Arts, Faculty of
Asian Studies, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Kim, Jinsung
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
This dissertation, entitled “Between the Pillar of State and Social Stigma: Military Reform and Military Exile in Chosŏn Korea, 1863–1894,” examines military reform policies and the concurrent enforcement of military exile from 1863 to 1894 during King Kojong’s reign. While the Chosŏn government undertook military reforms to bolster its defenses against escalating foreign threats and emphasized the military’s importance, it paradoxically employed military service as punitive measures for offenders, adhering to traditional legal norms. This study argues that, contrary to the prevailing perception of military reform as a process of “modernization,” the Chosŏn government’s policies remained deeply entrenched in traditional values, prioritizing civil over military ideals and lacking any objective to fundamentally transform the military system. Furthermore, the sustained implementation of military exile underscored King Kojong and the ruling class’s perception of military service as a form of social disgrace. This dissertation is organized into three chronological chapters. Chapter One reexamines the characteristics of military policies, the changing status of military officials within the government, and the development of military exile during Taewŏn’gun’s regency from 1863 to 1873. Chapter Two explores King Kojong’s military reform policies, which reversed Taewŏn’gun’s major military agenda, including military exchanges with foreign states, efforts to strengthen royal guards, and the expansion of military exile to enforce national policies during the king’s first decade of direct rule between 1873 and 1884. Chapter Three examines King Kojong’s military policies and the enforcement of military exile during his second period of direct rule (1884–1894), highlighting Chosŏn’s continued reliance on Qing China’s military forces—grounded in traditional international relations—and the persistent implementation of military exile until the Kabo Reform of 1894. Through the analysis of military reform policies and the military exile practice, this study illuminates the characteristics of military affairs in Late Chosŏn during the late 19th century. It examines the contradictory nature of these reforms and the enduring influence of tradition, offering deeper insights into King Kojong and the ruling class’s stance on military reform while shedding light on the broader nature of the regime’s reform policies during this pivotal period.
Between the Pillar of State and Social Stigma: Military Reform and Military Exile in Chosŏn Korea, 1863-1894 by Jinsung Kim A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (Asian Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April 2025 © Jinsung Kim, 2025 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled: Between the Pillar of State and Social Stigma: Military Reform and Military Exile in Chosŏn Korea, 1863-1894 submitted by Jinsung Kim in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Studies Examining Committee: Nam-lin Hur, Professor, Asian Studies, UBC Supervisor Donald Leslie Baker, Professor, Asian Studies, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Leo Shin, Associate Professor, History and Asian Studies, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Steven Lee, Associate Professor, History, UBC University Examiner Bruce Rusk, Associate Professor, Asian Studies, UBC University Examiner Adam Bohnet, Associate Professor, History, King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario External Examiner iii ABSTRACT This dissertation, entitled “Between the Pillar of State and Social Stigma: Military Reform and Military Exile in Chosŏn Korea, 1863-1894,” examines military reform policies and the concurrent enforcement of military exile from 1863 to 1894 during King Kojong’s reign. While the Chosŏn government undertook military reforms to bolster its defenses against escalating foreign threats and emphasized the military’s importance, it paradoxically employed military service as punitive measures for offenders, adhering to traditional legal norms. This study argues that, contrary to the prevailing perception of military reform as a process of “modernization,” the Chosŏn government’s policies remained deeply entrenched in traditional values, prioritizing civil over military ideals and lacking any objective to fundamentally transform the military system. Furthermore, the sustained implementation of military exile underscored King Kojong and the ruling class’s perception of military service as a form of social disgrace. This dissertation is organized into three chronological chapters. Chapter One reexamines the characteristics of military policies, the changing status of military officials within the government, and the development of military exile during Taewŏn’gun’s regency from 1863 to 1873. Chapter Two explores King Kojong’s military reform policies, which reversed Taewŏn’gun’s major military agenda, including military exchanges with foreign states, efforts to strengthen royal guards, and the expansion of military exile to enforce national policies during the king’s first decade of direct rule between 1873 and 1884. Chapter Three examines King Kojong’s military policies and the enforcement of military exile during his second period of direct rule (1884-1894), highlighting Chosŏn’s continued reliance on Qing China’s military forces, grounded in traditional international relations, and the persistent implementation of military exile until the Kabo Reform of 1894. Through the analysis of military reform policies and the military exile practice, this study illuminates the characteristics of military affairs in Late Chosŏn during the late 19th century. It examines the contradictory nature of these reforms and the enduring influence of tradition, offering deeper insights into King Kojong and the ruling class’s stance on military reform while shedding light on the broader nature of the regime’s reform policies during this pivotal period. iv LAY SUMMARY This dissertation examines the implementation of military exile within the broader context of military reform undertaken by Chosŏn Korea between 1863 and 1894. While Korean-language scholarship has widely analyzed military reform as part of a “modernization” project, this study focuses on King Kojong and Chosŏn policymakers’ perceptions of military service and the underlying objectives of the reform initiatives. By exploring the execution of military exile as a punitive measure and the intent behind the military reform efforts, this dissertation seeks to provide new insights into Late Chosŏn military affairs. It argues that Chosŏn’s reform efforts were more closely tied to traditional norms than to a fundamental transformation of the existing military system. v PREFACE This dissertation is original, unpublished, and independent work of the author, Jinsung Kim. The use of Generative AI in this thesis was limited to the use of ChatGPT for checking sentences and paragraphs for correctness and clarity. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii LAY SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... iv PREFACE ....................................................................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix LIST OF MAPS .............................................................................................................................. x GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................. xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ xxx DEDICATION ......................................................................................................................... xxxiii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 Between the Pillar of State and the Social Humiliation: What Did the Military Represent in the Late 19th Century Chosŏn Korea, 1863-1894? .......................................................................... 1 Thesis .......................................................................................................................................... 8 Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 13 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................. 15 Organization ............................................................................................................................. 18 CHAPTER ONE: MILITARY REFORM DURING TAEWŎN’GUN’S REGENCY AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE), 1863-1873 ............................................................... 23 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 23 King Kojong’s Enthronement and Taewŏn’gun’s Military Policies ......................................... 25 The onset of Taewŏn’gun’s regency ...................................................................................... 25 Major military reform policies under Taewŏn’gun’s regency ............................................... 30 The Contentious Status of Military Officials during Taewŏn’gun’s Regency .......................... 44 State policies on the promotion of military officials ............................................................. 44 Continued marginalization of military officials .................................................................... 52 The Practice of Military Exile from 1863 to 1873 .................................................................... 59 An overview of the practice of military exile ........................................................................ 59 Military exile cases under the Taewŏn’gun regime .............................................................. 76 vii Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 93 CHAPTER TWO: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM UNDER KING KOJONG’S DIRECT RULE AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE), 1873-1884....... 94 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 94 King Kojong’s Direct Rule and the Change of Chosŏn’s Military System .............................. 96 End of Taewŏn’gun’s regency and his major military policies ............................................. 96 Military reforms and the persistence of traditional structures (1873-1884) ...................... 103 The Military Exile Practice between 1873 and 1884 ...............................................................117 Military exile cases linked to major political and diplomatic events ..................................117 Military exile cases involving corruption in the state service examinations ...................... 145 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 168 CHAPTER THREE: AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY REFORMS AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE) DURING THE SECOND PHASE OF KING KOJONG’S DIRECT RULE, 1884-1894 ................................................................................................................................... 170 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 170 Political Changes after the 1884 Coup and Chosŏn’s Military Reforms ................................ 172 The failure of the 1884 Coup and shifts in Chosŏn’s political and diplomatic landscape . 172 The characteristics of military policies from 1884 to 1894 ................................................ 181 The Continued Implementation of Military Exile between 1884 and 1894 ........................... 207 Military exile cases related to state governance ................................................................. 207 Military exile cases related to fraud in the government service examinations ................... 223 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 249 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 252 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 260 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: The Major Central Army Units of Late Chosŏn ............................................................. 39 Table 2: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1869-1873 .......................................................................... 49 Table 3: Five Categories of Military Exile ................................................................................... 65 Table 4: the Main Contents of Military Exile in the Comprehensive National Code ................... 71 Table 5: Summary of the Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1863 to 1873 ...................... 89 Table 6: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1873-1884 ........................................................................ 102 Table 7: Key Government Positions Held by the Four Offenders Following Release from Military Exile .............................................................................................................................. 157 Table 8: Summary of Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1873 to 1884 .......................... 164 Table 9: Cases of Financial Deficits in Chosŏn’s Government Offices and Military Units ....... 194 Table 10: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1884-1894 ...................................................................... 204 Table 11: Details of Government Orders and Punishments Regarding Gate Management ........ 214 Table 12: Summary of Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1884 to 1894 ........................ 246 ix LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: The Family Tree of King Kojong .................................................................................. 26 Figure 2: The New Family Tree of King Kojong after the Adoption ........................................... 28 x LIST OF MAPS Map 1: The Territory Gained by Russia after the Treaty of Beijing, 1860 ................................... 32 Map 2: The Map of the Korean Peninsula by David H. Burr, 1835 ............................................. 32 Map 3: The Map of the Korean Peninsula by James Wyld, 1873 ................................................. 33 Map 4: The Map of the Ch’ŏlsan Area in 1872 ............................................................................ 80 Map 5: The Map of the Sŏmjin Garrison in 1872 ......................................................................... 83 Map 6: The Map of Kimje County in 1872 .................................................................................. 87 Map 7: Major Locations of Military Exile during Taewŏn’gun’s Regency .................................. 92 Map 8: The Map of Kogŭm Island in 1872 ................................................................................ 125 Map 9: The Map of Naju Region in 1872 ................................................................................... 133 Map 10: The Map of Chain County in 1872 ............................................................................... 140 Map 11: The Map of Sinji Island in 1872 ................................................................................... 144 Map 12: The Map of Kimhae Prefecture in the 18th century ..................................................... 149 Map 13: The Map of Sangwŏn County in 1872 ......................................................................... 150 Map 14: The Map of Hŭngyang County and the Nokto Garrison in 1872 ................................. 162 Map 15: Major Locations of Military Exile during the First Phase of King Kojong’s Rule ...... 168 Map 16: The Locations of the Capital Guards Command in Local Areas (1885-1894) ............. 203 Map 17: The Map of Kŭmgap Garrison in 1872 ........................................................................ 220 Map 18: The Map of Yŏnghŭng County in 1872 ........................................................................ 227 Map 19: The Map of Samch’ŏk in 1872 ..................................................................................... 234 Map 20: The Map of Paech’ŏn County in 1872 ......................................................................... 242 Map 21: The Map of P’ungch’ŏn Prefecture Circa 18th Century............................................... 245 Map 22: Major Locations of Military Exile during the Second Phase of King Kojong’s Rule .. 249 xi GLOSSARY General Glossary abyŏng Elite combat soldiers 牙兵 Aekchŏngsŏ The Royal Concubine Office 掖庭署 aeminjido The principle of benevolence toward the people 愛民之道 amhaeng ŏsa Secret censors 暗行御史 anch’ihyŏng Settlement punishment 安置刑 Andong Kimssi The Andong Kim clan 安東 金氏 Anhaeksa The Specially Empowered Inspector 按覈使 Baqi The Eight Banners 八旗 bianyuanchongjun Distant frontier military exile 邊遠充軍 bingnong fenli The separation of soldiers and farmers 兵農分離 Ch’ambong The Junior Ninth Civil Officer 參奉 ch’amryŏnggawan Major 參領官 Ch’angdŏkkung Ch’angdŏk Palace 昌德宮 Ch’in’gun Chinŏyŏng The Defense Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍鎭禦營 Ch’in’gun Chŏnyŏng The Front Battalion 親軍前營 Ch’in’gun Chwayŏng The Left Battalion 親軍左營 Ch’in’gun Huyŏng The Rear Battalion 親軍後營 Ch’in’gun Munamyŏng The Military Southern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍武南營 Ch’in’gun Namyŏng The Southern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍南營 Ch’in’gun Pugyŏng The Northern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍北營 Ch’in’gun Pyŏlyŏng The Special Battalion within the Capital Guards Command 親軍別營 Ch’in’gun Simyŏng The Kanghwa Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍沁營 Ch’in’gun Sŏyŏng The Western Battalion of the Capital Guards Command 親軍西營 Ch’in’gun Uyŏng The Right Battalion 親軍右營 Ch’in’gunyŏng The Capital Guards Command 親軍營 ch’ogwan Major 哨官 Ch’ŏmsa The Third-Rank Special Army Officer 僉使 xii ch’ŏn’gŏ Recommendations 薦擧 Ch’ŏngjŏn Chinese coins 淸錢 Ch’ongŏyŏng The General Defense Battalion 總禦營 Ch’ŏngsŏngo The Review of the Selected Candidates 清選考 Ch’ongyungch’ŏng The Command of the Northern Approaches 摠戎廳 ch’ŏnmin Slaves 賤民 ch’osi The initial stage of an examination 初試 Ch’ujo The Ministry of Punishments 秋曹 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok Records of the Adjudication of Prison Cases by the Ministry of Punishments 秋曹決獄錄 ch’ulsin Examination passers 出身 ch’undogi A spring attendance examination 春到記 Ch’ungch’ŏng susa The Naval Commander of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province 忠淸水使 ch’unggun Military exile 充軍 ch’ut’al The deprivation of a public position 追奪 chaeji sajok Local elites 在地士族 chaesil The tomb keeper’s house 齋室 Chagyŏngjŏn Chagyŏng Hall 慈慶殿 chanban A marginalized group of fallen aristocrats 殘班 changhyŏng Heavy flogging 杖刑 changjŏng Able-bodied males 壯丁 Changnyŏng The Third-Rank Inspector 掌令 changsa Able-bodied men 壯士 Changwiyŏng The Robust Guard Battalion 壯衛營 Changyongyŏng The Robust and Brave Regiment 壯勇營 Chaoxian Shiyi Liutiao Banfa Six Provisions for Chosŏn Affairs 朝鮮事宜六條辦法 chapchol Miscellaneous soldiers 雜卒 Chikchang The Junior Seventh-Rank Official 直長 chikpu hoesi Proceeding to the second-stage examination 直赴會試 chin’gang A royal lecture 進講 chin’gwan ch’eje The Regional Command Center system 鎭管體制 chinbyŏnso Border garrisons 鎭邊所 Chinjang Garrison commanders 鎭將 Chinju Millan The Chinju Rebellion 晋州民亂 Chinmuyŏng Kanghwa Island Headquarters 鎭撫營 chinpŏp Training military formations 陣法 xiii chinsa Classics degree-holders 進士 chinsi Make-up examinations 陳試 Chip’yŏng The Fifth-Rank Minor Inspector 持平 chixing Light flogging 笞刑 chogwan Central officials 朝官 Chōheirei The Conscription Ordinance 徴兵令 chohŭlgang The exam permit 照訖講 Chŏlla chwasuyŏng The Left Naval Headquarters of Chŏlla Province 全羅左水營 chŏlto An isolated island 絶島 Chŏltosa Local army commanders 節度使 chŏn’gang The palace lecture examinations 殿講 chŏngbyŏng Regular soldiers 正兵 chŏnggun Regular duty soldiers 正軍 Chŏngŏn The Fourth-Rank Censor 正言 chŏngryŏnggwan Colonel 正領官 Chŏngsŏkkwanse The Ch’ŏngsŏk Pass tax 靑石關稅 chonho The honorific titles 尊號 Chŏnju Yissi The Chŏnju Yi clan 全州 李氏 chŏnsi The palace examination 殿試 choryumi Rice in its grain-transport warehouse 漕留米 Chosa Sich’altan The Courtiers’ Inspection Mission 朝士視察團 Chosŏn wangjo sillok The Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty 朝鮮王朝實錄 Chubu The Keeper of Records 主簿 Chuch’a Chosŏn ch’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang saŭi Director-General Resident in Chosŏn for Diplomatic and Commercial Relations 駐紥朝鮮總理交涉通商事宜 chuch’ŏngsa The Special Mission 奏請使 chujin The main garrison 主鎭 Chujŏnso The National Mint 鑄錢所 chungbyŏk Felony 重辟 Chungch’ubu The Military Affairs Commission 中樞府 Chungch’uwŏn The Council of Ministers without Portfolio 中樞院 chŭnggwangsi The palace augmented examination 增廣試 chungin The low-ranking clerks 中人 Chunwŏnjŏn Chunwŏn Palace 濬源殿 Chusŏ The Recorder 注書 Chwabyŏngyŏng The Left Headquarters of Provincial Military Commander 左兵營 xiv Chwarang The Assistant Section Chief 佐郞 chwasu Heads of the local agency 座首 Chwaŭijŏng The Left State Councillor 左議政 Da Ming lü The Great Ming Code 大明律 fan An outer vassal 藩 fengjin zhengce The prohibition policy 封禁政策 fujinchongjun Very near frontier military exile 附近充軍 Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 外務省外交史料館 gwimun ch’ŏnmu The principle of prioritizing civil over military affairs 貴文賤武 haedo A sea island 海島 haenggung Temporary palaces 行宮 haengsun Conducting patrols 行巡 hansan’in Idle officials 閑散人 hari Local clerks 下吏 harye Slaves 下隷 hoesi Public humiliation 回示 Hojo The Ministry of Taxation 戶曹 Hojo ch’amp’an The Second Minister of the Ministry of Taxation 戶曹參判 Hojo p’ansŏ The Minister of Finance 戶曹判書 hon’gun A foolish ruler 昏君 Hongmun’gwan The Office of Special Counsellors 弘文館 hop’ose The household cloth tax 戶布稅 Howich’ŏng The Royal Retinue Office 扈衛廳 Huaijun The Huai Army 淮軍 Hullyŏn Togam The Military Training Agency 訓鍊都監 Hullyŏn’gwan The Hall of Military Training 訓鍊館 Hullyŏnwŏn The Bureau of Military Training 訓練院 hwagi Harmony 和氣 hwan’gok Grain loans 還穀 hwanmi Grain loan rice 還米 hwap’ogwa Artillery tests 火砲科 hyanggwan The family clan 鄕貫 hyanggyo Local official schools 鄕校 hyangni Local clerks 鄕吏 Hyōbushō The Ministry of War of Meiji Japan 兵部省 hyŏngch’u Physical torture involving beating the shins 刑推 Hyŏngjo The Ministry of Punishments 刑曹 xv Hyŏpp’an The Vice Minister 協辦 idan Strange teachings 異端 Ijo The Ministry of Personnel 吏曹 Ijo p’ansŏ The Minister of Personnel 吏曹判書 Ilsŏngnok The Court Chronicle 日省錄 Imo Kullan The 1882 Military Mutiny 壬午軍亂 Imsul Millan The Imsul Rebellion 壬戌民亂 Injo Panjŏng The Injo Restoration of 1623 仁祖反正 ipchik Performing night duty 入直 isŏ Clerks 吏胥 iyangsŏn An unusual vessel 異樣船 jibianchongjun Farthest frontier military exile 極邊充軍 jinbianchongjun Nearby frontier military exile 近邊充軍 Jixiao xinshu The New Treatise on Effective Discipline 紀效新書 junji The military register 軍籍 Kabo Kaehyŏk The Kabo Reform 甲午改革 kaehwa Enlightenment 開化 Kaehwa sasang Enlightenment Thought 開化思想 Kaehwap’a The Enlightenment Party 開化派 Kaigunshō The Navy Bureau of Meiji Japan 海軍省 Kajusŏ The Sixth-Rank Temporary Recorder 假注書 Kamch’al The Investigator 監察 Kamguk Taesin The Supervisor of the Nation 監國大臣 kamgwan Stewards 監官 Kammokkwan The Keeper of Horses 監牧官 Kamsa Provincial governors 監司 Kanghawdo Choyak The Treaty of Kanghwa 江華島條約 Kanghwa yusu The mayor of Kanghwa Island 江華留守 Kanghwado Sakŏn The Kanghwa Island Incident 江華島事件 kapchuga Funds for armors and helmets 甲冑價 Kapsa Armored Soldiers 甲士 Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn The Coup d’État of 1884 甲申政變 karye The crown prince’s wedding 嘉禮 kasŏn taebu The Junior Second-Rank Minister 嘉善大夫 Kaŭi taebu The Junior Second-Rank Minister 嘉義大夫 ketsuzei Blood tax 血税 kinyŏnbok One-year mourning attire 朞年服 Kisajang The Third-Rank Horseman General 騎士將 kisŏn’gun Naval forces 騎船軍 xvi Kiyŏn Haebangyŏng The Coastal Defense Headquarters 畿沿海防營 Kojong sillok The Veritable Record of King Kojong 高宗實錄 Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan The National Archives of Japan 国立公文書館 Kŏnch’ŏnggung Kŏnch’ŏng Palace 乾淸宮 Kŏnch’unmun Kŏnch’un Gate 建春門 Kongdo chŏngch’aek The state policy of emptying islands 空島政策 konggok Public grains 公穀 Kongjo ch’amp’an The Second Minister of the Ministry of Works 工曹參判 kongnap Tribute taxes 貢納 konhyŏng Flogging 棍刑 konjanghyŏng Flogging with a stick 棍杖刑 Konoehei The Imperial Guard 近衛兵 kosin A certificate of appointment 告身 Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ Diplomatic Documents of Old Korea 舊韓國外交文書 kubon sinch’am Retaining traditional foundations while selectively integrating aspects of Western civilization 舊本新參 Kŭmgun The Royal Palace Guards 禁軍 Kŭmgunch’ŏng The Royal Palace Command 禁軍廳 Kŭmwi taejang The Commander of the Capital Garrison 禁衛大將 Kŭmwiyŏng The Forbidden Guard Division 禁衛營 kun’gwan Military officers 軍官 Kŭndae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents 近代韓國外交文書 kunp’ose The military cloth tax 軍布稅 kunsu County magistrates 郡守 kwagŏ The government service examinations 科擧 Kwangju yusu The Magistrate of Kwangju 廣州留守 Kwŏnnonggwan Agricultural officers 勸農官 kyejain Privy seals 啓字印 kyemong kunju Enlightened monarchs 啓蒙君主 Kyojo sinwŏn undong Movements to vindicate Tonghak’s founder from false accusations 敎祖伸寃運動 kyŏlchŏn The cash surtax on land 結錢 kyŏllyŏm The land-tax surcharge 結斂 Kyŏmsabok The Concurrent Royal Stables 兼司僕 Kyŏngbokkung Kyŏngbok Palace 景福宮 kyŏngch’ang chuin The agent of the Capital Treasuries 京倉主人 xvii Kyŏngguk taejŏn The Great Code for State Administration 經國大典 Kyŏngmudae The Kyŏngmu Office 景武臺 Kyŏngwŏn pusa The District Magistrate of Kyŏngwŏn Prefecture 慶源府使 kyorin The neighborly relationship 交隣 Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae The Military Training Unit 敎鍊兵隊 kyosaeng kogang Student evaluation examinations 校生考講 liuxing Banishment 流刑 Luying The Green Standard Army 綠營 Luying The Green Standard Army 綠營 Maech’ŏn yarok The Unofficial Records of Maech’ŏn 梅泉野錄 Man’guk kongpŏp International law 萬國公法 Mandongmyo The Shrine to Honor Ming China 萬東廟 manho Myriarchs 萬戶 minji The civil register 民籍 Miryang Pakssi The Miryang Pak family 密陽 朴氏 mongmin’gwan Shepherds of the people 牧民官 muban The military branch 武班 mugwan The military branch 武官 mumyŏngjapse Unclassified miscellaneous taxes 無名雜稅 mun’gwan The civil branch 文官 munban The civil branch 文班 munbŏl Class privileges 門閥 Mungo wŏnoerang The Gate Official 門考員外郞 munkwa The civil service examination 文科 munp’ung Civil values 文風 Muwiso The Palace Guard Unit 武衛所 Muwiyŏng The Palace Guards Garrison 武衛營 Muye byŏlgam Martial Arts Special Guards 武藝別監 Muyŏk Kyuch’ik The Regulations of Trade 貿易規則 Naegŭmwi The Forbidden Inner Zone Guards 內禁衛 Naemubu The Ministry of Home Affairs 內務府 Naesangjik The Inner Chamber Guards 內廂直 Naesibu The Office of Eunuchs 內侍府 najang Runners in county offices 羅將 Nambyŏngsa The provincial army commander of Hamgyŏng Province 南兵使 Namin The Southerners 南人 napsokkun Support taxpayers 納布軍 xviii Nasŏn Chŏngbŏl The Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658 羅禪征伐 Noktojin The Nokto Garrison 鹿島鎭 nongja ch’ŏnha chi taebon Farming is the foundation of the world 農者天下之大本 nongmyŏng Writing names 錄名 nongsang Agriculture and sericulture 農桑 Noron The Patriarch’s group 老論 nŭngjich’ŏch’am Quartering 陵遲處斬 Oesŏ The Chosŏn Diplomatic Office 外署 Ogunyŏng The Five Military Divisions 五軍營 ohyŏng Five punishments 五刑 Owi The Five Military Commands 五衛 Owijang The Five Guards General 五衛將 ŏyŏmse Fisheries and salt taxes 魚鹽稅 Ŏyŏngch’ŏng The Capital Guard Unit 御營廳 P’an’gyo The Senior Third-Rank Official 判校 P’odoch’ŏng The Capital Police 捕盜廳 p’oguse River port taxes 浦口稅 p’ohŭm Tax embezzlement 逋欠 p’oryangmi The artillery provision rice 砲糧米 p’osu musketeers 砲手 p’umgye Bureaucratic ranks 品階 P’ungyang Chossi The P’ungyang Cho clan 豊壤 趙氏 p’yohagun Standard bearers 標下軍 P’yŏngbi The Adjunct General 褊裨 P’yŏngsa Civil assistants 評事 P’yŏngsan Sinssi The P’yŏngsan Sin clan 平山 申氏 p’yŏnsaek Partisan colors 偏色 paekp’ae The white certificate 白牌 Paeksŏ Sakŏn The Silk Letter Incident 帛書事件 pakch’an Light banishment 薄竄 pangch’ukhyangni Stripping of official rank and banishment to one’s hometown 放逐鄕里 Pangmok The Roster of Successful Candidates 榜目 Pangŏyŏng The Defense Garrison 防禦營 Pannam Pakssi The Pannam Pak clan 潘南 朴氏 pibong The seal 祕封 Pibyŏnsa The Border Defense Council 備邊司 Pisŏwŏn The Royal Secretariat 秘書院 xix po Forts 堡 poin Supporting taxpayers 保人 pokche Mourning attire 服制 pokkwa Reinstation of the status as a successful exam-passer 復科 pongmagun Transportation soldiers 卜馬軍 pongsu Beacon stations 烽燧 Pŏpsŏngp’o tokchin The Pŏpsŏngp’o Independent Garrison 法聖浦獨鎭 puch’ŏhyŏng Official residence restriction 付處刑 Pugin The Northerners 北人 puguk kangbyŏng Enriching the Nation and Strengthening the Military 富國强兵 pugye Spirit-written texts 扶乩 Puhogun The Fourth Deputy Commander 副護軍 Pujehak The Third-Rank Vice Academic Counsellor 副提學 pukpŏl The Attack the North 北伐 Pukpyŏngsa The Commander of the Northern Headquarters 北兵使 pulch’i Unfit 不治 pulhyo Filial impiety 不孝 pungno Northern barbarians 北虜 puryŏnggwan Lieutenant major 副領官 Pusa The Deputy Envoy 副使 Pusagwa The Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer 副司果 pusang Peddlers 負商 Puyun The Special Magistrate 府尹 Pyŏlchang The Special Commander 別將 Pyŏlgun’gwan Lower-ranking military officials 別軍官 Pyŏlp’owigun The Special Cannon Army 別砲衛軍 Pyŏlsiwi Special Royal Guards 別侍衛 pyŏngbang Colonel 兵房 pyŏnggyo Military officials 兵校 Pyŏngin Yangyo The French Disturbance of 1866 丙寅洋擾 Pyŏngjo The Ministry of War 兵曹 Pyŏngjo ch’amŭi The Third Minister of the Ministry of War 兵曹參議 Pyŏngjo p’ansŏ The Minister of War 兵曹判書 Pyŏngma chŏltosa The Provincial Army Commander 兵馬節度使 Pyŏngsa Military commanders 兵使 xx Pyŏnjang Border garrison commanders 邊將 pyŏnwŏn A remote area 邊遠 pyŏnwŏn ch’unggun Military exile to a remote area 邊遠充軍 Qingliudang The Purist Party 淸流黨 ri A local clerk 吏 Rikugunshō The Army Bureau of Meiji Japan 陸軍省 Saal The Sixth-Rank Miscellaneous Post 司謁 sach’in Personal father 私親 saegni Local clerks 色吏 saengwŏn Literary degree-holders 生員 Sagan The Second-Rank Censor 司諫 Saganwŏn The Office of the Censor-General 司諫院 sahak Private academies 私學 Sahŏnbu The Office of Inspector-General 司憲府 sahwan Village grain loan rice 社還 sahyŏng Death penalty 死刑 sajang The sandy military training ground 沙場 sajok Aristocrats 士族 sajŏk The official roster 仕籍 salsu Close-combat specialists wielding swords, pikes, and spears 殺手 Sambanyesik The Book of Official Protocols 三班禮式 Samdo sugun t’ongjeyŏng The Navy Headquarters of Three Provinces 三道水軍統制營 Samgunbu The Three Armies Command 三軍府 samin chŏngch’aek A relocation policy 徙民政策 Samjŏng The Three Levies 三政 samsubyŏng Three combat corps 三手兵 Sanghogun The Deputy Commander 上護軍 saqian Deportation 發遣 sasa Death by poison 賜死 sasu Archers 射手 Sayak The Keykeeper 司鑰 sech’ogun Soldiers recruited to fill vacancies in the military roster 歲抄軍 sedo chŏngch’i In-law politics 勢道政治 Shenjiying The Divine Machine Battalion 神機營 shu’e Monetary redemption 贖額 shuxing Redemptive payments 贖刑 shuyin Redemption money 贖銀 xxi Sich’alwiwŏn The Inspector 視察委員 Sidok The Reader in Attendance 侍讀 sigwan Invigilators 試官 sigwŏn Answer sheet 試券 sijong Royal attendants 侍從 simu Current affairs 時務 singnyŏnsi The regular triennial examination 式年試 Sirhakp’a The Practical Learning school 實學派 siwi Overseeing guard duty 侍衛 siwigun Royal guard units 侍衛軍 sog’ogun Regimental troops 束伍軍 Sŏhak Western Learning 西學 sŏja An illegitimate son 庶子 Sŏjanggwan The Document Officer 書狀官 Sok ŭmch’ŏngsa Sequel to Turbulent History 續陰晴史 sokchŏn Redemption money 贖錢 sokhyŏn A subordinate county 屬縣 sokkuk A dependent state 屬國 sokwa Lower examinations 小科 Sŏmjinjin The Sŏmjin Garrison 蟾津鎭 somojin Recruitment garrisons 召募陳 Sŏnggyun’gwan The National Confucian Academy 成均館 sŏnghyanggok Provisions from fortresses 城餉穀 Sŏngnyŏk Sansŏng Sŏngnyŏk Mountain Fortress 聖曆山城 Sŏnhyech’ŏng The Office for the Dispensation of Benevolence 宣惠廳 Sŏnjŏn’gwan The Royal Messengers 宣傳官 Sŏnmusa Pacificator 宣撫使 Sŏnwŏn sokpo The Supplementary Royal Genealogy 璿源續譜 sŏŏl Descendants of concubines 庶孼 sŏwŏn Confucian academies 書院 Sŏwŏn Low-level clerks 書員 Such’an The Sixth-Rank Counsellor 修撰 sugun Marines 水軍 Sugun ch’ŏmjŏlchesa The Deputy Naval Commander 水軍僉節制使 Sugun ch’ŏmjŏlchesajin The Prefectural-Level Naval Garrison 水軍僉節制使鎭 Sugun chŏltosa The Provincial Navy Commander 水軍節度使 Sumujang The Gatekeeper 守門將 xxii Sŭngjŏngwŏn The Royal Secretariat 承政院 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi The Diary of the Royal Secretariat 承政院日記 Sŭngmunwŏn The Office of Diplomatic Documents 承文院 Sungryŏngjŏn Sungryŏng Shrine 崇靈殿 Sunyŏng The Headquarters of the Provincial Governor 巡營 Suŏch’ŏng The Command of the Southern Approaches 守禦廳 suryŏm ch’ŏngjŏng The dowager regency 垂簾聽政 suryŏng Local magistrates 守令 Susinsa The Good Will Mission 修信使 susok A commutation fee 收贖 sut’o Search for and suppress 搜討 Suyŏng The Provincial Naval Headquarters 水營 t’aehyŏng Light flogging 笞刑 T’ongjeyŏng The Regional Naval Headquarters 統制營 T’ongjŏng taebu The Senior Third-Rank Minister 通政大夫 T’ongni Kimu Amun The Office for the Management of State Affairs 統理機務衙門 T’ongwiyŏng The General Guard Battalion 統衛營 T’ongyŏng The Naval Headquarters 統營 taebu High-ranking officials 大夫 taedongmi Tribute rice 大同米 Taedongpŏp The Taedong Tribute Tax 大同法 taegan Censors 大諫 Taegujin The Taegu Garrison 大邱鎭 Taehan kyenyŏnsa History of the Waning Years of the Taehan Empire 大韓季年史 Taejŏn hoet’ong The Comprehensive Collection of the National Code 大典會通 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn The Comprehensive National Code 大典通編 taekwa Higher examinations 大科 taenyŏn’gun Underage reserve forces 待年軍 taerip Military service substitution 代立 Taesasŏng The Third-Rank Rector 大司成 taesin Three state councillors 大臣 taewŏnwibunbu The order from Taewŏn’gun 大院位分付 tambae Tobacco 淡蓓 tan’gŭnhyŏng Severing tendons 斷筋刑 tangbaekch’ŏn The 100-cash coins 當百錢 tangsanggwan High-level officials 堂上官 xxiii tansokkun Regimental troops 團束軍 Tohobu Large Prefecture 都護府 tohyŏng Forced labor 徒刑 Tojejo Supreme commissioners 都提調 Tokp’an The President 督辦 Tongbu sŭngji The Sixth-Rank Royal Secretary 同副承旨 Tonghak Eastern Learning 東學 Tonghak Nongmin Chŏnjaeng The Tonghak Peasant Rebellion of 1894 東學農民戰爭 tongjang Village chiefs 洞長 Tongji chungch’ubu sa The Senior Second-Rank Administrator of the Military Affairs Commission 同知中樞府事 Tongji tonnyŏngbusa The Second Minister of the Office of the Royal Clan 同知敦寧府事 Tongjisa The Winter Solstice Emissary 冬至使 tosŏngmunse The Seoul gate taxes 都城門稅 tunjŏn Military colony lands 屯田 tunjŏnbyŏng Peasant farmer soldiers 屯田兵 tuntian Military agricultural colonies 屯田 tuxing Forced labor 徒刑 ŭibyŏng The local militia 義兵 Ŭigŭmbu The State Tribunal 義禁府 Ŭijŏngbu The Supreme Council 議政府 Ujŏngguk The Postal Administration 郵政局 ŭmgwan Protected officials 蔭官 Ŭnggyo The Fourth-Rank Advisor 應敎 ŭngje A special examination 應製 Unha kyŏnmunnok The Record of Observation of Taewŏn’gun 雲下見聞錄 Unhyŏn’gung Unhyŏn Palace 雲峴宮 Unyangho Sakŏn The Un’yō Incident 雲揚號事件 ŭpchi county gazetteers 邑誌 Urimwi The Winged Forest Guards 羽林衛 wakō Japanese pirates 倭寇 weisuo Local garrisons 衛所 widap Illegal stamping of seals 僞踏 Wijang The Junior Second-Rank Guard Commander 衛將 wijo Forgery 僞造 xxiv wijŏng ch’ŏksa Defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy 衛正斥邪 wirianch’i A form of exile where the place of banishment was enclosed with thorny fences 圍籬安置 wŏllye A slave of the Royal Secretariat 院隷 wŏnakchi Remote and inhospitable places 遠惡地 wŏnakto Remote and inhospitable islands 遠惡島 wŏnji A remote area 遠地 wŏnnapchŏn Voluntary contributions 願納錢 Xiangjun The Xiang Army 湘軍 Xunfu Inspectors-general 巡撫 yangban The aristocratic class 兩班 Yanghyangch’ŏng The Office of Military Provisions 糧餉廳 yangin Commoners 良人 yanzhangchongjun In a malarial region military exile 煙瘴充軍 Yebinsi The Guest Ritual Agency 禮賓寺 Yejo The Ministry of Rites 禮曹 Yi Chae-sŏn Sakŏn The Yi Chae-sŏn Incident 李載先事件 yŏksŏ The transcription of the original answers 易書 yŏn’gangsuse The riverside tax 沿江收稅 yŏng Regiments 營 yŏnggwan Lieutenant major 領官 Yonghoyŏng The Dragon Tiger Regiment 龍虎營 yŏngjang Regiment commander 營將 Yŏngjongjin The Yŏngjong Garrison 永宗鎭 yŏngsebulmangbi Memorial tablets 永世不忘碑 Yŏngsŏnsa The Delegation to Tianjin 領選使 Yŏngŭijŏng The Chief State Councillor 領議政 yŏnjwaje Guilt by association 緣坐制 yŏnsŏk The royal audience 筵席 yoro By chance 僥路 yubae Banishment 流配 yubae Banishment 流配 Yugyŏng Kongwŏn The Royal English Academy 育英公院 yuhak Student scholars 幼學 yuhyŏng Banishment 流刑 yuhyŏng Banishment 流刑 Yukchin The Six Garrisons 六鎭 xxv Yukkun Mugwan Hakkyo The Chosŏn Military Academy 陸軍武官學校 yukkyŏng Six ministers 六卿 yumin Drifters 流民 Yun Ch’i-ho ilgi The Diary of Yun Ch’i-ho 尹致昊日記 yusaeng Confucian scholars 儒生 zhangxing Heavy flogging 杖刑 Zhongguo Middle Kingdom 中國 Zongdu Governors-general 總督 Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen The Office for the General Management of Affairs Concerning the Various Countries 總理各國事務衙門 Glossary of Personal Name Han Ki-hyŏn 韓基玄 Han Kyŏng-wŏn 韓敬源 Han Kyu-jik 韓圭稷 Han Se-hyŏng 韓世衡 Hanabusa Yoshimoto 花房義質 Hŏ Sŭp 許熠 Hong Chŏng-hui 洪正憙 Hong Kyŏng-nae 洪景來 Hong Pong-hwa 洪鳳華 Hong Si-hyŏng 洪時衡 Hong Wŏn-sik 洪遠植 Hong Yŏng-sik 洪英植 Horimoto Reizō 堀本礼造 Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn’gun 興宣大院君 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹 Hwang Sa-yŏng 黃嗣永 Hyŏn Yong-wŏn 玄龍源 Inoue Kaoru 井上馨 Inoue Yoshika 井上良馨 Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 Kang No 姜㳣 Ki Kwan-hyŏn 奇觀鉉 Kim Chae-hŭi 金在熙 Kim Chwa-gŭn 金左根 Kim Han-mun 金漢文 Kim Hŭng-gŭn 金興根 Kim Ki-sŏk 金箕錫 Kim Kyu-rak 金奎洛 Kim Ok-kyun 金玉均 Kim Po-hyŏn 金輔鉉 Kim Pyŏng-dŏk 金炳德 Kim Pyŏng-hak 金炳學 Kim Pyŏng-ik 金炳翊 Kim Pyŏng-si 金炳始 Kim Pyŏng-su 金炳洙 Kim Pyŏng-yun 金炳胤 Kim Sŏk-gu 金錫九 Kim Sŏng-un 金聖運 xxvi Kim U-yong 金禹用 Kim Wan-su 金完洙 Kim Yŏng-su 金永壽 Kim Yun-sik 金允植 Kim Yun-sik 金允植 King Ch’ŏlchong 哲宗 King Ch’ungsŏn 忠宣王 King Chŏngjo 正祖 King Hŏnjong 憲宗 King Hyojong 孝宗 King Hyŏnjong 顯宗 King Ikchong 翼宗 King Injo 仁祖 King Kojong 高宗 King Kwanghae 光海君 King Kwanghae 光海君 King Sejong 世宗 King Sŏnjo 宣祖 King Sukchong 肅宗 King Sunjo 純祖 King T’aejo 太祖 King T’aejong 太宗 King Yŏngjo 英祖 Kondō Masuki 近藤真鋤 Ku Sŏng-hŭi 具星喜 Kuroda Kiyotaka 黒田清隆 Kuroda Nagamasa 黒田長政 Kwak Yun-gi 郭允基 Kwŏn Chŏng-ho 權鼎鎬 Kwŏn Ŭng-gi 權應夔 Kwŏn Ŭng-gi 權應夔 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 Ma Jianzhong 馬建忠 Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 Min Ch’i-sang 閔致庠 Min Chong-muk 閔種默 Min Kyŏm-ho 閔謙鎬 Min Sŭng-ho 閔升鎬 Min T’ae-ho 閔台鎬 Min Ŭng-sik 閔應植 Min Yŏng-gyu 閔泳奎 Min Yŏng-hwan 閔泳煥 Min Yŏng-ik 閔泳翊 Min Yŏng-jun 閔泳駿 Min Yŏng-mok 閔泳穆 Min Yŏng-so 閔泳韶 Min Yŏng-sŏ 閔泳序 Min Yŏng-wi 閔泳緯 Nam Chŏng-ch’ŏl 南廷哲 Nam Chŏng-ho 南廷皓 O Ch’i-su 吳致壽 O Kyŏng-sŏk 吳慶錫 O Sun-sŏn 吳醇善 Ŏ Yun-jung 魚允中 Pae Sang-bŏm 裵相範 Pak Ho-sik 朴浩植 Pak Kyŏng-hak 朴景學 Pak Kyu-su 朴珪壽 Pak Mi 朴楣 Pak Pong-bin 朴鳳彬 Pak U-hyŏn 朴遇賢 Pak Wŏn-yang 朴元陽 Pak Yŏng-gyo 朴泳敎 Pak Yŏng-hun 朴泳薰 Pak Yŏng-hyo 朴泳孝 Prince Gong 恭親王 Prince Namyŏn 南延君 Prince Ŭnjŏn 恩全君 Prince Ŭnŏn 恩彦君 Prince Ŭnsin 恩信君 Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu 卞元圭 Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 Queen Consort Sinjŏng 神貞王后 Sasaki Kumakichi 佐々木熊吉 Sim Ik-pong 沈翼鳳 Sim Sun-t’aek 沈舜澤 Sim T’ak 沈倬 Sin Chae-u 愼㘽祐 Sin Hŏn 申櫶 Sin Paek 申柏 xxvii Sin Tae-hyŏn 申大顯 Sŏ Chae-p’il 徐載弼 Sŏ Kwang-bŏm 徐光範 Sŏ Sang-jŏng 徐相鼎 Sŏ Tang-bo 徐堂輔 Song Chu-hyŏn 宋胄顯 Song Kŭn-su 宋近洙 Song Paek-ok 宋伯玉 Sugimura Fukashi 杉村濬 T’ae Kyŏng-jin 太敬瑨 Taewŏn’gun 大院君 Takahira Kogorō 高平小五郎 Takezoe Shinichirō 竹添進一郎 Tongzhi Emperor 同治帝 Wu Changqing 吳長慶 Wu Zhaoyou 吳兆有 Xianfeng Emperor 咸豊帝 Yamagata Aritomo 山県有朋 Yamashiro Kenzō 山城建造 Yi An-sa 李安社 Yi Ch’oe-ŭng 李最應 Yi Chae-hŭi 李載熙 Yi Chae-myŏn 李載冕 Yi Chae-sŏn 李載先 Yi Chae-wŏn 李載元 Yi Cho-yŏn 李祖淵 Yi Chung-ch’il 李重七 Yi Chun-yong 李埈鎔 Yi Ha-ŭng 李昰應 Yi Ho-jun 李鎬俊 Yi Hŭi-dang 李禧戇 Yi Hŭi-t’ae 李嬉泰 Yi Hwi-rim 李彙林 Yi Ki-ch’un 李基春 Yi Ki-ju 李起周 Yi Ki-ŏn 李驥彥 Yi Ku 李球 Yi Kwang-ik 李光益 Yi Kwan-yŏn 李觀淵 Yi Kyo-hŏn 李敎獻 Yi Kyŏng-ha 李景夏 Yi Kyu-ch’ŏl 李圭徹 Yi Kyu-sŏk 李奎奭 Yi Min-dŏk 李敏德 Yi Myŏng-bok 李命福 Yi Pong-dŏk 李鳳德 Yi Pong-gu 李鳳九 Yi Pyŏng-ŭng 李秉膺 Yi Sŭng-o 李承五 Yi Sŭng-o 李承五 Yi Sun-sin 李舜臣 Yi Ton-ha 李敦夏 Yi U 李㘾 Yi Wi-so 李暐沼 Yi Wŏn-bŏm 李元範 Yi Yu-wŏn 李裕元 Yi Yu-wŏn 李裕元 Yu Hong-gi 劉鴻基 Yu Hyŏng-wŏn 柳馨遠 Yu Sŏk 柳奭 Yuan Baoqing 袁保慶 Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 Yun Ch’i-ho 尹致昊 Yun Cha-dŏk 尹滋悳 Yun Cha-sŭng 尹滋承 Yun T’ae-jun 尹泰駿 Yun Yŏng-gwan 尹永寬 Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 xxviii Glossary of Nations and Places Anak 安岳 Asan 牙山 Baoding 保定 Ch’ŏlsan 鐵山 Ch’ŏngdo 淸道 Ch’ŏngju 淸州 Ch’unch’ŏn 春川 Ch’ungchŏng Province 忠淸道 Chain 慈仁 Cheju Island 濟州島 Chindo 珍島 Chinju 晋州 Chŏksŏng 積城 Chŏlla Province 全羅道 Chongsŏng 鐘城 Chŏnju 全州 Chosŏn 朝鮮 Chunghwa 中和 Hamch’ang 咸昌 Hamgyŏng Province 咸鏡道 Han 漢 Hayang 河陽 Hŭksan Island 黑山島 Hŭngyang 興陽 Hwanghae Province 黃海道 Inch’ŏn 仁川 Kado Island 椵島 Kanghwa Island 江華島 Kangjin 康津 Kangwŏn Province 江原道 Karipo 加里浦 Kimhae 金海 Kimje 金堤 Kobu 古阜 Kogŭm Island 古今島 Kŏmun Island 巨文島 Koryŏ 高麗 Kŭmgap Island 金甲島 Kwangju 廣州 Kwangyang 光陽 Kyodong 喬桐 Kyŏnggang 京江 Kyŏnggi Province 京畿道 Kyŏngju 慶州 Kyŏngwŏn 慶源 Manchuria 滿洲 Masan 馬山 Ming 明 Muan 務安 Myŏnch’ŏn 沔川 Naju 羅州 Nanji Island 蘭芝島 Okkwa 玉果 Onsŏng 穩城 P’ungch’ŏn 豐川 P’yŏngan Province 平安道 P’yŏngyang 平壤 Paech’ŏn 白川 Pakch’ŏn 博川 Poŭn 報恩 Puan 扶安 Pusan 釜山 Pyŏktong 碧潼 Pyŏngnando 碧瀾渡 Qin 秦 Qing 淸 Ryūkyū 琉球 Sakchu 朔州 Samch’ŏk 三陟 Samnam 三南 xxix Sangju 尙州 Sangwŏn 祥原 Sinji Island 薪智島 Song 宋 Sunch’ŏn 順川 Suwŏn 水原 T’ongjin 通津 Taegu 大邱 The Han River 漢江 The Naktong River 洛東江 The Sŏmjin River 蟾津江 The Taehan Empire 大韓帝國 The Tuman River 豆滿江 The Yalu River 鴨綠江 Tianjin 天津 Tongnae 東萊 Ŭiju 義州 Ullŭng Island 鬱陵島 Wando Island 莞島 Xinjiang 新疆 Yong’in 龍仁 Yŏnggwang 靈光 Yŏnghŭng 永興 Yŏngjong 永宗 Yuan 元 Zhili 直隸 xxx ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have far too many people to thank in this section, and if I were to acknowledge everyone properly, this might turn into another dissertation. But I’ll do my best to keep it concise. First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to Prof. Nam-lin Hur, my supervisor and the best mentor I’ve ever had. The life of a doctoral student is a relentless cycle of challenges and agony, though the reward at the end is (hopefully) sweet. Without his academic support and encouragement, completing my Ph.D. would have been impossible. One day, a senior from my alumni, Sungkyunkwan University, visited Vancouver and had the chance to meet Prof. Hur with me. After our conversation, my senior advised me to treat Prof. Hur like my father. Without missing a beat, I jokingly replied that I don’t always listen to my father, but, in all seriousness, I have always appreciated Prof. Hur’s guidance as much as I do my parents’. Also, I am deeply grateful for the support and invaluable advice of my committee members at the University of British Columbia. A special thanks goes to Prof. Donald Baker, whose insightful comments and encouragement greatly improved my dissertation. I still remember his kind and nearly two-page reply when I first reached out to him while applying to UBC. Due to my shy personality, I did not contact him as often as I should have, but whenever I greeted him or sought his advice, he was always willing to help. I am also thankful to Prof. Leo Shin, who generously accepted my last-minute request to serve on my dissertation committee. He challenged me with thought-provoking questions (sometimes difficult to answer) but they pushed me to explore my research topic more deeply and consider it from new perspectives. Furthermore, I sincerely appreciate Prof. Peter Nosco’s invaluable support and feedback during my comprehensive exams and prospectus process. Although he was unable to serve on my dissertation committee due to his retirement, I remain grateful for his guidance and dedication. In addition to my esteemed committee members, I sincerely appreciate the dedication and support of the professors and staff in the Department of Asian Studies. In particular, Prof. Bruce Rusk served as both Graduate Advisor and university examiner for my dissertation. Contrary to my expectation that he might only offer a cursory reading due to the considerable difference between his specialty and my research topic, he provided detailed and insightful feedback that xxxi greatly enhanced my work. Additionally, Prof. Ross King has been one of the most dedicated supporters of graduate students in the Korean field, serving as both long-time Department Head and Director of the Centre for Korean Research. The support from CKR enabled me to undertake field research in South Korea, for which I am deeply grateful. Furthermore, I extend my heartfelt gratitude to Tina Wong, Graduate Program Assistant, whose support has been invaluable not only to me but also to many other graduate students. I am especially indebted to her for her assistance in facilitating my reentry into Canada during the pandemic, when uncertainty and disruption prevailed. Her efforts in providing essential documentation and guidance during that time were truly a lifeline. I would like to thank the research centers and foundations for generously supporting my doctoral research through fellowships and travel grants. To begin with, I am deeply indebted to the Department of Asian Studies at UBC for its unwavering support. The faculty members consistently strove to provide equitable and meaningful financial assistance to graduate students, which greatly alleviated the financial burden of my studies. In addition, I am especially grateful to the Centre for Korean Research at UBC for its travel grant, which enabled me to collect invaluable primary sources and more than 200 reference books that became a cornerstone of this dissertation. Moreover, a research grant from UBC’s Centre for Japanese Research enabled me to visit the National Diet Library in Japan, where I accessed materials available exclusively through local terminals, which significantly enriched my analysis of Korea-Japan relations. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Nippon Foundation for funding my participation in the Japanese language program at the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies in Yokohama in 2019 and 2020. The program not only enhanced my Japanese language proficiency but also offered the opportunity to experience Japanese culture firsthand in the beautiful city. Although the latter part of the program was completed virtually in South Korea due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it remained an invaluable part of my academic journey. I am profoundly indebted to my family throughout my Ph.D. journey. My father, a living testament to South Korea’s history as a Vietnam War veteran and a worker dispatched to the Middle East in the 1980s, worked tirelessly day and night to support our family. It was thanks to his unwavering dedication that I was able to focus on my studies during my academic years. My xxxii mother, a reserved and stoic individual, never openly expressed her concerns about my life abroad, yet she has always been the steadfast pillar and unyielding support in my life. My sisters, Eunsun and Danbi, have consistently been there for me, ready to lend a helping hand whenever needed. They regularly sent parcels packed to the brim without any gaps, and Danbi exhaustively scanned hundreds of books from the shelves in our family home despite the overwhelming nature of the work. Though she jokingly cursed me for burdening her with such toils, she never once refused to assist me. My brother-in-law, Kyuhyun, always welcomed me with warmth whenever I visited South Korea and stayed at his home. My beloved yet hugely towering nephew and niece, Junkeun and Yuna, despite their hectic lives as third-year high school students, always made time to visit me whenever I came home. Without my family’s mental and physical support, my dissertation would never have seen the light of day. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues and friends. My UBC colleagues, such as Jeongeun Park, Jiyoung Suh, Minami Orihara, Taeyeon Eom, Xiaoyi Ze, Kyrie Vermette, and King Kwong Wong, Ali Khalaf, have been both wonderful friends and academic companions, inspiring one another intellectually. I was fortunate to form a bond with them through Prof. Hur’s guidance. Furthermore, I extend my appreciation to my esteemed professors and fellow scholars from Sungkyunkwan University: Prof. Kyong-sok Lim, Prof. Ki-jung Kwon, Prof. Sang-kuk Lee, Dr. Young-soo Kim, Ki-hyun Nam, Deok-hwan Cho, Han-ul Lee, Seong-pil Jeong, Woo-seok Choi, Kuk-hwa Kim, Min-a Kim, Yoon-soo Lee, Sun-a Lee, Bong-seok Han, Chang-hee Pak, Joon-seok Seo, Kwang-sub Lee, and Ka-ya Wee. The enduring friendships I have built with them remain one of my greatest assets. Sun Ryung Park, my forever love and best friend, has been my greatest supporter since the day we first met. We studied together, strolled together, and exercised together every day throughout our academic years. Studying abroad is an unrelenting struggle with loneliness, and being with her was the best remedy for that hardship. I have always been amused by calling her by her nickname, and our shared jokes became a source of energy that kept me going in my research. Thanks to her, I was able to endure Vancouver’s long and gloomy winters. I was incredibly fortunate to have her as my fiancée and to complete my Ph.D. program alongside her. xxxiii DEDICATION To my parents, Jong-kyu Kim and Young-ok Yi, for their love, devotion, and guidance. 1 INTRODUCTION Between the Pillar of State and the Social Humiliation: What Did the Military Represent in the Late 19th Century Chosŏn Korea, 1863-1894? In the late 19th century, the international situation surrounding Chosŏn Korea was increasingly unfavorable. Foreign powers encroached upon Chosŏn, seeking to establish new diplomatic relationships and secure economic advantages. From Chosŏn’s perspective, these foreign states were perceived as either tigers blatantly revealing their claws or wolves in sheep’s clothing employing subtle, indirect strategies. In this precarious context, Chosŏn’s policymakers grew concerned about the possibility of foreign powers invading or even incorporating Chosŏn’s territory. Consequently, the significance of national defense and military strength as a pillar of the state was emphasized more than ever. In response to these mounting threats, the Chosŏn court began implementing military reform policies following the enthronement of King Kojong (高宗 r. 1863-1907) in 1863. However, these efforts ultimately failed to achieve their intended outcomes. In 1894, leaders of the Eastern Learning (東學 Tonghak) religion organized a large-scale rebellion against the Chosŏn regime. A substantial number of socially marginalized and exploited peasants joined the uprising, alongside adherents of Eastern Learning, in a collective effort to challenge the existing order. In a battle with the military forces dispatched by the central government, the approximately 8,000-strong, underarmed peasant army dealt a crushing blow to Chosŏn’s regular army. Yet, in stark contrast to the weakness of Chosŏn’s military, the peasant army was decisively defeated by Meiji Japan’s well-organized forces when the Japanese government intervened in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs and provided military assistance to the regime immediately after the Kabo Reform (甲午改革 Kabo Kaehyŏk) in the same year. This event marked the beginning of my research interest in Chosŏn’s military in the late 19th century. How was it that the regular military forces, equipped with superior weapons and training, were defeated by the disorganized and irregular peasant army, despite three decades of 2 the regime’s investment in military enhancement? While I do not argue that the Eastern Learning movement, which called for the abolition of social discrimination and exploitation of the socially vulnerable, should have been suppressed, it remains a significant mystery why Chosŏn’s military forces were unable to respond effectively to this challenge. In the field of military affairs during King Kojong’s reign, the majority of scholars have analyzed military reform policies as efforts to fundamentally transform the existing military system and the prevailing ideology regarding the military. These scholars have characterized military reform as a ‘modernization’ of Chosŏn’s military, implicitly equating it with the Westernization of the traditional system through advancements such as improved weaponry, the restructuring of military units, and the reformation of training systems, among other changes. However, was military reform indeed a fundamental change of the traditional military system? Which factors contributed to the incapacity of Chosŏn’s military forces? To address these questions and examine the reasons behind the ultimate failure of Chosŏn’s military reforms, which was demonstrated by the defeat of its regular army during the 1894 rebellion, this dissertation challenges the prevailing interpretation by critically reassessing the content of military reform policies and highlighting the practice of military exile1 implemented from 1863 to 1894. In evaluating success or failure, I argue that success should not be defined by the attainment of so-called modern or Western-style development. Rather, it should be determined by whether the intended objectives set by the actors were achieved. In this context, I contend that Chosŏn’s military policies was unsuccessful not because the regime failed to adopt a Western-style military system, but because it was ultimately unable to fulfill its fundamental goal of safeguarding the nation. Specifically, Chosŏn’s military exile conscripted offenders, including individuals from various social ranks, into military units stationed in remote and inhospitable regions, where they were assigned menial labor. This penal practice, which had been enforced even prior to the 1 Scholars commonly use the terms ‘banishment’ and ‘exile’ interchangeably to describe yuhyŏng (流刑), or yubae (流配), a form of punishment that forcibly relocates an individual, often a political figure or someone convicted of a serious crime, to a remote area. However, in this dissertation, I will use ‘banishment’ specifically for yuhyŏng (流刑) or yubae (流配) and reserve ‘exile’ for ch’unggun (充軍) to maintain clarity. This distinction follows the precedent set by Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris in their work Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, "Military Exile", in Law in Imperial China - Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan), with Historical, Social, and Juridical Commentaries, (Harvard University Press, 1967). 3 foundation of the Chosŏn Dynasty, reflects a persistent societal perception of military service as a punitive measure rather than an honorable duty. This perspective underscores how the regime employed military service not as a voluntary or esteemed duty, but as a tool for social humiliation and a mechanism to enforce political and ideological conformity. Chosŏn’s enforcement of military exile in the late 19th century is particularly significant in the context of the regime’s formal initiation of military reform projects, which were influenced by foreign systems, including those of Japan, Qing China, and the United States. Amid the growing emphasis on military strength due to the increasing likelihood of foreign invasions, the continued use of military service as a punitive measure highlights a persistent contradiction in the prevailing perception of military values within Chosŏn society. To gain a deeper understanding of the nature of military reform during this period, a thorough examination of individual military exile cases, alongside an analysis of the corresponding military reform policies, is necessary. Nevertheless, earlier studies on the military reform policies implemented by the Chosŏn government from 1863 to 1894 have primarily focused on the creation of new military units and the adoption of foreign-inspired military systems under the slogan ‘Enriching the Nation and Strengthening the Military (富國强兵, puguk kangbyŏng),’ a slogan originally associated with Meiji Japan’s national policy. As mentioned above, these reforms were viewed by many Korean scholars as part of a ‘modernization’ process aimed at aligning Chosŏn’s military with those of neighboring East Asian powers, such as Qing and Japan. The transformation of Chosŏn’s military system was often compared to the military advancements of these nations, suggesting that Chosŏn, like its neighbors, sought to strengthen its military comprehensively for the defense of the nation as a whole in response to growing foreign threats. Although interest in Chosŏn’s military history emerged among Korean scholars in the 1960s,2 it was not until the 1980s that historians began to conduct in-depth research on military reform during the late 19th century. These scholars often emphasize a perceived discontinuity between the premodern and modern periods, focusing on the Chosŏn regime’s efforts to reform its traditional military forces through the introduction of ‘modern’ military systems. Despite 2 Ch’oe Hyo-sik 최효식, Chosŏn hugi kunjesa yŏn’gu 조선 후기 군제사 연구, (Sinsŏwŏn, 1995), 16. 4 some limitations due to the scarcity of primary sources and previous studies at the time, these early research efforts highlighted the importance of military affairs and laid the groundwork for future investigations. Specifically, Korean scholars, such as Ch’a Mun-sŏp, Im Chae-ch’an, Kim Se-ŭn, and Kang Sŏng-mun, have significantly contributed to the study of Chosŏn’s military reforms. As a foundation for research on Chosŏn’s military history, their scholarly essays collectively offer broader insights into the structure of Chosŏn’s military system.3 Additionally, their research examines key aspects of its reform policies, including those implemented by Taewŏn’gun, the regent of King Kojong,4 as well as the establishment of specific military institutions during King Kojong’s direct rule. For instance, the Chosŏn Military Academy (陸軍武官學校 Yukkun Mugwan Hakkyo), which operated from 1898 to 1909, serves as a focal point in their discussions.5 Despite covering diverse topics, these scholars by and large share a common argument: Chosŏn’s military reform represented a ‘modernization’ process, and its ultimate failure stemmed from insufficient financial resources and the persistent interventions of Japan and Qing China. Since 2000, Korean historians have increasingly focused on military history during King Kojong’s reign, building on the foundational work of earlier studies. These scholars emphasize that an examination of military reform policies is critical to understanding Chosŏn’s potential for independent development and its efforts to safeguard national sovereignty. This scholarly interest has resulted in the publication of several monographs addressing military reform. Following the pioneering work of Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok, historians, such as Pae Hang-sŏp and Sim Hŏn-yong, have each produced significant contributions to this area of research. 3 Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, "Kuhanmal kunsachedo ŭi pyŏnch’ŏn" 구한말 군사제도의 변천, Kunsa 군사 5, (1982): 24-48; Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Kaehang ihu kunsa chedo ŭi kaep’ŏyn kwajŏng" 개항 이후 군사제도의 개편과정, Kunsa 군사 22, (1991): 88-120; and Kang Sŏng-mun 강성문, "Hanmal Chosŏn kundae ŭi kŭndaehwa noryŏk" 한말 조선 군대의 근대화 노력, Kunsa 군사 16, (1988): 80-110. 4 Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Taewŏnʼgun chipkwŏngi kunsa chedo ŭi chŏngbi" 대원군 집권기 군사제도의 정비, Hanʼguksaron 한국사론 23, (1990): 275-325. 5 Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, "Kuhanmal yukkun mugwan hakkyo yŏn’gu" 구한말 육군무관학교 연구, Asia yŏn’gu 아시아연구 16, (1973): 173-209 and Im Chae-ch’an 임재찬, "Kuhanmal yukkun mugwan hakkyo e taehayŏ" 구한말 육군무관학교에 대하여, Pokhyŏnsarim 복현사림 4, (1982): 107-139. 5 The authors present differing perspectives on King Kojong’s military policies. Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok and Pae Hang-sŏp argue that the monarch prioritized the protection of the royal palace and capital at the expense of broader national security.6 For instance, King Kojong bolstered the royal guard while downsizing local military garrisons, which had traditionally served as the bulwark of national defense. They conclude that this shift in focus enhanced the king’s personal security but undermined the country’s overall defensive capabilities.7 In contrast, Sim Hŏn-yong adopts a more favorable view of King Kojong’s military reforms. While acknowledging that the reinforcement of the royal guard weakened other military units, Sim contends that the reforms strengthened Chosŏn’s military power and facilitated the ‘modernization’ of its military system during King Kojong’s reign.8 Meanwhile, English-language scholarship remains thin on Chosŏn’s military reforms in the late 19th century. As Donald Baker aptly notes, while numerous studies have focused on Chosŏn’s diplomatic history, there has been insufficient exploration of whether the Chosŏn government possessed the financial capacity to establish a sustainable military force in response to foreign pressures during this period.9 The only notable historians include Sukhee Han and Carter Eckert who have addressed some aspects of Chosŏn’s military reforms during King Kojong’s reign in one manner or another. Sukhee Han’s doctoral dissertation examines King Kojong’s Enlightenment Movement from 1863 to 1895, encompassing military reforms as well as broader reform policies during his reign. Han contends that the failure of Chosŏn’s Enlightenment Movement was not a result of King Kojong’s personal weaknesses or incompetence, but rather the outcome of prevailing domestic and international circumstances. Specifically, Han attributes this failure to internal 6 Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, Kaehwagi ŭi kunsa chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 개화기의 군사정책 연구, (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000). 7 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, 19-segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsa chedo yŏn’gu 19세기 조선의 군사 제도 연구, (Kukhak charyowŏn, 2002). 8 Sim Hŏn-yong 심헌용, Hanmal kun kŭndaehwa yŏn’gu 한말 군 근대화 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2005). 9 Donald Baker, "Haeoe Han’gukhak ŭi yŏksa wa mirae: Pungmi hakkye ŭi Han’guksa kwaje rŭl chungsim ŭro" 해외 한국학의 역사와 미래: 북미학계의 한국사 과제를 중심으로, the 9th session of the Global Korean Studies Forum at Sungsil University in Seoul, (Presented Nov. 15, 2023): 18. 6 tensions within the ruling class and Qing China’s intervention in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs, both of which obstructed the nation’s efforts toward ‘modernization.’10 In a similar vein, Carter Eckert’s book, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945, explores Chosŏn’s military reforms as a means to trace the origins of South Korea’s militarism in the 1960s and 1970s. Eckert argues that Chosŏn’s military policies can be understood as a dimension of a broader process of militarism, linking the military reform efforts of Late Chosŏn with those under the Park regime in South Korea. His interpretation of Chosŏn’s military reforms as a component of a ‘modernization’ project and the subsequent failure due to financial constraints mirrors the views of many Korean scholars.11 Although Korean- and English-language scholarship present differing evaluations of King Kojong’s military reforms, there is a general consensus that Chosŏn’s military reform was part of a broader ‘modernization’ effort departing from the traditional military system, with its failure often attributed to financial limitations. This perspective is widely accepted; however, it remains unclear whether King Kojong and the central bureaucracy aimed to radically transform the conventional military structure as suggested by earlier studies. For instance, traditional military units persisted until the Japanese Empire began directly interfering in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs in 1895. Moreover, the Chosŏn government did not implement plans for universal conscription before its collapse,12 in contrast to the Meiji oligarchs in Japan, who introduced the universal conscription system to expand their military during the same period. These observations challenge the characterization of Chosŏn’s military reforms as a genuine departure from its traditional military institutions. Admittedly, the Chosŏn government did procure new weapons from Japan and Western states, which may indicate a partial effort at transformation. However, what role did this procurement play in the broader military reform process? Did King Kojong and high-ranking officials intend to fundamentally transform the system, or were these changes superficial adaptations within the traditional framework? To 10 Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998). 11 Carter J Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). 12 Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Kaehang ihu kunsa chedo ŭi kaep’ŏyn kwajŏng" 개항 이후 군사제도의 개편과정, Kunsa 군사 22, (1991): 105-111. 7 address these questions, it is imperative to critically reassess Chosŏn’s military reform policies to determine whether they represented a meaningful departure from the conventional system or merely an extension of existing norms under new conditions. In this context, examining military exile within the broader framework of military reform offers a nuanced understanding of the complexities and contradictions inherent in Chosŏn’s attempts to restructure its military system. The longstanding punitive measure remained influential, and this phenomenon reveals the persistent elements of tradition in Chosŏn’s military system in the late 19th century. Nevertheless, no comprehensive study on this specific topic has yet been conducted in either Korean-language or English-language scholarship regarding the Late Chosŏn period. Although no Korean-language studies directly address military exile during King Kojong’s reign, several works provide valuable insights into the broader historical context of this practice in Korea. For example, Ch’ae Ung-sŏk’s research examines military exile during the latter half of the Koryŏ Dynasty (918-1392), arguing that the penalty was not primarily punitive but instead designed to subject offenders to frustration and physical hardship.13 Similarly, Yi Yong-gil’s article sheds light on the use of military exile in the educational sphere, highlighting discussions within the Chosŏn court regarding the conscription of students from local official schools (鄕校 hyanggyo) who failed to meet minimum academic standards.14 While this practice did not carry a strictly punitive connotation, it reveals that military service was perceived as degrading by the ruling class, reinforcing its association with punishment rather than a noble duty. Such perceptions underscore the broader societal disdain for military service, which persisted across different periods of Korean history. While the aforementioned studies provide valuable insights into the context of the military system during the majority of King Kojong’s reign, they predominantly interpret military reforms as an element of a ‘modernization’ process, assuming a clear rupture between Chosŏn’s military system at the time and its historical foundations. This dichotomous framework 13 Ch’ae Ung-sŏk 채웅석, "Koryŏ chung-hugi ŭi chʼunggunhyŏng kwa chŏngyŏkhyŏng" 고려 중후기의 충군형 (充軍刑)과 정역형 (定役刑), Hanʼguksa yŏnʼgu 한국사연구, no. 131 (2005): 223-255. 14 Yi Yong-gil 이용길, "Chosŏnsidae ŭi nakkangch’unggunpŏp kwa hyanggyo ŭi kyoyukchŏk kinŭng" 조선 시대의 낙강충군법 (落講充軍法)과 향교의 교육적 기능, Han’guk kyoyuk sahak 한국교육사학, no. 18 (1996): 111-125. 8 of tradition versus modernity, or the success versus failure of achieving modernity, in earlier studies of Korean historiography has, however, obscured a more nuanced understanding of the nature of Chosŏn’s military system. In contrast to this prevailing perspective, my research highlights the enduring continuities within the process of military reform. By adopting this approach, it seeks to offer a new analytical framework that reveals the complexities of Chosŏn’s military reforms from an alternative vantage point. Thesis In this dissertation, I suggest that the military system during King Kojong’s reign represented a modification of the traditional military structure rather than a fundamental transformation or ‘modernization’ of the military system. Contrary to the dichotomy between traditional and so-called modern military systems suggested in earlier studies, the military system during this period remained grounded in conventional military ideology, with the regime gradually incorporating new ideas and technologies. As a result, the Chosŏn government was unable to swiftly and fundamentally overhaul its military system, which in turn contributed to the limitations of its military reform policies. To substantiate this argument, this dissertation firstly reexamines the content and procedures of military reform from 1863 to 1894. Central to this investigation is the question of whether these reforms were primarily aimed at strengthening national defense or ensuring the security of the royal family and the court’s immediate surroundings in response to growing foreign threats. This distinction is crucial because, despite the potential overlap between national defense and royal protection from the perspective of the ruling class, understanding the primary objective of the reforms provides critical insight into the broader direction of Chosŏn’s military policy. To build on this point, I examine the operations of the newly established military units individually, as well as the political circumstances surrounding their creation. Throughout Chosŏn history, rulers frequently established new military units and restructured the military system to serve their political objectives. For instance, King Hyojong (孝宗 1619-1659) implemented a military expansion policy to advance the Attack the North (北伐 pukpŏl) 9 campaign, which aimed to retaliate against the Qing following the second Manchu invasion of Chosŏn in 1636.15 Similarly, King Chŏngjo (正祖 1752-1800) established the Robust and Brave Regiment (壯勇營 Changyongyŏng) as a means to strengthen the royal guard in response to threats from political dissenters. In this context, analyzing both the rationale behind the creation of the newly formed military units and how King Kojong utilized them provides a deeper understanding of the ultimate objectives of his military reforms. Another key issue addressed in this study is the financial management of military affairs. Financial management in this context serves as a crucial indicator of the state’s policy priorities. While incomplete records make it challenging to develop a comprehensive understanding of Chosŏn’s military finances, the available fragmented records nonetheless offer useful insights into whether the Chosŏn regime prioritized military affairs relative to other state matters. Furthermore, since the royal treasury and national finances were not distinct entities before 1895, the management of finances during this period sheds light on whether royal interests were prioritized over national defense or other state matters. Building on this, I analyze the military perspective of King Kojong and high-ranking officials through their discussions at the royal audience, aiming to understand the characteristics of military reform policies between 1863 and 1894. In particular, the primary sources documenting these discussions often reveal that the king sought, not through coercion but through active choice, to rely on Qing military forces to address domestic political situations. Given the precedent of Chosŏn requesting military assistance from Ming China during the Imjin War from 1592 to 1598, King Kojong likely viewed military reliance on the Chinese empire as a more viable option than a substantial investment in Chosŏn’s own military system. Secondly, this dissertation explores the social status of military officials in the years of 1863-1894 during King Kojong’s reign. Historians often argue that one of Taewŏn’gun’s military policies was the promotion of military officials to key government positions, thereby elevating 15 For the military campaign, King Hyojong developed and deployed musketeer units during the Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658 (羅禪征伐 Nasŏn Chŏngbŏl) at the request of the Qing dynasty to expel Russian military forces. According to Hyeok Hweon Kang, these expeditions served multiple purposes: testing the capabilities of Chosŏn’s musketeers, surveying the geography of the Amur region, assessing the martial strength of Russian forces, and reinforcing the security of Chosŏn’s northern border. (Hyeok Hweon Kang, "Big Heads and Buddhist Demons: The Korean Musketry Revolution and the Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658", Journal of Chinese Military History 2, no. 2 (2014): 159.) 10 their social status. Traditionally, Chosŏn society favored civil ideas over military ones, which led to the marginalization of military officials, particularly in terms of promotion within the government. However, with the growing presence of Western powers on Chosŏn’s shores, military expertise began to gain prominence. Nevertheless, several cases documented in primary sources challenge the prevailing historical view, uncovering the complexities of the military’s role and status during this period. To analyze this point, this dissertation traces the career trajectories of officials from the military branch within government offices, as their appointments, promotions, and overall progression reveal the government’s attitude toward military officials. To this end, I examine the backgrounds of ministers in the Ministry of War (兵曹 Pyŏngjo) between 1863 and 1894. Factors, such as their affiliation with either the military or civil branch, tenure as ministers, and relationship with the king, serve as indirect indicators of the regime’s perception of military officials and their expertise. Additionally, this analysis examines the broader political dynamics of the period, investigating how partisan rivalries and shifts in power may have shaped the military’s status and role within the government. Furthermore, by examining episodes related to the treatment of military officials in both the central and local governments as recorded in primary sources, we can gain insight into their status within the bureaucracy. Additionally, discussions on this issue in the royal court, along with remarks from King Kojong and high-ranking officials about how military officials were viewed, provide a clearer understanding of the military official’s social status and the recognition of their expertise in Chosŏn. This analysis helps clarify the shifting perceptions of the military in Chosŏn society and whether their roles were regarded as integral to the state’s governance or as secondary to the influence of the civil bureaucracy. Thirdly, this dissertation offers a comprehensive examination of the history and operation of military exile as a central subject of study. Despite the government’s implementation of military reform policies and the transformation of the military system, this longstanding institution remained largely unchanged throughout the period. In fact, the continued enforcement of military exile aligns with the prevalent tendency among Chosŏn’s ruling class to avoid military service. For the aristocracy, military service was not seen as a noble duty; rather, being 11 compelled to serve was often perceived as a degrading experience. The Chosŏn government, in turn, exploited this perception to amplify the punitive effectiveness of military exile. Tracing the origin of military exile and analyzing its similarities and differences across countries where this penalty was implemented is necessary. Notably, this disciplinary measure originated in Chinese empires, with earlier records indicating its initial introduction during the Koryŏ period on the Korean peninsula. However, while the military exile practice in both Koryŏ and Chosŏn were modeled on the Chinese system, they were adapted to suit the specific conditions of Korean dynasties. Furthermore, the practice of military exile in Koryŏ was not identical to that of Chosŏn. This investigation sheds light on the unique characteristics of military exile in Chosŏn. Moreover, to explore the rationale behind this measure, I investigate patterns in the criminal cases that resulted in military exile, the procedures followed by relevant governmental offices in rendering judgments, and the criteria used to select exile sites. Furthermore, the discussions between King Kojong and officials responsible for punishing offenders vividly illustrate how the ruling class perceived military service during this period. By delving into these dialogues, we can better understand the intersection of punishment, governance, and societal attitudes. This analysis ultimately sheds light on how military exile functioned as both a disciplinary mechanism and a stark reflection of the diminished status of military service in Chosŏn society. Lastly, this research critically scrutinizes the role of military exile as a punitive measure, aiming to assess whether the regime sought to enforce the penalty rigorously or utilized it primarily as a symbolic gesture. Within Chosŏn’s penal hierarchy, military exile occupied a prominent position, representing a harsh punishment that ranked between the ultimate penalty of capital punishment and the second-tier penalty of banishment. However, despite its prominent status in the legal framework, the actual application of military exile to criminal cases does not always align with its theoretical rank within the system. This discrepancy invites a deeper investigation into the factors influencing the imposition of military exile, including political, social, and institutional considerations, and whether these factors diluted the penalty’s intended deterrent effect. 12 To this end, in the subsequent chapters, I examine the provisions related to military exile in Chosŏn’s legal code to provide a comprehensive overview of its application. Chosŏn’s legal codes, which were periodically produced and updated by the government, included numerous provisions that mandated the enforcement of military exile as a penalty. Notably, the enforcement of military exile within traditional legal frameworks persisted, even as the Chosŏn government engaged with Western states and gradually absorbed elements of international law through treaty negotiations. In this context, understanding the overall picture of the penalty is crucial. In this regard, I explore whether King Kojong and the officials responsible for enforcement strictly adhered to the provisions outlined in the Chosŏn legal code when deliberating on the imposition of the military exile penalty. The legal code clearly defined the circumstances under which military exile could be applied. By investigating individual cases, I aim to uncover whether the application of military exile adhered to these legal principles or was imposed subjectively, potentially extending beyond legal boundaries to intensify punishment and further disgrace the offenders. Furthermore, this study traces the actual application of military exile within Chosŏn’s legal framework, critically assessing the extent to which the penalty was enforced in accordance with legal sentences. Specifically, it is necessary to assess whether the sentences imposed on offenders were consistent with the terms of the verdict, whether offenders served their full terms, and whether they fulfilled the military duties outlined in the final judgment. According to Ch’oe Chong-go’s argument, the primary purpose of traditional law was the realization of moral principles, with the law playing a subsidiary role within the broader legal system.16 A detailed examination of individual cases enables a deeper understanding of the nature of the military exile practice in the late 19th century, shedding light on whether it was principally concerned with the realization of moral principles or the strict enforcement of legal norms. Additionally, by examining the career trajectories of aristocratic offenders after their release, I investigate the extent to which their criminal records impacted their careers. Although the provisions concerning military exile largely stipulated a life-long sentence, many cases demonstrate that this regulation was not consistently enforced, and offenders did not face 16 Choi Chongko (Ch’oe Chong-go), "Traditional Korean Law and Its Modernization", Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society 64, (1989): 2. 13 significant consequences for their past offenses in their careers in public office. This investigation enables us to assess the degree to which the Chosŏn government considered these past records when recruiting and promoting officials and provides insight into how military exile was perceived by the ruling class. Sources In this dissertation, I consult official documents produced by governmental offices, including the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty (朝鮮王朝實錄 Chosŏn wangjo sillok), the Diary of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi), the Court Chronicle (日省錄 Ilsŏngnok), Records of the Adjudication of Prison Cases by the Ministry of Punishments (秋曹決獄錄 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok), and the Roster of Successful Candidates (榜目 Pangmok). The first three documents, in particular, provide detailed insights into state policies and capture perceptions of King Kojong and high-ranking officials regarding military affairs through recorded discussions and conversations. Additionally, the Records of the Adjudication of Prison Cases by the Ministry of Punishments meticulously document the procedures for executing punishments. Lastly, the Roster of Successful Candidates serves as a valuable resource for obtaining personal details and tracing the subsequent careers of aristocratic offenders. In addition, to examine the legal dimensions of military exile, I refer to the legal codes of Chosŏn and Ming China, including the Comprehensive National Code (大典通編 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn), the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code (大典會通 Taejŏn hoet’ong), and the Great Ming Code (大明律 Da Ming lü). Since its publication in 1785, the Comprehensive National Code functioned as Chosŏn’s constitution until 1865, when the Chosŏn government, under Taewŏn’gun’s leadership, introduced the updated Comprehensive Collection of the National Code following King Kojong’s enthronement. These legal codes outline provisions regarding military exile, making them essential for understanding the legal basis of this punitive measure in Chosŏn. Moreover, as Chosŏn’s legal system was modeled on that of Ming China, the Great Ming Code, promulgated in 1397, continued to serve as a reference for the Chosŏn government when implementing legal provisions. 14 Furthermore, county gazetteers (邑誌 ŭpchi) serve as foundational materials for examining the conditions of military exile sites, encompassing aspects such as chronology, population, geography, notable figures, industry, culture, traditions, military forces, and more. Under Chosŏn’s legal code, local governments were mandated to periodically compile these gazetteers to report the contemporary status of each county or prefecture to the central government. These materials fill in the gaps left by the central government’s records, providing a more localized perspective. Regarding military exile, analyzing the disposition of military forces and the locations of garrisons at each site allows us to infer the types of duties performed by individuals subjected to military exile. As supplementary materials, private records, such as diaries and memoirs, provide first-hand accounts related to significant political issues surrounding military affairs. Examples include Chŏng Kyo (鄭喬 1856-1925)’s History of the Waning Years of the Taehan Empire (大韓季年史 Taehan kyenyŏnsa), Kim Yun-sik (金允植 1835-1922)’s Sequel to Turbulent History (續陰晴史 Sok ŭmch’ŏngsa), and Yun Ch’i-ho (尹致昊 1865-1945)’s the Diary of Yun Ch’i-ho (尹致昊日記 Yun Ch’i-ho ilgi). Since the Chosŏn government utilized military exile to punish officials for failures in state policies, both military and civil officials became entangled in various political incidents. Diaries from those directly involved or witnesses offer vivid accounts of these events. Additionally, such records delve into behind-the-scenes stories and private dialogues regarding military affairs that were omitted from official documents. These materials bridge informational gaps and enrich the narrative, providing greater depth and nuance to the historical account. An additional category of supplementary materials includes diplomatic correspondences and documents, such as Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents (近代韓國外交文書 Kŭndae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ), Diplomatic Documents of Old Korea (舊韓國外交文書 Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ), as well as diplomatic materials housed in the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省外交史料館 Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan) and the National Archives of Japan (国立公文書館 Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). These sources are invaluable for understanding the intersections between Chosŏn’s military reforms and its international relations. 