Arts and Social Sciences, Irving K. Barber Faculty of (Okanagan)
DSpace
UBCO
Gamage, Horagampita Dimuth Tharaka
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
China’s rise as a leading international study destination and its advancements in post-secondary have provided it with a strong position to attract educated youth and academics from developing countries. Through its own version of a "Marshall Plan"—the Belt and Road Initiative—China has leveraged significant financial investments to align its foreign policy goals with the expansion of its higher education system. The relationship that has developed between China and developing countries based on higher education has received relatively little attention in academia. This study, using Sri Lanka as a case study, has focused on how China's academic diplomatic strategies, such as providing scholarships and establishing collaborative academic partnerships with developing countries, have aligned with its soft power objectives in these nations. China provides tens of thousands of scholarships to students from developing countries to participate in Chinese academic initiatives. This study demonstrates that in addition to academic knowledge, China provides student recipients with significant exposure to Chinese language, culture, and political system. Through interviews with former students and current scholars who have pursued higher education in China, this research has identified various soft power tools that China has employed within this broad academic initiative, which has been recognized as part of China's short-term and long-term foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, this study has presented several significant and novel findings regarding the specifically designed academic structures in China targeting foreign students, specific soft power programs within this broader initiative, and various other direct and indirect impacts of these initiatives.
ACADEMIC DIPLOMACY ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: THE CASE OF CHINA’S SOFT POWER STRATEGIES IN POST-WAR SRI LANKA by Horagampita Dimuth Tharaka Gamage B.M., Sichuan University, 2021 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies) (Global Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) December 2024 © Horagampita Dimuth Tharaka Gamage, 2024 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled: Academic Diplomacy Along the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of China’s Soft Power Strategies in Post-war Sri Lanka submitted by Horagampita Dimuth Tharaka Gamage in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts. Dr. David Geary, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Supervisor Dr. Manfred Elfstrom, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Eric Li, Faculty of Management Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Kyong Yoon, Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies University Examiner iii Abstract China’s rise as a leading international study destination and its advancements in post-secondary have provided it with a strong position to attract educated youth and academics from developing countries. Through its own version of a "Marshall Plan"—the Belt and Road Initiative—China has leveraged significant financial investments to align its foreign policy goals with the expansion of its higher education system. The relationship that has developed between China and developing countries based on higher education has received relatively little attention in academia. This study, using Sri Lanka as a case study, has focused on how China's academic diplomatic strategies, such as providing scholarships and establishing collaborative academic partnerships with developing countries, have aligned with its soft power objectives in these nations. China provides tens of thousands of scholarships to students from developing countries to participate in Chinese academic initiatives. This study demonstrates that in addition to academic knowledge, China provides student recipients with significant exposure to Chinese language, culture, and political system. Through interviews with former students and current scholars who have pursued higher education in China, this research has identified various soft power tools that China has employed within this broad academic initiative, which has been recognized as part of China's short-term and long-term foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, this study has presented several significant and novel findings regarding the specifically designed academic structures in China targeting foreign students, specific soft power programs within this broader initiative, and various other direct and indirect impacts of these initiatives. iv Lay Summary China has become a key destination for international students from developing countries, leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative to align higher education with foreign policy goals. This study focuses on how China’s academic strategies, like offering scholarships and forming partnerships, align with its soft power objectives. Using Sri Lanka as a case study, the research draws on semi-structured interviews with former students and scholars educated in China. It reveals that, beyond academics, China exposes students to its language, culture, and political system. These educational exchanges are integral to China’s foreign policy, strengthening its global influence. The study also uncovers how China tailors its academic structures for foreign students and the broader impacts of these initiatives. v Preface Upon departing from China in 2021 as an undergraduate student, I consistently maintained an interest in examining my academic and non-academic experiences during my time in the country. The encounter was distinctive, and the circumstances I encountered there were markedly different from my previous and current experiences. Upon reviewing numerous academic publications concerning this topic, it becomes evident that comprehensive accounts of China's academic initiatives are scarce, and there exists a significant knowledge gap regarding international students from developing countries in China. Therefore, in this thesis, I examine the nature of China's academic initiatives in developing countries and their implications for both China and the developing nations. This thesis, which examines China's academic diplomacy in Sri Lanka, constitutes the original and unpublished work of the graduate student Dimuth Gamage. The data collection process for this study involves semi-structured interviews with human participants, for which ethics approval was obtained from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board of UBC Okanagan under certificate number H23-00516. This study aims to identify one of the most understudied areas in China's soft power strategy, specifically focusing on the role of higher education and its impact on youth and scholars from developing countries. The study was completed as part of the Master’s thesis in the Interdisciplinary Studies program under the Global Studies theme at University of British Columbia, Okanagan Campus. The study's data collection process involved conducting 16 interviews with individuals who had previously pursued academic studies in China. These former Sri Lankan students represented a diverse range of degree programs and educational levels within the Chinese higher education system. All the interviews were conducted using UBC licensed zoom vi account and it was conducted in Sinhala Language which later translated and transcribed into English by the author. The snowball sampling method was employed as the primary sampling technique. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, a discourse analysis was conducted on the principal policy documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative. The data analysis was approached through thematic analysis. Utilizing the NVivo data analysis software, a coding process was implemented to identify the potential soft power strategies within the academic initiatives of the Belt and Road Initiative. The primary challenge encountered during this study was that former students who had engaged with Chinese collaborative research centers in Sri Lanka declined to participate in the study. Some students, after initially agreeing, subsequently communicated their discomfort with participating in the research. As an individual who had previously resided in China and completed educational programs there, I had not anticipated that an individual residing in Sri Lanka would express apprehension about participating in this study. This factor also influenced my decision to focus exclusively on participants who had already departed from China following the completion of their academic programs. For these reasons, this section was excluded from the study due to considerations regarding participant safety. I also want to acknowledge that I utilized Artificial Intelligence (AI) software called Paperpal to enhance academic language quality and proofread this thesis. With my supervisor's consent, Paperpal was used to conduct grammar checks and in some sections improve the overall presentation to align with the academic writing standards. Paperpal's assistance focused exclusively on enhancing language and ensuring accuracy in academic expression after I completed the writing, while all ideas, findings, content, analyses, and conclusions remained entirely my own original work. vii Table of Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iv Preface ........................................................................................................................................ v Table of Contents……………………………………………………..………………………………….vii List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. ix Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... x Dedication .................................................................................................................................. xi Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Background ................................................................................................................. 1 1.2. Significance ................................................................................................................ 12 1.3. Research Questions .................................................................................................... 13 1.4. Conceptual and Theoretical Background ..................................................................... 14 1.4.1. Soft Power .............................................................................................................. 14 1.4.2. Academic Diplomacy .............................................................................................. 18 1.4.3. Internationalization of Higher Education ................................................................ 21 1.5. Research Design and Methodology .............................................................................. 23 1.6. Limitations ................................................................................................................. 29 1.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 31 Chapter 2. The Belt and Road Initiative and its Concentration on Education ............................... 32 2.1. The Belt and Road Initiative ............................................................................................. 32 2.2. The objectives behind the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative ......................... 34 2.2.1. Strategic Response to China's Domestic Challenges ................................................. 35 2.2.2. China’s Geopolitical Objectives ............................................................................... 39 2.3. Weaving Influence: The Soft Power Tools of China's Belt and Road Initiative ............... 42 2.3.1. The name that evokes the historical Silk Road ......................................................... 43 2.3.2. The development model of the BRI .......................................................................... 44 2.3.3. The Action Plan of the Belt and Road Initiative ....................................................... 45 2.4. The Academic Component of the Belt and Road Initiative ............................................ 47 2.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 50 Chapter 3. The Impact of the Belt and Road Education Plan in Sri Lanka: An Analysis of Higher Education and Scholarship Recipient Experiences ...................................................................... 52 viii 3.1. The higher education system in Sri Lanka: A critical analysis ............................................ 52 3.2. BRI education plan as an opportunity for achieving the dream of entering higher education. .............................................................................................................................................. 56 3.3. The Experiences of Sri Lankan Students Studying in China: Analyzing the Journey as an International Student in China ............................................................................................... 67 3.3.1. Building Academic and Non-Academic Relationships for International Students in China .......................................................................................................................................... 67 3.3.2. Employment opportunities as international students ................................................... 74 3.3.3. The Impact of Chinese Government Restrictions on Academic Freedom ...................... 75 3.3.4. Challenges encountered by International Students at Chinese Universities: Language Barriers, Inadequate Support Structures, and Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic .................. 78 3.4. Analyzing former Chinese scholarship recipients' views on Chinese presence in Sri Lanka . 81 3.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 90 Chapter 4. China's Geopolitical Objectives of the Educational Initiatives: An Analysis of Potential Soft Power Strategies within academic initiatives ........................................................................ 93 4.1. Fostering Favorable Perceptions of China: The Role of Cultural and Historical Integration in Academic Diplomacy .............................................................................................................. 93 4.1.1. Coursework on Chinese Culture ................................................................................. 95 4.1.2. The celebration of Chinese Festivals and Cultural Events ............................................ 99 4.1.3. Field Trips to Cultural Attractions ............................................................................ 101 4.2. Implementation of English as a Medium of Instruction (EMI): A Tool for Attracting Foreign Students and Promoting Mandarin Language Learning ......................................................... 105 4.3. Encouraging People-to-People Ties: A Strategy for Establishing Long-Lasting Relationships with International Students .................................................................................................. 110 4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 116 Chapter 5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 119 5.1. From Elite Ties to New Connections: China's Diplomatic Makeover in Sri Lanka ............ 125 5.2. Internationalization Drives Political Agenda: How Internationalization of Higher Education Facilitates Chinese Soft power .............................................................................................. 128 5.3. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 132 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 135 ix List of Tables Table 1.1: List of Study Participants and Background…………………………………….24 x Acknowledgements There are many people I could acknowledge here, but I will focus on a few key individuals who have played a pivotal role in my journey toward completing this thesis. First and foremost, I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. David Geary, whose unwavering support was the backbone of this project. In the beginning, I faced numerous challenges, from adapting to a new field of study to navigating the complexities of the North American academic system. Dr. Geary quickly recognized my struggles and, with patience and kindness, guided me through them. By the time I began working on my thesis, I had already overcome many of these obstacles, thanks to his mentorship, allowing me to focus on my research with confidence. He not only focused on my academic progress but also prioritized my mental well-being, ensuring that I stayed mentally strong throughout the process. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Manfred Elfstrom, and Dr. Eric Li, who helped shape this study and pointed out key areas I initially overlooked. Additionally, I am deeply thankful to Dr. Fiona McDonald, whose guidance on research methodology and ethics was invaluable in helping me navigate the early milestones of this thesis with ease. Finally, I want to convey my sincerest appreciation to my incredible wife, Michelle. She made the heartfelt decision to leave behind the career she had worked so hard to build in order to join me in Canada. Her unwavering support and love have been my constant source of strength throughout this journey. xi Dedication To my parents, who recognized my passion for the social sciences long before I did and encouraged me to pursue it, even in a culture where only STEM was revered. Your belief in me allowed my passion to thrive, and for that, I am forever grateful. 1 Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1. Background Today, I am writing this thesis from a comfortable table at one of the world's top higher educational institutions. As a post-graduate student in Canada I have many privileges. However, exactly ten years ago, my life was not the same as it is today. In 2014, I was a disheartened middle-class youth residing in Sri Lanka, who unsuccessfully attempted to secure a spot in Sri Lanka's highly competitive public university system. The admission process at public institutions in Sri Lanka is highly competitive, with an acceptance rate of only one out of every nine students who take the exam. Entering one of these institutions was regarded as a prestigious achievement in society, and losing it was a significant disappointment, not only because of the lost opportunity but also because it significantly limits prospects for higher education in the country. The most disheartening aspect of my situation was that, despite achieving a result that would have qualified me for entry into a public university, my admission was still blocked by the district quota system. The government established the district quota system to provide equal opportunities in education for students from underprivileged communities who lack access to adequate educational facilities (Warnapala and Silva 2011). Since I sat for the exam in Colombo, the population hub of the country, my prospects were constrained by the overwhelming number of applicants and the restricted number of available entrance opportunities. The outcome of these incidents ultimately led me to make the decision to abandon my pursuit of higher education and instead dedicate myself to my sporting career as a coach. In Sri Lanka, the privileges granted to sports were primarily limited to cricket, with other sports such as swimming receiving little to no 2 recognition. Due to the dearth of opportunities in the country, my early career ambitions proved unsuccessful. Consequently, I decided to pursue higher education once more. These challenges led me to contemplate pursuing higher education opportunities within and beyond Sri Lanka. My journey back to higher education was fraught with various obstacles, and I had to navigate through three different paths, each presenting its own set of challenges. My initial preference was to attend a private university and obtain a degree, a path that is commonly pursued by many members of the middle class in Sri Lanka. While the cost in the private universities may not be as prohibitive as studying abroad in most cases, it still represents a significant financial burden for many families in the country. The quality of education within the rapidly expanding private higher education sector in Sri Lanka has also been a subject of constant scrutiny and debate. Private institutions of higher education typically never concentrate on subjects that belong to the domain of social sciences, as their primary focus is fields more closely aligned with job growth such as business studies and computer science. Fortunately, my family had prepared to cover my tuition expenses, and I would not have encountered any major financial impediments that would have prevented me from attending a private university. However, the absence of social sciences programs at these institutions hindered my enrollment plans and aspirations. My subsequent choice was to enroll in a part-time external degree program at a public university, which is designed for students who face challenges in securing full-time, free-of-charge entrance due to insufficient grades or other obligations1. The coursework design did not appeal to me, as I would be required to 1 External Degrees in Sri Lanka are designed by public universities as part-time degree programs that facilitate flexible access to post-secondary education for individuals who are employed full-time or who were unable to gain admission to a degree program directly through the Advanced Level examination (Student Lanka 2010). 3 complete it independently at home, relying solely on online instructions. In the social sphere, the status of part-time degree programs at public universities is not considered equal to that of full-time degree programs at public universities. This disparity in prestige led me to reconsider this option. Importantly, when I was making these decisions, this was an era in which Sri Lanka was undergoing a significant political transformation. The end of the thirty-year civil war, which was widely regarded as one of the most brutal and protracted conflicts in history, marked the beginning of a post-war development phase for the country. Civil war posed a significant obstacle throughout my life, and I spent the greater part of my childhood in an environment where public places were repeatedly subjected to bomb blasts or shootings.2 Nevertheless, former President Mahinda Rajapakse attained widespread recognition and admiration mainly from the Sinhala Buddhist community for his victorious military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). During this period, the Rajapakse regime was at the height of its power, with its members holding nearly all key decision-making positions in the government. Their grip on the country’s political landscape seemed unshakeable, until the tides of change, driven by the people’s frustration, finally turned against them. In 2022, a powerful wave of protests swept through Sri Lanka, ousting the once mighty and seemingly unbeatable Rajapakse government. The regime’s mismanagement and corruption had led the country into an economic catastrophe, sparking a public uprising. One of the primary reasons for the Rajapakse monopoly in the country was the consistent support it received from the Chinese 2 The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009) was an armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), a militant organization that sought to establish an independent Tamil state. The war resulted in significant loss of life and displacement, affecting civilians on both sides. After nearly three decades of conflict, the military engagement concluded in 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE by government forces (Ganguly 2018). 4 government during crucial situations. China offered significant military support to the military movement against the LTTE by providing a steady supply of weapons, which played a pivotal role in sustaining the conflict and ultimately leading to the defeat of the LTTE. During the post-war period the Chinese also provided financial support through extensive loans for various post-war development initiatives introduced by the Rajapakse government. At that point in time, the agreements and transactions between China and Sri Lanka were brought under the microscope; however, the authority of the Rajapakse government was so formidable that it seemed almost insurmountable to challenge the might of the regime during that period. Furthermore, individuals who spoke out against the government and its actions, including journalists and activists, faced severe repercussions, including brutal treatments and even death. The investigations into these killings were never conducted adequately, and the perpetrators were never identified (Butler 2022; Allsop 2022). This situation in Sri Lanka provided the ideal setting for China to exert a more significant influence in the country with the blessings of the Rajapakse regime. Within the confines of the nation, no one dared to challenge the credibility or the feasibility of these arrangements, and certain agreements were not even made accessible to the general public. Due to the thirty-year-long war in Sri Lanka, the country had limited infrastructure development for many decades. As a result, the Chinese infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka were widely appreciated by the citizens of the country. Many news outlets and newspapers in Sri Lanka regularly forecasted positive developments in relation to China and the growing political ties between China and Sri Lanka. As young adults, we were drawn to this phenomenon and perceived China to be a country that would provide us with a promising future. During this time, I became aware of the opportunity for a Chinese scholarship through 5 a newspaper, and without any hesitation, I promptly applied for it. I had always dreamed of pursuing a degree abroad but was also keenly aware of the significant costs and fees associated with pursuing foreign education. However, upon learning about the availability of Chinese scholarships, the prospect became more feasible and therefore I decided to explore it further. The application process for the university was relatively straightforward, and there were no additional steps required to secure the scholarship. In short, I was awarded the scholarship alongside the admission letter upon review of my application in 2017. Following my acceptance letter, I submitted my application for the Chinese student visa, which I received within a period of two weeks. As a result, I, who was denied admission to higher education in my home country despite achieving a praiseworthy grade, was now accepted into a country with an education system that is seen as more advanced by international standards. As noted earlier, undertaking an undergraduate degree abroad is often an extremely costly endeavor for a period of three to four years. Many middle-class families in Sri Lanka are compelled to sell their properties to provide their children with the opportunity to pursue an overseas education. However, in this instance, I was relieved of the financial burden of tuition fees and living expenses, as my scholarship at a respected university provided coverage for all these expenses. The inflow of opportunities from China has imbued me with an unbreakable emotional connection to the country even before I landed there. Prior to our arrival in China, a gathering was held at the parliament complex of Sri Lanka, for all the students who had been awarded scholarships at Sichuan University. Approximately thirty students from various regions of Sri Lanka were present at this event. During our subsequent studies in China, I learned that more than half of these students came from low-income families. For many students, it is their first time traveling outside of the island nation. It was a significant event for the students and their 6 families, with many of them accompanied by their parents and even extended relatives to witness the scholarship presentation ceremony, which was hosted by one of the members of parliament in Sri Lanka. The students, parents, and relatives all spoke about China with great love, respect, and gratitude, and everyone was thankful for China providing them with such a life-changing opportunity. Later, I discovered that this member of parliament is a relative who owns a study abroad agency that functions as an intermediary for Chinese universities in their search for scholarship candidates. On the one hand, they earned money from the Chinese university through commissions while simultaneously bolstering his political popularity by awarding the same scholarships. A couple of weeks after our arrival in China, we were warmly greeted by the university and treated to a delightful welcome dinner organized by the faculty. The following week, the classes for the first year commenced. All the professors who instructed us held doctoral degrees from esteemed universities in the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia. In the third week, all the international students were taken on a trip to Mount Qingqing, which is widely considered the birthplace of Taoism. This excursion provided the students with an opportunity to experience the rich cultural and spiritual heritage of China. In the ensuing week, our department arranged for us to embark on a three-day trip to visit the renowned Leshan Giant Buddha and Mount Emei, both of which have been recognized as world heritage sites by the UNESCO. As a follower of Buddhism, I was thrilled at the prospect of visiting these sites, particularly the Leshan Buddha, which holds the distinction of being the largest Buddha statue in the world. We were provided with luxury transportation and accommodation during the trip. The university extended its generosity by accommodating us in a four-star hotel for three nights, ensuring that we had the opportunity to explore the cultural sites of China to the fullest 7 satisfaction. This field trip proved to be a memorable experience for a considerable number of our classmates. Many of us, myself included, had never experienced such a luxurious and extravagant experience before. My batch at the university comprised 34 individuals hailing from diverse regions across the globe. Significantly, the largest contingent originated from developing countries. The composition of my class was reflective of China's current priorities in international relations, as evidenced by the demographic makeup of the batch. This trend was not unique to my class but was evident across all classes within the university. In my course, there were five students each from Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh. Additionally, there were three students each from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The remaining students mainly consisted of individuals from Southeast Asia and Latin America. Interestingly, there was no representation from African continent; however, there was a substantial number of students from Africa in the engineering and management classes. We only had one student each from the United Kingdom and Italy, who were the only representatives from the global north. Most of the students were selected as part of the Belt and Road Scholarship initiative. However, there were students who had received scholarships from other Chinese funding schemes, such as the China Scholarship Council or Sister city programs. The one student from the United Kingdom did not receive any type of scholarship. During my time in Sichuan, I was exposed to a diverse array of subjects as part of our coursework, the majority of which were not available in Sri Lanka. In addition to the mandatory courses as part of my Major in the field of tourism, we were also required to complete compulsory courses in Chinese language, Culture, and History. Having the proficiency in Mandarin language can be advantageous in many respects since China plays a 8 significant role in various sectors today. Understanding the culture and history of China is also relevant for the tourism industry, as China is a major market for international travel. Therefore, in no way did I see these courses as a detriment for my tourism undergraduate degree, as they are beneficial in various ways. Interestingly, I discovered that even students studying engineering, medicine, and management were required to take these compulsory courses, which provided exposure to Chinese culture and history. We were provided with hostel accommodation during our stay, and the cost of the accommodation was covered by the scholarship. The system of accommodation for students was unlike any I had experienced previously. Foreign students were segregated from their Chinese counterparts and were housed in separate buildings designated exclusively for them. We were prohibited from residing in Chinese student hostels, and concurrently, Chinese students were barred from lodging in facilities designated for international students. In the hostels that cater specifically to international students, there were subdivisions created for students from particular countries. With the approval of the hostel manager, the students were permitted to move into the blocks designated for the students from other countries, as it was not explicitly prohibited like moving into the Chinese student residence. The system of accommodating students based on their country of origin has generated intense competition among them, which was evident in both academic and sports events. The preference of many students to stay in these on-campus accommodations is often influenced by the fact that these facilities are covered by scholarship funds, allowing them to avoid additional expenses. Consequently, a significant number of students opt to reside on campus to take advantage of this financial assistance. Although I enjoyed my time in these campus hostels, I was also eager to explore China and its people, so I made the decision to obtain off-campus accommodations. 9 This was the first time in my life that I signed a rental agreement, and I must confess, I could not read a single word of the document, as I was not able to understand Mandarin at that time. The scholarship holders enjoyed a host of advantages from the Chinese government, which they held in great emotional regard. I would confidently say that the facilities at the university and the quality of life we received both on and off campus were superior to what I had experienced in Sri Lanka. Upon our arrival in China, a meeting was organized by the senior students from Sri Lanka, during which they imparted a warning regarding the ramifications of confronting authority in social media platforms and other venues. As a result, we made necessary adjustments to our daily routines and social media activities in accordance with the regulations and guidelines set forth by the Chinese government. Although adapting to the high level of technology use in China was initially challenging, once we became accustomed to it, it provided us with numerous convenient ways to manage our daily lives. The popular social media platforms that we typically use in Sri Lanka were unavailable in China, and a Virtual Private Network (VPN) was necessary to access them. Consequently, the only viable option was to use a paid VPN service, which allowed for faster access to the blocked social media platforms. Despite being illegal in China, some student agents at the university sold VPN services. The censorship measures implemented by the Chinese government on social media platforms in the country are extensive. Once on WeChat, my Chinese friend abruptly halted our discussion when I addressed the topic of the Chinese government, as it can lead to the immediate blocking of one's account until the statements are reviewed. More severe punishments may be imposed, as per your remarks. Since the international students did not hold any political views that were in opposition to the Chinese Communist Party at that time, it did not pose any issues for us. However, at a later point in my academic journey in China, I 10 did encounter a difficult predicament in which I was required to express my critical thoughts and opinions in China. I frequently traveled inside China, particularly to its rural and remote western regions, where few foreign people typically venture. This experience afforded me the opportunity to view China from a unique perspective, which diverged from many of the viewpoints I had encountered on campus. As I began to observe certain aspects that contradicted my prior expectations of the country, I found myself grappling with some internal conflict and doubts. For example, in Sri Lanka, China has long been promoted for its promotion of Buddhism and its numerous benevolent endeavors on its behalf. During my travels to Tibet, I came to understand that the government of China has severely suppressed Buddhism. I heard firsthand accounts from Tibetans detailing the challenging circumstances they face under the government's oppressive regime. Buddhist monasteries have been demolished, and religious freedom is severely restricted. Many students who are accepted into scholarship programs lack the financial means to fund their own travel, and therefore do not have the opportunity to travel independently. Instead, universities frequently organize trips to renowned cultural and heritage locations, which often constitute the only travel experience for students within China. Moreover, even those who have the means to travel within China, they tend to visit well-known urban centers, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Chongqing. As a result, they are limited to viewing content that has been curated to present a positive image of China. Even in the academic realm, it is often difficult for students to interact with their Chinese counterparts. This is because the English medium students have their own classes, which operate independently of the Chinese medium classes. They also possess a limited proficiency in the Chinese language, which can make it more difficult to communicate with the majority of 11 Chinese medium students who do not have sufficient English language ability. Hence, the likelihood of most international students enrolled in English-medium programs gaining insight into China's grassroots realities is rather slim. They receive a favorable portrayal of China and upon their departure, it is expected that they carry with them a positive image of China. The narrative I have shared is just one among the many stories of over 90,000 students from various developing countries who have received Chinese government scholarships up until 2023. These scholarships are primarily intended for students from countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2015, China introduced the BRI's education plan, which included several projects, one of which was to offer 10,000 scholarships per year to students from BRI countries. As noted, this program is just a one scholarship initiative among many other scholarship schemes introduced by the Chinese government and targeting students from developing countries. As a result, thousands of students, primarily from low-income countries, began studying in China on full scholarships that covered nearly all of their expenses. As in my case, these scholarships have provided a life-changing opportunity for many young people, who otherwise would have been unable to gain financial access to these educational programs. This study explores two main aspects of this story: first, the educational opportunities provided to international students through Chinese academic initiatives; and second, the implications of the Chinese government's significant financial investments in these initiatives. Specifically, it examines how these initiatives, which attract thousands of international students, align with China's geo-political engagements. Additionally, it analyzes the current and potential impacts for developing countries like Sri Lanka. This study also provides valuable insights into the different kinds of academic and non-academic experiences of international students who studied in China. 