015). These include, just to name a few, the Labour Movement of the 19th and 20th century (resulting in things such as the eight-hour workday or the right to unionize), the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s (resulting in significant legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Voting Rights Act of 1965), or the LGBTQ+ Rights Movement of the last 60 years (resulting in decriminalization of homosexuality, legalization of same-sex marriage, and a broader societal acceptance in many countries). Regarding environmental topics, a recent example is the Energiewende in Germany, one of the most ambitious energy transition initiatives worldwide that may largely be attributed to a social movement that originated in the 1970s, the formation of the powerful Green Party in the 1980s, and more recently the youth-led Fridays for Future movement that embraces climate justice and pushes for more urgency and shorter timelines, for example the coal phase-out. Still, there is no conclusive evidence that social movements generally achieve the political change they seek to create. Even these successful examples have endured setbacks throughout their existence and generally extend over long timespans that can stretch over several decades. Current examples of setbacks include the regression in transgender rights in the US, or a growing opposition to same-sex marriage with the introduction of laws severely restricting LGBTQ+ rights, for example in Poland and Hungary. The abortion movement in the US suffered a significant setback when the landmark Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade was overturned in 2022, ending the federal constitutional right to abortion that had been established in 1973. As these examples show, success or failure are highly dependent on many factors, including a favorable partisan context, the issue’s presence on the political agenda, high strategic and mobilization capacity of the movement, and having public opinion on its side (Amenta et al., 2010). Social movements are most successful at the stage of agenda setting and policy formulation. They are seen as less effective at the implementation stage or as a way to sustain policy change (i.e., making sure the new policy will not be reversed after the attention of the public declines) (Amenta et al., 2010; Della Porta & Diani, 2020). 34 2.4.1.1.2 Civil resistance Civil resistance, or nonviolent resistance, “is a method of struggle in which unarmed people confront an adversary by using collective action – including protests, demonstrations, strikes, and noncooperation – to build power and achieve political goals…which has become a mainstay of political action across the globe” (p. 70) (Chenoweth, 2020). Civil resistance is often the most visible tactic to put pressure on decision makers used by social movements or other interest groups. Famous historical and successful civil resistance campaigns speak to the efficacy of this approach: South Asian uprising against the British colonial power, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, or the more recent Arab Spring are all examples that were driven by grassroots civic action (Chenoweth, 2020; Lemons & Brown, 2011). In fact, historically, nonviolent campaigns have been successful up to 65% of the time in overthrowing a government within one year of the campaign’s peak (Chenoweth, 2020). Paradoxically, the last ten years have seen an unprecedented rise in nonviolent campaigns while their success rate has declined to 34%. Among the most important factors for the success of nonviolent campaigns is their ability to mobilize large numbers of people across sections of its population which has not been the case for more recent movements (Chenoweth, 2020). Chenoweth, in line with Ganz’s focus on strategic capacity of movements, further argues that a nonviolent campaign’s success depends on its planning and organizing capabilities. It is crucial for campaigns to strategically coordinate mass demonstrations with other tactics of civil resistance such as strikes and mass civil disobedience (“a constrained, communicative protest, contrary to law, that people engage in to support a change in governmental or nongovernmental practices” (p.3) (Smith & Brownlee, 2017) – ideally over an extended period of time. Particularly with the rise of leaderless campaigns that are organized almost exclusively through social media channels, such strategic capacity may be lacking, thus risking the success of the campaign (Chenoweth, 2020). Conversely, Chenoweth argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has forced campaigns to regroup and rethink their strategies in light of the limited possibilities to conduct mass protests. This, she argues, will ultimately strengthen their organizational capacities, their coalition and relationship building with like-minded groups, and their ability to prompt lasting transformation (Chenoweth, 2020). Civil resistance, and particularly civil disobedience (the latter defined as “a particular form of political protest that is marked by the deliberate violation of the law for social purposes” (J. D. Wright, 2015), is a contentious issue. While the historical examples are testimonies to the success of this tactic, conclusive evidence on its causal effects are still lacking (Bennett et al., 2020). One key point of criticism 35 is that civil resistance has mostly been successful as a tactic to overthrow undemocratic regimes of the Global South and that it cannot be assumed that the same results would be achieved when applied to the issue of climate change in democratic governance structures (Berglund & Schmidt, 2020). As a stand-alone tactic, especially with limited organizational capacity, civil disobedience is likely not sufficient to create climate policy change (Bennett et al., 2020; Berglund & Schmidt, 2020; Chenoweth, 2020). Some critics voice the concern that acts of civil resistance, and civil disobedience in particular, might undermine public trust in the professions engaged in these actions and make them outsiders in the policy process. On the other hand, their participation might increase the credibility and seriousness of movements. In the end, it highly depends on the particular action taken and its integration in the overall strategy of a movement (Bennett et al., 2020). To that end, successful examples of civil resistance and disobedience in the environmental movement include Fridays for Future whose flagship tactic is that of (mostly youth) mass protests and has been credited with playing a significant role in putting climate action on the political agenda (Siebler et al., 2023); or numerous more locally-focused actions such as the logging blockades on Lyell Island (Athlii Gwaii, Haida Gwaii) in 1985 or Clayoquot Sound in 1993. 2.4.1.2 Inside lobbying Inside lobbying is a way to directly influence policy makers through channels that are out of the view of the public such as face-to-face meetings (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Inside lobbying is what lay persons generally think of when they hear the term “lobbying”. It is a tactic of framing and persuasion. Inside lobbying requires one to directly engage with those in power, fully understand their points of view and their value systems and then present the evidence in line with their values, combined with emotional appeals, political and financial advantages and feasible policy solutions (Cairney, 2016). The discomfort (by some) with this strategy stems from its non-transparency and the fear of overrepresentation of particular interests over the public good. As Kollman puts it, we associate with it “the image of the fat-cat lobbyists shoving money in the pockets of legislators” (p. 5) (Kollman, 1998). To ease these concerns, I believe it is helpful to understand that there are two different conceptualizations of lobbying: lobbying as a tactic that can be applied by anyone vs. acting as a lobbyist. The former is generally defined by (most states in the US) as “an attempt to influence government action through either written or oral communication” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021). The National Conference of State Legislatures writes that “lobbyists are not simply individuals who engage in lobbying. As an example of one common exception, a legislator attempting to gather support for a bill through the normal course of legislative operations would not be considered a 36 lobbyist. A constituent making a call to a policymaker regarding a matter of personal concern would similarly be exempt. The definition of a lobbyist typically revolves around lobbying on behalf of another for compensation” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021). In Canada, the Lobbying Act applies to “individuals who are paid to lobby. People who lobby on a voluntary basis are not required to register” (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2022a). The Act is based on four key principles: “Free and open access to government is an important matter of public interest; Lobbying public office holders is a legitimate activity; It is desirable that public office holders and the general public be able to know who is engaged in lobbying activities; The system of registration of paid lobbyists should not impede free and open access to government.” (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2022a) These definitions and regulations make it clear that there is a difference between employing the tactic of lobbying vs. being a paid lobbyist with a vested interest. Indeed, the Act explicitly states that academics are not considered lobbyists with a vested interest under the following circumstances: “…when faculty members provide independent advice to government bodies but are not speaking on behalf of the institution where they are employed to teach or conduct research. Professors often speak as experts on public policy issues and may not be speaking on behalf of the institution that employs them. Therefore, where faculty members communicate an independent opinion on a matter of public policy, but are not specifically paid by their employer or a third party to express that opinion, registration is not required.” (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2022b) Another clarification necessary is the difference between expert advising and lobbying. In my conceptualization of power neutral and power navigating/building tactics, expert advice is the former while lobbying is the latter. The difference lies in the way the evidence is presented and the goal of the individual sharing the information. The expert advisor aims to present the extant evidence on an issue to address a presumed information deficit while remaining disengaged about the policy implications of this evidence. This is most akin to what Pielke calls “science arbiters” - individuals who “avoid entanglement in normative debates but provide detailed answers to policymakers’ specific questions” or, if they consider policy options in their advice, “honest broker” (M. B. Brown, 2008; Pielke, 2007). Those employing the tactic of lobbying fall into the category of Pielke’s “issue advocates” – individuals who “reduce the range of policy options and align themselves with a particular political agenda or interest group” (M. B. Brown, 2008; Pielke, 2007; Schmidt & Donner, 2017). 37 Inside lobbying is often considered to be the preferred way of lobbying, particularly for the private sector, while outside pressure is perceived as the “weapon of the weak” (p. 59) (Binderkrantz, 2008, 2016; De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). This is emphasized by the fact that many groups representing aspects of the public interest may not be able to gain inside access due to a relative lack of power. However, there is not a generalizable advantage of one approach over the other. This rather depends on the context of the issue at hand. Inside lobbying is more effective for issues that are not broadly covered in public discourse and/or do not enjoy broad public support. For these issues in particular, outside pressure can actually be a damaging tactic (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Outside pressure, on the other hand, “leads to policy success when the lobbyist’s policy position enjoys popular endorsement within media debates and when the lobbyist engages in a coalition with other organized interests” (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Some issues or contexts may require a combination of the two. For example, when outside pressure generates a pathway for advocates to gain access to individuals inside of the policy community and can then engage with them directly in the form of inside lobbying (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019; Kollman, 1998). 2.4.2 Think and act like a marketer Once one has identified the most strategic tactical approach to navigating systems of politics and power as described in the previous sections, one is ultimately faced with the challenge of needing to change people’s minds. The literature shows movements and lobbyists have long understood that human decision-making is driven by emotion, intuition, and values much more so than by scientific evidence (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017; Crow & Jones, 2018; Haidt, 2012). This means the budding issue advocate must consider how humans in general and policy makers in particular make decisions (Cairney, 2014b; Haidt, 2012). As a practice-relevant conclusion, Paul Kershaw and I encourage the budding academic advocate to not only think like a movement and lobbyist, but also to “think and act like a marketer” (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). Marketing tools such as the use of narratives and stories can be used as tools for manipulation and persuasion as advised by colleagues who are well-versed in the world of politics and policy (Cairney et al., 2016; Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017; Crow & Jones, 2018; Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; Sachs, 2012). The underlying assumption about human decision-making that guides much of conventional KMb research and practice is that people make rational decisions based on information and facts. For a long time, the idea of the homo economicus prevailed – the idea that humans make rational decisions leveraging optimal availability of information, and that by doing so, achieve the best possible outcome 38 for all (Meadows & Wright, 2009). The field of KMb has further been influenced by cognitive psychology theories which predominantly aim to explain behaviours of individuals. These theories “assume that individuals make rational decisions based upon systematic analysis of the information available to them” (p. 289) (Straus et al., 2013) and have been extrapolated to explain decision-making of individuals such as the research-use behaviour of health professionals (Straus et al., 2013). Limitations of these theories include: the neglect of external factors such as organizational pressures, the inherent value system that heavily but unconsciously influences an individual’s or a group’s decision-making, the social construction of knowledge, or the principle of bounded rationality (which means that information available to people is always incomplete, especially regarding more distant events; and that the decisions they do make based on this incomplete information is often less than perfect) (Cairney et al., 2016; Meadows & Wright, 2009; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). These factors are of particular importance in the policy realm where decisions are often guided by political ideologies (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). There is some debate on whether ideologies are caused by innate morality or vice versa (Hatemi et al., 2019). However, the currently dominant theory depicting how morals, intuitions, and emotions guide our decision- making and thus political decisions, is the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Haidt, 2001). MFT is a dual-process theory which sees the brain as having two functionally different, operating parts: the intuitive judgement (which Haidt terms “the elephant”) and the rational “rider” that only seemingly steers the elephant but, in reality, merely justifies and rationalizes the elephant’s (moral) judgement (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007). The intuitive moral judgement is a combination of six “moral taste buds” – psychological mechanisms that form the foundation of our moral system: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, and liberty/oppression. According to Haidt, these “taste buds” help explain differences in political orientation and ideology whereby liberals tend to be influenced mainly by the care and fairness foundations while conservatives form judgements influenced by all six (Haidt, 2012). What does this mean for the idea that evidence and facts drive policy decisions? Simply put, evidence may predominantly be used by the “rider” to support the “elephant”: facts often help rationalize intuitive judgements but do not change them. The theories of the policy process (see Section 2.3) assume ambiguity to be at the centre of political decision-making, rather than uncertainty. As opposed to uncertainty, where we assume a lack of information, ambiguity refers to ambivalence, i.e., “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena” (p. 5) (Feldman, 1989). This means that more information may not 39 reduce ambiguity, rendering the objective and isolated presentation of scientific evidence secondary to decision-making (Cairney et al., 2016). It follows that certain tools of communication are crucial building blocks to all previously described tactics – from using them as a form of outside pressure in order to shape public opinion and thereby increase pressure on decision makers to one-on-one meetings with said decision makers. Rather than focusing on reducing ever more the uncertainty that is inherent to scientific research and appealing to the rational decision-making part of the brain, one needs to consider more the emotional, intuitive part of drivers to decision-making and reduce ambiguity through a process of persuasion that “exploit[s] the emotional and ideological biases of policy makers” (p. 399) (Cairney et al., 2016; Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017; Crow & Jones, 2018). Similarly, Greenhalgh and Russel propose to present evidence “as moves in a rhetorical argumentation game and not as harvesting of objective facts to be fed into a logical decision-making sequence” (p. 34) (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009). One tool that shows particular promise is the use of narratives where emotion and approaches such as storytelling are connected to the evidence (Crow & Jones, 2018). This approach can be compared to marketing as it is oriented first and foremost towards the beliefs of the audience rather than the evidence/product itself (Sachs, 2012). Cairney and Kwiatkowski summarize this very poignantly as follows: “People will pay attention to certain narratives because they are boundedly rational, seeking shortcuts to gather sufficient information – and prone to accept simple stories that seem plausible, confirm their biases, exploit their emotions, and/or come from a source they trust” (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). 2.4.3 Legal tactics Rather than seeking to influence the process in the legislative or executive branch, legal tactics are deployed to leverage the judicial branch of government. An in-depth discussion of this approach would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I would be remiss if I did not include at least a brief exploration of it. In particular, I present herein litigation as an example of a legal tactic used in efforts to achieve policy change. According to Lawrence M. Friedman, “litigation, in ordinary speech, refers to actions contested in court; this involves a claim, a dispute or conflict, and the use of a specific institution, the court, to resolve the conflict or dispute” (p. 17) (Friedman, 1989). This tactic may best align with the strategy of social movements and other non-governmental and private interest groups. Indeed, there are vast examples of the latter using litigation as a tactic to stimulate policy change in line with their interests or to block policy changes that they perceive as contrary to their interests. In the case of the EU, litigation “works most effectively where a very organized interest group with a narrow 40 mandate and well endowed with resources is able to swiftly bring several cases” (p. 427) (Bouwen & McCown, 2007). Interestingly, it has also been shown that litigation can be successful in cases where legislative changes were difficult to achieve (Bouwen & McCown, 2007). As noted earlier, legislative and policy changes regarding climate change still lack the needed level of vigour to avoid catastrophic effects on people, communities, human rights and ecosystems (Mooney & Dennis, 2018; NASA, 2013; Peel & Osofsky, 2020). Litigation in this area has thus been constantly increasing over the last decade with 3613 cases filed globally as of December 2024 (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 2025). Moreover, litigation is hypothesized to be an important and effective pathway to policy change, particularly given more recent developments that expand approaches based on environmental statutes and target discrete but significant emitters (Metzger & Aidun, 2020) or bring forward human rights-based claims (Peel & Osofsky, 2020). For example, the widely heralded Urgenda and Neubauer court decisions, from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands and the Constitutional Court of Germany, respectively, have catalyzed more urgent and ambitious climate policies and actions in those two countries. Two prominent Canadian examples of a rights-based claim are La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen and Mathur et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, both cases where children and youth argue that Canada’s inadequate action on climate change has violated their rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedom and the rights of present and future Canadian children (La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen, n.d.; “Mathur, et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario,” 2019). Both Canadian cases are still underway in the court process. Critics of this approach have raised concerns that judges do not have the necessary expertise to come to conclusions about causal relationships between a defendant’s actions and the damage to the plaintiff(s) in the case of climate change (Peel & Osofsky, 2020). This is an area where we see increasing involvement of scientists as experts who are called upon to translate scientific knowledge into language that is usable for the courts (Peel & Osofsky, 2020). There is inconsistent evidence on whether litigation actually has a direct impact on climate policies and therefore climate outcomes. In some cases, the answer is yes and in others, no. In some cases, it may well be that these impacts happen in more indirect ways, and in conjunction with other strategies and activities of civil society, youth, and Indigenous peoples, through framing the understanding of an issue in certain ways and mobilizing public support, thereby pressuring governments into adopting more stringent policies (Peel & Osofsky, 2020; Posner, 2006). More generally, there is considerable concern among scholars about the appropriateness of turning toward the court system to drive legislation and policy as this may hold potential for watering 41 down the separation of power between the government branches (Peel & Osofsky, 2020). This is less of a concern in rights-based litigation, as courts have a clear and well-established role in holding other branches of government accountable for their human rights obligations. 2.5 The importance of context The previous sections focus on examples of specific tactics to create change on a policy level in very general terms. As stated in 1.4.1, I conceptually include all three branches of a liberal democratic governance system. However, it is important to note that the context of the particular policy change one aims to achieve is crucial in determining which tactic to deploy. I will elaborate on this more in Chapters 3 and 4 but generally speaking, there are six crucial elements that influence policy choice (see Chapter 2). These elements are actors making choices (e.g., policy makers in legislative and executive branches, interest groups) who are influenced by institutions (rules, norms, practices, and relationships); networks or subsystems (relationships between actors); ideas or beliefs (worldviews, beliefs, knowledge, shared definitions, solutions within groups); policy context (e.g., cultural context or public opinion); and events (routine such as elections or unanticipated such as natural disasters) (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). The specific audience as well as the specific target of choice will then heavily depend on the context-specific conditions of these elements. This means that the advocate or activist will need to have clarity on the policy target that they wish to influence and then analyse from there who the actors are that make the choice (akin to a power analysis), what kinds of institutional norms they are influenced by, what kind of relationships they have within networks or other actors, what their beliefs and values are, what policy and political context they operate within, and whether or not there are particular events at play that might influence the policy choice (Ganz, 2004; Howard, 2020; Howard et al., 2023; Topp et al., 2021). Once this overarching political framework is clearer, a decision on more effective tactics can begin to emerge. However, there are also other real-world constraints to consider. Advocates and activists will be faced with barriers that restrict access to decision makers, media, or even the public. Groups generally perceived as less powerful, such as high school students, will rarely get one-on-one access to decision makers in a nation’s cabinet, for example. If they determine that is needed to achieve the change they seek, however, they need to and may be able to find ways to gain that access, for example by generating public support and outside pressure. As mentioned before, the Fridays for Future movement is a prominent example of this approach. Related to power is also the question of privilege – 42 or lack thereof (Klein, 2024; Topp et al., 2021). Racialized groups, members of lower socio-economic classes, or marginalized/vulnerable populations might face additional obstacles to achieving inside access or to generating broad public support due systemic barriers (Klein, 2024) (see also the Social Construction of Target Populations theory, Section 2.3). This is an area where Participatory Action Research (PAR) models in particular have gained traction. The goal of this approach is to empower marginalized groups and foster social change through collective action and co-creation of knowledge (Baum et al., 2006). 2.6 Conclusions and synthesis of the literature into a conceptual framework In this chapter, I sought to answer research question 1: What practice-relevant learnings can be generated from a multidisciplinary literature on effective policy and political change making? I reviewed and interpreted two bodies of literature that come to different conclusions as they pertain to this question. As seen in Section 2.2, the KMb literature operates within an EBPM ideal and from an information deficit assumption. The practice-relevant learnings derived from this literature, i.e. responses to research question one, can be summarized as: conduct high-quality, relevant research and then summarize and communicate it well to decision makers with whom you need to build relationships. There is little mention of power and political realities beyond a lamentation of the same and advice thus focuses mostly on tactics and tools to overcome the assumed information deficit. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 I then review the contrasting literature of the political sciences and policy studies which accepts and integrates the complexities created by power and political dynamics. This literature encourages us to think about the actors making choices as influenced by institutions, networks or subsystems, ideas or beliefs, policy context, and events (routine such as elections or unanticipated such as natural disasters) (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). Scientific evidence is not seen as the central driver to policy choice and change nor is an information deficit among decision makers the main issue that needs to be overcome when one seeks to move evidence into policy action. Rather, policies are often the result of the successful implementation of interests by particular groups rather than objective outcomes based on the best available knowledge (Cáceres et al., 2016). Practice-relevant learnings for the academic advocate thus evolve around strategies and tactics that are helpful in the implementation of one’s interests. In essence, the role that may be most helpful for academic advocates to identify with is that of the policy entrepreneur. The tactics of the policy entrepreneur on the inside include lobbying 43 around problem definition and development of policy options, or on the outside via tactics of collective action. The policy entrepreneur is well prepared to leverage crucial moments by responding to events well, by having solutions at hand, ready to work existing networks and coalitions. The policy entrepreneur is further well-versed in tools that recognize complex human decision making in light of bounded rationality, inherent value and belief systems, and approaches that borrow from marketing ideas. In the following, I organize the responses to the research question in a conceptual framework (see Figure 2.1) that is built around two axes from power neutral to power building and actions performed on the inside or outside of the policymaking community. The KMb literature mostly lives in the upper two quadrants of this framework in power neutral activities which I label “information provider”. The insights from the political science and other literatures thus are represented in the bottom two quadrants of the framework under the label of the “power navigator”. Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework connecting information provider and power navigator tactics and archetypes as applied within and outside of the policymaking community Within these quadrants, this conceptual framework depicts what I call “tactics” (see Section 1.4.2 for the definition). These tactics are neither mutually exclusive nor are they concepts that should 44 be applied separately. They rather overlap and complement each other, and form parts of an advocate’s and activist’s skills set. The same is true for the integration of several “tools” (see Section 1.4.2) within one tactic, for example, a social movement can use social media outlets to gather support or organize protests to create pressure on decision makers. The legal tactics employ the judicial branch; however, they can also be integrated with other tactics and tools in an overarching strategy aiming to impact the legislative or executive branch (e.g., court cases arguing for the right to a healthy environment as a tactic by the environmental movement). Depending on the context in which the legal path is employed and to which end, it can either be a power neutral or power building, an inside or an outside tool. The tactics as depicted in Figure 2.1 then align with certain advocacy or activist “archetypes”. For example, individuals who operate mostly outside of the policy community aiming to build power are what I call “activists”. This label is in line with Gardner et al.’s definition of an activist as someone who engages in “a subset of advocacy that uses more direct forms of action to influence policy, such as protest and non-violent civil disobedience” (Gardner et al., 2021); Individuals who operate on the inside of the policy community but operate from a power neutral stance are what I call “advisors” – individuals who employ tactics such as expert testimony. This is akin to what Pielke calls “honest brokers” (Pielke, 2007). Having said this, there is nuance to the advisor role between more power neutral and more power conscious advising, particularly when the advice is given to players outside of the policy community (e.g., social movements). As I will discuss in Chapter 3, some of the study participants who support movements as expert advisors draw a very clear and distinct line between their advice and the movement and would not want to be seen as part of the movement, others are more willing to either use the evidence more strategically themselves to “persuade” decision makers, or let the movement use it in such ways, or be identified as part of the movement. Of course, these archetype categories are not mutually exclusive. While one may fall primarily into the category of “expert advisor”, they may also employ tactics and tools from other quadrants, although they are more likely to remain above the horizontal axis (in the power neutral space) as this presents a boundary that is hard to cross if one holds a certain belief system (e.g., the belief that participation in more confrontational tactics such as civil disobedience would undermine one’s credibility as a scientist – as I will show in Chapter 3). The archetype categories also served as a framework for participant selection for the study presented in Chapter 3. I aimed to have at least two representatives of each archetype. One key insight that the literature encourages us to take away is that the difficulty and key to success lies in developing an integrated synergy (= strategy) of the right tactics and tools for a particular 45 issue and context at hand in order to achieve strategic targets (Amenta et al., 2010; Ganz, 2004, 2006; Howard, 2020). Such a strategy requires strategic capacity in movements that needs to be based on a theory of change (ToC) that makes explicit the understanding of how the wanted change is achieved (more on that in Chapters 3 and 4) (Ganz, 2006; Howard, 2020). The overarching ToC is reflected in the “information provider” and “power navigator” labels in this framework. The “information provider” strategy might have a general theory of change that sounds like this: “If we conduct high quality research and communicate it well to the public and decision makers, then people and governments will act upon this evidence because the evidence provides answers about the right solutions”. Conversely, an overarching “power navigator” ToC is grounded in a political and power-based understanding of policymaking may sound like this: “If we mobilize enough people or incentives for decision makers to listen to us, then decision makers will respond to that pressure because governments respond to those who organize and show up”. These ToCs reflect the basic underlying understanding of the two literature-based assumptions about how change is made. Once the budding academic advocate then delves into the specific issue at hand, they will begin to create a more specific ToC that will encompass the different tactics and potentially integrate tactics from both strategic pathways. The following is an example for such a (admittedly complex) ToC: “If we (i) make meaning of the evidence in light of our target audience’s values in order to (ii) shape public opinion, (iii) frame policy beliefs about problems and evidence-based solutions, (iv) identify a policy agenda with specific changes to achieve these solutions, and (v) build a powerful coalition around that agenda; then policy makers are more likely to act on our evidence-based recommendations; because politics responds to those who organize and show up (via activities like (i) through (v))” (p. 9-10) (Kershaw et al., 2017; Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). This ToC contains an understanding of power building and navigation but also includes “truth telling” tactics, particularly in steps (i), (ii), and (iii). However, as opposed to the power neutral expert advisor archetype, these truth telling tactics of the strategy are integrated into an overarching goal of building power. Another example of an overlap of the strategic pathways is that of an inside navigator. In my conceptual framework, this individual would have access to individuals and networks on the inside of the policy community and would strategically use these relationships to “tell truth to power” without necessarily having power themselves. The same could be true for an advisor who operates more on the outside of the policy community and advises social movements with the goal to build outside pressure. This literature-based understanding of strategic approaches to KMb forms my point of departure for the study presented in Chapter 3 and the corresponding research questions. The goal was to assess to what degree academic advocates conduct their KMb activities in line with the findings from 46 the literature and why they might or might not do so. As a starting point, I was therefore interested to explore how academic advocates generally seek to influence climate-related policy (research question 2). In other words, I wanted to hear from them what kinds of tactics and tools they employed and whether they integrated those into an overarching strategy. I was also interested to hear about the challenges and opportunities that arose for participants as they conduct these activities, particularly what it means to be an advocate/activist as an academic (research question 3). This informed my understanding of barriers and facilitators to this work. Third, I wanted to explore what factors determined their decisions to engage in a certain strategy, tactic, and tools (research question 4) – are the decisions evidence-based or assumption-based? What else plays a role? And finally, I connected the findings from the interviews back to the conclusion of the literature review and explored whether there was a knowledge and skills gap among participants and what might explain the persistence of such a gap (research question 5). The responses to the last question in particular then informed Chapter 4. 47 3 Learning from academic advocates 3.1 Introduction A growing number of academics are willing to engage in climate change advocacy and activism (Capstick et al., 2022; Cologna et al., 2021; J. F. Green, 2020; Zourou et al., 2024). For a variety of reasons (see subsequent sections), activism and advocacy in the policy arena among academics is still more of an exception than the rule. Learning from more experienced academic advocates can help save resources, avoid pitfalls, and potentially improve impact (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). This study is meant to serve as a first stop on the budding academic advocate’s journey who wants to learn from more experienced colleagues. As the literature on advice for academic advocates shows, there is still a paucity of applicable, helpful guidance that goes beyond generic statements. By assessing the strategies, tactics, and tools that academic advocates employ in greater detail, and by understanding their underlying assumptions, skill sets, and theories of change, this study also aims to uncover knowledge and skills gaps among them. I organize the study to provide answers to research questions 2-5: ● How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? ● What gaps in strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and knowledge mobilization (KMb)? ● What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? ● Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools as well as the persisting knowledge gap? I organize my analysis of the results around a thematic map that represents the academic advocates’ journey from motivation to action and has at its centre the strategies, tactics, and tools that people employ in their activism as well as interpretations on how these choices come to be. To paint a richer picture of these experiences, I weave in quotes from participants that support and illustrate my interpretation. The discussion of the study provides my interpretation of the findings from the qualitative study in light of the wider literature on policy change examined in Chapter 2, while also reflecting on the limitations of the study and its generalizability. 48 3.2 Background The literature that concerns itself specifically with scientists as activists mostly contains two broad themes: (i) a discussion of the question of whether academics should be activists (not the focus of this dissertation), and (ii) advice for scholarly activists on what to do to influence policy choices (see Chapter 2). Previous empirical work on the ways in which academics engage in activism as well as experience and attitudes among academic activists is scarce. It mostly focuses on the advocate archetype (i.e., academics who act as public intellectuals) or scientists’ engagement with social movements (archetype of activist or advocate, depending on the role of the scientist within the movement). The former was found to be the primary way to engage in an anonymous survey by the journal Nature of all living IPCC authors at the time about their advocacy activities (response rate: 38.6%) (Tollefson, 2021). 66% of the respondents had been engaged in climate advocacy, primarily through actions of public outreach (speeches, publications, videos). Fewer (40%) have signed petitions or letters or have contacted lawmakers directly and only 25% had participated in protests. Due to the nature of this survey-based study, more in-depth information about the respondents’ experiences is lacking. Similarly, Schmidt and Donner argue that “any responsible scientist who is publicly active today effectively lies in the ”issue advocacy” (quoting Pielke, 2007) quadrant and must decide how to best approach that role (p. 2) (Schmidt & Donner, 2017). They offer a framework that sees public engagement by scientists as a continuum from more science-dominated to more advocacy-dominated and argue that the latter end of the spectrum will come with greater risks to one’s credibility among peers, public criticism, scrutiny of one’s professional and personal life, or loss of access to funding or resources (Schmidt & Donner, 2017). However, they also note that these risks are “most often overwhelmed by the benefits (advocacy success, increased transparency of science, higher profiles, greater opportunities)” (p. 2) (Schmidt & Donner, 2017). Kotcher et al. conducted a randomized controlled experiment in which they tested public reactions to different scientific advocacy statements along the continuum from science to advocacy-dominated as described by Schmidt and Donner (2017). Their results suggest that climate scientists can indeed engage in public advocacy without running the risk of harming their credibility (Kotcher et al., 2017). Experts’ engagement in social movements has been described to be “complex, takes many forms, changes across social settings and time, and can either have positive or negative effects” (Frickel et al., 2015). The authors describe that “expert activists” do not act alone but are usually active in 49 networks such as social movements or communities, often hidden from the public eye and the engagement goes beyond the academic system (Frickel et al., 2015). This description is most akin to the activist or advocate archetype in my conceptual framework (depending on the role of the academic in the network or social movement within which they are active). Fields such as science and technology studies or sociology have produced a body of literature that concerns itself with questions around activists’ experiences. For example, Zourou et al. (2024) highlight the social meaning that academic activists draw from their activist identity as part of a community who shares “a sense of responsibility toward revealing the truth together with a political and social commitment, and a long-term vision for the impact of current actions on the future of humanity.” Interviewees in this study describe their engagement in activism as a turning point in their lives which profoundly impacts “their way of being, teaching and transmitting knowledge” (Zourou et al., 2024). Arancibia (2016) offers a similar viewpoint in that expert activism is a form of collective action, embedded within and structured by networks and institutions. There are further several personal views, news articles, and commentaries by and about individual academics who depict their personal experiences as climate activists. For example, Michael Mann, prominent climatologist and climate activist, has frequently been the target of attacks from right-wing lobby groups and conservative politicians. He has endured public harassment, threats to job and wellbeing, and even death threats (C. Wright & Mann, 2013). Rose Abramoff and Peter Kalmus were expelled from the 2022 American Geophysical Union conference after disrupting a session and issuing a call to action (Grossman, 2024). Abramoff subsequently lost her position with a research institution in Tennessee for “violating its code of conduct” (Abramoff, 2023). A group of Australian climate scientists, including Will Steffen, received credible death threats in 2011 (Milman, 2011). Maria Caffrey lost her position with the US National Park Service because she refused to alter her report on human-caused climate change under the first Trump administration (Caffrey, 2019). Accounts like these abound but they are highly publicized cases of individual academic advocates. They beg the question whether these kinds of experiences are common among academics who engage in climate advocacy and activism or whether they depend on factors such as the chosen tactics, visibility, position, field, etc. It is interesting, for example, that I was not able to find a single rendition in the literature of a scientist academic who tends to operate more on the inside of the policymaking community – a gap this study aims to fill. It also seems that for many academics, the repercussions of engaging in activism are more subtle. As one academic advocate describes: “Our work 50 is not just about papers and the promotions you get; it’s also about whether you still have a good time at the coffee machine. When I did my ‘coming out’ as an activist, a year ago or something, that is when lots of friction happened, and certain people didn’t want to see me that much anymore” (Upton, 2023). Another individual reports having had to deal with anonymous complaints to her human resources department which were upsetting and took time away from her work (Upton, 2023). But there are also indications that activism is not always detrimental to an academic career. For example, some individuals report having received more positive responses to grant applications when they frame their activism as a form of KMb. Others reflect that the rigor of their research has been improved by activist engagement (Upton, 2023). This study explores academic advocates’ capacities and experiences in the climate and environmental policy space empirically by interviewing a sample of academic advocates rather than through literature reviews or theoretical arguments. As such, it contributes an in-depth assessment of academic advocates’ KMb capacities as well as a rich description of academic advocates’ experiences, particularly regarding challenges and opportunities as they relate to their activist efforts – insights that remain scarce in the extant literature. Moreover, the findings are meant to inform the generation of a training opportunity for academic advocates and activists. The study thus focuses primarily on practice-relevant insights and does not engage in a normative discussion about whether or not academics should be advocates or activists, or in what way they should engage from a philosophical standpoint but rather from a pragmatic point of view (i.e., rather than asking “is a particular action appropriate for an academic?”, I ask “what are the actions one takes and how do they match with the literature on effective change making?” as well as “How does the academic advocate/activist experience taking this action?”). 3.3 Methodology 3.3.1 Overview In the following section, I present a rationale for my operational decisions within the research methodology. I begin by reflecting on the research design for the qualitative interview-based study of 17 cases, the generalizability (or lack thereof) of the findings, and my sampling approach, inclusion criteria and decisions around saturation. I continue by describing the procedures of data collection (recruitment and interview procedure). I then describe my analytic approach and coding decisions to allow for replication and greater reliability of the findings. Finally, I reflect on issues of rigor in this study and what measures I took in order to meet evaluation criteria for qualitative research studies. 51 Qualitative research is often faced with the critique that “anything goes”. This critique can be mitigated by meeting objective criteria of rigor and evaluation (see Section 3.3.6.4), by being transparent about one’s operational decisions (see for example Section 3.3.5), and finally by adhering to a cohesive chain of procedures such as Chenail’s Qualitative Research “Plumb Line” (Chenail, 1997). Chenail proposes four components of a research project that need to align: area of curiosity, mission questions, data to be collected, and data analysis procedure (Chenail, 1997). In this case, the area of curiosity is academic advocates and their activism skills and experiences. The mission questions are what they do and how they experience it. The data to be collected are interviews with academic advocates reflecting on what they do and how they experience it. The data analysis procedure focused on the accounts of the individual participants with a layer of interpretation informed by my synthesis of the interdisciplinary literature on activism presented in Chapter 2. As such, my analytic approach follows the practice of interpretive description (Thompson Burdine et al., 2021; Thorne, 2016). This is useful as a guiding approach for my project because I anticipated that my participants would co-create the findings with me and that the results would be highly contextual and dependent on the experience of individual minds. This then led me to the appropriate methodology: A series of interviews allowed me to learn about my area of curiosity and opened the door for a narrative analysis of the experiences as well as comparing contextual factors of different individuals (Punch, 2013). 3.3.2 Epistemology I conducted this study within a pragmatist paradigm as a framework for my research methodology (not in the sense of Dewey’s philosophical school of thought). This means that in my worldview, I am not strictly aligned with one ontology over another but rather believe that reality is constantly renegotiated in light of its usefulness to practical solutions. As such, the pragmatic research paradigm allows for a flexible approach in research methodologies as it is guided by an epistemology that sees change as the underlying aim as long as the methods used to get there are the ones best suited to answer the research questions at hand. Given that the focus of this study is on skills and experiences of individuals, a qualitative methodology lends itself well to answering the research questions in this case (Morgan, 2014; Rehman & Alharthi, 2016). 3.3.3 Research design The design of this study was an interview-based interpretive description study based on the narratives of 17 academic advocates in Canada, the US, and the UK. The narrative inquiry was the guiding framework for my methodology. The narrative inquiry design is particularly valuable when the 52 focus is on understanding individual or group experiences and on capturing the context in which these experiences occur (Clandinin, 2022). The individual academic was the single unit of analysis but findings from all interviews were integrated in order to come to cross-individual conclusions. 3.3.4 Guiding propositions Yin suggests making explicit the propositions that guide one’s research to narrow down the issues that need attention (Yin, 2017). My guiding propositions are that some researchers refrain from activities that go beyond generating evidence and distributing it through conventional channels of academic reach (peer-reviewed publications, conferences, exchange with other academics, teaching). Others are motivated to engage in activities that specifically aim to move this evidence into policy. Typically, these activities have a goal which reflects the underlying theory of change: to close a knowledge gap/information deficit among decision makers and the public. Further, the assumption is often that policymaking is a linear process (see my discussion of the Policy Cycle in Chapter 2) which provides clear entry points for evidence to drive decision-making at multiple stages in the process. Examples for KMb activities performed under these assumptions include public appearances (in person, in mass media outlets, or social media platforms), more formal engagements such as participation in expert panels (e.g., IPCC), or testimonies in front of government bodies (legislative, executive, or judicial). While not all researchers frequently engage in such activities, they are still perceived as an accepted part of being an academic and are sanctioned by the academic community. In some cases, they even increase the prestige of the academic in question, for example in the case of the IPCC contributions. My study focused on activities that go beyond these sanctioned engagements and i. adheres to evidence that the information deficit model is insufficient in explaining the persistent evidence-to-policy gap. It instead draws on theories of the policymaking process that consider complexities in the political system that relate to power, values, interest representation, the role of the public, and the instrumental use of evidence. It contends that the path from evidence to policy is mediated by politics and that in order to influence policy, one must get engaged with politics (Kershaw et al., 2017). ii. assumes that comparatively few researchers base their KMb activities on these more complex frameworks. 53 iii. therefore, assumes that the evidence-to-policy gap persists partially because researchers have an incomplete understanding of the policymaking process and the politics involved, and therefore conduct insufficient KMb activities. iv. acknowledges that even if such knowledge is present, there are philosophical, normative, political, and sociological barriers for academics to get engaged in political KMb activities. v. assumes that there are nevertheless examples of researchers who have the option to base their KMb activities on these more complex theories, despite the philosophical, normative, and sociological challenges, and might therefore be more successful (or perceive themselves to be more successful) in influencing policies based on extant evidence. The reason why they have the option may be context-specific and relate to social or professional privilege (e.g., being White, male, tenured etc.); or may be due to the nature of the field in which they work (e.g., geography vs. climate science); or may be due to the policy context within which they work (e.g., carbon pricing as highly contested vs. more straight-forward, less value-laden issues); or may be due to the geographic location where they are active (potentially more acceptance of academic advocacy and activism in UK vs. US and Canada?). vi. assumes that exploring the narratives of these individuals will allow for extrapolation of learnings for the rest of the academic community and contribute to the practical understanding that can guide more effective KMb activities. 3.3.5 Sampling, inclusion criteria, saturation The 17 individuals I interviewed work in Canada, the US, and the UK. The sampling strategy was purposive (Miles et al., 2020), meaning that participants were selected intentionally based on their ability to provide answers to the research questions. My objective was to include people who could speak from personal experience as academic advocates and would be willing to share with me a rendition of their actions and experiences as such. The inclusion criteria were: i. Individual is (or was at the time of their activist efforts) primarily an academic, i.e., affiliated with an academic institution in a researcher and/or teaching role. This includes research and teaching professors, associates, fellows, or members of university administrative leadership (e.g., Dean) ii. Individual is based in Canada, USA, UK (Anglophone country with relatively comparable liberal democratic governance systems) 54 iii. Individual conducts activist efforts that go beyond actions that are typically sanctioned by the academy. As typically sanctioned, I conceptualized activities such as publications in the peer-reviewed literature, conference presentations, or teaching. iv. Individuals who exclusively acted as invited expert witnesses or advisors (in the advisor archetype) and did not engage in any other tactic of the framework were also excluded as I see this activity as something that is typically sanctioned in academia. After an initial round of interviews with nine interviewees, six additional participants were referred to me through chain-referral sampling (Penrod et al., 2003). This method is appropriate to reach potential participants who could otherwise not be identified (Penrod et al., 2003). I identified the final two interviewees through a peer-reviewed paper in which participants reflected on civil disobedience as a legitimate tactic for academic advocates. They graciously agreed to participate in the study while my experience in general was that individuals whom I contacted without an introduction through a mutual connection did not respond to my query. My decision to complete the interview process after having interviewed 17 individuals was based on two factors. One, I had reached my goal of including at least two individuals per activist archetype, and participants represented various disciplines from the natural and social sciences, medicine, and law. The literature describes (and my experience confirms) that academic advocates and activists are relatively hard to identify and study (Frickel et al., 2015). The goal of including a minimum of two individuals per archetype was therefore a compromise between wanting to introduce nuance by including more than one person per archetype and the real barrier of identifying and recruiting a greater number of participants. Furthermore, I made an effort to include individuals with a variety of gender and ethnic identities to reflect a wider spectrum of experiences. And two, the responses to both the interview and the research questions yielded no new insights at that point. More specifically, information shared with me did not render more nuance, opposing views, or confirming material pertaining to the themes and codes (more on that in Section 3.2.5.3), or responses to the research questions; nor did it add dimension to the conceptual framework of strategies, tactics, and archetypes, or expand the thematic map further. One could argue that saturation may never be reached when the question is about the experience and knowledge of individuals because every individual’s experience may differ from the next. However, this was neither a phenomenological nor an ethnographic study that would have aimed to explore the largest possible variety of experiences. It was rather meant to explore possible accounts of academic advocates who fall into the four quadrants of conceptual framework that 55 guided my sample recruitment (see Figure 2.1). I judge that the information gathered after interviewing 17 individuals was enough to meet this objective. 