15 The military reform efforts were inextricably linked to diplomatic engagements, and military exile itself often functioned as a punitive response to failures in diplomatic affairs. Consequently, the examination of diplomatic exchanges between Chosŏn and foreign governments is indispensable for gaining a nuanced understanding of the role of military exile within the broader context of Chosŏn’s military strategy. Moreover, these diplomatic documents offer crucial insights into the geopolitical dynamics that shaped key military and political decisions, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of the period’s political landscape. Theoretical Framework As previously mentioned, many Korean scholars connect the military reform policies during King Kojong’s reign with the broader process of ‘modernization.’ While these scholars do not explicitly define the term ‘modernization,’ they imply that it refers to the Westernization of the traditional military system. Specifically, attention is drawn to the Chosŏn regime’s importation of Western military weapons, the adoption of Western military tactics, and the hiring of foreign military instructors. Moreover, scholars have focused on the influence of Japanese and Chinese military systems, which themselves had incorporated Western practices, as a central theme of their research. Implicitly, these scholars argue that the integration of Western elements and the departure from traditional military practices characterize the military reforms of King Kojong’s era. Besides, they often operate on the assumption that there was a clear distinction between the traditional and ‘modern’ aspects of the Chosŏn military system. According to these scholars, military reform was a process aimed at removing traditional elements from the military structure, albeit with several limitations during its implementation. This premise, however, has impeded a more nuanced understanding of the nature of military reform and the military system during this period. Many historians argue that while the direction of military reform, viewed as a departure from the traditional framework, was broadly considered desirable, its implementation was hindered by significant limitations. However, despite the Chosŏn regime’s importation of Western military techniques and the hiring of foreign military instructors, as previously discussed, these measures did not lead to a fundamental transformation of the military system. Notably, the continued enforcement of military exile 16 between 1863 and 1894 serves as a clear indication that traditional views on the military persisted, if not entirely dominated, during this time. Indeed, certain traditional elements continued to exert influence, often complicating or even obstructing the military reform process. In this context, the military reform policy was grounded in the concept commonly referred to as kubon sinch’am (舊本新參), a notion widespread during the Taehan Empire of Korea between 1897 and 1905, which entailed retaining traditional foundations while selectively integrating aspects of Western civilization. To better articulate the analytical perspective on the military system during King Kojong’s era, I draw upon Jeremy Black’s theoretical framework, which emphasizes the importance of ‘elements of continuity’ in military history. Black critiques several prevailing trends in the field, including Eurocentrism, reliance on a paradigm or diffusion model, the artificial separation of land and sea conflicts, and an excessive focus on interstate conflicts at the expense of internal conflicts.17 These biases are evident in earlier studies on military systems, both in Korea and internationally. Consequently, Korean scholars have often prioritized identifying ‘modern’ elements, specifically Western-style features, in Korean military history, inadvertently perpetuating these biases. Jeremy Black asserts that the condition of society and the political context play a crucial role in shaping the ‘responsibility and ethos of the military.’18 He highlights that changes in military systems are neither universal nor monolithic but instead emerge through complex and varied processes. Additionally, he critiques the tendency in military history to overstate the emulation of military systems from other nations, pointing out that while less militarily developed states did adopt certain elements from more advanced powers, this phenomenon has been exaggerated.19 This perspective challenges the conventional view that weaker states uniformly followed the developmental trajectories of Western powers during the ‘modern’ period. In this regard, Hyeok Hweon Kang’s research, which examines discrepancies in musket technology between East Asia and Europe, provides valuable insights into the peculiarities of 17 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History, (Routledge, 2004), ix. 18 Ibid., 15. 19 Ibid., 3. 17 Chosŏn’s military system. According to Kang, while East Asian countries, such as Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan, prioritized the accuracy of musketry following the introduction of muskets in the 16th century, European countries emphasized volley fire for its speed and consistency. Kang contends that both technologies had their respective advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to assert the superiority of one over the other.20 Clearly, it is crucial to consider surrounding contexts, such as politics, economy, culture, and society, when examining military systems and practices. Furthermore, Jeremy Black’s theoretical framework offers an alternative to the once-dominant theory of military revolution proposed by Western scholars. For instance, Geoffrey Parker argues that the European military revolution during the early modern period was characterized by massive manpower growth, significant changes in tactics and strategy, and an intensified societal impact of war. According to Parker, this revolution also accelerated Europe’s overseas expansion.21 While his theory holds validity within the European context, it remains Eurocentric and overlooks the societal conditions that Black emphasizes. This limitation hinders the applicability of Geoffrey Parker’s theory to regions outside Europe. In this context, S. N. Eisenstadt’s theory of ‘multiple modernities’ is worth reflecting on. Rather than emphasizing the uniformity of ‘modernity,’ Eisenstadt argues that the developments following the onset of modernity, particularly after World War II, undermined the assumption that Europe’s cultural program of modernity would dominate globally. The diverse trajectories of modernizing societies have challenged and refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions underpinning the Western model of modernity.22 Furthermore, Eisenstadt asserts that modernity and Westernization are not synonymous, and Western models of modernity are not the only ‘authentic’ expressions of modernity.23 In fact, whether late 19th-century Chosŏn society can be categorized as ‘modern’ society remains a subject of controversy. Contrary to Eisenstadt’s definition of modernity, which asserts that the essence of modernity lies in the dismantling of traditional justifications for the political 20 Hyeok Hweon Kang, "Difference in an Age of Parity: Technologyand Global Military History", in The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs, ed. Mark Charles Fissel (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023). 21 Geoffrey Parker, "The Military Revolution Revisited", in The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 22 S N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000): 1. 23 Ibid., 3. 18 system, thereby opening up new possibilities for constructing a different political order, Chosŏn’s political and military systems still retained strong traditional elements. Nevertheless, Eisenstadt’s perspective is valuable, as it offers a framework for examining Chosŏn’s military reform from a different angle. Rather than defining the military reform as Westernization, we can regard it as an independent and distinct process. The process of Chosŏn’s military reform, along with the persistence of military exile, which contradicted national policy, can be partially understood within this framework. In addition to existing theories on military reform, Kim Yŏng-min’s perspective on the relationship between the state and society in Chosŏn offers crucial insights. Departing from earlier studies that emphasize the despotic nature of Chosŏn’s kingship, he argues that Chosŏn can be characterized as a ‘minimalist state’ and a ‘minimalist society’, wherein the government refrained from extending its influence over society, and society, in turn, did not challenge the regime.24 This framework offers lens for analyzing Chosŏn’s military policies and the reform efforts during King Kojong’s reign, which largely neglected the enhancement of local military forces and broader national defense. Building upon the theories discussed above, this dissertation identifies the distinctive features of Chosŏn’s military reform in the late 19th century. The interaction between traditional elements and what is often referred to as “modern” aspects, despite the complexities surrounding the term “modernity”, played a significant role in shaping a unique military system in Chosŏn that diverged from Western models. Additionally, this study emphasizes the persistence of traditional norms within the military system, demonstrating how these enduring elements continued to influence military reforms during this period. Organization This dissertation is organized into three main chapters, following the chronological trajectory of political and diplomatic developments in the Chosŏn government. The first chapter examines the restructuring of the military system and the characteristics of military exile during 24 Kim Yŏng-min 김영민, "Kungmunhak nonjaeng ŭl t’onghae pon Chosŏn hugi ŭi kukka sahoe hengwija" 국문학 논쟁을 통해 본 조선 후기의 국가, 사회, 행위자, Ilbon pip’yŏng 일본비평, no. 19 (2018): 254. 19 Taewŏn’gun’s regency on behalf of King Kojong from 1863 to 1873. The second chapter focuses on King Kojong’s assumption of direct political power, analyzing the subsequent changes in the military system and the continued enforcement of the military exile practice during the first decade of his direct rule from 1874 to 1884. The final chapter explores the shifting diplomatic landscape surrounding Chosŏn after the failure of the pro-Japanese coup, the new military reform policies undertaken by the Chosŏn government, and the final stage of military exile during the second phase of King Kojong’s direct rule, spanning from 1884 to 1894. Chapter One, entitled “Military Reform during Taewŏn’gun’s Regency and Ch’unggun (充軍 Military Exile), 1863-1873,” examines the military reform policies and characteristics of the military exile practice under Taewŏn’gun’s regency. Following the enthronement of young King Kojong, Taewŏn’gun assumed control of state affairs on behalf of his son. A core objective of Taewŏn’gun’s political agenda was to curtail the entrenched dominance of oligarchic civil officials, or in-law politics—commonly known in Korean historiography as sedo politics (勢道政治 sedo chŏngch’i)—within the Chosŏn government. Early scholarship suggests that Taewŏn’gun’s preferential treatment of the military official as a counterforce to these entrenched ruling cliques, coupled with policies aimed at strengthening military capabilities in response to escalating foreign threats, contributed to the rise of military officials. However, was the status of military officials indeed elevated during Taewŏn’gun’s regency? A reexamination of primary sources reveals a more nuanced reality, prompting questions about whether the military branch’s status was genuinely elevated to be on par with or above that of its civil counterparts, or if it remained marginalized within the Chosŏn government. Specifically, an analysis of key positions within military institutions, such as the Ministry of War, along with the patterns of military officials’ promotions, provides insights into the actual conditions and status of military officials during this period. Furthermore, I examine the characteristics of military exile during Taewŏn’gun’s regency to uncover the ruling class’s perception of military service. Despite the central government’s military enhancement policies, the punitive system, modeled on the traditional Chinese legal code and implemented in Chosŏn prior to Taewŏn’gun’s administration, remained unchanged under his governance. By analyzing individual cases where this penalty was imposed and tracing 20 the subsequent careers of offenders after their release from military exile, I explore how the regime perceived both military service and the institution of military exile. In Chapter Two, titled “The Transformation of the Military System under King Kojong’s Direct Rule and Ch’unggun (充軍 Military Exile), 1873-1884,” I investigate the significant shifts in military policies following King Kojong’s assumption of direct rule, alongside the continued enforcement of military exile during this period. After the conclusion of Taewŏn’gun’s regency, King Kojong dismantled his father’s key military policies and adopted a more conciliatory approach toward foreign powers, diverging from Taewŏn’gun’s ostensibly anti-foreign stance, although Taewŏn’gun himself was not entirely opposed to foreign interaction. As a facet of this political realignment, King Kojong introduced foreign-style military systems into Chosŏn’s military forces, which was a move often described by Korean historians as a step toward ‘modernization’ that marked a clear break from premodern institutions. However, is it appropriate to characterize King Kojong’s military policy as a ‘modernization’ of the military system, as defined by Korean historians? An examination of official and private records sheds light on whether the military’s operation remained firmly rooted in traditional values, such as the protection of the monarchy and royal family, or whether it genuinely aimed to enhance national defense under the public rhetoric of ‘Enriching the Nation and Strengthening the Military’. Additionally, an analysis of the status of the military official within government offices, particularly the Ministry of War, coupled with the financial management of military units, reveals key features of the military system during the first decade of King Kojong’s direct rule. Furthermore, this chapter examines the characteristics of military exile during the first decade of King Kojong’s direct rule. While the king reversed Taewŏn’gun’s conservative national policies, including those related to military affairs, the practice of military exile remained intact. In fact, King Kojong expanded the use of military exile as a punitive measure, employing it to discipline officials and clerks who failed to implement national policies and to penalize individuals implicated in government service examination fraud. By analyzing the patterns of military exile cases and tracing the post-sentence pathways of convicts during this period, this study delves into the ruling class’s underlying perceptions of military affairs. This 21 examination underscores how the traditional marginalization of military service persisted, even during a period of purported military reform. Lastly, Chapter Three, entitled “An Analysis of Chosŏn’s Military Reforms and Ch’unggun (充軍 Military Exile) during the Second Phase of King Kojong’s Direct Rule, 1884-1894,” examines the military reform policies and the creation of so-called modern military units led by the Chosŏn government under the influence or intervention of Qing as well as the continued implementation of military exile. Following the failure of the pro-Japanese group’s coup in 1884, Qing sought to deepen its involvement in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs, including military policies. However, due to the geopolitical balance among foreign powers surrounding Chosŏn, the court managed to implement certain military reform policies with a degree of independence, albeit not entirely free from Qing interference. Nonetheless, does the transformation of the military structure by the Chosŏn government truly reflect a process of ‘modernization’, or a clear departure from the existing system, as asserted by Korean scholars? While the regime did create new military units and consolidate fragmented ones to reform the military system, an in-depth investigation into the activities and characteristics of these units reveals a more nuanced reality. Furthermore, examining the Chosŏn government’s dependence on Qing’s military forces during national emergencies offers insight into King Kojong and the ruling class’s perspectives on national defense and the independence of military power. Notably, the discussions among the king and policymakers regarding the management of Qing’s military presence after the 1884 coup and Qing’s subsequent dispatch of military forces to Chosŏn during the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion (東學農民戰爭 Tonghak Nongmin Chŏnjaeng) in 1894 highlight the persistence of King Kojong’s traditional military outlook. On top of that, this chapter examines the changes in the military exile practice in relation to the shifting political landscape within the Chosŏn government. The consolidation of King Kojong’s direct rule had a partial impact on the patterns of military exile, and tracing these modifications illuminates King Kojong and the ruling class’s perception of military service. Additionally, by exploring the conclusion of military exile during the Kabo Reform of 1894, which was heavily influenced by the Japanese Empire following Japan’s victory over Qing in the 22 Sino-Japanese War, we can better understand how the military system and its punitive measures were shaped by external pressures and internal transformations. In summary, the examination of military reform and the military exile practice provides insight into the nature of the military system under King Kojong’s leadership. Specifically, the analysis of the military reform process between 1863 and 1894 challenges the prevailing scholarly interpretation that these policies aimed at a fundamental overhaul of the conventional military system to strengthen national defense. Contrary to the widely accepted view of King Kojong’s military reforms, the entrenched traditional ideology of prioritizing the royal guard and elevating civil values over military concerns largely persisted in the reform policies. Furthermore, the practice of military exile during this period reinforces this argument. Despite the proactive reforms implemented by Taewŏn’gun and King Kojong, the imposition of military exile on offenders reflects the ruling class’s neglect in recognizing the value of military service, which was viewed not as a noble duty but as a punitive measure for criminals. This enduring attitude toward the military significantly hindered, if not completely obstructed, reform efforts. By cross-examining the Chosŏn government’s military policies and the implementation of military exile, I argue that my dissertation offers a deeper understanding of the late 19th-century military policy, demonstrating how the traditional framework shaped national policy. 23 CHAPTER ONE: MILITARY REFORM DURING TAEWŎN’GUN’S REGENCY AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE), 1863-1873 Introduction In the late 19th century, Chosŏn Korea’s political landscape underwent significant transformation. During the regency of Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn’gun (興宣大院君 1820-1898), or Grand Prince Hŭngsŏn, from 1863 to 1873, on behalf of King Kojong (r. 1863-1907), the 26th king of the Chosŏn Dynasty who had not yet reached maturity, Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn’gun (hereafter Taewŏn’gun) reformed traditional institutions to resolve national issues and address the infiltration of Western powers into Chosŏn society. To this end, Taewŏn’gun implemented various reform policies, including the reorganization of the central government, restructuring of the financial system, and reform of the military. Given the increasing encroachment of Western powers on the Korean peninsula since the mid-19th century, the enhancement of national defense was a primary and essential undertaking for the Chosŏn Dynasty. Several studies on the military system during the regency of Taewŏn’gun in Korean academia argue that the ‘new’ military policies brought about significant changes in Chosŏn’s military institutions, if not radically, and contributed to repelling the invasion of the U.S. navy in 1871. Furthermore, scholars have focused on Taewŏn’gun’s measures to leverage military officials to restrain the civil branch (文班 munban), which had practically ruled the nation and marginalized the political power of titular kings since 1800. According to these claims, Taewŏn’gun’s ‘innovative’ approach enabled the elevation of the status of military officials (武班 muban), within Chosŏn’s central government. Given the traditional principle of prioritizing civil over military affairs in Chosŏn society, articulated in primary sources as gwimun ch’ŏnmu (貴文賤武)1, Taewŏn’gun’s military policies marked a significant departure from established norms. 1 Chŏngjo sillok (正祖實錄) 50:9a [1798/11/23]. 24 These claims, however, fail to explain the Chosŏn army’s incapability of defending against Japan’s gunboat attack on Kanghwa Island and the crushing defeat Chosŏn suffered in 1875, just two years after Taewŏn’gun resigned from the regency. Additionally, the withdrawal of the U.S. navy during the American invasion of Korean soil in 1871 was far from a defeat of the U.S. forces. Rather, the U.S. navy strategically withdrew because the prospects for negotiation with the Chosŏn government were uncertain, although the unyielding resistance by the Chosŏn army did play a role in America’s decision to withdraw. Korean historians generally acknowledge that Taewŏn’gun’s military reforms contributed to strengthening the maritime defense to some extent. However, if these reforms were effective, why did the Chosŏn army fail so decisively to repel the Japanese gunboat attack on Kanghwa Island in 1875, merely two years after his regency ended? Admittedly, the restructuring of the existing military system did not necessarily ensure Chosŏn’s victory over Japan, as multiple factors certainly influenced the battle. Nevertheless, Chosŏn’s military forces proved powerless in defending this strategic point. What underlying factors contributed to the persistent weakness in Chosŏn’s military system, despite the implementation of ‘new’ military policies during Taewŏn’gun’s regency? To explore these questions, this chapter reexamines the military system under Taewŏn’gun’s leadership. I contend that, although Taewŏn’gun sought to fortify his political authority by leveraging military officials and overseeing advancements in military weaponry and organization, the regime’s fundamental attitude toward the military remained entrenched in traditional norms, precluding any substantive change. To support this argument, I will concentrate on two key issues: the social status of the military official and military exile, which involved the forced enlistment of negligent officials or those convicted of serious crimes into military service and their assignment to remote, inhospitable areas. First, the examination of the social status of the military official reveals that, although high-ranking military officials benefited from the government’s new policies, the majority of military officials, comprising mid- and low-ranking personnel, did not enjoy these 而況我國, 貴文賤武? (This refers to the Chŏngjo sillok [Veritable Records of King Chŏngjo], fascicle 50, page 9, left side (a), dated month 11/day 23 of the lunar year 1798, as part of the Chosŏn wangjo sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄. The reference is based on the digitized version of the original veritable records. (https://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.do) In the citation format used here, “a” denotes the left side of the page and “b” the right side. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 25 privileges. This disparity underscores the continued lower status of the majority of military officials compared to their civil counterparts, who retained significant power. Second, as previously mentioned, military exile further reflects the regime’s perception of the military, revealing that military service was regarded as a form of punishment. While comparable penal units existed in European countries, Chosŏn’s military exile differed in that it primarily aimed to punish offenders, whereas the European system was largely intended to alleviate pressure on the penitentiary system or address military manpower shortages. The following sections will further elaborate on these differences. These issues of the social status of the military official and military exile serve as indicators for evaluating the regime’s genuine attitude toward the military. They offer insights into whether Taewŏn’gun’s reforms led to a substantive shift in military values or if the Chosŏn government’s approach remained fundamentally consistent with traditional views. Analyzing these aspects will help determine whether the persistent neglect of the military and the aristocracy’s disregard for military service were significant barriers to enhancing military preparedness in the face of external threats. King Kojong’s Enthronement and Taewŏn’gun’s Military Policies The onset of Taewŏn’gun’s regency On 12/8 of 1863,2 King Ch’ŏlchong (哲宗 1831-1863) died without an heir or a designated successor. According to the Chosŏn Dynasty’s royal code, the senior dowager of the royal family held the authority to appoint the next king. Consequently, Queen Dowager Cho, the widow of Crown Prince Hyomyŏng (孝明世子 1809-1830) and also known as Queen Consort Sinjŏng (神貞王后 1809-1890), exercised this authority by selecting Yi Myŏng-bok (李命福 1852-1919), the second son of Yi Ha-ŭng (李昰應 1820-1898), to ascend the throne as King Kojong.3 King Kojong’s succession was highly unconventional, given his status as a member of a collateral line of the royal family; under normal circumstances, he would not have been a likely 2 Dates that correspond to the lunar calendar are indicated as month/day of year. 3 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:1a [1863/12/08]. 26 candidate for the throne.4 Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the family tree of King Kojong and Yi Ha-ŭng, underscoring the extraordinary nature of his accession. Figure 1: The Family Tree of King Kojong 21st King Yŏngjo (英祖 r. 1724-1776) Crown Prince Sado (思悼世子 1735-1762) 22nd King Chŏngjo (正祖 r. 1776-1800) Prince Ŭnŏn (恩彦君 1754-1801) Prince Ŭnsin (恩信君 1755-1771) 23rd King Sunjo (純祖 r. 1800-1834) Grand Prince Chŏn’gye (全溪大院君 1785-1841) Prince Namyŏn (南延君 1788-1836) Crown Prince Hyomyŏng (孝明世子 1809-1830) 25th King Ch’ŏlchong (哲宗 r. 1849-1863) Grand Prince Hŭngsŏn (興宣大院君 1820-1898) 24th King Hŏnjong (憲宗 r. 1834-1849) 26th King Kojong (高宗 r. 1863-1907) Source: The Supplementary Royal Genealogy (璿源續譜 Sŏnwŏn sokpo), vol. 7, 1902. As Figure 1 shows, King Kojong’s enthronement was deeply rooted in the complex dynamics of the Chosŏn royal family. His lineage traces back to the 21st king, King Yŏngjo (英祖 1694-1776). Crown Prince Sado (思悼世子 1735-1762), who was King Yŏngjo’s heir but tragically executed by his father, had four sons: King Chŏngjo, Prince Ŭnŏn (恩彦君, 1754- 4 For details, see Hong Soon-ok, "A Study on the Regime of Hung-son Tae-won-kun (1864-1873)", Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 33, (1970): 14-17. 27 1801), Prince Ŭnsin (恩信君, 1755-1771), and Prince Ŭnjŏn (恩全君, 1759-1778). While King Chŏngjo succeeded to the throne, his brothers became entangled in Catholic persecution or conspiracy incidents,5 leading to their banishment or execution, which greatly reduced the number of male heirs in the royal court. After King Chŏngjo’s sudden death in 1800, his young son ascended the throne as King Sunjo (純祖, 1790-1834). King Sunjo’s only son, Crown Prince Hyomŏng, died prematurely in 1830 without leaving an heir, and upon the king’s death in 1834, Crown Prince Hyomŏng’s son, King Hŏnjong (憲宗, 1827-1849), became the 24th king. However, King Hŏnjong also died young without an heir, necessitating the Chosŏn government to seek a successor outside the immediate royal lineage. They eventually selected Yi Wŏn-bŏm (李元範), a descendant of Prince Ŭnŏn, who resided on Kanghwa Island where his family had settled, and enthroned him as King Ch’ŏlchong. With King Ch’ŏlchong also dying without an heir, the search for a new king led the court to the offspring of Prince Ŭnsin, the third son of Crown Prince Sado. In 1815, Yi Ku (李球 1788-1836), who was posthumously honored as Prince Namyŏn (南延君), was adopted to Prince Ŭnsin. Yi Ha-ŭng, the fourth son of Prince Namyŏn as well as the grandson of Prince Ŭnsin, had little expectation of ascending the throne under normal circumstances. However, due to the continued political instability, Yi Ha-ŭng’s son was chosen as the next monarch, becoming King Kojong. Yi Ha-ŭng was subsequently honored with the title of Grand Prince Hŭngsŏn.6 The succession process was also extraordinary in that King Kojong did not succeed to King Ch’ŏlchong’s line but was instead adopted by Queen Consort Sinjŏng into the line of Crown Prince Hyomyŏng, who was posthumously honored as King Ikchong (翼宗).7 This 5 Ŭnŏn was compelled to drink poison due to his wife’s involvement with the Catholic community, even though he himself had no connection to it. 6 The ennoblement of a living father of a king as Taewŏn’gun was an unprecedented event in Chosŏn history. Despite Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s favor, Taewŏn’gun firmly declined the title. Consequently, Queen Consort Sinjŏng ordered high-ranking officials Chŏng Wŏn-yong (鄭元容 1783-1873), Kim Hŭng-gŭn (金興根 1796-1870), and Kim Chwa-gŭn (金左根 1797-1869) to discuss the matter. However, they could not reach a conclusion, as there was no precedent for such a case. It appears that the title was ultimately conferred on Yi Ha-ŭng through Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s unilateral decision. (Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:6a [1863/12/13].) 7 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:13b [1863/12/30]. 28 measure aimed to secure the legitimacy of the new monarch while also allowing Queen Consort Sinjŏng to stabilize her political standing through the adoption of King Kojong. As the eldest female member of the royal family and the official mother of King Kojong, Queen Consort Sinjŏng served as regent in accordance with the royal code, since King Kojong ascended to the throne at the age of twelve, which was too young to govern the nation. Figure 2 illustrates the official lineage of the kingship following King Kojong’s adoption into the line of Crown Prince Hyomyŏng. Figure 2: The New Family Tree of King Kojong after the Adoption 21st King Yŏngjo (英祖 r. 1724-1776) Crown Prince Sado (思悼世子 1735-1762) 22nd King Chŏngjo (正祖 r. 1776-1800) Prince Ŭnŏn (恩彦君 1754-1801) Prince Ŭnsin (恩信君 1755-1771) 23rd King Sunjo (純祖 r. 1800-1834) Grand Prince Chŏn’gye (全溪大院君 1785-1841) Prince Namyŏn (南延君 1788-1836) Crown Prince Hyomyŏng (孝明世子 1809-1830) 25th King Ch’ŏlchong (哲宗 r. 1849-1863) Grand Prince Hŭngsŏn (興宣大院君 1820-1898) 24th King Hŏnjong (憲宗 r. 1834-1849) 26th King Kojong (高宗 r. 1863-1907) Source: Chosŏn wangjo sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄 (The Veritable Records of Chosŏn). 若論傳國之統, 則正、純、翼、憲四廟之統, 傳至于大行大王, 而主上承之, 豈有貳統之疑哉? 百世之下, 皆當諒予此心矣。 其於翼宗, 稱‘皇考’稱‘孝子’, 於憲宗稱‘皇兄’稱‘孝嗣’, 於大行大王, 稱皇‘叔考’。 三年內, 稱‘哀從子’; 三年後, 稱‘孝從子’ 。 29 Even so, Taewŏn’gun served as a de facto regent, despite lacking any legal or customary foundation for assuming the position.8 As the biological father of King Kojong, Taewŏn’gun took charge of his son’s tutelage unofficially. Furthermore, both King Kojong and Queen Consort Sinjŏng sanctioned Taewŏn’gun’s regency. As Yŏn Kap-su argues, Taewŏn’gun’s unofficial rule over Chosŏn was possible due to the tradition of specific dominant clans unofficially managing governmental affairs in Chosŏn.9 Nonetheless, this absence of a legal basis suggests that the transfer of political power did not proceed smoothly. For example, the Andong Kim clan (安東 金氏), an oligarchic family that had effectively dominated the government, presented significant opposition to Taewŏn’gun’s regency. According to Hwang Hyŏn’s (黃玹 1855-1910) memoir, the Unofficial Records of Maech’ŏn (梅泉野錄 Maech’ŏn yarok), Kim Hŭng-gun (金興根 1796-1870), a prominent member of the Andong Kim clan, argued that the king’s personal father (私親 sach’in) was not allowed to engage in politics, and thus Taewŏn’gun had to return to his private residence.10 Be that as it may, the opposition from the Andong Kim clan was muted because Queen Consort Sinjŏng from the P’ungyang Cho clan (豊壤 趙氏) endorsed and supported Taewŏn’gun’s rule. Furthermore, Kim Hŭng-gun’s remarks regarding Taewŏn’gun’s political position do not imply that officials in the central government formally repudiated his regency. While it is plausible to assume that the major in-law clans in the government shared Kim’s view, they lacked justification to publicly oppose the rule of sach’in of the young king. Indeed, there are no official records of opposition to Taewŏn’gun’s rule until 1873, when Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn (崔益鉉 1834-1907) submitted a memorial to the throne, requesting Taewŏn’gun’s resignation. Consequently, Taewŏn’gun acted as a de facto regent on behalf of King Kojong and Queen Consort Sinjŏng. 8 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 27. 9 Yŏn Kap-su 연갑수, Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi puguk kangbyŏng chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 대원군 집권기 부국강병 정책 연구, (Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2001), 19. 10 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹, Maech’ŏn yarok 梅泉野錄 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Sinjisa, 1955), 2, and Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 32. 30 Since Taewŏn’gun’s regency was not based on a legal foundation, he was unable to issue official orders directly. Instead, his orders were issued in the form of edicts from either Queen Consort Sinjŏng or King Kojong. Therefore, official records, such as the Veritable Record of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok), the Diary of the Royal Secretariat, and the Court Chronicle, do not directly illustrate his political actions. In addition, his commands were also issued in the form of a special order known as taewŏnwibunbu (大院位分付 the order from Taewŏn’gun).11 While taewŏnwibunbu was not a legal and official directive but rather a personal order, this format did not prevent Taewŏn’gun from executing his policies. Major military reform policies under Taewŏn’gun’s regency As the de facto regent, Taewŏn’gun was compelled to address the longstanding social issues within Chosŏn and manage the diplomatic challenges posed by foreign powers. Internally, a series of peasant revolts erupted throughout Chosŏn in the late 19th century, primarily due to punitive taxes imposed on the populace. Worsening the situation, the adverse weather conditions in the 19th century led to a decline in harvest yields. Notable examples include the rebellion of Hong Kyŏng-nae (洪景來 1780-1812) in 1812, the Chinju Rebellion (晋州民亂 Chinju Millan) of 1862, and the Imsul Rebellion (壬戌民亂 Imsul Millan) of 1862. These uprisings were largely a result of the mismanagement of Chosŏn’s traditional taxation system, known as the Three Levies (三政 Samjŏng), which comprised the three main sources of state revenue: the land tax, the military tax, and the grain loan system. The abuse of the grain loan system, in particular, was the primary cause of these rebellions.12 Additionally, the Chosŏn regime aggressively suppressed Korean Catholics, viewing them as a threat to Confucian tradition, regardless of the validity of this belief. Following Confucius (孔子 551-479 BCE), who labeled non-Confucian ideas as ‘strange teachings’ (異端 idan), Chosŏn’s Neo-Confucianists similarly regarded Catholicism as idan, or heresy.13 This fear 11 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹, Maech’ŏn yarok 梅泉野錄 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Sinjisa, 1955), 3. 12 For details, see Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812, (University of Washington Press, 2007), and Song Ch’an-sŏp, "The Development of the Chinju Peasants’ Rebellion of 1862", International Journal of Korean History 3, (2002): 123-178. 13 Donald Baker, Catholics and anti-Catholicism in Chosŏn Korea, (University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2017), 30-36. 31 was not entirely unfounded, given the Silk Letter Incident (帛書事件 Paeksŏ Sakŏn) of 1801, in which Hwang Sa-yŏng (黃嗣永 1775-1801), an aristocratic Korean Catholic, advocated for foreign intervention to stop the persecution of Catholics.14 Although this incident was triggered by the government’s violent suppression of Catholics, political leaders remained wary of potential collusion between Chosŏn Catholics and foreign powers. Moreover, the international circumstances surrounding Chosŏn were unfavorable for Taewŏn’gun. The threat from Western powers and Russia posed significant challenges for the Chosŏn government. For instance, from July 1864 to August 1865, four unidentified Western vessels and a Chinese ship carrying an Englishman consecutively reached Chosŏn’s shores. On occasion, sailors from these ships plundered islands. In response, the Chosŏn government merely reprimanded local magistrates (守令 suryŏng) for dereliction of duty and issued orders to strengthen maritime defenses.15 Besides, following their defeat in the Arrow Incident of 1860, the Qing government was compelled to sign the Beijing Treaty with Russia, resulting in the cession of the Maritime Territory. This territorial concession marked the first time Russia shared a border with Chosŏn.16 As shown in Map 1, the red area represents the territory newly acquired by Russia from Qing under the Beijing Treaty, which resulted in Chosŏn having a direct border with Russia along its eastern frontier. Maps 2 and 3 illustrate the changes in the borderlines around the time of the Beijing Treaty. Although the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding areas are not depicted with complete accuracy in these maps, they effectively convey the shifts in the geopolitical landscape surrounding Chosŏn. To be specific, Map 2 is the map of Chosŏn produced by American cartographer David H. Burr (1803-1875) in 1835. This map shows Chosŏn’s northeastern frontier encircled by Manchuria (referred to as “Mantchooria” on the map). In contrast, Map 3, created by British geographer James Wyld (1812-1887) in 1873, reflects the territorial changes where Chosŏn’s northeastern border became adjacent to Russia. 14 Ibid., 102-103. 15 Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, Kaehwagi ŭi kunsa chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 개화기의 군사정책 연구, (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000), 34-35. 16 German Kim and Ross King, "The Northern Region of Korea as Portrayed in Russian Sources, 1860s–1913", in The Northern Region of Korea, History, Identity, and Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim (University of Washington Press, 2015), 261. 32 Map 1: The Territory Gained by Russia after the Treaty of Beijing, 1860 Source: Library of Congress (https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7822m.ct002999/?st=image&r=-0.541,0.149,1.63,0.59,0) Map 2: The Map of the Korean Peninsula by David H. Burr, 1835 Source: Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan p’yŏn 동북아역사재단 편. Sŏyang kojido sok ŭi Hanbando, Tonghae kŭrigo Tokto 서양 고지도 속의 한반도, 동해 그리고 독도. Seoul: Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan. 2021, p. 301. 33 Map 3: The Map of the Korean Peninsula by James Wyld, 1873 Source: Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan p’yŏn 동북아역사재단 편. Sŏyang kojido sok ŭi Hanbando, Tonghae kŭrigo Tokto 서양 고지도 속의 한반도, 동해 그리고 독도. Seoul: Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan. 2021, p. 317. This new diplomatic dynamic emerged as a tangible threat to Chosŏn. For instance, on 2/28 of 1864, Yi Yu-wŏn (李裕元 1814-1888), the governor of Hamgyŏng Province in the northern region, reported to the central government that Russians had approached the Tuman River (豆滿江) and demanded to trade with Chosŏn. Yi declined the request, stating that local governors were not authorized to make significant decisions on national affairs without prior approval. He also suspected that this move was part of a scheme orchestrated through internal collusion with the Russians.17 As a result of Yi’s report, two Korean suspects directly involved in the incident were executed, and three regional officials were imprisoned.18 17 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:37a [1864/02/28]. 18 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 1-05-15 (15) [1864/05/15]. (This refers to the Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi [The Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat], reign year 1, month 5, day 15 (article number 15), dated year 1864/month 5/day 15. This reference is based on the digitized version of the Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi available in the Han’guk Kojŏn Chonghap DB (한국고전종합 DB, Korean Classics Comprehensive Database) (http://db.itkc.or.kr). This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 34 Given the aforementioned domestic and international challenges confronting the Chosŏn regime, Taewŏn’gun and Chosŏn’s policymakers were compelled to implement comprehensive reform policies to address deeply entrenched social issues. Consequently, the regime pursued substantial national reforms, including curtailing in-law politics, restructuring the taxation system, and strengthening national defense. In this chapter, I will primarily investigate the military reforms conducted during the regency of Taewŏn’gun, although other reform policies were directly or indirectly associated with changes to the military system. According to Hyeok Hweon Kang, Chosŏn’s musketry technology experienced significant advancements during King Hyojong’s reign in the 17th century, with its effectiveness demonstrated during the Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658, where Chosŏn musketeers inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian army in the Amurian region. Kang argues that Chosŏn emerged as a gunpowder state through this victory and contends that the military transformation within Chosŏn surpassed that of 17th-century Europe.19 However, the continued development of military technology stagnated due to the prolonged peace that lasted for two centuries and the absence of interstate warfare. In this context, the Chosŏn government found it essential to reform its military system. Historians have analyzed the Chosŏn government’s military buildup in response to foreign intrusions and generally agree that enhancing military preparedness was crucial, given the deteriorated state of military units immediately following Taewŏn’gun’s regency.20 Specifically, the regime undertook significant refurbishments of military facilities and fortifications across Chosŏn, while also increasing the budget for military infrastructure and units. As Carter Eckert contends, the early stages of Korea’s militarization can be traced to Taewŏn’gun’s regime.21 Indeed, the Chosŏn government substantially increased investment in 19 Hyeok Hweon Kang, "Big Heads and Buddhist Demons: The Korean Musketry Revolution and the Northern Expeditions of 1654 and 1658", Journal of Chinese Military History 2, no. 2 (2014): 169-170. 20 Korean historians such as Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok, Im Chae-ch’an, Kim Se-ŭn, Pae Hang-sŏp, and Yŏn Kap-su have explored the military policies during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, interpreting them as either modern or new military reforms. Meanwhile, scholars in English-language academia, such as James Palais and Ching Young Choe, have emphasized the limitations of Taewŏn’gun’s policies, which were rooted in traditional norms. Nevertheless, both Korean and English scholars concur that military reform was a central policy of the Taewŏn’gun regime. 21 Carter J Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 21-26. 35 military affairs, irrespective of the policy’s effectiveness. This issue will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. In fact, reforming the military was a pressing issue for the Chosŏn government. Numerous records document the dilapidated state of military offices and the impoverished condition of major military units. Additionally, the soldiers were lax in discipline, making it nearly impossible for the government to conduct regular military drills.22 Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s concern about the military situation, as expressed in her edict, vividly describes the poor condition of the central army’s military system.23 The Grand Queen Dowager issued a decree, stating: “Recently, it has been noted that the sons of military families often take shortcuts (捷徑) to obtain official positions, completely neglecting the practice of archery or the study of military texts. Moreover, I have heard that the buildings of the Bureau of Military Training (訓練院 Hullyŏnwŏn) are on the verge of collapse. This is indeed a matter that concerns the rise and fall of military affairs. Currently, as the finances of the Ministry of Taxation (戶曹 Hojo) are not sufficient, let the Military Training Agency (訓鍊都監 Hullyŏn Togam) take charge of the repairs, and send an additional 1,000 nyang (兩) from the royal treasury to cover the costs. Furthermore, the commanders of each military camp should be instructed to conduct and encourage the training and practice of the military officers.” 22 For instance, Kim Chong-su contends that the presence of soldiers from the Military Training Agency (訓鍊都監 Hullyŏn Togam) in Seoul contributed to a range of social problems, including criminal activities, such as robbery and rape, physical assaults against members of the yangban (scholar-official class), and urban challenges arising from population concentration in the capital since the 17th century. See Kim Chong-su 김종수, "Chosŏn hugi Hullyŏn Togam unyŏng ŭi sahoe kyŏngjejŏk yŏnghyang" 조선후기 훈련도감 운영의 사회경제적 영향, Kunsa 군사 33, (1996): 184-185. 23 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:36a [1864/02/20]. 大王大妃敎曰: “近來將家子弟, 多由捷徑取官, 習射習講全不留意。 而且聞訓鍊院廨宇, 將至頹圮云。 實關戎務之興廢矣。 見今度支經用不敷, 其令訓局專任修葺, 內下錢一千兩, 以爲補用, 而武士講習, 各營將臣, 另爲申飭勸課可也。” 36 Queen Consort Sinjŏng observed that the sons of military officials were more focused on securing official positions rather than acquiring the fundamental knowledge necessary to become competent soldiers. This phenomenon aligns with Eugene Park’s research on military examinations in the Late Chosŏn period. Park argues that these examinations served dual roles: politically, they ensured a place within the power structure for a segment of the aristocracy, and socioculturally, they helped alleviate tensions created by the rigid status hierarchy.24 While the argument does not explicitly state this, it is evident that the function of military examinations was more a conduit for military officials to achieve upward social mobility than a platform for testing military abilities. Specifically, the Chosŏn government had held military examinations more frequently than civil examinations, and the number of military examination passers vastly outnumbered civil examination passers in the 1800s, with over 37,000 passing the military examinations compared to just 3,782 passing the civil counterparts.25 Given these figures, it is evident that military examinations were significantly less competitive than civil ones, providing military candidates with a higher likelihood of securing government positions regardless of their actual military abilities. Moreover, the condition of the Bureau of Military Training was considerably dire according to the records. The Bureau of Military Training was the office responsible for overseeing both military training and the administration of military examinations.26 This bureau was originally established under the name of the Hall of Military Training (訓鍊館 Hullyŏn’gwan) when Chosŏn was founded in 1392, and it was renamed the Bureau of Military Training in 1466, solidifying its institutional framework. This military office was tasked with training the major royal guard units that safeguarded the royal palaces and the king’s residence.27 In other words, this organization was the core of the military forces in Chosŏn. However, the government failed to maintain the condition of its buildings. One can infer from this record that other military units were also in a serious state of disrepair. 24 Eugene Y. Park, Between Dreams and Reality: The Military Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea, 1600-1894, (The Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2007), 2. 25 Eugene Y. Park, "Military Examinations in Late Chosŏn: Elite Substratification and Non-Elite", Korean Studies 25, no. 1 (2001): 4. 26 Shin Myŏng-ho, Joseon Royal Court Culture: Ceremonial and Daily Life, trans. Timothy V. Atkinson (Dolbegae Publishers, 2004), 33. 27 Han’gun minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture). 37 According to the edict, Queen Consort Sinjŏng ordered the Military Training Agency to oversee the repairs of the Bureau of Military Training. The Military Training Agency was one of the central military units, originally established on a temporary basis to defend against the Japanese invasion during the Imjin War in 1593. This unit was one of the few salaried standing military units in Chosŏn, comprising three combat corps (三手兵 samsubyŏng): archers (射手 sasu), close-combat specialists wielding swords, pikes, and spears (殺手 salsu), and musketeers (砲手 p’osu). Its formation was based on the New Treatise on Effective Discipline (紀效新書 Jixiao xinshu) by the Ming general Qi Jiguang (戚繼光 1528-1588), and the Chosŏn government adapted the text according to Chosŏn’s context, including terrain, weather, the local populace, and the other relevant elements.28 Over time, this temporary unit evolved into one of the core components of Chosŏn’s central army.29 Due to the special status of the Military Training Agency, the training of this unit was initially rigorous, with soldiers required to train every third day and undergo skill tests each month. Failure to pass the test resulted in their transfer to other units.30 However, over time, the discipline within the military units weakened, and the role of the Military Training Agency as the core of the central army no longer held the same significance as before. Despite its declining status as a key military unit, it had to assist another unit, the Bureau of Military Training, due to financial constraints within the Ministry of Finance. This edict highlights the financial practices in Chosŏn as well as the government’s fiscal limitations in supporting military policies. In response to the challenges within the military system, the Chosŏn regime initiated military reform policies. With the approach of Western powers to Chosŏn’s shores, it became imperative for the government to enhance national defense. The first step was to establish a government office dedicated to military affairs. On 5/26 of 1865, the Three Armies Command 28 Felix Siegmund, "The Adaptation of Chinese Military Techniques to Chosŏn Korea, Their Validation, and the Social Dynamics Thereof", in Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History: From Ancient China to the Communist Takeover, ed. Kai Filipiak (Routledge, 2014), 176-177. 29 James B. Palais, "Military Reform", in Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty, (The University of Washington Press, 1996), 89, and Kim Chong-su 김종수, Chosŏn hugi chung’ang kunje yŏn’gu - hullyŏndogam ŭi sŏllip kwa sahoe pyŏndong 조선후기 중앙군제연구 - 훈련도감의 설립과 사회변동, (Hyean, 2003), 71-89. 30 Felix Siegmund, "Some Aspects of the Assessment and Evaluation of Military Skills and Knowledge in Chosŏn Korea", in Beyond the State Examinations Evaluations of Knowledge in Premodern Korea, ed. Martin Gehlmann and Vladimír Glomb (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2024), 111. 38 (三軍府 Samgunbu) was established on the site previously occupied by the Ministry of Rites (禮曹 Yejo).31 The Three Armies Command had originally been the governmental organization responsible for controlling military units when Chosŏn was founded, but it had been abolished in the early 15th century. Thus, strictly speaking, this military office was reestablished during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. I will elaborate on the characteristics of the office later. In addition to establishing the office responsible for military affairs, the regime attempted to replenish the national treasury for military finance and update the military register to accurately assess the size of the military forces in Chosŏn. Consequently, King Kojong ordered an investigation into the military registers of private Confucian academies (書院 sŏwŏn) and their affiliated villages.32 Initially, the Confucian academies were established with the goal of nurturing young students as devoted members of moral education, rather than simply teaching Confucian texts to pass the state examinations.33 However, many of these private Confucian academies became centers for military service evasion, as students were granted special privileges that exempted them from conscription. As a result, aristocrats who sought to legally dodge military duty enrolled in these academies, which, in turn, accepted more students than their quotas allowed, often illegally. Additionally, it was widespread for commoners to attempt to evade their military duties. For example, some commoners forged their genealogies to falsely claim aristocratic status, thereby attempting to avoid military service, a practice documented at least since the 18th century, according to Eugene Park’s research.34 However, in a reverse and seemingly paradoxical manner, commoners seeking to avoid heavy taxes often became slaves to private Confucian academies, as slaves were exempt from military service unless they voluntarily enlisted. In this 31 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 2:25a [1865/05/26]. 又曰: “景福宮方張營建, 而際此議政府重新矣。 今之禮曹, 卽國初三軍府, 而與政府對峙者, 以其一國政令, 文事與武備也。” 32 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:106a [1864/12/13]. 33 Vladimír Glomb, "Learning for Oneself: Evaluation of Knowledge in Korean Confucian Academies", in Beyond the State Examinations Evaluations of Knowledge in Premodern Korea, ed. Martin Gehlmann and Vladimír Glomb (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2024), 26-27. 34 Eugene Y. Park, A Family of No Prominence: The Descendants of Pak Tŏkhwa and the Birth of Modern Korea, 1590–1945, (Stanford University Press, 2014), 31. 39 context, the crackdown on private academies and the revision of the military register likely contributed to an increase in the pool of potential military forces. At the same time, the reform of the central army was crucial for the regime to enhance national defense and protect the royal family. However, the military preparedness of the central army was in a considerably poor state. At the beginning of Taewŏn’gun’s regency, the size of the major five central military units, such as the Military Training Agency, the Capital Guard Unit (御營廳 Ŏyŏngch’ŏng), the Forbidden Guard Division (禁衛營 Kŭmwiyŏng), the Command of the Southern Approaches (守禦廳 Suŏch’ŏng), and the Command of the Northern Approaches (摠戎廳 Ch’ongyungch’ŏng), was quite small. The units of the central army altogether comprised 16,000 soldiers, but half of them were old and feeble. Table 1: The Major Central Army Units of Late Chosŏn35 Unit Name Year of Establishment Defense Area Founding Background Headquarters Location Military Training Agency (訓鍊都監 Hullyŏn Togam) 1593 (26th year of King Sŏnjo’s reign) Capital City (Seoul) Training elite soldiers Seoul Capital Guard Unit (御營廳 Ŏyŏngch’ŏng) 1623 (1st year of King Injo’s reign) Capital City (Seoul) Defense against Late Jin (後金) Seoul Command of the Northern Approaches (摠戎廳 Ch’ongyungch’ŏng) 1624 (2nd year of King Injo’s reign) Pukhan Mountain Fortress (北漢山城), North Seoul Preparation for attack by Later Jin (後金) Pukhan Mountain Fortress Command of the Southern Approaches (守禦廳 Suŏch’ŏng) 1626 (4th year of King Injo’s reign) Namhan Mountain Fortress (南漢山城), South Seoul Defense of southern Kyŏnggi Province Seoul & Kwangju, Kyŏnggi Forbidden Guard Division (禁衛營 Kŭmwiyŏng) 1682 (8th year of King Sukchong’s reign) Capital City (Seoul) Strengthening palace defense (王宮) Seoul 35 This table is derived from Ch’oe Hyŏ-sik’s book. Ch’oe Hyo-sik 최효식, Chosŏn hugi kunjesa yŏn’gu 조선 후기 군제사 연구, (Sinsŏwŏn, 1995), 23-113. 40 In fact, the military units in the central army had rarely been trained for centuries.36 According to Kim Chong-su, the Military Training Agency, the core unit of Chosŏn’s central army, was so inadequately trained that soldiers engaged in commercial activities rather than military drills. They were also involved in crimes, causing various social problems.37 Furthermore, Eugene Park’s monograph examines the case of the Miryang Pak family (密陽 朴氏), whose members, holding chungin (中人 low ranking clerks) status, 38 engaged in commercial activities while simultaneously serving as military officers during the 19th century.39 Although this case does not provide a comprehensive representation of the disarray and fragmentation within military units at the time, it can be inferred that the military system was in a state of significant decline during this period. To address these issues, the Chosŏn government implemented reforms within the Military Training Agency, including the elimination of redundant positions, the reassignment of soldiers to combat units, and the cultivation of elite troops through intensified military drills.40 Additionally, the Royal Palace Guards (禁軍 Kŭmgun) was strengthened to enhance overall military capability. King Kojong himself expressed concern over the deteriorated state of the palace guards and issued orders for their restoration to their former standards.41 For example, the government mandated the training of 60 elite combat soldiers (牙兵 abyŏng) from the pool of 36 According to Sim Hŏn-yong’s estimation, the central army consisted of around 5,000 soldiers in the Military Training Agency (訓鍊都監 Hullyŏn Togam), 3,000 in the Capital Guard Unit (御營廳 Ŏyŏngch’ŏng), 3,000 in the Forbidden Guard Division (禁衛營 Kŭmwiyŏng), 2,000 in the Dragon Tiger Regiment (龍虎營 Yonghoyŏng), and 3,000 in the Command of the Northern Approaches (摠戎廳 Ch’ongyungch’ŏng). Sim Hŏn-yong 심헌용, Hanmal kun kŭndaehwa yŏn’gu 한말 군 근대화 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2005), 33-34. 37 Kim Chong-su 김종수, Chosŏn hugi chung’ang kunje yŏn’gu - hullyŏndogam ŭi sŏllip kwa sahoe pyŏndong 조선후기 중앙군제연구 - 훈련도감의 설립과 사회변동, (Hyean, 2003), 269-287. 38 Chungin, often translated as either the ‘middle class’ or ‘middle people’ in English-language scholarship, is a group whose status was situated between aristocrats and commoners. This group included various echelons of people, such as specialists, painters, scribes, medical officers, translators, bookkeepers, and others. Since terms like ‘middle class’ or ‘middle people’ merely describe their social status between aristocrats and commoners but fail to capture their diversity, I will use chungin to refer to this group. In addition to the specialist positions, Eugene Park’s research sheds light on the military chungin group. For further details, refer to Eugene Y. Park, A Family of No Prominence: The Descendants of Pak Tŏkhwa and the Birth of Modern Korea, 1590–1945, (Stanford University Press, 2014). 39 Ibid., , 47-70. 40 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 4:9a [1867/01/25]. 41 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 4-11-05 (06) [1867/11/05]. 傳曰, 禁旅設置, 本自不輕, 而近則不然, 馬匹軍裝, 殆不成樣, 言念宿衛, 極爲寒心。從今以往, 禁軍及龍虎營軍, 摠復舊例, 該營別將, 專管黜陟, 而別將以二十四朔爲瓜久任事, 著爲定式。 41 transportation soldiers (卜馬軍 pongmagun) and underage reserve forces (待年軍 taenyŏn’gun) within the Dragon Tiger Regiment (龍虎營 Yonghoyŏng), a unit of the Royal Palace Guards that had been separated from the Forbidden Guard Division in 1686.42 Meanwhile, as foreign powers increasingly approached the Korean peninsula, reinforcing local garrisons and fortresses became essential. To understand the transformation of Chosŏn’s local military system, it is important to examine its traditional structure. Since the 16th century, Chosŏn’s local military had been organized around regimental troops (束伍軍 sog’ogun) and regiment commander (營將 yŏngjang) systems. First, regimental troops literally meaning ‘keeping the troops in line,’ consisted of both commoners (良人 yangin) and slaves (賤民 ch’ŏnmin). This military unit was established in 1594 during the Imjin War, or Hideyoshi’s invasion of Chosŏn, as a defensive measure against the Japanese army. Prior to the Imjin War, slaves were excluded from military service, and the Chosŏn government faced challenges in recruiting commoner soldiers due to many commoners falling into slavery amid economic instability. As a result, the government sought to expand the recruitment pool by forcibly enlisting slaves, despite vehement resistance from slave owners during the war.43 Just as the Military Training Agency was modeled on the New Treatise on Effective Discipline, the regimental troops were also structured into three combat corps. However, the operational methods of these troops varied depending on the specific conditions of each region.44 As indicated by its name, the unit of regimental troops was characterized by a strict joint responsibility framework; if half of the unit perished in battle, the surviving members faced execution. In contrast to these severe penalties, it was stipulated that the government had to confer commoner status upon slave soldiers in recognition of their battlefield achievements under this system.45 42 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 4:47a [1867/11/02]. 兵曹啓: "龍虎營卜馬軍與待年軍中六十名, 以壯健者抄擇, 作牙兵名色, 以補軍制何如?" 允之。 43 Kim U-ch’ŏl 김우철, Chosŏn hugi chibang kunjesa 조선 후기 지방군제사, (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000), 28-29. 44 Ibid., 32-37. 45 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 89. 42 Second, the regiment commander system was introduced in 1627 to strengthen the command of local regimental troops. Regiments (營 yŏng), as the highest-level unit,46 were, in principle, led by military officers appointed by the central government to supervise and train soldiers at each garrison. However, the operation of these troops varied across regions; in some areas, civil magistrates assumed the role of regiment commander, while in others, military officials held command.47 Despite undergoing repeated cycles of abolition and reinstatement, the regiment commander system remained the cornerstone of the local military structure. Nonetheless, the traditional military systems in Chosŏn’s local areas had deteriorated, and the soldiers were largely untrained. With the increasing presence of foreign warships along Chosŏn’s shores, exemplified by the French invasion in 1866 and the American incursion in 1871, the regime recognized the urgent need to bolster maritime defenses. In response, the Chosŏn court undertook efforts to strengthen local armaments, establishing new garrisons and fortifications along strategic shores and islands. A key example of these reforms was the fortification of Kanghwa Island. Kanghwa Island, located at the estuary of the Han River, served as a critical point of defense for Seoul, as ships had to pass through this island to approach the capital. Recognizing its strategic importance, the Supreme Council (議政府 Ŭijŏngbu) requested the repair of the dilapidated temporary palace (行宮 haenggung), garrisons, bastions, and watchtowers on the island. King Kojong approved this suggestion and allocated 3,000 nyang for the repairs.48 Additionally, the status of the commander of Kanghwa Island Headquarters (鎭撫營 Chinmuyŏng) was elevated to match that of second-rank generals, and the commander also assumed the role of mayor of Kanghwa Island (江華留守 Kanghwa yusu).49 46 Regimental troops were hierarchically organized in the following order: tae (隊), ki (旗), ch’o (哨), sa (司), and yŏng (營), with yŏng being the highest unit and tae the lowest. Typically, one tae consisted of 11 individuals; three tae formed one ki, three ki constituted one ch’o, five ch’o made up one sa, and five sa comprised one yŏng, which totaled approximately 2,500 members. 47 Sŏ T’ae-wŏn 서태원, "Chosŏn hugi chibanggun unyong kwa yŏngjangje" 조선후기 지방군 운용과 영장제, Tongsŏsahak 동서사학 6, (2000): 114-117. 48 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 2:27a [1865/潤 05/02]. 49 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, 19-segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsa chedo yŏn’gu 19세기 조선의 군사 제도 연구, (Kukhak charyowŏn, 2002), 56-68. 43 Given the Western countries’ reliance on gunboat diplomacy, the Chosŏn government needed to overhaul its traditional artillery system. Thus, the establishment of advanced artillery units, such as the Special Cannon Army (別砲衛軍 Pyŏlp’owigun), was initiated by the government. This followed a suggestion by Hŏ Sŭp (許熠 1824-n.d.), the provincial army commander of Hamgyŏng Province (南兵使, Nambyŏngsa) on 3/14 of 1865.50 Also, the regime offered attractive incentives to soldiers, providing them with opportunities for rewards or promotions through a series of special tests, such as artillery tests (火砲科 hwap’ogwa). These special tests, initially implemented in Kyŏnggi Province, were eventually expanded throughout the entire country. Prior to this proposal, testing had been employed since the 16th century to monitor the progress of soldiers’ training and ensure their acquisition of essential skills during military drills. Soldiers repeatedly practiced military manuals until they became proficient in them.51 The distinction between traditional testing and Hŏ Sŭp’s concept lies in the introduction of a reward system. By offering incentives to those who achieved high standards in the tests, the regime sought to enhance their fighting spirit and foster the esprit de corps among the members of the military units. Certainly, promoting these new military policies required a significant amount of financial resources. Previous studies have focused on the methods the government employed to secure these new financial resources. Given the chronic financial deficits of the Chosŏn government, it was a daunting task for policymakers to establish a stable financial foundation. Consequently, the government levied new taxes on its subjects. A typical example was the imposition of the household cloth tax (戶布稅 hop’ose), a type of military cloth tax (軍布稅 kunp’ose), on aristocrats who had traditionally been exempted from taxes. The imposition of a military tax on aristocrats marked a significant breakthrough in Chosŏn history, given its impact on expanding the tax base and creating a fissure in the rigid class system. Unsurprisingly, the 50 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 2-03-14 (14) [1865/03/14]. 以南兵使許熠狀啓, 砲手軍, 挽近以來, 轉至渙散, 更置別砲衛軍, 均排於洪原等邑, 依親騎衛例, 設科試才, 則擧切樂赴之心, 尤爲不虞之備, 事係軍政, 不敢擅便, 令廟堂稟處事。 51 Felix Siegmund, "Some Aspects of the Assessment and Evaluation of Military Skills and Knowledge in Chosŏn Korea", in Beyond the State Examinations Evaluations of Knowledge in Premodern Korea, ed. Martin Gehlmann and Vladimír Glomb (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2024), 108. 44 aristocrats resisted the new taxation, and even when they did pay, the tax was often recorded under the names of their slaves. Additionally, the regime introduced various miscellaneous taxes, such as the Seoul gate taxes (都城門稅 tosŏngmunse), river port taxes (浦口稅 p’oguse), fisheries and salt taxes (魚鹽稅 ŏyŏmse), and land levies.52 Furthermore, the government increased the national treasury by minting overvalued coins, specifically the 100-cash coins (當百錢 tangbaekch’ŏn), and importing Chinese coins (淸錢 Ch’ŏngjŏn).53 A series of policies related to military affairs during Taewŏn’gun’s regency clearly demonstrate the regime’s concerted efforts to enhance national defense amid the escalating threat from Western powers.54 Consequently, Taewŏn’gun appointed military officials to prominent positions and prioritized military policy. This shift has led many scholars to posit that the political influence and social standing of the military official increased within the Chosŏn government. This interpretation holds some validity, as a select number of high-ranking military officials did receive preferential treatment. However, the majority of military officials were excluded from such advantages. Furthermore, a closer examination of the policies reveals that societal perceptions of the military and military service remained largely unchanged. These topics will be explored in greater depth in the following section. The Contentious Status of Military Officials during Taewŏn’gun’s Regency State policies on the promotion of military officials Numerous scholars have examined military affairs and the expansion of the military branch in Chosŏn, using military reform as a benchmark to understand societal changes during this period. For instance, they have explored shifts in the social status of the military official.55 52 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 189. 53 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 3:85b [1866/10/30]. 54 France posed a significant threat to Chosŏn, particularly after the Chosŏn government executed nine French missionaries in 1866. Three others, including Felix Clair Ridel (1830-1884), narrowly escaped to Qing China. In response, the French government dispatched an expeditionary navy, leading to the French Disturbance of 1866 (丙寅洋擾 Pyŏngin Yangyo). For details, refer to Yu Hong-ryŏl 유홍렬, Kojong ch’iha sŏhak sunan ŭi yŏn’gu 고종치하 서학수난의 연구, (Ŭryu munhwasa, 1947), 136-156. 55 Kyung Moon Hwang argues that muban (military officials) began to penetrate the upper echelons of the restructured bureaucratic system, with the military once again acting as a catalyst for significant social change. 45 Their findings suggest that Taewŏn’gun intentionally strengthened the power of military officials by promoting them to high-ranking positions within the central government.56 This strategy sought to diminish the influence of oligarchic and in-law officials while elevating the status of the military branch. Although the monopolization of political power by certain families had been prevalent prior to the 19th century, the concentration of authority among a small number of in-law families after King Chŏngjo’s death in 1800 further exacerbated this trend. Consequently, the division within the ruling class intensified: while aristocrats in the capital, particularly in Seoul, dominated Chosŏn politics, those who were pushed out of central politics relocated to local areas. This led to a widening political and economic gap between the two groups.57 According to one study, the dominant group of clans, including Chŏnju Yi (全州 李氏), Andong Kim (安東 金氏), P’ungyang Cho (豊壤 趙氏), Pannam Pak (潘南 朴氏), among others, constituted 64.5% of high-level officials (堂上官 tangsanggwan) in the Border Defense Council (備邊司 Pibyŏnsa), the de facto highest level office in the Chosŏn government, during the reigns of King Chŏngjo and King Ch’ŏlchong from 1776 to 1863.58 This exclusivity became synonymous with corruption and maladministration, which were long considered major contributors to Chosŏn’s political decline. The clans strengthened their political power through intermarriage, further consolidating their influence.59 However, despite Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to eliminate in-law politics, dominant clans were not entirely excluded from Chosŏn’s central officialdom. Rather, the regent strategically maintained associations with influential clans, as evidenced by King Kojong’s enthronement process, in which Queen Consort Sinjŏng of the P’ungyang Cho clan played a pivotal role. Furthermore, another major group, the Andong Kim clan, including figures such as Kim Pyŏng- Kyung Moon Hwang, "The Muban", in Beyond Birth: Social Status in the Emergence of Modern Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004), 292. 56 O Hong-guk 오홍국, "Taewŏnʼgun ŭi kukpangnyŏk kanghwa chŏngchʼaek yŏnʼgu" 대원군의 국방력 강화정책 연구 (MA thesis, Yonsei University, 2002), 16-18. 57 Nam Chi-dae 남지대, "Chungang chŏngch’i seryŏk ŭi sŏngkyŏk" 중앙정치세력의 성격, in Chosŏn chŏngch’isa: 1800-1863 조선정치사: 1800-1863, ed. Han’guk yŏksa yŏn’guhoe 19-segi chŏngch’isa yŏn’guban 한국역사연구회 19세기정치사연구반 (Ch’ŏngnyŏnsa, 1990), 166. 58 Ibid., 190. 59 For details, refer to Tae Yeon Eom, "Collusive Oligopolistic Politics: Sedo and the Political Structure of Early-Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn Korea" (MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012), 59-63. 46 hak (金炳學 1821-1879) and his family, continued to wield political influence and cooperated with both Taewŏn’gun and King Kojong.60 Now, I will investigate the Chosŏn government’s policies to elevate the status of the military branch. On 1/13 of 1864, Queen Consort Sinjŏng issued an order for the Supreme Council to rectify the tradition of treating high-ranking officials from the military with disrespect within the organization.61 According to Felix Siegmund’s research, the status of military officials within the Chosŏn court was significantly elevated in the 17th century due to the growing necessity of importing military knowledge in response to external military threats.62 However, the subsequent two centuries of peace likely contributed to the decline in the standing of military officials within the officialdom. Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s order highlights that military officials faced discrimination in the government. This aligns with Kyung Moon Hwang’s argument that military officials occupied a “decidedly lower, segregated, and subordinate place” in officialdom.63 At the same time, Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s directive marked the beginning of Taewŏn’gun’s preferential treatment policies toward military officials. This order laid a political and socio-philosophical foundation for Taewŏn’gun to appoint military officials to higher positions within the governmental organization. Following this order, a book called the Book of Official Protocols (三班禮式 Sambanyesik) was published in May 1868. This book outlines the protocols that the three branches, civil (文官 mun’gwan), military (武官 mugwan), and protected officials (蔭官 ŭmgwan)64, were obliged to follow toward each other. According to the royal edict, this book would make it possible for civil and military officials to receive equal and fair treatment within 60 Ibid., 75-77. 61 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:20a [1864/01/13]. 仍敎曰: 武弁若經總管, 則以宰列待之, 而卿等之下對爲東西班, 體格甚不美。 自今更定規式, 後日次對稟達, 可也。 左根曰: 筵退後議定, 而政府事, 亦一體議定後仰達矣。 62 Felix Siegmund, "The Adaptation of Chinese Military Techniques to Chosŏn Korea, Their Validation, and the Social Dynamics Thereof", in Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History: From Ancient China to the Communist Takeover, ed. Kai Filipiak (Routledge, 2014), 187. 63 Kyung Moon Hwang, "The Muban", in Beyond Birth: Social Status in the Emergence of Modern Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004), 304. Regarding the status of military officials, Eugene Park highlights cases of the chungin class serving as mid-ranking personnel in capital military units. Given the structure of these military units, discrimination against military officials was not entirely inconceivable. For details, refer to Eugene Y. Park, A Family of No Prominence: The Descendants of Pak Tŏkhwa and the Birth of Modern Korea, 1590–1945, (Stanford University Press, 2014), 48-49. 64 Protected officials were special officials appointed due to their parents’ meritorious service to the country. 47 the government.65 Through this book, the Chosŏn government endeavored to prevent conflicts between civil and military officials,66 serving as a prominent example of Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to challenge the prevailing ideology that favored civil officials over military ones. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Three Armies Command played a crucial role in expanding the power of military officials, according to earlier studies. Although this organization was established in 1865, it became fully operational in 1868. The status of the military office was elevated to that of a first-rank office, ostensibly on par with the Supreme Council of Chosŏn.67 According to Kim Kyu-rak (金奎洛 n.d.-1933) in his book Record of Observations of the Taewŏn’gun (雲下見聞錄 Unha kyŏnmunnok), the significance of the Three Armies Command came to rival that of the Supreme Council.68 Whether or not the Three Armies Command truly held the same level of status in practice remains controversial,69 but this office primarily managed military affairs independently. It was comprised of the Minister of War (兵曹判書 Pyŏngjo p’ansŏ) and commanders of major central military units, such as the Military Training Agency, the Capital Guard Unit, and the Forbidden Guard Division.70 65 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1864/07/02]. (命三班禮式更刊頒賜) 敎曰: 向以文武體統之和平釐正, 印出《三班禮式》而頒賜矣。 以文對武、以武對文之間, 略有未詳戛戛處, 更刊均平, 玆又頒賜。 前下冊子, 竝勿施, 一遵此式, 務相和平。 此爲朝象也、國瑞也。 舊闕重建, 朝體之復舊釐正, 予意有在。 在廷臣僚, 庶幾諒悉。 (This refers to the Ilsŏngnok [The Court Chronicle], dated year 1864/month 7/day 2 (title of the article). This reference is based on the digitized version of the Ilsŏngnok available at the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies (https://kyudb.snu.ac.kr/main.do). This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 66 Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, "Kaehwagi ŭi kunsa chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu" 개화기의 군사정책 연구 (Ph.D. diss., Hongik University, 1987), 52. 67 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 05-06-08 (128) [1868/06/08]. 傳曰, 三軍府旣爲復設, 則體貌有別, 必以正一品衙門磨鍊, 時任三相, 例兼都提調, 節制視務, 與廟堂一體爲之事, 定式。 68 Kim Kyu-rak 金奎洛, Unha Kyŏnmunnok 雲下見聞錄, (Asea munhwasa, 1990), 31. 69 Kim Se-ŭn maintains that the Three Armies Command was on par with the Supreme Council in terms of status. (Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Taewŏnʼgun chipkwŏngi kunsa chedo ŭi chŏngbi" 대원군 집권기 군사제도의 정비, Hanʼguksaron 한국사론 23, (1990): 321.) In contrast, An Oe-sun argues that the chain of command was structured such that orders were passed down from the Supreme Council to the Ministry of War and then to the Three Armies Command, as the latter was an affiliated organization of the Ministry of War (An Oe-sun 안외순, "Taewŏnʼgun chipchŏnggi kunsa chŏngchʼaek ŭi yŏnʼgu" 대원군 집정기 군사정책의 성격, Tongyang kojŏn yŏnʼgu 동양고전연구 2, (1994): 153.) Another perspective supporting Kim’s claim suggests that the function of the Three Armies Command was limited because three state councillors in the Supreme Council also served as supreme commissioners (都提調 Tojejo) in the Three Armies Command. (Yukkun kunsa yon’guso 육군 군사 연구소, Han’guk kunsasa 9 - Kŭnhyŏndae 1 한국 군사사 9 - 근현대 1, (Yukkun ponbu, 2012), 102.) 70 When it comes to the composition of the Three Armies Command, see Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 48-51; Yukkun kunsa 48 Gradually, the Three Armies Command took over several tasks that had previously been handled by the Supreme Council. For instance, King Kojong ordered that the Three Armies Command assume the authority to recommend the commander of the Capital Police (捕盜廳 P’odoch’ŏng), a responsibility that had been held by the Supreme Council. The Three Armies Command justified this shift by highlighting that the Capital Police commander’s duties included not only suppressing theft but also overseeing the security of the main gates of the capital.71 The rationale behind this change remains somewhat ambiguous, as it is unclear whether the inspection of the main gates was classified as a military affair. Nonetheless, the objective of this measure was evidently intended to augment the influence of military officials supporting Taewŏn’gun. In this context, Yŏn Kap-su’s assertion that the Three Armies Command functioned as an extension of Taewŏn’gun himself (分身 punsin), and that King Kojong could be held hostage if his political views diverged from those of Taewŏn’gun, is well-founded.72 When it comes to the appointment of major positions in offices related to military affairs, Korean scholars argue that either military officials were appointed as commanders of central military units or the Minister of War was selected from among key officials loyal to Taewŏn’gun.73 Their tenure was secured for two years at the request of Kim Pyŏng-hak, the Chief State Councillor (領議政 Yŏngŭijŏng), contrary to conventional practice.74 Indeed, on 3/30 of 1869, Kim petitioned for the term of the Minister of War to be set at 24 months due to the importance of the position in military affairs, and King Kojong approved the request.75 However, this measure proved ineffective. Historically, the tenure of ministers was notably unstable, with some newly appointed ministers being replaced almost immediately. Likewise, the Chosŏn government failed to consistently uphold the commitment to secure the yon’guso 육군 군사 연구소, Han’guk kunsasa 9 - Kŭnhyŏndae 1 한국 군사사 9 - 근현대 1, (Yukkun ponbu, 2012), 104; and Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, Kaehwagi ŭi kunsa chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 개화기의 군사정책 연구, (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000), 57-59. 71 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 5:45b [1868/10/10]. 72 Yŏn Kap-su 연갑수, Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi puguk kangbyŏng chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 대원군 집권기 부국강병 정책 연구, (Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2001), 71-72. 73 An Oe-sun 안외순, "Taewŏnʼgun chipchŏnggi kunsa chŏngchʼaek ŭi yŏnʼgu" 대원군 집정기 군사정책의 성격, Tongyang kojŏn yŏnʼgu 동양고전연구 2, (1994): 157. 74 Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Taewŏnʼgun chipkwŏngi kunsa chedo ŭi chŏngbi" 대원군 집권기 군사제도의 정비, Hanʼguksaron 한국사론 23, (1990): 303. 75 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 6:12a [1869/03/30]. 