12 1.2. Significance In the 21st century, China's ascendancy to global dominance has engendered substantial changes in diplomacy. China has successfully devised unique diplomatic strategies by integrating its own strengths with conventional approaches, which have shown promising results so far. The employment of internationalization of higher education as a means of projecting soft power has been a practice adopted by several nations for many years. China is not an exception in employing higher education as a tool for soft power3, as evidenced by the inception of the "Confucius Centers' project in 2004 to promote Chinese language and culture globally (Yang 2002). This initiative has been the subject of extensive studies by scholars worldwide, focusing on the soft power elements involved. However, China's academic diplomacy mission has transcended beyond its original objective of promoting Chinese culture and language. The country has placed a heightened emphasis on bolstering developing nations in its diplomatic endeavors, particularly through the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)4. The BRI has undertaken numerous academic initiatives, such as providing scholarships to developing countries and establishing collaborative research institutes across various regions in the developing world. Despite these recent developments, there exists a significant void in the scholarly literature regarding the implications of China's recent academic diplomatic mission in developing nations. This study endeavors to bridge this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of China's academic diplomacy mission in Sri Lanka, 3 “The ability to obtain power through attraction or persuasion is called soft power”(Nye 2016). 4 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was initiated by China as a global development strategy in 2013 to enhance international connectivity and economic cooperation through the funding of infrastructure projects and the development of trade corridors and networks across Asia, Europe, and Africa. This initiative is frequently referred to as the "New Silk Road," drawing parallels to the ancient Silk Road, which historically facilitated trade and cultural exchange between Asia and Europe (Winter 2021). 13 functioning as an instrumental case study. The findings of this research extend beyond China’s soft power strategies in academic initiatives and offer insights into the university system in China that facilitate international scholarship students. Moreover, it delves into how students navigate the various obstacles they encounter in China due to the country's distinct political and socio-cultural landscape. Although I will explain my research methods further in section … The data collection process for this research involved conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews with former Sri Lankan international students who had studied in China. Additionally, a discourse analysis was performed on a range of governmental and commercial documents relevant to China's scholarly and collaborative initiatives in Sri Lanka. 1.3. Research Questions The purpose of this research is to present a thorough examination of the extensive consequences of China's incorporation of higher education in the BRI's participating countries, particularly in the realm of developing nations, by utilizing the firsthand accounts of Sri Lankan graduates from Chinese post-secondary institutions. Previous research and the investigator's own experience suggest that China has placed a significant emphasis on the execution of academic initiatives targeting international students and scholars from developing countries. Consequently, it is important to investigate the potential role of education within China's Belt and Road Initiative. In this sense, I developed the first research question: Is education an important component of China’s soft power strategy within the BRI initiative, and if so, how has it impacted Sri Lanka? South Asia has the highest population density globally, and due to limited capacity and financial constraints, youth in this region frequently encounter challenges when transitioning 14 from secondary to post-secondary education. This research examines the career-related outcomes of educational opportunities provided by China for the younger generation in Sri Lanka. Additionally, it aims to understand and assess the perspectives of Chinese politics and culture held by these individuals. The study also investigates the effects of the ongoing political and economic turmoil in Sri Lanka on these findings. China faces significant public criticism in Sri Lanka these days5, and many in the public argue Chinese engagement in Sri Lanka is one of the primary causes of the economic downturn. Therefore, it is vital to consider the impact of public criticism on former students' perceptions of Chinese academic projects. The second research question is developed based on this phenomenon: How has this newfound academic diplomacy influenced Sri Lankan youth and scholars within the recent decade, especially in light of the recent political and economic crisis in the country? 1.4. Conceptual and Theoretical Background 1.4.1. Soft Power “Power refers to the ability to obtain what one wants from others. This can be done in three ways. You can get it with coercion, by payment, or by attraction or persuasion. The ability to obtain it through coercion or payment is called hard power. The ability to obtain it through attraction or persuasion is called soft power.” 5 This referred to the period of economic crisis in Sri Lanka, which reached its peak in 2022, due to high national debt, corruption, economic mismanagement, and reduced foreign direct investments resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. 15 - Joseph Nye (2016) – The theoretical framework of this research is firmly rooted in Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. The primary objective of this research is to determine the strategies utilized by China in drawing in youth from developing nations by presenting academic opportunities. Thus, Joseph Nye's concept serves as the foundation for this research, allowing for the identification of academic initiatives that aim to attract and foster opportunities for young people. Although Joseph Nye introduced the term "soft power" in 1990, the practice of using non-coercive methods to influence others has been evident throughout human history (Thussu 2013). The impact of World War II led to widespread financial, human, and social destruction across the globe. In the face of such enormous costs associated with utilizing hard power to enhance international influence, world leaders recognized the need for more cost-effective and non-violent methods of exerting power and maintaining global stability. In response, the United States, among other global superpowers, pursued a number of strategies aimed at attracting other countries and fostering cooperative relationships to establish global stability in the post-war era (Ellwood 2018). The increased visibility of this phenomenon was particularly evident during the Cold War era, when the world was divided into two opposing camps in an effort to compete for global dominance. During the Cold War era, there was no direct military interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, both nations engaged in intense competition to gain the support of other countries in their bid for global dominance and ideological influence. While there were some military conflicts that occurred as a result of this rivalry, there were no significant direct confrontations between the two superpowers. 16 According to J. Nye (2019), it is rare for any of the military power, financial power, or soft power to stand alone in achieving objective outcomes. In order to achieve successful outcomes, it is essential for a country to possess all three components of power. While it is true that a country can utilize financial or military power to compel another government to take a decision in their favor, it is important to recognize that the lack of popular consent can have a significant impact on the outcome of such actions. Numerous instances across history illustrate that even the most prosperous nations in terms of economic and military power can experience significant setbacks in overseas territories if they fail to gain the approval of the local population in a specific country. On January 16, 1979, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was a close ally of the United States, fled the country following a revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, which brought an end to the last American alliances in Iran. The United States, under the administration of Mohammed Reza, played a significant role in delivering far-reaching political, social, and economic reforms in Iran, which became famously known as the "white revolution" of Shah. Reforms were introduced and carried out in a rapid phase, without considering Iranian local values and religious convictions, which subsequently ignited a religiously motivated revolution against the Shah's leadership. Despite devoting substantial financial resources and possessing the military prowess of the world's most formidable military power, the United States failed miserably to maintain its power in Iran due to the ineffectiveness of its soft power strategies (Musavian and Shahidsaless 2014). In the same year in 1979, the Soviet Union, another major power at the time, attempted an invasion of Afghanistan, which ultimately proved to be a failure. Despite possessing significantly greater military might than Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's mistreatment of the Afghan populace resulted in a significant setback for the superpower (Dibb 2010). Therefore, it is 17 crucial for even the most powerful countries in the world, with the most formidable militaries and economies, to possess a well-defined and accurate soft power strategy that encompasses both diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts. Today, the concept of soft power has gained considerable prominence not only in the spheres of politics and international relations, but also in various other disciplines such as anthropology, cultural studies, sociology, and several others. The theory of soft power has been integrated into these disciplines, showcasing its relevance and applicability in diverse fields (Hannerz 2015; Zamorano 2016). The primary reason for this is that countries are increasingly utilizing a diverse range of resources, such as culture, religion, education, and any other available resources, which they can employ as a soft power tool. The concept of soft power in relation to China has been the subject of extensive discussion and debate in academic circles globally. According to Nye (2022: 03), China should realize that most of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government. Propaganda is not credible and thus does not attract. China needs to give more leeway to the talents of its civil society, even though this is difficult to reconcile with tight party control. Although China has placed a great emphasis on the notion of soft power; it could be argued that the dominant hard power imposed by the Chinese Communist Party has hindered its ability to attain some of its desired outcomes. However, China possesses a substantial quantity of soft power resources, stemming from its wealthy historical civilization and alluring culture. The modern Silk Road initiative introduced by China is considered to be one of the most captivating geocultural undertakings in contemporary times (Winter 2021). In recent years, China has 18 placed a particular emphasis on its connection with developing countries and has invested billions of dollars in this region. This research seeks to explore some of the contours of these soft power investments, especially in relation to academic diplomacy. 1.4.2. Academic Diplomacy This study utilizes the concept of academic diplomacy as the basis for discussing the broader context of Chinese soft power and political diplomacy within education. The deployment of education as a means of exerting soft power or propaganda has been prevalent among various nations throughout history. It is well known that colonizing powers utilized this approach extensively to sway indigenous and local communities (Peterson 2014). Chen (1951), posited that during the establishment of communist government in China, the Communist Party of China employed extensive propaganda efforts through education system to promote the ideology among the general public. Despite the passage of time, the concept of diplomacy through education remains a significant aspect of public diplomacy, which now extends beyond the domestic sphere to youth demographics in foreign countries (Lima 2007). However, there are various mutations of this phenomena where certain countries offer academic opportunities or collaborations with the aim of garnering political influence and support. The practice of granting honorary doctorates or other academic degrees to influential members of a certain society is one vehicle for demonstrating certain political and economic interests with a soft power veneer. For example, in 2019 and 2022, the President of China, Xi Jinping, was awarded Honorary Doctorate degrees from Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Despite aforementioned exceptions, academic diplomacy remains a highly effective public diplomacy tool that can yield significant long-term benefits. More specifically, the funding 19 programs and mechanisms geared towards international students are widely recognized as one of the most effective means of academic diplomacy that can foment certain state interests and public outcomes (Sheng-Kai 2015; J. T. Lee 2015; Wojciuk 2018). The advantages of academic diplomacy within the context of soft power can be achieved from the moment that such programs are initiated or publicized in foreign countries by a particular nation. Achieving the benefits of scholarship schemes in terms of soft power can be received from the beginning when the scholarship scheme is advertised in overseas territories. Some scholarship programs around the world have gained significant recognition and renown for providing mass scholarships that have helped thousands of students over the years. The United States' Fulbright scholarship, the United Kingdom's Commonwealth scholarship, and the Erasmus Mundus scholarship by the European Union are among the scholarship programs that have garnered widespread attention (Peterson 2014). There are many ways that these types of scholarship programs can act as soft power tools. When international students arrive in a foreign country, they typically become temporary residents for an extended period of time, during which they are exposed to the culture and society of the host nation. However, certain countries have taken this a step further by devising more comprehensive strategies that foster lasting appeal for international students who choose to study in their respective nations. That includes special coursework, cultural events, language training, internships, community collaboration programs, etc. (Vaxevanidou 2018). The use of international higher education in a track II diplomatic manner has been emphasized by numerous scholars throughout the years (von Feigenblatt 2019; Nye 2005). Montville (1991,162) defined track II diplomacy as an “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public 20 opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict.” According to Nye (2005), the academic exchanges that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era played a significant role in the development of American soft power, which ultimately led to a triumphant outcome. He emphasized that the American university system's hosting of influential individuals who later became important government figures in the Soviet Union has been a positive aspect for the United States. Nye (2005: 14) stated, Aleksandr Yakovlev was strongly influenced by his studies with the political scientist David Truman at Columbia University in 1958. Yakovlev eventually went on to become the head of an important institute, a Politburo member, and a key liberalizing influence on the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The example provided by Joseph Nye illustrates that international higher education serves not only as a public diplomatic tool, but also as a track II diplomatic tool that can exert significant political, cultural, and ideological influence on individuals who may later become influential figures in their home countries. According to the Soft Power Index of the Higher Education Policy Institute6, a UK-based independent think tank, 28% of the world leaders have pursued their higher education in the United States, while 27% have attended institutions in the United Kingdom (Hillman 2023). This study examines academic diplomacy as a public and track II diplomatic tool that is deployed as a significant element of contemporary diplomacy with the potential for long-term success. 6 The Soft Power Index of the Higher Education Policy Institute quantifies the number of senior serving world leaders – defined as monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers – who have received higher education in countries other than their own (Hillman 2024). 21 1.4.3. Internationalization of Higher Education The internationalization of higher education (IoHE) may not be the primary theoretical focus of this thesis; however, all of these Chinese academic initiatives have been initiated using the latest trends in IoHE, which has become one of the main foci in contemporary research on post-secondary education. Identifying the trends and objectives of China's use of IoHE in developing countries is crucial, as it encompasses a wide range of strategies, such as providing scholarships to international students and establishing collaborative research centers overseas. Thus, this subsection aims to present a concise introduction drawing upon extant literature on the internationalization of higher education, particularly highlighting its burgeoning trend within China. This study endeavors to delve into the underlying motives driving China's pursuit of IoHE. The process of IoHE may seem like a simple undertaking that involves the transference of students, educators, and academic services across international boundaries. Nevertheless, the concept has evolved significantly over time, with numerous scholars providing divergent definitions as the process of internationalization has advanced. van der Wende (1996, 23) has defined internationalization as an “any systematic, sustained effort aimed at making higher education (more) responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labor markets.” Many scholars have showcased the significant interconnection between globalization and internationalization of higher education. According to Knight (2004, 05) “Internationalization is changing the world of higher education, and globalization is changing the world of internationalization.” Globalization has brought about a profound transformation to the domain of higher education, and in the current climate, it is 22 deemed indispensable for educational institutions to embrace and maintain their internationalization initiatives in order to enhance their reputation. The topic of internationalization in Chinese higher education has garnered considerable attention in recent years, as China has launched several initiatives in this area over the past two decades. It is worth mentioning that under the Chinese Communist Party, internationalization within China has undergone swift transformations. In the first decade of Mao's leadership, China's higher education was limited to the Soviet Union, and there were numerous collaborations between the two countries. During the post-Mao era, the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping brought about a new era in higher education in China, which included the lifting of the ban on international education. It became one of the major decisions implemented by Deng Xiaoping during his Open Door Policy. As a result, thousands of Chinese students began pursuing higher education abroad (Yang 2002). The process of internationalizing higher education in China experienced a pivotal moment as a significant number of Chinese students began to gain exposure to Western academic institutions. The exposure ultimately resulted in transformative changes within Chinese academic institutions and facilitated increased connectivity with the globalization of higher education. According to Wu (2019), today China’s IoHE process has shifted towards a more "outward-oriented" approach, moving away from its historical "inward-oriented" trajectory. The concept of "inward-oriented" internationalization encompasses the acquisition of foreign knowledge, norms, academic cultures, and higher education models, while the notion of "outward-oriented" internationalization entails the dissemination of domestic knowledge, norms, culture, and higher education models to outside world. 23 1.5. Research Design and Methodology This study utilizes the case study method as its fundamental research design. As per the classification of Stake (1994), case studies are divided into three distinct categories: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. An intrinsic case study focuses on a single case in point, but a collective case study examines multiple cases to better comprehend and interpret a phenomenon. An instrumental case study can be used to rigorously investigate a certain issue or problem. The academic initiative of BRI encompasses an extensive case study that spans across 149 countries. Hence, it is not possible to address the whole initiative in a holistic way. Hence, I employed the “instrumental case study” to pragmatically approach this topic. Mills et al. (2023: 474) define an instrumental case study as a “study of a case (e.g., person, specific group, occupation, department, organization) to provide insight into a particular issue, redraw generalizations, or build theory." Therefore, the situation in Sri Lanka can be considered a valuable exemplar to utilize as an instrumental case study in order to gain an overall understanding of China's academic diplomacy strategy towards developing countries. However, it is also imperative to emphasize that although this study has presented a significant insight into the overall situation of China's academic diplomacy in developing countries, it is essential to conduct similar types of studies in other nations to obtain a thorough understanding of this initiative, as China's objectives may vary across different countries. The following sub-chapter will present a thorough introduction to the chosen case study for this research, providing a rationale for the selection of this particular case. The social constructivism paradigm permeates the philosophical foundation of this research design and its case study method. According to Schwandt (2000), the constructivist paradigm 24 is based on the fundamental principles that knowledge is the product of social construction by those who participate in the research process and that researchers ought to make an effort to comprehend the complexities of the world of lived experience from the perspective of those who really have such experiences. To investigate such dynamics in this instrumental case study, I will employ two data collection methods as follows, 1. In-depth semi-structured virtual interviews 2. Discourse analysis on archival sources In-depth semi-structured interviews: I have identified two distinct cohorts of individuals who have pursued academic endeavors facilitated by BRI. The first cohort consists of graduates from various Chinese universities in Sri Lanka who were part of a BRI scholarship program while residing in China. The second cohort comprises students who participated in institutes or projects funded by the BRI through academic institutions in Sri Lanka. These cohorts are significant because they represent different aspects of China's academic diplomacy that fall under the same overarching framework. However, my attempts to recruit participants from local institutions in Sri Lanka were unsuccessful, as they declined my invitations to participate in the study. Consequently, the semi-structured interviews for this research were conducted exclusively with former students who pursued higher education in China on scholarships provided by the Chinese government, covering a wide range of degree programs. I have chosen to exclude current scholarship recipients due to their incomplete participation in the program's comprehensive process thus far, as well as considering their safety given their current residence in China. 25 In total, 15 interviews were conducted, comprising 7 interviews with former undergraduate students, 4 interviews with former master students, and 5 interviews with former doctoral students. Graduate students were prioritized over undergraduates due to their involvement in more extensive research and collaborative programs. Additionally, they can be considered experts due to their significant impact on Sri Lankan society. It is important to note that possessing a foreign post-graduate degree is highly valued and often a highly valued requirement for securing senior-level employment opportunities in Sri Lanka. To ensure a representative sample, the sampling procedure took into account the geographical diversity of the Chinese university system. This was done to mitigate the potential influence of subject bias that may arise from exclusively recruiting individuals from the same Chinese university or province. The following chart provides information regarding the participants. It is important to note that the real names of the participants have been replaced with aliases in the chart and throughout the study. Name Gender Type of degree received in China Current Profession Province of study in China 1. Aruni Female Bachelor/ Engineering Self Employed Tianjin 2. Sachin Male Masters/ Engineering Self Employed Yunnan 3. Achini Female Bachelors/ Engineering Site Engineer Hubei 4. Anne Female Bachelors/ Engineering Student (reading for masters) Sichuan 5. Sahan Male Doctoral/ Public Administration Senior Academic Hubei 26 Name Gender Type of degree received in China Current Profession Province of Study in China 6. Kanishka Male Doctoral/ Social Science Academic Beijing 7. Ishini Female Masters/ Social Science Academic Hubei 8. Asanka Male Doctoral/ Management Senior Academic Sichuan 9. Nayana Female Masters/ Social Science Secondary/ High School Teacher Sichuan 10. Sashini Female Doctoral/ Management Senior Academic Shanxi 11. Shavin Male Bachelors/ Archaeology Self Employed (Overseas) Zhejiang 12. Amali Female Masters / Politics Policy Analyst Beijing 13. Umesha Male Bachelors/ Performing Arts Audio Engineer Chongqing 14. Akila Male Bachelors/ Engineering Self Employed Yunnan 15. Matheesha Male Bachelors/ Management Assistant Manager Yunnan Table 1.1: List of Research Participants and Background Participants for this study were recruited through existing professional networks, with additional subjects identified using the snowball sampling method. Upon completion of the interviews, the researcher translated the transcripts from Sinhala to English and subsequently sent them to the respective participants for verification, ensuring that their insights and 27 statements were accurately translated without compromising the original intent. Fourteen of the fifteen interviews were conducted in Sinhala, with one interview conducted in English. The data analysis of this study was conducted utilizing a dual approach, employing both thematic and content analysis methods. In the initial stage, thematic analysis was utilized to identify patterns within the transcripts. For instance, codes related to academic experiences were categorized under the themes of either "Academic Challenges" or "Academic Advantages". The thematic analysis was conducted to identify novel themes that were not evident in existing literature. Notably, the majority of the themes were identified through thematic analysis. Subsequently, a content analysis was integrated with the themes identified through existing literature or those recognized from the earlier thematic analysis. The predefined themes facilitated the identification of similar patterns and themes in subsequent interviews. This combined approach allowed for both a quantitative overview and an in-depth understanding of the participants' experiences and perspectives. It is noteworthy that my personal experience studying in China significantly contributed to establishing robust discussions with the participants. The participants demonstrated comfort in sharing their experiences, recognizing my familiarity with those situations. In contrast to a conventional formal interview approach, I ensured that the participants engaged in a more conversational manner while recollecting their time in China. Although the questions varied for each participant, I utilized the following questions as foundational questions. These questions are highly open-ended, and care has been taken to ensure that the researcher's experience and understanding of the situations do not influence the participants' responses. But 28 when the discussions are being built on, I make sure I use my experience and understanding appropriately to build impactful discussions. The researcher's position as an insider proved advantageous in the participant recruitment process. This benefit was particularly apparent during an unsuccessful endeavor to enlist participants from Chinese-funded collaborative research centers located in Sri Lanka. 1) Can you tell me more about yourself? 2) 2) What is your current field of work? 3) Why did you decide to go to China for your higher studies? 4) What was your perception of China before going there? 5) What steps did you need to take to be eligible for the BRI scholarship? 6) How was your life in China, and what activities did you participate in? 7) How was your academic life there? What kind of support did you receive from the university? 8) What kind of events and activities did they organize for BRI students? 9) What kind of challenges did you face in China? 10) How have you found this scholarship to have benefited your life? 11) What do you think about China-Sri Lanka relations, especially in recent years as a result of the economic situation? How has your educational journey contributed to these views? 12) Are there are any questions not asked that you feel will be helpful in me understanding the role of education and academic diplomacy between China and Sri Lanka under the BRI. 29 Discourse Analysis on Archival Sources: To complement the semi-structured interviews, a discourse analysis was conducted on the documents pertaining to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Specifically, the Belt and Road Action Plan and the Belt and Road Education Action Plan were examined to ascertain the Chinese government's perspective. Merriam and Tisdell (2016: 162) identify these textual data sources as a wide range of written, visual, digital, and physical materials relevant to the study. The primary focus was on the action plan and the educational materials that were developed and disseminated throughout the various stages of the academic programs. A separate thematic analysis was employed as the data analysis method for these documents, and through the utilization of an inductive approach, it was possible to discern the Chinese government's perspective on introducing different aspects of these programs. 1.6. Limitations This research has examined one aspect of one of the most intricate political challenges emerging in developing nations as a result of China's increasing involvement. In certain cases, the level of Chinese presence can have a considerable influence on the ability to conduct a thorough investigation of political subjects. Due to the politically sensitive nature of some of this research, my data collection process has some limitations. I made extensive efforts to seek participants for this study from the collaborative research institute at the University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, no one was willing to contribute their insights to the study. Despite not receiving any direct reasons for their refusal, it was evident that they were not comfortable discussing their partnership with China. One of the significant elements of Chinese academic diplomacy is the establishment of foreign 30 collaborative academic centers as part of the BRI (Jain 2021). Through those initiatives China has gained the ability to embed themselves in local research settings and academic landscapes with extensive financial and expert support. For example, as a part of the BRI, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has established nine research institutions in BRI countries. These institutions have diverse research focuses and include overseas joint research centers such as the China-Brazil Joint Center for Space Weather, the China-Africa Joint Center for Research and Development, and the China-Sri Lanka Joint Center for Research and Education (CSL-CER). Due to these limitations I was forced to restrict my analysis to the participants who pursued their studies within China, while excluding those who engaged with local institutions. This resulted in my exclusion of one of the key components of China's academic diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka, which hindered my ability to fully explore the entire scope of the area of focus in my study. This study was also constrained by the insufficient availability of policy-related and other documentary materials necessary for executing thorough discourse analysis. The documents available from the Chinese government provided only generic information and lacked specific details regarding their plans or objectives. Another limitation was the insufficient availability of scholarly findings regarding Chinese academic diplomacy. Due to the nascent nature of scholarly focus in this area, the quantity of existing data was considerably limited. Another limitation of this study lies in the methodology employed, specifically the instrumental case study approach. Although this method has the potential to provide valuable insights into larger subjects by selecting a single sample to represent the entire subject matter, there are limitations to the extent of the results that can be obtained. Although China has undertaken similar academic initiatives in the majority of BRI member states, it is crucial to 31 recognize that China may have unique objectives and diverse diplomatic goals in addressing each individual country. As such, the results of this study may have limitations in their applicability beyond Sri Lanka, due to differences in the engagement objectives of China in various contexts. 