3.3.6 Data collection 3.3.6.1 Recruitment I initially identified potential participants with the help of my supervisory committee. All members of my committee are academic advocates to a certain degree and thus have relationships with and knowledge of others who would meet my inclusion criteria. Through this process, I identified 21 potential participants through my committee’s networks. My committee members introduced me to the potential participants via an informal email. Once potential participants signaled a willingness to participate, I sent a recruitment email (Appendix B) which contained all necessary information for informed consent (Appendix C). Agreement to take part in the study was taken as evidence of consent. I concluded the recruitment once I had interviewed at least two participants from each archetype. 3.3.6.2 Interview procedure All participants were invited to a 90-minute interview. Four participants asked me to reduce the time to 60 minutes due to their limited capacity. I carried out the interviews between May and August of 2022. Each interviewee was interviewed only once apart from one individual where the first half of the interview was not recorded, that portion of the interview was repeated several weeks later. The interview form was semi-structured, meaning I had examples of questions guiding me through the process (see interview guide in Appendix D). These sample questions were developed based on the overarching research questions of this study. Guided by literature on best practices in interview-based studies focused on the experience of individuals, the interview questions addressed six different focal areas: opinions, knowledge, experience, behaviour, feeling, and value (Miles et al., 2020). The objective was not to get answers to each of these questions from every participant but rather to help with the flow of the interview and to keep me focused. 3.3.7 Data analysis 3.3.7.1 Transcription of interview recordings I transcribed all interviews myself utilizing Zoom®’s automatic transcription function as a starting point. 16 participants agreed to audio and video taping and subsequent transcription of the interview; one participant declined the recording. I therefore took extensive notes during the interview. The first round of transcription consisted of checking, correcting, and re-writing, if necessary, the 56 verbatim auto transcription text that was created by the Zoom® software. I only changed obvious errors such as words that were misunderstood by the software but did not make changes to the actual content. However, I deleted pauses and other non-verbal content in the transcripts to increase readability. In the second round of transcription, I listened to and simultaneously read all transcripts again and made changes to the text only to enhance comprehensibility. This included, for example, exclusion of “uhm”, addition of punctuation characters, or introduction of paragraph structure. 3.3.7.2 Analytic approach Braun and Clarke write that “what is important [when it comes to the choice of the analytic approach] is that the theoretical framework and methods match what the researcher wants to know” (p. 80) (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Given the objective of the study to explore academic advocates’ experiences, an inductive and exploratory analytic approach was most fitting. This is also reflected in the research questions which are posed in a way that invites exploratory answers (how and what). My primary objective was to describe the experiences shared with me by those who have lived them and then put those in context with the literature base on activism strategies to address super-wicked policy problems. As such, I remained relatively close to the data at hand in my analysis. However, I added a layer of interpretation in the way I structured and organized the data and then compared it to existing literature. This is particularly true for the way in which I organize my reporting on subjects’ strategies, tools, and tactics. The general analytic lens that I took to the data was therefore interpretive description (Thompson Burdine et al., 2021; Thorne, 2016). Interpretive description has at its core “the discovery of recurrent patterns, or shared realities” within human experiences (Thompson Burdine et al., 2021). It allows the researcher to “identify themes and patterns among subjective perspectives, while also accounting for variations between individuals. It is grounded in an interpretive orientation that acknowledges the constructed and contextual nature of human experience” (Thompson Burdine et al., 2021). It is particularly useful in generating knowledge that is meant to find practical application drawn from subjective experiences (Thorne, 2016). Its epistemological alignment is relatively flexible which makes it a great fit for my pragmatic stance and objectives (Thompson Burdine et al., 2021; Thorne, 2016). The exploratory and inductive nature of my research questions also directed me to thematic analysis as the analytic method of choice (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This is a widely used method that allows the researcher to “identify, analyze, and report patterns within data. It minimally organizes and describes the data set in rich detail” but it also “frequently goes further than this and interprets various 57 aspects of the research topic” (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Like interpretive description, thematic analysis can be used across a spectrum of epistemologies. According to Braun and Clarke, the researcher is well advised to make explicit the following six decisions that influence the particular approach to thematic analysis: i. First, one needs to define what qualifies as a theme. For me, a theme is a piece of information that provides important insight into the research question. Here, it was less important to me that this theme be presented a certain number of times but rather that it describes something that will help me answer the question, even if it is only mentioned by one participant. I also aimed to consider rivaling explanations and did not just aim to find themes that would reflect a majority view. ii. Second, the goal of the analysis was a rich description of phenomena across the entire data set rather than in-depth analysis of a specific aspect. iii. Third, while I had defined some guiding suppositions prior to conducting the interviews (see Section 3.3.3), I did not develop a priori themes or codes to which I then matched the data. The suppositions were used more as a way to scope the interview focus areas. My approach to data analysis was thus inductive and the themes generated emerged from and were very close to the data at hand (some were even labeled by using terms that participants themselves used). iv. Fourth, I chose to develop themes on the semantic level which allows for description of the data with a certain degree of interpretation (e.g., to “theorize the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications” (Braun & Clarke, 2006)). v. Fifth, my pragmatic epistemology meant that the primary focus of my thematic analysis was on the description of the experiences and actions of the participants without going too deep into an interpretation of either the underlying personal psychologies (realist paradigm) nor the sociocultural context (constructivist paradigm). vi. Finally, I made an effort to develop themes that went beyond responses to the interview script to inform answers to my overarching research questions. The following section describes in more detail my approach to theme generation. 3.3.7.3 Coding procedures and theme generation I divided my coding procedure into two major stages (Miles et al., 2020). In first cycle coding, I took an inductive approach by going through the data and highlighting anything that seemed interesting and relevant with respect to my research questions. I simultaneously applied concept coding as well as 58 in-vivo coding. Concept coding was helpful in generating overarching ideas and starting to condense the data; in-vivo coding allowed me to use certain terms that participants themselves would use to describe their actions and strategies as there are no definitive, agreed-upon terms that everyone used to describe the same thing (e.g., the term "direct action" was used by one participant to describe protests and other outside tactics of social movements, while other participants labeled the same action as “civil disobedience”, “protesting”, or “activism”, respectively). I went through four iterations of first cycle coding during which codes and their definitions became clearer and more precise. Throughout this process, I maintained a codebook that outlined these definitions and corresponding examples/quotes. I subsequently organized codes that aligned conceptually into categories. For example, I put codes such as “civil disobedience” or “shaping public opinion” into the category “tactics” and codes such as “lack of incentives” or “time commitment” into the category of “barriers”. I now reached a point where it was very clear to me which code and category any text passage would fit and there were no more conflicts about the codes that I had created. At this point, I felt confident to move on to second cycle coding. For second cycle coding, I shifted away from mostly coding to achieve data condensation and started to think more about how categories and codes related to each other and built themes and patterns. For example, this meant that the initial code category of "activism trajectory" (with codes "motivation", "responsibility", "entry pathway", "early career", "end of career", "criticism of academia", "leaving academia", "radicalization", and "red lines") turned into the theme "call to action" which contained codes "motivation", "responsibility", and "criticism of academia". I now understood this theme as the starting point of an activist’s experience and efforts, and I began to conceptualize the thematic map that is presented in the result section of this Chapter. I continued to iteratively review text passages and codes to integrate them in the thematic map in a coherent manner. I developed the thematic map with the goal to show the relationships between themes and how certain factors impact certain actions. This part of the analysis was certainly the most interpretive stage of the analysis along with the organization of actions into strategies, tactics, and tools rather than into one theme of “actions”. I decided that theme saturation was reached when no new codes or themes emerged after iterative reviews of the interviews. I also made sure to consider and include a variety of rivaling explanations to majority views. 3.3.7.4 Rigor Some scholars of qualitative research suggest ways in which the three main criteria internal validity, external validity, and reliability can be met in qualitative research projects (Charmaz & 59 Thornberg, 2021; Miles et al., 2020; Yin, 2017). In Table 3.1, I follow these suggestions and highlight the tactics of rigor and validation that I incorporated in my research methodology. Yin writes that these criteria are more important for explanatory than exploratory studies (Yin, 2017). Nevertheless, I view these criteria as important guideposts to maintain the quality of my research. Criteria Tactic used in this project Phase in which the tactic is addressed Internal validity/ Credibility/Authenticity ✔ Have key informants review draft results ✔ Unify findings (i.e., they are clear, coherent, systematically related as demonstrated by the thematic map) Data analysis, composition External validity/ Transferability/Fittingness ✔ Use replication logic Research design Data analysis Reliability ✔ Use study protocol (see Appendix E) ✔ Maintain a chain of evidence ✔ Assess intra-rater reliability (see below) Data collection Data analysis Table 3.1 Criteria of evaluation To introduce greater reliability to my data analysis, I randomly chose three interviews after I had completed coding the data set and recoded them again three months later using my codebook (and without seeing the initial codes that I had applied). I used NVIVO 14's coding comparison function to measure the intra-rater reliability. The resulting intra-rater agreement was 89% (should ideally be between 85% and 90%, see Miles et al., 2020). It remains important to note that particularly the interpretive portion of my research remains my own interpretation which of course is subject to the lens and viewpoint that I bring to this work. For example, my approach of focusing primarily on strategies vs. individual tools has brought forth knowledge gaps among the participants (as I interpret them) that another researcher who focuses more on other aspects of the KMb literature would not have interpreted as such. Throughout this project, I 60 aimed to remain cognisant of this subjectivity and had frequent exchanges with my supervisory committee to reflect on these potential biases. 3.3.8 Ethics This study was conducted under UBC BREB ethics approval H21-03150. Data was subject to security measures such as encryption and storage on a password protected laptop. My supervisor and I were the only people with access to the data. In accordance with Article 10.2 of TCPS2, agreement to participate in the study was taken as evidence of consent. Before publication of this study, I shared both the interview transcripts as well as the result section with each participant asking for their feedback and giving them the option to either withdraw or change their contributions at these moments. Conversely, participants also had the option to be named as a source should they so choose. For chain referral recruitment, participants were asked not to share names and contact details with me but rather approach the potential candidate and ask them to contact me directly should they be interested. To maintain third party consent, participants were also instructed to omit names and identifying characteristics of individuals who had not given consent to participate during the interview. In general, the anticipated harms associated with participation in this study were minimal as experts were being asked to discuss their publicly known involvement in KMb tactics. However, there is a possibility that some individuals may receive unwelcomed criticism of these activities which may receive more attention due to the publication of this work. I was therefore careful to protect personal information and quoted all participants anonymously. If there were certain characteristics or circumstances that would identify an individual, I chose to exclude this information from my writing and from the quotes. 3.4 Results 3.4.1 Participants Seven of the 17 interviewees were female, three of which identified as racialized; ten interviewees were male, two of which identified as racialized. 13 participants were based in Canada, two in the USA, and two in the UK. Four participants had a background in and/or worked primarily in the natural sciences, seven participants in the social sciences, three in medicine and/or public health, and three in law. Nine participants were full, associate, or assistant professors at the time of the interview, two held an adjunct appointment and primarily worked as a practitioner, one was a teaching professor, one an emeritus professor and practitioner, one was an academic university administrator in a leadership position, and three participants held positions as students, fellows, or associates, respectively. 61 At the time of recruitment, six participants fell into the archetype category (see Figure 2.1) of “insider” applying tactics of elected officials (or running for elected office while holding a senior leadership position in academic administration, a postdoctoral, and adjunct faculty appointment, respectively), civil servants (while on leave from their academic appointment), and lobbying; four were primarily “activists” who participated in social movements and civil disobedience efforts; one participant fell into the “advocacy” category; and three participants were mostly “advisors”. Three participants primarily employed legal tactics (litigation) – one as an “advisor” and two as “advocates”. I made the assignment into a specific archetype category based on the primary activity of the participant. However, most participants also employed tactics of other archetypes but either not as frequently or very intentionally not in their role as an academic (for example, one participant has engaged in community organizing efforts and litigation but says they did so deliberatively as a private citizen, not as an academic). 3.4.2 A conceptual journey of the academic advocate Through the coding procedure described above, I identified several themes that not only condense and describe the data regarding the research questions but also contain a layer of my own interpretation of how these themes are interrelated. These themes illuminate why and how academic advocates try to shape climate-related policies and what factors play a role in these decisions. I present this interrelationship as a conceptual journey, visually represented by a thematic map (see Figure 3.1) meant to guide the subsequent analysis of the interview results. By conceptual, I mean that there is a certain logic in how these themes relate to each other. Several of these factors can happen at the same time or even in reverse chronology from how I present them in the thematic map. Therefore, the arrows in the thematic map are not necessarily a linear reflection of causality but rather express a theoretical, albeit logical order of themes or events that influence or correlate with each other. The solid arrows represent relationships between factors that are close to the data, meaning that these are relationships that participants themselves describe. The dotted arrows represent my interpretation and explanation of relationships between themes. Interrupted arrows mean that there is a lack of relationship between themes that is worth analyzing as this lack may be unexpected or renders an explanation for something observed in the data. 62 Figure 3.1 Thematic map of the conceptual journey of an academic advocate The solid arrows represent relationships between factors that are close to the data, meaning that these are relationships that participants themselves describe. The dotted arrows represent my interpretation and explanation of relationships between themes. Interrupted arrows mean that there is a lack of relationship between themes that is worth analyzing as this lack may be unexpected or renders an explanation for something observed in the data 63 The thematic map corresponds as follows with the research questions: Research question 2: How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? Both the strategy (red) and tactics and tools (pink) fields help to answer this question. Research question 3: What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? This question focuses attention on the challenges/opportunities theme (yellow). Research question 4: Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? The answers to this question live in the call to action (green), the mediators on which the choice of strategy depends (orange), the subjects’ underlying theory of change (blue), and their reflection on efficacy (turquoise). Research question 5: What gaps in their strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist? Answers to this question conceptually live in the disconnect between the gray (literature) and red/pink (strategy and tactics/tools) fields, and I highlight more in my discussion Section. Table 3.2 provides an index for definitions of the individual themes (and the codes therein, if applicable) that I use throughout my discussion of the results, along with a summary of how these themes relate to each research question. This table is intended to be used as a legend to the thematic map and a quick reference guide throughout the presentation of the results. 64 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # Call to action Factors that drive the academic to become an activist Motivation What they care about 4 Sense of responsibility Feeling responsible to help create change Exposure Form of activism and activists that participants have been exposed to, e.g., role models or successful campaigns Criticism of academia Believe that current academic approaches to creating change are insufficient Social standing in the academy Factors on the personal/professional level of the individual that shape their trajectories, approaches, and views of activism Field/discipline Academic background of the participant 3 Job security (No) tenure or similarly secure job (No) privilege Gender, ethnicity, financial safety net Concept of bias and values Viewpoints on what constitutes bias for an academic and what role value systems (should) play in academia and activism n/a n/a 4 Identity How the role/identity of an academic and the role/identity of an activist align (or not); includes reflections on whether it is appropriate to conduct activism efforts with Unionist The identity, roles, and/or efforts of an academic are one and the same as those of an activist 4 Separatist The identity, roles, and/or efforts of an academic are 65 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # academic credential and/or during work hours separate from those of an activist Strategy The overarching strategy that one employs as an activist Information provider The guiding proposition is that the academic does their best to share facts, evidence, research, knowledge with a particular audience (the public, decision-makers, leaders, etc.) and that it is the audience’s responsibility to come to the right conclusions and act upon those; this pathway is generally power neutral; but tactics go beyond academy-typical methods of knowledge dissemination 2 Power navigator The guiding proposition is that power is needed to influence policy-level decisions, this power can be built through an inside or outside approach or both (via different tactics) and the academic actively aims to build this power or navigate power dynamics in order to advance evidence in policy decisions 2 66 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # Theory of change Implicit and explicit explanations about how an activity leads (or doesn’t) to an outcome n/a n/a 4 Facilitators Factors that make it easier for the academic to either engage in activism or that are perceived to make one a more effective activist Build a reputation When one builds a reputation for oneself as an expert/makes a name for themselves; within academic community and beyond 3 Change in academic culture The academic culture is changing and is starting to, if not honor, at least accept activism Courage Whether one has courage plays a role in someone getting involved and staying involved in advocacy/activism Credibility Using the “scientist hat”/one's credibility to open doors, to be a more successful activist or to mitigate potential risks Positive public perception The public perceives academic advocates positively 67 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # Support from others When one receives support and encouragement from others (peers, superiors etc.) for their activism efforts Barriers Factors that make it hard(er) for academics to engage in activism or to be effective activists Academic culture The academic culture does not make room for activism that goes beyond the traditionally sanctioned activities; this is somewhat implicit and doesn’t follow “written rules” 3 Change is slow Creating change in the real world is very slow and requires perseverance Different timelines The timelines and schedules between academia and the real world are different and often don't align. It takes a conscious decision to possibly abandon the academic schedule in order to work within the 68 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # timelines of the outside world Discomfort Activism creates a sense of discomfort (either when done by oneself or by others) Incentive system The incentive system of academia does not honor activism efforts; one may even have to pay significant opportunity costs Industry influence on academia Private corporations apply pressure on universities, e.g. through funding which in turn stifles activism that goes against the interest of these industries 3 Lack of opportunity (systemic) When the system is built in a way that doesn’t allow for bridges to be built between academia and the policy sphere, e.g., in the US it is more normalized for academics to serve as public servants 69 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # and then return to the university, it is not the same in Canada Lack of resources Lack of resources that support activism activities (such as funding) Time commitment Activism takes a lot of time that has to be spent in addition to one's responsibilities as a scholar and often competes with these responsibilities leading to opportunity costs or time away from personal lives University administration University administration/management interferes with/prohibits one's activism University policies University policies that interfere with activism Tactics The kind of power building or truth telling Civil disobedience Intentionally breaking the law in order to create change 2 70 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # activities that people engage with Expert advice Acting as expert advisor to NGOs or government; this includes expert witness, contributing to advisory bodies such as IPCC etc. Frame new ideas Developing new ways to think about an issue or its solutions (e.g., the right to a healthy environment) Litigation and law Using the law or litigation to create change Organizing/campaigning Organizing and campaigning around a target or with the intention to create a movement Partisan Getting involved in partisan political activities, either as a volunteer or elected official Public servant Acting as public servant inside the policy system Shape public opinions/norms Shaping public opinion/norms as 71 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # objective to one’s activism efforts Tools The “things” people do, these can be applied independently of a tactic or strategic pathway or be strategically used to achieve a certain strategic/tactical goal; tools can be used across a variety of tactics Communications Focusing on communication strategies and skills (e.g., graphics, or media training, or social media) 2 Movement support Supporting movements/actors within movements with expertise and other "technical and strategic support" Policy-relevant research Conduct policy-relevant research that is not necessarily curiosity driven but applicable to real world problems Provide solutions Provide actionable solutions to decision makers Relationships Build and maintain relationships with people both on the inside and on the outside of the policy sphere 72 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # Teaching Conceptualizing teaching as a way to create change Teams Building teams to enhance capacity Timing Timing one’s activism efforts strategically Understand policy process Understanding the policy process and legislation in order to identify leverage points Reflections on efficacy Reflections and perceptions on whether one’s activism is or has been successful Optimistic One is generally optimistic about the efficacy of one's activism 4 Questioning One is generally pessimistic or unsure (puzzled) about the efficacy of one's activism Risks The risks one is possibly exposed to when engaging in activism as an academic Career disadvantage Activism results in career disadvantages (or doesn't) 3 Failure Even if one spends a lot of time, effort, other resources on activism, this doesn't mean they will achieve the goal/change; this code 73 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # includes descriptions of failures and reflections on what these failures mean Financial burden Activism results in a financial burden (or not) Perceived as biased One fears or experiences to be perceived as biased by the academic community (or not) Threat to reputation One fears or experiences damage to one's reputation (or not) Threat to wellbeing One fears or experiences a threat to one's wellbeing (or not) Benefits The benefits one possibly reaps from their activism efforts Feels good Activism creates sense of pride, satisfaction, belonging, hope, fulfilment, etc. 3 Friendships Friendships developed through activism activities Reciprocity Research gets better because of activism and vice versa 74 Theme name Theme definition Code(s) Code definition Corresponds to research question # Successful change Achieving the change one wants to see in the world Table 3.2 Definitions of themes and codes and how they correspond to the research questions 75 3.4.2.1 Research question 2 How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? In this section, I provide participants’ descriptions of their activist activities. In line with my conceptualization of strategy, tactics, and tools as an integrated three-layer construct (see definition in 1.4.2), I present the results in two parts: (i) strategy and (ii) tactics/tools. These can be found on the thematic map (Figure 3.1) in the red and pink fields. As this question is framed as “how”, responses err on the side of description of actions. I will provide some reflections and interpretation of these responses in the discussion section, highlighting how they do and do not align with insights about strategy and tactics/tools provided by the existing literature. 3.4.2.1.1 Strategy As shown in Chapter 2, there are two overarching strategic pathways described in two separate bodies of literature in terms of how evidence can be mobilized to affect policy. I call one strategic path that of “power navigators” for whom considerations of power (who has it? who doesn’t have it? how do I get it? how do I use it?) are central. Power navigators do not necessarily have power themselves, but they strategically navigate their activities with power in mind. As such, the two dominant archetypes who fall under this strategic pathway are the insider and the activist. In contrast to the second group of “information providers”, power navigators are willing to engage with power dynamics and find it appropriate to do so as academics. Again, that is not to say that they would not employ tactics such as public outreach but their rationale or theory of change for doing so differs from that of the information providers. Meaning, they do it in order to engage with power dynamics or in order to build power rather than with the “pure” intention of informing their audience. I categorize nine study participants into this group. Here is a reflection of two power navigators on their strategic thinking: “For everything I do, I have articulated a concrete, robust “if…, then…, because” statement; my theories of change… We have them written down. I can go back to them and remind myself. I can hold us accountable to it, I can ask, does it remain the right theory of change? I haven't always done that, and I think I'm better when I do… I’m always guided by the six steps of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. I mean, I can tell you this is shaping opinion, this is framing beliefs, this is setting the agenda, this is building the coalition, now we're making meaning, now I’m changing incentives. But getting to, like, for each initiative that we're deploying within those six steps…have I got a theory of change? I believe I am better and more effective at this work when I go through the steps… I giggle sometimes, when in a busy life, I can fall back into the habits of being intuitive rather than methodical. Taking the time, it takes to articulate that theory of change, so that I can be as succinct as…if we do this, then this will happen because of x. 76 There's such clarity there when we do it. So, I didn't want to lose that. I confess I’m not being that intentional all the time, but I’m better when I am.” – Participant #10 “And then the other is around creating salience around an issue which I think is really key. Make it a problem so that a decision maker feels that they have to take action to address that problem. If it's just in the background, they can get away with ignoring it. And you know, if you can make it a hot potato through creating a scene about it, if necessary, you know, so it's constantly in the front of mind… that people will start kind of worrying about it, that they stop, maybe even think about voting differently because of it. That's how I think we can to a large extent kind of force this up the political agenda to the point where policy decisions start being made in the right direction. That's probably how I think about it, anyway.” – Participant #1 The second group are the “information providers” (n=7) [one participant did not agree to be recorded, and interview notes were not detailed enough to come to a valid conclusion on their strategic approach]. Individuals in this group still have a very complex understanding of the policy system, including the role of power, but they feel that it is not appropriate to engage with it in a way that aims to build or navigate power. They rather come to it from a power neutral stance. Here are some reflections on their roles and actions as information providers: “Like, for example, when I was a research scientist. You know, there's sort of that role you play. You walk into the room, you've got your scientists hat, I'm just going to give you all the information and you can sort of do with it as you please.” – Participant #2 “In earlier days in my life, I was like, oh, the PhD is the expert, I can be the hero of the story, and I'll go knock on the doors and point out hey, by the way, you know, evidence says you should be doing this and you're actually doing that. Let's change that so that you get better results.” – Participant #10 “So, I’ve always just kind of gone with my gut feeling about what is an important message at that time, and even though it's often unpopular and often I’m the only one, talking about it… I still go with it. So, we'll see… I’m endlessly naive about how to make change in the world.” – Participant #11 “My position is that policy decisions rely both on questions of fact - what is the risk? What can we do about it? What's it going to cost? Where are the impacts on the economy? - those are factual questions. And on values - what's important to us? Do we want to spend that much money? How much risk is acceptable? For whom is that distribution of risks reasonable in a democratic society? And as an academic, I have that expertise on the factual questions. When media call me up, it's because of that. But there is no reason to believe that my values are more important than anyone else’s. There's no reason to expect that I should have more say on those questions of values than any other citizen and, in fact, the people who are elected, are the ones who are accountable for the value judgments.” – Participant #7 77 3.4.2.1.2 Tactics and tools Tactics and tools are the activities carried out as described by the participants. I make a distinction between tactics (the ways in which a strategy is implemented) and tools (what is used to get it done). The description of the activities is based on information shared with me by the participants; however, the conceptualization of the categories is primarily based on my understanding and interpretation of the literature, refined through insights from the interviews. Power navigators are more likely to engage in tactics of the insider, activist, or advocate archetypes (see conceptual framework in 2.6). Information providers tend to employ tactics of the advisor or advocate archetype. Table 3.3 gives an overview of which tactics align with which strategy, along with the corresponding archetypes from my conceptual framework as described in 2.6. Strategic pathway: Information provider Tactics Expert advice Advisor Archetypes Inform the public Advocate Frame new ideas Advocate Litigation Advisor Tactics Strategic pathway: Power navigator Archetypes Partisan Insider Public servant Insider Lobbying Insider Shape public opinion Activist Organizing/campaigning Activist Civil disobedience Activist Litigation Insider/activist Table 3.3 Strategies and corresponding tactics and archetypes Below are some descriptions by participants of their tactics. Note how the reflections in these quotes on the tactics point at the different strategic pathways (information provider to power navigator) as well as 78 the spectrum from outside to inside tactics. As I understand it, the first four quotes are representative of the information provider approach. Here, participants signal a tactic of sharing knowledge, evidence, or ideas but refrain from further engaging with power dynamics. Specific lines that point at this interpretation are, for example: “So, you do a report, and you submit it as evidence on their behalf, and then that evidence gets taken into account in the process.” Or “it’s an idea-mediated theory of change in which there is a close connection between ideas and practice”. The subsequent quotes support a strategic approach that goes beyond truth telling/advising. For example, when the participant states “I believe that nothing will happen unless we create that critical mass”, they signal that they understand power dynamics that go beyond “rational, good ideas”. On expert advice (information provider): “I’ve worked with Indigenous communities representing them in hearing processes like National Energy Board hearings on pipelines or environmental assessment hearings on major projects as an expert witness, and that is in the public realm. So, you do a report, and you submit it as evidence on their behalf, and then that evidence gets taken into account in the process.” – Participant #16 On informing the public (information provider): “I think that first of all, there is a job of getting information out beyond the academy and beyond people who read journals. So, the public needs to know. And that's the point of good journalism and media communications and all the rest of it. And, I mean, one of my weaknesses is, I don't have social media. I’m not on Facebook and Twitter. And I don't do them partly because I don't like them, partly because I’m busy enough as it is, I don't need another two or three layers to add on. But… and, of course, when you do provide information to the public, it does motivate some people to look at something, get involved, take action.” – Participant #17 On framing new ideas (information provider): “There is a very simple distinction between two types of impacts, right? So, you can have the impact on policies and practices, and you can have impact on ideas, on how people see the world, be they policymakers, or the general public, or one person whose mindset you want to impact, or a key decision maker, or a funder. And this theory of change very much revolves around the belief that ideas matter, and that in conditions of uncertainty, especially when it comes to complex problems like climate, that having timely interventions that offer specific solutions and make clear cases for certain alternatives to regulation or to public policy interventions, or to the creation of new norms at the international level, that that in turn will end up changing the material status quo. So that’s, you know, it’s an idea-mediated theory of change in which there is a close connection between ideas and practice.” – Participant #4 On litigation (as an advisor; information provider): 79 “We aim to affect policy by challenging existing policy, or challenging gaps in existing legal frameworks, right? So, I'll give you a couple of examples from Brazil. So, we're supporting a number of pioneer lawsuits against the Brazilian Government and Brazilian corporations on climate… the lack of investment of the foreign aid funds that the Bolsonaro government has received, and he's decided - because he is intent on destroying the Amazon, basically – so, he decided to sit on millions of dollars rather than use them for the purposes that they have been donated, which is to increase and strengthen environmental protection in the Amazon region. So, a bunch of local groups took the government to court. They reached out to us and said, well, can you help us out with kind of international law argument about why the court should step in and against the government. So, that case went forward, the plaintiff won about a month ago. And our contribution, they say, did make a difference.” – Participant #4 On partisan activities (power navigator): “I thought well, here's a party that somebody with some experience could probably be very helpful in shaping. And professionalize the activities of that party and so, in my free time… Then I ran for this elected position, so it's my first time being elected to something. So now, since about six months ago I’ve been volunteering for this. So, I am involved with the party in that way, explicitly in a partisan fashion, which is really weird for me...But I made that decision for an intentional reason.” – Participant #2 On public service (power navigator): “So, I've operated in two quite distinct environments, both as an academic at a university and of course I was on leave for about 15 years from university. And during that period, I would go work in senior positions in government actually developing policy and implementing policy and legislation. Working in the government world is distinct and can only be done…it can’t be done in conjunction with being in the academic world, so that's an either or: being an academic working in university versus working in government. I mean, academics can bring a lot to the table in terms of policy and decision-making. You know, bringing in somebody from the outside, into a large government organization, the set of ideas can stimulate a lot of advancement in the way things are done. So, I'd say almost every innovative thing that we did in government during that period…and I wasn't the only outside academic, there were a few of us…came from those people. New approaches to land use planning, collaboration, consensus building, you know, climate change policy etc. So, it had a huge effect.” – Participant #16 On lobbying (power navigator): “I mean we had a lot of meetings with decision makers essentially as unpaid lobbyists. I was a paid lobbyists to the Canadian Medical Association as well for a couple of years. I think relationships…basically, people make change when they trust you. And they trust you once you have a relationship with them, so I believe relationships are absolutely essential. There was also a Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives report in which they analyzed lobbying records and showed that oil lobbyists are essentially out lobbying the environmental movement by like 4:1 or 5:1 and I think that's really important. You know, one of my goals is to change this ratio. If every physician in Canada goes to meet with their decision maker, we can easily change that ratio. And I think that matters.” – Participant #3 80 On shaping public opinion (power navigator): “So, I think I believe that nothing will happen unless we create that critical mass and public opinion. We can do this again, using myself, my educational platform, my work with media, and all that. But yes, as I said in the beginning, also working directly with politicians, policymakers, and generating and providing them those recommendations, that's still very important work to do. But politicians have this seventh sense. They know if they can get elected by not doing the work, they will not do any work. So, it has to be together. We have to feed them the rational, good ideas and decisions, but they also have to feel the pressure coming from the public opinion.” – Participant #8 On organizing/campaigning (power navigator): “And to me the real political and social change is all about organizing, right, it's all about the back end more than anything else. And it's not about the ideas. The ideas are important, and the narratives are important, but most of what's important is like getting people to talk to each other and to come to understanding and then to do a little bit more with their, you know, very constrained time and energy. And that's not what academics do. Ever. I mean, there's some stuff that happens, I think, but yeah to me that's not…But that's the core for me of political and social change that's where it comes from. The organizing that leads to a building of a political force.” – Participant #6 On civil disobedience (power navigator): “It's much more acceptable to be lobbying than it is to be getting arrested. But that's true not only if you're a scientist, that's true across the board, right? So, to be in a position where I am being arrested, I think that is still socially quite shocking, and that's good. Because that's partly why I did it. Because I want to shock people and make them think well, why is he so driven to do this? And if I’m trying to say, look, I'm doing this because I can't think of anything else that can get the message across clearly enough about how urgent the need for action is, and how the governments are refusing to do what's required, even though they make all these grand promises that they're following the science and everything, and to kind of just say, look, I’m a scientist, I understand what the science is, and the government is lying to you about the fact that they are in line with scientific targets. I can communicate that I think most effectively through walking the talk. And that means putting my body on the line in this case. Now, yeah, the shock value of that, I guess, is partly what makes it effective. And so, you know, maybe that's a problem again, within activism is that you have to keep escalating, you know. And there is this kind of tendency to kind of have to push, because people become socially accustomed to seeing, you know, more disrupted acts. And then you have to do a little bit more to get in the paper the next time, you know, and I think that's again what we've seen throughout history and other forms of disruptive protests.” – Participant #1 On litigation (as an activist; power navigator): “There’s all this research on how international law matters. What it says is that it is not the actual mechanism of implementation of the Convention itself, but it's how social movements will use the Convention as a rhetorical device. It’s because it also has an agenda setting function. 81 And it also takes on a life of its own through bureaucratic implementation procedures. So, basically, I’m using the symbolic power of this Convention and I’m using the law as a sort of powerful institution that, at least in some context, is compelling.”- Participant #13 Most participants will employ a primary tactic that is in line with their identity of academic and activist (separatist vs. unionist) and therefore with their overarching strategy (power navigator vs. information provider). But they also combine tactics of either strategic pathway (e.g., their primary tactic is giving expert advice, but they may also be involved in some form of organizing/campaigning). However, these different tactics are not always integrated into an overarching strategy but rather present somewhat coincidental developments, as this participant describes: “This little neighbourhood environmental group [omitting name to protect anonymity] which is really a bunch of neighbours and then I was a friend of one of them, several academics in the mix. But like, a half dozen people were the group, and then you know, we had like a mailing list. But there were no members, and it had spoken up on carbon taxes… And so, I don't know, I somehow got invited in to be part of the board.” – Participant #7 But there are also participants who have a very complex strategic integration of a variety of tactics. Here is one example: “So, the first step that I follow is like, how do we use the evidence to make meaning of what's going on around people to show that there is socioeconomic change, or some sort of disruption, and then articulate the evidence about that disruption in a way that attracts their values… And then in step 2, you do that all in order to shape public opinion, broadly speaking, because if you can have public opinion writ large on your side, that's a kind of power. And then more intentionally start to frame people's beliefs about problems and policy solutions – that is step 3. Step 4 is you then take some of those solutions and put them into an agenda, something really concrete. Oftentimes this is a hard step for me. As like, there’s not just one policy lever we need to pull. There's like thirty all at once. But an agenda probably needs three or four things that we're going to prioritize. So that's step 4. Set that agenda. And, then build a coalition around it. Now it's not all public. It's like a subset, but you got the power of diffusely spread opinion that you're now harnessing with hopefully thousands that you can wrap around your agenda, so that’s step 5. And then you get to step 6. I'm going to marshal the evidence and the values – step 1 – alongside the public opinion – step 2 – people's, beliefs, framed beliefs about solutions – step 3 – that I then prioritize into the agenda – step 4. I built the person power in my coalition, and these are all tools I can use in step 6 to go and change the incentives to which decision makers respond… And so, you ask, well, who are you making meaning of the evidence for in the light of their values? Well, when I'm on step 2, I'm like, okay, what’s the broad public opinion? What’s a key set of values for this Canadian constituency? But we kind of go after, you know, like, the big conversations of the day. If you start to then say, oh, later on, I need to build a coalition. So, who's my choir that I can harness most quickly to get excited by that coalition? And what are 82 their values? And how do we use those to make meaning of the evidence? And, like, get them because the ask of them is a higher bar. It's a higher level of engagement. I need you to like, you know, opt in for something, and be willing to stand for something to make the compromises to like…uh, it’s not perfect but I’m willing to be part of this. And then, later on, when you get more to step 6, it's like, okay, now I'm thinking who are the decision makers that I'm needing to change the incentives for. They're going to be easier to interpret because they're typically aligned with a party that's going to have more expressly stated values, often in a platform. What are those values? What have they said in mandate letters? Accordingly, you bring that out. And now I'm actually going in a much narrower way to like, what do they care about? And how does the evidence align with what they care about? And how can we get them to lean in accordingly? And how can we show them that we're tapping to things that matter to them from a values perspective and then is actually helpful for them because their success as decision-makers will be supported by public opinion, supported by being seen to be responding to a constituency that has evidence on its side. And so, it all comes together in those six steps.” – Participant #10 At the level of tools, all participants, independent of their strategic pathway, showed a lot of skill and integrated thinking. They would employ a variety of tools and usually think about how one action would support another. As an example, one participant describes how they became aware of a policy that was failing due to a loophole in the process of moving the issue to parliament, then met with a decision maker to provide them with (or co-develop) a possible solution to closing that loophole, contributed to the political cover needed, and later harnessed an existing relationship with an MP to encourage a private member’s bill: “I had been documenting the [omitting the issue and reflection of policy process to protect anonymity]. I went to an MP, who was on the Environmental Parliamentary Committee. And I said, help! And he's like, well, isn't this kind of against the law? And I’m like yeah. And he was like, what do you want to do about it? And I was like, well, I was hoping you would do something about it. You know, this kind of insightful, oh, we both don't know what to do about it. Let's figure out what should happen. But you know, it was nice to…he was shocked that this was happening, and then the Environment Minister was using their weasel words to get out of actually doing their job at the time. So, I think that his reaction helped me go, oh, actually he needs press. So, we talked about do we need op-eds on this, and news articles, do we need to blow this up? And he's very much yes, I can ask on the legal route, but yes, this needs to be out in the open. So, that was very helpful. It wasn't until Harper was out of government that an MP [name omitted to uphold anonymity], did a private member's bill that closed that loophole. And that’s relationship building. He used to be a naturalist who I knew from his days [omitting to protect anonymity]. So, it's just continually checking in and keeping in touch with them.” – Participant #14 The focus on communication skills via media outlets was particularly clear in most participants’ 83 descriptions: “And what I would put in the centre of it is working with media. And by media, I mean the traditional, mainstream media, reporting, which I still believe has a lot of power as the fourth branch of our governance. But also, all other kind of allied media channels. Through social media. Direct communication in townhall formats, for example. So, I think this is where we have a lot of areas where people can find good work to do right, so depending on where you are more comfortable. In public speaking, engaging one-on-one with people in small groups, community meetings and town halls where you are better to generate really good messages, key points for media release, and then speaking to the media to tell the story.” – Participant #8 The tools-level, and particularly around science communication is also where participants would most likely seek formal training: “I would encourage them [emerging academics] to get media training. That was really invaluable to me, I did this like two-day intensive thing. We did like, they televised little interviews with us, I mean it was really fantastic.” – Participant #7 “Honestly, I got my Twitter account because we were doing science communications training and the guy there, he was like, if you're not on Twitter, you don't exist.” – Participant #15 “Through that training we wrote a policy brief and presented it to an MP and I’ve now done many policy briefs after that training, so I think that was useful.” – Participant #15 Another tool that several participants employ is collaboration. More specifically, collaboration with and support for non-academic groups such as NGOs. For some participants, this is a way to gain access to the policy community via organizations that are already established. Others believe that their credibility as a scientist will strengthen the partner organization or movement. Conversely, others caution the academic to clearly define their role within the organization or movement and remain in the role of the objective advisor. Participants who have engaged in collaborations consistently feel that it strengthened their academic work. “We almost never do anything alone by ourselves. We do legal actions in partnerships. In partnership with NGOs, social movements, or key public officials. And the ideas are chosen very much in the process of collaborating and engaging with those various actors. So, collaboration and anticipation kind of helps us filter out other alternative ideas and alternative uses of our time.” – Participant #4 “There's a last kind of step from that as well, which is showing, publicly that there are scientists within the movement, and that we are part of the solidarity of the movement. So, you know, being very clear. So, taking on more spokes people kind of roles. You know, when we do actions, 84 we do it very visibly as scientists, but also as part of the movement in general, and, you know, linking our name to the cause, and so on, right?” – Participant #1 “The challenge there is not to become kind of a spokesperson for the movement but to remain independent or semi-autonomous. And that makes for difficult conversations, sometimes, because some of those movement, not all of them, and many movements are incredibly sophisticated about the division… they don't want you to sign their statement, because they know that they will tarnish your independence and your potential. So, but some will expect you to be fully behind them and in my book, that's where the line needs to be drawn. Well, if I do that a) I don't agree with the language of the framing and b) I have no idea about the specific topic that you're writing about or protesting about and c) even for strategic reasons, I shouldn't be appearing as if I was the lawyer for the movement and you’re my client. Because then that's the end of any semblance of independence and any keeping of the boundaries of the academic world. But again. It's like the gray zone is huge, and I think that progress proceeds through mistakes.” – Participant #4 Building and maintaining relationships as a tool is also given importance by several participants as described here: “It didn’t happen until [MP’s name omitted to protect anonymity] did a private member's bill that closed that loophole. And that’s relationship building. He used to be a colleague who I knew from his days working with [name of workplace omitted to protect anonymity]. So, it's just continually checking in and keeping in touch with them.” – Participant #14 “I just reached out to people that were running locally. I was like, hey, I just want you to know who I am, I just arrived in [name of place omitted to protect anonymity], and I do [description of work omitted to protect anonymity] work and can we have a coffee? And so, I think that built relationships. The key is to cultivate those relationships before you need something. You don't want to do it when you need something, you want them to already know who you are before you need something, right?” – Participant #2 The fourth most commonly referred to tool was timing one’s activities strategically: “So, the election cycle gives us those moments where the public opinion and the framing of the strengths and weaknesses of party responses to evidence can be influential. That means that those of us wanting to do KMb well not only need to respond to the academic time frames such as grant application cycles. We need to do that, and then add to it the electoral cycle, it's a moment. Or I would dare say the budget cycle…seven, eight months in advance of a budget coming out, that's actually when policymakers are actually going and asking for advice about what should happen. And I think those of us who are better at making the world of politics work with more of an insider game, you need to be out four or five, six, seven months in advance, talking to officials of the Finance Ministry. They are kind of the gatekeepers to those other policy ideas coming in and getting into a budget. So, you've got those cycles that you can prepare you activities around.” – Participant #10 85 Additional tools mentioned by a minority of participants were conducting policy relevant research, providing solutions, teaching as a tool to share information and motivate action, and working in multidisciplinary teams – all tools that are employed by many academics beyond this sample who follow a conventional KMb approach. 