49 tenure of the Minister of War until the conclusion of Taewŏn’gun’s regency in 1873. The table below delineates the duration of tenures for Ministers of War between 1869 and 1873. Table 2: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1869-1873 Name Branch76 Tenure Appointment Date Yi Kyŏng-ha (李景夏 1811-1891) Military official 21 months 6/30 of 1869 Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元 1831-1891) Civil official 2 days 4/1 of 1871 Kang No (姜㳣 1809-1887) Civil official 18 months 4/3 of 1871 Min Ch’i-sang (閔致庠 1828-1888) Civil official 11 months 10/12 of 1872 Min Sŭng-ho (閔升鎬 1830-1874) Civil official 1 month 9/10 of 1873 Sŏ Sang-jŏng (徐相鼎 1813-1876) Civil official 30 months 10/6 of 1873 Source: The Diary of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi), Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok) Table 2 demonstrates that no Minister of War achieved the promised two-year tenure until 1873. For instance, Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元 1831-1891) was appointed as Minister of War on 4/1 of 1871, but was promptly replaced by Kang No (姜㳣 1809-1887) just two days later, on 4/3 of 1871.77 Although the critical health condition of Yi Chae-wŏn’s mother may have contributed to his early resignation, the exact reason for Yi’s abrupt replacement remains unclear.78 Kang No was subsequently replaced by Min Ch’i-sang (閔致庠 1828-1888) on 10/12 of 1872, and his tenure fell short of the promised two years. Additionally, with the exception of Yi Kyŏng-ha (李景夏 1811-1891) and Kang No, the tenures of the remaining Ministers of War were notably 76 I divided the branches according to the sorting of officials in Ch’ŏngsŏngo (清選考, Review of the Selected Candidates) from the Jangseogak Archives (https://jsg.aks.ac.kr/dir/view?dataId=JSG_K2-603) (Jangseogak (藏書閣) is the royal archive affiliated with the Academy of Korean Studies (한국학중앙연구원, Han’gukhak Chungang Yŏn’guwŏn). According to the McCune–Reischauer Romanization system, it is rendered as Ch’angsŏgak; however, in this dissertation, I adhere to the official Romanization used by the institute, Jangseogak.) 77 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 8:21b [1871/04/03]. 78 Yi Chae-wŏn’s mother passed away on 8/28 of 1871. See Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 08-08-28 (129) [1871/08/28]. 50 brief by the time Taewŏn’gun resigned from regency in 1873. The case of Sŏ Sang-jŏng (徐相鼎 1813-1876), however, does not align with Taewŏn’gun’s policy, as his tenure extended primarily into the direct rule of King Kojong, which commenced in November 1873, despite his appointment occurring during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. Furthermore, the predominance of civil officials selected as Ministers of War, as illustrated in the table, underscores the continued dominance of civil officials in this position. Yi Kyŏng-ha, the only military official listed, was known for his loyalty to Taewŏn’gun according to Hwang Hyŏn’s memoir.79 In contrast, the other Ministers all passed the civil examination.80 Extending this observation, out of the eleven Ministers of War appointed during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, only three were from the military official: Sin Hŏn (申櫶 1811-1884)81, Yi Kyu-ch’ŏl (李圭徹 1801-n.d.)82, and Yi Kyŏng-ha. Additionally, Sin Hŏn and Yi Kyu-ch’ŏl served as the 79 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹, Maech’ŏn yarok 梅泉野錄 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Sinjisa, 1955), 7. 李景夏最被雲峴器使, 以大將兼管捕將, 刑殺無虛日。 80 For details, refer to Ch’ŏngsŏngo 清選考 (Review of the Selected Candidates) from the Jangseogak Archives (https://jsg.aks.ac.kr/dir/view?dataId=JSG_K2-603). 81 The appointment of Sin Hŏn as Minister of War was largely influenced by his distinguished family background. He hailed from the P’yŏngsan Sin clan (平山 申氏), one of the most prominent hereditary military families in Chosŏn. Research indicates that his branch of the clan constituted 7% of all successful military exam candidates in Late Chosŏn. In addition to his lineage, Sin Hŏn’s political trajectory contributed significantly to his advancement. During King Sunjo’s reign, Sin Hŏn emerged as a member of the new elite supporting Prince Hyomyŏng, who served as regent for his incapacitated father. This period was marked by Prince Hyomyŏng’s political struggle against the Andong Kim clan, which held substantial power in Chosŏn politics. Later, during King Kojong’s reign, Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to curtail the influence of the Andong Kim clan further elevated Sin Hŏn’s role in the government. (Han Po-ram 한보람, "Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi Sin Hŏn ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk chihyang kwa yŏkhal yŏn’gu – Sin Hŏn kwa Taewŏn’gun ŭi kwan’gye rŭl chungsim ŭro-" 대원군 집권기 신헌의 정치적 지향과 역할 연구－신헌과 대원군의 관계를 중심으로-, Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo 조선시대사학보, no. 104 (2023): 252-261.) Moreover, Sin Hŏn made substantive contributions to Taewŏn’gun’s military policies. Prior to his appointment as Minister of War, he submitted a six-article reform proposal that laid the groundwork for Taewŏn’gun’s military reforms. (Sim Hŏn-yong 심헌용, Hanmal kun kŭndaehwa yŏn’gu 한말 군 근대화 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2005), 34.) 82 Yi Kyu-ch’ŏl’s family background undoubtedly influenced his appointment as Minister of War, as his lineage was distinguished by generations of high-ranking military officials. His father, Yi Kwang-ik (李光益 n.d.-1811), held the prestigious position of the Commander of the Capital Garrison (禁衛大將 Kŭmwi taejang). His maternal grandfather, Sin Tae-hyŏn (申大顯 n.d.-1812), served as the Minister of Punishments and as the Provincial Army Commander (兵馬節度使 Pyŏngma chŏltosa) of Hwanghae Province. Additionally, his father-in-law, O Ch’i-su (吳致壽 n.d.), was the Provincial Navy Commander (水軍節度使 Sugun chŏltosa) of Kyŏngsang Province and played a crucial role in suppressing the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812. For details, refer to Chang P’il-gi 장필기, Chosŏn hugi muban pŏlyŏl kamun yŏn’gu 조선 후기 무반벌열가문 연구, (Chimmundang, 2005), 344. 51 first and third Ministers of War, respectively, indicating that most Ministers of War during the latter half of Taewŏn’gun’s regime were selected from civil officials. Moreover, it appears that Taewŏn’gun’s influence in the selection of the Minister of War diminished as King Kojong matured. Initially, Taewŏn’gun’s relationships with the candidates for Ministers of War clearly played a crucial role in appointing Ministers of War. However, the appointments of Min Ch’i-sang and Min Sŭng-ho (閔升鎬 1830-1875) deviated from this trend.83 Both Mins were relatives of Queen Consort Min, who was a political adversary of Taewŏn’gun. Specifically, Min Sŭng-ho, the stepbrother of Queen Consort Min, was instrumental in Taewŏn’gun’s resignation from the regency.84 He was assassinated in a bombing attack in 1874, shortly after Taewŏn’gun’s departure, and it is widely alleged that Taewŏn’gun orchestrated this assassination. Despite their brief tenures as Ministers of War, the appointments of the two Mins indirectly indicate the waning political power of Taewŏn’gun in the latter half of his regency, particularly in military affairs. This development supports Sukhee Han’s argument that King Kojong was not entirely a puppet ruler.85 Furthermore, it challenges the claims of Korean scholars that Taewŏn’gun predominantly appointed his close associates as Ministers of War 86 and that military officials held key positions, including ministerial roles across various ministries.87 In summary, the rise of military officials within the Chosŏn government did not 83 Ching Young Choe contends that King Kojong appointed Min Sŭng-ho as the Minister of War, replacing Min Ch’i-sang, whom he describes as a "faithful admirer of Taewŏn’gun". (Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 170.) However, Choe provides no concrete evidence to support this claim. In fact, Min Ch’i-sang continued to play a central role within the Min clan after Taewŏn’gun’s resignation, later holding key positions such as the Minister of Finance (戶曹判書 Hojo p’ansŏ) and the Minister of Personnel (吏曹判書 Ijo p’ansŏ), among others. Han’gun minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture). 84 Chŏng Kyo 鄭喬, Taehan kyenyŏnsa 大韓季年史 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe, 1957), 8. 大院君秉國十載, 興土木·濫殺戮·務掊克·用私人, 政亂民怨。時后閔氏之兄升鎬, 欲攬政權 85 Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998), 4. 86 Kim Se-ŭn 김세은, "Taewŏnʼgun chipkwŏngi kunsa chedo ŭi chŏngbi" 대원군 집권기 군사제도의 정비, Hanʼguksaron 한국사론 23, (1990): 292, 303. Kim Pyŏng-u also argues that Taewŏn’gun consolidated his political power through the control of military organizations. For details, see Kim Pyŏng-u 김병우, "Taewŏnʼgun chipkwŏnʼgi chŏngchʼi seryŏk ŭi sŏngkyŏk" 대원군 집권기 정치세력의 성격, Kyemyŏng sahak 계명사학 2, (1991): 56. 87 An Oe-sun 안외순, "Taewŏnʼgun chipchŏnggi kunsa chŏngchʼaek ŭi yŏnʼgu" 대원군 집정기 군사정책의 성격, Tongyang kojŏn yŏnʼgu 동양고전연구 2, (1994): 159. 52 translate into a broader recognition of military value or an overall improvement in the status of military officials, contrary to findings of Korean historians. Continued marginalization of military officials High-ranking military officials primarily benefited from preferential treatment in major political appointments due to the central government’s new policy aimed at elevating the status of military officials, as well as through their marital alliances with prominent aristocratic families. This policy, however, did not extend to mid- or low-ranking military officials, who continued to face enduring discrimination. Contrary to earlier studies, various cases indicate that the status of military officials did not undergo a significant change during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. To address this issue, Queen Consort Sinjŏng and King Kojong repeatedly issued directives and warnings regarding the disrespectful behavior of civil officials toward military counterparts in local offices. However, these efforts were largely ineffectual and had not yielded significant results by the end of Taewŏn’gun’s regency. As a case in point, the handling of a corruption case in Tongnae County on 5/5 of 1865 underscores the widespread unfair treatment of military commanders in local counties. According to a report by the Supreme Council, five former naval commanders of the Tongnae headquarters, such as Cho Pyŏng-ch’il (趙秉七 n.d.), Cho Hŭi-wŏn (趙羲元 n.d.), Yi Chae-hŭi (李載熙 n.d.), Yi Kwan-yŏn (李觀淵 n.d.), and Yi Ki-ch’un (李基春 n.d.), were arrested for corruption and embezzlement of public funds.88 However, Queen Consort Sinjŏng, the formal regent of King Kojong, raised concerns about the case, noting that only military officials were apprehended on minor charges despite numerous clandestine reports implicating various local magistrates in the corruption. She further remarked that several local magistrates had shifted their responsibilities onto the five naval commanders under suspicion of embezzlement within the headquarters. According to Queen Consort Sinjŏng, the local magistrates also conspired with local clerks (鄕吏 hyangni) to conceal these cases. As a result, she suspected that the directive to crack down on embezzlement did not 88 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 02-潤 05-05 (18) [1865/05/05]. 53 extend to civil officials and that several powerful families disregarded the orders of the central government.89 This case is indeed suspicious, given that local residents established memorial tablets (永世不忘碑 yŏngsebulmangbi) for Cho Hŭi-wŏn and Yi Ki-ch’un to commemorate their achievements as commanders of the naval headquarters.90 While the erection of these memorial tablets by local residents does not entirely exonerate them from the charges, it does lend credence to Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s suspicions regarding the handling of the embezzlement case. Due to a lack of records, it is extremely difficult to find information on the other indicted commanders, and it is highly possible that they may have actually committed the crime. Nonetheless, the arrest of only military officials on corruption charges clearly demonstrates the discriminatory treatment towards military officials, as Queen Consort Sinjŏng argued. The former commanders were all released on 5/8 of 1865, just three days after their indictment.91 One might argue that this initial incident occurred because Taewŏn’gun’s pro-military policy had not yet fully established itself in Chosŏn. However, discrimination against military officials continues unabated. Particularly, conventional societal discrimination persisted in local areas, despite Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s stern warnings against the unfair treatment of military officials. For example, on 3/16 of 1866, King Kojong expressed dismay over reports that civil assistants (評事 P’yŏngsa) had disregarded military leaders, such as the Commander of the Northern Headquarters (北兵使 Pukpyŏngsa) in Hamgyŏng Province. He cautioned that civil officials who ignored their superiors would be disciplined according to traditional regulations.92 The issuance of this stringent edict was sparked by a seemingly minor incident. The Civil Assistant Kim Pyŏng-ik (金炳翊 1837-1921) encountered Chŏng Ki-wŏn (鄭岐源 1809-n.d.), 89 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 2:28 b [1865/潤 05/06]. 而向旣有釜山之責徵, 今又有萊營之督刷, 此皆武人也。 所犯雖近零瑣, 如是究竟。 至於監留及文官作宰者, 果皆廉潔無所躬犯, 而免於此患乎? 90 Two memorial tablets commemorating the exemplary administration of Cho Hŭi-wŏn and Yi Ki-ch’un were established in Kijang County and Suyŏng County in Pusan, respectively. For further details, refer to this link: https://busan.grandculture.net/?local=busan 91 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 02-潤 05-08 (11) [1865/潤 05/08]. 92 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 3:22a [1866/03/16]. 而近則昧例文官, 不思朝體之嚴重, 徒以文貴武賤之別, 自尊彼卑而不受節制者, 往往有之云。 言念及此, 萬萬慨然。 自今爲始, 節制體統, 復舊施行, 無敢違越事, 自兵曹措辭行會。 54 the Commander of the Northern Headquarters, on his way back from furlough, but Kim did not salute Chŏng, according to Chŏng’s appeal. The civil assistant was a major sixth rank (正六品) civil position within the military headquarters in the northern provinces of Chosŏn. This position was responsible for assisting commanders with military affairs such as troop promotions, military funds, and official documents.93 In other words, Chŏng Ki-wŏn was the immediate supervisor of Kim Pyŏng-ik. Chŏng Ki-wŏn strongly argued that this incident not only disgraced him but also violated precedents.94 Considering the approximate 30-year age gap between Chŏng Ki-wŏn and Kim Pyŏng-ik, Kim’s disrespectful behavior was particularly unacceptable in Chosŏn, where Confucianism strongly influenced societal norms. Consequently, King Kojong agreed with Chŏng’s appeal and ordered Kim Pyŏng-ik to be imprisoned for a brief period.95 Nevertheless, the penalty for this violation was minimal. Although Kim Pyŏng-ik was punished for his disrespectful attitude, his prison time was considerably short, as he was appointed to the Fourth-Rank Advisor (應敎 Ŭnggyo) on 3/25 of 1866.96 Instead of being expelled from public office, Kim was promoted to a higher-ranking position. The regime’s lack of intention to genuinely punish him is evident. As a member of the Andong Kim clan, one of the most powerful oligarchic families in Chosŏn,97 Kim may have been immune to strict regulations due to his family background. However, it is also noteworthy that Chŏng Ki-wŏn was one of the most trusted military officials during the Taewŏn’gun regime. Taewŏn’gun’s trust in Chŏng Ki-wŏn was evident in his appointment as the commander of Kanghwa Island Headquarters, where Chŏng negotiated with the U.S. Navy during the American invasion of 1871 on behalf of Taewŏn’gun.98 Be that as it may, this incident illustrates that civil officials continued to disparage military officials, despite the government’s efforts to address outdated customs and elevate the status of military officials. The central government did not take proactive measures to address this ethical issue, which had the potential to undermine the social order. 93 Han’guk minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture). 94 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 03-03-15 (10) [1866/03/15]. 95 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 03-03-16 (08) [1866/03/16]. 96 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 03-03-25 (42) [1866/03/25]. 97 Han’guk Kojŏn Chonghap DB Inmul Kwan’gye Chŏngbo 한국고전종합 DB 인물관계정보 (Korean Classics Comprehensive DB: Person Relationship Information). (https://db.itkc.or.kr/people/item?gubun=person#/view?gubun=person&cate1=Z&cate2=&dataId=P006410) 98 Paek Ki-in 백기인, Han’guk kŭndae kunsa sasangsa yŏn’gu 한국 근대 군사 사상사 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2012), 44. 55 In the meantime, it is crucial to examine the issues surrounding the promotion of military officials to investigate their social status. Earlier studies have emphasized the government’s carrot-only policy for military officials under Taewŏn’gun’s regency. To implement this policy, the regime conducted special military examinations in addition to the regular ones, as well as irregular tests for riflemen and gunners. Officially, those who ranked first were awarded either promotions or prize money based on their performance.99 A notable case was that of Han Ki-hyŏn (韓基玄 n.d.), a government slave who ranked first in the artillery test. His situation sparked debate among officials, as slaves were traditionally barred from both civil and military service examinations. However, King Kojong emancipated Han, allowing him to take the palace examination (殿試 chŏnsi).100 Considering the stringent social hierarchy of Chosŏn, Han’s case was exceptionally significant. While the result of Han’s military examination is unknown, this incident has been cited by scholars as a symbol of the openness of the military system during Taewŏn’gun’s administration. However, on 5/23 of 1868, Kim Pyŏng-hak, the Chief State Councillor, highlighted issues related to the unfair promotion practices for military officials. According to his report to King Kojong, military exam-passers faced challenges in maintaining their positions unless they obtained recommendations (薦擧 ch’ŏn’gŏ) from high- ranking officials. Essentially, promotions were contingent upon endorsements from high-ranking officials, irrespective of the exam-passers’ military capabilities. Kim’s observations about the unjust promotion system reveal that personal relationships, rather than abilities and contributions, played a predominant role in promotions within the military. As a solution, he proposed that the government should oversee and regulate the recommendation system.101 However, his suggestion did not aim to fundamentally reform the promotion system, as he still endorsed the recommendation system to some extent. 99 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, 19-segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsa chedo yŏn’gu 19세기 조선의 군사 제도 연구, (Kukhak charyowŏn, 2002), 82-88. 100 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 3:89a [1866/11/11]. 101 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 5:9a [1868/03/23]. 又曰: “武臣晉塗, 各有其薦, 而武科壯元, 若無南行薦, 則一番付職, 更不得遷轉, 其所齎菀, 由來久矣。 自今爲始, 地閥之可合奬進者, 武將臣筵奏後, 依別薦例許用宣薦事, 著式施行何如?” 允之。 56 Subsequent records concerning the promotions and demotions of military officials indicate that Kim Pyŏng-hak’s proposal was not particularly effective. A year later, Kim reiterated his concerns, highlighting that all military exam passers were assigned to one of the three branches of the Royal Palace Guards, namely, the Concurrent Royal Stables (兼司僕 Kyŏmsabok), the Winged Forest Guards (羽林衛 Urimwi), and the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards (內禁衛 Naegŭmwi), at the outset of their military careers. He noted, however, the absence of established regulations governing promotions and demotions within these branches. This regulatory vacuum led to significant disorder within the military, with promotions increasingly determined by chance (僥路 yoro).102 Although Kim did not explicitly detail what constituted “chance,” it can be inferred that the influence of high-ranking officials’ recommendations continued to significantly affect military promotions. Similar to their counterparts in central offices, military officials stationed in frontier and border regions also encountered inequities in the promotion system. What is particularly noteworthy is that this concern was raised by King Kojong himself. He expressed dissatisfaction with the manipulation of promotions for garrison commanders (鎭將 Chinjang) and border garrison commanders (邊將 Pyŏnjang) by local clerks, which led to persistent complaints from commanders about unfair treatment. Additionally, King Kojong voiced concerns over the appointment of lower-ranking military officials in central military units (別軍官 Pyŏlgun’gwan) who lacked the requisite skills and military knowledge for command positions. He noted that the promotion of idle officials (閑散人 hansan’in), those holding ranks without duties, to commanderships had compromised military readiness in the border regions.103 King Kojong’s observations regarding the disorder in local garrisons highlight the arbitrary and opaque nature of promotions for local commanders. Notably, local clerks played a significant role in the promotion process. Despite their lower status compared to the aristocratic military officials, their influence over promotions was substantial. This scenario underscores the 102 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 6:16a [1869/05/29]. 又曰: “文之三館、武之三廳, 卽其肇創之初也, 分岐之際, 不容不另加區別, 故三館分隷之後, 則有陞降之規, 而三廳之無此例者, 終未免淆雜之患。 從今爲始, 六臘月越薦後, 自三軍府, 亦爲陞降, 以嚴薦法, 以杜倖路何如?” 允之。 103 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 06-10-11 (05) [1869/10/11]. 57 dire conditions faced by military officials in local regions. To address this issue, King Kojong issued a directive for the government to closely supervise the appointments of garrison commanders. However, it remains unclear whether this directive was implemented, as there are no surviving records of subsequent actions taken. It is highly plausible that the government did not undertake further measures, reflecting a continuation of the failures previously observed in addressing this problem. Despite efforts by King Kojong, and by extension Taewŏn’gun, tensions between military and civil officials persisted until the end of Taewŏn’gun’s regency. For instance, on 11/1 of 1870, King Kojong inquired about whether his order to respect ministers from the military branch was being followed. The conversation between Yi Yu-wŏn (李裕元 1814-1888), the Chief State Councillor, Kim Pyŏng-hak, the then Left State Councillor (左議政 Chwaŭijŏng), and King Kojong vividly illustrates the relationship between military and civil officials. The king said, “There was a previous edict issued with the intention of honoring men in high military posts. Is this being observed?” Yi Yu-wŏn replied, “The recent edict from His Majesty is indeed being followed.” Kim Pyŏng-hak said, “I heard the edict issued during the Pyŏngin (丙寅) year (1866) at the royal audience (筵席 yŏnsŏk), and it has already been incorporated into the Book of Official Protocols (三班禮式 Sambanyesik) and is still being implemented.” The king then said, “If a high-ranking official (大夫 taebu) is arrogant, he will ruin his own household, and if no one in the court dares to arrogantly challenge, it benefits not only himself but also the country, as the country will not lose its harmony (和氣 hwagi). Before I became king, I heard that the royal court looked down on the royal family and those referred to as ‘partisan colors (偏色 p’yŏnsaek).’ This was also the case with men in high military posts. How did this come about?”104 104 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 7:32a [1870/11/01]. 敎曰: “以武宰相敬之意, 向有所敎, 果遵行乎?” 裕元曰: “年前聖敎, 今果奉行矣。” 炳學曰: “丙寅筵敎, 臣果承聞。 而亦已刊布於《三班禮式》, 至今奉而遵行矣。” 敎曰: “大夫驕人失其家, 朝廷之上, 如無驕亢, 則非但58 This conversation reveals the differing perspectives among the three individuals regarding the relationship between the military and civil branches. Yi Yu-wŏn and Kim Pyŏng-hak, both civil officials, confidently claimed that King Kojong’s order to honor military officials had been fully implemented. However, King Kojong exhibited a skeptical attitude. Although the king referenced instances of civil officials’ disrespectful treatment of military officials before his enthronement, his reaction to Yi and Kim’s remarks suggests that he did not fully agree with their assessment. This indicates a possibility that King Kojong inquired about the implementation of his order due to concerns about civil officials’ disobedience to his edicts. The following month, King Kojong once again emphasized the importance of harmony between military and civil officials.105 The fact that the king repeatedly stressed this point suggests that discord between the two branches persisted. Despite the differing perceptions of the situation between them, King Kojong’s understanding appears more valid than that of the civil officials, given the aforementioned events. These events indicate that military officials continued to face discrimination in the civil official-dominated public offices, suggesting that the elevation of their status was not fully achieved. This calls into question the argument that Taewŏn’gun capitalized on military officials to enhance his political power by supporting bureaucrats from the military branch. While this does not imply that Taewŏn’gun and King Kojong completely abandoned their pro-military policy, it does suggest that their efforts fell short of transforming the traditional relationship between the two branches. In this context, it warrants a close review of Kenneth Quinones’s research on military examination passers and officials conducted some time ago. Quinones reported that from 1864 to 1894, 15,289 individuals successfully passed the military examination; however, their promotions were managed by the highest-ranking civil aristocrats within the government. Furthermore, through filtering mechanisms such as the palace lecture examinations (殿講 爲自己之好, 國亦可以不失和氣矣。 予於潛邸時聞之, 則朝廷之於宗班及所謂偏色中, 多有賤待者, 至於武宰亦然。 此何爻象乎?” 105 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 7:39b [1870/12/13]. 敎曰: “此時人和, 是朝廷之大事。 至於文武體統言之, 亦從忠厚。 59 chŏn’gang), a test held bi-monthly starting in February aimed at promoting the study of Confucian scriptures, the advancement of military officials was restricted at the highest levels of government.106 This preliminary research on military officials falls short of a detailed examination of how military bureaucrats were treated within the Chosŏn government, as it primarily focuses on the quantitative aspects of military examination passers and their promotions within central government bureaus. In fact, this study centers more on the operational role of military examinations rather than the social status of military officials. Nevertheless, Kenneth Quinones’s research provides a foundational basis for challenging the generalizations that military officials significantly benefited from preferential treatment during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. The Practice of Military Exile from 1863 to 1873 An overview of the practice of military exile Military exile was a punitive measure used in premodern Korea, China and other regions, involving compulsory military service as a form of punishment for serious crimes. The term has two meanings: this can be translated as “replenishment of a vacancy in the military forces,” but traditionally, it referred to assigning individuals to naval or frontier garrisons in remote locations.107 Military exile was a combination of forced labor (徒刑 tohyŏng), the third most severe punishment, and banishment (流刑 yuhyŏng), the second most severe punishment under Chosŏn’s legal system.108 Those subjected to this punishment were required to perform menial and servile tasks within these military units, rather than serving as elite soldiers. The severity of the exile varied 106 C. Kenneth Quinones, "Military Officials of Yi Korea: 1864-1910", Che 1-hoe Han’gukhak kukche haksul hoeŭi nonmunjip 제 1회 한국학 국제 학술 회의 논문집, (1980): 693-696. 107 Kim Chong-su 김종수, "Chosŏn hugi chungang kunje ŭi unyŏng kwa Sukchongdae yangban chʼunggunnon" 조선후기 중앙군제의 운영과 숙종대 양반충군론, Kunsa yonʼgu 군사연구, no. 141 (2016): 86. 108 The five primary punishments in the Chosŏn judicial system, ranked by increasing severity, were light flogging (笞刑 t’aehyŏng), heavy flogging (杖刑 changhyŏng), forced labor (徒刑 tohyŏng), banishment (流刑 yuhyŏng), and death penalty (死刑 sahyŏng). In addition to these, there were various other punishments, such as flogging with a stick (棍杖刑 konjanghyŏng) and severing tendons (斷筋刑 tan’gŭnhyŏng). (Shin Myŏng-ho, Joseon Royal Court Culture: Ceremonial and Daily Life, trans. Timothy V. Atkinson (Dolbegae Publishers, 2004), 147.) 60 depending on the individual’s social status and the gravity of their offense. This form of punishment reflects the traditional societal perceptions of the military system in the Korean context. It not only illustrates the prevailing tendency to esteem civil over military values, but also underscores that military service was often regarded as a mark of disgrace and humiliation rather than a revered duty. The military exile practice remained in effect during Taewŏn’gun’s regency even when the Chosŏn government promoted national defense and military values on the surface. Historians argue that the Taewŏn’gun regime implemented military reforms under the slogan of “a rich nation and a strong army”,109 ostensibly elevating military values. Carter Eckert suggests that Chosŏn was transformed into a “Garrison State” during this period. 110 Notably, he emphasizes the Chosŏn government’s special tributes to soldiers who were killed or wounded in conflicts with foreign powers, including rewards and material compensation.111 These actions undeniably reflect the regime’s efforts to transform the traditional perception of military values. Nonetheless, the continued use of military exile under the Taewŏn’gun regime may partly reflect prevailing attitudes toward military service in Chosŏn. National policies often mirror the government’s stance on social issues. Despite official rhetoric about military strengthening, the Chosŏn rulers and high-ranking aristocrats maintained traditional views, particularly regarding the use of military service as legal punishment. Previous studies have often overlooked the significance of military exile in late 19th-century Chosŏn, despite its importance for understanding the ruling class’s attitude toward military service and the potential causes of Chosŏn’s military weakness. A detailed investigation of this punitive system, particularly its inherent contradictions, can shed light on the inconsistency between Chosŏn policymakers’ aspirations to strengthen the military and the persistent disregard for military values reflected in their policies during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. To address this, this section will explore military exile issues in depth. 109 Yŏn Kap-su 연갑수, Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi puguk kangbyŏng chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 대원군 집권기 부국강병 정책 연구, (Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2001). 110 Carter J Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866-1945, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 22. 111 Ibid., 24. 61 Before delving into military exile implemented during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, it is necessary to understand the history of this practice in China and Korea prior to the 19th century. This is because the laws applied to military exile cases under the Taewŏn’gun regime were based on traditional legal codes. It is crucial to recognize that, despite similarities, the application of military exile in Chosŏn differed significantly in context and social atmosphere. However, as the aim of this dissertation is to investigate the military perspective of the penalty rather than its legal history, I will provide only a brief overview of the history of military exile. Chosŏn’s legal code was based on Ming China’s the Great Ming Code, promulgated in 1397. In premodern China, both banishment and military exile served to spatially exclude perpetrators from society and functioned as penalties one level below the death penalty.112 In particular, the concept of assigning criminals to military service on the frontiers is an old practice, intermittently used since the Qin (秦) and Han (漢) dynasties. Military exile began to differentiate itself from regular exile during the Song (宋) period (960-1279), was more clearly defined under the Yuan (元) Dynasty (1280-1367), and was fully systematized and established as a significant form of punishment during the Ming (明) Dynasty.113 In particular, the Song Dynasty employed military service and the assignment of convicts to military units as a punitive measure, commuting death sentences to forced military labor. Rather than executing offenders, the state redirected them into hard labor, thereby utilizing them as a source of manpower. 114 According to Elad Alyagon’s estimation, the number of convict soldiers in the Song period reached approximately one hundred thousand. This phenomenon resulted from the Song government’s policy of forcing military deserters to serve as convict soldiers instead of being imprisoned. While the policy was initially intended to rehabilitate convicts through military service and alleviate pressure on the prison system, it ultimately contributed to the decline in the status of soldiers and the criminalization of military service. 115 112 Kim Han-bak キム ハンバク, "Hairyūkei no jidai -Sindai hairyūkei no shosō o megutte-" 配流刑の時代 -清代配流刑の諸相をめぐって- (Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 2021), 16. 113 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, "Military Exile", in Law in Imperial China - Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan), with Historical, Social, and Juridical Commentaries, (Harvard University Press, 1967), 87. 114 Elad Alyagon, "A Motley Crew: Sources for Military Manpower", in Inked: Tattooed Soldiers and the Song Empire’s Penal-Military Complex, (Harvard University Press, 2023), 70. 115 Ibid., 71-73. 62 Meanwhile, under the Ming Dynasty, military exile was primarily imposed as a punishment for soldiers, while civilians were subjected to forced labor (徒刑 tuxing) or banishment (流刑 liuxing). Soldiers were listed in the military register (軍籍 junji), and if sentenced to forced labor or banishment, their status would be transferred to the civil register (民籍 minji), resulting in a reduction in military personnel.116 Although the scope of military exile was expansive enough to encompass the family members of the military offenders as well as civilian offenders, such as illicit sellers of government salt and delinquent eunuchs,117 it remained primarily a punishment for military offenders. This strict separation between soldiers and civilians in penal administration reflected the Ming government’s need to maintain the effectiveness and size of its military forces. However, the use of military exile expanded as forced labor and banishment became largely ineffective due to the widespread practice of redemptive payments (贖刑 shuxing). Offenders could evade or mitigate their punishments by paying a redemption fee or performing less onerous forms of labor. Banishment, originally intended as a severe penalty just short of death, lost its intended deterrent effect because of this practice. In contrast, military exile stood out as an exception, distinguished by its non-redeemable nature. Consequently, the Ming government increasingly relied on military exile to fill the gaps in the penal system.118 Additionally, corporal punishments, such as light flogging (笞刑 chixing) and heavy flogging (杖刑 zhangxing), were increasingly replaced by non-corporal forms of labor punishment, such as military exile.119 Consequently, the scope of military exile was broadened by the Ming court. From a military perspective, military exile had multiple implications. First, this punishment underscored the low value placed on military service in remote areas. For instance, military officers often sought to avoid military exile due to its association with relocation to a distant and less prestigious position. To evade this punishment, soldiers frequently offered 116 Kim Han-bak 김한밝, "Myŏngdae ŭi sokhyŏngjuŭi wa chʼunggun ŭi pʼaengchʼang" 명대의 속형주의 (贖刑主義)와 충군 (充軍)의 팽창, Chungguksa yŏnʼgu 중국사연구, no. 142 (2023): 128. 117 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Exile and Expansion prior to the Qing", in Mid-Qing China - Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820, (Yale University Press, 1991), 48-50. 118 Kim Han-bak キム ハンバク, "Hairyūkei no jidai -Sindai hairyūkei no shosō o megutte-" 配流刑の時代 -清代配流刑の諸相をめぐって- (Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 2021), 21. 119 Kim Han-bak 김한밝, "Myŏngdae ŭi sokhyŏngjuŭi wa chʼunggun ŭi pʼaengchʼang" 명대의 속형주의 (贖刑主義)와 충군 (充軍)의 팽창, Chungguksa yŏnʼgu 중국사연구, no. 142 (2023): 139. 63 monetary redemption (贖額 shu’e). This practice suggests that military exile was regarded as a punishment entailing poor life prospects and significant risks. In particular, the risk of contracting endemic diseases in insalubrious regions was likely a major concern for the exiled offenders. Second, military exile served as a means to address shortages in military forces. By assigning civilians to the military register as part of their exile, the number of soldiers was effectively increased, even though the punishment itself was regarded as a less honorable form of service.120 Third, from a scholarly standpoint, the influx of educated exiles from China proper into the underdeveloped region had a profound impact on local society and culture. These exiles were also responsible for authoring some of the earliest recorded accounts of the region.121 Similarly, during the Qing (淸) Dynasty, military exile was employed as a punitive measure for serious crimes. Although the Qing rulers possessed their own legal traditions prior to their conquest of mainland China, these were largely set aside following the establishment of their dynasty in Beijing. The first edition of the Qing Code, promulgated in 1646, closely mirrored the Ming Code, reflecting a deliberate continuation of the previous dynasty’s legal framework.122 As a consequence, the Qing legal system retained a form of military exile akin to that of Ming, underscoring a broader pattern of legal continuity and adaptation. From the Qing Dynasty’s perspective, criminals sentenced to military exile were seen as potential contributors to the administration and development of newly acquired territories, particularly as the empire expanded westward. Offenders subjected to military exile, as well as those sentenced to banishment, who were forcibly relocated to regions such as Mongolia or Xinjiang (新疆), were often compelled to engage in agricultural labor, including the cultivation of fields. In addition, the Qing military established military agricultural colonies (屯田 tuntian), where soldiers both farmed and defended the newly acquired territories in rotational shifts. These policies enabled the Qing government to reduce the costs associated with transportation and 120 Ibid., 147-150. 121 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Exile and Expansion prior to the Qing", in Mid-Qing China - Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820, (Yale University Press, 1991), 49. 122 Dorothea Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols", The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998): 311. 64 logistical support for stationed troops while simultaneously encouraging the settlement of new immigrants in these frontier regions.123 Nonetheless, while the terminology of military exile remained consistent, its implementation underwent significant changes under the Qing Dynasty. Unlike the Ming period, where military exile primarily targeted soldiers, the Qing era indiscriminately applied exile to both soldiers and civilians. Additionally, the gradual abolition of local garrisons (衛所 weisuo), to which exiles were once assigned, hindered the Qing government’s ability to sustain the original framework of military exile.124 Furthermore, a notable departure from the Ming practice was the elimination of the requirement for military or military-related service as part of military exile. Instead, certain elements of Ming military exile were adapted and absorbed into Qing’s newly established system of frontier banishment.125 As a result, military exile became a punishment in name only and effectively deteriorated to the level of banishment. Another key factor that contributed to the modification of military exile was the transformation of the military structure. While the Ming army primarily consisted of peasant soldiers, the Qing military system was characterized by the separation of soldiers and farmers (兵農分離 bingnong fenli). The main forces of the Qing military, such as the Eight Banners (八旗 Baqi) and the Green Standard Army (綠營 Luying), were composed of professional soldiers. Members of these military units received preferential treatment, as the Qing government was concerned about preserving their combat capabilities. Consequently, even when these soldiers committed crimes, their penalties were often mitigated.126 During the Qing Dynasty, most criminals sentenced to military exile were permitted to offer monetary payments or labor in exchange for a reduction in the duration and severity of their punishment, which was a practice not permitted during the Ming Dynasty. Moreover, governors- 123 Peter C. Perdue, "Land Settlement and Military Colonies", in China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 324-328. 124 Kim Han-bak キム ハンバク, "Hairyūkei no jidai -Sindai hairyūkei no shosō o megutte-" 配流刑の時代 -清代配流刑の諸相をめぐって- (Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 2021), 19. 125 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "The Law and Policy of Exile under the Qing", in Mid-Qing China - Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820, (Yale University Press, 1991), 53-54. 126 Kim Han-bak 김한밝, "Chʼongdae yubaehyŏng ŭi chu’i: 18-segi ŭi ch’unggun kwa palgyŏn ŭl chungsim ŭro" 청대 유배형의 추이: 18세기의 충군 (充軍)과 발견 (發遣)을 중심으로 (MA thesis, Yonsei University, 2015), 9-10. 65 general (總督 Zongdu) and inspectors-general (巡撫 Xunfu) were authorized to petition the court for the redemption of exiles, which necessitated a substantial payment of redemption money (贖銀 shuyin).127 The amount required varied according to the severity of the punishment, ranging from a small fraction of a tael for a beating to less than 1.5 taels for a death sentence.128 As a result, many wealthy criminals were able to avoid their sentences. Since military exile was ineffective as a punitive measure, deportation (發遣 faqian), which involved sending criminals to remote non-Chinese garrisons like those in the Xinjiang region, began to replace its role.129 However, military exile did not become obsolete. Instead, it was categorized based on the distance of the military exile sites from the criminals’ home base to maintain its function as a minimal punishment. The five categories of military exile are as follows: Table 3: Five Categories of Military Exile Degree Types of Military Exile Distance from the Home Base 1 Very near frontier military exile (附近充軍 fujinchongjun) 2000 li (里) 2 Nearby frontier military exile (近邊充軍 jinbianchongjun) 2500 li (里) 3 Distant frontier military exile (邊遠充軍 bianyuanchongjun) 3000 li (里) 4 Farthest frontier military exile (極邊充軍 jibianchongjun) 4000 li (里) 5 In a malarial region military exile (煙瘴充軍 yanzhangchongjun)130 4000 li (里) Sources: Bodde, Derk and Morris, Clarence “Military Exile.” In Law in Imperial China - Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan), with Historical, Social, and Juridical Commentaries. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1967., p. 89. 127 Ibid., 14. 128 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "The Law and Policy of Exile under the Qing", in Mid-Qing China - Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820, (Yale University Press, 1991), 73. 129 For details, see Kim Han-bak 김한밝, "Yubaehyŏng ŭi sidae wa palgyŏn - Chʼŏngdae hyŏngbŏl chedo esŏŭi yŏkhal ŭl chungsim ŭro" 유배형의 시대와 발견 (發遣) - 청대 형벌제도에서의 역할을 중심으로, Myŏng Chʼŏngsa yŏnʼgu 明淸史硏究, no. 56 (2021): 267-297. 130 According to David Bello, the Qing regime’s failed foray into the region was due in large part to malaria, which had become a serious and virulent endemic. As he notes, the imposition of military exile to such a malarial and insalubrious region amounted to ‘a near-death sentence’. For details, refer to David A. Bello, "To Go Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the Qing Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in Frontier Yunnan", Modern China 31, no. 3 (2005): 296-299. 66 Meanwhile, military exile was enforced in dynasties in Korea in a manner similar to that of Chinese empires, despite several differences. While it is unclear when the punishment was first introduced in Korea, the earliest official record of military exile dates back to 1309 in the Koryŏ (高麗) Dynasty (918-1392). King Ch’ungsŏn (忠宣王 1275-1325), a pro-Yuan ruler of Koryŏ, proactively adopted military exile from the Yuan Dynasty. In line with the Yuan system, criminals were largely relocated to border garrisons (鎭邊所 chinbyŏnso) and forced to serve as border guards and peasant farmer soldiers (屯田兵 tunjŏnbyŏng). They were also assigned to navies and beacon stations (烽燧 pongsu) as rank-and-file soldiers and compelled to engage in corvee labor.131 Koryŏ’s military exile served not only to address the shortage of military forces in local garrisons and naval bases but also, and perhaps more significantly, to achieve political objectives. To be specific, among various applications of military exile, this punishment was utilized for both military failures and political purposes. Commanders in local garrisons who failed to fend off Japanese pirates (倭寇 wakō) were punished with military exile. Additionally, this punishment was widely used during political purges in the Late Koryŏ period. The primary subjects of military exile were members of the ruling class, including civil and military officials, eunuchs, and monks. Those who were punished experienced frustration and endured physical toil, a stark contrast to the privileges they enjoyed as aristocrats. According to Ch’ae Ung-sŏk’s argument, the imposition of military exile was perceived as a source of personal humiliation and hardship.132 This dual purpose of military exile underscores the low regard for military service and the prioritization of political control over genuine military strengthening. After the founding of the Chosŏn Dynasty in 1392, the regime continued to enforce the military exile practice. Aligning itself with a pro-Ming policy, Chosŏn’s legal framework was heavily based on Ming China’s legal code, the Great Ming Code. The provisions regarding military exile are specified in Chosŏn’s legal code, the Great Code for State Administration 131 Ch’ae Ung-sŏk 채웅석, "Koryŏ chung-hugi ŭi chʼunggunhyŏng kwa chŏngyŏkhyŏng" 고려 중후기의 충군형 (充軍刑)과 정역형 (定役刑), Hanʼguksa yŏnʼgu 한국사연구, no. 131 (2005): 227. 132 Ibid., 229-230, 238. 67 (經國大典 Kyŏngguk taejŏn), promulgated in 1484. I will cite these five articles below to provide a clearer understanding of the application of military exile in Chosŏn.133 1. Anyone who borrows another person (to take the exam) or takes (the exam) on behalf of another will be punished with 100 lashes and sent to serve in the navy. 2. If a tenant farmer falsely reports a disaster and colludes with local clerks (吏 ri), agricultural officers (勸農官 Kwŏnnonggwan), or low-level clerks (書員 Sŏwŏn) to deceive, the whistleblower is permitted to report them. Each false report incurs 10 lashes, with an additional grade for each further false report, resulting in up to 90 lashes and military exile. 3. A soldier who commits a crime (punishable by) forced labor and is sentenced to military exile will be released after completing the term of forced labor. 4. Those permanently sentenced for robbery will be executed on the second offense. For those sentenced to forced labor, banishment, official residence restriction (付處刑 puch’ŏhyŏng), settlement punishment (安置刑 anch’ihyŏng) or assigned to military labor after military exile, execution will follow the third offense. 5. For those sentenced to military exile, the punishment is equivalent to 100 lashes and three years of forced labor. For individuals subjected to military exile in remote border areas, those who are enslaved, whose entire family is relocated to border regions, or those assigned to declining postal stations, the punishment is equivalent to 100 lashes and banishment for 3,000 li. 133 1. (試取) 凡借者·代者, 竝杖一百, 身充水軍 (經國大典 兵典 試取 [科目] (奎 1298-v.3)) 2. 如有佃夫冒告災傷及當該吏·勸農官·書員通同妄冒者, 許人陳告。一負各笞一十, 每一負加一等, 罪止杖一百充軍 (經國大典 戶典 收稅 [新加耕田·全災傷田] (奎 1298-v.2)) 3. 軍人犯徒充軍者, 徒年限滿後, 放 (經國大典 刑典 推斷 [凡拷訊取旨乃行] (奎 1298-v.4)) 4. 犯强盜永屬者, 二度處斬。 徒·流·付處·安置·充軍定役及竊盜永屬者, 三度處斬 (經國大典 刑典 逃亡 [犯强盜永屬者] (奎 1298-v.4)) 5. 犯充軍者, 准杖一百徒三年。 邊遠充軍者·爲奴者·全家徙邊者·屬殘驛吏者, 竝准杖一百流三千里。(經國大典 刑典 罪犯准計 [犯充軍者] (奎 1298-v.4)) (This reference information in parentheses refers to Kyŏngguk taejŏn (經國大典 the Great Code for State Administration), the title of the article, the specific article title, a brief description of the relevant cases, and the reference number assigned by the Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies (with the volume number).) 68 There are only five articles pertaining to military exile in the legal code of Early Chosŏn, suggesting that military exile was not a significant punitive measure during this period. This stands in stark contrast to the Ming legal code, which contains 28 articles related to military exile, encompassing provisions addressing both soldiers’ illegal acts and the broader roles of the military, along with the enforcement of military exile.134 Similar to the Chinese empires, military exile in Chosŏn was initially considered a punishment less severe than the death penalty but more serious than banishment.135 However, the application of military exile in Chosŏn diverged from that of Ming China. While the Ming regime predominantly imposed military exile on soldiers, with civilian offenders subjected to this penalty only in exceptional cases, in Chosŏn, the punishment was applied indiscriminately from the outset, extending to include civil officials, clerks, and commoners as well. Additionally, regulations indicate that military exile was actively used to address issues such as civil service examination fraud and false disaster reports. However, there were limitations on the application of military exile. For instance, if a soldier committed an offense punishable by forced labor, they were to be released upon completion of their term. Generally, criminals faced forced labor for 2 to 3 years. Nonetheless, this provision was not universally applied, as Chosŏn kings frequently included additional clauses mandating that the punishment be served without parole. In such cases, criminals were not released until the ruler issued a specific amnesty. In the meantime, in the Late Chosŏn period, the application of military exile expanded significantly: the Comprehensive National Code published in 1785, included 23 clauses detailing circumstances under which military exile should be enforced. This indicates that compulsory military service was increasingly used as a punitive measure. This shift likely reflects the 134 Kim Han-bak キム ハンバク, "Hairyūkei no jidai -Sindai hairyūkei no shosō o megutte-" 配流刑の時代 -清代配流刑の諸相をめぐって- (Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 2021), 16. 135 There is a controversy whether military exile is close to forced labor or banishment among scholars. For details, see Sim Chae-u 심재우, "Chosŏn chŏn’gi yubaehyŏng kwa yubae saenghwal" 조선전기 유배형과 유배생활, Kuksagwan nonch’ong 국사관논총 92, (2000): 204. 69 growing complexity and diversification of Chosŏn society, as well as a potential change in the military perspectives held by Chosŏn’s aristocracy. Immediately after the establishment of the Chosŏn Dynasty, the aristocratic class (兩班 yangban) was generally required to fulfill military duties, with exceptions made for current and retired government officials holding ranks above the second level. Failure to meet this obligation could result in banishment to remote areas. Until the early 15th century, members of the ruling class were mobilized into royal guard units (侍衛軍 siwigun) or naval forces (騎船軍 kisŏn’gun). The strong central authority of the Early Chosŏn period, coupled with the compensation provided to the aristocratic class, enabled the government to effectively recruit aristocrats for military service.136 However, this trend underwent a significant shift in the mid-15th century, as the power of the Chosŏn kings waned while the influence of officials grew. The aristocrats employed a range of strategies, both legal and illegal, to evade military service. For instance, they frequently avoided direct military duties by joining special forces that required no actual service. Additionally, aristocrats could exempt themselves from military obligations by focusing on Confucian studies to take civil service examinations or by enrolling in private Confucian academies or local official schools.137 According to Martin Gehlmann’s analysis, the establishment of these local official schools aimed to introduce Confucian ideology and morals to the local populace while serving as a tool to ensure the ruling class’s political control and stability in local areas during the Early Chosŏn period. To achieve this, the regime provided these schools with land, slaves, and books, which were significantly costly.138 However, this original purpose became diluted over time. Although local official schools introduced student evaluation examinations (校生考講 kyosaeng kogang) in the 17th century. This test was designed to assess students’ academic knowledge and 136 Kim Chong-su 김종수, "Chosŏn hugi chungang kunje ŭi unyŏng kwa Sukchongdae yangban chʼunggunnon" 조선후기 중앙군제의 운영과 숙종대 양반충군론, Kunsa yonʼgu 군사연구, no. 141 (2016): 87-88. 137 Yi Yong-gil 이용길, "Chosŏnsidae ŭi nakkangch’unggunpŏp kwa hyanggyo ŭi kyoyukchŏk kinŭng" 조선 시대의 낙강충군법 (落講充軍法)과 향교의 교육적 기능, Han’guk kyoyuk sahak 한국교육사학, no. 18 (1996): 113. 138 Martin Gehlmann, "Assessing Basic Knowledge: Student Evaluation Examinations in Chosŏn Local Schools", in Beyond the State Examinations Evaluations of Knowledge in Premodern Korea, ed. Martin Gehlmann and Vladimír Glomb (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2024), 50-51. 70 expel those who did not meet the criteria, and students widely opposed this institution. Their opposition stemmed from the fact that expulsion would strip them of their privilege of being officially exempted from military duty.139 As Nam-lin Hur contends, the ruling class was considered the most suitable for military service. Aristocrats were not only well-versed in Confucian values of loyalty and public service but were also entrusted with leadership and governance. Economically, they were uniquely positioned to bear the costs of military service due to their self-sufficiency.140 However, the aristocratic class held a firm belief that they should be exempt from military duty. While voluntary military service was viewed as commendable and socially acceptable, aristocrats vehemently resisted any attempts by the government to impose compulsory military service upon them.141 As Kim Chong-su argues, by the 16th century, the aristocracy had increasingly evaded military duty due to the Chosŏn government’s diminishing regard for military positions held by the ruling class, such as Armored Soldiers (甲士 Kapsa) and Special Royal Guards (別侍衛 Pyŏlsiwi). This trend unfolded within a broader societal context in which the prioritization of civil over military values, deeply ingrained since the founding of the Chosŏn Dynasty,142 became further entrenched. The sharp increase in the number of regulations concerning military exile in the Comprehensive National Code likely reflects this shift in societal values. In other words, military service became something aristocrats sought to avoid, leading Chosŏn government and policymakers to leverage the prevailing social attitudes to enforce regulation and control over the populace. Table 4 organizes the regulations concerning military exile by category. This table shows that the scope of the applications of military exile had broadened to diverse fields, although approximately 50% of the articles were relevant to military service. 139 Ibid., 58-59. 140 Nam-lin Hur, "Confucianism and Military Service in Early Seventeenth-Century Chosǒn Korea", Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 1 (2011): 58. 141 Ibid., 77. 142 Kim Chong-su 김종수, "Chosŏn hugi chungang kunje ŭi unyŏng kwa Sukchongdae yangban chʼunggunnon" 조선후기 중앙군제의 운영과 숙종대 양반충군론, Kunsa yonʼgu 군사연구, no. 141 (2016): 91-92. 71 Table 4: the Main Contents of Military Exile in the Comprehensive National Code Category Main Contents of Punishments Subjects of Punishments 1 Taxation ● The omission of households (大典通編 戶典 戶籍 [戶籍不實] (奎 202.2)) ● Military exile for commoners 2 Taxation ● Lack of inventory of warehouses (大典通編 戶典 倉庫 [軍資監米麵出納] (奎 202.2)) ● Military exile for warehouse keepers ● Military exile to the navy for local clerks (下吏 hari) 3 False report ● False report of disaster (大典通編 戶典 收稅 [有佃夫冒告災傷] (奎 202.2)) ● Military exile for everyone involved 4 The civil service examination ● Examination fraud ● Disturbance at exam sites (大典通編 禮典 諸科 [借述·代述者] (奎 202. 3)) ● Military exile to a remote area for officials, literary degree-holders (生員 saengwŏn), classics degree-holders (進士 chinsa) without parole ● Military exile to the navy for student scholars (幼學 yuhak) for life 5 The military service examination ● Illegal entry into exam sites (大典通編 兵典 武科 [科場用奸] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile to the navy for the perpetrator ● Military exile to the navy in an isolated island for staffs for life 6 The government service examination ● Illegal action to obtain the exam permit (照訖講 chohŭlgang) (大典通編 禮典 諸科 [科場應赴人] (奎 202. 3)) ● Military exile to the navy for proxy test-takers for life 7 The government service examination ● Suspicious filling in of candidates’ name (大典通編 禮典 諸科 [擧子錄名] (奎 202. 3)) ● Military exile to the navy for the perpetrator 8 The government service examination ● Illegal taking of examination by private and public slaves, runners in county offices (羅將 najang) (大典通編 兵典 武科 [擧子保擧主] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile to the navy for the perpetrator without parole 9 Military service ● Inspection of local military units without authority (大典通編 兵典 敎閱 [兵馬節度使巡歷] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile for the perpetrator 10 Military service ● Illegal military service substitution (代立 taerip) (大典通編 兵典 番上 [當番代立者] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile to a remote area for both requestors and substitutes within one year 11 Military service ● Delayed departure for the reinforcement of local garrisons ● Military exile to the assigned area for the perpetrator 72 Category Main Contents of Punishments Subjects of Punishments (大典通編 兵典 留防 [武科出身赴防] (奎 202. 4)) 12 Military service ● Negligence of sentry duties (大典通編 兵典 留防 [入防軍士闕防代身] (奎 202. 4)) ● 1-year Military exile for those who did not fulfill the sentry duty for 30 days ● 2-year military exile for those who did not fulfill the sentry duty for 60 days ● 3-year military exile for those who did not fulfill the sentry duty for 90 days 13 Military service ● False reports on the military enlistees (大典通編 兵典 免役 [軍士物故者代定] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile for stewards (監官 kamgwan) and local clerks (色吏 saegni) 14 Military service ● Inappropriate use of warships in open sea (外洋) (大典通編 兵典 兵船 [戰兵船出送外洋] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile for the perpetrator after 100 lashes 15 Military service ● Runaway of Martial Arts Special Guards (武藝別監 Muye byŏlgam) from military drills (大典通編 兵典 用刑 [軍律犯罪] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile to an isolated island after public humiliation (回示 hoesi) and 30 lashes of flogging (棍刑 konhyŏng) 16 Military service ● Proxy test-taking in the military test (大典通編 兵典 試取 [處罰] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile to the navy after 100 lashes 17 Military service ● Evasion of proceeding to the post by newly appointed border garrison commanders (邊將, Pyŏnjang) (大典通編 兵典 雜令 [邊將規避者] (奎 202. 4)) ● Military exile for the perpetrator 18 Ethical violation ● Slander of princes and high-ranking officials (大典通編 刑典 推斷 [醜辱王子君] (奎 202. 5)) ● Military exile to a remote area for the perpetrator 19 Ethical violation ● Illegal collection of ginsengs in the border area (大典通編 刑典 禁制 [犯越採蔘佃獵者] (奎 202. 5)) ● Military exile to forts (堡 po) in remote areas for examination passers (出身 ch’ulsin) ● Military exile to a remote area for local magistrates (守令 suryŏng) and border garrison commanders (邊將 Pyŏnjang) in case of failure to discover in advance Source: the author collected data from the Comprehensive National Code 73 According to the table, the application of military exile largely depended on the social class of the criminals, though it was universally imposed not only on military officials but also on other classes, such as civil officials, clerks, and commoners. For example, incumbent officials and exam-passers who committed civil examination fraud were exiled to garrisons in remote areas, whereas student scholars without any degree were sent to the navy, which was considered a harsher punishment compared to regular military exile.143 Additionally, regarding the omission of three able-bodied males (壯丁 changjŏng) in the household register, aristocrats (士族 sajok) were banished indefinitely, while commoners faced military exile.144 Given that military exile was regarded as a more severe punishment than banishment, it is evident that the lower the social class, the harsher the penalties were in Chosŏn. The duration of military exile varied according to the severity of the crime, ranging from one year to indefinite terms, and even military exile without parole. However, these regulations were quite flexible, especially during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. Specific cases will be discussed in the next section. In addition, regarding the distance for military exile, there are no concrete specifications. Given the small size of Chosŏn’s territory, applying Qing’s criteria was not suitable in Chosŏn. Instead, the distance was expressed in somewhat ambiguous terms, such as a remote area (邊遠 pyŏnwŏn) even though the distance from Seoul was still a key factor in determining the severity of military exile. Following the Comprehensive National Code, another legal code, the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code was promulgated in 1865 under the leadership of Taewŏn’gun. This new constitution was intended to provide legal support for his policies. However, the articles regarding military exile remained unchanged in the new legal code. Despite the regime’s efforts to promote military enhancement and elevate military officials, the legal framework did not support these public policies effectively. 143 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 禮典, 諸科 [借述·代述者]. (奎 202. 3). 中外大·小科場, 借述·代述者, 帶率隨從者, 不錄名闌入者, 符同易書者, 首倡作亂罷場者, 朝官·生·進, 則邊遠充軍, 勿揀赦前, 幼學以下, 則限己身降定水軍。 (This refers to Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn (The Comprehensive Collection of the National Code), the title of the article, the specific article title, a brief description of the relevant cases, and the reference number assigned by the Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 144 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 戶典, 戶籍 [戶籍不實]. (奎 202.2). 漏丁者家長, 一口, 杖一百徒三年, 三口以上士族, 勿限年定配, 平民, 充軍, 公私賤, 島配。 74 Meanwhile, a comparative analysis with European practices is necessary to elucidate the distinctive nature of Chosŏn’s military exile. For instance, powerful European states, such as Britain, Russia, and Germany, established penal military units. Although these units differed from Chosŏn’s system in terms of historical continuity and ultimate purpose, as will be further examined, both shared the fundamental characteristic of incorporating convicts and criminals into military service. Specifically, the British Army enacted a series of laws in 1744 and 1777 that enabled the government to recruit offenders, including vagrants and convicted smugglers, among others.145 As indicated in these acts, the majority of individuals subjected to this practice belonged to socially marginalized and lower-class groups. Subsequently, in the late 18th century, the government established penal military units to compensate for the shortage of troops caused by colonial expansion and battlefield casualties. This need became particularly urgent during the American War of Independence. According to Brad Marena and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, the recruitment of criminals into the British military functioned as a form of ‘plea bargaining’.146 Recruiters targeted individuals awaiting trial or serving prison sentences, offering them a choice between incarceration and military service. Those who opted for military enlistment had their criminal records expunged by royal decree. This practice became known as the “King’s shilling,” as convicted individuals who “volunteered” for service received a symbolic shilling from recruiting officers.147 This system stands in stark contrast to Chosŏn’s military exile. Above all, in Britain, military service, despite its hardships, provided an avenue for convicts to regain legal status and reintegrate into society. In contrast, under Chosŏn’s legal framework, military exile was not an alternative path to pardon, although it served as a commutation of the death penalty in a limited number of cases. Rather, compulsory military service, coupled with harsh labor in frontier garrisons, functioned as a direct form of punishment. Furthermore, Chosŏn’s ruling class was not 145 Stephen R. Conway, "The Recruitment of Criminals into the British Army, 1775–81", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 58, no. 137 (1985): 47-48. 146 Brad Manera and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, "The Legion of the Damned: Britain’s Military Deployment of Convict Labor in the Atlantic World, 1766–1826", in Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions: A Global History, c. 1750–1830, ed. Jan C. Jansen and Kirsten McKenzie (Cambridge University Press, 2024), 132. 147 Ibid., 133. 75 exempt from this penalty. Although concrete data remains scarce, a significant number of those subjected to military exile were aristocrats. By contrast, in Britain, members of the nobility were rarely assigned to penal military units, with only a few notable exceptions. Another notable case of penal military units was the Soviet Red Army during World War II. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) actively employed these units to repel German forces on the Eastern Front. A distinctive feature of these units was that they primarily consisted of soldiers who had committed serious offenses. For instance, individuals accused of desertion, insubordination, assaulting a superior, or other military crimes were subjected to this form of “voluntary” service as a punitive measure.148 In contrast, Chosŏn’s military exile applied to a broader spectrum of individuals, including the aristocracy. This distinction highlights the broader societal impact of Chosŏn’s punitive system, which was not limited to a specific class of offenders but extended to the ruling elite as well, although the total number of such cases was far fewer than those in Soviet penal units. When examining the size of the military penal units in the Soviet Union, one study indicates that 55,000 deserters were assigned to penal units in 1919. Moreover, during World War II, the Soviet Union organized 65 penal battalions.149 These units played a significant role in the war effort. In particular, Stalin deployed these units to perilous battlefields, effectively using them as cannon fodders to protect the elite forces of the Soviet military. Similar to the British case, the individuals in these penal units were promised a pardon and restoration of their legal status upon discharge; however, the survival rate of those in these units was extremely low. Even in the United States during the 20th century, there were ongoing discussions regarding the operation of military service as an alternative to imprisonment. For instance, Jack E. Bynum and Leo C. Downing Jr. advocated for this practice as a response to the increasing burden placed on American society by the expanding prison population in 1981. They emphasized several potential benefits, including enhanced military security, reduced prison overcrowding, decreased incarceration costs, and increased opportunities for prisoner rehabilitation and employment. 150 However, in the 1970s, the U.S. military branches, including 148 Alex Statiev, "Penal Units in the Red Army", Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 5 (2010): 722-723. 149 Ibid., 727-729. 150 Jack E. Bynum and Leo C. Downing Jr., "Military Conscript & War: An Alternative to Prison", Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 9, no. 1 (1981): 87-89. 76 the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, generally opposed the recruitment of convicts. They were concerned about the potential for such individuals to violate military regulations, protest the conditions of service like pay and duration, and ultimately refuse to fulfill their duties. Additionally, the military leadership expressed apprehension that the inclusion of convicts could undermine the integrity of the all-volunteer force model.151 Although the U.S. government does not currently enforce the recruitment of convicts, the debate remains ongoing, as evidenced by a 2022 proposal by a senator of Florida Senate to offer certain offenders the option of military service in lieu of imprisonment.152 However, in Chosŏn, offenders subjected to military exile did not significantly contribute to the enhancement of national defense contrary to the cases observed in Western contexts. First, Chosŏn’s legal code did not include provisions for penal units exclusively for offenders. In practice, offenders were dispersed across various garrisons and made up only a small portion of each unit. Additionally, while a comprehensive investigation into the overall scale of military exile cases is necessary, the number of individuals subjected to military exile was considerably smaller than in the Britain or the Soviet Union, as will be explored in the following chapters. Furthermore, military exile occurred sporadically, not as a continuous or systematic practice, and Chosŏn’s central government did not manage these cases in an organized manner. Thus, this practice indicates that the imposition of military exile was not intended to enhance military strength. Military exile cases under the Taewŏn’gun regime The first recorded instance of military exile during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, which is documented in official records, involved the illegal actions of Ku Sŏng-hŭi (具星喜 1832-n.d.). On 5/14 of 1864, Sin Chae-u (愼㘽祐 1840-1903), the Fifth-Rank Minor Inspector (持平 Chip’yŏng) in the Office of Inspector-General (司憲府 Sahŏnbu), uncovered Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s corruption in the civil service examination. In response, King Kojong ordered that Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s 151 Neil J. Dilloff, "The Involuntary Volunteer: Coerced Military Enlistments", American University Law Review 25, no. 2 (1976): 446-450. 152 "SB 1356: Military Service Option for Certain Criminal Offenders - GENERAL BILL by Rouson", The Florida Senate, effective July 1, 2022, https://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/1356. 77 name be removed from the roster of successful candidates for the civil service examination (文科 munkwa) because he had falsely stated his hometown as Cheju Island. According to the report, candidates from Cheju were specially allowed to write their hometown on the first page of their answer sheet to account for the remote distance from mainland Chosŏn. However, Ku exploited this privilege despite not being from Cheju Island. Furthermore, the king exiled Ku to Cheju Island through the imposition of military exile and forced him to apologize to the Cheju aristocrats.153 Although the civil service examination system had been regarded as a ladder of success for Koreans, despite its limitations, since its introduction to the Korean peninsula in 958 during the Koryŏ Dynasty,154 corruption within this system remained a chronic social problem in Chosŏn society. The corruption resulted from the highly competitive nature of the state service examination, where the rise of individual scholars to official posts was intimately linked to their economic benefits. Since this competition was incompatible with the idealistic Confucian values of pursuing the Learning of the Way or learning for oneself, many scholars criticized the state examination system.155 As a case in point, Yu Hyŏng-wŏn (柳馨遠 1622-1673), the Confucian reformer during the Late Chosŏn period, even proposed abolishing the civil service examination system in favor of a recommendation system.156 While the regime did not abolish the civil service examinations until 1894, the court consistently cracked down on corruption cases and stringently punished perpetrators as well as invigilators by exiling them to remote areas.157 Given that either banishment or military exile was the second most severe punishment, corruption in civil service examinations, like cheating or proxy test-taking, was considered a felony (重辟 chungbyŏk), not mere misconduct. The case of Ku Sŏng-hŭi illustrates that military exile was one of the harshest penalties imposed on felons, second only to capital punishment. 153 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:63b [1864/05/14]. 154 Edward W. Wagner, "The Ladder of Success in Yi Dynasty Korea", Occasional Papers on Korea, no. 1 (1974): 1-8. 155 Vladimír Glomb, "Learning for Oneself: Evaluation of Knowledge in Korean Confucian Academies", in Beyond the State Examinations Evaluations of Knowledge in Premodern Korea, ed. Martin Gehlmann and Vladimír Glomb (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2024), 22. 156 James B. Palais, "Military Reform", in Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty, (The University of Washington Press, 1996), 654. 157 For example, on 9/26 of 1869, a commotion erupted at the civil service examination site in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, leading to the exile of Yi Ton-ha (李敦夏 1824-n.d.), the invigilator. Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 6:26a [1869/09/26]. 78 According to the Comprehensive National Code, published in 1785, individuals who cheated on an examination, took an examination for someone else, entered examination sites without permission, or caused disturbances at testing sites were subject to military exile.158 The choice of Cheju Island as Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s place of exile carries two significant implications. First, according to King Kojong’s edict, Ku was required to apologize to the local scholars in Cheju Island for his misuse of the island’s name. It is possible that the king selected this location to publicize this punishment to the Cheju scholars and to mitigate their grievances. Furthermore, Cheju Island was regarded as one of the “remote and inhospitable places” (遠惡地 wŏnakchi) and was considered one of the harshest banishment sites due to its considerable distance from the capital. Historically, Cheju Island was primarily used for banishing serious criminals, including traitors and religious dissenters such as Catholics, who were considered threats to the state.159 Given these factors, it is reasonable to infer that the government took Ku’s case very seriously.160 Ku Sŏng-hŭi was under military exile for three years until he was released along with 12 other exiles on 4/14 of 1867.161 Despite his illicit actions at the civil service examination, he was given another chance to take the palace augmented examination (增廣試 chŭnggwangsi) in 1874, which he successfully passed.162 He was subsequently promoted to the position of the Fourth-Rank Censor (正言 Chŏngŏn) in the Office of the Censor-General (司諫院 Saganwŏn) in 1881 and became the Assistant Section Chief (佐郞 Chwarang), a 6th rank position in the Ministry of War, in 1882.163 It is noteworthy that the Fourth-Rank Censor was obliged to remonstrate the ruler against wrong-doing and disclose corruption. Given Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s past activities, this position was 158 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 禮典, 諸科, [借述·代述者]. 中外大·小科場, 借述·代述者, 帶率隨從者, 不錄名闌入者, 符同易書者, 首倡作亂罷場者, 朝官·生·進, 則邊遠充軍, 勿揀赦前, 幼學以下, 則限己身降定水軍。 冒入代寫者, 良人, 則水軍充定, 公·私賤, 則絶島爲奴。 159 Kim Chae-hyŏng 김재형, "Chosŏnsidae Cheju yubaein silt’ae punsŏk kwa t’ŭkching" 조선시대 제주유배인 실태 분석과 특징 (MA thesis, Cheju National University, 2011), 39. 160 From the regulation of Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn, it can be inferred that Ku Sŏng-hŭi was likely enlisted in a naval unit on Cheju Island because he belonged to the student scholar status. 161 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 04-04-15 (25) [1867/04/15]. 162 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 11-05-27 (23) [1874/05/27]. 163 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-08-26 (34) [1882/08/26]. 79 indeed not well-suited for him. The case of Ku Sŏng-hŭi indicates that the penalty records for military exile of the ruling class did not significantly impact their careers, even though it did not serve as a badge of honor. In other words, while the Chosŏn government used Ku Sŏng-hŭi as an example to warn civil service examination candidates against illegal actions by imposing military exile, it did not treat the penalty with lasting seriousness. Meanwhile, not only those from the civil branch but also military officials were subject to military exile. On 6/10 of 1870, Yi Ho-jun (李鎬俊 1821-1901), the governor of Chŏlla Province, accused Yi Wi-so (李暐沼 n.d.), the Third-Rank Special Army Officer (僉使 Ch’ŏmsa) of the Karipo (加里浦) garrison, of swindling 10,000 nyang from the residents.164 The Karipo garrison on Wando Island in Chŏlla Province was established in 1522 to fend off the invasion of Japanese pirates.165 Due to the strategic significance of the island, the position of the commander, in this case the Special Army Officer, was considerably high, equivalent to that of a third-rank military officer. In response to the report by the governor of Chŏlla, the Supreme Council recommended that Yi Wi-so be flogged 30 times (棍刑 konhyŏng) and subjected to military exile in a remote area instead of being executed, as a special consideration due to his descent from the Chosŏn royal family. King Kojong approved this recommendation.166 Yi was ordered to be exiled to the garrison in the Ch’ŏlsan area of P’yŏngan Province, near the Chinese border, until the ruler permitted his release from military exile. Ch’ŏlsan was traditionally the strategic point for Chosŏn’s national defense. This garrison was established to defend against Later Jin (後金)’s invasion of Chosŏn. In addition, Mao Wenlong (毛文龍), the Chinese military general of the Ming Dynasty, occupied Kado Island (椵島) in front of Ch’ŏlsan as a military base to counterattack Later Jin’s army.167 As the map 164 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 7:14b [1870/06/10]. 165 Yu Yŏng-in 유영인, "Suryŏn 200-yŏn Wando Karip’ojin yŏksa rŭl kanjikhan sanjŭngindŭl" 수령 300년, 완도 가리포진 역사를 간직한 산증인들 OhmyNews.com, May 17, 2024, https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003030838&CMPT_CD=P0010&utm_source=naver&utm_medium=newsearch&utm_campaign=naver_news. 166 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 07-06-10 (08) [1870/06/10]. 李暐沼特貸一縷, 嚴棍三十度後, 邊遠充軍, 勿揀赦典事, 分付該道道臣之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 167 No Yŏng-gu 노영구, "Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏngnamdo kansŏn pangŏ ch’egye" 조선후기 함경 남도 간선 (幹線) 방어체계, Han’guk munhwa 한국문화 36, (2005): 383. 80 below shows, the Ch’ŏlsan garrison was a strategic point for both maritime and land defense, surrounded by several castles and mountains that served as natural barriers. Map 4: The Map of the Ch’ŏlsan Area in 1872 Source: The Map of the Ch’ŏlsan Area (鐵山府地圖 Ch’ŏlsanbu chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10622) In fact, corruption did not warrant either capital punishment or military exile according to Chosŏn’s legal code, yet the government sought to apply these punishments to Yi Wi-so. Furthermore, the imposition of flogging was a particularly humiliating measure, especially considering the process involved. During the execution of the penalty, water was poured on the offenders’ buttocks, unavoidably exposing their private parts. This additional, embarrassing punishment was often imposed alongside military exile cases. However, similar to Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s release after three years of military exile, Yi Wi-so was freed from military exile in March 1872 and was immediately promoted to the position of the Fourth-Rank Deputy Commander (副護軍 Puhogun) of the Five Military Commands (五衛 81 Owi) in December 1872.168 Although military exile temporarily served as an impediment and a form of humiliation, it did not irreparably damage his career. Notably, Yi Wi-so’s situation might have differed from Ku Sŏng-hŭi’s due to Yi’s status as a military official. In Ming China, military officials who committed crimes were subjected to military exile, which often involved reassignment to different garrisons without the change of positions.169 Similarly, Yi was likely regarded as fulfilling his equivalent military duties at a different garrison despite being punished. Another incident for the imposition of military exile on military officials was the punishment of Kim Sŏk-gu (金錫九 n.d.), the Special Commander (別將 Pyŏlchang) of the Sŏmjin Garrison (蟾津鎭). The position of the Special Commander was a ninth-rank military official in charge of defending local fortresses or ports.170 According to a report by Yi Ho-jun, the governor of Chŏlla Province, on intercalary 6/18 of 1873, the allegations against Kim Sŏk-gu were particularly egregious. The accusations included: first, falsely arresting an innocent civilian on charges of filial impiety (不孝 pulhyo) and subsequently releasing the individual after receiving a bribe; second, coercing a chaste woman into attempting suicide by fabricating evidence of adultery and later rescuing her; third, embezzling funds allocated for the repair of military equipment; and finally, misappropriating funds intended for the transportation of logs used in vessel production and forcibly collecting these expenses from the local villagers.171 In fact, an evaluation by the Regional Naval Headquarters (統制營 T’ongjeyŏng) on 12/1 of 1872 provided a notably negative assessment of Kim’s performance even before this incident was formally addressed by the central government. The report stated, “The restoration of dignity previously compromised is itself valuable.” 172 This suggests that the headquarters may have been aware of his misconduct. 168 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 09-12-04 (22) [1872/12/04]. 169 Kim Han-bak 김한밝, "Myŏngdae ŭi sokhyŏngjuŭi wa chʼunggun ŭi pʼaengchʼang" 명대의 속형주의 (贖刑主義)와 충군 (充軍)의 팽창, Chungguksa yŏnʼgu 중국사연구, no. 142 (2023): 128. 170 Pak Chŏng-hye, " Pak Chŏng-hye ŭi yetgurim ŭro pon sadaebu ŭi kkum" 박정혜의 옛그림으로 본 사대부의 꿈, Munhwa Daily News, March 31, 2023, https://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2023033101032012000001. 171 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:16b [1873/潤 06/18]. 172 T’ongjeyŏng kyerok 統制營啓錄 (Reports of the Regional Naval Headquarters) 4, 013a (奎 15101). 82 It appears that King Kojong was deeply angered by Kim Sŏk-gu’s cruelty, as he approved the Supreme Council’s request to flog Kim 30 times, nearly to the point of death, and to exile him to the Sŏmjin garrison.173 In response, Chin Che-p’il (陳濟弼 n.d.) was promptly appointed as the Special Commander of the Sŏmjin garrison.174 While military exiles were generally sent to remote areas, Kim Sŏk-gu was placed in the same garrison. This decision suggests that the regime sought to socially humiliate Kim for his corruption through both involuntary military service and corporal punishment. As Map 5 indicates, the Sŏmjin Garrison (蟾津鎭), situated in Kwangyang City at the mouth of the Sŏmjin River, was established in the Late Chosŏn period as a small naval fort under the direct control of the Navy Headquarters of Three Provinces (三道水軍統制營 Samdo sugun t’ongjeyŏng). In 1603, during the 36th year of King Sŏnjo (宣祖 1552-1608)’s reign, the court set up administrative offices and storage facilities at Sŏmjin and created a militia of civilian volunteers for its defense and management. With its growing importance, the garrison was formally upgraded and incorporated into the Regional Command Center system (鎭管體制 chin’gwan ch’eje) in 1705, during the 31st year of King Sukchong (肅宗 1661-1720)’s reign.175 前警事體改之爲貴。 (When citing official reports (啓錄 kyerok), the reference information includes the title of the document, volume number, page number, and the reference number assigned by the Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies. In the citation format used here, “a” denotes the left side of the page and “b” the right side. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation. In this reference, T’ongjeyŏng kyerok is rendered as Reports of the Regional Naval Headquarters.) 173 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-潤 06-18 (10) [1873/潤 06/18]. 174 T’ongjeyŏng kyerok 統制營啓錄 4, 083b (奎 15101). 蟾津別將金錫九罷黜代閏六月二十日政珍山居陳濟弼下批。 175 Kwangyang ŭpchi 光陽邑誌 (The Kwangyang Gazetteer), 017b-018a (奎 17435). 萬曆癸卯自統營卨都廳置募軍矣康熙乙酉本道巡使閔公遠鎭巡撫使權公尙游統制使吳公重周以蟾津防守緊安之意論理狀 啓設鎭焉別將一員從八品京營則敎訓官統營則守城中軍三十朔交遞。 (When citing gazetteers, the reference information includes the title of the gazetteer, the reference number assigned by the Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies, and the page number. In the citation format used here, "a" denotes the left side of the page and "b" the right side. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 83 Map 5: The Map of the Sŏmjin Garrison in 1872 Source: The Map of the Sŏmjin Garrison in Kwangyang County (光陽縣蟾津鎭地圖 Kwangyanghyŏn Sŏmjinjin chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10445). Although records concerning Kim Sŏk-gu’s life during his military exile are limited, it can be inferred that his status likely remained relatively unchanged, despite his official demotion to menial tasks, when compared to Ming practices. In the Ming Dynasty, military exile for soldiers was essentially a reassignment to another garrison, and military officers were typically exempt from forced labor, which was a form of prerogative for them.176 Given that Chosŏn’s practice of military exile was modeled on Ming legal precedents and that his place of exile coincided with his duty station, it is plausible that Kim Sŏk-gu retained at least some degree of his former status, if not entirely. The next year, Kim Sŏk-gu was pardoned along with 11 other exiled individuals following an order from King Kojong on 2/27 of 1874.177 The duration of his military exile was 176 Kim Han-bak キム ハンバク, "Hairyūkei no jidai -Sindai hairyūkei no shosō o megutte-" 配流刑の時代 -清代配流刑の諸相をめぐって- (Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 2021), 18. 177 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 11-02-27 (18) [1874/02/27]. 義禁府啓曰, 本府徒流案中金斗河名下減等定配事書下, 朴鳳煥 · 吳慶泓 · 金錫九 · 安驥洛 · 洪萬爕 · 全泰亨 · 洪彦錫 · 金瑛默 · 許元栻 · 李舜儀 · 金敬孚 · 金運盛, 竝放蕩滌事, 承傳啓下矣。 84 extremely short compared to that of Yi Wi-so, despite the charges against him being much more severe. This treatment clearly violated the spirit of the military exile law, which was intended to place criminals in harsh conditions and force them to engage in menial tasks far from their home. This leniency may have been influenced by the international circumstances surrounding Chosŏn; the invasion of the U.S. Navy in 1871 just two years prior to Kim Sŏk-gu’s military exile, and the ongoing threats from foreign powers put pressure on the regime. Thus, the government needed to strengthen national defense at each garrison. This context may have influenced the Chosŏn government’s decision regarding the punishment of Kim Sŏk-gu. After Kim Sŏk-gu was released from military exile, he was promoted to the Keeper of Records (主簿 Chubu) in 1876,178 and later appointed as the Keeper of Horses (監牧官 Kammokkwan), a sixth-rank military official, in Naju in 1878.179 Although it is difficult to fully assess the impact of the punishment on his career, Kim Sŏk-gu’s military exile, much like Yi Wi-so’s experience and other similar cases, did not significantly hinder his professional trajectory. Meanwhile, military exile was also applied to commoners in cases of tax embezzlement (逋欠 p’ohŭm). On 5/22 of 1864, Han Chŏng-gyo (韓正敎 1810-1875), the former governor of Kyŏnggi Province, reported that Kim Sŏng-un (金聖運 n.d.), the shipowner of a tribute ship and the agent of the Capital Treasuries (京倉主人 kyŏngch’ang chuin), had received 233 sŏk of the tribute rice (大同米 taedongmi) from the Tribute Bureau in 1859 but had failed to transfer the grain to the office for six years. The Supreme Council responded to this crime with extreme severity. They recommended that Kim Sŏng-un be handed over to military units, subjected to public humiliation (回示 hoesi), tortured to the brink of death at the Ministry of Punishments (刑曹 Hyŏngjo), and subjected to military exile to an isolated island (絶島 chŏlto) for the remainder of his life.180 King Kojong approved the suggestion. Simultaneously, Cho Chae-ŭng (趙在應 1803-n.d.), the incumbent governor of Kyŏnggi Province, uncovered another embezzlement case involving Yun Yŏng-gwan (尹永寬 n.d.), the owner of a tribute ship, on 9/5 of 1864. According to Cho’s report, Yun Yŏng-gwan received 277 178 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 13-07-16 (58) [1876/07/16]. 179 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 15-02-14 (17) [1878/02/04]. 180 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:66b [1864/05/22]. 85 sŏk of tribute rice in 1862, but he only transferred 36 sŏk, delaying the transfer of the remaining tribute rice. In response, the Supreme Council recommended the same punishment as in Kim Sŏng-un’s case. Additionally, the council requested the punishment of the magistrate of Yun Yŏng-gwan’s town.181 Initially, Kim Sŏng-un was sent to the Headquarters of the Kyŏnggi Provincial Government the day after his punishment was determined. After being tortured at the Office of the Ministry of Punishments, he was exiled to a naval unit on Kŭmgap Island of Chindo County in Chŏlla Province.182 However, the atmosphere surrounding his punishment suddenly changed after Yun Yŏng-gwan’s crime was reported. King Kojong was furious about the misappropriation of public funds by the two shipowners. The Supreme Council assessed that the punishment for Kim Sŏng-un was excessively lenient and appealed for both Kim Sŏng-un and Yun Yŏng-gwan to be beheaded.183 Ultimately, King Kojong approved the request. Yun Yŏng-gwan was executed immediately, and Kim Sŏng-un was transferred from Kŭmgap Island to the nearby naval headquarters and beheaded there. Along with Kim and Yun, the other unlucky prisoners, who had been under banishment for the same crime, were collectively executed. Their heads were displayed at the riverside to serve as a warning against embezzlement.184 While Kim Sŏng-un and Yun Yŏng-gwan were executed for embezzlement, the case of Chŏng Chung-gŏm (鄭仲儉 n.d.), a shipowner in the Kyŏnggang area of Seoul, was treated differently. According to a report from the Capital Police on 12/23 of 1871, Chŏng Chung-gŏm transported 800 sŏk of tribute rice from Puan County in Chŏlla Province to Kanghwa Island near Seoul, where he sold it at a high price. He then bought cheaper rice in Kobu County and delivered this to the Capital Police. In essence, he engaged in a form of arbitrage, profiting from price differences between locations.185 Kyŏnggang merchants earned profits by transporting tax rice and goods from local regions to the capital area. Following the introduction of the Taedong Tribute Tax (大同法 Taedongpŏp) in the 17th century, a system through which the government collected tribute taxes 181 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:90a [1864/09/05]. 182 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 01-05-26 (08) [1864/05/26]. 183 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:90a [1864/09/06]. 184 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 01-09-13 (17) [1864/09/13]. 185 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 8:66a [1871/12/23]. 86 (貢納 kongnap) in the form of rice or cotton cloth,186 the Chosŏn government entrusted the transportation of tribute rice to Kyŏnggang merchants.187 Chŏng Chung-gŏm exploited this monopolistic privilege. The case of Chŏng Chung-gŏm was unique because he neither consumed nor embezzled the tribute rice. However, his activity was illegal since he did not have the necessary permits. Clearly, his actions violated Chosŏn’s institutions, as Chosŏn was far from a “business-friendly” society. Additionally, there were questions about whether the quality of the rice from Kobu matched that of Puan. Regarding this crime, the Supreme Council initially recommended the execution of Chŏng Chung-gŏm, arguing that failing to execute him, despite his not having actually embezzled the public grains (公穀 konggok), would render the national law ineffective. The Supreme Council even suggested displaying his head as a deterrent to others. However, the treatment of Chŏng Chung-gŏm differed from earlier embezzlement cases. King Kojong commanded that Chŏng Chung-gŏm be transferred to the Ministry of Punishments, subjected to severe torture, and exiled to a remote military garrison. He was ordered to be exiled to a military garrison in Kimje County in Chŏlla Province until he received a pardon.188 The punishment of Kim Sŏng-un, Yun Yŏng-gwan, and Chŏng Chung-gŏm was part of Taewŏn’gun’s broader anti-corruption campaign, which aimed to address the serious financial deficits faced by the Chosŏn government due to embezzlement of public funds and taxes. Taewŏn’gun’s administration was committed to expanding the central government’s fiscal base by rigorously enforcing anti-corruption measures. As part of this campaign, clerks convicted of embezzlement were required to forfeit all their possessions. Depending on the severity of their crimes, they faced either naval service or execution. Typically, convicted officials were banished, and their descendants were barred from government service.189 186 For details, see Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner (Ilchokak Publishers, 1984), 224. 187 Ko Tong-hwan, "Development of Commerce and Commercial Policy during the Reign of King Chŏngjo", Korea Journal 40, no. 4 (2000): 203. 188 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 08-12-23 (21) [1871/12/23]. 189 Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 33. 87 In light of state policy on embezzlement and the geographical features of Kimje County, situated near the riverside as shown in the map below, it is likely that Chŏng Chung-gŏm was assigned to the county’s naval base. Map 6: The Map of Kimje County in 1872 Source: The Map of Kimje County (金堤郡地圖 Kimjegun chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10501) Additionally, Taewŏn’gun emphasized the importance of recovering unpaid taxes and grain loans (還穀 hwan’gok) that had not been repaid.190 The peak of enforcement occurred during the first and second years of King Kojong’s reign, as the inspection agency conducted retroactive prosecutions.191 Kim Sŏng-un and Yun Yŏng-gwan’s cases exemplify the application of Taewŏn’gun’s new fiscal policies. 190 Kim Hye-sŭng 김혜승, "Taewŏnʼgun ŭi kukga kyŏngyŏng - 19-segi chungyŏp segyehwa tojŏn kwa taeŭng ŭi chŏngchʼaekhwa" 대원군의 국가 경영 - 19세기 중엽 세계화 도전과 대응의 정책화, Hanʼguk chŏngchi oegyosa nonchong 한국정치외교사논총 34, no. 1 (2012): 17. 191 Song Ŏndŏgi 송언더기, "Taewŏnʼgun chipchŏnggi ŭi chaejŏng chŏngchʼaek - pʼohŭmja e taehan chŏngchʼaek ŭl chungsim ŭro" 대원군 집정기의 재정정책 - 포흠자에 대한 정책을 중심으로, Suktae saron 숙대사론 13, (1989): 47. 88 Another significant point in these cases is that the government initially attempted to impose military exile on the two criminals for embezzlement. This demonstrates that military service was considered a burden and toil for commoners, rather than a noble duty, and underscores the severity of military exile. In fact, the legal code of Chosŏn did not include clauses related to the imposition of military exile for embezzlement. Instead, the Comprehensive National Code specified the punishment for warehouse keepers who failed to inspect whether the national treasury was empty.192 Presumably, the government adapted this clause to penalize Kim Sŏng-un and Yun Yŏng-gwan. As eradicating corruption was a primary task for the regime, military exile was utilized to crack down on severe crimes that did not warrant the death penalty. However, the government arbitrarily altered the application of the law by shifting from military exile to decapitation of the individuals involved, according to their needs, indicating that military exile and the death penalty could be applied interchangeably. Lastly, there was a case where military exile was imposed on clerks (吏胥 isŏ). On 12/23 of 1871, the Supreme Council requested the decapitation of Kwak Yun-gi (郭允基 n.d.) and T’ae Kyŏng-jin (太敬瑨 n.d.), low-level clerks in the Office of Eunuchs (內侍府 Naesibu), on the charge of illegally stamping (僞踏 widap) one of the privy seals (啓字印 kyejain). According to the office’s report, the two clerks misappropriated several thousand sŏk of public rice using the royal seal. In response, the king ordered the decapitation of Kwak Yun-gi as the main culprit while exiling T’ae Kyŏng-jin to a remote and inhospitable island as he had merely turned a blind eye to Kwak’s malpractice.193 According to Song’s investigation, the number of convicted offenders for embezzlement of public funds and taxes during the first and second years of King Kojong’s reign was 15 and 20, respectively. However, in the subsequent years until the end of Taewŏn’gun’s regency, the number of convicted cases dropped to fewer than four per year. The number of convicted embezzlers by year Year 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 Number of offenders 15 20 3 3 - - 4 3 3 1 192 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 戶典, 倉庫, [軍資監米麵出納]. 凡稅穀入倉後, 遺在將盡新捧未到前, 發遣本曹郞官, 擲奸反庫, 而若有欠縮, 則當該倉官, 沿邊充軍, 下吏, 沿海邑限己身水軍充定。 193 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 8:66a [1871/12/23]. 89 The embezzlement of public funds was a serious crime in Chosŏn, but the illicit use of a royal seal was regarded as a more severe offense, as demonstrated in the case of Kwak Yun-gi and T’ae Kyŏng-jin. In terms of issues surrounding royal or official seals, forgery (僞造 wijo) was punishable by death,194 whereas the illegal stamping of seals, though still a grave offense, did not carry the death penalty.195 In other words, Kwak Yun-gi might not have faced execution if the legal code had been applied strictly as written. However, his act of embezzling public rice using the forged royal seal likely led to the aggravated punishment. This incident also illustrates the arbitrary application of the law in Chosŏn. After being tortured at the Ministry of Punishments, T’ae Kyŏng-jin was exiled to a remote and perilous area in Chinju Region of Kyŏngsang Province.196 The exact duration of his military exile remains unknown due to a lack of records about his subsequent career. As noted, T’ae Kyŏng-jin narrowly avoided execution due to King Kojong’s clemency. Table 5 succinctly summarizes the main points of the six cases of military exile by year discussed above, which occurred during Taewŏn’gun’s regency from 1863 to 1873. These cases illustrate the varied application of military exile as a form of punishment and reflect the complexities of the legal and political landscape during this period. Table 5: Summary of the Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1863 to 1873 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 1 1864 Ku Sŏng-hŭi (具星喜 1832-n.d.) ● Student Scholar (Aristocrat) ● Later Civil Official ● Corruption in the civil service examination ● 3-year military exile to Cheju Island (1864.5-1867.4) 194 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 刑典, 僞造 [僞造印信者]. 僞造原僞造印信者, 印文雖未成, 處斬, 妻子, 永屬諸邑奴婢。 捕告者, 給犯人財産。 195 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1790/11/01]. (遞刑判 趙鼎鎭 承旨 鄭益祚) 敎曰雖以眞箇印信言之僞造者一律僞踏者非一律也。 196 Kyŏngsang kamyŏng kyerok 慶尙監營啓錄 (Reports of the Provincial Administration of Kyŏngsang Province) 3, 024b (奎 15100). 謹依傳敎, 罪人太敬瑨, 嚴刑一次後, 慶尙道晉州牧遠惡地充軍, 定配所卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 90 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 2 1864 Kim Sŏng-un (金聖運 n.d.) ● Merchant (Commoner) ● Misappropriation of tribute rice ● 4-month military exile to Kŭmgap Island in Chindo County (1864.5-1864.9) ● Death penalty 3 1870 Yi Wi-so (李暐沼 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Third-Rank Special Army Officer (僉使 Ch’ŏmsa) ● Embezzlement of public funds ● Flogging (棍刑 konhyŏng) 30 times ● 1 year 9 month military exile to the Ch’ŏlsan area (1870.6-1872.3) 4 1871 Chŏng Chung-gŏm (鄭仲儉 n.d.) ● Shipowner (Commoner) ● Arbitrage of tribute rice ● Military exile to Kimje County (1871.12-n.d.) ● Duration of military exile unknown 5 1871 T’ae Kyŏng-jin (太敬瑨 n.d.) ● Low-level clerk (書員 sŏwŏn) (Functionary) ● Embezzlement of public rice ● Illicit use of a royal seal ● Military exile to Chinju Region (1871.12-n.d.) ● Duration of military exile unknown 6 1873 Kim Sŏk-gu (金錫九 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Special Commander (別將 Pyŏlchang) ● False arrest of innocent civilians ● Bribery ● Evidence fabrication ● Embezzlement of public funds ● Flogging(棍刑 konhyŏng) 30 times ● 8-month military exile to the Sŏmjin garrison (1873.6-1874.2) Sources: the author collected the data from the Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok) Table 5 suggests a trend that the application of military exile was relatively evenly distributed across different social classes, including aristocrats, functionaries, and commoners, although this observation is not fully confirmed due to limited evidence. A notable distinction in the implementation of military exile was the additional use of flogging, which, according to the records presented in the table, was imposed solely on military officials. This is attributable to the fact that flogging, introduced in the late 16th century during the reign of King Sŏnjo, was specifically designated as a military punishment and, in principle, was not applied to civilians.197 197 Sim Chae-u 심재우, "Chosŏn hugi Hullyŏn Togam gunpŏp ŭi tŭkching kwa hyosihyŏng ŭi chiphaeng yangsang" 조선후기 훈련도감 군법의 특징과 효시형 (梟示刑)의 집행 양상, Kunsa 군사 101, (2016): 311. However, Catholic records indicate that Catholics were frequently subjected to flogging during their interrogation, although this punishment was not their ultimate penalty. 91 Furthermore, based on the available data on the duration of military exile, the average length of the penalty was approximately 26 months, with a tendency for its duration to decrease over time, except in the case of Kim Sŏng-un, who was ultimately executed. Notably, the three aristocratic offenders, Ku Sŏng-hŭi, Yi Wi-so, and Kim Sŏk-gu, although sentenced to military exile without parole, were released relatively shortly thereafter. 198 This observed trend should be interpreted cautiously, but it is plausible that increasing external threats from foreign powers influenced the administration of criminal justice. Lastly, the imposition of military exile on individuals lacking expertise in military affairs, such as Ku Sŏng-hŭi and T’ae Kyŏng-jin, without adequate preparation underscores the ruling class’s disregard for military proficiency. Neither Chosŏn’s legal code nor state policies concerning military exile outlined any process for training convicts assigned to military units. Instead, government documents indicate that individuals were dispatched to garrisons and units immediately upon sentencing. Although training was essential for cultivating elite soldiers, the implementation of military exile reveals that the development of such expertise was not treated as a priority. Map 7 below illustrates the locations designated for military exile during the regency of Taewŏn’gun. As shown, these locations are primarily situated in maritime areas or regions close to the sea. The Chosŏn legal code stipulated that sites for military exile were to be significantly distant from Seoul, and this map confirms that the regulation was observed. Moreover, these locations held strategic significance, being positioned near neighboring countries such as Qing China and Japan, where military garrisons were established. Individuals subjected to military exile were indeed assigned menial tasks at these bases. 198 The Great Code for State Administration specifies that soldiers subjected to military exile instead of forced labor were to be released upon fulfilling their term. (Sim Chae-u 심재우, "Chosŏn chŏn’gi yubaehyŏng kwa yubae saenghwal" 조선전기 유배형과 유배생활, Kuksagwan nonch’ong 국사관논총 92, (2000): 204.) However, this clause was not applied to Yi Wi-so and Kim Sŏk-gu, as the government sentenced them to military exile without parole until the king ordered their release. 92 Map 7: Major Locations of Military Exile during Taewŏn’gun’s Regency Source: Ksiom, CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>, via Wikimedia Commons (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Korean_Peninsula_topographic_map.png) Although this map does not provide details on the living conditions at the military exile bases, it is evident that these areas were considerably underdeveloped despite their strategic importance. Notably, islands, such as Cheju Island and Kŭmgap Island, as well as counties along the border like Ch’ŏlsan, were traditionally regarded as desolate and barren. The individuals subjected to military exile likely endured significant hardship living in these places, though they left no records of their experiences, making it challenging to understand their conditions during military exile. For aristocrats, who were unaccustomed to such impoverished conditions, this would have been a particularly frustrating experience. 93 Conclusion According to both Korean and English-language scholarship, the military policies implemented during Taewŏn’gun’s regency aimed to strengthen national defense and elevate the status of military officials. However, despite the efforts of the ruler and policymakers within the Chosŏn government, these “new” institutions did not lead to a substantial departure from traditional practices. Military officials continued to be marginalized in Chosŏn society, and military values remained undervalued, even though some high-ranking military officials were granted special privileges. Consequently, the reforms to the military and weaponry systems implemented under Taewŏn’gun’s leadership were insufficient to significantly enhance Chosŏn’s military power. Although the Taewŏn’gun regime adopted a ‘National Defense First’ policy in response to rising foreign encroachments and intensified military threats, the fundamental perception of military service remained largely unchanged, as evidenced by the continued use of military exile. Moreover, the relatively short duration of military exile compared to banishment in Chosŏn199 suggests that military exile was not primarily intended as a severe punitive measure, although it was considered a punishment less severe than the death penalty but more serious than banishment. Instead, military exile often served more as a form of social disgrace for those subjected to it. Consequently, the limited application of military exile as a judicial punishment, its relatively short duration, and the general disregard for military service underscore the broader undervaluation of military duties during this period. In summary, the prevailing attitudes of the regime and the aristocracy toward the military clearly acted as significant impediments to the implementation of military reform policies during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, if not entirely undermining them. 199 According to Sim Chae-u’s research, 46.5% of those who were banished were released within 2 to 3 years, while 29.3% died at their place of banishment during the 16th century. (ibid., 217) 94 CHAPTER TWO: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM UNDER KING KOJONG’S DIRECT RULE AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE), 1873-1884 Introduction The regency of Taewŏn’gun, sustained by a fragile political foundation, came to an abrupt end in 1873 following Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s memorial to the throne, which urged the regent’s resignation. This resignation not only marked the conclusion of Taewŏn’gun’s rule but also signaled a significant shift in national policies under King Kojong. In contrast to his father’s rigid stance on foreign affairs, King Kojong sought to open Chosŏn to the outside world. Upon assuming full political authority from his father, the now mature king launched a series of reforms later characterized by Korean historians as efforts toward “modernization.” The period from 1873, when King Kojong assumed direct control of the government, to 1884, when the Qing Dynasty earnestly began intervening in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs, represents a crucial juncture in Chosŏn’s political evolution. In response to shifts in the global political environment, King Kojong recognized the imperative of engaging with foreign powers. The characterization of Chosŏn as a ‘hermit kingdom,’ implying a state of isolation, is a misnomer, given its historical interactions with China and Japan up until the early 19th century. Furthermore, Chosŏn’s active engagement with Western powers commenced in earnest under King Kojong’s direct governance. The Chosŏn government independently advanced its diplomatic policies, largely free from Qing interference, despite the latter’s status as Chosŏn’s longstanding suzerain. This autonomous stance, though not entirely unfettered, persisted despite strong opposition from Taewŏn’gun, his loyalists, and conservative Confucian scholars within Chosŏn. Consequently, the government’s pursuit of an open-door policy catalyzed the implementation of numerous reforms aimed at transforming Chosŏn’s traditional institutions. Among the various reforms undertaken by the Chosŏn government, military reform was regarded as one of the most critical responses to the escalating threats from foreign nations. 95 Following the signing of treaties with foreign powers such as Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,1 Chosŏn began to integrate foreign military systems to revitalize its traditional military institutions. Scholars have highlighted the military reform policies of the 1880s as emblematic of Chosŏn’s broader modernizing efforts. It is widely agreed among historians that King Kojong and his courtiers actively pursued the modernization of Chosŏn’s military system, recognizing it as both an urgent and essential undertaking for the time. In this chapter, I reexamine the Chosŏn government’s military reform policies between 1873, when King Kojong began his direct rule, and 1884, when Qing China significantly intensified its involvement in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs. Contrary to the arguments of Korean scholars, I contend that the military reform policies implemented by King Kojong and his advisors were not intended to fundamentally transform Chosŏn’s traditional military system or to realize the motto of a rich nation and a strong army, which served as a national policy slogan in Meiji Japan during the late 19th century. Despite the regime’s adoption and integration of foreign military systems, the underlying attitude toward Chosŏn’s military remained largely unaltered. Notably, the persistence of military exile as a punitive measure highlights the ruling class’s persistent negative perceptions of the military in Chosŏn society. To support my argument, I examine three key aspects of the military system. First, I analyze the function of the newly created military units between 1873 and 1884. Although the regime established and trained these units according to foreign military systems, their role fell short of enhancing national defense. Instead, their primary focus remained on protecting the royal family, a continuation of traditional military priorities in Chosŏn, rather than addressing external threats. Second, the status of military officials underwent significant changes as King Kojong implemented a new personnel policy. This policy favored civil officials and the relatives of Queen Consort Min, effectively sidelining military officials allied with Taewŏn’gun who took 1 The Chosŏn government concluded the Treaty of Kanghwa with Japan in 1876, marking the first modern treaty in Korean history and effectively ‘opening’ Korean ports to a foreign state. In response, Qing China, seeking to counter Japan’s growing influence over Chosŏn affairs, pursued diplomatic relations for Chosŏn with Western nations. This effort culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, commonly known as the Shufeldt Treaty, between Chosŏn and the United States in 1882. That same year, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France also established treaty relations with Chosŏn. Thus, 1882 emerged as a pivotal year in Chosŏn’s diplomatic history. For further details, see Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (University of California Press, 1980), 204-300, and Kim Wŏn-mo 김원모, Kŭndae Han’guk oegyosa yŏnp’yo 근대 한국 외교사 연표, (Tan’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1984). 96 a pro-military stance, albeit with many limitations in Taewŏn’gun’s policy. Finally, the continued use of military exile is noteworthy. Although this punitive measure, rooted in traditional military norms, was inconsistent with King Kojong’s efforts to reform Chosŏn’s military system and move away from conventional practices, it underscores the prevailing mindset of Chosŏn’s ruling elite toward both the military and its officials. King Kojong’s Direct Rule and the Change of Chosŏn’s Military System End of Taewŏn’gun’s regency and his major military policies On 10/25 of 1873, Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn, the Sixth-Rank Royal Secretary (同副承旨 Tongbu sŭngji) in the Royal Secretariat (承政院 Sŭngjŏngwŏn), submitted a trenchant memorial to the throne, sharply criticizing the maladministration of the Chosŏn government.2 Although the submission of memorials by Chosŏn officials was a routine practice, Ch’oe’s criticism sparked unprecedented political turmoil. His memorial ultimately led to the end of Taewŏn’gun’s regency as well as the resignation of officials closely aligned with him. At the time of Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s memorial submission, King Kojong was already 21 years old, and Queen Consort Sinjŏng, the official regent during his minority, had long since ended the dowager regency (垂簾聽政 suryŏm ch’ŏngjŏng). Thus, Taewŏn’gun’s continued regency over an adult king was highly irregular, persisting solely due to King Kojong’s tacit consent to his father’s extralegal control of the government. The political foundation of Taewŏn’gun’s regency was so insubstantial that even a minor event had the potential to destabilize the entire political system. Notably, even before Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn called for Taewŏn’gun’s resignation, King Kojong had shown a keen interest in the political situation of Qing China. Like Chosŏn, Qing was also under a regency on behalf of a boy emperor. Tongzhi Emperor (同治帝 1856-1874) ascended the throne at the age of five following the sudden death of his father, Xianfeng Emperor (咸豊帝 1831-1861). His two mothers, Empress Dowager Ci’an (慈安太后 1837-1881) and Empress 2 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:24a [1873/10/25]. 97 Dowager Cixi (慈禧太后 1835-1908), served as regents on his behalf. In the realm of domestic and foreign affairs, Prince Gong (恭親王 1833-1898), the late emperor’s brother, played a central role in managing key issues.3 King Kojong was sharply critical of Prince Gong’s foreign policies toward Western nations. During a royal lecture (進講 chin’gang) on 4/20 of 1871, the king expressed his doubts about Prince Gong’s stance toward the Western powers in a conversation with Kim Pyŏng-hak. The king speculated that the invasion by the ‘Western barbarians’ might have been facilitated by the cunning Prince Gong, to which Kim replied that Prince Gong likely accepted bribes from the ‘barbarians.’ He even went so far as to assert that the collusion between the ‘Western barbarians’ and Prince Gong ultimately had repercussions for Chosŏn.4 During a conversation on 4/30 of 1872, with Pak Pong-bin (朴鳳彬 1838-n.d.), who had recently returned to Chosŏn from Qing as the Document Officer (書狀官 Sŏjanggwan) of the Special Mission (奏請使 chuch’ŏngsa), King Kojong scathingly criticized Prince Gong’s stance toward the ‘Western barbarians’ once again.5 The king said, “It is said that the Western barbarians invaded China because Prince Gong colluded with them. Is this truly the case?” Pak Pong-bin replied, “Yes, it is.” 3 For details, see John K. Fairbank, "The Creation of the Treaty System", in The Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 257-263. 4 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 08-04-20 (11) [1871/04/20]. 上曰, 洋賊闖入中國, 必是恭親王之所引也。 我國之力, 固不及中國, 而以中國之大, 不能廓掃, 似是恭親王, 染邪陰護之致也。 炳學曰, 恭親王之陰護洋夷, 爲其受賂而然, 而向來咨文, 自禮部, 再三阻搪, 畢竟恭親王再三周旋, 至於移咨之境云, 其染邪綢繆之迹, 遠及我國者, 乃若此矣。 5 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 09-04-30 (27) [1872/04/30]. 上曰, 洋夷之侵犯中國, 恭親王爲內應而然云, 果然乎? 鳳彬曰, 然矣。 上曰, 恭親王以皇上之叔, 洋夷不爲禁制, 而乃反通貨, 其爲害民, 漸至浸染, 豈可如是耶? 鳳彬曰, 恭親王, 利其賄賂, 陰護洋夷, 朝野雖有禁制之心, 莫敢誰何云矣。(…) 上曰, 中原朝臣中, 或有才能之人乎? 鳳彬曰, 恭親王用事以後, 朝士中有雅望者, 擧皆休退, 現今在朝者, 別無其人, 而皇上親總後, 藝能之士, 當不日進用云矣。 98 The king continued, “Prince Gong, as the emperor’s uncle, should have opposed the Western barbarians. Instead, he has been trading goods with them, gradually causing harm to the people. How could such a thing be allowed?” Pak Pong-bin responded, “Prince Gong has been secretly protecting the Western barbarians because he benefits from bribes. Even though there are those in the court and among people who wish to stop this, they are powerless to do so.” [...] The king then asked, “Are there any officials in China with talent?” Pak Pong-bin replied, “Since Prince Gong seized power, most of the scholars with good reputations have withdrawn from the court. Currently, there are few such individuals remaining. However, it is said that once the emperor takes direct control of governance, scholars with talent and ability will quickly be employed.” The king questioned whether Prince Gong’s cooperation with the ‘Western barbarians’ had facilitated their encroachment on Qing. In response, Pak Pong-bin concurred with King Kojong’s suspicions, despite the fact that their concerns were unfounded. In this dialogue, particular attention should be given to the final exchange. Critiquing Prince Gong’s regency, Pak Pong-bin predicted that once the young emperor assumed direct rule, he would seek out and appoint scholars with talent and ability, despite the exodus of such individuals from the court due to Prince Gong’s misuse of political power. These conversations had the potential to jeopardize relations between Chosŏn and Qing, which likely explains their absence from Chosŏn’s official chronicle, the Veritable Records of King Kojong. Instead, these exchanges are recorded only in the Diary of the Royal Secretariat and the Court Chronicle, which were sources used for the Veritable Records but are not considered as official or definitive. While the king and Chosŏn officials lacked concrete evidence to substantiate claims that Prince Gong was aligned with Western powers, these discussions nonetheless reveal King Kojong’s perception of Prince Gong’s regency in Qing. Although King Kojong’s anti-foreign 99 stance, particularly toward Western powers, is evident from this conversation, he also expressed a clear disapproval of Prince Gong’s regency. Given the political context in Chosŏn, where Taewŏn’gun effectively ruled on the king’s behalf, King Kojong’s conversation with Pak Pong-bin was fraught with risk. Yet, it subtly signaled his desire to reclaim his political authority and hinted at his discontent with his father’s dominance. In this context, the memorial submitted by Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn on 10/25 of 1873 can be seen as a blessing in disguise from King Kojong’s perspective. In the memorial, Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn, known for his relentless criticism, assailed virtually every aspect of Taewŏn’gun’s regency, including the regent’s methods of recruiting officials, the passive attitudes of the three state councillors (大臣 taesin) and six ministers (六卿 yukkyŏng), the dereliction of duty by censors (大諫 taegan) and royal attendants (侍從 sijong), and the burdensome taxation imposed on the populace. Although it was not uncommon for Confucian scholars to critique government policies through memorials, the provocative nature of Ch’oe’s criticisms was particularly striking. However, King Kojong’s reaction was notably unexpected: rather than dismissing Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn, he appointed him as the Second Minister of the Ministry of Taxation (戶曹參判 Hojo ch’amp’an), acknowledging Ch’oe’s forthright and discerning observations.6 According to Hwang Hyŏn’s memoir, the timing and nature of Ch’oe’s censure of Taewŏn’gun led many to suspect that it was orchestrated by King Kojong himself.7 However, this speculation was unfounded, as Ch’oe’s subsequent opposition to King Kojong’s open-door policies revealed. Despite strong opposition from government officials, King Kojong supported Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn and quickly moved to dismantle Taewŏn’gun’s policies. One of his first actions was to suspend the collection of “voluntary contributions” (願納錢 wŏnnapchŏn) and the cash surtax on land (結錢 kyŏlchŏn) on 10/29 of 1873. The so-called “voluntary contributions” were used to 6 Pak Chu-dae 朴周大, Naam surok chŏn 羅巖隨錄 全 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (T’amgudang, 1980), 106. 同副承旨崔益鉉上時弊疏 癸酉十月 疏略曰, 且見挽近以來, 政變舊章, 人取軟熟, 大臣六卿, 無建白之議, 臺諫避好事之謗, 朝廷之上, 俗論恣行而正誼消, 諂侫肆志而眞士藏, 賦斂不息, 人民魚肉, 彛倫斁喪, 士氣沮敗。 7 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹, Maech’ŏn yarok 梅泉野錄 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Sinjisa, 1955), 19. 世見崔疏猝發, 而遽被奬擢, 遂意其受嗾。 100 fund the reconstruction of Kyŏngbok Palace (景福宮 Kyŏngbokkung), which had been destroyed by enraged Koreans during the Imjin War in the 16th century, as they expressed their fury over the king’s royal refuge. This tax was a hallmark of Taewŏn’gun’s taxation system and, contrary to its name, was effectively compulsory. The tax generated significant resentment among the populace, making its abolition popular and seemingly justified. However, King Kojong’s decision to eliminate these taxes did not account for the potential fiscal shortfall that might arise from this measure, raising concerns about the impact on national finances. King Kojong’s fiscal reforms effectively dismantled Taewŏn’gun’s taxation system, aligning with Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s proposals. The Chosŏn government repealed numerous taxes established during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, including the riverside tax (沿江收稅 yŏn’gangsuse), the artillery provision rice (砲糧米 p’oryangmi) for the Kanghwa Island Headquarters, the Seoul gate taxes, the Ch’ŏngsŏk Pass tax (靑石關稅 Chŏngsŏkkwanse),8 and the use of Chinese coins.9 This reduction in miscellaneous taxes appears to have been aimed at easing the population’s financial burden. In this context, James Palais’s assertion that while Taewŏn’gun addressed the immediate challenges of governance and established new precedents for royal authority, King Kojong was instructed in humility and virtuous rule by his Confucian mentors, holds merit.10 However, this new policy lacked a contingency plan to address the financial shortfall resulting from the dismantling of the existing taxation system. The negative impacts of King Kojong’s abrupt termination of Taewŏn’gun’s fiscal policies quickly became apparent. Specifically, with the diminished national budget threatening government military capacity, high-ranking Chosŏn officials expressed concern that the policy would hinder both reform efforts and military readiness. On 12/24 of 1873, Yi Yu-wŏn, the Chief State Councillor, conveyed his reservations about the abolition of the riverside tax, cautioning that it might deplete funds essential for artillery units, though he supported the king’s plan in principle.11 The cessation of 8 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:55a [1873/12/14]. 議政府啓: "向奉聖敎, 都城門稅及京外沿江稅, 一竝革罷事, 纔已布諭矣。 靑石關收稅, 亦不可異同, 分付松營, 使之卽速撤罷後登聞何如?" 允之。 9 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:2a [1874/01/06]. 10 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 35. 11 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-12-24 (25) [1873/12/24]. 又曰: "沿江收稅革罷事, 纔有行關於各道矣。 德意藹然, 孰不對揚明命? 而如或設砲所需之物, 參在其中, 則其在重邊固圉之道, 不得不措劃給代。 101 Chinese coin circulation further exacerbated the military budget shortfall, as the government lacked the capacity to mint sufficient new coins to compensate for the deficit. Yi U (李㘾 1807-n.d.), the Magistrate of Kwangju (廣州留守 Kwangju yusu), reported that an outstanding balance of 45,300 nyang, initially designated for payment in Chinese coins, remained unresolved following the discontinuation of their use. This financial shortfall rendered him unable to procure funds necessary for military supplies.12 Moreover, a significant order was issued on 12/20 of 1880 to dismantle the Three Armies Command, which represented the pinnacle of Taewŏn’gun’s military policy. The rationale for this abolition was that the office had become practically inactive.13 In fact, King Kojong had substantially defunded the office immediately after assuming direct rule, which hindered the Three Armies Command’s ability to perform its military duties. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the king employed a weak justification for his decision. In addition, a notable indicator of the shift in military policy was the diminishing significance of the Kanghwa Island Headquarters. During Taewŏn’gun’s regency, the regime prioritized the maritime defense of Kanghwa Island, situated at the mouth of the Han River, which connects to the capital city of Chosŏn. Consequently, the status of the headquarters was elevated from a junior second-rank office to a senior second-rank office, granting it authority over surrounding garrisons. Furthermore, the size of the headquarters was significantly expanded, with estimates of military personnel reaching between 3,000 and 4,000. The commander of the Kanghwa Island Headquarters also concurrently held the position of magistrate of the island.14 However, this prominence quickly diminished once King Kojong assumed direct control over state affairs. In 1874, the status of the Kanghwa Island Headquarters was reduced to its former rank, and the commander lost authority over surrounding garrisons,15 leading to 12 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:8a [1874/01/19]. 13 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 17:42a [1880/12/20]. 敎曰: "三軍府之設置, 雖有年, 而今無異汗漫職事, 革罷以爲新設衙門處所。" 14 Yukkun kunsa yon’guso 육군 군사 연구소, Han’guk kunsasa 9 - Kŭnhyŏndae 1 한국 군사사 9 - 근현대 1, (Yukkun ponbu, 2012), 132-133. 15 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:97a [1874/12/04]. 敎曰: "統制使外登壇革罷, 復舊例爲之。" 102 independent operations for units such as the Kyodong and Yŏngjong garrisons.16 By 1882, the budget allocated to Kanghwa Island was reassigned to the newly established Office for the Management of State Affairs (統理機務衙門 T’ongni Kimu Amun) to support new artillery units managed by this office.17 Under King Kojong’s administration, the Kanghwa Island Headquarters experienced neglect, effectively compromising the island’s maritime defense. In the meantime, King Kojong reversed Taewŏn’gun’s policy that ensured a two-year tenure for the Minister of War and commanders of major central military units.18 Although the government rarely adhered to this promise in practice, the king formally announced the policy’s abolition. Since the tenure guarantee had been designed to benefit military officials, revoking it signified the regime’s objective to withdraw preferential treatment for the military elite.19 Indeed, the tenure of the Minister of War was often short-lived. The table below summarizes the tenure duration and corresponding branch for each minister. Table 6: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1873-1884 Name Branch Tenure Appointment Date Sŏ Sang-jŏng (徐相鼎 1813-1876) Civil official 30 months 10/6 of 1873 Sŏ Tang-bo (徐堂輔 1806-1883) Civil official 2 months 6/27 of 1876 Kim Pyŏng-si (金炳始 1832-1898) Civil official 13 months 8/11 of 1876 Min Kyŏm-ho (閔謙鎬 1838-1882) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 11 months 9/16 of 1877 Kim Po-hyŏn (金輔鉉 1826-1882) Civil official 16 days 7/4 of 1878 16 Kanghwabu yusu chaeimsi kyerok kŭp naemun 江華府前留守在任時啓錄及來關 (Records and Communications Submitted During the Tenure of the Former Magistrate of Kanghwa Prefecture) 3, 20a [1875] (奎 15088). 光緖元年十月 日到 議政府爲相考事節 啓下敎府 啓辭向奉 傳敎仁川陞作防營永宗移屬仁川之節制措劃之方畿伯沁留商議登 聞事行會矣道守臣狀本今纔齊到而永宗旣係海門要衝則復設本鎭之論必有爛確深裁。 17 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 19:10b [1882/02/11]. 命沁都砲糧木十一同零, 自今年移屬該府, 以贍新設砲軍餼料。 因統理機務衙門啓也。 18 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:58a [1873/12/24]. 敎曰: "兵曹判書、禁軍別將之定朔數, 非古規。 且亞卿亞將之除拜大將, 則依例陞正卿, 直擬兵判, 亦非古法, 有似太濫。 竝復舊例施行。" 19 In fact, ministers in other ministries often served in their posts for only about six months or even less before being reassigned. In this context, the promise of a two-year tenure for the Minister of War and commanders was a special privilege associated with their duties. 103 Name Branch Tenure Appointment Date Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元 1831-1891) Civil official Royal Family 12 months 7/20 of 1878 Song Kŭn-su (宋近洙 1818-1903 Civil official 2 months 7/29 of 1879 Kim Pyŏng-dŏk (金炳德 1825-1892) Civil official 3 months 12/7 of 1879 Yi Chae-myŏn (李載冕 1845-1912) Civil official Royal Family 11 months 3/9 of 1880 Min T’ae-ho (閔台鎬 1834-1884) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 7 months 1/11 of 1881 Cho Yŏng-ha (趙寧夏 1845-1884) Civil official 18 months 8/2 of 1881 Yun Cha-dŏk (尹滋悳 1827-1890) Civil official 4 days 2/11 of 1883 Han Kyŏng-wŏn (韓敬源 1817-n.d.) Civil official 5 months 2/15 of 1883 Yi Ho-jun (李鎬俊 1821-1901) Civil official 3 months 7/27 of 1883 Min Yŏng-wi (閔泳緯 1818-1886) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 4 months 10/10 of 1883 Chŏng Pŏm-jo (鄭範朝 1833-1897) Civil official 4 months 1/17 of 1884 Min Yŏng-mok (閔泳穆 1826-1884) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 23 days 5/4 of 1884 Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元, 1831-1891) Civil official Royal Family 5 months 5/27 of 1884 Source: The Diary of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi) and the Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok) In addition to the brief tenures, the table illustrates that King Kojong’s relatives, including both royal family members and relatives of Queen Consort Min, were frequently appointed as Ministers of War. The consistent appointment of the king’s relatives and civil officials suggests that military expertise was rarely prioritized when selecting candidates for these crucial roles. Despite the growing threat of Western encroachment on Chosŏn, the regime’s approach to national defense largely remained consistent with long-established practices. Military reforms and the persistence of traditional structures (1873-1884) After taking direct control, King Kojong sought to reshape the traditional military system in line with his ambitions and vision. Indeed, it was an effort to put new wine into new 104 wineskins. Most Korean scholarship supports the notion that the formation of new military units under Kojong’s leadership represented a “modernization” process within Chosŏn’s military structure.20 This interpretation emphasizes a clear departure from the traditional framework and draws a distinct line between the old system and the newly introduced military institutions. However, his reforms stopped short of thoroughly transforming the underlying military framework and ideology. As Ching Young Choe observes, the continuation of Taewŏn’gun’s policies in the decade following his resignation is a critical factor that should not be overlooked.21 Additionally, Jihyun Kim’s research on spirit-written texts (扶乩 pugye), which was used by civil and military elites to sustain Enlightenment (開化 kaehwa) discourse during Kojong’s reign, challenges the rigid binary between premodern and modern structures. According to Kim, the king continued to advocate traditional values such as morality, loyalty, and filial piety through these writings, suggesting that such virtues were seen as foundational to Enlightenment, rather than industrialization or Westernization. In this context, King Kojong’s military reform policies during the first decade of his direct rule cannot be seen as a clear break from tradition.22 Specifically, the first step in King Kojong’s military reform was the establishment of the Palace Guard Unit (武衛所 Muwiso). Concerned for his safety during the political transition within the central government, King Kojong recognized the need for a stronger security presence. On 05/05 of 1874, he ordered an increase in the number of royal guards, citing the previous force as excessively inadequate in light of increasing resistance from the pro-Taewŏn’gun group,23 Despite Yi Yu-wŏn’s concerns regarding the potential negative 20 For instance, Ch’a Mun-sŏp contends that the Military Training Unit (敎鍊兵隊 Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae), also known as Special Skill Force (別技軍 Pyŏlgigun), represented a “precondition for modern reform.” (Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, "Kuhanmal kunsachedo ŭi pyŏnch’ŏn" 구한말 군사제도의 변천, Kunsa 군사 5, (1982): 32.) Likewise, Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok describes the reform policies implemented by the Chosŏn government as part of the “process of modernizing military forces.” (Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, "Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae yŏn’gu" 교련병대 연구, Kunsa 군사 18, (1989): 74.) Additionally, Yi Chong-jin highlights the significance of Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae as it was “the first modern military unit to implement a systematic training and education curriculum.” (Yi Chong-jin 이종진, "Kojong sidae kŭndaejŏk kunsa chedo ŭi suyong: Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae ŭi sŏlch’i wa unyŏng" 고종시대 근대적 군사제도의 수용: 교련병대 (별칭 별기군, 왜별기)의 설치와 운영 (MA thesis, Seoul National University, 2014), 18.) 21 Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 177. 22 Kim Jihyun, "Enlightenment on the Spirit-Altar: Eschatology and Restoration of Morality at the King Kwan Shrine in Fin de siècle Seoul", Religions 11, no. 6 (2020): 1-2, 23. 23 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:43b [1874/05/05]. 105 repercussions of strengthening the palace guard, including the financial burden on the state and potential discord among military units, the king chose to proceed with his decision. The following month, the royal guard unit was officially renamed the Palace Guard Unit, and the commander of the Military Training Agency was appointed as the head of this new unit.24 The political threat to the king was, in fact, not entirely unfounded. A key event underscoring this was the assassination of Min Sŭng-ho, the stepbrother of Queen Consort Min, in 1875. He was killed by a bomb concealed in a package delivered to his home.25 While Taewŏn’gun was implicated as the alleged mastermind behind the assassination, no concrete evidence supported this claim. Moreover, there were persistent memorials to the throne urging the restoration of Taewŏn’gun to power, seeking an end to his forced seclusion in a remote area. For instance, Yi Hwi-rim (李彙林 1829-n.d.), the Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer (副司果 Pusagwa), argued that the king should kindly persuade his father to return.26 Yi Hwi-rim was subsequently banished for lèse-majesté after using disrespectful language in his memorial. Despite valid concerns about potential assaults on the king, the excessive expansion of the Palace Guard Unit became problematic. Specifically, in July 1874, 590 standard bearers (標下軍 p’yohagun) and transportation soldiers from the Military Training Agency, the Forbidden Guard Division, and the Capital Guard Unit were reassigned to the Palace Guard Unit.27 As a result, the size of the unit expanded from 500 to approximately 4,400 in 1880.28 Subsequently, on 08/20 of 1874, 40,000 nyang from the ginseng tax allocated to the Kanghwa Island Headquarters was redirected to the Palace Guard Unit.29 This shift held historical 敎曰: "闕內宿衛, 頗爲疎虞。 若値幸行時, 武藝廳六十名扈駕, 守宮者無多。 今則又有元子, 尤當加意, 所以把守軍添數之事有之矣。" 裕元曰: "新定宿衛, 恐或有流弊, 不可不審愼者也。" 24 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:55b [1874/06/20]. 敎曰: "把守軍稱號, 以武衛所爲之, 令訓將仍爲句檢。" 25 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 242-244. 26 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:87a [1874/10/20]. 27 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 11-07-11 (04) [1874/07/11]. 以司謁口傳下敎曰, 訓局標下軍一百九十三名, 卜馬軍三十三名, 禁衛營標下軍一百六十四名, 卜馬軍十九名, 御營廳標下軍一百六十二名, 卜馬軍十九名, 移屬武衛所事, 分付。 28 Sim Hŏn-yong 심헌용, Hanmal kun kŭndaehwa yŏn’gu 한말 군 근대화 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2005), 45. 29 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:73b [1874/08/20]. 裕元曰: "稅錢四萬兩, 尙未歸屬, 而姑未措處矣。 鎭撫營所去蔘稅中四萬兩, 自明年移劃于武衛所, 而今年則只以萬兩劃上。 106 significance, marking the dismantling of Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to consolidate maritime defense in favor of bolstering royal family protection. King Kojong’s preferential treatment of the Palace Guard Unit prompted high-ranking officials to voice concerns about its potential negative consequences. During an audience with the king, Yi Yu-wŏn, the then Chief State Councillor, remarked, “There is no official position that the Palace Guard Unit does not hold, nor any task it does not undertake.”30 Similarly, Pak Kyu-su (朴珪壽 1807-1877), the then Left State Councillor, expressed his apprehension about the king directly consulting the clerks of the Palace Guard Unit on military affairs regarding individual military units.31 Yi Yu-wŏn further noted that the troopers in the Palace Guard Unit acted arrogantly and looked down on soldiers from other units, urging the regime to take measures to prevent such behavior.32 Moreover, it appeared that the troopers were recklessly mistreating civilians outside the royal palace. Yi Yu-wŏn reiterated his concerns about their conduct and called for stringent measures against them.33 Nevertheless, the king continued to expand the Palace Guard Unit, and the social issues associated with this unit persisted. Notably, while salaries for other traditional units were often in arrears, this was not the case for the Palace Guard Unit. Moreover, the unit was composed of the most elite military personnel and was equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. King Kojong’s favoritism toward this special unit repeatedly resulted in the neglect of traditional military units and fostered discord among them in the future. King Kojong’s military reform contrasted sharply with Meiji Japan’s efforts to transform its military structure. Following the establishment of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese government began constructing a new military system, dismantling the traditional, samurai-based model. Specifically, the regime focused on strengthening the central army and establishing a 30 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:63b [1874/07/15]. 竊覵武衛之制, 當初聖意, 不過是侍衛捍禦宮禁而已。 以今見之, 無任不備, 靡事不擧。 31 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:63b [1874/07/15]. 卽如各司各營書吏之擇其解事者, 移屬兼帶, 伏未知何爲而然也。 該司該營該之凡干事務, 隨時下問, 誠爲簡便容易。 聖意攸在, 恐出於此, 而竊謂事體, 不必如此。 32 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1874/08/20]. (命武衛軍各營各司不可凌侮其憑藉作弊亦當禁戢) 而若使各司各營, 視若尋常編伍, 凌侮不已, 則揆以事體, 不當如是。 若使該軍, 恃而恣橫, 仍無顧忌, 則揆以紀律, 又不當如是。 防微杜漸, 古人有語。 33 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:82b [1874/10/08]. 武衛所之設, 重宿衛也。 軍卒之作弊外間, 洞燭無餘, 至有嚴束之處分, 則孰不欽仰德意? 107 standing army system through conscription. Authorities required each domain to dispatch 10 soldiers to the central army for every 10,000 bushels of rice produced and to enlist 50 soldiers per 10,000 bushels as part of the regional standing army.34 This administrative directive marked the initial step in building a national standing army. Moreover, in 1869, the Ministry of War (兵部省 Hyōbushō) was established, alongside two affiliated organizations: the Army Bureau (陸軍省 Rikugunshō) and the Navy Bureau (海軍省 Kaigunshō). The ministry also prioritized military education, culminating in the founding of the Kyoto Military Academy in 1868.35 In fact, the Meiji government made significant efforts to strengthen the imperial palace guard, resulting in the establishment of the Imperial Guard (近衛兵 Konoehei) under the direct command of Emperor Meiji (明治天皇) in 1872.36 However, the central goal of Japan’s military reforms was the creation of a standing army system based on the conscription of commoners. While Chosŏn had also maintained military units composed of commoners, it primarily focused on expanding the troops assigned to guard the royal palace. In contrast, Meiji Japan’s efforts to build large-scale standing armies from the commoner class marked a significant departure from Chosŏn’s military policy. Despite considerable debate among political leaders, the government resolved to adopt a universal conscription system in 1872, formalizing this decision with the promulgation of the Conscription Ordinance (徴兵令 Chōheirei) in 1873. Implementing the conscription system, however, presented numerous challenges. Financial instability, rooted in an unreliable tax base, alongside a deficient supply network and widespread draft evasion, complicated the process. Exemptions were allowed for heads of households, and prospective conscripts could legally avoid service by paying a substitution fee of 270 yen. Manuals detailing methods to evade conscription circulated widely, underscoring the public’s resistance.37 Furthermore, the term “blood tax” (血税 ketsuzei), which was borrowed from European terminology, was widely misunderstood by the peasant population, who 34 Katō Yōko 加藤陽子, Chōheisei to kindai Nihon, 1868-1945 徴兵制と近代日本, 1868-1945, (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1996), 27. 35 Pak Yŏng-jun 박영준, "Myŏngch’iyusin chŏnhu ŭi Ilbon kunsasa (1853-1877)" 明治維新 전후의 일본 군사사 (1853-1877), Kunsa 군사 28, (1994): 140. 36 Ōba Akira 大場昭, "Nihon ni okeru gunsei no tenkai - 6 - Meiji shoki no gunsei - ka" 日本における軍制の展開- 6 -明治初期の軍制- 下, Kokubō 国防 39, no. 4 (1990): 103-104. 37 Oleg Benesch, "Before Bushidō: Considering Samurai Thought and Identity", in Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 37. 108 interpreted it literally and staged protests in opposition to conscription. Despite these significant barriers, the Japanese government pressed ahead with its military reforms, emphasizing the enhancement of national defense as a strategic priority. Meanwhile, the diplomatic landscape surrounding Chosŏn underwent a significant transformation. Unlike Taewŏn’gun, who adopted a relatively exclusive stance toward opening the port, King Kojong actively sought to establish new diplomatic relations with foreign powers, despite facing strong opposition from senior officials in the court. In this context, Kim Yong-gu aptly characterizes King Kojong’s efforts as a “lonely struggle.” 38 Japan, in turn, sought to reshape the traditional neighborly relationship (交隣 kyorin) into a modern framework grounded in the principles of international law (萬國公法 Man’guk kongpŏp). This shift was exemplified by the Treaty of Kanghwa (江華島條約 Kanghawdo Choyak), signed in 1876 between Chosŏn and Japan, which marked the beginning of Chosŏn’s engagement in modern diplomatic relations with foreign states. Amid this shifting international context, Qing, the longstanding suzerain of Chosŏn, also adjusted its foreign policy toward the kingdom. In fact, Qing strongly advised Chosŏn to negotiate with Japan during the process of the Kanghwa Treaty, as it sought to avoid becoming involved in the military conflict that arose from the failed negotiations between Chosŏn and Japan.39 Traditionally, the Qing court had refrained from intervening in Chosŏn’s domestic and foreign affairs; however, it began to exert a more proactive influence on Chosŏn’s political landscape.40 Japan and China competed for dominance on the Korean peninsula, and this shift in diplomatic relations significantly impacted Chosŏn’s military system. King Kojong adopted a strategy of equidistant diplomacy in the context of Chosŏn’s military reform. He sent two separate missions: the Good Will Mission (修信使 Susinsa) and the Courtiers’ Inspection Mission (朝士視察團 Chosa Sich’altan) to Japan,41 alongside the 38 Regarding King Kojong’s attitude towards new diplomatic relations with Japan, refer to Yong-gu Kim, Korea and Japan: The Clash of Worldviews, 1868-1876, (Circle, 2006), 35-56. 39 Brahm Swaroop Agrawal, "The Opening of Korea and the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876", in Japan and the Pacific, 1540–1920, ed. Mark Caprio and Koichiro Matsuda (Routledge, 2000), 314-318. 40 Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (University of California Press, 1980), 204-300. 41 For details, refer to Hŏ Tonghyŏn (Huh Donghyun), "The Korean Courtiers’ Observation Mission’s Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern State Building", Korean Studies 29, (2005): trans. Vladimir Tikhonov, 30-54; 109 Delegation to Tianjin (領選使 Yŏngsŏnsa) to Qing in 1880.42 These missions were designed to study the military systems and acquire advanced military technology from both nations. Subsequently, Chosŏn’s government implemented military reforms inspired by both Japanese and Chinese models. Despite his outwardly balanced approach to military transformation, King Kojong showed a personal preference for the Japanese military system over the Chinese one. For instance, in the 1880s, the king specially granted audiences to Japanese military cadets and midshipmen,43 no such occurrences were recorded for Chinese cadets. Besides, his conversation with Cho Pyŏng-sik (趙秉式 1823-1907) on 04/15 of 1876 underscored this particular interest.44 King: The Japanese indicated that they would instruct us on machine production, did they not? Cho: They responded affirmatively, stating they would certainly teach us if we expressed interest in learning about Gatling guns and matches. King: Did they also mention providing instruction on the construction of steamships? Cho: I have not received any information regarding that. King: Did they suggest that we also explore agricultural machinery? Cho: According to their comments, it would be advisable for our country to observe and imitate when we send envoys to Japan. Kitsunetsuka Yoko 狐塚裕子, "1881-nen Chōsen chōshi shisatsudan (Shinshi yūrandan) no Nihon haken -- Nihon-gawa kara mita haken keii" 1881年朝鮮朝士視察団(紳士遊覧団)の日本派遣--日本側から見た派遣経緯, Seisen joshi daigaku kiyō 清泉女子大学紀要 51, (2003): 49-68; and Kitsunetsuka Yoko 狐塚裕子, "1881-nen Chōsen chōshi shisatsudan (Shinshi yūrandan) no rainichi (I): Gaimushō no taiō o chūshin ni" 1881年朝鮮朝士視察団(紳士遊覧団)の来日(一): 外務省の対応を中心に, Seisen joshi daigaku kiyō 清泉女子大学紀要 56, (2008): 27-43. 42 For details, see Kwŏn Hyŏk-su 권혁수, 19-segi mal Han-Chung kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu: Yi Hong-jang ŭi Chosŏn insik kwa chŏngch’aek ŭl chungsim ŭro 19세기말 한중관계사 연구: 이홍장의 조선인식과 정책을 중심으로, (Paeksan charyowŏn, 2000). 43 Kōbunroku (公文録, Records of Official Documents), vol. 12, [1883/01/23, 明治十六年一月-二月], Gaimushō (外務省, the Ministry of Diplomacy). (朝鮮国王ヘ陸海軍士官謁見并操練等御覧ノ件) 朝鮮国王ヘ陸軍士官謁見並操練御覧相成候儀ニ付近藤臨時代理公使ヨリ別紙写ノ通届出候間此段及上申候也。 44 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1876/04/15]. (召見忠淸監司 趙秉式于含元殿) 上曰, 其時彼人云, 器械制作, 當指導云, 然否? 秉式曰, 回旋砲·自起磺, 若欲學得, 則當指導云矣. 上曰, 火輪船造法, 亦爲指導云, 然否? 秉式曰, 未得聞之矣. 上曰, 農器亦勸學云, 然否? 秉式曰, 彼云本國使若入來, 則其時模倣爲好云矣。 110 In 1881, King Kojong established the Military Training Unit (敎鍊兵隊 Kyoryŏnbyŏngdae) modeled after the Japanese system. Hanabusa Yoshimoto (花房義質 1841-1917), the Japanese ambassador to Chosŏn, actively lobbied the king to adopt this military structure.45 Alongside King Kojong’s personal preference for the Japanese approach to military reform, Hanabusa’s lobbying efforts significantly contributed to the formation of the new military unit. Horimoto Reizō (堀本礼造 n.d.-1882), a Japanese second lieutenant in the engineer corps and military attaché to Hanabusa Yoshimoto, was appointed as a military instructor for the unit. While the establishment of the Military Training Unit is often regarded as a precursor to the modernization of Chosŏn’s military system, its operational effectiveness does not substantiate this claim. Contrary to the prevailing view of the newly formed military organization, the unit, consisting of only 20 cadet candidates and 140 students, was insufficient to meet the demands of national defense. Furthermore, this unit was not employed as a model for transforming the organizational structure of traditional military units. Instead, the regime primarily deployed this unit to safeguard the king during public processions. Regarding Chosŏn’s military reform and the Training Military Unit, in his correspondence to Inoue Kaoru (井上馨 1836-1915), the then Japanese minister of diplomacy, Hanabusa Yoshimoto appraised that the military reform was not yet a “true reform.” His assessment underscores the incomplete and superficial nature of the special army.46 Furthermore, the Japanese instructor, Horimoto Reizō, who specialized in the engineer corps, was not adequately equipped to provide effective military training for Chosŏn’s forces. This limitation was exacerbated by the nascent state of Japan’s weaponry system, particularly as the Murata rifle, Japan’s main firearm, was only developed in 1880, two years before the formation of the Military Training Unit.47 45 Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998), 131-132. 46 Ichikawa Masaaki 市川正明, eds., Nikkan gaikō shiryō 2-Ningo jihen 日韓外交史料 2-壬午事変 (Hara shobō, 1980), 86. 右ハ未タ真正ノ改革トハ難云候得共之ヲ以テ彼政府カ得失利害ヲ考ルノ始トスル者ニテ即真正改革ノ初歩我陸軍士官ノ手ニ相開ケル者ニテ是亦実際上數年勸誘の一結果ニ付別紙往復相添不取敢及上申候。 47 Kim Sŏng-gŭn 김성근, "Meiji Ilbon ŭi tae Chosŏn oegyo wa kunsa kisul, 1876-1882" 메이지 일본의 대조선 외교와 군사 기술, 1876-1882, Han’guk kwahaksa hakhoeji 한국과학사학회지 37, no. 1 (2015): 65. 111 The creation of new military units, such as the Palace Guard Unit and the Military Training Unit, acted as a financial black hole, absorbing vast amounts of resources and leading to severe reductions in provisions for traditional military units. For example, in August 1877, Kim Han-mun (金漢文 n.d.) and four other members of the traditional Military Training Agency publicly posted a notice protesting their unpaid salaries. This incident highlights the challenges of implementing comprehensive military reform across the entire armed forces, particularly in light of the financial constraints. Consequently, the soldiers were subsequently exiled to remote and inhospitable islands (遠惡島 wŏnakto) as a commuted punishment from the death penalty.48 Furthermore, reports from 1878 indicated that officers and rank-and-file soldiers in various units had not been paid for an entire year.49 The Chosŏn government, however, failed to resolve this persistent issue, which ultimately contributed to the military mutiny by soldiers from traditional units in 1882. The preferential treatment afforded to the Military Training Unit resulted in significant discrimination against other traditional units. In June 1882, soldiers from these traditional units revolted after going without their salaries for 13 months. In particular, they killed Horimoto Reizō and attempted to launch an attack on the Japanese legation. To address this unrest, King Kojong summoned his father, Taewŏn’gun, requesting his assistance in managing state affairs. Consequently, the new military units were disbanded, and the traditional military system was reinstated. Qing China intervened in Chosŏn’s political crisis at the behest of the Chosŏn government. Following the completion of the Courtiers’ Inspection Mission to Japan, Ŏ Yun-jung (魚允中 1848-1896) visited Tianjin, where, alongside Kim Yun-sik (金允植 1835-1922), the head of the Delegation to Tianjin, he formally requested Chinese officials to deploy military forces to suppress the military mutiny in Chosŏn.50 From Qing’s perspective, intervening in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs was an inevitable decision given the international circumstances surrounding the peninsula. In 1879, the Meiji government of Japan annexed the Ryūkyū 48 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 14:27b [1877/08/10]. 49 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 15:431 [1878/12/25]. 以各營將卒餼料言之, 年終而不能準數放下, 則其在事體, 實爲可悶。 斯速別般措劃之意, 申飭戶惠廳及各營. 50 Ŏ Yun-jung 魚允中, Chongjŏng yŏnp’yo 從政年表 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe, 1971), 136. 112 Kingdom (琉球), a tributary state of Qing, heightening regional tensions. Additionally, Russia’s southward expansion toward the Korean peninsula posed a significant threat to Qing’s security.51 In response, Qing forces abducted Taewŏn’gun and transported him to Baoding, Qing China.52 With Qing troops launching decisive attacks on Chosŏn’s traditional military units, the military mutiny was ultimately suppressed.53 Amid the military mutiny, the Qing government dispatched the 23-year-old military officer Yuan Shikai (袁世凱 1859-1916) to Chosŏn, where he played a significant role in the abduction of the Taewŏn’gun and the suppression of Chosŏn’s traditional soldiers. Yuan’s appointment was strongly supported by Li Hongzhang (李鴻章 1823-1901), while the close relationship between his stepfather, Yuan Baoqing (袁保慶 1825-1873), and Wu Changqing (吳長慶 1833-1884), the supreme commander of the Qing military forces in Chosŏn, was instrumental in securing his position.54 Yuan’s subsequent intervention in Chosŏn’s domestic affairs and his fraught interactions with King Kojong over diplomatic matters underscore the military mutiny as a critical juncture in Sino-Korean relations. After the restoration of his authority, King Kojong once again restructured the military units, albeit with slight modifications to their organization. Japan exerted a significant influence on Chosŏn’s political landscape, and not only Japan but also Qing China played a role in shaping the new army system. In fact, Qing troops did not fully withdraw from Chosŏn, leaving 3,000 military personnel stationed in Seoul. Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili and the Beiyang Trade 51 Kwŏn Sŏk-pong 권석봉, "Imo Kunbyŏn si Ch’ŏngch’ŭk kaeip ŭi paegyŏng" 임오군변시 청측 개입의 배경, Suktae saron 숙대사론 6, (1971): 11-20. 52 The Qing government was concerned about Taewŏn’gun’s conservative foreign policy toward foreign nations and the potential reversal of King Kojong’s new policies. Thus, the Qing regime decided to abduct Taewŏn’gun. On 7/13 of 1882, when Taewŏn’gun visited the military camp where Ding Ruchang (丁汝昌 n.d.-1895) and Ma Jianzhong (馬建忠 1845-1900), the commanders of the Qing military forces, were stationed to greet them, Chinese military forces captured him and transported him to Baoding. For details regarding the abduction process, refer to Dong-jae Yim, "The Abduction of the Taewŏn’gun: 1882", Papers on China 21, (1969): 99-130, and Kwŏn Sŏk-pong 권석봉, "Taewŏn’gun ŭi p’isu wa Cho·Ch’ŏng kwan’gye" 대원군의 피수와 조청관계, in Chuktang Yi Hyŏn-hŭi kyosu hwagap kinyŏm: Han’guk sahak nonch’ong 죽당 이현희교수 화갑기념: 한국사학논총, ed. Chuktang Yi Hyŏn-hŭi kyosu hwagap kinyŏm nonchong kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 죽당이현희교수 화갑기념논총 간행위원회 편 (Kukhak charyowŏn, 1998). 53 For details, refer to Cho Sŏng-yun 조성윤, "Imo Kullan ŭi sahoejŏk sŏngkyŏk" 임오군란의 사회적 성격 (MA thesis, Yonsei University, 1982). 54 Yi Yang-ja 이양자, Kamguk taesin Wian Sŭk’ai: chwajŏlhan Chosŏn ŭi kŭndae wa Chungguk ŭi kansŏp 감국대신 위안스카이: 좌절한 조선의 근대와 중국의 간섭, (Hanul ak’ademi, 2019), 31-35. 113 Minister (直隸總督兼北洋大臣) of Qing, sought to withdraw the Chinese military forces from the Korean peninsula, as their presence could lead foreign powers to perceive Qing as responsible for Chosŏn’s national security.55 However, maintaining dominance over the Chosŏn regime took precedence over potential misunderstandings from the international community amid the competitive context of Japan’s involvement in Chosŏn affairs. Consequently, the Chosŏn government established the Capital Guards Command (親軍營 Ch’in’gunyŏng), comprising four battalions, between 1882 and 1884. Furthermore, in August 1884, the traditional units within the central army were disbanded and integrated into the Capital Guards Command. This effectively abolished the traditional central army system, leaving only a few minor units in existence.56 However, a significant challenge arose from the divergent training methodologies adopted by the four units. The Left Battalion (親軍左營 Ch’in’gun Chwayŏng) and Right Battalion (親軍右營 Ch’in’gun Uyŏng) were trained under the supervision of Chinese officers, including Yuan Shikai and his subordinates.57 The Qing’s military support for Chosŏn was not explicitly intended to strengthen Chosŏn’s military capabilities; rather, the Qing regime dispatched Chinese drill instructors as part of its diplomatic strategy to counter Japan’s expanding influence in Chosŏn. In contrast, the Front Battalion (親軍前營 Ch’in’gun Chŏnyŏng) and Rear Battalion (親軍後營 Ch’in’gun Huyŏng) adhered to a Japanese training model, with their drills led by members of the pro-Japanese party.58 The inconsistency in training practices and operational characteristics hindered the regime’s ability to establish a coherent chain of command within the central army, leading to significant discord among the various units. For instance, in his diary, Yun Ch’i-ho expressed his concerns to King Kojong before the coup, stating, “Currently, the Left and Right Battalion troops and the Front Battalion troops view each other as enemies, and they act this way even in ordinary 55 Kirk W Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910, (Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2008), 95-96. 56 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:70b [1884/08/29]. 統理軍國事務衙門以"依下敎, 龍虎營、禁衛營、御營廳、總戎廳, 移付於親軍四營節目, 與軍務司堂上, 爛漫商確, 條列書入"啓。 57 Lin Mingde 林明德, Yuan Shikai yu Chaoxian 袁世凱與朝鮮, (Zhong yang yan jiu yuan jin dai shi yan jiu suo, 1970), 28-33. 58 Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, "Imogullan hu ch’in’gunje ŭi sŏngnip kwa kŭ mosun" 임오군란후 친군제의 성립과 그 모순, Kunsa 군사 26, (1993): 100-106. 114 times. How, then, can they possibly muster any effort to serve the country when a crisis arises?”59 Yun Ch’i-ho inadvertently predicted the military conflict that would arise in the future. The presence of differing training styles within a single military unit is problematic and stands in stark contrast to the cohesive structure of the Japanese military. The Meiji government actively recruited foreign military advisers and instructors from France and the United Kingdom to facilitate these reforms. For instance, French officer Albert Charles Du Bousquet (1837-1882) served as both an interpreter and diplomat, playing a pivotal role in the transformation of the Japanese army. He specifically counseled Yamagata Aritomo (山県有朋 1838-1922), the Minister of War, to promptly disband the domain armies following the Meiji Restoration, a recommendation that Yamagata faithfully enacted.60 Similarly, upon the establishment of the naval school in Yokohama in 1869, the Japanese navy employed 34 British instructors. Consequently, the army adopted the French model for its land forces and the British system for its navy, in line with the directives of the Meiji government.61 Japan maintained a uniform training methodology across its military branches, in contrast to Chosŏn’s military system. Given that no significant conflicts occurred within the Japanese army or the navy between different military units, this coherence likely contributed to the effective management of Japan’s military structure, unlike the discord present in Chosŏn’s system. In terms of military financial management, the Chosŏn government exhibited significant inconsistencies. Considering the already limited funds for each military unit, the regime frequently redirected military budgets from traditional units to other departments to address urgent issues as they arose. While it is conceivable that the government prioritized certain matters over the management of individual units, this reallocation of funds undermined the financial stability of the traditional military units. For instance, on 04/25 of 1875, the Office for the Dispensation of Benevolence (宣惠廳 Sŏnhyech’ŏng), responsible for managing the taedong tribute tax, reported that it held only 59 Yun Ch’i-ho 尹致昊, Yun Ch’i-ho ilgi 尹致昊日記, 己未 十二月 二十一日 [1884/12/21]. 今左右營與前營, 視若仇敵, 平日如此, 況有事之時, 豈肯出力爲國哉。 60 Ōba Akira 大場昭, "Nihon ni okeru gunsei no tenkai - 6 - Meiji shoki no gunsei - ka" 日本における軍制の展開- 6 -明治初期の軍制- 下, Kokubō 国防 39, no. 4 (1990): 93. 61 D. Eleanor Westney, "The Military", in Japan in Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji, ed. Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton University Press, 1986), 178. 115 30,000 sŏk of rice in its grain-transport warehouse (漕留米 choryumi). In response, the office reallocated 12,000 nyang of coins, worth approximately 1,714 sŏk of rice,62 originally earmarked for funds for armors and helmets (甲冑價 kapchuga), to fund the reconstruction of three halls within Kyŏngbok Palace.63 This indicates that the coins were insufficient to address the financial shortfall. The report underscores the office’s precarious budget situation and illustrates the government’s management of the taxation system. The regime’s actions reveal a prioritization of strengthening royal authority, often at the expense of national defense. In fact, the financial practice of reallocating military budgets for other purposes had already become prevalent during the regency of Taewŏn’gun. Yi Ch’oe-ŭng (李最應 1815-1882), the Chief State Councillor, expressed concerns about the adverse consequences of such temporary measures. His arguments presented during an audience with King Kojong clearly illustrate the financial practices within the government.64 Yi Ch’oe-ŭng reported, “The resources that each unit and the Ministry of War have kept in reserve used to always have a surplus each year in the past. However, whenever unexpected expenditures arise in the country, they are transferred to cover those expenses, resulting in the units eventually being depleted, which often leads to the suspension of necessary expenditures. As this situation unfolds, I cannot help but feel sorrow. Although this situation did not arise overnight, it is better to adopt measures to ensure sustainability through 62 According to the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code (大典會通 Taejŏn hoet’ong), the exchange rate for 1 sŏk of rice was set at 7 nyang of coins. Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 戶典, 收稅 [定田稅三手米]. 永作錢邑, 米一石七兩, 太一石三兩, 田米一石五兩。 63 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:18a [1875/04/25]. 宣惠廳以"景福宮三殿閣重建之役, 以本廳錢十萬兩劃送事, 命下矣。 本廳時在無他措辦之道, 只有總外漕留米三萬石。 今雖執錢取用, 每年剩餘, 可以取次立本。 故以此先爲劃送, 而其餘不足條, 以甲冑價錢一萬二千兩充數何如?" 允之。 64 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 14:22a [1877/06/14]. 最應曰: "各營及兵曹封樁財貨, 在昔則歲常有裕, 國有不恒之需, 而動輒移劃, 營樣遂至空蕩, 支放應下, 停闕居多。 興言及此, 不覺哀痛。 此雖非一朝一夕之故, 嗣後支拄之方, 莫若亟加謹節, 少收一分之效, 原定廩況外, 各軍門之新營策應所移用, 兵曹之他色移用。 俱係謬例, 自玆以往, 使之永勿擧論。 而如或因襲不悛, 則該將臣、兵判, 難免重究之意, 申明提飭。 116 further frugality, achieving at least some effectiveness. Aside from the originally designated provisions, transferring resources to the office of strategic planning within new units or using other reasons to move funds to the Ministry of War is all against established practices; thus, let it not be mentioned from now on. Furthermore, if the previous bad habits are not corrected, it should be made clear once again that the respective generals and the Minister of War will find it difficult to avoid severe repercussions.” King Kojong pledged to prohibit the malpractice concerning the military budget, yet these promises ultimately proved to be hollow. In fairness, it seems that the regime made efforts to avoid reallocating military funds until 1881, following Yi Ch’oe-ŭng’s recommendations. However, on 5/20 of 1881, the Supreme Council resolved to draw from the budgets of the Office for the Dispensation of Benevolence, the Military Training Agency, the Forbidden Guard Division, the Capital Guard Unit, and the Command of the Northern Approaches in order to cover entertainment expenses for Chinese envoys.65 The practice persisted intermittently until 1884. In December 1881, the government redirected funds from the same military units to cover the insufficient expenses for the crown prince’s wedding (嘉禮 karye).66 Furthermore, in February 1884, the regime transferred 45,500 sŏk of provisions from fortresses in the Northwestern region to replenish the supplies for the Capital Guards Command.67 Although this action did not fully constitute a redirection of the military budget to another sector, it could potentially weaken local military forces in favor of strengthening the central army. 65 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 18:21b [1881/05/20]. 二十日。 議政府啓: "卽見戶曹所報, 則‘支勅所需銀子限七千兩, 某樣區劃’爲辭矣。 見今勅行迫頭, 銀子未盡措辦, 該曹事勢極涉可悶。 就惠廳天銀二百兩·丁銀二千二百兩, 訓局正銀七百兩·丁銀一千六百兩, 禁衛營天銀二百兩·丁銀四百兩, 御營廳丁銀五百兩, 總戎廳天銀一千二百兩, 劃送, 以爲需用何如?" 允之。 66 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 18:66a [1881/12/23]. 議政府啓: "卽見戶曹判書金炳始所奏, 則‘嘉禮所需錢, 限十二萬兩, 令廟堂區劃’爲辭矣。 就惠廳錢九萬兩、訓·禁·御三營錢各六千兩、兵曹錢五千兩、總廳錢四千兩、司僕寺錢三千兩, 劃送入用何如?" 允之。 67 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:2a [1884/01/22]. 就關西城餉中, 限四萬五千五百石, 姑先取用。 而陰雨之備, 亦不可不充數乃已, 立本之節, 從後更爲稟處何如?" 竝允之。 117 Overall, Chosŏn’s military reform during the first decade of King Kojong’s direct rule did not lead to substantial changes in the traditional military structure. The regime’s efforts to prioritize the security of the royal family and the capital area were especially notable throughout the reform process. Contrary to the prevailing belief that King Kojong actively pursued the “modernization” of Chosŏn’s military, the institution largely retained its traditional framework, even with the introduction of new weaponry and military training techniques. The Military Exile Practice between 1873 and 1884 Military exile cases linked to major political and diplomatic events Even though King Kojong undertook reforms to Chosŏn’s traditional military system by adopting Japanese and Western military practices after assuming direct control, it is challenging to assert that these changes significantly altered the societal perception of the military in Chosŏn. While the newly established military units were equipped with so-called modern weaponry and trained by Japanese instructors, the monarch and ruling elite continued to perceive the military in a traditional manner, primarily employing these forces for ceremonial displays or parades during national events. Contrary to earlier studies, the reform of Chosŏn’s military system did not lead to a substantial enhancement of national defense, as it primarily maintained the conventional structure. This attitude is also evident in the administration of military exile, wherein military service continued to function as a punitive measure, a practice that persisted from the time of Taewŏn’gun’s regency. The first recorded case of military exile following King Kojong’s assumption of direct rule involved Pak U-hyŏn (朴遇賢 1829-1907), who held the position of Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer. Pak U-hyŏn, who had originally entered public service by passing the civil service examination as a student scholar (幼學 yuhak) with a ranking of 8th among the candidates,68 had previously served in various civil offices, including the Royal 68 Kukcho pangmok 國朝榜目 (The Roster of Examination Graduates) 12, 19, (奎貴 11655) (This refers to Kukcho pangmok (The Roster of Examination Graduates), fascicle 12, page 19, the reference number 11655 assigned by the Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 118 Secretariat and the Office of the Inspector-General. However, around 1873, he was appointed to the position of Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer within the Five Military Commands, a key unit of Chosŏn’s central military structure.69 Notably, the position was accessible to officials from the three branches, such as civil, military, and protected officials, although the Five Commands was one of the military offices.70 Despite his military appointment, Pak U-hyŏn maintained his identity as a civil official when he was subjected to the punitive measure of military exile. Now, I delve into Pak U-hyŏn’s military exile case in detail. This case is particularly informative because the process of deliberating his punishment reveals how military exile was regarded as a punitive measure in the Late Chosŏn period. To get straight to the point, Pak U-hyŏn was initially punished by military exile, but King Kojong later escalated the punishment to wirianch’i (圍籬安置), a form of exile where the place of banishment was enclosed with thorny fences to restrict entry and exit. While his case has often been studied as part of the Taewŏn’gun group’s resistance against King Kojong’s direct rule,71 few studies have focused on the military exile imposed on Pak U-hyŏn. On 12/12 of 1873, Pak U-hyŏn submitted an incisive memorial. Although the memorial commenced with Pak’s commendation of King Kojong’s adherence to filial piety and fraternal affection, it swiftly evolved into a scathing critique of the king’s maladministration, the deterioration of the military system, and the erosion of civil values (文風 munp’ung). Pak further accused the king of responsibility for a series of fire accidents, including the blaze at Chagyŏng Hall (慈慶殿 Chagyŏngjŏn) on 12/10 of 1873 and the fire at the tomb keeper’s house (齋室 chaesil) of King Chŏngjo’s tomb on the same day, attributing these incidents to the king’s failure 69 Pak U-hyŏn was appointed as the Fourth-Rank Censor (正言 Chŏngŏn) in the Office of the Censor-General on 7/19 of 1873, but he submitted his memorial as the Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer on 12/12 of 1873. It is likely that he was transferred from the Office of the Censor-General to the Five Commands at some point between July and December (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-07-19 (19) [1873/07/19].). 