1.7. Conclusion This chapter serves as an introductory framework for this study, drawing on the author's personal experience and offering a theoretical and methodological foundation. The author's previous experience as a Belt and Road Scholarship holder in China has provided a strong basis for this study, allowing for the identification of key areas to investigate. The expansion of China as a popular destination for international students is a relatively new phenomenon in the context of international higher education. Therefore, there has been a lack of studies conducted on the dynamics of this trend. Hence, this study serves not only as an investigation on studying Chinese soft power but also as a valuable study on identifying how China has transformed into a study destination for students from developing countries. The following chapter serves as my literature review, wherein I delve deeply into the BRI and its soft power elements, utilizing the findings of previous researchers who have studied the initiative. Moreover, it highlights the significance of the education component as one of the four principal soft power elements of the BRI. 32 Chapter 2. The Belt and Road Initiative and its Concentration on Education China's significant financial commitments to initiatives such as BRI have prompted increased scrutiny of the concept of soft power in academic research concerning China. Despite the implementation of several strategies related to education and research within the BRI, academic diplomacy has received the least attention thus far from scholars who are focusing on the BRI (Peters 2020). Through initiatives like BRI, China has employed advanced strategies in line with its foreign policy to maximize the effectiveness of education in its soft power mission. Moreover, this chapter scrutinizes the debates surrounding the implementation of the BRI and its emphasis on soft power and education, with the objective of evaluating the current academic understanding of education in Chinese soft power. 2.1. The Belt and Road Initiative The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, featuring two central proposals. The first of these proposals was the "Silk Road Economic Belt," which was introduced during a visit to Kazakhstan in September. This initiative aimed to reinvigorate historic land-based trade routes that connected China to Europe through Central Asia. The second proposal, the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road," was put forth in Indonesia in October, with a focus on bolstering sea-based trade routes between China and Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe (Huang 2016). The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, who assumed office in 2013, swiftly captured the attention of both domestic and international 33 audiences upon the launch of this project. Subsequently, over 140 countries signed on to participate in this initiative. As Rolland (2017, 136) notes, The Belt and Road Initiative attempts to combine all of the elements of Chinese power and to use all the nation’s strengths and advantages in order to achieve these ends. China’s banks, SOEs, diplomats, security specialists, intellectuals, and media have all been summoned to join in this effort. The aforementioned statement underscores the considerable focus that China has allocated to this endeavour, not only in terms of financial resources but also in terms of the substantial non-financial affiliations and connections that have been expended in the name of BRI. According to Nedopil (2024) China has invested 1.053 trillion dollars for BRI, with 634 Billion on Construction investments and 419 Billion on non-financial investments. Several scholars and political analysts have drawn comparisons between BRI and the 1948 United States' Economic Recovery Act for Europe, also known as the Marshall Plan (Shen and Chan 2018; Ru 2023). Both the United States in 1945 and China in 2013 were prominent world industrial powers, grappling with domestic overcapacity and inadequate capacity for global markets to bolster their economies further. Both countries had an adversarial global power by the time they implemented these initiatives. As a result, they sought to enhance their standing in the world by amassing an increasing number of nations into their alliance (Shen and Chan 2018). The subsequent sub-chapter will concentrate on the main objectives that underpin the introduction of BRI, which represents a substantial investment of both financial and non-financial resources on the part of China to establish an infrastructure development alliance. 34 2.2. The objectives behind the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative The introduction of the BRI has triggered substantial discussion and debate across various academic fields. Some of these debates focused on the project's feasibility (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019), its ecological consequences (Hardiman 2020), and the possible difficulties it could present to both the developed and developing nations (Gonzalez Jauregui 2021). These were some of the most contentious issues discussed in relation to this endeavor. However, there is another area that has consistently sparked extensive debate, with experts presenting diverse perspectives supported by varied arguments. In short, the discussion revolves around the actual impetus and aims behind China's introduction of this initiative. Nevertheless, the action plan of the BRI presented a perspective that demonstrates a more cooperative foundation and an objective of mutual benefits as the primary expectation of this extensive project. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries. This perspective presents a potentially viable approach to addressing the global challenges currently unfolding. The world economy is once again experiencing a period of instability, with developing nations being particularly susceptible to its effects. Consequently, the objective presented by the BRI offers a compelling proposition for developing countries to identify a pathway for economic growth and development. Nevertheless, the academic and expert 35 community outside China has not accepted this as the sole objective or the appropriate objective of this initiative. Upon examining the studies conducted on the purpose of the BRI, it becomes evident that there are two main camps that present arguments based on the fundamental goals associated with China’s implementing of the project. The first camp asserts that the BRI was initially implemented to address internal challenges, while the second perspective argues that the primary purpose of the BRI is to advance China's geopolitical objectives. However, it is worth noting that the second camp has become more prevalent with a higher number of publications discussing the geopolitical objectives of the initiative. Moving forward, I contend that China introduced BRI with the intention of fulfilling both domestic and geopolitical goals. In the next section I expand on these two spheres in more detail. 2.2.1. Strategic Response to China's Domestic Challenges "The BRI strategy was formed in the context of political–economic crises, as state agencies were deeply fragmented; well-reasoned and practiced policy proposals could not rally cross-agency support. ... Xi’s concentration of power at the top also disguised the fact that agents in the Chinese state have ample ways to interpret and improvise the BRI to suit their own functional priorities, which may or may not conform to the autocrat’s intent." (Ye 2020)- It is well documented that the Chinese government has intensified its efforts to control and suppress various influential business elites, activists, journalists, government officials, academics, religious groups, and even lucrative businesses such as online gaming (Stewart, 36 Grabe, and Zheng 2024; Bader 2024). It appears that questioning the rule of the CCP currently comes with severe consequences. From Deng Xiaoping's leadership until the early years of Xi Jinping, it could be argued that China experienced significant reforms that transformed its authoritarian conditions into a more relaxed political, economic, and social environment. However, under Xi Jinping's current leadership, China appears to be reverting to a state reminiscent of the Mao era, which occurred several decades prior. While it has not yet reached the level of Mao's authoritarianism, an analysis of its progression suggests a trajectory towards that direction. However, under the current leadership of Xi Jinping, China has transformed into a state that resembles the country during Mao's era several decades ago. The policies implemented in the post-Mao era to prevent the resurgence of Mao's dictatorial style in China have largely been abolished under Xi's leadership, dismantling the renowned "collective leadership" approach that had prevailed in China for the past two decades (Shirk 2022). According to (Šebok 2024, 73), The CCP has undergone a dynamic reform process over the past decades, which did not bring democratization but the optimization and professionalization of processes within the autocratic system. The Communist Party was thus able to maintain its power, even while most other communist regimes in the world gradually collapsed. However, many of these adjustments have been reversed by Xi Jinping, and Chinese politics is currently in flux. It is crucial to determine the factors that led the current leadership to depart from the prevailing system and heighten the authoritarian tendencies of CCP. In the past decade, numerous experts have highlighted the growing domestic challenges in China, which have 37 resulted in various adverse consequences that have raised doubts about the CCP's capacity to address these issues. Xi Jinping assumed leadership during a period of political instability in the country, characterized by a range of domestic challenges including corruption, labor unrest, limited prospects for the emerging middle class, and high rates of youth unemployment. The current regime's actions have raised concerns about the future of the CCP's ability to govern effectively and address the country's growing domestic challenges (Overholt 2012; Ye 2020). The extent of labor unrest escalated considerably, prompting certain experts to characterize China as the emerging epicenter of global labor unrest (Elfstrom 2021). Due to this profound distress in Chinese society, the CCP was confronted with an exceedingly difficult predicament concerning the legitimization of its authority. To address these emerging challenges within the country, President Xi Jinping, who recently assumed office, needed a comprehensive and effective strategy that would demonstrate to the Chinese public that the government is actively working towards resolving these concerns. Before implementing the current authoritarian approach, Xi Jinping initially introduced the BRI, which momentarily enhanced trust and stability in his leadership within the domestic context. According to Hayes (2020), he argues that Xi Jinping employed the BRI as a strategic tool to achieve the "China Dream," thereby consolidating his authority within China and facilitating the implementation of his leadership. However, despite its initial successes, the CCP continues to grapple with significant domestic challenges, raising doubts about the BRI's capacity to address China's growing domestic issues. According to this perspective, China introduced the BRI with the primary objective of enhancing growth capacity for its strained domestic market, which requires additional 38 opportunities. However, it is important to consider why an initiative focused on the aforementioned objective is funding foreign nationals of developing countries for their higher education. There are several potential reasons for this approach, but two main factors will be discussed here. Firstly, in addition to infrastructure deficiencies, developing countries often lack the human resources necessary for such initiatives due to insufficient educational resources to develop the required skills. Hence, funding the youth of developing countries for their education will create a human resource force that will help China to more successfully implement their initiatives. The Education Action Plan of the BRI, under the theme of Cultivating Supportive Talent, emphasized that, We will spare no effort in cultivating the much-needed talent for the Belt and Road Initiative to support policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, and financial integration among the Belt and Road countries. (Yue 2017) Second, and of greater significance, these individuals can demonstrate their appreciation to China for this transformative opportunity, which will enable China to enhance the effectiveness of its initiatives. This second potential reason will be deeply discussed in the upcoming chapters. Furthermore, in the context of China-Sri Lanka relations, China requires Sri Lanka's involvement in multiple aspects. Sri Lanka is situated in one of the most strategically significant shipping corridors globally. It serves as a major port that facilitates the movement of goods across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Despite its limited infrastructure, Sri Lanka has been regarded as a crucial refueling and 39 transshipment port for larger vessels. Approximately 80% of the world's oil trade traverses this route. Consequently, for China, which seeks to expand into more global markets, Sri Lanka represents a critical location to enhance its secure supply chain system, enabling the movement of goods with increased security. This argument is considered one of the primary reasons for China to enhance its diplomatic and soft power initiatives in Sri Lanka, as increased control over Sri Lanka provides China with greater security and infrastructure for the movement of goods to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (Kelegama 2014). 2.2.2. China’s Geopolitical Objectives Since its establishment in 1949, the governance of CCP in China has consistently engendered a contentious relationship with Western powers, primarily attributable to the disparate political and ideological fault lines associated with Communism. Nevertheless, the inherent interdependence within the global economy, facilitated by the capitalist economic system, has averted the potential for this rivalry to escalate into a violent confrontation (Weede 2010). One prominent example is the U.S.-China trade war that started in 2018. This conflict involved significant economic measures, including tariffs and trade restrictions, and highlighted deeper ideological differences regarding trade policies and economic strategies. The trade war underscores the broader competition between China and Western nations over economic dominance and influence on the global stage (Chong and Li 2019). Historically, China has been regarded as one of the most powerful civilizations in the world. However, the imperial missions and forms of colonization by Europe and Japan have led to the loss of its former glory. According to Modongal (2016, 01), 40 Nationalism in China emerged through historical experiences of greatness and humiliation. Until the 19th century, the Chinese were proud of its civilization and considered themselves as the center of the world. Humiliation in the wars with Britain and Japan created new feelings of nationalism in China. The nature of nationalism changed according to variation in its relationship with western countries. It could be argued that Chinese nationalism is rooted in the idea of reclaiming past glories. This viewpoint attributes Western colonization as a chief contributor to the decline of China's former grandeur. The colonization by European powers and the invasions by Japan from 1839 to 1949 inflicted humiliation upon China, significantly influencing the development of contemporary nationalism in the country (Tang and Darr 2012). Furthermore, the state-led nationalism that was associated with the communist ideology espoused by the CCP played a significant role in enhancing this view. China faces a daunting task in surpassing Western influence in global affairs, given that the current international system is largely shaped by Western ideological interests. The colonial period provided European countries with the opportunity to cement their global power and hegemonic interests in various social, political, and economic spheres that have become dominant throughout the twentieth century. In their efforts to modernize and become a global superpower, even China has had to adopt certain Western capitalist economic principles while maintaining its communist political system (Tisdell 2009). However, several academics contend that the current global economic system underpinned by Western European power possesses a noteworthy deficiency, which has become increasingly visible in recent years. This weakness is due to the underdeveloped regions on the periphery of the current global economic system (Halvorson 2013; Wallerstein 41 1976). Following the work of Wallerstein, I am referring to countries that have been unable to achieve their anticipated political, economic, or social objectives within the current Western-based global economic system. These nations are often left behind in terms of development and face considerable barriers to keeping up with the rest of the world. Due to the failure to achieve certain objectives, there has been a rise in anti-Western sentiment, resulting in some political parties advocating for a more localized and independent form of nationalism (Smith and Wiest 2012). As a consequence, China has taken advantage of this rising anti-Western sentiment in various parts of the developing world to enhance its global influence as an emerging superpower. Additionally, China's implementation of a state capitalist market system has allowed it to achieve substantial economic growth, thereby providing it with the financial means to support its geopolitical ambitions (Schweinberger 2014). The BRI was initiated by China with the promotion of using the peripheral states surrounding China as a model to stimulate infrastructure investment-driven development in those countries. For example, as part of the roll-out of the BRI, China was able to invest billions of dollars in member states, which allowed them to exert significant influence over the political, economic, and social systems of these developing nations. The BRI was initiated by capitalizing on the increasing anti-Western sentiment in peripheral nations and seeking further geopolitical benefits through stronger ties with these nations. Despite some current uncertainties about the future of this initiative, when it was first launched, it was met with considerable excitement and promise, with over 150 nations worldwide, including 18 European Union countries, joining the program. The question arises as to why an initiative intended to enhance China's global influence incorporates a program that funds foreign nationals for their higher education and research. The primary rationale appears to be that this approach will produce individuals who have 42 studied in China with Chinese financial support, potentially fostering favorable attitudes towards China. This, in turn, may benefit China’s geopolitically significant initiatives. However, this is a complex generalization that requires further clarification through empirical research. This study will provide valuable elucidation of this rationale; however, to obtain a comprehensive understanding, additional studies focusing on ground-level research are necessary in other countries as well. Furthermore, in the context of China-Sri Lanka relations, as in the domestic-centered perspective, this geopolitical perspective holds significant importance for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's strategic location in the center of the Indian Ocean presents the potential for surveillance and establishing a secure position in a region where China's traditional rival, India, has historically maintained dominance. Numerous scholars assert that Sri Lanka is crucial for China in securing and expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean region and, moreover, in consolidating its influence. India and the United States have consistently and explicitly expressed their opposition to China's presence in Sri Lanka. 2.3. Weaving Influence: The Soft Power Tools of China's Belt and Road Initiative The BRI was formulated using various strategies that have the capacity to function as a soft power tool, primarily aimed at attracting developing nations. I have selected four key soft power tools from this initiative that are closely aligned with China's geopolitical goals. These tools are a) the leveraging of the historical Silk Road, b) the development model of the BRI, c) the action plan of the BRI, and d) the academic components of the BRI. 43 2.3.1. The name that evokes the historical Silk Road The BRI and its ties to the history of the Silk Road is an important aspect of Chinese soft power. The Silk Road, which connected China and the East through the Middle East and Europe, was an intricate network of trade routes that emerged during the Han Dynasty in China around 130 B.C. to facilitate regular trade with the West. These routes persisted until 1453, when the Ottoman Empire declined trade with China and obstructed their passage. The term "Silk Road" was first used by German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877, four centuries after the decline of this network of commercial routes (Chin 2013). Cultural geographer Tim Winter (2023: 133) defines the BRI as “Geo cultural imaginary of connected pasts, that is the Silk Road, one that spans oceans and continents, is thus portrayed as a heritage of shared values – harmony, dialogue, mutual respect – around which prosperous shared futures, even a ‘shared destiny’ can be built”. Hence, the term "Silk Road" possesses a great capacity to evoke a sense of romanticized nostalgia for the imagined past grandeur of countries that were once a part of it. However, one significant obstacle that China faces in its pursuit of soft power interests is overcoming the fears associated with China as a communist and authoritarian nation, that does not easily align with the political systems of countries that follow a liberal ideology (Peng 2004). Thus, in response to these concerns there was a need for a better narrative that could bolster their prospects of success in the world. In this context, the resurgence of the historical term 'Silk Road' could be used as a suitable soft power strategy to highlight the illustrious civilization networks of the past and garner positive perceptions from international communities. Given that the Silk Road was historically characterized by principles of unity, mutual respect, collaboration, and shared values (Winter 2021), its contemporary reincarnation 44 through the framework of the BRI has helped confer significant diplomatic significance. It is hoped that this image will hold great allure, especially for peripheral states that possess a rich historical legacy but lack adequate representation in the current global order. 2.3.2. The development model of the BRI One of the most attractive components of the BRI is the implementation of a customized development model that closely aligns with the objectives of developing countries. According to Wallerstein (1976), the current world system is in a state of crisis, and peripheral states are not being afforded sufficient opportunities to attain their development objectives. Despite the fact that the existing system has embedded certain modern aspirations and dreams in various peripheral nations, it has not afforded them with adequate pathways to reach those objectives. The development model within the BRI has been proposed as a means of addressing some of these disparities by positioning China as a benevolent nation willing to invest in their achievement of these goals. Due to China's remarkable economic growth over the past three decades this has granted it the capacity to offer financial assistance to countries in need. China's practice of providing loans to developing nations with limited restrictions to qualify for a loan has been successful in many ways. However, it has also raised concerns about ethics and transparency. While Western countries aligned with global financial organizations typically require governments to meet certain criteria when seeking loans, such as demonstrating progress in areas like transparency, human rights, anti-corruption efforts, and democratic governance, China does not adhere to these same standards (Hernandez 2017). The lack of these contingencies on China's loans has led to criticism surrounding its lending practices, particularly in light of allegations of corruption and human rights abuses in some of the countries that have received these loans. As a result, there are concerns that China's lending 45 practices may not always be in the best interests of the recipient countries or their citizens (Morris, Parks, and Gardner 2020). As noted, the Chinese government does not frequently ask for such conditions as a prerequisite for providing financial assistance (Hernandez 2017). As a result, numerous leaders around the world who engage in autocratic governments, corrupt systems, and human rights violations have been able to obtain financial benefits without encountering the same restrictions they would face when borrowing from global financial institutions or certain Western nations. While these lending practices may appear unethical in a democratic context, it has become an attractive method for gaining flavour with leaders who share similar interests with China, including anti-western sentiment. To summarize, the BRI has introduced a development model that has become an attractive tool for developing nations in two main ways. Firstly, it offers essential financial capital to emerging nations that require investment opportunities of this nature. Secondly, it offers some flexible eligibility criteria compared to other lending institutions or countries with clear restrictions on accessing financial assistance. These two techniques have played an important role in enticing numerous leaders from developing nations to seek financial aid from China and subsequently participate in the BRI program. 2.3.3. The Action Plan of the Belt and Road Initiative I believe that the overall promotional campaign for the BRI was to elicit a positive response from developing countries through its persuasive soft power means. The action plan commences with a preface that highlights the historical significance of the Silk Road and proposes it as a remedy for contemporary economic challenges. 46 In the 21st century, a new era marked by the theme of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, it is all the more important for us to carry on the Silk Road Spirit in face of the weak recovery of the global economy, and complex international and regional situations. (The State Council 2015) Subsequently, it focuses on the principles underlying this endeavor, with the notable selection of the famous ‘Five Ideals of Peaceful Coexistence (Hépíng gòngchǔ wǔ xiàng yuánzé)’ as its foundational principles. The five principles refer to the foreign relations principles of the Chinese government, which were initially introduced in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement. These principles are mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Dai 2019). All five of these notions are intricately connected to China's ambition to become a global superpower. Over the past half-century, the United States has faced widespread condemnation for its military interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore, certain Western countries, particularly the United States, have been accused of meddling in the internal political affairs of various developing nations. Consequently, anti-Western sentiments have proliferated globally, with calls for noninterference, non-aggression, and harmonious relations (E. Y. J. Lee 2023). Therefore, China could potentially capitalize on the aforementioned values to further the BRI by aligning itself with the tenets of noninterference, non-aggression, and harmonious relations. Nevertheless, China's stance on nonintervention has faced considerable criticism in recent times, as a number of global incidents have accused China of exerting influence in internal political and trade affairs (Dreher et al. 2019). Drawing on the principles of 'win-win 47 cooperation,' the initiative has promoted a framework that emphasizes the mutually beneficial nature of international partnerships. This approach has become increasingly popular among developing countries, who have come to recognize that traditional forms of cooperation have not effectively supported their interests. China, in particular, aims to fill this void by employing these principles associated with the BRI and cultivate closer bilateral relations. By prioritizing mutual benefits, the initiative aims to create cooperative relationships that are both effective and sustainable (Alves 2013). Another crucial component of the BRI action plan is the emphasis on 'people-to-people ties', which focuses on fostering interpersonal connections at the grassroots level between various individuals or organizations. These can be either official or unofficial, and the BRI has recognized them as a crucial component of this project (He 2022). With this emphasis people-to-people connections, it has afforded China with the opportunity to wield influence over individuals who are involved in politics, trade, and social decision-making at the grassroots level. This study has particularly accentuated this domain, as academic diplomacy operates as a subsystem within the BRI that fosters the development of novel interpersonal connections. At its core, the action plan for the BRI serves as an effective soft power instrument, incorporating both allure and practical utility. 2.4. The Academic Component of the Belt and Road Initiative A decade ago, the option of pursuing higher education in China was not a popular choice among Sri Lankan students, and few were aware of the possibility. Prior to this time, the opportunity was primarily available to those who possessed a comprehensive understanding of Mandarin. With the launching of the BRI, China's higher education system made significant 48 strides in welcoming international students. By offering a multitude of English-medium degree programs, China eliminated a number of language barriers and created more opportunities for students worldwide. When I initially departed for China, I was unaware of any relatives or friends who had gone there for higher education. However, today I am aware that almost a dozen of my relatives and friends have undertaken their higher education in China. The increasing popularity of Chinese higher education among Sri Lankans, among other nations, is attributable to the attractive programs and financial assistance it offers to international students. The most significant aspect of the Chinese higher education system is the extensive provision of scholarships. Every year, thousands of students come to China to pursue their academic and research programs, thanks to these scholarships. The Belt and Road scholarship program provides annual scholarships to ten thousand international students, in addition to numerous national and provincial scholarship programs (Jain 2021). The number of scholarships awarded to international students by the BRI significantly exceeds the combined total of the 4,000 Full Bright Scholarships granted annually by the United States, as well as the 1,600 Chevening Scholarships awarded yearly by the United Kingdom (Fullbright Online 2024; Rayner 2022) The other major component of the BRI’s academic initiative was the introduction of Collaborative research centers established around the world where Chinese academic institutions like the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) have helped to foster overseas collaborations with many developing countries. As Jain (2021: 112) states, CAS is spear-heading research projects in BRI participating countries, having also contributed US$268 million since 2013, apart from training around 5,000 high-level sci-tech talent from the BRI region. Under the BRI’s banner, CAS 49 has set up research centers in South America, Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia in the fields of astronomy, research and education, ecology and environment, drug development, space weather, biodiversity, and innovation cooperation. China's establishment of collaborative research centers within foreign institutions as part of the BRI has not only facilitated a larger presence of international students in these settings, but also has enabled the country to enter the post-secondary setting of numerous countries. Chinese institutions have established research centers within the universities of other countries, which has facilitated greater internal engagement with post-secondary institutions in those countries under the guise of collaborative research centers. In addition to the thousands of international students who have studied in China, hundreds of students have been able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by these partnerships. However, it is crucial to recognize how academic initiatives also serve as potential instruments of soft power. As an illustration, let's consider the recent elections in Sri Lanka. Notably, these elections are infamous for the billions of rupees that politicians spend to increase their voting base. In the run-up to elections, they often provide houses, jobs, scholarships, and other benefits to the predominantly impoverished community. As a result, there exists a longstanding tradition of political loyalty that transcends generations. It is not uncommon for a person's grandchild to vote for the same politician who once helped their grandfather. This generational patronage of voting has helped establish a permanent support base for politicians, ensuring their continued success in various elections. Although this context is different from the focus of our discussion, there is a high likelihood that the same phenomenon could occur in the realm of public diplomacy in Sri Lanka. Providing scholarships to students to obtain a degree can be 50 a valuable opportunity for China to foster long-lasting, loyal relationships not only with the recipients of the scholarships, but also with their families. This initiative can have far-reaching benefits for China, as it can help to create a positive image of the country among the students and their families, which can lead to increased goodwill and support for China in the future. This is just one example of how soft power works within these academic initiatives; however, this study has focused on some of the more advanced and complex soft power tools that have emerged as different tools used within these initiatives. 2.5. Conclusion In this chapter, I have provided a comprehensive analysis of the various soft power tools employed by the BRI and the significant attention that has been devoted to its post-secondary and scientific projects. In recent years the BRI has garnered considerable debate among various scholars, politicians, and policy experts. During the initial phase of the program, numerous scholars offered diverse perspectives regarding the underlying motivation for its implementation, with many characterizing it as a geopolitical initiative introduced by China to enhance its status as a global superpower. Nevertheless, certain scholars have posited that this initiative is a domestically oriented endeavor, wherein China sought expanded foreign markets as a means to address its domestic overcapacity. This study has acknowledged the significance of both these viewpoints. This chapter also identified four primary categories of soft power tools associated with the BRI as recognized by the existing scholarship on the topic. The entire initiative comprises multiple soft power components for developing countries, and these components have been categorized into four main classifications. Among these, education is argued to be a crucial 51 soft power tool within the BRI framework, but it has not received as much attention in academic literature as the other three tools. This study has further elucidated the evolution of China's academic programs from their minimal attention a couple of decades ago to their current prominence. The extant literature demonstrates that the BRI and associated programs have established a substantial foundation for China's academic diplomacy abroad, facilitating its increased prominence and influence, bolstered by significantly augmented financial resources and international collaborative platforms. However, there is a paucity of academic findings available to identify the methods that these programs have employed to achieve this development. In the following chapters, I have presented several soft power tools within China's academic diplomacy mission parallel to the BRI. 52 Chapter 3. The Impact of the Belt and Road Education Plan in Sri Lanka: An Analysis of Higher Education and Scholarship Recipient Experiences This chapter's primary objective is to examine the Belt and Road Education Plan, and other associated scholarly endeavours implemented by China in Sri Lanka. To achieve this objective, the chapter commences with an overview of the higher education system of Sri Lanka and discusses some of the reasons behind the growing appeal of Chinese academic initiatives among Sri Lankans during the post-war period. Furthermore, this chapter employs findings derived from interviews conducted with previous recipients of the scholarships to examine some of the impacts they have encountered as a result of earning those scholarships. Drawing on these interviews and relevant literature, the objective is to ascertain some of the effects that have emerged within the academic, governmental, and commercial sectors in Sri Lanka. 