3.4.2.2 Research question 3 What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? Answers to this question are located in the challenges/opportunities theme of the thematic map (yellow field). These are factors that academic advocates encounter as they conduct their activism; these factors might be of a systemic or a more personal nature. Conceptually, these factors appear once participants are engaged in activism activities as opposed to mediators which are factors in the personal and professional lives of participants that come before the engagement and shape the choice of strategy. In this group, I include two themes: barriers and facilitators, and risks and benefits. In this particular sample, I found that neither the barriers nor the risks were deterrents from being engaged in activism nor did they prompt a change in strategy, tactics, or tools among participants. Several facilitating factors were described as a way to overcome barriers while risks can be mitigated by benefits or are simply tolerated as part of the work. 3.4.2.2.1 Barriers and facilitators I present the frequency of mentions of barriers and facilitators in Table 3.4 to give an idea of the relevance of the individual factors in this sample of academic advocates. The most frequently described barriers all lie within the academic system – the significant time commitment to activism does not align with the lack of incentives for such activities. And even though there are pockets within academia where this is changing, the overall culture within the academy also does not foster activism. Interestingly, only one participant explicitly laments a lack of resources and funding to conduct activism activities. Here are some examples of how participants describe these barriers: On time commitment: 86 “I mean it's a hindrance in the sense that it takes a lot of time, and that means I’m, you know, not publishing as much as I would. A hundred interviews and a half dozen op-eds a year is a big chunk of my time. And it's not recognized in the sense that, you know…it varies by department. In my department it’s 50% research, 40% teaching, 10% service, this would be in service for the most part. It takes time, a lot of it just means I work seven days a week. But, you know, it also means I’m less likely to get merit pay in a given year. I…that's my choice.” – Participant #7 On incentive system: “In fact, none of what I'm talking about is rewarded by the university. And it’s because your time is being consumed doing this, as opposed to what the university traditionally considers important like producing academic papers. So, there is a cost to all of these activities. So, they're not rewarded, and I would say, sometimes they're actually discouraged… But you know, as I said, maybe...there is certainly no upside from the university’s perspective, in university metrics, to go out and be an advocate. There’s really no upside and there’s a lot of potential pitfalls and downsides. It’s a structural problem of how the system is organized and the way rewards are provided. So, for example: This legislation that we developed was adopted and passed by the House of Commons. So, in my performance review – every two years, you submit all this evidence of what you’ve accomplished – and I, of course, I would put this in, and it received zero credit whatsoever. If it was an academic article published in a journal, it would have been great. But here, you have a piece of legislation that you developed that's been adopted by and passed by the House of Commons and become a law of Canada and still it receives zero credit. So, there's something wrong with the performance systems, the systems that are in place when that kind of activity receives no awards.” – Participant #16 On academic culture: “And so sometimes you get advice saying, you know, if you really want to get ahead, you're gonna have to put in more hours or whatever. And I said, well, that's not really how I want to use this knowledge that I'm producing. I don't see the point of just producing more and more papers if they're never going to get used. So, you know, for me, public engagement work and ultimately activism as a form of public engagement became a really important way of actually helping communicate science and be a scientist in society, and so on. So, yes, I think that's a real dilemma, and I think, unless we kind of look at work allocation, unless we look at hiring practices, unless we look at, you know, social expectations within academic institutions, we are not going to see this mass awakening of scientific activism I would like to see.” – Participant #1 While this may not be true for every academic advocate beyond this sample (more on that in the limitations section), participants describe barriers as making the activism aspect of their work harder, but they do not deter participants from conducting the activities in the first place. 87 Participants further describe facilitators that help in navigating and overcoming certain barriers. For example, many participants would describe that building a reputation as an expert (mostly via conventional academic activities) on a certain subject was both helpful to maintain their status and respect at the university. Others reflected that the reputation also helped open doors for their activism (such as being contacted for interviews, etc.). One’s credibility as an academic frequently gets used strategically to be more effective as an activist. Support from others is described as a safety net to mitigate potential risks of one’s activism and as an encouragement to keep going. Only one participant describes strategically referring to their university’s strategic plan as cover for their activism activities. Here are some examples of how participants view these facilitators: Building a reputation is described as a “shield” that will protect someone from critics: “The foundation of your science communication is the published paper. I still think this is a really good way to do it as an early career person when you really don't know what you're doing and you're really early on. You know, get that published paper first, that is your shield now, because if people are like ‘you suck’, you can say, well, the journal sucks, too, then because I published. You're following the process.” – Participant #7 While most participants would describe university metrics as a barrier, one participant describe using their university’s strategic plan intentionally to justify their activism efforts: “I regularly turn to my university’s strategic plan to justify my devoting an extensive amount of my scholarly time to KMb. My university’s strategic plan describes research excellence as not only the creation of new knowledge, but also its application for impact. Application for impact takes a lot of time, as the KMb literatures reveal. So, I am deeply appreciative that I can account for my time in my annual departmental reports by referring back to the details of the university’s strategic plan.” – Participant #10 The positive public perception of scientists may function as a justification to get involved in activism despite opposing norms in one’s academic environment: “There is some research that's been done…that suggests that, actually, this sort of stereotype I’ve outlined of the nerdy scientist who doesn't get involved in things is not what the public necessarily wants to see from their scientists and their experts. So, the public is actually quite happy or wants the people who know about this stuff to at least be advocates.” – Participant #12 Likewise, support from others is valuable when navigating criticism from within the academic community: “So, you know, having each other's backs, supporting each other in solidarity, is really key to helping us overcome that part of the barrier [referring to criticism from academic community 88 and threat to one’s wellbeing].” – Participant #1 Similarly, a change in academic culture is perceived as slowly bringing down the barriers within: “Also, going back to that first wave of Extinction Rebellion… It was weird, actually. After it happened, there was all these posters kicking around the place, and flyers and stuff. And on our floor, they all started appearing. People started putting them up in their offices, and it became, I’m not gonna say normal, but it certainly… there was safety in numbers, everyone was putting them up. I remember being in a meeting once with one of the professors... And the professor, who doesn't do this stuff, asked ‘how did the weekend go?’ And this one person said ‘oh, well, I was arrested’. And the professor was like ‘oh, well, join the club’… So again, not like ‘well done’. But yeah, whatever, I know what everyone's doing. So, I think that helped. It was a bit more normal.” – Participant #12 And finally, this participant reflects that having courage is helpful in navigating barriers and risks to activism: “I have learned over time, that people will censor your efforts, but they also respect courage. So, they will be scared when you do stuff. They may even say something about it to you, but there's a part of them that is like, wow, like, that takes some guts, and they do respect you for it. And I had a few people come up and say that to me explicitly, but I certainly know that I feel that way about other people watching them take risks.” – Participant #3 One facilitator (credibility) was described as making one’s activism perceivably more effective (and is thus used strategically): “I think the academic status; I think the legal expertise… I think that makes a huge difference. You know, if I say, ‘what you're doing is wrong’. Or if I say, ‘what you're doing is a violation of international treaty’ - there's a huge difference in how it's received by some people.” – Participant #13 “I think it is, it remains something I feel obliged, because I feel empowered, like, it's harder to disqualify me with the degree…you're like, okay, you don't agree with this analysis, give me your counterpoint... Who are you going to believe? The developer, like the lobby organization for developers, or an academic? And I totally play off that.” – Participant #10 Barrier # of participants Facilitator # of participants Time commitment 10 Build a reputation as an expert 7 Incentive system 8 Use credibility as an academic 5 89 Barrier # of participants Facilitator # of participants Academic culture 7 Change in academic culture 5 Different timelines (academia vs politics) 4 Support from others (peers, supervisors) 4 Industry influence on universities 3 Courage 3 Discomfort 2 Positive public reception 2 Lack of opportunity (because the system is not built for it) 2 University strategic plans 1 University administrators/management 2 Change is slow 1 Lack of resources 1 University policies 1 Table 3.4 Number of mentions of barriers and facilitators to activism 3.4.2.2.2 Risks and benefits The conversation about being an academic advocate would not be complete if I didn’t explore associated risks and benefits. As presented in the introduction to this Chapter, there are prominent and not so prominent examples of academics who have had to pay great professional and personal costs for their activism, but this might not be as ubiquitous as one might think. While some participants of this study have had setbacks, all of them continue to engage in their activism activities, despite the risks. The most commonly mentioned potential risk was a threat to one’s well-being, followed by threat to one’s reputation and career disadvantages. Fewer participants worried about being perceived as biased or suffering financial burden and only one participant mentioned the risk of failure but framed this as an opportunity to learn from. Although these risks exist across the board, they seem to be more elevated for efforts that are more confrontational such as civil disobedience. Here are some renditions to describe these experiences: 90 “So, we were all held for the maximum twenty-four hours, and that's after several hours glued to a window, and then a couple of hours in a van, so they only start the clock when you get to the station. So that was pretty stressful, really, even though I knew kind of what was coming… to be locked in a room on your own, with no hygiene, and not knowing what's going to happen. No window effectively, so I didn't know if it was night or day. No watch or anything. It's not nice at all. I mean, I think I was okay. I know that one of the other people who was arrested with us really did struggle. She had kind of a lot of… I don't know if she had panic attacks, but she was, she was very anxious and upset through it. They also sort of pulled us out in the middle of the night to be interviewed, and we had quite a long barrage of interrogation. It was anxiety provoking as well, because there was clearly some stuff coming from up high. We did have lawyers set up. And so that was okay. But yeah, it wasn't nice at all. And then you get released the next day, and you’re kind of a bit dazed, and then you've been given a… so we were charged with criminal damage.” – Participant #12 “Develop a thick skin, it can be really nasty. You know, I’ve gotten nasty anonymous phone calls left in the middle of the night on my office phone. There have been anonymous packages mailed to me at my university. And that's like nothing compared to what, you know, environmental activists and Indigenous activists are dealing with, it’s just a teeny tiny nothing but it's shocking. Like, we think peer review is tough. Like, the world of politics is mean. And no holds barred, and so that's been kind of hard.” – Participant #7 Interestingly, while the fear of career disadvantages and damaged reputation is often high in the discourse about scientist activists, it seems to be relatively benign among my participants. An initial thought might be because participants have relative job security, however, this assumption does not hold true in this sample. The actual career disadvantage among my participants comes in the form of opportunity costs such as these: “Yeah… And here I feel a little bit, you know, I feel a bit vulnerable talking about it sometimes. I am definitely a type A personality. I want to be, you know, like so many of us are, I want to be viewed as being excellent in all aspects of my professional work. And you're talking to someone who's definitely been at [omitting university to protect anonymity] long enough to have applied for full professorship and has intentionally not for two reasons. One, I haven't organized my career to have a CV that would be a straightforward case. And two, the time to put in arguing for it to go forward successfully would distract me from the time I actually want to make real change in the world. But there are moments when I'm like, ugh, that kind of sucks. Like, it's a bit embarrassing.” – Participant #10 The most severe manifestation of this risk among my participants is this person’s experience: Participant: “I’ve had grants that have been rejected because I’m ‘too much of an activist’ and not enough of a scientist; multiple grants rejected for that reason. But then other people really value that I’m trying to make change and do the science, so it's a total mixed bag.” Me: “The 91 rejection of the grants, was that transparent to you? Was that actually something that they said?” Participant: “Oh yeah, it was literally “they are an activist, not a scientist”. Despite the fact that I published the first documented quantitative evidence on [omitting to protect anonymity] in North America and published in Science, like what other journals do you need? And I have a book in Princeton University Press, like, I literally could not make my CV more scientific.” – Participant #15 It seems that my participants have actually been spared – for the most part – the feared repercussions. But, as this participants states, this may depend on one’s social standing in the academy: “So, personally, I haven't had a situation where I think it's been a problem. But that's probably because of my own very specific circumstances. I’ve got a reasonably understanding manager. I don't know whether the higher echelons of the university know about what I’m up to or not. I’ve never had to deal with any kind of slack like that. My main experience has been a kind of slightly puzzled ‘what was that about’ and then followed by a ‘well, well done to you’ sort of thing. Fair play, anyway. In fact, for the most part, I think when people I work with have interacted with me on this, and that might be people who are senior to me or whatever, it's tended to be a kind of a mumbled ‘well, well done, I don't trust them either’…” – Participant #12 The damage to one’s reputation or attempts to be discredited were also described in less extreme ways than I had anticipated: “I have had some folks who are trying to undermine climate policy, you know, lobbyists for the fossil fuel industry, tweet about like what my kids do. You know, my daughter worked for an environmental group… or somebody has occasionally called [a large public broadcaster] and told them that my daughter worked for an environmental group. So, people try to discredit academics if they don't like what you're saying, but not much. Yes, not really, it hasn't been a big thing.” – Participant #7 And finally, only one participant mentioned the risk of failure of their KMb activities in their interview, and they actually framed it as an opportunity to improve: “What I've learned is that movements are built through wins, like, you need to actually do stuff and in order to do stuff you need to accept the risk of failure. And I think that's why people don't do this. You know, like who likes to risk failure. But as Marshall [Ganz] says, like, reading about riding a bike is not the same as getting on a bike and risking failure picking your feet up putting them on the pedals and seeing what happens…What I’ve found is that we need to really exclusively acknowledge the risk of failure and really frame that as learning. You know, because when I look at everything, we've accomplished whether it's, you know, divestment or coal power phase out, or what have you, we didn't usually win the first time.” – Participant #3 92 Participants reflect on a number of beneficial factors that help mediate or offset potential risks. First, having actual success in creating the change one wants to see is undoubtedly a benefit to activism activities and several participants can indeed give examples for their successes: “That was like a dream delivery service for moving knowledge into action in the world of politics: Here's the evidence, here's a constituency, here is good framing, for, you know, your news conference, and we can kind of supply you with the ability to show that you were responding to a group calling for change. That was just a lovely textbook example of what various political theories would say we ought to be doing.” – Participant #10 “We did the thing where I was testifying in parliament. Myself and another fellow, we wrote a paper, the paper we gave to the committee that was doing a study on [omitted to protect anonymity]. We advocated very intensely for some policy things, they ended up in the law, it was awesome, like it was totally the best-case scenario of how scientists can like literally do science, engage in an explicit process that is there, that the government works on when they’re doing laws and then to directly draw a direct line between things that we said and things that you saw in the law. That was probably the clearest policy influence story that I can tell you about.” – Participant #2 “What I have done in the past is one-on-one meetings with a government representative many, many times. And sometimes those meetings have had an impact. For example, to give you one specific example: When we won this big lawsuit against [omitted to protect anonymity], I had a number of meetings on how to implement and translate the court's orders into actual policies and programs. And I met, you know, a number of times with the Minister of Environment to try to hash out an implementation plan. So that's the type of one-on-one meetings that I felt most comfortable with.” – Participant #4 “We actually drafted legislation that was attached to the report that outlined in clear detail a system for developing sustainable development strategies and with a piece of legislation that was about eight or nine pages long. And so, it's hard to say, hey, you gotta do good, you should implement some legislation. We actually provide legislation and lo and behold, the Canadian government looked at it and they said, yeah, this is great. They took what we had produced, and they passed it in the House of Commons unanimously. In fact, it was the only piece of legislation that's probably ever been passed unanimously, and it became the federal Sustainable Development Act. And I just use that as an illustration of what is effective strategy.” – Participant #16 One benefit unique to academic advocates (compared to non-academics) is that they describe a reciprocity between their activism and their academic work. In fact, all of my participants stated that they are better at their academic job precisely because they were engaged in various forms of advocacy and activism: 93 “I think I belong to the camp that’s mostly been lucky to be in a kind of in a positive sum relationship between my academic work and my practice. So, you refer to some of your participants saying the same. I definitely would say, if I have to - of course I haven't done this accounting precisely. But if I had to say, well, has this benefited my academic work and my practice, I would say yes, that I wouldn't have had as much impact on either front had it not been for the effort to connect one thing with another.” – Participant #4 “I wouldn't have done the same science because it wouldn't have been ‘what questions do they need answered? Let's work back from there.’ And so, you were saying other researchers often find their own research is motivated and inspired by their policy work, and I think that that's true once you switch what drives your questions.” – Participant #14 The final two beneficial factors are ubiquitous across activists – academic or not. Advocacy and activism can lead to friendships, as this participant discovered: “And one outcome of this work was also to connect with a lot of local, passionate people here that I had no idea they lived in my town. And I connected with these people who are probably going to be my friends forever. We meet almost every other day or so, and it's like amazing to find like minded people.” – Participant #8 And finally, and very importantly, standing up for what one believes in creates a sense of agency, fulfillment, hope, and satisfaction: “For me it's fulfilling. The people who do these things… it's not because they have to do it but because it is important, it is meaningful.” – Participant #13 “Someone said to me recently: “do you regret it? Do you think you’ll do it again?”. And I don't regret it, I mean I didn't know all the ins and outs of what happened, and there's no way of predicting that. But I don't regret it. I think I’m glad I did it, and I think I did the right thing, even though it is, even though I’d rather it still went away now, all the court stuff. I think I’m glad we did it.” – Participant #12 “I know that when someone reads my tombstone down the road, it will not say that he was sad he didn't publish another peer-reviewed publication or that he's embarrassed that he didn't publish enough there. So, I know my values, I know with enough clarity the potential impact I think I can help lead. And I know the scale of the challenges before us, and I think that I have skill sets to contribute, and so, if I weren't to do that, then I'd want on my tombstone “he was not courageous enough.” And so, you know, there are moments when you have to pump yourself up.” – Participant #10 3.4.2.3 Research question 4 Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? 94 Answers to this question can be found in the following four themes: the call to action (green field in thematic map), the mediators (orange), the underlying theory of change (blue), and reflections on efficacy (turquoise). 3.4.2.3.1 Call to action Early exposure to activism is the first factor I found to explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools. I see this factor in the theme of call to action because motivation, sense of responsibility, and criticism of conventional academic approach to KMb are common factors among all participants. They are essential components pushing the academic advocate to a point where they are ready to seek opportunities for exposure to and involvement in advocacy and activism. 3.4.2.3.1.1 Motivation Participants share strong motivations that fuel the inner drive to change the world. This motivation can either be in the form of a general sentiment and sense of worry: "I want to make the world a better place. We are facing a lot of big challenges and anything I can do to help out, I’m going to do it." – Participant #16 "That is what I’m concerned about. I’m concerned about my family, my community, my country, and the world." – Participant #8 Or it comes in the form of reaching a tipping point: "…that was the moment I broke. That was the moment that my moral injury exceeded my lack of capacity and time to take something on." – Participant #3 "I can't do this anymore. So, I started organizing." – Participant #3 3.4.2.3.1.2 Sense of responsibility Motivation alone is not yet enough to answer the call to action. What also plays a role is a sense common in all participants that it is indeed their responsibility, if not even obligation, as academics and/or private citizens to do something about the issues that they feel are important: "I feel this very strongly. I don't know if all scientists do. But for me, I feel morally obliged to act on what I know." – Participant #1 "We have every right and I would even say ethical responsibility, to be on the front lines and directly engaged in this kind of work. So that's where I think I stand." – Participant #8 95 "So, who's going to fill in? I think we have this responsibility, all the more so with the fake news just growing. And I think that has to be such a big part of the call to action. Whether we like it or not, whether we intended to be scholars who would be public facing or not. If not us, then who? Who else has that flexibility? And when will we rise to the call? Again, I don't know who else can fight fake news if not academics." – Participant #10 3.4.2.3.1.3 Criticism of academia A critical stance towards academia and its ability to contribute to change, at least in the way it currently operates, is also common among all participants. Participants’ degree of criticism here varies from a reflection of the academy’s theory of change and its shortcomings… “There is the kind of standard model of academics as kind of disinterested, dispassionate. They do their research, they write up their publications, they put them out there and that's their job. Kind of done. They might do a bit of communicating. They might do a presentation or something. But really that's their job done, and then that is picked up by, say, policymakers who receive that wisdom. And then, as a result, do the right thing about it. And yeah, that might happen sometimes, but also it doesn't, and certainly not enough, and a lot of the time it’s just completely disregarded…there's been an absolute mountain of reports, studies, saying what the problems are, what needs to happen, and yet we haven't seen the required level of action.” – Participant #12 “Unfortunately, I would say most academic work is so separated from actual organizing and so it's just like putting things out into the world as though that's going to be enough.” – Participant #6 …to strong critique of the academic system as a whole (noting that the participant mostly worked in the public health realm): “One of my critiques of the academy, and I have lots, is that in this day and age it doesn't value thinking, it values churning. And I have very little respect for the academy these days…And secondly, going back to the role of the academy… why the hell do we have universities? We didn't put them in place so they can develop secret knowledge that they don't share with anyone. Or that they don't speak about in public.” – Participant #17 3.4.2.3.1.4 Exposure Participants reported that once they responded to the call to action, they sought exposure to specific kinds of advocacy and activism. I found that exposure was in line with further involvement, meaning that if one was exposed to protests and civil disobedience early on, one would likely continue on that path. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the further activism trajectory causally depends on that early exposure. Rather, I hypothesize that the early exposure is already chosen in that it is a tactic that 96 one already gravitates towards because of role models and/or other factors such as their (implicit) theory of change or how they conceptualize their identity of academic advocates (more on that below) – just as the participant in the first quote below confirmed by stating “I have always been kinda drawn to this stuff…”. This hypothetical relationship is reflected by the dotted arrows that point from theory of change and the mediator fields back to the call-to-action field in the thematic map. The early exposure to certain activism tactics is often experienced as exciting and as a confirmation of being on the right track as these participants describe: “So, personally I have always been kind of aware and drawn to this stuff. The first interaction I had with some of this was when I was finishing university, actually… There was this groundswell of resistance which got a lot of public attention in quite affectionate ways, actually. Some of the protesters became almost kind of celebrities, and they were living up trees and in tunnels, and all this sort of stuff. And I paid only the briefest of visits to one of these sites but ended up getting involved in some action and getting chased by police, helicopter and everything. And it was all very exciting, and all this sort of stuff… the grassroots movement was widely credited with stopping the government's road building program. It put it on the agenda.” – Participant #12 “I just put myself in the same room, super opportunistic, as basically all my heroes and [inaudible]. I’ve been lucky to meet them, too. I mean, what a life, right? I can honestly say I met and worked with all of my heroes. That’s very cool, I feel very lucky.” – Participant #3 These moments can further have the effect of pushing oneself over a tipping point towards taking more action as these participants reflect: “He [referring to role model] had an amazing career as a health professional, physician, and one of the most ethical people that you can meet in your life, and the life that he lives… you can learn so much from him. I have known him for fifteen years. So, it's not like I just discovered that he's sitting on the tree [referring to a protest action of blocking logging efforts], knowing that person for a really long time as someone who is not an emotional person, a true scientist, you know, with a really nice sense of humor, but a really cool person who I considered a friend and mentor for a long time. And now, seeing him sitting there protecting the bird nest was a tipping point for me. You know, what am I doing with my time and my life?” – Participant #8 “In about 2011, Bill McKibben came to [omitted name of university to protect anonymity] and he gave a big talk… And he's folksy, and he's Bill McKibben and, at the end, someone said, you know, but we're very uncomfortable with this activism, and, you know, we're academics. And he said – and this is only loosely paraphrasing – ‘I get that your reputation is everything. As an academic, this is what you built, this is what you do. But I got to ask you: what are you saving it for if not the greatest challenge humankind has ever faced?’ And so, he wasn't saying go out and get arrested, he was saying, you can do more. And he said that, and you could hear a pin drop. The room was silent. And that…I hear that, like what are you saving it for?” – Participant #7 97 These four components – motivation, sense of responsibility, criticism of academia, and early exposure – together shape participants’ drive to do something. Once participants answer the conceptual call to action, they reflect on several factors that shape their strategic approach as well as the choice of tactics and tools that they employ in their activism. These factors will be presented in the next section. 3.4.2.3.2 Mediators The mediators are factors in the personal and professional life of the participants that mediate the path from call to action to strategies, tactics, and tools. They include three themes (identity, social standing in the academy, and concept of bias and values). I found that the path from call to action to strategy, tactics, and tools is mediated primarily by one’s identity (i.e., academic and activist identities being separate or one and the same), as well as the disciplinary background of participants. Further aspects of the social standing in the academy (namely job security and degree of privilege) as well as concept of bias and values did not show a clear trend in their impact on strategic choice among participants. I describe them here nevertheless as I see them as important parts of the full picture of academic advocates’ experiences. 3.4.2.3.2.1 Identity I created this theme because it struck me as interesting that even though all participants were of the opinion that activism and their respective values do not make them biased in their research (more on that see below under concept of bias and values), they still held convictions about whether or not it was appropriate to melt the academic and the activist identities and activities into one. Participants significantly differ in the conceptualization of their identity of an academic and an activist. This indeed seems to be the most important predictor for the strategic approach. One group’s conceptualization sees the two identities and roles as separate – I call them “separatists” (n=4). Separatists lean towards the information provider approach (n=4/4) and more commonly hold an information deficit theory of change (more on that below in Section 3.4.2.3.3 Theory of change). Here, separatists describe their worry that it is either inappropriate to spend time on activism during work hours… “I actually intentionally tried to keep [my activism] more arm's length from my professional work, I did not consider it my job… Those were actions I was taking as a citizen. They're informed by my scholarship, but they are…I don't think it's appropriate to use my [university’s name omitted to protect anonymity] time to do those things. Those are, you know, extra to work things.” – Participant #7 98 “It’s a different job! I mean, you know, I do consulting for governments and [inaudible] organizations all the time and I have to disclose it. It’s a conflict of interest… Because the university is paying me to work full time, there's a legitimate reason why they might not want me to be doing outside work. You have to explain why. So, it's a conflict of interest in the sense of like, you can't do more than one job at once at that level…And especially an NGO, it's a separate entity. It takes so much time to get started, how could I ever sell that to my Dean and my faculty as connected to what I’m doing as a professor? It's like I said, that will be a separate job.” – Participant #13 “My volunteer work, which is now partisan in nature, is very separate from that. So, like, I wouldn't do that during the day. I make sure that occurs outside of business hours, just so that there's no question at all about, you know, whether the two are overlapping.” – Participant #2 …or to avoid the perception that one is speaking on behalf of the university: “And so, I think the risk of sort of pontificating as a public intellectual on something, the risk of it being conflated with the university is there and so I’m just being careful about how I navigate. I'm not stopping, like I was on a podcast recently, I'm not stopping. But we have a media team, and so I run things through them, and we consult with each other and there's communication about how things may be received and that type of thing.” – Participant #2 “When I was going to be appointed acting Dean, I talked to the Provost about it and said there's a court case and I actually offered to sort of back off. I mean I wouldn't have time, but also to back off on a lot of my more strident public stuff while I was Dean, because it does reflect on the university. People find it more difficult to separate statements I would make as XY, a regular person and XY, senior executive at the university.” – Participant #7 Conversely, some participants agree that the identities and roles are one and the same – I call them “unionists” (n=12). Unionists show a tendency to engage in power building strategies (n=9/12) and hold theories of change that go beyond the information deficit (see Section 3.4.2.3.3 Theory of change). “I believe the work that I’m doing is also public service. And we, as academics, are expected to provide service to our communities. And I believe what I’m doing through being engaged in social movements and working with grassroots, community-based organizations is part of my work as well. I work at a public institution. I do believe that I am accountable to the public in my workplace as well. So, it's really interesting how a lot of things intersect in what we, as researchers, academics, public health professionals do. But sometimes we'll forget that there are also people who live in those communities who feel responsibility for this place, for the environment of where you are. So, that's why sometimes it's going to be very hard for me to separate things, because I wear many hats.” – Participant #8 “Maybe it's just a strawman… that stereotype I outlined… the scientist as a dispassionate kind of robotic type person. It doesn't make sense at all. People aren't like that. Scientists get involved in all sorts of things, whether it's giving a public talk or going along to the local kids’ school. 99 Scientists are passionate about their work, and they love it, whatever that might be. And so, I don't think you can disentangle the two.” – Participant #12 Interestingly, for some unionists, unambiguously appearing in public as an academic who is also an activist is indeed a strategic decision: “It's really important for me that scientists are seen to be part of the outside as well. You know, that we are seen as citizens in that we are an active voice, and that we can lend our legitimacy and our credibility, and the public trust in science to help grow and support these movements, because I don't think they're going to be powerful enough without lots of different social groups being part of those movements, and science as a key institution in society has to be there, too.” – Participant #1 “And I think from the point of view of scientists it’s like… I mean one question that sometimes gets asked is if the climate crisis was that bad, wouldn't the scientists be out on the streets? I’ve heard people say that over the years… you know, they write their papers, and then they go and fly off to conferences, but they can't be taking it that seriously. And I think whether that question is asked or not, the fact that if you see scientists that are doing this stuff, I hope, at least for some people, it conveys the idea that… if the people who know about this stuff are doing these things, then it must be serious. And part and parcel of that is that it isn’t the sort of thing we normally do. We're not known for… if there is a stereotype of a scientist, it's someone who [inaudible] quietly writing their papers, and whatever. It’s almost so jarringly at odds with what we're “supposed” to do that is has that kind of potency of message, I think… I hope.” – Participant #12 3.4.2.3.2.2 Social standing in the academy This theme contains three codes: field or discipline, job security, and presence or absence of privilege. i. Field or discipline Besides identity, one’s disciplinary background is the strongest predictor for strategic choices. The disciplinary background that one brings to the work as an academic advocate is relevant because it shapes not only one’s understanding of the world but also upholds certain cultural norms in terms of what actions the academic advocate is “allowed” to do. The norms that one feels bound by differ according to the fields as follows: Participants with a background in the social sciences (n=7) generally reported that an action-oriented stance is not only accepted but often encouraged in their professional environments. They tend to be power navigators (n=5/7) more so than information providers. 100 “I think this is going to be so department and disciplinary specific. Like, I'm in a discipline where critical perspectives and what I would like to call critical environmental studies is the norm and so people seem to get actually more credence and kind of legitimacy, the more they're working in solidarity and in direct service of movements and civil society.” – Participant #6 Participants with a background in law (n=3) report activism to be within their field’s norm, even if modern law scholars seldom still practice law. Participants with a background in medicine and public health (n=3) perhaps understand activism most clearly as part of their responsibility: “And so, within medicine, the CANMED criteria [a set of competencies used to guide medical education and profession in Canada], advocate is one of our assigned roles as a doctor…I’m like, look, I'm advocating for healthy public policy on behalf of my patient population… So, I don't really know how that works in other sort of evidence-aligned professions that may or may not have such a really explicit code of ethics.” – Participant #3 Participants with a background in medicine/public health or the law go either way in terms of their strategic pathway. For them, the deciding factor is their identity (see above). Conversely, participants with a background in the natural sciences (n=4) seem to feel more constrained about what is allowed in terms of activism. While participants did not explicitly state this (as the somewhat vague statements below show), this is indirectly implied by the observation that natural scientists in my sample tend to be information providers (n=3/4) more so than power navigators. “But mainly, I got the sense that we were self-editing ourselves, we were preventing ourselves from having a policy impact.” – Participant #14 “So, even when I'm doing like the more neutral scientists thing, I think I’m just more honest when I do it that way, than a lot of people are. And I think, you know, I never have a problem with people sort of laying their cards on the table, because I think it facilitates discussions as opposed to sort of pretending that it doesn't exist.” – Participant #2 ii. Job security When I initially conceptualized this research project, I assumed that having a tenured (or similarly secure) position would unequivocally mean that respective participants would be more courageous in their activism efforts, just like these participants reflect: “I think there's absolutely no doubt that my career trajectory changed as soon as I earned tenure and it totally intentionally did… like, so much security comes with that… So, there's no doubt that tenure has given me the security.” – Participant #10 101 Me: “Has anyone ever given you the label activist or advocate and was that a problem in your academic career?” Participant: “Well, it's hard for me to talk about something that would be a problem when I have like a tenured position at [omitted to protect anonymity]. So, I think the answer to that is pretty much no.” – Participant #6 One participant reflected on tenure even bringing with it not just freedom but certain obligations: “I’ve argued this and will continue to argue it - particularly if you think about tenure. Okay, if you've got tenure, I think you have an ethical duty to speak out. If you don't speak out, you are failing as an academic because why the hell would we set up a system of tenure that gives you the right to remain employed, no matter what? And that is because we want you to be able to speak out, no matter what. The whole point about tenure supposedly is it allows you the freedom to think and write and speak as you see fit. If you don't then write and speak out and think as you see fit, you shouldn't have tenure. You are failing the institution, you're failing society.” – Participant #17 However, some participants reflected that they made decisions about their activism independent of their tenure status and thus did not confirm my assumption of tenure being a decisive factor: Me: “Do you think it [having tenure] makes you more courageous about your advocacy activities?” Participant: “Not really. People were kind of joking about that, when I announced my tenure, they're like, oh, now you'll tell us how you really feel, when I’ve always been very vocal about how I really feel.” – Participant #15 “Oh, I didn't have tenure at the time. I got tenure afterwards. I mean, it probably wasn't… I don't think there's anyone that would advise me to do this as a good move. It does nothing to get tenure, like zero. Like in my tenure file, all the work I did on that…is like a sentence, right? It's just like, oh yeah, and I did this. Like, in my service portfolio of my tenure. But this is why I became a professor, to be able to do these kinds of things, so I didn’t hesitate.” – Participant #13 Me: “Does that [having a permanent position] make you more courageous in making these decisions [around activism engagement]?” Participant: “No, not at all. I think these movements really need people like me who don't care about this at all. So, I’m just so fortunate that my family is so resourceful that the day I lose that job, you know, we’ll be fine. So, no…But I totally understand other people, my colleagues, who really depend on their jobs. I was able to create a lifestyle that we can sustain without my job as well. Let's put it that way.” – Participant #8 iii. Degree of privilege This last statement above is a good segue into another personal circumstance that is interconnected with other mediating factors: privilege. I recognize that there are very complex 102 definitions and concepts around what privilege is and how it is defined. For the purpose of my study, I use this term to label a code category that subsumes participants’ reflections on the role that their gender, ethnicity but also their financial stability plays in their academic advocate lives and decision-making. “And as a white boy I’ve got a lot going for me in terms of a lot of unearned privilege. So, I’m harder to disqualify.” – Participant #10 “I have to acknowledge that I am a heterosexual white guy that is cis gendered and all those other things that put your life on its trajectory. And so certain things, including the public advocacy that I do… I'm also tall; right, so I benefit from all those things, and again, that is something where I am cognizant that if those things were not the case, things wouldn't have worked this way.” – Participant #2 “I mean there's a tremendous amount of privilege involved in my ability to do that [spend a lot of time on activism]. I'm married to a physician. And so, you know, if I wasn't married to physician, I wouldn’t be able to do it. Like, we can't depend on privileged family structures to be the thing that allows for this kind of work.” – Participant #3 Me: “Do you feel like running for office helped you develop that thick skin?” Participant: “No, just being a queer immigrant did. With the amount of racism, homophobia, and sexism I've had over my life at this point, I have just had enough trolls…There's a lot less of it in academia for sure, politics definitely has a lot of it. People I’ve run against have undermined me everywhere they could – ‘you don't understand this, you're not from here, you don't understand this, you don't get that’… and they even undermined me as a scientist. ‘Oh, but other scientists say climate change isn’t real’…yeah right, follow the money, right? So yeah, you know, after years of all this – which is sad – but it doesn’t bother me.” – Participant #5 “I also have problems being a woman of colour who is not being taken as seriously as some of my white male colleagues… All the time people say that I’m not a scientist, it happens all the time, whether or not I see it all is another thing. There was a sort of recent policy-related example…I’ve worked on [topic omitted to protect anonymity] for 15 years. And the government gave the bid to write the report to a white man who has never worked in [omitted for anonymity], let alone the species. I’m the only person that has actually published on this, so, basically, he would have had to write this report entirely based on my research, not on his own research.” – Participant #15 This reveals that participants see privilege as something that allows – if not requires – them to be activists whereas those who are more marginalized see it as an additional challenge but not as a barrier that would deter them from activism. However, those who are more marginalized may be less likely to gain access to certain “inner circles” and may therefore be limited in the tactics that are actually available to them, as one participant describes: 103 “As a person who stands out in diversity, you know, it's hard, and politics is really not welcoming to equity seeking candidates…I see a lot of gatekeeping. I see when there are other equity seeking candidates from other parties running or even from our own party running in other ridings…I see the kind of wrong attention they get from people, other parties, and media; it's definitely harder.” – Participant #5 Another participant shared that she experienced more personal attacks and faces issues being taken seriously as a woman of colour, but again, she did not state that this experience in general kept her from acting as an advocate: “I also have problems being a woman of color who is not being taken as seriously as some of my white male colleagues... So, often I’m attacked on Facebook groups, like my science gets attacked, my credibility is attacked.” – Participant #15 3.4.2.3.2.3 Concept of bias and values Whenever criticism of academic advocates arises, a fear of bias and loss of objectivity is at the centre of the conversation. Critics feel that one’s activism reveals a certain value system that the academic holds. And they assume that this value system dictates both the wanted outcome of one’s activism but also the wanted outcome of one’s research – which in turn makes the academic biased and therefore diminishes the objectivity and thus credibility of their research findings. This view is surely held more strongly in fields that follow a positivist tradition such as the natural sciences while disciplines in the social sciences have, at least in theory, moved past this assumption. However, all of my participants, independent of their field, agree that this view does not adequately portray the reality. In general, they view “objectivity” as more nuanced and recognize that the notion of being objective as a person is flawed, as this quote highlights: “Well, I mean first off, I would challenge the idea of objectivity. I don't think anybody is objective. They're not outside of being a person and as soon as you're a person, you've got subjectivity in there. So, I think the whole notion of objectivity is bullshit anyway.” – Participant #17 Participants also make a distinction between the neutrality of the research process and the value-shaped process of the KMb that follows the research: “Having a certain position on an issue and advocating on behalf of this position does not make one biased. As long as this position is grounded in principles such as human rights, it is legitimate and should be advocated for. Any pretense of impartiality is just that – a pretense.” – Participant #9 “I think we have to recognize that as scientists, we have values, we have motivations. We have biases, and those aren't necessarily bad things. They are often what lead us to do the work that 104 we're doing in the first place. Often it helps us make sure that the work that we're doing is useful to society, and so on, right? Where we try and make sure that we are at least aware of those biases and kind of institutionalized checks on those biases is through, you know, the research methodologies that we develop or the peer review processes that we try and put our work through in order to, you know, make sure that the knowledge that we're producing is robust and rigorous. But what we do with that knowledge, and how we communicate that knowledge is never going to be neutral.” – Participant #1 3.4.2.3.3 Theory of change This theme is among those that are mostly based on my interpretation of the data and is thus somewhat removed from the descriptive nature of this study. I therefore go into more detail on this particular theme in the discussion section. I conceptualize a theory of change as something that explains how and why an action leads to an outcome. One participant articulates this poignantly: “When I’m performing KMb most effectively, I take the time it takes to articulate a clear theory of change, one that let’s me be as succinct as…if we do this, then those with the power to make the change will do so, because we perform some activity, which likely includes supplying something genuinely wanted by those with the power to act on the evidence. There's such clarity of focus when we have a realistic hypothesis about what will incentivize people with power to implement the evidence. This clarity is essential to avoid being busy, but not effective.” – Participant #10 As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two schools of thought that I engage with, which have two distinct theories of change: (i) the policy theory and evidence use in policy literature, which assumes complex political and power dynamics mediate the implementation of evidence into policy action, and (ii) the KMb literature on tactics and tools, which tends to hold on to an information deficit theory. This same distinction can be found among participants. The underlying theories of change strongly correspond with the strategic approach in that those who are information providers mostly hold on to an information deficit, and those who are power navigators hold more complex mental models. The following are examples of such different viewpoints. The first, in my interpretation, is representative of a power navigator: “I'd gone in with the science to try and make a difference through my research. I realized at that point that actually the reason that we're not taking action is not because of the lack of knowledge, lack of understanding, lack of research, but because of the power of these fossil fuel companies, their vested interest, because of the way in which governance structures are always protecting the status quo. And I felt, well, if that's what the problem is, then that’s what my attention has to be directed to…” – Participant #1 105 This second quote is by an information provider. While it highlights the motivation to share information and evidence, it also suggests that information providers in this study still depart from a simplistic information deficit model and take complexities such as timing and audience into account. It is not merely about passive information dissemination. However, the fundamental attitude remains that it is the sharing of the information that has the potential to create the change: “You have to provide information and evidence at the right time to the right people to get any movement. And even if you do it to the right people at the right time, they don't necessarily move, but if you're not there, they certainly won't.”