70 For details, see Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通 (The Comprehensive Collection of the National Code). Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 兵典, 京官職, 正三品衙門, 五衛 [官員 定額]. 71 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 238-241; Pak Chin-ch’ŏl 박진철, "Kojong ŭi wangkwŏn kanghwach’aek yŏn’gu (1873-1897)" 고종의 왕권강화책 연구 (1873-1897) (Ph.D. diss., Wonkwang University, 2002), 45-57; Yŏn Kap-su 연갑수, Kojongdae chŏngch’i pyŏndong yŏn’gu 고종대 정치변동 연구, (Ilchisa, 2008), 257-265; and Chŏng Kyŏng-min 정경민, "Taewŏn’gun seryŏk ŭi pokkwiundong kwa 'pan-Taewŏn’gun yŏnhap ch’eje' ŭi han’gye" 대원군 세력의 복귀운동과 ‘반대원군연합체제’의 한계, Haklim 學林 47, (2021): 195-234. 119 to govern effectively. Initially, King Kojong responded with a measured remark, stating, ‘I have understood the content of the memorial.’72 However, the king soon expressed intense anger and ordered that Pak U-hyŏn be punished by military exile to a remote and inhospitable island for the remainder of his life. The king cited the rude expressions and malevolent intentions in the memorial as the reasons for his severe reaction. Although King Kojong expressed a desire to execute Pak U-hyŏn, he ultimately commuted the sentence to military exile following a special edict from Queen Consort Sinjŏng.73 The reasons behind King Kojong’s sudden change of attitude towards the memorial remain unclear, but it is likely that he came to understand Pak U-hyŏn’s true intentions after discussing the matter with other high-ranking officials and Queen Consort Sinjŏng. Although Pak U-hyŏn submitted his appeal in his individual capacity, it is challenging to regard this memorial solely as a personal appeal. Instead, the memorial appears to have been intended as a call for the official restoration of Taewŏn’gun to the royal court. According to Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s testimony, Pak U-hyŏn had previously visited Unhyŏn Palace (雲峴宮 Unhyŏn’gung), the residence of Taewŏn’gun, and sought a government position, which he ultimately secured.74 One study characterizes this memorial incident as a revolt by the pro-Taewŏn’gun members against King Kojong and his loyalists.75 The initial commendation of King Kojong’s filial piety and fraternal affection in the memorial’s introduction was likely intended as a sarcastic critique of the king’s political actions against his father. In addressing the punitive measure in Pak U-hyŏn’s case, it appears that King Kojong invoked the clause related to the slander of princes and high-ranking officials as outlined in the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. This clause prescribes the imposition of military exile to a remote and inhospitable island for the perpetrator.76 However, this measure 72 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:53a [1873/12/12]. 73 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:53b [1873/12/12]. 敎曰: "卽見朴遇賢疏, 則許多句語, 非臣子之所敢道。 而設心造意, 節節凶悖, 卽當設鞫得情, 明正邦刑。 而如此蟣蝨之類, 不可以人責之, 且承慈敎矣。 朴遇賢特貸一縷, 遠惡島限己身充軍, 使之當日押送。" 74 Myŏnamjip 勉庵集 (The Collection of Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s Records), Purok 附錄 (Appendix) 1, p. 216. 朴。榮川人也。甞出入雲宮。圖得仕䆠。時景福宮失火。翌朝陳䟽。 75 For details, see Chŏng Kyŏng-min 정경민, "Taewŏn’gun seryŏk ŭi pokkwiundong kwa 'pan-Taewŏn’gun yŏnhap ch’eje' ŭi han’gye" 대원군 세력의 복귀운동과 ‘반대원군연합체제’의 한계, Haklim 學林 47, (2021): 199-216. 76 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 刑典, 推斷, [醜辱王子君]. 120 seems somewhat arbitrary when compared to the king’s handling of Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s memorial incident, which occurred shortly before Pak U-hyŏn’s case. Despite the similarly critical tone of Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s critique of state policies, which was deemed disrespectful and scathing by Chosŏn’s censors and high-ranking officials and led to the resignation of three councillors from the Supreme Council, King Kojong chose to promote Ch’oe rather than impose a punitive measure. This differential treatment highlights a degree of inconsistency in the application of punitive measures, a pattern that persisted throughout King Kojong’s reign. Ultimately, Pak U-hyŏn was sentenced to lifelong military exile on 12/12 of 1873 to a military unit on Sinji Island in Kangjin County of Chŏlla Province.77 Sinji Island had a long history as a site for military exile and banishment (流配 yubae) during the Chosŏn period, with as many as 46 literati exiled to this small island. Among the notable figures exiled there were Chŏng Yak-chŏn (丁若銓 1758-1816), a member of the Practical Learning School (實學派 Sirhakp’a) and brother of Chŏng Yag-yong (丁若鏞 1762-1836), as well as Chi Sŏg-yŏng (池錫永 1855-1935), a member of the Enlightenment Party (開化派 Kaehwap’a) who introduced Jenner’s vaccination to Chosŏn.78 However, the repercussions against the king’s ‘lenient punishment’ of Pak U-hyŏn soon followed. Officials from the Office of the Inspector-General and the Office of the Censor-General formally remonstrated against King Kojong’s handling of Pak’s case, demanding his execution.79 As multiple memorials from Chosŏn officials continued to call for a more severe interrogation and penalty, King Kojong eventually yielded to these demands and ordered Pak U-hyŏn’s transfer to the State Tribunal (義禁府 Ŭigŭmbu) on 12/14 of 1873.80 After intense interrogation and torture, Pak U-hyŏn was banished to Hŭksan Island under the punitive measure 醜辱王子君·大臣者, 邊遠充軍。 77 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:54a [1873/12/12]. On Sinji Island, which is currently part of Wando County, a stud farm was established in 1660, but it was relocated to Chindo Island in 1681. In 1685, Sinji Island was placed under the administrative jurisdiction of Ch’ŏngsan Island when a garrison (萬戶鎭, manhojin) was established on Ch’ŏngsan Island (Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Chŏlla, Cheju p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 전라 제주편, (Jinhan M&B, 2015), 664.) 78 Chŏng Tae-ha, 정대하, "46-myŏng yubaesari Sinjido rŭl asinayo?" ‘46명 유배살이’ 신지도를 아시나요?, Hangyoreh Newspaper, October 19, 2019, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/area_general/869947.html. 79 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-12-13 (08) [1873/12/13]. 請薪智島充軍罪人朴遇賢, 亦令王府, 拿鞫得情, 快正典刑焉。 80 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-12-14 (31) [1873/12/14]. 121 of wirianch’i, on 12/18 of 1873.81 Despite this harsher punishment, Chosŏn officials and high-ranking figures, including the three state councillors, remained dissatisfied, criticizing King Kojong’s perceived leniency. Nevertheless, King Kojong remained resolute, and Pak endured his banishment for 12 years before being released in October 1884.82 As James Palais argues, Pak U-hyŏn’s incident was a consequence of the traditional Korean state’s inability to establish clear boundaries for acceptable dissent, as well as the outcome of tensions between individual scholar-officials and the central bureaucracy, which ultimately unified into a cohesive interest group focused on preserving their positions and power.83 However, from a military perspective, it is noteworthy that military exile was initially used to punish individuals who might otherwise have faced the death penalty. While numerous scholars argue that the Chosŏn government sought to transform its military system during King Kojong’s direct rule, this punitive measure reflects a continued adherence to traditional views of military service as a form of punishment. The tendency to undervalue the military is further evidenced by King Kojong’s later statement that Chosŏn prioritized civil affairs while failing to maintain its military capability.84 Additionally, the incident indicates that wirianch’i, a form of banishment, was considered a harsher penalty than military exile, at least in the late 19th century. It is possible to suggest that military exile was an intermediate form of punishment between wirianch’i and regular banishment (流刑 yuhyŏng). Meanwhile, the military exile of Kim Chae-hŭi (金在熙 n.d.), a clerk in the Royal Secretariat and a member of administrative specialist group, highlights the rank of military exile within Chosŏn’s punitive system, positioned between banishment and execution. On 12/24 of 1873, Yi Yu-wŏn, the Chief State Councillor, petitioned King Kojong to impose military exile on Kim Chae-hŭi to an isolated island rather than a light banishment (薄竄 pakch’an) for the offense of publicly insulting Hong Si-hyŏng (洪時衡 n.d.), the Third-Rank Inspector (掌令 81 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-12-18 (12) [1873/12/18]. 傳曰, 卽見鞫廳議啓, 則朴遇賢之一向抵賴, 尤極狡惡, 如此凶逆, 斷當快正邦刑, 而今承慈敎之屢屢矣。 罪人朴遇賢, 姑貸一縷, 黑山島圍籬安置, 三倍道卽刻押送。 82 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-10-29 (43) [1884/10/29]. 83 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 240. 84 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:17b [1893/03/25]. 敎曰: "只右文而不修戎事, 果不可矣。 122 Changnyŏng) of the Office of the Inspector-General. Yi also urged the removal of Hong Si-hyŏng from his public office, arguing that Hong had brought dishonor to the royal court by allowing himself to be insulted by Kim Chae-hŭi.85 To fully comprehend Yi Yu-wŏn’s petition, it is essential to understand the events that transpired between Hong Si-hyŏng and Kim Chae-hŭi approximately two months earlier. This sequence of events can be traced back to Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s first memorial incident on 10/25 of 1873. In his scathing memorial, Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn criticized the Taewŏn’gun’s maladministration and the negligence of duty by censors and royal attendants. While a majority of high-ranking officials and Confucian scholars (儒生 yusaeng) vehemently opposed Ch’oe’s appeal, Hong Si-hyŏng stood alone in his support for Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s memorial, even praising it by stating, “Indeed, it was as upright as a phoenix crying in the morning sunlight.”86 However, when Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn criticized King Kojong’s policies in a subsequent memorial, Hong Si-hyŏng contradicted his earlier stance by adding his name to a joint memorial calling for Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s impeachment. This inconsistency in Hong Si-hyŏng’s actions led to widespread denunciations and criticism. The initial denunciation was made by Ki Kwan-hyŏn (奇觀鉉 1837-n.d.), the former Fifth-Rank Minor Inspector of the Office of the Inspector-General. Ki Kwan-hyŏn criticized not only Hong Si-hyŏng’s inconsistency but also questioned his filial piety. He alleged that, during Hong Si-hyŏng’s tenure as a magistrate of Kangjin County, Hong had concealed his father’s death for several days and only announced the mourning after completing the distribution of officials’ salaries.87 Although this rumor was unfounded, Ki Kwan-hyŏn used it to support his denunciation of Hong Si-hyŏng. Eventually, Ki Kwan-hyŏn’s petition was exposed as a false accusation, as Hong Si-hyŏng provided an alibi refuting Ki’s claim, leading to Ki Kwan-hyŏn’s 85 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:56b [1873/12/24]. 又曰: "臣在鄕時, 聞朝堂之上, 吏胥輩詬辱名官, 傳說狼藉, 至有自上處分之截嚴, 擧國衿紳, 莫不聳觀。 而履霜之漸, 不可薄竄而止。 院吏金在熙, 特貸一縷, 限己身絶島充軍。 至若洪時衡, 顧其官則經幄之臣也。 遭此慢侮, 貽羞朝廷, 亦難免其責, 請施以譴罷之典何如?" 86 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:27b [1873/10/29]. 臣伏讀前承旨崔益鉉疏批, 有曰‘極爲嘉尙’。 及見其疏, 則果是正直, 鳳鳴朝陽也。 可知大聖人包容直言, 以開言路欽, 誦萬萬矣。 87 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:40a [1873/11/06]. 臣本以湖南之人, 曾聞洪時衡之守康津縣時, 遭其父喪, 幾日隱置, 待其官俸之磨勘, 始乃發喪。 臣亦始也不信, 終至鴟張於道路, 狼藉於京鄕。 渠以何面目, 立於世與於人, 肆然立言於扶倫之日乎? 123 punishment with banishment. Nonetheless, criticism of Hong Si-hyŏng’s actions continued unabated. In addition to Ki Kwan-hyŏn’s denunciation, Kim Chae-hŭi, a clerk in the Royal Secretariat, highlighted a contradiction between the language used in Hong Si-hyŏng’s memorial and his subsequent decision to sign the joint petition to impeach Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn. According to testimony, Kim Chae-hŭi remarked, “In a previous memorial, it was already stated that it was an outstanding act, like a phoenix crying from the east of the mountain. If you participate in today’s joint memorial, wouldn’t there be no issue?” 88 While Kim Chae-hŭi’s question was valid, it became problematic because it was raised publicly within the Royal Secretariat office. Initially, King Kojong did not perceive Kim Chae-hŭi’s action as an issue, given the persuasiveness of his question. However, the problem arose from the difference in social status. In Chosŏn society, where a rigid social hierarchy was deeply entrenched, it was unacceptable for a low-status clerk, referred to as the chungin class in Korean studies, to openly challenge the actions of aristocrats. Consequently, Yi Yu-wŏn, the Chief State Councillor, along with other aristocratic officials, demanded that Kim Chae-hŭi be punished, a request with which King Kojong ultimately concurred. Initially, Kim Chae-hŭi was sent to the Ministry of Punishments for interrogation. After enduring interrogation and torture, King Kojong ordered his banishment to a remote and inhospitable area in Yŏnggwang County of Chŏlla Province.89 However, Yi Yu-wŏn strongly opposed the king’s lenient penalty, insisting that Kim Chae-hŭi should be subjected to military exile on an isolated island as a pre-emptive measure against the defamation of the aristocracy. Yi Yu-wŏn further emphasized that all government officials were closely monitoring the outcome of this case. In response to Yi Yu-wŏn’s request, King Kojong revised his initial decision and ultimately imposed military exile on Kim Chae-hŭi.90 88 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-11-07 (10) [1873/11/07]. 原相曰, 前日之事, 臣未得見聞, 而向日聯箚之時, 洪時衡亦爲同參矣, 院吏金在熙, 來問於洪時衡曰, 日前之疏, 旣稱鳳鳴朝陽, 今日聯箚同參, 得無何如乎爲言矣。 89 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-11-06 (06) [1873/11/06]. 移送秋曹, 嚴刑一次後, 遠惡地限己身定配, 以正風化事, 命下矣。 謹依傳敎, 罪人金在熙, 嚴刑一次後, 全羅道靈光郡, 遠惡地限己身定配所, 卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 90 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:56b [1873/12/24]. 124 This discussion highlights the hierarchical ranking of punishments in Chosŏn, particularly between military exile and banishment, within the broader five-punishment system: light flogging (笞刑 t’aehyŏng), heavy flogging (杖刑 changhyŏng), forced labor, banishment, and death penalty (死刑 sahyŏng). Officially, military exile was classified as a form of banishment. Yi Yu-wŏn, as Chief State Councillor, indicated that military exile was a harsher penalty than ‘light banishment,’ reflecting the punitive hierarchy of the late 19th century. This underscores that military exile was considered a more severe punishment than banishment but less so than death, positioning involuntary military service as a measure for serious offenses. Furthermore, Kim Chae-hŭi’s chungin status affected the severity of his punishment. Had he been an aristocrat, he might have avoided military exile, as the aggravated penalty was influenced by his social position. This disparity highlights the inherent inequality in Chosŏn’s legal system, despite the ruling class’s justification of the measure. Ultimately, on 12/25 of 1873, Kim Chae-hŭi was transferred from Yŏnggwang County to a military unit on Kogŭm Island in Kangjin County.91 While the specific military unit to which he was assigned remains unrecorded, it is plausible that he was placed in a naval military force, given that a naval garrison had been established on the island in 1681 and remained active until its abolition during the Chosŏn military reforms of 1895.92 Military exile to the navy was considered a more severe form of punishment compared to other types of military exile due to the arduous labor associated with naval duties. Furthermore, Chosŏn’s legal code mandated naval military exile for offenders convicted of more serious crimes compared to those sentenced to army military exile. The map below illustrates the island’s geographical assets as a naval base. 又曰: "臣在鄕時, 聞朝堂之上, 吏胥輩詬辱名官, 傳說狼藉, 至有自上處分之截嚴, 擧國衿紳, 莫不聳觀。 而履霜之漸, 不可薄竄而止。 院吏金在熙, 特貸一縷, 限己身絶島充軍。 91 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 10-12-25 (41) [1873/12/25]. 謹依傳敎, 罪人金在熙, 全羅道康津縣古今島, 限己身絶島充軍定配所, 而時在本道靈光郡配所, 自本道押送事, 分付該道道臣之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 92 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Chŏlla, Cheju p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 전라 제주편, (Jinhan M&B, 2015), 661. Kogŭm Island, originally part of Kangjin County, is now administratively affiliated with Wando County in Chŏlla Province. Admiral Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣) praised Kogŭm Island as an invaluable strategic asset, noting that it enabled the Chosŏn navy to effectively control the sea between the eastern and western regions of Chŏlla Province. Moreover, the island was noted for its extensive farmlands and significant population. According to one source, the island’s population was estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,000 residents. (Kim Kyŏng-ok 김경옥, "16-17-segi Kogŭmdo in’gŭn haero wa sugunjin ŭi sŏlch’i" 16-17세기 고금도 (古今島) 인근 해로와 수군진 (水軍鎭)의 설치, Tosŏ munhwa 도서문화, no. 3 (2009): 178-182.) 125 The severity of Kim Chae-hŭi’s punishment likely reflects the gravity with which the regime viewed the incident. Map 8: The Map of Kogŭm Island in 1872 Source: The Map of the Garrison in Kogŭm Island of Kangjin County (康津古今島鎭地圖 Kangjin Kogŭmdojin chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10444). Which clause in Chosŏn’s legal code was applied to this incident? In fact, there is no explicit provision for military exile that directly pertains to Kim Chae-hŭi’s case within the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. It is possible that the clause concerning the punishment for slandering princes or high-ranking officials was invoked in this instance.93 However, the application of this clause would have been irregular, given that Hong Si-hyŏng held a relatively low-ranking position within the government at the time. 93 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 刑典, 推斷, [醜辱王子君]. 醜辱王子君·大臣者, 邊遠充軍。 126 The severity of the punishment imposed on Kim Chae-hŭi was likely influenced by Hong Si-hyŏng’s political stance toward King Kojong. Shortly after King Kojong assumed direct rule, Hong Si-hyŏng emerged as one of the few prominent supporters of the king’s new policies at the Chosŏn court. In his role as the Third-Rank Inspector of the Office of the Inspector-General, Hong Si-hyŏng submitted a memorial advocating for the restoration of the Shrine to Honor Ming China (萬東廟 Mandongmyo) and Confucian academies, the abolition of household cloth tax, the elimination of the practice of collecting voluntary contributions and the land-tax surcharge (結斂 kyŏllyŏm), the abolition of the use of Qing coins, caution against disasters, correct handling of rewards and punishments, and careful appointment of officials.94 Through this memorial, Hong Si-hyŏng supported King Kojong’s new policies while critiquing the policies of Taewŏn’gun. The king promptly implemented the abolition of voluntary contributions and the land-tax surcharge from Hong Si-hyŏng’s recommendations, while gradually adopting other suggestions.95 James Palais described King Kojong as an ineffective and indecisive ruler who lacked an understanding of the prestige and authority of his office. In moments of severe crisis and mounting pressure, he was completely incapable of providing the leadership required.96 However, when it came to dismantling Taewŏn’gun’s legacies and defending his closest allies after assuming direct control, the king displayed an uncharacteristic swiftness and boldness, in stark contrast to James Palais’s description. In particular, the household cloth tax was originally intended to be paid by commoner families as a substitute for military service. However, during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, it was extended to include aristocratic households where the family head held no official position, as a measure to increase the military budget. Eliminating this tax, therefore, significantly reduced the funds available for transforming the military. Nevertheless, King Kojong prioritized abolishing his father’s military policy, even at the expense of this critical financial foundation. 94 Ch’oe Sŏn-hŭi 최선희, "Kojong ŭi chʼinjŏng chʼeje hyŏngsŏng kwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk" 고종의 친정체제 형성과 그 성격 (MA thesis, Chŏnnam University, 2003), 16. 95 Kim Sŏng-hye 김성혜, "1873-yŏn Kojong ŭi t’ongch’igwŏn changak kwajŏng e taehan ilgoch’al" 1873 년 고종의 통치권 장악 과정에 대한 일고찰, Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu 대동문화연구 72, (2010): 361. 96 James B. Palais, "Political Leadership in the Yi Dynasty", in Political Leadership in Korea, ed. Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (University of Washington Press, 1976), 12-13. 127 The military exile of Kim Chae-hŭi lasted significantly longer than most other cases. Sometime before 1880, he was transferred from Kogŭm Island to Muan in Chŏlla Province,97 and in January 1880, he was relocated again to Asan County in Ch’ungchŏng Province, which was closer to Seoul than Chŏlla Province. Kim was finally released from banishment in June 1882.98 In total, Kim Chae-hŭi, a low-status clerk, endured approximately ten years of military exile and banishment merely for insulting an aristocratic official. His case underscores the arbitrary nature of Chosŏn’s legal system and the profound social implications of military exile as a form of punishment, where the offender’s social class played a decisive role in the execution of the sentence. Two years after the incident involving Kim Chae-hŭi, another instance of military exile occurred in 1875 during the Un’yō Incident (雲揚號事件 Unyangho Sakŏn), also referred to as the Kanghwa Island Incident (江華島事件 Kanghwado Sakŏn), when a Japanese warship bombarded Kanghwa Island, demanding trade relations with Chosŏn. In this engagement, Chosŏn’s artillery units stationed on the island were unable to repel the Japanese naval forces, resulting in a devastating defeat. While previous scholarship has predominantly examined the diplomatic consequences of this incident within the context of Chosŏn-Japan relations, a closer analysis of the post-battle treatment of Chosŏn soldiers reveals the incident’s further significance. Notably, military exile was imposed on one of the commanders held accountable for the defeat, highlighting the punitive measures taken by the Chosŏn state in response to military failure. The individual subjected to this punishment was Yi Min-dŏk (李敏德 1816-n.d.), who served as the Third-Rank Special Army Officer at the Yŏngjong Garrison (永宗鎭 Yŏngjongjin) on Kanghwa Island at the time. The Chosŏn government held him accountable for the failure to adequately defend the garrison and protect Kanghwa Island from Japan’s invasion of this strategically significant location, resulting in his imposition of military exile. Additionally, several officials were subjected to banishment for their roles in the defeat. This punitive response 97 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 17-01-02 (21) [1880/01/02]. 98 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-06-12 (32) [1882/06/12]. 128 highlights the Chosŏn state’s stringent emphasis on military accountability and the severe repercussions faced by commanders who failed to perform their duties during critical moments. Yi Min-dŏk was a distinguished officer within the military branch, who passed the military service examination at the age of 29, achieving the 25th rank in the palace augmented examination in 1844.99 These examinations, held irregularly, were convened to commemorate significant events in Chosŏn. Yi Min-dŏk’s career progression underscores a predominantly naval orientation within the Chosŏn military. Over the course of his career, Yi held several prominent naval commands, including the position of Naval Commander of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province (忠淸水使 Ch’ungch’ŏng susa)100 and Deputy Naval Commander (水軍僉節制使 Sugun ch’ŏmjŏlchesa) of the Pŏpsŏngp’o Independent Garrison (法聖浦獨鎭 Pŏpsŏngp’o tokchin).101 Yi Min-dŏk was appointed as the Third-Rank Special Army Officer of the Yŏngjong Garrison in March 1874, a position he assumed a year and a half prior to the Un’yō Incident.102 However, his appointment proved to be a double-edged sword. What initially appeared to be a promising advancement ultimately turned into an unfortunate and consequential event. On 8/22 of 1875, Yi Min-dŏk reported the presence of an unusual vessel (異樣船 iyangsŏn) anchored near Nanji Island, located southeast of Kanghwa Island.103 This vessel was identified as the Japanese gunboat Un’yō, commanded by Inoue Yoshika (井上良馨 1845-1929). Three days later, Yi Min-dŏk provided a subsequent report detailing the confrontation between Chosŏn and Japanese military forces at the Yŏngjong Garrison. The following is the content of Yi Min-dŏk’s report. 104 99 Mubo 武譜 (Genealogies of Military Examination Graduate) 1, 20b, Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-1741). 100 T’ongjeyŏng kyerok 統制營啓錄 [1847/07/27]. 101 Chŏlla usuyŏng kyerok 全羅右水營啓錄 (Reports of the Right Navy Commander’s Headquarters) [1858/02/10]. 102 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 11-03-05 (25) [1874/03/05]. 李敏德爲永宗僉使, 鄭甫鉉爲公州營將。 103 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:31b [1875/08/22]. 104 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:32a [1875/08/25]. 京畿監司閔台鎬狀啓以爲: "卽接永宗僉使李敏德謄報, 則‘彼船起烟擧碇, 下來前洋, 連放大砲。 全軍顚仆, 火焰滿城, 民家比燒, 燃及公廨, 祗奉殿牌, 退軍土城, 軍卒死傷, 姑未指數, 僉使印信, 入於灰燼。’ 俄忽之頃, 遽失全城, 無辭可達。 129 After smoke rose above this ship and it began to move, it began firing cannons at us continuously as it approached the outer waters. This caused the entire army to be thrown into disarray, with flames engulfing the fortress and spreading to private homes, eventually reaching public buildings. Consequently, we had to retreat to the earthen fortress with the royal ancestral spirit tablets. We have not yet been able to count the number of soldiers who were killed or wounded, and even the commissioner’s seal was lost. This account vividly portrays the chaos that ensued when the Japanese navy raided villages on Kanghwa Island. However, there are two entirely contradictory versions of the battle. Japan claimed they approached the island simply to obtain water, but Chosŏn’s shore batteries opened fire on them despite the Japanese gunboat flying their national flag, which Japan argued was a violation of international law. Conversely, the Korean account stated that only a few warning shots were fired at an unidentified ship displaying a yellow flag.105 The Chosŏn soldiers were unable to determine the gunboat’s nationality and acted according to their rules of engagement. Regarding the issue of the Japanese flag, Yi T’ae-jin’s research suggests that the Un’yō did not initially hoist its national flag, and the Meiji government later manipulated the report to alter the narrative.106 Regardless of whether the Japanese ship actually hoisted the national flag, the Chosŏn army was entirely incapable of repelling the Japanese assault, and Yi Min-dŏk withdrew from the garrison in a demoralized state. Approximately thirty Japanese soldiers landed on Yŏngjong Island, killing thirty-five Korean troops. The Japanese forces then plundered and set fire to the district town, capturing a significant amount of weapons and gunpowder.107 The Chosŏn regular army’s inability to defend against a relatively small Japanese force underscores the inefficiency 105 Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885, (University of Washington Press, 1977), 23-24. 106 Yi T’ae-jin 이태진, "Unyangho sagŏn ŭi chinsang - sagŏn kyŏngwi wa Ilbon kukki keyangsŏl ŭi chinwi" 운양호 사건의 진상 - 사건 경위와 일본국기 게양설의 진위, in Chosŏn ŭi chŏngch’i wa sahoe 조선의 정치와 사회, ed. Ch’oe Sŭng-hŭi kyosu nonmunjip kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 최승희교수 정년기념논문집 간행위원회 (Chipmundang, 2002), 452-468. 107 Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885, (University of Washington Press, 1977), 23. 130 of Chosŏn’s military policies and the lack of state-of-the-art weaponry, particularly given the significant investment in military units on Kanghwa Island during Taewŏn’gun’s regency. The Chosŏn government had received intelligence about Japan’s plans to invade from the Qing regime. Since 1864, the Office for the General Management of Affairs Concerning the Various Countries (總理各國事務衙門 Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen), or Zongli Yamen, of the Chinese government had alerted Chosŏn to the possibility of Japanese encroachment.108 Despite these warnings, the Chosŏn government exhibited a significant lack of military preparedness. In particular, in 1874, a year prior to the Un’yō incident, Zongli Yamen reiterated that Japan was engaging with Western powers and advised Chosŏn to prepare for potential attacks from both Japan and Western nations. However, the response of King Kojong and Chosŏn’s high-ranking civil officials was disproportionately focused on suppressing perceived internal threats, such as Catholics, rather than addressing the enhancement of military defenses along the borders.109 On the other hand, Japan had meticulously prepared for this attack well in advance. The Meiji government believed that by employing gunboat diplomacy, they could open Chosŏn just as the U.S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794-1858) had done with Japan in 1853. Moreover, the Meiji government proactively addressed diplomatic issues related to Chosŏn. In May 1875, Japan signed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which resolved the Sakhalin issue and eased Japan’s concerns about potential Russian interference in its efforts to open Chosŏn. At the same time, China was preoccupied with a new conflict with the United Kingdom over the murder of British vice-consul Augustus Raymond Margary (1846-1875) in February of that year, further diminishing the likelihood of Chinese intervention.110 The disparity in preparedness between Chosŏn and Japan for the invasion was starkly evident. Nonetheless, responsibility for the failure was shifted entirely to the field commanders. On 8/25 of 1875, Min T’ae-ho (閔台鎬 1834-1884), the governor of Kyŏnggi Province, demanded the punishment of Yi Min-dŏk and other commanders for their failure to protect the 108 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 04-03-07 (23) [1867/03/07]. 又啓曰, 卽見都京禮部咨文出來者, 則準摠理各國事務衙門咨稱口奏, 査閱新聞紙, 載有日本欲攻朝鮮之語, 請由禮部咨照朝鮮, 訪査明確, 防患未萌, 爲辭矣。 109 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:56a [1874/06/25]. 110 Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2023), 47-48. 131 garrison, citing the damage inflicted by the Japanese navy on the island.111 The Three Armies Command also called for Yi Min-dŏk’s dismissal and interrogation.112 Despite the broader issues of mismanagement in Chosŏn’s military policies that contributed to the failure, the buck stopped with Yi Min-dŏk, the Third-Rank Special Army Officer of the Yŏngjong Garrison, and the other commanders. This scapegoating exemplifies how the Chosŏn government’s failure to address systemic issues was deflected onto individual officers, underscoring a pattern of avoiding accountability at higher levels. After the Japanese ship withdrew from Chosŏn’s shores, the Chosŏn government began the process of punishing those responsible for the failure to defend Kanghwa Island. According to a report from the State Tribunal during interrogation, Yi Min-dŏk admitted to his dereliction of duty. Although he was subjected to hyŏngch’u (刑推), a form of physical torture involving beating the shins to extract confessions or information during the interrogation, the tribunal exempted him from this method. Chosŏn’s legal code specified that individuals who had previously served as the Royal Messenger (宣傳官 Sŏnjŏn’gwan) were exempt from such punishment.113 Instead, the tribunal recommended that Yi Min-dŏk’s case be addressed under the clause for military exile to a remote area (邊遠充軍 pyŏnwŏn ch’unggun), which was subsequently approved by King Kojong.114 This decision was seen as a compromise that acknowledged his past service while still addressing his failure to protect the garrison. However, when it came to the application of military exile to a remote area, there was no specific clause applicable to Yi Min-dŏk’s case in either the Comprehensive National Code or the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. At best, the closest applicable regulation is the clause stating: ‘If an official of the Martial Arts Special Guards, a division under the Military Training Agency responsible for protecting the royal palace, escapes, he shall be paraded around the sandy military training ground (沙場 sajang) on the day of tactical exercises, given 50 111 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:32a [1875/08/25]. 112 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:32a [1875/08/26]. 該防禦使李敏德, 爲先罷黜, 待交符, 令該府拿問定罪。 113 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-09-17 (19) [1875/09/17]. 義禁府啓目, 永宗防禦使李敏德原情云云。 傳旨內辭緣, 泛稱遲晩, 所當請刑是白乎矣, 曾經宣傳官, 勿爲請刑, 載在法典, 議處, 何如? 啓, 依允。 114 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-09-19 (17) [1875/09/19]. 義禁府啓曰, 時囚罪人李敏德, 係是邊遠充軍, 不付功議以入之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 132 strokes with a cane, and then exiled to military service in a provincial garrison. However, if he avoids this punishment, he shall be severely flogged and exiled to military service on a sea island (海島 haedo).’115 Clearly, this clause does not directly pertain to Yi Min-dŏk’s strategic failure, as it was intended for cases of desertion rather than tactical misjudgments. This discrepancy suggests that his punishment might have been an ad hoc decision or based on an interpretation of existing laws to suit the circumstances, highlighting the flexible application of legal codes in certain situations. Yi Min-dŏk was ultimately exiled to Naju Region following the revocation of his certificate of appointment (告身 kosin). However, he was fortunate to avoid the prescribed 100 lashes of heavy flogging (杖一百) by paying a commutation fee (收贖 susok).116 It is likely that Yi Min-dŏk was sent to the naval headquarters in Naju, a location of strategic importance since the Koryŏ period. Specifically, the Koryŏ dynasty had established a naval garrison in Naju to defend against Japanese pirates, and a military significance continued into the Chosŏn Dynasty when Naju became part of the naval garrison system for the right region of Chŏlla Province (全羅右道),117 as seen in Map 9. After the Imjin War, the Naju garrison remained a pivotal defensive stronghold against Japanese naval forces. Furthermore, second-rank military officials were appointed as garrison commanders in Naju, with a status equivalent to that of provincial governors (監司 Kamsa) or military commanders (兵使 Pyŏngsa).118 115 Taejŏn t’ongp’ŏn 大典通編, 兵典, 用刑 [軍律犯罪]. 武藝別監逃亡者, 習陣日, 沙場回示後, 決棍五十度, 絶島充軍, 厭避者, 嚴刑海島充軍。 116 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-09-20 (26) [1875/09/20]. 義禁府啓曰, 時囚罪人李敏德, 杖一百收贖, 告身盡行追奪, 發邊遠充軍, 照律公事判付內, 依允矣。 117 Han Chŏng-hun 한정훈, "Koryŏ-Chosŏn ch’ogi Naju chiyŏk sugun kiji ŭi yŏkhal kwa pyŏnch’ŏn" 고려·조선 초기 나주지역 수군 기지의 역할과 변천, Yŏksahak yŏn’gu 역사학연구 93, (2024): 55-63. 118 Kim Paek-ch’ŏl 김백철, "Chosŏn sidae Chŏllado kŏjŏm koŭl ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng kŏmt’o: chiriji charyo rŭl chungsim ŭro" 조선시대 전라도 거점고을의 형성과정 검토: 지리지자료를 중심으로, Chŏnbukhak yŏn’gu 전북학연구 11, (2024): 80-81. 133 Map 9: The Map of Naju Region in 1872 Source: The Map of Naju (羅州地圖 Naju chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10483) After attributing full responsibility for the defeat in the conflict with Japan to local commanders, including Yi Min-dŏk, the Chosŏn government initiated negotiations with the Meiji government of Japan to establish a modern treaty. These negotiations, conducted between Sin Hŏn representing Chosŏn and Kuroda Kiyotaka (黒田清隆 1840-1900), Japan’s minister plenipotentiary, culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa in February 1876, marking Chosŏn’s first modern treaty with Japan. Irrespective of the historical significance of the Treaty of Kanghwa for Korea-Japan relations, the Chosŏn government’s treatment of Yi Min-dŏk after the treaty’s signing reveals that military exile functioned more as a means of publicly imposing exemplary punishment than as a substantive punitive measure. Nine months after Yi Min-dŏk’s initial punishment, King Kojong considered commuting his sentence and ordered the imposition of pangch’ukhyangni (放逐鄕里), a penalty that involved stripping him of his official rank and banishing him to his 134 hometown. This decision was made alongside the commutation of the sentences of four other officials who had been banished.119 This measure amounted to nothing more than Yi Min-dŏk’s release from military exile, given that he had already been stripped of his official position. Ultimately, he was sent to his hometown in accordance with King Kojong’s edict. The king proceeded with this decision despite opposition from the Royal Secretariat. Although King Kojong occasionally emphasized the leniency of punishment in line with Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s instructions,120 his decision to commute Yi Min-dŏk’s sentence risked undermining the legal system of Chosŏn, as argued by officials in the Royal Secretariat. Nevertheless, the monarch decided to release Yi Min-dŏk from military exile. Ultimately, Yi Min-dŏk was fully released from pangch’ukhyangni on 12/28 of 1879. Subsequently, he was appointed as the Officer in the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards (內禁衛將 Naegŭmwijang) on 2/23 of 1882.121 This military post, a second-rank position within the Royal Palace Guards, was responsible for guarding the king, performing night duties at the palace, and commanding the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards.122 Given the proximity of the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards to the monarch, Yi Min-dŏk’s appointment to this position suggests that he was regarded as one of the most trusted generals, despite his previous punishment. This case exemplifies how the Chosŏn government’s approach to military exile reveals a broader trend in its treatment of military service. Yi Min-dŏk’s experience demonstrates that, similar to other instances of military exile for officials, such punishment did not significantly tarnish his career or reputation. The use of military exile as a punitive measure in Chosŏn reflects a troubling disregard for its potential as a serious deterrent. Despite being subjected to military 119 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:30b [1876/潤 05/19]. 敎曰: "減死安置罪人崔鳳周、減死島配罪人金俊文等, 竝減等定配, 安置罪人李承澤, 島配罪人李有信等, 竄配罪人崔炳大, 充軍罪人李敏德, 遠配罪人裵翊承, 竝放逐鄕里。" 120 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 197. 121 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-02-23 (17) [1882/02/23]. 兵曹口傳政事, 以李敏德爲內禁將。 122 The Forbidden Inner Zone Guards (內禁衛 Naegunwi) were established in October 1407, during the 7th year of King T’aejong’s (太宗 r. 1400-1422) reign. This new organization was created by reorganizing the previously ineffective Inner Chamber Guards (內廂直 Naesangjik). The Forbidden Inner Zone Guards comprised close retainers who served the king in the closest proximity. (Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, Chosŏnsidae kunsa kwallyŏn yŏn’gu 조선시대 군사관련 연구, (Tan’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 19.) 135 exile, Yi Min-dŏk was ultimately restored to a position of significant responsibility within the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards. This reappointment highlights that military exile was often utilized more as a temporary solution to address immediate failures rather than as a meaningful, long-term disciplinary action. Another case of military exile occurred in 1876, as King Kojong navigated emerging domestic and international challenges, including his own reform policies, the Un’yō incident, and the establishment of new diplomatic relations with Japan. In response to these developments, King Kojong adopted a hardline stance, using military exile as a tool to discipline officials who failed to meet the national agenda, as previously noted in the case of Yi Min-dŏk. The exile of Yi Hŭi-t’ae (李嬉泰 n.d.), the District Magistrate of Kyŏngwŏn Prefecture (慶源府使 Kyŏngwŏn pusa), serves as another example of the king’s efforts to set an example through punitive measures against those who did not comply with royal directives. On 9/18 of 1875, the Three Armies Command reported to King Kojong that families from eleven households in Kyŏngwŏn Prefecture had crossed the border and illegally entered Russia. The office recommended the arrest of all officials responsible for administering the region, including Yi Hŭi-t’ae, heads of the local agency (座首 chwasu), military officials (兵校 pyŏnggyo), and village chiefs (洞長 tongjang).123 In response to this recommendation, the Chosŏn government decided to punish Yi Hŭi-t’ae, who had been appointed magistrate in June 1874,124 for the failure to enforce the border policies of the Chosŏn government. This incident highlighted the challenges faced by the government in maintaining effective border control amid growing tensions in the region. The region of Kyŏngwŏn in Hamgyŏng Province functioned as a key military garrison against the so-called northern barbarians following King Sejong’s (世宗 1397-1450) expansion of the northeastern frontier of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of the Six Garrisons (六鎭 Yukchin), such as Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Hoeryŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏnghŭng, and Puryŏng, 123 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 12:33b [1876/09/18]. 十八日。 三軍府啓: "卽見咸鏡監司徐堂輔、北兵使金永求狀啓, 則‘慶源府 新乾原 新河山東三社民家十一戶, 竝率眷逃躱。 不善操飭之該府使李喜泰罪狀, 令攸司稟處, 座首兵校及各該社洞長字內把守將卒, 竝捉囚, 犯越民家幕土地, 待回下擧行’爲辭矣。 124 P’alto ch’ongnok 八道總錄 (General Records of Eight Provinces) (한古朝 57-가 527). 136 along the Tuman River in 1418. This strategic initiative, based on the recommendation of Pak Mi (朴楣 1433-1491), who held the position of Deputy Commander (上護軍 Sanghogun), was designed to defend the Chosŏn state from incursions by the Jurchen tribes.125 In order to secure these newly acquired territories, the Chosŏn government implemented a relocation policy (徙民政策 samin chŏngch’aek), resettling populations from the southern provinces, which resulted in the establishment of permanent Korean settlements in the region. By the Mid-Chosŏn period, Kyŏngwŏn had also assumed a critical role in facilitating economic exchanges with China. The regular border market, held biennially since its inception in 1646, significantly contributed to the economic development of both Manchuria and Hamgyŏng Province.126 However, the economic conditions in the region underwent significant changes during the Late Chosŏn period. Natural disasters made it increasingly difficult for residents to sustain their livelihoods. Moreover, corrupt magistrates and local commanders exacerbated the situation by exploiting the population through the imposition of excessive and unclassified miscellaneous taxes (無名雜稅 mumyŏngjapse). As a consequence, depopulation of the Six Garrison area became widespread, with the population of Kyŏngwŏn, once around 4,000 households, plunging to approximately 2,000 households by 1759, as reported by one study.127 In search of new means of survival, many inhabitants of Kyŏngsŏng began to illegally migrate into Russian-controlled territory following the cession of land adjacent to Chosŏn by the Qing government to Russia under the terms of the Beijing Treaty in 1860. The responses of the Chosŏn and Russian governments to this phenomenon were starkly different. Naturally, the Chosŏn court sought to stem the tide of illegal migration through a combination of appeasement and stringent punitive measures. For instance, on 7/13 of 1876, King Kojong and his high-ranking officials convened a court meeting to address the emigration issue. Proposed solutions included the cancellation and mitigation of taxes, the dispatch of secret 125 Following the establishment of the Kyŏngwŏn garrison, high-ranking officials in the Chosŏn court debated relocating it due to the area’s strategic disadvantages in defending against northern tribal incursions. After extended deliberations, the government ultimately rejected the proposal to relocate the garrison. For details, see Chi Yo-hwan 지요환, "Sejongdae Kyŏngwŏn insik kwa Hoeryŏng chiyŏk ŭi hwakpo" 세종대 경원 (慶源) 인식과 회령 (會寧) 지역 확보, Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo 조선시대사학보, no. 18 (2024): 194-206. 126 Alexander Thomas Martin, "Bridled Tigers: The Military at Korea’s Northern Border, 1800–1863" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2019), 184. 127 Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏnʼgun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea, (Harvard University Asia Center, 1972), 85-86. 137 censors (暗行御史 amhaeng ŏsa) to investigate the region, and the punishment of corrupt local magistrates.128 Simultaneously, the regime declared that any magistrates who failed to uncover illegal border crossings into Russia would be dismissed and punished.129 In fact, Russia’s proximity to Chosŏn, sharing a border and consolidating its hold on newly acquired territories, posed a significant political and diplomatic threat to the Chosŏn regime. Amidst the increasing invasions of Western powers, the Chosŏn court grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of Russian encroachment into the Korean peninsula.130 In addition, the issue of illegal emigration not only signified the breakdown of Chosŏn’s border policies but also exposed the limitations of the regime’s purported principle of benevolence toward the people (愛民之道 aeminjido), an admonition King Kojong received from Queen Consort Sinjŏng upon his enthronement.131 However, the policies proposed by King Kojong and Chosŏn officials fell short of fundamentally reforming the conventional system. Despite the urgency of the situation, the measures primarily focused on immediate remedies rather than addressing the underlying structural issues contributing to the population’s dissatisfaction and migration. On the other hand, Russia welcomed the illegal Korean immigrants in the border area, as the Russian government sought to populate and develop the newly acquired territory. Specifically, in April 1861, the Russian government passed legislation aimed at promoting and accelerating the migration of Russian peasants to the Amur and Maritime Provinces (Primorskaya Oblast). This law extended numerous benefits to both Russian citizens and foreign immigrants willing to settle in these regions. Settlers were granted 100 dessiatines of land per 128 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:38a [1876/07/13]. 129 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:56a [1874/06/25]. "匿影潛入, 橫行彼中, 或經年不還, 或間路徑歸, 防限之無節, 邊禁之解弛, 莫此爲甚。 今別行在, 卽如有似此之弊, 書狀官及灣尹, 難免其責, 該首譯斷當重勘。 以此先爲行會於灣府何如?" 敎曰: "各別申飭可也。" 130 The perception of Russia as a potential threat was widely recognized throughout East Asia. For instance, according to a report by Morooka Michiyoshi, an officer in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated May 1875, Russia had plans to establish a colony in Sakhalin and encroach on Chosŏn, using Japan as a supply base for both material and human resources. The Japanese Foreign Ministry argued that Japan needed to exert control over Chosŏn to prevent Russia’s advancement into East Asia. For more details, see Shinichi Fumoto, "Russia’s Expansion to the Far East and Its Impact on Early Meiji Japan’s Korea Policy", in Russia and Its Northeast Asian Neighbors: China, Japan, and Korea, 1858-1945, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Lexington Books, 2017), 5-6. 131 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 1:52a [1864/04/07]. 今主上亦應習知民間之事, 愛民之道, 莫如節儉。 雖一粒飯、一尺布, 皆出於民, 若不節儉, 其害必歸民。 民不聊生, 國不爲國, 必須一念慥慥, 不忘‘愛民’二字。 138 household, along with exemptions from military conscription for ten years and taxation for twenty years, though they were required to cover their own transportation costs.132 Chosŏn peasants who settled in the area proved to be ideal for Russia’s objectives. According to a report from Lieutenant Rezanov, who oversaw the construction of outposts in the region, to his superior, Governor-General O. V. Kazakevich of Primorskaya Province, in November 1863, Chosŏn immigrants were described as industrious and diligent workers, capable of stocking the garrison’s stores with buckwheat despite having limited agricultural tools.133 From the perspective of impoverished Chosŏn peasants, Russia represented a “Russian Dream,” offering the promise of a better life. In response, the central government of Chosŏn took significant measures to prevent the outflow of peasants, as the taxes collected from them constituted a critical source of revenue; however, due to the attractive incentives offered to new immigrants, Chosŏn’s local governments struggled to curb the migration. As previously mentioned, the regime imposed punishments on local magistrates to counter the trend, with the military exile of Yi Hŭi-t’ae, the magistrate of Kyŏngwŏn, serving as part of Chosŏn’s national strategy in reaction to the shifting diplomatic circumstances. While the illegal emigration issue stemmed largely from the failures of Chosŏn’s economic and tax policies, the regime shifted the blame onto local officials, despite their partial responsibility for the situation. On 9/19, 1875, the State Tribunal submitted a memorial to King Kojong, appealing for the arrest and interrogation of Yi Hŭi-t’ae, the former magistrate of Kyŏngwŏn, by dispatching clerks from the tribunal, despite his prior dismissal from office. The king approved their request.134 However, Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s punishment was not immediately enacted; he remained in custody for approximately three months until his conviction was confirmed.135 Following his 132 Woosung Lee, "The Koreans’ Migration to the Russian Far East and Their Deportation to Central Asia: From the 1860s to 1937" (MA thesis, University of Oregon, 2012), 9-10. 133 Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2023), 18. 134 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-09-19 (18) [1875/09/19]. 義禁府啓曰, 咸鏡監司徐堂輔狀啓內, 慶源前府使李喜泰, 不可以已遞, 置而勿論, 其罪狀, 令攸司稟處事, 啓下矣。 李喜泰, 自任所未及上來云, 依例發遣府書吏, 所到處拿來, 何如? 傳曰, 待待命拿囚。 135 His prolonged imprisonment was partly attributed to his chronic hernia (疝症, sanchŭng). He was temporarily released from prison to seek treatment for the condition. (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-12-19 (34) [1875/12/19].) 139 torture and interrogation, Yi Hŭi-t’ae was sentenced to 100 lashes of heavy flogging, which could be commuted through payment of a redemption fee, as well as to the deprivation of his public position (追奪 ch’ut’al) and military exile to a remote area on 1/6 of 1876.136 Chain County,137 located in the southeastern part of Kyŏngsang Province, was designated as the site of his military exile.138 Although Yi Hŭi-t’ae was sentenced to military exile under the directive of King Kojong, the relevant clauses in the Comprehensive National Code do not directly apply to his situation. The only plausible regulation that could be referenced was the clause concerning individuals who illegally crossed borders to gather ginsengs or engage in hunting. While the principal and secondary offenders were subject to capital punishment, the legal code also stipulated that local magistrates and border garrison commanders would be exiled to a remote area if they failed to prevent border crossings, provided the cases were discovered by local army commanders (節度使 Chŏltosa).139 However, this regulation was not entirely appropriate for Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s case, as the eleven households that had entered Russia illegally were not seeking to collect ginsengs but intended to permanently settle in the region. Despite these discrepancies, the Chosŏn court applied military exile to Yi Hŭi-t’ae in response to the issue of illegal migration. Chain County, previously a subordinate county (屬縣 sokhyŏn) under Kyŏngju Prefecture, attained independent county status in 1637 following a 70-year campaign led by local 136 Nanch’o 爛抄 (The Summary of the Court Gazette) 11, 5b-6a, 丙子正月初九日. 禁府 照目 慶源府使 李喜泰 段沿邊防禦何等愼嚴而匪類之乘夜突入民戶之越江潛逃矇未覺察罪有當勘 以此照律罪杖一百收贖告身盡行追奪發邊遠充軍私罪啓依允。 137 Chain County is now Chain District in the city of Kyŏngsan, located in Kyŏngsang Province. During the Silla period (57 BCE-935), the region was called Nosahwa County or Kihwa County. However, under the reign of King Kyŏngdŏk (景德王 n.d.-765), it was renamed Chain County and became part of Changsan County. In 1914, it was incorporated into Kyŏngsan County and renamed Chain District, the name by which it is known today. The name “Chain” is thought to be derived from the character ‘Cha (慈),’ symbolizing the Buddhist teachings of Wŏnhyo (元曉 617-686), who was born in the area, and ‘In (仁),’ representing the Confucian ethics of Sŏlchong (薛聰 655-n.d.), Wŏnhyo’s son. (Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Kyŏngsang p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 경상편, (Jinhan M&B, 2011), 355.) 138 Ilsŏngnok日省錄 [1876/01/06]. (配李喜泰等) 義禁府啓言李喜泰 慈仁縣邊遠充軍朴長夏 溫陽郡徒三年定配請依例押送允之。 139 Taejŏn t’ongp’yŏn 大典通編, 刑典, 禁制, [犯越採蔘佃獵者]. 犯越地界守令·邊將, 徒三年, 定配。 座首·兵房軍官, 島配。 守令·邊將自爲捕納者, 將功折罪。 若掩置徵贖於犯越人, 則計贓論。 守令·邊將不能摘發而現捉於節度使, 則守令·邊將, 邊遠充軍。 140 elites (在地士族 chaeji sajok).140 Situated amidst major prefectures, including Kyŏngju, Taegu, Hayang, and Ch’ŏngdo, Chain County played a pivotal military role during the Imjin War, serving as a key defensive base for these surrounding regions against Japanese forces. Research indicates that the local militia (義兵 ŭibyŏng) commanded by Ch’oe Mun-byŏng (崔文炳 n.d.-1599) was instrumental in disrupting Japanese supply lines.141 Thanks to the region’s mountainous topography, as shown in Map 10, guerrilla activity was particularly prominent in the county. Although small in population and size, Chain County was of significant strategic value.142 Map 10: The Map of Chain County in 1872 Source: The Map of Kyŏngsang Province (慶尙道地圖 Kyŏngsangdo chido) vol. 5 (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10512) 140 Yi Kwang-u and Yi Su-hwan 이광우 이수환, "16-17-segi Kyŏngsangdo Chainhyŏn pokhyŏn kwajŏng kwa i rŭl tullŏssan Chain, Kyŏngju chiyŏk chaeji sajok ŭi tonghyang" 16-17세기 경상도 자인현(慈仁縣) 복현(復縣) 과정과 이를 둘러싼 자인(慈仁), 경주(慶州) 지역 재지사족의 동향, Komunsŏ yŏn’gu 고문서연구 41, (2012): 34-41. 141 Pak Sun-jin 박순진, "Imjin Waeran gi Ch’oe Mun-byŏng ŭi ŭibyŏng hwaltong" 임진왜란기 최문병 (崔文炳)의 의병활동, Tonga inmunhak 동아인문학 52, (2020): 326-327. 142 When Yi Hŭi-t’ae was exiled to Chain County in 1876, the population of the county is estimated to have been approximately 11,600. (Yi Kwang-u and Yi Su-hwan 이광우 이수환, "16-17-segi Kyŏngsangdo Chainhyŏn pokhyŏn kwajŏng kwa i rŭl tullŏssan Chain, Kyŏngju chiyŏk chaeji sajok ŭi tonghyang" 16-17세기 경상도 자인현(慈仁縣) 복현(復縣) 과정과 이를 둘러싼 자인(慈仁), 경주(慶州) 지역 재지사족의 동향, Komunsŏ yŏn’gu 고문서연구 41, (2012): 30.) 141 Although the military role of Chain County had diminished during the prolonged period of peace following the Imjin War when Yi Hŭi-t’ae was exiled to the area, numerous soldiers remained present, including military officers (軍官 kun’gwan), regular duty soldiers (正軍 chŏnggun), marines (水軍 sugun), supporting taxpayers (保人 poin), and various soldiers belonging to different branches, as documented in the local gazetteer of Chain County. In terms of military units, in addition to the Five Military Divisions (五軍營 Ogunyŏng), the area comprised local army and naval units, including the local army units: the Headquarters of the Provincial Governor (巡營 Sunyŏng), Left Headquarters of Provincial Military Commander (左兵營 Chwabyŏngyŏng), and Taegu Garrison (大邱鎭 Taegujin). The local naval units included the Naval Headquarters (統營 T’ongyŏng) and Provincial Naval Headquarters (水營 Suyŏng).143 However, it is likely that only small subordinate units from each headquarters and garrison were established in the county, given the status and size of Chain County. Unfortunately, the specific military unit to which Yi Hŭi-t’ae was assigned is not recorded. As with other instances of military exile, the duration of Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s punishment was brief. On 2/8 of 1876, King Kojong decreed the release of central officials (朝官 chogwan) who had been exiled. In compliance with this order, the State Tribunal submitted a list of parole candidates, which included Yi Hŭi-t’ae along with eight other former officials. The king immediately approved the recommendation.144 Considering that Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s exile was confirmed only a month before his amnesty, it is highly likely that the government did not intend for the punishment to be strictly enforced. Rather, it seems that the regime sought to use Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s exile as a cautionary example for other local governors and magistrates, underscoring the importance of border security. As in other cases of military exile involving aristocrats, the punishment was more symbolic, if not completely so. One might speculate that Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s early parole was not granted due to a lack of accountability, but rather due to concerns about his health, as he had been temporarily released 143 Kyŏngsangdo ŭpchi 慶尙道邑誌 (The Gazetteer of Kyŏngsang Province) 16. 1832., pp. 19-20. 144 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 13-02-08 (25) [1876/02/08]. 義禁府啓曰, 卿宰·侍從·文蔭武朝官徒流以下, 竝放事, 命下矣。(…) 慈仁縣邊遠充軍罪人李喜泰, (…) 一體蕩滌放送, 何如? 傳曰, 允。 142 during the interrogation process for treatment of hernia. Nevertheless, his subsequent career suggests that his criminal record did not significantly hinder his professional trajectory as a local official. For instance, in January 1878, Yi Hŭi-t’ae was appointed as the magistrate of Pyŏktong County in P’yŏngan Province.145 Pyŏktong County, located on the border between Qing and Chosŏn along the Yalu River, held considerable military importance since the founding of the Chosŏn Dynasty. The region was fortified with multiple beacon mounds, including Koyŏndae Peak (古煙臺峰 Koyŏndaebong) and Yŏndae Peak (煙臺峰 Yŏndaebong),146 underscoring its strategic value. However, Yi Hŭi-t’ae did not appear to be an ideal or commendable magistrate. According to a report by Min Yŏng-wi (閔泳緯 1818-1886), the then governor of P’yŏngan Province, Yi Hŭi-t’ae was portrayed as a magistrate who mistreated the local population and showed favoritism towards dishonest individuals.147 Despite his negative reputation, Yi Hŭi-t’ae completed his term without major issues until August 1879.148 Later, in 1889, the Chosŏn government elevated his official rank to the Junior Second-Rank Minister (嘉善大夫 Kasŏn taebu), a promotion given to former officials who had reached the age of 80.149 Despite the numerous drawbacks in Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s career as a local official, his ability to secure such a position and the subsequent honors conferred upon him suggest that the regime’s application of military exile in his case was more symbolic than permanently damaging to his career. Furthermore, Yi Hŭi-t’ae’s punishment partially reflects the attitudes of the Chosŏn ruling class toward military service, which was perceived as a disgraceful penalty, similar to other instances of military exile. This pattern of treatment underscores the ruling elite’s tendency to manipulate punitive measures for political ends, aiming to maintain control over local officials rather than to enforce accountability. 145 P’alto ch’ongnok 八道總錄 (General Records of Eight Provinces) (한古朝 57-가 527). 146 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Pukhan p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 북한편, (Jinhan M&B, 2011), 283-290. 147 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1879/06/15]. (開坼京外殿最) 平安監司 閔泳緯啓本碧潼郡守 李喜泰民何胥聒嬖或售奸。 148 Kangyŏng ilgi 岡營日記 (Diary of the Hwanghae Province Garrison) (己卯八月)十八日 [1879/08/18], Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-3281). 十八日晴 國忌正日 碧潼郡守 李喜泰 遞任上去路來謁 營。 149 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 26-01-02 (14) [1889/01/02]. 143 In the meantime, military exile was employed as a disciplinary measure against local officials for corruption and maladministration. One prominent example is the case of Pae Sang-bŏm (裵相範 n.d.), who served as the Adjunct General (褊裨 P’yŏngbi) to the governor of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province and was sentenced to military exile in 1883. On 8/7 of 1883, Yu Sŏk (柳奭 n.d.), the Secret Censor dispatched to Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, reported various corruption cases involving magistrates in the region, including Pae Sang-bŏm’s own misconduct, to King Kojong.150 Following this report, King Kojong ordered that both Pae Sang-bŏm and Yi Sŭng-o (李承五 n.d.), the former governor of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, be penalized, citing Yi’s failure to supervise and address Pae’s transgressions. After deliberation, Yi Sŭng-o was sentenced to banishment, while Pae Sang-bŏm received a sentence of military exile.151 Although corruption among magistrates and local commanders was not uncommon, the punishment of Pae Sang-bŏm and Yi Sŭng-o was unique in that a governor faced disciplinary action for neglecting to monitor his subordinates’ corruption. In this regard, Yi Sŭng-o’s fate was particularly unfortunate. Ultimately, the Ministry of Punishments resolved to send Pae Sang-bŏm to Sinji Island in Kangjin County, following a single instance of corporal punishment.152 150 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 20-08-07 (37) [1883/08/07]. 至於褊裨裵相範, 不可置以勿論, 令攸司勘罪爲白乎旀。 151 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 20:42b [1883/08/11]. 前忠淸監司李承五, 施以竄配之典。 該褊裨, 秋曹堂上開坐, 通衢嚴刑一次, 遠惡島充軍。 152 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok 秋曹決獄錄 (Records of the Adjudication of Prison Cases by the Ministry of Punishments) 35, 51a (奎 15148). 傳敎忠淸監營前褊裨裴相範開坐通衢嚴刑一次後全羅道康津縣薪智島遠惡島充軍定配所卽爲押送之意敢 啓 傳曰知道。 144 Map 11: The Map of Sinji Island in 1872 Source: The Map of the Garrison in Sinji Island of Kangjin County (康津薪智島鎭地圖 Kangjin Sinjido chinjido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10456) In light of the island’s topography and the presence of a military garrison shown on the map, it can be inferred that Pae Sang-bŏm was assigned to the naval base. However, just one year after Pae Sang-bŏm’s sentencing, the government decided to release 789 individuals under banishment or military exile.153 Consequently, Pae Sang-bŏm benefited from this lenient measure on 8/1 of 1884.154 As a military official, he was able to continue his public service both in the military and as a local magistrate without significant disruption. For instance, in 1890, he held the position of the Junior Second-Rank Guard Commander (衛將 Wijang) at Ch’angdŏk Palace (昌德宮 Ch’angdŏkkung), one of the principal palaces of the Chosŏn court.155 The responsibilities of the guard commander included training military formations (陣法 chinpŏp), performing night duty (入直 ipchik), conducting patrols (行巡 haengsun), and overseeing guard duty (侍衛 siwi) as the supreme commander of the Five Military Commands. This unit served as the capital defense force, tasked with protecting the royal family during the Chosŏn Dynasty.156 153 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:64b [1884/08/01]. 154 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-08-01 (17) [1884/08/01]. 155 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 27-07-18 (21) [1890/07/18]. 156 Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, Chosŏnsidae kunsa kwallyŏn yŏn’gu 조선시대 군사관련 연구, (Tan’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1996), 28-37. 145 In other words, the regime’s appointment of Pae Sang-bŏm to such a significant position reflects the ruler’s trust in him. Subsequently, Pae Sang-bŏm was appointed as the Senior Second-Rank Administrator of the Military Affairs Commission (同知中樞府事 Tongji chungch’ubu sa) in August 1890. The Military Affairs Commission (中樞府 Chungch’ubu) was a ceremonial office without actual duties, established to extend favor to elderly sinecures who were formerly high-ranking civil and military officials.157 His appointment to this honorary position was indicative of the regime’s special consideration for him. The last recorded position held by Pae Sang-bŏm was that of magistrate of Chŏksŏng County in Kyŏnggi Province. He was appointed to this role on 1/1 of 1893 but resigned the following day due to illness.158 The lack of official records complicates efforts to trace his career trajectory beyond this point. Nevertheless, his résumé indicates that he was not excluded from the central officialdom despite his criminal record associated with military exile. This indicates a degree of indulgence within the political system regarding the rehabilitation of officials previously subjected to military punishment. Military exile cases involving corruption in the state service examinations During the Chosŏn Dynasty, the civil and military service examinations functioned as the primary route for literati to enter government service. The Chosŏn government, therefore, endeavored to maintain the fairness and integrity of these examinations in order to identify the most qualified and capable officials. Despite these efforts, scandals, fraudulent activities, and corruption persisted in relation to the government service examinations (科擧 kwagŏ). Thus, at 157 According to the Comprehensive National Code, the position of Senior Second-Rank Administrator was traditionally conferred upon the guard commander as part of a sinecure. It is likely that Pae Sang-bŏm’s appointment to this position was consistent with this regulation. Taejŏn t’ongp’ŏn 大典通編, 兵典, 京官職 [正一品衙門 中樞府]. 領事一員正一品。, 判事二員從一品。, 知事六員正二品。, 同知事八員從二品。 原 七員。 續 加一員, 衛將遞兒。 158 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1893/01/02]. (改差結城縣監 白冀洙 積城縣監 裴相範) 吏曹以冀洙等身病啓請改差也。 146 the onset of his direct rule, King Kojong repeatedly issued warnings and directives aimed at eradicating scandals and systemic corruption. Various scandals and fraudulent activities in government service examinations were widespread in Late Chosŏn’s aristocratic society. A notable example is Kim Ok-kyun (金玉均 1851-1894), a leader of the Enlightenment Party and the Coup d’État of 1884 (甲申政變 Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn), who advocated for the abolition of class privileges (門閥 munbŏl) and the appointment of talented individuals through meritocracy.159 Despite his reformist stance, Kim Ok-kyun was implicated in a scandalous case and subsequently banished to a remote area in 1880.160 His case illustrates that even officials committed to reform were not immune to examination-related misconduct. In response, the monarch turned to military exile as a punitive measure, consistent with the provisions outlined in the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. The first instance in which King Kojong imposed military exile for government examination corruption occurred in 1876, early in his direct rule. On 8/25 of 1876, a civil examination scandal was uncovered by Kim Yun-sik, who was serving as the Secret Censor. The officials responsible for the fraudulent act were subjected to military exile and wirianch’i, both penalties typically reserved for serious crimes. This incident underscores the seriousness with which the Chosŏn government addressed corruption within the civil examination system. While the cases of Pak U-hyŏn, Kim Chae-hŭi, and Yi Min-dŏk were associated with broader political and diplomatic shifts in Chosŏn, with military exile applied in excess of the Comprehensive National Code or the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, this incident represents rare occasions where the Chosŏn court adhered to the legal codes in punishing the perpetrators. The three officials implicated in the scandal were Chŏng T’ae-ho (鄭泰好 1837-n.d.), the former governor of Hwanghae Province; Chŏng Chung-u (鄭重愚 1808-n.d.), the former Junior Ninth Civil Officer (參奉 Ch’ambong) of the Guest Ritual Agency (禮賓寺 Yebinsi) 161; and 159 Harold F. Cook, Korea’s 1884 Incident: Its Background and Kim Ok-kyun’s Elusive Dream, (Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1972), 247. 160 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 17:7a [1880/02/29]. 雖以文公事官言之, 渠以糾察, 反事行雜云。 聞不勝痛惋。 亦施以邊遠竄配之典。 161 According to the Court Chronicle, Chŏng Chung-u was appointed as the Junior Ninth Civil Officer on 1/4 of 1862, 14 years prior to the bribery incident in question. (Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1862/01/04]. (都政下批 吏曹判書 147 Hong Pong-hwa (洪鳳華 n.d.), a subordinate of Chŏng T’ae-ho and the Five Guards General (五衛將 Owijang).162 Prior to Kim Yun-sik’s discovery of his fraudulent actions in the civil service examination, Chŏng T’ae-ho had already been banished due to his misconduct and for uttering vile words recklessly.163 Kim Yun-sik’s investigation further revealed that, while serving as the governor of Hwanghae Province, Chŏng T’ae-ho accepted a bribe from Chŏng Chung-u. Moreover, Hong Pong-hwa actively collaborated with Chŏng T’ae-ho in carrying out these illegal activities.164 Upon receiving Kim Yun-sik’s report on 9/12 of 1876, King Kojong summoned Chŏng T’ae-ho from his place of banishment to further investigate the allegations that he permitted approximately 40 candidates to participate in the civil service examination in exchange for bribes during his tenure as governor of Hwanghae Province from 1874 to 1875. The king additionally mandated the punishment of these candidates through military exile. Consequently, Chŏng T’ae-ho was subjected to wirianch’i. In contrast, both Chŏng Chung-u and Hong Pong-hwa were placed under military exile in a remote and inhospitable area and a remote area (遠地 wŏnji), respectively.165 徐有薰 參議 李升洙 兵曹判書 李鍾愚進).) Yebinsi was a government office responsible for overseeing banquets for guests, as well as the food provisions for royal family members and high-ranking officials. (Han’gun minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture).) 162 Chŏng Chung-u passed the civil service examination in 1852, ranking 37th out of 100 candidates at the age of 45 (Sungjŏng kiwŏnhu-sa imjasik samabangmok 崇禎紀元後四壬子式司馬榜目 (The List of Successful Candidates in the Civil Service Examination of the Fourth Year of Imja after the Chongzheng Era), 古 6024-50.). In contrast, no records have been found regarding Hong Pong-hwa’s success in the civil service examination. However, his father, Hong In-hwa (洪麟華 1825-n.d.), achieved 98th rank out of 277 candidates in the civil service examination of 1873 (Sungjŏng kiwŏnhu-sa[o] kyeyusik samabangmok 崇禎紀元後四[五]. 癸酉式司馬榜目 (The List of Successful Candidates in the Civil Service Examination of the Fourth and Fifth Year of Kyeyu after the Chongzheng Era), 古 6024-29). In addition, prior to this incident, Hong Pong-hwa was appointed as the Five Guards General. (Sŭngjŏngwŏn chobo 承政院朝報 (the Report of the Royal Secretariat) 1, no. 179990) 163 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:45a [1876/08/25]. 二十五日。 議政府啓: "瓦署別提李獻耆, 名以朝官, 符同雜類, 行其所不爲之事。 苟存一分嚴畏之心, 焉敢乃爾? 爲先永刊仕籍, 令該府嚴刑島配, 勿揀赦前。 行護軍鄭泰好, 持身不謹, 締結獻耆, 駭悖之說, 極其狼藉。 以若宰臣之列, 不可但以貽羞言, 施以竄配之典何如?" 允之。 164 Kim Yun-sik 金允植, Sok ŭmch’ŏngsa 續陰晴史, (T’amgudang, 1971), 590-591. 165 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:47b [1876/09/11]. 罪人鄭泰好, 濟州牧圍籬安置, 三倍道押送。 其犯贓諸條, 自秋曹刻期徵捧, 下送本道監營, 充補還給之方, 量宜措處。 繡啓中所謂裨幕輩, 不可以人微而勿問。 亦令秋曹, 竝捉致。 鄭重愚嚴刑一次, 遠惡地充軍, 洪鳳華遠地充軍。 148 The clause regarding civil service examination fraud was detailed in the Comprehensive National Code. According to this clause, individuals involved in examination corruption were subject to punishment by military exile.166 Those who arrange for someone else to compose exam answers at examination sites in Seoul or other regions, those who write on behalf of an examinee, those who enter the exam hall accompanied by attendants, those who unlawfully intrude without being called, those who collude in tampering with answer sheets during the transcription of answers, and those who instigate disturbances leading to the suspension of the exam, will be subject to legal punishment. If they are government officials, or if they hold the title of literary degree-holders (生員 saengwŏn), classics degree-holders (進士 chinsa), they will be sent to remote border areas for military exile, and even if an amnesty is issued, they will not be pardoned. Those below the class of student scholar will be exiled to the navy for life. Corruption in civil service examinations constituted a persistent social issue in Chosŏn, leading King Kojong to issue a series of royal edicts aimed at implementing stringent measures against illegal practices, such as bribery and falsification of place of birth records, at examination sites. Moreover, invigilators (試官 sigwan) who failed to uphold order during the examinations faced demotion as a consequence of their negligence. Notably, in 1874, approximately thirteen entries in the Veritable Record of King Kojong documented actions taken to address the issue of examination corruption. This substantial number of measures, given that it pertains to a single issue, underscores the government’s acknowledgment of the severity of the problems associated with the government service examination system. As a result of the court’s deliberations, Chŏng T’ae-ho was banished to Cheju Island, regarded as the most severe place of exile, and the bribe he had received was confiscated. 166 Taejŏn t’ongp’ŏn 大典通編, 禮典, 諸科 [借述·代述者]. 中外大·小科場, 借述·代述者, 帶率隨從者, 不錄名闌入者, 符同易書者, 首倡作亂罷場者, 朝官·生·進, 則邊遠充軍, 勿揀赦前, 幼學以下, 則限己身降定水軍。 149 Additionally, Chŏng Chung-u was sent to Kimhae Prefecture in Kyŏngsang Province in the south, while Hong Pong-hwa was exiled to Sangwŏn County in P’yŏng’an Province in the northwest. Although Chŏng Chung-u was originally exempt from flogging (棍杖 konjang) due to his prior position as the Junior Ninth Civil Official, a privilege customarily accorded, King Kojong ultimately denied this exception.167 This decision reflected the extent of the king’s outrage regarding the case. The harsh penalties imposed on these officials served not only as a punitive measure but also as a warning to others in positions of authority, underscoring the seriousness with which the court regarded corruption. Map 12: The Map of Kimhae Prefecture in the 18th century Source: The Extensive Map of the Territories (廣輿圖 Kwangyŏdo), vol. 7 (古 4790-58) 167 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 13-09-12 (20) [1876/09/12]. 刑曹啓曰, 謹依傳敎, 黃海前監司鄭泰好, 犯贓諸條, 合錢十一萬八百二十五兩六錢二分, 自臣曹捉囚家僮, 刻期督捧。 裨幕洪鳳華, 平安道祥原郡遠地充軍, 定配所卽爲押送。 鄭重愚, 曾經禮賓參奉矣, 係是朝官, 何以爲之之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 如此之類, 何可以朝官待之乎? 自該曹卽爲擧行。 150 Map 13: The Map of Sangwŏn County in 1872 Source: The Map of Sangwŏn County (祥原郡地圖 Sangwŏn’gun chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10601) The places of military exile, Kimhae and Sangwŏn, were of strategic military significance to Chosŏn. First, as depicted in Map 12, Kimhae is located at the estuary of the Naktong River, which empties into the Korea Strait, a critical maritime passage between Korea and Japan. Historically, this region had been exploited by Japanese pirates and naval forces to launch invasions of the Korean peninsula.168 Notably, Chosŏn’s guerrilla resistance against Japanese military forces was particularly active along the Naktong River in Kyŏngsang Province during the Imjin War from 1592 to1598.169 After the conclusion of the Imjin War, Chosŏn’s local defense system was severely weakened. In response, following the Imjin War, King Kwanghae (光海君 1575-1641) implemented policies aimed at restoring national defense, including the establishment of 168 During the Imjin War, the third division of Japan’s naval forces, led by Kuroda Nagamasa (黒田長政 1568-1623), launched their expedition from Kimhae. (JaHyun Kim Haboush, The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation, (Columbia University Press, 2016), 79.) 169 James B Lewis, The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence and Memory, (Taylor and Francis, 2015), 142-147. 151 recruitment garrisons (召募陳 somojin) as naval strongholds. These garrisons were temporary formations designed to mobilize drifters (流民 yumin) as supplementary naval forces beyond the regular quota, by granting them military colony lands (屯田 tunjŏn). In peacetime, these individuals engaged in agriculture on the military colony land, but they served as naval servicemen in times of emergency. In this regard, recruitment garrisons functioned differently from regular military garrisons. Due to the strategic significance of Kimhae, the Chosŏn government took the unusual step of establishing two recruitment garrisons within Kimhae Prefecture between 1609 and 1610.170 However, by the 18th century, the operational methods of these quasi-temporary garrisons began to closely resemble those of regular naval garrisons.171 Given this context, it is highly plausible that Chŏng Chung-u was assigned to one of the naval garrisons in Kimhae Prefecture, which was considered among the harshest forms of military exile, although the specific military units to which he was attached are not detailed in the available records. Second, Sangwŏn County172 played a crucial role in Chosŏn’s defense strategy against the so-called “northern barbarians” (北虜 pungno) in the northeastern region. Control of this county, along with P’yŏngyang, now the capital of North Korea, was essential for the northern tribes to advance toward Seoul. Due to its strategic importance, the Chosŏn government appointed officials of junior fourth-rank (從四品) as county magistrates (郡守 kunsu) of Sangwŏn from the Early Chosŏn period.173 Considering the long-standing marginalization of the northeastern region throughout Chosŏn history, one of the core factors behind the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812, the appointment of relatively high-ranking officials to this remote area was particularly notable. 170 Han Sŏng-il 한성일, "Kwanghaegundae sugun somojin (召募陣) ŭi sŏlch’i wa Kimhaebu" 광해군대 수군 소모진 (召募陣)의 설치와 김해부 (金海府), Ch’onggye sahak 청계사학 27, (2024): 169. 171 Ibid., 157. 172 Although Sangwŏn County is currently part of North Hwanghae Province, it was administratively considered part of P’yŏngyang, the capital of North Korea, until 2010. (Kim To-gyun 김도균, "Pukhan Kim wiwŏnjang kaein kŭmgo 38 hosil puhwal, Pyŏngyangsi nŭn ch’ukso kaep’yŏn" 북한 김 위원장 개인금고 38호실 부활, 평양시는 축소 개편, OhmyNews, February 14, 2011, https://m.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Mobile/amp.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001523387.) 173 Yi Chon-hŭi 이존희, "Chosŏn ch’ogi ŭi suryŏng chedo" 조선초기의 수령제도, Yŏksa kyoyuk 역사교육 31-32, (1982): 50. 152 According to the Sangwŏn County Gazetteer (祥原郡誌 Sangwŏn’gunji), compiled by Han Se-hyŏng (韓世衡 1668-n.d.) in 1730, the military structure of Sangwŏn County consisted of 4,113 soldiers, including 287 soldiers recruited to fill vacancies in the military roster (歲抄軍 sech’ogun), 273 regimental troops (團束軍 tansokkun), and 3,003 support taxpayers (納布軍 napsokkun). 174 Given that Sangwŏn is situated inland, it is highly improbable that naval garrisons were established in the area. Thus, it is more likely that Hong Pong-hwa was assigned to an army garrison, which was considered a less severe form of military exile compared to naval service. However, as with most cases of military exile, discussions regarding the release of those punished in this incident began shortly after their sentences were imposed. On 2/9 of 1879, King Kojong issued a royal command for the release of Chŏng T’ae-ho, who had been banished to Cheju Island, along with others serving sentences, including Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn and Cho Pyŏng-sik, approximately two years after Chŏng’s banishment was confirmed.175 Despite strong opposition from the Royal Secretariat, the king proceeded with his decision, directing the office to promptly promulgate their release.176 Following their release, the king appointed them to government positions. On the other hand, there are few records concerning the release of Ch’ŏng Chung-u and Hong Pong-hwa from military exile. However, it can be inferred that discussions regarding their release likely coincided with the royal court’s deliberations on Ch’ŏng T’ae-ho’s discharge from banishment. Notably, the Records of the Adjudication of Prison Cases by the Ministry of Punishments indicates that the issue of Hong Pong-hwa’s release, along with that of other imprisoned offenders, was discussed in August 1877.177 It is significant that deliberations regarding Hong’s release began just one year after his military exile. Although records 174 Han Se-hyŏng 韓世衡, Sangwŏn’gunji 祥原郡誌, (Kyujanggak Hangukhak yŏn’guwŏn, 1730), 17. 175 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 16:7b [1879/02/09]. 初九日。 敎曰: "黑山島圍籬安置罪人崔益鉉、楸子島安置罪人趙秉昌, 竝放逐鄕里。 濟州牧圍籬安置罪人鄭泰好、智島島配罪人趙秉式、碧潼郡極邊遠竄罪人李建昌, 放逐鄕里, 罪人金世鎬、洪坃、李載晩, 竝放送。" 176 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 16:8a [1879/02/09]. 批曰: "今番處分, 實有斟量者, 存惟允之地。 不必如是, 卽爲頒布。" 177 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok 秋曹決獄錄 29, 21a (奎 15148). 曹 啓目內因平安監司金尙鉉放未放修 (…) 洪鳳華 因傳敎。 