3.1. The higher education system in Sri Lanka: A critical analysis In Chapter One, I elaborated on the difficulties I experienced in confronting the harsh reality of entering the higher education system in Sri Lanka. In this chapter, I will further explore the challenges faced by the nation's youth within the higher education system and the factors that compel them to consider studying abroad in countries such as China. The higher education system in Sri Lanka comprises four distinct types of institutions. These four categories consist of State Universities, private non-profit educational institutions, higher educational institutes, and private universities. However, the system is largely dominated by State Universities, which are governed by the University Grants Commission (UGC) of Sri Lanka, followed by other 53 higher educational institutes that are overseen by the Ministry of Higher Education (Weerasinghe and Fernando 2018). In 1944, C.W.W. Kannangara, a highly esteemed and influential politician in Sri Lanka, successfully implemented the policy of free education. This policy granted all Sri Lankans equal access to primary, intermediate, and tertiary education without charge, regardless of any form of discrimination. Due to the free education system in Sri Lanka, citizens are able to access primary, middle, secondary and post-secondary education without incurring tuition fees. Furthermore, the government provides all textbooks and uniforms free of charge, enabling students to pursue their education without a financial burden (Alawattegama 2020). Thus far, the narrative of the higher education system appears to present a well-organized structure that benefits from state funding. Nonetheless, upon closer examination of enrollment data from state universities, it becomes evident that this system has several issues and drawbacks that have not been rectified through successful reforms after its inspection. According to the University Grant Commission (2021), 272,682 individuals took the examination for admission to state universities in 2021, with 163,160 of them meeting the eligibility criteria. However, the capacity of state universities was limited to accommodate only 31,415 new coming students. The disheartening reality is that even when students meet the prerequisites, they may still find themselves unable to attend a public university. This is exemplified by the fact that a substantial number of qualified students, a total of 131,745 to be precise, faced the disappointment of having their dreams of pursuing higher education at a state institution thwarted. Furthermore, within the group of students who are qualified, a significant proportion are compelled to abandon their preferred area of study due to the hierarchical nature 54 of the z-score system7, which dictates the specific field in which they are eligible for admission (Wijesinghe et al. 2023). The scarcity of public universities in Sri Lanka has resulted in an increased level of competition among high school students for better opportunities for higher education. Numerous scientists and scholars in Sri Lanka have voiced the necessity for a comprehensive restructuring of the higher education system, citing its antiquated structure as being at odds with the present-day educational demands (Alawattegama 2020; Tharmaseelan 2007). Tharmaseelan further stated that the process of colonization in Sri Lanka resulted in the establishment of an education system that aimed to train students for roles within an outdated colonial administrative system. The persistence of this trend can be observed in the contemporary Sri Lankan university system, which places a higher emphasis on preparing individuals for government positions rather than for advanced globalized industrial and innovative roles. In contrast, it could be posited that the contemporary European education system has embraced a more flexible and adaptable approach, resulting in individuals prepared for a diverse array of roles in numerous sectors, which are well-suited for the present global landscape (Tharmaseelan 2007). Deplorably, the university system in Sri Lanka has not been able to successfully carry out the necessary adjustments to furnish students with the aptitudes and knowledge required by contemporary employment markets. The outdated nature of this arrangement has led to individuals grappling with securing employment prospects in the modern-day job market. As per a report by the University Grants Commission of Sri Lanka, 7 The Z-score system in Sri Lanka represents a statistical methodology employed to standardize student performance in the Advanced Level (G.C.E. A/L) examinations, facilitating equitable university admissions. This system accounts for variations in examination difficulty across different disciplines, thereby ensuring a fair assessment of candidates. This approach is implemented in conjunction with the island-wide and district quota system (Warnapala and Silva 2011). 55 the unemployment rate for state sector graduates is 32.2%, with arts stream graduates exhibiting the highest rate at 50.4%. Unfortunately, the arts stream produces the highest number of graduates in Sri Lanka's higher education system. The aforementioned research indicates that the unemployment rate for university graduates in the non-state sector is also 34% (UGC 2021; Gunaratne, Ramanayake, and Panagoda 2018). It is imperative to consider that the data mentioned above was acquired between 2017 and 2018, a time when Sri Lanka did not undergo an economic disaster. The current statistics would likely display a more deplorable situation due to the heightened levels of stress experienced by numerous organizations resulting from the economic collapse and political turmoil faced by the country. Considering these factors, it is not surprising that universities in Sri Lanka have shown subpar performance in global university ranking systems. Prominent global post-secondary ranking systems such as Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), Times Higher Education (THE), and Shanghai Ranking Consultancy (ARWU) are widely acknowledged as the primary organizations for evaluating university rankings on a worldwide scale. Despite the various critiques associated with the accuracy and sustainable nature of ranking systems, they have emerged as a significant criterion for assessing the prestige of modern-day institutions of higher education. The University of Peradeniya and the University of Colombo are the only two universities from Sri Lanka that have been included in the QS World Rankings. However, it is notable that neither institution secured a position within the top 1000 in the aforementioned list. Four state universities in Sri Lanka have been included in the Times Higher Education rankings, yet none of these institutions have been able to secure a position among the top 1000 institutions. The presence of ranking systems serves as compelling evidence that Sri Lanka, although boasting 56 one of the highest literacy rates in Asia, faces significant challenges within its higher education system. These challenges have a detrimental impact on the lives of the country's youth. 3.2. BRI education plan as an opportunity for achieving the dream of entering higher education. In view of the unfavorable attitudes towards pursuing higher education in Sri Lanka, China has become a preferred destination for students seeking higher education in recent years. In order to gain insight into the factors that influenced participants' decisions to choose China as their preferred study abroad destination, research participants were asked to provide their own rationale for selecting China. The majority of undergraduate participants whom I interviewed indicated that the shortcomings of the local higher education system were a significant factor in their decision to choose China. According to Sandun, who finished his bachelor of engineering degree in Western China, I sat for the second attempt of my advanced-level examination targeting the engineering faculty of the University of Peradeniya. As I remember, I had a district rank of 320th, and that was not enough to get into the University of Peradeniya. My best friend also had a similar ranking as mine, and he was the one who suggested for me to go to China first. Anne, hailing from Kurunegala district in the Northwestern province, expressed her exasperation at not being chosen for her preferred field, despite obtaining favourable results on the exam, 57 The time was truly difficult for me. While failing the exam was acceptable, being disappointed despite achieving good results and not being selected was disheartening. I had high hopes when the results were announced, but when my enrollment results showed that I was selected to study physical science instead of engineering, my lifelong dream, I felt disheartened. However, during this challenging period, a family friend suggested an opportunity for me in China. The esteemed faculties of Engineering and Medicine are widely recognized as the most competitive academic faculties to get admission within the country. The prevalent cultural perception in South Asia regarding the elevated prestige associated with degrees such as engineering and medical has resulted in intense competition among students vying for admission into these respective programs (De Silva 2017). According to the data provided by the University Grant Commission, a total of 1967 students were granted admission to one of the 12 medical colleges in Sri Lanka in the year 2020, despite the prevailing lack of medical officers in the country. The Engineering faculties in Sri Lanka have admitted only 2466 students for various engineering degrees in the same academic year (UGC 2021). Due to the scarcity of available seats, a significant number of students are unable to fulfill their ambitions of studying in their preferred field each year. At present, there are no private medical institutions in Sri Lanka, but some students have opted to pursue their engineering aspirations by enrolling in private engineering colleges. One of the primary reasons why numerous students opt to study in China rather than local institutions in Sri Lanka is due to the questionable academic reputation that these institutions maintain. Some of the local institutions in Sri Lanka award degrees that do not meet the standards set by both global and local professional governing bodies in respectable fields. 58 Whereas China has achieved more progress in its academic mobilization and internationalization, which has led to its institutions being accredited by global professional organizations. Anne stated during our interview, My university in China has been granted the Washington Accords, which has presented a significant opportunity for me. Unfortunately, some civil engineering students at private universities that do not possess the Washington Accords are not accepted by the Institute of Engineers Sri Lanka, a crucial step in becoming a licensed engineer in Sri Lanka. As a result, many of these students are unable to secure their desired job due to the lack of acceptability of their degrees, despite investing substantial time and money. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping lifted the restrictions that had previously prevented Chinese students from studying abroad. As a result, a significant number of Chinese students have since travelled to countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European nations to pursue their education at some of the most prestigious universities in the world. The Chinese academic system has experienced considerable success as a result of the decision to incorporate experienced educators and scholars from Western academic institutions. These individuals have helped to enhance the standards of Chinese universities, leading to their current prominence. Furthermore, China has established a robust reputation in the global higher education landscape as one of the most prominent players from the Asian region. According to Xu and Montgomery (2019), China has successfully challenged the dominant position of the Western countries in the international higher education system by altering the movement of students, scholars, and institutions. Although this claim may be subject to debate, there is no denying that China has made substantial progress in modernizing 59 its higher education system, which has enabled its students to achieve greater alignment with international standards. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan higher education system has fallen behind in meeting modern international standards, necessitating extensive reforms to overcome its antiquated nature. As a result, numerous students have recognized China as a viable alternative to their antiquated domestic higher education system, which has been unable to impart upon them the necessary credentials for entry into international and domestic job markets. While studying in China as an international student, I had the opportunity to interact with numerous Sri Lankan students who had chosen to discontinue their degree programs in Sri Lanka and instead enroll in Chinese universities in pursuit of more promising career prospects. Data belonging to this study further indicates that many students who were enrolled in undergraduate degree programs in fields such as general arts, science, or mathematics at local state universities have opted to discontinue their studies due to the perceived limited prospects for future employment. Instead, these individuals have chosen to pursue their academic ambitions in China, with a particular focus on fields that are believed to provide direct employment prospects, such as tourism, engineering, or medicine. Achini, who opted to enroll in a Chinese university through a scholarship, justified her decision to decline her opportunity to study physical science in Sri Lanka by stating the following: Obtaining admission to a public university in Sri Lanka was one of my long-term aspirations. I aimed to excel in my Advanced-level examination and enrolled in the Engineering faculty of the Moratuwa University, which is renowned as the top engineering school in Sri Lanka. Ultimately, I achieved a good result; however, the door to my dream school remained closed due to 60 limited availability. Consequently, I was selected for a degree in physical science, which did not hold considerable job prospects. As a result, I decided to apply to an engineering school in China through the scholarship program. As illustrated by Achini and several other interviewees, a segment of students who were unable to procure admission to the highly competitive state university system in Sri Lanka have gone on to pursue higher education opportunities through scholarship initiatives offered by China. Prior to the implementation of initiatives such as the BRI, individuals who were unable to obtain admission to state universities and sought to acquire a bachelor's degree were confronted with limited options within Sri Lanka. These options mostly comprised either paying a substantial sum to study abroad or enrolling in a local private university, which still entailed significant expenses. Nevertheless, the financial burden proved to be unaffordable for a considerable portion of the lower and middle-class households within the island nation. As a result, the scholarship scheme initiated by the BRI and other Chinese initiatives gained significant popularity among Sri Lankan individuals who were unable to fulfill their aspirations of enrolling in a domestic institution due to inadequate qualifications or financial obligations. According to Anne, who is presently employed as a junior civil engineer at a prominent construction firm in Sri Lanka, Without the scholarship I received, I wouldn't have been able to obtain a degree or land a high-paying job by now. I come from a modest background and my mother passed away while my father works as a schoolteacher in Sri Lanka, where teachers are paid very little. It would have been impossible for him to cover my overseas educational expenses. Therefore, the Chinese scholarship 61 became my only means of pursuing higher education after I failed to meet the university entrance qualification marks. I have encountered numerous Sri Lankan students in China who hail from families that fall below the poverty line. Relying solely on scholarship funds, some of these students even took on jobs to provide for their loved ones back home. One of my fellow university students, who happened to be a roommate of mine, faced considerable financial hardships at home during our time at college. Despite this, he managed to get by solely on scholarship funds and had to make do with the most affordable food options available in the university canteen to satisfy his hunger. We often provided him with sustenance to assist him in economizing resources for his personal use. Despite grappling with the challenges of his mental health, he persevered and managed to secure good grades with the aid of a scholarship. After coming back to Sri Lanka, I didn't hear from him for a few years until I received a message from him on Facebook. It was heartening to learn that he was currently serving as a marketing manager at one of the leading government-controlled factories in the country, where his mother had toiled for years as a general factory worker. He told me that if he did not receive a scholarship from China, he would have likely ended up as a general factory worker in a large government factory in his village, like his mother and several of his close friends. The Chinese scholarship programs offered in Sri Lanka have enabled hundreds of students like this to upgrade their life standards, with this particular success story being just one of many. Several participants in this study indicated that the unfavourable economic situation in Sri Lanka prompted them to explore China as their preferred choice, mostly due to the availability of scholarship programs. The confluence of the COVID-19 epidemic and governmental economic incompetence has precipitated a dire circumstance, wherein the nation's inflation 62 rate reached an all-time high at 69.8% in September of 2022 (CBSL 2022). This had a substantial impact on households, as they were compelled to exert greater reliance on fundamental subsidies, so constraining their financial capacity to allocate resources towards areas like education. A survey done in June 2022 by Save the Children International revealed that a significant proportion, notably 60%, of households in Sri Lanka lack adequate food resources to meet their daily consumption needs (Burgess et al. 2022). Some scholars even emphasize the importance of government and other educational authorities implementing school food programs as a means to prevent children from discontinuing their education. In times of economic difficulty, students who are unable to gain admission to a state university may also face significant challenges in affording the costly tuition and living expenses associated with private universities or overseas educational institutions. Furthermore, Sri Lanka is currently grappling with a scarcity of foreign currency, which has resulted in banks imposing strict limitations on the sale of foreign currencies (Nandy, Abdullah-Al-Mamun, and Akon 2023). Due to these factors, the pursuit of higher education abroad has become nearly unattainable for numerous aspiring students from various economic backgrounds. Additionally, students who were already studying abroad encountered significant difficulties when local banks limited their parents' ability to transfer funds internationally. The economic crisis has contributed to a scenario wherein students aspiring to study abroad are required to be self-sufficient at their chosen foreign study destinations while bearing the burden of high tuition fees, living expenses, and other related expenses. As a result, a considerable number of students perceive China as a financially secure and comfortable study abroad option due to the abundance of available scholarships. 63 The growing interest in Chinese academic funding programs is not limited to high school graduates; it has also been observed among university graduates and scholars seeking to enhance their academic credentials. As stated by the study's participants, the shortcomings in Sri Lanka's higher education system have had a detrimental effect on postgraduate students who require advanced resources for their research endeavours. Asanka, who currently holds a professorship at a prominent university in Sri Lanka and earned his PhD in China, mentioned: Compared to universities in Sri Lanka, those in China are significantly superior. Even in Asia, they hold a high rank. We observed that the quality of the degrees awarded in terms of research outcomes and practicality is exceptional. I have also spoken with many former PhD students from China who are now thriving in the academic field in Sri Lanka. They attested to the fact that China is an excellent place for PhD students, boasting top-notch facilities, ample research funds, and grants, which enabled them to conduct their research without any obstacles. For many years, a substantial number of scholars from Sri Lanka have chosen to study abroad in major metropolitan destinations in the West, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia, primarily for the purpose of pursuing doctoral studies. However, securing a PhD position in these countries presents numerous challenges that require a significant investment of effort and time to overcome. This task becomes increasingly difficult when originating from a nation such as Sri Lanka, where local institutions are not widely regarded for their excellence. Demonstrating proficiency in meeting the norms of a Western academic institution requires a substantial investment of effort, resulting in a demanding and anxiety-inducing experience. Many academics whom I interviewed emphasized the formidable issue of meeting those 64 entrance requirements and balancing personal commitments such as teaching, administrative duties, and family responsibilities. Nevertheless, it was clearly acknowledged by all participants that China provides a far more flexible and better alternative procedure in terms of the admission criteria for postgraduate study. This factor has served as a significant motivation for numerous candidates, leading them to select China as their preferred study destination and pursue doctoral studies. Sashini, a devoted mother of two and currently serving as the department head of a prestigious university in Sri Lanka, remarked, I must admit that my initial intention was not to pursue my PhD in China. However, I had always dreamed of finishing my PhD studies before turning 35. Realizing that I needed to start my PhD by 2015 to achieve this goal, I began to consider my options. While I had initially hoped to do my PhD in Australia, I was unable to take the IELTS exam at the time due to the demands of caring for my young son, who was only 3 years old. I knew that changing countries mid-way through primary school could have a negative impact on my son, so I decided to prioritize my goal of obtaining my PhD by 35. As a result, I chose China as my destination for my PhD studies, even though it was not my first choice. She was not the only academic who acknowledged the flexibility of China as a potential option for pursuing PhD studies. Asanka, a former PhD student in China, shared a similar perspective, The admission process for PhD programs in Western countries can be extremely stressful due to the highly competitive nature of the system. With hundreds of students vying for just a few spots, the pressure is high. However, in China, the 65 competition is not as intense yet for international students, which made the process easier for me. Additionally, I had many connections with the university in China through colleagues who had previously obtained their masters and PhDs there. Making initial contact with my supervisor was not difficult, and the admission and funding process was relatively smooth after that. During the interviews, it was discovered that the large number of scholars who have previously studied in China has made it simpler for young scholars and graduate students to apply to Chinese institutions with the assistance of these existing academic relationships. These institutions have strong connections with their post-graduate alumni, providing a valuable opportunity for new candidates to apply. This has also served as a stimulus for young scholars who aspire to attain graduate positions, specifically master’s and PhDs. The fact that higher-ranking faculty members in their institutions have attained success due to their PhDs obtained in China has proven to be a significant driving force for these young faculty members to pursue their graduate studies in China. While numerous students highlighted academic and career-related reasons for choosing to study in China, some of them also cited cultural and social factors as contributing to their decision. Attending a Western country was frequently perceived as a significant challenge for numerous individuals residing on the island of Sri Lanka, necessitating the completion of several steps. Many of them regarded Western culture as something inaccessible for them to assimilate. Although this would likely not pose as much of a challenge for middle-class urban residents in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, for an individual originating from a distant rural area, this could have a considerable effect on their decision-making process. Throughout my two-year stay in Canada, I encountered very few individuals from Sri Lanka who were born in rural 66 areas far from the main cities in the country. Nayana, a resident of a remote area in the countryside, shared her account of selecting China as the destination to pursue her master's degree. Despite having the option to apply to universities in any European country due to my high GPA, I was hesitant to pursue studies abroad. My rural upbringing had instilled in me a lack of familiarity with foreign cultures and an unfamiliarity with independent travel. Furthermore, I was worried that cultural barriers would impede my academic focus if I were to study in a Western country. However, my supervisor who was a Buddhist monk had strong ties with China, which allowed me to overcome my apprehensions and study there. The cultural proximity between China and Sri Lanka as Asian countries made me feel more at ease about the potential experience. She currently serves as a schoolteacher in a remote school, and she noted that she is the sole individual among the students and staff who has travelled abroad in her school. Additionally, she has indicated that her pupils at the school consistently demonstrate a strong desire to learn about China, and she frequently shares her personal experiences in China with them. This can be considered an example of the significant impact that China's academic initiatives have had on rural and low-income communities in Sri Lanka, an area that other countries have not prioritized. The greater familiarity with China and the cultural ties between China and Sri Lanka has facilitated China's ability to engage with all segments of Sri Lankan society in their academic diplomacy mission. 67 Given the post-war environment, it is evident that Sri Lankan students have experienced numerous benefits from participating in Chinese scholarship programs. These initiatives have provided crucial opportunities for some individuals to navigate the competitive higher education system in their home country and mitigate the consequences of its limited capacity. By offering financial assistance for their studies, these programs have enabled many students to pursue their dream of studying abroad, which would have otherwise been unattainable. 3.3. The Experiences of Sri Lankan Students Studying in China: Analyzing the Journey as an International Student in China Discussing the influence of the academic component of the BRI necessitates evaluating the academic and non-academic experiences of students who studied in China. This section aims to provide valuable insights into the outcomes achieved by students during their time in China. Typically, international students enrolled in a degree program spend three to seven years in China, depending on the specific program they are pursuing. In the given period, Sri Lankan individuals have been granted the opportunity to forge connections in a variety of areas, encompassing academia, interpersonal relations, and commercial enterprises. 3.3.1. Building Academic and Non-Academic Relationships for International Students in China The fostering of interpersonal connections that bolster research, commerce, and other professional and personal networks can be viewed as an essential element of the BRI. As reported by the participants, their program in China encompassed various official and unofficial components that helped them establish a deep network within the Chinese academic 68 and business communities. The students from Sri Lanka whom I interviewed gained several advantages from adopting this approach. For instance, several individuals who have obtained PhD funding and currently hold academic positions in Sri Lanka have highlighted the ongoing benefits of the research networks they established in China for their research pursuits. As one of the research participants pointed out, Generally, Sri Lankan universities do not provide sufficient funding for our research. But now we have the opportunity to talk with my former supervisors in China and find funds for my research. I cannot obtain money directly for my research. However, I can talk to them and establish a center where I can collaborate with my university in China. The collaborative research center provides me with the necessary financial resources and technological support for my research, including the facilities I require for my research. Financial constraints have consistently represented a major obstacle for scholars in the local academic community. The expenses associated with conducting research are substantial and often exceed the resources allocated by institutions. In recent years, a significant change has been observed in the funding landscape for research in universities worldwide. Notably, there has been a decline in government funding, and private sector funding has experienced a substantial increase (Yu, Dong, and de Jong 2022). In light of the fact that state universities in Sri Lanka offer tuition-free education, their financial stability is heavily dependent on government funding. Unlike some prominent institutions of higher learning worldwide, Sri Lankan universities have not managed to establish a strong presence in the corporate sector, hindering their ability to secure consistent funding from private sources. As a result, researchers affiliated with local institutions often lack adequate financial support for their 69 research from any source. On the other hand, the Chinese government has significantly increased its financial backing for research institutions, leading to a notable rise in the country's national research output in recent times. For instance, between 2008 and 2018, China surpassed the United States as the country with the highest number of peer-reviewed publications, accounting for approximately 20% of all global publications (McCarthy 2020). In addition, the BRI has made significant investments in global research and international collaborations, thereby providing substantial financial support to academic institutions. As a result, Chinese institutions have been allowed to establish connections with foreign institutions and individuals. According to Peters (2020), China has established educational collaborations with 188 countries and areas globally, which has yielded benefits for researchers from nations along the BRI by providing improved research prospects. All of the scholars that were interviewed emphasized that their research work was significantly improved due to their affiliations with Chinese higher educational institutions. Furthermore, the majority of the respondents indicated that they continue to derive technical and financial benefits from their research networks in China, even several years after their graduation. According to Asanka, As a PhD student under the guidance of my supervisor, who was a prominent figure in my field in China, I established a collaborative research center that connects academics from China and Sri Lanka. Currently, I hold the position of co-director at this center, which has enabled my colleagues and me to enjoy several research benefits. Despite having left China more than three years ago, I maintain a strong connection with my former university due to this ongoing collaboration. 70 Based on the findings of this study, it is evident that studying in China offers students advantages that extend beyond academic links. Of particular note, the BRI also facilitate the growth of commercial and industrial networks, thereby playing a crucial role in the establishment of new business ventures and the creation of employment opportunities for international students in their respective countries. Shavin, who completed a Chinese language program and a bachelor's degree in China, emphasized, I did not involve any business activity when I was in China. However, I had many friends not just from Sri Lanka but also from other countries who were involved in business. The basic thing was that they buy different products from Chinese companies and sell them in their home countries. I rarely found anyone who sold goods from their home countries in China. In the realm of commercial and industrial networks, it has been identified that there exist two distinct types of relationships between students and the Chinese business community. The most commonly employed method of fostering commercial relationships involves international students serving as direct business partners for Chinese enterprises, thereby facilitating the expansion of these businesses into their home countries. For instance, a student might establish a direct connection with a Chinese company in order to secure supplies for their business in their home country. The other method of constructing commercial networks involves the participation of international students who function as intermediaries between companies in China and Sri Lanka. Numerous experts who have conducted research on international students in China have reaffirmed the significance of their higher education in facilitating their engagement in transnational economic activities. Haugen (2013), for example, in his research on African students in China, discusses the trend of "traders-turned students." These 71 individuals apply to various university programs in China with the intention of obtaining a longer visa duration, which enables them to pursue their entrepreneurial and trade aspirations. It is widely acknowledged that China has earned the reputation of being the world's factory. The country has emerged as a leading supplier of products ranging from raw materials to advanced technological products for industries across the globe. One of the main characteristics of the Chinese manufacturing system is that it has been able to produce goods affordable to different levels of markets around the world (K. H. Zhang 2006). For many years leading companies in Sri Lanka enjoyed selling Chinese goods in Sri Lanka and earning huge profit margins. This has become a common practice today as many companies around the world have been maintaining their practice of buying cheap goods from China in order to achieve higher profit margins. Numerous international students who intend to study in China have recognized this as a potential to gain additional financial advantages during their stay through engaging in commercial endeavors that provide financial benefits. International students studying in China have gained flexible access to Chinese businesses for a variety of reasons. Prior to delving into the factors that contribute to students' accessibility to Chinese commercial networks, it is crucial to examine the evolution of modern China's presence in the global marketplace. When Deng Xiaoping initiated China's transformation into a manufacturing economy in its early stages, the country's role was to produce goods for Western-based multinational corporations. These companies subsequently sold the goods globally and reaped substantial profits. Although the Chinese leadership was able to achieve financial success through this existing system, they recognized the need to take control of the entire business process and sell products directly to foreign markets in order to achieve greater financial and political development (Kothari, Kotabe, and Murphy 2013). Nonetheless, China 72 faces certain obstacles in achieving this greater success, which originate from its social and cultural environment. Due to a history of colonization spanning several centuries, Western countries have enjoyed certain advantages in integrating with the developing world. For instance, the widespread use of English, which has been established as a globally accepted language as a result of British colonial influence, has facilitated communication between multinational corporations from the United States or the United Kingdom and their counterparts in developing countries. Additionally, Western culture is widely followed in urban areas of the developing world. However, this narrative does not hold true for China. The Chinese language and culture are not familiar to the majority of countries around the world. In Sri Lanka, a country that has historically maintained close ties with China for millennia, the number of locals proficient in the Chinese language and familiar with Chinese culture is relatively small. Therefore, the presence of over 500,000 international students in China has provided the country with a significant opportunity to surmount language and cultural obstacles in its quest for globalization. All students who come to China to pursue a degree program are mandated to complete compulsory Chinese language training as part of their curriculum. Even those enrolled in English-medium degree programs must fulfill these language requirements during their course of study, regardless of the absence of Chinese language prerequisites for admission. As Asanka, a former PhD student, pointed out, These days even though you go for an English medium program in China you still have to complete a lot of Chinese language courses and get through exams like HSK in order to graduate8. That needs lots of investment of time. So, China 8 The HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi) is a standardized proficiency assessment for the Chinese language (Mandarin), specifically designed for non-native speakers. The HSK is considered the third largest language proficiency examination after IELTS and TOEFL (Chinese Tests Service Website 2024). 