- Participant #14 Given that participants are individuals who aim to strengthen the role of evidence in policy decisions, one could assume that their theory of change and approach to advocacy is in turn evidence based. However, most participants have not consulted literature on effective change making or have only read it partially and still develop an – often implicit – theory of change independent of an evidence base (represented by interrupted arrows from the literature base to the theory of change in the thematic map). Furthermore, those participants who have thoroughly studied the literature on change making have not arrived at concurrent conclusions. While some of them have embraced the power navigating pathway, others remain information providers. Participants hold on to opinions about certain tactics as these examples suggest: “Lobbying is kind of a dirty word for me that associates with industry lobbying for their interest. We're speaking out of public interest.” – Participant #8 “I’ve never actually done civil disobedience. I don't mind if people do it to a point. I think it can become counterproductive. For example, the locking of bridges by people who oppose a deforestation or whatever, is counterproductive. It just pisses off the public and when you're trying to actually get support and all you're doing is alienating… So, I don't tend to do that.” – Participant #17 3.4.2.3.4 Reflections on efficacy The objective of this research was not to evaluate whether my participants’ activism efforts were successful in creating the change they wanted to see. However, I asked participants to share with me their reflections on whether or not they think they are/were successful. I had anticipated that these reflections would guide participants’ choice of strategy, tactics, and tools. Neither participants nor I developed a definition of what “being successful” really means, as the question was relatively broad and merely meant to encompass whether or not they ever felt like they were able to achieve the policy change they set out to create. Either way, the consideration of effectiveness does not seem to be at the 106 forefront of most participants’ minds. The choice of strategy and tactics seems more aligned with the factors described above than with a hypothesized success. This can be seen in participants’ reflections on their efficacy. Most participants are somewhat optimistic about their efficacy, particularly those who engage in power navigation strategies; information providers are more pessimistic or at least question their efficacy. And yet, participants who reflect that their activism has not been successful in creating change still do not significantly change their tactics. They may, however, aim to improve their skills at a tools level (such as communication skills). Examples for optimistic sense of efficacy: “I would see the role of civil disobedience as, potentially at least, being one of the most effective things you can do as a person and as a scientist. And I think it’s hard to tell for sure. I do that on the basis of faith and hope as much as anything else. When I say faith, I mean a secular way. But relatively small amounts of activism or civil disobedience can push things in a way that lots of people signing a petition or standing on the road with a placard doesn't… there are lots of cases through history where small numbers of people doing these things has promoted change. So, I think that's why I’m kind of drawn to this.” – Participant #12 “The advantage of joining government is, if you do make change or you can succeed in making change then it's impactful change. Often, not always but often. So, you actually can have a real impact. I mean, I think I had a real impact.” – Participant #17 “Because what I’ve found is that we need to really exclusively acknowledge the risk of failure and really frame that as learning. You know, because when I look at everything we've accomplished, whether it's, you know, divestment from the [omitted to protect anonymity], or coal power phase out, or what have you, we didn't usually win the first time. However, what does happen is you usually increase your resources. So, you'll usually create some relationships to increase your relational support; you may sort of get the attention of some decision makers, increase your political capital; somebody with funding might show up, so that the next time you go around, you don't have your videos made by a medical student, but you actually have professional audiovisual materials. And so, then the next time you go around you actually, you know, after a few tries, if you have some luck and you picked a good target, you win. And when you win, when you actually create visible change in the world, that sense of hope, that sense of ‘you can make a difference’ that Marshall [Ganz] talks about, that's what attracts further resources.” – Participant #3 “And it's kind of pretty [inaudible] that if you file a lawsuit and you’re strategic about it, it can really have an impact, a very direct impact on government policy. And, of course, there's a struggle for the implementation of that policy, and so it doesn't end there. Just like it doesn't end with the op-ed or the journal article, it doesn't end with you getting a positive federal court ruling. But it gets you closer, right. It gets you closer than an op-ed or a journal article.” – Participant #4 107 Examples for more pessimistic reflections: “I don't know whether I could really give you any examples of having changed things.” – Participant #11 “We've produced studies that identified some problems that have led to [omitted to protect anonymity] decline, despite all the commitments to do something or to conserve and protect them. And then we've noticed that in those cases, we've been asked by some of the ministries to give them like briefings and talks. So, we put the work out and it just gets [inaudible] in the media. Or maybe we gave a couple talks at these big sort conferences and then people who work in the ministries, like, the Federal Impact Assessment Ministry and in BC the Mining Ministry… anyway, people will ask us if we want to come and talk about our research. But I don't know if that's been very effective, because I don't think I’ve seen any sense that the kinds of recommendations we made are being taken up.” – Participant #6 “If you wanted to go on a scale of scientists, yes, I’m in the top 1% of effective voices in science and policy. But no, I think, if you went by a company, we're terrible. I think we just don't know how to lobby, we don't know how to get our attention constantly in front of all of the politicians. So, I don’t know….I could do more, others could do more.” – Participant #14 “I mean you're really asking a question about how to have legitimacy, right? It is kind of unclear to me how legitimacy works at the moment. It works differently with different people and parties. I think there's times when research can have an impact, and then there's times when you just feel like you're producing more research into a void. So, I think I don't know how that's…I don't have a strong idea right now about how to mobilize research into like political change. I mean… you're catching me in a pretty cynical moment, I have to admit, today. Every day is different, and I don't have a great sense… I mean, I've worked on [omitted to protect anonymity] for a long time. We also know all the blah blah blah of the climate convention, I mean…” – Participant #6 3.4.2.4 Research question 5 What gaps in the strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist? As indicated initially, responses to this research question are based on my interpretation of the gap between what participants described and what the literature on effective strategies to impact policy-level decisions recommends. As such, this research question is conceptually located at the disconnect between the gray and the red/pink fields in the thematic map (see Section 3.4.2). The following is a summary of my interpretation. I will reflect in more detail on this research question and my interpretation of it in the discussion Section. 108 The first gap I observed is that only a minority of participants base their strategic choice on insights from the literature. This is particularly true for the policy theory literature and adjacent fields that discuss the issue of evidence use in politics from a more systemic viewpoint. Participants are more likely to consult literature that concerns itself with individual tools such as communication tools or other forms of knowledge brokerage. This leads to a somewhat intuitive strategic approach overall even if there is a more sophisticated application of tools in this sample compared to many other academics. This intuitive approach can be based on personal experience, observation, or learning by doing and is often shaped by what I call mediators (see Section 3.4.2.3.2). Interestingly, a pessimistic reflection on one’s efficacy also does not lead to a significant change in tactics. However, it may lead to participants seeking to improve their skills on a tools level. To me, this reflects a lack of understanding of how tools need to be integrated into an overarching strategy as they are less effective as stand-alone interventions. The lack of literature consideration is true for both power navigators and information providers which points at the interpretation that the choice of strategy is mostly driven by identity (see 3.4.2.3.2.1) and implicit theories of change based on assumptions and perhaps experience (see 3.4.2.3.3) than it is on evidence. While power navigators’ overarching approach may be more in line with the literature, most participants in this group still choose their tactics based on early exposure, identity, or beliefs rather than evidence on efficacy of certain tactics. Even those who do consult the literature come to varying conclusions about the “right” tactic to follow. I will discuss the importance of context and nuance of what the “right” tactic might mean in the discussion section. 3.5 Discussion This study sheds light on the way academics seek to influence climate-related and adjacent policy decisions and how they navigate both the complexity of the super-wicked policy issue as well as the tension of being both an academic and an activist. Because the focus of this study was not on the outcome of activities described by participants nor on specific policies, I can justify defining “policy decisions” quite broadly in this study. As such, it includes all levels of policy realms from institutional to multinational as well as all three branches of government. By policy, I generally mean “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (p. 15) (Jenkins, 1978). It follows that by policy change, I 109 mean changes (or lack thereof) in those respective decisions made (and actions taken) by political actors. This is in contrast to change aimed at individuals such as consumers or practitioners. The goal of this study was to empirically explore academic advocates’ capacities, experiences, and attitudes around climate (and related issues) advocacy and activism. These insights are important as the number of academics willing to engage in advocacy and activism is surging (Grossman, 2024; Tormos-Aponte & Frickel, 2023). However, once these budding activists decide to take on the role of an academic advocate, they are faced with the challenge that the skill set of an activist is typically different from that of a researcher or teacher. This dissertation’s objective is to advance actionable and more specific advice for academic advocates by comparing insights from academic advocates’ renditions of their strategies and experiences to the vast body of knowledge on the complex nature of policymaking which has not been done sufficiently before (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). In this section, I discuss the findings from Section 3.3 (Results) particularly in light of their contribution to the expansion of this advice by putting the findings in the larger context of the literature on policymaking and KMb (as presented in Chapter 2). I add reflections on factors that may challenge or contribute to the uptake of such updated advice. 3.5.1 Discussion of results For the reader’s convenience, I am adding here again the thematic map from Section 3.4.2 as a quick reference for the subsequent paragraphs: 110 Figure 3.1 (repeated) Thematic map of the conceptual journey of an academic advocate 3.5.1.1 Research question 2 How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? Study participants describe that they employ a variety of tactics and tools. As I conceptualize it, these can generally be categorized in two strategic pathways (see red circle in the middle of the thematic map) as “power navigators” or “information providers”. The former is the essence of the literature on the policy process as well as social movement scholarship (see Chapter 2, for example, De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019; Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Ganz, 2004; Raphael, 2015; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The latter dominates the literature on KMb and adjacent fields (see Chapter 2, for example, Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Crow & Jones, 2018; Graham et al., 2018; Mitton et al., 2007; Sarkies et al., 2017). However, in my interpretation and based on what participants shared with me, there is quite a bit of variability to be explored within these pathways (see also conceptual framework, first discussed in Section 2.6, which I add here again for the reader’s convenience). 111 Figure 2.1 (repeated) Conceptual framework connecting information provider and power navigator tactics and archetypes as applied within and outside of the policymaking community I developed four archetypes that reflect the tendency to engage in one of four quadrants from inside/outside information provider to power navigator and subsumes specific tactics. The lines between the different archetypes and tactics are fluid, of course, but there is some nuance that is worth discussing. For example, an individual who is active in the public realm as a public intellectual may also serve as an expert witness or advisor and thus cross over into the advisor archetype. Similarly, a person who is engaged in social movement organizing may also resort to tactics of inside lobbying and vice versa. However, crossing over the horizontal line from information provider to power navigator is less typical. My understanding is that here, the held beliefs about what is appropriate for an academic in terms of their KMb activities provide a strong barrier such that information providers do not feel comfortable with power navigation tactics. To bring it back to the thematic map (see Section 3.4.2), the choice of strategy is based more on the mediators (i.e., identity, social standing in the academy, and concept of bias and values) rather than a literature-informed theory of change. On the other hand, power navigators will easily cross the horizontal line and employ tactics of the information provider but will often do so more strategically integrated, e.g., the informing the public is done very intentionally to build political cover or to increase the outside pressure on decision makers with whom the academic may then follow up directly via inside lobbying tactics. Interestingly, crossing over from the activist to the insider archetype may not be as straightforward as some of the other movement along the 112 horizontal line. As one activist participant shared with me, they thought it futile to engage directly with decision makers and believed in the “power of the people” – it seemed there was a fundamental attitude of “us against them”. Along those lines, it also seems unlikely that this individual would consider joining the government as a public servant or elected official. The tactical focus of information providers is on communicating evidence and knowledge in an “objective” way. As such, this group’s actions are in line with the KMb literature that focuses heavily on tools of communication and relationship building with knowledge users. The preferred tactics are those of the expert witness (e.g., in parliamentary hearings), the expert advisor (e.g., on advisory boards, or in litigation), or the public intellectual who faces outward to the public rather than inward toward the policymaking community. They may also build relationships with policy community insiders but do so as “honest brokers” communicating scientific consensus neutrally without advocating for a specific policy option (Pielke, 2007). The tools used by this group include op-eds or social media presence, conducting policy-relevant research, understanding and navigating the policy process from a procedural perspective (e.g., who has which mandate, which committee meets when to what end, when is an important point in time for evidence interjection, etc.), and providing support to advocacy groups as an objective advisor, including for litigation purposes. It is worth noting that the extent to which information providers in this study will use these tactics and tools is still a departure from what most academics do in terms of the mobilization of their evidence. It is going beyond the conventional channels of knowledge distribution such as publications in the peer-reviewed literature. Study participants who fall into this category have a complex understanding of the policy issue, they identify political barriers to policy change, they understand that power, value systems, beliefs, and vested interests are at play – but they do not think it appropriate for the scientist to play the game of this system, always with the fundamental attitude of the “honest broker”. They rather approach the system as an outsider “armed” with evidence and knowledge. Power navigators share the complex understanding of the policy issue and the system with information providers, but they are willing and able to engage with the political system in a more direct way by aiming to build power, thus acting (intentionally or unintentionally) in line with theories of the policy process such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier, 1988). Their tactics are akin to what Pielke refers to as “issue advocate” – advocating for specific policy solutions that are in line with the advocate’s interests (Pielke, 2007). The tactics therefore include those of the policy insider, inside navigator (lobbying, public servant, elected official/partisan engagement) and/or of the outside power 113 builder/navigator (social movement, civil disobedience). They may also use litigation to pressure governments but compared to the information providers, they will use litigation more strategically to build and navigate power (e.g., one participant’s organization was an intervener in a national case) and will not merely serve as an advisor to or expert witness in a case. That is not to say that this group would not employ tactics of the public intellectual, or expert advisor, or tools of communication but they use these tactics and tools specifically with the aim to build and navigate power rather than to objectively disseminate information. As an example, while the “honest broker” public intellectual may use a social media post or op-ed with the intention to inform the public about a certain issue, the power navigator will use this tool explicitly (and probably repeatedly and in integration with other tactics) in order to shape public opinion as a way to put pressure on decision makers, thereby building power. The distinction comes down to the fundamental attitude and held belief of the individual academic. If one serves as an expert advisor to a social movement with the idea to provide an evidence base as the honest broker and the social movement then uses that evidence instrumentally and potentially in a way that it wasn’t intended by the academic, the academic is still an information provider/expert advisor. On the other hand, a power navigator academic would approach the advising of the social movement in a different way, for example by suggesting ways in which the evidence can be used strategically, or by directly suggesting preferred solutions. The basic distinction is: “here is the evidence” vs. “here is the evidence and this is what you should do with it or because of it”. Two participants stand out in that they left academia to fully engage in power building activities. One participant left a position as post-doctoral research fellow and joined a not-for-profit organization as a campaigner for several years before they returned to university to complete a second graduate degree. The other participant left their faculty position for a total of 14 years to work in a senior civil servant position in government. They returned to a faculty position thereafter. A third participant spent many years of their career as a civil servant, a political party organizer, and movement builder before they ultimately took up a faculty position. While it is tempting to view these examples as indication that there is a certain flexibility in academic appointments, I think it is important to note that the latter two participants did not work in a natural science field and are part of a previous generation of academics for whom faculty appointments weren’t as competitive as they are for emerging academics nowadays. The first participant left a natural science field with the knowledge that they will likely not return to the field as an academic. When they returned to academia, they re-entered as a graduate student in a social science discipline. Therefore, the option of leaving and returning to an academic position may not be available to many other academic advocates. 114 Litigation in particular is a tactic that can be used within both strategic approaches but is a somewhat special case since it operates through the judicial branch of government. Not surprisingly, legal tactics to achieve policy change are primarily used by lawyers/law scholars. However, there are two participants with non-law backgrounds who have also engaged in court cases/litigation. One participant integrated the pathway of litigation into their overarching strategy to change policies by forming a coalition to intervene in a court case around carbon pricing. The other participant was part of a grassroots group who sued the government and a corporation for their expansion of local coal export infrastructure. One participant shared with me this quote: “litigation is a flawed strategy for social movements, because it's costly, because you often lose, and because it distracts you from the important task of mobilizing community at the grassroots.” In the participants’ interpretation, social movements often lose because the law is inherently conservative and because there is almost always an imbalance of power in the court between the social movement and powerful, vested interests who often represent the opposition. There are potential costs and benefits of litigation and the context within which the case has been brought to court is crucial. Even if cases are won in the courts, they may later encounter difficulties in implementation and enforcement. Conversely, if a case is defeated in court, this may actually help mobilize and shift public opinion in favour of the movement. For example, when youth across the globe began to sue governments for violating their human right to a healthy environment, they received a lot of media attention independent of whether they won the case or were dismissed (Kotzé, 2021; Laville & correspondent, 2023; MacLean, 2020). These court cases arguably helped pave the way to this new framing of climate change as an issue of health, wellbeing, and human rights and away from a complex ecological issue that most people felt too detached from (Rossa-Roccor et al., 2021). 3.5.1.2 Research question 3 What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? Participants describe barriers and facilitators to activism that are largely in line with the extensive literature on these factors. Barriers include the significant time commitment that activism requires; the lack of incentives in academic to conduct these activities; the fear of potential professional and personal repercussions; the lack of supportive academic culture and criticism from peers; a lack of job security especially for junior faculty; and a lack of funding and resources for this work. This is in line with the most current systematic review of barriers and facilitators to KMb work from 2023 (Golhasany 115 & Harvey, 2023). The authors therein summarize issues on the side of the knowledge producers (i.e., researchers) that inhibit KMb as “related to the traditional institutional rewards system” and the “lack of necessary institutional support for KMb, which limits access to KMb funding, training, and infrastructure” as well as factors on an organizational level such as “culture’ and “resistance to change” (Golhasany & Harvey, 2023). The authors further found that other challenges include researchers’ lack of knowledge of the policy landscape as well as difficulties engaging with non-academic partners (Golhasany & Harvey, 2023). These last two factors are not described as issues among participants of this study. By contrast, most participants actually have a very sophisticated understanding of the policy sphere around their particular issue, especially where the procedural/formal system is concerned. Furthermore, the majority of participants describe collaborations with non-research partners as a tool they frequently employ. This is likely due to the sampling of participants in this study who are all active activists who conduct KMb that goes beyond conventional academic activities. The most common facilitator described in the literature is the quality of the relationship between researcher and policy maker (Oliver et al., 2014). Both information providers and power navigators in this sample very actively engage in relationships with policy makers and view this as one of the key tools to employ. Other facilitators found in this study are building a reputation as an expert (mostly via conventional academic activities); support from others; using one’s credibility strategically; and a changing academic culture, both perceived and described in updated university strategic plans. These findings are somewhat unsurprising and reflect existing insights on facilitators (Golhasany & Harvey, 2023; Oliver et al., 2014). The risks and benefits described in this study are also mostly confirmative of existing literature and anecdotal evidence (see for example, Upton, 2023). This is particularly true for racialized and otherwise marginalized scholars included in this sample. They report their experiences as extra challenging, for example due to a lack of access to insider circles, a lack of respect and consideration within the academic and advocacy community, and potentially more severe repercussions to them personally, for example by suffering from online bullying aimed at their person rather than their professional presence. One important nuance that this study contributes, however, is that despite potential or actual negative experience and repercussions, all participants continue to be involved in their activism activities. There may be many former academic advocates who have indeed ceased to be engaged in activism due to consequences they deemed to be too severe to justify continuation. Given the inclusion criteria of currently active academic advocates, this group was not included in the study 116 and might contribute a viewpoint that may very well be the opposite of what I found in this study. In this study sample, it seems that the motivation and sense of responsibility that has set participants on the activism path, surpass negative consequences. This may change over time, but I do not have the data to explore this hypothesis further. Nevertheless, this is interesting and important because it may mean that activists are willing to dedicate the necessary time – sometimes decades – and resources needed (Cairney, 2017; Sabatier & Weible, 2014) that are an unequivocal deterrent for those who may not share this strong sense of responsibility and motivation. It is also relevant for capacity building to understand the drive and motivation that one brings to the work. Given that this is such a powerful force, it can potentially be channeled into convincing learners of more effective tactics and tools that they may not have considered before, but are willing to engage in, even if the associated risks are higher. Notably, this study shows that these negative consequences are not ubiquitous. In fact, some participants actually describe a benefit to their academic career, although these were all participants who employ more power neutral tactics. Regarding how best to navigate these tensions, the essence of the interview findings is “do it anyways”. Factors that make it easier to “do it anyways” are supportive peers, superiors, and institutions, a culture shift within the academy, as well as friendships with like-minded individuals. Most participants also report experiencing a deep sense of fulfillment and satisfaction due to their activism. Arguably, this observation may not be enough for many who seek to embark on the path of an academic advocate. They may still be worried about “systemic barriers within the academy and funding programs, including patterns of promotion” (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). This study cannot render sufficient evidence to put those minds at ease. The purposive sampling strategy of this study carries the risk that individuals who may have experiences that diverge from those in the sample were not included. For example, the finding that risks associated with activism do not deter individuals from continuing on the activist path cannot be assumed to be true for everyone beyond the participants. Indeed, some authors warn the academic advocate of potential pitfalls and ethical dilemmas as Paul Kershaw and I summarize in (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024) as follows: “The [academic advocate’s] travel down the marketing path is not for the politically faint of heart, whether done in alignment with a movement, or as an insider whispering expertise behind closed doors. The quest to empower evidence with enough influence to break through the competition for political attention does not depend merely on skill acquisition of the sort anticipated by continuing professional development – although mastery of new competencies is required before most scholars will think adequately like a marketer, lobbyist, movement, and 117 political scientist…Some may feel unsettled because the selection of insider versus outside strategies itself implies a moral choice. There are tensions between utilitarian commitments to get good things done behind the scenes, versus abiding by democratic principles that celebrate inclusive, participatory policymaking, or publicly speaking truth to power. Moral implications also flow from any decision to resist getting one’s hands “dirty” in the world of politics, because such decisions cede valuable terrain to the influence of fake news or conspiracy theory. Since politics responds to those who organize and show up, we must anticipate that the tactics of thinking like a marketer, lobbyist, or movement will be used by groups that some judge are unethical, like fearmongering populists or corporate profiteers…We should also be honest that many a social movement we judge to be noble will deploy the same tactics, as will thought leaders we deem well-intentioned. From this perspective the selection of which political tactic to deploy may be less of a moral decision than is the cause to which the tactic is applied. The literature already recognizes systemic barriers within the academy and funding programs, including patterns of promotion, that may deter many from devoting the time required to act like a marketer, lobbyist, movement, and political scientist”. However, to counter that, we also provide some recommendations to navigate these potential challenges, some of which are in line with what study participants report doing already (e.g., using university strategic plans to justify one’s activism activities): “Issue advocates will need to find creative workarounds to reduce these constraints, which are smaller after one earns tenure. As a starting point, we intend this article to be a peer-reviewed tool that can be shared with colleagues to justify the selection of KMb tactics we feature in our analysis. We also recognize that academic granting agencies increasingly have funding streams that prioritize KMb projects, with adjudicators who are more likely to understand the value of thinking like a political scientist. Receipt of peer-reviewed grants that validate KMb plans to borrow from marketers, lobbyists, or movements can quiet objections from colleagues who remain skeptical about whether academics should embrace such tactics. Even on route to tenure, university policies that create incentives for promotion regularly prioritize KMb impact more than some departmental cultural norms acknowledge. So, there is opportunity for us to socialize colleagues to whom we report about our institution’s guide to promotion. We can “lobby” or build a departmental “movement” to influence departmental merit committees to value KMb activities on par with research activities. We can account for our KMb initiatives as advancing objectives prioritized by our university strategic plan and identify supportive Deans and Presidents who can provide institutional cover for issue advocates who may face questions from honest broker colleagues” (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). Some participants in this study report using these strategies to navigate challenges. For example, one participant uses their university’s strategic plan as a cover to justify their activist activities to critics among his colleagues and university administrators. Others report using their KMb activities to 118 strengthen their grant applications, and others still specifically choose departments that include a mandate of advocacy and activism. 3.5.1.3 Research question 4 Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? The three main factors explaining the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools in this sample are early exposure to a certain form of activism or role models, identity (separatist vs. unionist), and underlying theory of change (information deficit vs. more complex mental models). Rather than affecting the strategy choice independently of each other, it seems there is an interconnectedness between these factors. The identity and therefore the concept of what is right or wrong for an academic is so strong that it ultimately guides one’s underlying theory of change (see dotted arrow from mediators to theory of change in the thematic map) and also impacts the chosen early exposure to certain kinds of activism or activists (instead of the other way around where the theory of change would prompt someone to seek out certain activism efforts over others). As such, the underlying theory of change seems to be a pathway through which one’s identity and values operate on the choice of strategies, tactics, and tools. This belief will probably be upheld no matter how much the individual will grow their activism skill set, or more adequately, it will provide the direction in which the academic seeks to grow their skill set (e.g., more communication skills vs. organizing skills). The understanding that identity is such a strong determinant may also explain the somewhat surprising finding that the reflection on one’s efficacy does not seem to impact strategy choice. One would expect that a lack of success would prompt participants to change their strategies and tactics. However, this is not the case. This is important to know because core beliefs are hard to change – not just among politicians but also among academics (Haidt, 2012; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The assumption that an increase in knowledge about evidence-based strategies and tactics will suffice to sway more academic advocates toward power building strategies is thus flawed because the problem is not an information deficit. What would be needed simultaneously is a shift in the culture of the academy that is more conducive to activism activities in the power navigator spectrum (Gardner et al., 2021). I further assumed that decisions around strategy, tactics, and tools are also clearly impacted by other factors such as the significant time commitment that activism requires; the lack of incentives in academia to conduct these activities; the fear of potential professional and personal repercussions; the lack of supportive academic culture and criticism from peers; a lack of job security especially for junior faculty; a lack of funding and resources for this work; and last but not least the many systemic, cultural, 119 and social barriers that deny equitable opportunities to those with unearned disadvantages resulting from racism, classism, sexism, colonialism, and other -isms. While the degree to which participants experience risks and barriers may vary depending on some of these factors (such as job security, lack of privilege, or disciplinary background), none of my participants significantly change their strategy, tactics, or tools in light of these adverse experiences but still choose to continue on the path of activism as they had originally chosen. 3.5.1.4 Research question 5 What gaps in the strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist? In my interpretation, the lack of strategic thinking and integration of tactics and tools into an overarching strategy that is anchored in the literature on change making is the primary knowledge and skills gap among participants. It is therefore a key issue on which I focus for skill development training in Chapter 4. The activism efforts are often opportunistic and intuitive; some participants even describe them as “naïve” or “faith-based”. Only four participants have thoroughly studied the literature on change making or sought out specific training to enhance their strategic capacity. And even these individuals have come to diverging conclusions about what this literature means for their strategy and tactics of choice. One participant whose strategic integration of tactics is outstandingly sophisticated even admitted to having used literature to justify actions retrospectively in the past. When it comes to the specific tactics that participants employ, several of them reflect that they have consulted the literature on their tactic of choice in order to become more informed about the efficacy of the respective tactic. However, an inconclusive literature base did not deter the participants from their tactic. Most participants rely on experience (either their own or that of their mentors) as a source for knowledge and skills – a method that risks repeating what has been done before if a critical reflection on its efficacy is missing (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). This shows that one cannot assume evidence-based decisions among academic advocates where their strategic and tactical choices are concerned. It also shows that the evidence base is ultimately open to different interpretations and judgements about its transferability to specific cases. Chapter 4 is an attempt to provide guidance for an approach that can be applied across different contexts and scenarios. When it comes to tools, however, many participants (both power navigators as well as information providers) have sought formal training, in particular for communication tools such as (social) media or science communication workshops. The use of narratives and storytelling has recently 120 seen an uptake in the KMb literature (Crow & Jones, 2018) and represents a much-needed convergence with the policy theory literature (for example the Narrative Policy Framework or the Social Construction of Target Populations). It is also a tool in line with insights from marketing and moral psychology (see for example, Haidt, 2012; Sachs, 2012) and therefore holds promise as an essential tool in the academic advocate’s toolbox. However, only three participants report having consulted this literature and intentionally using storytelling techniques in their activism work. Another concept from the KMb literature that has found growing support and recognition is the integrated knowledge translation (iKT) approach (Gagliardi et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2018). This tool integrates the knowledge user (ideally the decision maker) into the research process early on and allows for co-creation of research projects including the posing of questions to which answers are assumed to be relevant to the end user. In particular, this approach depends on ongoing relationship building and maintenance with decision makers and their delegates – advice that is heavily featured in the KMb literature (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). Indeed, many participants – from both the power navigator and information provider groups – report that they actively seek to build relationships and trust with decision makers, civil servants, not-for-profit organizations, or other research entities even if they do not formally include them in their research processes as envisaged by the iKT approach. Having said this, there is a certain naivety about the iKT approach in the policy arena. As Paul Kershaw and I write: “End users who have the time to join a research project from its inception will rarely be political actors with the requisite power to shape policy agendas… Yet it is these high-level actors who primarily shape policy direction. Members of the bureaucracy who have time to join iKT projects may be responsible for the implementation of an already set political agenda. Should the research evidence align with that agenda, then the iKT approach may be a unique way for scholars to perform some direct lobbying. If the evidence recommends that the political status quo needs disruption, the iKT approach will offer limited results… Put bluntly, iKT practices should not be counted on to attract the attention of the most influential policy makers, because they simply don’t have the time.” (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024) Conversely, if the iKT approach or the relationships that many academics hold were interpreted more in line with the tactic of lobbying it may be more effective in the policy sphere (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). Lobbying recognizes that “the most influential policy networks are dominated by insider groups, acceptable to government, responsible in their expectations, and willing to work with and through government…” (Rhodes, 2006). What could be seen as another version of the iKT approach is the participatory action research (PAR) design, where the knowledge user is often a frontline community or a community organization. In 121 essence, this academic tradition comes out of a constructivist and critical paradigm that emphasizes the co-creation of knowledge to empower marginalized groups and foster social change through collective action (Baum et al., 2006). PAR seeks to empower relatively powerless communities to organize and advocate for themselves with the support of academics. The way in which the co-created knowledge is used and implemented towards social change highly depends on the context, goals, skills, and resources of the knowledge user. As Davis and Ramirez-Andreotta write, “although participatory research may extend the value and uses of science, a diverse toolbox is needed to address the political, economic, and social structures that create disproportionate environmental health burdens for communities of color and communities in poverty. Along with technical and scientific knowledge, proximity to the power and prestige of a university may be an invaluable resource for academic allies to leverage on behalf of environmental justice communities”(Davis & Ramírez-Andreotta, 2021). Interestingly, some research shows that it is not the produced knowledge itself but the process of co-learning that may help drive consensus or at least improve legitimacy, even in the face of value disagreements (Brugnach & Ingram, 2012; Karl et al., 2007). Communication tools and relationship building tactics are important and valid skills for the academic advocate to have. However, they only touch on the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Marshall Ganz reflects that tactics and tools that are not integrated into an overarching strategy are “a waste of resources” (Ganz, 2006) and views strategic capacity in movements as essential for their success (Ganz, 2004). Chenoweth agrees and observes that “it is often quiet, behind the scenes organizing that enable movements to mobilize in force over the long term, and to coordinate and sequence tactics in a way that builds participation, leverage, and power” (Chenoweth, 2020). This invites the question: what exactly is a strategy anchored in the literature other than an overarching approach into which tactics and tools need to be integrated? Marshall Ganz summarizes it concisely by defining strategy as follows: “Strategy is to turn what you have (evidence, people, resources) into what you need (power) to get what you want (policy change)” (Ganz, 2006). By anchoring the strategy around building power, he is in line with the policy theory literature that widely recognizes the role power plays in policymaking (see Chapter 2). Among the participants, power navigators centre their KMb efforts around this middle part. Their underlying theory of change is therefore based on power generation to achieve the wanted change. They either seek to build power inside of the policy system via lobbying tactics, taking on civil servant or elected positions, or, in some cases, through litigation (depending on the case). Or they aim to build power from the outside by 122 mobilizing the public or disrupting public life in a way that puts pressure on decision makers. However, even within the group of power navigators, there seems to be a lack of recognition that different issues may require different tactics and tools. For example, when the issue already enjoys broad public support and little division on the topic, the outside mobilizing path may be more effective, particularly when organized interests collaborate (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). Inside lobbying, on the other hand, is more effective for issues that are not broadly covered in public discourse and/or do not enjoy broad public support. For these issues in particular, outside lobbying can actually be a damaging tactic (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). The necessity to adjust one’s strategy to the issue and context at hand seems easy to miss when one is already engaged in activism efforts to which one came for reasons other than evidence-based conclusions (see research question 3 for more on these factors). Information providers skip the middle part of Ganz’s concept of strategy (“into what you need (power)”). They rather aim to turn evidence into policy change directly. The problem is that only on narrow issues of technocratic, incremental policy change is this strategy successful (Oliver & Cairney, 2019; Pielke, 2007). The underlying theory of change of information providers is different from the power navigators. The overarching approach is to provide more knowledge and evidence upon which others will act – the epitome of the information deficit model. And even if the academic understands that evidence and knowledge are not the primary driver for policy change, they may still wish it were so (Cairney, 2017) and act accordingly (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). As discussed in research question 1, information providers often have sophisticated ways of communicating their evidence and do so via a multitude of channels – with decision makers directly, the public, or other stakeholders (including litigators). But their ammunition, so to speak, is the evidence, not the power. As such, they risk “wasting their resources” (Ganz, 2006) – an observation that some participants share in their reflections on their efficacy. The second part of research question 5 encourages a discussion about why this knowledge gap persists. I do not mean to say that this knowledge gap is simply a replication of the information deficit model, meaning that I assume academics do not practice more evidence-based KMb simply because they lack the insights and knowledge from the literature base. Instead, the existence of deeply held belief systems and the presence of circumstantial factors are the two main factors explaining the knowledge gap. The primary choice of strategic pathway (power navigator vs. information provider) is almost entirely intuitive, only a minority of participants reflect having made that decision intentionally. The identity of whether or not one deems it appropriate for an academic to engage in power navigation 123 strategies (unionist vs. separatist) also plays a big part here. Participants further hold certain prejudices with regard to specific tactics. For example, even though they were part of the group of power navigators, some participants voiced their disdain for lobbying and referred to it as a “dirty word”. Others were sceptical of civil disobedience as an effective tactic without actually conferring with the literature whether or not this scepticism was justified. One may interpret it as irony that as a group, academic advocates demand policy makers to make choices based on evidence while at the same time, their own decision-making is based on a variety of factors beyond an evidence base. However, this behaviour is not surprising when one recalls the literature on decision-making, for example, the metaphor of the elephant and the rider (intuitive vs. rational decision-making) and the role that beliefs, values, and socialization play in these decisions (Cairney, 2014b; Haidt, 2001; Meadows & Wright, 2009). Circumstantial factors may also prohibit participants from seeking out capacity building opportunities. Issues such as time constraints, a lack of incentives, a lack of resources, and a fear of repercussions are all factors that do not exactly motivate one to spend a significant amount of time and resources on building a skill set that is not particularly valued in one’s professional environment. However, participants overcome these barriers frequently when seeking tools-level training and may well do so for more comprehensive training if they had the opportunity. This leads to the last hypothesized reason why a gap in strategic capacity persists: there is a lack of time-efficient training opportunities that are designed specifically for academic advocates. A truly effective learning opportunity will need to take into consideration the individual’s belief systems and the systemic factors (such as the constraints of the academic system) which impact their decision-making. Chapter 4 is an attempt to fill this gap. 3.5.2 Limitations and remedies The following sections attempt to make transparent the limitations inherent in this study as well as some thoughts on how to mitigate these challenges. 3.5.2.1 Methodological limitations This study highlights the experiences and opinions of 17 individuals. A common concern with qualitative study designs is the lack of generalizability of the findings. Although I included at least two participants per archetype and then integrated the findings across all interviews, the findings presented in this study are true for this sample only and cannot be transferred to the entire population of academic advocates. However, the goal of this research was not to deduct generalizable insights but rather to highlight the “bright spots” (Heath & Heath, 2010), the special cases of active academic 124 advocates, and extrapolate lessons learned from these particular cases for the broader community of academic advocates. These lessons evolve mostly around strategies, tactics, and tools and are applicable ubiquitously, especially when consolidated with the broad literature base on effective change making. Where the personal circumstances and experiences of my participants are concerned, this study highlights that much of this experience is based on each individual’s personal circumstances such as identity, social standing, or theory of change. If the goal is to assess whether the experiences shared by my participants are true for a larger portion of this population, future research could aim to quantify these insights via a large-scale survey-based inquiry. This study only included active academic advocates who choose to continue their activism despite the presence of risk factors or barriers. It would be interesting and important to compare these findings to a subpopulation of academic advocates who have ceased their activist activities, for example due to negative repercussions. As was already alluded to in this study, members of marginalized groups likely experience the barriers to academic activism in a different, potentially more severe way. This study did not highlight these differences in much detail. Therefore, a study that includes more individuals of marginalized groups would also be important and add a more nuanced picture. Qualitative research designs typically suggest using a variety of data sources. I had therefore originally envisioned using not only key-informant interviews to triangulate my findings across different data sources. I had assumed that documents would exist that render information about (i) the strategic approach my participants take and how they operated in these spaces, and (ii) that would shed some light on challenges that my participants face in their work as academic advocates. Through the process of engaging with my participants over the course of several months, I learned that such documents either do not exist or participants prefer not to share them, for example to protect the identity of others who were involved. A third obstacle referred to by all participants was time constraints and not being able to think more about what documents would be appropriate and then finding them to share with me. I had access to material that had been published either in mass media outlets or the peer-reviewed literature. Upon review, these documents generally did not render additional information to what was shared with me during the interview. My inquiries were more targeted at overarching strategies that they employed rather than the particular contents of specific issues, campaigns, or petitions that I was able to find in published outlets. To counter this limitation and to uphold construct validity, I included participants in the data analysis by sharing with them my descriptions and interpretations and giving 125 them the opportunity to provide feedback and potentially correct my interpretations to allow them to be more in line with their experience. I acknowledge that my research design did not dive deeply into the particular contexts within which participants were conducting their KMb activities. Because I took a pragmatic stance and was primarily interested in the strategies, tactics, and tools employed by academic advocates rather than the outcome of these activities with regard to specific policies or changes, I defined the context within which participants acted very broadly. By context I mean the policy issues (climate, biodiversity, conservation; but all defined as super-wicked policy problems) as well as the level of interference (institutional to multinational), the government branch (executive, legislative, and judicial), and the geographic location in liberal democracies. I can justify this breadth because the goal of this research was not to assess what strategy works under which circumstances but rather what strategies are used in general, why those strategies were adopted, and what the literature would add to guide their selection. However, future research could add great value by exploring these context-specific nuances. For example, it could match different tactics and strategies to stages of the policy process: what is more effective to move an issue onto the policy agenda vs. what tactic is needed when the question becomes how to implement a policy? It could also evaluate which tactics were successful or unsuccessful in leading to a specific policy outcome. Finally, this study did not aim to make comparisons between participants in different countries and only includes individuals from Canada, the US, and the UK. A comparison to countries of similar governance structures but with cultures where civic engagement in politics is more ubiquitous (e.g., France) could render more insights on whether the overall cultural acceptance of political participation is also true for academics or if the academic norms supersede national norms. In addition, a study on academic advocates in countries with more authoritarian regimes would be interesting and potentially very inspiring as it will likely generate a different kind of experience by the individual academic activist. 