153 concerning Chŏng Chung-u’s release have yet to be uncovered, it is highly plausible that the Ministry of Punishments reviewed his case. Moreover, on 12/21 of 1875, King Kojong issued an edict pardoning individuals sentenced to forced labor, banishment, and military exile, irrespective of whether they had arrived at their designated places of banishment or exile. This decree was issued in celebration of the elevation of the honorific titles (尊號 chonho) of Queen Consort Sinjŏng and her late husband, Prince Hyomyŏng.178 In light of this context, it is likely that both Chŏng Chung-u and Hong Pong-hwa were released from military exile around this time. Chŏng Chung-u’s career following his release suggests that the corruption cases and military exile associated with his crimes did not impede his future prospects. For instance, in January 1882, the Chosŏn government granted elevated bureaucratic ranks (品階 p’umgye) to former officials who reached the age of 70. At that time, Chŏng Chung-u, who held the position of the Senior Third-Rank Minister (通政大夫 T’ongjŏng taebu), benefited from this policy.179 Additionally, he was promoted to the Junior Second-Rank Minister (嘉義大夫 Kaŭi taebu) in January 1887,180 followed by his appointment as the Second Minister of the Office of the Royal Clan (同知敦寧府事 Tongji tonnyŏngbusa) in February 1887.181 Although the promotions Chŏng Chung-u received were sinecures and honorary positions, his criminal record of military exile did not hinder him from enjoying the king’s favor. In the meantime, despite the imposition of strict penalties on those involved in civil service examination corruption, another large-scale scandal further compromised the integrity of the examination system. In 1879, four candidates falsified their hometowns to exploit the affirmative action policy implemented by the Chosŏn government, which granted preferential treatment to candidates from remote regions. The individuals implicated in the case were two classics degree-holders, Nam Chŏng-ho (南廷皓 1837-n.d.) and Pak Yŏng-hun (朴泳薰 1848- 178 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 12-12-21 (25) [1875/12/21]. 雜犯孔罪以下徒流付處, 安寘充軍, 已至配所·未至配所·已發覺·未發覺·已決定, 咸宥除之, 敢以宥旨前事, 相告言者以其〈罪〉罪之, 在官者各加一資, 資窮者代加。 179 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-01-27 (15) [1882/01/27]. 180 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-01-24 (19) [1887/01/24]. 181 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-02-30 (20) [1887/02/30]. 154 n.d.), and two student scholars, Yi Hŭi-dang (李禧戇 1855-n.d.) and Min Yŏng-sŏ (閔泳序 1837-1904). On 3/13 of 1879, Kim Pyŏng-su (金炳洙 1836-n.d.), the Senior Third-Rank Official (判校 P’an’gyo) from the Office of Diplomatic Documents (承文院 Sŭngmunwŏn), filed an appeal requesting that Yi Hŭi-dang be punished for falsely claiming Cheju Island as his hometown, despite not being born in the remote region.182 What led Kim Pyŏng-su to suspect Yi Hŭi-dang’s birthplace? Unfortunately for Yi, Kim Pyŏng-su himself hailed from Cheju Island and argued that he could not overlook Yi’s illegal action, considering the benevolence the court had shown toward him.183 Given that Cheju Island was sparsely populated, with limited opportunities for its residents to succeed in the civil service examination, it is highly likely that Kim was familiar with the local aristocracy. In this context, Yi Hŭi-dang’s decision was not only reckless but also perilous. As outlined in Chapter 1, the Chosŏn government provided special considerations for candidates from Cheju Island due to its considerable distance from the capital. Only candidates from the island were permitted to indicate Cheju as their hometown, allowing examiners to manage their answer sheets accordingly. This preferential treatment aimed to rectify the neglect of Cheju Island; for instance, special examinations were held there, and local officials were directed to recommend individuals for governmental appointments.184 Yi Hŭi-dang abused this national policy to pass the civil service examination, despite his actual residence being in Chunghwa County of P’yŏngan Province. Clearly, Yi’s illicit actions were serious enough to provoke the ire of King Kojong, who ordered the imposition of military exile on Yi Hŭi-dang to Cheju Island and the deletion of his name from the roster of successful candidates.185 Although the official records do not specify the 182 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 16:11a [1879/03/13]. 承文判校金炳洙疏略: "今番慶科之各書道名也, 李禧戇非濟州人, 而冒書參榜。 進身之初, 敢犯欺君之罪, 不可仍置。 亟施當律焉。" 批曰: "豈有如許士習乎? 朝家之此地示意, 因此而未究, 尤爲痛歎。 當有處分矣。 183 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 16-03-13 (28) [1879/03/13]. 承文判校金炳洙疏曰, 伏以臣, 本以海隅微蹤, 濫竊科第, 十有七年, 名忝朝列, 揆分不稱, 惝怳踧踖, 靡所容措, 而臣是濟州人也, 事在目下, 有不容不泯默, 玆敢仰籲於聽卑之天, 伏乞聖明, 垂察焉。 184 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 51-52. 185 Chuyŏnjip 珠淵集 (The Collection of King Kojong’s Works) 10, 2b, Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K4-5682). 155 references that informed King Kojong’s decision to punish Yi Hŭi-dang, it is plausible that the king referred to the examination fraud case of Ku Sŏng-hŭi, which occurred in 1864. As detailed in the previous chapter, Ku Sŏng-hŭi was exiled to Cheju Island, his name was removed from the roster, and he was coerced into making public apologies to the literati of Cheju. Given the similarities between these two cases, it is likely that Yi Hŭi-dang was similarly sent to the island and publicly expressed his contrition for his deceit. Amidst this situation, on 3/25 of 1879, Yi Pong-dŏk (李鳳德 1830-n.d.), the Second-Rank Censor (司諫 Sagan) of the Office of the Censor-General, reported to King Kojong that, in addition to Yi Hŭi-dang, three candidates, Nam Chŏng-ho, Pak Yŏng-hun, and Min Yŏng-sŏ, had falsely reported their hometowns. Specifically, although Nam Chŏng-ho and Pak Yŏng-hun resided in Seoul, they recorded their residences as Ch’unch’ŏn in Kangwŏn Province and Naju in Chŏlla Province, respectively. Additionally, Min Yŏng-sŏ falsified his hometown from Kwangju Prefecture in Kyŏnggi Province to Sangju County in Kyŏngsang Province.186 All three suspects resided either in the capital or nearby, yet they exploited the state policy that offered special treatment to candidates from remote areas. King Kojong immediately issued an order to impose military exile to Cheju Island on the three perpetrators and removed their names from the roster of successful candidates, just as Yi Hŭi-dang had been punished.187 Given the king’s longstanding concern about corruption in government service examinations, this swift measure was indeed commonsensical. The four offenders were exiled to Taejŏng District on Cheju Island, following the precedent that most individuals sentenced to military exile or forced labor were sent to this district.188 向日庭試。使之頭書濟州。特出於軫念遠人。而乃有此僞冒欺罔。竟使原籍之士。抱玆漏榜之歎。究其所爲。豈非可痛乎。李禧戇。原榜目拔去。濟州牧充軍。 186 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 16-03-25 (19) [1879/03/25]. 進士臣南廷皓, 居是京也而懸之以春川地, 進士臣朴泳薰, 亦是京也而懸之以羅州地, 幼學臣閔泳序, 居是廣州而懸之以尙州地, 幼學臣李禧戇, 居是中和而懸之以濟州地, 次第獲參, 各道儒生之失望, 已無可言, 而聖朝眷念之意, 果安在哉? 187 Kim, Hyŏng-gyu 金衡圭, Ch’ongu illok 靑又日錄 (The Diary of Kim Hyŏng-gyu), 己卯 三月 [1879/03/25]. 看朝報, 上曰, 今見臺䟽, 其僞冒之習, 誠極痛駭, 士子通籍, 欲其事君也, 而先行欺君可乎, 不可尋常處之, 庭試被選人南廷澔, 朴泳薰, 閔泳序, 並原榜目拔去, 濟州牧充軍。 188 Ko Ch’ang-sŏk 고창석, "Chosŏnjo ŭi yuhyŏng chedo wa Chejudo" 조선조의 유형제도 (流刑制度)와 제주도, T’amna munhwa 탐라문화, no. 5 (1986): 17. 156 Nonetheless, their punishment proved brief, in line with other cases of military exile imposed for examination-related misconduct, despite the legal code’s stipulation of life military exile for fraudulent examination offenses. On 1/1 of 1880, the Chosŏn government issued a large-scale pardon to commemorate the fiftieth birthday of the dowager queen. The following day, the Ministry of Punishments directed each provincial governor to release individuals subjected to banishment or exile. Consequently, the four offenders, such as Yi Hŭi-dang, Nam Chŏng-ho, Pak Yŏng-hun, and Min Yŏng-sŏ, were released from Cheju Island. Additionally, the rescission of the prior order to strike their names from the examination roster reinstated their eligibility for public office.189 Thus, within a mere year and three months of their punishment for examination misconduct, their official status was restored. Although their pardon aligned with the royal celebration, the brevity of their military exile underscores the symbolic nature of the punishment, suggesting it served more as a nominal reprimand than a substantive penalty. According to Yang Sŏng-bŏm, the Chosŏn regime employed two distinct approaches in its punitive measures for government service examination corruption. First, by enforcing severe penalties, such as military exile to remote areas or naval assignments, the regime sought to eliminate malpractice and uphold the integrity of the recruitment system. Second, in contrast to these stringent measures, the government extended pardons to offenders, allowing them opportunities to repent, even though they were formally sentenced to lifelong military exile. Yang interprets this dual approach as reflecting a belief that, through effort, individuals could achieve sage-like virtue despite past transgressions.190 However, from a military perspective, the government’s use of military exile for examination offenders was intended to publicly humiliate them and reveals a broader disparaging attitude toward military service. Similar to other cases of military exile, the four offenders maintained relatively secure and promising careers in public office, despite their misconduct in the civil service examination. Table 7 presents an overview of their major official positions within the government. 189 Tonggung illok 東宮日錄 (The Diary of the Crown Prince Hall) 7, 39a, (庚辰六月) 初十日丙午 [1880/06/10], Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-50). 上敎曰今番慶年設科試取之會不可無參量示意 昨年春庭試削科人 李禧戇 南廷皓 朴泳薰 閔泳序 竝特爲復科付之今番增廣文科殿試榜末。 190 Yang Sŏng-bŏm 양성범, "Chosŏn hugi kwagŏ pujŏnghaengwi wa kŭ ch’ŏri e kwanhan yŏn’gu" 조선후기 과거 부정행위와 그 처리에 관한 연구 (MA thesis, Korea National University of Education, 2023), 104-105. 157 Table 7: Key Government Positions Held by the Four Offenders Following Release from Military Exile Yi Hŭi-dang Nam Chŏng-ho Pak Yŏng-hun Min Yŏng-sŏ 1 ● Sixth-Rank Assistant Section Chief of the Ministry of War in 1882 ● (兵曹佐郞 Pyŏngjo chwarang) ● Sixth-Rank Librarian of the National Confucian Academy in 1880 ● (成均館 典籍 Sŏnggyun’gwan chŏnjŏk) ● Sixth-Rank Temporary Recorder of the Office of Royal Secretariat in 1880 ● (承政院 假注書 Sŭngjŏngwŏn kajusŏ) ● Sixth-Rank Temporary Recorder of the Office of Royal Secretariat in 1880 ● (承政院 假注書 Sŭngjŏngwŏn kajusŏ) 2 ● Fifth-Rank Secretary of the Ministry of Taxation in 1883 ● (戶曹正郞 Hojo chŏngnang) ● Sixth-Rank Counsellor of the Office of Special Counsellors in 1882 ● (弘文館 副修撰 Hongmun’gwan pusuch’an) ● Fifth-Rank Counsellor of the Office of Special Counsellors in 1887 ● (弘文館 校理 Hongmun’gwan kyori) ● Sixth-Rank Librarian of the National Confucian Academy in 1887 ● (成均館 典籍 Sŏnggyun’gwan chŏnjŏk) 3 ● Fifth-Rank Commentator of the Office of Annals Compilation in 1885 ● (記注官 Kijugwan) ● Fourth-Rank Inspector of the Office of Inspector-General in 1882 ● (司憲府 掌令 Sahŏnbu changnyŏng) ● Fourth-Rank Censor of the Office of Censor-General in 1888 ● (司諫院 正言 Saganwŏn chŏngŏn) ● Fourth-Rank Censor of the Office of Censor-General in 1888 ● (司諫院 正言 Saganwŏn chŏngŏn) 4 ● Third-Rank Five Guards General in 1893 ● (五衛將 Owijang) ● Third-Rank Assistant Master of the National Confucian Academy in 1884 ● (成均館 司成 Sŏnggyung’wan sasŏng) ● Third-Rank Minister of the Ministry of Public Works in 1890 ● (工曹參議 Kongjo cha’mŭi) ● Fifth-Rank Assistant of the Office of State Tribunal in 1890 ● (義禁府 都事 Ŭigŭmbu tosa) 5 ● Fourth-Rank Adviser of the Office of Special Counsellors in 1885 ● (弘文館 應敎 Hongmun’gwan ŭnggyo) ● Third-Rank Royal Secretary-Transmitter of the Office of Royal Secretariat in 1891 ● (承政院 承旨 Sŭngjŏngwŏn sŭngji) ● Fourth-Rank Censor of the Office of Censor-General in 1890 ● (司諫院 正言 Saganwŏn chŏngŏn) 158 Yi Hŭi-dang Nam Chŏng-ho Pak Yŏng-hun Min Yŏng-sŏ 6 ● Third-Rank Minister of the Ministry of War in 1892 ● (兵曹參知 Pyŏngjo ch’amji) ● Magistrate of Sunch’ang County in 1895 ● (淳昌郡守 Sunch’ang kunsu) ● Fifth-Rank Reader in Attendance of the Office of Special Counsellors in 1898 ● (弘文館 侍讀 Hongmun’gwan sidok) 7 ● Third-Rank Royal Secretary-Transmitter of the Office of Royal Secretariat in 1893 ● (承政院 承旨 Sŭngjŏngwŏn sŭngji) ● Magistrate of Naju County in 1897 ● (羅州郡守 Naju kunsu) 8 ● District Magistrate of Ich’ŏn District in 1894 ● (利川府使 Ich’ŏn pusa ) ● Magistrate of Cheju Special Administrative Town in 1898 ● (濟州牧使 Cheju moksa) 9 ● Magistrate of Kap’yŏng County in 1897 ● (加平郡守 Kap’yŏng kunsu) ● Director-General Resident in Vladivostok, Russia in 1900 ● (駐箚海蔘威 Chuch’a Haesamwi) 10 ● Magistrate of Yŏju Special Administrative Town in 1898 ● (驪州牧使 Yŏju moksa) ● Senior Advisor of the Council of Ministers without Portfolio in 1906 ● (中樞院 副贊議 Chungch’uwŏn puch’anŭi) Source: The Diary of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi), the Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok), the Kap’yŏng Gazetteer (加平邑誌 Kap’yŏng ŭpchi), the Official Gazetteer of Chosŏn and Great Han Empire (朝鮮·大韓帝國 官報 Chosŏn·Taehan Cheguk kwanbo), the Database of Korean Modern Historical Records – Modern and Contemporary Figures Data (한국근대 사료 DB – 근현대인물자료 Han’guk Kŭndae Saryo DB – Kŭnhyŏndae Inmul Charyo) The table above clearly indicates that the four officials achieved successful careers following their release from military exile in 1880, despite slightly differing career trajectories. They attained public positions ranging from third to fourth rank until their retirement. Coincidentally, three of them, namely Yi Hŭi-dang, Nam Chŏng-ho, and Pak Yŏng-hun, changed 159 their names around the time they began their public service.191 While changing names was permissible upon receiving royal approval through a report from the Ministry of Personnel (吏曹 Ijo) to the throne,192 it likely hindered efforts by critics to trace their past misconduct. Specifically, the appointment of Yi Hŭi-dang as the Five Guards General holds historical significance. According to Eugene Park’s research, during the Late Chosŏn period, this position was conferred upon previous or current officeholders, government technical experts, including interpreters, physicians, jurors, astronomers, accountants, calligraphers, painters, and musicians, and secondary status military officers. The primary beneficiaries of this system were non-elites who possessed wealth but held a low social status. While some military officers in this role continued to serve as incumbent military commanders in the central army, the majority occupied sinecures with no official duties. In other words, this position was largely honorary. The conferment of the Five Guards General title contributed to maintaining an appropriate gradation of mollifiers, allowing aristocratic statesmen to uphold the integrity of the established status hierarchy, thereby benefiting both the donors and recipients.193 In addition to the social impact of the Five Guards General that Eugene Park discusses, the excessive issuance of this position to retired officials and non-elites can be seen as a symbol of the diminishing military value in the latter half of Chosŏn society. Numerous instances occurred in which King Kojong conferred the title upon literary degree-holders and classics degree-holders who were over 80 or 85 years of age during his direct rule.194 On 9/10 of 1876, Yi Ch’oe-ŭng, the then Chief State Councillor, voiced his concerns about the increasing number of unqualified candidates being recommended for the position of Five Guards General and suggested that the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of War adhere to existing 191 For instance, Yi Hŭi-dang was officially renamed Yi Hŭi-ryong (李禧龍) in 1880, while Nam Chŏng-ho adopted the name Nam Chŏng-gi (南廷綺) around 1881. Additionally, Pak Yŏng-hun’s name was changed to Pak Yong-wŏn (朴用元) circa 1886. 192 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 吏典, 改名 [凡改名者本曹啓]. 凡改名者本曹啓, 移藝文館, 置簿給文。 193 Eugene Y. Park, "Status and "Defunct" Offices in Early Modern Korea: The Case of Five Guards Generals (Owijang), 1864-1910", Journal of Social History 41, no. 3 (2008): 739-750. 194 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 11:48a [1874/05/23]. 敎曰: "生、進中八十五歲以上人, 竝特爲五衛將, 令該曹加設單付。" Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:21b [1876/02/26]. 命生進中年八十以上人, 竝令該曹, 五衛將加設, 單付。 160 regulations.195 Despite Yi’s valid criticisms regarding the overproliferation of Five Guards General positions, the institution continued to be maintained by the Chosŏn government. Alongside Yi Hŭi-dang’s case, the public career trajectories of Nam Chŏng-ho and Pak Yŏng-hun are particularly intriguing, as they share many similarities. For instance, both individuals changed their original names. Furthermore, after their service in the central government, both Nam and Pak took on roles as local magistrates in various counties and towns until their retirement. Indeed, military exile did not significantly hinder their careers, as they were appointed as the so-called shepherds of the people (牧民官 mongmin’gwan), a position responsible for administering local government and educating the populace. In particular, Pak Yŏng-hun’s profile notably stands out. Ironically, he faced punishment once again for civil service examination misconduct as an invigilator due to his and another examiner’s delay in commencing the examination in 1892.196 However, he made a triumphant return to Cheju Island as magistrate, the very place where he had previously been exiled for his misconduct. Pak Yŏng-hun appears to have been regarded as a specialist in Cheju, as evidenced by his appointment as the Specially Empowered Inspector (按覈使 Anhaeksa) during the 1901 revolt in the Taejŏng District, the site of his military exile.197 However, there was criticism regarding the overly lenient policy. On 3/3 of 1886, Kim Pyŏng-yun (金炳胤 1838-n.d.), a classics degree-holder from Cheju Island, submitted a memorial to the throne in which he argued that Confucian students residing in Cheju had failed the civil service examinations due to fraudulent activities perpetrated by ‘sly’ groups such as Ku Sŏng-hŭi and Yi Hŭi-dang. He further criticized the government for pardoning these offenders and granting them public positions despite their military exile.198 Although King Kojong 195 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:46a [1876/09/10]. 又曰: "兵批之五衛將, 自是正職, 而挽近輒多濫擬, 另飭銓曹, 俾無違越定規。 196 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 29:65a [1892/10/09]. 敎曰: "御題已下於辰刻, 而試官之屢次懸頉, 以致日暮開場。 豈有如許無憚之習乎? 當該試官 【朴用元、鄭萬朝】 , 竝施譴罷之典。 197 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 38-04-14 (07) [1901/04/14]. 議政府參政徐正淳謹奏, 今聞大靜郡有民擾, 聽聞所及, 萬萬駭瞠。 此不可不急遠査覈, 正三品朴用元, 按覈使差下, 使之不日前往, 前後委折, 到底査覈登聞, 以法從事。 198 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 23-03-03 (06) [1886/03/03]. 科規本自嚴重, 雖尋常盜籍, 猶有當律, 況彼欺天禦人之罪, 當復何居哉? 所謂竊其大科者二人, 縱施充軍之律, 旋蒙赦宥, 隨登仕宦。 世人見此, 以爲是常然, 少無忌憚之心, 爭慕僥倖之計。 161 promised to rigorously enforce military exile for offenders, he subsequently continued to take actions that led to the release of these individuals. Four years after the military exile incident involving Yi Hŭi-dang and the other three candidates, another case of civil service examination corruption emerged in 1883. On 4/28 of that year, Kim U-yong (金禹用 1848-n.d.) was accused of colluding with An Kyŏng-hwan (安敬煥 n.d.), the Sixth-Rank Miscellaneous Post (司謁 Saal) in the Royal Concubine Office (掖庭署 Aekchŏngsŏ), and Pak Kyŏng-hak (朴景學 n.d.), a slave of the Royal Secretariat (院隷 wŏllye), to borrow an answer sheet that had been written outside the examination site. King Kojong was infuriated that such a crime occurred during the examination in his presence (親試 ch’insi). As a result, An Kyŏng-hwan was banished to Okkwa County in Chŏlla Province, while Pak Kyŏng-hak was sent to Sakchu Prefecture in P’yŏngan Province. Kim U-yong was immediately subjected to military exile; however, due to his status as a central official, he was referred to the State Tribunal for further investigation.199 Following deliberation, Kim U-yong was exiled to the Nokto Garrison (鹿島鎭 Noktojin) in Hŭngyang County, Chŏlla Province.200 The Nokto Garrison was one of the five key garrisons under the Left Naval Headquarters of Chŏlla Province (全羅左水營 Chŏlla chwasuyŏng), which included the Sado Garrison (蛇島鎭 Sadojin), Pangdap Garrison (防踏鎭 Pangdapjin), Yŏdo Garrison (呂島鎭 Yŏdojin), and Palp’o Garrison (鉢浦鎭 Palp’ojin). These garrisons were established for defense against Japanese military forces during the Imjin War.201 199 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok 秋曹決獄錄 35, 09a (奎 15148) 傳曰, 今日臨軒親試, 卽予取士之苦心. 而金禹用者, 符同掖屬與院隷, 潛借外作, 至於參榜。揆以士習, 極爲駭惋, 原榜目拔去, 遠惡島, 限己身充軍, 該掖屬, 遠地定配, 院隷出付秋曹, 嚴刑一次, 遠惡地定配。 曹草記內謹依。 傳敎, 司謁安敬煥, 全羅道玉果縣, 遠地定配所, 卽爲押送, 院隷朴景學, 嚴刑一次, 平安道朔州府, 遠惡地定配所, 而適値齋日, 待用杖嚴刑押送, 金禹用, 係是朝官, 移送義禁府, 擧行何如 傳曰, 允。 200 Hŭngyang County is currently part of Toyang District Town in Kohŭng County. This area served as a military strategic point due to its highly indented coastline. Leveraging this topographic advantage, the Chosŏn government established major garrisons along the coast. (Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Chŏlla, Cheju p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 전라 제주편, (Jinhan M&B, 2015), 492-493) 201 An Pyŏng-ch’ŏl 안병철, "Kim Sangjo ŭi munhwa yusan tapsagi 90 – Kohŭng Noktojinsŏng" 김상조의 문화유산답사기 90 고흥 녹도진성, Taegyŏng Newspaper, July, 13, 2021, https://www.dkilbo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=338792. 162 Map 14: The Map of Hŭngyang County and the Nokto Garrison in 1872 Source: The Map of Hŭngyang County (興陽縣地圖 Hŭngyanghyŏn chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10454) However, the status of the Nokto Garrison as a naval base declined in the late 19th century with the rise of Kŏmun Island.202 Known to Westerners as Port Hamilton, Kŏmun Island attracted significant attention from Western powers due to its strategic value. In 1885, the British navy occupied the island illegally for two years to curb Russian naval expansion toward Chosŏn.203 Naturally, the Chosŏn government allocated more resources to the Kŏmundo 202 Before the 19th century, despite its strategic importance, the Nokto garrison remained modest in scale, as evidenced by official records. The Records of Garrisons in Chŏlla Province (湖南鎭誌 Honam Chinji), published in 1895, documents that the garrison housed only 50 households. Functionally, it operated as a subsidiary rather than an independent post, under the primary control of the Sado garrison as a main garrison (主鎭, chujin). (Honam Chinji 湖南鎭誌 (The Records of Garrisons in Chŏlla Province) 1, 91-92, [高宗 32年(1895)] (奎 12188).) On the other hand, according to the 1758 local gazetteer, the Nokto garrison’s military assets included a warship (戰船 chŏnsŏn), a troopship (兵船 pyŏngsŏn), and two patrol boats (伺候船 sahusŏn). The garrison’s personnel comprised 25 military officers (軍官 kun’gwan), three banner and tally officers (旗牌官 kip’aegwan), an armored ship commander (防船將 pangsŏnjang), two bandit control officers (捕盜官 p’odogwan), two local education officers (訓導 hundo), 30 military commissioners (鎭撫 chinmu), and 230 marines (舟師 chusa). (Sinjŭng Hŭngyangji 新增興陽誌 (The Newly Augmented Gazetteer of Hŭngyang), 24b, [1758] (奎 10804).) 203 For details, see Sangpil Jin, "The Port Hamilton (Geomundo) Incident (1885–1887): Retracing Another Great Game in Eurasia", The International History Review 41, no. 2 (2019): 280-303. 163 Garrison than to other existing bases. Meanwhile, the condition of the Nokto garrison deteriorated considerably, with the garrison’s myriarchs (萬戶 manho) struggling to make ends meet.204 This financial strain likely contributed to difficult conditions for Kim U-yong during his military exile at the garrison. Kim U-yong’s period of military exile ultimately proved short-lived. One year and five months after his sentencing, on 10/23 of 1884, the State Tribunal instructed regional governors to release the majority of individuals under sentences of banishment or military exile, resulting in Kim’s release from the Nokto Garrison.205 In the following year, a royal edict on 3/17 of 1885 reinstated his status as a successful exam-passer (pokkwa 復科), restoring his name to the roster of recognized candidates.206 This decision contradicted the king’s prior assurances and ruling that individuals who had engaged in fraudulent activities in the government examination system would remain in military exile for life. After his release from military exile, Kim U-yong enjoyed a stable and promising career, akin to that of other individuals who had experienced military exile. Notably, his career path mirrored that of Pak Yŏng-hun, who had been exiled for falsely reporting his hometown during the civil service examination in 1879. Following his release, Kim began his career as the Sixth-Rank Temporary Recorder in the Office of Royal Secretariat (承政院 假注書 Sŭngjŏngwŏn kajusŏ). He subsequently held positions in the Office of Censor-General and the Office of the Inspector-General within the central government. Remarkably, he navigated through two of the three censorate offices during his career, despite his prior misconduct. Additionally, he served as a local magistrate of Onsŏng Prefecture in Hamgyŏng Province. Ultimately, he concluded his career in the Council of Ministers without Portfolio 204 Paek Hyŏng-dae 백형대, "1880-yŏndae sugunjin sŏkch’i wa Hŭngyang chiyŏk esŏ gungbangjaejŏng ŭi yŏkhal – Kŏmundojin kwa Noktojin ŭl chungsim ŭro-" 1880년대 수군진 설치와 흥양 지역에서 궁방재정의 역할 -거문도진과 녹도진을 중심으로- (MA thesis, Chŏnnam University, 2021), 41-42. 205 Unlike previous large-scale pardons, there is no record of any commemorative events or celebrations associated with this particular pardon. It is likely that this measure was implemented to alleviate pressure on the judicial system. 206 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 22:11a [1885/03/17]. 又敎曰: "削科人金禹用, 特爲復科, 付之今番庭試榜末, 以示廣慶之意。 164 (中樞院 Chungch’uwŏn).207 It appears that King Kojong placed considerable trust in Kim U-yong. For instance, following the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Kim U-yong was appointed as the Inspector (視察委員 Sich’alwiwŏn) tasked with investigating the conditions in Kyŏnggi Province, alongside eleven other inspectors, particularly focusing on the hardships endured by local residents.208 In summary, Kim U-yong’s military exile did not impede his career progression in any significant manner. Table 8 below summarizes the specific instances of military exile applied during the initial phase of King Kojong’s direct governance. Table 8: Summary of Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1873 to 1884 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 1 1873 Pak U-hyŏn (朴遇賢 1829-1907) ● Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● Junior Sixth-Rank Military Officer (副司果 Pusagwa) ● Submission of the disrespectful memorial to the throne ● Originally lifelong military exile to Sinji Island in Kangjin County ● 12 year wirianch’i (圍籬安置) in Hŭksan Island (1873.12-1884.10) 207 Han’guk Yŏktae Inmul Chonghap Chŏngbo Sisŭt’em 한국역대인물 종합정보시스템 (Comprehensive Information System for Historical Figures of Korea). (http://people.aks.ac.kr/front/dirSer/ppl/pplView.aks?pplId=PPL_6JOc_A1848_1_0030480&curSetPos=0&curSPos=0&category=dirSer&isEQ=true&kristalSearchArea=P) 208 Hwang Hyŏn 黃玹, Maech’ŏn yarok 梅泉野錄 ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편, (Sinjisa, 1955), 172. 二月 遣視察委員于各道。 京圻金禹用, 忠左金貞澤, 忠右車學模, 慶左洪建祖, 慶右李秉輝, 全左權明勳, 全右曺協承, 黃海安宗洙, 江原金一河, 咸鏡金恒基, 平南權相文, 平北金洛龜, 探亂後情形, 問民間疾苦。 However, Hwang Hyŏn’s assessment of this inspection was scathing; he noted that the inspectors failed to achieve their objectives and were provided with food by local offices, despite being instructed not to cause any harm to local residents. 165 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 2 1873 Kim Chae-hŭi (金在熙 n.d.) ● Clerk in the Royal Secretariat (承政院 Sŭngjŏngwŏn) (chungin) ● Public insult directed at an aristocrat ● Originally banishment to a remote and inhospitable area (遠惡地 wŏnakchi) in Yŏnggwang County ● 7 year military exile to Kogŭm Island in Kangjin County (1873.12-1880) ● 2 year banishment to Muan and Asan counties (1880-1882) 3 1875 Yi Min-dŏk (李敏德 1816-n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Third-Rank Special Army Officer (僉使 Ch’ŏmsa) at the Yŏngjong Garrison on Kanghwa Island ● Failure to defend the garrison against the Japanese naval assault (Un’yō Incident) ● 9 month military exile to Naju Region (羅州牧) (1875.9-1876.潤 5) ● pangch’ukhyangni (放逐鄕里), exiling to hometown (1876-1879) 4 1876 Yi Hŭi-t’ae (李嬉泰 n.d.) ● Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● District Magistrate of Kyŏngwŏn Prefecture (慶源府使 Kyŏngwŏn pusa) ● Failure to enforce the border policies of the Chosŏn government ● 100 lashes of heavy flogging (杖一百) ● Deprivation of the public position (追奪 ch’ut’al) ● 1 month military exile to Chain County (1876.1-1876.2) 5 1876 Chŏng Chung-u (鄭重愚 1808-n.d.) ● Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● Junior Ninth Civil Officer (參奉 Ch’ambong) of the Ritual Guest Agency (禮賓寺 Yebinsi) ● Provision of bribery in the civil service examination ● 2 year and 4 month military exile to Kimhae Prefecture in Kyŏngsang Province (1876.9-1879.2?) 6 1876 Hong Pong-hwa (洪鳳華 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Five Guards General (五衛將 Owijang) ● Provision of bribery in the civil service examination ● 2 year and 4 month military exile to Sangwŏn County in P’yŏng’an Province (1876.9-1879.2?) 166 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 7 1879 Yi Hŭi-dang (李禧戇 1855-n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● False hometown recording in the civil service examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 Pangmok) ● 10 month military exile to Cheju Island (1879.3-1880.1) 8 1879 Nam Chŏng-ho (南廷皓 1837-n.d.) ● A classics degree-holder (進士 chinsa) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● False hometown recording in the civil service examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 Pangmok) ● 10 month military exile to Cheju Island (1879.3-1880.1) 9 1879 Pak Yŏng-hun (朴泳薰 1848-n.d.) ● A classics degree-holder (進士 chinsa) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● False hometown recording in the civil service examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 Pangmok) ● 10 month military exile to Cheju Island (1879.3-1880.1) 10 1879 Min Yŏng-sŏ (閔泳序 1837-1904) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● False hometown recording in the civil service examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 Pangmok) ● 10 month military exile to Cheju Island (1879.3-1880.1) 11 1883 Kim U-yong (金禹用 1848-n.d.) ● Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● Former Junior Seventh-Rank Official (直長 Chikchang) of Sungryŏng Shrine (崇靈殿 Sungryŏngjŏn) ● Cheating in the civil service examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 Pangmok) ● 1 year and 5 month military exile to the Nokto Garrison in Hŭngyang County (1883.4-1884.10) 167 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 12 1883 Pae Sang-bŏm (裵相範 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Adjunct General (褊裨 P’yŏngbi) to the Governor of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province ● Corruption and maladministration (with the specific reason remaining unknown) ● 1 year military exile to Sinji Island in Kangjin County (1883.8-1884.8) Source: Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok), The Diary of Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi) According to Table 8, the average duration of military exile was approximately 14 months, spanning from one month to two years and four months, with the exception of an outlier: the case of Kim Chae-hŭi, who remained in military exile for seven years. Given his mid-level status and his offense of defaming aristocrats, the severity of his punishment appears to be an exception. Overall, the enforcement of military exile was significantly lenient. Map 15 below illustrates the locations designated for military exile. This map reveals that most sites of military exile were situated along the coast of Chosŏn, with the exceptions of Sangwŏn County and Chain County. The selection of these locations may have been influenced by Chosŏn’s national defense policy, wherein maritime defense constituted one of the primary objectives. In comparison to the locations of military exile during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, Cheju Island continued to be utilized as a site of exile; however, there were no overlapping areas. 168 Map 15: Major Locations of Military Exile during the First Phase of King Kojong’s Rule Source: Ksiom, CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>, via Wikimedia Commons (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Korean_Peninsula_topographic_map.png) Conclusion Upon assuming direct rule, King Kojong implemented a range of military reforms aimed at bolstering military strength and securing national defense. Many historians in Korean-language scholarship have viewed Chosŏn’s early military reforms under King Kojong’s leadership as a step toward drastically transforming the traditional military system. The Chosŏn government introduced Western-style weaponry, constructed advanced military facilities, employed foreign military advisers, and established new military units modeled on contemporary practices. Nevertheless, these efforts fell short of fully fundamentally reforming the military system. Although the regime appeared to transform the traditional military structure on the surface, its foundational aspects remained largely unchanged. 169 In this context, the practice of military exile illustrates the Chosŏn regime’s enduring stance toward the military. This penalty served as a tool to discipline officials who either failed to fulfill national policies or engaged in corrupt activities within government service examinations. Despite an apparent shift toward military reform, the foundational ideology underpinning the military remained consistent with the structure established under Taewŏn’gun’s regency. Most perpetrators served relatively brief terms of military exile, despite original life sentences given for offenses related to civil and military service examination misconduct, indicating that punishments were generally not enforced verbatim. This suggests that military exile was intended more as a public display of contempt toward offenders than as a genuine attempt to rectify malpractice. The offenders’ successful careers following their release further clarify the regime’s intent behind military exile, underscoring its symbolic rather than corrective purpose. 170 CHAPTER THREE: AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY REFORMS AND CH’UNGGUN (充軍 MILITARY EXILE) DURING THE SECOND PHASE OF KING KOJONG’S DIRECT RULE, 1884-1894 Introduction In 1884, the political landscape of Chosŏn underwent significant changes. Following the Qing military forces’ suppression of the Coup d’État of 1884, led by the pro-Japanese reformists known as the Enlightenment Party1, the Qing government sought to deepen its intervention in Chosŏn’s politics. Simultaneously, the Japanese government endeavored to maintain its influence over Chosŏn’s national policies. Since neither Qing nor Japan could unilaterally dominate the Korean peninsula through military power, the two nations reached a compromise by concluding the Convention of Tianjin (天津條約) in April 1885. Under the treaty’s terms, both nations agreed to withdraw their military forces from Chosŏn and faced limitations on interfering in its domestic affairs. This arrangement allowed Chosŏn politicians to pursue independent military reform policies, although Qing continued to exert indirect influence on Chosŏn’s policy-making process, albeit with limited success. In this context, the Chosŏn government implemented military reform policies that included enhancing the royal palace guard, unifying the central army, and strengthening the local defense system. While these reforms did not entirely exclude the influence of Qing and Japan, the regime independently undertook efforts to transform its military system. Similar to the reform measures initiated during King Kojong’s first phase of direct rule between 1873 and 1884, most historians concur that the Chosŏn government consistently aimed to modernize its military system and bolster its military capabilities through various initiatives. 1 According to Jihyun Kim, the core members of the Enlightenment Party did not use the term Enlightenment (開化 kaehwa) at the time of the coup. Rather, it was the Japanese newspapers that began referring to them as the Enlightenment Party (開化黨 Kaikatō) after 1881. For details, see Kim Jihyun, "Enlightenment on the Spirit-Altar: Eschatology and Restoration of Morality at the King Kwan Shrine in Fin de siècle Seoul", Religions 11, no. 6 (2020): 3-4. 171 In Chapter 3, I delve into the changes in the military system during the second phase of King Kojong’s direct rule from 1884 to 1894. In this chapter, I argue that the military reform policies implemented between 1884 and 1894, prior to the intensification of Japanese influence following Japan’s victory over Qing in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, were primarily focused on reinforcing the protection of the royal family and the capital’s immediate surroundings. This focus persisted despite some measures aimed at bolstering local military units, revealing a prioritization of royal and central security over broader national defense. Furthermore, King Kojong’s approach to national defense remained largely unchanged, despite shifts in the diplomatic environment surrounding Chosŏn. He continued to rely on Qing military forces and outsourced national defense responsibilities to the suzerain state during emergencies. Additionally, the Chosŏn government actively employed military exile as a punitive measure, particularly targeting administrative misconduct and examination fraud cases, with the latter becoming a central focus during this period. This persistent use of military exile underscores the ruling class’s continuous and unaltered negative perceptions of the military within Chosŏn society. In this chapter, I analyze three key aspects of Chosŏn’s military system to support the argument. To begin with, I examine the overhaul of central and local military units during this period. Although there were efforts to transform the traditional military forces, the Chosŏn government’s primary military focus remained on safeguarding the royal palace. With regard to the local defense system, the regime sought to unify military command by integrating individual key local military units into the Capital Guards Command (親軍 Ch’in’gun) system and strengthening maritime defense by increasing the size of the military forces. However, the government occasionally ordered the transfer of soldiers and funds from local units to central forces when deemed necessary. Additionally, both central and local military units faced chronic funding shortages, which hindered the payment of soldiers’ wages. To make matters worse, the government often reallocated military funds to other priorities, reflecting the ruling class’s view that military matters, particularly national defense, were secondary to other concerns amidst foreign threats. Finally, the continued use of military exile during the second phase of King Kojong’s rule reveals the attitude of Chosŏn’s policymakers toward military service. While earlier studies argue 172 that King Kojong and key court officials made efforts to build a strong military system (強兵 kangbyŏng), the continued devaluation of military service contradicted this stated goal. The military exile practice remained in place until its abolition in 1894, which coincidentally occurred during the Kabo Reform, which was spearheaded by pro-Japanese reformists under Japan’s increasing influence in Chosŏn politics. Political Changes after the 1884 Coup and Chosŏn’s Military Reforms The failure of the 1884 Coup and shifts in Chosŏn’s political and diplomatic landscape On 10/17 of 1884, members of the pro-Japanese group, also known as the Enlightenment Party, led by young politicians such as Kim Ok-kyun, Hong Yŏng-sik (洪英植 1856-1884), Pak Yŏng-hyo (朴泳孝 1861-1939), Sŏ Kwang-bŏm (徐光範 1859-1897), Sŏ Chae-p’il (徐載弼 1864-1951), among others, orchestrated an attack targeting prominent pro-Chinese politicians in the Chosŏn government.2 Influenced and mentored by proponents of so-called Enlightenment 2 Various academic terms are employed to describe the political groups of the period. For instance, the pro-Japanese group is alternatively identified as the Independence Party (獨立黨 Tongniptang), the Progressive Party (開化黨 Kaehwadang), or the Radical Progressive Party (急進開化黨 Kŭpchin Kaehwadang). In contrast, the pro-Chinese group has been characterized by titles such as the Moderate Progressive Party (穩健開化黨 On’gŏn Kaehwadang), alongside terms with negative connotations, including the Faction of Serving the Great (事大黨 Sadaedang), the Conservative Party (保守黨 Posudang), or the Party for the Preservation of Tradition (守舊黨 Sugudang). (Andrew C. Nahm, "Kim Ok-kyun and the Reform Movement of the Progressives", The Academy of Korean Studies 24, no. 12 (1984): 38–62.) However, these terms are not without issues, as the demarcation between the two groups was ambiguous, and they shared a common philosophical foundation. In particular, the negative labels associated with the pro-Chinese officials misrepresent their political stance, as they neither wholly relied on the Qing for state governance nor entirely opposed reform policies. To address these inaccuracies, several scholars have proposed alternative terminology: identifying the pro-Japanese group as the Reform and Enlightenment Party (變法開化派 Pyŏnpŏp Kaehwap’a) and the pro-Chinese group as the Current Affairs Enlightenment Party (時務開化派 Simu Kaehwap’a). According to this interpretation, the former prioritized the reform of Chosŏn’s political system along modernist lines, while the latter sought to adopt modern technologies and establish trade relations with foreign powers, all while maintaining a balance of power among external influences. (Han’guk kŭnhyŏndae sahoe yŏn’guhoe 한국근현대사회연구회, Han’guk kŭndae kaehwa sasang kwa kaehwa undong 한국 근대 개화사상과 개화운동, (Sinsŏwŏn, 1998), 9-31.) Despite the validity of the proposed terminology, this dissertation will refer to the groups as the pro-Japanese group and the pro-Chinese group, acknowledging the limitation that neither group fully relied on Japan or the Qing for their policies. These terms are used here for their relative clarity and simplicity compared to alternative labels. Moreover, they effectively highlight the groups’ differing political stances and their respective attitudes toward Japan and Qing as models for their reform policies. 173 Thought (開化思想 Kaehwa sasang), including aristocrats like Pak Kyu-su and members of the chungin class such as Yu Hong-gi (劉鴻基 1831-n.d.) and O Kyŏng-sŏk (吳慶錫 1831-1879),3 the pro-Japanese group advocated for more radical and progressive reforms of the Chosŏn government. This position sharply conflicted with the pro-Chinese members’ more moderate stance on reform policies, reflecting the diverse social backgrounds and ideologies within the Enlightenment Party. The assault by the Enlightenment Party, supported by military assistance from the Japanese legation, unfolded during a banquet celebrating the opening of the Postal Administration (郵政局 Ujŏngguk). In the ensuing chaos, Min Yŏng-ik (閔泳翊 1860-1914), the nephew of Queen Consort Min and the Commander of the Right Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍右營使 Ch’in’gun uyŏngsa), sustained severe injuries.4 The following day, the pro-Japanese group assassinated several key commanders of the Capital Guards Command, including Yi Cho-yŏn (李祖淵 1843-1884), the Commander of the Left Battalion (親軍左營使 Ch’in’gun chwayŏngsa), Yun T’ae-jun (尹泰駿 1839-1884), the Commander of the Rear Battalion (親軍後營使 Ch’in’gun huyŏngsa), and Han Kyu-jik (韓圭稷 1845-1884), the Commander of the Front Battalion (親軍前營使 Ch’in’gun chŏnyŏngsa). This massacre of commanders was likely intended to secure control over the central army. In addition, several pro-Chinese politicians, including Min T’ae-ho, Min Yŏng-mok (閔泳穆 1826-1884), and Cho Yŏng-ha (趙寧夏 1845-1884), were also killed, despite King Kojong’s earnest efforts to persuade the group to spare their lives.5 The primary targets of this assault were prominent members of Queen Consort Min’s group, who aligned themselves with a pro-Chinese stance by relying on Qing military support, seeking guidance on reform initiatives, and consistently opposing the state governance policies advocated by the Enlightenment Party. 3 Regarding O Kyŏng-sŏk’s activities within the Enlightenment Party, refer to Eugene Y. Park, A Family of No Prominence: The Descendants of Pak Tŏkhwa and the Birth of Modern Korea, 1590–1945, (Stanford University Press, 2014), 50-53. 4 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:79b [1884/10/17]. 5 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:80a [1884/10/18]. 174 This incident, historically known as the Coup d’État of 1884 or the Kapsin Coup, was not only the culmination of conflicts between two opposing parties over state policies,6 but also marked the beginning of new military policies within the Chosŏn government, as the weaknesses of Chosŏn’s military system were exposed through this revolt. The pro-Japanese group mobilized the Front Battalion and certain elements of the Rear Battalion of the Capital Guards Command, which were modeled after the Japanese military system, as their military forces. In response, the Left and Right battalions counterattacked with military assistance from the Qing army, which had been stationed in Chosŏn since the suppression of the 1882 Military Mutiny (壬午軍亂 Imo Kullan). As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, Yun Ch’i-ho expressed concerns about potential conflicts among the battalions. In this context, it is reasonable to understand why Kim Ok-kyun proposed unifying the four battalions into a single unit and establishing a royal guard composed of able-bodied soldiers from the unified battalion in his 14-article reform plan.7 The pro-Japanese group’s revolt was abruptly quelled after three days by a counteroffensive from the 1,500-strong Qing army and Chosŏn military forces under the control of the pro-Chinese group. Particularly, Yuan Shikai led the subjugation operation against the coup, despite Wu Changqing remaining the chief commander of the Qing military forces. Although Yuan Shikai held a lower rank within the Chinese army, he disregarded Wu Changqing’s authority and effectively held real power over the Qing army stationed in Chosŏn. Yuan’s approach to Chosŏn’s diplomatic policy was even more aggressive than that of Li Hongzhang, and there were occasions when Li broke into a cold sweat trying to dissuade Yuan from independently pursuing coercive measures. Given this context, it is not surprising that Yuan Shikai advocated for the attack on the pro-Japanese military forces, despite the reservations expressed by his subordinate officials during the 1884 coup.8 The victory in the Coup d’État of 1884 significantly consolidated Yuan Shikai’s position overseeing Chosŏn affairs within the Qing 6 For details, refer to Harold F. Cook, Korea’s 1884 Incident: Its Background and Kim Ok-kyun’s Elusive Dream, (Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1972); Sin Yong-ha 신용하, Ch’ogi kaehwa sasang kwa Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn yŏn’gu 초기 개화사상과 갑신정변 연구, (Chisik Sanŏpsa, 2000); Pak Ŭn-suk 박은숙, Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn yŏn’gu 갑신정변연구, (Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2005). 7 Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yŏng-hyo and Sŏ Chae-p’il 김옥균 박영효 서재필 저, Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn hoegorok 갑신정변 회고록, trans. Cho Il-mun and Sin Pong-nyong 신복룡 조일문 편역 (Kŏn’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2006), 132. 8 Yi Yang-ja 이양자, Kamguk taesin Wian Sŭk’ai: chwajŏlhan Chosŏn ŭi kŭndae wa Chungguk ŭi kansŏp 감국대신 위안스카이: 좌절한 조선의 근대와 중국의 간섭, (Hanul ak’ademi, 2019), 58-60. 175 government, enabling him to intervene more forcefully in Chosŏn’s domestic and diplomatic matters. In reality, the rebellious group was poorly prepared for the coup. According to the memoir of Pak Yŏng-hyo, he anticipated that his members could mobilize 1,000 soldiers he had trained during his tenure as mayor of Kwangju Prefecture and 200 reinforcements from Japan, while their opponents had only a regular army of 400 and 800 miscellaneous soldiers (雜卒 chapchol).9 However, this proved to be overly optimistic, as the Qing military forces alone significantly outnumbered those of the pro-Japanese group. Moreover, contrary to Pak’s expectations, one study estimates that only approximately 200 individuals were mobilized during the coup. This included 14 cadets, around 70 soldiers from the Front Battalion of the Capital Guards Command, roughly 30 able-bodied men (壯士 changsa), and about 100 peddlers (負商 pusang).10 To make matters worse, the guns and swords of the battalions were so poorly maintained that the soldiers were unable to load their firearms immediately. In desperation, the troops disassembled their weapons to clean them, but during this chaotic moment, the Chinese army stormed into the palace.11 This absurd situation underscores the lack of preparation for the coup. On 10/19, at the request of Queen Consort Min, Qing forces encircled the royal palace. As the situation deteriorated, the Japanese legation refused to provide military support to the pro-Japanese group. Takezoe Shinichirō (竹添進一郎 1842-1917), the Japanese ambassador to Chosŏn, withdrew from the palace along with the Japanese military forces, followed by Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yŏng-hyo, Sŏ Kwang-bŏm, and Sŏ Chae-p’il. Meanwhile, Hong Yŏng-sik and Pak Yŏng-gyo (朴泳敎 1849-1884), the brother of Pak Yŏng-hyo, stayed behind to escort King Kojong but were ultimately killed by Chosŏn soldiers.12 In the aftermath, Kim Ok-kyun and 9 Ibid., 206. 10 Pak Ŭn-suk 박은숙, "Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn chudoseryŏk ŭi ch’amyŏch’ŭng p’osŏp kwa muryŏk tongwŏng" 갑신정변 주도세력의 참여층 포섭과 무력동원, Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn’gu 한국 근현대사 연구 27, (2003): 31. 11 Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yŏng-hyo and Sŏ Chae-p’il 김옥균 박영효 서재필 저, Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn hoegorok 갑신정변 회고록, trans. Cho Il-mun and Sin Pong-nyong 신복룡 조일문 편역 (Kŏn’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2006), 133-138. 12 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:80a [1884/10/19]. 176 other pro-Japanese group members disguised themselves by cutting their hair and wearing Western suits to conceal their identities. They escaped to Japan via Inch’ŏn Port, accompanied by staff from the Japanese legation.13 The pro-Japanese group sought political asylum there until 1894, when Japanese military forces occupied Kyŏngbok Palace and coerced the Chosŏn government into adopting reform policies modeled on Japanese systems. In the meantime, following the coup, there was a significant shift in the international dynamics surrounding Chosŏn. Both the Japanese and Qing governments initiated negotiations to resolve the incident, culminating in the Convention of Tianjin in 1885, which mandated the withdrawal of their military forces from the Korean peninsula. This agreement effectively reduced the influence of both powers in Chosŏn’s political and military affairs, thereby creating greater autonomy for the Chosŏn government to independently formulate and implement its military policies. However, one must question why Japan and Qing, whose interests in the region were deeply entwined, would consent to the withdrawal of their forces, a decision seemingly detrimental to their strategic objectives. As a matter of fact, the Chinese expeditionary army clashed with the Japanese legation guard soldiers during the coup, although the former’s main target was the Chosŏn military forces aligned with the pro-Japanese group. To be specific, when the Qing troops stormed the royal palace, the Japanese soldiers supported the coup members, and they exchanged gunfire, which resulted in significant casualties on both sides. However, it remains unclear who fired the first shot and how many soldiers died during the engagement. The Chinese side argued that the Japanese soldiers attacked the Qing army first when Qing soldiers entered the royal palace to protect King Kojong and Queen Consort Min at the request of Nam Chŏng-ch’ŏl (南廷哲 1840-1916), the Second Minister of the Ministry of Works (工曹參判 Kongjo ch’amp’an).14 The 日公使率兵辭宮。 金玉均、朴泳孝、徐光範、徐載弼等, 皆隨而去。 惟洪英植、朴泳敎及生徒七人從後至北廟。 亥刻, 吳統領聞上在北廟, 領隊往迎。 英植等挽御衣, 請勿往。 衆奉上御四人轎, 英植等, 又盛氣叱之。 我兵斫殺英植及泳敎, 又殺生徒七人。 13 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:80b [1884/10/20]. 時城中軍民, 疾視日本人, 逢輒毆鬪, 多有殺傷。 日本公使竹添進一郞率兵, 保護居留民, 出城。 金玉均、朴泳孝、徐光範、徐載弼及生徒十餘人, 皆藏身於日本公使館, 薙髮洋服, 潛往仁川港, 直逃日本。 14 Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) to Zongli Yamen (總署) (1884/12/23 [1884/11/07].) 朝員南廷哲乞師痛哭 王妃死 王未知存亡 朝兵入宮保護 兼殺日本兵 我軍知會日使 入宮保護 吳袁張帶隊入宮 日兵先放槍 擊傷我軍數人 刻已交戰 聞仁川將有日兵到 未知眞否 祈速派援兵是要 轉報津門云云。 177 Chinese military commanders also maintained that the conflict caused around 40 casualties during the engagement.15 However, the testimony from the Japanese side starkly contrasted with that of the Qing government. Takezoe Shinichirō reported to Inoue Kaoru, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, that the Chinese government had misrepresented the conflict and that the Qing and Chosŏn forces fired their guns before the Japanese soldiers.16 According to the diplomatic document, approximately 30 Japanese soldiers were killed during the skirmish.17 This Rashomon-like situation remained unresolved, but both nations ultimately agreed that continued military presence in Seoul would likely lead to further conflict. In fact, this skirmish not only intensified tensions between the two powers but also underscored the precariousness of Chosŏn’s sovereignty, caught between competing foreign interests. Despite the strong advocacy for war against the Qing by hawkish factions in Japan, including army and naval generals, who sought to exploit the ongoing conflict between the Qing and France in Vietnam, proponents of diplomacy, such as Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文 1841-1909) and Inoue Kaoru, prevailed in influencing Japanese policy. These individuals led efforts to negotiate with the Qing government,18 driven in part by the dovish politicians’ assessment that Japan’s military power was insufficient to decisively outweigh Chinese forces at the time. (Kundae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 근대 한국 외교 문서 편찬 위원회, Kŭndae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ – Kapsin chŏngbyŏn 1 근대한국외교문서 – 갑신정변 1, (Seoul National University Press, 2015), 120.) (In this reference, the dates of the diplomatic documents are presented in the Gregorian calendar system, with the corresponding lunar calendar dates provided in brackets [ ]. This convention is consistently applied throughout this dissertation.) 15 Yuan Shikai, Wu Zhaoyou, and Zhang Guangqian (袁世凱, 吳兆有, 張光前) to Takezoe Shinichirō (竹添進一郞) (1884/12/12 [1884/10/25].) 宮門ニ入レハ熗ノ下ル雨ノ如ク地電火炮一時ノ並ヒ発シ我軍ノ死傷スル四十餘人弟等以爲ラク邪臣亂作シ敢テ天兵ヲ拒クト故ニ亦タ小熗ヲ施放シ自カラ捍禦ヲ爲ス初メヨリ先ツ熗炮ヲ發スル者ハ即チ貴公使ノ之ヲ爲サシムルヲ知ルサリキ。 (ibid., 178.) 16 Takezoe Shinichirō (竹添進一郞) to Inoue Kaoru (井上馨) (1884/12/12 [1884/10/25].) 此等ハ皆自ラ其ノ事實ヲ詐ルノ證ヲ顯ハスモノナリ何トナレハ彼ヨリ銃發ヲ始メタルハ午後三時頃ニシテ戰ヲ止メタルカ日暮ナリ然ルニ待テ日夕ニ至ルト云此レ即時刻ヲ以テ其ノ詐リヲ證スヘキノ一ナリ （…）銃戰ヲ始メタルハ支那朝鮮ノ兵ニシテ日本兵ニ関係ナシ。 (ibid., 249.) 17 Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) to Zongli Yamen (總署) (1884/12/20 [1884/11/04].) 吳等入內保護 日兵先發槍各節 與吳袁稟同 並及派員赴日講論事 各函牘仍封固交利運 明日赴榆關接遞 又世凱與齡書云 日兵死三十餘 未提及日商云云 請先代奏 俟函牘到再抄呈。 (ibid., 143.) 18 Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2023), 79. 178 Specifically, Itō Hirobumi not only instructed his secretary to persuade Inoue Kaoru to support the dispatch of a plenipotentiary ambassador to Chosŏn to initiate negotiations with the Chosŏn government, but also personally traveled to Qing as ambassador plenipotentiary to commence direct negotiations with the Chinese government.19 Likewise, Li Hongzhang, Viceroy of Zhili and Beiyang Trade Minister of the Qing, sought to avoid further military conflict with Japan, particularly as the Sino-French War remained unresolved. Although he viewed the situation in Chosŏn as more critical than the conflict with France in Vietnam and dispatched seven warships to Chosŏn’s shores, he instructed Wu Zhaoyou (吳兆有 1829-n.d.), the admiral of the Chinese navy stationed in Chosŏn, to avoid provoking Japan. In this way, both Japan and the Qing sought to de-escalate tensions and prevent the conflict from escalating into full-scale war, given the prevailing international circumstances.20 Itō Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang initiated negotiations to address the aftermath of the coup, but the question of accountability for the conflict became a contentious issue. Japan demanded the punishment of Chinese officers responsible for casualties among the Japanese guards and sought compensation for the damages incurred. In contrast, the Qing government held Takezoe Shinichirō accountable for escalating the situation and issued a warning of potential future conflict with Qing.21 This stalemate was unexpectedly broken when rumors surfaced that the Chosŏn government had secretly dispatched a mission to Russia, seeking protection for Chosŏn.22 Since Russia represented a common threat to both Japan and Qing, potentially undermining their interests in Chosŏn, Itō and Li hastened the negotiation process, setting aside some contentious issues. 19 Yu Chen 于晨, "1885-yŏn Ch’ŏng·Il Ch’ŏnjin choyak ŭi sŏngkyŏk" 1885 년 청일 천진조약의 성격 (MA thesis, Sŏnggyungwan (Sungkyunkwan) University, 2012), 43. 20 Ibid., 44-45. 21 Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2023), 79. 22 Yu Chen 于晨, "1885-yŏn Ch’ŏng·Il Ch’ŏnjin choyak ŭi sŏngkyŏk" 1885 년 청일 천진조약의 성격 (MA thesis, Sŏnggyungwan (Sungkyunkwan) University, 2012), 68. 179 Ultimately, they reached an agreement, culminating in the promulgation of the Convention of Tianjin in April 1885. The key provisions of the convention are as follows: 23 1. China will withdraw the military forces stationed in Chosŏn, and Japan will withdraw the forces dispatched to guard the legation in Chosŏn. A four-month deadline from the signing of the treaty is set for both nations to complete the withdrawal, thus removing the possibility of conflict between them. The Chinese forces will withdraw from Masan Harbor, and the Japanese forces will withdraw from Inch’ŏn Port. 2. Both nations agree to urge the king of Chosŏn to train enough soldiers to maintain public order. Furthermore, the king of Chosŏn may choose one or more military officers from a third country to oversee the training. After this, neither China nor Japan shall dispatch personnel to Chosŏn to station or train troops. 3. In the future, if a rebellion or significant event occurs in the Chosŏn Kingdom, either China or Japan, or both, must first send a formal notice to each other before dispatching military forces. Once the situation is resolved, all military forces must be withdrawn immediately, and no forces shall be stationed thereafter. Although earlier studies have mainly focused on the diplomatic impact of the convention on the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, given that the two nations dispatched military forces to Chosŏn under its third provision, the second provision is also significant. It granted the Chosŏn government the right to officially and earnestly employ Western military officers as military instructors for the Chosŏn military. As a result, the Chosŏn government was able to implement military reforms with diminished interference from Qing and Japan, despite their continued efforts to preserve influence in Chosŏn. 23 1. 議定中國撤駐紮朝鮮之兵, 日本國撤在朝鮮護衛使館之兵弁, 自畫押蓋印之日起, 以四個月爲期, 限內各行盡數撤回, 以免兩國有滋端之虞. 中國兵由馬山浦撤去, 日本兵由仁川港撤去. 2. 兩國均允勸朝鮮國王教練兵士, 足以自護治安. 又由朝鮮國王選僱他外國武弁一人或數人, 委以教演之事. 嗣後中·日兩國均毋派員在朝鮮教練. 3. 將來朝鮮國若有變亂重大事件, 中·日兩國或一國要派兵, 應先互相行文知照, 及其事定, 仍即撤回, 不再留防. (Wang Tieya 王铁崖, eds., Zhong wai jiu yue zhang hui bian 1 中外舊約章彙編 1 (Sanlian shudian, 1957), 466.) 180 Regarding the issue of military withdrawal from Chosŏn, Japan appeared to take a more proactive stance than Qing China. According to Li Hongzhang’s correspondence, Inoue Kaoru suggested that both nations send officials to Chosŏn and expedite the withdrawal of their military forces, citing the disturbances caused by the presence of both Japanese and Chinese soldiers.24 On the same day, Inoue sent a diplomatic correspondence in English to the Qing government, urging the swift ratification of the Convention. Japan sought to prevent further conflicts between the rank-and-file soldiers of Qing and Japan.25 From Japan’s perspective, this convention likely bolstered its position in Chosŏn affairs by granting Japan the same right as Qing to dispatch military forces to Chosŏn in the event of a crisis, despite Qing’s authority as the suzerain state of Chosŏn. In this context, the swift implementation of the convention served to advance Japan’s international policy objectives. In contrast, the Qing government did not prioritize the immediate withdrawal of its forces from Chosŏn. In fact, following the near eradication of the pro-Japanese group in Chosŏn due to the coup, the Chinese government favored maintaining the status quo rather than reducing its influence in Chosŏn’s political affairs. On 6/9 of 1885, Japan withdrew its military forces from the Korean peninsula, followed by Qing on 6/11, in accordance with the Convention of Tianjin. King Kojong’s reaction to the withdrawal of the Qing army reveals an intriguing perspective on Chosŏn’s national defense strategy. In a conversation with Sim Sun-t’aek (沈舜澤 1824-n.d.), the king expressed concern that the departure of Qing forces could weaken Chosŏn’s national defense and urged officials to devise a solution to retain the Qing military presence. Sim Sun-t’aek concurred with the king’s 24 Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) to Zongli Yamen (總署) (1885/05/20 [1885/03/16].) 徐承祖初六電稱 今日井上來 謂駐朝中日兵丁現屢滋事 恐釀巨案 致乖友誼 彼意條約互易後 兩國宜卽派大員往朝撤兵 不必拘定限期 惟於未請西人之先 請朝王派一妥武員暫權兵事。 (Kundae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 근대 한국 외교 문서 편찬 위원회, Kŭndae Han’guk oegyo munsŏ – Kapsin chŏngbyŏn 2 근대한국외교문서 – 갑신정변 2, (Seoul National University Press, 2015), 148.) 25 Inoue Kaoru (井上馨) to Enomoto Takeaki (榎本武揚) (1885/05/20 [1885/03/16].) Japanese Minister, Peking The Tientsin [sic]. convention has been ratified by His Majesty and you are instructed to inform Chinese Government of this and at the same time to press them for early issue of their ratification, for it is eminently necessary that the convention should be carried into effect as soon as possible, Reason is: -although not serious, there have occurred already two or three affairs in Seoul, involving Japanese or Chinese soldiers, and no one can tell what emergency might occur, if withdrawal of troops be delayed any longer. Inouye [sic]. (ibid., 418.) 181 assessment.26 This dialogue underscores the prevailing attitude of King Kojong and high-ranking officials toward the military and national defense. Despite over a decade of military reforms and the introduction of an advanced system, the ruler and his court adhered to the traditional perspective that Chosŏn, as a vassal state, could rely on Qing, its suzerain and the major regional power, for security. Given the chronic financial constraints of the Chosŏn government, this reliance may have been unavoidable despite two decades of efforts to reform the military system and strengthen the state’s military capacity. Rather than addressing the financial imperatives needed to achieve effective national defense, King Kojong’s military policy, as reflected in this dialogue, failed to prioritize the establishment of self-reliant defense capabilities. Nonetheless, these efforts ultimately failed to prevent the Qing military forces from departing Chosŏn. However, the withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese armies created a critical juncture for advancing Chosŏn’s military reform. Freed from the immediate presence of foreign troops, the Chosŏn government was able to take proactive measures to reform its military system, despite some limitations imposed by Qing’s influence over Chosŏn politicians. Furthermore, the Chosŏn government gained an opportunity to leverage the Convention of Tianjin to broaden its military ties beyond those with Qing and Japan. Whether the Chosŏn government could effectively overhaul the traditional military system depended on the will and ability of King Kojong and his courtiers. The characteristics of military policies from 1884 to 1894 Chosŏn’s political and diplomatic landscape underwent significant changes following the Coup d’État of 1884, and its impact on Chosŏn politics remains a pivotal topic in Korean historiography. Politically, the failure of the coup enabled the pro-Chinese group, supported by Qing and Qing officials stationed in Chosŏn, such as Yuan Shikai, to dominate state affairs. However, their control frequently conflicted with King Kojong’s attempts to independently implement significant policies. Diplomatically, the withdrawal of Qing and Japanese military forces from the Korean peninsula partially restored a balance of power between the two states 26 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 22:24b [1885/05/25]. 敎曰: "日兵已撤歸, 而今聞駐防, 亦將撤還云, 在我國, 豈不疎虞乎? 若有請留之道, 則爲國事幸甚, 極力另圖也。" 舜澤曰: "四載依恃之餘, 疎虞莫甚。 如不撤還, 誠萬幸矣。" 182 regarding Chosŏn. However, Qing retained significantly greater influence over Chosŏn’s internal politics. Meanwhile, the international situation surrounding Chosŏn grew increasingly complex as King Kojong sought to form an alliance with Russia in an effort to counter Qing’s intervention. Concerned about the potential Sino-Japanese war following the 1884 coup, he attempted to engage Russia, seeking protection for Chosŏn in the event of the conflict. However, due to the lack of concrete evidence and King Kojong’s denial of this diplomatic initiative, the true nature of the incident remains unclear.27 In response, the Qing government returned Taewŏn’gun, who had been held in captivity during the 1882 military mutiny, to Chosŏn in 1885,28 and re-dispatched Yuan Shikai, who had returned to Qing following his father’s death29, to Chosŏn in October 1885, appointing him Director-General Resident in Chosŏn for Diplomatic and Commercial Relations (駐紥朝鮮總理交涉通商事宜 Chuch’a Chosŏn ch’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang saŭi). While King Kojong’s welcome of their return is documented in the Diary of the Royal Secretariat, his feelings must have been conflicted.30 However, the impact of the Coup d’État of 1884 on Chosŏn’s military system must not be overlooked. The coup revealed the significant shortcomings of Chosŏn’s central army system. As noted earlier, the factional divisions within the Capital Guards Command led to internecine strife among its units. This highlighted the need for the unification of military forces as a critical policy issue. Furthermore, although King Kojong was the supreme commander of Chosŏn’s military, his authority was disregarded by the soldiers during the coup. As a result, control over the central army became a central concern for the regime. In connection with this, the strengthening of the royal palace guard remained a central aspect of military policy, as it had been during the first 27 For details, see Ku Sŏn-hŭi 구선희, "Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn chikhu pan-Ch’ŏng chŏngch’aek kwa Ch’ŏng ŭi Wŏn Segae p’agyŏn" 갑신정변 직후 반청정책과 청의 원세개 파견, Sahak yŏn’gu 사학연구, no. 51 (1996): 33-80. 28 Kwŏn Sŏk-pong 권석봉, Ch’ŏngmal tae-Chosŏn chŏngch’aeksa yŏn’gu 청말 대조선정책사 연구, (Ilchogak, 1997), 262-337. 29 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-12-19 (18) [1884/12/19]. 30 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 22-08-26 (65) [1885/08/26]. 上曰, 大院君還次, 情私喜幸, 無以爲比也。 舜澤曰, 大院君還次, 下情不勝欣祝。 我殿下年來戀慕, 臣等常所憧憧, 今日獻喜, 何以形達乎? 弘集曰, 便使先到, 已探諸節乎? 上曰, 諸節無損云矣。 仍敎曰, 今聞電報, 袁世凱又來, 摠兵王光勝亦爲隨來云。 王摠兵聞是吳提督部曲云, 則金判府或曾相見乎? 弘集曰, 臣於登州吳師營中, 多見其部曲, 而王姓人未能詳憶矣。 上曰, 王摠兵, 今從旅順出來云矣。 上曰, 近日天氣甚佳, 爲秋事可幸也。 183 phase of King Kojong’s direct rule. Lastly, improving the quality of weapons was crucial for maintaining the military system. During the revolt, the pro-Japanese group’s forces suffered due to the poor condition of their weapons. Clearly, the regime needed to overhaul its military system. Following the coup, the Chosŏn government reorganized the Capital Guards Command, as the commanders had been assassinated and the troops had scattered. The restoration of the units was a key policy objective. With most pro-Japanese politicians and military officers fleeing to Japan to evade punishment, the pro-Chinese politicians took control of the four battalions of the Capital Guards Command.31 As a result of efforts to strengthen the command, military supplies were transferred from the Coastal Defense Headquarters (畿沿海防營 Kiyŏn Haebangyŏng), enabling the government to dispatch approximately 700 soldiers from the front and left battalions to secure the Seoul area.32 The next step was the unification of operation system in each battalion. The command structure of the Front and Rear Battalions, which had been based on the Japanese style, followed the Left and Right Battalions.33 In the end, the operational system of the Capital Guards Command was unified into the Chinese-style command system. Moreover, King Kojong requested Yuan Shikai to temporarily train the former two units.34 This decision holds historical significance, as Yuan Shikai was the first Chinese official from the Qing Dynasty to be 31 On 10/20 of 1884, Yi Kyo-hŏn (李敎獻 1832-n.d.) was appointed as the Front Commander, Yi Kyu-sŏk (李奎奭 1835-n.d.) as the Left Commander, and Yi Pong-gu (李鳳九 1841-n.d.) as the Rear Commander and concurrently the Commander-General of the Right Capital Police (右邊捕盜大將 Ubyŏn p’ododaejang). (Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:81a [1884/10/20].) Min Yŏng-ik, the survivor of the coup, remained as the Right Commander. 32 500 matchlocks, 500 gunpowder barrels, and 500 cartridges were procured from the Coastal Defense Headquarters and subsequently allocated to the four battalions within the Capital Guards Command. (Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, "Kaehanggi Chi’n’gunyŏng ch’eju yŏn’gu" 개항기 친군영 체제 연구, Hanʼguk kunsasa yŏnʼgu 한국 군사사 연구 3, (1999): 140.) 33 The titles of commanders in the Front and Rear Battalions were specifically changed to align with the designations of the Left and Right Battalions. For example, chŏngryŏnggwan (正領官 colonel), puryŏnggwan (副領官 lieutenant major), and ch’amryŏnggawan (參領官 major) were renamed as pyŏngbang (兵房), yŏnggwan (領官), and ch’ogwan (哨官), respectively, following the formation of the Left and Right Battalions. Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-11-10 (10) [1884/11/10]. 傳于曺寅承曰, 前後營軍制, 依左右營例磨鍊, 正領官改以兵房, 副領官改以領官, 參領官改以哨官。 34 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, "Kaehanggi Chi’n’gunyŏng ch’eju yŏn’gu" 개항기 친군영 체제 연구, Hanʼguk kunsasa yŏnʼgu 한국 군사사 연구 3, (1999): 146. 184 dispatched to assume such a powerful position in Korea after the Yuan Dynasty’s control over Koryŏ’s sovereignty in the 13th and 14th centuries. Meanwhile, King Kojong focused on the protection of the royal palace and the strengthening of royal guard units. As Sukhee Han contends, the relationship between the king and the aristocracy was both mutually supportive and antagonistic.35 During this period, the dominance of the pro-Chinese group within the central government likely heightened King Kojong’s apprehensions, prompting him to fortify the royal guard. Also, the fortification of the royal guard was also closely tied to the rising tensions between King Kojong and the Qing government. Scholars hold differing views on the nature of Sino-Korean relations between 1884 and 1894,36 but there is consensus that the Qing regime, particularly figures like Li Hongzhang 35 Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998), 33. 36 Yuanchong Wang argues that Chosŏn-Qing relations were framed within the Zongfan (宗藩) system, a hierarchical structure that defined the relationship between late imperial China and its subordinate states. According to Wang, Zongfan refers to the political hierarchy in which both parties mutually recognized each other’s political legitimacy despite their unequal status. He contends that “Zongfanism”, or the Zongfan system, was Qing China’s primary foreign policy framework for managing relations with Asian countries such as Chosŏn, Burma, and Vietnam. This system contrasts with the Westphalian system, which is based on international law (萬國公法 Wanguo gongfa). Wang’s argument highlights the distinct nature of the Sino-Korean relationship, which was grounded in traditional, non-Western norms of sovereignty and diplomatic engagement. (Yuanchong Wang, Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911, (Cornell University Press, 2018), 3-18.) In contrast, Kirk W. Larsen’s research on Sino-Korean relations emphasizes the imperialistic aspect of the Qing-Chosŏn relationship, incorporating geopolitical and commercial factors alongside traditional diplomatic motives. Larsen introduces the concept of informal imperialism and multilateral imperialism to describe Qing’s influence in Chosŏn, noting that the Qing did not directly incorporate Chosŏn into their empire but exerted control through advisors, both Chinese and Western. Moreover, unlike Japan’s unilateral imperialism, the Qing government encouraged Chosŏn to engage with Western powers through treaties in the early 1880s, illustrating a more collaborative form of imperialism. (Kirk W Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910, (Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2008), 10-17.) Similarly, Ku Sŏn-hŭi’s perspective on the Sino-Korean relationship aligns with Larsen’s in that she also sees Qing policies as imperialistic. However, Ku argues that Qing’s actions stopped short of full imperialism due to the limited capitalist development in China at the time. While Qing did not fully integrate Chosŏn into its empire, it sought to dominate it as a dependency (屬國 sokkuk) within the traditional suzerain-vassal framework. The Qing’s aim, Ku asserts, was to secure Chosŏn as sokpang (屬邦), a subordinate state under Qing’s suzerainty, rather than a fully colonized entity. (Ku Sŏn-hŭi 구선희, Han’guk kŭndae tae Ch’ŏng chŏngch’aeksa yŏn’gu 한국 근대 대청정책사 연구, (Hyean, 1999), 10-20.) Meanwhile, Kwŏn Hyŏk-su examines Li Hongzhang’s approach to Chosŏn and concludes that Li held a dual attitude towards foreign relations in East Asia. He pursued the modern treaty system with Western powers, while simultaneously maintaining coercive, premodern tributary relations with subordinate countries. This duality, Kwŏn argues, extended to Qing’s broader international relations: while Li sought peaceful interactions with foreign powers, he took a hardline approach with those nations under Qing suzerainty, including Chosŏn. (Kwŏn Hyŏk-su 권혁수, 19-segi mal Han-Chung kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu: Yi Hong-jang ŭi Chosŏn insik kwa chŏngch’aek ŭl chungsim ŭro 19세기말 한중관계사 연구: 이홍장의 조선인식과 정책을 중심으로, (Paeksan charyowŏn, 2000), 2-27.) 185 and Yuan Shikai, adopted a high-handed policy toward Chosŏn and tried to intervene in both its domestic and foreign affairs. Specifically, Western diplomats referred to Yuan Shikai as the “governor-general” of Chosŏn, and Yuan himself regarded his role as that of the Supervisor of the Nation (監國大臣 Kamguk Taesin) on behalf of the Qing emperor.37As Yu Pada argues, the title of the Supervisor, or Kamguk, roughly equivalent to the “Resident-General” of a protectorate, was problematic within the context of Sino-Korean relations, which were still framed within an entrenched suzerain-vassal system. Under the traditional system, the Qing regime and its officials generally refrained from actively interfering in Chosŏn’s domestic and diplomatic affairs, adhering to a principle of non-intervention. This stood in stark contrast to the relationship between colonizing powers and their protectorates as defined in international law.38 Yet, Yuan asserted his privileged position within Chosŏn. Within the Qing government, opinions on the Sino-Korean relationship were divided. Although Li Hongzhang enforced a high-handed policy towards Chosŏn, he was a relatively benevolent figure compared to the Purist Party (淸流黨 Qingliudang), which advocated for the immediate annexation of Chosŏn as a province of the Qing.39 Provincialization of Chosŏn violated the traditional Qing diplomatic framework regarding Chosŏn prior to the 19th century, under which the Qing refrained from incorporating Chosŏn, treating it instead as an outer vassal (藩 fan) of the Middle Kingdom (中國 Zhongguo). However, following the failure of the Coup d’État of 1884, some Qing officials and scholars proposed sending Chinese military forces to Chosŏn and expelling its leading politicians.40 Although Li Hongzhang consistently opposed the outright incorporation of Chosŏn, he was not immune to the Purist Party’s pressures. In fact, Li 37 Kim Chŏng-gi 김정기, "Ch’ŏng ŭi Wŏn Se-gae p’agyŏn kwa Chosŏn kunsa chŏngch’aek" 청의 원세개 파견과 조선군사정책, Yŏksa pip’yŏng 역사비평, no. 54 (2001): 393. 38 Yu Pada 유바다, "1885-yŏn Chuch’al Chosŏn Ch’ongni Kyosŏp T’ongsang Saŭi Wŏn Segae ŭi Chosŏn p’agyŏn kwa chiwi munje" 1885년 주찰조선총리교섭통상사의 (駐紮朝鮮總理交涉通商事宜) 원세개 (袁世凱)의 조선파견과 지위문제, Sach’ong 사총 92, (2017): 57-62. 39 Lew Young Ick, "Yüan Shih-k’ai’s Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885-94)", The Journal of Korean Studies 5, (1984): 68. 40 For details, refer to Yuanchong Wang, Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911, (Cornell University Press, 2018), 181-183. 186 himself sought to shift the Sino-Korean relationship from one of traditional non-interference to a more coercive stance. Scholars generally agree that the Qing’s official diplomatic policy designated Chosŏn as a dependent state (屬國 K. sokkuk, C. shuguo) of the Qing Empire. While this status may appear similar to protectorates or colonies under the framework of international law, it held distinct characteristics. Dependent states under the Qing system were permitted to dispatch envoys, establish legations overseas, and sign treaties, but only under Qing supervision. In line with this policy, Zongli Yamen of the Qing government drafted a proposal in 1890 titled “Six Provisions for Chosŏn Affairs” (朝鮮事宜六條辦法 Chaoxian Shiyi Liutiao Banfa). A summary of the six provisions is as follows:41 1. Qing oversees the expansion of military forces and the construction of railways in the northeastern region. 2. Tax officials responsible for managing tariff affairs in Chosŏn will be appointed and dispatched by Qing to ensure they comply with the established system. 3. The dispatch of Chosŏn’s foreign envoys must adhere to the traditional suzerain-vassal framework to ensure that Chosŏn does not infringe upon Qing’s authority (僭越 ch’amwŏl). 4. Steps are taken to prevent Chosŏn from accumulating foreign debt and to protect Qing’s interests. 5. Given the ongoing deterioration of Chosŏn’s governance, it must be regularly guided to navigate unstable conditions and maintain stability. Although the Chinese office used the term “guide,” this proposal was essentially designed to limit King Kojong’s authority and the sovereignty of the Chosŏn government. In this context, Yuan Shikai’s plan to dethrone King Kojong in 1886 represented a significant threat to the kingship. Yuan Shikai criticized the king as a “foolish ruler” (昏君 hon’gun) and proposed that Yi Chun-yong (李埈鎔 1870-1917), the grandson of Taewŏn’gun and nephew of King Kojong, be installed as the new king. Although Li Hongzhang opposed this plan, preventing its 41 Kim Hyŏng-jong 김형종, "19-segi kŭndae Han·Chung kwan’gye ŭi pyŏnyong – chaju wa tongnip ŭi sai" 19세기 근대 한·중 관계의 변용 - 자주와 독립의 사이, Tongyang sahak yŏn’gu 동양사학연구 140, (2017): 247. 187 success, King Kojong remained in a precarious position.42 Understanding King Kojong’s efforts to strengthen the royal palace guard and the central army requires consideration of these circumstances. King Kojong’s plan to enhance the protection of the royal palace culminated in the establishment of the Special Battalion within the Capital Guards Command (親軍別營 Ch’in’gun Pyŏlyŏng). On 11/7 of 1884, the king issued a directive to form this new battalion, which involved the reorganization of soldiers from the Forbidden Guard Division and the Capital Guard Unit, both of which had previously been integrated into the four battalions of the Capital Guards Command following the dissolution of the traditional Five Military Divisions system on 8/29.43 Consequently, the scale of the Capital Guards Command was expanded with the incorporation of this newly established unit. As suggested by its designation, the Special Battalion received preferential treatment. Specifically, in 1884, the Special Battalion’s size significantly exceeded that of the other four units, with 2,288 personnel assigned to it, compared to a combined total of approximately 780 for the Left and Right units.44 Following its formation, the Special Battalion assumed a central role within the Capital Guards Command. Given that the Forbidden Guard Division had functioned as the royal palace guard prior to its dissolution, the establishment of this battalion represented a revival or enhancement of the royal guard units. Despite efforts to reform the Capital Guards Command, the unit’s deeply entrenched structural issues appear to have persisted. On 11/26 of 1884, Song Paek-ok (宋伯玉 1837-1887)45, the Junior Sixth-Rank Minor Military Official, submitted a memorial that critically 42 In terms of Yuan Shikai’s plan to dethrone King Kojong, refer to Lew Young Ick, "Yüan Shih-k’ai’s Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885-94)", The Journal of Korean Studies 5, (1984): 82-84, and Yur-Bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea, (University of Hawai'i Press, 1988), 158. 43 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:84b [1884/11/07]. 初七日。 敎曰: "前禁御兩營之分屬四營者, 合爲一營, 營號以親軍別營爲稱, 制置等節, 該營使就議廟堂, 成節目以入。" 44 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, "Kaehanggi Chi’n’gunyŏng ch’eju yŏn’gu" 개항기 친군영 체제 연구, Hanʼguk kunsasa yŏnʼgu 한국 군사사 연구 3, (1999): 141. 45 According to his biography in the Han’guk Yŏktae Inmul Chonghap Chŏngbo Sisŭt’em 한국역대인물 종합정보시스템 (Comprehensive Information System for Historical Figures of Korea), he is described as having committed suicide out of despair over the fall of Chosŏn and the growing encroachment of foreign powers into the nation. 188 exposed the systemic disorder within the command. In this memorial, Song identified ten pressing issues requiring immediate government attention, with the eighth article addressing specific deficiencies in the military system.46 The Five Military Divisions were reorganized into Four Battalions (of Capital Guards Command), but many of the soldiers recruited were unruly individuals from the streets. Although their newly learned skills appeared novel and unique on the surface, they were, in fact, often arrogant and lazy. Furthermore, they were not accustomed to the system or discipline. The Palace Guards Garrison (武衛營 Muwiyŏng) was of no assistance during the military mutiny of 1882, and the new structure of the Four Battalions also failed to prove effective during this recent uprising [The Coup d’Etat of 1884]. In general, military forces should value a small, elite composition rather than pursuing sheer numbers, and technical skills should be cultivated with expertise, avoiding superficial formalities. (…) Regarding the military system, I suggest referring to the systems of the previous military camps and focusing on training in newly learned techniques. Additionally, commanders should be carefully chosen based on their qualifications and should share in both the hardships and joys of their troops. If this is implemented, military discipline will be established, soldiers will grow to respect their commanders, and they will develop the loyalty to sacrifice their lives for their superiors. (http://people.aks.ac.kr/front/dirSer/ppl/pplView.aks?pplId=PPL_6JOc_A1837_1_0016218&curSetPos=0&curSPos=0&category=dirSer&isEQ=true&kristalSearchArea=P&isEQ=true&kristalSearchArea=P) However, Kim Kwang-nyŏn argues that this description lacks concrete evidence. (Kim Kwang-nyŏn 김광년, "Kyŏngsan Song Paek-ok ŭi saengae wa chŏsul e taehayŏ" 경산 송백옥의 생애와 저술에 대하여, Minjok munhwa yŏn’gu 민족문화연구 53, (2010): 266.) Whether or not he committed suicide out of loyalty to the nation is unclear; however, it appears that he continuously criticized the errors in the state policies. 46 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:89b [1884/11/26]. 