73 is not freely giving out their money. They are spreading their culture and language. Chinese language training plays a crucial role in this development role for students as well as for China. The results indicate that international students receive extensive language training during their programs, which enhances their proficiency in written and spoken Mandarin. On top of that, when their language ability improves, individuals are afforded the opportunity to integrate with Chinese society, thereby enhancing their awareness and knowledge of Chinese culture and community. Numerous studies have been conducted regarding the obstacles that impede Chinese society's ability to integrate with cultures beyond their culture (Ang 2001; Gao and Prime 2010). Nevertheless, these students receive an exposure to Chinese culture, which facilitates their ability to communicate and engage in social, cultural, or commercial activities with Chinese citizens. According to Sashini, As a foreigner, to deal with Chinese society or to work with them, you should know them first. If they feel that you are aware of their system and culture, then they are more open to working with you. But if they feel you do not have that awareness, they are not ready to work with you. That is where the international students get an opportunity to engage in commercial activities that brings financial benefits. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that the potential for cultivating academic and non-academic connections with Chinese society has provided Sri Lankan students with an advantage in enhancing their lives through both formal and informal networks. Moreover, it 74 was uncovered that these advantages have facilitated some students in establishing permanent careers in both academia and business upon their return to Sri Lanka after graduation. 3.3.2. Employment opportunities as international students The participants I interviewed expressed a diverse range of sentiments regarding the scarcity of employment opportunities they encountered during their stay in China. On one hand, international students are generally prohibited from engaging in employment activities in China, except for internships that are an integral part of their academic program. Nevertheless, numerous students reported incidents in which they and their peers have served as English instructors, sports instructors, or culinary professionals in eateries with a foreign cultural influence. The participants also noted that although there was a prohibition on employment, the authorities did not make significant efforts to prevent overseas students from engaging in work within these domains. Nevertheless, students who were involved in other forms of employment faced significant consequences, including substantial financial penalties and, in certain cases, the threat of deportation. The perceptions of students regarding work prospects after graduation were also found to be quite varied in their responses. For example, a significant proportion of the respondents indicated that they encountered no significant barriers in their job hunt upon completion of their academic program in China. Several engineering students reported being hired by Chinese companies in Sri Lanka directly following their graduation. However, it is important to note that their proficiency in the Chinese language and understanding of Chinese culture, rather than only possessing a degree from China, was considered to be the primary factor influencing their recruitment. Apart from engineering students, there were a few instances where 75 opportunities were recognized for some former Sri Lankan students, particularly those who were hired as translators or Chinese language teachers. 3.3.3. The Impact of Chinese Government Restrictions on Academic Freedom The prior sections of this chapter have focused primarily on what could be deemed the more positive effects of Chinese scholarships among Sri Lankan students. However, a substantial number of students reported experiencing adverse effects while studying in China. Participants enrolled in academic programs such as Communication Studies, Political Science, and Performing Arts emphasized the influence of the Chinese government's restrictions on their academic freedom. Amali, who pursued her undergraduate studies in the United States and subsequently obtained a master's degree from China, stated, In the US, what they do is try to develop your thinking. In addition to giving you subject knowledge, they increase their ability to think critically. However, I did not experience this in China. I also encountered problems with the restrictions imposed by the government in the field that I studied. I studied the field of international relations, which requires freedom of speech for day-to-day academic activities. However, the restrictions from the Chinese government influenced many limitations for our academic acitivites. Another participant, who pursued a degree in performing arts and audio engineering in China, expressed profound discontentment with the constrained resources and restricted freedom resulting from the restrictions and regulations imposed by the Chinese government. In his words, he argued that, 76 If you are doing something related to economics, management, or maybe engineering, it won’t be an issue. But for a person who studies performing arts-type things, you really have to depend on those new media platforms and interactions that are blocked by the Chinese government. That creates many barriers for your learning process as well as future career. He subsequently emphasized that due to various reasons, including those stemming from Chinese government censorship, he ultimately discontinued his degree after completing his first year and relocated to Australia to pursue further studies in performing arts and audio engineering. The findings of this research contribute to the growing body of evidence that underscores the restricted state of academic freedom in China. The participant, having a background in performing arts, emphasized that, according to his acquaintances within the university, there has been a noticeable increase in governmental restrictions in recent years. Furthermore, he mentioned that in the past, they were engaged in musical activities intended for public performances. However, it appears that such events have ceased completely for the current students. Suspicions exist that the prohibition may be related to the influence of "Western-style music culture," which has been popularized by some overseas students. In the latter stage of Xi Jinping's tenure, various instances of restrictions on academic freedom have emerged, culminating in some scholars facing incarceration for their academic pursuits and research findings. One noteworthy case was that of Xu Zhangrun in 2020, which vividly illustrated the strict constraints on academic freedom in China. In accordance with the essay translated into English by Geremie Barmé, Zhangrun (2020) mentions, As I write these words I am forced to reflect on my own situation, one which also dramatically changed in 2018 (when the author published his famous anti-77 Xi jeremiad), having raised my voice then I was punished for “speech crimes.” Thereafter, (in March 2019) I was suspended from my job as a university lecturer and cashiered as a professor, reduced to a minor academic rank. I was also placed under investigation by my employer, Tsinghua University, and my freedoms have been curtailed ever since. Writing as I do herein, I can all too easily predict that I will be subjected to new punishments; indeed, this may well even be the last thing I write. But that is not up to me. This essay led to the sudden disappearance of Xu Zhangrun, who was later discovered to be under house arrest with all of his external communication channels blocked by the government. Although Xu Zhangrun was subsequently freed from house arrest, the event involving Xu Zhangrun ignited a profound sense of fear among the academic community in China, and the message conveyed by the Xi administration was unambiguous: intellectuals were to refrain from challenging the government's authority through their work. Although no additional empirical evidence is available to support these assertions in this study, several of my participants, particularly those in Arts-based disciplines, infer that academic freedom in China is increasingly subject to scrutiny and constraints imposed by the current regime. This state of affairs could have significant implications for international students who prioritize freedom of expression as a fundamental principle of their studies and research. 78 3.3.4. Challenges encountered by International Students at Chinese Universities: Language Barriers, Inadequate Support Structures, and Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic A considerable number of graduate students have expressed dissatisfaction with the administrative and support services provided to international students at academic institutions. These negative experiences were illustrated through various examples, including a lack of scholarly collaborations and insufficient institutional assistance from the university. Several former doctoral candidates who moved to China with their families have encountered numerous obstacles, particularly regarding the deceptive promises and inadequate support provided by the university administration, such as access to educational facilities for their children. One former doctoral candidate noted that the university administration had assured them of the availability of educational facilities for their children on campus before they arrived in China, but upon their arrival, they were informed that admission to these schools was only open to the children of post-doctoral students. Additionally, some students reported that they were denied access to post-graduate student accommodation due to the presence of their young children. These challenges facing students with families are not unique to China. Numerous studies indicate that universities worldwide continue to face a significant challenge in adequately addressing the needs of student parents, as they often fail to prioritize the provision of supportive services for this demographic (Springer, Parker, and Leviten-Reid 2009). However, this research suggests that some Chinese universities have not provided sufficient support to their students in this regard, and in some instances, have not effectively communicated the situation in advance, thereby exacerbating the issue. 79 One of the areas in which several Sri Lankan students expressed dissatisfaction was the limited availability of educational resources in the English language. Despite the implementation of English-medium degree programs at some Chinese universities, one of the previous doctoral candidates, Asanka, explained, It was evident to me that there was a dearth of support for international students. This was largely due to the fact that the university's supporting mechanisms and systems were only available in Chinese, despite the institution's introduction of English Medium programs. Unfortunately, the majority of these supporting systems had not been established in the English language. The issue of language barriers in academic settings was raised by several of my postgraduate informants, highlighting the obstacles they faced in communication. One of the participants mentioned that she had previously been placed under the guidance of a supervisor who had no proficiency whatsoever in the English language. The initial plan of the university was to hire a designated translator to facilitate communication between the student and her supervisor. Following a significant dispute and subsequent protest against that particular decision, she was then reassigned to a new supervisor who possessed good English fluency but lacked any prior experience in supervising PhD students. She also stated that despite these limitations, her new supervisor turned out to be very supportive and helped her complete her program exceptionally well. Despite the university's inclination to provide English-medium supervision for post-graduate students, these comments indicate that certain Chinese universities face challenges in terms of human resources and other necessary resources to effectively support such programs. 80 Finally, another area of concern was that some participants expressed significant dissatisfaction with the treatment they received from the Chinese government and their respective educational institutions when they had to return to their home countries amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. In January 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic emerged in China, international students had to evacuate from the country due to the health emergency and the escalating apprehension surrounding the pandemic. Several nations even arranged special flights to repatriate their students from China. During this time, Chinese universities transitioned their traditional face-to-face classroom instruction to virtual formats using video conferencing platforms developed in China. Many students expressed their discontent with the Chinese learning platforms as a result of encountering various technological limitations during their virtual instructional sessions. Certain platforms were not developed with the intention of functioning beyond the boundaries of China. Additionally, the participants expressed that the universities in China failed to establish efficient means of communication with them, thereby hindering their academic progress and causing significant distress during the period of remote learning. Despite these initial obstacles, some of the interviewees expressed satisfaction that their educational pursuits were able to persist through these online platforms, even in the face of significant technical and administrative limitations. Nonetheless, during this time, the Chinese government implemented a temporary suspension on the reentry of overseas students for a longer duration following the stabilization of the situation. In the year 2021, as the pandemic's intensity waned, several countries opted to reinstate their standard operations and allow students to enter by opening their borders. Conversely, China made the decision to extend these restrictions until January 2023. This decision elicited significant dissatisfaction from my participants, particularly those in the fields of medicine and engineering. During 81 interviews, some of these individuals expressed that they were compelled to defer or even cancel vital practical and clinical training sessions due to this decision. 3.4. Analyzing former Chinese scholarship recipients' views on Chinese presence in Sri Lanka One of the primary questions I posed during the interviews pertained to the respondents' perspectives on Chinese participation in Sri Lanka and their assessment of the potential consequences resulting from such involvement. Importantly, the data collection process for this study was carried out amidst the economic turmoil in Sri Lanka, particularly during a time when anti-Chinese sentiments were on the rise. This was attributed to China's close association with the Rajapakse regime and the failure of several economic projects in the country. Overall, the findings of this study indicate that former recipients of undergraduate scholarships mostly retain positive sentiments towards Chinese engagement in Sri Lanka, while postgraduate scholarship recipients exhibit a more mixed range of feelings towards this engagement. A significant portion of the participants who held a favorable impression of China attributed the mishandling and mismanagement of loans to the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan government was held solely responsible, whereas China was perceived as having purely altruistic intentions in seeking a mutually beneficial outcome between the two nations. A subset of the participants conceded the occurrence of unintentional improper behavior on the part of China, while concurrently asserting that it was the responsibility of the Sri Lankan government to avert such unfavorable circumstances and maximize the benefits for the country from the financial resources provided by China. Consequently, it was emphasized that China's actions in Sri Lanka were motivated by its national interests, and it was the obligation of the 82 Sri Lankan political leaders and policymakers to guarantee favorable results for the island nation. These viewpoints have also been presented by various scholars who have voiced their opposition to the widely criticized notion of China's debt trap diplomacy. According to Brautigam (2020), the leasing of the Hambanthota port to China was prompted by political instability during the presidential election of 2015 and Sri Lanka's need to alleviate its substantial debt burden. The author suggests that the construction of this port came before its actual anticipated demand, which it is projected to reach in the future. The writer further asserts that it is typical to encounter economic losses during the initial period following the completion of port construction, which is a widespread phenomenon observed in many ports worldwide. This is because it takes time for the actual demand to be realized, which can be considered a long-term investment. However, this has prompted an inquiry into whether China was unaware of the timing of the port's demand and Sri Lanka's capacity to endure the losses until it aligns with the actual demand. Sri Lanka is a small island nation with a limited economic resource, especially due to the impact of 30 years of war. Even for an investment that has long-term benefits but no short-term gains, it can be dangerous for the small economy of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Hambanthota Port was not the sole infrastructure development project that was constructed in the same vicinity, with substantial debts owed to China. The construction of an airport cost $200 million, which was funded by a loan once again from China. Furthermore, substantial highways and conference halls were constructed in a sparsely inhabited region, with the expectation that the presence of a port would bring about a significant economic and urban transformation and attract popularity to the area. It is worth questioning whether the Chinese government provided loans and undertook the construction 83 of these development projects with the anticipation that Sri Lanka would experience financial loss for some years until the port reached its full potential. By raising this issue, one cannot help but question whether the blame should be solely placed on the government of Sri Lanka. Some scholars and Chinese critics suggest this is an example of neo-colonialism, whereby the Chinese utilize deceitful tactics, including the exploitation of the vulnerabilities and corruption of local stakeholders, as a means to acquire control over their desired objectives (Antwi-Boateng 2017; Dever and Dever 2021). Some of the participants in my research highlighted that China, when contrasted with other international institutions and Western countries, is relatively inexperienced in its role as a global lender in the global economic landscape. These participants acknowledged that China made a mistake in failing to discern the vulnerabilities of local governments while engaging in lending activities. They emphasized that this is the rationale behind China's decision to offer financial assistance to Sri Lanka when Western countries were neglecting to fund the country. These remarks may also be seen as positive perspectives towards China, aimed at holding local governments fully responsible for the white elephant projects and mounting loans that were received as investments from China. As Aruni, a former undergraduate, expressed, I think more blame should go to the wrong administrative and financial decision-making by the government of Sri Lanka. It can be China that pushed them to make those unhealthy financial decisions for the country. So, in that case, I put more blame on Sri Lanka. The controversial financial assistance was offered by China, but it was accepted by Sri Lanka. So, I accuse the Sri Lankan side over China of that. 84 As noted previously, the findings from this research indicate that a substantial portion of undergraduate respondents displayed a positive attitude towards China despite these contentious issues. Their views closely align with the slogans promoted by China's BRI. It was observed that they were exposed to the dissemination of phrases such as "China is the future of world trade," "China offers greater opportunities for third world countries," and "the win-win strategy for China and the host country." Several of these slogans were cited by my research participants during the interviews. The following slogans can also be considered to be the main themes in both the BRI action plan and the BRI education action plan (The State Council 2015). China's remarkable economic expansion in the 21st century has garnered extensive praise from economists and academics, particularly for its success in eradicating extreme poverty and elevating the living standards of approximately 800 million citizens. This accomplishment served as a model for other underdeveloped countries that had been waiting for a long time to achieve the modernization and development goals introduced by the West. Thus, this accomplishment served as one of China's most effective soft power instruments in their diplomatic endeavors abroad. Particularly, it facilitated the enhancement of its rapport with developing nations, who were eager to progress and improve their economic standing. Drawing from this development narrative, China initiated the win-win strategy predominantly through the BRI, offering a compelling incentive for underdeveloped nations to join the program and realize economic prosperity alongside China (Zongze 2017). Without question, China's rapid economic growth in recent years has been extraordinary; however, its "win-win" strategy, which primarily targets developing nations, has recently come under scrutiny. Some scholars have questioned the veracity of China's win-win strategy and its actual ability to provide beneficial outcomes for developing countries. According to Bernal-85 Meza (2016), the structure of Chinese economic connections in Latin America primarily benefits Chinese economic development rather than promoting the development of Latin America. The author has highlighted that China has employed the win-win rhetoric to rationalize the disparate nature of this alliance within the domain of public diplomacy. According to Alves (2013), an African perspective highlights a tendency towards China's win-win strategy in Africa, which entails the provision of infrastructure in exchange for resource-based financing. However, the author has also emphasized the need to address crucial issues, including debt sustainability, labor practices, and governance, in order to prevent disparities in outcomes for the African continent in the future. It can be observed that many scholars have generally agreed that it is difficult to forecast the future of China's win-win strategy in developing countries. Gitlitz (2023, 220) have concluded that “Is China’s win-win ideology designed for long-lasting structural development? Or are Beijing’s actions little more than an exchange of infrastructure and military/security aid to enable resource extraction for China’s benefit?” The scholarly perspective appears to indicate that it remains uncertain whether China's win-win approach towards developing countries truly holds benefits. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sri Lanka suggest that this strategy may not be in Sri Lanka's best interests so far, while it has undeniably benefitted China by granting them access and ownership to strategically crucial locations in the country. Consistent with the ideas previously discussed by scholars worldwide, several former post-graduate students whom I interviewed raised a number of concerns that warrant a critical and nuanced examination of China's involvement in Sri Lanka. These individuals consistently questioned China's involvement in Sri Lanka's internal political affairs and decision-making processes. Many of them pointed to China as a primary contributor to Sri Lanka's debt crisis 86 and alleged that China had used the corrupt local political regime to make decisions that were detrimental to Sri Lanka. As Asanka mentioned, To secure their investments, they have invested billions of dollars in huge projects with strict conditions for the host country. These projects often require the host country to pay back within five to ten years with interest rates as high as 4% to 7% per year. Some have accused China of bribing senior officials in these countries, but I do not have evidence of this. Despite these accusations, China's projects continue to expand in countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, and many more in Africa, with the aim of exerting control over their internal politics. China's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs has been a topic of discussion for some time, with concerns raised since the end of the civil war. However, it has recently gained widespread attention from the general public due to the growing discontent with the Rajapakse regime and the visible shortcomings of Chinese infrastructure projects, which have placed a strain on the country's economy. The most recent case of Chinese interference in internal affairs gained widespread attention due to the shipment of organic fertilizer, which sparked a strong public backlash. In May 2021, amidst a mounting crisis of dwindling foreign reserves, the Sri Lankan government prohibited the use of chemical fertilizers in the country, resulting in a severe agricultural crisis characterized by crop failures. The government implemented a solution by ordering the import of 99,000 metric tons of organic fertilizer at a cost of 50 million US dollars from a Chinese firm. The National Plant Quarantine Service (NPQS) of Sri Lanka reportedly discovered harmful bacteria in the fertilizer samples, leading to the government's decision to halt the shipment and creating a diplomatic quandary between the two governments. The High 87 Court in Sri Lanka issued an order to the People's Bank, a state-owned institution, to withhold payment to a Chinese company. In response, the Economic and Commercial Office of the Chinese embassy in Sri Lanka placed the People's Bank on a blacklist. Due to the growing public outrage over this decision, the government was ultimately compelled to take this course of action and sent back the first shipment of 20,000 tonnes. However, when the Chinese government pressured the Sri Lankan government, Sri Lankan government paid 6.9 million dollars to the Chinese firm without even getting single drop of fertilizer to the country (Attanayake 2021). The Sri Lankan government's resolution to pay 6.9 million to the Chinese firm, while simultaneously grappling with substantial pressure from the Chinese government, was met with widespread condemnation from the public as an egregious instance of foreign interference. Despite these fears around foreign interference, all the post-graduate alumni I interviewed recognized China as a crucial bilateral partner for Sri Lanka, acknowledging its significant role in Sri Lanka's economic recovery process post-crisis. As Asanka highlighted, Despite the presence of some ambiguous areas, there are numerous areas in which Sri Lanka can get the support of China for the development. Specifically, China's advanced technology is a valuable resource. In every sector, China's technological prowess far surpasses that of Sri Lanka. While the coal project in Norochchole and some other construction projects throughout the country are a step in the right direction, more must be done to fully utilize Chinese technology. For example, consider the Chinese automobile industry. By introducing Chinese brands to Sri Lanka and manufacturing them in-country, numerous opportunities for growth and development arise. 88 Although the China-Sri Lanka relationship has not yielded many positive outcomes for Sri Lanka so far, many experts contend that China could be a valuable resource for the country to rebuild its economy which has been devastated by crisis. Samarakoon (2024) has noted that Sri Lanka must restructure its debts as a medium-term stability solution. The international monetary organizations have recommended that Sri Lanka negotiate with China in order to secure a better opportunity for debt restructuring and facilitate the country's economic recovery. However, China initially declined to restructure the debts and instead offered additional loans, which would provide a temporary respite for the economy. Nevertheless, many experts have criticized this proposal as it would exacerbate Sri Lanka's already dire debt crisis. Consequently, following extensive negotiations at the highest level, Sri Lanka succeeded in reaching an agreement with China for the restructuring of its debt (Latiff and Wijesinha 2022; Abeyrathne and Kamburawala 2023). Following the conclusion of this agreement, Sri Lanka successfully obtained a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by fulfilling the agreed-upon conditions with China for debt restructuring. In light of the current economic crisis, Sri Lanka has no choice but to continue negotiations with China in order to secure a path forward. In addition to loan restructuring, Sri Lanka have the potential of benefitting from other sectors in its bilateral relationship with China. Numerous individuals pointed out sectors such as tourism, energy, and technology as potential regions where Sri Lanka could obtain developmental aid from China. In 2019, prior to the Easter Sunday bombings, Chinese tourists made up the largest proportion of tourist arrivals in Sri Lanka. However, the security concerns that arose from the series of bomb blasts, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic, which halted the flow of Chinese tourists to the country, caused significant damage to the tourism industry. 89 Despite many countries lifting restrictions on tourism after the pandemic, China took a considerable amount of time to open its borders to tourism. In 2018, prior to the Easter Sunday bombings, Sri Lanka received 265,965 Chinese tourist arrivals, second only to neighboring India. According to data, Chinese tourists are ranked highest among international tourists in terms of their spending in Sri Lanka's tourism industry (SLTDA 2019). To secure further advantages, it is essential for Sri Lanka to engage in negotiations with the Chinese government and reach agreements pertaining to tourism and promotional initiatives aimed at reinvigorating Chinese tourist arrivals in Sri Lanka, which has yet to fully recover following the pandemic. Given that Sri Lanka is currently experiencing an upswing in tourist arrivals in the aftermath of the people’s uprising, the restoration of the Chinese tourist market would provide a substantial boost to the country's economy. Participants frequently voiced their belief that Sri Lanka could benefit from Chinese assistance in enhancing its energy sector. One such example they cited was the Norochchole coal plant, which was constructed with the aid of Chinese financing and expertise. Despite its frequent breakdowns, the Norochchole Lakvijaya coal plant currently provides 40% of Sri Lanka's electric supply and acts as the best option for the country's electric shortage during the dry season when hydro power supply breaks down. The construction of this coal plant has been criticized significantly due to its frequent breakdowns. According to some experts, the use of low-quality materials may have contributed to this issue (Attanayake 2023). The Norochchole plant is currently fulfilling a critical role in meeting Sri Lanka's electricity requirements, and this is one of the few Chinese projects in the country that has achieved some measure of success. Additionally, Sri Lanka can seek assistance from China's expertise in renewable energy, which many people view as a potential area where Sri Lanka could overcome its crisis. 90 According to recent reports, China has significantly invested in its renewable energy sector, and Sri Lanka can potentially benefit from this plan due to its status as an island nation positioned near the equator, where there is considerable potential in solar and wind power (Curran, Lv, and Spigarelli 2017). The general perspective of research participants on the topic of China-Sri Lanka relations revealed a noticeable divergence between undergraduate and postgraduate alumni. While undergraduate alumni exhibited a more favorable view of China, postgraduate students held a more nuanced stance on the issue. Nevertheless, both groups acknowledged the significance of China as a crucial actor in Sri Lanka's pursuit of economic growth. The fourth chapter of this thesis will concentrate on the elements that shape these perceptions and how China has structured its degree programs to align with its diplomatic objectives abroad. 3.5. Conclusion This chapter portrays several notable aspects concerning China's academic endeavors in Sri Lanka. One of the most salient features highlighted in this context is that the inadequacies of Sri Lanka's academic landscape have proved advantageous for China in successfully alluring its academic initiatives towards Sri Lanka. Developing nations have been grappling with the inadequacy of financial resources to support adequate educational infrastructure. Moreover, they are also plagued by issues such as corruption, outdated policies, and systems, which further exacerbate their situation (Mbiti 2016). In the current economic climate, even developed countries are grappling with the challenge of financing their educational institutions. As a result, many institutions are compelled to seek alternative sources of funding, such as attracting international students who are willing to pay high tuition rates or soliciting 91 contributions from private donors. Nevertheless, China's economic development has enabled it to maintain substantial government funding for its educational institutions while also exercising strong political control over them. I would argue that China has gained a competitive advantage in initiating international academic projects that align with its diplomatic and geopolitical objectives. Moreover, other external factors such as low cost of living and other expenses have significantly benefited these programs. It is noteworthy that the amount of funding required to support a student in China is significantly lower than the amount of funding needed to support an international student in a Western country. China has afforded a substantial edge in financing a higher portion of international students via several scholarship programs targeted at high school graduates, postgraduates, academic scholars, government officials, educators, and political figures who currently occupy or will occupy influential positions in society. As noted in my analysis, the majority of Chinese university alumni in Sri Lanka express satisfaction with their overall experience, despite facing some negative experiences during their time in China. Additionally, they report benefiting from favorable career prospects following their programs in China. Apart from that, the majority of undergraduate students displayed a strong emotional attachment to China, which they attributed to the opportunities they had, the knowledge they acquired, and the experiences they gained during their time in China. The favorable perceptions of China were expressed during a period when China, along with the Rajapakse administration, was subjected to significant criticism for the economic turmoil that Sri Lanka was experiencing. China enjoyed significant popularity during the height of the Rajapakse regime's post-war era; however, it was closely aligned with the regime and, consequently, suffered a loss of popularity when the regime's popularity in the country 92 began to wane. As a result, people began to view China as one of the major parties responsible for helping the Rajapakse regime destroy the country's economy. The fall of the Rajapakse regime, marked by President Gotabaya Rajapakse's departure from the country in response to the people's uprising, has led to a shift in Sri Lanka's foreign policy, with the country moving closer to India and distancing itself from China (Mushtaq 2024). One of the most recent decisions made by the Sri Lankan government, which prohibits research vessels from entering the nation for a period of one year, can be seen as a significant illustration of this policy of distancing from China. Although the regulation did not explicitly refer to China, it was China that persistently urged Sri Lanka to accommodate its research vessels in the Indian Ocean (Kuruwita 2024). Thus, the participants' positive views towards China can be deemed distinct from the prevailing social discourse in the country. Moreover, there is a notable difference between postgraduate and undergraduate alumni in terms of their views on China, with the former post-graduate students exhibiting a predominantly unfavorable outlook on the current China-Sri Lanka relationship. In the following chapter, I will examine some of the reasons behind the predominantly pro-China perceptions held by undergraduate students, despite the general view in the country, including that of post-graduate students. 