3.5.2.2 Conceptual limitations As I have made transparent throughout this dissertation, many of the findings and conclusions I come to are based on my own interpretation (albeit with frequent input from members of my supervisory committee). While this subjectivity is a core feature of qualitative research, it is not without its limitations. The following is my attempt to make these limitations explicit. 126 I read, interpret, and merge several bodies of literature from fields in which I am not a disciplinary specialist. I rather approach the interpretation of the literature as well as the results of my study from the perspective of a pragmatic knowledge user with the goal to translate theoretical findings into actionable advice. My own identity as a unionist (academic and activist identity are merged into one) as well as my experience in leadership positions of several NGOs very possibly have influenced the way I understand this literature. I therefore may have taken a leap from policy theory to, for example, civil disobedience. Particularly the step from policy theory (Section 2.3) to conclusions about potentially more effective tactics (Section 2.4) may be one that not everyone may concur with. Here is an example: In Section 2.4 I write: “Under the ACF, coalition building and mobilizing becomes a particularly important strategy. This can be achieved through social movements or forming interest groups that directly lobby decision makers.” The first sentence is made explicit in the ACF, the second sentence is my interpretation that “coalition building and mobilizing” means social movements or lobbying. Others might interpret “coalition building and mobilizing” as creating a boundary-spanning think tank. In this example and throughout this dissertation, I uphold certain power navigation strategies, tactics, and tools as strategically superior to those of truth telling. Some of it may be due to my own bias but the literature on the effectiveness of social movements and lobbying (see Section 2.4) does render evidence to their promise – even if there is no guarantee that these tactics will work in every context. As Cairney puts it: “theory-informed studies recommend investing your time over the long term – to built up alliances, trust in the messenger, knowledge of the system, and to seek ‘windows of opportunity’ for policy change – but offer no assurances that any of this investment will ever pay off” (Cairney, 2017). Future impact evaluations of power building strategies among academic advocates would be an important contribution to validate or disprove my conclusions and add important information to exploring the conditions under which these conclusions are true or false, thereby adding more nuanced considerations of context. My own bias as a unionist with a strong sense of responsibility to create change despite the risks may have also led me to understate the relevance of risks and barriers in the choice to embark on an activist’s path as perceived by the audience of this work. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, accounts of severe repercussions such as job loss or ruined reputations exist and are surely a concern for many. For participants in this sample, it seems true that their own sense of responsibility as well as their driving motivations surpasses these concerns, but I cannot assume that this is true for everyone. Emerging scholars hoping to score one of the few coveted faculty positions may certainly feel that they need to play by the rules of the academic game and cannot risk raising a hiring committee’s negative 127 attention if perceived as biased activists – even if they themselves do not agree with such a viewpoint as shown by participants’ reflections on bias and values and their influence in research decisions. Finally, I sometimes wonder if I have made my life too easy by not further engaging in the normative argument on whether or not academics should engage in activism. But I usually conclude that this question will never reach an empirically conclusive answer. One’s answer to this question is a function of the individual author’s identity and the academic culture within which they have been socialized – and as such a reflection of deeply held beliefs. These beliefs may ultimately change when (or if?) the culture and self-concept of academia changes. Until then, I do not think this discussion is particularly valuable from the viewpoint of a pragmatic knowledge user. It is not my objective to convince the unconvinced but instead to make the convinced more effective by advancing KMb practice. 3.6 Summary and future directions The objective of this study was to assess the strategies, tactics, and tools that academic advocates employ, to understand their underlying assumptions and theories of change, and to highlight contextual factors that guide decision-making processes regarding strategies, tactics, and tools of choice. These insights were used to uncover knowledge and skills gaps and the reason for their persistence among participants so that they can be addressed by further training for the larger academic advocate audience. Here, I provide a summary of the study findings. More in-depth reflections on the conclusions that emerge from this work can be found in Chapter 5. Research question 2: How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? Study participants describe that they employ a variety of tactics and tools. As I conceptualize it, these tactics and tools live within four archetypes (“advisor”, “advocate”, “activist”, “insider”) that can generally be categorized into two strategic pathways as “power navigators” or “information providers”. The tactical focus of information providers is on communicating evidence and knowledge in an “objective” way. As such, this group’s actions are in line with the KMb literature that focuses heavily on tools of communication and relationship building with knowledge users. The preferred tactics are those of the expert witness (e.g., in parliamentary hearings), the expert advisor (e.g., on advisory boards, or litigation purposes), or the public intellectual who faces outward to the public rather than inward toward the policymaking community. They may also build relationships with policy community insiders but do so as “honest brokers” communicating scientific consensus neutrally without advocating for a specific policy option. Study participants who fall into this category have a complex understanding of the 128 policy issue, they identify political barriers to policy change, they understand that power, value systems, beliefs, and vested interests are at play – but they do not think it appropriate for the scientist to play the game of this system, always with the fundamental attitude of the “honest broker”. They rather approach the system as an outsider armed with evidence and knowledge. Power navigators share the complex understanding of the policy issue and the system with information providers, but they are willing and able to engage with the political system in a more direct way by aiming to build or navigate power, thus acting (intentionally or unintentionally) in line with theories of the policy process such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Their tactics are akin to what Pielke refers to as “issue advocate” – advocating for specific policy solutions that are in line with the advocate’s interests. The tactics therefore include those of the policy insider, inside navigator (lobbying, public servant, elected official/partisan engagement) and/or of the outside power builder/navigator (social movement, civil disobedience). This group employs tactics of the public intellectual, or expert advisor, or tools of communication specifically with the aim to build and navigate power rather than to objectively disseminate information. The distinction comes down to the fundamental attitude and held belief of the individual academic. If one serves as an expert advisor to a social movement with the idea to provide an evidence base as the honest broker and the social movement then uses that evidence instrumentally and potentially in a way that it wasn’t intended by the academic, the academic is still a information provider/expert advisor. On the other hand, a power navigator academic would approach the advising of the social movement in a different way, for example by suggesting ways in which the evidence can be used strategically, or by directly suggesting preferred solutions. The basic distinction is: “here is the evidence” vs. “here is the evidence and this is what you should do with it or because of it”. Research question 3: What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? Participants describe barriers and facilitators to activism that are largely in line with the extensive literature on these factors. Barriers include the significant time commitment that activism requires; the lack of incentives in academic to conduct these activities; the fear of potential professional and personal repercussions; the lack of supportive academic culture and criticism from peers; a lack of job security especially for junior faculty; and a lack of funding and resources for this work. In terms of facilitators, both information providers and power navigators in this sample report engaging in 129 relationships with policy makers and view this as one of the key tools to employ. Other facilitators found in this study are building a reputation as an expert (mostly via conventional academic activities); support from others; using one’s credibility strategically; and a changing academic culture, both perceived and described in updated university strategic plans. The risks and benefits described in this study are also mostly confirmative of existing literature. The most commonly mentioned potential risk was a threat to one’s well-being, followed by threat to one’s reputation and career disadvantages. This is particularly true for racialized and otherwise marginalized scholars included in this sample. Fewer participants worried about being perceived as biased or suffering financial burden and only one participant mentioned the risk of failure but framed this as an opportunity to learn from. Notably, this study shows that these negative consequences are not ubiquitous in this sample. In fact, some participants actually describe a benefit to their academic career, although these were all participants who employ more power neutral tactics. Despite the potential or actual negative experience and repercussions, all participants continue to be involved in their activism activities (which may be because of the sampling strategy that only included active advocates). It seems that the intrinsic motivation and sense of responsibility shared by all participants surpass negative consequences. This may change over time, but I do not have the data to explore this hypothesis further. Following academic advocates over time to investigate whether this inner drive can sustain long periods of engagement in advocacy and activism – potentially without any success – would be an interesting aspect of future research; as would be insights on whether there are negative consequences that will deter even the most driven, courageous academic from pursuing their advocacy activities further. Research question 4: Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? One key finding in this study is that the choice of strategy for most participants is not literature/evidence/training-based but rather intuitive and depends largely on one’s concept of what is right or wrong as an academic (“identity”) and – connected to identity – one’s underlying theories of change (assumptions about how change happens) and the early exposure to certain forms of activism or role models. This is important to know because such core beliefs are hard to change. In line with this insight is the finding that choice of strategy was not impacted by one’s (perceived) efficacy, meaning that even if participants reflected not having been successful in past advocacy activities, they did not generally consider a change in strategy. 130 I further assumed that decisions around strategy, tactics, and tools are also clearly impacted by contextual factors highlighted in research question 3 (i.e., the necessary time commitment; the lack of incentives in academia to conduct these activities; the fear of potential professional and personal repercussions; the lack of supportive academic culture and criticism from peers; a lack of job security especially for junior faculty; a lack of funding and resources for this work; and last but not least the many systemic, cultural, and social barriers that deny equitable opportunities to those with unearned disadvantages resulting from racism, classism, sexism, colonialism, and other -isms). While the degree to which participants experience risks and barriers may vary depending on some of these factors (such as job security, lack of privilege, or disciplinary background), none of my participants significantly change their strategy, tactics, or tools in light of these adverse experiences but still choose to continue on the path of activism as they had originally chosen. Future studies could investigate in more depth and potentially with a larger sample of advocates across the globe if and how specific contexts such as geographic location, positionality, or specific policies within which academic advocates are active, may inform the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools. Research question 5: What gaps in the strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist? The lack of strategic thinking and integration of tactics and tools into an overarching strategy that is anchored in the literature on change making is the primary knowledge and skills gap among participants. The advocacy and activism efforts described by participants in this sample are often opportunistic and intuitive, some participants even describe them as “naïve” or “faith-based”. In Chapter 2, I conclude that, for most super-wicked policy issues that go beyond a narrow, technocratic question, the power navigating strategy with its related tactics is likely more effective. This is particularly true when one develops an integrated synergy (= strategy) of the right tactics and tools for a particular issue and context at hand. Marshall Ganz summarizes it concisely by defining strategy as follows: “Strategy is to turn what you have (evidence, people, resources) into what you need (power) to get what you want (policy change)” (Ganz, 2006). By anchoring the strategy around building power, it is in line with the policy theory literature that widely recognizes the role power plays in policymaking. Information providers skip the middle part of Ganz’s concept of strategy (“into what you need (power)”). They rather aim to turn evidence into policy change directly. This strategy is usually only 131 successful on narrow issues of technocratic, incremental policy change (Oliver & Cairney, 2019; Pielke, 2007). The overarching approach is to provide more knowledge and evidence upon which others will act – the epitome of the information deficit model. Power navigators centre their KMb efforts around the middle part of Ganz’s concept of strategy (“into what you need (power)”). Their underlying theory of change is therefore based on using power to achieve the wanted change. However, even within the group of power navigators, there seems to be a lack of recognition that different issues may require different tactics and tools. The necessity to adjust one’s strategy to the issue at hand seems easy to miss when one is already engaged in activism efforts to which one came for reasons other than evidence-based conclusions (see research question 3 for more on these factors). And even if participants studied the literature on change making, they came to diverging conclusions about what this literature means for their strategy and tactics of choice and an inconclusive literature base did not deter the participants from their tactic. Most participants rely on experience (either their own or that of their mentors) as a source for knowledge and skills – a method that risks repeating what has been done before without reflecting critically on its efficacy (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). This shows that one cannot assume evidence-based decisions among academic advocates where their strategic and tactical choices are concerned. Conversely, many participants (both power navigators as well as information providers) have sought formal training when it comes to tools, in particular for communication tools such as (social) media or science communication workshops. Communication tools and relationship building tactics are important and valid skills for the academic advocate to have. However, they only touch on the proverbial tip of the iceberg and are “a waste of resources” (Ganz, 2006) if not integrated into an overarching strategy. Participants’ willingness to dedicate time to capacity building opportunities signals that academics may also be willing to engage in trainings on tactics and strategy once they are offered. In Chapter 4, I propose such a training. The knowledge and skills gap persist because (i) deeply held belief systems supersede evidence and literature-based insights, (ii) circumstantial factors make it harder to engage in certain activities, and (iii) there is a lack of time-efficient and evidence-based resources for academic advocate and activists. The primary choice of strategic pathway (power navigator vs. information provider) is almost entirely intuitive, only a minority of participants reflect having made that decision intentionally. The identity of whether one deems it appropriate for an academic to engage in power navigation strategies (unionist vs. separatist) is the key driving factor here. Issues such as time constraints, a lack of incentives, a lack of 132 resources, and a fear of repercussions are all factors that do not exactly motivate one to spend a significant amount of time and resources on building a skill set that is not particularly valued in one’s professional environment. However, participants overcome these barriers frequently when seeking tools-level training and may well do so for more comprehensive training if they had the opportunity. A truly effective learning opportunity will need to take into consideration the individual’s belief systems and the systemic factors (such as the constraints of the academic system) which impact their decision-making. Future inquiries could illuminate in more depth how these belief systems (e.g., identity and theories of change) come to be and potentially, how they can be shifted to increase uptake of evidence-based recommendations over intuitive approaches. For example, while I found that participants who worked in fields that are generally more open to a critical paradigm, there are also prominent examples of academic activists who come from very positivist fields. What makes them embrace the role of an advocate/activist (even if it goes against the dominant culture in their field) and what are the contexts within which they operate that facilitate their advocacy/activism? Future directions for KMb scholarship could embrace academic advocates who specifically seek to impact policy-level decisions as their audience. The evidence-to-policy process needs to be understood from both sides – knowledge producer and user. The latter is still largely underrepresented, particularly in the KMb literature (Oliver et al., 2014). As suggested by Cairney and other authors, bridging KMb scholarship to policy and political science would help add the perspective of the policy maker to this literature (Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; Kershaw et al., 2017; Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024; Kickbusch, 2013; Oliver & Boaz, 2019; Oliver & Cairney, 2019). Learning from successful academic advocates could be enhanced by studying individual cases around a certain policy issue and generating in-depth and context-specific knowledge from these single case studies. And finally, how can a culture change in the academy be brought about that normalizes and embraces advocacy and activism as a third pillar of the academic mandate, equal to research and teaching? For those who cannot wait for this culture change to come about, a better understanding of how the current barriers and risks can be navigated would be helpful so that motivated universities or departments can support the academic advocate in their development into a power builder. 133 4 A workshop for academic advocates 4.1 Motivation for this workshop As discussed in Chapter 3, a comparison of the interview results with 17 academic advocates with the literature on policy theories and effective change making reveals a gap. This particularly true when it comes to the development of an overarching strategy that is based on a theory of change, rooted in an understanding of power and politics. Many academics become good science communicators, expose themselves to public scrutiny by becoming public intellectuals, or meet with decision makers. There is no lack of motivation or willingness to push boundaries of what is considered acceptable for an academic. However, there often is a paucity of strategic thinking from identifying the strategic target, to analyzing power, to recruiting the right people and skill sets, to integrating KMb tools into that overarching strategy. As shown in Chapter 3, academic advocacy often still operates in the realm of information providers where the underlying assumption is that of an information deficit. Therefore, much attention to skills development usually focuses on tools such as communication skills, media training, lay summaries, infographics, or policy briefs. While these tools are important, they are much less effective if they are not implemented within an overarching strategy, and even much less so when an analysis of power is missing. A crossing over into the power navigating realm of KMb is rare (while the opposite direction from power navigator to employing tactics of information providers is common). This workshop aims to support those who are willing to enter the world of power navigation. The results of the interviews also show that it is important to consider the individual’s circumstances and underlying belief systems when designing a skills development opportunity. It cannot be assumed that every academic will lean into power navigating strategies due to their own social standing in the academy, their tolerance for tension and potential repercussions, and their held beliefs and values. In addition, academics typically report severe time constraints and lack of funding for KMb activities beyond the academic tradition. This workshop takes these factors into consideration and is focused on helping the budding academic advocate develop strategic thinking that is informed by political science literature and employs tactics and tools from community organizing approaches. In its structure, this workshop is loosely organized around eight steps that represent the operationalized progression of the “think and act like…” statements in Section 2.4. This workshop therefore focuses particularly on power navigation strategies while giving the learner an opportunity to identify barriers and facilitators to this approach in their own context. 134 4.2 Operationalizing the evidence base In Chapter 2, I conclude that effective KMb must consider power dynamics and politics and suggests that the effective advocate “think and act like…(i) a political scientist, (ii) a lobbyist and/or movement, and (iii) a marketer” (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). Considering that this is very high-level advice, this workshop seeks to operationalize this advice into several steps that serve as a field guide for the academic advocate in the audience. These steps are as follows: 4.2.1 STEP 1: Think like a political scientist, lobbyist, movement, and marketer The theories of the policy process all have in common the assumption that scientific evidence is not the main factor that drives the individual or the group tasked with coming to a policy conclusion. This means that a lack of information or evidence is not at the core of policy choices that do not align with the evidence. This is in stark contrast to the evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) ideal and the information deficit belief still held by many academics (Suldovsky, 2017). It is essential for the budding academic advocate to understand that human beings do not come to conclusions based on comprehensive rationality. Instead, they make boundedly rational decisions based on incomplete information and guided by morals, intuitions, and emotions (Cairney, 2016; Haidt, 2012; Kahneman, 2017). This view is considered in the Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) which postulates that people come to biased and emotional judgements about the relative importance and deservingness of certain groups. These intuitive guideposts are difficult, if not impossible to change, even if the evidence goes against them. And so, as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) depicts, people build advocacy coalitions around their shared beliefs and values. More effective tactics to engage with these beliefs rather than factual evidence are persuasion, for example through narratives and particular framing of issues, often in the form of emotional appeals (Cairney, 2014b; Haidt, 2012; Sachs, 2012). Fields that can provide more specific insight into these tactics include communications and marketing (Kershaw & Rossa-Roccor, 2024). The budding academic advocate must begin to think about the issue in a way that appeals to those who have the power to create the change. 4.2.2 STEP 2: Pick a strategic target The six crucial elements influencing policy choice point at the complexity of the policymaking system. These elements are actors making choices (e.g., interest groups) who are influenced by institutions (rules, norms, practices, and relationships); networks or subsystems (relationships between actors); ideas or beliefs (worldviews, beliefs, knowledge, shared definitions, solutions within groups); policy context (e.g., cultural context or public opinion); and events (routine such as elections or 135 unanticipated such as natural disasters) (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). They also highlight that each policy choice depends on many context-specific factors. Before the academic advocate can even begin to think about how to mobilize their evidence, they will need to analyse and understand the specific context within which they advocate for a specific policy change. This inevitably means that they need to begin by picking a strategic target to be very clear and intentional about the objective of their actions (Howard, 2020). This target metaphorically sits in the middle of the policy process as the desired outcome of the policy process. Depending on the issue and, importantly, the resources and skills one has available to them, this target can sit at the micro (individual), meso (community), or macro (sub-national, national, or international) level of the policy system (Howard, 2020). As an example, a strategic target could be anything from getting your neighbors to commit to solar power (individual) to the divestment of one’s institution’s investments (community-level) to a nation’s commitment to a coal phase out (macro). 4.2.3 STEP 3: Track down who has the power This step requires the academic advocate to become deeply familiar with the players in the field around one’s strategic target. The guiding question becomes: who has the power to create the change necessary to achieve the goal of the strategic target? The theories of the policy process show us that this answer is not as straightforward as we may think at first glance. There is not always a single individual who can make a top-down decision. Therefore, to understand who has the power, one needs to evaluate all subsystems consisting of actors, institutions, and networks. As the ACF states, these subsystems not only include civil servants and elected officials but all actors such as researchers, advocates, lobbyists, NGOs, etc. The SCTP and Policy Feedback Theory (PFT) stipulate that existing policies also assign power to certain groups within and outside of the policymaking community. Importantly, one also needs to be aware of who is in opposition of one’s goal and to what degree they hold power over the decision (see more on that in Module 4). Given the expansive number of actors that this analysis may generate, it is crucial to find a narrow answer to who actually has the power and who or what can influence those in power. The academic advocate must be aware of these dynamics and value attributions. Depending on the issue and the context at hand, this might mean that it would be more fruitful to engage with a senior civil servant who can influence the elected decision maker rather than trying to gain access to the decision maker themselves. Another example would be to consider power by other non-government actors (such as industry lobbyists) and to develop a strategy that would counter their power if that were what is needed to achieve one’s strategic target. 136 4.2.4 STEP 4: Revisit and amend your strategic target given the identified power structures Once the academic advocate understands the power distributions around their initial strategic target, it is time to reassess whether their own strategic capacity, resources, and access will be enough to either build counterpower or be able to align themselves with or influence powerful existing structures and coalitions. If neither of these options are realistic, one needs to consider changing the strategic target. This is a common occurrence and must not necessarily discourage the academic advocate from pursuing their initial strategic target. Rather, it may mean to divide the quest into incremental steps toward the peak goal (Ganz, 2006). 4.2.5 STEP 5: Develop a theory of change A theory of change (ToC) is nothing less than the basis that informs one’s strategy and understanding of how one can achieve the strategic target in one sentence. Note that an overarching strategy might have several components to it, and each component may require its own specific ToC. People may intuitively implement a strategy. But developing a succinct theory of change requires one to bring a ToC to the front and centre of one’s planning. It makes the design of a strategy so much more intentional – not so intuitive. A ToC states, “If we do X, then Y will happen, because Z”. When taking a power building approach, Z will rarely state “because the evidence suggests this is the best option” or “because information about the scientific evidence will change peoples’ minds”. Most often, the “because” statement will then actually reveal what those in power want. This then signals how the academic advocate can build power by figuring out how to give more of what is wanted to those in the position to act on the evidence. This may seem simple, but it can take years to get it right. Depending on the complexity of the strategic target, the theory of change can also change over time as the tactics are adapted to the context and situation (see next step). 4.2.6 STEP 6: Choose your tactics and tools to build power At this point, the academic advocate knows what they want to achieve, they know who and what they are up against, and they have a high-level idea of how to get there. It is now time to develop the specific tactics that will turn the theory of change into success. As the MSA calls it, this is when the academic advocate turns into a policy entrepreneur. Depending on the issue, the first decision will be whether inside or outside approaches are better suited, or whether the two will need to be combined. If 137 it is the outside approach, an organizing statement can help narrow down one’s target constituency and strategy. It states: “We are organizing WHO? To achieve WHAT? Through HOW? By WHEN?” (Ganz, 2006). If it is the inside approach, one needs to start thinking about how to get access to those in power and develop the necessary framing and marketing strategy to reduce the ambivalence or opposition of those in power. This is also finally the moment when thinking about tools will be worthwhile (as opposed to the tendency of many to start with the tools). For example, will a social media strategy work best to attract the constituency I want to organize? Will I need to create political cover for the decision maker I plan to persuade by initiating a media storm on a certain issue? Will it be necessary to sway public opinion in a certain direction before I can even begin to think about successfully influencing a policymaker? How am I framing the issue and its solution, will this resonate with those who have the power to create the change? It is very important to keep in mind that these tools are not mutually exclusive but that they need to be integrated into the overarching strategy and tactics of choice. The academic advocate is therefore well advised if they do not assume a linear journey from tactic deployment to achieving their strategic target. It will rather be an iterative process with a stepwise approximation to the final goal. It will be important to continuously re-visit the previous steps and adapt the tactics accordingly. This may also mean that one needs to revisit the theory of change considering experiences deploying the tactics and tools it motivates. 4.2.7 STEP 7: Enhance your strategic capacity by attracting skilled people As academics, we are conditioned to think we need to do everything ourselves. However, the academic advocate can greatly enhance their strategic capacity by attracting and collaborating with people who have skill sets that are potentially vastly different from their own. Here I do not refer to researchers from other fields. I rather mean partnering up with professionals who are skilled in the tools one chooses to employ. This can include marketing advisors, professional videographers, journalists, social media experts, lobbyists, and others. A movement’s strategic capacity is greatly enhanced if there is a wide variety of skills and backgrounds represented (Ganz, 2004). 4.2.8 STEP 8: Be ready to time your efforts right The Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) in particular highlight the importance of timing and the windows of opportunity for change in the policymaking process. However, this sometimes leads to the flawed conclusion that one must wait for the famous “policy window” to open before they can take action. While there are predictable recurring windows of 138 opportunity – such as elections – the MSA does not assume that all policy windows are predictable or coincidental, passive events. It rather stipulates that policy windows can actively be pushed open. For example, a shift in public opinion or increasing public pressure can drive the problems stream, a shift in government (e.g., through elections) can drive the politics stream, and advocacy on behalf of certain policy solutions can drive the policy stream – these are all levers which the academic advocate might be able engage with. However, when I speak of timing here, I refer to more pragmatic timing considerations. For example, the time of campaigns before elections is a crucial moment to influence party platforms and help set the course for future policies, while it might not be a particularly strategic time to achieve policy formulation. Another example is consideration of parliamentary timelines such as budget sessions when resources are allocated to different issues. One consideration for the academic in particular is that policy timelines are often relatively short and might not be easily aligned with either one’s own research agenda or the academic calendar and its deadlines. It may pay off to anticipate such time conflicts well in advance and prioritize accordingly. 4.2.9 STEP 9: Be aware of the challenges While there are many ways in which the academic advocate can enhance their activist skill set, become more strategic, and increase their potential for impact, it still might not work. This seems obvious but it is one of the main challenges of this work. Another is that it may take many years, if not decades, to reach one’s strategic target and/or take a considerable number of resources, both of materialistic as well as emotional nature. To gain access to the inside of the policymaking community may come with potential pitfalls for the scientist academic. As Cairney and Toth observe, this requires the academic advocate to play by the rules of two separate games. There is an expectation of confidentiality of those inside the policy community that is hard to reconcile with the rules of transparency of the scientific community (Cairney & Toth, 2023). Ethical dilemmas abound as well. Even if we put the discussion whether scientists should become activists aside, there are still many questions that each academic advocate will need to critically reflect on ongoingly. First, science is hardly an apolitical self-evident truth. It is rather a political act in and of itself to privilege science over other concerns (Cairney, 2018). Second, if one seeks to build power, this almost inevitably means that others will become or remain more powerless. Third, the power to play the insider game will be systemically limited for researchers with unearned disadvantages that result from racism, classism, sexism, colonialism, etc. The importance of interpersonal connections can also be key – certain individuals may be able to build trust and influence more easily, perhaps due to commonalities with the decision 139 makers. Finally, this work carries with it the risk of career disadvantages, a damaged reputation, and threats to one’s wellbeing. These risks are not the same for everyone (e.g., tenured vs. assistant professor; white male vs. woman of colour), but these are factors that each individual academic advocate will need to give some honest thought as they embark on their advocacy and activism journey. 4.3 Workshop outline 4.3.1 Overview of the workshop There is a growing recognition among the scientific and academic community that the barriers to meaningful climate policy interventions are political rather than a lack of scientific evidence. More academics are therefore willing to engage in knowledge mobilization (KMb) activities that go beyond conventional efforts of the academic community and interact with the political realm. Despite potential repercussions to career and wellbeing, these individuals are highly motivated to create change. However, the skill set of an advocate/activist is vastly different from that of a researcher. There is a paucity in skills development opportunities for academics that go beyond the acquisition of science communication skills and require a reasonable time commitment. This workshop will introduce the learner to a multidisciplinary literature on change making strategies and provide them with an opportunity to develop their own strategy to move evidence into policy action specific to their issue and context. A particular focus lies on literature from the political sciences, social movement scholarship, and community organizing approaches as well as insights from moral psychology and marketing. Theoretical concepts will be complemented by case examples and regular opportunities to apply the learned material to one’s own strategic plan. The exercises in this workshop are designed with the assumption that it is taken in a group setting. However, all exercises described in the following can also be completed as an individual. Some of the main questions guiding this workshop are: i. What are the problems with dominant assumptions about how evidence shapes policy? ii. What are insights from the multidisciplinary literature that render a more realistic explanation of the role of evidence in policy? iii. What is a theory of change? iv. What is a strategy? And what isn’t? v. Who has the power to create the change? And what do they want? How can we get them what they want? 140 vi. Which tactics and tools are most effective for my strategic target? vii. What are specific challenges for the academic advocate and how can they be overcome? By the end of this workshop, learners will meet the following objectives: i. Identify their own underlying assumptions about the role of evidence in policy and interpret the limitations of these approaches ii. Discuss the insights about policymaking processes from the multidisciplinary literature and apply these concepts to their own context iii. Assess the strategic target for their own advocacy/activism efforts iv. Design an overarching strategy to achieve the strategic target and develop the necessary tactics and tools to implement this strategic plan within a rough timeline v. Acknowledge the limitations, facilitators, and the benefits to activism as an academic 4.3.2 Modules and workshop slides1 4.3.2.1 Module 1: Points of departure In this module, learners will reflect on and share their own story and experiences. The objectives2 for this module are: 1. get to know each other if taking this workshop in a group setting 2. familiarize themselves with an important tool in an advocate/activist’s toolbox: story telling 3. uncover some of their potentially implicit assumptions about the role of evidence in policy decisions Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation with an example for Story of Self Exercise 1 Module 1: Current KMb skills and approach (group discussion) Exercise 2 Module 1: Story of Self (individual writing/drawing exercise and sharing with the group) 1 Material for this workshop builds, expands upon, and refines content featured in the class Knowledge to Action (SPPH 548) taught by Paul Kershaw at the University of British Columbia’s School of Population and Public Health as well as Marshall Ganz’s People Organizing: People and Change guide (Ganz, 2006). 2 Learning objectives were formulated based on BCIT’s Instructional Job Aid - Writing Learning Outcomes (BCIT Learning and Teaching Centre, 2010) 141 Suggested Reading: Leading Change Network et al. Organizing: people, power, change. Section “Telling Stories” p.7-12. Available here: https://commonslibrary.org/organizing-people-power-change/; Crow, D., & Jones, M. (2018). Narratives as tools for influencing policy change. Policy & Politics, 46(2), 217-234. Retrieved May 30, 2024, from https://doi.org/10.1332/030557318X15230061022899 Module slides and corresponding transcripts: Slide 1 of 5: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 1. In this module, you will reflect on and share your own story and experiences. The objectives for this module are: 1. to get to know each other if you are taking this workshop in a group setting 2. to familiarize yourself with an important tool in an advocate/activist’s toolbox: story telling 3. to uncover some of your assumptions about the role of evidence in policy decisions 142 Slide 2 of 5: Slide 2 transcript: In this first exercise, you are asked to develop and share your story of self with the group. What is a story of self and why is it important? A story of self communicates your values that have called you to take action. By sharing these with others, you are taking your very first step to organizing. People are given an opportunity to relate to and empathize with your personal experiences and are therefore more inclined to take action alongside you. Sharing your story of self is also a great way to connect with likeminded people and to find support and strength in numbers. A story of self that will resonate with others typically evolves as a plot from challenge to choice to outcome. What was the challenge, the moment, that ultimately made you want to take action? Why did you make the choice you did? How did it make you feel? Where did you get the courage and hope (or not) to make that choice? What was the outcome of your actions…meaning, what’s the moral of the story? I recommend taking some time to silently reflect on your story and draw it out schematically. It doesn’t matter if your artistic skills are rudimentary ;-). We will then share each other’s stories of selves with the group. If you are taking this workshop individually, you are welcome to draw or write your story of self and share it with your network. 143 Slide 3 of 5: Slide 3 transcript: To give you an example, here is a short version my own story of self: When I was working as a psychiatrist about 10 years ago, I became really frustrated with only being able to put the proverbial band aids on issues that were clearly generated by systemic factors [that was the challenge]. I thought, if we only knew more about how these factors contribute to mental health issues, surely, we would take action accordingly. So, I decided to go back to school to get a degree in public health to research social and ecological determinants of health [that was the choice]. Imagine my disappointment when I realized that the bridge between evidence and action is broken at best, sometimes nonexistent [that is how I felt about the choice]. And in my opinion, this is particularly evident and urgent in the case of climate policy. So, I used my PhD to dig deep into the literature on change making and to learn from academics how they seek to bridge the gap from evidence to policy. Well, I was in for another surprise! I learned that the common KMb strategies and tactics that we apply as academics rarely contribute to transformative change on a policy level. In fact, I found that the most promising strategies can be found in literatures about social movements, lobbying, marketing, and psychology. I thought, well, there is a huge gap to fill in terms of training for academics who want to be more successful evidence mobilizers. And four years later, I created this workshop to ultimately help our community address systemic challenges. 144 Slide 4 of 5: Slide 4 transcript: In this exercise, you are invited to share your own experiences and insights with the group. The following questions can guide you in these conversations: - How have you tried to mobilize evidence into policy in the past? - Have you had any successes? Any failures? - Why do you think you were successful? - Why do you think you failed? - How do you understand evidence to shape policy in the real world (not how should it shape policy)? I would recommend taking some time to yourself first to contemplate the answers and then get together in groups of no more than 4 people to share your experiences and insights. 145 Slide 5 of 5: Slide 5 transcript: Now that we have established a shared interest and motivation in change making as well as discussed some of your assumptions about how evidence shapes policy, we will explore what the literature has to say and what this means for your knowledge-to-action strategies. All of this is coming up in Module 2. 4.3.2.2 Module 2: Politics and evidence In this module, learners will gain an overview of the interdisciplinary literature on the role of evidence in policymaking and will extrapolate practice-relevant conclusions from this literature. The objectives for this module are: 1. acknowledge the realities of policymaking and the role that politics and power play within 2. help learners depart from an information deficit assumption and corresponding theories of change 3. come to conclusions about more effective KMb strategies Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on theoretical background and practice-relevant conclusions Suggested readings: Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming Common Anxieties in Knowledge Translation: Advice for Scholarly Issue Advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. 146 p. 1-5; Cairney, P., & Oliver, K. (2020). How should academics engage in policymaking to achieve impact? Political Studies Review, 18(2), 228-244. Case examples: Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment, Scientist Rebellion, Generation Squeeze Module slides and corresponding transcripts: Slide 1 of 15: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 2. In this module, you will gain an overview of the interdisciplinary literature on the role of evidence in policymaking. We will also extrapolate practice-relevant conclusions from this literature. The objectives for this module are: 1. To acknowledge the realities of policymaking and the role that politics and power play within 2. To help you depart from an information deficit assumption and corresponding theories of change 3. To come to conclusions about more effective KMb strategies 147 Slide 2 of 15: Slide 2 transcript: One of the leading scholars in the field of evidence use in public policy, Professor Paul Cairney, has put it this way: “if you want to inject more science into policymaking, you need to know the science of policymaking.” I think this is pretty sound advice and, in this Module, I will aim to convey to you a time-efficient summary of this evidence. Slide 3 of 15: 148 Slide 3 transcript: Let’s do something unusual and begin by talking about how policymaking usually does NOT work. Why would we begin with this? Because this model is still widely used outside of the political sciences when talking about policymaking. Chances are, you have come across it before. If we are going to move away from our current assumptions how things work, we need to be explicit about what these assumptions are. The Policy Cycle is still so widely used because it is straight forward and intuitive. It describes the different stages of the policy process from agenda setting to evaluation. One is then tempted to link certain research activities to particular stages in the process as the authors of this graphic have done. Now, on first glance there is nothing wrong with that idea. If your research identifies emerging issues, you are to get involved in the agenda setting stage of the Policy Cycle. If you conduct impact assessments, you can contribute to the formulation of a policy and so on. So, what is the issue here? The issue is that the Policy Cycle is simplistic at best. These stages do not happen neatly in order, or sometimes not at all. Many policy issues are rather represented by hundreds of these cycles overlapping or a messier image altogether. So, let’s bid farewell to orderly, predictable steps in policymaking and say hello to more complex theories! Slide 4 of 15: Slide 4 transcript: There are dozens of policy theories that seek to better explain different aspects of the policymaking process. There is no single theory that seeks to encapsulate the entirety of the policy process. All of these theories focus on specific aspects of policymaking. If you are interested to dig a bit deeper, I recommend Paul Cairney’s blog and/or the seminal book by Sabatier and Weible on the Theories of the Policy Process. Among those theories most commonly known are: 149 1. The Multiple Streams Approach of Framework (think “policy window”) 2. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (think “policy leaps”) 3. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (think “coalitions around beliefs” and “power structures”) 4. The Policy Feedback Theory (think “past policies impact new ones”) 5. The Social Construction Theory (think “deserving and undeserving, powerful and powerless populations and how policies are shaped for and by them”) 6. Or the Narrative Policy Framework (think “policy debates as battles of narratives and stories”) Despite the complexity of the field, most policy scholars agree that there are six key elements that are essential when trying to explain policy choices: Slide 5 of 15: Slide 5 transcript: These elements are: ● Institutions (rules, norms, practices, relationships) ● Networks or subsystems (relationships between actors) ● Ideas and beliefs (worldviews, shared definitions, knowledge, value systems) ● Policy context (cultural context, public opinion) ● Events (routine or unanticipated) And these factors all influence policy actors and their choices. Many conventional KMb approaches assume that individuals make rational decisions based upon systematic analysis of the information available to them. By contrast, most policy theories assume the policy actors to make boundedly rational decisions. This means that decisions are made based on the – 150 often limited- information at hand that will be integrated into pre-existing belief systems, values, experiences, and allegiances of the individual. Is there anything here that surprises you? Or, asked in another way: do you notice the absence of a particular factor that much of academia focuses on? That’s right, scientific evidence is not one of those key elements impacting policy choice. In fact, all policy theories have one thing in common: they neither conceptualize scientific evidence as the central driver to policy choice and change, nor do they assume an information deficit among the decision makers to be the main issue that needs to be overcome when one seeks to move evidence into policy action. Slide 6 of 15: Slide 6 transcript: The reality is this: “the path from evidence to policy is mediated by raw politics and power.” The policy realm is a highly context-specific, contested, and polarized environment. Different forms of information and evidence compete with each other and with deeply held value systems and believes. To add to the complexity, the policy realm is riddled with power dynamics that can be difficult to uncover. Ok, let that sink in: evidence is not a main driver in most policy decisions – even if the evidence is extremely convincing. And even if it is summarized and communicated well. Chances are, you have come to this realization by yourself in the past. But as an academic, trained to uncover evidence and generate knowledge, it is extremely hard to bid farewell to the assumption that “to know better means to do better” or that “the science speaks for itself”. You may bemoan this reality, but it is the reality, nonetheless. 151 Slide 7 of 15: Slide 7 transcript: The good news is: once we move on from a simplistic idea of the policy process and the way policy actors make decisions and acknowledge that it takes more than well-communicated evidence, we can open our minds to more effective strategies to sway decision makers. We will explore some of these strategies and tactics in more detail over the next few modules. For now, I am going to give a brief overview of the literature so that you can familiarize yourself with these insights before we delve into applying them to your particular context. 152 Slide 8 of 15: Slide 8 transcript: The policy theories and insights into decision-making processes of policy actors described earlier in this module provide very helpful information on strategies and tactics necessary to engage with the raw politics and the power dynamics that shape policy choices: For example, the Multiple Streams Approach (think “policy windows”) suggests that successful policy entrepreneurs - defined as “the agents for policy change who possess the knowledge, power, tenacity and luck to be able to exploit key opportunities” - can indeed help create windows of opportunities rather than just wait for them. As a successful policy entrepreneur, one would employ tactics of manipulation, for example through collective action using media advocacy, lobbying, or protests at strategically crucial points in time. Under the premise of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, coalition building and mobilizing becomes a particularly important strategy. This can be achieved through social movements or forming interest groups that directly lobby decision makers. The Narrative Policy Framework highlights the importance of stories and narratives that can be used strategically to manipulate and persuade decision makers, or in changing public opinion. 153 Slide 9 of 15: Slide 9 transcript: A quick note on some of the terms that I start using here: words such as “manipulation”, “persuasion”, “lobbying”, or even “activism” will trigger some pretty negative responses from some of you. Maybe not as strong as this image but still… So, let me take a moment to clarify something: Political scientists define these terms in a more “neutral” manner by offering the following definition: persuasion, manipulation, and lobbying are the “strategic use of information in combination with institutions and policy windows that changes context, meaning, and policy over time”. With that in mind, let’s also remember that we already established that the reality of policymaking is one of politics and power. These strategies and tactics acknowledge this reality and ultimately allow you to play the game. Nevertheless, we will return to these potential feelings of discomfort in module 7 where you will have an opportunity to reflect on the challenges and solutions that come along with this approach to KMb. 154 Slide 10 of 15: Slide 10 transcript: Now, some of you may ask “what about these things”? As an academic or scientist keen to enter the science-policy interface, you have probably spent a lot of time thinking about or even doing these activities. Why are these not listed on my slide of effective strategies? Are they not important? These actions can be important tools to incorporate into an overarching strategy. But they are very, very rarely effective as stand-alone tactics. We will learn more about the distinction and how tools and tactics can be integrated into a strategy in Module 6. For now, let’s look at some examples for inspiration. 155 Slide 11 of 15: Slide 11 transcript: Let’s bring some of these theoretical inputs to life. Here are some case examples of organizations that employ what we have just learned. I won’t go into the details of their work just yet. For now, I recommend visiting their websites to see a spectrum of academic/scientist activities at the science-policy interface. The first one is Generation Squeeze, a think and change tank founded and led by my PhD supervisor Paul Kershaw. Full disclosure: I am a voting member of the organization, so I have more insight into their work which is why I will continue to use Generation Squeeze as a case example throughout the following modules. Generation Squeeze is an organization that rallies public support for policy solutions (aka organizing) and then uses that support to advocate for policy decisions inside of the policy community (aka lobbying). 