五營變爲四營, 而兵丁多取市井無賴之流, 所學技藝, 外若新異, 而內或驕惰。 且名目節制, 不相慣習, 武衛親軍, 旣未得力於壬午之變, 四營新制, 又無著效於今日之亂。 大抵兵貴精少, 而不取林衆, 技貴專習, 而不取花套。 臣請官方, 旣爲減省, 則不宜煩改, 至於軍制, 參量舊營之名目, 練習新學之技藝, 而亦只在將得其人, 與士卒同甘苦勞佚, 則師出以律, 得其親上死長之心矣。 189 The Palace Guard Garrison succeeded the Palace Guard Unit, which had been established in 1874 at the directive of King Kojong to enhance the royal palace guard. In 1881, the Chosŏn government unified the Palace Guard Unit with three other traditional units, including the Military Training Agency, the Dragon Tiger Regiment, and the Royal Retinue Office (扈衛廳 Howich’ŏng), to streamline the chain of command and eliminate redundant soldiers and costs. As its name implies, the Palace Guard Unit served as the core of the Palace Guard Garrison. However, this garrison was abolished following the military mutiny of 1882 after Taewŏn’gun, serving as the head of the interim government, reinstated the traditional military units.47 According to Song Paek-ok’s account, both the Palace Guard Garrison and the four battalions of the Capital Guards Command failed to effectively respond to the revolts of 1882 and 1884, respectively. He criticized the government for prioritizing the quantitative expansion of military forces over advancements in military technology and expertise. Furthermore, Song criticized the arrogance of the troopers in the Capital Guards Command, who showed disdain for soldiers in other military units. This problem emerged when King Kojong began allocating preferential treatment to the Palace Guard Unit by channeling substantial military funds into the unit and expanding its size in 1874. Song’s memorial reveals that this issue within Chosŏn’s military system persisted throughout King Kojong’s reign. While his recommendation to reinstate the former military camps was anachronistic, his incisive critique of the military system demonstrates considerable insight, particularly given his position as the Junior Sixth-Rank Minor Military Official. Even though the issues within the royal palace guard units and the Capital Guards Command remained unresolved, King Kojong established another unit to reinforce the royal palace guard. On 3/6 of 1885, the regime reinstated the Dragon Tiger Regiment, a military unit that had historically served as royal palace guards since the reign of King Hyojong. During his reign, King Hyojong expanded the military buildup, aiming to prepare for a potential campaign to avenge the Qing’s 1636 Manchu invasion. Despite growing opposition from officials, the king prioritized strengthening the royal palace guards. Under his leadership, the total number of troops across the three palace guard units, such as the Concurrent Royal Stables, the Winged 47 For details, refer to Sŏ In-han 서인한, "Imo Kullan tangsi ŭi chung’ang’gun chojik kwa kunbi silt’ae" 임오군란 당시 중앙군의 조직과 군비 실태, Kuksagwan nonch’ong 국사관논총 90, (2000): 58-110. 190 Forest Guards, and the Forbidden Inner Zone Guards, increased from 600 to 1,000.48 Subsequently, King Hyojong unified these three units into a consolidated royal palace guard force. King Hyŏnjong (顯宗 1641-1674), the heir of King Hyojong, renamed this unified force the Royal Palace Command (禁軍廳 Kŭmgunch’ŏng) in 1666 and reduced its size to 700 soldiers. This reduction aligned with broader national military policies, as King Hyojong’s earlier military expansion had strained the state’s fiscal resources. Despite the downsizing, the Royal Palace Command maintained its elite status. Its officers and soldiers cultivated close ties with the monarchy, providing them with greater opportunities for promotion compared to other military units. Eventually, King Yŏngjo renamed the Royal Palace Command as the Dragon Tiger Regiment in 1755. This elite regiment was tasked with escorting the king, performing sentry duties at the royal palace, and cracking down on corruption and illegal activities.49 The Dragon Tiger Regiment faced an uncertain fate during the reign of King Kojong. On 8/29 of 1884, following the Coup d’État of 1884, the regiment, along with other traditional military units, such as the Forbidden Guard Division, the Capital Guard Unit, and the Command of the Northern Approaches, was disbanded. The soldiers from these units were reassigned to the four battalions of the Capital Guards Command.50 However, just seven months later, King Kojong reinstated the Dragon Tiger Regiment. In his directive, the king ordered the regiment’s affairs to be conducted as they had been prior to its abolition.51 Amid the growing threat posed by Qing and tensions with pro-Chinese officials within the Chosŏn court, King Kojong sought to reinforce his own security and that of the royal family by restoring this elite military unit. 48 James B. Palais, "Military Reform", in Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty, (The University of Washington Press, 1996), 506. 49 Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, "Chosŏn hugi chungang kunje ŭi chaep’yŏn" 조선후기 중앙군제의 재편, in Han’guksaron 9 한국사론 9, ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편 (Minjok munhwasa, 1992), 37-42, and Ch’oe Hyo-sik 최효식, "Yonghoyŏng e taehayŏ" 용호영 (龍虎營)에 대하여, Kyŏngju sahak 경주사학 4, (1985): 37-62. 50 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:70b [1884/08/29]. 統理軍國事務衙門以"依下敎, 龍虎營、禁衛營、御營廳、總戎廳, 移付於親軍四營節目, 與軍務司堂上, 爛漫商確, 條列書入"啓。 51 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 22-03-06 (16) [1885/03/06]. 又以兵曹言啓曰, 騎士·駕前別抄等, 今已還屬該營矣。 馬軍所, 更以龍虎營稱號, 而諸般擧行, 依前爲之之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 191 However, the reinstatement of the Dragon Tiger Regiment was not without issues. Above all, the directive indicated that the unit would operate as it had in the past. While the regime faced the urgent task of reforming the traditional military system to effectively resist foreign encroachment, this policy contradicted those reformative objectives. Moreover, this policy parallels King Kojong’s earlier establishment of the Palace Guard Unit in 1874, which he implemented to counter challenges from the pro-Taewŏn’gun group following Taewŏn’gun’s resignation. The reinstatement highlights that the primary focus of Chosŏn’s military policy remained the protection of the royal family, consistent with its priorities over the preceding two decades. Although Korean historians generally interpret King Kojong’s military reform policies as a ‘modernizing’ effort aimed at significantly transforming the traditional military system and ethos, the prioritization of the royal palace guard calls this interpretation into question. In addition, Chang Yŏng-suk argues that King Kojong, through the establishment of the Palace Guard Unit, continued the military policy of King Chŏngjo, who had previously formed the Robust and Brave Regiment as a royal palace guard unit.52 Therefore, the policy to strengthen the royal palace guard may be seen as a restoration of traditional military structures rather than a move toward the upheaval of the existing military system. In addition to fortifying the royal palace guard, the policy to strengthen the central army continued. The most notable example was the reorganization and streamlining of the Capital Guards Command. On 4/19 of 1888, the Chosŏn government restructured the five battalions of the Capital Guards Command into three battalions: the Right and Rear Battalions and the Coastal Defense Headquarters (海防營 Haebagnyŏng) were consolidated into the General Guard Battalion (統衛營 T’ongwiyŏng), the Front and Left Battalions into the Robust Guard Battalion (壯衛營 Changwiyŏng), and the Special Battalion into the General Defense Battalion (總禦營 Ch’ongŏyŏng). According to King Kojong’s remark, this action was modeled after the Qing military reforms, specifically the Divine Machine Battalion (神機營 Shenjiying) and the Green 52 Chang Yŏng-suk 장영숙, "Kojong ŭi ‘Chŏngjo kyesŭngron’ e taehan kŏmt’o wa siron" 고종의 ‘정조 계승론’에 대한 검토와 시론, Inmunhak yŏn’gu 인문학연구 12, (2009): 47. 192 Standard Army (綠營 Luying), and aimed to reduce the unnecessary expenses of maintaining the previous five military battalions.53 The reorganization of the Qing military began in the 1850s, when the Qing government faced various challenges from Western powers. Qing’s traditional military structures, such as the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army, proved ineffective against both internal rebellions and external invasions. Thus, the Qing regime restructured their military system into larger military units, culminating in the creation of the Xiang Army (湘軍 Xiangjun) by Zeng Guofan (曾國藩 1811-1872) and the Huai Army (淮軍 Huaijun) by Li Hongzhang.54 Additionally, the Divine Machine Battalion was established in 1862, with its soldiers trained by bannermen who had, in turn, been trained by British officers. The unit’s primary duty was to safeguard the Beijing area, and by around 1865, the emperor ordered the detachment of 30,000 soldiers from various units to reinforce the battalion. However, as tensions with France escalated in the 1870s, Li Hongzhang redeployed approximately 25,000 of these soldiers to defend the Zhili (直隸) region.55 The streamlining of the Capital Guards Command was ostensibly intended to reduce unnecessary military expenditures. However, King Kojong’s subsequent measure focused on enhancing the royal palace guard by restoring the Royal Retinue Office in 1892.56 This office was originally established in 1623 following King Injo’s (仁祖 1595-1649) successful military coup, which deposed King Kwanghae (光海君 1575-1641) in what is known as the Injo Restoration of 1623 (仁祖反正 Injo Panjŏng). The coup’s contributors facilitated the creation of the unit under the pretext of strengthening palace security, though their underlying objective was 53 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 25:20a [1888/04/19]. 近日中國之神機營綠營軍制, 亦有變通, 則此乃時措之宜, 不得不然者也。 年來各營分置, 冗費實多。 且每營五百兵, 不合於演操之規。 故今欲只存三營。 合右後及海防, 而稱統衛營; 合前左, 而稱壯衛營; 別營則稱總禦營矣。 54 Richard S. Horowitz, "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850–1911", in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (The University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 155-156. 55 Kwang-ching Liu, "The Military Challenge: The North-West and the Coast", in The Cambridge History of China Volume 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 204-205. 56 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 29:1b [1892/01/01]. 敎曰: "扈衛廳之當初制置, 意非徒然。 而年前權屬于他司, 亦甚無謂。 自今依舊例復設。" 193 to preserve the military forces they had mobilized during the revolt. Contrary to its original purpose, King Chŏngjo later transformed the Royal Retinue Office into a dedicated royal guard loyal to the throne.57 Although this office was dissolved in 1882 and incorporated into the Dragon and Tiger Regiment,58 it was reestablished a decade later, marking its revival as a key component of the palace guard. Given the increasing pressure from Qing on the Chosŏn court,59 King Kojong’s decision to establish a royal palace guard unit is, on one level, understandable. However, this action appears inconsistent with his earlier remarks when ordering the reorganization of the Capital Guards Command in 1888. As noted earlier, the king stated that the restructuring was modeled after Qing’s military reforms. If he had truly adhered to the precedent of the Divine Machine Battalion, whose majority of forces were reassigned to Li Hongzhang’s units, the Chosŏn government would have prioritized strengthening the central army over bolstering royal palace guard units. While Zhili belonged to the capital region, the Qing regime made a strategic decision to enhance its central army. By contrast, King Kojong fell short of demonstrating such strategic resolve. Subsequently, King Kojong issued another directive concerning the royal palace guard unit. On intercalary 6/15 of 1892, the king described the Dragon Tiger Regiment’s condition as both impoverished and deplorable, noting that the soldiers had not received their wages and were subjected to humiliation by their fellow soldiers due to their tattered uniforms. Despite being central to the royal palace guard, the regiment’s military command was disorganized. In response, the king ordered that the previous financial measures for the regiment be adhered to and additional steps be taken to ensure the soldiers’ livelihoods.60 This edict underscored the 57 Ch’a Mun-sŏp 차문섭, "Chosŏn hugi chungang kunje ŭi chaep’yŏn" 조선후기 중앙군제의 재편, in Han’guksaron 9 한국사론 9, ed. Kuksap’yonch’an wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 편 (Minjok munhwasa, 1992), 33-37, and James B. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty, (The University of Washington Press, 1996), 93-94. 58 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 19:95b [1882/12/29]. 59 For details, refer to Lin Mingde (Lin Ming-te), "Li Hung-chang’s Suzerain Policy toward Korea, 1882-1894", in Li Hung-chang and China’s Early Modernization, ed. Samuel C. Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu (M.E. Sharpe, 1991). 60 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-潤 06-15 (15) [1892/潤 06/15]. 敎曰: "龍虎營之禁旅者, 入則衛禁中, 出則扈仗內, 其爲近密, (…) 餼料恒缺; 旣無以資身, 名額自在, 又不能遷業。 衣藍縷而蒙恥於儕流, 策玄黃而見擯於行伍, 令慢而無律, 氣挫而不振, 祇存其名, 實不爲用。 非徒爲禁旅而可憫, 有國軍容, 安有如此者乎? 宜思所以湔拂而激勵之, 使爲國家爪牙之備。 此非創新, 惟當遵舊, 而凡所規式與接濟之方, 亦不可無略加裁制。 194 deteriorating state of the royal palace guard units, despite the government’s overarching military policy, which ostensibly prioritized strengthening the royal palace guard. On the surface, this directive appears to merely highlight the dire condition of the Dragon Tiger Regiment. However, upon closer examination of the broader situation across other military units, this order can be interpreted as preferential treatment towards the regiment. In fact, during King Kojong’s second phase of direct rule from 1884 to 1894, the Chosŏn government consistently failed to provide adequate military provisions and wages to its troops. Even the Capital Guards Command, the cornerstone of King Kojong’s military reform efforts, was not exempt from this financial hardship. The table below presents a breakdown of the financial deficits suffered by Chosŏn’s military units. Table 9: Cases of Financial Deficits in Chosŏn’s Government Offices and Military Units Date Event Response of the Regime Reference July 1885 ● Shortage of military provisions in the Capital Guards Command ● Providing wages in rice, exchanged from the collected tax coins from the three southern provinces (三南 Samnam) Kojong sillok, 22:34b [1885/07/07] May 1886 ● Shortage of military provisions in the Capital Guards Command ● Transferring 10,000 sŏk of provisions from fortresses (城餉穀 sŏnghyanggok) in the Northwestern region Kojong sillok, 23:32b [1886/05/13] July 1886 ● Shortage of wages for troopers in the Capital Guards Command ● Transferring 20,000 sŏk of grain loan rice (還米 hwanmi) from Hwanghae Province Kojong sillok, 23:38a [1886/07/22] July 1886 ● Shortage of wages for the Foreign Office (統理交涉通商事務衙門) ● Redirecting the interest from transporting tax grains from shipowners to staff in the Foreign Office Kojong sillok, 23:39a [1886/07/27] October 1886 ● Financial shortage of the Defense Garrison in Kyodong (喬桐防禦營 Kyodong Pangŏyŏng) ● Providing 200 sŏk of grain loan rice from Kanghwa Prefecture Kojong sillok, 23:58b [1886/10/17] April 1888 ● Failure to provide salaries to officials and soldiers ● Discussions by the Ministry of Finance, the Office for the Dispensation of Benevolence (宣惠廳 Sŏnhyech’ŏng), and the Office of Military Provisions (糧餉廳 Yanghyangch’ŏng) Kojong sillok, 25:19a [1888/04/13] 195 Date Event Response of the Regime Reference September 1889 ● Failure to provide salaries to officials and soldiers from the Ministry of Finance, the Office for the Dispensation of Benevolence, and the Capital Guards Command ● Distributing 1,000,000 nyang of cash from the National Mint (鑄錢所 Chujŏnso) by the Ministry of Home Affairs (內務府 Naemubu) Kojong sillok, 26:30a [1889/09/25] November 1889 ● Shortage of wages for troopers in the Capital Guards Command ● Transferring 5,000 sŏk of village grain loan rice (社還 sahwan) from Hwanghae Province Kojong sillok, 26:39b [1889/11/15] September 1893 ● Shortage of wages for troopers in the Capital Guards Command ● Transferring 40,000 sŏk of provisions from fortresses in the Northwestern region Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi, 30-09-11 (32) [1893/09/11] As indicated in Table 9, Chosŏn’s governmental offices and military units, particularly the Capital Guards Command, suffered from an unstable financial foundation. However, the Capital Guards Command received some support from the regime, which transferred funds from other military units and offices facing similar financial difficulties. Given the prestige of the Capital Guards Command in the context of Chosŏn’s military reform, it can be inferred that other, less significant units were likely in an even more precarious financial state. In this context, the king’s directive to support the Dragon Tiger Regiment can be seen as a special measure taken by the government to address its needs. Regarding the nature of this policy, it is noteworthy that the Chosŏn government chose to adhere to previous financial measures, as articulated in the directive. Rather than introducing new regulations to address the current circumstances, the king asserted the continuation of traditional practices in managing the Dragon Tiger Regiment, which entailed relocating military funds to sustain this unit. This approach contrasts with the prevailing perspective among many Korean historians, who regard King Kojong’s military reform as an effort toward so-called modernizing the military system. While certain elements of modernization were indeed introduced into Chosŏn’s military system during the reform process, a closer examination of this issue challenges such a characterization. Admittedly, the Chosŏn government implemented various policies to reform local military units and garrisons, recognizing the importance of local defense in the face of increasing foreign threats. However, the strengthening of the central army was still prioritized over the local 196 defense system, despite the equally critical role of local defense in safeguarding both the borders and the local populace in light of the measures by the Chosŏn government. This imbalance left local units underfunded and chronically neglected, undermining their ability to function as an effective bulwark against potential invasions. The exemplary policy of King Kojong’s reform of local military units was the unification of individual units in major local counties and prefectures under the banner of Capital Guards (親軍 Ch’in’gun) modeled after the structure of the central army.61 These unified units operated independently within their jurisdictions but were officially subordinate to the Capital Guards Command. For instance, on 4/20 of 1885, the battalion in P’yŏngyang Prefecture was renamed the Western Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍西營 Ch’in’gun Sŏyŏng).62 Although the distance between Seoul and P’yŏngyang was considerable, the Western Battalion was established as an outer battalion of the Left Battalion, with Min Ŭng-sik, the Commander of the Left Battalion, assuming a co-commander role for the Western Battalion.63 Two years later, on 5/14 of 1887, Yi Ho-jun, the Governor of Kyŏngsang Province, requested that the military unit in the province be renamed the Southern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍南營 Ch’in’gun Namyŏng). This unit was incorporated into the Capital Guards Command system and directed to follow the precedent set by the Western Battalion.64 This move further integrated the provincial military forces into the centralized structure of the 61 For details, refer to Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998), 224-272; Ch’oe Pyŏng-ok 최병옥, Kaehwagi ŭi kunsa chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu 개화기의 군사정책 연구, (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2000), 225-248; Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, 19-segi Chosŏn ŭi kunsa chedo yŏn’gu 19세기 조선의 군사 제도 연구, (Kukhak charyowŏn, 2002), 220-237; Sim Hŏn-yong 심헌용, Hanmal kun kŭndaehwa yŏn’gu 한말 군 근대화 연구, (Kukpangbu kunsa p’yŏnch’an yŏn’guso, 2005), 117-132; and Yukkun kunsa yon’guso 육군 군사 연구소, Han’guk kunsasa 9 - Kŭnhyŏndae 1 한국 군사사 9 - 근현대 1, (Yukkun ponbu, 2012), 188-254. 62 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 22:19a [1885/04/20]. 兵丁旣已抄募, 技藝又漸鍊熟, 營號以親軍西營爲稱, 將官則令該曹單付啓下何如?" 允之。 63 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 [1885/06/09]. (命閔應植 西營 兼提調差下) 敎曰: "各營使之例兼親軍提調, 已有定式。 而西營卽外營也, 不可無自京句管。 左營使閔應植, 親軍西營兼提調差下, 使之隨機董飭。 64 Ch’in’gun pyŏlyŏng tŭngnok 親軍別營謄錄 (Records of the Special Battalion of the Capital Guards Command) 6, 61b, [1887/05/14]. Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-3385). 兵丁旣抄, 技藝漸熟, 營號以親軍南營爲稱, 將官令該曹單付啓下何如?" 允之。 仍敎曰: "依西營例爲之, 兵房以邊禦以上擇擬。 197 Capital Guards Command, reinforcing the regime’s control over both local and central defense units. On the same day, King Kojong issued an edict affiliating the Kanghwa Island Headquarters with the Capital Guards Command system, renaming it the Kanghwa Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍沁營 Ch’in’gun Simyŏng).65 This decision reflects King Kojong’s recognition of Kanghwa Island’s strategic importance, in contrast to his earlier policy of downgrading the island’s military headquarters during his first phase of direct rule. In the same year, the king ordered the artillery provision rice from T’ongjin Prefecture, which had previously been allocated to the Coastal Defense Headquarters, to be redirected to the Kanghwa Battalion. Notably, this artillery provision rice had been supplied to Kanghwa Island’s military units during Taewŏn’gun’s regency before it was reassigned to the Coastal Defense Headquarters.66 Thus, this directive restored earlier practices and reinstated Kanghwa Island’s military status. However, the policy to incorporate major local military units under the Capital Guards Command was temporarily halted due to the government’s decision to reduce the size of local battalions. On 11/10 of 1888, the Capital Guards Command submitted a request to the court, proposing that, while the regular soldiers (正兵 chŏngbyŏng) of each battalion should be maintained, the commanders should appropriately reduce various unnecessary troops. Furthermore, it was requested that half of the soldiers from the two outer battalions in P’yŏngan and Kyŏngsang provinces, namely, the Western Battalion and the Southern Battalion, be discharged, and the grains from these reduced soldiers be transported to the main battalion in Seoul.67 65 Ch’in’gun pyŏlyŏng tŭngnok 親軍別營謄錄 (Records of the Special Battalion of the Capital Guards Command) 6, 61b, [1887/05/14]. Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-3385). 敎曰: "沁都旣設兵丁矣, 不可無營號。 稱以親軍沁營, 依西營例爲之, 兵房以邊禦以上擇擬。" 66 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 24:42b [1887/11/14]. 本府砲糧, 自今年條爲始, 依前還送于沁營。 而海防營所納, 量其石數, 以距京便近邑換定之意, 分付該道、該營何如?" 允之。 67 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 25:55a [1888/11/10]. 親軍營條陳, 則‘其一, 各營正兵原額外, 不緊名色, 令各營將臣, 量宜減省, 關西、嶺南兩外營兵丁中, 各限折半減額, 以半減之錢穀, 輸納本營’事也。 198 This proposal aligned with the military policy aimed at streamlining the central battalions of the Capital Guards Command in April 1888. As noted earlier, the regime reorganized the five battalions into three to reduce unnecessary expenses. Similarly, the headquarters of the Capital Guards Command sought to cultivate an elite army in the local battalions rather than expanding the military forces. However, the issue with this approach was that the military provisions, which were saved through the retrenchment, were redirected to the central battalions, at the expense of the local defense system. While this measure may have enhanced the management of military forces, it ultimately weakened the local military capabilities. The systemic issues inherent in Chosŏn’s local military organization became evident during the Tonghak followers’ movements to vindicate their founder from false accusations (敎祖伸寃運動 Kyojo sinwŏn undong) in 1892 and 1893. Tonghak was founded by Ch’oe Che-u (崔濟愚 1824-1864), a member of chanban (殘班), a marginalized group of fallen aristocrats whose economic standing had declined to the level of the lower classes. Although Ch’oe’s father belonged to the aristocracy, his mother was a concubine, relegating him to the status of an illegitimate son (庶子 sŏja) and subjecting him to systemic discrimination.68 The foundation of Tonghak was primarily a religious movement deeply rooted in the international upheavals of the time. Its core principles centered on spiritual resistance to Western influences and countering Western learning with Ch’oe Che-u’s own religious teachings. Ch’oe Che-u’s anxiety over potential Western military incursions was evident, particularly in light of events such as the British-French allied forces’ attack on Beijing during the Second Opium War.69 Ch’oe Che-u fundamentally opposed Western Learning (西學 Sŏhak), specifically Catholicism, as it originated from the West. However, his opposition was not absolute. Scholars have identified significant overlaps between Eastern Learning (Tonghak) and Western Learning. For instance, Ch’oe utilized the concept of a personified heaven to represent God. Later, Tonghak 68 Carl Young, "Early Tonghak and the 1894 Rebellion", in Eastern Learning and the Heavenly Way: The Tonghak and Ch’ŏndogyo Movements and the Twilight of Korean Independence, (University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 3. 69 Pae Hang-sŏp 배항섭, "Tonghak ŭn wae ch’angdo toeŏnna" 동학은 왜 창도되었나, Naeil ŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa 내일을 여는 역사 24, (2006): 89-90. 199 leaders further cemented the movement’s legitimacy and their leadership by portraying Ch’oe as a martyr executed for his beliefs, framing his death as proof to the movement’s righteousness.70 Tonghak gained significant traction among the fallen aristocrats and the populace, particularly in southeastern Chosŏn. Alarmed by its rapid growth, the Chosŏn government began persecuting Tonghak adherents, ultimately arresting Ch’oe Che-u on charges of performing unorthodox rituals and amassing followers. These activities reminded the government of secret societies in China, prompting the decision to execute him. In 1864, Ch’oe Che-u was executed, and Tonghak was officially condemned as heresy. However, the government’s treatment of Ch’oe was notably less severe compared to its actions against Catholics. Unlike Catholic martyrs, whose executions were often accompanied by public displays of their severed heads, Ch’oe’s remains were returned to his hometown for burial, reflecting the nuanced stance the government adopted toward Tonghak compared to Western influences.71 After the martyrdom of Ch’oe Che-u, Tonghak activities were forced underground. However, under the leadership of Ch’oe Si-hyŏng (崔時亨 1827-1898), Tonghak’s second leader, the movement embraced non-violence, which helped alleviate tensions between the religion and Chosŏn’s ruling elite. By the 1880s, treaties signed by Chosŏn with Western powers introduced the concept of religious freedom, which gradually, albeit limitedly, eased restrictions on Tonghak. This shift enabled the religion to spread further across the Korean peninsula. The growing influence of Tonghak emboldened its leaders to petition the government to rehabilitate Ch’oe Che-u’s name and formally recognize their faith. Alongside these efforts, Tonghak adherents expressed strong grievances over systemic corruption and the economic exploitation caused by the growing presence of Japanese merchants in Chosŏn markets. This shift significantly fueled the anti-Japanese sentiment among Tonghak followers, partially replacing their earlier anti-Western stance. In 1892 and 1893, Tonghak members organized two major petition movements, one originating in Chŏlla Province and the other in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province.72 They regarded 70 George L. Kallander, "The Tonghaks Have Again Arisen, 1864–1894", in Salvation through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea, (University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 100. 71 Ibid., 93. 72 Carl Young, "Tonghak in the Aftermath of the Tonghak Rebellion, 1895–1901", in Korea: The Past and the Present, ed. Susan Pares and Jim Hoare (Global Oriental, 2008), 5. 200 Chosŏn’s religious policy as unjust, as Christianity was openly permitted while Tonghak remained officially banned in public spaces. Despite their persistence, the Chosŏn government rejected their appeals, further deepening dissatisfaction among Tonghak followers. The large-scale assembly of over 10,000 Tonghak followers in Poŭn County, Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, during March 1893, profoundly alarmed the Chosŏn regime. This mass gathering, aimed at supporting the petition movement, underscored the growing organizational strength of Tonghak and its capacity to mobilize the populace. However, discussions within the Chosŏn court revealed the inability of Chosŏn’s military to respond effectively to the large-scale protest. According to records from a court meeting, the garrisons in Ch’ŏngju County of Ch’ungch’ŏng Province and Chŏnju of Chŏlla Province were nearly abandoned. King Kojong attributed this dire situation to the government’s prioritization of civil affairs, which had resulted in the neglect of military affairs.73 Confronted with the limitations of the Chosŏn military to suppress such widespread dissent, King Kojong held an audience with high-ranking officials to deliberate on the prospect of seeking military assistance from Qing.74 The king instructed, “Troops from Seoul should not be dispatched yet. Borrowing troops from other nations has precedents; why not utilize foreign forces?” Sim Sun-t’aek responded, “That is inadvisable. If we do, we will inevitably need to supply their provisions ourselves.” Cho Pyŏng-se replied, “There is no need to borrow troops.” Chŏng Pŏm-jo said, “How can we discuss issues to borrow troops lightly?” The king remarked, “China once borrowed British troops.” 73 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:17b [1893/03/25]. 仍敎曰: "兵者不可一日無備, 而顧今昇平日久, 不爲養兵。 今聞錦營淸營, 可謂全無矣。 完營亦無兵乎?" 範朝曰: "完營亦然矣。 只有奴令而已, 所以疎虞莫甚矣。" 敎曰: "只右文而不修戎事, 果不可矣。" 範朝曰: "有文事者, 必有武備。 何可不修乎? 此是安不忘危者也。" 74 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:17b [1893/03/25]. 敎曰: "京軍姑不可派送矣。 借用他國兵, 亦有各國之例也。 何不借兵耶?" 舜澤曰: "此則不可矣。 若用之, 則軍餉不得不自我國進排矣。" 秉世曰: "不必借兵矣。" 範朝曰: "借用何可遽議乎?" 敎曰: "中國曾有借用英國兵之事矣。" 範朝曰: "此豈可效中國事乎?" 敎曰: "非欲借各國也。 淸兵可用, 故言之矣。" 範朝曰: "淸兵借用, 雖異於各國, 而曷若初不借之爲好乎?" 201 Chŏng Pŏm-jo countered, “Should we emulate China’s example in this matter?” The king clarified, “I am not suggesting borrowing from multiple countries but considering the use of Qing forces.” Chŏng Pŏm-jo concluded, “Even if borrowing Qing troops differs from others, how could borrowing them be better than refraining from the outset?” The discussions between the king and his key officials not only reflect immediate security concerns but also underscore King Kojong’s broader approach to military dependence. This reliance reveals a critical aspect of Chosŏn’s political and military strategy during the late 19th century, highlighting the kingdom’s continued dependency on Qing support to maintain internal stability. King Kojong’s attitude toward military affairs mirrored his concern about the withdrawal of Qing troops a decade earlier. Rather than addressing the grievances of his subjects, he demonstrated a willingness to resort to utilizing foreign military forces. Furthermore, the king cited the Qing Dynasty’s precedent of seeking military support from Britain to justify his proposal. While it is unclear which specific incident King Kojong referred to, it likely alluded to the Tianjin Massacre of 1870. After Qing’s borders opened, Western missionaries established churches and orphanages in port cities like Tianjin. However, widespread anti-missionary sentiment fueled rumors accusing foreigners of abducting Chinese children, mutilating their bodies, and harvesting their hearts and eyes for medicinal purposes. These allegations incited Chinese mobs to destroy British and American churches and kill French officials. The unrest was eventually quelled with the intervention of Western gunboats, including the British navy, which anchored at Tianjin. Although this foreign intervention enabled the Qing government to restore order, it came at a significant cost. The Qing paid 400,000 taels in compensation and sent an apology mission, highlighting the high price of foreign military support.75 Moreover, such reliance inevitably deepened the Western powers’ incursions into Qing society. Additionally, the discussions highlight that King Kojong refused to deploy the capital’s military forces to suppress the Tonghak believers. Despite the Capital Guards Command and 75 Immanuel Hsu, "Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866–1905", in The Cambridge History of China Volume 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge University Press, 1980), 78-81. 202 other military units serving as the core of Chosŏn’s military system, the king was unwilling to compromise the capital’s defense under any circumstances. Instead, he reinforced the security of the capital region by relocating 300 soldiers from Kanghwa Island to Suwŏn County, a critical location along the route to Seoul.76 However, this decision risked jeopardizing maritime defense. In the face of potential rebellion, the king’s primary concern remained the protection of the capital and the royal palace. This incident came to an end on 3/30 of 1893, following the efforts of Ŏ Yun-jung, the Pacificator (宣撫使 Sŏnmusa) of the Chosŏn government, who was responsible for investigating the incident and calming the public.77 Given that Chosŏn’s request for the dispatch of Qing troops to suppress the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion the following year led to the Sino-Japanese War, it is possible that the war could have occurred in 1893 if the Tonghak movement had not been disbanded. Furthermore, while the movement ended peacefully, this incident revealed the deep-rooted issues within Chosŏn’s local military system, particularly that Chosŏn’s local military units were incapable of suppressing rebellions within the country. After the Tonghak movement to clear the name of its founder, the Chosŏn regime continued transforming the local military system by establishing several battalions under the Capital Guards Command. In August 1893, the Military Southern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍武南營 Ch’in’gun Munamyŏng) was created in Chŏnju Prefecture in Chŏlla Province.78 In March 1894, the Northern Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍北營 Ch’in’gun Pugyŏng) was established in Chongsŏng County in Hamgyŏng Province,79 followed by the creation of the Defense Battalion of the Capital Guards Command (親軍鎭禦營 Ch’in’gun Chinŏyŏng) in Ch’unch’ŏn in Kangwŏn Province.80 These actions were aimed at unifying the local military system and preparing for potential rebellions in the regions. 76 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:20a [1893/03/28]. 內務府啓: "要衝防守, 纔有稟旨蒙允。 淸州兵丁, 亦有仍屬之命矣。 戎嚴之節, 不容虛徐。 沁營兵丁三百名, 出駐水原, 與本營兵, 協力防守。 餉穀, 以本營公穀中, 量宜取用事, 分付何如?" 允之。 77 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 30-03-30 (42) [1893/03/30]. 兩湖宣撫使魚允中以"報恩郡黨民, 曉諭退散。" 馳啓。 敎曰: "今見此啓, 民情大可見捨舊從新。 使歸安業之意, 令廟堂卽速稟覆, 以爲回諭。" 78 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:35a [1893/08/14]. 79 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 31:13a [1894/03/10]. 80 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 31-03-19 (43) [1894/03/19]. 203 Map 16: The Locations of the Capital Guards Command in Local Areas (1885-1894) Source: Ksiom, CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>, via Wikimedia Commons (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Korean_Peninsula_topographic_map.png) Despite the Chosŏn government’s efforts to strengthen the local defense system, this policy proved ineffective during the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion of 1894. Not only did Chosŏn’s local military units fail to suppress the peasant army, but even the elite units dispatched from Seoul were unsuccessful.81 This failure stemmed from the maladministration of Chosŏn’s military reform policies. As a result, King Kojong requested that the Qing government send expeditionary forces to quell the rebellion. However, Japan also dispatched its own military forces in accordance with the third provision of the 1885 Convention of Tianjin. The 81 For example, at the Battle of Hwangt’ohyŏn, a 4,000-strong peasant army of Tonghak defeated 2,000 regular troops from the Chŏlla Province Headquarters. (Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, Han’guksa 39: Chegukchuŭi ŭi ch’imt’u wa Tonghak nongmin chŏnjaeng 한국사 39: 제국주의의 침투와 동학농민전쟁, (T’amgudang, 2013), 335-337.) 204 simultaneous deployment of these two military forces into Chosŏn led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and Japan’s victory over Qing accelerated the colonization of Chosŏn, despite the prolonged process that followed. The Chosŏn government’s failure in military reform significantly contributed to the infiltration of foreign powers. In addition to the issues in the operation of both the central and local military systems, the tenure and career of the Ministers of War during King Kojong’s second decade of direct rule are reminiscent of his first period of direct rule from 1873 to 1884, as expertise and knowledge in military affairs were not the primary criteria for appointing individuals to the position. This continuity underscores the persistence of Chosŏn’s traditional practices, which assumed that a scholar well-versed in Confucian texts was better suited to make military decisions than a soldier, thereby hindering the adoption of merit-based approaches to military leadership. The table below provides a summary of the ministers’ tenure and the branches to which they belonged. Table 10: Tenure of Ministers of War, 1884-1894 Name Branch Tenure Appointment Date Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元 1831-1891) Civil official Royal Family 5 months 5/27 of 1884 Kim Yun-sik (金允植 1835-1922) Civil official 1 day 10/20 of 1884 Yi Chae-wŏn (李載元 1831-1891) Civil official Royal Family 2 days 10/21 of 1884 Kim Yun-sik (金允植 1835-1922) Civil official 5 months 10/23 of 1884 Min Chong-muk (閔種默 1835-1916) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 2 months 3/29 of 1885 Yun Cha-sŭng (尹滋承 1815-n.d.) Civil official 2 months 3/14 of 1885 Kim Ki-sŏk (金箕錫 1828-1890) Military official 3 months 7/5 of 1885 Min Yŏng-ik (閔泳翊 1860-1914) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 3 days 10/19 of 1885 Kim Yŏng-su (金永壽 1829-1899) Civil official 3 months 10/22 of 1885 Kim Ki-sŏk (金箕錫 1828-1890) Military official 3 months 2/3 of 1886 205 Name Branch Tenure Appointment Date Min Yŏng-ik (閔泳翊 1860-1914) Civil official 2 months 4/25 of 1886 Min Ŭng-sik (閔應植 1844-n.d.) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 8 months 6/27 of 1886 Kim Yŏng-su (金永壽 1829-1899) Civil official 2 months 2/28 of 1888 Min Yŏng-hwan (閔泳煥 1861-1905) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 4 months 4/16 of 1888 Sim Sun-t’aek (沈舜澤 1824-n.d.) Civil official Incumbent Chief State Councillor 1 month 8/19 of 1891 Min Yŏng-so (閔泳韶 1852-1917) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 2 months 9/7 of 1891 Chŏng Ki-hoe (鄭基會 1829-n.d.) Civil official 3 months 11/16 of 1893 Min Yŏng-jun (閔泳駿 1852-1935) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 15 days 2/14 of 1894 Yi Sŭng-o (李承五 1837-n.d.) Civil official 3 months 2/29 of 1894 Min Yŏng-gyu (閔泳奎 1846-1923) Civil official Relative of Queen Min 1 month 5/22 of 1894 Source: The Diary of the Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi) and the Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok), and the Roster of Examination Graduates (國朝榜目 Kukcho pangmok) 12 According to the table, the average tenure for the ministerial position was approximately three months, excluding instances where ministers temporarily held the role during interregnal periods between outgoing and incoming appointees. Such brief tenures were insufficient for ministers to fully grasp their responsibilities or effectively advance military policies. James Palais characterizes Chosŏn’s frequent appointments and rapid rotation system in the bureaucracy during Taewŏn’gun’s regency as a “game of musical chairs,” attributing this practice to the government’s effort to confer titles on as many eligible officials as possible due to the disparity between the number of qualified candidates and available posts.82 While this practice was not confined to the Ministry of War, its impact was particularly problematic in the context of increasing international tensions, marked by Japan’s military expansion, and Chosŏn’s domestic initiatives to strengthen its military forces. The short tenure of ministers in such a critical ministry significantly hindered the implementation of consistent and effective policies. 82 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 56. 206 Additionally, the relationship with the royal family was evidently a significant factor in the appointment process for the ministerial position. Notably, nine out of the twenty appointments were of individuals who were either relatives or in-laws of the king. In particular, seven ministers were related to Queen Consort Min to varying degrees of familial closeness. This dominance of a single family in the ministerial positions within the Ministry of War highlights a reversal of Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to dismantle in-law politics, or sedo politics (For details, see Chapter 1). This pattern of appointments reflects King Kojong’s tendency to prioritize individuals close to him, rather than selecting high-ranking officials based on their qualifications or capabilities, during his reign. Furthermore, with the exception of Kim Ki-sŏk, all other Ministers of War were civil officials. The reason for Kim Ki-sŏk’s appointment to the position, despite his background, remains somewhat ambiguous but appears to be linked to his role in escorting Queen Consort Min back to the royal palace during the military mutiny of 1882. At the time, Kim Ki-sŏk, along with 60 soldiers, ensured the queen consort’s safe return from her flight to Ch’ungch’ŏng Province,83 which likely influenced King Kojong’s selection as Minister of War. His term, however, lasted only three months, which was an extremely brief period to effectively carry out ministerial duties. although short tenures were common among other ministers as well. Additionally, while a few ministers from the civil official had experience in military units, the majority lacked expertise in military affairs. This disconnection between the need to strengthen national defense, Chosŏn’s primary policy objective, and the appointment practices for Ministers of War undermined the stated policy goals. When evaluating the reform program during King Kojong’s reign, James Palais’s assessment warrants careful consideration. He contends that after 1876, the Korean government showed neither confidence in the old order’s capacity to secure the state nor dedication to intentionally adopting new and foreign institutions. Instead, it was pressured to implement limited modernizing reforms, primarily to appease its Chinese advisers or pacify the Japanese aggressors. However, its primary objective remained the preservation of the social and political status quo, which relied on the traditional structure of a dominant aristocracy and a weak 83 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-07-26 (23) [1882/07/26]. 又以摠戎廳言啓曰, 兼察摠戎使金箕錫, 率該廳軍兵六十名, 奉迎時進去之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 207 monarchy with minimal central authority. He concludes that it was unsurprising that the sweeping changes of the Kabo Reform in 1894 were enacted by the government operating under the protection of Japanese armed forces, which was an external authority unrestrained by domestic social and political influences.84 This assessment remains pertinent when analyzing the military reform policies of Chosŏn. While it may be somewhat overstated to claim that King Kojong and key figures in the Chosŏn court aimed solely to preserve the status quo or implemented reforms merely to placate either Chinese advisers or Japanese hardliners in military affairs, especially in light of the various reform initiatives undertaken, fundamental changes to the military system ultimately failed to materialize. Instead, traditional practices largely persisted throughout King Kojong’s reign. The Continued Implementation of Military Exile between 1884 and 1894 Military exile cases related to state governance After the failed Coup d’État of 1884, the Chosŏn government pursued military reforms aimed at unifying the central and local military units. However, as previously discussed, King Kojong and government officials maintained a traditional stance on military matters, rendering these reforms ineffective in strengthening Chosŏn’s military power. In addition to the ineffectiveness of these reforms, the ruling class’s perception of military service showed little change between 1884 and 1894, as evidenced by the continued implementation of military exile to punish individuals who violated national policies. In fact, the number of military exile cases in this category during King Kojong’s second phase of direct rule markedly decreased compared to his first. While concrete evidence is lacking, this trend may be linked to the stabilization of King Kojong’s kingship, as Taewŏn’gun and the pro-Taewŏn’gun group became marginalized from political power. In other words, relatively lenient measures sufficed for King Kojong to discipline officials and tighten bureaucratic order. Nevertheless, much like during his first decade of direct rule, the government 84 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 285. 208 continued to impose military exile on officials who failed to comply with its policies, albeit with less frequency than in the previous decade. In the meantime, it appears that the idea of using military exile as a punitive measure was shared among Chosŏn’s aristocrats. Right after the abortive coup, numerous memorials proposing political and administrative reform measures to stabilize the uneasy society were submitted to the throne in 1884, with some suggesting that the government rely on military exile in cases where bureaucrats failed to follow the reformative measures. These cases indicate that not only the ruler but also the ruling class regarded military service as a vigorous and punitive means to enforce state affairs. For example, the memorial of Chi Hyŏn-nyong (池見龍 n.d.), the Fourth-Rank Deputy Commander of the Five Military Command, submitted on 6/17 of 1884, suggested that the imposition of military exile was a viable measure for the regime to enforce its reform policies. Chi Hyŏn-nyong had submitted memorials twice on 6/6 and 6/17 of 1884, and in his second memorial, he proposed developing the border area, reclaiming military colony land, increasing wealth, promoting agriculture and commerce, and training and maintaining a standing army.85 His memorial aligned with the diplomatic circumstances along the border between Chosŏn and Qing in the late 19th century. In the 1860s, amid natural disasters in Chosŏn, many individuals crossed the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, migrating to the Manchu region of Qing. There, they established farms and built homes within Chinese territory. Initially, the Qing government enforced the prohibition policy (封禁政策 fengjin zhengce) in Manchuria, which passively sought to restrict immigration to the region. This policy left the area beyond effective Qing control, resulting in a significantly porous border. However, with Russian expansion into Qing’s northeastern regions, the Qing government adopted a more proactive strategy to secure the area by encouraging Chinese migration into Manchuria.86 Consequently, the concept of the border shifted from a fluid to a more rigid one. The demarcation of the border became a diplomatic issue between the Qing and Chosŏn governments, leading to prolonged and heated negotiations 85 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-06-17 (17) [1884/06/17]. 拓疆屯田, 不可不務, 殖財農商, 不可不務, 練戎常備, 不可不務, 擇人作宰, 不可不務。 86 Han Sŏng-ju (Han Seong-Joo), "The Temporal Aspects of Change in the Contact Zone during the Joseon Dynasty: Focusing on the Yalu River and Tumen River Basins", in The Borderlands of China and Korea: Historical Changes in the Contact Zones of East Asia, ed. Ch’a Yong-gu (Cha Yong-ku) (Lexington Books, 2020), 131-133. 209 to define a precise boundary.87 In this context, Chi Hyŏn-nyong’s proposal aimed not only to secure but also to potentially expand the border with Qing. To further support his argument, Chi Hyŏn-nyong contended that magistrates should be assessed based on their performance and penalized for any shortcomings. Specifically, according to his proposal, if a magistrate was deemed unfit (不治 pulch’i) in the first evaluation (考 ko), a fine of 5,000 nyang (the exact unit is uncertain, but ‘nyang’ was commonly used in the context of official fines during this period) would be imposed; if deemed unfit in the second evaluation, the individual would be subjected to military exile to the respective district; and if deemed unfit in the third evaluation, both the magistrates and the person who had recommended them would be executed.88 Despite the apparent contradiction that a magistrate exiled in the second evaluation could still undergo a third evaluation, Chi Hyŏn-nyong’s proposal was notably stringent, as military exile and capital punishment were typically reserved for serious criminals. This suggestion reflects his strong commitment to enforcing reform policies and underscores the widespread perception of military exile as both a significant form of punishment and a compulsory measure during this period. It is noteworthy that Chi Hyŏn-nyong, despite his position as a high-ranking military officer, proposed the imposition of military exile as part of his reform strategy. While it remains unclear whether the government adopted his suggestions, the case of Chi Hyŏn-nyong’s memorial suggests that even military aristocrats may not have viewed military service as a sacred duty for national defense, a perspective more commonly held by civil officials. Instead, the military elite likely viewed military service as a pragmatic means of maintaining discipline and advancing state policies rather than a moral obligation. Another memorial, submitted by Yi Ki-ŏn (李驥彥 1863-n.d.), also advocated for the use of military exile as a disciplinary measure. Yi Ki-ŏn had held several military positions, 87 In terms of the process of demarcation between Qing and Chosŏn, refer to Nianshen Song, Making borders in Modern East Asia: Tumen River Demarcation, 1881-1919, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 26-39. 88 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 21-06-17 (17) [1884/06/17]. 爲官牧民, 縝密撢實, 一考不治, 罰金五千, 二考不治, 充軍該邑, 三考不治, 與薦主同斬, 富國强兵, 安民之效, 必翹足而可待矣。 210 including the Five Guards General 89 and the Fourth-Rank Deputy Commander, at the time of his proposal. Similar to Chi Hyŏn-nyong, Yi Ki-ŏn, despite his role as a military official, recommended utilizing military service as a mechanism to enforce national policies. On 9/13 of 1884, Yi Ki-ŏn presented eight proposals addressing current affairs (時務 simu) to King Kojong. These included: first, acquiring talented individuals; second, fostering the local militia; third, enforcing strict examination practices; fourth, promoting agriculture and sericulture (農桑 nongsang); fifth, emphasizing the importance of official ranks and salaries; sixth, reducing the salaries of local administrators; seventh, maintaining and repairing beacon towers; and eighth, prohibiting tobacco (淡蓓 tambae).90 In response to this proposal, King Kojong expressed his general approval. Specifically, in promoting agriculture and sericulture, he referenced a precedent from the Ming dynasty, where Emperor Hongwu (洪武帝 1328-1398) personally championed these endeavors. The emperor set an example by plowing fields himself and having the empress rear silkworms, while mandating the planting of mulberry trees throughout the empire so that even slaves (下隷 harye) could afford silk garments. Those who disregarded these directives were subjected to military exile.91 Although Yi Ki-ŏn did not explicitly call for military exile for negligence in agriculture and sericulture in his memorial, his reference to this historical case suggests its potential as a disciplinary measure within his broader reform framework. However, with regard to the prohibition of tobacco, Yi Ki-ŏn explicitly advocated for the use of military exile as a penalty for those who violated the ban. He proposed burning piles of tobacco as fuel, issuing public warnings in villages to prohibit smoking, and banning tobacco cultivation for three years. Penalties for violations were to be determined based on the severity of the offense, ranging from the acceptance of redemption money (贖錢 sokchŏn) to the enforcement of military exile. For individuals who repeatedly violated the law two or three 89 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-10-23 (25) [1882/10/23]. 李驥彦·南興喆·李漢龜·鄭海昇·張履泰爲五衛將。 90 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 21:73a [1884/09/13]. 副護軍李驥彦疏, 陳時務八條: 一, 得人才。 二, 養義兵。 三, 嚴科制。 四, 務農桑。 五, 重爵祿。 六, 減外任(月捧)〔月俸〕 。 七, 修烟臺。 八, 禁淡蓓。 批曰: "所陳諸條, 或有可採也。" 91 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-09-13 (17) [1884/09/13]. 至大明時, 太祖高皇帝又以農桑爲務, 天子親耕, 皇后親蠶, 敎天下民課歲種桑, 雖下隷, 皆着紋繡, 違者充軍。 211 times, he proposed implementing the five punishments (五刑 ohyŏng), which encompassed measures from light flogging to the death penalty, to ensure strict adherence to the prohibition.92 The prohibition of tobacco remained a complex issue throughout the Late Chosŏn period. Tobacco, introduced in the form of tobacco leaves from Japan in either the late 16th or early 17th century, rapidly gained popularity. According to Hendrick Hamel (1630-1692), a Dutch castaway who resided in Chosŏn from 1653 to 1666, the habit of smoking became so prevalent that even children as young as four or five years old partook in it. Initially regarded as a medicinal substance, tobacco’s perceived therapeutic benefits hindered government efforts to ban its consumption, despite the numerous problems it caused.93 However, the societal perception of tobacco in Chosŏn began to shift in the 17th century. The medicinal value once attributed to tobacco came into question, and it evolved into a widely preferred commodity among the populace. As a luxury item, tobacco also became a vehicle for bribery, prompting King Sukchong to implement strict regulations on its use. Furthermore, the cultivation of tobacco encroached upon rice farming, contradicting the Confucian principle of “farming is the foundation of the world” (農者天下之大本 nongja ch’ŏnha chi taebon).94 Compounding these issues, the smuggling of opium under the guise of tobacco raised alarm within the Chosŏn government. This concern was reflected in the Regulations of Trade (貿易規則 Muyŏk Kyuch’ik), the follow-up agreement to the Treaty of Kanghwa signed with Japan in 1876, where Article 10 stipulated a strict prohibition on the sale of opium cigarettes.95 In this context, Yi Ki-ŏn proposed what might appear to be a merciless approach to suppress tobacco cultivation. From today’s perspective, it seems absurd that individuals would risk their lives for the sake of smoking. However, considering the devastating opium crisis in Qing, where countless lives were destroyed by addiction, such an extreme measure becomes 92 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 19-09-13 (17) [1884/09/13]. 惟玆淡草, 斷當禁絶, 而禁斷之道, 亦爲不難, 下令之日, 已儲之草, 代以樵蘇, 自各道各邑, 嚴勅防曲, 閭里截勿耕種, 此草限三年不種, 則自然禁斷, 而如或違令者, 隨其輕重, 受贖充軍, 再三犯禁者, 施以五刑之律, 則必當禁絶, 而國之財貨, 此嬴饒矣。 93 Sin Kyŏng-mi 신경미, "Chosŏn hugi tambae e taehan insikbyŏnhwa wa kŭ yŏnghyang" 조선후기 담배에 대한 인식변화와 그 영향, Chiyŏk kwa yŏksa 지역과 역사 50, (2022): 274-279. 94 Ibid., 285-287. 95 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 13:34b [1876/07/06]. 貿易規則 【準據譯漢原本】 第十則, 嚴禁鴉片煙販賣。 212 more comprehensible. While no evidence has been found to suggest that the Chosŏn regime attempted to implement Yi Ki-ŏn’s recommendations, his appeal once again underscores the ruling class’s perception of military service as an effective punitive measure. Despite the Chosŏn government’s official policy to strengthen military preparedness, there was an underlying societal tendency to disregard military values. Now, I analyze actual cases where the Chosŏn government employed military exile as a disciplinary measure against officials or clerks who failed in their duties during the second phase of King Kojong’s direct rule. The first recorded instance of military exile during this period involved the punishment of officials and clerks responsible for managing the gates of the royal palace, following their failure to lock Kŏnch’un Gate (建春門 Kŏnch’unmun) of Kyŏngbok Palace on 10/2 of 1885. Specifically, Yi Ki-ju (李起周 n.d.), the Gatekeeper (守門將 Sumujang); Sin Paek (申柏 n.d.), the Gate Official (門考員外郞 Mungo wŏnoerang); and Pak Ho-sik (朴浩植 n.d.), the Keykeeper (司鑰 Sayak), were arrested and interrogated for their negligence. According to a report from the Ministry of Punishments, the three officials in charge failed to notice that the lock was completely broken, despite the key and lock being stored in the Royal Secretariat. In response, King Kojong ordered the dismissal and punishment of the three officials. To summarize the outcome, Yi Ki-ju, Sin Paek, and Pak Ho-sik were pardoned by the king immediately. However, it is notable that the Ministry of Punishments referenced Article 219: Locking Gates through Which Passing Is Prohibited (門禁鎖鑰 Menjin suoyao) of the Great Ming Code, which states, “If the imperial city gates should be locked, but someone mistakenly fails to lock the gate, the offenders will be punished by 100 strokes of beating with the heavy stick and sent into military exile to distant frontiers,” as the basis for punishing the three individuals.96 Initially, the ministry proposed that Pak Ho-sik be sent to Pakch’ŏn County in 96 The full sentence of Article 219, as referenced from the Great Ming Code (The Great Ming Code: Da Ming lü, trans. Jiang Yonglin (University of Washington Press, 2012), 126) is as follows: 1. In all cases where the city gates shall be closed but mistakenly, they are not locked, the offenders shall be punished by 80 strokes of beating with the heavy stick. If the gates are opened at nonprescribed times without authorization, the penalty shall be 100 strokes of beating with the heavy stick. For the gates of the capital city, in each case, the penalty shall be increased one degree. If, because of urgent government affairs, the gates are opened or closed at nonprescribed times, this prohibition shall not be applicable. 2. If the gates of the Imperial City should be closed but mistakenly are not locked, the offenders shall be punished by 100 strokes of beating with the heavy stick and sent into military exile to distant frontiers. If the gates are opened at nonprescribed times without authorization, the penalty shall be strangulation, but if they are opened or closed in accordance with imperial rescripts, there shall be no punishment. 213 P’yŏngan Province after receiving 100 strokes of beating, following the stipulation in the Great Ming Code.97 Although the Ming Dynasty had collapsed nearly two centuries earlier, the specter of Ming’s legal system was haunting Chosŏn’s politics. Despite having its own legal code, the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, Chosŏn’s policymakers still invoked the defunct Ming legal code, which had been replaced by Qing’s, though some clauses were retained. However, in terms of the application of Article 219 during King Kojong’s reign, only two cases are recorded in the Diary of the Royal Secretariat of Chosŏn, including the punishment of Yi Ki-ju, Sin Paek, and Pak Ho-sik.98 Then, despite recognizing the significance of palace security, why was the regime so fixated on gatekeeping to the extent that the Ministry of Punishments resorted to citing an article from the Great Ming Code, a provision rarely invoked during King Kojong’s reign? This action was likely driven by concerns not only over potential attacks from remnants of the pro-Japanese group but also from individuals influenced by Qing officials in Chosŏn, particularly Yuan Shikai, who had been involved in plans to depose the king. Specifically, in December 1885, George Clayton Foulk (1856-1893), the U.S. Naval Attaché and acting chargé d’affaires to Chosŏn, reported to the U.S. government that Chosŏn was precariously positioned between major powers. He urged the U.S. government to dispatch military instructors to Chosŏn without delay.99 Concurrently, rumors circulated that Kim Ok- 大明律直解 卷 13, 兵律, 宮衛, 第 219條, 門禁鎖鑰. 1.凡各處城門 應閉而誤不下鎖者 杖八十, 非時擅開閉者 杖一百, 京城門 各加一等 其有公務急速 非時開閉者, 不在此限。 2.若皇城門 應閉而誤不下鎖者 杖一百 發邊遠充軍, 非時擅開閉者 絞, 其有旨開閉者 勿論。 97 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 22-10-02 (14) [1885/10/02]. 又以刑曹言啓曰, 兵曹啓辭內, 謹依下敎, 建春門入直守門將李起周, 門考員外郞申柏及司鑰朴浩植等, 捉致嚴覈, 則所告內, 開金與鎖鑰, 在於承政院矣。 初不知鎖鑰之完破, 今當顯頉於摘奸, 致致[此].嚴覈之境, 萬萬惶悚, 無辭仰對云矣。 恭俟處分之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 不念禁門鎖鑰之重, 如是錯誤, 極爲駭然。 竝爲先汰去, 兵郞·守門將, 令該府拿問嚴勘, 司鑰, 令攸司重勘事, 命下矣。 謹按律文, 則大明律門禁鎖鑰條有曰, 皇城門應閉而誤不下鎖者, 杖一百, 發邊遠充軍。 罪人朴浩植, 依此律決杖一百後, 平安道博川郡定配所, 卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 特爲分揀放送。 98 On 7/7 of 1887, the troopers of the Left Battalion of the Capital Guards Command were penalized for breaking the lock. (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-07-07 (12) [1887/07/07].) 99 Chang Kyŏng-ho 장경호, "Kojong ŭi pan-Ch’ŏng insik kwa Chosŏn chujae Migugindŭl (1880-1894) – Syup’elt · Chosŏn chujae Miguk kongsagwanwŏn · Migugin komun’gwan ŭl chungsim ŭro-" 고종의 반청인식과 조선 주재 214 kyun would return to Chosŏn accompanied by Japanese military forces. In response to these rumors, Qing, the U.K., and the U.S. deployed gunboats to Chosŏn’s shores, though the rumors ultimately proved baseless.100 More seriously, Qing posed a significant threat, particularly through Yuan Shikai, whose actions deeply intimidated King Kojong. The Qing government, as part of its strategy to constrain King Kojong’s pursuit of independence policies, orchestrated the return of Taewŏn’gun, who had been abducted by Qing forces in 1882, to Chosŏn under Yuan Shikai’s escort. Furthermore, Yuan censured the contents of a secret letter reportedly sent by King Kojong to Karl Weber (1841-1910), the Russian minister to Chosŏn. Yuan Shikai alleged that the king had requested Russian protection for Chosŏn in the letter. While many scholars suspect the letter was forged, Yuan Shikai and the Qing government exploited the incident to consolidate their control over the Chosŏn court.101 As previously mentioned, Yuan Shikai devised a plan to depose King Kojong and install Taewŏn’gun’s favored grandson as his successor. In this context, one specific measure to enhance palace security likely included enforcing the strict securing of gates and punishing low-ranking officials who neglected their duties, such as failing to lock the palace gates. The table below summarizes these cases. Table 11: Details of Government Orders and Punishments Regarding Gate Management Date Details of the Punishment Reference 9/30 of 1885 The punishment of the Gatekeeper (守門將 Sumujang), Gate Official (門考員外郞 Mungo wŏnoerang), and Keykeeper (司鑰 Sayak) of Kŏnch’un Gate (建春門) for failing to lock the gate Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 22:53b 6/25 of 1887 The request from the Royal Secretariat to punish those responsible for failing to secure Hŭngin Gate (興仁門) Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 24:26b 8/13 of 1888 King Kojong’s decree to regulate access through the palace gates Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 25:36a 미국인들 (1880-1894) – 슈펠트 · 조선 주재 미국 공사관원 · 미국인 고문관을 중심으로 –, Kangwŏn sahak 강원사학, no. 26 (2014): 83. 100 Jerome Chʼen, "Chapter 2: Korea 1882-1895", in Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859-1916: Brutus Assumes the Purple, (Stanford University Press, 1961), 35. 101 Feng Hongzhi 馮鴻志, "13-yŏn’gan Chosŏn esŏŭi Wŏnsegae (袁世凱) sohaeng" 13년간 조선에서의 원세개 (袁世凱) 소행, in Han’guk sahak nonch’ong: Such’on Pak Yŏng-sŏk kyosu hwagap kinyŏm 한국사학논총: 수촌 박영석교수 화갑 기념, ed. Such’on Pak Yŏng-sŏk kyosu hwagap kinyŏm nonchong kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 수촌 박영석교수 화갑기념 논총간행위원회 편 (T’amgudang, 1992), 101. 215 Date Details of the Punishment Reference 4/22 of 1889 The punishment of the Royal Messenger (宣傳官 Sŏnjŏn’gwan) and the Gatekeeper for failing to manage the key of Kwanghwa Gate (光化門) and Sinmu Gate (神武門) Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 26:11a 2/24 of 1891 The punishment of high-level official (堂上官 tangsanggwan) and the Gatekeeper for failing to obstruct intruders Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 28:10b 2/12 of 1893 The royal directive to strictly secure palace gates Kojong sillok (高宗實錄), 30:8a The duties of gatekeepers, keykeepers, and other officials responsible for gate management during the Chosŏn period were meticulously outlined in the legal code of Chosŏn.102 Nevertheless, King Kojong undertook measures, as detailed in the table, to reinforce the relaxed system. Notably, gatekeepers bore a wide range of responsibilities: controlling access to palace and city gates, preventing disturbances near palace entrances, prohibiting unauthorized entry, and addressing issues like anonymous placards posted on palace walls, unapproved petitions, grievances, and unauthorized written appeals. These duties were pivotal to ensuring the protection of the royal family. Consequently, gatekeepers operated directly under the authority of the ruler and the Ministers of War.103 In this context, gatekeepers’ failure to fulfill their duties was met with stringent punishment. The State Tribunal submitted a request to King Kojong to impose military exile on Yi Ki-ju, the Gatekeeper, and Sin Paek, along with the revocation of Yi’s certificate of appointment. Additionally, the tribunal proposed allowing the payment of a commutation fee in lieu of 100 strokes of beating. While Pak Ho-sik was subjected to corporal punishment, Yi and Sin were exempted due to their higher status compared to Pak. However, as Pak Ho-sik received a special pardon from the king, both Yi Ki-ju and Sin Paek were also promptly released by King Kojong’s order. 104 102 Taejŏn t’ongpy’ŏn 大典通編, 兵典, 門開閉 [宮城門都城門]. 門開閉原宮城門, 初昏閉, 平明開, 都城門, 人定閉, 罷漏開。宮城門, 則注書與都摠府堂下官·司鑰開閉, 受納鑰匙於承旨。 都城門, 則護軍·五員開閉, 遞代時, 受納於本曹。 ○ 行在時, 則守門將守鑰匙待命。 及期啓達事至, 則護軍若五員從門隙而受, 急詣闕門啓。 103 Han Chŏng-su 한정수, "Yŏmal Sŏnch’o Kungwi (宮衛) insik kwa sumunjang chedo ŭi sŏngnip" 여말선초 궁위 (宮衛) 인식과 수문장 제도의 성립, Kunsa yŏn’gu 군사연구, no. 131 (2011): 75-76. 104 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 22-10-21 (36) [1885/10/21]. 216 Despite the cessation of military exile for the three individuals involved, this incident reveals several significant implications. First, military exile was indirectly employed by the king as a means to safeguard his authority, even though such actions potentially risked demoralizing Chosŏn’s soldiers amidst efforts to strengthen the military. Second, the regime justified the imposition of military exile by relying on the Ming legal system, emphasizing the Ming law code as the primary legal framework, with Chosŏn’s own laws serving only as a supplement. In the absence of a legal foundation for this severe penalty within Chosŏn’s own legal code, this reliance on an outdated law highlights the regime’s strained and unnatural resort to external legal precedents. Finally, consistent with other cases of military exile, military service remained undervalued, even as King Kojong endeavored to fortify the royal guard and central defense systems in response to Qing’s looming threat. Meanwhile, beyond concerns related to palace security, military exile was also employed as a tool for managing diplomatic affairs. The case of Kim Wan-su (金完洙 n.d.), the Third-Rank Special Army Officer of Pusan Prefecture, exemplifies this complexity. His punishment was intricately tied to Chosŏn’s relationship with Japan and involved prominent political figures, such as Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu (卞元圭 1837-n.d.) and Kim Yun-sik. On 5/28 of 1887, King Kojong, in a fit of anger, ordered military exile for Kim Wan-su. This punishment stemmed from Kim’s misuse of the Chosŏn Diplomatic Office’s (外署 Oesŏ) contract document to secure a loan from a Japanese individual, which he failed to repay even after more than a year, prompting repeated demands for repayment. The king commanded that Kim’s name be removed from the official roster (仕籍 sajŏk) and that he be exiled to a remote and inhospitable island for the remainder of his life. However, the fallout did not stop with Kim Wan-su. A curveball was thrown at the officials of the Diplomatic Office as well. Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu, the Vice Minister (協辦 Hyŏpp’an) of the office, was banished to a harsh region for colluding with Kim. Even Kim Yun-sik, the President (督辦 Tokp’an) of the Diplomatic Office, found 義禁府啓目粘連, 建春門守門將李起周, 兵曹員外郞申栢等, 矣本府議啓內, 禁門鎖鑰, 何等重大, 而不能審愼, 以致錯誤, 法律莫嚴, 當勘焉逭? 竝只以此照律, 罪各杖一百收贖, 告身盡行追奪, 發邊遠充軍, 竝只私罪。 啓, 不無斟量者存, 竝特爲分揀放送。 217 himself unexpectedly banished to Chŏlla Province for the careless act of affixing his official seal to the private loan agreement.105 In Korean historiography, Kim Wan-su’s case has garnered significant attention from political and diplomatic perspectives, particularly due to its connection to Kim Yun-sik’s eight-year banishment, which ultimately concluded with his reinstatement during the Kabo Reform. As a prominent figure within the pro-Chinese group, Kim Yun-sik collaborated closely with Yuan Shikai and emerged as a key opponent of King Kojong’s independence policy. Notably, prior to his banishment in April 1886, Kim Yun-sik’s political stance led to his impeachment on charges related to his actions during the Coup d’État of 1884. Specifically, amid the political turmoil, Pak Wŏn-yang (朴元陽 1804-1884), the father of Pak Yŏng-hyo who was one of the coup’s leaders, succumbed to starvation and the cold. In an act of compassion, Kim Yun-sik buried Pak’s body. While this action stemmed from empathy, King Kojong exploited the incident to remove Kim Yun-sik from the court. However, Kim was reinstated three months later under pressure from Yuan Shikai on the Chosŏn government.106 Nonetheless, King Kojong did not abandon this effort. In this context, the king utilized Kim Wan-su’s case to rid the central government of Kim Yun-sik and his ally, Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu, as part of a broader strategy to counter Chinese influence in Chosŏn.107 However, little attention has been given to the fact that the military exile imposed on Kim Wan-su also served as a tool for resolving diplomatic issues with Japan. To delve deeper into the case, Kim Wan-su had been appointed as the Special Military Officer of Pusan on 10/7 of 1886.108 In this capacity, he was responsible for surveillance in the 105 Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok 備邊司謄錄 (Records of the Border Defense Council) 268 [1887/05/29]. 傳曰: "釜山前僉使金完洙, 圖出外署約定之書, 貸用日本人之錢貨, 逾年不報, 至於屢煩督徵之境云。 雖曰法禁蕩然, 寧有如許世變乎? 言念國綱, 不覺寒心。 似此悖亂之類, 不可置諸朝列, 永刊仕籍。 令秋曹捉囚, 所負錢項, 不日督捧, 以淸、日人之債。 後嚴刑二次, 遠惡島限己身充軍, 勿揀赦典。 協辦通商事務卞元圭, 名在朝籍, 罔念守分, 自請符同, 參證挾雜之事, 恣行不法、無憚之習。 苟究弊源, 實由於此, 痛惋之極, 寧欲無言。 施以遠惡地定配。 且以督辦通商事務金允植言之, 其在職任之重, 尤當審愼於各國交際。 而私債文字, 遽自蓋印成約, 致有此末由之閙端, 見笑他邦、貽辱朝廷。 揆以事體, 極爲駭然。 施以湖沿定配之典。" 106 Ku Sŏn-hŭi 구선희, "Kapsin Chŏngbyŏn chikhu pan-Ch’ŏng chŏngch’aek kwa Ch’ŏng ŭi Wŏn Segae p’agyŏn" 갑신정변 직후 반청정책과 청의 원세개 파견, Sahak yŏn’gu 사학연구, no. 51 (1996): 61-63. 107 For details, refer to Pak Ŭn-suk 박은숙, "Kim Yun-sik kwa Wŏn Se-gae, Yi Hong-jang, Chu Pok ŭi kyoryu (1881-1887)" 김윤식과 원세개 · 이홍장 · 주복의 교류(1881-1887), Han’guksa hakpo 한국사학보, no. 61 (2015): 540-545, and Chang Yŏng-suk 장영숙, "Ch’in Ch’ŏng esŏ Ch’in Il ro, sise e choŭnghan Kim Yun-sik" 친청에서 친일로, 시세에 조응한 김윤식, Han’guksa hakpo 한국사학보, no. 86 (2022): 251-257. 108 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 23-10-07 (36) [1886/10/07]. 金完洙爲釜山僉使, 尹斗植爲神光僉使, 韓仲涉爲全羅左水虞候, 尹泰逸爲全羅右水虞候, 金溎炫爲花島別將. 218 vicinity of the shore of Pusan, which included monitoring foreign vessels navigating around the Korean Strait and rescuing stranded people at sea.109 Kim remained in this position until he was selected as the Third-Rank Horseman General (騎士將 Kisajang) of the Special Battalion in the Capital Guards Command in intercalary April, 1887.110 During his 7-month tenure as the Special Military Officer, he took loans from two Japanese merchants: Yamashiro Kenzō (山城建造 n.d.) and Sasaki Kumakichi (佐々木熊吉 n.d.). To be specific, on 11/2 of 1886, Sugimura Fukashi (杉村濬 1848-1906), the Japanese Provisional Charge D’affaires to Chosŏn (臨時代理公使), sent a diplomatic correspondence to Kim Yun-sik, who was serving as President of the Diplomatic Office, regarding the loan contract between Kim Wan-su and Yamashiro Kenzō. In his communication, Sugimura requested the official seal from the office to verify the terms of the contract. According to the correspondence, Kim Wan-su and Yamashiro Kenzō had agreed to exchange 15,000 nyang in Korean currency for 5,000 Japanese yen, which was intended to cover military supplies for the Special Battalion of the Capital Guards Command in October 1886.111 Additionally, Kim Wan-su borrowed 1,500 nyang from Sasaki Kumakichi to defray public expenses, such as provisions for the garrison soldiers.112 In fact, Kim Wan-su did not misappropriate the money for personal gain. In certain respects, he secured the loan to support the welfare of the troops under his command, effectively acting on behalf of the government. This incident underscores the Chosŏn government’s failure 109 For instance, on 5/12 of 1887, Kim Wan-su reported that the military forces near Pusan gathered stranded individuals and their cargo, placing them on a single vessel for transfer to the relevant office. T’ongjeyŏng kyerok 統制營啓錄 [1887/05/12]. 追于到付五月初一日酉時成帖 釜山僉使金完洙馳報內 領護將多大浦二戰船將及終站差員 栗浦權管等馳報內 漂人卜物幷載船一隻 與玉浦譯學 達夜領曳 本鎭二戰船將眼同 當日巳時 領付館所是如爲宁旀。 110 Ch’in’gun pyŏlyŏng tŭngnok 親軍別營謄錄 6, 45b, [1887/潤 04/09]. Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-3385) 啓曰, 本營 騎士將金完洙 前任 釜山僉使, 李鐸應 前任 平安兵虞候, 韓咸浩 前任 黃海中軍, 俱在任 所矣 領兵之職久曠可悶竝改差何如。 111 Koryŏ taehakkyo Aseamunje yŏn’guso 고려대학교 아세아문제 연구소, Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ 1 – Il an 1 구한국외교문서 1 - 일안 1, (Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1965), 367-368. 112 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, Saryo Kojong sidaesa 14 史料 高宗時代史 14, (Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2018) Diplomatic Correspondence from Kondō Masuki (近藤真鋤) to Yi Chung-ch’il (李重七) [1884/08/24]. 逕啓者. 案准在釜山我領事[室田義文]. 凾稱, 昨年陽曆六月, 我國商民佐佐木熊吉, 將錢一千五百兩借與釜山僉使金完洙, 以充釜山守兵食糧等公項費用, 而領有盖用僉使官印證票, 緣其年八月該僉使晋京, 故索討該錢, 而不見償還。 219 to establish a stable financial foundation for military operations, likely resulting from an insufficient economic surplus to support the government’s efforts to upgrade its military. For some reason, Kim Wan-su failed to repay the loan from Yamashiro Kenzō by the agreed deadline and was even unable to pay the accrued interest. Consequently, on 5/16 of 1887, Takahira Kogorō (高平小五郎 1854-1926), the then Japanese Provisional Charge D’affaires to Chosŏn, acting on behalf of Yamashiro, sent a diplomatic correspondence to Kim Yun-sik, demanding the immediate full payment of the outstanding interest.113 From this point forward, the issue of the loan contract between the two individuals escalated into a significant diplomatic matter between Chosŏn and Japan. As previously mentioned, King Kojong issued a decree mandating punishment for all individuals involved in the loan incident. In accordance with this order, the Ministry of Punishments escorted Kim Wan-su from Pusan to Seoul for interrogation. During this process, the government pressed Kim to promptly repay the debt.114 Due to the government’s insistence, the interest on the loan was fully repaid by some point in August.115 While the exact means by which Kim repaid the debt remain unclear due to a lack of records, it seems unjust, considering that he had used the loan to support his military unit rather than for personal gain. Following this development, the Ministry of Punishments decided on 8/26 of 1887 to exile Kim Wan-su to Kŭmgap Island in Chindo County.116 Kŭmgap Island was a commonly used location for military 113 Koryŏ taehakkyo Aseamunje yŏn’guso 고려대학교 아세아문제 연구소, Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ 1 – Il an 1 구한국외교문서 1 - 일안 1, (Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1965), 431. 與東萊府簽使金完洙立約 而該簽使違約 不行交付代錢等情 據此 合依前例 移案貴館等因 據此 査此事係山城健造照與簽使金完洙氏所定約條明文 向貴衙門 索討本利浮費合計一文錢八萬六千六百十兩者 而旣於貴衙門 擔當該約條之責盖印 則一經山城健三[造誤]. 稱以背約 求其償完 是在貴政府速應其請 爲當然焉。 114 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-07-03 (10) [1887/07/03]. 刑曹啓曰, 釜山前僉使金完洙, 自本道, 發關捉上, 待押來擧行之意, 已有所草記蒙允, 而罪人金完洙, 今纔押來, 故爲先嚴囚, 日人債錢不日督捧之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 115 Koryŏ taehakkyo Aseamunje yŏn’guso 고려대학교 아세아문제 연구소, Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ 1 – Il an 1 구한국외교문서 1 - 일안 1, (Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1965), 456. 大日本代理公使近藤 爲照覆事 接准貴曆丁亥八月二十一日照會內稱云云等因 准此閱悉 當將此事 詢問在京城我領事官 [橋口直右衛門]. 據覆報稱 該案業經彼此私和了事等因 據此 相應照覆。請煩貴督辦査照可也 須至照覆者。 116 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-08-26 (09) [1887/08/26]. 刑曹啓曰, 釜山前僉使金完洙處, 日人債錢, 今已準數督捧矣。 謹依傳敎, 罪人金完洙, 嚴刑二次, 全羅道珍島府金甲島遠惡島, 限己身充軍, 勿揀赦典, 定配所, 而待拷限準二次後, 卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 220 exile, as seen in the case of Kim Sŏng-un, who was exiled there in 1864 for misappropriating tribute rice (see Chapter 1). Map 17 indicates that the topography of this island provided conditions suitable for a naval base. It is highly plausible that Kim Wan-su was dispatched to the navy for his military exile, despite the absence of direct records regarding the specific location of his exile. Map 17: The Map of Kŭmgap Garrison in 1872 Source: The Map of Kŭmgap Garrison (金甲鎭地圖 Kŭmgapchin chido), (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10688) At the same time, Kim Yun-sik was banished to Myŏnch’ŏn County in Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, while Pyŏn Wŏn-gyu was banished to Sunch’ŏn County in Chŏlla Province. In his diary, Kim Yun-sik lamented the unfairness of his punishment, arguing that affixing the official seal was an unavoidable duty as the President of the Foreign Office.117 On 5/29 of 1887, Kim 117 Kim Yun-sik 金允植, Sok ŭmch’ŏngsa 續陰晴史, (T’amgudang, 1971), 1. 丁亥五月二十九日雨 有湖沿定配之命 去年十月濟州人金完洙 借日商之款 由外衙門盖印于合同 余時帶督辦 實主盖印之事 盖出于不得已也。 221 Yun-sik departed Seoul for his place of banishment. As he prepared for his journey to Myŏnch’ŏn County, he exchanged farewell letters with Yuan Shikai, who responded by gifting him silver coins and medicines.118 This gesture reflects the deep and close relationship between the two, which may have unsettled King Kojong and influenced his decision to leverage the loan incident to remove Kim Yun-sik from the political scene. When it comes to the application of the legal term, the military exile of Kim Wan-su lacks a clear legal basis. In fact, there were no provisions in Chosŏn’s legal codes that specifically addressed the military exile of individuals who either failed to repay debts or caused diplomatic conflicts with foreign nations. While one might attempt to cite the provision in the Comprehensive National Code regarding the punishment for the lack of inventory in warehouses, this provision is far-fetched and largely unfit for Kim Wan-su’s case.119 Unlike the military exile cases of Yi Ki-ju, Sin Paek, and Pak Ho-sik, where the Great Ming Code was referenced to justify the punishment, the Chosŏn government did not cite the Chinese legal code in Kim Wan-su’s case. These discrepancies suggest that the Chosŏn government imposed an unusually harsh punitive measure, likely to appease the resentment and remonstrations of Japanese diplomats. However, Chosŏn’s diplomatic efforts to placate Japan’s remonstrations appear to have been unsuccessful. The Japanese legation in Chosŏn persistently sent diplomatic letters condemning the failure to repay the debt. This time, the loan borrowed from the Japanese merchant Sasaki Kumakichi became a focal point of diplomatic contention between Chosŏn and Japan. On 8/27 of 1887, Kondō Masuki (近藤真鋤 1840-1892), the Japanese legation official, requested Yi Chung-ch’il (李重七 n.d.), the Acting President of the Foreign Office of Chosŏn, to facilitate the repayment of the loan taken by Kim Wan-su.120 Later, on 10/19 of 1888, Kondō 118 Ibid., 2. 初六月一日晴 配所草記以沔川啓下 距京三百里 往復禁府都事 約以明早發行 今日人客之擾如昨日 書別元慰廷 [世凱]. 慰廷送銀子 藥物以贐之。 119 Taejŏn t’ongpy’ŏn 大典通編, 戶典, 倉庫 [軍資監米麵出納]. 凡稅穀入倉後, 遺在將盡新捧未到前, 發遣本曹郞官, 擲奸反庫, 而若有欠縮, 則當該倉官, 沿邊充軍, 下吏, 沿海邑限己身水軍充定。 120 Koryŏ taehakkyo Aseamunje yŏn’guso 고려대학교 아세아문제 연구소, Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ 1 – Il an 1 구한국외교문서 1 - 일안 1, (Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1965), 584. 當時經將案由使武田 [邦太郞]. 書記生備告貴前任督辦 [趙秉式], 而荏苒至今, 仍未濟事, 該商借款旣係充用公費, 則理當由該官籌資墊償以圖速結, 似屬公允. 爲此凾請, 貴署督辦査照轉諭該僉使, 妥速處之爲幸。 222 again sent a diplomatic correspondence to Cho Pyŏng-jik (趙秉稷 1833-1901), the Acting President of the Foreign Office, pressing for the prompt repayment of the entire loan.121 Despite these repeated requests, the Chosŏn government failed to complete the repayment. On 12/16 of 1888, the Japanese legation sent another diplomatic letter to the Chosŏn government, listing eight pressing diplomatic issues. Among them was the unresolved loan owed by Kim Wan-su, along with Kim Ok-kyun’s mistreatment of Japanese nationals during his asylum in Japan.122 The following year, Kondō Masuki sent a final request for the Chosŏn government to conduct a thorough investigation into the matter and to repay the outstanding debt in full.123 The situation resembled a “hot potato” game, with both Kim Wan-su and the Chosŏn government seemingly passing responsibility. It remains unclear whether either party fully repaid the loan from Sasaki Kumakichi, as there are no records to confirm this. Clearly, the Chosŏn government’s response to this issue was lackluster, displaying little urgency or willingness to resolve the diplomatic matter. Eventually, Kim Wan-su was released from military exile on 1/5 of 1892.124 Compared to other military exile cases, his approximately four-year sentence was unusually long, especially considering the relative severity of his offense. This harsh punishment may have been influenced by Japan’s persistent efforts to resolve the debt issue. However, his record of military exile did 121 Ibid., 600. 122 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, Saryo Kojong sidaesa 14 史料 高宗時代史 14, (Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2018) Diplomatic Correspondence from Kondō Masuki (近藤真鋤) to Cho Pyŏng-jik (趙秉稷) [1888/12/16]. 以書翰致啓上候. 陳者, 我民甲斐軍治, 內田德次郞, 田中喜左衞門ヨリ貴國舊開拓使[金玉均].ニ依ル夫役, 駐在, 支辦諸費請求事件, 本國難民高尾子之吉漂流經費事件, 元山手越卜税廢撤事件, 蔚陵島長[徐敬秀].我漁民ノ捕獲ニ係ル飽魚ヲ沒收セシ事件, 釜山命使[金完洙].ノ我民佐佐木熊吉ノ錢文ヲ借用セシ事件, 佛國公使館付貴國兵丁, 我民宮田平山ヲ毆傷セシ事件等, 屢本使ヨリ貴署督辦ニ對シ至急御處分有之度旨及御照會置候處, 今日ニ至ル迄數十日ノ久キヲ經テ, 尙未タ何等ノ御回答モ無之束テ懸案トセラレ候ハ, 恐クハ友國辦公ノ道ニアラス, 實ニ 本使解セサル所ロ有之候. 因テ玆ニ御照催ニ及候間, 貴署督辦ニ於テ速ニ以上各案ヲ御處分相成候樣致希望候。 123 Koryŏ taehakkyo Aseamunje yŏn’guso 고려대학교 아세아문제 연구소, Ku Han’guk oegyo munsŏ 1 – Il an 1 구한국외교문서 1 - 일안 1, (Koryŏ taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1965), 622. 准此 査該簽使旣負債於我商 則嚴行査覈 令其追辦債欠者 時屬貴政府當務之職責 條規第九款盛意 固不外于此 而今貴署督辦之言如此 實本使之所不解也。 124 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-01-05 (16) [1892/01/05]. 