93 Chapter 4. China's Geopolitical Objectives of the Educational Initiatives: An Analysis of Potential Soft Power Strategies within academic initiatives The preceding chapter has illustrated some of the perceived favorable results of China's academic endeavors in Sri Lanka, wherein they successfully fostered positive and emotional connections among the younger generation and intellectuals of Sri Lanka through the provision of transformative educational prospects. This chapter will undertake an analysis of the interconnections between these educational initiatives and China's local and geopolitical objectives. The analysis has utilized the insights obtained from interviews conducted with former students and scholars, my personal interactions with various individuals who have interacted with different Chinese organizations, and discourse analysis of China's governmental documents, including the BRI Action plan. It further employs Joseph Nye's concept of soft power as a conceptual framework and draws upon literature from the fields of politics and education to examine the potential interrelationships between Chinese geopolitical ambitions and academic programs aimed at students from BRI countries. 4.1. Fostering Favorable Perceptions of China: The Role of Cultural and Historical Integration in Academic Diplomacy During my four-year tenure as an international scholarship student in China, if someone were to inquire about the most significant lessons and experiences that I gained other than my field of study, I would readily assert that it relates to the dimension of Chinese culture and history. Since the beginning of my orientation period until my graduation, Chinese culture was 94 pervasive, manifesting in various educational and extracurricular activities such as classroom instruction, field trips, and events. The integration of Chinese Culture into soft power missions is a very common practice that China has been doing for some decades. However, as we have been discussing, China's contemporary image is significantly influenced by its communist foundation, which has emerged as a major obstacle in establishing relations with numerous nations that prioritize democratic liberal principles and perceive communism in opposition to democracy. Specifically, the situation is most challenging in the realm of public diplomacy, where China must extend its outreach to sizeable foreign populations. China boasts a wealthy historical and cultural legacy that is of interest to the global and diaspora community. This extensive cultural foundation has emerged as a primary source of Chinese soft power in contemporary times, enabling the country to project a more favorable image, transcending its traditional image as a country with communist political ideology. While many scholars have emphasized the role of geo-politics and economic interests underpinning China’s BRI initiative, it also plays a central role in expanding cultural influence, especially through its use of the ancient Silk Road. Winter (2021) for example, has defined BRI as the most compelling geocultural project of the modern era. Although a plethora of scholars have extensively deliberated upon the ancient cultural significance and historical backdrop of the BRI, several of them restrict their discussions to the contemporary manifestation of the Silk Road. The application of culture in the context of BRI encompasses a much broader scope, as evidenced by this chapter's examination of the academic component's cultural soft power strategies. Based on the findings, three distinct approaches have been identified by which China facilitates the provision of Chinese cultural exposure to foreign students. The three components encompassed under the framework are as follows: a) coursework, b) events and festivals, and c) field trips. 95 4.1.1. Coursework on Chinese Culture The interviews conducted with students from diverse degree programs and academic levels revealed that they were all exposed to an abundance of cultural instruction integrated within their respective curricula. Students pursuing degree programs such as Tourism Management and Business Studies reported that gaining familiarity with Chinese culture was considered advantageous in light of potential future professional interactions with Chinese society. Nonetheless, the required and mandatory inclusion of extensive Chinese cultural education within degree programs, including those in engineering and medicine, differentiates it from the normative coursework structure observed in other countries. The findings also revealed another noteworthy element, which is the prevalent incorporation of Chinese history within the curriculum pertaining to Chinese culture. In certain instances, the subject of history was taught as an independent discipline, although in the majority of situations, it was integrated as a component within the broader instruction of Chinese culture. In my second year of undergraduate studies, for example, I was required to take a separate course on "20th Century Chinese History." However, prior to that, Chinese history was also integrated with courses on Chinese culture. The historical topics covered in these courses primarily focused on ancient Chinese trade, various dynasties, and the mistreatment of China by Western countries and Japan during the period known as the "century of humiliation." The other participants in the study also emphasized that they had covered similar topics in their coursework, which broad emphasis on Chinese history. The inclusion of ancient trade in the curriculum primarily serves to showcase China’s historical grandeur and foster a sense of belonging among students, particularly those whose home nations were historically engaged in foreign trade with China. In the context of Sri Lanka, the 96 process of fostering a sense of connection and belonging was notably situated within a historical context of longstanding commercial links between Sri Lanka and China spanning thousands of years and bringing about mutually positive interactions. When asking students about their exposure to Chinese culture and history in their curriculum, many of them highlighted a strong sense of affiliation with China in their recounting of narratives of historical trade and cultural interactions. Moreover, the story of the “century of humiliation” was a prominent recurring theme in educational curriculums. Commonly, the period between 1839 and 1949, which encompasses the First Opium War and the initiation of communist rule in China, is referred to as the “century of humiliation”. During this time, China experienced substantial military, political, and economic aggression from Western nations and Japan. Concurrently, it was characterized by internal domestic uprisings that contributed to the destabilization and unrest within the country (Melancon 2003). Callahan (2004, 199) has noted that “though they do not receive much attention in Western analysis, it turns out that there are textbooks, novels, museums, songs, and parks devoted to commemorating national humiliation in China.” As Callahan suggests, the CCP has effectively employed the humiliation narrative as a propaganda tool to legitimize its authoritarian governing model and rationalize its shortcomings domestically. China has undoubtedly faced immense hardship during the period of colonization by the West and Japan. However, one must also question the motivations to use this historical narrative in order to justify the authoritarian actions of the Chinese government towards its citizens and foreign nations. That said, the incorporation of cultural education into curricula as a “means of propaganda” is not a recent phenomenon in China, nor in many other parts of the world. According to Hsi-En 97 Chen (1951, 136) “the hyphenated term ‘culture-education’ is used to designate administrative agencies of the Chinese government charged with the supervision and direction of all propaganda and indoctrination activities as well as the program of the schools.” His-En Chen is among the pioneering authors who discussed the earliest iteration of CCP's ideological mobilization or propaganda within the educational sphere in China by experiencing the situation working as an educator in China (L. Chen 2023). He subsequently moved to the United States to continue his career as an educator, and his scholarly contributions have become crucial early resources for understanding how China utilized propaganda in education to promote the ideology of CCP. Chen's statement suggests that cultural education has been employed as a means of indoctrinating the Chinese society in support of the communist government since its inception. It is essential to note that in China propagating is not viewed as an unethical or immoral conduct. The CCP has succeeded in establishing a propaganda system in China that is now considered a tool to mobilize the masses, fostering national unity, and promoting socialist ideals (Shambaugh 2007). Similarly, I would argue that the CCP has a prerogative to devise and assimilate Chinese cultural and historical materials in a manner that can also engage and captivate international students. Nonetheless, providing local cultural knowledge to international students is not inherently problematic, especially if students are being provided with significant funding to support their higher education. However, the question arises as to the reasons behind such instruction and the objectives that it aims to achieve. If it is determined that the historical and cultural information presented in coursework has been intentionally distorted, and the aim of instruction is to indoctrinate foreign youth to advance political objectives abroad, this would be considered academically unethical. Several individuals who have taken these courses as part 98 of their studies in China have mentioned that the contents of these courses primarily consist of positive narratives, while the more contentious and unsavory aspects of China’s rise to power are omitted. The results of this study suggest that China has utilized a comparable propaganda narrative in their academic diplomacy efforts, specifically aimed at the youth and intellectuals in the global south. As Sahan highlighted, We never heard any unfavorable stories. I had the impression that they were only telling us the facts about their history that they wanted us to know. Even when we question some negative incidents, they simply shift the emphasis and talk about something else. Whatever the case may be, they claim to make every effort to extol the virtues of their technology. And I believe they are delighted to share that technology with us as well. They teach us everything we need to know about technology. In that case, they taught us thoroughly. But, in history and politics, I believe they are always careful not to acknowledge the bad and unsuccessful decisions they made. They concealed the unpleasant aspects. According to the participants I interviewed, the coursework included substantial cultural content related to ancient Chinese philosophies, such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. These philosophies often emphasize teachings on harmony, peace, and cooperation, which can foster an attractive image of Chinese culture. Even though these philosophical traditions are several centuries old, they still hold a strong positive image outside of China. As a result, they have emerged as a potent instrument for China to employ in various soft power endeavors, including academic diplomacy. This is not the first time that China has utilized its ancient philosophies for academic initiatives targeting overseas citizens. The Confucius Institute 99 project, for instance, has been heavily focused on promoting these philosophies that are embedded in Chinese culture alongside the promotion of Mandarin language (Hartig 2013). 4.1.2. The celebration of Chinese Festivals and Cultural Events Chinese universities actively arrange celebrations for scholarship recipients that enables them to participate alongside domestic students in commemorating Chinese cultural events and festivities. All the students who took part in the study confirmed their involvement in several Chinese cultural events held on the university premises. The festive elements of these activities were frequently cited by the Sri Lankan students as a delightful and joyful component of their educational experience. Furthermore, it was noted that it helped instill a greater sense of interest in Chinese culture itself. Among my network of friends who have studied in China, I have noticed that international students actively engage in these festival activities and their social media profiles becoming adorned with vibrant photographs and videos capturing the special occasions. In the sphere of cultural events, it is discernible that universities typically arrange two distinct types of celebrations. The first type consists of events that focus on Chinese culture, while the second type comprises events that facilitate cultural exchanges among international students. The initial type of gatherings is generally arranged during renowned Chinese cultural celebrations and holidays, including the Lunar New Year or Dragon Boat Festival. During these occasions, educational institutions typically arrange large-scale activities for international students to participate in. The students are encouraged to engage in these cultural activities, with the aim of providing international students with a memorable experience of Chinese cultural life. As Sachin described, 100 They have tried hard to promote their culture. I think to become familiar with Chinese culture, it is essential to learn Chinese. Otherwise, it is harder to go and find insights into the people, and culture in China. But English-medium students do not have that ability as much. These cultural events and festival celebrations have become a useful tool for China to give their cultural exposure for international students to create a positive image of China. The majority of students who come to China to study in English-medium programs generally lack fluency in the Chinese language. Typically, students with strong Chinese language skills are more likely to gain admission to Chinese-medium degree programs, which are generally less competitive and offer greater opportunities for scholarships. As a result, most English-medium students enter their programs with limited Chinese language comprehension, which significantly restricts their ability to interact with Chinese society and culture. Therefore, these events organized by universities I would argue provide a critical role in supplementing their education with a rich exposure to Chinese culture. The other form of celebration involves cultural exchange events that allow students from other countries to showcase their cultural identities and activities. The universities strongly promoted these events, occasionally providing financial assistance. In my university, for example, one of my classmates from Bangladesh was awarded two thousand Chinese yuan as a token of appreciation for organizing cultural exchange events. Ishini, who was eager to share her experiences with cultural events, stated, There were numerous cultural events in which we could participate, and I had the opportunity to represent my country at several of them. Additionally, there 101 were events where we had to represent each other's countries, making it a truly international cultural exhibition. The university administration gave us money to prepare these events. In Maags (2014) study on China’s national image and cultural festivals, she states that China strategically utilizes cultural events and festivals as a prominent tool in their efforts to construct a positive national image. As a means of exerting soft power Maags suggests that more academic attention is needed on China's extensive promotion of events and festivals and the underlying rhetoric of harmony, friendship, prosperity, and peace that accompanies them. The spring festival (Chinese New Year), mid-autumn festival, and dragon boat festivals, for example, are among the most significant and captivating celebrations observed throughout China and the Chinese diaspora worldwide provide a rich reserve for soft power influence. These events highlight certain affectionate elements of Chinese civilization that helps to counteract the perception of China’s authoritarian image. Like the use of Panda diplomacy for soft power interests (Hartig 2013), Chinese festivals and events provides a powerful tool of attraction that helps to elevate China’s benevolence in the global arena 4.1.3. Field Trips to Cultural Attractions During the orientation program for our degree program, the department head informed us to prepare for our first field trip. We were both thrilled and surprised when he mentioned that the university would cover all the expenses for a three-day trip. The journey was planned with lavish lodging and excellent transportation facilities, and many of my classmates, who hail from diverse developing countries, informed me that it was their first ever experience in life of experience in such luxurious travel. Over the course of a three-day trip, we had the opportunity 102 to visit two esteemed UNESCO World Heritage sites: Emei Mountain and the Leshan Giant Buddha. Several days after the excursion, the International Office of the university sponsored and arranged another journey for the newly enrolled students to visit Mount Qingcheng, a sacred Taoist Mountain that was featured in the renowned Kungfu Panda animated movie. This was just the beginning. Throughout my degree program we had several field trips sponsored by the university. The results of interviews with other students indicate that all students who were part of this study shared similar experiences with field trips during their time in China. For example, Nayana Stated, They also provided free-field trips to various cultural sites and landmarks within the university province. These trips were well funded, and they even booked rooms in top-tier hotels. As someone who grew up in a rural area in Sri Lanka, I was truly impressed by the level of luxury and comfort provided. It was a unique experience that I would always cherish. As noted earlier in the thesis, typically, China is not a preferred destination for higher education among Sri Lankans. Instead, many affluent or higher middle-class individuals with aspirations for foreign education tend to pursue studies in renowned Western countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia. The majority of students who travel to China for higher education belong to the lower-middle class or even come from families below the poverty line. This applies not only to Sri Lanka but also to most developing countries where students go to China for their studies. Thus, the opportunity to experience luxury travel is not commonly available to these students; and many of my informants noted the eagerness and delight in embarking on these trips. This experience instills a sense of gratitude towards their university 103 and China for providing a unique opportunity that they have not encountered previously in their lives. China boasts one of the oldest and most illustrious ancient civilizations, characterized by a wealth of cultural traditions and philosophical ideas. The historical sites that we visited as part of our educational field trips serve as vivid testaments to the greatness of China’s past. Teaching Chinese culture to international students in classrooms or at cultural events can be an effective means of providing cultural exposure. It is well documented that experiential education programs involving fieldwork or fieldtrips can be a transformative and impactful mode of learning. Based on a study conducted by Ferrer-Fons and Rovira-Martínez (2021, 345) on young people visiting historical museums, the researchers concluded that, The results show that an experiential approach to the past that works with emotions, empathy and dialogue with secondary students (17 years old) and older young people (15–25 years old) is a very effective means of offering a touching interpretation of the past and learning opportunity for youth, regardless of level of previous knowledge. During my initial years of study in China, I became deeply fascinated with Chinese history, particularly the period when China was governed by the Communist Party. My perception of this era was primarily shaped by the curriculum, events, and field trips organized by my university. However, after a few years, I had the opportunity to explore China independently and visit several places using public transportation, delving deeper into various aspects of Chinese society. This led to a shift in my previously held impression, and my mind began to question some of the prevalent narratives that were being presented to me by the university. 104 For example, I visited the Tibetan Autonomous Region quite often, and what I saw and heard from the locals changed my impression significantly. To gain entry to Tibet, I was required to obtain multiple permits, and I was only permitted to visit under the guidance of a licensed tour guide sanctioned by the CCP. The tour vehicle was subject to extensive censorship, and all conversations between the tour guide and myself were recorded by a device installed in the vehicle by the government. Despite the censorship, I was able to gain entry into the society and engage in conversations with locals, thereby gaining insight into the extent of political, social, cultural, and religious pressures exerted by the CCP government to suppress the minority Tibetan community. Although Tibetan culture and religion has faced significant repression from the CCP, my academic coursework did not reflect this reality. The relevant question that emerges from my reflection on these travels, is why other undergraduate students did not identify or critique these aspects of Chinese oppression in the same manner as I did or as some postgraduate students did? There can be several reasons for these divergent views. One possible answer to this question is that the vast majority of international students who study in China do not have the opportunity to explore the country as extensively as I did. A significant number of international students who journey to China faced considerable financial barriers that prevented them from exploring the country independently. Among those who had financial means to travel independent opt for urban and popular tourist destinations, such as Beijing and Shanghai, rather than places that offer more complicated and sensitive histories of the modern Chinese state. In short, the formation of their cultural, historical, and political perception of China is exclusively influenced by the knowledge they acquire in school and the experiences they gain from the popular school-organized field trips. 105 4.2. Implementation of English as a Medium of Instruction (EMI): A Tool for Attracting Foreign Students and Promoting Mandarin Language Learning Last year, a noteworthy discussion occurred within the academic community in Canada regarding the financial policies proposed by the Quebec provincial government for anglophone post-secondary institutions. According to the Quebec government, the tuition fees for students from outside the province are scheduled to increase by 12,000 CAD, constituting a substantial 33% rise from their present rate. They declared that the decision was implemented in order to safeguard the French language, as the growing popularity of English-speaking institutions posed a threat to the French language in the province (Yousif 2023). In contrast to the Quebec case, roughly ten years past, China has sought to expand the popularity of the English language by incorporating English-medium degree programs into their educational system. Generally, China has placed great importance on its own language, while giving less emphasis to European languages, including English. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the implementation of EMI curricula across numerous higher education institutions in China (McKinley et al., 2023). Before the introduction of EMI, it was mandatory for individuals wishing to study in China to attain proficiency in Mandarin before gaining admission to a Chinese university. Alternatively, they were required to complete an additional academic year at a language school in China before enrolling in their degree program. This procedure presents challenges for international students who aspire to study in China, as it increases the complexity of their journey and adds unnecessary burdens of time, effort, and financial resources. 106 Several participants in the present study highlighted that they opted to travel to China due to the availability of EMI programs. The vast majority of individuals who participated in this research indicated that they would not have chosen China as their preferred destination for further education if China did not provide EMI. Although some Chinese scholarships were available in Sri Lanka even before the post-war era, language barriers prevented many from obtaining them. According to Asanka, Because of the introduction of English-medium programs, China got access to markets which they were not able to access previously with Chinese-medium degree programs. If there was no English-medium education, I don’t think I would have considered going there for my PhD. They attract most of the foreign students through these English-medium programs. At my university, the number of international students studying through Chinese as a medium of instruction was extremely small compared to the hundreds of students enrolled in EMI programs. Numerous researchers who have concentrated on China's EMI movement have pinpointed various reasons for the country's growing promotion of EMI. Among the numerous factors that have been highlighted, many have underscored the significance of expanded opportunities in globally competitive post-secondary market, financial advantages, improved student and instructor mobility, and access to advanced technology as the primary reasons driving this trend (Galloway et al., 2017; Z. Zhang 2018). Nonetheless, from the perspective of a developing nation, like Sri Lanka, the study's findings suggest that China's growing preference for incorporating EMI in their higher educational institutions is motivated by a desire to enhance its cultural and linguistic influence globally. Based on the findings from interviews conducted with students and academics, it is evident that universities in China place 107 significant pressure on students to study the Chinese language during their time at university. In many instances, this requirement extends beyond mere coursework in the language and includes mandatory exams that must be passed in order to graduate. For instance, even if a student has met all the requirements for their degree program, they will not be allowed to graduate if they fail the Chinese language exam. Aruni explained her experience as follows, The main thing was the pressure that they put on us to learn their language. This is not something that happens in other countries. If the degree is conducted in English, they do not pressure us to learn another language. In China, whatever language you use as your medium of study, Chinese is a compulsory subject. It was funny that out of nowhere, in the middle of the degree, without any prior notice at the admission level, they signed a contract with us mentioning that to graduate, we needed to pass the HSK 4th level in Chinese language. It was shocking for us since they did not mention anything about that when we were applying. However, with the COVID-19 situation, we did not have to do that. But for junior batches, they have to do that. During my undergraduate studies, I had a similar experience. Prior to my departure for China, the university sent an authorized agent to Sri Lanka to provide us with instructions and answer any questions we had about our future study program in China. During this session, I inquired about the level of Chinese language proficiency required for the program. The agent reassured me, stating that we would be taught everything from the beginning and not to worry about learning the language. However, during my second year, the university informed us that in order to fulfill the graduation requirements, we would need to complete the HSK level four exam, which is an upper-intermediate level exam that necessitates significant time and effort 108 to pass. Later, it was revealed that China mandates all EMI students to pass this exam in order to graduate. Therefore, it is clear that even though China do not expect you to have proficiency in Chinese language before joining the course you must have upper-intermediate proficiency by the time you graduate. Achieving HSK Level four signifies a strong basis in Mandarin Chinese, enabling effective communication in a variety of daily situations, comprehension of extensive written and spoken materials, and engagement in conversations with native speakers with a reasonable level of fluency and accuracy. For instance, numerous universities in China mandate that international students possess HSK level 4 in order to be eligible for enrollment in their Chinese language instruction degree programs. Whether deliberate or unintended, EMI has effectively utilized China’s initiatives to gain substantial advantages in their missions aimed at developing nations. I would argue that it has currently emerged as a vital element in China's successful execution of academic diplomacy that is used alongside other Chinese soft power initiatives. Not only has China gained a greater quantity of young students to exert influence globally, but it has also enabled many young people from developing nations to boost their proficiency in the Chinese language that could serve beneficial in the long run. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, the possibility of a correlation between the significant increase in EMI in China and broader political motivations cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the rapid rise of EMI in China coincided with the launch of the BRI and its education program, which is widely acknowledged as one of the most potent demonstrations of soft power in contemporary times. Another significant aspect of this case involves the disparity between English and Chinese medium instruction classes. In China, students studying in English-medium study programs are often treated as a distinct group, and they may even have separate courses and curricula 109 from their Chinese-language counterparts, even within the same faculty. According to Umesha, who pursued a Chinese language program at Beijing International Studies University (BISU) and subsequently enrolled in a Chinese-medium degree program at another renowned institution in Beijing, I had a really nice time at BISU and its multi-cultural environment. I learned so many things and enjoyed every moment. The batch that I was studying with previously had only international students in my class. It was a global platform, and I loved it. But I always feel that the environment I had at that university is not the real and authentic Chinese academic environment. It was designed and staged for the purpose of preparing students to gain international exposure in every aspect. But when I enrolled in the university where I started my Chinese medium bachelor’s degree, I was exposed to real China and the Chinese academic system. It was totally different to what I experienced at BISU. This statement by a student who has experienced both the EMI and Chinese Medium of Instruction (CMI) highlights the differences observed in not only the language, but also the overall student experience. Starting from accommodation, the accommodation arrangements for EMI and CMI students differ, with separate dormitories designated for each group. However, it is crucial to note that the separation is based on international-domestic distinctions rather than EMI or CMI considerations. The enrollment of international students in CMI undergraduate courses was significantly smaller in number. The dormitories designated for international students at universities are often equipped with superior facilities and possess amenities not readily available to domestic students. For instance, at my alma mater in Chengdu, the electricity and hot water supply for domestic dormitories were discontinued at 110 10 pm each night, while the international student dormitories, where all the EMI students were accommodated, enjoyed 24-hour access to these utilities. This is a common practice in many universities in China. According to a study conducted at three universities in Chengdu, including my previous institution, students from developing countries have exhibited greater satisfaction with the accommodations provided by the university (Qadeer et al. 2021). The provision of accommodation is only one aspect of this narrative, as there are several other factors that have conferred a greater advantage upon EMI students. In general, the majority of EMI students have received either partial or full financial aid from a variety of scholarship programs. This is not a benefit that is extended to domestic students in China, as their financial support is contingent upon a highly competitive system. The field trips discussed in the previous chapter were exclusive to EMI students and not accessible to domestic students. The general trend observed in this case indicates that China has implemented additional measures to enhance the satisfaction levels of EMI students beyond what would normally be expected. These things can be identified as the reasons behind the higher satisfaction levels of undergraduate students regarding their overall experience in China. Overall, I would argue that a central plank of China’s scholarship program is to target educated individuals from developing countries who have the potential to yield significant long-term diplomatic benefits for the country. 4.3. Encouraging People-to-People Ties: A Strategy for Establishing Long-Lasting Relationships with International Students In the chapter thus far, I have examined the steps taken by China to improve the satisfaction and favorable viewpoint of international students towards China during their time in the 111 country. However, China's mission does not end with merely creating satisfaction and perception. Instead, they continue to engage with these students even after they have left the country. In order to accomplish this, they have adopted the "People-to-people ties" strategy, which was initially introduced through China's BRI action plan. In this section, I argue that the people-to-people connection between individuals is critical to China's ability to maintain strong support from international students even years after they have completed their studies in China. This relationship functions as a vital mechanism of soft power, allowing China to exercise influence through these students in their respective home countries. In February 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education issued a new directive that outlined measures to enhance patriotic education within the Chinese education system. At the end of the document, the directive proposed the establishment of a network that would connect domestic and international students and experts. The aim of this network would be to disseminate knowledge about the country's development, strategically positioning all Chinese students studying overseas and international students studying in China as potential people-to-people ambassadors (Bislev 2017). The discourse surrounding people-to-people interactions gained international prominence with the advent of the BRI, as China prioritized this strategy in their action plan for the initiative. Nevertheless, this is not an unfamiliar strategy in China, as the traditional concept of 'guanxi'—a fundamental social custom—is representative of this idea. Yen, Tseng, and Wang (2014,174) elucidate the concept of guanxi as follows, Guanxi in Chinese society tends to be based on shared institutions, such as kinship, birthplace, alma maters, and work units, rather than personal or 112 demographic similarities. Chinese people tend to rely on and favor people with whom they have a relationship instead of those with whom they do not share a close relationship. The results of this study provide evidence of China's cultivation of interpersonal relationships with Chinese citizens and international students. Particularly, within the domain of graduate studies, this practice is particularly conspicuous, as graduate students have forged strong connections with Chinese academics and researchers who continue to maintain these relationships for extended periods post-graduation. In terms of academic networks, I would argue that it has given China the opportunity to keep the intellectual community that has studied in China closer to China. Numerous Sri Lankan graduate students who were awarded scholarships by China to pursue doctoral degrees were appointed to various academic positions in public universities in Sri Lanka. In addition to their academic positions, they are also appointed as mentors in government organizations or ministries, lead projects, and have advisory positions in other important initiatives and activities within the country. Thus, they have a substantial capacity to influence a country's critical decision-making system. Sahan, who holds a senior academic post and serves as a mentor and advisor for numerous national and provincial level programs, remarked, By being exposed to China, their culture, language, way of thinking, beliefs, and development, I and thousands of other scholarship students now have eternal gratitude towards China. So, if something happened here that is unfavorable to China, perhaps one day we might get to gather and say, ‘Let’s do it like this.’ And also, when they are sponsoring some thousands of students, not only from the government sector but also from the private and key industrial 113 sectors, one day the top decision-making positions will be the products of China. They are going to make some favorable decisions towards Chinese policies and Chinese development projects that are taking place in Sri Lanka. They have not reached out to me yet, not even the embassy, but one day they might come to me. They might come to me and ask about things related Sri Lanka, about the policies, about the development. At that point, it is kind of obligatory to answer those questions. Because they have done a huge favor to us by giving us scholarships, by teaching us, by looking after us well, and by developing us to the present standards. So far, it is not within my capabilities to provide empirical data to support the assertion that Chinese academic initiatives in Sri Lanka have led to individuals favoring China in governmental or national decision-making processes. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the context in which these individuals are situated. As young people in a developing country with limited access to post-secondary education, their opportunities are severely constrained. Consequently, the support and opportunities they receive from China may have a profound emotional impact, leading them to feel a sense of indebtedness to China for their assistance. In such a situation, China has the potential to achieve great diplomatic success through these individuals by maintaining ties with them. Chinese academics continue to sustain robust connections with their Sri Lankan students who earned their PhD or Master's degree under their supervision, even years after they have graduated. The study indicates that the Chinese government has significantly contributed to the facilitation of this process by offering further financial support and strengthening collaborative projects. The collaborative research centers between Chinese and Sri Lankan 114 post-secondary institutions has been instrumental in fostering these ties, as it has provided an institutional framework that offers advantages to both parties. The other aspect that contributes to the fomenting of these relationships is the significance placed on publications in the contemporary global academic infrastructure. Peer-reviewed publications, book publications, and other forms of publications have become a means of measuring an individual's intellectual capabilities in the academic field and showcasing them to the world (McGrail et al. 2006). The scholarly community in Sri Lanka faces financial limitations that hinder their ability to conduct research and publish in high-quality academic journals or books through reputable publishing platforms. These processes often require processing fees or subscription charges that are beyond the reach of universities in underdeveloped countries and their scholars. As a result, scholars in Sri Lanka have come to regard their links with China as a crucial resource for maintaining their scholarly reputations. However, the academic initiatives have not only fostered people-to-people interactions within academic communities but have also extended academic and training opportunities to numerous high-ranking government and military officials, both long-term and short-term. This has enabled these officials to acquire academic and specific training credentials. Having grown up in a household of government officials, I have had the privilege of interacting with various officials in different contexts. In these settings, I have rarely come across an individual who has not officially visited China, even if only for a brief trip. In Sri Lanka, former high-ranking military personnel hold influential decision-making positions due to their significant popularity during the war. Many esteemed military officials have also transitioned into crucial non-military roles within the country, such as ministerial secretary positions like Foreign Secretary and Defense Secretary, as well as diplomatic positions. I remember my time in China when a 115 renowned retired Naval Commander from Sri Lanka frequently visited our university as a visiting scholar to deliver lectures to Chinese students. He was also designated as a Guest Professor by the university and frequently traveled to post-secondary institutions in China to give lectures and engage in scholarly activities related to his area of expertise. In August 2020, the pro-China Rajapakse government, which came to power after a defeat in 2015, appointed him as the Foreign Secretary of the country. He became famous for his statements on China. One of his statements was published by one of the leading Chinese media outlets with the headline “No evidence of genocide or detention camp in Xinjiang, says Sri Lanka's foreign secretary.” According to his statement, he was inspired to make the remark based on his travels to Xinjiang in 2019. During that period, these military leaders gained high esteem and recognition by the majority Sinhala ethnic community, and such statements could have a substantial impact in shaping people's views on China (and elsewhere). As shown previously, China has played a crucial part in fostering people-to-people connections with public institutions in Sri Lanka, which can be perceived as an approach aimed at achieving greater influence in the country. In this context, personal relationships have enabled direct assistance from Chinese organizations, eliminating the need to navigate the intricate channels of governments and embassies. This has not only made communication between organizations and individuals more convenient, but it has also increased the frequency of exchanges between the two countries by offering a more flexible means of communication. Furthermore, my contacts with government and military personnel, as well as other sources, indicate that those who frequently collaborate with their Chinese counterparts often seek expert advice, technical assistance, and financial backing for their new initiatives. Such interactions have allowed 116 China to exert influence over crucial aspects of Sri Lanka's affairs, which may prove beneficial for their future plans. 4.4. Conclusion In contrast to Western academic institutions where universities are granted a considerable degree of autonomy from the government, Chinese universities are subject to considerable pressure and influence from the government. This results in a stronger attachment to the Chinese government and a requirement to fulfill the imposed desires of these political institutions. Chinese President Xi Jinping frequently highlights the responsibility of Chinese educational institutions in disseminating the Party's objectives within both Chinese society and the global community (Perry 2020; Xia, Li, and Cao 2023). In the past decade, China has made substantial investments in its soft power missions, primarily targeting developing countries, following the initiation of BRI and other programs. This study presents some preliminary findings based on former students and suggests that China has strategically prioritized and effectively utilized academic diplomacy to cultivate a generation of young people, including intellectuals, abroad who possess a more profound understanding of Chinese culture, language, and society. According to the research participants' perspective, China has assisted them in obtaining higher education and new opportunities that the majority of them would not have been able to achieve without the Chinese scholarship program. This has helped foster a significant emotional connection with China, which could prove advantageous for China's future endeavors in Sri Lanka. The other aspect of this story involves the social, political, and cultural factors that shape Sri Lankan society. It is not difficult to find many people in Sri Lanka who vote for certain political 117 parties or political figures for generations because they received some patronage in the past from that party or political elite. According to Höglund and Piyarathne (2009, 292) this “Patron–client relationships are core aspects of party politics and organisation in Sri Lanka. The party workers and supporters expect benefits in different forms – for themselves and for their family. Such rewards include, for instance, employment opportunities, state contracts and loans, or governmental welfare benefits.” These personal benefits have frequently served as the primary motivation for individuals to cast their votes, not only for the recipients of these benefits but also for their entire families. With such social and political ties, the academic initiatives that China offers, which provide both academic opportunities and financial benefits, can have a significant influence on people's loyalty and support. Kanishka, who earned his PhD from China, explained this situation by saying, I went to China and completed my PhD using not the money of Sri Lanka, but the money given by China. So, it builds kind of an obligation towards China from me. Well, within our culture, we have a value called "treat back”. If someone does good to me, I have a culturally constructed emotional responsibility to treat them back with something good. One could potentially assert that this phenomenon could also be applicable to students who pursue post-secondary education in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or other Western nations. However, there are several reasons why this phenomenon may not apply to students who travel to countries like these. For one, the financial background of students is a crucial factor in this situation. Many students who travel to Western countries come from financially stable backgrounds, and receiving a scholarship may not create the same strong emotional connection as it does for those who come from more financially constrained 118 circumstances. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention that a minuscule proportion of individuals who travel to study in Western countries receive financial aid from their destinations, and in the majority of cases, this aid is only extended to a portion of the postgraduate population. Secondly, a substantial number of students who pursue their studies in these countries do not return to Sri Lanka, thus limiting their ability to make a significant impact in their native land, unlike post-secondary graduates from Chinese institutions who are required to return to Sri Lanka. In the current economic crisis this has considerably reduced the number of students returning to Sri Lanka after completing their studies, as they are more inclined towards establishing themselves in countries with more favorable financial conditions. Kaluarachchi and Jayathilaka (2024) reported that immigration levels increased significantly during the financial crisis due to individuals' fear of protecting their families and avoiding hunger. The main reason that Chinese academic initiatives are successful in generating soft power is their use of soft power strategies, which I have covered in this chapter. 119 Chapter 5. Conclusion This study offers an in-depth examination of China's academic initiatives in Sri Lanka and their implications for developing countries, particularly with regard to their effect on Sri Lanka and China as the initiator and receiver of these programs. Let me begin by summarizing my key findings and how they align with the two main research questions. The first research question of this study examines the significance of academic diplomacy within the framework of the BRI. The quantity of scholarships China offered through this initiative, as well as the other large-scale projects, suggests that China has invested a substantial amount of capital and planning to develop this network of academic initiatives as part of BRI. Furthermore, the interviews with participants indicate that China's planning and expenditure on these initiatives extend beyond merely providing scholarships, encompassing additional investment and strategic planning to accommodate international students and provide them with extensive exposure to Chinese language, culture, and history. Consequently, this study provides substantial evidence to demonstrate that China has allocated significant importance to education within their Belt and Road Initiative, specifically targeting youth and scholars from developing countries. The second research question investigates the impact of these academic diplomacy initiatives specifically on Sri Lanka. This question seeks to ascertain how China's efforts in this domain have affected Sri Lanka's academic landscape, academic scholars, youth and overall engagement with the BRI. Chapters Three and Four present a comprehensive analysis of these aspects, offering several findings and insights into how China's academic diplomacy aligns with its strategic objectives and influences its global position. 120 According to the findings in chapter three, the chronic problems within Sri Lanka's higher education system have provided China with a significant opportunity to further its soft power interests by extending certain academic initiatives in the country. Regardless of whether an individual is a high school graduate or an academic scholar, the issues in Sri Lanka have created a challenging environment that has made the scholarship programs and collaborative academic initiatives of China increasingly appealing. Maintaining a quality and productive higher education system presents a significant challenge for numerous developing countries. Many nations have encountered comparable obstacles to those present in Sri Lanka's higher education system, wherein they struggle to provide adequate opportunities for the country's youth due to insufficient financial resources to make necessary developments. Altbach et al. (2010) have identified the growing cost pressure in higher education as a critical trend, which has now reached a level beyond what most countries can afford. Hence, the low cost or free higher educational opportunities coming from China can be highly attractive for the youth from the developing countries. As I have shown further in Chapter Three, these programs provide a life-changing opportunity for many individuals who face a lack of funding and opportunities in their home country. It could be argued that both Sri Lanka and China have benefited from the knitting of these academic ties between their countries. On the one hand, the Chinese initiatives have offered educational advantages to its citizens and financial support for the research and development sector, areas in which the Sri Lankan government have had limited investment and growth. On the other hand, these initiatives have allowed China to influence the country's citizens, some of whom have the potential to reach high government, academic, and industrial positions in the future. Additionally, these initiatives have provided China with the opportunity to influence 121 academic institutions and other critical organizations in the country as a funding entity and expert support provider. The participants of these programs provided positive feedback regarding the opportunities they received through these academic initiatives. Each individual viewed it as a life-changing experience to study in China's more advanced higher education institutions. The post- graduate students emphasized the advanced research facilities and financial assistance they have received both during and following their graduation. Furthermore, numerous post-graduate students who eventually secured academic positions in Sri Lanka have also gone on to establish collaborative projects with their respective universities in China. These collaborations have provided the scholars in Sri Lanka with access to funding and technical support for their research endeavors. However, students from certain academic disciplines, such as performing arts and political science, have indicated that they have also faced some constraints due to the limitations imposed by the Chinese government on freedom of speech and other restrictions on their academic development. The relationship between China and Sri Lanka in the context of academic initiatives can be characterized as a core-peripheral relationship, wherein the core country, China, dominates the exchange significantly. Wu (2019, 91) talking about China’s position in the international higher education landscape, stated, China’s present approach can be regarded as its effort to move from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core’ of the world culture and knowledge system. China has its ambitious strategy of promoting its ‘overall influence’ and ‘going global’ through ‘outward-oriented’ higher education internationalization. 122 In this relationship, wherein China occupies a core position, it can reap numerous advantages that extend beyond mere diplomatic leverage. In line with the traditional core-peripheral relationship, where the Global North has authority over the Global South regarding education and learning, the core nation exerts significant influence over the epistemology of knowledge (Santos 2018). This influence, it could be argued, leads to the devaluation of indigenous or existing knowledge systems in the countries located in the global south. At this stage, there is insufficient evidence to extend this to China's involvement in Sri Lanka. However, it is worth noting that the involvement of China in Sri Lanka also contrasts with forms of European colonization in the past, in which the epistemology of the Global North was imposed upon the local community using forceful colonial power. Those who hold this viewpoint may also maintain that the epistemology of knowledge in China is primarily influenced by the Global North at this stage, as China has significantly integrated its social and economic systems within globalizing networks that is primarily shaped by the Global North. However, it is essential to acknowledge that China's political authority has still preserved and maintained its communist-socialist political system and values despite changes in the economy and social structure. Additionally, China, governed by the Communist Party, is considered an ideological and, more recently, economic competitor in the West's pursuit of global dominance. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has emerged as a significant challenge and ideological counterpart to the West, and it has demonstrated its intention to increase its geo-political power by expanding its influence beyond its borders (Marston 2024). It is still premature to ascertain whether China is attempting to bring about an epistemological change in knowledge in the global south to counter the competition from the West or to fulfill its own geo-political ambitions. This study has revealed a number of parallels between Chinese academic initiatives 123 in Sri Lanka and the neocolonial educational strategies employed by the Global North to extend its epistemological reach. It is well known that the expansion of British Colonialism extended the usage of the English language across the world through its colonial expansion, and as a result, English has become the most widely recognized language in global communication, thereby granting American and British influence considerable authority when it comes to the expansion of a global epistemology (Majhanovich 2013; R’boul 2024). In a similar vein, the findings of this research reveal numerous instances that suggest a potential correlation between neocolonial educational approaches and forms of Chinese academic diplomacy. Illustrative examples of this include required Chinese language instruction, the selective use of historical content, and certain funding practices. As I discussed, the results of this study demonstrate that China is employing extensive strategies to promote the dissemination of its language more effectively in recent decades, utilizing advanced techniques such as the implementation of EMI to expand the use of Mandarin. During my primary education, my parents and relatives encouraged me to learn English, emphasizing its importance for my future. At that time, no one instructed me to learn Chinese. However, during my high school years, several of my older acquaintances urged me to learn Mandarin, citing its status as the language of the future. Learning the Chinese language has gained popularity in contemporary Sri Lankan society, resulting in the emergence of numerous language schools and learning centers in various neighborhoods. Although Mandarin is not currently positioned to replace English as a widely used language in Sri Lanka, it is exhibiting significant growth, which could potentially pose a challenge to English in the future. Another notable example illustrative of these neo-colonial practices involves the selective presentation of Chinese history and culture that is embedded within academic 124 coursework. The findings showed that the students had never encountered any negative aspects of Chinese history and culture in their education; and that the teaching had primarily focused on highlighting only attractive aspects of Chinese history and culture. This packaging of historical narratives and accounts has been widely acknowledged by scholars as a key ideological form of neo-colonization (Trouillot and Carby 2015). In Chapter Four, a comprehensive examination of the diverse academic and non-academic aspects of these programs, as perceived by the participants, reveals a wealth of potential soft power tools. China has integrated numerous courses that are connected to their cultural and historical heritage into the curriculum of all students, regardless of their field of study. By concentrating on events such as the “Century of Humiliation” and omitting incidents like the “Cultural Revolution”, it can be assumed that China aims to create a positive perception of modern China among international students. Different types of cultural exposure have also been provided to students through field trips to cultural and historical sites, as well as the organization of specific cultural events and festivals. It can be argued that these academic programs have utilized the rich culture and history of China as a tool to enhance the positive impressions towards China. The other important finding in chapter four is the way China has included Chinese language training within EMI programs. For the students who are coming to China for an EMI program they do not have to show any Chinese language proficiency before joining the program; however, to complete their graduation they must show Chinese language proficiency as high as HSK-4 which is the higher intermediary. Based on the final analysis of this study, this conclusion highlights two key areas that are significantly relevant to the research: diplomatic changes and internationalization of higher education. 125 5.1. From Elite Ties to New Connections: China's Diplomatic Makeover in Sri Lanka In the summer of 2019, while I was partaking in my daily rituals at Sichuan University in Chengdu, a high-ranking official from the university's international office approached me. They conveyed a sense of urgency laced with hospitality as they informed me of an upcoming event: delegations from Sri Lanka were to visit our campus. As the designated leader of the Sri Lankan student community, I was summoned to participate alongside my fellow countrymen. My curiosity was piqued, so I inquired about the anticipated visitors from Sri Lanka. "To which university do they belong?" I asked, assuming they were academic scholars, a common occurrence during that season. The official's response surprised me, unfolding an unexpected narrative. "No, not scholars," he replied with a hint of intrigue. "They are parliamentary members led by Namal Rajapakse, the eldest son of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa." The reply stunned me—not just because the delegation was a group of elite Sri Lankan politicians but also because of the nature and timing of their tour. In 2015, the Rajapaksa family lost power following the election. Therefore, at that time, they were not representative of the Sri Lankan government. However, during this period, Sri Lanka was gearing up for another election. The Rajapaksa family members were already positioning themselves for roles in the anticipated new government, with former military officer Gotabaya Rajapaksa appointed as their presidential candidate. The event kicked off in the main meeting room of the university's central administrative building. Like similar political gathering, the politicians made endless promises about what they'd do once they won the election. Among the crowd, a few members of the university’s top leadership were also present, watching the Sri Lankan leaders present their case before the students. 126 This incident which I experienced as a student in Sichuan University illustrates some of the changes in Chinese public diplomacy in Sri Lanka. Prior to 2015, China did not require assistance from the Sri Lankan general public, as it was able to achieve its objectives through the Rajapaksa regime. Chinese diplomacy was heavily centered on the leadership of the Rajapaksa family. As I have noted in this research, the approach of leveraging relationships with leaders of developing countries is an essential aspect of Chinese diplomacy. China has traditionally invested heavily in fostering these connections, providing substantial financial support to maintain the leaders' grip on power. In exchange, these leaders facilitate China's strategic goals, such as securing infrastructure projects, obtaining access to natural resources, and expanding its geopolitical influence (Dreher et al. 2019). However, the events that I describe here, in my opinion, are illustrative of the way the Chinese government sought to reinstate the Rajapakse regime by fostering its popularity among Sri Lankan international students in China. I believe that following the defeat of the Rajapaksa government in the 2015 elections, China acknowledged the need for a more proactive approach to public diplomacy in Sri Lanka. Relying solely on elite politicians had proven to be a risky strategy, and therefore, China aimed to target various groups in Sri Lanka, with a primary focus on the youth and scholarly community. I argue that there are two main reasons for this strategic shift. First, this targeted approach reflects China's acknowledgment of the critical role that these groups play in shaping the future socio-political landscape. Second, and most importantly, the criticism towards Chinese engagement in Sri Lanka initially came from the educated youth. The initial reception of China's initiatives in Sri Lanka during the post-war period received heavy public support. The educated youth and scholarly community expressed reservations about the feasibility, environmental consequences, and 127 corruption linked to these projects from the outset. Despite these criticisms, China's appeal persisted due to its alignment with the Rajapakse regime and its role in securing the war victory. However, later, the Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka has typically been met with controversy and suspicion regarding the hidden motivations driving these partnerships. At the beginning, China portrayed the bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka as a mutually beneficial arrangement for both Sri Lanka and China, similar to its approach in other countries participating in the BRI. However, to date, it could be argued that the aforementioned partnership has yielded little benefit for the island nation, while China has gained substantial advantages. For instance, China secured a 99-year lease for the Hambanthota Port, which is strategically located in a critical area for maritime trade and military operations within the Indian Ocean region. The acquisition of Hambanthota Port by China has generated both international attention and local backlash due to the implications of granting one of South Asia’s most sensitive locations. Despite the initial disregard for the opinions of the educated youth, they eventually gained recognition as influential leaders, contributing to President Rajapakse's loss in the 2015 election and the public uprising against the same regime in 2022 (Fernando et al. 2025). Jayamaha (2022, 366) asserts “The youth of Sri Lanka was thrown the Rajapaksha’s dictatorship to the ground, … this will be a milestone in revolution history in world politics.” Although these incidents were not explicitly targeted in China, in both cases, the Rajapaksa government was accused of granting China unethical opportunities to acquire land and exercise significant influence over the country's key decision-making processes. The recent events in Sri Lanka were by no means the only instances where the youth of the country took to the streets to protest against the inadequate leadership and mistreatment of the nation. In the 1970s, both Sinhala and Tamil youth commenced a separate armed struggle 128 campaign against the Sri Lankan government, and there have been numerous occasions where the youth of the country have displayed their resistance against governments. In such circumstances, winning the favor of the youth would be a significant advantage for any party anticipating substantial political and economic gains from the island nation. China has already invested substantial resources to Sri Lanka for various infrastructure, political, and economic projects (Kelegama 2014; Attanayake and Atmakuri 2021). Based on the information provided, it can be reasonably asserted that China has reoriented its diplomatic priorities towards the youth demographic in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it can be posited that this shift is an endeavor to ensure enhanced protection for its investments and maintain its influence in the country in the long term. In comparison to China's involvement in Sri Lanka a decade ago, the current Chinese diplomatic efforts are more focused on engaging with society and the youth, rather than prioritizing the political leadership. 5.2. Internationalization Drives Political Agenda: How Internationalization of Higher Education Facilitates Chinese Soft power Globalization has made global connectivity essential for achieving success. Although China initially adhered to a strict communist ideology and resisted engagement with countries holding different political views, it eventually dismantled these barriers. By doing so, China entered the global arena, seeking geopolitical and economic advancement through increased international connectivity. As a nation, China has achieved remarkable progress following its decision to open up its economy to the global community, and today, it boasts a substantial gross domestic product (GDP) of 17.79 trillion USD, positioning it second only to the United States in the world (World Bank 2023). China, despite its lower GDP per capita compared to 129 Western countries, has invested on a large scale in various sectors, positioning itself as a dominant global player in several sectors including education (X. Li and Wye 2023). China devotes a substantial portion of its annual GDP to education, amounting to roughly 4% of its total economic output. Furthermore, the country invests approximately 2.5% of its GDP annually in research and development, with a considerable portion of that funding directed towards the research initiatives of post-secondary institutions. It is worth mentioning that Chinese colleges and universities also derive revenue from student tuition fees and private donations, which are utilized for expenditures within the institutions. With the substantial financial and political support directed towards Chinese higher education this has enabled it to achieve significant internationalization. As a result, the country is now recognized as one of the prime destinations for international students seeking higher education. Additionally, Chinese institutions and the academic community have successfully established a robust network of research and academic collaborations worldwide. This internationalization has been particularly apparent among some of the developing countries like Sri Lanka. In the context of the internationalization of higher education in developing countries, China has emerged as a core country rather than a semi-peripheral or peripheral one. The findings of this study confirm that China, with its financial and strategic governmental support, provides a significant number of scholarships, technical assistance, research collaborations, and other academic resources to developing countries. In the context of Sri Lanka, China is spearheading these collaborations and is the primary funder of various scholarships and initiatives for Sri Lankan youth. All these collaborative academic endeavors are orchestrated by the Chinese government via various projects that they have initiated, such as the BRI. Consequently, the Chinese government exerts significant geopolitical influence over the internationalization 130 efforts of Chinese higher education institutions. Talking about the government's role in internationalizing higher education, F. Li (2016, 47) describes, The internationalization of Chinese higher education has always been strategically designed and programmed by the government; consequently, institutions formulate their own strategies and plans within the framework of the national ones. Though fundamental reforms are being implemented continuously, the Chinese government is still the major provider of funding for internationalization, just as it is for the whole public education sector. The Chinese government also acts like the executive director of a corporation in managing the internationalization of higher education. Government regulation and supervision are deeply embedded in the daily operation of Chinese institutions owing to political anxieties and economic considerations. The aforementioned statement highlights the Chinese government's extensive control over every aspect of China's internationalization strategy for higher education. Furthermore, it underscores the significance of the Chinese government's provision of a blueprint for institutions to adopt and implement according to their own unique strengths. This enables the Chinese government to design its higher education initiatives more aligned with its geopolitical goals, while closely monitoring the entire process at the operational level. There are numerous reasons to suggest that the Chinese government may employ internationalization in higher education projects as a platform to further soft power interests in order to gain certain geo-political and economic leverage. In Chapter Four, several examples are presented illustrating potential soft power initiatives targeting international students 131 studying in China. These initiatives include providing students with Chinese cultural exposure through academic and non-academic initiatives across all disciplines, providing extensive language training, and fostering academic collaborations that extend beyond the period of study. These strategies exemplify potential methods through which the Chinese government can exert their soft power influence. The findings of this study also reveal that coursework contents on Chinese history are designed to emphasize a more favorable version while excluding negative aspects from modern history. As described by F. Li (2016) the Chinese government possesses the authority to design the blueprint for all these programs, while educators at universities are limited to implementing them within the framework provided by the government. The study also identified that students from all universities, not just a select few, reported never being taught about any unfavorable aspects of Chinese history. Therefore, these findings provide compelling evidence to argue that the Chinese government heavily incorporates soft power elements targeting international students. The period from 2010 to 2020 can be characterized as a time when Chinese universities significantly expanded their research and academic collaborations with post-secondary institutions worldwide. This is also the same time period where China introduced BRI as a geo-political project and included education as one of their main components in the initiative. BRI, as a geopolitical project, stands out due to its concentration on developing nations globally (Johnston 2019). As part of the program, the government provided direct funding to Chinese universities to offer scholarships to international students and establish collaborations with universities in developing countries. In this period, China’s overall focus on developing countries in international politics also gained significant development, and this trend is clearly visible in their academic initiatives targeting international students. The majority of 132 scholarships granted to international students are typically reserved for individuals hailing from developing countries. In particular, undergraduate scholarships are often awarded to students from these nations. Some of the main scholarship initiatives introduced to specifically focus developing countries include Belt and Road Scholarships, ASEAN- China Young Leaders Scholarships, Pacific Island Forum Scholarships, Youth of Excellent Scheme, China-Africa Friendship Program. Apart from these scholarships, there are country specific bilateral scholarship programs introduced by the Chinese government or the provincial governments. At my university, a significant number of undergraduate students from Sri Lanka were awarded the Belt and Road Scholarship, accounting for approximately 70% of the total population. The remaining students received the Sister City Scholarship, which was a unique initiative between Chengdu, China and Kandy, Sri Lanka. However, opposing to higher number of scholarship initiatives targeting developing countries there are very limited number of scholarship programs were available specifically targeting developed countries. Chinese academic initiatives directed at developed nations generally operate as collaborations in which both parties make financial investments, whereas China's academic partnerships with developing countries are characterized by funding that is primarily provided by China. Hence, between 2010 and 2020, there was a noticeable increase in China's academic initiatives with developing countries. This shift aligns with China's changing geopolitical focus at the same period, especially with the introduction of BRI, which focused more on developing nations. 