156 Slide 12 of 15: Slide 12 transcript: Another organization that uses a similar approach is the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment. They bring together organizations and individuals in campaigns to advocate for policy solutions and utilize the public support to lobby decision makers. Slide 13 of 15: Slide 13 transcript: Finally, I recommend checking out Scientist Rebellion, an organization that focuses specifically on putting “outside” pressure on decision makers by engaging in acts of civil disobedience. 157 Slide 14 of 15: Slide 14 transcript: To finish off this module, I want to evoke Paul Cairney once more. He says: “Scientists have a stark choice: to produce information and accept that it will have a limited impact (but that scientists will maintain an often-useful image of objectivity), or to go beyond one’s comfort zone, and expertise, to engage in a normative enterprise that can increase impact at the expense of objectivity.” If you are still certain you want to engage in the – quote – normative enterprise, then please continue on to Module 3… 158 Slide 15 of 15: Slide 15 transcript: …where you will start to apply the insights you have just learned to your own KMb project. We will begin this journey by picking your strategic target and identifying your people and resources. 4.3.2.3 Module 3: Strategic target and resources In this module, learners will begin to develop their strategic approach by identifying a strategic target and assessing which resources are needed to achieve this target The objectives for this module are: 1. differentiate between strategy, tactics, and tools and describe how they are integrated 2. reflect on and identify the strategic target of your own project 3. reflect on and identify constituency, leadership, available and needed resources Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on strategy Exercise 1 Module 3: Pick a strategic target (group exercise) Suggested Readings: Leading Change Network et al. Organizing: people, power, change. Section “Strategizing” p.30-34; Howard, C. (2020). Targeted change making for a healthy recovery. The Lancet Planetary Health, 4(9), e372-e374. 159 Case example: 350.org Exercise 2 Module 3: Who are our people/resources? (group exercise) Case example: Generation Squeeze Module slides and corresponding transcripts: Slide 1 of 10: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 3. In this module, we will begin to develop your KMb strategy by identifying a strategic target and assessing which resources you need to achieve this target The objectives for this module are: 1. Differentiate between strategy, tactics, and tools and describe how they are integrated 2. Reflect on an identify the strategic target of your own project 3. Reflect on and identify your constituency, your leadership, your available and needed resources 160 Slide 2 of 10: Slide 2 transcript: Marshall Ganz, a well-known practitioner and professor of community organizing, defines strategy as “turning what you have into what you need to achieve what you want.” Let’s look at this statement in more detail… Slide 3 of 10: Slide 3 transcript: The most common misunderstanding among academics is to skip the middle part of that statement. For many of us, a strategy would be to turn what you have (evidence) into what you want (change). The problem here is that this ignores the essence of what we learned in Module 2 – 161 namely that the path from evidence to policy is mediated by politics and power. A strategy is therefore how we navigate the political landscape and realities in a way that allows us to create the change we want to see. Slide 4 of 10: Slide 4 transcript: There is often some confusion about the distinction between strategy, tactics, and tools. We talk about a “social media strategy” or “communication strategies”. But for our purpose, it is very important to understand the distinction between these three terms because the literature on effective change making shows that a strategically integrated and diversified application of tactics and tools improves efficacy. Academics often tend to focus their efforts on the tactics and tools levels, for example by seeking media or science communication trainings. This can be explained again by the skipping of the middle part of the strategy definition. If I think all it needs is for the evidence to be shared widely and understandably for change to happen, then these activities seem to suffice. But, while these are important skills, they are not effective as stand-alone efforts. We will learn in Module 6 how tactics and tools can be integrated into an overarching strategy. The conceptualization that I found most helpful stems from the marketing and business development literature. This literature describes the concepts as existing in an integrated three-layer construct: Strategy is the overarching approach, tactics are the ways in which the strategy is implemented, and the tools are what is used to get it done. As an example: the strategy is to build political counterpower to industry influence on public opinion and decision makers; the tactic is organizing a grassroots movement; the tools are everything from (social) media marketing, to building relationships with decision makers and meeting with them, to timing one’s efforts right. For those for whom an image is a better mnemonic device: think of the strategy as the infamous large body of an iceberg that is submerged, tactics and tools are only the tip that one can see at first glance. 162 Slide 5 of 10: Slide 5 transcript: So, what is a strategic target? A strategic target is the evidence-aligned change with the most potential to improve whichever issues you are focusing on, for example air pollution in Canada, achievable by a given team with available resources in a specific context. The importance of the second part of this definition cannot be overstated. Particularly as academics, we often tend to think big and academic journal articles often end with very general recommendations for policy change. For your strategic target, you have to be as precise as possible while taking into consideration the real-world constraints to achieving this goal. As an example, if your group works on issues related to climate change in Canada, your strategic target cannot be “solve climate change” or even “completely transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy by 2050”. Strategic targets are developed around points of leverage that your group can harness. So, in the example of climate change in Canada, the strategic target should focus on something tangible that your group can achieve and be passionate about because a good strategic target always has to be a motivational force! There are endless possibilities from getting your institution to commit to reducing their executives’ air travel, to getting your professional governing body to divest their funds from fossil fuels – as long as the target is achievable for your group given your resources and is evidence-aligned (meaning that it aims to introduce measures that have been proven to impact climate change). A word on the motivational force piece of a strategic target. Academic groups have a tendency to focus on what I call intermediaries to action such as developing strategic plans, commitments, or similar deliverables. While those are important, they are usually only the first steps towards generating action. If you want your constituency engaged and excited about your strategic target, I highly recommend going beyond these intermediaries and developing a strategic target that has the potential to create tangible impact. 163 Slide 6 of 10: Slide 6 transcript: To make this all a bit clearer, let me describe a case example for you. Many of you have probably heard of the organization 350.org. 350.org is now an international grass-roots movement with campaigns in over 70 countries. It was founded in 2008 by author Bill McKibben and friends, many of whom were academics at the time. Their overall strategic target was and is to “stop fossil fuel projects everywhere” – granted, this is a lofty goal. But they are a global movement… So, they aim to achieve their strategic target by building a global climate movement that would put pressure on decision makers to reduce fossil fuel production => The strategy is to build political counterpower. One of their tactics as a global counterpower movement – and probably the one they are most known for – is to halt fossil fuel finance by campaigning for divestment from the fossil fuel industry. In order to achieve this goal, they employ a myriad of different tools: a vast mass and social media presence, organization of protests, educational material, lobbying, or collaborations with many other organizations across the globe, just to name a few. Note, this breakdown of their strategy is on the macro level, i.e., internationally. But they have many local campaigns that break down this overarching strategy into smaller targets and goals such as university-based groups lobbying their institutions to divest. 164 Slide 7 of 10: Slide 7 transcript: This exercise is meant to help you identify your strategic target. I recommend discussing the questions in small groups of no more than 4 or 5 people. If there are more people who are working with you on the same initiative, I highly recommend achieving consensus and clarity on your strategic target with everyone before moving on to the next steps. In your small groups, discuss and identify responses to the following questions: ● 1. What problem do we need to solve? ● 2. How will the world change if we solve it? ● 3. What does this reveal about our strategic target? Remember, it is extremely important to develop your strategic target relative to your resources (more on that in the next exercise). For now, that means that you need to be as specific in your responses as you can. Questions 2 and 3 are meant to help you reflect on the evidence alignment of your target – is what you are aiming to do actually helpful in achieving the change you want to see? “The world” here means anything from your institution to the actual globe. Be creative but realistic ;-) 165 Slide 8 of 10: Slide 8 transcript: This exercise is meant to help you become more aware what your resources are and who you are trying to mobilize or who is in your group, respectively. In your small groups, discuss and identify responses to the following questions: 1. Who is our constituency? 2. Who is our leadership? 3. What kind of resources do we have available (time, money, skill sets)? 4. Who/what else do we need to attract to our team given our strategic target? Constituents are people who have a need to organize, who can contribute leadership, can commit resources, and can become a new source of power. The goal is to turn a community – people who share common values or interests – into a constituency – people who can act on behalf of those values or interests. Leaders within the constituency are those who have Leaders within the constituency: those with the skills to organize and lead the constituency. Keep in mind that this is not necessarily the PI who leads a research project or the public face of an organization. Just like in the last exercise, the more precise you can be, the better. That includes listing names of people in your constituency and leadership group. There is often a tendency in question 3 to talk about things that are possible vs. what you actually have (e.g. grants you could apply for). For now, try to resist that and only list the resources you actually have. Question 4 is then what else you would need in order to reach your strategic target. This question is meant to help you reflect on your strategic target and whether it clearly aligns with the resources you have available. 166 Slide 9 of 10: Slide 9 transcript: Let’s revisit the definition of strategy that we saw at the beginning of this module. Through the exercises in this module, you now have a pretty good idea of the first part of that sentence: what you have and the last part of the sentence: what you want. In the next module, we will talk about what you need… Slide 10 of 10: Slide 10 transcript: …and that means we will talk about power. 167 4.3.2.4 Module 4: Power In this module, learners will further refine their strategy by identifying powerful players as they relate to the strategic target. The objectives for this module are: 1. describe the role and importance of power and politics in the policymaking arena and their meaning for KMb activities 2. conduct an environmental scan of powerful players in the context of their own KMb activity/strategy Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on the role of power in the policymaking process/in politics Suggested readings: Leading Change Network et al. Organizing: people, power, change. Section “Strategizing” p.30-34; Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming Common Anxieties in Knowledge Translation: Advice for Scholarly Issue Advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. p. 5-8; Raphael, D. (2015). Beyond policy analysis: the raw politics behind opposition to healthy public policy. Health Promotion International, 30(2), 380-396. Exercise 1 Module 4: Player mapping (group exercise) Exercise 2 Module 4: Revisit your strategic target given what you now know about power (group exercise) Module slides and corresponding transcripts: 168 Slide 1 of 7: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 4. In this module, you will further develop your strategy by identifying powerful players in the context of your strategic target. The objectives for this module are: 1. describe the role and importance of power and politics in the policymaking arena and their meaning for KMb activities 2. conduct an environmental scan of powerful players in the context of your own KMb activity/strategy 169 Slide 2 of 7: Slide 2 transcript: Marshall Ganz says that “Power is not a thing, quality, or trait. Power is a relationship among interests and resources.” This means that policies are often a representation of interests of a particular group who have the resources to see their interests made a priority. Organizing, then, focuses on power: who has it, who does not, and how to build enough of it to shift the power relationship. That shift is what makes change. 170 Slide 3 of 7: Slide 3 transcript: For this purpose, you can think about power in terms of who can create the change you want to see. Many of us understand the formal policy process and will immediately identify elected officials to have the power. However, this is often a misleading assumption as these elected officials, as we know from module 2, are subject to influence and pressure from many different players. So, in the following exercise, you will start to identify these players in the context of your strategic target. Remember this: what they may want can be vastly different from what you want, even if the underlying values align. As an example, you may want to implement a climate just housing policy in your city. While the decision makers may agree with your values, they may not in fact want to achieve the same thing. Instead, what they really want is political cover, or a bigger budget allocated to their housing department, or attract more real estate investment etc. Always try and see the issue from the other players’ perspective and do not assume that they have the same values. 171 Slide 4 of 7: Slide 4 transcript: Be as precise as you can be, identify people by name, if you can. Supporters are people whose interests are not directly affected but may find it worthwhile to support your organization financially, politically, voluntarily, etc. E.g.: faith communities who backed the civil rights movement. Competition or collaborators share some of your interests but not all, they may target the same constituency, the same sources of support, and face the same opposition. E.g.: two unions trying to organize the same workforce; however, they may also become collaborators Others are actors who have great relevance but could either contribute to solving the problem or make it harder. E.g., media, general public, courts etc. Opposition are groups whose interests are in conflict with your own, meaning they do not share the same values. E.g., an employer’s interest to maximize profit opposes the employee’s interest to earn a comfortable wage. 172 Slide 5 of 7: Slide 5 transcript: Now that you know the different players in the field, it is time to track down the power. As stated initially, those with the most resources are those who can realize their interests. But do not mistake resources for money only. Resources can be anything from public support to positive public image, to access to decision makers, to skillful lobbying etc. Discuss responses to the two questions in this exercise and it will help you understand who has the power to create the change you want. 173 Slide 6 of 7: Slide 6 transcript: It is time to revisit your strategic target given what you now know about who has the power and what it is that you can give them in order to have their interests met. In your small groups, reflect on these three questions: 1. What exactly is the problem you are trying to solve? 2. Why has it not been solved yet? 3. What does this reveal about your strategic target? 174 Slide 7 of 7: Slide 7 transcript: Great, now that you have identified who has the power to create the change you want to see and have revisited your strategic target in light of these insights, you will take the first step towards planning your actions in actually achieving the strategic target. Coming up next, you will develop your theory of change. 4.3.2.5 Module 5: Theory of change In this module, learners will develop their project’s theory of change. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. explain what a theory of change is 2. develop the theory of change for their own project (that is not an information deficit model) Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on theories of change Suggested readings: Leading Change Network et al. Organizing: people, power, change. Section “strategizing” p. 35 Case example: Generation Squeeze Exercise 1 Module 5: Develop your theory of change (group exercise) Module slides and corresponding transcripts: 175 Slide 1 of 6: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 5. In this module, you will develop your project’s theory of change. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. explain what a theory of change is 2. develop the theory of change for your own project (that is not an information deficit model) 176 Slide 2 of 6: Slide 2 transcript: A theory of change is a statement that makes explicit your assumptions about how your actions will lead to the change you want to see. In the power builder strategy that you are developing in this workshop, that theory of change will be based on power relationships. Essentially, your theory of change will be the response to the question “how can we organize our resources to give us enough leverage to get what we want?” It can be encapsulated in one sentence: “If we do X, then Y, because Z”. The “because” part of the sentence is really essential and is the core of why and how you think your resources can lead to the change you want to see. 177 Slide 3 of 6: Slide 3 transcript: That can all sound a bit, well, theoretical. So, I wanted to showcase what I mean by going through a case example. Generation Squeeze is an advocacy organization that works towards generational equity in Canada. They focus on highly complex and contested policy issues such as housing, climate change, or affordable childcare. Their theory of change is based on power relationships between the public and policy makers. In the one-sentence statement, their theory of change would be the following: “If we organize to marshal opinion, evidence, and person power to alter political incentives, then policies will become more equitable for all generations because governments respond to those who organize and show up” 178 Slide 4 of 6: Slide 4 transcript: Ok, with that example in mind, you can give it a try and develop your own theory of change. First, discuss the answer to these two questions: What do those in power (who we identified in the last module) want? And what would it take to solve the problem? Then, reflect if you have what they want. If not, can you leverage your resources to generate what they want? The responses to these questions then guide your theory of change which will be expressed in one sentence as: “If we do X, then Y, because Z”. The “because” part of the sentence is really essential and is the core of why you and how you think your resources can lead to the change you want to see. It may take quite some time to really “nail” your theory of change. It may also change over time as you learn more and more about the power dynamics in your area. But for now, it should act as a guidepost for your strategy. And it cannot be “if we communicate the evidence to those in power, then they will act upon this evidence, because it is of high quality, convincing and understandable”. You would be surprised by how often people will come back to this statement; it is just so tempting… 179 Slide 5 of 6: Slide 5 transcript: Ok, let’s recap briefly: You now know what you want since you have identified your strategic target. You also know who the players in your area are and to what degree they share your interests and values; you also know who has the power to create the change you want to see. Based on these insights, you have created your theory of change that tells you how you can turn what you have into what you need. Congratulations, you now have created the basis for your strategy! All that’s left to do is think about how you will bring this strategy to life… 180 Slide 6 of 6: Slide 6 transcript: …and that is coming up in the next module on strategy, tactics, tools, and timing. 4.3.2.6 Module 6: Strategy, tactics, tools, and timing In this module, learners will start to think about the tactics and tools they might employ to bring their strategy to life. They will also be made aware of the importance of defining a timeline and appropriate timing of their activities. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. generate a list of possible tactics and tools that will help you get to your strategic target and lay out an estimate for a timeline 2. prepare an organizing sentence that will integrate your strategic target, tactics, and timeline Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on strategy, tactics and tools Suggested readings: Leading Change Network et al. Organizing: people, power, change. Section “Acting” p. 36-41; Jonathan Haidt: The righteous mind – why good people are divided by politics and religion p. 150 – 216 Exercise 1 Module 6: Tactics and timeline (group exercise) Exercise 2 Module 6: Organizing sentence (group exercise) 181 Case example: Generation Squeeze Module slides and corresponding transcripts: Slide 1 of 12: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 6. In this module, you will start to think about the tactics and tools you might employ to bring your strategy to life. We will also talk about the importance of timing your efforts right. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. Generate a list of possible tactics and tools that will help you get to your strategic target and lay out an estimate for a timeline 2. Prepare an organizing sentence that will integrate your strategic target, tactics, and timeline 182 Slide 2 of 12: Slide 2 transcript: Let’s recap what we learned in module 3: a strategy is the overarching approach that you take in your KMb plan, tactics are the ways in which the strategy is implemented, and the tools are what is used to get it done. The example I used was this: the strategy is to build political counterpower to industry influence on public opinion and decision makers; the tactic is organizing a grassroots movement; the tools are everything from (social) media marketing, to building relationships with decision makers and meeting with them, to timing one’s efforts right. For those for whom an image is a better mnemonic device: think of the strategy as the infamous large body of an iceberg that is submerged, tactics and tools are only the tip that one can see at first glance. Did you notice that we are six modules into this workshop and only now has the moment come to think about tools - as opposed to the tendency of many to start with the tools? This is a common problem in academic KMb and one I truly hope you will be able to avoid after this workshop. 183 Slide 3 of 12: Slide 3 transcript: As Marshall Ganz puts it: - read quote – Your organization will quickly get into trouble if you use a tactic just because you happen to be familiar with it but haven’t figured out how that tactic can actually help you achieve your goal. This pitfall is all too common among academic KMb activities who often focus scarce resources on producing outputs such as policy briefs or infographics without incorporating them into a strategy. Similarly, if you spend all your time strategizing, without investing the time, effort, and skill to learn how to use the tactics you need skillfully, you will have wasted your time. 184 Slide 4 of 12: Slide 4 transcript: Ok, let’s begin with strategy. When looking back at the previous modules, we can put together what you have come up with and turn it into your strategy. You now know what you want since you have identified your strategic target. You know who your people are and what kinds of resources you have at your disposal. You also know who has the power to create the change you want to see and what it takes to solve the problem. Based on these insights, you have created your theory of change that tells you how you can turn what you have into what you need. Congratulations, you have created the basis for your strategy! All that’s left to do is think about how you will bring this strategy to life… 185 Slide 5 of 12: Slide 5 transcript: Your organization will quickly get into trouble if you use a tactic just because you happen to be familiar with it but haven’t figured out how that tactic can actually help you achieve your goal. Similarly, if you spend all your time strategizing, without investing the time, effort, and skill to learn how to use the tactics you need skillfully, you will have wasted your time. The right tactic for your strategy will a) Be strategic, meaning that it will result in concrete progress toward your strategic target b) Strengthen your organization in that it attracts and engages people c) Develop individuals in your constituency in their leadership and advocacy skills 186 Slide 6 of 12: Slide 6 transcript: Here are some examples of what a tactic is: - Shaping public opinion - Mobilizing collective action - Lobbying - Civil disobedience - Litigation And here are some examples for tools that can be used across these tactics: - Social media presence - Op-ed - Policy brief - Building relationships with decision makers 187 Slide 7 of 12: Slide 7 transcript: Two very essential considerations for the implementation of your strategy are timing and timeline. By timing, I mean the strategic execution of your tactics regarding events that shape the pathway to your strategic goal. As an example, the time of partisan campaigns before elections is a crucial moment to influence party platforms and help set the course for future policies. However, it might not be a particularly strategic time to achieve policy formulation or implementation. Another example is consideration of parliamentary timelines such as budget sessions (if one’s strategic target is related to the budget). One consideration for the academic in particular is that policy timelines are often relatively short and might not be easily aligned with either one’s own research agenda or the academic calendar and its deadlines. It may pay off to anticipate such time conflicts well in advance and prioritize accordingly. By timeline, I mean the road map your organization develops and follows in terms of the implementation of your tactical steps as depicted in this graphic. It is rarely the case that you will achieve your strategic goal with a one-off tactical action. Rather, your KMb plan will evolve over time as the capacity of your organization grows. During the foundation, the goal is capacity building. It is wise to focus heavily on relationship-building during this time. The kick-off is the time when the KMb plan officially springs into action. A kick-off event can take the form of a big meeting with the goal to rally everyone around the cause, to motivate people, and to clarify roles. The peaks are the actual “bursts” of activity in which we employ tactics and tools in order to get closer to our strategic target. These activities rest on each other and require increasing capacity of the team. For example, If the goal is to mobilize public pressure to block a certain policy in parliament, the first peak activity may be an op-ed in a newspaper; the next may be a larger social media presence gathering 188 followers; the next peak may be provision and distribution of a tool kit for individuals to take actions in their ridings; the mountain top may then be a 1:1 meeting with senior-level decision makers with the goal to convince them to block the policy. Finally, always evaluate your KMb plan – what worked, what didn’t work and why. And always celebrate wins and the hard work that went into the plan even if it wasn’t successful. Slide 8 of 12: Slide 8 transcript: Here is an example of Generation Squeeze’s tactics tool kit: this organization’s overall strategy is to organize a large number of people in order to alter political incentives for decision makers. They do so through shifting public opinion, framing policy beliefs, setting an agenda around those beliefs and building a coalition around the agenda. Tools include a prominent presence in the mass media (e.g., weekly op-ed in the Globe and Mail), a growing social media presence, collaborations with other organizations who share the same goals, voter’s guides (“report cards”) for provincial and federal elections, and fostering strong relationships with policy insiders. 189 Slide 9 of 12: Slide 9 transcript: This exercise is meant to get you started on developing a more precise plan through which you will execute your strategy. In your small group, discuss possible tactics and tools that may help you achieve your strategic target. In this discussion, make sure you consider your team’s current skill set as well as the potential for development and capacity building. Second, try and lay out a rough timeline for the implementation of these tactics. As you do so, keep in mind timing considerations such as elections or other external factors that may dictate when you take certain steps. 190 Slide 10 of 12: Slide 10 transcript: We will conclude this workshop’s intent to support you in developing your own KMb plan by working on your organizing sentence. This statement is a great way to tie together your strategy, tactics, and timeline. It is crucial to get this right as, similar to your theory of change, this statement will serve as a guidepost throughout your KMb plan. Slide 11 of 12: Slide 11 transcript: In this final exercise, you and your group will revisit your strategic target, your theory 191 of change, your ideas about tactics and tools, and your timeline. Does this all fit together or are there remaining issues that need to be discussed and resolved? Finally, try and formulate your organizing sentence “We are organizing WHO (=your people/constituency) to what OUTCOME (=strategic target) through HOW (=tactic) by WHEN (=timeline)” This sentence will guide your actions and will need to be revisited as your make progress in your KMb strategy. Slide 12 of 12: Slide 12 transcript: Congratulations! You have now developed a first blueprint for your KMb plan. Keep in mind, this is a living document and will need to be adjusted as you gather experience on what works and what doesn’t. In our next module, we will look at some of the challenges and benefits of doing this work, particularly as an academic. 4.3.2.7 Module 7: Challenges In this module, learners will hear results from this study on the experiences of academic advocates and activists. They also have the opportunity to reflect on the challenges that they themselves are facing in this work. They will identify beneficial and facilitating factors that can make this work easier for them and connect to other members in the group over these solutions. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. acknowledge challenges and barriers to advocacy work specific to an academic 2. conceptualize mitigating factors and approaches that address these challenges 192 Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation on findings from my study with academic advocates Suggested readings: Paul Cairney’s blog post on how far should you go to privilege evidence; Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming Common Anxieties in Knowledge Translation: Advice for Scholarly Issue Advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. p. 10-12 Exercise 1 Module 7: Reflection and potential remedies (group discussion) Module slides and corresponding transcripts: Slide 1 of 7: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to Module 7. In this module, you will hear results from a study on the experiences of academic advocates and activists. You will also have the opportunity to reflect on the challenges that you are facing in this work. As a group, you will identify beneficial and facilitating factors that can make this work easier for you. The learning objectives for this module are: 1. Acknowledge challenges and barriers to advocacy work specific to an academic 2. Conceptualize mitigating factors that address these challenges 193 Slide 2 of 7: Slide 2 transcript: For my PhD, I conducted interviews with 17 academic advocates and activists in Canada, the US, and the UK. I asked them to identify barriers to being an advocate or activist and, conversely, factors that they use as facilitators to this work. I am sure it comes as no surprise to you that the most frequently described barriers all lie within the academic system – the significant time commitment to activism does not align with the lack of incentives for such activities. And even though there are pockets within academia where this is changing, the overall culture within the academy also does not foster activism. Interestingly, only one participant mentioned a lack of resources as barrier to their advocacy work. Participants further describe facilitators that help in navigating and overcoming certain barriers. For example, many participants would describe that building a reputation as an expert (mostly via conventional academic activities) on a certain subject was both helpful to maintain their status and respect at the university while others reflected that the reputation also helped open doors for their activism (such as being contacted for interviews, etc.). Using one’s credibility as an academic frequently gets used strategically to be more effective as an activist. Support from others is described as a safety net to mitigate potential risks of one’s activism and as an encouragement to keep going. Only one participant describes strategically referring to their university’s strategic plan as cover for their activism activities. 194 Slide 3 of 7: Slide 3 transcript: The conversation about being an academic advocate would not be complete if I didn’t explore associated risks and benefits. There are prominent of academics who have had to pay great professional and personal costs for their activism and the fear of such repercussions is real amongst our peers. However, as my study shows, these risks may not be as ubiquitous as we might think. While some participants of the study have had setbacks, all of them continue to engage in their activism activities, despite the risks. The most commonly mentioned potential risk was a threat to one’s wellbeing, followed by a perceived threat to one’s reputation and career disadvantages. Fewer participants worried about being perceived as biased or suffering financial burden. Although these risks exist across the board, they seem to be more elevated for efforts that are more confrontational such as civil disobedience. Regarding how best to navigate these tensions, the essence of the interview findings is “do it anyways”. Factors that make it easier to “do it anyways” are supportive peers, superiors, and institutions, a culture shift within the academy, as well as friendships with like-minded individuals. Notably, this study shows that these negative consequences are not ubiquitous. In fact, some participants actually describe a benefit to their academic career, although these were all participants who employ more power neutral tactics. Most participants also report experiencing a deep sense of fulfillment and purpose due to their advocacy and activism efforts and develop stronger relationships with their like-minded peers and partners beyond academia. 195 Slide 4 of 7: Slide 4 transcript: -read bullet points- Slide 5 of 7: Slide 5 transcript: Ok, now over to you. This exercise gives you the chance to reflect on the challenges that you may encounter in this process and what factors or circumstances may serve as potential remedies. I recommend beginning by taking a few minutes to write down the first 3 to 5 challenges or 196 risks that you anticipate or have experienced as you are embarking on this journey. Then go on and share this in your small group and come up with ways to mitigate these challenges together. Please share your top 3 ideas with the larger group at the end of the exercise. Slide 6 of 7: Slide 6 transcript: I’d like to leave you with this quote by one of my study participants. This person is a scholar who has been arrested for their participation in a peaceful act of civil disobedience. I find this very powerful. 197 Slide 7 of 7: Slide 7 transcript: We will end this workshop with a brief overview and summary of what we have learned and an opportunity for you to present your KMb plan to the group - coming up in the next and final module. 4.3.2.8 Module 8: Summary In this module, learners will recapture the workshop content. They will have the opportunity to present the road map for their own projects that they have begun to design throughout this workshop. Learning objectives: 1. solidification of learned concepts 2. presentation of own KMb plan and opportunity to receive feedback Lecture component: PowerPoint presentation with summary of the learnings (in the form of a step-by-step guide) Exercise 1 Module 8: Presentation of KMb plans by workshop participants Module slides and corresponding transcripts: 198 Slide 1 of 12: Slide 1 transcript: Welcome to the final module in this workshop. In this module, we will recapture what you have learned. You will have the opportunity to present the road map for your own project that you have begun to design throughout this workshop. I look forward to hearing your ideas! Learning objectives: 1. Solidification of learned concepts 2. Presentation of own KMb plan and opportunity to receive feedback 199 Slide 2 of 12: Slide 2 transcript: The goal of this workshop was to start developing a strategy for an impactful, power-building KMb strategy. Let’s remember Marshall Ganz’s quote on what we mean by strategy: - read quote – Throughout this workshop, we learned a) Why power building strategies are important and potentially more effective than power neutral strategies and tactics (through a brief review of the literature on KMb and effective change making) b) Where we stand in terms of willingness to engage in activities that go beyond what is typically done by academics, what the challenges are that we may face and how to overcome them c) How to get started on our own strategy, what a good theory of change constitutes, and what tactics and tools we should consider bringing our strategy to life In the following, we will go through the steps on the way again to recap what we have learned and applied before each group has a chance to present their own KMb strategy and receive feedback from the audience. 200 Slide 3 of 12: Slide 3 transcript: All policy theories have one thing in common: they neither conceptualize scientific evidence as the central driver to policy choice and change, nor do they assume an information deficit among the decision makers to be the main issue that needs to be overcome when one seeks to move evidence into policy action. The reality is this: The policy realm is a highly context-specific, contested, and polarized environment. Different forms of information and evidence compete with each other and with deeply held value systems and beliefs. To add to the complexity, the policy realm is riddled with power dynamics that can be difficult to uncover. Keep in mind: evidence is not a main driver in most policy decisions – even if the evidence is extremely convincing. And even if it is communicated well. This means that in our strategies and tactics, we have to move away from those that focus on communicating the evidence and towards those that aim to build power. Chances are, you have come to this realization by yourself in the past. But as an academic, trained to uncover evidence and generate knowledge, it is extremely hard to bid farewell to the assumption that “to know better means to do better” or that “the science speaks for itself”. You may bemoan this reality, but it is a reality, nonetheless. 201 Slide 4 of 12: Slide 4 transcript: Once we have embraced the necessity to be more strategic in our KMb activities, we begin by picking a strategic target. A strategic target is the evidence-aligned change with the most potential to improve whichever issues you are focusing on, for example air pollution in Canada, achievable by a given team with available resources in a specific context. In other words: it is the outcome you want to see. For your strategic target, you have to be as precise as possible while taking into consideration the real-world constraints to achieving this goal. And it has to be something you can be passionate about because it needs to function as a motivational force for you and your colleagues or constituency. Questions that help us in identifying the strategic target are: 1. What problem do we need to solve? 2. How will “the world” change if we solve it? 3. What does this reveal about our strategic target? 202 Slide 5 of 12: Slide 5 transcript: The next step in your KMb plan is to track down the power. Now that you have established what it is that you want, you need to ask yourself: who truly has the power to create the change we want to see? Is it us? Is it others? Again, it is immensely helpful to gain clarity about what it is that you want to achieve before you move on to think about who can achieve what you want. Slide 6 of 12: 203 Slide 6 transcript: Next, we want to revisit the strategic target given what we now know about who has the power and what it is that we can give them in order to have their interests met. Did your strategic target change? Slide 7 of 12: Slide 7 transcript: Then, you think about what it is that those in power want – this is very important as it is often not the same thing that you want. Remember the example from module 4 on power: You may want to implement a climate just housing policy in your city. While the decision makers may agree with your values, they may not in fact want to achieve the same thing. Instead, what they really want is political cover, or a bigger budget allocated to their housing department, or attract more real estate investment etc. Always try and see the issue from the other players’ perspective and do not assume that they have the same values. Once you have a complete understanding of these questions, you will be able to formulate your theory of change, expressed as “if we do X, then Y, because Z”. The theory of change will be your guidepost as you develop and implement your KMb plan. But keep in mind that it can and likely will change over time. 204 Slide 8 of 12: Slide 8 transcript: The last step in this workshop towards formulating a KMb plan is coming up with an organizing sentence. This statement is a great way to tie together your strategy, tactics, and timeline. Remember that it is crucial to get this right as, similar to your theory of change, this statement will serve as a guidepost throughout your KMb plan. This sentence will need to be revisited as you adapt your tactics and tools to the experiences you have while implementing your strategy. Slide 9 of 12: 205 Slide 9 transcript: We saw and discussed that there are obvious challenges, risks, and ethical dilemmas that come with this work. Even if we put the discussion whether scientists should become advocates and activists aside, there are still many questions that each academic advocate will need to critically reflect on ongoingly. This work can come with threats to your professional career and your personal life, ethical pitfalls abound, and/or it may take many years, if not decades, to reach one’s strategic target and/or take a considerable number of resources, both of materialistic as well as emotional nature. Or it may not work at all… These are factors that each of you will need to give some honest thought throughout your journey as academic advocates and activists. And keep in mind that there are factors that may make it easier, like surrounding yourself with supportive peers and superiors. Slide 10 of 12: Slide 10 transcript: Now it is time for you to present the KMb blueprint that you have developed throughout this workshop. Obviously, this will be a first draft, and we will take this opportunity to discuss open questions and issues to be worked out beyond this workshop. I am excited to hear what you have been working on. 206 Slide 11 of 12: Slide 11 transcript: Thank you all so much for your participation in this workshop. I know it can only serve as a first step on your journey towards creating impact and it will not always be easy. I will leave you with this quote by Paul Cairney that we already saw at an earlier moment during this workshop. Ultimately, the choice is up to you but hopefully, this workshop has given you some valuable tools in case you decide to engage in the normative enterprise that is effective KMb. Slide 12 of 12: 207 Slide 12 transcript: Please reach out to me via this email address if you have any questions, feedback, or would like to book this workshop (either as in-person or live online version) for your lab or organization. I would be happy to support your KMb plans in any way I can. Until then, good luck!!! 4.3.3 Critical reflections I cannot help but address the irony of my criticizing the information deficit assumption while at the same time providing a workshop that assumes and seeks to address an information deficit among my audience. However, one crucial difference is that this workshop is ultimately geared towards individuals and a change in their behaviour rather than organizational or policy-level change. Furthermore, the presumed audience of this workshop already has aligned belief and value systems in that they embrace the role of an advocate or activist academic. This workshop therefore makes use of the proverbial “open window” when someone is ready to apply new knowledge and provides them with the “ammunition” needed to create the change they want to see. While this workshop focuses on building capacity particularly with widening the horizon towards power navigation, it also highlights the importance of tactics of the information provider. By providing a step-by-step approach that participants can apply to the issue and context at hand, the workshop seeks to retain a flexibility in its content’s applicability across a variety of issues and contexts, including those where “truth telling” might be the strategy of choice. Still, this course will not resonate with everyone, and some participants may conclude that they do not want to go as far as this workshop suggests. This is a justified and important realization, which is why I built in an exercise that allows for this reflection at the beginning of the workshop, and again at the end. Just as not every academic makes a great teacher, not everyone will be a great knowledge mobilizer. This course still has the potential to enhance the skills of those who naturally gravitate towards this work, and who are willing to make the respective sacrifices and commitments. I aim to maximise the reach of this workshop via established community partnerships with not-for-profit organizations and academy-adjacent organizations such as the UBC Public Scholars Initiative, UBC Sustainability Scholars, UBC Climate Justice Centre, the Planetary Health Alliance, or the Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions. Repeatedly, I have had the experience in conversations with other academics that they are embracing the role of a knowledge mobilizer, but either have great difficulty understanding what it would really take to mobilize evidence into policy because they have never thought about more than end-of-grant KMb or lay summaries, and/or do not feel comfortable embracing the strategies, tactics, 208 tools suggested herein. This workshop nudges people towards a reflection of what would be needed in these cases. On the other hand, the group setting has proven to be a stimulating environment for sceptics to move past their criticism in past iterations of this workshop. I have piloted this workshop in a similar form with two groups: a not-for-profit organization that focuses on providing research evidence to activists in the just food system space and a group of academics who formed a network to coordinate advocacy and activism around health equity and climate justice concerns. Through these pilots I realized that, depending on their background, people will embrace the workshop content more easily – or not. Participants in the non-profit group immediately were on board with the power-building strategic approach and were able to develop their strategic plan with that lens in mind more easily than the group of academics. The latter had a difficult time, in general, to move away from the information deficit assumption. In fact, it took a full day of workshop for one of the participants to comment: “I am starting to think that my skills as a researcher have nothing to do with the skills needed to become an activist”. This makes me reflect further on the necessity to be mindful about the beliefs and values held by people who take the workshop. Even if they are committed to engage in advocacy and activism that goes beyond their usual mandate, this may not mean that they are immediately on the same page about the how. Finally, there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness of this workshop in terms of achieving its learning outcomes, not to mention its effectiveness in generating more impactful academic advocates/activists. The intention is to complete such an evaluation moving forward as I embark on disseminating this workshop to a growing number of people. 209 5 Conclusions This dissertation provides three distinct scholarly contributions: In Chapter 2, I present a conceptual framework that synthesizes and considers theories of the policymaking process as well as the literature on strategies, tactics, and tools to create policy-level change. In this framework, I describe four archetypes in terms of participants’ knowledge mobilization (KMb) approaches: the advisor, the advocate, the activist, and the insider. These archetypes are somewhat fluid categories along two axes: (i) where participants exert their influence - inside vs. outside of the policy community - and (ii) how they strategically approach their KMb activities from “power navigator” to “information provider”. This synthesis and interpretation of a multidisciplinary literature provides the answer to research question 1 (what practice-relevant learnings can be generated from a multidisciplinary literature on effective policy and political change making?). If one operates based on an information deficit assumption and under the evidence-based policymaking ideal, the strategy of choice will be truth telling with tactics such as expert advice or public intellectual. Insights into this approach mostly live in the KMb literature. By contrast, the literature in the political sciences, social movement scholarship, marketing, or moral psychology operates based on more complex theories of change that take into consideration realities such as power dynamics, politics, values and beliefs, and ambiguity in human decision-making. Once one accepts and embraces these realities, the strategy of choice should be that of a power navigator with tactics such as movement building or lobbying. In Chapter 3, I present empirical data from a study of 17 academic advocates and activists in Canada, the US, and the UK. The individuals included in this study represent the four archetypes described in the conceptual framework in Chapter 2. Responding to research questions 2 to 5 (How do academic advocates seek to influence climate-related policy? What are the challenges and/or opportunities that academic advocates encounter and how do they navigate these issues? Which factors explain the choice of strategy, tactics, and tools? And what gaps in the strategic capacity emerge when these insights are compared to the multidisciplinary literature on policy change and KMb and why does this gap persist?), this study reveals the following key insights: i. Most participants lack intentional strategic thinking and integration of tactics and tools into an overarching strategy that is anchored in the literature on change making, particularly in the literature that calls for a power navigating strategic approach, even if they use sophisticated tools. 210 ii. The choice of tactics and strategic alignment (i.e., which archetype category one falls into) is mostly intuitive rather than intentional and is informed by one’s identity (i.e., what one believes to be right or wrong as an academic) and underlying theories of change (i.e., implicit assumptions about how change is made, such as an information deficit model). Participants who hold more complex theories of change tend to align themselves conceptually with the power navigation strategy; however, if they also believe that it is not appropriate for an academic to engage in power navigation, they will instead employ tactics of the information provider. iii. The intrinsic motivation to create change is a very strong driver among participants. This means that, in this sample, contextual factors such as time constraints, job security, disciplinary field, or even compounded risks and barriers for racialized and otherwise marginalized participants are described as making the work “harder” but are not deterrents from engaging in advocacy and activism. iv. Most participants are willing to engage in capacity building opportunities but focus mostly on improving their tools (e.g., science communication, media workshops). v. There is a dearth of training and capacity building offerings for academic advocates that go beyond improving stand-alone tools. This is an opportunity for KMb scholarship and practice to better integrate insights from a broad range of literatures, mobilize these insights beyond their own field, and ultimately contribute to a better-equipped academic KMb force. In Chapter 4, I present a workshop that serves as an opportunity for academic advocates and activists to grow their capacities as power navigators. The curriculum is designed in a way that helps the participants move on from an intuitive to a more intentional approach to their KMb activities. More specifically, the workshop helps participants break down Ganz’s strategy advice to “turn what you have into what you need” into actionable steps. It guides participants through activities that allow them to build a power navigating strategy and apply it to their specific KMb project and contexts at hand. The workshop does not only assume an information deficit among participants but also engages them in reflections and discussions about belief and value systems. In the following, I discuss in more detail the conclusions that emerge from these findings and how they build upon each other, culminating in and informing the curriculum of the workshop that responds to the findings from Chapters 2 and 3. 211 The study paints a nuanced picture of strategic and tactical approaches to academic advocacy as described by participants. The power navigator engages in the realities of politics inside the policy community (e.g., civil servant, partisan activities, or lobbying/influencing), or as an outsider putting pressure on decision makers via tactics such as social movements or civil disobedience. The information provider aims to maintain the status of an “objective” advisor via tactics such as acting as an expert witness or public intellectual. These two pathways should be seen as very overarching, rather loose constructs. However, as shared by my participants, there is a tendency to subscribe to one of the two categories, at least in attitude, even if someone employs tactics from within the other category. To avoid contrasting power navigation and truth telling in a way that creates a false binary, throughout this dissertation, I feature a quadrant in my conceptual framework that is meant to represent a fluid spectrum. In this study I found that the choice between the four archetypes and the corresponding tactics is intuitive rather than intentional for most participants. This lack of intentional strategic thinking and integration of tactics and tools into an overarching strategy that is anchored in the literature on change making is the primary knowledge and skills gap among participants. The literature I refer to in this work makes clear that evidence “competes” with other factors that shape the policymaking process. In order to be an effective advocate for evidence-based decision-making in policy, one must engage with these other factors. While these factors vary by context, it can generally be assumed that institutions (rules, norms, practices, and relationships), networks or subsystems (relationships between actors), ideas or beliefs (worldviews, beliefs, knowledge, shared definitions, solutions within groups), policy context (e.g., cultural context or public opinion), and events (routine such as elections or unanticipated such as natural disasters) heavily influence the policy decision (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). A strategy, in my conceptualization of it, then represents an integration of tactics into an overarching approach to change making that not only considers these factors but actively uses them within the given context. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, I find Marshall Ganz’s definition of strategy most useful here: “Strategy is to turn what you have (evidence, people, resources) into what you need (power) to get what you want (policy change)” (Ganz, 2006). An intentional strategic approach would therefore focus much of its action on the middle part (“turn what you have into what you need”). While this may sound simple, it can be highly complex to operationalize this overarching idea into tangible action and adapt it to the context and goals at hand. The workshop presented in Chapter 4 therefore helps participants break down the “turning what you have into what you need” into 212 actionable steps. Much of KMb research and practice focuses on improving truth telling tactics. The implications of my dissertation suggest the need to nudge people to embrace power navigation as a strategic pathway that is representative of a more intentional approach. The workshop also helps participants view power navigation as an appropriate approach for an academic and as a potentially more expedient strategy, particularly under circumstances and within contexts when truth telling as a stand-alone strategy is not enough. I agree with the literature that there is no “one size fits all” solution. The workshop is thus conceptualized in a way that allows the participants to develop a strategy that is in line with the context within which they find themselves. The steps outlined in the workshop are general enough in their nature that it can be applied for any given context as its primary aim is to understand the context at hand with all its complexity, and to define realistic strategic targets within that context, given the resources at hand. Once the workshop participants have gained clarity on the contextual factors, they are asked to develop a theory of change (ToC). In this study, I have found that the underlying ToCs for most participants are implicit and based on beliefs, assumptions, and sometimes experience rather than an empirical evidence base. The overarching approach of information providers is to provide more knowledge and evidence upon which others will act. Even if the academic advocate understands that evidence and knowledge are not the primary driver for policy change, they may still wish it were so (Cairney, 2017) and act accordingly (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). Consequently, the way in which I encourage workshop participants to think about their ToC is, again, in line with the literature on the competing factors to evidence in policy decisions, as well as Ganz’s understanding of strategy. Developing and making explicit a succinct ToC makes the design of a strategy much more intentional and less intuitive. A ToC states, “if we do X, then Y will happen, because Z” – the X being the tactics and tools, the Y being the strategic target or wanted change, and the Z being the reason why X leads to Y. Most often, the “because” statement will reveal what those in power want or need, or how their decision-making can be influenced. This then signals the tactics and tools needed to give more of what is wanted by those in the position to act on the evidence. An example of such a ToC is the following, taken from a strategy document by Generation Squeeze, a think and change tank advocating for intergenerational fairness in Canada, and a case example that I use in the workshop curriculum: “If we build a lobby as powerful as the Canadian Association of Retired Persons (CARP), Canadian governments will adapt policy as urgently for younger generations as they do for the aging population, because governments respond to those who organize and show up”. 213 It is very likely that the tactics of choice at which participants arrive will include tactics and tools often used by information providers. The difference is the intention with which these tactics and tools are deployed under a complex and context-specific ToC in line with a power navigation strategy. Going back to Generation Squeeze’s example above, what is needed is a powerful lobby or alliance through which citizens can organize and put pressure on decision makers. A powerful lobby or alliance can also generate political cover for decision makers whose value systems are aligned with the organization’s interest (see for example the Advocacy Coalition Framework as a theoretical underpinning for this assumption). When operating from a power-cognisant standpoint, (public) pressure or political cover are indeed frequent components of the “because” portion of a ToC, at least in liberal democracies where an engaged citizenry is part of the political system. Other possibilities include considerations of what those with the decision-making power want and either providing or withholding these resources. A good example for this would be the ToC of the 1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott, a civil rights protest against racial segregation on public buses in Montgomery, Alabama. The ToC of the movement conceptualized the movement constituency’s bus fare as the resource that was wanted by the public transit system. It could be written as: “If African Americans in Montgomery boycott the bus system, then the bus company will desegregate the buses, because the decrease in ridership will significantly impact their profits” (Ganz, 2006). Orienting one’s strategy around an explicit ToC will also help avoid the pitfall of skipping the middle part of Ganz’s concept of strategy (“into what you need”) which is a tendency that information providers in particular show. They rather aim to turn evidence into policy change directly (usually because of a reluctance to engage with the realities of the policymaking process – more on the reasons for this hesitancy below). As discussed in research question 1 (what practice-relevant learnings for academic advocates can be generated from a multidisciplinary literature on effective policy and political change making?), information providers do often have sophisticated ways of communicating their evidence and do so via a multitude of channels – with decision makers directly, the public, or other stakeholders (including litigators). And as such, they may indeed think and act as sophisticated marketers (see Chapter 2.4). But their ammunition, so to speak, is the evidence, not power as they are hesitant to think and act like a movement or lobbyist. As such, they risk “wasting their resources” (Ganz, 2006) – an observation that some participants share in their reflections on their efficacy. This study supports the notion that the impact of truth telling tactics tends to be overestimated among academics, even within contexts where more information is indeed needed and may even be 214 requested by decision makers. I concur that there may be conditions under and contexts within which stand-alone information provider tactics may be effective, particularly when these activities are sophisticated and employ tools such as storytelling, integrated knowledge translation, or participatory action research. The literature mostly describes narrow issues of technocratic, incremental policy change as conditions under which the truth telling strategy is most successful (Oliver & Cairney, 2019; Pielke, 2007). Understanding the conditions in which truth telling is the preferred strategy in more depth could be another valuable contribution to this area of research and could strengthen the impact of those who will not feel comfortable to cross into power navigation tactics. In the workshop, the conclusion about the most fitting tactics in the particular context remains open and gives participants the opportunity to apply the tactics and tools most useful – and feasible – in their case. This means that the workshop does not intend to prescribe a one-size-fits all list of actions to take in any given context – as opposed to the quest in parts of the KMb literature that seeks to identify generalizable recommendations on tactics to implement under any given circumstance (as described for example in Mitton et al., 2007, and again in Sarkies et al., 2017). The workshop rather asks participants to identify the right tactics to achieve their targets with the given resources and with a thorough understanding of the context at hand. This approach makes this workshop unique in that it offers guidance to expose implicit assumptions that might otherwise remain covert and does not jump straight to tactics and tools as is often done in science communication and similar trainings. Indeed, the identification of tactics and tools is only step 6 (of 9) in the workshop. Tactics and tools are preceded by a reflection on one’s own implicit assumptions about how change is made, the identification of the strategic target, the identification of who has the power to create the wanted change as well as uncovering what it is that they want or need, and the development of a case and context-specific ToC (see Section 4.2 Operationalizing the evidence base). Only then are participants invited to choose the tactics and tools that will be most helpful in achieving the strategic target given the pathway to change identified in the “because” statement of the ToC. Developing a strategic target and a ToC before choosing specific tactics and tools will also help avoid the risk of approaching one’s KMb in too general or broad of terms (e.g., instead of “we want to alleviate the burden of disease due to heat exposure for vulnerable populations in Vancouver”, the strategic target and pathway could be “we want to lobby Vancouver City Council to create cooling spaces that are easily accessible for the identified target populations”). Gaining this clarity also helps with choosing targets, tactics, and tools that are realistically feasible for the knowledge mobilizers and their constituency and the resources and relationships that are available to them. 215 As my conversations with participants confirm, in academia in general, the tendency to act as an information provider is strong for several reasons. An information deficit assumption is intuitive and tangible and the raison d’être for any academic institution as a centre for knowledge creation and teaching – of course with some nuance depending on the institution and the field or discipline (e.g., fields/disciplines that embrace more critical paradigms may be more open to academic KMb that goes beyond the information deficit). Ironically, I also somewhat succumb to the information deficit assumption in this work by stating that academic advocates have a knowledge and skills gap in their advocacy approaches. However, I acknowledge that it is not merely a question of filling this gap by providing the respective training (for example via the workshop developed for this dissertation) but that there are indeed other factors at play as well. Most notably, I found that the most critical determinant for the intuitive decision which strategic approach to take or which tactics to employ is one’s concept of what is “right or wrong” as an academic (a concept I call “identity”). The conviction one holds about what is appropriate for an academic determines which archetype one will ultimately subscribe to. Arguably, this identity reflects implications and signals from the academic community and culture. In the case of those who identify as “separatists” (i.e., academics who deem it inappropriate to engage in power navigating tactics), this expected identity for the academic is antithetical to embracing evidence about moving research into policy action. A shift in the culture of the academy that is more conducive to advocacy and activism activities in the power navigator spectrum would allow for more leeway in academic advocacy identities and therefore allow academics to embrace power navigation tactics (Gardner et al., 2021). As it stands currently, this culture (with some variability between fields and institutions) deters individuals from participating in advocacy and activism via systemic barriers such as the lack of incentives in academia to conduct these activities; the fear of potential professional and personal repercussions; the lack of supportive academic culture and criticism from peers; a lack of job security especially for junior faculty; a lack of funding and resources for this work, and last but not least the many systemic, cultural, and social barriers that deny equitable opportunities to those with unearned disadvantages resulting from racism, classism, sexism, colonialism, and other -isms. For the general population of academics, these factors can reasonably be assumed to deter academics from getting engaged in KMb work and assume a “unionist” identity. The surprising finding that participants in this study did not necessarily find that job security, a lack of resources to conduct KMb work, or a lack of support from their institutions/universities were decisive factors for them cannot be assumed to be true ubiquitously. Addressing the barriers is key for transforming the “implied” identity and therefore the willingness to 216 embrace KMb strategies that are more in line with the literature and the complexities of the policy world. The motivation and sense of responsibility that has set participants on their KMb path surpass not only systemic barriers but also other risks. Again, this finding may entirely reflect the nature of this sample which intentionally included only academics who are currently engaged in advocacy, and I therefore cannot come to conclusions about those who might indeed have ceased their activities because of these challenges. Nevertheless, I was still surprised by the summative response to the question how participants dealt with risks and barriers that could be phrased as “do it anyways”. One could assume that risks and experiences such as arrest, death threats, or being denied research grants and other career opportunities would certainly qualify as major deterrents from advocacy and activism, and many of my colleagues fear exactly these consequences to advocacy and activism. In the light of recent developments for example in the US, where Vice President Vance has called professors “the enemy”, these fears are justified. However, the participants of this study all continue in their advocacy work despite these risks. Notably, this study shows that these negative consequences are not ubiquitous. Factors that make it easier to “do it anyways” are supportive peers, superiors, and institutions, a culture shift within the academy, as well as friendships with like-minded individuals. Most participants also report experiencing a deep sense of fulfillment and satisfaction due to their activism. In the workshop, I attempt to take these factors into consideration, particularly in module 7 where I give participants the opportunity to reflect on and engage in a conversation about these factors with other participants assuming that this will contribute to a growing willingness to engage in advocacy despite the risks. I am inspired by the resilience and drive that my participants demonstrate. This is particularly true for racialized and otherwise marginalized scholars included in this sample. They report their experiences as extra challenging, for example due to a lack of access to insider circles, a lack of respect and consideration within the academic and advocacy community, and potentially more severe repercussions to them personally, for example by suffering from online bullying aimed at their person rather than their professional presence. Unfortunately, this is not a surprising finding. It highlights the necessity to consider aspects at the personal as well as institutional level when thinking about strategies and tactics that are available to the individual advocate. However, there is value in taking a strength-based lens to this aspect of my study as well. I would not want to come to generalizable conclusions as the sample of racialized participants was very small, but I was impressed by the participants’ ability to 217 turn adverse experiences into strengths. As one participant shared, they felt that a lifetime of exposure to racism, homophobia, and sexism has prepared them for the inside game of politics and this “thick skin” now allows them to confidently run for office. This study also suggests that one cannot assume evidence-based decisions among academic advocates where their strategic and tactical choices are concerned. The evidence base is ultimately open to different interpretations and judgements about its transferability to specific cases. Some participants even describe their KMb efforts as “naïve” or “faith-based” and most participants rely on experience (either their own or that of their mentors) as a source for knowledge and skills – a method that risks repeating what has been done before without reflecting critically on its efficacy (Oliver & Cairney, 2019). This finding was quite surprising to me as I assumed participants would seek out more formal training opportunities or consult the literature on change making strategies to make sure that their efforts are indeed effective and worth the risks. Indeed, participants are generally willing to invest the time and effort to seek training. However, most describe the available trainings to be at the tools level (e.g., (social) media trainings or science communication workshops). This shows again that the tendency to jump to tools and to neglect or skip over strategic thinking is strong. It also shows that there is a dearth of training opportunities that focus on an overarching strategy or that consider what the literature on complex change making suggests. What does this mean for KMb scholarship and practice? There is much potential for the field of KMb and related disciplines to follow their own advice: “developing scientifically sound advice and then designing knowledge exchange interventions to translate that advice into practices at the collective level…” (p. 459) (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010). Ironically, the scholarly fields and disciplines that concern themselves with policy change making seem to have generated poor outcomes in terms of mobilizing their own insights. Much of the relevant literature is written for and distributed among an audience of other KMb or policy/political science scholars and seems inaccessible (and possibly irrelevant) for advocates and activists. KMb as a scholarly field provides ample evidence on specific tactics, tools, theories, or frameworks for academic advocates to consider. But, as previously discussed, I conclude that a focus on information provider tactics and tools, as is mostly done in the KMb literature, is not enough. The field would greatly benefit from expanding its scope to insights that might initially go against what its audience is comfortable with and expand into strategies of power navigation. In general, the field is not oblivious to the complexity of the policymaking process. It routinely acknowledges the presence and importance of these factors but then rarely goes beyond lamenting 218 their existence and holding on to an ideal of the evidence-based policymaking framework. This means that the knowledge mobilizers who follow the KMb literature by and large fall short of employing the most promising strategies. The field would thus need to bid farewell to the separatist identity that seems to prevail among KMb scholars and instead embrace a more pragmatic approach to change making that engages with political realities and power. This study shows that academics are generally willing, despite the downsides and tensions, to engage in advocacy and activism that go beyond the academic norm. They are willing to dedicate the necessary time – sometimes decades – and resources needed (Cairney, 2017; Sabatier & Weible, 2014) that are an unequivocal deterrent for those who may not share a strong sense of responsibility and motivation. Given that the motivation behind one’s KMb work is such a powerful force, it can potentially be channeled into convincing learners of more effective tactics and tools that they may have not considered before but are willing to engage in even if the associated risks are higher, particularly if the KMb community of scholars and practitioners began to embrace power navigating strategies. While it may be assumed that circumstantial factors (such as time constraints, a lack of incentives, a lack of resources, or a fear of repercussions) may prohibit participants from seeking out capacity building opportunities, participants overcome these barriers frequently when seeking tools-level training and may well do so for more comprehensive training if it was available. This is an opportunity for the fields’ own KMb to introduce trainings that go beyond improving tools and instead focus on strategy. I leverage this willingness to engage in skills building activities, while considering the circumstances of the individual advocate and activist in the workshop presented in this dissertation. The group setting and peer support offers a stimulating environment that may help more sceptical individuals embrace ideas that are not yet fully in line with their identity. Furthermore, I expect participants to be self-selective as they are already leaning into the methodology offered through the workshop because they generally embrace the role of an advocate or activist academic. Still, this course will not resonate with everyone, and some participants may conclude that they do not want to go as far as this workshop suggests. Just as not every academic makes a great teacher, not everyone will be a great knowledge mobilizer. But for those who naturally gravitate towards this work and are willing to make the respective sacrifices and commitments, this course might be of great value to increase their efficacy. It takes but one look at the news to make it abundantly clear that we live in an era of fake news and populism where attention and power are ever more important than facts and evidence. And while the idealist in me wishes it weren’t so; the pragmatist understands that this underscores the importance 219 of embracing power navigating strategies to mobilize evidence into policy action on a larger scale amongst academics. I am writing these last few paragraphs at the same time as outgoing US President Biden felt it was necessary to issue a pre-emptive pardon for Anthony Fauci, the former director of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for any actions Fauci might have taken relating to the origin of and public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Kaiser, 2025). This action followed political persecution of Fauci from Republican lawmakers who had stated that he “belonged in prison…for crimes against humanity” (Kaiser, 2024). Fauci’s role in government was that of an insider archetype but his strategy and tactics during the COVID-19 pandemic were first and foremost those of an information provider. As such, he advocated publicly for an evidence-based approach to public health measures during the pandemic but ultimately faced a belief and value system among decision makers and a public who were never going to be persuaded by facts, particularly during Trump’s first presidency. His “opponents” instead took measures to attack his persona as a scientist and private citizen (Abutaleb et al., 2020; Bor et al., 2021). More recently, the appointment of individuals such as Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (a known anti-vaccine activist and conspiracy theorist) for United States Secretary of Health and Human Services highlights the prioritization of personal relationships and loyalty towards the governing elite at the expense of the (scientific) expertise and experience historically required to fill such positions. While these examples are based in the US, the same tendencies can be observed globally, particularly in Europe, East Asia and Latin America with populist right-wing leaders becoming ever more powerful (Populism in 2023, 2023). For example, in Germany, the far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which is projected to win upwards of 20% of the vote in the upcoming 2025 Federal election, has announced it would demolish all wind turbines (currently providing approx. 32% of Germany’s electricity production). They made this announcement despite a consensus that wind turbines are an ecologically and economically superior source of energy and an abrupt end to wind turbines would risk significant power shortages for the public and industry alike (Aston & Krüger, 2025). While this plan would be hard to implement in reality (e.g., because the industry provides more than 100,000 jobs and because most wind turbines are owned by private corporations that would need to be expropriated), the message has been effective and is seen to have gained the AfD even more support from the electorate. The reason for this is exclusively political and completely independent from scientific reasoning: wind turbines in Germany have become a much-hated symbol of green 220 progressivism and therefore, against all scientific evidence and “truth”, the expansion of wind energy is at risk in the current political climate (Aston & Krüger, 2025). Under such circumstances, truth telling is not only less effective but seems increasingly risky as public distrust in scientists grows, particularly among those who are right leaning on the political spectrum (Cologna et al., 2025; Eichengreen et al., 2021; Tyson, 2023; Weber, 2019). For example, during the pandemic, the risks faced by Fauci and other experts such as Bonnie Henry (Provincial Health Officer of British Columbia since 2014) were severe and included credible death threats that warranted protection by security (The Canadian Press, 2020). Unfortunately, it is not unlikely that this scenario will be repeated even in the post-pandemic era, especially if scientific evidence goes against dominant belief and value systems. This is particularly true for issues such as climate change which suffer from an increasing political polarization (Falkenberg et al., 2022). Faced with these realities, academic advocates and activists must look towards power navigating strategies described in this dissertation if we want evidence-informed policies in the future. 221 References Abramoff, R. (2023, January 10). Opinion | I’m a Scientist Who Spoke Up About Climate Change. My Employer Fired Me. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/opinion/scientist-fired-climate-change-activism.html Abutaleb, Y., Parker, A., Dawsey, J., & Rucker, P. (2020, December 19). The inside story of how Trump’s denial, mismanagement and magical thinking led to the pandemic’s dark winter. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/trump-covid-pandemic-dark-winter/ Amenta, E., Caren, N., Chiarello, E., & Su, Y. (2010). The Political Consequences of Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36(Volume 36, 2010), 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120029 Arancibia, F. (2016). Rethinking Activism and Expertise within Environmental Health Conflicts. Sociology Compass, 10(6), 477–490. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12374 Aston, H., & Krüger, A. (2025, January 13). Erneuerbare Energien: Die bizarre Aversion der AfD. Die Tageszeitung: taz. https://taz.de/Erneuerbare-Energien/!6058595/ Bambra, C., Fox, D., & Scott-Samuel, A. (2005). Towards a politics of health. Health Promotion International, 20(2), 187–193. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/dah608 Baron, J. (2018). A Brief History of Evidence-Based Policy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 678, 40–50. Barrett, B., Charles, J. W., & Temte, J. L. (2015). Climate change, human health, and epidemiological transition. Preventive Medicine, 70, 69–75. Basseches, J. A., Bromley-Trujillo, R., Boykoff, M. T., Culhane, T., Hall, G., Healy, N., Hess, D. J., Hsu, D., Krause, R. M., Prechel, H., Roberts, J. T., & Stephens, J. C. (2022). Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: A critical review and way forward. Climatic Change, 170(3), 32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w Bassett, M. T. (2020). Tired of science being ignored? Get political. Nature, 586(7829), Article 7829. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-02854-9 Bauer, M. S., Damschroder, L., Hagedorn, H., Smith, J., & Kilbourne, A. M. (2015). An introduction to implementation science for the non-specialist. BMC Psychology, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-015-0089-9 Baum, F., MacDougall, C., & Smith, D. (2006). Participatory action research. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 60(10), 854–857. https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.028662 Bennet, A., & Bennet, D. H. (2015, April). An overview of knowledge mobilization: Mobilizing research in the social sciences and humanities. ResearchGate. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3236.4964 Bennett, H., Macmillan, A., Jones, R., Blaiklock, A., & McMillan, J. (2020). Should health professionals participate in civil disobedience in response to the climate change health emergency? The Lancet, 395(10220), 304–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)32985-X 222 Berglund, O., & Schmidt, D. (2020). A Theory of Change: The Civil Resistance Model. In O. Berglund & D. Schmidt (Eds.), Extinction Rebellion and Climate Change Activism: Breaking the Law to Change the World (pp. 79–95). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48359-3_6 Binderkrantz, A. (2008). Different groups, different strategies: How interest groups pursue their political ambitions. Scandinavian Political Studies, 31(2), 173–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00201.x Binderkrantz, A. (2016). Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. Political Studies. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00552.x Black, N. (2001). Evidence based policy: Proceed with care. British Medical Journal, 323(7307), 275–279. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.323.7307.275 Bor, J., Himmelstein, D. U., & Woolhandler, S. (2021, March 5). Trump’s Policy Failures Have Exacted a Heavy Toll on Public Health. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-policy-failures-have-exacted-a-heavy-toll-on-public-health1/ Boswell, C., & Smith, K. (2017). Rethinking policy ‘impact’: Four models of research-policy relations. Palgrave Communications, 3(1), 44. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0042-z Bouwen, P., & McCown, M. (2007). Lobbying versus litigation: Political and legal strategies of interest representation in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(3), 422–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760701243798 Bowen, S., Martens, P., & Team, T. N. to K. (2005). Demystifying knowledge translation: Learning from the community. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 10(4), 203–211. JSTOR. Boyd, D. R. (2019). Safe Climate: A report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment. http://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/safe-climate-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-and-environment Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa Brown, L., & Strega, S. (Eds.). (2015). Research as Resistance—Revisiting Critical, Indigenous, and Anti-Oppressive Approaches (2nd ed.). Canadian Scholars. https://canadianscholars.ca/book/research-as-resistance-2nd-edition/ Brown, M. B. (2008). Review of Roger S. Pielke, Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics. Minerva, 46(4), 485–489. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-008-9106-y Brugnach, M., & Ingram, H. (2012). Ambiguity: The challenge of knowing and deciding together. Environmental Science & Policy, 15(1), 60–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2011.10.005 Burstein, P., & Linton, A. (2002). The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns. Social Forces, 81(2), 380–408. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2003.0004 223 Cáceres, D. M., Silvetti, F., & Díaz, S. (2016). The rocky path from policy-relevant science to policy implementation—A case study from the South American Chaco. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 19, 57–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2015.12.003 Caffrey, M. (2019, July 25). I’m a scientist. Under Trump I lost my job for refusing to hide climate crisis facts. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/25/trump-administration-climate-crisis-denying-scientist Cairney, P. (2013, November 11). Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: The Policy Cycle and its Stages. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2013/11/11/policy-concepts-in-1000-words-the-policy-cycle-and-its-stages/ Cairney, P. (2014a, February 19). Is Evidence-Based Policymaking the same as good policymaking? Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2014/02/19/is-evidence-based-policymaking-the-same-as-good-policymaking/ Cairney, P. (2014b, April 7). The Psychology of Evidence Based Policymaking: Who Will Speak for the Evidence If It Doesn’t Speak for Itself? Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/1288/ Cairney, P. (2015). Political science improves our understanding of evidence-based policymaking, but does it produce better advice? Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2015/10/28/political-science-improves-our-understanding-of-evidence-based-policymaking-but-does-it-produce-better-advice/ Cairney, P. (2016). The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy Making. Palgrave Macmillan. Cairney, P. (2017, April 17). How far should you go to secure academic ‘impact’ in policymaking? From ‘honest brokers’ to ‘research purists’ and Machiavellian manipulators. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2017/04/10/how-far-should-you-go-to-secure-academic-impact-in-policymaking-from-honest-brokers-to-research-purists-and-machiavellian-manipulators/ Cairney, P. (2018, July 20). How far should you go to privilege evidence? 2. Policy theories, scenarios, and ethical dilemmas. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2018/07/20/how-far-should-you-go-to-privilege-evidence-2-policy-theories-scenarios-and-ethical-dilemmas/ Cairney, P. (2021). Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs. In C. M. Weible & P. Cairney (Eds.), Practical Lessons from Policy Theories (pp. 13–34). Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.46692/9781447359852.002 Cairney, P., & Kwiatkowski, R. (2017). How to communicate effectively with policymakers: Combine insights from psychology and policy studies. Palgrave Communications, 3(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0046-8 Cairney, P., Oliver, K., & Wellstead, A. (2016). To bridge the divide between evidence and policy: Reduce ambiguity as much as uncertainty. Public Administration Review, 76(3), 399–402. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12555 224 Cairney, P., Timonina, I., & Stephan, H. (2023). How can policy and policymaking foster climate justice? A qualitative systematic review. Open Research Europe, 3(51), 1–42. https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15719.2 Cairney, P., & Toth, F. (2023). The politics of COVID-19 experts: Comparing winners and losers in Italy and the UK. Policy and Society, 42(3), 392–405. https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puad011 Cairney. P. (2024, June 27). Policy in 750 Words: Implementation science and policy implementation studies. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2024/06/27/policy-in-750-words-implementation-science-and-policy-implementation-studies/ Canadian Institutes of Health Research. (2012). Guide to Knowledge Translation Planning at CIHR: Integrated and End-of-Grant Approaches. Canadian Institutes of Health Research. https://cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/45321.html Canadian Institutes of Health Research. (2022). Priority areas. Canadian Institutes of Health Research. https://cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/53000.html Canon, G. (2025, January 31). Trump orders USDA to take down websites referencing climate crisis. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/31/trump-order-usda-websites-climate-crisis Capstick, S., Thierry, A., Cox, E., Berglund, O., Westlake, S., & Steinberger, J. K. (2022). Civil disobedience by scientists helps press for urgent climate action. Nature Climate Change, 12(9), Article 9. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01461-y Charmaz, K., & Thornberg, R. (2021). The pursuit of quality in grounded theory. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 18(3), 305–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2020.1780357 Chenail, R. (1997). Keeping things plumb in qualitative research. The Qualitative Report, 3(3), 1–8. Chenail, R. (2000). Navigating the “Seven C’s”: Curiosity, confirmation, comparison, changing, collaborating, critiquing, and combinations. The Qualitative Report, 4(3), 1–6. Chenoweth, E. (2020). The future of nonviolent resistance. Journal of Democracy, 31(3), 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0046 Clandinin, D. J. (2022). Engaging in narrative inquiry. Routledge. Clavier, C., & de Leeuw, E. (Eds.). (2013). Health Promotion and the Policy Process. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658039.001.0001 Clemence, M. (2019, November 26). Trust in politicians falls sending them spiralling back to the bottom of the Ipsos MORI Veracity Index. Ipsos MORI. https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/trust-politicians-falls-sending-them-spiralling-back-bottom-ipsos-mori-veracity-index Climate Change Committee. (2024, July). Progress towards reaching Net Zero in the UK. Climate Change Committee. https://www.theccc.org.uk/climate-action/uk-action-on-climate-change/progress-snapshot/ Colebatch, H. K. (2009). Policy (3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill Education. 225 Cologna, V., Knutti, R., Oreskes, N., & Siegrist, M. (2021). Majority of German citizens, US citizens and climate scientists support policy advocacy by climate researchers and expect greater political engagement. Environmental Research Letters, 16(2), 024011. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abd4ac Cologna, V., Mede, N. G., Berger, S., Besley, J., Brick, C., Joubert, M., Maibach, E. W., Mihelj, S., Oreskes, N., Schäfer, M. S., van der Linden, S., Abdul Aziz, N. I., Abdulsalam, S., Shamsi, N. A., Aczel, B., Adinugroho, I., Alabrese, E., Aldoh, A., Alfano, M., … Zwaan, R. A. (2025). Trust in scientists and their role in society across 68 countries. Nature Human Behaviour, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02090-5 Connors, S. (2016, September 14). GeoPolicy: Science and the policy cycle. European Geosciences Union - GeoLog. https://blogs.egu.eu/geolog/2016/09/14/geopolicy-science-and-the-policy-cycle/ Conservative Party of Canada. (2025). Conservative Party of Canada. Conservative Party of Canada. https://www.conservative.ca/ Contandriopoulos, D., Lemire, M., Denis, J.-L., & Tremblay, E. (2010). Knowledge exchange processes in organizations and policy arenas: A narrative systematic review of the literature. The Milbank Quarterly, 88(4), 444–483. Cooper, A., Rodway, J., & Read, R. (2018). Knowledge mobilization practices of educational researchers across Canada. Canadian Journal of Higher Education/Revue Canadienne d’enseignement Supérieur, 48(1), 1–21. Costello, A., Abbas, M., Allen, A., Ball, S., Bell, S., Bellamy, R., Friel, S., Groce, N., Johnson, A., Kett, M., Lee, M., Levy, C., Maslin, M., McCoy, D., McGuire, B., Montgomery, H., Napier, D., Pagel, C., Patel, J., … Patterson, C. (2009). Managing the health effects of climate change: Lancet and University College London Institute for Global Health Commission. The Lancet, 373(9676), 1693–1733. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60935-1 Costello, A., Romanello, M., Hartinger, S., Gordon-Strachan, G., Huq, S., Gong, P., Kjellstrom, T., Ekins, P., & Montgomery, H. (2023). Climate change threatens our health and survival within decades. The Lancet, 401(10371), 85–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)02353-4 Crow, D., & Jones, M. (2018). Narratives as tools for influencing policy change. Policy & Politics, 46(2), 217–234. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557318X15230061022899 Crowe, K. (2019, September 27). Misinformation is affecting public opinion of climate change and how best to tackle it, research suggests. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/climate-change-denial-fossil-fuel-think-tank-sceptic-misinformation-1.5297236 Dablander, F., Sachisthal, M. S. M., Cologna, V., Strahm, N., Bosshard, A., Grüning, N.-M., Green, A., Brick, C., Aron, A., & Haslbeck, J. (2024). Climate Change Engagement of Scientists. Nature Climate Change, 14, 1033–1039. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/73w4s Dahlby, B., Drummond, D., Frank, B., St-Hilaire, F., & Ragan, C. (n.d.). 10 Myths about Carbon Pricing in Canada. Canada’s Ecofiscal Commission. Retrieved February 6, 2025, from https://ecofiscal.ca/10-myths-about-carbon-pricing-in-canada/ 226 Daly, M., & Borenstein, S. (2025, January 20). Trump signs order directing US withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/trump-paris-agreement-climate-change-788907bb89fe307a964be757313cdfb0 Daniel, A., & Neubert, D. (2019). Civil society and social movements: Conceptual insights and challenges in African contexts. Critical African Studies, 11(2), 176–192. https://doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2019.1613902 Davis, L. F., & Ramírez-Andreotta, M. D. (2021). Participatory Research for Environmental Justice: A Critical Interpretive Synthesis. Environmental Health Perspectives, 129(2), 026001. https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP6274 De Bruycker, I., & Beyers, J. (2019). Lobbying strategies and success: Inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics. European Political Science Review, 11(1), 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773918000218 DeConcini, C., Rennicks, J., & Hyman, G. (2024, November 13). Trump May Thwart Federal Climate Action, but Opportunities for Progress Remain. World Resources Institute. https://www.wri.org/insights/trump-climate-action-setbacks-opportunities-us Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). Social Movements: An Introduction (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. Douglas, H. (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ubc/detail.action?docID=2038867 Driscoll, D. A., Garrard, G. E., Kusmanoff, A. M., Dovers, S., Maron, M., Preece, N., Pressey, R. L., & Ritchie, E. G. (2021). Consequences of information suppression in ecological and conservation sciences. Conservation Letters, 14(1), e12757. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12757 Drummond, C., O’Toole, T., & McGrath, H. (2020). Digital engagement strategies and tactics in social media marketing. European Journal of Marketing, 54(6), 1247–1280. https://doi.org/10.1108/EJM-02-2019-0183 Dunlap, R. E., & McCright, A. M. (2011). Organized climate change denial. In J. S. Dryzek, R. B. Norgaard, & D. Schlosberg (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566600.003.0010 Eccles, M. P., & Mittman, B. S. (2006). Welcome to Implementation Science. Implementation Science, 1(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-1-1 Eichengreen, B., Aksoy, C. G., & Saka, O. (2021). Revenge of the experts: Will COVID-19 renew or diminish public trust in science? Journal of Public Economics, 193, 104343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104343 Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and “Mode 2” to a triple helix of university–industry–government relations. Research Policy, 29(2), 109–123. Fafard, P., & Hoffman, S. J. (2020). Rethinking knowledge translation for public health policy. Evidence & Policy, 16(1), 165. https://doi.org/10.1332/174426418X15212871808802 227 Falkenberg, M., Galeazzi, A., Torricelli, M., Di Marco, N., Larosa, F., Sas, M., Mekacher, A., Pearce, W., Zollo, F., Quattrociocchi, W., & Baronchelli, A. (2022). Growing polarization around climate change on social media. Nature Climate Change, 12(12), 1114–1121. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01527-x Feldman, M. S. (1989). Order without design: Information production and policy making (Vol. 231). Stanford University Press. Fraser, I. (2004). Organizational research with impact: Working backwards. Worldviews on Evidence-Based Nursing, 1(s1), S52–S59. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1524-475X.2004.04044.x Frickel, S., Torcasso, R., & Anderson, A. (2015). The Organization of Expert Activism: Shadow Mobilization in Two Social Movements*. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 20(3), 305–323. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-20-3-305 Friedman, L. M. (1989). Litigation and society. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 17–29. JSTOR. Gagliardi, A. R., Berta, W., Kothari, A., Boyko, J., & Urquhart, R. (2016). Integrated knowledge translation (IKT) in health care: A scoping review. Implementation Science, 11(1), 38. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13012-016-0399-1 Ganz, M. (2004). Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements. In D. M. Messick & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), The Psychology of Leadership: New Perspectives and Research (pp. 227–260). Erlbaum Associates. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781410611406-17 Ganz, M. (2006). Organizing: People, power and change. Dogwood Institute, Stonehouse Institute, Desmog Canada, Leading Change Network. https://commonslibrary.org/organizing-people-power-change/ Gardner, C. J., Thierry, A., Rowlandson, W., & Steinberger, J. K. (2021). From Publications to Public Actions: The Role of Universities in Facilitating Academic Advocacy and Activism in the Climate and Ecological Emergency. Frontiers in Sustainability, 2. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2021.679019 Giardina, M. D., & Newman, J. I. (2020). The Politics of Research. In P. Leavy (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190847388.013.38 Golhasany, H., & Harvey, B. (2023). Capacity development for knowledge mobilization: A scoping review of the concepts and practices. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 10(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01733-8 Government Office for Technology Transfer. (2025). Government Office for Technology Transfer. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-office-for-technology-transfer Graham, I. D., Kothari, A., McCutcheon, C., Angus, D., Banner, D., Bucknall, T., Dunn, S., Gagnon, M., Gifford, W., Godfrey, C., Holmes, B., Horsley, T., Hutchinson, A. M., Jull, J., Law, S., MacLeod, M., McLean, R. K. D., Mrklas, K., Nguyen, T., … On behalf of the Integrated Knowledge Translation Research Network Project Leads. (2018). Moving knowledge into action for more effective practice, programmes and policy: Protocol for a research programme on integrated knowledge translation. Implementation Science, 13(1), 22. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13012-017-0700-y 228 Graham, I. D., Logan, J., Harrison, M. B., Straus, S. E., Tetroe, J., Caswell, W., & Robinson, N. (2006). Lost in knowledge translation: Time for a map? Journal of Continuing Education in the Health Professions, 26(1), 13–24. https://doi.org/10.1002/chp.47 Green, J. F. (2020). Less Talk, More Walk: Why Climate Change Demands Activism in the Academy. Daedalus, 149(4), 151–162. Green, L. W., Ottoson, J. M., García, C., & Hiatt, R. A. (2009). Diffusion theory and knowledge dissemination, utilization, and integration in public health. Annual Review of Public Health, 30(1), 151–174. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.031308.100049 Greenhalgh, T. (2017). How to Implement Evidence-Based Healthcare. John Wiley & Sons. Greenhalgh, T., & Russell, J. (2009). Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Critique. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 52(2), 304–318. https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.0.0085 Greenhalgh, T., & Wieringa, S. (2011). Is it time to drop the ‘knowledge translation’ metaphor? A critical literature review. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 104(12), 501–509. https://doi.org/10.1258/jrsm.2011.110285 Grossman, D. (2024). Scientists under arrest: The researchers taking action over climate change. Nature, 626(8000), 710–712. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-00480-3 Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814. Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage. Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2007). Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press. https://ssrn.com/abstract=855164 Hammersley, M. (2013). Some Questions About Evidence-Based Practice in Education. In The Myth of Research-Based Policy & Practice. SAGE Publications Ltd. Hancock, T. (2018). Global change and public health: Addressing the ecological determinants of health. Canadian Public Health Association and deslibris. https://www-deslibris-ca.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/ID/248329 Hanson, H. (2022, April 16). “We’ve Been Trying To Warn You”: Fed-Up Scientists Get Arrested Demanding Climate Action. HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/scientist-climate-protests_n_625b06fae4b0723f801972a7 Hatemi, P. K., Crabtree, C., & Smith, K. B. (2019). Ideology justifies morality: Political beliefs predict moral foundations. American Journal of Political Science, 63(4), 788–806. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12448 Hayes, K., Blashki, G., Wiseman, J., Burke, S., & Reifels, L. (2018). Climate change and mental health: Risks, impacts and priority actions. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 12(1), 28. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-018-0210-6 229 Haynes, A. S., Derrick, G. E., Chapman, S., Redman, S., Hall, W. D., Gillespie, J., & Sturk, H. (2011). From “our world” to the “real world”: Exploring the views and behaviour of policy-influential Australian public health researchers. Social Science & Medicine, 72(7), 1047–1055. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.02.004 Head, B. W. (2014). Evidence, uncertainty, and wicked problems in climate change decision making in Australia. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1068/c1240 Heath, C., & Heath, D. (2010). Switch: How to Change Things When Change Is Hard. Crown. Heffernan, A. (2025, January 9). The upcoming election is a critical juncture for Canada’s carbon tax and climate policies. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/the-upcoming-election-is-a-critical-juncture-for-canadas-carbon-tax-and-climate-policies-243560 Heikkila, T., & Andersson, K. (2021). Policy design and the added-value of the institutional analysis development framework. In C. M. Weible & P. Cairney (Eds.), Practical Lessons from Policy Theories (1st ed., pp. 151–172). Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03sh7.12 Heikkila, T., & Cairney, P. (2018). Comparison of Theories of the Policy Process. In Theories of the Policy Process (4th ed.). Routledge. Hering, J. G. (2016). Do we need “more research” or better implementation through knowledge brokering? Sustainability Science, 11(2), 363–369. Howard, C. (2020). Targeted change making for a healthy recovery. The Lancet Planetary Health, 4(9), e372–e374. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(20)30200-X Howard, C., MacNeill, A. J., Hughes, F., Alqodmani, L., Charlesworth, K., Almeida, R. de, Harris, R., Jochum, B., Maibach, E., Maki, L., McGain, F., Miller, J., Nirmala, M., Pencheon, D., Robertson, S., Sherman, J. D., Vipond, J., Yin, H., & Montgomery, H. (2023). Learning to treat the climate emergency together: Social tipping interventions by the health community. The Lancet Planetary Health, 7(3), e251–e264. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(23)00022-0 Innvaer, S., Vist, G., Trommald, M., & Oxman, A. (2002). Health policy-makers’ perceptions of their use of evidence: A systematic review. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 7(4), 239–244. Jenkins, W. I. (1978). Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective. London: M. Robertson. Kahneman, D. (2017). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Kaiser, J. (2024, June 3). Anthony Fauci fends off COVID-19 accusations in pandemic origin probe | Science | AAAS. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/fauci-fends-off-covid-19-accusations-pandemic-origin-probe Kaiser, J. (2025, January 21). Biden pardons Fauci but debars EcoHealth and its leader for actions during pandemic. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/biden-pardons-fauci-debars-ecohealth-and-its-leader-actions-during-pandemic 230 Karl, H. A., Susskind, L. E., & Wallace, K. H. (2007). A Dialogue, Not a Diatribe: Effective Integration of Science and Policy through Joint Fact Finding. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 49(1), 20–34. https://doi.org/10.3200/ENVT.49.1.20-34 Kershaw, P., & Rossa-Roccor, V. (2024). Overcoming Common Anxieties in Knowledge Translation: Advice for Scholarly Issue Advocates. The Milbank Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.12694 Kershaw, P., Swanson, E., & Stucchi, A. (2017). A surgical intervention for the body politic: Generation Squeeze applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework to social determinants of health knowledge translation. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 108(2), e199-E204. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.17269/CJPH.108.5881 Kickbusch, I. (2013). Foreword: We need to build a health political science. In C. Clavier & E. de Leeuw (Eds.), Health promotion and the policy process (pp. iii–iiv). Oxford University Press. Kingdon, J. & Thurber, J. (2011). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.). Longman. Klein, E. (2024). Reparative public policy. Critical Policy Studies, 18(4), 600–619. https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2023.2288666 Kollman, K. (1998). Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton University Press. Kotcher, J. E., Myers, T. A., Vraga, E. K., Stenhouse, N., & Maibach, E. W. (2017). Does Engagement in Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results from a Randomized National Survey Experiment. Environmental Communication, 11(3), 415–429. https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2016.1275736 La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen. (n.d.). Climate Change Litigation. Retrieved September 23, 2020, from http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/la-rose-v-her-majesty-the-queen/ Lackey, R. T. (2007). Science, scientists, and policy advocacy. Conservation Biology, 21(1), 12–17. JSTOR. Lamb, W. F., Grubb, M., Diluiso, F., & Minx, J. C. (2022). Countries with sustained greenhouse gas emissions reductions: An analysis of trends and progress by sector. Climate Policy, 22(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1990831 Landry, R., Lamari, M., & Amara, N. (2003). The Extent and Determinants of the Utilization of University Research in Government Agencies. Public Administration Review, 63(2), 192–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00279 LaRocca, R., Yost, J., Dobbins, M., Ciliska, D., & Butt, M. (2012). The effectiveness of knowledge translation strategies used in public health: A systematic review. BMC Public Health, 12, 751. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-12-751 Lazarus, R. J. (2008). Super wicked problems and climate change: Restraining the present to liberate the future. Cornell Law Review, 94(5), 1153–1234. Legg, C., & Hookway, C. (2021). Pragmatism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/pragmatism/ 231 Lemons, J., & Brown, D. A. (2011). Global climate change and non-violent civil disobedience. Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, 11(1), 3–12. https://doi.org/10.3354/esep00109 Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S., & Auld, G. (2012). Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: Constraining our future selves to ameliorate global climate change. Policy Sciences, 45(2), 123–152. JSTOR. Levy, B. S., & Patz, J. A. (2015). Climate change, human rights, and social justice. Annals of Global Health, 81(3), 310–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aogh.2015.08.008 Mathur, et al. V. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario. (2019). Climate Change Litigation. https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mathur-et-al-v-her-majesty-the-queen-in-right-of-ontario/ McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2003). Defeating Kyoto: The conservative movement’s impact on U.S. climate change policy. Social Problems, 50(3), 348–373. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2003.50.3.348 McGrath, M. (2019, July 23). Climate change: 12 years to save the planet? Make that 18 months. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-48964736 McKibbon, K. A., Lokker, C., Wilczynski, N. L., Ciliska, D., Dobbins, M., Davis, D. A., Haynes, R. B., & Straus, S. E. (2010). A cross-sectional study of the number and frequency of terms used to refer to knowledge translation in a body of health literature in 2006: A Tower of Babel? Implementation Science, 5(1), 16. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-5-16 McMichael, A. (2017). Climate change and the health of nations: Famines, fevers, and the fate of populations. Oxford University Press. Meadows, D. H., & Wright, D. (2009). Thinking in Systems: A Primer. Earthscan. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849773386 Metzger, D., & Aidun, H. (2020). Major Developments in International Climate Litigation in Early 2020. Climate Law Blog. http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/03/12/major-developments-in-international-climate-litigation-in-early-2020/ Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2020). Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook (Fourth edition). SAGE. Milman, O. (2011, June 6). Australian climate scientists receive death threats. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jun/06/australia-climate-scientists-death-threats Mintrom, M. (2019). So you want to be a policy entrepreneur?. Policy design and practice, 2(4), 307-323. Mitton, C., Adair, C. E., Mckenzie, E., Patten, S. B., & Perry, B. W. (2007). Knowledge transfer and exchange: Review and synthesis of the literature. The Milbank Quarterly, 85(4), 729–768. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2007.00506.x Mooney, C., & Dennis, B. (2018, October 7). The world has just over a decade to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/08/world-has-only-years-get-climate-change-under-control-un-scientists-say/ 232 Morgan, D. (2014). Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Mixed Methods Research. In Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: A Pragmatic Approach. SAGE. NASA. (2013). The relentless rise of carbon dioxide. Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/24/graphic-the-relentless-rise-of-carbon-dioxide National Conference of State Legislatures. (2021). National Conference of State Legislatures. How States Define Lobbying and Lobbyist. https://www.ncsl.org/ethics/how-states-define-lobbying-and-lobbyist Nosek, G. (2020). The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Push to Target Climate Protesters in the U.S. Pace Environmental Law Review, 38, 53. Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. (2022a). Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. The Lobbying Act. https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/ Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. (2022b, April 8). Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada | Registration requirements related to the academic sector. https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/registration-requirements-related-to-the-academic-sector/ Oliver, K., & Boaz, A. (2019). Transforming evidence for policy and practice: Creating space for new conversations. Palgrave Communications, 5(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0266-1 Oliver, K., & Cairney, P. (2019). The dos and don’ts of influencing policy: A systematic review of advice to academics. Palgrave Communications, 5(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0232-y Oliver, K., Innvaer, S., Lorenc, T., Woodman, J., & Thomas, J. (2014). A systematic review of barriers to and facilitators of the use of evidence by policymakers. BMC Health Services Research, 14(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-14-2 Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Defeating the merchants of doubt. Nature, 465(7299), Article 7299. https://doi.org/10.1038/465686a Ottoson, J. M. (2009). Knowledge-for-action theories in evaluation: Knowledge utilization, diffusion, implementation, transfer, and translation. New Directions for Evaluation, 2009(124), 7–20. https://doi.org/10.1002/ev.310 Parkhurst, J. (2017). The Politics of Evidence: From evidence -based policy to the good governance of evidence. Taylor & Francis. https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/31002 Paterson, M., & P-Laberge, X. (2018). Political economies of climate change. WIREs Climate Change, 9(2), e506. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.506 Peel, J., & Osofsky, H. M. (2020). Climate change litigation. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 16. Penrod, J., Preston, D. B., Cain, R. E., & Starks, M. T. (2003). A Discussion of Chain Referral As a Method of Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations. Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 14(2), 100–107. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043659602250614 233 Phipps, D., Cummins, J., Pepler, D., Craig, W., & Cardinal, S. (2019). The co-produced pathway to impact describes knowledge mobilization processes. Journal of Community Engagement and Scholarship, 9(1). https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/jces/vol9/iss1/5 Pielke, R. A. (with Cambridge Core EBA eBooks Complete Collection). (2007). The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics. Cambridge University Press. Posner, E. A. (2006). Climate change and international human rights litigation: A critical appraisal. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, 1925. Powering Past Coal Alliance. (2025). The end of coal is in sight. Powering Past Coal Alliance. https://poweringpastcoal.org/ Public Scholars Initiative. (n.d.). Public Scholars Initiative. UBC Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies. Retrieved February 6, 2025, from https://www.grad.ubc.ca/psi Punch, K. F. (2013). Introduction to social research: Quantitative and qualitative approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Quinn, R. (2025, February 6). As the DEI Crackdown Escalates, Faculty Choose Between Silence and Resistance. Inside Higher Ed. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/faculty-issues/diversity-equity/2025/02/06/trump-attacks-dei-faculty-pick-between-silence Raphael, D. (2015). Beyond policy analysis: The raw politics behind opposition to healthy public policy. Health Promotion International, 30(2), 380–396. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/dau044 Rehman, A. A., & Alharthi, K. (2016). An introduction to research paradigms. International Journal of Educational Investigations, 3(8), 51–59. Rhodes, R. (2006). Policy Network Analysis (M. Moran, M. Rein, & R. Goodin, Eds.). Oxford. Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730 Rogers, E. M. (2010). Diffusion of Innovations. Simon and Schuster. Sá, C. M., Li, S. X., & Faubert, B. (2011). Faculties of education and institutional strategies for knowledge mobilization: An exploratory study. Higher Education, 61(5), 501–512. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-010-9344-4 Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein. Policy Sciences, 21(2/3), 129–168. JSTOR. Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (Eds.). (2014). Theories of the Policy Process (3rd ed.). Westview Press. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. (2025). Global Climate Change Litigation. Climate Change Litigation. https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-climate-change-litigation/ Sachs, J. (2012). Winning the Story Wars: Why Those Who Tell (and Live) the Best Stories Will Rule the Future. Harvard Business Press. 234 Sarkies, M. N., Bowles, K.-A., Skinner, E. H., Haas, R., Lane, H., & Haines, T. P. (2017). The effectiveness of research implementation strategies for promoting evidence-informed policy and management decisions in healthcare: A systematic review. Implementation Science, 12(1). Gale OneFile: Health and Medicine. http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A546070268/HRCA?u=ubcolumbia&sid=zotero&xid=751d7b0a Schmidt, G. A., & Donner, S. D. (2017). Scientific advocacy: A tool for assessing the risks of engagement. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(5), 344–347. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1364008 Schwandt, T. A. (2000). Further diagnostic thoughts on what ails evaluation practice. American Journal of Evaluation, 21(2), 225–229. Scientist Rebellion. (2025). Scientist Rebellion. Scientist Rebellion. http://scientistrebellion.org/ Scientists 4 Future. (n.d.). Scientist 4 Future International. Scientists 4 Future. Retrieved February 6, 2025, from https://scientists4future.org/ Siebler, C., Schmidt, L., Schürmann, L., & Gonzatti, D. S. (2023). Five years of ‘Fridays for Future’: What future now? Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/five-years-of-fridays-for-future-what-future-now Smith, W., & Brownlee, K. (2017, May 24). Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.114 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. (2012, May 11). Definitions of terms. https://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/programs-programmes/definitions-eng.aspx#km-mc Sriram, V., Bennett, S., Raman, V. R., & Sheikh, K. (2018). Developing the National Knowledge Platform in India: A policy and institutional analysis. Health Research Policy and Systems, 16(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-018-0283-3 Steakin, W. (2025, January 31). USDA orders removal of climate change mentions from public websites. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/US/usda-orders-removal-climate-change-mentions-public-websites/story?id=118312216 Straus, S., Tetroe, J., & Graham, I. D. (2013). Knowledge translation in health care: Moving from evidence to practice. John Wiley & Sons. Suldovsky, B. (2016). In science communication, why does the idea of the public deficit always return? Exploring key influences. Public Understanding of Science, 25(4), 415–426. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516629750 Suldovsky, B. (2017, September 26). The Information Deficit Model and Climate Change Communication. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.301 The Canadian Press. (2020, September 22). B.C.’s chief health officer says she’s received death threats, abuse. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/bonnie-henry-death-threats-1.5734809 The University of British Columbia. (2023). Shaping UBC’s Next Century. UBC Strategic Plan. https://strategicplan.ubc.ca 235 The White House. (2025, January 20). Declaring a National Energy Emergency. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/ Thompson Burdine, J., Thorne, S., & Sandhu, G. (2021). Interpretive description: A flexible qualitative methodology for medical education research. Medical Education, 55(3), 336–343. https://doi.org/10.1111/medu.14380 Thorne, S. (2016). Interpretive Description. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315426259 Tilly, C., & Wood, L. J. (2015). Social Movements, 1768—2012 (3rd ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315632070 Timperley, J. (2020, June 18). Who is really to blame for climate change? BBC Future. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200618-climate-change-who-is-to-blame-and-why-does-it-matter Tollefson, J. (2021). Top climate scientists are sceptical that nations will rein in global warming. Nature, 599(7883), 22–24. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-02990-w Tollefson, J. (2025). Drill, baby, drill? Trump policies will hurt climate ― but US green transition is under way. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-025-00243-8 Topp, S. M., Schaaf, M., Sriram, V., Scott, K., Dalglish, S. L., Nelson, E. M., SR, R., Mishra, A., Asthana, S., Parashar, R., Marten, R., Costa, J. G. Q., Sacks, E., BR, R., Reyes, K. A. V., & Singh, S. (2021). Power analysis in health policy and systems research: A guide to research conceptualisation. BMJ Global Health, 6(11). https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2021-007268 Tormos-Aponte, F., Brown, P., Dosemagen, S., Fisher, D. R., Frickel, S., MacKendrick, N., Meyer, D. S., & Parker, J. N. (2023). Pathways for diversifying and enhancing science advocacy. Science Advances, 9(20), eabq4899. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abq4899 Tormos-Aponte, F., & Frickel, S. (2023, July 6). Science activism is surging – which marks a culture shift among scientists. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/science-activism-is-surging-which-marks-a-culture-shift-among-scientists-207454 Tyson, B. K. and A. (2023, November 14). Americans’ Trust in Scientists, Positive Views of Science Continue to Decline. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2023/11/14/americans-trust-in-scientists-positive-views-of-science-continue-to-decline/ United Nations Environment Programme. (2024, October 24). Emissions Gap Report 2024. United Nations Environment Programme. https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2024 Upton, B. (2023, August 25). Does Climate Activism Help or Hinder an Academic Career? Times Higher Education. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/global/2023/08/25/does-climate-activism-help-or-hinder-academic-career Watmough, S. P. (2023, December 31). Populism in 2023: The Year in Review. European Center for Populism Studies. https://www.populismstudies.org/populism-in-2023-the-year-in-review/ 236 Watts, N., Adger, W. N., Agnolucci, P., Blackstock, J., Byass, P., Cai, W., Chaytor, S., Colbourn, T., Collins, M., Cooper, A., Cox, P. M., Depledge, J., Drummond, P., Ekins, P., Galaz, V., Grace, D., Graham, H., Grubb, M., Haines, A., … Costello, A. (2015). Health and climate change: Policy responses to protect public health. The Lancet, 386(10006), 1861–1914. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60854-6 Watts, N., Amann, M., Arnell, N., Ayeb-Karlsson, S., Belesova, K., Berry, H., Bouley, T., Boykoff, M., Byass, P., Cai, W., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Chambers, J., Daly, M., Dasandi, N., Davies, M., Depoux, A., Dominguez-Salas, P., Drummond, P., Ebi, K. L., … Costello, A. (2018). The 2018 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: Shaping the health of nations for centuries to come. The Lancet, 392(10163), 2479–2514. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)32594-7 Weber, B. (2019, September 23). Canadians’ trust in science falling, poll suggests. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/science-survey-1.5291291 Weible, C. M., & Ingold, K. (2018). Why advocacy coalitions matter and practical insights about them. Policy & Politics, 46(2), 325-343. Weiss, C. H. (1979). The Many Meanings of Research Utilization. Public Administration Review, 39(5), 426–431. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3109916 Weiss, C. H. (1986). The Many Meanings of Research Utilization. In Social Science and Social Policy. Routledge. Wilson, I. A. G., & Staffell, I. (2018). Rapid fuel switching from coal to natural gas through effective carbon pricing. Nature Energy, 3(5), 365–372. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0109-0 World Bank Group. (2023a). Social Dimensions of Climate Change. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/social-dimensions-of-climate-change World Bank Group. (2023b). Within Reach: Navigating the Political Economy of Decarbonization. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/11/16/overcoming-political-economy-barriers-to-climate-action World Health Organization. (2023). Climate change. World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health Wright, C., & Mann, M. (2013). Future imaginings and the battle over climate science: An interview with Michael Mann. Organization, 20(5), 748–756. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508413489818 Wright, J. D. (Ed.). (2015). International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier. http://www.sciencedirect.com:5070/referencework/9780080970875/international-encyclopedia-of-the-social-and-behavioral-sciences Yin, R. (2017). Case study research and applications: Design and methods. Sage publications. Yusa, A., Berry, P., J Cheng, J., Ogden, N., Bonsal, B., Stewart, R., & Waldick, R. (2015). Climate change, drought and human health in Canada. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 12(7), 8359–8412. Zimonjic, P. (2024, December 12). Carbon tax had “negligible” impact on inflation, new study says. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carbon-tax-negligible-impact-on-inflation-study-1.7408728 237 Zourou, K., Potolia, A., & Oikonomou, S. (2024). Academic activism: Learning and self-transformation through collective action taking. Frontiers in Education, 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc.2024.1215522 238 Appendices Appendix A: Summaries of Policy Theories Multiple Streams Approach3 The Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) seeks to explain the conditions under which policy change happens. Its key tenet is the parallel existence of three streams: problems, policy, and politics. When these three streams align at one point in time (a “policy window”), then a change in policy is possible. The MSA does not assume that focusing events alone will open a policy window but rather that other conditions need to be met before policy change can occur. The problem stream includes issues of interest to which attention is being paid (crucial element ideas). There is an inherent competition for the attention of the policy maker who operates under significant time constraints. This attention does not come arbitrarily but is rather prompted through a number of ways: the occurrence of focusing events that are ideally highlighted by the media to perpetuate their significance (e.g., COVID-19 has increased the attention on pandemic preparation); through indicators which could be provided through scientific studies (e.g. rising infant mortality rates); a paucity in competing issues that allows attention to be paid to the issue at hand; or, very importantly, actors in the policy world (“policy entrepreneurs”) influence policy makers in such a way that they pay attention to the issue at hand and act aligned with the interests of the policy entrepreneur. The policy stream is thought of as a “primeval soup” (p. 33) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014) of ideas that float around waiting to be implemented. These ideas are generated by a wide variety of individuals that are organized in networks, e.g., bureaucrats, academics, or think tanks. Their chance of application increases if they are perceived as technically feasible, acceptable within the dominant value systems, and are in proportion to the resources needed to implement them. It has also been shown that networks of idea generators that are smaller in size, have high administrative capacity, and have better access to policy makers are more successful in pushing their ideas forward. The politics stream refers to the influences of the political environment that shape policy decisions. These are the national mood (“the notion that a fairly large number of individuals in a given country tend to think along common lines” (p. 34) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014)), pressure group 3 Unless otherwise noted, the information on theories of the policy process in this and the following subsections is based on Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (Eds.). (2014). Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press. 239 campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover. The combination of the national mood with legislative turnover seems to be the most powerful in affecting policy change. It is important to note that, as opposed to a rational approach where we assume a temporal order of problem –> solution –> implementation, the MSA assumes that any one stream can prompt the others, or all can happen at the same time and that decision makers operate under bounded rationality. The key strategy to achieve policy change is therefore persuasion and manipulation, i.e., the “strategic use of information in combination with institutions and policy windows that changes context, meaning, and policy over time” – just as a successful policy entrepreneur would do (p. 31) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) seeks to explain why there is, often over long periods of time, very little change in policy on a particular issue, interrupted by leaps in policy change within relatively short periods of time. According to the PET, the policy process happens in political institutions with limited attention spans. New ideas and evidence, especially if not in line with the dominant ideology, hardly break through the established equilibrium. This resistance to change is explained by the way the policy system is divided up into institutions within which so-called “policy subsystems” emerge. These subsystems are usually occupied with one or few policy issues, but many subsystems and therefore policy issues exist in parallel and often independent of each other. If these policy issues within subsystems are particularly in line with widely accepted values (“policy images”) and are held by powerful and prestigious actors, then the equilibrium is harder to disturb. Only when the equilibrium is disturbed, then bursts in policy change occur. These disruptions happen due to “mobilizations”. Within mobilizations, a large number of new actors (e.g., interest groups, actors from different policy sectors or institutions, etc.) are proponents of change and challenge the policy monopoly on a certain issue. They push the issue out of its subsystem and onto the agenda of macro-level decision-making ranks. It thus becomes a high-profile issue, supported by pressure from the broader public and media coverage, and has the chance to trigger significant policy change. Advocacy Coalition Framework The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) It aims to explain the entire policy process and does so with a long-term lens (over one decade or more) and beyond the constraints of individual government institutions. Its particular focus is on the roles of actors within the policy formulation process. The ACF hypothesizes that values and belief systems lead to the construction of networks of actors, so-called 240 “advocacy coalitions” that compete with each other. The key assumption of the ACF is that new information and evidence get interpreted through the lens of pre-existing belief systems among all individuals and coalitions. The ACF provides an expansion of the PET’s policy subsystems in terms of the specification of the processes that happen within them. Subsystems include not only the civil servants and elected officials, but all actors actively involved in a policy issue such as researchers, advocates, lobbyists, NGOs, etc. These actors form coalitions based on their shared values and belief systems which are separated into three levels: core beliefs (e.g., religious conversion), policy core beliefs (e.g., proper balance between government and free markets), and secondary aspects (e.g., regulations vs. economic incentives). Secondary aspects are the most likely to change, the core beliefs are assumed to remain unchanged or change only over decades in line with gradual societal enlightenment (Cairney, 2013a). The advocacy coalitions coordinate their activities over time and thereby influence how information and events are interpreted and acted upon. External events or ‘shocks’ in and of themselves are not enough to cause change, it is rather up to the coalitions to use them to advance their interests. Policies are therefore translations of belief systems and scientific evidence is a source of information in the policy learning of policy subsystems but is often politicized and integrated into existing belief systems. A powerful coalition can successfully challenge data supporting policy change that goes against their belief systems for many years (e.g., climate change scepticism among policy makers). Some individuals or groups are separate from coalitions and mediate between them, these are called “policy brokers”. Social Construction of Target Populations The Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) was first proposed in the late 1980s by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram and is based on the understanding that political issues are socially constructed rather than objective realities. As such, the framing of an issue becomes central to how it is perceived and what kind of action (i.e., policy content) follows. The SCTP provides insights into the policy design and agenda setting process, meaning it addresses some of the blind spots of the previously summarized theories which focus on policy arenas but where the actual content development of policies remains a ‘black box’. Target populations are population groups that are attributed certain values by decision makers and by society and therefore either receive benefits or burdens due to certain policies. As an example, small businessowners are seen as powerful and deserving (a combination that the authors call “advantaged”), children are seen as powerless and deserving (“dependents”), environmentalists are seen as powerful and undeserving (“contenders”), and criminals are seen as powerless and undeserving (“deviants”). This value judgement happens based on intuitive, emotional, 241 and moral reasoning, rather than on rational reasoning. Evidence is considered selectively to confirm these judgements rather than being used to change them. Pathways to change are often opened up through social movements; scientific knowledge can contribute to the success of these movements if framed accordingly. The SCTP renders an explanation for policy stasis since changing social constructions is hard, especially because past policies reinforce negative status of certain populations (so-called “feed-forward effects”, e.g., the “war on drugs” and its effect on incarceration policies that disproportionally harm young Black men). The SCTP contends that past policies provide the main context for policymaking and both subsystems and institutions are relatively powerless in comparison (Heikkila & Cairney, 2018). Policy Feedback Theory Similar to the SCTP, the Policy Feedback Theory (PFT) suggests that past policies deeply influence the creation of new policies. The term was first made popular by Theda Skocpol in 1992 and is rooted in historical institutionalism. PFT sees the policies themselves as formal institutions that can shape politics and therefore future policies. Although the focus seems to be on institutions (in the wider sense), this theory does incorporate other aspects of the crucial elements as well, namely, actors, networks, or ideas. As such, existing policies impact future policies via four major streams: (i) by shaping the relationship between government and the people. For example, through certain policies that regulate immigration and support (or not support) settlement, governments either motivate or discourage individuals from political participation, therefore shaping the electorate in multiple ways (through status, identity, forms of civic engagement). (ii) By shaping forms of governance and a governments’ capacity. For example, by administering health care benefits through the employer and thus moving it into the private sector, the government’s role in health care coverage became less obvious. Health care coverage was thus increasingly perceived as a domain of the private sector and the government’s ability to pass transformative policies has been diminished. (iii) By Influencing the power of (interest) groups. Studies have shown that the formation of interest groups has often been an outcome of new policies rather than the cause for them. For example, the Reagan administration provided challenges to the non-for-profit sector through budget cuts and increased postal rates. (iv) By shaping the political agenda by defining which matters are “worthy” of political action, for example, childcare provision that is slowly moving from the private to the public sector because it is increasingly seen as a matter of education rather than support for working families. 242 Narrative Policy Framework The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) is a relatively new theory of the policy process aiming to explore the role that narratives play within. It was first put forward in 2010 by Michael Jones and Mark McBeth. Narratives play a particularly important role in a modern world where communication technology is crucial to policy and “consumerism and marketing appetite has given rise to policy entrepreneurs who expend considerable energy turning public policy debates into battles over competing narratives” (p. 225) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). According to the NPF, there are different forms of policy narratives (setting, characters, plot, and moral) that convey policy beliefs and strategies as their content. At the core of the theory are several assumptions: bounded rationality, social construction of policy issues, simultaneous operation at three levels of analysis (individual, group, institutional), and the importance of narratives in the decision-making process of individuals (homo narrans model of the individual). The NPF focuses particularly on the strategic application of narratives in the policy process and highlights the importance of contextual factors (“the setting”, such as legal constraints or economic contexts) that have to be accounted for in the construction of narratives. Institutional Analysis and Development Framework The IAD was first proposed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom in 1971 and focuses on the “logic, design, and performance of institutional arrangements in a wide variety of settings and at different scales” (p. 267) (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Or, put in another way, it seeks to provide variables that might explain the actions of individuals within institutional arrangements, in particular their problem-solving approaches. As a framework, it does not seek to explain fully decision-making processes but rather points out variables that may need to be considered when analyzing a particular institution. It is particularly applicable when it comes to questions of governance and collective action around common-pool resources. The core unit within which individuals act is called the “action arena” where action situations (e.g., level of control each individual has over choice, or the information available to individuals) and different sets of actors (individuals or groups who have certain values, beliefs, capabilities, and mechanisms to decide strategies) are present. The unit of action arena is influenced by physical or material conditions (such as availability of resources), the attributes of the community (norms and behaviours generally accepted within this community) within which it exists, and the explicit and implicit rules (shared understandings that are enforced, such as who is in charge) to which the actors in the action arena subscribe. The actions taken in the action arena then lead to certain outcomes 243 (and past outcomes may shape future decisions) and are shaped by evaluative criteria such as economic efficiency, equity, or adaptability. Diffusion of Innovation This theory focuses on the process through which governments adopt new policies and programs and highlights the importance of “policy innovation” – moments when something new and original is introduced, in contrast to the common incremental change to existing policies and programs. It renders two explanations for policy innovation: internal determinants (political, social, economic factors within a jurisdiction) and diffusion (governments adopt policies that others have adopted previously); or both, the so-called “unified model”. Diffusion can happen purely as an attempt to emulate what has been done before or it happens through processes such as learning, imitation, normative pressure, competition, or coercion, or a combination of any of the above. Internal factors are shaped by motivation to innovate, availability of resources, and obstacles to innovation. The updated unified model recognizes the interconnectedness between both diffusion and internal determinants, considers variability in motivation to adopt new policies over time, and considers the influence of existing policies on the adoption of new ones. It also focuses more on the process by which a policy diffuses rather than on the question whether it diffuses. As it currently stands, work on this theory focuses mostly on the stage of policy adoption but pays little attention to other moments in the process such as when a policy first emerges on a government’s agenda. The elements most prominently featured in DOI models are actors, ideas, and contexts. 244 Appendix B: Recruitment emails If I had been introduced: Dear X, As David/Paul/Amanda/Veena has explained in his/her introduction, I am a PhD student at the University of British Columbia’s Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability. I research political knowledge-to-action strategies employed by members of the academic community. I am particularly interested in how evidence-based knowledge-to-action activities that take a realpolitik approach may be implemented by academics such as yourself, whether they are feasible and perceived as effective in shaping climate policies, and how the barriers for academics to engage in such activities are perceived and may be overcome. …continued as below If contact is established directly: Dear X, I am a PhD student at the University of British Columbia’s Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability. I research political knowledge-to-action strategies employed by members of the academic community. I am particularly interested in how evidence-based knowledge-to-action activities that take a realpolitik approach may be implemented by academics such as yourself, whether they are feasible and perceived as effective in shaping climate policies, and how the barriers for academics to engage in such activities are perceived and may be overcome. Given your presence on [example: Twitter]/given your role as [example: Executive Director of Dogwood], it seems you have some expertise and experience in this area. I was therefore wondering whether you would be interested in talking to me about your experience as an academic who also conducts activities that may be labeled “activist”. The interview would be conducted online via Zoom; it would last approximately 90 minutes and would be video recorded with your permission. In case there are any remaining open questions, we would schedule one subsequent interview of up to 90 minutes. I would also kindly ask you to share any additional form of information or data source that you think would be relevant and that you feel comfortable sharing with me. This may include meeting minutes, email correspondence, audio or video recordings, or personal notes. My goal is to produce a publication on the topic which hopefully serves as a field guide to colleagues in the academic community who would like to expand their own knowledge-to-action activities. If you are interested in participating in this research study, you can choose to be identified or not in the resulting publication, it is entirely up to you. I will also send you the transcript of the interviews for your review as well as a draft of the publication in advance of its submission so that you can confirm its final content and how you have been quoted. At that point, you would be able to make changes – or withdraw your comments completely if you decided you would prefer not to be quoted at all in the final paper. 245 I would be very grateful if you decided to share your experience with me and look forward to speaking with you soon. Regards, Verena Rossa-Roccor, MD, MSc PhD Student at the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada P.S.: Should you know of any other potential participants, please feel free to pass on this information to them. However, due to privacy concerns, please do not pass on their names and contact information to us without first obtaining their permission to do so. Three follow up emails after 10 business days each: Dear X, You may remember that I contacted you on XX about your participation in my study on knowledge-to-action strategies. This is just a friendly reminder to consider whether you would like to share your experience with me. The interview would be conducted online via Zoom; it would last approximately 90 minutes and would be video recorded with your permission. In case there are any remaining open questions, we would schedule one subsequent interview of up to 90 minutes. I would also kindly ask you to share any additional form of information or data source that you think would be relevant and that you feel comfortable sharing with me. This may include meeting minutes, email correspondence, audio or video recordings, or personal notes. My goal is to produce a publication on the topic which hopefully serves as a field guide to colleagues in the academic community who would like to expand their own knowledge-to-action activities. If you are interested in participating in this research study, you can choose to be identified or not in the resulting publication, it is entirely up to you. I will also send you the transcript of the interviews for your review as well as a draft of the publication in advance of its submission so that you can confirm its final content and how you have been quoted. At that point, you would be able to make changes – or withdraw your comments completely if you decided you would prefer not to be quoted at all in the final paper. If I do not hear back from you by XX, I will not contact you again in this matter. Thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing from you. Regards, Verena Rossa-Roccor, MD, MSc PhD Student at the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 246 P.S.: Should you know of any other potential participants, please feel free to pass on this information to them. However, due to privacy concerns, please do not pass on their names and contact information to us without first obtaining their permission to do so. 247 Appendix C: Consent information Dear participant, Thank you very much for expressing your interest to participate in our study Academics as activists? Leveraging political knowledge-to-action strategies to influence climate policy (UBC Ethics ID# H21-03150). This letter contains important information regarding your consent to participate in the study. You were invited to participate in this study because we think you have valuable expertise in how research evidence can be moved more effectively into climate policy and because you have taken an approach to do so that is not usually considered among academics. I will soon follow up to find a day and time for our interview. Please note that agreeing to participate in the interview will be taken as consent. Study team and funding The principal investigator of this study is Dr. Paul Kershaw, Associate Professor and Director of the Master’s in Public Health program at the School of Population and Public Health the University of British Columbia. This study is funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research through my doctoral award and research allowance (UBC Grant# F20-03026) Study procedures and confidentiality We will conduct our interview(s) over Zoom. The recording of the interview will be stored on a UBC licensed Zoom cloud server which stores the data in Canada. When you log into our Zoom session, please use a nickname or substitute name. You may also choose to turn off your camera and mute your microphone when it is not needed. I will also ask you to share any documentation of additional information as you see fit and feel comfortable. This may include personal notes, email correspondence, meeting minutes, or meeting recordings. Please de-identify any personal information of individuals other than yourself in these supporting data sources. Should this not be possible, for example in the case of audio or video recordings, please seek third-party consent from these individuals (in this case, I will provide you with the third-party consent form). You can choose to be identified or not in the resulting publication of this research, this is entirely up to you. All data will be encrypted and stored for 5 years on my password-protected computer. Only the PI and I have access to the data. Potential risks of the study We do not anticipate that you will be harmed by participating in this study. You will be asked to share only the kind of information that you feel comfortable sharing and if you wish, your data will be de-identified for publication. Potential benefits of the study 248 By sharing your expertise and experiences with being an academic advocate, you may inspire others to follow your path. This may expand your own personal network and support. For the wider academic community, this study may provide important insights into how to move more research evidence into climate policy. Open access As you know, some journals require that data is made accessible to other researchers (open access). In this case, all identifiers will be removed from the data. Once the data is made available, you will no longer be able to withdraw from the study. Contact for complaints If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Ethics at 604-822-8598 or if long distance e-mail RSIL@ors.ubc.ca or call toll free 1-877-822-8598. Participant consent Participating in this study is entirely up to you. You may withdraw from the study at any point without giving a reason and without any negative impact. Please note that agreeing to participate in the interview will be taken as consent. Thank you in advance for your participation in this study! Sincerely, Verena Rossa-Roccor, MD, MSc PhD Candidate at the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 249 Appendix D: Interview guide Thank you so very much for your time today. Before we get started, I just want to remind you that the recording of the interview will be stored on a UBC licensed Zoom cloud server which stores the data in Canada. Please feel free to use a nickname or substitute name. You may also choose to turn off your camera and mute your microphone when it is not needed [participant will have already been informed of this in the consent form, participation in this interview signals consent]. I look forward to talking about two broad topics during our time together. One is your approach to driving political action on climate change and related issues, your strategy, your mental models, and theories about the approach and so on. The other is about what it is like to do this work as an academic and what kinds of issues arise from that for you, and how you potentially navigate these tensions. I look very forward to learning from you over the next hour and a half. Do you have any questions before we get started? Why don’t you start by telling me in as much detail as possible how you seek to influence policy or drive policy action? And particularly those efforts that go beyond what is typically done under the umbrella of knowledge translation or mobilization in academia? Focus of question What do I want to learn? Question Notes KMB strategies, mental models Behaviour What do academics do in terms of KMB activities? Could you tell me in as much detail as possible how you seek to influence policy or drive policy action? Begin with this question Opinion Do you feel like your actions are effective? These questions are possible prompts to guide the conversation Opinion What makes them effective, or maybe more effective than other strategies/methods? Opinion What are the issues with these activities? If you don’t think they are effective, why do you think is that? Opinion What would make them more effective? 250 Opinion Why can’t you do whatever would make them more effective? Knowledge What is their knowledge background on KMB strategies/how to influence policies? Do they act based on assumptions or based on ‘the literature’? Did you actively look for information on how to influence policy? Knowledge What were your conclusions from what you found in the literature/media? Knowledge What theories do they follow/’hold true’? Any hints on how the KMB cycle could be expanded? What are the mental models or theoretical frameworks that guide your actions? Knowledge and experience Can you tell me more about how these mental models guide you in your activities? [particularly interested in whether they use KMB cycle or theories of the policy process other than the Policy Cycle] Experience Information to point at what to add the KMB cycle Can you tell me about a time that you faced strategic, contextual, political barriers to your [KT] approach? These questions are meant to solicit different answers than those on barriers for academics specifically. Experience How did you navigate or overcome these barriers? Experience Was there anything that made it easier for you? Experience How did you leverage these more positive circumstances? Is there anything else that you would like to add about how you approach driving 251 political action in light of evidence? The academic as an activist Experience/behaviour How the ‘tension’ of being an academic advocate influences their KMB work AND their work as an academic Can you tell me a little about what makes you an activist? OR: How did you come to be an activist? Opinion What makes an activist in your opinion? How the ‘tension’ of being an academic advocate influences their KMB work AND their work as an academic; did you What is your experience with being an academic advocate? Experience Can you tell me about a time when you faced barriers as an academic advocate? Could I ask you if you ever had any disadvantages in terms of your career as an academic from being an activist? Experience How did you navigate or mitigate these barriers/challenges? Feeling How did you feel in that situation? Experience Factors that facilitate being an academic advocate Can you tell me about a time when you felt like it was “easy/positive” to be an academic advocate? Experience What made it easy or positive? Did you ever see a benefit in terms of 252 your academic career that stemmed from your activist role? Feeling How did you feel in that situation? Opinion Their value judgements and opinions on the role of academia as a whole Where do you see the role of academia as a part of society in this (rather than the individual academic)? Opinion Can academics truly be activists? Why/why not? Value Should academics be activists? Why/why not? Is there anything that you would like to add about being an academic advocate? 253 Appendix E: Study protocol Theoretical framework The space of climate policy is contested and riddled with power dynamics. This is in stark contrast to the guiding theory of change (ToC) that dominates much of the KMb literature where it is assumed that the path from evidence to policy is linear and where scientific findings can thus be injected into the Policy Cycle in all stages. Under this assumption, the problem that requires solving is an information deficit among decision and policy makers4. The current ‘gold standard’ model in the KMb literature is the Knowledge-to-Action Cycle by Graham et al5. It divides the KMb process into two concepts: the knowledge creation and the action cycle, while acknowledging that in reality, these two concepts and the ideal phases therein influence each other and that the process is complex, iterative, and dynamic. The knowledge creation is described as a funnel in which knowledge becomes increasingly refined and thus presumably more useful to the knowledge user (see idea of science communication and knowledge synthesis). The action cycle, on the other hand, describes the activities needed to implement the knowledge and highlights the importance of integrating the two through collaboration. This study departs from this model by taking into consideration the following points of criticism: the assumption that ample resources on both sides are present to do this work and that both, the researcher as well as the knowledge user, can afford to ignore their respective performance evaluation metrics which likely do not include successful knowledge-to-action projects6,7. This model has further been criticized for its lack of focus on the real-life challenges of reciprocal relationship building8. It further neglects raw politics, power, and ideologies and – in its current iteration – may be of limited use in polarized contexts where the potential knowledge user/decision maker has no interest in collaboration as the research program is at odds with their own value system and ideology or lacks the necessary resources. By contrast, contributions from the political science and public policy literatures (and others) come to the conclusion that the ToC of the information deficit is overly simplistic9,10. Alternative models acknowledge that policymaking is not a process wherein rational, independent individuals have the top-down power to make decisions. Policymaking is rather embedded in a system of politics which is one of ‘bounded rationality’, meaning that policy makers make decisions in non-ideal settings (i.e., with limited information, time, resources) based on their inherent but unconscious value and belief systems11. These decisions are not made in a vacuum but are influenced by external factors such as social constructs12, 4 Suldovsky B. The information deficit model and climate change communication. In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science; 2017. 5 Graham ID, Logan J, Harrison MB, Straus SE, Tetroe J, Caswell W, et al. Lost in knowledge translation: Time for a map? J Contin Educ Health. 2006 Dec 1;26(1):13–24. 6 Straus S, Tetroe J, Graham ID. Knowledge translation in health care: moving from evidence to practice. John Wiley & Sons; 2013. 7 Kothari A, Wathen CN. A critical second look at integrated knowledge translation. Health Pol. 2013 Feb 1;109(2):187–91 8 Phipps DJ, Jensen KE, Myers JG. Applying social sciences research for public benefit using KMb and social media. In: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Social Sciences and Knowledge Management; 2012. IntechOpen. 9 Sabatier PA, Weible CM, editors. Theories of the Policy Process. 3rd ed. Boulder, USA: Westview Press; 2014. 10 Cairney P. The Politics of Evidence-Based Policymaking. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan; 2016. 11 Cairney P. Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: Bounded Rationality and Incrementalism [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2013 [cited 2020 Oct 12]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2013/11/11/policy-concepts-in-1000-words-bounded-rationality-and-incrementalism/ 12 Cairney P. Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: The Social Construction of Target Populations [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2016 [cited 2020 Oct 12]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/?s=social+construction+of+target 254 narratives13, interest groups and coalitions14, and political and power dynamics12,15. The key strategies to change policy are therefore ones of persuasion, manipulation, coalition building, and power-brokering12,13,16. This understanding of the policy process and the (potential) role of the academic therein is based on several theories of the policy process, first and foremost the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), complemented by insights from the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), the Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP), and the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). These theories informed the formulation of the guiding suppositions of this research program. Role of protocol in guiding the researcher This protocol serves as the agenda and point of reference for the researcher’s line of inquiry. It therefore serves to increase this research project’s replicability and reliability. Data collection procedures Inclusion/exclusion criteria for participants, sampling: In this research, several academics who depart from conventional KMB activities will be studied in order to illustrate different strategies of exertion of political influence by academics in Western liberal democracies and to learn how these academics navigate the tension between their identities as activists and academics. Inclusion criteria for participants: Individuals who identify as academics and have an academic position and are involved in activities such as social movements/grassroots organizations, civil disobedience, inside lobbying, or initiate/lead litigation without this being part of their field (i.e., I am mostly interested in non-lawyers/legal scholars who initiate/lead litigation), or are themselves civil servants or elected officials (while holding an academic appointment) Individuals who engage in political activities focused on climate change and climate change-related policy issues Individuals who act on their own or are part of an organization or movement Individuals may live, work, and exert their influence in Canada, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the UK, or the EU (i.e., Western regions with liberal democratic political systems) Individuals who are easily accessible and willing to engage in the study. 13 Cairney P. Policy in 500 Words: The Narrative Policy Framework [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2019 [cited 2020 Oct 12]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2019/01/28/policy-in-500-words-the-narrative-policy-framework/ 14 Cairney P. Policy Concepts in 1000 Words: The Advocacy Coalition Framework [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2013 [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/policy-concepts-in-1000-words-the-advocacy-coalition-framework/ 15 Cairney P. Policy in 500 Words: Multiple Streams Analysis and Policy Entrepreneurs [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2017 [cited 2020 Oct 12]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2017/06/23/policy-in-500-words-multiple-streams-analysis-and-policy-entrepreneurs/ 16 Cairney P. The Psychology of Evidence Based Policymaking: Who Will Speak for the Evidence If It Doesn’t Speak for Itself? [Internet]. Paul Cairney: Politics & Public Policy. 2014 [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/2014/04/07/1288/ 255 Exclusion criteria for participants: Individuals who conduct activities that are typically sanctioned by the academy Individuals who live, work, and exert their influence in countries with governance structures that do not constitute a liberal democracy Individuals who have no ties to an academic institution at the time of their political activities Organizations as unit of analysis Cases will thus include individuals of the four ‘archetypes’ as developed in conceptual framework Through purposeful sampling, I will initially include two individuals per archetype, which will sum up to a total of eight participants. Ideally, participants represent a diverse population of lived experience in terms of their gender, ethnicity, and career moment. Potential participants will be selected from my own and the PhD committee members’ extensive existing networks. Individuals will be contacted by email, either by myself or via an e-introduction by a committee member. If the individual does not respond, three follow-up emails will be sent, all within 10 business days of the previous reminder. In line with what Strauss and Corbin call "theoretical sampling”, participant recruitment or use of other data sources may be expanded as simultaneous data analysis is being carried out if gaps or contradictions in the data become evident17. Data sources Prolonged key informant interviews in the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews which will be video, and audio recorded (90min). Opportunity for participant feedback and continued consent once results have been written up. Data collection will be concluded when saturation is reached, meaning that data sources do not render additional information. Procedures The time frame for participant recruitment is April to May 2022. Data collection will be done ongoingly and in accordance with the availability of the participant from April 2022 to November 2022. Once prospective participants respond indicating that they are interested in being interviewed, they will be sent an email containing consent information (see Appendices B and C). This email will also contain information on third-party consent. Participants will be instructed to de-identify any personal information of individuals other than the participant in supporting data sources such as email conversations, meeting minutes, or personal notes. Should this not be possible, for example in the case of audio or video recordings, the participant will be instructed to seek third-party consent from these individuals (in this case, we will provide them with a third-party consent form). Upon agreement to participate, a time for an initial in-depth, unstructured interview via Zoom will be arranged. At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer will discuss preferences whether the interviewees want to be identified in the study publication or not. The interviewer will also let the interviewees know 17 Strauss A, Corbin J. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. Thousand Oaks, California: Saga Publication. 1998. 256 that they can revise their answer upon reception of the final case study report before publication. With the interviewees' permission, the Zoom interview will be video, and audio recorded, and written notes will also be taken. The recordings will be stored on UBC’s licensed Zoom cloud server. The interviews will be unstructured but guided to focus on the participants' knowledge-to-action strategies and their reflections on what this engagement has meant for their identity as an academic (see Appendix D). No personal information will be requested except for their personal opinions and experiences. The interviews will be analyzed, and transcripts will be shared with interviewees for their review. The final study report will be shared with interviewees before submission for publication. Protocol questions: see Interview guide (Appendix D) Study report The main audience for the study report will be the academic community. As such, the style of written communication will be very similar to publications in the peer-reviewed literature. A workshop will be created for academics who are interested in learning more about the theoretical underpinnings and concrete strategies to participate in political influencing.
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Kershaw, Paul W. (Paul William), 1974-
Boyd, David R. (David Richard), 1964-
Academics as activists : exploring and building political knowledge mobilization capacities to influence climate policy
Text