223 not appear to hinder his future career, as he later served as the magistrate of Anak County around 1900.125 Military exile cases related to fraud in the government service examinations During King Kojong’s second phase of direct rule, military exile functioned not only as a punitive measure to discipline officials and clerks for failures in state and foreign affairs but also as a tool to address corruption in the government service examination system, as it had during the first decade of his direct rule. Maladministration and corruption in the examination were among the most pressing societal issues, prompting the king to issue annual decrees aimed at strictly punishing perpetrators and rectifying the system’s shortcomings. Maintaining the fairness of the examination, a vital mechanism for selecting talented officials, was regarded as a core state policy. Despite its limitations and growing inefficiencies, the government service examination system remained the most reliable institution for identifying potential bureaucrats and curbing the hereditary succession of the aristocracy.126 King Kojong’s strong determination to uphold the integrity of the state service examination was evident in his response to Kim Pyŏng-yun’s memorial on 3/3 of 1886, which addressed the preferential treatment granted to literati from Cheju Island. As previously noted, the regime provided incentives to examination candidates from Cheju due to the island’s considerable distance from Seoul. Kim, a classics degree-holder from Cheju, petitioned that the Ministry of Rites produce a seal inscribed with “Cheju” and affix it to the first page of examination answer sheets to prevent exploitation of this privilege by individuals falsely claiming Cheju origin. King Kojong’s response was notably decisive. He unequivocally declared that individuals found to have abused this preferential policy would be punished with military exile.127 This firm stance underscores the king’s commitment to addressing corruption within the 125 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 37-08-24 (12) [1900/08/24]. 靈巖郡守沈相瑚, 順天郡守李載現, 潭陽郡守金德洙, 尙州郡守李漢膺, 安東郡守李命宰, 善山郡守黃演秀, 安岳郡守金完秀, 固城郡守曺有承, 免本官。 126 Yi Nam-hŭi 이남희, "Kwagŏ chedo, kŭ pit kwa kŭnŭl" 과거제도, 그 빛과 그늘, Onŭl ŭi Tongyang sasang 오늘의 동양사상, no. 18 (2008): 121. 127 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 23:11b [1886/03/03]. 初三日。 濟州進士金炳胤等疏略: "科試時命書道號, 則又有特書濟州之令者, 蓋欲使遐遠之地, 均被寵拔之盛意。 而他道奸僞輩, 冒書濟州, 幸竊大科及初試, 不翅爲數十名。 由是原居人, 每每漏榜, 窮鄕齎鬱, 遠莫上達224 examination system. Despite his efforts, however, such issues persisted throughout his reign, ultimately remaining unresolved until the abolition of the government service examination in 1894. The first recorded case involving military exile was the corruption scandal of Song Chu-hyŏn (宋胄顯 1862-n.d.), a student scholar from Kwangju County. On 3/22 of 1888, during a special examination (應製 ŭngje) for student scholars held at King Kojong’s behest, Song audaciously altered the seal (祕封 pibong) of his answer sheet (試券 sigwŏn). In response, the king ordered Song to be handed over to the Ministry of Punishments for a thorough investigation.128 Candidates for the civil service examinations were required to include detailed personal information on the seal, such as their name, birthdate, residence, family clan (鄕貫 hyanggwan), and ancestors spanning four generations. It was not uncommon for offenders to tamper with the seal, altering their personal information to secure an unjust examination pass.129 However, Song’s case was, in some respects, a matter of misfortune. Given the enormous number of answer sheets submitted during the examination,130 it is likely that similar instances of corruption occurred but went undetected. Song’s incident may have been one among many in a broader pattern of malpractice. Notably, the Chosŏn government partially reformed its education system by introducing Western-style educational institutions, culminating in the establishment of the Royal English Academy (育英公院 Yugyŏng Kongwŏn) in 1886. Students at this academy received instruction in Western subjects, including English, geography, mathematics, sciences, international law, and 矣。 特自禮曹, 刻爲‘濟州’二字圖書, 下給濟州儒生, 踏於券首, 則其於墨書, 僞冒自現矣。 特令稟處, 著爲恒式焉。" 批曰: "士習誠極痛駭。 日後如有冒稱, 卽令嚴刑, 押送本牧, 限己身充軍。" 128 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 25:17a [1888/03/23]. 都承旨金聲根曰: "昨日庭試入格儒生宋冑顯, 換粘祕封, 肆然呈券。 揆以士習, 萬萬無嚴。 坼封時未及照察, 臣不勝惶悚。 而原榜目中, 爲先拔去, 出付秋曹, 依律嚴勘何如?" 敎曰: "爲先移送秋曹, 嚴覈可也。" 129 Yi Kyu-p’il 이규필, "18-9 segi kwagŏje mullan kwa pujŏng haengwi - ‘Mumyŏngjajip’ ŭi sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro-" 18-9세기 과거제 문란과 부정 행위 -‘무명자집’의 사례를 중심으로-, Hanmun kojŏn yŏn’gu 한문고전연구 27, no. 1 (2013): 183-184. 130 For example, 38,614 answer sheets were collected on 3/21 of 1799, followed by 32,884 answer sheets from civil examination candidates and 35,891 from military examination candidates collected during the examination on the following day. (ibid., 175.) 225 more.131 Although these subjects were traditionally areas of specialization for chungin (low-ranking clerks), the students in the academy were the sons of Chosŏn’s aristocrats, in accordance with King Kojong’s stringent order.132 This directive illustrates the king’s steadfast determination to indoctrinate new knowledge into the noble class. However, the traditional education system and the civil service examination remained the dominant method for recruiting government officials. Despite these reforms, corruption within the examination system persisted and proved difficult to eliminate. Song Chu-hyŏn was interrogated by the Ministry of Punishments, where he claimed that the alteration of the seal was not intentional. According to his testimony, he could afford to buy only one sheet of paper for the answer sheet due to his poverty. After making a mistake, he borrowed a replacement sheet from his cousin. Upon removing the original seal, the paper became thinned, prompting him to cut away the damaged portion and attach a stub of paper to the torn area. Despite these extenuating circumstances, the Ministry of Punishments dismissed his explanation and recommended strict punishment.133 Finally, on 4/21 of 1888, Song Chu-hyŏn was sent to Yŏnghŭng County in Hamgyŏng Province for military exile.134 His punishment was based on a provision in the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, which prescribed penalties for fraudulent actions committed at examination sites. However, strictly speaking, the application of military exile in Song’s case did not fully align with the national code, as the relevant provision applied specifically to military examination cases.135 Given Song Chu-hyŏn’s status as a civil examination candidate, this minor 131 Leighanne Yuh, "Late Nineteenth-Century Modern Education in Korea: The State, Ideology, and Moral Education", in Education, Language and the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Korea, 1875-1945, ed. Andrew Hall and Leighanne Yuh (Brill, 2022), 87. 132 Yi Kwang-rin 이광린, "Yugyŏng Kongwŏn ŭi sŏlch’i wa kŭ pyŏnch’ŏn e taehayŏ" 육영공원의 설치와 그 변천에 대하여, Tongbang hakchi 동방학지 6, (1963): 106. 133 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 25-03-25 (21) [1888/03/25]. 隨衆赴擧, 家貧所致, 僅備一張試紙而入場矣, 不幸誤書, 竟至落望。 從弟大顯, 在傍咄歎, 給渠已書封內之副件試紙一張, 使之改書封內而呈券云, 故坼糊見之, 則此亦已誤書, 割去更書者也。 又爲割改, 紙薄透瘡, 故不得已截去原紙, 付黏他紙, 改書封呈於最晚。 134 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 25-04-21 (15) [1888/04/21]. 又以刑曹言啓曰, 換粘祕封罪人宋冑顯嚴覈草記, 傳曰, 知道。 依律勘處事, 批下矣。 謹按律文, 則大典會通諸科條有曰, 科場用奸者邊遠充軍。 罪人宋冑顯, 咸鏡道永興府邊遠充軍, 定配所, 卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 135 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 兵典, 武科 [科場用奸]. 科場用奸者, 從輕重論罪濫入者, 水軍充定, 保擧主, 以科場用情律論。 226 deviation from the legal code was likely intentional, serving as a demonstration of the government’s commitment to enforcing state policies with rigor. Yŏnghŭng County, known as Kumya County since 1977, holds historical significance as the hometown of King T’aejo (太祖 1335-1408)’s maternal grandfather.136 It also housed the old residence of King T’aejo’s father and Chunwŏn Palace (濬源殿 Chunwŏnjŏn), the birthplace of the king.137 Located along the eastern shore of Chosŏn, the county was further distinguished by Sŏngnyŏk Mountain Fortress (聖曆山城 Sŏngnyŏk Sansŏng), which served as its main garrison (主鎭 chujin).138 Militarily, Yŏnghŭng County was substantial, with a total of 5,051 soldiers, including cavalry, infantry, and support taxpayers, recorded in 1872, This represented a notably large force compared to other counties.139 This underscores the county’s importance both historically and militarily. Given this context, it is plausible that Song Chu-hyŏn was sent to serve at the army base in the county, which would have further diverged from the provisions outlined in the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. However, this interpretation warrants caution due to the absence of concrete records confirming such details. 136 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Pukhan p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 북한편, (Jinhan M&B, 2011), 1371. 137 Mun Sang-myŏng 문상명, "1872-yŏn chibangjido e nat’ananŭn Chosŏn hugi chiyŏk sahoe ŭi t’ŭksusŏng – Hamgyŏngdo rŭl chungsim ŭro" 1872 년 지방지도에 나타나는 조선 후기 지역 사회의 특수성 - 함경도를 중심으로, Yŏlsang kojŏn yŏn’gu 열상고전연구 50, (2016):186-187. 138 Yŏnghŭngbu ŭpchi 永興府邑誌 (The Yŏnghŭng Prefecture Gazetteer), p. 9 (奎 17528). 139 Yŏnghŭngbu ŭpchi 永興府邑誌 (The Yŏnghŭng Prefecture Gazetteer), p.43-44 (奎 17528). 都合五千五十一銘內 官騎兵七十三名 馬兵九百七十九名 步兵一千七百四十名 保人二千二百五十九名。 227 Map 18: The Map of Yŏnghŭng County in 1872 Source: The Map of Yŏnghŭng Prefecture (永興府地圖 Yŏnghŭngbu chido) (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10688) However, like other military exile cases, Song Chu-hyŏn’s punishment was relatively short-lived. The Chosŏn court ordered his release from military exile and reinstated his status as an examination passer on 12/11 of 1889. Additionally, his name was added to the roster of successful candidates.140 Contrary to the initial stringent penalty imposed on Song, the government ultimately absolved him of the serious offense. This action served as a symbolic gesture, indicating that the enforcement of military exile on current or potential civil officials was not taken with much seriousness. Song Chu-hyŏn’s career in the government after his release was remarkably successful. On 12/22 of 1889, he was immediately appointed as the Sixth-Rank Temporary Recorder of the Royal Secretariat.141 The following year, he was promoted to Recorder (注書 Chusŏ) of the same 140 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 26:48a [1889/12/11]. 十一日。 命削科人宋冑顯, 特爲復科, 付之今番謁聖榜末。 141 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 26-12-22 (15) [1889/12/22]. 金應權改差, 代以宋胄顯爲假注書。 228 office, thanks to the office’s recommendation.142 In 1891, he was appointed as the Fourth-Rank Censor at the Office of Censor-General.143 By May 1892, he had risen to the position of the Third Minister of the Ministry of War (兵曹參議 Pyŏngjo ch’amŭi).144 Although Song was impeached by the Supreme Council due to his involvement in the corruption case of Yi Pyŏng-ŭng (李秉膺 n.d.), the former Investigator (監察 Kamch’al) at the Office of the Inspector-General who was accused of extorting money from the populace using the office’s slaves,145 Song was reinstated to his post as the Third Minister in the Ministry of War.146 Indeed, his criminal record of military exile did not significantly hinder his career, as evidenced by the positions he continued to hold. In the following year, on 5/2 of 1889, another case of military exile occurred, involving the two student scholars Sim T’ak (沈倬 1825-n.d.) and Sim Ik-pong (沈翼鳳 n.d.). Prior to this, on 4/30, a special civil service examination was held in front of Kŏnch’ŏng Palace (乾淸宮 Kŏnch’ŏnggung), an auxiliary palace located within Kyŏngbok Palace, the primary royal residence. During this examination, Sim T’ak attained the lowest rank (草三下 ch’osamha) among the successful candidates and was thereby granted eligibility to proceed to the second-stage examination (直赴會試 chikpu hoesi).147 Given that Sim T’ak was 64 years old when he passed the examination, this achievement suggests the fulfillment of a long-cherished ambition. 142 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 27:63b [1890/10/10]. 注薦: 閔泳瓚、申養均、李範仁、宋冑顯、宋鍾億。 143 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 28-01-29 (71) [1891/01/29]. 144 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-05-02 (53) [1892/05/02]. 145 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 30:2b [1893/01/21]. 議政府啓: "前監察李秉膺私送府隷, 推捉外邑之民, 勒奪非理之財事, 啓稟請勘矣。 卽見其供辭, 則節節粧撰, 有若毫無干涉者然。 當初邑民之奔訴, 追後秋曹之行査, 已不啻的確, 則擅送府隷, 捉來杖囚者誰也? 勒奪標紙, 止竟還納者誰也? 如是而焉敢開啄發明乎? 究厥情狀, 去益無嚴, 依律勘處, 斷不可已。 副護軍宋冑顯, 身在朝籍, 締結悖類, 指目有歸, 至登供招, 貽羞極矣。 施以刊削之典何如?" 允之。 146 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 31-05-14 (16) [1894/05/14]. 吏曹口傳政事, 以徐丙鼎爲兵曹參判, 宋胄顯爲兵曹參知, 尹昌燮·尹櫶·李根秀爲同春秋, 李承九爲左通禮, 金禹用爲右通禮。 147 Sŭngjŏngwŏn chobo 承政院朝報 1, no. 76936, 1889. 己丑四月三十日 傳曰, 館學儒生應製, 賦居首三下一, 幼學鄭濟鎬, 三下二, 幼學閔廣植, 竝直赴殿試, 之次草三下幼學沈倬·朴根英·金相德, 竝付之進士榜末, 之次草三下幼學成在三等十人, 竝直赴會試, 之次次上幼學姜文欽等十七人, 竝給二分, 之次次上幼學羅經成等十八人, 竝給一分, 之次次上幼學金秉一等二十五人, 竝付之監試初試榜末, 之次次上幼學韓用承等二十五人, 各奎章全韻一件賜給。 傳曰, 入格儒生, 明日待令。 229 However, Sim T’ak’s brief moment of glory was abruptly curtailed. Three days later, the Ministry of Punishments uncovered that Sim T’ak and Sim Ik-pong were father and son, a relationship that contravened Chosŏn’s legal code, which prohibited a father and son from participating in the civil service examination simultaneously. Consequently, the ministry petitioned to have Sim T’ak’s name removed from the roster of successful candidates and requested the transfer of both individuals to the Ministry of Punishments for disciplinary action. In response, King Kojong approved the ministry’s request.148 Indeed, the Comprehensive National Code contained the regulation cited by the Ministry of Punishments. The following provision is directly relevant to the case of Sim T’ak and Sim Ik-pong.149 Among those who passed the initial stage (初試 ch’osi) of the higher (大科 taekwa) or lower examinations (小科 sokwa), individuals in one-year mourning attire (朞年服 kinyŏnbok) who have not yet completed the funeral rites, as well as fathers and sons participating in the examination together, are all permitted to take the make-up examination (陳試 chinsi). However, those who falsely claim to be in mourning attire (服制 pokche) and improperly submit official documents are barred from taking the civil service examinations for ten years. Officials who prepare such fraudulent documents will be dismissed from their positions. According to the provision, when a father and son were required to take the examination simultaneously, they could report their situation to the Ministry of Rites and obtain a certificate granting permission to proceed to the next round of second-stage examination. In Late Chosŏn, instances of civil examination candidates abusing this system increased, particularly as many 148 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 26-05-02 (04) [1889/05/02]. 又啓曰, 凡於科試, 父子之無得同赴, 法典所載, 而今番館學儒生應製時, 沈倬·沈翼鳳之冒赴參榜者, 揆以士習, 極爲無嚴。 原榜目中, 竝拔去, 移送秋曹, 照律勘處, 何如? 傳曰, 允。 149 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 禮典, 諸科 [大小科初試者]. 大·小科初試者, 在喪人·朞服未葬人·父子俱參人, 竝許陳試。詐稱服制冒出公文者, 限十年停擧, 公文成給官員, 罷職。 230 attempted to retake the second-stage examination after failing the first attempt. However, the deterrent measures for offenders did not function as intended.150 Despite the inherent limitations of the system, an alternative existed for Sim T’ak and Sim Ik-pong to avoid any conflict of interest. Nonetheless, they failed to comply with the regulations. Finally, on 5/9 of 1889, the Ministry of Punishments recommended that the two Sims be subjected to military exile in accordance with a provision from the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, which stipulated that “those who obstruct or unlawfully enter the higher and lower examination sites are to be assigned to the navy for life.” King Kojong, in turn, agreed with this recommendation.151 However, the actual provision in the national code was slightly different from the version cited by the ministry. The provision read as follows:152 Those who have someone else write their answers or write on their behalf at any examination site in Seoul or the provinces, those who bring attendants into the examination, those who fail to write their names (錄名 nongmyŏng) and entered the examination site, those who conspired to commit fraud during the transcription of the original answers (易書 yŏksŏ), and those who caused such disorder that the examination had to be halted, will be punished according to the law. Government officials, as well as individuals holding literary or classics degrees, will be exiled to remote border areas for military service. This punishment will be enforced even if a pardon is granted. Those with the status of a student scholar will be exiled to the navy for life. 150 Yi Kyu-p’il 이규필, "18-9 segi kwagŏje mullan kwa pujŏng haengwi - ‘Mumyŏngjajip’ ŭi sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro-" 18-9세기 과거제 문란과 부정 행위 -‘무명자집’의 사례를 중심으로-, Hanmun kojŏn yŏn’gu 한문고전연구 27, no. 1 (2013): 169-170. 151 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok 秋曹決獄錄 39, 9a (奎 15148). 謹按律文, 則大典會通諸科條, 有曰大小科場攔入者, 限己身降定水軍。 罪人沈倬·沈翼鳳, 依此律, 令兵曹擧行之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 152 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 禮典, 諸科 [借述代述者]. 中外大·小科場, 借述·代述者, 帶率隨從者, 不錄名闌入者, 符同易書者, 首倡作亂罷場者, 朝官·生·進, 則邊遠充軍, 勿揀赦前, 幼學以下, 則限己身降定水軍。 231 According to the provision in the national code, candidates were to be punished if they failed to register their names upon entering the examination site. However, there are no records indicating that Sim T’ak and Sim Ik-pong failed to write their names, although it is highly plausible that they did not disclose their familial relationship. The imposition of military exile on them appears somewhat tenuous, as their case did not directly violate the specific provisions cited above. In particular, the first provision does not include specific penalties regarding violations related to fathers and sons participating in the examination together. Therefore, the enforcement of military exile in this case does not fully align with the national code. On 5/26 of 1889, King Kojong ordered the release of Sim T’ak and Sim Ik-pong, and Sim T’ak’s name was reinstated on the roster of successful candidates.153 Following the king’s directive, the Ministry of Punishments released the two Sims two days later.154 While the precise reason for the king’s swift decision remains unclear, King Kojong might have been reluctant to incarcerate both the father and son simultaneously, considering the strong Confucian values that permeated Chosŏn society. As a man of iron will, Sim T’ak proudly marked his advanced age by passing the augmented second-stage examination in May 1891 at the age of 67.155 Although this did not qualify him for public office, his determination to continue pursuing the examination was unwavering. Given that the average life expectancy for a man in the 1890s was around 60, according to one study, Sim T’ak’s achievement is particularly remarkable.156 However, there is no record indicating that his son succeeded in passing the examination. Meanwhile, the military exile case of Hyŏn Yong-wŏn (玄龍源 n.d.), a student scholar, highlights a significant loophole in the enforcement process of military exile. Specifically, this penalty, intended to punish serious offenders, proved ineffective when perpetrators succeeded in passing the government service examination during military exile. This systemic flaw not only 153 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 26-05-26 (11) [1889/05/26]. 向日充軍之沈倬·沈翼鳳, 竝卽放送, 依原榜目施行事分付。 154 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 26-05-28 (09) [1889/05/28]. 155 Sangji chŭkcho 29-yŏn sinmyonyŏn kyŏnggwa chŭnggwangsi samabangmok, 上之卽祚二十九年辛卯慶科增廣 司馬榜目 (The List of Successful Candidates in the Augmented Civil Service Examination of the Twenty Ninth Year of Sinmyo after the King’s Enthronement), Jangseogak (藏書閣) (K2-3546). 156 Yi Ki-sun 이기순, "Chosŏn hugi sajok ŭi ch’ulsaeng kwa samang" 조선후기 사족의 출생과 사망, Sach’ong 사총 60, (2005): 141. 232 undermined the punitive intent of military exile but also reflected the diminished recognition of military value in Chosŏn society. In the following section, I will examine Hyŏn Yong-wŏn’s case in detail. After passing the first-stage civil service examination alongside eight other student scholars on 9/14 of 1887, Hyŏn Yong-wŏn was granted admission to the National Confucian Academy (成均館 Sŏnggyun’gwan).157 Three years later, on intercalary 2/1 of 1890, a spring attendance examination (春到記 ch’undogi), a special test administered during the Chosŏn Dynasty for students at the National Confucian Academy or private academies (私學 sahak) upon completing their attendance requirements, was held. For reasons unknown, Hyŏn Yong-wŏn became dissatisfied after comparing his answer sheet with those of others and caused an affray at the examination site. As a result, King Kojong decreed that Hyŏn be sent to the Ministry of Punishments, while the invigilators were also subjected to disciplinary measures.158 Following the king’s strict order, the Ministry of Punishments apprehended the quick-tempered Hyŏn Yong-wŏn and petitioned the king to impose military exile upon him, in accordance with the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code. According to the Ministry, two legal provisions could be applied to his case: first, Hyŏn was liable to 100 strokes of heavy flogging under the Great Ming Code; second, he could be punished by military exile as stipulated in the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, which prescribed life-long exile to the navy for individuals with a status lower than a student scholar who caused disturbances at the examination site.159 157 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 24-09-14 (26) [1887/09/14]. 幼學玄龍源·崔雲鍾·鄭聖軫·玄龍純·宋鎭協·金仁順·金東薰·金永泰·李弘善, 以上給一分事, 命下矣。 158 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 27:63b [1890/潤 02/01]. 承政院啓: "今日春到記講比較時, 以士習之駭悖, 至有諸試官陳疏撤講之境, 事未前有, 萬萬未安。 臣等之不能檢束, 不勝惶恐。 而作鬧之講生玄龍源, 移送秋曹, 照法嚴繩。 雖以諸試官言之, 無難撤講, 事涉徑庭, 不可無警, 竝從重推考何如?" 敎曰: "當有處分, 而卿等亦爲推考。" 仍敎曰: "殿講法意, 何等嚴重, 而悖儒乖擧, 胡至此極? 試體壞損, 寧欲無言, 該儒生爲先停擧, 令秋曹照律嚴處, 比較更爲考講。" 159 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 27-潤 02-05 (35) [1890/潤 02/05]. 又以刑曹言啓曰, 傳曰, 殿講法意, 何等嚴重, 而悖儒乖〈擧〉, 胡至此極? 試體壞損, 寧欲無言。 該儒生爲先停擧, 令秋曹照律嚴處事, 命下矣。 罪人玄龍源, 爲先捉囚, 謹按律文, 則大明律宮內忿爭條, 有曰凡於宮內忿爭, 聲撤御在所及相毆者, 杖一百, 大典會通諸科條, 有曰中外大小科場, 首倡作亂者, 幼學以下, 則限己身降定水軍, 大明律名例, 有曰二罪俱發, 以重者論, 罪人玄龍源, 依大典會通限己身降定水軍之文, 依例令兵曹擧行之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 233 Specifically, the provision from the Great Ming Code referenced by the Ministry of Punishments was Article 327, which addresses quarreling within the palace (宮內忿爭 Gongnei fenzheng). According to Article 327, any instance of quarreling within the palace is punishable by 50 strokes with a light stick. If the noise reaches the emperor or if mutual blows are exchanged, the penalty increases to 100 strokes with a heavy stick. In cases where the conflict results in bone fractures or more severe injuries, the penalty is elevated by two degrees from that for simple assault. Additionally, if the altercation occurs within the palace halls, the punishment is progressively increased by one degree.160 The ministry ultimately decided to impose military exile in accordance with the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, citing another article from the Great Ming Code. Article 25, which deals with the punishment for multiple offenses discovered simultaneously (二罪俱發以重論 Erzui jufa yi zhong lun), stipulates that when multiple crimes are uncovered together, the punishment will be based on the most severe crime. If the offenses are of equal severity, the punishment will be determined according to one of the crimes.161 Clearly, military exile was a much more severe penalty than heavy flogging, and the ministry referenced this provision from the Chinese legal code to justify their decision. In the end, Hyŏn Yong-wŏn was exiled to a naval base in Samch’ŏk Large Prefecture (都護府 Tohobu) in Kangwŏn Province on intercalary 2/8 of 1890.162 Samch’ŏk County had been elevated to the status of a prefecture shortly after the establishment of the Chosŏn Dynasty, as Yi An-sa (李安社 1200?-1274), the great-great-grandfather of King T’aejo, had been born in this county. In 1413, the name of Samch’ŏk Prefecture was changed to Samch’ŏk Large Prefecture.163 This administrative region functioned as the central hub for military commands in 160 The Great Ming Code: Da Ming lü, trans. Jiang Yonglin (University of Washington Press, 2012), 180. 第 327條 宮內忿爭 凡於宮內忿爭者 笞五十 聲徹御在所及相毆者 杖一百 折傷以上加凡毆傷二等 殿內又遞加一等。 161 Ibid., 36. 第 25條 二罪俱發以重論 凡二罪以上俱發 以重者論, 罪各等者 從一科斷. 若一罪先發 已經論決 餘罪後發, 其輕若等勿論, 重者更論之 通計前罪 以充後數。 162 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 27:11a [1890/潤 02/08]. 初八日。 命儒生玄龍源, 三陟府水軍充定。 以講比較時作鬧也。 163 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Chungbu p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 중부편, (Jinhan M&B, 2015), 553. 234 the eastern part of the Chosŏn Dynasty. As the map below illustrates, Samch’ŏk was located on the shore of the East Sea and surrounded by mountains, which contributed to enhancing the region’s defensive capabilities. Map 19: The Map of Samch’ŏk in 1872 Source: The Map of Samch’ŏk Prefecture (三陟府地圖 Samch’ŏkbu chido), (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10648) According to the Samch’ŏk County Gazetteer (三陟郡邑誌 Samch’ŏkkun ŭpchi), compiled in the 19th century, the Prefectural-Level Naval Garrison (水軍僉節制使鎭 Sugun ch’ŏmjŏlchesajin) was established at Samch’ŏk Port in 1397, with a stone fortress constructed in 1520. The garrison commander of Samch’ŏk concurrently held the position of magistrate of the county.164 In terms of military forces, the port had four warships and a contingent of 245 soldiers King T’aejong (太宗) elevated counties with more than 1,000 households to the status of large prefectures. (Han’gun minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture).) 164 Samch’ŏkkun ŭpchi 三陟郡邑誌 (The Samch’ŏk County Gazetteer), p. 19 (奎 10955). 235 in the early 15th century.165 By the late 19th century, the garrison had grown to approximately 950 personnel, including non-combatants.166 While there may be some inaccuracies in the data, it can be reasonably inferred that Samch’ŏk played a significant military role in the region. Furthermore, Samch’ŏk served as the center for the state policy of emptying islands (空島政策 Kongdo chŏngch’aek) in the East Sea, which aimed to relocate the inhabitants of island regions to the inland areas. This policy sought to prevent the residents from becoming vulnerable to pirate attacks and to safeguard them from Japanese raiders.167 However, as pirate invasions from Japan diminished after the 15th century, the government reduced the size of the garrison. Specifically, the number of myriarchs under the Samch’ŏk garrison commander was decreased from six to one in Kangwŏn Province.168 Despite this reduction, Samch’ŏk continued to play a central role in the defense system of Kangwŏn Province. The garrison commanders of the region were also dispatched to Ullŭng Island in the East Sea to search for and suppress (搜討 sut’o) illegal residents on the island.169 The duration of Hyŏn Yong-wŏn’s military exile was brief, as in other cases. However, it was not the Chosŏn government that determined his release. Surprisingly, Hyŏn himself secured his release by passing the first-stage military service examination on 4/1 of 1891. The Ministry of Punishments reported that, in accordance with the legal code, they would exempt Hyŏn from 三陟浦: 在府東八里 初爲水軍簽節制使鎭 正德庚辰築石城 周九百尺高八尺 康熙壬子兼營將 城中有制勝樓鎭東樓 登樓觀日月出。 165 Kim Ho-dong 김호동, "Wŏlsongp’ojin ŭi yŏksa" 월송포진(越松浦鎭)의 역사, Sahak yŏn’gu 사학연구, no. 115 (2014): 308. 166 Samch’ŏkkun ŭpchi 三陟郡邑誌 (The Samch’ŏk County Gazetteer), p.32-33 (奎 10955). 三陟鎭屬: 討捕軍官 三十人, 軍器監官及都訓導保 幷 八人, 吹軍牢 二十八名, 砲手矢人搗砧軍點火軍匠人 幷 四十二名, 束伍千摠 一, 把摠 一, 哨官 四, 旗鼓 一, 旗牌官 三, 敎鍊官 二, 武學 二十名, 束伍軍隨率 幷 四百八十名, 鎭騎兵 三百三十名。 167 Chang Chŏng-su 장정수, "Chosŏn sidae Ullŭngdo kwalli chŏngch’aek ŭi pyŏnhwa – sut’oje sihaeng ŭl chungsim ŭro" 조선시대 울릉도 관리정책의 변화 - 수토(搜討)제의 시행을 중심으로, Yŏngt’o haeyang yŏn’gu 영토해양연구 26, (2023): 8. 168 Sin T’ae-hun 신태훈, "Chosŏn hugi Wŏlsong manho wa Ullŭngdo sut’oje" 조선후기 월송만호와 울릉도 수토제, Han·Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 한일관계사연구 72, (2021): 51. 169 Chang Chŏng-su 장정수, "Chosŏn sidae Ullŭngdo kwalli chŏngch’aek ŭi pyŏnhwa – sut’oje sihaeng ŭl chungsim ŭro" 조선시대 울릉도 관리정책의 변화 - 수토(搜討)제의 시행을 중심으로, Yŏngt’o haeyang yŏn’gu 영토해양연구 26, (2023): 25-28. 236 military service and remove his name from the roster of exiles.170 Which legal provision was the ministry referring to? According to the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, individuals with a status lower than student scholars, who were subjected to military exile, would be exempted from their duties upon passing the first-stage civil and military service examination.171 Given that Hyŏn Yong-wŏn was a candidate for the civil service examination, his transformation is particularly noteworthy. While the processes for both civil and military examinations were similar,172 the subjects tested differed significantly. For instance, the military examination assessed candidates in a total of eleven martial disciplines, which required rigorous practice, although these disciplines varied depending on the stage of each military service examination.173 It is notable that the same subjects were tested during King Chŏngjo’s era in the late 18th century.174 Even after nearly a century, the basic structure of the military examination remained unchanged. Although the number of successful candidates in the military examination vastly outnumbered those in the civil examination,175 and the former was considered easier than the 170 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 28-04-01 (26) [1891/04/01]. 又以刑曹言啓曰, 卽接兵曹文移, 則江原監司移文內, 三陟府水軍定配罪人玄龍源, 今番慶科庭試武科初試入格云。 (…) 依法典, 免役徒流案頉下事, 分付各該道帥臣之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 171 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 禮典, 諸科 [借述代述者]. 幼學以下水軍充定者, 初試入格, 則免役。武科同。 172 Regarding the process of civil and military examinations, the competition was organized into three stages: the first stage was the local preliminary examination (初試 ch’osi), held nationwide with regional quotas; the second stage was the metropolitan examination (會試, 覆試 hoesi, poksi), conducted in Seoul; and the final stage was the palace examination (殿試 chŏnsi), during which the successful candidates from the metropolitan examination were ranked in the presence of the king. (Eugene Y. Park, Between Dreams and Reality: The Military Examination in Late Chosŏn Korea, 1600-1894, (The Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2007), 26.) 173 Among the main subjects of the military service examination were wooden arrow archery (木箭 mokchŏn), iron arrow archery (鐵箭 ch’ŏlchŏn), light arrow archery (片箭 p’yŏnjŏn), horseback archery (騎射 kisa), arrow shooting (貫革 kwanhyŏk), horseback lance-wielding (騎槍 kich’ang), polo (擊毬 kyŏkku), willow leaf-shaped arrow shooting (柳葉箭 yuyŏpchŏn), musketry (鳥銃 choch’ong), iron flail (鞭芻 p’yŏnch’u), and book discussion (講書 kangsŏ). (Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通 兵典, 試取, [科目].) 174 Yun Tae-jung 윤대중, "Chosŏn hugi Chŏngjodae mukwa e kwanhan yŏn’gu" 조선후기 정조대 무과(武科)에 관한 연구, Tongyang kojŏn yŏnʼgu 동양고전연구, no. 65 (2016): 231-232. 175 According to Chŏng Hae-ŭn’s estimate, the number of military exam passers between King Kwanghae and King Kojong was 138,800, while the number of civil exam passers was only 14,684. (Chŏng Hae-ŭn 정해은, "Mubo rŭl t’onghaesŏ pon 19-segi mugwa kŭpcheja ŭi kwanjik chinch’ul yangsang" 무보를 통해서 본 19세기 무과 급제자의 관직 진출 양상, in Chosŏn sidae ŭi sahoe wa sasang 조선시대의 사회와 사상, ed. Chosŏn sahoe yŏn’guhoe 조선사회연구회 (Chosŏn sahoe yŏn’guhoe, 1998), 185.) 237 latter, passing the military examination still required extensive preparation. In particular, it was challenging for commoners to own a horse, making it nearly impossible for them to practice horseback riding, which was essential for the examination. Even Admiral Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣 1545-1598), who achieved a decisive victory over the Japanese naval forces during the Imjin War, failed his first military examination because he fell from his horse and had to wait four years before passing the next one.176 In this context, Hyŏn Yong-wŏn’s success in passing the military examination is indeed puzzling. Before his military exile, he had been pursuing the civil service examination. Moreover, he was in the midst of military exile, performing menial tasks at the naval command headquarters, when he passed the military service examination. Had he truly fulfilled the military service requirements outlined in the legal code, it seems unlikely he would have passed the examination, especially considering the improbable scenario that he was exceptionally skilled in martial disciplines. With caution, it can be inferred that Hyŏn’s life during his military exile was not severely restricted, suggesting that the enforcement of military exile may not have been as stringent as it appears. After his release from military exile, Hyŏn Yong-wŏn once again sat for the civil service examination, rather than its military counterpart, in August 1891.177 While the lack of records leaves it unclear whether he passed, this action suggests his intention to have leveraged the military examination during his exile as a means to end his military exile. Hyŏn’s case exemplifies several characteristics of military exile. According to the law, military exile could be pardoned if the individual passed the government service examination, even though the legal provision stipulated that those subjected to military exile were to serve in the navy for life. Another key aspect of his case is that, just as the application of the law was lenient, the actual enforcement of military exile by local authorities was not strict. This highlights the lack of seriousness with which military service was regarded. 176 Kim Il-hwan 김일환, "Yi Sun-sin ŭi Asan nakhyang kwa mugwa suryŏn kwajŏng" 이순신의 아산 (牙山) 낙향과 무과 수련과정, Yi Sun-sin yŏn’gu nonch’ong 이순신연구논총, no. 30 (2018): 29-30. 177 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 28-08-16 (12) [1891/08/16]. 又以禮曹言啓曰, (…) 己丑三月春到記殿講, 入格幼學金學奎·鄭忠彬·玄龍源 (…) 以上給一分事, 命下 (…) 給一分幼學李㝡承等三十二人, 依例許赴於文科初試, 較藝等第之意, 分付, 何如? 傳曰, 允。 238 Meanwhile, the case of Hong Chŏng-hui (洪正憙 n.d.), a student scholar subjected to military exile, offers a compelling illustration of Chosŏn’s traditional legal system and the distinctive features of military exile. As with other instances of military exile, the enforcement of this punitive measure was lax, and its impact on the career of the offender was minimal. Furthermore, shifts in Chosŏn’s political and administrative structures significantly influenced the implementation and operation of military exile. On 3/11 of 1892, Hong Chŏng-hŭi participated in a special civil service examination held for students from the National Confucian Academy and private academies at the Kyŏngmu Office (景武臺 Kyŏngmudae) in Kyŏngbok Palace, with King Kojong and the crown prince in attendance. Along with other 100 successful candidates, Hong was granted the privilege to proceed directly to the final-stage palace examination.178 In accordance with the king’s command, the Ministry of Rites issued a formal report on 3/14 of 1892, permitting Hong Chŏng-hŭi and the other candidates to take the forthcoming palace examination.179 The seemingly smooth process encountered an obstacle when the Supreme Council revealed that Hong Chŏng-hŭi was the maternal grandson of Kwŏn Ŭng-gi (權應夔 1815-n.d.), a criminal implicated in a conspiracy case. The council argued that, as Hong had taken a government service examination despite his status as a descendant of a traitor, his name should be removed from the list of successful candidates and that the Ministry of Punishments (秋曹 Ch’ujo) should investigate the matter and punish him accordingly. King Kojong promptly approved the request.180 Considering that the special civil service examination was held as a preferential measure for students in higher education institutions, the king’s outrage at such a fraudulent act was understandable. To understand the incident involving Hong Chŏng-hŭi in depth, it is necessary to examine its background. By birth, Hong Chŏng-hŭi hailed from a prominent and privileged family. His 178 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-03-11 (27) [1892/03/11]. 179 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-03-14 (23) [1892/03/14]. 又以禮曹言啓曰, (…) 同年三月, 館學儒生應製入格, 幼學梁在八·洪正憙·劉中植, 以上直赴殿試。 180 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 29:12b [1892/04/09]. 議政府啓: "向日應製, 直赴殿試人洪正憙, 聞是根腳罪人權應夔外孫。 而肆然冒赴, 萬萬駭惋。 爲先技去榜目, 令秋曹照律勘處何如?" 允之。 239 father, Hong Wŏn-sik (洪遠植 1848-n.d.), passed the civil service examination in 1864.181 In 1871, he was appointed as the Third-Rank Vice Academic Counsellor (副提學 Pujehak) of the Office of Special Counsellors (弘文館 Hongmun’gwan).182 That same year, Hong Wŏn-sik was selected as the Deputy Envoy (副使 Pusa) of the Winter Solstice Emissary (冬至使 Tongjisa) to Qing.183 Likewise, Hong’s maternal grandfather, Kwŏn Ŭng-gi (權應夔 1815-n.d.), had a successful governmental career, particularly during King Ch’ŏlchong’s reign. He passed the civil service examination in 1843184 and was appointed as the Sixth-Rank Counsellor (修撰 Such’an) of the Office of Special Counsellors in 1852.185 Around 1861, he served as the Special Magistrate (府尹 Puyun) of Ŭiju Prefecture.186 The following year, he became the Third-Rank Rector (大司成 Taesasŏng) of the National Confucian Academy.187 Despite Kwŏn Ŭng-gi’s clean slate as a successful civil official, what led to his involvement in a conspiracy? The situation is somewhat complicated, as Kwŏn Ŭng-gi did not directly participate in the plot. Instead, it was his son, Kwŏn Chŏng-ho (權鼎鎬 1836-1881), who, along with his collaborators, planned to depose King Kojong in 1881, an event known as the Yi Chae-sŏn Incident (李載先事件 Yi Chae-sŏn Sakŏn) in Korean historiography. This treasonous plot was closely linked to the political circumstances of the time, particularly King Kojong’s kingship and his discord with his father, Taewŏn’gun. During Taewŏn’gun’s regency, he strategically cultivated support among marginalized aristocratic groups, including the Southerners (南人 Namin) and Northerners (北人 Pugin), who had historically faced discrimination in Chosŏn society, as a means to counter the long- 181 Kukcho pangmok 國朝榜目 12, 122, (奎貴 11655). 182 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 9:20b [1872/05/28]. 以洪遠植爲弘文館副提學、金炳奎爲司憲府大司憲、尹致聖爲司諫院大司諫。 183 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 10:24a [1873/10/24]. 二十四日。 召見冬至三使臣。 【正使鄭健朝、副使洪遠植、書狀官李鎬翼】 辭陛也。 184 Kukcho pangmok 國朝榜目 10, 33, (奎貴 11655) 185 Ch’ŏlchong sillok 哲宗實錄, 4:3b [1852/03/13]. 行都堂錄, 李敬溥、金重夏、權應夔、李鍾淳、趙憲燮、金炳溎、鄭獻敎、南鍾順、任應準、金永秀、洪祐吉、林謇洙、姜鍊、李啓善、李鍾愚、洪鍾序、曺錫元、崔遇亨、成載球、金鎭衡、尹秉鼎、尹正求。 186 Ch’ŏlchong sillok 哲宗實錄, 13:7b [1861/08/19]. 義州府尹權應夔, 以七月十七日皇帝崩逝, 馳啓。 187 Ch’ŏlchong sillok 哲宗實錄, 14:3b [1862/04/01]. 以金炳德爲司憲府大司憲, 朴臣圭爲司諫院大司諫, 權應夔爲成均館大司成。 240 established dominance of the Patriarch’s group (老論 Noron).188 As a member of the Southerners, Kwŏn Chŏng-ho vocally criticized King Kojong’s key policies following the commencement of his direct rule. In response to the king’s enlightenment policies, a coalition of disgruntled Confucian scholars initiated movements under the doctrine of “defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy” (衛正斥邪 wijŏng ch’ŏksa). Leading figures, such as An Ki-yŏng (安驥泳 1819-1881), Ch’ae Tong-sul (蔡東述 1841-1881), Kwŏn Chŏng-ho, and others primarily from the Southerner group, conspired to depose King Kojong and replace him with his older half-brother, Yi Chae-sŏn (李載先 n.d.-1881).189 Whether Taewŏn’gun directly participated in this plot remains a subject of debate,190 but this incident posed a significant threat to the kingship. The foiled plan was uncovered due to a tip-off from an insider, and the punishment for the conspirators was ruthless. Most of those involved were executed by quartering (陵遲處斬 nŭngjich’ŏch’am), with Yi Chae-sŏn being put to death by poison (賜死 sasa) due to his royal status. Despite this, Taewŏn’gun, widely believed to be the mastermind behind the plot, remained unscathed, as he was the father of the king.191 As with other cases of treason, the punishment extended beyond those directly involved in the plot, affecting their family members as well, in accordance with the principle of guilt by association (緣坐制 yŏnjwaje). Specifically, in addition to the death penalty or enslavement of surviving family members, descendants of criminals were barred from applying for government service examinations unless granted a special permit by the king. According to Chin Sang-wŏn’s 188 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, (Harvard University Press, 1997), 51. 189 Cho Sŏng-yun 조성윤, "Hanmal sahoe pyŏndong kwa Yi Chae-sŏn sakŏn – Taewŏn’gunp’a k’ut’et’a inyŏm kwa chojik" 한말 사회 변동과 이재선 사건-대원군파 쿠테타 이념과 조직, Hyŏnsang kwa insik 현상과 인식 8, no. 1 (1984): 101. 190 For example, Cho Sŏng-yun argues that Taewŏn’gun doubted the dethronement plan and that Yi Chae-sŏn instead led the incident. (ibid., 107-108.) On the other hand, Sheila Miyoshi Jager asserts that both Taewŏn’gun and Yi Chae-sŏn secretly conspired with Confucian scholars to depose his son. (Sheila Miyoshi Jager, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2023), 67.) Meanwhile, some scholars, such as Kim Sŏng-hye and Martina Deuchler, present more reserved perspectives. Specifically, Kim contends that Taewŏn’gun was likely the behind-the-scenes power, despite the lack of concrete evidence (Kim Sŏng-hye 김성혜, "Kojong sidae kunjukwŏn wihyŏp sakŏn e taehan ilgoch’al" 고종시대 군주권 위협 사건에 대한 일고찰, Han’guk munhwa yŏn’gu 한국문화연구 18, (2010): 18.), while Deuchler claims that the plotters were inspired and possibly controlled by Taewŏn’gun (Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885, (University of Washington Press, 1977), 106.) 191 Kim Sŏng-hye 김성혜, "Kojong sidae kunjukwŏn wihyŏp sakŏn e taehan ilgoch’al" 고종시대 군주권 위협 사건에 대한 일고찰, Han’guk munhwa yŏn’gu 한국문화연구 18, (2010): 18. 241 study, this practice contrasted with the Ming legal system, where the Ming court punished the sons and grandsons of political offenders but did not impose any restrictions on their right to take government service examinations or advance to public office.192 Indeed, this stringent policy in treason cases was a distinctive feature of Chosŏn’s legal system. Regarding the regulations on the government service examination, Chosŏn’s legal code specified that individuals above the status of a commoner were eligible to take the civil service examination. However, even among the aristocracy, there were specific disqualifications. For example, descendants of criminals, individuals permanently barred from holding office due to their crimes, children of remarried women or women who had committed misconduct, and descendants of concubines (庶孼 sŏŏl) were excluded from eligibility.193 Although this regulation was relaxed over time, the prohibition on government service examinations for the descendants of traitors largely remained intact. To return to Hong Chŏng-hŭi’s incident, on 4/11 of 1892, the Ministry of Punishments proposed that Hong be exiled to the navy for life, in accordance with the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, which stipulated that those who entered the examination site without authorization would be sent to the navy until death.194 King Kojong concurred with this request. The following day, the Ministry of War declared that Hong Chŏng-hŭi would be transferred to Paech’ŏn County (白川郡) in Hwanghae Province.195 Paech’ŏn County, home to Pyŏngnando (碧瀾渡) Port during the Koryŏ period, served as a key hub for the dynasty’s foreign trade. The county’s strategic location, adjacent to major cities such as Kaesŏng and Kanghwa Island,196 highlights its military importance. Just as Kanghwa 192 Chin Sang-wŏn 진상원, "Chosŏn wangjo ŭi yŏnjwaje – chŏngch’ibŏm huson ŭi kwagŏ ŭngsi munje rŭl chungsim ŭro" 조선왕조의 연좌제 - 정치범 후손의 과거응시 문제를 중심으로, Yŏksa wa kyŏnggye 역사와 경계 113, (2019): 42. 193 Yi Nam-hŭi 이남희, "Kwagŏ chedo, kŭ pit kwa kŭnŭl" 과거제도, 그 빛과 그늘, Onŭl ŭi Tongyang sasang 오늘의 동양사상, no. 18 (2008): 127. 194 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 29-04-11 (15) [1892/04/11]. 謹按律文, 則大典會通諸科條有曰, 科場冒赴者, 限己身降定水軍, 依此律罪人洪正熹, 依例令兵曹擧行之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 195 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 29:13a [1892/04/14]. 命洪正憙 白川郡水軍充定。 因兵曹啓也。 196 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Pukhan p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 북한편, (Jinhan M&B, 2011), 819-820. 242 Island was central to the Chosŏn government’s maritime defense, Paech’ŏn County functioned as a critical rear base, as suggested by Map 20 below. Additionally, a significant military presence is recorded in the local gazetteer of Paech’ŏn. In 1899, the population of Paech’ŏn County was approximately 11,755, according to the gazetteer,197 with around 4,900 military personnel, both combat and non-combat units, stationed in the area by the late 19th century.198 It could be said that Paech’ŏn County was a military city. Map 20: The Map of Paech’ŏn County in 1872 Source: The Map of Paech’ŏn County (白川郡地圖 Paech’ŏn’gun chido), (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 奎 10553) 197 Specifically, 6,379 men and 5,376 women resided in this county. (Paech’ŏn’gun ŭpchi 白川郡邑誌 (The Paech’ŏn’gun County Gazetteer), 22, 1899 (奎 10893).) 境內十六坊戶口三千九十九戶 人口男六千三百七十九口 女五千三百七十六口。 198 Paech’ŏn’gun ŭpchi 白川郡邑誌 (The Paech’ŏn’gun County Gazetteer), 24-25 (奎 17474). 兵曹屬 忠翊衛 四十九人 騎兵 三百三十一名 上番軍七名 步兵一百三十九名 別騎兵二十名, 各色保一百十三名 有廳軍三十名 補充隊餘丁五名, 訓鍊都監屬 砲保四百五十三名 軍餉保六名, 御營廳屬 上番軍十二名 保三百二十八名 減番軍五名 除番軍五名, 禁衛營屬 保一百九十九名 別破陣八名 工曹屬 匠保一百三十六名, 尙衣院屬 諸員保九十五名, 掌樂院屬 樂生資保十四名 元戶工一名 享直定一名, 守禦廳屬 義僧一名, 監營屬 別武士六人 騎士十二人 別武軍官二十四人, 鎭軍七十六名 各色匠保三十八名 羅卒保二十名, 兵營屬 鎭軍四十六名 作隊把摠一人 哨官六人 旗牌官六人 都訓導一人 敎師十二人 書記七人, 軍兵七百三十八名, 水營屬 防船代將一人 執事一人 旗牌官一人 軍器監官一人 捕盜官一人, 水軍一百三十三名 能櫓軍八十九名 兩烽臺監官六人 監考十二人 伍丈十二名 軍一百名, 鎭撫營屬 把摠一人 哨官四人 旗鼓官二人 旗牌官十六人 都訓導二人 敎師十人 武學一百二十四名 束伍四百九十四名, 書記馬丁隨率等軍七十名 選武官五十七人, 統禦營屬 水軍二百四十名 保一百二十名。 243 The exact timing of Hong Chŏng-hŭi’s release from military exile remains uncertain, but he was likely freed before or around the time of the Kabo Reforms in 1894. Amid the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion, the Chosŏn government introduced reform policies that addressed the demands of Tonghak followers while simultaneously reflecting Japan’s influence.199 Among the 190 articles of the reform plan, the fifth article called for the abolition of the guilt by association system.200 This measure was part of broader efforts to eliminate traditional discriminatory practices, including the abolition of the slave system, the prohibition of slave trade, and the emancipation of marginalized social groups such as leather workers, post-station laborers, and entertainers.201 After his release, Hong Chŏng-hŭi held various posts in the central government. For instance, in 1895, he was appointed as the sixth-rank official in the newly established Royal Secretariat (秘書院 Pisŏwŏn).202 Additionally, in 1899, he served as the Reader in Attendance (侍讀 Sidok) in the Office of Special Counsellors.203 In other words, Hong’s criminal record and experience of military exile did not seem to negatively affect his ability to secure government positions, similar to other cases. The final case of military exile in Chosŏn history occurred on 5/8 of 1894, just prior to the Kabo Reform. The regular triennial examination (式年試 singnyŏnsi) had been held on 2/22 of that year, during which O Sun-sŏn (吳醇善 1874-n.d.), a student-scholar from Yong’in County in Kyŏnggi Province, successfully passed the second-stage civil service examination and attained 199 In terms of the Kabo Reform, refer to Lew Young Ick, "The Kabo Reform Movement: Korean and Japanese Reform Efforts in Korea, 1894" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972); Lew Young Ick (Yu Yŏng-ik) 유영익, Kabo Kyŏngjang yŏn’gu 갑오경장연구, (Ilchogak, 1990); Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, Han’guksa 40: Ch’ŏng·Il chŏnjaeng kwa Kabo Kaehyŏk 한국사 40: 청일전쟁과 갑오개혁, (T’amgudang, 2000); and Wang Hyŏn-jong 왕현종, Han’guk kŭndae kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa Kabo Kaehyŏk 한국 근대국가의 형성과 갑오개혁, (Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2005). 200 Lew Young Ick (Yu Yŏng-ik) 유영익, Kabo Kyŏngjang yŏn’gu 갑오경장연구, (Ilchogak, 1990), 229. 罪人自己外 緣坐之律 一切勿施事。 201 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, Han’guksa 40: Ch’ŏng·Il chŏnjaeng kwa Kabo Kaehyŏk 한국사 40: 청일전쟁과 갑오개혁, (T’amgudang, 2000), 202. 202 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 32-11-17 (15) [1895/11/17]. 秘書院郞申弼熙·洪正憙。 203 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 36-05-14 (09) [1899/05/14]. 任弘文館侍讀金瑢鍊·洪正憙。 244 the status of classics degree-holder.204 However, the issue arose when another candidate with the exact same name, O Sun-sŏn from Hamch’ang County in Kyŏngsang Province, seized the white certificate (白牌 paekp’ae) that officially confirmed the examination result. The Ministry of War investigated this incident and reported that O Sun-sŏn of Hamch’ang had falsely recorded Yong’in as his residence, claiming it was his ancestral hometown, and he longed for the place. In contrast, O Sun-sŏn of Yong’in had truthfully documented his residence. This dubious justification was far from convincing, prompting King Kojong to order that O Sun-sŏn of Hamch’ang be transferred to the Ministry of Punishments for rigorous interrogation.205 On 5/11 of 1894, the Ministry of Punishments invoked a provision from the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, which mandated military exile to a remote area for individuals who employed deceit during the examination. Following this guideline, the Ministry recommended that O Sun-sŏn be exiled to P’ungch’ŏn Prefecture in Hwanghae Province, a suggestion that King Kojong approved.206 Strictly speaking, this application of the provision was not entirely precise, like the earlier case of Song Chu-hyŏn’s military exile, as it pertained specifically to fraudulent actions in the military service examination, though it was not entirely inaccurate.207 The government’s swift and seemingly excessively rigorous response to O Sun-sŏn’s case is understandable, given that one of the common misconducts in government service examinations involved the purchase of certificates from candidates who had already passed the first-stage examination and whose family name was the same as the purchaser’s.208 Considering 204 Sangji chŭkcho 32-yŏn kabosingnyŏn samabangmok 上之卽祚三十二年甲午式年廣司馬榜目 (The List of Successful Candidates in the Regular Triennial Civil Service Examination of the Thirty Second Year of Kabo after the King’s Enthronement), (B13LB-40) 205 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 31-05-08 (26) [1894/05/08]. 又以兵曹言啓曰, 謹依下敎咸昌吳醇善, 龍仁吳醇善竝招致詰問, 則咸昌, 稱以祖先舊基, 不能無故鄕之戀, 應擧居住, 因以書龍仁之號云 (…) 傳曰, 知道。 究厥所爲, 萬萬痛駭。 咸昌吳醇善移送秋曹, 照法嚴繩, 白牌, 推給於龍仁吳醇善。 206 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記, 31-05-11 (11) [1894/05/11]. 推給於龍仁吳醇善, 而謹按律文, 則大典會通諸科條有曰, 科場用奸者, 邊遠充軍, 依此律咸昌吳醇善黃海道豐川府邊遠充軍定配所, 卽爲押送之意, 敢啓。 傳曰, 知道。 207 Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通, 兵典, 武科 [科場用奸]. 科場用奸者, 從輕重論罪濫入者, 水軍充定, 保擧主, 以科場用情律論。 208 Yi Kyu-p’il 이규필, "18-9 segi kwagŏje mullan kwa pujŏng haengwi - ‘Mumyŏngjajip’ ŭi sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro-" 18-9세기 과거제 문란과 부정 행위 -‘무명자집’의 사례를 중심으로-, Hanmun kojŏn yŏn’gu 한문고전연구 27, no. 1 (2013): 169. 245 that the Chosŏn government lacked the ability to issue identification cards with headshots or digitalize personal information for all candidates, fraudulent activities exploiting this similarity in family names posed a significant challenge. Although O Sun-sŏn’s case was somewhat different from these typical schemes, the government felt it necessary to impose a strict punishment to address the broader issue of examination fraud. P’ungch’ŏn Prefecture, now known as Kwail County (with “Kwail” meaning “fruits” in Korean, a name derived from the area’s apple farming districts),209 played a significant military role in Early Chosŏn. In 1423, a naval garrison at the prefectural level was established in P’ungch’ŏn County, which was elevated to the status of a Large Prefecture in 1469. The garrisons in this region were tasked with monitoring illegal Chinese immigrants, and beacons along the shore served as watchtowers.210 However, by the time of O Sun-sŏn’s exile to this prefecture, the military significance of P’ungch’ŏn appears to have waned. For example, according to the 1899 gazetteer, the total number of military personnel listed in the records was 3,341, but the actual number was only 782.211 Map 21: The Map of P’ungch’ŏn Prefecture Circa 18th Century 209 Kukt’ojirijŏngbowŏn 국토지리정보원, Han’guk chimyŏng yuraejip - Pukhan p’yŏn 한국 지명유래집 - 북한편, (Jinhan M&B, 2011), 846. 210 Han’gun minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture). 211 P’ungch’ŏn’gun ŭpchi 豊川郡邑誌 (The P’ungch’ŏn County Gazetteer), 1899, 14-15 (奎 10899). 諸色軍三千三百四十一名 內, 七百六十七名無徵布, 七百九十一名己丑虛額均布磨鍊, 一千一名乙巳虛額以丙申排捧條移劃區處, 七百八十二名時存。 246 Source: The Map of Chosŏn (海東地圖 Haedong chido) Vol. 2, (Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, 古大 4709-41) Although there are no concrete records, it is plausible that the duration of O Sun-sŏn’s military exile ended with the Kabo Reform in July 1894. During the Kabo Reform, the Chosŏn government undertook significant transformations of the existing military system. As a result, the long-standing practice of military exile, rooted in the traditional military framework, may have ceased to function. Furthermore, despite the persistence of the Comprehensive Collection of the National Code, the regime introduced a new legal system influenced by Japanese law. Although the provision regarding military exile remained in Chosŏn’s legal code, it likely became obsolete. Indeed, after O Sun-sŏn’s military exile, there are no further cases related to military exile recorded in Chosŏn’s official chronicles. One of the key policies of the Kabo Reform was the abolition of the traditional government service examination. In its place, the regime introduced a new style of civil service examination that focused on practical subjects such as Korean, mathematics, and topics related to current and foreign affairs, as well as a recommendation system.212 Given that most military exile cases had been related to fraudulent behavior in the examination process, the enforcement of military exile naturally ceased following the Kabo Reform. The table below summarizes the notable military exile cases during the second phase of King Kojong’s direct rule. Table 12: Summary of Major Military Exile Cases by Year from 1884 to 1894 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 1 1885 Yi Ki-ju (李起周 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Gatekeeper (守門將 Sumujang) ● Failure to lock Kŏnch’un Gate (建春門) of Kyŏngbok Palace ● Originally lifelong military exile according to the Great Ming Code ● Permission to pay a commutation fee 212 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄, 32:05b [1894/07/12]. 銓考局條例: 一, 銓考局, 掌考試各府、衙所送選擧人。 其試驗有二法。一, 普通試驗, 一, 特別試驗。 一, 普通試驗。 國文、漢文、寫字、算術、內國政、外國事情、內情外事, 俱發策。 一, 特別試驗。 准該人所帶選狀內所註明適用才器, 單擧發題。 247 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment (收贖 susok) in lieu of 100 strokes of beating ● Being immediately pardoned by King Kojong 2 1885 Sin Paek (申柏 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Gate Official (門考員外郞 Mungo wŏnoerang) ● Failure to lock Kŏnch’un Gate (建春門) of Kyŏngbok Palace ● Originally lifelong military exile according to the Great Ming Code ● Being immediately pardoned by King Kojong 3 1885 Pak Ho-sik (朴浩植 n.d.) ● Clerk ● Keykeeper (司鑰 Sayak) ● Failure to lock Kŏnch’un Gate (建春門) of Kyŏngbok Palace ● Originally lifelong military exile to Pakch’ŏn County and 100 strokes of beating according to the Great Ming Code ● Being immediately pardoned by King Kojong 4 1887 Kim Wan-su (金完洙 n.d.) ● Military Official (Aristocrat) ● Third-Rank Special Army Officer (僉使 Ch’ŏmsa) of Pusan Prefecture ● Failure to repay the loans from Japanese merchants ● 4 year and 3 month military exile to Kŭmgap Island (1887.8-1892.1) ● Being forced to repay the debts 5 1888 Song Chu-hyŏn (宋胄顯 1862-n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● Unauthorized alteration of the seal (祕封 pibong) on his answer sheet (試券 sigwŏn) ● 1 year and 8 month military exile to Yŏnghŭng County in Hamgyŏng Province (1888.4.-1889.12) 6 1889 Sim T’ak (沈倬 1825-n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Violation of the legal code prohibiting a father and son from taking the examination simultaneously ● Originally lifelong military exile to a navy ● Being immediately pardoned by King Kojong 7 1889 Sim Ik-pong (沈翼鳳 n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Violation of the legal code prohibiting a father and son from taking the examination simultaneously ● Originally lifelong military exile to a navy ● Being immediately pardoned by King Kojong 248 Year Name Social Status Criminal Allegations Final Punishment 8 1890 Hyŏn Yong-wŏn (玄龍源 n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Causing an affray at the examination site ● 1 year and 2 month military exile to a naval base in Samch’ŏk Large Prefecture (都護府 Tohobu) in Kangwŏn Province (1890.2-1891.4) ● Being exempted from punishment due to passing the military service examination while under military exile. 9 1892 Hong Chŏng-hui (洪正憙 n.d.) ● A student scholar (幼學 yuhak) ● Later Civil Official (Aristocrat) ● Violation of the legal code prohibiting descendants of traitors from taking the examination ● Removal of name from the roster of successful candidates (榜目 pangmok) ● Military exile to a navy in Paech’ŏn County (白川郡) in Hwanghae Province (1892.4-1894.7 (?)) 10 1894 O Sun-sŏn (吳醇善 n.d.) ● Social status unknown or unspecified ● False information of residence and seizure of certificate ● Military exile to P’ungch’ŏn Prefecture in Hwanghae Province (1894.5-1894.7 (?)) Source: Veritable Records of King Kojong (高宗實錄 Kojong sillok), The Diary of Royal Secretariat (承政院日記 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi) As Table 12 demonstrates, the duration of military exile was generally less than two years or not implemented at all, as King Kojong pardoned the offenders, with the exception of the case involving Kim Wan-su, which was complicated by the involvement of the Japanese legation. This brief duration of military exile, despite the legal code specifying it as a penalty for life, suggests that the penalty was not intended to serve as a severe punishment but rather to socially and publicly humiliate the perpetrators, although how offenders themselves perceived the penalty remains a subject for future research. Additionally, the government likely sought to achieve a publicity effect through the military service. 249 Map 22 shows the military exile sites involved in the cases discussed in this chapter. According to the map, all the military exile sites were located along Chosŏn’s coastline. This phenomenon reflects a shift in the operation of military exile. While cases of examination fraud, which were punished by exile to a navy, increased, other instances related to the state administration declined. Map 22: Major Locations of Military Exile during the Second Phase of King Kojong’s Rule Source: Ksiom, CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>, via Wikimedia Commons (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Korean_Peninsula_topographic_map.png) Conclusion During the second phase of King Kojong’s direct rule from 1884 to 1894, military reform remained a central focus of national policy. Key initiatives included the unification of central 250 military units, the recruitment of Western military advisors, and the reorganization of the local defense system, among others. Despite these efforts, the military reforms ultimately failed, as evidenced by the inability of Chosŏn’s regular forces to suppress the untrained and poorly armed peasant armies during the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion from 1894 to 1895. The Chosŏn government ultimately sought assistance from Qing military forces to suppress the revolt, a move that, contrary to Chosŏn’s intentions, precipitated the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Previous studies on Chosŏn’s military system between 1884 and 1895 have primarily examined the military reform initiatives of the period, often framing them as attempts at modernization. These studies frequently attribute the failure of Chosŏn’s reform policies to the intervention and obstruction by Qing officials, particularly Yuan Shikai, who aimed to consolidate Qing influence over Chosŏn’s politics, diplomacy, and economy.213 Scholars argue that Qing’s sabotage, rooted in a desire to preserve Chosŏn as a vassal state, significantly impeded the progress of military reforms. While Qing’s unprecedented interventionist policies undoubtedly created substantial obstacles, other factors must also be considered to fully understand the limitations of Chosŏn’s military reform efforts. Qing’s high-handed policies toward Chosŏn do not fully exonerate King Kojong and Chosŏn’s principal politicians from responsibility for the limitations in implementing military policies. In fact, the king’s stance on Chosŏn’s military was not markedly different from the conventional ideology, despite some efforts to reform the military units. King Kojong’s primary military policy focused on strengthening the royal guard and central army, while the local and maritime defense structure, critical to the national defense, remained peripheral to the policy agenda. Moreover, King Kojong continued to rely on Qing military forces in times of emergency, as he had during the military mutiny of 1882. Despite apparent efforts to alter Chosŏn’s military system, the underlying attitude toward the military largely remained unchanged. 213 For example, Lew Young Ick argues that Qing’s anachronistic policy of intervention created a hiatus in Korea’s reform movement. (Lew Young Ick, "Yüan Shih-k’ai’s Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885-94)", The Journal of Korean Studies 5, (1984): 64.) Similarly, Sukhee Han contends that Yuan Shikai’s interference undermined King Kojong’s efforts to implement enlightenment policies. (Sukhee Han, "Beyond the Celestial Sinic Sphere: King Kojong and Korea’s Pursuit of Modernization" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 1998), 13.) Furthermore, Yurbok Lee asserts that Yuan Shikai obstructed Korea’s modernization endeavors, a situation that ultimately provided justification for Japan’s intervention in Chosŏn’s political affairs. (Yur-Bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea, (University of Hawai'i Press, 1988), 171-172.) 251 In this context, the continued imposition of military exile during this period illustrates the ruling class’s prevailing attitude toward military service. Although the application of this penalty to political and diplomatic matters notably declined, the regime nonetheless maintained its use as a punitive measure against individuals implicated in corruption within the government service examinations. Similar to the perception of military service during the two decades from 1863 to 1884, King Kojong and Chosŏn policymakers exploited military service, which was intended as a crucial responsibility for national defense amid increasing foreign pressures, as a means of inflicting public disgrace. This entrenched and customary view of military service likely obstructed the Chosŏn government’s efforts to enact a fundamental transformation of the military system from the outset. Interestingly, no instances of military exile enforcement are found after 1894, a pivotal moment in Korean history when the Chosŏn government, influenced by pro-Japanese politicians and encircled by Japanese armed forces, initiated the Kabo Reform. While there are no official records of the formal abolition of the military exile practice, its use as a punitive measure ceased. Regardless of the differing assessments of the reform by historians, the deeply entrenched and outdated system of military exile was swept away by the winds of foreign influence. Indeed, the shift in military policy during this period was not accompanied by a corresponding change in the mindset of King Kojong and Chosŏn’s politicians, who continued to view military reform through the lens of their traditional approach to governance. This gap between the policy objectives and the underlying perception regarding military reform became a significant obstacle to the regime’s ability to defend the nation from foreign intrusion. 252 CONCLUSION This dissertation has explored Chosŏn’s military reform policies and the implementation of military exile in the years of 1864-1894 during the Kojong’s reign. By examining these two self-contradictory policies, I sought to analyze the distinctive characteristics of Chosŏn’s military affairs in the late 19th century. Previous studies have often interpreted the military reform project as part of King Kojong’s broader efforts to advance Chosŏn society, with scholars arguing that Taewŏn’gun and the king fundamentally altered the military system, despite limitations, marking a departure from traditional practices. However, upon revisiting primary sources on military reform during this period and analyzing individual cases of military exile, I have concluded that the military policies and ideology of King Kojong and Taewŏn’gun remained firmly grounded in traditional military norms. To be specific, the first issue addressed in this dissertation is the evaluation of the content and procedures of military reform from 1863 to 1894, as proposed in the Introduction. In relation to this issue, I argue that the reform policies either failed or did not aim to fundamentally transform the traditional military system, contrary to the prevailing view among most Korean historians, who recognize the military reform process as part of the Chosŏn regime’s broader “modernization” efforts. For instance, as regent, Taewŏn’gun implemented various measures aimed at enhancing the military capabilities of local units in response to the growing threat posed by Western warships. Central to his military policies were efforts to establish a financial foundation for military reform and to strengthen local military forces, both aimed at bolstering national defense. Given the external pressures facing Chosŏn during this period, these initiatives can be seen as a rational response. However, Taewŏn’gun failed to secure the financial base needed for military reform, as he heavily drained the treasury through large-scale construction projects, such as Kyŏngbok Palace, and expenditures related to conflicts with foreign states. Moreover, his military strategy largely retained traditional structures and an anti-foreign stance, albeit with some modifications. In practice, these policies yielded only limited success, as demonstrated by the significant losses suffered by Chosŏn forces during the French invasion of 1866 and the American disturbance of 1871. 253 After assuming power, King Kojong’s military reform policy can be characterized as an anti-Taewŏn’gun policy. A significant portion of the military-related policies implemented during Taewŏn’gun’s regency was swiftly abolished. In particular, the taxation measures introduced under Taewŏn’gun were repealed almost immediately after King Kojong took political control. While the king sought to alleviate the burden on the populace, motivated by his desire to be a benevolent ruler in accordance with Confucian principles and following the advice of his Confucian advisors to govern frugally, he failed to implement sufficient countermeasures to mitigate the negative effects of this abrupt decision. As a result, Chosŏn’s fragile financial foundation continued to serve as a persistent obstacle to the king’s military policies. As an element of his anti-Taewŏn’gun military policy, King Kojong significantly reduced funding for local military units, particularly those stationed on Kanghwa Island, while demoting the status of the commanders of the island’s garrisons. Instead, he concentrated the budget on strengthening the central army and royal guard units, which were tasked with safeguarding the royal family and areas in proximity to the royal palace. King Kojong’s new military policy was intricately linked to the growing threat from his political opponents, culminating in the establishment of the Palace Guard Unit in 1874, the Capital Guards Command from 1882 to 1884, and the reinstatement of the Dragon Tiger Regiment in 1885. Given that the primary objective of military maintenance in pre-19th century Chosŏn was the protection of the royal family, King Kojong’s military policy can also be seen as aligned with the traditional military perspective. Indirectly related to the evaluation of military reform, I also examined King Kojong’s attitude toward Qing military assistance to better understand his military viewpoint. Even amid increasing pressure from Chinese politicians and threats to depose him, King Kojong supported the stationing of Qing military forces in Chosŏn following the suppression of the Coup d’État of 1884. Additionally, in 1893, he proposed requesting Qing military assistance to quell the Tonghak movement, despite opposition from high-ranking officials in the court. This request was eventually fulfilled in 1894 when a large-scale uprising was initiated by the Tonghak leaders, with peasants, who vastly outnumbered the Tonghak followers, joining the revolt and advancing toward the capital. 254 As Kim Yŏng-min suggests that the Chosŏn regime maintained a minimalist state during the Late Chosŏn period, the Chosŏn government under King Kojong similarly did not significantly augment its military power. Instead, Chosŏn occasionally relied on its suzerain state for military support, following the extraordinary precedent set in the Chosŏn-Ming relationship. However, Chosŏn failed to foresee that this military dependence would unexpectedly lead to Japan’s military intervention in the 1895 uprising. Japan’s military power had grown significantly in the decade since its forces withdrew from the Korean Peninsula, and the empire took advantage of the political upheaval to realize its long-standing ambition of expanding influence in Chosŏn. Furthermore, the attitude of King Kojong and the ruling class towards the military is evident in their financial management practices. The examination of budget relocation cases reveals that the Chosŏn government frequently diverted funds from military units and offices related to military affairs to other non-military departments, even though military units were already burdened by financial deficits. Although Yi Ch’oe-ŭng, the Chief State Councillor, temporarily put a brake on these practices, leading to a brief suspension of such malpractices, this practice did not completely cease, and the regime repeatedly resumed it until 1894. Even amid the growing threat of foreign powers, the regime’s policy priorities were misaligned with the needs of national defense. The second point addressed in this dissertation concerns the social status of the military official between 1863 and 1894, during King Kojong’s reign. Taewŏn’gun’s military reforms were deeply intertwined with the political dynamics of Chosŏn. Specifically, the elevation of military officials’ status was a strategic move to counterbalance the influence of powerful oligarchic families, such as the Andong Kim clan, who had held dominance over Chosŏn’s political landscape since the early 19th century. The primary goal of Taewŏn’gun’s military policy was to restore the authority of the kingship, despite some progress achieved through his efforts to refine the military system. However, contrary to the prevailing consensus in earlier studies that Taewŏn’gun’s preferential treatment of military officials elevated the status of the military official within the Chosŏn court, his policies largely failed to improve their overall standing. For instance, the publication of the Book of Official Protocols in 1868 aimed to ensure equitable treatment of both 255 civil and military officials within the government. Yet, instances of discrimination and disrespect toward military officials by their civil counterparts persisted, despite King Kojong and Queen Consort Sinjŏng’s periodic admonitions against such behavior. Admittedly, Taewŏn’gun’s preferential policies allowed a small number of high-ranking military officials to benefit from appointments to key positions in the central government. However, the majority of military officials remained excluded from these privileges. The exclusion of military officials from certain privileges is evident in the promotion process. Military officials faced significant challenges in advancing their careers, with several official records indicating that their promotions were often influenced more by personal networks with high-ranking officials than by their actual military abilities. Notably, recommendations from prominent aristocrats played a decisive role in the advancement of mid- and low-ranking military officials. Despite the inherent flaws in the recommendation system, the regime chose to partially rectify and improve these corrupt practices rather than fundamentally overhaul the promotion system. In addition, regarding the appointment pattern of the Ministers of War, who were responsible for military affairs and national defense policies amid the increasing presence of Western powers in Chosŏn, substantial military expertise was required. However, civil officials predominantly occupied these ministerial positions rather than military officials, except for the early period of Taewŏn’gun’s regency. The regent continued to adhere to traditional practices in military governance, ultimately leading to the exclusion of the military official from key offices related to military affairs. Moreover, throughout King Kojong’s direct rule, all other ministers were selected from the civil branch, except for Kim Ki-sŏk, who served as Minister of War for six months. This pattern indicates the continued marginalization of military officials. Furthermore, with respect to the tenure of the Ministers of War, despite the regime’s official declaration to secure a 24-month term for each Minister during Taewŏn’gun’s regency, this commitment was never upheld, even amid rising external threats. Similarly, the tenure of these ministers during King Kojong’s direct rule remained notably brief, with only a few exceptions. In fact, King Kojong formally abolished the policy of securing tenure for this position, illustrating that the development of expertise in military affairs was not prioritized by the government in its personnel management. 256 The third aspect examined in this dissertation is the history and implementation of military exile during King Kojong’s reign. I investigated sixteen cases of military exile and concluded that, despite the shifting international circumstances and growing threats from foreign powers during King Kojong’s reign, military service continued to be disregarded in line with traditional societal values. Military exile in Chosŏn was, in fact, modeled after the Ming dynasty’s military exile institution. Drawing upon the Great Ming Code, Chosŏn’s legal codes included detailed provisions governing the practice of military exile. Unlike the Qing dynasty, where such legal provisions became largely obsolete, the Chosŏn government consistently enforced this punitive measure. Notably, the regime employed military exile as a penalty for individuals who either failed to execute state policies or committed offenses related to government service examinations. Additionally, contrary to the European context, where the recruitment of convicts was used to strengthen military power by pardoning crimes and expunging criminal records, Chosŏn’s system of military exile played little, if anything, role in national defense. Basically, military exile is a penalty that reflects the disrespectful recognition of military service. Had the regime revered military service as a noble duty from the outset, such a penalty would not have been necessary. Although the government sought to shift public perception of military service as a component of efforts to strengthen national defense in response to increasing foreign threats, King Kojong and his officials continued to utilize this traditional punitive measure. The disregard for military duty was exacerbated by the persistent evasion of service by aristocrats. During King Kojong’s reign, this trend persisted, as evidenced by the aristocracy’s vehement resistance to the imposition of the household cloth tax, a form of military levy, on yangban households. The Chosŏn aristocrats regarded the imposition of the household cloth tax as deeply insulting, perceiving it as an equalizing measure that placed them on the same level as commoners. The government’s response, attempting to publicly humiliate the offenders by imposing involuntary military service, further exemplifies the regime’s reliance on traditional punitive measures. In this context, the practice of military exile reflects the continuation of traditional views toward military service. In addition, military exile reflected a disregard for military expertise, as offenders were assigned to military units without proper training. In other words, the regime believed that 257 individuals lacking knowledge of military affairs could still engage in military tasks without the need for preparation, despite the rigorous training such roles required. This tendency mirrored the appointment patterns within government offices related to military affairs, where civil officials, who, at most, had minimal exposure to military classics, were appointed to key positions in military units and the Ministry of War. This long-standing practice, which originated in the early years of the Chosŏn Dynasty, likely contributed to the weakening of military power, albeit indirectly. The final theme of this dissertation examines the rigor with which military exile was executed. The degree to which the regime adhered to this penalty sheds light on its broader objectives regarding military exile. To this end, I analyzed the duration of military exile imposed on offenders and their subsequent government careers following release. Although Chosŏn’s legal code explicitly stipulated the duration of exile, these provisions were seldom enforced. In practice, most individuals sentenced to life military exile were released within one or two years, often earlier. Rather than serving as a strictly enforced punitive measure, military exile functioned primarily as a mechanism of social humiliation imposed by the regime, a pattern consistent with practices observed during the Koryŏ and Early Chosŏn periods. Furthermore, the imposition of military exile did not significantly impede the career trajectories of aristocratic offenders within the governmental framework. Once they obtained public office or successfully passed government service examinations, they were able to resume their professional advancement. While the penalty may have temporarily disrupted their careers, it did not have a lasting detrimental effect. This is not to suggest that the penalty should have permanently hindered the offenders’ prospects; rather, it underscores the limited efficacy of military exile as a punitive measure over time. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that traditional elements continued to exert considerable influence over military affairs during King Kojong’s reign from 1864 to 1894. Although many Korean historians contend that the military reform policy during King Kojong’s era was part of a broader “modernization” effort, the continued enforcement of military exile undermines this view. This legal practice suggests that the traditional institution remained largely intact and that military service continued to be undervalued during a period often characterized as “modern,” when military preparedness was considered more important than ever. 258 Along with the practice of military exile, the content of military reform policies further illustrates that the military developments of this period were far from representing a drastic transformation of the existing system. The persistence of traditional practices within Chosŏn’s military policies in the late 19th century aligns with Jeremy Black’s perspective on military history, wherein conventional factors remained deeply embedded in military institutions. Furthermore, while Chosŏn’s military reforms included the incorporation of Western systems, they did not necessarily constitute a European-style military revolution. This necessitates a reconsideration of the paradigm and diffusion models frequently employed by Western scholars, such as Geoffrey Parker, to explain the theory of military revolution in the early modern and modern periods. Despite a comprehensive examination of the military system and military exile during King Kojong’s reign, this dissertation acknowledges several limitations that warrant further exploration in future research. First, while it provides a focused analysis of the central government’s military reform initiatives, it falls short of thoroughly investigating the conditions within individual military units. Additionally, a more detailed study of the operations of local military units is needed, given their critical role in Chosŏn’s national defense. Although the scarcity of available documents on these local units presents a challenge, it is hoped that future discoveries will shed light on this overlooked aspect. Second, as the primary focus of this dissertation is military exile, which remained in effect until 1894, it does not encompass King Kojong’s military policies from 1895, following the establishment of the Taehan Empire (大韓帝國 Taehan Cheguk), to 1907, when Emperor Kwangmu (光武皇帝)—the title adopted by King Kojong after the establishment of the Taehan Empire—was forcibly dethroned by Japan. Without further exploration of this period, a comprehensive understanding of King Kojong’s military affairs remains incomplete. I intend to leave this as a subject for future research. Finally, due to the paucity of available records, this dissertation is unable to fully elucidate the experiences of offenders during their period of military exile. While certain cases presented in this dissertation offer indirect insights into the lax nature of their military service, a more detailed investigation into their lives and responsibilities within the framework of military exile would provide a more nuanced understanding of this punitive measure. To advance this line 259 of inquiry, future research would benefit with further examination of diaries or personal accounts of the offenders detailing their experiences during exile, as well as of more detailed records pertaining to the military units to which they were assigned. Nonetheless, the analysis of the characteristics of military exile and military reform policies during King Kojong’s reign provides insights into the broader context of the so-called “modernization” initiatives. In the scholarly evaluation of King Kojong’s reform policies, some nationalist Korean historians have drawn comparisons between him and the enlightened monarchs (啓蒙君主 kyemong kunju) of Europe, who achieved modernistic reforms in their respective nations.1 This comparison has sparked significant debate among scholars of Korean studies. This dissertation challenges the notion of King Kojong’s reform policy as a drastic departure from convention, an argument put forth by nationalist historians, and seeks to contribute to this discourse by offering a more nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of his reforms. 1 Yi T’ae-jin 이태진, Kojong sidae ŭi chaejomyŏng 고종 시대의 재조명, (T’aehaksa, 2000). 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Government Documents Ch’ŏlchong sillok 哲宗實錄 Ch’ŏngsŏngo 清選考 Ch’ujo kyŏrongnok 秋曹決獄錄 Ilsŏngnok 日省錄 Kojong sillok 高宗實錄 Kukcho pangmok 國朝榜目 Mubo 武譜 Nanch’o 爛抄 Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok 備邊司謄錄 Samabangmok 司馬榜目 Sŏnwŏn sokpo 璿源續譜 Sŭngjŏngwŏn chobo 承政院朝報 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記 Tonggung illok 東宮日錄 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회. Saryo Kojong sidaesa 14 史料 高宗時代史 14. Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2018. Natori, Katsusaburō 名取勝三郎. Nihon-tō Shina-tō Chōsen senki dai2go 日本党支那党朝鮮戦記 第2号. Tōkyō: Kaiseisha, 1885. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Asian Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Hur, Nam-lin
Between the pillar of state and social stigma : military reform and military exile in Chosŏn Korea, 1863–1894
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