5.3. Conclusion As discussed in Chapter One, the field of higher education for international students in China is considerably underexplored compared to other study destinations. A significant proportion 133 of students studying in China come from developing countries, indicating a substantial academic exchange between China and the developing world. This dynamic has received limited attention in research primarily conducted in the Global North. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that China has emerged as one of the top five destinations for international students globally. While a limited number of scholars have talked about China's potential to generate soft power through international students and academic programs, the existing body of research in this area is notably sparse in terms of empirical evidence. Most studies on this topic tend to be more theoretical or opinion-based, lacking direct, concrete data. This study aims to address this gap by offering important insights on the topic. Specifically, it examines how China strategically utilizes various elements—such as the content of its educational programs, language strategies, and financial incentives—in its academic diplomacy efforts aimed at developing countries. The participants' firsthand experience and the researcher's direct engagement with these initiatives significantly contributed to identifying this case from a unique perspective, specifically that of the participants from developing countries. This research aimed to demonstrate how China's academic diplomacy has established its presence in developing nations. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize that there are constraints when attempting to apply these results beyond Sri Lanka's boundaries. China may have specific objectives in different countries when applying its diplomatic strategies; therefore, there may be certain exceptions to where the findings of this study can be applied across all developing countries. Consequently, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of China's academic diplomacy mission in developing countries, additional studies similar to this one are necessary in other nations as well. This study has primarily focused on the aspect of local students 134 pursuing higher education in China; however, there are additional strategies that China has been employing in their broader academic diplomacy initiative, such as establishing collaborative research centers in foreign countries. Consequently, further research is necessary to address these additional areas of this initiative. An attempt was made to incorporate the collaborative research centers aspect into this study; however, none of the contacted individuals were willing to participate in an interview to provide their perspectives regarding these collaborations. Some of them explicitly indicated their discomfort in taking part in this study. It remains a persistent challenge to mitigate these data collection obstacles when addressing topics related to Chinese politics, and individuals who are involved in these initiatives are often reluctant to share their insights. However, despite these challenges, it is imperative that further studies be conducted to identify the various strategies embedded in these academic programs in order to obtain a comprehensive perspective on China's academic diplomacy. 135 Bibliography Abeyrathne, Dilmini Hasintha, and Tharindu Udayanga Kamburawala. 2023. “Comparative Analysis of Debt Restructuring Strategies in Developing Economies: A Case Study of Ghana, Zambia, and Sri Lanka.” HAPSc Policy Briefs Series 4 (2): 147–53. https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.36693. Alawattegama, Kingsley K. 2020. “Free Education Policy and Its Emerging Challenges in Sri Lanka.” European Journal of Educational Sciences 7 (1): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.19044/ejes.v7no1a1. Allsop, Jon. 2022. “Sri Lanka’s Fallen President and the Press.” Columbia Journalism Review, 2022. https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/sri_lanka_press_freedom.php. Altbach, Philip G., Liz Reisberg, and Laura E. Rumbley. 2010. Trends in Global Higher Education: A Tracking an Academic Revolution. 1st ed. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Sense. https://brill.com/display/title/36570. Alves, Ana Cristina. 2013. “China’s ‘win-Win’ Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa.” The South African Journal of International Affairs 20 (2): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2013.811337. Ang, Ien. 2001. On Not Speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West. 1st ed. Book, Whole. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203996492. 136 Antwi-Boateng, Osman. 2017. “New World Order Neo-Colonialism: A Contextual Comparison of Contemporary China and European Colonization in Africa.” The Journal of Pan African Studies 10 (2): 177–95. Attanayake, Chulanee. 2021. “Sri Lanka-China Organic Fertiliser Spat: Reflections.” ISAS Brief. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/sri-lanka-china-organic-fertiliser-spat-reflections/. ———. 2023. “Unveiling Sri Lanka’s Agency: Empowering Infrastructural Transformation in China-Sri Lanka Relations.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 12 (1): 59–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2280479. Attanayake, Chulanee, and Archana Atmakuri. 2021. “Navigating the Sino-Indian Power Struggle in the Indian Ocean: The Case of Sri Lanka.” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 17 (1): 114–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2021.1878587. Bader, Julia. 2024. “China: Change and Continuity.” In Research Handbook on Authoritarianism, edited by Natasha Lindstaedt and Jeroin Bosch, 317–30. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827.00031. Bernal-Meza, Raúl. 2016. “China and Latin America Relations: The Win-Win Rhetoric.” Journal of China and International Relations 4 (2). https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.jcir.v4i2.1588. 137 Bislev, Ane. 2017. “Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese International Students as a Soft-Power Tool.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46 (2): 81–109. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261704600204. Brautigam, Deborah. 2020. “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a Meme.” Area Development and Policy 5 (1): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828. Burgess, Melissa, Jessica Chia, Diluksion Francis, and Nischal Lamichhane. 2022. “Sri Lanka Crisis: Rapid Needs Assessment June 2022.” Colombo: Save the Children International. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/document/sri-lanka-crisis-rapid-needs-assessment/. Butler, Steven. 2022. “Who Was Behind the Killing of Sri Lankan Journalist Lasantha Wickrematunge?” Global Investigative Journalism Network, 2022. https://gijn.org/stories/who-was-behind-the-killing-of-sri-lankan-journalist-lasantha-wickrematunge/. Callahan, William A. 2004. “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29 (2): 199–218. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540402900204. CBSL. 2022. “CCPI Based Headline Inflation Recorded at 69.8% on Year-on-Year Basis in September 2022.” COlombo: Statistics Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka. https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20220930_inflation_in_september_2022_ccpi_e.pdf. 138 Chen, Li-ping. 2023. “Dr. Theodore Hsi-En Chen (1902-1991): Chinese American Education Pioneer and Founder of East Asian Studies at USC.” 2023. https://scalar.usc.edu/works/theodore-chen/life-and-career. Chen, Theodore Hsi-En. 1951. “Education and Propaganda in Communist China.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 277 (1): 135–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271625127700114. Chin, Tamara. 2013. “The Invention of the Silk Road, 1877.” Critical Inquiry 40 (1): 194–219. https://doi.org/10.1086/673232. Chinese Tests Service Website. 2024. “About the HSK Tests.” The World’s Most Popular Chinese Language Proficiency Tests (blog). 2024. https://www.chinesetest.cn/HSK. Chong, Terence Tai Leung, and Xiaoyang Li. 2019. “Understanding the China-US Trade War: Causes, Economic Impact, and the Worst-Case Scenario.” Economic and Political Studies 7 (2): 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2019.1595328. Curran, Louise, Ping Lv, and Francesca Spigarelli. 2017. “Chinese Investment in the EU Renewable Energy Sector: Motives, Synergies and Policy Implications.” Energy Policy 101 (February):670–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.018. Dai, Chaowu. 2019. “China’s Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962.” Asian Perspective 43 (3): 435–57. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0022. 139 De Silva, Dileep. 2017. “How Many Doctors Should We Train for Sri Lanka? System Dynamics Modelling for Training Needs.” Ceylon Medical Journal 62 (4): 233–37. https://doi.org/10.4038/cmj.v62i4.8573. Dever, James, and Jack Dever. 2021. “Information Age Imperialism.” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 52 (2): 1–48. Dibb, Paul. 2010. “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons to Be Learned?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64 (5): 495–509. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2010.513366. Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky, and Michael J. Tierney. 2019. “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance.” Journal of Development Economics 140 (September):44–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.003. Elfstrom, Manfred. 2021. Workers and Change in China: Resistance, Repression, Responsiveness. 1st ed. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108923286. Ellwood, David W. 2018. “The Force of American Modernity: World War II and the Birth of a Soft Power Superpower.” International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity 6 (1): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.18352/hcm.548. Feigenblatt, Otto von. 2019. “Flexible Diplomacy: Scholars as Key Players in Track II Diplomacy.” Espirales Revista Multidisciplinaria De Investigación, no. Journal Article, 32–45. https://doi.org/10.31876/er.v3i28.574. 140 Fernando, Udan, Jude Fernando, and Bodh Maathura. 2025. “On the Verge of an Economic Collapse and an Uprising: Changing Character of Sri Lankan CSOs.” In Varieties of Civil Society Across Asia, edited by Akihiro Ogawa and Anthony Spires, 26–38. Routledge Contemporary Asia. New York: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003482116/varieties-civil-society-across-asia-akihiro-ogawa-anthony-spires. Ferrer-Fons, Mariona, and Marta Rovira-Martínez. 2021. “Visiting The Past: A Case Study of Experiential Learning with Young People at Historic Sites.” Slovenský Národopis 69 (3): 345–58. https://doi.org/10.2478/se-2021-0020. Fullbright Online. 2024. “Fulbright Foreign Student Program.” 2024. https://foreign.fulbrightonline.org/about/foreign-student-program. Galloway, Nicola, Jaroslaw Kriukow, and Takuya Numajiri. 2017. “Internationalisation, Higher Education and the Growing Demand for English: An Investigation into the English Medium of Instruction (EMI) Movement in China and Japan.” ELT Research Papers. London: British Council. https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/internationalisation-higher-education-and-the-growing-demand-for-. Ganguly, Sumit. 2018. “Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War.” Daedalus 147 (1): 78–89. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00475. 141 Gao, Hongmei, and Penelope Prime. 2010. “Facilitators and Obstacles of Intercultural Business Communication for American Companies in China: Lessons Learned from the UPS Case.” Global Business Languages 15 (10): 142–69. Gitlitz, Sam. 2023. “Security and Development, the Two Wins of China’s African Strategy: Initial Research into China’s Win-Win Strategy’s for African Security.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 18 (2): 216–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/15423166231157435. Gonzalez Jauregui, Juliana. 2021. “Latin American Countries in the BRI: Challenges and Potential Implications for Economic Development.” Asian Education and Development Studies 10 (3): 348–58. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-08-2019-0134. Gunaratne, PSM, Asoka Ramanayake, and Damayanthi Panagoda. 2018. “Tracer Study of Graduates.” Colombo: University Grant Commission of Sri Lanka. https://www.ugc.ac.lk/downloads/statistics/webTracer/2018/Tracer%20Study%202018.pdf. Halvorson, Daniel. 2013. States of Disorder: Understanding State Failure and Intervention in the Periphery. 1st ed. Book, Whole. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315610733. Hannerz, Ulf. 2015. “Writing Futures: An Anthropologist’s View of Global Scenarios.” Current Anthropology 56 (6): 797–818. https://doi.org/10.1086/684070. Hardiman, Richard. 2020. “Environmental Considerations of the Belt and Road Initiative.” In The Belt and Road Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New Development Model, edited 142 by Francisco José B. S. Leandro and Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, 173–201. Singapore: Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_8. Hartig, Falk. 2013. “Panda Diplomacy: The Cutest Part of China’s Public Diplomacy.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8 (1): 49–78. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-12341245. Haugen, Heidi Østbø. 2013. “China’s Recruitment of African University Students: Policy Efficacy and Unintended Outcomes.” Globalisation, Societies and Education 11 (3): 315–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2012.750492. Hayes, Anna. 2020. “Interwoven ‘Destinies’: The Significance of Xinjiang to the China Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Xi Jinping Legacy.” The Journal of Contemporary China 29 (121): 31–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621528. He, Xiao. 2022. “People-to-People Exchanges and Cooperation.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road, edited by Cai Fang, Peter Nolan, and Wang Linggui, 2nd ed., 1:428–32. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003286202-93. Hernandez, Diego. 2017. “Are ‘New’ Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality?” World Development 96 (August):529–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.035. Hillman, Nick. 2023. “Over One-Quarter of the World’s Countries Are Headed by Someone Educated in the UK and Another Quarter Are Headed by Someone Educated in the US – HEPI’S 2023 SOFT-POWER INDEX.” Soft Power Index. Oxford: The Higher Education Policy Institute. https://www.hepi.ac.uk/2023/08/22/over-one-quarter-of-143 the-worlds-countries-are-headed-by-someone-educated-in-the-uk-and-another-quarter-are-headed-by-someone-educated-in-the-us-hepi-2023-soft-power-index/. ———. 2024. “HEPI SOFT-POWER INDEX 2024: The US Pulls Further Away, While the UK Stands Still and France Slips Back.” HEPI Blog (blog). 2024. https://www.hepi.ac.uk/category/blog/. Höglund, Kristine, and Anton Piyarathne. 2009. “Paying the Price for Patronage: Electoral Violence in Sri Lanka.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47 (3): 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040903090807. Hsi-En Chen, Theodore. 1951. “Education and Propaganda in Communist China.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 277 (1): 135–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271625127700114. Huang, Yiping. 2016. “Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment.” China Economic Review 40 (Journal Article): 314–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007. Hurley, John, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance. 2019. “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 3 (1): 139. https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v3i1.1123. Jain, Romi. 2021. China’s Soft Power and Higher Education in South Asia: Rationale, Strategies, and Implications. Book, Whole. New York: Routledge. https://go.exlibris.link/2bQ8WPZ3. 144 Jayamaha, J.H.S.T. 2022. “The Youth Uprising Movements in Sri Lanka in 2022.” Sprin Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (07): 360–66. https://doi.org/10.55559/sjahss.v1i07.38. Johnston, Lauren A. 2019. “The Belt and Road Initiative: What Is in It for China?” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 6 (1): 40–58. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.265. Kaluarachchi, Sandunima, and Ruwan Jayathilaka. 2024. “Unveiling Sri Lanka’s Brain Drain and Labour Market Pressure: A Study of Macroeconomic Factors on Migration.” PLOS ONE 19 (3): e0300343. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0300343. Kelegama, Saman. 2014. “China–Sri Lanka Economic Relations: An Overview.” China Report 50 (2): 131–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445514523646. Knight, Jane. 2004. “Internationalization Remodeled: Definition, Approaches, and Rationales.” Journal of Studies in International Education 8 (1): 5–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/1028315303260832. Kothari, Tanvi, Masaaki Kotabe, and Priscilla Murphy. 2013. “Rules of the Game for Emerging Market Multinational Companies from China and India.” Emerging Market Firm Competitiveness: Internationalization, Innovation and Institutions (3Is) 19 (3): 276–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2013.03.007. Kuruwita, Rathindra. 2024. “Months After Banning Research Vessels, Sri Lanka Permits German Vessel’s Docking.” The Diplomat, March 27, 2024, sec. Know the Asia Pacific. 145 https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/months-after-banning-research-vessels-sri-lanka-permits-german-vessels-docking/. Latiff, Aquilah, and Anushka Wijesinha. 2022. “Understanding China’s Role in Sri Lanka’s Debt Restructuring Efforts.” The Diplomat, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/understanding-chinas-role-in-sri-lankas-debt-restructuring-efforts/. Lee, Eric Yong Joong. 2023. “Rethinking Twenty Years of American Unilateralism in the Middle East: A Critical Evaluation of the War on Terror.” In Revolutionary Approach to International Law: The Role of International Lawyer in Asia, edited by Eric Yong Joong Lee, 101–20. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7967-5_5. Lee, Jack T. 2015. “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy: Emerging Education Hubs in Asia.” Comparative Education 51 (3): 353–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2015.1037551. Li, Fuhui. 2016. “The Internationalization Of Higher Education In China: The Role Of Government.” Journal of International Education Research 12 (1): 47–52. https://doi.org/10.19030/jier.v12i1.9566. Li, Xinyao, and Chung-Khain Wye. 2023. “The Effect of Investment in Education on China’s Economic Growth: The Role of Financial Development.” The Chinese Economy 56 (1): 69–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2058182. 146 Lima, Antônio F de. 2007. “The Role of International Educational Exchanges in Public Diplomacy.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3 (3): 234–51. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.6000066. Maags, Christina. 2014. “Enhancing China＇s National Image Through Culture Festivals： A Case Study of China Culture Years in Europe.” 复旦人文社会科学论丛：英文版, no. 1, 33–55. Majhanovich, Suzanne. 2013. “English as a Tool of Neo-Colonialism and Globalization in Asian Contexts.” In , 249–61. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789460919060/BP000019.xml. Marston, Hunter S. 2024. “Navigating Great Power Competition: A Neoclassical Realist View of Hedging.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 24 (1): 29–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcad001. Mbiti, Isaac M. 2016. “The Need for Accountability in Education in Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 30 (3): 109–32. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.109. McCarthy, Niall. 2020. “The Countries Leading the World in Scientific Research.” World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/top-ten-countries-leading-scientific-publications-in-the-world. McGrail, Matthew R., Claire M. Rickard, and Rebecca Jones. 2006. “Publish or Perish: A Systematic Review of Interventions to Increase Academic Publication Rates.” Higher 147 Education Research & Development 25 (1): 19–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/07294360500453053. McKinley, Jim, Heath Rose, and Xiao Lan Curdt-Christiansen. 2023. “EMI in Chinese Higher Education: The Muddy Water of ‘Englishisation,’” Applied Linguistics Review, 14 (6): 1475–81. https://doi.org/10.1515/applirev-2022-0015. Melancon, Glenn. 2003. Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840. 1st ed. Book, Whole. Aldershot, England: Ashgate. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315261331. Mills, Albert, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. 2023. “Encyclopedia of Case Study Research.” In , 474. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397. Modongal, Shameer. 2016. “Development of Nationalism in China.” Cogent Social Sciences 2 (1): 1235749. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2016.1235749. Montville, Joseph. 1991. “Track Two Diplomacy: The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy.” In The Psychodynamics of International Relations, edited by V.D. Volkan, Joseph Montville, and D.A. Julius, 2:161–75. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Morris, Scott, Brad Parks, and Alysha Gardner. 2020. “Chinese and World Bank Lending Terms: A Systematic Comparison Across 157 Countries and 15 Years.” Policy Papers. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. 148 https://www.cgdev.org/publication/chinese-and-world-bank-lending-terms-systematic-comparison. Musavian, Hossein, and Shahir Shahidsaless. 2014. Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. 1st ed. Book, Whole. New York: Bloomsbury. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781501317903. Mushtaq, Munza. 2024. “Sri Lanka Turns to India as Counterbalance to Chinese Presence: Vital Power, Port, Airport Projects Involve Neighbor as Asian Rivals Focus on Indian Ocean.” Nikkei Asia, September 24, 2024, sec. International Relations. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Sri-Lanka-turns-to-India-as-counterbalance-to-Chinese-presence2. Nandy, Debasish, Abdullah-Al-Mamun, and Saifullah Akon. 2023. “Financial Crises in Sri Lanka: In Search of Reasons, Sufferings, and Way Forward.” In Financial Crimes: A Guide to Financial Exploitation in a Digital Age, edited by Chander Mohan Gupta, 49–65. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29090-9_4. Nedopil, Christoph. 2024. “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023.” Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. DOI: 10.25904/1912/5140. Nye, Joseph. 2005. “Soft Power and Higher Education.” International Policy and Law. Forum for the Future of Higher Education (Archives). https://library.educause.edu/resources/2005/1/soft-power-and-higher-education. 149 ———. 2016. Joseph Nye - On Soft Power. Interviews with Expert Diplomats. Foriegn Policy Association. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_58v19OtIIg. ———. 2019. “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Revisited.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14 (1–2): 7–20. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14101013. ———. 2022. “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept.” The Journal of International Communication 28 (1): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2021.2019893. Overholt, William H. 2012. “Reassessing China: Awaiting Xi Jinping.” The Washington Quarterly 35 (2): 121–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.666496. Peng, Zengjun. 2004. “Representation of China: An across Time Analysis of Coverage in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times.” Asian Journal of Communication 14 (1): 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/0129298042000195170. Perry, Elizabeth J. 2020. “Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China.” Theory and Society 49 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-019-09373-1. Peters, Michael A. 2020. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Reshaping Global Higher Education.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 52 (6): 586–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2019.1615174. Peterson, Mcgill Patti. 2014. “Diplomacy and Education: A Changing Global Landscape.” International Higher Education, no. 75, 2–3. https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2014.75.5410. 150 Qadeer, Talat, Muhammad Kashif Javed, Aqsa Manzoor, Min Wu, and Syed Imran Zaman. 2021. “The Experience of International Students and Institutional Recommendations: A Comparison Between the Students from the Developing and Developed Regions.” Frontiers in Psychology 12 (Journal Article): 667230–667230. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.667230. Rayner, Naomi. 2022. “Chevening’s Impact.” London: Chevening.org. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.chevening.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Chevening-Annual-Report-2022.pdf. R’boul, Hamza. 2024. Postcolonial Challenges to Theory and Practice in ELT and TESOL: Geopolitics of Knowledge and Epistemologies of the South. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Book, Whole. Oxford: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003322535. Rolland, Nadège. 2017. “China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?” The Washington Quarterly 40 (1): 127–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302743. Ru, Sung Hee. 2023. “America’s Marshall Plan and China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative: The Capitalist World Economy’s Two-Headed Horse.” Comparative Sociology 22 (3): 439–74. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-bja10085. Samarakoon, Lalith P. 2024. “What Broke the Pearl of the Indian Ocean? The Causes of the Sri Lankan Economic Crisis and Its Policy Implications.” Journal of Financial Stability 70 (February):101213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2023.101213. 151 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2018. The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South. London: Duke University Press. https://doi.org/10.1215/9781478002000. Schwandt, Thomas. 2000. “Three Epistemological Stances for Qualita-Tive Inquiry: Interpretivism, Hermeneutics, and Social Construc-Tivism. Pages 189–214 in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, Ed-Itors. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks,California.” In Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, 189–214. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Schweinberger, Albert. 2014. “State Capitalism, Entrepreneurship, and Networks: China’s Rise to a Superpower.” Journal of Economic Issues 48 (1): 169–80. https://doi.org/10.2753/JEI0021-3624480108. Šebok, Filip. 2024. “China’s Political System: How Does the Communist Party Rule China?” In Contemporary China, edited by Kristina Kironska and Richard Turcsanyi, 1st ed., 1:73–88. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003350064-9. Shambaugh, David. 2007. “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy.” The China Journal (Canberra, A.C.T.) 57 (57): 25–58. https://doi.org/10.1086/tcj.57.20066240. Shen, Simon, and Wilson Chan. 2018. “A Comparative Study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan.” Humanities & Social Sciences Communications 4 (1): 32. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0077-9. 152 Sheng-Kai, Charles Chia. 2015. “Higher Education Scholarships as a Soft Power Tool : An Analysis of Its Role in the EU and Singapore.” EU Centre in Singapore, EUC working paper, . https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98673. Shirk, Susan L. 2022. Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190068516.001.0001. SLTDA. 2019. “Annual Tourism Statistical Report.” Colombo: Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority. https://www.sltda.gov.lk/storage/common_media/Tourist%20Board%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report%202018_Web784216427.pdf. Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Wiest. 2012. Social Movements in the World-System: The Politics of Crisis and Transformation. Book, Whole. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. https://go.exlibris.link/bwWb87sy. Springer, Kristen W., Brenda K. Parker, and Catherine Leviten-Reid. 2009. “Making Space for Graduate Student Parents: Practice and Politics.” Journal of Family Issues 30 (4): 435–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X08329293. Stake, Robert. 1994. “Case Studies.” In Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, 236–47. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 153 Stewart, Abigail J., Shelly Grabe, and Wang Zheng. 2024. “Women’s Movement Activism in Authoritarian States: Lessons from the Global Feminisms Project.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 49:385–409. Student Lanka. 2010. “External Degrees in Sri Lanka.” 2010. https://studentlanka.com/2010/02/26/external-degrees-in-sri-lanka/. Tang, Wenfang, and Benjamin Darr. 2012. “Chinese Nationalism and Its Political and Social Origins.” Journal of Contemporary China 21 (77): 811–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.684965. Tharmaseelan, N. 2007a. “Tertiary Education in Sri Lanka: Issues and Challenges.” Bulgarian journal of science and education policy 1 (1): 173–90. ———. 2007b. “Tertiary Education in Sri Lanka: Issues and Challenges.” Bulgarian journal of science and education policy 1 (1): 173–90. The State Council. 2015. “‘Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative.’” Government of China. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm. Thussu, Daya Kishan. 2013. “The Historical Context of India’s Soft Power.” In Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood, 45–71. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137027894_3. 154 Tisdell, Clem. 2009. “Economic Reform and Openness in China: China’s Development Policies in the Last 30 Years.” Economic Analysis and Policy 39 (2): 271–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(09)50021-5. Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, and Hazel V. Carby. 2015. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. 1;New; Book, Whole. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. https://go.exlibris.link/0PXGKk8Q. UGC. 2021. “Sri Lanka University Statistics 2021.” Colombo: University Grant Commission of Sri Lanka. https://www.ugc.ac.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2404%3As. Vaxevanidou, Maria. 2018. “Education as Public Diplomacy: How to Build an International Image in Education.” Journal of Media Critiques 4 (14): 55–70. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. “Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis.” Theory and Society 3 (4): 461–83. Warnapala, Yajni, and Karishma Silva. 2011. “Z-Score Demystified: A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan University Admission Policy.” Journal of Case Studies in Education 2. https://go.exlibris.link/tTR2JZF2. Weede, Erich. 2010. “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence.” International Interactions 36 (2): 206–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050621003785181. 155 Weerasinghe, I. M. S., and R. L. S. Fernando. 2018. “Critical Factors Affecting Students’ Satisfaction with Higher Education in Sri Lanka.” Quality Assurance in Education 26 (1): 115. https://doi.org/10.1108/QAE-04-2017-0014. Wende, Marijk van der. 1996. “Internationalizing the Curriculum in Higher Education: Report on a OECD/CERI Study.” Tertiary Education and Management 2 (2): 186–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/13583883.1996.9966900. Wijesinghe, Dimali, Lakshmi Ranwala, Sampath Siriwardena, Lalith Edirisinghe, and Veronica Kurukulaarachchi. 2023. “A Literature Review on Students University Choice and Satisfaction.” International Journal of Educational Administration and Policy Studies 15 (2): 71–87. https://doi.org/10.5897/IJEAPS2023.0753. Winter, Tim. 2021. “Geocultural Power: China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Geopolitics 26 (5): 1376–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1718656. ———. 2023. “Heritage Diplomacy; an Afterword.” International Journal of Cultural Policy 29 (1): 130–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2022.2141728. Wojciuk, Anna. 2018. “Higher Education as a Soft Power in International Relations.” In Handbook of Cultural Security, edited by Yasushi Watanabe. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786437747.00025. World Bank. 2023. “World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data Files.” World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN. 156 Wu, Hantian. 2019. “Three Dimensions of China’s ‘Outward-Oriented’ Higher Education Internationalization.” Higher Education 77 (1): 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-018-0262-1. Xia, Chengqi, Xinge Li, and Shixiong Cao. 2023. “Challenges for the Government-Controlled Higher Education System in China.” International Journal of Educational Development 97 (March):102721. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2022.102721. Xu, Cora Lingling, and Catherine Montgomery. 2019. “Educating China on the Move: A Typology of Contemporary Chinese Higher Education Mobilities.” Review of Education 7 (3): 598–627. https://doi.org/10.1002/rev3.3139. Yang, Rui. 2002. Third Delight: The Internationalization of Higher Education in China. 1st ed. Book, Whole. London;New York; Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315811154. Ye, Min. 2020. The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018. 1st ed. Book, Whole. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108855389. Yen, Yu-Fang, Jung-Feng Tseng, and Hsing-Kuo Wang. 2014. “Exploring the Mediating Role of Trust on the Relationship between Guanxi and Knowledge Sharing: A Social Network Perspective.” Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 52 (2): 173–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7941.2012.00034.x. 157 Yousif, Nadine. 2023. “Quebec to Raise University Fees and Mandate French for Out-of-Province Students.” BBC News, 30 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67706840. Yu, Nannan, Yueyan Dong, and Martin de Jong. 2022. “A Helping Hand from the Government? How Public Research Funding Affects Academic Output in Less-Prestigious Universities in China.” Research Policy 51 (10): 104591. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2022.104591. Yue, Liu. 2017. “Education Action Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative.” Ministry of Education of the People’s republic of China. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/30277.html. Zamorano, Mariano Martín. 2016. “Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture under the Soft Power Theory.” Culture Unbound 8 (2): 165–86. https://doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.1608165. Zhang, Kevin H. 2006. China as the World Factory. China as the World Factory. 1st ed. Vol. 64. Book, Whole. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203799529-26. Zhang, Zhiguo. 2018. “English-Medium Instruction Policies in China: Internationalisation of Higher Education.” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 39 (6): 542–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/01434632.2017.1404070. Zhangrun, Xu. 2020. “Viral Alarm: When Fury Overcomes Fear.” Journal of Democracy 31 (2): 5–23. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0033. 158 Zongze, Ruan. 2017. “Belt and Road Initiative： A New Frontier for Win-Win Cooperation.” China International Studies/ 中国国际问题研究：英文版 62 (4): 78–85.
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Interdisciplinary Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Geary, David, 1976-
Academic diplomacy along the Belt and Road Initiative : the case of China's soft power strategies in post-war Sri Lanka
Text